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The present translation of Aristotle's Politics is based on the well-known version of Ellis, in the revision of which the translation of Taylor, and the polished paraphrase of GilHes, have been consulted. The text of Bekker has been followed, and only departed from where the emendations of Goettling and others appeared preferable. Analyses of both the Po- litics and Economics have been prefixed, which, it is hoped, will be found of service to the student. The valuable In- troduction to the Politics by Dr. Gillies is reprinted entire, as giving, on the whole, the clearest general view of the subject. E. W. CONTENTS. !.iFE OF Aristotle (by Dr. Gillies) Introduction (by Dr. Gillies) Analysis of the Politics . Analysis of the Economics . xxxlii Ixxiis: POLITICS. BOOK I. Nature and end of a commonwealth. — Analysis thereof. — Monarchy the first form of government. — Domestic economy. — Slavery. — Accumula- tion of stock. — Riches, real and artificial, — Commerce. — Money. — Manufactures. — Monopolies. — Women. — Children. — Slaves. — Con- nexion between domestic and political economy , . 2 — 32 BOOK II. Plato's Republic. — Community of wives, children, and goods. — Nature and necessity of separate property. — Plato's books of laws examined. — Schemes for equalizing property. — Their futility. — Hippodamus. — His ideal republic. — Arguments in favour of political innovation. — Stronger arguments against it. — The Spartan government. — The Cretan. — The Carthaginian. — The Athenian. — Zaleucus. — Charondas. — Philolaus. — Diodes. — Phaleas. — Pittacus. — Androgamas . ^ 33 — 8.1 BOOK III. The citizen, how constituted. — Virtues of the man and of the citizen.— Their difference. — Different forms of government. — Their distinctive characters. — Pretensions of democracy — Of oligarchy — Of monarchy. Its five kinds — Arraigned — Defended . . 81 — 124 BOOK IV Governments — Their classification. — Democracy — Its four kinds.— Con- stitutions — One thing by law, another in fact. — Materials respec- tively fitted for different governments. — Mixed governments. — Tests of good government. — How governments may be improved. — Sleights by which the nobles deceive the people, and the people, the nobles. — Analysis of tJie sovereignty. — Constitution of its different branches — Agreeably to the different spirit of different governments 124— 1G6 CONTENTS. BOOK V. Causes of seditions. — Insolence and rapacity of men in power. — Secret combination of obscure factions, etc. — Particular causes in each form of government respectively. — How governments are to be preserved — By strengthening the middle ranks, etc. — Of laws relative to demo- cracy — Oligarchy — Monarchy— Tyranny . . 166 — 212 BOOK VI. Of republics of husbandmen — Of manufacturers and merchants. — Im- perfections of democracy — Oligarchy. — Military and naval force. — Branches of executive magistracy. — Magistrates for protecting com- merce and contracts. — Of police. — Of revenue. — Courts of record. — Controllers of public accounts.— Different orders of priests. — Superin- tendents of education and morals . . . 212 — 230 BOOK VII. Different views of national happiness. — Fair estimate of it. — The best com- monwealth. — Extent and nature of its territory. — Commerce. — Naval power. — Climate . — Constituent members. — H ealth. — M arriage . — Cliil - dren 231—^^0 BOOK VIII. Education. — Its different branches. — How far to be cultivated. — Granw mar. — Drawing. — Gymnastics. — Music. — Exercises adapted to different ages. — Doubts concerning music. — Its different kinds. — Purgation of the passions. — Conclusion . . . 270 — 286 ECONOMICS. BOOK I. Nature of the Economic science. — Civil society. — Conjugal and herile relations. — Domestic management . . . 289 — 303 BOOK II. Economy of foui kinds.— Contrivances for gaining money • 303 — 325 Appendix. Note on Politics, Book V . . . 325— LIFE OF ARISTOTLE, BY JOHN GILLIES, L.L.D. ARGUMENT. Aristotle's birth-place. — His education at Atarneus. — at Athens — His re- sidence with Hermeias.— Singular fortune of that prince. — Aristotle's residence at Lesbos — in Macedon. — Plan pursued in the education of Alexander. — Aristotle's residence in Athens. — Employment there. — Calumnies against him. — His retreat to Chalcis, and death. — His testa- ment — sayings. — Extraordinary fate of his works. — Published at Rome by Andronicus of Rhodes. — Their number and magnitude. It is my design in the present work to give a more distinct, and, I flatter myself, a juster view, than has yet been exhibit- ed, of the learning of an age, the most illustrious in history for great events and extraordinary revolutions, yet still more pre- eminent in speculation than it is renowned in action. A cen- tury before the reign of Alexander the Great, there sprang up and flourished in Greece a species of learning, or science, totally unlike to any thing before known in the world. This science was carried to its highest perfection by Aristotle : it decayed with the loss of his writings, and revived with their recovery. But the imperfect and corrupt state of those writ- ings rendered them peculiarly liable to be misinterpreted by ignorance, and misrepresented by envy ; his philosophy, there- fore, has been less frequently inculcated or explained, than disguised, perverted, and calumniated. It has not, certainly, since his own time, received any material improvement. To the philosophical works of Cicero, though that illustrious Ro- man professes to follow other guides, the world at large is more indebted for a familiar notion of several of Aristotle's most important doctrines, than to the labours of all his ocm- b 6 LIFE OP ARISTOTLE. nientators^ collectively. But how loose and feeble, and often how erroneous, is the Roman transcript, when compared with the energetic precision of the Greek original ! Yet the works of Cicero are known universally to the whole literary world, while those of Aristotle (vnth the exception of a few short and popular treatises) are allowed to moulder away in the dust of our libraries, and condemned to a treatment little less ignominious than that which, as we shall have occasion to re- late, befell them soon after their composition, when they were immured in a dungeon, and remained for near two centuries a prey to dampness and to worms. It is time once more to release them from their second unmerited captivity ; to revive, and, if possible, to brighten the well-earned fame of an author, sometimes as preposterously admired, as at others unaccount- ably neglected ; and whose fate with posterity is most sin- ^ All these commentators lived many centuries after Aristotle. They are Greek, Arabic, and Latin. The first be^an in the age of the Antonines, in Alexander Aphrodisiensis at Rome, and Ammonius Sacchus in Alex- andria ; they continued to flourish through the whole succession of Ro- man emperors, under the once revered names of Aspasius, Plotinus, Por- phyry, Proclus, the second Ammonius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. Aristotle was ardently studied, or rather superstitiously adored, by the Saracens, during upwards of four centuries of their proud domination, till the taking of Bagdat by the Tartars in 1258. The names of the /irabian commentators, Alfarabius, Avicenna, and Averroes, long re- sounded even in the schools of Europe. But the Aristotelian philosophy, or rather logic, had early assumed a Latin dress in the translation of Boethius Severinus, the last illustrious consul of Rome, in the beginning of the sixth century. x\fter a long interval of more than six hundred years, Latin translations and commentaries began to abound, through the industry of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and the succeeding scholastics ; and multiplied to such a pitch, that, towards the close of the sixteenth century, Patricius reckons twelve thousand commentators on different works of the Stagirite. (Discuss. Peripatet.) This vast and cold mass of Gothic and Saracenic dulness is now consigned to just ob- livion. But even to the best of Aristotle's commentators there are two unanswerable objections : first, they universally confound his solid sense with the fanciful visions of Plato, thus endeavouring to reconcile things totally incongruous : secondly, they ascribe to their great master innu- merable opinions which he did not hold, by making him continually dog- matize, where he only means to discuss. To the same objections those more modern writers are liable, who have drawn their knowledge of Aris- totle's philosophy from any other than the original fountain. HIS BXUrH-i'LACE, STAGIRA. gular in this, not that his authority should have been most respected in the ages least qualified to appreciate his merit, but that philosophers should have despised his name almost exactly in proportion as they adopted his opinions. The mul- tiplied proofs of this assertion, which I shall have occasion to produce in examining his works, will not^ it is presumed, ap- pear uninteresting to men of letters. Those who know some- thing of Aristotle, must naturally be desirous of knowing all that can be told ; and of seeing, comprised within a narrow compass, the life and writings of a man, whose intellectual magnitude ought to have preserved and shown him in his proper shape to the impartial eye of history, but whose pic- ture, beyond that of all other great characters, has been most miserably mangled. Aristotle, who flourished in Athens when Athens was the ornament of Greece, and Greece, under Alexander, the first country on earth, was born at Stagira towards the beginning of the 99th Olympiad, eighty-five years after the birth of Socrates,^ and three hundred and eighty-four before the birth of Christ. The city of Stagira ^ stood on the coast of Thrace, in a district called the Chalcidic region, and near to the innermost recess of the Strymonic Gulf.^ It was origin- ally built by the Andrians,^ afterwards enlarged by a colony ^ Socrates drank the hemlock, according to most authors, the first year of the 95th Olympiad; and, according to Diodorus Siculus, the first year of the 97th. Socrates therefore died at least eight years before Aristotle was born. The latter was one year older than Philip, and three years older than Demosthenes. Vid. Dionys. Halicarn. Epist. ad Ammseum. This chronology is clearly ascertained by various critics. See Bayle's Dictionary, article Aristotle." I know not therefore why Lord Mon- boddo and the late Mr. Harris (two modern writers who have paid great attention to Aristotle's works) should say, and frequently repeat, on no better authority than that of the Life of Aristotle ascribed to AmmoniujB, or Johannes Philoponus, that the Stagirite was three years a scholar of Socrates. 2 Strabo Excerpt, ex lib. vii. p. 331. He calls the place Stageinis. ^ Ptolemei Geograph. According to his division, Stagira was in tl'.e Amphaxetide district of Macedon. * Herodot. 1. vii. ch, 115 ; and Thucyd. 1. iv. ch. c. b 2 IV LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. from Euboean Chalcis,^ and long numbered among the Greek cities of Thrace, until the conquests of Philip of Macedon extended the name of his country far beyond the river Stry- mon, to the confines of Mount Rhodope.^ Stagira, as well as the neighbouring Greek cities, enjoyed the precarious dignity of independent government ; it was the ally of Athens in the Peloponnesian war, and, like other nominal allies, experienced the stern dominion of that tyrannical republic. It afterwards became subject to the city and commonwealth of Olynthus ; which, having subdued Stagira and the whole region of Chal- cidice, was itself besieged by Philip of Macedon ; and, with all its dependencies, reduced by the arms or arts of that politic prince, in the first year of the 108th Olympiad, and 348 years before the Christian era.^ That the resistance of Sta- gira was obstinate, may be inferred from the severity of its punishment ; the conqueror rased it to the ground.^ Aris- totle, who was then in his thirty-seventh year, had been re- moved from Stagira almost in his childhood ; and he appears not, in that long interval, to have ever resided in it, and even rarely to have visited it.^ But the misfortunes which fell on that city gave him an opportunity of showing such ardent af- fection for his birth-place, as is the indubitable proof of a feeling heart. Through his influence with Alexander the Great, Stagira was rebuilt ; ^ both its useful defences and its ornamental edifices were restored ; its wandering citizens were ^ Justin. 1. viii. c. 13. * Thence the frivolous dispute among modern biographers, whether Aristotle, who was really a Greek, ought to be deemed a Macedonian or a Thracian. See Stanley and Brucker's Lives of Aristotle. ^ Gillies* History of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. xxxv. * Plutarch, adversus Colot. p. 1126; and de Exil. p. 605. ^ Dionys. Halicarn. Epist. ad Ammaeum. Ammonius and Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. 6 Plin. Nat. Hist. 1. vii. c. 29 ; and Valer. Maxim. 1. v. c. 6. Plu- tarch prefers to all the pleasures of the Epicurean, the delights which Aristotle must have felt when he rebuilt his native city, and placed in their hereditary seats his expatriated countrymen. Plutarch, advers. Epicur. p. 1097. He ascribes the rebuilding of Stagira to Ariatotle'i jifluence with Philip. HIS BIRTH-PLACE, STAGIRA. V collected, and reinstated in their possessions; Aristotle him self regulated their government by wise laws ; and the Sta- girites instituted a festival to commemorate the generosity of Alexander, their admired sovereign, and the patriotism of Aristotle, their illustrious townsman.^ The city of Stagira indeed owes its celebrity wholly to Aristotle and his family ; and, if its name is still familiar to modern ears, this proceeds merely from its having communi- cated to our philosopher the appellation of Stagirite.^ His father, Nicomachus, who was the physician and friend ^ of Amyntas, king of Macedon, is said to have derived his descent, through a long line of medical ancestors, from -Ssculapius, the companion of the Argonauts, whose skill in the healing art had raised him to a seat among the gods.^ Nicomachus improved a branch of knowledge, which was the inheritance of his family, by writing six books on natural philosophy and medicine.^ To the same illustrious origin which distinguished Nicomachus, the testimony of one ancient biographer^ (but his only) traces up the blood of Phasstis, Aristotle's mother ; who^ whatever was her parentage, certainly acknowledged for her country^ the middle district of Euboea, which lies within twelve miles of the Attic coast. Aristotle was deprived of his parents in early youth ;^ yet it is an agreeable, and not altogether an unwarranted conjecture, that by his father, Ni- comachus, he was inspired with that ardent love for the study of nature, which made him long be regarded as her best and * Plutarch, advers. Colot. p. 1126; and Ammonius in Vit. Aristot. ' Strabo Excerp. ex lib. vii. p. 331. ' He was held by Amyntas, ev (^iXov xpft^. Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. * Lucian. Jupiter Traga^dus ; and Suidas in Nicomach. It is interest- ing to observe that Aristotle himself is fond of noticing physicians and their operations in his explanatory comparisons by way of illustration. ^ Idem ibid. ^ Ammon. Vit. Aristot. ^ Dionys. Halic. Epist. ad Ammaeum. ^ Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. The biography of Aristotle in the Die tionary of Greek and Roman Biography states that Aristotle lost his father in his seventeenth year, and that his mother seems to have died at aa earlier period. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. chosen interpreter ; ^ while from his mother, Phaestis, he first imbibed that pure and sweet Atticism which every where pervades his writings. Aristotle also inherited from his parents a large fortune ; and their early loss was supplied and compensated by the kind attentions of Proxenus, a citizen of Atarneus in Mysia, who received the young Stagirite into his family, and skilfully directed his education. These important obligations our philosopher, in whose character gratitude appears to have been a prominent feature, amply repaid to Nicanor the son of Proxenus, whom he adopted, educated, and enriched.^ At the age of seventeen,"^ the young Stagirite was attracted by the love of learning to Athens, and particularly by the desire of hearing Plato in the Academy, the best school of science as well as of morals then existing in the world ; and where the most assiduous student might find competitors worthy of ex- citing his emulation and sharpening his diligence. Plato early observed of him, that he required the rein rather than the spur.^ His industry in perusing and copying manuscripts was unexampled, and almost incredible ; he was named, by way of excellence, "the student or reader."^ Plato often called him the "soul of his school;"^ and, when Aristotle happened to be absent from his prelections, often complained that he spoke to a deaf audience.^ As the student advanced in years, his acuteness was as extraordinary in canvassing opinions, as his industry had been unrivalled in collecting them :^ his capacious mind embraced the whole circle of sci- ence ; and, notwithstanding his pertinacity in rejecting every principle or tenet which he could not on reflection approve, * ' ApKTTOTsXrjg rrjc (pvascog ypamiarivQ y}v. Anonym, apud Suid. in Aristot. Literally, " Nature's secretary." ^ Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. ^ Idem ibid. '* Dionys. Epist. ad Ammaeum. Diogen. Laert. ibid. ^ Idem ibid. ® Diogen. Laert. ibid. ^ Or rather, the mind or intellect, vovq rrjg diaTpiPrig. Idem ibii ® Philoponus de Eternit. Mund. advers. Pnclum, vi. 27. • Diogen. Laert. ubi supra. HIS LITERARY INDUSTRY. his very singular merit failed not to recommend him to the discerning admiration of Plato, with whom he continued to reside twenty years, even to his master's death ; alike careless of the honours of a court, to which the rank and connexions of his family might have opened to him the road in Macedon ; and indifferent to the glory of a name, which his great abilities might early have attained, by establishing a separate school, and founding a new sect in philosophy.^ At the same time that Aristotle applied so assiduously to the embellishment of his mind, he was not neglectful, we are told, of whatever might adorn his person. His figure was not advantageous ; he was of a short stature, his eyes were remarkably small, his limbs were disproportionably slender, and he lisped or stammered in his speech.'^ For his ungra- cious person Aristotle is said to have been anxious to com- pensate by the finery and elegance of his dress ; his mantle was splendid ; he wore rings of great value ; and he was fop- pish enough (such is the language of antiquity) to shave both his head and his face, while the other scholars of Plato kept their long hair and beards. To some learned men, the omis- sion of such particulars might appear unpardonable ; yet, in a life of Aristotle, such particulars are totally unworthy of be- ing told ; since his love for ostentatious finery (probably much exaggerated by his enemies) was in him merely an accessory, which neither altered his character, nor weakened that ardent passion for knowledge which reigned sole mistress of his soul. In men born for great intellectual achievements, this passion must, at some period of their lives, suppress and stifle every other ; and, while it continues to do so, their real happiness is probably at its highest pitch. The pursuit of science in- deed, not having any natural limitations, might be supposed to invigorate with manhood, to confirm itself through custom, * ovT€ ffxo\i]v rjyovfiBvog, ovrs id'iav TreiroujKojQ alptcnv. Dionys. Epist. ad Ammpeum. - Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. — Plutarch, de Discrim. Adulat. et Amic. p 53, says, '* that many imitated Aristotle's stuttering, as they did Alex- ander's wry neck." LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. and to opetate through life with unceasing or increasing energy. But this delightful progress is liable to be inter- rupted by other causes than the decline of health and the decay of curiosity ; for great exertions are not more certainly rewarded by celebrity, than celebrity is punished with envy, which will sometimes rankle in secret malice, and sometimes vent itself in open reproach ; wrongs will provoke resentment ; injuries will be offered and retorted ; and, a state of hostility being thus commenced, the philosopher, in defending his opi- nions and his fame, becomes a prey to the wretched anxieties incident to the vulgar scrambles of sordid interest and sense- less ambition. Of this melancholy remark, both the life and the death of Aristotle, as we shall see hereafter, will afford very forcible illustrations. Plato died in the first year of the 108th Olympiad, and 338 years before the Christian era. He was succeeded in the Academy by Speusippus, the son of his sister Potona ; a man far inferior to the Stagirite in abilities ; and however well he might be acquainted with the theory, not strongly confirmed in the practice, of moral virtue, since he was too often and too easily vanquished both by anger and pleasure.^ Aristotle appears not to have taken offence that, in the succession to his admired master, the strong claim of merit should have been sacrificed to the partialities of blood. In some of the latest of his writings, he speaks of Plato with a degree of re- spect approaching to reverence. Soon after that philosopher's decease, Aristotle wrote verses in his praise, and erected altars to his honour : ^ and the connexions which he himself had already formed with some of the most illustrious as well as the most extraordinary personages of his own or any age, might naturally inspire him with the design of leaving Athens, after he had lost the philosopher and friend whose fame had first drawn him thither, and whose instructive society had so long retained him in that celebrated city. One of the memorable characters with whom Aristotle • Diogen. Laert. in Speusipp. - Idem ; and Ammonius in AiietoU HIS RESIDENCE WITH HERMEIAS. iX maintained a close and uninterrupted correspondence, was Herrneias, styled, in the language of those days, tyrant of A.SSUS and Atarneus ; a man whose life forcibly illustrates the strange vicissitudes of fortune. Hermeias is called a slave and a eunuch ; ^ but he was a slave whose spirit was not to be broken, and a eunuch whose mind was not to be emasculated. Through the bounty of a wealthy patron, he had been enabled early to gratify his natural taste for philosophy ; and, having become a fellow-student with Aristotle at Athens, soon united with him in the bands of aifectionate esteem, which finally cemented into firm and unalterable friendship. Aristotle through life pursued the calm and secure paths of science, but Hermeias ventured to climb the dangerous heights of ambi- tion. His enterprising spirit, seconded by good fortune, raised him to the sovereignty of Assus and Atarneus, Greek cities of Mysia, the former situate in the district of Troas, the latter in that of -^olis, and both of them, like most Grecian colonies on the Asiatic coast, but loosely dependent on the Persian empire. Hermeias availed himself of the weakness or distance of the armies of Artaxerxes, and of the resources with which his own ambition was supplied by a wealthy banker, to gain possession of those strong-holds, with all their dependencies ; and endeavoured to justify this bold usurpation of the sceptre, by the manly firmness with which he held it.^ Upon the invitation of his royal friend, Aristotle, almost im- mediately after Plato's death, revisited Atarneus,^ the same city in which he had spent the happy years of his youth under the kind protection of Proxenus ; and might we indulge the conjecture that this worthy Atarnean still lived, our philoso- pher's voyage to ^olis must have been strongly recommended by his desire of repaying the favours of a man whom his gratitude always regarded as a second father, and of thus * 'Evvovxo(: ijv Kal dovXog i]pxBv 'Epfuiag. His master's name waa Kubulus, a prince and philosopher of Bithynia. Suidas. 5 Diodor. Sicul 1. xvi. sect. 122. • Dionys. Epist. ad Ammeeuni. 5t LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. propping, by his friendly aid, the declining age of his early guardian. Aristotle found at Atarneus the wish of Plato realized ; he beheld, in his friend Hermeias, philosophy seated on a throne. In that city he resided near three years, enjoying the inex- pressible happiness of seeing his enlightened political maxims illustrated in the virtuous reign of his fellow-student and sove- reign. But, to render his condition enviable, an essential requi- site was wanting, namely, that of security. Artaxerxes, whose success against the rebels in Egypt had exceeded his most san- guine hopes, could no longer brook the dismemberment of the fair coast of Mysia, through the usurpation of a slave and a eunuch. Mentor, ^ a Greek, and kinsman of Memnon the Rhodian, a general so famous in the Persian annals, had sig- nalized his zeal and valour in the Egyptian war. He was one of those crafty and unprincipled Greeks, whom the am- bitious hopes of raising a splendid fortune often drew to a standard naturally hostile to their country ; and his recent merit with Artaxerxes recommended him as the fittest instru- •ment to be employed in chastising the Mysian usurper. This employment he did not decline, although the man whom he was commissioned to destroy had formerly been numbered among his friends.^ Mentor marched with a powerful army to the western coast. He might have ettected his purpose by open force ; but to accomplish it by stratagem, was both more easy in itself, and more suitable to his character. He had been connected with Hermeias by the sacred ties of hospi- * Aristotle himself brands with infamy this successful knave, by con- trasting his profligate dexterity with the real virtue of prudence. 'AXXd dtLvoQ fisv Kal 6 ^avXog Xsy&raL, etc. " A scoundrel may be clever ; for example, Mentor, who seemed to be very clever, but surely was not pru- dent ; for it belongs to prudence to desire and prefer only the best ends, and to carry such only into execution ; but cleverness implies barely that fertility in resource, and dexterity in execution, by which any purposes, whether good or bad, may be fitly and speedily accomplished." Magn. Moral. 1. i. c. 25, p. 171. Diodor. Sicul. 1. xvi. sect. 122. HERMEIAS DESTROYED BY MENTOR. tality ; the sanctity of this connexion was revered by the greatest profligates of antiquity ; but the impious Mentor knew no religion but obedience to his master's commands. He employed his former intimacy with Hermeias as the means of decoying that unwary prince to an interview : Mentor seized his person, and sent him privately to Upper Asia, where, by order of Artaxerxes, he was hanged as a traitor.^ The cruel artifices of Mentor ended not with this tragedy. Having possessed himself of the ring which the unfortunate Hermeias usually employed as his signet, he sealed with it his own despatches, and immediately sent them to the cities that acknowledged the sovereignty of a man, whose mild exercise of power tended, in the minds of his subjects, to justify the irregular means by which he had acquired it. In these de- spatches Mentor signified that, through his own intercession, Hermeias had obtained peace and pardon from the great king. The magistrates of the revolted cities easily gave credit to intelligence most agreeable to their wishes ; they opened their gates without suspicion to Mentor's soldiers^ who instantly made themselves masters both of those Mysian strong-holds, which might have made a long and vigorous re- sistance to the Persian arms, and of the powerful garrisons by which they were defended.^ One further deception crowned the successful perfidy of Mentor. He affected to treat the conquered places with unexampled moderation. He was par- ticularly careful to keep in their offices the same collectors of revenues and intendants who had been employed by Her- meias. Those officers, when they w^ere first apprized of the danger which threatened their master, concealed their trea- sures under ground, or deposited them with their friends ; but when they found themselves treated with so much unex- pected generosity by the invader, they resumed their wonted ' Diodor. ubi supra. Helladius apud Phot. Biblioth. p. Polyaon. Stratag. vi. 48. • Diodor. ubi supra. xii LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. confidence, and conveyed back into their own coffers their long accumulated wealth ; of which circumstance Mentor was no sooner informed by his emissaries, than he seized both the effects and the persons of those too credulous collectors.* The veil of moderation which Mentor's policy had assumed in his first transactions at Atarneus, enabled Aristotle to avoid the punishment which too naturally fell on the ambi- tion of his friend. By a seasonable flight he escaped to Mity- lene m the isle of Lesbos, in company with Pythias, the kinswoman and adopted heiress of the king of Assus and Atarneus, but now miserably fallen from the lofty expecta- tions in which her youth had been educated. But this sad reverse of fortune only endeared her the more to Aristotle, who married the fair companion of his flight in his thirty-seventh year ; ^ which is precisely that age pointed out by himself as the fittest, on the male side, for entering into wedlock.^ Py- thias died shortly afterwards, leaving an infant daughter, whom Aristotle named after a wife tenderly beloved, and who repaid his affection with the most tender sensibility. It was her last request that, when Aristotle should die, her own bones might be disinterred, and carefully enclosed within the monument of her admired husband.^ The Stagirite passed but a short time in the soft island of Lesbos, in the tender indulgence either of love or of melan- choly. During his residence in Athens, he had strengthened his hereditary friendship with Philip of Macedon, a prince one year younger than himself, who, having lived from the age of fifteen to that of two-and-twenty in Thebes and the neighbouring cities, ascended the throne of his ancestors in the twenty-third year of his age. The busy scenes of war and negotiation in which Philip was immediately after his * We learn this particular, which is necessary to explain what follows in the text, from Aristotle himself, in his curious treatise De Cura Rei familiaris, p. 608. * Comp. Dionys. Epist. ad Ammae im ; et Diogen. Laert. in Aristot, ' P)Litic. 1. vii. c. 16. * Diogen. Laert. ubi supra. HE IS INVITED TO MACEDON. xiii cccftssion engaged by necessity, and in which he continued to be involved during his whole reign by ambition, seem never to have interrupted his correspondence with the friends of his youth ; with those who either possessed his affection, or who merited his admiration. ^ In the fifth year of his reign his son Alexander was born ; an event which he notified to Aristotle in terms implying much previous communication between them ; " Know that a son is born to us. We thank the gods for their gift, but especially for bestowing it at the time when Aristotle lives ; assuring ourselves that, educated by you, he will be worthy of us, and worthy of inheriting our kingdom." 2 If this letter was written at the a^ra of Alexan- der's birth, it must have found Aristotle at Athens in his twenty-ninth year, still a diligent student in the school of Plato. But it is certain that the Stagirite did not assume the office of preceptor to the son of Philip till fourteen years afterwards, when the opening character of this young prince seemed as greatly to merit, as peculiarly to require, the as- sistance of so able an instructor.-^ In the second year of the 109th Olympiad, Aristotle, probably in consequence of a new invitation from Philip, sailed from the isle of Lesbos, in which he had resided near two years, escaped the dangers of the Athenian fleet, which then carried on war against Macedon, and arrived at the court of Pella,^ to undertake one of the few employments not unworthy of an author qualified to in- struct and benefit the latest ages of the world. In the education of Alexander, the Stagirite spent near * Gillies' History of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 33. 2 Aulus Gellius, 1. ix. c. 3. 3 The chronology is clearly ascertained by Dionysius of Halicarnassus's letter to Ammaeus ; yet the accurate Quintilian, because it served to en- force his argument, says, An Philippus, Macedonum rex,'' etc. Would Philip, king of the Macedonians, have thought fit that Aristotle, the greatest philosopher of the age, should have been employed in teaching his son Alexander the first rudiments of learning, or would Aristotle himself have accepted of such an office, had he not believed it of the ut- most importance to the success of our future studies, that their first foundation should be laid by a teacher of consummate skill ? " QuintU* Instit. 1. i. c. 1 . * Dionys. Halicarn. ubi supra. LIFE OF AKISTOTLE. eight years ;^ during which long period, in an office of muclh delicacy, he enjoyed the rare advantage of giving the highest satisfaction to his employers, while he excited the warmest gratitude in his pupil.^ The temper of Alexander, prone to every generous affection, loved and esteemed many ; but Aristotle is the only one of his friends whose superior genius he appears unceasingly to have viewed with undiminished rdmiration, and whom he seems to have treated through life with uniform and unalterable respect. By Philip and his proud queen Olympias, our philosopher was honoured with every mark of distinction which greatness can bestow on illustrious merit. Philip placed his statue near to his own : he was admitted to the councils of his sovereign, where his advice was often useful, always honourable ; and where his kind intercession benefited many individuals, and many com- munities.^ On one occasion the Athenians rewarded his good s?ervices, by erecting his statue in the citadel ; ^ and his letters, both to Philip and to Alexander, attested his unremitting ex- ertions in the cause of his friends and of the public, as well as his manly freedom in admonishing kings of their duty.^ But the ruling passions of Philip and Alexander, the interested policy of the one, and the lofty ambition of the other, were too strong and too ungovernable to be restrained by the power of reason, speaking through the voice of their admired philosopher. The ambition of Alexander had early taken root ; and the peculiarities of his character had displayed * The author of the very able Life of Aristotle in the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, already quoted, says that "Aristotle spent seven years in Macedonia, but Alexander enjoyed his instruction without interruption for only four years." But the two statements are easily re- concilable ; for he states below that even after the beginning of Alex- ander's regency, Aristotle continued to be the young prince's instructor, but that he probably " confined his instruction to advice and suggestion ; which may possibly have been carried on by means of epistolary corre- spondence." ^ Plutarch, in Alexand. torn. i. p. 668 ; an.d advers. Colot. tom. ii. p. 1126. ^ Ammonius, Vit. Aristot. * Pausanias Eliac. ^ Ammonius, ibid. See also the fragments still remaining in Dl\ Vailc's edition, p. 1102, et seq. mS EDUCATION OF ALEXANDER. XV themselves, in a very public and very important transaction, which happened several months before the Stagirite arrived at the court of Pella. During Philip's lUyrian expedition, Macedon was honoured with an embassy from the great king. In the absence of his father, Alexander, at that time scarcely fourteen years old, received the ambassadors ; and his conversation with those illustrious strangers, at a period in history when the public conferences of great personages consisted not merely in words of ceremony, afforded a just subject of praise and wonder. Instead of admiring their ex- ternal appearance, or asking them such superficial questions as corresponded with the unripeness of his years, he inquired into the nature of the Persian government ; the character of Ochus, who then reigned ; the strength and composition of his armies ; the distance of his place of residence from the western coast; the state of the intermediate country, and particularly of the high roads leading to the great capitals of Susa and Babylon.^ To his premature love of aggrandize- ment, Alexander already added singular dexterity and unex- ampled boldness in his exercises, particularly in horsemanship ; the most fervid affections, invincible courage, and unbending dignity.^ In training such a youth, the Stagirite had a rich field to cultivate ; but he could only hope to give a new direction to passions, which it was too late to moderate or control. In his treatise on Politics, he has carefully delineated the plan of education best adapted to persons of the highest rank in society ; and in performing the task assigned to him by Philip, this plan was to be skilfully modified, by adjusting it to the peculiar circumstances and extraordinary character of his pupil. Alexander's loftiness could not be conquered, but it might be made to combat on the side of virtue : if he was angry, it was proved to him that anger was the effect of in- i suit, and the mark of inferiority.^ His love for military glory, * Plutarch, in Alexand. ^ idem ibid. ^ 3 ^lian. Var, Hist. 1. xii. c. 54. xvi LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. which, while it is the idol of the multitude, will always be the passion of the great, could neither be restrained nor moderated ; but, to rival this tyrant of the breast, still more exalted affections were inspired, which rendered Alexander as much superior to conqueror is conquerors deem them- selves superior to the lowest of the vulgar. Agreeably to a maxim inculcated in that book of Aristotle's Politics which relates to education, the two years immediately following puberty constitute that important period of life, which is peculiarly adapted for improving and strengthening the bodily frame, and for acquiring that corporeal vigour which is one mainspring of mental energy. During this interesting period of youth, with the proper management of which the future happiness of the whole of life is so intimately connected, Aristotle observes that the intellectual powers ought indeed to be kept in play, but not too strenuously exercised, since powerful exertions of the mind and body cannot be made at once, nor the habits of making them be simultaneously ac- quired. In conformity with this principle, Alexander was encouraged to proceed with alacrity in his exercises, till he acquired in them unrivalled proficiency ; after which, the whole bent of his mind was directed to the most profound principles of science. It is the opinion of many, that a slight tincture of learning is sufficient for accomplishing a prince. Both Philip and Aristotle thought otherwise ; and the ardent curiosity of Alexander himself was not to be satisfied with such superficial and meagre instructions as have been sometimes triumphantly published for the use of persons destined to reign. The young Macedonian's mind was therefore to be sharpened by whatever was most nice in distinction, and to be exalted by whatever was most lofty in speculation ; * that his faculties, by expanding and invigorating amidst objects of the highest intellection, might thereby be rendered capable of compre- hending ordinary matters the more readily and the more * Plutarch, in Alexand. fflS AOP.OAfIC PHILOSOPHY. xvii perfectly.^ This recondite philosophy, which was delivered by the Stagirite, first to his royal pupil, and afterwards to his hearers in the Lyceum, received the epithet of acroatic;^ to distinguish those parts of his lectures which were confined to a select audience, from other parts called exoteric, be- cause delivered to the public at large. It has been sup- posed that, in those two kinds of lectures, the Stagirite main- tained contradictory doctrines on the subjects of religion and morality. But the fact is far otherwise : his practical tenets were uniformly the same in both ; but his exoteric or popular treatises nearly resembled the philosophical dialogues of Plato or Cicero ; whereas his acroatic writings (which will be ex- plained in the following chapter) contained, in a concise, energetic style peculiar to himself, those deep and broad prin- ciples on which all solid science is built, and, independently of which, the most operose reasonings, and the most intricate com- binations, are but matters of coarse mechanical practice.^ The sublimity of this abstract and recondite philosophy admirably * Aristot. de Anima, 1. iii. c. 5, 6, and Ethic. Nicom. 1. x. c. 7 and 8. * This diWsion of Aristotle's works into acroatic and exoteric, has given rise to a variety of opinions and disputes ; which all have their source in the different accounts given by Plutarch and Aulus Gellius, on one hand ; and by Strabo, Cicero, and Ammonius, on the other. The former writers (Plutarch, in Alexand. ; and Aulus Gellius, 1. xx. c. 4,) maintain that the acroatic, or, as they call them, the acroamatic works, differed from the exoteric in the nature of their subjects, which consisted in natural philosophy and logic ; whereas the subjects of the exoteric were rhetoric, ethics, and politics. But the opinions of both Plutarch and Gellius (for they do not entirely coincide) are refuted by Aristotle's references, as we shall see hereafter, from his Ethical to his exoteric works. The latter class of writers (Strabo 1. xiii. p. 608; Cicero ad Attic, xiii. 19; and Ammonius Herm. ad Cateegor. Aristot.) maintain, that the acroatic works were distinguished from the exoteric, not by the difference of the subjects, but by the different manner of treating them ; the former being discourses, the latter dialogues. * 8implicius and Philoponus allow other writings besides the dialogue* to ha"N e been exoteric, as historical disquisitions, and whatever else did not require for understanding them intense thought in the reader. Simplicius says that Aristotle was purposely obscure in his acroatic writ- ings : " ut segniores ab eorum studio repellerit et dehortaretur.*' Simplic. ad Auscult. Physic, fol. ii. This would have have been a very unworthy motive in the Stagirite : but the truth is, that the obscurity of Aristotle's works pro<)eeds from a corrupt text. When tLe text is pure, his writini;* C xviii LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. accorded with the loftiness of Alexander's mind ; and ho^v highly he continued to prize it, amidst the tumultuary occupa- tions of war and government, appears from the following letter, written soon after the battle of Gaugamela, and while he was yet in pursuit of Darius: "Alexander, wishing all happiness to Aristotle. You have not done right in publish- ing your acroatic works. Wherein shall we be distinguished above others, if the learning, in which we were instructed, be communicated to the public. I would rather surpass other men in knov/ledge than in power. Farewell."^ Aristotle, not considering this letter as merely complimental, answered it as follows : " You wrote to me concerning my acroatic works, that they ought not to have been published. Know that in one sense this still is the case, since they can be fully under- stood by those only who have heard my lectures." ^ Of those much valued writings, the theological part, if at all published, was probably most involved in a sublime obscurity. To have maintained, in plain and popular language, the unity and perfections of the Deity, must have excited against the Stagirite an earlier religious persecution than that which really overtook him. Yet in this pure theology Alexander was carefully instructed ; as his preceptor reminded him in the midst of his unexampled victories and unbounded con- quests, concluding a letter with this memorable admonition ; that " those who entertain just notions of the Deity are better entitled to be high-minded, than those who subdue kingdoms."^ Aristotle's love of philosophy did not, like that of Plato, set him at variance with poetry. He frequently cites the poets, particularly Homer ; and he prepared for his pupil a correct copy of the Iliad, which that admirer of kindred heroes always carried with him in a casket, whencg this transcript are as easily intelligible, as a mere syllabus of lectures on most abstruse subjects can well be rendered. ^ Aulus Gellius, 1. xx. c. 5. - Idem ibid. If these letters be ascribed to their right authors, they prove in what light Aristotle regarded his acroatic works-; he considered them merely as text-books. » Piutarck de Tranquillitate Animi, p. 474 HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO ALEXANDER. xix was called " the Iliad of the Casket." ^ The Stagirite was not only the best critic in poetry, but himself a poet of the first eminence. Few of his verses indeed have reached modern times ; but the few which remain prove him worthy of sounding the lyre of Pindar ;^ and it is not the least sin- gularity attending this extraordinary man, that with the nicest and most suitable powers of discrimination and analysis, he united a vigorous and rich vein of poetic fancy. Aristotle carefully instructed his pupil in ethics and politics. He wrote to him, long afterwards, a treatise on government ; and exhorted him to adjust the measure of his authority to the various character of his subjects ; agreeably to a doctrine which he frequently maintains in his political works, that dif - ferent nations require different modes of government, respect- ively adapted to their various turns of mind, and different habits of thinking.^ From the ethical writings of Aristotle which still remain, and which are the most practically useful of any that pagan antiquity can boast, it is easy to detect that wicked calumny of his enemies, " that, for sordid and selfish purposes, he accommodated the tenets of his philosophy to the base morals of courts."'* It maybe safely affirmed, that if Alexander is distinguished above other princes for the love of knowledge-^ and virtue, he w^as chiefly indebted for this ad- vantage to his preceptor : the seeds of his haughtiness and ambition were sown before Aristotle w^as called to direct his * Plutarch, in Alexand. vol i. p. 688. ^ Menag. Observat. in Diogen. Laert. 1. v. p. 189. 2 Plutarch, in Alexand. * This absurdity is brought forward and insisted on by Brucker, Hist. Philosoph. vol. i. p. 797. Nothing can be more erroneous or more un- intelligible than Brucker's account of Aristotle's philosophy. 1 have heard it said in his own country, that this laborious German did not un- derstand Greek. ^ See the proofs of this in Plutarch, p. 6G8. Alexander spared the house of Pindar, when he sacked Thebes ; and the town of Eressus in Lesbos, in his war with the Persians, because it was the birth-place o^ Theophrastus and Phanias, Aristotle's disciples. In the midst of his ex pedition, he wrote to Athens for the works of the tragic poets, with lli© dithyrambics of Telestua and Philoxenus, and the history of PhilisitUii. c 2 XX LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. education ; his excellencies therefore may be ascribed to our philosopher ; ^ his imperfections to himself, to Philip, above all to the intoxicating effects of unbounded prosperity. This is the language of antiquity, and even of those writers who are the least partial to the fame of the Stagirite. After the most intimate communication during the space of eight years,^ the pupil and the preceptor separated for ever, to pursue, in a career of almost equal length, the most oppo- site paths to the same immortal renown ; the one by arms, the other by philosophy ; the one by gratifying the most immo- derate lust of power, the other by teaching to despise this and all similar gratifications. During his eastern triumphs, ter- minated in the course of ten years by his premature death, Alexander (as we shall have occasion to relate) gave many illustrious proofs of gratitude to the virtuous director of his youth. One incident, and one only, seems to have occasioned some disgust between them. At leaving the court of Pella, Aristotle recommended, as worthy of accompanying Alex- ander in his Persian expedition, his own kinsman Callisthenes, an Olynthian ; a learned and certainly an honest man, but of a morose, unaccommodating temper, pertinaciously attached to the old system of republicanism, which the father of Alex- ander had overturned in Greece ; equally daring and inflexi- ble in his purposes, and unseasonably bold in his speech.^ Aristotle himself perceived and lamented his faults, and ad- monished him in a line of Homer, " that his unbridled tongue might occasion his early death." ^ The prophecy was fulfilled. Callisthenes, not reflecting that "he who has once conde- scended" (in the words of Arrian) "to be the attendant of a king, ought never to be wanting in due deference to his will," rudely and outrageously opposed Alexander's resolution of ' *Api(TroTs\rjQTa ^Eovra (TVfxISovXsviJV 4X£^av^py TroXXoTf w^gXi/iOfjyv, iElian. Var. Hist. I. xii. c. 54. ^ Dionys. Halicarn., and Dio^en. Laert. ubi supra. See also note above, p. xiv. 3 Arrian. Exped. Alexand. 1. iv. c. 8. * 'QKVfiopog 3rj fioi Hkoq laatai di ayoptvtig. II. xviii. 95. PLAN OF HIS LIFE IN ATHENS. Xxi exacting the same marks of homage from the Greeks which were cheerfully paid to him by the Persians.^ The manner of Callisthenes's punishment and death is related more vari- ously ^ than almost any historical event of such public noto- riety ; but most writers concur in opinion, that he met with the just reward of his rashness and arrogance. This trans- action, it is asserted, much estranged Alexander from his an- cient preceptor. The assertion however is not accompanied with any solid proof ;^ and the absurd calumny, that Aris- totle not only regarded this pretended displeasure as an injury, but even proceeded to the wickedness of joining in a con- spiracy against Alexander's life, is warranted by nothing in history, but a hearsay preserved in Plutarch,"* and the affected credit given to the monstrous report by the monster Caracalla, for the unworthy purpose of justifying his own violence in destroying the schools of the Aristotelian philosophers in Alexandria, the burning their books, and depriving them of all those privileges and revenues which they enjoyed through the munificence of the Ptolemies, Alexander's Egyptian successors.^ Having taken leave of the Macedonian capital, Aristotle returned to his beloved Athens ; where he spent thirteen ^ years, almost the whole remainder of his life, instructing his disciples, and improving the various branches of his philoso- phy. His acroatic lectures were given in £he morning to those who were his regular pupils.*^ A considerable part of * Arrian. ubi supra. * By Arrian, Curtius, Justin, Diogenes Laertius, Philostratus, and Suidas. ^ Alexander's resentment is inferred from a vague and hasty expression in a letter to Antipater ; T6v (ro(piffTrjv kyuj KoXdau), Kal tovq iKTrkfi- wovTag avTov — I will punish the sophist (meaning Callisthenes) and those who sent him.'' Plutarch, in Alexand. p. 696. Alexander, it is true, sent presents to Xenocrates ; but so did Antipater, who always remained Aristotle's sincere and confidential friend. * Those who say that Aristotle advised Antipater to destroy Alexan- der by poison, cite for their authority a certain Agnothemis, who heard it from king Antigonus." Plut. in Alexand. p. 707. * Dion, ir Caracall. ® Dionys. Epist. ad Ammgeum. * Aulus Gellius. xx. c. 5 Xxli LIFE OF A-^iSTOTLE. them is still preserved in his works, which form an abstract or syllabus of treatises on the most important branches of philosophy. His exoteric discourses were held after supper with occasional visitors, and formed the amusement of his evening walks ; ^ for he thought " exercise peculiarly useful after table for animating and invigorating the natural heat and strength, which the too rapid succession of sleep to food seem fitted to relax and encumber.^ Before his arrival at Athens, Speusippus was dead ; and Xenocrates, whose dull gravity and rigid austerity a man of Aristotle's character could not much admire, had taken possession of the Academy.* The Stagirite, therefore, settled in a gymnasium in the suburbs, well shaded with trees, near to which the soldiers used to ex- ercise, and adorned by the temple of Lycian Apollo, from whose peripaton^ or walk, Aristotle and his followers were called Peripatetics."^ It is reported that he opened his school, observing, " That it would be shameful for himself to be si- lent while Xenocrates publicly taught."^ Aristotle is not likely to have uttered such a presumptuous boast ; but if it was really made, even this arrogant speech was certainly very fully justified by the fame which the Lyceum speedily ac- quired, which the Stagirite himself maintained unimpaired through life, and which was ably supported by his disciple and successor Theophrastus. Such is the genuine history of Aristotle's life, in the most important passages of which all the ancient writers,^ wlio * Aulus Gellius, 1. xx. c. 5. 2 Plutarch. Conjug. Precept, p. 133. ^ Diogen. Laert. in Xenocrat. * Menagius ad Diogen. Laert. 1. v. sect. 2. * Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. But Cicero, Quintilian, and Dionysius Halicarn. read " Isocrates " instead of "Xenocrates." The reading in the text is the more probable, for Isocrates and Aristotle, following very different pursuits, were not naturally rivals ; besides, the former is said to have died soon after the battle of Chjerona^a in extreme old age, and Aristotle did not return to Athens till three years after that decisive en- gagement. Compare my Life of Isocrates, and the History of Ancient (ireece, vol. iv. c. 33. « Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Diogenes Laertius, and Ammonius: the ancient Latin translation cf this last, first published by Nunnesius, CALUMNIES a«;ainst HIM. xxiii have expressly treated his biography, unitedxy concur. By arranging the subject, therefore, according to our present method, both my own labour will be abridged, and the reader's time will be saved ; for the calumnies against Aristotle will be no sooner mentioned than they will refute themselves, and they could not pass unnoticed, because they are perpetuated in the sarcasms of Lucian,^ and the lying whispers of Athp-- naeus,^ which have been too often mistaken, even by the learned, for true history. The absurd reports that Aristotle first served in the army, that he there dissipated his fortune by low profligacy, and then followed for bread the trade of an apothecary,^ may be confidently rejected by those who know, on unquestionable authority, that he became, at the early age of seventeen, a diligent student in the Academy at Athens, where he remained during the long period of twenty years. The reader who has seen the testimonies of his gratitude to Plato, will not easily be persuaded that he could treat this revered master with the grossest brutality;^ and let him who reads and meditates on the Ethics to Nicomachus ask his own heart, as well as under- standing, whether it is likely that the author of such a treatise should, instead of restraining and correcting, have flattered^ and fomented the vices of Alexander, Instead of further ex- amining these wild fictions, which stand in direct contradiction (Helmestadij, 1767,) contains some additional circumstances, but thoje (^f little value, and of doubtful authority. ' Lucian treats both Aristotle and his pupil with equal injustice. Vid. Dialog. Diogen. et Alexand. et Alexand. e< Philip. 2 Athenaeus Deipnos. 1. viii. p. 354. ^ Athenaeus ubi supra, and Aristocles apud Rusebium. Their report rests on a supposititious letter of Epicurus on Study, and the assertion (*f Timseus of Tauromenon in Sicily ; an author nicknamed Epitimceus, the Detractor. Diodorus Siculus, 1. v. c. 1. Athenaeus, 1. vi. p. 272. * 'ApKTTOTsXrjg rjfiag oTrtXdicTLcre — Aristotle has kicked at us;" a strong metaphor. Diogenes Laert. 1. v. sect. 2. ^^lian, Var. Histor. 1. iii. c. 19, ascribes both to Phto and to Aristotle a behaviour totally incon- sistent with every thing tliat we know of their characters. Comp. ^lian, Var. Hist. 1. iv. c. 19. Photius, Biblioth. c 279. Augustin. de Civitate Dei, 1. viii. c. 12. Such contradictory reports mutually destroy each other, ^ Lucian. Dial. Diogen. et Alexand. xxiv LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. to the matters of fact above related, it is of more importance to inquire whence such improbable tales could have originated ; especially as this inquiry will bring us to the events which immediately preceded our philosopher's death. From innumerable passages in the moral and political works of which we have presumed to offer the translation to the public, it will appear that Aristotle regarded with equal con- tempt vain pretenders to real science, and real professors of sciences which he deemed vain and frivolous. His theologi- cal opinions, also, were far too refined for the grossness of paganism. He fought only for truth, and was careless of the obstacles which stood in his way to attaining it, whether they were found in the errors of philosophers, or in the prejudices of the vulgar. Such a man, in such a city as Athens, where, since the days of Socrates, the learned taught publicly and conversed freely with all descriptions of persons, could not fail to have many rivals and many enemies. Sophists and sciolists, soothsayers and satirists, and that worst of banes satirical historians,^ heaped obloquy on a cliaracter, the orna- ment of his own age, and destined to be the great instructor of posterity. But the name of Alexander, which then filled the world, was duly respected, even in the turbulent demo- cracy of Athens ; and it was not till the year following the death of that incomparable prince, that the rancorous malig- nity, which had been long suppressed, burst forth against Aristotle with irresistible violence. He was accused of ir- religion (cKTejieiag) before the Areopagus by the hierophant Eurymedon, abetted by Demophilus^ a man of weight in the republic ; and both of them were instigated to this cruel prosecution by our philosopher's declared enemies.^ The * Aristocles (apud Eusebium) says, that Aristotle was attacked by a host of writers, " whose books and memories have perished more com- pletely than their bodies." Even his fellow-student, Aristoxenus, who had treated him most respectfully while he lived, heaped t.he most illiberal reproaches on his memory, because he preferred to himself Theophrastus for his successor. Suidas in Aristoxen. and Aristocles apud Eusebium. ' Diogen. Laert. 1. v. sect. HIS ACCUSATION AT ATHENS. XXV heads of the accusation were, " that Aristotle had commemo- rated the virtues both of his wife Pythias and of his friend Hermeias, with such ceremonies and honours as the piety of Athens justly reserved for the jnajesty of the gods." To Hermeias, indeed, he erected a statue at Delphi ; he also wrotft an ode in his praise. Both the inscription and the ode have come down to modern times ; the former simply relating "the unworthy and treacherous death of Hermeias ; " and the latter " extolling virtue above all earthly possessions ; and especially that generous patriotism, for the sake of which the native of Atarneus, rivalling the merit of Hercules and Achilles, had willingly relinquished the light of the sun ; whose fame there- fore would never be forgotten by the Muses, daughters of memory ; and as often as it was sung would redound to the glory of Hospitable Jove, and the honour of firm friendship." * From the frivolousness of the accusation respecting Hermeias, which was considered as the chief article of the impeachment, we may warrantably conjecture that the reproach of worship- ping Pythias with honours due to Eleusinian Ceres, was al- together groundless : but in a philosopher, whose intellectual rather than his moral virtues have been the object of panegy- ric, we may remark with pleasure both the strength of his friendship, and the sincere tenderness of his love, since both affections must have been expressed with an amiable enthu- siasm, to enable even the malice of his enemies to interpret them into the crime of idolatry. It must not be dissembled that the accusation, and conse- quent condemnation, of Aristotle by the Areopagus, has been ascribed to a different cause from that above assigned, and re- ferred merely to the impiety of his tenets. He is said by those who have carelessly examined his works, to have de- nied a Providence, and thence to have inferred the inef- icacy of prayers and sacrifices : doctrines, it is observed, which ' Laertius in Aristot. Athenteus, xv. p. 697. xxvi LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. could not bat enrage the priesthood, as totally subversive of its functions, establishments, and revenues.^ But never was any accusation urged more falsely or more ignorantly. Aris- totle, as it will be shown hereafter, enumerates the priesthood among the functions or offices essentially requisite to the ex- istence of every community. In writing to Alexander he says, that those are not entitled to be high-minded who con- quer kingdoms, but rather those who have learned to form just notions of the gods ; ^ and in his life, as well as in his work^*, he uniformly showed his veneration for religion in general, by treating with great tenderness,^ even that distorted image of it reflected from the puerile superstitions of his country.'* He is said to have written his own defence,^ and to have inveighed, in a strong metaphor, against the increasing dege- neracy of the Athenians.^ His discourse, of which the bold- ness would only have inflamed the blind zeal of his weak or wicked judges, was not delivered in court : since he escaped his trial by seasonably quitting Athens for Chalcis in Euboea, saying, in allusion to the death of Socrates, that he was un- willing to afford the Athenians a second opportunity of sin- ning against philosophy.'^ He survived his retreat to the shores of the Euripus scarcely a twelvemonth ; persecution and banishment having probably shortened his days.^ * Origines contra Celsum et Brukeri, Histor. Critic, vol. i. p. 790. * Plutarch, in Alexand. ^ This tenderness, however, did not, probably, satisfy the Athenian priests ; who, as it will appear from the following analysis of his works, had more to apprehend from his real piety, than to fear from his pretend- ed irreligion. * Diogen. Laert. 1. v. sect. 16. Bnt the best proof of this will appear hereafter, when we come to examine Aristotle's works. * His defence, (airoXoyia d(Jsl3e'iaQ,) according to the bif)graphical no- tice in the Dictioi ary above quoted, is still in existence. But its authen- ticity was doubted even by the ancients. Athen. xv. 16, p. 696. ^ Laert. 1. v. sect. 16. "Ox^t] stt' oxvy ynpcKTKei. Homer's description of the gardens of Alcinous. " The tig rotting on the fig," alludes to the Athenian sycophants, {(jvKO(pdvrai,) so called originally from, informing against the exporters of fiss. -^lian, iii. 36. » Justin (in Admon. ad Gentes) and St. Gregory Nazianzen (contra Ju- lian.) say that he died through the uneasiness of discontent at not being HIS TESTAMENT. xxvii His testament, preserved in Diogenes Laertius, accords with the circumstances related concerning his life, and prac- tically illustrates the liberal maxims of his philosophy. An- tipater, the confidential minister of Philip, regent of Macedon both under Alexander and after his demise, is appointed the Executor of this testament, with an authority paramount, as it should seem, to that of the other persons who are afterwards' conjoined with him in the same trust. To his wife Her- pyllis, (for he had married a second time,) Aristotle, besides Other property in money and slaves, leaves the choice of two houses, the one in Chalcis, the other his paternal mansion at Stagira ; and desires, that whichever of them she might pre- fer, should be properly furnished for her reception. He com- mends her domestic virtues ; and requests his friends that, mindful of her behaviour towards him, they would distinguish her by the kindest attention ; and should she again think of a husband, that they would be careful to provide for her a suitable marriage. To Nicomachus, his son by this Herpyllis, and to Pythias, the daughter of his first wife, he bequeathed the remainder of his fortune, with the exception of his library and writings, which he left to his favourite scholar Theo- phrastus.^ He desires that his daughter, when she attained a marriageable age, should be given to Nicanor, the son of his ancient benefactor Proxenus ; and failing Nicanor, that his esteemed disciple Theophrastus should accept her hand and fortune. The bones of his first wife, Pythias, he ordered to be disinterred, and again buried with his own, as she her- self had requested. None of his slaves are to be sold ; they are all of them either emancipated by his will, or ordered to able to explain the cause of the tides of the Euripiis ; upon which au- thority the puerile story is ingrafted of his throwing himself into that arm of the sea, saying, You shall contain me, since 1 cannot comprehend you." Others say that he ended his life by poison to escape the venge- ance of the Athenians. (Rapin's Comparaison de Platon et d*Aristote.) Such unwarranted reports would not be worthy of mention, did they not afford an opportunity of observing the extreme improbability that Aris- totle should have been guilty of suicide, since he always speaks of it as of a shameful and cowardly crime. * Strabo, xiii. 413. xsviii LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. be manumitted by his heirs, whenever they seem worthy oi liberty; an injunction conformable to the maxims inculcated in his Politics, that slaves of all descriptions ought to be set free, whenever they merited freedom, and are qualified for enjoying it. He concludes with a testimony of external de- ference at least for the religion of his country, by ordering that the dedications which he had vowed for the safety of Nicanor, should be presented at Stagira to Jupiter and Mi- nerva, the saviours. Thus lived, and thus died, in his 63rd year, Aristotle the Stagirite. His enlightened humanity was often seasoned by pleasantry. Many strokes of genuine humour, little suspected by his commentators, will be found in his political writings. His smart sayings and quick repartees were long remembered and admired by those who were incapable of appreciating his weightier merits. Some of these sayings, though apparently not the most memorable, are preserved in Diogenes Laertius ; of which the following may serve for a specimen. Bein, asked. What, of all things, soonest grows old ? — Gratitude. What advantage have you reaped from study? — That of doing through choice what others do through fear. What is friendship ? — One soul in two bodies. Why do we never tire of the company of the beautiful ? — The question of a blind man ! Such apophthegms would be unworthy of mention, had they not, by their perpetual recurrence in our philosopher's conversation, shown a mind free and unencumbered amidst the abstrusest studies ; and, together with the most intense thought, a readiness of wit, which never failed to repel sneerers, and to abash arrogance.^ He exhibited a character as a man, worthy of his pre-eminence as a philosopher ; inhabit- ing courts, without meanness and without selfishness ; living in schools, without pride and without austerity;^ cultivating with ardent affection every domestic and every social virtue, whils with indefatigable industry he reared that wonderful * Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. et Diogen. ' Plutarch, de Virtut. Moral, p 448. EXTRAORDINARY FATE OF HIS WRITINGS. Xxix edifice of science, the plan of which we are still enabled to delineate from his imperfect and mutilated writings. The extraordinary and unmerited fate of these writings, while it excites the curiosity, must provoke the indignation of every friend to science. Few of them were published in his life-time ; the greater part nearly perished through neglect ; and the remainder has been so grossly misapplied, that doubts have arisen whether its preservation ought to be regarded as a benefit. Aristotle's manuscripts and library were bequeathed to Theophrastus, the most illustrious of his pupils. Theo- phrastus again bequeathed them to his own scholar Neleus, who^ carrying them to Scepsis, a city of the ancient Troas, left them to his heirs in the undistinguished mass of his pro- perty. The heirs of Neleus, men ignorant of literature and careless of books, ^ totally neglected the intellectual treasure that had most unworthily devolved to them, until they heard ihat the king of Pergamus, under whose dominion they aved, was employing much attention and much research in collecting a large library.^ With the caution incident to the subjects of a despot, who often have recourse to concealment in order to avoid robbery, they hid their books under ground ; and the writings of Aristotle, as well as the vast collection of ..materials from which they had been composed, thus remained in a subterranean mansion for many generations, a prey to dampness and to worms.^ At length they were released from * Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608 and 609. Bayle gives too strong a meaning to lhu)TaiQ dvOpwTToiQ, when he calls them " gens idiots : " idnurrjg means one who confines his attention to the private affairs of life, in op- position to philosophers and statesmen. (See Pol. ii. sub fin.) 2 Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 60S. ' Athenaeus, 1. i. p. 3, says, that Neleus sold Aristotle's books to Pto- lemy Ph'iladelphus ; and Bayle (article Tyrannion) endeavours with Pa- ricius (Discuss. Peripatet. t. i. p. 29) to reconcile this account with that )f Strabo, by supposing that Neleus indeed sold Aristotle's library and works to king Ptolemy, but not before he had taken the precaution of liraving the whole carefully copied. According to those writers, the books thus copied, and not the originals, suffered the unworthy treatment men- tioned in the text. This supposition seems highly improbable ; for, not 10 mention the difficulty of copying, in a short time, many thousand volumes, it cannot be believed that Ptolemy, had he been in possession of XXX LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. their prison, or rather raised from the grave, and sold for a large sum, together with the works of Theophrastus, to Apellicon of Athens, a lover of books rather than a scholar ; ^ through whose labour and expense the work of restoring Aristotle's manuscripts, though performed in the same city in which they had been originally written, was very imperfectly executed. To this, not only the ignorance of the editors, but both the condition and the nature of the writings themselves, did not a little contribute. The most considerable part of his acroatic works, which are almost the whole of those now re- maining, consist of little better than text books, containing the detached heads of his discourses ; and, through want of connexion in the matter, peculiarly liable to corruption from transcribers, and highly unsusceptible of conjectural emend- ation. What became of Aristotle's original manuscript we ar^ not informed ; but the copy made for Apellicon was, together with his whole library, seized by Sylla, the Roman conqueror of Athens, and by him transmitted to Rome.^ Aristotle's works excited the attention of Tyrannion, a native of Amysus in Pontus, who had been taken prisoner by LucuUus in the Mithridatic war, and insolently manumitted,^ as Plutarch says, by Muraena, LucuUus's lieutenant. Tyrannion procured the the genuine works of Aristotle, would have purchased at a high price those counterfeits, which had no other connexion with that philosopher than bearing his forged name on their title-page. (Ammonius ad Cate- gor. sub init.) Had a correct copy of the Stagirite's works adorned the library of Alexandria under the first Ptolemies, his genuine philosophy would have struck deeper root, and made further progress than it ever did, in that Egyptian capital. Vossius (de Sect. Philosoph. c. xvi. p. 89) endeavours to prove that Athenaeus's words (which are cert-ainly in- correct) imply that Neleus retained Aristotle's works when he sold all the rest. ^ Sirabo says, " rather than a philosopher." 2 Plutarch, in Sylla. 3 Plutarch speaks with the dignity becoming a man of letters, who fe^ela liimself superior to the prejudices of his times : *' That to give liberty by manumission to a man of Tyrannion's education and merit, was to rob him of that liberty which he naturally and essentially possessed,*' Plutarch, in Lucull. p 504. NUMBER AND MAGNITUDE OF IIIS WORKS. xxxi manuscript by paying court to Sylla's librarian ; and commu- nicated the use of it to Andronicus of Rhodes, who flourished as a philosopher at Rome, in the time of Cicero and Pom- pey ; and who, having undertaken the task of arranging and correcting those long-injured writings, finally performed the duty of a skilful editor.^ Though the works which formed the object of Andronicus's labours had suffered such injuries as the utmost diligence and sagacity could not completely repair,'^ yet in consequence of those labours the Peripatetic philosophy began to resume the lustre of which it had been deprived since the days of The- ophrastus ; and the later adherents to that sect, as they became acquainted with the real tenets of their master, far surpassed the fame and merit of their ignorant and obscure predecessors.^ From the sera of Andronicus's publication to that of the in- vention of printing, a succession of respectable writers on civil and sacred subjects (not excepting the venerable fathers of the Christian church) confirm, by their citations and criti- cisms, the authenticity of most of the treatises still bearing Aristotle's name; and of more than ten thousand^ commen- * Plutarch, in Syll. Porpliyr. in Vita Plotini. Boetius in Prooemio libri de interpret. Strabo only says that Tyrannion, in the manner men- tioned in the text, got possession of the manuscript ; which was copied for the Roman booksellers by careless transcribers, who did not even take the pains of comparing their copies with the original : a negligence, he observes, too common among the transcribers both in Rome and Alexandria. ^ Even after this publication, Aristotle's followers were obliged ra TToXXa siKOTijjQ XsyeLV Sia ro TrXrjOog rwv afiapTLwr^ " often to guess at his meaning, through the faultiness of his text.'* Strabo, in the place above cited. ^ Strabo, I. xiii. p. 609. He observes, *' that the Peripatetic philoso- phers succeeding Theophrastus had, till this time, but few of their master's works, and those few chiefly of the exoteric kind ; so that they were more conversant about words than things ; and instead of reasoning ac- curately and profoundly, were contented with displaying their skill in dialectic and rhetoric." I have thus paraphrased the obscurity of the original (pL\o(TO(ptiv irQayfxaTiKujq and Oscreig XtjicoOi^eLVf because Strabo, who had himself diligently studied Aristotle's philosophy, (Strabo, 1. xvi. p. 757,) uses the word Trpayuamcajg, most probably, in the same sense in which it occurs in Aristotle, as synonymous with aKpipojg, Kara aXrjOtiav ; sind in opposition to ^laXsKrucioQ and to diaXtyeaOai XoyiKujg. * Patricius Discuss. Peripatet, LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. tators, who have endeavoured to illustrate different parts of his works, there are incomparably fewer than might have been expected, whose vanity has courted the praise of su- perior discernment by rejecting any considerable portion of them as spurious.^ According to the most credible accounts, therefore, he composed above four hundred ^ different trea- tises, of which only forty-eight ^ have been transmitted to the present age.'* But many of these last consist of several books, and the whole of his remains together still form a golden stream^ of Greek erudition, exceeding four times the col- lective bulk of the Iliad and Odyssey. ^ Compare Diogenes Laertius in Vit. Aristot., Patric. Discuss. Peripa- tetic, Fabricius Bibliothec. Graec, and Bruckerus Histor. Philos. artic. Aristot. * Diogenes Laertius (in Vit. Aristot.) makes Aristotle's volumes amount to four hundred ; Patricius Venetus, a learned professor of Padua in the sixteenth century, endeavours to prove that they, amounted to nearly double that number. (Patric. Discuss. Peripat.) The laborious Fa- bricius employs one hundred pages of his second volume in enumerating and ascertaining Aristotle's remains ; which still exceed four times the collective bulk, of the Iliad and Odyssey. The whole works of Aristotle, therefore, must have contained a quantity of prose, equal to sixteen times 28,088 verses ; a fact the more extraordinary, since the greater part of hia writings are merely elegant and comprehensive text books, containing the heads of his lectures ; laborious, but clear reasonings ; and often ori- ginal discoveries in the most difficult branches of science. The following passage concerning him in the French Encyclopedic, (article Aristote- lisme,) must excite a smile of something more than surprise. *' Lenoni- bre de ses ouvrages est prodigieux ; on en put voir les titres en Diogtne Laerce . . . encore ne sommes nous pas surs de les avoir tons : li est meme probable que nous en avons perdu plusieurs," etc. 3 The treatises de Plantis et de Mundo are rejected by most writers. The former is, indeed, of little value ; the latter, of the greatest ; but I do not cite it as an authority, because it is my ambition to place my ac* count of his philosophy beyond the reach of cavil. * A very excellent table of Aristotle's works, with a brief but accurate sketch of their contents, and an account of their transmission to the pre- sent time, will be found appended to the Lif*^ of the philosopher by Pro- fessor Stahr in the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography. * Veniet fli?men orationis aureum fundens Aristotele*. Cicero, Acadeiii ii 38. OTRODUCTION, BY JOHN GILLIES, L.L.D. This book embraces three subjects, the noblest and most interesting that civil science can boast : the origin of society and government ; the distinction of ranks in a commonwealth ; and a comparison of the best plans of political economy. On each of these topics I shall offer a few remarks, not with the presumption of interposing my own judgment, but with the hope of justifying or illustrating the decisions of my author. In explaining the origin of political society, Aristotle writes neither the satire nor the panegyric of human nature ; which, by writers of less wisdom than fancy, have been al- ternately substituted for plain history. In this, as in all other inquiries, his first question is, what are the phenomena ? His second, what is the analogy of nature ? Building on these foundations, he concludes that both society and government are as congenial to the nature of man, as it is natural for a plant to fix its roots in the earth, to extend its branches, and to scatter its seeds. Neither the cunning, cowardly princi- ples asserted by Hobbes and Mandeville, nor the benevolent moral affections espoused by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, ac- cording to our author's notions, ought to be involved in the solution of the present question : since the first political so- cieties are as independent of human intelligence, and there- fore of moral determination, as the instinctive actions of plants and insects, tending to the preservation of their respective kinds, are independent of any intelligence of their own ; even when they move and operate conformably to the laws of the most consummate wisdom. Government, then, is coeval with society, and society witb INTRODUCTION. men. Both are the works of nature ; and therefore, in ex- plaining their origin, there cannot be the smallest ground for the fanciful supposition of engagements and contracts, inde- pendently of which the great modern antagonist of Aristotle declares, in the following words, that no government can be lawful or binding : " The original compact, which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority, to unite and to incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which could give beginning to any lawful go- vernment in the world." ^ From this maxim, which is per- petually inculcated in Locke's two treatises on government, is tairly deducible the inalienable right of mankind to be self- governed; that is, to be their own legislators, and their own directors ; or, if they find it inconvenient to assume the ad- ministration of affairs in their own persons, to appoint repre- sentatives who may exercise a delegated sovereignty, essen- tially and inalienably inherent in the people at large. Thence results the new inalienable right of all mankind to be fairly represented, a right with which each individual was invested from the commencement of the world, but of which, until very recently, no one knew the name, or had the least notion of the thing.^ From this right to fair representation, there follows, by necessary consequence, the right of universal suffrage, universal eligibility, and the universal and just preponderancy of majorities in all cases whatever. Such is the boasted and specious theory begun in the works of our Locke and our Molyneux,^ continued in those of our * Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 185, edit, of 1714. 2 According to the system of Locke and his followers, representatives are appointed by the people to exercise, in their stead, political functions which the people have a right to exercise in their own persons. They are elected by the people, they derive their whole power from the peo- ple ; and to the people, their constituents, they always are responsible. Of this doctrine, Mr. Locke is the first or principal author. But the term representatives, in the usual and legal acceptation of the word in the English constitution, meant, and still means, persons in virtue of their election exercising political functions, which the people had not a right to exercise in their own persons, and so little responsible to their electors, that they are not even bound to follow their instructions. That the ancients were not unacquainted with representation in the usual and only practical sense of the word, will be shown hereafter. • See his Case of Ireland, reprinted by Almon, p. 113, and agaiii, INTRODUCTION. XXXV Price ^ and our Priestley ,2 and carried to the utmost extrava- gance in those of (I wish not to say our) Kousseau,^ Paine/ and the innumerable pamphleteers whose writings occasioned or accompanied the American and French revolutions. Such works, co-operating with the peculiar circumstances of the times, have produced, and are still producing, the most extraordinary effects ; by arming the passions of the multitude with a false principle, fortifying them by specious arguments, and thereby stirring into action those discordant elements which naturally lurk in the bosom of every community. It is not consistent with my design, in defending the tenets of my authoi% to answer his political adversaries with declamation and obloquy, — (a rash and dangerous attempt ! since the voice of the multitude will always be the loudest and the strong- est,) — but merely to examine whether the fundamental maxim of their great master, Locke, be itself founded in truth. To prove that government is merely a matter of consent, he as- sumes for a reality a wild fiction of the fancy ; what he calls a state of nature, which he defines to be men living to- gether according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them."^ But he him- self seems aware that this supposed natural state of man is a state in which man never yet was found ; and in which, if by violence thrust into it, he could not remain for a single day. Locke, 1 say, saw the difficulty, which, instead of meeting, he only endeavours to elude. " Where are there," he asks, or ever were there, any men in such a state of nature?"^ He answers, " that since all princes and rulers of independent governments, all through the world, are in the state of nature, it is plain the world never was, and never will be, without numbers of men in that state." ^ But this, I affirm, is not to answer the proposed question ; for princes and rulers of inde- pendent states do not live together, nor associate and "herd,'* as he himself expresses it, in the same society. If they did so, they could not subsist without government : for government and 169. "I have no other notion of slavery, but being bound by a law to which I do not consent." * Observations on Civil Liberty, etc. * Essay on the First Principles of Government. ^ Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du Droit Politique. * Rights of Man, etc. » Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 164. 6 ibij. p. 162, ^ ibid. d 2 xxxvi INTRODUCTION. society are things absolutely inseparable ; they commence to- gether ; they grow up together ; they are both of them equally natural ; and so indissolubly united, that the destruction of the one is necessarily accompanied by the destruction of the other. This is the true sense of Aristotle, as understood and expressed by an illustrious defender of just government and genuine liberty. " As we use and exercise our bodily mem- bers, before we understand the ends and purposes of this ex- ercise, so it is by nature herself that we are united and associated into political society." ^ Locke, who so severely, and, as I have endeavoured to prove, so unjustly arraigns what is called Aristotle's Meta- physics, appears to have equally mistaken his Politics. Had he understood^ the invaluable work to which he refers in terms of commendation, this idol of modern philosophers, and especially of modern politicians, would not probably (since he was a man of great worth as well as of great wisdom) have produced a theory of government totally impossible in practice ; a theory admirably fitted, indeed, for producing revolutions and sedition, but according to which, as is evinced by all history, no political fabric ever yet was reared ; or if it were to be reared, could ever possibly be preserved.^ The neglect or misapprehension of some of the most important parts of Aristotle's writings is indeed most deeply to be la- mented. Of the many thousand authors who have copied or commented on his Logic, the far greater number omit his in- teresting chapters on language ; deeming the consideration of ^ Quemadmodum igitur membris utimur, priusquam didicimus cujus ea utilitatis causa habeamus ; sic inter nos nostra ad civilem communi- tatem conjuncti et consociati sumus. De Fin. Bon. et Mai. lib. iii c. 20. Conf. de Officiis, lib. i. c. 16, et seq. Cicero does not say " commmiita- tem " simply, but " civilem communitatem," which agrees with Aris- totle's definition of man, ^wov ttoXitlkov, not merely a herding, but a political animal. See the same doctrine in Polybius, lib. vi. c. 4, vol. ii. p. 460, edit. Sweigh. ^ Among Locke's private letters, there is one to Mr. King, who had asked him for a plan of reading on morality and politics. " To proceed orderly in this," Mr. Locke observes, the foundation should be laid in inquiring into the ground and nature of civil society, and how it is formed into different models of government, and what are the several species oi it. Aristotle is allowed a master in this science, and few enter into thia consideration of government without reading his Politics." How honour« able a testimony ! ^ Aristot. Polit. passim. See especially book iv. ch. , p. 12C. INTRODUCTION. xxxvii words below the dignity of philosophers. His profound ob servations concerning the nature and constitution of a familjr have been equally overlooked by his pretended followers in politics. Yet as his analysis of language has been proved to be the sole foundation of logic, so his analysis of a family, and his explanation of the causes through which its elements na turally and regularly combine, can alone enable us clearly to discern the analogous principles — (principles continually in sisted on by himself) — which have raised and upheld the great edifice of civil society ; which is not a mass, but a sys- tem, and which, like every system, implies a distinction of parts ; with many moral as well as physical differences, rela- tive and reciprocal ; the powers and perfections of one part supplying the incapacities and defects of another. To form a commonwealth from elements of equal value, or of equal dig- nity, is an attempt not less absurd than that of composing a piece of music from one and the same note. A difficult question follows, how far social inequality, whe- ther civil or domestic, may be allowed to extend ? It is with a trembling hand that I touch the delicate subject of slavery ; an undertaking to which nothing could encourage me, but the utmost confidence in the humanity, as well as in the judg- ment, of my author. First of all, Aristotle expressly con- demns the cruel practice, prevalent in his own days, of en- slaving prisoners of war ; ^ secondly, he declares, in the most explicit terms, all slaves fairly entitled to freedom, whenever it clearly appears that they are fitly qualified for enjoying it. But the benefits conferred on men, he observes, must in all cases be limited by their capacities for receiving them ; and these capacities are themselves limited by the exigencies and necessities of our present imperfect condition. The helpless- ness of infancy and childhood, the infirmities of old age, and * Locke says on this subject, " There is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who, being captives taken in a just war, are by the rights of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men, having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates, and being in a state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society." Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 18L We should imagine that the liberal Locke and the slavish Aristotle had interchanged their ages and countries as well as their maxims and prin» ciples. xxxviii INTRODUCTION. the urgencies attending mankind in every stage of their exist- ence on earth, render it indispensably necessary that a great proportion of the species should be habitually employed in mere mechanical labour, in the strenuous exertions of pro- ductive industry, and the petty tasks of domestic drudgery Nature, therefore, in whose plan and intention the system cf society precedes and takes place of the parts of which it is composed, has variously organized and moulded the human character as well as the human frame, without settinor other bounds to this variety, than are imposed by the good of the whole system, of which individuals are not independent units, but constituent elements. According to this plan or inten- tion, the Stagirite maintains, that there is room for the widest of all discriminations, and the lowest of all occupations, do- mestic servitude, a species of labour not employed in produc- tion, but totally consumed in use ; because solely, but not unprofitably, spent in promoting the ease and accommodation of li'fe. In the relation of master and servant, the good of the master may indeed be the primary object ; but the benefit of the servant or slave is also a necessary result, since he only is naturally and justly a slave, whose powers are competent to mere bodily labour ; who is capable of listening to reason, but incapable of exercising that sovereign faculty ; and whose weakness and short-sightedness are so great, that it is safer for him to be guided or governed through life by the pru- dence of another. But, let it always be remembered, that " one class of men ought to have the qualifications requisite for masters, before another can either fitly or usefully be em- ployed as slaves." Government, then, not only civil but do- mestic, is a most serious duty, a most sacred trust ; a trust, the very nature of which is totally incompatible with the supposed inalienable rights of all men to be self-governed.^ ^ Politics would not be a science, unless it contained truths, absolute, universal, and unalterable. One of these is that in the text ; because it essentially springs from the nature of society and of man. Another uni- versal political truth is, that the good of the governed is the main end and aim of every good government. From these two premisses, it neces- sarily follows, that the main object of political society never can be effected on Mr. Locke's principles. But the good of the community (without supposing all sovereign power derived from the people at large, and of which each individual is entitled to participate) may, under many given circumstances, be highly promoted by giving to the people at large INTRODUCTION. xxxix Those rights, and those only, are inalienable, which it is im- possible for one person to exercise for another : and to main tain those to be natural and inalienable rights, which the persons supposed to be invested with them can never possibly exercise, consistently either with their own safety, or with the good of the community, is to confound all notions of things, and to invert the whole order of nature ;^ of which it is the primary and unalterable law, that forecast should direct improvidence, reason control passion, and wisdom command folly.^ I now proceed to examine Aristotle's reflections on political economy, which are not less adverse than his long misunderstood and often mistated vindication of slavery itself, both to the theories formerly prevalent, and to others which have begun recently to prevail among the civilized nations of modern Europe. The northern conquerors who invaded and desolated the Roman empire, disdained to produce by slow industry, what they gloried in ravishing by sudden violence. War was their delight and their trade. They subsisted by rapine ; and therefore cared not how far they were excelled by others in peaceful and productive arts, while gold, and all that it could purchase, might be conquered by iron. But the spoils of ra- pacity having supplied them with the instruments of luxury, a control in the government. This control in all large communities can only be conveniently exercised, either by particular magistrates, or by representative assemblies. Things, therefore, that have not any necessary connexion with the origin of government, (so far from being its only just principle,) may be found admirable expedients for carrying it on. It will be shown hereafter, that assemblies elected by the people to provide for their interests, and thence called their representatives, are not so new in the world as is commonly imagined. In some republics we shall see a double row of delegates, representatives of representatives ; in others, wo shall find representation and taxation regarded as correlatives ; and even in some democracies, we shall meet with persons elected by the people, and representing them in the most useful sense of the word, " that of acting for the people at large, as the people at large, if the majority of them was wise and good, would act for themselves." * Stat ratio contra, et secretam garrit in aurem, Ne liceat facere id, quod quis vitiabit agendo. Publica lex hominum, naturaque continet hoc fas, Ut teneat vetitos inscitia debilis actus. Persius, Satir. v. 96. ^ AfJLStvov bv VTTO Quov Kai (pQovL^ov dpx^^^^'-y jJiaXiGTa [ikv clkhop i\ovroq tv eaurtp, el firif t^ujbev itptaribTOQ. Plato in Repub. ix. p. xi INTRODUCTION. they began to relish the pleasures of repose ; and instead of courting new dangers abroad, to imitate at home those objects and conveniences which, though they had not the genius to invent, they gradually acquired the taste to approve, the vanity to display, and the desire to accumulate. Manufactures then were established : navigation was exercised for the purpose not only of war, but of traffic : an extensive conamerce was in- troduced ; and colonies were planted. The avowed purpose of all those operations v/as to augment in each country the quantity of gold and silver ; since, with those precious metals, all other coveted obj-ects might usually be procured. The business of each individual merchant is to get money; and commercial nations, it was thought, could not reasonably have any other end in view. This false principle was regarded as the basis of all sound political arithmetic ; and the most con- clusive reasoning of Aristotle, in the book now before us, would not perhaps have sufficed to prove, that national wealth consisted not in gold and silver, had not the ruined state of Spain confirmed experimentally the same important truth. For many years back, political writers have acknowledged, with our author, that the real wealth of nations consists in the productive powers of their land and labour. They acknow- ledge also, with him, that the precious metals, in contradis- tinction to other useful commodities, have only the peculiar advantage of serving as the fittest instruments of exchange, and the most accurate measures of value ; but that the quantity of number in which they ought to be desired or accumulated is, like the quantity and number of all other measures or in- struments, naturally limited and fixed by the ends and oper- ations which they are employed to answer or effect.^ Yet, while they reason thus justly respecting gold and silver, the same writers have not sufficient enlargement of mind to ge- neralize their assertion, and to perceive with our author that property itself is as much an instrument as money, though * It is worthy of remark, that Locke is one of the most strenuous as- serters of the now exploded doctrine concerning money, which he con- siders " as the most solid and substantial kind of wealth, regarding the multiplication of the precious metals as the great object of political economy.*' See the passage quoted and refuted in Smith's Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 140, 8vo edit. It is time that, with regard to subjects still more important, men should return from the school of Locke to thai of Aristotle. INTRODUCTION. serving for a far more complicated purpose ; and therefore, if it be collected in greater quantities than that purpose requires, the surplus will be at best useless, most commonly pernicious ; will inflame desire, foment luxury, provoke rapacity, and pro- duce that long train of disorders, which made our philosopher declare, " that the inhabitants of the Fortunate Isles, unless their virtue kept pace with their external prosperity, must inevitably become the most miserable of all mankind.*' ^ In the fashionable systems of modern politicians, national wealth is considered as synonymous with national prosperity. To the increase of productive industry and the augmentation of pub- lic revenue, both health, education, and morals are sacrificed without apology and without remorse ; since that trade is uni- versally held to be the best, which produces most money with the least labour. But according to Aristotle, it is not the quantity or the value of the work produced, that ought to form the main object of the statesman's care, but the effect which the producing of that work naturally creates on the mind and body of the workmen. In the praises of agricul- ture and a country life, our author's sentiments and expres- sions have been faithfully and generally copied by the most judicious writers of antiquity ; many of whom mark with as much reprobation as Aristotle himself, that species of traffic which is cultivated, not for accommodation but for gain ; since such a traffic, universally diffused among a people, has a tend- ency to pervert their feelings, and to confound their princi- ples ; to make them value as ends, things only useful as means ; and to debase and corrupt every part of their charac- ter ; because wherever wealth is the primary object of pursuit, luxury will naturally afford the principal source of enjoyment. In agriculture and pasturage, the energy of nature co-operates with the industry of man. They are, of all occupations, the most beneficial and most necessary, as well as the most agree- able and most salutary ; conducing, with peculiar efficacy, to the firmest and happiest temperament of the mind and body : and the property acquired by them is intrinsically more valu- able, because essentially more useful, than any other property whatever. Our author likewise maintains, that those natural and primeval pursuits are of all the least likely to engender sloth, intemperance, avarice, and their concomitant vices ; and POiit. book vii. ch. 15. xlii INTRODUCTION. that nations of husbandmen, in particular, afford m&terialg susceptible of the best political form, and the least disposed to disturb, by sedition, any moderately good government un- der which it is their lot to live. In consideration of so many advantages attending it, he concludes that rural labour ought to be the most favoured branch of national industry ; an api- nion which nothing but the intrepidity of ignorance, fortified by false system, could venture to contradict. Yet, how fai other methods of accumulating stock, beside those proposed by our author, ought to be admitted and encouraged, or dis- couraged and rejected, must depend on circumstances and events, the force of which the philosopher's experience could not supply him with the means exactly to appreciate. From the artifices and shifts which he explains, — (and he is the only writer that explains them,) — as practised by the repub- lics and princes of his own and preceding times, for the purpose of raising money, it was impossible for him to conjec- ture that, in a future age of the world, monarchical govern- ment should attain such stability as would render the public revenues a safe mortgage to creditors ; that the immense debts contracted through the facility of borrowing, would have a direct tendency, by interesting a great number of powerful individuals in the permanence of constituted author- ities, to augment that facility itself, and thereby still further to accumulate the national debt ; for discharging the interest of which, heavy taxes must necessarily, but not altogether unprofitably, be levied, since they would in some measure re- pay, in public security, the burdens which they impose on personal labour, or rather the sums which they withdraw from private property. But taxes to a great amount cannot possi- bly be raised, except in countries flourishing in such resources as agriculture and pasturage alone were never yet able to afiTord ; resources, which can only be acquired by war and rapine on the one hand, or obtained on the other, by the powers of national industry, assisted and multiplied by the most complicated machinery, and an endless subdivision of allotted tasks ; each individual performing his part quickly and dexterously, because each has but one, and that a small part, to perform ; while the diligence of all is perpetually stimulated by the bait of gain, supplied from the exhaustless fund of an enlightened con^naercial spirit, as extensive as the INTRODUCTION. xllii world, and as enterprising as those renowned adventurers who discovered and explored its remotest regions. It is in vain to inquire whether the plan of political economy pro- posed by Aristotle be in itself preferable to that which some modern nations pursue. Nations, circumstanced as they are, may derive armies chiefly from agriculture, but must princi- pally depend for supplies on manufactures and commerce. The option of their own or a better system is now no longer in their power : the question of expediency has ceased : they must obey necessity.* This seems to me the only firm ground of defence for what is called the commercial system of economy ; a system which has often been defended by very inclusive arguments. ^' Pub- lic wealth and prosperity," Mr. Hume observes, " is the end of all our wishes ; " and this wealth or prosperity, both he and his follower. Dr. Smith, maintain, is only to be promoted by encouraging, with equal impartiality, all kinds of lawful in- dustry ; for though food be the great want of mankind, yet one man may produce as much food as will maintain many.^ * It is not difficult to explain why the doctnnes of speculative poli- ticians, respectinc^ the wealth and economy of nations, should also differ so materially from the theory proposed by our author. Among the Gothic nations who subdued the Roman empire, every thing most valuable and most interesting is connected with the improvement of arts, and conse- quent extension of commerce ; which were the only engines that could counteract without violence their peculiar and unnatural arrangements with regard to landed property. Previous to the refinement and luxury introduced by commerce and the arts, the great landholders, who had engrossed whole provinces, dissipated the superfluous produce of their grounds in maintaining idle servants and worthless dependents, ever ready to gratify the wildest and wickedest of their passions, to abet their inso- lence, to uphold their haughtiness, to encourage and second their violence and rapacity ; and the governments of Europe, ignorantly termed aris- tocracies, formed the worst species of oligarchy ; an oligarchy consisting, not in the collective authority of the whole body of landholders, but in the prerogatives and powers of -each individual lord over his respective vassals and retainers. In such a condition of society the expensive allurements of luxury, produced by what Aristotle condemns as over- refinement in arts and manufactures, had the most direct tendency to remedy evils greater than themselves, to undermine the exorbitant power of the few, and to bestow consideration on the many. This particular case has been, by a very usual fallacy in reasoning, converted into a general political axiom. 2 Hume's Essays, voL i., " Refinement of Arts;" and Smith's Wealth of Nations, passim. xliv INTRODUCTION. But this assertion is not true in the acceptation in which it must be taken, in order to recommend the commercial system above the agricultural. In agriculture, as we above observed, nature operates in concert with man ; and though one family- co-operating with nature, may, in a given piece of ground, produce as much food as will serve six, yet six families la- bouring the same ground, will not reap a proportional in- crease ; and twenty families labouring the same ground, may find it barely sufficient to supply their own nourishment. The more that the land is laboured, it will be the more pro- ductive ; and the more fitly and fairly it is divided,^ (other circumstances remaining the same,) it will be the more la- boured ; and the same country or island will thus maintain the greater proportion of inhabitants employed in that kind of work, which, according to Aristotle, is the most favourable to health, morals, good government, the development of intel- lectual as well as corporeal powers, and the attainment of that measure of happiness which the general mass of mankind can ever in this world hope to reach. * Does our author, therefore, propose an Agrarian law ? No ; he knew better. The second book of his Politics is, of all works ever written, the best adapted to prove vo levellers themselves, that the measures from which they expect so mu'jh good, if carried into execution, would infalli- bly terminate in their own ruin and that of the community. ANALYSIS AEISTOTLE'S POLITICS. Introductory. — Aristotle, in conformity with his usual custom, commences the first Book of his treatise with a prac- tical inquiry into the parts or elements of which the steite is composed ; and having laid down a brief outline of the first principles of man's social nature, and of domestic life in its various relations, he shows how these relations na- turally combine into that form of social existence which is called a state. But before entering theoretically into the nature of the best state, he gives, in Book II., a brief account of, and criticism upon, the various forms of government which have been devised by philsosophers and politicians. In Book III. he proceeds to discuss in detail the state, the citizen, and the government, with its various forms, and their respective perversions and corruptions. In Book lY. he gives a brief outline of his " Polity," or perfect republic, (TroXtreta,) with an enumeration of the magistrates necessary for carrying it out: while Book V. enters philosophically into the causes which tend to overthrow it. In Book VI. he returns to the subject of democracy and oligarchy ; while in the two con* eluding books of his treatise — (which has evidently come down to us in a mutilated condition) — he enters into an ela- borate discussion of the best regulations of government in his ideal polity, descending to the comparatively minute par- ticulars of the sites necessary for towns and houses, and the laws requisite for regulating matrimony and the education of the young, with a special view to the interests of the com- munity. In Book YIII. he commences his inquiry into the education of the young, wliich breaks ofi* most abruptly just at xlvi AmsrOTLE's POLITICS. [book I. the point where we should most earnestly have desired to sec our author's opinions fully and fairly worked out, in the de- velopment and practical application of those principles which he has so carefully laid down. BOOK L Introductory. — The first book divides itself into three pai;ts. (1.) Chap. i. and ii., concerning "the family (oiKog) and village {Ku)iJir]\ as integral parts of the state (TroXig). (2.) Chap. iii. — vii. and xii. xiii., concerning the three domestic relations, the herile, conjugal, and paternal. (3.) Chap. viii. — xi., concerning the getting of money {rj xP^l^^'^'-^'^^^^n)- Chap. i. — All society aims at some good end ; therefore its best and highest form will aim at the best end. Monarchical^nd republican governments do not differ in number alone, but also in kind. To ascertain the nature of a state, we must first con- template it in its component parts. Chap. ii. — The first of domestic relations is the conjugal : this is both natural and necessary ; the male being by nature formed and fitted to rule, the female to obey. The second relation is the herile : the slave formed by nature to obey. Yet the wife and the slave differ, (except among barba- rians). From the former of these relations springs the paternal tie : And the combination of these three ties forms the family {o\koq). The gradual development of the family described, and the consequent formation of the village (^Koj/j-ri), which is defined. The antiquity of monarchical rule deduced from the fact that families were originally under one head. The formation of the state (ttoXlq) ; and its definition ; its test, avTcipKELa, (i. e. its power to supply its own wants). The facts adduced here prove man to be a social creature, (iroXLTiKoy iwor,) and the founder of political life to be the greatest of benefactors to the human race. Chap. hi. — In domestic rule, {oiKovoiiia^) the three relations of CnAF, IV. — VI.] ANALYSIS. xlvil the head as master, husband, and father, give the three kinds of government w^hich it embraces. These three relations further considered. The art of getting money (// xpVH-'^T'-^^'-Kn) comes partly under oiKovoiiia, Chap. iv. — Possessions (.«cr///xara) are parts of a house ; and hence ?/ ktyitlkt] is part of the economic art. Possessions are either animate {a\ljv\a) or inanimate, (ejjLxpvxdj) and relate either to TroLTjaiQ or to 7rpdt,LQ, A slave (dovXog) is a living instrument for practical pur- poses, {tiVi\jvyov opyavov tCjv Trpog Trjy Trpd^w,) and he is a part of his master, though separable (xt^picrroy). The description of the characteristics of a good slave. Jhap. v.— Some are slaves by nature and birth, {(pvaeiy) as others are free and born to rule. This point established by sundry analogies, from the soul with regard to the body, from the male w^ith regard to the female, etc., and from inanimate things. We infer, then, that subjection is a law of nature ; and as some men are born wholly inferior to others in mental and moral endowments, it is clear that it is not only expedient but just that they should be slaves. Mental power and energy is the test of free birth ; mere bodily efficiency marks the slave, whose whole excellence {aperi]) lies in mere bodily activity. Chap. vi. — There is also a second kind of slavery, which is not natural, but by compact and agreement, (ro^xw,) as for example, v/here prisoners taken in war are reduced lo the rank of slaves. Some persons think this slavery just, others unjust. Aristotle attempts to reconcile the conflicting opinions by laying down, that while such slavery is abstractedly unjust, still to a certain extent it is defensible, because sanctioned by the common law of nations. But it must be always unjust, when the war from which it results is unjust, or when persons of noble birth are enslaved. Slaves and their masters can have an identity of interest, Ul they are such (jivaet ; but nothing of the kind can exist xlviii Aristotle's politics. [book l between the conqueror and his captive, because that relation does not exist between them ^vcei. Chap. vii. — Despotic and civil {toXltlki]) rule differ; the former is over slaves, the latter over freemen. The ruler of a household has monarchical or despotic power. The test of political government is the alternation of power and office between the rulers and the ruled. The science of ruling a household, so far as it relates to slaves, is of an inferior character. Chap. vm. — Domestic rule is over, (1.) Persons; as wife, children, and slaves. (2.) Possessions. Having already explained the herile relation, Aristotle postpones (to chap, xii.) the further discussion of the domes- tic rule over persons, and confines himself to that over pos- sessions. Money-getting (J] yjpr^ixaTKTTiKi]) differs from the economic art, in that the work of the former is to provide, of the latter to use what has been already procured. 'H ')(pr]fxaTL(TTLK{] is divided into natural and artificial. Its natural form divided " secundum vitae, genera, et modes." (1.) The pastoral life. (2.) The chase. (3.) Agriculture. [The art of war (?/ TroXefxiKri) comes partially under the second of these heads ; for it is just to hunt by war men who are born to be slaves.] True wealth consists, not in money, but in the produc- tions of nature. Chap. ix. — The artificial form of rj xp'^ixaTidTLKr} considered. Every possession has two possible uses : the one proper, the other improper, as a shoe may be used either to cover the feet or for exchange. In the family all things were held in common ; but as families and villages increased into states, a system of ex- change grew up of necessity ; and money was devised as the standard and common measure of this exchange. The artificial form of ?/ xPVf^^^'^f^^'^^'^V and the economic art differ in the fact that the former has no limit in its work of collecting money, whereas the latter is limited by the wants and necessities of man. CHAP. X. — xm.] ANALYSIS. Chap. x. — The money-getting art is subservient to the eco- nomic art, though not strictly a part of it. But it is only in its natural form that this is true ; for Its artificial form (which is called fj KaTrrjXiKrj, traffic) does not directly contribute to the ends of nature ; and besides, In its furthest development, usury, (tokl(tijl6q,) it is to be abominated, as being entirely unnatural (irapa (jjvcriv). Chap. xi. — rj xpr^juartortfc?/ practically divided into (1.) Natural, embracing (a.) agriculture and cattle. (2.) fiETajjXrjTLKr] or mercatorial, embracing three kinds, a. ifXTTopia^ commerce. /3. Tonafjiog, usury, y. juLLadapyia, hiring, or contracting. Besides these two divisions, there is a third or mixed kind, which is concerned with mining (rj ^eraWevrin/). Division of labours into servile and noble. The advantage of a practical knowledge of these matters shown by the example of the philosopher Thales. Chap. xn. — Aristotle here goes back to consider the conjugal and paternal relations. In the former relation, the husband exercises political rule. In the latter, the father exercises a despotic rule. Where political rule prevails, the ruler for the time being is invested with external signs of dignity. Chap. xni. — The master of a house should first regard the persons over whom he rules, next, the possessions. He should strive to make each person perform his own epyov virtuously. How a wife, a child, and a slave differ in their respective virtues (dperai). Slaves must be forced by punishments to perform their work voluntarily; but wives and children must be vir- tuously trained. Hence the necessity of a system of education for the women and children in every republic. 3 ARISTOTLE*S POLinCS. [book n. BOOK II. (Introductory.) This book is divided into two parts; (1.) chap. i. — viii., in which Aristotle discusses the ideal po- lities of Plato and of others, and (2.) chap. ix. — xii.. in which he treats of the existing constitutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage. Chap. i. — In order to exhibit the best form of a state, we must examine the best existing states, and also the purely ideal state (?) fxaXicrTa Kar tvyr]v\ It is necessary that there should be in every state (i.) a community of all things, or (2.) of some things only, or (3.) of nothing. The last of these three alternatives is contradicted by the very idea of a state, as being a community, and sharing therefore in site, etc. Ought then some things, or ought every thing, to be in common in a good state ? In Plato's Republic all things are in common among the citizens, even their children and wives. Should this be so or not ? Chap. n. — Plato's Republic discussed. The opinion of Socrates and Plato as to the community of wives and children refuted. Aristotle denies that a state is best in proportion as it is more entirely one ; for, (1.) the very theory of a state excludes such a unity as Plato imagines ; and (2.) a state is overthrown by too complete a unity {Trpo'iovGa koX yiyvo- jiivT] fxia fj-dWor ov^e iroXic eorai). A state is composed of persons difFeriag in species {sE eidei lia(pep6vTii)v) ; and it is the just balance {to \aov to dvTLTreTToydog) of the various elements which compose a state that preserves it. Moreover a state must be self-dependent (aurapfcr/c). But all avTapKEia would be destroyed by this Platonic unity. Chap. m. — But granting that this unity tends to preserve, and not to destroy a state ; it does not follow that unity would be realized, though the citizens should call their pro- perty common (eav irayTec ajjia Xeywai to (^jlov kol to ^ri CHAP. IV.— VI.] ANALYSIS. li For the word " all'* {iraPTeg) is used in two senses ; Ist^ collectively, 2nd, distributively. And as every thing, (as wives, children, etc.,) would be- long to all the citizens collectively alone, and not distri- butively, they would not be cared for, since what is every- body's business is nobody's (jjiCKTTa yap iTrifxeXeiag rvyyavti TO 7r\£L(TTb)V KOLVOv). Such a state of things, instead of binding families to- gether, would do away with family affections, and so weaken the state. Chap. iv. — It would also give rise to incests and murders, which would be inexpiable. Certain other difficulties and inconsistencies noticed in the Kepublic of Plato How far the community of wives should be extended. Evils arising from the interchange of children, and from the fact that nature will defeat the end proposed by So- crates, by the likeness of the children to individual citizens. Chap. v. — As to community of property, instead of bringing about unity, it will be the parent of discord. It will also cause neglect, for what is everybody's busi- ness is nobody's. It will deprive individuals of the pleasure derived from that which is to t^toj/ mt to dyaTrrjTov, It will cut off opportunities of practising the virtues of temperance and liberality. This too great unity, then, wall destroy the very essence of a state, as harmony would be destroyed if all sounds were reduced to a single note. A state then is not a mere individual, but a body com- posed of dissimilar parts, {nXfjOog drojjLoiijjr,) and its unity is to be drawn "ex dissimilium hominum consensu."' The perpetuity of the magistrates in office, which flows as a consequence from the myth in Plato concerning the three classes of citizens, in whose natures gold, silver, ai\d brass are blended, will be a further cause of strife. It is also absurd to attempt to make the whole state happy, while its component parts are deprived of their proper happiness. Chap, vi.— Plato's book of Laws discussed. e 2 lii Aristotle's politics. [book u* It omits all mention of many important points ; such as the discipline of the citizens. It divides the citizens into two classes or castes, but says nothing of the lower class bearing arms. It says nothing of the education of the lower class. It confines itself to laws, and says little about govern- ment Some discrepancies noticed between the " Laws " of Plato and his " Republi*:.'* General character of the Socratic dialogues. Absurdity of framing polities which cannot be realized ; and of using vague terms ; And of enforcing equality of property. It is better to regulate the population. Pheidon the Cor- inthian. Plato. Plato's state tends to a perfect community of goods, but does not approach the true standard of excellence. Great merits of the Spartan constitution ; it blends to- gether a variety of forms. The monarchical form has not justice done to it in the Republic of Plato. Prevalence of the oligarchic principle in the election of senate. Chap. yii. — The ideal state of Phaleas ; based on equality of property, as a guarantee against discord. We object, first, that he limits the property, but not the number of the citizens ; And further, that an equality of property does not suflSice to suppress discords ; Because, if men do not contend about goods, they will for honour. Other points are left undefined by Phaleas, as to military affairs and external policy. r*'HAP. viii. — The ideal state of Hippodamus consisted of 10,000 citizens, divided into three classes, artizans, hus- bandmen, and soldiery. The land of the state to be divided into three parts, sa- cred, common, and private. Three kinds of law-suits to be admitted, with one su- preme tribunal of appeal; and the amount of punishment CHAP. IX.] ANALYSIS. to be settled by the sentence of the judges written on a tablet. Honours and rewards to be given to those who have done good service to the state, and their children to be reared at the public expense. The magistrates to be elected by the three classes of the people. Objections of Aristotle against the system of Phaleas. (1.) He has done wrong in giving full rights of citizens to the second and third class, though he has deprived them of arms. (2.) The husbandmen till the land, not for themselves, but for the soldiery. (3.) There is no class to till the public land, each being busied with its own duties. (4.) The office of the judge is confounded with that of an arbiter. (5.) The system of rewards tends to produce calumnies and detractions, and thus a premium is offered for innova- tions ; but a change of laws and institutions is perilous in any state. Chap. ix. — In testing a constitution, we should ask, (1.) whether it is consistent with the idea of perfection or not ? and (2.) whether it is consistent with itself? All political writers agree that citizens should be ex empted from illiberal arts and labours. But they differ as to the means of effecting this end. The Spartan constitution faulty, (1.) Because it allots the illiberal arts to strangers, and gives agriculture to the He- lots. (2.) It does not enforce authority over the women. Hence the women at Sparta, and indeed in all warlike states, grow licentious, owing to the long absence of the male population who are serving in arms. (3.) Too great a share of property is given to the women at Sparta. (4.) The choice of Ephors from the lower ranks is ob- jectionable. (5.) The senators retain their office when they are too old and past their work. iiv ARISTOTLE*S POLITICS. [book II. (6.) The common meals are open to objection as being defrayed by private and not public cost. (7.) The permanency of the post of admiral of the Spar- tan fleet is objectionable. (8.) The end of the Spartan constitution and of the in- stitutions of Lycurgus, namely, war, is a wrong end. As was proved by fact : for Sparta throve, as long as she was engaged in war and acquiring power ; but as soon as she had gained the summit of her ambition, she fell through luxury and licentiousness. Chap. x. — The constitution of Crete is like that of Sparta, though less skilfully contrived. How Lycurgus became acquainted with the legislation of Minos. The natural advantages of the situation of Crete. Analogy between the Spartan Helots and the Cretan serfs — common tables — the Ephors and Cosmi. Objections against the constitution of the senates of Sparta and Crete, as irresponsible {avvK^vQwoL), Practical evil consequences. The insular position of Crete saves it from external at- tacks, and keeps the serfs from revolting. Chap. xi. — The constitution of Carthage is like the two above mentioned : but better ; for it has remained a long time un- changed. Common tables. Council of the " hundred and four,'* answering to the Ephors and Cosmi. The kings or suffetes at Carthage chosen on a better principle than at Sparta. The ruling body chosen on a good principle. Tendency of this state to pass into an oligarchy. Advantages of placing political power in the hands of those only who have a competency. Two points to be remarked in the constitution of Carthage 5 (1.) Admixture of oligarchic and democratical principles. (2.) Pluralism, and its ill effects. Chap. xii. — Different writers on Politics, both statesmen and philosophers. Various opinions concerning Solon. Fusion of different elements in the Athenian system. CHAP. I. — ^in.J ANALYSIS. Iv Aristocratical tendency of the Areopagus ; this was gra- dually diminished as the popular power increased after the Persian war. Solon introduced a plutocracy. His different ranks. Other legislators. BOOK III. This book naturally is divided into two parts. (1.) Chap, i. — v., in which the definition of a citizen and of a city or state is considered. (2.) Chap. vi. — xvii., which discuss succes- sively the various forms of government. Chap. i. — First question, "what is a state It is a whole body or system made up of citizens. What then is a citizen? To answer this, let us first see who are not citizens. Slaves, sojourners, children, degraded persons, {anjuLoi,) are not called citizens, because they have no share in the government. It is this share which constitutes a man a citizen. Ob- jection answered. But in different sta-tes it is not always the same persons who will have the rights of citizens ; ( e. g, in a tyranny the people have no share.) Hence our definition of a citizen will only apply strictly to a democracy or polity ; for no one can be truly a citizen who is absolutely excluded from obtaining civil power. Chap. ii. — The popular definition of a citizen, as a person who has one parent at least a citizen, considered. Its absurdity shown by considering the case of the first founders of a state or a family. The true test of citizenship is the actual right of holding office ; whether justly or unjustly, it matters not. Chap. hi. — The identity of a state is not altered, though its outward form is changed. When may a state be said to be the same ? Its identity does not consist in mere sameness of situation. Is it then in containing the same inhabitants ; as a river or fountain is still the same, though its waters are for ever changing ? Ivi Aristotle's politics. [bock III. No, for the form of government may be changed, though its material part continues the same. It consists therefore, in the same form of government being preserved. Chap. iv. — The good man and the good citizen are not ab- stractedly (cLTiXwc) the same ; nor, consequently, is the virtue of the one and of the other the same. For the virtue of a good man is always the same, since it is the union of all the moral virtues. But that of a good citizen differs w^ith the form of go- vernment ; and in the same state the virtue of some citizens differs from that of others. The virtue of a ruler in a state, and of a good man, may possibly be the same ; and in the best ideal state, the good citizens must also be good men. The peculiar virtue of a ruler is ^poj/r/cic? or prudence. Servile occupations do not befit citizens. In a political government, or that of equals, the citizen must learn how to obey and command ; and therefore, to some extent, the virtue of a good citizen and of a good man may be identical. Chap. v. — Reasons for regarding mechanics as citizens, and also for excluding them from citizenship. In the best state, mechanics and tradesmen will not be citizens. They may be admitted, however, to civil rights in an oligarchy or democracy, especially if they become rich. Chap. vi. — Being about to speak concerning the various forms of government, Aristotle now proceeds to define a common- wealth (TToXtrc/a). The government differs according to the number of hands in which the supreme power is lodged. Man is a social being, and has a natural tendency to asso- ciate with others, even apart from all consideration of per- sonal wants and mutual benefits. The rule of a master over his slave is primarily for the benefit of himself, and accidentally for that of his slave ; but the master of a house rules over his wife and children for their common good as well as his own. CHAP. VII. — IX.] ANALYSIS. Ivii Just so, in states, the ruling body, be it composed of one or of many, may regard the interest of itself only, or that ol the entire community. All those forms of government which regard the common good, are right and proper forms. And those which do not, are perversions or corrupt forms (Trapffc/Bacftc)* Chap. vii. — The various kinds of government. There are three proper kinds, (1.) monarchy, (2.) aris- tocracy, and (3.) a commonwealth. Corresponding to which are their three respective per- versions, (1.) tyranny, (2.) oligarchy, (3.) democracy. The latter are distinguished from the former, by their regarding the interest, not of the community in general, but of the rulers only. Chap. viii. — Tyranny is a despotic monarchy : and the sub- jects of a tyranny are analogous to slaves. The state is an oligarchy when power is exclusively in the hands of the rich ; a democracy, when in the hands of the poor only ; whether they be few or many, in either case it matters not. Still it seldom happens that the rich in an oligarchy are many in number, or that the poor in a democracy are few. Chap. ix. — The Athenians held that a democracy was just ; the Spartans thought in like manner of an oligarchy ; the former considering that every thing should be equal, as the citizens were all equal in liberty ; the latter, that things should be equal among those who were already equal in power and riches. Now neither party are wholly right. For firstly, individuals are bad judges in their own case. And secondly, they are apt to confound what is relatively just with that which is so abstractedly. Virtue and merit, not riches and liberty, ought to have supreme power in the state ; and the best citizens are not the most wealthy or free, but those of the highest virtue. This position proved from considering the end of a state ; which is, not merely life, or mutual aid, or commercial in- tercourse, but a perfect and happy life, sufficiently supplied with external goods, and which looks to virtue as its aim. Will AR1ST0TL.¥'« POLITICS. [bOOK III. Chap. x. — In whose hands ought the supreme power of a state to be lodged ? In the hands of one or of more ? The different inconveniencies which arise under each form of government. Under a democracy, there is danger of the poor laying violent hands on the property of the rich. Under an oligarchy, there is danger lest the wealthy few should tyrannize over the poor. Under an aristocracy, lest the many should be left ex- cluded from honours and office. Under a monarchy, lest all but the reigning sovereign should be excluded. But if any one says that the law should be supreme, the difficulty remains the same ; for the law must be adminis- tered by men, under any form of government, and must be accommodated to that form. Chap. xi. — It is better to lodge power in the hands of the many than of the few. For collectively the citizens will unite many points of ex- cellence which one individual could not possess. It is not however safe to intrust the highest magistracies to a poor and ignorant multitude, nor yet wholly to exclude them from office. They must therefore have a share in deliberative and judicial functions. Thus Solon gave them at Athens the right of election and of scrutiny (evOvyrj), A fusion of the upper and lower classes is good for both and for the state. Brief review of the constitution of Solon. In the professors of the arts there are three grades ; the lowest grade executes practically, another prescribes, while the third and highest studies the theory ; and even the lowest grade, by mere experience, comes to be a fit judge of matters within its own sphere. Just so in political matters, the multitude, even though they know nothing of the political science, and hold no ma- gistracy, Still can form a good practical judgment upon go- vernment in general, and even a better one than those in office, who cannot see their own defects and errors. The supreme power should rest with the laws, if they are just. :nAP. xu. — XIV.] ANALYSIS. DiiAP. XII. — Justice (to diKaior) is the end of the political science. But justice is a certain equality ; and equality is of two kinds, like j ustice itself. In distribution of honours, mere equality or inequality of things is not to be regarded. But the end and interest of the state itself must be taken into account. Dhap. XIII. — If a state contains the rich, the noble, the good, and the multitude, to which of these classes shall the public honours be given ? To answer this, let us first settle whether upright laws ought to regard the interest of the good, or of the multi- tude. Clearly they should refer to the common good : and a citizen w^ll be one who has a share both in governing and in being governed. The citizen differs in each different form of government, etc. As to men of pre-eminent and heroic virtue, if such be found, the supreme power should be given to them ; for they stand in the relation of gods to their fellow-men ; and it is absurd to legislate for such individuals ; for they are a law to themselves. Great pre-eminence, however, in merit or civil power, is an object of suspicion among citizens. Ostracism devised as a remedy against this evil in free states. Corresponding methods adopted in other states. The principle defended from the analogy of the arts. Pre-eminence of political power not to be tolerated ; but the man who is pre-eminent in virtue should be elected king, and receive perfect submission from all. Chap. xiv. — Discussion concerning particular forms of go- vernment ; firstly concerning the right forms, secondly con- cerning their perversions. Is monarchy better adapted for practical purposes than any other form ? , To answer this question, we distinguish the different 1 kinds of monarchy Aristotle's politics. BOOK in. (1.) That established at Sparta ; which is, m fact, a per- petual generalship. (2.) Hereditary ; as among barbarians. (3.) Elective ; called ^symneteia in ancient Greece. (4.) Limited monarchy, such as that of the heroic times. (5.) Absolute and paternal. Chap. xv. — These five kinds may be reduced to two, the ab- solute and the Lacedaemonian forms. Two questions proposed ; (1.) Is it for the interest of the state to have a perpetual monarchy established, as at Sparta ? This question postponed. (2.) Is it better to be under an absolute king, or under the best of laws ? The law does not enter into particular cases, but the king can do so in executing the law. It is absurd, therefore, to go upon a mere written law. On the other hand, the law is not affected by passion as a king is. In the best state, the law and the king should conspire. Is it better to leave the correction of the written law to one or to many ? Three reasons in favour of the latter. Monarchy, as compared with aristocracy, is free from fac- tions ; though if the members of an aristocracy be good, they can be as one man ; hence aristocracy is to be pre- ferred. Monarchy proved to be the more ancient form ; for it was easier to find one good man than many ; and it is only as good citizens increased, that aristocracies supplanted mon- archies, and in turn were supplanted by democracies. The love of wealth and gain next paved the way for oligarchies, which soon were turned into tyrannies, and these at length reverted to the form of democracies. Two questions proposed ; (1.) Whether upon the suppo- sition of a monarchy being the best form, it ought to be made hereditary ? (2.) Whether a king has need of arms and soldiery to support him ? The former question left unsolved : it is bad to have as kings the degenerate sons of noble parents ; but it is na- tural for a parent to bequeath his power to his son. CHAP. XVI. XVII.] ANALYSIS. The second question solved : the king ought to have a sufficient guard to enforce the lav/s. Chap. xvi. — An absolute monarchy not natural. It is better that the law should be supreme, than any citizen. (1.) The citizens being all equal, it is unjust not to give them equal dignity. (The law should be supreme, and the magistrates minis- ters of the law.) (2.) The law is intellect free from all passions, and the supremacy of the law is but the supremacy of God under another name. (The argument supported by the analogy of the medical art.) (3.) Many eyes see better than one eye. (4.) Two good men are better than one. (5.) The policy of kings in power proves the superiority of aristocracy ; for they impart a share of their power to friends. Chap, xvii.— Men are not all fitted to one kind of govern- ment ; but some to a despotism, others to a political state. Three kinds of government are natural ; monarchy, aris- tocracy, and a republic ; the others are unnatural. In a true and well-constituted republic, all the citizens should have a share of rule. Any person of pre-eminent merit ought to be chosen king ; for any other arrangement will involve an inequality and absurdity. The same course of education and training which make a good man, will also make a good citizen or king. BOOK lY. Introductory. — This book contains three parts: (1.) Chap. i. — iii., which treats of states in general. (2.) Chap. V. — xiii., of their different forms. (3.) Chap. xiv. — xvi., the component parts of a free state. Chap. i. — The politician ought to be acquainted with four things ; (1.) What is the best ideal and abstract polity. (2.) What is the best viewed practically. Ixii Aristotle's politics. [book IV. (3.) The nature of the constitution of his own state and its means of preservation. (4.) What government is best suited to all states. Argument drawn from analogy of the arts and sciences. The medical art ought to ascertain the best abstract bodily condition, the same viewed practically, and so forth. The politician ought to study existing forms of govern- ment, and existing laws. Chap. ii. A repetition of what was said in the last book con- cerning monarchy and aristocracy, and the division of governments into natural and unnatural. We come now to consider a polity properly so called ; and also to treat of oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. A tyranny is the worst perversion, as being the corrup- tion of the best form. And consequently a democracy is the least bad perversion. An outline of our future method. Chap. in. — A variety of constituent parts causes a corre- sponding variety in the forms of government. The rich and the poor, the noble and ignoble, etc., con- stitute these different parts. The noble, too, may be so called, from their riches, or their birth, or their personal merit. The error of those who reckon only two forms of govern- ment, oligarchy and democracy. Chap. iv. — The test of a democracy is the supreme power being vested in its poor but free citizens, as superior in numbers to the rest. That of an oligarchy in its being vested in the wealthy citizens, though inferior in numbers. As the various genera of animals are distinguished by the varied composition of their bodily organs, so it is in polities. And their different genera are subdivided into various minuter species. The component parts of a state are eight different classes. Plato censured for introducing into his state none but such as are employed in necessary matters of daily life, omitting such as belong to the liberal arts. CHAP. V. — IX,] ANALYSIS. Ixiii Five classes of democracies ; the last of which is tyran- nical, because the laws are not supreme in it. Chap. v. — Oligarchy distinguished into its four kinds. (1.) When its members are chosen from a high census. (2.) When its members are chosen from a low census, to supply vacancies. (3.) Hereditary. (4.) When the richest individual is chosen, without re- gard to the law or merit. This tyrannical, and called a dynasty. Chap. vi. — Democracy similarly distinguished into its four kinds. In what cases the four kinds of oligarchy are respectively found. Chap. vii. — A polity, properly so called, very rarely found in existence. There are three kinds of aristocracy, to be distinguished from each other. Chap. vin. — A polity or republic. It is an admixture or fusion together of oligarchy and democracy ; its offices being open, as in the former, to the rich, and to the poor, as in the latter. And hence, it is called an aristocracy or a democracy, according as it tends to the one or the other of these extremes. But the name of an aristocracy is not rightly given to it ; for an aristocracy and an oligarchy differ very widely. Chap. ix. — The origin of a polity considered. It arises from a fusion of oligarchic and democratic prin- ciples; and this in three w^ays. (1.) Where a fine is laid on the rich, and pay is given to the poor. (2.) Where the standard is moderate for the admission of citizens to political power. (3.) Where an oligarchic principle (such as election by votes) is combined with a democratic principle (such as election of persons without an income). The first test of a good admixture is, if you are able to call the same state by either name indiscriminately ; for each extreme should be recognised in the mean. ahistotle's politics. ["book IV. Chap. x. — Three kinds of tyranny. (1.) That among bar- barians. (2.) The CEsymnetie. These are not tyrannies, but monarchies, if exercised over willing subjects. Upon this point, see above, book iii. (3.) The last kind is that which is the most perfect coun- terpart to monarchy ; viz. where one individual is supreme and irresponsible, and consults his own interest, and not that of his subjects. Chap. xi. — The best practicable form of government and the happiest state is that in which the middle ranks are very numerous. For the upper ranks, if many, become factious and de- spotic : the lower classes, if they preponderate, produce fraud and malice, and tend to servility. The middle state safest and best. This kind of republic is rarely found, because a large middle class is rare : so democracies and oligarchies pre- vail. The best form of democracy, or of oligarchy, is that which most nearly approximates to this polity ; the worst, which departs furthest from it. Chap. xii. — The conservative element ought to have greater weight and authority in a state than the element which is given to change. There are two things in a state, quality and quantity. By quantity is meant numbers ; by quality, wealth, no- bility, etc. Sometimes the one party excels in quantity, and the other in quality. A democracy is best where the popular party by its quan- tity surpasses the quality of the nobler class ; an oligarchy, where the contrary takes place. The law to be especially directed to the interests of the middle class. The mistakes of statesmen who seek to bend states towards aristocracy. The riches of the wealthy more to be feared than the humble state of the poor ; for the people will easily rise against a wealthy nobility. CHAP. XIII.— XV.] ANALYSIS. IxY CflAP. XIII. — The tricks used by nobles against the poor, and by the poor against the nobles. (1.) The rich nobles cajole the lower orders in matters connected with the assembly, the magistracies, the law courts, the arms, the exercises. (2.) On the contrary, the people have their own weapons of defence ; in oligarchies they fine the rich, in democracies they pay the poor for attendance at the council. In a polity, rightly so called, the chief power lies in the hands of the soldiery. After the cessation of monarchy in Greece, the soldiery constituted the state ; first the cavalry, and second, the foot- soldiers. Chap. xiv. — There are three departments in every republic: the deliberative, the executive, and the judicial. The first of these is the chief. A share in its deliber- ations is either given to all citizens, (in which case it is de- mocratic ;) or else to a few only, (which renders it olig- archic ;) or such a share is given to all in certain matters only ; or to a select few in certain matters. The tendency of the state affected by the mode of elec- tion. It will be aristocratic, if the election is by vote ; de- mocratic, if by lot. Democratical and oligarchical precepts. In democracies pay should be given to the poor for at- tendance ; the rich should be fined for absenting themselves. Persons to be chosen from all ranks for deliberation. In an oligarchy, some few members of the senate should be chosen by the people. Power of deliberation to be given to all members of the state ; but of execution, only to the magistrates. The power of pardon to be given to the many ; of con- demnation, to the magistrates only. Chap. xv. — As to the magistracy, a question arises as to what and how many they should be, perpetual or not, and from what class they should be chosen. A magistrate defined as one who has the right of deliber- ation, of judging, and of ordaining, but especially the last right. With respect to an union of more than one office in a t Aristotle's politics. [book t. single magistrate, it is laid down that in large states such an arrangement is not proper, but necessary in a small one. Different magistracies are n-ecessary in different govern- ments. Magistrates to inspect the behaviour of the youths and of the women. Chap. xvi. — As to the judicial department, there are eight different courts and tribunals. Courts for civil matters. Different modes of electing judges. What method suits a democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy BOOK y. Introductory. — This book, (which, together with the fol- lowing one, Gillies regards as supplemental to the rest, and therefore places last in order, as Books YIT. and YIII.,) contains two parts: (1.) Chap, i — iv. On the causes of thfe preservation and overthrow of democratic states ; (2.) Chap. V. — xii. On those of a monarchy or tyranny. Chap. i. — The origin of all sedition lies in false views of equality. Persons are apt to think that because they are equal in one point, they are equal in all. And hence they desire complete equality. Others, of higher rank, desire not equality, but superiority. How changes of governments take place. (1.) When their form is changed into another. (2.) When the form remains, but the ruling body is changed. (3.) When the form and the ruling body remaining, the government departs from its own theory, or carries out its own principles to a further length. Democracy and oligarchy are practically the most com- mon forms of government. Governments generally fail through being based on a wrong principle at first. An oligarchy is less safe than a democracy, because com- posed of a larger number of individuals of the middle class. Chap. ii. — The first cause of sedition is a false idea of equality. CUAP. III. — Vll.] ANALYSIS. (see chap, i.,) when citizens forget that equality is not ab- solute, but relative. Another is the desire of gain and honours, with fear of their opposites. Several other causes enumerated. CriAP. III. — Further exposition of the eleven causes of se- dition mentioned in the preceding chapter, illustrated by examples. Origin of ostracism. Difference of race, or of site, or of merit, tends to sedition. Historical examples of seditions. Chap. iv. — Republics are sometimes disturbed by seditions on trifling matters ; e. g. by love affairs. Dissensions are the bane of all states. The state suffers perversion by changes of party or of ranks in the state. Two special methods of overthrowing a state ; treachery and violence. Different kinds under each method. Chap. y. — Thus far as to the overthrow of governments in general : now of particular kinds. As to a democracy, it is overthrown by the petulance of mob orators. It generally becomes changed into a tyranny, or an olig- archy, or some better or worse form of democracy. Chap. vi. — As to an oligarchy ; it is overthrown by two especial causes : Either by the violence of the nobles towards the lower orders ; or By the internal dissensions of its rulers. Chap. vii. — An aristocracy is subverted by several causes. By reason of the fewness of those who share in honours. Through the nobles being partly rich and partly poor. If one of the nobles is too pre-eminent ; for so he comes to aim at a tyranny. Through a transgression of justice. This cause is com- mon also to a polity ; and it arises in either case from the fact that the constituent parts of each are not well blended together. i 2 ixviii Aristotle's politics. [book v. All states are mostly changed into that form towards which they naturally incline. Sometimes, however, it is otherwise ; e. g. an aristocracy changes into a democracy, when the popular party are not content with having crushed the nobles, but take the entire government into their own hands. The same happens not only by internal causes, but also by the operation of external causes ; as through the prox- imity of a hostile state, or the plots of a powerful enemy though distant. Chap. viii. — The causes of a state's preservation. The exact observance of the laws, and precautions against innovations. The prudent conduct of the magistrates tow^ards their subjects. The vigilance and concord of the rulers. The settlement of differences by a legislator, and not by chance hands. A fair and equitable census. Precaution against allow- ing any individual to grow too powerful. The creation of a magistrate to see that the citizens con- duct themselves aright towards the state. Care to keep the various parts of the state in due pro- portion. The prevention of persons from making a gain or traffic of government. The good treatment of the ruled by their rulers. Due regulation of property bequeathed. If some advantages are bestowed on those who are not in office. Chap. ix. — The rulers in a state should be patriots, skilled in their duties, and virtuous. To preserve states which are themselves deflexions, me- diocrity must be observed, e. g. Into a democracy some anti-democratic principle should be infused. Danger of an unmixed oligarchy and democracy. In a democracy the demagogues should favour fhe power- ful ; the opposite in an oligarchy. In every state, whether oligarchic or democratic, the CHAP. X. XI.] ANALYSIS. citizens should be educated and trained in a matter suited to it. Chap. x. — Monarchy, and the causes of its destruction. Monarchies reduced to two kinds : monarchy proper, and tyranny. The same causes tend to overthrow a monarchy as other states ; for a monarchy follows the form of an aristocracy, a tyranny that of an oligarchy. Hence tyranny is the worst of all bad forms of govern- ment. Monarchy and tyranny have a different origin ; a king is chosen from the good, for protection ; a tyrant from the commons, for oppression, A tyranny and a monarchy are different in their ends, objects, and circumstances. A tyranny and an oligarchy have in common the pursuit of riches. A tyranny and a democracy have in common their hatred towards the chiefs and leaders of the state. The same things as those above related are the causes of the overthrow and preservation of monarchies. (See above, chap. ii. and iii.) To the above causes we may add ^iXon/x/a, or ambition. The external and internal causes of the overthrow of tyrannies and of monarchies are different. The causes which tend to overthrow tyrannies are the same as those which subvert extreme oligarchies and demo- cracies. Monarchies are seldom destroyed by external causes, but by two internal ones ; viz. discord between the heirs to a throne, and the assumption of illegal powers. Chap. xi. — The means of preserving monarchies are the eon traries to the means of their overthrow. The first cause of preservation is due moderation. A tyranny may be preserved by great cruelty, or by great indulgence. (The object of a tyranny is to corrupt its subjects, and to cause them to distrust each other.) A monarchy is rule over a willing, tyranny over an un- unwilling, people. ixx Aristotle's politics. (^book vi, A tyranny, in order to be stable, should assume, as far possible, the appearance of a monarchy. It should pretend to affability, moderation, and a regard for religion and virtue. A tyrant should try to be neither exactly good nor bad, but rjixLTTovrjpdc /cat i}fJii^pr]aT6c^ half good and half wicked. Chap. xii. — Of all forms of government, oligarchy and tyranny are the least stable. Reason why such is the case. Censure of the errors of Plato concerning the changes to which states are subject. First, Plato assigns as a cause the general flux in which all things are, and explains the reason by his theory of harmonic numbers. But numbers cannot be causes of such changes. Some are by nature so bad that they cannot be made good by any means. Secondly^ Plato asserts that these changes take place in a fixed order and method ; but states do not always change into the same kind of forms. Thirdly, He has laid down nothing concerning tyranny. Fourthly, He has made oligarchy not one form of .govern- ment, but two. Lastly, He asserts that an oligarchy always changes into a democracy. BOOK YI. Introductory. — This book comprises three parrs ; (1.) Chap. i. Explanation of the method and matter contained. (2.) Chap. ii. — vi. Further dissertations on democracy and oligarchy, which is a kind of appendix to Book IV. (3.) Chap. vii. viii. Treating of the various kinds of magistrates. Chap. i. — A brief repetition of what has been already laid down in books IV. and V., concerning the senate, the ma- gistrates, and the judicial body, as also concerning the cor- ruption and preservation of states. The union and fusion of the democratic and oligarchic forms of government. Democracies are of various kinds — reasons why such is the case. CHAP 11. — IV.] ANALYSIS. ixxs Chap. ii. — Liberty the end of democracy. Two notes of liberty : first, a share of governing and be- ing governed alternately. Second, the right of living at will. Hence these two things are the concomitants of demo- cracy. The institutions of a democracy are, (1.) The election of magistrates from the whole body of citizens. (2.) That all shall have power over each and each over all (3. The election of magistrates by lot. (4.) The absence of a fixed census as a qualification for ofiice. (5.) That no office be held twice, (6.) nor for a perma- nency. (7.) That all shall have the right of judging overall causes. (8.) The supremacy of the ecclesia, or popular assembly, over the /3ouX?/, or senate. (9.) Pay to be given to certain magistrates. The jSovXrj will have greater power when no pay is offered to the people for their attendance in the ecclesia, or in the courts of justice. Chap. in. — The rights of the people in a democracy. Is the decision of the majority, or of the leaders, or of the wealthy few, to be binding ? That which is affirmed by the majority of both rich and poor should be deemed binding. One rich man's vote should be equal to that of two poor men. If the votes are equal, the matter must be decided by lot, or by some other way. Chap. iv. — Of the four kinds of democracies, the earliest or agricultural kind is the best. The people should have conceded to them the right of electing their magistrates and of calling them to account. It is bad to exclude any section of the community from office, as such a proceeding tends to foster seditions. The best method of appointing and regulating the magis» tratea. Aristotle's politics. [book VI. Agrarian regulations — share of land held by each person to be limited by law. Of the other kinds, that which is composed of shepherds is best. Other kinds of democracies — the last and worst — the reason why it is not apt to be permanent. A democracy should be strengthened by taking care that the plebs out-number the rest ; by an increase in the tribes ; by confiscating private sacred rights ; by a general fusion of all ranks and classes ; and by giving general licence to in- dulgence. Chap. v. — Care to be taken not only in appointing, but also in preserving a state. The property of the citizens not to be confiscated, but to be consecrated. Trials to be as few as possible — so also meetings of the popular assembly. The people not to be suffered to sink too deeply into poverty. Five means of preserving the people from poverty enu- merated. Chap. vi. — As to an oligarchy, the means of preserving it are to be inferred from what has been said upon the subject of democracy. In the best and purest oligarchy, the highest magistracies should be given to those who have the highest census, the lesser to those who are poorer. It is for the interest of an oligarchy to confer some lesser offices on men of slender means. In the second kind of oligarchy a higher census is to be required, so that fewer persons may be in ofiice. The third and worst kind is most tyrannical, and requires the greatest attention. A large number of citizens suits a democracy, a smaller number, if well ordered, suits an oligarchy. CnAP. vii. — The commonalty divided into four classes suited to a peaceable life, and four warlike classes. CHAP, vm.] ANALYSIS. The worst kind of oligarchy will arise where the land is suited to cavalry, The middle kind of oligarchy, where the land is suited to foot-soldiers. Light-armed troops and seamen suit a democracy. Light-armed troops to be mixed with the hoplites and eavalry. Circumstances under which the plebeians in an oligarchy may be chosen for office. The duty of rulers in oligarchies to give sumptuous " liturgies." Chap. vin. — Magistrates, civil, religious, and extraordinary. What civil magistrates are indispensable to the existence of a state. Six different offices enumerated. Some other magistrates of a higher order enumerated. Religious magistrates — priests. Extraordinary magistrates — officers to superintend the women and children — the theatres and games — Nomo- phylaces. What magistrates are suited to each respective form of government. BOOK VIL Introductory. — This book contains three parts. (I.) Chap. i. — iv. Prefatory — concerning the best state and the best life. (2.) Chap. v. — xiii., containing certain principles as to the theoretic construction of a state. (3.) Chap. xiv. — xvii., in which Aristotle commences the practical considera- tion of the education, training, matrimony, etc., of the citizens of the best state, which he continues throughout the next book, to the end of his treatise, at least as it exists in its pre- sent state. Chap. i. — The politician should have clear views of the best life, for this and the best form of government cannot be disjoined. The happiest life is that which is based on virtue ; and our happiness is proportioned to our virtue. That a life of virtue is best for a state, may be proved Ixxiv Aristotle's politics. [book m by the same arguments which prove it to be the best for individuals. External goods come in as auxiliaries (xop^yyta). Chap. ii. — The chief good of the state is identical with that of the individual ; viz. happiness. Those therefore who regard happiness as consisting in riches, make riches the end of a state ; and so forth. So also with reference to virtue. Two questions proposed: first, Whether the philoso- phical or political life is superior ? Secondly, What is the best form of government ? That is to be regarded as the best government, in which a man can live the best. But as to the former question, a dispute is raised. Some propose dominion over neighbours, as the end of states, and estimate virtue by warlike prowess. Reasons why the latter end cannot be right, and why such a state cannot be perfect or happy. War not to be regarded as an end, but as a means. The duty of a politician is to consider the true interest and happiness of the citizens. Chap. hi. — Is the political or contemplative life to be pre- ferred ? Reasons for preferring the latter — " the life of a citizen is servile." Reasons for entertaining the contrary opinion — the contemplative life is indolent, and works no good." Aristotle answers that not all obedience to government is servile. Reasons for preferring upon the whole the political and practical life. Mistake of politicians as to the practical life. There are higher kinds of actions even than the carrying out of the details of government. Philosophers, in consulting and advising, follow this higher line of action. Character of the actions of God. Chap. iv. — The best and most perfect form of government requires certain external conditions, e. g. population, a fit site, climate, etc. CHAP. V. — IX.] ANALYSIS. Only things practicable are to be desired. Hence Plato's errors. The real power of the citizens not to be reckoned by their mere numbers ; the best city will be the greatest. Slaves, and low mechanics, etc., are not parts of the state in reality. Too large a population not to be regarded as a sign of strength : it is not easily managed by the law. States, like every thing besides, should have a certain definite size — the best size is one such as can be controlled by the laws, while it makes the state independent, and en- ables the citizens to become known to each other. Chap. v. — The site of the city should possess various advan- tages. It should be self-sufficient in productiveness : Inaccessible to enemies ; easy of access to its own mem- bers : Commodious for sea and land traffic. Chap. vi. — Commerce by sea profitable to the state. Advantages and dangers arising from commerce. Too large a force of sailors not to be maintained in the best state. Chap. vn. — The citizens of this state ought to be ingenious and brave. The particular merits of the European and northern na- tions ; their bravery. Character of the Asiatics ; the reasons of it. The middle position of Creece ; its advantages. Influence of climate on national temperament. Civil war most deadly in its character and results. Chap. viii. — Many things necessary to a state, but not parts of it ; e. g. food. Things necessary for a state. Chap. ix. — In a democracy, diffijrent offices may be combined in one individual. Illiberal arts and trades forbidden to the citizens of the best state. Military power to be intrusted to the young ; political lo the elder. ixxvi Aristotle's politics. |_BOOK VTL Some amount of wealth necessary for the citizens. The priestly order to be chosen from the upper ranks. Chap. x. — Things invented at the earliest date are most ne- cessary. The land should be partly public and partly private ; an I each of these divided again into two portions. The tillers of the land should be a servile race. Chap. xt. — In choosing a site, regard should be had to health, to security from attack, to a good supply of water^ etc. A lofty acropolis suits a monarchy or oligarchy ; a level plain suits a democracy ; a quantity of strong places suits an aristocracy. Private houses how to be arranged. Chap. xii. — The public tables to be held on the ramparts. Temples of the gods to be set apart from profane uses. The gymnasia; the forum; syssities of the priests and magistrates. Regulations for the country districts. Temples to be consecrated to the gods and heroes. Chap. xiii. — To be happy, one must choose a good end and good means. All seek happiness ; but the good need fewer things than the bad in order to attain to it. The test of a good state is the goodness of its citizens ; and men become good by nature, by habit, and by reason. Chap. xiv. — Internal discipline. Interchange of govern- ment requisite, except where a person of heroic virtue is found. Obedience the best stepping-stone towards command. War to be sought for the sake of peace. Hence the error of the Spartan constitution. Chap. xv. — Philosophy more necessary in the time of peace. Moral virtues required both in peace and in war. The body to be taken care of before the soul in order of time ; but only for the sake of the soul. The passions to be disciplined for the sake of the in- tellect. Chap. xvi. — The legislator should regulate the marriage of the citizens. CHAP. XVII. J ANALYSIS. Age for marriage — time of year — state of health. Abortion allowed as a chsck to population. Chap. xvii. — Early rearing of children — diet — manner of life. Amusements — exercise — fables and stories. Periods of life for a change in education ; at seven ; at fourteen ; and at twenty-one. Manhood. BOOK VIII. Introductory. — Contains seven chapters, all on the in- struction of the young ; comprising gymnastics, grammar, painting, and music. The book, as well as the entire treatise, has come down to us in a mutilated form. See observations above, p. xvii. Chap. i. — The legislator ought to take cognizance of the edu- cation of the youth ; this proved by expediency. All education should be directed by the same pattern and to the same end. And, as the part exists for the sake of the whole, this end should be the good of the state. Chap. ii. — Children first to be taught such useful arts as are not illiberal and mean. It is not illiberal to study the liberal arts to a certain point ; but they should not be studied to excess.^ To study them for their own sake, or for one's own sake, or for that of one's friends, is not illiberal, but to do so for money is mercenary. Chap, hi, — The arts to be learned by youths are, (1.) Gram- mar and painting. (2.) Gymnastics. (3.) Music for recreation, rather than as a mere diversion. Youths to be handed over when young to the wrestler and trainer. Chap. iv. — Gymnastics not to be enforced so far as to injure health, and so defeat their end. Mistake of the Spartans. Bravery not so often to be found in fierce as in gentler creatures. ^ Du Vallius in his Synopsis suggests as an example in point, the case of Louis XI. of France, who would not allow his son, afterwards Charles VIII., to study literature. Ixxvlii Aristotle's politics. [book VIII. The same true of men. After the fourteenth year, should follow a space of three years spent in harder exercises. • The body and the mind not to be severely exercised at once. Cha?. v. — On what account should music be cultivated ? For recreation, and for moral improvement. The moral effects of music. Moral effects produced by some paintings. The Doric and Phrygian harmonies ; their opposite effects. The Pythagorean and Platonic schools identify the soul with harmony.^ Chap. vi. — Youths should learn music in order to practise it hereafter, as a source of amusement. But not to an excess, nor on all instruments.^ Chap. vii. — Three kinds of harmony : the moral ; the prac- tical ; and the enthusiastic. Various ends and objects of music : purification of the affections. (See Poetics.) All harmonies to be used, but not in the same way. The harmony to be suited to the hearer. The Doric is of a moral kind, as between Lydian and Phrygian. Different harmonies suit the old and the young.^ ^ Aristotle refutes this opinion in his first book de Anima. ^ Thus Alexander the Great, we are told, was severely censured by his father Philip, because he played skilfully on the lyre, "quod eximie fidibus caneret." Plut. in Pericle. ^ We append here the remarks of the learned Du Vail on this last chapter. " Sic finit Politica sua Aristoteles, quibus multa deesse vel hinc apparet, quod in puerorum institutione adhuc versetur. Conatus est Cyriacus Stroza, Patricius Florentinus, ea supplere quae deesse videban- tur, duobus libris Graece et Latine a se ad Aristotelis miram imitationem editis ; ubi agit de facultate militari, principali, et sacerdotali. In quos suos libros ipse posuit argumentum satis clarum et facile. Quanquam Hubertus Gifanius Jurisconsultus duos illos Strozae libros non satis con* Tenienter institute Aristotelis scriptos esse dicat." ANALYSIS OP AEISTOTLE'S ECONOMICS. { Prefatory Remarks. — Like " Politics," it is to be ob served that the term " Economics," in the language of ancient Greek philosophy, had a much wider signification than it now bears with us. It is almost superfluous to remark that, in the language of Aristotle, it signifies the science or art (for it is both) of managing and providing for the well-being of a fa- mily, (oTkoq,) the first natural combination to which man's social nature disposes him. See Politics, Book I. chaps, i. ii. viii. and xiii. If the Politics of Aristotle have come down to us in an imperfect state, much more is this the case with his Eco- nomics, which only just introduce the subject of domestic rule. The relation in which the Economics stand to the whole sys- tem of Aristotle's moral philosophy, as holding a middle post between his Ethics and Politics, has been already sufficiently touched upon in the introductory note, prefixed above, to the first book of the Politics (page xvii.). It only remains for the editor to add, that while some critics have gone so far as to doubt the genuineness of the first book of the Economics, a much greater suspicion, in the opinion of all, hangs over the second book ; and that it existed for many ages only in a Latin version, from which it was translated back again into Greek by Aretinus or Tusanus. Sylburgius regards the whole of the second book as spurious, and in fact believes the chap- ters of which it consists to have been "supposita ab Aretino, non con versa." However, he follows Camerarius in admitting what is generally known as the first chapter, as standing on a somewhat difierent footing from the rest, and accordingly he prints it as belonging to Book I. It should be observed, how- ever, that Plutarch, in his Life of Aristotle, expressly attributes to Aristotle two books on the subject of the economic art. We have, therefore, given the whole of the so-called second book in this edition ; the translation of it is entirely original, Ixxx Aristotle's economics. [books i. ii. and it is believed that no attempt has hitherto been made to present the reader with an English version. BOOK I. Chap. i. — Economics distinguished from Politics, (1.) By their subjects. (2.) By their objects. The economic art is onev^hich both provides and executes. It is anterior in point of time to the political art or science. Chap. ii. — A repetition of sundry arguments already given in Politics, I. chaps, i. and ii., as to the origin of civil society. Chap. hi. — The conjugal relation ; its ends and objects. The providence of God shown in this respect. The share of the man and of the woman as to property, and as to the education of children. Chap. iv. — The husband may not injure the wife by adultery. It is better to marry a maiden. Display in dress to be avoided. Chap. v. — The herile relation. A master's duty towards his slaves. Slaves of two kinds. Liberty ought to be given as the reward of good behaviour. Chap. vi. — The duty of an olKorofioQ is to procure, preserve, and use property. Certain practical precepts relative to domestic economy. BOOK II. Chap. i. — ^Four kinds of economy : the monarchical, the sa* trapical, the political, and private or domestic. Subdivisions of the above. Chap, ii.— xli. — Clever artifices by which individuals have collected large sums of money. " Sed hac sola indigent lectione, ut intelligantur." END OP analysis. i ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS. OR, TREATISE ON" GOYEENMENT. INTRODUCTORY NOTE. Politics, or the political science, (as has been observed in the Ana* lytical Introduction to the Ethics,) was understood by Aristotle, and indeed by ail the ancient philosophers, not in the narrow and restricted «ense to which modern ideas have confined it, but as a science investi- gating the subject of human good and the nature of man, not merely as an individual, but as a member of the family and of the state. Hence it naturally divides itself into three corresponding parts ; Ethics, which treat of man's nature and good, apart from the social relations ; and Economics and Politics, which view him under the social relations of the family {oIkoq) and the state {ttoXlq) respectively. Occasionally, however, the word ttoXltlkt] is used in a wider, as well as in its nar- rower, sense, both as embracing the two other branches, and as ex- clusive of them. In the last chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Arist. speaks of education, and shows that it is the duty of every state to educate its members, and that the study of legislation is necessary in order to qualify persons to undertake the education of others, he expresses his intention to write at length upon the subject of poli- tics ; and in the last words of the chapter, he even goes so far as to sketch out the three divisions of the present treatise, thus : " Since ... all former authors have passed over without examination the subject of legis- lation, it would be better perhaps for us to examine it ourselves, and, in short, the whole subject of politics, in order that the philosophy of human nature may, as far as in our power, be completed Let us then make a commencement." (Eth. x. ch. 9.) The present treatise is that to which he here refers ; and it is divisible into three general parts, (1.) B, i. and ii. (2.) B. iii. — vi. (3.) B. vii. and viii. The following table of the division of Philosophy in general, according to the Stoic and the Peripatetic schools respectively, will be useful. It may be observed in passing that Cicero mainly follows the former of these di- visions, Aristotle the latter. 1. ^vGiKT] (the laws of nature). 2. rjOiKY], or TToXiTLKT] (moral or political sci« ence; that of human nature). 3. XoyiKYi (the exact sciences). A. Stoical division. Of (pLXotJOfpia. > . Peripatetic division. Of ' 1 n ±^ /» ^ The knowledge proper use oi his slaves, lor the oince oi a master ofa master d f- lies in the employment, not in the mere possession ^^-^^^l ^^^^ of them. Not that this knowledge contains any thing great or lofty ; for what a slave ought to know how to do, that a master ought to know how to order. For this reason, those who have it in their power to be free from such toilsome matters, employ a steward for this business, and apply themselves either to public atfairs or philosophy. [But the knowledge of procuring property^ is different from either of the above ; and this, in order to be just, must be either by war, or hunting.] And let thus much suffice as to the distinction of a master and a slave. CHAP. VIII. But since a slave was laid down to be a part of property, let us make a general inquiry intc the nature of property, and the acquisition of money, according to the manner we have proposed. In the first place, then, some one may is^^p^^aT^tfT.K,', question whether the getting of money is the same the same as thing as economics,^ or whether it is a part of it, parTont ? or * r/ KTtjTiKrj — scil. raiv xPVH^^t^'^' Both Taylor and Ellis understand it in this sense. But probably the whole paragraph is an interpolation, and as it stands, it involves an obvious contradiction. * OiKovojuLiKr) is part of Tro^LTiKrj ; and kttjtikt], or xp^i"«7-t(TriK-i7 — (for the words seem to be used here loosely and indiscriminately) — is in some degree a part of oUovofXLKrj ; e. g. that part of KTrjTiKrj which provides food for the members of an olicog. 'H Krrjnicrj may be thus divided : I rwv fxtj auTO(pvTov €xoj/ra)v r^yi^ tpyacnav. |^ ^ KaTrrjXiKrj I / a. i) vofxaciKotv. ■ roiv avrotpVTOv ixovnov rrjv Ipyaaiav. \ jS. rj ynopyiKusv. ' y. r'f bijpiifTiKutv. 18 Aristotle's politics. [book I. Bubserrien*. to or something subservient to it ; and if so, whether " it is as the art of making shuttles is to the art of weaving, or as the art of making brass to that of statue- founding ; for they are not subservient in the same way ; for the one supplies the tools, the other the matter ; and by the matter I mean, that out of \\ hlch the work is finished ; as, for instance, wool is the matter of the clothier, and brass of the sta- tuary. It is evident then that the getting of money and why .^"^^ ' Same thing as economy, for the business of the one is to furnish the means, of the other to use them. For what art is there but economics, to make use of what is in the house ? Still there is a doubt, wheth^ we%e- whether this is a part of economics, or something of gard it as a a different kind ; for if it is the business of him who ordinate.^ ' is to get money, to find out how riches and pos- sessions may be procured, and if possessions and wealth embrace various parts, we must first ^ ascertain whe- ther the art of husbandry is a part of money-getting, or some- thing different, and whether [the same is not true of] the care and acquisition of provisions in general. But as there are many sorts of provision, so is there a variety hves*ofmeii* Hves both of men and of the brute crea- tion : and as it is impossible to live without food, the difference in that particular makes the lives of animals so different from each other. Now of beasts, some live in herds, others separate, as is most convenient for procuring them- selves food ; as some of them live upon flesh, others on fruit, and others on whatsoever they light on, for nature has dis- tinguished their course of life, so that they can with ease make choice of such things. And as the same things are not agreeable to all, but one animal likes one thing and another another, the lives of carnivorous beasts must be different from the lives of those who live on fruits ; and in like manner is i. with men ; for their lives differ greatly from each other. Now of these, the idlest is the nomad life ; for their food comes from the flesh of tame animals, without any trouble, while they sit at ease ; and as their cattle of necessity keep changing their place on account of pasture, they too are compel- led to follow with them, cultivating, as it were, a living farm. * The word oifrrt, in the text of Bekker and others, is plainly corrupt We hav? adopted Goettling's emendation, yvaxiTeov norepov, k. t. \. CHAP. VIII. J VARIETY OF LIVES. 10 Other men live by the chase, some hunting this thing, and others that ; some by freebooting, and some by fishing ; as for example, those who live near lakes and marshes, and rivers, or the sea itself ;^ while others are fowlers, or hunters of wild beasts. But the greater part of mankind live upon the produce of the earth, and its cultivated fruits. Such, for the most part, are the lives of those who labour for their own subsistence, and without procuring their provision by way of exchange or merchandise ; such are shepherds, husbandmen, freebooters, fishermen, and hunters : some join different em- ployments together, and thus live very agreeably, supplying those deficiencies which are wanting to make their mode of life independent. Thus, for instance, some persons will join tosrether the life of a nomad and a freebooter, or of a hus- bandman and a hunter ; and so with respect to the rest, they pursue that mode of life to which necessity conspires to com- pel them. Now such a power of providing food seems to be taught to all animals by Nature herself, as well immediately upon their first birth, as also when they are arrived at maturity. For with respect to the first of these periods, some of them, together with their young, produce nourishment which is sufficient until their new-born ofiTspring can get food for itself; as is the case with those which are vermiparous and oviparous ; and as to those which bring forth their young alive, they have within themselves the means for their subsistence for a certain time, namely, milk. It is evident then that we may conclude^ that plants are created for the sake of animals, and all other animals for the sake of man ; the tame for our use and provision ; the wild, at least the greater part, for our provision also, or for some other advantage, as in order to furnish us with clothes, and the like purposes. Since, therefore. Nature makes nothing either imperfect or in vain, it necessarily follows that she has made all these things for the sake of J^o. ""^^ man. For this reason the art of war is, in some • The common reading, and that which Bekker retains, is roiavrr\Vy which must be rendered, " such as is suited to their mode of hfe/* Per- haps, however, it is better to read avrrjv, with Coraes. ^ The word yevojikvoiQ here occurs in Bekker's text. We have not retained it in our translation, as it has clearly crept into the text from thi; preceding line. Goetthng and others omit it as evidently a mistake of uouie po^udst. c *i 20 Aristotle's politics. [book 1, TrXoi^To? de- fined. sense, a part of the art of acquisition ;^ for hunting is a part of it, which it is necessary for us to employ against wild beasts, and against those of mankind who, being intended by nature for slavery, are unwilling to submit to it ; and on this One kind of o^casion, such a war is by nature just. That KTr^TcK^j, name- spccics of acquisition, then, only which is accord- is Vlpf rjJ^'^Il nature, is part of economy ; and this ought is part of oUo- to be at hand, or if not, it should be immediately von x.t]. procured, by those whose office it is to keep in store what is useful as well for the state community as for the family. And true riches would seem to consist in these ; and the independent possession of those things which are necessary for a happy life is not infinite ; though Solon speaks otherwise in this verse, "No bounds to riches can be fixed for man for a bound may be fixed here, as in all other arts ;^ for the instruments of no art whatsoever are infinite, either in their number or their magnitude ; but riches are a number of in- struments in domestic and civil economy. It is therefore evi- dent that there is a natural art of acquisition, both in domestic and civil economy, and for what reason. CHAP. IX. , . There is also another kind of acquisition, which a kind of^r^;- men Specially call pecuniary, and with great jus- be lithe? ^tf/e^ ^icc too ; and by this indeed it seems that there or oi>vaei,]\\&t are no bounds to riches and wealth. Now many as all things » , . i x* i have a natural pcrsous supposc, irom their near relation to each ^ Under his KvijriKi^ Aristotle classes TroXtjut/cr). This Tvould be true in a rude age, when the rule of might was right, when pirates were gen- tlemen, and every one was forced to subsist by plunder (vivere rapto). VVarfare would range under KTrjriKri, when undertaken for want of slaves, for a slave is above defined as Krrifxa ^iJixpvxov. But is there not a little inconsistency in tbis sentence ? For above Aristotle has said that a cap- tive is a vofKp dovXoQ, and that it is unjust to enslave the free. Here he Bays the same is a just war. Again, " ocn." 24 Aristotle's politics. [book l pursuit. For they each employ the same thing, but not in the same manner ; for the end of the one is something beyond itself, but the end of the other is merely to increase it ; so that some persons are led to believe that this is the proper object of economy, and think that for this purpose In the above j. \' j. x t_ i sense xpnua- they ought to contiuue to save or to hoard up Ti i i and a child are should both be that 01 tree persons, but not the to be governed, ^^^q . f^j. ^j^g ^jfg g^Quld be treated as the member of a state, but the children should be under kingly rule ; for the male is by nature made to rule over the female, except when something happens contrary to the usual course of nature ; as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and Difference of imperfect. Now in the generality of free states^ tween^^o\^Tt«^ govcmors and the governed alternately and /SaatXiKt] change place ; for an equality without any pre- apxri- ference is what nature chooses ; however, when one governs and another is governed, she endeavours that a distinction shall be made between them, in forms, expressions, and honours ; according to what Amasis said of his laver.^ This then should be the established rule between the male * For further instances the reader can refer to the Economics, book ii. passim. ^ The story of Amasis and the laver, out of which a statue had been made, may be seen in Herodotus, ii. 172, — (pdg iic rov TroSavLTrrijpog r(»iya\fia ysyovkvai' ijdrj ojv, acprj Xtywv, ouoiinc clvtoq TTodaviTrrij^i iriTrpyjysvaL. CHAP. Xin.] DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT. 29 and the female. The government of children should be kingly ; for the power of the father over the child is founded on both affection and seniority ; and this is a species of kingly government; for which reason Homer very properly calls Jupiter " Father of gods and men," as being the king of all of them. For it is required that a king should be of the same species with those whom he governs, though naturally supe- rior ; as is the case between the elder and the younger, and between the father and the son. CHAP. XIII. It is evident then that, in the due government of a family, greater attention should be paid to its mutnoortcT^ several members than to the mere gainino; of inan- f^^^^^^^®, . a ^ n hoUSehold. imate things ; and to the virtues oi the lormer rather than of the latter, (and this we term wealth ;) and greater regard to those of freemen than of slaves. But can a slave here some one mav question whether there is anv P^^^^^j apern, • 11 i«i beyond per- other virtue m a slave than his mechanical ser- formance of bo- vices, and of higher estimation than these, as tem- ^^^^ labour ? perance, fortitude, justice, and other such like habits, or whether slaves possess none beyond mere bodily qualities. Each side of the question has its difficulties ; for if they possess these virtues, wherein will they differ from freemen? and .since they are men, and partakers of reason, it is absurd to say that they do not. Nay, nearly the same in- quiry may be made concerning a woman, and a chUd^^^^^ child, whether these also have their proper virtues, whether a woman ought to be temperate, brave, and just, and whether a child can be unbridled and temperate or not ; ^ and indeed this inquiry ought to be made in general, whether the virtues of those who by nature either govern or are governed, are the same, or different. For if it is necessary that both of them should partake of noble charac- p^firgenerai. ter, why is it necessary that the one should alw^ays govern, the other always be governed ? Surely this difference cannot be merely one of degree ; for to govern, and to be ^ Goettling (p. 303) takes a different view of Aristotle's meaning here, and says aKoXaarov esse, quod vitio vertitur servo, laudabile est in puero. cLKoXacTia puerilis est immatura fortitudo. Quis enim dvdpiap pueri esse dicat ? " 30 Aristotle's politics. [book I. governed, are things different in species, but more or less are not. And yet it is strange that the one party ought to have ihem, and the other not ; for if he who is to govern shall not be temperate and just, how can he govern well? or if he is to be governed, how can he be governed well ? for he who is intemperate and a coward, will never do what he ought. It is evident, then, that both parties ought to partake of virtue, but that there must be some difference of virtue between them, Different Apexai there is between those who by nature command of the ruler and thosc who by nature obey. This is sug- an e ru e . g^g^^^j ^]^^ g^^j ; for in this there is implanted by nature one part that rules and one that obeys ; and the virtues of these we say are different, as are those of a rational and an irrational being. It is plain then that the same prin- ciple may be extended to the case of the others, so that there is by nature a variety of things which e^overn The a peraJ of J TV^ T 1 • each differ ac- and are governed. JNow a freeman governs his cording to their giavc in One manner, the male governs the female in another, and in another manner the father go- verns his child ; and all these have the different parts of the soul within them, but in a different manner. Thus a slave can have no deliberative faculty,^ a woman but a weak one,^ a child an imperfect one. Thus also must it necessarily be with respect to moral virtues ; it must be supposed that all must possess them, though not in the same manner, but as is best „ suited to the several ends of each. Hence, by the must^be per- way, he who is to govern ought to be perfect in feet in r.diKn moral virtue, — (for his business is entirely that of a master artificer, and reason is the master arti- ficer;) — while others want only that portion of it which may be sufficient for their station : and hence it is evident, that although moral virtue is common to all those of whom we have spoken, yet the temperance of a man and of a woman are not the same, nor their courage, nor their justice, as Socrates thought ;^ for the courage of the man consists in commanding, ^ If however this be the case with the cpixrei ^ovXoq, the question natur- ally arises, " why educate him at all ? and how shall he be educated ? " Here is clearly an inconsistency; for at the end of the present chapter Aristotle says that " slaves need education even more than children." This dicvpov PovXevTiKov of the wife nearly corresponds to (jvviaig. E?h. vi. 10. • ]lefer< "^e is here made to the opinion given by Socrates in the lie- TitiK SLAVE, THE WIFE, AND THE CHILD. si the woman's in obedience. And the same is true in all other particulars, and this will be evident to those who will examine the matter in detail ; for those who use general terms deceive themselves, when they say that virtue consists in a good dis- position of mind, or in doing what is right, or something of this sort. They do much better who enumerate the different virtues as Georgias did, than those who thus de- fine them, and hence we ought to think of all per- J^q^^I^^'^ sons, as the poet says of a woman, Silence is woman's ornament,*' ^ but it is not the ornament of a man. But as a child is incomplete, it is evident that his virtue is Ji^echm! not to be referred to himself, but to the full-grown man, and to him whom he obeys. In like manner, the virtue of a slave is to be referred to his master ; for we laid it down as a maxim, that the use of a slave is to be employ- ed in what is wanted ; so that it is clear enough ^^e\tave!^ that but little virtue is required in him, only just so much as that he may not neglect his work through intem- perance or cowardice. Here some person may question (supposing what I have said is true) whether r^j^^ ^^^^^.^ virtue will not be necessary for artificers in their an artificer calling ; for they often neglect their work through intemperance But the diiference between the two cases is very great ; for a slave partakes of animal life, but the arti- ficer is something more than this ; ^ as near therefore as the artificer approaches to the slave, just so much ought he to have of the virtues of one, for a mean artificer has a certain distinctive kind of slavery ; but then a slave is one of those things which are by nature what they are, though this is not public of Plato, to the effect that women are equally fit with men to un- dertake civil offices and duties. See Plato Rep. b. ii. ch. 5, in. ' This line occurs in Sophocles Ajax, 1. 291. The words are spoken by the hero to his slave Tecmessa. ^ 6 TroppujTspov. Passow says that " no example of this form is found." It is just therefore to regard this passap:e with suspicion as not entirely sound. Perhaps we ought to read dXX ov Troppwrfpw, " but no further than this;" in other words, he enjoys t,(hr] but not fiioq, which at once implies tt^cl'^iq. If however we read the passage as it stands at pr«>sent, we must render it thus; "But he (the artificer, rexvi'rjjc) is something more.** 82 Aristotle's politics. [book l ^ equally true of a shoemaker, or of any other artist.* Slaves must be . . , ^ ^, , ^ , i *: , i . ■. trained to vir- It is evident then that a slave ought to be trained masters^^^'^ to such Virtue by his master ; and not in the way in w^hich a master would teach him mere servile drudgery. Those therefore are in the wrong who would de- prive slaves of reason, and say that they have only to follow their orders, for slaves want more instruction than children ; thus, then, let us determine as to this matter. But it is ne- cessary, in a treatise upon government, to enter particularly into the relations of husband and wife, and of parent and child, and to show what are the virtues of each and their respective connexions with each other, what is right and what is wrong ; and how they ought to follow the good, and avoid the evil. We must seek ^^^^^ ^^^^^ every family is part of a state, and theapeT»7ofthe cach of thosc individuals is part of a family, fng^itsYndw^ virtue of the parts ought to have regard dual members to the virtue of the wholc ; it is necessary to in- struct both the wives and children of the commu- nity, as to the nature thereof, inasmuch as it is of some conse- quence to the virtue of the state that the wives and children therein should be virtuous. And of consequence it necessarily is, for the wives compose one half of the free persons ; and of the children the succeeding citizens are to be born. As then we have determined these points, we will leave the rest to be considered in another place ; and^ as if the subject was now finished, let us begin again anew, and first consider the senti- ments of those who have treated of the most perfect form of government. * The slave then must be brought by his master to such apcr^ as this, and not merely instructed according to the way that a master would teach him mere servile duties. Td kxovra tCjv ipywv, ''ea quae ad servilia mu- nera necessario pertinent." * These words refer to the question discussed at greater length in b vii. and viii. — that of education in relation to the state. CHAT. I. ] THE BEST POLITY. 8S BOOK II.— CHAP. I. Since then we propose to inquire what civil to find what ii society is of all others best ^ for those who have it ^^st go- *; . • . , . . vernment, let in their power to live entirely as they wish, it is us examine necessary to examine into the polities adopted in ^^^^^^"e ^"'■"^8. those states which are allowed to be well governed, and in any others which may chance to have been described by writers, and appear properly regulated, in order that we may note what is right and useful in them. And as to our seeking for something beyond these states, let it not be re- garded as an affectation of wisdom ; but let us have the credit of setting ourselves to this systematic work, because there are great defects in those which are already established. And we must begin first with that part of the subject which na- turally is the foundation of our discussion. Now the members of every state must of necessity have all things in common, or nothing at all in common, or some things in common and not others. To have nothing in common is evidently impossible, for the social state itself is a species of community ; and the first thing necessary is a common place of habitation, namely, the city ; this too must be one, and every citizen must have a share in this one state. But in a ' Having in the first book laid down the elements of which states are composed, Aristotle proceeds next in order to discuss the question, *' What is the best form of government ?" and he examines it in a prac- tical way, and with a practical object. There are three possible ways of examining this question : 1. Ideally. Which is the most perfect conceivable theory, irrespective of practicability ? 2. Really. Which is the best form of government now in existence ? 3. Practically. Which is the best and most suitable that can be devised for man as he is ? It is the third of these methods which Aristotle adopts, as most entirely in accordance with his system of philosophy. Compare book iv. ch. i. " Besides . . . it is necessary to distinguish what sort of government is best fitting for all cities : for most of those writers who have treated this subject, however speciously they may handle other parts of it, have failed in describing the practical parts : for it is not enough to lay down scien- tifically what is best, but what can be put in practice (rt ^vvarov). It should also be simple and easy for all to attain to. But, contrary to this, they seek out cnly the most subtle form of government, and one which ueeds many things to fill it up." 9 34 akistotle's politics. [book XL state which is to he well governed, will it be best that all shall have a share in every thing which is capable of being shared, or only in some particulars, but not in others ? for it is possible that the citizens may have their wives, and chil- dren, and goods in common with each other, as in Plato's com- monwealth ; 1 for in that, Socrates affirms that the children, the wives, and the possessions ought to be common. Which then shall we prefer ? the plan which is already established; or the custom which is proposed in Plato's commonwealth ? ^ For the views of Socrates on this subject, the reader will do well to consult Plato's Republic, especially b. v. p. 458 — 465. Aristotle's objec- tions to the theory of Plato may all be reduced to two heads : 1 . That Plato's end is a wrong one. 2. That his means do not answer their end. Plato's end was that the state should be as much one as possible. Compare Rep. iv. 423, B., ovkovv ovtoq dv tiri KoXXitTTOQ opbg toTq rjfisrkpoiQ dpxovffiv, offtjv del to fxsyeBog ti)v ttoXiv TroisXnOai, koI i)\iKy ovay offrjv x^pdv di/) sed diversorum origine Haec quid differat a vera civitate, vmm dicimus rempiiblicam, non est quod multis demonstrem." As tg -je second, he adds, " Post pugnam Leuctrica, Arcadum g;ens synedrmia d2 36 Aristotle's politics. [book n are two different things ; a confederacy is valuable for its numbers, though all those who compose it are men of the same calling ; for this is entered into for the sake of mutual defence, just as the addition of another weight makes the scale go down. The same distinction will prevail between a state and a tribe, when the people are not collected into separate villages, but live as the Arcadians. Now those things by which a state should become one are of different sorts ; and it is the preserving a just and equal balance of power, which is the safety of states, as has already been mentioned in our treatise on Ethics.^ Now among freemen and equals this is absolutely necessary ; for all cannot govern at the same time, but either by the year, or There must be according to somc Other regulation or time.^ By a distinction ^j^jg nieans, it follows that every one in his turn between the *' ruiersandthe will be in officc ; as if the shoemakers and ruled. carpenters should exchange occupations, and not always be employed in the self-same calling. But as it is better that these should continue in their respective trades, so also in civil society, where it is possible, it would be better that the government should continue in the same hands ; but where it is not — (as Nature has made all men equal, and therefore it is just, be the administration good or bad, that all should partake of it) — there it is best to observe a rotation, and let those who are their equals by turns submit to those who are magistrates at the time since they in turn will alternately be governors and governed, as if they were different men \^ by the same method different persons will execute dif- rr]V ixsydXriv iroXiv constituit, quo, quasi vinculo gens universa con- tineretur, rwv ofioiajv sed non diversorum origme,** On the other hand, a TToXiQ is constituted Ik twv t'iSsi Sia(pep6vr(ov. * The reference is to Eth. Nicom. v. 5, rtf avTiiroLtlv yap dvdXoyov (TVfifievH r) TToXiQ— the state subsists by the preservation of a balance of power. ^ See below, b. vii. 14, rj yap cpvffig d'E^wKS rrjv cilptGLv iroi^aaaa av- T(f Tip ykvu rauTov, to jxlv veijjTspov, to TrpEolSvTepov' lin' Tolg fikv ap- 7rp£7rtt, toIq apx^iv' dyavaicTti d' ovdeigKaO' qKiKiav cipxontvoQ. ^ Locke says, that " A magistrate was for this purpose appointed, to give a sanction to that common measure to which reason teaches us that creatures of the same rank and species, and endowed with the same faculties, have all an equal right." See Prefatory Essay by Dr. Gil- lies. * On this difficult and complicated passage, see Goettling's note. He suggests as better reading, to iv fispti To7g "icroig e'lKtiv dfioiujg Tovg ii CHAP. III.J TOO GKEAT UNITr DESTRUCTIVE. 37 ferent offices. From hence it is evident that a state cannot naturally be one in the manner that some persons propose ; and that what has been said to be the greatest good of states, is really their destruction ; though the good of any thing tends to preserve it. For anotb- reason also it is clear, ^ ^^^^^ that it is not for the best to endeavour to make ^ ought not totte State too much one, because a family is more an^n^dlviduai! sufficient in itself than a single person, and a state than a family ;^ and indeed it can lay claim to the name of a state only when this sufficiency results to the members of the community. If then this sufficiency is preferable, a state which is less one, is better than that which is more nearly so. CHAP. III. But admitting that it is best for the state to be pj^^^.^ ^^^^ one as much as possible, it does not seem to be fails when proved that this will take place on his theory, by p^^^u^e*^ permitting all at once to say " this is mine," and " this is not mine," though this is what Socrates regards as a proof that a state has perfect unity. For the word all is used in two senses ; if it means each mdividual, what Socrates proposes will more nearly take place ; for each person will say, this is his own son, and his own wife, and his own pro- perty, and of every thing else that may happen to belong to him, that it is his own. But now those who have their wives and children in common will not say so, but all will say so, though not as individuals ; and likewise with regard to property, all will say so, but not as individuals ; therefore, this use of the word "all," is evidently a fallacious mode of speech ;2 for the words " all " and " both " are odd and even, and are some- times used distributively, and sometimes collectively, on ac- ^PX^Q' The words Trapa ixkpog in the following line, he regards as a mere gloss on the Iv /itlpfi which precedes them. * In other words, it is certain that by stretching this unity too far, we shall lose the independence of a state ; for it will sink down first into a mere family, and from a family into an individual : and when it has gone thus far, its essence will be found to be in a great measure destroyed. ^ 'I his is what is commonly called a fallacy of " Compositio et Divisio." See Soph. Elench. i. 2, where among syllogisms which are Trapa rrjv Xb^lv, Aristotle enumerates those which are said to be Trapd rrjv ciaioifriVj and he gives as an example the following, ort rd irkpTt. itjri Ivb kui rpta Kai irepiTrd Kai apria. 88 Aristotle's politics. [book it count of tlielr double meaning, and are the cause of contentious syllogisms in reasoning. Therefore for all persons to say the same thing was their own, using the word "all" in its distribu- tive sense, would be well, but is impossible : while in its collec- tive sense, it would by no means contribute to the concord of the state. Besides, there is another harm attending this proposal ; for whatever is common to many is taken least care of ; for all men regard most what is their own, and care less for common property, or only just as much as concerns them. For, be- sides other considerations, every one is more negligent of what another has to see to ; as in a family, one is often worse served by many servants, than by a few. Now each citizen in the state will have a thousand children, but none of them will be as the children of any individual, but every child will be the son of every father, as chance may have it, and the parents all will alike neglect them. Besides, in consequence of this, whenever any citizen fared well or ill, every person, be the number what it would, might say, "this is my son," or " that man's son ;" and in this manner would they speak, and Farther diffi- doubtingly withal, concerning each of the thou- cuities; con- sand, or whatever number the city consisted of; for it would be uncertain to whom each child be- longed, and who should preserve it when born. Now which of the two do you think is better, for every one to say " this is mine," while they apply it equally to two thousand, or ten thousand ;^ or, as we say " this is mine," under our present forms of government, where one man calls another his son, another calls that same person his brother, another nephew, or according to some other relationship, either by blood or marriage, and first extends his care to him and his, while another regards him as one of the same brotherhood and the same tribe ? For sure it is better for any one to be a nephew in his private capacity, than a son after this manner. Besides, it will be impossible to prevent some persons from rris^ing^from suspcctiug that they are brothers and children, or family like- fathers and mothers, to each other ; for from the mutual likeness which exists between the parent » On the cosmopolitan theory which would merge all particular and social affections into a mere system of general benevolence, compare Chalmers* Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. c. 6, (p. 245,) and Newman Sermon on St. John's Day. I CHAP. IV.J C03IMUNITY OF WIVES AND CHILDREN. 39 and the offspring, they will necessarily obtain proofs of tlielr mutual relationship. This circumstance, we are informed by those writers who describe different parts of the world, does sometimes happen ; for some tribes of Upper Africa ^ have their wives in common, but yet their children are distin- guished by their likeness to their parents. There are also some women, and some other animals too, as mares and cows, which naturally bring forth their young very like the male ; such was the mare called Dicaea, in Pharsalia.^ CHAP. IV. Besides, those who contrive this plan for a com- munity, cannot easily avoid such evils as the fol- ders^&T""^'^ lowing ; namely, blows, murders, voluntary or in- voluntary, quarrels and reproaches ; all of which it would be impious indeed to be guilty of towards our fathers and mothers, or those who are nearly related to us, as it is towards those who are not connected with us : and certainly these mis- chiefs must necessarily happen oftener among those who do not know each other, than among those who do ; and when they do happen, among those who know their relations, they admit of a legal expiation, but in the latter case, this can- not be done.^ It is also absurd for those who pj^to's com- make a community of children, to hinder those munity of who love each other from sexual intercourse, beTxtended^ while they do not restrain them from the passion itself, or from those other embraces, which are of all things ' For example, the Nasamones, (see Herod, iv. 172,) and the Aysenses, (ib. 180,) and the Agathyrsi, (ib. 104,) ol 'AyaOvpaoi — tTriKoivov twv yvvaiK(i)v Ti)v ^>Xiv Troievvrai, ivd KacnyvrjToi n dWrjXiov twcn, Kai oUrfioi €orr£c Travreg fir/Te (pOoviii firjTS tx^^^ XP^^^''^* dXXrjXovg. *' The Agathyrsi have their women in common, that so they may be all brotliers, and in virtue of their relationship, they may be free from all envy and mutual hatred." Mela (i. 8) relates the same of the Gara- mantes ; as also does Pliny, Hist. Nat. v. 8. 2 Compare Aristotle's Hist. Anim. vii. 6. (Schn.) ^ It is worthy of remark here, how wide-spread among the heathen world was the doctrine of the necessity of expiatory sacrifices. On this subject, compare the remarks of Butler, Analogy, Part H. chap. v. Bohn's edition, p. 252. See also iEschylus, S, c. T. 676. aW dvdpa^ ' Apytioicri KaSjULBiov^ ih x«t/0fi5 kXdsTv' aiixa yap Kuddpaioi/' di/dpcov ^' o/xaifxcov 6dvaTo^ (L^' auTO/CTOVOt, ottK icTi y^pa^ Tovde tov mdar/uLaTOi, 40 Aristotle's politics. [book II. most improper, as between a father and a son, a brother and a brother ; for mere love in such cases is wrong. It is also absurd to prevent sexual intercourse between relations, for no other reason than the violence of tlie pleasure, while the relation of father and daughter, or of brother and sister, is held to be of no consequence at all. It seems also more ad- vantageous, that the husbandmen ^ should have their wives and children in common, than the military class, for there will be less affection in case of a community of wives, than other- wise ; for such persons ought to be under subjection, that they may obey the laws, and not seek after innovations. Upon the whole, the consequences of such a law as this would be directly contrary to the state of things which good laws ought to establish, and to insure which Socrates thinks it right to lay down his regulations concerning women and Friendship children. For we think that friendship is the better than greatest good which can happen to any state, as unity. nothing so much prevents seditions : and unity * In order to understand the allusions of Aristotle here and elsewhere, t is necessary to inform the reader that Plato divided his purely theoretic state into three classes. 1. (pvXaKsg — the ruling military class ^ into whose minds and bodies precious metal had been infused. 2. ycwpyoi, {husbandmen^) \ called citizens, but practically excluded 3. rexviTai, {artificers,) ] from all share in the government. A community of wives was allowed by Plato to the ruling class only. Aristotle here says, by way of objection, that the two latter classes will not be satisfied with nominal rule ; and that they too ought to be allowed a community of wives, lest they should unite too closely among themselves and rebel against the , in the ** Symposium," or "Banquet" of Plato, wherein Aristophanes is introduced as a speaker. See Plato, Symp. ch. xiv. 599. ^ To dyaTTTjTov. Thus in the New Testament, (and indeed generally,) dyaTrrjTOQ is used as equivalent to iiovoytvr]Q. See St. Matt. i. 25. Com- pare also Homer, Od. B. 3G5, where speaking of a son, he says, ucvvo^ ittfv dyaTniTog, ti-jd Arist. Rhet. book i. ch. 7, sub fin. 42 Aristotle's politics. [book n CHAP. Y. We proceed next to consider, as to property, in p?J15S?y"*^ what way it should be regulated among those who are to live under a state formed after the most perfect mode of government, whether it should be common or not ; (for this may be considered as a separate question from what has been determined concerning wives and children ;) I mean, whether it is better, (although these should be held separate, as is now the case every where, that not only the possessions but also the produce of them should be in common ; or that the soil should belong to a par- ticular owner, but that its produce should be brought to- gether and used as one common stock, as some nations at present do ; or, on the contrary, that the soil should be com- m.on and be cultivated in common, while the produce is divided amongst individuals for their special use, as is said tc be the practice among some of the barbarians; or whether both the soil and the fruit should be in common ? When the husbandman and the citizen are distinct, there hivoived hi^it!^ another and easier method ; but when they each labour at their possessions for themselves, this may occasion several difficulties ; for if there be not an equal proportion between their labour and what they consume, those who labour hard and have but a small proportion of the pro- duce, will of necessity complain against those who take a large share and do but little labour. Upon the whole, it is difficult to live together as a community, and thus to have all things that man can possess in common, and especially this is the case with respect to such property. This is evident from the partnerships of those who go out to settle a colony ; for nearly all of them have disputes with each other upon the most common matters, and come to blows upon trifles : we find too, that we oftenest disagree with those slaves who are gener- ally employed in the common offices of a family. A community of property then has these and other inconveniences attending it : but the manner of life which is now established, more particularly when embellished with good morals and a system of upright laws, is far superior to it, for it will embrace the advantages of both ; by " both" we mean, the advantage arising CHAP, v.] COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY. 43 from properties being common, and from being divided also ; for in some respects it ought to be common, but upon the whole private. For the fact that every man's attention is em- ployed on his own particular concerns, will prevent mutual complaints ; and prosperity will increase as each person la- bours to improve his own private property ; and it will then happen that, from a principle of virtue, they will perform good offices to each other, according to the proverb, " All things are common amongst friends." And in some states there are traces of this custom to be seen, showing that it is not impracticable ; and particularly in those which are best governed some things are in a manner common, and others might be so ; for there, while every person enjoys his own private property, he assists his friend with some things, and others he shares in common ; as in Lacedaemon, where they use each other's slaves as if they were, so to speak, their own,^ and also their horses and dogs, or even any provision they may want in a journey. It is evident then that it is best to have property private, but to make the use of it common ; but how the citizens are to be brought to this mind, is the particular business of the legis- lator to contrive. And also with respect to pleasure, it is unspeakable how advantageous it is, that a man should think he has something of his own ; for it is by no means to no purpose,^ that each person has an affection for himself, for that is natural, and yet selfishness is justly censured ; for we mean by that, not that he loves himself, but that he loves himself more than he ought ; in like manner we blame a money- lover ; and yet all men love both money and self. Besides, it is very pleasant to oblige and assist our friends destroys the and companions, and strangers,^ which cannot be practice of mo- unless property be private ; but this cannot result ^^^^^^s. * Mrj yap oh ^aTrjv. Est modeste negantis opinio. *' For possibly it may not be in vain,*' &c. As to self-love and selfishness, and the dis- tinction between them, see Butler's first Sermon on Human Nature, and Analogy, Part I. chap. v. ^ We have here almost a Christian argument against the ideal com- munity of goods proposed by Socrates. In a state where the principle of unity is thus carried out, it will be impossible to exercise the social duties of liberality, kindness, &c., and there will be no room for the virtues of benevolence, charity, modesty, &c. But virtue cannot exist if its proper objects are withdrawn ; this result, then, shows that however fair and plausible such an Utopian theory may be, it is contrary to the nature of man, and therefore false in principle. 44 ARISTOTLE S POLITICS. [book n. where they make the state too entirely one. And further, they destroy the offices of two principal virtues, modesty and liber- ality — modesty with respect to the female sex, for it is right to abstain from her who is another's ; and liberality, as it re- lates to private property, without which no one can appear liberal, or do any generous action ; for the office of liberality On other consists in imparting to others what is our own. grounds also This System of polity does indeed recommend it- impracticabie. ^^^^ j|.g g^^^ appearance, and specious pretences to humanity ; and the man wlio hears it proposed will receive it gladly, concluding that there will be a wonderful bond of friendship between all its members, particularly when any one censures the evils which are now to be found in society, as arising from property not being common ; as for example, the disputes which happen between man and man, upon their con- tracts with each other; the judgments passed to punish per- jury, and the flattering of the rich ; none of which arise from . properties being private, but from the corruption of man- kind. For we see those who live in one community and have all things in common, disputing with each other oi'tencr than those who have their property separate ; but we observe fewer instances of strife, because of the very small number of those who have property in common, compared with those where it is appropriated. It is also but right to mention not only the evils from which they who share property in common will be preserved, but also the advantages which they will lose ; for viewed as a whole, this manner of life will be found impracticable. We must suppose, then, that the ?f unky!^'""^' error of Socrates arose from the fact that his first principle^ was false; for we admit that both a family and a state ought to be one in some particulars, but not entirely so ; for there is a point, beyond which if a state proceeds towards oneness, it will be no longer a state. There is also another point at which it will still be a state, but in proportion as it approaches nearer to not being a state, it will be worse ;^ as if one should reduce the voices of those who sing ' Trjv vTToOeaiv. The first principle with which he starts, " Initia et fundamenta reipublicae.'* (Goettling). See below, book vi. chap. 2, vno- 6t(Tig fiev ovv rrjg drf^OKpaTiKrjg TroXireiag IXevOepia. ' The Greek text as received by Bekker and others stands thus, t(Tri ktg £f our inquiry — or that wliich is abstractedly the best and purest. This Aristotle would consider £ 2 UBRARY fVfvPRsmr OF njjwwi ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS. [BOOK n. SO ; for perhaps some persons will give the preference to the Lacedaemonian form of government, or some other which may more nearly approximate to an aristocracy. Now some per- sons say, that the most perfect government should be one composed of all others blended together, for which reason they commend that of Lacedaemon ; for some say, that this is composed of an oligarchy, a monarchy, and a democracy ; their kings representing the monarchical part, their gerusia the oligarchical ; and that in the ephoralty may be found the de- mocratical element, as they are taken from the body of the people. But others assert, that the ephors have absolute power, and that it is their common meals and daily course of life, in which the democratic form is represented. It is also said in this treatise of Laws, that the best form of government must be one composed of a democracy and a tyranny ; though such a mixture no one would allow to be any government at all, or, if it is, the worst possible. Those, on the other hand, propose what is much better, who blend many governments together ; for the most perfect is that which is formed of many Faults as to the parts. But now this polity (of Plato's) shows no anTdection of ^ monarchy, but only of an oligarchy and the ruling democracy ; and it seems rather to incline towards body. oligarchy, as is evident frrii the appoint- ment of the magistrates ; for to choose them Dy lot, is common to both ; but the fact that men of fortune must necessarily be members of the assembly, and elect the magistrates, and take part in the management of other public affairs, while the rest are passed over, this makes the state incline to an oligarchy ; as does the endeavouring that the greater part of the rich may be in office, and that the rank of their appointments may correspond with their fortunes. The oligarchic principle prevails also in the choice of their senate; the manner of electing which is favourable also to an oligarchy ; for all are obliged to vote for senators out of the first class, afterwards for the same number out of the second, and then out of the '. third ; but this compulsory voting does not extend to all of to be one in which the various forms of government are blended to some extent, but inclining more nearly to an aristocracy, which, as its name im- plies, is based on virtue or merit {apiri)). See a few lines below, *' Those on the other hand propose what is much better, who blend many govern- ments together ; for the most perfect is that which is composed of many CHAP VII. J THE IDEAL STATE OF PHALEAS. 53 the third and fourth classes, but only the first and second classes out of the entire four.^ By this means, he says, he ought to show an equal number of each rank elected : but he is mistaken ; for the majority will always consist of the first rank, and the most considerable people ; and for this reason, that many of the commonalty, not being obliged to it,^ will not attend the elections. From hence it is evident, that such a state will not consist of a democracy and a monarchy, as well as from what we shall say when we come particularly to con- sider this form of government. Danger also will arise from the manner of choosing the senate, when those who are elected themselves are afterwards to elect others ; for, if a certain number choose to combine together, though not very considerable, the election will always fall according to their pleasure. Such are the points on which Plato touches, concerning his form of government, in his book of Laws. CHAP. VII. There are also certain other forms of govern- ment, which have been proposed, some by pri- poHt^g.^^*^ vate persons,^ and some by philosophers and politicians, all of which come much nearer than the above to those which have been really established, or now exist : for no one else has introduced the innovation of a community of wives and children, and public tables for the women ; but they have set out with establishing such points as are absolutely necessary. There are some who think that the first object That of of government should be to regulate well every ^^g^l^^^de of thing relating to property ; for they say, that equalizing herein lies the source of all seditions whatsoever. P^op^'^^y- For this reason, Phaleas the Chalcedonian was the first who proposed this plan, that the fortunes of the citizens should be equal. This he thought was not difiicult to accomplish when ^ Bekker reads ek rov rsraprov ratv rerapTiov. But it is necessary to read Terrdpiov in order to preserve the sense. 2 Compare Plato's Laws, b. vii. 5. See also Goettling*s note. ' idiioTai, This word must be understood as opposed not so much to 0iX6(ro0ot as to TroXirtfcoi. The class of philosophers being divided into those who have taken a practical part and share in legislation {TroXtn* foi), and those who have not (idiwTai), AHISTOTLE S POLITIOS. [book n. a community was first settled, but that it was a work of much difficulty in states which had been long established ; but yet that an equality might possibly be effected as follows : name- ly, that the rich should give marriage portions but never receive any, while the poor should always receive but never give them. But Plato, in his treatise of Laws,^ thinks that a difference in circumstances should be permitted to a certain degree ; but that no citizen should be allowed to possess more than five times as much as the lowest income,^ as we have already men- tioned. But one thing ought not to escape the notice of legis- lators who would establish this principle, though now they are apt to overlook it ; that while they regulate the quantity of property belonging to each individual, they ought also to regulate the number of his children ; for if the number of his family exceed the allotted quantity of property, the law must necessarily be repealed ; and yet, apart from such a repeal, it will have the bad effect of reducing many from wealth to poverty ; so difficult is it for innovators not to fall into such mistakes. That an equality of goods has some force to strengthen political society, seems to have been determined by some of the ancients ; for Solon made a law to this effect ; and also among certain others there is a law restraining per- sons from possessing as much land as they please. And upon the same principle there are laws which forbid men to sell their property, (as among the Locrians,) unless they can prove that some notorious misfortune has befallen them. They were also to preserve their ancient patrimony ; and this custom being broken through among the Leucadians, made their government too democratic ; for by that means it >vas no longer necessary to be possessed of a certain fortune, in order to step into the magistracy. But it is possible that an equal- ity of goods is established, and yet tha.t this may be either too great, when it tends to luxurious living, or too little, when it obliges them to live hard. Hence it is evident, that it is not enough for the legislator to establish an equality of cir- cumstances, but he must aim at a proper medium. Besides, if any one should so regulate property, as that there should be * See the Laws, book v. ch. 13. 2 Aristotle is here quoting from memory. In the Laws of Plato, the quadruple of a single lot (KXrjpog) is laid down as the exlreme limit of wealth which the legislator ought to tolerate. CHAP. VII. I THE IDEAL STATE OF PHALEAS. 55 a moderate sufficiency for all, it would be of no use ; for it is of more consequence that the citizens should entertain a simi- larity of feelings than an equality of property ; but this can never be, unless they are properly educated under the direction of the laws. But probably Phaleas may say, that this is what he himself mentions ; for he thinks that states ought to pos- sess an equality of these two things, property and education. But he should have said particularly what education he in- tended ; nor is it of any service to have this one and the same for all ; for this education may be one and the same, and yet such as will make the citizens over-greedy to grasp after honours, or riches, or both. Besides, not only an inequality of possessions, but also one of honours, occasions seditions, though in a contrary way in either case ; for the vulgar will be seditious if there be an equality of goods, but those of more elevated sentiments, if there is an equality of honours ; whence it is said, " When good and bad do equal honours share." Homer, II. ix. 319. For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only, — (for which they think an equality of goods would be a sufficient remedy, as they would then have no occasion to steal for cold or hunger,) — but that they may enjoy what they desire, and not wish for it in vain ; for if their desires extend beyond the common necessaries of life, they will do any injustice to gra- tify them ; and not only so, but, if they feel a desire, they will do the same to enjoy pleasures free from pain.^ What remedy then shall we find for these three disorders ? For the first, let every one have a moderate subsistence, and labour for his living. For the second, let him practise temperance ; and thirdly, let those who wish for pleasure through them- selves, seek for it only in philosophy ; for all other pleasures want the assistance of man. Men, then, are guilty of the greatest crimes from ambition, and not from necessity ; no one, for instance, aims at being a tyrant, to keep him from the cold ; hence great honour is due to him who kills not a thief, but a tyrant ; ^ so that form of polity which Phaleas * There are three motives of human actions, according to Aristotle in this passage. 1st, Absolute want (sTnBvfiLa tCjv avayKaiiov). 2nd, De- iire {nov iirj avayKa'iiov). 3rd, Pleasure itself {ivd %aipwi ties. Rewards who devised any thmg lor the good or the citv, and honours. ^|^^^ children of thoso who fell in battle should be educated at the public expense :^ this law had never up to that time been proposed by any other legislator, though it is at present in use at Athens as well as in other cities. ^ Compare the words of Pericles, (Thucydides, b. ii. 46,) avriov rov Traldag to avb rovde drjfjiocrLg, r) ttoXlq fJ-sxpiQ VpVQ ^p^'^p^i" The law to which Aristotle here alludes, was introduced after the Persian war but before the year 439, b. c, when Pericles spoke the funeral oration over those who had been killed in his expedition against Samos, just as nine years later he spoke that celebrated Funeral Oration which has come down to us in the pages of Thucydides, over the bodies of those who had been killed in the first year of the Peiop^nnesian war. CHAP. VIIT.J ITS DIFFICULTIES IN PRACTICE. 59 Further, he would have the magistrates all chosen out of the people ; (meaning by the people the three parts before spoken of ;) and that those who were so elected, should be the particular guardians of what belonged to the public, to strangers, and to orphans. These are the principal parts and most worthy of notice in the plan of Hippodamus. But some persons might doubt the propriety of his di- His system viding the citizens into three parts ; for the open to many artisans, the husbandmen, and the soldiery, all are to have a share in the community, while the husband- men are to have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, which would in a manner render them slaves to the soldiery. It is also impossible that they should all par- take of all the posts of honour ; for the generals and the guardians of the state must necessarily be appointed out of the soldiery, and indeed, so to say, the most honourable magis- trates ; but if the others have not their share in the govern- ment, how can they be expected to be friendly disposed towards it ? But it is necessary that the soldiery should be superior to the other two parts, and this will not be effected unless they are very numerous ; and if they are so, why should the community consist of any other members, and have a right to elect the magistrates ? Besides, of what use are the husbandmen to this community ? Artisans, it is true, are necessary, for these every city wants, and they can live off their business as in all other states. If the husbandmen in- deed furnished the soldiery with provisions, they would be properly part of the community ; but these are supposed to have their private property, and to cultivate it for their own use. Moreover, if the soldiery are themselves to cultivate that common land which is appropriated for their support, there will be no distinction between the soldier and the husband- man, which the legislator intended there should be ; and if there should be any others besides those who cultivate their own private property, and the military, there will be a fourth order in the state, which has no share in it, and will always be alien from it. But further, if any one should propose that the same persons should cultivate their own lands and the public land also, then there would be a deficiency of provisions to supply two families, as the lands would not immediately yield enough for themselves and the soldiers also ; all these 60 ARISTOTLE S POLITICS. [baoK II. Difficulties of t^^ngs, then, involve great confusion. Neither his judicial is his method of determining causes a good one, 8>sem. when he would have the judge, in deciding, split the case which comes simply before him, and thus, instead of being a judge, become an arbitrator. Now in matters of arbitration, this is possible to a number of indi- viduals ; ^ (for they confer together upon the business that is before them ;) but when a cause is brought before judges it is not so ; but on the contrary, the majority of legislators take care that the judges shall not communicate their sentiments to each other. Besides, what can prevent confusion in the de- cision, when one judge thinks a fine should be inflicted, but not so great an one as that which the suitor thinks fit ; the latter proposing twenty mina, while the judge imposes ten, or be it more or less, another four, and another five ? It is evi- dent then that in this manner they will differ from each other, some giving the whole damages sued for, and others nothing ; and if so, how shall the determinations of their votes be settled ? Besides, nothing compels a judge to perjure him- self who simply acquits or condemns, if the action is fairly and justly brought; for he who acquits the party, does not say that he ought not to pay any fine at all, but that he ought not to pay a fine of twenty minae. But he that condemns him is guilty of perjury, if he sentences him to pay twenty minae, while he believes the damages ought not to be so high. But with respect to the honours which he proposes to bestow on those who devise any thing which is useful to the community, this, though all very pleasing to the ear, is not safe for the legislator to settle, for it would occasion informers, and, it may be, commotions too in the state. And this pro- ^ , . posal of his ^ives rise also to a further coniecture tions and diffi- and inquiry ; for some persons doubt whether it cuiti.es. |g useful or hurtful to alter the established laws of any country, if even it be for the better ; for which reason one cannot immediately accede to what is here said, since it is not advantageous to alter them. We know indeed, that it is pos- sible to propose a remodelling of both the laAvs and govern- ment as a common good ; and since we have mentioned this subject, it may be very proper to enter into a few particulars * Kai irXsioaiv. On this passage Goettling remarks, ** Mihi hcRC verba suspecta sunt, saltern quo pertineant non intelligo.*' CHAP, viit.] JUDICIAL MATTERS. 61 concerning it ; for it contains some difficulties, as we have al- ready said, and it may appear better to alter them, for it has been found useful in other sciences at all events so to do. Thus the science of physics is extended beyond its ancient bounds ; so is the gymnastic, and indeed all other arts and faculties ; and hence, since the political science must be held to be one of them, it is clear that the same thing will necessarily hold good in its respect. And it may also be affirmed that experience itself gives a proof of this ; for the ancient laws are too simple and barbarous ; for example, the Greeks used to wear armour in common,^ and to buy their wives of each other. And indeed all the remains of old laws which we have, are very simple ; for instance, a law in Cyme relative to murder, by which if any one, in prosecuting another for murder, can produce a certain number of witnesses to it of his own relations, the accused person is to be held guilty of the crime. But, in a word, all persons ought to endeavour to follow what is right, and not what is established ; and it is probable that the first of the human race, whether they sprung out of the earth, or were saved from some general calamity, were much in the same state as the vulgar and un- learned now, as is affirmed of the aborigines ; so that it would be absurd to continue in the practice of their rules. Nor is it moreover right to permit written laws always to remain unaltered ; for as in all other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible that every thing should be expressed in writ- ing with perfect exactness ; for when we commit a thing to writing we must use general terms ; but in every action there is something particular to itself, which these may not com- prehend ; and hence it is evident, that certain laws will at certain times admit of alterations. But if we consider this matter in another point of view, it will appear to be one which requires great caution ; for when the advantage pro- posed is trifling, as the accustoming the people easily to abolish their laws is a bad thing, it is and constitu-^^ evidently better to pass over some faults on the ^ part of both the legislator and the magistrates ; " ^' for the alterations will not be productive of so much good, as * Compare the statement of Thucydides, b. i. 6. iracja yap rj 'EXXa? lmdripo(f)6pu did rag cKppdicTovg re oUijaeiQ Kal ovk dfftpaXtXg trap dAA»i- \ovQ lipooovg. 62 Aristotle's politics. [book 11. a habit cf disobeying the magistrates will be of harm. Be- sides, the instance brought from the arts is fallacious ; for it is not the same thing to alter the one as the other. For a law derives from custom all its power to enforce obedience, and this requires long time to establish ; so that to make it an easy matter to pass from the established laws to other new ones, is to weaken the power of laws. And besides, if the laws are to be altered, are they all to be altered, and in every government or not ? and shall it be the pleasure of any chance person, or of whom ? Now all these particulars make a great difference ; for which reason let us at present drop this in- quiry, for it better suits some other occasion. CHAP. IX. But the considerations which offer themselves The govern- i t i t mentofSpar- With rcspcct to the governments established at ta reviewed. Laceda3mon and in Crete, and indeed in all other st-r^ted ^^^^^"^ states, are two in number ; the one, whether their laws are laid down well or ill, when com- pared with the best form possible : the other, whether there is any thing in its principles or administration, in any way opposed to the theory proposed to them.^ Now it is allowed that the members of every well-regulated state should be free from servile labour ; but in what manner this shall be effected, is not easy to determine. For the Penestae have very ofte^i attacked the Thessalians, and the Helots^ the ^ The questions to be asked here with reference to slavery are two : a. Is the end good, in comparison with the best possible form of polity ? h. Do the means succeed in effecting their end ? 2 The Helots, a. The object of their institution is sufficiently good ; viz. to enable the citizens to perform the duties of citizenship. b. The practical working of the system is bad ; for, 1. Like the Penestea of Thessaly, it breeds Helot wars. If the case be otherwise in Crete, this is to be attributed to its insular position and the prevalence of the same institution in all its towns ; while Sparta was surrounded by nations who had no Helotry. 2. It is impossible to associate with them on common terms ; if you oppress them, they rebel ; if you treat them with kindness, they grow insolent. Miiller speaks as follows concerning the Helots. Their name is de- rived (not from the town Helos, but) from 'Aw, capio — ' perhaps those wko were taken after resisting to the uttermost, while the Perioeci sur- rendered on conditions j' but more probably ' an aboriginal race, subdued CHAP. IX. ] SPARTA. THE HELOTS. 63 Lacedaemonians ; for they in a manner continually difficulties watch an opportunity for some misfortune to be- arising from fal them.i But no such thing has ever yet hap- Helots, pened to the Cretans ; the reason for which probably is, that although the neighbouring cities are engaged in frequent wars with each other, yet none of them are ready to enter into alliance with the revolters, as it would be disadvantageous for themselves who have villains of their own. But there has been perpetual enmity between the Lacedaemonians and all their neighbours, the Argives, the Messenians, and the Arca- dians. Their slaves also, from the very first, have revolted from^ the Thessalians, while they have been engaged in wars at a very early period, and passed over as slaves to the Dorian conqner- ors.' '* Dorians, vol. ii. book iii. ch. 3. 1. Political rights of the Helots, a. They were public slaves — not alienable, even by the state — belonged to the land — had dwellings of their own — paid rent — got wealth by cultivating the soil, and by plunder in war, (Herod, ix. 80,) — had little intercourse with their masters, for the Spar- tans lived in town — and served as ^piXoi in war. At Platsea 5,000 Spar- tans were attended by 35,000 Helots. The Helots in battle were imme- diately under the king. (Herod, vi. 80, 81.) Slavery was, in Dorian states, the basis of commercial prosperity ; but in time of war slaves were dangerous — wcrre yap Ifpedpsvovreg roXg drvxvf^^'^'' SiareXoixru See Thucyd. i. 100, 118; v. 14, 23. b. They could be enfranchised. They served in the fleet with the Perioeci, under the name of ^tairoGiovavrai. After some time they were called Neodamodes; and the Mothaces, or Mothones, answered to the Latin " Vernae," were well treated, and could acquire full citizenship; for Callicratidas, Gylippus, and Lysander were all of this class. 2. Their treatment has probably been much misrepresented. They wore a kvvyi — as the peasants in Homer. (See Odyss. xxiv. 230.) This has been absurdly understood as a hardship. Plutarch's story we reject as un- true ; that they were compelled to get drunk as an example to the Spartan youth. The Cryptea is also misunderstood ; it was not an institution for murder, but for inspection of roads and fortresses. This we gather from Plato's Laws, i. p. 633, C. Thucydides, however, (iv. 80,) seems to adhere to the popular belief. 3. Their number. Thucydides (viii. 40) says that the Lacedaemo- nians had the largest body of slaves. Now there were present at Plataea 5000 Spartans, 35,000 Helots, and 10,000 Perioeci. Almost all the Spartans served in the war, but few Perioeci ; for the latter had 30,000 KXrjpoi^ the former 9000. And as there were 8000 Spartans, Iv ottXgiq, they were attended by 56,000 Helots, i. e. by about half their entire number. ' In Crete slaves of the class corresponding to the Helots were called AphamiottE, and at Argos, Gymnesians (TvixvrjreQ). * Perhaps it would be better to read here sfpicTravro, as it suits battel the context, and the case governed by the verb — risefi up against, " 64 Aristotle's politics. [book XL wi til their neighbours the Achasans, the Perrhabbeans, and the Magnesians. It seems to me indeed, if nothing else, yet a very troublesome business, to settle how to keep upon proper terms with them ; for if you are remiss in your discipline, they grow insolent, and think themselves upon an equality with their masters ; and if they are hardly used, they are continually plotting against you, and hate you. It is evident then, that those who happen to employ slaves, have not as yet hit upon the right way of managing them. As to women^™ giving licence to the women, it is hurtful to the end of government and to the prosperity of the state ; for as a man and his wife are each a part of a family, it is clear that we must suppose the city to be divided into two nearly equal parts, namely, into the number of men and of women. In whatever city, then, the women are not under good regulations, we must look upon one half of it as not under the restraint of law. And this actually happened at Sparta ; for the legislator, desiring to make his whole city a collection of warriors, most evidently accomplished his design with respect to the men, but in the mean time the women were quite neglected, for they live without restraint in every improper in- dulgence and luxury. 1 So that in such a state riches will ne- cessarily be in general esteem, particularly if the men chance to be governed by their wives, which has been the case with many a brave and warlike people, except the Celts, and those other nations, if there are any such, who openly approve of connexion with men. And the first mythologists seem not without good reason to have joined Mars and Venus to- gether ; for all nations of this character appear to be greatly addicted either to the love of women or of boys ; for which reason it was thus at Lacedsemon ; and many things in their * *' So strange did the influence ^vhich the Lacedaemonian women ex- ercised, as the managers of their household and mothers of families, appear to the Greeks at a time when the prevalence of Athenian manners prevented a due consideration for national customs, that Aristotle sup- posed Lycurgus to have attempted, but without success, to regulate the life of women as he had that of the men. ... In accusing the women o Sparta, however, for not essentially assisting their country in times of ne- cessity, Aristotle has . . . required of them a duty which even in Sparta lay out of their sphere, and ... bis assertion has been sufficiently contra- dicted by the events of a subsequent period, in the last days of Sparta, which acquired a surprising lustre from female valour. See Plutarch, Cieom. 38." Miiller's Dorians, vol. ii. ch. iv. 4. CHAP. IX.] POWER IN THE HANDS OF WOMEN. 65 state were done by the authority of the women. For what is the difference, if the power is in their hands, whether the women rule, or whether the rulers themselves are influenced by their women ? The same is the result in either case. And as this boldness of the women can be of no use in any matters of daily life, if it was ever so, it must be in war ; but we find that the Lacedaemonian women were of the greatest disservice in this respect, as was proved at the time of the Theban inva- sion, when they were of no use at all, as they are in other cities, but made more disturbance than even the enemy. This licence which the Lacedaemonian women enjoy is wliat might be expected from the first ; for the ^Zt'' men were wont to be absent from home for a long time upon foreign expeditions against the Argives, and afterwards against the Arcadians and Messenians ; so that, when these wars were at an end, owing to their military life, in which there is no little virtue, they showed themselves pre- j)ared to obey the precepts of their lawgiver ; but we are told, that when Lycurgus endeavoured to reduce the women also to an obedience to his laws, upon their refusal, he de- sisted from his purpose. The women, then, were the causes of these ri^^sults, so that all the fault was theirs. But we are not now considering for whom we ought to make allowance or not, but what is right and what is wrong ; and when the manners of the women are not well regulated, as we have al- ready said, they are likely not only to occasion discord be- tween the various parts of the community, which is dis- graceful, but also to increase the love of money. In the next place, after what has been said, one might find fault with his unequal division of property ; for iJ^e^quai"distri- it so happens that some have far too much, bution of pro- others too little, by which means the land has come into few hands ; and this matter is badly regulated by ais laws. For he made it infamous for any one either to buy or sell his possessions, and in this he did right ; but he per- mitted any one that chose it to give them away or bequeath them, although nearly the same consequences must needs arise from the one course as from the other. For it is supposed that nearly two parts in five of the whole country is the property of women, owing to their being so often heiresses, and having euch large fortunes in marriage ; though it would bo better to 66 Aristotle's politics. [book n» allow them none, or a little, or a certain regulated propor- tion. Now however every one is permitted to give his heiress to whomsoever he pleases ; and if he dies intestate, he who succeeds as heir at law gives her to whom he pleases. Whence it happens that, although the country is ^ pop^iSation. ^^1^ support fifteen hundred horse and thirty thousand foot, the number does not amount even to one thousand. And from these results it is made evident, that in this particular the state is badly regulated ; for the city could not support one blow, but was ruined for want of men.2 They say, that during the reigns of their ancient kings they used to present foreigners with the freedom of their city, to prevent there being a want of men while they carried on long wars ; it is also affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten thousand ; but be that true or false as it may, it is far better to increase the number of the male population by an equality of property. The law too which he made to encourage population, was by no means calculated to correct this inequality ; for being willing that the Spartans should be as numerous as possible, he encouraged them to have as large families as possible ; and to this end there is a law that he who had three children should be ex- empted from the night-watch, and that he who had four ^ It has been suggested that we should here read rpiaxi^Lovg, and not rpL(TtJLvpLovg. But it is to be remembered that the Perioeci served as Hopiites, and at Plataea were double in number to the ^TrapridraL. The Spartans were at one time 9000 or even 10,000 in number. The Hop- iites from among the Perioeci in that case would have amounted to 18,000 or even 20,000. And this would make the number nearly correct as it stands here. 2 A Spartan was degraded if he could not support himself in his proper rank. This, combined with exclusive right of marriage between true Dorians, produced the 6Xiyav9pio7ria. Moreover, at Sparta strangers were never enfranchised, at least latterly. As to the population of SpartOj, i. e. of the '^TrapTidraL, the following is the received estimate. In early times, according to report, 10,000 In time of Lycurgus . . . 9,000 Herodotus . . . 8,000 Thucydides . . 6,000 Aristotle . . 1,000 Agis .... 700 The *' one blow " alluded to here was the battle of Leuctra, b. c. 371, in which the Spartan supremacy was overthrown by the Thebans undei Epaminondas. CHAP. IX.] THE EPHORS OF SPARTA. 67 should pay no taxes :^ though it is very evident, thai while the land was divided in this manner, if the people increased, many of them must be very poor. And further, objections the constitution of the Ephoralty is faulty ; ^ for against the these magistrates take cognizance of things of the -^P^^^^^^y* last importance, and yet they are chosen out of the people in general ; so that it often happens that very poor -^^^ persons chance to be elected to that office, who, Ephoraity was from that circumstance, are easily bought. There have been many instances of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at Andros. For certain men, being j^j^^^^^.^^ corrupted with money, went as far as they could with regard to to ruin the city. And, moreover, because their V"^^ , oparia. power was very great and nearly tyrannical, ' Cf. Herod, i. 136. Among the Persians he is most honoured who has the largest family. And to this day the same law is said to be observed in some parts of Switzerland. ^ The establishment of the Ephoraity has been erroneously assigned to Theopompus, and to Lycurgus, (Herod, i. 65,) but it probably existed earlier ; for we find Ephors in Tbera, Gyrene, etc., and under the name of Cosmi in Crete. It Avas an office intended to limit the authority of the kings ; though perhaps, in very early times, its chief duty lay in the trial of civil causes ; their very name seems to imply " inspectors,"— perhaps of the market (Herod, i. 153) ; for " buying and selling " was esteemed honour- able, even among the Spartiatfe. Thucyd. v. 34. Herod, vi. 50. They were elected from the whole body of the people, (oi tvxovtsq,) but not by lot alone (Pol. iv. 15, fif]deiJ.idv KXrjpajrrjv dQxV'^)l perhaps by lot and choice combined. (Plato, Legg. iii. p. 692, lyyvg rrjg K\r]pu)Tr}g.) Their powers gradually came to be enlarged ; for in all Grecian statee, the civil courts rose in power in proportion as the criminal courts de- clined — e. g. the Helisea and Areopagus at Athens They became Kpiasiov fxeydXiov /cwpioi, as Aristotle here states, when they gained the right of scrutiny (IvOvvrj) into the conduct of magistrates ; but they were subjected to it themselves at the end of their year of office. In time the kings became subject to the Ephors. Cleomenes was tried br them on a charge of bribery. {dojpodoKia. Herod, vi. 82.) They could evei* imprison the king, or put him to death. (Th. i. 131.) They conducted their court with great propriety. (Th. v. 63.) Agis was brought before them. They compelled Anaxandridas to marry a second wife, though polygamy was contrary to Spartan usage. (Herod, v. 39.) They fined Agesilaus^ (Plutarch.) They punished citizens for indolence, luxurious habits, etc., and pro- bably took a part in superintending public education. They were assessors of the kings in judicial matters, (Herod, vi. th:^ and they judged according to their own will and pleasure, or rather ac- cording to unwritten laws ; for Sparta knew no others. As to their ve- aality see some remarks in Aristotle's Rhet. iii. 18. ^ - 5*2 63 Aristotle's politics. [book XL their kings too were obliged to flatter them, which contri- buted greatly to hurt the state ; for it was altered from an aris« tocracy to a democracy. This magistracy ^ is indeed the great bond which holds the state together ; far the people are easy, knowing that they have a share of the first office in it ; so that whether it took place by the intention of the legislator, or whether it happened by chan-ce, this is of great service to their affairs ; for in a state which aims at permanency, every member of it ought to endeavour that each part of the govern- ment may be preserved and continue the same. And upon this principle their kings have always acted, out of regard to their honour ; the wise and good from their attachment to the senate, a seat wherein they consider as the reward of virtue ; and the common people, that they may support the epliors, for the latter are chosen from the entire body. And it is proper that these magistrates should be chosen out of the whole community, but not in the way which is customary at present, for it is very ridiculous. The ephors are the supreme judges in cases of the last consequence ; but, as they are per- sons taken at chance from the people, it is not right that they should determine according to their own opinion, but by written law or established customs.^ Their way of life also is not consistent with the will of the city, for it is too indul- gent ; whereas that of the others tends to too great severity, so that they cannot support it, but privately act contrary to the law and enjoy sensual pleasures. There are also great de- fects in the institution of their senators. If indeed they were of a kind disposition, fitly trained to manly virtue, every one would readily admit that they would be useful to the govern- ment ; but still it might be debated, whether they should con- tinue judges for life, to determine points of the greatest moment, since the mind has its old age as well as the body ; but as they are so brought up that even the legislator could not depend upon them as good men,^ their power must be far ^ The Ephoralty was established at Sparta by Lycurgus ; its powers were extended by Theopompus. The Ephors were elected out of the ^nfiog, and to a great extent resembled the Tribunes of the people in the Roman commonwealth. ' In defence of the Dorian policy, Miiller says that there were no writ- ten laws at all at Sparta. ' The reference of Aristotle here is evidently to some particular occa« sion and person, but what it may be we are unable to asc-ertain. CHAP. IX.] FAULTS IN THE SYSTEM OF LYCUKGUS. 69 from safe : for it is known that the members of tuat body have been guilty of taking bribes, and of much partiality in public affairs. For this reason it had been much better if they had been made responsible for their conduct, which they are not. But it may be said that the ephors seem to have a check upon all the magistrates. This power indeed is far too great a pri- vilege ; but I affirm that they should not be intrusted with this control in the manner in which they are. Moreover, the jnode of choice which they make use of at the election of their sen- ators is very childish. Nor is it right for any one about to be elected to of&ce to solicit a place ; for every person who is fit to hold office, whether he chooses it or not, ought to be elected. But his intention was evidently the same in this, as in the other parts of his government. For making his citizens am- bitious after honours, he has employed persons of that dispo- sition in the election of his senate, since no others will solicit that office ; and yet the principal part of those crimes of which men are deliberately guilty, arise from ambition and avarice. We will inquire at another time whether the kingly office is useful to the state or not : but thus much is certain, that they should be chosen, not as they are now, but from a consideration of their individual conduct. But that the legis- lator himself did not expect to make all his citizens completely virtuous, is evident from the fact, that he distrusts them as not being sufficiently good men ; for he sent out enemies upon the same embassy, and thought that dissensions between the kings were the very safety of the state. Neither Tendency of were their common meals, called Pheidittia,^ well the put uc arranged by him who first established them : for ^ the table should rather have been provided at the public ex- pense, as at Crete ; whereas at Lacedaemon every one was obliged to contribute his portion, although he might be very poor and could by no means bear the expense. By this means the contrary happened to what the legislator desired : for he intended that the appointment of those public meals J should strengthen the democratic element ; but arranged as it i was by him, it had far from a democratic tendency ; for those * Compare the statement of Plutarch, Lyc. 12. *' The Lacedaemonians call them (their common tables) (pidiTia, either as connected with friend- I ship (0i\i'a) and merriment, {(piXocppotrvvt},) or as tending to cheap-hving and saving {(f>ei8(l)).'* The interchange of d smd I is of course common; . ihus vOLKpvov, lacryma, /jLeXtrdu), meditor. 70 ARISTOTLE*S POLITICS. [hook n. who were very poor could not take part in them ; and the limit of the state was laid down by their forefathers, that whoever could not contribute his proportion to the common tables should have no share in them. Other persons have censured his law concerning the office of High Admiral, and not with- out reason, as it gave rise to disputes. For the office of admi- ral is in opposition to the kings, who are generals of the army, and being fo-r life, becomes, as it were, a second monarchy. And in this respect, too, one might censure the theory of the legis- lator, as Plato has done in his Laws ; the whole arrangement of the constitution is calculated only for the business of war, for it is excellent to make them conquerors. And tary^sta^eTand this is the rcasou why the state survived as long could live only ^s they Were at war, but began to perish as soon as they gained sway : for they knew not how to be idle, or to engage in any other employment more proper than war. In this also they were no less mistaken, that they thought rightly enough that those things which are objects of conten- tion, are better procured by virtue than by vice ; yet they wrongfully supposed the things themselves to be preferable to virtue. Nor was the public revenue well managed at Sparta ; for the state had nothing in its coffers while it was obliged to carry on extensive wars, and the subsidies were badly raised ; for as the Spartans possessed a large extent of country, they were obliged to look closely to each other, as to what they paid in. And thus an event took place contrary to the prudent design of the legislator ; for he made the state poor, and its individual members avaricious. Let it suffice to have said thus much concerning the Lacedcemonian government; for these are the chief points in it which one would blame. CHAP. X. The form of government in Crete ^ bears a near resem- blance to this ; in some few particulars it is not worse, but ^ " In Crete the constitution founded on the principles of the Doric race, was first moulded into a firm and consistent shape, but even in a more simple manner than in Sparta at a subsequent period. Thus Ly- curgus was able, without forcing any foreign usages upon Sparta, to take for a model the Cretan institutions, which had been more fully deve- loped at an earlier period ; so that the constitutions of Crete and Sparta had from that time, as it were, a family resemblance." Miiller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. i. 8. CHAP. X.] MINOS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF CRETE. 71 in general it is less skilfully contrived. For it appears, and is said, that in most particulars ^nfof Crete the constitution of Lacedsemon was formed in g^^^JJ^^^J^^ imitation of that of Crete ; and in general most old things are less compactly put together than new ones. For they say, that when Lycurgus ceased to be guardian to King Charilaus, he went abroad, and spent a lon^; time with his relations in Crete. For the Lycians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians ; and those who first settled there adopted that body of laws which they found already established by the inhabitants ; in like manner also, those who now live near them have the very laws which they had when Minos first drew out his system of a state. This island seems formed by nature to be the mistress of Greece, for it lies across the en- tire length of the sea, around which nearly all the Greeks are settled ; and it is not far distant on the one side from Pelo- ponnesus, on the other, which looks toward Asia, from Trio- pium and Rhodes. Hence Minos * acquired the empire of the sea and of the islands, some of which he subdued, and others he colonized :^ at last he died at Camicus while he was at- tacking Sicily. There is this analogy between the customs of the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans, the Helots cultivate the grounds for the one, the serfs for the other.^ Both states too ^ Comp. infr. book vii. chap. 10. ^ Comp. Thucyd. i. chap. 8. ^ " In this island, several different classes of dependants existed. Sosicrates speaks of three classes, the public bondsmen, {koit/ti dovXeia, called by Cretans iivoia,) the slaves of individual citizens, (dcpafiiwrai,) and the Perioeci {vtttjkool). Now we know that the Aphamiotae re- ceived their name from the cultivation of the lands of private individuals, (in Crete called acpafxiai,) and accordingly were agricultural bondsmen. These latter are identical with the Clarotse, {KXripCjroi). . . . They were bondsmen belonging to the individual citizens, and both the Clarotae and Aphamiotae have therefore been correctly compared with the Helots : and as the latter were entirely distinct from the Lacedaemonian Perioeci, so were the former from the Cretan, though Aristotle neglects the distinction accurately observed by Cretan writers. The fivoia, by more precise his- torians, was distinguished as well from the constitution of the Perioeci as from that of private bondage, and it was explained to mean a state of public vassalage. Hence we may infer that every state in Crete was pos- sessed of public lands, which the Mnotse cultivated in the same relative situation to the community as that in which the Aphamiotae, who culti- vated the allotted estates, stood to the several proprietors. Finally, the Perioeci in Crete, as in Laconia, formed dependent and tributary commu- nities ; and their tribute, like the produce of the national lands, was partly applied to the public banquets." (Miiller's DorianSj ibid.) 72 ARISTOTLE S POLITICS. [book n. have their common meals, and the Lacedasmonians called these formerly not ^eihirTia, but "Av^pta, as the Cretans do ; which proves whence the custom arose. In this particular their governments are also alike : the ephors have the same power with those who are called Cosmi in Crete ; ^ with this differ- ence only, that the number of the one is five, of the other ten. The senators are the same as those whom the Cretans ca^ll the council. There was formerly also a kingly power in Crete , _ ^ . but it was afterwards dissolved, and the command The Cosmi. n jt > • i i r>t . -i-. 01 their armies belongs to the Cosmi. Every one also has a vote in their public assembly ; but this has only the power of confirming what has akeady been passed by the council and the Cosmi. The Cretans conducted taWes!^^^^*^ their public meals better than the Lacedaemonians, for at Lacedaemon each individual was obliged to furnish what was assessed upon him ; and if he could not do this, there was a law which deprived him of the rights of a citizen, as has been already mentioned : but in Crete they were furnished by the community ; for all the corn and cat- tle, taxes and contributions, which the domestic slaves were obliged to furnish, were divided into parts, and allotted to the gods, the public services of the state, and these public meals ; so that all the men, women, and children were main- tained from a common stock. The legislator gave many minute regulations to encourage a habit of eating sparingly, as being very useful to the citizens. In regard to the marriage of the women also, he provided that they should not be too prolific, by introducing the love of boys: whether in this he did well or ill we shall have some other opportunity of considering.^ But that the public meals were better ordered at Crete than at Lacedsemon is very evident. The institution of the Cosmi ^ " What the Dorians endeavoured to obtain in the state was good order, or K6r3 from 3lientship at Rome, see tlie Diet, of Gr. and Rom. Antiq. CHAP. I.] THE CITIZEN DEFINED. 83 objections, and the same answers. There is nothing that more characterizes a complete citizen than having a citizen is one a share in the judicial and executive part of the ^jj^^^^?^^ government. With respect to offices, some are government of fixed to a particular time, so that no person on any s^^^^- account is permitted to fill them twice, or else not till some certain period has intervened ; others are not fixed, as that of a juryman, or a member of the popular assembly. But pos- sibly some one may say, these are not offices, nor . . have the citizens in these capacities any share in ^°"* the government ; though surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the principal power in the state bear no office in it. But grant that this objection is of no weight, for it is only a dispute about words ; as there is no general term which can be applied both to a dicast and a member of the assembly. For the sake of distinction, then, let us call it an indeterminate office : we lay it down then as a maxim, that those are citi- zens who have this share. Such then is the description of the citizen who comes nearest to what all those are who are called citizens. Every one also should remember, that of the component parts of those things which differ from each other in species, those which follow after the first or second remove have either nothing at all, or to a very little extent, in com- mon. Now we see that governments differ from each other in their form, and that some of them are prior, others poste- rior in time ; for it is evident, that those which have many defects and deviations in them must be in time posterior to those which are without such faults.^ (What we mean by deviations will be hereafter explained.) Hence it _ is clear, that the office of a citizen must differ just emunder as governments do from each other : for which ^^rent forms ol reason he who is called a citizen is most truly a citizen in a democracy. In other forms of government he may be so indeed, but not necessarily ; for in some states the people have no power ; nor have they any general assembly, but a few select officers ; the trial also of different causes is allotted ' Just as in the Nic. Ethics, (book i. ch. 6,) Aristotle disproves the existence of the abstract or ideal good " of Plato, by asserting that pri- ority and posteriority could not be predicated concerning it ; so here, ac- cording to Aristotle, there can be no single definition given of a rroXirrigj because some polities are prior and posterior to others. a 2 84 Aristotle's politics. |;book hi. to different persons ; as at Lacedaemon, wliere all disputes con- cerning contracts are brought before some of the ephors , while the senate are the judges in cases of murder, some cases being heard by one magistrate, others by another : and thus at Car- thage certain magistrates determine all causes.^ But our former description of a citizen will admit of correction ; for in some governments, the office of a dicast and of a member of the general assembly, is not an indeterminate one ; but there are particular persons appointed for these purposes, some or all of the citizens being appointed jurymen, or members of the general assembly ; and this either for all causes and all public business whatsoever, or else for some particular one. This A state is the ^^^^ Sufficient to show what a citizen is ; for aggregate of whocvcr has a right to take part in the judicial ^ * and executive part of government in any state, him we call a citizen of that place ; and a state, in one word, is the collective body of such persons, sufficient in themselves for all the purposes of life.^ CHAP. II. other opinions -^^^ common usc, then, men define a citizen to be as to citizen- one who is Sprung from citizens on both sides, not on the father s or the mother's only.^ Others carry the matter still further, and inquire as to his ancestors, * See above, note on the last chapter. * In the same spirit Cicero, in the Somnium Scip. ch. 3, defines a state as " conciUum coetusque hominum jure sociati.*' A civitas," or TrdXt^, therefore, is properly a political community, possessed of an internal prin- ciple of unity of its own, sovereign and independent. Its avrapKtia (of which Aristotle here speaks) is a property necessarily flowing from the above essential point in its constitution. ^ Aristotle here says that, for practical purposes, it is sufficient to define a citizen as the son or grandson of a citizen. It is certain that the law required that any one enrolled as a citizen should prove that he had been bom in lawful wedlock. This regulation, however, was only carried out in its utmost rigour at the time when Athenian citizenship was most valuable. In Solon's time, it is not certain that the offspring of a citizen and a foreign woman incurred any civil disadvantage ; and even the law of Pericles, (Plut. Pericl. c. 37,) which enacted citizenship on the mo> ther's side, appears to have become obsolete very soon afterwards. Our author in this place makes his test the formal cause of a man being a citizen, viz. the power which he actually enjoys : the other writers re- ferred to, measured his citizenship by the efficient or material cause, namely, birth and hereditary descent CHAP, m.] OPINIONS CONCERNING CITIZENSHIP. 80 for three or more generations. But some persons have ques- tioned how the first of the family, be he third or fourth in ascGTit, could prove himself a citizen, according to this popu- lar and careless definition. Gorgias of Leontium, partly entertaining the same doubt, and partly Jefutel^'"'^^ in jest, says, that as mortars ape made by mor- tar-makers, and Larissa3an kettles by kettle-makers, so citizens are made by citizen-makers.^ This is indeed a very simple account of the matter ; for they would be citizens if they had a share in the state, according to this definition ; but this can- not apply to the first founders or inhabitants of states, who can claim no right either from their father or mother. It is probably a matter of still greater difficulty to determine their political rights, in the case of those who are enfranchised after any revolution in the state. As, for instance, at Athens, after the expulsion of the tyrants, when Cleisthenes enrolled many foreigners and city slaves amongst the tribes ; the doubt with respect to them was, not whether they were citizens or no, but whether they were legally so or not. Though indeed some persons may have this further doubt, tlo^^tociti!" whether a citizen can be a citizen, when he is ^^^ated"^^^^^^ illegally made ; as if an illegal citizen, and one who is no citizen at all, were the same : but since we see some persons govern unjustly, whom yet we admit to be governors, though not justly so, and the definition of a citizen is one who exercises certain offices, (for such we have defined a citizen to be,) it is evident that a citizen illegally created yet continues to be a citizen ; but whether justly or unjustly so, follows next upon the former inquiry. CHAP. III. Some also doubt what is and what is not the act wherein con- of the state ; as for instance, when a democracy sjsts the iden- arises out of an aristocracy, or a tyranny ; for ^ ^ ' some persons then refuse to fulfil their contracts ; as if the * Copper kettles made at Larissa were called Larissae, just as those made at Tanagrawere called Tanagrae. Thirlwall, however, understands the word dr}jiLovpyol in a different sense, and would seem inclined to iden- tify it with the office of 7roXtro0u\a^, mentioned below, book v. 6. See Thirl wall's Greece, vol. i. p. 438, note. 86 Aristotle's politics. [book III. right of receiving the money was in the tyrant, and not in tlie state, and many other things of the same nature ; or as if any covenant was founded for violence and not for the com- mon good. So in like manner, whatever is done by those who manage an established democracy, the actions of this go- vernment are to be considered as the actions of the state, as well as in the oligarchy or tyranny. And here it seems very proper to consider this question, when shall we say that a state is the same, and when shall we say that it is different ? ^. , Now the most superficial mode of examininor Not in locality. . ^ ^, . ^. • . , . . , i ^ into this question, is to begin with the place and the people ; for it may happen that the place and the people may be divided, and that some one of them may live in one place, and some in another. But this question may be re- garded as no very knotty one ; for, as a state is so called in a variety of senses, it may be solved many ways. And in like manner, when men inhabit one common place, when shall we say that the state is the same ? for it does not depend upon the walls ; for it would be possible to surround Pelo- ponnesus itself with a wall, as was Babylon, and every other place which encircles rather a nation than a city ; for they say that when it had been taken three days, some of the in- habitants knew nothing of it. But we shall find a proper time to determine this question ; for the extent of a state, how large it should be, and whether it should consist of more than one people, these are particulars which ought not to escape the politician. This too is a matter of inquiry, whether Nor in mere shall Say that a State is the same while it is sameness of inhabited by the same race of men, though some of them are perpetually dying, others coming into the world, as we say that a river or a fountain is the same, though the waters are continually changing ; or, when a si- milar event takes place shall we say that the men are the same, but the state is different ? ^ For if a state is a community, it is community of citizens ; but if the mode of government * The definition of a ttoXittjq will depend upon the d^og of the polity itself; and in like manner whether we are able to predicate of a state at two different periods that it is the same state, will depend upon whether the eUoQ TToXiTs'iag be the same or no. And whether an action may be justly called the action of the state will depend upon the part of it in which the supreme power is lodged (rb KvpLop), CHAP. IV. 1 WHAT MAKES THE IDENTITY OF A STATE. 87 should alter, and become of another sort, it would seem a ne- cessary consequence that the state is not the same ; as we regard the tragic chorus as different from the comic, though it may probably consist of the same performers. Thus every other community or composition is said to be different, if the species of composition is different ; as in music the same voices produce different harmony, as at one time the Doric and at another the Phrygian melody. If this is true, it is evident that when we speak of a state of^gVveJnnS as being the same, we refer especially to the go- vernment there established ; and it is possible to call it by the same name or any other, whether it be inhabited by the same men or by different ones* But whether or no it is right or not right to dissolve the community, when the state passes into an altered form of constitution, is another question. CHAP. IV. After what has been said, it follows that we is the virtue should consider, whether the virtue of a ofood man ^ sood man 1 1 n 1 1 1 • • TyY» the same as IS the same as that oi a valuable citizen, or diiier- that of a good ent from it ; and since this point ought to have a ^^^^2^^- particular inquiry, we must first give in a general outline the virtue of a good citizen. For as a sailor is one of those who make up a community, this also we say of a citizen ; although the province of one sailor may be different from that of an- other,— (for one is a rower, another a steersman, a third a boat- swain, and so on, each having their several denominations,) — it is evident, that though the most accurate description of any one good sailor must refer to his peculiar abilities, still there is some common description which will apply to the whole crew ; for the safety of the ship is the common business of all of them, as this is the point at which each sailor aims. So also with respect to citizens, although different from each other, yet they have one common care, the safety of the community ; for the state is a community : and for this reason, the virtue of a citizen has necessarily a reference to the state. But since there are different kinds of governments, it is evi- dent, that those actions which constitute the virtue of an ex- cellent citizen will not always be the same, and hence that it cannot be perfect ; but we call a man good when he is of 88 Aristotle's politics. Pbook III. perfect virtue ; and hence it follows, that a man who is an excellent citizen may not possess that virtue which constitutes a good man. Those who are doubtful concerning this same question as to the best polity, may follow up the matter in another way ; for if it is impossible that a state should con- sist entirely of excellent citizens, (while it is necessary that every one should do well in his calling, in which consists his excellence, and as it is impossible that all the citizens should be upon the same level,) it is impossible that the virtue of a citizen and a good man should be the same. For all should possess the virtue of an excellent citizen, for from hence ne- cessarily arises the perfection of the state ; but that every one should possess the virtue of a good man is impossible, if it is not necessary that all the citizens in a well-regulated state should be virtuous. Besides, as a state is composed of dis- similar parts, as an animal is of life and body ; the soul, of reason and appetite ; a family, of a man and his wife ; pro- perty, of a master and a slave ; in the same manner, as a state is C3mposed of all these, and of many other very differ- The virtue of ^^^^ parts, it ncccssarily follows, that the virtue some citizens of all the citizens cannot be the same ; as the bu- siness of the leader of a chorus is different from that of others. ^ t «... that ot a dancer, l* rom all these proois it is evi- dent that the virtues of a citizen cannot be one and the same. But do we never find those virtues united which constitute a good man and excellent citizen ? for we say that such a one is an excellent magistrate, and a prudent and good man ; but prudence is necessary to all who engage in public affairs.* Nay, some persons affirm, that the education of those who are intended to command, should from the beginning be different from other citizens ; as is shown by those who instruct the children of kings in riding and warlike exercises ; and thus Euripides says, * The (ppovrjcTiQ which Aristotle requires in the private citizen is only that which will enable him to perform well his proper tpyov, and differs widely from that moral (ppovricrig properly so called, which is a maater faculty, (sTTLfTTariKrj duvafiig,) and is requisite in the ruler only. The ruler indeed knows, or should know, how to rule and to obey, but the latter he need only know virtually, not experimentally. But the subject need only know how to rule virtually, if at all, but it is necessary that he should know practically and experimentally how to obey. CHAP. IV.] THE VIRTUE OF THE MAN AND THE CITIZEN. R9 " No showy arts be mine,* But what the state requires ; " as if there were some education peculiar to a ruler. But siiics the virtues of a good man and a good magistrate may be the same, and since a citizen is one who obeys the magistrate, it follows that the virtue of the one cannot in general be the same as the virtue of the other, although it may be true of some particular citizen ; for the virtue of the magistrate must be different from the virtue of the citizen. For this reason Jason declared, that were he no longer king, he should pine away with regret, as not knowing how to live a private man. But it is a great recommendation to know how to command as well as to obey ; and to do both these things well is the virtue of an accomplished citizen. Since then the virtue of a good man consists in being able to dedded!^^^°" command, but that of a good citizen renders him equally fit for either post, they are not both equally praise- worthy. It appears then, that both he who commands and he who obeys should each of them learn their separate busi- ness, and not the same ; but that the citizen should be master of and take part in both these, as any one may see from the fact that in a family government there is no occasion for the master to know how to perform the necessary offices, but rather to enjoy the labour of others ; for to do the other is a servile part. 1 mean by the other, the performance of the family business of the slave. There are many sorts of slaves, for their em- ployments are various ; one of these are the handi- fjrjnt kinds^' craftsmen, who, as their name imports, get their living by the labour of their hands ; and amongst these all me- chanics are included. For which reasons such workmen in some states were not formerly admitted into any share in the government, till at length democracies were established: it is not therefore proper for any man of honour, or gerviie occupa- any citizen, or any one who engages in public af- tions unfit for fairs, to learn these servile employments, without ^ they have occasion for them for their own use ; for otherwise the distinction between a master and a slave would be lost. * This verse does not occur in any of the extant plays of Euripides, but is preserved among his fragments. 90 ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS. [book III. But there is a government of another sort, in which men go- vern those who are their equals in rank and freemen ; and this we call a political government, in which men learn to command, by first submitting to obey ; just as a good general of horse, or a commander-in-chief, must acquire a knowledge of his duty, by having been long under the command of an- other, and having served in command of a rank and a troop ; for well is it said, that no one knows how to command, who has not himself been under command of another. The virtues „ ^ of each are indeed different, but a erood citizen How far the . , i -, i -it virtue cf the must kuow how to be able to command and to fhe^crj^,d"cm.^ ^^^y 5 ought also to know in what manner zen are iden- freemen ought to govcrn and be governed. Both ' too belong to the good man, even though the temperance and justice of him who commands is different in kind from that of another ; for it is evident that the virtue of a good citizen cannot be the same when he is under com- mand or free, (as justice, for instance,) but must be of a dif- ferent species in either of these different situations, as the temperance and courage of a man and a woman are different from each other ; for a man would appear a coward, who had only that courage which would be graceful in a woman, and a woman would be thought a chatterer, who should take as large a part in the conversation as would become a man of consequence. The domestic employments of each of them are also different ; it is the man's business to acquire a sub- sistence, the woman's to take care of it. But practical wis- dom is a virtue peculiar to those who govern, while all others seem to belong in common to both parties. But practical wisdom does not concern the governed, but only to entertain just notions; the latter indeed are like flute-makers, while he who governs is the musician who plays on the flutes. And thus much to show whether the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same, or if it is different, and also how far it is the same, and how far different. CHAP. V. Are mechanics citizens ! But with respect to the citizens there is a doubt remaining, whether those only are truly so who are allowed a share in the government, or whether CHAP, v.] LABOURERS HOW FAR CITIZENS. 91 mechanics also are to be considered as such. For if those who are not permitted to rule are to be reckoned among them, it is impossilDle that the virtue of all the citizens should be the same ; (for these also are citizens ;) and if none of them art"* admitted to be citizens, where shall they be ranked ? for they are neither sojourners, nor foreigners. Or shall we say that no absurdity v/ill arise from their not being citizens, as nei- ther the slaves nor the freedmen consist of those above men- tioned ? This is certainly true, that all are not citizens who are necessary to the existence of a state, as boys are not citizens in the same manner that men are, for the former are perfectly so, the latter under some conditions ; for they are citizens, though imperfect ones. In former times indeed, among some people, the mechanics and foreigners were slaves ; and for this reason many of them are so now ; and indeed the best-regulated states will not permit a mechanic to be a citizen ; but if it be allowed them, we cannot then attribute the virtue which we have described to every citizen or freeman, but to those only who are disengaged from servile offices. Now those who are employed in such things by one person, are slaves ; those who do them for money, are mechanics and hired servants ; and hence it is evident on the least reflection what is their situation, for what I have said is self-evident, and fully explains the matter. Since the number of commu- nities is very great, it follows necessarily that r^j^j^ ^j^j there will be many different sorts of citizens, par- different in ,.ii/..t 1 TT ,1 different states. ticularly ot those who are governed by others ; so that in one state it may be necessary to admit mechanics and hired servants to be citizens, but in others it may be impos- sible ; as particularly in an aristocracy, and where honours are bestowed on virtue and merit ; for it is impossible for one who lives the life of a mechanic or hired servant to prac- tise a life of virtue.^ In oligarchies also hired servants are not admitted to be citizens ; because there a man's right to bear any office is regulated by the size of his fortune ; but 1 The prescription which practically excluded from the rights of citi- zenship all those who gained their living by agricultural labour, or by handicraft trades, was of course derived from the old heroic times, before the rise of the dominant class which afterwards overthrew the mon- archies. The force of this prescription is shown remarkably in such words as %£tpo;j/, x^P^Q) ^tc. 92 ARISTOTLE S POLITICS. [book IIL mechanics are admitted, for the majority of citizens are very rich. There was a law at Thebes, that no one could have a share in the government, till he had been ten years out of trade. In many states the law invites strangers to accept the freedom of the city ; and in some democracies the son of a free-woman is himself free. The same is also observed in many others with respect to natural children ; but it is through want of citizens regularly born that they admit such ; for these laws are always made in consequence of a scarcity of inhabitants ; so, as their numbers increase, they first deprive the children of a male or female slave of this privilege, next the child of a free-woman, and last of all, they will admit none but those whose fathers and mothers were both free. From this it is clear that there are many sorts of citizens, and that he who shares the honours of the state may be called a complete citizen. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains of Agamemnon's treating him *' like some unhonoured strange-r ; " ^ for he who shares not in the honours of a state, is as it were a stranger, or sojourner ; and whenever such a thing as this is concealed, it is for the sake of deceiving the inhabitants. , From what has been said then, it is plain whether The virtue of a .ii .i •.^ /> t i good man may wc must lay dowu the Virtue ot a good man and that^of^a™ood^ excellent citizen to be the same or different ; citizen when in for WC find that in some states it is the same, command. others not, and also that this is not true of each citizen, but of those only who take the lead, or are ca- pable of taking the lead, in public affairs, either alone or in conjunction with others. CHAP. VI. How many And since thesc points are determined, we pro- poiities are eccd next to Consider whether one polity only admissible? g^ould be established, or more than one; and if more, then how many, and of what sort, and what are the differences between them. Now a polity is the ordering and regulating of the state, and of all its offices, particularly of that > See Homer II. ix. 644. CflAP. VI.] POLITIES OF DIFFERENT KINDS. 93 wherein the supreme power is lodged ; and this ^^^^^ power is always possessed by the administration ; with^theform but the administration itself determines the particu- of^administra- lar polity. Thus, for instance, in a democracy the supreme power is lodged in the whole people ; on the contrary, in an oligarchy it is in the hands of a few. We say then, thai the polity in these states is different, and we shall find the same thing hold good in others. Let us first determine for whose sake a state is established, and point out the different species of rule which relate to mankind and to social life. It has already been mentioned, in the beginning of our treatise, where a definition was made as to ^^jjjg^ the management of a family, and the power of a master,^ that man is an animal naturally formed for society, and that therefore, even when he does not want any foreign assistance, he will equally desire to live with others ; not but that mutual advantage also induces them to it, as far as the share of it enables each person to live agreeably. This is indeed the great object, not only to all in general, but also to each individual : and they join in society also for the sake of being able to live, (for doubtless in this, too, what is agreeable has a share,) and they also bind together civil society, even for the sake of preserving life, unless they are grievously over- whelmed with its miseries : for it is very evident, that men will endure many calamities for the sake of life, as having in itself something naturally sweet and desirable. It is easy to point out the different received modes of government, and we often lay them down in our exoteric^ discourses. The power of the master, though there is an identity of interest between him who is by nature a master and him who is by nature a slave, yet nevertheless tends especially to the benefit of the master, but accidentally to that of the slave ; for if the slave is destroyed, the power of the master is at an end. But the authority which a man has over his wife, and Distinctions of children, and his family, which we call domestic government in government, is either for the benefit of those who are under subjection, or else for the sake of something com- * See book i. ch. 8. ^ diopi^ofieOa. See the note of Goettling. " Praesens certissimum indi- cium est sermonem esse de Aristo tells ratione coram auditoribus veie peri- pate tice disserendi.'* Another reading is ^twpi^o/xt^a. 94 Aristotle's politics. mon to both j but its essential object is the benefit of the go- verned, as we see in other arts, (in physic, for instance, and the gymnastic exercises.) but accidentally it may be for the sake of those who govern ; for nothing forbids the master of the exercises from sometimes being himself one of those who take exercise, as the steersman is always one of the sailors ; but both the master of the exercises and the steersman con- sider the good of those who are under their government. But when either of them becomes one of these, it is by acci- dent that he shares in their benefits ; for the one becomes a common sailor, and the other one of the wrestlers, though he is Governments Piaster of the cxerciscs. Thus in all political diifer accord- governments, which are established upon the prin- which they" ciple of an equality of the citizens, and accord- have in view, ing to similitude, it is held right to rule by turns. Formerly, as was natural, every one expected that each of his fellow-citizens should in his turn ^ serve the public, and thus administer to his private good, as he himself when in office had done for others. But now every one is desirous of being continually in power, that he may enjoy the advantage which he derives from public business and being in office ; as if offices were a never-failing remedy for sickly rulers ; for if this were so, no doubt they would be eagerly sought after. , It is evident, then, that all those governments What govern- , . , i , , . . ^ • i i ments are which have the common good in view, are rightly proper. established and strictly just ; but that those which have in view only the good of the rulers, are all founded on wrong principles, and are widely different from what a go- vernment ought to be ; for they are tyrannical ; whereas a state is a community of freemen. ^ XeLTovpyuv, For an account of the ancient XeiTovpyiaif see the article under that head in the Dictionary of Grecian and Roman Anti- quities. They are mentioned again in the Economics, book ii. 5, and were probably sanctioned, even if they were not first introduced, by the legislation of Solon. They were divided into extraordinary and ordinary or encyclic (lyKvKXioi) liturgies ; and as soon as the democratic power became fully established at Athens, they became practically a simple tax upon property, connected with personal labour and exertion. CHAP, VII. 1 THE THREE FORMS kjF GOVERNMENT. 95 CHAP. VII. Having established these particulars, the next point is to consider how many different kinds of governments there are, and what they are ; and first we must review those of them which are correct ; for when we have determined this, their deflections will be evident enough. It is evident that every form of government or ^j^^ ^^^^^ administration, (for the words are of the same im- government port,) must contain the supreme power over the ^°^"* whole state, and that this supreme power must necessarily be in the hands of one person, or of a few, or of the many ; and that when the one, the few, or the many direct their po- licy to the common good, such states are well governed : but when the interest of the one, the few, or the many who are in office, is alone consulted, a perversion takes place ; for we must either affirm that those who share in the community are not citizens, or else let these share in the advantages of govern- ment. Now we usually call a state which is go- verned by one person for the common good, a ^' ^o^^rchy. kingdom ; one that is governed by more than one, but by a few only, an aristocracy ; either because the go- vernment is in the hands of the most worthy 2- citizens, or because it is the best form for the city, and its in- liabitants. But when the citizens at large direct their policy to the public good, it is called simply sta^e!"^^^^'^^ a polity ; a name which is common to all other governments. And this distinction is consonant to reason ; foi' it will be easy to find one person, or a very few, of very distinguished abilities, but most difficult to meet with the majority of a people eminent for every virtue ; but if there is one common to a whole nation it is valour ; for this exists among numbers : for which reason, in this state the military have most power, and those who possess arms will have their share in the erovernment. Now the perversions «3 Ine corruption attendnig each ot these governments are these ; a of each several kingdom may degenerate into a tyranny, an aris- J^^yranny. tocracy into an oligarchy, and a state into a de- 2. oligarchy. . 1 , 3. Democracy. mocracy. JNow a tyranny is a monarchy where the good of one man only is the object of government, an oligarchy considers only the rich, and a democracy only the 96 Aristotle's politics. [cook 111, poor ; but neither of them have the common good of all in view.^ CHAR VIIL It will be necessary to enlarge a little more upon the nature of each of these forms of government ; and this is a matter which includes some difficulties ; for he who would enter into a phi- losophical inquiry into their principles, and not content him- self with a mere practical view of them, must pass over and omit nothing, but explain the true spirit of each of them. A tyranny then is, as has been said, a monarchy where one person has a despotic power over the whole community : an oligarchy, where the supreme power of the state is lodged with the rich : a democracy, on the contrary, is where it is in the hands of those who are worth little or nothing. CifficultiGS re- suiting from But the first difficulty that arises from the dis- division^^ tiuctiou laid down is this ; should it happen that the majority of the inhabitants who possess the power of the state (for this is a democracy) are rich, the question is, how does this agree with what we have said ? The same difficulty occurs, should it ever happen that the poor compose a smaller part of the people than the rich, but from their superior abilities acquire the supreme power ; (for this is what they call an oligarchy :) it would seem then that our definition of the different forms of government was not cor- rect ; nay, moreover, could any one suppose that the majority of the people were poor, and the minority rich^ and then de- scribe the state in this manner, that an oligarchy was a government in which the rich, being few in number, possessed the supreme power, and that a democracy was a state in which the poor, being many in number, possessed it, still there wiU be another difficulty ; for what name shall we give to those states which we have been describing? we mean, that in ^ In his Ethics (book viii. ch. 10) Aristotle gives a veiy similar division of governments. He there says that there are three kinds of political constitutions, monarchy, aristocracy, and timocracy; and three cor- ruptions of tliem, namely, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Of the above forms, he says that monarchy is best and timocracy worst ; while, in- ^ersely, of the three corruptions, democracy is the least bad and tyranny the worst. So true is the old proverb, " Corruptio optimi possima fit corruptio.** criAP. IX.] OLIGARCHY AND DEMOCRACY. 97 which the greater number are rich, and that in which the lesser number are poor, where each of these respectively pos- sess the supreme power? If there are no other forms of government besides those we have described, it seems there- fore evident to reason, that it may be a mere accident whether the supreme power is vested in the hands of many or few ; but that it is clear enough, that when it is in the hands of the few, it will be a government of the rich ; when in the hands of the many, it will be a government of the poor ; since in all countries there are many poor and few rich. It is not there- fore the cause that has been already assigned, namely, the number of people in power, which makes the difference be- tween the two forms of srovernment; but an oli- , T T T nn • 1 - n i How an olisfar- garchy and a democracy diiier m this irom each chy and a de- other, namely, in the poverty of those who go- ^^^^^'^-y ^^ff^^- vern in the one, and the riches of those who govern in the other ; for when the government is in the hands of the rich, be they few or be they more, it is an oligarchy ; when it is in the hands of the poor, it is a democracy. But, as we have already said, the one will be always few, the other numerous ; for few enjoy riches, but all enjoy liberty ; and hence will arise continual disputes with each other for the lead in public affairs. CHAP. IX. Let us first determine what they lay down as the oligarchy proper limits of an oligarchy and a democracy, and democracy and what is just in each of these forms of go- ^ vernment. For all men have some natural inclination to justice, but they proceed therein only to a certain degree ; nor can they universally point out what is absolutely just. For instance, what is equal appears just, and is so, but not to all, only among those who are equals ; and what is unequal ap- pears just, and is so, but not to all, only amongst those who are unequals. This relative nature of justice some people neglect, and therefore they judge ill ; and the reason of this is, that they judge for themselves, and almost every one is the worst judge in his own cause. Since then justice has reference to persons, the same distinctions must be made with fa^tive.^ ^'^ ^ respect to persons, which are made with respect H 98 Aristotle's politics. [book in. to tilings, in the manner that I have ah^eadj described in my Ethics.^ As to the equality of the things, they are agreed; but their dispute is concerning the equality of the persons, and chiefly for the reason above assigned, because they judge ill in their own cause ; and also because each party thinks, that if they admit what is right in some particulars, they say what is just on the whole. Thus, for instance, if some per- sons are unequal in riches, they suppose them unequal in the whole ; or on the contrary, if they are equal in liberty, they suppose them equal in the whole. But they forget that which is the essential point ; for if civil society was founded for the sake of preserving and increasing property, every one's right in the state would be in proportion to his fortune ; and then the reasoning of those who insist upon an oligarchy would be valid ; for it would not be right that he who contributed one mina should have an equal share in the hundred, along with him who brought in all the rest, either of the original money or of what was afterwards acquired. Nor was civil wirj!\Sinded. socicty founded merely in order that its members might live, but that they might live well, — (for otherwise a state might be composed of slaves, or of the ani- mal creation ; which is far from the case, because these have no share in happiness, nor do they live after their own choice ;) — nor is it an alliance mutually to defend each, other from in- juries, or for a commercial intercourse ; for then the Tyr- rhenians, and Carthaginians, and all other nations between whom treaties of commerce subsist, would be citizens of one state. For they have articles to regulate their imports, and engagements for mutual protection, and alliances for mutual defence ; yet still they have not all the same magistrates established among them, but they are different among differ- ent people ; nor does the one take any care that the morals of the other should be as they ought, or that none of those who have entered into the common agreements should be unjust, or in any degree vicious, but only that they shall not injure another confederate. But whosoever endeavours to establish wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual who composes it ; ©/legislation'!^ licnce it is evident that the first care of a man who would found a state truly deserving that * He refers to book t. chap. 5. CHAP. IX,] JUSTICE; SOCIETY; LEGISLATION. 99 name, and not nominally so, must be to have his citizens virtuous ; ^ for otherwise it is merely an alliance for self- ttefence, differing only in place from those which are made between different people. For the law is an agreement, and as the sophist Lycophron says, a pledge between the citizens of their intending to do justice to each other, though not suf- ficient to make all the citizens just and good. And it is evident that this is the fact ; for could any one bring different places together, as, for instance, Megara and Corinth, within the same walls, yet they would not be one state, not even if their inhabitants intermarried with each other, though this inter-community contributes much to combine people into one state. Besides, could we suppose a set of people living separ- ate from each other, but within such a distance as would ad- mit of an intercourse, and that there were laws subsisting between each party to prevent their injuring one another in their mutual dealings, — (one being a carpenter, another a husbandman, another a shoemaker, and the like,) — and that their numbers were ten thousand, and still that they had nothing in common but a tariff for trade, stat^ diffeJs^^ or an alliance for mutual defence, even so they confede^cy^ would not constitute a state. And why in the world? Not because their mutual intercourse is not near enough ; for even if persons so situated should come to one place, and every one should live in his own house as in his native city, and there should be alliances subsisting between each party, mutually to assist and prevent any injury being done to the other, still they would not be admitted to be a ' In the last chapter of the Ethics, Aristotle confesses, with regard to this point, that moral instruction has but a limited influence, being con- fined to those minds which are generous and liberal, and not reaching to those of the masses. And as men are to be made good in three ways, by nature, by reasoning, and by teaching ; and as over nature we have no power at all, while reasoning and teaching exercise an influence only over minds duly cultivated for their reception, the moral character of the in- dividual members of a state must be formed by education, and this edu- cation ought to be enforced by law. And as education is necessary not only while we are children, but throughout life, hence exhortations to virtue become the duty of legislators, as much as the punishment of evil- doers ; and as men will acknowledge the authority of the state and of tne law, though not of individuals, the state therefore ought to undertake the duty of educating its members — a duty which, if neglected by the state, in the opinion of Aristotle, falls upon the parents. u 2 100 Aristotle's politics. [book ni. city by those who reason correctly, if they preserved the same customs when they were together as when they were separate. It is evident, then, that a state is not a mere community of place, nor established for the sake of mutual safety or traffic ; but that these things are the necessary consequences of a state, although they may all exist where there is no state ; but a state is a society of people joining together with Sy is."*^^'' their families, and their children, to live well, for the sake of a perfect and independent life ; and for this purpose it is necessary that they should live in one place, and intermarry with each other. Hence in all cities there are family meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and public enter- tainments, to promote friendship ; ^ for a love of sociability is friendship itself ; so that the end for which a state is estab- lished is that the inhabitants of it may live happily ; and these things are conducive to that end ; for it is a community of fa- milies and villages, formed for the sake of a perfect independ- ent life ; that is, as we have already said, for the sake of living Its end ^^^^^ happily.^ The political state therefore is founded not for the purpose of men's merely living together, but for their living as men ought ; for which reason those who contribute most to this end deserve to have greater power in the state than either those who are their equals in family and freedom, but their inferiors in civil virtue, or those who excel them in wealth, but are below them in worth. It is evident from what has been said, that in all disputes upon forms of government each party says something that is just. CHAP. X. Who should There may also be a doubt as to who should possess possess su- the supreme power of the state. Shall it be the ?n the s^tate^^ majority, or the wealthy, or a number of proper ^ See Professor Browne's introductory remarks prefixed to the Analy- sis of Aristotle's Ethics, book viii. - Civil rights, it is clear, will and ought to differ according to the differ- ent ends for which the state was established. In a state whose end is TO €u tyv, he who has the most political virtue, will have the precedence in civil rights ; for it is just that the greatest power should be lodged in the hands of those who contribute most to the end for which the state was founded and continues to exist. Thus, if the state has wealth in view as its chief end, it ought to be an oligarchy. CHAP. XI. , THE SUPREME POWER. 101 persons, or one better than the rest, or a tyrant ? ^^^^^^^ But whichever of these we prefer, some difficulty cuities consi- will arise. For what ? if the poor, because they ^1 ... T » 1 u 1 Shall it be are the majority, may divide among themselves in the hands of what belongs to the rich, is not this unjust? In ^^^^^many? sooth, by heaven, it will have been judged just enough by the multitude when they gain the supreme power. What there- fore is the extremity of injustice, if this is not? Again, if the many seize into their own hands every thing which be- longs to the few, it is evident that the state will be at an end. But virtue never tends to destroy what is itself virtuous ; nor can what is right be the ruin of the state. Therefore such a law can never be right ; nor can the acts of a tyrant ever be wrong, for of necessity they must all be just ; for, from his unlimited power, he compels every one to obey his command, as the multitude oppress the rich. Is it right then that the rich and few should have the su- ^^^^^ preme power ? and what if they be guilty of the same rapine, and plunder the possessions of the majority, will this be just ? It will be the same as in the other case ; but it is evident that all things of this sort are wrong and unju'^t Well then, suppose that those of the better sort shall have the supreme power, must not then all bes??^^^^^ the other citizens live unhonoured, without sharing the offices of the state ? for the offi,ces of a state we call honours, and if one set of men are always in power, it is evi- dent that the rest must be without honours. Then, will it be better that the supreme power be in the hands of that ono person who is fittest for it ? but by this means the power will be still more confined, for a greater number than before will continue unhonoured. But some one may say, that, in short, it is wrong that man should have the supreme power rather than the law, as his soul is subject to so many passions* But if this law appoints an aristocracy, or a democracy, bow will it help us in our present doubts ? for those things wiD happen which we have already mentioned. CHAP. XI. Of other particulars, then, let us treat hereafter ; Reasons but as to the fact that the supreme /oowei ought ve«ting tt* 102 Aristotle's politics. [book III. preme power to be lodged with the many, rather than with those with the many, better sort, who are few, there wouM seem to be some doubt, though also some truth as well ^ Now, though each individual of the many may himself be unfit for the supreme power, yet, when these many are joined together, it is possible that they may be better qualified for it, than the others ; and this not separately, but as a collective body. So the public suppers exceed those which are given at one per- son's private expense : for, as they are many, each person brings in his share of virtue and wisdom ; and thus, coming together, they are like one man made up of a multitude, with many feet, many hands, and many senses. Thus is it with respect to the character and understanding. And for this reason the many are the best judges of music and poetry ; for some understand one part, some another, and all collectively the whole. And in this particular men of consequence differ from each of the many ; as they say those who are beautiful difier from those who are not so, and as fine pictures excel any natural objects, by collecting into one the several beautiful parts which were dispersed among different originals, although the separate parts of individuals, as the eye or any other part, may be handsomer than in the picture. But it is not clear whether it is possible that this distinction should exist between every people and general assembly, and some few men of con- sequence ; but, by heaven, doubtless it is clear enough that, with respect to a few, it is impossible ; since the same conclu- sion might be applied even to brutes : and indeed, so to say, wherein do some men differ from brutes ? But nothing pre- vents what I have said being true of the people in some states. The doubt, then, which we have lately proposed, dedded!^*^°^ with that which is its consequence, may be settled in this manner ; it is necessary that the freemen and the bulk of the people should have absolute power in some things ; but these are such as are not men of property, nor have they any reputation for virtue. And so it is not safe to trust them with the first offices in the state, both on account of their injustice and their ignorance ; from the one of which ' In Bekker's text the words stand thus, do^eiev av Xveadai Kal Ttv* txeiv cLTTopiav. But it is clear that the word XvEGQai has crept into the text through the carelessness of some copyist. Goettling has printe-i it V2. brackets as spurious. CHAP. XI.] THE FEW AND THE MANY. 103 they are likely to do what is wrong', from the rpi^g people other to make mistakes. And yet it is dangerous to should be su- , 1 ♦ xi X 1 preme in some allow them no power or share m the government ;^ things, but not for when there are many poor people who are others, excluded from office, the state must necessarily have very many enemies in it. It remains, then, that they should have a place in the public assemblies, and in determining causes. And for this reason Socrates and some other legislators give them the power of electing the officers of the state, and also of inquiring into their conduct after their term of office, but do not allow them to act as magistrates by themselves. For the multitude, when they are collected together, have An union of the all of them sufficient understanding for these pur- many with the T , . . ,1 o -t ' ^ 1 few, desirable. poses, and by mixmg among those oi higher rank are serviceable to the state ; as some things which alone are improper for food, when mixed with others, make the whole more wholesome than a few of them would be ; though each individual is unfit to form a judgment by himself. But there is a difficulty attending this form of government ; for it seems that the same person, who himself was capable of curing any one who was then sick, must be the best judge who to employ as a physician ; but such a one must be himself a physician. And the same holds true in every other practice and art : and as a physician ought to give an account of his practice to physicians, so ought it to be in other arts. But phy- sicians are of three sorts ; the first makes up the medicines ; the second prescribes ; the third understands the science, but never practises it. Now these three distinctions may be found in those who understand all other arts ; and we have no less opinion of their judgment who are only instructed in the principles of the art, than of those who practise it. And with respect to elections the same would seem to ^^^^ should hold true ; for to elect a proper person in any line, have the power is the business of those who are skilled in it ; as electing . . 1 n . . \ n magistrates? in geometry, it is the part oi geometricians, and oi steersmen in the art of steering. But even if some individuals do know something of particular arts and works, they do not know more than the professors of them ; so that, even upon * Instances in point here may be found in the annals of cur own country. 104 Aristotle's politics. [book III. this principle, neither the election of magistrates, nor the cen- sure of their conduct, should be intrusted to the many. But possibly much that has been here said may not be right ; for, to resume the argument lately used, if the people are not very brutal indeed, although we allow that each individual knows less of these affairs than those who have given particular attention to them, yet when they come together they will know them better, or at least not worse : besides, in some particular arts it is not the workman only who is the best judge, as in those the works of which are understood by those who do not profess them. Thus he who builds a house is not the only judge of it, (for the master of the family who inhabits it is a better one ;) thus also a steersman is a better judge of a tiller than he who made it, and he who gives an entertain- ment than the cook. What has been said seems a sufficient solution of this difficulty ; but there is another that follows : for it seems absurd that greater power in the state should be lodged with the bad than with the good. Now the power of election and censure are of the very utmost consequence, and this, as has been said, in some states they intrust to the people ; for the general assembly is the supreme court of all. And yet they have a voice in this court, and deliberate on all public affairs, and try all causes, without any objection to the mean- ness of their circumstances, and at any age : but their quaes- tors, generals, and other great officers of state are taken from men of high condition. This difficulty, then, may L^termfned.^ solvcd upon the Same principle ; and here too they may be right. For the power is not in the man who is member of the assembly or council, but in the assembly itself, and in the council and people, of which each individual of the whole community forms a part, as senator, adviser, or judge. And for this reason it is very right that the many should have the greatest powers in their own hands ; for the people, the council, and the judges are composed of them, and the property of all these collectively is more than the property of any person, or of a few who fill the great offices of the state : and thus let us determine these points. But the first question that we stated shows nothing besides so plainly, as that the supreme power should be thJ'iaw.**'^ lodged in laws duly made, and that the magistrate, or magistrates, (either one or more,) should be CHAP. XII.] JUSTICE OF TWO KINDS. 105 authorized to determine those cases on which the laws cannot define particularly ; as it is impossible for them, in general language, to explain themselves upon every thing that may arise. But what these laws are, which are established upon the best foundations, has not been yet explained, but still remains a matter of some question : but the laws of every state will necessarily be like the state itself, either trifling or excellent, just or unjust ; for it is evident, that the ^aws good or laws which are framed, must correspond to the a test of constitution of the government ; and, if so, it is plain, that a well-formed government will have good laws, a bad one, bad ones. CHAP. XII. Since in every art and science the end aimed at is always good, the greatest good is particularly uie^nd^onhe*^ the end of that which is the most excellent of all, political sci- and this is the political science : the political good is justice ; for this, in other words, is the interest of all. Now, it is the common opinion, that justice is a certain equal- ity ; and up to a certain point men agree with the teaching of philosophers, when they lay down definitions of morals : for they say what is j ust, and to whom ; and that equals ought to receive equal ; but we should know how to determine of what things there is equality, and of what there is an in- equality ; and in this there is some difficulty, which calls for the philosophy of the writer on morals. Some persons will probably say that the offices of state ought unequally to be given according to every particular excellence of each citizen, if there is no other difference between them and justice abso- the rest of the community, but they are in every lute and reia- respect else alike: for to persons who differ from each other, justice is one thing and that which is according to worth is another. But if this is admitted to be true, com- plexion, or height, or any such advantage will be made by the superiors a means of grasping for a greater share of the public rights. But, surely, this is evidently absurd ; as is clear from the other arts and sciences ; for with respect to musicians who are equal in their art, the best flute is not to be given to those who are of the best family, for they will 106 Aristotle's politics. [book III. play never the better for that, but the best instrument ought to be given to him who is the best artist. But if what is now said does not make this clear, we will explain it still further : if there should be any one who is a very excellent player on the flute, but very deficient in family and beauty, (though each of these are more valuable endowments than a skill in music, and excel this art in a higher degree than that player excels others,) yet the best flutes ought to he given to him ; for the superiority in beauty and fortune should have a reference to the business i n hand ; but these have none. Moreover, ac- cording to this reasoning, every possible excellence might be brought into comparison with every other ; for if some bodily strength might dispute the point with riches or liberty, even any amount of strength might do it ; so that if one person excelled in size more than another did in virtue, and if, in short, bodily size was a thing more excellent than virtue, all things must then admit of a comparison with each other. For if such a size is greater than virtue by so much, it is evident that another size must be equal to it. Since, however, this is impossible, it is plain that it would be contrary to common sense to dispute a right to any oflice in the state according to every point of superiority whatsoever : for if one set of persons be slow, and another swift, neither are the one better qualified, A claim to Other worse, on that account ; though in office must be the gymuastic races a difierence in these particu- quaiffication^ lars will gain the prize ; but a pretension to ofiices for the particu- of State should be founded on those qualifications ^ar place. which are part of itself. And for this reason, men of family, independence, and fortune, with great propriety contend with each other for ofifice ; for those who hold oflice ought to be persons of independence and property : for a state can no more consist of all poor men, than it can of all slaves. But although such persons are requisite, it is evident that there is an equal need of justice and military valour. For without justice and valour, no state can be supported ; just as %7ithout the former class a state cannot exist, and without the ktter it cannot be well governed. CHAP. Xm.j WHO SHOULD HAVE SUPKEME POWER. 107 CHAP. XIII. It seems then requisite that all, or at least many, ^.^^^^ of these points should vie together towards the education the establishment of a state ; but virtue and education h^pp^iness'^^^^ may most justly dispute the right of being consi- dered as the necessary means of enabling the citizens to live well, as we have already said. But as those who are equal in one particular need not therefore be equal in all, and those who are unequal in one particular need not therefore be unequal in all ; it follows of necessity, that all governments which are established upon such a principle are erroneous. We have already said that all the members of the commu- nity will dispute with each other for !he offices of fZt'^^'^'^'' the state ; and to a certain extent justly, but ab- stractedly not so in general ; the rich, for instance, because they have the greatest landed property, and because the ultimate right to the soil is vested in the community ; and also because their fidelity in contracts is in general most to be depended on. The freemen and men of family •Vi -,. , ••111 1 Of the noble. Will aispute the pomt with each other, as nearly on an equality ; for these latter have a right to higher regard as citizens than obscure persons: for honourable descent is every where of great esteem ; and further, it is reasonable to expect that the descendants of men of worth w^ll be men of worth themselves ; for noble birth is the virtue of a fiimily. For the same reason also we shall justly say that ofthevirtuous virtue has a right to put in her pretensions ; for justice, we say, is a social virtue, and all others must yield her the precedence. Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the few ; ^ ^^^^ ' they may say, that if each are collectively taken and compared, the many are stronger, richer, and better than the others. But should it ever happen that all these should inhabit the same city, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as ' This is but another form of the old proverb, dyaOvjv dyaOovQ, Compare Hor. Od. IV. iv. 30—32, Est in juvencis, est in equis, patrum Virtus : neque imbellem feroces Progenerant aquilaj columbp.m." 108 Aristotle's politics. [book in. the many, such as usually make up the community, I ask, will there be any reason to dispute concerning who shall govern, or will there not ? for in every community which we have mentioned, there is no dispute as to who ought to rule ] for they differ from each other in those who have the chiet power. For in one state the rich enjoy it, in another the me- ritorious, and thus, each according to their separate manners. Let us however consider what is to be done when cuSef solved. thcsc happen at the same time to inhabit the city. If the virtuous should be very few in num- ber, how shall we then decide ? shall we direct our attention to their fewness as compared with their work, if they are capable of governing the state ? or should they be so many as to compose a state ? There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those \tdio claim the honours of government : for those who found them either on their fortune or their family would seem to have nothing which they can justly say in their defence ; since it is evident upon their principle, that if any one person can be found richer than all the rest, the right of governing all these will be justly vested in this one person. In the same manner, one man who is of the best family will claim it from those who dispute the point upon family merit ; and probably in an aristocracy the same dispute might arise on the score of virtue ; for if there is one man better than all the other men of worth, who are in the same community, it is requisite on the same plea of justice, that he should enjoy the supreme power. In like manner also, while the many suppose that they ought to have the supreme com- mand, as being more powerful than the few, if one, or more than one, though it be a small number, should be found stronger than themselves, these ought rather to have it than they. All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles are justly founded, on which these persons would establish their right to the supreme power, and that rA\ men whatsoever ought to obey them ; for with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their fortune, the multitude might justly have some objection to make, which they could jointly urge against them ; for nothing hinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better or richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their col- lective capacity. As to the doubt which some persons raise CHAP. XIII.J LEGISLATION \ OSTRACISM. 109 and propose, we may answer it in this manner ; g^^^^^ ^ ^^^.^^ it is this, whether a legislator who would estab- lator lay down lish the most perfect system of laws, should cal- ignefit of the culate them for the use of the better part of the many, or of the citizens, or of the many, under the circumsta-nces we have already mentioned? The rectitude of any thing must be assumed to consist in its equality; that therefore which is equally right, will be advantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in common. Now, in general, a citizen is one who shares in the government, and also in his turn submits to be governed ; but his condition is different in different states ; the best is that in which a man is enabled to choose both to govern and to be governed with regard to virtue during his whole life. But should there be found one person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon degree of virtue, though not enough to make up a civil state, so that the virtue or political abilities of the many are unable to come into comparison with theirs, if more than one ; or ^^^^ ^^^^ if there be but one, with his abilities alone ; such with the per- are not to be considered as part of the state ; for ^^^^y virtuous it would be doing them injustice to rate them on a level with those who are so far their inferiors in virtue and political abilities ; for it is fit that such an one should appear to them like a god amongst men.^ Hence it is evident, that a system of laws must be calculated for those who are equal to each other in nature and power. Such men therefore are not the object of law, for they are themselves a law ; and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to include them in legislation ; for probably they might say what Antisthenes tells us the lions did to the hares, when they harangued and demanded an equal share with them in the government. And it is on this account that democratic states have rj,^^ ^^^^ ^j.-^^. established Ostracism;^ for of a truth equality cipie of ostra- seems the principal object of their government. ' See Eth. Nicom. vii. ch. i., for an explanation of Aristotle's opinion concerning supernatural virtue, (rjpuj'iKr] rig Kal Qua aperr],) on which he there comments at considerable length. He there admits that this rjpio'iKi} dparrj is brought about by external causes ; i. e. that man cannot work him- self into it, as he does into auxpporjvvri for example. Hence it only incident- ally enters into a practical treatise on morals, such as the Ethics really are. 2 Ostracism, says Suidas, and the Scholiast on Aristoph. Eq. 861, dif- fers from (pvyi], inasmuch as those who were banished lost their property, lib Aristotle's poi jtics. [book iu. And for this reason they ostracise all those who are very eminent for their power, their fortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give them too great weight in the government, and force them to leave the city for a stated time ; as the fabulous histories relate the Argonauts left Her- cules behind, for they were unwilling that he should command the ship Argo together with the rest, because he excelled the other sailors in valour. For which reason those who hate a tyranny, and find fault with the advice which Periander gave to Thrasybulus,^ must not think that they are wholly right in their course. For the story goes, that Periander said nothing to the messenger sent to him with reference to the matter of advice, but that he struck off those ears of corn which were higher than the rest, and so reduced the whole crop to a level ; so that the messenger, without knowing the cause of what whereas the ostracised did not ; the former also had no fixed place of abode, or time of return, but the latter had. This ostracism is supposed by some to have been instituted by Cleisthenes, after the expulsion of the Pisistratidse. It is well known, as Aristotle implies here in the text, that ostracism was not a punishment of any crime, but rather a precautionary removal of those who possessed sufficient power in the state to excite either envy or fear. Thus Plutarch says (Pericl. ch. x.) that it was a good-natured way of allaying envy, {(p96vov TrapafxvOia (piXdvOpajTrog) by the humiliation of superior dignity and power. The manner of effecting it was as follows at Athens. A space in the dyopd was enclosed within barriers, with ten entrances for the ten tribes. By these the tribesmen entered, each with his oarpaKov or piece of tile, on which was written the name of the individual whom he wished to be ostracised. The nine archons and the senate, i. e. the presidents of that body, superintended the proceedings ; and the party who had the greatest number of votes againgt him, supposing that this number amounted to 6000, was obliged to with- draw from the city within ten days ; but if the number of votes did not amount to 6000, nothing was done. The expelled was not deprived of his property .... some of the most distinguished men at Athens were removed by ostracism, but recalled when the city found their services in- dispensable. Amongst these were Themistocles, Alcibiades, Cimon, and Aristides The last person against whom ostracism was used at Athens was Hyperbolus, a demagogue of low birth and character ; but the Atlienians thought their dignity compromised, and ostracism degraded by such an application of it, and accordingly discontinued the practice. (Plut. Arist. c. 7. Thucyd. viii. 73.) Ostracism prevailed in other de- mocratica.1 states as well as at Athens ; as for instance at Argos, Miletus, and Megara; and from it was copied the Petalism (TreraXicrfibg) of t}ie Syracusans, so called from the leaves (TrsraXov) of the oUve tree, on which was written the name of the obnoxious person. Diet, of Gr. and Ruia. Antiq. Art. Banishment. * See the story as related in Herodotus, i. 20. CHAP. XIII. 1 OSTRACISM. Ill was done, related the fact to Thrasybulus, who understood from it that he must take off all the principal men in the city. Nor is this serviceable to tyrants only, nor is it tyrants only wh'o do it ; tor the same thmg is cipie prevails practised both in oligarchies and democracies : oligarchies^,^' for the ostracism has in a manner nearly the same and democra- power, by restraining and banishing those who ^ * are too great. And the very same thing is done also by those who have the supreme power in the cities and separate states ; as by the Athenians, with respect to the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians ; ^ for when suddenly they had acquired a firm sway over Greece, they brought the other states into subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them. The king of Persia also very often has reduced the Medes and Babylonians, when they have assumed a tone of arrogance on account of their former power. And this is a principle on which all governments act, even those which are best administered : those which are corrupted do it for the sake of private utility, and this also takes place in like man- ner in polities which look to the common good. The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences ; for a painter would not represent an animal with a foot large be- yond proportion, though he had drawn it remarkably beau- tiful ; nor would the shipwright make the prow, or any other part of the vessel, larger than it ought to be ; nor will the mas- ter of the chorus permit any one who sings louder and better than the rest, to sing in concert with them. There is there- fore no reason why a monarch should not act in agreement with free states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for the benefit of their respective communities ; upon which account when there is any acknowledged disparity in the power of the citizens, the reason upon which the ostra- cism is founded will be politically just. It is prevention better indeed for the legislator so to establish his i^etter than state at the beginning as not to want this remedy : but, in the second place, if in course of time such an incon- venience should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such correction. This certainly was not done in the states ; for * For an account of the growth of the Athenian dgxri after the Persian war, see Thucyd. b. i. chap. 95, 96, and compare ThirlwaxJ's History of Greece, vol. iii. p. 46 — 54. 112 AniSTOTLE's POLITICS. [book Ot- they did not regard the benefit of their respective communitiet, but used the ostracism for party purposes.^ It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and useful in an individual case, though probably it is as clear that it is not absolutely just : for in a well-governed state there may be great doubts about the use of it, not on account of the su- periority which one may have in strength, riches, or friends ; but when the point of superiority is virtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not right to turn out such a person, and to banish him ; neither does it seem right to subject him to control ; for that would be like desiring to share the power with Jupiter, and to govern him. Nothing then remains but , , what indeed seems natural, and that is, for all The perfectly . virtuous cha- pcrsous quictly to submit to one who is thus emi- nently virtuous, and to let such men be perpetu- ally kings in the respective states. racter to be chosen kin: Monarchy. CHAP. XIV. After what has been now said, it would seem proper to change our subject, and to inquire into the nature of a monarchy ; for we admit this to be one of those species of government which are properly founded. And here let us consider, whether a kingly government is proper or not for a city or country which desires to be well governed^ or whether some other polity is proper. But let us first deter- ■ mine whether this is of one kind only or more. Now it is easy enough to perceive that it consists of many dif- Tst^^lt^sparta' ^^^^^^ spccics, and that the forms of government are not the same in all states ; for at Sparta the kingly power seems chiefly regulated by the laws ;^ for it is 1 See note above, p. 109, ] IC ^ With respect to the nature of the sovereignty in Doric states in ge- neral, as well as at Sparta in particular, see Miiller's Dorians, vol. ii. ch. vi. As to the power of the kings of Sparta, Miiller observes that it " de- rived additional strength from the fabulous notion that the conquest of the r.ountry had originated from the royal family." In war they had liberty to sacrifice, (see Herod, vi. 46,) and it consequently follows that they pre- sided over the entire worship of the army, being both priests and princes, ike the Agamemnon of Homer, or like x\nius in Virgil, " Rex Anius, rex idem hominum, Phoebique sacerdos.'* rhey considered the kingly power as proceeding from the Deity, and not AH originating from the people. The constitutional powers of the kings at CHAF. XIV.] MONARCHY OF TWO KINDS. 113 not supreme in all circumstances ; but when the king quits the territories of the state, he is their general in matters of war ; and all religious affairs are intrusted to the king. In- deed, the kingly power with them is chiefly that of a general who cannot be called to account for his conduct, and whose command is for life : for he has not the power of life and death, except as a general ; as the ancients frequently had in their expeditions by martial law, which we learn from Homer ; for when Agamemnon was affronted in the council, he restrained his resentment, but when he was in the field, he had the power of life and death. At any rate, he says, " Whoe'er this day shall shun th' impending fight, To dogs and vultures soon shall be a prey ; For in my hands is death." II. v. 391. This then is one species of monarchical government, in which a man is made general for life ; and it is sometimes hereditary, sometimes elective. But besides this, there is 2nd. Among also another, which is to be met with among some barbarous of the barbarians. In these states the kings are invested with powers nearly equal to those of a tyrant, yet are they nevertheless bound by the laws and the customs of their country. For as the barbarians ^ are by nature more prone to slavery than the Greeks, and those about Asia more than those in Europe, they endure a despotic government without murmuring. For this reason their governments are tyran- nical ; but yet not liable to be overthrown, as being customary Sparta were inconsiderable, when compared with their dignity and hon- ours. The two kings were members of the gerusia, but as such they had only single votes. The greater part of their prerogative was their power in foreign affairs. The kings of Sparta were the commanders of the Pelo- ponnesian confederacy ; and limited as was his power at home, as soon as the king had assumed the command of the army, and had crossed the boundaries, he became general with unlimited powers. It appears that the political sagacity was almost past belief with which the ancient con- stitution of Sparta protected the power, dignity, and welfare of the office ot a king, yet without suffering it to grow into a despotism, or placing the king in any one point above the law. And so, without endangering the liberty of the state, a royal race was maintained, which, blending the pride of their own family with the national feelings, produced, for a long succession of years, monarchs of a noble and patriotic disposition. {Vol, ii. book iii. chap. 6.) See also Herod, vi. 57, and Thucyd. i. 20. ' Compare the statement of Aristotle aboi^e, book i. ch. 2-. I 114 Aristotle's politics. [book Hi and according to law. Their guards also are such as are used in a kingly government, not in a despotic one ; for the guards of kings are composed of his citizens, but those of a tyrant are foreign mercenaries. The one according to law rules over willing subjects ; the other arbitrarily rules over those who consent not. The one therefore is guarded by the citizens, 3rd. Elective Other against them. These, then, are two tyrannies in different sorts of monarchies ; and another is that ancien reece. -^j^'^]^^ among the ancient Greeks, is called an ^symnety ;^ which, speaking simply, is nothing more than an elective tyranny ; and its difference from that which is to be found amongst the barbarians, consists not in its not being according to law, but only in its not being according to an- cient customs. Some persons possessed this power for life, others only for a particular time or purpose ; as the people of Mitylene elected Pittacus to oppose the exiles, who were headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet. And Alcaeus himself, in one of his songs, proves this fact ; for he upbraids the Mitylenians for having chosen Pittacus for their tyrant, and with one voice extolling him to the skies, though he was the ruin of a senseless and devoted people. These sorts of government then are, and ever were, despotic, on account of their being tyrannies ; but inasmuch as they are elective, and 4th The heroic ^^^^ willing subjccts, they are also kingly. A fourth species of kingly government is that which was in use in the heroic times, when a free people submitted to a kingly government, according to the laws and customs of their country.^ For those who were at first of benefit to * The alcTVfjLvrjTrjg was an individual sometimes invested with unlimited power in the Greek states. His power, according to Aristotle in this place, partook in some degree of the nature both of kingly and tyrannical authority ; since he was appointed legally, and did not usurp the govern- ment like a rvpavvog, but at the same time was not bound by any laws in his public administration. Hence Aristotle and Theophrastus call the office Tvpavvig aipsTT}. It was not hereditary, nor was it held for life; but it only continued for a certain time, or till some object was accom- plished. Thus we read that the inhabitants of Mitylene appointed Pittacus to the post of aiffvixvrjTTjg, in order to prevent the return of Alc«eus and the other tribes. Dionysius compares it with the dictatorship at Rome In some states, such as Cyrene and Chalcedon, it was the title bore by the regular magistrates. (Diet, of Gr. and Rom. Antiq.) The verb aicrvfi- vdwy used in the wider and more general sense of ruling, occurs in Eurip^ Medea, 19. * Compare the statement of Thucyd. book i. ch. 13, as to the real lu,- CHAP. XIV.] MONARCHY IN ANCIENT GREECE, 115 mankind either in arts or arms, or by collecting them into civil society, or by granting them possessions, became kings over a willing people, and handed on the monarchy to their successors.^ They were also their generals in war, and pre- sided over their sacrifices, excepting such only as belonged to the priests : in addition to this they were supreme judges in lawsuits ; and in this case some of them took an oath, others did not ; when they did, the form of swearing was by lifting up their sceptre.^ In ancient times the power of Kingly power the kings extended to every thing whatsoever, gradually both civil, domestic, and foreign ; but in after- times they relinquished some of their privileges, and others the people assumed ; so that, in some states, they left their kings only the right of presiding over the sacrifices ; and even those whom it is worth while to call by that name, had only the right of being commander-in-chief in their foreign wars. These then are the four sorts of kingdoms : the first is that of the heroic times ; which was a government over a free people, with limited rights in some particulars ; for the king was their general, their judge, and their high priest.^ The second, that of the barbarians ; which is an hereditary despotic government, regulated by laws : the third is that which they call ^symnetic, which is an elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedemonian ; and this, in a few words, is nothing mo?:e than an hereditary ge- neralship : and in these particulars they differ from each other. There is a fifth species of kingly government, which is where ture of the ancient monarchies of Greece, irportpov de rjrrav ettI prjroTg ykpaffi iraTQiical jSaaiXeiai. These yspara, it would seem, consisted chiefly in the teixevy], or ground allotted to them ; a right of irpoidpia in coun- cil, and the first or the largest share at public feasts. ^ The reader will do well here to consult the chapter on " National Institutions and Forms of Government,'' inThirlwall's History of Greece, vol. i., especially fr(5m page 394 to 411, (1st ed.) * Thus in Homer, Iliad i. line 234, Achilles says, Nal ^id Tode crKriirTpov, to fxiv ovirort (pvXXa Kal o^ous (p6(T£L- — " Yea, swear I by this sceptre, which again Shall never bud nor shoot.'* ^ A parallel to this we find in the instance of Melchisedec, of whom we are told in the book of Genesis, (ch. xiv. 18,) that he was " king of Sa- lem," and at the same time priest of the Most High God.'* Compare the words of Virgil, {Mn, iii. 80,) ** Rex Anius, rex idem hominum, Phoebique s^cerdos." I 2 1)6 Aristotle's politics. [book m. one person has a supreme power over all things whatsoever, in the manner that every tribe and every state is supreme over those things which belong to the public : for as the master of a family has a kingly rule in his own house, so a king is master of his own state, and over one or more tribes. CHAP. XV. The four kinds ^hc different sorts of kingly governments, so maybe re- to say, may be reduced to two ; which we must The^first. a^^d cousidcr morc particularly ; that of which we have fourth. spoken, and the Lacedaemonian ; for the greater part of the others lie between these, inasmuch as they have less power than an absolute monarchy, and yet more than the Lacedaemonians. So that the matter in question may be re- duced to these two points ; the one is, whether it is advan- tageous or not to the citizens to have the office of general con- tinued in one person for life, and whether this should be by famil}^ right to the succession ; the other, whether it is advan- tageous for one person to have the supreme power over every thing or not. But to enter into the particulars postponed.'^ Concerning the office of a Lacedaemonian general, would concern a treatise on laws rather than to political science ; since we know that this is what is done in all forms of governments ; so that we must pass over this question. The other kind of monarchy is a regu- Jidered"^^ lar kind of polity; and it will be necessary to examine particularly into this matter, and to run over such difficulties as may arise. Now the beginning of our consideration is this, whether it is best to be governed by the Reasons for ^^^^ men, ov by the best of laws ? Those who approving prefer a kingly government think that laws only monarchy. speak a general language, but cannot adapt them- selves to particular circumstances ; for which reason it is absurd in any science to follow a mere written rule ; and even in Egypt the physician was allo\N^ed to alter the mode of cure which the law prescribed to him, after the fourth day ; but if he did it sooner it was at his own peril. Hence it is evident, on the very same account, that a government according to written laws is not the best ; and yet general reasoning is necessary to all those who are to govern, and it will be much CHAP. XV.] MONARCHY FURTHER CONSIDERED. 117 more perfect in him who is entirely free from passions, than in him to whom they are naturaL In the law indeed this quality does not exist ; while the other of necessity belongs to every human soul. But some one perchance may say, in answer to this, that man will be a better judge of particulars. It will be necessary, then, for a king to be a legislator, and that his laws should be published, but that they should have no authority where they are absurd, but that in all other cases they should have authority. But is it better for the commu- nity that those things which cannot possibly come under the cognizance of the law at all, or properly, should be under the government of every worthy citizen ? for at the present day they come together, and act as judges and counsellors, and decide cases ; but all their decisions are upon particular mat- ters.^ For one individual, be he who he will, will be found upon comparison inferior to a whole rea"oi?s7 people taken collectively : but a state, as composed of many, is, as a public entertainment, better than one man's portion ; for which reason the multitude judge of many things better than any one single person. The multitude are also less liable to corruption ; as water is from its quantity, so are the many less liable to corruption than the few : besides, the judgment of an individual must necessarily be perverted, if he is overcome by anger, or any other passion ; but it would be hard indeed if the whole community should be misled by anger. Moreover, let the people be composed of freemen, who do nothing contrary to the law, except only in those cases which the law necessarily omits. But though the following may not easily be met with, yet if the majority of the state should happen to be good men, should one uncorrupt governor be preferred, or the majority who are all equally good ? Is it not evident that the many should be preferred ? for there may be divisions among them, but this cannot happen when there is but one. In answer to this, it may be replied, that all their souls will be as much animated with virtue, as this one man's. If then a government of the many, and all of them good men, must be laid down as composing an aristocracy, and the go- * For a complete account of the eKKXtjcriaf or popular assembly at Athens, the povXr), or senate of 500, and the various diKaarrjpia, the reader will do well to consult the admirable Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, edited by Dr, Smith. 118 Aristotle's politics. [book iil Why an arist- vernment of one, as a kingly power, it is evident, ocracy prefer- that an aristocracy is to be preferred to a monarchy, whether the state is powerful or not, if many Wh the an ^^^^ persons SO alike can be found. And for this ?ient states " reason probably it was, that the first governments monarchies Were generally monarchies ; because it was diffi- cult to find a number of persons eminently vir- tuous,^ more particularly as they then dwelt in small commu- nities. Besides, kings were appointed in return for the benefits they had conferred on mankind ; and such actions are peculiar to good men. But when many persons equal in virtue ap- peared at the same time, they brooked not a superiority, but sought after equality, and established a free state.^ After this, when they degenerated, they made a property of the public ; w^hich probably gave rise to oligarchies ; for they Gradual sue- ^lade wealth a mark of honour. And this was the cession of oHgin of tyrannies, and these in their turn gave chiTt^^vern^^" ^isc to democracies ; for as the power of the ty- ments. rants continually decreased, on account of their rapacious avarice, the people grew powerful enough to frame and establish democracies : and as cities after that happened to increase, probably it was not easy for any other form of government to prevail beside a democracy. But if any person prefers a kingly government in a state, we ask what is to be ' It is difficult, and indeed impossible, to reconcile this jmssage with the assertions of the First Book, as to the natural growth of the monar- chical power out of domestic and paternal rule. Compare especially book i. chap. 2. " And hence, by the way, states were originally governed by kings, as the barbarians now are ; for they were composed of those who were always under kingly government. For every family is governed by the elder." ^ Upon the various stages through which the ancient governments of Greece seem to have passed, by the operation of an almost uniform law, tlie reader will do well here to consult the masterly sketch given by Thirl- wall in his History of Greece, vol. i. chap. 10. The passage would be too long to be quoted here, though much of its contents will be found em- bodied in the Introductory Essay prefixed to the present volume. It will be enough here to quote the author's words as to the real cause of the abolition of royalty in the early states of Greece, as indeed it was the cause of all their after-changes. " It is to be sought for," he says, " in the character of the people : in that same energy and versatility which prevented it from ever stiffening, even in its infancy, in the mould of oriental institutions ; and from stopping short, in any career which it had once opened, before it had passed through every stage." CHAP. XV.] MONAKCHT FURTHER CONSIDERED. 119 done with regard to the king's children ? Is the family also to reiffn ? But should they have such children as ^ * n 1 • Ml 1 1 • Some limita- Rome persons usually have, it will be very detri- tions necessary mental. It may be said, that then the king, who ^ "^^narc^y. has it in his power, will never give his kingdom to such chil- dren. But it is not easy to trust to that ; for it is very hard, and requires greater virtue than is to be met with in human nature. There is also a doubt concerning the power with which a king should be intrusted, whether he should be allowed force sufficient to compel those who do not choose to be obe- dient to the laws, and how he is to support his government ? for if he is to govern according to law, and do nothing of his own will which is contrary thereto, at the same time it will be necessary that he should have some power with which to guard the law. This matter however concerning a king may not be very difficult to determine ; for he ought to have a proper power, and such a one as will be sufficient to make the king superior to any one person, or even to a large part of the community, but inferior to the whole ; just as the ancients always appointed guards for that person whom they created ^symnete, or tyrant ; and some one advised the Syra- cusans, when Dionysius asked for his guards, to allow him a certain number for his defence.* ^ Compare here the .following passage from Thirl wall's History of Greece, vol. i. chap. 10. " A tyranny, in the Greek sense of the word, was the irresponsible dominion of a single person, not founded on heredi- tary right, like the monarchies of heroic ages and of many barbarous nations ; nor on a free election, like that of a dictator or an ^Esymnete, but on force. It did not change its character when transmitted through several generations ; nor was any other name invented to describe it, when the power which had been gained by violence was used for the public good ; though Aristotle makes it an element in the definition of tyranny that it is exercised for selfish ends Most of the tyrannies which sprung up before the Persian wars, owed their existence to the cause above described, and derived their peculiar character from the occasion which gave them birth. It was usually by a mixture of violence and artifice that the demagogue accomplished his ends. A hackneyed stratagem, which, however seems always to have been successful, was to feign that his life was threatened, or had even been attacked, by the fury of the nobles, and on this pretext to procure a guard for his person from the people. This band, though composed of citizens, he found it easy to attach to his own interests, and with its aid he made the first step towards absolute power by seizing the citadel ; an act which might be considered as a formal assump- tion of the tyranny, and as declaring a resolution to maintain it by force." 120 Aristotle's politics. BOOK III. CHAP. XVL An absolute follows next in Order to consider the absolute monarchy con- monarch whom we have just mentioned, who does * every thing according to his own will ; for a king governing under the direction of laws does not of himself con- stitute any particular species of government, as we have al- ready said ; for in every state whatsoever, whether an aris- tocracy or a democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life ; and there are many who intrust the administration of aiFairs to one person only ; such is the government at Dyrrachium, and the same at Opus though in a less degree. As for an absolute monarchy, as it is called, (that is to say, when the whole state is wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the king,) it seems to many to be unnatural that nai-uratl^ should liavc the entire rule over his fel- low-citizens, when the state consists of equals ; for nature requires that the same right, and the same rank, should necessarily exist amongst all those who are equal by na- ture ; for as it would be hurtful to the body, for those who are of different constitutions to observe the same regimen, either of diet, or clothing ; so with respect to the honours of the state, it is as hurtful that those who are equal in merit should be unequal in rank. And for this reason it is as much a man's duty to submit to command, as to assume it, and this also by rotation ; for this is law, for order is law ; and it is more proper that the law should govern, than any one of the citizens. Upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to be only guardians and servants of the Shall man or l^ws, for the Supreme power must be placed some- law be su- where ; but they say, that it is unjust that where preme. ^^^^ equal, One person should continually enjoy it. But mpn would scarcely be able to adjust that which the law cannot determine. It may be replied, that the law having purposely laid down the best rules, leaves the rest to be ad- justed by the most fair decision, and to be regulated by the magistrates ; besides, it allows any thing to be altered, which experience proves may be better established. Moreover, he who bids the law to be supreme, makes God supreme, [and CHAP. XVI.] EVILS OF ABSOLUTE MONARCHY. 121 the laws;^j but he who intrusts man with supreme power, gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him ; passion, too, influences those who are in power, even the very best of men ; for which reason the law is intellect free from appetite. The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious : wherein it is said to be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that it would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in physic ; for these are not biassed by any feeling towards their patient to act contrary to the principles of their art ; but when the cure is performed, they receive a pecuniary recompence : whereas those who have the management of public affairs, do many things through hatred or favour. And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed, that whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been persuaded by his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in his profession, he then chooses rather to apply to books for his cure. And not only this, but even physicians themselves, when they are ill, call in other physicians : and those who teach others the gymnastic ex- ercises practise with those of the same profession, as being incapable from self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what concerns themselves. From whence it is evident, that those who seek for what is just, seek for a mean ; now the law is a mean. Moreover, the moral law is far superior to the written law, and is conversant with far superior objects ; for the supreme magistrate is safer to be trusted to than the written one, though he is inferior to the moral law. But as it is not easy for any one person to have an eye to every thing himself, it will be necessary that the supreme magistrate should employ several subordinate ones under him ; why then should not this be done at first, instead of appointing one per- son in this manner ? Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the man of worth is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are certainly better than one ; as for in- stance, in Homer, " Let two together go : " ' and also Agamemnon's wish ; *' Were ten such faithful counsellors mine own ! *' ' * These words are omitted bv Goettling. * Iliad X. 224. ^ jii^d ii. 37i. 122 Aristotle's politics. [book hi. Not but that there are even now some particular magistrates invested with supreme power to decide, as the judges, those things which the law cannot decide, as being one of those cases which c(3mes not properly under its jurisdiction ; for of those which can, there is no doubt. Since then the laws com- prehend some things, but not all, these points make it neces- sary to inquire, and consider which of the two is preferable, that the best man, or the best law, should govern ; for it is impossible to reduce to law every subject which can come The law needs "^^^^i* deliberation. No one then denies that it a living expo- is necessary that there should be some person to * decide those cases, which cannot come under the And it is better coffuizanco of a Written law : but we say, that it to have many .0 ' j ^ exponents than IS better to have many than one; lor every one one alone. dccidcs according to the principles of the law decides justly. Yet surely it seems absurd to suppose, that one person can see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, or do better with two hands and two feet, than many can do with many ; for we see that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with many eyes, and ears, and hands, and feet ; for they intrust those who are friends to themselves and their government with part of their power. If they are not friends to the monarch, they will not do what he chooses ; but if they are friends to him, they are friends also to his go- vernment : but a friend is an equal, and like his friend : if then he thinks that such should govern, he thinks that those who are his equals and like himself should govern. These are nearly the objections which men usually urge in dispute against kingly power. CHAP. XYIL Now, probably what we have said, may be true of some per- sons, but not of others ; for some men are by nature formed to be under the government of a despot ; others, of a king ; others, again, to be citizens of a free state, sharing what is j ust and useful ; but a tyranny is not according to nature. Tyranny and . ' , • p xi I the other cor- nor IS the pervcrsiou 01 any other government Jum^"'*^""^" whatsoever ; for they are all contrary to it. But it is evident from what has been said, that among equals it is neither advantageous nor right, that one person CHAP. XVII.] ALL NOT SUITED TO ONE GOVERNMENT. 123 should be lord over all, either where there are no established laws, but where his will is the law, or where there are laws : neither is it right that one who is good should have rule over those who are good ; or one who is not good, over those who are not good ; nor one who is superior to the rest in worth, except in a particular manner ; and this manner shall be de- scribed, though indeed it has been already mentioned. But let us next determine what people are best qua- ^^^^ ^^^^ lified for a kingly government, what for an aris- subjects for a tocratic, and what for a democratic. And first, • those who are accustomed by nature to submit themselves to the political rule of a family eminent for virtue, are adapted to kingly government. For an aristocracy, those who are naturally framed to bear the rule of free- ^racy!" men, whose superior virtue makes them worthy of the management of others ; while a people adapted to a free state is one among whom there is wont to poj.^ free state be found a multitude formed by nature both to govern and be governed by laws, which admit the poor citi- zens to a share of honours according to their worth. But whenever a whole family, or any one of another, ^^^^^ shall happen so far to excel in virtue as to surpass right to choose all other persons in the community, then it is right ^ ^'^^^^^ that the kingly power should be vested in them, or if it is an individual who does so, that he should be king and lord of all. For this, as we have just mentioned, is not only corre- spondent to that principle of right to which all founders of all states, whether aristocracies, oligarchies, or democracies, have a regard, (for they all regard excellence of some kind, though not the same excellence) ; but it is also agreeable to what has been already said, as it would not be right to kill or banish or ostracise such an one for his superior merit. Nor would it be proper to let him have the supreme power only in turn ; for it is contrary to nature, that what is highest should ever be lowest ; but this is the case, should such a one ever be governed by others. So that nothing else can be done, but to submit and suffer him continually to enjoy the supreme power. And with respect to kingly power in different states, whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and to what states, and in what manner, let thus much be laid down. Since, then, we have said that there are three kinds of regular go- 124 Aristotle's politics. [book IV. vernments, find since of these the best must necessarily be that which is administered by the best men, — (and this must be that which happens to have one man, or one family, or a number of persons, excelling all the rest in virtue, who are able to govern and be governed in such a manner as will make life most agreeable, and we have already shown that the virtue of a good man and of a citizen in the most perfect government will be the same,) — it is evident, that in the same manner, and by the same means, whereby a man becomes The best prac truly good, any one would compose a state in the ticaUorm of shape of an aristocracy or monarchy; so that it ffovernrnent is *^ j an aristocracy will be found to be education and morals that are or monarchy, almost the whole which go to make a good man, and that the same qualities will make a good citizen or good king.^ These particulars being treated of, we must next endeavour to consider what sort of government is best, how it naturally arises, and how it ought to be established. Now it is neces- sary that he who intends so to do, should make a proper in- quiry concerning this point. BOOK IV.2— CHAP. I. The practical ^ those arts aujd sciences which are not con- province of versant with parts, but with some one genus, and ^* are perfect, it is the business of each to determine ^ This branch of Aristotle's inquiry is resumed below, in books vii. an(^ viii. With the following book a new division commences. ^ The present book does not resume the subject of the precedini; ones, but it is intended to show how civil society is formed and moulded into different types and models of government, and what are the several species of government. The book itself is generally divided into seven parts. 1st, The proposed outline of the treatise, with a statement of the necessary subjects of political society. 2nd, The causes which lead tc tliere being several kinds of polities. 3rd, The different denominations of polity, and different species under the same form. 4th, Of the Republic and the Tyranny. 5th, Of the best polity in the abstract. 6th, Of the best polity according to the particular case of individycrJ Btates. 7th, Deliberative, executive, and judicial powers. OHAP. I.] THE IDEAL STATE. 125 what is fitted to its particular genus ; as what particular exercise is fitted to a particular body, and suits it best: (for that body which is formed by nature the most beauti- ful and most perfectly constructed, necessarily requires the best exercise ;) and also what that one kind must be, which will suit most and all bodies, for this is the business of the gymnastic art. And although any one should not desire to acquire an adequate knowledge and skill in these exercises, yet it is not, on that account, the less necessary that he who professes to be a master, and to instruct the youth in them, should be perfect therein. And we see that this is what hap- pens equally in the art of healing, ship-building, cloth-making, and indeed all other arts ; so that it evidently belongs to the same art to find out what kind of government is best, and would of all others be most correspondent to our wish, provid- ing it received no impediment from without, and also what parti- cular species of it is adapted to particular persons ; for there are many probably who are incapable of enjoying the best form. So that the legislator, and he who is truly politician a politican, ought to be acquainted not only with should study, that which is most perfect in the abstract, but retU'but*^^''' also that which is the best suited under any given practical ex- circumstances.^ There is, moreover, a third sort of polity, an imaginary one ; and he ought, if such a one should be presented to his consideration, to be able to discern how it would grow into being, and, when once established, what would be the proper means to preserve it for the longest time. I mean, for instance, if a state should happen not to have the best form of government, or to be deficient even in what was necessary, or not to be as good as possible under existing circumstances, but something inferior. And, besides all this, it is necessary to distinguish what sort of government is best fitting for all cities : for most cedinV^rite'rs. of those writers who have treated this subject, however speciously they may handle other parts of it, have * Boeck (in his Plat. Min. p. 65) says, that by these words Aristotle implies existing states. This is not quite true. By a TToXireia vno' Os(7€U)Q or Ka9' viroQEaiv^ he means, (to use the definition of Goettling,) "respublica qusB optima fingitur latis quibusdam conditionibus," and the words, therefore, here as elsewhere, stand opposed to ri airXioQ Kpariarri voXiTua. See b. ii. chap. 6 ; iii. 3; v. 9 ; v'd 4, 8^ 12, etc., etc. 126 Aristotle's politics. [-BOOK IV. failed in describi.^g the practical parts : for it is not enough to be able to lay down scientifically what is best, but what can be put in practice. It should also be simple, and easy for all to attain to. But, contrary to this, they seek out only the most subtle form of government, and one which needs many things to fill it up. Others again, choosing rather to treat of what is common, censure those which now exist, and extol the excellence of a particular state, as the Lacedaemonian, What the aim some Other. But every legislator ought to of a politician establish such a form of government, as from the present state, and disposition of the people who are to receive it, they will most readily submit to, and persuade the community to partake of: for it is not a business of less trouble to correct the mistakes of an established government, than to form a new one ; as it is equally difficult to recover what we have forgotten, and to learn any thing afresh. The politician, therefore, besides all that we have already said, ougl t to be able to remedy the faults of a government already established, as we have before mentioned. But this is im- possible for a man who does not know the different forms of Hence then d o^^^^^^^^^ • somo pcrsons think, that there is of studying the Only ouc spccics both of democracy and oligarchy ; various govern- ^|-^^g jg ^^^q . gQ should be UU- ments. , , . acquainted with the difference of these govern- ments, how great they are, and in how many ways they are constituted. And together with this practical wisdom, he ought to perceive what laws are best, and what are most suit- able to each particular government : for all laws ought to be framed, and are framed by all men, with reference to the state, and not the state with reference to the laws. For government is a certain ordering in a state, which respects the magistrates as to the manner in which they are regulated, where the supreme power shall be placed ; and what is tlie final object which each community shall have in view. But laws are something different from what expresses the form of the constitution ; ^ and according to them, the magistrate must rule and keep watch over those who transgress them. And * What is the difference between vo^ot and iroXirsia, has been already incidentally explained above in the second book. Goettling remarks, vofiOQi est jus civile : TroXireta, vel rd. hikovvra rrjv TroKirtiav^ universse reipublicae constitutio. CHAP. II.J GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORRUPTIONS. 127 hence it is evident, that the founders of laws should attend to the different kinds and to the number of governments ; for it is impossible that the same laws should be fitted to all sorts of oligarchies and democracies ; for of both these governments there are many species, and not one only. CHAP. 11. Since, then, according to our first method of Three kinds of treating the different forms of government, we government, have divided those which are regular into three sorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, and the free state, and have shown their three corruptions respectively ; — tyranny the corruption of monarchy ; oligarchy of an aristocracy ; and democracy of the free state ; — and as we have already treated of the aristo- cratical and kingly governments ; — (for to enter into an in- quiry what sort of government is best, is the same thing as to treat of these two expressly ; for each of them desires to be established upon the encouragement of virtue :) — and as more- over we have already determined wherein a monarchy and an aristocracy differ from each other, and when a state may be said to be governed by a king, — it now remains that we ex- amine into a free state, and also those other forms ^nq^ij-y into of government, an oligarchy, a democracy, and the nature of a a tyranny. And it is evident, which of these ^^^^^* three excesses must be the worst of all, and which next to it ; for, of course, the excesses of the best and Tyranny the most divine must be the worst ; ^ for it must ne- worst corrup- cessarily happen either that the monarchy will have the name of king only remaining without a reality, or else that it will remain owing to the great excess of power on the part of the king ; whence a tyranny will arise, the worst ex- « cess imaginable, as being a government the most contrary to a free state. The excess next most S worst, hurtful, is an oligarchy ; for an aristocracy differs much from this sort of government ; and that which is least hurtful is a democracy. This subject has been already treated of by one of those writers who have gone before me,^ * An illustration of the old proverb, " Corrnptio optimi pessima fit per* ?ersio." Compare the well-known expression, r) 9r}piov rj Oiof. * Aristotle here refers to Plato, Rep. p. 303, A. 123 Aristotle's politics. [book it. though his views do not look the same way as aosoFinion. . thought, that a democracy was the worst of all excellent constitutions, as a good oligarchy, or the like, but the best of all bad ones. Now I affirm that all these states without exception have fallen into excess ; and also it is not well to say that one oligarchy is better than another, but that it is not quite so bad. But let us defer How man ^^^^ question for the present. We must first in- kinds^riree quiro how many different sorts of free states there states there ^j.^ . gince there are many species of democracies and oligarchies ; and which of them is the most comprehensive, and most desirable after the best form of government ; or if there is any other, aristocratic in its prin- ciples, and well-established ; and also which of these is best adapted to most cities, and which of them is preferable for particular persons ; — (for, probably, some may suit better with a violent oligarchy than with a democracy, and others better with the latter than the former ;) — and afterwards in what manner a man ought to proceed who desires to establish either of these states, I mean the several species of democracy and of oligarchy. And, to conclude, when we shall ments^are pre- havc briefly made mention of every thing that is served and de- neccssarv, we must cndeavour to point out the sources oi corruption and oi stability in govern- ments, as well those which are common to all, as those which are peculiar to each state, and from what causes they chiefly are wont to arise. CHAP. III. Why govern- "^^^ reason for there being many different sorts ments are of of governments is this, that each state consists of different kmds. ^ ^^^^^ number of parts ;i for, in the first place, we see that all cities are made up of families : and, again, out ' The cause of there being several kinds of polities, is the fact that there are so many different ingredients in the state ; the diropoi, the tvTTopoi, and the fiscroL, of whom the first is dvoTrXov^ the others are ottXitlkov. And, again, there are other divisions of the citizens on a different principle. Nom^ these parts, it is clear, may all partake of state privileges ; and according as a larger or a smaller part of them has an ftctual share in the administration the complexion of the government itself will vary. CHAP. Ul."] FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 129 of the multitude of these some must be rich, some poor, and others in the middle station ; and that both of the rich and poor, some will be used to arms, and others not. We see also that some of the common people are husbandmen, while others attend the market, and others are artificers. There is also a difference between the nobles in their wealth, and the dignity which they maintain ; for instance, in the number of their horses ; for this cannot be supported without a large fortune. For this reason, in former times, those cities whose strength consisted in horse, became by that means oligarchies ; and they used horse in their expeditions against the neighbouring states which were at war with them ; as the Eretrians, the Chalcidians, and the Magnetians, who lived near the river Maeander, and many others about Asia. Moreover, besides the difference of fortune, there is that which arises from family and from merit ; or, if there are any other distinctions which make part of the city, they have been already men- tioned in treating of an aristocracy ; ^ (for there we considered of how many parts each city must necessarily be composed ;) and sometimes each of these have a share in the government, sometimes a few, sometimes more. It is evident, then, that there must be many forms of govern- o/governmen^t^ ment, differing from each other in kind ; for the gt^^g"^^ parts of which they are composed, each differ from the other. For government is the ordering of the magis- tracies of the state ; and these the community share between themselves, either as they can attain them by force, or accord- ing to some common equality which there is amongst them, as poverty, wealth, or something of which they both partake. There must therefore necessarily be as many different forms of governments as there are different ranks in the society, arising from the superiority of some over others, and their different situations. And these seem chiefly to be resolvable two, as they say the winds are but two, namely, into two main the north and the south ; while all the others are declinations from these. And thus in polities, j That of the there is the government of the many, and the many, government of the few ; or a democracy, and an 2. That of tho oligarchy ; for an aristocracy may be considered ' The reference of Aristotle here is to book iii. chapters G and 7* Jf. 13C Aristotle's politics. [book IV. as a sf ecies of oligarchy, as being also a government of the few ; and what we call a free state, may be considered as a democracy ; as among the winds, they consider the west as part of the north, and the east as part of the south. Thus, too, it is in music, according to some, who say that there are only two species of it, the Doric and the Phrygian, and who call all other species of composition after one of these names. Many peo- ple are accustomed to consider governments in the same light ; but it is both more convenient and more in accordance with truth, to distinguish governments, as I have done, into two species : one of those established upon proper principles, so that while there are one or two sorts rightly constituted, the others are but excesses of these ; so that we may compare the best form of government to the best-tempered harmony ; the oligarchic to the more violent and impassioned tunes ; and the democratic to the soft and gentle airs.^ CHAP. IV. Objections a- We ought not, howevcr, to define a democracy as fen^dVA^nitions How-a-days, who say simply that it is a of democracy government where the supreme power is lodged and oligarchy. ^j^^ people ; for even in oligarchies every where the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should we define an oligarchy as a government where the supreme power is in the hands of a few : for let us suppose the num- ber of a people to be thirteen hundred, and that of these, one thousand were rich, who would not permit the three hundred poor to have any share in the government, although they were free, and their equals in every thing else ; no one would say that this government was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, when few in number, should acquire the power over the rich, though more than themselves, no one would say that this formed an oligarchy ; nor would any one call such a state an oligarchy, when the poor, though few in number, are supe- Truerdistinc ^^^^ powcr to the rich, who have a majority, tion between We should rather say that the state is a demo- them. cracy, when the supreme power is in the hands * In this sentence it has been found impossible to adhere Uterally to the original text ; but it is hoped that the paraphrase here given may be found adequately to express the meaning of our author. Ed. CHAP. IV,] DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY. 131 of the freemeK ; an oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the rich. It happens indeed that in the one case the many will possess it, in the other the few ; because there are many poor, and few rich. And if the offices of state were to be distri buted according to the size of the citizens, as they say it is in Ethiopia, ^ or according to their beauty, then it would be an oligarchy : for the number of those who are tall or beautiful is small. Nor withal are those things which we have alreadj^ mentioned, alone sufficient to describe these states ; for since there are many species both of a democracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires that further distinction be made ; as we cannot admit, that if a few freemen possess the supreme power over the many who are not free, this government is a demo- cracy : as in Apollonia upon the Ionian Sea, and in Thera ; ^ for in each of these cities the honours of the state were in the hands of some few distinguished families who first founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because they are superior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at Colophon ; for there the majority had large possessions before the Lydian war. But a democracy is a state where the free- ^ democracy men and the poor, being the majority, are invested defined, with the power of the state ; and an oligarchy is An oligarchy a state where the rich and those of noble family, defined, being few, possess it. We have now proved that there are various forms of government, and we have assigned a reason for it ; and shall proceed to show, that there are even more than ^ See Herod, iii. 20. An obvious parallel occurs in the case of Saul, the first king of Israel, who is said to have been taller than the rest of the 7eople from his shoulders upward. (See 1 Sam. x. 23.) Compare also the words of king Priam to Helen, in Iliad, book iii. 226, 227, Ti9 t' cfp' o5' d\\o9 'Ax^tos dpi)p r}'vch purpose they ^ould seem to have carried in their hands a whip, as we learn from the Scholiast on Aristoph. Acharn. 688. 162 Aristotle's politics. [book IV. few in number, the state inclines to an oligarchy The pro- visional committee indeed must always be few, so that it is peculiar to an oligarchy: and where there are both these offices in the same state, this office is superior to that of the senator, the one having only a democratical power, the other an oligarchical. And inde-ed the power of the senate is lost in those democracies in which the people meet in one public assembly and take all the business into their own hands. And this is likely to happen when the community in general are either in easy circumstances or paid for their attendance ; for they then have leisure often to meet together and determine ^ ^ every thing for themselves. A magistrate to control andyvva^K6-^°^ the boys ^ or women^ or who takes any department .0M09, where similar to this, is to be found in an aristocracy, but necessary. . ' ni.ii. not m a democracy ; lor who can lorbid the wives of the poor from appearing in public ? Neither is such a magistrate met with in an oligarchy ; for the women there are too delicate to bear control. And thus much for this subject at present ; but we must endeavour to treat at large of the establishment of magistrates, beginning from first principles. Now they differ from each other in three ways, from which, when blended together, arise all the varieties of necessity. The first of these differences is in d/stfnctSn!^ thosc who appoint the magistrates, the second consists in those who are appointed, the third in Each of these modc of appointment. And each of these a?ain happen three differ in three ways ; for either all the 111 three ways, (.j^j^ens collccti vely, or some out of their whole ^ The iraidovofioQ at Sparta was a magistrate who had the general superintendence of the education of the boys. His office was held in very high esteem, and he was always chosen from the noblest citizens. He had to make a general inspection of the boys, and to punish those who were negligent and idle : those who were refractory he might even bring before the Ephors. The yvvaiKovofioi were Athenian magistrates who superintended the conduct of Athenian women. There were no such officers at Sparta ; whence arose perhaps the laxity of the women, (yvvai- Ktjji' dveffLQ,) to which our author in the first book of his present treatise attributes such serious consequences. Some think that they were first instituted by Solon, but that their powers were afterwards extended so as to include the control of men as well, and of repressing all excesses and indecencies committed in private society. They would appear to have been ministers of the court of Areopagus, and in this capacity to have taken care that decency and moderation were observed in private as well as in public life. CHAP. XV.] COMBINATION OF MAGISTRATES. 163 body, or some out of a particular order in it, may appoint, according to fortune, nobility, or merit, or some other rule — (as at Megara, where the right of election was with those who had returned together to their country, and had reinstated themselves by force of arms) — and this either by vote or lot. Affain, these several modes may be differently ^ x.. ^ nit r» • • combined. formed together ; as tor instance, some magistrates may be chosen by part of the community, others by the whole ; some out of part, others out of the whole ; some by vote, others by lot : and each of these different modes admit of a four -fold subdivision. For either all may elect all by vote, or by lot ; and when all elect, they may either proceed without any distinc- tion, or they may elect by a certain division of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through the whole com- munity : and some magistrates may be elected one way, and others another. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote or lot by all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of some, or some one way and some another ; that is to say, some by the vote of all, others by the lot of all ; there will then be twelve different methods of electing the magis- trates, without blending the two together. Of which form these there are two forms adapted to a democracy ; i^est in a demo- namely, to have all the magistrates chosen out of all the people, either by vote, or by lot, or by both ; that is to say, some of them by lot, and some by vote. In a free state the whole community should not elect ^j^iy^ ^ at the same time, but some out of the whole, or out of some particular rank ; and this either by lot, or vote, or both : and they should elect either out of the whole com- munity, or out of some particular persons in it, and this both by lot and vote. In an oligarchy it is proper to choose some magistrates out of the whole body of ^garchy.^^ the citizens, some by vote, some by lot, others by both : but to choose by lot is most suitable to that form of government. In a free aristocracy, some magis- trates should be chosen out of the community in a^{ocrLcy." general, others out of a particular rank, or these by choice, and those by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the magis ' trates should be chosen out of certain ranks, and by certain persons, and some of those by lot, others by both methods ; but to choose them out of the whole community is not corre- M 2 64 Aristotle's politics. [book iv. epondent to the nature of this government. It is proper in an aristocracy for the whole community to elect their magistrates out of particular persons by vote. So many then are all the different ways of electing magistrates ; and they have been allotted according to the nature of the different communities ; but what mode of proceeding is proper for different com- munities, or how the offices ought to be established, and with what powers, shall be particularly explained. I mean by the powers of a magistrate, such a province as the management of finance or the position of a guardian ; for different magis- trates have different powers, as that of the general of the army differs from the clerk of the market.^ CHAP. XVI. The judicial three parts of a government, it remains department to considcr the judicial;^ and this also we shall consi ere . divide in the same manner as before, into three parts. And there are three points of distinction ; of whom the judges shall consist, and for what causes, and how chosen. When I say of whom, I mean whether they shall be the whole people, or some individuals ; by for what causes, I mean, how many different kinds of courts there shall be ; and by how, whether they shall be elected by vote or lot. Let S^ds^Srts! first determine, how many different kinds of courts there ought to be. Now these are eight : the first, is the court of judicial scrutiny ; the second, one to punish those who have injured the public ; the third, to take cognizance of those causes in which the state is a party ; the fourth, to decide between magistrates and private persons who appeal from a fine laid upon them ; the fifth, to determine dis- ^ See note above on the ayopdvofioif p. 161. 2 For an adequate explanation of the import of the terms diKacrrrjQ and StKacTTrjpioVi the reader is referred to Smith's Dictionary of Grecian and Roman Antiquities. It is as well to add, that at Athens the Dicasts were elected by lot to their duties in the Heliastic courts; and that the con- ditions of eligibility were, that the individual should be, Istly, a free citi- zen : 2ndly, in actual enjoyment of the franchise, in other words, not drifiog ; and 3rdly, at least thirty years of age. It is to be observed that Aristotle here tacitly approves the principle on which the Heliastic courts were founded, and that in fact the division here given is mainly based upon it. CHAP. XVI.] ELECTION OF JUDGES. 165 putes which may arise concerning contracts of great value ; and besides these there must be courts to judge between foreigners, and of murders, of which there are different species. And these may all be tried by the same judges or by different ones ; for there are murders of malice prepense, and of chance- medley ; there is also justifiable homicide, where the fact is admitted, but the legality of it disputed. There is also a fourth, called at Athens the court of Phreatto,^ which deter- mines points relating to a murder committed by one who has run away, to decide whether he shall be allowed to return ; but such afiairs happen very seldom, and then in large cities ; the seventh court is to determine causes wherein strangers are concerned, one part if cause is between stranger and stranger, and another if between a stranger and a citizen. Over and above all these there is a court for small actions, ranging from one drachma to five, or a little more ; for these ought also to be legally determined, and not to be brought before the whole body of the judges. But let us set aside these matters, both actions for murder, and those wherein strangers are the par- ties ; and let us particularly treat of those courts which more particularly relate to the affairs of the community, and which, if not well conducted, occasion seditions and commotions in the state. Now, of necessity, either all persons, appointed by vote or by lot, must judge of all these different causes, or all must, judge of all causes, some of them chosen by vote, and others by lot, or in some causes by vote, in others by lot. Thus there will be four modes of appointing pourwaysof judges. There will be just the same number also appointing if they are chosen out of part of the people only ; for again, either the judges of all causes must be chosen out of that part by vote or lot, or some by lot and some by vote ; or some courts which have cognizance of the same causes must be formed partly by vote, and partly by lot ; by which means there will be the same number of them also as was mentioned. Besides, the same may be joined together ; I * Probably so called from its position, as being near a well or reservoir, iirl (ppedri. The Heliastic courts were many in number ; and this was one of the five courts which had cognizance of matters of blcod, and in general of all graver cases. The other four were the courts km HaWadii^, iitl A£X(pivi(j>f ETTi Ufivraveiiii, and that of the Areopagus. 166 Aristotle's politics. [book v. mean that some may be chosen out of the whole people, or from part of them, or from both ; as, for instance, in the same court, some of the judges may be chosen from all the people, others from a part only, and this either by vote, or by lot, or by wiiich mode is both. And thus we have said how many sorts of demo^cracy ^an^ courts it is possiblc to form. Of these appoint- oiigarchy, and mcuts, that which admits all the community to be an aristocracy, j^(3ges in all causes is most suitable to a demo- cracy ; ^ the second, which appoints that certain persons shall judge all causes, to an oligarchy ; the third, which appoints the whole community to be judges in some causes, but par- ticular persons in others, to an aristocracy or a free state.^ BOOK V.^— Chap. I. What tends to h.2LYe now nearly gone through all those par- preserve and ticulars of which we proposed to speak ; it re- destroy states. . i 1 . J. ' -I n i ^ mams that we next consider from what causes, and how many, and of what kinds, a change arises in govern- ments, and what tends to the destruction of each state ; as also from what form a polity is most likely to shift into another form, and what are the preservatives both of governments in * "A further application of the same democratic principle of legal equality, which is the basis of democracy, was as much as possible to in- crease the number, and to abridge the duration and authority, of public offices, and to transfer their power to the people in a mass.*' Thirlwall, History of Greece, vol. i. chap. 10. 2 Although, theoretically, an aristocracy and a polity differed in prin- ciple, yet nevertheless in practice they would often approximate very closely, even if they did not become to some extent identical. For ex- ample, as Thirlwall remarks, " when the census or pecuniary standard of citizenship was high, and especially if it was fixed from the produce of land, the constitution differed little in effect from the aristocratic oligarchy, except as it offered to those who were excluded a prospect of raising themselves to a higher rank.'* (Vol. i. ch. 10.) ' This and the following book Gillies regards as supplemental to the rest ; and accordingly in his translation, or rather paraphrase, he places them last in order, and calls them books vii . and viii. CHAP. I.] CAUSES OF CHANGE IN STATES. 167 general, and of each state in particular ; and what are the means of saving each form of government from corruption. And here we ought first to lay down dowT"^^^ ^^'^ this principle, that there are many governments, Two kinds of all of which approve of what is just and equal ^^^^^^^y- according to analogy,^ and yet fail of attaining ^avecome^to to it, as we have already mentioned. Thus de- ?^e^r^end' mocracies have arisen from supposing that those '^^^ ^" who' are equal in any one thing, are so in every other cir- cumstance ; as, because they are equal in liberty, they think themselves equal in every thing else ; and oligarchies, from supposing that those who are unequal in one thing, are un- equal in all ; for they deem that when men are unequal in point of fortune, there can be no equality between them. Hence it follows, that those who in some respects Desire of equal- are equal with others endeavour to secure an ity or superior- equality with them in every thing ; and those who are superior to others, endeavour to get still more ; and it is this more which keeps the inequality. Thus though most states have some notion of what is just, yet they are almost totally wrong ; and, upon this account, when either party has not that share in the administration which answers to its ex- pectations, it becomes seditious. But those who of all others have the greatest right so to act, are least disposed to do it, namely, those who excel in virtue ; for it is most reasonable that they alone should be generally superior to the rest. There are too some persons of distinguished families, who, on account of that point of superiority, disdain to be on an equality with others : for those esteem themselves noble who can boast of their ancestors' merit and fortune ; and tbase, to speak the truth, are the source and fountain-head from whence seditions arise. Ac- cordingly, changes of government take place in two distinct ways ; for at one time they raise seditions for the purpose of changing the state already established to some other form ; a? when they propose to erect an oligarchy instead of a democracy, or a democracy or free state in place of an oligarchy ; or an aristocracy in place of these, or one of the latter instead of an aristocracy ; and at another time without reference to the established government, which they wish to be still the same, ^ For a further account of this relative justice, the reader is referred to the Nicomach. Ethics, book v., especially chaps. 3 and 7. 168 Aristotle's politics. [book v. though they choose to have the sole management of it them- Desire of carry- SelVCSj either in the hands of a few, or of one only, ing out the They will also raise commotions con^erninff the constitution to »' i y. i t r, - the furthest degree 01 power to be established ; as, tor instance, lengths. £^ ^j^^ government is an oligarchy, and in the same manner if it is a democracy, to have it more purely so, or else to have it less so : and, in like manner, in the case of the other forms of government, changes arise either to extend or contract „ . „ , their powers, or else to make some alterations in Spirit of change. ^ ' x i, -u t ^• some parts oi it ; as to establish or abolish a parti- cular magistracy ; as some persons say Lysander endeavoured to abolish the kingly power in Sparta, and king Pausanias, that of the Ephors. Thus in Epidamnus there was an alteration in one part of the constitution, for instead of the Phylarchs * they established a senate. It is also still necessary for all the magistrates at Athens to attend in the court of Heliaea^ when any new magistrate is created : the power of the one Archon,^ also, in that state partook of the nature of an Jther^caule^"" oligarchy. Inequality is always the occasion of sedition, but among those who are not equal, an unequal treatment is not unfair. Thus kingly power is un- equal when it is exercised over equals. Upon the whole it is this aiming after an equality which is the cause of seditions. But equality is two-fold, for it is either in number, or in desert. Equality in number is when two things contain the same parts or the same quantity ; but equality in value is at- tained by proportion, as three exceeds two and two exceeds * See note on book iv. chap. 10. 2 For some further notice of the courts of the Heliasa at Athens, see note on book iv. chap. 16, and compare Miiller's Dorians, vol. ii. book iii. chap. 5, and the various references there given. The word r/\mta, according to Hesychius, is the same word with aX'ia, the usual name of a public assembly in the Doric states. This is the name by which the Spartan assembly is mentioned in Herodotus, vii. 134. * " After the death of Codrus, the nobles, taking advantage perhaps of the opportunity atforded by the dispute between his sons, are said to haye abolished the title of king (jSacriXct'c), and to have substituted for it that of archon (apx^^v). This change, however, seems to have been import- ant, rather as it indicated the new and precarious tenure by which the royal power was held, than as it immediately affected the nature of the office. It was still held for life .... The archon was deemed a respon- sible magistrate, which implies that those who elected him had the power of deposing him.'* (Thirlwall, History of Greece, vol. ii. chap. 11.) CHAP, n.] EQUALITY OF TWO KINDS. 169 one by the same number ; but by proportion four exceeds two and two one in the same degree, for two is the same part ot four as one is of two, that is to say, they are halves. Now all agree as to what is absolutely and simply just ; but, as we have already said, they dispute concerning proportionate value ; for some persons, if they are equal in one respect, think themselves equal in all ; others, if they are superior in one thing, think they may claim the superiority in all. Hence chiefly there arise two sorts of governments, demo- cracy and oligarchy ; for nobility and merit are to be found only amongst a few ; ^ but their contraries, amongst the many ; as there is not one man of nobility and merit in a hundred, but many without either are every where. But ^^^^^^^ to establish a government entirely upon either pi^of equality' of these equalities is wrong ; as is made clear by exchlsivdy the example of those so established ; for none of them have been stable. And the reason of this is, that it is impossible that whatever is wrong at the first and in principle should not at last come to a bad result ; and therefore in some things an equality of numbers ought to take place, in others an equality in value. However, a democracy is safer and less liable to sedition than an oligarchy ; for in this latter it may arise from two causes, the few in power conspiring either against each other, or against the people ; but in a democracy, men conspire only against the few who aim at exclusive power ; but there is no instance worth speaking of where the people have raised a sedition against themselves. Moreover, a government composed of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a democracy than to an oligarchy, and is the safest of all such states. CHAP. 11. But since we are inquiring into the causes of se- ditions and revolutions in governments, we must of^^editkm.^^ assume in general the first principles and causes of them. Now these, so to speak, are much about three in number ; these we must first distinguish in outline from each * Compare the words of Juvenal, (Sat. xiii. 1. 26,) Rari quippeboni;'* and t:ose of iEacus in the Ranae of Aristophanes, (1. 783,) oXiyov TO •)^pr](JT6v iaTiv^ ditjTTfp lvQa^%. 170 Aristotle's politics. [book v. other, and then endeavour to show in v^hat situation people are who begin a sedition, and for what causes ; and, thirdly, who are the sources of political troubles and mutual quarrels. , , ^ Now, the fact that they are thus or thus disposed 1 . Under what ^ ^ , . -, i • t circumstances towards a Change in government, must be laid ditious^f down as one cause, and is one which we have al- ready mentioned. For some raise seditions through desire of equality, if they see those whom they esteem their equals possessed of more than they have themselves ; others do the same by not being content with equality, but aiming at supe- riority, if they think, that while they deserve more than their inferiors, they have only an equal share with them, or less. Now, they may pursue their aim either justly or unjustly ; justly indeed when those who are inferior raise sedition for the sake of equality; unjustly, when those who are equal do 2 what superiority. We have then mentioned the reasons. situations in which men will be seditious ; but the CFinai cause.) (jg^^g^g f^j, -^hjch they wiU be so are profit and honour, and their contraries ; for, to avoid dishonour or loss of fortune by fines, either on their own account or that of their friends, they are apt to raise commotions in the state. The sources and causes of commotions which dispose men in the way which we have mentioned, if we take them in one manner, are seven in number, but in another they are more. Now two of these are the same with what have been already mentioned, but they act in a different manner ; for on account of profit and honour men rouse themselves against each other, not to get the possession of them for themselves, (as was said above,) but at seeing others, some jjstly, and others unjustly, engrossing them. The other causes are haughtiness, fear, eminence, contempt, envy of those whose fortunes are beyond their rank. There are also other things which in a difierent manner occasion revolutions, as contention, neglect, want of numbers, and too great disparity of circumstances. CHAP. III. The various It is almost self-evident what influence ill-treat- sediUon con Client and profit have for this purpose, and how ^idered. they are causes of sedition ; for when the magis- ili-treatment. trates are haughty and grasping, they not only raiso CHAP, m.] CAUSES OF SEDITION. 171 seditions amongst each other, but against the Profit, state also which gave them their power ; and this their ava- rice has two objects, either private property, or the property of the state. What influence belongs to honours, jj^j^^^j.^ and how they may occasion sedition, is evident enough ; for those who are themselves unhonoured while they see others honoured, will be ready for any disturbance : and these things are done unjustly when any one is either hon- oured or discarded contrary to his deserts, but justly when according to them. Excessive honours are also a cause of sedition, when one person or more are greater than accords with the state and the power of the government ; for then a monarchy or a dynasty are usually established. On this ac- count the ostracism ^ was introduced in some places, as at Argos and Athens : though it is better to guard against such excess of honours in the founding of a state, than to correct it afterwards when it has been permitted to take place. Those who have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of sedition through fear of punishment ; as * will those also who expect an injury, that they f/^^-^^^^^^^ may prevent it before it is inflicted ; as was the ^ case at Rhodes,^ when the nobles conspired against the people, on account of the decrees which they expected would be passed ae^ainst them. Contempt also is a cause of sedition 1 • • • T 1 • u xi. Contempt. and conspiracies ; as in oligarchies, where there are many who have no share in the administration ; for they fancy that they are superior. The rich also, even in democra- cies, thinking lightly of the disorder and anarchy which will arise, hope to better themselves by the same means ; as hap- pened at Thebes, after the battle of Oenophyta,^ where through bad administration the democracy was destroyed ; as it was at Megara,'* where the power of the people was lost through ^ For a detailed account of the practice of ostracism at Athens, see note on book iii. chap. 13. At Syracuse a similar proceeding was styled Petalism. * See the other allusion to Rhodes, a few lines below. Compare also below, (chap. 5,) the reference to the same state, where mention is made of al ETTLcpepSfievaL dUai. All three passages refer to the same occasion in the opinion of Miiller. But see Goettling's note. 3 Compare Thucyd. i. 108. ^ The allusions here made to the internal history of Megara, Syracuse, Tarentum, and other Dorian states, will be made clear by a reference to Miiller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9. 172 Aristotle's politics. [book v. anarchy and disorder. The same thing happened at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelo, and at Rhodes before the popular government was overthrown. Revolutions in the SeSease!"' ^^^^^ ^^^^ SLYise from a disproportionate increase ; for as the body consists of many parts, it ought to increase in due proportion, in order to preserve its symmetry, which will otherwise be destroyed ; as if the foot were to be four cubits long, and the rest of the body but two palms ; it might otherwise be changed into an animal of a different form, if it were to increase beyond proportion not only in quantity, but also in disposition of parts. So also a city consists of parts, one of which may often increase without notice, as the number . ^ of poor in democracies and free states. They will also sometimes happen by accident, as at Taren- tum a little after the Persian wars, where so many of the nobles were killed in a battle by the lapyges, that from a free state the government was turned into a democracy ; and at Argos, where so many of the citizens were killed in Hebdo- ma^ by Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit several husbandmen ^ to the freedom of the state : and at Athens, through the unfortunate event of the war by land, the number of the nobles was much reduced by being chosen into the troops ^ in the war with Sparta. Revolutions also sometimes take place in a democracy, though more seldom ; for where the poor increase faster than men of property, the state Governments bccomes an oligarchy or dynasty. Governments changed with- also sometimcs alter without seditions : by petty out seditions ; , . tt /» i • i- xi. contention, as at Heroea : for which purpose they changed the mode of election from votes to lots, and thus got the contentious parties chosen : and by negligence, as when the citizens admit to state offices men who are not friends to the constitution : an event which happened at Orus, when the * ev T7J ^EfSdSjjiy, The meaning of these words is not quite certain. It is clear that the ancients were equally in the dark ; some of them thinking that Aristotle here refers to the day on which the fight took place ; others, again, that he alludes to the number slain, which according to Phitarch was 777. Perhaps the simplest interpretation is to suppose that the grove, which Herodotus mentions (vi. 78) as the scene of the encounter, may have been called Hebdoma, just as other places were called Trite and Tritaea. This is Goettling's view of the subject ; see his note. • riveg tCjv TrepioiKiov* The yvfivi^Teg, or lowest order, are here meant, ' Compare Thucyd. vi. 31; viii. 24. CHAP. III.] GRADUAL CHANGES IN STATES. 173 oligarchy of the archons was suppressed at the election of He- racleodorus, who changed that form of government into a democratic free state. Moreover they change by little and little; and I mean by this that very ^"'^ &^^^^^"y ' often great alterations silently take place in the form of a government, when people overlook small matters ; as at Am- bracia, where the census was originally small, but at last became nothing at all, as if a little and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. A state also composed of different nations is liable to seditions until their ^Ice?''"''"^ differences are blended together; for as a city cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither can it in every given time. For this reason all those republics which have hitherto been originally composed of different people, or have afterwards admitted their neighbours to the freedom of their city, have been most liable to revolutions ; as when the Achasans joined with the men of Traezen Samples! in founding Sybaris ; for soon afterwards, the former grew more powerful than the Tr^ezenians, and expelled them from the city ; (hence the Sybarites became under sen- tence of a curse ;) and again, disputes from a like cause happened at Thurium, between the Sybarites and those who had joined with them in building the city ; for claiming all the country as their own, they were driven out in consequence. And at Byzantium the new citizens, being detected in plots against the state, were driven out of the city by force of arms. The Antisseans also, having taken in those who were banished from Chios, afterwards did the same thing ; and also the Zan- cleans, after having taken in the people of Samos. The men of Apollonia ^ on the Euxine, having admitted their sojourners to the freedom of their city, were troubled with seditions ; and the Syracusans, after the times of their tyrants, having en- rolled strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens,^ quar- relled with each other and came to an open rupture : and the people of Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the greater part of them driven out of the city by them. * Apollonia was the only colony of the Corinthians that lay to the east of Greece. Its inhabitants were ordered by the Athenians to throw down their walls shortly before the Peloponnesian war. * Compare He*od. vii. 156. 174 ATIISTOILES POLITICS. [book V Further Many persons occasion seditions in oligarchies, causes. because they think themselves ill used in not fice"^^ sharing as equals in the honours of the state with their equals, as we have already mentioned ; but in democracies the principal people do the same because they have only an equal share with others who are not equal to them. The situation of the place will also some- Local situa- times occasion disturbances in the state, when the ground is not well adapted for one city ; as at Clazomenae, where the people who lived in that part of the town called Chytrum quarrelled with those who lived in the island, and the Colophonians with the Notians.^ At Athens too the disposition of the citizens is not the same ; for those who live in the Piraeeus are more attached to a popular go- vernment than those who live in the city. For as the inter- position of a rivulet, however small, breaks the lines of the phalanx, so any trifling disagreement becomes the cause of seditions. The greatest disagreement perhaps then lies be- tween virtue and vice, and next to that between poverty and riches, and so on in order, one difference being greater than another ; and one of these is that which we have mentioned. CHAP. lY. But seditions in governments do not arise concerning little things, but from them ; for men quarrel concerning something Great effects moment. Now trifling quarrels are attended from trifling with the greatest consequences, when they arise quarreis. between persons of the first distinction in the Snpies^^^ ^^^^ with the Syracusans at a remote period : for a revolution in the government was brought about by a quarrel between two young men who were in office, upon a love affair ; for one of them being ab- sent, the other, who was a friend of his, seduced his mistress ; he in his turn took offence at this, and persuaded his friend's wife to come and live with him ; and upon this they persuaded the whole city to take part either with the one or the other, and caused a complete rupture. Every one therefore at the beginning of such disputes ought to take care to avoid the consequences, and to smother up all quarrels which may arise * Compare Thiicyd. iii. 34, CHAP. IT.] POLITICAL QUARRELS- 175 amongst those in power ; for the mischief lies in the begin- ning ; for the beginning is said to be ''half of the business,"^ so that what was then but a little fault, will be found to bear its full proportion to errors in the other parts. Moreover, disputes between men of note involve the whole city in their consequences ; as in Histiaea, after the Persian war, where two brothers had a dispute about their paternal estate ; he who was the poorer, because the other had concealed some eiFects and some money which his father had found, engaged the popular party on his side, while the other, who was rich, the men of fashion. And at Delphi,^ a quarrel about a wedding was the beginning of all the seditions that afterwards arose amongst them ; for a bridegroom there, being terrified by some unlucky omen, waited upon the bride, but went away without marrying her ; in resentment for which her relations put some sacred money into his pocket while he was sacri- ficing, and then killed him as a sacrilegious person. At Mi- tylene also a dispute which arose concerning heiresses, was the beginning of great evils, and of a war with the Athenians, in which Paches^ took their city ; for a man of fortune named Timophanes left two daughters, and Doxander, being out- witted in procuring them in marriage for his two sons, began a sedition, and excited the Athenians against them, as he was a public guest of the city.^ There was also a dispute at Phocaea concerning an heiress between Mnaseas the father of Mneson, and Euth;^crates the father of Onomarchus ; and this strife brought upon the Phoc^eans the sacred war. The go- ' See Zellius on Aristotle's Nicomach. Ethics, p. 39. ^ Upon the constitution of Delphi, see Miiller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9, sub finem. 3 See Thucyd. iii. 2. * Upo^evog. Hospitality in ancient Greece was divided into ^evla and TTpo^evia^ respectively corresponding to the hospitium privatum and publi- cum of the Romans. This Trpo^evia might exist either between two states, or between an individual or family on the one hand, and a state on the other. Of the latter kind was the hospitium existing between the family of the Pisistratidae on the one hand, and the state of Sparta on the other. (See Arnold'? note on Thucyd. ii. 29, and Goller's note on Thucyd. iii. 70.) Upon the honours and privileges enjoyed by a proxenus at the hands of the state with which he had formed that tie, the reader will do well to consult the very complete account contained in the Dictionary of Or. and Bom. Antiquities, Article Hospitium, 176 Aristotle's politics. [bock v. vernment of Epidamnus^ too was changed from a marriage quarrel ; for a certain man having contracted his daughter in marriage, the father of the young man to whom she was con- tracted, being Archon, punished him ; whereupon, in resent for the affront, he seditiously joined himself with those who were excluded from any share in the government. Into what form government may be changed either into an governments oligarchy, a dcmocracy, or a free state ; when the may change, magistrates, or any one part of the city, acquire great TheAreopagus. or are increased in power ; as the court of Areopagus 2 at Athens, which, having procured great credit during the Persian war, added firmness to the administration ; Growth of the Other hand, the maritime force, com- popuiar power poscd of the commoualty, having gained the vic- at t ens. ^^^^ Salamis,^ by their power at sea got the lead in the state, and strengthened the popular party. And at Ar- gos,^ the nobles, having gained great credit by fighting the battle of Mantinea against the Lacedasmonians, endeavoured to * Upon the constitution and history of Epidamnus, see Thucyd. i. 24, etc., and Miiller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9, where the reader will also find information concerning the changes in the constitutions of Argos and Syracuse, mentioned below. 2 " The venerable character," says Thirlwall, " of the court of Areo- pagus, seems tt) have determined Solon to apply it to another purpose ; and . ... to erect it into a supreme council, invested with a superintending and controlling authority, which extended over every part of the social sys- tem.** It was the main anchor of the state against democratical in- fluences. *' The nature of its functions rendered it scarcely possible pre- cisely to define their limits; and Solon probably thought it best to let them remain in that obscurity which magnifies whatever is indistinct.** (vol. ii. ch. 11.) On its consequent aristocratical character, it would be needless to speak. The reader who desires further information will do well to consult the Dictionary of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities. Upon the rise of the Athenian apx??, as the immediate effect of the bravery shown by that state in the Persian wars, and of the policy of Themistocles in strengthening her maritime power, see Thirlwall' s History of Greece, vol. ii. chap. 16. Compare Thucyd. book i. chaps. 89 — 97. 3 B. c. 480. * " After the Persian war, Argos, which had previously been under a dynasty of the Heracleid family, became a democracy. When Argos began to aspire to the leadership of Greece after the peace of Nicias, it appointed a council of twelve, with full power to treat with such Greek states as would be willing to join them. It was natural however that this oligarchic body should endanger the democracy, which they over- CHAP. IV.] RISE OF SEDITIONS. 177 dissolve the democracy. And at Syracuse, as the victory in their vv^ar with the Athenians was owing to the common people, they changed their free state into a democracy ; and at Chal- cis, the people having destroyed the tyrant Phoxus together with the nobles/ immediately seized the government; and at Ambracia also, the people, having expelled the tyrant Peri- ander with his party, brought round the supreme power to themselves. And this in general ought not to be forgotten, that whosoever has been the real occasion of a state being powerful, whether private persons, or magistrates, a tribe, or any part of the citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, they become a cause of disputes in the state. For either some persons, who envy them the honours they have acquired, will begin to be seditious, or else on account of the dignity they have acquired, they themselves will not be content with their former equality. A state is also liable to ^ ^. . / ^/ ^ /» 1 • 1 X Seditions arise commotions, when those parts oi it which se^m to m states when be opposite to each other approach close to an smltf-^^^^^^ equality, as the rich and the common people ; so that the part which is between them both is either nothing at all, or too little to be worth notice. For if the one party is so much more powerful than the other as to be evidently stronger, that other will not be willing to hazard the danger : for which reason those who are superior in merit never are the cause of seditions ; for they are too few for that purpose when compared to the many. In general, then, the begin- nings and causes of seditions in all states are such as I have now described, and revolutions in them are brought about in two ways, either by violence or fraud ; and if by ^^^^ violence, then either at first, or by compelling them violence or afterwards to submit. They may also be brought about by fraud in two different ways, either when the people, being at first deceived, willingly consent to an alteration in threw in concert with the Lacedaemonians after the battle of Mantinen, (b. c. 418,) having- first put the demagogues to death. Their dominion however only lasted eight months, as an insurrection and battle within the city deprived them of their power, and reinstated the democracy ; a change which Alcibiades afterwards completed by the expulsion of many of the oligarchs who still remained in the state." Compare Thucyd. V. 81—84. ' ot yvMptfioi, more generally known at Chalcis under the tit\e ?f llipuobotae. See Herod, v. 77, with Baehr's note. 178 Aristotle's politics. [book v. their government, but are afterwards obliged by force to abide by it : as for instance, when the four hundred ^ imposed upon the people, by telling them that the king of Persia would sup- ply them with money for the war against the Lacedsemonians ; and after they had been guilty of this lie, they endeavoured to keep possession of the supreme power ; or when they are at first persuaded, and afterwards consent to be governed. By one or other, then, of the methods above mentioned, all revolutions in governments are brought about. CHAP. V. Whence sedi- ought now to inquire separately into the tions arise in a events which will arise from these causes in each democracy. spccics of government. Democracies will be most subject to revolutions from the dishonesty of their dema- gogues ; for partly by informing against men of property, and partly by rousing the common people against them, they induce them to join together, for a common fear will make the greatest enemies unite : — and this is what any one may con- tinually see practised in many states. In the ainpkT^^ island of Cos,2 f^j. instance, the democracy was subverted by the wickedness of the demagogues, for the nobles entered into a combination with each other. And at Rhodes,^ the demagogues distributed bribes, and so prevented the people from paying the Trierarchs what was owing to them ; and the latter were obliged by the number of actions brought against them, to conspire together and destroy the popular state. The popular state too was overthrown at Heraclea,'* soon after the settlement of the city, by the same persons ; for the citizens of note, being ill treated by them, quitted the city, but afterwards the exiles banded together and returned, and overthrew the popular state. Just in the same manner the democracy was destroyed in Megara ; for there the demagogues, to procure money by confiscatrons, kept on driving out the nobles, until the number of those who were ' Concerning the four hundred, see Thucyd. viii. 48, and following chapters : and Aristoph. Acharn. 1. 103. ^ For the allusions to Cos, Rhodes, Heraclea, Megara, see Muller'a Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9. ^ See above, note on chap. 3. * Generally called, from its situation, Heraclea Pontica. CHAP, v.] SEDITIONS IN DEMOCRACIES. 179 banished became considerable ; and those returned and got the better of the people in a battle, and so established an olig- archy. The like happened at Cyme, during the time of the democracy which Thrasymachus destroyed ; and whoever considers what has happened in other states may perceive that revolutions have arisen from the same causes. For often, to curry favour with the people, they drive the nobles to con- spire together, either by dividing their estates, or by obliging them to spend them on public services, or by publicly impeach- ing them, that they may be able to confiscate the fortunes of the wealthy. In former times, whenever the The generals same person was both demagogue and general, the superseded by democracies were changed into tyrannies ; and in- ^^"^^^^s^es. deed most of the ancient tyrants were once demagogues. And there is a reason why such was the case at that time, but not now ; for at that time the demagogues were of the soldiery ; (for they were not as yet powerful by their eloquence ;) but now that the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers lead the people ; ^ but, as they are unqualified to act in a military capacity, they cannot impose themselves on the people as ty- rants, if we except one or two trifling instances. Formerly, too, tyrannies were more common than more^frequient now, because great powers were more often in- j^meTandwhy trusted to some magistrates then than now ; (as to the Pry tanes ^ at Miletus ; for they were supreme in many things of the last consequence ;) and also because at that time the cities were not of that very great extent, and the people in general lived in the country, employed in husbandry, the leaders of public affairs, if they had a turn for war, tried to make themselves tyrants. AH this they did as soon as * In the later period of Athenian history, so paramount was the influence of oratory, and consequently of the demagogues, but the great generals frequently retired after successful campaigns, not to Athens, but to some parts of Egypt or Asia Minor. Thus Conon retired to Cyprus, Iphicrate^ to Thrace, Chares to Sigeum, Chabrias to Egypt, Timotheus to Lesbos. 2 Trpvrdveig. " Officers called by this name were often intrusted with the chief magistracy in several states of Greece, as Corcyra, Corinth, and Miletus, (Wacksmuth, 1. i. 184,) and the title is sometimes synonymous with fSaaiXug or princes, having apparently for its root the word Trpiorog or TTporaroQ. At Athens in early times, the Prytanes were probably a magistracy of the second rank in the state, next to the Archon, acting as judges in various cases, probably in conjunction with him, and sitting in the prytaneium." Diet, of Gr. and R. Ant. N 2 180 Aristotle's politics. [book v. they had gained the confidence of the people ; and this con- fidence was their hatred to the rich. This was the case of Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed the Pedia^ans : ^ and of Theaganes in Megara, who slaughtered the cattle be- longing to the rich, after he had seized those who kept them by the rive-rside. Theagenes also, on account of having ac- cused Daphnasus^ and the rich, was thought worthy of being raised to a tyranny, for in consequence of these enmities, the How a 0 uiar P^^P^^ trusted him as a man of popular principles, govlrnment Governments also alter from their ancient demo- ochiocracy^ cratic form into one entirely new ; for where magis- trates are elected without a fixed income, and the election is with the people, the aspirants for ofifice,^ to flatter them, endeavour with all their power to make the people supe- rior even to the laws. To prevent this entirely, or at least in a great measure, the magistrates should be elected by the tribes, and not by the people at large. These are nearly the revolu- tions to which democracies are liable, and the causes from whence they arise. CHAP. VI. „ - There are two things which of all others most How changes .i , . ^ , . . , arise in oil- evidently occasion a revolution m an oligarchy ; ffByTii-treat- people are injuriously treated ; for raent of the then cvcry person is a ready champion of sedition, ^°°^* and more particularly if one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader ; as Lygdamis/ at Naxos, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which arise from different causes will differ from each onhe^rich.^^°^ Other ; for sometimes a revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share in the ad- ministration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed : and this happened in Massilia,^ and Ister, and Heraclea, and ' See Herodot. i. 59, and Thucyd. ii. 55, 56. ^ See Diodor. Sic. xii. 91. ^ (TTTov^apxtwi^rfg. Compare Arist. Acliarn. lib. 595, where Dicaeopolis, in answer to the inquiry of Lamachus as to who he is, replies, TToXiTTjg XjOTjoTo^, oif (TTTovdapx^^^lQ' ♦ See Herod, i. 61, 64. * For an account of the foundation of Massilia, see Herodotus, book i chap. iG(> CHAP. VI.] CHANGES IN OLIGARCHIES. 181 in other cities. For those who had no share in the govern- ment ceased not to raise disputes, till they were admitted to it ; first the elder brothers, and then the younger also : for in some places the father and son are never in office at the same time ; in others, the elder and younger brother. In the first of these cities, the oligarchy verged upon a free state. At Ister it was changed into a democracy ; in Heraclea, from being in the hands of a few, it came to consist of six hundred. At Cnidos,^ the oligarchy was destroyed by the nobles who quar- relled with each other because the government was in the hands of so few ; (for there, as we have just mentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not be ; or, if there were many brothers, the eldest only ;) for the people, taking ad- vantage of their disputes, elected one of the nobles for their general, and got the victory : for a government torn by sedi- tions is weak.2 And formerly at Erythrae, during the oli- garchy of the Basilidae, although the state flourished greatly under their excellent management, yet because they were dis- pleased that the power should be in the hands of so few, the people changed the form of government. Oli- 3 quarrels garchies also are subject to revolutions, from among the those who are in office therein, as well as from the quarrels of the leaders of the people. Demagogues are of two sorts ; the one flatter the few when they are in power : for even among the few there are demagogues ; such were Charicles and his followers at Athens,^ who had great influ- ence over the Thirty ; and, in the same manner, Phrynichus ^ over the Four Hundred. The others are those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy and flatter the people : such were the state-guardians^ at Larissa, who flattered the * Cnidos was a close aristocracy, or rather an oligarchy : at the head of the state was a council of sixty, chosen from the nobles, with powers almost identical with those of the Gerusia at Sparta : its members held office for life, and were irresponsible {dvvTrevOvvoi). Owing to the fact, that one only out of each family could be elected, some of the excluded mem- bers joined the popular faction, and the oligarchy was overthrown, proba- bly but a very short time before the life of Aristotle, according to the opinion of Miiller. 2 " A house divided against itself, falleth." Matt. xii. 25. ' Compare Lysias contra Eratosth. p. 125. * Compare Thucyd. viii. 68 and 90. * It is uncertain to what period in the history of Larissa Aristotle here refers. The 7ro\iTO(pv\aKeQ would seem to ha"^e been certain magistrate^ 182 Aristotle's politics. [book V people, because they were elected by them. And happen.^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ always happen in every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect themselves, but are chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain ranks by the soldiers or by the people ; as was the custom at Abydos. And when the judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme power, the demagogues favour the people in their causes, and so overturn the government ; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus. And also when some desire to con- tract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands ; for those who endeavour to support an equality, are obliged to apply 4 By luxury people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions, when the nobility spend their fortunes in luxury ; for such persons are desirous of in- novation, and endeavour either to be tyrants themselves, or to ^ support others in becoming so, as Hipparinus supported Diony- sius of Syracuse.^ And at Amphipolis one named Cleotimus collected a colony of Chalcidians, and when they came, he set them to quarrel with the rich : and at JEgina, a certain per- son who brought an action against Chares, attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes they try to raise commotions, sometimes they rob the public ; whence they quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who endea- vour to detect them ; as was the case at ApoUonia in Pontus. But if the members of an oligarchy agree among themselves, the state is not very easily destroyed from within itself. Pharsalus is a proof of this, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have great power from the prudent use to 5 B raisin which they turn it. An oligarchy also will be another^oii"^ destroyed when they create another oligarchy garchy within vvithin it ; that is, when the management of pub- lic affairs is in the hands of a few, but unequally who exercised a superintendence over the admission of freemen, and were elected out of the whole body of the people ; and hence they were led to court the people in a way unfavourable to the interests of the aristocracy. Goettling, speaking of these offices, says that they seem to have resembled the driiJLiovpyo'i at Larissa, who may possibly be alluded to in book lii. chap. 2. See note above on that passage ; and compare Thirl wall, Hist, of Greece, vol. i. p. 438. * On this passage, see Miiller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9. It is to be observed that Cicero (De Repubhca iii. 31) denies that Syracuse, in the reign of Dionysius, was a Respublica at all. CHAP. VI.] CHANGES IN OLIGARCmP«! 183 divided, and when all of the few do not partake of the supreme power. This happened once at Elis,^ where the supreme power in general was in the hands of a very few, and fewer still gainec^ places in the senate, which consisted of but ninety, who heh their places for life ; and their mode of election was calculatec to maintain a dynasty, like that of the senate at Lacedcemon. An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in time of war and peace ; in war, because, through a distrust in the citizens, the government is obliged to employ mercenary troops, and the man to whom they give the command of the army often as- sumes the tyranny, as Timophanes did at Corinth ; ^ and if they appoint more than one general, they will very probably establish a dynasty among themselves ; and sometimes, through fear of this, they let the people in general have some share in the government, because they are obliged to employ them. In peace, from their want of confidence in each other, they will intrust the guardianship of the state to mercenaries and their general, who will be an arbiter between them, and some- times become master of both, a thing which happened at Larissa, when the Aleuadae had the chief power at Samos.^ The same thing happened at Abydos, during the time of the political clubs, among which the party of Iphiades was one. Commotions also will happen in an oligarchy, if one party overbears and insults the other, or from comJsff^^^"^^ their quarrelling about law-suits or marriages. How their marriages, for instance, will have that effect, has been already shown ; and in Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the ^ In Elis the government resembled that of Sparta, and the Gerusia formed a very important part of the constitution. It consisted of ninety members, who were chosen for their lifetime from oligarchical families ; but in other respects the election was the same as at Sparta, and there- fore they were chosen by the whole people. There was also a larger council of six hundred, (see Thucyd. v. 47,) which may have been an aristocratical committee, selected from the popular assembly. Thus much is clear, that the power of the people was very limited ; and that, as Aristotle here says, there was one oligarchy within another. Miiller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 6. ^ This must have been about the year b. c. 345. The tyranny of Timophanes was but a short interruption of the oligarchy in this city : he was put to death by Timoleon. ^ Since, according to Herodotus, (vi. 130; vii. 6,) the Aleuadae were princes of Thessaiy, and not of Samos, some editors have suggested as the true reading here, oi irf pi 'Idffova, or oi nepi Yiixov. See the note of Goettling. 1S4 Aristotle's politics. [book V oligarchy of the knights on account of a marriage quarrel. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person being condemned by the court ; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's being found guilty of adultery ; the punishment indeed which Eurytion suffered from the men at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed : as was that at Thebes upon Archias ; for their enemies eagerly contended to have them publicly bound in the pillory. Many oligarchies too have been de- 7. By being too stroycd by disatfccted persons in the state, owing despotic. to their too despotic spirit : as the oligarchy at Cnidos, and at Chios. Changes also may happen 8. By accident. -^^ accident, in what we call a free state, and in an oligarchy, wherever the senators, judges, and magistrates are chosen according to a certain census. For it often happens, that what was fixed as the highest census suitable to that time, so that a few only could have a share in the government in an oligarchy, and those of moderate fortunes only in a free state, becomes so little as the city grows rich through peace or some other happy cause, that every one's fortune rises to many times the amount of the census, and so the whole com- munity partake of all the honours of government ; and this change sometimes happens by little and little, and insensibly approaches, and sometimes more quickly. These are the re- volutions and seditions that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to which they are owing : and indeed both democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter, not into governments of a contrary form, but into other forms of the same government ; as, for instance, from democracies and oligarchies which place the supreme power in the law, they come to vest it in the ruling party, and the contrary. CHAP. VII. How seditions arise in an aristocracy. L By paucity of numbers. Commotions also arise in aristocracies, partly because there are so few persons in power, — (a fact which, as we have already said, shakes oligarchies, because in a certain sense an aristocracy most nearly approaches to an oligarchy ; for in both these states the administration is in the hands of a few ; not that this arises from the same cause in both, though it is herein tha« an aristocracy seems to be oligarchical) : — and these will neces- CHAP. VII.] CHANGES IN ARISTOCRACIES. 185 sarily be most likely to happen when the generality of the people are high-spirited, as thinking themselves equal to each other in merit ; such were those at Lacedsemon, called the Parthenias,^ (for these were descendants of citizens,) who being detected in a conspiracy against the state, were sent as colonists to Tarentum. They will happen also when some great men are disgraced by those who fZatmln^.^ have received higher honours than themselves, but to whom they are no ways inferior in abilities, as Ly- sander, who was disgraced by the kings or when an ambi- tious man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the reign of Agesilaus, was chief mover of a conspiracy against the Spartans. And also when some are too poor, and others too rich, which will most frequently happen in time of war ; as was the case at Laced^emon, about the time of the Messenian war. This is proved by a poem of Tyrtseus, called Eunomia ; for some persons being reduced by war, desired that the lands might be divided. They arise also when some person of very high rank might still be higher if he could rule alone, which seems to have been the case of Pausanias at Lacedsemon, when he was their general in the Persian war, and that of Hanno^ at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies ^ • • T ° T T 1 ^ r, . . 3. By injustice. are mostly destroyed by a departure irom justice in the administration itself ; the cause of this evil at first is the want of a due mixture of the democratic and oligarchic principle in a free state ; and in an aristocracy from these causes, and also on account of merit ; but chiefly from the former two, I mean, the undue mixture of the democratic and oh'garchic parts ; for these two things are what all free states, and many of those which we call aristocracies, endeavour to ^ HapQkviai, Children born after marriage, but before the husband brought his bride into his own house, according to Miiller, (Dorians, vol. ii. book iv. ch. 4,) were called by this name. They were in general considered in all respects equal to those born at home ; but in the first Messenian war, particular circumstances seem to have made it impos- sible to provide them with lots o^ land; and hence they became the founders of Tarentum. 2 For the account of Lysander, see Mliller's Dorians, vol. ii. book It. ch. 9. ^ See the learned disquisition of Cluzius on Aristotle's statements con* cerning the constitution of Carthage, p. 200, etc. 186 Aristotle's politics. [book v. m a free Wend into one. For aristocracies differ from what state is more are Called polities in this, the one form is less ol^^f stable, and the other more so : for that state which ansiocracy. .i» ^, i.-ii-i • inchnes most to an oligarchy is called an aris- tocracy, and that which inclines most to a democracy is called a free state. And on this account the latter is more secure than the former ; for the greater power is the stronger, and men are more content to live where they have equality. But the rich, if the community gives them rank, often endeavour to insult and to tyrannise over others. On the whole, which- ever way a government inclines, towards that it has a tend- ency to settle, each party supporting their own men. Thus a free state will become a democracy ; an aristocracy, an oli- garchy ; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change into a democracy, (for the poor, if they think themselves injured, directly take part with the contrary side,) and a free state When a state oligarchy. The only firm state is that may be called where evcry one enjoys the equality which befits ^ ^ ^* his merit, and fully possesses what is his own. And that of which I have been speaking happened at Thu- rium ; for the magistrates being elected according to a very high census, it was altered to a lower one ; and they were sub- divided into more courts, but because the nobles possessed all the land, contrary to law ; for the state was too much of an oligarchy, so that they were able to encroach on the people ; but the people, being well inured to war, so far got the better of their guards, as to drive out of the country every one who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as all aristocracies are free oligarchies, their nobles are apt to grasp at too much power ; as at Lacedaemon, where property is now in the hands of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do as they please, and to make such alliances as they please. Thus the state of the Locrians ^ was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius ; and this would not have happened in the case of a democracy or a well- A Chan in tempered aristocracy. But aristocracies chiefly ap* ^istocrlcy" ^ proach to a secret change through being destroyed duar^"^^^^' by degrees, as we have already said of all go- vernments in general. And this happens because changes are caused by something which is trifling ; for when- * Compare Diodor. Sicul. xiv. 44. Chap, viii.] how go\ ernments are preserved. 187 ever they throw aside any thing which in the least regards* the state, afterwards they more readily change something else of a little more consequence, until they subvert the wilole government. This happened in the state of Thurium ; for as there was a law that its citizens should serve as soldiers for five years, some young men of a martial disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their officers, despising those who had the management of public affairs, and imagining that they could easily gain their end, first endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it declared lawful that the same person might continue in the military, perceiving that the people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates ap- pointed to this matter, who are called counsellors,^ first joined together with an intention to oppose it, but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief that, if that law was not repealed, they would permit the management of all other public affairs to be in their hands ; but afterwards, when they endeavoured to restrain some from making fresh changes, they could do nothing, for the whole form of government was altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced the innova- tions. In short, all governments are liable to be destroyed either from within or from without ; destroyed^from from without, when a state whose policy is con- ^jthin, or from . ' . %. without. trary to their own, is near, or even at a distance, if it has great power. This happened in the case of both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians ; for the one every where destroyed the oligarchies, the other the democracies. What then are the chief causes of revolutions and of dissensions in governments, has been pretty accurately stated. CHAP. VIII. It follows next that we consider the means of jj^^ govem- preserving both governments in general, and each ments are pre. state in particular. In the first place, then, it is evident, that if we are right as to the causes of their destruction, we know also the means of their preservation ; for things con- trary produce contrary effects ; but destruction and preserva- * (TvfiPovXoi. The meaning of the term in this passage must not be confounded with the officers of the same name at Athens, who were assessors {Trdpedpoi) to the three chief Archons. 188 Aristotle's politics. [book v. Danger of neg- ^^^^ Contrary to each other. In well-tem- lecting lesser pered governments it requires much care to watch matters. ^^^^ nothing be done contrary to law : and this ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of small conse- quence ; for a small transgression comes on with secret step, just as in a family small expenses when often repeated con- sume a man's income. For the understanding is deceived thereby, as it were by this sophism,^ " if every part is little, then the whole is little." Now, this in one sense is true, but in another it is false, for the whole and all the parts together are large, though made up of small parts. This first step therefore in any matter is what the state ought to guard against. In the next place, no credit ought to be given to those arguments which are composed to deceive the people ; for they are confuted by facts. But what we mean by the sophistical devices of states, has been already mentioned. How a govern- oftcu pcrccivc both aristocracics and ment is render- oligarchies Continuing firm, not from the stability e s a e. their forms of government, but from the wise conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who have a part in the management of public affairs, and those also who have not: towards those who have not, by never injuring them, and by introducing those who are of most consequence amongst them into ofiice, and by never harshly disgracing those who are desirous of honour, or injuring the multitude for the sake of gain ; towards themselves and those w^ho have a share, by behaving justly towards each other. For that equality which the favourers of a democracy seek to establish in the state, is not only just, but convenient also, amongst those who are of the same rank. And for this reason, if the administration is in the hands of the many, several rules By making the which are established in democracies will be very terms of office uscful ; as to let no one continue in office longer ^ ' than six months, so that all of the same rank may have their turn ; for between these there is a sort of demo- cracy, for which reason demagogues are most likely to arise up amongst them, as we have already mentioned. Besides, by this means both aristocracies and democracies will be the less liable to be corrupted into dynasties. And this, because ^ This is the well-known fallacy of "Compositio et Divisio. ' See Whately's Logic, book iii. section il. CHAP. VIII.J MEANS OF PRESERVATION 199 it will not be easy for those who are magistrates for a short time, to do as much mischief as they could in a long time ; for it is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies and oli- garchies ; for either those who are most powerful in each state establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one and the despots in the other, or else this is done by the chief ma- gistrates when they are long in power. Govern- By being very ments are preserved, not only by having the ^Jj^^^^e means of their corruption at a great distance, but means of cor- sometimes also by its being very near them ; for ^^p^^^"- those who are in continual fear, keep a stricter hand over the state ; ^ for which reason it is necessary for those who have the care of the constitution to be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they may preserve it, and not to be remiss in protecting the state, as a night watch, but to make the distant danger appear at hand. Great care ought also to be used to endeavour to restrain by law the quarrels and dis- putes of the nobles, as well as to prevent those who are not already engaged in them, from taking a part in them : for to perceive an evil at its very first approach is not the lot of every one, but of the politician. To prevent any alteration taking place in an oligarchy or free state, on account of the census, if that happens to continue the same while the quantity of money is increased, it is useful to take a general account of the whole amount of it in former times, to compare it with the present, and to do this every year in those cities where the census is taken yearly, in larger communities gy continual once in three or five years ; and if the whole revision of the should be found much larger or much less than it was at the time when the census was first established in the state, let there be a law either to extend or contract it accord- ingly, if it increases making the census many times larger, and if it decreases, smaller. For if this latter be not done in oligarchies and free states, a dynasty is apt to arise in the one, an oligarchy in the other : if the former be not done, a free state will be changed into a democracy, and oligarchies into free states or democracies. It is a general By checking maxim in democracies, oligarchies, monarchies, excessive and indeed in all governments, not to let any one ^ Compare the phrase of Thucyd., (ii. 13,) rd tiov ^vfiiidxcov did xetpo^ 190 Aristotle's politics. [book v. acquire a rank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavour to confer moderate honours for a con- tinuance, than great ones for a short time ; (for the latter spoil men, and it is not every one v^ho can bear prosperity ;) but if this rule is not observed, let not those honours which were conferred all at once, be all at once taken away, but rather by degrees. But, above all things, let this poter^^^^^^^^ regulation be made by the law, that no one shall have too much power, by means either of his fortune or of his friends ; but, if he has, for his excess therein, let it be contrived that he shall be removed from the country. Now, as many persons stir up seditions that they may enjoy their own manner of living, there ought to be a particular officer By keeping iuspcct the manners of all those whose lives watch over the are Contrary to the interests of their own state, citizens. whether it be an oligarchy, a democracy, or any of the other forms of government. For the same reason, watch should be kept in turn over those who are most pros- perous in the city ; and the means of remedy for this is by appointing those who are in the opposite scale to the business and offices of the state. By opposite I mean, men of cha- racter and the common people, the poor and the rich. It is By increasing ^^^^ blend both thcsc into One body, and the middle to increase the numbers of the middle ranks ; and ' this will prevent those seditions which arise from an inequality of condition. But above all, in every state, it is necessary, both by the laws and every other method, venaiity?^^^^ that matters be so ordered as to shut out venality from state offices ; and this ought particularly to be studied in an oligarchy. For then the people will not be so much displeased when excluded from a share in the go- vernment — (nay, they will rather be glad to have leisure to attend their private affairs) — as if they suspect that the officers of the state steal the public money ; then indeed they grieve on two accounts, because they are deprived both of Way of blend- State houours and of profit. There is one method ing an aristo- of blending together a democracy and an aristo- ' The allusion is to honourable banishment. — An instance in point would be that of Pompey, who was sent out to clear the sea of pirates, as a pretext, but in reality because the citizens were afraid of his influ- ence at Rome. CHAP. VIII.] MEANS OF PRESERVATION. 191 cracy at the same time, if any one should choose pj-^^^y and a to form such a state ; ^ for it would be possible to democracy to- admit both the rich and the poor to enjoy what they desire. For to admit all to a share in the government, is democratical ; but to reserve offices for the rich is aristo- cratical. This will be done by allowing no public employ- ment whatsoever to be attended with any emolument ; for the poor will not desire to be in office when they can gain nothing by it, but had rather attend to their own affiiirs ; the rich however will choose it, as they want nothing which belongs to the community. Thus the poor will increase their fortunes by being wholly employed in their own concerns ; and the principal part of the people will not be governed by the lower sort. To prevent the exchequer from being defrauded, let all public money be delivered out openly in the face of all the citizens, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in the dif- ferent wards, tribes, and divisions. But, as the magistrates execute their offices without pay, the law ought to provide proper honours for those who execute them well. In demo- cracies also it is necessary that the rich should be protected, not only by not permitting their lands to be divided, but not even the produce of them, which in some states is done im- perceptibly. It would be also better if the people would pre- vent them, when they offer to exhibit a number of unnecessary and yet expensive entertainments^ of plays, torch-races, and the like. But in an oligarchy it is necessary to take great care of the poor, and to allot them public employments which are profitable ; and, if any of the rich insult them, to let their punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own ^ An instance of this, perhaps, may be found in the Roman state as soon as the commonalty attained their full rights and privileges. The same might be said of Athens, with some limitation, as in fact it is said by Plato in the Menexenus, (ch. viii.,) KaXn de 6 fxsv avrriv crjiJioKpar'iav, 6 dk dWo Ti av %atp^* karl dk ry dXriOei^ ^er tvdo^iag TrXrjOovg apto"- TOKparia. BactXag yap du rjjMV thlv, ovroi ds rore fiev Ik yevoug tots de aiperoL. 'EyKpareg Se rrjg iroXewg rd TroWd to TrXrjOog' rag dt ap^ag ^idovai Kal TO KpaTog ToXg dei ^o^acriv dpi^TOig elvai. ^ Upon the XeLTovpyiai, both encyclic and extraordinary, see the ar- ticle on that subject m the Dictionary of Greek and Rom. Antiquities, as also the note above on book iii. 6, and iv. 1 5. The XafiTradapxia here men- tioned was the superintendence of the Xafi7radr](popia, one of the five or- dinary or encyclic Liturgies. See also Boeck, Public Economy of Athens, ii. 199, etc., and Hermann, Pol. Antiq. § 161, etc. 192 Aristotle's politics. [book V, rank ; and to let estates pass by affinity, and not by gift ; and not to permit the same person to have more than one ; for by this means property would be more equally divided, and a greater part of the poor would rise into better circumstances. By studying ^^^^ Serviceable in a democracy and an olig- equaiity among arcliy, to allot thosc who take less part in public the citizens. • t, n • ii xi • aiiairs, an equality, or a preierence m other things, (as to the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy,) except the principal offices of state ; but to intrust these only, or mostly, to those who are statesmen. CHAP. IX. There are three qualifications necessary for those SrlSman. who intend to fill the first departments in go- vernment ; first of all, an affection ^ for the estab- lished constitution ; in the second place, abilities wholly equal to the business of their office ; in the third, virtue and justice correspondent to the nature of that particular state in which they are placed ; for if justice is not the same in all states, it is evident that there must be different species of it. There may be some doubt, when all these qualifications do not meet in the same person, in what manner the choice shall be made ; as for instance, suppose that one person is an accomplished general, but a bad man, and no friend to the constitution, while another is just, and a friend to it, how ought the choice to be made ? We should then consider, of two qualities, which of them the generality possess in a greater, and which in a less, degree. For this reason, in the choice of a general a generaiT^ should regard his courage more than his cha- racter, as the more uncommon quality ; as fewer men partake of military skill than of virtue : but, to protect the state or manage the finances, the contrary rule statesman^ should be followcd ; for these require greater vir- tue than that which the generality possess, but mere knowledge is common to all. It may be questioned, if a man has abilities for statesmanship, and is well affected to the constitution, what occasion is there for being virtuous, since * Compare Thiicyd. ii. chap. 60, where Pericles lays claim to the pos- session of ivvoia, (ppovrjcTig, and dperri, the three causes of tjOikti iriartQ^ according to Aristotle. See Rhet. ii. 1. OHAP. IX. I IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE 01 ASS. 193 these two things alone are sufficient to render him useful to the public ? But it is of use, because those who possess the above qualities are often deficient in prudence ; for, as men often neglect their own affairs, though they know them, and love themselves, so nothing will prevent them from being dis- posed towards the commonwealth in the same manner. In short, whatever is contained in the laws, and which we allow to be useful to states, all contributes to preserve the state ; but its principal support (as has been often urged) jj^ should re- is to secure that the number of those who desire gajd the topreserveitshallbegreater than of those who wish ^ ^ to destroy it. Above all things, one must not be forgotten, though it is forgotten by many governments which are now corrupted, namely, the mean. For many things which seem favourable to a democracy, destroy a democracy, and many which seem favourable to an oligarchy, tend to destroy it. Those who think this the only virtue, extend it to an excess ; for they do not consider that as a nose which varies a little from perfect straightness, either towards being aquiline or flat, may yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at, but that still if any one extend this variation too far, first of all the properties of the part itself will be lost, till at last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at all, on account of the excess of the rise or sinking — that thus, I say, it is with other parts of the human body. So also the same thing is true with respect to the other states ; for both an oligarchy and a democracy may vary somewhat from their most perfect form, and yet be well constituted ; but if any one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at first he will make the government worse, but at last he will bring it to no government at all.^ should The lawgiver and the politician, then, should know study what well what preserves and what destroys the demo- ^[^t^^^®^ ^ cracy of the people or the oligarchy of the few ; for neither the one nor the other can possibly continue without both rich and poor : but that whenever an entire equality of circumstances prevails, the state must necessarily become of another form ; so that those who destroy these laws ^ which ' See above note on book ii. chap. 5. ' TovQ vo^ovQ, See Goettling's note, where he defends this reading M^ainst the proposed emendation, xaioovTiQ Toig xaO' vtre^toxriv v6fioi£, o 194 ARISTOTLE S POLITICS. [book V. authorize an inequality, destroy the government. Errors are also made both in democracies and oligarchies : in democracies, when demagogues make the common people superior to the laws ; for thus, by setting them at variance with the rich, they divide one city into two ; whereas they always ought to in- cline to speak in favour of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, the oligarchic party should speak in favour of the people. The oaths also which they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they now are ; for, at present, in some places they swear, " I will be adverse to the common people, and contrive all I can against them whereas they ought rather to suppose and pretend the contrary, and openly to sig- nify in their oaths that they will not injure the people. But of all things hitherto mentioned, that which con- Se"young tributes most to preserve the state is, what is now great preserva- most dcspiscd, to cducatc children with reference to the state ; for the most useful laws, and most approved by every statesman, will be of no service, if the citizens are not accustomed to and brought up in the princi- ples of the constitution ; of a democracy, if that form is by law established ; or an oligarchy, if it be an oligarchy. For if there is such a thing as incontinence in an individual, there And to be di ^^^^ ^ cducatc a child in a way rected towards fitting to the State, is not to do such things as will statf gratify those who have the power in an oligarchy, or who desire a democracy, but to do those things whereby they will be able to conduct respectively either of these forms of governments. But now the children of the magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up delicately, and the children of the poor are made hardy with exercise and labour ; so that they are both desirous of change, and able to promote it. In democracies of the purest form a method is pursued which is contrary to their welfare ; the reason of which is that they define freedom wrongly. Now, there are two things which seem to be the limits of a democracy, that the people in gene* ral are supreme, and enjoy freedom ; for that which is just seems to be equal, and it is just that what the people deter- mine should be supreme. Now, their freedom m^prtVi^.^ and equality consists in every one's doing as he pleases. So that, in such a democracy every one CflA.P. X.J MONARCHY AND TYRANNY. 195 may live as he likes ; " as leads his bent," ^ to use the words of Euripides. But this is wrong, for ho one ought to think it slavery, to live in conformity with government, but pro- tection. The causes, then, of corruption in different states, and the means of their preservation and continuance, to speak simply, are such as we have related. CHAP. X.. It now remains that we speak of monarchy, the monarchy causes of its corruption, and the means of preserv- ing it. And indeed almost the same things which have been said of other governments are incident to kingdoms and tyran- nies ; for a kingdom partakes of the nature of an aristocracy ; but a tyranny is formed from the worst species of oligarchy and-de- mocracy. For this reason it is the most injurious to ^ tyranny em- its subjects, as being composed of two bad forms, bodies two bad and retains all the corruptions and the defects of p^^^^^p^^^- both these states. Now the source of these two kinds of mon- archy arises from principles contrary to each other : for a kingdom is formed to protect the better sort of people against the multitude, and a king is appointed out of the better sort, who are chosen either for their superior virtue, and actions flowing from virtuous principles, or else from their superiority of noble descent ; but a tyrant is chosen out of the meanest populace, as an enemy to the higher class, that the common people may not be oppressed by them. And this is clear from experience. For the generality of tyrants were indeed, mere demagogues, who gained credit with are ^ amfhow the people by inveighing against the nobles, ^^^y s^i" ^^^^ir Some tyrannies were established in this manner, when the cities were already considerably enlarged ; others, before that time, by kings who exceeded their hereditary power, from a desire of governing despotically ; while others were founded by those who were elected to the superior offices of state ; (for formerly the people appointed officers for life to be at the head of civil and religious affiiirs ;) and some were This reference to Euripides is uncertain at the best. Aristotle may poasibly be referring to Iphig. in Aul. 1. 1017, el yap to xP^^ov iTTiOeT ov Tov^bv x(^C(a>y \itipUV, o2 196 Aristotle's politics. [book y. founded by the oligarchs, who chose one out of their body, with the supreme power over the highest magistrates. By all these means it was easy to establish a tyranny, if they chose it ; for their power was ready at hand, because they were either kings, or else in possession of the honours of state. Thus Pheidon^ at Argos and others became ty- ^ampief. rants, having enjoyed originally the kingly power ; while Phalaris,^ and others in Ionia, from holding state honours. Panaetius at Leontium, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others, acquired their tyrannies by having been demagogues. A How man- kingdom, as we have said, partakes much of the archieo are nature of an aristocracy, and is bestowed accord- gamed. .^^ private worth, or character for virtue, or rank, or beneficent actions, or to these joined with power. For all persons have gained this power as having benefited cities and states, or as being able so to do ; some by prevent- ing a people from falling into slavery by war, as Codrus, and some by freeing them from it, as Cyrus ; or by having founded cities or colonized a country, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon, and the Molossians. A king desires to be the guardian of his people, that those who have property may suffer no wrong, and that the people in general may live free from injury ; but a tyrant, as has been often said, has no regard to the common good, except for his own advantage. His only object is pleasure, but that of a king is virtue. A tyrant therefore is ambitious of engrossing wealth, but a king rather of honour. The guards too of a king are citizens, but those of a tyrant are foreigners. That a tyranny contains what- tySSny"^^ ^^^^ bad both in a democracy and an oligarchy is evident ; from an oligarchy it has gain for its end, (for thus only will the tyrant be sure of the continuance of his guards and his luxuries ;) and it puts no confidence in the people, and therefore deprives them of the use of arms : it is also common to both an oligarchy and a tyranny to i>er- secute the people, and to disperse the population. It borrows * Pheidon of Argos must not be confounded with Pheidon the Corin- thian legislator, who is mentioned in book ii. chap. 5. For the history of this Pheidon, see Miiller's Dorians, vol. i. book i. chap, 7, § 15. * For the history of Phalaris at Agrigentum, see Miiller's Dorians, hook lii. chap. 9, note. CHAP. X.] DESTRUCTION OF MONARCHY. 197 from a democracy its quarrels with the nobles, and the fact that it destroys them publicly and privately, or drives them into banishment, as rivals and an obstacle to the government ; hence naturally arise conspiracies, as the one party desires to govern, and the others are not willing to be slaves. Hence the advice of Periander to Thrasybulus to take off the tallest stalks,^ hinting thereby, that it was necessary from time to time to make away with the most eminent citizens. We ought then in reason, as has been already said, to account for the changes which are incident to a monarchy, from the same causes which produce them in other states ; for it The same is on account of injury, terror, and contempt, that causes destroy . . 1 ^ monarchy as many oi its subject^ conspire against a monarchy, destroy other But of all wrongs, injurious contempt has most influence on them for that purpose ; sometimes it is owing to their being deprived of their private fortunes. The dissolu- tion too of a kingdom and a tyranny are generally the same ; for monarchs abound in wealth and honour, which all are de- sirous to obtain. Of plots, some aim at the life of those who govern, but others at their government. Those formed on account of injury aim at their persons. Injury may be owing to many causes, and either of these is a sufficient cause to excite anger; and most of those who are led by anger join in a conspiracy, for the sake not of their own advancement, but of revenge. Thus the plot against the children of Pisistratus arose from the fact that they affronted fxampiet the si°ter of Harmodius, and insulted him also ;^ for Harmodius resented the injury done to his sister, and Aristogiton the injury done to Harmodius. A conspiracy was also formed against Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, because while drinking with a favourite youth, he asked him if he were as yet with child by him. Philip^ too was slain by Pausanias, for permitting him to be affronted by Attains ; as was Amyntas the Little, by Dardas, for insulting him on account of his age ; and the Eunuch,'* by Evagoras the Cy- prian, for in revenge for having taken his son's wife away from him, he slew him as having been injured by him. » Herod, i. ch. 20. * The story is told by Herodotus (book v. ch. 55, etc.); ccmpare Th-Qcydides (vi. 54). * See Diodor. Sicul. xvi. 93. * Ibid, xv 47. 198 Aristotle's politics. [book v. And many attacks have been made on tyrants owing to some such personal insult offered by them, as that of Cratseus * on Archelaus ; for liis familiarity always disgusted him ; so that even a small pretext became a sufficient plea, namely, fchat he did not give him one of his daughters to wife, as he had promised. For being entangled in a war against Sirrha and Arrhabaeus, he gave his elder daughter to the king of Elima^a, and his younger to the son of Arnagentas, thinking that he would thus have less strife with the son of Cleopatra. But the real origin of his estrangement was his disgust at certain familiarities. And Hellanocrates of Larissa joined with him in his attack for the same reason ; for when, in his intercourse with him, he did not fulfil his promise, he thought that the intercourse took place as an act not of affection but of insult. Parrhon and Heraclides of ^nos, too, slew Cotys, in order to be revenged for the injury offered to their father ; and Adamas revolted from Cotys, considering that he had been insulted ; for he had been castrated by him when a boy. Many also who have had their bodies scourged with stripes, through resentment have either killed or conspired against their injurers, even when they were in office and in possession of royal dynasties ; as, at Mitylene, Megacles joined with his friends and killed the Penthelidae, who used to go about strik- ing those they met with clubs. Thus, in later times, Smerdis killed Penthilus, for whipping him and permitting his wife to drag him by the feet. Decamnichus also was the chief cause of the conspiracy against Archelaus, for he was the first to urge others to the assault : the occasion of his resentment was his having delivered him to Euripides the poet to be scourged ; for Euripides was greatly offended with him, for having said something of the foulness of his breath. And many others have been killed or conspired against for such reasons as these. In like manner through terror : for terror is one of the causes mentioned above, and this as well in monarchies as in other states. Thus Artabanes conspired against Xerxes through fear of being accused to him about Darius, whom he had hung without his orders, supposing that he would obtain pardon, and that the king would forget the matter, on account of the splendid banquet which he gave him. Some kings have beea killed through contempt ; as some one conspired against Sar* * Compare Plato, Alcib. 11. 7. CHAP. X.] ORIGIN OF CONSPIRACIES. 199 ianapalus, having seen him spinning with his women, if the story be true which historians relate of him ; but if it is not true of him, it may very probably be true of some one else. Dion also conspired against Dionysius the Younger, because he saw his subjects desirous of the deed, and that he himself was always drunk. And even some of a man's friends will do this if they despise him ; for from being trusted by him, they think that they shall not be found out. Those also who think they shall gain his throne will conspire against a king some- how or other through contempt ; for as they are powerful themselves, and despise the danger, on account of their strength, they will readily attempt it. Thus generals at the head of an army will endeavour to dethrone the monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages,^ despising both his manner of life and his forces ; because the latter were inactive, and his life effemin- ate : thus Seuthes the Thracian, who was general to Amado- cus,2 conspired against him. Sometimes men enter into con- spiracies, on account of more than one of these reasons, as through contempt and desire of gain ; as Mithridates conspired against Ariobarzanes. Those also who are of a bold dispo- sition, and have gained military honours amongst kings, on this account of all others most frequently engage in sedition ; for strength and courage united inspire great bravery : when therefore these join in one person, he will be ready for con- spiracies, as hje will easily conquer. Those who conspire against a tyrant through ambition, have a different motive in view from what we have already mentioned ; for they do not attack tyrants as some do, seeing before them great gains and vast honours ; it is not thus that any of those who conspire through ambition engage in the dangerous enterprise, but the others do so for the aforesaid reason, while these engage in this, as they would in any other noble action, that they may be illustrious and distinguished among others, and so destroy a tyrant, not wishing to gain a tyranny, but renown. ISo doubt the number of those who act upon this principle is very small, for we must suppose they regard their own safety as nothing in case they should not succeed ; and they must embrace the opinion of Dion, (which few can do,) when he made war upon Dionysius with a very few troops ; for he said, > See Heredot. book i. ch. 127—129. * Compare Xenoph. Anab. vii. 2. 2i)0 ARISTOTLE S POLITICS. [book V. that let the advantage he made be ever so little, it would satisfy him to have gained it ; and that should it be his lot to die the moment he had gained footing in his country, he should A tyranny de- think this death glorious. A tyranny also is ex- stroyed by ex- posed in One way to destruction, just as each of erna vio ence, other States are, from without, if there be some hostile power superior to it. For it is evident that the wish to subvert it will exist, owing to the opposition of prin- ciples, and all who can, will carry into effect what they desire. And some states are opposed to others, as a democracy to a tyranny; as says Hesiod,^ " Potters with potters clash for the extreme of a democracy is a tyranny ; a kingly power is opposed to an aristocracy, from their different forms of government. For this reason the Lacedaemonians destroyed very many tyrannies ; as did the Syracusans, during the prosperity of their state. And in one way they wiuiiru™ destroyed from within, when those who have no share in the power bring about a revolution, as that which happened to Gelo, and lately to Dionysius ; to the first, by means of Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, who flattered Gelo's son, and urged him to lead a life of pleasure, that he might govern himself; but the family joined together, and endeavoured to support the tyranny and expel Thrasybu- lus ; but those of them who combined together seized the opportunity and expelled the whole family. Dion made war against his relation Dionysius, and being assisted by the people, first expelled him, and afterwards was killed. As there are two causes which chiefly induce men to conspire against tyrannies, namely, hatred and contempt, one of these, namely, hatred, seems necessarily to belong to tyrants, but con- tempt also is often the cause of their destruction. For though, lor instance, those who have raised themselves to the supreme power, have generally preserved it, still those who have re- ceived it from them, to speak the truth, almost immediately all lose it ; for, by falling into an effeminate way of life, they soon grow despicable, and offer many opportunities to con- spirators. Part of their hatred we may very fitly ascribe to anger ; for in some cases it becomes their motive to the same » See Op. i. 25. CHAP. X.I DESTRUCTION OF MONARCHIES. 201 actions ; for it often urges them to act more powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater vehemence against those whom they attack, as this passion is not under the di- rection of reason. But it happens that persons especially yield to this passion on account of injury ; a matter which oc- casioned the fall of the Pisistratids and of many others. But hatred is still more powerful ; for anger is accompanied with grief, which prevents the entrance of reason ; but hatred is free from grief. In short, whatever causes may be assigned as the destruction of a pure and unmixed oligarchy^ and of an extreme democracy, the same may be applied to a tyranny ; for these are distinct forms of tyrann3\ But a ^j^y ^ ^^^^^ kingdom is very seldom destroyed by any outward dom seldom attack; for which reason it is generally very extlrnaWi^ stable ; but it has the greatest number of causes of subversion within. Of these, two are especial causes ; the one, when those who share in the regal powder excite a sedition, the other, when they endeavour to establish something more like a tyranny by assuming greater power than the law gives them. A kingdom, indeed, is never erected in why kingdoms our times, but rather monarchies ^ and tyrannies ; are seldom for a kingly government is one that is voluntarily submitted to, and its power is supreme in great matters : but now a days many are equal, and there are none in any respect so much better than others as to be qualified for the great- ness and dignity of government over them. On this account, then, these equals will not willingly submit to be commanded ; but if any one assumes the government, either by force or fraud, this is a tyranny. But in the case of he- reditary kingdoms, we must add one cause of 4us^e^of'ru?n^ destruction to that which we have mentioned to hereditary above ; namely, that many who enjoy it are proper objects of contempt, and that they are insolent, though the power which they have gained is not despotic, but merely kingly. Such a state is soon destroyed ; for a king ceases to exist if the people will not obey, but a tyrant still rules, though ' What Aristotle means by a kingdom, as distinct from a monarchy, is clear from this passage. The test of a kingdom is the voluntary sub* ttiission of its subjects ; volentes Per populos dare jura. Virg, Georg. iv. 1. 202 aristotlf's politics. [book v. they will not. These and other such like things are the causes of the destruction of monarchies. CHAP. XL Howmon- BuT, to speak simply, it is clear that monarchies archies are are preserved by means contrary to these. But preserved , speak of cach Separately : a kingdom will stand by due limita- by keeping the king's power within moderate bounds. For by how much the less extensive their power is, by so much the longer will their entire go- vernment of necessity continue ; for they become less despotic, and more upon an equality of condition with their subjects ; and on that account they are the less envied by them. It was on this account that the kingdom of the Molossi continued so long, and that of the Lacedaemonians,^ owing to the fact that their government from the beginning was divided into two parts, and also to the moderation introduced into the other parts of it by Theopompus, and especially to his establishment of the Ephors ; for by taking something from the power, he increased the duration of the kingdom, so that in some mea- sure he made it not less but greater. As they say he replied to his wife,2 when she asked him if he was not ashamed to de- liver down his kingdom to his children less than what he had received from his ancestors ; " No," answered he, " for I give it them more lasting." But tyrannies are preserved in two ways most opposite to each other, one of which is, when the power is delegated from one to the other ; and in this manner most tyrants govern in their states. Report says that Peri- ander founded many of these. There are also many of them to be met with amongst the Persians. What has been already mentioned is conducive, as far as any thing can be, to the preservation of a tyranny, namely, to keep down be preseried^ thosc who risc too high, to take off those who are of S^ubjlcts^ aspiring tone, to allow no public meals, no clubs, no education, nor any thing at all, but to guard against every thing which is wont to give rise to high spirits or mutual confidence ; not to suffer schools or learned meetings of those who have leisure for discussion, and to en- deavour by every means possible to keep all this people ■ See above, book ii. chap. 2. ^ See Plut. Lyc. 7. CHAP. XI,] PRESERVATION OF TYRANNIES. 203 strangers to eacli other ; for knowledge increases mutual con- fidence ; ^ and to oblige all strangers to appear in public, and to live near the city gate,^ that all their actions may be suffi- ciently seen, and that by being kept like slaves they may be accustomed to be humble. In short, to imitate every thing which the Persians and Barbarians do, to support slavery ; (for all their policy is the same ;) and to endeavour to know what 3very single subject chooses to do and say, and for this pur- pose to employ spies : such were those women whom the Sy- racusans called Uorayojyideg.^ Hiero also used to send out listeners, wherever there was any meeting or conversation ; for the people dare not speak with freedom for fear of such persons ; and if any one speaks out, there is the less chance of concealment ; and to endeavour that the whole community should mutually accuse and come to blows with each other, friend with friend, the commons with the nobles, and the rich with each other. It also suits a tyranny to reduce its sub- jects to poverty, that they may not be able to compose a guard, and tha4;, being employed in procuring their daily keeping the bread, they may have no leisure to conspire against people poor their tyrants. The pyramids of Egypt are a proof employed , of this, and the votive edifices of the Cypselidae, and the tem- ple of Olympian Zeus built by the Pisistratidse, and the works * It was for this reason that the poHcy prevailed so extensively with the Persians and other Eastern despots of transferring whole tribes from their original homes to another locality. The phrase expressing this is avaGTraarovQ ttoislv, which occurs so often in Herodotus, as in iii. 93 ; iv. 204, etc. The cases of Eretria, Cyrene, Miletus, the lonians, and the Paeonians (v. 12) are well known in profane history ; not to mention the tase of the Israelites in the Old Testament. With regard to the senti- Hent that " knowledge inspires confidence," compare the words of Butler, Analogy, Part i. chap. 3,) If the soul be naturally immortal, and thir Itate be a progress to a future one, .... good men may naturally unite not only amongst themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous beings in that future state. For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some degree, amongst all who are endued with it and known to each other,'* 2 See Xenoph. Cyr. vii. 8. ^ See Plutarch Dion. 28. They were eaves-droppers and busy-bodies, who hung about the court and person of a tyrant, and reported to him the secrets and feelings of the people. The word is derived from Trorri (Doric for irpbc) and aya>. They were called by the above name at Sy- racuse only, as it would seem, but elsewhere were known as wTaKovffrai 204: Aristotle's politics. [book v. of Polycrates at Samos ; for all these have the same effect^ to keep the people well employed and poor.^ It is necessary also to multiply taxes, as at Syracuse in the time of Dionysius,^ who in five years collected all the private property of his sub- jects into his coffers. A tyrant also should endeavour to en- gage his subjects in a war, that they may have employment and may be for ever dependent upon their general. A king is preserved by his friends ; but it is the part of a tyrant to place no confidence in friends, as every one desires to dethrone him, and these have it specially in their power. All those things also which belong to an extreme democracy may be done in a tyranny ; as for example, the giving great licence to the women in the house, that they may reveal their husbands' secrets, and great indulgence to slaves for the same reason. For neither slaves nor women conspire against tyrants ; but when they are treated with kindness, both of them are of ne- cessity favourers of tyrants and to extreme democracies ; and the people too in such a state desire to rule alone. For which reason, flatterers are in repute with both ; the demagogue in the democracy, for he is the proper flatterer of the people ; and among tyrants, the man who will servilely bend to them ; for this is the business of flatterers. And for this reason ty- rants always love bad men, for they rejoice in being flattered, a thing to which no man of a liberal spirit will submit ; for the virtuous love others, but they flatter none. Bad men too are fit for bad purposes ; '4ike to like,"^ as the proverb says. A tyrant also should show no favour to a man of worth or a freeman ; for he thinks that no one deserves these names but himself; for he who supports his own dignity, and is a friend to freedom, encroaches upon the superiority and the despotism of the tyrant : such men, therefore, they naturally hate, as * The Cloaca Maxima at Rome, built under the tyranny of the Tar- quins, would be another example in point ; as also the vast sepulchre of Alyattes in Lydia, mentioned by Herodotus, i. 93. * It is probable in the opinion of Coraes, that there is some latent mis- take here; for in his Economics (ii. 1) Aristotle predicates this of Cyp- selus, not of Dionysius, and speaks of ten years and not five as the period. See however Goettling*s note, in which he defends himself for not agreeing with the above view. ' See Eustath. ad II. p. 126, where this passage is quoted from Aristotle. CHAP. XI.] PRESERVATION OF THlANNIES. 205 destructive to their government. A tyrant also preferring should rather admit strangers than citizens to his strangers to table and familiarity, for the latter are his ene- " mies, but the others have no design against him. These and such like matters are marks of a tyranny, and tend to preserve its povrer, for it has no lack of villany. But all these things, so to say, may be comprehended in three divisions, ^he three ob- for there are three objects vrhich tyranny has in jectsofaty- view ; one of which is, that the citizens shall be * of abject dispositions ; for men of abject spirits never would conspire against any one. The second is, that they shall have no confidence in each other ; for while none feel confidence in themselves, the tyrant is safe from overthrow. For which reason they are always at enmity with men of merit, as hurt- ful to their government ; not only because they scorn to be governed despotically, but also because they are trustworthy towards themselves and towards others, and because they will not inform against their associates, nor any one else. The third is, that they shall be without the means of doing any thing ; for no one undertakes what is impossible for him to perform ; so that without power a tyranny can never be de- stroyed. [These then are the three objects to which the wishes of tyrants incline ; for all their tyrannical plans tend to promote one of these ends, that their people may have nei- ther mutual confidence, nor power, nor boldness of spirit.] ^ Such, then, is one of the two methods of preserving ^^^^j^^^ tyrannies, the other proceeds in a way nearly con- method of pre- trary to what has been already described ; and ^^^^y ? * it may be discerned from considering the causes which destroy a kingdom: for as one cause of that lies in bringing the government nearer to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists in making the government more nearly like that of a king ; taking good care of only one thing, namely, the power ; that not only the willing, but the unwilling also, shall submit to it ; for if he once lose this, his tyranny is at an end. This, then, must be kept as the foundation, but affecting in other particulars the tyrant ought partly to act the style of a and partly to affect to seem like a king ; first, by appearing to pay attention to what belongs to the public, and * Schneider, Coraes, and Goettling all agree in considering these linea as a spurious addition by some grammarian of a later date. 206 Aristotle's politics. [book v. not making such profuse presents as will offend the people, while the money is taken out of the hard labour of their own hands, and given in profusion to mistresses, foreigners, and actors ; as also by keeping an exact account both of what they receive and pay, a practice which some tyrants ere this have followed, though ruling on this plan they seem rather masters of families than tyrants ; nor need a tyrant ever fear lest he shall lack money, while he have the supreme power in his own hands. It is also much better for those tyrants who quit their kingdom, to go without money, than to leave behind them the money which they have hoarded ; for their regents will be much less desirous of making innovations ; and these guardians are more to be dreaded than the citizens by tyrants while absent : for some of the citizens go out with him, but these regents are left behind. He should also endeavour to appear to collect taxes and to require public services only for purposes of the state, that whenever they are wanted they may be ready in time of war ; and particularly to take care that he appear to collect and keep them, not as his own pro- The private P^^ty? that of the public. His appearance character of a also should not be harsh, but noble, so that those tyrant. meet him shall look on him with veneration rather than with fear ; but this will not be easily accomplished if he is easily despised. If, therefore, he will not study to acquire any other virtue, yet he ought to aim at political ability, and at impressing on others that opinion of himself. He should also take care not to appear to be guilty of the least offence against modesty towards the young of either sex, neither himself, nor any of those who are about him : and not to permit the women of his own family to treat others haughtily, for the haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many ty- rannies. With respect to the pleasures of sense, he ought to act apart, directly contrary to the practice of some tyrants at present ; for they do not only continually indulge themselves in them from early morning, and for many days together, but they seem also to desire to have other witnesses of their con- duct, that they may admire them as happy and fortunate. But the tyrant ought especially to be moderate in these, and, if not, at least to appear to others to avoid them ; for it is not the sober man who is exposed either to plots or contempt, but the drunkard ; not the early riser, but the sluggard. His conduct CHAP. XI.J CHARACTER OF A TYRANT. 207 in general should also be contrary of almost all that is re- ported of former tyrants ; for he ought to improve and adoin his city, so as to seem a guardian and T^ot a tyrant. More- over, he ought always to seem to pay particular attention to the worship of the gods, for from i^P^rf^Ms of such a character, men entertain less fears of suffering any thing contrary to the law, while they suppose that he who governs them is religious ind reverences the gods ; ^ and they will be less inclined to raise seditions against such a tyrant, as one who has the gods on his side : but this must be so done as to give no suspicion of hypocrisy. He should also show such respect to men of merit in any line, that they shall not think that they could be more honoured, if their fellow-citizens were members of a free state. He should also distribute all such honours from him- self, but every censure should come through other officers and the courts of law. It is also a common preservative of all monarchies not to make one person too great ; but if any, then more than one ; for they will act as a guard upon each other. If however it is necessary to intrust any large powers to one person, then he should take care that he be not one of an ardent spirit ; for such a disposition is upon every opportunity most ready to rebel ; and, if it should seem necessary to deprive any one of his power, it is well to do it by degrees, and not to reduce him all at once. It is also necessary to ^ ^^^^^^ should abstain from all kinds of insolence, more particu- abstain from ■I T r 1 • 1 J. J J? X acts of violence. larly Irom corporal punishment, and trom wanton conduct towards young men. And especially must he be careful in this respect with regard to men of honour ; for as those who love money are touched to the quick when any thing affects their property, so are men of honour and prin- ciple when they receive any disgrace. Therefore a tyrant ought either never to employ personal punishment, or if he does, he should let it be only in a paternal manner, and not with insult. His intercourse too with young men should arise from amatory causes and not from authority ; and upon the whole he should atone for any seeming disgrace by bestow- ing greater honours. But of all persons who are most likely to entertain designs against the person of a tyrant, those are chiefly to be feared and guarded against, who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives, so that they can but destroy him ; ^ dei J ^^^^ should remain after the government has been long changed into a demo- cracy, they should endeavour by degrees to diminish its power, and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things, then, ap- pertain to all democracies ; and they arise from that kind of justice which is suited to those governments; (that is, that all its members shall enjoy an equality according to number ;) which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government Equality the pcoplc. For it is held to be fit that the means to rich should have no more share in the govern- iiberty. ment than the poor, nor be alone in power ; but that all should be equal according to number ; for thus, they think, the equality and liberty of the state is likely to be best preserved. CHAP. III. How equality next placc wc inquire, how they shall at- to be brought tain this equality.^ Shall the fortune of five hun- dred be divided amongst a thousand, and these ^ Aristotle here enumerates rag dpx^Qy tol diKa(TTrjpia, and ri^v f5ov\rjv, that is, magistrates invested respectively with executive, judicial, and deliberative powers ; who, as well as the citizens at large, convened in their iKKXrjtriaL Kvpiai, or stated assemblies, ought, according to the prin- ciples of simple democracy, to be paid for their political labours. But if the public revenues cannot suffice for this profusion of expense, then those magistrates at least must be remunerated, whose uninterrupted functions require that they should mess together. And witli them it would appear that Aristotle means to class, as to this particular, the citizens convened in their stated and periodical assemblies. 2 By the word pavavaia Gillies would argue that Aristotle means here ** that condition of manners and morals resulting from the degrading state of labour, generally known by that term." But this, after all, is a ques* tion of little moment, as in common conversation things which stand in the mutual relation of cause and effect are often confounded. ' It is to be remembered here that the Greeks always employed pro- portion to answer the purpose of fractions. CHAP, m.l POLITICAL EQUALITY. 217 thousand have equal power with the five hundred ? or shall we establish our equality in another manner, dividing as be- fore, and afterwards taking an equal number both out of the five hundred and the thousand, and then investing them. with the power of creating the magistrates and judges ? Is this state then established according to perfect democratical justice, or rather that which is guided by numbers only ? For the defenders of a democracy say, that that is just which the ma- jority approve of; but the favourers of an oligarchy say, that that is just which seems right to the wealthier part; and that we ought to be directed by the amount of property. But both the propositions are unequal and unjust, for if we agree with what the few propose, we erect a tyranny ; — (for if it should happen, that one individual has more than the rest who are rich, according to oligarchical justice this man alone has a right to the supreme power ;) — but if superiority of numbers is to prevail, injustice will then be done, by confiscating the property of the rich, who are few, as we have already said. What then that equality shall be, which both parties will admit, must be collected from the definition of right which is common to them both ; for they both say, that what the ma- jority of the state approves ought to be estab- lished.i Be it so, but not entirely; but, since a S^joruy?^*^^ city happens to be made up of two different ranks of people, the rich and the poor, let that be established which is approved of by both of these, or by the greater part ; but, should contrary sentiments arise, let that be established which shall be approved of by the greater part, and by those who have the greater property. For instance, if there should be ten rich men and twenty poor, and six of the first and fifteen of the last should agree upon any measure, and the remaining four of the rich should join with the remaining five of the poor in opposing it, that party whose census when added to- gether is greater, should determine which opinion shall be law ;^ and should these happen to be equal, it should be re- ^ Compare the following passage taken from Cicero's frap:mentary trea- tise de Republica, book iii. " Respublica res est populi. Populus autem non omnis coetus multitudinis, sed coetus juris consensu et utilitatis com- munione sociatus.*' 2 Niebuhr, in his History of Rome, (vol. i. p. 263,) considers that Aris- totle is here speaking of symmories, {(TVjjifiopiai,) and not of private citi. tens. For some satisfactory reasons for venturing to doubt whether that 218 ARISTOTLE S POLITICS. [book VI. garded as a case similar to the assembly or a court of justice now-a-days dividing equally upon any question that comes before them ; for in such cases they must determine it by lot or some other such method. But although, with respect to what is equal and just, it may be very difficult to establish the truth, yet it is much easier to do so, than to persuade those who have it in their power to encroach upon others, to be guided thereby; for the weak always desire what is equal and just, but the powerful pay no regard to it.^ CHAP. IV. Democrac of '^^^^^ ^^^^ kinds of democracies. The best four kinds. ° of them is that which is first in order, as has been The best kind ^^^^ ^ former place ; and this also is the most ancient of them all. I call that the first which every one would so place, if he were to divide the people ; for the best part of these are the husbandmen. A democracy may be framed where the majority live by tillage or pastur- age : for, as their property is but small, they have no leisure perpetually to hold public assemblies, but are continually employed in following their own business, not having other- wise the means of living ; nor are they desirous of what an- other enjoys, but prefer to follow their own business rather than meddle with state affairs, and accept offices which will be attended with no great profit. For the greater part of man- kind are desirous of riches rather than honour. And here is one proof: for they submitted to tyrannies in ancient times, and now they submit to oligarchies, if no one hinders them in their usual occupations, or deprives them of their pro- perty ; for some of them soon get rich, and others are removed The right of ^^^^ poverty. Besides, their right of electing mpetrifand magistrates and of calling them to account, will eveui^n^ satisfy them, if they feel any desire of honours. great historian has here exactly understood the meaning of Aristotle, see Goettling's note in loco. * This lamentation is often made by the historians of Rome. Compare for instance Liv. iii. 65 : '* Sed alter semper ordo gravis alterius modes- ticE erat. Adeo moderatio tuendse libertatis, dum eequari velle simulando ita se quisque extollit, ut deprimat alium, in difficili est : cavendoque ne metuant homines, metuendos ultro se efficiunt : et injuriam a nobis re- pulsam, tanquam aut facere aut pati necesse sit, injungimus aiiis." CHAP. IV.] THE BEST DEMOCRACY. 219 For in some democracies, though the right of electing the ma- gistrates is not in hands of the commonalty, yet it is invested in part of that body chosen to represent them, as was the case at Mantinaea ; and it is sufficient for the people at large to pos- sess the deliberative power. Now this we ought to consider as a species of democracy ; and for this reason it is proper and also customary for that democracy of which we have now been treating, to have a power of choosing their magistrates, and of censuring them, and of sitting in judgment upon all causes: but that the chief magistrates should be elected according to a certain census, higher according to sirabie^n the the rank of their office, or else not by a census at all, f magis- but merely according to their abilities. A state thus constituted must be well constituted ; for the magistracies will always be filled with the best men ; for the people will acquiesce, and will feel no envy against their betters ; and these and the nobles should be content with this part in the administration ; for they will not be governed by their inferiors. They will also rule justly, as others will censure their conduct ; for it is serviceable to the state to have them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do whatsoever they choose ; for the power of doing whatever a man pleases affords no possible check against that evil particle which is in every man. It is necessary, therefore, and useful to the state, that its offices shall be filled by the principal persons whose characters are unblemished, and that the people shall not be oppressed. It is now evident that this is the best species of demo- cracy, and on what account ; because the people ^st'demo! are of a particular character. In order to turn cracy. the populace to husbandry, some of those laws a community which were observed in many ancient states are o^^usband- all 01 them useiul: as, lor instance, on no account to permit any one to possess more than a certain quantity of land, or within a certain distance from the city. Formerly also, in some states, no one was allowed to sell his original lot of land. There is also a law, which they call a law of Oxylus,^ the effect of which is, to forbid any one to add by usury to his income arising from land. We ought also to Bteer by the law of the Aphytfieans,^ as useful towards our ' King of the Elians. • In some editions they are called Aphetali. Plutarch, in I-ysand. ? 220 Aristotle's politics. [book VI. present purpose. For they had but very little ground, while they were a numerous people, and at the same time were all husbandmen, and so did not include all their lands within the census, but divided them in such a manner, that, according to the census, the poor had more power than the rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is one of shep- and^ofshep- j^^^^g^ ^^iere they live off their herds; for they have many things in common with husbandry, and by their habits of life they are excellent ly qualified to make good soldiers, being stout in body, and able to continue in the open air all night. The generality of the people worse.^^"^^ of whom the other democracies are composed, are much worse than these ; for their lives are wretch- ed, nor is there room for virtue in any business which they take in hand, whether they be mechanics, petty traders, or hired servants. And, moreover, as all this sort of men frequent the exchange and the citadel, in a word, they can readily attend the public assembly ; whereas the husbandmen, being more dispersed in the country, cannot so easily meet together, nor are they as desirous as the others of meeting The best site ^^^^^ When a country happens to be so situated for a jjood de- that a great part of the land lies at a distance from mocracy. ^-^^^ there it is easy to establish a good demo- cracy, or a free state, ^ for the people in general is obliged to form its settlements in the country ; so that it will be neces- sary in such a democracy, though there may be a town popu- lation near, never to hold an assembly unless the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown, then, in what manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it will be equally evident as to the rest ; for it is necessary to make a correspondent deviation, always separating the worst of the people from the rest. But the last and worst of^de™crac™ ^"^^^^ which gives a share to every citizen ; a thing which few cities can bear, nor is it easy to preserve it for long, unless well supported by laws and manners. 444, calls them Aphygsei. They inhabited the peninsula Pallene in the region of Chalcis, on the coast of Thrace or Macedon. See Strabo Excerpt. 1. viii. p. 330. * Aristotle says, that such people may establish an aseful democracy, and a rroXircia, which he has before explained to be a mixed govern- ment, and the best form of republicanism. CHAP. V.J ITS GROWTH. 221 We have already noticed almost every cause that can destroy either this or any other state. Those who have ^^^^^^^ ^ taken the lead in such a democracy have endea- which this^ voured to establish it, and to make the people abo'^lt^ ^^^''^^^ powerful, by collecting together as many persons as they could, and giving them their freedom, not only legiti- mately but naturally born, and also if either of their parents were citizens, that is to say, on the father or mother's side. This method is better suited to this state than any other : and thus the demagogues have been wont to manage. They ought, how- ever, not to collect thus any longer than the common people are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and then to stop ; for, if they proceed further, they will make the state disorderly, and excite the nobles to feel indignant at the power of the common people ; which was the cause of the insurrection at Cyrene :^ for a little evil is overlooked, but when it becomes great, it strikes the eye. It is moreover very useful, in such a state, to adopt the means which Clisthenes used at Athens, when he was desirous of increasing the power of the people, and as those did who established the democracy in Cyrene ; that is, to institute many tribes and fraternities, and to reduce the religious rites of private persons to a few, and those com- mon ; and every means is to be contrived to associate and blend the people together as much as possible ; and that all former customs be broken through. Moreover, whatsoever practice belongs to a tyranny, seems adapted to a democracy of this species ; as for instance, the licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the children ; (for this to a certain degree is useful in such a state ;) and also to overlook every one's living as they choose. For many will support such a government as this : for it is more agreeable to many to live without any con- trol than with moderation. CHAP. V. It is also the business of the legislator, and all stability to be those who would establish a government of this chiefly con- sort, not to make it too great a work or too per- ^ feet, but to aim only at rendering it stable. For, let a state * This state flourished as a monarchy, and as an aristocracy, but de- cayed when it became altered into a democratic form. 222 Aristotle's politics. [book VI, be constituted ever so badly, there is no difficulty in its con- tinuing for two or three days : they should therefore endeavour to procure its safety by all those ways which we have de- scribed in assigning the causes of the preservation and destruction of governments; avoiding what is hurtful, and framing such laws, both written and unwritten, as shall con- tain those things which chiefly tend to the preservation of the state ; and they should not suppose that any thing is useful either for a democratic or an oligarchic form of government, which contributes to make it more purely so, but what will _ . contribute to its duration. But our demao-oo-ues Faults m ex- ^ ^ n . ^ i -, . ^ ® ® isting demo- at present, to natter the people, occasion irequent cracies. Confiscations in the courts. For which reason those who have the welfare of the state really at heart should act on the opposite side, and enact a law to prevent forfeitures from being divided amongst the people or paid into the trea- sury, but to have them set apart for sacred uses. For those who are of a bad disposition would not then be the less cautious, as their punishment would be the same ; and the community would not be so ready to condemn those on whom they sit in judgment, when they are about to get nothing by it. They should also take care that the causes which are brought before the public should be as few as possible, and punish with the utmost severity those who bring an action against any one without cause ; for it is not the commons, but the nobles, whom they are wont to prosecute. But in all things the citizens of the same state ought to be aiFectionate to each other, or at the least not to treat those who have the chief power in it as their enemies. Now, as the democracies be^observeTin which havc been lately established are very un- popular assem- merous, and it is difficult to get the common people to attend the public assemblies unless they are paid for it, this is against the interest of the nobles, when there is not a sufficient public revenue. For the deficiencies must be necessarily made up by taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice : things which have already destroyed many democracies. Whenever, then, the revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public assemblies ; and the courts of justice should have extensive jurisdiction, but continue sitting a few days only ; for by this means the rich will not fear the expense, although they receive nothing CHAP, v.] PRACTICAL RULES. 223 for their attendance, though the poor do ; and judgment also will be given much better ; for the rich will not choose to be long absent from their own affairs, but will willingly be so for a short time. And, when there are sufficient revenues, a different conduct ought to be pursued from what the dema- gogues at present follow ; for now they divide the surplus of the public money amongst the poor ; these receive it, and again want the same supply ; while the giving such help to the poor is like pourinar water into a sieve. But 1 , ' ^ ' 1 wxxi Each of the the true patriot in a democracy ought to take care poor should be that the majority are not too poor, for this is the ^gndent^^" cause of rapacity in that government. He should endeavour, therefore, that they may enjoy a lasting plenty ; and as this also is advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out of the public money should be put by, and then divided at once among the poor, if possible, in such a quantity as may enable every one of them to purchase a little field ; or, if that cannot be done, at least to give each of them enough to pro- cure the implements of trade and husbandry ; and if there is not enough for all to receive so much at once, then to divide it acording to tribes, or any other allotment. In the mean time, let the rich pay them for the necessary attendance, and cease from lavishing them on useless shows. And something like this was the manner in which they manage at Carthage, and so preserve the affections of the people ; for, by continually sending some of their community into colonies, they procure plenty. It is also worthy of a sensible and generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and to induce them to work by supplying them with what is necessary ; or to imitate the conduct of the people at Tarentum :^ for by permitting the poor to partake in common of every thing which is needful for them, they gain the affections of the commonalty. They have also two different ways of electing their magis- trates ; for some are chosen by vote, others by magLTrat!^. lot ; by the last, that the people at large may have some share in the administration; by the former, that the state may be well governed. It is also possible to accomplish the same thing, if of the same magistrates some are chosen ^ Upon the constitution of Tarentum, see Miiller's Dorians, moU vu chap. 9. 224 Aristotle's politics. [book vi by vote, and others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies ought to be established CHAP. YI. The constitu- From what has been already said, it will be almost tionofan manifest how an oligarchy ought to be founded, oligarchy. right to draw conclusions from things which are contrary, and to frame every species of oligarchy by a kind of analogy, corresponding to some opposite species of democracy. The best kind purest and bcst-framcd oligarchy is one which approaches most nearly to what we call a free state ; in which there ought to be two different standards of income, the one made high, the other low. From those who are within the latter, the ordinary officers of the state ought to be chosen ; from the former, the supreme magistrates : nor should any one be excluded from a part of the administration who is within the census ; which should be so regulated that the commonalty who are included in it should, by that means, be made superior to those who have no share in the govern- ment. For those who are to take their share in public affairs ought always to be chosen out of the better sort of the people. The next kind "^^^^ same manner ought the next kind of oligarchy to be established, by drawing the rule a little tighter ; but as to that which is most opposite to a pure The worst democracy, and approaches nearest to a dynasty and a tyranny, as it is of all others the worst, so it requires the greatest care and caution to preserve it. For as bodies of sound and healthy constitutions, and ships which are well manned and well adapted for sailing, can bear many defects without perishing thereby, while a diseased body, or a leaky ship with an indifferent crew, cannot support the least shock; just so the worst-established governments w^ant the Tests of sta- carcful attention. A number of citizens is bility in a de- the preservation of a democracy ; for they are a wi^oifgarchy ^ody opposcd to thosc rights which are founded in rank ; while on the contrary, the preservation of an oligarchy depends upon the due regulation of the dif- ferent orders in the society. cnAi% VII.] OLIGARCHY. 225 CHAP. VII. As the greater part of the community is divided ^yj^g^g ^jj. into four sorts of people, husbandmen, mechanics, garchy can be petty traders, and hired servants ; and, as those ^ ^ ^® ® - vi^ho are useful in v^ar may likewise be divided into four sorts, the horseman, the heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor ; wherever the nature of the country admits of a great number of horse, there a powerful oligarchy may be easily established. For the safety of the inhabitants depends upon a force of that sort ; but those who can support the expense of horsemen must be persons of some considerable fortune. Where the troops are chiefly heavy-armed, there an inferior oligarchy may be established ; for a heavy-armed force is com- posed more out of the rich than the poor, but the light-armed and the sailors always contribute to support a democracy. But where the number of these is very great, and a sedition arises, the other parts of the community fight at a disadvan- tage ; but a remedy for this evil is to be learned from skilful generals, who always mix a proper number of light-armed soldiers with their horse and heavy-armed. For it is in this way that the populace get the better of the men of fortune in an insurrection ; for being lighter, they are easily a match for the horse and the heavy-armed. So that for an oligarchy to form a body of troops from these is to form one against itself. But as a city is composed of different ages, some young and some old, the fathers should teach their sons, while they are still very young, the light and easy exercises ; and when they are grown up from childhood, they should be perfected in war- like exercises in general. Now, the admission of ^ the people to any share in the government, a^ I latTtherd-^' said before, should be either regulated by a census, ™ opjeVoffice or else, as at Thebes, allowed to those who for a certain time have ceased from any mechanic employment ; or as at Massalia, where they are chosen according to their worth, whether citizens or foreigners. With respect to the magis- trates of the highest rank, which it may be necessary to have in the state, their services to the public should be strictly laid down, to prevent the common people from being desirous of a ahare, and also to induce them to regard their magistrates a 226 ARISrOTLES POLITICS. [BOOK VI. with faTOur, as men who pay a large price for their honours. It is also fitting that the magistrates, upon entering into office, should make magnificent sacrifices, and erect some public structure, that the people, partaking of the entertainment, and seeing the city ornamented with votive gifts in their temples and public structures, may see with pleasure the stability of the government : the nobles will thus gain lasting records of their generosity. But now this is not the conduct of those who are at present at the head of an oligarchy, but quite the con- trary ; for they are not more desirous of honour than of gain ; for which reason such oligarchies may more properly be called little democracies. Let it then suffice to have laid down thus much as to the principles on which a democracy and an oli- garchy ought to be established. CHAP. VIII.' What magis- After what has been said, it follows next to dis- tracies are ne- tinguish accurately concerning the magistracies ; cessary. what nature they should be, how many, and for what purpose, as I have already mentioned : for without the necessary magistrates no state can exist, nor without those who contribute to its dignity and good order can it exist hap- pily. Now it is necessary, that in small states the magistrates should be few, in large ones many ; it is well also to know what offices it is suitable to join together, and what ought to be separated. The first thing necessary is to establish proper the mark^et!*^ regulations in the markets ; for which purpose a certain officer should be appointed, to inspect all contracts, and to preserve good order; for, of necessity, in almost every city there must be both buyers and sellers, to supply each others' mutual wants, and this is the readiest means towards independence ; for the sake of which men seem first to have joined together in one community.^ A second ' The learned Schneider admonishes the reader that there is evidently an omission here, and that in this place we ought to look for Aristotle's complete statement of doctrine with reference to the constitution of aristo- ciacies, free states, and monarchies. But the reader has already been warned of the fragmentary character of the present treatise of our author. Compare book i. chap. 2, and Nicom. Eth. book v. chap. 6. CHAP. VrjI.] VARIOUS OFFICERS NECESSARY. care, and nearly related to the first, is to have an eye both to the public and private edifices in the buiicfnfe",^e^^^ city, that they may be ornamented ; and also to take care of all buildings which are likely to fall, and of the repair of highways ; and also to see that the land-ipiarka between different estates are preserved, that they may live free from disputes, and all other business of a like nature. Now such an office as this is called by most an inspectorship of tlie city, and the business itself may be divided into several branches, over each of which in populous cities they appoint a separate person ; one to inspect the buildings, another the foun- tains, and another the harbours. There is a third office, most necessary, and very like the last, and conversant nearly about the same objects ; only its sphere lies in the country and the suburbs of the city. These officers some persons , ... r» 1 1 T T 1 • Of lands. call inspectors or the lands, and others, inspectors of the woods ; these then are three matters of care. But there must also be another magistracy appointed, to receive the public revenue, from whose safe-keeping it is to be delivered out to those who are in the different departments ^ p , , n 1 • Quaestors. 01 the state ; these are called receivers or quaestors. There must also be another, before whom all private contracts and sentences of courts shall be enrolled ; and before these same, as well as the magistrates, must be brought all indictments and openings of pleadings. Sometimes this employment is divided amongst many, but there is one supreme Notaries, etc. over the rest ; these are called proctors, notaries, ^^^^^ and other like names. Next to these is an recovery of officer, whose business is of all others the most necessary, and yet most difficult ; namely, the exaction of penalties from those who are condemned, the recovery of tines, and the charge of the persons of prisoners. This office is very difficult, on account of the odium attending it, so that no one will engage in it unless it is made very profitable, nor, if he does, will he be willing to execute it according to law ; but it is most necessary, as it is of no service to pass judgment in any cause, except that judgment is carried into execution ; for if human society cannot subsist without actions at law, it certainly cannot exist without the infliction of penalties. For this reason it is best that this office should not be executed by one person, but by some of the magistrates of other courts. q2 228 Aristotle's poLincs. [book VI. Ill like manner, endeavour should be made that the levying of fines which are ordered by the judges, shall be divided amongst different persons. And further, that different magis- trates shall judge different causes ; new judges trying novel matters in preference ; and as to those which are already ruled, let one person pass sentence, and another see it executed ; as, for instance, let the curators of the public buildings execute the sentence which the inspectors of the markets have passed, and conversely in other cases ; for in proportion as less odium attends those who carry the laws into execution, by so much the easier will they gain their proper end. Therefore for the same persons to pass the sentence and to execute it, will sub- ject them to double hatred; and if the same judges pass sen- tence in all cases, they will be considered as the enemies of all. And in many places a different magistrate has custody of the prisoner, while another sees execution done upon him ; as the eleven at Athens : for which reason it is prudent to se- parate these offices, and to seek out a plea for arranging this matter. For it is no less than any matter of care already mentioned ; for it so happens that men of character will de- cline accepting this office, and worthless persons cannot pro- perly be intrusted with it, as being themselves rather in want of a guard, rather than qualified to guard others. This, there- fore, ought by no means to be a separate office from others ; nor should it be permanently allotted to any individuals, but to the young men ; and where there is a band of young men or a city guard, the youths ought in turns to take these offices upon them. These, then, as the most necessary magistrates, ought to be first mentioned ; next to these are others no less necessary, but of much higher rank, for they ought to be men of great skill and fidelity. Such would be those the city! magistrates which have the guard of the city, and provide every thing necessary for war ; whose bu- siness it is, both in war and peace, to defend the walls and gates, and to take care to muster and marshal the citizens. Over all these there are sometimes more officers, some- SfficerZ times fewer ; thus, in little cities there is one su- preme over all, whom they call either general or polemarch ; but where there are horse and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and sailors, they sometimes place over each of these distinct commanders, called navarchs, hipparchs, and CHAP. VIII.] MAGISTRACIES OF THE HIGHEST ORDEH. ?29 taxiarchs ; who again have others under them, as trierarchs, lochagi, and phylarchs, according to their different divisions ; all of which join together to make one body, appertaining tc the military department. But since some of the magistrates, if not all, have business with the public money, it is necessary that there should be other officers, whose employment shall be nothing else than to take an account of what they have, and to correct any mismanagement therein ; and these they call auditors, or logistje, or inquisitors, or scrutineers. But, besides all these magistrates, there is one who is ^^^^ remier supreme over them all, who very often has in his own power the disposal both of the public revenue and taxes ; who presides over the people, when the supreme power is in them ; for the magistrate who has a power to summon them together, must be supreme head of the state. These are sometimes called probuli, because they preadvise ; ^^^^^-^^ but, where there are many, they are more proper- ly called a council. These are nearly all the civil magistrates which are requisite to a government : but there are other per- sons, whose business is confined to religion ; as the -p^-^^^^^ priests, and those who have to take care of the temples, that they are kept in proper repair, or, if they fall down, that they may be rebuilt ; and whatever else be- longs to public worship. This charge is sometimes intrusted to one person, as in small cities ; in others it is delegated to many, and these distinct from the priesthood, as the builders or keepers of holy places, and officers of the sacred revenue. Next to these are those who are appointed to have the general care of all the public sacrifices, which the law does not intrust to the priests, but which have their high rank as being offered on the common hearth of the city ; and some call them archons, some kings, and others again prytanes. To sum up in few words the different magistracies which are . ,^ . . Various others. necessary in these matters, these are either con- cerned with religion, with war, with taxes and expenditure, with markets and public buildings, with harbours and high- ways. Belonging to the courts of justice there are scribes, to enrol private contracts ; and there must also be some to see to executions, and guards over the prisoners ; there are also courts of inquiry and scrutiny, to pass the magistrates' ac- counts ; and lastly, others to watch over the deliberative element 230 Aristotle's politics. [book VI, of the state. ^ But separate states which are peculiarly happy, and have leisure to attend to more minute particulars, and Superintend- ^re vcry attentive to good order, require parti- ents of the cular mao^istrates ; such as those who have the women, pi youths, and government oi the women, who are to see tho education. \siws are cxecuted ; who take the care of the boys, and preside over their education. To these may be added, those who have the care of the gymnastic exercises, the the- atres, and every other public spectacle which there may hap pen to be. Some of these however clearly do not concern the people at large, as the governors of the women ; for the poor are obliged to employ their wives and children in servile offices, for want of slaves. But as there are three magistrates to whom some states intrust the supreme power, namely, What officers guardians of the laws,^ preadvisers,^ and senators ; suit the three guardians of the laws suit best to an aristocracy, forms of go- preadviscrs to an olij?archy, and a senate to a de- vernment. ^ a t i i i • -• i mocracy. And thus much has been said by way of an outline concerning all magistrates. * In this obscure and difficult passage, in which Aristotle seems to al- ternate between loose and technical terms, the editor has followed the reading of Bekker, with the single exception of rejecting the Kai before the words Trpbg evOvvag. This he prefers to the proposed reading of Goettling, Kai TrpocrtvOvvag. In the earlier part of the sentence Schneider, followed by Coraes and Goettling, read dTToXoyicriJLovg instead of IttlXo- yiafiovg. But in a later edition G. recalls his assent in the following terms,]which are here transcribed. " Aristoteles hie de magistratu loqui- tur, cujus fidei commissa est exquisitio gesti a ceteris magistratibus mu- neris. Magistratus autem in defendendis (a.TroXoyKTfjio'ig) iis occupatus esse non potest, a quibus administrationis rationes accipit." 2 voiio^vXaKsg. The Dictionary of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities states that this name denotes certain magistrates of high authority, who exer- cised a control over the whole body of the magistrates and people, and whose duty was to see that the laws were duly administered and obeyed. Mention is made of this office at Sparta and elsewhere ; but no such body existed at Athens, as it would have been incompatible with the demo- cratic genius of its constitution, at least when vested in the hands of a single person. The office of guardian of the laws, in part at least, seems to have been discharged at Athens by the Areopagus. At a later period an inferior office under this name is said to have been devised at Athens. ^ TTpo^ovXoL. These officers Gillies compares with the " lords of ar- ticles " in the old Scottish constitution. For further remarks on the word, the reader will do well to refer to note on book iv. cliap. 14. CHAP. THE BEST LIFR< 231 BOOK VII.^— Chap. I. He who proposes to make the fitting inquiry as ^^^^ to which form of government is the best, ought gibie life to be first to determine what manner of liviner is most considered by . tne politician. ehgible ;^ for while this remains uncertain, it will also be equally uncertain what government is best. For, un- less some unexpected accident interfere, it is probable that those who enjoy the best government, will live best according to existing circumstances ; he ought, therefore, first to come to some agreement as to the manner of life which, so to speak, is most desirable for all ; and afterwards, whether this life is the same or difierent in the individual and the member of a * This and the following book are placed by Gillies as the fourth and fifth. The fifth and sixth books (called by him the seventh and eighth) are regarded by him as supplemental to the rest. He thus defends his re- arrangement of the treatise, and traces the connexion between its several parts. In the first book of his Politics, Aristotle examines the origin of society and government, the essential distinction of ranks in a common- wealth, and the best plans of political economy. In the second, he de- scribes the most admired schemes of policy, either delineated by philoso- phers or instituted by legislators. In the third, (of which a considerable part is now lost,) he explains the nature and principles of the various governments existing in Greece and in the ancient world, whether repub- lican or monarchical ; bestowing just and liberal praise where praise seemed to be due ; but declaring himself not to be completely satisfied with any thing that philosophers had devised, legislators prescribed, or that time and chance had produced, he proceeds in this fourth (commonly published as the seventh) book, to exhibit the result of his own reflections concerning the great question, what form of government is the best ? This problem, he observes, cannot be solved abstractedly ; because government \)eing an arrangement, the best government must be the best arrangement, and this must be that form which the materials to be arranged are the ^est fitted to receive and to preserve/' " In order to find what is aiperwrdTr] TroXtrft'a, Aristotle considers first the practical question on v/hich it must depend, viz. what is aipeTiSjraTog jiLog. In both the one and the other, that will be the best which is the best under existing circumstances. Now in his Rhetoric, (book i. chap. 5,) to which he here alludes as one of his exoteric treatises, Aristotle divides all goods into, 1. to. Iktoq. 2. ra kv Ttf awfj^arL. 3. rd sv ry Each and all of them, though they do not constitute happiness, are yet necessary to its perfection, as every one but a fool will admit : the only difference will be concerning the proportion of each kind which is necessary. 232 ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS. [book VII, State. Deeming then that we have already sufficiently shown what sort of life is best, in our popular discourses on that subject, we must now make use of what we there said.^ Cer- tainly no one ever called in question the pro- Three kinds of • / /» P ^1 T • • 1 .if goods neces- priety ot One ot the divisions ; namely, that as saryforhap- there are three kinds of things good for man, namely, what is external, what belongs to the body, and to the soul, it is evident that all these must conspire to make men truly happy. For no one would say that a man was happy who had nothing of fortitude or temperance, justice or prudence, but was afraid of the flies that flew round him ; or who would abstain from nothing, if he chanced to be desirous of meat or drink, or who would murder his dearest friend for a farthing ; or, in like manner, one who was in every particular as wanting and misguided in his understanding as an infant or a maniac. These truths are so evident that all must agree to them, though some may dispute about the quantity and the degree : for they may think, that a very little amount of virtue is sufficient for happiness ; but as to riches, property, power, honour, and all such things, they endeavour to increase them without bounds. But to such we say, that it is easy to prove, from what experience teaches us concerning these cases, that it is not through these external goods that men acquire virtue, but through virtue that they acquire them.^ As happy Hfe de- ^ l^^PPJ ^i^^* whether it is to be found in and^w?sdom^"^ pleasure or in virtue, or in both, certain it is that it belongs more frequently to those whose morals are most pure, and whose understandings are best cultivated, and who preserve moderation in the acquisition of external goods, than to those who possess a sufficiency of external good things, ^ He refers to Rhet. book i. chap. 5. * That virtue is more essential than external goods to sv ^rjVf is proved ir two ways : 1 , Practically : rd Urbc dyaOd are caused and preserved by virtue, not virtue by them. Z* Theoretically; (a) rd Urbg dyadd have a limit and excess; not so virtue. (jS) The soul is superior to the body ; but qualities differ in relative importance according to the importance of the subject in which they reside. (y) External goods exist for the sake of the soul, not the contrary. For happiness depends upon the exercise of apcr/) and (pciovrjaig. CHAP. I.] THE BEST STATE. 233 but are deficient in the rest. And that such is the case will be clearly seen by any one who views the matter with reflec- tion. For whatsoever is external has its boundary, as a machine ; and whatsoever is useful is such that its excess is either necessarily hurtful, or at best useless to the possessor. But every good quality of the soul, the higher it is in degree, becomes much the more useful, if it is permitted on this sub- ject to adopt the word " useful " as well as " noble." It is also evident that the best disposition of each thing will follow in the same proportion of excess, as the things themselves, of which we allow they are accidents, differ from each other in value. So that if the soul is more noble than any outward possession, or than the body, both in itself and with respect to us, it must be admitted, of course, that the best disposition of each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it is for the sake of the soul .that these things are desirable, and it is on this account that wise men should desire them, and not the soul for them. Let us therefore be well agreed that so much of happiness falls to the lot of every one as he possesses of virtue and wisdom, and in proportion as he acts according to their dictates ; since for this we have the example of the God Himself, who is completely happy, not from any exter- nal good, but in Himself, and because He is such by nature. For good fortune is something of necessity different from hap- piness, as every external good of the soul is produced by chance or by fortune ; but it is not from fortune that any one is just or wise. Hence it follows, as established by the same reasoning, that the state which is best, happiest sute. and acts best, will be happy : for no one can Bire well who acts not well ; nor can the actions either of man or city be praise-worthy without virtue and wisdom. But valour, justice, and wisdom have in a state the same force and form as in individuals ; and it is only as he shares in these virtues that each man is said to be just, wise, and prudent. Thus much then may suffice to be said by way of introduc- tion ; for we cannot refrain from touching on this subject in our discourse, though we could not go through all the details which belong to it ; for that business properly belongs to an- other inquiry. But let us at present lay down so much, that a man's happiest life, both as an individual and as a citizen, is a life of virtue, so far accompanied by external goods as to 234 ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS. [book VII. be able to perform virtuous actions. But if there are any who still dispute the matter, and are not persuaded by what we have said, we will consider them hereafter, but at present we shall proofed according to our intended method. CHAP. II. The happiness It now remains for us to say whether the happi- vL^aiami'of ^^^^ ^^^^ individual and of a city^ is the same t.i- state the or different. But this also is evident ; for all same. would confess that it is the same. For whosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must place the happiness of the city in riches, if it possesses them ; those who prefer a life which enjoys tyrannic power, will also think that the city which has many others under its command is most happy : thus, also, if any one approves a man for his vir- tue, he will think the most worthy city the happiest. But here Two questions ^^^^^ particulars which require consider- 1. Is political ation, one of which is, whether it is the most or private life elic^ible life to be a member of the community and the better ' P .... . ^ enjoy the rights of a citizen, or to live as a stranger, without interfering in public affairs ; and also what form of 2 What is the g^^^ernment and what disposition of the state w^e best form of ought to Consider the best ; whether the w^hole government? community should be eligible to a share in the administration, or only the greater part, and some only. As this, therefore, is a subject of political examination and spe- culation, and not what concerns the individual, and as this is the view which we have at present chosen, the deferred?^^ one of these would be foreign to our purpose,^ but the other is proper to our present design. * The object of Plato in his Republic was to arrive at what is good for the individual through the medium of what is good for the state ; the method of Aristotle would be as nearly as possible the converse of this. We do not, however, accurately know how far Plato all along had in view a different object, namely, to disprove the sophistical notion that happiness and virtue depend mainly on keeping up the outward sem- blance of it. 2 As not being strictly in accordance with the practical character of the present treatise. Still Aristotle enters into the question as a irdpspyov. Since virtues are twofold, 1. Political or practical, 2. Theoretical or con- templative, is a political or contemplative life preferable ? The man who foMows the latter kind of life objects to the politician, that his life is CHAP. II.] THE BEST FORM OF GOVERN^IENT. 235 Now it is evident that that government must be the best, which is so established that every one therein may have it in his power to act most virtuously and live happily : but some, who admit that a life of virtue is most eligible, still doubt which is preferable, a public life of active virtue, or one entirely dis- engaged from what is without, and spent in contemplation ; which some say is the only one worthy of a philosopher. And one of these two different modes of life, both now and formerly, seem to have been chosen by all those who were the most ambitious of virtue ; I mean the political or the philosophic life. And yet it is of no little consequence on j^j^g^g^^o i- which side the truth lies ; for a man of sense must nions on the naturally direct his aim to the better mark; and letter question, not only individuals, but the state also, should do the same. Some think that a tyrannical government over our neighbours is accompanied with the greatest injustice ; but that a politi- cal rule over them is not unjust: but that still is a restraint on the tranquillity of political life. Others chance to hold, as it were, the contradictory opinion, and think that an active and political life is the only life for man ; for that private persons have no opportunity of practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged in the public management of the state. These are their sentiments ; others say, that a tyran- nical and despotical mode of government is the only happy one ; for even among some free states the object of their laws seems to be this, to tyrannise over their neighbours. So that poli- tical institutions, wheresoever dispersed among the greater part of mankind, if they have anyone common object in view, all of them aim at this, to conquer and govern. As for ex- ample, at Lacedsemon and in Crete, the education of their children and the generality of the laws was directed towards a state of war. Besides, among all nations, those who have power enough to enslave others, are honoured on that account ;V attended with injustice in certain cases. He answers, that it is only in political life that scope for certain particular virtues is found. Others hold that despotic rule over as many subjects as possible is the best tning. But this surely cannot be true ; for no other art endeavours to effect its end by force, but to provide fit and proper means. ^ *' The institutions of Rome had not acquired that celebrity which entitled them to be cited as examples in the time of Aristotle, who flour- ished towards the beginning of the fifth century from the building of the city. Yet, even at this early period, the Romans were distinguished 236 Aristotle's politics. [book vil as were the Scythians. Persians, Thracians, and Gauls ; and with some there are laws whose end is to excite the virtue of courage ; thus they tell us, that at Carthage they allowed every person to wear as many rings for distinction as he had served campaigns. There was also a law in Macedon, that a man, who had not himself killed an enemy, should be obliged to wear a halter round his neck. Among the Scythians, at a fes- tival, none were permitted to drink out of the cup which was carried about who had not done the same thing. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, they erect as many columns upon a man's tomb as he has slain enemies ; and among different nations different things of this sort prevail, some of them established by law, others by custom. Probably it may seem absurd to those who are willing to inquire, whether it is the business of a legislator to be able to point out by what means a state may govern and tyrannise over its neighbours, whether they will, or will not. For how can that which is itself un- lawful belong either to the politician or legislator ? but it is unlawful to rule not only justly but unjustly also; for a con- quest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing of this in the other sciences ; for it is the business neither of the phy- sician nor of the pilot to use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients, the other to his passengers. And yet many seem to think that a despotic government is a political one, and what they do not allow to be just or proper, if exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise over others ; for they endeavour to be justly governed themselves, but think it of no consequence whether others are ruled justly or not and this is absurd except where there are beings which nature in- tended to rule, and others which as naturally obey. And there- fore, since this is the case, no one ought to assume it over all in general, but over those only who are the proper objects of it just as no one should hunt men either for food or sacrifice, but above all nations in the world, by the nice gradation, as well as by the general diffusion, of military honours." (Gillies.) * As an instance in point, it would be apposite to quote the principli; adopted by the Romans in their conduct towards foreign states. ^ Aristotle here dwells on what is often repeated in other parts of thig work, the injustice of any kind of authority not derived from nature; the differences between the power or jurisdiction of masters, fathers, and hus- bands, and the evils resulting from confounding the limits of government* specifically difi'erent.'* (Gillies.) CHAP. III. FREEDOM AND SLAVERY. 237 only what is fit for this purpose ; and these are such wild ani" mals as are eatable. But withal, a city which is well governed may ^ ^.^ ^.^^ be very happy in itself, while it enjoys a good goodLTeJnai system of internal laws, though its constitution J^^^^p^y*^^"^ be not framed for war or conquest over its enemies ; for it would then have no occasion for these. It is evident therefore that all the business of war is to be con- sidered as commendable, not as a final end, but as the means of procuring it. It is the duty of a good iegis- lator to examine carefully into his state, and the garded as a nature of man, and every community, and to see ^^^^^ ^"^y- how they may partake of a virtuous life, and of the happiness which results from it. In this respect some laws and customs difier from others. It is also the duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring states, to consider in what manner he shall oppose each of them, or how he shall conduct himself suitably to each. But as to what should be the final end at which he should direct the best government, may possibly meet with due consideration hereafter. CHAP. JIL We will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue is most eligible, yet difier in the use of it, addressing ourselves to both these parties ; for there are some who disapprove of all political J^Jinlons^as to governments, and think that the life of one who is ^^^^l^^ really free is different from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible : while others, again, think tha the life of a citizen is the best ; and that it is impossible for hin who does nothing to be well employed ; but that virtuous activity and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties in some particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong ; thus, it is true that the life of a freeman is better than the life of a slave, for a slave, as a slave, is employed in nothing noble ; for the common servile employments which he is com- manded to perform have nothing honourable in them. But, on the other hand, it is not true that a submission to every sort of government is slavery ; for the mission if government of freemen differs not less from the ^^^^^'y* 238 Aristotle's politics. [book VII. government of slaves, than slavery and freec.om differ from each other in their nature ; and how they differ has been already mentioned in our first book.^ To prefer idleness to activity is also wrong, for happiness consists in action,^ and many noble ends are produced by the actions of the just and wise. From what we have already determined on this subject, some one probably may think, that supreme power is of all things best, for thus is a man enabled to perform very many useful services. So that he who can obtain this power ought not to give it up to another, but rather to seize it : and, for this purpose, the father should have no attention or regard for his son, or the son for his father, or friend for friend ; for what is best is mo*t eligible : but to be in prosperity is the best. What these persons advance might probably be true, if the supreme good were certainly theirs who plunder and use violence to others. But it is most unlikely that it should be so ; for it is a mere false supposition : for it does not follow, that their actions are honourable who thus assume the supreme power over others, unless they are by nature as superior to them as a man to a woman, a father to a child, a master to a slave. So that he who so far forsakes the path of virtue can never return back so far as he has departed from it. For amongst equals whatever is fair and just ought to be recipro- cal ; for this is equal and right ; but that equals should not share with equals, or like with like, is contrary to nature ; and . , whatever is contrarv to nature is not right. If, Who IS by . " . ^ nature fitted therefore, there is any one superior to the rest oi to rule. ^Y^^ community in virtue and abilities for active life, him it is proper to follow, and him it is right to obey : but he must have not virtue alone, but also the power according to which he may be capable of acting. If, then, we are right in what we have now said, it follows, that happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that with respect to the state, as well as to the individual, an active life- is the best. Not that an active life must necessarily refer to other persons,^ as * See book i. chaps. 5, 6, and 7. * The two imaginary disputants ccncerning virtue are evidently partly right and pave already said, it is impossible to obtain hap- piness without virtue ; it follows, that in the best governed states, where the citizens are really men of intrinsic and not relative goodness, none of them should be permitted to exer- cise any low mechanical employment or traffic,^ as being ignoble and destructive to virtue : neither should they who are destined for office be husbandmen ; for leisure is necessary in order to improve in virtue, and to perform the duty which they owe to the state. But since the soldiery, and j^.^^^^^^^ the senate which consults, and the judge who de- imcaUons^for' cides on matters of law, are evidently necessary to tor^^and^judge" the community, shall they be allotted to different persons, or shall they both be given to the same person ? This too is clear : for in some cases the same persons may execute them, in others they should be different ; for where the dif- ferent employments require different abilities, as when prac- tical wisdom is wanting for one, but energy for the other, there they should be allotted to different persons. But where it is evidently impossible that those who are able to do violence and to impede matters, should always be under command, there these different employments should be trusted to one person ; for those who have arms in their hands have it in their option whether the supreme power shall remain or no. It remains, then, that we should intrust the ffo- , , ' ' . ^ When and how vernment to these two parties ; but not at the they may be same time, but as nature directs ; what requires c^"^^"^^^- energy, to the young ; what requires practical wisdom, to the old. Thus each will be allotted the part for which they are fit according to their different merits. It is also necessary that the landed property should belong to these men ; for it is necessary that the citizens should be rich, and these are the * In the best state, happiness is the chief object. This cannot be at- tained except by individual virtue. And virtue, according tc Aristotle, cannot belong to any one who leads a life of any servile kind, as such an one can have no leisure fcr acquiring virtue. 250 Aristotle's k»OLiTics. [book VIL men proper for citizens ; for no low mechanic ought to be admitted to the rights of a citizen, nor any other sort of people, whose employment is not productive of virtue. This is evident from our first principle ; for to be happy it is neces- sary to be virtuous ; and no one should say that a city is happy so long as he considers only one part of its citizens, but he must look to the whole body. It is evident, therefore, that the landed property should belong to these, though it may be necessary for them to have for husbandmen, either slaves, bar- , . barians, or servants. There remains of the classes The order of ^ . ' , , _ ^ . , priests to be 01 the pcoplc already enumerated, one only, that distinct. ^£ ^YiQ priests ; for these evidently compose a rank by themselves ; for the priests are by no means to be reckoned amongst the husbandmen or the mechanics ; for it is fitting that the gods should be reverenced by the citizens. And since the itizens have been divided into two orders, namely, the military and the council, and since it is proper to offer due worship to the gods, and since it is necessary that those who are employed in their service should have nothing else to do, let those who are ripe in years be set aside for the business of the priesthood. We have now shown what is necessary to the existence of a city, and of what parts it consists ; and that husbandmen, mechanics, and the class of mercenary servants are necessary to a city ; but that the parts of it are the sol- diery and the councillors. Each of these also is separated from the other ; the one indeed always, but the other only in part. CHAP. X. It seems neither now nor very lately to have become known to those philosophers who have made politics their study, that a city ought to be divided by families into different orders of men ; and that the husbandmen and soldiers should be kept separate from each other ; a custom which is even to this day preserved in Egypt and in Crete also ; Sesostris having founded it in Egypt, Minos in Crete. The common meals seem also to have been an ancient regulation, and to have been established in Crete during the reign of Minos, and in a still more remote period in Italy. For it is said by those who are the best versed in the annals of the people who dwell CHAP. X.] ANCIENT ITALY. EGYPT. 251 there, that one Italus was "ring of ^notria,^ and that from him the people changed their names, and were called Italians instead of ^notrians, and that part of Europe was called Italy, which is bounded by the Scylletic gulf on the one side, and the Lametic^ on the other, the distance between which is about half a day's journey. Now this Italus, as they relate, made husbandmen of the ^notrians, who were formerly shepherds, and gave them other laws, and especially was the first who established the common meals ; for which reason some of his descendants still use them, and observe some of his laws. The Opici inhabit that part which lies towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, who both now are and formerly were called Ausonians. The Chaonians inhabited the part toward lapy- gia and the Ionian Sea, which is called the Syrtis. These Chaonians were descended from the jEnotrians. Hence arose the custom of common meals, but the separation of the citizens into different families came from Egypt : for the reign of Sesostris is of much higher antiquity than that of Minos. As we ought to think that most other things were often found out in a long time, nay, times without number — (for reason teaches us that want would make men first invent that which was necessary, and, when that was obtained, then those things which were requisite for the conveniencies and ornament of life) — so should we conclude the same with respect to a political state. But every thing in Egypt is a proof of the great antiquity of these customs ; for the people of Egypt seem to be the most ancient of all others, and yet they have ac- quired laws and political order. We should therefore make a proper use of what is told us concerning states, and en- deavour to find out what others have omitted.^ We have » Comp. Virg. Mn. i. 1. 530 : Est locus, Hesperiam Graii cognomine dicunt ; ********* jEnotri coluere viri, nunc fama minores Italiam dixisse, ducis de nomine, gentem. Upon the subject of the ^Enotrians, the reader will do well to consult the learned remarks of Niebuhr in the first volume of his History of Rome. 2 Niebuhr, in his History of Rome (sub. init.), calls this the Napetic" gulf, not the Lametic." Polybius also is said to mention the same part of the Mediterranean Sea under that name. * Aristotle here signifies his intention to fill up the deficiencies of others who have gone before him ; in allusion, perhaps, to his last work 252 Aristotle's politics. [book vn. The husband- ^^^^^^7 Said, that the landed property ought to men a separate belong to the military and those who partake of order. ^j^^ government of the state ; and that therefore the husbandmen should be a separate order of people ; and how large, and of what nature, the country ought to be. We will therefore first treat of the division of the land, and of the husbandmen, how many, and of what sort they ought to be ; since we by no means hold that property ought to be common, as some persons have said,^ but only by way of friend- ship it should be made common, so as to let no citizen want subsistence. As to common meals, it is in general agreed that they are proper in well-regulated cities ; but on account of what reasons we also approve of them shall be mentioned hereafter. They are things of which all the citizens ought to partake ; but it will not be easy for the poor, out of what is their own, to contribute as much as is enjoined, and to supply their own house besides. The expense also of religious worship should be defrayed by the whole state. Of divided into ^ necessity therefore the land ought to be divided public and [y^iq ^wo parts, ouc of which should belong to the ■private. community in general, the other to the individuals separately. Each of these parts should again be subdi- vided into two : and half of that which belongs to the public should be appropriated to maintain the worship of the gods, the other half to support the common meals. Half oAhaf which that which belongs to the individuals should be haiTdr^^^^^ at the extremity of the country, the other half near the city ; so that these two portions being allotted to each person, all would partake of land in both places, which would be both equal and right; and induce them to act more in concert in any war with their neighbours. For when the land is not divided in this manner, one party neglects the inroads of the enemy on the borders, the other makes it a matter of too much consequence, and more than is fair. For which reason, in some places there is a law, which forbids the inhabitants of the borders to have any vote in the upon the constitutions of the various states of Greece. His remark above, to the effect that most things have been invented and have been suffered to fall into disuse, will remind the reader of the wise saying of Solomon, that there is nothing new under the sun.'* * He alludes here to Plato, de Republ. book v. See above note on p. 14. CHAF. XI.] SITE OF A CITY. 253 council when they are debating upon a war made against them, as their private interest might prevent their voting impartially. Thus, therefore, the country ought to be divided, and for the reasons before mentioned. But those 1 . 111 T- • 1. The tillers of who are to act as husbandmen, it choice be the ground allowed, should by all means be slaves, nor all of ^sTerfs^^ the same nation, nor men of any spirit : for thus they will probably be industrious in their business, and safe from attempting any novelties. Next to these, barbarian servants are to be preferred, similar in natural disposition to those we have already mentioned. Of these, some who are to cultivate the private property of the individual, should belong to that individual, and those who are to cultivate the public ter- ritory should belong to the public. In what manner these slaves ought to be used, and for what reason it is very proper that they should have liberty held out to them as a reward for their services, we will mention hereafter, CHAP. XI. We have already mentioned, that the city should communi- cate both vTith the continent and the sea, and with the adjoin- ing territory equally, as much as possible. There ^^^^ situation are these four things of which we should be par- of the city ticularly desirous in the position of the city with chosen wUh respect to itself. In the first place, as to health, regard to, as the first thing necessary. Now a city which ' fronts the east and receives the winds which blow from thence is esteemed most healthful ; next to this a northern position is to be preferred, as best in winter. It should next be con- trived, that it may have a proper situation for the business of government, and for defence in war ; that in war the citizens may have easy access to it, but that it may be difficult of access to the enemy, and hardly to be taken. In the next place, that there may be a suitable supply of water and rivers near at hand ; but if those cannot be found, very large and immense cisterns must be prepared to save rain water, so that there may be no want of it when cut ofi" from the country in time of war. And as great care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, the first thing to be attended to is that the city should have a good situation and a good position ; the second 3S4 Aristotle's politics. [book vu. is, that they may have good water to drink, ^nd this must not be taken care of as a secondary matter. For what we chiefly and most frequently use for the support of the body, must principally contribute to its health ; and this is the influence which the air and water naturally have. For this reason, in all wise governments, the water ought to be appropriated to different purposes if they are not equally good ; and, if there is not a plenty of both kinds of water, that which is to drink should be separated from that which is for other uses. As to fortified places, what is suitable to some govern- posuSn.^^^ ments is not equally suited to all ; as, for instance, a lofty citadel is proper for a monarchy and an oligarchy, but a city built upon a plain suits a democracy; neither of these for an aristocracy, but rather many strong places. As to the form of private houses, those are thought to be best, and most useful for their different purposes, which are separate from each other, and built in the modern manner, after the plan of Hippodamus. But for safety in time of war, on the contrary, they should be built as they formerly were ; for they were such that strangers could not easily find their way out of them, and the method of access to them such as an enemy who assailed them could with difficulty find. A city, therefore, should have both these sorts of buildings ; and this may easily be contrived, if any one will so regulate them as the planters do their rows of vines ; not making the buildings throughout the city detached, but only in some parts of it ; for thus elegance and safety will be equally consulted. With respect to walls, those who say that a courageous nece^ary.^^ people ought not to havc any, form their ideas from antiquated notions ; particularly, as we may see those cities which pride themselves herein confuted by facts. It is indeed disreputable for those who are equal, or nearly equal, to the enemy, to endeavour to save themselves by taking refuge within their walls ; but since it is possible, and very often happens, that those who make the attack are too powerful for the courage of those few who oppose them to resist, if they would be saved, and not encounter much suffer- ing and insolence, it must be thought the part of a good soldier to make the fortification of the walls such as to give the best protection, more especially since so many missile weapons and machines have been ingeniously invented to besiege cities. In" CHAP. XII.] BUILDINGS OF THE CITY. 255 deed to neglect surrounding a city with a wall would be similar to choosing a country which is easy of access to an enemy, or levelling the eminences of it ; or as though an individual should not have a wall to his house, as if those who dwelt in it were likely to be cowards. Nor should this be left out of our ac- count, that those who have a city surrounded with walls, may act both ways, either as if it had, or as if it had not ; but where it has not, they cannot do this. If this be true, not only is it necessary to have walls, but care must be taken that they may be a proper ornament to the city, as well as a de- fence in time of war, not only according to the old methods, but also according to modern improvements. For as those who make offensive war seek by what means they can gain advantages over their adversaries, so for those who are upon the defensive, some means have been already found out, and others they ought scientifically to devise, in order to defend themselves ; for people seldom attempt to attack those who are well prepared. CHAP. XII. And as it is necessary that the citizens in general should eat at pubKc tables, and as it is necessary fiS rampaJls. that the walls should have bulwarks and towers at proper distances, it is evident that the nature of the case demands that they prepare some of the public tables in the towers. And these indeed any one could arrange for this purpose ornamentally. But the temples for public ^ worship, and the hall for the public tables of the ^"^^ chief magistrates, ought to be built in proper places, and con- tiguous, except those temples which the law or the oracle from the god orders to be separate from all other buildings. And the site of these should be so conspicuous, that they may have an eminence which will give them the advantage of distinc- tion, and this, too, near that part of the city which is best for- tified. Adjoining to this place there ought to be a large square, like that which they call in ?he nXT Thessaly the square of freedom, in which nothing is permitted to be bought or sold ; into which no low mechanic or husbandman, or any such person, should be permitted to enter, unless commanded by the magistrates. It Gymnastic ex- will also be an ornament to this place, if the gym- ercisei. 256 Aristotle's politics. [book VII. nastic exercises of the elders are performed in it. For it is proper that for the performance of these exercises the citizens should be divided into distinct classes, according to their ages, and that the young persons should have proper officers to be with them, and that the seniors should be with the magistrates ; for the presence of the magistrates before their eyes would greatly inspire true modesty and ingenuous fear, for tradef^^^'^^ There ought to be another square separate from this, for buying and selling, which should be so situated as to be commodious for the reception of goods both by sea and by land. As the citizens may be divided into ma- gistrates and priests, it is proper that the public tables of the priests should be in buildings near the temples. Those of the magistrates who preside over contracts, indictments, and such like, and also over the markets and the public streets, should be near the square, or some public way, I mean the square where things are b©ught and sold ; for we intend the other for those who are at leisure, and this for necessary business. The same order which I have directed here, should higVountry!*^' obscrvcd also in the country ; for there also their magistrates, such as the surveyors of the woods, and overseers of the grounds, must necessarily have their common tables and their towers, for the purpose of pro- tection against an enemy. There ought also to be temples erected at proper places, both to the gods and the heroes. But it is unnecessary to dwell longer and most minutely on these particulars ; for it is by no means difficult to plan these things, but it is rather so to carry them into execution ; for the theory is the child of our wishes, but the practical part must depend upon fortune ; for which reason let us dismiss the matter without saying any thing further upon such sub- jects. CHAP. XIII. But concerning the state itself, we must say of tiou.^^^^^^" what numbers and of what sort of people it ought to consist, that the state may be happy and well administered. As there are two particulars on which the perfection of every thing depends, one of these is, that the object and end of the actions proposed should be proper; OHAP. XIII.J HAPPINESS. 2o7 the other, to find the courses of conduct which lead to that end. For it may happen that these may either agree or dis- agree with each other ; for sometimes the end which men propose is good, but in taking the means to obtain it they may err ; at other times they may have all the proper means in their power, but they have proposed to themselves a bad end ; and sometimes they may mistake in both : as in the art of medicine, physicians sometimes do not know in what con- dition the body ought to be, in order to be healthy ; and sometimes they do not hit well upon the means wiiich are productive of their intended aim. In every art and science, therefore, we should be master of this knowledge, namely, as to the proper end, and as to the means of obtaining it. Now it is evident that all persons are desirous to live well, and be happy ; but that some have the means of so doing in their own power, others not ; and this either through nature or fortune. For much external assistance is necessary to a happy life ; but less to those who are of a good, than to those who are of a bad, disposition. There are others who, though they have the means of happiness in their own power, do not rightly seek for it. But since our proposed object is to inquire what government is best, namely, that by which a state may be best administered, and that state would seem best administered where the people are the happiest, it is evident that the nature of happiness is a thing which i^s^is?^^^^ ought not to escape us. Now, we have already said in our treatise on Ethics,^ (if there be any use in what we there said,) that happiness consists in the energy and per- fect practice of virtue,^ and this not relatively, but simply. I mean by relatively, what is necessary in some certain circum- stances ; by simply, what is good in itself. Of the first sort are just punishments and restraints in a just cause ; for they arise from virtue, and are necessary, and on that account are virtuous : (though it is more desirable, that neither any state or any individual should stand in need of such things :) but * Aristotle's reference is to Ethic. Nicom. book i. chap. 7. ' If the excellence of the state depends on the attainment of happinesi by the citizens who are its members, we must then know what happiness is. Now it is defined elsewhere as kvepyela Kar* aperriv reXeiav : and these words clearly imply and suppose some external advantages. Many consequently suppose that these external things constitute happiness. ft 258 Aristotle's politics. ^book vn* those actions which are directed to procure either honours or wealth are simply best. For the one are eligible as tending to remove an evil: these actions, on the contrary, are the foundation and means of producing relative good. A worthy How far virtue indeed will bear poverty, disease, and other is necessary, unfortunato accidcuts, with a noble mind, but external goods ^appiuess consists in the contrary to these. Now we have already determined in our treatise on Ethics,^ that he is a man of worth who considers what is good because it is virtuous, as what is simply good : it is evi- dent, therefore, that the using these things in such a manner must be worthy and simply good. This has led some persons to conclude that the cause of happiness was external goods ; which would be as if any one should attribute to the lyre itself a brilliant and noble performance, and not to the art itself. It necessarily follows from what has been said, that some things should be ready at hand and others procured by the legislator : for which reason, we earnestly wish that the constitution of the state may have those things which are under the dominion of fortune — (for over some things we admit her to be supreme) ; — but for a state to be worthy and great is not the work of fortune only, but of knowledge and deliberate choice as well. But for a state to be worthy, it is necessary that those citizens who are in the administration should be v^rorthy also : but in our city every citizen has a share in the state. And so we must consider how a man may become worthy. For if the whole body could become worthy^ and not some individuals only, it would be more desirable ; for then it would follow, that what might be done by one, might be done by all.^ Men are worthy and good in nafure^habit, three ways ; and these are, by nature, by custom, and reason on })y reason. In the first place, each one ought to be born a man, and not any other animal ; that is to say, he ought to be of a particular disposition both in body and soul. But as to some things, it avails not to be born with ' Aristotle refers here to the Nicom. Ethics, hook ii. chap. iv. 2 It is better for the state that its citizens should possess these virtues in their individual, than in their collective, capacity. For upon their possession individually it will soon follow that they will be in the pos- session of all. A somewhat similar form of expression occurs in Thucy- dides, (ii. 60,) in the speech uf Pericles, who speaks of the condition ot a city, leaO' 'dKafrrov rwv itoXitmv evTrpayovaaVf d9p6av Ce (T