REESE LIBRARY riiK UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. Deceived |JJM * 1 1PQ3 Accessions No. ' / / ^ Class No. THE THE^ETETTJS OF PLATO. CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY r. PALMER. THE THE^TETUS OF PLATO TRANSLATED, WITH INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF EXPLANATORY NOTES, BY F. A. PALEY, M.A., TRANSLATOR OF THE " PHILEBUS," ETC., AND PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL LITERATURE IN THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, KENSINGTON. LONDON: GEORGE BELL & SONS, YORK STREET, COYENT GARDEN CAMBRIDGE : DEIGHTON, BELL, AND CO. 1875. 3324, INTEODUCTION. THE subject of the Thecetetus is the inquiry, What is Know- ledge ? This question might be put, and perhaps in a form more familiar to ourselves, What is Truth ? Everyone who has thought at all knows how difficult is the answer. The thinkers of old, 1 bewildered by the differences of opinion that prevailed on all speculative subjects, concluded that nothing was certainly true that did not fall under the cognizance of the senses. Thus : ' I am quite certain that fire is hot, or that this stone is hard, because I feel it so. But I am not sure that God exists, or that this action is right or wrong, because moral and metaphysical questions do not fall within the province of sense. They are only matters of conviction, and people do not agree about them.' The existence then of any positive or objective truth residing outside of things phenomenal and independent of opinion, was denied by this school. Plato is constantly cavilling at it ; these are ' the giants who can only clutch at sticks and stones' 2 ; c those who think nothing is but what 1 " All the old philosophers identified, or at any rate did not distinguish, thinking and sensation or feeling ; ical ol ye apxcuoi rb fypoveiv Kal rb alffQa./i/, ireiflotxra Se e/c rovrcav fAev dvaxwpetj' *&Gv ^ avoy/CTj avrols xpriffQai, OUT^/J/ Se els avr^v ^ avr^v avrf], '6n Uv vo^cry avr^j Kad J avT^v avrb Had* avrb TUV 2 Phaedo p. 74. A, a/uw vov rt elvai icrov, ov ^v\ov Aeyco |u\y ouSe XiBov \iQcp ouS' &\\o roi>i/ TOIOVTUV ouSei', d\Aa irapa ravra irdj/ra erep^// n, avrb T^I iffov. Ibid. p. 76 7 See RespubL p. 596. 3 Theat. p. 156. A. 4 Sophist, p. 246. B. Mr. Campbell however (Introduction to the Thcatetus, p. xxx.) thinks that certain atomists, followers of Dernocritus, may be meant. 5 Eth. N. i. 4. viii INTRODUCTION. truth to the theories of a friend, and holds himself bound to show the fallacy, or, at least, the wholly unpractical nature, of Plato's doctrine of iSrj, or abstract existences. He asks how can abstract man, for instance, be conceived to differ from actual or particular man, avrodvOpwrros from avOpcoiros, since the definition and description of both must be the same. ****** *** Plato then (it seems reasonable to suppose) set himself to the task of combating these objectors to his doctrine of abstracts, and undertook to show that sensuous perception is altogether deceptive and worthless as a test of truth. With some satire, we may surmise, on those who professed to teach knowledge while they were unable to define what knowledge was, the real object (or at least, the scope) of the Thecetetus extends far deeper and wider, and embraces the whole question whether there is such a thing as positive or objective truth at all. Protagoras had either categorically or by implication denied this, by asserting that every man is his own sole test of truth, perpov e/eaoro?. And this he had not limited to mere matters of bodily feeling, as heat or cold, sour or sweet, but had extended to moral questions, and affirmed that an act became just or unjust according as the law had sanctioned or forbidden it, and that there was no natural right or wrong in human actions at all. 1 And indeed, it seems impossible to lay down the exact line where the peTpov e/eacrro? ceases to be a test; for if it is true for determining hot or cold to each person, i. e. to his bodily feelings, it may be true to him, i. e. to his conscience, or 1 Thecet. p. 167. C, ola &v eKaffrr) Tr6\ei Siitata Kal /caAcfc SoKrj, ravra nal OUT??, fas kv avra vop.i^y. Hence the VO^IK^V and fyvaiKbv Siicaiov discussed by Aristotle, Eth. N. V. 10, as branches of iro\iTiKbv Siitaiov. INTRODUCTION. ix mental feeling, as a test of right and wrong. Nor is it very easy to combat the position, that practices are right because the law sanctions them, and wrong because it forbids them, when we entertain the question of the abstract right or wrong of revenge, polygamy, slavery, or the tenure of pro- perty, which inherently and naturally belongs to the strong, though the law steps in and secures it conventionally for the weak. 1 If every man is his own test of truth, he needs the opinion of no one; and thus results the apparent paradox, that every man is as wise as every other man. 2 Protagoras evaded a conclusion which would have been fatal to his own claims to superior wisdom as a teacher, by saying 3 that wisdom consisted in causing others to hold better views by making the men themselves better, and that men who could do this were really wiser, though the views they taught were not, strictly speaking, truer, because that only is true to each which he thinks and believes to be true. " The general question involved in the discussion of the Protagorean dictum, is of the most real and serious import- ance : it is no mere dialectical encounter <3f wits between Plato and Protagoras, but is of the highest and universal interest. The question 'in fact amounts to this : is there ^/jlPvTfc ^ any such thing as truth ? If so, what is it ? Is there any standard of truth and knowledge independent of ourselves, our own feelings and momentary consciousness ? Or are we doomed to be for ever the sport of our own individual fancies and subjective impressions ?" 4 According to the doctrine of Protagoras, then, all forms of religious belief, depending as they do on individual con- 1 Gorgias, p. 483. B. 2 Theat. p. 161. D. 3 Theet. p. 166. D. * Mr. Cope, ut sup. p. 8. x INTRODUCTION. viction, are alike true to those who hold them. For as all alike appeal to some external evidence or authority alleged to be supernatural, each in this respect is precisely in the same position as the rest. Protagoras would have denied that any one form of belief had an absolute inherent truth, because no other standard could be obtained to prove it to be true ; or, by consequence, that the others were false. Yet in fact, men do both act and argue as if some particular form of belief must be ipso facto and absolutely true, because they firmly believe it themselves. It never occurs to them to allow that they cannot possibly go further than the allega- tion that it is true to them. There is nothing objective that they can appeal to, except such evidence or testimony as (usually without any serious examination) satisfies them. They never listen to or value for a moment the opinion of others, who may be quite as good and learned as them- selves, that they are mistaken in their belief. 1 It is quite evident then that the issue of this question is of the gravest possible significance. It intimately affects the whole theory of right or wrong, and of conscience itself, which at best is a purely subjective test. If Socrates thought it his duty to remain in prison and calmly await his execution, then to him that course was right ; while to the friends who wished to procure his escape, 2 his resolution was wrong; it was perversely sacrificing a valuable life for a whim and 1 Tliecet. p. 170. D, Srav crv ttpivas rt trapa ffawry irp6s p.* airo(pait>r) irepi nvos 8oai>, ffol i^v d^j TOVTO Kara, rbv e/ceiVou \6yov a\r)Ges fffrw, rjfjuv Se 5?) rots &\\ois irepl rrjs (rfjs Kpi a\t]0ri 8oat'; It is obvious that, if the world had fully accepted Protagoras' view, dogmatism and intolerance would have been without a history. But the human mind is so constituted, that it will not rest without a sense of assurance ; and practically, the assurance that one is right means the assurance that others (perhaps all others) are wrong. 2 Crito, p. 45. B. INTRODUCTION. xi a caprice. Mr. Cope presses this point very strongly : " The truth or falsehood of Protagoras' opinion is in reality a matter of no slight importance to ourselves, quite independ- ently of Plato's success or failure in refuting it ; for it seems to involve nothing less than the possibility of 1 the very existence and reality of truth and knowledge. For if each individual man and his own thoughts and feelings, whatever their quality and character and duration, are to be set up as the sole measure and standard of truth and right, it is difficult to conceive how any truth, reality, or knowledge worthy of the name is possible at all." It is remarkable that Plato, in refuting Protagoras' theory, as set forth in a work which its author had called 'AhrjOeia, shows no certain conviction, and makes no definite statement, of the existence of any objective standard of truth and knowledge whatever. Mr. Cope, however, thinks that, " from occasional hints dropped here and there through- out the course of the dialogue, the author does recognize some objective standard of truth and knowledge, and that th e_ latt er_ mu st be characterised by universality, constancy, myariability_^though this, like the former, is merely sug- gested, and left to the reader's ingenuity to make out." 2 It is pretty evident, indeed, that, in writing the Thece- tetus, Plato was feeling his way to some better definition of knowledge, and was reviewing the various modes of ap- prehension in order to find some test or standard of truth which should be less liable to caprice and error than mere sensation. He was the first to set up a psychological against an esthetic theory, a course quite in accordance with his 1 (In place of the word of (p. 22) there is a comma in Mr. Cope's text, which I think must be a misprint.) 2 p. 7. xii INTRODUCTION. habitual depreciation of body as not only not favouring, but being adverse to fypovrjcris. 1 There were other modes of stating the same proposition, that " what seems to every man, that is so to him." One^ was the relativity of knowledge. Nothing exists absolutely, but only in relation to some percipient. Every patient implies an agent, every subject an object, and the converse. No quality orcon ditJQn^j&Jji only comes into existence for somebody, and it is therefore only particular, not universal. OvSev ea-9 or alteration is a movement that is going on without the least check. Consequently, even when I say that wall " is white," I state what cannot be really true ; for during the instant of pronouncing the word, " is" orj* wbite^' the change is going on ; you cannot assert that it is white, since the term " is" fixes the pYifitf-nfiq nf whitPTiPg^ The opposite school, 1 who regarded the universe and all within it as fixed and immoveable (the ol o-rao-iwrai, as Plato calls them in playful contrast with the ol peovres) were the stern opponents of the Ephesian enthusiasts who were followers of Heraclitus, 2 and were perhaps headed by Antisthenes and the Cynics. All these considerations militate against the idea of truth 1 That of the Eleatics, the followers of Parmenides, whose primary dogma was unity, being, uniformity, and consequently rest. 2 It is singular that Heraclitus, who taught (though perhaps in a theological as much as in a cosmical or physical sense) that all things were composed of fire, which seems a near approximation to the modern view of the ultimate identity of heat, force, and motion, should have been the special object of attack both of Plato and Lucretius (i. 638). He rightly saw that motion was the generating as well as the preserving principle of all things. That air and sea have circulat- ing currents as well as plants and animals, he must be considered to have fore- cast by a wonderful sagacity. So the vovs of Anaxagoras, and the subtle principle which, Lucretius teaches (iii. 243), forms an ingredient in the anima, or vital principle, seems as near an approach to electricity as was possible, short of the actual enunciation of it. xiv INTRODUCTION. being an absolute or permanent entity ; and when we affirm that such a proposition as that 2x2 = 4 is absolute truth, we can only explain this to mean that all human experience points to the fact, and no diversity of opinion exists about it. It is not so easy to prove, that if a man insists that the world is flat or immoveable, or that the sun goes round the earth, it is not true. It is not true to us, who believe facts are against it ; but it is quite as true to him, who believes facts are in favour of it. Here, too, Protagoras would have said, " Don't try to prove his opinion to be wrong. It is not wTojigJxrhim. Teach him more accurate principles of reason- ing, and more careful observation, and the other and better view willjbecome true to him of itself." The first part of the Thecetetus is occupied with showing the many ways in which alcrOricns, or perception, is deceptive. , And as eV^rr?;/^ means real, constant, unchanging know- ledge, it must be something distinct from sensation, which can only be particular. The latter part of the treatise dis- cusses the possibility of joiowledge being Sofa.," judgment formed on experience," opOrj Sofa, " correct estimate," or 6p6rj Bo^a fjLera \6jov , that is, when you can give a reason for holding that particular^opinion and-jnot a.nnthftr^ In the general conclusion, that no man can say what knowledge is or in what faculty it resides, there seems, as we have said, to be some satire on the rival systems which all claimed alike severally to impart knowledge. Whether Plato really thought knowledge, in its absolute sense, unattainable, seems left un- certain. But his constant reference to cfrpovrjo-is, the pure intellect to be attained only in an after life,_points_jtQ jfchis conclusion^rather than to any other. 1 1 Mr. Campbell observes (Introd. p. Ixii.) that " it is not by any means INTRODUCTION. xv Mr. Grote's strictures on Plato, that he has misrepresented Protagoras, and that Protagoras did not mean to deny the possibility of knowledge consisting in mental apprehension as well as in mere sense, have been elaborately answered by Mr. Cope in the treatise already referred to. Mr. Cope contends that Plato must have perfectly understood the, doctrine of Protagoras, and consequences; and he does not think Plato would have knowingly misrepresented one of whom he always speaks with at least the semblance of respect. " We may therefore conclude" (he says, p. 20) "that Protagoras with all his versatility and manifold accomplishments was not in advance of his age in psychological knowledge, and, like his con- temporaries, ^joade no _digtinction between thinking and sensation or feeling." The series of arguments by which Plato shows aLO-Orjcris to be deceptive, and in its very nature something distinct from knowledge, is very ingenious and logically conclusive. The first is (p. 152. B), that perception cannot imply real (universal) existence, since it is but the sense of the in- dividual ; it may be hot to me but cold to you, and it is impossible to have knowledge 1 of anything so capricious, and so purely a matter of fancy. The second is, that as all effects are transient, and brought intojbeinff for the particular person who at the moment feels them J J:liey have no ovala at all, but only a yeyeo??, and therefore cannot be the subject Plato's intention to point out.the hopelessness of the attempt to define knowledge. What he does point out is the impossibility of conceiving Knowledge apart from its object." Apparently, the proposition is a paradox, since everyone talks familiarly of himself or others being "mistaken," i.e. every one practically assumes the possibility of error. 1 If a thermometer tells you it is hot, it may still feel cold to you. xvi INTRODUCTION. of eTrto-rrjfjir) (p. 153 4). The third, that as all things are constantly shifting, there can be no real aicrOrjcns of anything, even for a moment (p. 156. 7. and 181. C.) The fourth is, that in morals at least (right and wrong), aicrOrjais can have no place whatever, and therefore cannot form our knowledge of them (p. 157. D). The fifth, that in dreams, mad-fits, delusions, our perceptions are ^avowedly false (p. 158), and if we are asleep and dreaming for half our lives, one half of our sensations must be false. The sixth (p. 159), that the same thing seems or feels different to us at different times ; and so far from alcrQ^ais being eTT^a-n^wy, it makes a thing at once to be the same and something else. Thejseventh (p. 160), turns on the relativity of knowledge, which of necessity implies a subject and an object ; and the effects being special to individuals, cannot be universal, and so are not the subjects of true knowledge. The eightb > (p. 163), is that perception must imply cognition ; it falls short in itself of conveying that apprehension which we mean by know- ledge. T!^e_ninth (p. 163. D), that a knowledge of something gained by experience remains in the mind after the actual is past, and is quite distinct from it ; and therefore cannot be the same as aicrOyo-is. The tenth (p. 164), that on the hypothesis of aiaQijais being eTrtcmJ/z??, a man can have no knowledge by memory, he must be ignorant of what he knows by sight, should he chance to shut his eyes. The elej^ath (p. 165. B), that a man may at once know and not know the same thing, if he sees it with one eye but not with the other. The twelfth (p. 165. D), that we apply terms to the senses, which are inapplicable to mental apprehension; you may 'see an object near', but no one talks of 'understanding a subject near', etc. The INTRODUCTION. xvii thirteenth and last (p. 178), that knowledge may be pros- pective, as a cook knows that a seasoned dish will be palatable, or an orator knows that a speech will 'take', whereas aio-O^cr^ is of present effects only. In such cases there certainly is such a thing as superior intelligence; whence it follows, that not all knowledge is_ to be brought to the standard of present feeling or perception. The general conclusion is arrived at (p. 184. E), that there must be some mental faculty or mode of apprehension beyond mere sensuous perception ; in other words, that every perception involves some conception. You cannot see a horse, for instance, without the mental conceptions of its colour, size, motion, existence, distinctness from other animals, / / etc. Knowledge therefore is a mixed ^process of experience// andjjitujtion, of thought consequent on perception. In the latter part of the Thecetetus (from p. 187) Plato proceeds to examine Opinion (Sofa), as a kind of knowledge distinct from sense, and as a pure act of the intellect. " Considered quite in the abstract" (says Mr. Campbell, 1 ), "false opinion seems impossible. For whenever we think, our thought is known to us, and real. Or, if thinking be a silent proposition, it seems impossible that we should join two ideas wrongly when both are clearly present to the mind." Opinion is a " judgmejit^Qimed^n sensatiojn/' 2 and the x forming it is a process between thought and perception. And " false opinion will thus be the failure of the mind in bringing together the impressions of sensation and memory." 3 Plato's argument is certainly not very easy to follow; 1 Introduction to Theeet. p. lx. 2 Mr. Cope, p. 6. 8 Mr. Campbell, ibid. See Philebus, p. 39. A. xviii INTRODUCTION. but it turns mainly on the point, that every conception, being of something, must be real, i. e. must have an ovo-la, to him who conceives it. And if it is real, it cannot be false in the sense of non-existent. To mistake one thing for another, if apart from sensation, is at once ' to know and not to know', i. e. to know a subject and yet not know its dif- ference from another. If combined with sense (e.g. when we see a stranger approach, and mistake him in the distance for a friend, or what we call ' mistaken identity'), it is when the memory is at variance with the impression of the senses. Plato treats exhaustively all the cases where knowledge and sensation, sensation without knowledge, or knowledge with- out sensation, are concerned ; and he concludes 1 that mis- taken opinion can only occur when the mind knows and remembers two distinct objects, but, from defective sight or other sense, applies the memory of one to the perception of the other. In a word, apart from sensation there is no false opinion properly so-called. 2 The nearest approximation to knowledge would seem to be "right opinion for which one can give a reason" (//-era \6yov) . A man who can give an account of an eclipse, and explain why it occurs, may fairly be said to have a knowledge of it. But here occurs a difficulty : unless one knows the elements or first conditions of things, can one be said to know them in their results or combinations ? If one does not know what gold and copper are, i. e. how they are formed 1 ircpl &i> ftr/iey re /cal al as Theocritus says of the Cyclops. The protuberance of the eye, or the puffy look round it, was regarded as a mark of sensuality. Hence KV\oi5iav UTT' epcoros, Theoc. i. 38. 2 Lit. ' as is hard for another (to be).' Stallbaum quite misses the sense, Sicuti aliis difficilis solet esse istius modi homo. 3 Magis quam quivis alius. Stallbaum. 4 Perhaps we should omit irp6s. But the metaphor may be from the inclina- tion of a scale to one side. THE^TETUS. i impulsive rather than of a manly decision. While your B dullards, on the other hand, come reluctantly to their lessons, and with nothing in their heads but forgetfulness. But our young friend comes so smoothly and without the least hitch, 1 with such success too, to his hooks and problems, and with the greatest gentleness, like oil that makes no sound as it runs, that one feels surprised that one so young can perform his duties in so pleasing a way. Soc. You give a promising account; but tell me further, who of our citizens is his father ? Theo. I have heard his name, but don 't recollect it. How- ever, here he is between two friends coming this way. It C seems that he and some of his companions have just been getting rubbed with oil in the outer portico ; and now, I sup- pose, they have been anointed and are coming this way. See now, if you recognize him. Soc. I know him. 'Tis the son of Euphronius of Sunium, a character much as you describe your friend, and of general good repute* If I mistake not, he left a very large property ; but the name of the youth I don't know. Theo. 'Eisname, Socrates, is Theaetetus. As for his fortune, D I am afraid certain guardians of his have not improved it; yet even in liberality in money matters one can't help admiring him, Socrates. Soc. 'Tis a generous fellow that you describe. Do oblige me by asking him to take a seat here by me. Theo. That shall be done. Theastetus ! come here and speak to Socrates. Soc. Yes, pray do, Theaatetus, if only that I may get a good sight of my own likeness ; for Theodore tells me I have a face like yours. Now suppose each of us had a lute, and he E said they were both tuned to the same pitch ; should we at once believe him, or should we have considered whether the man who says so skilled in music ? Thecet. We should have considered. 1 Like the launching of a trireme from a well-greased slip. 6 THEJETETUS. Soc. And if we found that he was, we should believe him ; or, if ignorant of music, we should put no faith in him. Theat. True. Soc. So now, I suppose, if we care at all about our faces being alike, we must consider whether the person who says so is conversant with lines, 1 or not. 145 Thecet. I think he is that. Soc. Has then Theodore any skill as a portrait painter ? Theat. Not that I know of. Soc. What ! do you mean to say he is not even a geometer ? 3 Theeet. He is that, of course, Socrates. Soc. "Well, is he also versed in astronomy, and abstract calculation, and music, and such other kinds of knowledge as belong to general education ? Theat. He appears to me to be so. Soc. Then if he says we are like in any part of our bodies, either in praise or disparagement, we are by no means bound to listen to him. 3 The&t. Perhaps not. Soc. But what if he were to praise the mind of either of B us, in respect of virtue and wisdom ? Would it not be worth while for the party who heard the remark to take a little trouble to examine the person praised, and for him to exhibit himself freely and readily ? Thecet. Certainly it would, Socrates. III. Soc. Then, my dear Thea3tetus, it is high time for you to exhibit and for me to observe. For I assure you, though Theodore has spoken favourably to me of very many, both strangers and citizens, he never praised any of them as he praised you. 1 As a geometer. But it does not follow from his being ypafyiKbs in this sense, that he is also faypatyiKts. 2 i. e. that he cannot even draw lines or circles. The sense is, ' but surely, as a geometer, he must know how to draw.' 3 If he is only generally clever, but has no special knowledge of portrait- painting. THE^TETUS. 7 \ Thecet. It might be right then to do as you say ; only I am afraid he was not in earnest when he spoke of me thus. c Soc. That is not Theodore's way; no, don't try to evade your promise by pretending that our friend here was only joking, or we may have to produce him in court as a witness. Whatever he says of you, no one will indict such a man for perjury. So take courage and abide by your agreement. 1 Thecet. Well, I suppose I must do so, if you think it right. Soc. Then tell me ; you learn from Theodore, I presume, something about geometry ? Thecet. I do. Soc. And also something of astronomy, music, and figures? Thecet. I endeavour to do so, certainly. D Soc. Well, and so do I, my child, from him at all events, if not from others, whom I may suppose to have any know- ledge of these subjects. Still, though I have a fair acquaint- ance with them, there is one little matter 2 which I am in doubt about, and which I should like to consider with you and the present company. And now tell me ; is not learning the becoming wiser in what one learns ? Thecet. Of course. Soc. And it is in wisdom that the wise are wise. Thecet. Yes. Soc. Now, is there any difference between this and science ? E Thecet. Of what do you speak ? 3 Soc. Wisdom. If we have accurate knowledge on any subjects, are we not also wise in them? Thecet. Of course. Soc. Then science and wisdom are the same. Thecet. Yes. Soc. This then is precisely the point that I am perplexed 1 Expressed above by the -words irdvv (JLCV odv. 2 Ironical ; this being in fact the subject of the dialogue, and one which from its difficulty is left undecided at the end. For e^co fffj.iKpbv Se ri we should perhaps read ex wv ff^^v e-rt, etc. 3 As rovro might mean rb ffoQwrepov yiyveirOaiy an explanation is asked. -- 8- THE^ETETUS. about, and unable to realise as I should wish in my own mind,i what 'accurate knowledge' is. Possibly now we may des- ' cribe it. What say you ? Which of you will be the first to 1 46 speak? He who gives a wrong answer, and gets wrong always, shall be Donkey (as the boys say who play at ball), and have to sit down ; while he who gets through the examin- ation without a mistake, shall be King over us, and impose on us any subject on which he may choose that we should give answers. Why are you silent ? I hope, Theodore, it is not / that am acting the churl from fondness of discussion, 1 and in my eagerness to make you converse, and so become friends and have a chat with each other ! Theodore. That, Socrates, would be anything but churlish ; B but desire one of these young men to give you a reply; for I am not much used to this sort of conversation, and I am not of an age either to become used to it. But it will just suit our young friends here, and they will greatly improve ; for it is quite true that youth has a capacity for improving in any thing. So, as you began, put the question to TheaBtetus, and don't let him off. 2 Soc. You hear, Theaetetus, what Theodore says, and I sup- pose you will not care to disobey him, as, indeed, it is not C permitted for a younger man to do when a man learned in such matters 3 gives his commands. So let us have a good clear answer without stint: what does ' Science' seem to you to be? Thecet. Well, I suppose I must reply, Socrates, since you and the rest desire me. For of course, if I do make some mistake, you will set me right. IV. Soc. Oh certainly, that is, if we are able. Thecet. Well, then, I think that what one can learn from Theodore may be called sciences, geometry and those you just 1 Socrates pretends that the answer is so obviously easy that any one of the company could reply at once, if he chose. Ironically he ' hopes he has said nothing to offend,' and so to cause the silence of all. 2 As he had wished, sup. p. 145. B. 3 Rather perhaps, ' it is not permitted in matters of this kind,' viz. important in their moral bearings and on Truth. THE^TETUS. 9 named 1 ; and again, shoe-making and the trades of the other D craftsmen, all and each of them, are nothing else than know- ledge. Soc. Like a generous and free-handed man, my friend, when asked for one you offer many, 2 and various for simple. TJiecet. "What do you mean by that, Socrates ? Soc. It has no meaning, perhaps; but what I think I intended to say, I will explain. When you speak of a cobbler's art, do you mean by it anything else than the science of the manufacture of shoes ? Thecet. Nothing else. Soc. Well, when you speak of carpentry, is it of anything E but the science of manufacturing wooden implements ? Thecet. My reply is the same in this case too. Soc. Then in both you confine your answer to that, of which each art is the science ? Tkeat. Yes. Soc. But, my Theaetetus, the question asked was not this, of what things 'Knowledge' is the science, nor how many sciences there are. For it was not with any wish to count them that we asked, but to get a clear knowledge about science, what it is in the abstract. Or is there nothing at all in what I say? Theat. Indeed, you say very rightly. Soc. Now then consider well what I am going further to remark. Supposing a person should ask us about some common- place and obvious thing, for instance, What is clay? should we 147 not appear ridiculous if we answered him, ' Clay is the clay of the potters, and also of the porcelain-makers, and of the brick- makers likewise' ? Thecet. Perhaps we should. Soc. In the first place, I presume, in supposing that the questioner would understand what clay was from our answer, 1 Astronomy, music, etc., p. 145. D. 2 Specific examples instead of an abstraction or generality. 10 THEJETETUS. ' Clay is clay,' adding either ' such as the image-makers use,' or any other artists you please. Or do you believe that a man understands the name of a thing, if he does not know what the B thing itself is ? Thecet. By no means. Soc. Then one who does not know what science means, cannot understand either the ( science of shoes.' Thecet. He cannot. Soc. And again, whoever is ignorant what science is, does not comprehend the knowledge of leather, or any other trade. Thecet. That is so. Soc. Then the answer is absurd, when a man is asked ' What is knowledge ?' if he gives in reply the name of some trade. For his answer is confined to the knowledge of some particular subject ; but he was not asked that. C Ttiecet. So it seems. Soc. Thus then, when he might, I suppose, have answered in a common way, and in brief, he goes a roundabout way that has no end to it. For instance, in the question about clay, it was obvious, surely, and simple to reply, that ' earth mixed up with any fluid would be clay'; 1 and you need not concern yourself as to whose clay it is. V. Thecet. Yes, it appears easy enough now, Socrates, when you put it thus. But your question seems like one which lately presented itself to .us when we were talking, I and your namesake here, Socrates. D Soc. "What was that, now, TheaBtetus ? Thecet. Theodore here was writing down for us some facts about the powers 2 of numbers, and showing us that a rectangle 1 A curious instance of the total ignorance of chemistry in Plato's age. Not only does the same word express ' mud' and ' clay,' but Plato supposes the con- stituents are precisely the same. 2 Hoots, we should now say. He means, literally, the equivalence of certain numbers expressing the sides of a rectangle, with the superficial feet they repre- sent. The ' square of a number' assumes both sides of the rectangle to be the same; e. g. 4 x 4 = 16, means that 4, if it has another 4 making a rectangle, gives 16 superficial feet. THE^ETETUS. 11 composed of a three-foot and a five-foot line (3x5) is not geometrically commensurable by the one-foot line 1 ; and so he went on taking examples one by one up to the seventeen-foot line ; and at that he stopped. 2 The idea then occurred to us, that as these powers seemed indefinitely numerous, we should try to comprehend them under some one general term by which we might describe all those of this kind. E Soc. Did you then find such a term ? Thecet. I think we did ; but consider it also yourself. Soc. Tell me then. Thecet. We divided all number into two kinds. 3 That which could be resolved into an equal number of factors we compared to a figure square in form, and called it both quad- rangular and equal-sided. Soc. And very appropriately too. Thecet. "Well, the intervening numbers, such as three and 148 five, and all such as cannot be resolved into equal factors, but can only become either more taken fewer times, or less taken more times, 4 and so, do as you will, must ever be inclosed by one side that is greater than another side, this kind of num- bers we compared to the oblong form, and called it 'Long number.' 1 Because one line has only three, and the other line has Jive iro5m?at. In other words, this rectangle would not form a square, but a long-shaped paral- lelogram ; and therefore arithmetically the product, 3 x 5 15 would be a surd and the square root could not be extracted. This square root is the briefest way of expressing the size meant ; e. g. a square constructed on a given line of four feet contains 4 x 4 = 16 superficial square feet. 2 Rectangles of 5 x 7, 7x9, 9x11, etc. 3 i. e. square numbers and surds. The number 16 can be represented by 4 x 4, as well as by 2 x 8. But twelve, though equivalent to 2 x 6 or 3 x 4, can- not be made up of equal factors. The first represents a square, the other an unequal-sided parallelogram. You cannot have a square containing twelve superficial feet, though twelve is an equal number. * Say, either 6x2 or 2x6. Geometrically, * a parallelogram standing on its end or laid on its side,' as it were. When we say we cannot extract the square root of 15, we mean that 15 superficial feet cannot be packed in a square figure, but only in a figure whose rectangle is 3 x 5 or 5 x 3. 12 THEJETETUS. Soc. Very good indeed. But what next ? Tliecet. All the lines which make up an equilateral rect- angular superficial area, we distinguished as 'regular,' and all that include a parallelogram, as ' powers', on the ground that in linear figure they were not commensurable with those other lines, 1 but only with the superficial squares they were equi- valent to. And similarly with cube numbers. B Soc. None could possibly have done better, my dear boys ; so that Theodore, as it seems to be, will not be held liable to the penalties of perjury. 2 Thecet. But, Socrates, your question about knowledge I am not likely to answer as readily as that about the geometrical extension and the power of number, though it seems to me that you require some such a reply. I am afraid therefore that if Theodore was right in the other matter, he is wrong in this. 3 Soc. What! Suppose that, in praising you for running, C he had said, 'I never met with any young man so good a runner/ and then, in running a race, you had been beaten by one who was in the very prime of his strength, and had no superior in speed ; do you think our friend would have praised you the less truly for that ? 4 Theat. No, I do not. Soc. But now about this knowledge, as I was saying just now, do you suppose it is a small matter to find out what it is, and not rather the part of very close thinkers r 5 Theat. Indeed, I think it is a task of quite first-rate men. 5 Soc. Then have confidence about yourself, and believe 1 Both of which were equal. 2 Since he praised you justly. 3 In praising me for aptitude in matters beside geometry. See p. 144. A. 4 It did not follow, because he praised you, that no one was superior to you ; and therefore he cannot he said to have spoken falsely. He spoke the truth according to his knowledge. 5 There seems no necessity to alter aKptfiuv into &Kp6u Aoxeias, or avei\ei8via, Eur. Ion. 453. 2 Both being &vev Aox^ios, though, from different causes. 3 Our word does not express irpofAvriffTpia. The Greeks, who thought so THE^ETETUS. 15 clever at forming an opinion what kind of man and woman must consort together to produce the finest children ? Thecet. I certainly am not aware of that at all. Soc. Then let me tell you that they pique themselves more on this than on the surgical operation. For observe: would E you say it belonged to the same, or to a different art, to grow and gather in the fruits of the earth, and also to know on what soil what trees and what seeds must be planted ? Theat. Not to a different, but to the same art. Soc. Do you suppose then that in the case of a woman 1 the judgment in question is one art, and the bringing of the child into the world is another ? Thecet. Why it does not seem likely. Soc. Of course not. But the fact is, it is through that 150 dishonest traffic, which requires no skill at all, of procuring a meeting between- a man and a woman, (which, as we all know, is called the trade of the procuress,) that your mid wives, as having a proper pride, shun the practice of giving advice about marriages, fearing lest through this latter profession they should incur the odium of practising the former. For, of course, none but real midwives are entitled to give a sound opinion on such subjects. Thecst. So it seems. Soc. What the midwives do, then, I have said ; but it is less than the part that I play. For it is not in the nature of much of physical beauty, consulted these women professionally as to the pro- bability of offspring being born of a fine type and constitution. See Ar. Nub. 41. It may well seem surprising to us that a professed teacher of high virtue and morality should have held such a conversation as the following with a young and ingenuous lad. Still more surprising is the free way in which Socrates enters into these delicate topics with a lady, in Sympos. p. 201. D. seqq. "Whether he held them or not, his admirer Plato does not scruple to attribute to him such kind of talk. 1 Lit. TOV TOIOVTOV, TovrcffTi ffiTslpeiv fis, etc. The figure of speech is common, e.g. Find. Pyth. iv. 255, Soph. Ant. 569. 16 THE^TETUS. women to bring forth sometimes mere semblances, 1 at other B times genuine offspring, and that without any means of dis- tinguishing them. If it were so, there would be no greater or more honourable duty for midwives than to separate the true and the false. Do you not think so ? Thecst. I do. VII. Soc. Well, my art of midwifery has all the duties attached to it which theirs has, bat it differs in this, that I deliver men and not women, and look to their minds when there is anything to come from them, and not to their bodies. But the chief boast of our art is this, that it can put to the test in every way and ascertain whether it is a mere sham and C a delusion that the ideas of the young man are giving birth to, or a true and genuine sentiment. This peculiarity, I grant, belongs to me as well as to midwives; I have never given birth to any wisdom 2 ; and the taunt that many have before now uttered against me is quite true, that I put questions to others, but never give an answer myself on any subject from having nothing clever to say. Well, the reason of this I will explain. The god constrains me to play the part of midwife to others, but does not allow me to have a family myself. 3 I am then on my own part anything but wise, for I have no such great results to show as any offspring of my genius that D has seen the light. But, although those who converse with me seem at first to be, in some cases, even wholly ignorant, yet all, as our intercourse goes on, that is, to whom the god permits it, show a marvellous improvement, as both they and others imagine ; and it is also evident, that this improvement is not due to anything they have ever learnt from me, but 1 Alluding, perhaps, to the story of Stesichonis ahout the wraith of Helen. See Eespubl. p. 586. C. For TOVTO Se just below we should perhaps read ravra 5e. 2 He alludes probably to his not having written any books, which are some- times spoken of by Plato as TroTSes and yei/v^iMara. 3 There seems a playful allusion to the oracular warning given to Laius, not to beget children. THEJETETUS. 17 comes from the many fine ideas they have hit upon and retained in their own imaginations. But then the safe delivery of these conceptions is due to me and the god. And this is how we know it : many 'ere now have not been aware of our part in the matter, but have thought it was all due to them- E selves; and so, despising me in their own hearts, or induced by others to do so, they have left me sooner than they ought, and thus, from keeping bad company, have not only brought to an untimely birtn the other notions they had conceived, but have lost, from bad nursing, those which I had assisted them in bringing into the world, and that because they valued mere shams and semblances more than the truth. Thus in the end they seem both to themselves and to others to be utterly illiterate. One of these is Aristides, the son of Lysimachus; 151 and there are very many more. Now, when such persons come back to me, wanting me to converse with them, and having recourse to all sorts of strange expedients, 1 the Familiar that ever attends me prevents me from having any more to say to some of these, while it allows me to keep company with others : and then they again begin to improve of themselves. 2 There is another point in which my pupils resemble women in labour : they are in travail and are filled with restless longings by night and by day even more than those of the other sex ; and these labour-pains my skill can bring on or alleviate. So much then for these. But some there are, my TheaBtetus, B who seem to me not to have an idea in them ; and well know- ing that they do not require my aid, I act the part of a Mend in making other matches for them ; 3 and (to speak under favour of the god) I can make a pretty good guess at the sort of 1 Like ardent lovers in trying to win the objects of their affection. Socrates ironically describes some conceited pupils who have been enticed away by the Sophists, and whom he will only take back again on their showing real signs of earnestness and good ability. 2 He had said before, Trap' e/tov ovSev p.a.Q6vrs. 3 Lit. ' Those who may have appeared to me not to have an idea in them, I good-naturedly find other partners for,' etc., *. e. I send them to other teachers. C 18 THE^TETUS. teachers by whose conversation they will be benefited. Many of them I have made over to Prodicus 1 , and many to other wise and inspired teachers. If I have made a long story, my good friend, it was on this account; I suspected that you, as indeed you imagine yourself, were in travail with some notion that you had conceived in your mind. Now, therefore, behave towards me as to the son of a midwife who himself knows something of the art ; and do your best to answer such c questions as I may put to you. If, on examining what you say, I shall consider it a mere sham and not a reality, and so try to remove and reject it, do not be savage with me as women are about their first offspring. For I can tell you that many have shown such a temper towards me as to be quite ready to bite me when I propose to rid them of some nonsensical idea. They fancy that I am not acting kindly in doing this ; they are yet very far from understanding that, as no god bears any ill will to man, so I do nothing of this sort from unkindness ; D it is because it is not permitted me 2 to concede falsehood or to put out of sight the truth. VIII. Try, therefore, TheaBtetus, to begin again and say what you consider knowledge to be. And don't tell me that you can't; if the god wills, and you play the man, you will find yourself able. The&t. "Well, Socrates, when you so encourage me to try, it would be a shame not to do one's very best to say what one has to say. 3 I think, then, that if a man knows anything, he E has a perception of it ; and so according to my present view, knowledge is nothing else than perception. 4 ' 1 The metaphor from sexual union is kept up in ee'5o>/ca, which is sometimes used of making over a mistress to another. There is much dry humour in speaking thus of pupils who in their conceit have left Socrates for the more pretentious instructions of a sophist. 2 As the servant of Apollo, o^euS^s Oe6s. There are few nobler sentiments than that contained in the hrief words ^eDSos ^vyx^p^ai nal dA^es o.^aviffa.1 ov8a[j.a>s EMI2. 3 Perhaps Tp6ir< l > is an interpolation. 4 It is this old and obvious, but inaccurate definition that Plato undertakes to disprove in the present dialogue. THEJETETUS. 19 Soc. "Well said, and right nobly, my boy ! That is just as one ought to speak who wishes to say without any reserve what he really thinks. But come, now, let us consider the matter in common, to see if our egg has a chick in it, or is a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge ? Theast. I do. Soc. Indeed, you seem to have delivered an opinion about 1 52 knowledge that is by no means common-place : for it is one that Protagoras also gave, though it was in a somewhat dif- ferent way that he expressed the same meaning. If I mistake not, he says that ' Man is the measure of all things,' of things that are, that they are so, and of non-existing things that they are not. You have read it, I think ? Thecet. I have read it many times. Soc. Does he not then say, in effect, that as things appear ; severally to me, such they are to me, and as they seem to you, to you they are : and both of us, I suppose, are human beings^- Thecet. Well, he does say so. Soc. And we may be sure that a wise man is not in the B habit of talking nonsense. Let us therefore follow him in his argument. Does it not happen sometimes, when the wind blows, that one of us feels cold, another does not? And one feels it but slightly, another very much ? Theat. Certainly. Soc. Must we then on that particular occasion say that the wind is cold of itself, 2 or not cold ? Or must we accept the 1 And therefore satisfy the terms of the saying, /aerpov &vQp