m 
 
 h 
 
THE THEAETETUS 
 
 OF 
 
 PLATO. 
 
(ITambriiigt: : 
 
 PRINTED BY C. J. CI.AY, M.A. 
 AT THK INIVEKSITY FKHSS. 
 
THE THEAETETUS 
 
 OF 
 
 PLATO, 
 
 WITH TRANSLATIQS-^ND NOTES. 
 
 'UNIVEESITY 
 
 BENJAMIN hXlL KENNEDY, D.D. 
 
 REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK, 
 
 AND HONORARY FELLOW OF ST JOHN's COLLEGE, CAMHRlDlil•: 
 
 CANON OF ELY. 
 
 KDITKP FOR THE S^NpiCS OF THE USUVERSITY PRESS. 
 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 
 iLonuou: CAMBRIDGE WAREHOUSE, 17, Paternoster Row 
 
 CambriUge : DEIGHTON, BELL, AND CO. 
 
 ILcipjig: V. A. HRUCKHAUS. 
 
 188I 
 \AIl Rights rcsc}-vcd.\ 
 

IVjVl 
 
 ΔίΓ'ΐρΟΝ ΛλΒ' HTIC AilOjTATH Τ(_)λ€' 
 XApIC χΛρίΝ Γ-^Ρ eCTIN Η TlKTOyC* AGl 
 
Β 
 
 ■ί^/ά-/ 
 
INTRODUCTIOX. 
 
 I. The dialog-Lies of Plato, which I chose, from 
 time to time, for the school work of my Sixth Form, 
 were chiefly the Protagoras, the Euthydemus, and the 
 Hippias Major; since this last, if not Platonic, is very 
 amusing and instructive. But I seldom allowed any 
 of my foremost boys to leave school without reading 
 \vith them privately in the evenings the Theaetetus 
 also, as the best preparative for their deeper study 
 of Plato and of Greek philosophy in general : often 
 adding to it the earlier books (i — 4) of Aristotle's 
 Ethics. In the past year, i88o, I took it for the sub- 
 ject of my Cambridge Lectures, reading a translation 
 to my class, and commenting as occasion required. 
 This was executed in the first instance quite indepen- 
 dently, without reference to Professor Jowctt's ver- 
 sion; but in revising my translation for the press I 
 have compared the two, with frequent advantage, as 
 might be expected, to the correction of my own work. 
 Still the result is, that I have generally departed less 
 widely from the literal Greek than my coufi'b'C in the 
 Sister Universit}': and the reason of this is evident: 
 
vi ii INTR OD UCTION. 
 
 the Master of Balliol has translated for the instruc- 
 tion of all English-speaking students of Plato, whether 
 Greek scholars or not: I for the special convenience 
 of Greek students in Universities. 
 
 II. The order of Plato's writings, and the genu- 
 ineness of many, are questions respecting which the 
 varieties of opinion and the controversies resulting, 
 chiefly within the present century, have been so man\- 
 and so discordant, as to prove that no certainty can 
 be reached on either point. Schleiermacher's trans- 
 lation with its prefaces (first published 1804 — 18 10) 
 was the trumpet-call of the warfare which has gone 
 on ever since. His elaborate attempt to arrange the 
 dialogues on a systematic principle of nascent and ever 
 growing philosophic doctrine has not been fully accept- 
 ed by any of the scholars who have since published 
 their views, Ast, Socher, Stallbaum, K. F. Hermann, 
 Steinhart, Susemihl, Suckow, Munk, Bonitz, Ueberweg, 
 Schaarschmidt and others: while Ritter Brandis and 
 Zeller, historians of Greek philosophy, are less unfa- 
 vourable to the principle of Schleiermacher, though not 
 admitting it in its details. Out of 35 or 36 dialogues 
 usually set down as Plato's, Ast will only accept 14 
 as genuine; viz. (i) Protagoras, Phaedrus, Gorgias, 
 Phaedo: (2) Theaetetus, Sophista, Politicus, Parmeni- 
 des, Cratylus: (3) Philcbus, Symposium, Respublica, 
 Timaeus, Critias: in this order. Thus he even rejects 
 the Leges, though cited by Aristotle. This may be 
 considered the extreme opinion on the sceptical side, 
 as Grote in his work on 'Plato and the other com- 
 panions of Socrates' represents the extreme credulous 
 
INTRODUCTION. ix 
 
 view, supporting the Alexandrine canon of Tlirasyllus, 
 a grammarian of the Augustan age, cited by Diogenes 
 of Laerta. This canon rejected ten dialogues, which 
 Diogenes enumerates; and these have since then 
 been universally treated as spurious. Some of them 
 did not survive: seven are printed at the close of 
 the Tauchnitz edition and by Bekker, along \vith 
 the 13 Epistles (which Grote, differing from most 
 scholars, accepts as genuine) and the Definitions (όροι). 
 Thrasyllus, distributed the dialogues of Plato into two 
 classes; (i) d. of Investigation (ζητητικοί); (2) d. of 
 Exposition {ύφη^ητικοί). The^e he also subdivided 
 variously : but his subdivisions have little interest. 
 The chronological order of the dialogues, like the 
 genuineness of many, is a much disputed question on 
 some points: strikingly so respecting the date of the 
 Phaedrus, Avhich Schleiermacher, as an essential fea- 
 ture in his system, deems the earliest; while others, as 
 Stallbaum and Steinhart, place it among the latest. 
 
 Generally it may be said that the shorter and 
 slighter dialogues, when accepted as genuine, are 
 ascribed to Plato's youth; the Republic, Timaeus and 
 Leges are universally admitted to be the latest: while 
 the Theaetetus, Sophista and Politicus (usually too 
 the Parmcnidcs and Cratylus) are supposed to have 
 been written by Plato during his travels or on his 
 return — at all events before his 40th )'car. 
 
 The following arrangement is that of a critic who 
 had evidently given much time and thought, with 
 great zeal, to the elucidation of these questions; I 
 mean K. F. Hermann. He, in common with most 
 
INTR OD UCTION. 
 
 writers on this subject, distributes the works which he 
 accepts into three groups: (i) the eadier, composed 
 partly before the death of Socrates B.C. 399, partly 
 after it, before Plato quitted Megara: (2) those written 
 under the influence of the Megarian dialectic, during 
 or immediately after the years of travel: (3) the later, 
 commencing with the Phaedrus, and going on during 
 the second half of Plato's career, while he was scho- 
 larch of the Academy, from 386 (probably) till his 
 death in 347. 
 
 (3) 
 
 Phaedrus e 
 Menexenus* 
 Symposium e 
 Phaedo e 
 Philebus e 
 Respublica c 
 Timaeus e 
 Critias e 
 Leges e. 
 
 (I) (2) 
 
 Hippias II. Cratylus e 
 
 Ion Theaetetus 
 
 Alcibiades I. Sophistes e 
 
 Charmides Politicus e 
 
 Lysis Parmenides. 
 
 Laches 
 
 Protagoras 
 
 Euthydemus 
 
 Apologia Socr.* 
 
 Crito e 
 
 Gorgias 
 
 Euthyphro 
 
 Meno 
 
 Hippias I. 
 
 Those to which e is appended are classed by Grote 
 as dialogues of exposition ; the rest are of investiga- 
 tion (zetetic) except the two with asterisks, which are 
 of neither kind, Grote accepts seven others which 
 Hermann disallows. 
 
INTRODUCTION. xi 
 
 It is satisfactory to gather from these notices that 
 the Theaetetus is admitted on all hands to be a 
 genuine work of Plato. It is almost universally as- 
 cribed to his age of manhood, and to a time when 
 (having imbibed before his 27th year the lore and 
 didactic skill of Socrates, having in the subtle dis- 
 cussions of Megara had full opportunity of prac- 
 tising the dialectic method) he had enlarged his 
 learning and experience by intercourse with the ma- 
 thematicians of Cyrene and the Pythagorean school- 
 men of Italy. The dialogues called Sophistes and 
 Politicus are connected with the Theaetetus, and their 
 genuineness is generally admitted, though the So- 
 phistes is disallowed by Ueberweg. 
 
 III. A preface to the Theaetetus would be in- 
 complete without some account of antecedent Hellenic 
 philosophy. But in a preface, even to Plato's works, 
 much more to a single dialogue, such an account 
 must be brief and eclectic. Some topics must be 
 placed in stronger light, and more fully considered 
 than others. What are these.'* 
 
 (i) In the first place, Socrates is an interlocutor 
 in all Plato's dialogues, excepting 'the Laws': and 
 in most of them (though not in the Sophistes) we 
 find him discussing, more or less, some principle or 
 practice of those who are called Sophists. With 
 Socrates himself therefore, with his method, and with 
 the Sophists and their doctrines, a young student will 
 do well to make acquaintance, before he enters upon 
 any of Plato's writings. 
 
 (2) In several of Plato's works (as in the Thcactc- 
 
xii . INTR on UCTION. 
 
 tus) appears the contrast between (i) the physical 
 teaching of the Eleatic School (Melissus, Parmenides, 
 Zeno), the forerunner of pantheism, in which the 
 universe is one Being (Ens) at rest, and (2) that of 
 Heracleitus of Ephesus, who taught Becoming in the 
 place of Being, Many rather than One, Motion and 
 Change instead of Rest, ascribing such motion to 
 the flow of a prevailing fiery element [ττάντα pel). 
 Distinct again from these were (i) the teaching of 
 Empedocles of Agrigentum, who took the concord 
 of four elements (fire, air, earth, \vater) as the base 
 of existence ; (2) that of the Atomists, Leucippus 
 and Democritus, who ascribed the origin of things to 
 the fortuitous concurrence in space of small indivisi- 
 ble particles {άτομα) ; (3) that of Anaxagoras, who 
 assigned the arrangement of his όμοωμβρειαί to 
 supreme Intelligence (z^ou?). All these philosophers 
 had been preceded by two other famous schools in 
 the 6th century B.C.: (i) the Ionian (Thales, Anaxi- 
 mander, Anaximenes), who imagined the primary sub- 
 stance of things to be — the first, Water, the second, 
 Indeterminate Matter (το άτταρον), the third, Air: 
 (2) the Italic sect of Pythagoras, which lasted long, and 
 formed a powerful order. This school ascribed marvel- 
 lous organic properties to Number, and believed in 
 the transmigration of souls. All the philosophers 
 above-named, from Thales to Anaxagoras, flourished 
 during the century and a half anterior to the age of 
 Socrates (600 — 440 B.C.), though their exact dates are 
 uncertain. 
 
 Zeller, whose views are welcomed by Professor 
 
INTRODUCTION. xiii 
 
 Jowett, maintains that all these various schools were 
 engaged in teaching purely physical doctrines; for 
 that even the seeming abstractions, assumed as primal 
 by the Pythagoreans the Eleatics and Anaxagoras 
 (Number, Being, Intellect), were not understood by 
 them as absolutely incorporeal. See Zeller's Preso- 
 cratic Philosophy (translated byAlleyne); also Preller's 
 Historia Philosophiae(for citation of passages), Schweg- 
 ler's History of Philosophy (translated by Stirling), 
 and the fuller wOrk of Ueberweg (published by 
 Messrs Hodder and Stoughton). 
 
 IV. Socrates is said by Cicero to have called 
 down philosophy from heaven ; by which is meant 
 that Socrates' was the first to change the direction 
 of philosophical studies in Hellas; to divert them 
 from the universe to man himself, from cosmogony 
 to anthropology. But this credit belongs rather 
 to that school of thinkers with whom Socrates was 
 most at war, to those who are called Sophists: espe- 
 cially to Protagoras the eldest and most influential 
 of their number — the author of the famous do^ma 
 
 ο 
 
 'man is the measure of all thin^fs,' in other words, 
 
 I 
 ' what seems to each is to each.' Protagoras was born 
 
 at Abdera in Thrace, and flourished B.C. 450 — 430. 
 
 Gorgias of Leontini was contemporary, but lived to 
 
 a great age, dying 380. Prodicus of Ceos flourished 
 
 435. Others of note were Hippias of Elis, Polus, 
 
 Thrasymachus, and the brothers Euthydemus and 
 
 Dionysodorus. They professed to teach all subjects 
 
 of liberal education; philosophy, rhetoric, language, 
 
 logical eristic, &c. : and they travelled from city to 
 
xiv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 city, exacting and obtaining large fees for the in- 
 struction given. This instruction was calculated, as 
 , they declared, to acquaint their pupils with the pro- 
 \gress of human civilization, to free them from preju- 
 dices, to give breadth and strength to their mental 
 faculties, to make them wise thinkers and fluent speak- 
 ers, to teach them how to form just opinions on public 
 affairs, how to manage their own property, and to 
 deal with mankind in general. 
 
 In mentioning this famous Sophistic school, so far 
 as it deserves to be called a school, Ave may note the 
 fate which has attended the name itself and its derived 
 words. Sophist, sophistical, sophism, sophistry, so- 
 phistication, are all of them terms used to designate 
 what is delusive and false. A similar discredit in 
 modern times attaches to the words Jesuit, Jesuitical, 
 Jesuitry, Jesuitism. So the words heresy, heretic, 
 heresiarch, heretical, are now never used except in a 
 vituperative sense. Yet Sophist was a creditable 
 name originally : it is given by Herodotus to the 
 Seven Sages and to Pythagoras. Jesuit simply means 
 a member of the Society of Jesus, such title being 
 allowed by the Pope (who calls himself 'Vicar of Jesus 
 Christ on earth ') to the Order of Ignatius Loyola, for 
 the enhancement of its dignity and credit. Heresy 
 (αφεσ^?, choice) merely meant the Latin 'secta,' a sect: 
 and Clement of Alexandria calls the Catholic Church 
 itself 'the best of all heresies' (sects). Each of these 
 terms therefore acquired its evil sense, partly, no 
 doubt, by errors and faults of those who bore them, 
 partly by the charges and invectives of powerful ene- 
 
INTRODUCTION. xv 
 
 mies. Undoubtedly the Sophists, as a class, found 
 their most powerful enemy in Plato: and upon his 
 dialogues (especially the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hip- 
 pias I. and Sophistes) the principal charges against 
 them as a class originally rest. In the great historian 
 of Greece, Mr Grotc, they have found their most 
 powerful champion and rehabilitater ; their cause 
 being likewise pleaded strongly by the late Mr Lewes 
 in his History of Philosophy. All Greek students 
 have in their hands Grote's History; and they ma}- 
 be referred to that work for a general statement 
 of the case on both sides; but more particularly to the 
 facts and arguments urged by him as counsel (so to 
 say) for the defendants in Part II. Ch. Ixvii/ On the 
 other side, as not fully agreeing with Mr Grote's strong 
 championship, may be consulted Thirhvall's Histoiy 
 of Greece, Fcrrier's Lectures, and Professor Jowett's 
 prefaces to the Platonic Dialogues, especially his 
 preface to the Sophistes. 
 
 V. Besides the Academic school of Plato and his 
 successors, philosophic schools of minor influence were 
 founded by three other pupils of Socrates. These 
 were Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Eucleides. Antis- 
 thenes taught at Athens in the gymnasium called 
 Cynosarges, whence his school was called that of 
 the Cynics. He held that virtue alone suffices for 
 happiness, anticipating the later Stoic doctrines. 
 Diogenes of Sinope, whose interview with Alexander 
 the Great is so famous, was the best known member of 
 
 ^ Grote's views are supported by Mr H. Sitli;\vick in two nhle 
 papers printed in the Cambridge Journal of I'hilology (Nos. viii. ix.). 
 
ΛΝ i INTR on UCTION. 
 
 this school. Aristippus of Cyrcnc founded the Cyre- 
 iiaic or Hedonic school, which taught that pleasure is 
 the supreme good of man, thus forerunning the later 
 teaching of Epicurus. Eucleides of Megara founded 
 the short-lived Megaric school, which is said to have 
 taught a fusion of Kleatic and Socratic doctrines. 
 Dialectic was among its special studies, and was 
 occasionally carried to the excess known as Eristic. 
 Many curious puzzles of thought are ascribed to its 
 disciples. Of these three schools see a brief account 
 in Schwegler's History of Philosophy (Transl. p. 53), 
 and consult also the larger work of Ueberweg (Vol. I. 
 5^§ 34 — 38). It was to Megara that Plato retired after 
 the death of Socrates, and resided there before his 
 travels, probably exercising himself in dialectic dis- 
 cussion. Susemihl thinks that in gratitude for this 
 kindness he commemorates his Megarian friends in 
 the introduction to the Theaetetus, thus indirectly 
 dedicating the dialogue to them. 
 
 VI. An analysis of the Theaetetus is given in 
 the headings of the several sections, noted in the 
 Greek text I. — XLIV., in the translation i — 44. In 
 the notes at the close, as in the Greek text, the mar- 
 ginal pages and alphabetic divisions of the first edition 
 of Stephens are also referred to. These notes are 
 chiefly designed to trace the chain of Plato's reasoning 
 in places where it is not easily discerned : but occa- 
 sionally tlicy refer to the commentaries of Professor 
 Campbell and H. Schmidt. 
 
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 
 
 κ. ρ. 
 
ΤΛ TOY ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ. 
 
 ΕΤΚΛΕΤΔΗΣ, 
 ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, 
 
 ΧΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, 
 ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, 
 
 ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 
 
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ /v^ of^ tfik^ ^ 
 Ο Ε A I Τ Η Τ Ο Σ. V ^. 
 
 [Xumeri marginales Arahici qui vocaiitur, editio7us prtmae Sfepha- 
 iiianae paginas indicant, Romani ejusdem editionis capitula. Stellula 
 paginae, signum I sectionis iiiitiuni notat.] 
 
 I. * "ApTL•, ω Ύ^ρψίων, ή ιτάΧαι ef ciypov; TEP. 142 
 ETTifci/CfC? ΊτάΧαι,. καυ σε ye εζήτουν κατ dyopnv καΐ 
 έθανμαζον ότί ονχ^ οΙός τ η evpelv. ΕΤ. Ου yap η 
 κατά ττόΧίν. ΤΕΡ. ΥΙου μην; ΕΤ. ΈΙς Χίμενα κατα- 
 βαίνων θβαλτ/'τω ενετυχον φερομενω εκ Κορίνθου άττο 
 του στρατοΊτε^ου ^Αθ}']ναζε. ΤΕΡ. Ζώνη ή τετεΧευ ■ 
 τηκοτί ; ΕΤ. ' Ζώί/Τ6 καΐ μάΧα μό^ΐ'ζ' γ^αΧεττώ^ μεν Β 
 yap εγει και υττο τραυμάτων τινών, μ(7ΧΧον μην αύτον 
 αίρει το yεyov^ς νόσημα εν τω στρατενματι. ΤΕΡ. 
 ^Ιών η Βυσεντερία; ΕΤ. Να/. ΤΕΡ. Οίον clvSpa Χε- 
 γ£ί9 εν κίνΒύνω είναι. ΕΤ. Καλόζ^ re καΐ ayaOov, ώ 
 Ύερψίων' εττεί τοι καΐ νυν ηκουόν τίνων μάΧα εyκω- 
 μιαζυντων αύτον ττερί την μήχ7)ν. ΤΕΡ. Και. ον^έν 
 7 άτοτΓον, αΧΧα ττοΧύ θαυμαστοτερον, ει μη τοιούτο^; 
 ήν. άτάρ ττώς οίκ ' αύτου Xhyapoi κατέλυεν ; ΕΤ. C 
 Ηττειγετο οϊκαΒε' εττεΙ ^γωγ' εύεόμην και συνεβούΧευον, 
 άΧΧ ουκ ήθελε, καΐ Βήτα ιτροττεμ-ψα^ αντόν, αιτιών 
 τταΧιν άνεμνήσθην και έθανμασα ^ωκράτου<ί, ώς μαν- 
 τικώς άΧΧα τε Βη ειττε και ττερΙ τοι'του. Βοκεΐ yap μοι 
 
 1—2 
 
4 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 okiyov ττρό τον θανάτου ii'TVy^eJv αυτω μβιρακιω οντι, 
 και συγγβνόμενό^ τβ καΐ hiaXey^Oel^; ττάνυ α<γασθήναί 
 αυτοί) την φυσιν. και μοί βΧθόντί ^Αθήναζβ τους τε 
 D λόγου? οί)ς• ΒίβΧίχθη αυτω Βίη^ησατο, καΐ ' μάΧα αξίου<ζ 
 ακοής, βίττέ re υτί ττασα άνά'^/κη βϊη τούτον i\\oJlμov 
 yeviaOat, el'irep etV ήλικίαν eXOoL. ΤΕΡ. ΚαΙ αΧηθη ye, 
 ώς 60LK6V, βίττβν. άτάρ τίνες ήσαν οι Xoyot ; βχους αν 
 hLηyήσaσθai', ΕΤ. Ου μα τον Δί'α, ονκουν ούτω ye 
 143 ""^^ στόματος' αλλ' iypaψάμηv μεν τότ ενθνς * οϊκαΒ 
 βΧθών ύτΓομνήματα, υστβρον Se κατά σ'χοΧην άναμιμνη- 
 σκόμενος ε^ραφον^ καΐ οσάκις Αθήναζε αφικοιμην, 
 εττανηρώτων του ^ωκράτην ο μη εμεμνημην, καΐ Ββΰρο 
 εΧθών εττηνωρθούμην. ώστε μοί σχ^εΒόν τι ττας ο Xoyoς 
 ykypaiTTai. ΤΕΡ. ^ΚΧηθή' ηκουσά σου καΐ ττρότερον, 
 καΐ μεντοί άεϊ μέΧΧων κεΧεύσειν εττιΒεΐζαί Βιατετρίφα 
 Βεύρο. άλλα τ ι κωΧνεί νυν ημάς ΒιεΧθεΐν ; ττάντως 
 έγωγ^ και άνατταΰσασθαι δέομαι, ως εξ aypod ηκων. 
 Β ΕΤ. ' Άλλα μεν Srj και αύτος με'χ^ρι ^EjptvoO θεαίτητον 
 ττροϋτΓεμψα, ώστε ουκ αν αηΒώς ανατταυοίμην. αΧΧ 
 ϊωμεν, και ημΐν άμα ανατταυομενοις ο τταΐς avayvωσετaι. 
 ΤΕΡ. 'Ορθώς XeyεLς.-~EΎ. Ύο μεν Sr) βιβΧίον, ω 
 Ύερψιων, τουτί' εypaψάμηv Βε Βη οντωσι τον Xoyov, ουκ 
 εμοί Χωκράτην hLηyoύμevov ως BLηyelτo, άλλα δίαλεγό- 
 μενον οίς εφη ΒιαΧεχθήναι, εφη Βε τω τε yεωμετpr] 
 ^εοΒώρω και τω ^~)εαιτήτω. Ινα ούν εν τη ypaφη 
 f< μη ' τταρε^οιεν TΓpάyμaτa αι μεταξύ των Χοηων Βιη- 
 yήσεLς ττερί αυτού τε, οττότε XεyoL• ο Σωκράτης, οίον 
 1\αι €γώ εφην ή ΚαΙ εγώ είττον, ή αύ ιτερι τού αττο- 
 κρινομενου, ότι %υνεφη ή Ουχ^ ώμυXύyεL, τούτων ένεκα 
 ως αύτον αύτοΐς SιaXεyόμεvov eypa-^a, εξεΧων τα τοι- 
 αύτα. ΤΕΡ. ΚαΙ ονΒεν yε άττο τρίττου, ω Ί^νκΧείΒη. 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟ:^. 5 
 
 ΕΤ. Άλλί/, τταΐ, \a/3e το βιβΧίον καΐ λέγε. — II. —Ω. 
 Et μ€ν των iv Κυρήνη ' μάλλον €κη8όμην, ώ ("^βόόωρβ. D 
 τα €Κ6Ϊ αν (Τ€ και ττβρι βκβίνων άνηρώτων, et tu'6<; αυτόθι 
 TTtpL ^βωμετριαν η τίνα αλλην φιλοσοφίαν βίσΐ των νέων 
 €7Γίμ6λ€ίαν ττοίονμενοϋ' νυν δ^ — ήττον yap €Κ€ίνου<ζ i} 
 τούσΒβ φιλώ, καΐ μαλΧον βτηθυμώ elBevai, TiVe? ημΐν 
 των νίων εττί^οζοι γενέσθαι €7Γί€ίΚ6Ϊ<;' ταύτα Βή αυτός 
 τ€ σκοΊτώ καθ' όσον Βνιαμαί, καΐ τους άλΧονς ερωτώ, 
 οίς αν ορώ τους νέους εθελοντας ζυ^^ί^νεσθαι. σο\ δ/) 
 ουκ ολί^ιστοί ττΧησιάζουσί, καΐ Βικαίως' άζίος yap 
 τά ' τε (ΪΧΧα καΐ yεωμετpLaς ένεκα, εΐ ^η οΰν τινί Ε 
 ενετυ-χες άζίω Xoyov, η^εως αν ττυθοίμην. ΘΕΟ. ΚαΙ 
 μην, ώ Ζ,ώκρατες, εμοί τε είττεΐν καΐ σοΙ άκοΰσαί ττάνυ 
 ά^ίον, οίω ύμΐν τών ττολιτών μειρακίω εντετύ'χ^ηκα. καΐ 
 ει μεν rjv καλός, εφοβούμην αν σφόδρα \εyεLv, μή και 
 τω ho ζω εν εττίθυμία αυτού είναι' νυν 8έ, και μή μοι 
 άχθου, ουκ εστί κάλος, ττροσεοικε δε σο\ την τε σιμό- 
 τητα και το εζω τών ομμάτων' ήττον δε i) συ ταΰτ 
 ε;^εί.. αΰεως οή λέγω. ευ ^ yap ισσι οτι ων οή ττω- 144 
 τΓοτε ενετνχον — κα\ ττανυ ττοΧΧοΐς ττεττΧιισίακα — ούδένα 
 ττω γσθόμην ούτω θαυμαστώς ευ ττεφυκότα. τυ yap 
 ενμαθή οντά, ως άΧΧω 'χαΧεττόν, ιτραον αυ είναι Sia- 
 φεροντως, καΐ ε'ττΐ τούτοις ανΒρεΐον τταρ όντινουν, iyco 
 μtv OUT αν ωομην yεvεσθai ούτε ορώ yιyvoμεvoυς' αλλ' 
 οι τε οζεΙς (υσιτερ ούτος καΐ dyy^ivoi καΐ μνήμονες ώς 
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G ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΙΙΤΟ^:. 7 
 
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8 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 9 
 
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10 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟ!. 11 
 
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 μάΧα yεvvaίaς τε καΐ βΧοσυρας^ Φαιναρετης \ ΘΕΑΙ. 
 
 113 C. Num Icgeiulum sit τον pro τον (μιαιτΐ jiotest, noii dcct mi. 
 
12 Πχ\ΑΤΩΝ05: 
 
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 ev ϊσθ' ΟΤΙ' μη μεντοι μου κατβίττυς ττρος τον<; άλλου?. 
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 αύτη κυίσκομενη τε καΐ τίκτουσα οΧΚας μαίεύεται, 
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 ye. ΧΩ. ΚαΙ μην καΐ ΒιΒούσαί γε αι μαΐαι φαρμάκια 
 
 D κα\ εττά^ουσαι δύνανται ε^είρειν τε τάς ώΒΐνας ' καΐ 
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 τάς Βυστοκούσας, και εαν νέον ον Βοζη αμβΧισκειν, 
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 lid D. νέον ον coiTuptum viclctur. 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ:. 13 
 
 τούτω μβΐζον φροΐ'οΰσίν ή ΙττΙ τ/} ομφαΧητομία. ' evvoeL Ε 
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14 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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 αΰτοΙ η νττ αλΧων ττεισθεντες, άττηΧθον ττρωΐαίτερον 
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 150 Ε. -η αύτοϊ η υπ άλλων. Ita rectissime Heind. Stallb. alii, 
 pro YUlgato ή αϋτοΙ υπ άλλων. 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΙΙΤΟ^. 15 
 
 elirelv, ττανυ ικανως τοτταζω οίς αν ζνγ^/βνόμβνοι οναιντο. 
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 εΐ'ρηκε τα αντά ταύτα, φησί yap ττον ττάντων χρημάτων 
 
IG ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 μ€τρον άνθρωτΓον eLvai, των μβν όντων, ωζ βση, των Se 
 μη όντων, ώ? ουκ eaTW. αν€'γνωκα<ζ yap ττου ) ΘΕΑΙ. 
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 κάηώ ; ΘΕΑΙ. Κεηει ηαρ ουν ουτω<;. 5)Ω. Ε^'ατο? μεντοι 
 
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 άρα τού οντος αεί εστί καΐ ίΙψευΒες, ως εττιστημη ούσα. 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΧΩ. Άρ' ουν ττρος Χαρίτων ττάσ- 
 σοφός τις ην 6 Tlpωτaycpaς, καΐ τούτο ημίν μεν γνίξατο 
 τω ΤΓοΧλω συρφετω, τοις δε μαθηταΐς εν άττορρητω 
 την άΧήθειαν ελεyεv ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πω? δτ}, ώ %ώκρατες, 
 
 Τ) τούτο * λε'γοί? ; ΧΩ. 'Εγώ ερώ καΐ μάΧ' ου φαύΧον 
 Xoyov, ώς άρα εν μεν αύτο καθ^ αύτο οιΒέν εστίν, ουΒ 
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 μεya 'πpoσayopεύr|ς, καΐ σμικρόν φανεΐται, και εαν βαρύ, 
 κούφον, ξύμτταντα τε ούτως, ώς μηδενός οντος ενός μήτε 
 Τίνος μήτε όττοιουούν' εκ δε Βή φοράς τε καΐ κινήσεως 
 
 152 Β. έφ" ΐαντον. De hac lectione cf. Vers. 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 17 
 
 καΐ κράσβως 7Γρ6<ζ άΧληΧα jLyverat ττάντα, α δ?; φαμεν 
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 7Γ0Τ ovhev, ael δε ' ^ίηνεται. και irepX τούτου ττάντβ^ γ, 
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 ΤΓΟίητών οι άκροι της ιτοίήσεως βκατβρας, κωμωΒίας μεν 
 ^Επίχαρμος, τ/^αγωδ/α? Se "Ομηρος' είττών jap 
 
 ^Ω^κεανόν τβ Θεών ^ενεαην και μητέρα Ύηθυν 
 ττάντα εϊρηκεν CKyova ρο7]ς τε καΐ κινήσεως, η ού Εοκεΐ 
 τούτο Χε^ειν] Θ Ε ΑΙ. "Έμοι^ε. IX. 2Ω. Ύίς ούν αν 
 €τι Ίτρός ηε τοσούτον * στρατόττεΕον καΐ στρατη^ον 153 
 ^Όμηρον Βνναίτο άμφισβητησας μη ου κατα^εΧαστος 
 γενέσθαι ; ΘΕχ\Ι. Οι; paStov, ώ '^ώκρατες. ^Ω. Οι; 
 yap, ώ Θεαίτητε, εττεί καΐ τά^ε τω Xoyω σημεία ίκανα, 
 οτι το μεν είναι Βοκοΰν καΐ το ^ίηνεσθαι κινησις τταρ- 
 έχει, το δε μη είναι και άττόΧΧυσθαι ησυχία' το yap 
 θερμόν τε καΐ ττυρ, ο δ/) καΐ τάΧΧα yεvva και εττιτρο- 
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 κινήσεις, η ούχ αύται yεvεσεις ττυρος ; ΘΕΑΙ. Κυται β 
 ' μεν ούν. ΧΩ. ΚαΙ μ7)ν τό yε των ζωών yεvoς εκ των 
 αυτών τούτων φύεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Πω? δ' ου ; ΧΩ. ΎΙ Sai ; 
 77 τών σωμάτων εζΐς ούχ ύττο ησυχίας μεν και apyιaς 
 ΒίόΧΧυται, ύττο yυμvaσίωv δε καΐ κινήσεων ως εττι το 
 ΤΓοΧύ σώζεται ; ΘΕΑΙ. Να/. ΧΩ. Ή δ' εν τ?] ψυχ;, 
 έξις ούχ ύττο μαθήσεως μεν και μεΧετης, κινήσεων 
 όντων, κτάται τε μαθύ^ματα καΐ σώζεται και yιyvετaι 
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 ούσης, ούτε τι μανθάνει ά τε άν μάθρ ' εττιΧανθαιεται ; q 
 ΘΕΑί. ΚαΙ μάΧα. ΧΩ. Το μεν άρα ayaOov κίνησ.ς 
 
 152 Ε. ξ^νμφξρέσθων recte se habet pro vuJg. ζνμψ^ρεσθοκ 
 
 Κ. P. 2 
 
18 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 κατά Τ6 "ψυχην καΐ κατά σώμα, το Be τουναντίον', 
 ΘΕΑΙ. "FiOLKev. ]^Ω. "Ετι οΰν σου λέγω νην€μία<ζ re 
 καΐ ΎαΧηνας κα\ οσα τοιαύτα, οτΰ at μβν ησνχ^ίαί ση- 
 τΓουσί καΐ άττοΧλύασί, τά δ' βτερα σώζβί; καΐ βττΐ τού- 
 τοις τον κοΧοφώνα αναγκάζω ττροσβίβάζων, την γ^ρυσήν 
 σειράν ώς ούΒεν αλΧο i) τον ηΧιον "Ομηρος Xeyei, και 
 
 D ΒηΧοΐ οτί ' έω? μεν αν η ττεριφορά y κινούμενη καΐ ο 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 19 
 
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20 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΧ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 21 
 
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22 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΧ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤ02. 23 
 
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24 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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26 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 27 
 
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28 ΠΛΑΤΩΝ02: 
 
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32 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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34 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟ:^. 35 
 
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38 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 39 
 
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40 ΠχΥΑΤΩΝΟΧ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 41 
 
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42 ΠΛΑΤί1Ν02 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 43 
 
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44 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 45 
 
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46 ΠΛΑΤΩΝ02 
 
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ΘΕΑΐΤΗΤΟΧ. 47 
 
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48 ΠΛΑΤΩΧ02: 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 49 
 
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 ανόητων τινώιν άκουσονται. ΘΕΟ. ΚαΙ μάΧα Βη, ώ 
 Έ,ώκρατες. ΣΩ. ΟΙΒά τοι, ' ώ εταίρε, εν μεντοι τι Γ. 
 αιτοΐς συμβεβηκεν, ότι αν ίύία Xoyov Berj Βούναί re καϊ 
 Κ. Ρ. 4 
 
50 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 Ββζασθαί irepl ων ^eyovdt, και εθβΧησωσιν ανΒρικως 
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 μεν οΰν τούτων, έττεώή καϊ Trapepya Tvy^aveu Χβ'γυμβνα, 
 
 C ατΓοστώμβν' el Se μη, ΊτΧβίω del βτηρρβοντα ' κατα-χ^ώσβι 
 r /μών τον εζ ^ρ^η<ζ \oyov' εττΐ δέ τα εμττροσθεν ϊωμεν, 
 εΐ καϊ σοΙ Βοκεΐ. ΘΕΟ. Έ/χοΙ μεν τά τοιαύτα, ώ 
 ^ώκρατες, ουκ αηδέστερα άκονειν' ράω <yap τηΧικωΒε 
 οντί εττακόΧουθεΙν ει μεντοι So κει, ττάλιν εττανίωμεν. 
 XXVI. ]$Ω. Ονκονν ενταύθα ττου η μεν του Xoyou, εν 
 ω εφαμεν τους την φερομενην ούσίαν λεγοι^τα?, καϊ το 
 άεϊ Βοκοϋν εκάστω τούτο καϊ είναι τούτω ώ Βοκεΐ, εν 
 μεν T0t9 <χλλοί9 εθεΧειν Βιισγνρίζεσθαι, καϊ ουχ ηκιστα 
 
 D περί τα Βίκαια, ώ? τταντος ' μάΧλον, α αν θήται ττόλί? 
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 τούτο δε ΤΓον σκώμμ αν εϊη ττρος ο Xeyoμev. ούχ^ί\ 
 
 Ε ΘΕΟ. Τίάνυ yε. 2Ω. Μη ' λβγετω το όνομα, άΧΧά το 
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 8ιαμαρτάνει εκάστη; ΘΕΟ. Οΐμαι έγωγβ καΐ Βιαμαρ- 
 τάνειν. ^Ω. "Ert τοίνυν ενθεΐ'Βε αν μαΧ\ον ττα? τις 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 51 
 
 ομόΧο'γησείζ ταύτα ταύτα, el ττβρί τταντος τίζ του εϊόους 
 βρωτωη, iv ω καϊ το ωφίλίμον τνγ-χ^ανβϋ 6ν, έ'στί δε 
 ΤΓου καϊ irepl τον μεΧΧοντα γ^ρονον. Όταν yap νομο- 
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 αν Χε'^οιμεν. ΘΕΟ. ' ΤΙάνυ ye. 2Ω. "Ιθί 8ή, ούτωσΐ Β 
 €ρωτώμεν ΤΙρωτα^όραν η άΧλον τίνα των εκείνω τα 
 αύτα Χε^όντων' Τίάντων μετρον άνθρωττος εστίν, ώς 
 φατ€, ώ IlpcuTayopa, Χευκών, βαρέων, κούφων, ούΒενος 
 Ότου ού των τοιούτων. €•χ^ων yap αυτών το κρντηρίον 
 εν αύτω, οϊα ττάσγεο τοιαύτα οΐόμενος, αΧηθη τε οϊεται 
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 καϊ των μεΧλόντων εσεσθαι, φησομεν, ώ Tίpωτay6pa, 
 ε'χει το κριτηριον εν αύτω, καϊ οϊα ' άν οιηθ^ εσεσθαι, C 
 ταύτα καϊ yίyvετai εκείνω τω οιηθέντι ; οίον θερμά' 
 αρ' Όταν τις οΙηθΡ] ΙΒιώτης αυτόν ττυρετόν Χηψεσθαι 
 καϊ εσεσθαι ταύτην την θερμότητα, καϊ έτερος, ιατρός 
 δε, άντοιηθΡ], κατά την ττοτερου Βοξαν φώμεν το μεΧλον 
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 οίνου yXvκύτητoς καϊ αύστηρότητος μεΧΧούσης ' €σε- D 
 σθαι η τού yεωpyoϋ 8όξα, αλλ' ούγΐ η του κιθαριστού, 
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 τταώοτρίβτ] Βόξει εύάρμοστον είναι. Η !{,(). ΟύΒαμώς. 
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 ρικού όντος, σκευαζομενης θοινης, άκυροτερα ή κρίσις 
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 yap τού ηΒη ' όντος εκάστω ηΒίος i) yεyovότoς μηΒεν Ε 
 
 4—2 
 
52 ΠΑΑΤΩΝΟΧ 
 
 ττω τω λόγω Ζιαμ.α'χωμεθα, άΧλα ττβρι του μ€\\οντο<ζ 
 €κάστω καΧ Βόξβιν καΐ ^σβσθαι ττότερον αυτο<; αντω 
 αρίστο<; κριτής ; η σΰ, ώ Τίρωταιγόρα, το ye irepi λο- 
 ^ου<ζ ΊΤίθανον βκάστω ημών βσόμβνον βίς Βίκαστηρίον 
 βελ,τίον αν ΊτροΒοξάσαί^ i} των ΙΕίωτών οστισουν ; 
 ΘΕΟ. ΚαΙ μάλα, ώ ^ώκρατβς, τοντο J6 σφόδρα νιτι- 
 σγνύτο ττάντων Βίαφερβιν αυτό?. ^Ω. Ν?) Αία, ώ 
 ijg μύΧβ' η ουδέ/? 7' ^^ αντώ SieXeyeTO * δίδου? ττοΧυ 
 dpyupLov, el irr) τους σννόντας eiretOev, otl καΐ το μεΧ- 
 Χον βσβσθαί τε καί Bo^eiv οντ6 μάντις ούτβ τίζ αΧΧο^ί 
 αμεινον Kpiveiev αν η αύτος αυτω. ΘΕΟ. ΑΧηθεστατα. 
 ΣΩ. Οικούν καΐ αΐ νομοθεσιαι και το ώφίΧιμον ττερί 
 το μβΧΧον εστί, καΐ ττα? αν oμoXoyol νομοθετουμενην 
 ττόΧίν ΤΓοΧΧάκί^ί άuάyκηv είναι του ωφεΧιμωτατου άττο- 
 τυγχάνειν, ΘΕΟ. Μάλα yε. 5,Ω. Μετρ/ω? αρα ημίν 
 
 Β ττρό? τον ΒίΒάσκαΧόν σου είρησεται, otl dvayKy ' αΰτω 
 cμo\oyεlv σοφώτερόν τε άΧΧον αΧΧου είναι καΐ τον μεν 
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 τοιούτον είναι. ΘΕΟ. ''Έικείντ) μοι Βοκεΐ, ώ Ι,ώκρατες, 
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 νησαν τους εκείνου X6yoυς ουΒαμτ} αΧηθεΐς yyovμεvaι. 
 
 C 2Ω. ' JJoXXayrj, ώ Θεόδωρε, καΐ aXXy αν το ye τοιούτον 
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 και επιστήμας Tayjx uv οντά Xeyoiev, καΐ Θεαίτητος 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 53 
 
 bSe ουκ άττο σκοττου είρηκεν αϊσθησίν καΧ ετηστήμην 
 ταντον θβμει/ο^;. ττροσίτβον ονν εγγ^τερω, ' ω? ο virep D 
 ΙΤρωταγόρου \oyo<; βττεταττε, καΐ σκετττεον την φερο- 
 μενην ταύτην ούσίαν Βιακρονοντα, etre ι.'γί.€? elVe σαθρον 
 φθiyyeτaί. μάχη S ονν irepl αντης ου φαύλη ούό* 
 oXlyoc^ yeyove. XXVII. ΘΕΟ. ΠολλοΟ καΙ het 
 φαύλη elvac, άλλα irepl μεν την Ίωνίαν καϊ εττίόίΒωσο 
 ΤΓοιμτΓοΧν. ο Ι yap του ΊΆρακλβίτου εταίρα 'χopηyoυσi 
 τούτου του λGyoυ μάλα ερρωμενω'ζ, %Q. Τω rot, ώ 
 φίλε &εό8ωρε, μαΧλον σκβτττεον καΐ εΡ ^ρχή'^, ωσττερ 
 αυτοί ' ύτΓΟτείνονται. ΘΕΟ. ΤΙανταττασί μεν ονν. καΐ Ε 
 yap, ώ 2,ώκρατε<^, ττερί τούτων των '\\ρακλείτείων, ?) 
 ωσττερ συ λεyεL•^ Όμηρειων, καϊ ετο τταΧαίοτερων, αν- 
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 τούτου ζητ-ης λόγοι/ λαβείν, τι εϊρηκεν, ετέρω ττεττλίίξεο 
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 "Ισως•, ώ Θεόδωρε, τονς άνΒρας μαχόμενους εωρακας, 
 βίρηνενουσι δε ου συyyεy ονας' ου yap σοι εταίροι εισιν. 
 
54 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΧ 
 
 αλλ', οΊμαί, τα τοιαύτα τοΙ<; μαθηταΐς irrl σχ^ολη<ζ 
 φρήζονσιν, ου<; αν βονΧωνταΰ ομοίου^ αντοΐς ττοιησαν. 
 ΘΕΟ. Ilotot? μαθηταΐς, ώ Βαιμόνίβ ; ovSe jiyveTaL των 
 
 C τοιούτων €Τ€ρος erepov μαθητής, ' αλλ' αυτόματοι, ανα- 
 φύονται, οττόθβν αν τύ'χτ] βκαστος αυτών ενθουσίασαν^ 
 καΧ τον €Τ€ρον 6 €Τ6ρο<ζ ούΒβν ή'γεΐται elhevai. τταρα 
 μβν οΰν τούτων, οττερ fja €ρών, ουκ αν ττοτε Χάβοίς 
 \cyov οϋτε εκ,όντων οϋτ6 ακόντων' αυτούς δέ hel τταρα- 
 Χαβόντας ωσιτβρ ττρόβΧημα ίτησκοιτεΐσθαι. ΧΩ. Kat 
 μετρίως ye Xeyeiv. τό ye Βη ττρόβΧημα άΧΧο τι, ττα- 
 ρβιΧήφαμεν τταρα μεν των άρ-χ^αιων, μετά ττοιησεως 
 
 D ετΓίκρυτΓτομένων τους ' ττοΧΧους, ως η yev€σις των αλ- 
 Χων ττάντων ^Ω-κεανός τε καΐ Ύηθύς ρεύματα τυyχ^άvεΰ 
 καΐ ούΒεν εστηκε, τταρα Be των ύστερων, ατε σοφωτε- 
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 αυτών την σοφίαν μάθωσιν ακούσαντες και τταυσωνται 
 ηΧίθίως οΐόμενοί τα μεν εστάναι, τα Βε κινεΐσθαι τών 
 όντων, μαθόντες Β otl ττάντα κινείται τιμώσιν αυ- 
 τούς ; 6Xίyoυ Βε εττεΧαθόμην, ώ ^εόΒωρε, οτι oXXol αυ 
 
 Ε τάναντία τούτοις άττεφήναντο, οίον ' άκίνητον τεΧεθειν 
 τώ τταντ Ιινομ είναι, και αΧΧα Όσα ^ΙεΧισσοι τε καΐ 
 ΤΙαρμενίΒαί εναντιούμενοί ττάσί τούτοις Βιισγυρίζονται, 
 ώς εν τε τταντα εστί καΐ εστηκεν αυτό εν αυτω, ουκ ε-χον 
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 'χ^ρησομεθα ; κατά, σμικρόν yap ττροΐόντες ΧεΧήθαμεν 
 αμφοτέρων εις το μέσον ττετττωκότες, καΐ αν μΐ] tttj 
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 ταΐς τταΧαίστραις Βιά ypaμμης τταίζοντες, όταν ύττ 
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 οϋν μοι τους ετέρους ττρότερον σκετττεον, εφ ο'υσττερ 
 ώρμήσαμεν, τους ρέοντας, καΐ εάν μεν τι φαίνωνται 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 55 
 
 Xiyovre^, συνβΧξομβι^ μβτ αυτών ημα<; αυτούς, τους ετέ- 
 ρους Ικφυ^είν 7Γ6ΐρωμ€Ρ0ί' iav he oi του οΧου στασι,ώται, 
 άΧηθ^στερα Xeyetv Βοκώσί, φευ^όμβθα τταρ^ αυτούς άττο 
 τούτων των καΐ τα ακίνητα Κίνούντων. αμφότεροι ' δ' Β 
 αν φαΐ'ώσί μη^εν μέτρων Χε^οντβς, yeXotoc έσόμεθα 
 ηγούμενοι ημίΐς μεν τί Χέ^ευν φαίΧους οντάς, τταμΊτα- 
 Χαίους δε καΐ ιτασσοφους ανΒρας άττοΒεΒοκιμακότες, 
 ορα ούν, ώ Θεόδωρε, el ΧυσυτεΧεΐ εΙς τοσούτον ττροίεναν 
 KLvSuvov. ΘΕΟ. Οι^δεζ^ μεν συν άνεκτόν, ώ Χώκρατες, 
 μη ου Βίασκεψασθαι, τί Χε^ουσιν εκάτεροί των άντρων. 
 XXVIII. 5.Ω, ΖκετΓτεον αν εϊη σου γε ούτω ττροθυ- 
 μουμεΐ'ου. Αοκεΐ ούν μοι »ρχή είναι της σκίψεως κινή- 
 σεως ιτερι, ' τΓοΙον τί ττοτε άρα λ,εγοζ^τε? φασί τα ττάντα G 
 κινεΐσθαι. βούΧομαο δε Χε^είν το τοίόν^ε' ττότερον ev 
 Τί ε2δο9 αύτης Χε^ουσιν ή ώσττερ εμοί φαίνεται, 8ύο ; μη 
 μεντοι μόιον εμοΙ 8οκείτω, άΧΧά συμμετε'χε καΐ συ, Χνα 
 κοινΐ) Ίτάσγωμεν, αν τυ καΐ Serj. και μοί λέγε* αρα 
 κινεΐσθαί καΧεΙς, όταν το 'χωράν εκ χώρας μεταβάΧΧη 
 η καΐ εν τω αύτω στρεφηται ; ΘΕΟ. 'Έγωγε. ΧΩ. 
 Ύοντο μεν τοίνυν ev έστω εΖόο?. όταν δε y μεν εν τώ 
 αύτω, ^ηράσκη δε η ' μεΧαν εκ Χευκού ή σκΧηρον εκ D 
 μαΧακου <yί>yvητaL, η τίνα αΚΚην αΧΧοίωσιν άΧΧοιώται, 
 άρα ούκ άξίον έτερον εΐΒος φαναι κινήσεως ; ΘΕΟ. 
 "Εμοι^ε ^οκεΐ. Χίΐ. ^AvayKawv μεν ούν. Βύο Βή λε'γω 
 τούτω εϊΒη κινήσεως, άΧΧοίωσιν, την δε ττεριφοράν. 
 ΘΕΟ. ^ϋρθώς γε Χε^ων. ΧΩ, Τούτο τοίνυν οΐτω 8l6- 
 Χομενοι ΒιαΧε^ωμεθα ηΖη τοις τα ττάντα φάσκουσΰ 
 κίνεΐσθαι, και ερωτώμεν, Ιλότερον ττίιν φάτε άμφοτερως 
 κινεΐσθαι, φερόμενόν τε καΐ ' άΧΧοιού μενον , ή το μεν tl Ε 
 
 181 D. τψ ΰέ ττεριφοράν. Latere viJetur corruptio. Cf. Vers. 
 Angl. 
 
56 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 άμφοτ€ρως, το δ' ετβρω? ; ΘΕΟ. Άλλα μα Δ/' έγωγε 
 ουκ ύχω elirelv' οΐμαυ δ' tiv φάναι σμφοτβρωζ. ΙΕΩ. Et 
 δε ye μη, ώ eracpe, κινονμβνά re αυτοΐζ καΐ ίστώτα 
 φανεΐται, και ovBev μαΧΧον ορθώς e^ec elirelv, Ότι Kivel- 
 ταυ τα ττάντα η Ότι βστηκβν. ΘΕΟ. ^ ΑΧηθβστατα 
 Xiyei^. ^Ω. Ονκοΰν eTreiBrj κονεΐσθαι αυτά Bee, το δε μή 
 1 82 KLvelaOai μη evelvai μηζeι'L, ττάντα δ?) ττάσαν * κίνησιν 
 del KtvecTac. ΘΕΟ. ^Avay/cy. !^Ω. ^KOTreL 8ή μοι τόδε 
 αυτών' της θ€ρμοτητο<ζ η Χ6νκοτητος ?; οτουουν yeveauv 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟ! 57 
 
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58 ΠΛΑΤΩΝ02 
 
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62 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
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 άκούείν, Ισφραινεσθαί,^Ιτύχεσθαί, θερμαίνεσθαυ) ΘΕΑΙ. 
 
 Ε Αίσθάνεσθαι ' εγωγε' τι yap αλΧο ; 2 Ω. Άυμιταν dp 
 αύτο καΧεΐς αίσθησιν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Avάyκη. 2Ω. ^Ω.ί yε, 
 φαμεν, ου μετεστιν αΧηθείας α^^ασθαι' ουΒε yap ουσίας. 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Ου yap ουν. ^Ω. Ουδ' άρ' εττιστήμης. ΘΕΑΙ. 
 υ yap. Ζ12. κ)υκ up αν ειη ττοτε, ω ννεαιτητε, 
 αίσθησίς τε καϊ εττιστήμη ταυτόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οι; φαίνε- 
 ται, ώ Ί,ώκρατες, καϊ μαΧιστά yε νυν καταφανεστατον 
 yeyovεv άΧΧο 6ν αισθησεως εττιστήμη. ^Ω, 'Αλλ' ου 
 iS; '^^ * /^^^ ^ν 'τούτου yε ένεκα ηργόμεθα BLa\εyόμεvoί, ίνα 
 εύρωμεν τι ττοτ ουκ εστ εττιστήμη, άΧΧά τι εστίν, 
 όμως δε τοσούτον yε ττροβεβήκαμεν, ώστε μη ζητεΐν 
 αυτήν εν αίσθησει το τταράτταν, άΧΧ εν εκείνω τω 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. C3 
 
 ονόματι, ο τι ττοτ €χ€ΐ η ψνχτ}, όταν αύτη καθ' αυτήν 
 ττρα'γματβνηταί ττερι τα όντα. ΘΕΑΙ. Άλλα μην τουτό 
 7β κα\€Ϊταί, ώ ^ώκρατβς, ώς εγω/χαί, Βο^άζειν. ΣΩ. 
 Ορθώς yap οϊβί, ώ φίΧβ. καΐ ορα 8ή νυν ττάΧιν i^ αργ^ής, 
 ττάντα τά ττρόσθβν ' ύξαΧβίψας, €Ϊ τι μάλΧον καθορας, Β 
 67Γ6ί8ή €νταΰθα ττροβΧηΧυθας. καΐ Xeye αύθις, τι ττοτ 
 €στΙν 67Γίστημη, XXXI. ΘΕΑΙ. Αοζαν μβν ττΓισαν el- 
 ΤΓβΐν, ώ Έ,ώκρατβς, αΒύνατον, βττβώή καΐ 'ν^εΐ'δ?;^ iart 
 Βόζα' κίν^υνεΰβί he η άΧηθης 8όζα ^ττιστήμη ehai, και 
 μοί τούτο άττοκεκρίσθω. iav yap μη φανη Ίτροϊούσιν, 
 ωστΓζρ το νυν, αΧΧο τι ττβιρασόμβθα Xeyeiv. 2χΩ. Ού- 
 τω μίντοι χρή, ώ θβαίτητβ, Xeyeiv, ττροθύμως μάΧΧον, 
 η ως το πρώτον ώκνβι,ς αιτοκρίνεσθαι. iav yap ούτω 
 Βρώμεν, Βυοΐν θάτερα, ή ενρήσομεν βφ' ο ερχόμεθα, ' C 
 i] ήττον οίησομεθα εΙΒεναί ο μη8αμη ϊσμεν' καίτοι ούκ 
 αν εϊη μεμτττυς μισθός 6 τοιούτος' καΐ 8ή καΐ νύν τι 
 φ?;9 ; 8υοΙν οντοιν εΙΒεοιν 8όζης, του μεν αληθινού, -ψευ- 
 Βούς Βε τού έτερου, τήν αΧηθή Βόζαν εττιστήμην ορίζει ; 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Έγωγε' τούτο yap αύ νυν μοι φαίνεται. Έ.Ω.. 
 ^Αρ* ούν €τ άξιον ττερί Βόξης άναΧαβεΐν ττάΧιν ; ΘΕχΥΙ. 
 Το τΓοΐον Br) Xεyεις ; ^Ω. &ράττει με ττως νύν τε και 
 ι'.ΧΧοτε Βη ΤΓοΧΧάκις, ώστ εν άττορία iroXXf} ττρος ' D 
 εμαυτον και ττρος άΧΧον yεyovεvaι, ούκ έχοντα είττεΐν τι 
 Ίτοτ εστί τούτο το τταθος τταρ ημΐν καΐ τίνα τρόττον 
 εyyιyv6μεvov. ΘΕΑΙ. Το ττοΐον Βή ] ΣΩ. Το Βοξάζ^ιν 
 τινά ■ψευΒή. σκοττώ Βη καϊ νύν ετι Βιστάζων, ττότερον 
 εασωμεν αυτό ή εττισκεψωμεθα ίίΧΧον τρόττον ή oXίyov 
 Ίτροτερον, ΘΕΑΙ. Ύί μήν, ώ ^ώκρατες, εϊττερ ye καϊ 
 οττηούν φαίνεται Βεΐν ; ί/ρτι yap ου κακώς ye συ καϊ 
 ^είΒωρος εXεyετε σχοΧ7}ς ττερι, ώς ούΒεν εν τοις τοιοΐσΒε 
 κaτε7Γείyει. !χΩ. ' 'Ορθώς ύττεμνησας. ίσως yap ονκ Κ 
 
G4 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 άτΓΟ καιροί) τταλιν ωσττερ ϊχ^ΐ'ος μετεΧθβΐΐ'. κρεΐττον fyap 
 ΤΓου σμικρόν ev η ιτόΧύ μη Ικανώς irepuvai. ΘΕΑ Ι. Ύί 
 μy]V ; Sn. ΐΐώς ούν ', ri 8η καΙΧεΎομβν; ΛίτενΒή φαμβν 
 εκάστοτε είναι Βόζαν, και τίνα ημ(Ζν Βο^άζειν ^Ιτευ^η, 
 τον δ' αύ αΧηθή, ω? φύσει ούτως εχ^όντων ; ΘΕΑΙ. 
 Φαμεν <yap δ?;'. ^Ω. Ονκοΰν τόδε 7' ^'<^^' ημΐν ΊτερΙ 
 iSS τταντα * καΐ καθ εκαστον, ήτοι εΙΒεναι i] μ)) εΙΒεναι , 
 μανθανειν 'yap καΐ εττιΧανθάνεσθαι μεταξύ τούτων ώς 
 όντα 'χαίρειν Χεγω εν τω τταρόντι' νυν yap ημΐν ττρό? 
 Xoyov εστίν ovSev. ΘΕΛΤ. Άλλα μην, ώ ^ώκρατες, 
 αΧλο 7 ονΒεν Χείττεται ττερϊ εκαστον ιτΧην εΙΒεναι ή μη 
 εΙ^εναι. ΣΩ. Οικούν η8η ανάγκη τον Βοζάζοντα δο- 
 ξαζειν ή ών τι οίόεν η μη οίΒεν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Κνά^κη. 
 Ζ12. Ivat μην ειοοτα γε μη ειόεναι το αυτό η μι) ειοοτα 
 
 Β εΙΒεναι ' αδύνατον. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς δ' ου ; ΣΩ. ^Αρ' ούν 
 ο τα "ψευΒή Βοξάζων, α οίΒε, ταύτα οϊεται ού ταύτα είναι, 
 αΧΧα έτερα αττα ών οΐόε, και αμφότερα βίδώ? αγνοεί αΰ 
 αμφότερα; ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' αδύνατον, ώ Έ,ωκρατες. ΣΩ. 
 Αλλ όρα, α μη οΐ8εν, i/yeiTai αύτ(ΐ είναι έτερα άττα 
 ων μη οΙΒε, καϊ τούτ εστί τω μήτε Οεαίτητον μήτε 
 'Σωκράτη εΙΒοτι et? την htavoiav Χαβεΐν ώ<; 6 Σωκράτης 
 
 C Θεαίτητος ή 6 θεαίτητο'ζ Έωκράτης ', ΘΕΑ Ι. ' Καϊ 
 ττώ? αν ; ^Ω. 'Αλλ' ού μην, α yi tl<; οίΒεν, οΙεταί ττου 
 ά μη ΟίΒεν αυτιι είναι, ουΒ αύ α μη οιΒεν, α οΙΒε. 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Tepa9 yap εσται. ΣΩ. Πω? ούν αν τΐζ ετι 
 Λ^τευΒη Βοξάσειεν ; εκτο<ζ yap τούτων αΒυνατον ττου Βοξά- 
 ζειν, εττείττερ ττάντ η ίσμεν η ούκ ϊσμεν, εν Βε τοίτοί<ί 
 ούΒαμοΰ φαίνεται Βυνατον ^ΙτευΒή Βοξάσαι. ΘΕΑΙ. 
 ^ΑΧηθεστατα. ΣΩ. ^Αρ' ονν ού ταύτη σκειττεον ο 
 ζητουμεν, κατά το εΙΒεναι καϊ μη εΙΒεναι Ιυντας, αΧΧα 
 
 Τ) κατά το είναι ' καϊ μή ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πώ? Xεyείς ; ^Ω. 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 65 
 
 Μ?7 αττΧουν 'ρ, Ότι ο τα μΐ] οντά rrepL οτονουν Ζο^άζων 
 ουκ, έ'σ^' ώς ου '\^ευΖη Ζοξάσβί, καν οττωσουν αΧλως τά 
 της διανοίας e%^^. Θ Ε ΑΙ. Et/co? 7 <^^) ^ Έ,ώκρατβζ. 
 ΧΩ. Πώ? ούν ; τι βρυΰμβν, ώ &€αίτητ€, iav τις ημάς 
 άνακρίντι' Αυνατον δέ οτωουν Ό XiyeTat, και τί? άνθρω- 
 ιτων το μη ον Βοξάσβί, βϊτε irept των όντων του etre αύτο 
 καθ" αυτό] ΚαΙ ήμεΐ^ί 8ή, ως βοίκβ, Ίτρος ταύτα φήσομβν 
 ^"Οταν ye άΧηθή μη οϊηται Οίόμβνος. ή ττώς βροϋμβν ; Ε 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Οί;τω?. ΧΩ. ^Η ούν καΐ αΧλοθί ττου το τοιού- 
 τον βστί ; ΘΕΑΙ. Το ττοΐον ; ΧΩ. ΕΓ τις 6ρα μεν τι, 
 ορα δε ούΒεν. ΘΕΑΙ. ΚαΙ ττώς ] ΖΩ. Άλλα μην el 
 €v ye τι ορα, των όντων τι ορα. ή συ otei ττοτε το ev iv 
 τοις μη οΰσιν elvai ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ουκ έ'γωγε. ΣΩ. Ό cipa 
 €υ ye τι ορών ον τι όρα. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΧΩ. * ΚαΙ 1S9 
 ό άρα Τ6 άκουων εν ye τι ακούει και ον ακούει, ΘΕΑΙ. 
 Nat. ΧΩ. ΚαΙ 6 άτΓτόμενος δr) του ενό^ yk του ατττεται 
 καΐ οντος, εϊττερ ενός) ΘΕΑΙ. Κα t τούτο. ΧΩ. Ό δε 
 δ/} Βοξάζων ονγ^ εν τι Βοξάζει ; ΘΕΑΙ. ^Avάyκη. ΧΩ. 
 Ό δ' εν τι Ζοζάζων ουκ ον τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ηι^γγωρώ. 
 ΧΩ. Ό άρα μή ον Βοξάζων ούύεν Βοζάζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Οι; 
 φαίνεται. ΧΩ. 'Αλλά μ}) ν ο ye μηΒεν 8οζάζων το 
 Ίταράτταν ούΖε δοξάζει. ΘΕΑΙ. ΑήΧον, ως εοικεν. ΧΩ. 
 ' Ουκ άρα οιόν τε το μη ον Βοξάζειν, ούτε ττερί των Β 
 όντων οΰτε αύτο καθ' αυτό. ΘΕΑΙ. Ου φαίνεται. ΧΩ. 
 ' Αλλο τι άρ εστί το Λ/τευδ/; Βοζάζειν του τά μη οντά 
 Ζοξάζ^ιν. ΘΕΑΙ. Άλλο εοικεν. ΧΩ. Ούτ άρ όντως 
 οντε ως 6\ίyov ττρότερον εσκοττούμεν, ψευΕής εστί Βόξα 
 εν ημίν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ου yap ούν Βή. XXXII. ΧΩ. Άλλ' 
 αρα ώΒε yιyvόμεvov τούτο 7Γpoσayopεύoμεv ; ΘΕΑΙ. 
 ΙΙώς ; ΧΩ. ^ΑΧΧοΒοζίαν τινά οΰσαν ΛίτευΒη φαμ^ν είναι 
 οοξαν, όταν τις τι των όντων άΧΧο αΰ ' των όντων, C 
 Κ. Ρ. 5 
 
6β ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 άνταΧλαξάμενος rrj hiavoia, φτ} elvai. ούτω yap ον μίν 
 del Βοξάζβί, erepov δε άνθ^ erepov, καϊ αμαρτάνων ου 
 βσκότΓβί Βικαίωζ αν καΧοΙτο ψβνζή Βοξάζων. Θ Ε ΑΙ. 
 'Ορθότατα μοί νυν Βοκεΐς είρηκεναι. όταν <γάρ τις αντί 
 καΧοΰ αίαγ^ρον ή άντΙ αίσ^ροΰ καΧον Βοζαζτ], τοτβ ω? 
 αληθώς 8οξάζ€ΐ, ψευΒι). 2!Ω. Δτ/λο? el, ώ Θεαίτητε, 
 κατ αφρόνων μου καϊ ου δεδίώ?. ΘΕχ\Ι. Ύι, μάλιστα; 
 Χί2. Ουκ αν, οΐμαί, σοΙ Βοκώ του αληθώς ψβύΒους 
 D άντιλαβεσθαι, ' ερόμενος, el οΙόν τε ταχύ βραΕεως η 
 κοΰφον βαρέως ή άλΧο τι εναντίον μη κατά την αυτού 
 φύσιν άΧΧά κατά την του εναντίου ηίηνεσθαι εαυτω 
 εναντίως. τούτο μεν οΐιν, ϊνα μτ} μάτην θαρρηστ}<^, 
 άφίημι. αρέσκει Βε, ώς φ-ρς, το τα ψευΒή Βοξάζεον 
 άΧΧοΒοξεΐν είναι ; ΘΕΑΙ. "Εμονγε, 2Ω. "Εστίν άρα 
 κατά την σην Βόξαν έτερον τι ώς 'έτερον καϊ μη ώς εκείνο 
 ττ) Βιανοία τίθεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. "Εστυ μεντοι. ΣΩ. 
 Έ'Όταν ούν τούθ'' η Βίάνοίά του hpa, ου καϊ ' ανάγκη αυτήν 
 ήτοι αμφότερα η το έτερον Βιανοεΐσθαι ; ΘΕΑΙ. 
 'Ανάγκη μεν οΰν. 2Ω. "Ητοι άμα ^ε ή εν μέρει ; 
 ΘΕΑΙ. ΚάΧΧιστα. ^Ω. Το δβ Βιανοεΐσθαι άρ οττερ 
 iyώ καΧεΐς ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ύί καΧών ; ^Ω. Aoyov, ον αύτη 
 Ίτρος αύτην η 'ψ'υχτ] Βιεξερ-χεται ττερι ών αν σκοττ'^. ως 
 yε μη είζώς σοι άττοφαίνομαι. τούτο yap μοι ΙνΒάΧΧεται 
 διανοούμενη, ουκ άΧΧο τι η SιaXέyεσθaι, αυτη εαυτην 
 Ι go ερωτώσα * κα\ άττοκρινομενη, καϊ φασκουσα και ου 
 φάσκουσα. οταν δε όρίσασα, εϊτε βραΒντερον είτε και 
 όξύτερον ετταί'ξασα, το αύτο ηΒη φρ καϊ μη Βιστάζτ), 
 Βόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αύτης. ώστ εγωγε το Βοξάζειν 
 Xεyειv καΧώ καϊ την Βόξαν Xoyov είρημενον, ου μεντοι 
 ττρος άΧΧον ούΒε φωνρ, άΧΧά σLyf} ττρός αυτόν, συ δε 
 τ/; ΘΕΑΙ. Καγώ. 2Ω. "Οταν άρα τις το έτερον 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 67 
 
 erepov ^οζ(ΐζτ], καΐ φησίν, ω? €0ίΚ€, το erepov erepov 
 elvai ττρος εαυτόν. ΘΕχ\Ι. ' Ύί μην ; ^Ω. ^ Κναμ,ιμνη- Β 
 σκου Βη, €ί ττωτΓοτ etTre? ττρο? σεαντόν, οτι τται^το? 
 μαΧλον το του καΧον αισγ^ρον εστίν i) το ahttcov δίκαιον, 
 η καΐ το ττάντων κεφαλαιον σκόττει, εϊ ττοτ εττεχ^είρησας 
 σεαυτον ττείθείν ώ? τταντος μαΧλον το έτερον ετερόν 
 εατιν, η τταν τουναντίον ουΒ εν υττνω ττωττοτε ετίΧμησας 
 είττεΐν ΤΓ^ο? σεαυτόν, ως τταντάττασιν αρα τα ττεριττά 
 άρτίά εστίν η τί αλΧο τοιούτον. ΘΕχ\Ι. ^ΑΧηθή λεγβί?. 
 ΣΩ. "ΑΧΧον δε Τίνα οϊεο ' vyialvovTa ή μαινόμενον τοΧ- c 
 μησαι σττουΒί} ττρος εαυτόν είττεΐν, άναττείθοντα αύτόν^ 
 ώ? ανάγκη τον βουν ϊιτίΓον είναι, η τά Βύο εν ; ΘΕΑΙ. 
 Μα. Δ/' ουκ έγωγε. 2Ω. Ονκοΰν εΐ το Χε'^ειν ττρος 
 εαυτόν Βοξάζείν εστίν, ούΒεΙς αμφότερα j€ λεγωι» καΐ 
 Βοζάζων καΐ εφατττόμενος αμφοΐν ifj 'ψ^υχτ} εϊττοί αν καϊ 
 Βοζάσειεί', ως το έτερον ετερόν εστίν, εατεον δε καΐ σοΙ 
 το ρήμα ττερί του έτερου, λέγω <γαρ αυτό τ/} δε, μηΒενα 
 8οζάζείν, ως το αίσχ^ρόν καΧόν η αΧΧο τί ' των τοιούτων. D 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Άλλ\ ώ ^ωκρατες, εω τε και μοι 8οκεΐ ως 
 \εyεις. Σ Ω. "Αμφω μεν αρα Βοξάζοντα αΒννατον το 
 έτερον έτερον Βοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικεν. Έ,Ω.. Άλλ<χ 
 μην το ετερόν 'γε μόνον Βοξάζων, το δε έτερον μη^αμτ], 
 οΰΒέτΓοτε δοξάσει το έτερον έτερον εΐυαι. ΘΕΑΙ. ΆΧηθή 
 Xεyεις' άνα^κάζοιτο yap αν εφάτττεσθαι καΐ ου μή 
 δοξάζει. ^Ω. Οντ* dp" αμφότερα οΰτε το έτερον Βο- 
 ^άζοντι εγχωρεί άΧΧοΒοζεΙν. ωστ εϊ τις ' όριεΐται Be- Ε 
 ζαν eivai -ψευΒή το ετεροΒοζ^Ιν, ουΒεν αν Xeyoi' ούτε 
 yap ταΰττ] ούτε κ ατοί τά ττρότερα φαίνεται ^^τευΒής εν 
 ήμΐν οΰσα Βόξα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ουκ εοικεν. XXXIII. ^^Ω, 
 Αλλα μεντοι, ώ Θεαίτητε, εΐ τούτο μη φανήσεται ον^ 
 ττοΧΧά άvayκaσθησόμεθa 6μoXoyεΐv καϊ ίίτοττα. ΘΕΑΙ. 
 
 5—2 
 
68 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 Τα τΓοΙα Βή ; 2,Ω. Ουκ βρω σοι, ττρίν αν πταντα'χτϊ 
 Ίτειραθω σκοιτων. αίσ'χυνοΐμ.ην <yap αν virep ημ,ων, iv 
 ω ατΓορονμβν, αΐ'α<γκαζομ€νων ομοΧο'γεΐν οΙα λέγω. αλΧ' 
 iQi €αν * €νρωμ€ν καΐ eXevOepoi ^γβνώμεθα, τ6τ ηΕη ττβρί 
 των αλΧων εροΰμεν ω? ττασ'χοντων αυτά, e/cro? του 
 yeXoLOV εστώτβς' eav δε iravTrj άττορήσωμβν, ταττεινω- 
 θεντες, οίμαΰ, τω λόγω τταρβζομβν ως ναυτίωντβς ττατβΐν 
 Τ€ καΐ 'χ^ρήσθαι ο τι αν βονΧηταί. y ούν ert ττόρον τινά, 
 ευρίσκω του ζητήματος ήμΐν, άκουε. Θ Ε ΑΙ. Λέγε 
 μόνον. Σ Ω. Ου φησω ημίις ορθώς ομοΧοΎησαί, ηνίκα 
 ωμοΧοΎησαμεν, α τίς olSev, αδύνατον Βοζάσαι α μη 
 
 ν> oiBev είναι αυτά, καΐ ' ψευσθηναί' άΧΧά tttj δυνατόν. 
 ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αρα λέ'γεί? υ καΐ iyco τότε ύττωτττευσα ηνίκ 
 αυτό εφαμεν, τοιούτον είναι, οτι ενίοτ ε<γω 'γΐ'γνωσκων 
 ^ωκράτη, ττόρρωθεν δε opcbV clXXov, ον ου ^ί^νώσχω, 
 αηθην εΙναί Σωκράτη, ον oiSa ', 'yίyvετaL• yap hrj εν τώ 
 τοιουτω οίον Χέζεις. ΣΩ. Ούκοϋν άττεστημεν αύτου, 
 Ότί α ϊσμεν, εττοίει ημίΐς ε18ότας μη εΙΒέναι ; ΘΕΑΙ. 
 ΤΙάνν μεν οΰν, ΣΩ. Μ^ γαρ ούτω τιθώμεν, αλλ' ώδε. 
 καυ Ισως ιτη ημΐν συγχέω ρήσεται, ϊσως δε άντίτενεΐ. 
 
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70 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 verai €'χων κατά ταύτα, Ό αισθάνεται' και Ό αύ μη oiSe 
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 7Γθ\ύ ΤΓλεΐον άττεΧείφθην η τότε. XXXIV. ΧΠ. "^Ωδε 
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 τοίνυν, ΟΤΙ τον μεν yιyvώσκωv υμών, τον Βε μή yiyvw- 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟ^:. 71 
 
 σκων, αΙσθανομ6νο<ζ Se μη^ετβρον, ουκ άν ττοτε αν 
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 ΘΕΑΙ. "Eoi/ce yap, ω ^ωκρατε<^, θαυμάσιων; ω λεγεί? 
 το τη<ζ Βόξης ττάθος. ^Ω. "Ετύ τοίνυν καϊ όταν άμφο- 
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 την αϊσθησιν έ'%ω, ο iv τοις ττρόσθεν ούτως eXeyov 
 και μου τότε ουκ iμάvθavες. ΘΕΑΙ. Ου yap ούν. 
 ^Ω. Τούτο μην eXeyov, Οτι yιyvωσκωv τον €τερον καϊ 
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 του ε'χων, ούΒεττοτε οΐήσεται είναι αυτόν ετερυν τίνα 
 ων yιyvώσκει τε καΧ αισθάνεται καΐ την yvώσιv αΰ 
 
72 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 και €Κ€ΐνου β'χει κατά την αϊσθησιν. ην yap τούτο ; 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Nat. λΩ. ΐΙαρέλβίττΕτο δε je ττον το νυν Xeyo- 
 μβνον, iv ω S?) φαμβν την ψβνΒη So^av yiyveaOai το 
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 οταν τοίνυν τω μβν Trapfj αϊσθησί<ζ των σημείων, τω he 
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 Β δό|^α, εϊ τί νυν ημεΐ<ζ ύyίeς \eyoμ€v' ττερί δε ων ϊσμεν 
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 XεyετaL• ; 2Ω. "Ert τοίνυν καΐ τά8ε άκουσας ' μάΧΧον 
 
 C αυτό ερεΐς. το μεν yap τάΧηθεζ Βοξάζειν καΧόν, το δε 
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 τοίνυν φασιν ενθεν^ε yίyvεσθaί. οταν μεν 6 κηρός τον 
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 ωpyaσμεvoς η, τα Ιόντα Sea των αΙσθησεων, ενσημαί- 
 νόμενα εΙς τούτο το της ψυ'χτ}ς κεαρ, ο εφη 'Όμηρος 
 αινυττομενος την του κηρού ομοιότητα, τότε μεν καΐ 
 τούτοις καθαρά τά ' σημεία εyyiyvόμεva καΐ Ικανώς 
 
 D τού βάθους εγοντα ττοΧυγ^ρόνιά τε yίyvετaL καΐ είσΐν 
 οΐ τοιούτοι Ίτρώτον μεν εύμαθεΐς, εττειτα μνήμονες, είτα 
 ου τταραΧΧάττουσί των αισθήσεων τά σημεία, άΧΧά 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ:. 73 
 
 Βο^άζονσίν αΧηθη. σαφή yap καΧ ev εύρνχωρία οντά 
 τα'χυ Βιανβμουσίν βττί τα αυτών βκαστα eKpLayela, Ιΐ 
 Βή 'όντα καΧεΙται. και σοφοί Βή ούτοί καΧοΰνταί. η 
 ου Βοκ€Ϊ σοι ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ύττβρφυώ'ζ μεν οΰν. ^Ω.. 'Όταν 
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 yap ουκ εν υ. ασαφή δέ καΐ οΐ τά isypa' ύττο yap του 
 συγχ^εΐσθαί ταχύ * yLyvετab άμυΒρά. εάν δέ ττροζ ττάσι 1 95 
 τούτοις εΐΓ άΧΧήΧων συμττετττωκοτα y υττο στενοχώ- 
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 θότατα άνθρώττων XεyεLς, ώ %ώκρατες. %ίΙ. Φώμευ 
 άρα εν ήμίν ψευΒεΐς Βύξας είναι; ΘΕΛΙ. "^φόΒρα yε. 
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 ονν οΐόμεθα ίκανώς ώμoXoyήσθaί, Ότί τταντος μάΧΧον 
 εστον αμφότερα τούτω τώ Βόξα ; ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ύττερφυώς 
 μεν οΰν. XXXV. 2ΐΩ. Αεινόν τε, ώ Θεαίτητε, ως 
 άΧηθώς κινΒυνεύει καϊ άη^ες είναι άνήρ άΒοΧεσχης. 
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 του Βυσμαθίαν Βυσχεράνας καϊ ως άΧηθώς άΒοΧεσχίαν. 
 τί yap ην τις άλλο θεΐτο Ονομα, Όταν άνω κάτω τονς 
 
74 ΠΛΑΤΩΝ02 
 
 λόγου? βΧκτ) τίζ ντΓο νωθείας ου Βυνάμβνος ιτεισθηναί, 
 και y ^υσαττάΚΚακτο^ αφ' εκάστου \oyov ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ζ,υ 
 δε Βή τι Βυαγ^εραίρβίς ; ^Ω. Ου ^υσχ^βραίνω μόνον, 
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 ev ταϊζ αίσθήσεσίν εστί ιτρος αλλ?;λ(Χ9 οϋτ εν ταΐς 
 Ό Βίανοίαις, αλλ' εν Trj ' συνάψει αίσθήσεως ττροζ Βία- 
 νοίαν ; Φΐ]σω δε εγώ, οΐμαί, καΧΧωττίζομενος ως τί 
 ενρηκότων ημών καΧόν. ΘΕΑΙ. "Ε/^οί-γε Βοκεΐ, ώ Χώ- 
 κρατες, ουκ αίσχ^ρον είναι το νυν άττοΒε^εΐ'γμενον. λΩ. 
 Οΰκοΰν, φήσει, 'λεyεL<;, οτι αύ τον ανθρωττον, Όν hia- 
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 οίηθείημεν εΐΐ'αι, ον αυ ούτε ορωμεν ούτε άτττομεθα, 
 Βιανοονμεθα δε μόνον καΐ αλλ' ούΒεν αίσθανομεθα ττερι 
 αυτού; Ύαντα, οϊμαι, φήσω Xiyetv. ΘΕΑΙ. ΚαΙ ορθώς 
 Ε γε. Χω. Ύί οΰν ; ' φήσει' τα ενΕεκα, α μφεν αΧλο ή 
 διανοείται τις, άΧΚο τι εκ τούτου του λόγου ουκ αν 
 ΊΓΟτε οίηθείη δώδβΛτα είναι, α μόνον αύ διανοείται ; ϊθΰ 
 οΰν δ?/, συ άττοκρίνου. ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' άττοκρινοΰμαι, 
 ΟΤΙ όρων μεν αν τις i) εφατττόμενος οίηθείη τα ενΒεκα 
 ΒώΒεκα είναι, ά μεντοι εν ττ) Siavola βχει, ουκ αν ττοτε 
 ττερΙ αυτών ταύτα Βοζάσειεν ούτω. ΧΩ. Τ/ οΰν) οϊει 
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 εκεί μνημεία εν τω εκμα^είω είναι καΐ ψευΒτ} εν αυτοΐς 
 ουκ είναι Βοξάσαι, ταύτα αυτά εϊ τις άνθρωττων η^η 
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 ητοτ εστί, καΐ ό μεν τις είττεν οίηθείς ενΒεκα αυτά 
 είναι, ό δε ΒώΒεκα' η ττάντες Χέ^ουσί τε και οίονται 
 ΒώΒεκα αυτά είναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ου μά τον Αία, άΧΧά 
 
0EAITIITO:S. 75 
 
 TToWol B>) Koi ei'SeKa. ' eav 3e ye iv nfkeLOVL αριθμώ Β 
 Ti9 σκοττηται, μαΧλον σφαΧλεται. οΤμαι, yap σε ττερι 
 τταντοζ μάΧλον αριθμού Xeyeiv. 2^Ω. ^Ορθω<; yap oXet. 
 καΐ Ινθυμου, μη τι "ποτέ yLyverai aXko ή αντα τα 
 ^ώΒεκα τα iv τω eκμayeίω ενΒεκα οίηθηναι. ΘΕΑΙ. 
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 Tjvay κάζο μεν μη είναι ' ψευΒη Βόξαν, ΐνα μη τα αυτά 6 C 
 αΰτος άvayκάζoιτo εΙΒώς μη είΒεναι αμα. ΘΕΑΙ. Άλτ;- 
 θεστατα. ^Ω. Οΰκοΰν αλΧ' οτιουν Set άττοφαίνειν το 
 τά ΛίτευΒή Βοξάζειν η Βιανοίας ττρος αϊσθησίν τταραΧ- 
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 'Σώκρατες. %Ω,. Άλλα μεντοι αμφότερα ' ye κινΒυ- D 
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 τεον, τι εΐ ετπ'χείρήσαίμεν άναισ-χυντείν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πω? ; 
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 στασθαί. ΘΕΑΙ. ΚσΙ τι τούτο αναίσγυντον ; 3Ω. 
 "Eot/ca? ουκ ivvoetv, Ότι ττα? ημΐν εζ αρ'χ^τ}^ ο \cyoς 
 ζήτησίζ yεyovεv εττιστήμης, ως ουκ είκοσι, τι ττοτ 
 εστίν. ΘΕΑΙ. ^Έννοώ μεν οΰν. ^Ω. "Επειτ ουκ 
 άναιΒες 8οκεΐ, μη εΙΒότας εττιστημην άττοφαινεσθαι το 
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 yap είρηκαμεν το yιyvώσκoμεv καΐ ου yιyvωσκoμεv, και 
 ετΓίστάμεθα καΐ ουκ εττιστάμεθα, ως τι συνιεντες «λ- 
 "ΚηΚων εν ω ετι εττιστημην άyvooυμεv. ει οε βουΧει, 
 κα\ νυν εν τω τταρόντι κεχρήμεθ^ αύ τω ayι•oεΐv τε 
 
76 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 και σννιίναι, ώς ττροσηκον αντοΐζ γ^ρησθαι, etirep στε- 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΙΙΤΟ^. 77 
 
 ΒοκΓ] αΐ'τω. ΘΕΑΙ. Έστί ταύτα. ΣΩ. ΤΙάΧιν δ>;, 
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 τα? δέ κατ 6XL'yaς, βνίας δε μόνα'ζ 8ίά ιτασων, oirrj 
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 το έττίστασθαΰ τουτ eivat. ΘΕΑΙ. "Εστω. 2Ω. Το 
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 6 τοιούτος αριθμοί αν ττοτε τι η αντυ ττρος αυτόν // 
 
78 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 άΧλο TC των έ'^ω, όσα e^et άρίθμόρ ; Θ Ε ΑΙ. Πώ? yap 
 ου ; 5)Ω. Το δε αρίθμβΐν ye ov/c αΧλο το θησομεν του 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 79 
 
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so ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 ISQ. ο J ράΒών 76, ώ Θεαίτητε, μη iiraLvelv σε. Ό 
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 ryap ; Χω. Άλλ' άΧηθή <ye, καΙ ώ? εΙΒώς Βίακείσεται, 
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 Β "yap εΧε<^/κτικος εκείνος <γεΧασας φησει' ' ΤΙότερον, ώ 
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 νά^κη, ω ^ωκρατες, εν τω τταρόντι ως Χε'γεις οϊεσθαι. 
 XXXVIII. Χω. Ύί οΰν τις ερεΐ ιτάΧιν εζ άρχ^7}ς εττιστή- 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 81 
 
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 2^Ω. Ό τον Ίτοταμον καθ 7]y ο ύμενο';, ώ Θεαίτητε, εφη 
 αρα ^είζειν αυτό' καν τούτο εάν Ιόντε^ ερευνώ μεν, τάχ^ 
 αν εμτΓοΒιον yevόμεvov αυτό * φ7)νειε το ζητουμένου, 20ΐ 
 μενονσί Se 8ήΧον ουΒεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ορθώς Xeyet^' aW 
 ϊωμεν ye καΐ σκοττώμεν. 2Ω. Ονκοϋν τούτο yε βρα- 
 χείας σκέψεως' τε-χνη yap σοι ό\η σημαίνει μί) είναι 
 ετΓίστήμην αυτό. ΘΕΑΙ. Υίώς δτ; ; κα\ τίς αύτη ; ΣΩ. 
 *Η των /χεγ/στων εΙς σοφίαν, ους Βή καΧούσι ρήτορας 
 τε καΐ δικανικούς, οντοι yap ττον ττ] εαυτών τέχνη 
 ττείθουσιν ου ΒιΒάσκοντες, αλΧά Ζοζάζειν ττοιούντες α ίιν 
 βούΧωνται. ή συ οϊει Βεινούς τινας οίτω ΒώασκάΧονς 
 είναι, ώστε οίς ' μί) ^Γapεyevovτό τίνες άττοστερουμενοις υ 
 χρήματα ή rt clXXo βιαζομενοις, τούτοις Βύνασθαι ττρος 
 νΒωρ σμικρόν ΒίΒάξαι Ικανώς των yεvo μένων την αΧη- 
 θειαν ; ΘΕΑΙ. ΟύΒαμώς Ιγωγε οΐμαι, άΧΧά ττεΐσαι 
 μεν. ^Ω, Το ττεΐσαι δ' ουχί Βοζάσαι Xεyεις ττοιησαΐ] 
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 μί], ταύτα τότε εζ ακοής κρίνοντες, αΧηθή Ζυζαν ' λα- Ο 
 βόντες, (ίνευ εττιστήμης έκριναν, ορθά ττεισθεντες, ειττερ 
 ευ ε^ίκασαν ; ΘΕΑΙ. ΐΐαντάττασι μεν ονν. !χΩ. Ουκ 
 αν, ώ φίΧε, ει yε ταντον ην Βό^α τε άΧηθής [καΐ Βικα- 
 στ7]ρια] καΐ επιστήμη, ορθά ττοτ αν Βίκαστής άκρος 
 Κ. Ρ. C 
 
82 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 βΖόξαζβν avev €7ηστημη<^' νυν δε eotKev ά\\ο η €κα• 
 repov βϊναι. ΘΕΑΙ. '^Ο γε iyco, ώ ΧωκρατΕς, βίττόντος 
 του άκουσας ΙτΓίΚεΧησμ,ην, νυν δ' ivvow. βφη δε την 
 
 Ί) μβν μβτά \6^ου άΧηθή Βόξαν ετηστήμην elvai, ^ την δε 
 ciXoyov έκτος βττίστήμη^;' και ών μεν μή εστί Χο^ος, 
 ουκ ετΓίστητά είναι, ούτωσΐ καΐ ονομάζων, α δ' εχ^ει, 
 ετΓίστητά. ΣΩ. Ή καΧώς λεγε^?. τά δε Βτ} ετηστητά 
 ταύτα καΐ μη Trrj SirjpEL, Xeye, εϋ dpa κατά ταύτα συ τε 
 Λίαγώ άκηκόαμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' ουκ οϊΒα, εΐ εξευρησω' 
 Χε^οντος μεντ αν έτερου, (νς ε^ωμαι, άκοΧουθησαιμι. 
 XXXIX. ΣΩ. "Ακουε Βή οναρ άντΙ ονείρατος. εγω 
 
 Ε yap αυ έΒόκουν ακούεον τινών, οτι τά μεν ' ττρώτα 
 οίονττερεί στοιγεία, εξ ων ημείς τε συηκ,είμεθα καΐ 
 τάΧΧα, Xoyov ουκ ε'χοι. αύτο yap καθ^ αυτό 6/<:αστον 
 ονομάσαι μόνον εϊη, ιτροσειττείν δε ούΒΙν αΧΧο Βυνατον, 
 ονσ ως εστίν, ουσ ως ουκ εστίν ηοη yap αν ουσιαν 
 ;ο2 * η μη ούσίαν αύτω ττροστίθεσθαι, ΒεΙν δε οΰΒεν ττροσ- 
 φερειν, εϊττερ αυτό εκείνο μόνον τις ερεΐ. εττεϊ ούΒε το 
 αύτο ούΒε το εκείνο ούΒε το εκαστον ουδέ το μόνον 
 ούΒε το τούτο πτροσοιστέον, ουΒ άΧΧα ττοΧΧα τοιαύτα. 
 ταύτα μεν yap ττερυτρεχοντα ττασι ττροσφερεσθαο έτερα 
 οντά εκείνων, οίς Ίτροστίθεται, Βεΐν δε, εϊττερ rjv Βυνατον 
 αύτο XεyεσθaL• και είγεν οικεΐον αυτού Xoyov, άνευ των 
 άΧΧων άττάντων Xεyεσθaι, νύν δε άΒύνατον είναι οτιούν 
 
 Β των Ίτρώτων ρτ]θηναι ' λόγω* ου yap είναι αυτω αλλ ή 
 ονομάζεσθαι μόνον' ι!νομα yap μόνον εχειν, τά δε εκ 
 τούτων ηΒη συyκεΊμεva, ωσττερ αυτά ττεττΧεκται, οντω 
 καΐ τά ονόματα αυτών συμττΧακεντα Xoyov yEyovhai' 
 ονομάτων yap συμττΧοκην είναι Xόyoυ ουσιαν. ούτω 
 Βη τά μεν στοιχεία aXoya καΐ άyvωστa είναι, αισθητά 
 δε* τάς δε συΧΧαβάς yvωστάς τε καΐ ρητάς καΐ αΧηθεΙ 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 83 
 
 όόξη Βοξαστάς. όταν μβν οΰν t'lveu Xoyou την άΧηθη 
 So^av τινός τί<ζ Χαβτ}, αΧηθεϋείν μεν αυτού την ' "ψν-γην c 
 ΤΓβρΙ αυτό, ytyvwaKeLv δ' ου' τον <γάρ μη Βυνάμβνον 
 Βοΰναί Τ6 καΐ ^βξασθαί Xoyov άνβτηστήμονα elvai irepl 
 τούτου' ττροσΧαβόντα Be Xoyov 8υνατόν re ταύτα ττάντα 
 yey ovkvai καΐ τελβ/ω? ττρος• έττίστήμην βχειν. Ούτως συ 
 το α'ΰτΓΓίον ή αλΧως ακηκοας ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ούτω μεν οΰν 
 τταντάττασιν. ΧΩ. 'ApeV/cei ούν σε καϊ τίθεσαο ταύτη, 
 So^av αληθή μετά X6yoυ ειτιστήμην είναι ; ΘΕΑΙ. 
 Κομώβ μεν οΰν. ΧΩ. ^Αρ', ώ (""Θεαίτητε, ' νύν ούτω D 
 τ^^δε τβ ήμερα εΙΧηφαμεν ο ττάΧαί καϊ ττοΧΧοΙ των 
 σοφών -ζητούντες ττρίν εύρείν κaτεyήpaσav ; ΘΕΑΤ. 
 ^ΈJμo\,yoύv Βοκεΐ, ώ ^ωκρατες, καΧας XεyεσθaL το νύν 
 ρηθέν. Χω. ΚαΙ εΙκός yε αΰτο τούτο ούτως εχ^ειν' 
 τις yap αν καϊ ετι ετηστημη εϊη 'χ^ωρίς Xόyoυ τε καΐ 
 ορθής Βοξης ; εν μεντοο τι με των ρηθίντων άτταρεσκει. 
 ΘΕΛΙ. Το ΤΓοΐον Βή ; ΣΩ. '^Ο καϊ Βοκεΐ Xέyεσθac 
 κομψότατα, ως τά μεν στοιχεία ayvωστa, το Βε των 
 συΧΧαβών ykvos ' yvωστόv. ΘΕΑΙ. Ούκούν ορθώς ; Ε 
 ΧΩ. Ιστεον 8 ή' ώσττερ yap όμηρους ε-χομεν τού Xόyoυ 
 τα τΓapaBείyμaτa, οίς γ^ρώμενος είττε τταντα ταύτα. 
 ΘΕχ\Ι. ΙΙοΐα Βή ; ΧΩ. Τα των ypaμμάτωv στοι-χ^εΐά 
 τε και συΧλαβας. η οίεΰ αΧΧοσε irot βλεττοντα ταύτα 
 είττεΐν τον είττόντα, ά Xeyoμεv', ΘΕΑΙ. Ou/c, αλλ' εΙς 
 ταύτα. XL. ΧΩ. ν>ασανίζωμεν * Βή αυτά άναΧαμβά- 205 
 νοντες, μίΐΧΧον Βε ημάς αυτούς, ούτως ή ούχ^ ούτως 
 y ράμματα εμάθομεν. φίρε ττρώτον' άρ' αϊ μεν συΧ- 
 ΧαβαΙ Xoyov εχ^ουσι, τά Βε στοιχ^εΐα aXoya; ΘΕΑΙ. 
 ' \σως. ^Ω. ΐΐάνυ μεν οΰν καϊ εμοϊ φαίνεται. Σωκρά- 
 τους yoύv ει τις εροιτο την ττρώτην συΧΧαβήν ούτωσί, 
 Ω (-)εαίτητε, Xεyε τι εστί σω, τι άττοκρινεΐ; ΘΕΑΙ. 
 
 0—2 
 
84 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 "Οτι σϊ'γμα καΐ ω. SO. Ούκοΰν τούτον (^χ^ίς \6yov 
 ttJ? συΧλαβης ; ΘΕΑΙ. Έγωγε. 5^Ω. "Ιθο Βή, ουτω'ζ 
 
 Β βΙτΓβ και τον του ' σίημα \όηον. ΘΕΑΙ. ΚαΙ ττώ? του 
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 το Τ6 σΓγ/χα των άφωνων εστί, ^Ρ'όφος τΐζ μόνον, οίον 
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 ovT€ ^^όφος, ουδέ των ττΧβίστων στοιχείων, ώστε ττάνυ 
 €v έχει το Χε^εσθαι, αύτα dXoya, ων ye τα εvapyεστaτa 
 αυτά, τά ετττά, φωνήν μόνον έχει, \oyov όε ov8^ οντινονν. 
 2Ω. ΎουτΙ μεν άρα, ώ εταίρε, κατωρθώκαμεν ττερι εττι- 
 
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 ματος. άΧΧο τι υ yιyvώσκωv αύτην τά αμφότερα 
 
 D yιyvώσκει ; ΘΕΑΙ. ' Ύί μην ; ΧΩ. Το σlyμa καΐ το 
 ω άρα yιyvώσκει. ΘΕΑΙ. Να./. 2Ω. Ύί δε; εκάτερον 
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 Ε σεται. ΘΕΑΙ. ΚαΙ μάλα yε ' εξαίφνης. ΧΩ. Ου yap 
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 ΣΩ. Πάλίΐ^ δ' ούΒεν Χέ^ομεν τα τταντα Xέyovτες ; 
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 SG ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟ 
 
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ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 87 
 
 ω ^ωκρατεζ, μόρια ταύτης συ^χωροίην, yeXouv ττου 
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 τά ττάντα μέρη τω υΧω ταύτον εφάνη. ΘΕΑΙ. ' Και Ε 
 μάΧα. ΧΩ. Et δε 7^ ^'^ "^^ ^^f' αμερες, ομοίως μεν 
 συΧΧαβί], ωσαύτως Βε στοιχεΐον dXoyov τε καϊ άyvω- 
 στον' η yap αυτή αίτια ττοιήσει αυτά τοιαύτα. ΘΕΑΙ. 
 Ουκ εχω άΧΧως είττεΐν. SD.. Ύούτο μεν άρα μη άττο- 
 ^εχωμεθα, Ός άν Xiyrj συΧΧαβην μεν yvωστov καϊ 
 ρητόν, στοιχεΐον 8ε τουναντίον. ΘΕΑΙ. jM;) yap, εϊ- 
 ττερ τω λόγω ττειθόμεθα. 5)Ω. * Ύί δ' αν ; τουναντίον 2θ5 
 Xεyovτoς άρ ου μαΧΧον άν άττοΒεζαιο εζ ών αυτός 
 σύνοισθα σαυτω εν τή τών ypaμμάτωv μαθησει ; 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Τϋ 17 οίον \ ΣΩ. Ώ? ού^εν άΧΧο μανθΰνων 
 ΒιετέΧεσας ή τά στοιχεία εν τε τή όψει SLayιyι•ώσκειv 
 
88 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 ττεφώμενος καΐ eV ry άκοτ} αύτο καθ" αύτο βκαστον, ϊνα 
 μη Ύ) θεσι<; ae ταράττοι Χε'γομά'ων τ€ καΙ 'γραφομβί'ων. 
 ΘΕΑΙ. ^ΑΧηθεστατα Xeyet^. ΧΩ^. Έζ^ δε κιθαριστοΰ 
 τεΧεω? μεμαθηκίναι μων άΧΧο τί ήν ή το τω φθό'^- 
 
 V, γω ' βκάστω Βύνασθαι βττακοΧονθβΐρ, ττοί'α? χορδ?;? €ίη' 
 α St] στοί'χ^βΐα ττα'ζ αν ομοΧο^ησβίβ μουσικής; XejeaOai', 
 ΘΕΑΙ. OvSev αΧΧο. λΩ. Ό.ν μεν up αυτοί βμττειροί 
 βσμεν στοί'χείων καΐ συΧΧαβών, el Set άττο τούτων 
 τεαμαίρεσθαυ καΐ et? τα αΧΧα, ττοΧύ το των στοί-χείων 
 yevo<; εναρΎεστεραν τε την ηνωσιν εγειν φήσομεν καΐ 
 κνρίωτεραν τ?;9 σνΧΧαβης ττρος το Χαβεΐν τεΧεω<ί εκα- 
 στον μάθημα, καΐ εάν τί<=; φη συΧΧαβην μεν γνωστόν, 
 ayvωστov δε ττεφνκεναι στοΐ'χ^εΐον, εκόντα η άκοντα 
 τταίζείν ηηησόμεθ' αυτόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Κο/χίδ?; μεν ουν. 
 
 C XLII. ΖΩ. ' Άλλα δ?) τούτου μεν ετΰ καν άΧΧαί 
 φανεΐεν άττοΒείξείς, ω? εμοί Βοκεΐ' το δε ττροκείμενον 
 μη ετΓίΧαθωμεθα Bl αυτά ΙΒεΐν, ο τί Ζηιτοτε καΐ λέγεται 
 το μετά Βό^η<; άΧηθους Xoyov ιτροσ^ενόμενον την τελεω- 
 τάτην ετΓίστήμην ^ε^ονεναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ούκουν 'χρή οράν. 
 , ^Ω. Φε'ρε δ/;, τι ττοτε βούΧεται τον Xoyov ημίν σημαί- 
 
 \ νειν ; τριών yap εν τι μου Βοκεΐ XεyεLv. ΘΕΑΙ. Ύί- 
 
 1> νων οη ', 2^11. Ιο μεν ττρωτον ειη αν το την αυτού 
 Βοάνοίαν εμφανή ττοιείν δί.α φωνί/ζ μετά ρημάτων τε 
 καΐ ονομάτων, ωσττερ εί? κάτοτττρον η ύδωρ την Sc^av 
 εκτυτΓούμενον εΙς την Βιά του στόματος ροην. η ου 8οκεΐ 
 σοι το τοιούτον Xoyo^ είναι', ΘΕΑΙ. "Ε//.οίγε. τον y ου ν 
 αυτό Βρώντα Xεyειv φαμεν. ΣΩ. Ούκουν αύ τούτο ye 
 '7Γά<ζ τΓοιεΐν Βυνατό<; θάττον η σ'χοΧαίτερον, το εν8εί- 
 ζασθαι τι Βοκεΐ ττερί εκάστου αύτω, ό μη ενεόζ ή κωφόζ 
 άιτ α/3%^;9' και ούτω<ζ όσοι τι ορθόν Βοξάζουσι, ιτάντεζ 
 
 Ε αυτό μετά ' Xoyov φανουνται εγοντε'^, καΐ ούΒαμοΰ 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 89 
 
 • 
 
 6TL• ορθη Ζόζα χίορίς βτηστήμης yevr/aeraL. ΘΕΑΙ. 
 
 \\Χηθη, ΣΩ. 'Μη τοίνυν ρα^ίως κατα'^ί'^νώσκωμεν τυ 
 
 μηΒβν βιρηκβναί τον αττοφηνάμενον βττίστημην, Ό νυν 
 
 σκοτΓοΰμεν. ϊσως yap 6 Χί^ων ου τοΰτο eXeyev, άλλα 
 
 το βρωτηθίντα τί βκαστον Βυνατον eluai την άττόκρισιν 
 
 Sui των στοΐ'χείων άττοΒοΰναΰ * τω €ρομίνω. ΘΕΑΙ. 207 
 
 Οίον τί XeyeL^, ω ^ώκρατε^ ; ΣΩ. Οίον καΐ 'Ή.σίοζο<; 
 
 Trepl άμάζη<ζ Xeyet το εκατόν δε re 8ονραθ^ αμάξης, α 
 
 iycu μεν ουκ αν ^νναίμΎ)ν elirelv, οΐμαι δε οι/δε σΰ' αλλ' 
 
 άya'π^o:^μev αν ερωτηθέντες ο τί εστίν α. μάζα, εΐ εγοιμεν 
 
 είττείν τροχ^οί, άξων, ύττερτερία, avτυyες, ζυyόv. ΘΕΑΙ. 
 
 ανυ μεν ουν. ΧΙΙ. U oεye ίσως ololt αν ημάς, ούσττερ 
 
 αν το σον όνομα ερωτηθεντας καϊ αττο κρίνο μένους κατά 
 
 συΧλαβήν, yε\oίoυς εϊναι ' ορθώς μεν δοξάζοντας καϊ Β 
 
 \έyovτaς α 'Xεyoμεv, οίομενους δε ypaμμaτiκoυς είναι 
 
 καϊ εχ^είν τε καΐ 'λέyειv ypaμμaτίκώς τον του Οεαιτήτου 
 
 ονόματος \6yov. το δ' ουκ είναι ετηστημόνως ούΒεν \εyείv, 
 
 ΊτρΙν άν δ^ά των στοιγείων μετά της άΧηθους 8όξης 
 
 εκαστον ττεραίντ) τις, οττερ καϊ εν τοις ττρόσθεν ττου 
 
 ερρήθη. ΘΕΑΙ. 'Έρρήθη yap. ^Ω. Οίίτω τοίνυν καϊ 
 
 •περί αμάξης ημάς μεν ορθην ε-χειν 8οξαν, τον δε δία 
 
 των εκατόν εκείνων ^υνάμενον 8ίε\θεΐν αυτής την ' ου- G 
 
 σίαν, ττροσΧαβόντα τούτο, \6yov τε τΓροσείληφεναι ττ} 
 
 άΧηθεΐ ^όξτ] καϊ άντΙ Ζοξαστικου τεχνικόν τε καϊ ετη- 
 
 στημονα ττερί αμάξης ουσίας yεyovεvaL•, Sia στοιχ^είων 
 
 το όΧον ττεράναντα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ούκουν ευ Βοκεΐ σοι, ώ 
 
 ^ούκρατες ; ΣΩ. Et σοί, ώ εταίρε, Βοκεΐ, καΐ άττο^εγει 
 
 την Βία του στοΐ'χ^είου ΒιέξοΒον ττερΙ εκάστου \oyov 
 
 είναι, την δε κατά συΧΧαβάς i) και κατά μείζον ετι 
 
 aXoyiav, τουτό μοι λε'γε, ΐν αυτυ ' εττισ κοιτώ μεν. D 
 
90 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Άλλα ιτάνυ άττοΒε^ομαί. Sfl. ΤΙότβρον yyov- 
 μενοζ έτΓίστημονα elvau όντινουν οτουουν, Όταν το αιτο 
 οτ€ μεν του αύτου Sokt} αντω είναι, τότε δε έτερου, ή και 
 όταν του αύτου τότε μεν έτερον, τότε δέ έτερον ^οξάζρ ; 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Μά ΔΓ ουκ έ'γωγβ. ΣΩ. Έΐτα άμνημονεΐζ εν 
 τβ των ypaμμάτωv μαθήσει κατ αργίας σαυτόν τε καΐ 
 τους αΧλουζ δρώντας αυτά ; ΘΕΑΙ. "^Κρα λεγεί? της 
 Ε αυτής συΧλαβής τότε μεν έτερον, τότε δε ' έτερον 
 yy ου μένους y ράμμα, καΐ το αύτο τότε μεν εΙς την ττροσ- 
 ηκουσαν, τότε δε εΙς άΧλην τιθέντας συΧλαβην ; %Ω.. 
 Ύαΰτα λέγω. ΘΕΑΙ. ]\Ιά ΔΓ ου τοίνυν άμνημονώ, 
 οΰΒε yi ττω ηyoυμai εττίστασθαι τους ούτως έχοντας' 
 ΣΩ. τ/ ουν ; όταν εν τω τοιοΰτω καιρώ ^εαίτητον 
 ypa^wv τις θήτα καΐ ε οϊηταί τε Βεΐν ypάφειv κα\ 
 2oS Ύράψΐ), καΐ αΰ * ^εό^ωρον εττί'χειρών ypάφειv ταυ καΐ 
 ε οϊηταί τε 8εΐν ypάφειv καΐ ypayjrr), dp εττίστασθαι 
 φήσομεν αΰτον την ττρωτην των υμετέρων ονομάτων 
 συΧλαβην ; ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' άρτι ώμoXoyήσaμεv τον ού- 
 τως έχοντα μήττω ειΒέναι. ΧΩ. Κωλι;εί. ουν τι καΐ ττερί 
 την ύευτεραν συΧλαβην καΐ τρίτην καΐ τετάρτην ούτως 
 εχειν τον αυτόν, ΘΕΑΙ. Οι;δε^» yε. ΙΕΩ. ^Αρ' ούν τότε 
 την δία στοιχείου ^ιεξοΒον €χων y ράψει θεαίτητον 
 μετά ορθής Βόξης, Οταν έξης ypάφrJ ; ΘΕΑΙ. AfjXov Βη. 
 Β Χω. ' Ούκουν ετι άνεττιστημων ων, ορθά δε Βοξάζων, 
 ώς φαμεν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Να/. 2^Ω. Aoyov yε έχων μετά 
 ορθής Βόξης. την yap Βια του στοιχείου οΒυν έχων 
 εypaφεv, ην δ?) \oyov ώμόλoyησaμεv. ΘΕΑΙ. ^ΑΧηθή. 
 Χω. ^'Έιστιν άρα, ώ εταίρε, μετά \oyoυ ορθή Βόξα, ην 
 οΰττω Βεΐ εττιστήμην καΧεΐν. ΘΕΑΙ. ΙίινΒυνεύει. XLIII. 
 5Ω. "Οναρ Βή, ώς εοικεν, εττλουτήσαμεν οίηθεντες βχειν 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 91 
 
 7ον αληθβστατον βττίστημης \c<yov. η μηττω κατψ/ο- 
 ρώμβν ; Γσω? yop ου τοΰτό ης αυτόν οριβΐταί, ' αλ- C 
 λα το ΧοίΤΓον βίΒος των τριών^ ών ev ye tl βφαμβν 
 Xoyov θήσεσθαί τον ίττιστημην οριζόμενον Βόζαν 
 elvai ορθτϊν μβτα λόγοι;. ΘΕΑΙ. ^Ορθώς ύττβμνησας' 
 €Τί yap €V ΧοίΤΓον. το μίν yap ήν διανοίας ev φωνΡ/ 
 ωσττβρ €ί8ω\ον, το δ' αρτί Χβ-χ^θβν Βίά στοιχείου όδος• 
 eVl το όλον' το δε δ^ τρίτον τι λεγεί? ; ]^Ω. "Οττερ 
 αν οΐ ΤΓολλοΙ eliTOLev, το ^χ^€ΐν tl ση μείον elireiv, ω των 
 άττάντων Βίαφβρεί τοΊρωτηθεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οίον τίνα τίνος 
 έχεις μοι \oyov είττεΐν ; ΣΩ. ' ΟΓοι^, ε^ βούΧει, ηΧίου D 
 ττερί ικανον οιμαί σοι είναι αττοΕε^ασθαί, ότι το Χαμττρό- 
 τατον εστί των κατά τον ούρανον Ιόντων ττερί yηι'. 
 ΘΕΑΙ. ΤΙάνυ μεν ούν. ^Ω. Ααβε 8ή ου χάριν εϊρηται. 
 εστί δε οττερ άρτι εK,εyoμεv, ως αρα την Βιαφοράν εκάσ- 
 του αν Χαμβάνρς, τ) των αΧ\ων Βιαφερει, Xoyov, ως 
 φασί τίνες, Χη^^ει' εως δ' αν κοινού τίνος εφάττττ], 
 εκείνων ττερι σοι εσται ο Xόyoς, ών αν η κοινότης y. 
 ΘΕΑΙ. ^Ιανθάνω' ' και μοι Βοκεΐ καΧώς εχειν Xoyov Κ 
 το τοιούτον καΧεΐν. ΣΩ. 'Ό? δ' αν μετ ορθής Βόξης 
 ττερι οτουούν των όντων την Βιαφοράν των αλΧων ττροσ- 
 Χάβυ, αυτού εττιστήμων yεyovώς βσται, ου ττρότερον ην 
 ^οξαστης. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμεν ye μην ούτω. ΣΩ. ΝΟζ' 
 Βήτα, ω Θεαίτητε, τταντάττασιν εγωγε, εττειΒή εγγ^^*» 
 ώσττερ σκιaypaφήμaτoς yέyova τού Xεyoμεvoυ, ξυνίημι 
 ουΒε σμικρόν, εω? δε άφεστήκη ττόρρωθεν, εφαίνετό τι 
 μοι Xεyεσθaι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πω? τι τούτο ; ΣΩ. * Φράσω, 209 
 εάν οΙός τε yεvωμaι. ορθήν εγωγε έχων Βόξαν ττερΙ σού, 
 εαν μεν ττροσΧάβω τον σον Xoyov, yιyvώσκω Βή σε, ει 
 δε μη, Βοξάζω μόνον. ΘΕΑΙ. Nat'. ΣΩ. Αόγο? δε yε 
 
92 ΠΛΑΤίΙΝΟ:^ 
 
 yu η της σης Ζίαφορότητος ίρμηνβία. ΘΕΑΤ. Οντως. 
 Χω. 'HvLfc ουν έΒόζαζον μόνον, αλΧο τι ώ των αλΧων 
 Βιαφερβίς, τούτων ονΒενος ητττόμην ττ) Siavoia ; ΘΕΑΙ. 
 OufC eoLK.6. ISO. Ύών κοινών tl cipa 8ί€νοονμην, ων 
 
 Ε ovSev συ μαΧλον ή τις αΧλ,ος €χ^€ί. ΘΕΑΙ. ' Ανάγκη. 
 2Ω. Φβρε Βή ττρυς Αίός' ττώς ττοτβ iv τω τοίούτω σβ 
 μαΧλον €Βόζαζον ή άΧλον όντινούν ; ΘΙς 'yap μβ Βιανοον- 
 μενον, ως €στίν ούτος (Θεαίτητος, ος αν y τ€ υνθρω- 
 ΤΓος καΧ e^rj ρίνα καΐ οφθαλμούς και στόμα καυ ούτω 
 Βή 6V βκαστον των μελών, αυτή ούν η διάνοια βσθ ο 
 Τΰ μαΧλον ττοιησβί μβ ^εαίτητον ή &60Βωρον Βιανο€Ϊσθαί, 
 i) το λεγό/χβζ^οι/, ^Ιυσών τον βσ-χατον ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί- <yap ; 
 !ΧΩ. 'Αλλ,' euv 8η μη μόνον τον βχ^οντα ρίνα καΐ οφθάλ- 
 
 C μούς διανοηθώ, ' άλ\α καΐ τον συμόν τβ καΐ εζόφθαΧμον, 
 μη το σε αύ μάΧλον 8οζασω ή βμαντον η όσοι τοιούτοι ; 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Oi'SeV. Χω. ΆΧλ' ου ττρότερόν ye, οΐμαι, 
 Θεαίτητος iv εμοί Βοζασθησεται,ττρ'ιν αν η σιμότης αυτή 
 τών άλλων σιμοτητων (Ζν 6γώ εώρακα Βίάφορόν τι 
 μνημεΐον τταρ* εμοί ενσημηναμενη καταθηταί, καϊ 
 τάλΧα ούτως εζ ών εΐ συ, η εμε, και εάν αύρων ατταν- 
 τησω, άναμνήσει καϊ ττοίήσει ορθά Βοξάζειν ττερί 
 
 Ό σου. ΘΕΑΙ. ^Αληθέστατα. 2Ω. ΐίερί την ' Βίαφο- 
 ρότητα άρα καϊ η ορθή 8όζα αν είη εκάστου ττερί. 
 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται ye. ΧΩ. Το ουν ττροσλαβεΐν \oyov 
 τη ορθί] Βόζη τί άν ετί εϊη ; εΐ μεν yap ττροσΒοξάσαι, 
 \εyεί y Ζίαφερει tl τών άλΧων, ττάνυ yελoLa yίyvετaι 
 Ύ] εττίτα^ις. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώ?; 2ΐ,Ω. "^ζίν όρθήν Βοξαν εχομεν, 
 rj τών άλΧων διαφέρει, τούτων ττροσλαβεΐν κεΧενεί 
 
 209 C. η 'έμε. Si rj Platonis est, neglcgentius scriptum videtur. 
 Bed nescio an debuerim vel cum Heindorfio ό vel ά reponere. 
 
ΘΕΑΙΤΠΤΟ^. 93 
 
 7;;u<a9 ορθην Ζόζαν, y των αΧλων Βίαφερ€ί. καΧ ουτω<ζ 
 η μεν σκυτάΧη<; η virepov η ότου Srj λε'γεταί ττεριτροττη 
 ττρος ' ταύτην την εττίταζίν ovSev αν Xeyot, τυφΧού Se Ε 
 τταρακέΧευσί'ζ αν κάλοΐτο Βικαωτερον' το yap α €χ^ομ€ν 
 ταύτα ττροσΧαβεΐν /ceXeveiv, Ινα μάθωμεν α Βοξάζομεν, 
 ττάνυ γενναίως εακεν εσκοτωμενω. ΘΕΑΙ. EtVe δ?;, 
 TL νυν δ?) ώ? ερών εττνθου ; ΣΩ. JLl το Xoyov, ώ τταΐ, 
 ττροσΧαβεΐν ^νωναι κεΧεύει, αΧΧα μ}) Βοξάσαϋ την 
 Βιαφορότητα, η8υ χρημ αν εϊη του καΧΧίστου των 
 ττερΰ ετΓίστήμης λόγου. το yap yvcovaL εττιστήμην 
 ΤΓου Χαβεΐν εστίν. * η yap', ΘΕΑΙ. Nat. 2ΐΩ. Ονκονν 2ΐο 
 ερωτηθείς, a? eoLK6, τι εστίν ετηστήμη, άττοκρίνείταυ, 
 οτί δό^α όρθη μετά ετηστήμης Βίαφορότητο^. Xόyoυ yap 
 ΤΓρόσΧη^Ιης τοΰτ αν εϊη κατ εκείνον. ΘΕΑΙ. ^' Κούκε, 
 ΣΩ. ΚαΙ τταντάττασί yε εΰηθες, ζ7}τούντων ημών ετη- 
 στήμην, Βόζαν φάναυ ορθην ευναι μετ εττιστημης εϊτε 
 Βίαφορότητος εϊτε ότονουν. ούτε άρα αϊσθησις, ώ Θεαί- 
 τητε, οΰτε Βόζα άΧηθης ούτε μετ άΧηθους Βόζης Χό- 
 yoς ' ΤΓ ρ ο σyίyv 6 μένος εττίστήμη άν εϊη. ΘΕΑΙ. Ουκ Β 
 εοίκεν. ^Ω. "Ή ονν ετυ κυουμεν tl καΐ ώΕίνομεν, ώ 
 φίΧε, ττερί ε7ηστ7]μης, ή ττάντα εκτετόκαμεν ; ΘΕΑΙ. 
 Kat ναο μα Al έγωγε ττΧείω ή 'όσα εΐ-χον εν εμαυτώ 
 8ιά σε εϊρηκα. 2,0.. Ούκοΰν ταύτα μεν ατταντα ?; 
 μαιευτική ημίν τεχ^νη ανεμιαΐά φησο yεyεvησθat καΐ 
 ουκ άξια τροφής; ΘΙΪΙιΑΙ. Ιΐαντάττασι μεν ονν. XLIV. 
 ^Ω. *Κάν τοίνυν άΧΧων μετά ταύτα εyκvμωv εττιχ^είρης 
 yLyvεσθac, ώ Θεαίτητε, εάν re ' yiyvrj, βεΧτιόνων εσει c 
 7ΓΧ^]ρης Βίά την νυν εζετασιν, εάν τε κενός γς, ήττον 
 εσεί βαρύς τοις συνούσι καΐ ήμερώτερος, σωφρόνως ουκ 
 Οίομενος elBivac ά μη οίσθα. τοσούτον yap μόνον η 
 
94 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΥ. 
 
 εμη Τ6χ^νη Βύναταί, ifkiov he ovSev, ovSe tl οί^α ων ol 
 άΧλοί, Όσου μβ'γαλοί καΐ θαυμάσιοι άνΒρβς είσί Τ6 καΐ 
 fyeyovaac. την Se μαιείαν ταύτην εγω re καΐ η μήτηρ 
 €κ θβοΰ εΚά'χομ6ν, η μίν των «γυναικών, eyco Se των 
 Τ> νβων τ€ ' καΐ «γβνναίων καΐ όσοι καΧοί. νυν μεν ουν 
 (ΐΊταντητεον μοο eh την του βασολεως στοάν eTrt την 
 MeXrJrou ^γραφήν, ην μ6 γεγραττταί.' 6ωθ6ν Si, ώ Θεό- 
 δωρε, Bevpo ΊτάΧίν άτταντώμεν. 
 
TRANSLATION 
 
 WITH NOTES EXPLANATORY AND ILLUSTRATIVE. 
 
TRANSLATION. 
 
 [Etulides, founder of the ATcgaric School, and his friend Terpsion, both 1 
 of the77i pupils of Socrates, meet in one of the streets of Alegar a. The 
 former mentions that on his way to the harboiir he had met Thcae• 
 tetus, wounded and dangerously sick, being carried to Athens from 
 the Atheniaji cauip near Corinth. A conversation ensuing on the 
 noble character of Theaetctus, and the estimation in which he was held 
 by Socrates, Eicclides says that he has at home in ?nanuscript a 
 dialogue, which Thcaetetus took part in with Socrates. As Terpsion 
 expresses a wish to hear this dialogue^ the friends adjourn to the house 
 of Eicclides, where a slave reads it aloud to them as they repose. ^ 
 
 Eu. Ha, Terpsion! long in^ from the country"? 
 Ter. A good while, i^nd you^ — I was looking for 
 you in the Agora, and wondering that I could not find you. 
 Eu. I was not in the city. 
 Ter. Where then? 
 
 1 ^ "λρτί.,.Ύΐ ττάλαι; English idiom would say *just in?' or 'long in?' 
 but not both. The translation therefore omits one alternative. 
 
 ^ Έξ άγροΟ. Terpsion has a country residence; whether a town 
 house also, there is nothing to show. 
 
 3 Kat ai 7e. This emphasis implies a question as to the cause of 
 Euclid's absence. The dyopa or market-square was a promenade, 
 where a friend might be looked for at a certain time of day, as in the 
 Cascine at Florence. 
 
 , K. r. 7 
 
98 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Eu. As I was going down* to the harbour I met with 
 Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at 
 Corinth. 
 
 Ter. Alive or dead ? 
 
 Eu. AHve, but only just^ Besides being very ill from 
 wounds^ he is more seriously affected^ by the malady which 
 has broken out in the army. 
 
 Ter. You mean the dysentery ? 
 
 Eu. Yes. 
 
 Ter. In danger, you say, such a man as that ! 
 
 Eu. Ay, a gallant and good one^ Terpsion . It was but 
 just now I heard some people praising him highly for his 
 behaviour in the battled 
 
 Ter. Nothing strange in that. It were far more sur- 
 prising if he had not behaved so. But how came he not to 
 put up here at Megara^? 
 
 Eu. He was in haste to get home. For all my entrea- 
 ties and advice, he would not stay. So after accompanying 
 him some way, as I went back I bethought me of the mar- 
 vellous divination shown by Socrates in so many cases, 
 especially in that of Theaetetus. I think it was but a little 
 
 ^ Καταβαίνων. The preposition κατά, compounded with verbs of 
 motion often implies coastward movement, the converse being ofa. 
 The harbouB-was Nisaea. 
 
 5 Kat μάλα. The intensive καΐ is largely used by Plato. 
 
 6 ΑΙρεΐ. A technical verb for morbid affection. 
 
 7 Καλοί/ T€ Kai ayadov. KaXoKayadia is the Athenian term for the 
 heroic ideal of a gentleman. 
 
 8 Μάχην. What battle is here meant we cannot absolutely de- 
 termine. The great battle near Corinth, in which the Lacedaemonians 
 defeated the Athenians, was in July, 394 B. c. Grote, H. Gr. Part ii. 
 ch. Ixxiv. Demosth. Lept. 41. But Plato may point to some other 
 affair before 387. 
 
 9 Αύτοΰ Mey apoL, two local adverbs = ei' αύτοΐ$ tols iSieyapois, at 
 Megara itself; at the veiy place he had reached, viz. Megara. 
 
 / 
 
TRANSLATION. 99 
 
 while before his own death that he met liim, a mere lad at 
 the time, and, after conversing and arguing with him, admired 
 his genius greatly. When I went to Athens, he repeated 
 to me the arguments he had held with him — well worth 
 hearing they were — and said this youth must inevitably be- 
 come distinguished, if he should reach man's estate. 
 
 Ter. He spoke the truth, manifestly. But what Avere 
 the arguments ? Can you repeat them ? 
 
 Eu. No indeed : not from mere recollection. But, 
 having returned home immediately, I jotted down*" some 
 notes at once, and, afterwards taxing my memory at leisure, 
 I went on writing; and, every time I visited Athens, I used 
 to ask Socrates anything I had not remembered, and to 
 make corrections on my return here. So that I have got 
 nearly the whole conversation in writing. 
 
 Ter. True : I heard you say so once before ; and I 
 have always been meaning to bid you show it me, but have 
 loitered till this moment. What hinders us from perusing 
 it now ? Especially as I am in real want of rest, after com- 
 ing from the country. 
 
 Eti. Well, and I too escorted Theaetetus as far as 
 Erineum'^ ; so I should not dislike a siesta. Let us go then; 
 and while we repose, the attendant shall read to us. 
 
 Ter. A good suggestion. 
 
 [^T/iey go to Euclid's house P\ 
 
 Eu. Here is the manuscript, Terpsion. I must obser\'e 
 that I wrote out the conversation in my own way: — not in 
 the narrative form as Socrates related it to me, but as a 
 dialogue between him and his fellow-disputants, whom he 
 
 ^*^ Έ-γραψάμψ. The use of the middle voice here, as compared witli 
 (η/ραψον afterwards, is notable : perhaps it impHes the act of writing at 
 the moment from recollection and /or his cnun future revision. 
 
 " Erineum : a locality on the way from Megara to Athens. 
 
 r . '> 
 
100 THEAETETUS. 
 
 stated to be Theodorus the geometrician and Theaetetus. 
 And, in order to escape the troublesome notices between 
 the speeches in my manuscript (such as, when Socrates was 
 speaker, *I spoke,' Ί said,' and, in case of an answerer, 'he 
 agreed' or 'he disagreed') I wrote as if he were actually- 
 talking with them, and got rid of such interpolations. 
 
 Ter. Well, no harm in that, Euclid. 
 
 Eu. Now, boy, take the volume, and read. 
 \The slave reads aloud all that follows?^ 
 
 2 \Tlie interIoc7ifors in the following dialogue aj-e: Socrates, Theodorus the 
 geofnetrician of Cyrene, and Theaetetus. Two young fi'iends of the 
 latter are also present, one of zahom is called Socrates ; but neither of 
 them is ?7iade to speak. Socrates, meeting Theodorus in a gymiiasium 
 at Athens, asks him if he has encountered any youths of pro7nise. 
 Theodorus navies Theaetetus with high praise, adding that in some of 
 his features he resenibles Socrates. Theaetetus, then approachijtg with 
 his two friends, is invited to sit beside Socrates, who engages hi7?i in a 
 conversation about their personal resemblance. The pmpose of it 
 seems to be, partly to test the dialectic faculty of Theaetetus, partly to 
 embolden him by relatijig the praise he has received from so compe• 
 tent a judge as Theodorus.'] 
 
 So. If I had a peculiar interest in Cyrene and its 
 affairs, Theodorus, I would ask you about things there, and 
 about its people, whether any of the young men in those 
 parts are studying geometry or other scientific subjects. But 
 I really care for them less than I do for our youth here, 
 and would rather know which of our own young men are 
 expected to become scholars. This therefore I observe 
 for myself as well as I can, and inquire about it from 
 every body else, with whom I see the young men desirous 
 to converse. Now the largest number of pupils attend 
 
TRANSLATJON. 101 
 
 your lectures ; and justly : for you deserve it on many 
 grounds, but especially for geometry. So I shall be glad to 
 hear if you have met with any one worth naming. 
 
 Theo. Yes, Socrates ; among your citizens I have met with 
 a youth, Avhose character I can cite as well worthy of your 
 attention. If he Avere handsome, I should be much afraid 
 to mention him, lest any one should fancy I am in love with 
 him. But in fact (don't be vexed witli me) he is not hand- 
 some: he has a flat nose and protruding eyes like you: but 
 less marked in his case than in yours. I speak then with- 
 out scruple. And I can assure you that of all the persons 
 I ever met (and I have associated with a great number) I 
 never found any of a nature so wonderfully excellent. Apti- 
 tude for learning such as it\N attain, combined with a 
 temper singularly mild, and furthermore with unrivalled 
 courage, I could never have expected to find, nor have I 
 ever seen any similar instances. Those who, like him, are 
 quick and ready-witted and gifted with a good memory, are 
 liable to keen emotions; they rush impetuously like unbal- 
 lasted vessels, and grow up with more of madness in them 
 than of valour : whilst others of more solid temperament 
 usually approach studies in a somewhat sluggish mood, and 
 laden ^ with forgetfulness. But he comes to all his studies 
 and investigations with perfect gentleness, like a current of 
 oil flowing without sound, so smoothly, firmly and success- 
 fully, that we marvel to see one of his age perform these 
 things as he does. 
 
 So. Good news indeed. Pray whose son is he ? 
 
 Theo. I have heard the name, but do not remember it. 
 However, he is the middle one of those who are now ap- 
 proaching us. He and these friends of his were anointing 
 
 2 ^ Γέμοντ€ί. A word properly applied to laden vessels, and here 
 opposed to ανερμάτιστα ττλοία. 
 
i<>S:/i ''.i•;';"• ■ THEAETETUS. 
 
 themselves just now in the outer race-course. They have 
 finished, I suppose, and are coming this way. So see if you 
 know him. 
 
 Su. I do. He is the son of Sophronius of Sunium, just 
 such a man, my friend, as you describe this one to be, of 
 good repute generally, and, I can tell you, a man who left a 
 considerable property. But I do not know the name of the 
 youth. 
 
 Thea. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates: the property I 
 fancy certain trustees have wasted: yet even in money mat- 
 ters he is wonderfully liberal. 
 
 So. A noble character you give him. Bid him come 
 and sit down by me here. 
 
 Thco. I will. Theaetetus, come and sit here by Socra- 
 tes. 
 
 So. Do by all means, Theaetetus, that I may view my- 
 self, and see what kind of face I have. Theodorus says it's 
 like yours. Now if each of us held a lyre in his hand, and 
 he said they were tuned to the same pitch, should we believe 
 him at once, or should we have taken note whether he 
 spoke as a musician? 
 
 Theae. We should have taken note. 
 
 So. And if we found him such, should we not believe 
 him, if ignorant of music, we should disbelieve? 
 
 Theae. True. 
 
 So. And in the present case, I suppose, if we care at 
 all for resemblance of faces, we must consider whether he 
 speaks with a painter's skill or not. 
 
 Theae. I think so. 
 
 So. Is then Theodorus skilled in portrait-painting? 
 
 Theae. Not to my knowledge. 
 
 So. And is he not skilled in geometry ? 
 
 Theae. Without doubt, Socrates. 
 
TRANSLATION, 103 
 
 So. And in astronomy and calculations and music ' 
 and every subject of education? 
 
 Theae. I think so. 
 
 So. If then he says, either by way of praise or dispraise, 
 that we are alike in some bodily feature, it is not very well 
 worth while to attend to him ? 
 
 Theae. Perhaps not. 
 
 So. But how, if he were to praise the soul of one or 
 the other for virtue and wisdom? Would it not be worth 
 while for the one who heard the praise to observe him 
 who was praised, and for the other to exhibit himself with 
 alacrity ? 
 
 Theae. Quite so, Socrates. 
 
 {Socrates, after telling Theaetetus of the high praise given to him by 3 
 Theodortis, and, questioning him about his studies, leads him to 
 admit that the end to be gained by them is * wisdom,^ and that this 
 is the same thing as 'knowledge.^ He goes on to confess the difficulty 
 he finds in defining what knowledge is, and invites the company to 
 discuss the question. Theodorus declines for himself pleading age 
 and want of dialectic practice, but suggests that Theaetetus should be 
 invited to carry on the discussion with Socrates.] 
 
 So. It is time, then, my dear Theaetetus, for you to 
 exhibit and for me to observe. For I must tell you that, 
 although Theodorus has often spoken to me with praise of 
 many persons, both foreigners and citizens, he never gave 
 such praise to anybody as he did to you just now. 
 
 TJieae. I am glad to hear it, Socrates ; but see to it, 
 that he did not speak in jest. 
 
 - Mouaticoy. This word can cither mean 'musical,' or 'literary.' 
 The former is more probable here. 
 
104 THEAETETUS. 
 
 So. That is not the way of Theodorus. So do not 
 retract your admissions on the plea that our friend here 
 speaks in jest, lest he be compelled to add an affidavit. I 
 am sure nobody will indict him for perjury ^ So stand to 
 your confession boldly. 
 
 Tkeae. Yes, I must, if you think so. 
 
 So. Tell me now : you learn, I suppose, from Theodo- 
 rus some lessons of geometry ? 
 
 Tkeae. I do, 
 
 So. And of astronomy and harmony and calculations ? 
 
 Theae. I use my best endeavour. 
 
 So. So do I, my boy, both from him and from all 
 others whom I suppose to have any acquaintance with the 
 subjects. Nevertheless, though I am in general pretty well 
 versed in them, I have one little difficulty, which I must 
 examine Avith your help and that of our friends here. Tell 
 me, does not 'to learn' mean to become wiser in that which 
 one learns? 
 
 Theae. Certainly. 
 
 So. And by wisdom it is, I suppose, that the wise are 
 wise? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Does this differ at all from knowledge? 
 
 Theae. Does what differ ? 
 
 So. Wisdom. In things whereof we are knowing, are 
 we not also wise ? 
 
 • Theae. Can it be otherwise? 
 
 So. Are then wisdom and knowledge the same thing ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 5 1 "Επισκήφα. Heindorf rightly says : έπίσκηττειν h. 1. est i. q. 
 eyKoXeip ψευδομαρτυριών. The verb in this sense is usually middle; but 
 Aeschines Tim. 143 has the active, ην ουδέ ψευδομαρτυριών ξστιν 
 έττισκηψαι. See below 5 ; also Diet. Ant. (Martyria, Έπίσκηψίί). 
 
TRANSLATION. 105 
 
 So. Now here is precisely my difficulty, and I cannot 
 adequately comprehend in my own mind what knowledge 
 really is. Are we then able to define it ? What say ye? 
 Which of us will speak first ? Wlioever misses the mark on 
 each trial, shall sit down, as boys playing at ball say, for 
 donkey: and whoever goes through to the end without miss- 
 ing, shall be our king^, and shall command us to answer 
 anything he likes to ask. But perhaps, Theodorus, my love 
 of discussion leads me to be rude in trying so hard to make 
 us argue, and beconie friendly and chatty with one another. 
 
 Theo. No, Socrates, such a wish is the reverse of rude- 
 ness. But call on one of the youths to answer you. I am 
 unaccustomed to this kind of debate, and too old to acquire 
 the habit. It would suit our young friends, and they would 
 get on much better: for it is a fact that in all things youth 
 has the gift of progress. So, as you had Theaetetus in hand 
 at first, do not let him go, but continue to question him. 
 
 [Theaetetus t having modestly consented to take his share of the argument ^ 4 
 endeavours to define 'knowledge'' by emunerating various sciences and 
 arts ivhich are specific kinds of it. Hereupon Socrates, by a series of 
 elenctic questions in the dialectic inaiiner, exposes the futility of all at- 
 tejnpts to define., which contain the term itself proposed for definition.'] 
 
 So. You hear then, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says ; 
 and you will not, I think, wish to disobey him. In such 
 matters a wise man's injunctions cannot be lawfully dis- 
 obeyed by his junior. Speak then well and nobly. What 
 do you think that knowledge is ? 
 
 Tlicae. I must, Socrates, since you both require. No 
 doubt, if I make any blunder, you will correct me. 
 
 2 Βασίλίΐίσβί. See Hor. Epist. I. i, 59: pucri luJeiitcs, Rex cris, 
 aiunt, si rcctc facies. 
 
106 THEAETETUS. 
 
 So. Certainly, if we are able. 
 
 Theae. Well then, I think that all the things one can 
 learn from Theodorus are knowledge; geometry for instance 
 and the others which you enumerated just now : and again 
 leather-dressing\ and the trades of the other craftsmen, all 
 and each, I consider nothing else than knowledge. 
 
 So. In a truly noble and bountiful style, my friend, 
 when asked for one thing you give many, and various thing? 
 instead of a simple one. 
 
 Theae. Why, what is the sense of your words, Socrates? 
 
 So. Perhaps none at all": however, I will explain what 
 I mean. When you name leather-dressing, do you intend 
 anything else than the knowledge of the manufacture of 
 shoes ? 
 
 Theae. Nothing else. 
 
 So. Or when you name carpentry, do you intend any- 
 thing but the knowledge of the manufacture of wooden im- 
 plements ? 
 
 Theae. No, nothing. 
 
 So. In both cases then, you express that thing of which 
 each is the knowledge ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. But the question put, Theaetetus, was not concern- 
 ing the various subjects of knowledge, or their number. We 
 did not ask with a wish to count them, but to know what 
 the nature of knowledge itself is. Am I talking nonsense ? 
 
 Theae. No, quite correctly. 
 
 So. Consider this also. Should some one ask us any 
 trivial and obvious question, such as, what is clay? if we 
 
 4 1 Σκυτοτομικη and σκυτική, σκυτοτόμοι and aKvrels are indifferently 
 used for the shoe- trade. 
 
 2 Ούδέι^ (λ^γω). Kayeiv ουδέν, to speak unreasonably (wrongly); 
 X^7etJ' Ti to speak reasonably (rightly). 
 
TRANSLATION. 107 
 
 said in reply, the clay of the potters, and the clay of the 
 stove-makers, and the clay of the brickmakers, should we 
 not deserve to be laughed at ? 
 
 Theae. Probably. - 
 
 So. In the first place because we thought the questioner 
 would understand us from our answer, when we introduce 
 the word 'clay,' whether we add that of the doll-makers, or 
 of any other craftsmen. Does anybody, think you, under- 
 stand any name of anything, when he does not know its 
 correct meaning? 
 
 Theae. Not at all. 
 
 So. Then he who is ignorant of ' knowledge,' does not 
 understand 'knowledge of shoes.' 
 
 Theae. He does not. 
 
 So. And he Avho is ignorant of knowledge does not 
 understand leather-dressing or any other art ? 
 
 Theae. True. 
 
 So. Then an answer made to the question«^\Vhat is 
 knowledge ? is ridiculous, Λvhen a person gives in his reply 
 the name of some art, For he names ' the knowledge of 
 something,' Λvhen that was not the thing asked from him. 
 
 Theae. Apparently, 
 
 So. In the next place, when he might have answered 
 easily and briefly, he goes an infinite way round. For in- 
 stance, in the question about clay, it was easy and simple to 
 say, that clay is moistened earth, and to abstain from add- 
 ing whose it is. 
 
 \Theaetetiis now accepts the prittciple of definition laid dcnun by Socrates, 5 
 and illustrates it by citing certain mathematical terms adopted by 
 himself and his fellow-student, young Socrates, ίο distinguish rational 
 and irrational numbers. These terms are (a) τ€τρά'γωνοί άριθμο!, 
 square number (4, 9, 16, 25...//-); {β) προμηκψ αριθμοί, oblong 
 
108 THEAETETUS. 
 
 mimher [the rest exc. i); (7) μ-ηκο$, length (all integral mimbers after i) 
 which may be represented by straight lines ^ and used to for 771 squares ; 
 (δ) δυνά/χείϊ {irrational roots, \^, ν 5, ν 6 ό^ί,) which are hicom- 
 viensiwable with the utiit of length (ττοδίαία), but catt beco77ie sides 
 of fgu7'es co77ii7iensnrable in area with squares. Socrates applauds 
 this inventio7i, and exhorts Theaetetus to apply his 77ii7id i7i the sa77ie 
 way to discover a d(fuiitio7i of k/iowledge.l 
 
 Theae. Yes, Socrates ; this method now indeed appears 
 easy. You seem to be asking the same sort of question 
 that occurred some time since to us in our discussions; — 
 to myself I mean, and your namesake, Socrates here. 
 
 So. What was that, Theaetetus ? 
 
 Theae. Theodorus was writing out for us something 
 about * powers,' proving, as to the * tripod ' ' and the ' pente- 
 pod,' that in length they are not commensurable with the 
 foot-unit: and so proceeding one by one as far as seventeen: 
 but here he somehow came to a pause. We then bethought 
 us of such a notion as this : since the 'powers' were evidently 
 infinite in number, to try to comprise them under one term, 
 by which we should entitle all these ' powers.' 
 
 So. Did you find any such term ? 
 
 Theae. I think we did. Consider it yourself. 
 
 So. Speak on. 
 
 Theae. We divided number generally into two classes, 
 one, that which is capable of being formed by the 'multipli- 
 cation of equal factors into one another, we likened in 
 form to the square, and called it square and equilateral. 
 
 So. Very good. 
 
 5 1 Ipiirovs, as Hcindorf says, is ευθεία δννάμβί τρίπους, i.e. ^JT 
 ΛνΗΐοΗ is irrational (not commensurate with the foot-unit, not integral), 
 but potentially rational (becoming so when squared: s/3'XiJ^ = s). 
 So TrevT^wovs and the rest. The use of δΰναμί$ is therefore differ- 
 ent from the modern mathematical term ''power" {x^, χ^.,.χ'^). 
 
TRANSLA TION. 100 
 
 T/ieae. All intervening numbers, to Avhich belong 3 and 
 5 and every one that is incapable of being formed by the 
 multiplication of equal factors, but is formed either by a 
 larger number having a smaller — or by a smaller number 
 having a larger — as its multiplier, we likened on the other 
 hand to the oblong figure, which in every instance has 
 greater and lesser sides, and called it oblong number'. 
 
 So. Excellent. What next ? 
 
 Theae. All lines which being squared form an ecjui- 
 lateral plane figure we defined to be 'length'; all which 
 form an oblong, we comprised under the name 'powers' 
 (i.e. irrational roots), as not being commensurable with 
 the others except through the surfaces which they have 
 power to form'. And similarly with respect to the solids 
 (cubes). 
 
 So. Nobody in the world could do better, my boys. So 
 I do not think Theodorus Λνϋΐ incur the guilt of perjury. 
 
 Theae. But as to your question about knowledge, 
 Socrates, I could not answer it in the same way as that 
 about length and power. Yet you seem to me to be look- 
 ing for some such answer. So that now Theodorus again 
 appears to be a false speaker. 
 
 So. Well, but if he had praised your running, and said 
 he had never met with any young man so fleet, and then in 
 
 - This appears as a general expression in the form 
 
 72 X 1 I = I - X « I =« + I. 
 71 \ η J 
 
 Example: iy.\\{—\\y.'i)-=•^. As η is any integer, this inchules all 
 
 nambers greater than unity, τετρά-γωνοί as well as ιτρομηκηί αριθμοί. 
 
 ^ ΤοΓί ό' έπιττέδοίί a δύνανται. Thus ^n being 3*464 (nearly), 
 
 ^y 12 Χ;ι^ΐ2= 12 = 2 X 6 = 3 X 4 = (geometrically represented) a rectangle 
 
 with sides respectively either 2 and 6, or 3 and 4, or an imaginary 
 
 square with side 3"464 (nearly). 
 
110 THEAETETUS. 
 
 a racing-match you had been defeated by one in the prime 
 of life, and very fleet, do you think his praise would have 
 been any the less true ? 
 
 Theae. I do not. 
 
 So. And, as to knowledge, as I was saying a little while 
 since, do you think it a small thing to discover its nature, 
 and not one of the highest achievements ? 
 
 Theae. Nay indeed, Socrates, I do place it among the 
 very highest of all. 
 
 So. Then be at ease about yourself: and consider that 
 Theodorus speaks truly, and shew desire in every way to 
 obtain a right definition of knowledge, as of all other things. 
 
 Theae. As for desire, Socrates, it will not be found 
 wanting. 
 
 G [ Theaetetus, though he has not yet succeeded in finding a definition of 
 kno7uledge, confesses a mental feeling that he is always oti the verge of 
 success. Socrates likens this feeling to the throes of impending child- 
 birth in women : ajid reminding Theaetetus that he himself {Socrates) 
 is the son of an excellent midzvife, he claims the analogous function of 
 assisting the labour of intellectual parturition in the jninds of young 
 men ; and describes the obstetric art in many of its details, with a 
 view to illustrate af id justify his own method as an educator. ^ 
 
 So. Come then: you roaoe a good suggestion just now. 
 Imitate your answer about the 'powers'. As you comprised 
 their vast number under one term, so also try to describe 
 the many kinds of knowledge by a single definition. 
 
 Theae. I assure you, Socrates, I have often endeavoured 
 to gain insight into that matter, while listening to the ques- 
 tions you put. But, though 1 cannot persuade myself that 
 I have anything important of my own to say, or that I have 
 heard from some one else any such statement as you require, 
 
TRANSLATION. Ill 
 
 nevertheless I cannot rid myself of the feeling that I am on 
 the point of doing so \ 
 
 Su. Oh ! you are in the throes of labour, dear Theae- 
 tetus, through being not empty, but pregnant. 
 
 Theae. I do not know, Socrates. I tell you my feeling, 
 at all events. 
 
 So. Have you not heard then, simpleton, that I am 
 the son of a very famous and solid midwife, Phaenarete ? 
 
 Theae. I have heard it before now. 
 
 So. Have you heard too that I practise the same art ? 
 
 Theae. Never. 
 
 So. I do really. But don't tell of me to other people. 
 I am not known, my friend, to have this skill. And others, 
 being unaware, do not say this of me, but only that I am a 
 very strange person, and that I perplex people. Have you 
 heard this too ? 
 
 Theae. I have. 
 
 So. Shall I tell you the reason ? 
 
 Theae. Pray do. 
 
 So. Reflect then upon the general situation of midwives, 
 and you will more easily learn what I mean. You know, I 
 suppose, that none of them practise while they are still con- 
 ceiving and bearing children, but those alone who are past 
 child-bearing. 
 
 Theae. Certainly. 
 
 So. This custom is said to be derived from Artemis, for 
 that she, though a virgin, has the charge of parturition. Ac- 
 cordingly, she did not indeed allow barren women to become 
 midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an 
 art of which it has no experience: but she assigned it to 
 
 G 1 MeXXetv is undoubtedly the true reading, giving the cue to the 
 parable of the midwives. M^Xeiv would fail to do this. 
 
112 THEAETETUS. 
 
 those who are past the age of childbearing, in honour of 
 their resemblance to herself. 
 
 Theae, Naturally. 
 
 So. Is not this also natural, that those who conceive 
 and those who do not are better known by midwives than 
 by others? 
 
 Theae. Quite so. 
 
 So. Moreover also midwives, by giving drugs and_ 
 chanting incantations, are able to excite the throes and to 
 quell them, if they will, and to make those who have a 
 hard time bring forth: and they produce abortion^, if the 
 case require it. 
 
 Theae. True. 
 
 So. Have you furthermore noted this in them, that they 
 are also very clever match-makers, being well skilled to 
 know what woman uniting with what man must bear the 
 fmest children ? ■'.% 
 
 Theae. I was not quite aware of that. 
 
 So. I assure you they pride themselves on this much 
 more than on their special practiced Just consider. Bo 
 you think the care and collection of the fruits of the earth 
 belongs to one art, and the knowledge of what soil you must 
 plant or sow to another ? 
 
 Theae. No, to the same. 
 
 So. And do you consider it different in the case of a 
 woman ? 
 
 Theae. Seemingly not. 
 
 So. No, truly. But on account of the unlawful and 
 
 1 N^v 6v. Prof. Campbell writes, *Sc. το βρέφος, said here of 
 the embryo "at an early stage," i.e. before it is dangerous to do so.' 
 But most commentators do not believe that νέον would be used of το 
 κύημα. Heindorf conjectures δέον for νέον 6v. The words may be a 
 gloss, and in translation no point is lost by neglecting them, as above. 
 
 ^ Gr. όμφαΧητομίί}. 
 
TRANSLA TION. 113 
 
 unscientific conciliation of man and woman, which is termed 
 * procuration/ midwives, being a respectable body, shun 
 match-making, fearing lest by this they should incur the 
 other charge. For it is only to genuine midwives, I suppose, 
 that the art of correct match-making belongs. 
 
 TJieae. Apparently so. 
 
 So. Thus highly important is the function of midwives ; 
 but less so than my procedure. For, it does not happen to 
 women at one time to bear idols, at another true children, 
 so that it shall not be easy to distinguish them. Had they 
 been liable to this, the greatest and noblest task for mid- 
 wives would have been to decide between the true child 
 and the untrue. Do you not think so ? 
 
 Theac. I do. 
 
 [ The parable of the application of the obstetric art to the labours of the 7 
 intellect is carried on and concluded.'] 
 
 So. But my art of midwifery, though it has in other 
 respects the same conditions as theirs, differs in these points, 
 that I attend men, not women, and that I inspect the labour 
 of their souls, not of their bodies. The most important 
 skill in our art is, the being able to test m every way 
 whether the young man's mind is bringing forth an idol and 
 an unreality, or a genuine and true progeny. For to me as 
 well as to the midwives belongs the following condition. I 
 am incapable of producing wisdom, and the reproach which 
 many ere now have cast on me, that, while I question others, 
 I myself give no answer about anything, because I have no 
 wisdom in me, is a just reproach. Tlie reason of it is this : 
 the god compels me to act the midwife, but hindered me 
 from engendering. I then am not indeed perfectly wise 
 myself, nor have I brought to birth any discovery of that 
 K. P. 8 
 
114 THEAETETUS. 
 
 kind, as the outcome of my own soul. But of those who 
 resort to me, some indeed appear in the outset utterly igno- 
 rant, but all, as the intercourse proceeds, and the god gives 
 opportunity, make wonderful progress, in their own opinion 
 and in that of others. And it is evident that they do scr 
 not by any learning they have gained from me, but because 
 they have of themselves discovered many excellent things, 
 which they retain. Of that midwifery however I and the 
 god are authors. The proof is this. IMany persons ere now, 
 not knowing that fact, and imputing all to themselves while 
 they despised me, quitted me earlier than they ought, either 
 of their own will or by the persuasion of others \ After this, 
 they baulked all subsequent conceptions by evil intercourse, 
 and lost by ill nurture the offspring which I had helped 
 them to, valuing unrealities and idols more than truths; and 
 ended by seeming to themselves, as to everybody else, mere 
 blockheads. One of these, though there are many more, is 
 Aristeides" son of Lysimachus. When these truants come 
 back and pray for admission to my society, and move heaven 
 and earth to gain it, with some of them my familiar genius 
 forbids me to consort, with others it allows me : and these 
 
 7 ^ η αυτοί η υπ άλλων ιτζίσθέντε^. The translation follows this 
 conjecture ; MSS. omit the second ?}', by the absence of Avhich αύτοΙ be- 
 comes void of sense and propriety. Is it not possible that Plato wrote 
 KoX η αυτοί €αντού% {μέν) αΐτίασάμενοι έμοΰ δέ καταφρονησαντ€ζ η ύττ 
 άλλων TreiaOeuTes κ.τ.λ. ' Many ere now, being ignorant of this, and 
 either imputing all to themselves, while they contemned me, or per- 
 suaded by others S:c. &c.'? This would give a still better sense than the 
 adopted reading, viz. Many forsook the teaching of Socrates : a/l did 
 so in ignorance of his divinely given power {τοΰτο ayvorjaavTes) ; but 
 same through self-conceit {η αύτοΙ €αυτού$ αίτίασάμενοή, some through 
 yielding to persuasion (17 ΰττ άλλων ireiaOevTes). Also the passage 
 would be more perspicuous if έαυτούί μέν were written. 
 2 Άρίστβίδη^, a descendant of the great Aristeides. 
 
TRANSLATION. 115 
 
 latter improve again. And this affection also they that as- 
 sociate with me have in common with women in labour : 
 they feel throes and are full of worry day and night much 
 more than the women. And my art has the power to excite 
 and allay that throe. So much then for them. And some- 
 times, Theaetetus, when any do not seem to me to be preg- 
 nant, perceiving that they do not need me, I very kindly 
 make a match for them, and, with the blessing of heaven, 
 I guess very aptly by whose conversation they will profit. 
 ]\Iany I have made over to Prodicus", many to other wise 
 and inspired men. I have spoken at this length to you be- 
 cause I suspect, in conformity with your own opinion, that 
 you are suffering throes from some inward conception. Deal 
 with me then as the son of a midwife, and a practitioner 
 myself, and try to answer my questions as well as you are 
 able. And if, on examining anything you say, I consider it 
 an idol and not a true progeny, and so remove it quietly 
 and put it away, don't be angry as women at their first lying 
 in are about their infants. For many, my good friend, 
 have felt towards me so that they are actually ready to bite 
 me when I take from them any cherished trifle : and they 
 imagine I am not acting kindly; so little are they aware 
 that no god is unkind to men, and that I do nothing of this 
 sort from ill will. But my sense of duty will in no wise 
 allow me to accept falsehood and stifle truth. 
 
 [ TheacietuSf agam exhorted by Socrates, takes courage^ and suggests as a ^ 
 defining term for knowledge αϊσθησις, perception [sensation, sensuous 
 perception). Socrates at once identifies this definition ivith the fijmous 
 doctrine of Protagoras, ττάντων χρημάτων μ^τρον dyOponros, ^ man is 
 
 ^ Έ^^δωκα YlpobiKip. Έλδιδοΐ'αί [θιτ/ατέρα] means 'to give a daughter 
 in marriage.' Prodicus of Ceos was a famous Sophist, learned in his- 
 tory, mythology, and legend. 
 
 8—2 
 
116 THEAETETUS. 
 
 the measure of all things. ' He goes on to argue that this implies 
 'what apt^ears to each is true to eachf and ajter illustrating by an 
 example he farther proceeds to connect this view with that of Hera- 
 cleitus and his school {to whom he adds HO?ncr) respecting a per- 
 petual motion or fltix of all things — ττάντα pet. This doctrine does 
 not suffer a fixed term of being to be given to anything, such as 'one,'' 
 'some,' 'of some quality,'' 'great,' 'small,' 'heavy,' 'light,' o-V. 
 Nothing 'is' any of these, but by motion and conunixture all things 
 'become' this or that. There is no 'heing,' only 'coming to be.'] 
 
 So now again, returning to the point, Theaetetus, endea- 
 vour to say what knowledge is: and never reply that you 
 are unable : for if the god please and you play the man, you 
 will be able. 
 
 T/ieae. Well, Socrates, when you thus exhort, I must 
 own it were disgraceful not to use one's utmost endeavour 
 to state what suggests itself to the mind. It seems to me 
 then that he who knows anything perceives what he knows; 
 and, in my present view, knowledge is nothing else than 
 
 PERCEPTION \ 
 
 So. Well and nobly said, my boy. It is quite proper to 
 /speak with such open frankness. But now let us examine 
 the doctrine in common, to see whether it is a genuine 
 product or a wind-egg. Knowledge, you say, is per- 
 ception? 
 
 T/ieae. Yes. 
 
 So. I really think you have given an account of know- 
 ledge which is not insignificant, being one which Protagoras 
 also gave. But he has said the same thing in a different 
 way. He says, I fancy, that 'man" is the measure of all 
 
 8 ^ ΑϊσΘησί$. Sensation; perception; or rather, 'sensuous percep- 
 tion,' which must be understood when either of the two former terms 
 is used in this translation. 
 
 2 "Αρθρωπον, i.e. the human mind ; the mind of each percipient. 
 
I 
 
 TRA Ν SLA ΤΙ ON. 117 
 
 things;' of things existing, that they do exist; of non-existing 
 things, that they (do not exist. Have you perhaps read 
 this ? 
 
 Theae. Yes, I have read it often. 
 
 So. He speaks then to this effect, that such as things 
 appear to me, they severally are to me ; and such as they 
 appear to you, they severally are to you. The term ' man ' 
 includes you and me. 
 
 Theae. He does speak so. 
 
 So. Yes; and it is probable that a wise man is not 
 talking nonsense : so let us follow his track. Does it not 
 sometimes happen that, when the same wind is blowing, 
 one of us is cold, the other not ; and one is slightly cold, 
 the other exceedingly } 
 
 Theae. No doubt. 
 
 So. Shall we then in that case say the wind in itself^ is 
 cold or not cold ; or shall we assent to Protagoras that to 
 one who feels it cold it is cold, to one who does not feel it, 
 not ? 
 
 Theae. The latter, I should say. 
 
 So. And this is apparent to each ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And the term 'is apparent ' implies 'perceiving'? 
 
 Theae. It does. 
 
 So. Appearance then and perception concur in things 
 warm and the like generally. For such as each perceives 
 them, they probably are to each. 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Perception then is always of that which *is'; and it 
 is unerring, since it is knowledge. 
 
 ' In itself. Codd. have Ιφ'' iavro, which Prof. Campbell supports 
 by examples. Bekker reads έφ' έαντψ. But 4φ' έαυτοΰ is most usual 
 in this sense. 
 
118 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Theae. Manifestly. 
 
 So. In the name of the Graces, then, was Protagoras a 
 man of consummate shrewdness, and did he hint this darkly 
 to us of the common herd, while to his disciples he spoke 
 'the truth' in secret confidence^? 
 
 Theae. What do you mean by this, Socrates ? 
 
 So. I will state to you a doctrine of no slight import- 
 ance : namely, that nothing in itself ' is one,' nor can you 
 rightly call a thing * some ' or 'of some kind,' but, if you 
 Ν style it great, it will turn out also small, and if heavy, light, 
 and so in every case ; since nothing ' is ' ' one ' or ' some,' or 
 'of some kind' : but from vection and motion and mixture 
 with each other all things ' come to be,' of which we say 
 that they ' are,' using a wrong term : for nothing at any time 
 *is,' but always 'comes to be.' And on this point let all 
 philosophers except Parmenides^ be compared in their 
 order, Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles^: and 
 of the poets those that are consummate in each poetic kind, 
 
 ^ The work in which Protagoras expounded his doctrine was called 
 Άληθίΐα, Truth. To this circumstance Plato here alludes, but perhaps, 
 as Prof. Campbell says, he means that Protagoras " told the real truths 
 not in his book which is so entitled, but privately to his disciples." 
 
 ^ Πλήΐ' Παρμεί/ίδου. Parmenides, the greatest name to the Eleatic 
 School and here made its representative (though Xenophanes before 
 him, and Zeno after him, taught similar principles), held the doctrine 
 directly opposed to the Heracleitean, namely, that the universe is one, 
 continuous, stable: that only 'being' is; 'non-being' is not; there is 
 no ' becoming. ' 
 
 6 Έ/ΛΤΓεδοΛτλτ}?. Prof. Campbell justly says that Plato introduced 
 the words κράσβωί Trpbs άλληλα in order to include Empedocles of 
 Agrigentum, who, without accepting the doctrine of Heracleitus, that 
 ουδέν 'έστι, ττάντα yLyverai, denied the Eleatic unity, continuity and 
 stability of substance, teaching that phenomenal changes are caused by 
 the intermixture of four elements (fire, air, water, earth) which are 
 themselves alone unchangeable. 
 
TRANSLATION. 110 
 
 in the comic, Epicharmus'', in the tragic, Horner^; for in 
 saying 
 
 Ocean of gods progenitor and Tethys mother 
 
 he has said that all things are born from ilux and motion. 
 Does he not seem to say so ? 
 Theae. I think he does. 
 
 \The Ihracleitean doctrine [ττάντα pe2) is furthei' expounded and seeviiugly 9 
 defended. But, as it is confuted aftei'wards (28), ive imist explain 
 this defejtce as an instance of the Socratic dpu>vua.\ 
 
 So. After this then, who that disputes with so great a 
 host, and Homer its captain, can avoid making himself 
 ridiculous ? 
 / Thcae. It were not easy, Socrates. 
 
 So. No indeed, Theaetetus. Since our statement — 
 that motion produces the semblant^ ' being,' and the 'coming 
 to be,' while ' non-being ' and ' perishing ' are produced by 
 rest — has in its favour many competent proofs. The heat 
 of fire, which engenders and protects other things, is 
 itself engendered by vection and attrition. And these are 
 motions". Are not these the parents of fire ? 
 
 ^ 'Επίχαρμος. Diogenes Laertius, iii. 10, quotes verses from Epi- 
 charmus, the comic poet of vSyracuse (490 r..c.), which contain the 
 doctrine of perpetual mutation. 
 
 ^ Ύρα•γφδίας δέ'Όμηρος. Plato recognizes only two forms of poetry, 
 viz. Comedy and Tragedy, inchiding in the latter Epic poetry, and its 
 great master Homer. vSee Rep. X. 495 D, έπισκετττέον την re rpayi^hiav 
 καΐ rhv η-γέμονα αυτής "Ομηρον. 
 9 1 To μ^ν di'ai δοκούν. As he is professing to expound the Ilera- 
 cleitean theory, which does not admit τό dvai, he evasively says τό 
 ehai δοκούν, * the semblant being.' 
 
 * Τούτω δέ κινήσεις. This is the reading in most codd., for which 
 
120 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Thcae. They are. 
 
 So. Moreover the race of animals is produced from 
 them ? 
 
 Theae. To be sure. 
 
 So. Again : is not the habit of bodies ruined by rest 
 and laziness, and preserved in general^ by exercise and 
 motion ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And does not the habit of the soul by learning and 
 study, which are motions, acquire doctrines and preserve* 
 them and become better, while through rest, which is the 
 absence of study and learning, it both learns nothing, and 
 forgets what it has learnt ? 
 
 Theae. Decidedly. 
 
 So. The one then, namely motion, is a good both in 
 soul and body, the other is the reverse. 
 
 Theae. Seemingly. 
 
 So. Must I farther mention to you calms and serenities 
 and such-like things, showing that quietudes rot and destroy, 
 while their opposites preserve? and besides these must I 
 clinch the matter^, and evince that by the golden cord*^ 
 Homer means nothing but the sun, and indicates that, as 
 long as the revolution continues, and the sun keeps moving, 
 
 κιιτησΐΐ (dual) is suggested. But some have τούτο hk κίνησί$, which 
 Bekker edits, and Campbell approves. 
 
 ^ In general, ώ$ €πΙ τό ττολύ, read in many codd. and by Stobaeus. 
 Professors Jowett and Campbell prefer iiri ττολύ ' for a long time,' as in 
 cod. Bodl. 
 
 ^ Σώ^€ταί. The middle voice of σώξ'ω is specially used of 'memory.' 
 
 ^ Tof κολοψωΐ'α auayKa^'u -προσβίβαξων ; ' must I bring up my crowning 
 reason and prove conclusively (άί/αγκά^ω)' ? See Strabo's explanation 
 of κολοψών in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon. Others have been given, 
 for which see Heindorfs note. 
 
 * For Homer's χρυσή ceipa see II. viii. 47. 
 
TRANSLATION, 121 
 
 all things in heaven and earth exist and are preserved ; but 
 should this stand still as if fettered, all things would be 
 spoilt, and, as the saying is, turned upside down ? 
 
 Theae. In my judgment, Socrates, he does indicate 
 what you say. 
 
 \The relativity of the facts of sensation is illustrated by the phejiomena of 1" 
 coloiir, mwiber and size. What you call colour has no definite place 
 or existence within or without you. ^ It is the result of a passing col' 
 lision between your eyes and the flux of things suited to act on them. 
 It is neither in the agent nor in the patient, but generated in passage 
 between them. It will not be the same to two subjects nor to the same 
 subject at different times. The object measiired or touched cannot be 
 in itself great, white, hot or anything else ; if it were, it would not 
 appear different to another subject. The stibject touching or measuring 
 cannot be ajiy of these, for, if so, it would be so always, and woidd not 
 be 7nodified by application to another object. Socrates illustrates by six 
 dice, which, as cof?ipared with four, are more, a?id half as jnany 
 ogaiyi {i.e. 3:2), btit fewer and half compared loith twelve {i.e. 
 1:2). Can then anything become more without being increased ; 
 or fewer without being dijninished? Theaetetus is puzzled ; and 
 Socrates merrily suggests that they are amusing themselves with mere 
 quibbles, like AIegaria?i disputants.'] 
 
 So. Conceive the matter in this way, my good friend. 
 As to vision first : that what you call white colour is not 
 in itself something outside your eyes or in your eyes. And 
 do not assign to it any place : for then, being somewhere 
 in position, it would 'be' and remain, and would not by 
 generation ' come to be.' 
 
 Theae. How so? 
 
 So. Let us follow the doctrine we were lately stating, 
 
 Ahat nothing exists as an independent unit -,ίαηά in that 
 
 way we shall see that black and white and e\ery other 
 
 colour have * come to be ' from the coincidence of the eyes 
 
 with the suitable motion ; and that what in each case we call 
 
122 THEAETETUS. 
 
 colour, is neither that which makes nor that which receives 
 the impact, but something between, which is pecuHar to 
 each. Or would you insist that what each colour appears 
 to you, such it appears also to a clog or any other 
 animal ? 
 
 Theae. No indeed, I would not. 
 
 So. Again : does anything Appear to another man like 
 what it appears to you? Are -you strongly convinced it 
 does, or are you much rather sure that even to yourself it is 
 not the same, because at no two times are you exactly the 
 same ? 
 
 Theae. The latter seems to me truer than the former. 
 
 So. Accordingly, if a thing beside which we measure 
 ourselves, or which we handle, were large or white or hot, 
 it would never have become different by contact with some 
 other, unless it underwent a change in itself. And if again 
 the measuring or handling subject had been any of these, 
 it would not have become different when another approached 
 or suffered any affection, if there were no affection in itself. 
 For now, my friend, we are compelled in a careless sort of 
 way to say marvellous and ridiculous things, as Protagoras 
 would afiftrm, and every one who ventures to propound the 
 same that he does. 
 
 Theae. How do you mean ? and what kind of things ? 
 
 So. Take a small sample, and you will know what I 
 mean. Six dice, if you place four beside them, we say are 
 more in number and half as many again. If you bring 
 twelve, we say the six are fewer in number, and half the 
 second set. To say otherwise were intolerable. Will you 
 tolerate it ? 
 
 Theae. No, I will not. 
 
 So. Well : suppose Protagoras or some one else were 
 to ask you : — Theaetetus, is it possible for anything to 
 
TRANSLA TION. 123 
 
 become greater or more, except by being increased ? What 
 answer would you give ? 
 
 T/ieae. If I were to answer what I think in reply to 
 your present question, Socrates, I should say 'no': but if with 
 reference to the former one, to avoid self-contradiction, I 
 should say ' yes.' 
 
 So. Well said, my friend, by Hera, and divinely. But 
 if you answer ' yes,' something λνϋΐ occur like the case in 
 Euripides ^ our tongue will be unconvicted, but our mind 
 not unconvicted. 
 
 Theae. True. 
 
 So. So then, if you and I were clever and wise folk 
 who had intimately studied the whole sphere of mind, and 
 from that time forth amused ourselves with trying one 
 another's powers, we should have engaged in a sophistical 
 conflict of this kind, and be bandying arguments with each 
 other'. But now, as \ve are not professors, we shall wish to 
 look at the statements comparatively, and see what it is 
 we mean ; whether they are consistent with each other or 
 inconsistent. 
 
 Theae. Certainly that is what I should wish. 
 
 \T7ie contradictions and difficulties implied in these statemejtts are novo 11 
 set forth. It cannot possibly be true that anything becomes greater or 
 less while it is equal to itself or is increased without addition or 
 diminished without subtraction, or that it is what it was not before 
 without having ''come to be.'' And yet the case of the six dice, and the 
 case of an old man who was taller than a growing youth and in the 
 course of one year is shorter without having ''come to be'' different ^ 
 seem to clash with these indubitable propositions. What are we to 
 
 10 ^ EupiTriSeiu;/ rt. See Ilippol. 612, 17 7λώσσ' ομώμοχ η δέ φρ^ν 
 άνύμοτοί. 
 
 ^ In this passage Plato censures the pseudo-dialectic (eristic) prac- 
 tice of certain sophistic teachers as idle waste of time. 
 
124 TIIEAETETUS. 
 
 say? Theaeietus wonders till he feels dizzy. Wofider, says Socrates, 
 is a philosophic affection, and I will try to enlighteti yon by a fuller 
 exposition of the Heracleitean doctri7ie.'] 
 
 So. So should I. But, since this is the case, shall we 
 not calmly, as we have plenty of leisure, re-examine (not 
 losing our temper, but really probing ourselves) what these 
 fancies in us are ? Looking at the first of them, we shall 
 say, I think, that nothing ever becomes greater or less either 
 in bulk or number, so long as it is equal to itself. Is it not 
 thus ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Secondly, that what suffers neither addition nor 
 subtraction, is never either increased or wasted, but is 
 always equal to itself. / 
 
 Theae. Unquestionably. 
 
 So. Is not this also a third proposition, that what was 
 not before, cannot afterwards be without ' having come to 
 be ' and ' coming to be ' .? 
 
 Theae. So it seems.' 
 
 So. These three admissions, I think, severally clash 
 with each other in our soul, when we say what was said 
 about the dice, or when Ave say that I, being of the age I 
 am, without having suffered increase or decrease, within the 
 space of a year begin by being bigger than you, who are 
 young, and afterwards become less, — when nothing has been 
 withdrawn from my size, but yours has increased. For thus 
 ' I am ' afterwards what before I was not, without having 
 * come to be ' so. Now without ' coming to be ' it is impos- 
 sible '■ to have come to be,' and Avithout losing any size I 
 could never 'come to be' ^mailer. And other like instances 
 there are, myriads upon myriads, if we choose to admit 
 these. I suppose you follow me, Theaetetus : at all events 
 you seem to me not inexperienced in such matters. 
 
TRANSLATION. \c , 125 
 
 Theae. I do, Socrates; and by all the gods Γ wonder _^ 
 immensely what these things are, and really sometimes I 
 feel dizzy when I look at them. 
 
 So. Ay, my friend ; evidently Theodorus forms no bad 
 estimate of your genius. This affection, I mean of wonder- 
 ing, is quite that of a philosopher ; for philosophy has no 
 other origin but this ; and he who said that Iris is the child 
 of giant Wonder seems to be no bad genealogist. But do 
 you by this time understand why these things result from 
 the statements we ascribe to Protagoras ? 
 
 Theae. Not yet, I think. 
 
 So. You will be thankful to me then, if, when a notable 
 man, or rather when notable men have truth hidden away 
 in the mind, I help you to search it out from them. 
 
 Theae. Thankful indeed I must be in the highest 
 degree. 
 
 \The doctrine of Heracleitus is ηοτυ set forth in its complication with the 12 
 doctrine imptiied to Protagoras. Agent and Patient engcjtder all 
 things by motion: and there is no absolute Ens. Socrates asks if 
 Theaetetus is so far content with the product of his intellectual labour. 
 His answer is indecisive: arid Socrates prepares hiynfor a new dialectic 
 discussion^ 
 
 So. Look about then, and see that none of the un- 
 initiated are listening. These are men who think that 
 nothing *is' but what they are able to grasp with their 
 hands, not accepting actions and generations and all that is 
 invisible as in the category of being. 
 
 Theae. Upon my word, Socrates, stubborn and refrac- 
 tory people are these you tell of 
 
 So. They are indeed, my boy, a fine set of boors'. 
 
 12 ^ Λ fine set of boors, μάλ' ev Άμονσοι. In these days they would be 
 called 'Philistines,' a term derived from German Universities. 
 
12G THEAETETUS. 
 
 Others there are much more refined, whose mysteries I am 
 going to describe to you. Their principle is, and upon it all 
 we were just now saying depends^that the whole universe 
 is motion, and nothing else but this, and of motions two 
 kinds, each in number infinite, but, in respect of power, the 
 one involving action, the other suffering. From the asso- 
 ciation and attrition of these with each other arfe formed 
 products in number infinite, but of two sorts, one percepti- 
 ble, the other perce ption, which continually breaks forth and 
 is born with the perceptible objects. Perceptions, we find, 
 have the following names ; sight, hearing, smell, feelings of 
 cold and heat, pleasure and pain and desire and fear and 
 others : infinite are those without names ; and those with 
 names very numerous. And the objects of perception 
 again are born with each of these, colours of all kinds with 
 all kinds of vision, sounds with hearing similarly, and Λvith 
 the other perceptions other objects of perception are con- 
 nate and 'come to be.'/What meaning has this tale for us, 
 Theaetetus, in reference to the former questions? do you 
 IDcrceive ? 
 
 Thcae. No, Socrates. 
 
 So. See then if it can be brought to its closing point. 
 It means that all these things, as we say, are in motion, and 
 in their motion are found swiftness and slowness. That 
 which is slow has its motion in the same place and in refer- 
 ence to things near, and so engenders : and the things thus 
 engendered [are slower. But that which is swift has its 
 motion in reference to things at a distance, and so engen- 
 ders, and the things thus engendered]' are swifter, for they 
 
 2 The words in brackets are not found in codd., but introduced by 
 Stephens from the Eclogae of Cornarius. Bekker is so convinced 
 of their being Plato's, that he prints them without bracketing. And 
 Heindorf maintains them. Lut Professors Jowett and Campbell reject 
 
TRA Ν SLA ΤΙ Ο Ν, 127 
 
 are conveyed, and their motion naturally consists in vection. 
 When then the eye and any other of its suitable objects 
 approach and beget whiteness and its kindred perception, 
 which could never have ' come to be ' if either of them had 
 gone to something else, then, while the sight on the part of 
 the eyes and the whiteness on the part of that which co- 
 engenders the colour are moving in mid space, the eye 
 becomes full of sight, and at length sees and ' comes to be,' 
 nowise sight, but a seeing eye, and that which co-engen- 
 dered the colour is filled full with whiteness, and ' comes to 
 be ' not whiteness but a white thing, whether it be wood or 
 stone or anything else that happens to have been coloured < 
 with this hue. And other things similarly, hard and warm 
 and all the rest, we must understand in the same manner 
 * to be ' nothing by themselves, as we heretofore said, but 
 in their mutual intercourse ' to become ' all and of all kinds I 
 from motion : since of agent and patient, as they affirm, j 
 taken apart (eVt kvo%) it is impossible to form any definite 
 
 them, holding that τά βραδύτβρα mean τό ttoiovp and τό ττάσχον, and 
 τά Θάσσω the αΙσθησ€ΐ$ and αισθητά engendered by them. I have been 
 unable to convince myself that this latter view is right. The words 
 rrpbs τά ττΧησίάΐΌΡτα την κίνησιν ΐσχει seem intended to describe the 
 organs of touch and taste, as distinguished from those of sight and 
 hearing, which can be employed on distant objects. It may be replied 
 that the example given is that of sight and its object, and the latter is 
 spoken of as ττΧησίάσαν to the eye : which may seem to prove that 
 anything on which τό ttolquv can act may be said ττΧησίάζζΐν αύτφ, 
 whether more or less distant. Weighty as this reply is, it does not 
 remove my difficulty; for I am unable to discern the use of discrimi- 
 nating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and 
 swiftness. The act of generation between the eye and a very distant 
 object must surely have been regarded by Plato (whatever later mathe- 
 maticians may say of it) as a swift act. I admit however that the 
 question at issue is difficult and doubtful : but it does not embarrass 
 Plato's general meaning here. See note at the close of the Translation. 
 
128 THEAETETUS. 
 
 notion :\for nothing is an agent till it concurs with a patient, 
 nor a patient till it concurs with an agentj and that which 
 concurs with one thing and is an agent, if it Hghts upon 
 ^^other, proves to be a patient, so that, as we before said, 
 I nothing is ' one by itself,' but always ' comes to be ' to some 
 oilier ; and the term ' being ' must be removed ohTall sides, 
 although we are often, even in our present discussion, com- 
 pelled to use it from habit and ignorance. But it is not 
 proper, as the wise lay down, to allow the use of the word 
 'some,' or 'of some' or 'me' or 'this' or 'that' or any 
 other term which ' fixes,' but in accordance Λvith nature to 
 speak of things as ' coming to be ' and ' being created ' and 
 'perishing' and 'taking new forms.' Since if any one fixes 
 anything in speech, he who does so is easily confuted. And 
 we ought to speak in this way both of individuals and of 
 many in the aggregate, by v/hich aggregation we determine 
 ' man ' and ' stone ' and each class of animals. Do these 
 views seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and will you find a 
 taste of them agreeable ? 
 
 Theae. I don't know, Socrates; for about you too I 
 cannot discern, whether you are speaking these as your own 
 opinions, or trying me. 
 
 So. Do you not remember, my friend, that I indeed 
 neither know nor adopt any of such things as mine ? but I 
 am barren, and act as midwife to you, and on that account 
 I charm, and offer you, to be tasted, wise things of various 
 sorts, until I can help to bring to light your opinion ; and 
 when it is brought forth, then and not before I will exa- 
 mine if it shall prove a wind-egg or a genuine offspring. So 
 then Avith courage and patience answer well and manfully 
 whatsoever appears to you to be right concerning my several 
 questions. 
 
 Theae. Ask then. 
 
TRANSLATION. 129 
 
 [Argtimeiiis against the Protagorcan doctrine β'ο/?ι dreams, fevers and 13 
 madness are suggested and ans7vered. Persons so affected perceive 
 different things from those pe?'ceived when they are axvake and in 
 health. Are these coiitradictory perceptions in each case equally true 
 to the percipient ?\ 
 
 So. Say then again, whether you are satisfied that 
 nothing should ' be,' but ever ' come to be,' good and noble 
 and all things which we were lately recounting. 
 
 Theae. Yes ; since I have heard this recital of yours, it 
 appears to me marvellously clear that it is reasonable, and 
 that we must accept the principles as you have stated them. 
 
 So. Let us then not abandon what remains of our 
 question. There remains the topic of dreams and diseases, 
 madness especially, and all that is called mis-hearing or 
 mis-seeing or any other wrong perception. For you know, 
 I suppose, that in all these cases the principle we lately 
 explained seems by admission to be confuted, since un- 
 doubtedly false perceptions occur to us in them, and things 
 that appear to each are far from 'being,' but, quite con- 
 trariwise, none of the things that appear ' are.' 
 
 Theae. You speak most truly, Socrates. 
 
 So. What reason then is left, my boy, to him who lays 
 down that 'perception is knowledge, and that things which 
 appear to each ' are ' in every such case ? 
 
 Theae. For my own part, Socrates, I shrink from 
 answering that I have nothing to urge, because just now 
 you rebuked me for saying so. Yet in very truth I cannot 
 contend that maniacs or dreamers do not imagine falsities, 
 when some of them think they are gods, and others suppose 
 they are fowls, and imagine they are flying in their sleej). 
 
 So. Have you not in mind then a certain difficulty 
 raised about them, especially as to the sleeping and waking 
 vision ? 
 
 Κ p. 9 
 
130 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Thcae. What difficulty ? 
 
 So. A question which I think you have often heard 
 people ask, what proof one would have to give, if somebody 
 were to ask at this moment, whether we are sleeping and 
 dreaming all that we imagine, or are awake and talking to 
 one another in that state. 
 
 T/ieae. Indeed, Socrates, it is a perplexing thing to say 
 by what proof we could establish it : for all the facts succeed 
 one another as counterparts. Even the whole discussion we 
 have now held there is nothing to prevent our seeming to 
 have held in a dream. And when in a dream we seem to 
 be relating dreams, the similarity between the cases is 
 marvellous. 
 
 So. You see then that it is not difficult to raise a ques- 
 tion, since it can be questioned even whether we are waking or 
 dreaming. And as the time during which we are asleep is 
 equal to that in which we are awake, our soul in each state 
 contends that the fancies which from time to time occur 
 are true, so that for half the time we say that the one are 
 existent, for half the other, and we are equally confident 
 in regard to each. 
 
 Thcae. Yes, unquestionably. 
 
 So. And is not the same true of diseases and madness, 
 except that the times are not equal ? 
 
 Thcae. Yes. 
 
 So. Well, shall truth be determined by length or short- 
 ness of time ? 
 
 Theae. That were ridiculous on many grounds. 
 
 So. Have you then any other clear sign to show which 
 of these fancies are true ? 
 
 Theae. I think not. 
 
TRANSLATION, 131 
 
 \The answer is, that a percipient is not the same stihject in each of two 14: 
 "^ di^'erent states : and if either of the two factors (τά •y^wCivTa.) is 
 changed, the residt {το ^^ννώμ^νον) is changed. Grote says that the 
 cardinal principle set forth exhibits itself in a perpetual series of 
 definite manifestations. To say that I the subject perceive is to say that 
 I -perceive some object : to perceive, and perceive nothing, is a contra- 
 diction. Again, if an object be sweet, it must be sweet to some per- 
 cipient subject : sweet, but sweet to no one, is an impossibility. Necessity 
 binds the percipient to a thing perceived. Eveiy term applied to one 
 implies some reference to the other : no naine can be tndy predicated 
 of the one which implies '■being'' or ^coming to be'' apart from the 
 other. 'I 
 
 Su. Hear then from mc wliat they will say on this 
 point, who lay it down that what from time to time ' seems,' 
 * is ' true for him who so beholds it. Their opinion, I think, 
 is expressed by this question : ' Ο Theaetetus, of two things 
 which are totally different, can the one and the other have 
 any identical powers?' We must not assume that the things 
 in question are in one respect the same, in another different, 
 but that they are wholly different. 
 
 Theae. It is impossible that they should have anything 
 the same, either in power or in aught else, when they are 
 w^iolly different. 
 
 So, jMust we not also perforce confess the two things 
 to be unlike ? 
 
 Theae. I think so. 
 
 So. If, then, anything happens * to become ' like, either 
 to itself or to another, shall we say that when made like it 
 ' becomes ' the same ; when it gets unlike, diiferent ? 
 
 Theae. Necessarily. 
 
 So. Were we not previously saying that agents are 
 many and infinite, and patients likewise? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 0—2 
 
132 THEAETETUS. 
 
 So. And also that a thing combining first with one, 
 then Λvith another, will not produce the same things, but 
 different ? 
 ' Theae. Certainly. 
 
 So. Let us now specify myself, or you, or anything else, 
 in the same relations. Say Socrates in health and Socrates 
 out of health. Shall we say the latter is like the former, 
 or unlike ? 
 
 Theae. Socrates out of health, you say ; do you com- 
 pare this as a whole with the former as a whole, with 
 Socrates in health ? 
 
 So. Very well put : that is my meaning. 
 
 Theae. Unlike, of course. 
 
 So. And different, as being unlike ? 
 
 Theae. Necessarily. 
 
 So. And you will say the same of Socrates sleeping, and 
 in all the states Ave cited ? 
 
 Theae. I would. 
 
 So. And will not each of the things which have an 
 active nature, when they find Socrates in health, deal 
 with me as one thing ; when out of health, as a different 
 one? 
 
 Theae. They must. 
 
 So. And I, the patient, and that agent, will in each 
 case produce different things ? 
 
 Theae. To be sure. 
 
 So. When I drink wine in health, does it appear to me 
 agreeable and sweet ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. True; for, by our admissions, the agent and the 
 patient produced sweetness and perception, both of them 
 in motion together; and perception on the side of the 
 patient made the tongue percipient, and sweetness on the 
 
TRANSLATION. 153 
 
 part of the Avine, moving about it, made the wine to be and 
 to appear sweet to the healthy tongue. 
 
 TJieae. Such certainly were our previous admissions. 
 
 So. But when it finds me out of health, does it not in 
 the first place find one who is not the same? It comes 
 to an unlike object. 
 
 TJieae. Yes. 
 
 So. Such a Socrates, then, and the draught of wine, 
 produce different things; in regard to the tongue a per- 
 ception of bitterness, in regard to the wine a bitterness 
 beginning to be and moving ; and the wine it makes not 
 bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but one that 
 perceives. 
 
 Theae. Assuredly. 
 
 So. I then shall never become percipient of anything 
 else in the same way ; for perception of another is another 
 thing, and makes the percipient different and another; nor 
 will that Λvhich acts on me, if it concur with another, ever 
 engender the same and become similar : for from another 
 it will engender another and become different. 
 
 Theae. That is true. 
 
 So. I then shall never become similar to my former 
 self; nor will the object become similar to its former self. 
 
 Theae. No, surely not. 
 
 So. When I perceive, I must needs become percipient 
 of something : for to become percipient, yet percipient of 
 nothing, is impossible; and the object, when it becomes 
 sweet or bitter, or anything of the kind, must become so to 
 some one : for to become sweet, yet sweet to no one, is 
 impossible. 
 ^' Theae. Assuredly. 
 
 So. Then, I think, the inference remains, that to each 
 other we 'are,' if we are, or we * come to be,' if we come 
 
134 THEAETETUS. 
 
 to be : since necessity binds our essence indeed, but 
 binds it to nothing else, nor yet to ourselves individually ; 
 it remains then that we are bound to one another. So that 
 if a person says that anything 'is' or 'becomes,' he must 
 say that it 'is' or 'becomes' 'to something,' or 'of some- 
 thing,' or 'in relation to something'; but, if we have come 
 to a right conclusion, he must not say or ?\\o\i of any- 
 one else saying, that anything 'is' or 'comes to be' 
 absolutely. 
 
 Theae. Undoubtedly, Socrates. 
 
 So. And so, when that which acts on me is to myself 
 and not to another, I perceive it, and no one else does. 
 
 Theae. Certainly. 
 
 So. Then my perception is true to me : for it belongs 
 always to my being ; and, according to Protagoras, I am 
 judge of things which are to me, that they are, and of things 
 which are not, that they are not. 
 
 Theae. So it seems. 
 
 15 ^Having thus by a series of plausible argtwients brought to birth the 
 suggestion of Thcaetetus, that knowledge is sensuous perception^ Socrates 
 » asks if he can bear to learn that the bantling after all is not worth 
 rearing. Theodorus interferes, and pledges hi 7Ji self for the tolerant 
 temper of his pupil. He is reminded that Socrates only professes to 
 draw out the thoughts of those who converse with him.\ 
 
 So. How then, being infallible and unerring in mind as 
 regards things which ' are ' and ' come to be,' can I be un- 
 knowing of things whereof I am percipient'? 
 
 Theae. In no sort of way. 
 
 So. Therefore you have said very well that knowledge 
 
 15 ^ λίσθητήί, a novel word, but here pretty certainly the true one. 
 
TRANSLATION. 135 
 
 is nothing else than perception ; and it turns out to be one 
 and the same thing, that (as Homer and Heracleitus, and 
 their whole tribe, affirm) all things move like streams, and 
 that (after the opinion of the consummately wise Protagoras) 
 man is the measure of all things, and that (as Theaetetus 
 infers from these premises) perception is proved to be know- 
 ledge. Is it so, Theaetetus? jNIust we say. that this, as 
 it were, is your newborn child, and the product of my 
 midwifery ? What say you ? 
 
 Theae. It must be so, Socrates. 
 
 So. This then, seemingly, we have with much difficulty 
 brought to birth, whatever it prove to be. And now, after 
 its birth, we must, in good sooth, run round the hearth with 
 it in our discourse', not failing to observe whether the child 
 be worth nurture, and not a wind-egg and an unreality. Or 
 do you deem it absolutely necessary to rear your offspring, 
 and not to put it away ? Can you bear to see it confuted, 
 and not be gready out of temper if some one should filch 
 from you your firstborn ? 
 
 Theo. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates. He is not 
 the least ill-tempered, But in heaven's name tell me, is not 
 this then true ? 
 
 So. You are a very gourmand of discussion, Theodorus, 
 and a good creature, in that you take me to be a sack of 
 arguments, and think I can pull out another, and aver that 
 what we have said is untrue. But you do not note what is 
 taking place : that none of the arguments proceed from 
 myself, but from him who is conversing with me at the time ; 
 and that I know nothing more than this little feat, how to 
 obtain an argument from another wise person and to treat 
 
 - The fifth (lay after α chiM's birth the festival λ\α3 called Άμφι- 
 δρόμια, when the babe was carried round the εστία and received its 
 name. 
 
136 THEAETETUS. 
 
 it fairly. And I will now try to obtain one from our friend, 
 and not to say something of my own. 
 
 T/ico. You put the thing well, Socrates : so be it. • 
 
 1 3 \_Socrafcs ncno assails the doctrine of Protagoras. If man is a measure, 
 why not an ape or a frog? If his own sensation is t7'ue to every man, 
 zuhat makes Protagoras stiperlatively tvise? or what is the good of 
 arguing on any stihject? Theodorns, who was challenged as a friend 
 of Protagoras, declines to take tip his defence, and refers Socrates back 
 to Theactetiis.'X 
 
 So. Do you know then, Theodorus, what surprises me 
 in your friend Protagoras ? 
 
 Thco. What is that ? 
 
 So. I am much pleased Λvith everything else he has 
 said, how what 'seems' to each 'is' to each. But the com- 
 mencement of his treatise does surprise me. I wonder 
 that in the outset of his ' Truth ' he did not say that a pig, 
 or a dog-faced baboon, or any other more monstrous spe- 
 cimen of things that have perception, is the measure of all 
 things, that so he might have spoken to us at once in a 
 magnificent and very disdainful style, ostentatiously shewing 
 that, Avhile we were marvelling at his Λvisdom, as if he were 
 a god, he was all the while not a whit superior in judgment 
 to a tadpole, not to say, to any of his fellow-men. Or 
 liow are \ve to put the case, Theodorus? For if that opi- 
 nion shall be true to each man which he gets by percep- 
 tion, and nobody's affection shall be better determined by 
 another person, nor one be more entitled than another to 
 review opinion, and to say whether it be true or false, but, 
 as has been often said, each person singly shall form his 
 own opinions, and all these shall be right and true — why 
 in the world, my friend, is Protagoras so wise as to be justly 
 deemed a \vorthy teacher with high fees, and we dunces in 
 
TRA NSL A TION. 137 
 
 comparison, who must go to scliool to him, though each of 
 us is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not say 
 that Protagoras speaks thus to amuse the vulgar? while as 
 to my case, and that of my art of midwifery, I forbear to 
 say what ridicule we incur : so indeed does the whole 
 practice of dialectic. For, as to reviewing and criticising 
 each other's fancies and opinions, when each man's are 
 right, is it not a tedious and monstrous folly, if the 'Truth' 
 of Protagoras is true, and he did not proclaim it in jest 
 from the shrine of his book ? 
 
 Theo. He was my friend, Socrates, as you said just 
 now. I cannot therefore allow Protagoras to be confuted 
 by my admissions, nor yet resist you contrary to my opinion. 
 So take in hand Theaetetus again. For certainly he ap- 
 peared some time back to follow your lead very prettily. 
 
 So. If you went to the wrestling-courts at Lacedaemon, 
 Theodorus, and there beheld naked people, some your in- 
 feriors, would you refuse to strip yourself beside them, and 
 exhibit your own form competitively ? 
 
 Theo. Why do you think I would not refuse, Socrates, 
 with their permission and consent ? So now I shall try to 
 persuade you to let me look on, rather than be dragged to 
 the play-ground in my present stiff condition, and to wrestle 
 it out yourself with one who is younger and more supple. 
 
 \Socrates asks Theaeicttts if his faith in the Protagorean doctrine is shaken 17 
 by what has been said. When he admits that it is, he is rallied by 
 Socrates for his facility, and recalLd to the question, ''Knaivledge is 
 sensation.^ ^re xve to say ive knozu the barbarian toiii;;ues because we 
 hear them spoken, or letters because we see them ? Theaetetus replies 
 that we know them in some respects, not in others.] 
 
 So. If such is your will, Theodorus, I don't say ' nill,' 
 as proverbialists have it. So I must turn again to the wise 
 
138 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Theaetetus. Tell me then, Theaetetus, first of all, as to our 
 late discussions ; do you not share my surprise if thus 
 all of a sudden you shall turn out to be no wise inferior 
 in wisdom to any man or even any god ? Or do you 
 suppose that the ' measure ' of Protagoras is less applicable 
 to gods than to men ? 
 
 Thcae. Upon my word I do not. And as to your 
 question, I am much surprised. For when we were engaged 
 in showing how that Avhich ' seemed ' to each ' was ' also 
 to him who thought it, the statement appeared to me very 
 good ; but now another view has taken its place all of a 
 sudden. 
 
 So. You are young, my dear 6oy: you quickly succumb 
 to popular declamation, and become a convert. For Pro- 
 tagoras, or some one on his part, will say in reply : My fine 
 gentlemen, young and old, ye sit togeiher and declaim, 
 bringing gods into question, whom I, after speaking and 
 writing about them, as to their existence or non-existence, 
 set aside : and you say just what the populace would 
 hear with approval, that it is too bad for mankind not to 
 differ in wisdom from every kind of beast : but you offer 
 no convincing proof whatever ; you resort to probability, 
 which if Theodorus or any other geometrician sought to 
 use in geometry, he would be good for nothing. Just 
 consider tlicn, you and Theodorus, if on such important 
 subjects you will accept arguments relying on mere per- 
 suasion and probability. 
 
 Theae. No, Socrates, we should not any more than 
 yourself affirm that to be just. 
 
 So. We must view it then in some other way, as you 
 and Theodorus suggest. 
 
 Theae. In some other way certainly. 
 
 So. In this way then let us consider it : whether know- 
 
TRANSLATION. 139 
 
 ledge and perception are the same or different. For to this 
 point, I ween, our whole argument tended ; and for this 
 purpose we stirred all these many strange questions. Did 
 we not ? 
 
 Theac. Assuredly. 
 
 So. Shall we then admit that all the things which we 
 perceive by sight and hearing we at the same time know? 
 For instance, before Λve have learnt the language of the 
 barbarians S shall we say that we do not hear them when 
 they speak, or that we both hear and understand what they 
 say ? And again, if we do not know letters, shall vv^e, when 
 we look at them, say we do not see them, or sliall we insist 
 that we know, since we see them ? 
 
 Theae. So much of them, Socrates, as we see and hear, 
 we shall say we know ; we shall say we both see and know 
 the figure and the colour, and that we both hear and know 
 the sharp and flat sound : but what grammarians and inter- 
 preters teach concerning them we shall say we neither per- 
 ceive by sight and hearing, nor know. 
 
 So. Excellent, Theaetetus. And it is not worth while 
 to dispute these positions of yours, that you may grow. 
 
 \Socrates now hriugs an argument against the Protagorcan doctrine which 18 
 he afterwards acknowledges to be captious and eristic, lie says that 
 Thcodorus ought to champion the cause of his friend'' s children., as their 
 guardian. Theodorus naively rays that Callias holds that ofp.ce^ not 
 himself. ] 
 
 But look at this other question also which approaches, 
 and consider how we shall repel it. 
 
 17 ' All who spoke another lany;uaL;e than Greek were by the Hellenes 
 called βάρβαροι.. Hence I'rof. Jowett renders this word in English, 
 • foreigners.' 
 
(q AfSiJ^^^ 
 
 ( 
 
 140 THEAETETUS, 
 
 \ Theae^ What is that ? 
 Q So. ' This. If any one shall ask — ' Suppose a man has 
 
 become cognisant of anything, is it possible that, having 
 and preserving memory of this thing, at the time when he 
 remembers he should not know the very thing which he 
 remembers ?^^ But I am verbose, apparently, when I wish 
 to ask if a man remembering anything he has learnt does 
 not know it. 
 
 Theae. How could that be, Socrates ? The thing you 
 suggest would be a miracle. 
 
 So. Perhaps then I am trifling : but consider. Do you 
 not call seeing perceiving, and sight perception ? 
 
 Thcae. I do. 
 
 So. Has not then one who has seen something become 
 cognisant of the thing he saw according to your last state- 
 ment ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Well : do you not grant there is such a thing as 
 memory ? 
 
 Thcae. Yes. 
 
 So. Memory of something or of nothing ? 
 
 TJieae. Of something, certainly. 
 
 So. Of what one has learnt then, and of what one has 
 perceived ; of such things, is it not ? 
 
 Thcae. Undoubtedly. 
 
 ^i7. What a man has seen, he remembers at times, I 
 suppose ? 
 
 Theae. He does. 
 
 So. Even when he has shut his eyes ? or on doing so 
 has he forgotten ? 
 
 Theae. It were monstrous to suppose that, Socrates. 
 
 So. AVe must, I can tell you, if we are to maintain our 
 former argument. If not, there is an end of it. 
 
TRANSLA TION. 141 
 
 Thcae. I really suspect so myself; but I cannot quite 
 make up my mind. Tell me how. 
 
 .5"^. In this way. One who sees becomes, we say, 
 cognisant of what he sees. For sight and perception and 
 knowledge are admitted to be the same. 
 
 T/ieae. Quite so. 
 
 So. And he who saw and became cognisant of what 
 he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers, but does not see 
 the thing. Is it so ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And not seeing means not knowing, if seeing means 
 knowing. 
 
 Theae. True. 
 
 So. The inference then is, that, while a man remembers 
 something of which he has become cognisant, yet, since he 
 does' not see, he does not know it: and this we said would 
 be a miracle. 
 
 Theae. All quite true. 
 
 So. If then anybody says that knowledge and percep- 
 tion are the same, there results an evident impossibility. 
 
 Theae. So it seems. 
 
 So. Therefore we must distinguish one from the other. 
 
 Theae. I suppose so. 
 
 So. What then will knowledge be? We must begin 
 our statement over again, it seems. Yet what are we going 
 to do, Theaetetus ? 
 
 Theae. About what ? 
 
 So. We seem to me, like an ignoble cock, to hop away 
 from the argument and crow, before we have gained the 
 victory. 
 
 Theae. How so? 
 
 So. Like rhetorical disputants we seem to be content 
 that we have come to a mutual agreement as to the admitted 
 
142 THEAETETUS. 
 
 uses of words, and by some such method mastered the ques- 
 tion. And though we say we are not Eristics but philoso- 
 phers, we unconsciously imitate the practice of those clever 
 fellows. 
 
 Theae. I do not yet understand your meaning. 
 
 So. Well then, I will try to explain my view of the 
 matter. We were asking whether a man who has learnt and 
 remembers something does not know it ; and taking the case 
 of one who had seen, and after shutting his eyes remembered 
 though he did not see, we shewed that he did not know at 
 the same time that he remembered ; and this, we said, was 
 impossible. And so the Protagorean fable came to ruin, 
 and yours with it, as to knowledge and perception being the 
 same. 
 
 Theae. Apparently. 
 
 So. But it would not, my friend, if the father of the 
 former fable had been alive. He would have made a strong 
 defence for it : but now that it is an orphan, we insult it. 
 For even those trustees, whom Protagoras appointed, one of 
 whom was Theodorus here, do not come to the rescue. 
 AVell, in the interest of justice, I will run the risk of helping 
 him myself. 
 
 Theo. No, Socrates, I was not his children's trustee, 
 but rather Callias son of Hipponicus. I diverged some- 
 what earlier from abstract studies to geometry. But we 
 shall be much obliged to you if you will succour him. 
 
 So. Well said, Theodorus. Have an eye then to my 
 succour. For a man would have to make stranger admis- 
 sions than we lately made, if he did not attend to the terms 
 in which we are generally wont to affirm and deny. Shall I 
 explain how to you or to Theaetetus ? 
 
 Theo. To the company generally, but let the younger 
 one answer. For he will incur less disgrace by defeat. 
 
TRANSLATION, 143 
 
 \Socrates produces some more eristic puzzles.^ 19 
 
 Sj. I put now the most startling question. To this 
 effect, I thinkl Is it possible for the same man knowing a 
 thinsf not to know what he knows?,.. — J 
 
 Ο 
 
 T/ieo. What answer shall we give, Theaetetus ? 
 
 Theae. Impossible, in my opinion. 
 
 So. Not if you lay it down that seeing is knowing. 
 For how will you deal with that inevitable question, when, 
 as they say, you are caught in a well, and an unabashed 
 man claps his hand to one of your eyes and asks, whether 
 with the closed eye you see your cloak. 
 
 Thcae. Not with that one, I suppose I shall say, but 
 with the other. 
 
 So. Then you see and do not see the same thing at 
 the same time ? 
 
 Theae. In a sort of way. 
 
 So. I do not, he will say, define anything, nor did I 
 ask how, but only whether you know that Avhich you do 
 not know. And now you are shown to see Λvhat you do 
 not see ; and you have admitted that seeing is knowing 
 and not seeing not knowing. Consider the inference from 
 these premises. 
 
 Theae. I consider that it directly contradicts my former 
 assertion. 
 
 So. Probably, my fine gentleman, you would have had 
 more such experiences, if somebody had farther asked you 
 whether it is possible to know keenly or to know bluntly, 
 and to know near and not at a distance, and to know the 
 same thing intensely or moderately, and other (questions, 
 countless in number, which a light-armed mercenary am- 
 bushed in the arguments might have asked, when you laid 
 
144 THEAETETUS. 
 
 it down that knowledge and perception are the same; and 
 attacking your senses of hearing and smeUing and the hke 
 he might have worried you with incessant confutation, until, 
 admiring his accursed wisdom, you were entangled by him 
 so far, that after mastering and binding you tight he might 
 then have ransomed you for Avhat sum you and he agreed 
 on. Now what argument, perhaps you may say, will Pro- 
 tagoras advance in aid of his doctrine? Must we iiot try 
 to state it ? 
 
 Theae. Certainly we must. 
 
 20 \SocTatcs, having obtained fro7n Theaetetiis an adniission that Protagoras 
 ought to be heard in his own defence, undertakes to plead his cause, 
 and does so in the assiwied person of Protagoras himself. ^ 
 
 So. Besides all this that we urge in his defence, he will 
 also, methinks, come to close quarters, contemning us, and 
 saying : Here's this good creature Socrates, who — when a 
 lad got frightened on being asked whether it is possible for 
 the same person at once to remember some particular thing 
 and not know it, and in his fright said 'no,' because he 
 could not see before him, — made a laughing-stock of me in 
 the course of his arguments. But the fact, my easy-going 
 Socrates, stands thus : when you examine any of my docr 
 trines by the method of interrogation, if the person ques- 
 tioned give such answers as I should, and be defeated, 
 I am confuted ; but if they differ from mine, then the 
 person questioned is confuted. For instance, if mutual 
 word-catching is the thing to guard against, do you think 
 anybody will concede to you that the memory of a past 
 feeling is anything like what the feeling itself was at the 
 time when it was experienced? Far from it. Or again, 
 that he will shrink from admitting that it is possible for 
 
TRANSLATION. 145 
 
 the same person to know and not to know the same thing ? 
 Or, if he dread this — that he will grant an altered person 
 to be the same he was before he was altered ? Or rather — 
 that anybody can be called * one ' and not ' many ' — infi- 
 nitely multipUed, if alteration goes on. But, Ο my good sir, 
 he will, say, encounter my main doctrine more generously, 
 if you can, and prove against it that individual perceptions 
 do not ' come-to-be ' to each of us, or that, supposing they 
 do, it does not follow that the appearance will ' come-to-be ' 
 (or 'be,' if that is the proper term) to that person alone, 
 unto whom it appears. When you talk of swine and dog- 
 headed baboons, you are not merely swinish yourself, but 
 you likewise induce your hearers to act as such towards my 
 treatises without any decency. For I say that the Truth ( o»• A 
 is as I have written : that each of us is a measure of 
 things that are and are not : but that, nevertheless, one 
 man differs vastly from another in this very respect, that 
 to one man some things are and appear, to another other 
 things. And I am far from denying that Λvisdom and a 
 wise man exist, but the man I call wise is he who, by 
 working changes, makes things to appear and to be good , 
 to any one of us, to whom they appear and aie evil. And 
 again, do not press my argument literally; but understand 
 from the following explanation more clearly what I mean. 
 Recollect how it was formerly said, that to a sick man 
 his food appears to be and is bitter, but to a man in health 
 the opposite is the fact and appears so. Neither of these 
 persons ought we to make wiser than the other; that is 
 impossible : nor may we declare that the sick man is igno- 
 rant for holding such an opinion, or the man in health 
 is wise for holding another. \\'e must effect a change to 
 the opposite state: for the one habit is better than the 
 other. So also in education we must cause a change from 
 K. p. 10 
 
/(>\ 
 
 146 THEAETETUS. 
 
 the one Jiabit to the better. Now the physician changes by 
 medicines ; the wise teacher by arguments . Never indeed 
 did anybody make ot^e who had false opinions afterwards 
 to hold true ones. ^For it is not possible either to think 
 what is not, or anythmg but what one feels ;) and this is 
 always true. But, I suppose, when througn a bad habit 
 of mind a man has corresponding opinions, a good habit 
 makes him hold opinions resembling it ; phantasms which 
 some persons from inexperience call true : but I call some 
 better than others, not truer. And wise men, dear Socrates, 
 I am far from calling frogs : but in relation to bodies I 
 call them physicians, in relation to plants husbandmen. 
 For I say that these last also produce in plants, instead 
 of evil sensations when any of them are sickly, good and 
 healthy sensations and truths, while wise and good rheto- 
 ricians make/good things instead of evil seem just to states. J 
 Since whatever things seem just and good to each state, 
 are such to it, as long as it deems them lawful; but the 
 wise man, in the place of those things which are severally 
 evil to each, makes the good both to be and to seem right. 
 And on the same principle the sophist also, who is able to 
 instruct his pupils thus, is both wise and worthy of high fees 
 at their hands. And thus some are wiser than others, and 
 nobody thinks falsities :/ and you, whether you will or not, 
 
 must submit to be a measure. For on these grounds this 
 
 V . . . 
 
 _jloctrme is mamtained. ^ And, if you Avish to revive your 
 
 dispute with it, dispute by counter- arguing at full ; or if you 
 prefer the method of questioning, adopt it ; for no person of 
 sense will avoid this method, but will pursue it most wil- 
 lingly. Mind this however ; you must not question unfairly. 
 \For it is most unreasonable in one who professes esteem for 
 virtue to be constantly pursuing an unfair method of argu- 
 ment. > Now unfairness is shown, when a man fails to con- 
 
TRA Ν SLA ΤΙ Ο Ν. 147 
 
 duct his arguments diversely; in one way as a combatant, 
 in another as a dialectician : in the former case rallying 
 and tripping up as much as he can, in the latter being 
 serious, and correcting his respondent, showing him only 
 those errors into which he was led by his own fault or in 
 consequence of former discussions. If you act thus, your 
 fellow-debaters will impute to themselves the fault of their 
 own confusion and perplexity, not to you ; and they will 
 follow and love you, and fly from themselves to philosophy, 
 that they may become different, and get rid of their former 
 selves. But if you take the contrary course, as most do, 
 you will find an opposite result, and your pupils instead of 
 philosophers will turn out haters of philosophy, when they 
 grow older. If then you will follow my advice, as was 
 before said, you will, in no hostile or contentious spirit, 
 but Λvith a really mild and condescending temper, consider 
 what we mean, when we declare that all things are in 
 motion, and that what seems 'is' also to each, individual 
 as well as state. From these considerations you will discern 
 whether knowledge and perception are the same : but not, 
 as you lately sought, from the use of words and names, 
 which most people pervert in every sort of Avay, causing 
 each other all kinds of perplexity. Such, Theodorus, is 
 the slight assistance which, from slight resources, I have 
 supplied, as I best could, to your old friend. Had he 
 been alive, he would have helped his own cause in grander 
 language. 
 
 [Protagoras had been made in the pleading of Socrates to complain that 21 
 admissions hostile to his doctrine had been wriutg from the mouth of a 
 terrified lad. " Socrates now constrains Theodorus to submit, very re- 
 luctantly ^ to a dialectic argument on the general question at issue. ^ 
 
 10—2 
 
148 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Theo. You are joking, Socrates : for you have helped 
 him most valiantly. 
 
 So. You are very obliging, my friend. Allow me one 
 word. You noticed probably that Protagoras in what he 
 said reproached us for holding our discussions with a boy, 
 and using that boy's alarm as a weapon of contention 
 against his propositions : and while he represented this 
 as mere amusement, he called 'the measure of all things' 
 a grave topic, and urged us to deal seriously with his 
 argument. 
 
 Theo. Of course I noticed it, Socrates. 
 So. Well : do you bid us take his advice ? 
 Theo. Very earnestly. 
 
 So, Do you see that all here are boys except you? 
 If then we are to take his advice, you and I must deal 
 seriously with his doctrine by mutual questions and answers, 
 that he may not have to reproach us with considering this 
 subject in a jocular manner with lads. 
 
 Theo. Nay, but would not Theaetetus follow the inves- 
 tigation of a doctrine better than many who have great 
 beards? 
 
 So. Not better than you, Theodorus. Do not suppose 
 that I am bound to defend your deceased friend in eveiy 
 manner, and that you are bound in no manner. But 
 come, good sir, follow the argument a little Λvay, till such 
 time as we know whether you are to be the measure of 
 diagrams, or if all are competent in themselves, equally with 
 you, to treat of astronomy and the other subjects wherein 
 you are reported to excel. 
 
 Theo. When one sits beside you, Socrates, it is not easy 
 to decline discussion. Indeed I spoke nonsense just noV 
 when I said you would allow me not to strip, and that you 
 would not compel me as the Lacedaemonians do: you seem 
 
TRANSLATION. 140 
 
 rather to tend in Sciron's ^ direction. The Lacedaemonians 
 indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act 
 your part hke Antaeus' : you will not let one who comes to 
 you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle 
 with you in argument. 
 
 So. You have found very good precedents for my 
 malady, Theodorus : but I am more robust than they were. 
 IMany a Hercules and Theseus strong in argument have ere 
 now met and thumped me very hard ; but I do not flinch 
 for all that : with such a wonderful love of this kind of 
 exercise am I possessed. Do not then refuse to benefit 
 yourself as well as me by trying a fall with me. 
 
 Thco. Be it as you will : I refuse no longer. I must 
 inevitably endure by cross-examination whatever destiny 
 you spin for me in this discussion. I shall not however be 
 able to put myself in your hands beyond the limit which 
 you have proposed. 
 
 Su. That limit is sufficient. And pray help me to be 
 careful of this, that we do not unawares carry on any 
 childish kind of argument, and incur reproach again for 
 doing so. 
 
 Thco. Very well, I'll try my best. 
 
 \The argument of Socrates against the doctrine of Protagoras, that * man 22 
 is a measure to himself^ may be briefly suvuHordsed thus. That doc- 
 trine means^ KljjjJiat seems to eac ji_ii to ea ch. ' Νοζυ to the mass of 
 mankind this doctrine seems to. L• untrue., Because it is cci-taui that 
 men in geiiei-al do consider some to be wiser tJuxn otJicrSy and look up 
 to the wise as teachers and guides. Therefore to tJuin it is untrue. 
 
 21 ^ Sciron, or Scirrhon, the legendary robber, who flung travellers 
 from rocks. He was slain by Theseus. 
 
 2 Antaeus, the gigantic wrestler, who slew his opponents : but was 
 himself defeated and slain by Hercules. 
 
150 THEAETETUS. 
 
 And Protagoras, on his own principle, must alloiv that they are 
 right ; from which it jiccessarily folloius that he is wrong, even in his 
 own opinion. In short Uhe Truth'' of Protagoras is not true to him- 
 self or to any body else.'\ 
 
 So. Let US first revert to the objection we took before, 
 and see whether we were right or Avrong in being out 
 of humour and censuring the doctrine, in that it made every- 
 one competent in wisdom ; and whether Protagoras rightly 
 conceded to us, that, in respect of better and worse, some 
 do surpass, and they are wise. Is it not so ? 
 
 Theo. Yes. 
 
 So. Now if he had himself been present and made this 
 admission, instead of our making it in his defence, we need 
 not have strengthened ourselves by recurring to the subject : 
 but now perhaps some one may allege that we are in- 
 competent to make the confession on his part. It is 
 better to come to a clearer mutual understanding on this 
 special point. For whether it is so or not makes a great 
 difference. 
 
 Theo. Very true. 
 
 So. Let us obtain the admission not through others, 
 but from his statement, as briefly as we can. 
 
 Theo. How ? 
 
 So. In this way. He says, does he not, that what 
 seems to every one ' is ' also to him unto whom it seems ? 
 
 Theo. Yes, he does. 
 
 So. Do not we also, Protagoras, state a man's opinion, 
 or rather the opinions of all men, when we say that 
 there is nobody who does not deem himself wiser than 
 others in some respects, and others wiser than himself in 
 other respects; and, moreover, that in the greatest perils, 
 when they are distressed in war or disease or at sea, men 
 regard their rulers on such occasions as gods, expecting 
 
TRANSLATION, 151 
 
 them to be their saviours, though they differ from them in 
 nothing but knowledge? And all human life teems with 
 people who are seeking teachers and rulers of themselves 
 and of other living creatures and of the various trades ; 
 and teems, again, with other people who deem themselves 
 competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all 
 these cases what else can we say than that men themselves 
 think there exists among them wisdom and ignorance ? 
 
 Theo. Nothing else. 
 
 So. Do they not deem wisdom to be true thought, and 
 ignorance false opinion? 
 
 Theo. Certainly. 
 
 So. Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, 
 Protagoras ? Must we say that men always have true 
 opinions, or sometimes true, sometimes false ? From both 
 views it results that they do not always think true things, 
 but at times true things, at times false. For consider, 
 Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would 
 wish to contend that no one person considers any other 
 to be unlearned and to have false opinions. 
 
 Theo. That is incredible, Socrates. 
 
 So. And yet the doctrine which says that man is the 
 measure of all things is brought to this unavoidable con- 
 clusion. 
 
 Theo. How so ? 
 
 So. When you, after forming some judgment in your 
 own mind on any point, declare to me your opinion, be it 
 granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you : 
 but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges 
 respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you 
 have true opinions? do not a countless number in each 
 instance contend against you with contrary opinions, be- 
 lieving that you judge and think falsities? 
 
152 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Theo. Yes verily, Socrates, countless myriads indeed, 
 as Homer says, who give me all the trouble in the world. 
 
 So. Well? would you have us say that in that case you 
 have opinions true to yourself but false to the countless 
 myriads ? 
 
 Theo. Such seems to be the necessary inference from 
 the statement. 
 
 So. And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing 
 he did not think man a measure, and the public did not 
 think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily 
 follow that \vhat he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth 
 to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not 
 agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who 
 deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much 
 more decidedly it is or is not so ? 
 
 Theo. Of necessity, if according to each individual 
 opinion it will be or will not be so. 
 
 So. In the next place it involves this very queer result, 
 that he on his side, by confessing that all men hold true 
 opinions, admits that the opinion of the opposite party 
 about his opinion (which they deem false) is a true one. 
 
 Theo. Certainly. 
 
 So. Will he not admit that his own is false, if he 
 confesses that the opinion of those who suppose him to 
 think falsely is true ? . ^ 
 
 Theo. Of course. 
 
 So. But the others on their side do not admit that they 
 think falsely. 
 
 Theo. No, they do not. 
 
 So. And he again confesses also this opinion to be true 
 according to his written doctrines. 
 
 TJieo. Evidently. 
 
 So. By all parties then it will be contended, including 
 
TRANSLA TION. 153 
 
 Protagoras (by him it will rather be confessed, for when he 
 grants to a gainsayer that the latter thinks what is true, then 
 does Protagoras himself confess), that no dog or man he 
 meets with is a measure concerning anything which he has 
 not learnt. Is it not so ? 
 
 Theo. Yes. 
 
 So. Since this is the contention of all, to nobody 
 will the Truth of Protagoras be true, neither to himself nor 
 to anyone else."^ 
 
 Theo. We run down my friend very hard, Socrates. 
 
 So. But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning 
 the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we : 
 and if he could at once pop up his head where Ave are, 
 he wOuld not sink down and run away again, until, pro- 
 bably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and 
 you of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, 
 make the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our 
 real opinions for the time being. And must we not now 
 say that everybody will confess this — that one man is wiser, 
 one more ignorant, than another? 
 
 Theo. Yes, I think so. 
 
 [If we admit, Socrates goes on, that each may judge for himself with equal 23 
 truth as to some sensible things, as ^hof and ' coldf this is not uni- 
 versally applicable. For instance, all do not know with equal truth 
 what is ^ wholesome^ for them. Again, if we admit that states and 
 
 persons may judge with equal trtith of ''right'' and ^wrong,^ Wioly^ 
 and Utnholy,'' they certainly cannot equally well decide what is and 
 will be ' expedient ' and ' inexpedient 'for them. But, he adds, th is opens 
 new questions. Well, says Theodorus, have we not leisure for them ? Ves, 
 replies Socrates, we have ; ami this is tJie reason why philosophers 
 make such a poor figure in the law-courts. Their habits are those of 
 
 freemen; those of lawyers are in a ynanner slavish. Then folloius 
 the Socratic picture of an Athenian lawyer's habits and character. 
 
154 THEAETETUS. 
 
 He asks if Thcodorus ivislies to hear its cont7-ast ΐ7ΐ the habits and 
 character of the true philosopher. Thcodorus is very desirous to 
 hear this-l 
 
 So. Must we not also say that our argument is most 
 stably conducted on the lines we prescribed in our defence 
 of Protagoras, averring that most things are as they seem to 
 each, hot, dry, sweet, all such-like ' ? but that, if he will grant 
 that one excels another in anything, he will be ready to say 
 so in judgments upon health and disease: not every woman 
 or child or beast, he will admit, knows what is wholesome 
 in its own case, and is competent to cure itself: here, if 
 anywhere, one excels another. 
 
 T/ieo. I think so. 
 
 So. In politics, too, will he not say, that of things 
 honourable and dishonourable, just and unjust, holy and un- 
 holy, whatsoever each state shall deem and enact to be lawful 
 for itself are also lawful in truth for each, and that in these 
 no individual or state is wiser than another? but in enacting 
 things expedient or inexpedient, here, if anywhere, he will 
 confess that counsellor differs from counsellor and the 
 opinion of one city from that of another in respect of truth, 
 and he will certainly not venture to affirm, that whatever 
 a state shall deem and enact to be expedient for itself λνϋΐ 
 most assuredly be expedient. But of the former things I 
 named, justice and injustice, holiness and unhohness, they 
 (the Protagoreans) are ready to insist that none has any 
 essential nature, but that whatever has seemed good by 
 public consent is true when it has seemed good, and as long 
 as it seems good". And those who do not altogether echo 
 
 23 1 Such-like, οσα του τύπου τούτου, lit. all that are of this type, i.e. 
 (as Prof. Jowett says) 'immediate sensations.' 
 
 " In the first two speeches (§ 23) assigned to Socrates the subjects 
 who express or allow opinions are very indistinctly stated. The reason 
 
TRANSLATION. 155 
 
 the doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic 
 view. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out 
 of question, greater out of less. 
 
 Thco. Are we not at leisure, Socrates ? 
 
 So. AVe appear to be. On many occasions, my good 
 sir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is 
 for those who have spent much time on philosophy, when 
 they go into the law-courts, to shew themselves absurd 
 orators. 
 
 Theo. How do you mean ? 
 
 So. People who from their youth have been knocking 
 about in law-courts and such like scenes, as compared with 
 those who have been reared in philosophic and literary 
 society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves 
 compared with freemen. 
 
 Theo. In what respects ? 
 
 So. In that (referring to your last observation) philoso- 
 phers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions 
 peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been 
 
 of this seems to be, that he is referring throughout to Avhat AA'as said in 
 his defence of Protagoras made in the name of Protagoras (§ 20). The 
 oratio obliqua with which the first speech begins is dependent (as the 
 translation indicates) on the άλλο τι φωμ^ν [initst we not say?) at the 
 close of the previous speech in § 22. Of ξ,υ-γχωρησεταί and βθελησαι αν 
 φάναι, according to Heindorf and Stallbaum, rts tlvL• understood are 
 severally the subjects. I am rather disposed to understand Ι1ρωτα'^6ραζ 
 and ΤΙρωτα-γόραν, as Protagoras had been mentioned just before, and 
 his confession would be appropriate here. For the same reasons I sup- 
 pose him to be the subject on whose statement or admission the oratio 
 obliqua depends in the first paragraph of the second speech (ονκονν 
 κ.τ.λ.), after which ομολογήσει comes, where Protagoras is the natural 
 subject. In the next sentence, where he recurs to τα καλά κ.τ.λ., 
 Plato uses the plural έΒέλονσιν ΙσχνρΙζίσθαι. We cannot doubt that 
 he speaks of the scholars of Protagoras, who still profess their master's 
 doctrine on the question specified. 
 
156 THEAETETUS. 
 
 pursuing three arguments in succession, so do they also, 
 if one which follows pleases them better than the preced- 
 ing; nor do they care whether they speak briefly or at 
 length, if only they can attain truth. The other class 
 always speak in haste ; for the flow of water^ quickens them, 
 and they are not allowed to make their speeches on any- 
 thing they desire; and the opponent stands over them 
 holding compulsion in the shape of a prescribing document 
 read in the ear, beyond the limits of which they must not 
 speak, yclept an affidavit^: and the arguments are always 
 about a fellow-slave addressed to a master on the bench, 
 who holds justice between his finger and thumb; and 
 the contests are never away from the point ^, but to the 
 point of self-interest ; and often too the race is for life. So 
 that on all these grounds they become keen and shrewd, 
 knowing how to wheedle the master by word and gratify him 
 by deed, being stunted and crooked in soul. For their 
 slavery from childhood has robbed them of growth and 
 uprightness and freedom, compehing them to act tortuously, 
 setting before their yet tender souls great perils and fears. 
 And as they cannot bear up against these with the help of 
 justice and truth, they have recourse at once to falsehood 
 and mutual injury, and twist themselves in many ways, and 
 become warped ; and so they pass from youth to manhood 
 without any mental soundness, becoming, as they imagine, 
 
 3 Flcnu of water. The κλεψύδρα or water-clock, used to measure 
 the time allowed to each orator, and placed within his view. 
 
 * Affidavit, άντωμοσία, literally counter-affidavit. The pleas of 
 each party in a cause were affirmed by their several oaths : and by these 
 affirmations they or their advocates would be bound, and could not 
 stray from them. 
 
 δ Away from the point, τψ άλλωί {οδόρ), a proverbial phrase. Such 
 also is Trepl ψνχψ 6 δρΌμο8. 
 
TRANSLATION. 157 
 
 clever and wise. Such is this class of men, Theodorus. 
 Would you wish us now to describe those of our circle, or 
 to pass them by and return to our argument, that we may 
 not, as we just now said, abuse too far our freedom in the 
 change of topics ? 
 
 Theo. Not so, Socrates ; finish the description. For 
 you have said with great truth that we who form a circle 
 hke this are not servants of our discussions : our discussions 
 are, as it were, our servants, and each of them waits to be 
 completed when we think fit. For amongst us there is no 
 presiding authority; neither dicast to rule, nor spectator, as 
 in the case of poets, to censure. 
 
 \The habits and character of the true philosopher are depicted ifz this and 24 
 the succeeding chapter.'\ 
 
 So. We must speak then, seemingly, since you think 
 proper, concerning the leaders of such a circle ; for why need 
 one mention the inferior students of philosophy ? This 
 class from their youth, in the first place, do not know 
 the way to the agora, nor where a law-court is or a council- 
 hall or any other political meeting-room : laws and decrees 
 spoken or written they neither see nor hear. Societies 
 agitating for office and clubs and dinners and wine-bouts 
 with flute-girls — these are practices which even in dreams 
 do not occur to them. Whether any one in the city is well 
 or ill born, whether a person has inherited any disgrace 
 from ancestors on the male or female side, he knows no 
 more than he does of the proverbial * gallons in the sea.' 
 He does not even know that he is icrnorant of all these 
 
 Ο 
 
 things; for it is not for credit's sake that he stands aloof 
 from them, but in point of fact it is only his body that 
 reposes and resides in the city, while his mind, deeming 
 
158 THEAETETUS. 
 
 all these things petty and insignificant, moves in every 
 direction, as Pindar says, measuring things beneath the 
 earth and on its surface, and star-gazing above the heaven, 
 and searching out everywhere the nature of each class of 
 existing things, condescending to none of those which are 
 near it. 
 
 Theo. How do you mean, Socrates ? 
 
 So. Compare the case of Thales, Ο Theodorus. While 
 he Λvas astronomising and gazing upward he fell into a well; 
 and a clever and witty Thracian maidservant is said to 
 have taunted him with desiring to know what was in heaven, 
 but not seeing what was before him and at his feet. The 
 same taunt is good for all who are devoted to philosophy. 
 For in fact such a student is not only unaware of what his 
 next neighbour is doing, but does not even know whether 
 he is a man or some other creature. But what man is, and 
 what it belongs to such a nature to do or to suffer differently 
 from all others, this he inquires, and takes pains to search 
 out. You understand, I hope, Theodorus, do you not ? 
 
 Theo. I do, and your words are true. 
 
 So. Therefore, my friend, a man like this, in his 
 associations private and public, as I said at first, when in 
 a laAV-court or elsewhere he is compelled to discourse of 
 things at his feet and before his eyes, becomes a laughing- 
 stock not only to Thracian maids, but to the general public, 
 falling into wells and perplexities of every kind from inex- 
 perience ; and his awkwardness is marvellous, raising a sus- 
 picion of imbecility. For when personal reviling is the order 
 of the day, he has no scandalous charge to bring, knowing 
 no evil of anybody, because he has never taken the trouble. 
 So he gets laughed at for his helplessness. And when 
 eulogies and glorification of others are the theme, he is 
 seen to laugh in right earnest without any affectation; and 
 
TRANSLATION. 159 
 
 so he seems to be silly. AVhen a tyrant or a king is ex- 
 tolled,- he thinks he hears one of the herdsmen, swineherd 
 or shepherd or cowherd, congratulated for his large milking: 
 but he considers that the royal proprietors in their tending 
 and milking have to deal with a more untoward and insidious 
 animal than the others have, and that any one of them 
 must, for want of leisure, perforce prove quite as rude and 
 uninstructed as the real herdsmen, having his fortifica- 
 tion built round him like a stall upon the mountain. 
 AVhen he hears it said that somebody, who has got ten 
 thousand acres of land or more, has a wonderfully large 
 estate, he thinks the quantity named a very small one, from 
 being in the habit of contemplating the whole earth. And 
 when they extol birth, and say that some one is a gentleman 
 for being able to show seven rich ancestors, this he regards 
 as praise emanating from very dull and short-sighted persons, 
 Avho through want of education can never take a comprehen- 
 sive view, so as to see that every man has had countless 
 myriads of forefathers, among whom in every case are found 
 many rich and poor, kings and slaves, both Greeks and 
 barbarians, recurring again and again. He is amazed at the 
 manifestly narrow conception of those who pride themselves 
 on a list of twenty-five ancestors, carried back to Heracles, 
 son of Amphitryon ; and he laughs at men who cannot bear 
 in mind that the twenty-fifth ancestor, counting back from 
 Amphitryon, and again the fiftieth before him, were just 
 Avhatever they might happen to be — and by such reflection 
 get rid of their foolish vanity. On all these occasions 
 such a man is scorned by the multitude, partly, it would 
 seem, on the charge of arrogance, partly for not know- 
 ing what stares him in the face, and for helplessness in 
 general. 
 
 Thco. It certainly docs happen as you say, Socrates. 
 
160 THEAETETUS. 
 
 25 \iyhcn Socrates has completed his description of the true philosopher^ 
 Theodoras, asscjitiiig, says there would be less evil in the -world if all 
 men felt as he did, Socrates says that evil must remaiji as the anti- 
 thesis of good ; and, in a beautiful digression, he exhibits the contrast 
 between justice and holiness ofi the one hand, which are blessed and 
 godlike, injustice and -unholiness on the other, which are wretcJied and 
 godless. The unrighteous are apt to pride themselves on their own 
 wickedness ; but their self-satisfaction is un^-eal, and collapses at the 
 last. ] 
 
 So. But when he himself, my friend, leads any man 
 to take a higher view, and that man consents to quit his 
 * How do I wrong you or you me,' for the consideration 
 of justice and injustice — what each is in itself, and wherein 
 they differ from all other things or from each other, — or to 
 turn from the maxim ' Happy the king, happy the possessor 
 of much gold,' to the consideration of kingship itself and 
 human happiness and misery generally — what they are and 
 how it befits human nature to attain the one and escape 
 the other — on all these subjects, I say, when that petty 
 narrow-minded legal personage is required to render reason, 
 ^ he presents a counterpart of the philosopher. Stationed 
 upon a height and gazing down from his elevated posi- 
 tion, he turns dizzy from inexperience, and, uneasy 
 perplexed and stuttering, he is a laughing-stock, not to 
 Thracian girls or any uneducated person, for they do not 
 see the absurdity, but to all whose training has not been 
 that of slaves. Such are their several characters, Theodorus. 
 One is that of the man really bred in freedom and leisure, 
 whom you call philosopher; who may without reproach 
 seem simple and be incompetent when he is engaged in 
 menial services ; when he does not, for instance, know how 
 to pack a trunk of linen, or to season a dish or a flattering 
 speech. The other is that of him who can perform all such 
 
TRANSLATION. IGl 
 
 services thoroughly and briskly, but who does not know 
 how to don his cloak like a gentleman, or, by acquiring 
 harmony of language, to sing well the true life of gods and 
 blessed men. 
 
 Theo. If you could bring home what you say to all 
 men, Socrates, as you do to me, there would be more peace 
 and less evil in the world. 
 
 So. Nay, Theodorus, evil cannot, on the one hand, 
 perish altogether, for something opposite to good there 
 must ever be ; nor, on the other, can it fmd a seat in heaven : 
 but our mortal nature and this lower region it haunts per- 
 force. IWherefore we must endeavour to fly from this world 
 to the other as soon as we can. Now that flight means 
 the becoming like to God as mXich as possible ; and the 
 way to be like God is to become just and holy and wise. 
 But indeed, my excellent friend, it is by no means an easy 
 task to convince the world that the reasons on which most 
 people found the duty of shunning vice and pursuing 
 virtue are not the just motives for practising the latter and 
 avoiding the former : in order, to wut, that a man may not 
 seem to be wicked, and that he may seem to be good. 
 These views, in my clear opinion, are what is called an 
 old woman's fable : the real truth we may state as follows. 
 God is in no way and in no degree unjust, but just in the 
 highest extreme ; and nothing is more like to him than one 
 of us who in his own sphere shall become as just as possible. 
 Hereby is shown a man's veritable power, in the one case ; 
 in the other, his worthless and unmanly character. For 
 the cognition of this truth is genuine wisdom and virtue, 
 while the ignorance of it is manifest unintelligence and 
 viciousness. Everything else which is taken for mental 
 power and wisdom is in political government vulgar, in art 
 ignoble. It is by far the best way then not to allow for a 
 K. P. 11 
 
162 THEAETETUS: 
 
 moment that one who acts unjustly and speaks or practises 
 impiety is a man of powerful mind because he is a rogue. 
 Such people pride themselves on the reproach, and suppose 
 it to mean that they are no Avhipsters, no mere loungers 
 about the streets, but the sort of men they ought to be to 
 hold their own in the state. They must be told the truth 
 therefore; namely — that their belief of not being what 
 they are makes them Λvhat they are so much the more. 
 For they do not know the penalty of injustice, a thing of all 
 others which it is most proper to know. It is not what they 
 suppose, stripes and capital punishments, which men some- 
 times do not incur when they act unjustly, but one from 
 which it is impossible to escape. 
 Theo. What do you refer to ? 
 
 So. There are, my friend, established in the world two 
 types ; of supreme happiness in the godly nature, of supreme 
 misery in the ungodly: and these men, not seeing this truth, 
 in their weakness and utter folly do by their unjust deeds 
 insensibly become like the latter nature, unlike the former. 
 The punishment they suffer is that of living a life corre- 
 spondent with that nature to which they become like. 
 And if Λνε tell them that, unless they get rid of their 
 Avondrous wisdom, when they are dead, yon place pure 
 from evil Avill not receive them, and they will ever continue 
 to live in this world a life resembling themselves — evil 
 amidst evil associations — such language they will un- 
 doubtedly hear as clever and cunning rogues listening to 
 a pack of fools. 
 
 Theo. To be sure they Λνϋΐ, Socrates. 
 
 So. I know it well, my friend. There is however one 
 
 thing that befalls them. If in private they are required to 
 
 give a reasonable account of their censures, though for a 
 
 long time they are willing to abide the brunt manfully and 
 
TRANSLATION. 163 
 
 not to ilee like cowards, at last, my good sir, they are 
 strangely dissatisfied with their own reasoning; and that 
 rhetoric of theirs dies out, somehow or other, so that 
 they seem no better than children. As to these people, 
 however, since the topic is a mere digression, let us drop 
 the conversation : or else further considerations will con- 
 tinue to stream in and stifle our original argument. Let 
 us return to the previous question, with your leave. 
 
 T/ieo. For my own part, Socrates, I lend an ear to such 
 digressions with quite as much pleasure, as they are easier 
 for a man of my age to follow. But, if you prefer it, let us 
 return to our subject. 
 
 [Returning to his snhjcct, Socrates says that the la7c<s of a state have Q^Q 
 expediency {το ώφέΧιμον) for their end ; but they often fail to attain 
 it. Expediency is tested l>y the futiire. Does Protagoras pj-etend to le 
 a measure of this? Will not a medical man judge better than he of 
 the probability of a fever, a vine-gi-otver of the expected quality of a 
 wine, a7id so on, ruen as Protagoras himself could judge better than 
 they of the argumoits likely to prevail in a court of law ? This was 
 his forte and profession. He got a fortune by it. Would he have done 
 so if he had told those who consulted him that they could judge as zuell 
 as he ? ΔΌ : and it is hence evident that the more iittelligent man is a 
 measure, the iinintelligcnt has no claim to be so called. True, says 
 Theodorus ; and my friend'' s doctrine is overthrown by this argument 
 as well as by the former which shojved that, while he admitted the 
 opinions of all moi to be true, most 7nen denied this opinion of his to 
 be true: which leaves him self confuted. Ves, says Socrates, and 
 many other confuting reasons might be added. But the motncntary 
 affections, from which arise sensation and opinion, are not so easily 
 shoivn to be untrue. There is great disputation o?i this subject.'] 
 
 So. We had, I think, reached this point in our argu- 
 ment. Speaking of those who teach the notion of moving 
 
 11—2 
 
164 THEAETETUS. 
 
 essence, and who aver that Avhat at any time seems to each is 
 for him to whom it seems, we said that — while on other points, 
 and specially with respect to justice, such men would insist 
 strongly, that what a state enacts as its pleasure, is just for 
 the enacting state as long as it remains enacted — yet with 
 respect to good, none are so bold as to contend that what 
 a state enacts considering it useful, is useful so long as it 
 remains enacted, unless one choose to lay stress on the 
 mere term; and that would be quibbling as to our real 
 question. Would it not ? 
 • Theo. Certainly. 
 
 So. He should not dwell on the term, but on the thing 
 >vhich under that term is considered. 
 
 T/ieo. Ti*ue. 
 
 So. Whatever term the state give to it, that which the 
 state aims at in its legislation is, I suppose, this : all its laws, 
 so far as its opinion and power extend, are framed in order 
 to be as useful to itself as possible. Does it legislate with 
 any other view ? 
 
 Theo. None. 
 
 So. Does it always succeed? or do all states err in 
 many cases ? 
 
 Theo. 1 think they sometimes err. 
 
 So. Ay, and one may be led to this same admission 
 more readily, by putting the question as to the whole class, 
 of which the useful is a part. I suppose it relates to future 
 time as well as to present. When w^e legislate, Λve enact 
 our laws as intended to be useful for the time that is to 
 follow. This we should rightly term ' future ' ? 
 
 Theo. Certainly. 
 
 So. Well then : let us ask Protagoras, or any of those 
 who adopt his doctrine, this question. Man is the measure 
 of all things, as ye say, Ο Protagoras ; of things white, heavy, 
 
TRA NSL A TION. 165 
 
 light, all such-like. For, having the test in himself, thinking 
 what he feels, he thinks what is, and what is to himself true. 
 Is it not so ? 
 
 Theo. It is. 
 
 So. And of things which are hereafter to be, we 
 shall say, Ο Protagoras, has he the test in himself, and 
 do they turn out to him such as he thinks they will be ? 
 Heat, for instance : when an unskilled person thinks that 
 he will be seized with fever, and that this state of heat will 
 occur, and another, who is a medical man, has an opposite 
 opinion, shall we say that the future will turn out according 
 to the opinion of one of the two, or according to that of 
 both, and that to the medical man he will not be hot or 
 feverish, but to himself both these ? 
 
 Theo. This would be absurd. 
 
 So. And, I suppose, with respect to the future sweetness 
 or harshness of wine, the vine-grower's opinion, not that of 
 the harp-player, will prevail ? 
 
 Theo. Of course. 
 
 So. Again, as to good and bad music, a gymnast cannot 
 judge beforehand so well as a musician, even of that which, 
 after he has heard it, the gymnast himself will deem to be 
 good music. 
 
 Theo. Certainly not. 
 
 So. The judgment also of one who, without culinary 
 skill, is preparing to feast, will, while the banquet is in 
 preparation, be less valid concerning the future pleasure 
 than the judgment of the cook. We must not in our 
 present argument inquire as to that which now is or 
 which has been pleasant to each, but as to that which 
 is about to seem and to be pleasant, — whether each 
 individual is the best judge for himself. For example, 
 would not you, Protagoras, form beforehand a better opinion 
 
166 THEAETETUS. 
 
 than an untutored person of the arguments which each of 
 us would find persuasive in a court of law ? 
 
 T/iL'o. The very point, Socrates, in which he used to 
 declare strongly that he had no rival. 
 
 So, To be sure he did, my dear friend ; and nobody 
 Avould have paid large sums of money to converse with him, 
 if he had tried to persuade his pupils that no person, 
 prophet, or other, is a better judge of what in the future will 
 be, and seem to be, than a man's own self ^ 
 
 T/ieo. Very true. 
 
 So. Are not legislation and expediency concerned with 
 the future, and will not every one confess that a state, 
 when legislating, must of necessity often fail to attain that 
 which is most useful? 
 
 T/ico. Certainly. 
 
 So. Then it will be a fair thing to say to your master, — 
 he must perforce confess that one man is wiser than another, 
 and that such a man is indeed a measure : while for me, who 
 am unknowing, there is no kind of necessity to become a 
 measure, compelled though I was just now to be one, 
 whether I would or not, by my argument in his defence. 
 
 T/ico. In my judgment, Socrates, that is the best way 
 of confuting his doctrine, though it is also confuted by this 
 consideration, that it makes other people's opinions valid, 
 and by these opinions (as Avas shown) his statements are 
 deemed to be anything but true. 
 
 So. In many other ways, also, Theodorus, a doctrine 
 such as this, that every opinion of every person is true, 
 can be confuted. But, in respect to momentary affections, 
 from which arise perception and correspondent opinion, 
 it is more difficult to convict these of untruth. I am 
 very Hkely wrong, however : possibly they are irrefragable ; 
 26 • 1 See Notes appended. 
 
TRANSLA TION. 167 
 
 and those who assert them to be clear, and to be cognitions, 
 
 may perhaps tell the truth, and our friend Theaetetus may 
 
 not have missed the mark in laying down that perception and 
 
 knowledge are the same. \Ve must come closer then and 
 
 examine this moving essence, by tapping it to 
 
 it sounds whole or cracked. No slight war >^^3^ϊ)ιέομΙ ,., ^ V 
 
 this between combatants not a few. //---j τ ττ •η ^ '*<τ m 
 
 \Theodortis gives a half serious^ half jocular^ character of tnSiigk^feif.'a η 27 ^ 
 
 chatnpions of the Flux. Socrates supports it by citing Homer s ic'drcTT^ 
 as a veiled philosophy, openly professed by Ileracleitus. He then refers 
 to the antagonistic School {Eleatic), of which are Melissus and Par- 
 viejiides, who teach the doctrine of Rat and Oneness of Being. Be- 
 tween the txuo, he says, zue may find ourselves perplexed like outsiders 
 bJween the two contending parties in the gavie called δια 7/)a/i^t^s.] 
 
 Theo. Far indeed from being a slight one ; in Ionia the 
 doctrine makes great strides. The followers of Heracleitus 
 support it very vigorously. 
 
 So. On that account, dear Theodorus, we must examine 
 it more fundamentally, as they suggest. 
 
 Theo. Decidedly. For indeed, Socrates, as to these 
 followers of Heracleitus, or, as you say, of Homer, and of 
 others still more ancient, if we take their leading men about 
 Ephesus, who pretend to be learned in the doctrines, there 
 is no possibility of holding an argument with them any more 
 than with lunatics. They are always in motion after the 
 manner of their writings, and as to pausing on one sub- 
 ject, and inquiring and answering quietly in turn, their 
 power of doing this is below zero. An infinite minus 
 quantity goes nearer to expressing that these men have 
 not in them the least particle of quietness. If you ask 
 them any question, they pluck as it were out of their quiver 
 
168 THEAETETUS. 
 
 a little riddling phrase or two and shoot them at you, and if 
 you try to get any account from the man of what he has 
 said, you \vill be smitten with another under some novel 
 change of name, and so you will neA^er reach a conclusion 
 with any one of them. Nor indeed will they themselves do 
 so in their mutual discussions. They carefully guard them- 
 selves from allowing any certainty to appear either in an 
 argument or in their own souls, deeming this, I suppose, a 
 stable principle. Any such they are at war with and repel, 
 as much as they can, on every side. 
 
 So. Probably, Theodorus, you have seen these men in 
 battle, and never met with them in a pacific state, as they 
 are no companions of yours. But, I suppose, they do teach 
 certain principles at leisure to their scholars, whom they wish 
 to make like themselves. 
 
 T/ico. What do you mean by scholars, my good sir? 
 These folk are not scholars one of another ; they arise by 
 spontaneous growth, each from some casual inspiration, 
 and there is not one of them that supposes another to kno\v 
 anything. From these men, as I was going to say, you can 
 never get a reason Λvith or against their Avill. We must 
 ourselves receive their doctrine, and examine it like a 
 mathematical problem. 
 
 So. Very fairly suggested. \Ve have hoAvever received the 
 problem in another shape, from the ancients first, λυΙίο hide it 
 from the multitude in poetry, how that Oceanus and Tethys, 
 the progenitors of all things, are streams, and that nothing 
 stands still : from later writers secondly, who, being 
 Aviser, proclaim their views openly, that even a cobbler 
 may hear and learn their wisdom, and cease to suppose 
 some existences stand still Avhile others are moving, 
 and so, having been taught that all things move, may 
 honour his teachers. I almost forgot, Theodorus, that 
 
TRANSLATION, IGD 
 
 others again put forth the doctrine opposite to this: for 
 instance, 
 
 ' Unmoved is that they call the universe/ 
 
 and other dogmas, which, in opposition to all the preceding, 
 such men as Melissus and Parmenides' insist upon, how that 
 all things are one, and that this one stands self-supported, 
 having no region wherein it moves. How shall we deal 
 with all these, my friend? for we have gone on little by 
 little till we find ourselves unexpectedly thrown midway 
 between them, and if we do not struggle to find an escape, 
 we shall be punished like those Λvho play across a line in 
 wrestling-grounds, when they are seized by both parties and 
 dragged in opposite directions. So I think we must begin by 
 considering the one party, to whom we first addressed our- 
 selves, the fluent gentlemen. And if they appear to have 
 good reasons, we will help them to drag us over, and try to 
 escape from their opponents ; but if the standard-bearers of 
 ' the Whole ' seem to give the true account, to them will 
 Ave fly from those who move even the immoveable. If we 
 find that neither of them have any satisfactory account to 
 give, Ave shall get laughed at for supposing that poor 
 creatures like us have anything of weight to say, and for 
 disavowing men of the highest antiquity and wisdom. 
 Consider, Theodorus, whether it is our interest to incur so 
 great a risk. 
 
 T/ico. Nay, Socrates, it cannot be endured that we 
 should refuse to consider what each of these parties has to 
 say. 
 
 27 1 The Eleatic School; see p. iiS. 
 
170 THEAETETUS. 
 
 28 \Socraies Jtow disproves the doctrine that perception is knowledge on Hera- 
 chitcan principles. Motion is of two kinds, locoin.oti&n [including 
 revolniion) a7id variation. And, as all is in βηχ, everything must 
 have both these motions. Refo-ring now to the account previously 
 given of the maimer in which seiisaiion is generated, he slieivs that no 
 object can be called by any name : for before you can say that it is this 
 or that [white for instance) the flux has proceeded^ ajtd the object is 
 ηοτυ sojuething else. Perception therefore can be no more said to be 
 knowledge than to be not knowledge, and the doctrine of Protagoras 
 falls to the ground. Socrates sums up by saying that he thcrefn'C 
 does not allow that man is the measure of all things, unless it be a 
 wise man ; nor yet that, according to the Ilcraclcitcan doctrine [πάντα 
 pel), knowledge is perception. '\ 
 
 So. We must consider them, as you urge it so strongly. 
 I think the first step in our consideration is concerning 
 motionj to see what they intend by saying that all things 
 move. What I mean to say is this. Do they speak of 
 one kind of motion, or. as I think evident, two? But let 
 it not be my sole opinion ; share it with me yourself, that 
 we may abide in common any result. Do you say a thing 
 is moved when it changes from place to place, or revolves 
 in the same place ? 
 
 Thco. I do. 
 
 So. Let this be one kind. Now, when it stays in the 
 same place, but grows old, or becomes black from being 
 white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other varia- 
 tion, is it not proper to say this is another kind of motion ? 
 
 Thco. I think so. 
 
 So. You cannot help it. These then I name are two 
 kinds of motion, variation one, revolution another'. 
 
 23 ^ τΓ€ρίφοράΐ'. But we should have expected φοράν, as Plato says 
 immediately φβρόμίνόν re καΐ άλλοωύμενον. Prof. Campbell thinks the 
 motion of the heavens is regarded as embracing all other kinds. Is this 
 quite satisfactory, or must Ave assume that τΓβρι,φυρχν is corrupt here ? 
 
TRANSLATION. 171 
 
 TJieo. You name them rightly. 
 
 So. Having made this division, let us now argue 
 with those who say that all things move, and put to them 
 this question : do you say that all things move in both 
 ways, by local movement and by variation, or that one 
 thing moves in both ways, another in one of the two ? / 
 
 Theo. Nay, upon my word I cannot pronounce. I 
 think they would say all things move in both ways. 
 
 So. Yes; for if not, my friend, they will evidently make 
 them to be both in motion and at rest, and it will be no more 
 right to say that all things move than that they stand still. 
 
 Theo. Most truly stated. 
 
 So. Accordingly, since they must move, and it is im- 
 possible for anything not to be moving, all things are 
 always moving with every kind of motion. 
 
 Theo. Necessarily. 
 
 So. Now consider this point in their statements. 
 Did we not say that they state the generation of heat or 
 whiteness or any other perception in some such way as 
 this — that each of these things at the moment of perception 
 moves between the agent and the patient, and that the 
 patient comes to be a percipient" but not perception, 
 and the agent a qualified thing but not a quality? 
 Perhaps however quality seems to you to be a strange term, 
 and you do not understand it when named in the general. 
 Hear it then in particulars. The agent comes to be neither 
 heat nor whiteness, but a hot thing and a white thing, and so 
 with everything elser You remember, I suppose, that in 
 
 - The ms. word αΙσΟητόν here must be corrupt. Luttmann's con- 
 jecture αίσΟητην (though not elsewhere found) has been largely received. 
 Prof. Campbell prefers αΙσΟανόμζνον, chielly on account of gender. 
 But, as the patient is conceived of as a man, the synesis is surely 
 allowable. 
 
172 THEAETETUS. 
 
 our former statements we laid it down thus ; that nothing 
 * is ' one by itself, so also neither agent nor patient ; but 
 that from both ' coming to be ' together in mutual relation, 
 sensations and sensible things are engendered, and the one 
 comes to be of some quality and the other percipient^ 
 
 Theo. I remember, of course. 
 
 So. Let us now spare ourselves the pains of consider- 
 ing their other various propositions, and, noting the one 
 Avhich is the subject of our discussion, let us put to them this 
 question: 'All things, you say, move and are in flux.' Is 
 this right ? 
 
 Theo. Yes. 
 
 So. Do they then move with both kinds of motion 
 which we distinguished, locomotion and variation? 
 
 Theo. Of course they do, if they are to move com- 
 pletely. 
 
 So. If they moved only, and were not changed, I 
 suppose we should be able to say what kinds of things 
 they are that move in flux. Should we not ? 
 
 Theo. Yes. 
 
 So, Since it is not even an abiding fact, that what is in 
 flux flows white, but it changes, and so there is a flux of 
 this very thing, whiteness, and a change to another colour, 
 that it may not be convicted of abiding in this one — is it 
 ever possible to name any colour so as to give a correct 
 name? 
 
 Theo. What possibility can there be, Socrates, in this 
 or any other such thing, if it always slips away as one is 
 speaking, being in constant flux? 
 
 So. And Avhat shall we say of any kind of perception, 
 such as sight or hearing? Shall we say that it ever abides 
 in the act of seeing or hearing?/^ 
 
 3 On this corrupt place see the appended Notes. 
 
TRANSLATION. 173 
 
 Theo. Certainly it must not, seeing that all things are 
 moving. 
 
 So. We cannot therefore aver that we see a thing more 
 than that we do not see it, or that we have any perception 
 more than that we have it not, since all things are in every 
 way moving ? 
 
 Thco. We cannot indeed. 
 
 So. And yet knowledge is perception, as I and Theae- 
 tetus settled it. 
 
 Thco. So it was. 
 
 So. Accordingly, when asked what knowledge is, in 
 our reply Ave no more stated Avhat it is than what it is not. 
 
 Theo. Seemingly not. 
 
 So. A fine issue to the supplement of our answer, when 
 we were so eager to show that all things move : — for the 
 purpose, forsooth, of proving that answer right. Now the 
 thing proved seems to be, that, if all things move, every 
 answer on every possible subject is equally right — to say it 
 'is' so and it 'is' not so, or if you prefer the term, 'comes 
 to be,' that our terminology may not make them^ stationary. 
 
 Theo. You say rightly. 
 
 So. Except, Theodorus, that I said ' So ' and ' Not so.' 
 I ought not to use this word 'So,' for no motion would be 
 expressed by it; nor yet 'Not so,' for here again is no 
 motion. But we must supply some other language to those 
 who state this doctrine ; since now in fact they have no 
 words to convey their own hypothesis, except perhaps 
 'Nowise.' This might suit them best, being an indefinite 
 expression. 
 
 Thco. Yes, that style of speech would be most natural 
 to them. 
 
 * kvTom. Buttm. Ileind. would read Καίτοι'?, ourselves: αιτά (τά 
 irkvTO.) suits better : but aurouj may stand, referred to roi-j piovras. 
 
174 THEAETETUS: 
 
 So. Thus, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, 
 and do not yet concede to him that every man is the 
 measure of every thing, if he be not a wise man ; nor yet 
 will we concede that knowledge is perception, at least on 
 the supposition of all things moving. 
 
 Theo. A good hearing, Socrates : for, as this topic is 
 concluded, I must be rid of the task of answering you, as 
 by our compact I was to be, when the question about the 
 doctrine of Protagoras should come to an end. ^ — ^^ 
 
 29 \_Theodoriis rejoices thai, according to the bargain, he ivas to he let off 
 fro77i the argument at this point. Theactetns thinks lie shojild go on 
 to discuss the opposite theory of Rest. Theodorus jocularly scolds him, 
 and insists on his taking his turn. lie consents. But Socrates, pro- 
 fessing the highest respect for Parmoiides, and alluding to the difficulties 
 which his writings present, prefers adhering to the question at issue, 
 the definition of knowledge. Returning to his dialectic process, he 
 leads Thcaetetus to admit that it is 7nore proper to say we perceive 
 through the senses than zuith the senses, thus pointing to a central 
 percipient [the soul). N'ext he makes him ad/nit that the senses belong 
 to the body, ajid that things perceived by one organ are not perceived 
 by another. Hence any comnioji notion acquired about tilings which are 
 perceived by two different organs is not acquired through either organ, 
 as existence, sameness, difference, likeness, and so on. JVhat are the 
 organs through which all these and otJier abstract notions aj'e ac- 
 quired? Thcaetetus thinks they have no peculiar organs assigned to 
 them ; but that the soul by its own powers observes these common pro- 
 perties. Socrates commends his coticlusion as agreeing with his own.] 
 
 Theae. Nay, Theodorus, not before you and Socrates 
 have discussed, as you just now proposed, the doctrine of 
 those who on the other hand affirm that the universe is at 
 rest. 
 
 Theo. What? you, Thcaetetus, a mere youth, teaching 
 your elders to commit the sin of violating compacts! Come, 
 gird yourself up to debate with Socrates that which remains. 
 
TRANSLATION. 175 
 
 Theae, Oh, certainly, if he wishes. But I should ha\^ 
 been delighted to hear the other topic discussed. 
 
 Thco. You challenge cavalry to the plain when you 
 challenge Socrates to argument. Ask him, and you will 
 hear his answer. 
 
 So. Ay, Theodorus ; but I do not think I shall obey 
 the call which Theaetetus makes. 
 
 Theo. Why not obey it ? 
 
 So. As to Melissus and the others who represent the 
 universe as one and at rest, I respect them too much 
 to treat their views cursorily ; but in still greater respect do 
 I hold the single name of Parmenides. He appears to me to 
 meet Homer's definition, Venerable and likewise awful \' I 
 was brought into contact with him when I was very young 
 and he very old, and he struck me as possessing a depth 
 of character pre-eminently noble. I fear that we may not 
 understand his language, still more that Ave may fail to 
 achieve his meaning : above all, I am afraid that our original 
 question, the definition of knowledge, may cease to be con- 
 sidered, if a fresh crowd of arguments rushes in, and gains 
 our attention. In particular, this hopelessly large argument 
 Avhich we are awakening, if considered as a digression, 
 would be unworthily treated; or, if pursued adequately at 
 full length, it will swamp the question of knowledge. We 
 should do neither one nor the other, but endeavour by our 
 art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions 
 about knowledge. 
 
 Thco. Very Avell; we must, if you please. 
 
 So. Once more then, Theaetetus, consider this part of 
 our previous discourse. You said in reply to me that 
 knowledge is perception. Did you not ? 
 
 Tlicac. Yes. 
 
 29 1 //. III. 172. 
 
/ 
 
 176 THEAETETUS, 
 
 So. If anybody were to ask you the question, with 
 what a man sees white things and black, and with what 
 he hears sharp things and flat, you would say, I suppose, 
 with the eyes and with the ears. 
 
 TJieae. I should. 
 
 So. The easy acceptance of names and terms, and the 
 non-exaction of strict accuracy, is indeed generally not out 
 of place in a well-bred man ; we may rather say the reverse 
 is vulgar, yet is it occasionally necessary. And so in the 
 present instance I must perforce take exception to the 
 answer which you give, in so far as it is wrong. Consider 
 which answer is more correct, that the eyes are that with 
 which, or that through which we see, and the ears that 
 with which, or that through which we hear. 
 
 Thcae. ' Through ' which in each case, I think, Socrates, 
 rather than * with ' which. 
 
 So. Yes, my boy ; it is strange, I ween, if in us, as 
 though we were 'wooden horses',' many independent senses 
 are seated, instead of all these tending in common to some 
 centre, whether we call it soul or anything else, whereby, 
 through these senses as instruments, we perceive all things 
 perceptible. 
 
 Thcae. I think this latter view the truer one. 
 
 So. AVhy am I putting these minute questions to you? 
 If with some one and the same part of ourselves we through 
 the eyes apprehend things white and black, and through the 
 other organs other things, and you will be able, on being asked, 
 to refer all such perceptions at once to the body... perhaps 
 however it is better you should specify them' in answer to 
 me than that I should save you that trouble. Now tell me. 
 The organs through which you perceive hot things and hard 
 
 - Plato alludes here to the famous wooden horse of the Trojan 
 leirend. 
 
TRANSLA TION. 177 
 
 and light and sweet — do you not state them to belong 
 severally to the body, or do they belong to anything else ? 
 
 Theae. To nothing else. 
 
 So. Will you also be ready to admit, that what you per- 
 ceive through any one organ, you cannot possibly perceive 
 through another ; for instance, what you perceive by hearing, 
 you cannot perceive by sight, or the converse ? 
 
 Theae. I most readily admit it. 
 
 So. If you have any common notion about both, you 
 would not acquire it from the one organ or from the other 
 concerning both ? 
 
 Theae. I should not. 
 
 So. As to sound and colour, in the first place, have you 
 this same notion respecting both, that both ' are ' ? 
 
 Theae. I have. 
 
 So. You suppose also, that each is different from each, 
 and the same with itself? 
 
 Theae. To be sure. 
 
 So. And that both are twain, but each is one ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Are you not also able to observe whether they are 
 like one another or unlike ? 
 
 Theae. Probably. 
 
 So. Through what do you form all these notions con- 
 cerning both? For neither through hearing nor through 
 sight is it possible to obtain a common notion of them. 
 Here again is another instance in point. If it were pos- 
 sible to examine, whether both are briny or not, you 
 know that you will be able to say with what you will 
 examine, and this is evidently neither sight nor hearing, but 
 something else. 
 
 Theae. No doubt it is; namely, the power exercised 
 through the tongue. 
 
 K. P. 12 
 
178 THEAETETUS, 
 
 So. Well said. Now, through what does the power act 
 which makes manifest to you what all things generally have 
 in common with these particularly — what you mean, to wit, 
 in saying 'is,' 'is not,' and all else comprised in our late 
 questions ? What organs will you assign as those through 
 which our percipient faculty perceives all these severally? 
 
 Theae. You mean being and non-being, and likeness 
 and unlikeness, and sameness and difference, and more- 
 over unity and any other number applicable to things 
 perceived ? Evidently too your question includes the even 
 and the odd, and all other such notions ; asking through 
 Avhat bodily organ Ave perceive them with the soul. 
 
 So. You follow me admirably, Theaetetus, and these 
 are the very questions I ask. 
 
 Theae. Well, Socrates, I really can give no other answer 
 than this, that in my opinion these have originally no organ 
 peculiar to them, such as the sensible objects have, but the 
 soul through its own individual power appears to me to 
 observe the common properties of all. 
 
 So. Yes, Theaetetus, you are a beauty, and not, as 
 .Theodorus said, ugly : for he who speaks beautifully is 
 beautiful and good. And besides your beauty, I am much 
 obliged to you for releasing me from a world of talk, if the 
 soul appears to you to observe some things through itself, 
 and other things through the bodily organs. This was my 
 own opinion, and I was wishing it to be yours. 
 
 Theae. Yes : to me it is apparent. 
 
 30 \_Socratcs now draws from Thcaetdiis the admission that while certain 
 properties, as hardness and softness, are perceived through the senses 
 covunon to men and beasts, essence, difference, nse, and the like are 
 matter of reflection by the soul attained through education. Without 
 attaining essence, truth is not attained, nor without truth knowledge. 
 
 J 
 
TRANSLATION. 170 
 
 // is not in the affections ihemsehes, but in the reasonable conclusio7is 
 concerning them, that knowledge lies. And what is the common name 
 for all these affections! Perception, which cannot therefore attain 
 essence or truth or knowledge. Hence it follows that perception and 
 kno^culedgc cannot be the same thing. Theaetetns admits the failure of 
 this theory. Socrates reminds him that the search is not to find what 
 knowledge is not, but to find what it is, and then begs him to consider 
 -what it is that the soul is said to do, when it forms a Judgment on 
 existing things. Theaetettcs replies : It is said to opine — to form an 
 opinion. Socrates now asks if he can give a new atiswer to the 
 question, What is knowledge .?] 
 
 So. To which of the two classes do you assign 
 * being ' ? For this is the notion most universally present. 
 
 Thcae. I assign it to that class which the soul attains to 
 by itself. 
 
 So. Do you say the same of likeness and unlikeness, of 
 sameness and difference ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And again of nobleness and baseness, good and 
 evil ? 
 
 Thcae. Yes : these are things the essence of which, 
 above all others, I believe that the soul observes in their 
 mutual relativity, comparing within itself the past and the 
 present with the future. 
 
 So. Wait a moment. Will it not perceive the hardness 
 of a hard object through the touch, and so again the softness 
 of a soft one ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. But their being, and what they are, and their 
 mutual opposition, and again the being of that opposition, 
 the soul itself, by reflecting and by comparing them with 
 each other, endeavours to determine for us? 
 
 Theae. Quite so. 
 
 So. Men and beasts then, as soon as they are born, are 
 
 12—2 
 
180 THEAETETUS. 
 
 able by nature to perceive some things, those affections I 
 mean which reach through the body to the soul. But the 
 reflections concerning these in regard to essence and use are 
 acquired, by those who do acquire them, painfully and. 
 gradually through the troublesome process of education. 
 
 Theae. Undoubtedly. 
 
 So. Can any one attain truth, Λvho does not attain 
 being ? 
 
 Theae. He cannot. 
 
 So. And if he fail to attain the truth of a thing, will he 
 ever have knowledge of it ? 
 
 Theae. Impossible, Socrates. 
 
 So. Knowledge, then, does not lie in the affections of 
 sense, but in the reasoning concerning them : for in this it 
 seems possible to grasp essence and truth, and not in the 
 affections ? 
 
 Theae. Evidently. 
 
 So, Do you call two things the same which are in so 
 many respects different ? 
 
 Theae. There were no justice in doing so. 
 
 So. What name do you give to the one class — seeing, 
 hearing, smelling, being cold and hot ? 
 
 Theae. 'Perceiving' I would certainly call them. 
 
 So. Their common notion then you would call percep- 
 tion? 
 
 Theae. Of course. 
 
 So. And this, we say, has no share in the attainment 
 of truth, having none in the attainment of being. 
 
 Theae. It has none. 
 
 So. Nor yet in the attainment of knowledge ? 
 
 Theae. No. 
 
 So. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge will 
 not be the same ? 
 
TRANSLATION. 181 
 
 Thcae. Evidently not, Socrates. Now especially has 
 knowledge been very clearly proved to be a diiiferent thing 
 from perception. 
 
 So. But it was not by any means with this view that 
 we began our argument, to find what knowledge is not, but 
 to find what it is. Nevertheless we have so far advanced 
 as not to seek it in perception at all, but in that name 
 which, whatever it be, is applicable to the soul's action 
 when by itself it deals with existing things. 
 
 Theae. This, I imagine, Socrates, is called 'opining' 
 (forming opinion). 
 
 So. You imagine rightly, my friend. Now go back 
 again and, erasing all that went before, see if you have any 
 clearer view, after having advanced to this point. Tell me 
 once more what knowledge is. 
 
 YThe first definition proposed by Theaetdiis — that scnsiiotis perception is 31 
 knowledge — being thus overthrown by the elenchiis concluded in § 30, 
 he is invited to attempt a second. He hopes now to find one in that 
 realm of pure thought which consists in believing., judging, or opijiing 
 {forming opinio Ji). But as it occurs to him that opinions formed 
 are not always trtie, he sees that he must limit his definition ; and, 
 accordingly, he ventures to suggest that true opinion is kno^vledge. 
 Against this doctrine Socrates opens a battery of argiunent without 
 delay. It implies that such a thing as ''false opinion ' is possible : 
 and that possibility Socrates is not prepared to admit. All things 
 sidyject to opinion are, he says, such as a man either knows or does 
 not know. If he opines, he either knows or does not know that about 
 which he opines: he cannot know, and not knoiv, one and the same 
 thing. Can he then {when he opines falsely) mistake one known 
 thing for another kno^cn thing? — No. — Or a known thing for an 
 unknozvn? — No. — Or an unknown for a knozon? — NO. — Or one 
 unknown for another unknoxvn ? — Impossible. — But if he forms a 
 false opinion, he must err in one of these four ways : — all which are 
 impossible. Therefore to form false opinion is impossible. But 
 perhaps, adds Socrates, we should regard 'being' and 'not-being' 
 
182 TIIEAETETUS. 
 
 rather than knowing and not-knowing. ]\Iay not a man opine what 
 is false, if he opines ' what is-not ' ? Bnt he goes on to argue that 
 nobody can opine ' what is not ' any more than he can see or hear 
 what is not : to opine ' what is not ' is to opine ' nothing ;' that is, not 
 to opine at all. Therefore false opinion is no more possible from this 
 point ofviezo than it was from the farmer. ^ 
 
 Theae. To say that it is opinion generally, Socrates, is 
 impossible, since there is false opinion. But true opinion 
 probably is knowledge : so let this be my answer. If it 
 shall be disproved while we proceed, as in the last case, we 
 will try some other statement. 
 
 So. Your present forwardness to speak, Theaetetus, is 
 more to the purpose than your original reluctance to an- 
 swer. For in this Avay, we shall secure one of two ad- 
 vantages : we shall either find what we are in quest of, or 
 our conceit of knowing Λvhat w^e do not know will be di- 
 minished. And this Λνϋΐ be no despicable reward. Now 
 let us see what it is you say. There being two kinds of 
 opinion, the true and the false, do you make true opinion 
 the definition of knowledge ? 
 
 Thcae. I do, according to my present view. 
 
 So. Is it worth while to resume the question of opi- 
 nion? 
 
 Thcac. Which do you mean ? 
 
 So. I am somewhat disturbed now^ as often before, 
 and have found myself sorely perplexed in my own mind 
 and in conversation, from my inability to say what this con- 
 dition is in us, and in what way engendered. 
 
 Theae. What condition? 
 
 So. The holding of false opinion. Now again I am 
 still considering and doubting whether we should leave it, 
 or review it in a way different from that we took some 
 little time ago. 
 
TRANSLATION, 183 
 
 TJieae. Why not review it, Socrates, if there is any 
 clear gain in doing so ? For, as to leisure, you and Theo- 
 dorus said very justly, that there is nothing to hurry us in 
 such cases. 
 
 So. Well reminded. And perhaps it is not unreason- 
 able to return upon our tracks. It is better, you'll allow, 
 to achieve a little well than much inadequately. 
 
 Theae. Of course. 
 
 So. Well then ? What do we in fact affirm ? do we 
 say that there is in each case false opinion, and that some 
 one of us opines falsely, another again truly, as if such 
 were the natural rule ? 
 
 Theae. Yes, we do. 
 
 So. Does not this occur to us in respect of all things 
 generally, and of each particularly — either knowing or 
 not-knowing? for learning and forgetting, which lie between 
 these, I set aside for the moment, as having no relation to 
 our present argument. 
 
 Theae. In fact, Socrates, nothing else remains in each 
 case but knowing and not-knowing. 
 
 So. Is it not a necessary consequence that he who 
 opines must opine about one of the things which he 
 knows, or one of those which he does not know } 
 
 Iheae. It is. 
 
 So. And it is impossible, if he knows a thing, not to 
 know it, or, if he knows it not, to know it ? 
 
 Theae. Quite impossible. 
 
 So. Does then he who holds a false opinion think 
 that things which he knows are not what they are, but some 
 other things within his knowledge, and knowing both, is he 
 ignorant of both ? 
 
 Theae. It cannot be so, Socrates. 
 
 So. Or docs he sui)pose things which he does not 
 
184 THEAETETUS. 
 
 know to be some other things outside of his knowledge ? 
 Does it happen to one who knows neither Theaetetus nor 
 Socrates to imagine that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaete- 
 tus Socrates ? 
 
 Theae. How can that be ? 
 
 So. But surely a man does not think that what he 
 knows is what he does not know, or that what he does 
 not know is Avhat he knows. 
 
 Theae. That were a miracle. 
 
 So. In what other Λvay then can any one hold false 
 opinions ? Except under the conditions stated it is impos- 
 sible, I suppose, to have opinion. In every case we either 
 know or do not know, and so situated, it is manifestly im- 
 possible for us ever to have false opinions. 
 
 Theae. Very true. 
 
 So. Perhaps we ought to examine our question with 
 reference not to knowing and not-knowing, but to being 
 and not-being. 
 
 Theae. How do you mean ? 
 
 So. Consider if it be not a simple truth that one who 
 thinks concerning anything that which is not, will inevitably 
 think what is false, whatever the condition of his mind in 
 other respects. 
 
 TJieae. This again is probable, Socrates. 
 
 So. How then? What shall we reply, Theaetetus, if 
 any one examine us : 'Is what you say possible for any 
 one, and will any human being think what is not, either 
 about some existing thing, or in the abstract?' Seemingly 
 we shall say in reply : ' Yes, when he thinks, and does not 
 think what is true.' Or how are we to speak? 
 
 Theae. As you say. 
 
 So. Does the like happen in any other case ? 
 
 Theae. AVhat do you mean ? 
 
TRANSLATION. 185 
 
 So. That a person sees something, yet sees nothing. 
 
 Theae. How can that be ? 
 
 So. If he sees some one thing, that 'something' is 
 among things that are. Or do you think ' the one ' is ever 
 among the things that are not ? 
 
 Theae. Not I. 
 
 So. He then, who sees some one thing, sees some 
 thing that is. 
 
 Theae. Evidently. 
 
 So. And he who hears something hears some one thing, 
 and a thing that is. 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And he who touches, I suppose, touches some one 
 thing, and a thing that is, since it is one. 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And does not he who opines form opinion of 
 some one thing? 
 
 Theae. He must. 
 
 So. And does not he who forms opinion of some one 
 thing form it of some thing that is ? 
 
 Theae. I grant this. 
 
 So. He then who opines what is not opines nothing. 
 
 Theae. Evidently. 
 
 So. Well, but he λυΙιο opines nothing does not opine 
 at all. 
 
 Theae. That seems clear. 
 
 So. Therefore it is not possible to think what is not, 
 either about things that are, or in the abstract. 
 
 Theae. IManifestly not. 
 
 So. Thinking falsities is therefore different from think- 
 ing what is not. 
 
 Theae. It seems different. 
 
 So. And thus neither from our present consideration 
 
186 THEAETETUS. 
 
 (of being and not-being), nor from our previous one (of 
 knowing and not knowing), do we find false opinion to 
 exist in us. 
 
 Thcae. No, we do not. 
 
 32 \_Socrates asks, whether false opinion may not possibly he found in what 
 he calls ^ allodoxy,^ the mental exchange of ojie existing thing for 
 another existing thing. Theaetetus wonld like to accept this expla- 
 nation. But Socrates disappoints hijjt. A short dialectic elenchus [in 
 the conrse of which Socrates describes opinioti as the result of a con- 
 versation which the soul holds with itself) leads to the conclusion 
 that, assicming two different things — the noble and the base — the 
 just and the unjtist — a horse ajid an ox, &Ό., nobody can mistake 07ie 
 for the other, either if he has formed an opinion of both, or if he 
 has for77ied an opinion of one, hut not of the other : so that allodoxy 
 {which he ηοτυ terms heterodoxy) does not supply any rational defini- 
 tion of false opi}tio7i.'] 
 
 So. But can we not speak of it as happening in this 
 ^yay ? 
 
 T/ieae. How ? 
 
 So. \Ve can say that an opinion which may be called 
 an ' allodoxy' is false when anybody says that some one 
 existing thing is another existing thing, exchanging them in 
 his mind. For thus he always thinks of what exists, but of 
 one thing instead of another, and, as missing that which he 
 had in view, he may be said to have false opinion. 
 
 Theae. Your present statement seems to me very cor- 
 rect. For when any one opines that a thing is ugly instead 
 of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he very truly 
 has fixlse opinion. 
 
 So. Evidently, Theaetetus, you speak in contempt of 
 me, and without fear. 
 
 Theae. Pray why ? 
 
TRANSLA TION. 187 
 
 So. You do not expect, I fancy, that I shall lay hold 
 of your term 'truly false', and ask if it is possible for the 
 swift to ' come-to-be ' slowly, or the light heavily, or for any 
 other opposite to come-to-be — not according to its own 
 nature, but according to the nature of its opposite — in a 
 manner opposed to itself. This however — that your con- 
 fidence may not be fruitless — I pass over. You say you 
 are pleased with the notion that opining falsities is ' allo- 
 doxy.' 
 
 TJieae. I am. 
 
 So. Then in your opinion it is possible to determine 
 in your mind that one thing is another, and not itself. 
 
 Thcae. It is. 
 
 So. When therefore the mind does this, must it not 
 perforce think either of both things, or of one of the two ? 
 
 Theae. Yes, it must. 
 
 So. At the same time, or else by turns. 
 
 Theac. A^ery good. 
 
 So. Do you employ the term 'thinking' in the same 
 sense that I do ? 
 
 TJieae. How do you define it ? 
 
 So. A discourse which the soul holds w^ith itself 
 about what it considers. I am representing this to you 
 not as a fact that I know. In the exercise of thought, the 
 soul, as I fancy it, is simply engaged in conversation, 
 questioning itself and answering, affirming and denying. 
 And when, having reached a definition, whether slowly 
 or by a more rapid impulse, it at length agrees and affirms 
 undoubtingly, we state this to be its opinion. So that 
 I call opining the soul's speaking, and opinion its spoken 
 word, not addressed to another or uttered by the voice, but 
 silently to itself. 
 
 Theae. So do I. 
 
188 THEAETETUS. 
 
 So. Therefore, when any one opines that one thing is 
 another, he says to himself, it would seem, that one thing 
 is another. 
 
 Theae. Certainly. 
 
 So. Try to remember whether you ever said to your- 
 self, * Assuredly the noble is base,' or, 'The unjust is 
 just.' Or, to sum up, consider if you ever attempted to 
 convince yourself that assuredly one thing was another : or 
 if, on the contrary, you never even in sleep ventured to 
 say to yourself, Undoubtedly the odd is even, or any 
 such thing? 
 
 Theae. You say the truth. 
 
 So. Do you think any body in or out of his senses 
 ever ventured seriously to say to himself, trying to make 
 himself beheve, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two 
 things one? 
 
 Theae. No indeed, not I. 
 
 So. If then to speak to oneself is to opine, nobody who 
 speaks and thinks of both things, and apprehends both 
 with his soul, can say and think that one is the other. 
 But you must avoid the terms 'one and other.' I'll state 
 the point in this way : Nobody thinks that the noble is 
 base, or anything of the sort. 
 
 Theae. Well, Socrates, I give up the terms, and I agree 
 with you. 
 
 So. That one who thinks of both cannot possibly 
 opine that one is the other? 
 
 Theae. Seemingly not. 
 
 So. Again, if he thinks of the one alone, and of the 
 other not at all, he will never opine that one is the other. 
 
 Theae. True : for so he would be forced to apprehend 
 that of which he has no thought. 
 
 Ο 
 
 So. Accordingly allodoxy is inadmissible for any one 
 
TRANSLATION, 189 
 
 who thinks either of both or of one. So that whoever shall 
 define false opinion to be heterodoxy will talk nonsense : 
 for it is shown by this method as well as by the former that 
 false opinion cannot exist in us. 
 Thcae. Seemingly not. 
 
 \Socrates sce?ns, or feigns, to he driven to despair by the failure of his 33 
 three attempts to find the habitat of false opinion. It is not in the 
 regio?t of knowledge, nor in that of being, nor in that confimon of 
 pheno77iena, which he ter^ns allodoxy. Surely it i7iust be somewhere, 
 Snrely mistakes are made. May not a person know something, and, 
 seeing something else which he does not know, mistake it for that 
 thing which he knows? At this point in the dialogue Plato iJi- 
 troduces two pai-ables or 7?iyths. He supposes first, a i7ie77iorial 
 waxe7i block, and, later 07i, a bii'd-cage or aviaiy, to be situated i7t the 
 hu7na7t 77iind. {Iji fig77ie7its of this ki7id Plato takes great delight: 
 he has scattered the 771 with proficsio7i throughout his xvorks. They do 
 not supply to the pure i}itellect that ve7'ificatio7t which it de77ia7tds i7t 
 order to accept d philosophic theory. But the literajy co77iposcr fmds 
 the77i a very co7ive7iie7it resotirce. They fill up gaps in serious argu- 
 77ie7it. They rouse the i77iaginatio7i, they char77i the faiicy : they 
 atti-act and amuse the ge7ie7-al 7-eader, whc7i fatigued with dty 
 dialexis, I/i short, they are a valuable part of that ψυχατ^ω^ία, which 
 Plato, who has a rheto7ic of his 01.071, is far f 7-0771 disdai7iing for his 
 0W71 use. See Dr Tho77ipso/i's I7it7vdiictiu7i to his editio7i of the 
 Phaedrus, especially pp. xxi — ii, also p. i^i.) I7i this section a general 
 desc7-iptio7i is give 7 1 of the waxe7t block or tablet, as Mr G7-ote calls it 
 (έκμα-γξίον). The wax va7-ies i7i various cases, i7i so7ne being larger, 
 firmer, cleaner, and in every way better tha7i i/i others. The recep- 
 tacle also is 7nore or less wide and co7ivenie7it. The tablet is a gift of 
 M7ie77iosy7ie {me77iory) for i7npressi7ig by seals every 07ie''s sc7isations 
 atid thoughts. These are re77ie7nbered and k7iozo7i while the i7npressions 
 remai7i : whe7i these fade, they are forgottc7i and no longer kno'um. 
 Socrates goes 07i to state when false ttotions can/iot be for7ned, and 
 whc/i they ca7i.'\ 
 
 So. And yet, Theactctus, if this shall be proved im- 
 
190 THEAETETUS. 
 
 possible, we shall be compelled to admit many absurd 
 consequences. 
 
 Theae. What are they ? 
 
 So. I will not say till I have tried every point of view. 
 For I should blush for us if, in a moment of perplexity, we 
 were forced to admit such things as I allude to. But if 
 we find a way to get free, then and not before we will speak 
 of others as thus perplexed, standing clear of ridicule our- 
 selves. But, if we find ourselves posed on every side, then, 
 in a humble frame, I suppose, like sea-sick men, we shall 
 allow the argument to trample on us and treat us as it 
 will. Listen, while I tell you how I may still find a way 
 of escape from our inquiry. 
 
 Theae. Pray tell me. 
 
 So. I will say we were wrong in admitting that it is 
 impossible to opine that what one knows is what one does 
 not know, and so to be deceived : for it is in a certain way 
 possible. 
 
 Theae. Do you mean what I myself suspected at the 
 time we made the assertion — a case occurring sometimes 
 like this, that I, knowing Socrates, and seeing at a distance 
 another whom I do not know, think it is the Socrates 
 whom I know? For in such a case something like what 
 you say comes to pass. 
 
 So. Did we not abandon that view, because it made 
 us, while knowing, not to know what we do know? 
 
 Theae. Certainly. 
 
 So. Suppose we do not state it thus, but in the follow- 
 ing manner. Perhaps it will give way to us, perhaps resist. 
 But indeed we are in such a strait, that we must perforce 
 turn about and examine every argument. See if I ask a 
 rational question. Is it not possible to learn something 
 which you formerly did not know ? 
 
TRANSLATION. 191 
 
 Theae. Yes, it is. 
 
 So. And one thing after another ? 
 
 Theac. Why not ? 
 
 So. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there 
 is in our souls a Avaxen block, in one soul larger, in 
 another smaller, of purer wax in one, in another of less 
 pure, harder in some, moister in others; in some of medium 
 quality. 
 
 Theae. Well. 
 
 So. Let us say it is a gift of Mnemosyne, mother of 
 the Muses, and that on this we strike off, as if we were 
 impressing ring-seals, any thing we wish to remember among 
 those we see or hear or imagine, submitting the block to our 
 senses and imaginations ; and that whatever is impressed, 
 we remember and know as long as its image subsists ; but 
 that, Λvhen it is obliterated or fails to be impressed, we have 
 forgotten and do not know. 
 
 Theae. Be it so. 
 
 So. See then if he Avho knows things, and considers 
 anything he sees or hears, may have false opinions in some 
 such way as the following : 
 
 Theae. In what way ? 
 
 So. By thinking sometimes that what he kno\vs is 
 what he does know, sometimes what he does not know. In 
 our previous statements we were wrong in denying this to 
 be possible. 
 
 Theae. How do you state it now? 
 
 So. Our statement on the subject must be this. We 
 first determine, that what a person knows, having a record 
 of it in his soul, but without perceiving it, he cannot pos- 
 sibly think to be some other thing which he knows, having 
 an image of this also, but not perceiving it. And again 
 it is impossible to think that what he knows is what he 
 
192 THEAETETUS. 
 
 knows not and has no seal of: and that what he knows 
 not is [something else] which he knows not : and that what 
 he knows not is what he knows : and to think what he 
 perceives is some other thing which he perceives; and what 
 he perceives, a thing which he does not perceive ; and 
 what he does not perceive to be another thing which he 
 does not perceive ; and what he does not perceive to be 
 a thing which he perceives. And again to think that a 
 thing which he knows and perceives, having the seal of 
 it according to perception, is some other thing which he 
 knows and perceives having its seal also according to per- 
 ception — this is, if it can be, still more impossible than 
 the preceding suppositions. And what one knows and 
 perceives, having its record correctly, it is impossible to 
 think [something else] which one knows : and what one 
 knows and perceives under similar conditions, to be [some- 
 thing else] which one perceives : and what one neither 
 knows nor perceives to be [something else] which one 
 neither knows nor perceives : and what one neither knows 
 nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does not 
 know; and what one neither knows nor perceives, to be 
 [something else] which one does not perceive. All these 
 things involve the very utmost impossibility of having any 
 false opinion about them. There remain the following 
 cases, in which, if anywhere, such a thing may happen. 
 
 Theae. What are they ? perhaps they may help me to 
 understand. At present I do not follow you. 
 
 So. In the case of things which a person knows, to think 
 that they are some other things which he knows and per- 
 ceives ; or some other things which he does not know, but 
 perceives : or that [some things] which he knows and per- 
 ceives are [some others] which he also knows and perceives. 
 
 Theae. I am more in the dark now than before. 
 
TRA Ν SLA Τ ΙΟ Ν. 193 
 
 \Ιη this section it is shewn hoiu, by the misuse of the ivaxen tablet, false 34 
 opinion may be supposed to occur ; namely, by an erroneous union of 
 sensatioji and itnpression. Mr Grote states it as follows : "A man, 
 having• sealed on his memorial tablet the impressions of two objects \ 
 A and B, which he has seen before, fnay come to see one of these objects 
 again : but he may by mistake identify the present sensation with 
 the wrong past impression, i. e. with that past impression to which it 
 does not belong. Thus, on seeing A, he may errotieously identify it 
 with the past impression B, instead of A ; or vice versa. And so 
 false opinion will lie, not in the conjunction or identification of sensa- 
 tions with sensations, nor of thoughts [or past impressiojis) with 
 thoughts, but in that of present sensations with past impressiotis or 
 thoughts.^'' Such an occtirrence Socrates imputes to defects in the 
 waxen block; which may be too shallozu or too hard or too soft or too 
 narrozv, or ijjipure, or inclosed in too S7nall a space. ] 
 
 So. Listen to this restatement. Do not I, knowing 
 Theodorus and remembering in my mind what sort of man 
 he is, and Theaetetus similarly, sometimes see them, some- 
 times not, and sometimes touch them, at other times not, 
 and hear them or have some other perception of them, and 
 again have no perception of you, but not the less remem- 
 ber you and know you in my mind ? 
 
 Theae. Certainly. 
 
 So. This is the first lesson which I wish to make 
 known to you, that a man may not perceive, or may per- 
 ceive, things which he knows. 
 
 Theae. True. 
 
 So. Things too which he does not know, a man may 
 often not perceive, of"ten perceive merely ? 
 
 Theae. This too is possible. 
 
 So. Now see if you follow me more easily. Socrates 
 knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither, and has 
 no other present perception about them. He could never 
 
 K. p. 13 
 
194 THEAETETUS. 
 
 form an opinion in his mind that Theaetetus is Theodo- 
 rus ? Do I speak sense or not ? 
 
 TJieae. All quite true. 
 
 So. This was the first of the cases spoken of. 
 
 Theae. It Λvas. 
 
 So. The second was, that knowing one of you, and 
 not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, I can never 
 suppose the one I know to be the one I do not know. 
 
 Theae. Right. 
 
 So. Thirdly, knowing and perceiving neither, I cannot 
 suppose one whom I do not know to be some other 
 whom I do not know. And as to all my former sup- 
 positions, imagine that you have heard them stated again 
 in order, wherein I can never have false opinions about 
 you and Theodorus, either if I know or if I do not know 
 both, or if I know one, but not the other. And similarly 
 with regard to perceptions, if you follow me. 
 
 Theae. I do. 
 
 So. False opinion remains possible in a case like 
 this : when, knowing you and Theodorus, and having in 
 that waxen block the seals of both of you as from rings, 
 then, seeing both at a distance and indistinctly, I strive to 
 assign the proper seal of each to its proper visage, and to 
 introduce and adapt this to its own mould, in order that 
 recognition may take place : but if, failing in the attempt, 
 and interchanging, like those who put on the wrong shoes, 
 I apply the visage of each to the other's seal ; or again, if 
 I go Avrong by an affection like that of sight in mirrors, 
 when, it flows from right to left : — then heterodoxy and false 
 opinion occur. 
 
 Theae. You describe v/ith marvellous truth, Socrates, 
 the conditions to which opinion is liable. 
 
 So. Moreover [false opinion happens] when, knoΛving 
 
TRANSLATION. 195 
 
 both, I perceive one, as well as know him, but not the 
 other, and so my knowledge of the second of the two is 
 not according to perception — a case put in my former 
 statement, which you did not then understand. 
 
 TJieae. I did not. 
 
 So. Well, I meant to say that a person knowing and 
 perceiving the one, and having his knowledge according to 
 perception, will never think that he is some other whom he 
 knows and perceives, and of whom his knowledge is also 
 according to perception. Was it so ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. There remained, I think, the case w^ now deal 
 with, in which we say that false opinion happens when a 
 person knowing and seeing both, or having any other 
 perception of both, does not keep each of the seals in 
 accordance with his perception, but like a bad archer 
 shoots beside the mark and so errs ; and such error is 
 called a falsity. 
 
 Theae. And reasonably. 
 
 So. And so, when to one of the seals perception is 
 present, but not to the other, and the mind adapts the seal 
 which is Avithout perception to the perception present, in 
 every such case it is deceived. In one word, about things 
 which a person knows not and never perceived, error and 
 false opinion seem out of the question, if there is any 
 soundness in our present argument : but in those things 
 about which we have knowledge and perception, opinion 
 turns and twists about, becoming true or false ; true, when 
 it brings the proper impressions and forms to meet oppo- 
 sitely and straightly; false, when it brings them crosswise 
 and crookedly. 
 
 Theae. Is not tliis a noble statement, Socrates ? 
 
 So. You will say so with more assurance after hearing 
 
 J. Ο — ^ 
 
196 THEAETETUS. 
 
 what I have farther to state : for to think the truth is 
 noble, to be deceived is base. 
 
 Theae. No doubt. 
 
 So. These things are said to happen as follows. When 
 the wax in any person's soul is deep and abundant and 
 smooth and nicely wrought, the impressions become durable 
 which pass through the senses and are sealed on this 
 (waxen) heart of the soul, as Homer called it in allusion 
 to the resemblance of wax ; for then, and in all such cases, 
 they are formed in it pure, and have depth enough. And 
 such persons are in the first place quick to learn, in the 
 next retentive, and finally they do not interchange the seals 
 of the perceptions, but form true opinions. For as their 
 impressions are distinct and have ample room, they rapidly 
 distribute them to their several niches ; and such impres- 
 sions are called 'real:' and these persons are termed 'wise.' 
 Do you not think so ? 
 
 Theae. With entire conviction. 
 
 So. Wlien any person's heart is shaggy, as that all- 
 wise poet sang, or when it is miry and of impure wax, or 
 exceedingly soft or hard — they whose heart is soft, are 
 quick to learn, but forgetful ; they whose heart is hard, the 
 opposite : and they who have a shaggy and rough and 
 gritty heart, or one defiled with a mixture of earth or 
 mire, have their impressions indistinct. In those who 
 have hard hearts, they are indistinct too, for depth is 
 wanting : likewise in those who have soft hearts, for 
 through confusion they soon become faint. And if besides 
 all these faults they are furthermore crushed one upon 
 another for want of room, when a man's soul is small, they 
 are still more indistinct than in the former cases. All these 
 people are capable of having false opinions. For when 
 they see or hear or imagine anything, being unable to 
 
TRANSLATION. 197 
 
 assign each thing quickly to its proper impression, they 
 go tardily to work, and, assorting erroneously, they see 
 and hear and conceive most things wrongly. And of these 
 persons again we say, that they have false notions of things, 
 and are ignorant. 
 
 T/icae. Never was a truer statement, Socrates. 
 
 So. May we say then that false opinions exist in us ? 
 
 Theae. Decidedly. 
 
 So. And true? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Now we think it sufficiently agreed that both these 
 kinds of opinion certainly exist ? 
 
 Theae. Beyond all question. 
 
 YSoc7'ates has no sooner reached his conchisioji as ίο the formatioji of false 35 
 opinion, than he proceeds to confute it. There are phefiotnena for 
 •which it does not account. Errors occur iti the identification of one 
 past impression with another: and this leads to the dilemma that 
 either false opinion is impossible, or it is possible for a person not io 
 know what he does know. This dilemma Theaetetiis cannot solve. 
 And Soc7'ates remarks that this discussion has become impure, in that 
 they have constantly used the terms ^ knozuing,'' * kjto^vledge,^ and 
 * ignorance ' before they have reached a definition of these terms. As, 
 however, he admits that he cannot carry on the discussion without 
 zising them in some sense or other, he declares himself willing to 
 make the attempt, and Theaetetiis applauds his resolution.'\ 
 
 So. What a truly terrible and disagreeable creature, 
 Theaetetus, a chattering man appears to be. 
 
 Theae. How so ? What do you say this for ? 
 
 So. Because I am so annoyed by my own dullness and 
 manifest garrulity. For what else can one call the conduct 
 of a man, who wears every argument threadbare, and cannot 
 be made to quit it, because he is too stupid to be convinced? 
 
 Theae. A\'hat vexes you ? 
 
 So. I am not only vexed, but at a loss how to answer, 
 should any one question me and say : * Have you now, 
 
198 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Socrates, discovered that false opinion lies neither in the 
 mutual relation of perceptions, nor in that of thoughts, but 
 in the union of perception with thought?' I shall say, 
 'Yes,' I suppose, with a triumphant air, as if we had made 
 some beautiful discovery. 
 
 T/ieae. I see nothing the reverse, Socrates, in what has 
 now been proved. 
 
 So. Do you mean, he will say, that we can never sup- 
 pose the man, whom we think of but do not see, to be a 
 horse, which again we neither see nor touch but only think 
 of, and in no way perceive? I suppose I shall say that 
 I do mean it. 
 
 TJieae. Yes, and rightly. 
 
 So. Well, he Avill say, as to the number eleven, which 
 is an object of thought only, must it not follow from 
 this statement that nobody could ever suppose it to be 
 twelve, which is also an object of thought only? Come 
 now, reply yourself. 
 
 Theae. I shall reply that any one who saw and touched 
 them might think eleven to be twelve, but so far as he 
 had them in thought, he could never conceive such an 
 opinion regarding them. 
 
 So. AVell, take the case of one who set before him- 
 self and regarded in his own mind five and seven. I 
 don't mean seven and five men or anything of the sort, 
 but the notions of five and seven, of which we say that 
 they are recorded there on the waxen block, and that as to 
 them it is impossible to have false opinion. Of these 
 things I ask if it never chanced, that while people were 
 considering them, and conversing with themselves, and 
 inquiring how many they come to — one person would think 
 and say they were eleven, another twelve : — or Λvould all 
 say and think that they make twelve ? 
 
 Theae. No, indeed, not all ; many will say, eleven. 
 
TRANSLATION. 190 
 
 And if a person has higher figures under consideration, he 
 is still more liable to error. I suppose you are speaking 
 of number generally. 
 
 So. Your supposition is right. Consider whether any- 
 thing happens in such a case but imagining the number 
 twelve, in the block, to be eleven. 
 
 Theae. Nothing else, seemingly. 
 
 So. We are thus carried back to our former discussion. 
 The person in such a case supposes a thing which he 
 knows to be another thing which he knows. This we 
 said was impossible; and on this very ground we forced 
 the conclusion that false opinion does not exist, in order 
 that the same person might not be compelled to know and 
 not know the same things at the same time. 
 
 Theae. Very true. 
 
 So. Therefore we must declare that holding false 
 opinion is something else than a discrepancy between 
 thought and sensation. For, if it were this, we could 
 never be deceived in our mental concepts themselves. But 
 now either there is no false opinion, or it is possible for a 
 person not to know what he knows. Which alternative 
 do you choose ? 
 
 Theae. You offer an impossible choice, Socrates. 
 
 So. Ay, but the argument will hardly allow both. 
 Nevertheless, as we must risk the utmost, suppose we 
 venture to be shameless? 
 
 Theae. How ? 
 
 So. By making up our minds to say what ' to know ' 
 means. 
 
 Theae. Why is this a shameless act ? 
 
 So. You seem not to bear in mind that all our dis- 
 cussion from the first has been a quest of knowledge, as- 
 suming that we do not know what it is. 
 
200 THEAETETUS, 
 
 Theae. I do bear this in mind. 
 
 So. Is it not then shameless, if we do not know know- 
 ledge, to proclaim what knowing means? But in fact, 
 Theaetetus, we have been long infected with an impure 
 method of discussion. Over and over again we have used 
 the terms 'we know,' and 'we do not know,' 'we have 
 knowledge' and 'we have not knowledge,' as if we could 
 understand one another, while we are yet ignorant of know- 
 ledge. If you remark, at this very moment we have again 
 used the terms ignorance and understanding, as though it 
 were fit for us to use them, if we are destitute of knowledge. 
 
 Theae. But in Avhat way will you argue, Socrates, if you 
 abstain from these terms ? 
 
 So. In no way, while I am the man I am : but I could 
 if I were a votary of contention. Were a man of that 
 school now present, he would -profess to abstain from such 
 terms, and would rebuke us sternly for our conduct. Since 
 however we are such poor creatures, will you let me ven- 
 ture to say what 'knowing' is? Fox I am clear that it will 
 be of some help to us. 
 
 Theae. Oh yes 1 pray venture. You will have great 
 excuse for not abandoning these terms. 
 
 \Having consented^ far the sake of disctnsion, to use the te7'm ' knoiuingy 36 
 thoiigh still 7mdc'Jined, Socrates noiv obsei-ves that most people suppose 
 it to mean ' the having of knoioledge? For his οτυη part, he zvonld 
 rather say ' the possessi/ig, ' thafi ' the having : ' for a person caniiot 
 Justly be said ' io have"" what he never uses, though he may '■possess ' 
 it, like a coat kept in a wardrobe but never luorn. This distinction 
 he illustrates by his second parable, that of the mental dove-cage. 
 A person may be stipposcd to have caiight a uu/nber of doves {i.e. io 
 have acquired scic7jces or cognitions) which he has ttirned into his cage 
 or aviary, and so ^possesses. ' But, if he wants to catch one of his 
 doves {i.e. to recall and tise one of his acquired cognitions), he has 
 
TRANSLATION. 201 
 
 to pursue another chase hi his mental aviary ; and this may not 
 always be successful. He may fail to catch the dove he wants {i.e. he 
 may find that he has forgottC7i the science he had once acquired) or he 
 may get hold of a wrong dove {i.e. he may confuse things which he 
 could accurately distinguish at a former time).] 
 
 Sa. You have heard then what people now m2an by 
 ' knowing ? ' 
 
 T/ieae. Possibly : but I do not remember at the mo- 
 ment. 
 
 So. They say it is a having of knowledge. 
 
 Theae. True. 
 
 So. Let us make a slight change and say, possession of 
 knowledge. 
 
 Theae. What will you say is the difference between 
 them ? 
 
 So. Perhaps none : but you may as well hear, and 
 help me to test my opinion. 
 
 Theae. I will if I can . 
 
 So, ' Having' does not appear to me the same thing 
 as 'possessing.' For instance, if any one bought a coat, 
 and being master of it did not wear it, we should not say 
 he had, but possessed it. 
 
 Theae. Right. 
 
 So. Now see if it is possible in the same manner to 
 possess knowledge Avithout having it. Suppose a person 
 had caught wild birds, doves or any other sort, and built a 
 dove-cage in his dwelling and fed them. In a certain way 
 we should say he always has them, because he possesses 
 them. Should we not ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. In another sense we should say he has none of 
 them, but he has got a power over them, since he has made 
 them subject to him in a domestic inclosure of his own. 
 
202 THEAETETUS. 
 
 He can take and hold them when he Ukes, catching any 
 one he wishes, and he can let it go again. And it is ίϊο.^ to 
 him to do this as often as he thinks proper ? 
 
 TJicae. It is. 
 
 So. So then, even as in the previous part of our dis- 
 course we framed in human souls a strange sort of waxen 
 figment, let us again make in every soul a certain cage of 
 various kinds of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest ; 
 others in small groups ; others alone, flying among all 
 wherever they may chance. 
 
 Theae. Suppose it made. What next ? 
 
 So. While we are children (we must say) this struc- 
 ture is empty : and we must think of sciences instead of 
 birds : and whatever science any one has acquired and 
 shut up in his inclosure, we must say that he has learnt or 
 discovered the thing of which it is the science : and this is 
 ' knowing.' 
 
 Theae. Be it so. 
 
 So. Again, as to catching any one of the sciences a 
 person chooses, and taking and holding it, and letting it 
 go again, — consider by what terms these acts should be 
 described, whether by the same as when he was first ac- 
 quiring the sciences, or by others. You will learn what I 
 mean more clearly from the following illustration. There 
 is an art you call arithmetic ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Suppose this to be a pursuit of the knowledge of 
 odd and even. 
 
 Theae. Well, I do. 
 
 So. By this art, I imagine, a person both has the 
 cognitions of all numbers in his power, and transmits them 
 to another. 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
TRANSLATION. V^ 203*' 
 
 So. And we say that one who transmits teaches, and 
 one who receives learns, and one who has them by possess- 
 ing in that cage 'knows?' ^'«^^-l' ' 
 
 TJieae. Quite so. 
 
 So. Attend and see what next follows. Does not a 
 perfect arithmetician know all numbers ? For he has in his 
 soul the science of all numbers. 
 
 Thcae. Certainly. 
 
 So. Could not such a person count any sum mentally, 
 or any outward objects capable of numeration ? 
 
 Theae. No doubt he could. 
 
 So. And shall we say that counting means anything but 
 considering how great any number is ? 
 
 Theae. Such is its meaning. 
 
 So. Then Λvhat a person 'knoAvs,' he is shown to con- 
 sider as if he did not know, though we have allowed that he 
 knows all number. You have heard, I suppose, of these 
 vexed questions ? 
 
 Theae. I have. 
 
 [Socraies now confutes his own hypothesis. Catching a dove which you 37 
 acquired and possess, seems to mean learning β -ojn yourself what you 
 knoxu already. This Theaetetus sees to be absurd. And the confusion 
 of two known things appears Ho be not less absurd. For this kno2uledge 
 is shezuji to produce the effect of ignorance. Why may not ignorance 
 as well be shexvn to produce the effect of knowledge, and blindness that 
 of sight ? May we not imagine, says Theaetetus y that the cage contains 
 nesciences [non- cognitions) as well as sciences [cognitions] and that false 
 opinion may take place when a person, hunting for a science, gets hold 
 of a nescience in its stead ? By a short eleitchus Socrates shnvs that 
 this hypothesis implies consequences which have been already acknoxo- 
 ledged to be impossible. For the man who has thus got hold of nes- 
 cieme mistakes it for science, does he not? Yes, says Theaetetus. But 
 how can anybody, kno7uing two things, take one for the other, or, 
 knowing neither, take what he does not know, for something else thai 
 
204 THEAETETUS. 
 
 he does not know : or kiiow'nig one but not the other, take what he 
 does know for what he does 7iot knozu, or the converse. All these are 
 impossibilities : and so we, until we knoio what kiioiuledge is, cannot 
 know what false opijiion is.'\ 
 
 So. We then, following the similitude of the possession 
 and chase of doves, will say that the chase was double ; one 
 before acquirement, with a view to possession : the other 
 after possession, in order to take and hold in hand what the 
 owner had long ago acquired. So even those same things 
 of which a person had the knowledge long since by learning, 
 and which he then knew, he may again thoroughly learn 
 by resuming and holding the knowledge of each, which 
 he had indeed long ago acquired, but had not within his 
 mental grasp. 
 
 Theae. True. 
 
 So. I was just now asking what terms we must use to 
 speak of such cases, as when the arithmetician proceeds to 
 count or the grammarian to read. Does he in this case, 
 although he knows, come to learn from himself what he 
 knows ? 
 
 Theae. That were absurd, Socrates. 
 
 So. But must we say that he will read and count 
 what he does not know, after allowing him to know all 
 letters and all number ? 
 
 Theae. This again is unreasonable. 
 
 So. Would you have us state that, as to terms, we 
 do not care at all in what way anybody likes to twist the 
 words 'knowing' and 'learning;' but that since we de- 
 fined 'possessing' knowledge to be one thing, 'having 'it 
 another, we say it is impossible for any one not to possess 
 Λvhat he has acquired ; so that it never happens that any one 
 does not know what he knows, but it is possible to get hold 
 of a false opinion concerning it : for it is possible not to 
 
TRA NSLA ΤΙ ON. 205 
 
 have the knowledge of this one, but of another in its stead, 
 when chasing any of the sciences which flit from him, he 
 mistakes and lays hold on one instead of another, as in the 
 case when he thought eleven to be twelve, getting hold of 
 the knowledge of eleven, instead of that of twelve, the 
 ring-dove as it were within him instead of the pigeon ? 
 
 Theae. Yes, that is reasonable. 
 
 So. But Avhen he gets hold of that which he tries to 
 take, shall we say, that then he is free from error and 
 opines realities, and that in this way there is true and 
 false opinion, and that none of the difficulties Avhich we 
 found in our foregoing arguments come in our way ? Per- 
 haps you will endorse my statement. Will you ? 
 
 Theae. I will. 
 
 So. Then so far we are rid of the notion that people 
 do not know what they know : for it no longer happens in 
 any case not to possess what we do possess, whether de- 
 ceived about it or not. And yet there seems to glance 
 sideways on me a trouble still more formidable. 
 
 Theae. Of what nature ? 
 
 So. Whether the interchange of cognitions will ever 
 come to be false opinion. 
 
 Theae. How do you mean ? 
 
 So. First, as to the notion of anybody's having know- 
 ledge of a thing, and at the same time being ignorant of it, 
 not by inacquaintance, but by his own knowledge : next, as 
 to opining this to be one thing, and the other thing to be 
 this — is it not the height of unreason, that, when know- 
 ledge is present the soul should recognize nothing, and be 
 ignorant of everything? for on this principle there is no- 
 thing to prevent ignorance being present and causing one to 
 know something, and blindness causing to sec, if knowledge 
 shall ever cause any one to be ignorant. 
 
206 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Theae. Perhaps, Socrates, we did not arrange the birds 
 Λνεΐΐ in placing sciences only, but we ought to have placed 
 also nesciences flying about with them in the soul ; and the 
 chaser, at one time getting hold of a science, at another of 
 a nescience, has about the same thing opinions false by 
 nescience, true by science. 
 
 So. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to avoid praising you. 
 But review your proposition. Suppose it as you state. 
 He who lays hold on nescience, you say, will have false 
 opinions. Is it so? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. He will not, I suppose, think he has false opi- 
 nions ? 
 
 Theae. How can he ? 
 
 So. He will think he has true ones then, and as to 
 things in which he is deceived, he will be in the same 
 condition as if he knew them ? 
 
 Theae. No doubt. 
 
 So. He will think that he has chased and got science, 
 not nescience? 
 
 TJieae. Evidently. 
 
 So. Accordingly, after a long circuit we have reached 
 our original perplexity. Our critic Λνϋΐ again laugh and 
 say : * My right worthy friends, will one who knows them 
 both, science and nescience, suppose that which he knows 
 to be the other which he knows? or knowing neither of 
 them, does he imagine what he knows not to be the other 
 which he knows not : or, knowing one but not the other, 
 does he suppose the one he knows to be the one he knows 
 not, or the one he knows not to be the one he knows ? 
 Or will you tell me again that there are also sciences 
 of sciences and of nesciences, which he who possesses 
 has shut up in some other ridiculous dove-cage or waxen 
 
TRANSLATION. 207 
 
 figment, and knows as long as he possesses them, even if 
 he have them not ready to hand in his soul? and so will 
 you be compelled to run round and round to the same 
 point without gaining anything by it?' What answer shall 
 we give to these questions, Theaetetus ? 
 
 Theae. Really, Socrates, I do not know what we ought 
 to say. 
 
 So. Does not the argument, my boy, rebuke us justly, 
 and show that we are wrong in leaving the question of 
 knowledge, and investigating false opinion first? It is 
 impossible to know this latter, before we have adequately 
 settled what knowledge is. 
 
 Theae. At this point, Socrates, 1 must accept your 
 view. 
 
 \Are we then to abando7i the mqimy — * what is knowledge ? ' Theaetetus 38 
 will not do so, if Socrates is ready to continue it ; but he reverts to 
 his secoftd definition, that true opinion is knowledge. Socrates says that 
 the whole profession of lawyers and orators gainsays this doctrine : for 
 their whole business is to persuade dicasts that certain things which 
 the dicasts did not personally witness, are true, and that they ought to 
 decide accoi'dingly. If they do so decide, and that rightly, they have 
 formed a true opinion, which cannot be called k}iaioledge, but the result 
 cf persuasion. Therefore true opinion and knowledge are not iden- 
 tical. Theaetetus now remefnbers that he once heard it said, that true 
 opinion with rational explanation (Xu7os) is knaiuledge. Things are 
 tmknaiuable^ if they cannot be rationally defined: if they can, they 
 are knowable. ] 
 
 So. Returning to the original question, what is one 
 to say that knowledge is? For we shall not give in yet, 
 I suppose. 
 
 Theae. Certainly not, if you do not set the example. 
 
 So. Say then how we must dc^mc it in order to escape 
 best from self-contradiction. 
 
208 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Theae. As we proposed in our foregoing discussion, 
 Socrates. I have no other suggestion to make. 
 
 So. What was the definition ? 
 
 Theae. That true opinion is knowledge. True opinion 
 is, I suppose, free from error, and its results are all noble 
 and good. 
 
 So. The man who led the way into the river, Theae- 
 tetus, said 'the trial will prove;' and if we search for this 
 as we go, perhaps the fact will stop us and exhibit what we 
 are looking for. If we stand still, we shall see nothing. 
 
 Theae. Right. Let us proceed and look out. 
 
 So. This look-out of ours will be a brief one : for 
 a whole profession indicates that true opinion is not know- 
 ledge. 
 
 Theae. How so ? What is that profession ? 
 
 So. The profession of the mightiest in wisdom, who 
 are called orators and lawyers. These men in their art 
 persuade, not by teaching, but by making men opine 
 whatever they will. Do you suppose there are any 
 teachers clever enough, within the flowing of a little water, 
 to teach adequately the truth of facts to certain persons, 
 Avho were not present when they were robbed of money, or 
 when they received some other violence ? 
 
 Theae. I do not suppose they could ; but they would 
 persuade. 
 
 So. By persuading you mean, * causing to form an 
 opinion ?' 
 
 Theae. Certainly. 
 
 So. When therefore dicasts are justly persuaded about 
 things which can be known by seeing only, not otherwise, 
 in that case, judging tihe things by what they hear, they 
 judged without knowledge, though persuaded rightly, if their 
 verdict was good ? \ 
 
TRANSLATION. 209 
 
 Theae. Unquestionably. 
 
 So. If, my friend, true opinion and knowledge were 
 the same, a perfect dicast would never form a right opinion 
 without knowledge. But now it seems they are not one 
 and the same. 
 
 Theae. As to this I had forgotten, Socrates, a thing 
 which I once heard somebody say : but I now recollect it. 
 He said that true opinion accompanied with rational expla- 
 nation was knowledge, but unexplained opinion out of the 
 sphere of knowledge : things of which there is no explana- 
 tion are, he said, not knowable, using that very term ; but 
 those which have explanation are knowable. 
 
 So. Well said. But what distinction did he draw be- 
 tween these knowable and unknowable things? Tell me, 
 that I may see whether you and I have heard the same 
 version or not. 
 
 Theae. I am not sure that I can recall it: but, if an- 
 other told it, I think I could follow him. 
 
 \Socrates says that he too has heard a similar definition, 7vhich he proceeds 39 
 to explain by the analogy ofzuords and letters. The primordial elements 
 of things are not matters either of knowledge or of true opinion, or of 
 rational explanation, but of sensible perception merely. An element 
 can only be perceived and called by its name. Yon can give it neither 
 predicate nor epithet : you cannot speak of it as ' being,"* as ^ this' or 
 ' that ' or * each,' or * single : * for so you add to it something foreign 
 to itself, and it is no longer an element. But the compounds of these 
 elements may be known and explained by enuma-ating the clemctits of 
 which they are composed. And to do this is to furnish a rational 
 explanation (λόγο?) of them. Theaetetus accepts this statement, and 
 repeats the new definition of knozuledge stated in the preceding section. 
 Socrates intimates that he is dissatisfied with the statement that 
 elements are tinknowable, while their compounds are knr<cable. He 
 further proposes to discuss this question in reference to syllabks and 
 the letters or elements of which they are composed.'] 
 
 K. P. 14 
 
210 THEAETETUS. 
 
 So. Hear then dream for dream. Methought I heard 
 some say that the primal elements, as it were, of which we 
 and all other things are compounded, have no reason : for 
 it is only possible to name each by itself, not to predi- 
 cate anything else of it, either that it is or is not, as in 
 such case 'being' or 'not-being' is attached: while it is 
 wrong to ascribe either, if one is to speak of the thing 
 itself alone. We must not, they say, ascribe the term ' self 
 or 'that' or 'each' or 'single' or 'this,' or many other like 
 expressions : for these run about and are applied to all 
 things, being different from the things to which they are 
 attached. If tl:ie primal element were capable of being 
 described, and had a proper description of its own, the 
 fitting course Avould be, that it should be described apart 
 from all others. Since, however, it is impossible for any one 
 of the first rudiments to be defined in words, there is 
 nothing for it except to be named only : name is all it has. 
 But, as to the things compounded of these, as they are 
 themselves complex, so also their names being combined 
 constitute definition : for a complex of names is the essence 
 of definition. Thus I dreamed that the elements are un- 
 described and unknown, but perceptible ; while their com- 
 binations are known and expressed and conceived by true 
 opinion. Whenever any one gains the true opinion of any- 
 thing without definition, his soul is truthful with regard to it, 
 but does not know it, for one who cannot give and receive 
 a spoken account of anything is incognisant of it. But 
 after adding such an account, he is capable of becoming 
 all this, and is perfect in knowledge. Have you heard the 
 dream thus or otherwise ? 
 
 Theae. Exactly thus. 
 
 So. Are you content with it, and do you lay it down 
 that true opinion combined with explanation is knowledge ? 
 
TRANSLATION. 211 
 
 TJieae. Quite so. 
 
 So. Have we to-day, Theaetetus, in this manner found 
 at last what from ancient time so many wise men have 
 grown old without finding ? 
 
 Theae. At all events, Socrates, I think our present 
 statement a good one. 
 
 So. It may naturally seem so. For what can be called 
 knowledge apart from definition and right opinion ? Yet 
 I am displeased with one of the things we said. 
 
 Theae. What was that ? 
 
 So. One that seems to be stated very neatly, how 
 that the elements are unknown, but the class of combina- 
 tions known. 
 
 Theae. Is not that true ? 
 
 So. We must see. For we have as hostages all the 
 examples which he used in saying what he did. 
 
 Theae. What are they? 
 
 So. Letters and syllables. Do you think the speaker 
 had anything but these in view when he said what we cite ? 
 
 Theae. No : he thought of these. 
 
 [Assailing the new definition ivitk reference to letters and syllables, and 40 
 taking as an instance the first syllable of his οτνη name, Σω, Socrates, 
 by a short clenches, proves that the syllable is not kno^un, unless the 
 letters sigma and omega are knozun also. But, starting a fresh 
 argument, he stiggests that possibly a syllable is a general notion 
 having a nature independent of its letters. Theaetetus is loilling to 
 accept this vino. Then, says Socrates, it can have no parts. Why ? 
 Because *a 7uhole^ must mean ^ all its parts.'' Can a whole be a 
 notion distinct from all its parts? Theaetetus ventures to say it can, 
 Socrates asks if * the all and the 7vhole ' are different. Theaetetus 
 risks the ans~iuer: * they are different. ^"^ 
 
 So. Let us then take and test them ; or, rather test 
 ourselves, whether we learnt letters on this principle or any 
 
 14—2 
 
212 THEAETETUS. 
 
 other. To begin : can syllables be defined, but letters 
 not ? 
 
 T/ieae. Probably. 
 
 So. I take the same view. If some one asked about 
 the first syllable of Socrates for instance and said, ' Tell me, 
 Theaetetus, what So is : how would you answer? 
 
 Thcac. Sigma and Omega. 
 
 So. This then you hold to be the definition of the 
 syllable ? 
 
 Thcae. I do. 
 
 So. Well now, tell me similarly the definition of 
 Sigma. 
 
 Thcae. How can one tell the elements of an element ? 
 For indeed, Socrates, Sigma is one of the consonants, a 
 sort of noise only, as when the tongue hisses ; Beta again 
 has neither sound nor noise : nor have most of the letters. 
 So they may very well be called undefined, as the clearest 
 of them have sound alone, but no definition at all. 
 
 So. So much then, my friend, we have rightly deter- 
 mined concerning knowledge ? 
 
 Theac. Apparently. 
 
 So. Well now? Have we rightly admitted that the 
 letter is not known, but only the syllable ? 
 
 Theae. Seemingly. 
 
 So. Do we now say that the syllable is both letters, 
 or if there be more than two, all these, or some one idea 
 arising from their combination ? 
 
 Theae. I think we should say, all of them. 
 
 So. Take the case of two, Sigma and Omega. These 
 two form the first syllable of my name. Does not one who 
 knows the syllable know both ? 
 
 TJieae. To be sure. 
 
 So. He knows Sigma and Omega ? 
 
TRANSLATION. 213 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. How then ? is he ignorant of each, and, knowing 
 neither, does he know both ? 
 
 Theae. That were strange and unreasonable, Socrates. 
 
 So. And yet, if a person must perforce know each, in 
 order to know both, it is absolutely necessary for one who is 
 ever to know a syllable, to know the letters first. And thus 
 our beautiful argument Avill have run clear away from us. 
 
 Theae. Ay, and in a very sudden way. 
 
 So. We do not keep a good watch on it. Perhaps we 
 ought to have laid it down that a syllable is not the letters 
 themselves, but some notion arising from them, having one 
 form belonging to itself, while another belongs to the sepa- 
 rate letters. 
 
 Theae. Quite so. And perhaps this statement may be 
 truer than the other. 
 
 So. We must consider the point, and not abandon in 
 this cowardly way a great and dignified theory. 
 
 Theae. Surely not. 
 
 So. Suppose it be as we now say. The syllable is one 
 general form arising from the harmonious adaptation of the 
 several elements ; both in grammar and everywhere else. 
 
 Theae. Very well. 
 
 So. Then there must be no parts of it. 
 
 Theae. AVhy? 
 
 So. Because, if a thing has parts, the whole must ne- 
 cessarily be all the parts. Or do you say that a whole 
 formed of parts is a notion distinct from all its parts ? 
 
 Theae. Yes, I do. 
 
 So. Do you call the all and the whole the same or 
 different ? 
 
 Theae. I have no clear view : but as you bid mc 
 answer readily, I take the risk of saying they are different. 
 
214 THEAETETUS, 
 
 So. Your readiness, Theaetetus, is right. Whether the 
 answer is so too, we must consider. 
 Theae. We must. 
 
 41 \TJie first eighteen questions of this section comprise an clcnchiis, hy which 
 Socrates compels Theaetetus to admits thai there is no difference be- 
 tween ^ the alV and ''the zvhole,^ and that both terms, in a thing that 
 has parts, mean ' all the parts.'' He then puts this alternative, which 
 Theaetetus grants .• if the syllable is not the letters^ they are not its 
 parts: if it is the same with them, both must be hiown equally. 
 And it was to avoid this latter consequence that it was taken to be 
 different. But what are the parts of syllables, if the letters are not? 
 Theaetetus admits, that, if syllables have parts, these must be the 
 letters. In that case, says Socrates, according to the doctrine as- 
 sumed, a syllable must be a single form without parts. And in that 
 case, he ηοζυ proves, it must be elementary, and so tindefinable arid 
 unknown. It is not true, therefore, that the syllable can be defined 
 and knoxvn, unless the letters ca?i be so likewise. This proof Socrates 
 strengthens by the testimony of experience. In learning to read, did 
 not Theaetetus endeavour to distinguish each individual letter ? In 
 learning music, did he not strive to distinguish each particidar note ; 
 and are not the notes the elements of music ? All this Theaetetus 
 admits. And Socrates draws the conclusion, that elements may be 
 known even more clearly than compounds {syllables). '\ 
 
 So. Will not the whole differ from the all, according to 
 your present argument ? 
 
 Theae. Yes, 
 
 So. Well now, is there any difference between all (plu- 
 ral) and the all (singular) ? For instance, when we say, one, 
 two, three, four, five, six, and if we say twice three or 
 thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, 
 do we in all these cases speak of the same or something 
 different ? 
 
 Theae. Of the same. 
 
TRA Ν SLA ΤΙ Ο Ν. 215 
 
 So. That is, six ; is it not ? 
 
 T/icae. Yes. 
 
 So. In each form of speech we have spoken of all 
 the six? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Again, when we speak of all, do we not speak of 
 one thing ^ ? 
 
 Theae. We must. 
 
 So. Is it not of the six ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Do we predicate the same unity of all things 
 consisting of number, whether under the term -καν or m 
 ττάντα (in singular or plural form) ? 
 
 Theae. Evidently. 
 
 So. Let us now state the question as follows : The 
 number of the acre and the acre are the same ; are they 
 not? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And so of the farlong ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Again, the number of the camp and the camp, and 
 all such things similarly? For the whole number is the 
 essential whole in each case? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And is not the number of each the parts of each ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And all things which have parts will consist of 
 parts ? 
 
 Theae. Evidently. 
 
 So. And all the parts have been admitted to be the all, 
 if the entire number is to be the all. 
 
 * Reading, with K. F. Hermann, δ' ούχ ip fur MS δ' οίδίρ. 41 
 
216 THEAETETUS, 
 
 Theae. True. 
 
 So. Then the \vhole does not consist of parts. For it 
 would be the all, being all the parts ? 
 
 Theae. Seemingly not. 
 
 So. But can any thing which is a part, be a part of 
 any thing except of a whole ? 
 
 Theae. Yes, of the all. 
 
 So. You show fight manfully, Theaetetus. But is it 
 not in the very case when nothing is absent that the all 
 is all ? 
 
 Theae. Necessarily. 
 
 So. And v/ill not the whole be the very same thing — 
 that from which nothing is anywhere absent? For that 
 from which anything is. absent, is neither a whole nor an 
 all, each of these being equally constituted by the same 
 combination of parts. 
 
 Theae. I now think there is no difference between an 
 all and a whole. 
 
 So. Did we not say, that whenever a thing has parts, 
 the whole and all will mean all the parts ? 
 
 Theae. Certainly. 
 
 So. Again : to resume my late essay, if the syllable is 
 not the letters, does it not follow that it has not the 
 letters for its parts, or if it be the same with them, it must 
 be known equally with them ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Was it not to obviate this result that we defined it 
 to be different from them ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Well, if the letters are not parts of a syllable, have 
 you any other things to name, which are parts of a syllable, 
 besides its letters ? 
 
 Theae. By no means. For if I allowed it to have 
 
TRANSLATION. 217 
 
 parts, it would be ridiculous to abandon the letters, and 
 seek anything else. 
 
 So. Decidedly, Theaetetus, according to the present 
 view a syllable must be a single generality without parts. 
 
 Thcae. Seemingly. 
 
 So. Do you remember, my friend, that a short time 
 back we accepted the statement, deeming it a good 
 one, that of the primal elements, of which all things are 
 composed, there is no definition, because each by itself is 
 uncompounded, and that it is not right to apply to it the 
 term 'is,' nor yet 'this,' which are alien and foreign to it; 
 and this cause makes such element undefinable and un- 
 known ? 
 
 Theae. I remember. 
 
 So. Is there any other cause than this of its being 
 simple and indivisible ? I see no other. 
 
 Thcae. Apparently none. 
 
 So. Accordingly, the syllable is shown to belong to the 
 same class as the element, if it has no parts, and is one 
 general notion? 
 
 Thcae. Undoubtedly. 
 
 So. If then the syllable has many letters, and is a cer- 
 tain whole, and they are its parts, syllables and letters are 
 alike knowable and utterable, since 'all the parts' were 
 shown to be the same with the whole? 
 
 Theae. Assuredly. 
 
 So. But if it is one and indivisible, both syllable and 
 letter are equally undefinable and unknowable : for the 
 same cause will make them both so ? 
 
 Theae. I cannot contradict you. 
 
 So. Let us not accept this statement from anybody, 
 that a syllable can be known and expressed, but not a 
 letter. 
 
218 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Theae. We must not, if we concur with the argument. 
 
 So. Yet further : would you not rather accept the 
 opposite view, from knowing what happened to yourself 
 when you learnt to read ? 
 
 TJicae. What is that ? 
 
 ^S*^. That all you went on doing in the course of 
 learning was, to try to distinguish each individual letter as 
 you saw and heard it, that their order might not confuse 
 you when they were spoken and written. 
 
 Thcae. Very true. 
 
 So. And did not a complete instruction at your music- 
 master's mean the being able to follow each note, and 
 say what string answered to it? These everybody would 
 own to be properly called the elements of music. 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. So far then as we have experience of letters and 
 syllables, if from these cases we may draw inferences as to 
 others, we shall say that the class of elements admits of a 
 knowledge much clearer than the syllable, and more 
 important for the perfect mastery of each study; and, if 
 any one shall say that the syllable is naturally known, but 
 the element unknown, we shall think he is joking or 
 talking nonsense ? 
 
 Theae. Undoubtedly. 
 
 42 \_Rccurring to the third definition of hnoioledge proposed by Theaetctics 
 — true opinion with rational explanation (λόγοϊ) — Socrates noio 
 criticises this adjunct. What does it mean ? Three answers may 
 be given, (i) // may simply ?nean — speech. Well ; but all who are 
 not born deaf and dumb speak sooner or later ; and all trtie opinion 
 will carry speech with it : and so it can never be separate from knoiv- 
 ledge. (2) Ao7os may incan the power of describing anything by the 
 elements of zvhich it consists. Hcsiod says : ' a xvagon has a hiindred 
 
TRANSLATION. 219 
 
 planhs.^ But yoti mid /, says Socrates, cannot detail these: we 
 describe a wagon by certain known parts : axle, wheels, body, yoke, 
 <^c. Thus we have a right opinion about it: but, as we ca^inot 
 enumerate the elements, we have not the full knoivledge. Or again^ 
 ift the case of spelling : perhaps somebody can spell the name Theae- 
 tetiis quite correctly, having a true opinion about it, and being able 
 to enumerate its syllables correctly: but, whoi another name, TheO' 
 dor us, is 171 question, he is foutid to spell it wrongly {writiiig Te 
 for θε) This proves that his true opinion in the former instance 
 did not amount to knowledge : and thus again we find ' true opinion 
 with rational explanation ' to fall short of knowledge. '\ 
 
 So. Other proofs of this fact might be shewn, I 
 think ; but let us not for their sake forget to keep in view 
 the proposed topic, namely, what is meant by saying 
 that true opinion combined with rational explanation is 
 the most perfect knowledge. 
 
 Thcae. AVe must keep it in view. 
 
 So. Well now, what does the term explanation indicate 
 to us? I think it means one of three things. 
 
 Theae. What are they ? 
 
 So. The first will be — making one's meaning clear 
 through the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging opinion 
 in the stream through the voice as in a mirror or in 
 water. Do you not consider explanation to be something 
 of this sort ? 
 
 TJicae. I do. We say therefore that one who does so 
 explains. 
 
 So. This however is not everybody able to do sooner 
 or later, — to shew what he thinks about anything — if he is 
 not born deaf or dumb? and so all those who have any 
 right opinion, will appear to have Λvith it the faculty of 
 explanation, and right opinion will thus nowhere be formed 
 without knowledge. 
 
 Thcae. True. 
 
220 THEAETETUS, 
 
 So. Let us not however lightly pronounce sentence on 
 him who defined knowledge in the way we are now con- 
 sidering — that he is guilty of talking nonsense. Perhaps 
 he did not mean to say this, but rather the being able, 
 when asked what anything is, to make answer to the 
 questioner in terms of its elements. 
 
 TJieae. Instance what you mean, Socrates. 
 
 So. As Hesiod speaking of a wagon says, *A wagon 
 consists of a hundred planks.' I cannot describe them, 
 probably you cannot. If we were asked what a wagon is, 
 we should be content if we could say, wheels, axle, body, 
 seat, yoke. 
 
 Theae. Quite so. 
 
 So. The questioner might perhaps think us ridiculous, 
 as he would if being asked your name and making answer 
 by syllables, — while all we thought and said was right — 
 we deemed that as skilful grammarians we had in mind 
 and stated grammatically the definition of the name Theae- 
 tetus; though the fact is that nobody can define any- 
 thing with knowledge, until he fully describe it in its 
 elements with true opinion; as was before, I think, laid 
 down. 
 
 Theae. It was. 
 
 So. So too he might consider, with respect to a 
 wagon, that we have right opinion indeed, but' that one 
 who was able to detail its nature by those hundred planks, 
 had, through this addition, joined explanation to true 
 opinion, and instead of opinion had got technical know- 
 ledge about the nature of a wagon, having fully described 
 the whole in its elements. 
 
 Theae. Do you not think his opinion good, Socrates ? 
 
 So. If you think so, my friend, and accept this view, 
 that the full description of everything by its elements is 
 
TRANSLATION. 221 
 
 explanation, but the description by syllables or anything 
 more comprehensive is failure of explanation, tell me so, 
 that we may criticize it. 
 
 Theae. I quite accept that view. y 
 
 So. Do you accept it under the belief that a person is 
 cognisant of anything when he thinks that the same thing 
 sometimes belongs to the same, sometimes to another, or 
 when he thinks that to the same thing at one time one 
 thing belongs, at another time another ? 
 
 Theae. I believe nothing of the sort. 
 
 So. Do you forget that, when you learnt your letters 
 at first, you and the other scholars did such things ? 
 
 Theae. Do you mean that we thought first one letter, 
 then another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we 
 assigned the same letter sometimes to its proper syllable, 
 sometimes to another? 
 
 So. That is what I mean. 
 
 Theae. No, I do not forget ; nor do I consider 
 that they who are in this condition have yet acquired 
 knowledge. 
 
 So. Well, when a child of that age writing ' Theaetetus,' 
 thinks he ought to write, and does write 'theta' and 
 * epsilon,' and again attempting to write Theodorus thinks 
 he ought to write and does write 'tau' and * epsilon,' 
 shall Λve say that he knoAvs the first syllable of your 
 names ? 
 
 Theae. It has been just allowed that such an one does 
 not yet know. 
 
 So. Is there anything to hinder the same child from 
 making a similar error in respect of the second, third, and 
 fourth syllables ? 
 
 Theae. Nothing at all. 
 
 So. Will one who has in mind the description by 
 
222 THEAETETUS. 
 
 elements write ' Theaetetus ' with true opinion, whensoever 
 he writes it in just order ? 
 
 Theae. Evidently. 
 
 So. Being still without knowledge, though having right 
 opinion, do we say? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And yet he unites explanation with right opinion : 
 for he wrote that description by elements which we admitted 
 to be rational explanation? 
 
 Theae. True. 
 
 So. And thus, my friend, there is a right opinion with 
 explanation, which we cannot yet call knowledge. 
 
 Theae, Apparently. 
 
 43 \Thcre remains (3) a third meaning of X07os, "viz. a mark of difference 
 by ivhich anything is shewn to be distinct from evejything else. It 
 is said that, while yotc perceive only those features which the thing 
 has in common tvith others, yon have trice opinion of it only : but 
 ihat, zuhcn yotc add those which are pecicliar to it and characteristic, 
 then yon have the knowledge of it. Socrates proves this to be falla- 
 cioccs. You have not a trice opinion aboict anybody or anything^ 
 tcntil yon are cognisant of the peculiarities in yotcr object. Hence it 
 folloxos that stcch a Xoyos is already included in trtce opinion, and 
 thai, if an adjunct to this, it is merely sccperfluous and absurd. So 
 then, says Socrates, all oicr three attempts to defijie knowledge have 
 failed. Have you any other conception, Theaetetus ? No, says the 
 youth: yo7i have already helped me to say much more than was in my 
 own mind.'\ 
 
 So. So we seem only to have dreamt we were rich in 
 thinking we had the truest explanation of knowledge. Or 
 must we suspend this charge? Somebody, perhaps, will 
 not define ' exj^lanation ' thus : but rather as the remaining 
 form of those three, one or other of which we said would 
 
TRANSLA TION. 223 
 
 be taken as ' explanation/ by one who defined knowledge 
 to be ' true opinion with explanation.' 
 
 Theae. You justly remind me. There was one form 
 left. The first Λvas the image, a s jt were, of thought in 
 utterance: the second, now discussed, was the road to the 
 whole through the elements. What do you call the 
 third ? 
 
 So. That which most people wOuld define as being 
 able to mention some sign by which the thing in question 
 differs from all others. 
 
 Theae. Can you give me an instance of any such ex- 
 planation of anything } 
 
 So. Yes, one which, if you like, I think you may com- 
 petently accept concerning the sun, that it is the brightest 
 of the bodies which travel in the heaven round the earth. 
 
 Theae. Certainly. 
 
 So. Now learn why this is said. The fact is, as we 
 were lately saying, that, if you take the difterence between 
 each individual and all others, you will get a definition, as 
 some say : but, as long as you lay hold of some common 
 feature only, your account will be about those things Avhich 
 have that community. 
 
 Theae. I understand. And I think it right to call such 
 a process definition. 
 
 So. But \vhosoever with right opinion about any thing 
 learns furthermore its difference from others, will have gained 
 knowledge of that of which before he had opinion. 
 , Theae. Yes, we state it so. 
 
 So. Now then most decidedly, Theaetetus, since I have 
 come near to our proposition, as it were to a drawing, 
 I do not understand it in the least. As long as I stood 
 at a distance from it, there appeared to be some sense 
 in it 
 
224 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Thcae. What do you mean by this ? 
 
 So. I will tell you, if I can. Having a right opinion 
 of you, if I add to this your definition, I kno\v you ; if not, 
 I have opinion of you only. 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. And the definition was the interpretation of your 
 distinction. 
 
 Theae. Even so. 
 
 So. When I was opining only, was it not the case that 
 I did not grasp with my mind any of the points in which 
 you differ from others ? 
 
 Theae. Seemingly. 
 
 So. Then I was taking note of some of the common 
 features, which belong no more to you than to other 
 people ? 
 
 Theae. Of course. 
 
 So. Now do pray tell me : in such a case how will 
 you more than anybody else have been conceived by me? 
 Suppose me to imagine that this is Theaetetus, whoever 
 is a man, and has a nose and eyes and mouth, and any 
 other individual member. Will this imagination cause me 
 to conceive Theaetetus more than Theodorus, or, pro- 
 verbially speaking, any rapscallion whatever ? 
 
 Theae. How can it? 
 
 So. Or, if I imagine him having not only nose and 
 eyes, but also as the one who has a flat nose and prominent 
 eyes, shall I have a notion of you more than of myself, or 
 of any other with these features ? 
 
 Theae. No. 
 
 So. Theaetetus, I fancy, will not be conceived in my 
 mind until this flatness of nose shall have stamped and de- 
 posited in my heart some memorial different from all other 
 snubnesses of nose seen by me (I might say the same of all 
 
TRANSLATION, 225 
 
 your other features), which shall bring you to my mind, if I 
 meet you to-morrow, and make me to have right opinion 
 about you. 
 
 T/ieae. Most true. 
 
 So. Right opinion then in each case will be concerned 
 with differentiation. 
 
 Theae. Evidently. 
 
 So. AVliat then Λνϋΐ be ' the adding explanation to right 
 opinion ?' For if it means, to add an opinion of the manner 
 in which one thing differs from all others, this direction 
 becomes utterly ridiculous. 
 
 Theae. How? 
 
 So. Of things whereof we have a right opinion as to the 
 nature of their difference from others, it bids us add a right 
 opinion of the nature of their difference from others. And 
 thus the proverbial twirl of the scytal or the pestle or any- 
 thing else would be a mere trifle compared with this direction : 
 nay it might more fairly be called a blind man's direction : 
 for to bid us add what we have got already, that Ave may 
 learn what we think already, is a splendid illustration of a 
 man groping in the dark. 
 
 Theae. Tell me now what answer you meant to give to 
 your last question. 
 
 So. If bidding us to add explanation is bidding us to 
 know distinction, — not to have an opinion of distinction — 
 the finest of our definitions of knowledge will turn out to be 
 a nice sort of thing. For to know is, I suppose, to get 
 knowledge. Is it not ? 
 
 Theae. Yes. 
 
 So. Then, if asked, it seems, what knowledge is, a 
 person will reply that it is right opinion Avith a knowledge 
 of difference ; for the addition of explanation will mean this 
 in his view. 
 
 K. P. 15 
 
226 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Theae. Seemingly. 
 
 So. Yet it is utterly silly, when we are seeking know- 
 ledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge whether 
 of difference or of anything else. So, Theaetetus, neither 
 sensible perception, nor true opinion, nor explanation ac- 
 companying true opinion will be knowledge. 
 
 Theae. Seemingly not. 
 
 So. Do we still conceive anything and feel throes, my 
 friend, about knowledge, or have we given birth to every- 
 thing ? 
 
 Theae. By all that's sacred, Socrates, with your help I 
 have said more than I had in my own mind. 
 
 So. And does not our art declare that all these products 
 have turned out to be wind, and not worth rearing? 
 
 Theae. Decidedly so. 
 
 44 [ Well, Theactdus, says Socrates in conchision, the discussion of to-day 
 will have done yon good scwice in every way. You imll cease to 
 think yojc know things which you do not k7ioiu, and your future 
 conceptions will be consequently truer. Also you will be a more 
 amiable coinpajiiojt, more willing to tolerate the mistakes of other 
 disputants. I must noiv leave you, to keep an appointment with my 
 accuser Illelitus. To-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again."] 
 
 So. Well, Theaetetus, if you seek to become, and do 
 become, pregnant Avith other thoughts hereafter, the present 
 enquiry will have improved your conceptions ; and, if you 
 do not, you will be less severe to your associates, more 
 mild and temperate, not supposing that you know what 
 you do not know. So much only as this my art can do, no 
 more. Nor do I know any of the things which others 
 do, who are — and have made themselves — great and 
 
TRANSLATION. 227 
 
 wondrous men. This midwifery I and my mother received 
 as our function from God, she to practise it on women, I 
 on young, noble and beautiful men. 
 
 Now, however, I , must encounter IMclitus and his in- 
 dictment against me at the Porch of the King\ In the 
 morning, Theodorus, let us meet again here. 
 
 4.4 1 The indictment against Socrates for impiety was brought by his 
 accusers Anytus and MeUtus in the court of the άρχων βασιΚ^ΰί, situated 
 at the στόα thence called βασιλική, the Porch of the King. 
 
APPENDED NOTES. 
 
 \The references are {\) to chapters in translation ; (2) to pages in text and 
 translation ; (3) to pages in Ed. I. of Stephens, as sheiOn in margin 
 of text ^ 
 
 5 pp. 10, 109. St. 147. D. Trept δυνα/χ€ωι/ τι ημίν Θεό- 
 δωρο? οδε έγραφε, τη'ς τε τρίποΒοζ Tripi καΧ ττει/τεττοδος αττοφαι- 
 νων OTL μ-ηκζί ου ένμμ.€τροί τύ} ττοδιαια, 'Theodoriis was descri- 
 bing to US something about powers, proving as to the root 
 of 3 and root of 5, that they are not in length commensur- 
 able with the foot-unit:' i.e. shewing that ^3 is greater than 
 I and less than 2, and that J^ is greater than 2 and less 
 than 3; that therefore they do not contain unity so many 
 times; that they are fractions, not integers. With ττοδιαια 
 understand ypa/x/xry. 
 
 H. Schmidt in his Exegetic Commentary tries to shew 
 that what Theodorus taught was a corollary to the Pythago- 
 rean Theorem (Euclid i. 47); that Βννάμας mean the powers 
 a", If &c. as in modern algebra, and that ττοδίαια here is a 
 unit scjuare a"., by which the squares of a series of hypote- 
 nuses of right-angled triangles, having for their kathetcs a 
 and the foregoing hypotenuse, are all commensurable: since 
 
 1.3—;} 
 
230 ^ THEAETETUS. 
 
 b" = 2i7", c^ = 3^", d" = 4a", &c. Theodorus may have taught 
 this truth, but it is certainly not introduced here, as the 
 Avord μηκ€ί proves, shewing ττοδιαια to be the Hnear foot-unit. 
 And that ^ννάμα^ mean roots, not the modern 'powers,' is 
 clear from what follows 148 a, οσαι Se τον ίτ€ρομηκη, Βννάμζίς, 
 ώ? μηκ€ί μίν ον ζνμμέτρον? eKCtVatg, το2<: δ' εττιττεδοι? ά δύνανται, 
 i.e. \/3, n/s &C. are called 'powers,' because they have 
 power^ when squared, to form areas which are commensur- 
 able with the squares 4, 9, 16, 25, &c. So Professors 
 Jowett and Campbell. 
 8 PP• 15» 116. St. 151 E. ov 4'λ€γ€ καΐ Πρωταγόρα?. 
 
 The words in which Plato recites the famous doctrine of 
 Protagoras on the relativity of knowledge (μέτρον άνθρωπος, 
 homo mensura) are probably cited from that philosopher's 
 treatise called Άληθ^ια, Truth. But the identification of it 
 with the suggestion of Theaetetus that knowledge is 
 sensuous perception, I suppose with Grote, (Plato, 11. p. 323 
 note) to be Plato's own view, which Grote considers 
 unjust, contending at some length against it (322 — 336). 
 His main argument is, that implication of object and sub- 
 ject is universal, affecting Noumena as well as Phaenomena: 
 'cogitata' suppose a 'cogitans,' as much as 'sensibilia' 
 suppose a 'sentiens.* Therefore Protagoras^ would not have 
 limited the application of his maxim to αίσθησις' alone. We 
 must concur with Grote in lamenting that we get the statements 
 and arguments of Protagoras at second hand only ; and that 
 the views of others, as of Heracleitus and his great opponent 
 Parmenides, are known to us only in fragments and citations, 
 and from the late biographies of Diogenes Laertius. 
 
 pp. 16, 117. St. 152 A. "Ανθρωττος δε συ τ€ κάγω; 
 Socrates means : as Protagoras applies his doctrine to man 
 generally, he applies it to you and me, seeing that we are 
 men. 
 
APPENDED NOTES. 231 
 
 pp. 1 6, 117. St. 152 B.C. By the illustration here used 
 Socrates proves that the maxim of Protagoras means that 
 what appears to any one 'is' to him: and, as appearance 
 implies perception, it follows that perception is knowledge. 
 
 pp. 16, 118. St. 152 C. "Ap ovv K.T.X. Why this out- 
 burst? Socrates has just drawn from Theaetetus the ad- 
 mission that αίσθησις τον οντος Ιστί, perception is of the 
 existent, of that which 'is.' But the Heracleitean doctrine 
 does not allow that anything 'is' {Ιστί) but says that all 
 things yiyvcTai 'come to be.' And Protagoras in his 'Κλψ 
 6ua adopts this: so we must infer from what follows. What? 
 says Socrates: did Protagoras then teach an obscure exoteric 
 doctrine (ryrt^aro) to the multitude, and tell the truth in 
 esoteric confidence (eV αττορβητω Ιλεγεν) to his disciples? 
 Did he teach the one to believe in οντά, the others in 
 nothing but ytyvo/xeva? λίνίττ^σθαι, 'to speak in riddles,' is 
 used of obscure or purposely veiled language. That Plato 
 considered the doctrines which now follow to be involved 
 in the teaching of Protagoras, is evident; indeed he dis- 
 tincdy says so; nor can we doubt that he had foundation 
 for his statement in the writings of that sophist. But it is 
 evident also that he does not here quote his precise words: 
 and it must always be doubtful how far Protagoras was com- 
 mitted to all the refinements of the Heracleitean school, 
 which appear in the next passage and afterwards. 
 
 pp. 17, 119. The Platonic complication of the three 
 doctrines (i) the Heracleitean {oXov ρεύματα κίν{ίσ6α.ί τα 
 παι/τα) (2) the Protagorean (ττάι/των χρημάτων avOpomov μίτρον 
 ίΐναι) and that put forth by Theaetetus {αίσθησιν Ιτηστημην 
 -γίγνζσθαι) is summarised below, 15, pp. a 8, 135. The fol- 
 lowing observations of Grotc (Plato, 11. p. 324) deserve 
 special attention, and supply a valuable key to the difficulties 
 occurring in Plato's treatment of this subject from 9 to 15 
 
232 THEAETETUS. 
 
 and again from 15 to 30, where the definition αίσθησις is 
 finally abandoned. 'Upon all the three opinions, thus 
 represented as cognate or identical, Sokrates bestows a 
 
 lengthened comment (occupying a half of the dialogue) 
 
 His strictures are not always easy to follow with assurance, 
 because he often passes with little notice from one to the 
 other of the three doctrines which he is examining : because 
 he himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to 
 take them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: 
 and further because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his 
 own, he sometimes leaves us in doubt what is his real 
 purpose — whether to expound or to deride the opinions 
 of others — whether to enlighten Theaetetus, or to test his 
 power of detecting fallacies. We cannot always distinguish 
 between the ironical and the serious. Lastly, it is a still 
 greater difficulty that Λve have not before us any one of the 
 three opinions as set forth by their proper supporters.' 
 12 pp• 21, 125. St. 155 E. των α/χυτ/των. Prof Camp- 
 bell in his learned Introduction to this dialogue ex- 
 amines at large the question, who are the men whom 
 Plato glances at here in such uncomplimentary language. 
 Plad he in mind Antisthenes and the Cynics? or Demo- 
 critus and the Atomists ? If Plato had either of these two 
 schools in view, it seems more probable that these were 
 the followers of Democritus. The -γηγενείς mentioned in 
 the Sophistes (p. 246 &c.) are evidently the same as the 
 σκληροί και αντίτνποι (ευ μάΧ αμονσοΐ) in this place. See 
 Camj^ell, pp. xx, xxx. 
 
 pp. 22, 126. St. 156 D. I must retract the partial 
 favour which my notes in the text and translation shew to 
 the interpolated words of Cornarius. I find the view taken 
 by Prof. Campbell and Prof Jowett supported also by 
 H. Schmidt (though Miiller in his German translation 
 
APPENDED NOTES, 233 
 
 renders the words of Cornarius, and Steinhart does not 
 contradict him) : to which authorities I have to add an 
 opinion which I highly value, that of my friend and former 
 pupil T^Ir R. D. Archer-Hind, Fellow of Trinity College, 
 Cambridge. I had never felt disposed to follow Bekker 
 in printing the passage as an unquestioned portion of the 
 text; yet I hardly know that I regret having given my 
 readers the opportunity of seeing and estimating that which 
 conciliated the favour of so many eminent scholars. I\Iy 
 own judgment in a case of this kind I regard as of little or 
 no value. 
 
 20 PP• 35, 144. St. 166 A. Socrates, who up to this 
 point has seemed to play with the doctrine of his intended 
 victim Protagoras, as a cat with a wretched mouse, some- 
 times expounding and apparently supporting it, but only 
 to strike it immediately with a harder blow, now professes 
 to make a formal defence of it in the name of its author, 
 for the express purpose of obliging Theodorus to take 
 his turn in the dialogue, instead of Theaetetus, and submit 
 to an elenchus, in defence of his old friend Protagoras. 
 Toi/ Ιμλ is an assumption of dignity : ' a man like me.' 
 
 26 pp. 52, 166. St. 179 A. if he had tried... a man's 
 own self.' In this translation we follow the reading et τη; 
 Tors σννόντο.% ίτταθζν instead of the vulgate cZ μή. Prof. 
 Campbell, though he keeps ct μη in the text, accepts 
 emendation in his note, but prefers el Srj. I can have 
 no doubt that αντος must not be referred to Protagoras 
 by reading αΰτω after it, but that the sense must be as I 
 have given it, αυτός αντω, 'a man's own self^ So Prof. 
 Jowett (who also reads δτ;) * a'ery one for htmsclf 
 
 28 pp. 56, 172. St. 182 B. αλλ' c^ άμφοτίρων κ.τ.λ. 
 
 The meaning of this passage can be none other than what 
 is given in my translation, which is the same as I'rof. 
 
234 THEAETETUS. 
 
 Jowett's in effect. But how the Greek construction is to 
 be explained is doubtful. Prof. Campbell's note gives very- 
 faint assistance, and neither Heindorfs Ιαυτών for άμ^φοτί- 
 ρων, nor α7Γοτικτό/χ€ΐ/α for άττοτίκτοντα, fully satisfy. All we 
 can say of the place is — medicam manum expectat. 
 
 38 pp. 82, 209. St. 201, C. It is commonly supposed that 
 the words €ΐπόντος τον άκουσας refer to Antisthenes. 
 
 44 As respects the definition of knowledge, this dialogue 
 only arrives at certain negative conclusions; namely, that 
 knowledge is neither perception, nor true opinion, nor 
 true opinion combined with rational explanation. Yet, in 
 the course of it, Plato has achieved certain objects, which 
 he had in mind, and which he valued. For (i) he has paid 
 a debt of gratitude to his Megarian friends and hosts, 
 Eucleides and Terpsion ; (2) he has shewn what he after- 
 wards declared by his inscription on the Academy, μηΒίΙς 
 αγ€ωμ,ζτρητοζ άσίτω, that mathematical studies (i.e. exact 
 science) are a necessary avenue to mental studies (i.e. to 
 transcendental or abstract science) ; (3) he has shewn that 
 minds capable of pursuing the former with success are 
 not necessarily capable of mastering the latter : this he 
 indicates by the nature of Theodorus, which is unphilo- 
 sophic, as compared with that of Theaetetus, who is an apt 
 student of philosophy ; (4) he has confuted doctrines (Pro- 
 tagorean and Heracleitean), which he considers erroneous 
 and mischievous, and has exhibited the errors of the great 
 leader of that sophistic band, which he had, from his 
 master Socrates, a mission to combat and defeat; (5) he 
 has found a noble opportunity to develope those moral and 
 political doctrines, as to the struggle of philosophic truth 
 against fallacious rhetoric, which he mooted in the Gorgias, 
 and developed more fully in the Republic at a later 
 time j (6) he does achieve a positive result by the victorious 
 
APPENDED NOTES. 
 
 ZOJ 
 
 assertion of a central seat of thought, to which all percep- 
 tions are conveyed, and so converted into ideas : this is 
 ί/α;χ77, the soul of man. The subsequent elenchi, which 
 confute the second and third definitions attempted by 
 Theodorus, seem to me little more than gladiatorial word- 
 fights, intended by Plato to exercise and display the dia- 
 lectic skill Avhich he liad acquired at Megara, and at the 
 same time to amuse and puzzle the minds of his readers 
 by the parables or myths of the waxen tablet and the dove- 
 cage. But he may have had more serious aims in these 
 elenchi than are obvious to my mind. 
 
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