BBDH 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS 
 
 COMPILED FKOM 
 
 PROF. JOWETT'S TRANSLATION 
 
 OF 
 
 DIALOGUES OF PLATO 
 
 BT 
 
 REV. C. H. A. BULKLEY, A. M. 
 
 PKOFE8SOK IN FAITH TRAINING COLLEGE, BOSTON, MAM. 
 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 JRIBNER, ARMSTRONG, AND COMPANY 
 1876 
 

 COPYRIGHT, 1876, 
 BY SCRIBXER, ARMSTRONG, AND- COMPANY. 
 
 RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE: 
 
 STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BT 
 H. 0. HOtJOHTON AND COMPANY. 
 
To 
 
 PROFESSOR JOWETT, 
 
 WHOSE SCHOLARSHIP IS UNEXCELLED IN EITHER HEMISPHERE, 
 AND WHO PREEMINENTLY MERITS 
 
 THE TITLE OF 
 " PLATO'S INTERPRETER," 
 
 Cfltis Folumt, 
 
 THE GATHERED FRUIT OF HIS TOIL, 
 
 IS RESPECTFULLY 
 
 DEDICATED. 
 
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON, in his Essay on Books, writes thus: Of Plato I 
 hesitate to speak, lest there should be no end. You find in him that which you 
 have already found in Homer, now ripened to thought, the poet converted to a 
 philosopher, with loftier strains of musical wisdom than Homer reached; as if 
 Homer were the youth, and Plato the finished man; yet with no less security of bold 
 and perfect song, when he cares to use it, and with some harp-strings fetched 
 from a higher heaven. He contains the future, as he came out of the past. In 
 Plato, you explore modern Europe in its causes and seed, all that in thought 
 which the history of Europe embodies or has yet to embody. The well-informed 
 man finds himself anticipated, Plato is up with him too. Nothing has escaped 
 him. Every new crop in the fertile harvest of reform, every fresh suggestion of 
 modern humanity is there. If the student wish to see both sides, and justice done 
 to the man of the world, pitiless exposure of pedants, and the supremacy of truth 
 and the religious sentiment, he shall be contented also. Why should not young 
 men be educated on this book ? It would suffice for the tuition of the race, to test 
 their understanding and to express their reason. Here is that which is so attractive 
 to all men, the literature of aristocracy shall I call it? the picture of the best 
 persons, sentiments, and manners, by the first master, in the best times^.. portraits 
 of Pericles, Alcibiades, Crito, Prodicus, Protagoras, Anaxagoras, and Socrates, with 
 the lovely background of the Athenian and suburban landscape, or, who can over- 
 estimate the images with which Plato has enriched the minds of men, and which pass 
 like bullion in the currency of all Nations ? Read the Phsedo,' the Protagoras,' 
 the Phsedrus,' the Timseus,' the Republic, and the Apology of Socrates.' " 
 
CJNJ V'KUSITt 
 
 CALI] 
 
 INTRODUCTION". 
 
 BY THE COMPILER. 
 
 THE late Dr. Nott, who, for so many years, was the efficient 
 President of Union College, is said to have remarked that, " a 
 professional man especially a clergyman needed to be 
 familiar with but three books, namely the Bible, Butler's 
 Analogy, and Shakespeare." To complete the circle, he might 
 have added Plato. With his dialectic skill, universality of 
 thought, subtle philosophy and purity of style, every scholar 
 and thinker should familiarize himself. Their influence on 
 all one's mental processes cannot fail to be stimulating and 
 strengthening. 
 
 Few readers of the Greek, however, in this land, are suffi- 
 ciently versed in that language to read Plato's original with 
 much freedom and pleasure. Fewer professional men, in our 
 age of active toil, have the time and opportunity even, to pe- 
 ruse throughout, the admirable translation of Prof. Jowett. 
 Nevertheless, every thoughtful man and even ordinary 
 readers may desire to reap the benefits of such a work, and 
 become somewhat acquainted with the -best thoughts of the 
 great Greek Philosopher. The present volume has been un- 
 dertaken with this design. It presents, in the most accessible 
 form, the wide range of subjects upon which Plato dwells, and 
 exhibits him in all his varied aspects of philosopher, moralist, 
 socialist, logician, rhetorician, scientist, and critic. The ex- 
 tracts here given have been carefully collated, so as to be 
 unique and integral in thought. A few of the discussions, 
 however, may seem to end somewhat abruptly, as could 
 
vi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 scarcely be avoided when taken from the midst of a prolonged 
 dialogue. 
 
 These quotations are not to be regarded as giving, in every 
 case, the proper views of Plato, or even of Socrates. Other 
 characters, opposed and refuted, are made to speak. Their 
 words are here given to be read and received as germs of 
 thought, and stimulants to inquiry in the reader, even as they 
 were first written by Plato, rather than as expressions of his 
 own opinions. 
 
 Many fine passages have been necessarily omitted with re- 
 gret, because their introduction here would swell this volume 
 beyond the dimensions designed for the ordinary reader. 
 Every theme, therefore, upon which Plato dilates, has not 
 been' presented in full. But there has been such a selection as 
 may give the reader a fair idea of his diversity of thought. 
 
 While those who are able to purchase, and desirous to pe- 
 ruse the complete translation of Prof. Jowett, will doubtless do 
 this, yet there are many others to whom this volume will be 
 welcome as giving them the finest wheat of Plato in a ready, 
 readable form, at a moderate rate. Even the possessor and 
 reader of the fuller work may be glad to have with him a com- 
 pendium of Platonic thought so available, because alphabet- 
 ical, for cursory perusal and casual quotation. 
 
 It is hoped, at least, by the compiler, that these limited 
 morsels of Plato's Hymettian honey will excite the desire for 
 a fuller feast from the rich banquet which Prof. Jowett has so 
 laboriously and sumptuously provided for those who relish true 
 thought and elegant language, whether coming from ancient or 
 modern thinkers. 
 
 The design at first was to interweave the choicest para- 
 graphs of this Translator from his learned and thoughtful 
 Introductions, but it was found that this would have made too 
 large a book. Those who desire to enter Plato's temple of 
 thought with the clearest comprehension of his master-mind, 
 should pass through the grand gateways which this eminent 
 English scholar has erected 
 
INTRODUCTION. vii 
 
 These interpretations of the great Greek thinker, are 
 tial to the full understanding of his ideas. Meanwhile, those 
 who cannot yet reach the head-waters of such mental invigora- 
 tion, may refresh themselves with the limited draughts of 
 Plato's lore, herein bottled up for them, from his perennial 
 springs of thought. C. H. A. B. 
 
PUBLISHER'S NOTE. 
 
 This volume was originally prepared from the American edi- 
 tion, to which the references with each extract are made. 
 Every page of it, however, has since then been carefully 
 compared with and corrected by Prof. Jowett's latest and im- 
 proved issue. 
 
LIFOI 
 
 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Ability and strength, difference between. 
 
 Socrates, When you asked me, I certainly did say that 
 
 the courageous are the confident ; but I was not asked whether 
 the confident are the courageous ; for if you had asked me that, 
 I should have answered, " Not all of them : " and what I did 
 answer you have not disproved, although you proceed to show 
 that those who have knowledge are more courageous than they 
 were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than 
 others who have no knowledge ; and this makes you think that 
 courage is the same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing 
 you might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You 
 might begin by asking whether the strong are able, and I 
 should say, " Yes : " and then whether those who know how to 
 wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those who do not 
 know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had 
 learned, and I should assent. And when I had admitted this, 
 you might use my admissions in such a way as to prove that 
 upon my view wisdom is strength ; whereas in that case I 
 should not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the 
 able are strong, although I have admitted that the strong are 
 able. For there is a difference between ability and strength ; 
 the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage, 
 but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body. 
 And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they 
 are not the same ; and J argue that the courageous are confi- 
 dent, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may 
 be given to men by art, and also, like ability, by madness and 
 rage ; but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy 
 state of the soul. Protagoras, i. 150. 
 
10 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Absolute, the. 
 
 Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice? 
 
 Assuredly there is. 
 
 And an absolute beauty and absolute good ? 
 
 Of course. 
 
 But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes? 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense ? 
 (and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and 
 health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of 
 everything). Has the reality of them ever been perceived by 
 you through the bodily organs ? or rather, is not the nearest 
 approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by 
 him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most 
 exact conception of the essence of that which he considers ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And he attains to . the purest knowledge of them who goes 
 to each of them with the mind alone, not allowing when in the 
 act of thought the intrusion or introduction of sight or any 
 other sense in the company of reason, but with the very light 
 of the mind in her clearness searches into the very truth of 
 each ; he has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and of 
 the whole body, which he conceives of only as a disturbing 
 element, hindering the soul from the acquisition of truth and 
 knowledge when in company with her is not this the sort of 
 man who, if any man, is likely to attain to the knowledge of true 
 being? Phaedo, i. 391. 
 Absolute knowledge in God. 
 
 Would you, or would you not, say that absolute knowl- 
 edge, if there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowl- 
 edge than our knowledge, and the same of beauty and of all 
 other things ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute 
 knowledge no one is more likely than God to have this most 
 exact knowledge ? 
 Certainly. 
 
 But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a 
 knowledge of human things ? 
 Why not? 
 
 Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that 
 the ideas are not relative to human things, nor human things 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 11 
 
 to them ; the relations of either are in their respective 
 spheres. 
 
 Y-s, that has been admitted. 
 
 And if God has this perfect authority, perfect knowledge, 
 his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or 
 any human thing ; just as our authority does not extend to the 
 gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by 
 parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters ; neither 
 do they know the things of men. 
 
 Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is 
 monstrous. 
 
 These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a 
 few, of the difficulties which arise on the hypothesis that there 
 are ideas of things and that each idea is an absolute and de- 
 terminate unity ; they will lead him who is told of them to 
 doubt the very existence of ideas he will say that even if they 
 do exist they must of necessity be unknown to man ; and he 
 will seem to have reason on his side ; and as we were re- 
 marking just now, will be very difficult to convince ; a man 
 must be a man of very considerable ability before he can learn 
 that everything has a class and an absolute essence ; and still 
 more remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for 
 himself, and can teach another to understand them thoroughly. 
 Parmenides, iii. 252. 
 Abstract ideas. See Ideas, abstract. 
 ^-Achilles ; his self-sacrifice. 
 
 Now Achilles was quite aware, for he had been told by 
 
 his mother, that he might avoid death and return home, and 
 live to a good old age, if he abstained from slaying Hector. 
 Nevertheless he gave his life to revenge bis friend, and dared 
 to die, not only on his behalf, but after his death. Where- 
 fore the gods honored him even above Alcestis, and sent him 
 to the Islands of the Blest. These are my reasons for affirm- 
 ing that Love is the eldest and noblest and mightiest of the 
 gods,, and the chief est author and giver of virtue, in life and 
 of happiness after death. The Symposium, i. 475. 
 Achilles; condemned. 
 
 Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved 
 
 or regarded as having given his pupil good counsel when he told 
 him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them ; 
 but that without a gift he should not be reconciled to them. 
 Neither will we believe or allow Achilles himself to have been 
 
12 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts, or 
 required a price as the ransom of the dead. 
 
 Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which ought 
 to be approved. 
 
 Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say what I must 
 say, nevertheless, that in speaking thus of Achilles, or in believ- 
 ing these words when spoken of him by others, there is down- 
 right impiety. As little can I credit the narrative of his inso- 
 lence to Apollo, where he says, 
 
 " Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of dei- 
 ties. Verily I would be even with thee, if I had only the power ; " 
 
 or his insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is 
 ready to lay hands; or the dedication to the dead Patroclus 
 of his own hair, which had been previously dedicated to the 
 other river-god Spercheius ; or his dragging Hector round the 
 tomb of Patroclus, and his slaughter of the captives at the 
 pyre ; of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more 
 than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, Cheiron's pupil, 
 the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of 
 men and third in descent from Zeus, was in such rare perturba- 
 tion of mind as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly 
 inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, com- 
 bined with overwhelming contempt of gods and men. The 
 Republic, ii. 214. 
 
 Actual and Ideal. See State, actual. 
 Adulterations. See Oaths. 
 
 Advocate, Art of the, corrupting the State, See State, etc. 
 Affections ; opposing. 
 
 Aih. Each one of us has in his bosom two counselors, 
 
 both foolish and also antagonistic ; of which, the one we call 
 pleasure and the other pain. 
 
 Gle. True. 
 
 Aih. Also there are opinions about the future, which have 
 the general name of expectations ; and the specific name of 
 fear, when the expectation is of pain ; and of hope, when of 
 pleasure ; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil 
 of them, and this when embodied in a decree by the State, is 
 called Law. 
 
 Gle. I am hardly able to follow you ; proceed, however, as 
 if I were. 
 
 Meg. I am in the like case. 
 
 Ath. Let us look at the matter in this way : May we not 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 13 
 
 regard every living being as a puppet of the gods, either their 
 plaything only, or created with a purpose which of the two 
 we cannot certainly know ? But this we know, that these affec- 
 tions in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and 
 opposite ways, and to opposite actions ; and herein lies the dif- 
 ference between virtue and vice. According to the argument 
 there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp, 
 and never let go but to pull with it against all the rest ; and this 
 is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the com- 
 mon law of the state ; there are others which are hard and of 
 iron, but this is soft because golden; and there are several 
 other kinds. Now we ought always to cooperate with the lead 
 of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beauti- 
 ful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have min- 
 isters in orderto help the golden principle in vanquishing the 
 other principles. And thus the moral of the tale about our 
 being puppets will not be lost, and the meaning of the expres- 
 sion " superior or inferior to a man's self " will become clearer ; 
 as also that in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, 
 cities as well as individuals should live according to reason ; 
 which the individual attains in himself, and the city receives 
 from some god, or from the legislator ; and makes it her law 
 in her dealings with herself and with other states. In this way 
 virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. And 
 when they have become clearer, education and other institu- 
 tions will in like manner become clearer. Laws, iv. 175. 
 Age ; its evil and its good. 
 
 I find that at my time of life, as the pleasures and de- 
 lights of the body fade away, the love of discourse grows upon 
 me. I only wish that you would come oftener, and be with 
 your young friends here, and make yourself altogether at home 
 with us. 
 
 I replied : There is nothing which I like better, Cephalus, 
 than conversing with aged men like yourself; for I regard 
 them as travelers who have gone a journey which I too may 
 have to go, and of whom I ought. to inquire, whether the way is 
 smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a ques- 
 tion which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at 
 that time which the poets call the " threshold of old age," 
 Is life harder towards the end, or what report do you give 
 of it? 
 
 I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. 
 
14 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Old men flock together ; they are birds of. a feather, as the 
 proverb says ; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance 
 commonly is I cannot eat, I cannot drink ; the pleasures of 
 youth and love are fled away : there was a good time once, 
 but that is gone, and now life is no longer life. Some of 
 them lament over the slights which are put upon them by 
 relations, and then they tell you plaintively of how many 
 evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, they 
 seem to blame what is not to blame ; for if old age were the 
 cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have 
 felt the same. Such however is not my experience, nor that 
 of others whom I have known. How well I remember the 
 Mged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How 
 does love suit with age, Sophocles, are you still the man 
 you were ? Peace, he replied ; most gladly have I escaped 
 that, and I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious 
 master. His words have often come into my mind since, and 
 they seem to me still as good as at the time when I first heard 
 them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and 
 freedom ; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles 
 says, you have escaped from the control not of one mad master 
 only, but of many. And of these regrets, as well as of the 
 complaint about relations, Socrates, the cause is to be sought, 
 not in men's ages, but in their characters and tempers ; for he 
 who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure 
 of age, but he who is of an opposite disposition will find youth 
 and age equally a burden. The Republic, ii. 149. 
 Age, poverty and riches in. See Poverty. 
 Age, love in old. See Ibycus. 
 Age, as viewing eternity. 
 
 \ Let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks him- 
 self to be near death he has fears and cares which never entered 
 into his mind before ; the tales of a life below and the punish- 
 ment which is exacted there of deeds done here were a laughing 
 matter to him once, but now he is haunted with the thought that 
 they may be true : either because of the feebleness of age, or from 
 the nearness of the prospect, he seems to have a clearer view of 
 the other world ; suspicions and alarms crowd upon him, and he 
 begins to reckon up in his own mind what wrongs he has done 
 to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgres- 
 sions is great, he will many a time like a child start up in his 
 sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 15 
 
 him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charm- 
 ingly says, is the kind nurse of age : 
 
 " Hope," as he says, " cherishes the soul of him who lives in holi- 
 ness and righteousness, and is the nurse of his age and the com- 
 panion of his journey ; hope, which is mightiest to sway the rest- 
 less soul of man." 
 
 How admirable his words are ! The Republic, ii. 151. 
 Age, Philosophy in. See Philosophy, etc. 
 Age; learning in. 
 
 Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man as he 
 
 is growing older may learn many things for he can no more 
 learn than he can run ; youth is the time of toil. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And, therefore, calculation and geometry, and all the other 
 elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, 
 should be presented to the mind in childhood ; not, however, 
 under any notion of forcing them. The Republic, ii. 364. 
 Allegory ; not for youth. 
 
 The narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, 
 
 or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking 
 her part when she was being beaten, such tales must not 
 be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have 
 an allegorical meaning or not. For the young man cannot 
 judge what is allegorical and what is literal ; anything that 
 he receives into his mind at that age is apt to become indel- 
 ible and unalterable ; and therefore the tales which they first 
 hear should be models of virtuous thoughts. The Republic, 
 ii. 201. 
 
 Ambition, inordinate. See Inordinate, etc. 
 Ambition of money-making. 
 
 Suppose the representative of timocracy to have a son : 
 
 at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his 
 footsteps, but presently he sees him founder in a moment on a 
 sunken reef, and he and all that he has are lost ; he may 
 have been a general or some other high officer who is brought 
 to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put 
 to death, or exiled, or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, 
 and all his property taken from him. 
 
 Nothing more likely. 
 
 And the son has seen and known all this he is a ruined 
 man, and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and pas- 
 
16 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 sion headforemost from his bosom's throne ; humbled by poverty 
 he takes to money-making, and by mean and miserly savings 
 and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such an one 
 likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous elements on the 
 vacant throne? They will play the great king within him, 
 and he will array them with tiara and collar and scimitar. 
 
 Most true, he replied. 
 
 And when he has made reason and spirit sit on the ground 
 obediently on either side, and taught them to know their place, 
 he compels the one to think only of the method by which lesser 
 sums may be converted into larger ones, and schools the other 
 into the worship and admiration of riches and rich men ; and 
 to be ambitious only of wealth, and of the pursuits which lead 
 to it. 
 
 Of all conversions, he said there is none so speedy or so 
 sure as when the ambitious youth changes into the avaricious 
 one. The Republic, ii. 381. 
 Ambitious men. 
 
 If they cannot be generals, they are willing to be cap- 
 tains ; and if they cannot be honored by really great and im- 
 portant persons, they are glad to be honored by inferior people, 
 but honor of some kind they must have. The Republic, 
 ii. 302. 
 Ambitious woman. 
 
 The character of the son begins to develop when he hears 
 
 his mother grumbling at her husband for not having a seat in 
 the government, of which the consequence is that she loses her 
 precedence among other women. Further, when she sees her 
 husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling 
 and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever 
 happens to -him quietly ; and when she observes that his 
 thoughts always centre in himself, while he treats her with 
 considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son 
 that his father is only half a man and far too easy-going ; not 
 to mention other similar complaints which women love to utter. 
 The'Republic, ii. 376. 
 Amusement; arguing for. - 
 
 Young men, as you may have observed, when they first 
 
 get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are 
 always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those 
 who refute them ; like puppy-dogs, they delight to tear and 
 pull at all wko come near them. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 17 
 
 Yes, he said, there is nothing of which they are fonder. 
 And when they have made many conquests and received 
 defeats at the hands of many, they violently and speedily get 
 into a way of not believing anything that they believed before, 
 and hence, not only they, but philosophy generally, has a bad 
 name with the rest of the world. 
 Too true, he said. 
 
 But when a man begins to get older, he will no. longer be 
 guilty of such insanity ; he will imitate the dialectician who is 
 seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for 
 the sake of amusement; and the greater- moderation of his 
 character will increase instead of diminishing the honor of the 
 pursuit. The Republic, ii. 367. 
 Amusement and harmless pleasure. 
 
 Ath. I should say that learning has a certain accompanying 
 
 charm which is the pleasure ; and that the right and the profit- 
 able, the good and the noble, are qualities given to it by the 
 truth. 
 
 Cle. Exactly. 
 
 Ath. And so in the imitative arts, if they succeed in making 
 likenesses, and are accompanied by pleasure, may not their 
 works be said to have a charm ? 
 
 Cle. Yes. 
 
 Ath. But equal proportions, whether of quality or quantity, 
 and not pleasure, speaking generally, would give them truth 
 or Tightness. 
 
 Cle. Yes. 
 
 Ath. Then that only can be rightly judged by the standard 
 of pleasure, which makes or furnishes no utility, or truth, or like- 
 ness, nor on the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality, 
 but exists solely for the sake of the accompanying charm ; and 
 the term " pleasure " is most appropriately used when these 
 other qualities are absent. 
 
 Cle. You are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not ? 
 
 Ath. Yes ; and this I term amusement, when doing neither 
 harm nor good in any degree worth speaking of. Laws, iv. 
 197. 
 Anarchy resulting from freedom. 
 
 Freedom in a democracy is the glory of the State, and 
 
 therefore, in a democracy only will the freeman of nature deign 
 to dwell. 
 
 Yes ; the saying is often enough repeated. 
 
18 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this 
 and the neglect of other things introduces the change in de- 
 mocracy, which occasions a demand for tyranny. 
 
 How so ? 
 
 When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil 
 cup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of 
 the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very 
 amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them to ac- 
 count and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs. 
 
 Yes, he replied, a very common thing. 
 
 Yes, I said ; and loyal citizens are insulted by her as lovers 
 of slavery and men of naught ; she would have subjects who 
 are like rulers, and rulers who are like subjects : these are 
 men after her own heart, whom she praises and honors both 
 in -private and public. Now, in such a state, can liberty have 
 any limit ? 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and 
 ends by getting among the animals and infecting them. 
 
 How do you mean ? 
 
 I mean that the father gets accustomed to descend to the 
 level of his sons and to fear them, and the son to be on a 
 level with his father, he having no shame or fear of either of 
 his parents ; and this is his freedom, and the metic is equal with 
 the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger on a 
 level with either. 
 
 Yes, he said, that is true. 
 
 That is true ; and there are other slight evils such as the 
 following ; the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the 
 scholars despise their masters and tutors ; and, in general, 
 young and old are alike, and the young man is on a level 
 with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed ; 
 and old men condescend to the young, and are full of pleasantry 
 and gayety ; they do not like to be thought morose and au- 
 thoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the 
 young. 
 
 Quite true, he said. 
 
 The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought 
 with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or 
 her purchaser ; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equal- 
 ity of the two sexes in relation to each other. The Republic^ 
 ii. 391. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 19 
 
 Animal, the world a great and intelligent. 
 
 - Let me tell you why the creator created and made the 
 universe, lie was good, and no goodness can ever have any . 
 jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired 
 that all things should be as like himself as possible. This is 
 the true beginning of creation and of the world as we shall 
 do well in believing on the testimony of wise men : God de- 
 sired that all things should be good and nothing bad in so far 
 as this could be accomplished. Wherefore also finding the 
 whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular 
 and disorderly manner, out of disorder he brought order, consid- 
 ering that this was far better than the other. Now the deeds 
 of him who is the best can never be or have been other than 
 the fairest, and the creator, reflecting upon the visible works of 
 nature, found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole 
 was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole ; and that in-\\ 
 telligence could not exist in anything which was devoid of soul. \ v 
 For these reasons he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, 
 and framed the universe to be the best and fairest work in the 
 order of nature. And therefore, using the language of proba- 
 bility, we may say that the world became a living soul and truly 
 rational through the providence of God. 
 
 This being supposed, let us proceed to consider the fur- 
 ther question, in the likeness of what animal did the Creator 
 make the world ? Certainly we cannot suppose that the form 
 was like that of any being which exists in parts only ; for 
 nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect thing ; but 
 we may regard the world as the very likeness of that whole of 
 which all other animals, both individually and in their tribes 
 are portions. For the original of the universe contains in itself 
 all intelligible beings, just as this world comprehends us and all 
 other visible creatures. For the Deity, intending to make this 
 world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, 
 framed one visible animal comprehending all other animals of 
 a kindred nature. Are we right in saying that there is one 
 heaven, or shall we rather say that there are many and infi- 
 nite ? There is one, if the created heaven accords with the 
 original. For that which includes all other intelligible creat- 
 ures cannot have a second or companion ; in that case there 
 would be need of another living being which would include 
 those two, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness 
 would be more truly said to resemble not those two, but that 
 

 20 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 other which included them. In order then that the world 
 might be like the perfect animal in unity, he who made the 
 worlds made them not two or infinite in number ; but there is 
 and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven. 
 Timaeus, ii. 524. 
 Animalism. 
 
 Those who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always 
 
 busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far 
 as the mean ; and in this region they move at random through- 
 out life, but they never pass into the true upper world ; thither 
 they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are 
 they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of true and 
 abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking 
 down and their heads stooping, not indeed to the earth but 
 to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in 
 theia excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at 
 one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron ; 
 and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. 
 For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, 
 and the part of themselves which they fill is . also unsubstantial 
 and incontinent. 
 
 Their pleasures are mixed with pains. How can they be 
 otherwise? For they are mere images and pictures of the 
 true, and are colored by contrast, which exaggerates both light 
 and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane de- 
 sires of themselves ; and they are fought about as Stesichorus 
 says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at 
 Troy in ignorance of the truth. 
 
 And must not the like happen with the spirited or pas- 
 sionate element of the soul ? Will not the passionate man who 
 carries his passion into action be in a like case whether he is 
 envious and ambitious, or violent and contentious, or angry and 
 discontented, if he be seeking to attain honor and victory and 
 the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense ? The 
 Republic, ii. 417. 
 Antagonisms; human. 
 
 There is a story which I remember to have heard, and 
 
 on which I rely. The story is that Leontius, the sou of 
 Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north 
 wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the 
 ground by the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see 
 them, and also a disgust and abhorrence of them ; for a time 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 21 
 
 he turned away and averted his eyes, and then, suddenly over- 
 come by the impulse, forced them open, and ran up, saying (to 
 his eyes), Take your fill, ye wretches, of the lovely sight 
 
 I have heard the story myself, he said. 
 
 The moral is that anger differs from the desires, and is some- 
 times at war with them. 
 
 Yes, that is the meaning, he said. 
 
 And are there not many other cases in which we observe 
 that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he 
 reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and 
 that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a 
 state, his spirit is on the side of his reason ; but for the pas- 
 sionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when 
 reason decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of 
 thing which, I believe, that you never observed occurring in 
 yourself, nor, as I think, in any one else ? 
 
 Certainly not, he said. 
 
 Suppose, I said, that a man thinks he has done a wrong to 
 another, the nobler he is the less able he is to feel indignant ; 
 his anger refuses to be excited at the hunger or cold or other 
 suffering, which he deems that the injured person may justly 
 inflict upon him ? 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, 
 then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he be- 
 lieves to be justice ; and because he suffers hunger or cold or 
 other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and 
 conquer ; he must do or die, and will not desist, until he hears 
 the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark 
 no more. The Republic, ii. 266. 
 Antagonisms and counterparts in nature. 
 
 Soc. Whereas the sharp and flat, the swift and the slow are 
 
 infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of them introduce a 
 limit, and perfect the whole frame of music ? 
 
 Pro. Yes, certainly. 
 
 Soc. Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the in- 
 troduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness and in- 
 fuse moderation and harmony ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite 
 come the seasons, and all the delights of life? 
 
 Pro. Most true. 
 
22 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Soc. I omit to speak of ten thousand other things, such as 
 beauty and health and strength, and of the many beauties and 
 high perfections of the soul ; methinks, O my fair Philebus, 
 that the goddess saw the universal wantonness and wickedness 
 of all things, having no limit of pleasure or satiety, and she de- 
 vised the limit of law and order, tormenting, as you say, Phile- 
 bus, or, as I affirm, saving the soul. Philebus, Hi. 161. 
 Appearance of good. 
 
 Do we not see that many are willing to appear to have, 
 
 or to do, or to be the just and honorable without the reality ; 
 but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good the 
 reality is what they seek ; in the case of the good, appearance 
 is despised by every one. 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
 This, then, which every man pursues and makes his end, 
 having a presentiment ^hat there is such an end, and yet hesi- 
 tating because neither knowing the nature nor having the 
 same sure proof of this as of other tilings, and therefore having 
 no profit in other things, is this, I would ask, a principle 
 about which the best men in our State, to whom everything is 
 to be intrusted, ought to be in darkness ? The Republic, ii. 
 333. 
 Appetites; natural. 
 
 I see that among men all things depend upon three wants 
 
 and desires, of which the end is virtue, if they are rightly led 
 by them, or the opposite, if wrongly. Now these are eating 
 and drinking, which begin at birth ; every animal has a natural 
 desire for them, and is violently excited, and rebels against him 
 who says that he must not satisfy all his pleasures and appe- 
 tites, and get rid of the corresponding pains. And the third 
 and greatest and sharpest want and desire breaks out last, and 
 is the fire of sexual lust, which kindles in men every species of 
 wantonness and madness. And these three disorders we must 
 endeavor to master by the three great principles of fear and 
 law and right reason ; turning them away from that which is 
 called pleasantest to the best, using the muses and the Gods 
 who preside over contests to extinguish their increase and in- 
 flux. Laws, iv. 303. 
 Argument ; the state of mind for. 
 
 Let us be careful of admitting into our souls the notion 
 
 that there is no truth or health or soundness in any arguments 
 at all ; but let us rather say that there is as yet no health in 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 23 
 
 us, and that we must quit ourselves like men and do our best to 
 gain health, you and all other men with a view to the whole 
 of your future life, and I myself with a view to death. For 
 at this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a 
 philosopher ; like the vulgar, I am only a partisan. For the 
 partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about 
 the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his 
 hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him 
 and me at the present moment is only this, that whereas he 
 seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am 
 rather seeking to convince myself ; to convince my hearers is a 
 secondary matter with me. And do but see how much I gain 
 by the argument. For if what I say is true, then I do well to 
 be persuaded of the truth ; but if there be nothing after death, 
 still, during the short time that remains, I shall not distress my 
 friends with lamentations, and py ignorance will not last, but 
 will die with me and therefore no harm will be done. This is 
 the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the 
 argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth 
 and not of Socrates ; agree with me, if I seem to you to be 
 speaking the truth ; or if not, withstand me might and main, 
 that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, 
 and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die. Phaedo, 
 i. 419. 
 
 Argument, less than character. 
 
 Let others praise the rewards and appearances of jus- 
 tice ; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from .them, 
 I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your 
 whole life in thinking about the question, unless I hear the con- 
 trary from your own lips, I expect something better. And 
 therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better 
 than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the 
 possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the 
 other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men. The 
 Republic, ii. 189. 
 Argument, not found in numbers. 
 
 If you have no better argument than numbers, let me 
 
 have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof 
 which, as I think, ought to be given ; for I shall produce one 
 witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person 
 with whom I am arguing ; his suffrage I know how to take ; 
 but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even 
 address myself to them. Gorgias, iii. 60. 
 
24 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Art, nature and chance as opposed to. See Nature^ etc. 
 Art imitative. See Likeness-making. 
 Art-colors less than words. 
 
 Our discussion might be compared to a picture of some 
 
 living being which had been fairly drawn in outline, but had 
 not yet attained the life and clearness which is given by the 
 blending of colors. Now to intelligent persons a living being 
 is more truly delineated by language and discourse than by 
 any painting or work of art; to the duller sort by works of 
 art. Statesman, iii. 561. 
 Art military, youth instructed in. See Military. 
 Arts ; the higher, what they require. 
 
 All the superior arts require many words and much 
 
 discussion of the higher truths of nature ; hence comes all 
 loftiness of thought and perfectness of execution. And this, 
 as I conceive, was the quality which, in addition to his natural 
 gifts, Pericles acquired from Anaxagoras whom he happened 
 to know. He was thus imbued with the higher philosophy and 
 attained the knowledge of Mind, which was the favorite theme 
 of Anaxagoras and applied what he learned to the art of speak- 
 ing. Phaedrus, i. 575. 
 Arts; experimental. 
 
 Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which 
 
 are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for ex- 
 perience makes the days of men to proceed according to art, 
 and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in 
 different ways are proficients in different arts, and the best 
 persons in the best arts. Gorgias, iii. 32. 
 Arts ; inquiry ruinous to. 
 
 Str. Yet once more, we shall have to enact, that if any 
 
 one is detected inquiring into sailing and navigation or health, 
 or into the true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other 
 conditions of the atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, 
 and has any ingenious notions about such matters, he is not 
 to be called a pilot or physician, but a cloudy talking sophist ; 
 also a corrupter of the young, who would persuade them to fol- 
 low the art of medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner, as 
 the irresponsible masters of the patients or ships ; and any one 
 who is qualified by law may inform against him, and indict 
 him in some court, and then if he is found to be corrupting any, 
 whether young or old, he is to be punished with the utmost 
 rigor of the law ; for no one should presume to be wiser than 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 25 
 
 the laws ; and as touching healing and health and piloting and 
 navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for anybody 
 may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such 
 were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and 
 about generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about paint- 
 ing or imitation in general, or carpentry, or any sort of manu- 
 facture, or husbandry, or planting, or if we were to see an art 
 of rearing horses, or tending herds, or divination, or any minis- 
 terial service, or draught-playing, or any science conversant 
 with number, whether simple or square or cube, or comprising 
 motion, I say, if all these things were done in this way ac- 
 cording to written regulation, and not according to art, what 
 would be the result? 
 
 T. Soc. All the arts would utterly perish, and could never 
 be recovered, because inquiry would be unlawful. And human 
 life, which is bad enough already, would then become utterly 
 unendurable. Statesman, iii. 585. 
 Artists ; what they should be. 
 
 Are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the oppo- 
 site forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency 
 in sculpture and building and the other creative arts ; and is he 
 who does not conform to this rule of ours to be prohibited 
 from practicing his art in our State, lest the taste of our citi- 
 zens be corrupted by him ? We would not have our guardians 
 grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious 
 pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb 
 and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather 
 a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our 
 artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nat- 
 ure of beauty and grace ; then will our youth dwell in a land 
 of health, amid fair sights and sounds ; and beauty, the effluence 
 of fair works, will visit the eye and ear, like a healthful breeze 
 from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul even in child- 
 hood into harmony with the beauty of reason. The Republic, 
 ii. 225. 
 Artists ; their work. 
 
 Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with 
 
 a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and 
 not at random ; just as all other artists, whether the painter, 
 the builder, the shipwright, or any other, look to their work, 
 and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but 
 keep in view the form of their work ? The artist disposes 
 
26 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and 
 accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular 
 and systematic whole ; and this is true of all artists, and in the 
 same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke be- 
 fore, give order and regularity to the body. Gorgias, iii. 94. 
 Astronomy, how learned. See Heavenly bodies. 
 Authority of the State. 
 
 " Tell us what complaint you have to make against us 
 
 which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the State ? 
 In the first place did we not bring you into existence ? Your 
 father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say 
 whether you have any objection to urge against those of us 
 who regulate marriage ? " None, I should reply. " Or against 
 those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and education 
 of children in which you also were trained ? Were not the 
 laws, which have the charge of education, right in commanding 
 your father to train you in music and gymnastic ? " Right, I 
 should reply. " Well then, since you were brought into the 
 world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the 
 first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers 
 were before you ? And if this is true you are not on equal 
 terms with us ; nor can you think that you have a right to do 
 to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right 
 to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father or to 
 your master, if you had one, because you have been struck or 
 reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands ? 
 you would not say this ? And because we think right to de- 
 stroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us 
 in return, and your country as far as in you lies ? Will you, 
 O professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified in 
 this ? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our 
 country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than 
 mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in 
 the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding ? also to be 
 soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even 
 more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed ? And when 
 We are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, 
 the punishment is to be endured in silence ; and if she lead us 
 to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right ; 
 neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank, but 
 whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, 
 he must do what his city and his country order him ; or he 
 
to nil 
 Auth 
 
 ' 
 
 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 27 
 
 must change their view of what is just : and if he may do no 
 violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence 
 to his country." Crito, i. 355. 
 Authorship; motives to. 
 
 I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno is your sec- 
 ond self in his writings too ; he puts what you say in another 
 w:iy, and would fain deceive us into believing that he is telling 
 what is new. For you, in your, poems, say All is one, and 
 of this you adduce excellent proofs ; and he, on the other hand, 
 says There is no many ; and on behalf of this he offers over- 
 whelming evidence. To deceive the world, as you have done, 
 by saying the same thing in different ways, one of you affirm- 
 ing the one and the other denying the many, is a strain of art 
 beyond the reach of most of us. 
 
 Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen 
 as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not quite ap- 
 prehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really 
 such an ambitious work as you. imagine ; for what you speak 
 of was an accident ; I had no serious intention of deceiving the 
 world. The truth is, that these writings of mine were meant 
 to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who 
 scoff at him, and show the many ridiculous and contradictory 
 results which they supposed to follow from the affirmation of 
 the one. My answer is an address to the partisans of the 
 many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon 
 them that their hypothesis of the being of many, if carried 
 out, appears in a still more ridiculous light than the hypoth- 
 esis of the being of one. A love of controversy led me to 
 write the book in the days of my youth, and some one stole 
 the copy ; and therefore I had no choice of whether it should 
 be published or not ; the motive, however, of writing, was not 
 the ambition of an old man, but the pugnacity of a young one. 
 Parmenides, iii. 244. 
 Avaricious men. See Miserly men, etc. 
 
 Bachelorhood an impiety. See Immortality in time. 
 Bad man's faults increased by power. 
 
 He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is 
 the real slave, and is obliged to practice the greatest adulation 
 and servility, and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. 
 He has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has 
 more wants than any one, and is truly poor, if you know how 
 
28 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 to inspect the whole soul of him : all his life long he is beset 
 with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the 
 State which he resembles ; and surely the resemblance holds ? 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 Moreover, as we said before, he grows worse from having 
 power : he becomes of necessity more jealous, more faithless, 
 more unjust, more friendless, more impious than he was at 
 first ; he entertains and nurtures every evil sentiment, and the 
 consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and he makes 
 everybody else equally miserable. The Republic, ii. 409. 
 Battle ; death in. 
 
 O Menexenus ! death in battle is certainly in many re- 
 spects a noble thing. The dead man gets a fine and costly 
 funeral, although he may have been poor, and an elaborate 
 speech is made over him by a wise man who has long ago pre- 
 pared what he has to say, although he who is praised may not 
 have been good for much. The speakers praise him for what 
 he has done and for what he has not done that is the beauty 
 of them and they steal away our souls with their embellished / 
 words ; in every conceivable form they praise the city ; and 
 they praise those who died in war, and all our ancestors who 
 went before us ; and they praise ourselves also who are still 
 alive. Menexenus, iv. 565. 
 Beauties tyrannical. 
 
 Soc. A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you 
 
 talking, and he would know that you are a fair creature and 
 have still many lovers. 
 
 Men. Why do you say that ? 
 
 Soc. Why, because you always speak in imperatives : like 
 all beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical ; 
 and also, as I suspect, you have found out that I have a weak- 
 ness for the fair, and therefore I must humor you and answer. 
 Meno, i. 249. 
 Beautiful true and good, the. 
 
 Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the 
 
 power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you 
 term the idea of good, and that you will regard as the cause of 
 science and of truth, as known by us; beautiful too, as are 
 both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this 
 other nature as more beautiful than either ; and, as in the pre- 
 vious instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the 
 sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 29 
 
 and truth may be deemed like the good, but not the good ; the 
 good has a place of honor yet higher. 
 
 What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the 
 author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty. 
 The Republic, ii. 336. 
 Beauty permeating our souls. 
 
 - Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and 
 therefore of a nature which easily slips in and permeates our 
 souls. For I affirm that the good is the beautiful. You will 
 agree to that? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good 
 nor evil is the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will 
 tell you why I am inclined to think so ; I assume that there 
 are three principles the good, the bad, and that which is 
 neither good nor bad. What do you say to that? 
 
 I agree. 
 
 And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil 
 of the evil, nor the good of the evil, that the preceding ar- 
 gument will not allow; and therefore the only alternative is 
 if there be such a thing as friendship or love at all that what 
 is neither good nor evil must be the friend, either of the good, 
 or of that which is neither good nor evil, for nothing can be 
 the friend of the bad. Lysis, i. 56. 
 Beauty, absolute. 
 
 There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell 
 
 you ; but only what I have been always and everywhere re- 
 peating in the previous discussion and on other occasions ; I 
 want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied 
 my thoughts, and I shall have to go back to those familiar words 
 which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume 
 that there is an absolute beauty and goodness, and greatness, 
 and the like ; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you 
 the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the 
 soul. 
 
 Cebes said : You may proceed at once with the proof, for I 
 grant you this. 
 
 Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree 
 with me in the next step ; for I cannot help thinking that if 
 there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty, that can 
 only be beautiful in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty 
 and this I should say of everything. Do you agree in this no- 
 tion of the cause ? 
 
30 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Yes, he said, I agree. 
 
 He proceeded : I know nothing and can understand nothing 
 of any other of those wise causes which are alleged ; and if a 
 person says to me that the bloom of color, or form, or anything 
 else of that sort is a source of beauty, I leave all that, which is 
 only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps fool- 
 ishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes 
 a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty 
 in whatever way or manner obtained ; for as to the manner I 
 am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful 
 things become beautiful. That appears to me to be the only 
 safe answer that I can give, either to myself or to any other, 
 and to that I cling, in the persuasion that I shall never be 
 overthrown. Phaedo, i. 429. 
 
 The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, 
 fond of fine tones and colors and forms, and all the artificial 
 products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable 
 of seeing or loving absolute beauty. 
 
 True, he replied. 
 
 Few are they who are able to attain the sight of this. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And he who, having a sense of beautiful things, has no sense 
 of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge 
 of that beauty is unable to follow of such an one I ask, Is 
 he awake or in a dream only ? Reflect : is not the dreamer, 
 sleeping or waking, one who puts the resemblance in the place 
 of the real object? 
 
 I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming. 
 
 But take the case of the other, who recognizes the existence 
 of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the 
 objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the ob- 
 jects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the 
 objects is he a dreamer, or is he awake ? 
 
 He is wide awake. The Republic, ii. 304. 
 Beauty, one and everlasting. 
 
 " These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even 
 
 you, Socrates, may enter ; to the greater and more hidden ones 
 which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them 
 in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be 
 able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and 
 do you follow if you can. For he who would proceed aright 
 in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms ; 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 31 
 
 and first, if he be guided by his instructor aright to love one 
 such form only out of that he should create fair thoughts ; 
 and soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one 
 form is akin to the beauty of another ; and then if beauty of 
 form in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to 
 recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same ! 
 And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of 
 the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will 
 become a lover of all beautiful forms ; in the next stage he 
 will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honorable 
 than the beauty of the outward form. So that if a virtuous 
 soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and 
 tend him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts 
 which may improve the young, until he is compelled to con- 
 template and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and to| 
 understand that the beauty of them all is of one family, and 
 that personal beauty is a trifle ; and after laws and institutions 
 he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, be- 
 ing not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or 
 man or institution, himself a slave, mean and narrow-minded, 
 but drawing toward and contemplating the vast sea of beauty,! 
 he will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in 
 boundless love of wisdom; until on that shore he grows and 
 waxes - strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a 
 single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere. /] To 
 this I will proceed ; please to give me your very best attention. 
 He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and 
 who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succes- 
 sion, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a 
 nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, is the final 
 cause of all our former toils,) a nature which in the first place 
 is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and wan- 
 ing ; in the next place not fair in one point of view and 
 foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one 
 place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another 
 place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the like- 
 ness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, 
 or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any 
 other being ; as for example, in an animal, or in heaven or in 
 earth, or in any other place, but beauty only, absolute, sepa- 
 rate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and 
 without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-grow- 
 
32 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 ing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who under 
 the influence of true love rising upward from these begins to 
 see that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order 
 of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use 
 the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upwards 
 for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and 
 from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, 
 and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions 
 he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows 
 what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear Socrates," said 
 the stranger of Mantineia, " is that life above all others which 
 man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute ; a 
 beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after 
 the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, 
 whose presence now entrances you ; and you and many a one 
 would be content to live seeing only and conversing with them 
 without meat or drink, if that were possible you only want 
 to be with them and to look at them. But what if man had 
 eyes to see the true beauty the divine beauty, I mean, pure 
 and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of 
 mortality, and all the colors and vanities of human life 
 thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty 
 divine and simple ? Do you not see that in that communion 
 only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be 
 enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities ; (for 
 he has hold not of an image but of a reality,) and bringing forth 
 and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be 
 immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life ? " 
 The Symposium, i. 502. 
 Beauty, madness of. 
 
 Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last 
 
 kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees 
 the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the 
 true beauty ; he would like to fly away, but he cannot ; he is 
 like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the 
 world below ; and he is therefore esteemed mad. And I have 
 shown this is of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest, 
 and the offspring of the highest, and that he who loves the 
 beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For, as 
 has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of 
 nature beheld true being ; this was the condition of her pass- 
 ing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recall 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHT*. 33 
 
 the things of the other world ; they may have seen them for 
 a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their 
 earthly lot, and may have lost the memory of the holy things 
 which they saw there, through some evil and corrupting asso- 
 ciation. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them ; 
 and they, when they behold any image of that other world, 
 are rapt in amazement; but they are ignorant of what this 
 rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For 
 there is no light in the earthly copies of justice or temperance 
 or any of the higher qualities which are precious to souls : 
 they are seen but through a glass dimly ; and there are few 
 who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and 
 they only with difficulty. They might have seen beauty shin- 
 ing in brightness, when, with the happy band following in the 
 train of Zeus, as we philosophers, or of other gods as others did, 
 they saw a vision and were initiated into mysteries, which may 
 be truly called most blessed, and which we celebrated in our 
 state of innocence ; having no experience of evils as yet to 
 come ; admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and sim- 
 ple and calm and happy ; shining in pure light, pure ourselves 
 and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry 
 about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster 
 in his shell. Let me linger thus long over the memory of 
 scenes which have passed away. Phaedrus, i. 554. 
 Beauty, celestial. 
 
 But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her there 
 
 shining in company with the celestial forms ; and coming to 
 earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the 
 clearest aperture of sense. For sight is the keenest of our 
 bodily senses ; though not by that is wisdom seen ;/ her loveli- 
 ness would have been transporting if there had been a visible 
 image of her, and the same is true of the loveliness of the 
 other ideas as well. But this is the privilege of beauty that she 
 is the loveliest and also the most palpable to sight. Now he 
 who is not newly initiated, or who has become corrupted, does 
 not easily rise out of this world to the sight of true beauty 
 in the other ; he looks only at her earthly namesake, instead of 
 being awed at the sight of her, like a brutish beast he rushes 
 on to enjoy and beget ; he consorts with wantonness and is 
 not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nat- 
 ure. But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been 
 the spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed 
 
34 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 when he sees any one having a godlike face or form, which is 
 the expression of divine beauty ; and at first a shudder runs 
 through him, and again the old awe steals over him. Phae- 
 drus, i. 556. 
 Beauty, proportionate. 
 
 If we were painting a statue, and some one were to come 
 
 and blame us for not putting the most beautiful colors on the 
 most beautiful parts of the body for the eyes, he would say, 
 ought to be purple, but they are black in that case we might 
 fairly answer, " Sir, do not imagine that we ought to beautify 
 the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes ; but see 
 whether, by giving this and the other features their due, we 
 make the whole beautiful." The Republic, ii. 244. 
 Beauty of figure and melody. 
 
 Ath. What is beauty of figure, or beautiful melody ? 
 
 When a manly soul is in trouble, and when a cowardly soul is 
 in a similar case, are they likely to use the same figures and 
 gestures, or to give utterance to the same sounds ? 
 
 Cle. How can they, when the very colors of their faces dif- 
 fer? 
 
 Ath. Good, my friend; I may observe, however, in passing, 
 that in music there certainly are figures and there are melo- 
 dies; and music is concerned with harmony and rhythm, so 
 that you may speak of a melody or figure having rhythm or 
 harmony ; the term is correct enough, but you cannot speak 
 correctly, as the masters of choruses have a way of talking 
 metaphorically of the " color " of a melody or figure. Al- 
 though you can speak of the melodies or figures of the brave 
 and the coward, praising the one and censuring the other. 
 And not to be tedious, the figures and melodies which are ex- 
 pressive of virtue of soul or body, or of images of virtue, are 
 without exception good, and those which are expressive of vice 
 are the reverse of good. 
 
 Cle. You are right in calling upon us to make that division. 
 Ath. But are all of us equally delighted with every sort of 
 dance ? 
 
 Gle. Far otherwise. 
 
 Ath. What is the cause of error or division among 
 
 us? Are beautiful things not the same to us all, or are they 
 the same in themselves, but not in our opinion of them ? For 
 no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more 
 beautiful than forms of virtue, or that he himself delights in 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS- 35 
 
 the forms of vice, and others in a muse of another character. 
 And yet most persons say, that the excellence of music is to 
 give pleasure to our souls. But this is intolerable and blas- 
 phemous ; there is, however, a more plausible account of the 
 delusion. Laws, iv. 185. 
 Being, real. 
 
 - Which classes of things have a greater share in pure ex- 
 istence, in your judgment those of which food and drink and 
 condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the 
 class which contains true opinion and mind and, in general, all 
 virtue ? Put the question in this way : Which has a more 
 pure being, that which is concerned with the invariable, the 
 immortal, and the true, and is found in the invariable, immor- 
 tal, true ; or that which is concerned with the variable and 
 mortal, and is found in the variable and mortal ? 
 
 Far purer, he replied, is that which is concerned with the 
 invariable. The Republic, ii. 416. 
 Belief and learning. 
 
 Soc. Let me raise this question : you would say that 
 
 there is such a thing as " having learned ? " 
 
 Gor. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And there is also " having believed? " 
 
 Gor. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And is the " having learned " the same as " having be- 
 lieved," and are learning and belief the same things ? 
 
 Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same. 
 
 Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in 
 this way : If a person were to say to you, " Is there, Gorgias, 
 a false belief as well as a true ? " you would reply, if I am not 
 mistaken, that there is. 
 
 Gor. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true ? 
 
 Gor. No. 
 
 Soc. No, indeed ; and this again proves that knowledge and 
 belief differ. 
 
 Gor. That is true. 
 
 Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who 
 have believed are persuaded ? 
 
 Gor. That is so. 
 
 Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion, one 
 which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is 
 of knowledge ? 
 
 Gor. By all means. Gorgias, iii. 39. 
 

 36 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. , 
 
 Beliefs and opinions, true. 
 
 Now when the Creator had framed the soul according 
 
 to his will, he formed within her the corporeal universe, and 
 brought them together, and united them centre to centre. The 
 soul, interfused everywhere from the centre to the circumfer- 
 ence of heaven, of which she is the external envelopment, her- 
 self turning in herself, began a divine beginning of never-ceas- 
 ing and rational life enduring throughout all time. The body 
 of heaven is visible, but the soul is invisible, and partakes of 
 reason and harmony, and being made by the best of intellectual 
 and everlasting natures is the best of things created. And be- 
 cause she is composed of the same and of the other and of the 
 essence, these three, and divided and bound together in pro- 
 portion, and is revolving backwards and forwards in herself, 
 the soul, when touching anything which has essence, whether 
 dispersed in parts or undivided, is stirred through all her pow- 
 ers to declare the sameness or difference of that and some 
 other thing, and in relation to what and in what way and how 
 and when individuals are connected or affected, both in the 
 world of generation and in the world of immutable being. 
 And when reason, which works with equal truth both in the 
 circle of the diverse and of the same, in the sphere of the 
 self-moved in voiceless silence moving, when reason, I say, 
 is hovering aromid the sensible world and the circle of the 
 diverse also moving truly imparts the intimations of sense to 
 the whole soul, then arise fixed and true opinions and beliefs. 
 But when reason is dwelling in the rational, and the circle of 
 the same moving smoothly indicates this, then intelligence and 
 knowledge are of necessity perfected. And if any one affirms 
 that in which these are found to be other than the soul, he 
 will say the very opposite of the truth. Timaeus, ii. 529. 
 Bodily pleasures desired by men. 
 
 Consider, my friend, whether you and I are agreed about 
 
 another question, which will probably throw light on our pres- 
 ent inquiry : Do you think that the philosopher ought to care 
 about the pleasures if they are to be called pleasures of 
 eating and drinking? 
 
 Certainly not, answered Simmias. 
 
 And what do you say of the pleasures of love should he 
 care about them ? 
 
 By no means. 
 
 And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 37 
 
 body, for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, 
 or other adornments of the body ? Instead of caring about 
 them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature 
 needs ? What do you say ? 
 
 I should say that the true philosopher would despise them. 
 
 Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the 
 soul and not with the body ? He would like, as far as he can, 
 to be quit of the body and turn to the soul. 
 
 That is true. 
 
 In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, 
 may be observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from 
 the communion of the body. 
 
 That is true. 
 
 Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that 
 a life which has no share in bodily pleasures is not worth hav- 
 ing ; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as 
 dead. 
 
 That is quite true. 
 
 What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowl- 
 edge ? is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, a hin- 
 derer or a helper ? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any 
 truth in them ? Are tlfey not, as the poets are always telling 
 us, inaccurate witnesses ? and yet, if even they are inaccurate 
 and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses ? for 
 you will allow that they are the best of them ? 
 
 Certainly, he replied. 
 
 Then when does the soul attain truth ? for in attempting 
 to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously 
 deceived. 
 
 Yes, that is true. 
 
 Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at 
 all? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And thought is best when the mind is gathered into -herself 
 and none of these things trouble her neither sounds nor 
 sights nor pain nor any pleasure, when she has as little as 
 possible to do with the body, and has no bodily sense or feel- 
 ing, but is aspiring after true being ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And in this the philosopher dishonors the body ; his soul 
 runs away from the body and desires to be alone and by her- 
 self? 
 
 That is true. Phaedo, i. 391. 
 
38 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Body, soul the life of. See Soul, etc. 
 
 Body and soul, their relative value. See Soul, etc. 
 
 If you were going to commit your body to some one, 
 
 who might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully con- 
 sider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and 
 deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the 
 care of your body ? But when the soul is in question, which 
 you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon the 
 good or evil of which depends the well-being of your all; 
 about this you never consulted either with your father or with 
 your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. 
 But no sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly 
 commit your soul to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, 
 you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, never de- 
 liberating, or taking the opinion of any one as to whether you 
 ought to intrust yourself to him or not ; you have quite made 
 up your mind that you will be a pupil of Protagoras, and are 
 prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your 
 friends in carrying out at any price this determination, although, 
 as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken 
 with him ; and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly igno- 
 rant of what a Sophist is ; and yet you are going to commit 
 yourself to his keeping. Protagoras, i. 113. 
 Body, affecting soul. 
 
 The lovers of knowledge are conscious that their souls, 
 
 when philosophy takes them in hand, are simply fastened and 
 glued to their bodies : the soul is able to view real existence 
 through the bars of a prison, and not of herself unhindered ; 
 she is wallowing in the mire of all ignorance ; and philosophy 
 beholding the terrible nature of her confinement, inasmuch as 
 the captive through lust becomes a chief accomplice in her own 
 captivity for the lovers of knowledge are aware that this was 
 the original state of the soul, but that when she was in this 
 state philosophy adopted and comforted her, and wanted to re- 
 lease her, pointing out to her that the eye and the ear and the 
 other senses are full of deceit, and persuading her to retire from 
 them in all but the necessary use of them, and to be gathered 
 up and collected into herself, and to trust only to herself and 
 her own pure apprehensions of pure existence, and to mistrust 
 whatever comes to her through other channels and is subject to 
 vicissitude philosophy, I say, shows her that all this is visible 
 and tangible, but that what she sees in her own nature is in- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 39 
 
 tellectual and invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher 
 thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and there- 
 fore abstains from pleasure and desires and pains and fears, as 
 far as she is able ; reflecting that when a man has great joys 
 or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not merely 
 the sort of evil which might be anticipated as for example, 
 the loss of his health or property which he had sacrificed to 
 his lusts but an evil greater far, which is the greatest and 
 worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks. 
 
 And what is that, Socrates ? said Cebes. 
 
 Why, that when the feeling of pleasure or pain in the soul 
 is most intense, all of us naturally suppose that the object of 
 this intense feeling is then plainest and truest : but such is not 
 the case. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And this is the state in which the soul is most enthralled by 
 the body. 
 
 How is that ? 
 
 Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which 
 nails and rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the 
 body and believes that to be true which the body affirms to be 
 true ; and from agreeing with the body and having the same 
 delights, she is obliged to have the same habits and haunts, and 
 is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world 
 below, but is always infected by the body; and so she sinks 
 into another body and there germinates and grows, and has 
 therefore no part in the communion of the divine and pure and 
 simple. 
 
 That is most true, Socrates, answered Cebes. 
 
 And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowl- 
 edge are temperate and brave ; and not for the reason which 
 the world gives. 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 Certainly not ! For the soul of a philosopher will reason 
 in another way ; she will not ask philosophy to release her in 
 order that when released she may deliver herself up again to 
 the thralldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only to be 
 undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's 
 web. But she will calm passion and follow Reason, and dwell 
 in her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of 
 opinion), and thence derive nourishment. Thus she seeks to 
 live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own 
 
40 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 kindred and to a congenial world and to be freed from human 
 ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has 
 been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her 
 departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the 
 winds and be nowhere and nothing. Phaedo, i. 411. 
 Body, affections of the. 
 
 The most important of the affections which concern the 
 
 whole body, remains to be considered. This is the cause of 
 pleasure and pain in the things which we have mentioned, and 
 in all other things which are perceived by sense through the 
 parts of the body, and have pleasures and pains consequent 
 upon them. Let us imagine the causes of every affection, 
 whether of sense or not, to be of the following nature, remem- 
 bering that we have already distinguished between the nature 
 which moves and that which is immovable ; for this is the di- 
 rection in which we must hunt the prey which we mean to 
 take. A body which is easily moved on receiving any slight 
 impression communicates this to the parts affected, and these to 
 other parts in an ever widening circle, until at last reaching 
 the principle of mind they announce the power of the produc- 
 ing cause. But a body of the opposite kind, being at rest, and 
 having no circular motion, is alone affected, and does not move 
 any of the neighboring parts ; and thus the parts not distribut- 
 ing their first impression to other parts, having no effect of 
 motion on the whole animal, produce no effect on the patient. 
 This is true of the bones and hair and other more earthly parts 
 of the human body ; whereas what was said above relates 
 mainly to sight and hearing, because they have in them the 
 greatest force of fire and air. Now, we must conceive of 
 pleasure and pain in this way. An impression produced in us 
 contrary to nature and violent, if sudden, is painful ; and, again, 
 the sudden return to nature is pleasant, and that which is gentle 
 and gradual is imperceptible, and vice versa. But the impres- 
 sion which is most easily produced is most readily felt, and is 
 not accompanied by pleasure or pain ; such, for example, are 
 the affections of the sight itself, which has been already said to 
 be a kindred body communicating with us in the daytime ; for 
 cuttings and burnings and other affections which happen to the 
 sight do not give pain, nor is their pleasure when the sight re- 
 turns to its natural state ; but the impressions are clearest and 
 strongest according to the manner of the affection and the num- 
 ber of the objects perceived ; for there is no violence either 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHT*. 41 
 
 in the contraction or dilation of the eye. But bodies which 
 are formed of larger particles yield to the agent only with a 
 struggle ; and then they impart their motions to the whole and 
 cause pleasure and pain pain when alienated from their 
 natural conditions, and pleasure when restored to them. 
 Things which experience gradual withdrawings and emptyings 
 of their nature, and great and sudden replenishments, fail to 
 perceive the emptying, and do perceive the replenishment ; 
 these occasion no pain, but the greatest pleasure to the mortal 
 part of the human soul, as is manifest in the case of perfumes. 
 But things which are changed all of a sudden, and only gradu- 
 ally and with difficulty return to their own nature, have all 
 the opposite effects, as is evident in the case of burnings and 
 cuttings of the body. Timaeus, ii. 556. 
 Body ; construction of the. 
 
 When all things were in disorder, God created in each 
 
 thing, both internally in relation to itself and externally in re- 
 lation to other things, certain harmonies in which were in- 
 cluded all possible harmonies and proportions. For in those 
 days nothing had any order except by accident ; nor did any 
 of the things which now have names deserve to be named at 
 all as, for example, fire, water, and the rest of the elements. 
 All these the Creator first arranged, and out of them he con- 
 structed the universe, which was a single animal comprehend- 
 ing all other animals, mortal and immortal, in itself. Now of 
 the divine, he himself was the Creator, but the creation of the 
 mortal he committed to his offspring. And they, imitating 
 him, received from him the immortal principle of the soul ; 
 and around this they fashioned a mortal body, and made the 
 whole body to be a vehicle of the soul, and constructed within 
 a soul of another nature which was mortal, subject to terrible 
 and irresistible affections, first of all, pleasure, the greatest 
 incitement of evil ; then pain, which deters from good ; also 
 rashness and fear, two foolish counselors, anger hard to be ap- 
 peased and hope easily deceived by sense without reason and 
 by all-daring love ; these they mingled together according to 
 necessary laws, and framed man. Wherefore, fearing to pol- 
 lute the divine any more than is necessary, they separated 
 the mortal nature, and to that gave a habitation in another 
 part of the body, placing the neck between them to be the 
 isthmus and boundary, which they constructed between the 
 head and breast, in order that they might be kept distinct. 
 
42 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 And in the breast, and in what is termed the thorax they en- 
 cased the mortal soul, and as one part of this was superior and 
 the other inferior they divided the cavity of the thorax into 
 two parts, as the women's and men's apartments are divided in 
 houses ; and placed the midriff to be a wall of partition be- 
 tween them. 
 
 That part of the inferior soul which is endowed with cour- 
 age and passion and loves contention they settled nearer the 
 head, in the interval between the midriff and the neck, in 
 order that it might be under the rule of reason, and might 
 join with it in controlling and restraining the desires when they 
 are no longer willing of their own accord to obey the word of 
 command issuing from the citadel. 
 
 The heart, which is the knot of the veins and the fountain of 
 the blood flowing rapidly through all the limbs, was set in the 
 place of guard that when passion was roused by reason mak- 
 ing proclamation of any wrong assailing them from without or 
 being perpetrated by the desires within, quickly the whole 
 power of feeling in the body, perceiving these commands and 
 threats, might obey and follow through every turn and alley, 
 and thus allow the principle of the best to have the command 
 in all of them. But as the gods foreknew that the palpitation 
 of the heart in the expectation of danger and the swelling and 
 excitement of passion was caused by fire, they formed and im- 
 planted as a supporter to the heart the lung, which was, in the 
 first place, soft and bloodless, and also had within hollows like 
 the pores of a sponge, in order that, receiving the breath and 
 the drink and cooling them, it might give the power of respi- 
 ration and alleviate the heat. For which reason they cut the 
 arteries or air vessels as passages to the lung, and placed the 
 lung about the heart as a soft spring, that, when passion was 
 rife within, the heart, beating against the yielding body, might 
 be refreshed and suffer less, and might thus become more ready 
 to enlist passion in the service of reason. 
 
 The part of the soul which desires meats and drinks and 
 such things as the bodily frame needs, they placed between 
 the midriff and the navel, contriving in all this region a sort 
 of manger for the food of the body ; and there they bound 
 the desires down as a wild animal which was chained up with 
 man, and must be nourished if man was to exist. They ap- 
 pointed this lower creation his place here in order that he 
 might be always feeding at the manger, and have his dwell- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 43 
 
 ing as far as possible from the council chamber, making as 
 little noise and disturbance as possible, and permitting the 
 best part to advise quietly for the good of the whole. And 
 knowing and considering that this lower principle in man 
 would not listen to reason, and even if attaining to some de- 
 gree of perception would never naturally care for any argu- 
 ments, and was liable to be led away by phantoms and visions 
 of the night and also by day, God framed the liver, to dwell 
 in the same house with the lower nature, contriving that it 
 should be solid and smooth, and bright and sweet, and also bit- 
 ter, in order that the power of thought, which originates in the 
 mind, might be reflected as in a mirror which receives and 
 gives back images of them to the sight. And this power 
 making use of the bitter part of the liver, to which it is akin, 
 inspires terror, and comes threatening and invading, and sud- 
 denly mingling with the entire liver produces colors like bile, 
 and contracts every part, and makes it wrinkled and rough ; 
 or, on the other hand, twisting out of their right place and 
 contracting the lobe and receptacles and gates, or again, closing 
 and shutting them up in these and other ways creates pain 
 and disgust. And the converse happens when some gentle in- 
 spiration of the understanding pictures images of an opposite 
 character, and allays the bile and bitterness by not stirring 
 them, and refuses to touch the nature opposed to itself, but by 
 making use of the natural sweetness of the liver, corrects all 
 things and makes them to be right and smooth and free, and 
 makes the portion of the soul which resides about the liver 
 happy and joyful, having in the night a time of peace and 
 moderation, and the power of divination in dreams, inasmuch 
 as it does not share in mind and reason. For the authors of 
 our being, remembering the command of their father when he 
 bade them make the human race as good as they could, thus 
 ordered our inferior parts in order that they too might obtain 
 a measure of truth, and in the liver placed their oracle, and 
 herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination hot 
 to the wisdom, but to the foolishness of man. For no man, 
 when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration ; but 
 when he receives the inspired word either his intelligence is 
 enthralled by sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or 
 possession. And he who would understand what he remem- 
 bers to have been said, whether in a dream or when he was 
 awake, by the prophetic and enthusiastic nature, or what he 
 
44 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 has seen, must first recover his wits ; and then he will be able 
 to explain rationally what all such words and apparitions 
 mean, and what indications they afford to this man or that, of 
 past, present, or future good and evil. But, while he contin- 
 ues demented, he cannot judge of the visions which he sees or 
 the words which he utters ; the ancient saying is very true, that 
 " only a man who has his wits can act or judge about himself 
 and his own affairs." And for this reason it is customary to 
 appoint diviners or interpreters to be judges of the true inspi- 
 ration. Some persons call them prophets; they do not know 
 that they are only repeaters of dark sayings and visions, and 
 are not to be called prophets at all, but only interpreters of 
 prophecy. 1 Timaeus, ii. 561. 
 Body and soul, health of. 
 
 Soc. What use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body 
 
 of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the 
 most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which 
 may be really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or 
 even worse, if rightly estimated. Is not that true ? 
 
 Gal. I will not say no to that. 
 
 Soc. For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if 
 his body is in an evil plight -*- in that case his life also is evil : 
 am I not right ? 
 
 Gal Yes. 
 
 Soc. When a man is in health the physicians will generally 
 allow him to eat when he is hungry, and drink when he is 
 thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is 
 sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all : even 
 you will admit that ? 
 
 Gal. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my 
 good sir ? While she is in a bad state and is senseless and in- 
 temperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be con- 
 trolled, and she ought to be prevented from doing anything 
 which does not tend to her own improvement. 
 
 Gal. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And that will be for her true interests ? 
 
 Gal. To be sure. 
 
 Soc. And controlling her desires is chastising her ? 
 
 1 Plato's ideas on the physical structure of man are given at large in succeeding 
 pages too lengthily to be inserted here. Those who are curious to know in full his 
 views on human physiology should read the whole of the " Timaeus." 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 45 
 
 Cal. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Then control or chastisement is better for the soul than 
 
 intemperance or the absence of control. Gorgias, iii. 96. 
 
 Body and soul, two processes of training. 
 
 Oh, my friend ! I want you to see that the noble and the 
 
 good may possibly be something different from saving and being 
 saved, and that he who is truly a man ought not to care about 
 living a certain time ; he knows, as women say, that we must- 
 all die, and therefore he is not fond of life ; he leaves all that 
 with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his 
 appointed term ; whether by assimilating himself to that con- 
 stitution under which he lives, as you at this moment have to 
 consider, how you may become as like as possible to the Athe- 
 nian people, if you intend to be dear to them, and to have 
 power in the State ; whereas I want you to think and see 
 whether this is for the interest of either of us ; I would not 
 have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this 
 power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, 
 bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own 
 perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the 
 art of becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming your- 
 self to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then 
 I can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles ; for he who 
 would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian 
 Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes' darling, who is called after 
 them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. 
 He, then, who will make you most like them, will make you 
 as you desire, a statesman and orator : for every man is pleased, 
 when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dis- 
 likes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of 
 another mind. What do you say ? 
 
 Cal. Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear 
 to me to be good words ; and yet, like the rest of the world, I 
 am not quite convinced by you. 
 
 Soc. The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which 
 abides in your soul is an adversary to me ; but I dare say 
 that if we recur to these same matters, and consider them 
 more thoroughly, you may be convinced for all that. Please, 
 then, to remember that there are two processes of training 
 all things, including body and soul ; in the one, as we said, 
 we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other 
 with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge 
 
46 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 but resist them : was not that the distinction which we 
 drew ? 
 
 Gal. Very true. Gorgias, iii. 104. 
 Body after death. 
 
 - Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation from 
 one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. And 
 after they are separated they retain their several characteristics, 
 which are much the same as in life ; the body has the same 
 nature and ways and affections, all clearly discernible ; for ex- 
 ample, he who by nature or training or both was a tall man 
 while he was alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead ; and 
 the fat man will remain fat ; and so on ; and the dead man, 
 who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have flowing 
 hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints 
 of the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you 
 might see the same in the dead body ; and if his limbs were 
 broken or misshapen when he was alive the same appearance 
 would be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was 
 the habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after 
 death, either perfectly, or in a great measure and for a con- 
 siderable time. And I should imagine that this is equally true 
 of the soul, Callicles ; when a man is stripped of the body, all 
 the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to 
 view. Arid when they come to the judge, as those from Asia 
 come to Rhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects 
 them quite impartially, not knowing whose the soul is : per- 
 haps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of some 
 other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his 
 soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars 
 of perjuries, and crimes with which each action has stained him, 
 and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no 
 straightness, because he has lived without truth. Him Rhada- 
 manthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which 
 is caused by license and luxury and insolence and incontinence, 
 and dispatches him iguominiously to his prison, and there he 
 undergoes the punishment which he deserves. 1 Gorgias, iii. 
 115. 
 Body and soul, mixtures of. 
 
 Soc. There are some mixtures which are of the body, 
 
 and only in the body, and others which are of the soul, and 
 
 1 The mythology of the Greeks as to the future state is largely given by Plato in 
 his " Gorgias." 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 47 
 
 only in the soul ; while there are other mixtures of pleasures 
 with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their com- 
 posite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains. 
 
 Pro. How is that ? 
 
 Soc. Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of 
 nature, a man experiences two opposite feelings ; for example, 
 when he is cold and is growing warm, or again, when he is hot 
 and is being cooled, and he wants to have the one and be free 
 from the other ; the sweet has a bitter, as they say, and both 
 together fasten upon him, and create irritation and in time 
 drive him to distraction. 
 
 Pro. That description is very true to nature. Philebus, iii. 
 185. 
 Body, honor of the. 
 
 Speaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and 
 
 improve the inferior, which is susceptible of improvement, in 
 the best manner possible. And of all the possessions which a 
 man has, the soul is by nature most inclined to avoid the evil, 
 and search out and find the chief good ; and having found, to 
 dwell with the good, during the remainder of life. Wherefore 
 the soul also is second in honor ; and third, as every one will 
 perceive, comes the honor of the body in natural order. Hav- 
 ing determined this, we have next to consider that there is 
 a genuine honor of the body, and that of honors some are and 
 some are not genuine. The legislator, as I suspect, ranks them 
 in the following order : Honor is not to be given to the fair, or 
 the strong, or the swift, or the tall, or the healthy body (although 
 many may think otherwise), any more than to their opposites ; 
 but the mean states of all these habits are by far the safest and 
 most moderate ; for the one extreme makes the soul braggart 
 and insolent, and the other, illiberal and mean ; and money, 
 and property, and distinction, all go to the same tune. The 
 excess of any of these things is apt to be a source of hatreds and 
 divisions among states and individuals ; and the defect of them 
 is commonly a cause of slavery. Laws, iv. 253. 
 Boldness of the Philosopher as to death. 
 
 Simmias, as the true philosophers are ever studying death, 
 to them, of all men, death is the least terrible. Look at the 
 matter in this way : if they have been always enemies of the 
 body, and wanting to have the soul alone, when this is granted 
 to them, how inconsistent would they be to be trembling and 
 repining ; instead of rejoicing at their departing to that place 
 
-I' 
 
 48 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life 
 they loved (and this was wisdom), and at the same time to be 
 rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been 
 willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of see- 
 ing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with 
 them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is 
 strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below 
 he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death ? Will he not 
 depart with joy ? Surely he will, my friend, if he be a true 
 philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there 
 only, and nowhere else, he can find wisdom in Ijer purity. And 
 if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he 
 were to fear death. 
 
 He would indeed, replied Simmias. 
 
 And when you see a man who is repining at the approach 
 of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a 
 lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at the 
 same time a lover of either money or power, or both ? 
 
 That is very true, he replied. 
 
 There is a virtue, Simmias, which is named courage. Is not 
 that characteristic of the philosopher ? 
 
 Certainly. Phaedo, i. 394. 
 oldness in thought. 
 
 Theaet. I cannot say, Socrates, that knowledge is all opin- 
 ion, because there may be a false opinion ; but I will venture 
 to say, that knowledge is true opinion ; let this then be my 
 answer ; and if this is hereafter disproved, I must try to find 
 another. 
 
 Soc. That is the way in which you ought to answer, Theaet- 
 etus, and not in your former hesitating strain, for if we are 
 bold we shall gain one of two advantages ; either we shall find 
 that which we seek, or we shall be less likely to think that we 
 know what we do not know and this surely is no mean re- 
 ward. Theaetetus, iii. 391. 
 Boundaries, removal of. See Landmarks. 
 Brave, honor to the. See Battle, death in. 
 
 There is another manner in which, according to Homer,' 
 
 brave youths should be honored ; for he tells how Ajax, after 
 he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long 
 chines, which seems to be a complement appropriate to a hero 
 in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of honor but 
 also a very strengthening thing. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 49 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
 Then in this, I said, Homer will be our teacher ; and we 
 too, at sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honor the brave, 
 whether men or women, with hymns 
 
 " and seats of precedence, and meats and flowing goblets ; " 
 
 and in honoring them, we shall also be training them. 
 
 That, be replied, is excellent. 
 
 Yes, I said ; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall 
 we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race ? 
 
 To be sure. 
 
 Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that 
 when they are dead 
 
 " They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of ill, the guardians 
 of speech-gifted men? " 
 
 Yes, and we believe him. 
 
 We must inquire of the God how we are to order the sepul- 
 ture of divine and heroic personages, and do as he bids ? 
 
 By all means. 
 
 And in ages to come we will do service to them and worship 
 at their shrines as heroes. And not only they but any who 
 are preeminently good, whether they die from age, or in any 
 other way, shall be admitted to the same honors. 
 
 That is very right, he said. 
 
 Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies ? What do 
 you say about this ? 
 
 In what respect do you mean ? 
 
 I mean, shall they be made slaves? Do you think that 
 Hellenes ought to enslave Hellenes, or allow others to en- 
 slave them, if they can help ? Should not their custom be to 
 spare them, considering the danger which there is that the 
 whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians ? 
 
 To spare them is infinitely better.. The Republic, ii. 296. 
 Brave sons of brave parents. See State, Heroes, etc. 
 Burial and remembrance of the dead. 
 
 At their death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither 
 exceeding the customary expense, nor yet falling short of the 
 honor which has been usually shown by the former generation 
 to their parents ; and let a man not forget to pay the yearly 
 tribute of respect to the dead, honoring them chiefly by omitting 
 nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them, 
 and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead. 
 4 
 
50 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our- 
 reward from the Gods and those who are above us ; and we 
 shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. Laws, 
 iv. 245. 
 Business, men of their money-sting. 
 
 On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they 
 
 walk, and pretending not even to see those whom they have 
 already ruined, insert the sting that is, their money into 
 some one else who is not on his guard against them, and re- 
 cover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family 
 of children : and so they make drone and pauper to abound in 
 the State. 
 
 Yes, he said, there are plenty of them, that is certain. 
 
 The evil is like a fire which is blazing up, and which they 
 will not extinguish. The Republic, ii. 383. 
 
 Calmness in view of death. See Courage. 
 
 Soc. Why have you come at this hour, Crito ? it must be 
 
 quite early ? 
 
 Crito. Yes, certainly. 
 
 Soc. What is the exact time ? 
 
 Or. The dawn is breaking. 
 
 Soc. I wonder the keeper of the prison would let you in. 
 
 Cr. He knows me because I often come, Socrates ; more- 
 over, I have done him a kindness. 
 
 Soc. And are you only just arrived ? 
 
 Cr. No, I came some time ago. 
 
 Soc. Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of at 
 once awakening me ? 
 
 Cr. By the Gods, Socrates, I would rather not myself have 
 all this sleeplessness and sorrow. I have been wondering at 
 your peaceful slumbers, which was the reason why I did not 
 awaken you, because I wanted you to be out of pain. I have 
 always thought you of a happy disposition ; but never did I 
 see anything like the easy, tranquil manner in which you bear 
 this calamity. 
 
 Soc. Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought 
 not to be repining at the prospect of death. 
 
 Or. And yet other old men find themselves in similar mis- 
 fortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining. 
 Orito, i. 347. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 51 
 
 Causes and conditions confounded. 
 
 J found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any 
 other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, 
 and water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to 
 a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the 
 cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavored 
 to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on 
 to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones 
 and muscles ; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and 
 have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and 
 they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environ- 
 ment of flesh and skin which contains them ; and as the bones 
 are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the 
 muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sit- 
 ting here in a curved posture ; that is what he would say, and 
 he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, 
 which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and 
 he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, 
 forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athe- 
 nians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have 
 thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo 
 my sentence ; for I am inclined to think that these muscles and 
 bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Boe- 
 otia, by the dog of Egypt they would, if they had been moved 
 only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen 
 as the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and run- 
 ning away, to undergo any punishment which the State inflicts. 
 There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in 
 all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and mus- 
 cles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my pur- 
 poses. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that 
 this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of 
 the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I won- 
 der that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, 
 which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistak- 
 ing and misnaming. Phaedo, i. 427. 
 Cause, limit and, in the Universe. See Limit t etc. 
 Cause for every creation. 
 
 What is that which always is and has no becoming ; and 
 
 what is that which is always becoming and never is ? That 
 which is apprehended by intelligence and reason always is, and 
 is the same ; but that which is conceived by opinion with the 
 
52 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of 
 becoming and perishing, but never really is. Now everything 
 that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by 
 some cause, for nothing can be created without a cause. The 
 work of the artificer who looks always to the abiding and the 
 unchangeable, and who designs and fashions his work after an 
 unchangeable pattern, must of necessity be made fair and per- 
 fect ; but that of an artificer who looks to the created only, 
 and fashions his work after a created pattern, is not fair or 
 perfect. Was the heaven then or the world, whether called by 
 this or any other more acceptable name assuming the name, 
 I am asking a question which has to be asked at the beginning 
 of every inquiry was the world, I say, always in existence 
 and without beginning ? or created and having a beginning ? 
 Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body, 
 and therefore sensible ; and all sensible things which are ap- 
 prehended by opinion and sense are in a process of creation 
 and created. Now that which is created must of necessity be 
 created by a cause. Timaeus, ii. 523. 
 Cause, mind a. See Mind, etc. 
 Causes ; two kinds of, intelligent and unintelligent. 
 
 These are the works of the second and cooperative causes 
 
 which God, carrying into execution the idea of the best as far 
 as possible, uses as his ministers. They are thought by most 
 men not to be the second, but the prime causes of all things, 
 because they freeze and heat, and contract and dilate, and the 
 like. But they are not so, for they are incapable of reason or 
 intellect ; the only being which can properly have mind is the 
 invisible soul, whereas fire and water, and earth and air, are 
 all of them visible bodies. The lover of intellect and knowl- 
 edge ought to explore causes of intelligent nature first of all, 
 and, secondly, of those which are moved by others and of ne- 
 cessity move others. And this we too must now do. Both 
 kinds of causes should be considered by us, but a distinction 
 should be made between those which are endowed with mind 
 and are the workers of things fair and good, and those which 
 are deprived of intelligence and accomplish their several works 
 by chance and without order. Of the second or concurrent 
 causes of sight, which give to the eyes the power which they 
 now possess, enough has been said. I will therefore now pro- 
 ceed to speak of the higher use and purpose for which God 
 has given them to us. The sight in my opinion is the source 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 53 
 
 of the greatest benefit to us, for had the eyes never seen the 
 stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words which 
 we have spoken about the universe would ever have been ut- 
 tered. But now the sight of day and night, and the revolution 
 of the months and years, have given us the invention of number, 
 and a conception of time, and the power of inquiring about the 
 nature of the whole ; and from this source we have derived 
 philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or will be 
 given by the gods to mortal man. This is the greatest boon 
 of sight : and of the lesser benefits why should I speak, even 
 the ordinary man if he were blind would in vain bewail the 
 loss of them. 
 
 Thus much let me say however : God invented and gave us 
 sight to the end, that we might behold the courses of intelli- 
 gence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our own 
 intelligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed to the per- 
 turbed ; and that we, learning them and being partakers of the 
 true computations of nature, might imitate the absolutely un- 
 erring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries. The 
 same may be affirmed of speech and hearing ; they have been 
 given by the gods to the same end and for a like reason. 
 For this is the principal end of speech, and there is a similar 
 use of musical sound, which is given to the hearing for the sake 
 of harmony. And harmony, which has motions akin to the 
 revolutions of our souls, is not regarded by him who intelli- 
 gently uses the Muses as given by them with a view to irra- 
 tional pleasure, which is the prevailing opinion in our day, but 
 with a view to the inharmonical course of the soul, and to be 
 our ally in reducing this into harmony and agreement with 
 itself ; and rhythm was given by them for the same reason, on 
 account of the irregular and graceless ways which prevail 
 among mankind generally, and to help us against them. 
 
 Thus far in what we have been saying, with small exceptions 
 the works of intelligence have been set forth ; and now we 
 must place by the side of them the things done from necessity 
 for the creation is mixed, being made up of necessity and 
 mind. Mind, the ruling power, persuaded necessity to bring 
 the greater part of created things to perfection, and thus in the 
 beginning, when the influence of reason got the better of neces- 
 sity, the universe was created. But if a person will truly tell 
 of the way in which the work was accomplished, he must in- 
 clude the other influence of the variable cause as well. Where- 
 
54 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 fore, we must return again and find another suitable beginning, 
 as about the former matters, so also about these. To which 
 end we must consider the nature of fire, and water, and air, and 
 earth, which were prior to the creation of the heavens, and 
 what happened before there were elements ; for no one has as 
 yet explained them, but we speak of fire and the rest of them, 
 whatever they mean, as though men knew their natures, and 
 we maintain them to be the letters or elements of the whole, 
 when they cannot reasonably be compared by a man of any 
 sense even to the syllables or first compounds. And let me 
 say thus much : I will not speak of the first principle or prin- 
 ciples of all things, or by whatever name they are to be called, 
 for this reason, because it is difficult to set forth my opinion 
 according to the mode of discussion which we are at present 
 employing. Do not imagine, any more than I can bring my- 
 self to imagine, that I should be right in undertaking so diffi- 
 cult a task. I will observe the rule of probability with which 
 I began, not less but more than others and especially when I 
 speak of the beginning of each and all. Once more, then, I 
 call upon God, at the beginning of my discourse, and beg him 
 to be our saviour out of a strange and unwonted inquiry, and 
 to bring us to probability. Timaeus, ii. 539. 
 Censorship of Fiction. See Fiction. 
 Censure, right and good. 
 
 Aih. At our time of life, Cleinias, there should be no feel- 
 ing of irritation. 
 
 Gle. Certainly not. 
 
 Aih. I will not at present determine whether he who cen- 
 sures the Cretan or Lacedaemonian polities is right or wrong. 
 But I believe that I can tell better than either of you what 
 the many say about them. For assuming that you have rea- 
 sonably good laws, one of the best of them will be a law for- 
 bidding any young men to inquire which of them are right or 
 wrong ; but with one mouth and one voice, they must all agree 
 that the laws are all good and of divine origin ; and any one 
 who says the contrary is not to be listened to. But an old man 
 who remarks any defect, may communicate his observation to a 
 ruler or to an equal when no young man is present. 
 
 Cle. Exactly so, Stranger ; and like a diviner, although not 
 there at the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the mean- 
 ing of the legislator, and to say what is most true. 
 
 Ath. As there are no young men present, and the legislator 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 55 
 
 has given old men free license, there will be no impropriety in 
 our discussing these matters now that we are alone. 
 
 Cle. True. And, therefore, you may be as free as you like 
 in your censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in know- 
 ing what is wrong ; he who receives what is said in a generous 
 and friendly spirit will be the better for it. 
 
 Ath. Very good ; however, I am not going to censure your 
 laws until to the best of my ability I have examined them, but 
 I am going to raise doubts about them. For you are the only 
 people known to us, whether Greek or barbarian, whom the 
 legislator commanded to eschew all great pleasures and amuse- 
 ments ; whereas in the matter of pains or fears which we have 
 just been discussing, he thought that they who from infancy 
 had always avoided the pains, and fears and sorrows which 
 must be, when they were compelled to face them would run 
 away from those who were hardened in them, and become their 
 subjects. 
 
 Now the legislator ought to have considered that this was 
 equally true of pleasure ; he should have said to himself, that 
 if our citizens, are from their youth upward unacquainted with 
 the greatest pleasure, and unused to endure amid the tempta- 
 tions of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all 
 things evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will overcome them 
 just as fear would overcome the former class ; and in another, 
 and even a worse manner, they will be the servants of those 
 who are able to endure amid pleasures, and have had the 
 opportunity of enjoying them, they being often the worst of 
 mankind. One half of their souls will be a slave, the other half 
 free ; and they will not be worthy to be called in the true sense 
 men and freemen. Tell me whether you assent to my words ? 
 
 Cle. On first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth ; 
 but to be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important 
 matters, would be very childish and simple. Laws, iv. 165. 
 Chance and Nature. See Nature. 
 Chance in legislation. See Legislation, etc. 
 
 angeableuess of Youth. 
 
 When a young man who has been brought up as we were 
 just now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted 
 drones' honey and has come to associate with fierce and danger- 
 ous natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refine- 
 ments and varieties of pleasure, then, as you may imagine, 
 the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him 
 into the democratical. 
 
 v Ch 
 \ Ch 
 
 4- Ch 
 
56 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Inevitably. 
 
 And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was 
 effected by an alliance from without assisting one division of 
 the citizens, so the young man also changes by a class of de- 
 sires from without assisting the unsatisfied desires within him, 
 that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin 
 and alike. 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical princi- 
 ple within him, whether the influence of friends or kindred, 
 advising or rebuking him, then there arises a faction and an 
 opposite faction, and the result is a civil war. 
 
 It must be so. 
 
 And there are times when the democratical principle gives 
 way to the oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others 
 are banished ; a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's 
 soul and order is restored. 
 
 Yes, he said, that sometimes happens. 
 
 And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out 
 fresh ones spring up, which are akin to them ; and because he 
 their father does not know how to educate them, wax fierce 
 and numerous. 
 
 Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way. 
 
 They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret in- 
 tercourse with them, breed and multiply in him ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's 
 soul, which they perceive to be void of all fair accomplish- 
 ments and pursuits of every true word, which are the best 
 guardians and sentinels in the minds of men who are dear to 
 the gods. 
 
 None better. 
 
 False and boastful words and conceits mount upwards in- 
 stead of them, and occupy the vacant post. 
 
 They are sure to do so. 
 
 And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus- 
 eaters, and takes up his abode there in the face of all men, 
 and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part 
 of him, the same vain conceits shut the gate of the king's fast- 
 ness ; they will not allow the new allies to pass. And if pri- 
 vate individuals, venerable for their age, come and parley, they 
 do not receive them ; there is a battle and they win : then 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 57 
 
 modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into 
 exile by them. They affirm temperance to be unmanliness, 
 and her also they contemptuously eject ; and they pretend that 
 moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and mean- 
 ness ; and, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites they drive 
 them beyond the border. 
 
 Yes, with a will. 
 
 And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of 
 him who is now in their power, and is being initiated by them 
 in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their 
 house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in 
 bright array, having garlands on their heads, with a great com- 
 pany, while they hymn their praises and call them by sweet 
 names ; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and 
 waste magnificence, and impudence courage. And so the 
 young man passes out of his original nature, which was 
 trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and liber- 
 tinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures. 
 
 Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough. 
 
 After this he lives on, spending his money and labor and 
 time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary 
 ones ; but if he.be fortunate, and is not too much intoxicated 
 with passion, when he gets older, after the great tumult has 
 passed away supposing that he then readmits into the city 
 some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give him- 
 self up to their successors in that case he balances his pleas- 
 ures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government 
 of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and 
 wins the turn ; and when he has had enough of that, then into 
 the hands of another, and is very impartial in his encourage- 
 ment of them all. 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
 Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any 
 true word of advice ; if any one says to him that some pleas- 
 ures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others 
 of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honor some and 
 curtail and reduce others whenever this is repeated to him 
 he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that 
 one is as honorable as another. 
 
 Yes, he said ; that is the way with him. 
 
 Yes, I said, he lives through the day indulging the appetite 
 of the hour ; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains 
 
58 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 of the flute ; then he is for total abstinence, and tries to get 
 thin ; then, again, he is at gymnastics ; sometimes idling and 
 neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a phil- 
 osopher ; often he is at politics, and starts to his feet and says 
 and does whatever comes into his head ; and, if he is emulous 
 of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, "or of 
 men of business, once more in that. His life has neither 
 order nor law ; and so he goes on continually and he terms 
 this joy and freedom and happiness. 
 
 Yes, his life is all liberty, and equality. 
 
 Yes, I said ; and multiform and full of the most various 
 characters ; he answers to the State which we described as 
 fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will 
 emulate him and many a constitution and many an example of 
 life is contained in him. The Republic, ii. 388. 
 Children, spoiled by friends. 
 
 Soc. The question is, Which of us is skillful or successful 
 
 in the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good 
 teachers ? 
 
 La. Well but, Socrates ; did you never observe that some 
 'persons, who have had no teachers, are more skillful than those 
 'who have, in some things ? 
 
 Soc. Yes, Laches, I have observed that ; but you would not 
 be very willing to trust them if they only professed to be mas- 
 ters of their art, unless they could show some proof of their 
 skill or excellence in one or more works. 
 
 La. That is true. 
 
 Soc. And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and 
 Melesias, in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, 
 have asked our advice about them, we too should tell them 
 who our teachers were, if we say that we have had any, and 
 prove them to be men of merit and experienced trainers of the 
 minds of youth and really our teachers. Or if any of us says 
 that he has no teacher, but that he has works to show of his 
 own ; then he should point out to them, what Athenians or 
 strangers, bond or free, he is generally acknowledged to have 
 improved. But if he can show neither teachers nor works, 
 then he should tell them to look out for others ; and not to 
 run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, which is the 
 most formidable accusation that can be brought against any 
 one by those nearest to him. Laches, i. 78. 
 
PLATO'S HEST THOUGHT*. 59 
 
 Children, training of, not easy. 
 
 Just as I thought that I had finished, and was only too 
 
 glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and was reflecting 
 how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, 
 you begin again, ignorant of what a hornet's nest of words, 
 you are arousing. Now I foresaw this coming trouble, and 
 avoided it. 
 
 For what do you think that we are here ? said Thrasyma- 
 chus ; to find the philosopher's stone, or to hear discourse ? 
 
 Yes, but discourse should have a limit. 
 
 Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the 
 only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such dis- 
 courses. But never mind about us ; only get on and in your 
 own way answer the question : What sort of community of 
 women and children is this which is to prevail among the guard- 
 ians ? and how shall we manage the period between birth and 
 education which seems to require the greatest care ? Tell us 
 how these things will be. 
 
 Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy ; 
 many more doubts arise about this than about our previous 
 speculations. For the practicability of what is said may be 
 doubted ; and looked at in another point of view, whether the 
 scheme, if ever so practicable, will be for the best, is also 
 doubtful. Hence there arises a fear, as we draw near, lest our 
 aspiration should be a dream only. The Republic , ii. 274. 
 Children, taught their letters. 
 
 - Sir. I will proceed, finding as I do, such a ready listener in 
 you : when children are beginning to know their letters 
 
 T. Soc. What are you going to say ? 
 
 Sir. That they easily recognize the several letters in very 
 short and easy syllables, and are able to tell you them cor- 
 rectly. 
 
 T. Soc. Certainly. 
 
 Str. Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, 
 and think and speak falsely of them. 
 
 Y. Soc. Very true. 
 
 Str. Will not the best and easiest way of guiding them to 
 the letters which they do not as yet know, be to refer them to 
 the same letters in the words which they know, and to compare 
 these with the letters which as yet they do not know, and show 
 them that they are the same, and have the same character in 
 their different combinations, until the letters, which they do not 
 
60 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 know, have been all placed side by side with the letters which 
 
 they do know ? in this way they have examples, and are made 
 
 to learn that every letter in every combination is pronounced 
 
 always either as the same or not the same. Statesman, iii. 
 
 562. 
 
 Children, what they owe to their parents. See Parents. 
 
 Next comes the honor of living parents, to whom, as is 
 
 meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all 
 debts, considering that all which a man has belongs to those 
 who gave him birth and brought him up, and that he must do 
 all that he can to minister to them : first, in his property ; 
 secondly, in his person ; and thirdly, in his soul ; paying the 
 debts due to them for the care and travail which they bestowed 
 upon him of old, in the days of his infancy, and which he is 
 now to pay back to them when they are old and in the ex- 
 tremity of their need. And all his life long he ought never to 
 utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them ; for of 
 all light and winged words he will have to give an account ; 
 Nemesis, the messenger of Justice, is appointed to watch over 
 them. When they are angry, and want to satisfy their feel- 
 ings in word or deed, he should not resist them, for a father 
 who thinks that he has been wronged by his son, may be rea- 
 sonably expected to be very angry. Laws, iv. 245. 
 Children, falsely trained. 
 
 Ath. I imagine that Cyrus, though a great and patriotic gen- 
 eral, had never given his mind to education, and never attended 
 to the order of his household. 
 
 Cle. What makes you say so ? 
 
 Ath. I think that from his youth upwards he was a soldier, 
 and intrusted the bringing up of his children to the women ; 
 and they brought them up from their childhood as the favorites 
 of fortune, who were blessed already, and needed no more 
 blessings. They thought that they were happy enough, and 
 that no one should be allowed to oppose them in any way, and 
 they compelled every one to praise all that they said or did. 
 This was the manner in which they brought them up. 
 
 Cle. A splendid education truly ! 
 
 Ath. Such an education as women were likely to give them, 
 and especially princesses who had recently grown rich, and in 
 the absence of the men, too, who were occupied in wars and 
 dangers, and too busy to look after them. 
 
 Cle. What would you expect? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 61 
 
 Ath. Their father had possessions of cattle and sheep, and 
 many herds of men and other animals ; but he did not con- 
 sider that those to whom he was about to make them over, 
 were not trained in his own calling, which was Persian ; for 
 the Persians are shepherds sons of a rugged land, which was 
 a stern mother, and well fitted to produce a sturdy race able to 
 live in the open air and watch, and to fight also, if fighting was 
 required. lie did not observe that his sons were trained dif- 
 ferently ; through the so-called blessing of being royal, they 
 were educated in the corrupt Median fashion by women and 
 eunuchs, which led to their becoming such as people do become 
 fjwhen they are brought up unreproved. And so, after the 
 death of Cyrus, his sons, in the fullness of luxury and license, 
 took the kingdom, and first one slew the other because he 
 could not endure a rival ; and, afterwards, the slayer himself, 
 mad with wine and brutality, lost his kingdom through the 
 Medes and the eunuch, as they called him, who despised the 
 folly of Cambyses. 
 
 Cle. That is what is said, and is probably the truth. 
 
 Ath. Yes ; and the tradition says, that the empire came back 
 to the Persians, through Darius and the seven chiefs. 
 
 Cle. True. 
 
 Ath. Let us note the rest of the story. Observe, that Darius 
 was not the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious 
 education. When he came to the throne, being one of the 
 seven, he divided the country into seven portions, and of this 
 arrangement there are some shadowy traces still remaining ; he 
 made laws upon the principle of introducing universal equality 
 in the order of the State, and he embodied in a law the settle- 
 ment of the tribute which Cyrus promised, thus creating a 
 feeling of friendship and community among all the Persians, 
 and attaching the people to him with money and gifts. Hence 
 his armies cheerfully acquired for him countries as large as 
 those which Cyrus had left behind him. Darius was suc- 
 ceeded by his son Xerxes, and he again was brought up in the 
 royal and luxurious fashion. Might we not justly say, " O 
 Darius, why did you not learn wisdom from the misfortunes of 
 Cyrus, instead of bringing up Xerxes in the same way in which 
 he brought up Cambyses ? " For Xerxes being the creation of 
 the same education, met with much the same fortune as Camby- 
 ses ; and from that time to this there has never been a really 
 great king among the Persians, although they are all called 
 
62 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 great. And their degeneracy is not to be attributed to chance, 
 as I maintain ; the reason is rather the evil life which is gen- 
 erally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons ; for 
 never will boy or man, young or old, excel in virtue, who has 
 been thus educated. And this, I say, is what the legislator 
 has to consider, and what at this moment has to be considered 
 by us. Justly may you, O Lacedaemonians, be praised for 
 this that you do not give special honor or maintenance to 
 wealth rather than to poverty in particular, or to a royal rather 
 than to a private station, where the divine and inspired law- 
 giver has not originally commanded them to be given. For no 
 man ought to have preeminent honor in a state because he sur- 
 passes others in wealth, any more than because he is swift or 
 fair or strong, unless he have some virtue in him ; nor even if 
 he have virtue, unless he have this particular virtue of temper- 
 ance. Laws, iv. 223. 
 Children, riches an evil left to. 
 
 I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for 
 
 the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as 
 rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no 
 use, either to them or to the State. The condition of youth 
 which is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of 
 the necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, 
 being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making 
 life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, 
 bequeath to their children not riches, but the spirit of rever- 
 ence. We, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from 
 us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. 
 But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present 
 style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought 
 always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather ex- 
 hort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take 
 heed that no young man sees or hears him doing or saying 
 anything base; for where old men have no shame, there young 
 men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way 
 of training the young, is to train yourself at the same time ; 
 not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own 
 principles in practice. Laws, iv. 254. 
 Children ; education of. See Youth, etc. 
 
 And now, assuming that children of both sexes have 
 
 been born, their nurture and education will properly follow 
 next in order ; this cannot be left altogether unnoticed, and 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 63 
 
 yet may be thought to be rather a subject for precept and ad- 
 monition than for law. In private life there are many little 
 things, not always apparent, arising out of the pleasures and 
 desires and pains of individuals, which are contrary to the in- 
 tention of the legislator ; these minutiae alter and discompose 
 the characters of the citizens, and cause great evil in states ; 
 for they are so small and of such frequent occurrence, that 
 there would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in mak- 
 ing them penal by law ; and if made penal, they are the de- 
 struction of the written law, because mankind get the habit of 
 frequently transgressing in small matters. The result is that 
 you cannot legislate about them, and still less can you say 
 nothing. I speak somewhat darkly, but I shall endeavor also 
 to bring my. wares into the light of day, for I acknowledge 
 that at present there is a want of clearness in what I am say- 
 ing. 
 
 Cle. Very true. 
 
 Ath. Am I not right in maintaining that a good education 
 is that which tends most to the improvement of mind and 
 body ? 
 
 Cle. Undoubtedly. 
 
 Ath. And nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies 
 ought to grow up from infancy in the best and straightest 
 manner ? 
 
 Cle. Very true. 
 
 Ath. And do we not further observe that the first shoot of 
 every living thing is by far the greatest and fullest ? Many 
 will even contend that a man at twenty-five does not grow to 
 twice the height which he attained at five. 
 
 Cle. True. 1 Laws, iv. 306. 
 Choral song; harmony in. 
 
 Ath. I was speaking at the commencement of our dis- 
 course, as you will remember, of the fiery nature of young 
 creatures ; I said that they were unable to keep quiet either in 
 limb or voice, and that they called out and jumped about in a 
 disorderly manner ; and that no other animal attained to any 
 perception of order, but man only. Now the order of motion 
 is called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high 
 and low are duly mingled, is called harmony ; and both to- 
 gether are termed choric song. And I said that the gods had 
 
 i In Book vii. of his " Laws," Plato discusses quite extensively the education of 
 children. 
 
64 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 pity on us, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our play- 
 fellows and leaders in the dance ; and Dionysus, as I dare say 
 that you will remember, was the third. 
 
 Cle. I quite remember. 
 
 Ath. Thus far I have spoken of the chorus of Apollo and 
 the Muses, and I have still to speak of the remaining chorus, 
 which is that of Dionysus. 
 
 Cle. How is that arranged ? There is something strange, at 
 any rate, on first hearing, in a Dionysiac chorus of old men, if 
 you really mean that those who are above thirty, and may be 
 fifty, or from fifty to sixty years of age, are to form a dance in 
 his honor. 
 
 Ath. That is very true ; and I think with you that some 
 reason should be given for the proposal. 
 
 Cle. Certainly. 
 
 Ath. Are we agreed thus far ? 
 
 Cle. About what ? 
 
 Ath. That every man and boy, slave and free, both sexes, 
 and the whole city, should never cease charming themselves 
 with the strains of which we have spoken ; and that there 
 should be every sort of change and variation of them in order 
 to take away the effect of sameness, so that the singers may 
 always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never 
 weary of them. Laws, iv. 194. 
 Choristers ; how they should sing. 
 
 Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imita- 
 tion, and therefore requires the greatest care of them all. For 
 if a man makes a mistake here, he may do himself the greatest 
 injury by welcoming evil dispositions, and the mistake may be 
 very difficult to discern, because the poets are artists very infe- 
 rior in character to the Muses themselves, who would never 
 fall into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men 
 the gestures and songs of women ; nor combine the melodies 
 and gestures of freemen with the rhythms of slaves and men 
 of the baser sort ; or, beginning with the rhythms and gestures 
 of freemen, assign to them a melody or words which are of an 
 opposite character ; nor would they mix up the voices and 
 sounds of animals and of men and instruments, and every 
 other sort of noise, as if they were all one. But human poets 
 are fond of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and 
 thus make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as 
 Orpheus says, " are ripe for pleasure." The experienced see all 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 65 
 
 this confusion, and yet the poets go on and make still further 
 havoc by separating the rhythm and the figure of the dance 
 from the melody, setting words to metre without music, and 
 also separating the melody and rhythm from the words, using 
 the lyre or the flute alone. For when there are no words, 
 it is very difficult to recognize the meaning of the harmony 
 and rhythm, or to see that any worthy object is imitated by 
 them. And we must acknowledge that all this sort of thing, 
 which aims only at swiftness and smoothness and a brutish 
 noise, and uses the flute and the lyre not as the mere accom- 
 paniments of the dance and song, is exceedingly rude and 
 coarse. The use of either, when unaccompanied by the others, 
 leads to every sort of irregularity and trickery. This is all 
 true enough. But we are considering not how our choristers, 
 who are from thirty to fifty years of age, and may be over 
 fifty, are not to use the Muses, but how are they to use them. 
 And the considerations which we have urged seem to show in 
 what way these fifty years' old choristers who are to sing, may 
 be expected to be better trained. For they need to have a 
 quick perception and knowledge of harmonies and rhythms ; 
 otherwise, how will they ever know which melodies would be 
 rightly sung to the Dorian mode, or to the rhythm which the 
 poet has assigned to them ? Laws, iv. 199. 
 Christ, unconsciously described. See Just man. 
 Cities, maritime, evil of, 
 
 Ath. Str. And now, what will this city be ? I do not 
 
 mean to ask what is or will be the name of the place ; that 
 may be determined by the accident of locality or of the origi- 
 nal settlement, a river or fountain, or some local deity may 
 give the sanction of a name to the newly founded city ; but I 
 do want to know what the situation is ; whether maritime or 
 inland ? 
 
 Oleinias. I should imagine, Stranger, that the city of which 
 we are speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea. 
 
 Ath. And are there harbors on the seaboard ? 
 
 Cle. Excellent harbors, Stranger ; there could not be better. 
 
 Ath. You don't say so ! And is the surrounding country 
 productive, or in need of importations ? 
 
 Cle. Hardly in need of anything. 
 
 Ath. And is there any neighboring State ? 
 
 Cle. None whatever, and that is the reason for selecting the 
 place; in days of old, there was a migration of the inhab- 
 
66 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 itants, and the region has been deserted from time immemo- 
 rial. 
 
 Ath. And has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, 
 and wood ? 
 
 Gle. Like the rest of Crete in that. 
 
 Ath. You mean to say that there is more rock than plain ? 
 
 Gle. Exactly. 
 
 Ath. Then there is some hope that your citizens may be 
 virtuous; had you been on the sea, and well provided with 
 harbors, and an importing rather than a producing country, 
 some mighty saviour would have been needed, and lawgivers 
 more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance of pre- 
 serving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners. 
 But there is comfort in the eighty stadia ; although the sea is 
 too near, especially if, as you say, the harbors are so good. 
 Still we must be satisfied. The sea is pleasant enough as a 
 daily companion, but has also a bitter and brackish quality ; 
 filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and beget- 
 ting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways mak- 
 ing the State unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, 
 and also to other nations. There is a consolation, therefore, in 
 the country producing all things at home ; and yet, owing to 
 the ruggedness of the soil, not providing anything in great 
 abundance. Had there been abundance there might have been 
 a great export trade, and a great return of gold and silver ; 
 which, as we may safely affirm, has the most fatal result on a 
 state whose aim is the attainment of just and noble sentiments ; 
 this was said by us, if you remember, in the previous discussion. 
 Laws, iv. 233. 
 Cities need faithful watchers. 
 
 Thus, my friends, and for the reasons given, should a 
 
 state act which would endure and be saved. But as a ship sail- 
 ing on the sea has to be watched night and day, in like manner 
 a city also is sailing on a sea of politics, and is liable to all sorts 
 of insidious assaults ; and therefore from morning to night, and 
 from night to morning, rulers must join hands with rulers, and 
 watchers succeed watchers, receiving and giving up their trust 
 in a perpetual order. A multitude can never fullfil a duty of 
 this sort with anything like energy ; moreover, the greater 
 number of the senators will have to be left during the greater 
 part of the year to order their concerns at their own homes. 
 They must be arranged in twelve portions, answering to twelve 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 67 
 
 months, and serve as guardians each portion for a single month. 
 Their business is to be at hand and receive any foreigner or 
 citizen who comes to them, whether to give information, or to 
 put questions of which other states are to receive the answers ; 
 or when the city desires to ask a question and receive an an- 
 swer, or again, when there is a likelihood of internal commo- 
 tions, which are always liable to happen in some form or other, 
 they will, if they can, prevent their occurring ; or if they have 
 already occurred, will lose no time in making them known to the 
 city, and healing the evil. Wherefore, also, this which is the 
 presiding body of the State, ought always to have the control of 
 their assemblies, and the dissolutions of them, regular as well 
 as occasional. All this is to be ordered by the twelfth part of 
 the council, which is always to keep watch together with the 
 officers of the State during one portion of the year and to rest 
 during the remaining eleven portions. 
 
 Thus will the city be fairly ordered. Laws, iv. 280. 
 Citizen, right of the State to the. See Authority. 
 Citizen, obligation of the. 
 
 Soc. Then the laws will say : " Consider, Socrates, if 
 
 we are speaking truly, that in your present attempt you are 
 going to do us an injury. For, after having brought you into 
 the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and 
 every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give, 
 we further proclaim to every Athenian, that if he does not 
 like us when he has come of age and has seen the ways of 
 the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he 
 pleases and take his goods with him ; and none of us laws will 
 forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not 
 like us and the city, and who wants to emigrate to a colony or 
 to any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods 
 with him. But he who has experience of the manner in which 
 we order justice and administer the State, and still remains, 
 has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we 
 command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, 
 thrice wrong: first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying 
 his parents ; secondly, because we are the authors of his educa- 
 tion ; thirdly because he has made an agreement with us that 
 he will duly obey our commands ; and he neither obeys them 
 nor convinces us that our commands are unjust ; and we do not 
 rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or 
 convincing us ; that is what we offer, and he does neither. 
 
68 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, 
 you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your inten- 
 tions ; you, above all other Athenians." Suppose I ask, why is 
 this ? they will justly retort upon me that I above all other men 
 have acknowledged the agreement. " There is clear proof," 
 they will say, "" Socrates, that we and the city were not displeas- 
 ing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most con- 
 stant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may 
 be supposed to love. For you never went out of the city 
 either to see the games, except once when you went to the Isth- 
 mus, or to any other place unless when you were on military 
 service ; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any 
 curiosity to know other states or their laws : your affections did 
 not go beyond us and our State ; we were your special favorites, 
 and you acquiesced in our government of you ; and here in 
 this city you begat your children, which is a proof of your 
 satisfaction. Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have 
 fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the trial the 
 State which refuses to let you go now would have let you go 
 then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile, 
 and that you were not grieved at death. And now you have 
 forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us the 
 laws, of whom you are the destroyer ; and are doing what only 
 a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your 
 back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a 
 citizen. And first of all answer this very question : Are we right 
 in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in 
 deed, and not in word only ? Is that true or not ? " How shall 
 we answer that, Crito ? Must we not assent ? 
 
 Cr. There is no help, Socrates. Crito, I 356. 
 Citizen, improvement of the. 
 
 Soc. And now, my friend, as you are already beginning 
 
 to be a public character, and are admonishing and reproaching 
 me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of 
 one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any 
 of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once 
 vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the 
 help of Callicles good and noble ? Was there ever such a man, 
 whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman ? Tell me, Cal- 
 licles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what 
 would you answer ? Whom would you say that you had im- 
 proved by your conversation? There may have been good 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 69 
 
 deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, 
 before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer ? 
 
 Col. You are contentious, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but 
 because I really want to know in what way you think that 
 affairs should be administered among us whether, when you 
 come to the administration of them, you have any other aim 
 but the improvement of the citizens ? Have we not already 
 admitted many times over that such is the duty of a public 
 man ? Nay, we have surely said so ; for if you will not answer 
 for yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the 
 good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own State, allow 
 me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just 
 now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and The- 
 mistocles, and ask whether you still think that they were good 
 citizens. 
 
 Gal. I do. Gorgias, iii. 106. 
 City, heavenly. See Heavenly idea of the earth. 
 City the mother of her citizens. See State, a parent, etc. 
 Clever unjust, the. 
 
 Look at things as they really are and you will see that 
 
 the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from 
 the starting-place to the goal, but not back again from the 
 goal : they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look 
 foolish, slinking away with their ears down on their shoulders, 
 and without a crown ; but the true runner comes to the finish 
 and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way 
 with the just ; he who endures to the end of every action and 
 occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the 
 prize which men bestow. 
 
 True. 
 
 And now you must allow me to repeat the blessings which 
 you attributed to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of the just 
 as you were saying of them, that as they grow older, if that is 
 their desire, they become rulers in their own city, if they care 
 to be ; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to 
 whomsoever they like ; all that you said of the others I now 
 say of these. And, on the other hand, I say of the unjust that 
 the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, 
 are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their 
 course, and when they come to be old and miserable are 
 flouted alike by stranger and citizen ; they are beaten and 
 
70 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term 
 them ; they will be racked and burned, as you were saying 
 but I shall ask you to imagine that I have repeated your tale 
 of horrors. The Republic, ii. 445. 
 Cognitions, ideas that are. 
 
 But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, 
 
 and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmen- 
 ides? For in that case each idea may still be one, and not 
 experience this infinite subdivision. 
 
 And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of 
 nothing ? 
 
 That is impossible, he said. 
 
 The thought must be of something ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Of something that is or is not ? 
 
 Of something that is. 
 
 Must it not be of a single something, which the thought rec- 
 ognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And will not this something, so apprehended which is al- 
 ways the same in all, be an idea ? 
 
 From that, again, there is no escape. 
 
 Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else par- 
 ticipates in the ideas, must you not say either that everything 
 is made up of thoughts and that all things think ; or that they 
 are thoughts having no thought ? 
 
 , But that, Parmenides, is no more rational than the other. 
 The more probable view is, that the ideas are, as it were, pat- 
 terns fixed in nature, and that other things are like them, and 
 < resemblances of them ; and that what is meant by the partici- 
 pation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to 
 them. Parmenides, iii. 249. 
 
 Colonization, a means of purification. See Purification. 
 Colonization, the best kind of. 
 
 Cities find colonization in some respects easier when the 
 
 colonists are of one race, which like a swarm of bees is sent 
 out from a single country, friends from friends, owing to some 
 pressure of population, or other similar necessity, or because 
 a portion of a state is driven by factions to emigrate. And 
 there have been whole cities which have taken flight, when 
 utterly conquered by a superior power in war. This, however, 
 which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator, 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 71 
 
 in another point of view creates a difficulty. There is an ele- 
 ment of friendship in the community of race, and language, 
 and laws, and in common sacrifices, and the like ; but colonies 
 which are of this homogeneous sort are apt to kick against 
 any laws different from their own ; and although the badness 
 of their own laws has undone them, yet because of the force of 
 habit they would fain preserve the very customs which were 
 their ruin ; and the leader of the colony, who is their legisla- 
 tor, finds them troublesome and rebellious. On the other hand, 
 the conflux of several populations might be more disposed to 
 listen to new laws ; but then, to make them combine and pull 
 together, as they say of horses, is a most difficult task, and the 
 work of years. And yet there is nothing which perfects the 
 virtue of men like legislation and colonization. Laws, iv. 
 235. 
 Color what is it ? 
 
 Soc. And now, as Pindar says, "Read my meaning:" 
 
 color is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and 
 sensible. 
 
 Theaet. I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained 
 his meaning. 
 
 Soc. Then apply his doctrine to perception, my good friend, 
 and first of all to vision ; that which you call white color 
 is not in your eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists 
 out of them, nor can you assign any .place to it; for if it had 
 position it would be and be at rest, and there would be no 
 process of becoming. 
 
 Theaet. -Then what is color ? 
 
 Soc. Let us carry out the principle which has just been 
 affirmed, that nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see 
 that every color, white, black, and every other color, arises out 
 of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, and that what we 
 term the substance of each color is neither the active nor the 
 passive element, but something which passes between them, 
 and is peculiar to each percipient ; are you certain that the 
 several colors appear to every animal say to a dog as they 
 appear to you ? 
 
 Theaet. Indeed I am not. 
 
 Soc. Or that anything appears the same to you as to an- 
 other man ? Would you not rather question whether you 
 yourself see the same thing at different times, because you are 
 never exactly the same ? 
 
72 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Theaet. I should. 
 
 Soc. And if that with which I compare myself in size, or 
 which I apprehend, were great or white or hot, it could not 
 without actually changing become different by mere contact 
 with another ; nor again, if the apprehending or comparing 
 subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged 
 from within, become changed by any approximation or affec- 
 tion of any other thing. For in our ordinary way of speaking 
 we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and won- 
 derful contradictions, as Protagoras and all who take his line 
 of thought would remark. Theaetetus, iii. 354. 
 Colors. 
 
 There is a fourth class of sensible things, having many 
 
 varieties, which have now to be distinguished. They are 
 called by the general name of colors, and are a flame which 
 emanates from all bodies and has particles corresponding to 
 the sense of sight. I have spoken already, in what has pre- 
 ceded, of the generation of sight, and this will be a natural 
 and suitable place in which to give some account of colors. 
 
 Of the particles coming from other bodies which fall upon 
 the sight, some are less and some are larger, and some are 
 equal to the parts of the sight itself. Those which are equal 
 are imperceptible, or transparent, as they are called by us ; 
 whereas the larger produce contraction, the smaller dilation, in 
 the sight, by the exercise of a power akin to that of hot and 
 cold bodies on the flesh, or of astringent bodies on the tongue, 
 or of those heating bodies which are termed pungent by us. 
 White and black, although they are found in another class of 
 objects, and for this reason are imagined to be different, are 
 affections of the same kind. Wherefore, we ought to term 
 white that which dilates the visual ray, and the opposite of 
 this black. There is also a swifter motion and impact of an- 
 other sort of fire which dilates the ray of sight and reaches 
 the eyes, forcing a way through their passages and melting 
 them, and eliciting from them a union of fire and water which 
 we call tears, being itself an opposite fire which comes to them 
 from without the inner fire flashes forth like lightning, and 
 the outer finds a way in and is extinguished in the tear-drop, 
 and all sorts of colors are generated by the mixture. This 
 affection is termed dazzling, and the object which produces it 
 is called bright and flashing. There is another sort of fire 
 which is intermediate, and which reaches and mingles with the 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 73 
 
 moisture of the eye without flashing ; and in this the fire 
 mingling with the ray of the tear-drop produces a color like 
 blood, to which we give the name of red. A bright hue 
 mingled with red and white gives the color called auburn 
 (ai>0oi/). The law of proportion, however, according to which 
 the several colors are formed, even if a man knew he would 
 be foolish if he attempted to tell, as he could not give any 
 necessary reason, nor even any tolerable or probable account 
 of them. Again, red, when mingled with black and white, 
 gives a purple hue, which becomes umber (opfawov) when the 
 colors are burnt as well as mingled and the black is more thor- 
 oughly mixed with them. Flame color (jrvppov) is produced 
 by a union of auburn and dun (<j&cuov) and dun by an admix- 
 ture of black and white ; yellow (<OXPW) by an admixture 
 of white and auburn. White and bright meeting, and falling 
 upon a full black, become dark blue (KVO.VOVV), and when dark 
 blue mingles with white, light blue (yAav/cov) color is formed, 
 as leek green (Tr/oao-tov) is formed also out of the union of 
 flame color and black. There will be no difficulty in seeing 
 how the colors derived from these are mingled and assimi- 
 lated in accordance with probability. He, however, who 
 should attempt to verify all this by experiment, would forget 
 the difference of the human and divine nature. For God only 
 has the knowledge and also the power which are able to com- 
 bine many things into one and again dissolve the one into 
 many. But no man either is or ever will be able to accom- 
 plish either the one or the other operation. Timaeus, ii. 559. 
 Community of wives. 
 
 Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women which 
 
 we have escaped ; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for 
 enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their 
 pursuits in common ; to the utility and possibility of this the 
 argument is its own witness. 
 
 Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped. 
 
 Yes, I said, but a much greater is coming ; you will not 
 think much of this when you see the next. 
 
 Go on, let me see. 
 
 The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that 
 has preceded, is to the following effect, " that the wives of 
 these guardians are to be common, and their children also com- 
 mon, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his 
 parent." 
 
74 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other ; 
 and the utility as well as the possibility of such a law is far 
 more doubtful. 
 
 I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about 
 the very great utility of having wives and children in common; 
 the possibility is quite another matter, and will be very much 
 disputed. The Republic, ii. 282. 
 Community, the first form of government. 
 
 The first and highest form of the State and of the govern- 
 ment and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely 
 the ancient saying, that " Friends have all things in common." 
 Whether there is now, or ever will be, this cornmuniftn of 
 women and children and of property, in which the private and 
 individual is altogether banished from life, and things which 
 are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have 
 become common, and in some way see and hear and act in 
 common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy 
 and sorrow, on the same occasions, and the laws unite the city 
 to the utmost, whether all this is possible or not, I say that 
 no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a 
 state more exalted in virtue, or truer or better than this. Such 
 a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, will make 
 them blessed who dwell therein ; and therefore to this we are 
 to look for the pattern of the State, and to cling to this, and, as 
 far as possible, to seek for one which is like this. The State 
 which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest im- 
 mortality and unity in the next degree ; and, after that, by the 
 grace of God, we will complete the third one. And, we will 
 begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second. 
 
 Let them at once distribute their land and houses, and not 
 till the land in common, since a community of goods goes be- 
 yond their proposed origin, and nurture, and education. But 
 in making the distribution, let the several possessors feel that 
 their particular lots also belong to the whole city ; and seeing 
 that the earth is their parent, let them tend her more carefully 
 than children do their mother. For she is a goddess and their 
 queen, and they are her mortal subjects. Laws, iv. 264. 
 Comparatives. 
 
 Soc. Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there 
 
 enters a more and a less. 
 
 Pro. True. 
 
 Soc. Then, says the argument, they have never any end, 
 and being endless must also be infinite. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 75 
 
 Pro. Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true. 
 
 Soc. Yes, my dear Protarchus, and the word which you 
 have just uttered suggests to me that such expressions as " ex- 
 ceedingly " and also the term " mildly " mean the same as 
 more or less ; for whenever they occur they do not allow of 
 the existence of quantity they are always introducing de- 
 grees into actions, instituting a comparison of the more or less 
 violent or more or less mild, and at each creation of more or 
 less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if 
 quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to 
 intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other compara- 
 tives', these last would themselves be driven out of their own 
 domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, there can 
 be no longer a "hotter" or a "colder" (for these are always 
 progressing, and are never in one stay) ; but definite quantity 
 is at rest, arid progresses not. Which proves that compara- 
 tives, such as the hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in 
 the class of the infinite. Philebus, iii. 159. 
 
 Compulsory and voluntary care of men. See Education, compul- 
 sion in. 
 
 Str. Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the 
 
 name, so as to have the notion of care gather than of feeding, 
 and then to divide, for there may be still considerable divisions. 
 
 T. Soc. How can they be made ? 
 
 Str. First by separating the divine shepherd from the human 
 guardian or manager. 
 
 T. Soc. True. 
 
 Str. And the art of management which is assigned to man 
 would again have to be subdivided. 
 
 T. Soc. On what principle ? 
 
 Str. On the principle of voluntary and compulsory. 
 
 T. Soc. Why ? 
 
 Str. Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error 
 here ; for our simplicity led us to rank them together, whereas 
 they are utterly different, and their modes of government are 
 different. 
 
 T. Soc. True. 
 
 Str. Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and 
 divide human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary 
 and compulsory. 
 
 T. 'Soc. Certainly. 
 
 Str. And if we call the management of violent rulers tyr- 
 
76 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 army, and the voluntary management of voluntary bipeds poli- 
 tics, may we not further assert that he who has this latter art 
 of management is the true king and statesman ? 
 
 Y. Soc. I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the 
 account of the Statesman. Statesman, iii. 560. 
 Concealment of evil. 
 
 Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of 
 
 Pindar : 
 
 " Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier 
 tower, which may be a fortress to me all my life ? " 
 
 For what men say is that, if I am really just without tfeing 
 thought just, this is no profit, but evident pain and loss. But 
 if, though unjust, I acquire the character of justice, a heavenly 
 life is to be mine. Since then, as philosophers say, appearance 
 tyrannizes over truth and is the lord of happiness, to appearance 
 I must wholly devote myself. I will have in front of me the 
 painted form and figure of virtue ; behind I will trail the subtle 
 and crafty fox, as Archilochus, first of sages, counsels. But I 
 hear some one exclaiming that wickedness is not easily con- 
 cealed ; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Never- 
 theless, this must be the way to happiness, and the way by 
 which we must go, if we follow in the steps of the argument. 
 As to concealment, that may be secured by the formation of 
 societies and political clubs. And there are professors of 
 rhetoric who teach the philosophy of persuading courts and 
 assemblies ; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, 
 I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear 
 a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can 
 they be compelled. But what if there are no gods ? or, sup- 
 pose that the gods have no care about human things why in 
 either case should we care about concealment ? And even if 
 there are gods, and they have a care of us, yet we know about 
 them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets ; 
 and the poets are the persons who say that they may be influ- 
 enced and turned by " sacrifices and soothing entreaties." Let 
 us be consistent then, and either believe both or neither. And 
 if we believe them, why then we had better be unjust, and offer 
 of the fruits of injustice ; for if we are just we shall indeed 
 escape the vengeance of heaven, but we shall lose the gains of 
 injustice ; whereas, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, 
 and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the 
 
 
PLATO 1 S BEST THOUGHTS. . 77 
 
 gods will be propitiated, and we shall be forgiven. " But there 
 is a world below in which either we or our children will suffer 
 for our deeds." Yes, my friend, will be the reply, but there 
 are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. 
 That is what mighty cities declare ; and the children of the 
 gods, who were their poets and prophets, affirm the same. 
 The Republic, ii. 187. 
 Conception and generation, divine nature of. 
 
 "There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous 
 
 of procreation procreation which must be in beauty and not 
 in deformity ; and this procreation is the union of man and 
 woman, and is a divine thing ; for conception and generation 
 are an immortal principle in the mortal creature, and in the 
 inharmonious they can never be. But the deformed is always 
 inharmonious with the divine, and the beautiful harmonious. 
 Beauty, then, is the destiny or goddess of parturition who pre- 
 sides at birth, and therefore when approaching beauty the con- 
 ceiving power is propitious, and diffuse, and benign, and begets 
 and bears fruit : at the sight of ugliness it frowns and con- 
 tracts in pain, and is averted and morose, and shrinks up, and 
 not without a pang refrains from conception. And this is the 
 reason why, when the hour of conception arrives, and the 
 teeming nature is full, there is such a flutter and ecstasy about 
 beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail. 
 For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beau- 
 tiful only." " What then ? " " The love of generation and of 
 birth in beauty." " Yes," I said. " Yes, indeed," she replied. 
 " But why of generation ? " I said. " Because to the mortal, 
 generation is a sort of eternity and immortality," she replied ; 
 " and if as has been already admitted, love is of the ever- 
 lasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire 
 immortality together with good, wherefore love is of immor- 
 tality." 
 
 All this she taught me at various times when she spoke of 
 love. And I remember that she once said to me, " What is 
 the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire ? See 
 you not how all animals, birds as well as beasts, in their desire 
 of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of 
 love ; this begins with the desire of union ; whereto is added 
 the care of offspring, on behalf of whom the weakest are ready 
 to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die 
 for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or 
 
78 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 suffer anything in order to maintain their offspring." The 
 Symposium, i. 498. 
 Concupiscent nature ruled. 
 
 Ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has 
 
 the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or 
 spirited principle to be the subject and ally ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and 
 gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining 
 the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and 
 soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and 
 rhythm ? 
 
 Quite true, he said. 
 
 And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having 
 learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the 
 concupiscent part of every man, which is the largest and of all 
 things most insatiable ; over this they will keep guard, lest, 
 waxing great with the fullness of bodily pleasures, as they are 
 termed, and no longer confined to her own sphere, the concu- 
 piscent soul should attempt to enslave and rule those who are 
 not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of 
 man ? 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
 The two will be the defenders of the whole soul and the 
 whole body against attacks from without ; the one counseling, 
 and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously exe- 
 cuting his commands and counsels. The Republic, ii. 268. 
 Confidence and courage. See Ability, etc. 
 Conjecture in art. 
 
 Soc. I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and 
 
 weighing be taken away from any art, that which remains will 
 not be much. 
 
 Pro. Not much, certainly. 
 
 Soc. The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of 
 the senses, which is given by experience and exercise in addi- 
 tion to a certain power of guessing, which is commonly called 
 art, and is perfected by attention and practice. 
 
 Pro. Nothing more assuredly. 
 
 Soc. Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism ; as is 
 seen in the harmonizing of sounds, not by rule, but by conject- 
 ure ; the music of the flute is always trying to guess the 
 pitch of each vibrating note, and is therefore mixed up with 
 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 79 
 
 much that is doubtful and has very little certainty. Philebus, 
 
 iii. 196. 
 
 Consonances and harmonies. 
 
 I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the 
 
 stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions, and these 
 are sister sciences as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glau- 
 con, agree with them ? 
 
 Yes, he replied. 
 
 But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had 
 better go and learn of them ; and they will tell us whether 
 there are any other applications of these sciences. At the 
 same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher object. 
 
 What is that ? 
 
 There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, 
 and which our pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short 
 of, as I was saying that they did in astronomy. For in the 
 science of harmony, as you probably know, they are equally 
 empirical. The sounds and consonances which they compare 
 are those which are heard only, and their labor, like that of 
 the astronomers, is in vain. 
 
 Yes, by heaven ! he said ; and 'tis as good as a play to 
 hear them talking about their condensed notes, as they call 
 them ; they put their ears alongside of their neighbors as if to 
 get a sound out of them one set of them declaring that they 
 catch an intermediate note and have found the least interval 
 which should be the unit of measurement ; the others main- 
 taining the opposite theory that the two sounds have passed 
 into the same either party setting their ears before their un- 
 derstanding. 
 
 You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture 
 the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument : I 
 might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of 
 the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations 
 against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to 
 sound ; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say 
 that these are not the men, but that I am speaking of the 
 Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to inquire 
 about harmony. For they too are in error, like the astrono- 
 mers ; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which 
 are heard, but they never attain to problems that is to say, 
 they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect 
 why some numbers are harmonious and others not. The He- 
 public, ii. 358. 
 
80 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Conspirators and traitors. 
 
 Whoever by promoting a man to power enslaves the 
 
 laws, and subjects the city to factions, using violence and stir- 
 ring up sedition contrary to law, him we will deem the greatest 
 enemy of the whole State. But he who takes no part in such 
 proceedings, and yet being the chief magistrate of the State, 
 knowing of them or not knowing of them, by reason of cow- 
 ardice does not interfere on behalf of his country, such an one 
 we must consider nearly as bad. Every man who is worth 
 anything will inform the magistrates, and bring the conspirator 
 to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change the 
 government. The judges of the traitor shall be the same as 
 of the robbers of temples ; and let the whole proceeding be 
 carried on in the same way, and the vote of the majority con- 
 demn to death. But let there be a general rule, that the dis- 
 grace and punishment of the father is not to be visited on the 
 children, except in the case of some one whose father, grand- 
 father, and great-grandfather have successively undergone the 
 penalty of death. Such persons the city shall send away with 
 all their possessions, reserving only and wholly their appointed 
 lot to their original city and country. And out of the citizens 
 who have more than one son of not less than ten years of age, 
 they shall select ten whom their father or grandfather by the 
 mother's or father's side shall appoint, and let them send to 
 Delphi the names of those who are selected, and him whom 
 the God appoints they shall establish as heir of the house 
 which has failed ; and may he have better fortune than his 
 predecessors ! Laws, iv. 369. 
 Constituency, legislators not always to obey their. 
 
 Str. They say, that if any one knows how the ancient laws 
 
 may be improved, he must first persuade his own State of the 
 improvement, and then he may legislate, but not otherwise. 
 
 T. Soc. And are they not right ? 
 
 Str. I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gen- 
 tle violence for their good, what is this violence to be called? 
 Or rather, before you answer, let me ask the same question in 
 reference to our previous instance. 
 
 T. Soc. What do you mean ? 
 
 Str. Suppose that a skillful physician has a patient, of what- 
 ever sex or age, whom he compels against his will to do some- 
 thing for his good which is contrary to the written rules, what 
 is this compulsion to be called ? Would you ever dream of 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 81 
 
 calling it a violation of the art, or breach of the laws of health? 
 Nothing could be more unjust than for the patient to whom such 
 a gentle violence is applied, to charge the physician who prac- 
 tices the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his disease. 
 
 T. Soc. Most true. 
 
 Str. In the political art the error is not called disease, but 
 evil, or disgrace, or injustice. 
 
 T. Soc. Quite true. 
 
 Str. And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is 
 compelled to do what is juster and better and nobler than he 
 did before, and this sort of violence is blamed, the last and 
 most absurd thing which he could say, is that he has incurred 
 disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of the legislator who 
 uses the violence. 
 
 Y. Soc. That is very true. 
 
 Str. And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a 
 rich man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust ? May not any 
 man, rich or poor, with or without written laws, with the will 
 of the citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is 
 for their interest ? Is not this the true principle of govern- 
 ment, in accordance with which the wise and good man will 
 order the affairs of his subjects ? As the pilot watches over 
 the interests of the ship, or of the crew, and preserves tne 
 lives of his fellow-sailors, not by laying down rules, but by 
 making his art a law even so, and in the self-same way, may 
 there not be a true form of polity created by those who are 
 able to govern in a similar spirit, and who show a strength of 
 art which is superior to the law ? Nor can wise rulers ever 
 err while they regard the one great rule of distributing justice 
 to the citizens with intelligence and art, and are able to pre- 
 serve, and, so far as that is possible, to improve them. 
 Statesman, iii. 582. 
 Contradiction, the art of. 
 
 Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art 
 \ of contradiction ! 
 
 Why do you say so ? 
 
 Because I think that many a man falls into the practice 
 against his will. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is 
 really disputing, just because he cannot define and divide, and 
 so know that of which he is speaking ; and he will pursue a 
 merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of 
 fair discussion. 
 
82 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Yes, he replied, such is very often the case ; but what has 
 that to do with us and our argument ? 
 
 A great deal ; for there is certainly a danger of our getting 
 unintentionally into a verbal opposition. 
 
 In what way ? 
 
 Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal 
 truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits, 
 but we never considered at all what was the meaning of same- 
 ness or difference of nature or why we distinguished them when 
 we assigned different pursuits to different natures. The He- 
 public, ii. 278. 
 Controversy. 
 
 Sir. Let us consider once more whether there may not be 
 
 another aspect of sophistry ? 
 
 Theaet. What is that ? 
 
 Sir. In the acquisitive there was a subdivision of the com- 
 bative or fighting art. 
 
 Theaet. There was. 
 
 Str. Perhaps we had better divide it. 
 
 Theaet. What shall be the divisions ? 
 
 Str. There shall be one division of the competitive, and the 
 other of the pugnacious. 
 
 Theaet. Very good. 
 
 Str. That part of the pugnacious which is a contest of bodily 
 strength may be properly called by some such name as violent. 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Str. And when the war is one of words, that may be termed 
 controversy ? 
 
 Theaet. Yes. 
 
 Str. And controversy may be of two kinds. 
 
 Theaet. What are they ? 
 
 Str. When long speeches are answered by long speeches, 
 and there is public discussion about the just and unjust, that is 
 forensic controversy. 
 
 Theaet. Yes. 
 
 Str. And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut 
 up into questions and answers, and this is commonly called dis- 
 putation ? 
 
 Theaet. Yes, that is the name. 
 
 Str. And of disputation, that sort which is only a discussion 
 about contracts, and is carried on at random, and without rules 
 of art, is recognized by dialectic to be a distinct class, but has 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 83 
 
 hitherto had no distinctive name, and does not deserve to re- 
 ceive one at our hands. 
 
 Theaet. No ; for the different species are too minute and 
 heterogeneous. 
 
 Sir. But that which proceeds- by rules of art to dispute 
 about justice and injustice in their own nature and about things 
 in general, have we not been accustomed to call argumentation 
 (Eristic) ? 
 
 Theaet. Very true. Sophist, iii. 459. 
 Conventional notions of right. 
 
 Soc. I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one 
 with himself, but that his whole life will be a discord. And 
 yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should be inharmo- 
 nious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I 
 provided ; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with 
 me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds 
 with myself, and contradict myself. 
 
 Gal. O, Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and are man- 
 ifestly running riot in the argument. And now you are de- 
 claiming in this way because Polus has met with the same evil 
 fate himself which he accused you of bringing upon Gorgias : 
 he said, if I remember rightly, that when Gorgias was asked 
 by you, whether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn 
 rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice ? 
 And Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he 
 thought that mankind in general would expect this of him, and 
 would be displeased if he said " No ; " in consequence of this 
 admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, and 
 you were delighted ; Polus laughed at you at the time, deserv- 
 edly, as I think ; and now he has himself experienced the same 
 misfortune. I cannot say very much for his wit when he con- 
 ceded to you, that to do is more dishonorable than to suffer 
 injustice, for this was what led to his being entangled by you ; 
 and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had 
 his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who 
 pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing 
 now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not 
 natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are 
 generally at variance with one another : and hence, if a person 
 is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contra- 
 dict himself ; and you, in your ingenuity, perceiving the advan- 
 tage to be hereby gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing con- 
 
84 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 ventionally a question which is to be determined by the rule of 
 nature ; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip away 
 to custom : as you did in this very discussion about doing and 
 suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the conven- 
 tionally dishonorable, you assailed him from the point of view 
 of nature ; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the 
 greater disgrace, because the greater evil ; but conventionally, 
 to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of injus- 
 tice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had 
 better die than live ; since when he is wronged and trampled 
 upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom 
 he cares. 
 
 The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the 
 majority who are weak; and they make laws and distribute 
 praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own 
 interests ; and they terrify the stronger sort of men, and those 
 who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may 
 not get the better of them ; and they say, that dishonesty is 
 shameful and unjust ; meaning, by the word injustice, the de- 
 sire of a man to have more than his neighbors ; for knowing 
 their own inferiority I suspect they are too glad of equality. 
 And therefore the endeavor to have more than the many, is 
 conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called in- 
 justice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the 
 better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than 
 the weaker ; and in many ways she shows, among men as well 
 as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, 
 that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more 
 than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes 
 invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians (not to speak of 
 numberless other examples) ? These are men who act accord- 
 ing to nature ; yes, by Heaven, and according to the law of 
 nature : not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we 
 forge and impose upon our fellows of whom we take the best 
 and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like 
 young lions, charming them with the sound of the voice, and 
 saying to them, that with equality they must be content, and 
 that the equal is the honorable and the just. But if there 
 were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and 
 break through, and escape from all this ; he would trample 
 under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our 
 laws, sinning against nature: the slave would rise in rebellion 
 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 85 
 
 and be lord over us, and the light .of natural justice would 
 shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, in 
 the poem in which he says that 
 
 " Law is the king of all, mortals as well as immortals." 
 
 Gorgias, iii. 71. 
 Conversion, the process of. 
 
 - Whether I am right or not God only knows. But, whether 
 true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the 
 Idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort ; 
 and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of 
 all things beautiful arid right, parent of light and of the lord of 
 light in this world, and the source of truth and reason in the 
 other ;. and is the power upon which he who would act ration- 
 ally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed. 
 I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you. 
 Moreover, you must not wonder that those who attain to this 
 beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs ; for 
 their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they 
 desire to dwell ; and this desire of theirs is very natural, if our 
 allegory may be trusted. 
 Yes, very natural. 
 
 And is there anything surprising in one who passes from 
 divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving 
 himself in a ridiculous manner ; if, while his eyes are blinking 
 and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding dark- 
 ness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, 
 about the images or shadows of images of justice, and is en- 
 deavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet 
 seen the absolute justice? 
 
 Anything but surprising, he replied. 
 
 Any one who has common sense will remember that the be- 
 wilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two 
 causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into 
 the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of 
 the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any 
 one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready 
 to laugh ; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come 
 out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccus- 
 tomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day 
 is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy 
 in his condition arid state of being, and he will pity the other ; 
 or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from 
 
86 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in 
 the laugh which greets the other coming from above into the 
 den. 
 
 That, he said, is a very just remark. 
 
 But if I am right, then certain professors of education must 
 be mistaken in saying that they can put a knowledge into the 
 soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes. 
 
 Nevertheless, they do say so, he replied. 
 
 Whereas, I said, our argument shows that the power is 
 already in the soul ; and that as the eye may be imagined un- 
 able to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so 
 too, when the eye of the soul is turned round, the whole soul 
 must be turned round from the world of becoming into that of 
 being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and 
 of the brightest and best of being or in other words, of the 
 good. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And there must be some art which will affect conversion 
 in the easiest, quickest manner ; not implanting eyes, for they 
 exist already, but giving them a right direction, which they 
 have not. The Republic, ii. 344. 
 Cookery, not an art. 
 
 Soc. Let me now remind you of what I was saying to 
 
 Gorgias and Polus ; I was saying, as you will not have for- 
 gotten, that there were some processes which aim at pleasure, 
 and at pleasure only, and know nothing of good and evil, and 
 there are other processes which know good and evil. And I 
 considered that cookery, which I do not call art, but only an 
 experience, was of the former cl-ass, which is concerned with 
 pleasure, and the art of medicine was of the class which is con- 
 cerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I 
 must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am 
 jesting with you ; do not answer at random what is not your 
 real opinion ; for you will observe that we are arguing about 
 the way of human life ; and to a man who has any sense at all 
 what question can be more serious than this ? whether he should 
 follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act 
 what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and 
 cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, after your 
 manner ; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy ; 
 and in what the latter way of life differs from the former. 
 But perhaps we had better distinguish them iirst, as I attempted 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 87 
 
 to do before, and when we come to an agreement that they 
 are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ 
 from one another, and which of them we should choose. Per- 
 haps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean ? 
 
 Gal. No, I do not. 
 
 Soc. Then I will explain myself more clearly : seeing that 
 you and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and 
 that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not 
 the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisi- 
 tion of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit 
 and process of acquisition of the other, which is good I wish 
 that you would tell me whether you agree thus far or not ? 
 
 Cal. Yes, I agree. 
 
 Soc. Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree 
 with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when 
 I further said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my 
 opinion is only an experience, not an art at all ; and that 
 whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and con.- 
 stitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason 
 in each case, cookery, in attending upon pleasure, never regards 
 either the nature or the reason of that pleasure to which she 
 devotes herself, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but 
 works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recol- 
 lection of what she had usually done when producing pleasure. 
 And first I would have you consider whether I have proved 
 what I was saying, and then whether there are not other simi- 
 lar processes which have to do with the soul some of them 
 processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest inter- 
 est others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, 
 considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be 
 acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, 
 and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether 
 good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, 
 and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether 
 concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed 
 with a view to pleasure, and without any consideration of good 
 and evil. Gorgias, iii. 91. 
 Cookery, medicine, etc. 
 
 Now, seeing that there are these four arts which are 
 ever ministering to the body and the soul for their highest 
 good ; flattery knowing or rather guessing their natures, has 
 distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them ; 
 
88 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 she puts on the likeness of one or other of them, and pretends 
 to be that which she simulates, and has no regard for men's 
 highest interests, but is ever making pleasure the bait of the 
 unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the 
 highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of 
 medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the 
 body ; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a 
 competition in which children were the judges, or men who 
 had no more sense than children, as to which of them best un- 
 derstands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would 
 be starved to death. A flattery I deem this and an ignoble 
 sort of thing, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, 
 because it aims at pleasure instead of good. An art I do not 
 call it but only an experience because it is unable to explain 
 or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And 
 I do not call any irrational thing an art ; if you dispute my 
 words, I am prepared to argue in defense of them. 
 
 Cookery, then, as I maintain, is a flattery which takes the 
 form of medicine, and dressing up, in like manner, is a flattery 
 which takes the form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, igno- 
 ble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of lines, and 
 colors, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a 
 spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is 
 given by gymnastic. 
 
 I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, 
 after the manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this 
 time you will be able to follow), 
 
 As dressing up : gymnastic : : cookery : medicine ; 
 or rather 
 
 As dressing up : gymnastic : : sophistry : legislation ; 
 and 
 
 As cookery : medicine : : rhetoric : justice. 
 And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetori- 
 cian and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, 
 they are apt to be jumbled up together neither do they know 
 what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to 
 make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and 
 were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not 
 discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but 
 the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judg- 
 ment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then 
 the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 89 
 
 Polus, are so well acquainted, would come true ; Chaos would 
 return, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an 
 indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of 
 rhetoric, which is in relation to the soul what cookery is to 
 the body. Gorgias, iii. 51. 
 Corporeal, and spiritual essence. 
 
 Now God did not make the soul after the body, although 
 
 we have spoken of them in this order ; for when he put them 
 together he would never have allowed that the elder should 
 serve the younger, but this is a random manner of speaking 
 which we have, because we ourselves too are very largely af- 
 fected by chance. Whereas he made the soul in origin and 
 excellence prior to and older than the body, to be the ruler 
 and mistress, of whom the body was to be the subject. And 
 he made her out of the following elements and on this man- 
 ner : of the unchangeable and indivisible, and also of the 
 divisible and corporeal he made a third sort of intermediate 
 essence, partaking of the same and of the other or diverse, 
 and this compound in like manner he placed in a mean be- 
 tween the indivisible and the divisible or corporeal. He took 
 the three elements of the same, the other, and the essence, and 
 mingled them all together, compressing the reluctant and un- 
 sociable nature of the other into the same. And when he had 
 mixed them and out of all the three made one, he again di- 
 vided this whole into as many portions as was fitting, each of 
 them containing an admixture of all thre. Timaeus, iii. 528. 
 Counterparts and antagonisms in nature making harmony. See 
 
 Antagonisms. 
 
 Country, motherhood of. See Motherhood. 
 Courage, a man of. 
 
 - Soc. Laches, suppose that we first set about deter- 
 mining the nature of courage, and in the second place pro- 
 ceed to inquire how the young men may attain this quality by 
 the help of studies and pursuits. Try, and see whether you 
 can tell me what is courage. 
 
 La. Indeed, Socrates, that is soon answered : he is a man 
 of courage who remains at his post, and does not run away, 
 but fights against the enemy ; of that you may be very cer- 
 tain. 
 
 Soc. That is good, Laches ; and yet I fear that I did not 
 express myself clearly ; and therefore you have answered not 
 the question which I intended to ask, but another. 
 
90 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 La. What do you mean, Socrates ? 
 
 Soc. I will endeavor to explain ; you would call a man 
 courageous, who remains at his post, and fights with the 
 enemy ? 
 
 La. Certainly I should. 
 
 Soc. And so should I ; but what would you say of another 
 man who fights flying, instead of remaining? 
 
 La. How flying? 
 
 Soc. Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well 
 as pursuing ; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of 
 Aeneas, that they knew "how to pursue, and fly quickly hither 
 and thither ; " and he passes an encomium on Aeneas himself, 
 as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and calls him " an au- 
 thor of fear or flight." 
 
 La. Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right ; for he was 
 speaking of chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian 
 cavalry, who have that way of fighting ; but the heavy-armed 
 Greek fights, as I say, remaining in his rank. 
 
 Soc. And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians 
 at Plataea, who, when they came upon the light shields of the 
 Persians, are said not to have been willing to stand and fight, 
 and to have fled ; but when the ranks of the Persians were 
 broken, they turned upon them like cavalry, and won the bat- 
 tle. 
 
 La. That is true. 
 
 Soc. That was my. meaning when I said that I was to 
 blame in having put my question badly, and that this was the 
 reason of your answering badly. For I meant to ask you not 
 only about the courage of heavy-armed soldiers, but about the 
 courage of cavalry and every other style of soldier ; and not 
 only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in 
 perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in poli- 
 tics, are courageous ; and not only who are courageous against 
 pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleas- 
 ures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. 
 There is this sort of courage, is there not, Laches ? 
 
 La. Certainly, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. And all these are courageous, but some have courage 
 in pleasures, and some in pains ; some in desires, and some in 
 fears ; and some are cowards under the same conditions, as I 
 should imagine. 
 
 La. Very true. Laches, i. 83. 
 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 91 
 
 Courage, generic. 
 
 Soc. Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in 
 
 general. And I will begin with courage, and once more ask, 
 What is that common quality, which is the same in all these 
 cases, and which is called courage ? Do you understand now 
 what I mean ? 
 
 La. Not over well. 
 
 Soc. I mean this : As I might ask what is that quality 
 which is called quickness, and which is found in running, play- 
 ing the lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar 
 actions, or rather which we possess in nearly every action that 
 is worth mentioning of arms, legs, mouth, voice, mind ; would 
 you not apply the term quickness to all of them ? 
 
 La. Quite true. 
 
 Soc. And suppose I were to be asked by some one : What 
 is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the 
 word, you call quickness ? I should say that which accom- 
 plishes much in a little time that I call quickness in running, 
 speaking, and every other sort of action. 
 
 La. You would be quite correct. 
 
 Soc. And now, Laches, do you try and tell me, What is 
 that common quality which is called courage, and which includes 
 all the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure 
 and pain, and in all the cases which I was just now mention- 
 ing? 
 
 La. I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the 
 soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades 
 them all. 
 
 Soc. But that is what we must do if we are to answer the 
 question. And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance 
 is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason : I 
 am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage to be a very 
 noble quality. 
 
 La. Most noble, certainly. 
 
 Soc. And you would say that a wise endurance is also good 
 and noble? 
 
 La. Very noble. 
 
 Soc. But what would you say of a foolish endurance ? 
 Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and 
 hurtful ? 
 
 La. True. 
 
 Soc. And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful ? 
 
92 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 La. I ought not to say that, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to 
 be courage for that is not noble, but courage is noble ? 
 
 La. You are right. 
 
 Soc. Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is 
 courage ? 
 
 La. True. 
 
 Soc. But as to the epithet "wise," wise in what? In 
 all things small as well as great ? For example, if a man en- 
 dures in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spend- 
 ing he will acquire more in the end, do you call him coura- 
 geous ? 
 
 La. Assuredly not. 
 
 Soc. Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, 
 or some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs 
 that he may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the 
 other refuses ; is that courage ? 
 
 La. No ; that is not courage at all, any more than the last. 
 
 Soc. Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and 
 is willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others 
 will help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men 
 against him than there are with him ; and suppose that he has 
 also advantages of position ; would you say of such an one 
 who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or 
 some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circum- 
 stances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is the 
 braver ? 
 
 La. I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver. 
 
 Soc. But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison 
 with the other ? 
 
 La. That is true. 
 
 Soc. And you would say that he who in an engagement of 
 cavalry endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not 
 so courageous as he who endures, having no knowledge of 
 horsemanship ? 
 
 La. That is my view. 
 
 Soc. And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use 
 of the sling, or the bow, or any other art, is not so courageous 
 as he who endures, not having such a knowledge ? 
 
 La. True. 
 
 Soc. And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds 
 out in this or any similar action, having no knowledge of div- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 93 
 
 ing, or the like, is, as you would say, more courageous than 
 those who have this knowledge ? 
 
 La. Why, Socrates, what else can a man say ? 
 
 Soc. Nothing, if that is what he thinks. 
 
 La. But that is what I do think. 
 
 Soc. And yet men who thus run risks and endure are fool- 
 ish, Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things, 
 having the skill to do them. 
 
 La. That is true. 
 
 Soc. But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to 
 be base and hurtful to us. 
 
 La. Quite true. 
 
 Soc, Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble 
 quality. 
 
 La. True. 
 
 Soc. And now on the contrary we are saying that the fool- 
 ish endurance, which was before held in dishonor, is cour- 
 age. 
 
 La. Very true. 
 
 Soc. And are we right in saying that ? 
 
 La. Indeed, Socrates, I am sure we that are not right. 
 
 Soc. Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, 
 are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of 
 words and deeds ; for our deeds are not in accordance with our 
 words. Any one would say that we had courage who saw us 
 in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking about 
 courage just now. 
 
 La. That is most true. 
 
 Soc. And is this condition of ours satisfactory ? 
 
 La. Quite the reverse. 
 
 Soc. Suppose, however, that we admit the principle to a 
 certain extent. 
 
 La. What principle ? And to what extent ? 
 
 Soc. The principle of endurance. We too must endure 
 and persevere in the inquiry, and then courage will not laugh 
 at our faint-heartedness in searching for courage ; which after 
 all may, very likely, be endurance. 
 
 Xa. I am ready to go on, Socrates ; and yet I am unused to 
 investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has 
 been aroused in me by what has been said ; and I am really 
 grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning. For I 
 fancy that I do know the nature of courage ; but, somehow or 
 
94 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of 
 f her and tell her nature. Laches, i. 84. 
 
 Courage, a special trait of the philosopher. See Calmness. 
 
 \ The true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking 
 
 to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the 
 soul from the body their especial study ? 
 
 That is true. 
 
 And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous 
 contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in 
 a state of death, and yet repining when death comes. 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 Then, Simmias, as the true philosophers are ever studying 
 death ; to them, of all men, death is the least terrible. Look at 
 the matter in this way ; if they have always been enemies of 
 the body, and wanting to have the soul alone, when this is 
 granted to them, how inconsistent would they be, to be trem- 
 bling and repining ; instead of rejoicing at their departing to 
 that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that 
 which in life they loved (and this was wisdom), and at the 
 same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a 
 man has been willing to go to the world below in the hope of 
 seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing 
 with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and 
 is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world 
 below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death ? Will 
 he not depart with joy ? Surely, he will, my friend, if he be a 
 true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that 
 there only, and nowhere else, he can find wisdom in her purity. 
 And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, 
 if he were to fear death. 
 
 He would indeed, replied Simmias. 
 
 And when you see a man who is repining at the approach 
 of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not 
 a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at 
 the same time a lover of either money or power, or both ? 
 
 That is very true, he replied. 
 
 There is a virtue, Simmias, which is named courage. Is 
 not that a characteristic of the philosopher ? 
 
 Certainly. Phaedo, i. 394. 
 Courage improved by love. 
 
 I say that a lover who is detected in doing any dishonor- 
 able act, or submitting through cowardice when any dishonor 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 95 
 
 is done him by another, will be more pained at being detected 
 by his beloved than at being seen by his father, or by his com- 
 panions, or by any one else. The beloved, too, when he is 
 seen in any disgraceful situation, has the same feeling about 
 his lover. And if there were only some way of contriving 
 that a state or an army should be made up of lovers and their 
 loves, they would be the very best governors of their own 
 city, abstaining from all dishonor, and emulating one another in 
 honor ; and when fighting at one another's side, although a 
 mere handful, they would overcome the world. For what 
 lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than 
 by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing 
 away his arms ? He would be ready to die a thousand deaths 
 rather than endure this. Or who would desert his beloved or 
 fail him in the hour of danger ? The veriest coward would 
 become an inspired hero, equal to the bravest, at such a time ; 
 Love would inspire him. That courage which, as Homer says," 
 the God breathes into the soul of heroes, Love of his own nat- 
 ure infuses into the lover. 
 
 Love will make men dare to die for their beloved love 
 alone; and women as well as men. Of this Alcestis the 
 daughter of Pelias is a monument to all Hellas ; for she was 
 willing to lay down her life on behalf of her husband, when 
 no one else would, although he had a father and mother ; but 
 the tenderness of her love so far exceeded theirs, that she 
 made them seem to be as strangers in blood to their own son, 
 and in name only related to him ; and so noble did this action 
 of hers appear to the gods, as well as to men, that among the 
 many who have done virtuously she was one of the very few 
 to wljom the gods have granted the privilege of returning to 
 earth, in admiration of her virtue ; such exceeding honor is 
 paid by them to the devotion and virtue of love. But Or- 
 pheus, the son of Oeagrus, the harper, they sent empty away, 
 and showed him an apparition only of her whom he sought, 
 but herself they would not give up ; because he appeared to 
 them to be enervated by his art and not daring like Alcestis 
 to die for love, to have been contriving how he might enter 
 Hades alive ; moreover, they afterward caused him to suffer 
 death at the hands of women, as the punishment of his coward- 
 liness. The Symposium, i. 473. 
 Courage in the State. 
 
 Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature 
 
96 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 of courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives 
 the name of courageous to the State. 
 
 How do you mean ? 
 
 Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or 
 cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes 
 out to battle on the State's behalf. 
 
 No one, he replied, would ever think of any other. 
 
 The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be 
 cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I con- 
 ceive, have the effect of making the city either one or the 
 other. 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of the 
 citizens in whom resides a never -failing quality preservative of 
 that opinion about things to be feared and not to be feared, 
 in which the legislator educated them ; and this is what you 
 term courage. 
 
 I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I 
 do not think that I perfectly understand you. 
 
 I mean that courage is a kind of salvation. 
 
 Salvation of what? 
 
 The salvation, I said, of the opinion about proper objects of 
 fear which the law implants through education ; and I mean by 
 the word " never-failing," to intimate that in pleasure or in 
 pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, 
 and does not lose this opinion. The Republic, ii. 254. 
 Courage and confidence. See Ability, etc. 
 Courage and cowardice. 
 
 Al. I rather think, Socrates, that some honorable things are 
 
 evil. 
 
 Soc. And are some dishonorable things good ? 
 
 Al Yes. 
 
 Soc. You mean in such a case as the following : In time of 
 war, men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a com- 
 panion or kinsman, when others who have neglected the duty 
 of rescuing them have escaped in safety ? 
 
 Al. True. 
 
 Soc. And to rescue another under such circumstances is hon- 
 orable, because of the attempt to save those whom we ought to 
 save ; and this is courage ? 
 
 AL True. 
 
 Soc. But evil because of death and wounds ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 97 
 
 Al Yes. 
 
 Soc. And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one 
 thing, and the death another. 
 
 AL Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Then the rescue of one's friends is honorable in one 
 point of view, but evil in another ? 
 
 Al True. 
 
 Soc. And if honorable, then also good : Will you consider 
 now whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging 
 that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honorable ? 
 Now is this courage good or evil ? Look at the matter thus : 
 which would you rather choose, good or evil ? 
 
 Al. Good. 
 
 Soc. And the greatest goods you would be most ready to 
 choose, and would least like to be deprived of them ? 
 
 Al Certainly. 
 
 Soc. What would you say of courage ? At what price would 
 you be willing to be deprived of courage ? 
 
 Al I would rather die than be a coward. 
 
 Soc. Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils ? 
 
 Al I do. 
 
 Soc. As bad as death, I suppose ? 
 
 Al Yes. 
 
 Soc. And life and courage are the extreme opposite* of 
 death and cowardice ? 
 
 Al Yes. 
 
 Soc. And they are what you would most desire to have, and 
 the opposites you would least desire ? 
 
 Al. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Is this because you think life and courage the best, and 
 death and cowardice the worst ? 
 
 Al Yes. 
 
 Soc. And you would regard the rescue of a friend in battle 
 as good, because of the courage which is there shown ? 
 
 Al I should. 
 
 Soc. But evil because of the death which ensues ? 
 
 Al. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Might we not describe their different effects as follows : 
 You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which 
 is the effect, and good in respect of the good which is the effect 
 of either of them ? 
 
 AL Yes. 
 
 7 
 
98 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Soc. And they are honorable in so far as they are good, and 
 dishonorable in so far as they are evil ? 
 
 Al. True. 
 
 Soc. Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle 
 is honorable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the 
 rescue is good and yet evil ? 
 
 AL I believe that you are right, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. Nothing honorable, regarded as honorable, is evil ; nor 
 anything base, regarded as base, good. 
 
 Al. Clearly not. Alcibiades I. iv. 530. 
 Courage untempered. 
 
 Str. Courage, when untempered by the gentler nature 
 
 during many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, 
 but at last bursts forth into every sort of madness. 
 
 Y. Soc. Like enough. 
 
 Str. And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty 
 and has no element of courage in many successive generations, 
 is apt to grow very indolent, and at last to become utterly 
 paralyzed and useless. 
 
 Y. Soc. That, again, is quite likely. 
 
 Str. It was of these bonds I said that there would be no 
 difficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held 
 the same opinion about the honorable and good ; indeed, in 
 this single word, the whole process of royal weaving is com- 
 prised never to allow temperate natures to be separated from 
 the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the 
 woof, by common sentiments and honors and opinions, and by 
 the giving of pledges to one another ; and out of them form- 
 ing one smooth and even web, to intrust to them the offices of 
 State. 
 
 Y> Soc. How do you mean ? 
 
 Str. Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a 
 ruler who has both these qualities ; when many, you must 
 mingle some of each, for the temperate ruler is very careful 
 and just and safe, but is wanting in thoroughness and go. 
 
 Y. Soc. Certainly, that is very true. 
 
 Str. The character of the courageous, on the other hand 
 falls short of the former in justice and caution, but has tht 
 power of action in a remarkable degree, and where either o 
 these two qualities is wanting, there cities cannot altogethei 
 prosper either in their public or private life. Statesman, iii 
 598. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 99 
 
 Courts of Law and lawyers. 
 
 In courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, 
 but only about conviction : and this is based on probability, to 
 which he who would be a skillful orator should therefore give 
 his whole attention. And they say also that there are cases in 
 which the actual facts ought to be withheld, and only the prob- 
 abilities should be told either in accusation or defense, and that 
 always in speaking the orator should keep probability in view, 
 and say good-bye to the truth. And the observance of this 
 principle throughout a speech furnishes the whole art. 
 
 Phaedr. That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually 
 say, Socrates. I remember that we have touched lightly upon 
 this matter already, but with them the point is all-important. 
 
 Soc. I dare say that you are familiar with Tisias. Does he 
 not define probability to be that which the many think ? 
 
 Phaedr. Certainly he does. 
 
 Soc. I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this 
 sort : He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted 
 a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat 
 or of something or other ; he is brought into court, and then 
 Tisias says that both parties should tell lies : the coward should 
 say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other 
 should prove that they were alone, and should use this argu- 
 ment : " How could a man like me have assaulted a man like 
 him ? " The complainant will not like to confess his own cow- 
 ardice, and will therefore invent some other lie which his adver- 
 sary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are 
 other devices of the same kind which have a place in the sys- 
 tem. Am I not right, Phaedrus ? 
 
 Phaedr. Certainly. Phaedrus, i. 578. 
 Courts of justice, establishment of. 
 
 A city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a 
 city ; and again, if a judge is silent and says no more than the 
 litigants in preliminary trials and in private arbitrations, he will 
 never be able to decide justly ; wherefore a multitude of judges 
 will not easily judge well, nor a few if they are not good judges. 
 The point in dispute should be made clear by both parties, and 
 time, and deliberation, and repeated examination, greatly tend 
 to clear up doubts. For this reason, he who goes to law with 
 another, should go first of all to his neighbors and friends who 
 know best the questions at issue. And if he be unable to ob- 
 tain from them a satisfactory decision, let him have recourse 
 
 
100 PLATO 1 S BEST THOUGHTS 
 
 to another court ; and if the two courts cannot settle the mat- 
 ter, let the third put an end to the suit. 
 
 Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded 
 as a choice of magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a 
 judge of some things ; and the judge, though he be not a mag- 
 istrate, yet in certain respects is a very important magistrate 
 on the day on which he is determining a suit. Regarding then 
 the judges also as magistrates, let us say who are fit to be 
 judges, and of what they are to be judges, and how many of 
 them are to judge in each suit. Let that be the supreme tri- 
 bunal which the ligitants agree to appoint in common for them- 
 selves. And let there be two other tribunals : one for private 
 individuals, who desire to have causes of action decided against 
 one another ; the other for public causes, in which some citizen 
 is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individ- 
 ual, and is willing to vindicate the common interests. Laws, 
 iv. 288. 
 Cowards, children made. See Courage. 
 
 I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that 
 
 " The gods, taking the disguise of strangers, haunt cities in all sorts of forms; " 
 
 and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, 
 either in tragedy or any other kind of poetry, introduce Here 
 disguised in the likeness of a priestess, 
 
 " Asking an alms for the life-giving daughters of the river Inachus; " 
 
 let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have 
 
 mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children 
 
 with abominable tales of certain gods who, as they say, 
 
 " Go about by night in the likeness of strangers from every land; " 
 
 let them beware lest they blaspheme against the gods and at 
 the same time make cowards of their children. The Repub- 
 lic, ii. 204. 
 Creation, beginning and reason of the. 
 
 If the world be indeed fair and the artificer good, then, 
 
 as is plain, he must have looked to that which is eternal. But 
 if what cannot be said without blasphemy is true, then he 
 looked to the created pattern. Every one will see that he 
 must have looked to the eternal, for the world is the fairest of 
 creations and He is the best of causes. And having been cre- 
 ated in this way the world has been framed with a view to 
 that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is un- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 101 
 
 changeable, and must, if this be admitted, of necessity be the 
 copy of something. Now that the beginning of everything 
 should be according to nature is a great matter. And in 
 speaking of the copy and original we may assume that words 
 are akin to the matter which they describe, when they relate 
 to the lasting and permanent and intelligible, they ought to be 
 lasting and unfailing, and as far as is in their nature irrefut- 
 able and immovable nothing less. But when they express 
 only the copy or image and not the eternal things themselves, 
 they need only be probable and analogous to the real words. 
 As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then, Soc- 
 rates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the genera- 
 tion of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are 
 in every way exact and consistent with one another, do not be 
 surprised. Enough, if we adduce probabilities as likely as any 
 others, for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and 
 you who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to 
 accept the tale which is probable and not inquire further. 
 Timaeus, ii. 524. 
 Creations of God indissoluble. 
 
 Oceanus and Tethys were the children of Earth and 
 
 Heaven, and from these sprang Phorcys and Cronos and Rhea, 
 and many more with them ; and from Cronos an<l Rhea sprang 
 Zeus and Here, and all those whom we know as their brethren, 
 and others who were their children. 
 
 Now, when all of them, both those who visibly appear in 
 their revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a 
 more retiring nature, had come into being, the Creator of 
 the universe spoke to them as follows : Gods and sons of gods 
 who are my works, and of whom I am the artificer and father, 
 my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound 
 may be dissolved, but only an evil being would wish to dis- 
 solve that which is harmonious and happy. And although 
 being created, ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble, 
 ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable to the fate of 
 death ; having in my will a greater and mightier bond than 
 those which bound you at the time of creation. Timaeus, ii. 
 533. 
 Creator, artist. 
 
 There is another artist, I should like to know what 
 
 you would say of him. 
 
 Who is he ? 
 
102 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 One who is the maker of all the works of all other work- 
 men. 
 
 What an extraordinary man ! 
 
 Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying 
 so. For this is he who makes not only vessels of every kind, 
 but plants and animals, himself and all other things the 
 earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven, or un- 
 der the earth ; he makes the gods also. 
 
 He must be a rare master of his art. 
 
 Oh ! you are unbelieving, are you ? Do you mean that there 
 is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might 
 be a maker of all these things but not in another ? Do you 
 not see that there is a way in which you could make them 
 yourself ? 
 
 What way? 
 
 An easy way enough ; or rather, there are many ways in 
 which the feat might be accomplished, none quicker than that 
 of turning a mirror round and round, you would soon make 
 the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other 
 animals and plants, and all the other creations of art as well 
 as nature, in the mirror. 
 
 Yes, he said, but that is an appearance only. 
 
 Very good,.! said, you are coming to the point now; and 
 the painter, as I conceive, is just a creator of this sort, is he 
 not? 
 
 Of course. The Republic, ii. 426. 
 Crimes and criminals treatment of. 
 
 There is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are 
 
 about to do, for all the details of crime in a state which, as we 
 say, is to be well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to 
 the practice of virtue. To assume that in such a state there 
 will arise some accomplice in crimes as great as any which are 
 ever perpetrated in other states, and that we must legislate for 
 him by anticipation, and threaten and make laws against him 
 if he should arise ; in order to deter him, and punish his acts, 
 under the idea that he will arise this, as I was saying, is in 
 a manner disgraceful. But seeing that we are not like the an- 
 cient legislators, who gave laws to demi-gods and sons of Gods, 
 being themselves, according to the popular belief, the offspring 
 of the gods, and legislating for others, who were also the chil- 
 dren of divine parents, whereas we are only men who are leg- 
 islating for the sons of men, there is no uncharitableness in ap- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 103 
 
 prehending that some one of our citizens may be like a seed 
 which has touched the ox's horn, and have a heart which cannot 
 be softened any more than those seeds can be softened by fire. 
 
 Among our citizens there may be those who cannot be sub- 
 dued by all the strength of the laws ; and for their sake, 
 though an ungracious task, I will proclaim my first law about 
 the robbing of temples, in case such a crime should ever be 
 committed. I do not expect or imagine that any well-brought- 
 up citizen will ever take the infection, but their servants, and 
 strangers, and strangers' servants, may be guilty of many im- 
 pieties. Arid with a view to them especially, and yet not with- 
 out a provident eye to the weakness of human nature generally, 
 I will proclaim the law about robbers of temples and similar 
 incurable, or almost incurable criminals. Having already 
 agreed that such enactments ought always to have a short pre- 
 lude, we may speak to the criminal whom some tormenting de- 
 sire by night and by day tempts to go and rob a temple, in 
 words of admonition and exhortation : O sir, we will say to 
 him, the impulse which moves you to rob temples is not an or- 
 dinary human malady, nor yet a visitation of Heaven, but a 
 madness which is begotten in men from ancient and unexpi- 
 ated crimes of his race, destroying him when his time is come ; 
 against this you must guard as well as you can. and how you 
 are to guard I will explain to you. When any such thought 
 comes into your mind, go and perform expiations, go as a supli- 
 ant to the temples of the Gods who avert evils, go to the society 
 of those who are called good men among you ; hear them tell 
 and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man should 
 honor the noble and the just. Fly from the company of the 
 wicked fly, and turn not back ; and if thy disorder is light- 
 ened sensibly by these remedies, well and good, but if not, then 
 acknowledge death to be nobler than life, and depart hence. 
 
 Such are the preludes which we sing to all who have 
 thoughts of unholy and treasonable actions, and to him who 
 hearkens to them the law has nothing more to say. But to him 
 who is disobedient when the prelude is over, cry with a loud 
 voice, He who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if he 
 be a slave or stranger, shall have his evil deed engraven on his 
 face and hands, and shall be beaten with as many stripes as 
 may seem good to the judges, and be cast naked beyond the 
 borders of the land. And if he suffers this punishment he will 
 probably be corrected and improved ; for no penalty which the 
 
104 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 law inflicts is designed for evil, but always makes him who 
 suffers either better or not so bad. But if any citizen be 
 found guilty of any great or unmentionable wrong, either in 
 relation to the Gods or his parents, or the State, let the judge 
 deem him to be incurable, remembering what an education and 
 training he has had from youth, upward, and yet has not ab- 
 stained from the greatest of crimes. The penalty of death is 
 to him the least of evils ; and others will be benefited by his 
 example, if he be put away out of the land with infamy. 
 Laws, iv. 366. 
 Crimnality and punishment of bad public men. 
 
 Of these fearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken 
 
 from the class of tyrants and kings and potentates and public 
 men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most impious 
 crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses 
 to the truth of this ; for they are always kings and potentates 
 whom he has described as suffering everlasting punishment in the 
 world below ; such were Tantalus, and Sisyphus, and Tityus. 
 But no one ever described Thersites, or any private person who 
 was a villain, as suffering everlasting punishment or as incura- 
 ble. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am inclined to 
 think, was not in his power, and he was happier than those 
 who had the power. Yes, Callicles, the very bad men come 
 from the class of those who have power. And yet in that 
 very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all ad- 
 miration they are, for where there is a great power to do 
 wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to 
 be praised, and few there are who attain this. Such good and 
 true men, however, there have been, and will be again, in 
 Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust right- 
 eously ; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, 
 Aristides,the son of Lysimaclms. But, in general, great men 
 are also bad, my friend. 
 
 And, as I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of 
 the bad kind, knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor 
 who his parents are; he 'knows only that he has got hold of a 
 villain ; and seeing this, he stamps him as curable or incurable, 
 and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives 
 his recompense. Gorgias, iii. 117. 
 Criminals co-existing with paupers. 
 
 God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without 
 
 stings, whereas of the walking drones he has made some with- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 105 
 
 out stings and others with dreadful stings ; of the stingless class 
 are those who in their old age end as paupers ; of the stingers 
 come all the criminal class, as they are termed. 
 
 Most true, he said. 
 
 Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a state, some- 
 where in that neighborhood there are hidden away thieves and 
 cut-purses, and robbers of temples, and other malefactors. 
 
 Clearly. 
 
 Well, I said, and in oligarchical states do you not find pau- 
 pers ? 
 
 Yes, he said ; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a 
 ruler. 
 
 And may we be so bold as to suppose that there are also 
 many criminals to be found in them, rogues who have stings, 
 and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force ? 
 
 Certainly, we may be so bold. 
 
 The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of 
 education, ill-training, and an evil constitution of the State ? 
 
 True. The Republic, ii. 380. 
 Cures, why unknown to physicians. 
 
 This Thracian told me that in these notions of theirs, 
 
 which I was mentioning, the Greek physicians are quite right 
 as far as they go ; but Zamolxis, he added, our king, who is 
 also a god, says further, " that as you ought not to attempt to 
 cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the eyes, 
 so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the 
 soul ; and this," he said, " is the reason why the cure of many 
 diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because they 
 are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied also ; for 
 the part can never be well unless the whole is well." For all 
 good and evil, whether in the body or in human nature, origi- 
 nates, as he declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence, as 
 from the head into the eyes. And therefore if the head and 
 the body are to be well, you must begin by curing the soul ; 
 that is the first thing. And the cure, my dear youth, has to be 
 effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms are 
 fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the soul, 
 and where temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not 
 only to the head, but to the whole body. And he who taught 
 me the cure and the charm at the same time added a special di- 
 rection : " Let no one," he said, " persuade you to cure the 
 head, until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the 
 
106 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 charm. For this," he said, " is the great error of our day in 
 the treatment of the human body, that physicians separate the 
 soul from the body." = Charmides, i. 10. 
 Curiosity does not make a philosopher. 
 
 May we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not 
 
 of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole ? 
 
 True. 
 
 Then he who dislikes knowledge, especially in youth, when 
 he has no power of judging what is good and what is not, 
 such an one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of 
 knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not hungry, and 
 may be said to have a bad appetite, and not a good one ? 
 
 There we are right, he said. 
 
 Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and 
 who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly 
 termed a philosopher ? Am I not right ? 
 
 Glaucon said : If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will 
 find many a strange being claiming the name. For all the 
 lovers of sights have a delight in learning, and will therefore 
 have to be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk won- 
 derfully out of place among philosophers, for they are the last 
 persons in the world who would come to anything like a philo- 
 sophical discussion, if they could help, while they run about at 
 the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear 
 every chorus ; whether the performance is in town or country 
 that makes no difference they are there. Now are we to 
 maintain that all these arid any who have similar tastes, as well 
 as the professors of minor arts, are philosophers ? 
 
 Certainly not, I replied, they are only an imitation. The 
 Republic, ii. 303. 
 Custom and Law. See Colonization, etc. 
 
 Dancing, natural. 
 
 The Gods, pitying the toils which our race is born to un- 
 dergo, have appointed holy festivals, in which men alternate 
 rest with labor ; and have given them the Muses, and Apollo 
 the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, to be partners in their 
 revels, that they may improve what education they have, at the 
 festivals of the gods, and by their aid. I should like to know 
 whether a common saying is true to nature or not. For what 
 men say is that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in 
 their bodies or in their voices ; they are always wanting to 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 107 
 
 move, and cry out ; at one time leaping and skipping, and over- 
 flowing with sportiveness and delight at something, and then 
 again uttering all sorts of cries. But, whereas other animals 
 have no perception of order or disorder in their movements, 
 that is, of rhythm or harmony, as they are called, to us the 
 Gods, who, as we say, have been appointed to be our partners 
 in the dance, have given the pleasurable sense of harmony and 
 rhythm ; and so they stir us into life, and we follow them and 
 join hands with one another in dances and songs ; and these 
 they call choruses, which is a term naturally expressive of cheer- 
 fulness. Shall we begin, then, with the acknowledgment that 
 education is first given through Apollo and the Muses ? What 
 do you say ? 
 
 Cle. I assent. Laws, iv. 183. 
 
 Dead, burial and remembrance of the. See Burial, etc. 
 Dead, they are our shades and images. 
 
 Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that 
 the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that even 
 in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only 
 the soul ; and that the body follows us about in the likeness of 
 each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the 
 dead are rightly said to be our shades or images ; for that the 
 true and immortal being of each one of us which is called the 
 soul goes on her way to other gods that before them she may 
 give an account an inspiring hope to the good, but very ter- 
 rible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us, which also 
 say that not much can be done in the way of helping a man 
 after he is dead. But the living he should be helped by 
 all his kindred, that while in life he may be the holiest and 
 justest of men, and after death may have no great sins to be 
 punished in the world below. If this be true, a man ought not 
 to waste his substance under the idea that all this lifeless mass 
 of flesh which is in process of burial is connected with him ; he 
 should consider that the son, or brother, or the beloved one, 
 whoever he may be, whom he thinks he is laying in the earth, 
 has gone away to complete and fulfill his own destiny, and that 
 his duty is rightly to order the present, and to spend moder- 
 ately on the lifeless altar of the Gods below. Laws, iv. 468. 
 Dead ; heroic. See Battle, death in. 
 
 Death, escape from, not always right. 
 
 Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in return for 
 the evil name which you will get from the detractors of the 
 
108 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 city, who will say that you killed Socrates, a wise man ; for 
 they will call me wise even although I am not wise, when they 
 want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while, your 
 desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For 
 I am far advanced in years, as you may perceive, and not far 
 from death. I am speaking now only to those of you who have 
 condemned me to death. And I have another thing to say to 
 them : You think that I was convicted because I had no words 
 of the sort which would have procured my acquittal I mean, 
 if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid. Not 
 so ; the deficiency which led to my conviction was not of words 
 certainly not. But I had not the boldness or impudence or 
 inclination to address you as you would have liked me to ad- 
 dress you, weeping and wailing and lamenting, and saying and 
 doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear 
 from others, and which, as I maintain, are unworthy of me. I 
 thought at the time that I ought not to do anything common 
 or mean when in danger : nor do I now repent of the manner 
 of my defense, and I would rather die having spoken after my 
 manner, than speak in your manner and live. For neither in 
 war nor yet at law ought any man to use every way of escap- 
 ing death. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man 
 will throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pur- 
 suers, he may escape death ; and in other dangers there are 
 other ways of escaping death, if a man is willing to say and do 
 anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not in avoiding death, 
 but in avoiding unrighteousness ; for that runs faster than death. 
 I am old and move slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken 
 me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, 
 who is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I de- 
 part hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death, 
 and they too go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer 
 the penalty of villainy and wrong ; and I must abide by my 
 award let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these things 
 may be regarded as fated, > and I think that they are well. 
 Apology, i. 336. 
 Death and life, chances of, not to be calculated. 
 
 Some one will say : And are you not ashamed, Socrates, 
 
 of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely 
 end ? To him I may fairly answer: There you are mistaken: 
 a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the 
 chance of living or dying ; he ought only to consider whether 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 109 
 
 in doing anything he is doing right or wrong acting the part 
 of a good man or of a bad. Whereas, according to your view, 
 the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much, and the 
 son of Thetis above all, who altogether despised danger in com- 
 parison with disgrace ; and when his goddess mother said to him, 
 in his eagerness to slay Hector, that if he avenged his com- 
 panion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would die himself, 
 " Fate," as she said, " waits upon you next after Hector ; " he, 
 hearing this, utterly despised danger and death, and instead of 
 fearing them, feared rather to live in dishonor, and not to 
 avenge his friend. " Let me die next," he replies, " and be 
 avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the beaked 
 ships, a scorn and a burden of the earth." Had Achilles any 
 any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man's 
 place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which 
 he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain 
 in the hour of danger : he should not think of death or of any- 
 thing, but of disgrace. And this, O men of Athens, is a true 
 saying. Apology, i. 326. 
 Death, fear of, no wisdom. 
 
 Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, 
 
 if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose 
 to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, re- 
 mained where they placed me, like any other man, facing 
 death, if , I say, now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God 
 orders me to fulfill the philosopher's mission of searching into 
 myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear 
 of death, or any other fear ; that would indeed be strange, and 
 I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence 
 of the Gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of 
 death : then I should be fancying that I was wise when I was 
 not wise. For the fear of death is indeed the pretense of wis- 
 dom, and not real wisdom, being a pretended knowledge of 
 the unknown ; and no one knows whether death, which men in 
 their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the 
 greatest good. Is there not here conceit of knowledge, which 
 is a disgraceful sort of ignorance ? And this is the point in 
 which, as I think, I differ from others and in which I might per- 
 haps fancy myself wiser than men in general, that whereas 
 I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that 1 
 know : but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a bet- 
 ter, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will 
 
110 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. 
 And therefore if you let me go now, and reject the counsels of 
 Anytus, who said that if I were not put to death I ought not 
 to have been prosecuted, and that if I escape now, your sons 
 will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words, if you 
 say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and 
 will let you off, but upon one condition, that you are not to in- 
 quire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you are 
 caught doing this again you shall die ; if this was the condi- 
 tion on which you let me go, I should reply : Men of Athens, 
 I honor and love you ; but I shall obey God rather than you, 
 and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from 
 the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one 
 whom I meet after my manner, and convincing him. Apol- 
 ogy, i. 327. 
 
 Death, calmness in view of. See Calmness, etc. 
 Death and life not to be considered in questions of duty. 
 
 I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought 
 
 not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians : 
 and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the at- 
 tempt ; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations 
 which you mention, of money and loss of character and the 
 duty of educating one's children, are, as I fear, only the doc- 
 trines of the multitude, who would be as ready to call people 
 to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death 
 and with as little reason. But now, since the argument has 
 thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be con- 
 sidered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in 
 suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in 
 money and thanks, or whether we shall not do rightly ; and if 
 the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue 
 on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the 
 calculation. Crito, i. 353. 
 
 Death, presentiment of in Socrates. See Presentiment. 
 Death, life from. 
 
 Here is a new way in which we arrive at the inference 
 
 that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from 
 the living ; and this, if true, affords the satisfactory proof that 
 the souls of the dead must exist in some place out of which 
 they come again. 
 
 Yes, Socrates, he said ; the conclusion seems to flow neces- 
 sarily out of our previous admissions. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. Ill 
 
 And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, 
 may be shown, I think, as follows : If generation were in a 
 straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in 
 nature, no turn or return of elements into one another, then 
 you know that all things would at last have the same form and 
 pass into the same state, and there would be no more genera- 
 tion of them. 
 
 What do you mean ? he said. 
 
 A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case 
 of sleep, he replied. You know that if there were no alter- 
 nation of sleeping and waking, the story of the sleeping En- 
 dymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other 
 things would be asleep too, and he would not be distinguishable 
 from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no di- 
 vision of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would 
 come again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things 
 which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead 
 remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, 
 all would at last die, and nothing would be alive how could 
 this be otherwise ? For if the living spring from any others 
 who are not the dead, and they die, must not all things at last 
 be swallowed up in death ? 
 
 There is no escape from that, Socrates, said Cebes ; and I 
 think that what you say is entirely true. 
 
 Yes, he said, Cebes, I entirely think so too ; nor is this a 
 delusion in which we are agreeing: but I am confident in the 
 belief that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that 
 the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead 
 are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion 
 than the evil. Phaedo, i. 399. 
 
 Death in age ; nearness of. See Age, as viewing eternity. 
 Death, willingness for, how consistent. 
 
 - There may be reason in saying that a man should wait, 
 and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is 
 now summoning me. 
 
 Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there is surely reason in that. 
 And yet how can you reconcile the seemingly true belief that 
 God is our guardian and we his possessions, with this willing- 
 ness to die which we were attributing to the philosopher ? That 
 the wisest of men should be willing to leave a service in which 
 they are ruled by the Gods who are the best of rulers, is not 
 reasonable, for surely no wise man thinks that when set at lib- 
 
112 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 erty he can take better care of himself than the Gods take of 
 him. A fool may perhaps think so he may argue that he had 
 better run away from his. master, not considering that his duty 
 is to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, 
 and that there would be no sense in his running away. But 
 the wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than 
 himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now 
 said ; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the 
 fool rejoice at passing out of life. Phaedo, i. 388. 
 Death, fear of, contrary to courage. See Courage. 
 Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly con- 
 stitution, by a happy combination of training and doctoring, 
 found out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and sec- 
 ondly the rest of the world. 
 
 How was that? he said. 
 
 By the invention of lingering death ; for he had a mortal 
 disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out 
 of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian ; 
 he could do nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in 
 constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his 
 usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he 
 struggled on to old age. 
 
 A rare reward of his skill ! 
 
 Yes, I said ; such a reward as a man might fairly expect 
 who could not be made to see that if Asclepius did not instruct 
 his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the , omission arose not 
 from ignorance or inexperience of such a department of medi- 
 cine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered states every 
 individual had an occupation to which he must attend, and 
 therefore has no leisure to spend in continually being ill. This 
 we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, 
 do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort. The 
 Republic, ii. 230. 
 
 Death, welcome to the philosopher. See Philosopher, and Bold- 
 ness. 
 Death may be life. 
 
 Soc. But surely according to you, life is an awful thing ; 
 
 and indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in say- 
 ing, 
 
 " Who knows if life be not death and death life; " 
 
 and that we are very likely dead ; I have heard a philosopher 
 say that at this very moment we are dead, and that the body 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 113 
 
 is a tomb (<n/ju.a), and that the part of the soul which 
 is the seat of the desires is liable to be blown and tossed about ; 
 and some ingenious man, probably a Sicilian or Italian, playing 
 with the word, invented a tale ; in which he called the soul a 
 vessel (TTI'^OS), meaning a believing vessel (TTWTIKOS), and the 
 ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the 
 souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being 
 the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel 
 full of holes, because they can never be satisfied. He is not of 
 your way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the 
 souls in Hades, meaning the invisible world (detSes), these un- 
 initiated or leaky persons are the most miserable, and that they 
 carry water to a vessel which is full of holes in a similarly holey 
 colander. The colander, as he declares, is the soul, and the soul 
 which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, 
 which is full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a 
 bad memory and want of faith. These are strange words, but 
 still they show what, if I can, I desire to prove to you; that 
 you should change your mind, and, instead, of the intemperate 
 and insatiate life, you should choose that which is orderly and 
 sufficient, and has a due provision for daily needs. Gorgias, 
 iii. 81. 
 
 Death in battle. See Battle. 
 Deceit and falsehood. 
 
 Str. Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one 
 
 among many classes of being, diffused over all being. 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Str. And thence arises the question, whether not-being min- 
 gles with opinion and language. 
 
 Theaet. How so ? 
 
 Str. If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all 
 things must be true ; but if not-being has a part, then false 
 opinion and false speech are possible, for to think or to say 
 what is not, is falsehood, which thus arises in the region of 
 thought and in speech. 
 
 Theaet. That is quite true. 
 
 Str. And if there is falsehood there is deceit. 
 
 Theaet. Yes. 
 
 Str. And if there is deceit, then all things must be full of 
 idols and images and fancies. 
 
 Theaet. To be sure. 
 
 Str. Into that region the Sophist, as we said, made his es- 
 8 
 
114 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 cape, and when he had got there, denied the very possibility of 
 falsehood ; no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered 
 falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any way partake of 
 being. Sophist, iii. 500. 
 Deceiver as to truth. 
 
 To know and to declare the truth in matters of high in- 
 terest which a man loves, among wise men who love him, is a 
 safe thing and gives confidence ; but to carry on an argument 
 when you are yourself only a doubting inquirer, which is my 
 case, is a dangerous arid slippery thing ; and the danger is not 
 that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be child- 
 ish), but that I shall miss the truth where I most need to be 
 sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. 
 And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I 
 am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an in- 
 voluntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about 
 the beauty or goodness or justice of institutions. And that 
 is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among 
 friends, and therefore you do well to console me. 
 
 Glaucon laughed and said : Well then, Socrates, in case you 
 and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be ac- 
 quitted beforehand of the homicide, and shall not be held to 
 be a deceiver ; take courage then and speak. 
 
 Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he 
 is free from guilt, and what holds in the one case may hold in 
 the other. The Republic, ii. 275. 
 Deception. See Concealment of evil 
 Deception, how practiced and avoided. 
 
 Soc. The art of disputation, then, is not confined to the 
 
 courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use 
 of language ; this is that art, if such an art there be, which 
 finds a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found, 
 and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises 
 which are used by others ? 
 
 Phaedr. How do you mean ? 
 
 Soc. Let me put the matter thus : When will there be 
 more chance of deception when the difference is large or 
 small ? 
 
 Phaedr. When the difference is small. 
 
 Soc. And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing 
 by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at 
 once ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 115 
 
 Phaedr. Of course. 
 
 Soc. He, then, who would deceive others, and not be de- 
 ceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences 
 of things ? 
 
 Phaedr. Yes, he must. 
 
 Soc. And if he is ignorant of the true nature of anything, 
 how can he ever distinguish the greater or less degree of like- 
 ness to other things of that which he does not know ? 
 
 Phaedr. He cannot. 
 
 Soc. And when men are deceived, and their notions are at 
 variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through 
 some resemblances ? 
 
 Phaedr. Yes, that is the way. 
 
 Soc. Then he who would be a master of the art must know 
 the real nature of everything ; or he will never know either 
 how to make the gradual departure from truth into the oppo- 
 site of truth which is effected by the help of resemblances, or 
 how to avoid it ? 
 
 Phaedr. He will not. 
 
 Soc. He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at ap-/ 
 pearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous 
 and is not an art at all ? 
 
 Phaedr. That may be expected. Phaedrus, i. 566. 
 Deception in the soul, detestable, and in God impossible. 
 
 But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still 
 
 by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they 
 appear in various forms ? 
 
 Suppose that, he replied. 
 
 Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, or 
 make a false representation of himself whether in word or 
 deed? 
 
 I cannot say, he replied. 
 
 Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if I may use such 
 an expression, is hated of gods and men ? 
 
 What do you mean ? he said. 
 
 I mean this, I said, that no one will admit falsehood into 
 that which is the truest and highest part of himself, or about 
 the truest and highest matters ; there he is most afraid of a 
 lie having possession of him. 
 
 Still, he said, I do not comprehend you. 
 
 The reason is, I replied, that, you attribute some grand 
 meaning to me ; I am but saying only that deception, or being 
 
116 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 deceived or uninformed about realities in the highest faculty, 
 which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold 
 the lie, is what mankind least like, that, I say, is what they 
 utterly detest. 
 
 There is nothing more hateful to them. 
 
 And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the 
 soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie ; for the 
 lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of 
 a previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated false- 
 hood. Am I not right ? 
 
 Perfectly right. 
 
 The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not 
 hateful ; in dealing with enemies that would be an instance ; 
 or again, as a cure or preventive of the madness of those who 
 are called your friends ; also in the tales of mythology, of which 
 we were just now speaking because we do not know the 
 truth about ancient traditions, we make falsehood as much like 
 truth as may be, and so of use. 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
 But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we sup- 
 pose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse 
 to invention ? 
 
 That would be ridiculous, he said. 
 
 The lying poet then has no place in our idea of God ? 
 
 I should say not. 
 
 But peradveuture again he may tell a lie because he is 
 afraid of enemies ? 
 
 That is inconceivable. 
 
 But he may have friends who are senseless or mad ? 
 
 But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God. 
 
 Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie ? 
 
 None. 
 
 Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of 
 falsehood ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Then is God perfectly simple and true both in deed and 
 word ; he changes not ; he deceives not, either by dream or 
 waking vision, by sign or word. The Republic, ii. 205. 
 Deeds and Words, tribute of. 
 There is a tribute of deeds and of words. The departed 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 117 
 
 have already had the first, when going forth on their destined 
 journey they were attended on their way by the State and by 
 their friends ; the tribute of words remains to be given to them, 
 as is meet and by law ordained. For noble words are a me- 
 morial and a crown of noble actions, which are given to the 
 doers of them by the hearers. A word is needed which will 
 duly praise the dead and gently admonish the living, exhorting 
 the brethren and descendants of the departed to imitate their 
 virtue and consoling their fathers and mothers and the surviv- 
 ors, if any, who may chance to be alive of the previous genera- 
 tion. What sort of a word will this be, and how shall we 
 rightly begin the praises of these brave men ? In their life 
 they rejoiced their own friends with their virtue, and their 
 death they gave in exchange for the salvation of the living. 
 And I think that we should, praise them in the order in which 
 nature made them good, for they were good because they were 
 sprung from good fathers. Wherefore let us first of all praise 
 the goodness of their birth ; secondly, their nurture and educa- 
 tion ; and then let us set forth how noble their actions were, 
 and how worthy of the education which they had received. 
 Menexenus, iv. 567. 
 Definition needed for knowledge. 
 
 Soc. Methought that I too had a dream, and J heard in my 
 dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you 
 and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or 
 explanation, but are names only, of which not even existence 
 or non-existence can be predicated ; you cannot say of them that 
 they are or are not, for either of the two implies existence, 
 which must not be added on, if one means to speak of this or 
 that thing taken by itself alone. You may not say itself, or 
 that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like ; for these go about 
 everywhere and are applied to all things, and are distinct from 
 them ; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had 
 a definition suitable to them, they would be spoken of apart 
 from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be de- 
 fined ; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a 
 name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they 
 are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the 
 combination of names is the essence of a proposition. Thus, 
 then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and 
 cannot be defined or known ; but the combinations or syllables 
 of them are known and expressed and apprehended by true 
 
118 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of 
 anything without definition, you may say that his mind is truly 
 exercised, but has no knowledge ; for he who cannot give and 
 receive a definition of a thing, has no knowledge of that thing ; 
 but when he adds the definition, then he is perfected in knowl- 
 edge, and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was 
 that the form in which the dream appeared to you ? 
 
 Theaet. Precisely. 
 
 Soc. And you allow and maintain that true opinion, com- 
 bined with definition, is knowledge ? 
 
 Theaet. Exactly. 
 
 Soc. Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in 
 this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former 
 times many wise men have grown old and have not found ? 
 
 Theaet. At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the pres- 
 ent statement. 
 
 Soc. Which is probably correct, for how can there be 
 knowledge apart from definition and true opinion ? Theaet- 
 etus, ii\. 408. 
 Definition, how attained 
 
 Soc. Understand why; just now the reason is, as I was 
 
 saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing 
 characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you 
 will get at the definition or explanation of it ; but while you 
 lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic no- 
 tion, you will only have the definition of those things to which 
 this common quality belongs. 
 
 Theaet. I understand you, and your account of definition is, 
 in my judgment, correct. 
 
 Soc. But he who, having a right opinion about anything, 
 can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other 
 things, will know that of which before he had only an opinion. 
 
 Theaet. Yes, that is what we are maintaining. 
 
 Soc. Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find my- 
 self quite disappointed in the picture, which at a distance was 
 not so bad. 
 
 Theaet. What do you mean ? 
 
 Soc. I will endeavor to explain : I will suppose myself to 
 have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, 
 then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only. 
 
 Theaet. Yes. 
 
 Soc. The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of 
 your difference. Theaetetus, iii. 417. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 119 
 
 Deluge, tradition and effects of the. 
 
 Ath. Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient 
 
 traditions ? 
 
 Ole. What traditions ? 
 
 Ath. The traditions about the many destructions of mankind 
 which have been occasioned by deluges and diseases, and in 
 many other ways, and of the preservation of a remnant. 
 
 Ole. Every one is disposed to believe them. 
 
 Ath. Let us imagine one of them : I will take the famous 
 one which was caused by a deluge. 
 
 Ole. What is to be remarked in them ? 
 
 Ath. I mean to say that those who then escaped would only 
 be hill-shepherds, small sparks of the human race preserved 
 on the tops of mountains. 
 
 Ole. Clearly. 
 
 Ath. Such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with 
 the arts of those who live in cities, and with the various de- 
 vices which are suggested to them by interest or ambition, and 
 all the wrongs which they contrive against one another ? 
 
 Cle. Very true. 
 
 Ath. Let us suppose, then, that the cities in, the plain and 
 on the sea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time. 
 
 Ole. Very good. 
 
 Ath. Would not all implements perish and every other ex- 
 cellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom ut- 
 terly fail at that time ? 
 
 Ole. Why, yes, my friend ; and if things had always con- 
 tinued as they are at present ordered, how could any discovery 
 have ever been made even in the least particular ? For it is 
 evident that the arts were unknown during thousands and 
 thousands of years. And no more than a thousand or two 
 thousand years have elapsed since the discoveries of Daedalus, 
 Orpheus, and Palamades, since Marsyas and Olympus in- 
 vented music, and Amphion the lyre, not to speak of num- 
 berless other inventions which are but of yesterday. Laws, 
 iv. 205. 
 Demons, Hesiod's use of the term. 
 
 Soc. I wish that you would consider what is the real 
 
 meaning of this word "demons." I wonder whether you 
 would think my view right ? 
 
 Her. Let me hear. 
 
 Soc. You know how Hesiod uses the word? 
 
120 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Her. Indeed I do not. 
 
 Soc. Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race 
 of men who came first ? 
 Her. Yes, I know that. 
 Soc. He says of them, 
 
 " But now that fate has closed over this race, 
 They are holy demons upon the earth, 
 Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men." 
 
 Her. What of that? 
 
 Soc. What of that ! Why, I suppose that he means by the 
 golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and 
 noble ; and I am convinced of this, because he further says 
 that we are the iron race. 
 
 Her. That is true. 
 
 Soc. And do you not suppose that good men of our own day 
 would by him be said to be of that golden race ? 
 
 Her. Very likely. 
 
 Soc. And are not the good wise ? 
 
 Her. Yes, they are wise. 
 
 Soc. And therefore I have the most entire conviction that 
 he called them demons, because they were Sar^xoves (knowing 
 or wise), and in the ancient Attic dialect this is the very form 
 of the word. Now he and other poets say truly, that when a 
 good man dies he has honor and a mighty portion among the 
 dead, and becomes a demon ; which is a name given to him 
 signifying wisdom. And I say too that every wise man who 
 happens to be a good man is more than human (oat/xoftov) 
 both in life and death, and is rightly called a demon. Ora- 
 tylus, i. 636. 
 Democracy. 
 
 Next comes democracy and the democratical man : the 
 
 origin and nature of them we have still to learn, that we may 
 compare the individual and the State, and so pronounce upon 
 them. 
 
 That, he said, is our method. 
 
 Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into 
 democracy arise ? Is it not on this wise ? The end which 
 such state desires is to become as rich as possible ; and the 
 rulers, who are aware that their own power rests upon prop- 
 erty, refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spend- 
 thrift youth because they will gain by their ruin ; they lend 
 them money, and buy their land, and grow more wealthy and 
 honorable than ever ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 121 
 
 Exactly. 
 
 There can be no doubt that you cannot have in the citizens 
 of the same state the love of wealth and the spirit of moder- 
 ation ; one or the other will have to be disregarded. 
 
 That is tolerably clear 
 
 Now in this state of things the rulers and their subjects 
 come in one another's way, whether on a journey or some other 
 occasion of meeting, or on a pilgrimage or a march as fellow- 
 soldiers or fellow-sailors ; they observe each other in the mo- 
 ment of danger (and where danger is there is no fear that the 
 poor will be despised by the rich), and very likely the wiry, 
 sunburnt poor man, may be placed in battle at the side of a 
 wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion, and has 
 plenty of superfluous flesh when he sees such an one puff- 
 ing and at his wits'-end, can he avoid drawing the conclusion that 
 men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to 
 despoil them ? And when they meet in private will not people 
 be saying to one another that our " warriors are not good for 
 much ? " 
 
 Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking. 
 
 And, as where a body is weak the addition of a touch from 
 without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there 
 is no external provocation a commotion may arise within, in 
 the same way where there is weakness in the State there is 
 also likely to be illness, of which the occasion may be very 
 slight, one party introducing their democratical, the other their 
 oligarchical allies, and the State falls sick, and is at war with 
 herself ; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no 
 external cause ? 
 
 Yes, surely. 
 
 And then democracy comes into being after the poor have 
 conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing 
 some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of free- 
 dom and power ; and this is the form of government in which 
 the magistrates are commonly elected by lot. 
 
 Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the 
 revolution has been affected by arms or whether fear has 
 caused the opposite party to withdraw. 
 
 And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a 
 government have they ? For as the government is, such will 
 be the man. 
 
 Clearly, he said. 
 
122 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 In the first place, are they not free? and the city is full of 
 freedom and frankness a man may do as he likes. 
 
 They say so, he replied. 
 
 And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to or- 
 der his own life as he pleases ? 
 
 Clearly. 
 
 Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety 
 of human natures ? 
 
 There will. 
 
 This, then, is likely to be the fairest of States ; and will appear 
 the fairest, being spangled with the manners and characters of 
 mankind like an embroidered robe which is spangled with 
 every sort of flowers. And just as women and children think 
 variety charming, so there are many men who will deem this 
 to be the fairest of States. 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Yes, my good sir, and there will be no better in which to 
 look for a government. 
 
 Why? 
 
 Because of the liberty which reigns there : they have a 
 complete assortment of constitutions : and he who has a mind 
 to establish a State, as we have been doing, must go to a de- 
 mocracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them, and 
 pick out one that suits him ; then when he has made his choice, 
 he may found his State. 
 
 He will be sure to have patterns enough. 
 
 And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in 
 this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed 
 unless you like, or to go to war when the others go to war, or 
 to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are dis- 
 posed there being no necessity also because some law forbids 
 you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office 
 or be a dicast, if you take a fancy is not that a way of life 
 which for the moment is supremely delightful ? 
 
 For the moment, yes. 
 
 And is not their humanity to the condemned often charm- 
 ing? Under such a government there are men who, whei 
 they have been sentenced to death or exile, stay where the 
 are and walk about the world ; the gentleman parades like 
 hero, as though nobody saw or cared. 
 
 Yes, he replied, many and many a one. 
 
 See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and th< 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 123 
 
 " don't care " about trifles, and the disregard which she shows 
 of all the fine principles which we were solemnly affirming at the 
 foundation of the city as when we said that, except in the 
 case of some rare natures, never will there be a good man who 
 in his early youth has not made things of beauty a delight and 
 a study how grandly does she trample our words under her 
 feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a 
 statesman, and promoting to honor any one who professes to 
 be the people's friend. 
 
 Yes, she is of a noble spirit. 
 
 These and other kindred characteristics are proper to de- 
 mocracy, which is a charming form of government, full of 
 variety and disorder, and dispensing equality to equals and un- 
 equals alike. The Republic, ii. 382. 
 Despot. See King. 
 Dialectic, what is it ? 
 Pro. What is dialectic ? 
 
 Soc. Clearly the science which knows all that knowledge of 
 which we are now speaking ; 'for I am sure that all men who 
 have a grain of intelligence will admit that the knowledge 
 which has to do with being and reality, and sameness and un- 
 changeableness, is by far the truest of all. And would you, 
 Protarchus, say or decide otherwise? 
 
 Pro. I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that 
 the art of persuasion far surpassed every other ; this, as he 
 says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things submit, 
 not by compulsion, but of their own free will. Philebus, iii. 
 198. 
 
 Dialectic, power of. See Science, etc. 
 Dialectical skill of Socrates. 
 
 Nic. You do not seem to be aware that any one who has 
 
 an intellectual affinity to Socrates, and enters into conversation 
 with him, is liable to be drawn into an argument ; and whatever 
 subject he may start will be continually carried round and 
 round by him, until at last he finds that he has to give an ac- 
 count both of his present and past life ; and when he is once 
 entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely 
 and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to his ways ; and 
 I know that he will certainly do as I say and also that I my- 
 self will be the sufferer ; for I am fond of his conversation, 
 Lysimachus. Neither do I think that there is any harm in 
 being reminded of the evil which we are, or have been doing : 
 
124 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more 
 heed of his after life ; as Solon says, he will wish and desire 
 to be learning so long as he lives, and will not think that old 
 age of itself brings wisdom. To me, to be cross-examined by 
 Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant ; indeed, I knew all 
 along that where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass 
 from our sons to ourselves ; and therefore, as I say, that for 
 my part, I am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his 
 own manner ; but you had better ask our friend Laches what 
 his feeling may be. 
 
 La. I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two 
 feelings about discussions. Some would think that I am a 
 lover, and to others I may seem to be a hater of discourse ; 
 for when I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort of 
 wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am 
 delighted beyond measure : and I compare the man and his 
 words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. 
 Laches, i. 80. 
 
 Dialecticians and Rhetoric. See Rhetoric. 
 Dialectic progress. 
 
 But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and 
 
 take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of 
 them ? 
 
 Neither can this be said any more than the other. 
 
 And so, Glaucon, we have at last arrived at dialectic. This 
 is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the 
 faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate ; for 
 sight, as you may remember, was finally imagined by us to 
 behold real animals and the stars, and last of all the sun him- 
 self ; and so with dialectic ; when a person starts on the discov- 
 ery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without 
 any assistance of sense, if he perseveres by pure intelligence, 
 he attains at last to the idea of good, and finds himself at the 
 end of the intellectual world, as in the other case at the end of 
 the visible. 
 
 Exactly, he said. 
 
 Then this is the progress which you call dialectic ? 
 
 True. The Republic, ii. 359. 
 Differences as to right opinion. 
 
 Soc. Then right opinion implies the perception of differ- 
 ences ? 
 
 Theaet. Clearly. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHT*. 125 
 
 Soc. What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explana- 
 tion to right opinion ? If the meaning is that we should form 
 an opinion'of the way in which something differs from another 
 thing, the proposal is ridiculous. 
 
 Theaet. How so ? 
 
 Soc. We are required to have a right opinion of the differ- 
 ences which distinguish one thing from another when we have 
 already a right opinion of them, and so we go round and 
 round ; the revolution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other 
 rotatory engine, in the same circles, is as nothing compared to 
 our mode of proceeding ; and we may be truly described as 
 the blind directing the blind ; for to add those things which we 
 already have, in order that we may learn what we already 
 think, implies a depth of darkness. 
 
 Theaet. Tell me, then ; what were you going to say just 
 now, when you asked the question ? 
 
 *Soc.'If, my boy, the argument, when speaking of adding 
 the definition, had used the word to " know," and not merely 
 " have an opinion " of the difference, this which is the most 
 promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come 
 to a pretty end, for to know is surely to get knowledge. 
 Theaetetus, iii. 418. 
 Discord and war. 
 
 There is a difference in the names " discord " and " war," 
 
 and I imagine there is also a difference in their natures ; the 
 one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of 
 what is external arid foreign ; and the first of the two is prop- 
 erly termed discord, and only the second, war. 
 
 That is a very just distinction, he replied. 
 
 Shall I further add that the Hellenic race is all united to- 
 gether by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange 
 to the barbarians ? 
 
 Very good, he said. 
 
 And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and bar- 
 barians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at 
 war when they fight, and by nature enemies, and this kind of 
 antagonism should be called war ; but when Hellenes fight with 
 one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of dis- 
 order and discord, and such enmity is to be called discord, they 
 being by nature friends. 
 
 I agree. 
 
 Consider then, I said, when that which is now acknowledged 
 
126 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 by us to be discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties 
 destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another, how 
 wicked does the strife appear, how can either* of them be a 
 lover of his country ? for no true lover of his country would 
 tear in pieces his nurse and mother ; there might be reason in 
 the conqueror depriving the conquered of their' harvest, but still 
 they would have the idea of peace in their hearts, and not go 
 on fighting forever. 
 
 Yes, he said, a better temper than the other. 
 
 And when you found a State, will it not be an Hellenic 
 State ? 
 
 It ought to be, he replied. 
 
 Then will not the citizens be good and civilized ? 
 
 To be sure. 
 
 And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas 
 as their own land, and share in the common temples ? 
 
 Most certainly. 
 
 And any difference that arises among Hellenes will be re- 
 garded by them as discord only, a quarrel among friends, 
 which is not to be called a war ? 
 
 Certainly not. The Republic, ii. 297. 
 Discord and disease. 
 Sir. In the soul there are two kinds of evil. 
 
 Tfteaet. What are they ? 
 
 Str. The one may be compared to disease in the body, the 
 other to deformity. 
 
 Theact. I do not understand. 
 
 Str. Perhaps you have never reflected that disease and dis- 
 cord are the same. 
 
 Theaet. To this, again, I know not what I should reply. 
 
 Str. Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of 
 kindred elements originating in some disagreement ? 
 
 Theaet. Just that. 
 
 Str. And is deformity anything but the want of measure, 
 which is always unsightly ? 
 
 Theaet. Exactly. 
 
 Str. And do we not see that opinion is opposed to desire, 
 pleasure to anger, reason to pain, and that all similar elements 
 are opposed to one another in the souls of bad men ? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Str. And yet they must all be akin ? 
 
 Theaet. Of course. 
 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 127 
 
 Sir. Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and 
 disease of the soul ? Most true. Sophist, iii. 462. 
 Discourse, Rhetoric the art of. See Rhetoric. 
 Discourses, long or short. 
 
 Sir. I would like to observe that you and I, remembering 
 
 what has been said, would praise or blame the shortness of dis- 
 cussions, not by comparing them with one another, but accord- 
 ing to a standard of measure, having in view what is fitting, 
 which as we were saying, must be borne in mind. 
 
 Y. Soc. Very true. 
 
 Sir. And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a 
 view to what is fitting in all respects ; for we do not want such 
 a length as is suited to give pleasure which is quite a sec- 
 ondary matter ; and reason tells us that we should be contented 
 to make the ease or rapidity with which an inquiry is attained, 
 not the first but the second object ; the first and highest of all 
 being to assert the great method of division according to species, 
 whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. 
 No offense should be taken at length, but the longer and snorter 
 are to be employed indifferently, according as either of them is 
 better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason 
 would also say to him who censures the length of discourses 
 and cannot away with their circumlocution, that he should not 
 at once lay them aside or censure them as tedious, but he 
 should prove that if they had been shorter they would have 
 made those who took part in them better dialecticians, and 
 more capable of expressing the truth of things, about any 
 other praise and blame, he need riot trouble himself ; he need 
 not be supposed to hear them. Statesman, iii. 571. 
 Diseases, cures of, why unknown. 
 Diseases. See Cures, etc. 
 Diseases, how originating. 
 
 Now every one can see whence diseases arise. There are 
 
 four natures out of which the body is compacted earth and 
 fire and water and air, and the unnatural excess and defect 
 of these, or the change of any one of them from their own 
 natural place into another (for there are more kinds than one), 
 and the assumption of that which does not belong to them, or 
 any similar irregularity, produces diseases and disorders ; for 
 each being produced or changed in a manner contrary to 
 nature, the elements which were previously cool grow warm, 
 and those which were dry become moist, and the light becomes 
 
128 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 heavy, and the heavy light ; all sorts of changes occur. For 
 we affirm that only the same, in the same and like manner and 
 proportion added or subtracted to or from the same, will allow 
 the body to remaia in the same state, whole and sound, and 
 that whatever comes or goes away in violation of these rules 
 causes all manner of changes and infinite diseases and disorders. 
 
 Timaeus, ii. 572. 
 Disorders and excesses. 
 
 Cle. The probability is that ignorance will be a more preva- 
 lent disorder among kings, because they lead a proud and lux- 
 urious life. 
 
 Ath. Is it not palpable that the kings of that time were guilty 
 of trying to be above the established laws, arid that they did not 
 consistently observe what they had agreed to observe by word 
 and oath? This inconsistency of theirs may have had the ap- 
 pearance of wisdom, but was really, as we assert, the greatest 
 ignorance, and utterly overthrew the whole empire through 
 fatal error and perversity. 
 
 Cle. Very likely. 
 
 Ath. Good ; and what ought the then legislator to have done 
 in order to avert this calamity ? Truly there is no great wis- 
 dom in knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil 
 has happened ; but to have foreseen the remedy at the time 
 would have taken a much wiser head than ours. 
 
 Meg. What do you mean ? 
 
 Ath. Any one who looks at what has occurred with you, Me- 
 gillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have 
 been done at that time. 
 
 Meg. Speak a little more clearly. 
 
 Ath. Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I 
 am about to make. 
 
 Meg. What is it ? 
 
 Ath. That if any one gives too great a power to anything, 
 too large a sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much 
 authority to the mind, and is regardless of the mean, everything 
 is overthrown, and, in the wantonness of excess, runs in the 
 one case to disorder, and in the other to injustice, which is the 
 child of excess. I mean to say, my dear friends, that there is 
 no soul of man, young and irresponsible, who will be able to 
 sustain the temptation of arbitrary power no one who will 
 not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly, that 
 worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 129 
 
 friends : when this happens his kingdom is undermined, and all 
 his power vanishes from him. And great legislators who know 
 the mean should take heed of the danger. Laws, iv. 220. 
 Disorders of the soul. See Mind. 
 Disputers, self-wise. 
 
 1 was led on by you to say more than I had intended ; 
 
 but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who 
 has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which 
 he afterward imagines to be false, whether really false or not, 
 and then another and another, he has no longer any faith left, 
 and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last that 
 they have grown to be the wisest of mankind ; for they alone 
 perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments, 
 or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, 
 are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow. 
 
 That is quite true, I said. 
 
 Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and very melancholy too, if there 
 be such a thing as truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge, 
 that a man should have lighted upon some argument or other 
 which at first seemed true and then turned out to be false, and 
 instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit, because he 
 is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame 
 from himself to arguments in general ; and forever afterwards 
 should hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge 
 of realities. Phaedo, i. 419. 
 Dissembler, the. 
 
 Str. Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, 
 
 and see whether he is all of a piece, or whether there is any 
 cleft in him. 
 
 Theaet. Let us examine him. 
 
 Str. Indeed, there is a very considerable cleft in him ; for if 
 you unfold him you find that one of the two classes of imitators 
 is a simple being, who thinks that he knows that which he only 
 fancies ; the other sort has knocked about among arguments, 
 until he suspects and fears that he is ignorant of that which to 
 the many he pretends to know. 
 
 Theaet. There are certainly the two kinds which you describe. 
 
 Str. Shall we regard one as the simple imitator the other 
 as the dissembling or ironical imitator ? 
 
 Theaet. That is good. 
 
 Str. And shall we further speak of this latter class as having 
 one or two members ? 
 
130 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Theaet. Answer yourself. 
 
 Str. Upon consideration, then, there appear to me to be two ; 
 there is the dissembler, who harangues a multitude in public in 
 a long speech, and the dissembler, who in private and in short 
 speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to con- 
 tradict himself. 
 
 Theaet. What you say is most true. 
 
 Str. And who is the maker of the long speeches ? Is he the 
 statesman or the public orator? 
 
 Theaet. The latter. 
 
 Str. And what shall we call the other ? Is he the philoso- 
 pher or the Sophist ? 
 
 Theaet. The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view he 
 is ignorant ; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have 
 a name which is formed by an adaptation of the word o-o<d<. 
 What shall we name him ? I am pretty sure that I cannot be 
 mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist. 
 
 Str. Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a 
 chain from one end to the other ? 
 
 Theaet. By all means. 
 
 Str. He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows : 
 He who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of 
 the art of making contradictions, is an imitator of appearance 
 and has divided off from the art of image-making which is a 
 branch of phantastic, that further division of creative art, the 
 juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine any one 
 who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage 
 will say the very truth. 
 
 Theaet. Undoubtedly. Sophist, iii. 509. 
 Diversities of opinion. 
 
 O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of 
 
 these subtleties and excellent devices of wisdom ; I am afraid 
 that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me there- 
 fore if I ask a very stupid question : if there be no falsehood 
 or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as 
 erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting 
 that is what you mean ? 
 
 Yes, he replied. 
 
 And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question : If there is 
 no such thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in 
 the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach ? And were 
 you not just now saying that you could teach virtue, best of all 
 men, to any one who could learn ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 131 
 
 And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionyso- 
 dorus, that you bring up now what I said at first and if I 
 had said anything last year, I suppose that you would bring 
 that up but are nonplussed at the words I have just ut- 
 tered ? 
 
 Why, I said, they are not easy to answer ; for they are the 
 words of wise men : and indeed I know not what to make of 
 this word " nonplussed " which you used last. What do you 
 mean by that, Dionysodorus ? You must mean that I cannot 
 refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other 
 sense. 
 
 Certainly, he said ; that is my meaning ; and I wish that you 
 would answer. 
 
 What, before you, Dioiiysodorus ? I said. 
 
 Answer, said he. 
 
 And is that fair? 
 
 Yes, quite fair, he said. 
 
 Upon what priuci-ple ? I said. I can only suppose that you 
 are a very wise man, who comes to us in the character of a 
 great logician, and who knows when to answer and when not 
 to answer and now you will not open your mouth at all, be- 
 cause you know that you ought not. 
 
 You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good 
 sir, you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you. 
 
 I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the 
 question. 
 
 Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless ? 
 
 They are alive. 
 
 And do you know of any word which is alive ? 
 
 I cannot say that I do. 
 
 They why did you ask me what sense my words had ? 
 
 Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, 
 perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a 
 sense ; what do you say, wise man ? If I was not in error, 
 you will not refute me, and all your wisdom will be non- 
 plussed ; but if I did fall into error, then again you are wrong 
 in saying that there is no error, and this remark was made 
 by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, 
 Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument is not very 
 likely to advance ; even your skill in the subtleties of logic, 
 which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throw- 
 ing another and not falling yourself. Euthydemus^ i. 190. 
 
132 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Diversities of pleasure. 
 
 Soc. The awe which I feel, Protarchus, about the names 
 
 of the Gods is more than human, and now I would not sin 
 against Aphrodite by naming her amiss ; of her, then, I say 
 nothing. But I will begin with Pleasure which I know to be 
 diverse, and will consider and ask what her nature is. She 
 has one name and therefore you will imagine that she is one, 
 and yet surely she takes the most various and even unlike 
 forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, 
 and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance, 
 and that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies 
 and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom ; 
 and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these 
 opposite pleasures are severally alike. 
 
 Pro. Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they 
 spring from opposite causes, but they are not in themselves op- 
 posite, for must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely 
 like pleasure, that is, like itself ? 
 
 Soc. Yes, my good friend, just as color is like color ; in so 
 far as they are colors, there is no difference between them ; 
 and yet we all know that black is not only unlike, but even 
 absolutely opposed to white ; or again, as figure is like figure, 
 for they are all comprehended under one class ; and yet some 
 figures are absolutely opposed to one another, and there is an 
 infinite diversity of them. And we might find similar examples 
 in many other things ; therefore do not' rely upon this argu- 
 ment, which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme 
 opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposi- 
 tion among pleasures. 
 
 Pro. Very likely ; but how will this invalidate the argu- 
 ment? 
 
 Soc. Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you ap- 
 ply to them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant 
 things are good ; now although no one can argue that pleasure 
 is not pleasure, he may argue, as we are doing, that pleas- 
 ures are oftener bad than good ; but you call them all good (he 
 would say), and at the same time are compelled, if you are 
 pressed, to acknowledge that they are unlike. And he will 
 want to know what is that identical quality existing alike in 
 good and bad pleasures, which makes you designate all of them 
 as good. 
 
 Pro. What do you mean, Socrates ? Do you think that any 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 133 
 
 one who asserts pleasure to be the good, will even tolerate the 
 notion that some pleasures are good and some bad ? 
 
 Soc. And yet you will acknowledge that they are different 
 from one another, and even opposite to one another ? 
 
 Pro. Not in so far as they are pleasures. 
 
 Soc. That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so 
 we are to say (are we) that there is no difference in pleasures, 
 but that they are all alike ; and the examples which have just 
 been cited do not pierce our dull minds, but we go on argu- 
 ing all the same, like the weakest and most inexperienced rea- 
 soners ? 
 
 Pro. What do you mean ? 
 
 Soc. Why, I mean to say, that in self-defense I may, if I like, 
 follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things 
 most unlike are most absolutely alike, and the result will be 
 that you and I will prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art 
 of disputing ; and the argument will be blown away and lost. 
 Philebus, iii. 146. 
 Divination, the work of. 
 
 Furthermore all sacrifices and the whole province of 
 divination, which is the art of communion between Gods and 
 men, these, I say, are concerned only with the preservation 
 of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all impiety is 
 likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honoring and rever- 
 encing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honors the 
 other love, whether in his feelings towards Gods or parents, 
 towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of di- 
 vination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination 
 is the peacemaker of Gods and men working by a knowledge 
 of the religious or irreligious tendencies which exist in human 
 loves. The Symposium, i. 482. 
 Divine power of the poet. 
 
 I am conscious in my own self and the general opinion is 
 
 that I do not speak better and have more to say about Homer 
 than any other man. But I do not speak equally well about 
 others tell me the reason of this ? 
 
 Soc. I perceive, Ion ; and I will proceed to explain to you 
 what I imagine to be the reason of this. The gift which you 
 possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, 
 but, as I was just saying, an inspiration ; there is a divinity 
 moving you, like that in the stone which Euripides calls a mag- 
 net, but which is commonly known as the stone of Heraclea. 
 
 - 
 
134 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 For that stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to 
 them a similar power of attracting other rings ; and sometimes 
 you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended 
 from one another so as to form quite a long chain ; and all of 
 them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. 
 Now this is like the Muse, who first of all inspires men her- 
 self ; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons 
 is suspended, who take the inspiration from them. For all 
 good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems 
 not as works of art, but because they are inspired and pos- 
 sessed. And as the Corybantian revelers when they dance are 
 not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their right 
 mind when they are composing their beautifnl strains; but 
 when falling under the power of music and metre they are in- 
 spired and possessed ; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk 
 and honey from the rivers, when they are under the influence 
 of Dionysus, but not when they are in their right mind. And 
 the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves 
 tell us ; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed 
 fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the 
 Muses ; whither, like the bees, they wing their way. And 
 this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, 
 and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and 
 is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him ; when he 
 has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to 
 utter his oracles. Many are the noble words in which poets 
 speak of the actions which they record, like your own words 
 about Homer ; but they do not speak of them by any rules of 
 art ; they are inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels 
 them, and that only ; and when inspired, one of them will make 
 dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral strains, 
 another epic or iambic verses and he who is good at one is 
 not good at any other kind of verse ; for not by art does the poet 
 sing, but by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he 
 would have known how to speak, not of one theme only, but of 
 all ; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, arid uses 
 them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, 
 in order that we who hear them may know that they speak not 
 of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of un- 
 consciousness, but that God is the speaker, and that through 
 them he is conversing with us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian 
 affords a striking instance of what I am saying; he wrote 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 135 
 
 nothing that any one would care to remember but the famous 
 prcan which is in every one's mouth, and is one of the finest 
 poems ever written, and truly an invention of the Muses, as he 
 himself says. For in this way the God would seem to indi- 
 cate to us and not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems 
 are not human or the work of man, but divine and the work of 
 God ; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods 
 by whom they are severally possessed. Was not this the les- 
 son which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of 
 the worst of poets he sang the best of songs? Am I not 
 right, Ion ? 
 
 Ion. Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are ; for your 
 words touch my soul, and I am persuaded somehow that good 
 poets are the inspired interpreters of the Gods. Ion, i. 223. 
 I Divine mind, good in the. See Mind. 
 Divine, the soul resembling the. 
 
 When the soul and the body are united, then nature or- 
 ders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey and 
 serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the di- 
 vine ? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear 
 to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the 
 mortal to be that which is subject and servant ? 
 
 True. 
 
 And which does the soul resemble ? 
 
 The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal, 
 there can be no doubt of that, Socrates. 
 
 Then reflect, Cebes : of all that has been said is not this 
 the conclusion, that the soul is in the very likeness of the 
 divine and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indis- 
 soluble, and unchangeable ; and that the body is in the very 
 likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual and mul- 
 tiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. Pfraedo, i. 408. 
 -HDivine nature of generation and conception. See Conception. 
 Divine madness. See Madness, etc. 
 Divine, Statesman called. See Statesman. 
 Divine things only unchangeable. 
 
 Only the most divine things of all are unchangeable, and 
 
 body is not included in this class. Heaven and the universe, 
 as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by 
 the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, and 
 therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbations. But the 
 heavenly motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same 
 
136 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 place, arid in relation to the same ; and is therefore only sub- 
 ject to a reversal, which is the least alteration possible. For 
 the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of himself; 
 and to think that he can go at one time in one direction and at 
 another time in another, is unlawful. Hence we must not say 
 that the world is either self-moved always, or all made to go 
 round by God in two opposite courses ; or that two Gods, hav- 
 ing opposite purposes, make it move round. But as I have al- 
 ready said (and this is the only remaining alternative) the 
 world is governed by an accompanying divine power, and re- 
 ceives life and immortality by the appointment of the Creator, 
 arid then, when let go again, moves spontaneously, being let go 
 at such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a re- 
 verse movement : this is due to exquisite perfection of balance, 
 and the size of the universe, which is the greatest of bodies, 
 and turns on the smallest pivot. Statesman, iii. 554. 
 Divine bonds in the. State. 
 
 Str. Can we say that such a connection as this will last- 
 ingly unite the evil with one another or with the good, or 
 that there is any science which would seriously think of using 
 a bond of this kind to join such materials ? 
 
 Y. Soc. Impossible. 
 
 Str. But in those which were originally noble natures, and 
 have been trained accordingly, in those only may we not say 
 that the bond of union is implanted by law, and that this is 
 the medicine which art prescribes for them, and the divine 
 bond, which, as I was saying, heals and unites dissimilar and 
 contrary parts of virtue ? 
 
 Y. Soc. Very true. 
 
 Str. Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in 
 imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other 
 human bonds. 
 
 Y. Soc. How is that, and of what bonds do you speak ? 
 
 Str. Those of intermarriage, and those which are formed 
 between States by giving and taking children in marriage, as 
 well as by private betrothals and espousals. For many per- 
 sons form unions of an improper kind, with a view to the pro- 
 creation of children. 
 
 Y. Soc. In what way ? 
 
 Str. They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony 
 are objects not worthy even of a serious censure. 
 
 Y. Soc. There is no need to consider them at all 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 137 
 
 Str. It was of these bonds I said that there would be no dif- 
 ficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held the 
 same opinion about the honorable and the good ; indeed, in this 
 single word, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised 
 never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the 
 brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, 
 by common sentiments and honors and opinions, and by the giv- 
 ing of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one 
 smooth and even web, to intrust them to the offices of state. 
 Statesman, iii. 597. 
 
 Divining of truth instinctive. See Instinctive. 
 Doctors and patients. 
 
 Ath. Of doctors, as you doubtless know, there are two 
 
 kinds, a gentler and a ruder, and two modes of cure ; and as 
 children ask the doctor to be gentle with them, so we will ask 
 the legislator to cure our disorders with the gentlest remedies. 
 What I mean to say is, that besides doctors, there are their 
 assistants, who are also styled doctors. 
 
 Cle. Very true. 
 
 Ath. And whether they are slaves or freemen makes no dif- 
 ference ; they acquire their knowledge of medicine by obeying 
 and observing their masters, empirically and not rationally, 
 as the manner of freemen is, who have learned scientifically 
 themselves the art which they impart to their pupils. You are 
 aware that there are these two classes of doctors ? 
 
 Gle. To be sure. 
 
 Ath. And did you ever observe that there are two classes 
 of patients in States, slaves and freemen ; and the slave doctors 
 run about and cure the slaves, and wait for them in the dispen- 
 saries practitioners of this sort never talk to their patients 
 individually, or let them talk about their own individual com- 
 plaints ? The doctor prescribes what he thinks good, out of 
 the abundance of his experience, as if he had no manner of 
 doubt ; and when he has given his orders, like a tyrant, he 
 rushes off with equal assurance to some other servant who is 
 ill ; and so he relieves the master of the house of the care of 
 his invalid slaves. But the other doctor, who is a freeman, at- 
 tends and practices upon freemen ; and he carries his inquiries 
 far back, and goes into the nature of the disorder ; he enters 
 into discourse with the patient and with his friends, and is at 
 once getting information from the sick man, and also instruct- 
 ing him as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe for him 
 
138 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 until he has first convinced him ; at last, when he has brought 
 the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and 
 set him on the road to health, he attempts to effect a cure. 
 Now, which is the better way of proceeding in a physician and 
 in a trainer ? Is he the better who accomplishes his ends in a 
 double way, or he who works in one way, and that the ruder 
 and inferior ? 
 
 Cle. I should say, Stranger, that the double way is far bet- 
 ter. Laws, iv. 247. 
 Dog, a true philosopher. 
 
 The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also 
 
 seen in the dog, and is remarkable in an animal. 
 
 What trait ? 
 
 Why a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry ; when an 
 acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never 
 done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never 
 strike you as curious ? 
 
 I never before thought of it, though I quite recognize the 
 truth of your remark. 
 
 And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming, 
 your dog is a true philosopher. 
 
 Why? 
 
 Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of 
 an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. 
 And must not the creature be fond of learning who deter- 
 mines what is friendly and what is unfriendly by the test of 
 knowledge and ignorance? The Republic, ii. 198. 
 Dorian kings, the cause of their ruin. 
 
 I remember, and you will remember what I said at first, 
 
 that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a 
 view to wisdom ; whereas you were arguing that the good law- 
 giver ought to order all with a view to war. And to this I 
 replied that there were four virtues, whereas your regards were 
 fixed on one of the four only ; but that you ought to regard 
 all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the guide 
 of all the rest I mean wisdom and mind and opinion, united 
 with the affection and desire which waits upon them. And 
 now the argument returns to the same point, and I say once 
 more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the 
 prayer of a fool is full of danger, being likely to end in the 
 opposite of what he desires. And if you would rather receive 
 my words in earnest, I am willing that you should ; and you 
 
PLATO' IS BEST THOUGHTS. 139 
 
 will find, as I have said already, that not cowardice was the 
 cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole de- 
 sign, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of 
 the rulers or of their subjects ; but the cause was the corrupt- 
 ing influence of the other vices, and especially their ignorance 
 of the most important human affairs. Laws, iv. 217. 
 Dreams, sleep free from fanciful. 
 
 Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites are 
 
 deemed to be unlawful ; every one appears to have them, but 
 in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by rea- 
 son, and the better desires prevail over them, either they are 
 wholly banished or they are few and weak ; while in the case 
 of others they are stronger, and there are more of them. 
 
 Which appetites do you mean ? 
 
 I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and hu- 
 man and ruling power is asleep ; when the wild beast in our 
 nature, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and leaps about, 
 and seeks to go and satisfy his desires, there is no conceivable 
 folly or crime, however shameless or unnatural not except- 
 ing incest or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food of 
 which at such a time, you, know, a man may not believe him- 
 self to be capable. 
 
 Most true, he said. 
 
 But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when 
 before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers and 
 fed them on noble thoughts and inquiries, collecting himself in 
 meditation after having first indulged his appetites neither too 
 much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and 
 prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering * 
 with the higher principle which he leaves in the solitude of 
 pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowl- 
 edge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future : 
 when again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has 
 a quarrel against any one I say, when, after pacifying the 
 two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, 
 before he takes his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth 
 most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fanciful and 
 lawless visions. The Republic, ii. 400. 
 Drinking wine condemned. See Wine forbidden. 
 Drunkenness condemned in Sparta. 
 
 Meg. The laws of Sparta, in as far as they relate to pleasure, 
 
 appear to me to be the best in the world ; for that which leads 
 
140 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 mankind in general into the wildest pleasure and license, and 
 every other folly, the law has clean driven out ; and neither in 
 the country nor in towns which are under the control of Sparta, 
 will you find revelries and the many incitements of every kind 
 of pleasure which accompany them, and any one who meets a 
 drunken and disorderly person will immediately have him 
 most severely punished, and will not let him off on any pre- 
 tense, not even at the time of a Dionysiac festival ; although I 
 have remarked that this may happen at your performances " on 
 the cart," as they are called ; and among our Tarentine colo- 
 nists I have seen the whole city drunk at a Dionysiac festival ; 
 but nothing of that sort happens among us. 
 
 Ath. O Lacedaemonian Stranger, these festivities are praise- 
 worthy where there is a spirit of endurance, but are very 
 senseless when they are under no regulations. In order to re- 
 taliate, an Athenian has only to point out the license which 
 exists among your women. To all such accusations, whether 
 they are brought against the Tarentines, or us, or you, there is 
 one answer which exonerates the practice in question from im- 
 propriety. When a stranger expresses wonder at the singular- 
 ity of what he sees, any inhabitant will naturally answer him : 
 Wonder not, O stranger ; this is our custom, and you may very 
 likely have some other custom about the same things. Now 
 we are speaking, my friends, not about men in general, but 
 about the merits and defects of the lawgivers themselves. Let 
 us then discourse a little more at length about them, and about 
 the nature of intoxication at large, which is a very important 
 matter, and will seriously task the discrimination of the legis- 
 lator. I am not talking of the mere practice of drinking or 
 not drinking wine in general, but about downright intoxica- 
 tion : are we to follow the custom of the Scythians, and Per- 
 sians, and Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, who are all 
 warlike nations, or that of your countrymen who, as you say, 
 wholly abstain ? Whereas the Scythians and Thracians, both 
 men and women, drink unmixed wine, which they also pour on 
 their garments, and this they think a happy and glorious insti- 
 tution. The Persians, again, are much given to other practices 
 of luxury which you reject, but they have more moderation in 
 them than the Thracians and Scythians. Laws, iv. 167. 
 Dualism. 
 
 You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling 
 
 powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 141 
 
 the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you 
 should fancy that I am playing upon the name (ovpavos, Spares). 
 May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and 
 intelligible fixed in your mind ? 
 
 I have. 
 
 Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, 
 and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and sup- 
 pose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and 
 the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions 
 as to their relative clearness and want 'of clearness, and you 
 will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible con- 
 sists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, 
 shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in 
 solid, smooth, and polished bodies, and the like : do you under- 
 stand ? 
 
 Yes, I understand. 
 
 Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the 
 resemblance, to include ourselves and the animals, and every- 
 thing in nature and everything in art. 
 
 Very good. 
 
 Would you not admit that this latter section has a different 
 degree of truth, and that the copy is to the object which is 
 copied as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge ? 
 
 Most undoubtedly. 
 
 Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of 
 the intellectual is to be divided. 
 
 In what manner ? 
 
 As thus : there are two subdivisions, in the lower of which 
 the soul uses the figures given by the former divisions as im- 
 ages ; the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of go- 
 ing upwards to a principle, descends to the other end ; in the 
 higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes 
 up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of 
 images, as in the former case, but proceeding only in and by 
 the ideas themselves. The Republic, ii. 337. 
 Duty, questions of. 
 
 Soc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do 
 wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we 
 ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dis- 
 honorable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already 
 acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions which 
 were made within a few days to be thrown away ? And have 
 
142 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 we, at our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another all 
 our life long only to discover that we are no better than chil- 
 dren ? Or, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of 
 consequences, whether better or worse, shall we insist on the 
 truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil 
 and dishonor to him who acts unjustly ? Shall we say so or 
 not? 
 
 Or. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Then we must do no wrong ? 
 
 Cr. Certainly not. 
 
 Soc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imag- 
 ine ; for we must injure no one at all ? 
 
 Or. Clearly not. 
 
 Soc. Again, Crito, may we do evil ? 
 
 Or. Surely not, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the 
 morality of the many is that just or not ? 
 
 Or. Not just. 
 
 Soc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him? 
 
 Or. Very true. 
 
 Soc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil 
 to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. 
 But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really 
 mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been 
 held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of 
 persons ; and those who are agreed and those who are not 
 agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only 
 despise one another when they see how widely they differ. 
 Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first 
 principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off 
 evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise of 
 our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? 
 For thus have I ever thought and still think ; but, if you are of 
 another opinion, let me hear what you have you to say. 
 Crito, i. 353. 
 
 Earth, the rotundity of the. 
 
 I may describe to. you, however, the form and regions of 
 
 the earth according to my conception of them. 
 
 That, said Simmias, will be enough. 
 
 Well then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a 
 round body in the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no 
 need of air or any similar force as a support, but is kept there 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 143 
 
 and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equabil- 
 ity of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise. For 
 that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of that which is 
 equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but 
 will always remain in the same state and not deviate. 1 
 Phaedo, i. 439. 
 
 Earth, likeness of the. See Animals, etc. 
 Earth, heavenly idea of. 
 
 - For I should say that in all parts of the earth there are 
 hollows of various forms and sizes, into which the water and 
 the mist and the lower air collect ; and that the true earth is 
 pure and in the pure heaven, in which also are the stars that 
 is the heaven which is commonly spoken of as the ether, of 
 which this is but the sediment gathering in the hollows of the 
 earth. But we who live in these hollows are deceived into the 
 notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth ; 
 which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea 
 were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water, and 
 that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and 
 the other stars, he having never come to the surface by 
 reason of his feebleness and sluggishness, and having never 
 lifted up his head and seen, nor ever heard from one who had 
 seen, how much purer and fairer the world above is than his own. 
 And such is exactly our case ; for we are dwelling in a hollow 
 of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface ; and the air 
 we call the heaven, wherein we imagine that the stars move. 
 But this again is owing to our feebleness and sluggishness, 
 which prevent our reaching the surface of the air ; for if any 
 man could arrive at the exterior limit, or take the wings of a 
 a bird and fly upward, then like a fish who puts his head out 
 and sees this world, he would see a world beyond ; and, if the 
 nature of man could sustain the sight, he would acknowledge 
 that this other world was the place of the true heaven and the 
 true light and the true earth. For our earth, and the stones, and 
 the entire region which surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded, 
 as in the sea all things are corroded by the brine ; for in the 
 sea too there is hardly any noble or perfect growth, but clefts 
 only, and sand, and an endless slough of mud : and even the 
 shore is not to be compared to the fairer sights of this world. 
 Phaedo, i. 439. 
 
 i Plato's cosmogonic ideas are largely given in the Dialogues of " Phaedo " and 
 " Timaeus." 
 
144 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Earthly and sensual soul. 
 
 But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at 
 
 the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of 
 the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body 
 and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led 
 to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a 
 man may touch and see and taste and use for the purposes of 
 his lusts, the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and 
 avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark 
 and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy ; do 
 you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed ? 
 
 That is impossible, he replied. 
 
 She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual asso- 
 ciation and constant care of the body have wrought into her 
 nature. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty 
 and earthy, and is that element of sight by which such a soul 
 is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, 
 because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below 
 prowling about tombs and sepulchres, in the neighborhood of 
 which, as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of 
 souls which have not departed pure, but are cloyed with sight 
 and therefore visible. 
 
 That is very likely, Socrates. 
 
 Yes, that is very likely, Cebes ; and these must be the souls, 
 not of the good, but of the evil, who are compelled to wander 
 about such places in payment of the penalty of their former 
 evil way of life ; and they continue to wander until through 
 the craving after the corporeal which never leaves them, they 
 are imprisoned finally in another body. And they may be 
 supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they 
 have had in their former lives. 
 
 What do you mean, Socrates ? 
 
 I mean to say that men who have followed after gluttony, 
 and wantonness, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of 
 avoiding them, would pass into asses and animals of that sort. 
 Phaedo,i. 409. 
 Education, compulsion in. 
 
 Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man as 
 
 he is growing older may learn many things, for he can no 
 more learn than he can run ; youth is the time of toil. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 145 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And, therefore, calculation and geometry, and all the other 
 elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, 
 should be presented to the mind in childhood ; not, however, 
 under any notion of forcing them. 
 
 Why not ? 
 
 Because a freeman ought to be a freeman in the acquisition 
 of knowledge. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no 
 harm ; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion has 
 no hold on the mind. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 Then my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let 
 early education be a sort of amusement ; you will then be bet- 
 ter able to find out the natural bent. 
 
 You are right there. The Republic, ii. 364. 
 Education, sign of a liberal. 
 
 Soc. Theaetetus, I take another view of the subject : you 
 
 answered that knowledge is perception ? 
 
 T/teaet. I did. 
 
 Soc. And if any one were to ask you : With what does a 
 man see black and white colors ? and with what does he hear 
 sharp and flat sounds ? you would say, if I am not mistaken, 
 " With the eyes .and with the ears." 
 
 Theaet. I should. 
 
 Soc. The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute 
 precision, is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and 
 the opposite is pedantic ; but sometimes precision is necessary, 
 and I believe that the answer which you have just given is 
 open to the charge of incorrectness ; for which is more cor- 
 rect, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and with the ears, 
 or through the eyes and through the ears ? 
 
 Theaet. I should say, Socrates, " through," rather than 
 with." 
 
 Soc. Yes, my boy ; for no one can suppose that we are Tro- 
 jan horses, in whom are perched several unconnected senses, not 
 meeting in some one nature, of which they are the instruments, 
 whether you term this soul or not, with which through these we 
 perceive objects of sense. Theaetetus, iii. 387. 
 Education, early. 
 
 Ath. According to my view, he who would be good at any 
 
 thing must practice that thing from his youth upwards, both in 
 sport and earnest, in the particular manner which the work re- 
 10 
 
146 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 quires ; for example, he who is to be a good builder, should 
 play at building children's houses ; and he who is to be a good 
 husbandman, at tilling the ground ; those who have the care of 
 their education should provide them when young with mimic 
 tools. And they should learn beforehand the knowledge which 
 they will afterwards require for their art. For example, the 
 future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in 
 play ; and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other 
 exercise for amusement, and the teacher should endeavor to 
 direct the children's inclinations and pleasures by the help of 
 amusements, to their final aim in life. The most important 
 part of education is right training in the nursery. } The soul of 
 the child in his play should be trained to that sort of excel- 
 lence in which, when he grows up to manhood, he will have to 
 be perfected. Do you agree with me thus far ? 
 
 Gle. Certainly. 
 
 Ath. Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambig- 
 uous or ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of 
 praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call 
 one man educated and another uneducated, although the unedu- 
 cated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling 
 of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. For 
 we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but 
 of that other -education in virtue from youth upwards, which 
 makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, 
 and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is 
 the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name ; 
 that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of 
 wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intel- 
 ligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to 
 be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one 
 another about a word, provided that the proposition which has 
 just been granted hold good ; to wit, that those who are rightly 
 educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a 
 slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that 
 the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take 
 a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work 
 of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives. 
 Laws, iv. 173. 
 
 Education of youth and children. See Youth, etc. 
 Education, the benefit of, to the State. 
 If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the State 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 147 
 
 from the right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus, 
 when the question is put in that form, we cannot deny that 
 the good is not very great in any particular instance. But if 
 you ask what is the good of education in general, the answer 
 is easy that education makes good men, and that good men 
 act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle, because they are 
 good. Education certainly gives victory, although victory 
 sometimes produces forgetfulness of education ; for many have 
 grown insolent from victory in war, and this insolence has en- 
 gendered in them innumerable evils ; and many a victory has 
 been and will be suicidal to the victors ; but education is never 
 suicidal. Laws, iv. 172. 
 Elevation of self. 
 
 Do you see any way in which the philosopher can be 
 
 preserved in his calling to the end ? and remember what we 
 were saying of him, that he was to have knowledge and mem- 
 ory and courage and magnanimity these were admitted by us 
 to be the true philosopher's gifts. 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Now, will not such an one be, from the first, in all things 
 first among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his 
 mental ones ? 
 
 Certainly, he said. 
 
 And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as 
 he gets older for their own purposes ? 
 
 No question. 
 
 Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do 
 him honor and flatter him, because they want to get into their 
 hands now, the power which he will one day possess. 
 
 That often happens, he said. 
 
 And what will he do under such circumstances, especially if 
 he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall, proper 
 youth ? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy 
 himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, 
 and therefore will he not dilate and elevate himself in the full- 
 ness of vain pomp and senseless pride ? 
 
 To be sure he will. 
 
 Now, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently 
 comes to him and tells him that he is without sense, which he 
 must have, but can only get it by slaving for it, do you think 
 that, under such adverse circumstances, he will be easily in- 
 duced to listen ? 
 
148 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 He would be very unlikely to listen. 
 
 But suppose further that there is one person who has feeling, 
 and who, either from some excellence of disposition or natural 
 affinity, is inclined or drawn towards philosophy, and his friends 
 think that they are likely to lose the advantages which they 
 were going to reap from his friendship, what will be the effect 
 upon them ? Will they not do and say anything to prevent his 
 learning and to make the teacher powerless, using to this end 
 private intrigues as well as public prosecutions ? 
 
 There can be no doubt of it. 
 
 And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a 
 philosopher ? 
 
 Impossible. 
 
 Then, were we not right in saying that even the very quali- 
 ties which make a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, 
 serve to divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and 
 their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life ? 
 
 We were quite right. 
 
 Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about the ruin and 
 failure of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits, 
 who, as we assert, are rare at any time ; and this is the class 
 out of whom come those who are the authors of the greatest 
 evil to States and individuals ; and also of the greatest good 
 when the tide carries them in the direction of good ; but a 
 small man never was the doer of any great thing either to in- 
 dividuals or States. 
 
 That is most true, he said. 
 
 They fall away, and philosophy is left desolate, with her 
 marriage rite incomplete*: for her own have forsaken her, and 
 while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, other un- 
 worthy persons, seeing that she has no protector, enter in and 
 dishonor her ; and fasten upon her the reproaches which her re- 
 provers utter; who say of her votaries that some of them are 
 good for nothing, and the greater number deserving of every- 
 thing that is bad. 
 
 That is certainly said. 
 
 Yes ; and what else would you expect, I said, when you 
 think of the puny creatures who, seeing this land open to them 
 a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles like 
 prisoners who run away out of prison into a sanctuary, take a 
 leap out of the arts into philosophy ; those who do so being 
 probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 149 
 
 For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains 
 a dignity about her which is not found in the other arts. And 
 many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect 
 and whose souls are marred and disfigured by their meanness, 
 as their bodies are by their arts and crafts. Is not that true ? 
 
 Yes. The Republic, ii. 3^1. 
 Eloquence, its force of truth. 
 
 - How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accu- 
 sers, I cannot tell ; but I know that they almost made me for- 
 get myself so persuasively did they speak; and yet they have 
 hardly uttered a word of truth. But many as their falsehoods 
 were, there was one of them which quite amazed me : I mean 
 when they told you to be upon your guard, and not allow your- 
 selves be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To use such 
 language, when they were sure to be detected as soon as I 
 opened my lips and displayed my deficiency, did certainly ap- 
 pear to me most shameless, unless by the force of eloquence 
 they mean the force of truth ; for if this is their meaning, I 
 admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from 
 theirs ! Well, as I was saying, they have hardly uttered a 
 word, or not more than a word, of truth ; but you shall hear 
 from me the whole truth : not, however, delivered after their 
 manner, in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. 
 No, by heaven ! but I shall use the words and arguments which 
 occur to me at the moment ; for I am certain that I am right in 
 this ; and that at my time of life I ought not to be appearing 
 before you, O men of Athens, in the character of a juvenile 
 orator : let no one expect it of me. Apology, i. 315. 
 Eloquence, power of. See Baltic. 
 Endurance. See Courage. 
 Enemies and friends, treatment of. 
 
 Well, there is another question : Are friends to be in- 
 terpreted as real or seeming, enemies as real or seeming ? 
 
 Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom 
 he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil. 
 
 Yes, but do not persons often err in their judgment of good 
 and evil ; many who are not good appear to them to be good, 
 and conversely ? 
 
 That is true. 
 
 Then to them the good will be enemies, and the evil will be 
 their friends ? 
 
 True. 
 
 
150 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil 
 and evil to the good ? 
 
 Apparently. 
 
 But the good are just and would not do an injustice ? 
 
 True. 
 
 Then according to your argument it is just to injure those 
 who do no wrong? 
 
 Nay, Socrates ; the doctrine is immoral. 
 
 Then I suppose that they ought to do good to the just and 
 harm to the unjust ? 
 
 I like that better. 
 
 But see the consequence : Many a man who is ignorant of 
 the world has friends who are friends, and then he ought to do 
 harm to them ; and he has good enemies whom he ought to 
 benefit; but if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of 
 that which we affirm to be the meaning of Simonides. 
 
 That is true, he said ; and I think that we had better cor- 
 rect an error into which we have fallen in the use of the words 
 " friend " and " enemy." 
 
 What was the error, Polemarchus ? I replied. 
 
 The error lay in the assumption that he is a friend who 
 seems or is thought good. 
 
 And how is the error to be corrected ? 
 
 We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as 
 seems, good ; and that he who seems only, and is not good, 
 only seems to be and is not a friend ; and of an enemy the 
 same may be said. 
 
 You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad 
 our enemies? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And instead of saying simply, as we did at first, that it is 
 just to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies, you 
 would now say, it is just to do good to your friends when they 
 are good, and harm to your enemies when they are evil ? 
 
 Yes, that appears to me to be the truth. 
 
 But then ought the just to injure any one at all ? 
 
 Undoubtedly he ought to injure the wicked who are his 
 enemies. 
 
 And when horses are injured, are they improved or de- 
 teriorated ? 
 
 The latter. 
 
 Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, 
 not of dogs ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 151 
 
 Yes, of horses. 
 
 And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and 
 not of horses ? 
 
 Of course. 
 
 And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that 
 which is the proper virtue of man ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And that human virtue is justice ? 
 
 To be sure. 
 
 Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust ? 
 
 That is the result. 
 
 But can the musician by his art make men unmusical ? 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 Or the horseman by his art make bad horsemen ? 
 
 Impossible. 
 
 And can the just by justice make men unjust, or, speaking 
 generally, can the good by virtue make them bad ? 
 
 Assuredly not. 
 
 Nor can heat produce cold ? 
 
 No. 
 
 Nor drought moisture ? 
 
 Never. 
 
 Nor can the good harm any one ? ( A..I.J I 
 
 Clearly not. > _ 
 
 And the just is the good ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a 
 just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust ? 
 
 I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates. 
 
 Then if a man says that justice consists in repaying a debt, 
 meaning that a just man ought to do good to his friends and 
 injure his enemies, he is not really wise ; for he says what is 
 not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another 
 can be in no case just. 
 
 I agree with you, said Polemarchus. 
 
 Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any 
 one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pitta- 
 cus, or any other wise man or seer ? 
 
 I am quite ready to join with you, he said. 
 
 Shall I whisper in your ear whose I believe the saying to 
 be? 
 
 Whose ? 
 
 ;iVKRSITY O 
 
152 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 I believe that Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Isme- 
 nias, the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had 
 a great opinion of his own power, first said that justice is doing 
 good to your friends and harm to your enemies. 
 
 Most true, he said. 
 
 Yes, I said ; but if this definition of justice also breaks 
 down, what other can be offered ? 
 
 Several times in the middle of our discourse Thrasymachus 
 had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands 
 by interrupting us, and had been put down by the rest of the 
 company, who wanted to hear the end. " But when I had done 
 speaking and there was a pause, he 'could no longer hold his 
 peace ; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild 
 beast seeking to devour us. Polemarchus and I cowered in fear. 
 The Republic, ii. 155. 
 Enemies, all men are. 
 
 Ath. Are we to conceive each man as warring against 
 
 himself : or how is that to be ? 
 
 Cle. O Athenian Stranger, inhabitant of Attica I will not 
 call you, who seem to me worthy to be named after the god- 
 dess Athene, because you go back to first principles; you, 
 from the light which you have thrown upon the argument, 
 will more readily recognize the truth of my assertion, when I 
 said just now that all men are the enemies of all other men, 
 both in public and private, and every individual of himself. 
 
 Ath. My good sir, what do you mean ? 
 
 Cle. I mean what I say ; and, further, that there is a victory 
 and defeat, the first and best of victories, the lowest and 
 worst of defeats, which each man gains or sustains at the 
 hands, not of another, but of himself ; this shows that there is 
 a war against ourselves going on in every one of us. Laws, 
 iv. 157. 
 Enslaving power of money. 
 
 Come, now, and let us reason with the unjust, who is not 
 
 intentionally in error. " Sweet Sir," we will say to him, 
 " what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble ? Is 
 not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or 
 rather to the god in man ; and the ignoble that which subjects 
 the man to the beast ? " He can hardly avoid saying Yes, 
 can he now? 
 
 Not if he has any regard for my opinion. 
 
 But, if he admit this, we may ask him another question : 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 153 
 
 How would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the 
 condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the 
 worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or 
 daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them 
 into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, 
 however large might be the sum which he received ? And 
 will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who sells his 
 own divine being to that which is most atheistical and detest- 
 able, and has no pity ? Eriphyle took the necklace as the 
 price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to 
 compass a worse ruin. The Republic, ii. 421. 
 Envy causing the death of good men. 
 
 I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus : 
 
 any elaborate defense is unnecessary ; but as I was saying be- 
 fore, I certainly have many enemies, and this is what will be 
 my destruction if I am destroyed ; of that I am certain ; riot 
 Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the 
 world, which has been the death of many good men, and will 
 probably be the death of many more ; there is no danger of 
 my being the last of them. Apology, i. 326. 
 Envy, a pain of the soul. 
 
 Soc. Do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, 
 
 emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the 
 soul only ? 
 
 Pro. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And shall we not find them also full of the most won- 
 derful pleasures ? need I remind you of the anger 
 
 " Which stirs even a wise man to violence, 
 And sweeter is than honey and the honeycomb? " 
 
 And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamen- 
 tation and bereavement ? 
 
 Pro. Yes, there is a natural connection between them. 
 
 Soc. And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies 
 the spectators smile through their tears ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly, I do. 
 
 Soc. And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul ex- 
 periences a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure ? 
 
 Pro. I do not understand you. 
 
 Soc. I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in rec- 
 ognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy. 
 
 Pro. There is, I think. 
 
154 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Soc. And the greater the difficulty the more desirable is the 
 examination of the case, because the difficulty of examining 
 other cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less. 
 
 Pro. Proceed. 
 
 Soc. I have just mentioned envy ; would you not call that 
 a pain of the soul ? 
 
 Pro. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And yet the envious man finds something in the mis- 
 fortunes of his neighbors at which he is pleased ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. Philebus, iii. 187. 
 Envy and injustice. 
 
 Worthy of honor, too, is he who does no injustice, and of 
 
 more than twofold honor if he not only does no injustice him- 
 self, but hinders others from doing any ; the first may count as 
 one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs 
 the rulers of the injustice of others. And yet more highly 
 to be esteemed is he who cooperates with the rulers in correct- 
 ing the citizens as far as he can he shall be proclaimed the 
 great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. 
 The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, 
 and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well 
 as acquired by a man for himself ; he who imparts them shall 
 be honored as the man of men, and he who is willing yet is 
 not able, may be allowed the second place ; but he who is 
 jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in 
 a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame : the good, 
 however, which he has, is not to be undervalued because pos- 
 sessed by him, but to be acquired by us to the utmost of our 
 power. Let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of 
 virtue, and let there no envy. For the unenvious nature in- 
 creases the greatness of States he himself contends in the 
 race and defames no man ; but the envious, who thinks that 
 he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic 
 himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to 
 despair by his unjust slanders of them. And thus he deprives 
 the whole city of the proper training for the contest of virtue, 
 and diminishes her glory as far as in him lies. Laws, iv. 
 256. 
 Equality not the same as impartiality. 
 
 When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one Critias, 
 
 I believe went on to say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias 
 appears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras. And this led 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 1;V> 
 
 Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side. But 
 we should not be partisans either of Socrates or Protagoras ; 
 let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up 
 the discussion. 
 
 Prodicus added : That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, 
 for those who are present at such discussions ought to be im- 
 partial hearers of both the speakers ; remembering, however, 
 that impartiality is not the same as equality, for both sides 
 should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed should not 
 be assigned to both of them ; but to the wiser a higher meed 
 should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well 
 as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant 
 our request, which is, that you will argue with one another 
 and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of good- 
 will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. Protagoras, 
 i. 137. 
 Equality and unequality. 
 
 Shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is 
 
 such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with 
 another, but that, over and above this, there is equality in the 
 abstract ? Shall we say so ? 
 
 Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the 
 confidence in life. 
 
 And do we know the nature of this abstract essence ? 
 
 To be sure, he said. 
 
 And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not 
 see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and 
 stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is 
 different from them ? for you will acknowledge that there is a 
 difference. Or look at the matter in another way : Do not 
 the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, 
 and at another time unequal ? 
 
 That is certain. 
 
 But are real equals ever unequal ? or is the idea of equality 
 the same as that of inequality ? 
 
 Impossible, Socrates. 
 
 Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea 
 of equality? 
 
 I should say, clearly not, Socrates. 
 
 And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea 
 of equality, you conceived and attained that idea ? 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
156 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Which might be like, or might be unlike them ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 But that makes no difference : whenever from seeing one 
 thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there 
 must surely have been an act of recollection ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 But what would you say of equal portions of wood and 
 stone, or other material equals ? and what is the impression 
 produced by them ? Are they equals in the same sense in 
 which absolute equality is equal ? or do they fall short of this 
 equality in a measure ? 
 
 Yes, he said, in a very great measure too. Phaedo, i. 401. 
 Equality of anarchy. 
 
 When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has 
 
 evil cup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too 
 deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers 
 are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them 
 to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed 
 oligarchs. 
 
 Yes, he replied, a very common thing. 
 
 Yes, I said ; and loyal citizens are insulted by her as lovers 
 of slavery and men of naught ; she would have subjects who 
 are like rulers, and rulers who are like subjects : these are men 
 after her own heart, whom she praises and honors both in pri- 
 vate arid public. Now, in such a State, can liberty have any 
 limit ? 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 By degrees, the anarchy finds a way into private houses, 
 and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them. 
 
 How do you mean ? 
 
 I mean that the father gets accustomed to descend to the 
 level of his sons and to fear them, and the son to be on a level 
 with his father, he having no shame or fear of either of his 
 parents ; and this is his freedom, and the metic is equal with 
 the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger on 
 a level with either. 
 
 Yes, he said, that is true. 
 
 That is true ; and, there are other light evils such as the 
 following : the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the 
 scholars despise their masters and tutors ; and, in general, 
 young and old are alike, and the young man is on a level with 
 the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed ; 
 
PLATO 1 S BEST THOUGHTS. 157 
 
 and old men condescend to the young, and are full of pleasantry 
 and gayety ; they do not like to be thought morose and au- 
 thoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young. 
 - The Republic, ii. 391. 
 Essence, individual. 
 
 Now God did not make the soul after the body, although 
 we have spoken of them in this order ; for when he put them 
 together he would never have allowed that the elder should 
 serve the younger, but this is a random manner of speaking, 
 because we ourselves too are very largely affected by chance. 
 Whereas he made the soul in origin and excellence prior to 
 and older than the body, to be the ruler and mistress, of whom 
 the body was to be the subject. And he made her out of the 
 following elements and on this manner: of the unchangeable 
 and indivisible, and also of the divisible and corporeal, he 
 made a third sort of intermediate essence, partaking of the 
 same and of the other or diverse, and this compounded in like 
 manner he placed in a mean between the indivisible and the 
 divisible or corporeal. He took these three elements of the 
 same, the other and the essence, and mingled them all to- 
 gether, compressing the reluctant and unsociable nature of the 
 other into the same. And when he had mixed them, and out 
 of all the three made one, he again divided this whole into as 
 many portions as was fitting, each of them containing an ad- 
 . mixture of all three. Timaeus, ii. 528. 
 Essence, war about. 
 
 Sir. There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and 
 
 Gods going on amongst them ; they are fighting about the nat- 
 ure of essence. 
 
 Theaet. How is that ? 
 
 Str. Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven 
 and from the unseen to earth, and seem determined to grasp in 
 their hands rocks and oaks ; of these they lay hold, and are 
 obstinate in maintaining, that the things only which can be 
 touched or handled have being or essence, because they define 
 being and body as one, and if any one else says that what is 
 not a body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of 
 nothing but body. 
 
 Theaet. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows 
 they are. 
 
 Str. And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously 
 defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily 
 
158 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and 
 incorporeal ideas ; the bodies of the materialists, which by them 
 are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little 
 bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be generation and 
 not essence. O Theaetetus, there is an endless war upon this 
 theme which is always being waged between the two armies. 
 - Sophist, iii. 483. 
 Essence, nature of. 
 
 Sir. If they will admit that any, even the smallest particle of 
 
 being is incorporeal, that is enough ; they must then say what 
 that nature is which is common to both the corporeal and in- 
 corporeal, which they have in their mind's eye when they say 
 of both of them that they " are." Perhaps they may be in a 
 difficulty ; and if this is the case, there is a possibility that they 
 may accept a notion of ours respecting the nature of essence, 
 having nothing of their own to offer. 
 
 Theaet. What is the notion ? Tell us, and we shall see. 
 
 Sir. My notion would be, that anything which possesses any 
 sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another 
 even for a moment, however trifling the cause and however 
 slight and momentary the effect, has real existence ; and I hold 
 that the definition of being is simply power. 
 
 Theaet. They accept your suggestion, having nothing better 
 of their own to offer. 
 
 Str. Very good ; perhaps we, as well as they, may one day 
 change our mind ; but, for the present, this may be regarded as 
 the understanding which is established with them. 
 
 Theaet. Agreed. Sophist, iii. 485. 
 Esteem and praise distinguished. 
 
 Then our meeting will be delightful ; for in this way you, 
 
 who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and 
 not praise only, among us who are your audience ; for es- 
 teem is a sincere conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is 
 often an insincere expression of men uttering falsehoods con- 
 trary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers 
 will be gratified and not pleased ; for gratification is of the 
 mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of 
 the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight. 
 Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his 
 words. Protagoras, i. 137. 
 Eternal, space is. 
 There is a third nature, which is space, and is eternal, and 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHT*. 159 
 
 admits not of destruction, and provides a home for all created 
 things, and is perceived without the help of sense, by a kind of 
 spurious reason, and is hardly matter of belief, which we, be- 
 holding as in a dream, say, of all existence, that it must of 
 necessity be in some place and occupy a space, but that what is 
 neither in heaven nor in earth has no existence. Timaeus, ii. 
 544. 
 Evil and good, the presence of. 
 
 Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is 
 
 assimilated by the presence of another substance ; or must the 
 presence be after a peculiar sort ? 
 
 The latter, he said. 
 
 Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the pres- 
 ence of evil, but not as yet evil, and that has happened before 
 now ? 
 
 True. 
 
 And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as 
 yet evil, the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that 
 thing ; but the presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes 
 away the desire and friendship of the good ; for that which was 
 once both good and evil has now become evil only, and the 
 good had no friendship with the evil ? 
 
 None. 
 
 And therefore we say that those who are already wise, 
 whether Gods or men, are no longer lovers of wisdom ; nor 
 can they be lovers of wisdom, who are ignorant to the extent 
 of being evil, for no evil or ignorant person is a lover of wis- 
 dom. There remain those who have the misfortune to be ig- 
 norant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of 
 understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what 
 they do not know ; and therefore those who are the lovers of 
 wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad. But the bad do not 
 love wisdom any more than the good ; for, as we have already 
 seen, neither unlike is the friend of unlike, nor like of like. 
 You remember that ? 
 
 Yes, they both said. Lysis, i. 58. 
 Evil, concealment of. See Concealment, etc. 
 Evil, God not the author of. See God. 
 
 Let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, 
 
 the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of 
 Zeus, going forth to perpetrate such a horrid rape ; or of any 
 other hero or son of a God daring to do such impious and hor- 
 
160 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 rible things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day : and let 
 us compel the poets to declare either that these acts were not 
 done by them, or that they were not the sons of Gods : both 
 in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We 
 will not have them teaching our youth that the gods are the 
 authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men ; un- 
 doubtedly, these sentiments, as we were saying, are neither 
 pious nor true, for they are at variance with our demonstration 
 that evil cannot come from -God. Undoubtedly. 
 
 And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those 
 who hear them ; for everybody will begin to excuse his own 
 vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always 
 being perpetrated by the kindred of the Gods, 
 
 " The relatives of Zeus, whose paternal altar is in the heavens and on the mount 
 
 of Ida/- 
 and who have 
 
 " The blood of deity yet flowing in their veins." 
 
 And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engen- 
 der laxity of morals among the young. The Republic, ii. 214. 
 Evil, suffering less than doing. See Injustice. 
 Evil-doers, justice among. See Honor among theives. 
 Evil-doers, effect of punishment on. See Punishment, etc. 
 Evil; the greatest in the State. See Injustice, penalty of. 
 
 Shall we begin by asking of ourselves what we conceive 
 
 to be the greatest good, and what ought to be the chief aim of 
 the legislator in the organization of a State, and what is the 
 greatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description 
 has the stamp of the good or of the evil. 
 
 By all means. 
 
 Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction 
 and plurality where unity ought to reign ? or any greater good 
 than the bond of unity ? 
 
 There cannot. 
 
 And there is unity where there is community of pleasures 
 and pains where all the citizens are glad or sorry on the 
 same occasions? 
 
 No doubt. 
 
 Yes ; and where there is no common but only private feeling, 
 a State is disorganized when you have one half of the world 
 triumphing and the other sorrowing at the same events hap- 
 pening to the city and the citizens ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 161 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about 
 the use of the terms " meum " and " tuum," mine and thine. 
 
 Exactly. 
 
 And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest 
 number of persons apply the terms " mine " and " not mine " 
 in the same way to the same thing ? 
 
 True, very true. 
 
 Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition 
 of the individual as in the body, when but a finger is hurt, 
 the whole frame, drawn towards the soul and forming one realm 
 under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes 
 all together with the part affected, and we say that the man 
 has a pain in his finger ; and the same expression is used about 
 any other part, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or 
 of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering. 
 
 Very true, he replied ; and I agree with you that in the 
 best-ordered State there is the nearest approach to this com- 
 mon feeling which you describe. 
 
 Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or 
 evil, the whole State will make his case their own, and either 
 rejoice or sorrow with him ? 
 
 Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered 
 State. The Republic, ii. 287. 
 Evil and good, power for. See Good, etc. 
 Evil and good, when they are such. 
 Soc. And punishment is an evil ? 
 
 Pol. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And you would admit once more, my good sir, that 
 great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his 
 advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power ; and 
 if not, then his power is an evil and is no power. But let us 
 look at the matter in another way : do we not acknowledge 
 that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of 
 death, and exile, and the deprivation of property, are some- 
 times a good and sometimes not a good ? 
 
 Pol Certainly. 
 
 Soc. About that you and I may be supposed to agree ? 
 
 Pol. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good 
 and when that they are evil : what principle do you lay 
 down ? 
 
 11 
 
162 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Pol. I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as 
 well as ask that question. 
 
 Soc. Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer 
 from me, I say that they are good when they are just, and 
 evil when they are unjust. Gorgias, iii. 56. 
 Evils imperishable. 
 
 Soc. Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there 
 
 must always remain something which is antagonistic to good. 
 Having no place among the Gods in heaven, of necessity they 
 hover around the earthly nature and this mortal sphere. 
 Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as 
 quickly as we can ; and to fly away is to become like God, 
 as far as this is possible ; and to become like him, is to become 
 holy and just and wise. But, O my friend, you cannot easily 
 convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice, 
 not in order that a man may seem to be good, which is the 
 reason given by the world, and in my judgment is only a rep- 
 etition of an old wives' fable, whereas, the truth is that God 
 is never unrighteous at all he is perfect righteousness ; and 
 he of us who is the most righteous is most like him. Herein is 
 seen the true cleverness of a man, and also his nothingness and 
 want of manhood. Theaetetus, iii. 378. 
 Excess in pleasures. 
 
 Soc. Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures 
 
 as a class, we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but 
 at the most extreme and most vehement ? 
 
 Pro. In that every one will be ready to agree. 
 
 Soc. And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasure, as 
 we have often said, are pleasures of the body ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when 
 we are sick or when we are in health ? And here we must be 
 careful in our answer, and not make a mistake. 
 
 Pro. How are we likely to mistake ? 
 
 Soc. Why, because we might be tempted to answer rashly, 
 " when we are in health." 
 
 Pro. Yes, that is the natural answer. 
 
 Soc. Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which 
 mankind have the greatest desires ? 
 
 Pro. True. 
 
 Soc. And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar 
 illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily affection more in- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 168 
 
 tensely ? Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper 
 want and great pleasure in the satisfaction of their want ? 
 
 Pro. That is clear when you say so. 
 
 Soc. Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a 
 person would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go 
 and look, not at health, but at disease ? And here you must 
 distinguish : do not imagine that I am asking whether those 
 who are very ill have more pleasure than those who are well, 
 but understand that I am speaking of the intensity of pleasure ; 
 I want to know where pleasures are found to be most in ex- 
 cess. For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and 
 what nature they attribute to her who deny her very exist- 
 ence. 
 
 Pro. I believe that I follow you. 
 
 Soc. We shall soon see whether you do or not, Protarchus, 
 for you shall answer me ; tell me, then, whether you see, I will 
 not say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wan- 
 tonness than in temperance ? and please to think before you 
 
 Pro. I understand you, and see that there is a great differ- 
 ence between them ; the temperate are restrained by the wise 
 man's aphorisms of " never too much," which is their rule, but 
 excess of pleasure possessing the minds of fools and wantons 
 quite maddens and infuriates them. Philebus, iii. 183. 
 Exchange, art of. 
 
 Str. Take another branch of his (the Sophist's) geneal- 
 ogy ; for he is a professor of a great and many-sided art ; and 
 if we look back at what has preceded, we see that he presents 
 another aspect, besides that of which we are speaking. 
 
 Theaet. In what respect ? 
 
 Str. There were two sorts of acquisitive art ; the one con- 
 cerned with hunting, the other with exchange. 
 
 Theaet. There were. 
 
 Str. And of the art of exchange there are two divisions, 
 the one of giving, and the other of selling. 
 
 Theaet. Let us assume that. 
 
 Str. Further, we will suppose that the art of selling is di- 
 vided into two parts. 
 
 Theaet. How? 
 
 Str. There is one part which is distinguished as the sale of 
 a man's own productions ; another, which is the exchange of 
 the works of others. 
 
164 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Str. And is not that part of exchange which takes place in 
 the city, being about half of the whole, termed retailing ? 
 
 Theaet. Yes. 
 
 Str. And that which exchanges the goods of one city for 
 those of another by selling and buying is the exchange of the 
 merchant ? 
 
 Theaet. To be sure. 
 
 Str. And this exchange of the merchant is partly an ex- 
 change of food for the use of the body, and partly of the food 
 of the soul which is bartered and received in exchange for 
 money. 
 
 Theaet. What do you mean ? 
 
 Str. You want to know what is the meaning of food for the 
 soul ; the other kind you understand. 
 
 Theaet. Yes. 
 
 Str. Take > music in general and painting and marionette 
 playing and many other things, which are purchased in one 
 city, and carried away and sold in another wares of the soul 
 which are hawked about either for the sake of instruction or 
 amusement ; may not he who takes them about and sells 
 them be quite as truly called a merchant as he who sells meats 
 and drinks ? 
 
 Theaet. To be sure he may. 
 
 Str. And would you not call by the same name him who 
 goes about from city to city, buying knowledge from all quar- 
 ters and exchanging his wares for money ? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly I should. " 
 
 Str. Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be 
 fairly termed the art of display ? And there is another which 
 is certainly not less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning 
 must be called by some name germane to the matter ? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Str. There should be two names for them, one descriptive 
 of the sale of the knowledge of virtue, and the other of the 
 sale of other kinds of knowledge. 
 
 Theaet. Of course. 
 
 Str. The name of art seller corresponds well enough to 
 the one ; and I hope that you will tell me the name of the 
 other. 
 
 Theaet. He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking ; no 
 other name can possibly be right. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 165 
 
 Str. No other ; and so this trader in virtue again turns out 
 to be our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced a 
 second time, through the art of acquisition exchange buy- 
 ing and selling, by the merchant, not forgetting that there is 
 a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and 
 knowledge. 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 .Str. And there may be a third reappearance of him; for 
 he may have settled down in a city, and partly fabricate as 
 well as buy these same wares, intending to live by selling them, 
 and he would still be called a Sophist ? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Str. Then that part of the acquisitive art which exchanges, 
 and of exchange which either sells a man's own productions or 
 retails those of others, as the case may be, and in either way 
 sells knowledge, you would again term Sophistry ? 
 
 Theaet. I must if I am to keep up with the argument. 
 Sophist, iii. 457. 
 Existence, recollection a proof of previous. 
 
 Yes, he said, Cebes, I entirely think so too ; nor is this a 
 delusion in which we are agreeing ; but I am confident in the 
 belief that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that 
 the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead 
 are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion 
 than the evil. 
 
 Cebes added : Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowl- 
 edge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a 
 previous time in which we learned that which we now recol- 
 lect. But this would be impossible unless our soul was in 
 some place before existing in the human form ; here then is 
 another argument of the soul's immortality. 
 
 But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias interposing, what proofs 
 are given of this doctrine of recollection ? I am not very sure 
 at this moment that I remember them. 
 
 One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If 
 you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a 
 true answer of himself, but how could he do this unless there 
 were knowledge and right reason already in him ? And this 
 is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to any- 
 thing of that sort. 
 
 But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I 
 would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you 
 
166 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 look at the matter in another way ; I mean, if you are still in- 
 credulous as to whether knowledge is recollection ? 
 
 Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have 
 this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, 
 and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect 
 and be convinced ; but I should still like to hear what you 
 were going to say. 
 
 This is what I should say, he replied : We should agree, if 
 I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have 
 known at some previous time. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection ? 
 I mean to ask, whether when a person has already seen or 
 heard, or in any way perceived anything, and he knows not 
 only that, but something else of which he has not the same but 
 another knowledge, we may not fairly say that he recollects 
 that which comes into his mind. Are we agreed about that ? 
 Phaedo, i. 399. 
 Existence, pure and real. 
 
 Which classes of things have a greater share of pure ex- 
 istence in your judgment, those of which food and drink 
 and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or 
 the class which contains true opinion and mind, and, in general, 
 all virtue ? Put the question in this way : Which has a more 
 pure being, that which is concerned with the invariable, the 
 immortal, and the true, and is found in the invariable, immortal, 
 true ; or that which is concerned with the variable and mor- 
 tal, and is found in the variable and mortal ? 
 
 Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is con- 
 cerned with the invariable. 
 
 And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowl- 
 edge in the same degree as of essence ? 
 
 Yes, of knowledge in the same degree. 
 
 And of truth in the same degree ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have 
 less of essence ? 
 
 Necessarily. 
 
 Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the ser- 
 vice of the body have less of truth and essence than those 
 which are in the service of the soul ? 
 
 Far less. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 167 
 
 And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than 
 the soul ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a 
 more real existence, is more really filled than that which is 
 filled with less real existence and is less real ? 
 
 Of course. 
 
 And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which 
 is according to nature, that which is more really filled with 
 more real being will have more real and true joy and pleasure ; 
 whereas that which participates in less real' being will be less 
 truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in a less true and 
 real pleasure ? 
 
 Unquestionably. The Republic, ii. 416. 
 
 Sir. Let us push the question ; for if they will admit that 
 any, even the smallest particle of being, is incorporeal, that is 
 enough ; they must then say what that nature is which is com- 
 mon to both the corporeal and incorporeal, and which they have 
 in their mind's eye when they say of both of them that they 
 " are." Perhaps they may be in a difficulty ; and if this is 
 the case, there is a possibility that they may accept a notion of 
 ours respecting the nature of essence, having nothing of their 
 own to offer. 
 
 Theaet. What is the notion ? Tell us, and we shall see. 
 
 Str. My notion would be, that anything which possesses any 
 sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another 
 even for a moment, however trifling the cause and however 
 slight and momentary the effect, has real existence ; and I hold 
 that the definition of being is simply power. Sophist, iii. 
 485. 
 Existences, separation of. 
 
 Str. But to show that somehow and in some sense the 
 
 same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or the like 
 unlike ; and to delight in always thus bringing forward oppo- 
 sitions in argument, is no true refutation, but only proves that 
 he who uses such arguments is a neophyte who has got but a 
 little way in the investigation of truth. 
 
 Theaet. To be sure. 
 
 Str. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all 
 existences from one another is not only tasteless but also illit- 
 erate and unphilosophical. 
 
 Theaet. Why so ? 
 
168 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Str. The attempt at universal separation is the final annihi- 
 lation of all reason ; for only by the union of conceptions with 
 one another do we attain to discourse of reason. 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Str. And observe that we were only just in time'm making a 
 resistance 'to such separatists, and compelling them to make the 
 admission that other did mingle with other. Sophist, iii. 499. 
 
 Faculties ; what are they ? 
 
 Do we admit the existence of opinion ? 
 
 Undoubtedly. 
 
 As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty ? 
 
 Another faculty. 
 
 Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds 
 of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And knowledge is relative to being, and knows being ; but 
 before I proceed, I will first make a division. 
 
 What division ? 
 
 I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves ; 
 they are powers in us and in all other things by which we do 
 as we do. Sight and hearing, for example, I should call fac- 
 ulties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean ? 
 
 Yes, I quite understand. 
 
 Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see 
 them, arid therefore the distinctions of figure, color, and the 
 like, which enable me to discern the differences of some things, 
 do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think only 
 of the end and the operation ; and that which has the same 
 end and the same operation I call the same faculty, but that 
 which has another end and another operation I call different. 
 Would that be your way of speaking? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 To return. Would you place knowledge among faculties, or 
 in some other class ? 
 
 Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the most powerful of 
 all faculties. 
 
 And is opinion also a faculty ? 
 
 Certainly, he said ; for opinion is that with which we are 
 able to form an opinion. 
 
 And yet you were surely admitting a little while ago that 
 knowledge is not the same as opinion ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 169 
 
 Why, yes, said he : for how can any reasonable being ever 
 identify that which is infallible with that which errs ? 
 
 That is very good, I said, and clearly shows that we are 
 conscious of a distinction between them ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Then knowledge and opinion, having distinct powers, have 
 also distinct ends or subject-matters ? 
 
 That is certain. The Republic, ii. 305. 
 False oaths. See Oaths. 
 False opinion and true. See Heterodoxy. 
 
 - What do you mean, Dionysodorus ? I have often heard, 
 and have been amazed, to hear this thesis of yours, which is 
 maintained and employed by the disciples of Protagoras, and 
 others before them, and which to me appears to be quite won- 
 derful and suicidal, as well as destructive, and I think that I 
 am most likely to hear the truth of this from you. The dictum 
 is that there is no such thing as falsehood ; a man must either 
 say what is true or say nothing. Is not that your position ? 
 
 He assented. 
 
 But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely ? 
 
 No, he cannot, he said. 
 
 Then there is no such thing as false opinion ? 
 
 No, he said. - Euthedymus, i. 189. 
 
 Soc. Let us then put into more precise terms the question 
 which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a 
 thing as opinion ? 
 
 Pro. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And such a thing as pleasure ? 
 
 Pro. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And there must be something about which a man has 
 an opinion ? 
 
 Pro. True. 
 
 Soc. And something which gives pleasure ? 
 
 Pro. Quite correct. 
 
 Soc. And whether his opinion is right or wrong, makes no 
 difference ; he will still always have an opinion ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or 
 not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure ? 
 
 Pro. Yes : that is also quite true. 
 
 Soc. Then, how can opinion be true and false, and pleasure 
 only true ; and yet the state of being pleased, or holding an 
 opinion may be both real ? 
 
170 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Pro. Yes ; that is the question. 
 
 Soc. You mean that opinion has the attributes of true and 
 false, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a 
 certain quality ; and this is what you think should be exam- 
 ined ? 
 
 Pro. Yes. Philebus, iii. 174. 
 Falsehood, when committed. See Fiction, etc. 
 Falsehood, God incapable of. See Deception. 
 Falsehood for the State. See Lies, etc. 
 Fame, immortality of fame. See Immortality, etc. 
 Family ties in the State. 
 
 Did you ever know an example in other States of a ruler 
 
 who would speak of one of his colleagues as a friend and of 
 another as not a friend to him ? 
 
 Yes, very often. 
 
 And the friend he describes and regards as one in whom he 
 has an interest, and the other as one in whom he has no in- 
 terest? 
 
 Exactly. 
 
 But would any of your guardians speak of one of their fel- 
 lows as a friend and of another as not a friend to him ? 
 
 Certainly not ; for every one whom they meet will be re- 
 garded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or 
 mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those 
 who are thus connected with him. 
 
 Capital, I said ; but let me ask you once more : Shall they 
 be a family in name only, or shall they always act as if they 
 were a family ? For example, in the use of the word " father," 
 would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence 
 and duty and obedience to him which the law commands ; and 
 is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and 
 unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good 
 either from the hands of God or man ? Are these to be the 
 strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by 
 all the citizens about their parents and kindred when they are 
 pointed out to them ? 
 
 These, he said, and none other ; for what can be more ridic- 
 ulous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the 
 lips only, and not to act upon them ? 
 
 Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will 
 be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing 
 before, when any one is well or ill, the universal word will be, 
 " mine is well " or " mine is ill." 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 171 
 
 Most true. 
 
 And agreeably to this mode of thinking or speaking, were 
 we not saying also that they will have their pleasures and 
 pains in common ? 
 
 Yes, and so they will. 
 
 And they will have a common interest in the same which 
 they will call " my own," and having this common interest they 
 will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain ? 
 
 Yes, they will have a far greater community of feeling. 
 The Republic, ii. 289. 
 Fancies of people. 
 
 But first I must tell you that I am one who from my 
 
 childhood upward have set my heart upon a certain thing. All 
 people have their fancies ; some desire horses, and others dogs ; 
 and some are fond of gold and others of honor. Now, I have 
 no violent desire for any of these things ; but I have a passion 
 for friends ; and I would rather have a good friend than the 
 best cock or quail in the world: I would even go further, and 
 say than a horse or dog. Yea, by the dog of Egypt, I should 
 greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of Darius, or even 
 to Darius himself ; I am such a lover of friends as that. And 
 when I see you and Lysis, at your early age, so easily possessed 
 of this treasure, and so soon, he of you, and you of him, I am 
 amazed and delighted, seeing that I myself, although I am now 
 advanced in years, am so far from having made a similar acqui- 
 sition, that I do not even know in what way a friend is acquired. 
 But I want to ask you a question about this, for you have ex- 
 perience : tell me then, when one loves another, is the lover or 
 the beloved the friend ; or may either be the friend ? 
 
 I think that either may be the friend. 
 
 Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the 
 other, they are mutual friends ? 
 
 Yes, he said ; that is my meaning. 
 
 But what if the lover is not loved in return ? That is a 
 possible case. 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Or is, perhaps, even hated ? for that is a fancy which lovers 
 sometimes have, Nothing can exceed their love ; and yet they 
 imagine either that they are not loved in return, or that they 
 are hated. Is not that true ? 
 
 Yes, he said, quite true. Lysis, i. 50. 
 
172 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Fancies of hope. 
 
 Soc. All men, as we were saying just now, are always 
 
 filled with hopes ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions 
 which exist in the minds of each of us ? 
 
 Pro. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And the fancies of hope are also pictured 'in us ; a man 
 may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensu- 
 ing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself 
 mightily rejoicing over his good fortune. 
 
 Pro. True. 
 
 Soc. And may we not say that the good, being friends of 
 the Gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and 
 the bad false pictures ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And yet the bad have pleasures painted in their fancy 
 as well as the good ; but I presume that they are false pleas- 
 ures ? 
 
 Pro. They are. Philebus, iii. 178. 
 Fathers, brave sons of brave. See State, heroes, etc. 
 Fathers, sons of good, why they turn out ill. 
 
 But why do the sons of good fathers often turn out 
 
 ill? Let me explain that, which is far from being wonder- 
 ful, if, as I have been saying, the very existence of the State 
 implies that virtue is not any man's private possession. If 
 this be true and nothing can be truer then I will ask you 
 to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of 
 knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition 
 of the existence of a State. Suppose that there could be no 
 State unless we were all flute-players, as far as each had the 
 capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, 
 both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as 
 freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the 
 laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, 
 but imparting them for all of us have a mutual interest in 
 the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason 
 why every one is ready to teach justice and the laws ; suppose, 
 I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among 
 us in teaching one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Soc- 
 rates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely 
 to be good than the sons of bad ones ? I think not. Would 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 173 
 
 not their sons grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished 
 according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, and 
 the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, 
 and the son of a bad player to be a good one, and all flute- 
 players would be good enough in comparison of those who 
 were ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? 
 In like manner I would have you consider that he who ap- 
 pears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought 
 up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and 
 a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who 
 had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints 
 upon them which compelled them to practice virtue with the 
 savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on 
 the stage at the last year's Lenaeau festival. If you were liv- 
 ing among men such as the man-haters' in his Chorus, you 
 would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynon- 
 das, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality of 
 this part of the world. And you, Socrates, are discontented, 
 and why ? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one 
 according to his ability, and you say that there is no teacher. 
 You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek ? For of that too 
 there will not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who 
 is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they 
 have learned of their fathers ? He and his fellow-workmen 
 have taught them to the best of their ability, but who will 
 carry them further in their arts ? And you would certainly 
 have a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of them ; but 
 there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who 
 are wholly ignorant. And this is true qf virtue or of any- 
 thing ; and if a man is better able than we are to promote 
 virtue ever so little, that is as much as we can expect. A 
 teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other 
 men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and 
 good ; and I give my pupils their money's-worth, and even 
 more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have in- 
 troduced the following mode of payment : When a man has 
 been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no 
 compulsion ; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a 
 temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and 
 he pays no more than he declares to be their value. 
 
 Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by 
 which I endeavor to show that virtue may be taught, and that 
 
174 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also at- 
 tempted to show that you are not to wonder at good sons hav- 
 ing bad fathers, or at good fathers having bad sons, of which the 
 sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who are the companions 
 of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing 
 in comparison with their father ; and this is true of the sons of 
 many other artists., Protagoras, i. 126. 
 Faultless man not to be found. 
 
 All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the 
 
 sequel. For he adds : " Therefore I will not throw away my 
 life in searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a 
 perfectly faultless man among those who partake of the fruit 
 of the broad-bosomed earth ; and when I have found him to 
 tell you of him " (this is the vehement way in which he pur- 
 sues his attack upon Pittacus throughout the whole poem) : 
 " but him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love ; not 
 even the Gods war against necessity." All this has a similar 
 drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he 
 praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there were 
 some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise map, as I believe, 
 will allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or volunta- 
 rily does evil and dishonorable actions ; but they are very well 
 aware that all who do evil and dishonorable things do them 
 against their will. And Simonides never says that he praises 
 him who does no evil voluntarily ; the word "voluntarily" ap- 
 plies to himself. For he was under the impression that a 
 good man might often compel himself to love and praise an- 
 other, and to be the friend and approver of another ; and that 
 there might be an involuntary love, such as a man might feel 
 to an unnatural father or mother, or his country, or the like. 
 Now bad men, when their parents or country have any defects, 
 rejoice at the sight of them and find fault with them and ex- 
 pose and denounce them to others under the idea that the rest 
 of mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task and 
 accuse them of neglect ; and they blame their defects far more 
 than they deserve in order that the odium which is necessarily 
 incurred by them may be increased: but the good man dissem- 
 bles his feelings, and constrains himself to praise them ; and if 
 they have wronged him and he is angry, he pacifies his anger 
 and is reconciled, and compels himself to love and praise his 
 own flesh and blood. And Simonides, as is probable, consid- 
 ered that he himself had often had to praise and magnify a ty- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 175 
 
 rant or the like, much against his will, and he also wishes to 
 imply to Pittacus that he is not censorious and does not cen- 
 sure him. " For I am satisfied," he says, " when a man is 
 neither bad nor very stupid, and when he knows justice (which 
 is the health of States), and is of sound mind, I will find no fault 
 with him, for I am not given to finding fault, and there are in- 
 numerable fools " (implying that if he delighted in censure he 
 might have abundant opportunity of finding fault). " All 
 things are good with which evil is unmingled." In these lat- 
 ter words he does not mean to say that all things are good 
 which have no evil in them, as you might say " All things are 
 white which have no black in them," for that would be ridicu- 
 lous ; but he means to say that he accepts and finds no fault 
 with the moderate or intermediate state. " I do not hope," he 
 say s, " to find a perfectly blameless man among those who par- 
 take of the fruits of the broad -bosomed earth, and when I have 
 found him to tell you of him ; in this sense I praise no man. 
 But he who is moderately good, and does no evil, is good 
 enough for me, who love and approve every one " (and here 
 observe that he uses a Lesbian word ftunj/u, because he is ad- 
 dressing Pittacus, " who love and approve every one volun- 
 tarily, who does no evil : " and that the stop should be put 
 after " voluntarily ") ; " but there are some whom I involun- 
 tarily praise and love. And you, Pittacus, I would never 
 have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and 
 true ; but I do blame you because, wearing the appearance of 
 truth, you are' speaking falsely about the greatest matters." 
 And this, I said, Prodicus and Protagoras, I take to be the 
 true meaning of Simonides in this poem. Protagoras, i. 145. 
 Fear, its object. See Courage, Bravery. 
 
 - Soc. Now, let us proceed a step, and see whether we are 
 equally agreed about the fearful and the hopeful. Let me tell 
 you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me right ; 
 in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which 
 do or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor 
 of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not 
 agree to that, Laches ? 
 
 La. Yes, Socrates, entirely. 
 
 Soc. That is my view, Nicias ; the terrible things, as I should 
 say, are the evils which are future ; and the hopeful are the 
 good or not evil things which are future. Do you or do you 
 not agree with me ? Laches, i. 92. 
 
176 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Fear, its source and influence. 
 
 Ath. Fear springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And 
 
 when some one applies external agitation to affections of this 
 sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the ter- 
 rible and violent internal one, and produces a peace and calm in 
 the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which 
 is a thing much to be desired, sending some to sleep, and mak- 
 ing others who are awake to dance to the pipe, with the help 
 of the Gods, to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and pro- 
 ducing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their 
 former agitations. And in this, as I would shortly say, there 
 is a considerable amount of sense. 
 
 Gle. Certainly. 
 
 Ath. But if fear has such a power we ought to consider fur- 
 ther, that every soul which from youth upward has been famil- 
 iar with fears, will be made more liable to fear, and every one 
 will admit that this is the way to form a habit of cowardice and 
 not of courage. 
 
 Gle. Certainly. 
 
 Ath. And, on the other hand, the habit of overcoming, from 
 our youth upwards, the fears and terrors which beset us, may 
 be said to be an> exercise of courage ? 
 
 Gle. True. Laws, iv. 309. 
 Few, the government of the, only true. 
 
 Str. The several forms of government cannot be defined 
 
 by the words few or many, voluntary or compulsory, poverty 
 or riches ; but some notion of science must enter in, if we are 
 to be consistent with what has preceded. 
 
 T. Soc. And we must be consistent. 
 
 Str. Well, then, in which of these various forms of States 
 may the science of government, which is among the greatest 
 and most difficult of all sciences, be supposed to reside ? That 
 we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false poli- 
 ticians who win popularity and pretend to be politicians and are 
 not, and separate them from the wise king. 
 
 T. Soc. That, as the argument has already intimated, is our 
 duty. 
 
 Str. Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain 
 political science? 
 
 Y. Soc. Impossible. 
 
 Str. But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would 
 be a hundred, or say fifty, who could ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 177 
 
 T. Soc. In that case political science would certainly be the 
 easiest of all sciences ; there could not be found in a city of that 
 number as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by 
 the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly 
 not be as many kings. For kings we may truly call those who 
 possess royal science, whether they rule or not, as was shown 
 in the previous argument. 
 
 Str. Thank you for reminding me ; and the consequence is 
 that any true form of government can only be supposed to be 
 the government of one, two, or, at any rate, of a few. 
 
 Y. Soc. Certainly. Statesman, iii. 578. 
 Fickleness of youth. See Chang eableness. 
 Fiction, censorship of. 
 
 You know also that the beginning is the chiefest part of 
 
 any work, especially in a young and tender thing ; for that is 
 the time at which the character is formed and most readily re- 
 ceives the desired impression. 
 
 Quite true. 
 
 And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any cas- 
 ual tales which may be framed by casual persons, and to receive 
 into their minds notions which are the very opposite of those 
 which are to be held by them when they are grown up ? 
 
 We cannot. 
 
 Then the first thing will be to have a censorship of the 
 writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction 
 which is good, and reject the bad ; and we will desire mothers 
 and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones only. Let 
 them fashion the mind with these tales, even more fondly than 
 they form the body with their hands. And most of those which 
 are now in use must be discarded. 
 
 Of what tales are you speaking ? he said. 
 
 You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said ; for 
 they are necessarily cast in the same mould, and there is the 
 same spirit in both of them. 
 
 That may be very true, he replied ; but I do not as yet know 
 what you would term the greater. 
 
 Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and 
 the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers 
 
 mankind. 
 
 But which stones do you mean, he said ; and what fault do 
 you find with them ? 
 12 
 
178 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 A fault which is most serious, I said ; the fault of telling a 
 lie, and what is more, a bad lie. 
 ' But when is this fault committed ? 
 
 Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature 
 of gods and heroes, like the drawing of a limner which has 
 not the shadow of a likeness to the truth. 
 
 Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable. 
 The Republic, ii. 200. 
 Figure and melody. 
 
 I may observe, however, in passing, that in music there 
 
 certainly are figures and there are melodies ; and music is con- 
 cerned with harmony and rhythm, so that you may speak of a 
 melody or figure having rhythm or harmony ; the term is cor- 
 rect enough, but you cannot speak correctly, as the masters of 
 choruses have a way of talking metaphorically of the " color " 
 of a melody or figure, although you can speak of the melodies 
 or figures of the brave and the coward, praising the one and 
 censuring the other. And not to be tedious, the figures and 
 melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul or body, or of 
 images of virtue, are without exception good, and those which 
 are expressive of vice are the reverse of good. Laws,iv. 184. 
 Filial monsters. 
 
 But we are digressing. Let us therefore return and in- 
 quire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and 
 various and ever-changing army of his. 
 
 If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will 
 confiscate them and spend the proceeds ; that is obvious. And 
 in so far as they suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes 
 which he would otherwise have to impose. 
 
 And when these fail ? 
 
 Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, 
 whether male or female, will be maintained out 'of his father's 
 estate. 
 
 I see your meaning, I said. You mean that the people from 
 whom he has derived his being, will maintain him and his com- 
 panions ? 
 
 Yes, he said ; he must be maintained by them. 
 
 But what if the people go into a passion, and aver that a 
 grown-up son ought not to be supported by his father, but that 
 the father should be supported by the son ? He did not bring 
 his son into the world in order that when he was grown up he 
 himself should be the servant of his own servants, and should 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 179 
 
 support him and his rabble of slaves and companions ; but 
 that, having such a protector, he might be emancipated from 
 the government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. 
 And so, bids him and his companions depart, just as any other 
 father might drive out of his house a riotous son and his party 
 of revelers. 
 
 By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a 
 monster he has been fostering in his bosom ; and when he 
 wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son 
 strong. 
 
 Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use vio- 
 lence ? What ! beat his father if he opposes him ? 
 
 Yes, he will ; and he will begin by taking away his arms. 
 
 Then he is a parricide, and a cruel, unnatural son to an aged 
 parent whom he ought to cherish ; and this is real tyranny, 
 about which there is no mistake ; as the saying is, the people 
 who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, 
 have fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus 
 liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the 
 harshest and bitterest form of slavery. The Republic, ii. 398. 
 
 But, O heavens ! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fan- 
 gled love of a harlot, who is anything but a necessary con- 
 nection, can you believe that he would strike the mother who 
 is his ancient friend and necessary to his very existence, and 
 would place her under the authority of the other, when she is 
 brought under the same roof with her ; or that, under like 
 circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, 
 first and most indispensable of friends, for the sake of some 
 newly-found, blooming youth who is the reverse of indispen- 
 sable ? The Republic, ii. 403. 
 
 Filial regards and duties. See Children , what they owe to their par- 
 ents. See Parents, etc. 
 Finite and infinite. 
 
 Soc. Were we not saying that God revealed a finite ele- 
 ment of existence, and also an infinite ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, 
 which is compounded out of them ; but I fear that I am very 
 clumsy at these processes of division and enumeration. 
 
 Pro. What are you saying, my good friend ? 
 
 Soc. I say that still a fourth class is wanted. 
 
 Pro. And what will that be ? 
 
180 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Soc. Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this 
 as a fourth class to the three others. 
 
 Pro. And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of 
 resolution, as well as a cause of composition ? 
 
 Soc. Not, I think, at present ;- but if I want a fifth at some 
 future time you shall allow me to have one. 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Let us begin with the three first ; and as we find two 
 out of the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavor 
 to reunite them, and see how in each of them there is a one 
 and many. 
 
 Pro. If you would explain to me a little more about them, 
 perhaps I might be able to follow you. 
 
 Soc. Well, the two classes are the same, which I mentioned 
 before ; one the finite, and the other the infinite, and I will first 
 show that the infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite 
 may be hereafter discussed. 
 
 Pro. I agree. 
 
 Soc. And now consider well ; for the question to which I 
 invite your attention is difficult and controverted. When you 
 speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in those 
 qualities ? Does not the more and less, which dwells in their 
 very nature, prevent their having any end ? for if they had an 
 end, the more and less would themselves have an end. 
 
 Pro. That is most true. 
 
 Soc. Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there 
 enters a more and a less. 
 
 Pro. True. 
 
 Soc. Then, says the argument, they have never any end, 
 and being endless must also be infinite. Philebus, iii. 158. 
 Fire in the Universe. 
 
 Soc. We see the elements which enter into the nature of 
 
 the bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm- 
 tossed sailor cries, ** Land ahead," in the constitution of the 
 world. 
 
 Pro. The proverb may be applied to us ; for truly the 
 storm gathers us and we are at our wit's end. 
 
 Soc. Consider now that each of the elements, as they exist 
 in us, is but a small fraction of any one of them, and of a 
 mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power 
 worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of 
 them ; there is a fire within us, and in the universe. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 181 
 
 Pro. True. 
 
 Soc. And is not our fire small and weak and mean, but the 
 fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in 
 every power that fire has ? 
 
 Pro. Most true. 
 
 Soc. And is that universal element nourished and generated 
 and ruled by our fire, or is the fire in you and me, and in other 
 animals, dependent on the universal fire ? 
 
 Pro. That is a question which does not deserve an an- 
 swer. 
 
 Soc. Right ; and you would say the same, if I am not mis- 
 taken, of the earth which is in animals and the earth which is 
 in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about all 
 the other elements ? 
 
 Pro. Why, how could any man who gave any other be 
 deemed in his senses ? 
 
 Soc. I do not think that he could, but now go a step 
 further ; when we see those elements of which we have been 
 speaking gathered up in one, do we not call them a body ? 
 
 Pro. Very true. 
 
 Soc. And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for 
 the same reason may be considered as a body, because made 
 up of the same elements. 
 
 Pro. Very true. Philebus, iii. 164. 
 Fire and friction. 
 
 Soc. There are plenty of other proofs which will show that 
 
 motion is the source of that which is said to be and become, 
 and rest of not-being and destruction ; for fire and warmth, 
 which are supposed to be the parent and nurse of all other 
 things, are born of friction, which is a kind of motion ; is not 
 this the origin of fire ? 
 
 Theaet. Yes. Theaetetus, iii. 353. 
 Flattery and shams. See Cookery. 
 Flattery in rhetoric. 
 
 Soc. In my opinion, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric 
 is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready 
 wit, which knows how to "manage mankind : this habit I sum 
 up under the word " flattery ; " and it appears to me to have 
 many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to 
 be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine, 
 and not an art : another part is rhetoric, and the art of dressing 
 up and sophistry are two others : thus there are four branches, 
 
182 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 and four different things answering to them. And Polus may 
 ask, if be likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part 
 of flattery is rhetoric : he did not see that I had not yet an- 
 swered him when he proceeded to ask a further question : 
 Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing ? But I shall not 
 tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have 
 first answered, " What is rhetoric ? " For that would not be 
 right, Polus ; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask 
 me, What part of flattery is rhetoric ? 
 
 Pol. I will ask, and do you answer ; what part of flattery is 
 rhetoric ? 
 
 Soc. Will you understand my answer ? Rhetoric, according 
 to my view, is the shadow of a part of politics. Gorgias, 
 iii. 48. 
 
 Flesh rejected as food. 
 
 Ath. The practice of men sacrificing one another still ex- 
 ists among many nations : and, on the other hand, we hear 
 of other human beings who do not even venture to taste the 
 flesh of a cow and had no animal sacrifices, but only cakes and 
 fruits swimming in honey, and similar pure offerings, but no 
 flesh or animals ; from these they abstained under the idea 
 that they ought not to eat them, and might not stain the altars 
 of 'the Gods with blood. In former days men are said to have 
 lived a sort of Orphic life, having the use of all lifeless things, 
 but abstaining from all living things. Laws, iv. 303. 
 Flux and change. 
 
 Soc. We may leave the rest of their theory unexam- 
 
 ined, but we must not forget to ask them the only question with 
 which we are concerned : Are all things in motion and flux ? 
 
 Theod. Yes, they will reply. 
 
 Soc. And they are moved in both those ways which we dis- 
 tinguished ; that is to say, they move and are also changed? 
 
 Theod. Of course, if the motion is to be perfect. 
 
 Soc. If they only moved, and were not changed, we should 
 be able to say what are the kinds of things which are in mo- 
 tion and flux? 
 
 Theod. Exactly. 
 
 Soc. But now, since not even white continues to flow white, 
 and the very whiteness is a flux or change which is passing 
 into another color, and will not remain white, can the name 
 of any color be rightly used at all ? 
 
 Theod. How is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 183 
 
 this or of any other quality, if while we are using the word 
 the object is escaping in the flux ? Theaetetus, in. 385. 
 Food, flesh rejected as. See Flesh. 
 
 Force and persuasion in legislation. See Legislation, etc. 
 Forgetfulness and memory. 
 
 Soc. The other class of pleasures, which, as we were say- 
 ing is purely mental, is entirely derived from memory. 
 
 Pro. What do you mean ? 
 
 Soc. I must first of all analyze memory or rather percep- 
 tion which is prior to memory if the nature of these mental 
 states is ever to be properly cleared up. 
 
 Pro. How will you proceed. 
 
 Soc. Let us imagine affections of the body that are extin- 
 guished before they reach the soul, which remains unaffected 
 by them ; and again, other affections which vibrate through 
 both soul and body, and impart a shock to both of them. 
 
 Pro. Granted. 
 
 Soc. And the soul may be said to be oblivious of the first 
 but not of the second? 
 
 Pro. Quite true. 
 
 Soc. When I say oblivious do not suppose that I mean for- 
 getfulness in a literal sense ; for forgetfulness is the exit of 
 memory, which in this case has not yet entered ; and to speak 
 of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has 
 been, is a contradiction ; do you see ? 
 
 Pro. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Then just be so good as change the terms. 
 
 Pro. To what shall I change them ? 
 
 Soc. Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are de- 
 scribing the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of 
 the body, say unconsciousness. Philebus, iii. 169. 
 Form, harmony of soul and. 
 
 - I maintain that neither we nor our guardians, whom we 
 have to educate, can ever become musical until we and they 
 know the essential forms of temperance, courage, liberality, 
 magnificence, and then kindred as well as the contrary forms, 
 in all their combinations, and can recognize them and their im- 
 ages wherever they are found, not slighting them either in 
 small things or great, but believing them all to be within the 
 sphere of one art and study. 
 
 Most assuredly. 
 
 And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, 
 
184 PLATO* 'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 and the two are cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of 
 sights to him who has an eye to contemplate the vision? 
 The fairest indeed. 
 
 And the fairest is also the loveliest ? 
 
 That may be assumed. 
 
 And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in 
 love with the loveliest ; but he will not love him who is of an 
 inharmonious soul ? 
 
 That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul, but 
 any merely personal defect he will not mind, and will love all 
 the same. The Republic, ii. 226. 
 Forms of government unessential. 
 
 We seem to have reached a height from which a man 
 
 may look down and see that virtue is one but that the forms 
 of vice are innumerable ; there being four special ones which 
 are deserving of note. 
 
 What do you mean ? he said. 
 
 I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of 
 the soul as there are forms of the State. 
 
 How many? 
 
 There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said. 
 
 What are they ? 
 
 The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and 
 which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristoc- 
 racy, accordingly as rule is exercised by one or many. 
 
 True, he replied. 
 
 But I regard the two names as describing one form only ; 
 for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if 
 the governors have been trained in the manner which we have 
 described, the fundamental laws of the State will be main- 
 tained. 
 
 That is true, he replied. The Republic, ii. 272. 
 Forms of government, four. 
 
 - I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four con- 
 stitutions of which you were speaking. 
 
 That, I said, is easily answered : the four governments of 
 which I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, the 
 Cretan and Spartan, which are generally applauded : next, 
 there is oligarchy ; this is not equally approved, and is a form 
 of government which has many evils : thirdly, democracy, 
 which naturally follows oligarchy, although different ; and 
 lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which is different from 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 185 
 
 them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I 
 
 do not know of any other constitution which can be said to 
 
 Lave a distinct form. There are lordships and principalities 
 
 which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate forms 
 
 of government. But these nondescripts are oftener found 
 
 among barbarians than among Hellenes. The Republic, iL 
 
 371. 
 
 Fortunate unjust, the. See Clever. 
 
 Free use of words and phrases. See Education, the sign of a liberal. 
 
 Freedom, artificers of. 
 
 If then we would retain the notion with which we began, 
 
 that our guardians are to be released from every other art, and 
 to be the special artificers of freedom, and to minister to this 
 and have no other end, they ought not to practice or imitate 
 anything else ; and, if they imitate at all, they should imitate 
 from youth upward the characters which are suitable to their 
 profession the temperate, holy, free, courageous, and the like ; 
 but they should not depict or be skillful at imitating any kind 
 of illiberality or other baseness, lest from imitation they should 
 come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how im- 
 itations, beginning in early youth, at last sink into the constitu- 
 tion and become a second nature of body, voice, and mind ? 
 The Republic, ii. 218. 
 
 Freedom, anarchy, resulting from. See Anarchy. 
 Freedom unknown to the tyrant. 
 
 The people are such fools, and this noxious class and their 
 
 followers grow numerous and become aware of their numbers, 
 and then they choose him who has most of the tyrant in his 
 soul, and make him their leader. 
 
 Yes, he said, they will choose him because he will be the 
 most fit to be a tyrant. 
 
 If the people yield, well and good ; but if they resist him, as 
 he began by beating his own father and mother, so now, if he 
 has the power, he beats them, and will maintain his dear old 
 fatherland and motherland, as the Cretans say, in subjection to 
 his young retainer whom he has introduced to be their rulers 
 and masters. Such is the end of his passions and desires. 
 
 Exactly. 
 
 Even in early days and before they get power, this is their 
 character ; they associate only with their own flatterers or 
 ready tools ; or, if they want anything from anybody, they in 
 their turn are equally ready to fall down before them ; there is 
 
186 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 no attitude of kindness which they will not assume, but when 
 they have gained their point they know them no more. 
 
 Yes, truly. 
 
 They are always either the masters or servants and never 
 the friends of anybody ; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom 
 or true friendship. 
 
 Certainly not. The Republic, ii. 404. 
 Freedom, of Philosophy 
 
 Soc. Those who have been trained in philosophy and liberal 
 
 pursuits compared with those who from their youth upwards 
 have been knocking about in the courts and such like places, 
 are in their way of life as freemen are to slaves. 
 
 Theod. In what is the difference seen ? 
 
 Soc. In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman can 
 always command ; he has his talk out in peace, and, like our- 
 selves, wanders at will from one subject to another, and from a 
 second to a third if his fancy prefers a new one, caring not 
 whether his words are many or few ; his only aim is to attain 
 the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry ; there is the 
 water of the clepsydra driving him on, and not allowing him to 
 expatiate at will ; and there is his adversary standing over him, 
 enforcing his rights ; the affidavit, which in their phraseology 
 is termed the brief, is recited ; and from this he must not de- 
 viate. He is a servant, and is disputing about a fellow-servant 
 before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands ; 
 the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always con- 
 cerns himself ; and often the race is for his life. The conse- 
 quence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd ; he has 
 learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in 
 deed ; but his soul is small and unrighteous. His slavish con- 
 dition has deprived him of growth and uprightness and inde- 
 pendence ; dangers and fears, which were too much for his 
 truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the ten- 
 derness of youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven 
 into crooked ways ; from the first he has practiced deception 
 and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so 
 he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness 
 in him ; and is now, as he things, a master in wisdom. Such is 
 the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of 
 the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood ; or shall we return 
 to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digres- 
 sion which we claim. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 187 
 
 Theod. Nay, Socrates, let us finish what we are about ; for 
 you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, 
 and are not the servants of the argument ; but the argument is 
 our servant, and must wait our leisure. Who is our judge ? Or 
 where is the spectator having any right to censure or control 
 us, as he might the poets ? Theaetetus, iii. 375. 
 Freedom in the Persian State. 
 
 Ath. The State which has become exclusively and exces- 
 sively attached to monarchy or to freedom has neither of them 
 in- moderation ; but your States, the Laconian and Cretan, have 
 a certain moderation ; and the Athenians and Persians having 
 had more at first, have now less. Shall I tell you why ? 
 
 Cle. By all means, if it will tend to the elucidation of our 
 subject. 
 
 Ath. Hear, then : There was a time when the Persians 
 had more of the state which is a mean between slavery and 
 freedom. In the reign of Cyrus they were freemen and also 
 lords of many others ; the rulers gave a share of freedom to 
 the subjects, and being treated as equals, the soldiers were on 
 better terms with their generals, and showed themselves more 
 ready in the hour of danger. And if there was any wise 
 councilor among them, he imparted his wisdom to the public ; 
 for the king was not jealous, but allowed him full liberty of 
 speech and gave honor to those who were able to be his coun- 
 selors in anything, and allowed all men equally to participate 
 in wisdom. And the nation waxed in all respects, because 
 there was freedom and friendship and communion of soul 
 among them. Laws, iv. 223. 
 Freedom growing to license. 
 
 Ath. As time went on, the poets themselves introduced the 
 
 reign of ignorance and misrule. They were men of genius, 
 but they had no knowledge of what is just and lawful in music ; 
 raging like Bacchanals and possessed with inordinate delights 
 mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithy- 
 rambs ; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and 
 making one general confusion ; ignorantly affirming that music 
 has no truth, and whether good or bad, can only be judged of 
 rightly by the pleasure of the hearer. And by composing such 
 licentious poems, and adding to them words as licentious, they 
 have inspired the multitude with lawlessness and boldness, and 
 made them fancy that they can judge for themselves about 
 melody and song. And in this way, the theatres from being 
 
188 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 mute have become vocal, as though they had understanding of 
 good and bad in music and poetry ; and instead of an aristoc- 
 racy, an evil sort of theatrocracy has grown up. For if the 
 democracy which judged had only consisted of freemen, there 
 would have been no fatal harm done ; but in music there first 
 arose the universal conceit of omniscience and general lawless- 
 ness ; freedom came following afterwards, and men fancying 
 that they knew what they did not know, had no longer any fear, 
 and the absence of fear begets shamelessness. For what is 
 shamelessness but the insolent refusal to regard the opinion of 
 the better by reason of an overdaring sort of liberty ? 
 
 Meg. That is most true. 
 
 Ath. Consequent upon this freedom comes the other free- 
 dom of disobedience to rulers ; and then the attempt to escape 
 the control and exhortation of father, mother, elders, and when 
 near the end, the control of the laws also ; and at the very 
 end there is the contempt of oaths and pledges, and no regard 
 at all for the Gods, herein they exhibit and imitate the old Ti- 
 tanic nature ; and thus they return again to the old, and lead a 
 life of evils which have no end. Why do I say so ? Because 
 I think that the argument ought to be pulled up from time to 
 time, and not be allowed to run away, but held with bit and 
 bridle, and then we shall not, as the proverb says, fall off our 
 ass. Laws, iv. 230. 
 
 Friends and enemies, treatment of. See Enemies. 
 Friendship dearer than money. See Fancies, etc. 
 
 Oh ! my beloved Socrates, let me entreat you once more 
 
 to take my advice and escape. For if you die I shall not only 
 lose a friend who can never be replaced, but there is another 
 evil ; people who do not know you and me will believe that I 
 might have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but 
 that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than 
 this that I should be thought to value money more than the 
 life of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded that I 
 wanted you to escape, and that you refused. Crito, i. 348. 
 Friendship, the principle of. 
 
 Ath. He who would rightly consider these matters must see 
 
 the nature of friendship and -desire, and of these so-called 
 loves, for they are of two kinds, and out of the two arises a 
 third kind, having the same name ; and this similarity of name 
 causes all the difficulty and obscurity. 
 
 Cle. How is that ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 189 
 
 Ath. Dear is the like in virtue to the" like, and the equal to 
 the equal; dear also, though after another fashion, is he who 
 has abundance to him who is in want. And when either of 
 these friendships becomes excessive, we term the excess love. 
 
 Cle. Very true. 
 
 Ath. The friendship which arises from contraries is horrible 
 and coarse, and has often no tie of communion ; but that which 
 arises from likeness is gentle, and has a tie of communion, 
 which lasts through life. As to the mixed sort, which is made 
 up of them both, there is, first of all, a difficulty in determin- 
 ing what he who is possessed by this third love desires ; more- 
 over, he is drawn different ways, and is in doubt between the 
 two principles ; the one exhorting him to enjoy the beauty of 
 youth, and the other forbidding him. For the one is a lover 
 of the body, and hungers after beauty, like ripe fruit, and 
 would feign satisfy himself without any regard to the charac- 
 ter of the beloved ; the other holds the desire of the body to 
 be a secondary matter, and looking rather than loving with his 
 soul, and desiring the soul of the other in a becoming manner, 
 regards the satisfaction of the bodily love as wantonness ; he 
 reverences and respects temperance, and courage, and magnan- 
 imity, and wisdom, and wishes to live chastely with the chaste 
 object of his affection. Now the sort of love which is made 
 up of the other two is that which we have described as the 
 third. Seeing then that there are these three sorts of love, 
 ought the law to prohibit and forbid them all to exist among 
 us ? Is it not rather clear that we should wish to have in the 
 State the love which is of virtue and which desires the beloved 
 youth to be the best possible ; and the other two, if possible, 
 we should hinder ? What do you say, friend Megillus ? 
 
 Meg. I think, Stranger, you are altogether right in what you 
 have been now saying. Laws, iv. 352. 
 Funerals, three kinds of. 
 
 Of three kinds of funerals, there is one which is too ex- 
 travagant, another is too niggardly, the third in a mean ; and 
 you choose and approve and order the last without qualifica- 
 tion. But if I had an extremely rich wife, and she bade me 
 bury her, and I were to describe Jier burial in poetry, I should 
 praise the extravagant sort ; and a poor miserly man, who had 
 not much to spend, would approve of the niggardly; and the 
 man of moderate means, who was himself moderate, would 
 praise a moderate funeral. Now you in the capacity of legis* 
 
190 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 lator must not barely say " a moderate funeral," but you must 
 define what moderation is, and how much ; unless you are defi- 
 nite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language 
 that can become law. Laws, iv. 247. 
 Funeral orations. See Battle, death in. 
 Future state and world. 
 
 Such is the nature of the other world ; and when the 
 
 dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally 
 conveys them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon 
 them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those 
 who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river 
 Acheron, and using such means of conveyance as they have, 
 are carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are 
 purified of their evil deeds, and suffer the penalty of the 
 wrongs which they have done to others, and are absolved, and 
 receive the rewards of their good deeds according to their de- 
 serts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the 
 greatness of their crimes who have committed many and 
 terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the 
 like such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable 
 destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have com- 
 mitted crimes, which, although great, are not irremediable 
 who in a moment of anger, for example, have done violence to 
 a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of 
 their lives, or who have taken the life of another under the 
 like extenuating circumstances these are plunged into Tar- 
 tarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a 
 year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth 
 mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides 
 by Pyriphlegethon and they are borne to the Acherusian 
 lake, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the vic- 
 tims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, 
 and to be kind to them, and to let them come out into the lake. 
 And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their 
 troubles ; but if not, they are carried back again into Tartarus 
 and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain 
 mercy from those whom they have wronged ; for that is the 
 sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those too who 
 have been preeminent for holiness of life, are released from 
 this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, 
 and dwell in the purer earth ; and those who have duly puri- 
 fied themselves with philosophy, live henceforth altogether 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 191 
 
 without the body, in mansions fairer far than these, which may 
 not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell. 
 
 Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not 
 we to do in order to obtain virtue and wisdom in this life ? 
 Fair is the prize, and the hope great. 
 
 A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be too confident, 
 that the description which I have given of the soul and her 
 mansions is exactly true. But I do say that, inasmuch as the 
 soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not im- 
 properly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. 
 The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself 
 with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out 
 the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about 
 his soul, who has cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the 
 body as alien to him, and hurtful rather in their effects, and 
 has followed after the pleasures of knowledge in this life ; who 
 has arrayed the soul in her own proper jewels, which are 
 temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth 
 thus adorned, she is ready to go on her journey to the world 
 below, when her hour comes. Phaedo, i. 443. 
 
 Gain, the lover of. 
 
 Has the lover of gain greater experience of the pleasure 
 
 of knowledge which is imparted by the truth than the philoso- 
 pher has of the pleasure of gain ? 
 
 TJie philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage ; for 
 he has always known the taste of the other pleasures from his 
 youth upwards : but the lover of gain in all his experience has 
 not of necessity tasted or, I should rather say, even if he de- 
 sired could hardly have tasted by any process of learning truth 
 the sweetness of intellectual pleasures. 
 
 Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the 
 lover of gain, for he has a double experience ? 
 
 Very great indeed. The Republic, ii. 412. 
 Generation and conception, divine nature of. See Conception. 
 Generation of opposites. 
 
 Are not all things which have opposites generated out of 
 their opposites ? I mean such things as good and evil, just 
 and unjust and there are innumerable other opposites which 
 are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in 
 all opposites there is a similar alternative ; I mean to say, for 
 example, that anything which becomes greater must become 
 greater after being less. 
 
192 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 True. 
 
 And that which becomes less must have been once greater 
 and then have become less. 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the 
 swifter from the slower. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from 
 the more unjust ? 
 
 Of course. 
 
 And is this true of all opposites ? and are we convinced that 
 all of them are generated out of opposites ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not 
 also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from 
 one to the other, and back again ; where there is a greater and 
 a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and dimi- 
 nution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which 
 decays to wane? 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 And there are many other processes, such as division and 
 composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a pas- 
 sage into and out of one another. And this holds of all oppo- 
 sites, even though not always expressed in words they are 
 generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process 
 from one to the other of them ? 
 
 Very true, he replied. 
 
 Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the 
 opposite of waking ? 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 And what is that ? 
 
 Death, he answered. 
 
 And these then are generated, if they are opposites, the one 
 from the other, and have there their two intermediate processes 
 also? 
 
 Of course. 
 
 Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of 
 opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its interme- 
 diate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. The 
 state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleep- 
 ing waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping ; and the 
 process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in 
 the other waking up. Are you agreed about that ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 193 
 
 Quite agreed. 
 
 Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the 
 same manner. Is not death opposed to life ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And they are generated one from the other ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 What is generated from the living ? 
 
 The dead. 
 
 And what from the dead ? 
 
 I can only say in answer the living. 
 
 Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are gen- 
 erated from the dead ? 
 
 That is clear, he replied. 
 
 Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below ? 
 
 That is true. 
 
 And one of the two processes or generations is visible for 
 surely the act of dying is visible ? 
 
 Surely, he said. Phaedo, i. 397. 
 Generation, spontaneous. See Life, spontaneous. 
 Generation of all things. 
 Soc. Here are two new principles. 
 
 Pro. What are they ? 
 
 Soc. One is the generation of all things, and another is 
 essence. 
 
 Pro. I readily accept both generation and essence at your 
 hands. 
 
 Soc. Very right ; and would you say that generation is for 
 the sake of essence, or essence for the sake of generation ? 
 
 Pro. You want to know whether that which is called essence 
 is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation ? 
 
 Soc. Yes. 
 
 Pro. By the Gods, I wish that you would repeat your ques- 
 tion. 
 
 Soc. I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would 
 tell me that ship-building is for the sake of ships, or are ships 
 for the sake of ship-building ? and in all similar cases I should 
 ask the same question. 
 
 Pro. Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates ? 
 
 Soc. I have no objection, but you must take your part. 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, 
 material, are always used with a view to generation, and that 
 18 
 
194 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 each generation is relative to, or for the sake of, some being or 
 essence, and the whole of generation relative to the whole of 
 essence. 
 
 Pro. Assuredly. 
 
 Soc. Then pleasure, being a generation, will surely be for the 
 sake of some essence ? 
 
 Pro. True. 
 
 Soc. And that for the sake of which something is done must 
 be placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the 
 sake of another thing, in some other class, my good friend. 
 
 Pro. Most certainly. 
 
 Soc. Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed 
 in some other class than that of good ? 
 
 Pro. Quite right. 
 
 Soc. Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to 
 him who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, 
 and had no true being ; for he is clearly one who laughs at the 
 notion of pleasure being a good. 
 
 Pro. Assuredly. 
 
 Soc. And he would surely laugh also at those who make 
 generation their highest end. 
 
 Pro. Of whom are you speaking and what do you mean ? 
 
 Soc. I am speaking of those who when they cure hunger or 
 thirst or any other defect, by some process of generation, are as 
 much delighted as if the generation were itself pleasure ; and 
 they say that they would not wish to live without these and the 
 like feelings. 
 
 Pro. That is certainly what they appear to think. 
 
 Soc. And is not destruction universally admitted to be the 
 opposite of generation ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation 
 and destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as 
 we were saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the 
 purest possible thought. Philebus, iii. 194. 
 Genius, a youthful. 
 Socrates, I have become acquainted with one very re- 
 markable Athenian youth whom I commend to you as well 
 worthy of your attention. If he had been a beauty I should 
 have been afraid to praise him, lest you should suppose that I 
 was in love with him ; but he is no beauty, and you must not 
 be offended if I say that he is very like you ; for he has a 
 
j. 
 
 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 195 
 
 snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less 
 marked in him than in you. Seeing, then, that he has no per- 
 sonal attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, 
 which is very large, I never knew any one who was his equal 
 in natural gifts : for he has a quickness of apprehension which 
 is almost unrivaled, and he is exceedingly gentle, and also the 
 most courageous of men ; there is a union of qualities in him 
 such as I have never seen in any other, and should scarcely 
 have thought possible ; for those who, like him, have quick and 
 ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers ; 
 they are ships without ballast, which go darting about, and 
 grow mad rather than courageous ; and the steadier sort, when 
 they have to face study, are stupid and cannot remember. 
 Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in the 
 path of knowledge and inquiry ; he is full of gentleness, and 
 flows on silently like a river of oil ; at his age, it is wonderful. 
 Theaetetus, iii. 343. 
 Gentleness and greatness seemingly inconsistent. 
 
 We shall have to select natures which are suited to their 
 
 task of guarding the city ? 
 
 We shall. 
 
 And the selection will be no easy task I said ; but still we 
 must endeavor to do our best as far as we can ? 
 
 We must. 
 
 The dog is a watcher, I said, and the guardian is also a 
 watcher ; and in this point of view, is not the noble youth very 
 like a well-bred dog ? 
 
 How do you mean ? 
 
 I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and 
 swift to overtake the enemy ; and strong too, if, when they 
 have caught him, they have to fight with him. 
 
 All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required. 
 
 Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight 
 well? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether 
 horse or dog or any other animal ? Have you never observed 
 how the presence of spirit makes the soul of any creature ab- 
 solutely fearless and invincible ? 
 
 I have. 
 
 Then now we have a clear idea of the bodily qualities which 
 are required in the guardian. 
 
196 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 True. 
 
 And also of the mental ones ; his soul is to be full of spirit ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 But then, Glaucon, those spirited natures are apt to be furi- 
 ous with one another, and with everybody else. 
 
 There is a difficulty, he replied. 
 
 Whereas, I said, they ought to be gentle to their friends, 
 and dangerous to their enemies ; or, instead of their enemies 
 destroying them, they will destroy themselves. 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 What is to be done then, I said ; how shall we find a gentle 
 nature which has also a great spirit, for they seem to be incon- 
 sistent with one another ? 
 
 True. 
 
 And yet he will not be a good guardian who is wanting in 
 either of these two qualities ; and, as the combination of them 
 appears to be impossible, this is equivalent to saying that to be 
 a good guardian is also impossible. The Republic, ii. 197. 
 Gentleness of warriors and rulers. 
 
 Soc. We spoke of those who were intended to be our 
 
 warriors, and said that they were to be guardians of the city 
 against the attacks of enemies internal as well as external, and 
 to have no other employment ; they were to be merciful in 
 judging their subjects, of whom they were by nature friends, 
 but when they came in the way of their enemies in battle they 
 were to be fierce with them. 
 
 Tim. Exactly. 
 
 Soc. We said, if I am not mistaken, that the guardians 
 should be doubly gifted with a passionate and also with a phi- 
 losophical temper, and that then they would be as they ought 
 to be, gentle to their friends and fierce to their enemies. 
 Timaeus, ii. 514. 
 Geometry, its study and uses. 
 
 Shall we inquire whether the kindred science also concerns 
 
 us? 
 
 You mean geometry ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Certainly, he said ; that part of geometry which relates to 
 war is clearly our concern ; for in pitching a camp, or taking 
 up a position, or closing or extending the lines of an army, or 
 any other military manoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a 
 march, there will be a great difference in a general, according 
 as he is or is not a geometrician. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 197 
 
 Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geom- 
 etry or calculation will be enough ; the question is rather of 
 the higher and greater part of geometry, whether that tends 
 towards the great end I mean towards the vision of the idea 
 of good ; and thither} as I was saying, all things tend which 
 compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place, where is 
 the full perfection of being, of which she ought, by all means, 
 to attain the vision. 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us ; 
 if becoming only, it does not concern us ? 
 
 Yes, that is what we assert. 
 
 Nevertheless, such a conception of the science is in flat con- 
 tradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians, as will 
 hardly be denied by those who have any acquaintance with their 
 study : for they speak of squaring and applying and adding, 
 having in view use only, and absurdly confuse the necessities 
 of geometry with those of daily life ; whereas knowledge is the 
 real object of the whole science. 
 
 Certainly, he said. 
 
 Then must not a further admission be made ? 
 
 What admission ? 
 
 The admission that this knowledge at which geometry aims 
 is of the eternal, and not of the perishing and transient. 
 
 That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true. 
 
 Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards 
 truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that 
 which is now unhappily allowed to fall down. 
 
 Nothing will be more effectual. 
 
 Then nothing should be more effectually enacted, than that 
 the inhabitants of your fair city should learn geometry. The 
 Republic, ii. 354. 
 
 Giants and Gods. See Essence, ivar db&ut. 
 Gifted minds, ill-educated, become the worst. 
 
 There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, 
 
 when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the in- 
 ferior, because the contrast is greater. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted 
 minds, when they are ill-educated, become the worst ? Do not 
 great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a full- 
 ness of nature ruined by education rather than from any iufe- 
 
198 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 riority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very 
 great good or very great evil ? 
 
 There I think that you are right. 
 
 And our philosopher follows the same analogy he is like a 
 plant which, having proper nurture, grows and matures into all 
 virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the 
 most noxious of all weeds, unless saved by some divine help. 
 - The Republic, ii. 318. 
 Gifts of the pure and impure. See Impure. 
 Gifts, natural. See Talents, etc. 
 Globe, the world, a. See Earth, rotundity of the. 
 Gluttony and sensuality. 
 
 Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are 
 
 always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up 
 again as far as the mean; and in this region they move at ran- 
 dom throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper 
 world ; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their 
 way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they 
 taste of true and abiding pleasure. Like cattle with their 
 eyes looking down and their heads stooping, not indeed to the 
 earth, but to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, 
 and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and 
 butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of 
 iron ; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable 
 lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not substan- 
 tial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsub- 
 stantial and incontinent. 
 
 Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the 
 many like an oracle. 
 
 Their pleasures are mixed with pains. How can they be 
 otherwise ? For they are mere images and pictures of the 
 true, and are colored only by contrast, which exaggerates both 
 light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools in- 
 sane desires of themselves ; and they are fought about as 
 Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of 
 Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth. The Republic, ii. 417. 
 God, not the author of evil. See Evil, concealment of. 
 
 Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, 
 
 as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, 
 and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the 
 goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good 
 only is to be attributed to God alone ; of the evils the cause 
 is to be sought elsewhere and not in him. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHT*. 199 
 
 That appears to me to be most true, he said. 
 Then we must not listen to Homer or any other poet who 
 is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks 
 
 " Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots; " 
 and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two, 
 " Sometimes meets with evil fortune at other times with good," 
 but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill, 
 
 "Him wild hunger drives. over the divine earth." 
 And again 
 
 " Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us." 
 
 And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties 
 of which Pandarus was the real author, was brought about by 
 Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and conflict of the Gods 
 was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our ap- 
 proval ; neither will we allow our young men to hear the 
 words of Aeschylus, that 
 
 " God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house." 
 
 And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe, which is the sub- 
 ject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur, or of 
 the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan War, or any similar 
 theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the 
 works of God, or, if they are of God, he must devise some such 
 explanation of them as we are seeking : he must say that God 
 did what was just and right, and they were the better for being 
 punished ; but that those who are punished are miserable, and 
 God is the author of their misery, the poet is not to be per- 
 mitted to say, though he may say that the wicked are misera- 
 ble because they require to be punished, and are benefited by 
 receiving punishment from God ; but that God being good is 
 the author of evil to any one, that is to be strenuously denied, 
 and not allowed to be sung or said in any well-ordered com- 
 monwealth by old or young. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, 
 impious. The Republic, ii. 202. 
 God unchangeable. 
 
 What do you think of another principle ? Shall I ask 
 
 you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear in- 
 sidiously now in one shape, and now in another sometimes 
 himself changing and becoming different in form, sometimes 
 deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations : or 
 is he one and the same, immutably fixed in his own proper 
 image ? 
 
200 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 I cannot answer you without more thought. 
 
 Well, I said ; but if we suppose a change in anything that 
 change must be effected either by the thing itself, or by some 
 other thing ? 
 
 That is most certain. 
 
 And things which are at their best are also least liable to be 
 altered or discomposed ; for example, when healthiest and 
 strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by 
 meats and drinks and labors, and the plant which is in the 
 fullest vigor also suffers least from heat or wind, or other simi- 
 lar accidents. 
 
 Of course. 
 
 And this is true of the soul as well as of the body ; the 
 bravest and wisest soul will be least confused or deranged by 
 any external influence. 
 
 True. 
 
 And further, as I should suppose, the same principle applies 
 to all works of art vessels, houses, garments ; and that when 
 well made and in good condition, they are least altered by time 
 and circumstances. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nat- 
 ure, or both, is liable to receive the least change at the hands 
 of others ? 
 
 True. 
 
 But surely God and the things of God are absolutely per- 
 fect ? 
 
 Of course they are. 
 
 He is therefore least likely to take many forms. 
 
 He is. 
 
 But suppose again that he changes and transforms himself ? 
 
 Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at 
 all. 
 
 And will he then change himself for the better, or for the 
 worse ? 
 
 If he change at all he must change for the worse, for we 
 cannot suppose that he is deficient in virtue or beauty. 
 
 Very true, Adeimantus ; but then, would any one, whether 
 God or man, desire to change for the worse ? 
 
 Impossible. 
 
 Then God too cannot be willing to change ; being, as is sup- 
 posed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God re- 
 mains absolutely and forever in his own form. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 201 
 
 That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment. The 
 Republic, ii. 203. 
 
 God incapable of falsehood. See Deception. 
 God, absolute kncfwledge in. See Absolute knowledge, etc. 
 Y Gods, impassiveness of the. 
 
 Soc. Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the disso- 
 lution, and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us 
 now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are 
 neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind 
 what you are going to say : I ask whether any animal who 
 is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or 
 pain, great or small ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly not. 
 
 Soc. Then here we have a third state, over and above that 
 of pleasure and of pain ? 
 
 Pro. Very true. 
 
 Soc. And do not forget that there is such a state of which 
 the recognition will very considerably affect our judgment of 
 pleasure, and I should like to say a word or two about it. 
 
 Pro. What have you to say ? 
 
 Soc. Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wis- 
 dom, there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral 
 state. 
 
 Pro. You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sor- 
 rowing ? 
 
 Soc. Yes ; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were 
 compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was 
 thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought 
 and wisdom. 
 
 Pro. Yes certainly, that was said. 
 
 Soc. Then he may live without pleasure ; and who knows 
 whether this may not be the most divine of all lives ? 
 
 Pro. At any rate, the Gods cannot be supposed to have 
 either joy or sorrow. 
 
 Soc. Certainly not. There would be great impropriety in 
 their having either. Philebus, iii. 169. 
 Gods, war of Giants and. See Essence, war about. 
 Gods, existence of the. 
 
 Aih. They will make some provoking speech of this sort : 
 O inhabitants of Athens, and Sparta, and Cnosus, they will re- 
 ply, in that, you speak truly ; for some of us deny the very ex- 
 istence of the Gods, while others, as you say, are of opinion 
 
202 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 that they do not care about us ; and others that they are turned 
 from their course by gifts. Now we have a right to claim, as 
 you yourself allowed, in the matter of the laws, that before you 
 are hard upon us and threaten us, you should argue with us and 
 convince us you should first attempt to teach and persuade us 
 that there are Gods by reasonable evidences and also that 
 they are too good to be unrighteous, or to be propitiated, or 
 turned from their course by gifts. For when we hear these 
 and the like things said of them by those who are esteemed to 
 be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and 
 innumerable others, the thoughts of most of us are not set upon 
 abstaining from unrighteous acts, but upon doing them and 
 making atonement for them. When lawgivers profess that 
 they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of 
 all use persuasion to us, and show us the existence of Gods, 
 if not in a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer ; 
 and who knows but that we shall hearken to them ? Laws, 
 iv. 397. 
 
 Good and evil, the presence of. See Evil and good, etc. 
 Good, all men desire the. 
 
 " When a man loves the beautiful, what does he desire ? " 
 
 I answered her, " That the beautiful may be his." " Still," she 
 said, " the answer suggests a further question : " What is given 
 by the possession of beauty ? " " To what you have asked," I 
 replied, " I have no answer ready." " Then," she said, " let 
 me put the word * good ' in the place of the beautiful, and re- 
 peat the question once more : He who loves the good loves, 
 what does he love?" "The possession of the good," I said. 
 " And what does he gain who possesses the good ? " " Happi- 
 ness," I replied ; " there is no difficulty in answering that." 
 " Yes," she said, " the happy are made happy by the acquisition 
 of good things. Nor is there any need to ask why a man de- 
 sires happiness ; the answer is already final." " You are right" 
 I said. " And is this wish and this desire common to all ? and 
 do all men always desire their own good, or only some men ? 
 what say you ? " " All men," I replied ; " the desire is com- 
 mon to all." The Symposium, i. 497. 
 Good, sufficiency of the. See Sufficiency, etc. 
 Good, the idea of, the highest knowledge. 
 
 . What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than these 
 
 . higher than justice and the other virtues ? 
 
 Yes, I said, there is. And of these too we must behold not 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 203 
 
 the outline merely, as at present nothing short of the most 
 finished work should satisfy us. When little things are elabo- 
 rated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear 
 in full clearness and precision, how ridiculous that the highest 
 truths should not be held worthy of the greatest exactness ! 
 
 A right noble thought ; but do you suppose that we shall re- 
 frain from asking you which are the highest ? 
 
 Nay, I said, ask if you will ; but I am certain that you have 
 often heard the answer, and now you either do not understand 
 or you mean to be troublesome ; I incline to think the latter, 
 for you have been often told that the idea of good is the high- 
 est knowledge, and that all other things become useful and ad- 
 vantageous only by their use of this. You must have already 
 guessed that of this I am about to speak, concerning which, as 
 you have often heard me say, we know so little ; and, without 
 which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will 
 profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of the 
 whole world is of any value without the good ? or of all knowl- 
 edge, without the beautiful and good ? 
 
 Assuredly not. 
 
 You are doubtless aware that most people call pleasure good, 
 and the finer sort of wits say knowledge ? And are you aware 
 that the latter cannot explain the nature of knowledge, but are 
 obliged after all to say that knowledge is of the good ? 
 
 How ridiculous. 
 
 Yes. I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with 
 our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of 
 it for good, they say, is the knowledge of the good, which 
 implies that we understand. them when they use the term "good," 
 is certainly ridiculous. The Republic, ii. 332. 
 Good, beautiful and true, the. See Beautiful. 
 Good counsel. 
 
 - The law would say that to be patient under suffering is 
 best, arid that we should not give way to impatience, as there 
 is no knowing whether such things are good or evil ; and noth- 
 ing is gained by impatience ; also, because no human thing is 
 of serious importance ; and grief stands in the way of that 
 which at the moment is most required. 
 
 What is most required ? he asked. 
 
 That we should take counsel about the past, and when the 
 dice has been thrown, order our affairs accordingly by the advice 
 of reason ; not like children who have had a fall, keeping hold 
 
204 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 of the part struck and wasting time in setting 4ip a howl, but 
 accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up 
 that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by 
 a real cure. 
 
 Yes, he said, that is the best way of meeting the attacks of 
 fortune. The Republic, ii. 435. 
 Good, the greatest. See Evil^ the greatest, etc. 
 
 Soc. I am still in the dark ; for which are the greatest and 
 
 best of human things ? I dare say that you have heard men 
 singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers 
 enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, 
 as the writer" of the song says, wealth honestly obtained. 
 
 Gor. Yes, I know the song ; but what is your drift ? 
 
 Soc. I mean to say, that the producers of those things which 
 the author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, 
 the trainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and 
 first the physician will say, "O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving 
 you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men, 
 and not his." And when I ask, Who are you ? he will reply, 
 " I am a physician." What do you mean ? I shall say. Do 
 you mean that your art produces the greatest good ? " Cer- 
 tainly," he will answer, " for is not health the greatest good ? 
 What greater good can men have, Socrates ? " And after him 
 the trainer will come and say, " I, too, Socrates, shall be greatly 
 surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can 
 show of mine." To him I shall say, Who are you, my friend, 
 and what is your business ? "I am a trainer," he will reply, 
 " and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in 
 body." When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the 
 money-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all. 
 " Consider, Socrates," he will say, " whether Gorgias or any 
 one else can produce any greater good than wealth." We-11, 
 you and I say to him, And are you a creator of wealth ? 
 '* Yes," he replies. And who are you ? "A money-maker." 
 And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man ? 
 " Yes," he will reply, " of course." And we shall rejoin : 
 Yes ; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a 
 greater good than yours ; and then he will be sure to go on 
 and ask, "What good? Let Gorgias answer." Now I want 
 you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by 
 them and by me : What is that which, as you say, is the great- 
 est good of man, and of which you are the creator ? Answer 
 us. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 205 
 
 Gor. That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being 
 that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to 
 rulers the power of ruling over others in their several States. 
 Gorgias, iii. 36. 
 
 Good and evil; when they are such. Seen7, and good; when, etc. 
 Good or evil, power for. 
 
 Of those fearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken 
 from the class of tyrants, arid kings, and potentates, and public 
 men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most impi- 
 ous crimes, because they have the power. And Homer wit- 
 nesses, to the truth of this ; for they are always kings and 
 potentates, whom he has described as suffering everlasting pun- 
 ishment in the world below ; such were Tantalus and Sisy- 
 phus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or 
 any private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting 
 punishment or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, 
 as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was 
 happier than those who had the power. Yes, Callicles, the 
 very bad men come from the class of those who have power. 
 And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and 
 worthy of all admiration they are, for where there is great 
 power to do wrong, to live and die justly is a hard thing, and 
 greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain this. Such 
 good and true men, however, there have been, and will be 
 again, at Athens, and in other States, who have fulfilled their 
 trust righteously. Gorgias, iii. 117. 
 Good, highest in the State. See Evil, the greatest, etc. 
 Good, in the divine mind. 
 
 Soc. And now have I not sufficiently shown that Phile- 
 bus' goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good? 
 
 Phi. Neither is your " mind " the good, Socrates, for that 
 will be open to the same objections. 
 
 Soc. Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying of so my 
 " mind," but of the true, which is also the divine mind far 
 otherwise. However, I will not at present claim the first place 
 for mind as against the mixed life, but we must come to some 
 understanding about the second place. For you might affirm 
 pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life, and 
 that case, although neither of them would be good, one of them 
 , might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might 
 proceed further to argue in opposition to Philebus that the 
 element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more 
 
206 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this 
 is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first 
 or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, 
 attain even to the third. Philebus, iii. 157. 
 Good and pleasant, a unity in nature. 
 
 Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living 
 
 beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover, that it is 
 the chief good of all, and that the two names " good " and 
 " pleasant," are correctly given to one thing and one nature ; 
 Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying this, and further 
 says, that in nature as in name, they are two, and that wis- 
 dom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Philebus, iii. 
 200. 
 Good, truth the beginning of every. 
 
 Truth is the beginning of every good thing, both in 
 
 heaven and on earth ; and he who would be blessed and happy, 
 should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may 
 live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted ; 
 but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, ancl 
 he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condi- 
 tion is to be desired, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has 
 no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays 
 up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on 
 the wane ; so that, whether his children or friends are alive 
 or not, he is equally solitary. Laws, iv. 255. 
 Good men, simplicity of. 
 
 I should like to put a question to you. Ought there not 
 
 to be good physicians in a State, and are not the best those 
 who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and 
 bad, just as good judges are those who are acquainted with all 
 sorts of moral natures ? 
 
 Yes, I said, I quite agree about the necessity of having good 
 judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think 
 good ? 
 
 Will you inform me ? 
 
 Yes, if I can. Let me however note that in the same ques- 
 tion you join two things which are not the same. 
 
 How so ? he asked. 
 
 Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now skillful 
 physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have com- 
 bined with the knowledge of their art, the greatest experience 
 of disease ; they had better not be robust in health, and should 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 207 
 
 have had all manner of diseases in their own persons. For 
 the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they 
 cure the body ; in that case we would not allow them ever to 
 be sickly ; but they cure the body with the mind, and the 
 mind which is or has become sick can cure nothing. 
 
 That is Very true, he said. 
 
 But with the judge the case is different ; he governs mind 
 by mind, and he ought not therefore to have been reared 
 among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from 
 youth upwards, in order that, having gone through the whole 
 calendar of crime, he may infer the crimes of others like their 
 diseases from the knowledge of himself ; but the honorable 
 mind which is to form a healthy judgment ought rather to 
 have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when 
 young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often 
 appear to be simple, and are easily practiced upon by the evil, 
 because they have no examples of what evil is in their own 
 souls. The Republic, ii. 233. 
 Goods of life. 
 
 goods are of two kinds : there are human and there 
 
 are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine ; and 
 the State which attains the greater, at the same time acquires 
 the less, or not having the greater loses both. Of the lesser 
 goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, 
 including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, 
 and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god [Pluto], but one 
 who is keen of sight, because he has wisdom for a companion. 
 For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, 
 and next follows temperance ; and from the union of these two 
 with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue 
 is courage. The four naturally take precedence of the other 
 goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place 
 them ; and after these he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances 
 on the citizens with a view to these, the human looking to 
 the divine, and the divine looking to their leader mind ..... 
 For the goods of which the many speak are not really good : 
 first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth 
 third, and then innumerable others, as for example to have a 
 keen eye, or a quick ear and in general to have all the senses 
 perfect ; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like ; and the 
 final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these 
 things, and as soon as you are possessed of them to be immor- 
 
208 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 tal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all these 
 things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all, 
 including even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth to have 
 sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all, 
 without justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all 
 the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life 
 be immortal ; but not so great, if the bad man lives a very 
 short time. These are the truths of which you must persuade 
 or if they will not be persuaded, must compel your poets, to 
 sing with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, 
 and in these they must train up your youth. Am I not right? 
 For I plainly declare that evils, as they are termed, are goods to 
 the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods are truly 
 good to the good, but evil to the evil. Laws, iv. 162, 190. 
 Government, forms of, unessential. See Forms. 
 Government, four kinds of. See Forms. 
 Government, property in. 
 What manner of government do you term oligarchy ? 
 
 A government resting on a valuation of property, in which 
 the rich have power and the poor are deprived of power. 
 
 I understand, he replied. 
 
 Ought I not to describe, first of all, how the change from 
 timocracy to oligarchy arises ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the 
 one passes into the other. 
 
 How? 
 
 The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individ- 
 uals is the ruin of timocracy : they invent illegal modes of ex- 
 penditure, but what do they or their wives care about the law ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And then one seeing another prepares to rival him, and thus 
 the whole body of the citizens acquires a similar character. 
 
 Likely enough. 
 
 After that they get on in trade, and the more they think of 
 making a fortune the less they think of virtue ; for when 
 riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the bal- 
 ance, the one always rises as the other falls. 
 
 True. 
 
 And in proportion as riches and rich men are honored in the 
 State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonored. The Republic, 
 ii. 377. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 209 
 
 Government, the beginning of. See Legislation, beginning of. 
 Government, science of. 
 
 Str. The several forms of government cannot be denned 
 
 by the words few or many, voluntary or compulsory, poverty 
 or riches ; but some notion of science must enter in, if we are 
 to be consistent with what has preceded. 
 
 T. Soc. And we must be consistent. 
 
 Str. Well, then, in which of these various forms of States 
 may the science of government, which is among the greatest 
 and most difficult of all sciences, be supposed to reside ? That 
 we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false poli- 
 ticians who win popularity and pretend to be politicians and 
 are not, and separate them from the wise king. 
 
 T. Soc. That, as the argument has already intimated, is our 
 duty. 
 
 Str. Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain 
 political science ? 
 
 Y. Soc. Impossible. 
 
 Str. But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would 
 be a hundred, or say fifty, who could ? 
 
 T. Soe. In that case political science would certainly be the 
 easiest of all sciences ; there could not be found in a city of 
 that number as many really good draught-players, if judged by 
 the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly 
 not be as many kings. For kings we may truly call those 
 who possess royal science, whether they rule or not, as was 
 shown in the previous argument. Statesman, iii. 578. 
 Government of the few, only true. See Few. 
 Government, with or without laws. 
 
 Str. That can be the only true form of government in 
 
 which the governors are found to possess true science, and are 
 not mere pretenders, whether they rule according to law, or 
 without law, over willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or 
 poor themselves, none of these things can properly be in- 
 cluded in the notion of the ruler. 
 
 T. Soc. True. 
 
 Str. And whether with a view to the public good they purge 
 the State by killing some, or exiling some; whether they lower 
 or increase the body corporate, by sending out or receiving 
 into the hive swarms of citizens, while they act according to 
 the rules of wisdom and justice, whether with or without laws, 
 if they use their power with a view to the general security 
 U 
 
210 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 and improvement, then the city over which they rule, and 
 which has these characteristics, may be described as the only 
 true State. All other governments are not genuine or real, 
 but only imitations of this, and some of them are better and 
 some of them are worse ; the better are said to be well gov- 
 erned, but they are mere imitations like the others. 
 
 T. Soc. I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you 
 say ; but as to their ruling without laws the expression has 
 a harsh sound. 
 
 Str. I was just going to ask, Socrates, whether you objected 
 to any of my statements ; and now I see that this notion of 
 there being good government without laws will require some 
 further consideration. 
 
 T. Soc. Certainly. 
 
 Str. There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner 
 the business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that 
 the law should rule, but that a man should rule, supposing him 
 to have wisdom and royal power. Do you see why this is ? 
 
 Y. Soc. Why? 
 
 Str. Because the law in aiming at what is noblest or most 
 just cannot at once comprise what is best for all. The differ- 
 ences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements 
 of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple 
 rule. No art can lay down a rule which will last for all time. 
 
 T. Soc. Of course not. 
 
 Str. But this the law is always striving to make one ; like 
 an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything 
 to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be 
 asked not even in sudden changes of circumstances, when 
 something happens to be better than what he commanded for 
 some one. 
 
 Y. Soc. True ; such is the manner in which the law treats 
 us. 
 
 Str. A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a 
 state of things which is the reverse of simple. 
 
 T. Soc. True. 
 
 Str. Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are 
 we compelled to make laws at all ? Statesman, iii. 579. 
 Government of Sparta, doubtful 
 
 Meg. Stranger, I perceive that I cannot say, without more 
 
 thought, what I should call the government of Lacedaemon, 
 for it seems to me to be like a tyranny ; the power of our 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 211 
 
 Ephors is murvelously tyrannical ; and sometimes it appears to 
 me to be of all cities the most democratical ; and who can rea- 
 sonably deny that it is an aristocracy ? We have also a mon- 
 archy which is held for life, and is said by all mankind, and 
 not by ourselves only, to be the most ancient of all mon- 
 archies ; and, therefore, when asked on a sudden, I cannot pre- 
 cisely say which form of government the Spartan is. 
 
 Cle. I am in the same difficulty, Megillus, for I do not feel 
 confident that the polity of Cnosus is any of these. 
 
 Aih. The reason is, my excellent friends, that you really 
 have polities, but the cities of which we were speaking are 
 mere aggregations of citizens who are the subjects and servants 
 of parts of their own State ; they are named after their several 
 ruling powers, and are not polities at all. But if States are to 
 be named after their rulers, the true State ought to be called 
 by the name of the God who rules over wise men. Laws, iv. 
 240. 
 Government, necessity for. 
 
 Mankind must have laws, and conform to them, or their 
 
 life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And 
 the reason of this is, that no man's nature is able to know 
 what is best for the social state of man ; or knowing, always 
 able to do what is best. In the first place, there is a difficulty 
 in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not 
 with private but with public good; for public good binds to- 
 gether States, but private only distracts them, nor do men 
 always see that the gain is greater both to the individual and 
 the State, when the State and not the individual is first consid- 
 ered. In the second place, even if a person know as a matter 
 of science that this is the truth, but is possessed of absolute 
 and irresponsible power, he will never be able to abide in this 
 principle or to persist in regarding the public good as primary 
 in the State, and the private good as secondary. Human nat- 
 ure will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, 
 avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and 
 will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better ; 
 and so, working darkness in his soul, will at last fill with evils 
 both him and the whole city. For if a man were born so di- 
 vinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he 
 would have no need of laws to rule over him ; for there is no 
 law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without 
 impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather 
 the lord of all. Laws, iv. 388. 
 
212 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Governors. See Kings, Rulers, Legislators. 
 
 Greatness and gentleness seemingly inconsistent. See Gentleness, 
 
 etc. 
 Greatness, the idea of. 
 
 You see a number of great objects, and when you look at 
 
 them together, there seems to you to be one and the same idea 
 (or nature) in them all ; hence you conceive of a greatness 
 as one. 
 
 Very true, said Socrates. 
 
 And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to 
 embrace in one view the idea of greatness and of great things 
 which are not the idea, and to compare them, will not another 
 greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of all these ? 
 
 That is true. 
 
 Then another kind of greatness now comes into view over 
 and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which par- 
 take of it; and then another over and above all these, by virtue 
 of which they will all be great, and so each idea, instead of be- 
 ing one, will be infinitely subdivided. Parmenides, iii. 249. 
 Grief, manifestations of. 
 
 Shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings 
 
 of famous men ? 
 
 They will go with the others. 
 
 But shall we be right in getting rid of them ? Reflect : our 
 principle is that the good man will not consider death terrible 
 to a good man. 
 
 Yes ; that is our principle. 
 
 And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as 
 though he had suffered anything terrible ? 
 
 He will not. 
 
 Such an one, as we further maintain, is enough for himself and 
 his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men. 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the 
 deprivation of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible. 
 
 Assuredly. 
 
 And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will 
 bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort 
 which may befall him. 
 
 Yes, he will feel such a misfortune less than another. 
 
 Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of 
 famous men, and making them over to women (and not even 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 213 
 
 to women who are good for anything), or to men of a baser 
 sort, that those who are being educated by us to be the de- 
 fenders of their country may scorn to do the like. 
 
 That will be very right. 
 
 Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets 
 not to depict Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying 
 on his side, then on his back, and then on his face ; then start- 
 ing up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren 
 sea ; now taking the dusky ashes in both his hands and pouring 
 them over his head, or bewailing and sorrowing in the various 
 modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe 
 Priam, the kinsman of the Gods, as praying and beseeching 
 "Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name." 
 
 Still more earnestly will we beg of him not to introduce the 
 Gods lamenting and saying, 
 
 "Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow." 
 
 But if he must introduce the Gods, at any rate let him not dare 
 so completely to represent the greatest of the Gods as to make 
 him say 
 
 " O heavens ! with my eyes I behold a dear friend of mine driven round and 
 round the city, and my heart is sorrowful." 
 
 Or again : 
 
 " Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued at 
 the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius." 
 
 For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously believe in 
 such unworthy representations of the Gods, instead of laughing 
 at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he 
 himself, being but a man, can be dishonored by similar actions ; 
 neither will he rebuke any inclination that may arise in his 
 mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any shame 
 or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on 
 slight occasions. The Republic, ii. 209. 
 Gyges, story of. 
 
 Now that justice is only the inability to do injustice will 
 
 best appear if we imagine something of this kind ; suppose we 
 give both the just and the unjust entire liberty to do what they 
 will, and let us attend and see whither desire will lead them ; 
 then we shall detect the just man in the very act ; the just and 
 unjust will be found going the same way, following their in- 
 terest, which all natures follow as a good, and are only diverted 
 into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty 
 
214 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 which we are supposing may be most conveniently given to 
 them in the form of such a power as is said to have been pos- 
 sessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. Accord- 
 ing to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the 
 king of Lydia, and, while he wag in the field, there was a storm 
 and earthquake, which made an opening in the earth at the 
 place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he 
 descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he be- 
 held a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping 
 and looking in saw a dead body, of stature, as appeared to him. 
 more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring ; this 
 he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the 
 shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might 
 send their monthly report concerning the flock to the king ; 
 and into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, 
 and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet 
 of the ring towards the inner side of the hand, when instantly 
 he became invisible, and the others began to speak of him as 
 if he were no longer there. He was astonished at this, and 
 again touching the ring he turned the collet outwards and re- 
 appeared ; thereupon he made trials of the ring, and always 
 with the same result ; when he turned the collet inwards he be- 
 came invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Perceiving this, 
 he immediately contrived to be chosen one of the messengers 
 sent to the court, where he no sooner arrived than he seduced 
 the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and 
 slew him and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were 
 two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and 
 the unjust the other ; no man they say is of such an iron nat- 
 ure that he would stand fast in justice. The Republic, ii. 181. 
 Gymnastics and music. 
 
 In speaking of education, the law means to speak of 
 
 those who have the care of order and instruction in gymnasia 
 and schools, and of the going to school and lodging of boys and 
 girls; and in speaking of contests, the law refers to the judges 
 of gymnastics and of music ; these again are divided into two 
 classes, the one having to do with music, the other with gym- 
 nastic. Laws, iv. 286. 
 
 After music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next 
 to be trained. 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And gymnastic as well as music should receive careful atten- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 215 
 
 tion in childhood, and continue through life. Now my belief is, 
 and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your 
 opinion, but my own belief is, not that the good body im- 
 proves the soul, but that the good soul improves the body. 
 What do you say ? 
 
 Yes, I agree. 
 
 Then if we have educated the mind, the minuter care of the 
 body may properly be committed to the mind, and we need only 
 describe the outlines of the subject for brevity's sake. 
 
 Very good. 
 
 That they must abstain from intoxication has been already 
 remarked by us, for of all persons a guardian should be the last 
 to get drunk and not know where in the world he is. 
 
 Yes, he said ; that a guardian should require another to 
 guard him is ridiculous indeed. 
 
 But next, what shall we say of their food ; for the men are 
 athletes in the great contest of all, are they not? 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 And will the usual gymnastic exercises be suited to them ? 
 
 I cannot say. 
 
 I am afraid, I said, that such exercise is but a sleepy sort of 
 thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that 
 athletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most dangerous 
 illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their 
 customary regimen ? 
 
 Yes, I do. 
 
 Then, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our 
 warrior athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see 
 and hear with the utmost keenness ; in the many changes of 
 water and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which 
 they will have to endure, they must not be liable to break down 
 in health. 
 
 That is quite my view, he said. 
 
 The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple 
 music which we were just now describing. 
 
 How so. 
 
 Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic also which is sim- 
 ple and good ; and that such ought to be the military gymnastic. 
 
 What do you mean ? 
 
 My meaning may be learned from Homer ; he, you know, 
 feeds his heroes, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare ; 
 they have no fish, although they are on the shores of the Hel- 
 
216 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 lespont, and they are allowed nothing but roast meat which 
 only requires a fire, and is therefore the most convenient diet 
 for soldiers and not boiled, as this would involve a carrying 
 about of pots and pans. 
 
 True. 
 
 And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces 
 are not even mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, how- 
 ever, he is not singular, as all professional athletes know that 
 a man who is to be in good condition should take nothing of 
 the kind. The Republic, ii. 227. 
 
 Habit, mental and bodily. See Mental^ etc. 
 Happiness gained by Wisdom. 
 
 Let us consider this further point, I said : Seeing that all 
 
 men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is 
 gained by a use, and a right use, of the things of life, and the 
 right use of them, and good fortune in the use of them, is 
 given by knowledge, the inference is that every man ought by 
 all means to try and make himself as wise as he can ? 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 And the desire to obtain this treasure, which is far more 
 precious than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend 
 or a suitor, whether citizen or stranger the eager desire and 
 prayer to them that they would impart wisdom to you, is not 
 at all dishonorable, Cleinias ; nor is any one to be blamed for 
 doing any honorable service or ministration to any man, 
 whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you 
 agree to that ? I said. 
 
 Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right. 
 
 Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does 
 not come to man spontaneously; for that is a point which 
 has still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you 
 and me. 
 
 But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said. 
 
 Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say that ; 
 and I am also grateful to you for having saved me from a long 
 and tiresome speculation as to whether wisdom can be taught 
 or not. But now, as you think that wisdom can be taught, 
 and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate, 
 will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom, 
 and you individually will try to love her ? 
 
 Certainly, Socrates, he said ; and I will do my best. 
 J&uthydemus, i. 184. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 217 
 
 Harmony. 
 
 - Might not a person say that harmony is a thing invisible, 
 incorporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre which is har- 
 monized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and ma- 
 terial, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality ? And when 
 some one breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then 
 he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same 
 analogy, that the harmony survives and has not perished ; for 
 you cannot imagine, as he would say, that the lyre without the 
 strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal, re- 
 main, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and im- 
 mortal nature and kindred, has perished and perished too 
 before the mortal. That harmony, he would say, must stiU 
 exist somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before 
 
 that decays Now there is an absurdity in saying that 
 
 harmony is discord, or is composed of elements which are 
 still in a state of discord. But perhaps what he really meant 
 to say was that harmony is composed of differing notes of 
 higher or lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now recon- 
 ciled by the art of music ; for if the higher and lower notes 
 still disagreed, there could be no harmony, as is indeed evident. 
 For harmony is a symphony, and symphony is an agreement ; 
 but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree, there 
 cannot be ; you cannot harmonize that which disagrees. This 
 may be illustrated by rhythm, which is composed of elements 
 short and long, once differing and now in accord ; which ac- 
 cordance, as in the former instance, medicine, so in this, music 
 implants, making love and unison to grow up among them ; and 
 thus music, too, is concerned with the principles of love in 
 their application to harmony and rhythm. Again, in the essen- 
 tial nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in dis- 
 cerning love which has not yet become double. But when 
 you want to use them in actual life, either in the composition 
 of music or in the correct performance of airs or metres com- 
 posed already, which latter is called education, then the diffi- 
 culty begins, and the good artist is needed. Then the old tale 
 has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love the love of 
 Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the duty of accept- 
 ing the temperate, and those who are as yet intemperate only 
 that they may become temperate, and of preserving their love ; 
 and again, of the vulgar Polyhymnia, who must be used with 
 circumspection that the pleasure may not generate licentious- 
 ness. Phaedo, i. 414, 481. 
 
218 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Harmony of soul and form. See Form. 
 Harmony of temperance. 
 
 Do you observe that we were pretty right in our antici- 
 pation that temperance was a sort of harmony ? 
 
 Why so ? 
 
 Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, 
 each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State 
 wise and the other valiant ; but that is not the way with tem- 
 perance, which extends to the whole, and runs through the 
 notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and 
 the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them 
 to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or strength or numbers or 
 wealth, or whatever else may be the measure of them. Most 
 truly then do we describe temperance as the natural agreement 
 of superior and inferior, both in States and individuals, about 
 which of the two elements shall rule. The Republic, ii. 257. 
 Harmony civilizing. 
 
 And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and 
 
 has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or 
 spirited principle to be the subject and ally ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and 
 gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining 
 the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating, 
 and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony 
 and rhythm? 
 
 Quite true, he said. The Republic, ii. 268. 
 Harmony of the inner man. 
 
 As we were saying at the beginning of our work of 
 
 construction, some divine power must have conducted us to a 
 primary form of justice that suspicion of ours has been now 
 verified ? 
 
 Yes, certainly 
 
 And justice was the reality, and was concerned not with the 
 outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and 
 concernment of man ; for the just man does not permit the 
 several elements within him to interfere with one another, or 
 any of them to do the work of others, but he sets in order 
 his own inner life, and is his own master, and at peace with 
 himself ; and when he has bound together the three principles 
 within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and 
 middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 219 
 
 when he has bound together all these, and is no longer many, 
 but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted 
 nature, then he will begin to act, if he has to act, whether in a 
 matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or some 
 affair of politics or private business; in all which cases he will 
 think and call that which preserves and cooperates with this 
 harmonious condition, just and good action ; and the knowledge 
 which presides over it, wisdom ; and that which at any time de- 
 stroys this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion 
 which presides over it, ignorance. The Republic, ii. 270. 
 Harmony of health and wealth. 
 
 On this liigher end the man of understanding will con- 
 centrate the energies of his life. And in the first place, he 
 will honor studies which impress these qualities on his soul, 
 and will disregard others ? 
 
 Clearly, he said. 
 
 In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit, and so 
 far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, 
 that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter ; 
 his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or 
 well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he 
 will be always desirous of preserving -the harmony of the 
 body for the sake of the concord of the soul ? 
 
 Certainly he will, he replied, if he has true music in him. 
 
 And there is a principle of order and harmony in the acqui- 
 sition of wealth ; this also he will observe, and will not allow 
 himself to be dazzled by the opinion of the world, and heap 
 up riches to his own infinite harm ? 
 
 I should think not, he said. 
 
 He will look at the city which is within him, and take care 
 to avoid any change of his own institutions, such as might 
 arise either from superfluity or from want ; and with a view 
 to this only gain or spend in so far as he is able ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And, for the same reason, he will accept such honors as he 
 deems likely to make him a better man ; but those which are 
 likely to disorder his constitution, whether private or public 
 honors, he will avoid. The Republic, ii. 423. 
 Harmony in the soul. 
 
 Soc. What would you say of the soul ? Will the good 
 
 soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which 
 there is harmony and order ? 
 
220 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Gal. The latter follows from our previous admissions. 
 
 Soc. What is the ^name which is given to the effect of har- 
 mony and order in the body ? 
 
 Gal. I suppose that you mean health and strength ? 
 
 Soc. Yes, I do ; and what- is the name which you would 
 give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul ? Try and 
 discover a name for this as well as for the other. 
 
 Gal. Why do you not give the name yourself, Socrates ? 
 
 Soc. Well, if you would rather, I will ; and you shall say 
 whether you agree with me, and if not you shall refute and 
 answer me. Healthy, as I conceive, is the name which is 
 given to the regular order of the body, and from this comes 
 health and every other bodily excellence : is that true or not ? 
 
 Gal True. 
 
 Soc. And " lawful " and " law " are the names which are 
 given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these 
 make men lawful and orderly : and so we have temperance 
 and justice ? have we not ? 
 
 Gal. Yes. Gorgias, iii. 95. 
 
 Harmony, counterparts and antagonisms in the soul, making. See 
 
 Antagonisms. 
 Harmony dissolved, a generation of pain. 
 
 Soc. I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, 
 
 there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain. 
 
 Pro. That is very probable. 
 
 Soc. And the restoration of harmony and return to nat- 
 ure is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in 
 the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest 
 moment. Philebus, iii. 167. 
 Harmony in choral song. See Choral. 
 Harmonies and consonances. See Consonances. 
 Harmonies of divers kinds. 
 
 We were saying, as you may remember, in speaking of the 
 
 words, that we had no need of lamentation and strains of sorrow ? 
 
 True. 
 
 And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? As 
 you are a musician, I wish that you would tell me. 
 
 The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor 
 Lydian, and the full-toned or bass Lydian, and others which 
 are like them. 
 
 These then, I said, must be banished ; even to women of 
 virtue and character they are of no use, and much less to men. 
 
 Certainly. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 221 
 
 In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence 
 are utterly at variance with the character of our guardians. 
 
 Of course. 
 
 Then I must ask you again, which are the soft or drinking 
 harmonies ? 
 
 The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian ; they are termed 
 "solute." 
 
 Well, and are these of any military use ? 
 
 Quite the reverse, he replied ; but then the Dorian and the 
 Phrygian appear to be the only ones which remain. 
 
 I answered : Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want 
 to have one warlike, which will sound the word or note which 
 a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or 
 when his cause is failing and he is going to wounds or death 
 or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis 
 meets fortune with calmness and endurance ; and another to be 
 used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when 
 there is no pressure of necessity; and he is seeking to per- 
 suade God by prayer or man by instruction and advice ; or on the 
 other hand, which expresses his willingness to listen to persua- 
 sion or entreaty and advice ; and which represents him when 
 he has accomplished his aim, not carried away by success, but 
 acting moderately and wisely, and acquiescing in the event. 
 These two harmonies I ask you to leave ; the strain of neces- 
 sity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate 
 and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and the 
 strain of temperance ; these, I say, leave. 
 
 And these, he replied, are the very ones of which I was 
 speaking. 
 
 Then, I said, if only the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies 
 are used in our songs and melodies, we shall not want multiplic- 
 ity of notes or a panharmonic scale ? 
 
 I suppose not. The Republic, ii. 222. 
 " Having " and " possessing," distinction between. 
 
 Soc. You have heard the common explanation of the 
 
 verb " to know ? " 
 
 Theaet. I do not know that I remember at the moment. 
 
 Soc. They explain the word " to know " as meaning " to 
 have knowledge." 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Soc. I should like to make a slight change, and say " to pos- 
 sess " knowledge. 
 
222 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Theaet. How do the two expressions differ ? 
 
 Soc. Perhaps there may be no difference ; but still I should 
 like you to hear and help to test my view. 
 
 Theaet. I will, if I can. 
 
 Soc. I should distinguish " having " from " possessing : " for 
 example, a man may buy and keep under his control a garment 
 which he does not wear ; and then we should say, not that he 
 has, but that he possesses the garment. 
 
 Theaet. That would be the correct expression. 
 
 Soc. Well, may not a man " possess " and yet not " have " 
 knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking ? As you 
 may suppose a man to have caught wild birds doves or any 
 other birds and to be keeping them in an aviary which he 
 has constructed at home ; and then we might say, in one sense, 
 that he always has them because he possesses them, might we 
 not? 
 
 Theaet. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And yet, in another sense, he has none of them ; but 
 he has power over them, and has them under his hand in an 
 inclosure of his own, and can take and have them whenever 
 he likes ; he can catch any which he likes, and again let them 
 go, and he may do so as often as he pleases. 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Soc. Once more, then, as in what preceded, we made a sort 
 of waxen figment in the mind, so let us now suppose that in 
 the mind of each man there is an aviary of all sorts of birds 
 some flocking together apart from the rest, others in small 
 groups, others solitary, flying anywhere and everywhere. 
 
 Theaet. Let us imagine such an aviary ; and what is to fol- 
 low ? 
 
 Soc. We may suppose this receptacle to be empty while we 
 are young, and that the birds are kinds of knowledge ; when a 
 man has gotten and detained in the inclosure any of those dif- 
 ferent kinds of knowledge, then he may be said to have learned 
 or discovered the thing of which that knowledge is : and this is 
 to know. Theaetetus, iii. 403. 
 Health, harmony of wealth and. See Harmony, etc. 
 Health of body and soul. See Body, etc. 
 Heavenly idea of the Earth. See Earth, etc. 
 Heavenly bodies, beheld as symbols of truths and means of educa- 
 tion. 
 
 Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS 223 
 
 praised astronomy before, my praise shall be more worthy of 
 your spirit. For every one, as I think, must feel that astron- 
 omy compels the soul to look upwards, and leads us from this 
 world to another. 
 
 I am an exception then, for I should rather say that those 
 who elevate astronomy into philosophy make us look downwards 
 and not upwards. 
 
 What do you mean ? he asked. 
 
 You, I replied, have in your mind a sublime conception of 
 how we know the things above. And I dare say that if a per- 
 son were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, 
 you would still think that his mind was the percipient, and not 
 his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a sim- 
 pleton : but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of 
 being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and 
 whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, 
 seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he 
 can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul 
 is looking, not upwards, but downwards, whether his way to 
 knowledge is by water or by land, and in whichever element he 
 may lie on his back and float. 
 
 I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I 
 should like to know how astronomy can be learned in any other 
 way more conducive to that knowledge of which we speak ? 
 
 I answered ; the starry heaven which we toehold is wrought 
 upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and 
 most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed in- 
 ferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute 
 slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them 
 that which is contained in them, in the true number and in 
 every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by rea- 
 son and intelligence, but not by sight. 
 
 True, he replied. 
 
 The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and 
 with a view to that higher knowledge ; their beauty is like the 
 beauty of figures or pictures wrought by the hand of Daedalus, 
 or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold ; 
 any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisite- 
 ness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of think- 
 ing that in them he could find the true equal or the true double, 
 or the truth of any other proportion. 
 
 No, he said, to think so would be ridiculous. 
 
224 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when 
 he looks at the movements of the stars ? Will he not think 
 that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator 
 in the most perfect manner ? But when he reflects that the 
 proportions of night and day, or^of both to the month, or of the 
 month to the year, or of the other stars to these and to one an- 
 other, are of the visible and material, he will never fall into the 
 error of supposing that they are eternal and liable to no devia- 
 tion that would be monstrous ; he will rather seek in every 
 possible way to discover the truth of them. 
 
 I quite agree now that you tell me so. 
 
 Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should use 
 problems and let the heavens alone if we desire to have a 
 real knowledge of the science and to train the reasoning faculty 
 by the aid of it. The Republic, ii. 356. 
 Heirships of wealth, an evil. See Inheritances. 
 Heracles and lolaus. 
 
 I am no Heracles ; and even Heracles could not fight 
 
 against the Hydra, who was a she-Sophist, and had the wit to 
 shoot up many new heads when one of them was cut off ; espe- 
 cially when he saw a second monster of a sea-crab, who was 
 also a Sophist, and appeared to have newly arrived from a sea 
 voyage, bearing down upon him from the left, opening his 
 mouth and biting. Then he called lolaus, his nephew, to his 
 help, and he ably succored him ; but if my lolaus, who is Pa- 
 trocles the statuary, were to come, he would make a bad busi- 
 ness worse. 
 
 And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said 
 Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether lolaus was the 
 nephew of Heracles any more than he is yours ? 
 
 I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, 
 for you will insist on asking that I pretty well know out 
 of envy, in order to prevent me from learning the wisdom of 
 Euthydemus. 
 
 Then answer me, he said. 
 
 Well then, I said, I can only reply, that lolaus was not my 
 nephew at all, but the nephew of Heracles ; and his father was 
 not my brother Patrocles, but Iphicles, who has a name rather 
 like his, and was the brother of Heracles. Euthydemus, i. 201. 
 Heroic sons of heroic fathers. See State, heroes. 
 Heroic men to be kissed and honored by all. See Brave, honor to the. 
 But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 225 
 
 done to him ? In the first place, he shall receive honor in the 
 army from his youthful comrades ; every one of them in suc- 
 cession shall crown him. What do you say to that ? 
 
 I approve. 
 
 And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of 
 fellowship ? 
 
 To that too, I agree. 
 
 But you will hardly agree to my next proposal. 
 
 What is your proposal ? 
 
 That he should kiss and be kissed by them. 
 
 Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further and 
 say : Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be 
 kissed by him while the expedition lasts. So that if there be 
 a lover in the army, whether his love be youth or maiden, he 
 may be more eager to win the prize of valor. 
 
 That is good, I said. That the brave man is to have more 
 wives than others has been already determined ; and he is to 
 have first choices in such matters more than others, in order 
 that he may have as many children as possible. 
 
 Agreed. The Republic, ii. 295. 
 Heterodoxy and false opinion. See False opinion. 
 Soc. If thinking is speaking to one's self, no one speak- 
 ing and thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both 
 in his soul, will say and think that the one is the other of 
 them, and I must add, that you will have to let the word 
 "other" alone [i. e. not insist that "one" and "other" are 
 both in Greek called " other," 4'repoi/]. I mean to say, that no 
 one thinks the noble to be base, or anything of the kind. 
 
 Theaet. I will give up the word " other," Socrates ; and I 
 agree in what you say. 
 
 Soc. If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot 
 think that the one of them is the other ? 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Soc. Neither, if he has one of them in his mind and not the 
 other, can he think that one is the other ? 
 
 Theaet. True ; for we should have to suppose that he appre- 
 hends that which is not in his thoughts at all. 
 
 Soc. Then no one who knows either both or only one of the 
 two objects in his mind can think that the one is the other. And 
 therefore, he who maintains that false " doxy " is heterodoxy is 
 talking nonsense ; for neither in this, any more than in the pre- 
 vious way, can false opinion exist in us The only pos- 
 
 15 
 
226 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 sibility of erroneous opinion is, when knowing you and Theo- 
 dorus, and having the seal or impression of both of you in the 
 wax block, but seeing you both imperfectly and at a distance, I 
 try to assign the right impression of memory visual to the right 
 impression, and fit this into the proper mould ; if I succeed, 
 recognition will take place ; but if I fail and transpose them, 
 putting the foot into the wrong shoe, that is to say, putting 
 the vision of either of you on to the wrong seal, or seeing you 
 as in a mirror when the sight flows from right to left then 
 "heterodoxy" and false opinion ensues. Theaetetus, iii. 395 
 398. 
 
 Highest good in the State. See Evil t etc. 
 Hippias, self-assertion of. See Self-assertion, etc. 
 Holiness, resembling Justice. 
 
 Suppose that he went on to say : Well now, is there such 
 
 a thing as holiness ? we should answer, Yes, if I am not 
 mistaken ? 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 And that you acknowledge to be a thing should we admit 
 that? 
 
 He assented. 
 
 And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the 
 holy, or of the nature of the unholy ? I should be angry at 
 his putting such a question, and should say, Peace, man ; noth- 
 ing can be holy if holiness is not holy. What do you say to 
 that ? Would you not answer in the same way ? 
 
 Certainly, he said. 
 
 And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, 
 What were you saying just now ? Perhaps I may not have 
 heard you rightly, but you seemed to me to be saying that the 
 parts of virtue were not the same as one another. I should 
 reply, You certainly heard that said, but not, as you imagine, 
 said by me ; for Protagoras gave the answer, and I only asked 
 the question. And suppose that he turned to you and said, Is 
 this true, Protagoras ? and do you maintain that one part of 
 virtue is unlike another, and is this your position ? how would 
 you answer him ? 
 
 I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, 
 Socrates. 
 
 Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this ; and now sup- 
 posing that he proceeded to say further, Then holiness is not 
 of the nature of justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 227 
 
 but of the nature of unholiness ; and holiness is of the nature 
 of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is 
 unholy ; how shall we answer him ? I should certainly an- 
 swer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holi- 
 ness is just ; and I would say in like manner on your behalf 
 also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with 
 holiness, or very nearly the same ; and above all I would as- 
 sert that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice ; and 
 I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to 
 give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree 
 with me. 
 
 He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposi- 
 tion that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there 
 appears to me to be a difference between them. But what 
 matter ? if you please I please ; and let us assume, if you will, 
 that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. 
 
 Pardon me, I said ; I do not want this " if you wish " or " if 
 you will " sort of argument to be proven, but I want you and 
 me to be proven ; I mean to say that the argument will be 
 best proven if there be no " if." 
 
 Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to 
 holiness, for there is always some point of view in which every- 
 thing is like every other thing ; white is in a certain way like 
 black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites 
 have some qualities in common ; even the parts of the face 
 which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different 
 functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of 
 them is like another of them. And you may prove that they 
 are like one another on the same principle that all things are 
 like one another ; and yet things which are alike in some par- 
 ticular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are un- 
 like in some particular, however slight, unlike. 
 
 And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice 
 and holiness have but a small degree of likeness ? 
 
 Certainly not, he said ; but I do not agree with what I un- 
 derstand to be your view. Protagoras, i. 130. 
 Holiness ; the essence of. 
 
 Soc. What do you say of piety, Euthyphro : is not piety, 
 
 according to your definition, loved by all the Gods ? 
 
 JSuth. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason ? 
 
 Euth. No, that is the reason. 
 
228 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Soc. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is 
 loved ? 
 
 Euth. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And that which is in a state to be loved of the Gods, 
 and is dear to them, is in a state. to be loved of them because 
 it is loved of them ? 
 
 Euth. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Then that which is loved of God, Euthyphro, is not 
 holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm ; 
 but they are two different things. 
 
 Euth. How do you mean, Socrates? 
 
 Soc. I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by 
 us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy be- 
 cause it is loved. 
 
 Euth. Yes. 
 
 Soc. But that which is dear to the Gods is dear to them be- 
 cause it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is 
 dear to them. 
 
 Euth. True. 
 
 Soc. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the 
 same as that which is dear to God, and that which is holy is 
 loved as being holy, then that which is dear to God would 
 have been loved as being dear to God ; but if that which is 
 dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that 
 which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. 
 But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are 
 quite different from one another. For one (tfeoc/uAcs) is of a 
 kind to be loved because it is loved, and the other (oo-tov) is 
 loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to 
 me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, 
 to offer an attribute only, and not the essence the attribute 
 of being loved by all the Gods. But you still refuse to explain 
 to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I 
 will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once 
 more what piety or holiness really is, whether dear to the Gods 
 or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel). 
 And what is impiety ? 
 
 Euth. I really do not know, Socrates, how to say what I 
 mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever 
 ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away. 
 Euthyphro, i. 294. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 229 
 
 Homer, the best of poets. See Imitative poetry. 
 
 - Soc. I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, Ion ; for 
 you have always to wear fine clothes, and to look as beautiful 
 as you can is a part of your art. Then, again, you are obliged 
 to be continually in the company of many good poets ; and 
 especially of Homer, who is the best and most divine of them ; 
 and to understand him, and not merely learn his words by rote, 
 is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be a rhapsode 
 who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the 
 rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hear- 
 ers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what 
 he means ? All this is greatly to be envied. 
 
 Ion. That is true, Socrates ; interpretation has certainly been 
 the most laborious of my art ; and I believe myself able to 
 speak about Homer better than any man 
 
 Soc. But how did you come to have this skill about 
 Homer, and not about Hesiod or the other poets ? Does not 
 Homer speak of the same themes which all other poets handle ? 
 Is not war his great argument ? and does he not speak of hu- 
 man society and of intercourse of men, good and bad, skilled 
 and unskilled, and of the Gods conversing with one another 
 and with mankind, and about what happens in heaven and in 
 the world below, and the generations of Gods and heroes ? 
 Are not these the themes of which Homer sings ? 
 
 Ion. Very true, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. And do not the other poets sing of the same ? 
 
 Ion. Yes, Socrates ; but not in the same way as Homer. 
 
 Soc. What ! in a worse way ? 
 
 Ion. Yes, in a far worse. 
 
 Soc. And Homer is better ? 
 
 Ion. He is incomparably better. Ion, i. 219. 
 Homer, not a legislator. See Legislator. 
 
 Homicide, less criminal than deception. See Deceiver as to truth. 
 Honesty professed. 
 
 That you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in 
 
 thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of 
 justice and of every other political virtue, let me give you a 
 further proof, which is this. In other cases, as you are awar6, 
 if a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skillful in any 
 other art in which he has no skill, people either laugh at him 
 or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad 
 and go and admonish him ; but when honesty is in question, or 
 
230 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 some other political virtue, even if they know that he is dis- 
 honest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the 
 truth about his dishonesty, in this case they deem that to be 
 madness which in the other case was held by them to be good 
 sense. They say that men ought to profess honesty whether 
 they are honest or not, and that* a man is mad who does not 
 make such a profession. Their notion is, that a man must have 
 some degree of honesty ; and that if he has none at all he 
 ought not to be in the world. Protagoras, i. 123. 
 Honor due to parents. See Children, etc. , and Parents. 
 Honor and justice among thieves. 
 
 We have already shown that the just are clearly wiser 
 
 and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are 
 incapable of common action ; nay more, that to speak as we 
 did of evil-doers, ever acting vigorously together, is not strictly 
 true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid 
 hands upon one another ; but there must evidently have been 
 some remnant of justice in them, or they would have injured 
 one another as well as their victims, and then they would have 
 been unable to act together ; they were but semi-villainous, 
 for had they been whole villains, wholly unjust, they would 
 have been wholly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is 
 the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But 
 whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust 
 is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I 
 think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given ; 
 but still I should like to examine further, for this is no light 
 matter, concerning nothing less than the true rule of life. 
 The Republic, ii. 175. 
 
 Honor and dishonor in love. See Love, Honor, etc. 
 Honor to the brave. See Death in battle, and Heroic. 
 Hope, fancies of. See Fancies. 
 Human life, in what consists the salvation of. 
 
 Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on 
 
 the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when 
 men ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to 
 themselves or to each other, whether near or at a distance ; 
 what would be the saving principle of our lives ? Would not 
 knowledge ? a knowledge of measuring, when the question 
 is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, 
 when the question is of odd and even ? The world will ac- 
 knowledge that, will they not ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 231 
 
 Protagoras himself thought that they would. 
 
 AYi'll, then, my friends, I say to them, seeing that the salva- 
 tion of human life has been found to consist in the right 
 choice of pleasures and pains, in the choice of the more 
 and the fewer and the greater and the less, and the nearer and 
 remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of excess 
 and defect, and equality in relation to each other ? 
 
 That is undeniably true. Protagoras, i. 156. 
 Hypotheses, used by reason. 
 
 Of this kind 1 still spoke -as intelligible, although in in- 
 quiring into it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses ; not 
 proceeding to a first principle because she is unable to ascend 
 above hypotheses, but employing the objects of which the shad- 
 ows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they hav- 
 ing in relation to the shadows a greater distinctness and there- 
 fore a higher value. * 
 
 I understand, he said, that you are speaking of geometry and 
 the sister arts. 
 
 And when I speak of the other division of the intellectual, 
 you will also understand me to speak of that knowledge, which 
 reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the 
 hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses that 
 is to say, as steps and points of departure into a region which 
 is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to 
 the first principle of the whole ; and clinging to this and then 
 to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends 
 again without the aid of any sensible object, beginning and 
 ending in ideas. 
 
 I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to 
 me to be describing a task far from easy ; but, at any rate, I un- 
 derstand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science 
 of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the 
 arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only : 
 these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by 
 the senses : yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not 
 ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to 
 you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when 
 a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the 
 higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geome- 
 try and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term un- 
 derstanding and not reason, as being intermediate between 
 opinion and reason. The Republic, ii. 339. 
 Human life, progression of. See Progression of, etc. 
 
232 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Ibycus, his love in old age. 
 
 I feel like Ibycus who, when in his old age, against his 
 
 will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old race-horse, who 
 was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the 
 course he knew so well this was his simile of himself. Par- 
 menides, iii. 254. 
 
 Ideal State, Philosophers to be kings in the. See Rulers in the 
 
 State, who should be. 
 Ideas, abstract. 
 
 Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards 
 philosophy ; tell me now, was this your own distinction between 
 ideas in themselves and the things which partake of them? 
 and do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from 
 the likeness which we possess, or of the one and many, and of 
 the other notions of which Zeno has been speaking ? 
 
 I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates. 
 
 Parmenides proceeded. And would you also make ideas of 
 the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class ? 
 
 Yes,' he said, I should. 
 
 And would you make an idea of man apart from us and 
 from all other human creatures, or of fire and water ? 
 
 I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to 
 -include them or not. 
 
 And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things 
 of which the mention may provoke a smile ? I mean such 
 things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else that is foul and 
 base ; would you suppose that each of these has an idea dis- 
 tinct from the actual objects with which we come into contact, 
 or not ? 
 
 Certainly not, said Socrates ; visible things like these are 
 such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be 
 an absurdity in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes 
 get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without 
 an idea ; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I 
 run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottom- 
 less pit of nonsense, and perish ; and so I return to the ideas 
 of which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with 
 them. 
 
 Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides ; that is because you are still 
 young ; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer 
 grasp of you, if I am not mistaken, and then you will not de- 
 spise even the meanest things : at your age, you are too much 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 233 
 
 disposed to regard the opinions of men. But I should like to 
 know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which 
 all other things partake, and from which they are therefore 
 named ; that similars for example, become similar, because they 
 partake of similarity ; and great things become great, because 
 they partake of greatness ; and that just and beautiful things 
 become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and 
 beauty ? 
 
 Yes, certainly, said Socrates, that is my meaning. Parmen- 
 ides, iii. 246. 
 
 Ideas that are cognitions. See Cognitions. 
 Idle talking. 
 I certainly do not see my way at present. 
 
 Yes, said Parmenides ; and I think that this arises, Socrates, 
 out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, 
 and the ideas generally, without sufficient previous training. I 
 noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talking here with 
 your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse 
 that carries you towards philosophy is assuredly noble and 
 divine ; but still there rs an art which often seems to be use- 
 less, and is called by the vulgar idle talking and is often imag- 
 ined to be useless ; in that you must train and exercise yourself, 
 now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp. Par- 
 menides, iii. 253. 
 Ignoble, the. 
 
 Come, now and let us reason with the unjust, who is not 
 
 intentionally in error. " Sweet Sir," we will say to him, " what 
 think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble ? Is not the 
 noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the 
 God in man ; and the ignoble that which subjects the man to 
 the beast ? " He can hardly avoid saying yes can he now ? 
 
 Not if he has any regard for my opinion. 
 
 But, if he admit this, we may ask him another question ; 
 How would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the 
 condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the 
 worst ? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or 
 daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them 
 into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, 
 however large might be the sum which he received ? And 
 will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who sells his 
 own divine being to that which is most atheistical and detest- 
 able, and has no pity ? Eriphyle took the necklace as the 
 
234 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to 
 compass a worse ruin. 
 
 Yes, said Glaucou, far worse, I will answer for him. 
 
 Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him 
 that huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large ? 
 
 Clearly. 
 
 And men are blamed for pride and sullenness, as when the 
 growth and increase of the lion and serpent are out of propor- 
 tion? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and 
 weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who 
 subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for 
 the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, ha- 
 bituates himself in the days of his youth to be trampled in the 
 mud, and from being a lion to become a monkey ? 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 And why are mean employments and handicraft arts a re- 
 proach ? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the 
 higher principle, and the individual is unable to control the 
 creatures within him, but has to court them, and his only study 
 is how to flatter them ? 
 
 Such appears to be the reason. The Republic, ii. 421. 
 Ignorance, legislative, destroying States. See States, destroyed by 
 
 ignorance. 
 
 Str. When the foundation of politics is in the letter 
 
 only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can 
 we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always 
 will be, in States ? Any other art, built on such a foundation, 
 would be utterly undermined, there can be no doubt of that. 
 Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political 
 bond ? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, 
 and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, 
 though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perish- 
 ing and have perished, and will hereafter perish, through the in- 
 capacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of 
 ignorance of the highest truths I mean to say, that they are 
 wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sci- 
 ences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect 
 knowledge. Statesman, iii. 588. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Ignorance the cause of crimes. 
 
 A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of 
 
 crimes. Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by 
 the legislator into two sorts : There is simple ignorance, which 
 is the source of lighter offenses, and double ignorance which 
 is accompanied by 'conceit of wisdom ; and he who is under 
 the influence of the latter, fancies that he knows all about 
 matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of ig- 
 norance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held 
 by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes, 
 but when attended with weakness will only result in the errors 
 of children and old men ; and these he will treat as errors, 
 and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them, 
 which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws. 
 Laws, iv. 376. 
 Images, sensible, some truths have not. 
 
 But people seem to forget that some things have sensible 
 
 images, which may be easily shown, when any one desires to 
 exhibit any of them or explain them to an inquirer, without 
 any trouble or argument ; while the greatest and noblest truths 
 have no outward image of themselves visible to man, which he 
 who wishes to satisfy the longing soul of the inquirer can 
 adapt to the eye of sense, and therefore we ought to practice 
 reasoning ; for immaterial things, which are the highest and 
 greatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other 
 way, and all that we are saying is said for the sake of them. 
 Moreover, there is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on 
 small matters than on great. Statesman, iii. 571. 
 Imitation, a form of jest. 
 
 Str. Is there any more graceful or artistic form of jest 
 
 than imitation ? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly not ; and imitation is a very comprehen- 
 sive term, which includes under one class the most diverse 
 sorts of things. 
 
 Str. We know, of course, that he who professes by one art 
 to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter's art 
 makes resemblance of them which have the same name with 
 them ; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young 
 children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the be- 
 lief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes. 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Str. And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 of reasoning ? Is there any impossibility in stealing the hearts 
 of youths through their ears, when they are still at a distance 
 from the truth, by showing them fictitious arguments, and mak- 
 ing them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the 
 wisest of men in all things ? 
 
 Theaet. Yes ; why should there not be another similar art ? 
 
 Str. But as time goes on, and they advance in years, and 
 come more into contact with realities, and have learnt by sad 
 experience to see and feel the truth of things, are they not 
 compelled to change many opinions which they had so that the 
 great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their 
 seeming speculations are overturned by the facts of life ? 
 
 Theaet. That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, 
 at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance 
 only. 
 
 Str. And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and 
 always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can 
 without the sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me 
 whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of 
 true being ; or are we still disposed to think that he may have 
 a true knowledge of the various matters about which he dis- 
 putes ? 
 
 Theaet. But how is that possible, Stranger ? Is there any 
 doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one 
 of the divisions of children's play ? 
 
 Str. Then we must place him in the class of magicians and 
 mimics. 
 
 Theaet. Certainly we must. 
 
 Str. And now our business is not to let the animal out, for 
 we have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one 
 thing which he certainly will not escape. 
 
 Theaet. What is that ? 
 
 Str. The inference that he is a juggler. 
 
 Theaet. Precisely my own opinion of him. 
 
 Str. Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the 
 image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Soph- 
 ist does not run away from us, to seize him and deliver him 
 over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and announce the 
 capture of him ; and if he creeps into the recesses of the imita- 
 tive art, and secretes himself in one of them, to divide again 
 and follow him up, until in some subsection of imitation he 
 is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 237 
 
 which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape in 
 triumph. 
 
 Theaet. That is good, and let us do as you say. Sophist, 
 Hi. 469. 
 Imitation in painting. 
 
 All that is said by any of us can only be imitation and 
 
 comparison. For if we consider how the works of the painter 
 represent bodies divine and heavenly, and the different degrees 
 of gratification with which the eye of the spectator receives 
 them, we shall see that we are satisfied with the artist who is 
 able in any degree to imitate the earth and its mountains, and 
 the rivers, and the woods, and the universe, and the things that 
 are and move therein, and further, that knowing nothing pre- 
 cise about such matters, we do not examine or analyze the 
 painting ; all that is required is a sort of indistinct and decep- 
 tive mode of shadowing them forth. But when a person en- 
 deavors to paint the human form we are quick at finding out 
 defects, and our familiar knowledge makes us severe judges of 
 any one who does not render every point of similarity ; and 
 we may observe the same thing to happen in discourse ; we 
 are satisfied with a picture of divine and heavenly things which 
 has very little likeness to them ; but we are more precise in 
 our criticism of mortal and human things. Critias, ii. 594. 
 
 Aih. And can he who does not know what the exact object 
 is which is imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is 
 truthfully executed ? I mean, for example, whether a statue 
 has the proportions of a body, and the true situation of the 
 parts, what fhose proportions are, and how the parts fit into 
 one another in due order ; also their colors and conformations, 
 or whether this is all confused in the execution ? Do you 
 think that any one can know about this, who does not know 
 what the animal is which has been imitated ? 
 
 Gle. Impossible. 
 
 Aih. But even if we know that the thing pictured or sculpt- 
 ured is a man, who has received at the hand of the artist all 
 his proper parts and forms and colors, must we not also know 
 whether the work is beautiful or in any respect deficient in 
 beauty ? 
 
 Gle. If this were not required, Stranger, we should all of us 
 be judges of beauty. Laws, iv. 198. 
 Imitations becoming a second nature. See Freedom, etc. 
 Imitative art. See Likeness-making. 
 
238 PLATO'S JBEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Imitative poetry. 
 
 Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of 
 
 our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me bet- 
 ter than the rule about poetry. 
 
 What rule ? 
 
 The rule about rejecting imitative poetry, which certainly 
 ought not to be received ; as I see far more clearly now that 
 the parts of the soul have been distinguished. 
 
 What do you mean ? 
 
 Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my 
 words repeated to the tragedians and the rest o the imitative 
 tribe but I do not mind saying to you that all poetical imi- 
 tations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and 
 that the knowledge of what they are is the only antidote to 
 them. 
 
 Explain the purport of your remark. 
 
 Well, I will tell you : although I have always from my earli- 
 est youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even now 
 makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great captain 
 and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company ; 
 but a man is not to be reverenced before the truth, and there- 
 fore I will speak out. The Republic, ii. 425. 
 Imitators, Poets are. 
 
 It remains narrative both in the speeches which the poet 
 
 recites and the passages between ? 
 
 Quite true. 
 
 But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we 
 not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person who, 
 as he informs you, is going to speak ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And this assimilation of himself to another either by the use 
 of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose char- 
 acter he assumes ? 
 
 Of course. 
 
 Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to 
 proceed by way of imitation ? 
 
 Very true. The Republic, ii. 216. 
 
 To me the wonder is rather that the poets, present as well as 
 past, are no better not that I mean to depreciate them, but 
 every one can see that they are a tribe of imitators, and will 
 imitate best and most easily the ways of life amid which they 
 have been brought up ; whereas that which is beyond the range 
 
PLATO' 'S BEST THOUGHTS. 239 
 
 of at man's education can hardly be imitated by him in action, 
 and,, with still more difficulty in speech. Timaeus, ii. 515. 
 Immortal, the world made. 
 
 - In the fullness of time, when the change was to take 
 place, and the earth-born race had all perished, and every soul 
 had fallen into the earth and been sown her appointed number 
 of times, the governor of the universe let the helm go, and re- 
 tired to his place of view ; and then Fate and innate desire re- 
 versed the motion of the world. Then, also, all the inferior 
 deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being in- 
 formed of what was happening, let go the parts of the world 
 of which they were severally the guardians. And the world 
 turning round with a sudden shock, having received an oppo- 
 site impulse at both ends, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, 
 producing a new destruction of all manner of animals. After 
 a while the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased, and 
 the universal creature, once more at peace, attained to a calm, 
 and settled down into his own orderly and accustomed course, 
 having the charge and rule of himself and of all other creat- 
 ures, and remembering and executing the instructions of the 
 Father and Creator of the world, more particularly at first, 
 but afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling 
 off was the admixture of matter in the world ; this was inher- 
 ent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, until at- 
 taining to the present cosmos or order. From God, the con- 
 structor, the world indeed received every good, but from a 
 previous state came elements of violence and injustice, which, 
 thence derived, first of all passed into the world and were trans- 
 mitted to the animals. While the world was producing ani- 
 mals in unison with God, the evil was small, and great the 
 good which worked within, bufc in the process of separation 
 from him, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded 
 well enough ; but, as time went on, there was more and more 
 forgetting, and the old discord again entered in and got the 
 better, and burst forth ; and at last small was the good, and 
 great was the admixture of the elements of evil, and there was 
 a danger of universal ruin of the world and the things in the 
 world. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, 1 , 
 seeing that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all 
 might be dissolved in the storm, and go to the place of chaos 
 and infinity, again seated himself at the helm ; and reversing 
 the elements which had fallen into dissolution and disorder 
 
240 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 when left to themselves in the previous cycle, he set them in 
 order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and 
 immortal. Statesman, iii. 557. 
 Immortality of fame desired by men. 
 
 Marvel not then at the lov which all men have of their 
 
 offspring ; for that universal love and interest is for the sake 
 of immortality I was astonished at her words and said : " Is 
 this really true, thou wise Diotima ? " And she answered 
 with all the authority of a Sophist : " Of that, Socrates, you 
 may be assured ; think only of the ambition of men, and you 
 will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you con- 
 sider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of 
 fame. They are ready to run risks greater far than they would 
 have run for their children, and to spend money and undergo 
 any amount of toil, and even to die for the sake of leaving be- 
 hind them a name which shall be eternal. Do you imagine 
 that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to 
 avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the 
 kingdom for his sons, if they had not imagined that the memory 
 of their virtues, which is still retained among us, would be im- 
 mortal ? Nay," she said, " I am persuaded that all men do all 
 things and the better they are the more they do them, in hope 
 of the glorious fame of immortal virtue ; for they desire the 
 immortal." The Symposium, i. 500. 
 Immortality in time. 
 
 The human race naturally partakes of immortality, of 
 
 which all men have the greatest desire implanted in them ; for 
 the desire of every man that he may become famous, and not 
 lie in the grave without a name, is only the love of continu- 
 ance. Now, mankind are coeval with all time, and are ever 
 following, and will ever follow, the course of time ; and so 
 they are immortal, inasmuch as they leave children behind 
 them, and partake of immortality in the unity of generation. 
 And for a man voluntarily to deprive himself of this gift, as 
 he deliberately does who will not have a wife or children, is 
 impiety. Laws, iv. 249. 
 Immortality of the soul. See Soul. 
 Immortality of God. See God unchangeable. 
 Impartiality not the same as equality. See Equality not the same, 
 
 etc. 
 Impassiveness of the Gods. See Gods, impassweness of the. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 241 
 
 Impiety, punishment of. 
 
 Now, men fall into impiety from three causes, which have 
 
 been already mentioned, and from each of these causes arise 
 two sorts of impiety, in all six, requiring judicial decision, but 
 differing greatly in their degrees of guilt. For he who does 
 not believe in the Gods, and yet has a righteous nature, hates 
 the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice, and avoids 
 unrighteous men, and loves the righteous. But they who, be- 
 sides believing that the world is devoid of ^Gods, are intemper- 
 ate, and have at the same time good memories and quick wits, 
 are worse ; although both of them are unbelievers, much less 
 injury is done by the one than by the other. The one may 
 talk loosely about the Gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and 
 perhaps by laughing at other men he may make them like him- 
 self, if he be not punished. But the other unbeliever, who 
 has ability, is full of stratagem and deceit men of this class 
 are prophets and jugglers of all kinds, and out of their ranks 
 sometimes come tyrants, and demagogues, and generals, and 
 hierophants of private mysteries and the ingenuities of so- 
 called Sophists. There are many kinds of unbelievers, but 
 two only for whom legislation is required ; one the hypocrit- 
 ical sort, whose crime is deserving of death many times over, 
 while the others need only bonds and admonition. Laws, 
 iv. 421. 
 Impure and pure soul. 
 
 - Are we to suppose that the soul, which is invisible, in 
 passing to the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, 
 and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, 
 if God will, my soul is also soon to go, that the soul, I re- 
 peat, if this be her nature and origin, is blown away and per- 
 ishes immediately on quitting the body, as the many say ? 
 That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth 
 rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing draws after 
 her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily had connection 
 with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into 
 herself; (for such abstraction has been the study of her life). 
 And what does this mean but that she has been a true disciple 
 of philosophy, and has practiced how to die cheerfully ? And 
 is not philosophy the practice of death ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible 
 world, to the divine and immortal and rational ; thither ar- 
 16 
 
242 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 riving, she is secure of bliss and is released from the error and 
 folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human 
 ills, and forever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in com- 
 pany with the Gods. Is not this true, Cebes ? 
 
 Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt. 
 
 But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the 
 time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of 
 the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body 
 and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led 
 to believe that the truth only exists- in a bodily form, which a 
 man may touch and see and taste and use for the purposes of 
 his lusts, the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and 
 avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark 
 and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy ; do you 
 suppose that such a soul as this will depart pure and unal- 
 loyed ? 
 
 That is impossible, he replied. 
 
 She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual asso- 
 ciation and constant care of the body have wrought in her 
 nature. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty, 
 and earthy, and is that element of sight by which such a soul 
 is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, 
 because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below. 
 Phaedo, i. 409. 
 Impure and pure, gifts of the. 
 
 Ath. What life is agreeable to God, and becoming in his 
 
 followers ? One only according to an old saying, that " like 
 agrees with like, with measure measure," but things which 
 have no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the 
 things which have measure. Now, God is the measure of all 
 things, in a sense far higher than any man, as they say, cart ever 
 hope to be. And he who would be dear to God must, as far 
 as is possible, be like him and such as he is. Wherefore the 
 temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like him ; and 
 the intemperate man is unlike him ; and different from him, 
 and unjust. And the same holds of other things, and this is 
 the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all say- 
 ings : that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and 
 hold converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and 
 every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 243 
 
 also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet. 
 But with the bad man, the opposite of this holds ; for the bad 
 man has an impure soul, whereas the good is pure ; and from 
 one who is polluted, neither a good man nor God is right in 
 receiving gifts. And therefore the unholy waste their much 
 service upon the Gods, which, when offered by any holy man, 
 is always accepted of them. Laws, iv. 244. 
 Individual; the State more to be valued than the. See Citizen, ob- 
 ligation of the. 
 Individual, the State greater than the. 
 
 Justice, which is the subject of our inquiry, is, as you 
 know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and 
 sometimes as the virtue of a State. 
 
 True, he replied. 
 
 And is not a State larger than an individual ? 
 
 It is. 
 
 Then in the larger the quantity of justice will be larger and 
 more easily discernible. I propose, therefore, that we inquire 
 into the nature of justice and injustice as appearing in the State 
 first, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater 
 to the lesser and comparing them. 
 
 That, he said, is an excellent proposal. 
 
 And suppose we imagine the State as in a process of crea- 
 tion, and then we shall see the justice and injustice of the State 
 in process of creation also. 
 
 Very likely. 
 
 When the State is completed there may be a hope that the 
 object of our search will be more easily discovered. 
 
 Yes, more easily. 
 
 And shall we make the attempt ? I said ; although I cannot 
 promise you that the task will be a light one. Reflect, there- 
 fore. 
 
 I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you 
 should proceed. 
 
 A State, I said, arisesj as I conceive, out of the needs of-^, 
 mankind ; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many 
 wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined ? 
 
 There can be no other. 
 
 Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed 
 to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another 
 for another : and when these helpers and partners are gathered 
 together in one habitation, the body of inhabitants is termed a 
 State. 
 
244 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and an- 
 other receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for 
 their good. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 Then, I said, let us begin and create a State ; and yet the 
 true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention. 
 The Republic, ii. 190. 
 Individuality and unity. 
 
 Pro. Do you mean when a person says that I, Protar- 
 
 chus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the single 
 " me " in many " me's," which he distinguishes and opposes as 
 great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand other 
 ways? 
 
 Soc. Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged 
 paradoxes about the one and many, which I may say that every- 
 body has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish arid obvious 
 and detrimental to the true course of thought ; and no more fa- 
 vor is shown to that other puzzle, in which a person proves the 
 members and parts of anything to be divided, and then confess- 
 ing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his own 
 words, why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, 
 and the many are only one. 
 
 Pro. But what, Socrates, are those other marvels which, as 
 you imply, have not yet become common and acknowledged, 
 relating to the same principle ? 
 
 Soc. When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of 
 things that are born and perish, as in the instances which we 
 were giving, for in those cases, and when unity is of this con- 
 crete nature, there is, as I was saying, a universal consent that 
 no refutation is needed ; but when the assertion is made that 
 man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good one, then 
 the interest which attaches to these and similar unities, and the 
 attempt which is made to divide them, gives birth to a con- 
 troversy. 
 
 Pro. Of what nature ? 
 
 Soc. In the first place, as to whether these unities have a 
 real existence ; and then how each individual unity, being always 
 the same, and incapable either of generation or of destruction, 
 but retaining a permanent individuality, can be conceived either 
 as dispersed and multiplied in the infinity of the world of gen- 
 eration, or as still entire and yet derived from itself, which latter 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 245 
 
 would seem to be the greatest impossibility of all, for how can 
 one and the same thing be at the same time in one and in many 
 things ? These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is 
 the one and many to which they relate ; they are the source of 
 great perplexity if ill decided, and the right determination of 
 them is very helpful. Philebus, iii. 149. 
 Indivisible essence. See Essence. 
 Inequality and Equality. See Equality. 
 Infinite and finite. See Finite. 
 Inheritances and heirships. 
 
 I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for 
 
 the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as 
 rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no 
 use, either to them or to the State. The condition of youth 
 vhich is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of 
 the necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, 
 being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making 
 life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, 
 bequeath to their children, not riches, but the spirit of rever- 
 ence. We, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from 
 us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. 
 But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present 
 style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought 
 always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather ex- 
 hort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take 
 heed that no young man sees or hears him doing or saying any- 
 thing base ; for where old men have no shame, there young 
 men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. Laws, iv. 254. 
 Iniquity, concealment of. See Concealment. 
 Injustice. 
 
 Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is 
 
 always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in 
 private contracts : wherever the unjust is the partner of the 
 just you will find the unjust man has always more and the just 
 less. Next, in their dealings with the State : when there is an 
 income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on 
 the same amount of income ; and when there is anything to be 
 received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe 
 also that when they come into office, there is the just man neg- 
 lecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, but he will 
 not compensate himself out of the public purse because he is 
 just : moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for 
 
246 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. Now all this is re- 
 versed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, 
 of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust 
 is most apparent, and my meaning will be most clearly seen if 
 we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal 
 is the happiest of men, as the suiferers or those who refuse to 
 do injustice are the most miserable I mean tyranny, which by 
 fraud and force takes away the property of others, not retail 
 but wholesale ; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as 
 profane, private and public ; for any one of which acts of wrong, 
 if he were detected perpetrating them singly, he would be pun- 
 ished and incur great dishonor ; since they who are guilty of 
 any of these crimes in single instances are called robbers of 
 temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. 
 But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens 
 has made slaves of them, then, instead of these dishonorable 
 names, he is called happy and blessed, not only by the citizens 
 but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation 
 of injustice. For injustice is* censured because the censurers 
 are afraid of suffering, and not from any fear which they have 
 of doing injustice. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, in- 
 justice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and free- 
 dom and mastery than justice ; and, as I said at first, justice is 
 the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own 
 profit and interest. The Republic, ii. 165. 
 Injustice, doing and suffering. 
 
 Pol. At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly 
 
 put to death is wretched, and to be pitied ? 
 
 Soc. Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so 
 much as he who is justly killed. 
 
 Pol. How can that be, Socrates ? 
 
 Soc. That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is 
 the greatest of evils. * 
 
 Pol. But is that the greatest ? Is not suffering injustice a 
 greater evil ? 
 
 Soc. Certainly not. 
 
 Pol. Then would you rather suffer than do injustice ? 
 
 Soc. I should not like either, but if I must choose between 
 them, I would rather suffer than do. Gorgias, iii. 55. 
 Injustice, penalty of. 
 
 Soc. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy 
 
 things, had far better not yield to the illusion that his roguery 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGH!*. 247 
 
 is clever ; for men glory in their shame they fancy that 
 they hear others saying of them, " These are not mere good- 
 for-nothing persons, burdens of the earth, but such as men 
 should be who mean to dwell safely in a State." Let us tell 
 them that they are all the more truly what they do not know 
 that they are ; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, 
 which above all things they ought to know not stripes and 
 death, as they suppose, which evil-doers often escape, but a 
 penalty which cannot be escaped. 
 
 Theod. What is that ? 
 
 Soc. There are two patterns eternally set before them in 
 nature : the one blessed and divine, the other godless and 
 wretched ; and they do not see, in their utter folly and infatu- 
 ation, that they are growing like the one and unlike the other, 
 by reason of their evil deeds ; and the penalty is, that they 
 lead a life answering to the pattern which they resemble. 
 And if we tell them that unless they depart from their cun- 
 ning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death ; 
 and that here on earth they will live ever in the likeness of 
 their own evil selves, and with evil friends when they hear 
 this, they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to 
 fools. 
 
 Theod. Very true, Socrates. Theaetetus, iii. 379. 
 Injustice and envy. See Envy. 
 Injustice, what is called. 
 
 - I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity, what 
 I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of 
 them : When anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jeal- 
 ousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they do 
 any harm or not I call them all injustice. But when the 
 opinion of the best, whatever States or individuals may suppose 
 that to be, has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every 
 man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in 
 accordance therewith, and the principle in individuals which 
 obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be 
 called just ; although the action, done in error, is thought by 
 the multitude to be involuntary injustice. Laws, iv. 377. 
 Injustice. See Wrong-doing. 
 Inner voice, the. 
 
 Soc. This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in 
 
 my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic ; 
 that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me 
 
248 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 from hearing any other. And I know that anything more 
 which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have any- 
 thing to say. 
 
 Cr. I have nothing to say, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. Leave me then to follow whithersoever God leads. 
 Crito, i. 359. 
 
 Inner life, harmony of the. See Harmony of the inner man. 
 Innovations, jests no bar to. ." 
 
 I should rather expect, I said, that several of our propos- 
 als, if they are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridicu- 
 lous. 
 
 No doubt of it. 
 
 Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of 
 women naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, espe- 
 cially when they get old ; they certainly will not be a vision of 
 beauty any more than the wrinkled old men, who have any- 
 thing but an agreeable appearance when they take to gymnas- 
 tics ; this, however, does not deter them. 
 
 Yes, indeed, he said : according to present notions the pro- 
 posal would appear ridiculous. 
 
 But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, 
 we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be directed 
 against this sort of innovation ; how they will talk of women's 
 attainments in music as well as in gymnastic, and above all 
 about their wearing armor and riding upon horseback ! 
 
 Very true, he replied. 
 
 Yet having begun, we must go on and attack the difficulty ; 
 at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their 
 life to be serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the 
 Greeks were of the opinion, which is still generally received 
 among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridic- 
 ulous and improper ; and when first the Cretans and then the 
 Lacedaemonians introduced naked exercises, the wits of that 
 day might have ridiculed them equally. 
 
 No doubt. 
 
 But when experience showed that to let all things be uncov- 
 ered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous 
 effect to the outward eye vanished before the approval of rea- 
 son, then the man was seen to be a fool who laughs or directs 
 the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly 
 and vice, or seriously inclines to measure the beautiful by any 
 other standard but that of the good. 
 
 Very true, lie replied. The Republic, ii. 276. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 249 
 
 Innovations forbidden in Egypt. 
 
 Cle. And what are the laws about music and dancing ? 
 
 Ath. You will wonder when I tell you : Long ago they ap- 
 peared to have recognized the very principle of which we are 
 now speaking that their young citizens must be habituated to 
 forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed and exhibited 
 the patterns of them in their temples ; and no painter or artist 
 is allowed to innovate upon them, or to leave the traditional 
 forms and invent new ones. To this day, no alteration is al- 
 lowed either in these arts, or in music at all. And you will 
 find that their works of art are painted or moulded in the same 
 forms which they had ten thousand years ago ; this is literally 
 true and no exaggeration, their ancient paintings and sculpt- 
 ures are not a whit better or worse than the work of to-day, 
 but are made with just the same skill. 
 
 Cle. How extraordinary ! 
 
 Ath. I should rather say, how wise and worthy of a great 
 legislator ! I know that other things in Egypt are not so good. 
 But what I am telling you about music is true and deserving 
 of consideration, because showing that a lawgiver may institute 
 melodies which have a natural truth and correctness without 
 any fear of failure. To do this, however, must be the work of 
 God, or of a divine person ; in Egypt they have a tradition 
 that their ancient chants are the composition of the Goddess 
 Isis. And therefore, as I was saying, if a person can only find 
 in any way the natural melodies, he might confidently embody 
 them in a fixed and legal form. For the love of novelty which 
 arises out of pleasure in the new, and weariness of the old, has 
 not strength enough to vitiate the consecrated song and dance, 
 under the plea that they have become antiquated. At any rate 
 they are far from being antiquated in Egypt. Laws, iv. 186. 
 Inordinate ambition. 
 
 My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly like to confess, would 
 
 long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you 
 loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to live in 
 the enjoyment of them. But I know that you entertain other 
 thoughts ; and I will prove to you that I have always had my 
 eye on you by declaring them. Suppose that at this moment 
 some God came to you and said : O Alcibiades, will you live as 
 you are, or die in an instant if you are forbidden to make any 
 further acquisition ? I verily believe that you would choose 
 death. And I will e tell you the hope in which you are at pres- 
 
250 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 ent living : Before many days have elapsed, you think that you 
 will come before the Athenian assembly, and will try to prove 
 to them that you are more worthy of honor than Pericles, 
 or any other man that ever lived, and having proved this, you 
 wilj. have the greatest power in the State ; and when you have 
 got the greatest power among us, you will go on to other 
 Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the bar- 
 barians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the 
 God were then to say to you again : Here in Europe is to 
 be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia 
 or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would 
 choose to live upon these terms ; but the world, as I may 
 say, must be filled with your power and name no man less 
 than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Alcibi* 
 ades I. iv. 516. 
 Inquiry, the spirit of. 
 
 Soc.^ Some things I have said of which I am not alto- 
 gether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and 
 less helpless if we think that we ought to inquire, than we 
 should have been jf we indulged in the idle fancy that there 
 was no knowing and no use in searching after what we do not 
 know : that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in 
 word and deed, to the utmost of my power. 
 
 Men. That again, Socrates, appears to me to be well said. 
 Meno, i. 262. 
 
 Inquiry forbidden as ruinous to Arts. See Arts, inquiry ruinous to. 
 Insane, two kinds of the. 
 
 Soc. There were two kinds of madness ; one produced 
 
 by human infirmity, the other by a divine release from the 
 ordinary ways of men. 
 
 Phaedr. True. 
 
 Soc. The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, 
 prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four Gods presiding 
 over them ; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second 
 that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that 
 of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind of 
 madness, which was also the best, being a sort of figure of 
 love, we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true, 
 though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honor of 
 Eros, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guar- 
 dian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in meas- 
 ured and solemn strain. Phaedrus, i. 570. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 251 
 
 Inspiration of the poet. See Divine power. 
 Inspiration of the Statesman. See Statesman, called divine. 
 Instability of youth. See Changeableness. 
 Instinctive divining of truth. 
 
 Soc. They say that what the school of Philebus calls 
 
 pleasures are all of them only avoidances of pain. 
 
 Pro. And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them ? 
 
 Soc. Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, 
 who are enabled to divine the truth, not by any rules of art, 
 but by an instinctive repugnance and extreme detestation which 
 a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, in which they 
 think that there is nothing sound, and whose seductive influ- 
 ence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. 
 This is the use which you may make of them ; you shall con- 
 sider the various grounds of their dislike, and then you shall 
 hear from me what I deem to be true pleasures ; and when the 
 nature of pleasures has been examined from both points of view, 
 we will bring her up for judgment. 
 
 Pro. True. Philebus, iii. 183. 
 Intelligence and knowledge. 
 
 When reason, which works with equal truth both in the 
 
 circle of the diverse and of the same, in the sphere of the 
 self-moved in voiceless silence moving, when reason, I say, 
 is hovering around the sensible world, and the circle of -the di- 
 verse also moving truly imparts the imitations of sense to the 
 whole soul, then arise fixed and true opinions and beliefs. But 
 when reason is dwelling in the rational, and the circle of the 
 same moving smoothly indicates this, then intelligence and 
 knowledge are of necessity perfected. And if any one affirms 
 that in which these are found to be other than the soul, he will 
 say the very opposite of the truth. Timaeus, ii. 530. 
 Intelligence, pleasures of the. 
 
 - But since experience and wisdom and reason are the 
 judges, the inference of course is, that the truest pleasures are 
 those which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason. 
 And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intel- 
 ligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that 
 he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasant- 
 est life ? 
 
 Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority 
 when he approves of his own life. The Republic, ii. 413. 
 
252 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Intemperance and temperance. 
 
 Soc. I wish, my good friend, that you would tell me, once 
 
 for all, whom you affirm to be the better and superior, and in 
 what they are better ? 
 
 Cal I have already told you. that I mean those who are 
 wise and courageous in the administration of a State ; they 
 ought to be the rulers of their States, and justice consists in 
 their having more than their subjects. 
 
 Soc. But whether rulers or subjects, will they or will they 
 not have more than themselves, my friend ? 
 
 Cal. How do you mean ? 
 
 Soc. I mean that every man is his own ruler ; but perhaps 
 you think that there is no necessity for him to rule himself ; 
 he is only required to rule others ? 
 
 Cal. What do you mean by his " ruling over himself " ? 
 
 Soc. A simple thing enough ; just what is commonly said, 
 that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and 
 ruler.of his own pleasures and passions. 
 
 Cal. What innocence ! you mean those fools, the tem- 
 perate ? 
 
 Soc. Certainly : any one may know that to be my meaning. 
 
 Cal. Quite so, Socrates ; and they are really fools for how 
 can a man be happy who is the servant of anything ? On the 
 contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought 
 to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chas- 
 tise them ; but when they have grown to their greatest he 
 should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and 
 to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural 
 justice and nobility. To this the many cannot attain, and they 
 blame the strong man, because they are ashamed of their own 
 weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say 
 that intemperance is base. As I was saying before, they en- 
 slave the nobler natures, and being unable to satisfy their 
 pleasures, they praise temperance and justice out of cowardice. 
 For if a man had been originally the son of a king, or had a 
 nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or exclu- 
 sive power, what could be more truly base or evil than tem- 
 perance to a man like him, I say, who might freely be en- 
 joying every good, and has no one to hinder him, and yet has 
 admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to be 
 lord over him ? must not he be in a miserable plight whom 
 the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be a 
 ruler in his city ? Nay, Socrates, for you profess to be a 
 votary of the truth, arid the truth is that luxury and intem- 
 perance and license, if they are duly supported, are happiness 
 and virtue ; all the rest is a mere bauble, custom contrary to 
 nature, fond inventions of men nothing worth. Gorgias, iii. 
 80. 
 
 Intemperate and temperate life. See Temperate, etc. 
 Intermediate state of pleasure and pain. 
 
 Soc. Let me make a further observation ; the argument 
 
 appears to me to imply that there is a kind of life which con- 
 sists in these affections. 
 
 Pro. Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you 
 speaking ? 
 
 Soc. I am speaking of emptiness and replenishment, and all 
 that relates to the preservation and destruction of living be- 
 ings, and of the alternations of pain and joy which accompany 
 them in their transitions. 
 
 Pro. True. 
 
 Soc. And what would you say of the kind of life which is 
 intermediate between them ? 
 
 Pro. What do you mean by " intermediate ? " 
 
 Soc. I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet re- 
 members the pleasures which, if they would only come, would 
 relieve him ; but as yet he has them not. May we not say of 
 him that he is in an intermediate state ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Would you say that he was in pain or in pleasure ? 
 
 Pro. Nay I should say that he has two pains ; in his body 
 there is the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing 
 and expectation. 
 
 Soc. What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains ? 
 May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of 
 being filled, and at other times be quite in despair ? 
 
 Pro. Very true. 
 
 Soc. And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is 
 hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at 
 the same time in pain ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Then man and the other animals have at one time both 
 pleasure and pain ? 
 
 Pro. I suppose so. Philebus, iii. 172. 
 
254 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Intoxication. See Drunkenness. 
 Inventors, not good judges. 
 
 O most ingenious Theuth, he who has the gift of inven- 
 tion is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of 
 his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance 
 a paternal love of your own child has led you to say what is 
 not the fact ; for this invention of yours will create forgetful- 
 ness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their mem- 
 ories ; they will trust to the external written characters and 
 not remember of themselves. You have found a specific, not 
 for memory but for reminiscence, and you give your disciples 
 only the pretense of wisdom ; they will be hearers of many 
 things and will have learned nothing ; they will appear to be 
 omniscient and will generally know nothing ; they will be tire- 
 some company, having the show of wisdom without the reality. 
 Phaedrus, i. 580. 
 lolaus. See Heracles. 
 Irritability of musicians. 
 
 Did you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind of 
 
 exclusive devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an 
 exclusive devotion to music ? 
 
 In what way shown ? he said. 
 
 In producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, or again of 
 softness and effeminacy, I replied. 
 
 Yes, he said, I am quite aware that your mere athlete be- 
 comes too much of a savage, and that the musician is melted 
 and softened beyond what is good for him 
 
 And, when a man allows music to play and pour over his 
 soul through the funnel of his ears, those sweet and soft and 
 melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking, and his 
 whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song ; in 
 the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which is in 
 him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of brittle 
 and useless. But, if he carries on the softening process, in the 
 next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away 
 his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul ; and he makes a 
 feeble warrior. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him this is soon 
 accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of 
 music weakening the spirit renders him excitable ; he soon 
 flames up, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 255 
 
 spirit he becomes irritable and violent and very discontented. 
 - The Republic, ii. 235. 
 
 Jest, imitation a form of. See Imitation. 
 Jests, no bar to innovations. See Innovations. 
 Judge, the virtuous. 
 
 - But with the judge the case is different ; he governs mind 
 by mind, and he ought not therefore to have been reared 
 among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from 
 youth upwards, in order that, having gone through the whole 
 calendar of crime, he may quickly infer the crimes of others, 
 like their diseases, from the knowledge of himself ; but the 
 honorable mind which is to form a healthy judgment ought 
 rather to have had no experience or contamination of evil hab- 
 its when young. And this is the reason why in youth good 
 men often appear to be simple, and are easily practiced upon 
 by the evil, because they have no examples of what evil is in 
 their own souls. 
 
 Yes. he said, that very often happens with them. 
 
 Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young ; he should 
 have learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from 
 late and long observation of the nature of evil in others ; 
 knowledge, and not his own experience, should be his guide. 
 
 Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge. 
 
 Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my an- 
 swer) ; for he is good whose soul is good. Whereas your cun- 
 ning and suspicious character, who has committed many crimes, 
 and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is 
 among men who are like himself, is wonderful in his precautions 
 against others, because he judges of them by himself ; but 
 when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have 
 the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to 
 his unseasonable suspicion ; he cannot recognize an honest 
 man, because he has nothing in himself which will tell him 
 what an honest man is like ; at the same time, as the bad are 
 more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, 
 he thinks himself, and others think him, rather wise than 
 foolish. 
 
 Most true, he said. 
 
 Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not 
 this man ; the other is better suited to us ; for vice cannot 
 know virtue, but a virtuous nature, educated by time, will ac- 
 
256 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 quire a knowledge both of virtue and vice ; the virtuous, and 
 not the vicious man, has wisdom, in my opinion. 
 
 And in mine also. The Republic, ii. 233. 
 Judge, the reconciling. See Reconciling. 
 Judge, the righteous. 
 
 Str. Once more let us consider the nature of the right- 
 eous judge. 
 
 Y. Soc. Very good. 
 
 Str. Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men 
 with one another to be just or unjust in accordance with the 
 standard which he receives from the king and legislator, 
 showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not per- 
 verted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or any sort of love or hatred, 
 into deciding the suits of men with one another contrary to 
 the appointment of the legislator ? 
 
 Y. Soc. No ; his office is such as you describe. 
 
 Str. Then the inference is that the power of the judge is 
 not royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which 
 ministers to the royal power ? 
 
 Y. Soc. True. Statesman, iii. 591. 
 Judges, true. 
 
 The judges will require virtue they must possess wis- 
 dom and also courage ; for the true judge ought not to learn 
 from the theatre, nor ought he to be panic-stricken at the 
 clamor of the many and his own incapacity ; nor again, know- 
 ing the truth, ought he through cowardice and unmanliness care- 
 lessly to deliver a lying judgment, out of the very same lips 
 which have just appealed to the Gods before he judged. He 
 is sitting, not as the disciple of the theatre, but, in his proper 
 place, as their instructor, and he ought to be the enemy of all 
 pandering to the pleasure of the spectators. Laws, iv. 1 88. 
 Judges and true opinion. 
 
 Soc. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about 
 
 matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in 
 any other way, and when thus judging of them from report 
 they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without 
 knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged 
 well. 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts 
 and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have 
 judged rightly without knowledge ; and therefore I must infer 
 that they are not the same. Theaetetus, iii. 408. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 257 
 
 Judges, three kinds of. 
 
 Ath. Now, which would be the better judge, one who 
 
 destroyed the bad, and let the good govern themselves; or one 
 who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and 
 made them voluntarily submit ? Or, lastly, there might be a 
 third excellent judge, who, finding the family distracted, not 
 only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them to one an- 
 other forever after, and gave them laws which they mutually 
 observed, and was able to keep them friends. 
 
 Cle. The last would be by far the best sort of judge and 
 legislator. Laws, iv. 158. 
 
 Just man, Christ unconsciously described as the, in contrast with 
 the unjust. 
 
 - I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume 
 the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, and we 
 must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have 
 gained the greatest reputation for justice. If he has taken 
 a false step he must be able to retrieve himself, being one 
 who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, 
 and force his way where force is required, and having gifts 
 of courage and strength, and command of money and friends. 
 And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness 
 and simplicity, being, as Aeschylus says, and not seeming. 
 There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he 
 will be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know 
 whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of 
 honors and rewards ; therefore, let him be clothed in justice 
 only, and have no other covering ; and he must be imagined in 
 a state of life very different from that of the last. Let him 
 be the best of men, and be esteemed to be the worst ; then let 
 us see whether his virtue is proof against infamy and its con- 
 sequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death ; 
 being just, and seeming to be unjust. Then when both have 
 reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the 
 other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the 
 happier of the two. The Republic, ii. 183. 
 Just man, the. 
 
 Justice was the reality and was concerned not with the 
 
 outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and 
 concernment of man ; for the just man does not permit the 
 several elements within him to interfere with one another, or 
 any of them to do the work of others, but he sets in order his 
 17 
 
258 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 own inner life, and is his own master, and at peace with him- 
 self ; and when he has bound together the three principles 
 within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and 
 middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals when 
 he has bound together all these, -and is no longer many, but has 
 become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, 
 then he will begin to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter 
 of property, or in the treatment of the body, or some affair of 
 politics or private business ; in all which cases he will think 
 and call that which preserves and cooperates with this har- 
 monious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge 
 which presides over it wisdom ; and that which at any time 
 destroys this condition, he will call unjust action, and the 
 opinion which presides over it ignorance. 
 
 You have said the precise truth, Socrates. 
 
 Very good ; and if we were to affirm that we had discov- 
 ered the just man and the just State, and the place of justice 
 in each- of them, we should not be telling a falsehood ? 
 
 Most certainly not. The Republic, ii. 270. 
 Just and wise soul, the. 
 
 Sir. Do they not say that one soul is just, and another 
 unjust, and that one soul is wise, and another foolish ? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Str. And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise 
 by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by 
 the opposite ? 
 
 Theaet. Yes, they do. 
 
 Str. But surely that which may be present or may be ab- 
 sent will be admitted by them to exist ? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Str. And allowing that these qualities of virtue, justice, ana 
 the like all exist, as well as the soul in which they inhere, do 
 they affirm any of them to be visible and tangible, or are they 
 all invisible ? 
 
 Theaet. None of them surely are invisible. 
 
 Str. And would they say that they are corporeal ? 
 
 Theaet. They would distinguish ; the soul would be said by 
 them to have a body ; but as to the other qualities of justice, 
 wisdom, arid the like, about which you asked, they would not 
 venture either to deny their existence, or to maintain that they 
 were all corporeal. Sophist, iii. 484. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 259 
 
 Just judge. See Judge, righteous. 
 
 Ath. The view which identifies the pleasant and the just 
 and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and relig- 
 ious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance 
 with the designs of the legislator, and, in his opinion, infa- 
 mous ; for no one, if he can help, will be persuaded to do that 
 which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant 
 prospects are apt to be dimly seen, especially in childhood, the 
 legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the 
 truth ; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by 
 customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are opposed 
 to one another as shadow and light, and that, seen from the 
 point of view of a man's own evil and injustice, the unjust ap- 
 pears pleasant and the just unpleasant ; but that, seen from the 
 just man's point of view, the very opposite is the appearance 
 which they wear. Laws, iv. 192. 
 Justice resembling holiness. See Holiness. 
 Justice among thieves. See Honor among, etc. 
 Justice and temperance in the State. 
 
 - Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State, first, 
 temperance, and then justice, which is the great object of our 
 search. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about 
 temperance ? 
 
 I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor 
 do I desire that justice should be brought to light and tem- 
 perance lost sight of ; and therefore I wish that you would do 
 me the favor of considering temperance first. 
 
 Certainly, I replied, I cannot be wrong in granting you a 
 favor. 
 
 Then do as I ask, he said. 
 
 Yes, I replied, I will ; and as far as I can at present see, 
 the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of symphony 
 and harmony than the preceding. 
 
 How so? he asked. 
 
 Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of 
 certain pleasures and desires ; this is implied in the saying of 
 " a man being his own master ; " and there are other traces of 
 the same notion. 
 
 No doubt, he said. The Republic, ii. 255. 
 
260 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Justice conducing to the excellence of the State. See State, what 
 
 most conduces, etc. 
 Justice, what is it. 
 
 I said, when we first began, ages ago, there was justice 
 
 tumbling about our feet, and we, fools that we were, failed to 
 see her, like people who go about looking for what they have 
 in their hands : and that was the way with us ; we looked 
 away into the far distance, and this I suspect was the reason 
 why we never saw her. 
 
 What do you mean ? 
 
 I mean to say that we, having been long speaking and hear- 
 ing of her, failed to recognize her. 
 
 I get impatient at the length of your exordium. 
 
 Well, then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not ; you 
 remember the original principle of which we spoke at the 
 foundation of the State, that every man, as we often insisted, 
 should practice one thing only, that being the thing to which 
 his nature was most perfectly adapted ; now justice is this 
 principle or a part of it. 
 
 Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing 
 only. 
 
 Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own busi- 
 ness, and not being a busybody ; we said so again and again, 
 and many others have said the same. 
 
 Yes, we said so. 
 
 Then this doing in a certain way one's own business may be 
 assumed to be justice. Do you know why ? 
 
 I do not, and should like to be told. 
 
 Because I think that this alone remains in the State when 
 the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are 
 abstracted ; and this is the ultimate cause and condition of the 
 existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also 
 their preservative ; and we were saying that if the three were 
 discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one. 
 
 That follows of necessity. The Republic, ii. 258. 
 Justice, approximate. 
 
 Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way 
 
 hither in the search after justice and injustice. 
 
 True, he replied ; but what of this ? 
 
 I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered 
 them, we are to require that the just man should in nothing 
 fail of absolute justice ; or may we be satisfied with an ap- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 261 
 
 proximation, and the attainment of a higher degree of justice 
 than is to be found in other men ? 
 
 The approximation will be enough. 
 
 And we inquired into the nature of absolute justice and into 
 the character of the perfectly just, and the possibility of his ex- 
 istence, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, only that we 
 might have an ideal. We were to look at them in order that 
 we might judge of our- own happiness and unhappiness according 
 to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which 
 we resembled them, not with any view of showing that they 
 could exist in fact. 
 
 True, he said. The Republic, ii. 299. 
 Justice, natural. 
 
 - Soc. Tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural jus- 
 tice : do you not mean that the superior should take the prop- 
 erty of the inferior by force ; that the better should rule the 
 worse, the noble have more than the mean ? Am I not right 
 in my recollection ? 
 
 Gal. Yes ; that is what I was saying, and what I still main- 
 tain. 
 
 Soc. And do you mean by the better the same as the supe- 
 rior ? for I could not make out what you were saying at the 
 time whether you meant by the superior the stronger, and 
 that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you seemed to im- 
 ply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accord- 
 ance with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, 
 as though the superior and stronger and better were the same ; 
 or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and 
 the superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in 
 the same way as superior : this is the point which I want to 
 have clearly explained. Are the superior and better and 
 stronger the same or different ? 
 
 Cal. Well ; I say unequivocally that they are the same. 
 Gorgias, iii. 76. 
 Justice and Virtue, rewards of. 
 
 We have fulfilled our obligations to the argument, putting 
 aside the rewards and glories of justice, such as you were say- 
 ing that Homer and Hesiod introduced ; and justice in her own 
 nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her nature : let 
 her do what is just, whether she have the ring of Cyges or not, 
 and besides the ring of Gyges, the helmet of Hades x 
 
 Very true. 
 
262 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumer- 
 ating, how many and how great are the rewards which justice 
 and the other virtues procure to the soul from Gods and men, 
 both in life and after death. 
 
 Certainly not, he said. 
 
 Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argu- 
 ment? 
 
 What did I borrow ? 
 
 The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and 
 the unjust just : for you were of opinion that even if the true 
 state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of Gods and 
 men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the 
 argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against 
 pure injustice. Do you remember? 
 
 You would have reason to complain of me if I had forgotten. 
 
 Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice 
 that the glory which she receives from Gods and men be also 
 allowed to her by you ; having been shown to have reality, and 
 not to deceive those who truly possess her, she may now have 
 appearance restored to her, and thus obtain the other crown of 
 victory which is hers also. 
 
 The demand, he said, is just. The Republic^ ii. 444. 
 Justice, Courts of, establishment of. See Courts, etc. 
 
 King, the, a Priest. 
 
 Str. There are also priests who, as the law declares, know 
 
 how to give the Gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices, 
 which are acceptable to them, and to ask for us a return of 
 blessings from them. Now both these are branches of the 
 servile or ministerial art. 
 
 T. Soc. Yes, clearly. 
 
 Str. And here I think that we seem to be getting on the 
 right track ; for the priest and the diviner also are full of pride 
 and prerogative this is due to the greatness of their employ- 
 ments ; and in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to reign, 
 unless he have priestly powers ; arid if he should be of another 
 class, and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in the 
 priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the 
 most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest 
 magistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national 
 of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by the 
 King Archon of the year. Statesman, iii. 576. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 263 
 
 King and tyrant distinguished. 
 
 Str. When an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, 
 
 his name will surely be the same he will be called a king ; 
 and thus the five names of governments, as they are now reck- 
 oned, become one. 
 
 Y. Soc. That is true. 
 
 Str. And when an individual ruler governs neither by law 
 nor by custom, but following in the steps of the true man of 
 science, pretends that he can only act for the best by violating 
 the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance direct the 
 imitation, may not such an one be called a tyrant ? 
 
 Y. Soc. Certainly. 
 
 Str. And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and 
 the king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies ; be- 
 cause men are offended at the one monarch, and can. never be 
 made to believe that any one can be worthy of such authority, 
 or can unite the will and the power in the spirit of virtue and 
 knowledge to do justly and holily to all ; they fancy that he 
 will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he 
 pleases of us ; for if there could be such a despot as we describe, 
 they would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have 
 him, and that he alone would be the happy ruler of a true and 
 perfect State. 
 
 Y. Soc. Certainly. Statesman, iii. 587. 
 Kingly art, the. 
 
 Soc. At last we came to the kingly art, and inquired 
 
 whether that gave and caused happiness, and then we got into 
 a labyrinth, and when we thought we were at the end, came out 
 again at the beginning, having still to seek as much as ever. 
 
 Gri. How did that happen, Socrates ? 
 
 Soc. I will tell you ; the kingly art was identified by us with 
 the political. 
 
 Qri. Well, and what came of that ? 
 
 Soc. To this royal or political art all the arts, including that 
 .of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, as to the 
 only one which knew how to use that which they created. 
 Here obviously was the very art which we were seeking the 
 art which is the source of good government, and which may be 
 described, in the language of Aeschylus, as alone sitting at the 
 helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing all things, 
 and utilizing them. 
 
264 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Cri. And were you not right, Socrates ? 
 
 Soc. You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what 
 followed ; for we resumed the inquiry, and a question of this 
 sort was asked : Does this kingly art, having this supreme 
 authority, do anything for us?- To be sure, was the answer. 
 And would not you, Crito, say the same ? 
 
 On. Yes, I should. 
 
 Soc. And what would you say that the kingly art does ? If 
 medicine were supposed to have supreme authority over the 
 subordinate arts, and I were to ask you a similar question 
 about that, you would say that it produces health ? 
 
 Ori. I should. 
 
 Soc. And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing 
 that to have supreme authority over the subject arts what 
 does that. do? Does it- not supply us with the fruits of the 
 earth ? 
 
 Ori. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And what does the kingly art do when invested with 
 supreme power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an 
 answer ? 
 
 Cri. Indeed I am not, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know 
 that if this is the art which we were seeking, it ought to be 
 useful. 
 
 Cri. Certainly. Euthydemus, i. 194. 
 Kings. See Rulers, Legislators. 
 Kings, Dorian, their ruin. See Dorian. 
 Kissing of the hero by all. See Heroic men. 
 Knowledge, on buying. 
 
 Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or 
 
 retail in the food of the soul ? To me that appears to be the 
 sort of man. 
 
 And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul ? 
 
 Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul ; and we 
 must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us 
 when he praises what he sells, like the dealers, wholesale or re- 
 tail, who sell the food of the body ; for they praise indiscrimi- 
 nately all their goods, without knowing what are really bene- 
 ficial or hurtful : neither do their customers know, with the 
 exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy 
 of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of 
 knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 265 
 
 them to 'any customer who is in want of them, praise them all 
 alike ; though I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of 
 them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul ; and 
 their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them 
 happens t> be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have 
 understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy 
 knowledge of Protagoras or of any one ; but if not, then, O 
 my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a 
 game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying 
 knowledge than in buying meat and drink : the one you pur- 
 chase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away 
 in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as 
 food, you may deposit them at home and call in any ex- 
 perienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or 
 drunken, and what not, and how much and when ; and hence 
 the clanger of purchasing them is not so great. But when you 
 buy the wares of knowledge you cannot carry them away in 
 another vessel ; they have been sold to you, and you must take 
 them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or 
 greatly benefited by the lesson ; and therefore we should de- 
 liberate and take counsel with our elders ; for we are still 
 young too yotfng to determine such a matter. Protag- 
 oras, i. 114. 
 
 Knowledge, certain, Science necessary to. See Science. 
 Knowledge and opinion. 
 
 - We seem to have discovered that the many things which 
 are esteemed beautiful or good by the multitude, are tossing 
 about in some region which is half-way between pure being 
 and pure non-being. 
 
 We have. 
 
 Yes ; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind 
 which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, 
 and not as matter of knowledge ; being the intermediate flux 
 which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty. 
 
 Granted. 
 
 Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither 
 see, nor can be taught to see, absolute beauty ; who see the 
 many just, and not absolute justice, and the like, such per- 
 sons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge ? 
 
 That is certain. 
 
 But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable 
 may be said to know, and not to have opinion only ? 
 
266 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Neither can that be denied. 
 
 The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the 
 other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare 
 say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and gazed 
 upon fair colors, but would pot tolerate the existence of ab- 
 solute beauty. 
 
 Yes, I remember. 
 
 Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them 
 lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they 
 be very angry with us for thus describing them ? 
 
 I shall tell them that they ought not to be angry at a de- 
 scription of themselves which is true. 
 
 But those who love the truth of each thing are to be called 
 lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion ? 
 
 Assuredly. The Republic, ii. 308. 
 
 - Knowledge, the highest, the idea of good. See Good, the idea of, etc. 
 Knowledge and Intellect. See Intellect, etc. 
 Knowledge, pleasures of. 
 
 Soc. To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, 
 
 if they appear to us to have no hunger of knowledge or pains 
 of hunger attaching to them. 
 
 Pro. And they have not. 
 
 Soc. Well, but are there not pains of forgetfulness, if a man 
 is full of knowledge and his knowledge is lost ? 
 
 Pro. They are riot natural or necessary, but there may be 
 times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowl- 
 edge. 
 
 Soc. Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating 
 only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with re- 
 flections. 
 
 Pro. In that case you are right in saying that the loss oi 
 knowledge is not attended with pain. 
 
 Soc. These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with 
 pain ; and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very 
 few. Philebus, iii. 191. 
 Knowledge, the truest. 
 
 ' 1 am sure that all men who have a grain of intelligence 
 
 will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and 
 
 reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the 
 
 truest of all. Philebus, iii. 198. 
 
 Knowledge, superhuman. 
 
 Soc. Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 267 
 
 has reason as well as understanding about the true nature of 
 this and of all other things. 
 
 Pro. Let that be supposed. 
 
 Soc. Will such an one have enough of knowledge if he is 
 acquainted only with the divine circle and sphere, and knows 
 nothing of our human spheres and circles, and with a like igno- 
 rance uses these or any other figures or rules in the building of 
 a house ? 
 
 Pro. The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is 
 ridiculous in man. 
 
 Soc. What do you mean ? Do you mean that you are to 
 throw into the cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art 
 which uses the false rule and the false circle ? 
 
 Pro. Yes, that must be done, if any of us is ever to find his 
 way home. Philebus, iii. 203. 
 Knowledge, absolute in God. See Absolute. 
 Knowledge, definition needed for. See Definition. 
 
 Lac edaemon, government of, doubtful. See Government of Sparta, 
 
 etc. 
 Landmarks, removal of. 
 
 Let us first of all, then, have a class of laws which shall 
 
 be called the laws of husbandmen. And let the first of them 
 be the law of Zeus, the God of boundaries. Let no one shift 
 the boundary line either of a fellow-citizen who is a neighbor, 
 or, if he dwells at the extremity of the land, of any stranger 
 who is contiguous to him, considering that this is truly " to 
 move the immovable," and every one should be more willing 
 to move the largest rock, which is not a landmark, than the 
 least stone which is the sworn arbiter of friendship and hatred 
 between neighbors ; for Zeus, the God of kindred, is the wit- 
 ness of the citizen and Zeus, the God of strangers, of the stran- 
 ger, and when aroused, terrible is their wrath. He who obeys 
 the law will never know the fatal consequences of disobedience, 
 but he who despises the law shall be liable to a double penalty, 
 the first coming from the Gods, and the second from the law. 
 For let no one voluntarily remove the boundaries of his neigh- 
 bor's land, and if any one does, let him who will, inform the 
 landowners, and let them bring him into court, and if he be 
 convicted of redividing the land by stealth or by force, let the 
 court determine what he ought to suffer or pay. In the next 
 place, many small injuries done by neighbors to one another 
 
268 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 through their multiplication, may cause a weight of enmity, 
 and make neighborhood a very disagreeable and bitter thing. 
 Wherefore a man ought to be very careful of committing any 
 offense against his neighbor, and especially of encroaching on 
 his neighbor's land ; for any man may easily do harm, but not 
 every man can do good to another. He who encroaches on 
 his neighbor's land, and transgresses his boundaries, shall make 
 good the damage, and, to cure him of his impudence and also 
 of his meanness, he shall pay a double penalty to the injured 
 party. Laws, iv. 357. 
 Laughter condemned. 
 
 Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. 
 
 For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost 
 always produces a violent reaction. 
 
 So I believe. 
 
 Then persons of worth, even if only mortal, must not be 
 represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a 
 representation of the Gods be allowed. 
 
 Still less of the Gods, as you say, he replied. 
 
 Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about 
 the Gods as that in which Homer describes how 
 
 " Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed Gods, when they saw He- 
 phaestus bustling about the mansion." 
 
 On your views, we must not admit them. 
 
 On my views, if you like to father them on me ; that we 
 must not admit them is certain. The Republic, ii. 211. 
 Laughter at self-conceit. 
 
 Soc. The vain conceits of our friends about their beauty, 
 
 wisdom, wealth, of which we made three divisions, are ridicu- 
 lous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful : 
 May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who 
 are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply 
 ridiculous ? 
 
 Pro. They are ridiculous. 
 
 Soc. And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to 
 be a misfortune ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it ? 
 
 Pro. Clearly we feel pleasure. 
 
 Soc. And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we 
 feel at the misfortunes of friends ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 269 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the 
 folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles 
 with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental 
 pain, and laughter is pleasant, and we envy and laugh at the 
 same instant. Philebus, iii. 189. 
 
 Law, preamble to, distinguished from the matter of. See Preamble, 
 
 etc. 
 
 Laws, makers of. 
 
 Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philoso- 
 phy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things 
 which a gentleman and a person of honor ought to know ; for 
 he is inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the lan- 
 guage which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, 
 whether private or public, and altogether ignorant of the pleas- 
 ures and desires of mankind and of human character in general. 
 And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics 
 or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, 
 when they make their appearance in the arena of philosophy. 
 For, as Euripides says, 
 
 " Every man shines in that and pursues that and devotes the greatest portion of 
 the day to that in which he thinks himself to excel most." 
 
 And anything in which he is inferior he avoids and depreciates, 
 and praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because 
 he thinks that he will thus praise himself. Gorgias, iii. 73. 
 Laws answering to virtue. 
 
 Cle. What ought we to say, then ? 
 
 Ath. What truth and what justice require of us, if I am 
 not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence ; 
 that the legislator when making his laws, had in view not a 
 part only, and this the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, 
 and that he devised classes of laws answering to the kinds of 
 virtue" ; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws 
 make the classes, for they only investigate arid offer laws of 
 which the want is being felt, arid one man has a class of laws 
 about inheritances in part or sole, another about assault ; oth- 
 ers about ten thousand other matters of a similar nature. But 
 we say that the right way of inquiry is to proceed as we have 
 now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition ; for you 
 are quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this 
 was the aim of the giver of the law, but I thought that you 
 
270 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 went wrong when you added that he referred all to a part, and 
 a most inferior part of virtue, and my subsequent observations 
 had a bearing on this. Laws, iv. 161. 
 Laws and music. See Music, different kinds of. 
 Laws, three classes of. 
 
 Ath. The general division 'of laws according to their im- 
 portance into a first, a second, and a third class, we who are 
 lovers of laws may make ourselves. 
 
 Meg. Very good. 
 
 Ath. We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe 
 and happy, as far as the nature of man allows, must and ought 
 to distribute honor and dishonor in the right way. And the 
 right way is to place the goods of the soul first and highest in 
 the scale, always assuming temperance as a condition of them ; 
 and in the second place, the goods of the body ; and in the 
 third place, those of money and property. And if any legis- 
 lator or State departs from this rule by giving money the place 
 of honor, or in any way preferring that which is really last, 
 may we not say, that he or the State is doing an unholy and 
 unpatriotic thing ? 
 
 Meg. Yes; let that be plainly asserted. Laws, iv. 226. 
 Laws annulled by unsuitable officers. 
 
 Ath. In the government of a State there are two parts : 
 
 First, the number of the magistrates, and the mode of appoint- 
 ing them ; and secondly, when they have been appointed, laws 
 will have to be provided for each of them, in nature and num- 
 ber suitable to them. But before electing the magistrates, let 
 us stop a little and say a word in season. 
 
 Cle. What have you got to say ? 
 
 Ath. This is what I have to say ; every one can see, that 
 although the work of legislation is a most important matter, yet 
 if a well ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable officers, 
 there will be no use in having the good laws ; not only are 
 they ridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and 
 evil accrues from them. 
 
 Cle. Of course. Laws, iv. 273. 
 Laws not received when first imposed. 
 
 Ath. I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which 
 
 we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive 
 our laws. Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, iu or- 
 der to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first im- 
 position. But if we could anyhow wait until those who have 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 271 
 
 been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured 
 in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the 
 public elections ; I say, if this could be accomplished, and rightly 
 accomplished by any way or contrivance, then, I think that 
 there would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a 
 State thus trained not being permanent. Laws, iv. 274. 
 Laws against sensual love. 
 
 Was I not just now saying that I had a way to make men 
 
 use natural love and abstain from unnatural, not intentionally 
 destroying the seeds of human increase, or sowing them in 
 stony places, in which they will take no root ; and that I would 
 command them to abstain, too, from any female field of increase 
 in which that which is sown is not likely to grow ? Now, if a 
 law to this effect could only be made perpetual, and gain an au- 
 thority such as already prevents intercourse of parents and 
 children such a law extending to other sensual desires, and 
 conquering them, would be the source of ten thousand blessings. 
 For, in the first place, moderation is the appointment of nature, 
 and deters men from all frenzy arid madness of love, and from 
 all adulteries and immoderate use of meats and drinks, and 
 makes them good friends to their own wives. And innumera- 
 ble other benefits would result if such a law could only be en- 
 forced. I can imagine some lusty youth who is standing by, 
 and who, on hearing this enactment, declares in scurrilous terms, 
 that we are making foolish and impossible laws, and fills the 
 world with his outcry. Therefore I said that I knew' a way of 
 enacting and perpetuating such a law, which was very easy in 
 one respect, but in another most difficult. There is no difficulty 
 in seeing that such a law is possible, and in what way ; for as I 
 was saying, the ordinance once consecrated would master the 
 soul of every man, and terrify him into obedience. But mat- 
 ters have now come to such a pass that the enactment of the 
 law seems to be impossible and never likely to take place just 
 as the continuance of an entire state in the practice of com- 
 mon meals is also deemed impossible. And although this lat- 
 ter is partly disproven by the fact of their existence among you, 
 still even in your cities the common meals of women would be 
 regarded as unnatural and impossible. I was thinking of the re- 
 belliousness of the human heart when I said that the permanent 
 establishment of these things is very difficult. Laws, iv. 354. 
 Laws, necessity for. 
 Mankind must have laws and conform to them, or their 
 
272 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And 
 the reason of this is, that no man's nature is able to know 
 what is best for the social state of man ; or knowing, always 
 able to do -what is best. In the first place, there is a difficulty 
 in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not 
 with private but with public good; for public good binds to- 
 gether States, but private only distracts them, nor do men 
 always see that the gain is greater both to the individual and 
 the State, when the State and not the individual is first consid- 
 ered. In the second place, even if a person know as a matter 
 of science that this is the truth, but is possessed of absolute and 
 irresponsible power, he will never be able to abide in this prin- 
 ciple or to persist in regarding the public good as primary in the 
 State, and the private good as secondary. Human nature will 
 be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding 
 pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring 
 these to the front, obscuring the jnster and better ; and so 
 working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him 
 and the whole city. For if a man were born so divinely 
 gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth he would 
 have no need of laws to rule over him ; for there is no law or 
 order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without im- 
 piety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather 
 the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free and in harmony 
 with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at 
 least not much ; and therefore we must choose law and order, 
 which are the second best. Laws, iv. 388. 
 Laws framed for whom. 
 
 Laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in 
 
 order to instruct them how they may live on friendly terms 
 with one another, and partly for the sake of those who refuse 
 to be instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued, or softened, 
 or hindered from plunging into evil. These are 'the persons 
 who cause the word to be spoken which I am about to utter ; 
 for them the legislator legislates of necessity, and in the hope 
 that there may be no need of his laws. Laws. iv. 394. 
 Lawyer, the, a slavish man. See Freedom of Philosophy . 
 Lawyers and courts of law. See Courts, etc. 
 Lawyers not teachers. 
 
 Soc. The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profes- ' 
 
 sion is against us. 
 
 Theaet. How is that, and what profession do you mean ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 273 
 
 Soc. The profession of the. great wise ones who are called 
 orators and lawyers ; for these persuade men by their art arid 
 do not teach them, but make them think whatever they like. 
 Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so 
 clever as to be able to convey to others the truth about acts of 
 robbery or violence, of which they were not eye-witnesses, 
 while a little water is flowing ? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly not, they can only persuade them. 
 
 Soc. And would you not say that persuading them is mak- 
 ing them have an opinion ? 
 
 Theaet. To be sure. 
 
 Soc. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about 
 matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in 
 any other way, and when thus judging of them from report 
 they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without 
 knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged 
 well. 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts 
 and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have 
 judged rightly without knowledge ; and therefore I must infer 
 that they are not the same. Theaetetus, iii. 407. 
 
 Lawyers, as advocates corrupting the State. See State, corrupting 
 
 the, etc. 
 Learning, the word as used. 
 
 Imagine then that you have gone through the first part 
 
 of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with 
 initiation into the correct use of terms. The two strange 
 gentlemen wanted to explain to you, as you do not know, that 
 the word. " to learn " has two meanings, and is used, first, in 
 the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of which 
 you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have 
 the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this same matter done 
 or spoken by the light of this knowledge ; this last is gener- 
 ally called "knowing" rather than "learning;" but the word 
 " learning " is also used, and you did not see that the term is 
 employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and 
 of those who do not know, as they explained. Euthydemus, i. 
 180. 
 .Learning, a process of recollection. 
 
 The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born ' 
 
 again many times, and having seen all things that there are, 
 18 
 
274 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of 
 them all ; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call 
 to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about 
 everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned 
 all things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or. as men say 
 learning, all out of a single recollection, if a man is strenuous 
 and does not faint; for all inquiry and all learning is but rec- 
 ollection. Meno, i. 255. 
 Learning, the lover of, must be truthful. 
 
 Let us assume that philosophical minds always love 
 
 knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature in 
 which is no varying from generation and corruption. 
 
 Agreed. 
 
 And further, I said, let us admit that they are lovers of all 
 true being ; there is no part, whether greater or less, or more 
 or less honorable, which they are willing to renounce ; as we 
 said before of the lover and the man of ambition. 
 
 True. 
 
 There is another quality which they will also need if they 
 are to be what we were saying. 
 
 What quality ? 
 
 Truthfulness ; they will never intentionally receive false- 
 hood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth. 
 
 Yes, he said, that may be affirmed of them. 
 
 " May be," my friend, I replied, is not the word ; say rather, 
 " must be affirmed ; " for he whose nature is amorous of any- 
 thing cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the ob- 
 ject of his affections. 
 
 Right, he said. 
 
 And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth ? 
 
 How can there be ? 
 
 Or can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of 
 falsehood ? 
 
 Never. 
 
 The true lover of learning, then, must from his earliest 
 youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth. The Republic, ii. 
 311. 
 Learning and belief. 
 
 Soc. Let me raise this question ; you would say that 
 
 there is such a thing as " having learned ? " 
 Gor. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And there is also " having believed ? * 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 275 
 
 Gor. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And is the " having learned " the same as " having be- 
 lieved," and are learning and belief the same things ? 
 
 Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same. 
 
 Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in 
 this way : if a person were to say to you, " Is there, Gorgias, 
 a false belief as well as a true ? " you would reply, if I am not 
 mistaken, that there is. 
 
 Gor. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true ? 
 
 Gor. No. 
 
 Soc. No, indeed ; and this again proves that knowledge and 
 belief differ. 
 
 Gor. That is true. 
 
 Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who 
 have believed are persuaded ? 
 
 Gor. That is so. 
 
 Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion, one 
 which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other 
 is of knowledge ? 
 
 Gor. By all means. 
 
 Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in 
 courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, 
 the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, 
 or that which gives knowledge ? 
 
 Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief. 
 
 Soc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a 
 persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but 
 gives no instruction about them ? 
 
 Gor. True. Gorgias, iii. 39. 
 Learning, facility in. 
 
 - Which, I said, is better facility in learning, or difficulty 
 in learning? 
 
 Facility. 
 
 Yes, I said ; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and 
 difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly ? 
 
 True. 
 
 And is it not better to teach one another quickly and ener- 
 getically, rather than quietly and slowly ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily 
 that is also better than to remember quietly and slowly ? 
 
276 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, 
 and not a quietness ? 
 
 True. 
 
 And is it not best to understand what is said, whether at the 
 writing-master's or the music-master's, or anywhere else, not as 
 quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And when the soul inquires, and in deliberations, not the 
 quietest, as I imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates 
 and discovers, is thought worthy of praise, but he who does this 
 most easily and quickly? 
 
 That is true, he said. 
 
 And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and 
 activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness? 
 
 That, he said, is the inference. Charmides, i. 14. 
 
 Legacies of wealth to children an evil. See Children, riches an 
 
 evil left to. 
 Legislation, the true aim of. 
 
 Soc. Whatever name he gives to the thing, he would 
 
 allow that the good or expedient is the aim of legislation, and 
 that the State as far as possible imposes all laws with a view 
 to the greatest expediency ; can legislatfon have any other aim ? 
 
 Theod. Certainly not. 
 
 Soc. But is the aim attained always? may not mistakes 
 often happen ? 
 
 Theod. Yes, I think that there are mistakes. 
 
 Soc. The possibility of error will be more distinctly recog- 
 nized, if we put the question in reference to the whole class 
 under which the good or expedient falls. That whole class has 
 to do with the future, and laws are passed under the idea that 
 they will be useful in after time ; which, in other words, is the 
 future. 
 
 Theod. Very true. Theaetetus, iii. 380. 
 Legislation cannot be particular. 
 
 Str. Let us consider, further, that the legislator who has 
 
 to preside over the herd, and to enforce justice in their deal- 
 ings with one another, will not be able, in enacting for the 
 general good, to provide exactly what is suitable for each par- 
 ticular case. 
 
 T. Soc. He cannot be expected to do this. 
 
 Str. He will lay down laws in a general form for the major- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 277 
 
 ity, roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them 
 he will deliver in writing, and others will be unwritten ; and 
 these last will be traditional customs of the country. 
 
 T. Soc. That will be right. 
 
 Str. Yes, that will be right ; for how can he sit at every 
 man's side all through his life, and prescribe for him the exact 
 particulars of his duty ? Who, Socrates, would be sufficient for 
 sm-li a task ? No one who really had the royal science, if he 
 had been able to do this, would have imposed upon himself the 
 restriction of having a written code of laws. Statesman, iii. 
 580. 
 
 Legislation, comprehensive. See Laws answering to virtue. 
 Legislation, the beginning of. 
 
 Ath. There is another thing which would probably 
 happen. 
 
 Cle. What is that ? 
 
 Ath. When these larger habitations grew up out of the 
 lesser original ones, each of the lesser ones would survive in 
 the larger ; every family would be under the rule of the eld- 
 est, and, owing to 'their separation from one another, would 
 have peculiar customs in things divine and human, which they 
 would have received from their several parents who had edu- 
 cated them ; and these customs would incline them to order, 
 when the parents had the element of order in them ; and to 
 courage, when they had the element of courage in them. And 
 they would naturally stamp upon their children, and upon their 
 children's children, their own institutions ; and, as we are say- 
 ing, they would find their way into the larger society, having 
 already their own peculiar laws. 
 
 Cle. Certainly. 
 
 Ath. And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the 
 laws of others not so well. 
 
 Cle. True. 
 
 Ath. Then now we seem to have stumbled upon the begin- 
 nings of legislation ? 
 
 Cle. Exactly. 
 
 Ath. The next step will be that these persons, who meet to- 
 gether, must choose some arbiters, who will inspect the laws of 
 all of them, and will publicly present such of them as they 
 approve to "the chiefs who lead the tribes, and are in a manner 
 their kings, and will give them the choice of them. These 
 will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the mag- 
 
278 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 istrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, 
 out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of 
 the government they will live. 
 
 Cle. Yes, they would be appointed in the order which you 
 mention. Laws, iv. 210. 
 Legislation, chance in. 
 
 Ath. I was going to say that man never legislates, but 
 that accidents of all sorts legislate for us in all sorts of ways. 
 The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are 
 constantly overturning governments and changing laws. And 
 the power of disease has often caused innovations in the State, 
 when there have been pestilences, and bad seasons continuing 
 during many years. Any one who sees all this, naturally 
 rushes to the conclusion of which I was speaking, that no mor- 
 tal legislates in anything, but that in human affairs chance is 
 almost everything. Laws, iv. 236. 
 Legislation, force and persuasion in. See Persuasion. 
 
 Legislators never appear to have considered that whereas 
 they have two instruments which they might use in legislation, 
 persuasion and force, in so far as a rude and uneducated 
 multitude are capable of being affected by them, they use one 
 only ; for they do not mingle persuasion with antagonism, but 
 employ force pure and simple. Laws, iv. 249. 
 Legislative ignorance destroying States. See Ignorance, etc. 
 Legislative purification. 
 
 - Take, for example, the purification of a city there are 
 many kinds of purification, some easier and others more diffi- 
 cult; and some of them, and the best and most difficult of 
 them, the legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to 
 effect ; but he who without a despotism sets up a new govern- 
 ment and laws, even if he attempt the mildest of purgations, 
 may think himself happy if he can complete his work. When 
 best the purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, 
 involving righteous punishment and inflicting death or exile in 
 the last resort. For in this way we commonly dispose of 
 great sinners who are incurable, and are the greatest injury of 
 the whole State. But the milder form of purification is as fol- 
 lows : When men who have nothing, and are in want of food, 
 show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the 
 property of the rich these, who are the natural plague of 
 the State, are sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit as 
 far as he is able ; and this dismissal of them is euphemistically 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 279 
 
 termed a colony And every legislator should contrive to do 
 this at once. Our present case, however, is peculiar. For 
 there is no need to devise any colony or purifying separation 
 under the circumstances in which we are placed. But, as 
 when many streams flow together from springs and mountain 
 torrents into a single lake, we ought to attend and take care 
 that the confluence of water should be perfectly clear ; and in 
 order to effect this, should pump and draw off and divert im- 
 purities, so in every political arrangement there may be trouble 
 and danger. But, seeing that we are discoursing and not act- 
 ing, let our selection be supposed to be completed, and the de- 
 sired purity attained. Touching evil men, who want to join 
 and be citizens of our State, we will not allow them to come 
 until we have tested them by persuasion and time ; but the 
 good we will to the utmost of our ability receive as friends 
 with open arms. Laws, iv. 260. 
 Legislator, Homer not a. 
 
 - I think that we must put a question to Homer ; not 
 about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only in- 
 cidentally refer ; we sire not going to ask him, or any other 
 poet, whether he ha< cured patients like Asclepius, or left be- 
 hind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or 
 whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second- 
 hand, but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, 
 politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects 
 of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. ' : Friend 
 Homer," then we say, " if you are only in the second remove 
 from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third 
 not an image-maker or imitator and if you are able to dis- 
 cern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or 
 public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your 
 help ? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, 
 and many other cities great and small have been similarly ben- 
 efited by others ; but who says that you have been a good 
 legislator to them and have done them any good ? Italy and 
 Sicily can tell of Charondas, and there is Solon who is re- 
 nowned among us ; but what city has anything to say about 
 you ? " Is there any city which he might name ? 
 
 I think not, said Glaucon ; not even the Homeridae them- 
 selves pretend that he was a legislator. 
 
 Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on 
 successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was 
 alive ? 
 
280 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 There is Dot. 
 
 Or is there any invention of his applicable to the arts, or 
 to human life, such as Thales the Milesian, or Anacharsis the 
 Scythian, and other ingenious men have made, which is at- 
 tributed to him ? 
 
 There is nothing at all of the kind. 
 
 But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately 
 a guide or teacher of any ? Had he in his life-time friends 
 and associates who loved him, and handed down to posterity an 
 Homeric way of life, as Pythagoras was beloved and his suc- 
 cessors, who at this day call their way of life by his name, and 
 do appear to have a certain distinction above other men ? 
 
 Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Soc- 
 rates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of 
 flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more 
 justly ridiculed for his want of education, if, as is said, Homer 
 was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when 
 he was alive ? 
 
 Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, 
 Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and 
 improve mankind, if he had possessed knowledge and not been 
 a mere imitator can you imagine, I say, that he would not 
 have had many followers, and been honored and loved by 
 them ? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a 
 host of others, have only to suggest to their contemporaries 
 that they will never be able to manage either their own house' 
 or their State unless they are made by them presidents of edu- 
 cation ; and for this wisdom of theirs tney are so much be- 
 loved that their companions all but carry them about on their 
 heads. And are we to believe that the contemporaries of 
 Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them 
 to beg their way as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to 
 improve mankind? Would they not have been as unwilling to 
 part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at 
 home with them ? Or, if the master would not stay, then the 
 disciples would have followed him about everywhere until they 
 had got education enough ? 
 
 Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true. The Republic, 
 ii. 430. 
 Legislator, compared to a physician. See Rulers, compared to, etc. 
 
 Str. Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or 
 
 trainer, who is about to go into a far country, and is expecting 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHT*. 281 
 
 to bo ii long time away from his patients ; he leaves written in- 
 structions for the patients or pupils, under the idea that they 
 will not be remembered unless they are written down. 
 
 Y. Soo. True. 
 
 Str. But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he 
 intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or 
 other celestial influences, some other remedies happened to be 
 better for them, would he not venture to suggest those other 
 remedies, although differing from his former prescription ? 
 Would he persist in observing the original law, neither himself 
 giving any new commandments, nor the patient daring to do 
 otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea that this course 
 only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and hetero- 
 dox ? Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not 
 all such regulations be utterly ridiculous ? 
 
 T. Soc. Quite true. 
 
 Str. And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, deter- 
 mining what was good or bad, honorable or dishonorable, just 
 or unjust to the tribes of men who herd in their several cities, 
 and are governed in accordance with them ; if, I say, the wise 
 legislator were suddenly to come again, or another like to him, 
 is he to be prohibited from changing them; 'would not this 
 prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the other ? 
 
 T. Soc. Certainly. Statesman, iii. 581. 
 
 Legislators not always to obey their constituency. See Constitu- 
 ency. 
 
 Leveling of anarchy. See Anarchy. 
 
 Liberal education, a sign of. See Education, sign of a, etc. 
 
 Liberty allowed the lover. 
 
 Consider, how great is the encouragement which all the 
 world gives to the lover ; neither is he supposed to be doing 
 anything dishonorable ; but if he succeeds he is praised, and if 
 iie fail he is blamed. And in the pursuit of his love the cus- 
 tom of mankind allows him to do many strange things, which 
 philosophy would bitterly censure if they were done from any 
 motive of interest, or wish for office or power. He may pray, 
 and entreat, and supplicate, and swear, and be a servant of ser- 
 vants, and lie on a mat at the door ; in any other case friends 
 'and enemies would be equally ready to prevent him, but now 
 there is no friend who will be ashamed of him and admonish 
 him, and no enemy will charge him with meanness or flattery ; 
 the actions of a lover have a grace which ennobles them ; and 
 
282 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 custom has decided that they are highly commendable and that 
 there is no loss of character in them ; and what is strangest of 
 all he only may swear and forswear himself (this is what the 
 world says), and the Gods will forgive his transgression, for 
 there is no such thing as a lover's oath. Such is the entire 
 liberty which Gods and men have allowed the lover, according 
 to the custom which prevails in our part of the world. The 
 Symposium, i. 477. 
 Liberty, popular. See Democracy. 
 Liberty and license. See Anarchy. 
 License, spirit of. 
 
 Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him; he says 
 
 that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the 
 State always change with them. 
 
 Yes, said Adeimantus ; and you may add my suffrage to 
 Damon's and your own. 
 
 Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their 
 fortress in music ? 
 
 Yes, he said ; and the license of which you speak very 
 easily creeps in. 
 
 Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement ; and at first sight 
 appears harmless. 
 
 Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm ; were it riot that lit- 
 tle by little, the spirit of license, finding a home, penetrates into 
 manners arid customs ; whence, issuing with greater force, it in- 
 vades agreements between man arid man, and from agreements 
 goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, and 
 ends, Socrates, by an overthrow of all things, private as well 
 as public. 
 
 Is that true ? I said. 
 
 That is my belief, he replied. 
 
 Then, as I was saying, our youth should be educated in a 
 stricter rule from the first, for if education becomes lawless, 
 and the youths themselves become lawless, they can never grow 
 up into well-conducted and meritorious citizens. 
 
 Very true, he said. The Republic, ii. 248. 
 License, freedom growing to. See Freedom growing to, etc. 
 Lie, a, when committed. See Fiction. 
 Lie, God cannot utter a. See Deception. 
 Lies for the good of the State. 
 
 Truth should be highly valued ; if, as we were saying, 
 
 a lie is useless to the Gods, and useful only as a medicine to 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 283 
 
 men, then the use of such medicines will have to be restricted 
 to physicians ; private individuals have no business with them. 
 
 Clearly riot, he said. 
 
 Then if any persons are to have the privilege of lying, 
 either at home or abroad, they will be the rulers of the State ; 
 they may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody 
 else is to meddle with anything of the kind ; and for a private 
 man to lie in return to the rulers is to be deemed a more 
 heinous fault than for a patient or the pupil of a gymnasium 
 not to speak the truth about his qvvn bodily illnesses to the 
 physician or trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain 
 truly how matters are going on in a ship. 
 
 Most true, he said. 
 
 If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in 
 the State, 
 
 " Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter," 
 
 he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally 
 subversive of ship or State. 
 
 Yes, he said, if our theory is carried into execution. The 
 Republic, ii. 211. 
 Life a valued good. 
 
 Soc. If, acting under the advice of men who have no un- 
 derstanding, we destroy that which is improved by health and 
 deteriorated by disease would life be worth having ? And 
 that which has been destroyed is the body ? 
 
 Or. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body ? 
 
 Or. Certainly not. 
 
 Soc. And will life be worth having, if that higher part of 
 man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and deteriorated 
 by injustice ? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may 
 be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be in- 
 ferior to the body ? 
 
 Cr. Certainly not. 
 
 Soc. More honored, then ? 
 
 Cr. Far more honored. 
 
 Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many 
 say of us : but what he, the one man who has understanding of 
 just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And 
 therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should 
 regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and 
 
284 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 evil, honorable and dishonorable. "Well, some one will say, 
 " But the many can kill us." 
 
 Or. Yes, Socrates ; that will clearly be the answer. 
 
 Soc. That is true : but still I find with surprise that the old 
 argument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. And I should 
 like to know whether I may say the same of another proposi- 
 tion that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued ? 
 
 Or. Yes, that also remains. 
 
 Soc. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable 
 one that holds also ? 
 
 Or. Yes, that holds. Orito, i. 352. 
 Life of the body, the soul the. See Soul giving life. 
 Life and death not to be considered in questions of duty. See 
 
 Death and life, etc. 
 Life, when unendurable. 
 
 In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become 
 
 ridiculous. If, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no 
 longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats 
 and drinks, and having all wealth and all power, shall we be 
 told that, when the very essence of the vital principle is un- 
 dermined and corrupted, even though a man be allowed to do 
 whatever he pleases, life is still werth having to him, if he be 
 forbidden to escape from vice and injustice, or attain justice 
 and virtue, seeing that we now know the true nature of each ? 
 
 Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as 
 we are near the spot at which we may see the truth with 
 our own eyes, let us not faint by the way. The Republic, 
 ii. 272. 
 Life a fearful thing. 
 
 Soc. There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of 
 
 approaching the argument ; for what you say is what the rest 
 of the world think, but are unwilling to say. And I must beg 
 of you to persevere that the true rule of human life may be- 
 come manifest. Tell me, then : you say, do you not, that in 
 the rightly developed man the passions ought not to be con- 
 trolled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and 
 somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue ? 
 
 Col. Yes ; that is what I say. 
 
 Soc. Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be 
 happy ? - 
 
 Gal. No, indeed, for then stones and dead men would be 
 the happiest of all. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 285 
 
 Soc. But surely according to you life is an awful thing ; and 
 I think that Euripides may have been right in saying, 
 
 "Who knows if life be not death and death life; " 
 
 for I think that we are very likely dead ; and I have heard a 
 wise man say that at this very moment we are dead, and that 
 the body(o-a>/xa) is a tomb (o-^/xa), and that the part of the soul 
 which is the seat of the desires is. liable to be blown and tossed 
 about. Gorgias, iii. 81. 
 Life, protracted, not to be desired. 
 
 O my friend ! I want you to see that the noble and the 
 good may possibly be something different from saving and be- 
 ing saved, and that he who is truly a man ought not to care 
 about living a certain time : he knows, as women say, that we 
 must all die, and therefore he is not fond of life ; he leaves all 
 that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend 
 his appointed term. Gorgias, iii. 104. 
 Life, spontaneous. 
 
 Str. It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing 
 
 in the then order of nature as the procreation of animals from 
 one another ; what we have heard of as the earth-born race 
 was the one which existed in. that second cycle they sprang 
 out of the ground in which they were sown ; and of this tradi- 
 tion, which is nowadays often unduly discredited, our ances- 
 tors, who came into being immediately after the end of the last 
 period and at the beginning of this, are the heralds to us. For 
 mark how consistent the sequel of the tale is ; after the return 
 of age to youth, follows the return of the dead, who are lying 
 in the earth, to life ; the wheel of their existence has been 
 turned back, and they come together and rise and live in the 
 opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to 
 some other lot. Such is the tradition of the so-called earth- 
 born men and so of necessity they came into being. States- 
 man, iii. 555. 
 
 Life, goods of. See Goods, etc. 
 Life, progression of. See Progression, etc. 
 Life, reason the rule of. 
 
 May we not regard every living being as a puppet of the 
 
 Gods, either their plaything only, or created with a pur- 
 pose which of the two w cannot certainly know ? But 
 this we know, that these affections in us are like cords and 
 strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to oppo- 
 
286 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 site actions ; and herein lies the difference between virtue and 
 vice. According to the argument there is one among these 
 cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but 
 to pull with it against all the rest ; and this is the sacred and 
 golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the 
 State ; there are others which are hard and of iron, but this is 
 soft because golden ; and there are several other kinds. Now 
 we ought always to cooperate with the lead of the best, which 
 is law! For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and 
 not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help 
 the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And 
 thus the moral tale about our being puppets will riot be lost, 
 and the meaning of the expression " superior or inferior to a 
 man's self" will become clearer ; as also that in this matter of 
 pulling the strings of the puppet, cities as well as individuals 
 should live according to reason ; which the individual attains 
 in himself, and the city receives from some God, or from the 
 legislator and makes it her law in her dealings with herself and 
 with other States. In this way virtue and vice will be mo"e 
 clearly distinguished by us. And when they have become 
 clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner be- 
 come clearer ; and in particular that question of convivial en- 
 tertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very 
 trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words 
 than were necessary. Laws, iv. 175. 
 Life, the nobler. 
 
 Enough has now been said of divine matters, both as 
 
 touching the practices which men ought to follow, and the 
 several characters which they ought to cultivate. But of 
 human things we have not as yet spoken, and we must ; for to 
 men we are discoursing and not to Gods. Pleasures and pains 
 and desires are a part of human nature, and on them every 
 mortal being must of necessity hang and depend with the most 
 eager interest. And therefore we must praise the noblest life, 
 not only as the fairest in appearance, but if a man will only 
 taste, and not as in the days of youth run away to another, he 
 will find that this nobler life surpasses also in the very thing 
 which we all of us desire, I mean in having the greatest 
 pleasure and the least pain during the whole of life. And this 
 will be plain, and will be quickly and clearly seen, if a man 
 has a true taste of them. : But what is a true taste ? That we 
 have to learn from the argument, the point being what 
 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 287 
 
 according to nature, and what is not according to nature. One 
 life must be compared with another ; the more pleasurable 
 with the more painful, after this manner : We desire to have 
 pleasure, but we neither desire nor choose pain ; and the neu- 
 tral state we are ready to take in exchange, not for pleasure, 
 but for pain ; and we also choose less pain and greater 
 pleasure, but less pleasure and greater pain we do not choose ; 
 and an equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert 
 that we should desire. And all these differ or do not differ 
 severally in number and magnitude and intensity and equality, 
 and in the opposites of these when regarded as objects of 
 choice, in relation to the will. And such being the necessary 
 order of things, we choose that life in which there are many 
 great and intense elements of pleasure and pain, and in which 
 the pleasures are in excess, and do not choose that in which 
 the opposites exceed ; nor, again, do we choose that in which 
 the elements of either are small and few and feeble, and the 
 pains exceed. And when, as I said before, there is a balance 
 ^ pleasure and pain in life, this is to be regarded by us as the 
 balanced life ; while other lives are preferred by us because 
 they exceed in what we like, or are rejected by us because 
 they exceed in what we dislike. All the lives of men may be 
 regarded by us as bound up in these, and we must also consider 
 what sort of lives we by nature choose. And if we wish for 
 any others, I say that we choose them only through some 
 ignorance and inexperience of the lives which actually exist. 
 
 Now, what lives are they, and how many in which, having 
 searched out and beheld the objects of will and desire and their 
 opposites, and making of them a law, choosing, I say, the dear 
 and the pleasant and the best and noblest, a man may live in 
 the happiest way possible ? Let us say that the temperate life 
 is one kind of life, and the rational another, and the courageous 
 another, and the healthful another ; and to these four let us 
 oppose four other lives, the foolish, the cowardly, the intem- 
 perate, the diseased. He who knows the temperate life will 
 describe it as in all things gentle, having gentle pains and 
 gentle pleasures, and placid desires and loves not insane ; 
 whereas the intemperate life is impetuous in all things, and has 
 violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and stinging desires, 
 and loves utterly insane ; and in the temperate life the pleas- 
 ures exceed the pains, but in the intemperate life the pains ex- 
 ceed the pleasures in greatness and number and intensity. 
 
288 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Hence one of the two lives is naturally and necessarily more 
 pleasant and the other more painful, and he who would live 
 pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperately. 
 Laws, iv. 258. 
 
 Likeness of the world. See Animal, etc. 
 Likeness-making. 
 
 Str. I think that I can discern two divisions of the imi- 
 tative art, but I am not as yet able to see in which of them the 
 desired form is to be found. 
 
 Theaet. Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of 
 which you are speaking ? 
 
 Str. One is the art of likeness-making ; generally a likeness 
 is made by producing a copy which is executed according to 
 the proportions of the original, similar in length and breadth 
 and depth, and also having colors answering to the several 
 parts. 
 
 Theaet. But is not this always the case in imitation ? 
 
 Str. Not always ; in works either of sculpture or of paint- 
 ing, which are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of 
 deception ; for if the true proportions were given, the upper 
 part, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion 
 in comparison with the lower, which is nearer ; and so our 
 artists give up the truth in their images and make only the 
 proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real 
 ones. 
 
 Theaet. Quite true. 
 
 Str. And that which being other is also like, may we not 
 fairly call a likeness or image ? 
 
 Theaet. Yes. 
 
 Str. And may we not, as I did just now, call that part o 
 the imitative art which is concerned with making such image 
 the art of likeness-making ? % 
 
 Theaet. Let that be the name. 
 
 Str. And what shall we call that resemblance of the beanti 
 ful, which is due to the unfavorable position of the spectator 
 but if a person had the power of seeing the great works o 
 which I was speaking as they truly are, would appear no 
 even like that to which it professes to be like ? May we no 
 call this an appearance, since it appears only and is not really 
 like? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Str. There is a great deal of this in painting, and in all im 
 itation ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 289 
 
 Theaet. Of course. 
 
 Sir. And may we not fairly call the sort of art which pro- 
 duces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art ? 
 TJieaet. That is very fair. 
 
 Sir. Then there are two kinds of image-making the art 
 of making likenesses and phantastic, or the art of making ap- 
 pearances ? 
 
 Theaet. True. Sophist, iii. 470. 
 Limit and cause in the universe. 
 
 Soc. Should we not be wise in maintaining that there is 
 
 in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit of 
 which we have often spoken, as well as a cause of no mean 
 power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and 
 months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind ? 
 
 Pro. Most justly. 
 
 Soc. And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly not. 
 
 Soc. And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say 
 that there is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in 
 him the power of the cause? And other Gods have other 
 noble attributes, whereby they love severally to be called. 
 
 Pro. Very true. 
 
 Soc. Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken 
 by us, Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the tes- 
 timony of those who said of old time that mind rules the uni- 
 verse. 
 
 Pro. True. Philebus, iii. 166. 
 Limitation of law and order. See Order and Law. 
 Little things, God attends to. 
 
 Aih. Let us not deem God inferior to human workmen, 
 who, in proportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, 
 small as well as great, by one and the same art ; or that God, 
 the wisest of beings, who is willing and able to extend his 
 care to all things, like a lazy good-for-nothing, wants a holi- 
 day, and takes no thought of smaller and easier matters, but 
 of the greater only. Laws, iv. 415. 
 
 Love the eldest of the Gods and the source of the greatest bene- 
 fits. 
 
 Phaedrus began by affirming that Love is a mighty God, 
 
 and wonderful among Gods and men, but especially wonderful 
 
 in his birth. For that he is the eldest of the Gods is an 
 
 honor to him ; and a proof of this is, that of his parents there 
 
 19 
 
290 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 is no memorial ; neither poet nor prose-writer has ever af- 
 firmed that he had any. As Hesiod says : . 
 
 " First Chaos came, and then broad-bosomed Earth, 
 The everlasting seat of all that is, 
 And Love." 
 
 In other words, after Chaos, the Earth and Love, these two 
 came into being. Also Parmenides sings of the generation of 
 the Gods : 
 
 " First in the train of Gods, he fashioned Love." 
 
 And Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod. Thus numerous are the 
 witnesses which acknowledge Love to be the eldest of the 
 Gods. And not only is he the eldest, he is also the source of 
 the greatest benefits to us. For I know not any greater bless- 
 ing to a young man beginning life than a virtuous lover, or to 
 the lover than a beloved youth. For the principle which ought 
 to be the guide of men who would nobly live that principle, 
 I say, neither kindred, nor honor, nor wealth, nor any other 
 motive is able to implant so well as love. Of what am I 
 speaking ? Of the sense of honor and dishonor, without 
 which neither States nor individuals ever do any good or great 
 work. The Symposium, i. 473. 
 Love, courage increased by. See Courage. 
 Love, honor and dishonor in. 
 
 There is dishonor in yielding to the evil, or in an evil 
 
 manner ; but there is honor in yielding to the good, or in an 
 honorable manner. Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the 
 body rather than the soul, and who is inconstant because he is 
 a lover of the inconstant ; and therefore when the bloom of 
 youth which he was desiring is over, he takes wing and flies 
 away, in spite of all his words and promises ; whereas the 
 love of the noble mind, which is one with the unchanging, is 
 life-long. The custom of our country would have them both 
 proven well and truly, and would have us yield to the one sort 
 of lover and avoid the other, and therefore encourages some to 
 pursue and others to fly ; testing both the lover and the be- 
 loved in contests and trials, which will show to which of the 
 two classes they respectively belong. The Symposium, i. 
 478. 
 
 Love, virtue the basis of. 
 
 There remains, then, only one way of honorable attach- 
 ment which custom allows in the beloved, and this is the way 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 291 
 
 of virtue ; for as we admitted that any service which the lover 
 does to him is not to be accounted flattery or dishonor, so the 
 beloved has also one way of voluntary service which is not 
 dishonorable, and this is virtuous service. 
 
 For we have a custom, and according to our custom, any 
 one who does service to another under the idea that he will be 
 improved by him either in wisdom, or in some other particular 
 of virtue such a voluntary service, I say, is not regarded as 
 a dishonor, and is not open to the charge of flattery. And 
 these two customs, one the love of youth, and the other the 
 practice of philosophy and virtue in general, ought to meet in 
 one, and then the beloved may honorably indulge the lover. 
 For when the lover and beloved come together, having each of 
 them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any 
 service which he can to his gracious loving one ; and the other 
 that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him 
 who is making him wise and good ; the one capable of com- 
 municating wisdom and virtue, the other seeking to acquire 
 them with a view to education and wisdom ; when the two 
 laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one then, and then 
 only, may the beloved yield with honor to the lover. Nor 
 when love is of this disinterested sort is there any disgrace in 
 being deceived, but in every other case there is equal disgrace 
 in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to 
 his lover under the impression that he is rich, and is disap- 
 pointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor, is dis- 
 graced all the same ; for he has done his best to show that he 
 would turn himself to any one's base uses for the sake of 
 money, and this is not honorable. But on the same principle 
 he who lives for the sake of virtue, and in the hope that he 
 will be improved by his lover's company, shows himself to be 
 virtuous, even though the object of his affection be proved to 
 be a villain, and to have no virtue ; and if he is deceived he 
 has committed a noble error. For he has proved that for his 
 part he will do anything for anybody for the sake of virtue 
 and improvement, than which there can be nothing nobler. 
 Thus noble in every case is the acceptance of another for the 
 sake of virtue. This is that love which is the love of the 
 heavenly goddess, and is heavenly, and of great price to indi- 
 viduals and cities, making the lover and the beloved alike eager 
 in the work of their own improvement. But all other loves 
 are the offspring of the other who is a common goddess. 
 The Symposium, I 478. 
 
292 - PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Love, double in all things. 
 
 Eryximachus spoke as follows : Seeing that Pausanias 
 
 made a fair beginning, and but a lame ending, I must endeavor 
 to supply his deficiency. I think that he has rightly distin- 
 guished two kinds of love. But my art further informs me 
 that a double love is to be found in all animals and plants, and 
 I' may say in all that is ; and is not merely an affection of the 
 soul of man towards the fair, or towards anything ; that, I say, 
 is a view of the subject which I seem to have gathered from 
 my own art of medicine, which shows me how great and won- 
 derful and universal is the deity of love whose empire extends 
 over all that is, divine as well as human. And from medicine 
 I will begin that I may do honor to my art. For there are in 
 the human body two loves, which are confessedly different and 
 unlike, and being unlike, have loves and desires which are un- 
 like ; and the desire of the healthy is one, and the desire of the 
 diseased is another ; and, as Pausanias says, to indulge good 
 men is honorable and bad men dishonorable ; and so too in the 
 body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the 
 bad elements and the elements of desire are not to be indulged, 
 but discouraged. And this is what the physician has to do, and 
 in this the art of medicine consists : for medicine may be regarded 
 generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the body, 
 and how to satisfy them or not ; and the good physician is he 
 who is able to separate fair love from foul, or to convert one 
 into the other; and he who knows how to eradicate and how 
 to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the 
 most hostile elements in the constitution, and make them friends, 
 is a skillful practitioner. The Symposium, i. 480. 
 Love, divination as to. See Divination. 
 Love, the youngest. 
 
 I would rather praise the God first, and then speak of his 
 gifts ; this is always the right way of praising everything. 
 I say without impiety or offense, that of all the blessed Gods 
 he is the blessedest because he is the fairest and best ? Am 
 he is the fairest, because, in the first place, Phaedrus, he is th< 
 youngest, and of his youth he is himself the witness, fleeing 01 
 of the way of age, who is swift enough surely, swifter thai 
 most of us like : love hates him and will not come near hii 
 but youth and love live and move together, like to like, 
 the proverb says. There are many things which Phaedrus saic 
 about Love in which I agree with him ; but I cannot agree tl 
 
LATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 293 
 
 he is older than lapetus and Kronos that is not the truth ; 
 as I maintain, he is the youngest of the Gods, and youthful 
 ever. The ancient things of which Hesiod and Parmenides 
 speak, if they were done at all, were done of Necessity and not 
 of Love ; had Love been in those days, there would have been 
 no chaining or mutilation of the Gods, or other violence, but 
 peace and sweetness, as there is now in heaven, since the rule 
 of Love began. The Symposium, i. 488. 
 Love, tenderness and flexibility of. 
 
 - Love is young and also tender ; he ought to have a poet 
 like Homer to describe his tenderness, as Homer says of Ate, 
 that she is a goddess and tender : 
 
 " Her feet are tender, for she sets her steps 
 Not on the ground but on the heads of men : " 
 
 which is an excellent proof of her tenderness, because she walks 
 not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us adduce a similar 
 proof of the tenderness of Love ; for he walks not upon the 
 earth, nor yet upon the skulls of men, which are not so very 
 soft, but in the hearts and souls of men : in them he walks and 
 dwells and has his home. Not in every soul without excep- 
 tion, for where there is hardness he departs, where there is 
 softness there he dwells ; and nestling always with his feet and 
 in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how can he 
 be other than the softest of all things ? And therefore he is 
 the tenderest as well as the youngest, and also he is of flexile 
 form ; for if he were hard and without flexure he could not en- 
 fold all things, or wind his way into and out of every soul of 
 man undiscovered. And a proof of his flexibility and symme- 
 try of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in 
 an especial manner the attribute of Love ; ungrace and love 
 are always at war with one another. The fairness of his com- 
 plexion is revealed by his habitation among the flowers ; for he 
 dwells not amid bloomless or fading beauties, whether of body 
 or soul or aught else, but in the place of flowers and scents, 
 there he sits and abides. Enough of his beauty, of which, 
 however, there is more to tell. But I must now speak of his 
 virtue : his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer 
 wrong to or from any God or any man ; for he suffers not by 
 force if he suffers ; force comes not near him, neither does he 
 act by force. For all men in all things serve him of their 
 own free-will, and where there is voluntary agreement, there, 
 as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is justice. And 
 
294 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 not only is he just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance 
 is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no 
 pleasure ever masters Love ; he is their master and they are 
 his servants ; and if he conquers them he must be temperate 
 indeed. As to courage, even the God of War is no match for 
 him ; he is the captive and Love is the lord, for love, the love 
 of Aphrodite, masters him, as the tale runs ; and the master is 
 stronger than the servant. And if he conquers the bravest of 
 all others he must be himself the bravest. Of his courage and 
 justice and temperance I have spoken ; but I have yet to speak 
 of his wisdom, and I must try to do my best, according to the 
 measure of my ability. For in the first place he is a poet (and 
 here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art), and he is also the 
 source of poesy in others, which he could not be if he were not 
 himself a poet. And at the touch of him every one becomes a 
 poet, even though he had no music in him before ; this also is 
 a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the 
 fine arts ; for no one can give to another that which he has 
 not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowledge. Who 
 will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing ? Are 
 they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him ? 
 And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them 
 whom love inspires has the light of fame ? he whom love 
 touches not walks in darkness. The Symposium, i. 488. 
 Love a spiritual power. 
 
 " What then is Love ? " I asked ; " Is he mortal ? " No." 
 
 " What then ? " " As in the former instance, he is neither 
 mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two." " What 
 is he then, Diotima ? " " He is a great spirit (Sat/xwi/), and 
 like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the 
 mortal." " And what," I said, " is his power ? " " He inter- 
 prets," she replied, " between Gods and men, conveying to the 
 Gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the com- 
 mands and replies of the Gods ; he is the mediator who spans 
 the chasm which divides them, and in him all is bound together, 
 and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their 
 sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and in- 
 cantation, find their way. For God mingles not with man ; 
 but through Love all the intercourse and speech of God with 
 man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom 
 which understands this is spiritual ; all other wisdom, such as 
 that of arts or handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now these 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 295 
 
 spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of 
 
 them is Love." The Symposium, i. 495. 1 
 
 Love escaped from in age. See Age. 
 
 Love sensual, laws against, impossible. See Laws against sensual 
 
 lore. 
 
 Love, a madness. See Madness. 
 Loves, the two. 
 
 The old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love 
 the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the 
 duty of accepting the temperate, and those who are as yet in- 
 temperate only that they may become temperate, and of pre- 
 serving their love ; and again, of the vulgar Polyhymnia, who 
 must be used with circumspection that the pleasure may not 
 generate licentiousness ; just as in my own art it is a great 
 matter to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may grat- 
 ify his tastes without the attendant evil of disease. The con- 
 clusion is, that in music, in medicine, in all other things human 
 as well as divine, both loves ought to be noted as far as may 
 be, for they are both present. The Symposium, i. 481. 
 Lover, liberty allowed the. See Liberty allowed. 
 
 Lover, madness of the. See Madness of the prophet. 
 Lover, wise and unwise, the. 
 
 O Hippothales, thou son of Hieronymus ! do not say that 
 you are, or that you are not in love ; the confession is too late ; 
 for I see not only that you are in love, but that you are already 
 far gone in your love. Simple and foolish as I am, the Gods 
 have given me the power of understanding this sort of affections. 
 
 At this he blushed more and more. 
 
 Ctesippus said : I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, and 
 hesitating to tell Socrates the name ; when, if he were with 
 you but for a very short time, he would be plagued to death 
 by hearing of nothing else. Indeed, Socrates, he has literally 
 deafened us, and stopped our ears with the praises of Lysis ; 
 and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every likelihood that 
 we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Lysis. His 
 performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in 
 comparison with his verse ; and when he drenches us with his 
 poems and other compositions, that is really too bad ; and 
 what is even worse, is his manner of singing them to his love ; 
 this he does in a voice which is truly appalling, and we cannot 
 
 1 In order to appreciate the full beauty and force of Plato's discourse upon Love, 
 his " Symposium" should be read throughout. Only a few passages could here 
 be given. 
 
296 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 help hearing him ; and now he has a question put to him by 
 you, and lo ! he is blushing. 
 
 Who is Lysis ? I said : I suppose that he must be young, 
 for the name does not recall any one to me. 
 
 Why, he said, his father being a very well-known man, he 
 retains his patronymic, arid is not as yet commonly called by 
 his own name ; but, although you do not know his name, I am 
 sure that you must know his face, for that is quite enough to 
 distinguish him. 
 
 But tell me whose son he is, I said. 
 
 He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexone. 
 
 Ah, Hippothales, I said ; what a noble and really perfect 
 love you have found ! I wish that you would favor me with 
 the exhibition which you have been making to the rest of the 
 company, and then I shall be able to judge whether you know 
 what a lover ought to say about his love, either to the youth 
 himself, or to others. 
 
 Nay, Socrates, he said ; you surely do not attach any weight 
 to what he is saying. 
 
 Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person 
 whom he says that you love ? 
 
 No ; but I deny that I make verses or address compositions 
 to him. 
 
 He is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus ; he is talking 
 nonsense, and is stark mad. 
 
 O Hippothales, I said, if you have ever made any verses or 
 songs in honor of your favorite, I do not want to hear them ; 
 but I want to know the purport of them, that I may be able 
 to judge of your mode of approaching your fair one. 
 
 Ctesippus will be able to tell you, he said; for if, as he 
 avers, I talk to him of nothing else, he must have a very ac- 
 curate knowledge and recollection of that. 
 
 Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus ; I know only too well ; and 
 very ridiculous the tale is : for although he is a lover, and very 
 devotedly in love, he has nothing particular to talk about to his 
 beloved which a child might not say. Now is not that ridicu- 
 lous ? He can only speak of the wealth of Democrates, which 
 the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the other 
 ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their vic- 
 tory at the Pythian games, and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea 
 with four horses and single horses ; and these he sings and 
 says, and greater twaddle still. For the day before yesterday 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 297 
 
 he made a poem in which he described how Heracles, who was 
 a connection of the family, was entertained by an ancestor of 
 Lysis as his relation ; this ancestor was himself the son of 
 Zeus and the daughter of the founder of the deme. And these 
 are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and recites to 
 us, and we are obliged to listen to him. 
 
 When I heard this, I said : O ridiculous Hippothales ! how 
 can you be making and singing hymns in honor of yourself be- 
 fore you have won ? 
 
 But my songs and verses, he said, are not in honor of my- 
 self, Socrates. 
 
 You think not, I said. 
 
 But what are they, then ? he replied. 
 
 Most assuredly, I said, those songs are all in your own 
 honor ; for if you win your beautiful love, your discourses and 
 songs will be a glory to you, and may be truly regarded as 
 hymns of praise composed in honor of you who have con- 
 quered and won such a love ; but if he slips away from you, 
 the more you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will 
 look at having lost this fairest and best of blessings ; and this 
 is the reason why the wise lover does not praise his beloved 
 until he has won him, because he is afraid of accidents. There 
 is also another danger ; the fair, when any one praises or mag- 
 nifies them, are filled with the spirit of pride and vainglory. 
 Is not that true ? 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 And the more vain-glorious they are, the more difficult is the 
 capture of them? 
 
 I believe that. 
 
 What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his 
 prey, and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting 
 more difficult ? 
 
 He would be a bad hunter, that is clear. 
 
 Yes ; and if, instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate 
 them with words and songs, that would show a great want of 
 wit : do you not agree with me ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And now reflect, Hippothales, and see whether you are not 
 guilty of all these errors in writing poetry. For I can hardly 
 suppose that you will affirm a man to be a good poet who in- 
 jures himself by his poetry. 
 
 Assuredly not, he said : I should be a fool if I said that ; 
 
298 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 and this makes me desirous, Socrates, of taking you into my 
 counsels, and I shall be glad of any further advice which you 
 may have to offer. Will you tell me by what words or actions 
 I may become endeared to my love ? 
 
 That is not easy to determine, I said ; but if you will bring 
 your love to me, arid will let me talk with him, I may perhaps 
 be able to show you how to converse with him, instead of sing- 
 ing and reciting in the fashion of which you are accused. 
 Lysis, i. 42. 
 Lovers universal. 
 
 1 dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not 
 
 remind you, that a lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought 
 to show his love, not to some one part of that which he loves, 
 but to the whole. 
 
 I believe that I must ask you to explain, for I really do not 
 understand. 
 
 Another, I replied, might fairly answer thus ; but a man of 
 pleasure like you ought to know that all who are in the flower 
 of their youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in 
 a lover's breast, and are thought by him to be worthy of his af- 
 fectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have with the 
 fair : one has a snub nose, and you praise his pleasant face, 
 another's beak, as you say, has a royal look ; while he who is 
 neither snub or hooked has the grace of regularity : the dark 
 visage is manly, the fair are angels : and as to the s.weet, 
 " honey pale," as they are called, what is the very name but the 
 invention of a lover who uses these pet names, and is not averse 
 to paleness on the cheek of youth ? In a word, there is no ex- 
 cuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not 
 say, in order to preserve for your use every flower that has the 
 bloom of youth. 
 
 If you are determined to make me an authority in matters 
 of love, for the sake of the argument, I assent. The Republic, 
 ii. 302. 
 Loyalty to the State. See Obligation, individual. 
 
 Madness, two kinds of. 
 
 Sue. I said, " love is a madness." 
 
 Phaedr. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And there were two kinds of madness ; one produced 
 by human infirmity, the other by a divine release from the or 
 dinary ways of men. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 299 
 
 Phaedr. True. 
 
 Soc. The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, 
 prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four Gods presiding 
 over them ; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second 
 that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that 
 of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind 
 of madness, which was also the best, being a figure of love, we 
 introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true, though partly 
 erring myth, which was also a hymn in honor of Eros, who is 
 your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair 
 children, arid to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn 
 strain. Phaedrus, i. 570. 
 Madness of the prophet, poet, and lover. 
 
 - That was a lie in which I said that the beloved ought to 
 accept the non-lover and reject the lover, because the one is 
 sane, and the other mad. For that might have been truly said 
 if madness were simply an evil ; but there is also a madness 
 which is the special gift of Heaven, arid the source of the 
 chiefest blessings among men. For prophecy is a madness, 
 and the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona, 
 when out of their senses have conferred great benefits on 
 Hellas, both in public and private life, but when in their 
 senses few or none. And I might also tell you how the Sibyl 
 and other persons, who have had the gift of prophecy, have 
 told the future of many an one and guided them aright ; but 
 that is obvious, and would be tedious. 
 
 There will be more reason in appealing to the ancient in- 
 ventors of names, who, if they had thought madness a disgrace 
 or dishonor, would never have called prophecy (/nayri/o)), which 
 is the noblest of arts, by the very same name as madness, 
 (/j.aviKfy thus inseparably connecting them ; but they must 
 have thought that there was an inspired madness which was no 
 disgrace ; for the two words, //avruoq and yuanKry, are really the 
 same, and the letter T is only a modern and tasteless insertion. 
 And this is confirmed by the name which they gave to the 
 rational investigation of futurity, whether made by the help of 
 birds or of other signs ; this because supplying from the reason- 
 ing faculty insight (voCs) and information (loropia) to human 
 thought (0070-15), they originally termed oiovoion/ci), but the 
 word has been lately altered and made sonorous by the modern 
 introduction of the letter Omega (OIOPOIO-TIKT) and OIWKICTTIKT;/), 
 and in proportion as prophecy (/xaimK>)) is higher and more 
 perfect than divination both in name and reality, in the same 
 
300 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 proportion as the ancients testify, is madness superior to a sane 
 mind (<rw(/>pocrwr;) , for the one is only of human, but the other 
 of divine origin. Again, where plagues and mightiest woes 
 have bred in a race, owing to some ancient wrath, there mad- 
 ness enters with holy prayers and rites, and by inspired utter- 
 ances finds a way of deliverance for those who are in need ; 
 and he who has part in this gift, and is truly possessed and 
 duly out of his mind,- is by the use of purifications and mys- 
 teries made whole and exempt from evil, future as well as 
 present, and has a release from the calamity which afflicts him. 
 There is also a third kind of madness, which is a possession of 
 the Muses ; which enters into a delicate and virgin soul, and 
 there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers ; 
 with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for 
 the instruction of posterity. But he who, having no touch of 
 the Muses' madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks 
 that he will get into the temple by the help of art he, I say, 
 and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man is nowhere at 
 all when he enters into rivalry with the madman. 
 
 I might tell of many other noble deeds which have sprung 
 from inspired madness. And therefore let no one frighten or 
 flutter us by saying that temperate love is preferable to mad 
 love, but let him further show, if he would carry off the palm, 
 that love is not sent by the Gods for any good to lover or be- 
 loved. And we, on our part, will prove in answer to him that 
 the madness of love is the greatest of Heaven's blessings, and 
 the proof shall be one which the wise will receive, and the 
 witling disbelieve. Phaedrus, i. 549. 
 Magistrates and rulers, qualities and choice of. See Rulers. 
 
 Ath. Let us observe what will happen in the constitution 
 
 of our intended State. In the first place, you will acknowl- 
 edge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power, 
 and their families, should severally give satisfactory proof of 
 what they are, from their youth upward until the time of their 
 election ; in the next place, those who are to elect should be 
 trained in habits of law, and be well educated, that they may 
 have a right judgment, and may be able to select or reject 
 men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of 
 either. But how can we imagine that those who are brought 
 together for the first time, and are strangers to one another, 
 and also uneducated, can avoid making mistakes in the choice 
 of magistrates? 
 
 Cle. Impossible. Laws, iv. 273. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS: 301 
 
 Man, absolute unity not in. 
 
 - In the life of the same individual there is succession and 
 not absolute unity ; a man is called the same ; and yet in the 
 short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in 
 which every animal is said to have life and identity, he is under- 
 going a perpetual process of loss and reparation hair, flesh, 
 bones, blood, and the whole body are always changing. Which 
 is true not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, 
 tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain 
 the same in any one of us, but are always coming and going. 
 And equally true of knowledge, which is still more surprising 
 for not only do the sciences in general come and go, so that in 
 respect to them we are never the same ; but each of them 
 individually experiences a like change. The Symposium, i. 
 500. 
 Man, transformation of. 
 
 He who lived well during his appointed time was to re- 
 turn to the star which was his habitation, and there he would 
 have a blessed and suitable existence. But if he failed in at- 
 taining this, in the second generation he would pass into a 
 woman, and should he not desist from evil in that condition, 
 he would be changed into some brute who resembled him in 
 his evil ways, and would not cease from his toils and transfor- 
 mations until he followed the original principle of sameness 
 and likeness within him, and overcame, by the help of reason, 
 the later accretions of turbulent and irrational elements com- 
 posed of fire and air and water and earth, and returned to the 
 form of his first and better nature. Having given all these 
 laws to his creatures, that he might be guiltless of their future 
 evil, the creator sowed some of them in the earth, and some 
 in the moon, and some in the other stars which are the vessels 
 of time ; and when he had sown them he committed to the 
 younger Gods the fashioning of their mortal bodies, and desired 
 them to furnish what was still lacking to the human soul, and 
 make all the suitable additions, and rule and pilot the mortal 
 animal in the best and wisest manner which they could, and 
 avert from him all but self-inflicted evils. Timaeus, ii. 535. 
 Man, his soul truly his own. 
 
 Listen, all ye who have just now heard the laws about 
 
 Gocls, and about our dear forefathers : Of all the things which 
 a man has, next to the Gods his soul is the most divine and 
 most truly his own. Laws, iv. 252. 
 
302 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Many opinion of the. See Opinion. 
 
 Many, the Science of Government not attained by the. See Govern- 
 ment not attained. 
 
 Marathon, the men and battle of. 
 
 Darius had a quarrel against us and the Eretrians, be- 
 cause, as he said, we had conspired against Sardis, and he sent 
 500,000 men in transports and vessels of war, and 300 ships, 
 and Datis as commander, telling him to bring the Eretrians 
 and Athenians to the king, if he wished to keep his head on 
 his shoulders. They sailed against the Eretrians, who were 
 reputed to be amongst the noblest and most warlike of the 
 Hellenes of that day, and they were numerous, but he con- 
 quered them all in three days ; and when he had conquered 
 them, in order that no one might escape, he searched the 
 whole country after this manner: his soldiers, coming to the 
 borders of Eretria and spreading from sea to sea, joined hands 
 and passed through the whole country, in order that they 
 might be able to tell the king that no one had escaped them. 
 And from Eretria they went to Marathon, expecting to bind 
 the Athenians in the same yoke of necessity in which they 
 had bound the Eretrians. Having effected one half of their 
 purpose, they were in the act of attempting the other, and none 
 of the Hellenes dared to assist either the Eretrians or the 
 Athenians, except the Lacedaemonians, and they only came the 
 day after the battle ; but the rest were panic-stricken and re- 
 mained quiet, happy that they had escaped for a time. He 
 who has present to him that conflict, will know what manner 
 of men they were who received the onset of the barbarians at 
 Marathon, and chastened the pride of the whole of Asia, and 
 by the victory which they gained over the barbarians first 
 taught other men that the power of the Persians was not in- 
 vincible, but that hosts of men and the multitude of riches 
 alike yield to virtue. And I assert that those men are the 
 fathers not only of ourselves, but of our liberties and of the 
 liberties of all who are on the continent, for that was the 
 action to which the Hellenes looked back when they ventured 
 to fight for their own safety in the battles which followed: 
 they became disciples of the men of Marathon. To them, 
 therefore, I assign in my speech the first place, and the second 
 to those who fought and conquered in the sea fights at Salamis 
 and Artemisium, for of them, too, one might have many things 
 to say ; of the assaults which they endured by sea and land, 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 303 
 
 and how they repelled them. But I will mention only that 
 act of theirs which appears to me to be the noblest, and which 
 wa< next in order of succession to Marathon, for the men of 
 Marathon only showed the Hellenes that it was possible to 
 ward off the barbarians by land, the many by the few ; but 
 there was no proof that they could be defeated by ships, and 
 at sea the Persians retained the reputation of being invincible 
 in numbers and wealth and skill and strength. This is the 
 glory of the men who fought at sea, that they dispelled the 
 second fear which had hitherto possessed the Hellenes, and so 
 made the fear of numbers, whether of men or ships, to cease 
 among them. This was the effect, and thus the soldiers of 
 Marathon and the sailors of Salamis became the schoolmasters 
 of Hellas ; the one teaching and habituating the Hellenes not 
 to fear the barbarians at sea, and the others not to fear them 
 by land. Menexenus, iv. 570. 
 Marriage, law of. See Immortality in time. 
 Marriage approved and regulated. 
 
 O my son, he who is born of good parents ought to make 
 such a marriage as wise men would approve. Now they would 
 advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially to 
 desire a rich one ; but if other things are equal, always to 
 honor inferiors, and with them to form connections ; this will 
 be for the benefit of the city and of the families which are 
 united ; for the equable and symmetrical tends infinitely more 
 to virtue than the unmixed. And he who is conscious of be- 
 ing too headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting in all 
 his actions, ought to desire to become the relation of orderly 
 parents ; and he who is of the opposite temper ought to seek 
 the opposite alliance. Let there be one word concerning all 
 marriages: Every man shall follow, not after the marriage 
 which is most pleasing to himself, but after that which is most 
 beneficial to the State. For somehow every one is by nature 
 prone to that which is likest to himself, and in this way the 
 whole city becomes unequal in property and in disposition ; 
 and hence there arise in most States results which we least de- 
 sire to happen. Now, to add to the law an express provision, 
 not only that the rich man shall not marry into the rich fam- 
 ily, nor the powerful into the family of the powerful, but that 
 the slower natures shall be compelled to enter into marriage 
 with the quicker, and the quicker with the slower, may awaken 
 anger as well as laughter in the minds of many ; for there is a 
 
304 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 difficulty in perceiving that the city ought to be well mingled 
 like a cup, in which the maddening wine is hot and fiery ; but 
 when chastened by a soberer God, receives a fair admixture 
 and becomes an excellent and temperate drink. Yet in mar- 
 riage no one is able to see the necessity of this. Wherefore 
 also the law must leave such matters, and try to charm the 
 spirits of men into believing the equability of their children's 
 disposition of more importance than equality in excessive for- 
 tune when they marry ; and him who is too desirous of form- 
 ing a rich marriage they should endeavor to turn aside by re- 
 proaches, not, however, by any compulsion of written law. 
 Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, not for- 
 getting what was said before that man should cling to im- 
 mortality and leave behind him posterity who shall be ser- 
 vants of the God in his place. All this and yet more may 
 truly be said about the duty of marrying in the way of pre- 
 lude. Laws, iv. 294. 
 
 Masses swayed by rulers. See Rulers swaying, etc. 
 Melody and figure, beauty of. See Figure. 
 Memory and forgetfulness. See Forgetfulness. 
 Memory, waxen tablet of. 
 
 Soc. I would have you imagine, then, that there exists 
 
 in the mind of man a block of wax, which is of different sizes 
 in different men ; harder, moister, and having more or less of 
 purity in one than another, and in some of an intermediate 
 quality. 
 
 Theaet. I see. 
 
 Soc. Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory, the 
 mother of the Muses ; and that when we wish to remember 
 anything which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own 
 minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and 
 in that receive the impression of them as from the seal of a 
 ring ; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as 
 long as the image lasts ; but when the image is effaced, or can- 
 not be taken, then we forget and do not know. Theaetetus, 
 iii. 396. 
 
 Men, compulsory care of. See Compulsory. 
 Mental and bodily habit. 
 
 Soc. And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idle- 
 ness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise ? 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Soc. And what of the mental habit ? Is not the soul in- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 305 
 
 formed, and improved, and preserved by thought and attention, 
 which are motions ; but when at rest, which in the soul means 
 only want of thought and attention, is uninformed, and speedily 
 forgets whatever she has learned? 
 
 Theaet. True. Theaetetus, iii. 353. 
 Metallic symbols of races. 
 
 In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who 
 
 have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your dif- 
 ferent races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold, and silver, and 
 brass, and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, and 
 brass with gold, and hence there will arise inequality and ir- 
 regularity, which always and in all places are causes of enmity 
 and war. Such is the origin of discord, wherever arising ; and 
 this is the answer of the Muses to us. 
 
 Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly. 
 
 Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly ; the Muses 
 cannot do otherwise. 
 
 And what do the Muses say next ? 
 
 When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different 
 ways : the iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and 
 houses and gold and silver ; but the gold and silver races, hav- 
 ing the true riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue 
 and the ancient order of things. There was a battle between 
 them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and 
 houses among individual owners : and they enslaved their 
 friends and maiutainers, whom they had formerly protected in 
 the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and ser- 
 vants ; and they themselves were engaged in fighting and keep- 
 ing watch against them. The Republic, ii. 374. 
 Might makes right. See Natural justice. 
 Military art, youths instructed in. 
 
 Lys. What say you of the matter of which we were 
 beginning to speak the art of fighting in armor ? Is that a 
 practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed ? 
 
 Soc. I will endeavor to advise vou, Lysimachus, as far as I 
 can in this matter, and also in every way will comply with 
 your wishes ; but as I am younger and not so experienced, I 
 think that I ought certainly to hear first what my elders have 
 to say, and to learn of them, and if I have anything to add, 
 then I may venture to give my opinion to them as well as to 
 you. Suppose, Nicias, that one of you speaks first. 
 
 NIC. I have no objection, Socrates ; and my opinion is that 
 20 
 
306 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 the acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young 
 men. There is an advantage in their being employed during 
 their leisure hours in a way which tends to improve their 
 bodily constitution, and not in the way in which young men 
 are too apt to be employed. No gymnastics could be better or 
 harder exercise ; and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts 
 most befitting to a freeman ; for they only who are thus trained 
 in the use of arms are the athletes of our military profession, 
 trained in that on which the conflict turns. Moreover, in act- 
 ual battle, when you have to fight in a line with a number of 
 others, this sort of acquirement will be of some use ; and will 
 be of the greatest, when the ranks are broken and you have to 
 fight singly ; either in pursuit, when you are attacking some 
 one who is defending himself, or in flight, when you have to 
 defend yourself against an assailant. Certainly he who pos- 
 sessed the art could not meet with any harm at the hands of 
 a . single person, or perhaps of several ; and in any case he 
 would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of skill in- 
 clines a man to other noble lessons ; for every man who has 
 learned how to fight in arms will desire to learn the proper ar- 
 rangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson ; and 
 when he has learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will 
 go on to learn the complete art of the general. There is no 
 difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other 
 military arts will be useful and valuable to a man ; and this 
 lesson may be the beginning of them. Let me add a further 
 advantage, which is by no means a slight one, that this sci- 
 ence will make any man a great deal more valiant and self- 
 possessed in the field. And I will not disdain to mention, 
 what to some may appear to be a small matter, that he will 
 make a better appearance at the right time ; that is to say, at 
 the time when his appearance will strike terror into his ene- 
 mies. My opinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, that the 
 youths should be instructed in this art, and for the reasons 
 which I have given. Laches, i. 74. 
 Mind, a cause. 
 
 I heard some one who had a book of Anaxagoras, as he 
 
 said, out of which he read that mind was the disposer and 
 cause of all, and I was quite delighted at this notion, which ap- 
 peared admirable, and I said to myself : If mind is the dis- 
 poser, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particu- 
 lar in the best place ; and I argued that if any one desired to 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 307 
 
 find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence 
 of anything, he must find out what state of being or suffering 
 or doing was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only 
 to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would 
 also know the worse, for that the same science comprised both. 
 And I rejoiced to think that I had found' in Anaxagoras a 
 teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I im- 
 agined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or 
 round ; and then he would further explain the cause and the 
 necessity of this, and would teach me the nature of the best 
 arid show that this was best ; and if he said that the earth was 
 in the centre, he would explain that this position was the best, 
 and I should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not 
 want any other sort of cause. And I thought that I would 
 then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and 
 that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and 
 their returnings and various states, active and passive, and how 
 all of them were for the best. For I could not imagine that 
 when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would 
 give any other account of their being as they are, except that 
 
 ,this was best; and I thought that when he had explained to 
 me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would 
 go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was 
 best for all. I had hopes which I would not have sold for 
 much, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could 
 in my eagerness to know the better and the worse. 
 
 What hopes I had formed, and how grievously was I disap- 
 pointed ! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether 
 forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having re- 
 course to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. 
 Phaedo, i. 426. 
 
 _JVImd, disorders of the. 
 
 The disorders of the soul which originate iu the body are 
 
 as follows : We must acknowledge disease of the mind to be a 
 want of intelligence ; arid of this there are two kinds ; to wit, 
 madness and ignorance ; and whatever affection gives rise to 
 either of them may be called disease. Excessive pains and 
 pleasures are justly to be regarded as the greatest diseases of 
 the soul, for a man who is in great joy or in great pain, in his 
 irrational eagerness to attain the one and to avoid the other, is 
 not truly able to see or to hear anything ; but he is mad, and 
 is at the same time quite incapable of any participation in 
 
308 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 reason. He who has the seed about the spinal marrow too 
 plentiful and overflowing, like a tree overladen with fruit, has 
 many throes, and also obtains many pleasures in his desires and 
 their gratifications, and is for the most part of his life mad, be- 
 cause his pleasures and pains are so very great ; his soul is 
 rendered foolish and disordered by his body ; and he is regarded 
 not as one diseased, but as one who is voluntarily bad, which is 
 a bad mistake. For the truth is that the intemperance of love 
 for the most part grows into a disease of the soul, owing to the 
 moisture and fluidity which is produced in one of the elements, 
 by the loose consistency of the bones. And in general, all that 
 which is termed the intemperance of pleasure is unjustly charged 
 upon those who do wrong, as if they did wrong voluntarily. For 
 no man is voluntarily bad ; but the bad become bad by reason 
 of an ill disposition of the body and bad education, things 
 which to every man are an involuntary evil ; and in like man- 
 ner the soul is often hurt by bodily pain. For where the sharp 
 and briny phlegm and other bitter and bilious humors wander 
 over the body, and find no exit or escape, but are compressed 
 within and mingle their own vapors with the motions of the 
 soul, and are blended with them, they produce an infinite va-- 
 riety of diseases in all sorts of degrees, and being carried to 
 the three places of the* soul on which any of them may sev- 
 erally chance to alight, they create infinite varieties of trouble 
 and melancholy, of tempers rash and cowardly, and also of 
 forgetfulness and stupidity. Further, when to this evil consti- 
 tution of body evil forms of government are added, and evil 
 discourses are uttered in private as well as in public, and no 
 sort of instruction is given in youth which may heal these ills, 
 here is another source of evil; and so the bad becomes bad, 
 through two things which are wholly out of their power. In 
 such cases the planters are to blame rather than the plants, the 
 educators rather than the educated. Still we should endeavor 
 as far as we can by education, and studies, and learning, to 
 avoid vice and attain virtue. Timaeus, ii. 577. 
 Mind, the life of. 
 
 Pro. And what is this life of mind ? 
 
 Soc. I want to know whether any one of us would consent 
 to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory 
 of all things, but having no fraction of a sense of pleasure 
 or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feel- 
 ings? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 309 
 
 Pro. Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is 
 likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else. 
 
 Soc. What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in 
 one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two ? 
 
 Pro. Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and 
 wisdom ? 
 
 Soc. Yes. Philebus, iii. 156. 
 Mind, good in the. See Good, in the mind, etc. 
 Mind, depth and greatness of, reverenced. 
 
 I have a kind of reverence ; not so much for Melissus 
 
 and the others, who say that " all is one and at rest," as for 
 the great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as 
 in Homeric language he may be called ; him I should be 
 ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him 
 when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, and he ap- 
 peared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. Theaetetus, 
 iii. 387. 
 Mind, movement of. 
 
 Ath. And what is the definition of that which is named 
 " soul ? " Can we conceive of any other than that which has 
 been already given the motion which is self -moved ? 
 
 Gle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as 
 the self-moved is identical with that which we call soul ? 
 
 Ath. Yes ; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there 
 is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin 
 and moving power of all that is, or has been, or will be, and 
 their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the 
 source of change and motion in all things ? 
 
 Gle. Certainly not ; the soul as being the source of motion, 
 has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all 
 things. 
 
 Ath. And is not that motion which takes place in another, 
 or by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power 
 at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be 
 reckoned in the second degree, or in any lower degree which 
 you may prefer ? 
 Gle. Very true. 
 
 Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and ab- 
 solute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, 
 and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born 
 to obey the soul which is the ruler ? 
 
 Gle. Nothing can be more true. Laws, iv. 408. 
 
310 PLATO'S BEST* THOUGHTS. 
 
 Minority, the government of the. See Few. 
 Minos, and naval warfare. 
 
 1 was saying that the imitation of enemies was a bad 
 
 thing ; and I was thinking of a case in which a maritime people 
 are harassed by enemies, as the Athenians were by Minos (I 
 do not speak from any desire tq recall past grievances) ; but he, 
 a*s we know, was a great naval potentate, who compelled the 
 inhabitants of Attica to pay him a cruel tribute ; and in those 
 days they had no ships of war as they now have, nor was the 
 country filled with ship timber, and therefore they could not 
 readily build them. Hence neither could they learn how to 
 imitate their enemy at sea, or become sailors themselves, and 
 in this way directly repel their enemies. Better for them to 
 have lost many times over the seven youths, than that heavy- 
 armed and stationary troops should have been turned into 
 sailors, and accustomed to leap quickly 'on shore, and again to 
 hurry back to their ships; or should have fancied that there 
 was no disgrace in not awaiting the attack of an enemy and 
 dying boldly ; and that there were good reasons, and plenty of 
 them, for a man throwing away his arms, and betaking himself 
 to flight ; which is not dishonorable as people say, at certain 
 times. This is the language of naval warfare, and is anything 
 but worthy of extraordinary praise. For we should not teach 
 bad habits, least of all to the best part of the citizens. You 
 may learn the evil of such a practice from Homer, by whom 
 Odysseus is introduced, rebuking Agamemnon, because he de- 
 sires to draw down the ships to the sea at a time when the 
 Achaeans are hard pressed by the Trojans : he gets angry with 
 him, and says : 
 
 " Who, at a time when the battle is in full cry, biddest to drag the 
 well-oared ships into the sea, that the prayers of the Trojans may 
 be accomplished yet more, and high ruin fall upon us ? For the 
 Achaeans will not maintain the battle, when the ships are drawn 
 into the sea, but they will look behind and will cease from strife ; 
 in that the counsel which you give will prove injurious." 
 
 You see that he quite knew triremes on the sea, in the neigh- 
 borhood of fighting men, to be an evil ; lions might be trained 
 in that way to fly from a herd of deer. Moreover, naval pow- 
 ers which owe their safety to ships, do not honor that sort of 
 warlike excellence which is most deserving of honor. For he 
 who owes his safety to the pilot, and the captain, and the oars- 
 man, and all sorts of rather good-for-nothing persons, cannot 
 rightly give honor to whom honor is due. Laws, iv. 233. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 311 
 
 Mirth-giver to be rewarded. 
 
 Ath. May not the true use of music and choral festivities 
 be described as follows : we rejoice when we think that we 
 prosper, and again we think that we prosper when we rejoice? 
 
 Cle. Exactly. 
 
 Ath. And when rejoicing is our good fortune we are unable 
 to be still ? 
 
 .Cle. True. 
 
 Ath. Our young men break forth into dancing and singing, 
 and we who are their elders deem that we are fulfilling our 
 part in life when we look on at them. Having lost the agility 
 of youth, we delight in their sports and merry-making ; because 
 we love to think of our former selves, and gladly institute con- 
 tests for those who are able to awaken in us the memory of 
 what we once were. 
 
 Cle. Very true. 
 
 Ath. People say that we ought to regard him as the wisest 
 of men, and the winner of the palm, who gives us the greatest 
 amount of pleasure and mirth. For when mirth is to be the 
 order of the day, he ought to be honored most, and, as I was 
 saying, bear the palm, who gives most mirth to the greatest 
 number. Now I want to know whether this is a true way of 
 speaking or of acting ? 
 
 Cle. Possibly. Laws, iv. 187. 
 Misanthropists and Misologists. 
 Let us take care that we avoid a danger. 
 
 And what is that ? I said. 
 
 The danger of becoming misologists, he replied, which is 
 one of the very worst things that can happen to us. For as 
 there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are also mis- 
 ologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, 
 which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy springs out of 
 the too great confidence of inexperience ; you trust a man and 
 think him altogether true and sound and faithful, and then in a 
 little while he turns out to be false and knavish ; and then an- 
 other and another, and when this has happened several times 
 to a man, especially within the circle of his own most trusted 
 friends, as he would deem them, and he has often quarreled 
 with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one 
 has any good in him at all. I dare say that you must have 
 observed this. 
 
 Yes, I said. 
 
312 PLATO' S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 And is not the feeling discreditable ? Such an one having 
 to deal with other men, had clearly no experience of them ; 
 for experience would have taught him the true state of the 
 case, that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great 
 majority are in the interval between them. Phaedo, i. 418. 
 Miserly men and oligarchies. 
 
 His fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion 
 
 headforemost from his bosom's throne : humbled by poverty he 
 takes to money-making, and by mean and miserly savings and 
 hard work gets a fortune together. Is not this man likely to 
 seat the concupiscent and covetous elements on that vacant 
 throne ? They will play the great king within him, and he 
 will array them with tiara and collar and scimitar. 
 
 Most true, he replied. 
 
 And when he has made the reason and spirit sit on the 
 ground obediently on either side, and taught them to know 
 their place, he compels the one to think only of the method by 
 which lesser sums may be converted into larger ones, and 
 schools the other into the worship and admiration of riches and 
 rich men; and to be ambitious only of wealth and of the 
 means which lead to this. 
 
 Of all conversions, he said, there is none so speedy or so 
 sure as when the ambitious youth changes into the avaricious 
 one. 
 
 And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth ? 
 
 Yes, he said ; at any rate the individual out of whom he 
 came is like the State out of which oligarchy came. 
 
 Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between 
 them. 
 
 Very good. 
 
 First, then, they resemble one another in the value which 
 they set upon wealth ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 Also in their penurious, laborious character ; the individual 
 only satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expendi- 
 ture to them ; his other desires he subdues, under the idea that 
 there is no use in them? 
 
 True. 
 
 He is a shabby fellow, I said, who saves something out of 
 everything and makes a purse for himself ; and this is the soi 
 of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is he not like the State 
 which he represents ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 313 
 
 That would be my view of him, he replied ; at any rate, 
 money is highly valued by him as well as by the State. 
 
 Why, he is not a man of cultivation, I said. . . . 
 
 The man, then, will be at war with himself ; he will be two 
 men, and not one ; but, in general, his better desires will be 
 found to prevail over his inferior ones. 
 
 True. 
 
 For these reasons such an one will be more decent than 
 many are ; yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious 
 soul will be far out of his reach. 
 
 I should expect so. 
 
 And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble com- 
 petitor in a State for any prize of victory, or other object of 
 honorable ambition ; he is so afraid of awakening his expen- 
 sive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the strug- 
 gle ; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part 
 only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses 
 the prize and saves his money. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money- 
 maker answers to the oligarchical State ? There can be no 
 doubt. Republic, ii. 381. 
 
 Yes, I said ; and men of this stamp will be covetous of 
 money, like those who live in oligarchies ; they will have a 
 fierce secret longing after gold and silver, which they will 
 hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasures of their 
 own for the deposit and concealment of them ; also castles 
 which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will 
 spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they 
 please. 
 
 That is most true, he said. 
 
 And they are miserly because they have no means of openly 
 acquiring the money which they prize ; they will spend that 
 which is another man's in their lust ; stealing their pleasures 
 and running away like children from the law, their father : 
 they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force ; 
 caring nothing about the Muse, the companion of reason and 
 philosophy, and honoring gymnastic before music. 
 
 Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you 
 describe is a mixture of good and evil. The Republic, ii. 
 375. 
 
314 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Misery of the unjust. 
 
 Soc. The matters at issue between us are not trifling; to 
 
 know or not to know happiness and misery that is the sum of 
 them. And what knowledge can be nobler than this ? or what 
 ignorance more disgraceful than this ? And therefore I will 
 begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who 
 is unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think 
 Archelaus unjust and yet happy? Am I not right in supposing 
 that to be your meaning'? 
 
 Pol. Quite right. 
 
 Soc. And I say that this is an impossibility, and here is one 
 point about which we are at issue : very good. But do you 
 mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punish- 
 ment he will still be happy ? 
 
 Pol. Certainly not ; in that case he will be most miserable. 
 
 Soc. On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, 
 according to you, he will be happy ? 
 
 Pol. Yes. 
 
 Soc. But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust 
 actions is miserable in any case, more miserable, however, if 
 he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less 
 miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution, at the 
 hands of God and men. Gorgias, iii. 59. 
 
 Mixtures of pleasures and pains, of body and of soul. See Body 
 
 and soul, etc. 
 Modesty and temperance. 
 
 Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and 
 
 look within; consider the effect which temperance has upon 
 yourself, and the nature of that which has the effect. Think 
 over all this, and, like a brave youth, tell me What is temper- 
 ance. 
 
 After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly ef- 
 fort to think, he said : My opinion is, Socrates, that temper- 
 ance makes a man ashamed or modest, and that temperance is 
 the same as modesty. 
 
 Very good I said ; and did you not admit, just now, that 
 temperance is noble. 
 
 Yes, certainly, he said. 
 
 And the temperate are also good ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And can that be good which does not make men good ? 
 
 Certainly not. 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 315 
 
 And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but 
 also good ? 
 
 That is my opinion. 
 
 Well, I said ; and surely you would agree with Homer when 
 
 he says, 
 
 " Modesty is not good for a needy man " ? 
 
 Yes, he said ; I agree to that. 
 
 Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good ? 
 
 That is plain. 
 
 But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and 
 not bad, is always good ? 
 
 That appears to me to be as you say. 
 
 And the inference is, that temperance cannot be modesty 
 if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as 
 a good ? 
 
 All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true. Charmides, 
 i. 15. 
 
 Modesty promoted by refutation See Purification. 
 Modesty and self-conceit. See Self-conceit. 
 Modesty, excess of. See Courage untempered, etc. 
 Money not to be valued above friendship. See Friendship. 
 Money, making of. See Miserly men. 
 Money, a ruler in the State. 
 
 What manner of government do you term oligarchy ? 
 
 A government resting on a valuation of property, in which 
 the rich have power and the poor are deprived of power. 
 
 I understand, he replied. 
 
 Ought I not to describe, first of all, how the change from 
 timocracy to oligarchy arises ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the 
 one passes into the other. 
 
 How? 
 
 The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individ- 
 uals is the ruin of timocracy ; they invent illegal modes of ex- 
 penditure, but what do they or their wives care about the law ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And then one seeing another prepares to rival him, and thus 
 I the whole body of the citizens acquires a similar character. 
 
 Likely enough. 
 
 After that they get on in trade, and the more they think of 
 making a fortune, the less they think of virtue ; for when riches 
 
316 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance, the 
 one always rises as the other falls. 
 
 True. 
 
 And in proportion as riches and rich men are honored in the 
 State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonored. 
 
 Clearly. 
 
 And what is honored is cultivated, and that which has no 
 honor is neglected. 
 
 That is the case. 
 
 And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men 
 become lovers' of trade and money, and they honor and rever- 
 ence the rich man, and make a ruler of him, and dishonor the 
 poor man. 
 
 They do so. 
 
 Whereupon they proceed to make a law which fixes a sum 
 of money as the qualification of citizenship ; the money is more 
 or less accordingly as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive ; 
 and any one whose property is below the amount fixed is not 
 allowed to share in the government ; which changes in the con- 
 stitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not 
 already done their work. 
 
 Very true. The Republic, ii. 377. 
 Money, enslaving power of. See Enslaving, etc. 
 Money not to have the place of power in the State. 
 
 Ath. We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe 
 
 and happy, as far as the nature of man allows, must and ought 
 to distribute honor and dishonor in the right way. And the 
 right way is to place the goods of the soul first and highest in 
 the scale, always assuming temperance as a condition of them ; 
 and in the second place, the goods of the body ; and in the 
 third place, those of money and property. And if any legis- 
 lator or State departs from this rule by giving money the place 
 of honor, or in any way preferring that which is really last, 
 may we not say, that he or the State is doing an unholy and 
 unpatriotic thing? 
 
 Meg. Yes ; let that be plainly asserted. Laws, iv. 226. 
 Money. See Wealth, Riches, Property, Possession. 
 Money -sting of business men. See Business men. 
 Monsters, filial. See Filial, etc. 
 Mother, ambitious., See Woman, etc. 
 Motherhood of country. 
 Their ancestors were not strangers, nor are these their 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 317 
 
 descendants sojourners only, whose fathers have come from 
 another country ; but they are the children of the soil, dwell- 
 ing and living in their own land. And the country which 
 brought them up is not like other countries, a step-mother to 
 her children, but their own true mother ; she bore them and 
 nourished them and received them, and in her bosom they now 
 repose. It is meet and right, therefore, that we should begin 
 by praising the land which is their mother, and that will be a 
 way of praising their noble birth. 
 
 The country is worthy to be praised, not only by us, but by 
 all mankind ; first, and above all, as being dear to the Gods. 
 This is proved by the strife and contention of the Gods respect- 
 ing her. And ought not that country which the Gods praise to 
 be praised by all mankind ? The second praise which may be 
 fairly claimed by her, is that at the time when the whole earth 
 was sending forth and creating diverse animals, tame and wild, 
 she our mother was free and pure from savage monsters, and 
 out of all animals selected and brought forth man, who is 
 superior to the rest in understanding, and alone has justice and 
 religion. And a great proof that she was the mother of us 
 and of our ancestors, is that she provided the means of support 
 for her offspring. For as a woman proves her motherhood by 
 giving milk to her young ones (and she who has no fountain of 
 milk is not a mother), so did this our land prove that she was 
 going to be the mother of men, for in those days she alone and 
 first of all brought forth wheat and barley for human food, 
 which is the best arid noblest sustenance for man, whom she 
 regarded as her true offspring. And these are truer proofs of 
 motherhood in a country than in a woman, for the woman in 
 her conception and generation is but the imitation of the earth, 
 and not the earth of the woman. And of the fruit of the earth 
 she gave a plenteous supply, not only to her offspring, but to 
 others also ; and after that she made the olive to spring up to 
 be a boon to her children, and to help them in their toils. And 
 when she had herself nursed them and brought them up to man- 
 hood, she gave them Gods to be their rulers and teachers, whose 
 names are well known, and need not now be repeated. They 
 are the Gods who first ordered our lives, and gave us arts to 
 supply our daily needs, and taught us the possession and use of 
 arms for the guardianship of the country. Menexenus, iv. 568. 
 Motion and rest of things. See Rest. 
 Multitude, the Science of Government not attained by the. See 
 
 Government, Science of. 
 
318 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Music, enervating power of. See Irritability. 
 Music, most celebrated. 
 
 Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imitation, 
 
 and therefore requires the greatest care of them all. For if a 
 man makes a mistake here, he may do himself the greatest in- 
 jury by welcoming evil dispositions, and the mistake may be 
 very difficult to discern, because the poets are artists very infe- 
 rior in character to the Muses themselves, who would never fall 
 into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men the 
 gestures and songs of women ; nor combine the melodies and 
 gestures of freemen with the rhythms of slaves and men of the 
 baser sort ; or, beginning with the rhythms and gestures of free- 
 men, assign to them a melody or words which are of an oppo- 
 site character ; nor would they mix up the voices and sounds 
 of animals and of men and instruments, and every other sort 
 of noise, as if they were all one. But human poets are fond 
 of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and thus make 
 themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as Orpheus says, 
 "are ripe for pleasure.'* The experienced see all this confusion, 
 and yet the poets go on and make still further havoc by sepa- 
 rating the rhythm and the figure of the dance from the melody, 
 setting words to metre without music, and also separating the 
 melody and rhythm from the words, using the lyre or the flute 
 alone. For when there are no words, it is very difficult to 
 recognize the meaning of the harmony and rhythm, or to see 
 that any worthy object is imitated by them. And we must ac- 
 knowledge that all this sort of thing, which aims only at swift- 
 ness and smoothness and a brutish noise, and uses the flute and 
 the lyre not as the mere accompaniments of the dance and song, 
 is exceedingly rude and coarse. The use of either, when un- 
 accompanied by the others, leads to every sort of irregularity 
 and trickery. Laws, iv. 199. 
 Music, different kinds of. 
 
 Ath. Let us speak of the laws about music ; that is to 
 
 say, such music as then existed ; in order that we may trace the 
 growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning ; for music 
 was early divided among us into certain kinds and manners. 
 One sort consisted of prayers to the Gods, which were called 
 hymns ; and there was another and opposite sort called lamen- 
 tations, and another termed paeans, and another called ditlr 
 rambs ; of which latter the subject, if I am not mistaken, W 
 the birth of Dionysus. And they used the actual word " laws/ 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 319 
 
 or vo'/xot, meaning " song," only adding such and such an instru- 
 ment, of the harp for example, when they wanted to denote a 
 particular strain. All these and others were duly distinguished, 
 nor were they allowed to intermingle one sort of music with 
 another. And the authority which determined and gave judg- 
 ment, and punished the disobedient, was not expressed in a 
 hiss, nor in the most unmusical " sweet voices " of the multi- 
 tude, as in our days ; nor in applause and clappings of the 
 hands. But the directors of public instruction insisted that 
 the spectators should listen in silence to the end ; and boys and 
 their tutors, and the multitude in general, were kept quiet by the 
 touch of the wand. Such was the good order which the mul- 
 titude were willing to observe ; they would not have dared to 
 give judgment by noisy cries. And then, as time went on, the 
 poets themselves introduced the reign of ignorance and misrule. 
 They were men of genius, but they had no knowledge of what 
 is just and lawful in music ; raging like Bacchanals and pos- 
 sessed with inordinate delights mingling lamentations with 
 hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs ; imitating the sounds of the 
 flute on the lyre, and making one general confusion ; igno- 
 rantly affirming that music has no truth, and, whether good or 
 bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure of the 
 nearer. Arid by composing such licentious poems, and adding 
 to them words as licentious, they have inspired the multitude 
 with lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they 
 can judge for themselves about melody and song. And in this 
 way, the theatres from being mute have become vocal, as 
 though they had understanding of good and bad in music and 
 poetry ; and instead of an aristocracy, an evil sort of theat- 
 rocracy has grown up. Laws, iv. 229. 
 Musical training. 
 
 Musical training is a more potent instrument than any 
 other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the secret 
 places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace 
 and making the soul graceful of him who is rightly educated, 
 or ungraceful of him who is ill-educated ; and also because he 
 who has received this true education of the inner being will 
 most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, 
 and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and 
 receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good, 
 he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his 
 youth, even before he is able to know the reason why ; and 
 
320 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 when reason comes he will recognize and salute her as a friend 
 with whom his education has made him long familiar. The 
 Republic, ii. 225. 
 Musician, the true. 
 
 When I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort 
 
 of wisdom, who is a true man^and worthy of his theme, I am 
 delighted beyond measure ; and I compare the man and his 
 words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. 
 And such an one I deem to be the true musician, attuned to a 
 fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instru- 
 ment of music ; for truly he has in his own life a harmony of 
 words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phry- 
 gian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic 
 mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such an one makes 
 me merry with the sound of his voice ; and when I hear him 
 I am thought to be a lover of discourse ; so eager am I in drink- 
 ing in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree with 
 his words is an annoyance to me ; and the better he speaks the 
 more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. 
 Laches, i. 81. 
 Musician, becoming soft. See Irritability. 
 
 National peace, degenerating. 
 
 The orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, 
 
 and do their own business ; this is their way of living with all 
 men at home, and they are equally ready to keep the peace 
 with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of 
 theirs for peace, which is often out of season where their in- 
 fluence prevails, they become by degrees unwarlike, and bring 
 up their young men to be like themselves ; they are at the 
 command of others ; and hence in a few years they and their 
 children and the whole city often pass imperceptibly from the 
 condition of freemen into that of slaves. Statesman, iii. 594. 
 Nations. See States destroyed, etc. 
 
 Nature, counterparts and antagonisms in. See Antagonisms, etc. 
 Nature, reversal of the order of. 
 
 Sir. The life of all animals first came to a stand, and the 
 
 mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed 
 and grew young and delicate ; the white locks of the aged 
 darkened again, and the cheeks of the bearded man became 
 smooth, and he was restored to his original youth ; the bodies 
 of the young grew finer and smaller, continually by day and 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 321 
 
 night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a 
 newly-born child in mind as well as body ; in the succeeding 
 stage they wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the 
 bodies of those who had died by violence quickly passed 
 through the like changes, and in a few days were no more 
 seen. Statesman, iii. 555. 
 Nature and chance. 
 
 Ath. They say that the greatest and fairest things are 
 
 done by nature and chance, and the lesser by art, which re- 
 ceives from nature all the greater and primeval creations, and 
 fashions them in detail ; and these lesser works are generally 
 termed artificial. 
 
 Gle. What do you and they mean ? 
 
 Ath. You will understand their meaning better, if I take 
 the elements as an example ; they mean to say that fire and 
 water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance, and 
 not by art ; and that as to the bodies which come next in 
 order, earth, and sun, and moon, and stars, they are cre- 
 ated by the help of these absolutely inanimate existences, and 
 that they are severally moved by chance and some inherent in- 
 fluence according to certain affinities of hot with cold, or of 
 dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and other chance admixt- 
 ures of opposites which have united of necessity, and that on 
 this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is 
 in the heaven, including animals and all plants, and that all the 
 seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, 
 as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, 
 by nature and chance only ; and that art sprang up after these 
 and out of them, mortal and of mortal birth, and produced in 
 play certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, 
 having an affinity to one another, such as music and painting 
 create and their companion arts. And there are other arts 
 which have a serious purpose, and these cooperate with nature, 
 such, for example, as medicine, and husbandry, and gymnastic. 
 And they say that politics cooperate with nature, but in a less 
 degree, and have more of art ; also that legislation is entirely 
 a work of art, and is based on assumptions which are not 
 true. 
 
 Cle. How do you mean ? 
 
 Ath. In the first place, my dear friend, they would say that 
 the Gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but only by the 
 laws of States, which are different in different places, according 
 21 
 
322 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 to the agreement of those who make them ; and that the hon- 
 orable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and 
 that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, 
 but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering 
 them ; and that the alterations which are made by art and by 
 law have no basis in nature, bjit are of authority for the mo- 
 ment and at the time at which they are made : these, my 
 friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, 
 which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told 
 by them that the highest right is might, and in this way the 
 young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not 
 such as the law bids them imagine them ; and hence arise con- 
 tentions the philosophers inviting them- to lead a true life 
 according to nature, which is to live in real dominion over 
 others, and not in legal subjection to them. Laws, iv. 400. 
 Natural gifts. See Talents, etc. . 
 Natural justice. See Justice, natural. 
 Natural appetite. See Appetites. 
 Naval warfare and potentate. See Minos. 
 Noble and just, the. 
 
 To him who maintains that it is profitable for the human 
 
 creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply, 
 that if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the 
 multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like 
 qualities and to starve and weaken the man ; who is conse- 
 quently at the mercy of either of the other two, and he is not 
 to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another : 
 he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one 
 another. 
 
 Certainly, he said ; that is what the approver of injustice 
 says. 
 
 To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he ought 
 rather to aim in all he says and does at strengthening the man 
 within him, in order that he may be able to govern the many- 
 headed monster. Like a good husbandman he should be 
 watching and tending the gentle shoots, and preventing the 
 wild ones from growing ; making a treaty with the lion-heart, 
 and in common care of them all uniting the several parts with 
 one another and with himself. 
 
 Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice will 
 say. 
 
 And from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honor, 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 323 
 
 or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the 
 truth, and the disapprover is wrong, and false, and ignorant? 
 
 Yes, from every point of view. The Republic, ii. 420. 
 Noble, man, the rich. 
 
 From what point of view then, and on what ground, shall 
 
 a man be profited by injustice or intemperance or other base- 
 ness, even though he acquire money or power ? 
 
 From no point of view at all. 
 
 What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected ? for he 
 who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected 
 and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and 
 humanized ; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his 
 whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of 
 justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever 
 is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength, and health, in propor- 
 tion as the soul is more honorable than the body. 
 
 Certainly, he said. 
 
 On this higher end, then, the man of understanding will con- 
 centrate the energies of his life. And in the first place, he 
 will honor studies which impress these qualities on his soul, 
 and will disregard others ? 
 
 Clearly, he said. 
 
 In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit, and so 
 far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, 
 that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter ; 
 his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or 
 well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but' he 
 will be always desirous of preserving the harmony of the body 
 for the sake of the concord of the soul ? 
 
 Certainly he will, he replied, if he has true music in him. 
 
 And there is a principle of order and harmony in the acqui- 
 sition of wealth ; this also he will observe, and will not allow 
 himself to be dazzled by the opinion of the world, and heap up 
 riches to his own infinite harm ? 
 
 I think not, he said. 
 
 He will look at the city which is within him, and take care 
 to avoid any change of his own institutions, such as might arise 
 either from superfluity or from want ; and with a view to this 
 only he will gain or spend in so far as he is able ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And, for the same reason, he will accept such honors as he 
 deems likely to make him a better man ; but those which are 
 
324 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 likely to disorder his constitution, whether private or public 
 honors, he will avoid? 
 
 Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a politician ? 
 
 By the dog of Egypt, he will ! in the city which is his own, 
 though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless by some 
 providential accident. The Republic, ii. 422. 
 Noble, no rhetorician is. 
 
 Soc. I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is 
 
 of two sorts ; one, which is mere flattery, and disgraceful dec- 
 lamation ; the other, which is noble and aims at the training 
 and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to 
 say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audi- 
 ence ; but have you ever known such a rhetoric ; or if you 
 have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, 
 will you tell me who he is ? 
 
 Gal. But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any 
 such among the orators who are at present living. 
 
 Soc. Well, then, can you mention any one of a former gen- 
 eration, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who 
 found them worse and made them better, from the day that he 
 began to make speeches ? for, indeed, I do not know of such a 
 man. 
 
 CaL What ! did you never hear that Themistocles was a 
 good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just 
 lately dead, and whom you heard yourself ? 
 
 Soc. Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at 
 first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own 
 desires and those of others ; but if not, and if, as we were af- 
 terwards compelled to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some 
 desires makes us better and of others worse, and we ought to 
 gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in dis- 
 tinguishing them can you tell me of any of these statesmen 
 who did distinguish them. 
 
 Gal. No, indeed, I cannot. Gorgias, iii. 94. 
 Nobler life. See Life, the nobler. 
 Novelty, the love of. See Innovations. 
 Novelty, the world jealous of. 
 
 Euth. I understand, Socrates ; he means to attack you 
 
 about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes 
 to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to 
 have you up before the court for this. He knows that such a 
 charge is readily received by the world. I can tell you that, 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 325 
 
 for when I myself speak in the assembly about divine things, 
 and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me as a mad- 
 man ; and yet every word that I say is true. But they are 
 jealous of all of us. I suppose that we must be brave and not 
 mind them. 
 
 Soc. Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of 
 much consequence. For a man may be thought wise ; but 
 the Athenians, I suspect, do not trouble themselves about him 
 until he begins to impart his wisdom to others ; and then for 
 some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they 
 are angry. Euthyphro, i. 286. 
 Numbers no argument. 
 
 - Soc. O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, 
 when my tribe were serving as Prytanes, and the lot fell upon 
 me and I was made a senator, and had to take the votes, there 
 was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And 
 as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of 
 the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better 
 argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make 
 trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, ought to be given ; 
 for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, 
 and he is the person with whom I am arguing ; his suffrage I 
 know how to take ; but with the many I have nothing to do, 
 and do not even address myself to them. Gorgias, iii. 60. 
 
 Oaths, false. 
 
 Every man should regard adulteration as a particular. 
 
 kind of falsehood, concerning which the many are too fond of 
 saying, that at proper times, the practice may often be right. 
 But they leave the time and place and occasion undefined and 
 unregulated, and from this want of definiteness in their lan- 
 guage they do a great deal of harm to themselves and to others. 
 Now, a legislator ought not to leave the matter undefined ; he 
 ought to prescribe some limit, either greater or less. Let this, 
 then, be the limit prescribed : no one shall call the Gods to wit- 
 ness, when he says or does anything false or deceitful or dis- 
 honest, unless he would be the most hateful of mankind to them. 
 And he is most hateful to them who takes a false oath, and never 
 thinks of the Gods ; and in the second place, he who tells a 
 falsehood in the presence of his superiors. Now, better men 
 are the superiors of worse men, and in general elders are the 
 superiors of the young ; wherefore, also, parents are the superiors 
 
326 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 of their children, and men of women and children, and rulers 
 of their subjects ; for all men ought to reverence any one who 
 is in any position of authority, and especially those who are in 
 State offices. And this is the reason why I have spoken of 
 these matters. For every one who is guilty of adulteration in 
 the agora tells a falsehood, and deceives, and when he invokes 
 the Gods, according to the customs and cautions of the wardens 
 of the agora, he is perjured, and has no respect either for God 
 or man. Laws, iv. 428. 
 Office-seeking disgraceful. 
 
 Of course you know that ambition and avarice are said 
 
 to be and are a disgrace ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And for this reason money and honor have no attraction for 
 them ; they do not wish to be directly paid for governing and 
 so get the name of hirelings, nor by indirectly helping them- 
 selves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. 
 And not being ambitious they do not care about honor ; and 
 therefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be 
 induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I 
 imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, in- 
 stead of waiting to be compelled, has been thought dishonora- 
 ble. Now he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one 
 who is worse than himself, than which no punishment can be 
 greater. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good 
 to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot 
 help ; nor under the idea that they are going to have any ben- 
 efit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because 
 they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who 
 is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For the proba- 
 bility is that if a city were composed entirely of good men, 
 then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention 
 as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain 
 proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his 
 own interest, but that of his subjects ; and every wise man will 
 therefore choose rather to receive a benefit from another than 
 to have the trouble of conferring one. The Republic, ii. 
 169. 
 Office-seekers. 
 
 You must contrive for your future rulers another and a 
 
 better life than that of a ruler, then you may have a well- 
 ordered State ; for oidy in the State which offers this will they 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 327 
 
 rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue 
 and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if 
 they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hun- 
 gering after their own private advantage, thinking that hence 
 they are to snatch away the good of life, order there can never 
 be ; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and do- 
 mestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers 
 themselves and of the whole State. The Republic, ii. 347. 
 Oligarchy. See Miserly men ; Government, property in ; and Money. 
 Opinion, true. 
 
 Soc. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, 
 
 and went to the place and led others thither, would he not 
 be a right and good guide ? 
 
 Men. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And a person who had a right opinion about the way, 
 but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide 
 also, might he not ? 
 
 Men. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And while he has true opinion about that which the 
 other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the 
 truth, as if he knows the truth ? 
 
 Men. Exactly. 
 
 Soc. Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action 
 as wisdom ; and that was the point which we omitted in our 
 speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that wis- 
 dom only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also 
 right opinion. 
 
 Men. True. 
 
 Soc. Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge ? 
 
 Men. The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has 
 knowledge will always be right ; but he who has right opinion 
 will sometimes be right, and sometimes not right. 
 
 Soc. What do you mean ? Can he be wrong who has right 
 opinion, as long as he has right opinion ? 
 
 Men. I admit the cogency of that, and therefore, Socrates, 
 I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion 
 or why they should ever differ. Meno, i. 273. 
 Opinion, right. 
 
 " Is that which is not wise, ignorant ? do you not see that 
 there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance ? " " And 
 what may that be ? " I said. " Right opinion," she replied ; 
 " which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not 
 
 
328 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason ? nor 
 again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), 
 but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance 
 and wisdom." The Symposium, i. 494. 
 Opinion, popular, not to be heeded. 
 
 Soc. But why, my dear Oito, should we care about the 
 
 opinion of the many? Good men, and they are tjie only per- 
 sons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly 
 as they occurred. 
 
 Cr. But you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many 
 must be regarded, for what is now happening shows that they 
 can do the greatest evil to any one who has lost their good 
 opinion. 
 
 Soc. I only wish, Crito, that they could ; for then they could 
 also do the greatest good, and that would be well. But in 
 reality they can do neither : for they cannot either make a 
 man wise or make him foolish ; and whatever they do is the 
 result of chance. Crito, i. 348. 
 Opinion of the many and the wise. 
 
 Soc. In questions of just and unjust, fair and foul, good 
 
 and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, 
 ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them ; 
 or the opinion of the one man who has understanding ? ought 
 we not to fear and reverence him more than all the rest of the 
 world : and if we desert him shall we not destroy and injure 
 that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved 
 by justice and deteriorated by injustice ; there is such a 
 principle ? 
 
 Cr. Certainly there is, Socrates 
 
 Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many 
 say of us ; but what he, the one man who has understanding of 
 just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And 
 therefore you begin in error when you suggest that we should 
 regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good 
 and evil, honorable and dishonorable. "Well," some one will 
 say, " but the many can kill us." 
 
 Cr. Yes, Socrates ; that will clearly be the answer. 
 
 Soc. That is true : but still I find with surprise that the old 
 argument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. Onto, i. 352. 
 Opinion and knowledge. See Knowledge, etc. 
 Opinion, public, compared to a great beast. 
 Let me crave your assent, also, to a further observation. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 329 
 
 ' All those mercenary individuals, whom the world calls Soph- 
 ists and esteems rivals, do but teach the collective opinion 
 of the many, which are the opinions of their assemblies ; and 
 this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who 
 should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast 
 who is fed by him he would learn how to approach and 
 handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is 
 dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his sev- 
 eral cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is 
 soothed or infuriated ; and you may suppose, further, that when, 
 by constantly living with him, he has become perfect in all 
 this he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes a system or 
 art, which he proceeds to teach, not that he has any real notion 
 of what he is teaching, but he names this honorable arid that 
 dishonorable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accord- 
 ance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute, when he 
 has learnt the meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good he 
 pronounces to be what pleases him, and evil what he dislikes ; 
 and he can give no other account of them except that the just 
 and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and 
 having no power of explaining to others, the nature of either, 
 or the immense difference between them. Would not he be a 
 rare educator ? 
 
 Indeed, he would. 
 
 And in what respects does he who thinks that wisdom is the 
 discernment of the tastes and pleasures of the assembled multi- 
 tude, whether in painting or music, or, finally, in politics, differ 
 from such an one ? For I suppose you will agree that he who 
 associates with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or 
 other work of art, or the service which he has done the State, 
 making them his judges, except under protest, will also experi- 
 ence the fatal necessity of producing whatever they praise. 
 And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in 
 confirmation of their notions about the honorable and good 
 Did you ever hear any of them which were not ? 
 
 No, nor am I likely to hear. 
 
 You recognize the truth of what has been said ? Then let 
 rne ask you to consider, further, whether the world will ever be 
 induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather 
 than of the many beautiful, or of the absolute in each kind 
 rather than of the many in each kind ? 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
330 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher? 
 
 Impossible. 
 
 And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the 
 censure of the world ? 
 
 They must. The Republic, ii. 319. 
 Opinion, right, differences as to." See Differences. 
 Opinion, false. See False and Heterodoxy. 
 Opinions and beliefs, true. See Beliefs. 
 Opposites, generation of. See Generation. 
 Order and Harmony, wealth acquired according to. See Noble rich 
 
 man. 
 
 Order and harmony in the soul. See Harmony. 
 Order and Law, limitation of. 
 
 Soc. I omit to speak of ten thousand other things, such 
 
 as beauty and health and strength, and of the many beauties 
 and high perfections of the soul ; methinks, O my fair Philebus, 
 that the goddess saw the universal wantonness and wickedness 
 of all things, having no limit of pleasure or satiety, and she de- 
 vised the limit of law and order, tormenting, as you say, Phile- 
 bus, or, as I affirm, saving the soul. Philebus, iii. 161. 
 Order of nature reversed. See Nature, etc. 
 
 Pain and pleasure related. 
 
 How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curi- 
 ously related to pain, which might be thought to be the oppo- 
 site of it ; for they never will come to a man together, and yet 
 he who pursues either of them is generally compelled to take 
 the other. Their bodies are two and yet they are joined to a 
 single head ; and I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had 
 noticed them, he would have made a fable about God trying to 
 reconcile their strife, and how, when he could not, he fastened 
 their heads together ; and this is the reason why when one 
 comes the other follows, as I find in my own case, pleasure 
 comes following after the pain in my leg which was caused by 
 the chain. Phaedo, i. 386. 
 Pain and pleasure simultaneous. 
 
 Soc. Do you see the inference : that pleasure and pain 
 
 are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? 
 For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the 
 same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body ; 
 which of them is affected, cannot be supposed to be of any 
 consequence ? Is that true or not ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 381 
 
 Cal True 
 
 Soc. I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated in the 
 great mysteries before you were initiated into the little. I 
 thought that was not allowable. But to return to our argu- 
 ment : does not a man cease from thirsting and from the 
 pleasure of drinking at the same moment ? 
 
 Cal. True. 
 
 Soc. And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he 
 not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment ? 
 
 Cal. Very true. 
 
 Soc. Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same 
 moment ? 
 
 Cal. Yes. 
 
 Soc. But he does not cease from good and evil at the same 
 moment, as you have admitted, do you not still admit that ? 
 
 Cal. Yes, I do ; but what is the inference ? 
 
 Soc. Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not 
 the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful, 
 for there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment ; 
 but not of good and evil. How then can pleasure be the same 
 as good, or pain as evil ? And I would have you look at the 
 matter in another point of view, which could hardly, I think, 
 have been considered by you when you identified them : Are 
 not the good, good because they have good present with them, 
 as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them ? 
 
 Cal. Yes. Gorgias. iii. 86. 
 Pain and pleasure, qualities of. 
 
 - Soc. But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and 
 pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or 
 small, and have various degrees of intensity ; as was indeed 
 said long ago by us. 
 
 Pro. Quite true. 
 
 Soc. And if there is badness in any of them, Protarchus, then 
 we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure ? 
 
 Pro. Quite true, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. And if there is Tightness in any of them, should we not 
 speak of a right opinion or right pleasure ; and in like manner 
 of the reverse of rightness ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say 
 that the opinion is erroneous, and not rightly opined ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
332 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Soc. And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect 
 of the object of pleasure or pain, shall we call that right or 
 good, or by any honorable name ? 
 
 Pro. Not if the pleasure is mistaken ; we could not. 
 
 Soc. And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an 
 opinion which is not true, but false ? 
 
 Pro. That is quite correct ; and in that case, Socrates, we 
 call the opinion false, but no one could call the actual pleasure 
 false. 
 
 Soc. How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defense of 
 pleasure ! 
 
 Pro. Nay, Socrates, I only say what I hear. 
 
 Soc. And is there no difference, my friend, between that 
 pleasure which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, 
 and that which is often found in us associated with falsehood 
 and ignorance ? 
 
 Pro. There must be a very great difference between them. 
 Philebus, iii. 175. 
 Painter, the Poet like the. See Poet, etc. 
 Painting and writing. 
 
 Soc. I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is un- 
 fortunately like painting ; for the creations of the painter have 
 the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they 
 preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of 
 speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but 
 if you want to know anything and put a question to one of 
 them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And 
 when they have been once written down they are tumbled about 
 anywhere among those who do arid among those who do not 
 understand them. And they have no reticences or proprieties 
 towards different classes of persons ; and, if they are unjustly 
 assailed or abused, their parent is needed to protect his offspring, 
 for they cannot protect or defend themselves. 
 
 Phaedr. That again is most true. 
 
 Soc. May we not imagine another kind of writing or speak- 
 ing far better than this is, and having far greater power, 
 which is one of the same family, but lawfully begotten ? Let 
 us see what his origin is. . / 
 
 Phaedr. Who is he, and what do you mean about his origin ? 
 
 Soc. I am speaking of an intelligent writing which is graven 
 in the soul of him who has learned, and can defend itself, and 
 knows when to speak and when to be silent. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 333 
 
 Phaedr. You mean the word of knowledge which has a living 
 soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than 
 an image ? 
 
 Soc. Yes, of course that is what I mean. Phaedrus^i. 581. 
 Painting, imitation. See Imitation, etc. 
 Painting, deception in. See Likeness of the world. 
 Parents, what the children owe to the. See Children, etc. 
 
 Ath. Neither God, nor a man who has understanding, will 
 
 ever advise any one to neglect his parents. To a discourse con- 
 cerning the honor and dishonor of parents, a prelude such as 
 the following, about the service of the Gods, will be a suitable 
 introduction: There are ancient customs about the Gods 
 which are universal, and they are of two kinds ; some of the 
 Gods we see with our eyes and honor them, of others we 
 honor the images ; raising statues of them which we adore ; 
 and though they be lifeless, yet we imagine that the living 
 Gods have a good will and gratitude to us on this account. 
 Now, if a man has a father or mother, or their father or mother 
 treasured up in his house stricken in years, let him consider 
 that no statue can be more potent to grant his requests than 
 they are, who are sitting at his hearth, if only he knows how 
 to show true service to them. 
 
 Cle. And what do you call the true mode of service ? 
 
 Ath. I will tell you, O my friend, for such things are worth 
 listening to. 
 
 Cle. Proceed. 
 
 Ath. Oedipus, as tradition says, when dishonored by his sons, 
 invoked on them the fulfillment of those curses from the God 
 which every one declares to have been heard and ratified by 
 the Gods ; and Amyntor in his wrath invoked curses on his 
 son Phoenix, and Theseus upon Hippolytus, and innumerable 
 others have also called down wrath upon their children, which 
 is a plain proof that the Gods listen to the imprecations of 
 parents ; for the curses of a parent are, as they ought to be, 
 mighty against his children as no others are. And shall we 
 suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is spe- 
 cially dishonored by his or her children, are heard by the Gods 
 in accordance with nature ; and that if a man is honored by 
 them, and in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the 
 Gods in his prayers to do them good, he is not equally heard, 
 and that they do not minister to his request? If not, they 
 would be very unjust ministers of good, and that we affirm to 
 be contrary to their nature. 
 
 
334 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Cle. Certainly. 
 
 Ath. May we not think, as I was saying just now, that we 
 can possesss no image which is more honored by the Gods, than 
 that of a father or grandfather, or of a mother stricken in 
 years? whom when a man honors, the heart of the God re- 
 joices, and he is ready to answer their prayers. And, truly, 
 the figure of an ancestor is a wonderful thing, far higher than 
 that of a lifeless image. For when they are honored by us, 
 they join in our prayers, and when they are dishonored, they 
 utter imprecations against us ; but lifeless objects do neither. 
 And, therefore, if a man makes a right use of his father and 
 grandfather and other aged relations, he will have the best of 
 all images which can procure him the favor of the Gods. 
 
 Cle. Excellent. 
 
 Ath. Every man of understanding fears and respects the 
 prayers of his parents, knowing well that many times and to 
 many persons they have been accomplished. Now, these things 
 being thus ordered by nature, good men think that they are the 
 gainers by having aged parents living, to the end of their life, 
 or if they depart early, they are deeply lamented by them ; 
 and to the bad they are very terrible. Wherefore let every 
 man honor with every sort of lawful honor, his own parents 
 agreeably to what has now been said. Laws, iv. 442. 
 Parents, brave sons of brave. See State, heroes, etc. 
 Parental sorrow to be lightly borne. See Sorrow. 
 Parricides. 
 
 But what if the people go into a passion, and aver that a 
 
 grown-up son ought not to be supported by his father, but that 
 the father should be supported by the son ? He did not bring 
 him into the world in order that when he was grown up he 
 himself should be the servant of his own servants, and should 
 support him and his rabble of slaves and companions ; but that, 
 having such a protector, he might be emancipated from the 
 government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. 
 And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any 
 other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and 
 his party of revelers. 
 
 By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a 
 monster he has been fostering in his bosom ; and when he 
 wants to* drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his 
 son strong. 
 
 Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use vio- 
 lence ? What ! beat his father if he opposes him ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 335 
 
 Yes, he will ; and he will begin by taking away his arms. 
 
 Then he is a parricide, and a cruel, unnatural son to an aged 
 parent whom he ought to cherish ; and this is real tyranny, 
 about which there is no mistake ; as the saying is, the people 
 who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, 
 has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus 
 liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the 
 harshest and bitterest form of slavery. The Republic, ii. 
 398. 
 Parties, political. 
 
 - Ath. Consider, then, to whom our State is to be intrusted. 
 For there is a thing which has occurred times without number 
 in States 
 
 Cle. What? 
 
 Ath. That when there has been a contest for power, and the 
 conquerors have monopolized the government, and have re- 
 fused all share to the defeated party and their descendants, they 
 have lived watching one another, in perpetual fear that some 
 one will come into power who has a recollection of former 
 wrongs, and will rise up against them. Now, according to our 
 view, such governments are not polities at all, nor are laws 
 right which are passed for the good of particular classes and 
 not for the good of the whole State. States which have such 
 laws are not polities but parties, and their notion of justice is 
 simply unmeaning. I say this, because I am going to assert 
 that we must not intrust the government in your State to any 
 one because he is rich, or because he possesses any advantage, 
 such as strength, or stature, or again birth ; but he who is 
 most obedient to the laws of the State, he shall win the palm; 
 and to him who is victorious in the first degree, shall be given 
 the highest office and chief ministry of the Gods; and the 
 second to him who bears the second palm ; and in a similar 
 ratio shall all the other offices be assigned to their holders. 
 And when I call the rulers servants or ministers of the law, I 
 give them this name not for the sake of novelty, but because I 
 certainly believe that upon their service or ministry depends 
 the well or ill-being of the State. For that State in which 
 the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the 
 highway to ruin ; but I see that the State in which the law is 
 above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, 
 has salvation, and every blessing which the Gods can confer. 
 Laws, iv. 242. 
 
336 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Passion, incorrupt, the end of reason. 
 
 You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first 
 
 sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say the con- 
 trary ; for in the conflict of the soul, spirit is arrayed on the 
 side of the rational principle. 
 
 Most assuredly. 
 
 But a further question arises : Is spirit different from 
 reason also, or only a kind of reason ; in which latter case, in- 
 stead of three principles in the soul, there will be only two, 
 the rational and the concupiscent ; or rather, as the State was 
 composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counselors, so may 
 there not be in the individual soul a third element which is 
 passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by education, is the 
 auxiliary of reason ? 
 
 Yes, he said, there must be a third. The Republic, ii. 267. 
 Patients and doctors. See Doctors. 
 Patriarchal State. 
 
 Ath. They could hardly have wanted lawgivers as yet ; 
 
 nothing of that sort was likely to have existed in their days, 
 for they had no letters at this early stage ; they lived by habit 
 and the customs of their forefathers, as they are called. 
 
 Cle. Probably. 
 
 Ath. But there was already existing a form of government 
 which, if I am not mistaken, is generally termed a lordship, and 
 this still remains in many places, both among Hellenes and 
 barbarians, and is the government which is declared by Homer 
 to have prevailed among the Cyclopes : 
 
 "They have neither councils nor judgments, but they dwell in 
 hollow rocks on the tops of high mountains, and every one is the 
 judge of his wife and children, and they do not trouble themselves 
 about one another." 
 
 Cle. That must be a charming poet of yours ; I have read 
 some other verses of his, which are very clever ; but I do not 
 know much of him, for foreign poets are not much read among 
 the Cretans. 
 
 Meg. But they are in Lacedaemon, and he appears to be 
 the prince of them all ; the manner of life, however, which he 
 describes is not Spartan, but rather Ionian, and he seems quite 
 to confirm what you are saying, carrying back the ancient state 
 of mankind by the help of tradition, to barbarism. 
 
 Ath. Yes ; and we may accept his witness to the fact that 
 there was a time when primitive societies had this form. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 337 
 
 Cle. Very true. 
 
 Ath. And did not such States spring out of single habita- 
 tions and families who were scattered and thinned in the de- 
 vastations ; and the eldest of them was their ruler, because 
 with them government originated in 'the authority of a father 
 and a mother, whom, like a flock of birds, they followed, form- 
 ing one troop under the patriarchal rule and sovereignty of 
 their parents, which of all sovereignties is the most just ? 
 
 Cle. Very true. Laws, iv. 209. 
 Patriotism. See Individual, the State greater, etc. 
 Patroclus and Achilles. See Achilles. 
 Paupers and criminals co-existing. See Criminals. 
 Peace in view of death. See Calmness. 
 Peace, national. See National. 
 People swayed by rulers. See Rulers, swaying, etc. 
 Persian princes, how cared for. 
 
 After the birth of the royal child, he is tended, not by a 
 good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the royal 
 eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially 
 with the fashioning and formation of his limbs, in order that 
 he may be as shapely as possible ; which being their calling, 
 they are held in great honor. And when the young prince is 
 seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding- 
 masters and begins to go out hunting. And at fourteen years 
 of age he is handed over to the royal schoolmasters, as they 
 are termed; these are four chosen men, reputed to be the best 
 among the Persians of a certain age ; and one of them is the 
 wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and 
 a fourth the most valiant. The first instructs him in the ma- 
 gianism of Zoroaster the son of Oromasus, which is the wor- 
 ship of the Gods, and teaches him also the duties of his 
 royal office ; the second, who is the justest, teaches him always 
 to speak the truth ; the third, or most temperate, forbids him 
 to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be ac- 
 customed to be a freeman and king indeed, lord of himself 
 first, and not a slave ; the most valiant makes him bold and 
 fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a 
 slave. Alcibiades I. iv. 538. 
 
 Persian State, freedom in the. See Freedom in the, etc. 
 Persuasion better than force. See Legislation. 
 In the days of old the Gods had the whole earth dis- 
 tributed among them by allotment ; there was no quarreling ; 
 
338 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 -*' 
 
 and you cannot suppose that the Gods did not know what was 
 proper for each of them to have ; or, knowing this, that they 
 would seek to procure for themselves by contention that which 
 more properly belonged to others. Each of them by just ap- 
 portionment obtained what they wanted, and peopled their own 
 districts ; and when they had peopled them they tended us human 
 beings who belonged to them as shepherds tend their flocks, 
 excepting only that they did not use blows or bodily force, as 
 shepherds do, but governed us like pilots from the stern of the 
 vessel, which is an easy way of guiding animals, holding our 
 souls by the rudder of persuasion, according to their own pleas- 
 ure; thus did they guide all mortal creatures. Critias, ii. 
 595. 
 Persuasion the crown of rhetoric. 
 
 Soc. What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good 
 
 of man, and of which you are the creator ? Answer us. 
 
 Gor. That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being 
 that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to 
 rulers the power of ruling over others in their several States. 
 
 /Soc. And what would you consider this to be ? 
 
 Gor. What is there greater than the word which persuades 
 the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the 
 citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting? 
 if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the 
 physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the 
 money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treas- 
 ures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and 
 persuade the multitude. 
 
 Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately 
 explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric ; and 
 you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the arti- 
 ficer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that 
 this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of 
 rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion ? 
 
 Gor. No : the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates ; 
 for persuasion is the crown of rhetoric. Gorgias, iii. 37. 
 Persuasion the greatest art. 
 
 Pro. I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that 
 
 the art of persuasion far surpassed every other ; this, as he 
 says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things sub- 
 mit, not by compulsion, but of their own free will. Philebus 
 iii. 198. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 839 
 
 Persuasion, the art of. 
 
 - Str. But the art of the lawyer, of the popular orator, 
 and the art of conversation may be called in one word the art 
 of persuasion. 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Str. And of persuasion, there may be said to be two 
 kinds ? 
 
 Theaet. What are they ? 
 
 Str. One is private, and the other public 
 
 But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing and 
 who baits his hook with pleasure and only exacts his main- 
 tenance as the price of his flattery, we should all, if I am not 
 mistaken, describe as possessing an art of sweetening, or mak- 
 ing things pleasant. Sophist, iii. 456. 
 Philosopher willing to die. See Boldness. 
 
 I must try to make more successful defense before you 
 than I did before the judges. For I am quite ready to ac- 
 knowledge, Simmias and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at 
 death, if I were not persuaded that I am going to other Gods 
 who are wise and good (of this I am as certain as I can be of 
 anything of the sort), and to men departed (though I am not 
 so certain of this last) who are better than those whom I leave 
 behind ; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, 
 for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for 
 the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for 
 the good than for the evil 
 
 And now I will make answer to you, O my judges, and 
 show that he who has lived as a true philosopher has reason to 
 be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death 
 he may hope to receive the greatest good in the other world. 
 And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavor to 
 explain. For I deem that the true disciple of philosophy is 
 likely to be misunderstood by other men ; they do not perceive 
 that he is ever pursuing death and dying ; and if this is true, 
 why, having had the desire of death all his life long, should he 
 repine at the arrival of that which he has been always pursu- 
 ing and desiring ? 
 
 Simmias laughed and said : Though not in a laughing 
 humor, I swear that I cannot help laughing, when I think 
 what the wicked world will say when they hear this. They 
 will say that it is delightfully true, and our people at home 
 will agree with them in saying that the life which philosophers 
 
340 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out 
 to be deserving of the death which they desire. 
 
 And they are right, Simmias, in saying so, with the excep- 
 tion of the words " they have found them out ; " for they have 
 not found out what is the nature of that death which the true 
 philosopher desires, or how he deserves or desires death. But 
 let us leave them and have a word with ourselves : Do we be- 
 lieve that there is such a thing as death ? 
 
 To be sure, replied Simmias. 
 
 And is this anything but the separation of soul and body ? 
 And being dead is the completion of the separation when the 
 soul exists in herself, and is parted from the body and the body 
 is parted from the soul that is death ? 
 
 Exactly : that and nothing else, he replied. Phaedo, i. 
 389. 
 
 Philosopher, curiosity does not make a. See Curiosity. 
 Philosopher characterized. 
 
 Soc. Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the 
 
 leaders ; for there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. 
 In the first place, the lords of philosophy have never, from 
 their youth upwards, known their way to the Agora, or the 
 dicastery, or the council, or any other political assembly ; they 
 neither see nor hear the laws or votes of the State written or 
 recited ; the eagerness of political societies in the attainment 
 of offices, clubs, and banquets, and revels, and singing- 
 maidens, do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any 
 event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may 
 have descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, 
 are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he 
 can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the 
 ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he 
 does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation ; 
 but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the city ; 
 his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human 
 things, is " flying all abroad," as Pindar says, measuring with 
 line and rule the things which are under and on the earth and 
 above the heaven, interrogating the whole nature of each and 
 all, but not condescending to anything which is within reach. 
 
 Theod. What do you mean, Socrates ? 
 
 Soc. I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest 
 which the clever, witty Thracian handmaid made about Thales, 
 when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 341 
 
 She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in 
 heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This 
 is a jest which is equally applicable to- all philosophers. For 
 the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next door 
 neighbor ; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he 
 hardly knows whether he is a man or an animal ; he is search- 
 ing into the essence of man, arid busy in inquiring what be- 
 longs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other ; 
 I think that you understand me, Theodorus ? 
 
 Theod. I do, and what you say is true. 
 
 Soc. And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as 
 well as public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law- 
 court, or in any place in which he has to speak of things which 
 are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of 
 Tlmician handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into 
 wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience. His 
 awkwardness is fearful, and gives the impression of imbecil- 
 ity. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say 
 in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows 
 no scandals of any one, and they do not interest him ; and 
 therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness ; arid when 
 others are being praised and glorified, in the simplicity of his 
 heart he cannot help laughing openly and unfeignedly ; and 
 this again makes him look like a fool. When he hears a 
 tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the 
 praises of some keeper of cattle, a swineherd, or shepherd, 
 or cowherd, who is congratulated on the quantity of milk 
 which he squeezes from them ; and he remarks that the creat- 
 ure whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth 
 is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, 
 he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered 
 and uneducated as any shepherd, for he has no leisure, and 
 he is surrounded by a wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hear- 
 ing of enormous landed proprietors of ten thousand acres and 
 more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, because he has 
 been accustomed to think of the whole earth ; and when they 
 sing the praises of family, and say that some one is a gentleman 
 because he has had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he 
 thinks that their sentiments only betray a dull and narrow 
 vision in those who utter them, and who are not educated 
 enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man 
 has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among 
 
342 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 them have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and 
 barbarians, many times over. And when the people pride 
 themselves on having a pedigree of twenty-five ancestors, which 
 goes back to, Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, he cannot un- 
 derstand their poverty of ideas. Why they are unable to cal- 
 culate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might 
 have been anybody, and was such as fortune made him, and he 
 had a fiftieth, and so on ? He amuses himself with the notion 
 that they cannot count, and thinks that a little arithmetic would 
 have got rid of their senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases 
 our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly because he is 
 thought to despise them, and also because he is ignorant of 
 what is before him, and always at a loss. 
 
 Theod. That is very true, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper 
 air and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the con- 
 templation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in 
 their difference from one another and from all other things ; 
 or from the commonplaces about the happiness of kings to the 
 consideration of government, and of human happiness and 
 misery in general what they are, and how a man is to attain 
 the one and avoid the other when that narrow, keen, little 
 legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the phi- 
 losopher his revenge : for dizzied by the height at which he is 
 hanging, whence he looks into space, which is a strange ex- 
 perience to him, he being dismayed and lost, and stammering 
 out broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens 
 or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the 
 situation, but by every man who has not been brought up as a 
 slave. Such are the two characters, Theodorus : the one of 
 the freeman called by you useless, when he has to perform 
 some menial office, such as packing up a bag, or flavoring a 
 sauce, or fawning speech ; the other, of the man who is able 
 to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows 
 not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman ; still less with the 
 music of discourse can he hymn the true life which is lived by 
 immortals or men blessed of heaven. Theaetetus, iii. 376. 
 Philosopher and Sophist. 
 
 Sir. The art of dialectic would be attributed by you onl; 
 
 to the philosopher pure and true? 
 
 Theaet. Who but he can be worthy ? 
 
 Str. This is the region in which we shall always discovei 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 343 
 
 the philosopher, both now and hereafter ; like the Sophist, he 
 is not easily discovered, but for a different reason. 
 
 Theaet. For what reason ? 
 
 Str. Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of 
 not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and 
 cannot be discovered himself because of the darkness of the 
 place. Is not that true ? 
 
 Theaet. Quite so. 
 
 Str. And the philosopher, always holding converse through 
 reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light ; 
 for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are unable to endure 
 the vision of the divine. 
 
 Theaet. Yes ; that is quite as true as the other. 
 
 Str. Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully con- 
 sidered by us, if we are disposed ; but the Sophist plainly must 
 not be allowed to escape until we have had a good look at him. 
 
 Theaet. Very good. Sophist iii. 492. 
 Philosophers and Statesmen, border-ground between. 
 
 Soc. What manner of man was he who came up to you 
 
 and censured philosophy ; was he an orator who himself prac- 
 tices in the courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the 
 speeches with which they do battle ? 
 
 On. He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether 
 he had ever been into court ; but they say that he knows the 
 business, and is a clever man, and composes wonderful speeches. 
 
 Soc. Now I understand, Crito ; he is one of an amphibious 
 class, whom I was on the point of mentioning one of those 
 whom Prodicus describes as on the border-ground between 
 philosophers and statesmen they think that they are the 
 wisest of all men, and that they are generally esteemed the 
 wisest ; nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in 
 their way ; and they are of the opinion that if they can prove 
 the philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will dispute 
 their title to the palm of wisdom, for that they are themselves 
 really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthy- 
 demus and his friend, when they get hold of them in conversa- 
 tion. This opinion which they entertain of their own wisdom 
 is very natural ; for they have a certain amount of philosophy, 
 and a certain amount of political wisdom ; there is reason in 
 what they say, for they argue that they have just enough of 
 both, while they keep out of the way of all risks and conflicts 
 and reap the fruits of their wisdom. Euthydemus, i. 211. 
 
344 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Philosopher, despising bodily pleasures. See Bodily pleasure. 
 Philosophers, dizzy. 
 
 1 have not a bad notion which came into my head only 
 
 this moment : I believe that the primeval givers of names were 
 undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, 
 in their search after the nature of things, are always getting 
 dizzy from going round and round and then they imagine that 
 the world is going round and round and moving anyhow ; and 
 this appearance, which arises out of their own internal condi- 
 tion, they suppose to be a reality of nature ; they think that 
 there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, 
 and that all is full of every sort of motion and change. 
 Cratylus, i. 650. 
 Philosophic nature, rare. 
 
 Neither is there any reason why I should again set in 
 
 array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember 
 that courage, magnanimity, apprehension, memory, were his 
 natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could 
 deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at 
 facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them 
 manifestly useless, and the greater number wholly depraved ; 
 we were then led to inquire into the grounds of these accusa- 
 tions, and we had arrived at the point of asking why are the 
 many bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the 
 examination and definition of the true philosopher. 
 
 Exactly. 
 
 And now we have to consider the corruptions of the phil- 
 osophical nature, why so many are spoiled and so few escape 
 spoiling I am speaking of those whom you call useless but 
 not wicked ; and after that we will consider the imitators of 
 philosophy, what manner of natures are they who aspire after 
 a profession which is above them and of which they are un- 
 worthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon 
 philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reproba- 
 tion of which we speak. 
 
 What are these corruptions, he said ? 
 
 I will see if I can explain them to you, I said. Every 
 one will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qual- 
 ities which make a philosopher, is a plant that rarely grows 
 among men there are not many of them. 
 
 They are very rare. The Republic, ii. 317. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 345 
 
 Philosophy to be followed. 
 
 Soc. Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind 
 whether the teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think 
 only of Philosophy herself. Try and examine her well and 
 truly, and if she be evil seek to turn away all men from her, 
 and not your sons only ; but if she be what I believe that she 
 is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house, as the 
 saving is, and be of good cheer. Euthydemus, i. 212. 
 Philosophy delivering the soul. 
 
 He who is a philosopher or lover of learning, and is en- 
 tirely pure at departing, is alone permitted to attain to the di- 
 vine nature. And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why 
 the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, 
 and endure and refuse to give themselves up to them, not 
 because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the 
 lovers of money, and the world in general ; nor like the lovers 
 of power and honor, because they dread the dishonor or dis- 
 grace of evil deeds. 
 
 No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes. 
 
 No indeed, he replied ; and therefore they who have a care 
 of their own souls, and do not merely live moulding and fash- 
 ioning the body, say farewell to all this ; they will not walk in 
 the ways of the blind : and when Philosophy offers them puri- 
 fication and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to 
 resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and fol- 
 low. Phaedo, i. 411. 
 Philosophy in early youth. 
 
 At present, I said, even those who study philosophy in 
 early youth, or in the intervals of money-making and hpuse- 
 keeping, do but make an approach to the most difficult branch 
 of the subject, and then take themselves off (I am speaking of 
 those who have the most training, and by the most difficult 
 branch I mean dialectic) ; and in after-life they perhaps go to 
 a discussion which is held by others, and to which they are in- 
 vited, and this they deem a great matter, as the study of phi- 
 losophy is not regarded by them as their proper business : then, 
 as years advance, in most cases their light is quenched more 
 truly than Heracleitus' sun, for they never rise again. 
 
 But what ought to be their course ? 
 
 Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and 
 what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender 
 age : let their bodies be taken care of during the period of 
 
346 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 growth, to be hereafter the servants of philosophy ; as the man 
 advances to mature intelligence he should increase the gymnas- 
 tics of the soul ; but when the strength of our citizens fails, 
 and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at 
 will and have no other serious employment, as we intend them 
 to live happily here, and, this, life ended, to have a similar hap- 
 piness in another. The Republic, ii. 325. 
 Philosophy in the State. 
 
 When persons who are unworthy of education approach 
 
 philosophy and make an alliance with her who is in a rank 
 above them, what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be 
 generated ? Will they riot be sophisms captivating to the ear, 
 yet having nothing in them genuine or worthy of or akin to 
 true wisdom ? 
 
 No doubt, he said. 
 
 Then there is a very small remnant, Adeimantus, I said, of 
 worthy disciples of philosophy : perchance some noble nature, 
 brought up under good influences, and detained by exile in her 
 service who in the absence of temptation remains devoted 
 to her ; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics 
 of which he contemns or neglects ; and perhaps there may 
 be a few who, having a gift for philosophy, leave other arts, 
 which they justly despise, and come to her; and perad venture 
 there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages' bridle 
 (for Theages, you know, has had everything to draw him away ; 
 but his ill-health keeps him from politics). My own case of 
 the internal sign is indeed hardly worth mentioning, as very 
 rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been vouchsafed to any one 
 else. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how 
 sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also 
 seen and been satisfied of the madness of the multitude, and 
 known that there is no one who ever acts honestly in the ad- 
 ministration of States, nor any helper who defends the cause 
 of. the just by whose aid he may be saved. Such a defender 
 may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts ; 
 he would not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither 
 would he be able alone to resist all their fierce natures, and 
 therefore he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, 
 and would have to throw away his life before he had done any 
 good to himself or others. When he reflects upon all this, he 
 holds his peace, and does his own business. He is like one 
 who retires under the shelter of a wall in the storm of dust 
 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 347 
 
 and sleet which the driving wind hurries along ; and when he 
 sees the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content if 
 only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or un- 
 righteousness, and depart in peace and good will, with bright 
 hopes. 
 
 Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he 
 departs. 
 
 A great work, yes ; but not the greatest, unless he find a 
 State suitable to him ; for in a State which is suitable to him 
 he will have a larger growth, and be the saviour of his country 
 as well as of himself. 
 
 Enough, then, of the causes why philosophy is in such an 
 evil name ; how unjustly, has been explained : and now is 
 there anything more which you wish to say ? 
 
 Nothing more on that subject, he replied ; but I should like 
 to know which of the governments now existing is in your 
 opinion the one adapted to her. 
 
 Not any of them, I said ; and that is the very accusation 
 which I bring against them : not one of them is worthy of the 
 philosophic nature ; and hence that nature is warped and de- 
 formed ; as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land be- 
 comes denaturalized, and is vanquished and degenerates into 
 the nature stock, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of 
 persisting, receives another character. But if philosophy ever 
 finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then 
 will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other 
 things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but hu- 
 man ; and now, I know, that you are going to ask what that 
 State is. 
 
 No, he said ; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask 
 another question whether it is the State of which we are 
 the founders and inventors, or some other? 
 
 Yes, I replied, ours in most respects ; but you may remember 
 our saying before that some living authority would always be 
 required in the State, whose idea of the constitution would be 
 the same which guided you originally when laying clown the laws. 
 
 That was said, he replied. 
 
 Yes, but imperfectly said; you frightened us with objec- 
 tions, which certainly snowed that the discussion would be long 
 and difficult ; and even what remains is the reverse of easy. 
 
 What is that ? 
 
 The question how the study of philosophy may be so or- 
 
348 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 dered as to be consistent with the preservation of the State ; 
 for all great things are attended with risk : as the saying is, 
 " Hard is the good." 
 
 Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the inquiry 
 will then be complete. 
 
 I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if 
 at all, by a want of power : of my zeal you shall have ocular 
 demonstration ; and please to remark in what I am about to say 
 how courageously and unhesitatingly I affirm that a State ought 
 not to have philosophy studied after the present fashion. The 
 Republic, ii. 323. 
 Philosophy, too much, is ruinous. 
 
 Philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the 
 
 proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much phi- 
 losophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good 
 parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is neces- 
 sarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a 
 person of honor ought to know ; for he is ignorant of the laws 
 of the State, and of the language which ought to be used in the 
 dealings of man with man, whether private or public, and alto- 
 gether ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of 
 human character in general. And people of this sort, when 
 they betake themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous 
 as I imagine the politicians to be, when they make their ap- 
 pearance in the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says, 
 
 " Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest portion of 
 the day to that in which he thinks himself to excel most," 
 
 and anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreci- 
 ates and praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and 
 because he thinks that he will thus praise himself. The 
 true principle is to unite them. Philosophy, as a part of edu- 
 cation, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a man 
 while he is young in pursuing such a study ; but when he is 
 more advanced in years, then the thing becomes ridiculous, and 
 I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and 
 imitate children. For when I love to see a little child, who is 
 not of an age to speak plainly, lisping at his play ; there is an 
 appearance of grace and freedom in his utterance, which is 
 natural to his childish years. And when I hear some small 
 creature carefully articulating its words, I am offended ; the sound 
 is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. But 
 when I see a man lisping as if he were a child, that appears to 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 349 
 
 me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have 
 the same feeling about students of philosophy ; when I see a 
 youth so engaged, that I consider to be quite in character, and 
 becoming a man of a liberal education, and him who neglects 
 philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire 
 to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the 
 study in later life, and not leaving off, I think that he ought to 
 be beaten, Socrates ; for, as I was saying, such an one, even 
 though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. Gor- 
 gias, iii. 73. 
 
 Philosophy, freedom of. See Freedom of Philosophy. 
 Physical force inferior to persuasion. See Legislation and Per- 
 suasion. 
 Physician, the false and the true. 
 
 Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in 
 
 medicine from the true physician, nor between any other true 
 and false professor of knowledge. Let us consider the matter 
 in this way : If the wise man or any other man wants to dis- 
 tinguish the true physician from the false, what is he to do ? 
 He will not talk to him about medicine ; and that, as we were 
 saying, is the only thing which the physician understands. 
 
 True. 
 
 And on the other hand, knows nothing of science, for this 
 has been assumed to be the province of wisdom. 
 
 True. 
 
 And further, since medicine is science, we must infer that he 
 does not know anything of medicine. 
 
 Exactly. 
 
 The wise man will indeed know that the physician has some 
 kind of science or knowledge ; but when he wants to discover 
 the nature of this he will ask, What is the subject-matter ? For 
 each science is. distinguished, not as science, but by the nature 
 of the subject. Is not that true ? 
 
 Yes ; that is quite true. 
 
 And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having 
 the subject-matter of health and disease ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And he who would inquire into the nature of medicine must 
 pursue the inquiry into health and disease, and not into what 
 is extraneous? 
 
 True. 
 
 And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a 
 physician in what relates to these ? 
 
350 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 He will. 
 
 He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether 
 what he does is right in relation to these ? Gharmides, i. 27. 
 Physician for the State. See State, physician for the, etc. 
 Physician, legislator compared to "a. See Legislator. 
 Physician, tried by boys. 
 
 I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a 
 
 court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would 
 he reply in such a case, if some one were to accuse him, say- 
 ing, " O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you : 
 he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among 
 you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, 
 until you know not what to do ; he gives you the bitterest 
 potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike 
 the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you ! " 
 What do you suppose that the physician would reply when he 
 found himself in such a predicament ? If he told the truth 
 he could only say, " All this, my boys, I did with a view to 
 health," and then would there not just be a clamor among a 
 jury like that ? How they would cry out ! Goryias, iii. 113. 
 Physicians and patients. See Doctors, etc. 
 Physicians and cookery. See Cookery. 
 Piety, conceptions of. See Holiness, etc. 
 Pleasant, just and good. See Just judge. 
 Pleasure as related to pain. See Pain. 
 Pleasure and pain, qualities of. See Pain, qualities of, etc. 
 Pleasure to be desired. 
 
 Soc. Let us next assume that in the soul herself, there is 
 
 an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and consoling, 
 and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious. 
 
 Pro. Yes ; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which 
 is of the soul only, and is produced by expectation without the 
 body. 
 
 Soc. Right ; and I think that the examination of these two 
 kinds, unalloyed as I suppose them to be, and not compounds 
 of pleasure and pain, will most clearly show whether the whole 
 class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of en- 
 tire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of 
 the classes which have been mentioned ; and whether pleasure 
 and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of this kind, are 
 not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, 
 as being not in themselves good, but sometimes and in some 
 instances admitting of the nature of good. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 351 
 
 Pro. You say most truly that this is the track which the 
 investigation should follow. P/tilebus, iii. 168. 
 Pleasure, victory over. 
 
 Ath. Have we not heard of Iccus of Tarentum, who, with 
 a view to the Olympic and other contests, in his zeal for his 
 art, and also because he was of a manly and temperate consti- 
 tution, never had any connection with a woman or a youth 
 during the whole time of his training ? And the same is said 
 of Crison and Astylus and Diopompus and many others, and 
 yet, Cleinias, they were far worse educated in their minds than 
 your and my fellow-citizens, and in their bodies far more lusty. 
 
 Cle. No doubt this fact has been often affirmed positively by 
 the ancients of these athletes. 
 
 Ath. And shall they be willing to abstain fronj what is ordi- 
 narily deemed a pleasure for the sake of a victory in wrestling, 
 running, and the like ; and our young men be incapable of a 
 similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory, which 
 is the noblest of all, as from their youth upwards we will tell 
 them, charming them, as we hope, into the belief of this, by 
 tales in prose and verse ? 
 
 Cle. Of what victory are you speaking? 
 
 Ath. Of the victory over pleasure, which if they win they 
 will live happily, or if conquered the reverse of happily. And, 
 further, will not the fear of impiety enable them to master that 
 which other inferior people have mastered ? 
 
 Cle. I dare say. Laws, iv. 355. 
 Pleasures of the body. See Bodily, etc. 
 Pleasures of the intelligent. See Intelligence. 
 Pleasures and pains mixed and unmixed. See Body and Soul. 
 Pleasures, true. 
 
 Pro. Which are the true pleasures, Socrates, and what is 
 the right conception of them? 
 
 Soc. True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of 
 color and form, and most of those which arise from smells ; 
 those of sound, again, and in general those of which the want 
 is painless and unconscious, and the gratification afforded by 
 them palpable to sense, and pleasant and unalloyed with pain. 
 Phileb-us, iii. 190. 
 Pleasures of Knowledge. See Knowledge. 
 Pleasures as hindrances. 
 
 Soc. Do you wish to have the greatest and most vehement 
 
 pleasures for your companions in addition to the true ones? 
 
352 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Why, Socrates, they will say, how can we ? seeing that they 
 are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us ; they trouble 
 the souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness ; 
 they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly 
 the ruin of our children when they do come to the birth, caus- 
 ing them to be forgotten and unheeded ; but the other true and 
 pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our kindred, 
 and the pleasures which accompany health and temperance, 
 and are in a manner the handmaidens and inseparable at- 
 tendants of virtue as of a God, mingle these and not the 
 others ; there would be great want of sense in any one who 
 desires to see the fair and untroubled stream, and to find in 
 the admixture what is the highest good in man and in the uni- 
 verse, and to divine what is the true form of good there 
 would be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, 
 which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle 
 with mind in the cup : Is not this a very rational and suitable 
 reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well 
 as on that of memory and true opinion, to the question which 
 has been asked of us ? 
 
 Pro. Most certainly. Philebus, iii. 204. 
 Pleasures, harmless. See Amusements. 
 Poetry, imitative. See Imitative. 
 Poetry expelled from the State. 
 
 Poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying 
 
 them up ; she lets them rule instead of ruling them as they 
 ought to be ruled, with a view to the happiness and virtue of 
 mankind. 
 
 I cannot deny it. 
 
 Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of 
 the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator 
 of Hellas, and that he is profitable for the management and 
 administration of human things, and that you should take him 
 up and get to know him and regulate your whole life according 
 to him, we may love and honor the intentions of these excellent 
 people, as far as their lights extend ; and we are ready to ac- 
 knowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of 
 tragedy writers ; but we must remain firm in our conviction 
 that hymns to the Gods and praises of famous men are the 
 only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For 
 if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, 
 either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of man- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 353 
 
 kind, which by common consent has ever been deemed the best, 
 but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State. 
 
 That is most true, he said. 
 
 Let this, then, be our excuse for expelling poetry, that the 
 argument constrained us ; but let us also make an apology to 
 her, lest she impute to us any harshness or want of politeness. 
 We will tell her, that there is an ancient quarrel between phi- 
 losophy and poetry ; of which there are many proofs, such as 
 the saying of " the yelping hound howling at her lord," or of 
 one " mighty in the vain talk of fools-," and " the mob of sages 
 circumventing Zeus," and the " subtle thinkers who are beg- 
 gars after all ; " and there are ten thousand other signs of an- 
 cient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us as- 
 sure our sweet friend, and the sister arts of imitation, that if 
 she will only prove her title to existence in a well-ordered 
 State we shall be delighted to receive her, knowing that we 
 ourselves also are very susceptible of her charms ; but we may 
 not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, 
 that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when 
 you see her in the garb of Homer ? 
 
 Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed. 
 
 Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from 
 exile, on this condition that she is to make a defense of her- 
 self in lyrical or some other metre ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and 
 yet not poets I think that we may grant a further privilege ; 
 they shall be allowed to speak in prose on her behalf : let 
 them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to 
 States and to human life, and we will gladly listen, for if this 
 can be proved we shall surely be the gainers, that is to say, if 
 there is a use in poetry as well as a delight ? 
 
 Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers. 
 
 If her defense fails, then, my dear friend, though much 
 against our will, we must give her up, after the manner of 
 lovers who abstain when they think that their love is not good 
 for them ; for we too are inspired by that love of poetry which 
 the education of noble States has implanted in us, and there- 
 fore we would have her appear at her best and truest ; but so 
 long as she is unable to make good her defense, even though 
 our ears may listen, this argument of ours will be like a charm 
 i to us, and into the childish love which the many have of her 
 23 
 
354 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 we shall take care not to fall again, for we see that poetry, 
 being such as she is, is not to be pursued in earnest or re- 
 garded seriously as attaining to the truth ; and he who listens 
 to her will be on his guard against her seductions, fearing for 
 the safety of the city which rs within him, and he will attend 
 to our words. The Republic, ii. 438. 
 Poets, poor. 
 
 Ctesippus said: I like to see you blushing, Hippothales,- 
 
 and hesitating to tell Socrates the name ; when, if he were 
 with you but for a very short time, he" would be plagued to 
 death by hearing of nothing else. Indeed, Socrates, he has 
 literally deafened us, and stopped our ears with the praises of 
 Lysis ; and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every likeli- 
 hood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Ly- 
 sis. His performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing 
 at all in comparison with his verse ; and when he drenches us 
 with his poems and other compositions, that is really too bad ; 
 and what is even worse, is his manner of singing them to his 
 love ; this he does in a voice which is truly appalling, and we 
 cannot help hearing him ; and now he has a question put to 
 him by you, and lo ! he is blushing. Lysis, i. 42. 
 
 Poets our guides. 
 
 Let us proceed no further in this direction (for the road 
 
 seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other in which 
 the poets will be our guide ; for they are to us in a manner 
 the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends 
 in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, 
 makes them and draws them to one another ; and this they 
 express, if I am not mistaken, in the following words : 
 
 " God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted." 
 
 I dare say that you have heard those words. 
 
 Yes, he said ; I have. Lysis, i. 53. 
 Poets, madness of the. See Madness of the prophet, etc. 
 Poets like painters. 
 
 Must we not infer that all the poets, beginning with Homer, 
 
 are only imitators ; they copy images of virtue and the like, 
 but the truth they never reach ? The poet is like a painter 
 who, as has already been observed, will make a likeness of a 
 cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling ; and his 
 picture is good enough for those who know no more than he 
 does, and judge only by colors and figures. Also the poet lays 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 355 
 
 over his words and expressions certain colors taken from the 
 several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to 
 imitate them ; and other people who are as ignorant as he is, 
 and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cob- 
 bling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and 
 harmony and rhythm he speaks very well such is the sweet 
 influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I 
 think that you must know, for you have often seen what a 
 poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the 
 colors which music puts upon them, and recited in prose ? 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but 
 only blooming ; and now the bloom of youth has passed away 
 from them ? 
 
 Exactly. The Republic, ii. 431. 
 Poets, the talk about the. 
 
 The talk about the poets seems to me like a common- 
 place entertainment to which a vulgar company have recourse ; 
 who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one an- 
 other, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own 
 voices and conversation by reason of their stupidity, raise the 
 price of flute-girls in the market, hiring for a great sum the 
 voice of a flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium 
 of intercourse among them : but where the company are real 
 gentlemen and men of education, you will see no flute-girls, 
 nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls ; arid they have no nonsense or 
 games, but are contented with one another's conversation, of 
 which their own voices are the medium, and which they carry 
 on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are 
 very liberal in their potations. And a company like this of 
 ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the 
 help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot in- 
 terrogate about the meaning of what they are saying ; people 
 who cite them declaring, some that the poet has one meaning, 
 and others that he has another ; and the point which is in dis- 
 pute can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they 
 decline, and prefer to talk with one another, a'nd put one an- 
 other to the proof in conversation. Protagoras, i. 147. 
 Poets, tragic, promoters of tyranny. 
 
 The tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and others 
 
 who have the perfect form of government, if we object to hav- 
 ing them in our State, because they are the eulogists of tyr- 
 anny. 
 
356 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive 
 us. 
 
 But still, I said, they go about to other cities and attract 
 mobs, and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw 
 the cities over to tyrannies and democracies. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honor the 
 greatest honor from tyrants, and the next greatest from democ- 
 racies ; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the 
 more their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of 
 breath to proceed farther. 
 
 True. The Republic, ii. 3 8. 
 Poets destroyed by popular demands. 
 
 Ath. The true legislator will persuade, and, if he cannot 
 
 persuade, will compel the poet to express as he ought, by fair 
 and noble words, in his rhythms, the figures, and in his melodies, 
 the music of temperate, and brave, and in every way good men. 
 
 Ole. And do you really imagine, Stranger, that this is the 
 way in which poets generally compose in States at the present 
 day ? As far as I can observe there is nothing of the sort, 
 except among us and among the Lacedaemonians, as you now 
 tell me ; in other places novelties are always being introduced 
 in dancing and in music, generally not under the authority of 
 any law, but at the instigation of lawless pleasures ; and these 
 pleasures are so far from being the same, as you describe the 
 Egyptian to be, or having the same principles, that they are 
 never the same. Laws, iv. 189. 
 Political bond. 
 
 When the foundation of politics is in the letter only, and 
 
 in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we won- 
 der, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always will 
 be, in States ? Any other art, built on such a foundation, 
 would be utterly undermined, there can be no doubt of that. 
 Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political 
 bond ? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, 
 and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, 
 though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perish- 
 ing and have perished, and will hereafter perish, through the 
 incapacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of 
 ignorance of the highest truths I mean to say, that they are 
 wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sci- 
 ences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most per- 
 fect knowledge. Statesman, iii. 588. 
 
PLATO 1 S BEST THOUGHTS. 357 
 
 Political parties. See Parties. 
 
 Politicians as philosophers. See Laws, makers of. 
 
 Politicians not Statesmen. 
 
 Str. But who are these elected kings and priests who now 
 come into view with a crowd of retainers, as the former class 
 disappears and the scene changes ? 
 
 T. Soc. Whom do you mean ? 
 
 kStr. How strangely they look ! 
 T. Soc. Why strangely ? 
 Str. A minute ago I thought that they were all sorts of ani- 
 mals ; for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many 
 more like satyrs and the weak and versatile sort of animals, 
 Protean shapes ever changing their form and nature ; and now, 
 Socrates, I begin to see who they are. 
 
 T. Soc. Who are they ? You seem to be gazing on some 
 strange vision. 
 
 Str. Yes ; every one looks strange when you do not know 
 him ; and at first sight, coming suddenly upon him, I did not 
 recognize the politician and his troop. 
 
 Y. Soc. Who is he ? 
 
 Str. The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wiz- 
 ards, who must at any cost be separated from the true king or 
 Statesman, if we are ever to see daylight in the present inquiry. 
 
 T. Soc. That certainly is not a hope to be lightly renounced. 
 Statesman, iii. 576. 
 Popular liberty. See Democracy. 
 Popular opinion. See Opinion, public. 
 Popular influence on Poetry. See Poetry, etc. 
 Possessing and having. See Having. 
 Poverty and wealth equally deteriorating. See Wealth. 
 Poverty and riches in Age. 
 
 They think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because 
 
 of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth 
 is well known to be a great comforter. 
 
 That is true, he replied ; they do not believe me : and there 
 is something in what they say ; not, however, so much as they 
 imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the 
 Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, 
 not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian ; " If 
 you had been an Athenian and I a Seriphian, neither of us 
 would have been famous." And to those who are not rich and 
 are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made ; for 
 
358 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 neither can a good poor man lightly bear age, nor can a bad rich 
 man ever be at peace with himself. The Republic, ii. 150. 
 Praise and esteem distinguished. See Esteem. 
 Prayer with every enterprise. 
 
 Soc. I see that I shall receive in my turn a perfect and 
 
 splendid feast of reason. And now, Timaeus, you, I suppose, 
 are to follow, first offering up a prayer to the God^ according 
 to custom. 
 
 Tim. All men, Socrates, who have any degree of right feel- 
 ing, at the beginning of every enterprise, whether small or 
 great, always call upon God. And we, too, who are going to 
 discourse of the nature of the universe, how created or how ex- 
 isting without creation, if we be not altogether out of our wits, 
 must invoke and pray the Gods 'and goddesses that we may say 
 all things in a manner pleasing to them and likewise consistent 
 with ourselves. Let this, then, be our invocation of the Gods, 
 to which I add an exhortation of myself that I may set forth 
 this high argument in the manner which will be most intelligi- 
 ble to you, and will most accord with my own intent. Tim- 
 aeus, ii. 523. 
 Preamble to law, distinguished from the matter. 
 
 All this time, from early dawn until noon, we have been 
 
 talking about laws in this charming retreat : now we are going 
 to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only the 
 prelude of them. Why do I mention this ? For this reason : 
 Because all discourses and vocal exercises have preludes and 
 overtures, which are a sort of artistic beginnings, intended to 
 help the strain which is to be performed ; lyric measures and 
 every other sort of music have preludes framed with wonderful 
 care. But of the truer and higher strain of law and politics, 
 no one has ever yet uttered any prelude, or composed or pub- 
 lished any, as though there was no such thing in nature. 
 Whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there 
 is these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not 
 exactly double, but they are in two parts, the law and the pre- 
 lude of the law. The arbitrary command, which was compared 
 to the commands of the physicians, whom we described as of 
 the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple ; and that which 
 preceded, and was described by our friend as hortatory only, 
 was, in fact, an exhortation, and is analogous to the preamble 
 of a discourse. For I imagine that all this language of concil- 
 iation, which the legislator has been uttering in the -preface of 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 359 
 
 the law, was intended to create good-will in the person whom 
 he addressed, in order that, by reason of this good-will, he 
 might more intelligently receive his command, that is to say, 
 the law. And therefore, in my way of speaking, this is more 
 rightly described as the preamble than as the matter of the 
 law. Laws, iv. 250. 
 Presentiment of death in Socrates. 
 
 Soc. Do not repeat the old story that he who likes will 
 kill me and get my money ; for then I shall have to repeat the 
 old answer that he will be a baci man and will kill the good, 
 and that the money will be of use to him ; but that he will 
 wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, 
 and if basely, hurtfully. 
 
 Cal. How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never 
 come to harm ! you seem to think that you are living in an- 
 other country, and can never be brought into a court of jus- 
 tice, as you very likely may be brought by some miserable and 
 mean person. 
 
 Soc. Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if 1 do not 
 know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. 
 And if I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which 
 you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial of that 
 I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. 
 Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you 
 why I anticipate this? 
 
 Cal. By all means. 
 
 Soc. I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian 
 living who practices the true art of politics ; I am the only poli- 
 tician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak I speak not 
 with any view of pleasing, and that I look to what is best and 
 not to what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts 
 and graces which you recommend, 1 shall have nothing to say 
 
 in the justice court For I shall not be able to rehearse 
 
 to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and 
 which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers 
 or the enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and 
 advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, 
 and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and 
 use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, it 
 is useless for me to reply, as I truly might : "All this I do for 
 the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my judges, 
 and of that only." And therefore there is no saying what may 
 happen to me. 
 
360 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Col. And do you think, Socrates, that a man, who is thus 
 defenseless, is in a good position ? 
 
 Soc. Yes, Callicles, if he have that defense which you have 
 often admitted that he should have ; if he be his own defense, 
 and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect 
 of Gods or men ; for that has often been acknowledged by us 
 to be the best sort of defense. And if any one could convict 
 me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I 
 should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, 
 or before a few, or by myself alone ; and if I died for want of 
 ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died 
 because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure 
 that you would not find me repining at death. For no man 
 but an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is 
 afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below, having 
 one's soul full of injustice, is the last and worst of all evils. 
 Gorgias, in. 112. 
 Pride, personal. 
 
 Soc. I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son 
 
 of Cleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken 
 to you for many years, when the rest of the world were weary- 
 ing you with their attentions, am the last of your lovers who 
 still speaks to you. The reason was, that I was hindered from 
 speaking to you by a power not human but divine, the nature 
 of which I will some day explain to* you ; that impediment has 
 been now removed, and I present myself before you, hoping 
 that the hindrance will not again occur. Meanwhile, I have 
 observed that your pride has been too much for the pride of 
 your admirers ; they were very numerous, but they have all 
 run away, overpowered by your superior force of character ; 
 not one of them remains. And I want you to understand the 
 reason why you have overpowered them. You imagine that 
 you have no need of any other man at all, as you have great 
 possessions and abundance of all things, beginning with the 
 body, and ending with the soul. In the first place, you think 
 that you are the fairest and tallest of the citizens, and this every 
 one who has eyes sees to be true ; in the second place, that 
 you are among the noblest of them, highly connected both on the 
 father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of the most 
 distinguished families in your own State, which is the greatest in 
 Hellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, 
 who can assist you when in need ; and there is one potent rela- 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 361 
 
 tive, who is more to you than all the rest, Pericles, the son of 
 Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian of you and your 
 brother, and who cannot only do as he pleases in this city, but 
 in all Hellas, and among many and mighty barbarous nations. 
 Moreover, you are rich ; but I must say that you value your- 
 self least of all upon your possessions. And all these things 
 have lifted you up, and you have overcome your lovers, and 
 they have acknowledged that you were too much for them. 
 Have you not remarked their absence ? And now I know that 
 you wonder why I have not gone away like the rest of them, 
 and what can be my motive in remaining. Alcibiades L iv. 
 515. 
 
 Priest, the, a King. See King, etc. 
 
 Primeval race, without procreation. See Spontaneous life. 
 Primitive Society. See Patriarchal State. 
 Prime of life, the age of begetting. 
 
 What is the prime of life ? May not that be defined as 
 a period of about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in 
 a man's. 
 
 Which years do you mean to include ? 
 
 A woman, I said, may begin to bear children to the State at 
 twenty years of age, and continue to bear until forty ; a man 
 may begin at five-and-twenty, when he has passed the point at 
 which the pulse of life beats quickest, and continue to beget 
 children until he be fifty-five. 
 
 Certainly, he said, both in men and women that is the prime 
 of physical as well as of intellectual vigor. 
 
 Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part 
 in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy 
 and unrighteous thing ; the child of which he is the father, if 
 it steals into life, will have been conceived under other auspices 
 than those of sacrifice and prayers, which at each hymeneal 
 priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer, that the 
 new generation may be better and more useful than their good 
 and useful parents : whereas his child will be the offspring of 
 darkness and strange lust. The Republic, ii. 286. 
 Principle and reason to be our guides. 
 
 Soc. Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one ; 
 
 but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger ; and 
 therefore we ought to consider whether I shall, or shall not 
 do as you say. For I am and always have been one of those 
 natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason 
 
362 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best ; 
 and now that this fortune has come upon me, I cannot put 
 away the conclusion at which I had arrived : the principles 
 which I have hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and 
 unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am 
 certain not to agree with you ; no, not even if the power of the 
 multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, 
 deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors. 
 Crito, i. 350. 
 
 Procreation, primeval race without. See Spontaneous life. 
 Production, three kinds of. 
 Str. In the first place, there are two kinds of creation. 
 
 Theaet. What are they ? 
 
 Str. One of them is human and the other divine. 
 
 Theaet. I do not follow. 
 
 Str. Every power, as you may remember our saying origi- 
 nally, which is the cause of things afterwards existing which 
 did not exist before, was defined by us as creative. 
 
 Theaet. I remember. 
 
 Str. Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and 
 plants which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, and at 
 inanimate substances which form within the earth, fusile or 
 non-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence not 
 having existed previously by the creation of God, or shall 
 we agree with vulgar opinion about them ? 
 
 Theaet. What is that ? 
 
 Str. The opinion that nature brings them into being from 
 some spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Shall we say this, 
 or that they come from God, and are created by divine reason 
 and knowledge ? 
 
 Theaet. I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often 
 waver in my view, but when I look at you and see that you 
 incline to refer them to God, at present I defer to your 
 authority. 
 
 Str. Nobly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were 
 one of those who would hereafter change your mind, I would 
 have gently argued with you, and forced you to assent ; but as I 
 perceive that you will come of yourself and without any argu- 
 ment of man to that belief which, as you say, attracts you, I will 
 leave time to do the rest. Let me suppose, then, that things 
 which are made by nature are the work of divine art, and that 
 things which are made by man out of these are works of human 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 363 
 
 art. And so there are two kinds of making and production, 
 the one human and the other divine. Sophist, iii. 506. 
 Progression of human life. 
 
 - What is implied in the word " recollection," but the de- 
 parture of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten and is re- 
 newed and preserved by recollection and appears to be the same 
 although in reality new, according to that law of succession 
 by which all mortal things are preserved, not absolutely the 
 same but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving 
 another new and similar existence behind unlike the divine 
 which is always the same and not another? And in this way, 
 Socrates, the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of im- 
 mortality ; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then 
 at the love which all men have of their offspring ; for that uni- 
 versal love and interest is for the sake of immortality. The 
 Symposium, i. 500. 
 
 Property in Government. See Government. 
 Prophet, madness of the. See Madness of the, etc. 
 Protector become a tyrant. 
 
 The people have always some champion whom they nurse 
 
 into greatness. 
 
 Yes, that is their way. 
 
 This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs ; 
 when he first appears above ground he is a protector. 
 
 Yes, that is quite clear. 
 
 How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant ? 
 
 Clearly when he does what^ the man is said to do in the tale 
 of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus. 
 
 What tale ? 
 
 The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single 
 human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is 
 destined to become a wolf. Did you never hear that ? 
 
 Oh, yes. 
 
 And the protector of the people is like him ; having a mob 
 entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the 
 blood of kinsmen ; by the favorite method of false accusation 
 he brings them into court and murders them, making the life 
 of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting 
 the blood of his fellow citizens ; some of whom he kills and 
 others he banishes, at the same time proclaiming abolition 
 of debts and partition of lands: and after this, what can be 
 his destiny but either to perish at the hands of his enemies, or 
 from being a man to become a wolf that is a tyrant ? 
 
364 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Inevitably. 
 
 This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the 
 rich. 
 
 The same. 
 
 And then he is driven out, and comes back, in spite of his 
 enemies, a tyrant full grown. 
 
 That is clear. 
 
 And if they are unable to drive him out, or get him con- 
 demned to death by public opinion, they form the design of 
 putting him out of the way secretly. 
 
 Yes, he said, their usual way. 
 
 Then comes the famous request of a body-guard, which is 
 made by all those who have got thus far in their career, " Let 
 not the people's friend," as they say, " be lost to them." 
 
 Exactly. 
 
 The people readily assent ; all their fears are for him 
 they have no fear for themselves. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of 
 being an enemy of the people sees this, then, my friend, as the 
 oracle said to Croesus, 
 
 " By pebbly Hennas' shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be a 
 coward." 
 
 And quite right too, said he, for, if he were, he would never 
 be ashamed again. 
 
 But if he is caught he dies. 
 
 Of course. 
 
 And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is not fallen in his 
 might, but himself the overthrower of many, is to be seen 
 standing up in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, 
 no longer protector, but tyrant absolute. The Republic, ii. 
 394. 
 Prudence and temperance. 
 
 Ole. I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of 
 
 which the Stranger speaks must be temperance ? 
 
 Ath. Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense, not that 
 which in the exaggerated language of some philosophers is 
 demonstrated to be prudence, but that which is the natural gift 
 of children and animals, and makes some of them live conti- 
 nently and others incontinently, but when isolated was, as we 
 said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods. I 
 think that you must understand my meaning ? 
 
 Ole. Certainly. Laws, iv. 237. 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 365 
 
 Public opinion compared to a great beast. See Opinion, public, 
 
 etc. 
 Public works, construction of. 
 
 - Soc. Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were engaged in 
 the administration of political affairs, and were advising one 
 another about some public work, such as walls, docks, or tem- 
 ples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, 
 first, as to whether we know or do not know the art of building, 
 and who taught us ? would not that be necessary, Callicles ? 
 
 CaL True. 
 
 Soc. In the second place, we should have to consider 
 whether we had ever constructed any private house, either of 
 our own or for our friends, and whether this building was a 
 success or not ; and if upon consideration we found that we 
 had had good and eminent masters, and had been successful in 
 building, not only with their assistance, but without them, by 
 our own unaided skill, in that case prudence would not dis- 
 suade us from proceeding to the construction of public works. 
 But if we had no master to show, and only a number of worth- 
 less buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would be ridicu- 
 lous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to 
 undertake them. Is not this true ? 
 
 CaL Certainly. Gorgias, iii. 105. 
 Public men, criminality of. See Criminality, etc. 
 Pugnacity, a motive to authorship. See Authorship. 
 Punishment, effect of, on evil-doers. 
 
 If you will think, Socrates, of the effect which punish- 
 ment has on evil-doers, you will see at once that in the opinion 
 of mankind virtue may be acquired ; no one punishes the evil- 
 doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done 
 wrong, only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that 
 way. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does 
 not retaliate for a past wrong, which cannot be undone ; he 
 has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who 
 is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred 
 from doing wrong again. He clearly punishes for the sake of 
 prevention, thereby implying that virtue is capable of being 
 taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others 
 either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your 
 own citizens, like other men, retaliate on all whom they regard 
 as evil-doers ; which argues them to be of the number of those 
 who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Pro- 
 tagoras, i 124. 
 
366 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Punishment, office of twofold. See Injustice. 
 
 Now the proper office of punishment is twofold ; he who 
 
 is rightly punished ought either to become better and profit by 
 it, or he ought to be made 'an example to his fellows, that they 
 may see what he suffers, and fear and become better. Those 
 who are improved, when they are punished by Gods and men, 
 are those whose sins are curable ; and they are improved, as 
 in this world so also in another, by pain and suffering ; for 
 there is no other way in which they can be delivered from 
 their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst 
 crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made 
 examples ; for, as they are incurable, the time has passed at 
 which they can receive any benefit themselves. But others 
 get good when they behold them forever enduring the most 
 terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of 
 their sins ; there they are, hanging up as examples, in the 
 prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a warning to 
 all unrighteous men who come thither. Gorgias, iii. 116. 
 Punishment of souls, the. See Soul after death. 
 Pure and impure soul. See Impure. 
 Purifications. 
 
 - Str. As to the question which you were asking about the 
 name which was to comprehend all these arts of purification, 
 whether of animate or inanimate substances, the spirit of dia- 
 lectic is in no wise particular about fine words, if she may be 
 only allowed to have a general name for- all other purifications, 
 binding them up together and separating them off from the 
 purification of the soul or intellect. For this is the purifica- 
 tion at which she wants to arrive, and this we should under- 
 stand to be her aim. 
 
 Theaet. Yes, I understand ; and I agree that there are two 
 sorts of purification, and that one of them is concerned with 
 the soul, and that there is another which is concerned with the 
 body. Sophist, iii. 461. 
 Purification by refutation. 
 
 Str. There is the time-honored mode which our fathers 
 
 commonly practiced towards their sons, and which is still adopted 
 by many either of roughly reproving their errors, or of 
 gently advising them, which may be called by the general term 
 of admonition. 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Str. But whereas some appear to have arrived at the con- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 3G7 
 
 elusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who 
 thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things, in 
 which he is conscious of his own cleverness, and that the ad- 
 monitory sort of instruction gives much trouble and does little 
 good 
 
 Theaet. There they are quite right. 
 
 Sir. Accordingly, they set to work to eradicate the spirit of 
 conceit in another way. 
 
 Theaet. In what way. 
 
 Sir. They cross-examine a man as to what he is saying, 
 when he thinks that he is saying something and is saying noth- 
 ing ; he is easily convicted of inconsistency in his opinions ; 
 these they collect, and placing them side by side, show that 
 they contradict one another about the same things, in rela- 
 tion to the same things, and in the same respect. He seeing 
 this is angry with himself, and grows gentle towards others, 
 and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh 
 notions, in a way which is most entertaining to hear, and pro- 
 duces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the 
 subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that 
 the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the 
 internal obstacles have been removed, so the instructor of the 
 soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from 
 the applications of knowledge until he is refuted, and from ref- 
 utation learns modesty ; he must be purged of his prejudices, 
 and think that he knows only what he knows, and no more. 
 
 Theaet. That is certainly the best and most temperate state. 
 
 Sir. For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that 
 refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he 
 who has not been refuted, though he be the great King himself, 
 is in the highest degree impure ; he is uninstructed and de- 
 formed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed 
 ought to be pure and fair. 
 
 Theaet. Very true. Sophist, iii. 464. 
 Purification, legislative. See Legislative, etc. 
 Purification, Colonization a means of. 
 
 Another piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, 
 
 which, as we were saying, the Heraclid colony had, and which 
 is also ours, that we have escaped division of land and the 
 abolition of debts ; for these are always a source of dangerous 
 contention, and a city which is driven to legislation upon such 
 matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor yet 
 
368 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 venture to alter them. We must have recourse to prayers, as 
 men say, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously ef- 
 fected in a length of time. And such a change can be accom- 
 plished by those who have abundance of land, and having also 
 many debtors, are willing, in a kindly spirit, to share with those 
 who are in want, sometimes remitting and sometimes giving, 
 holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to 
 be the increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his 
 property. For this is the chiefest foundation of a State, and 
 upon this lasting basis may be erected afterwards whatever 
 political order is suitable under the circumstances ; but if the 
 change be based upon an unsound principle, the political super- 
 structure which is added will hardly succeed. That is a 
 danger, which, as I am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had 
 better^ say how we, if we had not escaped, might have escaped ; 
 "and we may venture now to assert that no other way of escape, 
 whether narrow or broad, can be devised but a just content- 
 ment : upon this rock our city shall be built : for there ought to 
 be no disputes among citizens about property. If there are 
 quarrels of long standing among them, no legislator of any 
 degree of sense will proceed a step in the arrangement of the 
 State until they are settled. But that they to whom God has 
 given, as he has to us, to be the founders of a new State free 
 from enmity that they should create themselves enmities, by 
 reason of their mode of dividing lands and houses, would be 
 superhuman folly and wickedness. Laws, iv. 261. 
 
 Quarreling unholy. 
 
 Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the 
 
 habit of quarreling as dishonorable, should anything be said of 
 the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the Gods 
 against one another, which are quite untrue. Far be it from 
 us to tell them of the battles of the giants, and embroider them 
 on garments ; or of all the innumerable other quarrels of Gods 
 and heroes with their friends and relations. If they would 
 only believe us we would tell them that quarreling is unholy, 
 and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel be- 
 tween citizens ; this is what old men and old women should 
 begin by telling children, and the same when they grow up. 
 The Republic, ii. 201. 
 Quietness, temperance is. 
 In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 369 
 
 have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, 
 in your opinion, is Temperance ? 
 
 At first lie hesitated, and was very unwilling to answer : 
 then he said that he thought temperance was doing things 
 orderly and quietly, such things for example as walking in the 
 streets, and talking, or anything else of that nature. In a 
 word, he said, I should answer that, in my opinion, temperance 
 is quietness. 
 
 Are you right, Charmides ? I said. No doubt some would 
 affirm that the quiet are the temperate ; but let us see whether 
 there is any meaning in this ; and first tell me whether you 
 would not acknowledge temperance to be of the class of the 
 honorable and good ? 
 
 Yes. Charmides, i. 13. 
 
 Race, community of. See Colonization. 
 
 Races, metallic symbols of. See Metallic. 
 
 Real, shadows seeming. See Shadows, etc. 
 
 Real being. See Being. 
 
 Reason and principle, our guides. See Principle. 
 
 Reason, incorrupt passion the rod of. See Passion. 
 
 Reason, steps of. See Hypotheses. 
 
 Reason in the sphere of sense. See Intellect and Knowledge. 
 
 Reason the rule of life. See Life, etc. 
 
 Recollection, learning a process of. See Learning. 
 
 Reconciling judge. 
 
 Ath. Now, which would be the better judge, one who de- 
 stroyed the bad, and required the good to govern themselves ; 
 or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad 
 live, and made them voluntarily submit ? Or, lastly, there 
 might be a third excellent judge, who, finding the family dis- 
 tracted, not only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them 
 to one another forever after, and gave them laws which they 
 mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends. 
 
 Cle. The last would be by far the best sort of judge and 
 legislator. Laws, iv. 158. 
 Reflecting and unchanging, the soul. 
 
 Were we not saying long ago that the soul when using 
 
 the body as an instrument of perception, that is to say, when 
 using the sense of sight or hearing or some other sense (for 
 the meaning of perceiving through the body is perceiving 
 through the senses), were we not saying that the soul too is 
 24 
 
370 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and 
 wanders and is confused ; the world spins round her, and she is 
 like a drunkard when possessed by change ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 But when returning into herself she reflects ; then she passes 
 into the other world, the abode of purity, and eternity, and im- 
 mortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and 
 with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let 
 or hindered ; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being 
 in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this 
 state of the soul is called wisdom ? 
 
 That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied. 
 
 And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, 
 as far as may be inferred from this argument, as well as from 
 the preceding one ? 
 
 I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who fol- 
 lows the argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the un- 
 changeable, even the most stupid person will not deny that. 
 
 And the body is more like the changing ? 
 
 Yes. Phaedo, i. 407. 
 
 Reflection, not sensation, the source of knowledge. See Sensation. 
 Refutation a common good. 
 
 You are only doing what you denied that you were doing 
 
 just now, trying to refute me, instead of pursuing the argu- 
 ment. 
 
 And what if I am ? How can you think that I have any 
 other motive in refuting you but what I should have in exam- 
 ining into myself ? which motive would be just a fear of my 
 unconsciously fancying that I knew something of which I was 
 ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly 
 for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake 
 of my other friends. For is not the discovery of things as 
 they truly are a common good to all mankind? 
 
 Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said. 
 
 Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in 
 answer to the question which I asked, without minding whether 
 Critias or Socrates is the person refuted ; attend only to the 
 argument, and see what will come of the refutation. 
 
 I think that you are right, he replied ; and I will do as you 
 say. Gharmides, i. 22. 
 Refutation, a purification. See Purification. 
 Remembrance and burial of the dead. See Burial, etc. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 371 
 
 Respiration and inspiration. 
 
 Let us further consider the phenomena of respiration, and 
 
 inquire what are the real causes of it. They are as follows: 
 Seeing that there is no such thing as a vacuum into which any 
 of those things which are moved can enter, and the breath is 
 carried from us into the external air, the next point is, as will 
 be clear to every one, that it does not go into a vacant space, 
 but pushes its neighbor out of its place, and' that which is 
 thrust out again thrusts out its neighbor; and in this way 
 everything of necessity at last comes round to that place from 
 whence the breath came forth, and enters in there, and follows 
 with the breath, and fills up the place ; and this goes on like 
 the circular motion of a wheel, because there can be no such 
 thing as a vacuum. Wherefore also the breast and the lungs, 
 which emit the breath, are again filled up by the air which sur- 
 rounds the body and which enters in through the pores of the 
 flesh and comes round in a circle ; and, again, the air which is 
 sent away and passes out through the body forces the breath 
 within to find a way round through the passage of the mouth 
 and the nostrils. Now, the origin of this may be supposed to 
 be as follows : Every animal has his inward parts about the 
 blood and the veins as warm as possible ; he has within him a 
 fountain of fire, which we compare to the texture of a net of 
 fire extended through the centre of the body, while the outer 
 parts are composed of air. Now, we must admit that heat 
 naturally precedes outward to its own place and to its kindred 
 element; and as there are two exits for the heat, the one 
 through the body outwards, and the other through the mouth 
 and nostrils, when it moves towards the one, it drives round 
 the other air, and that which is driven round falls into the fire 
 and is warmed, and that which goes forth is cooled. But when 
 the condition of the heat changes, and the particles at the other 
 exit grow warmer, the hotter air inclining in that direction and 
 carried towards its native element, fire, pushes round the other ; 
 and thus, by action and reaction, there being this circular agita- 
 tion and alternation produced by the two, by this double 
 cause, I say, inspiration and expiration are produced. Tim- 
 aeus, ii. 570. 
 Rest and motion of things. 
 
 Some one says to me, " O Stranger, are all things in rest 
 
 and nothing in motion, or is the exact opposite of this true, or 
 are some things in motion and others at rest ? " To this I 
 
372 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 shall reply that some are in motion and others at rest. " And 
 do not things which move, move in place, and are not the 
 things which are at rest, at,, rest in a place?" Certainly. 
 " And some move or rest in one place and some in more places 
 than one ? " You mean to say, we shall rejoin, that those 
 things which rest at the centre move in the same place, as 
 when the circumference goes nound and the circle is said to be 
 at rest ? " Yes." And we observe that, in the revolution, the 
 motion which carries round the larger and the lesser circle at 
 the same time is proportionally distributed to greater and 
 smaller, and is greater and smaller in a certain proportion. 
 Here is a wonder which might be thought an impossibility, that 
 the same motion should impart swiftness and slowness in due 
 proportion to larger and lesser circles. Very true. "And 
 when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to 
 me to mean those which move from one place to another, and 
 sometimes have one centre of motion and sometimes several in 
 the course of their revolutions ; and sometimes impinging upon 
 each other they come against bodies which are at rest, and are 
 divided by them, or meeting other bodies which are coming 
 violently from an opposite direction unite with them and inter- 
 penetrate them." Laws, iv. 405. 
 Retribution for the erring. See Punishment, etc. 
 Retribution for injustice. See Injustice, etc. 
 Reverence, youthful, for the aged. See Mind, etc., referenced. 
 Rewards, glorious. 
 
 The Olympic victor I said, is deemed happy in receiving 
 
 a part only of the happiness which is the lot of our citizens, 
 who have won a more glorious victory and have a more com- 
 plete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which 
 they have won is the salvation of the whole State ; and the 
 crown with which they and their children are crowned is the 
 fullness of all that life needs ; they receive rewards from the 
 hands of their country while living, and after death have an 
 honorable burial. 
 
 Yes, he said, they are are indeed glorious rewards. The 
 Republic, ii. 292. 
 Rhadamanthus, the decision of. 
 
 The so-called decision of Rhadamanthus is worthy of all 
 
 admiration. He knew that the men of his own time believed 
 and had no doubt that there were Gods, which was a reason- 
 able belief in those days, because most men were the sons of 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 373 
 
 Gods, and according to tradition he was one himself. He ap- 
 pears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no 
 man, but to the Gods only, and in this way suits were simply 
 and speedily decided by him. For he made the two parties at 
 issue take an oath respecting the points in dispute, and so got 
 rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now that a certain 
 portion of mankind do not believe at -all in the existence of 
 the Gods, and others imagine that they have no care of us, and 
 the opinion of most men and of the worst men is that in re- 
 turn for a small sacrifice and flattering words they will aid 
 them in abstracting a great deal of money, and deliver them 
 from divers and great penalties, the way of Rhadamarithus is 
 no longer suited to the needs of justice, for as the opinions of 
 men about the Gods are changed, the laws should also be 
 changed. Laws, iv. 458. 
 Rhapsode, the profession of a. See Homer. 
 Rhetoric and dialecticians. 
 
 Soc. I am a great lover of these processes of division and 
 
 generalization ; they help me to speak and think. And if I 
 find any man who is able to see a One and Many in nature, 
 him I follow, and walk in his steps as if he were a God. And 
 those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of 
 calling dialecticians ; but God knows whether the name is right 
 or not. And I should like to know what name you would give 
 to your or Lysias' disciples, and whether this may not be that 
 famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others practice? 
 Skillful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who 
 will consent to worship them as kings and to bring them gifts. 
 
 Phaedr. Yes, they are royal men ; but their art is not the 
 same with tlje art of those whom you call, and rightly, in my 
 opinion, dialecticians. Phaedrus, i. 571. 
 Rhetoric, flattery in. See Flattery. 
 Rhetoric, persuasion the crown of. See Persuasion. 
 Rhetoric, the art of discourse. 
 
 Soc. Why if you call rhetoric the art which treats of dis- 
 course, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call 
 them arts of rhetoric ? 
 
 Gor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has 
 only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand ; 
 but there is no such action % of the hand in rhetoric which oper- 
 ates and is perfected through the medium of discourse. And 
 therefore I am justified, as I maintain, in saying that rhetoric 
 treats of discourse. 
 
374 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Soc. I do not know whether I entirely understand you, but 
 I dare say that I shall soon find out : please to answer me a 
 question : you would allow that there are arts ? 
 
 Gor. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And in some of the arts a great deal is done and noth- 
 ing or very little said ; in painting, or statuary, or many other 
 arts, the work may proceed in silence ; and these are the arts 
 with which, as I suppose you would say, rhetoric has no con- 
 cern ? 
 
 Gor. You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. And there are other arts which work wholly by words, 
 and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the 
 arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing 
 draughts ; in some of which words are nearly coextensive with 
 things : but the greater number of them are dependent wholly 
 on words for their efficacy and power : and I take your meaning 
 to be that rhetoric is an art of this better sort ? 
 
 Gor. Exactly. Gorgias, iii. 35. 
 Rhetoric an experience, process, or habit. 
 
 Pol. I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the 
 
 same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to 
 answer : What is rhetoric ? 
 
 Soc. Do you mean what sort of an art ? 
 
 Pol. Yes. 
 
 Soc. Not an art at all, in my opinion, if I am to tell you 
 the truth, Polus. 
 
 Pol. Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric ? 
 
 Soc. A thing of which, I was lately reading in a book of 
 of yours, you say that you have made an art. 
 
 Pol. What thing ? 
 
 Soc. I should say a sort of experience. 
 
 Pol. Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience ? 
 
 Soc. That is my view, if that is yours. 
 
 Pol. An experience in what ? 
 
 Soc. An experience in producing a sort of delight and grati- 
 fication. 
 
 Pol. And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a 
 fine thing ? 
 
 Soc. What are you saying, Polus ? Why do you ask me 
 whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet 
 told you what rhetoric is ? 
 
 Pol. Why, did you not tell me that rhetoric was a sort of 
 experience ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 375 
 
 Soc. As you are so fond . of gratifying others, will you 
 gratify me in a small particular ? 
 
 Pol I will. 
 
 Soc. Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery ? 
 
 Pol. What sort of an art is cookery ? 
 
 Soc. Not an art at all, Polus. 
 
 Pol. What then? 
 
 Soc. I should say an experience. 
 
 Pol. In what ? I wish that you would tell me. 
 
 Soc An experience in producing a sort of delight and grat- 
 ification, Polus. 
 
 Pol. Then are cookery and rhetoric the same ? 
 
 Soc. No, they are only different parts of the same pro- 
 fession. 
 
 Pol. And what is that ? 
 
 Soc. I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous ; I 
 should not like Gorgias to imagine that I am ridiculing his 
 profession, and therefore I hesitate to answer. For whether 
 or no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practices I 
 really do not know : from what he was just now saying, noth- 
 ing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric 
 which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole. Gor- 
 gias, iii. 47. 
 
 Rhetorician, the skillful. 
 
 Soc. Until a man knows the truth of the several partic- 
 ulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define 
 them as they are, and having defined them again to divide 
 them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like 
 manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul and dis- 
 cover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to 
 different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a 
 way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the 
 simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the complex 
 nature until he has accomplished all this, he will be unablo 
 to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their 
 nature allows them to be subjected to art, either for the pur- 
 pose of teaching or persuading ; that is the view which is im- 
 plied in the whole preceding argument. 
 
 Phaedr. Yes, that was our view, certainly. 
 
 Soc. Secondly, as to the justice of the censure which was 
 passed on speaking or writing discourses did not our previ- 
 ous argument show ? 
 
376 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Phaedr. Show what ? 
 
 Soc. That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever 
 was or will be, whether private man or statesman, tries his 
 hand at authorship in making laws, and fancies that there is a 
 great certainty and clearness in his performance, the fact of 
 his writing as he does is only a disgrace to him, whatever men 
 may say. For entire ignorance about the nature of justice 
 and injustice, and good and evil, and the inability to distin- 
 guish the dream from the reality, cannot in truth be otherwise 
 than disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of 
 the whole world. 
 
 Phaedr. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. But he who thinks that in the written word there is 
 necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither. poetry 
 nor prose, spoken or written, are of any great value if, like 
 the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in 
 order to be believed, and not with any view to criticism or in- 
 struction ; and who thinks that even the best of them are but 
 a reminiscence of what we know, and that only in principles of 
 justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated 
 orally and written in the soul, which is the true way of writ- 
 ing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness ; and 
 that such principles are like legitimate offspring ; being, in the 
 first place, that which the man finds in his own bosom ; sec- 
 ondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his idea 
 which have been duly implanted in the souls of others ; and 
 who cares for them and no others this is the right sort of 
 man ; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become 
 like him. 
 
 Phaedr. That is most assuredly my desire and prayer. 
 
 Soc. And now the play is played out ; and of rhetoric 
 enough. Phaedrus, i. 582. 
 Rhetorician to make good use of his art. 
 
 - Gor. I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I 
 will endeavor to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. 
 You must have heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of 
 the Athenians and the plan of the harbor were devised in ac- 
 cordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles and partly 
 of Pericles and not at the suggestion of the builders. 
 
 Soc. Certainly, Gorgias, that is the tradition about Themis- 
 tocles, and I myself heard the speech of Pericles when he ad- 
 vised us about the middle wall. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 377 
 
 Gor. And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision 
 to be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advis- 
 
 ; they are the men who win their point. 
 
 Soc. I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked 
 what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, 
 when I look at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of great- 
 ness. 
 
 Gor. A marvel indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how 
 rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior 
 arts. Let me offer you a striking example of this. On sev- 
 eral occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or some 
 other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow 
 the physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot 
 iron to him ; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he 
 would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. 
 And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to 
 any city, and there had to argue in the Ecclesia or any other 
 assembly as to which should be elected, the physician would 
 have no chance*; but he who could speak would be chosen if 
 he wished, and in a contest with a man of any other profession 
 the rhetorician more than any one would have the power 
 of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively 
 to the multitude that any of them, and on any subject. Such 
 is the power and quality of rhetoric, Socrates. And yet rhet- 
 oric ought to be used like any other competitive art, not against 
 everybody, the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength 
 any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of 
 fence ; because he has powers which are more than a match 
 either for enemy or friend, he ought not therefore to strike, 
 stab, or slay his friends. And suppose a man who has been 
 trained in the palaestra and is a skillful boxer, and in the full- 
 ness of his strength he goes and strikes his father or mother 
 or one of his familiars or friends, that is no reason why the 
 trainer or master of fence should be held in detestation or 
 banished, surely not. For they taught this art for a good 
 purpose, as an art to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in 
 self-defense, not in aggression, and others have perverted their 
 instructions, making a bad use of their strength and skill. 
 But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art 
 in fault or bad in itself ; I should rather say that those who 
 make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same holds 
 good of rhetoric ; for the rhetorician can speak against all men 
 
378 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 and on any subject, and in general he can persuade the multi- 
 tude of anything better than any other man, but he ought not 
 on that account to defraud the physician or any other artist of 
 his reputation merely because he has the power ; he ought to 
 use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. 
 And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use 
 of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on 
 that account to be held in detestation or banished. For he 
 was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his instruc- 
 tions, and he abuses them. And therefore he is the person 
 who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, 
 and not his instructor. Gorgias, iii. 41. 
 Rhetoricians, two sorts of. 
 
 Soc. Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at 
 
 what is best in their speeches, and to desire only the greatest 
 improvement of the citizens, or are they too bent upon giving 
 them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their 
 own interest, playing with the people as with children, and try- 
 ing to amuse them, but never considering whether they are 
 better or worse for this ? 
 
 Gal. I must distinguish. There are some who have a real 
 care of the public in what they say, while others are such as 
 you describe. 
 
 Soc. I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of 
 two sorts ; one which is mere flattery and disgraceful declama- 
 tion ; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and 
 improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say 
 what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience ; 
 but have you ever known such a rhetoric ; or if you have, and 
 can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, will you tell 
 me who he is ? 
 
 Gal. But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any 
 such among the orators who are at present living. 
 
 Soc. Well, then, can you mention any one of a former gen- 
 eration, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who 
 found them worse and made them better, from the day that he 
 began to make speeches ? for, indeed, I do not know of such a 
 man. Gorgias, iii. 94. 
 Rhetoricians, none noble. See Noble, etc. 
 Rhythm, the order of motion. 
 
 Ath. I was speaking at the commencement of our dis- 
 course, as you will remember, of the fiery nature of young 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 379 
 
 creatures ; I said that they were unable to keep quiet either in 
 limb or voice, and that they called out and jumped about in a 
 disorderly manner ; and that no other animal attained to any per- 
 ception of order, but man only. Now the order of motion is 
 called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high and 
 low are duly mingled, is called harmony ; and both together are 
 termed choric song. And I said that the Gods had pity on us, 
 and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our playfellows and 
 leaders in the dance ; and Dionysus, as I dare say that you will 
 remember, was the third. 
 
 Cle. I quite remember. Laws, iv. 194. 
 Rich man, bad company. 
 
 May I ask, Cephalus, whether you inherited or acquired 
 
 the greater part of your wealth ? 
 
 Acquired ! Socrates ; do you want to know how much I ac- 
 quired? In the art of making money I have been midway be- 
 tween my father and grandfather ; for my grandfather, whose 
 name like my own was Cephalus, doubled and trebled the value 
 of his inheritance, but my father Lysanias reduced the prop- 
 erty below what T now have ; and I shall be satisfied if I leave 
 my sons a little more than I received. 
 
 That was why I asked you the question, I said, because I 
 saw that you were indifferent about money, which is a charac- 
 teristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than 
 of those who have acquired them ; for the latter have a second 
 love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affec- 
 tion of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their 
 children, besides that natural love of money for the sake of use 
 and enjoyment which is common to them and all men. And 
 hence they are very bad company, for they talk about nothing 
 but the praises of wealth. 
 
 That is true, he said. 
 
 Yes, that is very true, I said ; but may I ask another ques- 
 tion? What do you consider to be the greatest blessing 
 which you have reaped from wealth ? The Republic, ii. 150. 
 Rich man, the true and noble. See Noble, etc. 
 Riches in government. See Money a ruler. 
 Riches and poverty in age. See Poverty. 
 Riches an evil left to children. See Children. 
 Ridicule no test of truth. 
 
 But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our 
 
 minds, we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be di- 
 
380 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 rected against this sort of innovation ; how they will talk of 
 women's attainments in music as well as in gymnastic, and 
 above all about their wearing armor and riding upon horse- 
 back ! 
 
 Very true, he replied. 
 
 Yet having begun, we must go on and attack the difficulty ; 
 at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their 
 life to be serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the 
 Greeks were of the opinion, which is still generally received 
 among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridic- 
 ulous and improper ; arid when first the Cretans and then the 
 Lacedaemonians introduced naked exercises, the wits of that 
 day might have ridiculed them equally. 
 
 No doubt. 
 
 But when experience showed that to let all things be uncov- 
 ered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous 
 effect to the outward eye vanished before the approval of rea- 
 son, then the man was seen to be a fool who laughs or. directs 
 the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly 
 and vice, or seriously inclines to measure the beautiful by any 
 other standard but that of the good. 
 
 Very true, he replied. 
 
 First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in 
 earnest, let us ask about the nature of woman ; Is she capable 
 of sharing either wholly or partially, in the actions of men or 
 not at all ? And is the art of war one of those arts in which 
 she can or cannot share ? That will be the best way of com- 
 mencing the inquiry, and will probably lead to the fairest con- 
 clusion. 
 
 That will be best. The Republic, ii. 276. 
 Ridicule at self-conceit. See Laughter. 
 Right and duty versus life and death. See Death and life. 
 Right, ridicule no test of. See Ridicule. 
 Right determined by might. See Might. 
 Right and wrong determined by the State. 
 
 Soc. Again, in politics, while affirming that right and 
 
 wrong, honorable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in real- 
 ity to each State such as the State thinks and makes lawful, 
 and that in determining these matters no individual or State is 
 wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not 
 deny that in determining the sphere of expediency one coun- 
 selor is better than another, and one State wiser than another ; 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 381 
 
 they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a city deems 
 expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other 
 case, I mean when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and 
 impiety, they are confident that these have no natural or essen- 
 tial basis the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of 
 agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts ; and this is the 
 philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Pro- 
 tagoras. Thaeatetus, iii. 374. 
 Right opinion, differences as to. See Differences, etc. 
 Righteous judge. See Judge, etc. 
 Round world. See Earth, rotundity of the. 
 Rulers swaying the people. 
 
 Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician, but 
 
 was really an eminent Sophist ; also Pythocleides and Cean ; 
 and there were many others; and all of them, as I was saying, 
 adopted these arts as veils or disguises because they were afraid 
 of the envy of the multitude. But that is not my way, for I 
 do not believe that they effected their purpose, which was to 
 deceive the government, who were not blinded by them ; and 
 as to the people, they have no understanding, and only repeat 
 what their rulers are pleased to tell them. Protagoras, i. 
 117. 
 Rulers in the State, who should be. 
 
 Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the 
 
 greatest of the waves, yet shall the word be spoken, even 
 though the overflowing of the laughing wave shall drown me 
 in laughter and dishonor ; and do you attend to me. 
 
 Proceed. 
 
 I said : Until, then, philosophers are kings, or the kings and 
 princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, 
 and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those com- 
 moner natures who follow either to the exclusion of the other 
 are compelled to stand aside, cities will never cease from ill 
 no, nor the human race, as I believe and then only will our 
 State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day : 
 this was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I was wanting to 
 utter, if it had not seemed too extravagant ; for to be con- 
 vinced that in no other State can there be private or public 
 happiness is indeed a hard thing. 
 
 Socrates, what do you mean ? I would have you consider 
 that the word which you have spoken is one at which numer- 
 ous persons, and very respectable persons too, pulling off their 
 
382 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 coats in a moment and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, 
 will run at you might and main, intending to do heaven knows 
 what ; and if you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself 
 in motion, you will be " pared by their fine wits," and no mis- 
 take. 
 
 You got me into the scrape, I said. 
 
 And I was quite right ; however, I will do all I can to get 
 you out ; but I can only give you wishes and exhortations, 
 and also, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers to your ques- 
 tions better than another that is all. And now having 
 such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbe- 
 lievers that you are right. 
 
 I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such valuable 
 assistance. And I think that, if there is to be a chance of our 
 escaping, we must define who these philosophers are who, as 
 we say, are to rule in the State ; then we shall be able to de- 
 fend ourselves : there will be discovered to be some natures 
 who ought to rule and to study philosophy ; and others who 
 are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers 
 rather than leaders. The Republic, ii. 301. 
 Rulers, who and what they must be. 
 
 The women and children are done with but there remains 
 
 the further question of the rulers, which I must now investi- 
 gate from the beginning. "We were saying, as you will re- 
 member, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by 
 the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in labors, nor fears, 
 nor any other change of circumstances were to lose their pa- 
 triotism ; he was to be rejected who failed but he who al- 
 ways came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was 
 to be made a ruler, and to receive honors and rewards in life 
 and after death. That was the sort of thing which was being 
 said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face ; 
 not liking to stir the question which has now arisen. 
 
 I perfectly remember, he said. 
 
 Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding 
 the bold word ; but now let me dare to say, that the perfect 
 guardian must be a philosopher. 
 
 Yes, he said, let that be proclaimed. 
 
 And do not suppose that there will be many of them, 
 for the gifts which we said were essential rarely grow to- 
 gether ; they are mostly found in shreds and patches. 
 
 What do you mean ? he said. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 383 
 
 You are aware, I replied, that persons who have quick in- 
 telligence, memory, sagacity, shrewdness, and similar gifts, are 
 not often of a nature which is willing at the same time to live 
 orderly and in a peaceful arid settled manner ; and this is equally 
 true of the high-spirited and magnanimous ; they are driven 
 any way by their impetuosity, and all solid principle goes out 
 of them. 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
 On the other hand, those steadfast, immovable natures which 
 in a battle are impregnable to fear and can better be depended 
 on are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; 
 they seem to be in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go 
 to sleep over any intellectual toil. 
 
 Quite true. 
 
 And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary 
 in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and 
 who are to share in any office or command. 
 
 Certainly, he said. 
 
 And will they be a class which is rarely found ? 
 
 Yes, indeed. 
 
 Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labors 
 and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before ; and 
 there is another kind of probation which we did not mention, 
 he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see 
 whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, 
 or will faint under them, as many do amid the toils of the 
 games. 
 
 Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing them. The Re- 
 public, ii. 330. 
 Rulers compared to gold and silver. 
 
 1 have only told you half. Citizens, we shall say to them 
 
 in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differ- 
 ently. Some of you have the power of command, and these 
 he has composed of gold, wherefore also they have the greatest 
 honor ; others of silver, to be auxiliaries ; others again who are 
 to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has made of brass and 
 iron ; and the species will generally be preserved in the chil- 
 dren. But as you are of the same original family, a golden 
 parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a 
 golden son. And God proclaims to the rulers, as a first prin- 
 ciple, that before all they should watch over their offspring, 
 and see what elements mingle in their nature ; for if the son 
 
384 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, 
 then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the 
 ruler must not be pitiful towards his child because he has to 
 descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just 
 as there may be others sprung from the artisan class who are 
 raised to honor, and become guardians and auxiliaries. For an 
 oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, 
 it will then be destroyed. The Republic, ii. 240. 
 Rulers must be characterized by truth and virtue. 
 
 Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the 
 
 eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region 
 of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you 
 which of the two kinds should be the rulers of our State ? 
 
 And how can we truly answer that question ? he said. 
 
 Ask yourself, I replied, which of the two are better able to 
 guard the laws and institutions of our State ; and let them be 
 our guardians. 
 
 Very good. 
 
 Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian 
 who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no 
 eyes? 
 
 There can be no question of that. 
 
 And are not those who are truly and indeed without the 
 knowledge of the true being of each thing, and have in their 
 souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to 
 look at the very truth and to that original to repair, and having 
 perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, 
 goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered and to guard 
 and preserve the order of them are they not, I say, simply 
 blind ? 
 
 Assuredly, he replied, that is very much their condition. 
 
 And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, 
 besides being their equals in experience and not inferior to 
 them in any particular of virtue, have also the knowledge of 
 the truth ? 
 
 There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who 
 have this great and preeminent quality, if they do not fail in 
 any other respect. 
 
 Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can 
 unite this and the other excellences. 
 
 By all means. 
 
 In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 385 
 
 the philosopher was to be ascertained ; about which, if we are 
 agreed, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also be agreed 
 that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those 
 in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in 
 the State. The Republic, ii. 310. 
 Rulers compared to pilots and physicians. 
 
 Str. I must again have recourse to my favorite images ; 
 
 through them, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers. 
 
 Y. Soc. What images ? 
 
 Str. The noble pilot and the wise physician, who " is worth 
 many another man ; " in the similitude of these let us endeavor 
 to discover some image of the king. 
 
 T. Soc. What sort of an image ? 
 
 Str. Well, such as this : every man will reflect that he 
 suffers strange things at their hands ; the physician saves any 
 whom he wishes to save, and many whom he wishes to injure 
 he injures cutting or burning them, and at the same time 
 requiring them to bring him payments, which are a sort of trib- 
 ute, of which a very small part is spent upon the sick man, 
 and the greater part is consumed by him and his domestics ; 
 and the finale is, that he receives money from the relations of 
 the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of 
 the way. And the captains of ships are guilty of numberless 
 evil deeds of the same kind ; they play false and leave you 
 ashore when the hour of sailing arrives, or they wreck their 
 vessels and cast away freight and lives ; not to speak of other 
 rogueries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind, 
 were to determine, after consideration, that neither of these 
 arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control 
 either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon 
 an assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, and 
 that anybody who likes, whatever may be his calling, or even 
 if he have no calling, may offer an opinion either about ships 
 or about diseases ; whether as to the manner in which physic 
 or surgical instruments are to be applied to the patient, or 
 about the vessels and the nautical instruments which are re- 
 quired in navigation, arid how to meet the dangers of winds 
 and waves which are incidental to the voyage how to behave 
 when encountering pirates ; and what is to be done with the 
 old-fashioned galleys, if they have to fight with others of ar 
 similar build : and that, whatever shall be decreed by the mul- 
 titude on these points, upon the advice of persons skilled or 
 26 
 
386 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 unskilled, shall be written down on triangular tablets and col- 
 umns, or embalmed unwritten as national customs ; and that in 
 all future time vessels shall be navigated and remedies admin- 
 istered to the patient after this fashion. 
 
 T. Soc. What a strange notion ! 
 
 Sir. Suppose, further, that ^ the admirals and physicians are 
 appointed annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole 
 people, and that they are elected by lot, and that after their 
 election they navigate vessels and heal the sick according to 
 the written rules. 
 
 Y. Soc. Worse and worse. 
 
 Str. But hear what follows : when the year of office has ex- 
 pired, the admiral or physician has to come before a court of 
 review, in which the judges are either selected from the wealthy 
 classes or chosen by lot out of the whole people ; and anybody 
 who pleases may accuse them, and he will lay to their charge, 
 that during the past year they have not navigated their vessels . 
 or healed their patients, according to the letter of the law or 
 according to the ancient customs of their ancestors ; and if 
 either of them is condemned, there must be persons to fix what 
 he is to suffer or pay. 
 
 Y. Soc. He who is willing to take a command under such 
 conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty. Statesman, iii. 583. 
 Rulers and warriors, gentleness of. See Gentleness. 
 Rulers, qualities of. See Magistrates. 
 
 Salvation of human life. See Human life, etc. 
 Science of time. 
 
 Soc. And now let me see whether you agree with Laches 
 
 and myself in a third point. 
 
 NIC. What is that ? 
 
 Soc. I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is 
 not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the pres- 
 ent, a third of what will be and will be best in the future ; 
 but that of all three there is one science only : for example, 
 there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the 
 inspection of health equally in all times, present, past, and fu- 
 ture ; and of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned 
 with the productions of the earth in all times. As to the gen- 
 eral's art, yourselves will be my witnesses, that the general 
 has to think of the future as well as the present ; and he con- 
 siders that he is not to be the servant of the soothsayer, but 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 387 
 
 his master, because he knows better what is happening or is 
 likely to happen in war : and accordingly the law places the 
 soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the 
 soothsayer. Am I not correct, Laches ? 
 
 La. Quite correct. 
 
 Soc. And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same 
 science has understanding of the same things, whether future, 
 present, or past ? 
 
 Nic. Yes, indeed, Socrates ; that is my opinion. Laches, 
 i. 92. 
 Science versus sense. 
 
 You, I replied, have in your mind a sublime conception 
 of how we know the things above. And I dare say that if a 
 person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceil- 
 ing, you would still think that his mind was the percipient and 
 not his eyes. And you are very likely right and I may be a 
 simpleton, but in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of 
 being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards and 
 whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, 
 seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that 
 he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science ; his 
 soul is looking, not upwards, but downwards, whether his way 
 to knowledge is by water or by land, in whichever element he 
 may lie on his back and float. The Republic, ii. 357. 
 Science, certain knowledge necessary to. 
 
 I must add that the power of dialectic alone can re- 
 veal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous 
 sciences. 
 
 Of that assertion you may be as certain as of the last. 
 
 And certainly no one, will argue that there is any other 
 method or way of comprehending all true existence ; for the 
 arts in general are concerned with the wants or opinions of 
 men, or are cultivated for the sake of production and con- 
 struction or for the care of such productions and construc- 
 tions ; and as to the mathematical arts which, as we were say- 
 ing, have some apprehension of true being geometry and 
 the like they only dream about being, and never can they 
 behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses 
 which they use unexamined and are unable to give an account 
 of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle,- 
 and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also con- 
 structed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that 
 such a conventional statement will ever become science ? 
 
388 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Impossible, he said. 
 
 Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first 
 principle, and is the only science which does away with hypoth- 
 eses in order to make certain of them ; the eye of the soul, 
 which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her 
 taught to look upwards ; and she uses as handmaids, in the 
 work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discuss- 
 ing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have 
 some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and 
 less clearness than science : and this, in our previous sketch, 
 was called understanding. But there is no use in our disput- 
 ing about names when we have realities of such importance to 
 consider. 
 
 No, he said ; any name will do which expresses the thought 
 clearly. The Republic, ii. 361. 
 
 Science of government, wherein resident. See Government, sci- 
 ence of. 
 
 Science, political, not attained by the many. See Government, sci- 
 ence of. 
 
 Science, political, refining of. 
 
 Str. There are, however, natures more nearly akin to the 
 
 king, and more difficult to discern ; the examination of them 
 may be compared to the process of refining gold. 
 
 Y. Soc. What is your meaning ? 
 
 Str. The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and 
 stones and the like; they then draw off in the fire, which is 
 the only way of abstracting them, the more precious elements of 
 copper, silver, or other metallic substance, which have an affin- 
 ity to gold ; these are at last refined away by the use of tests, 
 and the gold is left quite pure. 
 
 T. Soc. Yes, that is the way in which these things are said 
 to be done. 
 
 Str. In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has 
 been separated from political science ; and what is precious and 
 of a kindred nature has been left; there remain the nobler 
 arts of the general and the judge, and the higher sort of ora- 
 tory, which is an ally of the royal art, and persuades men to do 
 justice, and assists in guiding the helm of States. What way 
 can be found of taking them away, leaving him whom we seek 
 alone and unalloyed ? 
 
 T. Soc. That is clearly what has to be attempted. States- 
 man, iii. 589. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 389 
 
 Sculpture, deception in. See Likeness-making. 
 Sea, evil influence of the, on cities. See Cities. 
 Seen and unseen. 
 
 What would you say of the many beautiful whether 
 men or horses or garments or any other things which may be 
 called equal or beautiful, are they all unchanging and the 
 same always, or quite the reverse ? May they not rather be 
 described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, 
 either with themselves or with one another ? 
 
 The latter, replied Cebes ; they are always in a state of 
 change. 
 
 And these you can touch and see and perceive with the 
 senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with 
 the mind they are invisible and are not seen ? 
 
 That is very true, he said. 
 
 Well then, Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts 
 of existences, one seen, the other unseen. 
 
 Let us suppose them. 
 
 The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging ? 
 
 That may be also supposed. 
 
 And, further, is not one part of us body, and the rest of us 
 soul ? 
 
 To be sure. 
 
 And to which class may we say that the body is more alike 
 and akin ? 
 
 Clearly to the seen : no one can doubt that. 
 
 And is the soul seen or not seen ? 
 
 Not by man, Socrates. 
 
 And what we mean by " seen " and " not seen " is that 
 which is or is not visible to the eye of man ? 
 
 Yes, to the eye of man. 
 
 And what do we say of the soul ? is that seen or not seen ? 
 
 Not seen. 
 
 Unseen then ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to 
 the seen ? 
 
 That is most certain, Socrates. 1 Phaedo, i. 407. 
 Self-assertion of Hippias. 
 
 End. I am sure that Hippias will have no objection to 
 
 answer anything that you ask him ; tell me, Hippias, if Soc- 
 rates asks you a question, will you answer him ? 
 
 1 For the further discussion of this point, see Reflecting, etc. 
 
390 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Hippias. Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent 
 if I refused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, 
 as I went up from my house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, 
 where all the Hellenes were assembled, I continually professed 
 my willingness to perform any of the exhibitions which I had 
 prepared, and to answer any .questions which any one had to 
 ask. 
 
 Soc. Truly, Hippias you are a happy man if at every Olym- 
 pic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own 
 powers when you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any 
 muscular hero would be as fearless and confident in offering 
 his body to the combat at Olympia, as you are in offering your 
 mind. 
 
 Hip. And with good reason, Socrates ; for since the day 
 when I first entered the lists at Olympia I never found any 
 one who was my superior in anything. 
 
 Soc. What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your 
 wisdom be to the city of Elis and to your parents ! But to 
 return : what do you say of Odysseus and Achilles ? Which 
 of the two is the better of them ? and in what particular does 
 either surpass the other ? For when you were exhibiting and 
 company was in the room, though I could not follow you, I did 
 not like to ask what you meant, because there were other 
 people present, and I was afraid that the question might inter- 
 rupt your exhibition. Lesser Hippias, iv. 493. 
 Self-conceit of youth. 
 
 At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's 
 
 soul, which they perceive to be void of all fair accomplishments 
 and pursuits and of every true word, which are the best guard- 
 ians and sentinels in the minds of men who are dear to the 
 Gods. 
 
 None better. 
 
 False and boastful words and conceits mount upwards in- 
 stead of them, and occupy the vacant post. 
 
 They are sure to do so. 
 
 And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus- 
 eaters and takes up his abode there in the face of all men ; and 
 if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of 
 him the same vain conceits shut the gate of the king's fastness ; 
 they will not allow the new allies to pass. And if private in- 
 dividuals, venerable for their age, come and parley, they do not 
 receive them ; there is a battle and they win ; then modesty 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 391 
 
 which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by 
 them. They affirm temperance to be unmanliness and her also 
 they contemptuously eject ; and they pretend that moderation 
 and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and by 
 the help of a rabble of evil appetites they drain them beyond 
 
 the border Neither does he receive or let pass into the 
 
 fortress any true word of advice, if any one says to him that 
 
 some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, 
 
 and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honor 
 
 some, and curtail and reduce others, whenever this is repeated 
 
 to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike 
 
 and that one is as honorable as another. The Republic, ii. 
 
 388. 
 
 Self-conceit, laughter at. See Laughter, etc. 
 
 Self-conceit purged out by refutation. See Purification, etc. 
 
 Self-control. See Intemperance and Self-mastery. 
 
 Self-deception. 
 
 - Orat. You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have at- 
 tended to these matters, and possibly I might even turn you 
 into a disciple. But I fear that the converse is more probable 
 and I already find myself moved to say to you what Achilles 
 in the " Prayers " says to Ajax, 
 
 u Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, king of men, 
 You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind." 
 
 And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give 
 answers much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthy- 
 phro, or whether some Muse may have long been an inhabi- 
 tant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself. 
 
 Soc. Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my 
 /own wisdom ; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought 
 to stop arid ask myself what am I saying, for there is nothing 
 worse than self-deception when the deceiver is always at ] 
 home and always with you that is indeed terrible, and there- 
 fore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavor to " look 
 before me and behind me " in the words of the aforesaid 
 Homer. Cratylus, i. 667. 
 Self-elevation. See Elevation, etc. 
 Self-gratification. See Intemperance. 
 Self-ignorance. 
 
 Soc. Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self 
 
 may be shown ? 
 
 Pro. What are they ? 
 
392 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Soc. In the first place, about money: the ignorant may 
 fancy himself richer than he is. 
 
 Pro. Yes, that is a very common error. 
 
 Soc. And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or 
 fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of per- 
 son which he has not really. 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And yet surely by far the greatest number err about 
 the goods of the mind ; they imagine that they are a great 
 deal better than they are. 
 
 Pro. Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion. 
 
 Soc. And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the 
 mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses 
 in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. And may not all this be truly called an evil condi- 
 tion? 
 
 Pro. Very evil. 
 
 Soc. But we must pursue the division a step further, Protar- 
 chus, if we would find the singular mixture of pleasure and 
 pain ; pain is envy of the playful sort. 
 
 Pro. How can we make the further division which you sug- 
 gest? 
 
 Soc. All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit 
 of themselves may be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two 
 classes one of them having power and might ; and the other 
 the reverse. 
 
 Pro. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Let this, then, be the principle of division ; those of 
 them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when 
 they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those 
 who can defend themselves may be more truly described as 
 strong and formidable, for ignorance in the powerful is hateful 
 and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in 
 fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth 
 is, ridiculous. Philebus, iii. 188. 
 Self-knowledge and temperance. 
 
 But, Socrates, he said, I will withdraw my previous admis- 
 sions, rather than admit that a man can be temperate or wise, 
 who does not know himself ; and I am not ashamed to confess 
 that I was in error. For self-knowledge would certainly be 
 maintained by me to be the very essence of knowledge, and in 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 393 
 
 this I agree with him who dedicated the inscription, " Know 
 thyself ! " at Delphi. That word, if I am not mistaken, is put 
 there as a sort of salutation which the God addresses to those 
 who enter the temple ; as much as to say that the ordinary 
 salutation of "Hail!" is not right, and that the exhortation 
 " Be temperate ! " would be a far better way of saluting one 
 another. The notion of him who dedicated the inscription was, 
 as I believe, that the God speaks to those who enter his tem- 
 ple not as men speak ; but, when a worshiper enters, the first 
 word which he hears is " Be temperate ! " This, however, like 
 a prophet he expresses in a sort of riddle, for " Know thy- 
 self ! " and " Be temperate ! " are the same, as I maintain, and 
 as the writing implies [<raxpovet, -yvtoOi o-eauroi/], and yet they 
 may be easily misunderstood ; and succeeding sages who added 
 " Never too much," or, " Give a pledge, and evil is nigh at 
 hand," would appear to have misunderstood them ; for they im- 
 agined that " Know thyself ! " was a piece of advice which the 
 God gave, and not his salutation of the worshipers at their 
 first coming in ; and they wrote their inscription under the 
 idea that they would give equally useful pieces of advice. 
 Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this ? My object is 
 to leave the previous discussion (in which I know not whether 
 you or I are more right, but, at any rate, no clear result was 
 attained), and to raise a new one in which I will attempt to 
 prove, if you deny, that temperance is self-knowledge. 
 
 Yes, I said, Critias ; but you come to me as though I pro- 
 fessed to know about the questions which I ask, and as though 
 I could, if only I would, agree with you. Whereas the fact is 
 that I inquire with you into the truth 'of that which is ad- 
 vanced from time to time, just because I do not know ; and 
 when I have inquired, I will say whether I agree with you or 
 not. Please then to allow me time to reflect. 
 
 Reflect, he said. 
 
 I am reflecting, I replied, and discover that temperance, or 
 wisdom, if implying a knowledge of anything, must be a sci- 
 ence, and a science of something. 
 
 Yes, he said, the science of itself. Charmides, i. 20. 
 Self-mastery. See Intemperance. 
 
 There is something ridiculous in the expression " master 
 
 of himself ; " for the master is also the slave and the slave the 
 master ; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is 
 denoted. 
 
394 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 The meaning is, I believe, that the human soul has a better 
 principle, and has also a worse principle ; and when the better 
 principle controls the worse, then a man is said to be master of 
 himself ; and this is a term of praise : but when, owing to evil 
 education or association, the batter principle, which is less, is 
 overcome by the worse principle, which is greater ; in this case 
 he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprinci- 
 pled. 
 
 Yes, there is reason in that. 
 
 And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there 
 you will find one of these two conditions realized ; for the 
 State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of 
 self, if the words " temperance " and " self-mastery " truly ex- 
 press the rule of the better over the worse. The Republic, 
 ii. 256. 
 Self-motion. 
 
 Ath. When one thing moves another, and that another, 
 
 will there be any primary changing element? Can there 
 be, considering that what changes first will always have been 
 changed by another? There cannot. And when the self- 
 moved changes other, and that again other, and thus, thou- 
 sands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must 
 not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self- 
 moving principle ? 
 
 Cle. Very true, and I quite agree. 
 
 Ath. Or, to put the question in another way : If, as most of 
 these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, all things were 
 at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned principles 
 of motion would first spring up among them ? 
 
 Cle. Clearly the self-moving ; for there could be no change 
 in them arising out of any external cause, if there had been 
 no previous change in themselves. 
 
 Ath. Then we must say that self-motion being the origin 
 and beginning of motion, as well among things at rest as 
 among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of 
 change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves 
 other is second. 
 
 Gle. Quite true. Laws, iv. 407. 
 Self-moving power of the soul. 
 
 The soul is immortal, for that is immortal which is ever 
 
 in motion ; but that which moves another and is moved by an- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 395 
 
 other, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Therefore, only 
 that which is self-moving, never leaving self, never ceases to 
 move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that 
 moves besides. Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that 
 which is begotten has a beginning ; but the beginning itself 
 has no beginning, for if a beginning were begotten of some- 
 thing, that something would not be a beginning. But that which 
 is unbegotten must also be indestructible ; for if beginning were 
 destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, or 
 anything out of a beginning ; and all things must have a be- 
 ginning. And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of 
 motion ; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, else 
 the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand 
 still, and never again have motion or birth. But if the self- 
 moving is immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very 
 idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. For 
 the body which is moved from without is soulless ; but that 
 which is moved from within has a soul, for such is the nature 
 of the soul. But if the soul be truly affirmed to be the self- 
 moving, then must she also be without beginning, and immor- 
 tal. Phaedrus, i. 550. 
 Self-praise, ill manners. 
 
 Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, 
 
 for modesty is becoming in youth ; he then said very ingenu- 
 ously, that he really could not at once answer, either yes, or 
 no, to the question which I had asked : For, said he, if I affirm 
 that I am not temperate, that would be a strange thing for me 
 to say of myself, and also I should give the lie to Critias, and 
 many others, who think that 1 am temperate, as he tells you : 
 but, on the other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise 
 myself, which would be ill manners ; and therefore I have no 
 answer to make to you. Charmides, i. 12. 
 Self-ruling. See Intemperance, etc., and Self-mastery. 
 Self-sacrifice of Achilles. See Achilles. 
 Self-slavery. See Self-mastery. 
 Self-taught men. 
 
 La. Socrates ; did you never observe that some persons, 
 who have had no teachers, are more skillful than those who 
 have, in some things ? 
 
 Soc. Yes, Laches, I have observed that ; but you would not 
 be very willing to trust them if they only professed to be mas- 
 
396 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 ters of their art, unless they could show some proof of their 
 skill or excellence in one or more works. 
 
 La. That is true. Laches, L 78. 
 Self-wise disputers. See Disputers. 
 Sensation, not a sufficient source of knowledge. 
 
 Soc. The simple sensations which reach the soul through 
 
 the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but 
 their reflections on these and on their relations to being and 
 use, are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by 
 education and long experience. 
 
 Theaet. Assuredly. 
 
 Soc. And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being? 
 
 Theaet. Impossible. 
 
 Soc. And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a 
 knowledge of that thing ? 
 
 Theaet. He cannot. 
 
 Soc. Then- knowledge does not consist in impressions of 
 sense, but in reasoning about them ; in that only, and not in 
 the mere impression, truth and being can be attained ? 
 
 Theaet. Clearly. Theaetetus, iii. 390. 
 Sense, bodily, a bar to truth. See Bodily pleasures, etc. 
 Sense versus science. See Science, etc. 
 Sense, reason in the sphere of. See Intellect and knowledge. 
 Sense, soul at first without. 
 
 By reason of all these affections, the soul when inclosed 
 
 in a mortal body is at first without intelligence ; but when the 
 stream of growth and nutriment flows in with diminished speed, 
 and the courses of the soul attaining a calm go their own way 
 and become steadier as time advances, then the revolutions of 
 the several circles return to their natural figure, and call the 
 same and the other by their right names, and make the pos- 
 sessor of them a rational being. And if these combine in him 
 with any true nurture or education, he attains the fullness and 
 health of the perfect man, and escapes the worst disease of all ; 
 but if he neglects education he walks lame while alive to the 
 end of his journey, and returns imperfect and good for nothing 
 to the world below. Timaeus, ii. 536. 
 Senses, the source of knowledge. 
 
 Must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at 
 
 any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at be- 
 ing some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be that 
 other, he who makes this observation must have had a pre- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 397 
 
 vious knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, 
 was inferior? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals 
 and of absolute equality ? 
 
 Precisely. 
 
 Then we must have known equality previously to the time 
 when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all 
 these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall 
 short of it? 
 
 That is true. 
 
 And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only 
 been known, and can only be known, through the medium of 
 sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are alike 
 in this respect ? 
 
 Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of 
 them is the same as the other. 
 
 And from the senses then is derived the knowledge that all 
 sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall 
 short is not that true ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, 
 we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we 
 could not have referred to that standard the equals which are 
 derived from the senses ? for to that they all aspire, and of 
 that they fall short ? 
 
 That, Socrates, is certainly to be inferred from the previous 
 statements. Phaedo, i. 402. 
 
 Sensible images, some truths have not. See Images. 
 
 Sensual and earthly. See Earthly, etc. 
 
 Sensual love, laws against, impossible. See Laws against sensual love. 
 
 Sensuality and gluttony. See Gluttony, etc. 
 
 Shades and images, the dead are our. See Dead. 
 
 Shadows seeming real. 
 
 - Let me show you in a figure, how far our nature is en- 
 lightened or unenlightened: Behold ! human beings living in 
 an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light 
 and reaching all along the den ; they have been here from their 
 childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they 
 cannot move, and can only see before them ; for the chains are 
 arranged in such a manner as to prevent them from turning 
 round their heads. Above and behind them the light of a fire 
 
398 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners 
 there is a raised way ; and you will see, if you look, a low wall 
 built along the way, like the screen which marionette players 
 have in front of them, over which they show the puppets. 
 
 I see. 
 
 And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall some 
 apparently talking and others silent, carrying vessels and stat- 
 ues, and figures of animals, made of wood and stone and vari- 
 ous materials, and which appear over the. wall ? 
 
 You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange 
 prisoners. 
 
 Like ourselves, I replied ; and they see only their own shad- 
 ows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on 
 the opposite wall of the cave ? 
 
 True, he said ; how could they see anything but the shad- 
 ows if they were never allowed to move their heads ? 
 
 And of the objects which are being carried in like manner 
 they would only see the shadows ? 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 And if they were able to talk with one another, would they 
 not suppose that they were naming what was actually before 
 them? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And suppose, further, that the prison had an echo which came 
 from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy that the 
 voice which they heard was that of a passing shadow ? 
 
 No question, he replied. 
 
 Beyond question, I said, the truth would be to them just 
 nothing but the shadows of the images. 
 
 That is certain. 
 
 And now look again, and see how they are released and 
 cured of their folly. At first, when any one of them is liber- 
 ated and compelled suddenly to turn his neck round and go up 
 and look at the light, he will suffer sharp pains ; the glare 
 will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of 
 which in his former state he had seen the shadows ; and then 
 imagine some one saying to him, that what he saw before was 
 an illusion, but that now he is approaching real being and has 
 a truer sight and vision of more real things, what will be his 
 reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is 
 pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name 
 them, will he not be in a difficulty ; Will he not fancy that 
 
PLUG'S BEST THOUGHTS. 399 
 
 the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects 
 which are now shown to him? 
 
 Far truer. 
 
 And if he is compelled to look at the light, will he not have 
 a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take 
 refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he 
 will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are 
 now being shown to him ? 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a 
 steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into 
 the presence of the sun himself, do you not think that he will be 
 pained and irritated, and when he approaches the light he will 
 have his eyes dazzled, and will not be able to see any of the 
 realities which are now affirmed to be the truth ? 
 
 Not all in a moment, he said. 
 
 He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper 
 world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflec- 
 tions of men and other objects in the water, and then the ob- 
 jects themselves ; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon 
 and the stars ; and he will see the sky and the stars by night, 
 better than the sun, or the light of the sun, by day? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And at last he will be able to see the sun, and not mere re- 
 flections of him in the water, but he will see him as he is in 
 his own proper place, and not in another ; and he will contem- 
 plate his nature. 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And after this he will reason that the sun is he who gives 
 the seasons and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in 
 the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things 
 which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold ? 
 
 Clearly, he said, he would come to the other first and to this 
 afterwards. 
 
 And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom 
 of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he 
 would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them ? 
 
 Certainly, he would. 
 
 And if they were in the habit of conferring honors on those 
 who were quickest to observe and remember and foretell which 
 of the shadows when they moved, went before, and which fol- 
 lowed after, and which were together, do you think that he 
 
400 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 would care for such honors and glories, or envy the possessors 
 of them ? Would he not say with Homer, 
 
 " Better to be a poor man, and have a poor master," 
 
 and endure anything, rather than to think and live after their 
 manner ? 
 
 Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything 
 than live after their manner. 
 
 Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out 
 of the sun to be replaced in his old situation, would he not be 
 certain to have his eyes full of darkness ? 
 
 To be sure, he said. 
 
 And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in meas- 
 uring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out 
 of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes 
 are steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this 
 new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not 
 be ridiculous ? Men would say of him that up he went and 
 down he came without his eyes ; and that there was no use in 
 even thinking of ascending ; and if any one tried to loose 
 another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the 
 offender in the act, and they would put him to death. 
 
 No question, he said. The Republic, ii. 341. 
 Shams or simulations. See Cookery. 
 Simplicity of good men. See Good men. 
 Sin, God not the author of. See Evil, etc. 
 Sleep, quiet and unquiet. 
 
 I do not think that we have adequately determined the 
 
 nature and number of the appetites, and until this is accom- 
 plished the inquiry will always be perplexed. 
 
 Well, but you may supply the omission. 
 
 Very true, I said ; and observe the point which I want to 
 understand. Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appe- 
 tites are deemed to be unlawful ; every man appears to have 
 them, but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and 
 by reason, and the better desires prevail over them, either they 
 are wholly banished or they are few and weak : while in the 
 case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them. 
 
 Which appetites do you mean ? 
 
 I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and hu- 
 man and ruling power is asleep ; when the wild beast in our nat- 
 ure, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and leaps about and 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 401 
 
 seeks to go and satisfy his desires, there is no conceivable folly 
 or crime, however shameless or unnatural, not excepting in- 
 cest or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food, of which 
 at such a time, you know, a man may not believe himself to 
 be capable. 
 
 Most true, he said. 
 
 But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when 
 before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and 
 fed them on noble thoughts and inquiries, collecting himself in 
 meditation ; after having indulged his appetites neither too 
 much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and 
 prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering 
 with the higher principle which he leaves in the solitude of 
 pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowl- 
 edge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future : when 
 again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel 
 against any one I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational 
 principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes 
 his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is 
 least likely to be the sport of fanciful and lawless visions. 
 
 I quite agree. The Republic, ii. 400. 
 Social strife, origin of. See Metallic races. 
 Society, primitive. See Patriarchal Stale. 
 Socrates, the death of. 
 
 Me, already, as the tragic poet- would say, the voice of 
 fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison ; and I think that I 
 had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may 
 not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead. 
 
 When he had done speaking, Crito said : And ha^e you any 
 commands for us, Socrates anything to say about your chil- 
 dren, or any other matter in which we can serve you ? 
 
 Nothing particular, he said : only, as I have always told you, 
 I would have you to look to yourselves ; that is a service 
 which you may always be doing to me and mine as well as to 
 yourselves. And you need not make professions ; for if you 
 take no thought for yourselves, and walk not according to the 
 the precepts which I have given you, not now for the first 
 time, the warmth of your professions will be of no avail. 
 
 We will do our best, said Crito. But in what way would 
 you have us bury you ? 
 
 In any way that you like ; only you must get hold of me, 
 and take care that I do not walk away from you. Then 
 26 
 
402 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 he turned to us, and added with a smile : I cannot make Crito 
 believe that I am the same Socrates who has been talking 
 and conducting the argument ; he fancies that I am the other 
 Socrates whom he will soon see a dead body and he asks, 
 How shall he bury me ? And though I have spoken many 
 words in the endeavor to show- that when I have drunk the 
 poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed, 
 these words of mine, with which I comforted you and myself, 
 have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore 
 I want you to be surety for me now, as he was surety for me 
 at the trial : but let the promise be of another sort ; for he 
 was my surety to the judges that I would remain, but you 
 must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away 
 and depart ; and then he will suffer less at my death, and not 
 be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I 
 would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, 
 Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave 
 or bury him ; for false words are not only evil in themselves, 
 but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer then, my 
 dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and 
 do with that as is usual, and as you think best. 
 
 When he had spoken these words, he arose and told us to 
 wait until he went into the bath-chamber with Crito ; and we 
 waited, talking and thinking of the subject of discourse, and 
 also of the greatness of our sorrow : he was like a father of 
 whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the 
 rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his 
 children were brought to him (he had two young sons and 
 an elder one) ; and the women of his family also came, and 
 he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the pres- 
 ence of Crito ; and he then dismissed them and returned to us. 
 
 Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time 
 had passed while he was within. When he came out, he sat 
 down with us again after his bath, but not much was said. 
 Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the eleven, entered 
 and stood by him, saying : To you, Socrates, whom I know to 
 be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to 
 this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, 
 who rage and swear at me when, in obedience to the authori- 
 ties, I bid them drink the poison indeed I am sure that you 
 will not be angry with me ; for others, as you are aware, and 
 not I, are the guilty cause. And so fare you well, and try to 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 403 
 
 bear lightly what must needs be ; you know my errand. Then 
 bursting into tears he turned away and went out. 
 
 Socrates looked at him and said ; I return your good wishes, 
 and will do as you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How 
 charming the man is : since I have been in prison he has al- 
 ways been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to 
 me, and was as good as could be, and now see how generously 
 he sorrows for me. But we must do as he says, Crito ; let 
 the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared : if not, let the 
 attendant prepare some. 
 
 Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know 
 that many a one has taken the draught late, and after the an- 
 nouncement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and 
 enjoyed the society of his beloved ; do not hasten then, there 
 is still time. 
 
 Socrates said : Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are 
 right in doing thus, for they think that they will gain by the 
 delay ; but I am right in not doing thus, for I do not think 
 that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little 
 later ; I should be sparing and saving a life which is already 
 gone : I could only laugh at myself for this. Please then to 
 do as I say, and not to refuse me. 
 
 Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by ; and 
 he went out, and having been absent for some time, and re- 
 turned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates 
 said : You, my good friend, who are experienced in these mat- 
 ters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man 
 answered : You have only to walk about until your legs are 
 heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act, At the 
 same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest 
 and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of color 
 or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as 
 his manner was, took the cup and said : What do you say 
 about making a libation out of this cup to any God ? May I, 
 or not ? The man answered : We only prepare, Socrates, just 
 so much as we deem enough. I understand, he said : yet I 
 may and must ask the Gods to prosper my journey from this 
 to that other world even so and so be it according to 
 my prayer. Then holding the cup to his lips, quite readily 
 and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of 
 us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we saw 
 him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we 
 
404 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears 
 were flowing fast ; so that I covered iny face and wept over 
 myself, for certainly I was not weeping over him, but at the 
 thought of my own calamity in having lost such a friend. Nor 
 was I the first, for Crito, when he found himself unable to re- 
 strain his tears, had got up and moved away, and I followed ; 
 and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all 
 the time, broke out into a loud and passionate cry which made 
 cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness : What 
 is this strange outcry ? he said. I sent away the women mainly 
 in order that they might not offend in this way, for I have 
 heard that a man should die in peace. Be quiet then, and 
 have patience. When we heard that, we were ashamed, and 
 refrained our tears ; and he walked about until, as he said, his 
 legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to 
 the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and 
 then looked at his feet and legs ; and after a while he pressed 
 his foot hard and asked him if he could feel ; and he said, No ; 
 and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us 
 that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and 
 said : When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end. 
 He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he un- 
 covered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said (they 
 were his last words) he said : Crito, I owe a cock to Ascle- 
 pius ; will you remember to pay the debt ? The debt shall be 
 paid, said Crito ; is there anything else ? There was no 
 answer to this question ; but in a minute or two a movement 
 was heard, and the attendants uncovered him ; his eyes were 
 set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth. 
 
 Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, whom I may 
 truly call the wisest, and justest, and best of all the men whom 
 I have ever known. Phaedo, i. 444. 
 Socrates, presentiment of death in. See Presentiment, etc. 
 Soldiers and Rulers. See Gentleness. 
 Solitude of the tost soul. 
 
 - For after death, as they say, the genius of each indi- 
 vidual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain 
 place in which the dead are gathered together, whence after 
 judgment they must go into the world below, following the 
 guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to 
 the other : and when they have there received their due and 
 remained their time, another guide brings them back again 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 405 
 
 after many revolutions of ages. Now this journey to the other 
 world is not, as Aeschylus says in the Telephus, a single and 
 straight path, no guide would be wanted for that, and no 
 one could miss a single path ; but there are many partings of 
 the road, and windings, as I must infer from the rites and sac- 
 rifices which are offered to the Gods below in places where 
 three ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul follows 
 in the path, and knows what is happening ; but the soul which 
 desires the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long 
 been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, 
 is, after many struggles and many sufferings, hardly and with 
 violence carried away by her attendant genius, and when she 
 arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she 
 be impure and have done impure deeds, or been concerned in 
 foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, 
 and the works of brothers in crime, from that soul every one 
 flees and turns away ; no one will be her companion, no one 
 her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until cer- 
 tain times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is borne 
 irresistibly to her own fitting habitation ; as every pure and 
 just soul which has passed through life in the company and 
 under the guidance of the Gods has also her own proper home. 
 Phaedo, i. 438. 
 
 Song and harmony, choral. See Choral, etc. 
 Sons, unfilial. See Parricides. 
 
 Sons, brave, of brave fathers. See State, heroes, etc. 
 Sons of good fathers, why they turn out ill. See Fathers, etc. 
 Sophist and Philosopher. See Philosopher and Sophist. 
 Sophist summarized. 
 
 Sir. And who is- the maker of the longer speeches ? Is 
 
 he the statesman or the public orator ? 
 
 Theaet. The latter. 
 
 Sir. And what shall we call the other ? Is he the philoso- 
 pher or the Sophist ? 
 
 Theaet. The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view 
 he is ignorant ; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will 
 have a name which is formed by an adaptation of the word 
 tro^os. What shall we name him ? I am pretty sure that I 
 cannot be mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist. 
 
 Str. Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a 
 chain from one end to the other ? 
 
 Theaet. By all means. 
 
406 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Sir. He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows : 
 He who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of 
 the art of making contradictions, is an imitator of appearance, 
 and has divided off from the art of image-making, which is a 
 branch of phantastic, that further division of creative art, the 
 juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine any one 
 who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage 
 will say the very truth. 
 
 Theaet. Undoubtedly. Sophist, iii. 510. 
 Sophists, are they corrupters? 
 
 Do you really think, as people are fond of saying, that 
 
 our youth are corrupted by the Sophists, or that private teach- 
 ers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of ? 
 Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all 
 Sophists ? And do they not educate to perfection alike young 
 and old, men and women, and fashion them after their own 
 hearts ? . . . . 
 
 To that I quite assent, he replied. 
 
 Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation. 
 
 What are you going to say ? 
 
 Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the world 
 calls Sophists and esteems rivals, do but teach the collective 
 opinion of the many, which are the opinions of their assemblies ; 
 and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who 
 should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast 
 who is fed by him he would learn how to approach and han- 
 dle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dan- 
 gerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several 
 cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is 
 soothed or infuriated ; and you may suppose, further, that when, 
 by constantly living with him, he has become perfect in all this 
 he calls his knowledge wisdom, and he makes a system or art, 
 which he proceeds to teach, not that he has any real notion of 
 what he is teaching, but he names this honorable and that dis- 
 honorable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance 
 with the tastes and tempers of the great brute, when he has 
 learnt the meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good he pro- 
 nounces to be what pleases him, and evil what he dislikes ; and 
 he can give no other account of them except that the just and 
 noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and having 
 no power of explaining to others, the nature of either, or the 
 immense difference between them. Would not he be a rare 
 educator ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 407 
 
 Indeed, he would. 
 
 And in what respects does he who thinks that wisdom is the \ 
 discernment of the tastes and pleasures of the assembled multi- 
 tude, whether in painting or music, or, finally, in politics, differ - 
 from such an one ? For I suppose you will agree that he who 
 associates with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or 
 other work of art or the service which he has done the State, 
 making them his judges, except under protest, will also experi- 
 ence the fatal necessity of producing whatever they praise. 
 And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in 
 confirmation of their notions about the honorable and good. 
 Did you ever hear any of them which were not ? 
 
 No, nor am I likely to hear. The Republic, ii. 318. 
 Sorrow, manifestations of. 
 
 Reflect : our principle is that the good man will not 
 
 consider death terrible to a good man. 
 
 Yes, that is our principle. 
 
 And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as 
 though he had suffered anything terrible ? 
 
 He will not. 
 
 Such an one, as we further maintain, is enough for himself and 
 his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men. 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the de- 
 privation of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible. 
 
 Assuredly. 
 
 And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear 
 with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which 
 may befall him. 
 
 Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another. 
 
 Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of 
 famous men, and making them over to women (and not even to 
 women who are good for anything), or to men of a baser sort, 
 that those who are being educated by us to be the defenders of 
 their country may scorn to do the like. 
 
 That will be very right. 
 
 Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets 
 riot to depict Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, as first 
 lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face ; then 
 starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the bar- 
 ren sea, now taking the dusky ashes in both his hands and 
 pouring them over his head, or bewailing and sorrowing in the 
 
408 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he 
 describe Priam, the kinsman of the Gods, as praying and be- 
 seeching, 
 
 " Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name." 
 
 Still more earnestly will we beg of him not to introduce the 
 Gods lamenting and saying, 
 
 " Alas! my misery! alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow." 
 
 The Republic, ii. 210. 
 
 Sorrow, parental, to be lightly borne. 
 
 Some of us have fathers and mothers still living, and we 
 
 would urge them, if, as is likely, we shall die, to bear the calam- 
 ity as lightly as possible, and not to condole with one another ; 
 for they have sorrows enough, and will not need any one to 
 stimulate them. While we gently heal their wounds, let us 
 remind them that the Gods have heard the chief part of their 
 prayers ; for they prayed, not that their children might live 
 forever, but that they might be famous and brave. And this 
 which is the greatest good they have attained. A mortal man 
 cannot expect to have everything in his own life turning out 
 according to his will ; and they, if they bear their misfortunes 
 bravely, will be truly deemed brave fathers of the brave. But 
 if they give way to their sorrows, either they will be suspected 
 of not being our parents, or we of not being such as our pane- 
 gyrists declare. Let not either of the two alternatives happen, 
 but rather let them be our chief and true panegyrists, who 
 show in their lives that they are true men, and had men for 
 their sons. The ancient saying, ''never too much," appears to 
 be, and really is, well said. For he whose happiness rests with 
 himself, if possible, wholly, and if not, as far as is possible, 
 who is not hanging in suspense on other men, or changing with 
 the vicissitude of their fortune, has his life ordered for the 
 best. He is the temperate and valiant and wise ; and when 
 his riches come and go, when his children are given arid taken 
 away, he will remember the proverb, " Neither rejoicing over- 
 much nor grieving overmuch," for he relies upon himself. And 
 such we would have our parents to be that is our word and 
 wish, and as such we now offer ourselves, neither lamenting 
 overmuch, nor fearing overmuch, if we are to die at this instant. 
 And we entreat our fathers and mothers to retain these feel- 
 ings throughout their future life, and to be assured that they 
 will not please us by sorrowing and lamenting over us. But, 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 409 
 
 if the dead have any knowledge of the living, they will dis- 
 please us most by making themselves miserable and by taking 
 their misfortunes to heart, and they will please us best if 
 they bear their loss lightly and temperately. For our life will 
 have the noblest end which is vouchsafed to man, and should 
 be glorified rather than lamented. And if they will direct their 
 minds to the care and nurture of our wives and children, they 
 will soonest forget their misfortunes, and live more honorably 
 and uprightly, and in a way that is more agreeable to us. 
 Menexenus, iv. 579. 
 Sorrow, suppressed. 
 
 - "Were we not saying that a good man, when he loses his 
 son or anything else which, is most dear to him, will bear the 
 loss with more equanimity than another ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that, although 
 he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow ? 
 
 Yes, he said, the latter is the truer statement. 
 
 Tell me : will he be more likely to struggle and hold out 
 against his sorrow, when he is seen by his equals, or when "he 
 is by himself alone. 
 
 He will be more likely to hold out when he is in company. 
 
 But when he is left alone he will not mind saying or doing 
 many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or 
 seeing ? 
 
 True. 
 
 There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids 
 him resist, while passion urges him to indulge his sorrow ? 
 
 True. The Republic, ii. 435. 
 Sorrow, patience under. 
 
 The law would say that to be patient under suffering is 
 
 best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there 
 is no knowing whether such things are good or evil ; and noth- 
 ing is gained by impatience ; also, because no human thing is of 
 serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which 
 at the moment is most required. 
 
 What is most required ? he asked. 
 
 That we should take counsel about the past, and when 
 the dice have been thrown, order our affairs accordingly by 
 the advice of reason, not, like children who have had a fall, 
 keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting 
 up a howl, when we should be accustoming the soul forth- 
 
410 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 with to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and 
 fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by a real cure. 
 
 Yes, he said, there is no better way of meeting the attacks 
 of fortune. 
 
 Yes, I said ; and the higher principle is ready to follow this 
 suggestion of reason ? 
 
 Clearly. 
 
 And the other principle which inclines us to recollection of 
 our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of 
 them, we may call irrational, indolent, and cowardly ? 
 
 Indeed, we may. The Republic, ii. 436. 
 Soul, immortality of the. See Self -moving power of the soul. 
 
 Soc. I have heard from certain wise men and women who 
 
 spoke of things divine that 
 
 Men. What did they say ? 
 
 Soc. They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive. 
 
 Men. What was that ? and who were they ? 
 
 Soc. Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had 
 studied how they might be able to give a reason of their pro- 
 fession ; there have been poets also, such as the poet Pindar 
 and other inspired men. And what they say is mark, now 
 and see whether their words are true they say that the soul 
 of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is 
 termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never 
 destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always 
 in perfect holiness. For in the ninth year Persephone sends 
 the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of 
 ancient crime back again into the light of this world, and these 
 are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great 
 iii wisdom, and are called saintly heroes in after ages. The 
 soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many 
 times, and having seen all things that there are, whether in 
 this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all ; 
 and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remem- 
 brance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about every- 
 thing ; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all 
 things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say 
 learning, all out of a single recollection, if a man is strenuous 
 and does not faint ; for all inquiry and all learning is but rec- 
 ollection. Meno, i. 255. 
 
 Are you not aware, I said, that the soul is immortal and im- 
 perishable ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 411 
 
 He looked at me in astonishment, and said : No, by heaven ; 
 surely you are not prepared to affirm that ? 
 
 Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too, for there is no difficulty. 
 
 I see a great difficulty ; but I should like to hear you state 
 this argument of which you make so light. 
 
 Listen, then. 
 
 I am attending. 
 
 You speak of good and of evil ? V^ / V / /> 
 
 Yes, he replied. 
 
 Would you agree with me in thinking that the coitup^ng *nfl , 
 destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving 
 element the good ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And you admit that everything has a good and also an evil ; 
 as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes, and disease of the whole 
 body ; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of iron 
 and steel : in everything, or in almost everything, there is an 
 inherent evil and disease ? 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 And anything which is infected by any of these evils is 
 made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies ? 
 
 True. 
 
 The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruc- 
 tion of each ; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing 
 else that will, for good certainly will not destroy them, nor, 
 again, that which is neither good nor evil. 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent cor- 
 ruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain 
 that of such a nature there is no destruction ? 
 
 That may be assumed. 
 
 Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul ? 
 
 Yes, he said, there are all the evils of which we were speak- 
 ing : unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. 
 
 But do any of these dissolve or destroy her ? and here do 
 not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and 
 foolish, when they are detected, perish through their injustice, 
 which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body : 
 The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and 
 annihilates the body ; and all the things of which we were just 
 now speaking come to annihilation through their own inherent 
 evil clinging to them and destroying them. Is not this true ? 
 
412 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 Now consider the soul in the same way. Do the injustice 
 and other evils of the soul waste and consume the soul ? Do 
 they, by inhering in her and clinging to her at last, bring her 
 to death, and separate her from the body ? 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything 
 can perish from without through external affection of evil, 
 which could not be destroyed from within by any internal cor- 
 ruption ? 
 
 It is, he replied. 
 
 Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, 
 whether staleness, decomposition, or any other kind of badness, 
 when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy 
 the body ; although if the corruption of food communicates 
 corruption to the body, then the body also suffers from inter- 
 nal corruption or disease and perishes ; but that the body, be- 
 Iing one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which 
 is another thing, without any internal infection ; that will 
 never be admitted by us ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can pro- 
 duce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, 
 which is one thing, can be dissolved by any external evil which 
 belongs to another ? 
 
 Yes, he said, there is reason in that. 
 
 Either, then, let us refute this argument, or, while this ar- 
 gument of ours remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, 
 or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even 
 the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can 
 destroy the soul, until the soul also is proved to become more 
 unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being 
 done to the body ; but that the soul or anything else which is 
 not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an ex- 
 ternal one, Is not to be supposed. 
 
 No one, he replied, will ever show that the souls of men 
 become more unjust in consequence of death. 
 
 And if some one who would rather not admit the immortal- 
 ity of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do 
 really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker 
 is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed 
 to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 413 
 
 die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil 
 has, and which kills them sooner or later in quite another way 
 from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at 
 the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds ? 
 
 Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, 
 will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered 
 from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, 
 and that injustice which murders others keeps the murderer alive 
 aye, and unsleeping too ; so far removed is her dwelling- 
 place from being a house of death. 
 
 True, I said ; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the 
 soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is 
 appointed to be the destruction of the body destroy a soul or 
 anything which is not a body. 
 
 Yes, that can hardly be. >JJ -7 
 
 But the soul which cannot be destroyed by evilj whether in- 
 herent or external, must exist forever, and, if existing forever, 
 must be immortal ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 That is the conclusion, I said ; and if a true conclusion, then 
 the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed 
 they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, 
 for the increase of the immortal natures must come from' some- 
 thing mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality. 
 
 Very true. 
 
 But the argument will not allow us to believe this, nor yet 
 to believe that the soul, in her true nature, is full of variety 
 and difference and dissimilarity. 
 
 What do you mean ? he said. 
 
 The soul, I said, as is now proven, being immortal, must be 
 the fairest of compositions, and cannot be compounded of 
 many elements ? 
 
 Certainly not. The Republic, ii. 440. 
 Soul, change to all things having a. 
 
 Ath. All things which have a soul change, and possess in 
 
 themselves a principle of change, and in changing move accord- 
 ing to law and the order of destiny : lesser changes of nature 
 move on level ground, but greater crimes sink into the abyss, 
 that is to say, into Hades and other places in the world below, 
 of which the very names terrify men, and about which they 
 dream that they live in. them absent from the body. And 
 whenever the soul receives more of good and evil from her 
 
414 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 own energy and the strong influence of others, when she has 
 communion with divine virtue and becomes divine, she is car- 
 ried into another and better place, which is also divine and 
 perfect in holiness ; and when she has communion with evil, 
 then she also changes the place of her life. 
 
 "For tbat is the justice of the. Gods who inhabit heaven." 
 
 O youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by 
 the Gods, know that if you become worse you shall go to the 
 worse souls, or if better to the better, and in every succession 
 of life and death you will do and suffer what like may fitly 
 suffer at the hands of like. This is a divine justice, which 
 neither you nor any other unfortunate will ever glory in es- 
 caping, and which the ordaining powers have specially or- 
 dained ; take good heed of them, for a day will come when 
 they will take heed of you. If you say, I am small and will 
 creep into the depths of the earth, or I am high and will fly 
 up to heaven, you are not so small or so high but that you 
 shall pay the fitting penalty, either in the world below or in 
 some yet more savage place still whither you shall be con- 
 veyed. Laws, iv. 417. 
 Soul, imperishability of the. 
 
 What do we call that principle which does not admit of 
 
 death ? 
 
 The immortal, he said. 
 
 And does the soul admit of death ? 
 
 No. 
 
 Then the soul is immortal ? 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 And may we say that this is proven ? 
 
 Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied. 
 
 And supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not 
 three be imperishable ? 
 
 Of course* 
 
 And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm 
 principle came attacking the snow, must not the snow have re- 
 tired whole and unmelted for it could never have perished, 
 nor could it have remained and admitted the heat ? 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperisha- 
 ble, the fire, when assailed by cold, would not have perished or 
 have been extinguished, but would have gone away unaffected ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 415 
 
 Certainly, he said. . 
 
 And the same may be said of the immortal : if the immortal 
 is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot 
 perish ; for the preceding argument shows that the soul will 
 not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more than three or 
 the odd number will admit of the even, or fire, or the heat in 
 the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say : " But although 
 the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why 
 may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the 
 odd ? " Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot an- 
 swer that the odd principle is imperishable ; for this has not 
 been acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, there 
 would have been no difficulty in contending that at the ap- 
 proach of the even the odd principle and the number three* 
 took their departure ; and the same argument would have held 
 good of fire and heat and any other thing. 
 Very true. 
 
 And the same may be said of the immortal : if the immortal 
 is also imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well 
 as immortal ; but if not, some other proof of her imperishable- 
 ness will have to be given. 
 
 No other proof is needed, he said ; for if the immortal, 
 being eternal, is liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable. 
 
 Yes, replied Socrates, all men will agree that God, and the 
 essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never 
 perish. 1 Phaedo, i. 437. 
 Soul, truth attained by the. 
 
 What, again, shall we say of the actual acquirement of 
 
 knowledge ? is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, a 
 hinderer or a helper ? I mean to say, have sight and hearing 
 any truth in them ? Are they not, as the poets are always 
 telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are in- 
 accurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses ? 
 For you will allow that they are the best of them? 
 Certainly, he replied. 
 
 Then when does the soul attain truth ? for in attempting to 
 consider anything in company with the body she is obviously 
 deceived. 
 
 Yes, that is true. 
 
 Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at 
 
 all? 
 
 l See the continuation of this discussion on p. 418. 
 
416 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself, 
 and none of these things trouble her neither sounds nor 
 sights nor pain nor any pleasure, when she has as little as 
 possible to do with the body, and has no bodily sense or feel- 
 ing, but is aspiring after true being? 
 
 That is true. 
 
 And in this the philosopher dishonors the body ; his soul 
 runs away from the body and desires to be alone and by her- 
 self ? 
 
 That is true. Phaedo, i. 391. 
 
 Soul, philosophy delivering the. See Philosophy delivering, etc. 
 Soul degenerated by the body. See Body affecting soul. 
 Soul, solitude of the lost. See Solitude. 
 Soul, nature of the. 
 
 Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves What is that 
 
 which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered away, and about 
 which we fear ? and what, again, is that about which we have 
 no fear ? And then we may proceed to inquire whether that 
 which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of soul 
 our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon the an- 
 swer to these questions. 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
 Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be 
 naturally capable as of being compounded so also of being dis- 
 solved ; but that which is uncompounded, and that only, must 
 be, if anything is, indissoluble. 
 
 Yes ; I should imagine so, said Cebes. 
 
 And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and 
 unchanging, whereas the compound is always changing and 
 never the same. 
 
 That I also think, he said. 
 
 Then, now, let us return to the previous discussion. Is that 
 idea or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as 
 essence or true existence whether essence of equality, beauty, 
 or anything else : are these essences, I say. liable at times to 
 some degree of change ? or are they each of them always what 
 they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging 
 forms, and not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or 
 at any time ? 
 
 They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes. 1 
 Phaedo, i. 406. 
 
 1 For the continuation of this discussion, see Seen and unseen. 
 
I'LATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 417 
 
 Soul, reflecting and unchanging. See Reflecting, etc. 
 Soul resembling the divine. See Divine, etc. 
 
 Listen all ye who have just now heard the laws about 
 
 Gods, arid about our dear forefathers : Of all the things which 
 a man has, next to the God, his soul is the most divine and 
 most truly his own. Now in every man there are two parts : 
 the better and superior part, which rules, and the worse and 
 inferior part, which serves ; and the ruler is always to be pre- 
 ferred to the servant. Wherefore I am right in bidding every 
 one next to the Gods, who are our masters, and those who in 
 order follow them, to honor his own soul, which every one 
 seems to honor, but no one honors as he ought ; for honor is a 
 divine good, and no evil thing is honorable ; and he who thinks 
 that he can honor the soul by word or gift, or any sort of com- 
 pliance, without making her in any way better, seems to honor 
 her, but honors her not at all. For example, every man, from 
 his very boyhood, fancies that he is able to know everything, and 
 thinks that he honors his soul by .praising her, and he is very 
 ready to let her do whatever she may like. But I mean to 
 say that in acting thus he only injures his soul, and does not 
 honor her ; whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honor her as 
 second only to the Gods. Again, when a man thinks that 
 others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which 
 he has committed, and the many and great evils which befell 
 him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be ex- 
 empt and innocent, he is under the idea that he is honoring his 
 soul ; whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is really in- 
 juring her. And when, disregarding the word and approval of 
 the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again he is far 
 from honoring her ; he only dishonors her, and fills her full of 
 evil and remorse ; or when he does not endure to the end the 
 labors and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator ap- 
 proves, but gives way before them,- then, by yielding, he does 
 not honor the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be 
 dishonorable ; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a 
 good, does he honor her, but yet once more he dishonors her ; 
 for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil, he 
 yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her 
 that, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods below, in- 
 stead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods. Again, 
 when any one prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the 
 real and utter dishonor of the soul ? For such a preference 
 27 
 
 \ 
 
418 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 implies that the body is more honorable than the soul : and 
 this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more 
 honorable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise of 
 the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful 
 possession. Laws, iv. 252. 
 Soul, impure and pure. See Impure, etc. 
 Soul, sensual and earthly. See Earthly. 
 Soul, transmigration of the. 
 
 The happiest both in themselves and their place of abode 
 
 are those who have practiced the civil and social virtues which 
 are called temperance and justice, and are acquired by habit 
 and attention without philosophy and mind. 
 
 Why are they the happiest ? 
 
 Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle so- 
 cial nature which is like their own, such as that of bees or wasps 
 or ants, or even back again into the form of man, and just and 
 moderate men to spring from them. 
 
 That is not impossible. Phaedo, i. 411. 
 Soul, self-moving. See Self-moving. 
 Soul, indestructible. 
 
 Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not 
 
 the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable ? 
 
 Most certainly. 
 
 Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him 
 may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the ap- 
 proach of death and is preserved safe and sound ? 
 
 True. 
 
 Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and im- 
 perishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world ! 
 Phaedo, i. 437. 
 Soul, care for the. 
 
 O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what 
 
 care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion 
 of time which is called life, but of eternity ! And the danger 
 of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear 
 to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked 
 would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have 
 been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil 
 together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is 
 manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil 
 except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For 
 the soul when on her progress to the world below takes noth- 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 419 
 
 ing with her but nurture and education ; and these are said 
 greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very 
 beginning of his pilgrimage in the other world. Phaedo, i. 
 437. 
 
 'Soul, at first without sense. See Sense. 
 Soul, giving life to the body. 
 
 Soc. You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness 
 
 of the word I^T? (soul), and then of the word o-oyia (body)? 
 
 Her. Yes. 
 
 Soc. If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I 
 should imagine that those who first ^used the name $vx*l meant 
 to express that the soul when in the body is the source of life, 
 and gives the power of breath and revival, and when this re- 
 viving power fails then the body perishes and dies, and this, if 
 I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But please stay a mo- 
 ment ; I fancy that I can discover something which will be 
 more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid 
 that they will scorn this explanation. What do you say to an- 
 other ? 
 
 Her. Let me hear. 
 
 Soc. What is that which holds and carries and gives life and 
 motion to the entire nature of the body ? What is that but 
 the soul? 
 
 Her. Just that. 
 
 Soc. And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or 
 soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things ? 
 
 Her. Yes ; I do. 
 
 Soc. Then you may well call that power <u<7ex?7 which 
 carries and holds nature, and this may be refined away into 
 
 \ltvxn- 
 
 Her. Certainly ; and I think that this is a more scientific 
 derivation. 
 
 Soc. True ; and yet I cannot help laughing if I am to sup- 
 pose that this is the original meaning. 
 
 Her. But what shall we say of the- next word ? 
 
 Soc. You mean o-^a (the body). 
 
 Her. Yes. 
 
 Soc. That may be variously interpreted ; and yet more vari- 
 ously if a little permutation is allowed. For some say that 
 the body is the grave (o^) of the soul, which may be thought 
 to be buried in our present life ; or again the index of the 
 soul, because the soul indicates (cr^/xcuVei) through the body; 
 
420 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and 
 they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the 
 punishment of sin, and that the body is an inclosure or prison 
 in which the soul is incarcerated, kept (o-w/xa crw^rai), as the 
 name o-w/xa implies, until the penalty is paid ; according to this 
 view, not even a letter of the .word need be changed. Cra- 
 tylus, i. 638. 
 
 Soul, harmony of, and form. See Harmony of, etc. 
 Soul, its part in our action. 
 
 Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an 
 
 easy question whether the soul has these three principles or 
 not? 
 
 An easy question ! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds 
 that hard is the good. 
 
 Very true, I said ; and I confess that the method which we 
 are employing, in my judgment, seems to be altogether inade- 
 quate to the accurate solution of this question ; for the true 
 method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a 
 solution not below the level of the previous inquiry. 
 
 May we not be satisfied with that ? he said ; under the cir- 
 cumstances, I am quite content. 
 
 I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied. 
 
 Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said. 
 
 Can I be wrong, I said, in acknowledging that in the indi- 
 vidual there are the same principles and habits which there are 
 in the State ? for if they did not pass from one to the other, 
 whence did they come ? Take the quality of passion or spirit ; 
 it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, which is 
 characteristic of the Thracians, Scythians, and in general of 
 the northern nations, when found in States, does not originate 
 in the individuals who compose them ; and the same may be 
 said of the love of knowledge, which is the special character- 
 istic of our part of the world, or the love of money, which may, 
 with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyp- 
 tians. 
 
 Exactly, he said. 
 
 There is no difficulty in understanding this. 
 
 None whatever. 
 
 But the difficulty begins as soon as we raise the question 
 whether these principles are three or one ; whether, that is to 
 say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with an- 
 other, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 421 
 
 appetites ; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each 
 sort of action to determine that is the difficulty. 
 
 Yes, he said, there lies the difficulty. The Republic, ii. 261. 
 Soul, disfiguration of the. 
 
 Her immortality may be proven by the previous argument 
 
 and by other arguments ; but to see her as she really is, not 
 as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body 
 and other miseries, you should look upon her with the eye of 
 reason, in her original purity, and then her beauty would be 
 discovered, and in her image justice would be more clearly seen, 
 and injustice, and all the things which we have described. Thus 
 far we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at 
 present, but we must remember that we have seen her only in 
 a condition which juay be compared to that of the sea-God 
 Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because 
 his natural members are broken off and crushed, and in many 
 ways damaged by the waves, and incrustations have grown over 
 them of sea-weed and shells and stones, so that he is liker to 
 some sea-monster than to his natural form. And the soul is 
 in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not 
 there, Glaucon, not there must we look. 
 
 Where then ? 
 
 At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and 
 what converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the 
 immortal and eternal and divine ; also how different she would 
 become if wholly following this superior principle, and borne 
 by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and 
 disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and 
 rock which in wild variety grow around her because she feeds 
 upon earth, and is crusted over by the good things of this life 
 as they are termed : then you would see her as she is, and 
 know whether she have one form only or many, or what her 
 nature is. Of her character and affections in this present life 
 I have said enough. 
 
 True, he said. The Republic, ii. 440. 
 Soul made prior to the body. See Corporeal essence. 
 Soul, disorders of the. See Mind, etc. 
 Soul, compared to a vessel. 
 
 '- I have heard a philosopher say that at this moment we 
 are dead, and that the body (o-to/xa) is a tomb (o"J?fx) and that 
 the part of the soul which is the seat of the desires is liable to 
 be blown and tossed about ; and some ingenious man, probably 
 
422 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale 
 in which he called the soul a vessel (TTI^OS), meaning a believ- 
 ing (TTICTTIKOS) vessel, and the ignorant he called the uninitiated 
 or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which 
 the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent 
 part, he compared to a vessel full of holes, because they can 
 never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking, Calli- 
 cles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, meaning 
 the invisible world (aetSes), these uninitiated or leaky persons 
 are the most miserable, arid that they carry water to a vessel 
 which is full of holes in a similarly holey colander. The col- 
 ander, as he declares, is the soul, and the soul which he com- 
 pares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is full of 
 holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad memory and 
 want of faith. Gorgias, iii. 81. 
 
 Soul, effect of harmony and order in the. See Harmony, etc. 
 Soul, health of body and. See Body, etc. 
 
 Soul and body, two processes of training. See Body and soul, etc. 
 Soul after death. 
 
 Whatever was the habit of , the body during life would 
 
 be distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great 
 measure and for a considerable time. And I should imagine 
 that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles ; when a man is 
 stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired affections of 
 the soul are laid open to view. And when they come to the 
 judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, he places 
 them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not know- 
 ing whose the soul is : perhaps he may lay hands on the soul 
 of the great king, or of some other king or potentate, who has 
 no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and 
 is full of the prints and scars of perjuries, and crimes with 
 which each action has stained him, and he is all crooked with 
 falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, because he 
 has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of 
 deformity and disproportion, which is caused by license and 
 luxury and insolence and incontinence, and dispatches him ig- 
 nominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punish- 
 ment which he deserves. Gorgias, iii. 116. 
 Soul, waxen heart of the. 
 
 Soc. The explanation of truth and error is as follows : 
 
 when the wax in the soul of any one is deep and abundant, 
 and smooth and perfectly tempered, then the impressions which 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 423 
 
 pass through the senses and sink into the [waxen] heart of 
 the soul, as Homer says in a parable, meaning to indicate the 
 likeness of the soul to wax (KYJP icr/pos) these, I say, being 
 pure and clear, and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also 
 lasting, and minds such as these easily learn and easily retain, 
 and are not liable to confusion, but have true thoughts, for 
 they have plenty of room, and having clear impressions of 
 things, as we term them, quickly distribute them into their 
 proper places on the block. And such men are called wise. 
 Do you agree ? 
 
 Theaet. Entirely. 
 
 Soc. But when the heart of any one is shaggy, as the poet 
 who knew everything says, or muddy and of impure wax, or 
 very soft, or very hard, then there is a corresponding defect in 
 the mind : the soft are good at learning, but apt to forget ; 
 and the hard are the reverse ; the shaggy and rugged and 
 gritty, or those who have an admixture of earth or dung in 
 their composition, have the impressions indistinct, as also the 
 hard, for there is no depth in them ; arid the soft too are in- 
 distinct, for their impressions are easily confused and effaced. 
 Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jostled to- 
 gether in a little soul, which has no room. These are the nat- 
 ures which have false opinion ; for when they see or hear or 
 think of anything, they are slow in assigning the right objects 
 to the right impressions : in their stupidity they confuse them, 
 and are apt to see and hear and think amiss ; and such men 
 are said to be deceived in their knowledge -of objects, and ig- 
 norant. 
 
 Theaet. No man, Socrates, can say anything truer than that. 
 Theaetetus, iii. 400. 
 Soul, original and primeval. 
 
 Ath. I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument 
 
 of those who manufacture the soul according to their own im- 
 pious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the 
 generation and destruction of all things, to be not first but last, 
 and that which was last to be first, and hence they have fallen 
 into error about the true nature of the Gods. 
 
 Cle. Still I do not understand you. 
 
 Ath. Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of 
 the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to 
 her origin : they do not know that she is among the first of 
 bodies, and before them all, and is the chief author of their 
 
424 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 changes and transpositions. And if this is true, and if the 
 soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of 
 the soul's kindred be of necessity before those which appertain 
 to the body? 
 - Cle. Certainly. 
 
 Ath. Then thought and attention and mind and art and 
 law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and 
 light ; and the great and primitive works and actions will be 
 works of art ; they will be the first, and after them will come 
 nature and works of nature, which, however, is a wrong term to 
 apply to them ; these will follow, arid be under the govern- 
 ment of art and mind. 
 
 Cle. But why is the word " nature " wrong ? 
 
 Ath. Because those who use the term mean to say that nat- 
 ure is the first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be 
 the primeval element and not fire or air, then in the truest 
 sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to have a 
 natural or creative power : and this would be true if you 
 proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise. 
 
 Cle. You are quite right. Laws, iv. 403. 
 Soul, like a book. 
 
 Soc. Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in 
 my explanation of this phenomenon. 
 
 Pro. "What is your explanation ? 
 
 Soc. I think that the soul at such times is a like a book. 
 
 Pro. How so ? 
 
 Soc. Memory and perception meet, and they and their at- 
 tendant feelings seem to me almost to write down words in the 
 soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes truly, then true 
 opinion and true propositions grow in our souls, but when 
 the scribe within us writes falsely the result is false. 
 
 Pro. I quite assent and agree to your statement. 
 
 Soc. I must bespeak your favor also for another artist, who 
 is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul. 
 
 Pro. Who is that ? 
 
 Soc. The painter, who paints the images of the words which 
 the scribe or registrar has already written down. 
 
 Pro. But when and how does he do this ? 
 
 Soc. When abstracting from sight, or some other sense, the 
 opinions which he then received or the words which he heard, 
 he retains the image of them in his mind ; that is a very com- 
 mon mental phenomenon. 
 
 Pro. Certainly. Philebus, iii. 176. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 425 
 
 Soul, dividfd, forlings of body and. See Body and sow/, mixtures of. 
 Soul, envy, a pain of the. See Envy, etc. 
 r .Soul, the just and wise. See Just, etc. 
 
 Soul, definition of the. See Mind, movement of. 
 -Doul, prior to the body. See also Body and soul, etc. 
 
 Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and 
 
 absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, 
 and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born 
 to obey the soul which is the ruler ? 
 
 Cle. Nothing can be more true. 
 
 Ath. Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul 
 was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to 
 those of the body ? 
 
 Cle. Certainly. 
 
 Ath. And characters and manners, and wishes and reason- 
 ings, and true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are 
 prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if 
 the soul -is prior to the body. 
 
 Cle. Of course. 
 
 Ath. In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that 
 the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honorable, just 
 and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be 
 the cause of all things ? 
 
 Cle. Certainly. 
 
 Ath. And as the soul orders and inhabits all things moving 
 every way, must we not say that she orders also the heavens ? 
 
 Cle. Of course. 
 
 Ath. One soul or more ? More than one I will answer for 
 you ; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than 
 two one the author of good, and the other of evil. 
 
 Cle. Very true. 
 
 Ath. Yes, very true ; the soul then directs all things in 
 heaven, and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are 
 described by the terms will, consideration, attention, delib- 
 eration, opinion true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, 
 hatred, contentment, and other primary motions akin to these ; 
 which again receive the secondary motions of corporate sub- 
 stances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to composi- 
 tion and decomposition, and to the qualities which accompany 
 them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness 
 and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, 
 and all those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a god- 
 
426 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 dess, when truly receiving the divine mind and disciplining all 
 things rightly to their happiness ; but when the companion of 
 folly, doing the very contrary of all this. Shall we assume 
 this, or do we still entertain doubts ? 
 
 Cle. There is no room at all for doubt. 
 
 Ath. Shall we say, then, that soul is the nature which con- 
 trols heaven and earth, and the whole world ? Is it the prin- 
 ciple of wisdom and virtue, or that which has neither wisdom 
 nor virtue ? Suppose that we make answer as follows : 
 
 Gle. How would you answer ? 
 
 Ath. If, my friend, we say that the whole path of heaven, 
 and the movement of all that is therein, is by nature akin to 
 the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and pro- 
 ceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the 
 best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good 
 path. 
 
 Gle. True. 
 
 Ath. But when the world moves wildly and irregularly, then 
 the evil soul guides it. 
 
 Cle. True again. Laws, iv. 408. 
 Soul, sun and stars without. 
 
 Ath. Are we assured that there are two things which lead 
 
 men to believe in the Gods, as we have already stated? 
 
 Cle. What are they ? 
 
 Ath. One is the argument about the soul, which has been 
 already mentioned that it is the eldest and most divine of 
 all things, to which motion attaining generation gives perpetual 
 existence ; the other was an argument from the order of motion 
 of the heavens, and of all things under the dominion of the 
 mind which ordered the universe. If a man look upon the 
 world not lightly or foolishly, there was never any one so god- 
 less who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the 
 many imagine. For they think that those who handle these 
 matters by the help of astronomy, and the accompanying arts 
 of demonstration, may become godless ; because they see, as far 
 as they can see, things happening by necessity, and not by an 
 intelligent will accomplishing good. 
 
 Cle. But what, then, is the fact ? 
 
 Ath. Just the opposite of that opinion which once prevailed 
 among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. Even in 
 those days men wondered about them, and that which is now 
 ascertained was then conjectured by some who had a more 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 427 
 
 exact knowledge of them that if they had been things with- 
 out soul, and had no mind, they could never have moved ac- 
 cording to such exact calculations ; and even at that time some 
 ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the orderer 
 of the universe. But these same persons, again mistaking the 
 nature of the soul, which they conceived to be younger and 
 not older than the body, once more overturned the world, or 
 rather, I should say, themselves, for what they saw before their 
 eyes in heaven, all appeared to be full of stones, and earth, 
 and many other lifeless bodies, and to these they assigned the 
 various causes of all things. Such studies gave rise to much 
 atheism and perplexity, arid the poets took occasion to be 
 abusive, comparing the philosophers to she-dogs, uttering 
 vain bowlings, and saying other nonsense of the same sort. 
 But now, as I said, the case is reversed. 
 
 Cle. How is that ? 
 
 Aih. No man can be a true worshiper of the Gods who 
 does not know these two principles that the soul is the eld- 
 est of all things born, and is immortal and rules over all bodies ; 
 moreover, as I have now said several times, he who has not 
 contemplated the mind of nature which is said to exist in the 
 stars, and acquired the previous training, and seen the connec- 
 tion of them with music, and harmonized them all with laws 
 and institutions, is not able to give a reason of such things as 
 have a reason. And he who is unable to acquire this in addi- 
 tion to the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can hardly be a good 
 ruler of a whole State ; but he should be the subordinate of 
 other rulers. Laws, iv. 477. 
 Souls, punishment of. See Soul after death. 
 Speech, common, having a divine meaning. 
 
 - His words are like the images of Silenus which open ; 
 they are ridiculous when you first hear them : he clothes him- 
 self in language that is as the skin of the wanton satyr for 
 his talk is of pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers, 
 and he is always repeating the same things in the same words, 
 so that an ignorant man who did not know him might feel dis- 
 posed to laugh at him ; but he who opens the mask and sees 
 what is within will find that they are the only words which 
 have a meaning in them, and also the most divine, abounding 
 in fair examples of virtue, and of the widest comprehension, 
 or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and honorable 
 man. The Symposium, i. 512. 
 
428 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Speech and thought. 
 
 Theaet. Give me the^ knowledge which you would wish 
 
 me to gain. 
 
 Sir. Is not thought the same as speech, with this exception : 
 thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with her- 
 self? 
 
 Theaet. Quite true. 
 
 Sir. But the stream of thought which flows through the 
 lips and is audible is called speech. 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Str. And we know that in speech there is affirmation and 
 denial ? 
 
 Theaet. Yes, that we know. 
 
 Str. When the affirmation or denial takes place silently and 
 in the mind only, what would you call that but opinion ? 
 
 Theaet. There can be no other name. 
 
 Str. And when this state of opinion is presented, not sim- 
 ply, but in some form of sense, ought you not to call it phan- 
 tasy ? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. 
 
 Str. And seeing that language is true and false, and that 
 thought is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion 
 is the end of thinking, and phantasy or imagination is the 
 union of sense and opinion, the inference is that these also, as 
 they are akin to language, should have an element of false as 
 well as true ? 
 
 Theaet. Certainly. Sophist, iii. 504. 
 Spherical form of the earth. See Earth, rotundity of the. 
 Spiritual truths, uncertainty of. 
 
 I dare say that you, Socrates, feel as I do, how very hard 
 
 or almost impossible is the attainment of any certainty about 
 questions such as these in the present life. And yet I should 
 deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them 
 to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had ex- 
 amined them on every side. For he should persevere until he 
 has attained one of two things : either he should discover or 
 be taught the truth about them ; or, if this is impossible, I 
 would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human 
 theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through 
 life not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some 
 word of God which will more surely and safely carry him. 
 Phaedo, i. 414. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 429 
 
 Spontaneous life. See Life. 
 
 Starry heavens, the symbols of truth. See Heavenly bodies, etc. 
 
 Stars and sun, without soul. See Soul, sun and stars. 
 
 State, loyalty to the. See Citizen, etc. 
 
 State the, a parent. See Citizen, etc. 
 
 State, authority of the. See Citizen, etc. 
 
 State, right of the. See Citizen, etc. 
 
 State, more than the individual. See Citizen, etc. 
 
 State, rulers of the, who and what they must be. See Rulers. 
 
 State, poetry expelled from the. See Poetry. 
 
 State, origin of the. See Individual. 
 
 State, lies for the good of the. See Lies. 
 
 State, object of constructing the. 
 
 How would you answer, Socrates, said he, if a person 
 
 were to say that you make your citizens miserable, and miser- 
 able of their own accord ; for they are the actual owners of 
 the city, and are none the better ; whereas other men acquire 
 lands, and build large and handsome houses, and have every- 
 thing handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the Gods on 
 their own account, and practicing hospitality ; moreover, as you 
 were saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that 
 is usual among the favorites of fortune ; while our poor citi- 
 zens are no better than mercenaries who are fixed in the city 
 and do nothing but mount guard ? 
 
 Yes, I said ; and you may add that they are only fed, and 
 not paid, in addition to their food, like other men ; and there- 
 fore they cannot make a journey of pleasure, they have no 
 money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy, 
 which, as the world goes, is thought to be happiness ; and many 
 other accusations of the same nature might be added. 
 
 But, said he, let us suppose all that included in the charge. 
 
 You mean to ask, I said, what is to be our answer ? 
 
 Yes, he replied. 
 
 If we proceed on the path along which we are already going, 
 I said, my belief is that we shall find the answer. Even if our 
 guardians were such as you describe, there would not be any- 
 thing wonderful in their still being the happiest of men ; but 
 let that pass, for our object in the construction of the State is the 
 greatest happiness of the whole, and not that of any one class ; 
 and in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the 
 whole, we think that we are most likely to find justice, and in 
 the ill-ordered State injustice : and, having found them, we 
 
430 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 shall then be able to decide which of the two is the happier. 
 At present we are constructing the happy State, not piecemeal, 
 or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole ; 
 and by and by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of 
 State. If we were painting a statue, and some one were to 
 come and blame us for not putting the most beautiful colors on 
 the most beautiful parts of the body for the eyes, he would 
 say, ought to be purple, but they are black in that case we 
 might fairly answer, sir, do not imagine that we ought to beau- 
 tify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes ; but 
 see whether, by giving this and the other features their due, we 
 make the whole beautiful. And so I would say now, do not com- 
 pel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will 
 make them anything but guardians ; for we also should have no 
 difficulty in clothing our husbandmen in fine linen, and setting 
 crowns of gold on their heads, bidding them till the ground no 
 more than they like. There would be nothing easier than to al- 
 low our potters to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, 
 passing round the glittering bowl, while their wheel is conven- 
 iently at hand, and working at pottery as much as they like, and 
 no more ; in this way we may make every class happy and 
 then as you imagine, the whole State will be happy. But do not 
 suggest this ; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no 
 longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and 
 no class will have any distinct character. Now this is not of 
 much importance where the corruption of society, and preten- 
 sion to be what you are not, extends only to cobblers ; but 
 when the guardians of the laws of the government are only 
 seemers and not real guardians, that, you will observe, is the 
 utter ruin of the State : as, on the other hand, with them 
 alone rests the order and happiness of a State. If we then 
 really mean that our guardians are to be the saviours and not 
 the destroyers of the State, and the advocate of the other view 
 is talking of peasants at a festival, enjoying a life of rev- 
 elry, rather than fulfilling the duties of citizens, we mean dif- 
 ferent things, and he is speaking of something which is not a 
 State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing 
 our guardians we look to their greatest happiness, or whether 
 this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State 
 as a whole. But if so, the guardians and auxiliaries, and all 
 others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do 
 their own work in the best way ; and then the whole State 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 431 
 
 growing up in a noble order, the several classes will only have 
 to receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to 
 them. 
 
 I think that you are quite right. The Republic, ii. 243. 
 State, unity in the. 
 
 The State may increase to any size which is consistent 
 
 with unity ; that, I think, is the limit. 
 
 Very good, he said ; 
 
 Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be 
 conveyed to our guardians, that our city is to be neither 
 large nor small, but of such a size as is consistent with unity. 
 
 And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which 
 we impose upon them. 
 
 And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before, is 
 lighter still, I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the 
 guardians when inferior, and of elevating the offspring of the 
 lower classes, when naturally superior, into the rank of guar- 
 dians. The intention was, that, in the case of the citizens gen- 
 erally, we should put each individual man to the use for which 
 nature designed him, and then every man would do his own 
 business, and be one and not many, and the whole city would be 
 one and not many. 
 
 Yes, he said ; there will be even less difficulty in that. 
 
 These things, my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be 
 supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care 
 be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing, a thing, 
 however, which I would rather call not great, but enough for 
 our purpose. 
 
 What may that be ? he asked. 
 
 Education, I said, and nurture. For if our citizens are well 
 educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their 
 way through all this as well as other matters. The Republic, 
 ii. 247. 
 
 State, courage in the. See Courage, etc. 
 State, highest good in the. See Evil, etc. ; also Injustice. 
 State, ideal philosophers to be kings in the. See Rulers, etc. 
 State, philosophy in the. See Philosophy, etc. 
 State, weakness in the. 
 
 Where a body is weak the addition of a touch from with- 
 out may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no 
 external provocation, a commotion may arise within ; in the same 
 way where there is weakness in the State there is also likely 
 
432 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 to be illness, of which the occasion may be very slight, one 
 party introducing their democratical, the other their oligar- 
 chical allies, and the State falls sick, and is at war with her- 
 self and may be at times distracted, even when there is no ex- 
 ternal cause ? 
 
 Yes surely. 
 
 And then democracy comes into being after the poor have 
 conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing 
 some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of free- 
 dom and power ; and this is the form of government in which 
 the magistrates are commonly elected by lot. The Republic, 
 ii. 384. 
 State, physician for the. 
 
 Soc. If you and I were physicians, and were advising one 
 
 another that we were competent to practice as State-physicians, 
 should I not ask you, and would you not ask me, Well, but 
 how about Socrates himself, has he good health ? and was any 
 one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or free- 
 man ? And I should make the same inquiries about you. 
 And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citi- 
 zen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better 
 for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, 
 what an absurdity to think that we or any human being should 
 be so silly as to set up as a State-physician, and advise others 
 like ourselves to do the same, without having first practiced in 
 private, whether successfully or not, and acquired experience of 
 the art. Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar 
 when you are learning the potter's art ; which is a foolish 
 thing ? 
 
 Gal. True. Gorgias, iii. 105. 
 State, right and wrong determined by the. See Right. 
 State, education the foundation of the. See Education, etc. 
 State, divine bonds in the. See Divine, etc. 
 State, actual and ideal. 
 
 Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way 
 
 hither in the search after justice and injustice. 
 
 True, he replied ; but what of this ? 
 
 I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, 
 we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of 
 absolute justice; or may we be satisfied with an approximation, 
 and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is 
 to be found in other men ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 The approximation will be enough. 
 
 And we inquired into the nature of absolute justice, and into 
 the character of the perfectly just nlan and the possibility of his 
 existence, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust only that we 
 might have an ideal. We were to look at them in order that 
 we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness accord- 
 ing to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in 
 which we resembled them, not with any view of showing that 
 they could exist in fact. 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 How would a painter be the worse painter because, after 
 having painted with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beau- 
 tiful man, he was unable to show that any such man could ever 
 have existed ? 
 
 He would not. 
 
 Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State ? 
 
 To be sure. 
 
 And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to 
 prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner 
 described ? 
 
 Surely not, he replied. 
 
 That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to 
 try and show how and under what condition the possibility is 
 highest, I must ask you, having this in view, to repeat your 
 former admissions. 
 
 What admissions ? 
 
 I want to know whether ideas are ever realized in fact ? 
 Is not speech more than action and must not the actual, what- 
 ever a man may think, fall short of the truth ? What do you 
 say? 
 
 I agree. 
 
 Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual 
 State will in every respect coincide with the ideal : if we are 
 only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we 
 proposed, you will admit that we have discovered the possibility 
 which you demand ; and will be contented will not you? 
 
 Yes, I will. The Republic, ii. 299. 
 State, a luxurious. 
 
 The question which you would have me consider is, not 
 
 only how a State, but how a luxurious State is to be created ; 
 and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we 
 shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice grow up. 
 28 
 
434 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 I am certainly of opinion that the true and healthy constitution 
 of the State is the one which I have described. But if you 
 wish to see the State in a fever I have no objection. For I 
 suppose that many will be dissatisfied with the simpler way of 
 life. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other fur- 
 niture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, 
 and cakes, not of one sort only, but in profusion and variety ; 
 we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first 
 speaking, such as houses and clothes and shoes ; and the arts of 
 the painter and embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and 
 gold and ivory and other materials of the arts will be required. 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 Then we must enlarge our borders ; for the original healthy 
 State is too small. Now will the city have to fill and swell 
 with a multitude of callings which are not required by any 
 natural want ; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, 
 of whom one large class have to do with postures and colors, 
 another are musicians ; there will be poets and their attendant 
 train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors ; also makers 
 of divers kinds of utensils, including women's ornaments. And 
 we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in re- 
 quest, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well 
 as confectioners and cooks ; and swineherds, too, who were not 
 needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our 
 State, but are needed now ? They must not be forgotten : and 
 there will be hosts of animals, if people are to eat them. 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And living in this way we shall have much greater need of 
 physicians than before ? 
 
 Much greater. 
 
 And the country which was enough to support the original 
 inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough ? 
 
 Quite true. 
 
 Then a slice of our neighbor's land will be wanted by us for 
 pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like 
 ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give them- 
 selves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth ? 
 
 That, Socrates, will be unavoidable. 
 
 And then we shall go to war, Glaucon, that will be the 
 next thing. 
 
 So we shall, he replied. 
 
 Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 435 
 
 harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered 
 war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of 
 almost all the evils in States, private as well as public. 
 
 Undoubtedly. The Republic, ii. 194. 
 State, what most conduces to the excellence of the. 
 
 Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own 
 
 business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and 
 again, and many others have said the same. 
 
 Yes, we said so. 
 
 Then this doing in a certain way one's own business may be 
 assumed to be justice. Do you know why ? 
 
 I do not, and should like to be told. 
 
 Because I think that this alone remains in the State when 
 the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are 
 abstracted ; and this is the ultimate cause and condition of the 
 existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also 
 their preservative ; and we were saying that if the three were 
 discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one. 
 
 That follows of necessity. 
 
 Still, I said, if a question should arise as to which of these 
 four qualities contributed most by their presence to the excel- 
 lence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, 
 or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law 
 ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watch- 
 fulness in the rulers would claim the palm, or whether this 
 which I am about to mention, and which is found in children 
 and women, bond and free, artisan, ruler, subject, is not the one 
 which conduces most to the excellence of the State, this 
 quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not be- 
 ing a busybody, the question would not be easily determined. 
 
 Certainly, he replied, to answer the question would not be 
 easy. 
 
 Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own 
 work appears to compete with the other virtues of wisdom, tem- 
 perance, and courage? 
 
 Yes, he said. 
 
 And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice ? 
 
 Exactly. 
 
 Look at the matter in another light. Are not the rulers in 
 a State those to whom you would intrust the office of de- 
 termining causes? 
 Certainly. 
 
436 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 And they will act on the principle that individuals are neither 
 to take what is another's, nor to be deprived of what is their 
 own. 
 
 Yes ; that will be their principle. 
 
 "Which is a just principle ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 Then on this view, also, justice will be admitted to be the 
 having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him ? 
 
 That is true 
 
 Let us not, I said, be over-positive as yet ; but if, on trial, 
 this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as 
 in the State, then there will be no longer any room for doubt ; 
 if not, there must be another inquiry. Let us, however, finish 
 the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under 
 the impression that, if we could first examine justice on the 
 larger scale, there would be less difficulty in recognizing her in 
 the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, 
 and accordingly we constructed one, as good a one as we could, 
 knowing well that in the good State justice would be surely 
 found. Let us now apply what we discovered there to the 
 individual, and if they agree, we are satisfied ; or, if there be a 
 difference in the individual, we will come back to the State 
 and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two 
 when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which 
 justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed 
 we will fix in our souls. 
 
 That is reasonable ; and let us do as you say. The Re- 
 public^ ii. 258. 
 State, an allegory of the. 
 
 1 perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having 
 
 plunged me into such a hopeless discussion ; and now you shall 
 hear the parable in order that you may judge better of the 
 meagreness of my imagination : for the treatment which the 
 the best men experience from their States is so grievous that no 
 single thing on earth can be compared with them ; and there- 
 fore if I would defend them I must have recourse to fiction, 
 and make a compound of many things, like the fabulous unions 
 of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine, then, 
 a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and 
 stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a 
 similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not 
 much better. Now the sailors are quarreling with one another 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 437 
 
 about the steering ; every one is of opinion that he ought to 
 steer, though he has never learned and cannot tell who taught 
 him or when he learned, and will even assert that the art of 
 navigation cannot be taught, and is ready to cut in pieces him 
 who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, and do 
 all that they can to make him commit the helm to them ; and if 
 he refuses them and others prevail, they kill the others or throw 
 them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's 
 senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take 
 possession of the ship and make themselves at home with the 
 stores ; and thus, eating and drinking, they continue their voy- 
 age with such success as might be expected of them. Him 
 who is their partisan and zealous in the design of getting the 
 ship out of the captain's hands into their own, whether by force 
 or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, 
 able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man and call him a 
 good-for-nothing ; but they have not even a notion that the 
 true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky 
 and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he 
 intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship ; 
 while at the same time he must and will be the steerer, 
 whether other people like or not ; and they think that to com- 
 bine the exercise of command with the steerer's art is impossi- 
 ble. Now in vessels which are thus circumstanced, and among 
 sailors of this class, how will the true pilot be regarded ? Will 
 he not be called by the mutineers a prater, a star-gazer, a good- 
 for-nothing ? 
 
 Of course, said Adeimantus. 
 
 I do not suppose, I said, that you would care to hear the in- 
 terpretation of the figure, which is an allegory of the true phi- 
 losopher in his relation to the State ; for you understand 
 already. 
 
 Certainly. The Republic, ii. 314. 
 State, well ordered, a waking reality. 
 
 You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention 
 
 of the legislator ; he did not aim at making any one class in 
 the State happy above the rest ; the happiness was to be in the 
 whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion 
 and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and there- 
 fore benefactors of one another ; to this end he created them, 
 not that they should please themselves, but they were to be his 
 instruments in binding up the State. 
 

 438 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 True, he said, I had forgotten. 
 
 Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in com- 
 pelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others ; 
 we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their 
 class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics : and this 
 is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and 
 the government would rather not have them. Now the wild 
 plant which owes culture to nobody, has nothing to pay for 
 culture. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers 
 of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and 
 have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have 
 been educated, and you are better able to share in the double 
 duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go 
 down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of 
 seeing in the dark ; for all is habit ; and by accustoming your- 
 selves you will see ten thousand times better than the dwellers 
 in the den, and you will know what the images are, and of 
 what they are images, because you have seen the beautiful and 
 just and good in their truth. And thus the order of our State 
 and of' yours will be a reality, and not a dream only, as the 
 order of States too often is ; for in most of them men are 
 fighting with one another about shadows and are distracted in 
 the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. 
 Whereas the truth is, that the State in which the rulers are 
 most reluctant to govern is best and most quietly governed, and 
 the State in which they are most willing, the worst. 
 
 Quite true, he replied. 
 
 And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to share in 
 turn the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the 
 greater part of their time with one another in the heaven of 
 ideas ? 
 
 Impossible, he answered ; for they are just men, and the 
 commands which we impose upon them are just ; there can be 
 no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern neces- 
 sity and not like our present ministers of State. 1 The Repub- 
 lic, ii. 346. 
 State, the corrupting art of the advocate in the. 
 
 There are many noble things in human life, but to most 
 
 of them attach evils which corrupt and spoil them. Is not 
 justice noble which has been the civilizer of humanity ? How 
 then can the advocate of justice be other than noble ? And 
 1 For the remainder of this thought see Office-Seekers. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 439 
 
 yet upon this profession which is presented under the fair name 
 of science, has come an evil reputation. In the first place, we 
 are told that by ingenious pleas and the help of an advocate, 
 the law enables a man to win a particular cause, whether just 
 or unjust ; and that both the art and the power of speech 
 which is thereby imparted are at the service of him who is 
 willing to pay for them. Now, in our State this so-called art, 
 whether really an art or only an experience and practice desti- 
 tute of any art, ought if possible never to come into existence, 
 or if existing among us should listen to the request of the leg- 
 islator and go away into another land, and not speak contrary 
 to justice. If the offenders obey we say no more ; but if they 
 disobey let them hear the voice of the law : If any one thinks 
 that he will pervert the power of justice in the minds of the 
 judges, and unseasonably litigate or advocate, let any one who 
 likes indict him for malpractices of law and dishonest advo- 
 cacy, and let him be judged in the court of select judges ; and 
 if he be convicted let the court determine whether he may 
 be supposed to act from a love of money or from contentious- 
 ness. And if he be supposed to act from contentiousness, the 
 court shall fix a time during which he shall not be allowed to 
 institute or plead a cause ; and if he be supposed to act as he 
 does from love of money, in case he be a stranger he shall 
 leave the country, and never return under penalty of death ; 
 but if he be a citizen he shall die, because he is a lover of 
 money, however gained ; and equally, if he be judged to have 
 acted more than once from contentiousness, he shall die. 
 Laws, iv. 449. 
 State, the order of the. 
 
 Aih. Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are 
 
 not the younger guardians, who are chosen for their natural 
 gifts, placed in the head of the State, having their souls all full 
 of eyes, with which they look about the whole city? They 
 keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the memory, 
 and inform the elders of all that happens in the city; and 
 those whom we compared to the mind, because they have many 
 wise thoughts that is to say, the old men take counsel, 
 and making use of the younger- men as their ministers, and ad- 
 vising with them, in this way both together truly preserve the 
 whole State Shall this be the order of our State, or shall 
 we have some other order ? Shall we say that they are all 
 alike the owners of the State, and not merely individuals 
 
440 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 among them, who have had the most careful training and 
 education ? 
 
 die. That, my good sir, is impossible. 
 
 Ath. Then we ought to ' proceed to some more exact train- 
 ing than that which has preceded 
 
 Cle. I bow to your authority, Stranger : let us proceed in 
 the way which you propose. 
 
 Ath. Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians 
 of our divine state to perceive, in the first place, what that 
 principle is which is the same in all the four the same, as 
 we affirm, in courage and in temperance, and in justice and in 
 prudence, and which being one, we call, as we ought, by the 
 single name of virtue. To this, my friends, we will, if you 
 please, hold fast, and not let go until we have sufficiently ex- 
 plained what that is to which we are to look, whether to be 
 regarded as one or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. 
 Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot 
 tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one ? Certainly, if 
 you will take our advice, we shall in some way contrive that 
 this principle has a place amongst us ; but if you have made 
 up your mind that we should let the matter alone, we will. 
 Laws, iv. 475. 
 State, heroes who have died for the. 
 
 Such were the actions of the men who are here interred, 
 
 and of others who have died on behalf of their country ; many 
 and glorious things I have told of them, and there are yet 
 many more and more glorious things remaining to be told, 
 which many days and nights would not suffice to tell. Let them 
 not be forgotten, and let every man remind their descendants 
 that they also are soldiers who must not desert the ranks of 
 their ancestors, or fall behind from cowardice. Even as I ex- 
 hort you this day, and in all future time, and on every occasion 
 on which I meet with any of you, I shall continue to remind 
 and exhort you, O ye sons of heroes, that you strive to be the 
 bravest of men. And I think that I ought now to repeat to 
 you what your fathers desired to have said to you who are 
 their survivors, when they went out to battle, in case anything 
 happened to them. I will tell ^ou what I heard them say, and 
 what, if they had only speech, they would fain be saying, judg- 
 ing from what they then said. And you must imagine that 
 you hear them saying what I now repeat to you. 
 
 Sons, the event proves that your fathers were brave men ; 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 441 
 
 for we might have lived dishonorably, but have preferred to 
 die honorably rather than bring you and your children into 
 disgrace, and rather than dishonor our fathers and forefathers ; 
 considering that life is not life to one who is a dishonor to his 
 race, and that to such an one neither men nor Gods are 
 friendly, either while he is on the earth or after death in the 
 world below. Remember our words, then, and whatever is 
 your aim let virtue be the condition of the attainment of your 
 aim, and know that without this all possessions and pursuits 
 are dishonorable and evil. For neither does wealth bring 
 honor to the owner, if he be a coward ; of such an one the 
 wealth belongs to another, and not to himself. Nor does 
 beauty and strength of body, when dwelling in a base and 
 cowardly man, appear comely, but the reverse of comely, mak- 
 ing the possessor more conspicuous, and manifesting forth his 
 cowardice. And all knowledge, when separated from justice 
 and virtue, is seen to be cunning and not wisdom ; wherefore 
 make this your first and last and only and everlasting desire, 
 that if possible you may exceed not only us but all your an- 
 cestors in virtue ; and know that to excel you in virtue only 
 brings us shame, but that to be excelled by you is a source of 
 joy to us. And we shall most likely be defeated, and you will 
 most likely be victors in the contest, if you learn so to order 
 your lives as not to misuse or waste the reputation of your an- 
 cestors, knowing that to a man who has any self-respect, noth- 
 ing is more dishonorable than to be honored, not for his own 
 sake, but on account of the reputation of his ancestors. The 
 honor of parents is a fair and noble treasure to their posterity, 
 but to have the use of a treasure of wealth and honor, and to 
 leave none to your successors, because you have neither money 
 nor reputation of your own, is alike base and dishonorable. 
 And if you follow our precepts you will be received by us as 
 friends, when the hour of destiny brings you hither ; but if 
 you neglect our words and are disgraced in your lives, no one 
 will receive you friendly. This is the message which is to be 
 delivered to our children. Menexenus, iv. 576. 
 State, the mother of her citizens. 
 
 To the State we would say : Let her take care of our 
 
 parents and sons, educating the one in principles of order, and 
 worthily cherishing the old age of the other. But we know 
 that she will of her own accord take care of them, and does 
 not need exhortation from us. 
 
442 'PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 
 
 These, O ye children and parents of the dead, are the words 
 which they bid us proclaim to you, and which I do proclaim to 
 you with the utmost good-will. And on their behalf I be- 
 seech you, the children, to imitate your fathers, and you, par- 
 ents, to be of good cheer about yourselves ; for we will nour- 
 ish your age, and take care of you both publicly and privately 
 in any place in which one of us may meet one of you who are 
 the parents of the dead. And the care which the city shows 
 you yourselves know ; for she has made provision by law con- 
 cerning the parents and children of those who die in war ; and 
 the highest authority is specially intrusted with the duty of 
 watching over them above all other citizens, in order to see 
 that there is no wrong done to them. She herself takes part 
 in the nurture of the children, desiring as far as it is possible 
 that their orphanhood may not be felt by them ; she is a par- 
 ent to them while they are children, and when they arrive at 
 the age of manhood she sends them to their several duties, 
 clothing them in armor ; she displays to them and recalls to 
 their minds the pursuits of their fathers, and puts into their 
 hands the instruments of their fathers' virtues ; for the sake of 
 the omen, she would have them begin and go to rule over their 
 own houses arrayed in the strength and arms of their fathers. 
 And she never ceases honoring the dead every year, celebrat- 
 ing in public the rites which are proper to each and all ; and 
 in addition to this, holding gymnastic and equestrian festivals, 
 and musical festivals of every sort. She is to the dead in the 
 place of a son and heir, and to their sons in place of a father, 
 and to their parents and elder kindred in the place of a pro- 
 tector ever and always caring for them. Considering this, 
 you ought to bear your calamity the more gently : for thus 
 you will be most endeared to the dead and to the living, and 
 your sorrows will heal and be healed. And now do you and 
 all, having lamented the dead together in the usual manner, go 
 your ways. Menexenus, iv. 578. 
 States destroyed by ignorance. See Ignorance, etc. 
 
 - Ath. Consider what is really the greatest ignorance. I 
 should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree 
 with me about this : for my opinion is 
 
 Gle. What? 
 
 Ath. That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that 
 which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves 
 and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHT^. 443 
 
 lis disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judg- 
 ment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst igno- 
 rance ; and the greatest too, because affecting the great mass 
 of the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure and 
 pain in the individual, is like the mass or populace in a State. 
 And when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or 
 reason, which are her natural lords, that I call folly, just as in 
 the State, when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and 
 the laws ; or, again, in the individual, when fair reasonings 
 have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather 
 the reverse of good. All these cases I term the worst igno- 
 rance, whether in individuals or in States. I am not speaking, 
 Stranger, as you will understand, of the ignorance of handi- 
 craftsmen. 
 
 Cle. Yes, my friend, we understand and agree. 
 
 Aih. Let this, then, in the first place declare and affirm that 
 the citizen who does riot know these things ought never to 
 have any kind of authority intrusted to him ; he must be stig- 
 matized as ignorant, even though he be skillful in calculation 
 and versed in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental 
 dexterity ; and the opposite are to be called wise, even al- 
 though, in the words of the proverb, they know neither how 
 to read nor how to swim ; and to them, as to men of sense, 
 authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can 
 there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no har- 
 mony ? There is none ; but the noblest and greatest of har- 
 monies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom ; and of 
 this he is a partaker who lives according to reason ; whereas 
 he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and 
 the opposite of the saviour of the State : he is ignorant of 
 political wisdom. Laws, iv. 218. 
 
 Statesmen, are they good teachers of virtue? See Virtue, etc. 
 Any. Have there not been many good men in this city ? 
 
 Soc. Yes, certainly, Anytus : and many good statesmen also 
 there always have been, and there are still, in the city of Ath- 
 ens. But the question is whether they were also good teachers of 
 their own virtue ; not whether there are, or have been, good 
 men, but whether virtue can ^be taught, is the question which 
 we have been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the 
 good men of our own and of other times knew how to impart 
 to others that virtue which they had themselves ; or is this vir- 
 tue incapable of being communicated or imparted by one man 
 
444 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 to another? That is the question which I and Meno have 
 been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way. Would 
 you not admit that Themistocles was a good man ? 
 
 Any. Certainly ; no man better. 
 
 Soc. And must not he then have been a good teacher, if 
 any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue ? 
 
 Any. Yes, certainly, if he -wanted to be that. 
 
 Soc. But would he not have wanted ? He would, at any 
 rate, have desired to make his own son a good man and a gen- 
 tleman ; he could not have been jealous of him, or have inten- 
 tionally abstained from imparting to him his own virtue. Did 
 you never hear that he made Cleopharitus, who was his son, a 
 famous horseman? he would stand upright on horseback and 
 hurl a javelin ; and many other marvelous things he could do 
 which his father had him taught ; and in anything which the 
 skill of a master could teach him he was well trained. Have 
 you not heard from our elders of this ? 
 
 Any. I have. 
 
 Soc. Then no one could say that his son showed any want 
 of capacity? 
 
 Any. Possibly not. 
 
 Soc. But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hear- 
 ing that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, was a wise or 
 good man, as his father was? 
 
 Any. I have certainly never heard that. 
 
 Soc. And if virtue could have been taught, would his father 
 Themistocles have sought to train him in minor accomplish- 
 ments, and allowed him who, as you must remember, was his 
 own son, to be no better than his neighbors in those qualities 
 in which he himself excelled ? 
 
 Any. Indeed, indeed I think not. 
 
 Soc. Here, then, is a teacher of virtue whom you admit to 
 be among the best men of the past. Meno, i. 268. 
 Statesmen, called divine. 
 
 Soc. Not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, 
 
 did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke gov- 
 ern States. And this was the reason why they were unable to 
 make others like themselves, because their virtue was not 
 grounded on knowledge. 
 
 Men. That is probably true, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which 
 remains is that statesmen must have guided States by right 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 445 
 
 opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion ; for 
 diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know 
 not what they say. 
 
 Men. Very true. 
 
 Soc. And may we not, Meno, truly call those men divine 
 who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand 
 deed and word? 
 
 Men. Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Then we shall also be right in calling those divine 
 whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, 
 as well as all poets. Yes, and statesmen, above all, may be said 
 to be divine and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, 
 in which condition they say many grand things, not knowing 
 what they say. 
 
 Men. Yes. 
 
 Soc. And the women too, Meno, call good men divine ; and 
 the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say " that he is a 
 divine man." 
 
 Men. And I think, Socrates, that they are right ; although 
 very likely our friend Anytus may take offense at the word. 
 Meno, i. 275. 
 
 Statesmen and politicians distinguished. See Politicians, etc. 
 Strangers, treatment of. 
 
 In his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a 
 
 contract is a most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs 
 of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of 
 God, than the wrongs done to citizens ; for the stranger having 
 no kindred and friends, is more to be pitied by Gods and men. 
 Wherefore, also, he who is most able to assist him is most zeal- 
 ous in his cause ; and he who is most able is the divinity and 
 God of the stranger, who follows in the train of Zeus, the God 
 of strangers. And for this reason, he who has a spark of cau- 
 tion in him, will do his best to pass through life without sinning 
 against the stranger. And of offenses committed, whether 
 against strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against suppliants 
 is the greatest. For the God who witnessed to the agreement 
 made with the suppliant, becomes in a special manner the guar- 
 dian of the sufferer ; and he will certainly not suffer unavenged. 
 Laws, iv. 255. 
 
 Strength, physical, inferior to persuasion. See Legislation and Per- 
 suasion. 
 
446 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Style, mixed and unmixed. 
 
 Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the 
 
 course of narration comes on some saying or action of another 
 good man, I should imagine that he will like to personate 
 him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of imitation : he will 
 be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is 
 acting firmly and wisely ; in a less degree when his steps falter, 
 owing to sickness or love, or again from intoxication or any 
 other mishap. But when he comes to a character which is un- 
 worthy of him, he will not make a study of that ; he will dis- 
 dain his inferiors, and will wear their likeness, if at all, for a 
 moment only when they are doing some good ; at other times 
 he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practiced, 
 nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser 
 models ; he feels that the serious use of such an art would be 
 beneath him, and his mind revolts at it. 
 
 That is what I should expect, he replied. 
 
 Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have 
 illustrated out of Homer, that is to say, his style will be both 
 imitative and narrative ; but there will be very little of the 
 former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree ? 
 
 Certainly, he said ; that is the model which such a speaker 
 must necessarily take. 
 
 But another sort of character will narrate anything, and the 
 worse he is the more unscrupulous he will be ; nothing will be 
 beneath him : moreover, he will be ready to imitate anything, 
 not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large 
 audience. As I was just now saying, he will attempt to repre- 
 sent the roll of thunder, the rattle of wind and hail, or the 
 creaking of wheels and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, 
 pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments ; also he will bark 
 like a dog, bleat like a sheep, and crow like a cock ; his entire 
 art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will 
 be very little narration. 
 
 That, he said, will be his mode of speaking. 
 
 These, then, are the two kinds of style ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is 
 simple and has but slight changes ; and if the harmony and 
 rhythm* are also chosen for their simplicity, the result is that 
 the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the 
 same in style, and keeps within the limits of a single harmony 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 447 
 
 (for the changes are not great), and also keeps pretty nearly 
 the same rhythm? 
 
 That is quite true, he said. 
 
 Whereas the other style requires all sorts of harmonies and 
 all sorts of rhythms, if the music is to be expressive of the 
 variety and complexity of the words ? 
 
 That is also perfectly true, he replied. 
 
 And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, com- 
 prehend all poetry, and every form of expression in words ? 
 No one can say anything except in one or other of them, or in 
 both together? 
 
 They include all, he said. 
 
 And shall we receive one or both of the two pure styles ? or 
 would you include the mixed ? 
 
 I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue. 
 
 Yes, I said, Adeimantus ; but the mixed stylei is also very 
 charming : and indeed the pantomimic, which is the oppo- 
 site of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style 
 with children and their instructors, and with the world in 
 general. 
 
 I do not deny it. 
 
 But I suppose you mean to say that such a style is unsuita- 
 ble to our State, in which human nature is not twofold or mani- 
 fold, for one man plays one part only ? 
 
 Yes ; quite unsuitable. The Republic, ii. 220. 
 Substitution and succession in life. See Unity, etc., the greatest. 
 Suffering, community of. See Evil, etc. 
 Suffering evil, less than doing it. See Injustice. 
 Suffering, intermediate state between pleasure and. See Interme- 
 diate, etc. 
 ^Sufficiency of the good. 
 
 Soc. And is not and was not this a further point which 
 
 was conceded between us 
 
 Pro. What was the point? 
 
 Soc. That the good differs from all other things ? 
 
 Pro. In what way ? 
 
 Soc. In that the being who possesses good always, every- 
 where, and in all things, has the most perfect sufficiency, and 
 is never in need of anything else. 
 
 Pro. Exactly. 
 
 Soc. And did we not endeavor to make an ideal division of 
 them into two distinct lives, so that pleasure was wholly ex- 
 
448 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 eluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part 
 whatever in pleasure ? 
 
 Pro. That we did. 
 
 Soc. And did we think that either of them alone would be 
 sufficient ? 
 
 Pro. Certainly not. 
 
 Soc. And if we erred in any 'point, then let any one who 
 will, take up the inquiry again, and assuming memory and wis- 
 dom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same 
 class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or 
 acquire, I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, 
 if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any con- 
 sciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, however mo- 
 mentary, of the feeling, but would he desire to have anything 
 at all, if these were wanting to him ? And about wisdom I 
 ask the same question ; can you conceive that any one would 
 choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather 
 than having a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure de- 
 void of wisdom, rather than having a certain degree of wis- 
 dom? 
 
 Pro. Certainly not, Socrates ; but why repeat such ques- 
 tions any more? Philebus, iii. 201. 
 
 "Summum Bonum" in the State. See Evil, the greatest, etc., and 
 
 Good, greatest. 
 
 Sun and stars without soul. See Soul, etc. 
 Superhuman knowledge. See Knowledge. 
 Suspicious character, a. 
 
 Your cunning and suspicious character, who has com- 
 mitted many crimes and fancies himself to be a master in 
 wickedness when he is among men who are like himself, is 
 wonderful in his precautions against others, because he judges 
 of them by himself: but when he gets into the company of 
 men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to 
 be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable suspicion ; he can- 
 not recognize an honest man, because he has nothing in himself 
 which will tell him what an honest man is like ; at the same 
 time, as the bad are more numerous than the good, and he 
 meets with them oftener, he thinks himself and others think 
 him rather wise than foolish. The Republic, ii. 234. 
 Symbofs, the starry heavens are. See Heavenly bodies. 
 Symbols, metallic, of races. See Metallic, etc. 
 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 449 
 
 Talents, natural. 
 
 Come, now, and we will ask you a question : when you 
 
 said that one man has natural gifts and another not, was this 
 your meaning ? that the former will acquire a thing easily 
 which the latter will have a difficulty in acquiring ; a little 
 learning will lead the one to discover a great deal ; whereas 
 the other, after a great deal of learning and application, will 
 only forget what he has learned ; or again, you may mean, that 
 the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while 
 the body of the other is at war with his mind would these 
 be the sort of differences which distinguish the man of capac- 
 ity from the man who is wanting in capacity? 
 
 The existence of such differences, he said, will be univer- 
 sally allowed. The Republic, ii. 279. 
 Talking, idle. See Idle. 
 Taste, what is a true. See Life, the nobler. 
 Teachers, skillful and unskillful. 
 
 As Lysimachus and Melesias, in their anxiety to improve 
 
 the minds of their sons, have asked our advice about them, we 
 too should tell them who our teachers were, if we say that we 
 have had any, and prove them to be men of merit and expe- 
 rienced trainers of the minds of youth and really our teachers. 
 Or if any of us says that he has no teacher, but that he has 
 works to show of his own ; then he should point out to them, 
 what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generally ac- 
 knowledged to have improved. But if he can show neither 
 teachers nor works, then he should tell them to look out for 
 others ; and not run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, 
 which is the most formidable accusation that can be brought 
 against any one by those nearest to him. As for myself, Lysim- 
 achus and Melesias, I am the first to confess that I have never 
 had a teacher ; although I have always from my earliest youth 
 desired to have one. But I am too poor to give money to the 
 Sophists, who are the only professors of moral improvement ; 
 and to this day I have never been able to discover the art my- 
 self, though I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches may 
 have learned or discovered it ; for they are far wealthier than 
 I am, and may therefore have learnt of others. And they are 
 older too ; so that they have had more time to make the discov- 
 ery. And I really believe that they are able to educate a 
 man ; for unless they had been confident in their own knowl- 
 edge, they would never have sooken thus decidedly of the pur- 
 
450 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 
 
 suits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I 
 repose confidence in both of them ; but I am surprised to find 
 that they differ from one another. And therefore, Lysima- 
 chus, as Laches suggested that you should detain me, and not 
 let me go until I answered, I in turn earnestly beseech and ad- 
 vise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and question them. I 
 would have you say to them : Socrates avers that he has 
 no knowledge of the matter, he is unable to decide which 
 of you speaks truly ; neither discoverer nor student is he of 
 anything of the kind. But you, Laches and Nicias, should 
 either of you tell us who is the most skillful educator whom 
 you have ever known ; and whether you invented the art 
 yourselves, or learned of another ; and if you learned, who 
 were your respective teachers, and who were their brothers in 
 the art ; and then, if you are too much occupied in politics to 
 teach us yourselves, let us go to them, and present them with 
 gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in the hope that 
 they may be induced to take charge of all our families, in or- 
 der that they may not grow up inferior, and disgrace their an- 
 cestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverers in that 
 field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are the} 7 " who, 
 having been inferior persons, have become under your care 
 good and noble ? For if this is your first* attempt at educa- 
 tion, there is a danger that you may be trying the experiment 
 not on the " vile corpus " of a Carian slave, but on your own 
 sons, or the sons of your friend, and as the proverb says, 
 " Break the large vessel in learning to make p@ts." Laches, 
 i. 78. 
 
 Teachers, lawyers not. See Lawyers, etc. 
 Temperance and modesty. See Modesty, etc. 
 Temperance and justice. See Justice, etc. 
 Temperance, harmony of. See Harmony, etc. 
 Temperate man, the. 
 
 Ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has 
 
 the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or 
 spirited principle to be the subject and ally ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and 
 gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining 
 the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and 
 soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion with harmony 
 and rhythm? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 451 
 
 Quite true, he said. 
 
 And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having 
 learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the 
 concupiscent part of every man, which is the largest and most 
 insatiable ; over this they will set a guard, lest waxing great 
 with the fullness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, and no 
 longer confined to her own sphere, the concupiscent soul should 
 attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born 
 subjects, and overturn the whole life of man ? 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
 The two will be the defenders of the whole soul and the 
 whole body against attacks from without; the one counseling, 
 and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously exe- 
 cuting his commands and counsels. 
 
 True. 
 
 And he is to be deemed courageous in whom the element of 
 spirit holds fast in pain and in pleasure the command of reason 
 about which he ought or ought not to fear ? 
 
 Right, he replied. 
 
 And he is wise who has in him that little part which rules 
 and gives orders ; that part being supposed to have a knowl- 
 edge of what is for the interest of each and all of the three 
 other parts ? 
 
 Assuredly. 
 
 And would you not say that he is temperate who has these 
 same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling 
 principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and de- 
 sire, are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not 
 rebel ? 
 
 Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance, 
 whether in the State or individual. The Republic, ii. 268. 
 Temperate and intemperate life, the. 
 
 Let us say that the temperate life is one kind of life, and 
 
 the rational another, and the courageous another, and the 
 healthful another ; and to these four let us oppose four other 
 lives, the foolish, the cowardly, the intemperate, the dis- 
 eased. He who knows the temperate life will describe it as in 
 all things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures, and 
 placid desires and loves not insane ; whereas the intemperate 
 life is impetuous in all things, and has violent pains and pleas- 
 ures, and vehement and stinging desires, and loves utterly in- 
 sane ; and in the temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains 
 
452 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 and in the intemperate life the pains exceed the pleasures in 
 greatness and number and intensity. Hence one of the two 
 lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other 
 mere painful, and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly 
 choose to live intemperately. And if this is true, the inference 
 clearly is that no man is voluntarily intemperate ; but that the 
 whole multitude of men lack temperance in their lives, either 
 from ignorance or from want of self-control or both. And the 
 same holds of the diseased and healthy life ; they both have 
 pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasure exceeds the 
 pain, and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure. Now, our 
 intention in choosing the lives is not that the painful should 
 exceed, but the life in which pain is exceeded by pleasure we 
 determine to be the more pleasant life. And we should say 
 that the temperate life has the elements both of pleasure and 
 pain fewer and minuter and less concentrated than the intem- 
 perate. Laws, iv. 259. 
 Temperate man, duty of the. 
 
 And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both 
 
 in relation to Gods and to men ; for he would not be temperate 
 if he did not ? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his re- 
 lation to other men he will do what is just ; and in his relation 
 to the Gods he will do what is holy ; and he who does what is 
 just and holy cannot be other than just and holy ? Very true. 
 Arid he must be courageous, for the duty of a temperate man is 
 not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, 
 whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to 
 endure when he ought ; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate 
 man being as we have described, also just and courageous and 
 holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the 
 good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he 
 does : and he who does well must of necessity be happy and 
 blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable : now this 
 latter is he whom you were applauding the intemperate, who 
 is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position which 
 I assert to be true, and if I am right then I affirm that he 
 who desires to be happy must pursue and practice temper- 
 ance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will 
 carry him ; he had better order his life so as not to need pun- 
 ishment. Gorgias, iii. 98. 
 Thought, boldness in. See Boldness. 
 Thought and speech. See Speech. 
 

 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 453 
 
 Time, science of. See Science. 
 
 Trade, ruining virtue. See Money, a ruler. 
 
 Trade, men of, their money-sting. See Business men. 
 
 Traditional forms adhered to. 
 
 Ath. Long ago in Egypt they appear to have recognized 
 the very principle of which we are now speaking that their 
 young citizens must be habituated to forms and strains of vir- 
 tue. These they fixed, and exhibited the patterns of them in 
 their temples ; and no painter or artist is allowed to innovate 
 upon them, or to leave the traditional forms and invent new 
 ones. To this day, no alteration is allowed either in these arts, 
 or in music at all. And you will find that their works of art 
 are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten 
 thousand years ago ; this is literally true and no exaggeration, 
 their ancient paintings and sculptures are not a whit better 
 or worse than the work of to-day, but are made with just the 
 same skill. 
 
 Cle. How extraordinary! 
 
 Ath. I should rather say, how wise and worthy of a great 
 legislator ! I know that other things in Egypt are not so good. 
 But what I am telling you about music is true and deserving 
 of consideration, because showing that a lawgiver may institute 
 melodies which have a natural truth and correctness without 
 any fear of failure. To do this, however, must be the work 
 of God, or of a divine person ; in Egypt they have a tradi- 
 tion that their ancient chants are the composition of the God- 
 dess Isis. And therefore, as I was saying, if a person could 
 only find in any way the natural melodies, he might confidently 
 embody them in a fixed and legal form. For the love of nov- 
 elty which arises out of pleasure in the new, and weariness of 
 the old, has not strength enough to vitiate the consecrated song 
 and dance, under the plea that they have become antiquated. 
 At any rate they are far from being antiquated in Egypt. 
 Laws, iv. 186. 
 
 Transformation of man. See Man, etc. 
 Truth, ridicule, no test of. See Ridicule. 
 
 Truthfulness must characterize the lover of learning. See Learn- 
 ing. 
 
 Truths, spiritual, uncertainty of. See Spiritual, etc. 
 Tyrant, produced from a protector. See Protector. 
 Tyrant and king distinguished. See King, 
 
454 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 Unity in the State. See State, unity, etc. 
 Unity and individuality. See Individuality, etc. 
 Unjust, misery of the. See Misery, etc. 
 
 Vanity of youth. See Self-conceit. 
 
 Virtue, can it be taught ? See Statesmen, are they good teachers f 
 
 The best and wisest of our'citizens are unable to impart 
 
 their political wisdom to others : as, for example, Pericles, the 
 father of these young men, who gave them excellent instruc- 
 tion in all that could be learned from masters, in his own de- 
 partment of politics neither taught them nor gave them 
 teachers, but they were allowed to wander at their own free- 
 will, in a sort of hope that they would light upon virtue of 
 their own accord. Or take another example : There was 
 Cleinias the younger brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom 
 this very same Pericles was the guardian ; and he being in 
 fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted 
 by Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in the house of 
 Ariphron to be educated ; but before six months had elapsed, 
 Ariphron sent him back, not knowing what to do with him. 
 And I could mention numberless other instances of persons 
 who were good themselves, and never yet made any one else 
 good, "Whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having 
 before me these examples, am inclined to think that virtue can- 
 not be taught. But then, again, when I listen to your words, I 
 am disposed to waver ; and I believe that there must be some- 
 thing in what you say, because I know that you have great ex- 
 perience, and learning, and invention. And I wish that you 
 would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that virtue 
 can be taught. Protagoras, i. 120. 
 Virtue, the gift of God. 
 
 Soc. To sum up our inquiry, the result seems to be, if 
 
 we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural 
 nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. 
 Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be 
 supposed to be among statesmen any one who is also the edu- 
 cator of statesmen. , And if there be such an one, he may be 
 said to be among the living what Tiresias was among the dead, 
 who " alone," according to Homer, " of those in the world 
 below has understanding ; but the rest flit as shades ; " and 
 he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among 
 shadows. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 455 
 
 Men. That is excellent, Socrates. 
 
 Soc. Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the 
 virtuous by the gift of God. Meno, i. 276. 
 Virtue, the basis and bond of love. See Love, etc. 
 Virtue and justice, rewards of. See Justice, etc. 
 Virtue, not by chance, but order. 
 
 - The virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instru- 
 ment or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to 
 them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth 
 and art which are imparted to them. Am I not right ? I main- 
 tain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent 
 on order or -arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which 
 makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? 
 That is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of 
 her own better than that which has no order of her own ? 
 Certainly. Gorgias, iii. 98. 
 
 Virtue, laws answering to. See Laws answering to, etc. 
 Virtue, the law-giver's aim. 
 
 Ath. Remember, my good friend, what I said at first about 
 
 the Cretan laws, that they looked to one thing only, and this, 
 as you both agreed, was war ; and I replied that such laws, in 
 so far as they tended to promote virtue, were good : but in 
 that they regarded a part only, and not the whole of virtue, I 
 disapproved of them. And now I hope that you in your turn 
 will follow and watch me if I legislate with a view to anything 
 but virtue, or only with a view to a part of virtue. For I 
 consider that the tr.ue law-giver, like an archer, aims only at 
 that on which some eternal beauty is always attending, and dis- 
 misses everything else, whether wealth or any other benefit, 
 when separated from virtue. Laws, iv. 233. 
 Voice, inner. See Inner. 
 
 War, women, and children. 
 
 You agree then, I said, that men and women are to have 
 
 a common way of life such as we have described common 
 education, common children ; and they are to watch over the 
 citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to 
 war ; they are to guard together, and to hunt together like 
 dogs ; and always and in all things women are to share with 
 the men ? And in so doing they will act for the best and will 
 not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the sexes. 
 I agree with you, he replied. 
 
456 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 The inquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a 
 community will be found possible as among other animals so 
 also among men and if possible, in what way possible ? 
 
 That, he said, is just the question which I was going to ask. 
 
 There is no difficulty I said, in seeing how war will be 
 carried on by them. 
 
 How? 
 
 Why, of course they will go on expeditions together ; and 
 will take with them any of their children who are strong 
 enough, that, like the children of artisans in general, they may 
 look on at the work, which they will have to do when they 
 are grown up ; and besides looking on they will be able to 
 help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and 
 mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' 
 boys look on and help, long before they touch the wheel ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And shall potters be more careful than our guardians in ed- 
 ucating their children and giving them the opportunity of see- 
 ing and practicing their duties ? 
 
 The notion would be ridiculous, he said. 
 
 There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with 
 other animals, the presence of their cubs will be the greatest 
 incentive to valor. 
 
 That is quite true, Socrates ; and yet if they are defeated 
 which may often happen in war, how great the danger is ! the 
 children will be lost as well as their parents, and the State will 
 never recover. 
 
 True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk? 
 
 I am far from saying that. 
 
 Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not run 
 the risk when there is a chance of their improvement ? 
 
 Clearly. The Republic, ii. 293. 
 War and discord. See Discord. 
 War, geometry in. See Geometry. 
 War of Gods and giants. See Essence, etc. 
 War, two kinds of. 
 
 Ath. Come, now, and let us all join in asking this ques- 
 tion oi Tyrtaeus : O most divine poet, we will say to him, the 
 excellent praise which you have bestowed on those who excel 
 in war sufficiently proves that you are wise and good, and I 
 ' and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnosus do, as I believe, entirely 
 agree with you. But we should like to be quite sure that we 
 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 457 
 
 are speaking of the same men ; tell us, then, do you agree with 
 us in thinking that there are two kinds of war ; or what would 
 you say ? A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no diffi- 
 culty in replying quite truly, that there are two kinds of war, 
 one which is universally called civil war and is, as we were 
 just now saying, of all wars the worst ; the other, as we should 
 all admit, in which we fall out with other- nations" who are of a 
 different race, is a far milder form of warfare. 
 
 Cle. Certainly, far milder. 
 
 Aih. Well, now, when you praise and blame war in this 
 high-flown strain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to 
 which kind of war are you referring ? I suppose that you 
 must mean foreign war, if I am to judge from expressions of 
 yours in which you say that you abominate those 
 
 " Who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near and strike at 
 their enemies.' 7 
 
 And we shall naturally go on to say to him, You, Tyrtaeus, 
 certainly appear to praise those who distinguish themselves in 
 external and foreign war ; and he must admit this. 
 
 Cle. Certainly. Laws, iv. tf& 9&> 
 War, expeditions of. 
 
 - Now for expeditions of war much consideration and many 
 laws are required ; the great principle of all is that no one of 
 either sex should be without a commander; nor should the 
 mind of any one be accustomed to do anything either in jest 
 or earnest of his own motion, but in war and in peace he 
 should look to and follow his leader, and in the least things be 
 under his guidance ; for example, he should stand or move, or 
 exercise, or wash, or take his meals, or get up in the night to 
 keep guard and deliver messages when he is bidden ; and in 
 the hour of danger he should not pursue and not retreat ex- 
 cept by order of his superior ; and in a word, not teach the 
 soul or accustom her to know or understand how to do any- 
 thing apart from others. Of all soldiers the life should be in 
 common and together ; there neither is nor ever will be a 
 higher, or better, or more scientific principle than this for the 
 attainment of salvation and victory in war. And from youth 
 upwards we ought to practice this habit of commanding others, 
 and of being commanded by others ; anarchy should have no 
 place in the life of man or of the beasts who are subject to 
 man. I may add that all dances ought to be performed with u 
 view to military excellence, and agility and ease should be c.ul- 
 
458 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 tivated with a similar view ; and also endurance of the want 
 of meats and drinks, and winter cold and summer heat, and 
 hard couches ; and, above* all, care should be taken not to. destroy 
 the natural qualities of the head and the feet by surrounding 
 them with extraneous coverings, and so hindering their natural 
 growth of hair and soles. For .these are the extremities, and 
 of all the parts of the body, whether they are preserved or not 
 is of the greatest consequence ; the one is the servant of the 
 whole body and the other the master in whom all the ruling 
 senses are by nature set. Let the young man, when I say 
 this, imagine that he hears the praises of the military life ; 
 and the law shall be as follows : He shall serve in war who is 
 enrolled or appointed to some special service, and if any one 
 wrongly absents himself, and without the leave of the generals, 
 he shall be indicted before the military commanders for fail- 
 ure of service when the army comes home. Laws, iv. 452. 
 Warriors, gentleness of. See Gentleness, etc. 
 "Warfare, naval. See Minos. 
 Wars, civil, how arising. 
 
 When a young man who has been brought up as we are just 
 
 now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones* 
 honey and has come to associate with fierce and dangerous nat- 
 ures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements 
 and varieties of pleasure, then, as you may imagine, the 
 change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into 
 the democratical. 
 
 Inevitably. 
 
 And as in the city like was helping like, and the change 
 was effected by an alliance from without assisting one division 
 of the citizens, so the young man also changes by a class of 
 desires from without assisting the unsatisfied desires within him, 
 that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin 
 and alike. 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical princi- 
 ple within him, whether the influence of friends or kindred, ad- 
 vising or rebuking him, then there arises a faction and an op- 
 posite faction, and the result is a civil war. 
 
 It must be so. The Republic, ii. 388. 
 Wealth and poverty equally deteriorating. 
 
 There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the 
 
 arts. 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 459 
 
 What are they ? 
 
 Wealth, I said, and poverty. 
 
 How do they act ? 
 
 The process is as follows : When a potter becomes rich he 
 no longer takes the same pains with his art ? 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 He grows more and more indolent and careless ? 
 
 Very true. 
 
 And the result is that he becomes a worse potter ? 
 
 Yes ; he greatly deteriorates. 
 
 But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and is unable 
 to buy tools or instruments, he will not work equally well him- 
 self, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally 
 well. 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 Then workmen, and also their works, are apt to degenerate 
 under the influence both of poverty and of wealth ? 
 
 That is evident. 
 
 Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, which the 
 guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city 
 unobserved. 
 
 What evils ? 
 
 Wealth, I said, and poverty ; for the one is the parent of 
 luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and vicious- 
 ness, and both of discontent. The Republic, ii. 245. 
 "Wickedness, the road to. 
 
 Ath. I should wish the citizen to be as receptive of virtue 
 
 as possible ; this will surely be the aim of the legislator in all 
 his laws is evident. 
 
 Cle. Certainly. 
 
 Ath. What I have been proposing appears to me to have 
 some use ; for a person will listen with more gentleness and 
 good-will to the precepts addressed to him by the legislator, 
 when his soul is not altogether unprepared to receive them. 
 Even a little done in the way of conciliation gains his ear, and 
 is always worth having. For there is no great inclination or 
 readiness on the part of mankind to be made as good, or as 
 quickly good, as possible. The case of the many proves the 
 wisdom of Hesiod, who says that the road to wickedness is 
 smooth and very short, and there is no need of perspiring : 
 
 " But before virtue the immortal Gods have placed the sweat of 
 labor, and long and steep is the way thither, and rugged at first 
 
460 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 but when you have reached the top, then, however difficult, it be- 
 comes easy. 
 
 Cle. Yes ; and he certainly speaks well. Laws, iv. 246. 
 "Wine, divers effect of. 
 
 Soc. The wine which I drink when I am in health, ap- 
 pears sweet and pleasant to me ? " 
 
 Theaet. True. 
 
 Soc. For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient 
 and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a percep- 
 tion of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the 
 perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue 
 percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of 
 and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and 
 to appear sweet to the healthy tongue. 
 
 Theaet. Certainly ; that has been already acknowledged. 
 
 Soc. But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon me as 
 if I were another and a different person ? 
 
 Theaet. Yes. 
 
 Soc. The combination of the draught of wine, and the Soc- 
 rates who is sick, produces quite another result which is the 
 sensation of bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and crea- 
 tion of bitterness in the wine, which becomes not bitterness but 
 bitter ; as I myself become not perception but percipient ? 
 
 Theaet. True. Theaetetus, iii. 360. 
 "Wine, forbidden. 
 
 Ath. I have first to add a crown to my discourse about 
 
 drink. 
 
 Gle. What more would you say ? 
 
 Ath. I should say that if a city seriously means to adopt this 
 practice of drinking, under due regulation and with a view to 
 the enforcement of temperance, and in like manner, and on 
 the same principle, will allow of other pleasures, designing to 
 gain the victory over them in this way all of them may be 
 used. But if the State makes drinking an amusement only, and 
 whoever likes may drink whenever he likes, and with whom he 
 likes, and add to this any other indulgences, I shall never agree 
 or allow that this city or this man should adopt such a usage of 
 drinking. I would go farther than the Cretans and Lacedae- 
 monians, and am disposed rather to the law of the Carthagin- 
 ians, that no one while he is on a campaign should be allowed 
 to taste wine at all; but I would say that he should drink 
 water during all that time, and that in the city no slave, male 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 461 
 
 or female, should ever drink wine ; and that no rulers should 
 drink during their year of office, nor pilots of vessels, nor 
 judges while on duty should taste wine at all ; nor any one 
 who is going to hold a consultation about any matter of impor- 
 tance, nor in the daytime at all, unless in consequence of exer- 
 cise or as medicine ; nor again at night, when any one, either 
 man or woman, is minded to get children. There are number- 
 less other cases, also, in which those who have good sense and 
 good laws ought not to drink wine, so that if what I say is 
 true, no city will need many vineyards. Their husbandry and 
 their way of life in general will follow an appointed order, and 
 their cultivation of the vine will be the most limited and mod- 
 erate of their employments. And this, Stranger, shall be the 
 crown of my discourse about wine, if you agree. 
 
 Cle. Excellent : we agree. Laws, iv. 203. 
 Wine-drinking, a bad practice. 
 
 Socrates took his place on the couch and supped with the 
 
 rest ; and then libations were offered, and after a hymn had 
 been sung to the God, and there had been the usual ceremo- 
 nies, they were about to commence drinking when Pausanias 
 said : And now my friends, how can we drink with least injury 
 to ourselves ? I can assure you that I feel severely the effect of 
 yesterday's potations and must have tune to recover, and I 
 suspect that most of you are in the same predicament, for you 
 were of the party yesterday. Consider this. He would there- 
 fore ask, How can the drinking be made easiest? 
 
 I entirely agree, said Aristophanes, that we should, by all 
 means, avoid hard drinking, for I was myself one of those who 
 were yesterday drowned in -drink. 
 
 I think that you are right, said Eryximachus the son of 
 Acumenus ; but I should like to hear one other person speak. 
 What are the inclinations of our host ? 
 
 I am not able to drink, said Agathon. 
 
 Then, said Eryximachus, the weak heads like myself, Aris- 
 todemus, Phaedrus, and others who never can drink, are for- 
 tunate in finding that the stronger ones are not in a drinking 
 mood. (I do not include Socrates, who is able either to drink 
 or to abstain, and will not mind whichever we do.) Well, as 
 none of the company seem disposed to drink much, I may be 
 forgiven for saying, as a physician, that drinking deep is a bad 
 practice, which I never follow if I can help, and certainly do 
 not recommend to another, least of all to any one who still 
 feels the effects of yesterday's carouse. 
 
462 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 I always do what you advise, and especially what you pre- 
 scribe as a physician, rejoined Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and 
 the rest of the company, if they are wise, will do the same. 
 
 All agreed that drinking was not to be the order of the day. 
 The Syposium, i. 471. 
 Wise and just soul. See Just, etc* 
 Wisdom, as differing from other sciences. 
 
 1 want to know what is that which is not wisdom, and of 
 
 which wisdom is the science ? 
 
 That is precisely the old error, Socrates, he said. You come 
 asking in what wisdom differs from the other sciences ; and then 
 you try to discover some respect in which they are alike : but 
 they are not, for all the other sciences are of something else, 
 and not of themselves ; wisdom alone is a science of other 
 sciences, and of itself. And of this, as I believe, you are very 
 well aware ; and that you are only doing what you denied that 
 you were doing just now, trying to refute me, instead of pursu- 
 ing the argument. 
 
 And what if I am ? How can you think that I have any 
 other motive in refuting you but what I should have in exam- 
 ining into myself ? which motive would be just a fear of my 
 unconsciously fancying that I knew something of which I was 
 ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly 
 for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake 
 of my other friends. For is not the discovery of things as 
 they truly are a common good to all mankind ? 
 
 Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said. 
 
 Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in 
 answer to the question which I asked, never minding whether 
 Critias or Socrates is the person refuted ; attend only to the 
 argument, and see what will come of the refutation. 
 
 I think that you are right, he replied ; and I will do as you 
 say. 
 
 Tell me, then, I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom. 
 
 I mean, he said, that wisdom is the only science which is the 
 science of itself and of the other sciences as well. 
 
 But the science of science, I said, will also be the science of 
 the absence of science. 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
 Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know 
 himself, and be able to examine what he knows or does not 
 know, and see what others know, and think that they know and 
 
PLATO'S BEST TIIOn.HI >. 463 
 
 do really know ; and what they do not know, and fancy that 
 they know, when they do not. No other person will be able 
 to do this. And this is the state and virtue of wisdom, or 
 temperance, and self-knowledge, which is just knowing what 
 a man knows, and what he does not know. That is your 
 view ? 
 
 Yes, he said. Charmides, i. 21. 
 Wisdom, advantages of. 
 
 What profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in Wisdom 
 or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom ? If, indeed, 
 as we were supposing at first, the wise man had been able to 
 distinguish what he knew and did not know, and that he knew 
 the one and did not know the other, and to recognize a similar 
 faculty of discernment in others, there would certainly have 
 been a great advantage in being wise, for then we should never 
 have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring 
 guides of ourselves and of those who were under us ; and we 
 should not have attempted to do what we did not know, but we 
 should have found out those who knew, and confided in them ; 
 nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do 
 anything which they were not likely to do well ; and they 
 would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowl- 
 edge ; and the house or state which was ordered or administered 
 under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of which 
 wisdom was the lord, would have been well ordered ; for truth 
 guiding, and error having been expelled, in all their doings, 
 men would have done well, and would have been happy. Was 
 not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of 
 wisdom to know what is known and what is unknown to us ? 
 
 Very true, he said. 
 
 And now you perceive, I said, that no such science is to be 
 found anywhere. 
 
 I perceive, he said. 
 
 May we assume, then, I said, that wisdom, viewed in this 
 new light merely as a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, 
 has this advantage that he who possesses such knowledge 
 will more easily learn anything which he learns ; and that 
 everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition to the 
 knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will 
 better enable him to test the knowledge which others have of 
 what he knows himself ; whereas the inquirer who is without 
 this knowledge may be supposed to have a feebler and weaker 
 
464 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 insight ? Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which 
 are to be gained from Wisdom ? And are not we looking and 
 seeking after something more than is to be found in her ? 
 
 That is very likely, he said. Charmides, i. 28. 
 "Wisdom, the sway of. 
 
 Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now defin- 
 ing, and that she has absolute sway over us ; then each action 
 will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one pro- 
 fessing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or gen- 
 eral, or any one else pretending to know matters of which he 
 is ignorant, will deceive or elude us ; our health will be im- 
 proved ; our safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured ; 
 our coats and shoes, and all other instruments and implements 
 will be well made, because the workmen will be good and true. 
 Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy, which 
 is the knowledge of the future, will be under the control of 
 Wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers and set up the true 
 prophet in their place as the revealer of the future. Now I 
 quite agree that mankind, thus provided, would live and act 
 according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent 
 ignorance from intruding on us. But we have not as yet dis- 
 covered why, because we act according to knowledge, we act 
 well and are happy, my dear Critias. ^ 
 
 Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge you 
 will hardly find the crown of happiness in anything else. 
 Charmides, i. 30. 
 Wisdom, a means of good. 
 
 You perceive that in things which we knew every one 
 
 will trust us, Hellenes and barbarians, men and women, 
 and we may do as we please about them, and no one will like 
 to interfere with us ; we shall be free, and masters of others ; 
 and these things will be really ours, for we shall be benefited 
 by them. But in things of which we have no understanding, 
 no one will trust us to do as seems good to us they will 
 hinder us as far as they can ; and not only strangers, but father 
 and mother, and the friend, if there be one, who is dearer still, 
 will also hinder us ; and we shall be subject to others ; and 
 these things will not be ours, for we shall not be benefited by 
 them. Do you admit that? 
 
 He assented. 
 
 And shall we be friends to others ? and will any others love 
 us, in as far as We are useless to them ? 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 465 
 
 Certainly not. 
 
 Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can any- 
 body love anybody else, in as far as they are useless to them ? 
 
 No. 
 
 And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be 
 your friends and kindred, for you will be useful and good ; but 
 if you are not wise, neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, 
 nor any one else, will be your friends. And in matters of 
 which you have as yet no knowledge can you have any conceit 
 of knowledge ? 
 
 That is impossible, he replied. 
 
 And you, Lysis, if you require a teacher, have not as yet 
 attained to wisdom. 
 
 True. 
 
 And therefore you are not conceited, having nothing of which 
 to be conceited ? 
 
 Indeed, Socrates, I think not. " Lysis, i. 48. 
 "Wisdom makes men fortunate. 
 
 In what company shall we find a place for wisdom 
 
 among the goods or not ? 
 
 Among the goods. 
 
 And now, I said, think whether we have left out any consid- 
 erable goods. 
 
 I do not think that we have, said Cleinias. 
 
 Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have 
 left out the greatest of them all. 
 
 What is that ? he asked. 
 
 Fortune, Cleinias, I replied ; which all, even the most fool- 
 ish, admit to be the greatest of goods. 
 
 True, he said. 
 
 On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axio- 
 chus, have you and I escaped making a laughing-stock of our- 
 selves to the strangers. 
 
 Why do you say that? 
 
 Why, because we have already spoken of fortune, and are 
 but repeating ourselves. 
 
 What do you mean ? 
 
 I mean that there is something ridiculous in putting fortune 
 again forward, and saying the same thing twice over. 
 
 He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied : 
 Surely wisdom is good fortune ; even a child may know that. 
 
 The simple-minded youth was amazed ; and, observing this, 
 30 
 
466 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 I said to him : Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players 
 are most fortunate and successful in performing on the flute ? 
 
 He assented. 
 
 And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and read- 
 ing letters ? 
 
 Certainly. 
 
 Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate 
 on the whole than wise pilots ? 
 
 None, certainly. 
 
 And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would 
 you rather take the risk in company with a wise general, or 
 with a foolish one ? 
 
 With a wise one. 
 
 And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a com- 
 panion in a dangerous illness a wise physician, or an igno- 
 rant one ? 
 
 A wise one. 
 
 You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more for- 
 tunate than to act with an ignorant one ? 
 
 He assented. 
 
 Then wisdom always makes men fortunate : for by wisdom 
 no man would ever err, and therefore he must act rightly and 
 succeed, or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer. 
 
 We contrived at last somehow to agree in a general conclu- 
 sion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then 
 recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You 
 remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be 
 happy and fortunate if many good things were present with 
 us? 
 
 He assented. 
 
 And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good 
 things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us ? 
 
 If they profited us, he said. 
 
 And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not 
 use them ? For example, if we had a great deal of food and 
 did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should 
 we be profited ? 
 
 Certainly not, he said. - Euthydemus^ i. 181. 
 Wisdom through the touch. 
 
 How I wish, said Socrates, taking his place as he was de- 
 sired, that wisdom could be infused by touch, out of the fuller 
 into the emptier man, like water which is poured through wool 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 467 
 
 out of a fuller vessel into an emptier one ; in that case how 
 much I should prize sitting by you ! For you would have 
 filled me full of much and beautiful wisdom, in comparison of 
 which my own is of a very mean and questionable sort, no 
 better than a dream ; but yours is bright and only beginning, 
 and was manifested forth in all the splendor of youth the day 
 before yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand 
 Hellenes. 
 
 You are mocking, Socrates, said Agathon, and ere long you 
 and I will have to settle who bears off the palm of wisdom. 
 The Symposium, i. 471. 
 Wise endurance. See Courage. 
 Wit, no bar to progress. See Ridicule, etc. 
 Wives, community of. See Community, etc. 
 Woman, only a lesser man. 
 
 Can you mention any pursuit of man in which the male 
 
 sex has not all these qualities in a far higher degree than the 
 female ? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weav- 
 ing, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which 
 womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for 
 her to be beaten is the most absurd of all things ? 
 
 You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general 
 inferiority of the female sex ; at the same time many women 
 are in many things superior to many men, though speaking 
 generally, what you say is true. 
 
 And so, I said, my friend, in the administration of a State 
 neither a woman as a woman, nor a man as a man has any 
 special function, but the gifts of nature are equally diffused in 
 both sexes ; all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women 
 also, and in all of them a woman is only a weaker man. 
 
 Very true. The Republic, ii. 280. 
 Woman, ambitious. See Ambitious, etc. 
 Women and war. See War. 
 Wonder is philosophic. 
 
 Soc. I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a 
 true insight into your nature when he said that you were a 
 philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher and 
 philosophy begins in wonder ; he was not a bad genealogist who 
 said that Iris, the messenger of heaven, is the child of Thaumas 
 (wonder). Theaetetus, iii. 356. 
 Words, a lie in, an imitation. 
 I do not comprehend you. 
 
468 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 The reason is I replied, that you attribute some grand mean- 
 ing to me ; but I am only saying that deception, or being de- 
 ceived or uninformed about realities in the highest faculty, 
 which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold 
 the lie, is what mankind least like ; that, I say, is what they 
 utterly detest. 
 
 There is nothing more hateful to them. 
 
 And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul 
 of him who is deceived may be called the true lie ; for the lie 
 in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a 
 previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. 
 Am I not right ? 
 
 Perfectly right. The Republic, ii. 205. 
 Words, opposition of. See Contradiction, etc. 
 World, future state of. See Future state, etc. 
 World, made immortal. See Immortal, etc. 
 Writing, and painting. See Painting. 
 Wrong-doing, disgrace of. 
 
 Soc. I certainly think that I and you and every man do 
 
 really believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injus- 
 tice : and not to be punished than to be punished. 
 
 Pol. And I should say neither I nor any man ; would you 
 yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice ? 
 
 Soc. Yes, and you, too ; I or any man would. 
 
 Pol. Quite the reverse ; neither you, nor I, nor any man. 
 
 Soc. But will you answer ? 
 
 Pol. To be sure, I will ; for I am curious to hear what you 
 are going to say. 
 
 Soc. Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose 
 that I am beginning at the beginning : Which of the two, 
 Polus, in your opinion, is the worst? to do injustice or to 
 suffer ? 
 
 Pol. I should say that suffering was worst. 
 
 Soc. And which is the greater disgrace ? Answer. 
 
 Pol To do. Gorgias, iii. 61. 
 Wrong-doing, judgment for, to be sought. 
 
 Soc. To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of 
 
 evils ; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and 
 greatest of all ? 
 
 Pol. That is true. 
 
 Soc. Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? 
 You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 469 
 
 criminal and unpunished : I, on the other hand, maintained that 
 he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been 
 punished, is and ought to be, the most miserable of all men ; 
 and that the doer of injustice, whether Archelaus or any other, 
 is more miserable than the sufferer ; and he who escapes pun- 
 ishment, more miserable than he who suffers. Was not that 
 what I said ? 
 
 Pol Yes. 
 
 Soc. And that has been proved to be true ? 
 
 Pol Certainly. 
 
 Soc. Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use 
 of rhetoric ? If we admit what has been just now said, every 
 man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, 
 for he will thereby suffer great evil ? 
 
 Pol True. 
 
 Soc. And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does 
 wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be im- 
 mediately punished ; he will run to the judge, as he would to 
 the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be 
 rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul ; 
 must we not allow that, Polus, if our former admissions are to 
 stand ? and is there any other inference which is consistent with 
 them? 
 
 Pol To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer. 
 
 Soc. Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a 
 man to excuse his own injustice, or that of his parents or friends, 
 or children or country ; but may be of use to any one who 
 holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse himself 
 above all, and in the next degree, his family, or any of his 
 friends who may be doing wrong ; if he does not want to con- 
 ceal, but to bring to light the iniquity, that the wrong-doer may 
 suffer and be healed, and if he would force himself and others 
 to stand firm, closing their eyes manfully, and letting the phy- 
 sician cut, as I may say, and burn them, in the hope of attain- 
 ing the good and the honorable, not regarding the pain ; but if- 
 he have done things worthy of stripes, allowing himself to be 
 scourged, or if of bonds to be bound, or if of a fine to be 
 fined, or if of exile to be exiled, or if of death to die, and 
 himself being the first to accuse himself, and his own rela- 
 tions, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and their just ac- 
 tions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may be 
 delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Po- 
 
470 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 lus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say " Yes " or 
 " No " to that ? 
 
 Pol. To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very 
 strange, though probably in agreement with your premises. 
 
 Soc. Is not this the conclusion if the premises are not dis- 
 proven ? 
 
 Pol. Yes ; that is true. 
 
 Soc. And from the opposite point of view of doing harm to 
 some one, whether he be an enemy or not I except the case 
 in which I am myself suffering injury at the hands of another, 
 for I must take precautions against that but if my enemy in- 
 jures a third person, then in every sort of way by word as well 
 as deed, I should try to prevent his being punished, or appear- 
 ing before the judge ; and if he appears, I should contrive that 
 he should escape, and not suffer punishment : if he has stolen a 
 sum of money, let him keep and spend what he has stolen on 
 him and his, regardless of religion and justice ; and if he have 
 done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be im- 
 mortal in his wickedness ; or, if this is not possible, let him at 
 any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. Gorgias^ iii. 68. 
 Wrong-doing, responsibility and voluntariness in. 
 
 Soc. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought 
 
 to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies 
 both of himself and of the State, acting so that he may have 
 temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not 
 suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending 
 desire to satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such an one is 
 the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of com- 
 munion, and he who is incapable of communion is also inca- 
 pable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that 
 communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and 
 justice bind together heaven and earth and Gods and men, and 
 that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not dis- 
 order or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philoso- 
 pher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical 
 equality is mighty, both among Gods and men ; you think that 
 you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care 
 about geometry. Well, then, either the principle that the 
 happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temper- 
 ance, and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, 
 must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the conse- 
 quences ? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 471 
 
 and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when 
 I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and his 
 friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should 
 use his rhetoric all these consequences are true. And that 
 which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty 
 is also true, viz: that to do injustice, if more disgraceful than 
 to suffer is in that degree worse ; and the other position which 
 according to Polus Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he 
 who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a 
 knowledge of justice has also turned out to be true. And 
 now, let us proceed in the next place, to consider whether you 
 are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to help my- 
 self or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the 
 extremity of danger, or that I am like an outlaw to whom any 
 one may do what he likes ; he may box my ears, which was a 
 brave saying of yours ; or he may take away my goods or 
 banish me, or even do his worst and kill me, and this, as you 
 say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which 
 has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated 
 once more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears 
 wrongfully is not the worst evil that can befall a man, nor to 
 have my face and purse cut open, but that to smite and slay 
 me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil ; 
 aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at 
 all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to 
 the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These 
 truths, which have been already set forth as I state them in 
 the previous discussion, would seem now, if I may use an ex- 
 pression which is certainly bold, to have been fixed and riveted 
 by us in iron and adamantine bonds ; and unless you or some 
 other still more enterprising hero shall break them, there is no 
 possibility of denying what I say. For what I am always say- 
 ing is, that I know not the truth about these things, and yet 
 that I have never known anybody who could say anything else, 
 any more than you can, and not be ridiculous. This has 
 always been my position, and if this position is a true one, and 
 if injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and 
 yet there is if possible a greater than the greatest evils, in. an 
 unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that defense with- 
 out which a man will be truly ridiculous ? Must not the de- 
 fense be one which will avert the greatest of human evils ? 
 And will not the worst of all defenses be that with which a 
 
472 , PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends ? 
 and next will come that which is unable to avert the next 
 greatest evil ; thirdly, that which is unable to avert the third 
 greatest evil ; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of 
 evil so is the honor of being able to avert them in their several 
 degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am 
 I not right, Callicles ? 
 
 Gal. Yes, quite right. 
 
 Soc. Seeing, then, that there are these two evils, the doing 
 injustice and the suffering injustice, and we affirm that to do 
 injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil, 
 how can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the 
 one of not doing and the other of not suffering injustice 
 must he have the power or only the will to obtain them ? I 
 mean whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the 
 will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the 
 power ? 
 
 Gal. He must have provided himself with the power ; that 
 is clear. 
 
 Soc. And what do you say of doing injustice ? Is the will 
 'only sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice. 
 or must he have provided himself with power and art ; and if 
 he have not studied and practiced will he be unjust still ? 
 Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus 
 and I were right in admitting to the conclusion that no one 
 does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their 
 will? 
 
 Gal. Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done. Gor- 
 gias, \ii. 99. 
 Wrong-doing. See Injustice. 
 
 Young men, training of. 
 
 Youth instructed in military arts. See Military arts. 
 
 You have never acquired the knowledge of the most 
 
 beautiful kind of song in your military way of life, which is 
 modeled after the camp, and is not like that of dwellers in 
 cities ; and you have your young men herding and feeding to- 
 gether like young colts. No one takes his own individual colt 
 and drags him away from his fellows against his will, raging 
 and foaming, and gives him a groom for him alone, and trains 
 and rubs him down privately, and gives him the qualities in 
 education which will make him not only a good soldier, but 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 473 
 
 also a governor of a state and of cities. Such an one, as we 
 were saying at first, would be a greater warrior than he of 
 whom Tyrtaeus sings ; and he would honor courage every- 
 where, but always as the fourth, and not as the first part of 
 virtue, either in individuals or States. Laws, iv. 196. 
 Youth, philosophy in early. See Philosophy. 
 Youth to be tested by trial. 
 
 Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must inquire 
 
 who are the -best guardians of their own conviction that the 
 interest of the State is to be the rule of all their actions. We 
 must watch them from their youth upwards, and make them 
 perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to 
 be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to 
 be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That 
 will be the way ? 
 
 Yes. 
 
 And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts pre- 
 scribed for them, in which they will give further proof of the 
 same qualities. 
 
 Very right, he replied. 
 
 And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments 
 that is the third sort of test and see what will be their be- 
 havior : like those who take colts amid noises and cries to see 
 if they are of a timid nature, so must we take our youth amid 
 terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures, and 
 try them more thoroughly than gold is tried in the fire, in or- 
 der to discover whether they are armed against all enchant- 
 ments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of them- 
 selves and of the music which they have learned, and retain- 
 ing under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious 
 nature, such as will be most serviceable to the man himself and 
 to the State. And he who at every age, as boy and youth 
 and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and 
 pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State; he 
 shall be honored in life and death, and shall receive sepulture 
 and other memorials of honor, the greatest that we have to 
 give. The Republic, ii. 238. 
 Youth, the avaricious. See Miserly men. 
 Youth, self-conceit of. See Self-conceit. 
 Youthful genius. See Genius, etc. 
 Youth and children, education of. See Children, etc. 
 Ath. Let me once more recall our doctrine of right edu- 
 
474 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 
 
 cation ; which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due reg- 
 ulation of convivial intercourse. 
 
 Ole. You talk rather grandly. 
 
 Ath. Pleasure and pain I maintain to be the first percep- 
 tions of children, and I say that they are the forms under 
 which virtue and vice are originally present to them. As to 
 wisdom and true and fixed opinions, happy is the man who ac- 
 quires them, when declining in years ; and he who possesses 
 them, and the blessings which are contained in them, is a per- 
 fect man. Now, 1 mean by education that training which is 
 given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in chil- 
 dren ; when pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are 
 rightly implanted in souls not yet capable of understanding the 
 nature of them, and who find them, after they have attained 
 reason, to be in harmony with her. This harmony of the soul, 
 when perfected, is virtue ; but the particular training in respect 
 of pleasure and pain, which leads you always to hate what you 
 ought to hate, and love what you ought to love, from the be- 
 ginning to the end, may be separated off ; and, in my view, will 
 be rightly called education. 
 
 Cle. I think, Stranger, that you are quite right in all that 
 you have said and are saying about education. 
 
 Ath. I am glad to hear that you agree with me ; for, in- 
 deed, the true discipline of pleasure and pain which, when 
 rightly ordered, is a principle of education, has been often re- 
 laxed and corrupted in human life. And the Gods, pitying 
 the toils which our race is born to undergo, have appointed 
 holy festivals, in which men alternate rest with labor; and 
 have given them the Muses, and Apollo the leader of the 
 Muses, and Dionysus, as the partners in their revels, that they 
 may improve what education they have, at the festivals of the 
 Gods, and by their aid. I should like to know whether a com- 
 mon saying is true to nature or not. For what men say is 
 that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in their bodies 
 or in their voices ; they are always wanting to move, and cry 
 out ; at one time leaping and skipping, and overflowing with 
 sportiveness and delight at something, and then again uttering 
 all sorts of cries. But, whereas other animals have no percep- 
 tion of order or disorder in their movements, that is, of rhythm 
 or harmony, as they are called, to us, the Gods, who, as we say, 
 have been appointed to be our partners in the dance, have 
 given the pleasurable sense of harmony and rhythm 
 
PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 475 
 
 Ath. The inference at which we arrive for the third or 
 fourth time is, that education is the constraining and directing 
 of youth towards that right reason, which the law affirms, and 
 which the experience of the best of our elders has agreed to 
 be truly right. In order, then, that the soul of the child may 
 not be habituated to feel joy and sorrow in a manner at vari- 
 ance with the law, and those who obey the law, but may rather 
 follow the law and rejoice and sorrow at the same things as 
 the aged, in order, I say, to produce this effect, songs appear 
 to have been invented, which are really charms, and are de- 
 signed to implant the harmony of which we speak. And be- 
 cause the mind of the child is incapable of enduring serious 
 training, they are called plays or songs, and are performed in 
 play ; just as when men are sick and ailing in their bodies, 
 their attendants give them wholesome diet in pleasant meats 
 and drinks, but unwholesome diet disagreeable in things, in 
 order that they may learn as they ought, to like the one and 
 to dislike the other. Laws, iv. 182. 
 
 Zeal right and wrong. 
 
 Soc. Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one ; 
 
 but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger ; and 
 therefore we ought to consider whether I shall or shall not 
 do as you say. For I am and always have been one of those 
 natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason 
 may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best ; 
 and now that this fortune has come upon me, I cannot put 
 away the conclusion at which I had arrived : the principles 
 which I have hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and 
 unless we can at once find other and better principles I am cer- 
 tain not to agree with you ; no, not even if the power of the 
 multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, 
 deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors. 
 Onto, i. 350. 
 
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