F.x Libris C. K. OGDEN Λ '$» JRISrOTLE's THICS AND POLITICS. VOL. I. JRISrOTLE's ETHICS AND POLITICS, COMPRISING HIS PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK. ILLUSTRATED BY INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES j THE CRITIC JL HISTORT OF HIS LIFE ,- AND A NEW ANALYSIS OF HIS SPECULATIVE WORKS} By JOHN GILLIES, LL.D. V, R. S. and S. A. London ; ¥. R. S. Edinburgh j and Hiftoriogiapher to his Majefty for Scotland. Magna animi conteniia adUhenda eji in explicando Aryiotele. CICERO FRAGMENT. PHILOSOPli, IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. L LONDON; •Printed for A. Strahan j and T. Cadell Jun. and W. Davies, in the Strand, 1797• PREFACE. A' RISTOTLE is the moil voluminous, and ge- nerally deemed the moil obfcure, of all the Greek writers of claiTic antiquity. His imperfed: yet copious remains, which are now rather admired than read \ and which were formerly much read and little underilood, ftill naturally arrange themfelves in the minds of thofe capable of digefting them, under their original form of an encyclopedy of fcience ; in many parts of which, the author's labours are, doubtlefs, excelled by thofe of modern philofophers ; , while in other parts, and thofe of the moil important nature, his intelledual exertions remain hitherto unrivalled. It feemed high time, therefore, to draw the line between thofe writings of the Stagirite which » I except the fmall but incomparable Treatife on Poetry, excel- lently tranflated and commented in two recent publications in Englifli; the books on Rhetoric and the Hiftory of Animals, to which Mr» CaiTandre and Mr. Camus have refpeftively done juftice in French j and the Organum, or Logic, ftill ftudied in feme Univcrfiiies. 1G9G738 τΐ PREFACE. which ftill merit the moft ferious attention of the modern reader, and thofe of which the perufal is fuperfeded by more accurate and more complete in- formation. This line I have prefumed to draw in the prefent work, by endeavouring to the beft of my abilities to tranilate the former perfpicuouily and impreliively, while I contented myfclf with giving a diftinol and compreheniive analyfis of the latter. The " Ethics to Nicomachus and the Politics" ought never to have been disjoined, iince they are coniidered by Ariftotle himfelf as forming eflential parts of one and the fame work" j which, as it was the laft' and principal objed of his ftudies, is of all his performances the longeft, the beft connedled, and incomparably the moft interefting. The two treatifes combined, conftitute what he calls his praBical philofophy "^ ; an epithet to which, in comparifon with other works of the fame kind, they will be found peculiarly entitled. In the Ethics, the reader will fee a full and fatisfadory delineation of the moral * See vol. i. p. 150, and p. 408, & feq. ■• Compare vol. i. p. 408, & feqq. and vol. ii. pp. 338, 369. The Magna Moralia and Ethics to Eudemus are chiefly to be confidered as the firft imperfeft iketch of this great work. * Sec vol. i. p. 176. He elfewhere calls it " His Philofophy con- cerning Human Affairs." Ibid. p. 408. PREFACE. νίί moral nature of man, and of the difcipline and exer- cife beft adapted to its improvement. The Philofo- pher fpeaks with conimanding authority to thq heart and affedions, through the irrefiftible convic- tion of the underftanding. His morality is neither on the one hand too indulgent, nor on the other impraaicable. His leffons are not cramped by the narrow, nor perverted by die wild, fpirit of fyftem ; they are clear indu6lions, flowing naturally and fpontaneoufly from a copious and pure fource of well-digefted experience. According to the Stagirite, men are and always have been not only moral and focial, but alfo political animals ; in a great meafure dependent for their happinefs and perfedion on the public inftitutions of their refpedive countries. The grand inquiry, therefore, is, what are the different arrangements that have been found under given circumftances, pradically moft conducive to thefe main and ultimate purpofes ? This queftion the Au- thor endeavoured to anfwer in his " Politics," by a careful examination of two hundred fyftems of legif- lation, many of which are not any where elfe de- fcribed; and by proving how uniformly, even in political matters, the refults of obfervation and ex- periment vm PREFACE. periment confpire with and confirm the dedudlions of an accurate and full theory. In this incompara- ble work, the reader will perceive " the genuine fpirit of laws" deduced from the fpecific and unalterable diftindlions of governments ; and with a fmall effort of attention, may difcern not only thofe difcoveries in fcience, unju ftly claimed by the vanity of modern writers % but many of thufc improvements in prac- tice ', erroneoufly afcribed to the fortunate events of time and chance in thefe latter and more enlightened ages. The fame invaluable treatife difclofes the pure and perennial fpring of all legitimate authority ; for in Ariftotle's *' Politics," and his only^ govern- ment is placed on fuch a natural and folid founda- tion, • Compare, for example, the works of the modern cEconomiits, not excepting thofe of Hume and Smith, with the Fifth Book of the Ethics, p. 270, and the Firft Book of the Politics, p. 38, & feq. Compare Montefquieu's Spirit of Laws with Books iii, vi, and viii, of the Politics throughout: and judge whether the adm.irable French work be, as the Author's motto boafts, " Proles fine matre creata." Compare likewife Machiavel's " Prince," with the laft chapters oi Book vii. of the Politics, p. 374, & feqq. from which the Italian treatife is entirely copied. Yet none of all thofe Authors acknowledge their obligations to Ariftotle. ^ For the dodlrine of reprefentative government, (with which the an- cients are faid to have been totally unacquainted,) fee the following tranflation, voL ii. pp. 64, & feqq, 304, & feqq. and 40S, & feqq. iFor that of governments of reciprocal controul, fee p. 293, & feqq- 15 PREFACE. 13C tion, as leaves neither its origin incomprelienfiblc, nor its ftability precarious : and his conclufions, had they been well weighed, φΐιίΐ have fur mounted or fuppreiTed thofe erroneous and abfurd dodrines which long upheld defpotifm on the one hand, and thofe equally erroneous and ftill wilder fuppofitions of conventions and compads, which have more recently armed popular fury on the other. But our Author's principles and doairines will fpeak convincingly for themfelves. The intention of this Preface is merely to explain the plan and objed of the prefent performance ; which, befides giving a tranflation of Ariilotle's pradical philofophy, con- tains a new analyfis of his fpeculative works. This addition appeared the more neceifary, becaufe the Stagirite's intelkaual fyftem is fo compadly built, and fo folidly united, that its feparate parts cannot be completely underftood, unlefs the whole be clearly ' comprehended. The writings indeed here tranilated, ftand more detached and more independent than almoft any other ; yet, without the aid of the pre- fixed " Analyfis," even the Ethics and Politics would require frequent, almoft perpetual elucidation. The reader, I feared, would be foon tired with the VOL. I. a uncon- PREFACE. unconneded prolixity of notes ' ; he will, I hope, be entertained by the Analyfis even of thofe treatifes to which, independently of any fubftantial utility, his attention may be ftiil allured by a liberal and commendable curiofity. In my work throughout, I am ambitious of ex- hibiting fully, yet within a narrow compafs, the dif- coverics and attainments of a man deemed the wifeffc of antiquity ; and to whom, even in modern times, it will be eaiier to name many fuperiors in particular branches of knowledge, than to find any one rival in univerfal fclence. Confidered under this general afped, my " Engliih Ariftotle" is the natural com- panion and fit counterpart to my '' Hiftory of An- cient Greece ;" fince the learning of that country properly terminates in the Stagirite, by whom it was finally embodied into one great work ; a work rather impaired than improved by the labours of fucceeding ages. My time, I acknowledge, was miferably mif- fpent * 1 have alfo avoided to fwell my work with hiftorical notes ; a thing as eafy as it is ufelefs. Ariftotle relates with the utmoft precifion, the particulars neceflary for juftifying his conclufions j and to introduce other events and circumftances, altogether unconnei5led with the fubjeft, appears to me to be better calculated for difplaying an author's eruditioHj than for informing the mind of his reader. I I PREFACE. Χ' fpent in examining his numerous commentators " ; Greek, Arabic, and Latin ; but the attention with which I have many times perufed the whole of his invaluable remains, with a view of rendering him a perpetual commentary on himfelf, and thereby ex- preffing his genuine fenfe clearly and forcibly, will not, I hope, prove ufelefs to thofe who ftudy Greek literature on an enlarged and liberal plan ; not merely as grammarians and philologlfts, but as phi- lofophers, moralifts, and ilatefmen. To this clafs of readers, many pages of the prefent work are peculiarly addrefled ; but the far greater part of it, bearing an immediate reference to the people at large, will not, it is hoped, by the public, be either unregarded or unapplied ; efpecially in an age when, through the ardent adivity of the prefs, falu- tary information, whatever be its original form, fpeedily circulates to all clafles of the community in new and fit channels. Portman-Street, J. G. September 1797• " I am difpenfed from the neceffity of fpeaking of former tranHations of the Ethics and Politics, becaufe I have not borrowed a fingle fen- tence, nor derived the fmalleft affiftance, from any of them. The Ethics, which is incomparably the more difficult work of the two, has never, as far as I know, been tranOated into any modern language. a 2 CONTENTS. CHAP, h LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. Ariftotle's Birth-place.— His Education at Atarneus— at Athens. — His refidence with Hermeias — Singular fortune of that Prince — Ariftotle's refidence in Leibos — in Macedon. — Plan purfued in the education of Alexander. — Arifto- tle's refidence in Athens — Employment there. — Calumnies againft him. — His retreat to Chalcis, and death.— His teftament. — Sayings.— Extraordinary fate of his Works— Publiihed at Rome by Andronicus of Rhodes,— Their num- ber and magnitude. fage i CHAP. II. A NEW ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE's SPECULATIVE WORKS. Senfation — Its nature explained. — Imagination and memory. — Affociation of perceptions.— Reminifcence.—Intelleit. — Its power and dignity.— Ariftotle's organon. — Origin of general terms. — Categories. — Divifion and Definition. — Propofitions.— Syllogifms — Their nature and ufe, — Second analytics — Topics.^Ariftotle's organon perverted and mifapplied. — Demonftration. — Ariftotle's metaphyfics— Proper arrangement thereof. — Truth vindicated. — Intrududion to the firft philofophy— Its hiftory.— Refutation of the dodrine of ideas.— Elemerrts — Analyfis of the bodies fo called.— Their perpetual tranfmutations. — Do£lrine of atoms refuted.— Motion or change — Its dif- ferent kinds— Works of Nature.— How her operations are performed. - Mat- ter. — Form. — Privation. — The fpecific form or fight. — State of capacity and energy.— Ariftotle's aftronomy. — The earth and its produftions. — Hiftory of animals.— Philofophy of natural hiftory. — His book on energy. — The firft energy, eternally and fubftantlally active. — His attributes — Antiquity of the doctrine that Deity is the fource of being— Inculcated in Ariftotle's exoteric works.— Objedions to Arifttotle's philofophy— Anfwers thereto. 39 ARI- xiv CONTENTS. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. Β Ο Ο Κ I. Introduction. ...--- Page 143 Human a£tion. — Operations and produ(£Hons. — Happinefs— Opinions concern- ing it — Confifts in virtuous energies — Proved by irdudlion — Solon's faying concerning it explained.— Analyfis of our moral powers. . . - i^p Β Ο Ο Κ TI. Introduction 173 Moral virtues acquired by exercife and cuftom-»Coniiil in holding the mean between blameable extremes. — Teft of virtue. — ^The virtues, habits. — ^The nature of thefe habits afcertained. — Why vices miftaken for virtues, and con- verfely.— Pradical rules for the attainment of virtue. - - - 175 BOOK III. Introduction. ---_-_. ip^ Moral eleftion and preference.— Our habits voluntary.— Courage — Its different kinds diRinguiihed. — Temperance. — Natural and adventitious virants. — Com- parifon of intemperance and cowardice. ----- jpj BOOK IV. Introduction. -._.-_ _ 22c Liberality -rVices oppofite thereto. — Magnificence •, its contraries Magna- nimity. — Meeknefs ; its contraries. — Courtefy ; its contraries. — Plain-dealino- ; its contraries. — Facetioufnefs ; its contraries. — Shame. - - 227 Β Ο Ο Κ V. Introduction. ....... 255 Difference between intelleflual and moral habits. — Different acceptations of the word injuftice.- Juftice ftriaiy fo called.— Diftributive juftice.— Corredive juftice. — Rciaiiition. — Natural juftice, independent of pofitive inftitution.— . Misfortunes.— Errors.— Crimes.— Equity. . . _ _ 257 CONTENTS. XV Β Ο Ο Κ νΐ. Introduction. - - - - - " ^^^^ ^5 Senfation, intellea, and appetite.-Thelr different offices—The five intelkaual habits-Science- Art-Prudence-Common fenfe-Wifdom-Qu.cknefs of apprehenfion.-Juftnefs of fentiment.— Importance of the intelkdual habits. —Virtue, natural and acquired.— Their difference. ... 287 Β Ο Ο Κ VII. Introduction. ------- Z^S Vice.-Weaknefs.— Ferocity.— Self-command, and its contrary.— Unnatural ■ depravities, different from vices.— Voluptuoufnefs more deteftable than irafcibility— Reafons of this— Intemperance and incontinency— Their dif- ference. .--- - -- " - ' i I BOOK VIII. Introduction to Books viii and ix. - - 3^7 Utility and beauty of friendHiip.— Qualities by which it is generated.— Three kinds of friendihip— Thefe kinds compared.— Charafters moft fufceptible of friendiliip.— Unequal friendihips.— Their hmits.— Friendihips founded on propinquity. -- ------- 329 BOOK IX. Friendihip does not admit of precife rules.— Diffolution of friendihip v/hen iuilifiable.— Analogy betwreen our duties to ourfelves, and thofe to our friends. Happinefs of virtue.— Wretchednefs of vice.— Good-will.— Concord.— Ex- quifite delight of virtuous friendihip. - - - - - 355 Β Ο Ο Κ X. Introduction. 379 Pleafurc— Its ambiguous nature— Defined.— Happinefs -Intelkaual— Moral— . Compared.— Education.— Laws.— Tranfition to the fubjedt of Politics. 381 ERRATA in VOL. I. Page 98. line iS./w acceflaries «^yacceflbries 108. — 7 of the note, /or '.mnuaiw, read emmuaoi lot), — 4 of ihe note, Jir sudcToi read ίαντο» 127. — zo.yor a microfcope «Λ χαι ίαλος nf^s» ΐρμιιας, Hjs mafter's name was Eubulus, a prince and philofopher of Bithynia. Suidas. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. n firm and unalterable friendfliip. Ariftotle through life purfued the calm and fecure paths of fcience, but Hermeias ventured to cUmb the dangerous heights of ambition. His enterprifmg fpirit, feconded by good fortune, raifed him to the fovereignty of AiTus and Atarneus, Greek cities of Myfia, the former fituate in the diftria of Troas, the latter in that of iEolis, and both of them, like moil Grecian colonies on the Afiatic coaft, but loofely dependant on the Perfian empire. Hermeias availed himfelf of the weaknefs or diftance of the armies of Artaxerxes, and of the refources with which his own ambition was fupplied by a wealthy banker, to gain ροίΓείΤίοη of thofe ftrong-holds, ■with all their dependencies ; and endeavoured to juftify this bold ufurpation of the fceptre, by the manly firmnefs with which he held it '. Upon the invitation of his royal friend, Ariftotle, almoft immediately after Plato's death, revifited Acar- neus ", the fame city in which he had fpent the happy years of his youth under the kind protedion of Proxenus ; and might we indulge the conjedure that this worthy Atarnean ftill lived, our philofopher's voyage to iEolis muft have been ftrongly re- commended by his defire of repaying the favours of a man whom his gratitude always regarded as a fecond father, and of thus propping, by his friendly aid, the declining age of his early guardian. Ariftotle found at Atarneus the wiih of Plato realifed ; he Deftroyed beheld, in his friend Hermeias, philofophy feated on a throne, jifg Rhodian. In that city he refided near three years, enjoying the inex- preflible happinefs of feeing his enlightened political maxims illuftrated in the virtuous reign of his fellow-ftudent and fove- reign. ' Diodor. Sicul. 1. xvi. feft. 122. " Dionyf. Epift. ad Amm»um. c 2 12 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. reign. But, to render his condition enviable, an eflential re- quifite was wanting, namely, that of fecurity. Artaxerxes, whofe fuccefs againft the rebels in Egypt had exceeded his moft fanguinc hopes, could no longer brook the difmemberment of the fair coaft of Myfia, through the ufurpation of a flave and a eunuch. Mentor ", a Greek, and kinfman of Memnon the Rhodian, a general fo famous in the Perfian annals, had fig- nalifed his zeal and valour in the Egyptian war. He was one of thofe crafty and unprincipled Greeks, whom the ambitious hopes of raifmg a fplendid fortune often drew to a ftandard na- turally hoftile to their country ; and his recent merit with Ar- taxerxes recommended him as the fitteft inftrument to be em- ployed in chaftifmg the Myfian ufurper. This employment he did not decline, although the man whom he was commiffioned to deftroy had formerly beeii numbered among his friends". Men- tor marched with a powerful army to the weftern coaft. He might have effeded his purpofe by open force ; but to accomr- pliih it by ftratagem, was both more eafy in itfelf, and more fuitable to his charader. He had been conneded with Her- meias by the facred ties of hofpitality ; the fandlity of this con- nexion was revered by the greateft profligates of antiquity ; but the impious Mentor knew no religion but obedience to his maf- ter's commands. He employed his former intimacy with Her- meias as the means of decoying that unwary prince to an inter- view : » Ariftotle himfelf branJs with infamy tliis fuccefsful knave, bycontrailing his pro- fligate dexterity with the real virtue of prudence. Αλλχ «iiot «.£• z>.i ί (px^'Kuc y.iy:Tcci,Sic. " A fcoundrel may be clever ; for example. Mentor, who feemed to be very clever, but furely was not prudent ; for it belongs to prudence to defire and [irerer only the beft ends, and to carry fuch only into execution : but clevernefs implies baiely that fertility in refource, and dexterity in execution, by which any purpofes, whether good or bad, may be fitly and fpeedily accompliflied." M-ign. Moral. 1. i. c. 25. p. 171. • Diodor. Sicul. 1. xvl. fedt. 122. and cruel ar- tifices. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. ' 13 view . Mentor feized his perfon, and fent him privately to Upper Afia, where, by order of Artaxerxes, he was hanged as a traitor ^ The cruel artifices of Mentor ended not with this His fingular tragedy. Having poiTefied himfelf of the ring which the un- fortunate Hermeias ufually employed as his fignet, he fealed with it his own dlfpatches, and immediately fent them to the cities that acknowledged the fovereignty of a man, whofe mild exercifc of power tended, in the minds of his fubjeits, to juftify the irregular means by which he had acquired it. In thefe dlf- patches Mentor fignified that, through his own interceifion^ Hermeias had obtained peace and pardon from the great king. The magiftrates of the revolted cities eafily gave credit tc intelligence moft agreeable to their wiihes ; they opened their gates without fufpiclon to Mentor's foldiers, who inftantly made themfelves mailers both of thofe Myfian ftrong- holds, which might have made a long and vigorous refiftance to the Perfian arms, and of the powerful garrifons by which they were de- fended '', One further deception crowned the fuccelsful perfidy of Mentor. He affedled to treat the conquered places with un- exampled moderation. He was particularly careful to keep in their offices the fame collectors of revenues and Intendants who had been em.ployed by Hermeias. Thofe officers, when they were firil apprifed of the danger which threatened their mailer, concealed their treafures under ground, or depofited them with their friends ; but when they found themfelves treated with fo much unexpeded generofity by the invader, they refumed their wonted confidence, and conveyed back into their ow^n coffers their long-accumulated wealth ; of whlcli circumilance Mentor was nO' * Diodor. ubi fupra. Helladius apud Phot. Biblioth. p. 866. Poiyaen. Straiag». vi. 48» "ϊ Diodor. ubi fupra. 14 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. no fooner informed by his emiflaries, than he feized both the efFedls and the perlbns of thofe too credulous coUedlors '. Ariilotle The veil of moderation which Mentor's policy had aflumed Lefbos/° '^"- his firil tranfadions at Atarneus, enabled Ariilotle to avoid the puniihment which too naturally fell on the ambition of his friend. By a feafonable flight he efcaped to Mitylene in the ifle of Lefbos, in company with Pythias, the kinfwoman and adopted helrefs of the king of Affus and Atarneus, but now miferably fallen from the lofty expe£tations in which her youth had been educated. But this fad revcrfe of fortune only en- His marriage deared her the more to Ariilotle, who married the fair compa- wit yt las. ^.^^ ^^ j^.^ flight in his thirty-feventh year ' ; which is pre- cifely that age pointed out by himfelf as the fitteft, on the male fide, for entering into wedlock '. Pythias died ihortly after- wards, leaving an infant daughter, whom Ariilotle named after a wife tenderly beloved, and who repaid his affedlion with the mofl; tender fenfibility. It was her lail requeil that, when Arif- totle (which might the Fates long avert!) ihould die, her own bones might be difmterred, and carefully inclofed within the monument of her admired huiband ". Is invited to The Stagirite pafl"ed but a ihort time in the foft ifland of Macedon. Lefbos, in the tender indulgence either of love or of melan- choly. During his refidence in Athens, he had ilrengthened his hereditary friendihip with Philip of Macedon, a prince one year younger than himfelf, who, having lived from the age of fifteen ' We learn this particular, which is neceflary to explain what follows in the text, from Ariftotle himfelf, in his curious treatife De Cura Rei familiaris, p. 508. ' Comp. Dionyf. Epift. ad Ammaeum ; & Diogen. Laert. in Ariftot. * Politic. 1. vii. {e£t. 16. * Diogen. Laert. ubi fupra. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 15 fifteen to that of two-and-twenty in Thebes and the neighbour- ing cities, afcended the throne of his anceftors in the twenty- third year of his age. The bufy fcenes of war and negociation in which PhiUp was immediately after his accefllon engaged by neceffity, and in which he continued to be involved during his whole reign by ambition, feem never to have interrupted his correfpondence with the friends of his youth; with thofe who either poffefled his aifedion, or who merited his admiration ". In the fifth year of his reign his fon Alexander was born ; an event which he notified to Ariftotle in terms implying much previous communication between them : " Know that a fon is Philip's let- ^ -r 1 r • 11 tertobim. born to us. We thank the gods for their gift, but efpecially for bellowing it at the time when Ariftotle lives ; alTuring our- felves that, educated by you, he will be worthy of us, and wor- thy of inheriting our kingdom \" If this letter was written at the sera of Alexander's birth, it muft have found Ariftotle at Athens in his twenty-ninth year, ftill a diligent ftudent in the fchool of Plata. But it is certain that the Stagirite did not aiTume the office of preceptor to the fon of Philip till fourteen years afterwards, when the opening chara£ter of this young prince feemed as greatly to merit, as peculiarly to require, the affiftance of fo able an inftrudor \ In the fecond year of the 1 09th « Hiftory of ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. jj. * Aulus Gellius, 1. ix. c 3. y The chronology is clearly afcertained by Dionyfius of HalicarnaiTus's letter to Amraaeus; yet the accurate Quintilian, becaufe it ferved to enforce his argument, fays, " An Philippus, Macedonum rex," &c. " Would Philip, king of the Mace- donians, have thought fit that Ariftotle, the greateft philofopher of the age, (hould have been employed in teaching his fon Alexander the firft rudiments of learning, or would Ariftotle himfelf have accepted of fuch an office, had he not believed it of the utmoft importance to the fuccefs of our future ftudies, that their firft foundation fiiould be laid by a teacher of confummate ikiU ?" Quintil. /«/?//. 1• i• c. i. i6 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 1 09th olympiad, Ariftotle, probably in confequence of a new invitation from Philip, failed from the ifle of Lefbos, in which he had refided near two years, efcaped the dangers of the Athe- nian fleet, which then carried on war againft Macedon, and arrived at the court of Pella % to undertake one of the few em- ployments not unworthy of an author qualified to inftrud: and benefit the lateft ages of the world. His merit In the education of Alexander, the Stagirite fpent near eight fn the'edu! years ; during which long period, in an office of much delicacy, cation of j^g enjoyed the rare advantage of giving the higheft fatisfadlion to his employers, while he excited the warmeft gratitude in his pupil '. The temper of Alexander, prone to every generous affedlion, loved and efteemed many ; but Ariftotle is the only one of his friends whofe fuperior genius he appears unceafingly to have viewed with undiminiihed admiration, and whom he feems to have treated through life with uniform and unalterable Honours be- refpedl. By Philip and his proud queen Olympias, our philo- him by fopher was honoured with every mark of diftin£tion which ^' greatnefs can beftow on iliuftrious merit. Philip placed his ftatue near to his own : he was admitted to the councils of his fovereign, where his advice .was often ufeful, always honour- able; and where his kind interceffion benefited many individuals, and many communities \ On one occafion the Athenians re- warded his good fervices, by ere£ling his ftatue in the citadel " : and his letters, both to Philip and to Alexander, attefted his un- remitting exertions in the caufe of his friends and of the pub- lick, as well as his manly freedom in admonifhing kings of their * Dionyf. Halicarn. ubi fupra. . ' Plutarch, in Alexand. .torn. i. p. 668.; & adverf. Colot. t. ii. p. 11 26. * Ammonias Vit. Ariftot. * Paufanias Eliac. ter. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. i; their duty ''. But the ruling paflions of Philip and Alexander, the interefted policy of the one, and the lofty ambition of the other, were too ftrong and too ungovernable to be reftrained by the power of reafon, fpeaking through the voice of their ad- mired philofopher. The ambition of Alexander had early taken root ; and the peculiarities of his charadler had difplayed them- felves, in a very public and very important tranfadion, which happened feveral months before the Stagirite arrived at the court of Pella. During Philip's lUyrian expedition, Macedon Peculiarities was honoured with an embaiTy from the Great King. In the der's charac- abfence of his father, Alexander, fcarcely fourteen years old, received the ambaifadors ; and his converfation with thofe illuf- trious ftrangers, at a period in hiftory when the public confer- ences of great perfonages confifted not merely in words of cere- mony, afforded a juil fubjed of praife and wonder. Inftead of admiring their external appearance, or aiking them fuch fuper- ficial queftions as correfponded with the unripenefs of his years, he inquired into the nature of the Perfian government ; the charader of Ochus, who then reigned ; the ftrength and com- pofition of his armies ; the diftance of his place of refidence from the weftern coaft ; the ftate of the intermediate country, and particularly of the high roads leading to the great capitals of Sufa and Babylon \ To his premature love of aggrandize- ment, Alexander already added fmgular dexterity and unex- ampled boldnefs in his exercifes, particularly in horfemanihip ; the moft fervid affedions, invincible courage, and unbending dignity \ In i Ammonius, ibid. See alfo the fragments ftiil remaining in Du Valle's edition, p. 1 102. & feq. ■= Plutarch, in Alexand. ' Idem ibid VOL. I. D ιίί LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. In training fuch a youth, the Stagirite had a rich field to cul- tivate J but he could only hope to give a new diredtion to paf- The plan fions, which it was too late to moderate or control. In his followed by Ariftotle in treatife on Politics, he has carefully delineated the plan of ticn. education beft adapted to perfons of the higheft rank in fociety; and, in performing the tafk affigned to him by Philip, this plan was to be flvilfully modified, by adjufting it to the peculiar cir- cumftances and extraordinary chara£ler of his pupil. Alexan- der's loftinefs could not be conquered, but it might be made to combat on the fide of virtue : if he was angry, it was proved to him that anger was the efied of infult, and the mark of infe- riority ^. His love for military glory, which, while it is the idol of the multitude, will always be the paffion of the great, could neither be reftrained nor moderated ; but, to rival this tyrant of his breaft, ftill more exalted affedions were infpired, which rendered Alexander as much fuperior to conquerors, as conquerors deem themfelves fuperior to the loweft of the vulgar. Agreeably to a maxim inculcated in that book of Ariftotle's Politics which relates to education, the two years immediately following puberty conftitute that important period of life, which is peculiarly adapted for improving and ftrengthening the bo- dily frame, and for acquiring that corporeal vigour which is one main fpring of mental energy. During this interefting period of youth, with the proper management of which the fu- ture happinefs of the whole of life is fo intimately connected, Ariftotle obferves that the intellectual powers ought indeed to be kept in play, but not too ftrenuoufly exercifed, fince power- ful exertions of the mind and body cannot be made at once, nor ε Lilian. Vari Hift. 1. xii. c. 54. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 19 nor the habits of making them be fimultaneoufly acquired. In conformity with this principle, Alexander was encouraged to proceed with alacrity in his exercifes, till he acquired in them unrivalled proficiency ; after which, the whole bent of his mind was dire£ted to the moil profound principles of fcience. It is the opinion of many, that a flight tindture of learning is Ariftotle's fufficient for accomplifhing a prince. Both Philip and Ari- igfophy. ftotle thought otherwife ; and the ardent curiofity of Alexander himfelf was not to be fatisfied with fuch fuperficial and meagre inftruftions as have been fometimes triumphantly publiihed for the ufe of perfons deftined to reign. The young Macedonian's mind was therefore to be fharpened by whatever is mofl nice in diftindlion, and to be exalted by whatever is moft lofty in fpe- culation '' ; that his faculties, by expanding and invigorating amidft objeds of the higheft intelleilion, might thereby be ren- dered capable of comprehending ordinary matters the more readily and the more perfedtly '. This recondite philofophy, which was delivered by the Stagirite, firft to his royal pupil, and afterwards to his hearers in the Lyceum, received the epithet of acroatic^, to diftinguifli thofe parts of his ledtures which •^ Plutarch. iiiAlexand. ' Ariftot. de Anima, 1. iii. c. 5 & 6. & Ethic. Nicom. 1• x• c. 7 & 8. * This divifion of Ariftotle's works into acroatk and exoteric, has given rife to a variety of opinions ant' difputes ; which all have their fource in the different accounts given by Plutarch and Aulas Gellius, on one hand ; and by Strabo, Cicero, and Am- monias, on the other. The former writers (Plutarch, in Alexand. ; & Aulus Gellius, L XX. c 4.) maintain that the acroatic, or, as they call them, the acroamatic works, differed from the exoteric in the nature of their fubjefls, which confifted in natural phi- lofophy and logic; whereas the fubje£ls of the exoteric were rhetoric, ethics, and D ζ politics. 20 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. "which were confined to a feledt audience, from other parts called exoteric, bccaufe delivered to the public at large. It has been fuppofed that, in thofe two kinds of leftures, the Stagirite maintained contradidory dodtrines on the fubjeds of religion and morality. But the fad; is far otherwife : his practical tenets were uniformly the fame in both ; but his exoteric or popular treatifes nearly refembled the philofophical dialogues of Plato or Cicero ; whereas his acroatic writings (which will be explained in the following chapter) contained, in a concife energetic ftyle peculiar to himfelf, thofe deep and broad principles on which al! folid fcience is built, and, independently of which, the moil operofe reafonings, and the moil intricate combinations, are but Highly priz- matters of coarfe mechanical pradtice '. The fublimity of this ed by Alex- j^^^fl-j-a^t and recondite philofophy admirably accorded with the loftinefs of Alexander's mind ; and how highly he continued to prize it, araidil the tumultuary occupations of war and go- vernment, politics. But the opinions of both Plutarch and Gellius (for they do not entirely co- incide) are refuted by Ariftotle's references, as we ihall fee hereafter, from his Ethic to his exoteric works. The latter clafs of writers (Strabo, 1. xiii. p. 608. ; Cicero ad Attic, xiii. 19. ; & Ammonius Herm. ad Cataegor. Ariftot.) maintain, that the acro- atic works were diftinguillied from the exoteric, not by the difference of the fubjefts, but by the different manner of treating them ; the former being difcourfes, the latter dialogues. ' Simplicius and Philoponus allow other writings befides the dialogues to have been: exoteric, as hiftorical difquifitions, and whatever elfe did not require for underftand- ing them intenfe thought in the reader. Simplicius fays that Ariftotle was purpofely obfcure in his acroatic writings : " ut fegniores ab eorum ftudio repellcrer & dehorta- retur." Simplic. ad Aufcult. Phyfic. fol. ii. This would have been a very unworthy motive in the Stagirite : but the truth is, that the obfcurity of Ariftotle's works pro- ceeds from a corrupt text. When the text is pure, his writings are as eafily intel- ligible, as a mere fyllabus of leisures on moft abftrufe fubjedls can well be rendered ► LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 21 vernment, appears from the following letter, written foon after C HA P. the battle of Gaugamela, and while he was yet in purfuit of u— ^i ) Darius : " Alexander wiihing all happinefs to Ariftotle. You have not done right in publiihing your acroatic works. Wherein ihall we be diftinguiihed above others, if the learning, in which we were inftruded, be communicated to the public. I would rather furpafs other men in knowledge than in power. Fare- well ""." Ariftotle, not confidering this letter as merely com- plimental, anfwered it as follows: " You wrote to me con- cerning my acroatic works, that they ought not to have been publiihed. Know that in one fenfe this ftill is the cafe, fmce they can be fully underftood by thofe only who have heard my leftures "." Of thofe much-valued writings, the theological part, if at all publiihed, was probably moft involved in a fub- lime obfcunty. To have maintained, in plain and popular lan- guage, the unity and perfedions of the Deity, muft have ex- cited againft the Stagirite an earlier religious perfecution than that which really overtook him. Yet in this pure theology Alexander was carefully inftruded ; as his preceptor reminded him in the midft of his unexampled vidories and unbounded conquefts, concluding a letter with this memorable admonition ; that " thofe who entertain juft notions of the Deity are better entitled to be high-minded, than thofe who fubdue kingdoms"." Ariftotle's love of philofophy did not, like that of Plato, fet Ariftotle's f. 1 • 1 genius for him at variance with poetry. He frequently cites the poets, poetry. particularly » Aulus Gellius, 1. xx. c. 5. η Idem ibid. If thefe letters be afcribed to their right authors, they prove in what light Ariftotle regarded his acroatic works ; he confidered them merely as text-books,- • Plutarch, in Alexand. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. paiticularly Homer ; and he prepared for his pupil a corred copy of the Iliad, which that admirer of kindred heroes always carried with him in a caiket, Λvhence this tranfcript was called " the Iliad of the Caiket ^" The Stagirite was not only the heft critic in poetry, but himfelf a poet of the firft eminence. Few of his verfes indeed have reached modern times ; but the few which remain prove him worthy of founding the lyre of Pindar '' ; and it is not the leaft fmgularity attending this extra- ordinary man, that with the niceft and moft fubtile powers of difcrimination and analyfis, he united a vigorous and rich vein -of poetic fancy. The nature Ariftotle carefully inftruded his pupil in ethics and politics. ftruaions to ^^^ wrote to him, long afterwards, a treatife on government ; Alexander in ^nd exhorted him to adiuft the raeafure of his authority to the ethics and politics. various character of his fubjedls ; agreeably to a doftrine which he frequently maintains in his political works, that different nations require different modes of government, refpedtively adapted to their various turns of mind, and different habits of think:ing \ From the ethic writings of Ariftotle Λvhich ftill re- main, and which are the moft praftically ufeful of any that pagan antiquity can boaft, it is eafy to dete£t that wicked ca- lumny of his enemies, " that, for fordid and felfiih purpofes, he accommodated the tenets of his philofophy to the bafe mo- rals of courts '." It may be fafely affirmed that, if Alexander is f Plutarch, in Alexand. vol. i. p. 688. 'i Menag. Obfervat. in Diogen. Laert. 1. v. p. 189. ' Plutarch, in Alexand. ' This abfurdity is brought forward and infifted on by Brucker, Hiftor. Philofoph. vol. i. p. 797. Nothing can be more erroneous or more unintelligible than Brucker's account of Ariftotle's philofophy. I have heard it faid in his own country, that this laborious German did not underftand Greek ! viour. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 23 is dlilinguiihed above other princes for the love of knowledge ' and virtue, he was chiefly indebted for this advantage to his preceptor : the feeds of his haughtinefs and ambition were fown before Ariftotle was called to dired his education ; his excel- lencies therefore may be afcribed to our philofopher " ; his imperfedions to himfelf, to Philip, above all to the intoxicating effeds of unbounded profperity. This is the language of anti- quity, and even of thofe writers who are the leaft partial to the fame of the Stagirite. After the moft intimate communication during the fpace of Ariaotle re- - J r commends eight years % the pupil and the preceptor leparated tor ever, Callifthenes to purfue, in a career of almoft equal length, the moft oppofite g^ ^^i"' paths to the fame immortal renown ; the one by arms, the f^l'lf^l other by philoibphy ; the one by gratifying the moft immo- ^ derate luft of power, the other by teaching to defpiie this and all fimilar gratifications. During his eaftern triumphs, termi- nated in the courfe of ten years by his premature death, Alex- ander (as we ihall have occafion to relate) gave many illuftrious proofs of gratitude to the virtuous diredor of his youth. One incident, and one only, feems to have occafioned fome difguft between them. At leaving the Court of Pella, Ariftotle recom- mended, as worthy of accompanying Alexander in his Perfian expedition, his own kinfman Callifthenes, an Olynthian ; a learned t See the proofs of this in Plutarch, p. 668. Alexander fpared the houfe of Pindar, in the rack of Thebes j and the town of Ereffus in Leibos, in his war with the Per- fians, becaufe it was the birth-place of Theophraftus and Phanias, Ariftotle's difciplcs. In the midft of his expedition, he wrote to Athens for the works of the tragic poets. With the dithyrambics of Teleilus and Philoxenus, and the hiftory of Phihftus. " Αξ.Γοτ£λ« T« hon^ ^υμ?«λίΐ.^ν Αλ£|«»ίξ^ ^ολλο.ς «.?),λψο; r,. i^^lian. Var. Hift. 1. xii. J.. 54. » Dionyf. Halicarn•; & Diogen. Laert. ubi fupra. £4 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. Suppofed rupture be- tween Ari- ftotle and Alexander. learned and certainly an honeft man, but of a morofe unaccom- modating temper, pertinacioufly attached to the old fyftem of republicanifm, which the father of Alexander had overturned in Greece ; equally daring and inflexible in his purpofes, and unfeafonably bold in his fpeech ''. Ariftotle himfelf perceived and lamented his faults, and admoniihed him in a line of Homer, " that his unbridled tongue might occafion his early death %" The prophecy was fulfilled. Callifthenes, not re- fleding that " he who has once condefcended" (in the words of Arrian) " to be the attendant of a king, ought never to be wanting in due deference to his will," rudely and outrageoufly oppofed Alexander's refolution of exadting the fame marks of homage from the Greeks which were cheerfully paid to him by the Perfians \ The manner of Callifthenes's puniihment and death is related more varioufly " than almoft any hiftorical event of fuch public notoriety ; but moil writers concur in opinion, that he met with the juft reward of his raihnefs and arrogance. This tranfaftion, it is aiferted, much eftranged Alexander from his ancient preceptor. The aflfertion however is not accompanied with any folid proof ' ; and the abfurd calumny, that Ariftotle not only regarded this pretended dif- pleafure y Arrian. Exped. Alexand. I. iv. c. 8. * Ωκυμοξ^ις ίΐ) ftoi TtJto; ισσίΜ β» ayojtvsii• H• XV'lii. 95• » Arrian. ubi fupra. ^ By Arrian, Curtius, Juftin, Diogenes Laertius, Philoftratus, and Suidas. * Alexander's refentment is inferred from a vague and hafty expreflion in a letter to Antipater ; " To» St «•βιριΓΐι» tyu κοΧασυ, x»i TMi i«OT£ft7r;»Tct; uuTot—i will punifh the So- phift (meaning Callifthenes) and thofe who fent him." Plutarch, in Alexand. p. 6g6. Alexander, it is true, fent prefents to Xenocrates ; but fo did Antipater, who always remained Ariftotle's iincere and confidential friend. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. pleafure as an injury, but even proceeded to the wickednefs of joining in a confpiracy againft Alexander's life, is warranted by nothing in hiilory, but a hcarfay preferved in Plutarch '', and the affedled credit given to the monftrous report by the monfter Caracalla, for the unworthy purpofe of juftifying his ■own violence in deilroying the fchools of the Ariftotelian philo- fophers in Alexandria, the burning their books, and depriving them of all thofe privileges and revenues which they enjoyed through the munificence of the Ptolemies, Alexander's Egyp- •tian fucceflbrs ":. Having taken leave of the Macedonian capital, Ariftotle re- Plan of turned to his beloved Athens ; where he fpent thirteen ^ years, iife'in°' ^ * almoft the whole remainder of his life, inilruding his difciples, Athens, and improving the various branches of his philofophy. His acroatlc ledures were given in the morning to thofe who were iiis regular pupils ^. A confiderable part of them is ftill pre- ferved in his works, which form an abftrait or fyllabus of treatifes on the moft important branches of philofophy. His exoteric difcourfes were held after fupper with occafional vifit- ors, and formed the amufement of his evening walks " ; for he thought " exercife peculiarly ufeful after table for animating ■and invigorating the natural heat and ftrength, which the too rapid fucceihon of fleep to food feemed fitted to relax and en- cumber '." Before his arrival at Athens, Sheulippus was dead ; and *" " Thofe who fay that Ariftotle advifed Antipater todeftroy Alexander by poifon, cite for their authority a certain Agnothemif, who heard it from king Antigonus." Plut. in Alexand. p. 707. * Dion in Caracall. ' Dionyf. Epift. ad Ammaeum. 't Aulus Gellius, 1. xx. c. 5. '' Idem ibid. ' Piutaich, Conjug. Prxcept. p. 133. VOL. I, Ε 36 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. and Xenocrates, whofe dull gravity and rigid aufterlty a man of Ariftotle's charader could not much admire, had taken pof- fefllon of the academy ". The Stagirite, therefore, fettled in a gymnaftum in the fuburbs, well fliaded with trees, near to which the foldiers ufcd to exercife, and adorned by the temple of Lycian Apollo, from whofe per'ipaton^ or walk, Ariftotle and his followers were called Peripatetics '. It is reported that he opened his fchool, obferving, " That it would be ihameful for himfelf to be filent while Xenocrates publicly taught"." Ariftotle is not likely to have uttered fuch a prefumptuous boaft ; but if it was really made, even this arrogant fpeech was certainly very fully juftified by the fame which the Lyceum fpeedily acquired, which the Stagirite himfelf maintained un- impaired through life, and which was ably fupported by his difciple and fucceflbr Theophraftus. Such is the genuine hiftory of Ariftotle's life, in the moft important paflages of which all the ancient writers ", who have expreisly treated his biography, unitedly concur. By arrang- ing the fubjeft, therefore, according to our prefent method, both my '' Diogen. Laert. in Xenocrat. ' Menagius ad Diogen. Laert. 1• v. fed. 2. '" Diogen. Laert. in Ariftot. But Cicero, Quintilian, and Dionyfius Halicarn. read " Ifocrates" inilead of " Xenocrates." The reading in tiie text is the more pro- bable, for Ifocrates and Ariftotle, following very different purfuits, were not naturally rivals; befides, the former is faid to have died foon after the battle of Chseronaea in extreme old age, and Ariftotle did not return to Athens till three years after that de- cifive engagement. Compare my Life of Ifocrates, and the Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c 33. " Dionyfius of Halicarnaftlis, Diogenes Laertius, and Ammonias : the ancient Latin tranflation of this laft, firft publiftied by Nunnefius (Helmeftadij 1767), con- tiins feme additional circumftances, but thofe of little value, and of doubtful authority. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 27 my own labour will be abridged, and the reader's time Λνϋΐ be CHAP, faved ; for the calumnies againft Ariftotle will be no fooner ^_ _ '_ f mentioned than they will refute tliemfelves, and they could not pafs unnoticed, becaufe they are perpetuated in the farcafms of Lucian ", and the lying whilpers of Atheni^us % which have been too often miftaken, even by the learned, for true hiftory. The abfurd reports that Ariftotle firft ferved in the army, that Calumnies he there diifipated his fortune by low profligacy, and then fol- Ariibtle. lowed for bread the trade of an apothecary '', may be con- fidently rejedted by thofe who know, on unqueftionable autho- rity, that he became, at the early age of feventeen, a diligent ftudent in the academy at Athens, where he remained during the long period of twenty years. The reader who has feen the teftimonies of his gratitude to Plato, will not eafily be per- fuaded that he could treat this revered mafter with the grofleft brutality ' ; and let him who reads the Ethics to Nicomachus aik his own heart, whether it is likely that the author of fuch a treatife ihould, inftead of reftraining and correcting, have flattered " Lucian treats both Ariftotle and his pupil with equal injuftice. Vid. Dialog. Diogen. & Alexand. et Alexand. & Philip. Ρ Athenseus Deipnos. 1. viii. p. 354. s Athenaeus ubi fupra, and Ariftocles apud Eufebium. Their report relh on a fup- pofuitious letter of Epicurus on Study, and the aflertion of Timneus of Tauromenon in Sicily ; an author nicknamed Epitimseus, the Detractor. Diodorus Siculus, 1. v. c. I. Athenseus, 1. vi. p. 272. ' Αρ,ί-οτίλ»)? «μχ? avtXxxna-i — " Ariftotle has kicked at us j" a ftrong metaphor. Diogenes Laert. 1. v. feci. 2. yElian Var. Hiftor. 1. iii. c 19. afcribes both to Plato and to Ariftotle a behaviour totally inconfiftent with every thing that we know of their charaSers. Comp. JElhn, Var. Hift. 1. iv. c• 19. Photius, Eiblioth. c. 279. Auguftin.Je Civitate Dei, l.viii. c. 12. Such contradiilory reports mutually deftroy each other. Ε 2 18 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. flattered * and fomented the vices of Alexander. Inftead of farther examining thefe wild fidions, which ftand in dire£l contradidion to the matters of fad above related, it is of more importance to inquire whence fuch improbable tales could haΛ'e originated; efpecially as this inquiry will bring us to the events which immediately preceded our philofopher's death. Wherein From innumerable pafTages in the moral and political works l'ied.°'^'°'"' of which we have prefumed to oiler the tranflation to the public, it will appear that Ariftotle regarded with equal contempt vain pretenders to real fcience, and real profeflbrs of fciences which he deemed vain and frivolous. His theological opinions, alfo, were far too refined for the groifnefs of paganifm. He fought only for truth, and was carelefs of the obftacles which ftood in his way to attaining it, whether they were found in the errors of philofophers, or in the prejudices of the vulgar. Such a man, in fuch a city as Athens, where, fnice the days of Socrates, the learned taught publicly and converfed freely with all defcrip- tions of perfons, could not fail to have many rivals and many enemies. Sophifts and fciolifts, foothfayers and fatirifts, and that worft of banes, fatirical hiilorians ', heaped obloquy on a charader, the ornament of his own age, and deftined to be the inftrudor of pofterity. But the name of Alexander, which then filled the world, was duly refpeded, even in the turbulent democracy of Athens j and it was not till the year following the ' Lucian, Dial. Diogcn. & Alexand. ' Ariftoclcs (apud F.ufebium) fays, that Ariftotle was attacked by a hoft of writers, '• whofe boolcs and memories have periibed more completely than their bodies." Even his fellow ftudent, Ariftoxenus, who had treated him moft refpeilfully while he lived, heaped the moil illiberal reproaches on his memory, bccaufe he preferred to himfelf Theophraftus for his fUcceffor. Suidas in Ariftoxen. & Ariftoclcs apud Eufebium. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 29 the death of that incomparable prince, that the rancorous ma- lignity, which had been long fuppreiTed, burft forth againft Ariilotle with irrefiilible violence. He was accufed of irreligion before the Areopagus by the hierophant Eurymedon, abetted by Demophilus, a man of weight in the republic ; and both of them inftigated to this cruel profecution by our philofopher's declared enemies ". The heads of the accufation were, " that His accufa- Ariilotle had commemorated the virtues both of his wife Pythias Athens, and of his friend Hermeias, with fuch ceremonies and honours as the piety of Athens juftly referved for the majefty of the gods." To Hermeias, indeed, he erected a ftatue at Delphi ; he alfo wrote an ode in his praife. Both the infcription and tire ode have come down to modern times j the foi'mer fimply relating " the unworthy and treacherous death of Hermeias ;" and the latter " extolling virtue above all earthly pofleiTions ; and efpecially that generous patriotifm, for the fake of which the native of Atarneus, rivalling the merit of Hercules and Achilles, had willingly relinquiihed the light of the fun ; whofe fame therefore would never be forgotten by the Mufes, daughters of memory ; and as often as it was fung would redound to the glory of Hofpitable Jove'^^ and the honour of firm friendihip *■." From the frivoloufnefs of the accufation refpefting Hermeias, which was confidered as the chief article of the impeachment, we may warrantably conjeilure that the reproach of worship- ping Pythias with honours due to Eleufmian Ceres, was alto- gether groundlefs : but in a philofopher, whofe intelleftual rather than his moral virtues have been the objedt of panegyric, we may remark with pleafure both the ilrength of his friend- ihip, " Diogcn. Laert, 1. v. feiil. 4 & 5• * See above, p. 11. i' Laertius in Ariilot. Athen;euf, xv. p. 697. 3° LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. l^ip, and the fincere tendernefs of his love, fince both aifec- tions muil have been exprefled with an amiable enthufiafm, to enable even the malice of his enemies to interpret them into the crime of idolatry. His tenets It Hiuft not be diffembled that the accufation, and confequent ' a'i^°""iaied condemnation of Ariftotle by the Areopagus, has been afcribed to a different caufe from that above affigned, and referred merely to the impiety of his tenets. He is faid by thofe v^^ho have carelefsly examined his works, to have denied a Providence, and thence to have inferred the inefficacy of prayers and facri- - lices : dodlrines, it is obferved, which could not but enrage the priefthood, as totally fubverfive of its fun£lions, eftabliihments, and revenues ^. But never was any accufation urged more falfely or more ignorantly. Ariftotle, as it will be Ihewn here- after, enumerates the priefthood among the fundtions or offices eflentially requifite to the exiftence of every community. In writing to Alexander he fays, that thofe are not entitled to be high-minded w^ho conquer kingdoms, but rather thofe who have learned to form juft notions of the gods ^ ; and in his life, as well as in his works, he uniformly ihewed his veneration for religion in general, by treating, with great tendernefs % even that diftorted image of it refieited from the puerile fuperftitions of his country \ He ^ Origines contra Celfum & Bruckeri, Hiftor. Critic, vol. i. p. 790. . * Plutarch in Alexand. * This tendernefs, however, did not, probably, fatisfy the Athenian priefts ; who, as it will appear from the following analyfis of his works, had more to apprehend from his real piety, than to fear from his pretended irreligion. * Diogen. Laert. 1. v. kSt. 16. But the bed proof of this will appear hereafter, when we come to examine Ariilotle's works. 1 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 31 He is fald to have written his own defence, and to have in- veighed, in a ftrong metaphor, againft the increafing degeneracy of the Athenians \ His difcourfe, of which the boldnefs would only have inflamed the blind zeal of his weak or wicked judges, was not delivered in court ; fince he efcaped his trial by feafon- ably quitting Athens for Chalcis in Euboea, faying, in allufion His retreat to the death of Socrates, that he was unwilling to afford to the a^j death? Athenians a fecond opportunity of finning againil philofophy "*. He furvived his retreat to the ihores of the Euripus, fcarcely a twelvemonth ; perfecution and baniflunent having probably ihortened his days % His teftament, preferved in Diogenes Laertius, accords with the circumftances related concerning his life, and pradlically illuftrates the liberal maxims of his philofophy. Antipater, the confidential minifler of Philip, regent of Macedon both under Alexander and after his demife, is appointed the executor of this teftament, with an authority paramount, as it fhould feem, to His tefta- meiit. ' Laert. l.v. fefl. 16. 6χ>νι m οχντ, yr,(a.^Ku. Homer's liefcription of the gardens of Alcinous. " The fig rotting on the fig," alludes to the Athenian fycophants, fo called originally from informing againft the exporters of figs. * .^lian, iii. 36. ' St. Juftin (in admon. ad gentes) and Gregory of Naxianzen (contra Julian.) fay that he died through the uneafmefs of difcontent at not being able to explain the caufe of the tides of the Euripus ; upon which authority the puerile ftory is engrafted of his throwing himfelf into that arm of the fea, faying, " You ihall contain me, fince I cannot comprehend you." Others fay that he ended his life by poifon to efcape the vengeance of the Athenians (Rapin'sComparaifon de Platon & d' Ariftote). Such unwarranted reports would not be worthy of mention, did they not afford an opportunity of obferving the extreme improbability that Ariftotle ihould have been guilty of fuicide, fince he always fpeaks of it as of a ihamefu! and cowardly crime. ,2 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. J CHAP, to that of the other perfons who are afterwards conjouied with ,, ,' J him in the fame truft. To his wife Herpylis, (for he had married a fecond time,) Ariftotle, befides other property in money and flaves, leaves the choice of two houfes, the one in Chalcis, the other his paternal manfion at Stagira ; and de- fires, that whichever of them ihe might prefer, ihould be pro- perly furniihed for her reception. He commends her domeftic virtues ; and requeils his friends that, mindful of her behaviour towards him, they would diilinguifh her by the kindeft atten- tion ; and ihould ihe again think of a hufband, that they would be careful to provide for her a fuitable marriage. To Nico- machus, the fon of this Herpylis, and to Pythias, the daughter of his firft wife, he bequeathed the remainder of his fortune, with the exception of his library and writings, which he left to his favourite fcholar Theophraftus \ He defires that his daughter, when ihe attained a marriageable age, ihould be given to Nicanor, the fon of his ancient benefadlor Proxenus ; and failing Nicanor, that his efteemed difciple Theophraftus ihould accept her hand and fortune. The bones of his firft wafe Pythiac•, he ordered to be difinterred, and again buried with his own, as ihe herfelf had requefted. None of his flaves are to be ibid; they are all of them either emancipated by his will, or ordered to be manumitted by his heirs, whenever they ieem worthy of liberty; an injunftion conformable to the maxims inculcated in his " Politics," that flaves of all defcriptions ought to be let free, whenever they merited freedom, and are qualified for enjoying it. He concludes with a teftimony of external deference at leaft for the religion of his country, by ordering that the dedications which he had vowed for the fafety of '.Strabo, xiii. ^13. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. j of Nicanor, ihould be prefented at Stagira to Jupiter atid Minerva, the faviours. Thus lived and thus died, in his 63d year, Ariftotle the Stagirite. His enhghtened humanity was often feafoned by pleafantry. Many ftrokes of genuine humour, Uttle fufpeded by his commentators, will be found in his political \vritings. His- His fayings• fmart fayings and quick repartees were long remembered and admired by thofe incapable of appreciating his weightier merits. Some of thefe fayings, though apparently not the moil memo- rable, are preferved in Diogenes Laertius;- of which the following may ferve for a fpecimen. Being aiked, What, of all things,, fooneft grows old? — Gratitude. What advantage have you reaped from ftudy ? — That of doing through choice what others, do through fear. What is fnendihip ? — One foul in two bodies- Why do we never tire of the company of the beautiful ? — The queftion of a blind man ! Such apoththegms would be un- worthy of mention, had they not,- by their perpetual recurrence in our philofopher's converfation, ihewn a mind free and un- incumbered amidft the abilrufeft ftudies ; and, together with the moil intenfe thought, a readinefs of wit,, which never failed to repel fneerers, and to abaih arrogance^. He exhibited a charader as a man, worthy of his pre-eminence as a philofopher;, inhabiting courts, without meannefs and without feliiihnefs ; living in fchools, without pride and without aufterity •"; culti- vating with ardent aifedlion every domeflic and every focial virtue, while with indefatigable mduilry he reared that wonder- ful edifice of fcience, the plan of which we are ilill enabled to delineate from his imperfed and mutilated v;ritings. The: « Diogen. Laert. in Arillot. Si Diogen. •> Plutarch, de Virtut. Moral, p. 448. YOL.. I. Ϊ- •* 34 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. The extraordinary and unmerited fate of thefe writings, while it excites the curiofity, muft provoke the indignation of every 1 he extra- fnend to fcicnce. Few of them were pubUihed in his Ufetime : ordinary fate '^ of his writ- the greater part nearly periflied through negledt ; and the re- mainder has been fo grofsly mifapplied, that doubts have arifen whether its prefervation ought to be regarded as a benefit. Ariftotle's manufcripts and library were bequeathed to Theo- phraftus, the moft illuftrious of .his pupils. Theophraftus again bequeathed them to his own fcholar Keleus, who carry- ing them to Scepfis, a city of the ancient Troas, left them to his heirs in the undiftinguiilied mafs of his property. The heirs of Neleus, men ignorant of literature and carelefs of books '', totally negledted the intelledual treafure that had moft unworthily devolved to them, until they heard that the king of Pergamus, under whofe dominion they liAi^ed, was employ- \ ing much attention and much refearch in colledling a large library '. With the caution incident to the fubjefts of a defpot, who often have recourfe to concealment in order to avoid rob- bery, they hid their books under ground ; and the writings of Ariftotle, as well as the vaft colledlion of materials from which they had been compofed, thus remained in a fubterranean man- fion for many generations, a prey to dampnefs and to worms ''. At * Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608 & 609. Ba-yle gives too ftrong a' meaning to ιο.ωτιι? κif()ξω■7roiς, wlieii he calls them " gens idiots :" iSium; means one who confines his at- tention to the private affairs of life, in oppofition to philofophers and itatefmen. » Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608. ^ Athenaeus, 1. i. p. 3. fays, that Neleus fold Ariilotle's books to Ptolemy Phila- delphus ; andBayle (article Tyrannion) endeavours with Patricius (Difcun". Peripatet. t. i. p. 29. ) to reconcile this account with that of Strabo, by fuppofing that Neleus indeed fold Ariftotle's library and works to king Ptolemy, but not before he had taken ;the precaution of having the whole carefully copied. According to thofe writers, the books LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 35 At length they were releafed from their prifon, or rather ralfed CHAP, from the grave, and fold for a large fum, together with the i_ -.'- . f works of Theophraftus, to Apellicon of Athens, a lover of books rather than a fcholar ' ; through whofe labour and expence the work of reftoring Ariftotle's manufcripts, though performed in the fame city in which they had been originally written, was very imperfedly executed. To this, not only the ignorance of the editors, but both the condition and the nature of the writ- ino-s themfelves did not a little contribute. The moil confi- derable part of his acroatic works, which are almoft the whole of thofe now remaining, confift of little better than text books, containing the detached heads of his difcourfes ; and, through want of connexion in the matter, peculiarly liable to corruption from tranfcribers, and highly unfufceptible of conjedlural emen- dation. What became of Ariftotle's original manufcript, we are not Publiilied at informed ; but the copy made for Apellicon was, together with Andlonjc his whole library, feized by Sylla, the Ronaan conqueror of «f ^^""des Athens, and by him tranfmitted to Rome ". Ariftotle's works excited books thus copied, and not the originals, fuiFered the unworthy treatment mentioned in the text. This fuppolition fecms highly improbable ; far not to mention the diffi- culty of copying, in a ihort time, many thoufand volumes, it cannot be believed that Ptolemy, had he been in pofleffiofi of the genuine works of Ariftotle, would have pur- chafed at a high price thofe counterfeits, which had no other connexion with that philofopher than bearing his forged name on their title-page. ( Ammonius ad Categor fub init.) Had a corred copy of the Stagirite's works adorned the library of Alex- andria under the firft Ptolemies, his genuine philolbphy would have ftruck deeper root, and made farther progrefs than it ever did, in that Egyptian capital. "V offius (de Sed. Philofoph. c. xvi. p. 89.) endeavours to prove thzt Athenreus's words (which are certainly incorred) imply that Nelcus retained Ariftotle's works wnenhe fold all the reft. >' Strabo fays, " rather than a philofopher." '" Plutarch in Sylla. Έ 2 yciis j6 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. excited the attention of Tyrannion, a native of Amyfus ift Pontus, who had been taken prifoner by LucuUus in the Mithridatic war, and infolently manumitted °, as Plutarch fays, by Muraena, Lucullus's lieutenant. Tyrannion procured the manufcript by paying court to Sylla's librarian ; and commu- nicated the ufe of it to Andronycus of Rhodes, who flouriihed as a philofopher at Rome, in the time of Cicero and Pompey ; and who, having undertaken the taik of arranging and corre£t- ing thofe long injured writings, finally performed the duty of a ikilful editor *. Their num- Though the works which foi'med the obje£l of Andronycus's nUude. "^^^' labours had fuiFered fuch injuries as the utmoft diligence and fagacity could not completely repair p, yet in confequence of thofe labours the Peripatetic philofophy began to refume the luftre of which it had been deprived fmce the days of Theo- phraftus ; and the later adherents to that fe£t, as they became acquainted with the real tenets of their mafter, far fuiyaifed the » Plutarch fpeaks with the dignity becoming a man of letters, who feels himfelf fuperior to the prejudices of his times : " That to give liberty by manumiflion to a man of Tyrannion's education and merit, was to rob him of that liberty which he natu- rally and eflentially poflefled." Plutarch in Lucull. p. 504. I have melted into one fentence on yxp t^tdv (read α|ιον) AodxouMo; οα^ξχ λα ταιίίΐα» ίσ5Γοι;ίασ^6£ϊΐ)«— and ΛίρΜξίσις γας in της νναξρ(οι:ττζ ή της όίχασης ίλ£ίθ£ρας eoau. • Plutarch inSytl. Porphyr. in Vita Plotini. Boetius inProcemiolibri de interpret. Strabo only fays that Tyrannion, in the manner mentioned in the text, got poiTeifion of the manufcript ; which was copied for the Roman bookfellers by carelefs tranfcribers, who did not even take the pains of comparing their copies with the original : a ne- gligence, he obferves, too common among the tranfcribers both in Rome and Alex- andria. » Even after this publication, Ariftotle's followers were obliged τ« itoXKa. αχ^τως λί^Είν ίια το ττλίίθος to» a /Ααζτιαι•., " often to gucfs at his meaning, through the faultinefe j£ his text." Strabo, in the place above cited. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 37 the fame and merit of their ignorant and obfcure predeceiTors ". From the £era of Andronycus's publication to that of the inven- tion of printing, a fucceiTion of refpedable writers on civil and facred fubjeds (not excepting the venerable fathers of the Chriftian church) confirm, by their citations and crlticifms, the authenticity of moil of the treatifes ftill bearing Ariftotle's name ; and of more than ten thoufand ' commentators, who have endeavoured to illuftrate different parts of his works, there are incomparably fewer than might have been expeded, whofe vanity has courted the praife of fuperior difcernment by rejeding any confiderable portion of them as fpurious '. According to the moil credible accounts, therefore, he com- pofed above four-hundred ' different treatifes, of which only forty- » Str-abo, 1. xiii. p. 609. He obferves, " that the Peripatetic philofophers fucceed- ing Theophraftus had, till this time, but few of their mailer's works, and thofe few chiefly of the exoteric kind j fo that they were more converfant about words than things; and inftead of reafoning accurately and profoundly, were contented with dif- playing their (kill in diale£lic and rhetoric." I have thus paraphrafed the obfcurity of the original φίλοσοφιι> ■ττξαγματίχω•; and θίσεις ληχο^^ζαν, becaufe Strabo, who had himfelf diligently ftudied Ariftotle's philofophy (Strabo, 1. xvi. p. 757.), ufes the word ιτξαγ- μ,Λτικως, mofl; probably, in the fame fenfe in which it occurs in Ariftotle, as fynony- mous with «x^iCwc, κατ* «λϋΟκα» ; and in oppofition to ίι«λ£χτι««{ and το ieaXtyEirflai ' Patricius DifcuiT. Peripatet. 9 Compare Diogenes Laertius in Vit. Ariftot. Patric. DifcuiT. Peripatetic. Fabricius Bibliothcc. Grace. & Bruckerus Hiftor. Philof. artic. Ariftot. ' Diogenes Laertius (in Vit. Ariftot.) makes Ariftotle's volumes amount to four hundred ; Patricius Venetus, a learned profeflbr of Padua in the fixteenth century, endeavours to prove that they amounted to nearly double that number. (Patric. DifcufT. Peripat.) The laborious Fabricius employs one hundred pages of his fecond volume in enumerating and afcertaining Ariftotle's remains; which ftill exceed four times the colledlive bulk of the Iliad and Odyfley. The whole works of Ariftotle, therefore, muft have contained a quantity of profe, equal to fixteen times 28,088 verfesj afaa: 38 LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. forty-eight " have been tranfmitted to the prefent age. But many of thefe laft confiil of feveral books, and the whole of his remains together ilill form a golden chain of Greek eru- dition, exceeding four times the coUeilivc bulk of the Iliad and Odyifey. a fadt the more extraordinary, fince the greater part of his writings are merely elegant and comprehenlivc text books, containing the heads of his ledures ; laborious, but clear reafonings ; and often original difcoveries in the mod difficult branches of fcience. The following paflage concerning him in theFrench Ε ncyclopedie, article Ariftotelifme, muft excite a fmile of fomething more than furprife. " Le nombre de fes ouvrages efl prodigieux ; on en peut voir les titres en Diogene Laerce . . . encore ne fommes nous pas fars de les avoir tous : il eft meme probable que nous en avons perdu plufieurs," &c. • The treatifes de Plantis & de Mundo are rejeited by moft writers. The former is, indeed, of little value; the latter, of the greateft; but I do not cite it as an au- thority, becaufe it is my ambition to place my account of his philofophy beyond the KAch of cavil• η 9 ] CHAP. Π. yf NEW ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S SPECULATIVE WORKS. ARGUMENT. Satfat'ion — lis nature explabied — Imagifiation and memory — AJfociation of perceptions — Remmifcence — Intellect — Its power and dignity — Arifotles organon — Origin of general terms — Ca- tegories — Divifion and Definition — Propofitions — Syllogifms — Their nature and ufe — Second analytics — Topics — Arifotle' s organon perverted and inifappUed — Demonfiration — Arifotle s metaphyfics — Proper arrangement thereof — Truth vindicated — hitroduaion to the frf philofophy — Its hiflory — Refutation of the do&nne of ideas — Elements — Analyfis of the bodies f ο called — Their perpetual tranfnutations — DoElrine of atoms refuted — Motion or change — Its different kinds — Wo7-ks of nature — How her operations are performed — Matter — Form — Privation — The fpecific form or fight — State of capacity and energy — Ariflotle s afronomy — The earth and its produBions — Hifory of animals — Philofophy of natural hifory — His book 'on energy — The firf energy eternally and fuhfantially afiive — His attri- butes — Antiquity of the do Brine that Deity is the fource of being — Inculcated in Arifotle'' s exoteric works — ObjeElions to Arifotle s philofophy — Anfwers thereto. THE Works of Ariilotle derive their importance and fplen-• CHAP, dour, neither from their number nor their magnitude, ,_ . _' ^ but from their variety and their aim. Difdaining• the conqueft ^ ^^, differ- iof particular provmces, he daringly invaded the whole empire into which it - is divided. 5 of 4© MEW ANALYSIS OF CHAP, of philofophy ; and Tiis perfeverlng and generally fucceisful i_ — .- I i' exertions in this bold enterprife excites the jufteft admiration of his genius and induilry. The heavens and the earth ; things human and divine ; God, man, and nature ; under thefe com- prehenfive divifions of whatever is the obje<Α£>ος f«.o£» sie» a.v fta&oij, tjii συηοί• τα, it '^sfuTo. tor,j/.uTa, Ti:i oici^ii Τ8 ftti fa»-.. TcijfiaTa Eiicti ; ij ah ταντα βα»Τ5ια/χ»ται αλλ a» UiiV φαιτασμ-αταν ; DUt I no where find Ifl, Ariftotle the words univerfally afcribed to him, " Nihil eft in intelle£luj quid non prius fuerit in fcnfu." ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 41 fenfes, that of touch, he obferves, is generally diffufed through the whole animal frame, and cannot therefore be deftroyed without deftroying the animal ". The fenfe of tafte Ariftotle regards as a particular kind of touch, requifite for the purpofe of nutrition, and therefore eflential to life % But the three other fenfes, always refiding in particular organs, are in fome animals altogether wanting, in others extremely imperfed: ; and even in thofe animals in whom they are moil vigorous, are often, without deftruition to the animal itfelf, overwhelmed, weakened, or totally deftroyed, by the too powerful operation of their refpedtive objeds \ Colours and founds are perceived refpedively by the eye and Senidtiun. the ear, and by them only ; motions and figures are conveyed to the mind through the inftrumentality of more fenfes than one ; and a third clafs of perceptions are communicated and impreifed through the united energy of all the fenfes % Thofe of touch and of tafte feem to be nearly a-kin, becaufe external objeds feem to operate on them by dired and immediate ap- plication. This, however, is not probably the cafe ; becaufe, were it true, the analogy of nature would here be violated, fmce it is found by experiment, that external objeds, diredly and im- mediately applied to the organs of the three other fenfes, totally obftrud the motions on which their power of fenfation depends, and " Compar. Ariftot. de Anima, I. ii. c. iii. p. 633. and c. xi. p. 624. & kq. * Όhχvμoς,■^τ^rωva■π^m^ιn. Comp. 1. u. de Anima, c. iii. p.633,andc. lo, p.643. & feq. "I De Anima, 1. ii. c. 6, 7, 8, 9. ή Ta αισ9»τΰ ίΗίγιιχ ε» τω αιβτθίΐτιχοί ; and again, i ίε TS αισθίΐτ^ mifyii» Km τκ aie-Owii'j ϋ" Λΐιτί) fii» ίπ xai μ>Λ. De Anima, i. iii. c. i. p. 648. * De Anima, 1. ii. c. vi. p. 638. VOL. I. <"> 42 NEW ANALYSIS OF and render their refpedlive objeds, founds, colours, and odours, altogether imperceptible ^ By a rapid and continuous agitation of the air, fonorous bodies affedl the ear ; through the inter- vention of light, colours are diftinguiflied by the eye ; and odours arc communicated in a fubtile vapour, vphich muft in fome animals, before perception can have place, be accompanied with the adl of infpiring by the noftrils ^. Agreeably to this analogy, it is probable that the flefliy and tender part of our external frame, which feems to us to be endowed with fuch a delicate fenfe of touch, is nothing more than the medium through which the perceptions of hardnefs, foftnefs, and other qualities of that kind, are conveyed and communicated \ Its nature The real qualities of external objedls are fuppofed to be made exp aine . known to US by our fenfes ; but in fail thofe qualities, fuch as they are by us conceived and denominated, have not any adual exiftence until they are perceived '. Previoufly to this, they exift only in power or capacity ; which, in the language of Ariftotle, here means that they exift only in their caufes " ; caufes f iat "/ap Ti! Oil To £χοϊ xpufta m auTviv tm i^ii•, ακ οφίται ... ί is aero; λί^ί,-, »«i τιψ ψν^« χαι oj-ftoi £Γΐ> &c. De Anima, l.ii. c. vii. p. 639. * De Anima, 1. ii. c. ix. p. 643. f" De Aninaa, c. xi. p. 641. How far is this conjeilure connciSed with the dif- covery of the nerves and their funflions ? And to how many difcoveries might the ihrewd gueffes of Ariilotle, attentively examined, ilill give birth ? η oi Ta aiffOtjT» eiEpytia Kctt T115 αισ^γ,ΐίυς ri av-n ja.i» tri xari μίχ. De Anima, ]. iii. C. i. p. 6j8. And again, amyxD ά^,α ψ^ψσ^ια KM σωζισΰαι τη> ά-τω Xiyojinr.i axtni *«i ψ,,^Μ, χυμη» χαι ')'ίκσι», και τα άλλα ό^χ,οιως. De Anima, 1. iii. ς. i. p. 649. ^ Compare λχως yap λΕ^ομ£»ίς Tr,; αισθ^Εω? xai τα α.σΟν,ΤΗ, tuv μ,ιιι χατα ^νημιν, rat ii χχτ ticfynat, &C. De Anima, 1. iii. C. i. p. 649. And το /«» a» ftuTE τα αισβϋτα £ΐ«αι, (*iiTt τα αισθυρίίτα, ισκς αλγι6ι•;. τα yap uia^umjiua ■ααβος τντο ιτί' το ίί_τα vwoxii^ita μν ίΐ»βι « Είοιιι Tijn aifffinyifj χβι ακι• «ιβ-Ουο•!»);, αίΊΐϊατοϊ. Metaphyf. 1. iv. c. V. p. 870. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 43 caufes which, though themfelves imperceptible, have the power of moving and agitating our organs ', and thereby of producing in them that variety of fenfations, which relieves man from foli- tude, and conneds him with the external world. To beings differently conftituted, or to man himfelf, enjoying a dire£l and immediate intimacy with the caufes of his perceptions, this world would probably aflume an appearance altogether different from that which it now wears ; for all fenfation diredly and immediately depends, not merely on the nature of its external caufes, but on that alfo of the motions and changes produced iu the organs of fenfe. Ariftotle, therefore, juilly reproves Demo- critus for faying, that if no medium were interpofed, a pifmire would be vifible in the heavens ™ ; aiferting, on the contrary, that if vacuity alone intervened, nothing poifibly could be feen, becaufe all vifion is performed by changes or motions in the organ of fight ; and all fuch changes or motions imply an in- terpofed medium ". Between the perceptions of the eye and of the ear there is a ftriking analogy. Bodies are only vifible by their colour; and colour is only perceptible in light ; and unlefs different motions were excited by light in the eye, colour and the diitindions of colour would no more be vifible, than, independently of difierent vibrations communicated to the ear, found, and the diftindions of ' ,• h λιγ^^αο'ΐ «i^GrcTK, ω; "ifyi'«. *"w; τ.ς =%=. τ« ^"/^««t τ„ς ψι/%•« ^r.• De Somn. & Vigilia, ci. p. 685. ί oi «.aGu^r.,- ;>■ τ« ximcrSa. τε κ«. €7«σχπ, cri-f^S».*.. Dc Anima, 1. ii. c J. p• 636. "' De Anima, 1. ii. c. viii. p. 639. η De Senfu & Senfili, c. ii. p. 665. G 2 44 NEW ANALYSIS OF of found, would be audible °. When the vibrations in a given time are many, the fenfation of iharpnefs or ihrillnefs follows ; when the vibrations are, in the fame time, comparatively few, the fenfation of flatnefs is the refult : but the firft found does not excite many vibrations becaufe it is ihrill or fliarp, but it is fharp becaufe it excites many vibrations; and the fecond found does not excite few vibrations becaufe it is flat or grave, but it is grave becaufe it excites few vibrations "", Imagination The powers of imagination and memory owe their origin to an memory. ^^^ fenfes, and are common to man with many other animals. As fenfation is carried on by means of certain motions excited in our organs, fo imagination and memory, which are the copies of fenfation, exert their energy by means of fimilar but fainter motions, reprefentatives of the former''. That independently of external caufes fuch motions are produced, is demonftrable from what happens in fleep '. In fome kinds of madnefs too, the phantoms of the brain are miftaken for realities ' ; and, in other kinds, realities are miftaken for phantoms '. But when our ° De Anima, l.ii. c. viii. p. 641. See alfo 1- ii. c vii. p. 638. The intrepid ignorance of Voltaire might maintain, that Ariftotle confidered light as a quality merely ; and that luminous and coloured bodies had qualities exaflly fuch as they excited the ideas of in us. (Voltaire's Newtonian Philofophy.) But how could the learned Warburton aflent to this erroneous account of the Peripatetic philofophy ? See Divine Legation of Mofes, &c. b. iv. fedl. 6. ρ De Anima, l.ii. c viii. p. 641. < i h φαηασΜ trt aur^wn T»; aicriivm- Rhetor. 1. i. c. xi. p. 536. The fame doflrine is maintained De Anima, l.iii. c. 4. p. 65 2. and De Memor. Si Reminifcent. c. i. p. 680. c. ii. 682 & 683. ' De Anima, 1- iii. civ. p. 651. • Of this fee an extraordinary example in Mirabil. Aufcult. p• 1152. f De Anima, 1. iii. c. iv• p. 652. and De Mem. & Reminifc. c. i. p. 69o. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 45 our fenfes are found and awake, we can eafily diftinguiili be- CHAP, tween perceptions arlfing from external caufes, and thofe called ^ ' j into being by the mere agency of our internal conftitution ; and in many cafes we can difcover and explain the laws by which the energy of this conftitution operates ". For the per-• Aflbciation ceptions of imagination and memory, though not rigidly perceptions, governed, like thofe of fenfe, by the pOΛver and prefence of external objedls, do not, however, float at random, but are fubjedled to a certain order and progreffion, conformably to eftablilhed laws of aifociation, which Ariftotle was the firft philofopher that attempted to inveftigate, to enumerate, and to explain"'. He inveftigated them in analifing the complex a£t of reminifcence or recoUeftion, in which the principles of aifociation operate under the immediate direftion of the hu- fltian will. He enumerated them, as far as feemed requifite to the fubjedt which he was then treating, by faying that they might be reduced to the four following heads : proximity in time ; contiguity in place ; refemblance or fnnilarity j contra- riety or contraft '': And he explains them by ihewing, that in every " DeMemor. & Reminifcent. ci. p. 6So. " Ibid. c. 2. p. 68i. * Mr. Hume fays, " I do not find that any philofopher has attempted to enumerate or clafs all the principles of aflbciation ; a fubjefl, however, that feems very worthy of curiofity. To me there appears to be only three principles of connexion among ideas ; refemblance, contiguity in time or place, and caufe or cfFed." EfTays, fed. iii. of the Aflbciation of Ideas, vol. ii. p. 24. Mr. Hume might be ignorant that Ariftotle had attempted to enumerate the principles of aflbciation ; but it is an unpardonable error in logic, to affign caufe and efi^edl as one of thofe principles, fince caufe and eiFeft, as far as aflbciation is concerned, refolves itfelf into contiguity in time or place ; and according to Mr. Hume's doctrine, the very idea of caufe arifes folely from thefe connexions. Effays, vol. ii. pp. 34, 35. 88. 107. It may be re- marked that " the aflbciation of ideas" is a modern expreflion. Ariftotle did not need it, fmce the thing meant by it is referred by him to cuftom. τωγχ^ tun αχαλφο-ί «1 «(M) ι'ίί /ΛΕτα Tfiih. De Memor. p. 682. 46 NEW ANALYSIS OF CHAP, every aft of recoUeftion we are confcioiis of bunting about ^ as it li'ere, among our thoughts, until we hit on fome one which is intimately conneded with that which we wiih to recall j or, in other words, that we produce in fucceiTion a multitude of vibra- tions or motions in our organs, until we hit on fome one of them intimately connedled with that of which we are in quefl; ; and which has the power of reviving this laft, becaufe the one motion is either excited nearly at the fame time with the other, or is entirely the lame in kind with it, or fo nearly the fame, that the minute difference between them is fpeedily ovei-powered and loft, and from near agreement finally reduced to perfed: coincidence. Thus far our author proceeds in unfolding the mechanifm of fenfation, fancy ' , memory, and recolleftion ; or, in other words, in afcertaining the laws which regulate the union of mind and matter, without attempting the fruitlefs taik of explaining in what manner thofe totally heterogeneous "" fub- flances are united. Every exercife of recolledllon, he obferves, is a fpecies of in- veftigation, in which the mind may be confcious of its own activity in direding the current of its thoughts, in turning them from one channel to another, in rejecting thofe which hold by no tie to the perception or image of which it is in queft, and in preferring, examining, and contemplating in all their rela- tions f Fancy is here ufed in its ftri<£l and original meaning ; not, as in books of rhetoric and criticifm, for the power of combining ideas or images by creative genius, agreeably to the didlates of correal judgment and refined taile. * Ariftotle carefully diftinguiihes the percipient power from the motions accom- panying perception. ««ay*» ufx h η £ΐ>Λΐ τκξ J/t/^ijr, i, ctTsanx at^ucosTai, χαύατηρ tifzTat ejfoTtpo», άλλα h yimi; ίια κλλκ. De Scnfu, c. vu. p. 675. See alfo De Anima, 1. iii, c• X• p• 6f6. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 47 dons thofe which, by their connexion with this perception or image, have a natural tendency to roufe the one or to revive the other '. It is the charafteriftic of animals, in contradiftindtion to the in- Reminif- animate parts of nature, to be endowed with fenfation ; and what- r^n^f '^^ i ^ ^ ' htlt bound- ever is endowed with fenfation mufl have perceptions of pain ary between and pleafure ; and whatever has fuch perceptions muft feel the other ani- impulfe of appetite ; the great moving principle in all animated '"^^' beings \ But in the exercife of reminifcence, which is the immoveable boundary between man and other animals, he, and he alone, recognifes the divine principle of reafon or intelledl co-operating with the coarfer powers of fancy or memory ; fince every ad: of reminifcence, as above explained ', implies comparifon ; and every the flightefh comparifon, expreifed in the fimpleil proportion, indicates a fubftance different and fepa- rable from matter, a fubftance totally inconceivable by man in his prefent ftate, where the grofs perceptions of fenfe are the only foundation and fole materials of all others, how lofty foever and I'efined ; but a fubftance, notwithftanding, of whofe exiftence we are aflured by our confcioufnefs of its energies ''. To " Ten o£ yitsTai «iiakTss •!Γολλ«Γ Ιως α» τκι avTr,t xittjc-i; Χίη,σιν, r, axί^λrl5rισi^ το 'dfayjia. De Memor. & Reminifcent. c 2. p. 682. He adds, anticipating the philofophy of HobbeS and Hartley, th is αττο m aum mart μι> funaOmai, iviort Sb μχ, αιτκ», ότι cirt Ίολίίω £»ϊ•%£ται xtrnhmt aira τ-ης αυτνις αρχΐς — uavtp γαρ ψνσις r,6ri το ίθοζ, cic. IDld• IsUt the caufe that the fame thing recalls fometimes one perception, andfometimes another, is, that different motions may fpring from the fame principle ; for cuftom is like nature," &c. '' De Anima,l. ii. C. iii• p. 633. & feq. ' De Memor. & Reminifc c. ii. p. 683. * Com. De Anima, 1. i. c• v. p. 625. and c. ix. p. 629. 48 NEW ANALYSIS OF man. CHAP. To illuftrate this further by an example, Ariilotle fays, let the . ^^• . comparifon or propofition be one of the fimpleft imaginable, Proof of an ^^^^ whitenefs is not fweetnefs'. Thefe fenfible qualities which intelleclual , , • ^ , i -i r i i principle in the vulgar afcribe to external objeds, the philolopher knows, as above explained, to depend on certain motions communicated to his internal organs, motions vivid and forcible when firft produced by fenfation, more faint and languid when af;:erwards revived by imagination or memory ^ But the comparifon of any two objedls neceifarily implies, that they ihould be both prefent in the fame indivifible point of time, to one and the fame comparing power. Yet their prefence to the fenfes, the fancy, or the memory, is known to confift in nothing elfe but certain motions produced, in our bodily organs. If the com- parifon, therefore, could be made by any of them, it would follow that this organ was fufceptible of different and contrary motions, « De Anima, 1. iii. c. ii. p-o+g. f De Memor. &; Reminifcent. c. i. p. 63o. and De Anima, 1. iii. civ. p. 652. Senfible qualities as perceived by the mind, Ariilotle calls, therefore, 'zjMi^.cctu t, η ^νχ,, of which, he fays, words are the figns : De Interpret, c. i. p. 37 : Mean- ing, thereby, that language expreffes things as they are perceived, not as they really are. το μ.^> s» μ-^τι τα αισδοτα ειϊχι, μ-τ,τ. τα a.abriiA.c'.rci, ίσως αλίθ.;• τβ ya.f «icDaiaftEi-s ^αθο? ΤΗΤΟ tr»• το h τα t9f4)7ri»2 ipi^oa-o^ia. Ethic. N'lCOm. 1• X. Cult. "■ The word ofymo.', organum, is found in Diogenes Laertius (1. i. feil. 28.); where Ariftotle's philofophy is divided into pradtical and fpeculative : the pradical comprehending his Ethics and Politics ; the fpeculative, Natural Philofophy and Logic. Diogenes, however, does not ufe the word in the fenfe in which it was after- wards taken by Ariftotle's commentators. Befides, when Laertius fays, that logic is a part of fpeculative philofophy, he contradiiSs Ariftotle himfelf, who divides fpecu- lative philofophy into the three branches of Mathematics, Phyfics, and Theology. Metaph. l.vi. c.i. p. 904. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. S5 work \ They all relate, howcA'-er, to one and the fame fub- CHAP. je£t ; fmce dialedic °, in the ftridl and proper fenic, is merely the art of dialogue, that is, the art of converfing. Ariftotle's Organon, therefore, rightly underftood, is nothing more than an endeavour to teach the rational and fkilful employment of that chara£leriilic faculty of man, by which he expreifes, through appropriate figns'', not only his perceptions of fenfe, but whiit is indefinitely more various, the comparifons, ab- ilra£tions, and conclufions of his own mind concerning them. It is in this fenfe that logic, or dialedlic, in the order of com- municating liberal and univerfal knowledge, ought to precede the more abftrufe and loftier branches of philofophy, becaufe, by carefully analyfing the figns by which internal operations, as well as external objeds, are expreifed, we remount at once to the origin and fource both of our notions and of our per- ceptions ; difcover their intimate connections with each other ; and unfold, even to the unexperienced minds of youth, a vail intelledual " Even the different works muft have been arranged otherwife than they now ilanci, fince in fomeofthe firft of them we find references to thofe now publiihed as the laft. ° Dialedlic is the word often ufed by Ariftotle himfelf to denote what is commonly called his Logic, or the fubje£t of the booics compoftng his Organon. Vid. Metaph. 1. xiv. c. 4. Rhetor. 1. i. c. ii. ρ rm h o,c.iA,ccTm txxrov cvjt.'ioUo εη. " Each word or name is a fymbol or fign." De Senfu έί Senfiii. I• i. c. i. p• 663. The whole padage, beginning with αντω, h τΒτωϊ κξί'.σσων, and ending with the words juft cited, may be abridged as follows : *' Hearing is the fenfe moil inftrumental to Icnowledge, not efientially or in itfelf, for the fenfe of feeing difcovers to us more of the differences cf things; but becaufe found, which is the obje£l of hearing, is the vehicle of language ; which is com- pofed of words, each of which is a iign." Vid. etiam De Interpret. 1. i. c. i. p. 36 and 37. - J6 ,His analyfis of language. Origin of general terms. NEW ANALYSIS OF intelledual treafure, of which, without being aware of it, they were aheady in poiTeffion ^ Agreeably to thefe principles, the Stagirite defines difcourfe, or fpeech, to be found fignificant by compa£t, of which the parts alfo are fignificant "■ ; all difcourfe which fimply affirms or denies, he refolves into arguments, arguments into propofitions, and propofitions into words ; which laft are the ultimate ele- ments of language, becaufe, though fignificant themfelves, their parts are not fignificant '. Sounds fignificant by compadl are either nouns, that is, names denoting things without any reference to time ; or verbs, whofe fignification is accompanied with the appendage of time '. Nouns are either proper names or appellatives ; a proper name denotes one individual only ; an appellative denotes various individuals, and often various kinds or claifes of individuals. The formation of appellatives is, according to Ariftotle, the united work of abftradion and aflTociation " ; abftradlion, by which we feparate the combina- tions 1 Comp. Ariftot. Topic, 1. i. c ii. p. i8i. & Ariftot. de Anima, 1. iii. c. ix. p. 656. ' De Interpret. 1. i. c iv. p. 38. ' To obviate objeilions arifing from the fignificant parts of compound words, Ariftotle/ays, a Si τοις Αττλοκ, σημαία μιν τι, άλλα « κα5' αιιτα . . . The fyllables are figni- ficant, but not eflentially ; fmce the whole word is fignificant by compadl ; for how- ever fiibtilely words may be analyfed, they will ultimately refolve themfelves, not into ogyara, but into συμζολα. ; not into natural inftruments, but into conventional figns. De Interpret, c. iv. p. 3S. ' Ibid. c. iii. Thole parts of verbs, therefore, which do not imply time are merely nouns. Ibid. " Compare Metaph. l.xi. c. 2. pp. 955, 956. Ibid. c. xii. pp. 957, 958. Analyt. Pofterior, 1. ii. c. xix. p. 179• & feq. De Memor. & Reminifc. p. 181. & feq. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 57 tlons of fenfe, and confider a complex objedl In one view, without attending to the other afpeds under which it may be examined '" ; affociation, by which perceptions that are funilar naturally revive each other in unbroken fucceffion; and, in con- fequence of their fimilarity, are exprefled by a common name, or appellative, which is equally applicable to them all ". la re- ference to this common name, which is merely a fign that dif- ferent obje£ts have been compared together, and found to agree in one or more refpeds with each other, different individuals are faid to belong to the fame fpecies, and different fpecies are faid to belong to the fame genus ; for in order to explain the nature of things, and to fee their agreements and differences, it *" Metaph. 1. xi. c. ili. pp. 956, 957. * ύιιλοιι Jij oTt Jif*!» τα OT^dJTa ίπαγωγνι γl'aξiζiίι/ avayxaim* και γα.ξ και ij αίσ^ησις ίτω το «αθολΒ £ft7roi£i. The author here maintains, that even general principles can only be gathered by indu6tion from perceptions of fenfe, or from repeated a£i:s of memory coalefcing into one experience (i2i ye^ ■πολλαι μ.ίγιμα,ί τω αξίύμ,ίΐ ίμ.•!Γίίξΐ« ρ« εγι). And the comparifon by which this intelle£lual operation is explained equally applies to that by which " τα χαθΛΜ," "abftract notions," gathered from repeated fenfations, are generalifed and embodied in language. " In a flying army, when one man flops, the next to him will often flop alfo, and fo on in fucceffion, until the whole will fome- times ftand firm. The fame thing happens in the irregular flow of our thoughts. The fteady contemplation of any individual obje£l: in that afpeiSl in which it agrees with other individuals, will recall many fimilar objeds to the mind; the ftability of the one will communicate ftability to the others, and thus give birth to what are called Univerfals, that is, to general terms, equally applicable to an indefinite number of mdlVlduals. ζ-αηος γαξ των αίια^οξων ΐι/οζ, <αξωτα> (/,ίν iv ττι ψι/χΐ) *αθολ«* χαι yxa αΐί7-9αΐΈται /αεί/ το χα^ικαταν, ή is αισδίο-ι; τα χαβολκ tri. When Ariftotle fays that we per- ceive, by fenfe, the univerfal, he means that we view the objefl under that afpe£l in which it agrees with other objeas; and the contemplation of it under that afpe£l only, or, in other words, the confidering certain appearances of it apart from the reft, pro- duces in the mind an abftraol notion, of which, though itfelf be particular, the name is general. Metaph. ibid, VOL. I. I 58 Their im- portance. The catego- ries. NEW ANALYSIS OF it Is not neccflary to fuppofe the exiftence of general ideas, but it is neceflary that one word or term ihould, in the fame fenfe, be applicable to many individuals, and alfo that one word or term ihould, in the fame fenfe, be applicable to many fpecies \ Independently of this power in man, of expreifing things that are alike by a common fign, his knowledge would be confined to the coarfe and complex intimations of fenfe ; he could not form even the moil common notion of all, namely, that of number, fince objeds could not be enumerated, unlefs they tvere previoufly referred to the fame genus or clafs, that is, un- lefs they were expreifed by one comn^gn fign. They muft be fo many trees, fo many animals, or at leaft fo many beings ; and thus generically united, before they can be fpecifically or even numerically diftinguilhed. For this reafon Ariftotle ob- ferves, that " one" and " being" are, of all terms, the moil univerfal ; they are applicable to all other general terms ; they can be fiid in the fame fenfe of them all, but no other term can be corredly faid of them, becaufe no other term expreifes the full extent of their meaning ^ ; or, in other words, is ufed as a fign for all the variety of things which they are employed to denote. Next to them, in point of univerfality, the ten ca- tegories immediately follow. Thefe moil comprehenfive figns of things are called, in Latin, Predicaments, becaufe they can be faid, or predicated, in the fame fenfe of all other terms, as well as of all the objeds denoted by them ; whereas no other term can be corredly faid of them, becaufe no other is employed 1 Analyt. Poller. 1. i. c. xi. p. 141. ibid, c.xxiv. p. 155. ^ Metaph. 1. x. c. 2. p. 945. The το h xxt το on, "unity and being," agree, he ob- ferves, in the univerfality of their fignification. They contain all the categories, but are not included in any of them. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 59 employed to exprefs the full extent of their meaning. They are ; fubftance, quality, quantity, relation, time, place, adion, paffion, pofition, and habit% All the objeds of human thought that can be exprefl^d by fmgle words, arrange themfelves under one or other of thefe general terms. Ariftotle (not indeed in his « Categories," but in his works collectively) explains the nature and properties of each; and thus opens to the inquifitive^ xnind a wide field of various knowledge, fince the properties of each predicament belong to all the objefts, or claiTes of objeds, comprehended under'^ it, and the properties of the whole united extend to all things in the univerfe. But to avoid the reproach of bewildering his reader in barren generalities, the philofopher frequently applies his reafonings concerning figns to the things fignified by them ; perpetually inculcating, that individuals only have a real exiftence, and that what are called in the Pythagorean » sr. Ji rxvm TO. a^.Oftov J^a- T. £!-., ■u!^oyei χαθολ«, " univerfal denominations." Thus alfo they were confidered by Archytas the Peripatetic (Boeth. in Predicam. p. nz.), whom Mr. Harris (Philofoph. Arrangements, c.ii p. 31•) confounds with Archytas the Pythagorean. The confidering of thefe comprehenfive genera as the principles and caufes of the univerfe with the Pythagoreans, or merely as univerfal denominations with Ariftotle, conftitutes as wide a difference as that between a vifionary and a philofopher. * Categor. c.y. toc.ix. indufively. J 2 6ο NEW ANALYSIS OF Pythagorean or Platonic philofophy, numbers, ideas, immutable and eternal eflences, are merely the work of human thought exprefled and embodied in language \ This dodrine is nearly allied *= Categor: c. v. p. i;. " That if individuals, or the firft fubftances, were not, nothing elfe could be ;" fo that, inftead of ideas, &c. making them, every thing that exifts is made by[and from them. And again, ii^n μι> u-, sit«i, » i» η ■σαξ* τα 'boMu, UK asayxr,, ei αττοΛιξις ifat' nyai /A£»Toi I» χατα ■κολλά αλτιβί; euteh• atayxYi . . . iei αξα τι ί» χαι το αντο, ετγι αλιιοιιων imm, ja,vj o^anyioi. " For the purpofe of demonftration, it is not neceflary to fuppofe the exiftence of general ideas, but only that one general term can be applied with truth, and in the fame fenfe, to many individuals." Analyt. Pofter. f. i. C. xi. p. I4I• Compare CXxiv. p. 155. Ετι is aJEfti» avuyxn τι titai τ«το 'actio, ravTu, 6TI Ιϊ ίίλοι, aJic μαλλί» ft tvt Tm άλλων, ίσα, fwj τ» σγιμ,χαΐί, αλλ' n ■etoiov, >) •πξος τι, » CJoiEi»• £1 h αξα, αχ »" αττο^ίξΐζ αίτια, αλλ' ό ακαω». " It IS not neceflary tO fuppofe, that the general term, denoting any clafs of fubftances, exprelTes any thing befide the dif- ferent particulars to which it applies, any more than the general terms denoting qua- lities, relations, or aftions. One general term ftands as the fign for a variety of par- ticulars confidered under one and the fame afpeft ; but to fuppofe that this term re- quires one fubftantial archetype, or idea, as general as itfelf, is the hearer's fault ; fuch a fuppoiition not being neceflary for the purpofe of demonftration." The fimplicity and folidity of Ariftotle's philofophy was early deftroyed by confounding it with Pla- tonifm.The evil has been perpetuated from age to age, by his commentators and pre- tended followers ; not excepting the lateft of them all, Mr. Harris and Lord Mon- boddo, who perpetually afcribe to the Stagirite the dodrine of general ideas, which, in the paflages above cited, he formally denies. Thofe laft-mentioned writers acknowledge that Ariftotle oppofed Plato, in denying the feparate and fubftantial exiftence of ideas, but maintain, that he aflerted their exiftence originally in the divine intelleft, forming what we call the intelledual world. " From thence proceeds the material world, which is a copy of thefe forms or ideas. The firft kind of ideas, the Peripatetics called ro^o των ■αολλαν, "before the many;" the other kind they called ε» τοις ■οολλοΐί, "in the many;" and thefe laft are the fubftantial forms of the Peripatetics; that is, the form which gives the fubftance or efience to the thing. And, laft of all, come the ideas in our minds, which, being formed from the many, and only in confequence of their exifting in the many, are faid to be επι τοκ «υολλοις, " after the many." Mon- boddo Ancient Metaph. vol. i. p. 466. Mr. Harris, in defcribing this triple order of ideas, fpeaks to the fame purpofe. " By mind we mean fomething which, when it ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. ^i allied to another of Ariftotle's above explained, that all our dired; knowledge originates in perceptions of fenfe ; and in both a£ls, knows what it Is going to do ; fomething ftored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas thefe works are faihioned. Hermes, book iii. c. iv. p. 380. Again, To work and to know what one is about is to have an idea of what one is doing ; to poffefs a form internal, correfponding to the external, to which external it ferves for an exemplar or pattern. Here then we have an intelligible form which is prior to the fenfible form." Ibid. p. 376. The fame authors abound in repetitions of the fame dodtrine, which feems indeed to have been univerfally that of Ariftotle's com- mentators. But what fays the author himfelf. I (hall repeat his own words, left I ihould incur the reproach of fpeaking harihly. το h λιγείν 'αα^α^^γμ,α, timi χαι juTiXt» αυτω» τχ αλλα> «ivc^oyn» trij ticci ftsTaipoja; λιγίΐν Έτοοιτιχας. τι γας £Γΐ το ΐ(γαζομίΐιο>ι 'Βίξος Taj ιαεας xirci- ζλτ,ττιη ; nhxtTcu Τ£ Είναι και ytytia^ou ίτΐΗ» χαι ftii ΐίκαζομ.αθί. Mctaph. 1. XI. C. 5. ρ. 959* *' Το call ideas exemplars or patterns, and to fay that other things are made in imitation, or by participation of them, is mere empty found and poetical metaphor. Whoever confidered in working an idea as his model ? Things may exift or be made that never had an exemplar or archetype." According to Ariftotle, " the definition is the idea of the thing, and the definition is compofed of words." ό λο^ο? ειίοζ τ» ισ^α^^ατο; . , . χαι ό λο^οζ irt»j;£iT«i 4 o-iotiurui, Comp. Dc Anima, 1. i. c. i. p. 618. and De Senfu, c i. p. 663. I cannot conclude this note without obferving, that fomething nearly akin to Ariftotle's dodlrine concerning the categories or univerfals was revivedj in the darknefs of the eleventh century, by the fed called Nominalifts, which had for its author Rofcellinus, a native of Brittany and Canon of Compiegne. But the Stagirite's genuine tenets were generally unknown in that century, and fo little underftood after- wards, (being ftudied only in corrupt verfions, Arabic and Latin,) that the fefl of the Nominalifts, after the complete triumph of the fuppofed Ariftotelian philofophy in the twelfth and fucceeding centuries, were regarded as raih innovators and philofophical heretics. Their opinions, however, agreed more nearly with thofe of Ariftotle than the opinions of thofe who believed themfelves the Stagirite's moft obfequious follow- ers ; although the language of the Nominalifts feems to have been extremely liable to be perverted to the purpofes of fcepticifm, as taking away the fpecific diftinftions of things; and is in fail thus perverted by Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, and their innumera- ble followers. But Ariftotle's language is not liable to this abufe; he every where- main- tains the ftability of truth, and the reality of thofe fpecific diftinflions which general terms are employed to exprefs. He agrees with the Nominalifts, for example, that the words "hoife" and " dog" have notany correfpondent archetypesor ideas in.the mind, as 62 NEW ANALYSIS OF CHAP, both thefe capital points, the Learned, after innumerable dlfputes, carried on with fingular eagernefs through many centuries, have genei-ally embraced his opinion; and, what is moil remarkable, chiefly fmce the time that undue deference ceafed to be paid to his writings, and that his name was no longer fuperftitioufly venerated by thofe who either read what they did not under- iland, or who afFeded to admire what they had never taken the trouble to read. The as general as themfelves, but he maintains that thefe words imply therefultofthecom- parifon of different individuals agreeing in the fame ειίο;, the fame ihow or appearance; for the fight, as he obferves, is that of all the fenfes which enables us to perceive the greateft number of the agreements and differences of things, and is therefore moil ge- nerally ufeful in clafling them ; or, in other words, in diftinguiihing thofe which are alike by a fign common to them all ; that is, by a general name. Metaph. 1. iv. c. 7. p.88i. Comp. De Senfu, c. i. p. 662. and Metaph. 1. i. c. i. p. 838. To prevent the poflibility of miftake or obfcurity in the above note, it is necefTary to obferve, that the word "idea" inEngliih is popularly ufed, not merely to denote an objed of thought, but thought itfelf. To deny ideas in this latter fenfe is to deny thinking. But this is iiot the philofophical meaning of the word, as underilood by the pretended followers of Ariftotle, any more than by Locke in his Eilay on the Human Underftanding ; by whom, ideas are faid to be the objeSs immediately prefent to the mind in thinking. Effay, b. i. c. i. p. 13. Now Ariftotle, in the following paffage, exprefsly denies the prefence or exiftence of any objedl in the mind, when it theorifes or thinks, diitin£t from the a£l: of the mind itfelf. ewi τω» δίωρτιχω», ό λόγος το •ζα^αγμα, xai n' MJis-is* αχ hi^n Si ci-jroi TS toafAEvB και tb vb. Ισα ja,-» Cmv Εχει, το αντο trai' KM ή νογσί; TS νοαμαΐί f4ia. Me- taph. 1. xiv. c. ix• p. 1004. In another paifage he fays, ^ ψ^χ» ^ως εγι τα •anna.. «' The mind is after a fort all things." De Anima, 1. iii. c. ix. p. 656. What is meant by τα xaOoia, " generals, univerfals, ideas," as the words are tranflated by his pre- tended followers, he ftates clearly thus : Eirei erij τα μι» χαθολ» τω» TOfayftaTa»• τα ί; «αβ' ίΚαΓο»' λίγω h χαδολΒ μί>, Ό επι •πλίίονωι/ ariffxe κατγιγοξίΐσ6(ΐί' κοΆ ίκα^οιι ίε, ό fj.y,' όιο» ανθξωτΓΟΕ, τα» xkOcXb• χβλλιας ίε, τω» Κα9' iXaro»j &C. De Interpret. C. VU. p. 39. " The diftinftion is to be made between univerfals and particulars ; univerfals, which can be predicated of many, as the term " Man;" particulars, as " Callias," the proper name of an individual." 6 ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 63 The redudion of things to genera or clafies, by applying to C FI A P. them common names, is the foundation of divifion and deft- . ' - - > — -J , , , , ,1 , , • η 1 1 11 Divifion and nition, which have been called by a jult metaphor the hrm definition. Handles of Science. Each of the categories, or clafles, above mentioned, that of fubftance for example, may be variouily di- vided according to the intent of the divifion, which may be under- taken for explaining the works of art or of nature; for delineating the inftitutions of civil policy, or defcribing the ilrudure of plants and animals; in a word, for examining any objea:, whe- ther material or intelledual, about which human thought is converfant. But for whatever purpofe the divifion is intended, it can be perfpicuous and fatisfadtory only when it defcends from the more general claiTes, or terms, to thofe which are lefs general, until it arrives at the lowefl: fpecies of all, which re- jeds all further partition but into individuals only**. The in- termediate terms between the higheil genus and this loweft fpecies, ftand each of them in two diftind relations, and there- fore receive two diiFerent names, that of genus with refped to the lefs general terms which they contain, and that of fpecies with refped to the more general terms under which they are contained ^ Such is Ariilotle's own dodrine concerning claifification '' Analyt. Pofler. I. ii. c. xiii. p. 17;. « Compare Categor. c. ii. p. 15• and Analyt. Prior, c. i. p. 52. The fubjcit has been ftrangely perplexed by miftaking Ariilotle's language, which is in itfclf highly perfpicuous. το h ινόλω fi»a'i ΙτΕξο» ϊτίξύΐ, «α ι το κάτ» •ααηος xefrr,ytiftic&ai δατίξί» Οατίξΰ, r avTOJ £Γΐ' λιγομα Si το y.ara ^«ϊτος xaT-ziyof Είσθαι, όταν (*))ί£» n Ta νπαχιψί»! λβ^Εΐ», κατά α iaTsfo» Β λίχ&ησιτοα. "Το fay that one term is contained in another is the fame as faying, that the fecond can be predicated of the firft in the full extent of its fignification ; and one term is predicated of another in the full extent of its fignification, when there is no (54 NEW ANALYSIS OF claflificatlon and divifion ; a dodrine continually exemplified in his works throughout, moral as well as phyfical ; and admi- rably illuftrated by fome modern Avriters, efpecially on the fub- jedls of natural hiftory. Propofitions. Having explained the ufes and functions of fingle words, the author proceeds to examine their combinations into propo- rtions, and the combinations of propofitions into reafoning or difcourfe. According to the meafure of our defires or exigen- cies, our poΛver or inability, language• is varioufly moulded into commands, prayers, or wiilies ; but for the purpofes of inftrudion or argument, it requires the form of an enunciative propofition, which is defined by Ariftotle " the affirming or de- nying one thing of another." But all that can be directly affirmed of any fubjed is, either that it belongs to a certain clafs, or that it is pofleffed of certain qualities. Thofe qualities are either fuch as neceflarily inhere in the thing itfelf while it remains what it is, or retains its diftindive name; or fecondly, qualities neceffiirily proceeding from the former ; or thirdly, qualities which do not uniformly belong to the fubjed, nor pro- ceed from thofe uniformly belonging to it, but which accede to it no particular denoted by the fubjeii:, to which the predicate docs not apply." This remark, which is the foundation of all Ariftotle's logic, has been fadly miftaken by many. Among others, the learned and truly refpeftable Dr. Reid writes as follows: " The being in a fubjeil, and the being truly predicated of a fubjeft, are ufed by Ariftotle in his Analytics as fynonymous phrafes. And this variation of ftyle has led fome perfons to think that the Categories were not written by Ariftotle." See Kaim's Sketches, vol. iii. p. 316. But the two phrafes of "being in a fubjed," and "being predicated of it," are fo far from being ufed as fynonymous, that the meaning of the one is diredlly the reverfe of the meaning of the other. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 65 it merely by way of adjunct or appendage '. Thus we can fay of CHAP, man, that he is an animal, which is the clafs to which he belongs; ,_ _ '_ . that he is an animal capable of reafon, which is the quality ne- ceifarily inherent in him, while he deferves his diftindtive name; that he is capable of learning grammar or geometry, which are qualities neceffarily flowing from the former ; but when we proceed farther, and afcribe to him qualities not neceifarily flowing from thofe inherent in the fpecies, although they may be found in many individuals, and even many nations, it is plain that thefe qualities are mere accefllons or appendages to his diilindive name or fpecific charadter. To define a thing, or to define a term, (for when words are The fpeciftc confidered as figns, thefe expreflions are fynonymous,) is to tell, as precifely and perfpicuoufly as poffible, what that thing is, or what that term fignifies. This can only be done by afcertaining the clafs to which the objed: to be defined imme- diately belongs, and the quality or qualities which, neceflarily inhering in it, uniformly diftinguiihes that objedt from other obje£ts belonging to the fame clafs or genus. That quality, therefore, or thofe qualities form what is called the fpecific difference, becaufe they diftinguifh the fpecies in queftion from the other fpecies in the fame genus, or the objeab in queftion from the other objeds that moft nearly refemble it. Thus, to define f Topic, l.i. c.viii. p. 285. The Greek word σνίΑ,ξιζνιχος is, as far as I know, univerfally tranflated "accident ;" συμζίζηχοτα, in the plural, " accidents;" from which, *' Accidence," denoting the little book that explains the properties of the eight parts of fpeech, is generally held to be a corruption. But accident, in its proper fehfe of what is cafual or fortuitous, has nothing to do with the one or the other ; and Ariftotle's meaning of σνμξιΐ^νικο: ought to be expreffed by a Latin or Engliih word derived, not from ' accido,' but from ' accedo.' VOL. I, Κ 66 NEW ANALYSIS OF define the number three, or the triad, we may fay or predicate of it, that if is a quantity, and that kind of quantity called number, and that kind of number called an odd number ; but each of thefe predicates, and all of them united, have a figni- fication far more extenfn'e than tliat of the fubjedl ; fmce there are other quantities befide number, and other numbers befide odd numbers, and many other odd numbers befide three. How then are we to proceed to find the exa£t definition of the triad ? We mull continue to combine ilill more of thofe predicates, until the whole of them unitedly wall apply to the number three, and to it only ; although each of them taken feparately, and even any number of them ihort of the whole,, have a far more extenfive fignification. Thus, with the predicates " num- ber" and " odd" we muft join that of " firft," defining the triad " the firil odd number ;" for though the predicate " firil" ap- plies to the number " two" as well as to " three," yet " tlie firil odd number" applies to "three" only^ It may be neceflar)'• here to rem.ark, that, in the accurate language of Ariftotle, unity is not number, but the element of number *■; all numbers are com- pofed of units, but they themfelves are indivifible and ultimate elements, incapable as units of farther refolution '. For coarfe pradical purpofes, arithmeticians talk of the parts of unit ; but when they do this, they have always previoufly converted unity into number ; as when we fpeak of the tenth of an inch, wq muft neceflarily have firft changed the one inch into ten por- tions ; the inch therefore, before it can be divided, ceafes to be an unit, and is converted into ten. Ac- « A nalyt. Poller, l.ii. c.xiii. p. i73.&feq. •" iitti TO 'm αςΛι^Β αξχη, fi αξΛ/λος, Metaph. I.X. CI. p. 943. iiTe γαξ ία ίσχΛΤΒ, ισχαΤαΎίξον edi α» τι. Ibid. C iv. p. 946 ; and again, «iTlXMTas »• ί> Kca T« Έολλα} αϊ; «ϊιαίξίτοι χαι ^ίαίξίταν• IblO, C• Hit p. 945* ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 67 According to Ariftotle, definitions are the fountains of all C HA P. fclence"; but thofe fountains are pure only when they originate ■ in an accurate examination and patient comparlfon of the per- ceptible qualities of individual objeds; for it is in that cafe only, that our words being the correft figns of things, the conclufions drawn from our intelledual operations on the figns, exadly apply to the things fignlfied by them. We muil cau- tloufly proceed, therefore, from particulars to generals ', that we may not be cheated by words " ; endeavouring to dlfcover, in each objeil of our examination, that principal and paramount property in which all its other Inherent qualities unite and ter- minate ". To this property w^e muft aifign a name, when an appropriate name for it is wanting; and in the invention of this name, we muft refped the analogies of language % that the fame relations may be preferved among words which fubfift among the things which they denote ^ The name, thus in- vented, is called the fpeclfic difference f which, in the objeds to which It applies, is not always that quality which is moft pal- pable or moft ftriking; for many other qualities are often adually ^ «.«5X«,r..v u^ch^h'-^,, 5. οξ^μ... Analyt. Poller. Mi. c. 3. p. 16+. Compare Analyt. Pofter. 1. ii. c.xvii. p. 178. ' A. L• «^0 τα,ν χ»9.««Γ<.- a^. τ« ««6»λ« ρΒτα?«...... Analyt. Pofter. Mi. c.xiii. p. 176. '« «i Όμωνυμιαί λαιθχίΗσι μαλλο ;> τοις χαθ-Λ». Ibid. η Analyt. Pofter. l.ii. c.xiv. p. 176. & Topic, l.i. civ. p. 182. ο 5„T<. h para a. .^α,ς TK ^«,f*E«»•, !>?.?f«oi 7"'r«' ^« ^^«^ίχατος, & Metaph. 1. vii. c iv. p. 908. c. vi. p. gi I . & feq. Κ 2 68 NEW ANALYSIS OF adually difcovered in them, before we diftinguiili that moil im- portant and moil general one, which is implied in all the reft, and which forms, as it were, the bafis on which they all ftand''. This paramount property exifts independently in its fubjed ; but none of the other properties can fubfift independently of the fpecific difference, which is therefore the principle in which they originate, and the fource from which they flow. In many objeds with whofe fenfible qualities we are moft converfant, this fource is concealed; yet to remount to it, when poiTible, is the main bufmefs of philofophy, fmce the more our knowledge is generalifed, it will be the more fatisfadory, and therefore the more delightful '. Syllogifm. The patient examination of objeds, and the accurate defi- nition of terms, are continually employed by our philofopher, as the beft means for arranging perceptions into fcience. Thefe, and not fyllogifms, are the fole inftruments ufed by himfelf in the deepeft and moft various refearches that ever exercifed the ingenuity of man. Yet his art of fyllogifm (an art ignorantly depreciated in the prefent age, and more abfurdly magnified in preceding times beyond its real worth) is not therefore ufelefs, although its real ufes, as will prefently appear, are altogether different from the purpofes to which it was long moft injudi- cioufly applied. The art of fyllogifm was entirely Ariftotle's invention; and in appreciating his merit as a philofopher, it be- comes Ϊ TO it ταξαι ώς Jei era•» !«» To ιαξωταν λαζ•ιι. 78T0 h iraiy lat λί^δί» 2 ?raj-i» axsAtiOtij txmu h μη irmra. Analyt. Pofter. 1. u. c. xiu. p. 175. The word axaxeL• is ufed in the fame fenfe, when he fays (as quoted above) that i» ii ό', " unity and being," is implied in all the Categories. • Analyt. Pofter. l.i. cxxiv. p. 155. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 69 comes neceflary to examine his firft Analytics, in which that art Is contained, that we may be enabled to decide whether the fup- pofed improvements of his fyftem by fome writers be not igno- rant perverfions, and the objedions made to the whole of it by others be not fenfelefs cavils. It was formerly obferved that every propofition, affirming or denying one thing of another, muft affirm or deny that the fubjea of which we fpeak belongs to a certain clafs, or that it is endowed with certain qualities ^ But to affirm one term of another, when both of them are taken in the full extent of their fignification, is merely to fay that there is not any fpecies or any individual contained under the name of the fubjed, to which the name of the predicate does not apply. It matters not whether thofe names denote fubftances or qualities, or any other of the ten predicaments. Whatever they denote, the name of the fpecies, according to the principles on which all languages are conftruaed, may ftill be predicated of every individual, and the name of the genus of every fpecies. When the definition of any term is predicated of that term, the defi- nition and word defined, having exaftly the fame fignification, they ' The Author proves this by obferving, that every fubjea muft either reciprocate with its predicate, or not. If the fubjea reciprocates with the predicate, that is, if the fubjea can in its turn be predicated of it, then the predicate muft have been either the definition or the property of the fubjea: if the fubjea does not reciprocate, then the predicate muft have been either fomething contained in the definition, namely the genus or fpecific difference, or fomething not contained in the definition, but ac- ceding to it as an appendage. Thefe relations of genus, difference, &c. which the pre- dicates can ftand in to their fubjea are called, in the Scholaftic Philofophy, the Predicables. They are the only things that can be affirmed or denied of any fubjea, categorically, which means, in the language of Ariftotle, that can be affirmed of any fubjea merely by the interpofition of the fubftantive verb between two terms. Topic, cviii. p-i^S• Ϊ-3 NEW ANALYSIS OF they both ncceflarily apply to exactly the fame number of things, and are therefore of exadlly the fame extent. But in all propofitions not identical, but which affirm or deny one thing of another, the predicate is according to the ftrudlure of all languages, naturally more extenfive than the fubjeft ' ; becaufe, as before obferved, to predicate one term of another is merely to fay that there is not any thing contained under the name of the fubjeit to which that of the predicate does not apply. The predicate, therefore, in every propofition is called the major term ; the fubje£t, the minor term ; and thefe terms are conjoined in difcourfe by the fubftantive -verb " is," called therefore the copula. When we fay " the wall is white," the fubftantive verb is expreifed; the fame A-^erb is underftood, when we fay " Achilles runs j" becaufe the word "runs'' may be refolved into *' is running; " being in fadt merely an abbreviation of it for the purpofe of communi- Nature and eating the rapidity of our thoughts with fuitable rapidity of gifm. fpeech". To prevent impofition arifmg from the abufe of words, it is neceflary to be able quickly to difcern whether one term can be juftly predicated of another. Ariftotle, for this purpofe, invented the fyllogifm, which confifts in comparing both the fubje£t and the predicate of any propofition with what is called the middle term, becaufe its natural place is the middle between the other two terms, called therefore the extremes. Let the queftion be propofed, whether temperance be a habit ? I readily find a middle term which is contained under the more extenfive appellation of habit, and which itfelf contains the more limited appellation of temperance. The terms, therefore, ftand in ' Categor. c v. p. 17. " aie» '/χξ ^ιαψιμι τ• αΛξί'ΙΓοί vyicutu» tri, r, τ» Λνίζίύΐτος t'yueiiEi, &C• Metaph. 1. V. C. 7. p. 889. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 7^ tn this order . Habit, virtue, temperance ; or, in the form of C HA P. propofitions, '— "•"" -' Virtue is a habit, Temperance is a virtue ; therefore temperance is a habit.. Now the whole cogency of this argument depends on that great principle which prefides in the formation of language, that things, which have a common nature, receive a common name. They may differ in many important particulars, yet having received one common appel- lation from the particular in which they all agree, the term de- noting the genus may be predicated of every fpecies, and every individual contained under it. Whatever is affirmed or denied of a more general term, may therefore be affirmed or denied of all the more particular terms, as well as of all the individual things to which its fignification extends. In the language of Ariftotle, this is expreffed by his calling thofe things fynony- mous which have the fame name in the fame fenfe. Thus " man" and " ox" are, according to him, fynonymous, becaufe the name of animal is equally applicable to both " ; an obfer- vation which muft found harihly to thofe Englifh readers who have derived their knowledge of Greek through the circuitous channel of France. On the bafis of this one fimple truth, itfelf founded in the ^^^ξη^^'Ι natural and univerfal texture of language, Ariftotle has reared a fubjeafeem- lofty '"^'^ ple- '■ Categor. c. i. p. 14. Words, fynonymous in the modern fenfe, have nothing to do with philofophy, whofe terms, if accurate, cannot be interchangeable. Their proper place is poetry ; accordingly we find that Ariftotle, in his now imperfea trea- tife on that fubject, had treated of aviutvi^ct, ω» ίολίΐω τα ««ο/αλτ», λο^-ο,- Si i uv-roc, that is, « of various words meaning the fame thing;" which agtees.with the modern accept- ation Simplicius in Categor. fol. viii. 72 NEW ANALYSIS OF lofty and various ftrufture of abftrad fclence, clearly expreiTed, and fully demonili'ated. To convince ourfelves of the wron- derful variety in a fubjed, feemingly fo fimple, it is fufficient to obferve, that the middle term may either be the fubjeft of both the premifles; or the predicate of both; or, as in the fyl- logifm given above, the fubjedl of the major premifs, in which it is compared with the major extreme, and the predicate of the minor premifs, in which it is compared with the minor ex- treme. Thefe various arrangements form what are called the three figures of fyllogifm ^ ; and in each of thefe three figures, every one of the three propofitions may be either affirmative or negative ; and each of the affirmative and negative propofitions may be either univerfal or particular ; univerfal, when their fubjedt is taken in the full extent of its meaning, as " all men are mortal ;" particular, when their fubjedt in its fignification is reftrifted to a part of the things which its name properly de- notes, as " fome men are wife." If we exprefs thefe four kinds of propofitions, the univerfal affirmative, the univerfal negative, the particular affirmative, and the particular negative, by the four vowels, a, e, i, o, we ihall find that they will affiard fixty- four different combinations by threes, which are called the dif- ferent modes in each figure ; and therefore one hundred and ninety-two combinations in the three figures colle£tively. But the variety does not end here ; for propofitions themfelves are either y It may be proper to remark, that in books of logic there is a fourth figure which is faid to have been invented by Galen the phyfician. In this Galenical figure, as it is called, the middle term is predicated of the major, and the minor term is pre- dicated of the middle. In this abfurd figure, the more general term is placed as the fubje£l of the more particular. The natural arrangement of the terms is thus totally reverfed. But every fyllogifm in this figure, when properly exprefled, naturally falls under Ariftotle's firil figure. ARISTOTLE'? WORKS. 73 either pure or modal. A pure propofition fimply affirms or denies one thing of another ; a modal propofition affirms or denies v/ith the addition of neceffiity or contingency, poffibility or impoffibiUty. When we confider, therefore, the numerous combinations that will refult from thefe new elements varioufly joined with the old, and that every new combination forms a diftind fyllogifm, it is impoffible not to admire the perfevering induftry that could contemplate each feparately, and examine how the truth of the conclufion was affeded by each fpecific arrangement. From this indudlion, the moil copious and complete that any Allfylio- fpeculation ever exhibited, Ariftotle infers that all conclufive §''^^re- ■^ duced to fyllogifms whatever may be reduced to conclufive modes in the thofeofthe firft figure''; of all which, the truth refts immediately on the grammatical principle above explained ; and of which, there- fore, the fyllogifm already given may ferve for an example. When the three terms of a fyllogifm, therefore, are accurately- defined, and the three propofitions compofing it are properly arranged, the juftnefs of its conclufion may always be perceived' by a rapid glance of the mind difcerning, by means of the minor premifs, or the propofition in which the fubjeο; ί τ/,ς roftTv)? s^'ks "s en- The definition of any particular obje^ denoted by the one, is precifely the fame with the• definition of any particular object denoted by the other. Metaph, 1. x. c. iii. p. 84s•• L 3 ^6 NEW ANALYSIS OF CHAP, and the indefinite number of mathematical cheorems uhimately 1 refolve themfelves into a few fimple propofitions, which may themfelves perhaps be confidered as only different expreffions of one and the fame original conception of the mind. Rules of op- Upon this great principle of tranflating the fame truth into po 1 ion. different words, in order to render it more familiar to our thoughts, Ariftotle next examines the dodlrine of oppofition. Propofitions may be oppoiite or contrary, which are not contra- didory ; becaufe the truth of the one does not always infer the falfehood of the other. Thus, " all men are white," " no man is white," are contrary propofitions, and both of them falfe. "Some men are white," " fome men are not white," are contrary propo- fitions, and both of them true. But if I fay, " all men are white," " fome men are not white," the truth of tlie one propofition in- fers the falfehood of the other; becaufe in this laft cafe only the predicate " whitenefs" is affirmed of the whole fpecies, and denied of fome individuals belonging to it ; which is inconfiilent Λvith the great principle on which all language and all reafoning is founded % In = De Interpret, c vii. p. 39. &: feq. and Analyt. Prior, cxv. p. 117. & feq. To ihew how grofsly Ariftotle's logic has been miftaken, and with what contempt of reafon and grammar, as well as of good manners, the charafler of this philofopher has been ailailed, I ihall cite the following paflage from a late author (Lord Kaims) of confiderable reputation, and of very confiderable merit: " His (Ariftotle's) artificial mode of reafoning is no lefs fuperficial than intricate. The propofitions he at- tempts to prove by fyllogifm are all felf-evident. Take for example the following propofition, ' that man has the power of felf-motion.' To prove this, he ailumes the following maxim, upon which indeed every one of his fyllogifms are founded, ' that whatever is true of a number of particulars joined together holds true of every one feparately." Lord Kaims' Sketches, vol. iii. p. 306. It would have been cha- ritable in this acute author to have pointed out the pillage where Ariftotle maintains, that becaufe it is true of a number of particulars joined together, that they are an hundred or a thoufand, the fame holds true of every one of them feparately. It is iin- poflib'le to reftrain indignation at fuch unmeaTiing jargon, poured out againft the moft accurate of all v/nters. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. ηη In the firft Analytics, Ariftotle ihews what is that arrange- ment of terms in each propofition, and that arrangement of pro- pofitions in each fyllogifm, which conftitutes a neceflary con- of Ariibfle's nedion between the premifles and the conclufion. When this ^'^ ^^^,- ^ _ lytics mil- connedlion takes place, the fyllogifm is perfed in point of form; underitood. and when the form is perfed, the conclufion neceifarily follows from the premiiTes, whatever be the fignification of the terms of which they are compofed. Thefe terms, therefore, he com- monly exprefles by the letters of the alphabet, for the purpofe of ihewing that our aifent to the conclufion refults, not from comparing the things fignified, but merely from confidering the relation which the figns (whether words or letters) bear to each other. Thofe \ therefore, totally mifconceive the meaning of Ariftotle's logic, who think that, by employing letters inftead of words, he has darkened the fubje£t ; fince the more abftradt and general his figns are, they muft be the better adapted to ihew that the inference refults from confidering them alone, without at all regarding the things which they fignify. Theyo77« of fyllogifms may be perfed Λvhen there is much Hisfecond imperfedion in their vmtter; that is, in the premifles from which Analytics, the conclufion is derived ; and which may be either certain or probable, or only feem to be probable, as a face may feem to be beautiful which is only painted. In his fecond Analytics, Ariftotle treats of what he calls Demonftrative Syllogifms, be- caufe their premiflTes are certain. In his Topics, he treats of what he calls Dialedical Syllogifms, becaufe their premifles are only ^ A truly refpeflable philofopher fays, in fpcaking cf this fubjeft, " Ariftotle's rules are illuftrated, or rather in my opinion purpofely darkened, by putting letters of the alphabet for the feveral terms." Reid's Appendix to Kaims's Sketches, vol. iif. p.65i. 78 NEW ANALYSIS OF only probable ; and, in his Refutations of Sophiftry, he treats of thofe deceitful fyllogifms whofe premifi'es feena to be, but which are not really, probable. As fophiftry confifts, not only in reafoning from falfe principles, but in i^eafoning unfairly from principles that are true, the Author refers all fuch erro- neous deductions to one head, which he calls " a miftake of the queftion ;" becaufe, in all of them, the " conclufion or anfwer" will be found to come out otherwife than it ought to do when drawn agreeably to the rules of juft inference ". His Topics. The four clalTes of predicates above explained, Genus, Dif- ference, Property, and Appendage, are applicable to fmgle things or fmgle terms, confidered feparately ; there are other predicates which are applicable only to more things or more terms than one, confidered conjundlly. Thefe conjundl predi- cates the Author reduces to four clafles ; Agreement, Diverfity, Oppofition, and Order ; under which heads, as well as thofe firil-mentioned, he examines in his Topics all the probable arguments by which our affirmations or negations may be either confirmed or invalidated ; thus fupplying a vail: intel- ledual magazine, which, when compared with the flender ad- ditions made to it by fubfequent writers, attefts both the un- wearied ardour of his application, and the incomparable richnefs of his invention. His Orga- In as few words as feemed confiftent with perfpicuity, I have verted and thus endeavoured to explain the nature and defign of Ariftotle's miappie • Organon ; a work which has often been as ihamefully miirepre-• fented, as it was long moil grolsly mifapplied. In that fcho- lailic jargon, which infolently ufurped dtiring many centuries the name yl)e Sophift. Elencb. c. vi. p. 287. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 79 name of Philofophy, fyllogirms were perverted to purpofes for CHAP, which their inventor declares them totally unfit, and employed ■_ _ 1 _f on fubjedls in which his uniform pradice iliews that he con- fidered them as altogether ufeleis. Our acquaintance with the properties of things, he perpetually inculcates, muft be acquired by patient obfervation, generalifed by comparifon and in- dudlion ; but when this foundation is once laid, the words by which our generalizations are expreifed, deferve not merely to be regarded as the materials in which our knowledge is em- bodied, or the channels by which it is communicated, but to be confidered in the two following refpeds, as the principles or fources from which new knowledge may be derived, Firil, by Its real ufes. means of a ikilful arrangement of accurate and Avell-chofen lytic art. terms, many procefles of reafoning may be performed by dif- cerning the relations and analogies of words, with a certainty as great, and with a rapidity far greater, than thefe procefles could poflibly be carried on, were we obliged, in every ftep of our progrefs, to fix our attention on things. Every general term is confidered by Ariftotle as the abridgment of a defi- nition', and every definition is denominated by him a Col- ledion^ becaufe it is the refult always of obfervation and comparifon, and often of many obfervations and many com- parifons. The improvements in mathematics have advanced from age to age, chiefly by improving the language, that is, the figns,by which mathematical truths are exprefl^d; and the mofl: important difcoveries have been made in that noble fcience, by continually fimplifying the objeds of our comparifons ; or, in other ^ ίίο,φψι hah; kh η σλ=ιω τι; (p«i)] σφ^ηιν, fim'jt h wji/Tf^aci, Tt9ii>) yxf a.•' ί'π ίχο-τω 7^i.yui, ΐτί(0!0ίψχ. Metaph. l.iv. civ. p. 873. * ii ii (Ar, Ti9 άλλα aisn^a (7i;(*«i»£i» ?i«i'!> pa«j3ot 5τι BX m £"i λο^οί. Ibid. So NEW ANALYSIS OF As ftrength- ening the aflbciating principles, and thereby multiplying the energies of thought. Other words, by finding clear expreiTions for ratios, including the refults of many others. In all other fciences, this invefti- gation is of the utmoft importance; and, in many of them, our knowledge will be found to advance almoft exadlly in propor- tion to the fuccefs with which our language is improved. When terms, therefore, are formed and applied with that pro- priety which perpetually Ihines in the Stagirite's writings, his general formulas of reafoning afford an analytic art, which may be employed as an engine for raifmg new truths on thofe pre- vioufly eftabliihed ; and if modern languages do not afford the fame advantage pi'ecifely in the fame degree, it is not from the inefKcacy of words as figns, but from the inefficacy of figns ill chofen and ill arranged ; from impropriety of application, coij- tempt of analogy, and abufe of metaphor. Under another afpe£t, nearly connected with the former, yet really diilindl from it, Ariftotle's Analytics, and ftill more his Topics, have the moil diredt and moft efHcacious tendency to in- vigorate and iharpen the underftanding ; and even to animate and cheriih the feeds of invention and genius. The properties and relations of external objedls, whether adually prefent to the fenfes, or treafured up in the memory, are confined, both as to their kind and number, within narrow limits. But our ab- flradlions, comparifons, and conclufions refpeding thofe ob- jeils, expreifed and embodied in words, are of a much wider and almoft boundlefs extent. According to that law of mental action by which our Author proves that the current of thought is moved and regulated *■, the relations and analogies of words * See the remarks above made concerning what is commonly called " the aiTocia- tion of ideas." " Ideas are more powerfully aflbciated," (to ufe modern language,) " in proportion to the attention with which they are fimultaneoufly examined and obferved." ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 8» words, therefore, will appear to form the main fpring of intel- C HA P. ledual energy; and their conneaions and dependencies, as compared and claiTed by Ariftotle in his Topics, muft have a direa tendency to invigorate and expand the thinking facuky ; to revive and brighten thofe affociating bands that might other- ^ wife have been effaced ; to fuggeft thofe principles of reafoning which would not otherwife occur ; and thus to prevent that deception and error which moil commonly proceeds from par- tial and incomplete views of our fubjeft ; from weaknefs of combination, and narroAvnefs of comprehenfion. To fay, therefore, that this part of our Author's Works is converfant entirely about words, is not to depreciate or reproach it ; for Ariftotle well knew that our knowledge of things chiefly de- pending on the proper application of language as an inftrument* of thought, the true, art of reafoning is nothing but a lan- guage accurately defined and ikilfully arranged ; an opinion which, after many idle declamations againft his barren gene- ralities and verbal trifling, philofophers have begun very generally to adopt. Let it always, however, be remembered, that the Author who firft taught this dodrine, had previoufly endeavoured to prove that all our notions, as well as the figns by which they are exprefl"ed, originate in perceptions of fenie ; ^ and obferved." In Ariftotle's language, the aaion of thought depends on the attentive examination of things, and of words which are their f.gns. When not only the thnig. themfelves, but the f.sns expreffing them, are thus examined, the connea.ons between thefe things «ill take fafter hold of the mind ; the perception of them w.U be more vivid and the recoUeaion of them more eafy and more expeditious. But words are the figns not merely of perceptible objeas and their qualities, but of the companions, abftraaions, and conclufions of the mind with refpea to thofe objeas and their qua- lities. An attentive examination of the relations and analogies of words ferves, there- fore, not only to ftrengthen old aiTociations, but to produce many new ones. J Topic, 1. i. c. 15. Metaph. ubi fupra, and !. v. pafllm. VOL. I. Μ NEW ANALYSIS OF Of Truth Demon- ftrative. Wherein it ionfifts. and that the principles on which languages are firft conftrucled, as well as every ftep in their progrefs to perfedion, all ulti- mately depend on indubious frorp. obfei"vation ; in one word, on experience merely. To abridge Ariftotle's Works is to treat them unfairly, be- caufe (where his text is correal) no author exprefles his mean- ing in fewer or more appropriate words4 Yet, as it is the pur- pofe of this difcourfe to afford fuch fpecimens of every part of his writings, as may fatisfy the curiofity of one clafs of readers, while it augments or infpires that of another, I ihall colledl within a narrow compafs his obfervations on Truth Demon- ftrative, that is, on Science ; and follow him in his application of thofe principles to the loftieft, and, as commonly treated, the moil abilrufe fcience, that ever exercifed the human in- telled. All inilrudion, and all intellectual difcipline, he obferves, pro- ceeds on principles already known and eftabliflied. This is manifeftly the cafe in mathematics, in the arts, and in every, kind of reafoning, which is univerfally carried on either by fyl- logifm or by indudion ; the former proving to us, that a par- ticular proportion is true, becaufe it is deducible from a general one, already knowa to us ; and the latter demonftrating a ge- neral truth, becaufe it holds in all particular cafes. Orators per- fuade by examples or arguments, examples being a rhetorical or coarfer kind of induilion, as arguments are a rhetorical or coarfer kind of fyllogifm. Truth is the exad conformity of human conception with the real nature of things". Demonftrative truth, therefore, can appl^ ^ TO h Kvciurcern or» αληΟίζ i) ^ίυ^ος' tsto» S etti των •afoyftaru•• tr^ σνγκίίσ5α> η ΑαιρΕίβ-βα» . . ίψατα» ^ι ό [ίαίτΐί.;; ■Χ'^'> " ''* tsfayfiUTCi taoTi efij 1 aw en• A'Ictapb. l.lx• Ct J£• g. 9'JJ' Vid. etiam Metaph. 1. V. c.xxix. p. 901. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 8i v> ■^Ί^ρΐγ only to thofe things which neceflarily exiil after a certairi CHAP, manner, and whofe ftate is unalterable : and we know thofe i_ -/ ^j things when we knoAv their caufes : thus, we know a mathe- matical propofition, when we know the caufes that make it true ; that is, when we know all the intermediate propofitions up to the firft principles, or axioms, on which it is ultimately built. Demonftration cannot be indefinitely extended, becaufe Rules con- the certainty, and even probability of every kind of reafoning would be deftroyed, were we to call in queftion thofe firft prin- ciples which, in matters of fcience, are recognifed by what Ariftotle calls Intelledl, and in matters of practice by what he calls Common Senfe '. In demonftration, the premlfles are the caufes of the con- clufion, and therefore prior to it. We cannot, therefore, de- monftrate things in a circle, fupporting the premiifes by the con- clufion ; becaufe this would be to fuppofe, that the one propo- fition could be both prior and pofterior to the other. In all demonftration, the firft principles muft be neceflary, immuta- ble, and therefore eternal truths, becaufe thofe qualities could not belong to the conclufion, unlefs they belonged to the premifles, which are its caufes. An affirmative demonftration is preferable to a negative one, and a dire£t demonftration of any truth to that drawn from the abfurdity of fuppofing it falfe ; becaufe, other things remaining the fame, the ftiorteft demonftration is always the beft. Ariftotle debates the queftion, whether an univerfal demonftration is better than a particular one ; and, as his remarks on this fubjed: form an apology for the univerfality and abftra£lednefs of his own reafonings in many parts of his Works, * »λλ«, αισ^σ-ιςι fX ή TUu t^im. Ethic. Nicoill. C.vi, p• 8. Μ 2 84 NEW ANALYSIS OF Works, I iKall fubjoin a tranflation, or paraphrafe, of the _ whole chapter". " ift, To fome a particular demonftration UniverW ^^^^ £^^j^ preferable, bfcaufe we know any objed better by cular; which examining itfelf, than by examining the clafs to which it pre era e. i^^j^^^gg^ Thus, that the three angles of an ifoikeles triangle are equal to two rights, may be thought more convincing when proved with regard to the ifoflceles itfelf, than when proved with regard to triangles in general, to which clafs of figures the ifoikeles belongs ; and therefore the particular demonftration may appear better than a general one. 2d, If individuals only have a real exiftence in nature, and every demonftration fuppofes the exiftence of its fubjedt, a general demonftration muft be worfe than a particular one, becaufe it leads us to fup- pofe the exiftence of nonentities. Theforir.er In anfwerto thefe objedlions let it be remarked, that the firft for^'mh'^'rnd does not apply, becaufe if the property of having the three more fatif- angles equal to two rights belongs to the ifoikeles, not as it is an ifoikeles, but as it is a triangle, he who demonftrates this truth refpeding the ifofkeles only, lefs examines the objed in itfelf, than he who demonftrates the fame truth refpeding tri- angles in general : for the definition of a triangle enters into that of an ifofkeles ; and becaufe it is a triangle, the ifoflceles has its angles equal to two rights; fo that he who demonftrates univerfally, better fliews the caufe and reafon of the conclufion,^ than he who demonftrates particularly; and he fliews it from confidering the objed itfelf, that is, the definition of the objed, and that part of the definition from which the conclufion re- fults. Again, if univerfals are merely words, denoting certain claiTes or fpecies, to all the individuals of which they equally apply, » Analytic Pofterior, 1, i. c. xxiv. p; 154, &. feq. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 85 apply, there is no reafon to fay that they are nonentities when appUed to thofe objeds or individuals. Their exiftence is even firmer than that of any portion of the individuals fignified by them, w^hich is continually liable to corruption or change ; whereas the general name denoting the whole fpecies is not liable to either, but has a precife and permanent meaning as long as any objeds of that fpecies continue to exift. But to fuppofe that univerfals, becaufe they arc employed in demon- llration, have any exiftence independently of the objedls or in- dividuals which they denote, is a miftake chargeable, not on thofe who employ fuch terms, but on thofe who mifconceive their ufe". The more univerfal the demonftration of any propofition is rendered, it becomes at the fame time the more informing and the " Had the learned Lord Monboddo proceeded to read this fentence, perhaps he would not have quoted that immediately preceding it, to prove that Ariftoile thought, that " ideas, confidered as in the divine mind, have an exiftence, and an exiftence more rear than particulars, becaufe they are eternal and unchangeable." Monboddo's Ancient Metaphyfics, vol.i. p. 470. Ariftotle fpealcs with great caution concerning the divine mind, nor ever fays that any thing exifts In it. Of ideas or examplars he fpeaks often, and always contemptuouQy, as of metaphors and vain flourifhes. Analyt. Poft. l.i.cxxii. p. 151. Mctaph. l.i.c.vii. p. grj. So that it is plain what he v/ould have thought of the diftindtion, rap τ« β,οΛλΙ», Ε,τοκ^ολΛβκ, Επ>το.5^ο?Λοκ; which was adopted by his followers, and is fo much infifted on, as the grest doSrine of the Peripatetics, by Lord Monboddo and Mr. Harris. The following paflage may be quoted to fticw what Ariftotle thought of the rofo T..•» ^ολλί)., " thofe eternal exemplars." α:^« yap «^Οξ^το. ?>«?., ευαι, κα. «(,το :»Γ7Γ0» χα. uV'Eta», «λ^» Ϊ£ ί^^ί»" ««ίαττλ^σ.ο. ,χε. isoiam; «κ Οεβ; ^ε. :..ίί. ψΛσχ,ησ^ «iD™.- TroE.Je.s^i. aT£ y«e eXeiwi «9ε» άλλο Επο.Β. ., a:9ji.>7r«? αιί.»;, »Τ£ aro. τα Eiirj άλλα « αισΟΐτα. «ιϊια, « They who maintained the eternal exiftence of fuch exemplars, as the ideas of man, horfe, health, aaed exaftly like to thofe who maintained there were Gods, bat that the Gods were of a human ftiape. The Gods of fuch theologians were nothing more than eternal or incorruptible men; and the ideas of fuch philofophers nothing, more than eternal or incorruptible objeds of fenfe." Metaphyf. 1. iii. c. xi. p. 8O1. %6 NEW ANALYSIS OF Ariftotle's Metaphyfics extend to every tranch of human fcience• the more fatisfadory ; tlie more informing, becaufe it compre- hends the greater number of particular truths ; and the more fatisfadory, becaufe it demonftrates thefe truths from their firft and ultimate caufe ; at leaft, approximates nearer to this caufe in exad proportion to its greater "univerfality. To defcend froiii generals is alio more natural; becaufe, in matters of fcience, they are the fource and fountain of particulars. It has alfo more dignity, becaufe generals are the work of intelledl, whereas the more particular propofitionB are, the more nearly they ap- proach to perceptions of fenfe, in which, when ftritlly parti- cular, they ultimately terminate. From this part of Ariftotle's Logic, there is an eafy tranii- tion to what has been called his Metaphyfics; a name unknown, as above obferved, to the Author himfelf, and given to his moft abftradt philofophical works by his editors, from an opinion that thofe books ought to be ftudied immediately after his Phyfics, or Treatifes on Natural Philofophy. Confidered under one particular afped:, thofe books may be properly thus ar- ranged °; becaufe, as we fhall fee hereafter, the ftudy of nature, conducted according to Ariftotle's principles, neceflarily leads to Deity, and to the moft delightful of all contemplations, that of the Divine Goodnefs. But, viewed in the full extent of their relations, Ariftotle's Metaphyfics are intimately connected with every branch of human fcience, whether natural or moral, fince their real fubjedt (which has been grofsly miftaken through a prepofterous arrangement of the treatifes which they comprife) is the vindication of the exiftence and nature of truth againft the cavils of Sophifts, and thofe now called Metaphy- ficians : Topic, l.i. c. 2. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 87 flcians ; and this doftrine concerninf; truth illuilrated in the CHAP. . . . . II- demonftration of the being of one God, in oppofition to i_ ,,-.-■ _j Atheifts on one hand, and Pdytheifts on the other. The whole of Ariftotle's metaphyfical works may be referred to one or other of thofe two heads ; fince to them the greater part of his treatifes relate immediately, and the fmaller part will appear to be merely preparatory, to their difcuiTion. The unikilfulnefs of his editors '' has placed near the middle Begin with a of the work, a book plainly preparatory, fmce it merely exhi- Vocabulary, bits the different acceptation of the terms of which he has occafion afterwards to make ufe. This fifth book of his Meta- phyfics, which ought undoubtedly to ftand as the firft, con- tains in thirty chapters, an accurate philofophical vocabulary, which Ariftotle thought peculiarly requifite as an introdudtion to the firft and moft comprehenfive '' of all fciences, that of which truth in general was the fubjedt, fince the terms em- ployed in it having neceffarily a variety of meanings, it was impoffible to ufe thofe figns properly, without precifely afcer- taining the things which they iignified. Wonder and admi- ration, he obferves, are the paffions naturally excited by the contemplation of the univerfe, whofe fublime obfcurity, while it fixes the attention, inflames the curiofity of man, and makes him ambitious to know and comprehend fo interefting and magnificent a fpedlacle. But it is impoffible to know any thing without » Dr. Morton of the Britiih Mufeum, who has long ftudied the writings of Ariftotle with eciual diligence and fuccefs, firft Ihewed to me, that Saniuel Petit, in the fourth book of his MiJceUanea, had already placed Ariftotle's Mctaphyfics in nearly the fame order in which I alfo had arranged them. ' άλλα ri f^iv γιοιμ,'.Τξΐχ χαι r: α,-ξολιγίχ ra;fi τι>λ φνσαι i^iciv ίίσι• iKuyn it (ΐ ■KTffTi ^i^srcf ,'^;, feiikti^'jyixn)) καθίλϋ ^acrui Kotn, Metaphyf. 1. vi. c i• p. 904. S8! NEW ANALYSIS OF illudrated in words, cauie or principle. The mate- ria!, formal, efficient. finsl. without knowing its caufes and principles. Ariftotle, there- fore, begins his vocabulary with an explanation of thofe terms ; he obferves, that all caufes are principles ; and defines a prin- ciple to be that from which any thing exifts, is made, or is known. The notion of a caufe always includes that of pri- ority, which is the fpecific quality belonging to all the different acceptations of the word principle. Ariftotle enumerates four kinds of caufes, the fame word being taken in Greek in four different meanings, i. The material caufe, that is, the matter from which any thing is made ; as brafs of the flatue, and filver of the goblet ; and which are evidently caufes, fince, independently of them, neither the ftatue nor the goblet could exift. The brafs and the filver have alfo their material caufes, namely the fubftances from which thofe metals are compofed ; and in the works both of nature and of art, the firft component fubftances, which are fo fimple as not to admit of any further refolution, are called Elements. 2. The formal caufe, which is that fpecific form or fliape, or quality, moft commonly diftinguiftied by fight, which charadlerifes each particular objeil, and gives to it an appropriate nature and effence. It is from their agreement in the fame form or effence, that different ob- jefts receive a common name ; of which name, this form or effence is therefore the proper definition. In lofing their ap- propriate form, objects lofe their name and nature ; this form, therefore, is a caufe of thofe objects, fince, independ- ently of it, they would not be at all, or would not continue to exift. 3. The efficient caufe is the principle of motion or change ; or, in other words, the maker ; which term fuffi- ciently explains itfelf. 4. The final caufe, that is, the end or purpofe for which any thing is made, and, independently of 3 which ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 89 which end or purpofe, the maker could not have exerted his C HA P. power or ikill ; and therefore his work would never have com- l^,»,!,. . i menced ; that is, the thing made would never have exifted '. Of thefe four caufes, the two iirft are ahvays inherent in the obje£t caufed : in works of art, the two laft caufes are always feparate from this objea ; we ihall fee in the fequel, whether this is alfo the qafe with refped to the works of nature. Ariftotle's enumeration of the different meanings of the ^'^^''^^°']*^ word "caufe," which muft be carefully diilinguiihed in all parts fiders words r • r 1 i_ 1 I.• 1- as {landing of his philofophy, may ferve as a Ipecnnen or that book, which [„ oppofuio» was intitled " An Explanation of Words with various Signifi- ^°^^^^^ cations." That book is naturally followed by the tenth, which ouo-ht therefore to itand as the fecond ; becaufe, in it, words are confidered, not ftmply in themfelves, but as ftanding in the relation of oppofition or contrariety to each other. It is briefly intitled " The Seledion of Contraries," and treats of one and many ; likenefs and unlikenefs ; contraries in the fame genus, as " white" and " black ;" and contraries which are not in the fame genus, as «corruptible" and «incorruptible." The firil kind of contraries may fubilft at different times in the fame fubje£t ; ' Juftnefs of thought is infeparably conneaed with propriety of language. The feveral caufes enumerated by Atiftotle, the names of which found awkwardly in Eng- liih, were expreffed briefly in Greek, each by a particular prepofition. The material was the .1 «•; the formal, the ..ί a ; the efficient, the ύψ ύ ; and the final, the i.. ο : •befides which, the Greeks indicated the means, or inftrument, by which any thing is done, or made, by h. « ; and the model after which it was made, by jo.o. 1 his model, or exemplar, was confidered as a caufe by the Pythagoreans and Platomfts ; the former of whom maintained, that all perceptible things were imitations of num- hers ; and the latter, that they owed their exiftence to the participation of 'dr^^-'^^^t wherein either this imitation or this participation confiftcd, thefe philofophers, AnftoUc obferves, omitted to ihew• VOL. i. Ν 90 NEW ANALYSIS OF The third book trt-ats of fcience. There can- not be an in- finite pro- greiTion of caufes. fubjedt ; the fecond, never can ; becaufe the firft kind are merely appendages to the fubjedl in which they fubfift, and may therefore be feparated from it ; but the fecond are eifen- tials •. The fecond and fourth books treat of truth and fcience ; they ought to be confidered as one, and to ftand the third in order j fmce they naturally follow the definitions laid down in the firft and fecond. His treatife on fcience opens with great modefty. Its difficulty, he obferves, arifes not merely from the fubje£t, but from ourfelves, whofe intelledtual fight (as happens to the eyes of bats) is blinded by what is brighteft. Much thanks are due, not only to thofe who have eftabliihed truths worthy of being adopted, but to thofe alfo who have given us opinions worthy of being confidered. They fet our faculties to work ; and even their errors are ufeful to their fucceifors. Had Phrynis never lived, we ihould not now enjoy the charm- ing melodies of his fcholar Timotheus '. Of fpeculative philofophy, truth is the end ; and each ob- jedl participates of truth more or lefs, in proportion as it more or lefs participates of reality. Truth, therefore, is to be found in things eternal and unalterable, rather than in their contra- ries ; becaufe fuch things are not dependent for their reality on other things, but all others on them. There muft be fome principle or firft caufe of whatever really exifts ; for if this were not the cafe, there would be an infinite progreffion of caufes. But this infinite progreffion is impoffi- ble : I. With regard to material caufes; that fleih, for inftance, Ihould be made of earth, earth of air, air of fire ; and that to this * Metaphyf. 1.x. c. ix. and x. p. 951. ic feq. 6 ' Metaphyf. 1. ii. c.i. p. 856. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. •9-ι this ferles of produftions there ihould be no end. 2. As to the efficient caufc or prhiciple of motion ; that man, for inftance, ihould be actuated by the air, the air moved by the fun, the fun by ftrife, in endlefs fucceffion. 3. As to the final caufe ; that exercife, for inftance, ihould be taken for the fake of health, and health chofen for the fake of happinefs, and happinefs itfelf for the fake of fome farther objed. 4. As to the formal caufe ; that the charaderifmg properties of things ihould be derived one from the other without ultimately terminating in one com- mon fource. For in all thofe four cafes alike, to fuppofe an infinite fucceffion of caufes, is to fay that things exift without any caufe at all ; fince, in this infinite chain, every link is merely the effedl of the link preceding it, and when the chain is endlefs, there is no firft link, and therefore no caufe. Were we defired to tell which of three things is th^ caufe of the other two, we fhould name the firft of the three. We could not fay the laft, for it is the caufe of nothing ; neither could we fay the fecond, for it is the caufe of one thing only ; and though confidered in relation to that one, it be really a caufe ; yet confidered in relation to the whole, it is merely an effed ; and in the fame manner all the intermediate links are effeds, how numerous foever they may be fuppofed. The very term " final caufe" exprefles an end and boundary ; and if there was not fomething ultimately defirable on its own account, for the fake of which other things are defirable as means, all defire and all volition would neceflarily ceafe ; and all intelledion would be deftroyed, if the properties of things could be continually traced up to other properties ftill more eflential ; that is, if formal caufes might be traced back in infinite progreffion, there j^ 2 would 92 NEW ANALYSIS OF would be no firmnefsfor the intelled to reft on; in other words, no underftanding ". The exift- Democritus had faid, that truth either did not exift ; or that, vindicltedl'^ ^7 "^^^ ^^ ^^^^' '^^ "^'^^^ "°^ ^° ^^ difcovered. In the fame fpirit of fcepticifm, Protagoras maintained that man was the meafure of all things ; which were true or falfe, good or bad, merely- according to his conception of them. It is melancholy, Arifto- tle obferves, to hear thofe who might be expected beft to fee what is true, fince they moft fought and loved it, maintain fuch opinions; bccaufe, were they well founded, to aim at philo- fophy would be to court difappointment, and to purfue truth as puerile a folly as that of attempting to catch birds in their flight. But the misfortune of thofe philofophers is, that they confine their inquiries merely to fenfible and fublunary objeds, which from their own nature, as well as that of the fenfes by which they are perceived, are indefinite and variable, liable to decay and corruption, and continually appearing under different afpeds to different men ; and even to the fame man, according to the point from which he views them, and the a£lual difpo- fition of his organs. But thefe variations as to the objedls of perception by fenfe, take place chiefly in fublunary things, the . whole mafs of which is fo inconfiderable in magnitude, that it bears not any proportion to the univerfe at large, where all is permanent and invariable, and the ftability of whofe arrange- ment ought to convince us, that there is an eternal arranging caufe *, and fome manner at leaft of firmnefs and conftancy in the " i toficrti toiXtv γ,ρμ,-ησι% τικ και ZTCiTctati, μαΧΚΜ v) Χίΐτ,σα. Dc AnilTl• 1,1. C. 3. icir,irai 5t 8« ΕΓΙ /ii ΐ-ησχίτα.. Metaphyf. I. ii. c- ii. p. 857. ■* ■srwi yxi irai ταξίζ, fi,, tiki; «»t«5 «iJia^ &c. ρ•983. Natural. Aufcult. l.ii. C. VJ. p. 335. and civ. p. 332. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 95 the world by which we are furrounded ^ Even here, It belongs to the eye to judge of colours, to the ear to judge of founds, and to the other fenfes to judge of their refpedive objeds ; and they judge exaQly alike, when fimilarly difpofed and fnnilarly circumftanced. If fublunary things are generated, and periih, there muft be fome material caufe from which they are gene- rated ; and fomething that exifts immutably, even while the deftrudion of one fubftance is the produdion of another. The fceptics are not convinced by their own arguments. None of them, while in Libya, becaufe he can conceive himfelf in Athens, thinks of walking into the Odeum ". They confide more in their eyes, with regard to near than remote objeds* As to taftes and colours, they prefer the judgment of perfons in health to thofe of perfons in ficknefs ; and when they are them- felves indifpofed, they will have more confidence in the pre- diaion of a phyfician than in that of a perfon ignorant of the healing art. But fenfible objedts are neither the whole nor the principal of things. There are, as ihall be proved hereafter, exiftences firm and immoveable, and altogether imperceptible to corporeal organs. That our fenfes do not ihew us things as they really are, is perhaps true, but that there ihould not be fome caufe of our fenfation, exifting independently of the fen- fations themfelves, is impoffible ; becaufe, whatever is pro- duced by motion fuppofes a moving power % which exifts in- dependently, and is prior to the thing moved, in the order of caufality and nature '. , » Metaph. 1. Iv. c.v. p. 879. y The Theatre of Mufic at Athens. ^ Idem ibid- » The moving power does not infer the exiftence of the thing moved, ft» amrpo?»» «»T« n> Ts i.Fa. ««λβΟ^.., but the latter infers the former. Ariftot. Predicam. 94 NEW ANALYSIS OF It Is the mifery of the fceptics ftill vainly to reafon, while they deftroy the only bafe on which all folid reafoning muft ftand. Some of them do this through ignorance, and others through obftinacy. The latter ftand in need, not of convidtion, but corredlon, for the oppofers of fome truths ought to be chaftifed, not confuted ; as thofe who deny that we ought to reverence the Gods, or to refpe£t our parents. But it is the grofleft ignorance not to know, that all truths cannot be de- moixftrated ; for it is impoffible that demonftrations fhould run back to infinity, without flopping at certain principles or firft truths, which are called felf-evident, becaufe more certain and more neceffary in themfelves than any arguments that could be produced in proof of them. To deny a firft caufe, we have already proved, is to deny all caufation : to deny axioms, is, for the fame reafon, to deny all demonftration, and to fub- vert the principles on which both reafoning and language are built *". The very nature of words infers, that the things fig- nified by them, have a certain determinate mode of exiftence ; for words, even the moft comprehenfive, are nothing elfe than figns denoting that certain properties are charaderiftic of cer- tain fubjedls. How numerous foever thefe properties may be, provided they be not infinite, they are ftill capable of being collected under one name ; but if the properties were totally indefinite, there could not be any colledtion. Each term, therefore, affirms fomething definitely refpedting the obje£l which it denotes"; and to fay with the fceptics, truth is merely apparent, or that the fame thing may be both affirmed and denied •■ Metaph. 1. iv. c. iv. p. 874; * ί j'af λόγο;» m τβ i>n>i*a (rriiitu», ofi^fioi ytyvneu TU '^^(Λγμιιτος, p. 881. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 95 denied concerning the fame objedl at the fame time, is to main- CHAP, tain that it is impoflible for man, either to reafon within him- ■ - - _r felf, or to difcourfe with his fellow-creatures ". The exiftence of truth may be evinced, from the various The fuhjedl ihades σι error, which gradually receding from the regions of light, finally darken into perfedl obfcurity. As truth confifts in the agreement of humaij conception with the nature of things, the brighteft truths refult from thofe fciences which treat of things fimple and invariable. In this view, arithmetic and geometry have long held the pre-eminence. The geo- meter abftradls from body heat and cold, hardnefs, foftnefs, gravity, levity, and all other perceptible contrarieties ; and con- templates it only under the two properties of magnitude and continuity ; concerning which he demonftrates innumerable afFe£tions, afcertaining either the magnitudes themfelves, or their proportions to each other. His theorems therefore are more convincing than thofe of the natural philofopher, whofe fpeculations are more complex % as comprehending a greater variety of objeds. But there is a fcience preceding geometry in fimplicity as well as dignity ; which, inftead of contem- plating properties and their affedlions, contemplates being and its ^ ίει Toi»D» τω'J OToftariu» ίκαΓο» ει»«ι ytafi[io:>> χαι ori^ow I» τι, xai f/.ri ΌΐοΚΚα, /xo»o» ίε L•' xat αλίοια a-ri[naitr,t (panfot ί^οΐΕΐϊ s^' ό φΐ(ΐ> τακ/Λα tutu»' ό ίίί λίγων ε»αι tbtoj xctt μ.ΐί iirai, τϋτο ο όλων Eirai ψηο-ίν, ου ψισιν• ωΓΐ ό ίτημαικι ΤΒνο/χα, Τβτο a ψηιτι σ'ΐμχκ'ΐίΐ', ρ. 9^4* *V hen it IS faid that each name ihould denote one, Ariftotle means h, as explained p. 883. τα St "ETfiUTij; λίγοι/,ίνα If, ω» υ BO-tot f4ia' ftie h « σνίίχαα. η tiiii η λογω> Xhat unity is aicribed tO things whofe fubftance is one ; one in continuity, form, or definition ; one in form or appearance, is what our eyes tell us is one; one in definition, is what our reafon tells us is one ; the fpccific quality being fometimes vifible, fometimes intelligible. See above, p. 66. • αζρΕίΓαται τω» tTriflfto'v αι μαλίξ•» τω» ορωτω» ίίσι" «ι y»( ίζ ιλ«τΤο*(ί» axfiftftfai Tu» ι» •afohnw; λsγej,ι,eyuty Sig» βριθμι;τιχ>ι yiUf),V!(iaci SiC• p. SifZ.. gS NEW ANALYSIS OF CHAP, its properties'. This fcience may be juftly called the firft t_ ^]: f philofophy, and theology : it may be called the firft philofophy, becaufe all other fciences imply it, and borrow from it their principles^; and it may be called theology, becaufe all the claifes of being, as quantity, quality, and relation, finally reft on fubftance ; and God is the firft, the one neceflary and inde- pendent fubftance, whofe non-exiftence implies a contradidion, and from contemplating whofe nature our knowledge of being and its properties is ultimately derived *■. Ariftotle's Having given to his readers a glimpfe of this fublime fubjedl, to"hihif-°" our author proceeds in examining the principles of things ac- fTrft phSofo- cording to his ufual method ; firft explaining the fentiments of phy,orthco- j^jg predeceiTors in fcience, before he endeavours to eftablifti his logy. ^ own fyftem. The book publiilied as the firft, and that pub- liihed as the third, treat of principles ; and together form only one difcourfe, which ought to ftand as book the fourth. The elaborate exordium of this book feems to account for its being confidered as the beginning of the whole treatife. " That all men," our author obferves, "are naturally fond of knowledge, is proved from the pleafure which they univerfally take in the exercife of their fenfes ; which exercife they love on its own account, independently of any end or ufe. But of all our fenfes, the fight is that which we moft delight to exercife, and that independently of its afliftance in the bufinefs of life ; for even when we have nothing to do, we prefer this exercife to all other employments ; the caufe of which is, that the eye affords to us more knowledge, and makes us acquainted with more of the ' Metaph. l.iv. c. i. p. 869. and Metaph. l.xiii. c. iii. p. 983. e Metaph. l.iv. c. ii. p. 87i.&feq. '' Metaph. 1. iv. c. iii. p. 872. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 97 the dlfierences of things, than any of the other fenfes. All animals are endowed with fenllition ; but in fome only, fenfa- tion is followed by memory. Thofe who are endowed with memory, are fufceptible of inftrudion ; and even without in- ftrudion, (fmce incapable of hearing,) attain a wonderful degree of fagacity, as appears in bees, and in fome refembling tribes. The powers of hearing and remembering infer the capacity of being taught by inftru£tion as well as by experience ; of which capacity inferior animals participate in a fmall degree, but which in man is exalted into art and fcience. His expe- rience, alfo, arifes from memory; many particular remem- brances combining into our experience. From experience, ao-ain, both art and fcience are derived ; art being nothing more than the general refult of various experience ; as when we obferve that a certain medicine is beneficial to Socrates, to Callias, and many others, we infer that it will alfo be fo, to all others labouring under a fimilar malady. In each particular cafe, therefore, we can affign a caufe why the medicine ihould be adminiftered ; and the man of art is preferred to the mere empiric, becaufe he can thus explain the reafons of his prac- tice, and communicate his ikill to others. The prailice of the empiric, however, may often be far more fuccefsful ; and even his ikill in the healing art may be far greater ; for if his know- ledge is derived only from individuals, it is with individuals only he has to do. Arts, therefore, are admired rather/ for their ino-enuity than utility ; and the farther they are removed from the common ufes of life, our admiration of them is the greater. Such arts, indeed, are the lateft in invention; for men muft be provided with neceifaries and accommodations, before they can attain that freedom of mind Avhich is requifite VOL.1. ο for 9δ The nature and dignity of this fcience• NEW ANALYSIS OF for fpeculation. The mathematical ftudies, therefore, firft af- fumed a fyftematic form among the priefts of Egypt, who enjoved independent leifure. We make thefe obfervations to iliow how men are led from fenfe and memory to experience ; from experience to art, and from pradical arts to fpeculative fciences ; till they finally reach the moil lofty fpeculations of all, concerning the firft principles of the univerfe. The fcience containing thefe fpeculations is called wifdom ; and thofe by whom it is cultivated, are eminently diftinguiihed as the wife. The particulars in which it diiferg from other fciences are, that it is the moft univerfal, the moft difficult, the moft accurate ; and, merely for its own fake, of all fciences the moft defirable. It is the moft univerfal, becaufe the knowledge of firft principles is the fource of all other knowledge ; it is the moft difiicult, becaufe it is of all fciences the fartheft removed from fenfation ; it is the moft accurate, becaufe its objeft is the moft fimple, being unaccom- panied with any acceflaries ; as geometry is more fimple than phyfics, and arithmetic than geometry. It is alfo the moft defirable on its own account, fince in proportion as men poflefs all other goods of the mind and body, they become moft am- bitious of attaining this knowledge ; which is coveted, loved, and fought merely for itfelf, independently of any further end than the pleafure of enjoying it. A freeman, in oppofition to a flave, lives for himfelf, not for another ; fo this fcience is of all the moft liberal, terminating completely in itfelf. It may there- fore be deemed above the rank of humanity, (fince men are naturally flaves to innumerable wants,) and a fcience fit only for gods ; fo that if the gods, as the poets fay, are capable of envy, this fcience ought to draw dowa the divine difpleafure on thofe who ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. g^ who cultivate it. But the Divhiity cannot pofTibly be fuLjed to envy ; and the poets, even by the common proverb, are ac- knowledged to be hars. This fciencc, therefore, is moft valu- able, becaufe, in two reipeds, the moft divine ; firft, as the Divinity being a caufe or principle, is therefore its obje£t; fecondly, as the Divinity, to whom the univerfe is but one great truth, alone fully comprehends it. Although all other fciences are more neceflary than this, yet none is better. With this preface Ariftotlc introduces his hiftory of what he Its hiftory; calls wifdom, theology, and the firft philofophy ; and then pro- ceeds to ihow that of the two great fchools, the Ionian and the Italic, the philofophers of the former were attentive folely to grofs material caufes, whereas thofe of the latter wandered in the chimerical regions of ideas and numbers j fubftituting for the real caufes of things metaphyfical abftradions, which were the mere creatures of their own intelle£t. The materialifts differed widely from each other. Thales maintained water to be the firft principle of things ; probably, as our Author fays, obfcrving that the nouriihment, as well as the feeds, of moft natural objeds are moift ; and that heat, perhaps life, is produced by fermentation. He might alfo allege the opinions of divines and poets long before his own age, who confidered Oceanus and Tethys as the fathers of generation ; and who make the gods fwear by Styx, that is by water, as the moft to be revered of all things, becaufe the moft ancient. Anaximenes and Diogenes perceived that water might be refolved into air ; and therefore maintained air to be the original principle of bodies. The caufe of fire was defended by Flippafus and He- racleitus, who faw all things expanded, animated, and revived by heat ; and differing from each other in proportion as they ο 2 ' parti- 100 NEW ANALYSIS OF CHAP, participated of the different degrees of the caloric, from the II. extreme of condenfation to that of rarefadion. Empedocles confidering all thtie three fubftances as principles, added to them earth as a fourth principle ; and called thefe four the ele- ments, becaufe he fuppofed that all things were compofed of them, that all things might be refolved into them, and that they themfelves were fimple, indeftrudible, and totally incapable of farther refolution '. Anaxagoras introduced the obfcure doftrine of the omiEomeria, or the produdlon of bodies from indefinitely fmall organic particles, exadily refembling the bodies themfelves ; and therefore maintained principles to be infinite. In this inveftigation, which refpefted only the material caufe, philofophers were naturally led to inquire what made thefe principles or elements (whether one, many, or infinite) change their adlual ftate. In works of art, they perceived that the materials were totally inadtive ; that the iron did not make itfelf into a faw, nor the brafs into a ftatue. To anfwer this queftion, fome maintained, contrary to experience, that all things were one, and unaherable. Others afcribed an adive power to fire, which produced all the changes which we behold, by its operation on the other elements. But of the order and beauty which prevail in the univerfe, neither fire nor any fimilar fubftance could be fufpeύγομι^ In hi ant χ» νποχίΐσίαι το γίγι/ομιην. Natural. Aufcult• 1. ί• C. vHi. p. 324* " )!/*(ΐ5 5ε ψαμι» «λ»)» τι»β Tut cufitxTuv 7uv ακτ^τ,τωνι άλλα TauTnv » XUftriy» άλλα aiti μ,ιτ smtTturiui, ff 1; yimrai τα χαλ>ιμί>α j-oi^Eia ...» yap το 6ίξμ.αί ύλη τω ψΐ'Χξω* aJe rare τα νεξμω' αλλ» το νττύΧίΐΐΛίνον αμ^οιν» α)Γ£ 'aξuτoυ μ.ίν' το ϋνΐΛ^ίΐ σαμ» αισδΐΐτον Λξ^η iifTe^ov ίε^ 6ti tfcc^Tiuasi^' λtyu ύε otov 9ίζΐΛ0ΤΥΐς κα» ψϋ^οτϊΐς* τ^ίΤον de y^orj 'ανς χα* νοωξ . τανΤΛ μ,εν γας μεταζαλλ» £ΐ; άλληλα,' at ίε ειιαντωσεις, « ftETaSaMao-i. De Gcncrat. & Corrupt. I. ii. c. i. p. 515. "We fay that perceptible bodies have for their principle a certain fluff or matter, which exifts not feparately, but is always endowed with fome one of the contraries, hot or cold, moift or dry ; and from thefe two, matter and one of the contraries, the elements are compofed. For heat fupplies not the materials for cold, nor cold for heat ; but there is a certain fubjefl: fufceptible of either of thefe contraries. So that this fubje<3-matter is the firft conftituent principle, or element of perceptible bodies ; the fecond, the contraries of which this matter is fufceptible ; the third, the compound elements of fire, water, &c. ; which, as we have faid, change into each other j but the contraries do not fo change." See alfo De Generat. & Cor- nipt. 1. i. c. 6t ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 109 nature. adapted to anfwer their refpedive ends. This peculiar charac- CHAP. teriftic, by Avhich objedts are diftinguiflied, Ariftotle calls their \_ -_- j appearance or form, becaufc the fight, of all our fenfes, is that which gives us moil information concerning the diiferences of things. Works of art are eafily diftinguillied by their outward fliape ; What is but the primary form of phyfical produilions lies within ; for works oi all their fenfible differences refult from that internal principle determining their motion to or from a certain ftate, and of reft during a certain time in that ftate ; which principle is called their nature. Of this nature we fee,, for example, the effects in plants, when they fix their roots in the earth, rear their ftems, expand their leaves, and fcatter their feeds ; which operations, were thefe organifed bodies endowed with intelligence, could not be more ikilfuUy performed for the prefervation of the in- dividual, and the propagation of the kind °. Plants, therefore, aft, " Natur. Aufcult. l.li. C. vlii. p. 336. &. feq anirm is m f*» oit^Set mxa ra yiHaBa.1 tuv μη ιίωσι το «i»a» ζαλινσαμικι' xat το χαι ■η tiyjiyi a βΗλίΰ£τ«ι' χβι yap ει tm ti τα |ολΜ η «auwuyixu, ό/*οι«? α» Τ)) φυσίΐ ιποιιι' uri si ε\ι td Τίχιιτι Eitrt i vtKa, τ«, χαι ε» τ» <Ρνσ» Ε»£Γΐ• ραλίΓα 0£ ούλοι•, οτα.ν τι; lur^iuri αύται; ivarot' τ«~α; yap toixij/ ι! ψυσι;• Ibid. ρ. 33*• " It is abfurd to think, that becaufe we do not fee the moving principle adtually deliberating, that it therefore adls at random, and not with an end in view- Art, then, we muft fay, ads at random ; for if the art of ihip-buiiding was in wood, it would not a£l more judicioufly yir ma^in^^ αβίρ, than nature does for notiriflnng, preferving, and propagating a tree. If there is defign in art, there muft aifo be defign in nature. This is rnoft plain when a man, being a phyfician, cures himfelf. Nature aτω> τα μίΐ woilTix», τα h ΰπο tbt«» «ιαθίτιχα. τα μ'.ν m «iTirpsipE») όσιι» tj αυτ-/ι ΰλιι εγι, *«» <β>ητικη tiMrihm, χ«ι «raSiTixi isro «Mi^wf. De Generat. & Corrupt. 1. i. c. x. p. 507, g 112 NEW ANALYSIS OF deftroys a flavour that is contrary to It, one colour its contrary, and complexly one body ads on a body endowed with many contrary qualities. Ariftotle claims not for his own difcovery, that contraries are the elements of generation and corruption, and of all the leiTer changes obfervable in material objeds. That dodrine, he obferves, was firft eftabliihed by the fchool of Pythagoras \ which arranged contraries into two claiTes ; the better, and the worfe : as light, darknefs ; good, evil ; hnite, infinite : and thenceforth adopted by all philofophers, compelled Form, and thereto by the force of truth *. One of thefe contraries, it was privation. obferved, departs as foon as the other accedes ; three things, therefore, are concerned in every mutation or change, the mat- ter which ftill remains one and the fame ; the contrary which accedes, called in general form ; and the contrary which departs, which Ariftotle calls in general privation". This term, like many others employed by our author, is merely a fign to mark a thing indefinite and unknown ; for the contrary which accedes, or, in other words, the charaderifing quality, is fome- thing certain and definite ; but the form which departed in order to make room for this chara£lerifing quality, and without the departure of which the change could not have been eifedted, is, in a great meafure, uncertain and indefinite : thus there is but one form of health, and innumerable forms of ficknefs j one form of order, innumerable forms of confufion j or in things more fimple, each body has its definite colour or colours ; but it may have been changed to any of thefe colours, for inftance, C. V. p. 846. « Natural. Aufcult. 1. i. c. v. * Ibid. 1. i. c. viii. p• 325. tm iiccvrmt i ηι^χ σντταχί» ffvifVii' Ariftot• Metaph. paflim. II ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 113 inilance, to black, either from its contrary white, or from any of the intermediate fliades between thofe oppofite ex- tremes ". In the changes which material fubftanccs undergo, they reci- procally 3lQ. on each other j in other words, both fubftanccs are agents, and both patients. This is illuftrated by what happens in mixture ; which, according to Ariftotle, confifts in this, that two fubftanccs, ading on each other, produce a third fubftance fpecifically different from either ; and of which each, the mi- nuteft part, is fpecifically different from each, the minuteft part, of either of the compofmg ingredients. Leucippus and Demo- critus, the fathers of the mechanical philofophy, endeavoured to explain mixture as well as all other natural appearances by atoms and a vacuum, commenfurate pores, the motions, figures, and pofitions of the minute particles of matter. But Ariftotle juftly obferves, that if mixture depended merely on mechanical caufes, there would be no fuch thing to the keen fight of Lynceus, which could always diftinguifh thefe compofing ingre- dients, how minutely foever they were fubdlvlded, from each other ; and eafily perceive that what, to our obtufe fenfes, ap- peared to be the produdion of a new fubftance, was nothing more * Natural. Aufcult. 1. i. c. vi. ρ•33ΐ• Ariftotle maintained a definite number of colours ag?.in(t the atomic philofopliers, who made them depend on the indefinite variety of the figures and difpofitions of minute corpufcles, τα πί-ι ην χ^/ίψ.αιω> εγι ωρα/Λαα. κα, ϋκ awiip. De Senfu h Senfiti, c. iii. p. 667. He confidered colours alfo as bearing the fame relation to light, which fliarpnefs and flatnefs do to found ; ola-Trif ya^ au-j φι^ης ί:χ 'jfCiTM τα χ^ι•|Κ'/,τΛ ; ara• «is arey ψο^» το o|u xcti το £2,1•. De Anima, 1. ii. C. viii. p. 64.1• ΗοΛί ftrangely were his doicrines perverted by the fcholaftics ! And how nearly did they in ihenif(;lveb approach to incluctions from cxpeiimenti• with \s'hich he was net acquainted ! VOL. 1. Q_ 114 NEW ANALYSIS OF CHAP, more than the minute fubdivifion and new arrangement of two \_ . « old ones ". Tranfitionto Subftanccs endowed with different charaderifmg qualities, in other words, different forms \vhich have the fame matter, are fitted for reciprocally ading on each other. But there is a higher order of forms, which ad, without fufiering; and of which, the higheil of all muft necejjar'ily be impaffive. A patient is faid, with equal propriety, to be cured, either by the phyfician's fkill, or by the medicines prefcribed. The medicines, while they ad, are alfo adted upon ; are warmed, cooled, or undergo fome fuch alteration. But the phyfician's ikill fuffers nothing from the effedt produced on the patient ; and by this comparifon, Arif- totle fays we may conceive why, of fubftances not immerged in the fame matter, the one may produce a change on the other, without being reciprocally affeded by it. The form. To know phyfical objeds is to know their caufes; the efficient fight! ' and final, which are principles external to thofe objeds; and the material and formal, which, exifting in the objeds themfelves, are the elements into which they muil intelledually be refolved. The formal caufe is that by which each objed is charaderifed and diftinguiihed ; and from which, as from a -perennial and. abundant fpring, its fenfible qualities, as well as latent powers, perpetually flow. Ariftotle did not think that, in the prefent ftate of our exiilence, we could remount to this fruitful fource, and behold things as they are '' \ but in all his inquiries it is conftantly his endeavour to approximate as nearly as poifible to =■ De General, h Corrupt. 1. i. c. x. p. 507. Ariftotle illuftrates his doilrine by obfervations on the mixture of metals, one of which is noticed by my ingenious friend Dr. Pearfon, See Philofoph. Tranf, for the y«ar 1796, p. 432. f Metaph. 1. ii. c. i. p. 856. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. uj to U\\s /pedes ^ fortn, or fight, which words he often employs CHAP, merely as figns for things fought ; and to difcover in each ob- Ui, -m— ■!■> jed that eifentiating charaderiilic, whether fubftance or pro- perty, on which its perceptible qualities depend''. Familiar with the corred geometry of his times, he difcerned the concatenation of truths, which being linked indiiTolubly together, unite themoft diftant and feemingly unconnedled extremes. Of each objedt he inveftigates the true definition ; and of each fcience, the principal theorem ; becaufe the foundation and bond of union of its parts ; juftly thinking, that the variety of our apparent know- ledge is often the proof of our real ignorance ; and that true fcience improves in proportion as many particular propofitions refolve themfelves into one general truth. Under the influence of this generalifuig fpirit, the true fpirit of philofophy, he is carried fometimes beyond the bounds prefcribed to the human intelled; but his errors are always thofe of a man of genius ; and what adventurer in fcience ever fuccefsfuUy contended in the field of truth, without fometimes being tempted to launch on the ocean of conjedlure ? Nothing in nature, he obferves, exifts in a totally crude and J^^tin^^ abfolutely unorganifed ilate ; but it is the inward organization, this lower or invifible form, which moulds the external ihape of bodies ; and impofes on the motion, producing their various figures and appearances, ■^ Metaphyf. I. vii. c. ii, xi, xiii• It is worthy of remark, that Ariftotle did pre- cifely that which he is blamed by Bacon, Hobbes, Malbranche, &c. for not doing ; and declared it impoffiblc todo that which he is blamed for having attempted. By examining, comparing, and claffirs the perceptible qualities of things, he endeavoured to make them known by a definition, affirming this examination to be the only method by'which thty could be known and defined. sB-iifa» 7=1^ eZ<>f-" ανα^Ι-ΛΛ-. κχτα τι;» ψΛίτασίαι TTEfi rut τι6 NEW ANx\LYSIS OF appearances, the laws' and limits of its adlion. In exerting thii> inherent power of forms, fire feems to be their principal mini- fter'j for fire, the moil fubtile of material principles, and of which light feems to be a modification'', always diiFufes itfelf through bodies, and feeks their extremities, by which their out- ward conformation is delineated and defined. There are forms of a peculiar nature, as we fliall prove hereafter, that feem to be totally feparable from matter, becaufe they are capable of energies and pleafures totally unrelated to any of its properties ; but the forms of moft phyfical objedls are infeparably combined with the material principle, becaufe independently of it, they would not anfwerany poffible end. Of what ufe would be the nutritive power of plants, were there not fome material fubftance to be nouriihed ? To what purpofe would ferve the fierce inftinds of the lion^ feparated from his fangs, his paws, and his brawny members ? It is highly unreafonable, therefore, to believe the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine concerning the feparate exiftence of thofe fubftantial forms' ; and not lefs unreafonable to admit the opi- nion fo ftrongly inculcated by fome poets and philofophers, that fuch forms migrate from one body to another''. In ^ De Part. Animal, l.ii. c. vii. p. 986. ννξος η Toiara τίνος TrafStria ί« τω οιαψαιεΙ. De AnilTia, 1. ii. C. VU. p. 638• * Natural• Aufcult. 1. ii. c. ii. p• 329. * De Anima, 1. i. c. iii. p. 624. It is pleafant to find Hobbes, in the 4th chapter of his Leviathan, and in many other parts of his works, combating, under the name of Ariftotle's philofophy, abftrait eilences, fubftantial forms, and innumerable other doflrines, metaphyfical as well as moral and political, with nearly the fame arguments by which Ariftotle, their fuppofed author, had long before vidorioufly refuted them. Malbranche and the French philofophers in general treat the Stagyrite with not kfs unfairnefs, and fpeak of bis opinions with not lefs ignorance. I fcarcely except 14 Rapin, ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. τχ; ge of Ariftotle, the word " nature" is confined to that part of the univerfe fituate withhi the lunar fphere ; In the language of Ariftotle, the word " nature" is confined CHAP. which, according to a philofophy preceding his own times, was capacity and regarded as the intermediate ifthmus feparating terreftriul and ^""gv '^c; perifliing, from celeftial and immortal, things'. In its primitive ?■' ohjeits in and proper fenfe, nature peculiarly applies to this lower world, which is the region of perpetual change, and in which all things are continually fludluating between the extremes of generation and corruption ; whereas the heavenly bodies, whether origin- ally created, or the eternal produdlion of an eternal caufe ', appear, as far as our experience reaches, to perform their un- wearied motions exempted from the viciilltudes of renovation or decay. Every thing therefore in nature, that is, in this lower world, may be conceived as exifling in two different ftates ; fo called, though variable, becaufe relatively more ftable than the other changes to which they are liable. The firft ftate of their exiftence, both abfolutely % and in the order of human con- ception, Rapin, whofe account of Ariftotle, hitherto regarded as the beft, is difgraced by great inaccuracies. It is not eafy to conceive how a writer, who had not acquired his no- tion of Ariftotle's writings at fecond hand, fiiould fo totally miftake their aim as Rapin does in fpeaking of the Ethics to Eudeinus. See Comparaifon de Platen & Ariftotle, p. 345. Edit. Amftcrdam. 1686. • Gale's Opufcula Mythol. p. 516. ^ uVe to th 7ε»ίσ£ΐ Jrtpo», Tij (pcrti TrfoTifoi ittai. Natural. Aufcult. )• viii. ex. p, 422. : and we fhall fee hereafter that things exifting in capacity muft proceed univerfally from things exifting in energy. 8 No tenet of the Peripatetic philofophy is thought more clearly afcertained than the eternity of the world ; and this tenet, I believe, is univerfally afcribed to Ariftotle by all writers whatever, both ancient and modern. The brevity and energy of our author's ftyle, often gives to him indeed the appearance of dogmatifitig where he is only inveftigating; but, in the following pallage, he fpeaks concerning the eternity of the ii8 NEW ANALYSIS OF ception, is that of their maturity and perfeiilion ; in the ftate of a tree, a horfe, and a man. But with refpeit to the indivi- duals of thofe, as well as all other claffes, though they always univerfally proceed from other individuals in a ftate of ma- turity, it will be found that they all undergo innumerable changes, before they attain, by flow and infenfible degrees, the perfedlion of their nature. As the rude marble is gradually formed by art into a beautiful or majeftic ftatue, fo feeds and embryos, fcarcely perceptible to the fenfes, expand, by aiTunilating their proper nouriihment, into the wonderfully organifed produc- tions called plants and animals. Such progreflive and ever varying natures may be confidered therefore as exifting either in a ftate of capacity for attaining a certain form and maturity, a thing as different from abfolute incapacity as fleep is from death ; or in a ftate of ailuality and perfection, which qualifies them for performing their refpedtive fundtions, and- exerting their peculiar energies. What then is change or mo- tion in its moft comprehenfive and philofophical fenfe ? It is the paflage from a ftate of imperfedion to perfection, from ca- pacity the world with the fame becoming modefty that he (hows on other fuhjefls unfathom- able to mere reafon. Having mentioned that principle in the works of nature, analo- gous to art in the produftions of man, which makes the ftems of plants flioot upwards, while their roots fix deeply in the earth ; which gives to animals their detcrrminate or- ganifation and proper ihape, diftinguiihable in their refpeflive members, adapted to fpecific and falutary purpofes, he proceeds thus : μ^λλιν nx.o- tcv ygavoi. ^iysn^iiai uVo ToizL'Trr cctT;a:, £i yiy^viv^ xai είναι oia, loialTriv αίΤίαΐ' {ΛΟ-λλον v) τ<ζ ζωχ τα υντ,τα.' το yz ΰν mayijL-vov xcei ώ^ισ•[Λ:ν,ν ττολί/ ^*αλλο!' ψαίηται vj ΤΆς «|:α:ιοί-, -η Trtfi :i/stjic. LJG Part. ΑηΙίΓΓί', 1. i. p. 970. " It is more likely that the heavens were produced hy fuch a caufe, if in- deed they were produced, and ihat they fubfift through the efficacy of fuch a cauie, than periihing animals, fince definite arrangement and regular harmony are confpi- cuous far more in celeilial than in terreftiial tilings." Befides this, when Anftoile's doiiirine of time is underilood, we fliall fee that he means by the eternity of the world fomething very diti'cient from the fenfe coannonly affixed to thofe words. time. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 119 paclty to energy ; or, the revcrfc of this, from energy to mere CHAP, capacity. For this reafon Ariftotle, anticipating the lubtile prin- ciples which gave birth to the fubhme geometry of Newton and jj^^^'^j" Leibnitz, exprefles an objedl in itfelf too fugitive for words to re- prefent, by the limits or extremes between which it fluctuates ; calling motion the perfe£lion of mere capacity, becaufe the imme- diate end at which mere capacity aims; and an imperfed energy or aduality, becaufe until the productive motion ftops, the objedt is only approximating to its moil perceptible and moil perfed Hate \ Ariftotle obferves, that the four kinds of change or motion. Space and formerly defcribed, all finally refolve themfelves into lation, or change of place ' ; and that place is only a modification of fpace, that * Ariftot. Natural. Aufcult. I. iii. c. i, ii, lii. p. 339• & feqq. Had Mr. Locke known what Ariftotle meant by motion, his candour would not have allowed him to fpeak of this definition as he does in the following pafiage : " What more exquifite jargon could the wit of man invent than this definition, ' the a£l of a being in power, as far forth as in power ?' which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous abfurdity, to guefs what word it could ever be fuppofed to be the explication of. If Tully, afl-jng a Dutchman what beweeginge was, ihould have received this anfwer in his ov^n lan- guage, that it was " aiSus cutis in potentia, quatenus in potentia," I a(k whether any one can imagine he would thereby have underrtood what the word beweegtnTe lignified, or have guefled what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would fignify tp another, when he ufed that found ?" EiTay on the Human Underftanding, vol. ii. b. iii. C.4. p. 26. But Ariftotle, who had tauglit before Mr. Locke that, what the latter calls Ample ideas, could not be defined, (" φαη(ΐί» toi»u», ότι ίτιτιψ «tAwv hx. en Ti; ζ^,τησ^, uh λί^Ιις, άλλα εΤΕξο? τζοιτος της ζγ,ττ,αωζ τω» tcisti»." Metaphyf. k vii. c.xvii. ρ- 925• Vid.etiam, pp. 910 & 929.) would have more eafily explained to Mr. L. his ov/n definition of motion, than Mr. L. could have explained to Anftotle what he meant by the idea of a triangle, which is neither rectangular, obtufangular, nor acute-angular, but at once n.one and all of thefe together — the fuppofed exiftcnce of which ideas, and an infinity of others of the fame kind, is the principal bafis of thf v,ihole Eflay on Human Underftanding. ' Natural. Aufcult. 1. viii. c. x. p. 421. Metaph»l.xiv. c, vii. p. loou ,30 NEW ANALYSIS OF that unfubftantlal being of which no other definition can be given but that it is the recipient of body^ As our conception of fpace originates in that of body, and our conception of mo- tion in that of fpace, fo our conception of time originates in that of motion ; and particularly in thofe regular and equable mo- tions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfedt fimilarity to each other, are corredt meafures of the con- tinuous and fucceifive quantity called Time, with which they are conceived to co-exift. Time therefore may be defined the perceived number of fucceffive movements ; for as number af- certains the greater or leffer quantity of things numbei'ed, fo time afcertains the greater or leifer quantity of motion perform- ed'. An inftant is not a part, but the boundary of time"; whofe elements are the perceptible intervals bounded by in- ftants". If body, therefore, had a beginning, fo muft fpace, motion, and time, which are conceived merely as afFediions of body, or of each other ". If body cannot be fuppofed infinitely extended, without fuppofmg a contradidion, (for what quantity can adlually exift of which the magnitude cannot be afcertained and exprefl'ed?) fo neither can any of its properties ; and there- fore motion cannot be infinite ; nor time, which is conceived folely as the meafure of motion, a mere fidion of the fancy, pofl^effing no real exifi;ence independently of us and our thoughts. The very eiTence of infinity, again, confifts in pri- vation ; it is a word denoting not a conception, but the nega- tion of all conception ; fo that the errors committed on this fub- je£t by the ancients, and repeated by fome modern phllofophers, and ' Natural. Aufcult. ). iv. c. i, li &c. p. 551 — 364. ' Ibid. p. 367. . " Phyf. Aufc. p. 397. " Ibid. '. iv. c. xiv. ?cc. p. 364 — 373. " A-Ictaph. 1. V. c. xiii. ;-. S94. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 121 and even fome modern mathematicians "", proceed from their realifmg a non-entity, and affigning a pofitive archetype, or what they call an idea, to a word, which is merely a lign that nofuch archetype or idea exifts. Body and fpace cannot be conceived as infinite either in greatnefs or littlenefs ; and although its ad- jundt of motion or time is imagined to be fo conceived, this arifes from a mere illufion of the fancy, which, not retaining the parts of time firil taken, continually adds new parts, but without increafing the whole ; fince the former parts are continually an- nihilated, as the latter are created '', To realife infinity muft, in all our reafonings, neceifarily lead to abfurdity; thus, to give our Author's example, to fuppofe an infinite progreifion of caufes in making and arranging the world, is the fame thing as fuppofing it made or arranged without any caufe at all '. It ρ " La grandeur (fays the admirei-Fontenelle) eft fufceptlble d'augmentation fans fin. Elle n'eft done pas & ne peut ttre fuppofee dans le meme cas, que fi elle n'etoit pas fufceptlble d'augmentation fans fin : or fi elle n'etoit pas fufceptible d'augmenta- tion fens fin,'.elle refteroit toujours finie ; done etant fufceptible d'augmentation fans fin, elle peut etre fuppofee infinie." See the fame reafoning throughout his treatife, intitled, Elemens de la Geometrie de I'lnfini. It is eafy to perceive how much this ingenious man, and his innumerable followers, might have been benefited by reading the third book of Ariftotle's Phyfics, c. iv. to chapter xiii. both inclufive, p. 342 — 350• a» aφa^ςί^τa^ h ό λαγός ait ra; (Α«θ))^ατι)ίΒς Τ))» θίωζία», amifw ατως sttcci το «irsifo», ΰτ>_ι»ίξγα«. tivcii £OT rm uv^-iait ΰς α^αξιτνιτον' aJi γαξ tvi ^ωηΜ TS awtifa, uh x^w/rat, αλλχ ftovo» iitxi ίσπ! an ζαλίύνταί ττίΤίΐξΛσμ.ιηί' τω Λ ftL'.yira (Λε^εΘει to» «βτο» ifi ΤίΤμ,νισΒχι λαγον iiTr,>Kixcvat μιγώος eTtpov, ωί•£ wpo; μιν το isilai εΚΜως ηΘε» ΛοισΕί" το ίε ικαι, it τοι; sj-i tra^ μιγι^ίσ^• Ibid. C. XII. p. 350. " We do not deftroy the fpeculations of mathematicians, when we aflert that infinite magnitude cannot exift. For in thefe fpeculations, they neither employ nor need to employ infinite, but only a finite magnitude as great as they pleafe; and the fmalleft may be divided in the fame proportions with tlie greatcft. For finding pro- portions, therefore, it is not neceiTary to fuppofe the exiftence of what is impolSble." 1 Metaph. 1. v. c. xiii. p. 350. ' Ibid. 1. ii. c. ii. p. 857. VOL. I. R 122 NEW ANALYSIS OF It is both the glory and the fliame of Ariftotle's abftra£t phl- lofophy, that his general conclufions are corredl, whe:n fome of ajtronomy. *^^ arguments, by which he maintains them, are faulty. This is peculiarly maniieft in the ufe which he makes of the erroneous fyftem of aftronomy, which prevailed in his own age, to AUndi- cate the dodrines contained in his books of Phyfics. His trea- tife concerning the Heavens, indeed, delcribes with perfpicuity and precifion the celeftial phccnomena ; while, at the fame time, it informs us of the fublime notions given by the firft Pythagot- reans and their contemporaries, of the diftances, figures, mo- tions, and magnitudes of the planets '; that the moon abounded with inhabitants ; that the milky-way confifted of contiguous clufters of ftars'; and, conjedluring what it is the boaft of mo- dern aftronomy to have confirmed, that the fame principle which makes the heavenly bodies approach to their centre, perpetually impels them in their orbits, by proportionably increafing their celerity". Ariftotle's own fagacity led him to perceive that, in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, all was regular, eafy, and harmonious; and to rejed with difdain thofe childiih fidlions, by which the moving principles of the univerfe were degraded by a fuppofed analogy with the laborious exertions of mortals in fublunary and periihing fcenes"'. But he did not think the aftronomical theory of the Pythagoreans fufficiently juftified by obfervation : telefcopes were not to be invented till a far later ■ period ; and to thofe who held Ariftotle's dodrine concerning fpace and time, the argument in favour of the earth's motion, refulting from the otherwife inconceivable velocity of the heavens, • De Coelo, 1. ii. c xiii. p. 465. ' * Meteor. 1. i. c. viii. " De Coelo, 1. ii. c. i. p. 452. Comp. β. xiii. p. 465. & i. i. c. viii. pp. 443, 444. & 1. ii. c. ix. p. 462. " Ibid. p. 45'•^ C'vi. p. 458. 8 ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. i2t heavens, is not calculated to afford convidion. The earth, therefore, as the heavieil of bodies, he places at the centre ; around Avhich, the fun, moon, planets, and fixed ftars per- petually performed their refpedtive revolutions "; the only kind of motion or change to which thefe etherial ^ fubftances, un- changeable in their effence, were fuppofed to be liable ; whereas the earth and all its productions, the metals and minerals in its bowels, the plants and animals on its furface, together with the vapours and meteors between that furface and the lunar fphere, were obnoxious to a great variety of complicated motions, which changed their charafterifmg qualities or effence, and ren- dered the diffolution of one objedl the produdlion of another. On the hypothefis, therefore, of the ftability of the earth and the daily revolution of the heavens, Ariilotle argues, that the mate- rial univerfe cannot be infinite ; becaufe, could a radius be infi- nitely extended from the earth's centre to the remoteft body in the univerfe, that body could never perform a complete circular revolution ''; fmce an infinite extent of fpace could not be paffed over in a definite time. Space therefore cannot be infinite, be- caufe fpace is only the receptacle of body, the place where body may fubfift ; and, if fpace is not infinite, neither is motion, which depends on fpace ; nor time, which depends on motion» Unalterable and divine fubftances exift, therefore, in a manner totally unfathomable to our prefent faculties. In this manner, the firft Supreme Deity exifts ?2ecejhn/j^; neither generated in fpace, " De Ccelo, 1. ii. paflim. ^ Meteor. 1. i. c iii. p. 530. ^ De Ccelo, 1. i. c. v. p. 437. * χαΆαΌΐξ it Toi; εγχνχλιο; ^ιλοσο^υ;*»^! ντίξΐ τα. βίΐα πολλαχι? ττξο^αικτβι tdij λβ}'*'!• βτ• τβ β»» «(ΛΕΤββλτ,το» «yayxaio» siiat το TTfUTov *«ι axforam, p. 44-^• f( 2 124 NEW ANALYSIS OF fpace, nor growing old in time, unchangeable and impaffive, enjoying the beft and moft perfed life through all eternity ''. Ariftotle makes amends for his airy fpeculations in aftronomy, by well explaining, in oppofition to Democritus, the true prin- ciples of corpufcular attradion, which gives to the earth its globular form". This, he obferves, is further afcertained by the phasnomenon of lunar eclipfes, in which the bounding line is always perceived to be circular. The earth therefore, he fays, is plainly a fphere, and but a fmall '' one, compared with many others, its periphery not exceeding 37,000 miles ^ He fpeaks with fuch raptures, as the calmeft of philofophers could feel, of the beauty and grandeur of the heavenly motions, whofe celeri- ties, how frightful foever to fancy, yet being harmonifed by proportion, might be fteadily contemplated by the intelled^ Had he known the difcoveries of Galileo and Kepler, he might perhaps have been a Newton. But aftronomy being one of thofe fciences which requires long-continued obfervation for its bafis, was left by Ariftotle in the fame imperfed ftate in which he found it ; and yet, by the perverfenefs of ftupidity, it was that part of his works which, in the ages, of darknefs, was moft warmly admired, and moft obftinately and moft fuper- ftitioufly defended. His doc- From the magnitudes and motions of the heavenly bodies, cerning the Ariftotle defcended to a humbler fubjed, the produdions of the produflions! earth; which are conneded, however, with man, by far more numerous^ and powerful relations, namely, thofe of his daily wants. This globe which we inhabit feems to have undergone various " De Coelo, c. ix. p. 446, ' Ibid. 1. iv. c. vi. p. 492. & 1. ii. c. xiv.• p. 470. "■ Meteor. 1. i. c iii. p. 529. ' Ibid. p. 471• ' Ibid. p. 451 & 463. ί De Part. Animal. 1. i. c. v. p. 974. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 125 various revolutions, to have been overwhelmed by Inundations and ihattered by convulfions, which fwcpt away nations with their cities and their arts ; lb that the moil valuable inventions have innumerable times been loft, and times innumerable been recovered. Of the produdtions with which our earth abounds, many give indications of thefe direful viciflitudes ; and many appear to have emerged from the wreck of fome dreadful cataf- trophe. Both as the hiftorian and the interpreter of nature, our Author endeavoured to embrace and exhauft the complete fcience of the globe ; and if we may judge of thofe parts of his works which are loft or im.perfeil, by thofe which have come down to us entire, it muft have been no eafy matter to determine whether moft admiration was due to his defcriptions of the great mafles of nature, feas, rivers, mountains, and meteors ^, or to his minute diligence in treating the feveral objeds of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms. His books on plants and minerals no longer remain'; but both his hiftory of ani- mals, and his philofophy refpedling that hiftory, have come down to us in a far more perfedl ftate than any other portion of his writings concerning natural knowledge. On the fubjeft of Zoology, his treatifes are comprifed in fifty His hiilory books, of which twenty-five are happily preferved among his a„j οιΊΓε^Γ* works. The hiftory of animals occupies nine books : the fol- works rela- ^ _ f ^ ' tive to tl\ai lowing fixteen are employed in explaining their general afFec- fubjcdl. tions or properties, and their principal parts or members. Four books ^ Meteor. 1. i. c. i. p. 518. See the great views which he there gives of his undertakings. ' The two fiiort books on plants, p. 1007 — 1030• vol. ii. edit, du Val. are fpurious. In the laft chapter of the third book of his Meteorology, he fays he is to proceed to give an account of all the different foffils and metals j but tliat account nowhere appears. 126 NEW ANALYSIS OF books treat of their parts ; five treat of generation ; the remain- der, of their fenfations and motions, infpiration and refpiration, fleeping, v/aking, youth, old age, Ufe, and death ; in the know- ledge of which particulars, the liberal ftudy of Zoology, or, in Ariftotle's language, its philofophy, appears to him principally to confift. As he extends that term to its full and proper fenfe, denoting by it the knowledge of whatever has animal life, the firft four books of his hiftory, beginning with what is moil ftriking and palpable, the outward conformation of animals, di- vides and diftinguiihes, in relation to this complex objeft, and in comparifon with the human form, as that which is moft fami- liarly known, the inhabitants of the earth, the water, and the air, from the enormous whale and maify elephant to the fcarcely perceptible produdions of duil and rottennefs'', enumerating and defining with incomparable accuracy the agreements, differ- ences, and analogies that prevail, in point of external organiza- tion, among all living tribes, and fometimes referring to his treatifes on Comparative Anatomy, which are now unfortu- nately loft. In the three following books, he examines the dif- ferent claiTes of animals with refpeft to the commencement, duration, and term of their generative powers. His eighth book examines their habitation and nourilhment ; and the con- cluding •^ BufFon (vol. iii. p. 223) carries Ariftotle's fyftem of fpontaneous generation much farther than the author intended, when he makes him fay that " the firft men fprung from the earth in the form of worms." Our author is conftantly mifreprefented by being made to fpeak abfolutely, when he fpeaks merely hypothetically. His words are airif lyiywna wote ynyimz. Dc General. I. iii. c. ii. And we ftiall find hereafter, that the refultof all Ariftotle's inquiries into nature is a conclufion diredtly oppofite to the following of Mr. BufFon, namely, " qu'il y a peutetre autant d'etres, foit vivans, foit vegetaux, qu'il fe reproduifent par raiTemblage fortuit de molecules organiques, qu'il y a d'animaux ou de vegetaux qui peuvent fe reproduire par une fucceifion con- ftante de generations." Supplement a I'Hift, Nat. torn. viii. p. 18. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 127 eluding book of the hiftory contains their manners and habits, C H^A P. epumerates their friends and enemies, and explains the ordinary < ^-^ means by which each clafs provides for its prefervation and de- fence. In taking this wide furvey of animated nature, Ariftotle pretends not to comprehend its indefinitely varied branches (fince infinites of every kind fpurn the limits of fcience) ; but in the multitude of important and well-afcertained fads which he relates, and which is incomparably greater than can be found in any work of equal compafs, it is his main purpofe to illuftrate the general heads above mentioned, and to explain the proper- ties or affedions common to the greateft or moft diftinguiihed portion of the whole animal kingdom. To thefe general heads or common properties, he conftantly has refped in the hiftorical part of his work ; fo that his minuteft obfervations rcfpeding the minuteft infeds and leaft-organized animals, will be often found to elucidate or confirm fome important law of the animal oeconomy '. His Syftem, that is, in the popular fenfe of the word, H-jJi'^f his nomenclature, is indeed imperfed. The world created ralhillory by a microfcope, had not any exiftence for the philofo- phers of antiquity ; and, by the impro\^ments of this invention, new worlds perhaps may be brought to light in endlefs fuccef- fion. But in the chain of being, mortal eyes, however affifted, can contemplate only the middle links, of which, though our elaiTes have ihewn to us a greater number than were feen by ^ Ariftotle, 1 Take the following example: The σ>,..« is a fpecies of the Mollia, (fiOies fo called becaufe their foft parts are without, and their hard within,) wh.ch was long de- eraded by modern naturalifts to the rank of ila plants. Ariftotle remarks, w>th re- gard to this fpecies, that when the female is attacked, the n.ale boldly defends her ; but when an attack is made on the male, the female confults her own lafety by flight Females, except in defence of their young, are lefs courageous than males, and leU forward to give afliftance. Hiftor. Animal. 1. ix. c. i. p. 9^2• ^ (^^' natu- 128 NEW ANALYSIS OF Ariftotle, yet have they not brought us nearer to what ought to be the refult of beholding the extremity of the chain. This re- fult, the hiftory of nature in animals, the Stagyrite, by the intel- ledtual eye of reafon and analogy"', endeavoured to reach and reveal ; analyfmg, defining, demonftrating ; fometimes pene- trating deeply into nature's myfteries ; fometimes encountering difficulties which the human intellect is unable to furmount ; often foiled in his exertions, yet always renewing the combat with reanimated hope. Knowledge, he thought, was more likely to be ftruck out from the collifion of error than to emerge fpontaneoufly from confufion"; and while his theories are at- tacked and defended, exploded and revived, the fadls which he colledled with unexampled diligence, and which he relates with inimitable precifion, will for ever fupport his fame, and inftrudt the moft diftant ages of pofterity. Our wider furvey of the globe has indeed increafed our acquaintance with quadrupeds ; and the invention of glaifes has multiplied to our eyes the ever- diminiihing tribes of infedts, and enabled us to examine more accurately their germs and organs ; yet it will not be eafy to prove that modern writers have added any thing of importance to Ariftotle's obfervations on birds, or that any of their works difplay even an equal degree of knowledge on the fubjedt of fiihes". It " The expreflion of an anonymous writer prcferved in Suidas, is bold in the ex- treme ; AfiroTiXji; γραμμα/ηνι; nt Tr? ψυσιω;, το» χαΤ^χμαν αττοζριχί) ti; »8ί. " AriitOtls WIS Nature's ftcretary, having dipped his pen in intelleft." Suid. in ΑρΓοτίλϋ?. " Metaph. paffim. • In proof of this, I ihall cite the teftimony of an author, which derives great weight from the accuracy of his own obfervations, and the importance of his own difcoveries. " Quefti fatti finora rapportati in ordine alio fuiluppo delle ouva nei pefci ΓρϊηοΓι, fone ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 129 It may feem extraordinary that, on a branch of fcience, which, like all other parts of natural hiftory, is naturally pro- ereiTive, our author ihould have attained fuch accurate and ex- ^^ ^'^^^ ° ' means he was tenfive knowledge in fo early an age of the world. But Ari- enabled to itotle was the friend of a man as extraordinary as himfelf, from philofophy whom he received two favours, which, to a mind like his, '^ '^«'"P '^"^• muft fono quelli pochi che ho potuto oflbrvare nelle rare occafionl che mi fi fon prefcntati delle loro covate gattate, & gia fuiluppantifi. Ε percio la ferie di tali fatti e di multo interrotta, ne' continuata come a giorni noftri e' quella dello Iviluppo del feto nelle uova della gallina. Ε quando io reflettendo fu di quefta mancanza, fcorro la Storia degli Animali di Ariilotele, non ροίΓο non eilere da ftupore prefo, in eiTo leggendo veduti quei fatti, che a noi non fi fon potuti che a ilento manifeftare ; & relevati poi con tutta la nettezza, & pofti in parallelo coi fatti gia' riconofciuti nelfeto di gallo : & tanto maggiormente in me crefce lo ftupore, quanto che allora ufo non vi era degli inilrumenti microfcopici, che a tempi noftri abbiamo grandemente per- fezzionati. Ε quindi non poilb che di fdegno accendarmi contra dei modcrni Izzio- logi, vedendo per lor balordaggine trafcurato quanto la vcneranda antiquita avea fcritto fa quefto particulare, & a quello foftituite falfe oftervazioni, illuzioni afturde ed incoerenti." " Thefe are the few obfervations concerning the development of the eggs of ftiell-fifli, which I have been able to make on the few occafions on which I found the impregnated gems in the aft of difclofure ; obfervations of which the feries has been greatly interrupted, nor continued to the prefent times> like thofc which re- late to eggs of birds. When I confider this defeft, and turn to Ariftotle's Hiftory of Animals, I am feized with aftoniftiment at finding, that he (hould have fully and diftinftly feen the fafts which we have been able only very imperfeiSlly to perceive; that he fhould have defcribed them with the utmoft precifion, and compared them with the well-known obfervations concerning the eggs of birds. My aftoniihment is the greater, when I reflefl, that he was unaffifted by microfcopes, which inftruments have in our days been greatly perfeded ; and I cannot therefore reprefs my indig- nation againft thofe modern Ichthyologifts, whofe ftupidity, ncglefting the lights thrown on their fubjefl by venerable antiquity, has fubftitutcd in their ftcad falfe ob- fervations, abfurd and incongruous inferences.•' Memorie Sulla Generazione dei Pefci, di Philippo Cavolini. Compare p. 55. and p. 92. with Ariftotle's Hiftory of Animals, b. vi. c. viii. and c. xiii. To the petulant queftions in Athensus, I. viii. p. 352. " From whom did Ariftotle learn the minute particularities which he tells of fifties? From Proteus or Nercus?" No, (we may anfwer with If. Cafaubon,) but from fiftiermcn. Vid. Cafaubon Animadverf. in Athcnxum, 1. viii. p. 38S. VOL. I. .S I30 NEW ANALYSIS OF muft have been of ineflimable a^^Iuc. Alexander enabled him to rebuild and adorn his native city, for the benefit of his con- temporaries'', and to improve fcience for the benefit of pofteri'ty''. Upon his firft entering Babylon, that inimitable prince eagerly demanded, for the ufe of his preceptor, the aftronomical tables preferved in that ancient capital above nineteen centuries, and remounting 2234 years beyond the Chriftian sera"" ; and Pliny labours to defcribe with what ardour and zeal the fame illuftrious conqueror, during the courfe of his expedition, collected as prefents to be fent to Ariftotle, at the expence of 2co,oool.% and by the adtivlty of feveral thoufand men, whatever rarities were to be found in parks or ponds, in aviaries or hives, or were to be procured by hunting, fiihing, and fowling, in the wide ex- tent of Afia. Such were the refources of Ariftotle for writing the hiftory of animals, befides the afliftance of a great library, which Strabo fays that, to the beft of his knowledg'e, he was the firft perfon that knew properly how to arrange '. By com- bining with the defcriptions in his books the obfervation of thofe living wonders tranfported from the Eaft, Ariftotle, who preferred a philofophical refidence in Athens to the honour of perfonal attendance on the mafter of the world, compofed, in the tranquillity of the Lyceum, his immortal work, which a Pliny profefies to abridge ", and a BuiFon defpairs to rival ". In the wide furvey which our author takes of the heavens and of the earth, as well as in the minute diligence with which he ρ Plin. 1. vii. c, 29. ^ Idem, 1. viii. c. 16. ' Porphyrius apud Simplicium in Ariftot. de Coelo. ' Comp. Plin. ubi fupra, & Athenasum, p. 398. edit. Cafaub. t TOP ωτοζ ώί ισμίν σνναγοίγωι f ιβλια» *«ι SiSa^cti τας ι» αίγνπΤΛΐ Εασιλεβ; tite>.iaB>)X)f; σνηαζιν• Strabo, i.xiii. p. 609. " Plin. ubi fupra. " Hiftoire Naturelle, t. i. p. 6^. & feq^. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 131 he examines the produaions of the latter, whether inanimate or living, it is his perpetual aim to remount from eftcdts to caufes, and to lead us from perceptible qualities to thofc invi- fible principles by which they are produced. Thefe principles, not being objefts of fenfe, can be difcovered only by making fair inferences from obfervation and experience. In this man- The foul or ner Ariftotle treats, in three books, a fubjedt which naturally mlJji general follows his hiftory of animals, inveftigating thofe principles on *'=»'«• which their nutrition, fenilition, and appetite, with all their perceptible powers and adions, depend. In this treatife, intitled " Concerning the Soul," his language is perpetually and ne- ceffarily metaphorical, becaufe words, in their origin, being univerfally expreiTive merely of perceptions of fenfe, metaphors become indifpcnM)le in expreffing the dedudions of reafon. Of material as well as intelledtual fubftances our knowledge, he obferves, refults entirely froni their perceptible qualities, that is, from what our univerfal experience teaches us to regard merely as the eifeas of hidden caufes, fcarcely conceivable to ourfelves, and of which our notions are totally incommunicable to other men but by images and comparifons drawn from fen- fible objeds. When Ariftotle fpeaks philofophically of fire, he calls it " the power of communicating heat." In the fame manner, the hidden caufes neceifary for explaining the pro- perties and adions of animals, he calls " the nutritive, fentient, motive, and rational," that is, the coUeding " power ;" and as, from the phenomena of body, he inferred the exiftence of a fub- ftance called Matter; fo, from the phenomena of fenfation, reafon, and intelligence, he inferred the exiftence of a fubftance called Mind j of which latter fubftance our knowledge is equally s 2 cei"tain 132 NEW ANALYSIS OF certain with that of the former ". But as feme of the moil noted philofophers before him had attempted to explain every- thing by matter and its properties % Ariftotle, on the other hand, thinks that it is by mind chiefly that all natural pro- duftions are charafterifed and diftinguifhed; meaning, by mind, that inward principle and inviilble form whofe effedls are dif- played in the external organization of things, as well as in their perceptible properties and adtions. In this fenfe, therefore, the terms "form" and "mind" are applied to whatever charadlerifes and diftinguifhes, whether that be merely a fpecific and principal quality ; or whether it be a fubftance infeparable from matter, becaufe feparately unfit for any end or ufe "" ; or whether it be a fubftance capable of adlions and pleafures peculiar to itfelf, and fo totally different from thofe of body, and any of its va- riable affeitions, that, when feparated from this mortal frame. It will then, and then only, alTume its natural adivity, perfedlion, and dignity'. The book The doilrine of the mind naturally brings Ariftotle to what " Coticern- is publiihed as the ninth book of his Metaphyfics, but which, ing Ener- above mentioned, ought to ftand as the feventh. It is in- gy, con- ' ° nefls his titled " Concerning Energy," a word of mighty import in our lofophywith author's philofophy, fince his dodtrine on that fubjedt is a link his theology. in the grand chain, by which he connefts the earth with the heavens, and nature with the Deity. The ftate of energy, as oppofed * Sr,?iov h xou ότι »" f /Λν φ•-%ΐ) aff-if- >] ί^ςϋΤί» TO Ji Tirifia vhn' 'υοί αν^ξωττο; η το ζωοϊ το ϊ| «(χ^οιιν Metaph. Ι.νϋ. cxi. ρ•9'9• and '• '• De Anima, c. v. p. 625. "f Metaph. 1. viii. cii. p• 927. ^ Ibid. 1. viii. c. iii. p. 929. =" De Anima, l.i. c. iii. p. 623. and c. v. p. 625. and Metaph. 1. xiv. c. ix. p. 1004, 7 ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. i jj oppofed to that of capacity, was already explained ; but it may be a matter of feme curiofity more minutely to examine diftinc- tions, independently of which this great philofopher thought it impoffible to mount up from things vifible and perifhing to things invifible and eternal. Energy, then, as the word denotes. The nature is always faid in reference to adion ; and that is faid to exift explained. in energy, which executes its peculiar work, or performs its peculiar funftion '', The ftate of energy is the moft perfe£t ftate of exiftence in which any objedl can be exhibited ; as a mailer thinks he has perfected his fcholar when he fliews him performing ikilfully the proper work of the art in which ^ he was inftruited ^ Though energy always implies adion, yet all adlions are not energies. The ailions of build- ing, carving, healing, learning, refpedlively terminate i a houfe, a ftatue, health, and fcience. But the adions of thought, of life, and of happinefs, (which is a kind of life,) have not any natural limit, but may proceed eternally I'evolving on them- felves, perfed without addition, complete in every inftant''. That things eiTentially different may be diftinguiihed by differ- ent names, Ariftotle calls limited adions, motions ; the un- limited, energies ; obferving, that in the fcale of being there is a continual afcent from mere powers and capacities to motions or imperfed energies, properly fo called, becaufe terminating in nothing more excellent than themfelves ". Thofc operations, Avhich terminate in a certain work, are only perfed in the work or produdion in which they are fixed and concentrated ; as painting *• Metaph. 1. ix. c. viii. p. 339. Comp. Metaph. 1. ix. c. vi. p. 936* " IJem ibid. '' IN'Ietaph. !. ix. c vi. p. 937. ' Comp. Metaph, I. xiii, c. ix. p. 990. & p-y^i. and Metaph. 1. ix. c. viii^ !>. 9 ',8. 134 NEW ANALYSIS OF CHAP, painting in the pifture, building in the edifice ^ But energies 1^ -.- τ not terminating in any work or produdlion, are complete and perfed: in themfelves. The former belong in a certain fenfe to the work in which they are embodied '^ ; the latter can belong only to the energifing principle, which, when unceafingly adlive, as the firft efficient caufe was proved neceffarily to be, is fimple, unmixed, and pure energy \ The firft On fuch a principle as this, eternally and fubftantially adlive, na"y LT"^" both the heavens and the earth depend '. He is the fpring of fubftantially motion, the fountain of life, the fource of order and of beauty ''. All our obfervations and all our reafonings lead us irrefiftibly to this conclufion ; for in all the motions or changes of body or matter, there muft always be one part adled upon as well as another that a£ls, otherwife no ailion, and therefore no motion, could poffibly take place. But when we feparate this a£ling part from the inert mafs with which it is united, the fame rea- foning will ftill apply to it ; it cannot be felf-moved wholly ', and the part which gives the impulfe muft always be different from that which receives it". By our divifions and fubdivifions without end, we ihall therefore never come nearer to a folution than at firft fetting out, but ihall always be compelled to confider matter as fomething fit to be moved, changed, or aded upon, but ' Comp. Metaph. 1. xiii. c.ix. p. 990. & p. 991. and Metaph. l.ix. c. viii. ρ 93S. ε Metaph. 1. ix. c. vi. p. 936. * 5 71Z5 fsg «EgyEia. Metaph. 1. xiv. c. vi. p. 999. ' αιτοιαντης ίίξο. αξχγ,ς νίξτηται ά ΗςΜος Χ2ΐ i (piia-ic. 1. xiv. C. vii. p. lOOO. and PhyflC. Aufcuk. 1. viii. c. vii. p. 418. ^ τι '!ϋξωτο« "ααηωιι xwu)i 'aaiTa. Metaph. l.xiv. C. iv, p. 998. Comp. C. vi. p. ggq. and 1. xii. c. iii. p. 975. and 1. ix. c. viii. p. 930. ' Phyfic. Aufcult. 1. iii. c. i. p. 340. "' Ibid. 1. viii. c. vi. p. 417. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 135 but conftantly deriving its motion, change, or activity from CHAP, fomc foreign caufe". The prime mover, then, is neceiTarily « / . .> " immaterial ; and therefore indivifible, immoveable, impaifive. His attri- and invariable '' ; ever aduating this vifible fyftem, as is plain from the phsenomena, according to the beft principles both of intelledtion and volition, which exadlly coincide % when traced up to Deity, their ultimate fource. The phenomena of the univerfe are not unconnefted and epifodical, like an ill- written• tragedy ; but all of them regulated and adjufted with confum- mate harmony '. The Divinity, who comprehends and diredts the whole, is not himfelf divifible in parts, nor comprehenfible by magnitude, fmce all magnitude may be meafured^; and what finite magnitude can exert infinite power ' ? He ever is what he is ", exifting in energy before time began, fince time is only an aifedtion of motion, of which God is the author". That kind of life which the beft and happieft of men lead occafionally, in the unobftrudled exercife of their higheft powers, belongs eter- nally to God in a degree that fhould excite admiration in pro- portion as it furpaiTes comprehenfion \ This " Phyfic Aufcult. 1. viii. c. vi. ρ•4ΐ7. "Ibid. 1. viii. c. vi. p.416. & feq. Ρ Metaph. 1. xiv. c. vii. p. 1000. and looi. 1 τΒταν (in reference to the <ΐτι» and tonroi) τα wfoira ra. avru. Comp. Metaph. 1. ix. c. ix. and 1. xiv. c. vii. ' ux ioiKi 1) ipff>; ίΤΤΕΐσοίωσϋ? . . ώσπες (χοχθιΐξα τςαγωίκχ. Metaph. l.xii. C. iii. p. 975. ' Metaph. l.xiii. ex. p.ggi• t Ibid. 1. xiv. c.vii. p. looi. " ^£1 «ςα £i»ai αξχϋ» ToiauTii» ^S i) aaia £»e§yiia. Metaph. 1. xiv. C. vi. p. 999. Coilip, De Ccelo, 1. ii. c. xiii. p. 466. * Metaph. l.xiii. c. viii. p. 992. and το xi»sw βιίιοι, και ro^oTf^on tb xitujitm, xai το^ κι^οτ£ξο» SiTiai, ϋσιαν αναγκαιίί mai. Metaph. 1. xiv. C. vili. p. 1002. *- £1 $e ftaMo» «τι iav^aaiuTifW^ 1. xiv. CiVil. p. 1001. 136 NEW ANALYSIS OF That Deity the fource of Being hand- ed down from anti- quity. Ariftotle re- futes the nia- terialiils and metaphyfi- , cians. This doftrlne was delivered down from the ancients, and remains with their pofterity, in the form of a fable; which, with many additions to it, has been employed for the fervice of legiflation, and for bridling the paiTions of the multitude ". The Gods have thence been reprefented as' endowed with hu- man forms, and agitated by human paiTions; from which ftrange fuppofitions, many confequences not lefs ftrange have very naturally been derived. Yet, from the motley mafs of fiction, if we feparate this fmgle propofition, that Deity is the firft of fubftances, it will appear to be divinely faid ; and to have been faved, as a precious remnant, in the wreck of arts and philofo- phy, which, it is probable, have often fiouriihed, and often fallen to decay "". Such is Ariftotle's dodrine in his books intitled " Concern- ing Philofophy ;" the far greater part of which is employed in refuting two clafles of writers, who may very properly be called the Materialifts and the Metaphyficians. The former content- ing themfelves with the properties and laws of matter and mo- tion, beyond which they thought it impoffible to penetrate, mif- took effedts for caufes, and confounded the maker' with his works : The latter, who were the more modern, and alfo the more fafliionable of the two, perverted logical analyfis by apply- ing it to phyfical fubjeds " ; and fubftituting words for things, fought ' Metaph. 1. xiv. c. viii. p. 1003. ^ Idem Ibid. ^ TO xiia» TToiii, 1. xiv. c. X- p. 1006. This muft found harih to thofe who do not underftand Ariftotle's notion of the eternity of the world, in the fenfe in which it is above explained. '' Compar. Metaph. 1. xii. civ. p• 977. 1. xiii. c. ii. p. 981. & feq. and J. xiv. c. i. p, ^gs. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 1^7 fought for firll caufes in numbers, ideas, contraries, and other CHAP. metaphyfical abftradlions; or, in Ariftotle's language, general . , '_ ji terms; which, the more general they become, diverge the wider*^ in their nature from energies, the only fubftantial and efficient principles in the υηΙνεΓίε"* ; and all proceeding from the firll energy or fubftance, who is both fpecifically and numerically one \ This dodrine perfedlly agrees with that beautiful har- mony difcernible in the works of the firfl: mover ; which are all of them connefted by the moft intimate relations ' ; and whofe arrangements uniformly confpire to one great and falu- tary end^: For the perfedion, excellence, and beauty, dif- Goodncfs cernible in the unirerfe, are to be afcribed to its Maker, not lefs than the regular arrangement of a well difciplined army is afcribed to its general. This dodrine only is confiftent : *' One rules alone, one, only one, bears fway ; *' His are the laws, and Him let all obey '." This ° Compar. Metaph. 1. xiii. c. ii. p. 982. and 1. xiv. c. v. p. 998.• ■* Comp. !. xiii. c. vii. p. 988. and 1. xiv. c. ii, iii. p. 996. ° E> μια αζχ και λόγω χαι αξΛμ,αι το π^ΐίτ» xtryr ακίίτ,τον ο>. 1. XIV• C• viii. ρ, 1001• Things are one fpecifically or λο^»•, when they are collefled into one count, and cx- prefied by one word or κατ^,γοξτμχ, the definition of which applies equally to them all. Material things may be one fpecifically, though many numerically : but this cannot hold as to energies ; fo that if there were as majiy different heavens as there arc different men, the firft necefiary being would ftill be numerically, as well as fpe- cifically, one. Compar. Phyf. Aufcult. 1. viii. β. vii. p. 418. & feq. * βχ BT«; ίχ£ΐ, ώη ί^Ί "»ί" ββτί^ο» OnTtfi), 1. xiv. c. χ• p. looj. Si Phyf. Aufcult. 1. viii. c. vii. p. 418. * νξοι; μια γαξ I», ΚΊταηΛσνηίτακται. Ibid. ** Comp. 1. xii. c. iv. p. 976. & 1• xiv. c. x. p. 1004. Pliny, 1• i!• c. i. & 1. xxvii. c, ii. ftrangely miftakes his great matter in natural hiftory. The fame errors he -commits elfewhere in fpeaking of God, Nature, the world, &c. * Iliad, 1. 1. V. Ϊ04. quoted Metaph. 1. xiv. c. ult. p. 1006. Cicero greatly mif- VOL. I. τ reprefents Ϊ38 The fame doftrine in- culcated in his exoteric or popular works. NEW ANALYSIS OF This fyftem of theology, not lefs fatisfadory than fublime, Ariftotle tells us that he had often Inculcated, not merely in his acroatic works, which were ledures confined folely to his pupils, but alfo in his exoteric or popular writings, intended for the inftrudion of the public". If this aflertion cannot be dif- provedi his charader will be refcued from the charge of dif- honefty, in teaching a double dodrlne, one to his pupils, and another to the world. Cicero' indeed fays, that the Greek philofophers (meaning our author in particular) did not " feem always to hold the fame language in their popular and in their more accurate works;" which variation was, furely, to be ex- peded; fince, in the former, they often reafoned, as Ariftotle himfelf tells us, loofely or according to vulgar conception, and in the latter ftridly or philofophically. But as to the funda- mental points of his moft important dodrines, Ariftotle fre- quently refers from thofe of his books, " which were diftin- guiihed by pregnant brevity, clofenefs of thought, and quick- nefs of tranfitions""," to his more expanded, more perfpicuous, and more popular produdions". Much circumfpedion indeed became reprefents his original, " Inde deinde illi tot Dij fi numeramus etiam Ccelum, Deum," kc. De Natur. Deer. 1. i• c. xiii. "^ xaClaw!^ IV Teis ίγχνχλιηις ψΑοσοψημασι wt^i τα θίΐα ττολλαχι; w^oipaivsTsti τοις λονοι; ότι το ίιιω αμίταζ'Κ-'.τοι irat το ώ-(:«το» χ«ι aXfoTaTs». De Ccelo, I. 1. C. tX. p• 44"• ' De Fin. 1. v. c v. "• Simplicius (ad Categor. in Procem.) thus charaaerifes the acroatic, in contra- diftinilion to the exoteric work's, " % ξξ^χυολογ^^, r, τω> tmim -nuxioTv, xai TO Tn; pfatrewj ^νητξο,μμΜν. To the laft claufe I have given a fenfe.more conformable to truth than that which the words naturally prefent. " Simplicius Comment, in Ariftot. de Ccelo, fol. 67. Ethic. Nicom. 1. i. c. iii. & c. xiii. 1. vi. c. iv. Ethic. Eudem. 1. i. c. viii. 1. ii. c i. De Republ, 1. iii, c, vi. U 1. vii, c. i. nment. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS. 139 became a phllofopher, detefling fuperilition and deteftlng CHAP. St aSiv £> τοκ η-ολιτιχοι; ίΐ)»ατοιι νςαξαί ant Ts ποιον τι»» £i»a>, &c. " That it is impoffible to do any thing in politics, without having men endowed with certain habits ; wherefore Ethics," he obferves, " are likely to be a part as well as the principle and fource of politics." 14 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 151 It will be our endeavour to attain that accuracy which the nature of the fubjed admits ; for perfedtion is not required in all the labours of the mind, any more than in all the works of Chap. 3. the hand. Political iuftice or virtue feems liable to this un- ^. -' 1 he proper certainty, that it depends rather on law than on nature, method of The good, or end, at which this virtue aims, feems to be not moral and lefs doubtful ; fmce much evil is frequently its refult. Many {Ofophy, and are ruined by their wealth, and many by their couraee. In ^^%β^ ^ha- ^. ■' ■' ° raderofits matters fo little ftable we muft be contented, therefore, hearers, with catching the general refemblance of truth ; and our con- clufions will deferve to be approved, if In moil cafes they are found to hold true; for it Is the part of wifdom to be fatlsfied in each fubjeft with that kind of evidence which the nature of the fubjedt allows ; it not being lefs abfurd to require demon- ftrations from an orator, than to be contented with probabilities - from a mathematician. Of performances in each fclence, thofe only can appreciate the merit by whom that fclence has been . ftudied. From a work on politics, therefore, thofe alone can derive much benefit who have acquired a general and pra£tlcal knowledge of human nature. Youth is not the feafon for fuch a ftudy ; for youth is unexperienced in the bufinefs of life, which is both the fource and the objedt of all found political reafoning. It makes not any difference whether a man is young in point of years, or in point of character ; for his inapti- tude arifes entirely from his boylfh purfuits, and chlldifli . opinions. But to thofe whofe paifions have been difclplined by the maturity of years and reafon, this kind of knowledge ■will afford both pleafure and profit. Thus much concerning our fubjeit, the mode of treating It, and the chara([ler of thofe to whom our difcourfe is addreifed. Let Ϊ52 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. Let us refurae, therefore, by inquiring, fince all our thoughts and deftres aim at fome kind of good, what is the end of the fcience called politics: or, in other words, what is the prin- Differen '^^P''^' °^ ^'^ ^^^°^^ goods refulting from the proper diredlion of opinions human adlion ? Its name is univerfally ° acknowledged ; both concerning • r f τ> i_ happinefs. the learned and the multitude call it happmefs . But as to the thing itfelf, there is a wide diverfity of opinion between philo- fophers and the vulgar. The latter place happinefs in things vifible and palpable : in pleafure, wealth, honour ; and, often changing their minds, they place it, when fick, in health ; when poor, in riches ; and when they reflect on their own Ignorance, they deem thofe moil happy who can boail their attainments in fcience. Some philofophers again think that befides all thefe particular and relative goods, there is a good in itfelf abfolutely, the caufe of this quality in other things, which deferve to be called good merely becaufe they participate of this abfolute goodnefs. It would be ufelefs to enumerate all the opinions on this fubjedl ; let it fuffice to mention the moft prevalent, or the moil reafonable. It ought not to efcape our notice that, in all our inquiries, we may either proceed from principles, or mount up towards them. Plato, therefore, doubted which of the two was the beil mode of inveiligation ; as, in Olympic Stadium, whe- ther the proper courfe proceeded from the judges to the goal, or from the goal to the judges ^. In other fciences, we ought to be- gin from the things beil known ; either abfolutely in themfelves, from * σχιίοι «3•β Tun πλ£ΐΓ4ΐ» liM.>.t,yiira.i . " Almoft acknowledged by the moft," which feems merely a modeft way of fpeaking, not tolerable in EngliQi. ' TO Si IV f ii» και tv wjaTTti» τακτ•» JwoXafA^aKM τω iuJai^otii». " To live Well and tO aft well, they reckon fynonymous with being happy." This fentence is omitted. * See Hillory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. v. p. 228. i ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. ^S3 from the fimpUclty and ftabiUty of their nature ; or relatively to the inquirer, becaufe moft familiar to his fenfes, his obfervation, and experienced But in Politics, we ought to begin by ope- rating on the moral nature of man, fmce the firft requifite is to have^'difciples habituated to the pradice of virtue. Such per- fons either know, or will foon underftand, principles \ But thofe of a different charafter may attend to Hefiod. The bed and nobleft of the human kind Are thofe endow'd with a deep-thinking mind i Nor are tbey ufelefs, who fuch men obey, Submitting ftill to wifdom's lawful fway ; But he, who though unfit his ways to rule, Yet will not to a wifer go to fchool, That man is, fure, a good-for-nothing fool '. To return from this digreffion, men's notions of happlnefs Chap. 5• may eafily be conjedured from the lives which they lead. ^^^^^^^._ The grofs vulgar of mankind think of nothing but pleafure n.ns^ex- and therefore lead a life of mere fenfual enjoyment ; conftrained like flaves, and ftupid as cattle. Their error is excufable, ftnce many of the great fet them an example, which ^^mfeWes . For the fake of perfpicuity I have here expanded Ariftotle's thought by borrowing expreffions frequently repeated in his Analytics and Metaphyf.cs. X Ϊ:Ι been previoufly trained to good morals. I have inverted the order, becaufe the latter is proved in chapter iii. » Hefiod, Ε^νων, i. 293. VOL, I, ^ 154 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. feem to have copied from the fottiih Sardanapalus. A fecond plan of life is that purfued by men of adivity and enterprife, who eagerly engage in the public concerns of their country, and have honour for their object. But this honour is a thing too fuperficial and flimfy to be the happinefs of which we are in queft. It feems to depend not lefs on thofe who confer ho- nours, than upon thofe on whom they are conferred. But happi- nefs, we forefee, muft be fomething independent and permanent. Befides, thefe troublefomc honours are courted chiefly for the purpofe of flattering felf-love, for removing our fufpicions of our own unworthinefs, and for rendering us in our own conceit virtuous and happy. For this reafon we take moft pride in being honoured by men of fenfe, by thofe who beft know us, and for meritorious adions. Virtue, therefore, is plainly more valuable than honour, even in the efliimation of thofe by whom honour is moft coveted ; fmce the latter is purfued merely as the fign and Ihadow of the former. But virtue alone does not conftitute happinefs. A man poiTeflTed of virtue may be afleep or inadtive ; he may never, through life, have an opportunity of exhibiting his good qualities ; and notwithftanding thefe quali- ties, he may frequently be involved in the greateft difafters. Such a man was never, except for argument's fake, pronounced happy. But enough on this fubjed, which has been already treated in our popular difcourfes. A third plan of life is that of the fpeculative philofopher, which ihall be examined in the fequel. A life of money-making and commerce is plainly a Hate of toil and trouble ; and riches cannot be the good in- quired after, becaufe they are defired, not on their own account,, but for the purpofes which they anfwer ; and are valuable, not as ends, but merely as inftruments. The other fchemes of happinefs ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 135 happlnefs are, therefore, preferable to that of the money-maker ί but even thofe, it appears, are defedivc ; in confirmation of which many arguments may be produced, which we ihall not at prefent urge. It may, perhaps, be better to confider good, abfolute and Chap. 6. univerfal ; which, accordinc to fome philofophers, is the only — r 1 • 1 1 1 • Lxamuia- real good, by the mere participation of which other things are tion of entitled to this epithet. To me the tafk of examining this opi- ηΐ^η^^οη-*' nion is unpleafant and arduous, becaufe the dodrine of univer- ^^■^^"2^^': fals and ideas was introduced by thofe for whom I have the and refuca- , ., V, , , , ,.^ tion of the greateft friendfhip \ Yet a philofopher ought to demolifti even doftrine of his own fyftems, when they ftand in the way of truth ; nor ought the facred name of friendihip ever to obftrud a thing ftill more facred than itfelf. Thofe who introduced the doc- trine of ideas allow that it is not applicable to things prior in order the one to the other ', and therefore not applicable to number. But the word " good" applies equally to fubftances, to modes, and to relations ; although fubftances are certainly prior in order to modes and relations, which are the alfedions or ap- pendages of fubftances. The word " good" therefore, when ap- plied to both, is not taken in the fame fenfe ; and therefore it does not ^ The author means Plato. He fays, in his Magna Moralia, p. 145, tliat Pytha- goras firft treated of virtue, but improperly ; fince he explained the fcience of Ethics by that of numbers, confounding fpeculations altogether heterogeneous. Socrates ipoke better and more perfpicuouily : but his theory is imperfedl, becaufe he makes the virtues matters of fcience ; whereas fcience belongs only to the intelled or rational part of the foul, while the virtues belong not only to that, but (as will be fully ex- plained hereafter) to the irrational part, confiiling in the paffions and appetites, Plato followed, well diftinguiihing the rational and irrational principles, but perplexing and ■darkening the fubjed of Ethics, by mixing with it the dodrinc of ideas. J•. Eudem. Ethic. 1. i. c viii. p. 201.— See alfo Analyfis, p. 84. Si feq. X 2 1^6 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK riot denote any common idea. Good, indeed, is faid in as many ways as being : thus it is applied to God, and the human mind, which are fubftances ; to the virtues, which are qualities ; to utility, which is a relation ; to mediocrity, which is a quantity ; to the critical moment, which is time ; and to a fit refidence, which is place "". It is plain, therefore, that the word " good" applied to things fo different, does not denote any one idea common to all thofe claffes or categories. If it did, all kinds of good would belong to one and the fame fcience. But we find that various fciences are requifite for afcertaining the different kinds of good, even in one and the fame category. Thus, the critical moment in war is afce'rtained by a general ; in difeafe, by a phyfician. The medical fcience determines what is mediocrity with refpeit to diet ; and the gymnaftic, what is mediocrity in point of exercife. It is difficult to know wherein confifts the difference between the idea of a man and a man, fince both muft be defined by the fame terms. The fame obfervation applies to good, and the idea of good. The eternity afcribed to the latter does not make any difference ; for that which is white now, is as much white, as what has continued white for an indefinite length of time. The Pythagoreans rea- fon better when they diftinguiih various kinds of good and evil ° ; in which they feem to be followed by Speufippus °. But of this fubjeil we ihall treat hereafter. Some uncertainty feems ftill "* Ariftotle fays, £τ=ξα τοια«τα, meaning the other categories, See above, p. 58. " Ariftotle fays, they placed one in the co-arrangement of good. See above, p. i iz. ° Ariftotle is fuppofed to have taken it amifs that Plato ihould have preferred to him his own nephew Speufippu?, as his fucceflor in the academy ; and this private pique is thought to have influenced him in his philofophical oppofition to his mafter'sdoftrines. Were this true, it might be expe£ted th^t his oppofition would not have been lefs marked to Speufippus, whom he here goes out of his way to commend. 6 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 157 ftlU to adhere to the obfervations above made, becaufe we have not fufficiently dillniguiihed the two kinds of goods ; thofe which are loved and puriued for their own fake only, and thofe which are loved and purfued merely becaufe they are fitted to produce or preferve the former, or to ward off the contrary evils. Let us feparate therefore from things merely ufeful to fome further end, things called good in themfelves, and confider whether this epithet is beftowed on all of them precifely in the fame fenfe. What are thefe goods in themfelves, unlcfs fuch things as we wifla to obtain and enjoy for their own fake only ; pleafures, honours, the exercife of our fight or underilanding ? Such things may be ufeful, but they are not merely ufeful, fincc, independently of any purpofe which they anRver, they are de- fired on their own account. Are all fuch things then called good, for the fame reafon that fnow and cerufe are both called white, becaufe they excite one and the fame fimple perception of whitenefs ? This is not true; for pleafure is good in one fenfe, honour in another, intelleaion in a third ; in each of the three, the word " good" has a different meaning ; which would not be the cafe if the idea of good was as fimple and uniform as that of white ; a dodrine that totally confounds the fpecific diftindions of things. Why then is the fame appellation applied to fuch different objeds ? Not furely by chance ; but becaufe thofe objeds are fomehow related to each other, as proceeding from one caufe, tending to one end, or conneded by fome analogy ; as the underftanding is called the eye ,of the mind, having the fame relation to it, which the eye has to the body. But fucU nice fpeculations belong not to the prefent fubjed "; for if there be ρ Ariftotle fays, that it is not neceffary at prefent accurately to afcertain why difFer- ent things are called good, any more than to treat accurately concerning the general idea of goodnefs. ij-S ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK be a general idea of goodnefs, common to all things called good, ^ _ _ J and feparable from them, it is plain that this feparate goodnefs cannot be an objedt of human attainment, and therefore need not be an objedl of human purfuit. None of the arts or fciences contemplate this general idea as their example or pat- tern ' ; or confider it as affording the fmalleft affiftance for at- taining the different ends at which they refpedllvely aim. Of what benefit would fuch a contemplation be to the embroiderer or the architedt ? The phyfician does not confider good in general, but the good, or health of man, or rather of that par- ticular man who happens to be his patient ; for with individuals only he has to do. Chap. 7. Let us return again to the fought-for good, and try to find " out what it can be. We fee that it is a different thing in differ- A delinea- . ^ . , r tion of the ent arts and adtions : one thing, for example, m the art of goodi^^ phyfic ; another in the art of war. What then is the good peculiar to each ? Is it not that for the fake of which all the other operations of the art are performed; as in phyfic, health ; in war, vidory ; in architedure, a houfe ; and in all our ac- tions and deliberations, the end at which they aim ? If then there is an end or purpofe in life itfelf, the good fought for muft confiil in this ; and if more ends than one, in thefe. This in- vefligation therefore brings us back to the fame conclufiou as before ; but we muft endeavour, if poiTible, to render the matter ftiU more perfpicuous. Since there are various objedls of our purfuit, fome of which are defired merely for the fake of other things, and never rationally for their own, fuch as riches, a flute, •i The author fays, that though this general good be neither ίτρκτο» nor *τϋτο•-; neither an ol jed of human pradice nor human attainment, yet it may be thought to ierve as a *«ξαίίΐ-/(*α, or pattern ; and therefore removes this objedion, which he had propofed to himfelf. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. r^5 flute, and whatever conies under the defcriptlon of means or in- ftruments, it is plain that none of thefe can be the good of which we are in queft, and which muft be fomething complete and perfed in itfelf ; for we call that more perfed which is de- fired on its Ολνη account, than that which is defired as a means towards fome further end : and that more perfed which is never defired but as an end, than that which is defired both as a means and as an end. Happinefs is never defired but for its own fake only. Honour, pleafure, intelligence, and every virtue, are defirable furely on their own account, but they are alio defirable as means towards happinefs. But happinefs, we have faid, is never defired as a means, becaufe it is complete and all-fufficient in itfelf, which the good fought for ought to be ; and all-fufficient, not merely for the individual, but for his parents, children, family, friends, and fellow-citizens, fince man is by nature a focial being ; yet to this focial principle limits are affigned, for if it diverged to infinity ■■, there would be a de- fire without an objed ': but of this we ihall fpeak hereafter. That is all-fufficient, which, taken by itfelf, renders life an objed of defire. Such we fay is happinefs, which, feparate and alone, is the moil defirable of all things ; and therefore united v/ith the leaft of other goods, fl:ill entitled to pre-eminence*; complete and per- fed in itfelf, and the uUimate end of all our defigns and adions. But to call happinefs the beft thing in the world, (which none which con- will difpute,) does not clearly explain wherein human happi- tuous"ener- neis confiils. This will beft appear, if we confider what is the S'es. peculiar work and proper bufinefs of a man. A mufician, a fculptor, ' Ariftotle fays, to his children's children, and the friends of his friends, in endlcfs fucccdion. » See above, p. 91. • ΤΓιε good added to happinefs is ύτί^οχ.) tw» uya&^v, faperabundant. ιβο ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. fculptor, and every other artift, has his refpedblve operation and work, in the performance of which his main excellence lies } and can it be imagined, while ihoemakers and carpen- ters have their proper tafks affigned to them, that Nature in- tended man for idlenefs ? His eyes, and hands, and feet, ?nd all his other parts ^ have their peculiar fundlions ; and ihall there be no function different from any, or all, of thefe, belonging to the whole ? Wherein does this fun£tion confift ? To live, is common to him with plants. The mere power of growth and nutrition belongs not therefore to the prefent queftion. The fenfitive life follows next, which is common to man with horfes, oxen, and the whole animal kingdom. There remains then a life of rational aflion ; whether he exercife reafon him- felf, or obey the reafon of another. In fuch a life his real bufmefs confifts; and that man does his bufuiefs the beft', who a£ls moft rationally through life ; the virtue of each individual of a fpecies, depending on the excellence with which he per- forms the work peculiar to that fpecies alone. The proper good of man confifts then in virtuous energies ", that is, in the exercife of virtue continued through life ; for one fwallow makes not a fummer ; neither does one day, or a ihort time, conftitute happinefs. Let this ferve for a fketch of good — that univerfally coveted objeft, which will afterwards be more fully delineated : for, it fhould feem, that an accurate outline may eafily be filled up ; efpecially with the afliftance of time, from • The author illuitrates this, by faying that the bufinefs of a harper, and of a good harper, is the fame ; the difference between them arifing only from the fuperior ex- cellence with which the latter performs his work. " Ariflotle here introduces his diftindtion between virtue and the energy of virtue. See above, p. 133. This fenfe Is expreiled in the text, in language more familiar to the modern reader. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. i6i from which arts derive their improvement. Let us remember alfo what was before obfcrved, that more accuracy fliould not be expeded from άΠ author, than is confiftent with the nature of his fubjea, and his defign in treating it. Both the brick- layer and the mathematician are converfant with perpendiculars ; but the former confiders them only as ufeful in his work ; the latter examines their nature and properties, becaufe abftradl truth is the objed of his ftudy. Unlefs the example of the bricklayer be followed in other matters, the principal fubjeft will often be exceeded and obfcured by the mere acceiTories. Let it alfo be remembered, that we ought not to be over curious in the inveftigation of caufes ; concerning fome things it is fufficient to know that they are, without knowing their reafon. This is the cafe with thofe firft principles which refult from per- ceptions of fenfe, from induftion, and from cuftom \ We ought carefully to draw them from their refpedive fources, and exert our utmoft care that they be corredly afcertained. This is of the higheft importance in all our inquiries; in which, that which is begun well, is more than half ended ; fmce much light is thereby diffufed through every fubfequent part of our fpeculations. We ihall examine this chief good or happlnefs, not merely Chap. 8. in its definition, but in the properties rightly afcribed to it. ^^— :_ Truth only is confiftent ; and if our notion of happinefs be nio„ confift- juft, it will not be difcordant with thofe properties. Goods ^'^Jp^^i^.f ' are afcribed to » Our author adds. «Λλχ. h αΛ?^.-, which may be tranflated, " and other principles arife from other fources." But this docs not appear to me' to be his meaning, becr.ufe I do not find any other fources mentioned in any part of his works : The «w.a. αΜα,, muft then mean that fome of thofe principles aiife from one of thofe fources, anji fome from another, which is implied in the tranflation. VOL. I. "^ happinefs. i62 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. are divided into three kinds : tliofc of the mind, ihofe of the body, and thofe confifting in e?:ternals. We give the pre- ference to the firfl; of the three, which we regard as the fove- reign good ; placing happinefs in mental energy ; an opinion ancient and univerfal among philofophers. We do right alfo in placing the chief end and main purpofe of life in adion» From this, it refults that happinefs is feated in the mind ; a truth confirmed by the common fenfe of mankind embodied in language ; " living well," or " doing well," being expreflions fynonymous with happinefs. In all their inquiries on the fub- jedt, men feem to have been led to conclufions nearly refem- bling the notion of happinefs above given. Some place it in virtue, others in prudence, others in wifdom; fome join plea- fure ; others add externals ; and thofe different opinions have either been long held by the greater part of mankind, or more recently introduced by moil refpedable philofophers. It is not credible, that either party ihould totally miftake the truth. Our notion nearly agrees with theirs who place happinefs in virtue ; for we fay that it confifts in the adtion of virtue ; that is, not merely in the poifeiTion, but in the ufe'. The mere poffeiTion is confiilent with a flate of fleep, or liillefs apathy, from which no good can refult. But the virtuous man, when he ads, muft a£t well, and be happy ; as, in the Olympic games, the prize IS gained only by the combatants ; not by thofe, whatever their merits may be, who decline entering the lifts. To fuch men virtue is the higheil; pleafure ; for pleafure refides in the mind-, and each is moil pleafed with what he moil loves. Thus the lover of horfes is pleafed- with horfes ; the lover of ihows, with ihows ; and the lover of juflice is no lefs pleafed with juflice ; and y Ariifotle here oppofes habit to energy, as well as pofieflion to ufe. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 1C3 and the lover of virtue, with virtue. The multitude, indeed, JB ο Ο Κ purfue different pleafures, becaufe they do not rightly appre- hend in what true pleafure confiils. But pleafure, ftridly fo called, is the delight of a virtuous man, whofe life needs not an appendage of falfe joys, containing the perennial fpring of true pleafure in Itfelf. For he is not a good man jwho delights not in good adions ; and vain is the praife of juftice, liberality, and other virtues, by thofe who feel no gratification in their pradice. In the eftimation of a wife man, virtue is pleafant becaufe it is honourable and good ; his happinefs is one regular whole; not broken and disjointed like that in the Delian infcription : « The faired good is juftice ; health, the beft ; « The fweeteft far, to tafte of what we love." All thefe qualities belong to the beft energies, in which, we fay, happinefs confifts. The opinion of thofe who add exter- nals, is not ill-founded ; fince, independently of them, it is often impoffible, at leaft very difficult, to exhibit virtue in its full luftre ^ Many operations muft be performed by inftru- ments; under which name I include friends, wealth, and political power. The want of fome advantages ; for example, of honourable defcent, of promifing children, or of dignity of prefence ; » In the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. ii. p. igS., Aiiilotk makes an important diftinc- tion between the things in v^ich human happinefs confifts, aiid thofe without which it cannot be completely enjoyed ; i^ -nn τκ< -/i/z-ETifn. το ir,, lu• km tivui αν;ι•, τοι; «ιθ^υττοι; UK v,hx^TM £iTOi, &c. " Health is different from the things by which it is upheld, and life from thofe by which it is rendered comfortable. The fame holds with regard to all the aaions and habits of men." The confounding happinefs with the externals, with- out which, in our dependent ftate, it cannot be completely enjoyed, is confidcred by our author as one of the great fources of immoral praaice, as well as of erroneous tlieory. Υ 2 164 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. Chap. 9. Which de- pends on our own exertions. prefence ; deprives happinefs of its fplendour : and the man feems lefs qualified for attaining it, who is deformed in body, friendlefs, childlefs, and forlorn ". Wherefore fome place hap- pinefs in external profperity '', It comes then to be confidered, whether happinefs is acquired by inftruftion, cuftom, or fome other kind of exercife; or merely by the difpenfation of fortune and the gods. There is not any gift furely that might more reafonably be expeded to defcend from heaven, fmce, of all human poifeiTions, happinefs is the moil valuable. But this queftion will be more fitly examined in another place. For happinefs, even though it defcend not from heaven, but be attained by ftudy and exercife on earth, is yet moil divine in itfelf ; the end and prize of virtue, which all may gain by due exertion, who are not maimed in their minds. The acquiring of happinefs by ourfelves, is preferable to owing it to fortune " ; it moil probably therefore is thus acquired ; fince nature always eifeds her purpofes by the beft means ; a point aimed at by art, and every intelligent caufe, and which the beil caufe always attains : and to leave happi- nefs, the faireft and beil of things, to the difpofal of fortune, would be a mark of negligence not difcernible in any other of the afian"'ements of nature ■*. That happinefs is acquired by ourfelves, » Ariftotle adds, "or who having had good friends and promifing children, has loft them." '' What is added, t»ioi h m» ας^τψ, " and fome place it in virtue," feems fuperfluous. « For this be afligns two reafons in the Ethics to Eudemus, b. 1. c. iii. p. 197. » S'iiiTui, αυτό» ποκ,ν τίΐια. sirai, χαι τας χα,τ' αυτόν πξαξ^ς, χαιιοτίξοιι αι £ΐΐ) το aycc6o-j χαι ΰίίοΤίξον, &C. *' If good or happinefs confifts in the qaality of our adlions and charadlers, it mull be both more common and more divine ; more common, becaufe a greater number may attain it ; and more divine, becaufe it will depend upon our own exertions." Idem ibid. ■* There is, perhaps, an intentional obfcurity in the whole of this paflage. Ariftotle does ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 165 ourfelves, agrees alfo with its definition, " that it confifts in BOOK virtuous energies." Other things, we have faid, are neceilary, ,_ _' f as a certain length of time ; and others are ferviceable, as inftru- ments. The fame conclufion correfponds with what we fiid in the beginning, namely, that poUtics aimed at promoting the higheil fehcity of man; the principal care, therefore, of all good ftatefmen has always been, to form their fellow-citizens to virtue. Neither an ox nor a horfe, nor any other animal, is denominated happy; becaufe virtuous energies cannot be afcribed to them. Nor is this epithet bellowed on children, whofe imperfed age affords only a promife of happinefs. But many are the viciifitudes of life ; and thofe who have long beea profperous, may, towards the conclufion of their days, be in- volved in calamities rivalling the far-famed difaftcrs of Priam. None will call thofe happy, who, after fufFering fuch evils in life, die a wretched death. Ought we, then, to adopt the fentiments of Solon, " that no Chap. lo- man can be called happy while he lives ?" Is he therefore happy ^^^^^^_ when he dies ? or is not this too abfurd to be faid, efpecially by ing,thatnonc thofe who place happinefs in adion ? It does not appear that "unced"^"' Solon had this meaning, but only that a man might, at death, happy till be congratulated upon his efcape from the evils and calami- ties of life. Yet this opinion is liable to contradi£lion ; for a man when dead, is, with regard to profperity and adverfity, in the fame ftate with a man who meets with either of them when alive, does not exprefsly deny the interference of the gods ; but afterwards, confounding this interference with fortune, fays, that it is not reafonable to believe that nature, or (as ex- plained in other paflages) the God of nature, ihould connmit fuch an important obje£l as human happinefs to the direction of fo blind a guide as fortune. But m the ftriiSi philofophical fenfe, happinefs, as well as all other things, is ultimately to be referred to the Deity as its caufe. Metaphyf. 1. i. c. ii. p. 841. ί66 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. alive, without being fenfible of them ; and is in this manner ftill within the reach of the good or bad fortune \vhich befals his children and their defendants. And how unfcable is the profperity of families ? What vaft degeneracy in the fons of happy and illuftrious fathers ? Yet it feems abfurd to fuppofe the ftate of the dead affefted and altered by thefe revolutions, and not lefs abfurd to fuppofe that the happinefs of children ihould not be fliared by their pai'ents. But the folution of the queftion firft propofed, will enable us to folve the other difficulties. This faying Solon faid that we muft look to the end ; meaning thereby, expluuicd. j.|^^^ ^^g might then juftly fay, not that a man was, but that he had been, happy. Is it not therefore abfurd to think that, while he adliually was happy, this epithet could not be applied to him, becaufe of the viciffitudes of life to which he was ex- pofed ? If happinefs changes with fortune, it will be as variable as the colours of the camelion. But this is not true : for the propriety of our condudl depends, not on our fortune, but on our manner of ufing it ; and virtuous energies are the genuine fource of happinefs, as the vicious ai'e of mifery. This is attefted by the queftion juft ftarted concerning the importance Thepecu- of ftability to happinefs. Of all human things, habitual ener- οΓνίηυοίΒ^ S'^^s of virtue are the moft ftable ; they are more per- energies. niancnt than even the fciences ; and of the virtues them- felves, the m.oft valuable are the firmeft ; forming the continual meditation aiid delight of thofe whom they adorn. For this reafon, they alone are not liable to be forgotten or loft ; but are an immoveable property in the thoughts and life of a good man ; who, whatever may befal him, will behave gracefully ; approving his condud exadt, fquare, and blamelefs. Slight .misfortunes are unable to fliakehis well-balanced happinefs ; but, in Aristotle's ethics. 167 m the ufe of a great profpcrity, his excellence will fliine more conlpicuous ; and when perfecuted by painful and affliding calamity, which not only impedes his prefent exertions, but darkens his future profpeds, his v/orth Λνϋΐ irradiate the gloom, while he refifts and furmounts the fevereft fufFerings, not by ilupid infenfibility, but by generous magnanimity ; for, if our own adlions be the fovereign arbiters of our lot, a vir- tuous man can never be wretched ; becaufe he will never render himfelf an objedl either of hatred or contempt. Of the circum- ftances in which he is placed, he will always make the beft and moil honourable ufe ; as a good general, and a good artift, em- ploys the forces, and the materials, with which they are refpe£lively entrufted, always to the beil advantage. A happi^ nefs founded on fuch a bafis, can never fink into mifery ; air- though it muft be ihaken by tragic misfortunes, from which it will not foon recoΛ'er its natural ftate. Yet, in confequence of virtuous exertions, continued through a fufficient length of time, a good man, competently furnifhed with the accommo- dations of life, will refume his wonted ferenity ; and may be pronounced happy, notwithftanding the viciffitudes to which he is ftill expofed ; at leaft pofl'eiTed of fuch happinefs as is confiftent with the condition of humanity. We are not therefore to afcribe happinefs only to the dead, chap. 1 1 . (for thus Solon's fentiment is commonly underftood,) efpecially _ . - , 11, ,, • r η 1 1 τ How the fmce to fuppofe that the dead are totally mlenuble to the mil- dead are af- fortunes of their kinfmen and friends on earth, is neither con- thecondi- formable to common opinion, nor confiftent with the focial t'onofthe ^ ' living. principles belonging to human nature. It would be endlefs to enumerate and defcribe the various forms of calamity and woe, by the differences of which even the living arc very differently/ i68 ^ ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. < differently affedted ; but the fympathy of the dead with fuch miferies, bears lefs proportion to that of the living, than the fympathy of fpedlators at the theatre bears to that of fpec- tators in the real tragedies of life. It may deferve con- fideration, whether the dead at all participate in the good or bad fortune of their living friends j but if they do, it is rea- fonable to think that the events of this world affed: them too flightly, to render fuch of them as are miferable happy, or thofe that are happy miferable. Chap. 12. Let us proceed then to determine whether happinefs be the objedl of praife, or rather of honour; for it is plain that its nefs is above nature is not doubtful, and that it never can be blamed or de- praie. fpifed. That only is an objedl of praife which is endowed with certain qualities or habits, that naturally terminate in fome falutary effedl. For this reafon we commend juftice and cou- rage, as well as ftrength and fwiftnefs, and every virtue ; but the praifes which belong to men, are ridiculous when applied to the gods, whofe perfeilions are the objedts of emotions of a higher nature ; we blefs and honour and magnify them ; and even thofe things which, from fome refemblance to them, are called divine. Happinefs, therefore, is exalted above praife, by the excellence and divinity of its nature. Wherefore Eudoxus ' ingenioufly defended the pretenfions of pleafure to be called the fovereign good ; faying, that it was confeffedly not the objedt of praife, and therefore fomething better. But praife properly belongs to virtue, the only fource of thofe exertions of mind or body on which juft encomiums are beftowt .1 ; to examine which particularly, belongs to the fubjedl of Rhe- toric. • Eudoxus, the fcholar of Plato, and legiflator of his countrymen, the Cnidians He is again mentioned by our author in the tenth book of his Ethics. 14. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 169 toric. This, then, is clear, that the value of happinefs is not Β O^O Κ relative, but abfolute ; it is complete and perfea; in itielf ; and, <^ ,,', ^ being the ultimate end to which all praifc-worthy things are referred, is itfelf the objed, not of praife, but of veneration and honour ^ But fince happinefs refults from virtuous energies, by exa- Chap. 13.• mining the nature of virtue, we ihall be more likely to under- ^^■^^^_ ftand that of happinefs. The true ftarefman is chiefly folicitous ledge of the about virtue, exerting himfelf to the utmoft to infpire his fel- "^^Ij^.y^re- low-citizens with a refpedful deference for good laws. Such P^^ration for were the legiflators of Crete and of Sparta; and others, perhaps, fcience. who were animated by the fame enlightened principles of public fpirit. To inveftigate the nature of virtue belongs to every liberal fyftem of politics, and therefore to our prefent fubjeft, of which human happinefs is the end, and human virtue the means; underftanding, thereby, the virtue of the mind, in the exercife of which happinefs confifts. The true ftatefman there- fore ought to know the mind, as much, or rather more, (be- caufe his purfuit is ftill more excellent,) than the phyfician does the body ; and we fee that the more liberal fort of phyficians beftow no fmall pains in gaining an accurate knowledge of the latter. To enter into fpeculations, not conneded Avith pradice, is f This fubject is explained more ckarly in the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. i. p. 203. The author difcriminates the words syxcftii» Επαυες and ii.Jii(/.o>i7f4c.i : the nrft of which applies to particular adions ; the fecond to habits ; and the third to the ends and en- joyments which are thereby accompli (bed or attained. The Engliih language does not admit of fuch nice diftindtions ; and .ι^,μ,οησι^ο:, " beatification," is an appropriate term in the Romiih church, which could not, without doing violence, be diftortcd to a philofophical fenfe. VOL. I. '/> I7Q ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. Our moral powers com- poundeii of the rational and irrational principles of our nature. is befide our prefent purpofe. \Ve fliall make ufe of that dii- tinition between powers rational and irrational, which is fuffi- ciently explained in our popular difcourfes, without inquiring whether thefe two are feparable from each other, like the parts of the body and every thing diviiible, or whether they.be two merely to the intelledual eye, though as incapable of corporeal divifion as are the convexity and concavity of the fame circle ^ The irrational powers of the foul are diPcinguiiliable into difierent kinds, Thofe which contribute to nutrition and growth are the fame in man arrived at maturity, and in the child unborn, and even in plants. Any virtue belonging to them cannot be dignified with the epithet of human, fnice their energies are moil perfeit in ileep, during the total inadivity of thofe higher powers, by which men are peculiarly charaiterifed and indivi- dually diftinguifhed ; wherefore it is faid, that for nearly one half of their lives, the fame lot befals the good and the bad, the happy and the miferable ; except that, in confequence of fome remains of wakeful motions, the dreams of the former will commonly be more agreeable. But enough of this, which is foreign to our prefent fubjeft. There is another part of the foul, which, though irrational itfelf, is capable of combining with reafoii ; 1. ii. c. i. p. 204. Ariftotle fays, that it makes not any difference as to the prefent fubje£f, whether the foul be divifible or indivifible ; it is fufficient that it have diftiiiiSl powers or faculties ; that is, diflinft principles to which all the complicated operations of the mind, and all the wide variety of human aflion may be traced. It will not be eafy to point out what impiovement has been made nncc the days ot Ariflotle, either in the inveftigation of thofe piinciples from the phenomena, or in t!ie application of them when difcovered, to explain the highly-diverfifted operations obfervable in the in- telledual and moral world. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 171 reafon ; and, when thus cumbhicd, is virtuous and praife-worthy. This appears in perfoas endowed with felf-command, but not completely confirmed in that habit. Reafon exhorts them to prefer the better part, but another power impels them to the contrary fide, and violently refifts reafon ; in the fame manner as limbs aftedled by the palfy refufe obedience to our determina- tions, and ail'ume one direiilion when we wiili them to move in another. A fimilar rcfifting power exifts in the mind, though the falfe motion impreffed by it is not perceptible to the fcnfcs. This power, though irrational ", is capable of combining with reafon, and fubmitting to its control, as appears in men en- dowed with felf-command ' or continency, and ftill more in thofe whofe minds are harmonifed by temperance. The ap- petites therefore are of a higher order than the mere powers of growth and nutrition, becaufe they are capable of lillening to reafon, as children do to their parents, whofe admonitions they underftand and obey, in a fenfe quite different from that in which they afterwards underftand and know mathematical truths. If we choofe to call alfo this part of the foul rational, there will then be two diiFerent principles of reafon in the mind, the firft of which pofleiTes reafon abfolutely in itfelf, whereas the fecond is only capable of barkening to the reafon of another. On this diftinftion, •" This power, he fays, is fomething different from reafon, but how different it is un- neceifary to iniiuirej which relates to what is explained above. * Self-command or continency, in Greek ivx^anta, implies that a man is impelled by corrupt appetites, which he has flrength of mind fufficient to rcfifl ; temperance, in Greek σΐύφξοσ -jtr., implies that his appetites have been fo thoroughly fubdued by cuftom and reafon, that they no longer have any tendency to rebel. This latter, ia its higheft perfeflion, is that djughtful harmony of foul iji which our moral improve- ment terminates. Ζ 2 172 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. dlftm£ticm, the divifion of the virtues into the Intelledual and moral, is founded. Wifdom, intelligence, and prudence belong to the former clafs ; liberality and temperance to the latter. In reference to morals, we do not fay that a man is wife or intelligent, but that he is meak or temperate. Good men are praifed for good habits ; and all praife-worthy habits are called virtues. C m ) ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. Β ο ο κ IL INTRODUCTION. 'TpHE moft profound as well as the moil elegant of ail modern BOOK writers on the fuhjed of political Ethics, the immortal Grotius, in his treatife on the laws of war and peace, obferves, that Ariftotle holds the firft rank among philofophers, whether we eftimate him by the perfpicuity of his method, the acutenefs of his diftindlions, or the weight and folidity of his arguments \ This criticifm is fully juftified by the book before us, in which our author treats of the nature of moral virtue, ihews by what means it is acquired, proves by an accurate indudlion that it confiils in the habit of mediocrity, and lays down three prailical rules for its attainment. This part of his work will bear that trial which he regards as the teft of excellence ; *' it requires not any addition, and it will not admit of retrenchment." Tiie objections made to it, as falling ihort of the purity and fublimity of Chriftian morality, will equally apply to all the difcoveries of human reafon, when compared with " that divine light which, coming into the world, gives, or offers, light to every man in it ''. But the critics who make objedions " to Ariilotle, would urge * Grotius In Prolegom. '' John, c. i. v. 9. ' See ΓοΓπΐ' of them flatcu in Grotii Prolegom• and in the Eudemian Ethics, 1. ii. c. iii. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 185 arithmetical mean, becaufe it exceeds the lefler, as much as it is BOOK exceeded by the greater. But in regulating human adtions, , _ ' ^ which, like all other motions, are things continuous and divifible'', the fame fimple rule will not apply : for two pounds may be too fmall an allowance, and ten too large ; yet he who direds the regimen of the wreftlers, will not therefore prefcrlbe uniA^erfally fix pounds, which might be too little for Milo the wreftler, though far too much for one beginning his exercifes : the fame thing holds as to the quantity of labour which he en- joins to be performed, in running, wreilling, and the other branches of the gymnailic. Thus, he who is ikilful in directing actions of any other kind, will carefully avoid excefs or defeit, but find out and prefer the golden mean ; which is the objedl that every good artift always keeps in view, fmce the higheft commendation of works of art confifts in faying that they admit neither of addition nor retrenchment. But virtue, which is That the the perfeition of nature itfelf, is far fuperior to art, which only not admit of imitates her operations, in aiming at the juft mean between two ^g^J'j^. ^^^ vicious extremes. I fpeak here of moral virtue, which is con- ^"'^]''"^• ^ _ ^ mediocrity. verfant about paflions and adlions, all of which admit of medi- ocrity, as well as of excefs or defeat. Thus we may be too much or too little affeQed, with defire or averfion, courage or fear, anger or pity, pain or pleafure. ' Both extremes are bad ; and the paiTion is then only proper and correal", when we are aifeded fuitably to its caufes, its objeds, and its ends : when this is the cafe, both the paffion, and the adtion proceeding from it, are juftly praifed as virtuous ; becaufe they do not deviate from the mark at which they ought to aim. The Pythagoreans, therefore, did well in aifigning definite to the co-arrangement of * >i f*£» >αζ xini^K σνη^τ,ι;• -ή it ίτζαξι; xinisrij, £udcin. i. U. C 111• p. 205• i84 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK of good, and indefinite to that of evil"; for there is but one ^^• right road ; but the ways of error are innumerable. The former is as difficult as the latter is eafy ; it is difficult to hit the mark, but eafy to mifs it ; " Virtue is ftill the fame, but vice has various forms." The former, therefore, is the habit of prefemng and obferving mediocrity in our paffions and adions, agreeably to the rules of right reafon : virtue then, in its eifence, is mediocrity ; in its eifed, it is excellence, and the higheft excellence '. But neither all paffions nor all adlions admit of mediocrity ; for there are many whofe very names infer excefs and blame ; as the paffions of impudence, malice, and envy ; and the a£tions of adultery, theft, and murder. Such paffions and fuch actions are in themfelves deteftable exceffes : and for the fame reafon, there cannot be any mediocrity in cowardice, injuilice, or intem- perance; nor any excefs or defedl in the Λ'irtues of courage or wifdom ; nor univerfally can mediocrity or virtue admit of excefs '■ See Analyfis, p. ii2. ' This is the cleareft meaning I can affix to χχτα ro n- ακ;οτ);ς. But Ariftotle when he calls virtue, in one fenfe, an extreme, feems to allude to what is faid in his fecond Analytics concerning the οξοι σνμτηρασμχτίΜΐ, the termini concluforii,and the difference between them and, definitions, (hewing the eflence, that is, the caufe which makes any- thing to be what it is. Thus, What is it to fquare an oblong ? This queftion may be anfwered, or in other words, the fquaring may be defined by faying, either that it is to find a fquare equal to an oblong ; or, that it is to find a line which is a geometrical mean between the fides of the oblong. The former definition is called ημ,-ϊτεξα.σι/.χηκ'κ, becaufe when the mathematician demonftrates, that the fquare conftru£led on a line, which is the mean proportional between the fides of the oblong, is equal to that oblong, he draws the conclufioa, " a fquare, therefore, is found equal to an oblong :" but the fecond definition tells, not only that the fquare is equal to the oblong, but the caufe which makes it to be fo. In the fame manner, when we call virtue the higheit excel- lence or perfeilion of any objedt, we only tell, in other words, what is meant by virtue ; but when we call it mediocrity, we define it by its eflence, and ihew the caufe which makes it to be the higheft excellence. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 18 s That all the virtues coii- excefs or defe£l ; nor the vices, which are all of them extremes, admit of a virtuous mediocrity. In praitical morality, general principles are of little ufe, un- lefs they be applied to particulars, in which all praftice confifts, and by which all general principles muft, if true, be confirmed. Let the various paifions or emotions therefore' be arranged in a crity, proved diagram", and we fhall fee that the degree of them confiftent '^yi"'^"*^^On. with propriety always lies In the middle between two blamable extremes. Thus, In encountering or avoiding dangers, courage holds the middle place between raihnefs and timidity : in obey- ing or refilling folicitations to pleafure, temperance holds the middle place between voluptuoufnefs, and a vice which, being uncommon. Is namelefs, but which we ihall call unfeeling apathy. In pecuniary matters, liberality Is the mean between extravagance and parfimony. The prodigal is too carelefs In throwing away money, and at too little pains to acquire It. The mifer pays exceffive attention to the acquifition of money, and cxceiTive attention to the keeping of It. There are other qua- lities relating to money, as magnificence with Its contrary ex- tremes of niggardlinefs and wafteful profufion ; which diftinc- tions will be afterwards explained '. As to honour and dliho- nour, magnanimity Is the middle term between boaftful pride and mean-fpirited abafement ; and there is another quality or habit which bears the fame proportion to magnanimity which liberality does to magnificence, confifting in the propriety of our affedlion with refpeft to fmall and oi'dinary marks of ho- nour, •^ The diagram, or delineation, which is here wanting, may be partly fupplied from Ethic. Eudem. 1. ii. c. iii. for even there it is extremely incomplete. 1 In the firft chapters of the Fourth Book. VOL, I. Β Β i86 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK nour, whereas magnanimity confifts in the propriety of our affeftion with refpedt to thofe which are great and extraordinary. In the common intercourfe of life, men are diftinguiihed by too much or too little defire of honour ; the excefs and the de- fe£t are both marked by names "*, but the intermediate and praife- worthy degree of the affeftion is namelefs ; wherefore the ex- tremes contend with each other about the middle place ; and, as either happens to obtain it, we praife a decent pride or a becoming humility. The reafon of this Incongruity in our judgments will be afterwards explained : we proceed at prefent according to our propofed plan. With regard to anger, fome men are too fufceptible, and others too unfufceptible of this paf- fion; and others commonly indulge it only in that degree which is laudable. Thefe different difpofitions or habits are not ac- curately diftinguiihed by names. We ihall call the intermediate and proper degree of the affeftion meeknefs ; which inclines, however, more to the extreme of phlegmatic endurance, than to that of immoderate irafcibility. There are three other virtues or proprieties, which, though different, are yet nearly allied to each other, and all of them diftinguiihable in the ordinary inter- courfe of words and actions ; bearing different relations, the one to truth, and the other to pleafure ; and that which relates to pleafure, either confined to matters of paftime and amufe- ment only, or comprehending all the complicated bufmeffes of ■life, whether they be gay or ferious. Neither thefe proprieties themfelves, nor the various and contrary deviations from them, are accurately diftinguiihed by names ; but it is neceffary that they •" The perfons Jirtinguiihed by the excefs and defeft, were called φιληψοι and ciipiXoTifici : but there was only one of thefe adjedives,^ which afforded an ahftiaft ^Λ6τιρα, denoting the difpofition or habit. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. '^7 they ihould here be confidered, in order to flxew that the pralfe- worthy habit in trivial as well as in important aftions, always lies in the middle between two blameable extremes ; and as names are wanting, we muft, as in other cafes, take the liberty of making them, both for the fake of perfpicuity, and to keep unbroken the connexion of our difcourfe. In the habit or dil- pofition relative to the true exhibition of our charaders in word and adion, let the propriety or virtue which lies in the middle be called plain-dealing ; and the impropriety or vice, by which we aifume good qualities Λvhich do not belong to us, be called oftentation ; and that, by which we diveft ourfelves of the good qualities with which we are really endowed, be called diffimu- lation or irony. In matters relating to pkafure and mern- m^nt, there is a virtue in facetloufnefs ; buffoonery is the impro- priety on the one fide, and ruftic fimplicity on the other. In the more ferious concerns of life, but which have ftiU pleafure for their objea, the virtue of companionable friendlinefs is diilin- guiflied, on the one hand, from quarrelfome morofenefs ; and, on the other, both from unmeaning officioufnefs, and interefted flattery Even in mere affedions which do not exert themfelves either in words or deeds, modefty is praifed as holding the middle place between baihful timidity, and frontlefs aiTurance. An honeft indignation at the profperity of the worthlefs is eafily diftinguiihable, both from envy which pines at the profperity of all alike, and from that depraved pleafure which none but the moil vicious can receive from beholding the unmerited fuccefs of artful villany or ruffian violence". But concermng thofe habits, « ..;,«,...« in the Latin verfions is tranflatcd .aM., ff'^^^^^ all exprefsAriftotle's meaning: malevolence wifhes ill to all -"^""f ' "^^"^ "'! that g od, nd therefore is grieved .t their profperity -. but the vice here fpoken of . t ^ Β Β 2 i88 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK habits, we ihall treat more fully hereafter, and alio concerning "• . juftice, which muft be divided into two kinds, before we can diftinguiih wherein the propriety of each kind confifts ; and likewife concerning the intellectual virtues. Chap. 8. Of thofe three difpofitions or habits, of which that in the middle is only right, the extremes are contrary to, and at va- are oftel"^ riance with, each other, and alfo with the virtue which lies be- miftakenfor ^-,;^££η them. For as in a line divided into equal, and alfo un- virtues ; and ^ ^ converfely. equal, parts, the half is great when compared with the fmaller divifion, but fmall when compared with the greater ; fo of human paflions and atlions, their proper and moderate degree appears an excefs or defedl juft as it happens to be compared with either extreme. To the fool-hardy, courage appears cowardice ; and to the coward, raihnefs ". The voluptuary deems temperance infenfibility ; and the fpendthrift calls liberality avarice ; each pulhing the extreme, which happens to form part of his own character, into the place of honour. It is worthy of remark, that the extremes are not only more contrary to each other than either of them is to the middle, but alfo that one of them often bears a falfe refemblance to this middle, and is frequently mif- taken for it. Thus raihnefs often pafTes for bravery, and pro- fufion for liberality : but cowardice is never miftaken for cou- rage, nor voluptuoufnefs for temperance ; although temperance is depraved pleafure which wicked men take in beholding the fuccefs of arts like to their own. In this fenfe only, Ariftotle could fay κ/*£ο•ις tri μισατηζ φΰονα και ίπιχαίξΐχχχ,αζ, that indignation was the middle between envy and the vice here ipecified : for envy grieves at profperity well merited, but ίπιχοαξίχαχαχ rejoices at profperity unmerited ; which are two extremes equally remote from that afFeftion by which we rejoice at the profperity of good men, and grieve at the profperity of the wicked. • Ariftotle fays, that the courageous man, compared with the coward, feems fool- hardy, and therefore the coward calls him raQi. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 1S9 is fometlmes called infcnfibility, and infenfiblHty temper- BOOK ance. This Irregularity proceeds from two caufes ; firft, the ^ _ _ J_ j, one extreme is really nearer than the other to that proper affe£lion which lies between them. Raihnefs is nearer than cowardice to the virtue of courage ; and therefore cowardice, the moft diftant extreme, is moil properly oppofed to courage. The fecond caufe is, that mankind in general being more in- clined to one extreme than the other, thofe vices to which we are naturally moft prone, are moft the objects of our blame as well as of our attention. Thus, with regard to pleafure, moft men are prone to err rather on the fide of indulgence, than on that of abftinence. Voluptuoufnefs therefore is the vice natu- turally oppofed to temperance ''. Enough has been faid to ihew that virtue confifts in medio- Chap. 9. Grity. But this middle point, either in paflions or a£tions, it —; — is not eafy to hit ; for, as a man muft have fome knowledge in rules for the geometry to find the centre of a circle, fo it belongs not to of pro'^^Hcty thofe ignorant of Ethics to obferve the rules of propriety. Every otafti^tion one is capable of being angry, or of giving away money ; but how much, when, to whom, in what manner, and for what end or purpofe, are queftions which it is not eafy for every one to refolve ; and of which, as the proper folution is extremely rare, fo it is highly praifeworthy. He, therefore, who would not err widely from the point of propriety, muft make it his firft care to keep at a diftance from the moft blameable extreme; and as Calypfo advifes, " Steer by the higher rock ; left whirled around We fink, beneath the circhng eddy drown'd ■•." In. ' The fame thoughts are exprefied in other words, and lUuftrated by other examples, in the Ethics to Eudemus, 1. ii. c. v. s Pope's Iliad, b. xii. v. 263, ^64. But UlyfleSyand not Calypfo, fays this, II. xii. V. 108. 6 190 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK ^^ doing this we ihall imitate the ikilful pilot who, when he cannot hold the courfe which he defires, fails the neareft to it poffible J and of two evils prefers the leaft. We ought next to confider to which of the two extremes or faults we are moft prone ; for different men are more or lefs eafily befet by differ- ent faults or vices, and what thefe are by which each is moft liable to be entangled, he will beft difcover by attending to the pleafure which he has in indulging, or the pain in reftraining them. In order to corredt his charadler, he muft bend it, in a contrary diredion, as we ftraighten a crooked ftick ; but, above all, he muft beware of the blandiihments of pleafure, of which we are feldom impartial or uncorrupt judges : treating this fair enchantrefs, as the aged fenators in Homer did the beautiful Helen, whofe words on this occafion cannot be too often re- peated, nor their example too ftri£tly imitated. " They cry'd, no wonder, fuch celeilial charms For nine long years have fet the world in arms ; What winning graces ! what majeftic mien ! She moves a goddefs, and ihe looks a queen ! Tet hence. Oh, Heaven/ convey that fatal facej And from άεβηιδΙΊοη fave the Trojan race'.'* By thus baniihing pleafure, we ihall be lefs liable to error. Such, briefly, are the precepts by which propriety of affedion and adlion may be attained ; a thing for which it is extremely difficult to lay down general rules, which are at all applicable to the indefinite variety of particular cafes ; and to afcertain, for inftance, with whom we ought to be angry, how long, to what degree, and for what reafons or purpofes. Sometimes we praife the defe£l, and call infenfibility meeknefs ; fometimes we praife the excefs, and call irafcibility manhood. He who deviates ' Iliad, iii. v. 203, &c. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 191 deviates but a little from the middle point, commonty efcapes Β Ο Ο Κ blame; great deviations become perceptible, but the precife degrees of blame which they refpedively merit cannot be accurately expreiTed in words ; and in fuch pradical matters % common fenfe is the fole and ultimate judge. This only is certain, that mediocrity is always praifeworthy ; and that, in order to attain it, we muft, for the reafons above given, incline ourfelves, according to circumftances, fometimes to the one extreme, and fometimes to the other. » In things perceptible by fenfe, or obje6ls of fenfation, as contradiftinguiihed from objeas of intelleaion ; ia which latter only, accuracy is attainable. See above, p. i+i• ( 193 ) ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK III. INTRODUCTION. IN this Book, Ariftotle examines the fpecific diftin£1:lons be- BOO Κ tween moral virtue and other habits of the mind. The habit ^_ __J of moral virtue implies the deliberate preference of one kind of condud to another ; and deliberate preference implies freedom of choice. Thofe ailions are voluntary, which have their prin- ciple in ourfelves ; thofe are involuntary, v^rhich proceed from an external caufe. Building on accurate definitions and folid diilindions, the philofopher proves, with equal perfpicuity and energy, that our moral condud is the proper objed of praife or blame, of reward or punifhment. His reafonings and fpe- culations foar above and fuperfede the abftrufe, or rather the frivolous queftion, introduced by his perverters the fchoolmen, concerning the freedom of the human will ; a queftion which continued to be agitated, long after their other fubtilties were condemned to oblivion. With Ariftotle, all will is free-will; fmce nothing can be more free than that which is voluntary : and although fome anions originating in ourfelves are confidered as of a mixed nature, becaufe they are performed reludantly, though fpontaneouily, this happens merely becaufe, of two evils, we naturally choefe the leaft : fuch adions, how contrary foever to our will in their own nature, being neverthelefs volun- VOL. I. c c tary 194 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK tary in reference to the unfortunate circumilances in which we happen to be placed. His work, hitherto, proceeds with great regularity. He began by proving that the happinefs of man confifls in the exercife of the moral and intelledlual virtues ; or, in his own technical language, " that happinefs is energy diredled in the line of virtue." As his definition of happinefs implies an acquaint- ance with the nature of virtue, and the knowledge of virtue implies that of the mind in which this habit refides, he explains the different parts or principles of the mind, whether rational or irrational; ihewing that both principles neceffarily co- operate in the acquirement of good moral habits, as well as in the approbation of good moral charaders. This fyftem is totally different from that which regards morality as founded folely or ultimately on feeling ; whether a moral fenfe, fympathy, or any other modification of merely fenfitive nature ; an abfurd doc- trine, liable to grofs and dangerous perverfion ; and which has often been employed to juftify, and even to produce the wildefl pradlical errors. Having explained his theory of Ethics, the Author proceeds to the pradtice ; and concludes this Book with the examination of courage and temperance. ARISTOTLE'S ETHiCS. i95 BOOK III. ARGUMENT. Moral ekaion and preference.— Our habits voluntary.— Courage. Its different kinds diflinguified.— Temperance,— Natural and adventitious wants.^Comparifon of intemperance and cowardice. X7IRTUE is relative to pafllons and aftions ; of which, thofe BOOK ^ only which are voluntary, are the objeds of praife or blame; ,_ — _ _, and thofe which are involuntary, are the objeds always of par- Chap, i. don, and fometimes of pity. In treating of virtue, therefore, ^^hat is it is neceffary clearly to explain what is meant by the epithets ';^^^^^^ξ^^ voluntary and involuntary ; the force of which words ought to ^°'^^i^J]'-y ^^ be fully underftood by legiilators, when they eftabUih re- human ac- wards and puniihments. Thofe anions and thofe crimes, then, are involuntary, which are either done by compulfion, or com- mitted through ignorance. We are faid to adl or move by com- pulfion, when the principle of adion or motion is not in our- felves, but external ; as when we are driven before the force of tlie w^nd, or impelled by ftrength greater than our own. ^ But it is doubtful whether thofe evils are voluntary which we either encounter through motives of honour, or endure through the fear of greater calamities. Thus, if a tyrant commands us to commit feme ad of bafenefs, having in his power our parents and children, whofe fate depends on our obedience ; and when failors or merchants in a ftorm throw their goods overboard to fave their lives ; fuch adions are of a mixed nature, but rather voluntary, becaufe, at the moment of doing them, they are mat- ters of choice ; and the true motive to any aaion is that by c ς 2 which 196 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK which we are aduated at the time of performing it, Bcfide», the principle of motion is in ourfelves, and may be exerted or not at pleafure. Such adlions, therefore, are voluntary in refer- ence to the unfortunate circumftances in which we are placed, though independently of thofe circumftances they are much againft our will ; and therefore, confidered abfolutely, are invo- luntary. Adtions of this mixed kind are fometimes the objeds of high panegyric, when we boldly encounter pain and difgrace for the fake of great and honourable advantages : and when we decline this conflict, we often render ourfelves the obje£ls of reproach.. But to encounter difficulties and difgrace without the expect- ancy of honour or advantage, is the part only of a fool. On other occafions, though we receive not any praife, yet we meet with pardon, when our virtue yields to terrors too powerful for the weaknefs of humanity : but the degree in which it yields, is ftill in our power ; for there are fome criminal a£ls to which neither threats nor violence can ever compel thofe who, rather than commit them, would fuifer the moft wretched death. In Euripides' Alcmseon, the reafons for which that hero fays he is forced to commit matricide, are only worthy of ridicule. It is difficult to determine what goods are to be preferred, and what evils are to be encountered j and ftill more difficult in time of adion and danger to adhere firmly to our predetermined refolutions. For the moft part, men are forced to fuffer difgrace, only for the fake of avoiding pain ; and as thefe evils are of a different kind, it is not eafy fairly to compare, and exa£lly to appretiate them : but when pain is preferred to difgrace, our manlinefs is praifed ; when difgrace is preferred to pain, our effeminacy is blamed. On the whole then, what aftions are compulfory ? Are they thofe only whofe principle is external, & and ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 197 and in which the immediate agent has not any voluntary ihare? BOOK Or, ihall we call thofe adions compulfory, which, though mat- ters of choice relatiΛ^ely to the unfortunate circumftances in which we are placed, are yet, when confidered in themfelves, abfolutely againft our will ? We fay, that fuch adls ought to be confidered rather as voluntary, becaufe all adions being converfant about particulars only, muft depend on circumftances, and leave room for the preference of one motive to another. If it ihould be faid that pleafures and honours confifting in things external to ourfelves, the aftions performed for their attainment, are alfo compulfory, all adions whatever would then deferve this epithet, becaufe all proceed from fuch motives. But it is abfurd to accufe pleafure, which cannot be the objeft either of puniih- ment or blame ; and not ourfelves, who are too eafily feduced by it ; and equally abfurd to confider ourfelves as the caufe of our good adions, and pleafure as the caufe of our bad ones. Thofe anions only, therefore, are properly compulfory, whofe principle lies without, and which are totally independent of our own voluntary co-operation. We faid that crimes committed through ignorance are invo- luntary. But this alTertion is not univerfally true ; for thofe only are involuntary, which produce pain and repentance. He who has committed a wickednefs through ignorance, and feels no compunaion for the aft, cannot be faid indeed to have done voluntarily what he did not intend ; nor, on the other hand, is• his adion involuntary, fmce he feels not any uneafmefs for the commiflion of it. But as his adion is i?ivohentary who repents ; bis, who repents not, may be called ?iot voluntary : that things of different natures may be expreifed by different names. A dil- linaion is alfo to be made, between ading ihrousb ignorance and 19S ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK and zvitb ignorance. A man drunk, or in a paiTion, is guiltv of III • ... . violence through intoxication or anger, not through ignorance, though Ignorantly ; and every bad man is ignorant of what things it is his duty either to do or to avoid ; an ignorance pro- found and univerfal, infeparably connefted with his pravity of will and eleftion, and therefore inexcufable. But in the par- ticular ailions, which, becaufe committed through ignorance, feem entitled to pardon or pity, it will often be ufeful to diftin- guilh, between the agent and the adlion, its fubjedt, end, the manner how, and the inftrument with which it is performed. None but a madman can be ignorant with regard to all thofe particulars. In whatever he has done, every one in his fenfes muft know that he himfelf was the agent ; but he may not know that he was doing wrong; as thofe who blab in fpeaking, beg pardon for words which efcaped them unintentionally ; or, as ^fchylus ' profaned the myftical terms, not knowing them to be fuch ; and, in adions, a man ihowing a catapult, difcharged that formidable engine; and Merope' would have ilain her own fon, taking him for an enemy ; poifons have been given inftead of remedies ; fome perfons have been killed by thofe who inftruded them-in their exercifes; and others have been flain with fpears thought to be blunted, or with ftones miitaken for pumice. The refult of fuch adions being totally different from what the agents intended, they are juftly deemed involun- tary, when accompanied with pain and repentance ; whereas thofe adions feem moil voluntary, which not only proceed from» our own movements, but which are begun, carried on, and terminated t i^fchylus was acquitted by the Areopagus for divulging fome expreifions ufed in the myfteries, having proved that he was not initiated, and therefore did not know what he faid. Clemens Alexandiin, ftrom. ii. Aristotle's ethics. 199 terminated with a clear perception or knowledge of their real BOOK nature and end. To which of the two clafles then ihall we ^ ..^, ^ afcribe things done through anger or appetite ? If we call them involuntary, brute animals, and children, who are yet in- capable of reafon, can never aft voluntarily. But appetite and anger are principles of human nature, as well as realon itlelf ; and when they prompt us to adl amifs, are not lefs voluntary than when they prompt us to ad properly ; to repel injuries, and to defend our perfons ; to gratify hunger which promotes health, or to gratify curiofity which promotes knowledge. That which is" involuntary is painful, but the gratification of our natural appetites is highly pleafmg. Befides, what does it import us to fay, that things done in paiTion are lefs voluntary than thofe done on refledlion, fmce guilty tranfports of paffion ought to be as carefully avoided and fhunned as deliberate vil- lainy ? The adlions of man too often proceed from anger or concupifcence ; which irrational impulfes, being moving prin- ciples in the human frame, cannot, without abfurdity, be confi- ' dered as involuntary ". Having thus diftinguilhed adtions and paflions as voluntary Chap. 2. and involuntary, we next proceed to treat of that intentional ^^^~'^^ eledion or preference of one plan of conduct to another, which eleaion and feems, ftill more than adlions themfelves, to compofe the P''^^''^""• nature and eflence of virtue, and to conftitute the diftiadion of charaders. This eledion or preference is not only voluntary, but fomething more "; for it belongs not to brute animals and children, " See Magna Moralia, b. i. c. x'lii. ; and Ethic Eudem. b. ii. c. vli. » £π. τιλιο, το Exaa.o,. " Voluntary," is an epithet of more extenfive application. It applies to aaions that are not " deliberate." Moral ekaion therefore implies fome- thing more than merely what is " voluntary." 200 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. Β ο ο I-C children, whofe aftions are voluntar)'• ; nor to voluntary a£ls ^^^" done fuddenly, with fuch precipitate hafte as leaves not any time for comparifon, eledion, or choice. Thofe who name it inclination, paflion, or opinion, feem to miftake its nature. For the paffions, whether founded in anger or concupifcence, are common to man with the brute creation ; but this election or preference is peculiar to himfelf. The intemperate man adts from paifion, without eledlion; but the man of true temperance adts from eledion, without paflion ''. The calm motive, by which he is actuated, is a thing fo different from paflion or defire, that it is frequently fet in diredl: oppofition to them : but defire cannot be oppofed to defire, nor any one paflTion to itfeif. Pleafure and pain are the ultimate moving principles which fet all the defires and pafllons to work, but the actions of good men depending on a higher caufe, do not obey their impulfe. Neither ought this intentional preference or election to be con- founded with mere inclinations or wiflies, though it appears to be nearly conneiked \vith them. We may wifli for things im- poflible, as immortality ; or things not depending on ourfelves, as that fuch a player or wrefliler may gain the prize. But to prefer impoflibilities, is the part only of a madman ; and moral eledion or choice implies, that the goods preferred may be obtained by our own exertions. Befides, our wiflies relate principally to ends ; our preferences, to means : we wifli for health, Tf i άκρατης ίνΛυμυν μα ΤΓξαττιι, Tr^oaifUfiEK); is a* ό ιγγχξιχτης ο αναναλιν^ νξοαίξνμ,ινος μιν, ETTiPufiiai. J' s. " The intemperate man a£ls defiring, not preferring ; the temperate man (quite the reverfe) a£ls preferring, not defiring•" The full fenfe of this paflage will appear hereafter, when we come to treat of the important diftiniSlions between temperance and felf-command on the one fide, and intemperance, or weaknefs and wickednefs, on the other : diilin£tions effential to a complete theory of Ethics, but which Ariftotle is the only author that clearly explains. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 201 health, we prefer the means neceiTary for attaining It ; "to BOOK wifli for happinefs," is corredl language ; " to prefer happi- nefs," is art expreflion highly inaccurate : our preferences feem univerfally to relate to things Avithin our own power. Moral preferences, therefore, are not merely opinions ; which latter may relate to things impoflible, eternal, and unchangeable ; and which are charadlerifed by the epithets " true" and " falfe," not by thofe of " good" and " bad ;" which apply only to our preferences or eledions. Thefe laft differ not only from opi- nion in general, but from every opinion in particular ; for by no opinion whatever, and which is merely an opinion, are cur charadlers marked as good or bad. Our preferences afcertain the morality of our adions and habits. But our opinions merely tell us what it is that we -choofe or rejedl; wherein it may be ufeful or hurtful ; and how it may prove either the one or the other. Our opinions are eilimated by their truth, our preferences by their propriety ; the former are unftable like their caufes, the latter are regulated by our own expe- rience ; and what opinion tells us to be the bell; road, is not always that which w^e choofe to follow, our vices dragging us in an oppofite direction ^. To determine whether this moral preference is either preceded by, or accompanied with opinion, belongs not to the prefent queftion, which confifts only in de- ciding whether thefe two be one and the fame. We fee that they are not. What then can this moral preference be, fmce it belongs not to any of the claffes above mentioned ? It plainly is voluntary, but alfo fomething more, fmce it implies delibera- tion and reafon ; and, as its name indicates, is that which, after due * ■ Video meliora proboquc Deteriora fequor. Hor. VOL. I. D D 202 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK due comparifons made by the underftanding, the will prefers u.JiL_j asbeft\ Chap. ς. ■^"^ ^^ ^^ worthy of confideration, whether all queilions be the objects of fuch deliberations and comparifons, or fome obieasTt \s queftions only. There are fome points concerning which none converfant. j^^^j. ^ jp^^j ^j. madman would hefitate a moment ; and we are not faid to deliberate concerning things eternal and unalterable, as the exiftence of the univerfe, or the incommenfurability of the fides of a fquare with its diagonal. Neither do we deliberate concerning things merely fortuitous, as the finding of a trea- fure ; nor concerning thofe which either naturally or neceifarily always happen after the fame manner, as the feafons of draughts and tempefts ; the rifing, fetting, and motions of the planets. Nor do all human aiFairs, that is, all thofe depending on the ex- ertions of man, form a fit fubjedl for our deliberation. The Lacedsemonians do not deliberate what is the conftitution of government moil fuitable to the Scythians ; becaufe the condudl of the Lacedaemonians cannot have any efficacy in eftabliihing it. The proper obje£t of deliberation, therefore, confifts in thofe practical matters, which depend on our own exertions; fince thefe are the only things that remain unmentioned. Na- ture, neceffity, fortune, intelled:, are all of them confidered as caufes ; but our deliberations bear a reference to thofe caufes only which it is in our own power to influence and control. Things fubjedled to ftridl rules, admit not of deliberation ; for example, in writing the letters of the alphabet, we have only to follow the practice prefcribed. But the great field for deli- beration » See Ethics to Eudemus, b. ii. c. vii, viii, ix, x. ; and Magn. Moral, b. i. c. xiii, xiv, XV, xvi, xvii, xviii. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 203 beratioii lies in thofe pradical arts which are uncertain and doubt- Β Ο ρ Κ ful; phyfic, oeconomy, and navigation, rather than the gymnaftic ; becaufe the more precarious their operations are, the more patient deliberation is requifite ; it is more neceflary therefore in arts than in fciences ; and muft be conftantly exercifed about thofe things which, as they are not fortuitous, happen, for the moil part, after the fame manner ; but concerning Avhich, it is not eafy for human wifdom to forefee how they will, in any given cafe, fall out. In matters of this kind, which are of high moment, we do not choofe to adt without the advice of coun- fellors, miftrufting our own fagacity. It was before obferved, that we do not deliberate concerning ends, but concerning the means by which they may be attained. A phyfician never examines, whether he ihall cure his patient; nor an orator, whether he ihall perfuade his audience ; nor a ftatefman, Λvhe- ther he ihall promote public profperity. But the means through which thofe feveral purpofes may be beft attained, are the pro- per objeds of their refpedive deliberations ; which often ex- tend to a long feries of reafoning : for the immediate inilru- ments, or agents, through which their defigns may be eifeiiled, muft often be procured by means of others more remote, and thofe, by others naturally prior ; until they arrive finally at the firft efficient caufe ; which, as in a mathematical inveftigation or analyfis, is frequently the laft in the order of difcovery. The ftatefman, too, as well as the mathematician, when he comes to an impoffibility, there ftops ; and tries fome other road, which may lead to the end in view : as for example, if money be wanted, and cannot poflibly be found, his fchemes, which muft be ineftc£lual without it, are immediately laid afide ; but he does not defift from his purpofe until he has D D 2 examined 204 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK eximined not only his own refources but thofe of his friends l in y^ ^ ' _f for what may be done by our friends, is in our ΟΛνη power, fnice they may be fet to work by a principle in ourfelves. Our deliberations, therefore, ' relate to inftruments, to agents, to materials, and to means ; and not only to the caufes by which, but to the manner in which, our adtions are to be performed, our conduft regulated, and our purpofes effeded. On the other hand, our ends and purpofes themfelves are never fub- jedls of deliberation ; neither are we faid to deliberate concern- ing thofe particulars, which are merely perceptions of fenfe^ as whether this bit of bread be well baked ; neither can our deliberations be indefinite or endlefs, becaufe this would imply a defire without an objedt. Moral preference, then, is not deliberation, but that which, after mature deliberation, is pre-, ferred as moil agreeable to the commanding principles in our nature. In this preference, deliberation terminates ; and from, it, adion commences. This natural progrefs appears in the Heroic Polities, faithfully delineated by Homer. The wifdom of the fenate deliberates, and prefers, and declares its refolves, - to the people ; who immediately carry them into execution.. Moral preference, then, relates to thofe things only which may be accompliihed by our own exertions; it is appetite or affec- tion, combined with, and modified by, reafon ''j and, as above. obferved, '' The fagacious Polybius analyfes with Ariftotle the moral principle or faculty into reafon or intelledl, operating on the focial and fympathetic nature of man. The paiTage is in the part of Polybius tranflated by Hampton, in whofe words I ihall give it. " From the union of the two fexes, to which all are naturally inclined, children are born. When any of thcfe therefore, being arrived at perfed age, inftead of yield- ing- fuitable returns of gratitude and affiftance to thofe by whom they have been bred, on the contrary, attempt to injure them by words or adlions, it is manifeft that thofe who behold the wrong, after having alfo feen the fufFerings and the anxious cares that were ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 205 obferved, converfant, not about ends, but about the beft means BOOK by which they may be attained. , -.- j Volition, on the contrary, is, as above faid, converfant only Chap. 4. about ends ; which confift, according to fome, in real, and, ac- ^, ^ r ^ cording to others, in feeming, good. The opinion of thofe which move . , . , . . the will• who think that the will is moved only by what is really good, involves this contradidion, that the volitions of a bad man are not voluntary ; and the opinion of thofe who think that were fuilained by the parents in the nouriihment and education of their children, muft be greatly ofFended and difpleafed at fuch proceeding. For man, who, among all the various kinds of animals, is alone endowed with the faculty of reafon, cannot, like the reft, pais over fuch aflions with indifference ; but will make refle£lion on" what he fees ; and comparing likewife the future with the prefent, will not fail to exprefs his indignation at this injurious treatment ; to which, as he forefees, he may alfo at fome time be expofed. Thus again, when any one who has been fuccoured by another in the time of danger, inftead of fiiewing the like kindnefs to this benefador, endeavours at any time to deftroy or hurt him ; it is certain that all men muft be ftiocked by fuch ingratitude, through fympathy with the refentment of their neighbour ; and from an apprehenfion alfo, that the cafe may be their own. And from hence arifes, in the mind of every man, a certain noiion of the nature and force of duty, in which confifts both the beginning and the end of juftice. In like manner, the man, who, in defence of others,^ is feen to throw himfelf the foremoft into every danger, and even to fuftain the fury of the fierceft animals, never fails to obtain the loudeft acclamations of ap- plaufe and veneration from all the multitude ; while he who (hews a different conduili is purfued with cenfure and reproach. And thus it is that the people begin to difcern the nature of things honourable and bafe, and in what confifts the difference between them ; and to perceive that the former, on account of the advantage that attends them, are fit to be admired and imitated, and the latter to be detefted and avoided." Polybius, 1. vi. c. 6. The doftrine contained in this paffage is expanded by Dr. Smith into a theory of moral fentiments. But he departs from his author in placing the percep- tion of right and wrong in fentiment or feeling ultimately and fimply. This alfo was the doctrine of Hutchefun, who afcribes our notions of virtue and vice to what he c..l!s a moral fenfe *. Polybius, on the contrary, maintains with Ariftotle, that thefe notions arifc from reafon or intelledl operating on affection or appetite ; or, in other wottls, that the moral faculty is a compound, and may be refolved into two fimpler principles βί the mind. * Hutchefon's Moral Philoiophy. 2o6 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK that the will Is moved only by feeming good, deftroys all natu- ^ _ ' y ral motives to volition, and makes it dependent merely on hu- man caprice. If fuch opinions muil at firft fight be rejed:ed, let us, then, fay, that real good is the natural caufe of volition, but that each individual prefers what fcems good to himfelf ; a good man, what is truly good ; and a bad man, what he hap- pens to think fo ; juft as we fee, in different habits and conflitu- tions of body, the fame things are not equally conducive to the health of all alike, but wholefome things agree with healthy conilitutions, whereas the fickly often delight moft; in things natu- rally unwholefome. In the fame manner the moral conftitutioa of a virtuous man, being congenial with truth, appreciates things by their real worth ; for fuch as our habits are, fuch ΛνΙΙΙ be the eftimates which we form of honour, pleafure, and every objedl of defire. This perhaps is the chief excellence of virtue, that it enables us to fee the true value of things, and to meafure them by a correft ftandard. But the multitude, deceived by appearances, purfue pleafures as the only good, and ihun pain as the only evil. Chap. ζ. Ends are, then, the objedls of volition ; and the means of attaining them are the objedj of deliberation and preference ; habits are which, being couverfant only about fuch things as are in our voluwtary. ^,^^,^^ power, the virtues immediately proceeding from them muil abb be in our own power, and vohmtary, as well as the contrary vices. The poet's fentiment therefore is but partially true : " None chcofes wretchednefs, or fpurns delight%" The ' aht; \y.ijti ιτοηρς aJ' axut μΛκχξ. " Nobody is willingly wicked, or happy againil his will." The fentiment is afcribed to an ancient tragedian. Ethic. Nicom. edit. Ox- ford, p. io3. and to Hefiod, " si• τ'αις μιγαλαις•" Euftrat. in Moral. Ariftot. p. 62. The verfe originally meant that nobody was willingly ?)vferable. Sic. that fenfe being given to the word i7wr,^c5 in Hefiod. Suidas faySj that Hefiod wrote a catalogue of illuftrious women in five books, from which work Eullratius conjeulures this vcrfe may be copied. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. .207 The latter claufe cannot be difputed ; but the former miiH; be BOOK denied, otherwife we muft rejedt the dodlrine juit eftabliihed, Jl'^' that man is the author of his own aftions ; and that thofe things, whofe principles or caufes are in ourfelves, are alfo in our own power. Yet thefe truths are attefted by common fenfe and univerfal experience. Criminal aaiions are punifhed by- law, when not committed either thiOugh compulfion or igno- rance ; in which cafes they are pardoned, as not proceeding from ourfelves. Praife-worthy adlions, on the other hand, are encouraged and honoured ; that as men are deterred ' from vice by the dread of puniihment, they may be excited to virtue by the hope of reward. But were not our condud voluntary, fuch perfuafives to virtue would be ufelefs and abfurd j and there would be no more fenfe in exhorting a man to his duty, than in perfuadlng him not to feel cold or heat, thirft or hun- ger. Crimes committed through ignorance are only excufable when the ignorance is involuntary ; for when the caufe of it lies in ourfelves, it is then juftly puniihable ; as in that ancient law which inflifts a double penalty on crimes done in drunken- nefs "^, The ignorance of thofe laws, which all may know if they will, does not excufe the breach of them ; and negled is not pardonable, where attention ought to be beftowed. But perhaps we are incapable of attention. This however is our own fault ; fince the incapacity has been contraded by our continual careleffnefs j as the evils of injuftice and intemper- ance are contraded by the daily commiffion of iniquity, and the daily indulgence in voluptuoufnefs. For fuch as our ac- tions are, fuch muft our habits become ; a truth confirmed by fuch univerfal experience, that to be ignorant of it betrays the grofleft '^ This, and other laws of the fame tendency, will be confidered in the " Politics." 6 2oS ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK gToiTcft ilupidity. It is plain therefore that our vices arc λ'ο- ^ luntary ; fincc we voluntarily do thofe things which we know muft produce them. But does it depend merely on our own wills to correct and reform our bad habits ? It certainly does not ; neither does it depend on the will of a patient, who has defpifed the advife of his phyfician, to recover that health which is loft by his own profligacy. When we have thrown a ftone, we cannot reftrain its flight ; but it depended entirely on our- felves, whether we iliould throw it or not. The villain and the voluptuary are therefore A^oluntarily fuch; becaufe the caufe of their turpitude lies folely in themfelves. Not only the vices of the mind, but even the imperfeftiono of the body, are juft fubjefts for reproach, when they are not natural, but produced through our own indolence or negle£t. We pity blindnefs, lamenefs, or deformity, when they proceed from caufes inde- pendent on thofe afllifted with them; but they are juft ob- jefts of reproach, when contrafted through drunkennefs or any other fpecies of debauchery ; and, in the fame manner, all vices and imperfeolions are blameable which originate in our- felves ^ Objeflions But fhould any endeavour to excufe their wickednefs, by faying that all men afpire after apparent good, but that the ap- pearances or phantafms which make us aflugn to things this im- portant epithet, arife not from our own fuggeftion, but depend on our conftitution and character, it may be anfwered, that in as far as we ourfelves are the caufes of this conftitution and chara£ler, we alfo muft be the caufes of thefe phantafms or ap- pearances. But if the two former depend not at all on our- felves, and villains, when they commit wickednefs, do it merely through ignorance of the ends at which they oucht to aim ; and * The Magna Moralia, and Ethics to Eudemus, as above. aniwered. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.• 209• and virtuous men, on the contrary, when they perform virtuous Β Ο Ο Κ aaions, do them merely through Nature's bounty in furnilh- ^^^ ,, lag them with a moral or intelledual eye, which enables them to difcern what is truly good ; this furely would, in the latter, be the beft and faireft of pre-eminences, a prerogative not ad- ventitious but innate ', not acquired by inftrudiion or example, but growing up fpontaneoully with the admirable frame of their natural conilitution. Flrft of all, if this were the cafcy. virtue would not be voluntary any more than vice, fince both would folely depend on the original organization of our minds. But if we ourfelves are in any degree the artificers of our own charaders ; and if it depends on our own voluntary ads, what lort of habits we ihall form j and, if not entirely what ends we fliall purfue, at lead what means we fliall ufe for their attainment; then both our virtue and our vices will be voluntary ; and, as fuch, the former will be the objeds of praife and reward, and the latter of blame and punifliment. We have thus given a fltetch of the virtues in general, fliewr- Tranfition . 1• • 1 totheconh- ino- that they arc prailical habits, conliitnig m mediocrity, de- deration of pendent on ourfelves, voluntary, and agreeable to right reafon. ^n panlcuhr. Adions and habits are not precifely in the fame fenfe volun- tary; the former are voluntary throughout, from beginning, to end ; but the beginnings only of habits, which gain force, like maladies, by degrees, until they become irrefiillble ; even thcfe f This v/ord is ufed in other parts of Ariftotlc's works to diftlnguiih natural powers from thofe acquired by our own exertions. Thus in his Metaph. 1. ix. c. v. aw^j^w. οί τι^ ivi«jj.im oiaut, τωιι μιν avyyiwj, όιο» τω» ciiirOwEiu», tun h ίθ.= ι, ό'ιον T>i; Ta α«λ£ΐ»" rut oi ;Acc^r,j:>, im τν.ς tu'i τ=%«α•». " The mofl- genera) divifion• of powers is into three, whicii aj-e innate, like the fcnfes; thofe acquired by cuftom, like the power of playing on the flute ; and thofe acquired by inltruftion, like many of the arts." VOL. I. Ε Ε 210 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK thefe however are alfo voluntary, fince their caufes were fuch, III • y_ _ _' . namely, the adions by which they were formed. We now proceed to confider the feveral virtues in particular; wherein each coniifts, to what objeft it relates, and in what inanner it relates to them ; whence their number \vill be manifeft : — and firft, concerning courage» Chap. 6. This virtue, as we formerly obferved, confifts in the mode- „, 77 . ration and propriety of our affedlions and actions in reference I he dehni- . tion and na- to thofe caufes and circumilances which either excite fear, or rage. infpire confidence. Since whatever is evil is in fome degree formidable % fear is defined " the dread of evil," and of evil of every kind, infamy, poverty, difeafe, friendleifnefs, and death. . But courage is not difplayed in univerfal fearleifnefs ; for not to fear infamy is the part of impudence and bafenefs; whereas the worthy and refpedable character has always the keeneil fenfe of ihame, and the ftrongeft averfion to difgrace. Yet impudence fometimes pafles for courage ; and may be fo called, by a metaphor ; fince it refembles that virtue in being equally fearlefs. Neither poverty nor difeafe, nor whatever proceeds not from any voluntary turpitude, ought, perhaps, to be much dreaded by thofe who afpire to the dignity of virtue ; yet fearleflnefs, as to fuch objeds, does not conftltute what is properly called courage, though it fometimes receives metapho- rically that name : for thofe who tremble at the found of war, may be liberal of their money, and fearlefs of povert?y ; thofe, furely, are not cowards, who dread the infults likely to fall on their wives or children ; nor are thofe to be dignified with the epithet of courageous, who, with the calm intrepidity of flaves, endure * ^o?tffi:6a Je ί»λονοτι τα φι,ζΐξχ' ταύτα ί' tri» ωί αιτλω; iiirti», χαχα. " We fear things formidable, which, to expret them in one word, are evils." ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 21 ^ endure the profped of dlfgraceful ftrlpes. To what kind of Β Ο Ο Κ terrors, then, does courage render us fuperior ? To the greateft , , , of all, the fear of death ; for death feems of all things the moft formidahle ; becaufe, in common opinion, it is the ultimate | limit of all our pains and pleafures, beyond which there is nei- | ther good nor evil. Yet courage is not alike flaewn in con- tempt for every form of death. This virtue appears not con- fpicuous in difeafe or ihipwreck, but in an honourable death in the field of battle, which is, of all, the faireft and moft illuftrious;, as is attefted by the honours with which it is rewarded, both by republics and kings. Courage, therefore, is peculiarly dif- played in encountering death in battle, and in iettmg warlike dano-ers at defiance : not but that a brave man will be fearlefs dur-mg a ftorm at fea, or on a fick-bed ; but his fortitude is different from that of failors, who are rendered fearlefs through experience and cuftom ; whereas he, perceiving no means of fafety, fubmits with indignant " intrepidity to a death, from vvrhich no honour can be reaped, and in which no exertion of manhood can be difplayed. The Ν . r.K ro...r.K i. φδοξ». «3-^^ -«f%- P^th, Ulyffes and Eneas thoMght with ouc author. , With what a cloud the brows of Heaven are crown d < What raging winds ? What roaring waters round ? • 'Tis Jove himfelf the fwelling tempeft rears ; Death, prefent death, on every fide appears. Happy ! thrice happy, who in battle ilain, ^ , n- xr Preft, in Atrides' caufe, the Trojan plain, &c. OdyfT. V. v. 39c. And ^neas, Ο ter quaterquebeati. Quels ante orapatra.n,TroJ£fubmcenibusaltis, ^ . , . ^ ^ . . . i,r• j^neis, 1. 1. V..98. Contigit oppetere, &c. ' Ε Ε 2 212 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOO Κ The fame evils which terrify one perfon are not formidable f__ 1_1. _i to another ; though there are fome of fuch an irrefilllble nature, Chap. 7. as to ihake the firmeft minds, and to infpire fear into all pof- fefled of underftanding. But thofe obje£ts of terror which fur- pafs not the ilrength of human nature, differing from each other in magnitude, as well as do the grounds of confidence, courage will difcriminate between real and apparent dangers ; and make us meet the former as brave men ought, unihaken and dauntlefs, fubjeding the inftindlve emotions of fear to the didlates of reafon and of honour. For we betray our weak- nefs, not only when we fear things really not formidable, but when we are aifeded in an undue degree, or at an improper time, by obje£ts of real danger. A brave man avoids fucli errors ; and, eftimating things by their real worth, prefers the grace and beauty of habitual fortitude to the delufive fecurity of deformed cowardice. Yet he is not lefs careful to avoid that excefs of intrepidity, which, being rarely met with, is, like many other vices, without a name j though nothing but mad- nefs, or a moft ftupid infenfibility, can make any man preferve, amidil earthquakes and inundations, that unihaken compofure, which has been afcribed to the Celts '. An overweening efti- inate of the caufes of confidence, and a confequent excefs of courage, is called audacity ; a boaftful fpecies of bravery, and the mere ape of true manhood. What the brave man ?'j•, the j'afh and audacious man wiflics to appear ; he courts and pro- vokes unneceiTary dangers, but fails in the liour of trial ; and is, for the moft part, a bluftering bully, who, under a femblance of pretended courage, conceals no inconfiderable portion of cowardice. ' Alexander, who perhaps knew them better than his preceptor, con-fidered the -*' «λτβι or «αλαται, or -/^Λζταί," the Celts or Gauls, as an arrogant and boaftful natioiu \rrian. lixped. Alexand. 1. i. p. 5. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 213 cowardice. But the complete and genuine coward eafily be- BOO Κ trays himlelf, by fearing either things not formidable, or things u, -,— ^ formidable, in an undue degree ; and his failing is the more manifeft, becaufe it is accompanied with plain indications of pain ; he lives in continual alarm, and is therefore fpiritlefs and dejeded; whereas courage warms our breads, and animates our hopes. Such then is the charader of true courage, as op- pofed to audacity on one hand, and cowardice on the other. • It holds the middle place between thofe vicious extremes ; it is calm and fedate ; and though it never provokes danger, is al- ways ready to meet even death in an honourable caufe. But to die, rather than endure manfully the preiTure of poverty, or the ftings of love, or any other cruel fuffering, is the part of a coward ; who bafely flies from an enemy that he has not fpirit to encounter; and ignominioufly quits the field, where he mi"-ht have fuftained a fl;renuous and honourable confliil. There are five kinds of courage, befides that properly fo Chap. 8, called. The firft kind is the political, which moil refembles that above defcribed ; becaufe it is infpired by legal honours and rewards, and upheld by legal puniihments and infamy. Courage therefore chiefly prevails, where cowardice is moil ftigmatifed. Homer will fupply us wath examples ; hear thofe of Hedor and Diomed : Shall proud Polydamas before the gate Proclaim, his counfels are obeyed too late, Which timely followed but the former night, What numbers had been faved by Heftor's flight i And Diomed, But ah, what grief! fliould haughty Hector boail, I fled inglorious to the guarded coail ' ? This "^ ]]. xxii. V. I \o. Si kq. ' II• viii. v. 179. & fcq. 214 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK This political courage moft refembles genuine valour, becaufe it origil^ates in the love of glory and the ihame of reproach, which are virtuous and honourable motives. Nearly alike to it, is that bravery which is infpired into foldiers by their ge- nerals ; but inferior in merit, fmce engendered not by fliame, but by fear; and by the dread not of difgrace but of puniih- ment. For generals compel by threats; as Hedlor: " On niihed bold Heftor, gloomy as the night ; Forbids to plunder, animates the fight, Points to the fleet ; for by the Gods, who flies, Who dares but linger, by this hand he dies ; No weeping fifter his cold eye ihall clofe. No friendly hand his funeral pile compofe. "Who flops to plunder at this fignal hour. The birds fhall tear him, and the dogs devour ■«.** Thofe who advance, fearful of ilripes, ihould they retreat ; and thofe who ftand their ground, in confequence of obflacles to their flight, all fuch lofe the merit of bravery, becaufe they are brave on compulfion. Experience and cuftom may pro- duce likewife an artificial bravery ; wherefore Socrates thought that courage was a matter of fijience. Each is moft courageous in what he beft undcrftands ; and therefore foldiers in battle ; fince they know the emptinefs of many of the terrors with which the parade of war is accompanied. To the ignorant,, therefore, they appear truly valiant ; befides, their experience has taught them ikilfully to employ their weapons, and by what means they may beft defend themfelves, and moft efteaually aflault their enemies. They contend therefore with all the ad- vantage which a pradtifed prize-fighter enjoys over an ignorant ruftic ; " 11. XV. V. 194. & feq. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 215 ruftlc ; or that men completely armed enjoy over naked troops; BOOH for in Inch combats, fpirit and manhood yield to armed dex- terity. But when the odds are againft them, the courage of difciplined mercenaries fpcedily fails, and they are the ftrft to fly ; whereas the national troops remain and are flain ; which recently happened at the Hermseus, where the Theban citizens preferred death to an ignominious fafety, while their auxili- aries, though they behaved valiantly in the beginning of the a£lion, no fooner difcovered their inferiority in ilrength, than they bafely betook themfelves to flight ; fearing death more than difgrace. Anger is often called to the afllftance of man- hood ; and men feem courageous through pafllon, like wild beafts which turn, when wounded, and attack their purfuers ; for both valour and anger makes us regardlefs of danger. — Whence Homer fays : Inflaming thus the rage of all their hoils " ; And Each Trojan bofom with new warmth he fires '. Thefe paiTages imply, that the excitement of anger is auxi- liary to courage ; which, however, in man, ought to ori- ginate in a fenfe of honour, whereas in beafts it fprings only from the fmart of pain ; for they turn on their purfuers, only when they are afraid or hurt ; but, in their native woods or marihes, they venture not to approach human kind. Manly courage, therefore, cannot refult from the irritation of pain, or from that blind paflion which rufhes, improvident, on un- known dangers. Even the unfeeling afs, when hungry, does not, through the fear of blows, forfake his pafture ; and adulterers, impelled by luft:, have exhibited fignal examples of boUnefs ; " II. xvi. V. 65S. " IJ. vi. V. 626. 2i6. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK boldiiefs ; but fuch things are far remote from true courage. Yet, of all paffions, anger is the moil nearly allied to this virtue, and would entirely accord with it, if directed by mature deliberation, and controlled by maxims of honour. Even in men, anger is painful, and revenge is fweet : yet adling under the impulfe of fuch paifions, they are not courageous but quarrelfome ; for neither reafon nor moral principle has any fliare in their behaviour ; which has fomething in it refembling courage, but is not that virtue. Nor are perfons buoyed up by hope courageous ; for they are confident of fuccefs, only becaufe they have often conquered. This confidence, indeed, refembles that of true courage ; but it proceeds from a different principle, the opinion of fuperiority, and the confequent fenfe of fafety ; and like the fpurious valour of drunkards, (who are brave while fuccefsful,) fails them under the flighteft reverfe of fortune. But true courage furmounts real and known dan- gers, becaufe it is honourable to refift them, and bafe to fink under theni. . It is beft feen in fudden emergencies, becaufe, on fuch occafions, uadlfturbed firmnefs cannot be aiTumed, but muft be the refult of confirmed manly habits. Perfons igno- rant of the dangers which they encounter, have alfo a falfe femblance of courage ; they are fome what allied to thofe buoyed up by hope, but are of a ftamp ftill inferior, their bold- nefs-being founded on miftake, and therefore deilitute of merit :. for when they either know or uifpedl the truth, they betake, themfelves to fnameful flight ; as the Argives did, after encoun- tering the Lacedaemonians, whom they miftook for Scy- onians. AVe have now defcribed, who are truly courageous,., and- who only feem to be fo. Though ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 217 Though the office of courage confifts hi moderating the ha- BOOK pulfe of rafh boldnefs, as well as the excefs of cautious timidity, , ' . yet its principal bufinefs is employed about the latter; becaufe it Chap. 0. is more difficult, and therefore more praifeworthy, to endure pain, than to refift pleafure ; and we endure pain when we fiience the dilates of fear, and encounter real dangers with manly fortitude. Yet the end and eilence of courage arc truly plea- fant, though the pleafure difappears amidft the crowd of painful circumftances with which it is accompanied. In the Gym- naftic games, the prize-fighters contemplate with pleafure the crowns and honours with which their vidories are rewarded : but their laborious exertions, and repeated wounds, are uneafy and painful. The fplendour of the prize, which is fmall, is loft therefore in the gloomy magnitude of furrounding circum- ftances. The fame thing happens as to courage. Death and wounds are painful to a brave man, and reludlantly encoun- tered ; yet he meets and defies them, becaufe it is honourable to do fo ; and although the more diftinguiihed he is in virtue, and therefore in happinefs, he well knows that his lofs in death will be the greater, and therefore the more deeply laments the dangers to which he is expofed ; yet, on this account, his courage is only the more confpicuous in preferring a glorious death to a happy life. The exercife therefore of laborious vir- tue is painful in its progrefs, and only delightful as it approaches the goal. But there are mercenary ruffians, who, though en- dowed with little true courage, are ready, for their mifcrable hire, to throw away their lives, which are of ftlll lefs value. Thus much concerning courage ; of which we may delineate the nature, from the obfervations above made ^ We f Vid. Magna Moral. 1. i• c• xiii. ; and EuJem- 1. iii• c !■ VOL. 1. V V 2i8 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK We now proceed to fpeak of temperance, which, as well as courage, is employed In regulating the irrational, and merely Chap. lo. animal part of our conftitution. Temperance, we have faid, is the hahit of mediocrity in our affeilions with refpedl to- the f nition and objeds which afford pleafure ; and alfo (though in a different temperance, manner, and an ii:iferior degree) with refpeft to thofe which give pain. Ungoverned voluptuoufnefs is the reverfe of tem- perance. We farther proceed to examine what kinds of pleafure it is the office of temperance to regulate. Pleafures are commonly diftingulihed, as either corporeal or mental. Of the latter kind is the pleafure which we derive from virtue or from know- ledge ; v/ith both of which we are delighted, becaufe we love them ; and that, without any bodily fenfation, but merely through mental affedion. Neither temperance nor voluptu- oufnefs are converfant about fuch pleafures, nor about any others not originating in the body. Men fond of the marvel- lous, and who delight in relating idle ftories from morning to night, are called prattlers, not profligates : nor are thofe guilty of intemperance who indulge exceffive grief for the lofs of their fortunes or of their friends. Temperance relates therefore to bodily pleafures only, but not even to them univerfally. It re- ftrains not the gratification which the eye receives from co- lours, figures, and pidtures, nor that given to the ear by de- clamation or mufic. There is a propriety, doubtlefs, in the affedion with which we defire, and the degree in which we in- dulge, thofe pleafures ; but they who ad properly in fuch par- ticulars, are not denominated temperate ; nor thofe who ad improperly, intemperate. Nor do temperance and intempe- rance apply to our reftraint or indulgence with regard to the pleafures derived from the fcnfe of fmell, except by way of ac- 9 ceffion. l\ ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 219 ΐοίΤιοη, that is, when grateful odours arc confidered as an accef- Β Ο Ο Κ fory to agreeable fenfatlons derived from the tafte or^ touch. , To be delighted with the fragrancy of flowers and fruits, and of thofe aroinatics which perfume the altars of the Gods, is never regarded as fenfuallty ; but a propenfity to vicious in- dulgence may appear in the pleafures received from thofe arti- ficial fcents which are employed for heightening perfonal allure- ments, and from the odour of thofe delicacies which form the luxury of our tables ; becaufe, in thefe cafes, the perceptions of one fenfe naturally bring into our thoughts the perceptions of other fenfes, which are too often indulged with grofs and beaftly intemperance. The inferior animals, when hungry, are de- lighted with the fraell of their food ; but this delight in theiu happens alfo, as above explained, by way of acceifion ; dogs are pleafed with the fcent of the hare, becaufe they delight in eating that animal ; and lions are pleafed, not with the bellow- ing of the bull, but with devouring him ; and the bellowing only pleafes them, becaufe it is a proof that their prey is near to them. The fight of tlie deer or wild goat alfo delights them, becaufe it affords the expedation of foon tailing their fleih. Temperance, therefore, is convcrfant about thofe plea- fures only, which are common to us with beafts ; and in which an exceflive indulgence is therefore juftly deemed the loweft de- pravity. Thofe pleafures depend entirely on the touch and taftc, but fin- more on the former ; the tafte heing properly that fenfc which difcriminates different flavours, as is done by thofe who critically examine wines and fauces. But the beailly fenfualiil has little or no pleafure in any thing except mere corporeal con- tad in eating and drinking, as well as in vcaery. Wherefore the voluptuary Philoxenus wiihed his neck as long as a crane's, that his gratification in the ad of fwallowing might be the more ρ ρ 2 durable. 220 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK durable. Temperance, therefore, is chiefiy converiant about ^'■\' regulating the pleafures of that fenfe, of which,, as it is of all the moft common, the improper indulgence is the moft blameable and moft debafing j fmce it belongs to us, not as men, but as mere animals. To love and take delight in fuch gratifications, is to diveft ourfelves of the man, and to put on the wild beaft : for the more liberal pleafures of the touch, fuch as the warmth produced by fridlion and exercife in the gymjiofia^ fall not under this head ; intemperate voluptuoufnefs in conta£t, not extend- ing to the whole body, but centering in particular parts of it. ChaD II. Of our defires and appetites, fome are common and natural ;: ■ others, peculiar and adventitious. Every animal needs and de- idventitious ^^^^^ nouriihment, either dry or moift ; and fometimes both ; defires. ^^^ jj^ ^^ vigour of life, eveiy man, as Homer fays, wiihes for a mate. But all do not defire either the fame objedts ; nor is every particular obje£l alike neceifary to the hap- pinefs of every individual ; the defire of particular objedls, therefore, is often confidered as peculiar and adventitious* This defire may neverthelefs be natural to him who feels it, fince different men have different inclinations ; and one perfon may receive much delight from that which cannot af- ford any gratification to another. In our natural defires, there are few improprieties ; the fole error confifling in exceifive in- dulgence. Gluttony, which, inftead of fatisfying, overloads the ftomach, is the vice only of the moft abjedt of the human kind. But in adventitious and unnatural pleafures, there is fcope for the wlldeft and moft various errors ; which refult, not only from the exceifive degree, but from the improper and even odious objects, of our defires ; as well as from the unbecoming manner and unfeafonable occafions on Avhich they are in- dulged. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, 22t dulged. Intemperance, then, is an excefs with regard to plea- BOOK fure ; and juftly reprobated. With regard to pain, the office of ,_ ^J. f temperance is different from that of fortitude. The intempe- rate man is grieved at miffing pleafure ; which, by his perver- Hty and folly, is thus abfurdly converted into a perpetual fource of pain ; fince he defires it with diflreffing anxiety, and both abufes it when prefent, and forrows after it when it is gone. But temperance, which is not to be feduced by pleafures within its power, cannot grieve at the lofs of thofe which are placed beyond its reach. Extreme infenfibility to pleafure is not the lot of human nature ; even brute beafls prefer one kind of food to another. The fault therefore of being too little afieded by pleafure, as it feldom or never occurs, is not diilinguiilied by a name. But temperance holds the middle place between this namelefs vice and the oppofite extreme. The man endowed with temperance is fo far from defighting in, or enjoying, the pleafures of the voluptuary, that he beholds them with deteila- tion and difguil. He indulges in none but lawful pleafures, and in them feafonably and foberly; and not being intoxi- cated by them when prefent, does not painfully long for them, when abfent. His health, his fortune, and above all his ho- nour and his duty, prefcribe laws to his appetites. The pro- fligate prefers fenfual pleafures to all things befide : the man of temperance eftimates them at their true value, and that a low one ". Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice ; the former Qi^^p^ ,2.. proceedino; from the defire of pleafure, the latter from the aver- " ° r • 1 • j-n. u 1 Companion Ron to pain : and fuch is the nature of pam that it dilturbs and „f intempe- deilroys the frame of mind of thofe who behold its approach, [''^^^';^[^ and fl M?gna Moral, j. i. c. xxii. Eudem. 1. iii. c ii. Z21 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK and anticipate Its pangs. Pleafure not producing thefe eiTcds, the intemperate indulgence in it is therefore more voluntary, and confequently more blameable ; efpecially fnice there are innumerable opportunities in life for reilraining our purfuit of unlawful or improper pleafures, and thereby acquiring a con- firmed habit of temperance, the feveral a£ts of which are unat- tended with danger. The reverfe of this happens as to cow- ardice ; the opportunities for corredling it are much fewer in number, and the experiment is dangerous. But though parti- cular inilances of cowardice are in fome meafure involuntary, through the invincible terror which produces them, and Λvhich impels thofe afFeiled with it to throw away their fhields, and to commit other ihameful actions, yet the frame and habit of mind from which fuch actions flow,feems to be more a matter of choice; whereas the frame and habit of mind from which intemperance flows, feems lefs voluntary than the particular inilances of it ; for no one can will or choofe, that by his internal conftitution he ihould be the fport of vicious propenfities, and ungovernable appetites. The word denoting intemperance in Greek is ap- plicable to the wanton and unchailifed petulance of boys, which bears a near analogy to what is called intemperance in men. '»VTiich of the two was the primary meaning of the word, it is not material to inquire ; for the tranfition is extremely natural from the one fignification to the other, nothing ftanding more in need of chailifement than depravities which increafe by indul- gence ; to which depravities, pailions as well as boys are pecu- liarly liable. For boys are aduated almoft folely by paihon, pleafure being their ruling purfuit ; the defire of which, unlcfs it be reftrained by higher principles and controlled by autho- rity, will traufgrcfs all reafonable bounds ; and, gaining ilrength by / ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 223 by repeated ads of indulgence, will finally deftroy and extin- BOOK guifli the light of reafon itfelf. Our defircs therefore ought to be few and moderate, and as obedient to the diftates of rea- fon, as boys to the commands of their mailer. By fuch ha- bitual regulation, they will gradually harmonife with the higher powers of our nature, and at length terminate in the fame ex- cellent and honourable end ; exhibiting the ileady luftre of yir- tue ; and exactly conforming, as to their objeft, degree, time, and all other circumftances, to the ftriit rules of propriety. So much concerning temperancci ; ( 225 ) ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK IV. INTRODUCTION. AViNG treated of the virtues of courage and temperance, BOOK which, how different foever in many refpeds from each Η other, agree in this particular, that they hoth confift in the pro- per government of the irrational or merely fenfitive part of our nature, the author proceeds in the fourth book, to explain the na- ture of liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, meeknefs, courtefy, plain- dealing, and facetioufnefs. As things are beil underftood by comparifon, he points out and defines the blameable extremes (for example, of niggardlinefs and profufion) which ftand in direft oppofition to each other ; and which are both of them contrary, though not always in a like degree, to the praife- worthy habit which lies between them. He fiiows that there is an intermediate, but anonymous habit, highly deferving of ap- probation, between the extremes of ambition and blameable infenfibility to honour : obferving on this and other occa- fions, that many of the virtues, as well as of the vices, are not accurately dlftinguifhed by names; and that from this imperfedion of language, much confufion refults ; for when the intermediate and praifeworthy habit is namelefs, each of VOL. I. G G . the 226 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK the extremes will ftrive to thruil Itfelf into the middle place, which is the poft of honour ; and that habit which is approved as virtue by one clafs of men, will be condemned as vice by ano- ther. He examines whether fliame can be claiTed with the virtues, fmce it feems rather a paflion than a habit. He ex- plains what is meant by a conditional virtue, in oppofition to virtue fimply and abfolutely ; and proves that ilaame is at beft only a virtue of the conditional and imperfect kind. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 227 Β Ο Ο Κ IV. Α R G υ Μ Ε Ν Γ. JJberalily.— Vkes oppoftc thereto.— Magmfcence ; its contraries.— Magnanimity. — Meeknefs ; its contraries. — Conrtefy; its con- traries.— Plain-dealivg ; its contraries.— Facetionjnefs ; its con- ^ trarics.-^— Shame. WE proceed to ipeak of liberality, which feems to be that BOOK virtue which bears a peculiar relation to property. For ^_ __1 j the praife of liberality is not acquired by courage in w^ar, mo- Chap. i. deration in pleafure, or juftice in judgment, but by the pro- ^jbT^y, m-ietv of our behaviour in receiving or beftowing money, or and the vices t ^ ^ ^z . . ,, . contrary to whatever things can be meafured by money ; and prnicipally m it. beftowing them. Of the propriety of our conduft in relation to property, prodigality and niggardlinefs are the tw^o contrary and blameable extremes. Niggardlinefs always refers to thofc who fet more than a juft value on money : but prodigality is fometimes employed to exprefs extravagant profufion joined with inordinate intemperance ; for thofe are called prodigals, who wafte their fortunes in ruinous pleafures, and thus fignally debafe themfelves by complicated worthlefsneft. Yet prodi- gality more properly fignifies one fimple vice, that of ruining ourfelves by our own fault ; for he ruins himfelf by his own fault, who waftefully confumes his property, that is, the means G G 2 ^π 22δ ARISTOTLE'S ETXilCS. BOOK by which his life is fupportcd ; and in this acceptation ^^ ■ we take the word. Property falls under the defcription of things ufeful ; which may either be ufed rightly or abufed ; and he only can ufe them rightly, rwho is adorned with the virtue appertaining to them ; namely, liberality. The ufe of money confills in expending or beftowing it: for the taking or keeping of money relates to poiTeiTion rather than to ufe. The virtue of liberality therefore is more confpicuous in be- ftowing handfomely, than either in receiving what is our due, or in refufmg what we ought not to accept. For virtue confifts rather in ading our part well, than in avoiding what is amifs. This adtive virtue alone is the proper objedl of praife and gratitude ; for it is more meritorious to part with what is our own, than to abftain from what belongs to another ; which latter may be praifed indeed as juftice, but not as liberality ; and to accept what is ftridly due to us, is not entitled to any degree of praife. None are more beloved than the liberal, becaufe their virtue is extenfively ufeful, diffufmg itfelf in be- nefits. But the motive from which their adions proceed, is what chiefly conilitutes their excellence ; for liberality, like every other virtue, muft keep the beauty of propriety in view ; feleding its objeds, and proportioning its extent, according to thofe rules which right-reafon prefcribes. The critical moment for bed conferring a favour muft alfo be carefully ftudied ; and they muft be conferred cheerfully, at leaft not painfully : and when any one of thefe conditions is wanting, whatever ads of bounty a man may perform, he will not carry oft the palm of virtuous and graceful liberality. If the gifts bellowed on others occafion pain to ourfelves, it is a proof that we prefer money to the beauty ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 229 beauty of generous adions ; and if we are rapacioiis in ac- β ο Ο, Κ quiring money, we cannot be truly liberal in employing it. i___^ . A man of real beneficence will not be importunate in folicita- tion. He will be delicate as to accepting favours ; but will enrich himfclf by the diligent management of his own affairs, that he may acquire materials for his bounty, which will be dlftrlbuted with caution, that it may never fail the deferving. It belongs to his charader to be more provident for others than for himfelf ; and to extend the meafure of his beneficence far beyond thofe limits which the prudence of felfiihnefs would pre- fcribe. But our liberality is relative to our wealth ; it confifts, not in the value of our gifts, but in the temper and habit of the giver ; and he who gives the leafl: of all, may be the moll: liberal of all, if what he gives bears the hlgheft proportion to his fubftance ^ Men of hereditary eftates are more inclined to liberality, than thole whole fortunes are their own Λvork ; the former have never known the feverlties of want ; and all men are difpofed to love and cheriih their own works, as parents and poets. It is not eafy for a liberal man to be rich, fmce he is nice in receiving money, not retentive in keeping it ; and always ready to give it away, on no other account than that of the proper or beneficent purpofes to which it may be applied. Fortune, therefore, is continually accufed of en- riching thofe who are leaft worthy of her favours. But this happens naturally, without the interference of fortune ; fince wealth cannot well be poffeffed by thofe \vho employ not the ordinary means by v/hich it is acquired and accumulated. Yet true ' Verily I fay unto you, that this poor widow hath cafl more in, th.in all they which have caft into the trcafury. St. Mark, c.'xii. v. 43. 2;o ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. ■J BOOK true liberality avoids unneceflary and fuperfiuous expence, left the fource fliould be dried up, from which only its falutary ftreams can plenteoufly flow. Whoever lives beyond his in- come, is ftritlly a prodigal, and he only ; for kings, how great foever their expenditure may be, are never branded with this appellation ; becaufe it feems difficult for their munificence to exceed the meafure of their refources. The liberal man, both in great and in fmall matters, and both in giving and receiving, 43ehaves with cheerful ferenity, becaufe his behaviour is always proper, and alwavs confiftent with his character. As propriety in giving and receiving depends on the fame principle of moderation in our defires with regard to money, he who gives properly, will not improperly receive ; fmce contraries cannot refult from the fame principle, nor fubfift in the fame fubjecl. Should it happen that a liberal man confumes more than he ought, and on an improper occafion, he will doubtlefs lament it, but with that calm and moderate compofure which becomes his character; for it is the part of virtue not only to joy and grieve from fit motives, but to affign proper limits to thofe emotions. The liberal man is, in matters of intereft, of an accommodating temper; he is open to impofition and injury, becaufe he does not value money beyond its real worth, and is more uneafy at having omitted to do what he ought, than at doing too much ; living in direct oppofition to the avaricious rapacity of Simonides '. The prodigal, again, is directly the reverfe ; » A pcet of the Ifle of Ceos, and the firft on record who proftituted his mercenary mufe for the vile purpofe of gain. He was born 558 years before Chrift, and hved nuiety years ; the companion and favourite of many of the princes and grandees of his time. As his avarice increafed with his age, he apologized for it by ikying that the ^urpjit of money was the only delight v/hich time had left to him. Conf. Fragment. Ciliiraac. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. -jr reverfe ; both his joy and his grief fpring from improper mo- BOOK tives, and both iliew themfelves in unfeemly and immoderate , _ _ degrees ; which will be more manifeft in the fequel. Prodiga- lity and avarice are both of them excefles, and both of them defedls. Prodigality is exceffive in giving, and defedive in receiving ; avarice is defe<3;ive in giAdng, and excefllve in re- ceiving, and fcraping together the meaneft and moft fordid gains. The qualities which compofe and fupport prodigalitv, are not eafily united : it is difficult for him who is carelefs of receiving, to continue laviih in bellowing ; for his funds, if he is a private man, will foon be exhaufted. The prodigal, there- fore, is better than the mifer, becaufe his malady is more curable. Age, and the experience of want, will correct his extravagance ; and, as he ftill ihows a generofity of nature, though unwifely and unfeafonably, cuftom and good example will con\'ert his thoughtlefs profufion into decent and graceful liberality; fince his deviations from the right path proceed rather from folly than from depravity and turpitude. For this reafon fuch a prodigal is preferable to the mifer; and alfo becaufe the former benefits many, and the latter, no one; not even himfelf. But thofe Λνΐιο are prodigal of their own, are for the moft part rapacious of what belongs to others ; and finding it impoffible to fupply their wild extravagance by honourable means, abftain from no fource of gain, however impare and polluted it may be ; fo that even their bounties have nothing liberal in them, being Λvith-held from virtue in diftrefs, and lavifiied on parafites, flatterers, and on the idle retinue of vice and folly. For the greater part of prodigals unite profligacy with Callimac. apud Spanheim. v. i. p. 264 and 337. Plutarch. An feni capiend. Ref- pub'.ica, V. ii. p. 786. Athen xiv. c- xxi. Fabric. E'.buot. Grsc V. i. Γ•59ΐ• 5 232 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, BOOK with prodigality ; and infenfible to the beauty of virtue, fall ^'^ , vidtims to the allurement of pleafure. But though this happens to the undifcipUned prodigal, yet, under proper management, he may be brought into the middle and right path ; whereas avarice is incorrigible ; for it is increaied by old age and every kind of infirmity ; and it feems more congenial to human nature than the contrary vice, there being in every country more hoarders than fpendtbrifts. It alfo extends to extraordinary lengths, and aifumes a variety of forms ; the immoderate love of money leading fome men to daring rapacity, and others to fordid parfimony ; for there are niggardly mifers, and tenacious fcrape-pennies, who either through a fenfe of juftice, or through fear, are careful in abftaining from ihameful gains, and meanly fparing of their property, left they tlrould be forced, as they fay, on diihoneft expedients for fubfiftence. Their maxim is, neither to borrow nor to lend, neither to give nor to receive ; becaufe, ihould they accept any thing from others, they think it will be difficult always to avoid giving to others fomething in return. But rapacious avarice fticks at no expedient by which money may be acquired ; fubmits to the bafeft drudgery, pradiiei pimping or ufury, and thinks no profit too infamous or too minvite, which, by frequent repetitions, may accumulate into a great gain. Both kinds are alike dllgraced by their falfe efti- mate, and inordinate love of money ; imce, for the fake of profit, and that a fmall one, they encounter and endure a bur- denfome load of infamy ; which is an evil that even the greateft profits cannot poffibly compenfate. Thofe who afpire to great and fudden acquifitions of wealth, fuch as tyrants who ftorm cities and plunder temples, are not branded with the reproach of ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 233 ■of avarice, but of Impiety and vlllany. The pirate, the pick- BOOK pocket, and the gamefter, are guilty of illiberal rapacity ; fince . _ _'. f the two firft encounter, for the fake of gain, not only danger but difgrace ; and the lail plunders and ruins his friends and acquaintances, whom a man of liberal principles wiilies always to benefit. They are all equally debafed by a fhamelefs pre- ference of wealth to worth ; and by bartering things incom- - parably more valuable, for unjuft and illiberal gains. Illibe- . rality, therefore, is the vice moil properly oppofed to the virtue of liberality ; for it is a greater, more extenfive, and more uni- verfal evil, than the vice of prodigality, which holds the con- trary extreme. So much concerning mediocrity in our paf- fions and adxions with regard to money, and whatever money can purchaie, as well as concerning the vicious extremes which are inconfiftent with this praifeworthy and meritorious habit '. We naturally proceed to treat next of magnificence ; for that Chap. 2. likewife feems to be a virtue refpeding money; but differs from Iiberality m this, that it relates to money in one view only, cence, and namely, the fpending of it ; and in this, it exceeds the meafure which mere liberality would prefcribe. The very name of magnificence indicates a certain magnitude, joined with' pro- priety, in expence ; and the magnitude or fplendour of our ex- pence is eftimated by the occafion on v/hich it is employed ; for that might be great in a trierarch % which would be fmall in an ambaffador to the public folemnities of Greece ; and the propriety depends both on the objedl of the expence, and on the ' Vid. Magna Moral. 1. i. c xxiv. ; et Eudem. 1. iii. c iv. " The rich citizens of Athens were liable to the burden of equipping gallies for the public fervice ; in which they often vied with each other in difplaying their patriotifm to the ru'wi of their fortunes. Lyf. Orat. paffim. VOL. I. Η Η Its con- traries. 234 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK the character and fituation of the perfon who incurs it. He is IV . ... not called magnificent who fpends his money with propriety on faiall or ordinary occafions, like him " Who often gave the hungry beggar bread:" For magnificence is not firaply liberality, but fomething more ; the former implying the latter, though the latter does not imply the former. Magnificence holds the middle place between two blameable extremes, of which the one, in matters of expence, falls ihort of what is fuitable to our circumftances or to the occafion, and the other oftentatioufly exceeds them. To be truly magnificent requires no fmall degree of judgment ; fince it infers a graceful theory of moral propriety, and a ikilful harmony in great expenditure; for as we faid in the beginning, habits are charadlerifed by the ads and energies from which they fpring, and which in a man of real magnificence muft be great and decorous ; the work worthy the expence, and the ex- pence fuiting and rather exceeding the work. A man truly magnificent, is actuated by the love of moral beauty, which is the principle of all the virtues. His generofity is large and liberal, without ftridnefs of accounts; his confideration being, not how much any thing will coil him, but how it may be done moft handfomely. For the magnificence is not in the expence, but in the manner of employing it; which muft be fuch, not merely as propriety would didate, for this belongs to liberality, but fuch as will ftrlke the fpedlators with wonder. It is moft con- fpicuous in temples, dedications, facrifices, and whatever con- cerns the Gods : and in thofe honourable benefadions which generous patriots confer on the community; the equipment of gallies, public entertainments, and dramatic exhibitions. As magnificence muft be confiftent with propriety, it can never be the ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, 235 the virtue of a poor man, in whom every attempt towards ex- BOOK ercifing it muft be egregious folly. It becomes thofe only who ^_^ i, j. poifefs great hereditary wealth, or who have enriched them- fclves by great and fplendid exploits ; and it is moft honourably difplayed on the public occafions above mentioned. It may be Ihown alfo in matters of private concern, when they are fuch as occur but once in our lives, as a marriage ; or fuch as in- tereft the whole community, or at leaft the members of the go- vernment ; as the reception and entertainment of ftrangers, and the honours and prefents beftowed on them at their departure : for the expences of a magnificent man are public, not perfonal ; and prefents to ftrangers fomewhat refemble dedications to the Gods. To build a houfe fuitable to a great fortune, is a work of magnificence, for it is a public ornament ; and works are mag- nificent in proportion to their durability, provided propriety always be obferved, for the fame monuments will not fuit Gods and men, nor the fame ornaments become tombs and temples. Magnificence, we have faid, is not meafured fimply by the ex- pence, but by the expence in reference to the objedt on which it is beftowed. The magnificence, doubtlefs, rifes in proportion to the magnitude of that objed ; but a beautiful bauble, of little ■or no value, may be a magnificent prefent to a child ; becaufc, though trifling in itfelf, yet being confiderable with refpedt to the occafion, it attefts the noble liberalitty of the donor. True magnificence is far remote from unfeafonable oftentation, which makes a parade of wealth on ordinary and mean occafions ; the oftentatious man receives his gueft at a friendly dinner, as if he were celebrating a marriage feftival ; and when he exhibits dramatic entertainments, decks, after the awkward fafhion of the Magareans, his comic adors in the purple trappings of tra- H Η 2 gedy ; 236 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BO Ο Κ gedy ; catching popular admiration by unfeafonable and abfurd (_ _. _" I extravagance ; while, on the other hand, he is meanly parfimo- nioiis at times when true magnificence might properly be dif- played. The vice oppofite to magnificence betrays niggardli- nefs throughout, even in the midft of the moft profufe expence; for, in fome minute particular, an attention to a pitiful faving will be difcovered, which ruins the beauty and gracefulnefs of the whole, as it proves that whatever has been done, was done fparingly and painfully ; and that the performance, if great, far furpafled the mind of the performer. Thefe two contrary habits are both of them vices, but not very reproach- ful ones, fince they neither do harm to others, nor evince grofs turpitude in the mind which harbours them \ Chap. 3. Magnanimity, as the name imports, is converfant about great J. things; what thefe are let us firft confider ; contemplating not mity. the habit itfelf, but the perfon actuated by it, which will bring us to precifely the fame conclufions. A magnanimous man is he, whofe chara£ler being of great worth, is eftimated by him- felf at its full value. He who foi-ms a grofsly falfe eftimate of himfelf is a fool ; .and none of the virtues are confiftent with folly : while the man who, confcious of his defeats, appreciates his fmall merits by a fair and juft ftandard, may be praifed for his good fenfe and modefty, but cannot pafs for magnanimous ; which epithet always implies dignity and excellence ; this beauty of the mind requiring, like that of the body, elevation and magnitucie; for perfons of a diminutive ftature, are not called beautiful, but neat and elegant. A mean-fpirlted " man under-rates his own merits ; and the vain-glorious boafter ar- rogates * Eudem. 1. iii.c. vi. > Ariftotle fays "little- minded." y ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 237 rogates to himfelf merits, of which he is by no means pof- BOOK fefled ; but the more foUd merit he pofieiles, his vain-glory is the lei's ; whereas mean-fpiritednefs is the greater, in proportion to the excellence of the worth which is fo improperly appre- ciated by its pofleiTor ; for how contemptible would he be, even to himfelf, were his real character of little or no value ! The magnanimous man eftimates himfelf at the higheft rate, yet no- higher than he ought; and confcious of his inward worth, thinks himfelf entitled to whatever is held moft precious; to what the moft exalted of men claim as the higheft of all re- wards ; and to what all men confer on the Gods as their ac- knowledged due ; in a word, to honour, the greateft and moft. invaluable of external goods. Magnanimity, therefore, is pe- culiarly converfant about honour, and its contrary, ignominy ;. holding the middle place between vain-glory that unfairly courts undue honours, and mean-fpiritednefs that improperly re- jefts even thofe that are due. But though, in point of pro- priety, magnanimity holds the middle place, yet, in excellence and • dignity, it rifes to the fummit ; for it heightens and enlarges every virtue ; and the moft boaftful vain-glory never proudly arrogated more than true magnanimity has fairly claimed. This illuftrious habit of the mind cannot bear an alliance with any kind of vice. It is moft oppofite to cowardice or injuftice ;. for, from what motive can he, who thinks of nothing fo highly as of his own charaiter, exhibit himfelf under fuch deformities? And if we apply to particular inftances, or furvey individual charaders, we ihall find that thofe who affedt magnanimity without real worth, infallibly expofe themfelves to ridicule. For, honour, which is the meed of virtue, cannot belong to the worthlefs ; and magnanimity forms, as it were, the orna- ment 238 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK ment of the virtues, fince it cannot fubfiil without them, \__,, 1 yet heightens, extends, and magnifies them, wherever they •■are found. True magnanimity then is a thing moft difficult, fmce it implies the perfeilion of moral redlitude. It de- lights, moderately, in great honours beftoAved by the de- ferving, as meeting with its due, or lefs : for with perfect virtue no honour can be fully commenfurate. It accepts however fuch honours, becaufe nothing better can be beftowed ; but of vulgar honours, or from vulgar men, it is altogether difdainful; and is as infenfible to their reproach, as carelefs of their ap- plaufe. Wealth, power, good or bad fortune, it will meet and fuftain with the fame dignified compofure, neither elated with profperity nor dejedted by adverfity ; for to a magnanimous man thofe things 'are defirable chiefly as the figns of honour ; and, if he bears honour itfelf with moderation, much more muft he thus bear thofe things which are only its figns, and defired merely on its account ; fince to him who thinks not too highly 'of honour, nothing befides can poiTibly appear great. Mag- nanimity, therefore, fometimes paiTes for fupercilioufnefs; efpe- cially fince great external profperity feems to heighten and in- rreafe it ; for nobility is honoured ; and men of wealth or power, being diftinguiilied by great fuperiority of advantages, will al- ways find perfons ready to do them honour ; and though ho- nour belongs properly to virtue alone, yet virtue, adorned with great external profperity, will feem doubly entitled to pre-emi- fnence. But, in reality, the moft profperous fortune, when defti- tute of virtue, affords not any juft ground for felf-applaufe ; it gives to us neither a high opinion of ourfelves, nor a fair claim to be "highly thought of by others ; and as it is incapable of in- ilpiring true magnanimity, it too frequently begets infolence and J fuper- T . ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 239 fupercllloufaefs ; fincc worthlefs men cannot Hear gracefully the BOOK gifts of fortune, but abufe their fancied fuperiority by treating others contemptuoufly and unjuftly ; whereas the contempt ihown by the truly magnanimous, is juft ; their opinions being, formed on refleilion, as thofe of the multitude are taken up at random. A man of magnanimity neither courts dangers, nor willingly encounters them on flight occafions. But when a worthy occafion requires it, he is unfparing of his life, thinking that to live is not, under all conditions, eligible. He is eager to confer favours, and aihamed of receiving them ; becaufe the former is a mark of fuperiority, the latter the reverfe ; he there- fore repays every kindnefs with intereft, that the perfon who firft obliged him, may become his debtor. He hears with more pleafure a recital of the good offices he has performed, than that of the favours which he has received . Wherefore Thetis does not expatiate on her benefits to Jupiter >", nor the Lacedaemo- nians on thofe which they had conferred on the Athenians ^ ; but rather on the kindnefs they themfelves had received at their hands ; for magnanimity having few wants, feldom needs that affiftance which it is always difpofed to aflbrd ; it is lofty towards the great and profperous, but behaves modeftly towards men in moderate circumftances ; to rife above the former, has- difficulty and dignity ; but to magnify ourfelves in company with the latter, betrays a lownefs and littlenefs of mind, not lefs ungenerous and vulgar, than making a parade of our ftrength or courage amidft weaknefs and cowardice. Magnanimity con- temns trivial honours ; and difdains, even in great things, to a£t a fecond part. It is flow in adlion, and averfe to exertion, ex- cept when great honour may be obtained, or great adions are to '' Homer. Ilias. 1. i. v. 503. & feq. ^ Xenoph. Hellen. 1. vi. p. 609 — 613. Edit• Leunclav. .240 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK, -to be performed : not bufied about many things, but confined . to thole which are great and fplendid. A magnanimous man is :as open in his hatred as in his friendfliip ; for conceahnent is •.the part of fear ; he regards truth more than opinion, and fhows himfelf manifeftly in his words and aftions, declaring his mind with full freedom ; which indicates both his own love of truth and his contempt for the opinions of others ; but this opennefs of charader is liable to one exception, for he is much given to irony, diflembling his merits before the vulgar, who are un- worthy to appreciate them. He can fhow undue complaifance for no one's humours, except thofe of his friends ; for flattery is a low and fervile vice. He is not prone to admire, for he deems nothing great. He is not mindful of injuries, which his magnanimity teaches him to defpife. He is no man's pane- gyriil or flanderer ; he talks not of himfelf, nor does he blame others ; not fpeaking ill even of his enemies, except when their infolence excites his indignation. As to things of fmall import, or even daily ufe, he is no petitioner or complainer ; for that would ihew too much concern about them. His poiTeiTions are diftinguiihed for their beauty and elegance rather than for their fruitfulnefs and utility ; becaufe the former qualities are more nearly allied to that independence and all-fufficiency to which he aipires. The gait of a magnanimous man is flow ; his tone of voice grave, his pronunciation firm. Hafte and rapidity be- token too much folicitude. He therefore is feldom in hafte, who deems few things worthy of his purfuit ; nor is he often eager who thinks few things of importance : quicknefs and iharpnefs of voice proceeding from earneftnefs and eagernefs. Such then are the charadleriflicsofmagnani'mity, of which mean-fpiritednefs Is the defeil, and vain-glory the excefs; qualities which, though not ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 241 not very hurtful to others, yet ihow much imperfedion In the BOOK minds which harbour them. The little-minded man deprives , ,1 ^ himfelf of thofe advantages to which he is entitled. He is ig- norant of himfelf and of his own worth, otherwife he would afpire to thofe advantages which he really deferves. His fault however confifts rather in lluggiihnefs than folly; he draws back from noble adtions and illuftrious enterprifes, as things much above him ; and even excludes himfelf from that exter- nal profperity which fortune throws in his way. But the vain^ glorious man is ignorant of himfelf ftill more confpicuoufly ; and even to folly. He engages in undertakings the moil honour- able, but far above his abiUties ; and in which his fignal failure manifeftly convids him of unworthinefs. He delights in the ornaments of drefs, and all other ihowy externals. He makes a parade of his profperity, and boafts of it in the vain hope of being honoured on its account. Yet mean-fpiritednefs is more contrary than vain-glory to true magnanimity ; becaufe the former vice is more frequently met with, and is alfo attended with worfe confequences. Such then is the nature of magnanimity, or that virtue which is converfant about great and extraordinary honours \ There feems to be another virtue alfo converfant about chap. 4. honour, and bearing the fame proportion to magnanimity, -- — ' ° . , Uf the pro- which liberality bears to magnificence. This vutue, as well as prietyofaf- iiberality, relates, not to what is great and extraordinary, but to co^'nS with what is ordinary and moderate : and as liberality teaches us to \^^ζ^^^^ behave with propriety in the purfuit of ordinary and moderate profits, fo this namelefs virtue teaches us to behave with pro- priety in the purfuit of ordinary and moderate honours. A man • Vid. Miigna Moral. 1. i. c xxvi.; Eudem. 1. iii. c v. VOL. I. II 24i ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK i^ari may either be more or lefs defirous than ho ouglit, of ,_ ; ^ glory as well as of gain ; he may feek both thoie objeds on improper occafions, and by undue means. An ambitious man is more fond of honour than he ought ; an unambitious man, lefs than he ought ; not caring to reap the natural reward even of praifewortliy exploits : the former recommends himfelf by his fpirited manlinefs and emulation of excellence ; the latter, by his moderation and modefty ; and from the imper- fedion of language in not affigning diftinft names to the dif- ferent degrees of our affections, the fame word excites either praife or blame, according to the fenfe in which it is taken : ambition is a fubjedl of commendation, when it denotes a more than vulgar love of honour ; it is a term of reproach, when it denotes the fame affedlion in an immoderate and unwarrantable degree ; and as a term is wanting to denote that middle ftate of the affedion, which is alone confiftent with propriety, the contrary extremes contend with each other for the vacant place of pre-eminence. Whatever things admit of excefs or defed, admit alfo of this middle ftate, which is alone praife- worthy. This is the cafe with the defire of honour, which may be too ftrong, too weak, or in a moderate and proper degree ; a degree not marked by any diftind term, and which, by the ambitious, is called low-minded nefs ; and by the low- minded, ambition ; thus appearing to either extreme the vice oppofite to itfelf. This happens with regard to fome other virtues ; each of the extremes ufurping the middle place, be- caufe the middle itfelf is not diftinguiihed by a name. Chap. c. Meeknefs is propriety of affedion with regard to the caufes and circumftances which naturally provoke anger ; or rather, JlithhTcon- as names are wanting to denote either a mediocrity or the tfafits• 10 oppofite ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 243 oppofite extremes of this affeaion ; meeknefs, though verging Β Ο Ο Κ towards the anonymous extreme, confifting in defedt, is thruft ^_,_, into the middle place. The extreme confiiVrng m excefs, may be called irafcibility ; and anger being a paffion excited by a variety of different caufes, and under a variety of different cir- cumftances, it can only be commendable when it refults from a proper caufe, is direded towards proper objeds, is feafonable in its commencement, moderate in its degree, and limited m its duration. If meeknefs be a praifeworthy quality, even the meek man muft be affedted . with anger under the conditions above fpecified. For meeknefs denotes freedom from unrea- fonable perturbation, and a due refiftance to paffion, in com- pliance with the higher powers of our nature; inclining, indeed, to the defeaive extreme ; fince a meek man is not refentful of injuries, but always prone to pardon them. The incapacity of feeling juft provocation is certainly a fault ; which, when it proceeds beyond a certain pitch, borders on folly ; it denotes a ftupid infenfibility of charader ; and he who does not feel wrongs as he ought, cannot be well qualified to repel them ; he will fubmit, with the meannefs of a ilave, to infults offered either to himfelf or to his friends. An exceffive propenfity to anger difplays itfelf in a great variety of ways ; it is excited by improper caufes, and is determined towards improper objeas ; it appears in immoderate or exceffive degrees ; in fome men it burfts forth fuddenly into intemperate rage; in others, it fettles into unjuftifiable and permanent refentment. All thofe extra- vagancies of paffion do not take place at once ; for multiplied exceffes of vice are deftruaive of each other ; and ihould they fall with their full weight on one individual, their burden would be intolerable. Irafclble men, though moved to paffion 112 t°° 244 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK too fuddenly, In immoderate degrees, and on improper occa- fions, are yet eafily pacified ; if they be foon angry, they are alfo foon pleafed, which is the beft circumftance attending them ; and which happens from this, that they do not reftrain their paflion, but give free vent to it ; their quicknefs of tem- per plainly ihewing their affedions and intentions, which• they have no fooner made manifeft, than they are ready to be appeafed. The excefs of this difpofition, which takes oifence againft every perfon, and on every the flighteft occafion, re- ceives its name, in Greek, from two words denoting the iharpeft afperiiy of choler. The refentful and implacable tem- per retains anger long, becaufe it does not give free vent to it ; for, to vent anger in vengeance naturally appeafes it, by fub- ftituting pleafure in the ftead of pain ; but paihon reftrained, gathers ftrength by compreffion ; and as it remains hid within the breaft, the gentle power of perfuafion cannot be applied for its alleviation ; it muft be digefted by the internal vigour of the conftitution, which is a work of time. A fell and favage temper diredls its immediate anger againft improper objedts, and is implacable in its refentment,, until it is fully fatiated with vengeance. The exceffes of anger are more oppofite than its defeds to the virtue of meeknefs ; becaufe they occur more frequently ; becaufe human nature is too prone to be immo- derate in its refentment ; and becaufe perfons of irafcible and querulous tempers are the moft troublefome to live with. From ■what was above obferved, it is plain that words cannot accurately exprefs all the conditions, as to time, place, perfon, caufe, and degree, which render anger praife worthy or blameable. He who deviates a little on either fide from the exad point of pro- priety, efcapes blame, becaufe his flight error efcapes obferva- tion^ ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. - ^45 tlon. The incapacity of feeling or refenting an injury, is Β Ο Ο Κ fometimes praifed as meeknefs ; too ftrong a propenfuy to , . , anger, is fometimes extolled as manhood, and regarded as mdi- eating a dlfpofition fit for command. The precife middle pomt, in which alone propriety confifts, cannot be accurately afcer- tained in words, becaufe it is determined only by a perception of fenfe ; and the fenfes do not perceive minute variations. This however is plain, that the middle habit is laudable, and the extremes blameable, more or lefs, in exad proportion to their greater or leiTer deviations, in point of all, or any, of the conditions above fpecified. This laudable mediocrity, there- fore ought to be our conftant aim ; and let this much fuffice concerning the difpofitions and habits that have a reference to the caufes and circumftances that naturally provoke anger ^ In the intercourfe of life and fociety, there are men of Chap. 6. a fawning dlfpofition, ever prone to praife, totally averfe to ^^^^^^^^^ contention, and who think it incumbent on them to give plea- with^'ts con- fure to all with whom they converfe. There are others of fo peeviih a temper, that they are continually contradiding and croffing all thofe with whom they have to do ; and who feel not the fmalleft concern for the pain occafioned to others by their churliih afperity. That both thefe habits are blameable, is manifeft ; and alfo that there is an intermediate habit between iawning flattery and favage feverity, which is truly laudable, becaufe it diftrlbutes its approbation and difapprobation in due meafure, according to the circumftances of the cafe. This intermediate habit is not diftinguiihed by a name ; it moll refembles friendihip, for ihould affeftion be added to the com- panionable qualities of a man endowed with this ^^^ιτ,^^||^ »« Vid. Eudem. 1. iii. c ilL. 246 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK would be a moil delightful friend : but it differs from friend- ihip in this, that it does not include any peculiar affedlion towards thofe with whom we converfe; and the perfon adorned with this laudable habit, does not approA'e from love, nor dif- approve from hatred, but becaufe it is his nature and character to beftow has approbation and diiapprobation agreeably to thofe rules which moral propriety prefcribes ; whether he has to do with acquaintances or ftrangers ; with familiar friends, or with perfons altogether unknown to him; except, that his behaviour to each of thofe claffes of perfons will be marked with fuch diilindions as circumftances require ; for we ought not to teftify as much pleafure at the merit of mere ftrangers as at that of our friends ; nor to be equally complaifant to the follies of the latter, as to thofe of the former. The man of courtefy and civility (for thefe are the words by which the habit in queftion may moft nearly be expreffed) will, in the intercourfe of fociety, behave himfelf univerfally as he ought : his aim will be, never needlefsly to offend ; but to gratify and pleafe thofe with whom he lives, on all occafions on which it poffibly can be done confiftently with utility and propriety. But the cour- teous man will not betray his own intereft or honour, or even thofe of the perfons with whom he converfes, for the fake of affording a fmall and unfeafonable pleafure. He will refift their opinions, when to refift them gives fmall pain ; whereas to approve them would be injurious or difgraceful either to others or to himfelf. His behaviour will vary with the rank and dignity, with the degree of his familiarity or connexion, and with a variety of other circumftances belonging to the perfons with whom he converfes, but will be always regulated by pro- priety. Pleafure, we have faid, will be his aim j but without facrificing ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 247 facnficmg intereft or honour to pleafure, or a greater pleafuxe to a u Ο Ο Κ leiTer. Such then is this intermediate habit, which is namelels , ^ , in Greek ; and of which the extremes are, on one hand, univer- fal and indifcriminate complaifance, which, when it proceeds from motives of intereft, is called flattery; and, on the other, chm-lilh afperity and contentious peevi^nefs. As there is no term to exprefs the intermediate and laudable habit, the ex- tremes only feem to ftand in oppofition to each other, and alternately arrogate the praife of virtue, though in fad they are both vices ; and as fuch, in dired oppofition to the praife- worthy habit above defcribed. The virtue which lies between the extremes of diiTembhng chap. 7• concealment and arrogant oftentation is converfant about nearly ^^^— ^_ the fame objeds with courtefy ; except that this has a reference ^^^,^^ to the pleafure of thofe with whom we live, whereas that has a reference to truth in our words and adions. It is worth ^^hile to confider alfo this praifeworthy, though anonymous, habit; becaufe by thus ihewing that each particular virtue con- f,fts-in mediocrity, we ihall beft explain the nature oi virtue in general, and moft clearly eftabliai the truth of our moral theory. The charaderiftics of thofe who give pleafure or pain in the intercourfe of fociety, have already been defcribed ; we proceed to fpeak of thofe who are adorned by truth and frank- Lfs, or degraded by falfehood and diffimulation. There are men who arrogate to themfelves good qualities, of which they are entirely deftitute, and who amplify the good qualities of which they are poifeifed, far beyond their real meafure and natural worth. The ironical diifembler, on the other hand, cither conceals his advantages ; or if he cannot conceal, endea- vours to depreciate their value ; whereas the man 01 irantnefs and :4δ ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK and plain-dealing ihews his charadter in its natural fize : truth appears in all his words and adions ; which reprefent him ex- actly as he is, without addition and without diminution. Each of thefe three habits difplay themfelves either from the fponta- neous impulfe of our charader, or from motives of intereft ; and when men have not any reafon for ading otherwife, they indulge the bent of their charaiters, either to plain-dealing on the one hand, or to the oppoflte kinds of deceit above fpecified. There is a deformity in falfehood, which renders it odious in ilfelf ; whereas truth is beautiful and praife worthy : and plains dealing is the intermediate habit or virtue between the oppofite extremes or vices of him who would pafs himfelf for more than he is worth, and of him who conceals, or diflembles, his advantages. Of thofe two kinds of deceit the former is the mofi: blameable; λνε ihall treat of both, after having firft fpoken of plain-dealing. By this word we do not mean the faithful performance of contrads or engagements, nor any of thofe things which have a reference to juftiee or injuftice in our tranfadions ; for fuch matters as thefe belong to another branch of virtue : but we mean the undifguifed truth and downright honefty which are apparent in fome men's behaviour, when no intereft whatever is at ftake, merely becaufe fuch plain-dealing is moft agreeable to their character. Such men will naturally be juft in their tranfadions, fmce they who avoid deceit which i« harmlefs, will ftill more avoid fraud which is injurious to others and difgraceful to themfelves. This habit is praife- worthy, even when it inclines to the defedive extreme of difavowing or concealing advantages that really belong to us ; it derives a comelinefs from avoiding to make a parade ^f invidious diftindions, and of our own fuperiority, which ARISTOTLE^ ETHICS. ^^9 which is always mortifying to others. The vice of oftentatious Β O^O Κ vanity, and falfe arrogation of merit, when it proceeds not from ν any intereiled motive, ihews great weaknefs and levity ; but its folly is more confpicuous than its turpitude; when it fprings from a love of honour or psaife, which we muft be confcious that we do not deferve, it is indeed highly contemptible, but is in that cafe lefs odious than when it has its fource in the love of money, or of any thing by which money may be gained. The virtues and vices juft mentioned depend like all others not ©n our natural powers or propenfities, but on eledion and habit : it is from habit that fome delight in plain-dealing, others., in deceit ; and that fome take a pleafure in pradifing deceit for the purpofes of glory, and others for thofe of gain. The former affume the femblance of qualities, of which the reality would entitle them to congratulation and praife ; the latter ar- rogate to themfelves qualities, which, if they really poiTeffed them, might be fuccefsfuUy employed in promoting the plea- fure or alleviating the pain of others ; and to which qualities it is not eafy to prove that they are only vain pretenders : to this clafs of deceivers, belong phyficians, fophiils, and foothfayers. The ironical diffembler has more of the grace of propriety, be- caufe he conceals or depreciates his real advantages, in order to avoid the fweUing pomp of oftentatious arrogance. Such men cannot appear to be aduated by motives of intereft : they are fometimes- inclined to dillemble even the moft honourable advan- tages ; as happened in the cafe of Socrates. But there is a littlenefs and affedation in diflembling advantages iaconfiderable in them- felves, and too manifeft to be concealed ; fuch dlflemblers are contemptible, and that fometimes in point of vanity and often- tation ; witnefs the Lacedemonians with their ihort beggarly VOL.1. κ κ areis;. contraries. 250 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK, drefs ; for an aflumed poverty Is frequently as oftentatlous as ^• . the parade of riches. DiiTimulation, therefore, to be graceful, miift be ufed with refped to things not too open and vifible : but the arrogation of advantages which do not belong to us is the vice commonly oppofed to the virtue of plain-dealing ; be- caufe it is the worft of the two extremes. Chap. 8. As life requires repofe from ferious employment, and this — ; — repofe may be enlivened by amufement, there feems to be a nefs, and its virtue relative to the intercourfe of men in their hours of re- laxation and merriment, regulating both the matter and the manner of their converfation. The ftrain of this converfation jhay be more auftere or more ludicrous than it ought, or may flow in that happy medium which is alone confiftent with pro- priety. He who feeks to.raife laughter on all occafions indif- criminately, without regard to decency, or to the pain inflided on the obje£l of his ridicule, is a low and contemptible buffoon: he who is himfelf totally incapable of exciting mirth, and who is fo far from reliihing, that he is highly oifended with the in- nocent jefts of others, indicates a roughnefs and favagenefs of charader, unbending hardnefs, and unfocial aufterity ; whereas true facetioufnefs confifts in graceful flexibility of mind and manners, which can aiTume all ihapes, and which becomes all ; for as the habits of the body are known by its motions, fo are thofe of the mind. An immoderate propenfity to ridicule being a more prominent and more confpicuous quality than the con- trary extreme of fallen and ruftic gravity, and the greater part of mankind being inclined to delight in merriment, without anxioufly examining whether it originates in a pure and proper fource ; buffoonery often paffes for facetioufnefs, although there be thje^reateil difference between the coarfenefs of the one, and the ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 25Γ the elegance of the other ; for in facetioufnefs, which is the BOOK middle and proper habit, an eafy pliancy of humour is adorned with a graceful dexterity which ikilfully avoids whatever is indecent and illiberal ; never debafmg the delicate gaiety con- genial to the charader of well educated citizens, by the fmall- eft approximation to the vile raillery of profligates and flaves. The progrefs of letters and civility has a powerful influence on the refinement of wit and humour ; witnefs the difference be- tween the ancient and modern comedy. In the former, the moil ihameful reproaches, expreflTed in the coarfefl: language, formed a principal fource of the public entertainment ; in the latter, the audience are taught chiefly to reliih the faint infinua- tion, and the delicate hint : with refpeil to beauty and grace- fulnefs, the two ftyles of writing are marked by the ftrongefl; differences. But by what circumflance is true facetioufnefs eharaderifed ? Whether do:s it confiil in faying that only which becomes a well educated citizen ? or, may it be cha- ra£terized by the avoiding of offence ? or, thirdly, by the com- munication of pleafure ? Or rather is not fuch a habit in its nature indefinite, fince things pleafing to one audience, may be highly offenfive to another : for things which we are pleafed to do, we will not be much offended to hear ; and thcfe which we are pleafed to hear, we in fome meafure feem to do ; but perfons well educated prefcribe jufl limits both to their words and a£lions. The laws prohibit certain reproaches, when made ferioufly ; they ihould perhaps alfo prohibit malicious raillery, A man endowed with urbanity and facetioufnefs is a law unto himfelf. Such then is this intermediate habit ; whereas the extreme of buffoonery renders the mind in which it fubfifts a Have to low humour j for the buffoon neither fpares others nor Κ κ 2. himfelf;, ^^2 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK himfelf ; and provided he can excite laughter, condefcends to . ^ J^O fay what no man of an elegant turn of mind would venture to repeat, or even endure to hear. But the auilere and folemn charadter is, on the other hand, totally unfit for the intercourfe of fociety in hours of relaxation ; to the entertainment of which he not only does not contribute any thing himfelf, but glooms by his unfeafonable feverity the merriment of others. There are then three laudable habits which have a reference to our behaviour in fociety ; the firft confifts in a fair exhibition of our own charafters ; the other two relate to the pleafure of thofe with whom we live ; and of thefe two, the one confifts in heightening that pleafure in hours of relaxation ; the other, in promoting it amidft the ordinary employments of life ^ Chap. 9. Shame can fcarcely be numbered among the virtues ; for it feems to be rather a paifion than a habit. It is defined, the fear of difgrace ; and, like another kind of fear, it appears on the countenance ; for men, when aihamed, blulh, and when afraid of death, grow pale : both feem to be aifedlions of the body, and therefore more properly to be claffed with paifions than with habits. Shame is not graceful in every period of life ; it only becomes youth. Young perfons, we think, ought to be extremely fenfible to fhame ; becaufe, as they are chiefly ac- tuated by paflion, they would be thereby feduced into many difgraceful excefies, were they not reftrained by a fenfe of fliame. We praife the bluihing modefty of youth, but nobody would think fhamefacednefs in old age a fit fubjedl of com- mendation : for perfons of mature years ought to be incapable of any adion, on account of which ihame can be felt ; for as ihame ean * Ma^na Moral• I. i. c. xxviii. ; Eudem. 1. iii. c. vii. Ofihame« ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 253 can be felt only for things bafe or blameable, it cannot belong to BOOK men of confirmed virtue, who will aA'^oid all fuch actions, whe- _ _ ther they be really blameable in themfelves, or only of evil re- port. Bad men alone can be guilty of bad actions ; and it is the wildeil abfurdity to flatter ourfelves, that though we do what is wrongj yet wc may efcape the guilt thereof by being heartily aflhamed of our condudt. Shame is caufcd only by fuch adtions as are voluntary ; and bafe adioas a good man will never voluntarily commit. Shame then can at bell be con- fidered only as a conditional virtue ; that is, it may belong to a good man particularly circumftanced ; for on the fuppofition,, that he fliould have performed a bad adtlon, he certainly would be ailiamed of it. But the virtues, properly fo called, are things defirable and graceful on their own account, fimply and ab- folutely, independently of any fuppofitions or conditions what- ever. Impudence indeed is a vice ; but it does not therefore follow, that its contrary is a virtue ; for there is not any room for ihame, where nothing fhameful is either done or intended. For a fimilar reafon, felf-command, which is often fo highly commended, is only a conditional virtue, as ihall be proved hereafter. We now proceed to fpeak of juftice. i\ ( 255 ) ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, Β ο ο κ V. INTRODUCTION. 'TpHis Fifth Book is entirely dedicated to the important fub- je£l of juftice. Ariftotle explains the different acceptations of the word, anddiilinguiihes the different kinds of juflice flridly fo called. Political juftice, again, is either diftributive or com- mutative ; which laft our author, for a reafon given in the text, calls corredive. He ihews wherein thofe kinds of juftice differ ; the one being regulated by proportion, and the other by equality. The difference is pointed out between Λvhat our lawyers call the mala in fe, and the mala prohlb'ita ; and the diftinftion clearly explained between auing hai'm and committing injury, Ariftotle concludes v/ith examining the nature of equity in contradlftindtion to that of juftice ; and illuftrates his doilrine concerning the lattei", by confidering the queftion whether a man can be guilty of injury towards himfelf. As the author intro- duces not any thing fuperfluous, (for his account of the origin and ufe of money is eiTentially connedled with the fvibje£l,) he comprizes within a narrow compafs a folid and flitisfadtory ex- planation of thofe great commanding principles which uphold civil fociety ; an explanation exempt from thofe ambiguities -and contradidlions, which too often occur in the innumerable S volumes 256 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. Tolumes in which his opinions have been unfaithfully reported, or unikilfuUy commented. Yet had fucceeding writers improved• and enriched his obfervations, the prefent Book would have the faireft claim to attention, as containing the firft attempt to treat fully and fcientifically the moil important fubjeit on which the pen of any author can poflibly be employed. / ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 257 BOOK V. ARGUMENT. Difference between intelleBual and moral hahlts.— Different ac- ceptations of the -word injtifiice.-Jtifiice frialy β called.-^ Difrlbuftve jtifice.-CorreBlve jufilce.—Retaliation.^Natural jujice, independent of pofttivc infitution.—Misfortunes. —Er- rors. — Crimes, — Equity. JN examining juftlce and injuftice, we muft explain to what 1 kind of aaions they relate ; what kind of virtue juftice is, and what are the extremes or vices between which this virtue may be found. We ihall thus follow the fame method which has been purfued in the preceding parts of this difcourfe. All defcribe juftice as that habit which qualifies men to pradlife juft aaions with inclination and pleafure ; injuftice is the reverfe ; and this general defcription may fuffice for our prefent pur- pofe Juftice, we have faid, is the habit which qualifies men to pradife juft adions with pleafure ; becaufe the moral habits Differencc_ dlff"er efl"entially from the intelledual in this, that the latter, as well telleaual and as mere powers and capacities, may be fubfervient to quite con- trary purpofes ; and thofe endowed with the intelleatial habits, or fciences, may exercife them fpontaneouily and agreeably in producing diredly contrary eff-efts. But the moral virtues, like the different habits of the body, are determined by their nature VOL. I. ^ ^ 258 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK to one fpecific operation : thus a man in health ad:s and moves ■ - '- ,„ f ^'^ ^ manner conformable to his healthy ftate of body, and never otherwife, when his motions are natural and voluntary ; and in the fame manner the habits of juftice or temperance uni- formly determine thofe adorned by them, to a£t juftly and temperately. Yet habits of all kinds are often known by their contraries ; thus, if a good habit of body confifts in denfity and firmnefs of fleih, a bad habit muil confiil in its foftnefs and rarity. When the word denoting any habit is taken in diifer- ent fenfes, the word denoting its contrary is likewife, for the moil part, employed with equal' latitude : thus the different meanings of injuflice correfpond with thofe of juftice ; both thofe words having refpedlively various fignifications, which^ on account of their near affinity to each other, are feldom ac- curately diilinguiihed ; for when a word denotes two things totally unlike, its feparate meanings are manifefl ; as, for inftance, in the Greek word which is applied equally to denote In ho^ many the collar-bone, and the key of a door. Let us examine then the wotd in- '^^ how many acceptations the word injuflice is ufed. A man juftice IS vvho violates law is called unjuft, as well as he who afpires to any- undue advantage, and is not contented with equality ; fmce what is unlawful or unequal is unjufl, and juftice muft be con- formable to the principles of law and of equality. Injufttce confifts in defiring more than our fhare, not of all things in- difcriminately which fall under the denomination of good, but of thofe only which it is fuppofed to be good fortune to ob- tain ; and which, though univerfally deemed good in themr- feh^es, are often evils to thofe who obtain them. Such goods mankind in general wilh for and purfue ; though, in fad, they ought ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 259 ought rather to pray that thhigs abfokitely good, may be good in relation to themfelves ; and always to prefer and choofc thofe only which are likely to be fo. An unjuft man does not neceffarily choofe the greater fliarc ; fometimes he pre- fers the leffer; and that always, when the things in his option are evils. But as the leffer of two evils is in fome meafure a good, he feems always to defire the greater ihare, and is thence called in Greek an ufurper of more than his due; though, in reality, according to circumftances, he choofes fome- times the greater, and fometimes the leiTer iliare, but always an unequal one ; fo that his real turpitude confifts in ading con- trary to equality or to law ; an oppofition to both of which, is common to every fpecies of injuftice. Since, then, whatever is unlawful is unjuft, juftice may be faid to confift in ading agreeably to the laws of our country. But laws regulate the tranfadions of life, either with a view to the benefit of the public at large, or with a view to the benefit of that portion of the ftate which is invefted with fovereignty, whether that has been acquired by pre-eminence in virtue, or attained by any of thofe other means through which fovereign authority is eftabliihed. In one fenfe, therefore, juftice comprehends every thing that has a tendency either to produce or to maintain the happinefs of men in political fociety. The law preicribes ^o citizens who are foldiers, not to leave their ranks, not to fly, not to throw down their arms ; that is, it commands then) to behave themfelves with bravery. The law alfo prohibits all thofe fubjed to its authority from adultery, and every fpecies of debauchery which is injurious to others ; which is nothing elfe than to command its fubjeds to be temperate. It alfo pre- L L 2 icribes :βο . ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK icrlbes meeknefs, in the injunQions, " thou ihalt not ftrlke,** V. " thou ihalt not revile :" and in the fame manner, partly by- precepts, and partly by prohibitions, the law more or lefe accurately defines the rules and pradtice of the other virtues ; fo that juftice, taken in the fenfe of conformity to law, compre- hends the whole of virtue, not indeed fimply and abfolutely, but in reference to thofe with whom we are connected ; being another name for the ftridl performance of all thofe relative duties which are eifential to the happinefs of focial life. Viewed in this light, juftice is the firft and brighteft of all the virtues ; more worthy of admiration than either Hefperus or Lucifer j fince according to the proverb, " Juftice alone comprifes every virtue." It is indeed the perfeftion of virtue, fince it is not only the beft conftitution of our internal frame, but the external exercife of whatever is praifeworthy in behaviour towards others ; and even the whole community, however extenfive, of w^hich we are members'^. There are many capable of adling uprightly within a limited domeftic fphere, whofe imperfeilions become ■* manifeft '' This paflage is expanded and adorned by Cicero in language the moil glowing and impreflive, " Eft quidem vera lex, refta ratio, natur» congruens, difFufa in omnes, conftans, fempiterna quae vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat ; quae tamen neque probes fruftra jubct, neque improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nee abrogari fas eft, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari po- teft. Nee vero aut per Senatum, aut per poputum folvi hac lege pofTumus. Neque eft qusrendus explanator, aut interpres ejus alius : nee erit aliud lex Roma?, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia pofthac : fed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex et fempiterna et immortalis continebit ; unufque erit communis quafi magifter et impe- lator omnium Deus iUe, legis hujus inventor, difceptatoi , lator ; cui qui non parebit, ipfe fe fugiet, ac naturam hominis afpernabitur ; ac hoc ipfo luet maximas poenas, etiamfi cjetera fupplicia, quae putantur, effugerit." Fragment, de Republic. I. iii. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 261 manlfefl: on a wider and more exalted theatre. Wherefore Bias BOOK well obferved, " that government fliows the man ;" for he who ^' is entrufted with the exercife of power, is placed in multiplied relations with refpeft to others, and the whole commonwealth. Juftice, therefore, feems to contribute to the benefit rather of thofe towards whom it is exercifed, than of thofe who are en- dowed with this virtuous habit ; becaufe it is the nature of this habit always to bear a reference to our tranfadions with the world. The worft of men are thofe whofe vices injure them- felves and their friends ; the beft are thofe, Avhofe virtues benefit not only themfelves and their friends, but the commu- nity at large, and the whole fociety of mankind. This, indeed, is a noble, becaufe a difficult taflc. Juftice, then, confidered in this view, is not a part, but the whole of virtue ; and its contrary, injuftice, is not a part, but the whole of vice. Wherein virtue and juftice differ, is evident from the obferva- tions above made. They are precifely the fame thing viewed under two different afpedls; and denominated virtue when confidered in relation to the mind adorned by this praifeworthy habit ; but called juftice when confidered in relation to thofe towards whom it is exercifed. But our prefent inquiry is concerning juftice taken in a more Chap. 2. limited fenfe, and denoting one virtue in particular; and alfo ' • • n• r τ • • 1 • ι•η• Juilice i^ro- eoncernmg mjuiuce as iignifymg one particular vice, diftinft perly fo call- from every other. That fuch a fpecific injuftice, as well as juftice, exifts, appears from the following confideration ; that he who commits any other bafenefs, is indeed guilty of wrong, but does not thereby benefit his fortune ; which is plain, from the examples of him who throws away his iliicld through 7 cowardicCj ed. 262 ■ ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. comardice, who reviles his neighbour through ungovernable afperity of temper, or who refufes, through illiberality, any pecuniary aid to thofe who have claims on his bounty. But a man may benefit his fortune by ufurping more than his due fhare of worldly goods, without incurring the blame of all, or any, of thefe vices. His conduct, however, is culpable, and we arraign his injuftice. There is then a particular kind of injuftice differing from that above mentioned, and bearing the relation to it, of a part to the v/hole : in the firft fenfe, unjuft is fynonymous Λvith unlawful ; in the fecond, it implies the breach of a particular clafs of laws, namely, that which pro- hibits any man from benefiting himfelf at the expence of his neighbour. One man commits adultery for the fake of gain, another pays dearly for his criminal pleafure ; the vice of the former, is aggravated injuftice ; that of the latter, is profligate intemperance. All other wrongs may always be referred to fome particular fpecies of vice ; the commiiTion of adultery, to intemperance ; the defertion of our companions in war, to cowardice ; an aflault, to unbridled violence of anger : but that wrong which is committed for the fake merely of gain, is referred to no other vice than that of injuftice ; not that in- juftice above defcribed, which is fynonymous with wrong in general, but a fpecific vice, bearing the fame relation to the former, which the fpecies does to the clafs under which it is included; for injuftice, both in its large and in its limited fenfe, has always a reference to our tranfaftions with others ; its very eflTence confifts in our behaving amifs in thofe tranfaftions : but injuftice, ftridly fo called, implies that our mifcondudl reililts from the defire of promoting our own profit or honour, or ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 263 or whatever v/e think gainful to ourfelves^; whereas iryuftlce, BOOK largely taken, comprehends all thofe improprieties in our be- haviour towards others, which are inconfiftent with the cha- ra£ler of a virtuous man. We proceed then to explain the nature and properties of juftice and injuftice, ftridlly fo called. This fpecies of injuftice was faid to confift, not in what is un- lawful merely, but in what is alfo unequal ; for whatever is unequal is unlawful ; fince laws, properly made, aflure to each individual his equal ihare, that is his due, in his tranfaitions with his fellow-citizens ; but many things are unlawful which are not unequal, becaufe laws relate to many other objedls befides the diftribution and adjuftment of interefts and honours; enforcing, by authority, the practice of every virtue, and up- holding a fyftem of education by which this pradice may, through difcipline and cuftom, be rendered eafy and agreeable. Whether fuch an education properly falls under the fcience of poHtics, will afterwards be examined '^; for under all forms of government indifcriminately, perhaps the charadler of the good man will not be found compatible with that of a good citizen. The particular kind of juftice now under confideration, is employed either in diftributing to each citizen his due ihare of honour, wealth, and all other advantages, in the political partnerihlp, or commonwealth, of which he is a member ; or in regulating, by the rules of right, thofe tranfaflions, whether voluntary or involuntary, which happen between fellow-citizens ; and where wrong has on either fide been committed, in correiling this V. wrong. * Ariftotle fays, " for the fake of honour, money, fafety, or for that which would include all thefe in one word." ' Ariftotle examines this queftion in his Politics, which work is merely a continua- tion of his Ethics to Nicoraachiis. 264 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK wrong, by again fetting the parties, as far as may be, on a foot _ • _ . of equality Avith each other. Voluntary tranfadlions are thofe in which both parties voluntarily concur ; fuch as buying, felling, borrowing, lending, letting, hiring, pledging, depofit- ing. Involuntary tranfadlions are either fecret or open ; the fecret are, theft, adultery, poifoning, fedudion of other men's flave*, proftitution for hire of other men's wives, premedi- tated murder, and the bearing of falfe witnefs. The open but involuntary tranfadlions include all violent and manifeil aggreihons on the perfons, property, or reputation of others ; fuch as aflault, maiming, imprifonment, death, robbery, (lan- der, infult. Chap. i. Juftice implies equality ; and this equality lies in the middle between two extremes, the greater and the leiTer : for whatever juftice. admits of divifion into two unequal parts, may alfo be equally divided. ' But equality, being a relative term, always fuppofes the comparifon of two things at leaft. Diftributive juftice, therefore, always implies two things, and alfo two perfons be- tween whom thofe things are divided. If the perfons are ex- adlly equal, fo ought to be their ihares ; but if the perfons are unequal, the ihares ought alfo to be unequal in the fame pro- portion : for complaints and ftrife always will arife, when either perfons of unequal worth meet with precifely the fame treat- ment ; or when perfons of nearly equal worth are diftinguiihed from each other by too confiderable diiferences. This is uni- verfally acknowledged ; but men's notions of worth vary with their political principles. In democracies it is meafured by liberty ; in oligarchies, by wealth or birth ; in ariftocracies, by -virtue. Juftice, however, plainly confifts in proportion, which is the equality of ratios ; and proportion, whether difcrete or continuous. ARISTOTLFs ETHICS. 265 continuous, always implies four terms ; iince when continuous, BOOK one of the terms muft be taken twice. Diftributlve juiticc , _ 1_ . always requiring four terms at leaft, implies that the ihares bear the fame proportion to each other as do the perfons among whom thefe ihares are diftributed ; for proportion is applicable to all quantities, and not merely to numbers. If the firft fhare therefore be to the firft man, as the fecond ihare to the fecond ; then alternately, the firft ihare will be to the fecond ihare, as the firft man to the fecond man ; and as each of the antecedents is to its confequent, fo will both the antecedents be to both the coniequents. This is what is called by mathematicians geo- metrical proportion, confifting, as Λve have faid, in equality of ratios; which equality is in the middle between excefs and defed ; for if one of the ratios were greater or leiTer than the other, the proportion, or, in other words, the juftice of the diftribution, would be deftroyed. In diftributlve juftice, the four terms are all of them diftinil, the one from the other ; confifting of two perfons, and two ihares, at leaft; none of which can be taken twice in the feries. The proportion therefore is not continuous, but difcrete ; and when proportion is violated, injuftice immediately follows. This evidently appears in ac- tions: for the injurious perfon has more, the perfon injured has lefs, than their refpedive fhares of good ; of evil, the reverfe ; for the lefl*er evil is confidered as a good •=. The remaining fpecies of juftice is properly diftinguiihed by Chap. 4. the epithet of corredive : it applies to the mutual tranfadions between men, whether voluntary or involuntary. It differs tative and - coireQ'wz from juftioc. s I thought it unnecelTary to fubjoin with Ariftotle, that the leiTer evil is confidered as a good becaufe it is to be preferred to the greater ; that good is always dcfirablc., and, of two goods, the more defirable is the greater. VOL. I. MM. 2β6 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS^ from diilributive juftice In this, that the latter confifts in gecr metrical ^ roportion, and requires that the ihares ihould have the fame ratio to each other as the perfons among whom they are di"vided; fo that each citizen may find himfelf, treated ac- cording to, his deferts, and thofe who contribute moil to the public benefit may meet with proportionally higher remunera- tions. Corre£live juftice alfo implies equality, but an equality of a different kind, founded not on geometrical, but on arith- metical, proportion ; for the law does not make any difference in its correftion or puniiliment, whether a good man has in- jured a bad one, or a bad man a good. It contemplates merely the hurt done or the injury fuftained ; and endeavours to fet the two parties, the one of whom is wronged by the other, oa the fame foot of eqiiality on which they formerly ftood. The words gain and. lofs are not indeed applicable in all cafes where, one man is injured by another ; they can be properly ufed only when the injuries done may be eftimated in money; but in all cafes whatever, he who has committed an injury ihould be compelled, as far as may be, to make reparation, \vhich, when, complete, reduces the parties to that condition of equality from, which they fet out, by giving back to the lofer what had been^ taken from, him by the gainer. Corredlive juftice, then, holds, the middle place between gain and lofs. In their difputes with each other, men have recourfe to a judge, as to a living foun- tain of juftice; who, as it is his bufinefs to adjuft differences, and mediate between contending parties, is often ftyled a me- diator. This office he performs by finding the middle term between the unequal extremes of gain and lofs ; in the fame manner as if, a line being divided Into two unequal parts, he cut from the greater part its excefs above half the line, and, added; ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 267 added It to the lefler. When the whole is divided equally,' Β Ο Ο Κ each party has his due, becaufe the fliares are alike ; and this equality is the middle arithmetical term between the greater and the lefler extreme. It is the duty of a judge to hnd this middle term ; from which funftion, he appears in Greek to have derived his appellation ; for juftice in this language means an equal divifion ; and a judge, an equal divider. When, from two equal quantities, a part is taken from the one and added to the other, the latter will exceed by two parts : for were the part taken away deilroycd, it would exceed by one ; it ex- ceeds the middle term therefore by one ; and this term ex- ceeds the quantity from which the part was taken away by one. By this means we may learn, that in order to correft inequality, and thereby to do juftice, we muft take from the greater ex- treme that by which it exceeds the middle, and add this excefs to the lefler. This plainly appears in geometry by means of a diagram ; but the fame thing holds in all other arts, which would fpeedily be fubverted, and all human fociety overturned, imlefs equality and juftice were tolerably well maintained in the adions and intercourfe of life ; and proper corredives ap- plied where thefe bonds of fociety are materially violated. The words gain and lofs are introduced by the voluntary tranfadions of men ; in which, he who got more than he gave in exchange, was faid to gain by the bargain ; and he who got lefs, to lofc ; as in buying and felling, and all other legal contrads. But when the bargain was equal, each party was iliid to have his due. Juftice, then, even in fuch tranfadions as are involun- tary, confifts in a middle term betAveen a certain kind of gain and lofs, and requires that the parties fhould be reduced, as nearly as may be,• to that condition of equality in which they Μ Μ 2 ftood 268 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK V. Chap. 5. corredive. ilood with regard to each other, before any fuch tranfadllon took place. Retaliation feems to foine to be the whole of juftice. This opinion was held by the Pythagoreans ; who defined juftice to ?oe's'not ap- t>e " reciprocity of doing and fufiering." But retaliation will ply tojiiftice, j^qj- apply either to diftributive or to corredive juftice; although butiveor the law of Rhadamanthus fays, " The completeft juftice con- fifts in milking a man fuifer the fame ills that he has com- mitted." This rule, however^ is liable to innumerable excep- tions. Thus, if a general Ihould ftrike a foldier, the blow mufl: not be retorted ; but to ftrike a general, or any other perfoii invefted with authority, requires that the offender ihould be puniihed more feverely than by mere retaliation. The differ- ence alio is very great between voluntary and involuntary in- juries ; to the latter of which Rhadamanthus' rule is totally inapplicable. Yet the commercial intercourfe of nations, and of individuals in the fame nation, is maintained by a recipro- cation, not indeed of the fame, or fimilar, but of proportional benefits and injuries. When injuries are offered by one fet of perfons, and cannot be retorted by another, the latter clafs look on themfelves as nothing better than flaves : when benefits, on the other hand, are conferred, but without any profpedt of being returned, there is an end to that interchange of good offices, whicb is the main pillar of civil fociety ; a truth acknowledged by thofe commonwealths who have eredted temples to the Graces on the moft confpicuous fituations ; that man might continually be re- minded of the duty of gratitude, the favourite virtue of thofe di- vinities ; and that thofe who had received and returned favours,, might always be ready to renew the laudable contention among themfelves, by mutually provoking each othertoworksof kindnefs. 15 The ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 269 The comfort 01^ life requires an interchange of different works BOOK and exertioiis. The bricklayer, for example, muff: exchange the , ,: — , produdlon of his labour with the ihoemaker ; and the bar- H^^'^^'^^" gain will be juft, when the works exchanged bear the fame money, proportion to each other, as do the exertions - of the artiians by whom they were produced. If the exertions of the bricklayer be more valuable for their duration, or their difficulty, than thofe of the ilioemaker, the works pro- duced by the latter muft, to render the bargain equal, bear the fame proportion numerically to thofe produced by the former •. thus, if the bricklayer has confumed a thoufand times as much labour in making a houfe, as the ihoemaker has done in making a pair of ihoes, a thoufand pair of ihoes muft be given for one houfe. The fame thing happens with refped to all other arts, which derive their whole utility from the mutual exchange of different forts of labour, and which could not long be main- tained unlefs the exertions of one artifan in one way were nearly balanced and compenfated by thofe of another artifan in another. A community could not fubfift, compofed wholly of phyficians, or wholly of hufbandmen ; it muft confift of phyficians and huibandmen, and other claffes of individuals, employed in different trades and different profefllons. But that operations and works of fuch different kinds ihould be fairly- exchanged for each other, it is neceflary that they ihould be nearly commenfurate ; tliat is, that all of them ihould be ca- pable of being eftimated with tolerable accuracy by comparifoii with one common meafure. Hence the introdudion of mo- ney ; by means of which all thofe operations and works are compared in value with each other, and their reladve excefles or deficiencies afcertained with fufficient corrednefs for all prac- tical 270 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK tical purpofes. In reality, value depends on the mutual wants ^" of men, which form the great bond of fociety ; for unlefs their ivants were mutual, exchange could not be eiTefted : but mo- ney is ufed by convention as the reprefentative of all things wanted ; iince it ferves as a pledge and furety, that whenever thofe wants occur, they will be fpeedily gratified ; and its name is derived fi'om the word fignifying law, which indicates that it is founded, not on nature, but on convention ; and that hu- man laws, which have thought fit to employ it as a meafure of value, may, at pleafure, fet this ufe of it afide, and employ fome other meafure in its ftead. Money, which repi-efents the value of all other things, varies in its own ; but its variations are lefs confiderable than thofe of moft other fubftances. It ferves therefore to fix their price, and to render them commen- furate with each other, thus performing a fundion effential to the exiftence of civil fociety ; for communities could not fub- fift without exchange ; nor exchange, without equality ; nor equality, without a common meafure. The various kinds of labour, and the works thereby effeited, cannot indeed be ac- curately compared, 'and exadly meafured, either by each other or even by money ; but they may, by means of the latter, be eftimated with fufficient corredlnefs for maintaining that com- mercial intercourfe which is efl'ential to the fupply of our nu- merous exigencies "", From ** Ariftotle illuftrates this fubject by fliewing how the exchangeable value of a houfe and a bed are compared v^th each other, by reducing both to the common meafure of a certain number of minas. The text is corrupt, and the example fuperfluous ; but it is of importance to obferve how well our author explains the nature of traffic, money, labour, exchangeable value or price, on jufl: notions of which all theories of political «economy ought to be founded. In various parts of his works he makes the important diftindlion between labour confumed in ufe, and labour employed in produilion. That ARISTOTLE'^s ETHICS. 2?^ From the explanation given of juilice and injuillce, it Is BOOK manifeil that a juil adion holds the intermediate place between ,_, — j-.»j• doing and fuiFering an injury. The doer has more, the fuf- Chap. 6. ferer lefs, than he ought; and juftice is mediocrity, not indeed j_^ ^^-^^.(i, in the fame fenfe Λvith the other virtues, which He between two J.;;f^';^^ ^;^^'; contrary and vicious extremes, but becaufe it is produdive ot diocrity. equality in our dealings, and gives to each individual that ihare which trulv belongs to him ; whereas injuilice contains in it two oppofite faults, giving to the one party more than his due, and. robbing• ofa fervant or Jomeftic flavc is of the firft kind ; that of a manufaaurer or artiC.n, of the fecoiiJ. The labour of the artifan or manufaaurer is concentrateJ and fixed in his viork ; the labour of a builder in a houfe built, of a weaver in the web. (i ivisyztcc u τω ,το-.',μαω S,o, >; ouoSoy.^jr.i v, ™ o.-YoJ'.f^B/x.i.'i', ^«> ^ if^^^H " ™ ii'«"«;*£'i'.&C. Mctaph. 1. ix. c. viii. p. 930.) Having diftinguiihed between produdive and unproduflive labour, he obfervesOiaC every work or produdion may be employed in two different ways, either in the way of ufe or that of exchange. Thiis a pair of (hoes may either bo worn or they may be fold {Uov i^oSnyMTc;, ti'te t/VJ£cri.;,ca -i ΐΑ,ίταξλγ.τ^κγ., Politic. 1. i- c ix. p. 305.). Every produaion or commodity has, therefore, in reference to the wants of human life, two different values, a value in ufe and a value in exchange. Thefc dif- ferent values ought to be diftinguiihed, becaufe things that have the greateft value in- ufe, have often very little value in exchange^ and things that have a great value in ex- change have often very little value in ufe. The exchangeable value ot commodities, according to A riff otle, is always relative to th? labour requifite for procuring them; and the q^uantity of produaive labour is exaaiy meafured by the work or produaion i'l which this labour is fixed and embodied (Metaph. 1. ix. c. viii. p. 939•)• But commodities or oroduaions are fo complex in their nature, that they cannot be com- pared with each other without fome common meafure. The metals, m confequence of their ufefulnefs and beauty, their facility of divifion without injury, and of tranfporta- tion without much labour, above all, their extreme durability, have been adopted by very general confent as the fitteft meafures of the exchangeable value of all other com- modities. But neither the metals in general, nor any one metal in particular, is an exaa meafure. At different times and places, their own values are found to vary; and therefore they cannot be an exaa, that is, an invariable meafure of the value of other things. But though the exchangeable value of the metals vanes, Arilbtle mam- tains that it is lefs variable than that of any other commodity (^«^%-" f*^» «« «=«' τ«τ<. το »uTo^i Β 7«ί «>" .^ov 5.»τ*.• 5;/..•? h β.?.τ». pi...vf*»M«. Dc Moribus,!. v. c. vi.:. p. 6ς.)- ιηι ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK Chap. 7. Juftice ap- plied to ac- tions in a fenfe diftcr- ent from that in which it is applicable- to perfons. robbing the other of his right. The virtue of juftlce, tlien, is that by which a man pradlifes by preference and with pleafurc fairnefs in his dealings, not arrogating to himfelf more than his due proportion of good, nor declining to bear his equal fhare of evil. He treats other men as he would v/iih to be treated by them, affigning to each his fair proportion, and following the fame invariable rule, when his own intereft is at ilake, and when he is only adjuiling the difierences of others. Injuftice is diredtly the reverfe ; it leads men in all their tranfailions to give an undue preference to themfelves ; and when they are entruiled with fettling the concerns of others, always to do this unequally, by giving an undue advantage to one of the parties. This much may fuffice concerning the nature of juilice and injuftice. Since the commlfnon of ^very unjuft a£tion does not necef. farily make an unjuft man, it may be inquired whether, in this refpe£t, there be any diftindion between particular ads of injuftice, bearing the fame name, fuch as• theft, adul- tery, and robbery j or whether the difference of the ex- ternal adls is altogether immaterial as to conftituting the vice of injuftice, even when thofe ads are performed knowingly; for a man may know that the objedt of his paftion is his neighbour's wife ; and yet, if he a£ts merely from the blind impetuofity of appetite or defire, without deli- berate intention, he is not an adulterer. The fame holds in all other cafes in which wrong is done ; the mere perpetration of the adl does not infer the vicious ftate of mind from which fuch ads naturally flow. The difference between retaliation and juftice was formerly mentioned ; but, in our inquiries refped- ing the latter, it muft be remembered, that we have in view chiefly ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 27.5 -chiefly that kind of juftice which may be called political, fincc BOOK it is eftabliihed for the comfort and all-fufficiency of fociety among freemen and equals ; whether the government, being democratical, require that each citizen ihould be dealt by alike ; or whether it admit of thofe diilindlions of birth, wealth, and abilities, which are allowed their due weight under other forms of government. Where fuch equality does not prevail, there is not any room for what is ftridlly called juflice, but only for that virtue which, on account of its refemblance, receives the fame name. Juftice takes place among thofe who being capable of injuring each other, are reftrained by law from mutual en- croachments ; and thofe encroachments muft be made, before injuftice can be committed ; though, as we formerly obferved, the converfe of the proportion does not hold, that injuftice always is committed, when fuch encroachments are made, becaufe injuftice implies the deliberate purpofe of wrong- ing others for the fake of benefit to ourfelves j a propen- fity fo ftrong in human nature, that few men are capable of being entrufted with power, without ufing it tyrannically: wherefore law and reafon ought to bear fway, and rulers to be the guardians of equal juftice ;' contented with thofe rewards and honours which have been aifigned to them for upholding the pubUc good by their impartial adminiftration. Their power is of a different kind from that of fathers and defpots, in the exercife of which there is not any room for the virtue of juftice ftridtly fo called, fmce no one can, in propriety of language, be faid to commit injuftice againft himfelf, or what entirely belongs to himfelf; becaufe no one ever deliberately propofed to do real harm to either, and could not poifibly do VOL. !. Ν Ν fucU 274 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. fuch harm for the fake of benefiting h'lmfelf : but flaves, who are a kind of property, and alfo children, until they have at- tained a certain age, are fo intimately connedled with their mailers and parents, that no fuch relations as thofe of political juftice can fubfift between them ; for political juftice implies laws ; and laws fuppofe an equality, not indeed of ranks and perfons, but of rights and obligations. Wherefore fomething more nearly refembling political juftice takes place between huibands and wάΛ^es ; but this, which is called oeconomical juftice, is alfo different from the former. Natural Political juftice is founded either on nature or on law. The pendemV" natural, is that which has every where the fame force and pofitive in- authority ; the legal, is that which depends on human infti- tution, rendering adlions juft or unjuft, which are in themfelves indifferent ; as that no more than one mina iliould be required for the ranfom of a prifoner ; that a goat ihould be facrificed rather than two iheep ; regulations refpefting individuals, as that Brafidas ihould be honoured with heroic worihip ; and thofe that come in the ihape of decrees or refolutions. Some are of opinion that all juftice whatever depends on pofitive in- ftitution ; which they endeavour to prove by obferving that the laws of nature remain every where unalterably the fame : fire, for example, which burns and warms in Greece, has precifely the fame powers in Perfia ; whereas the rules of juftice are liable to perpetual variations. This, however, is true only in a certain fenfe ; for though among the gods in heaven, what is natural is, perhaps, unalterable, yet, in this lower world, many inftitutions of nature are capable of being changed and modified by circumftances. Yet the diftindtion between what is natural and ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 275 and conventional, is not thereby deftroyed ; unlefs we ihould BOOK infer that, becaufe fome men are capable of ufing both hands ■_ - '- _ji with equal dexterity, it is not natural for mankind in general to ufe one hand more dexteroufly than the other". Men's notions of juilice are often warped by their interefts ; and this great meafure of human ailions varies like the meafures of wine and corn, which the dealers in thofe articles have of dif- ferent fizes ; ufing the larger when they buy, and the fmaller •when they fell. Great variations refult alfo from the different forms of government ; although, as we fliall ihew hereafter, there is one form of government naturally the beft. Juilice is a general term ; and differs from an ad of injuilice, as an uni- verfal does from a particular. That is unjufl which is contrary to nature or to law ; and the fame thing, when done, is an unjufl aQion. An unjufl a£lion is a wrong; and when we redify a wrong, we are faid to do juflice. But the force of thofe terms will be afterwards more fully explained. Injuilice, as applicable to a£lions, confiils in what we have Chap. 8. now faid ; but it does not belong to perfons, unlefs it be com- j3i(^~^„ mitted voluntarily ; for when a man adls without intention, of misfor- ■' ' _ ... tunes, errors, the quality of his adion, as good or bad, jufl or unjufl, is, in and crimes, reference to the agent, merely an accefTory, not fpringing effentially from himfelf, and neither entitling him to praife, nor fubjecling him to blame. That, therefore, which is unjufl, is ' He gives the reafon more generally in Magna Moral. 1. i. c. xxxiv. p. 167. το yue ως £iri το wcXk ίίχμααν, tsto ψν^τα JixaioK -πξοφαηξ. ' That which IS mvariable and conftant is manifeftly natural juftice." Political juftice, on the other hand, varies with the arrangements and exigencies of men in fociety. He therefore concludes ζιΆτίο, a» hxamro χατχ ipujii', " That natural injuflice is the better of the tviO ;" a conclufion agreeable to his obfervations in the firft Philofophy. See Analyfis, p. 92, & paiEm. Ν Ν 2 276 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK is not injuftice in the agent, unlefs it be committed voluntarily; that is, as formerly explained, unlefs the aftion, with all its circumllances, depend entirely on our own power, and be performed kno\vingly, with intention, and without conftraint. Thus, to make the a£t of ftriking parricide, we muil know the perfon whom we ftrike, the nature of the inftrument with which the ftroke is inflidled, and the motive through w^hich we are impelled to fuch a horrid crime. The adlion muft alfo depend entirely on our own power; for in many na* tural events, we are both agents and patients knowingly, though not voluntarily ; wilnefs old age and death \ The fame happens as to juftice and injuftice. AVhen a man reftores a depofit involuntarily through fear, he cannot be faid to ad juftly, fmce the juftice of the adion is not caufed by himfelf: it is a mere acceflary or appendage, quite fo- reign to his defign or purpofe. In the fame manner, he can- not be accufed of injuftice, who is conftrained involuntarily not to reftore a depofit. Voluntary adions are performed with, or without eledlion ; deliberate adions are performed with election ; and thofe that are without deliberation are without eleftion. In the intercourfe of life, one perfon may hurt another in three ways ; either ignorantly, in which cafe the hurt done is called an error ; as when we are miftaken either in the perfon or the inftrument ; or when the adion turns out to be of quite a different nature from that which we intended : a man may be hurt by a blow meant merely for roufmg him ; a wound may be given cafually ; and one perfon rnay receive a blow w^hich was intended for another. When the harm is not only done unintentionally, but happens altoge- ther unexpectedly, it is called a misfortune ; when the confe- quences '' See Analyfis, p. log. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 277 quences of the aaion might have been forefeen and expe£tccl, the harm done, without any mifchievous purpofe, is properly termed a fault; for a fault is that evil which originates in ourfclves ; and a misfortune, that of which the caufe is exter- nal. Harm done knowingly, but not deliberately, is an injuf- tice ; as thofe injuries which proceed from anger and other paflions, that are either necelTary, or at leaft natural. Yet the perfons who have committed fuch injuries, are not branded with the reproach of injuiliee or wickednefs ; which falls only on wrong proceeding from wilful pravity. The law, therefore, well diftinguiihes between premeditated crimes, and thofe com- mitted through paffion; for the fource of the latter maybe traced up rather to him who provoked the paffion, than to him who yielded to its violence. In all fuch cafes, the queftion is, not whether the deed was done, but whether it was done juftly j for anger always proceeds from fome real or fuppofed injury. But in\ll other difputes, the queftion turns on fome fad, which one party affirms, and the other denies ; and as to which, either the one or the other, unlefs his memory deceives him, muft plainly be guilty; for every deliberate wrong is manifeft in- juftice whether it confift, as above explained, in violating the law of equality, or in violating that of proportion. The virtue of juftice, on the other hand, is exercifed only in fuch ads as are done voluntarily and deliberately. Involuntary ads are, or are not, entitled to pardon, according to circumftances. Thoi^ are pardonable, which proceed from complete and habitual igno- rance ; thofe are not, which proceed from a temporary igno- rance,' occafioned by the blind impetuofity of paffion, cither extravagantly exceffive in its degree, or highly improper in its objeot. Doubts BOOK V. 278 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK Doubts may arife, whether the doing and the fuiTcrlng of ^•_ injuftice, have been defined with fufficient precifion. Firft, Chap. 9. ihall we hearken to Euripides ? One of his charaders reafons e ,~ r thus : Solution or fp°eaing^" I flew my mother ; the defence is plain, juftice. She with her will, or 'gniii/i my will, was flain. Can any perfon be injured willingly ? or muft every injury be unwillingly fufFered as it is willingly infliited ? A man, it is faid, may be injured willingly; fmce an intemperate man will- ingly hurts himielf. But this argument is not conclufive, for the intemperate man does, what he thinks he ought not to do ; his paflion makes him adl againft his deliberate will ; for no one can deliberately will what he thinks mifchievous to himfelf. To in- jure then, is not only to hurt knowingly, but to hurt againft the will of the fuiferer ; for when his will confents, he may indeed be hurt, but is not injured. Glaucus was not injured by his difadvantageous exchange of armour with Diomed, be- caufe it was voluntary. " Brave Glaucus then, each narrow thought refign'd (Jove warm'd his bofom, and enlarg'd his mind), For Diomed's brafs arms of mean device. For which nine oxen paid (a vulgar price) He gave his own of gold divinely wrought, A hundred beeves the ihining purchafe tKJUght." Iliad VI. v. 250. et feq. Secondly, Whether is the injuftice In him who makes an unfair diftribution, or in him who receives more than his due ? If the former is afl'erted, thofe perfons diftinguiftied by liberality And equity, who are inclined rather to refufe their full propor- 5 tion, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 279 tlon, than to arrogate more than their juft iliare, will fometimes BOOK injure themfelves. It may be anfwered, that thefe perfons, liberal and equitable as they are as to things of a particular nature, will not decline their full iharc of goods in general ; and of fome kinds, fuch as praife, glory, and whatever is ho- nourable and laudable, will be inclined to arrogate more than fairly belongs to them. But the difficulty is folved by the obfervation above made, that no one can be the willing vi£lim ofinjuilice; fo that men cannot injure, although they may hurt, themfelves. Befides, the injuftice is plainly in him who makes the unfair diilribution ; for by him the unjufi: action is begun and completed ; whereas he who holds more than his due ihare, may often do it ignorantly and innocently. The word a£tion is taken in different fenfes. It is applied to inanimate things. The fword, or any other warlike inftrument, is faid to ftrike or kill, as well as the hand of one man moved by that of another ; or a ilave, by the command of his mailer. None of thofe injure, although they are the inftruments of injuftice. Unjuil judgments may proceed merely from ignorance; but that judge only is unjuft, who paffes unjuft decrees, knowingly, from par- tiality to one party, or ill-will to the other. Between fuch a judge and one of the parties, the iniquity, as well as its fruits, are fometimes divided ; the latter gets more land than he ought, and the other gets money to which he is not entitled. Injuftice, however, in judgment, as well as every other fpecies of injuftice, always confifts in arrogating to ourfelves more than our due proportion of advantage, whether this confifts in benefiting our fortune, indulging our partiality, or gratifying our refentment. Men think, becaufe injuftice feems to be always 28ο ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK ahvays in their power, that therefore juftice is eafy. The thin^, ,_ _^•_ , however, is far otherwife. To commit vicious anions is indeed Juftice, a alwavs in our power, but to acquire either virtuous or vicious ha- matter of ^ ~ . in ii•• •ι. more diffi- bits is the work of time and cuitom ; and the vice is not in the comminlV aft, but in the frame of mind and habit of the ador. They think imagined. ^j^^^ ^^^ ^q diilinguiih between juft and unjuft tianfaftions requires but fmall difcernment ; becaufe it is eafy to underftand the laws promulgated on this fubjed. But the jullice or in- juftice is not in thofe tranilidions themfelves, except by way . of appendage or acceffion, when, together with the fimple per- formance of the ad, certain difpofitions and afiedtions, and thofe uniform and habitual, concur in the agent. To know, therefore, what conftitutes or contributes to juftice, is ftill more difficult than to know what conftitutes and contributes to health. The medicines of hellebore, honey, and wine, as well as the operations of cutting and burning, are indeed eafily known ; but to underftand when, how, and to whom, wx ought to ad- minifter the one and to apply the other, is a thing of no lefs dif- ficulty than to be a fkilful phyfician. It is alfo a falfe opinion, that a good man is capable of ads of wickednefs ; becaufe, were he inclined to indulge guilty paffions, he is more likely to do it with impunity than any other. But, as we above obferved, the vice or wickednefs is not in the ad itfelf, but in the frame or habit of mind of him by whom that ad is performed. The art -of healing does not confift in performing operations and in adminiftering medicines ; it confifts in doing thefe things pro- perly, that is, in the intelledual habit or ikill of the phyfician. Juftice takes place only among thofe who are fliarers in that kind of goods, of which a certain proportion contributes to their ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. c8i their happlnels ; but of which cither the cxccfs or the dcfeil has a tendency to deftroy it. The Gods, perhaps, cannot have too much power and profperity ; and beings incurably wicked, cannot have too little of either ; fmce, by them, the means of good will always be converted into fources of evil. But men are benefited by a due proportion, and by that only. We proceed to fpeak of equity, and to confider what relation Chap, i o. it bears to juftice. It is not the fame thinfr, nor vet is it dif- ^. • 1 • 1 r • • •/- Of tne na- lerent in kmd ; tor it is a praifeworthy quality as well as juftice, ΐυ« of but is fpoken of as fomething better than mere juftice, and contiadif- really is fo, for it is the corrcdion of ftridl, that is, of legal -jjl^^^e" '* juftice ; which often needs to be modified by equity, becaufe laws being in their nature general, cannot decide rightly in the indefinite variety of particular cafes. The lawgiver is contented with making a rule, which fairly applies to the greater part of cafes ; well knowing that it will not include the whole, and the fault is neither in the law nor the lawgiver, but in the nature of things. When an exception to the rule occurs, which the lawgiver did not forefee, this exception is admitted in equity, which thus fupplies the defed of law, as the lawgiver himfelf would do, were he prefent in court, and as he would have done by amending his law, had he been aware of the exception. Equity, then, is better than legal juftice, being its amendment ; and fupplying that defed of laws, which arifes from their uni- verfility. The variety of human tranfadlions cannot be com- prifed within general rules. Occafional decrees therefore be- come requifite ; which vary with each variation of circum- ftances, for the meafure of what is indefinite muft be indefinite itfelf, like the leaden ruler in the Lefbian architecture, which changes its own fliape according to that of the ftones to Λνΐΰοΐι VOL. I. ο ο , tt 282 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK it is applied. It is manifeft, therefore, that equity is a fpecles t _ ' . of juftice, and contrailed with another fpecies to which it is pre- ferable. A man of equity is he who deliberately and habitually exercifes this virtue ; who prefers it in all his dealings to tbje rigour of juftice ; and who, even when the law is on his fids, will not avail himfelf of this advantage to treat others inju- rioufly or unhandfomely. Chap. II. Whether juftice be taken in its larger fenfe, of difobeying the laws ; or in its ftrider acceptation, of depriving others of their may hurt, property, it is plain, from the obfervations already made, that be guHty^of ^° ^^^ ^^^ ^^ g^u^y of injuftice towards himfelf A man may "y"7h°' fpontaneouily and knowingly commit an unprovoked injury ; felf. he may even deftroy his own life, in diredl oppofition both to the laws and to right reafon ". He thereby certainly does an injury ; but to whom ? Not to himfelf, becaufe he fuiFers volun- tarily. The injury is therefore done to the ftate ; which, on this accoimt,. puniflies felf-murder with infamy. As to the other kind of injuftice, which does, not comprehend wickednefs in general, but which confifts, like cowardice,, in one fpecific vice, we cannot, without a total confufion of thought, fuppofe that a man is guilty of it towards himfelf; for.inthat cafe, the fame thing * The Oxford edition very properly fupplies the word λονο» of which o^So» is the or- dinary epithet,, and of which it muft here be the adjunift, to render the paiTage intelli- gible. Suicide is always fpoken of by Ariftotle as a bafe and cowardly crime, as a mean dereliflion of all perfonal dignity, and a grofs violation of all focial duty. Cicero fometimcs (for on this fubje£l he is not confiftent) fpeaks othervvife. '' Atque hsc differentia naturarum tant-um habet vim, uti nonnumquam mortem fibi ipfeconfcifcere alius debeat, alius in eadem cauiTa non debeat." De Officiis, 1. i. c. xxxi. Here he fpeaks of fuicide as a duty ; probably out of deference for his admired Cato. But his language is very different elfewhere. Confer. Tufc. Difp. 1. i• e. xxx. Somn. Scip. c. iii. Had Ariftotle's Ethics been equally well known, Cicero's Offices would not have been fo long regarded as the purcft and moft folid predudlion of heathen tnorality. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 2B3 tiling would be both added to and taken from the fame perfon, BOOK at the fame tune. Injuftice, therefore, always implies two perfous r^ _ - j at leaft ; and if it did not, the diftindions formerly made concern- ing fpontaneity, deliberation, retaliation, andaggreiTion, would be totally deftroyed. Retaliation cannot deferve the epithet of in- jurious ; but could a man injure himfelf, injury would be cou- fiftent with the moil complete retaliation, namely, the doing and fuffering precifely the fame thing, under precifely the fame circumftances ; befides a man might fuffer injury vo- luntarily, which was formerly proved to be impoihble. Still further, the commiifion of wrong always implies fome fpecific ail ; but by no fuch aft can a man do wrong to himfelf. He cannot commit adultery with his own wife, he cannot be guilty of houfebreaking with regard to his own houfe, he cannot ileal his own property : univerfally, therefore, he cannot do an in- jury to himfelf. It is an evil to fuifer, as well as to do, wrong, but the latter is by far the woril evil of the two, becaufe it is blameable and bafe. The former, however, may fometimes, by concurring with other circumftances not eifentially connefted with it, be attended with far more deplorable confequences ; in the fame manner as a fall, by ftumbling, may fometimes have worfe effeds than a pleurify, becaufe it may occafion a man's capture by the enemy, and, in confequence thereof, his ignomi- nious death. But the fcience of Ethics, no more than that of Phy- fics, pays attention to confequences not eifentially inherent in the fubjed, and conneded with it merely by way of appendage or acceifion. It is faid metaphorically, not indeed that a man can exercife juftice tow^ards himfelf, but that one part of him may exercife juftice towards another. This juftice, however, refembles, not the political juftice above examined, but the juf- 002 tice 2&4 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, BOOK tice of fathers and mailers towards children and flaves ; whofe relation to each other bears a near fimilitude to that of the ra- tional and irrational parts in the human conftitution. The pailions often rebel againft reafon, as flaves do againft their mailers; and as the latter feem guilty of Injuftice, fo do the former. Let thus much fuffice concerning juftice, and the other moral virtues '. ' The do£lrine of juftice is explained on the fame principles delivered in this Book, Magna Moral, 1. i• c. xxxiv. ; & Eudem. 1. iv. ( 285 ) ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK VI. INTRODUCTION. 'F philofophy confift in explaining phsenomena, feemingly in- BOOK definite in number, by a few diftinit principles of adlion, this Sixth Book aiFords one of the finefl fpecimens of it ever exhibited. According to Ariftotle, moral virtue is appetite or affedion difciplined by reafon and cuftom ; which, enabUng us to make a fair eftimate of excellence, teaches us to prefer and purfue it \ To explain, therefore, the different acceptations of the word reafon ; or, in Ariftotle's language, to defcribe the different powers of the underftanding, muft form an effential part of every complete treatife of Ethics. By modern philo- fophers thofe powers are not accurately diftinguiflied; although, according to our author, the powers of intelleftion differ as widely from each other as thofe of fenfation. Colours, fla- vours, founds, and odours, and other objefts about which the fenfes are converfant, are not more diftinguiihable from each other, than the different claffes of fpeculative and pradtical truths, which are perceptible by what our author calls the de- monftrative and deliberative faculties of the underftanding ". Reafoning * Magna Moral. I. i. c. xxii, p. i6i. '' Magna Moral. 1. i. c, xxxv. p. 169. VI. 286 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK Reafoning on this principle, that powers muft differ from each _ , other, which exert themfelves in different adions and effedtuate different ends, he treats feparately of art, fcience, prudence, in- telle£t, and wifdom ; he explains the nature and fundtions of each of thofe habits ; examines the difference between what are called natural virtues, and thofe which are acquired by exercife and cuftom ; and proves that none of the acquired virtues can fubfift without that intelledtual habit which he calls prudence. ARISTOTLE'S ETHIC5. Φ BOOK VI. ARQUMENT. I. iition Si^tiofiy intelka, and appetite.— Their d'lfferent offices.— -The fve ititelkaual habits— Science— ^rt— -Prudence— Common Jenfc—Wifdom.-^icknefs of apprehenfion.—Jufnefs offenti- faent. Importance of the intcUeSlual habits. — Virtue, natural and acquired. — Their difference. HAVING formerly faid that, in moral matters, mediocrity BOOK only ought to be the objed of our preference, as being alone ,_ ^ confiftent with right reafon, it is proper that this fubjed ihould Chap be more diftindly explained. Whoever exercifes reafon has, ^^^^ in all his habitual adions, a certain aim, according to which he "ζ^^^"^^^ regulates his behaviour; moderating his paifions when too tues. ftrong, invigorating them when too weak, and always bending them to propriety, as a bow is rendered more or lefs tenfe in order to hit the mark. This obfervation is indeed true, but not fufficiently explicit to be pradically ufeful ; for, in all other matters in which fcience is concerned, we ought certainly to do what right reafon prefcribes, that is, neither too much nor too little. Thus the^ phyfician ought to aft with regard to his pa- tient ; but by knowing that this is his duty, he will not be rendered much the wifer as to what operations ought to be per- formed, or what medicines ought to be adminiftercd. It is ne- cefliiry, .therefore, to fpeak more definitely concerning the ha- bits. 28S ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK ί)ϊΐ5 of the mind, to explain what right reafon is, and to point _ • ^ out what are the boundaries which it alligns to our paifions and adions. The habits or virtues of the mind were formerly di- vided into the moral and intelledual ; concerning the moral we have already treated ; it remains to examine the intelledual, having previoufly fpoken of the foul itfelf. In this, we for- merly diftinguiihed two parts, the rational and irrational ; and the former may alfo be divided into two, namely, that faculty by which we underftand thofe fciences whofe principles are certain and neceifary, and which cannot poiTibly be otherwife than they are, and that by which we comprehend other branches of knowledge ; for if there be any refemblance or affinity between the truths recognifed, and the powers which recognife them, it is natural to think that things, fo extremely different as are the neceflary and contingent, fliould be per- ceived and known by different faculties % Knowledge, then, may be divided into that which is demonflrative and fcientific, and that which is deliberative and probable ; for no one deli- berates about things which neceffarily exiil after one certain manner, and which cannot poffibly exift after any other. Let t:s examine, then, what is the beft habit of each of thefe fa- culties : the beft habit of any thing is, in other words, its vir- tue ; and the virtue of each obje£t is afcertained by its fltnefs for performing its peculiar fundion. There are three principles in man, which, either fmgle or combined, are the fbvereign judges of truth and condudl. Thefe Seiifation, are, fentation, intellecil, and appetite. Of thefe three, mere fen- intelledt, and ' ' ' χ r ' appetite, fation cannot alone be the foundation of any iudtrment refpeft- theirdlfFerent , , ο i • , • r . r •, , , η offices. mg condutt, that is, the propriety of action ; for wild beafts have ■= See alio Magna Moralia, 1. i. c. xxxv. p. 169. ' 13 Chap. 2. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 289 have perception by fenfe, but are totally unacquainted with BOOK propriety. Affirming and denying are the operations of intel- led, defire and avcrfion are thole of appetite ; and fince moral virtue implies the habit of juil eledion, and eledion or pre- ferenee refolves itfelf into deliberation and appetite, every adt of virtuous preference requires, that there fliould be accuracy and truth in the comparifou, as well as correitnefs and pro- priety in the defire. Of that intellcvflual faculty which bears not any relation to life and pradtice, and which is employed, not in deliberation, but in demonftration, the fimplicity of ab- ftradt ti-uth is the proper and only objedl ; but deliberative mo- ral wifdom bears in all its operations a reference to human hap- pinefs; and terminates, not in the difcoA^eries of fpeculation, but in the exertions of adlion''. This latter faculty, then, only at- tains its end, when well-ordered appetite harmonifes with found pradtical reafon ; from the combination of which elements, re- fults that moral eleilion or preference, peculiar to man ; which may be called either impaffioned intelligence, or refleding ap- petite ; and which is the fole fountain of whatever is laudable and graceful in behaviour and manners ^ This pradlical reafon is fuperior to that cpnverfant about produdion : for produdion, as we above obferved, is imperfeit in itfelf, and continually re- mains fo, until the work, for the fake of which it operated, be produced. But the operation of pradical reafon terminates ia nothing better than the pleafure of its own energies. It is not given to us for the gratification of appetite : but appetite itfelf is '^ In conformity with wliat is here faid, Ariftotle in his Topics, b. v. c. i. p. 226. <3iftinguift-.es fciencc from virtue, by faying that the former is in one part of the foul, and the latter in more than one. ' ■; h ■7reo2..-;5-.c, Kiivo; iix:y.o.; Ky\ ί;.φβί. Ds Anim.-ll. iMottJ. -C. vi. p. '/'i. VOL. I. P'P VI. 290 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOO Κ VI. Chap. 3. The five intelleiSlual habits. Firft, fcience. is implanted in us for the fake of that virtuous moral aitionj which conftitutes an eflential part of human happinefs. Such, then, is man, an intelledtual but impaflioned being, exercifmg, his faculties concerning things contingent and future. The paft cannot be an objeil of deliberation or preference. No one choofes, that Troy ihould not be taken ; and Agathon. fays rightly, " All things to God are poffible, fave one, " That to undo, which is already done." As truth, then, is the obje<3; of both our rational faculties, (the fpeculative and prad;ical,) their excellencies muft confiil in thofe habits by which truth is moil clearly difcerned. Let thefe habits be the five following ; art, fcience, prudence, wifdom, intelledl. In matters of opinion we are liable to be deceived ; not fo in matters of fcience. The former relates to things variable in their nature, of whofe very exiftence we may doubt, unlefs when they are aftually perceived ; the latter is converfant about things unalterable, neceifary, and eternal, incapable of being generated, exempt from corruption ; the knowledge of which admits not of degrees between total igno- rance and abfolute certainty. All fcience may be taught, and all teaching implies principles, namely, thofe truths which are. previoufly known by experience or reafon. The firft principles are acquired by indudlion, that is, by intellect operating on ex- perience % Science, then, may be defined a demonftrative habit,, diftinguiihed by thofe properties which we have afcribed to it in our Analytics ^ The principles of fcience muft be perceived with the cleareft evidence ; for unlefs they be more evident than the conclufions drawn from them, thofe conclufions will not form • See Analyfis, p. 57. Comp. p. 161. ' See Analyfis, ρ .77. Aristotle's ethics. 291 ■form fcicnce ilridly fo called ; bccaufe their truth does not ne- BOOK VI. celTarily proceed from the truth of their prcmifes; with whicli tliey are conneiled, not eifentially, but only by way of accef- fion or appendage ". Things in their nature variable, and which might cither Chap. 4. have never been, which may ceafe to exift, or whofc mode of ' ^ ^ exiftence is Uable to perpetual alterations, are of two kinds ; produdlions or aftions. Thefe things are fufficiently diilin- guiihed from each other even in popular difcourfe ; fo that a rational habit of aition muil be different from a rational habit of produdion. Since building, which is a rational habit of pro- dudion, is an art, and every other fuch habit is alio an art, and every art is alfo the habit juft mentioned, art may be de- fined the habit of making or producing a certain work agreeably to the rules of right reafon. All art is employed in examining and contriving how it may beft form and faihion thofe produc- tions or works of which the efficient caufe is in the maker, not in th(2 materials. Things which exiil neceffarily, are not the fubjeits of art; nor thofe which are produced naturally; for the latter have their efficient caufe in themfelves ''. Art, then, is converfant after a certain manner about the fame things as fortune . Wherefore Agathon fays, " In friendly ties are art and fortune bound." Artlejfttefs is the contrary of art ; it is the producing of fuch works awkwardly ; according to erroneous principles of reafon. In explaining the nature of prudence, let us confider firft, Chap. c. who they are that deferve this appellation. It feems to be the part of a prudent man to deliberate wifely about his good or ad- vantage ; not in particular poin'is merely, as health or ftrength, bur » See above, p. 6;. Conf. p. nj• '' See above, p. 1C9. Ρ Ρ 2 Prudence•' 292 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.. Β ο ο Iv but as to the general happlnefs of life. This is indicated by our- VI . calling tliofe men prudent in their affairs, who take proper means for attaining valuable purpofes, which are not the proper objedls of particular arts. Prudence then implies deliberation ; and no one deliberates about things invariable in their nature, and which cannot be otherwife than they are ; nor about things which are not in their own power. Prudence then is not fcience, becaufe the objedls of fcience are things inva- riable ; it Is not art, becaufe the objedt of prudence is adion, not produdlion. It remains then, that prudence fhould be a rational and practical habit, bearing a reference to the happinefs and mifery of human life. The end of produdlion confifts al- •ways in the work produced ; but action is often its own end ;. for happinefs, which is a kind of a£lion, is perfedt in itfelf.. Pericles, and other great ftatefmen, are called prudent on ac- count of their fmgular ability in effeding the good of human kind; the great bufmefs of oeconomy, both political and do- meftic. The word, in Greek, denoting the moral virtue of temperance, is compounded of two other words, which may be literally tranllated, " the prefervative of prudence ;" for tem- perance tends to preferve this intelle(ilual excellence. Pleafure and pain do not deftroy every exercife of the underftanding, for inftance, that which relates to mathematical truth ; but that exercife only which relates to the pradlcial concerns of life. For the exceffive love of pleafure, or the exceffive abhorrence of pain, fubftitutes new principles of adion quite different from thofe by which wife and good men are aduated. Prudence, then, is a rational and pra£lical habit, effedive of human hap- pinefs. We fpeak of excellence in art, but prudence is itfelf excellence. In the arts, voluntary errors are the beft ; but, in matters ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 293 matters of prudence, they are the worfl: ; as in all the moral BOOK virtues. Prudence, then, is not an art but a virtue ; and the . _ _' j virtue of that faculty of the mind which is converfant about opinion and probability, difcerning in fuch things truth from falfehood. As it relates to the pradice of life, v\'hich, with all . men, is a conftant objedl of thought, prudence, when once acquired, is not, like other habits of the underftanding, liable to be forgotten or loft. Since the obje£t of fcience, as above obferved, is univerfal Chap. 6.. and demonftrable truth, and whatever is demonftrable muft be ,~7~: , intellect— founded on principles, it is manifeft that there muft be primary principles', which are not fcience, any more than they are art or prudence. They are not fcience, becaufe all fcience is de- monftrable ; they are not art or prudence, becaufe thefe have for their fubjed: things contingent and variable: neither are they wifdom, becaufe, as we ihall fee hereafter, wifdom, and tha hi^heft wifdom, is converfant about truths fufceptible of de- monftration. Since then none of the four habits juft men- tioned ; neither fcience, nor art, nor prudence, nor wifdom, can afford thofe primary principles j and fmce all the habits of the underftanding are reducible to five, it follows that intel- led, operating on experience % is the only fource from which thofe great and primary truths can be fuppofed to flow. Wifdom is fometimes taken for fkill in the arts ; and applied, Chap, 7,- for inftance, to Phidias, v^io was a ikilful fculptor ; or Poly- cleitus, the ikilful ftatuary. But there is a wifdom of a far fuperior kind, which does not denote excellence in any of thofe operations or arts to which Homer alludes in fpeaking of Mar- gites : " The Gods had not formed him for digging or plough- ing>. ' See Analyfis, p. 93. ίί feq. " See Analyfis, p. S7• Comp. p. i6u W ifdom^ .^4 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. book: ing, nor made him ikllful in any other work ;" but a wifdom ^ ^• , abfolute and univerfal, fmce it relates to the univerfe and its principles ; contemplating, not merely, like other faiences, the qualities or properties of things, but the things themfelves, or fubftances"; and, therefore, of all fciences the moft accurate as well as the moil fublime ; comprehending both the higheft demonftrations, and the vindication of thofe primary truths on which all demonftration is built '. To fay that prudence is more valuable than wifdom, is to prefer man to all other beings in the univerfe- One thing may be falutary and good for human kind ; and another for lifhes : but abftrait qualities remain perpetually the fame ; and in like manner v/ifdom is permanent and ftable, but prudence muft vary its maxims with each alteration of the fubjedl about which it is employed. The bufmefs of prudence confifts in providing for the good of thofe peculiarly recommended to its care ; and whoever beft under- ftands how to promote the good of each tribe or of each indi- vidual, to him we ihould be moil inclined to commit their diredion and management. Wherefore fome of the inferior animals feem to be endowed with a kind of prudence, in fore- feeing and providing what is neceflary for the prefervation of their own lives. The unalterable ftability of wifdom clearly diftinguiihes it from civil policy, which, if it would attain its end, the public good, muft be guided by clrcumftances ; and the different tribes of animals require, in health as well as in difeafc, different kinds of management, which are refpedively moft conducive to their well-being. It will not avail to fay, that as man is the nobleft of animals, therefore the virtue of prudence, , * Thefe are God and IntelleiEl — the beft fubftances, iv ho-m j/uh, i ho<; km i »Bi, liQ^ Moral. Eudem.l. i. c. viii. p. 201. * See above, Analyfis, p. 86. & feq. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 295. prudence, which is converfant about human happlnefs, merits BOOK the preference to every other"'; for that there are many natures more divine than man, is attefted by thofe glorious luminaries, and that beautiful arrangement which adorns the univerfe. Wifdom, then, comprehends both intelledl and fcience, applied to the higheft purpofes, the difcovery of the moft valuable truths. Wherefore we call Thales, Anaxagoras, and others of their charader, wife, indeed, but furely not prudent, fmce they manifeftly neglect their private concerns and perfonal advan- tage, and apply their thoughts to the inveftigation of fubjefts as lofty and difficult as they are completely ufelefs for the ordinary purpofes of human life. But the virtue of prudence is directed folely to thofe purpofes ; and he is juftly deemed the moft prudent, whofe advice is moil conducive to public profpe- rity. This great objeft is not to be attained by abftrait fpecu- lations. Prudence muil be converfant about particulars ; for all praftice relates to particulars only; wherefore many men,, ignorant of theory, are more ufeful than thofe acquainted with it ; for inftance, empirics, than phyficians. What avails it to know that light food is falutary, unlefs we alfo know, for in- ftance, '" According to Ariftotle, prudence is, as it were, wifdom's fteward, holding a dele- gated authority in leiTer concerns, that the mafter may have leifure for more important l^urfuitS, VI ipp&v>/C7"l•,- ωσττίξ £73ΓίΤ^&7Γος τίζ sfi Tr? σοφίΧ'_^ Kxi ΤΓΧξοσχίνχζίί τχυτίί σ•)ζ^\Ύ,\^ κχί το τΓοίΕίν τ>ι; (χντβ ίξ-/αν. Magn. Moral. Ι. i. c. xxxv. p. 172. Thefe more important purfuits confift in fpeculations concerning God ; in meditating on, and worihipping him ; ti Tii 0: »3 ov Evciiav, vj ύί υττεξ^ΰλ^ϊΐ' xu\vn TOW oiov QipaTTetjEiit Kxi DiCti^Eif, αντη οι φχνλ- ty. Moral. Eudem. c. xv. p. 291. This employment is the chief end of n:>an; the na- tural exercife of his nobleft faculties, «το; της ψυχ»;? ό ο^ο; «^iro?, τα ^y.ira cttaiccnaSui τ«' άλλα μίξ^ς τίς -ψ^χ'.?, ri τ£ί«τοιι. The lefs wc are difturbed by bodily pailions, or ha- raffed by worldly cares, the more likely we are to approach to this ultimate term of mental enjoyment. Idem ibid. Religion cannot be eradicated from the mind, un- lefs the underftanding be deftroyed : ^.r.is t^s θί«ι 9o?iicr8a( nz «vi^tiof, αλ\α ΐλ,ί'Μοΐλαίς^. Magna Moral, c. v. p. Iji. VI. 596 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK ftance, that the fleih of bu-ds Is light ? Prudence being a prac- i^, -J J tical virtue, eflentially includes the knowledge of particulars. Yet even here general and fuperintending principles are not without their ufe. €hap. 8. Prudence and policy are the fame habits, but applied to dif- •; ferent fubjeds. Policy is general or particular: the general general and confifts in legiflatiou J the particular, in deliberations and de- j>articu ar. crees ; for as decrees apply general principles to particular cafes, they immediately precede execution ; and therefore thofe who bufy themfelves about decrees, in propofing or procuring them, are peculiarly confidered as workmen in the trade of politics. Prudence chiefly relates to the management of our private affairs, and while diredled to this purpofe preferves its proper name ; but when our prudence extends to the affairs of others, it is called oeconomics, legiflation, politics ; which laft is either deliberative or judicial Yet politics is fometimes contrafted %vith prudence ; too much concern about other people's afi'airs feeming unfavourable to our own happinefs. Wherefore Eu- ripides fays, in the perfon of Philodetes, " How can the name of wife to me belong Who might have mingled in the martial throng, Unvex'd with bufmefs and exempt from care, Taking of fpoils my honourable ihare ; Yet chofe by over-anxious thoughts to move The direful hate of all-commanding Jove ?" But a prudential regard to our own intereft requires, perhaps, that we fliould not be regardlefs of politics, fince our own good is involved in that of the Public ; and many are extremely ill- fitted to provide even for their own. Young perlbns may become good geometers, and render themfelves fkilful in the arts ARISTOTLE^ ETHICS. 2^7 arts depending on the mathematical fciences. But it is fcarcely BOOK, poffible for a youth to have the virtue of prudence, bccaufe this l_— I'i- virtue is converfant about particulars, the accurate knowledge of which requires obfervation and experience, which muft be the - work of time. The mathematics are converfant merely about abftradions formed by ourfelves ; the notions of which are clear and precife. But the knowledge of nature, and of thofe caufes by which nature fubfifts, is far more complicated, requiring continually the aiTiftance of that experience in which it originates. As to pradical truths, refulting from long expe- rience, young men may indeed repeat them, but they feldom feel their full force. In applying theory to pra£tlce, errors may arife from miilaking either the general or the particular pro- pofition ; for example, that all heavy waters are bad, or that this water is heavy. Prudence is manifeilly diiferent from fcience ; being the perception of thofe part'calar and pradi- cal truths which admit not of demonftration ; whereas in- telledt is employed about thofe general and primary principles which require not any proof In the chain of mental faculties, intellect and prudence then form the two extreme links J prudence holding the extreme of individuality, and intelle£t that of generalization. Prudence then may be called common fenfe, fmce it is converfant about objeds of fenfe ; but in a manner fpeciiically different from that In which the other fenfes are refpedlively converfant about their particular objeits. Prudence Implies deliberation, which \vord has a lefs exten- Chap. 9. five meaning than Inveftlgation, becaufe deliberation is that fpecies of inveiligation which relates to the pradical concerns of life. It is not fcience, nor opinion, nor conjeilure ; not fcience, VOL. I. c^CL becaufe 298 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK becaufe no one deliberates about that which admits of demonilra- _^ j; bic proof: not conjedlure or guelTmg, becaufe thefe are quick and rapid, but deUberation is a Avork of time ; and it is a common maxim, that we ought to be prompt in execution, but flow in de- liberation. Deliberation is not prefence of mind, any more than happinefs of conjedlure ; it is not fcience, which cannot err ; nor opinion, the reititude of which confiils in truth, whereas that of deliberation confifts in utility ; fmce wrong deliberations are hurtful. Befides, every opinion is a propofition either af- firmative or negative ; whereas deliberation neither affirms nor denies, but inveftigates and inquires. Good deliberation is rec- titude of counfel ; but, as redtitude is taken in different fenfes, it is not every kind of reftitude, particularly it is not that by which an intemperate or bad man may contrive right means for attaining his wicked ends. His right deliberations termi- nate in much mifchief; whereas good deliberation naturally terminates in advantage. This, however, may fometimes be attained without good deliberation, fmce a right conclufion is fometimes inferred from wrong premifes. Good deUberation alfo~-muft be feafonable ; its refult muft be drawn at a right time, muft proceed from right premifes, and muft terminate in fome valuable purpofe, whether that be happinefs in general, or fomething thereto conducive. Good counfel^ then, confifts in difcovering proper means for attaining thofe ends which pru- dence approves as worthy objedls of purfuit. Chap. 10. There is a readinefs of apprehenfion in fome men, \vhich ■; makes them be diftinguifhed as intelligent ; while others are Quicfcnefs of ^ . . apprehen- equally remarkable for their flownefs and ftupidity. This quicknefs of thought, or acutenefs in decifion, is fomething quite different from fcience or opinion, fince all men are capable of learning ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. ^99 learning fciences and forming opinions j nor does It belong to Β (U) K. any fcience in particular, as phyfic, which is converfant about , , health, or geometry, which is converfant about magnitude ; nor does its proper fubjeft confift in things which happen cafually, or in thofe which are unalterable and eternal• ; but it is moil confpicuous in thofe things which are matters of deliberation and doubt. It is converfant, then, about the fame fubjed with pru- dence, though not precifely in the fame manner ; for prudence fpeaks with a voice of authority, commanding one adion and prohibiting another ; but the intellcftual excellence, now under confideration, is rather critical than commanding; it does not govern and regulate our adions, but enables us to underftand the regulations which prudence prefcribes ; and follows the dic- tates o^his fovereign virtue, as an intelligent youth goes along with the leffons of his teacher. That juftnefs of fentiment by which fome men render them- Chap. 1 1. felves fo commendable, is nothing more than a nice difcernment ^^ — ^^ of the virtue which we called equity ; in proof of whicn it i.ntiment. may be obferved, that thofe who are moft equitable in their tranfaaions, are alfo the moft diftinguiihed by their fellow- feelino- with others, and the moft inclinable to excufe their par- donabk errors. Pardon is nothing more than an equitable de- cifion ; that is, indulgence flowing from right reafon. The iii- telledual habits above defcribed, readinefs of apprehenfion, juftnefs of fentiment, prudence, intelligence, or common fenfe, are all of them converfant about the fame objeds, and all of them confpire to the fame great end of making men behave well in the pradical concerns of life. Thefe concerns are all of them particular, depending on time and circumftances ; and the ha- bits that have reference to them, muft therefore be diflerent J oo ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK from thofe which are converfant about general and abilradt _ truth. In pradtical matters, prudence regulates and commands, fentiment criticifes and approves, and intelligence, or common fenfe, operating on obfervation and experience, furniihes thofe firft principles, which are equally eifential to the due feleilion of ends, and the proper adjuftment of m.eans. As thefe firil principles fpring up in the mind, without teaching or reafoning, merely from obfervation and experience, they feem to be the gift of nature ; and juftnefs of fentiment, as well as the other virtues depending on them, feem alfo to be natural, and to be- long to men at a certain period of life, who feem then naturally to attain underftanding and fentiment ; whereas art, fcience, or wifdom, (as above explained,) never feem to grow up naturally, but always to be the work of application and iludy. Common fenfe, then, that is, intelledl operating on experience, being the ultimate judge of whatever is pra£tically good, we ought to re- fpedt the opinions of old and prudent men, not lefs than demon- ftration itfelf; becaufe they fee with the eye of experience, Λvhich alone can difcern right principles of condud. Such, then, is the nature of prudence in contradiftindion to that of wifdom ; virtues which are converfant about different objefts, and which refpeftively belong to different faculties of the foul. Chao 12. Doubts may arife in what refped thefe intelledual virtues are ufeful ; for wifdom, as above explained, has not any refer- ofthe'hitel- ^^^^^ ^° mutable and material things, and therefore feems not leaual vir- ^^ j^^^g ^^^^ tendency to promote human happinefs. Prudence, beeitimated. indeed, is converfant about worldly affairs; but wherein con- fifts its utility, fmce it only deliberates concerning honourable, juft, and other adlions conducive to happinefs, which a vir- tuous man has learned to pradife ? If virtue be a habit, how is ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 301 Β Ο ο Iv VI. is it to be improved by the refleaions of prudence? Perfons poffeiTed of health or ftrength would not be more ilrong or more healthy, though endowed with the ikill of phyficians and mafters of exercifes. But prudence, it will be faid, though not neceffary for the pradice, is ufeful to the acquifition of virtue. Is ikill in phyfic ueceiTary or ufeful to the acquifition of health ? If this were the cafe, we ought, when fick, to ftudy phyfic, inftead of calling a phyfician. Befidcs thefe doubts, it is not eafy to determine the relative value of wifdom and prudence ; and why the latter, which is inferior in dignity, ihould prefcribe rules for the exercife of the former. Having . propofed thefe difficulties, it is our duty, if poffible, to folve them. Firft of all, wifdom and prudence, though they ter- minated not in any diftind and feparate end, would be things hi-hly defirable in themfelves, fince they are refpedively the virtues of two mental faculties. But they are produdivc caufes of human happinefs, not indeed as phyfic is the caufe of health, but as health itfelf is the caufe of a healthy habit. The great bufinefs of human life is performed by the co-opera- tion of prudence with moral virtue. The latter makes us purfue right ends ; and the former makes us employ fit means for attaining them. To that power of the foul, which difcovers itfelf in the growth and nutrition of the body, no fuch fpontancous funaion belongs ; fince its operations are carried on altogether m- depcndently of our own wills ; and it is entirely befide our power to accelerate or retard them. As to the doubt whether pru- ru.n^^, dence contributes to the praclice of juft and honourable adions, it will be beft folved by tracing thofe adions to their real fource. Aas of virtue, in general, may be performed by thofe who are ;o2 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. J Β Ο Ο Κ are not virtuous men, involuntarily, ignorantly, through fear "^ ^j of the law, or through any other motive which does not imply the habitual love of virtue, and the deliberate preference of it merely for its own fake. This habit, then, makes our ends right and good ; but how to attain thofe ends, is the work, not of moral virtue, but of another principle. There is a power of the mind, call it cleΛ'■ernefs, keennefs, or fagacity, of Λvhich the nature confifts in enabling us to accomplifli our purpofes ; and which, when the purpofes are good, is praifevv'orthy ; when they are bad, this clevernefs changes its name, being juftly re- proached as villany. Prudence, though not the fame thing, (fmce a villain cannot be called prudent,) yet requires for its foundation this natural dexterity, which is determined to the fide of honour and propriety by habitual ad:s of virtue. For reafonings alone cannot fupply corred principles of condud. The ends beft to be purfued, appear fuch to good men only. Vice diftorts the judgment ; and even in men of naturally keen minds, produces the greateil practical errors : wherefore it is impoffible to be prudent without being morally virtuous. Chap. 1 7. ^^ ^s necefiary to fpeak farther of virtue ; for, as natural faga- city, thoxigh fnnilar, is not the fame with prudence, fo natural tueXffcrlnt' virtue, though funilar, is not the fame with virtue properly fo from virtue called. Our capacities and difpofitions are the work of nature ; properly lo ' ^ . . . - called. and therefore, in fome fort, our morals are fo likewife ; men being born with propenfities to juftice, temperance, and forti- tude. But this natural aptitude is not the virtue of which we are in queft. Strong natural propenfities, and ftriking dif- ferences of manners, appear in children, and even in wild beaib ; and this native vigour being unenlightened by reafon, 8 has ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 3^3 has a tendency to do much mUchief, like the irregular motions 13 Ο Ο Κ of giants when deprived of their eye-fight. But when the in- tellectual eye opens, and aifedlion is difciplined by reafon, then that moral virtue dlfplays itfelf ; which bears the fame relation to the natural, which prudence bears to that doubtful quality above mentioned, which, though fomewhat refembling it, is yet fpecifically different. As virtue properly fo called implies prudence, fome have refolved all the virtues into modifications of tliis intelle£tual excellence. Socrates did this; faying, ri"-htly, that none of the virtues could fubfiil without pru- dence ; which is nothing elfe than right reafon, (which all philofophers now add to the definition of virtue,) applied to the fubjed of morals ; but he erred in thinking that the Avhole of moral reditude depended folely on the underltanding, and in calling the virtues fciences. Virtuous men, indeed, muft aift, not only according to right reafon, but with right reafon ; that is, the right reafon which regulates their condudt, muft be a principle in themfelves. The virtues then, though not fciences, cannot fubfift without that principle of reafon from which all the fciences fpring ; in other words, prudence is re- quifite for conftituting the charader of the truly good man. The queftion therefore maybe anfwered,'\vhethcr tlie virtues can exift feparately. It ihould feem that they may ; bccaufe the fame perfon not being born with equal aptitude to them all, he may poffefs fome of them, though ftill dcikient in others. This indeed is true with regard to the natural virtues ; but Aviih regard to thofe which conftitute the charader of the truly good man, it is iinpofiiblc ; for none fuch can be exercifed Avithout prudence, and with this fingle intelledlual excellence, all the moral virtues neccffarily co-exift ; fince prudence not only fhews us how 3^4 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK VI. how beft to obtain our ends, but always implies that the ends themfelves are good. Yet prudence, extenfive and dignified as its fundlion is, ought not to be preferred to wifdom, which is converfant about ftill higher fubjeds, and is the virtue of a nobler faculty^. Phyfic is not better than health; though it prefcribes rules by which health may be attained ''. To fet prudence above wifdom, is the fame abfurdity as to fet policy above the Gods ; becaufe policy regulates the national religion, as well as all other public concerns % * See above, p. 285. 1 The art of phyfic docs not make ufe of health, it only contrives how health may be preferved or reilored. It is for the falce of health, and therefore lefs valuable. See above, p. 149. & feq. » The intelledlual virtues are treated of more briefly in the laft chapters of the firft, and firft chapters of the fecond Book of the work intitled Magna Moralia ; and in the fifth Book of the Ethics to Eudemus. ( 305 ) ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. mm BOOK VII. INTRODUCTION. TTAviNG examined the virtues and vices, ftridly fo called, BOOK "^ the author proceeds to habits which, though often con- ^ founded vi^Ith them, are yet eflentially different ; namely, felf- command, and its oppofite, incontinency ; heroic virtue, and its oppofite, beaftly depravity ; v\rhich fometimes ihews itfelf in favagenefs and ferocity, and fometimes in unnatural perverfions of the concuplfcible appetites. There is not any fyftem of Ethics that accounts fo fully and fo clearly for the important dif- tindion between weaknefs and wickednefs, as is done in this Seventh Book. VOL. I. R R ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 307 BOOK VII. ARGUMENT. fl^£^ — Weabiefs. — Ferocity. — Self-command^ atid its contrary. — Unnatural depravities, different from vices. — Voluptuotfiefs more detefable than irafcibility — Reafons of this. — Inteinpcrance and incontinency . — "Their difference, -r Ε now proceed, making a new divlfion, to obferve, BOOK that in morals three things ought to be avoided ; vice, l — . - j weaknefs, and ferocity: the oppofites to the two lirft are ^hap. 1. manifeft, namely, virtue and felf-command ; and to the third, i,, morals we may fet in oppofition a virtue more than human, fomethiag ^^'^ε av'ofj- heroic and divine, fuch as Homer makes Priam afcribe to Hedor; ed. " And laft great Hedor, more than man divine. For fure he feemed not of terreftrial line '." So that ihould we believe what is faid of the deification of illuftrious men, their pre-eminent worth might be properly ODDofed to favagenefs and ferocity : for virtue belongs not to Ferocity, ^^ η 1 η • r J and its oppo- gods, any more than vice to beafts ; the excellencies ot gods fues. are above virtue, and the depravities of beafts are fpecifically different from vice. The Lacedsemonians, when they admire any one exceedingly, fay, " you are a divine man ;" but as fuch men are feldom to be met Avith, fo beaftly depravities are feldom to be found in the human race ; they occur rarely, and chiefly * Iliac!, b. xxiv. v. 223. li. feq. R R 2 3o8 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS; BOOK chiefly among barbarians. They are foraetimes produced by difeafes or wounds; and the excefles of human vice are re- proached as beaftly. But concerning fucli enormous depravi- ties, we iliall afterwards have occafion to fpeak ; and we have already confidered vice properly fo called. It remains there- fore that wc now treat of incontinency and felf-command ; which feem not to be entirely the fame with the habits of vice and virtue, noi yet altogether different from them. We fhall firft mention the prevailing opinions on this fubjeft, and next ilate our own doubts : when difficulties are removed, and probabi- lities eftabliihed, the theory will be fufficiently correct for all practical purpofes. Firmnefs and felf-command appear then to be refpedtable and praifeworthy habits ; and their contraries,, weaknefs and yielding foftnefs, appear to be, in the fame pro- portion, both blameable and contemptible. The man of felf- command is fteady to the decifions of his reafon ; the weak man is eafily moved from them. The latter, knowing that his aftions are bad, yet commits them through paffion ; the former, knowing that his appetites are bad, yet reftrains them through reafon. Some confound felf-command with temperance, and the want of it with intemperance ; others think that thofe habits are widely different from each other. Prudence appears to fame to be totally incompatible with the want of felf-command ; ©thers think, that men, highly diftlnguiihed by their prudence and abilities, are often extremely deficient in this particular. A man is faid to lofe the command of himfelf, and to be maf- tered, not only by pleafure, but by anger, honour, and gain. Such are the prevailing opinions on this fubje£t^ It * The fubjefls treated in this Book are explained nearly in the fame words in the fixth book of the Etliics to Eudemus. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 309 It feems difficult to explain how a man, who entertains juft Β Ο Ο Κ conceptions of things, iliould voluntarily rcfign his indcpend- , ,-.«_, ence ; and how he who, as Socrates obferved, has fcience to Chap. 2. direit him, ihould allow himfelf to be domineered over by ^^— ^^ inferior principles, and dragged in captivity like a flave. So- felf-com- ,.111 l•• mand,and crates, indeed, maintained, that this could not happen to hum jts contrary. who poflfeiTed real fcience, and that none aded amifs but through ignorance only. But this opinion is manifeftly at variance with the phenomena ; for if paffion were caufed by ignorance, the ignorance ought to precede the paffion, which is plainly not the cafe ; for the man who erra through want of fdf-command, only does fo when ftimulated by paffion ; well knowing, before his paffion is excited, that the actions to which it moves him are wrong. Some philofophers maintain that none can err againft demonftrative knowledge, but that many daily err againft that which is only probable ; and that the love of pleafure, though it cannot prevail over fcience ftridly fo called may yet be too ftrong for opinion. But if opinion Difficulties ν,αιιν-υ, HI ! 7 ο 1 c u • u concerning merely, that is a faint and wavering impreffion of truth, is the this quality, only power that makes refiftance to the ftrength of appetite, it is not wonderful that the latter ihould obtain the vidory ; nor ought thofe to be blamed, in whom the ftronger principle pre- vails. But this we find is not true ; for men are highly blamed for indulging their corrupt appetites. If neither fcience nor opinion can take part in this mental confiici:, prudence remains as the only antagonift. But this is abfurd ; for the want of felf-command cannot fubfift in the fame mind with prudence ; a prudent man will not voluntarily commit bad adions ; and prudence, as we have above ihewn, is a pradlical principle, im- plying the exiftence of all other virtues ^ Self-command fup- ^ ^ ^ pofes * See p. 303. 3IO ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK pofes the prefeiice of ilrong paffions, and thofe blameable either VII in their nature or in their degree : if they were not blameable, they ought not to be refifted ; and if they were not ftrong, there would be little praife in refifting them. Temperance, as above explained, is inconfiilent with the prefence of any fuch paffions. Temperance and felf-command cannot therefore be- long to the fame charadler. If felf-command implied an im- moveable adherence to every conclufion of the underftanding, it would, when this conclufion happened to be falfe, be no- thing better than obftinacy ; and if the imperfeiilion oppo- fite to felf-command confifted in eafily departing from certain opinions or refolutions, it would fometimes be a very refpedable quality ; as in the cafe of Neoptolemus, who is reprefented in Sophocles' tragedy as eafily departing from the refolution which he had taken, by the advice of Ulyifes, becaufe he could not bear to tell a lie ; and thofe who having once yielded to the fedudlions of fophiftry, continue pertinacioufly to adhere to them, are furely not commendable on that account. Great weaknefs of refolution, when accompanied with great ftupidity, might fometimes be a virtue ; becaufe through extreme irrefo- lution, a man might be tempted to do diredly the reverfe of what he fooliihly intended. Befides, he who led a life of voluptuoufnefs through deliberate choice, and on convidlion of its being the beft kind of life that he could purfue, would not be in a condition fo totally hopelefs, as he who followed the fame plan through want of felf-command, in diredl oppofition to the didlates of his own reafon. The former having been corrupted by argument, might alfo, by argument, be reformed ; but the latter, refifting the perfuafion of his own mind, would be totally incurable ; and obnoxious to the proverb, " Of drinking ftill, e'en when the water chok'd." 8 Befides, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 311 Befides, wherein does felf-command, and the weaknefs oppofite Β Ο Ο Κ to it, properly confift; are the objcds about which thefe habits ,„^.^ 1 are converfant, limited to a certain clafs ? Such are the doubts of which we muft endeavour to find the probable folu- tion. We proceed firft to examine whether a man gives up the Chap. 3. command of himfelf knowingly ; and, if fo, how that can ^^^^^ hanoen : we fhall alfo inquire, whether felf-command, and the pcrfons defi- rr ^ ' cient in lelf- inability to reftrain our appetites, have a reference to all plea- command fures and pains indifcriminately, or to certain definite kinds of ingiy'. them ; and whether it belongs to the fame habit of mind to refill pleafure, and to encounter pain; with feveral other queftions naturally connedled with the prefent fpeculation. Does inability to reftrain our appetites appear in the improper pleafures that we purfue, or in the improper manner in which we purfue them, or in both thefe united ? Self-command, and its oppofite, incontinency, when taken in the ftrideft acceptation, have a reference to the fame things about which temperance and intemperance were formerly proved to be converfant^; but the kind of relation which they bear to thefe things is ex- ceedingly different. The intemperate man obeys his appetites knowingly and deliberately, thinking that he ought always to follow the impulfe of prefent pleafure ; the man, merely weak and incontinent, alfo obeys his appetites, but without thinking that he is thereby afting the part which becomes him. Whe- ther the perceived impropriety of his condud be the refult of certain or only probable knowledge, makes not any material alteration •, fince fome opinions, as Heraclitus proves, hold as firm poifeifion of the mind, as if they were conclufions of fcience, ■* See above, p. 218. &fcvill, in thofe deftitute of felf-command, be indulged, in oppofition to right reafon ; and thefe propofitions will be alleged by them in excufe for their infirmity. They will appear therefore to adt licentioufly on argument ; but, in fait, argu- ment is not in itfelf contrary to right reafon, but only by way of acceifion or appendage to appetite, which has the power of moving and changing the\vhole frame of the body, and thereby diftorting the intelledts. Beafts, therefore, cannot be blamed for this want of felf-command, becaufe they have not any perception of general precepts, their higheft powers confifting in imagination and memory. How men enilaved by their appetites refume the exercife of their underftandings, needs not here be explained ; this change has nothing in it peculi ar ; fince it entirely refembles what happens to all mankind wlien they awake from fleep, or to drunkards when they recover from a fit of intoxication ; fubjeds which belong to the pro- voL, I. s s -vincc VII. 3H ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK vince of the phyfiologift. Socrates then faid true, that fcience, properly fo called, could not be overcome by appetite, which only difturbs our perception of particular and pradical truths. Whether incontinency be a fpecific imperfedtion, denoting, without any addition to it, infirmities of a peculiar kind, comes next to be inquired. It is manifeftly converfant about pleafures and pains ; and as pleafures are either neceiTary, namely, fuch as are eiTential to the health of the body and the prefervation of the fpecies ; or though not neceiTary, yet in themfelves eligible, fuch as vidlory, honour, wealth, and fuch other external advan- tages, it is to be remarked that we do not call thofe incontinent who are too eafily maftered by the latter pleafures, and who are inclined to indulge them in a degree not warranted by right reafon, without adding the particular caufe or objedt which overfets them, fuch as gain, honour, anger. They are incontinent, that is wanting in felf-command, not fimply and abfolutely, but as to gain, honour, anger ; and the definition of incontinency in general no more applies to them, than the general definition of a man to an Olympic vidor. It is doubt- lefs an imperfedlion in a man's charadler that he is actuated by too eager a defire of honour or of wealth ; but incontinency, taken abfolutely, is blamed, not merely as an imperfedtion, but either as general depravity, or at leaft as a particular vice ; which ccnfifts in purfuing with too much eagernefs the plea- fures of the tafte and touch ; or in avoiding, foftly and weakly, the pains originating in thofe fenfes, cold and heat, hunger and thiril. Continency and incontinency, taken fimply and ftridlly, are converfant therefore about precifely the fame objedls v>'ith temperance and intemperance ; though the relation which they bear to thofe objeds be extremely different. The intemperate ς man ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 315. man purfues pleafure willfully and dcliberatdy, thinking it BOOK, always tlic proper objedc of his preference ; wherefore his in- ■ temperance is more odious in proportion to the debility of his defires ; for what exceffes might he be exploited to commit, were he ilimulated by the warmth of youthful paffipns ? Defires and pleafures, as we have already explained, are, either natural, (of which fome are even highly refpe£lable and honourable,) or unnatural ; or thii'dly, they hold an intermediate rank, being na- tural under certain conditions, and unnatural under others ; in which laft clafs we may place the defires of gain, glory, or vidlory. Defires of the firft and laft kind do not fubjedl thofe who gratify them to blame, provided they do not indulge them to excefs ; fo that thofe who delight in their own honours and advantage, or in the honour and advantage of their parents or children, and take proper means to promote objeds naturally fo dear to them, are juftly refpeded on this account ; although even here, extremes are dangerous ; as was exemplified in the cafe of Niobe, whofe pride in her children made her contend with the gods ; and in that of Satyrus, furnamed Philopater, whofe zeal for the honour of his father proceeded to the extra- vagance of folly. But fuch defires, being highly natural in themfelves, have nothing in them of wickednefs or tui-pitude, only their exceffes being hurtful or ufelefs, ought to be care- fully avoided. In indulging fuch defires beyond the limits prefcribed by right rcafon, we are indeed guilty of an error which ought to be fhunned, but which is not culpable, like that want of felf-command, properly called incontinence. Thefe errors bearing fome analogy to each other, fall under the com- mon denomination of weaknefs ; but that word, when applied to the one, does not mean the fame thing, as when it is applied s s 2 to 3i6 BOOK VII. Chap. 5. Unnatural depravities, their differ- ence from YJCCS. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. to the other, any more than the epithet bad, applied to a player or a phyfician, means the fame thing, as when it is applied to a man. Self-command then, and its oppofite weakneiTes, are con- verfant about the fame fubjedts with temperance and intem- perance. When the words are applied to other fubjeds, they are extended by way of fimile beyond their ftrift accepta- tion, and therefore other words mull be added to them in order clearly to exprefs our meaning. To fay fimply that a man is- wanting in felf-command, denotes that he is liable to be over- come by the fedudlions of fenfual pleafure, but does not imme- diately fuggeft to us that he is liable to be overcome by anger, honour, or gain. Some things naturally pleafe all animals ; others are naturally pleafant only to certain tribes ; and a third clafs, though not con- genial to any fpecies of animals in their found and natural ftate, are yet agreeable to fome individuals of the fpecies, either through certain bodily defeds, through perverfe habits, or through pravity of nature. From this laft kind refult the fierce and beaftly propenfities incident to fome individuals of the human fpecies ; witnefs that favage female who delighted in tearing to pieces women with child, and in devouring their young ; and thofe barbarians around Pontus, who feaft, fome of them on raw, others on human fleih, and who make mutual prefents of their children to eke out their horrid entertain- ments ; witnefs alfo the ihacking ftories told of the tyrant Pha- laris. Thefe are beaftly depravities, and others, not lefs abominable, are fometimes produced through difeafes and mad- nefs, as was exemplified in that wretch who facrificed and. eat his mother ; and in the flave who killed his companion that he might devour his liver. Some perfons, through difeafe or cuftom, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 317 cuftom, delight in plucking out their hair, biting off their nails, BOOK or in eating coals or earth. In nearly the Hime clafs we may ^ place psederafty. Such depravities, whether originating in na- tural corruption, cuftom, or malady, exceed the limits of vice, and cannot be reproached Avith epithets charadleriftic of merely human pravity, except by way of metaphor or fimilitude. Thus he who ihould fear even the buzzing of a fly, would be degraded by cowardice more than human, and brutifh. A man was afflided v/ith a malady which -made him tremble at the fight of a cat ; and there are fome nations of diftant barbarians who have fo little ufe of their reafon, and who are fo completely guided by their fenfations, that they are fcarcely diftinguiihable from brutes. Madnefs, epilepfy, and other difeafes alfo fubjed thofe afHided by them to ftrange perverfities of defire ; and from the fame fource of rational nature vitiated and changed, either by malady or cuftom, we fee fpring thofe excefles of folly, cowardice, intemperance, and favagenefs, which tranfcend the boundaries of merely human wickednefs. We may fuppofe a man ftimulated by brutal appetites, and yet reftraining them ; Phalaris for inftance, reftraining his defire to eat a boy, or to abufe him as the inftrument of an abfurd venereal pleafure ; and it may happen on the other hand, that a monfter in a human ihape may not only feel fuch propenfiiies, but want felf-com- mand to reftrain them. In fpeaking of men, fuch abominations cannot be called vices fimply and properly ; they are fomething worfe: depravities originating in difeafe or brutiihnefs, not fpringing from the improper indulgence of natural appetite. It is manifeft then, that felf-command and weaknefs, continency and incontinency, are converfant about the fame fubjeds with temperance and intemperance, and that there is another fpecies of 3iS. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK of contlnency, fo called metaphorically, though converfant about ^^ ^^^• , different objeds. Chap. 6. Incontinency of anger appears a leifcr deformity than incon- tinency as to pleafure. The reafons of this are, that anger voluptuouf-^ feems to liften to reafon, though it does not hear it dilVmdtly ;. deieftable'^ like officious fcrvants, who before they have received their than irafci- orders fully are in too great a hurry to execute them, and there- fore often do it amifs ; and dogs which bark at the leaft noife, before they know whether it proceeds from a friend or an enemy. In the fame manner anger, without waiting for rea- fon's lail commands, is precipitated through the warmth and quicknefs of its nature, into over-hafty ads of inconfiderate vengeance; concluding, at every real or fuppofed infult, that the author of it is worthy of indignation and puniihment. The conclufions of anger are indeed often erroneous ; but fenfuality, without flopping to draw any conclufions at all, at the firfl profpedt of pleafure, ruihes to enjoyment ; it is therefore the more degrading imperfedion of the two, fince the fenfualifl yields to mere appetite, whereas the angry man is led aftray by the appearance, at leafl, of reafon. Beiides this, it is to be ob- ferved, that all our faults feem to be more or lefs entitled to in- dulgence and pardon, in proportion as they are more or lefs na- tural, or more or lefs common. But tranfports of anger are far more natural than exceffes in criminal pleafure : the former feem to be congenial to fome races of men ; as in the family of him who apologized for beating his father by faying, that Jbe beat my grandfather, and my grandfather, the father before him ; and this little boy, pointing to his fon, will beat me when he is able ; the fault runs in our blood. Another, when dragged ty his fon to the door, defired him to flop there, becaufe he had only ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 319 only dragged his own father thither. Anger befides is open BOOK and undefigning ; but the paifion of vohiptuoufnefs is artful, and therefore unjuft. The ceftus of Venus is pregnant with wiles. " In this was every art and every charm To win the wifeft and the coldeft warm ; Fond love, the gentle vow, the gay defire. The kind deceit, the ilill reviving fire, Pcrfuafive fpeech and more perfuafive fighs. Silence that Ipoke, and eloquence of eyes «." The Incontinency of vohiptuoufnefs is therefore worfe than that of anger ; fince it more nearly approaches to deliberate wicked- nefs. It may be obferved to the fame purpofe, that no perfon afflidled with pain is addided to infolence ; for infults are com- mitted with pleafure, but anger is always accompanied with pain ; wherefore infolence, which is of all things the moil provoking, is incompatible with anger. The different kinds of incontinency have now been fufficiently explained, the hu- man, the brutiih, and that originating in difeafes ; the firft kind only is converfant about the fame obje£ls with the vice of intemperance ; a thing never afcribed to brutes, except meta- phorically, or comparatively ; when any clafs of animals is remarked as peculiarly obnoxious for its luft, voracity, or mif- chief. For brutes, being incapable of deliberation and eleftion, cannot be deformed by vice, ftridly fo called ; their ferocity, how formidable foever it may be, is a lefs evil than human vice ; fince they are deftitute of that bell principle of man, which, by corruption, becomes the worfl: ; and bad effects flowing from a principle, are thereby rendered more dangerous. A bad " Iliad, XIV. V. 247. k fcq. 320 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK A bad man is capable of doing ten thoufand times more mif- ^ - } chief than a beaft. Chap. 7. With refpeft to the pleafures and pains of the touch and tafte, which it falls within the province of temperance lo regu- late, we may be fo conilituted as either to conquer thofe by which the greater part of mankind are fubdued, or to be con- quered by thofe over which the greater part are vidlorious. The terms, felf-command, or continency, and its oppofite, incontinency, are moft properly applied m fpeaking of plea- fures ; the terms, firmnefs and foftnefs are refpedlively moft applicable to thofe who ihew more than an ordinary ftrength of mind in refifting pain, or more than an ordinary weaknefs in yielding to this adverfary. The greater proportion of man- kind float between the oppofite extremes of firmnefs and foftnefs, continency and incontinency ; verging, however, for the moft part, rather to the imperfedlions of incontinency and foftnefs. Since fome pleafures are altogether unneceflary, and of thefe which are neceflary, the excefles are carefully to be ihunned, he who purfues unne'ceffary or immoderate pleafures, with deliberate eledion, and merely for their own fake, is guilty of intemperance ; a vice the more incurable, becaufe thofe who harbour it are not liable to repentance. The vice oppofite to intemperance confifts in rejefting, through infen- fibility, even neceflary or commendable pleafures : the virtue of temperance lies in the middle between thefe blameable ex- tremes. With regard to bodily pains, a man may fly from and avoid, even thofe which ought to be encountered, cither through deliberate election, or through mere weaknefs and infirmity of nature ; and as one perfon is led captive by plea- sure, another may be overcome by the painful irritation of defire. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 321 defire. Bad adions are aggravated, when tliey are committed BOOK without impulfe from any violent pafTion. To ftrike in anger, , ^'f^' is an extenuation of the aflault ; and, in like manner, bafe adions, done without temptation, are rendered ftill bafer ; for, in what fhameful excefles would he who commits them be likely to indulge, were he ftimulated by fierce defires and headftrong appetites ? Intemperance, then, properly fo called, is more odious than that weaknefs which we have called incon- tinency ; and continency, which enables us to conquer plea- fures is preferable to that refifting firmnefs, which merely pre- vents us from being fubdued by pain. Softnefs, or effeminacy, confifts in yielding to flight pains ; and is illuftrated in him who trails his flowing garments on the ground, rather than fubmit to the uneafinefs of tucking them up ; thus exhibiting, without necefllty, a picture of difeafe and infirmity, and think- ing that there is no mifery in refembling the miferable. That a man ihould be overcome by great pleafures or great pain-e, is not a matter of wonder; and his defeat is entitled to pardon> provided his refifl:ance has been vigorous ; as is ex.emplified in the Philodetes of Theodeites, when bit by the fnake, and in the charadler of Cercyon in Cercinus' play of Alope. The burfts of agonifing pain are as natural on fuch occafions as thofe of laughter, when long and earnefl;Iy fupprefled ; an inftance of which was feen in Zenophantus. But a man is truly contemptible, when he foftly yields to flight and incon- fiderable fufferings, unlefs this happens through difeafe, or through fome natural infirmity in his race. In the kings of Perfia, effeminacy is hereditary j and manly firmnefs is not ex- pelled in women. A playful charadler is more allied to foftnefs than to intemperance ; for playfulnefs is the repofe and relax- VOL. I. τ τ atioa 322 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. η ο C) κ atlon of the mind. The want of ijlf-command originates, ^^^ either in raihnefs or in debiUty. Weak men deliberate, but want ilrength of mind to perfevere in their refolutions ; raiu men are hurried away by paiTion, without deliberating at all. Our own preparations and exertions have great power even over our bodily feelings ; a man may accuftom himfelf to bear tickling without fuffering the uneafy fenfaiion which it excites ; and, in the fame manner, by calling up pains and pleafures to the mind, by rendering them objedts of perception and ex- amination, and moderating by reafon the affedlions which they naturally ftir up in us, we may acquire the power of refifting and conquering thofe formidable enemies, whenever we are obliged adlually to contend with them in real life. Men of quick tempers, and thofe difordered by melancholy, are peculiarly deficient in felf- command ; the former, through their mobility ; and the latter, through that vehemence and impe- tuofity which renders them ilaves to their fancies, how wild foever they may be. -,, „ He that is properly intemperate, is not given to repentance ; becaufe, ailing with deliberate eleftion, he remains firm in his perverfe purpofes. He, on the other hand, who fees the right path, but, through weaknefs of charadler, does not purfue it, is liable to repent of his mifcondud:. His faults therefore are curable ' ; and the mental malady under which he labours, refembles rather the epilepfy, which comes by fits, than the confumption or dropfy, which are unremitting and continual. His weaknefs, indeed, is fpecifically different from vice ; for the latter can conceal itfelf, and even alTume the mafk of virtue ; but * Arlftotle fay;•-, " contrary to what was ftated in our doubts ;" he doubted how a man who knowingly erred, could ever be cured of his errors. See above, p• 3 > >• ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 323 but the former is always undifguifcd and open. This infirmity BOOK' of nature is tlic lefs inexcufable in proportion to the ftrength of paiTion, and the total abfence of reflection ; and the perfons difgraced by it refemble thofe who are fpeedily intoxicated and overcome by fuch a fmall quantity of wine, as would produce no perceptible eiFedls on ordinary conftitutions. Yet mere weaknefs of character is attended with as bad confequences as vice itfelf ; and is chargeable with the reproach which Demo- docus made to the Milefians, that though they were not Λ ftupid people, yet they adlcd ftupidly. In like manner, the weak man adls vicioufly ; but does not, like the intemperate man, give a deliberate preference to vice. His mind, therefore, is ftill open to perfuafion, and his life capable of reformation, fmce his charadter is not fo totally depraved as to make vice his end and aim. In the affairs of life, this end and aim forms a pradical principle, which cannot be taught any more than the axioms and poftulates of geome- try; and the perception of which refults entirely from virtue, either natural or acquired. The temperate man purfues right ends, from which he feels no inclination to deviate; the character of the intemperate man is diredly the reverfe. Be- tween thefe two, an intermediate place is held by him, who is hurried into bad adlions by the impetuous ftrength of paiTion ; but whofe mind is not fo totally vitiated as to make the grati- fication of fenfual appetites the deliberate objed of his purfuit. Perfons of tliis defcription do bad adions ; but as the principle of adlon itfelf, which is the main thing, ftill remains found, their condition is not hopelefs. They are indeed better than thofe who arc Intemperate on principle ; but ftill they are the objeds of great difapprobation ; whereas thofe Avho, though x X 2 liable Vil. 324 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK liable to be moved by corrupt defires, have yet fufficient ilrength , of mind to reftrain and cm'b them, are held praifeworthy ; not^ withilanding their characters fall far ihort of that perfedl tem- perance, with which no improper defire is compatible. Chap. 9• That firmnefs of mind called continency, implies a refolute . adherence to right opinions in oppofition to the fedudions of between in- appetite : it is totally different from obilinacy, which often and intern- yields to paffion, but perverfely refifts the didates of reafon. ^h^t^bT'* Obftinacy^bears the fame analogy to true firmnefs, that prodi- weakiiefs md galitv bears to liberality ; and raihnefs to couraee. It is infe- wickednefs. ^ ^ , . ■, r\r • • j i -n r parably connedted with felf-conceit, ignorance, and clowmmneis. An obftinate man takes pleafure in refilling conviction ; vic- tory, not truth, is his aim ; and, as if his opinions were laws, he is mortified and provoked by their rejection or reverfal. His character, therefore, fo far from implying firmnefs and felf-command, is rather a-kin to incontinency ; fince he is di- verted from propriety of thought and aCtion, by the allure- ments of falfe pleafure. A man may want ftedfailnefs in his purpofes, without being chargeable with incontinency or weaknefs. Of this we have an example in the character of Neoptolemus in Sophocles' PhiloCtetes. Pleafure made that young hero change his refolution ; but an honourable pleafure, the love of truth, after he had been perfuaded by Ulyffes to confent to be made an accomplice in falfehood ; for inconti- nency and intemperance do not originate in pleafure fimply and abfolutely, but in that kind of fenfual pleafure which is blameable and bafe. Men, as we have faid before, may be diverted from propriety of conduCl by being too little, as well as by being too much affeCted by bodily pleafures. Both ex- tremes are bad ; but as the former is obferved in few perfons> and ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 325 and on few occafions, it is not diftin^uiilicd by a name ; and Β Ο Ο FC . . . VII. the praifeworthy habit of continency is contrafted with that ._ - - ■ blameable difpofition which confifts in being too ftrongly afieded with the defirc of fenfual gratifications. Temperance and felf-command are in common difcourfe often confounded, from the refemblance which they bear to each other ; but the man deferving the praife of true temperance is above felf- command, becaufe his charadler is fuch, that he could not derive any enjoyment from bafe or blameable pleafures. The man endowed with continency or felf-command, refills, indeed, and overcomes fuch pleafures ; but ftill to him they feem to be pleafures, and he occafionally feels an inclination to enjoy them. In like manner, intemperance and incontinency are often confounded, for both lead to the fame voluptuous kind of life ; but the former prefers pleafure on principle ; the latter purfues it againft principle. Men deficient in felf-command may have clevernefs but Chap. ro. cannot have prudence; which latter is a praftical principle•, ^^;[~, implying not only that we know, but that we do, what is pmofs there- right. In reference to the underftanding, wit or clevernefs are nearly the fame with prudence ; but in reference to the will they are very different from it, becaufe prudence always implies a reftitude of moral eledion ; it is therefore abfolutely incompatible with the dominion of vicious paiTions. How fuch paiTions fhould be indulged knowingly, has been explained bv ihewing that the knowledge of thofe who indulge in them, is confined to m.ere fpeculations which are not applied; that it is knowledge not roufed to energy, but lying in a iluggiili ftate of mere capacity, like the knowledge of perfons afleep or intoxicated. The incontinent man is only wicked by halves, becaufe 325 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK becaufe he is not wicked on principle ; as he aits without de- ^_ 1 _ _j fign, he is not chargeable with injuftice. He either does not deliberate at all ; or if he deliberates, is like a ftate which has good laws, but does not obey them ; as Anaxandrides re- proached the Athenians, " The ftate confults how to make void the law." The real profligate, on the other hand, obeys laws, and thofe bad ones. A man is praifed for felf-command, when he excels moil others in that habit ; he is blamed for incontinency, when he yields to temptations, to which moil men are fuperior. The incontinency of thofe who deliberate rightly, but have not firmnefs to perfift in their refolutions, is more curable than that originating in melancholy ; which, through its quicknefs and vehemence, impels thofe affedled by it to adl without deli- beration ; and an incontinency depending on cuftom, is more curable than that which fprings from nature. For cuftom is more moveable than nature, fmce the difficulty of changing the former, depends on its refemblancc to the latter. — As the Poet Euenus fays, " Habits by long continued care impreft. Are ftrong as nature in the human breaft." Let this much fuffice for a defcription of the habits of conti- nency and firmnefs on the one hand ; of incontinency and foftnefs on the other ; and on the relations which thofe habits bear to each other'. * The four chapters which follow in the original of this work, are mere tranfc'ripts from the Sixth Book of the Ethics to Eudemus ; they treat of pleafme ; a fuhjecl more fully and more philofophically expLiined in the Tenth Bock of the Ethics to Nicoma- chus J of which the reader will find the tranflation in its proper place. . ( Ι^Ί ) ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK VIII. INTRODUCTION TO BOOKS VIII. AND IX. Ν thefe Books Ariftotle treats of friendihip, a fubjed, he ob- BOOK ferves, intimately connedled with morals ; " fmce friendihip, ^^^^• if not a particular virtue, at leaft ihines moft confpicuoufly in the virtuous." He explains the nature of friendihip, and re- folves the doubts concerning it. He divides it into different kinds, according to the principles in which it originates, and ihews how the beft kind of friendihip may be acquired, main- tained, and uninterruptedly enjoyed. Friendihips diifer, not only according to the fources from which they fpring, but ac- cording to the condition of the perfons by whom they are culti- vated. Our author examines the friendiliips between equals, and the friendiliips of inferiors with the great ; he explains the relations which friendihip bears to juftice, and how both are modified by political inftitutions. The rules of friendihip are far lefs precife than thofe of juftice, becaufe the fubjedl to which they apply is far lefs definite ; fcarcely any two cafes being exadlly alike. The author explains what is meant by loving our friends as ourfelves, and wherein true felf-love confifts, in oppofition to blameable felfiihnefs. He expatiates on the ex- 1 1 quifite 328 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK quifite delight of virtuous friendfliip, like a man who (as ap- pears from the hiftory of his life) had warmly felt its charms. The whole treatife, indeed, comprifed in the following two Books, is diftinguiihed by juft fentiment as much as by folid argument ; it is equally full and perfpicuous, rejeding paradox, difdaining declamation, and Ihewing, by an illuftrious example, how an important moral fubjedl may be unfolded with fcienti- fic accuracy, and imprefled with practical energy. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 329 BOOK VIII. ARGUMENT. Utility and beauty of frkndfiip.—^alhles by -which It Is gene- rated.— Three kinds offrlendfjlp.—Thefe kinds compared.— CharaElers moffufceptlble of frlendfjlp.— Unequal frlendfilps.— ■ Their limits.— Frlcndfilps founded on propinquity. 't piTE proceed next to treat of friendiliip, which is either a par- β Ο Ο Κ "^ ticular virtue, or which at Icaft ihines moil confpicuoufly l^_.— in the virtuous. It is alfo raoft eflential to the enjoyment of Chap. i. life, for without friends no one would choofe to Hve, though ^~^^^ poifeiTed of all other advantages Λ The rich and powerful beauty^of^ ftand moft in need of friends, without whom their profperity could neither be preferved nor enjoyed ; for wherein confifts the pre-eminence of power and wealth, but in the pleafures of be- neficence, which is moil laudably exercifed towards friends ? And how could this precarious pre-eminence be maintained without the ileady affiilance of friendly adherents? In poverty and other diftreifes, friendaiip feems our beft, or rather our fole, refu-e. It is neceffary in youth as the prefervative againft ir- ^ reparable » Si quisin CKlum adfcendliTet, naturamque tnundi, et pulchritudinem f.dcrum perfpcxiffet, infuavem iUam admirationem, &c. " To afcend to heaven, and behold the nature of the univerfe, and the beauty of the ftars, would afFord an adm.rat.on barren of delight, unkfs we had ibme one with whonn we might talk of thofe wonders. Ccero de Amicitia, c. ^y Cicero's Treatife on Friendftnp abounds wuh fparkhng paTages : he has often exi^anded and embellifhed Ariftotle's remarks ; but confidered as a philofophical work, it neither ibews that deep inf.ght into human nature, nor takes that comprebenQve view of the fubjea, which form the principal ment of the ..reek original. VOL.1. ^'" 330 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK reparable errors ; it is neceflary in old age, as the confolation amjdft unavoidable infirmities j. it is neceflary in the vigour of manhood, as the beil auxiliary in the execution of illuftrious enterprifes, both iharpening our thoughts and animating our exertions. " By mutual confidence and mutual aid. Great deeds are done and great difcoveries made : The wife new prudence from the wife acquire. And one brave hero fans another's fire ''." Friendfhip is implanted by nature in parents towards their children, as appears manifefl:ly, not only in the human race, but in the various tribes of birds, and in moft animals ; it prevails alfo among thofe of the fame clafs or family, but chiefly among men ; whence philanthropy is fo often the jufl: fubje£l of praife. During long and dreary journies, in every man the traveller meets, he beholds the face of a friend ; fuch congenial fym- pathy fubfifls among the human race ! Friendfhip holds man- kind together in communities and cities ; and lawgivers fl:udy more earneilly how to promote friendfhip than how to main- tain even jufl:ice itfelf ; for concord, which is a-kin to friendfhip, is the perpetual aim of all wife legiflation, which unceafingly ftrives to extirpate the feeds of difl^nfion and fedition, as of all things the moft hofl:ile to its views. When concord ripens into friendfhip, the rules of jufl:ice are fuperfluous, but juflice with- out friendlhip is infufficient for happinefs ; and the moft per- fe6l and moft comprehenfive juft:ice is that which moft refem- bles friendfhip in its operations and eiFedts. Friendfhip unites beauty with utility, it is not only necefl!ary but ornamental ; we praife it as a virtue ; we defire it as adding luftre to our charadlers ; ^ Iliad, X. V. 265. &feq. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 33^ charadters ; and to be a good friend feems to many fynonymous Β αο Κ tvith being a good man. Yet various doubts may be ftarted ^ , roncerning the nature of friendil.ip. Some think that it refults Doub. con- from fimilarlty of eharafter and purfuits, and cite the vulgar nacure^of _ proverb, « that fowls of a feather flock together." Others maintain that this fnnilarity more naturally begets eumlatioa and hatred ; quoting from Hefiod, « Potters hate potters ; bards quarrel with bards." They feek the principles of friendflup in the high philofophy of nature, faying either with Euripides, *' The parched earth longs for refreihing fhowers ; The ikies, heavy with rain, feek to unload Their weight of waters on the folid earth." or with Heraclitus, " that each nature requires and feeks it^ counterpart :" thus the beft harmony refults from differences, and thus all things proceed from contrary elements. Other phdo- fophers, particularly Empedocles, alTert diredly the reverfe, « that like draws to like." The confideration of thefe phyii- cal difficulties we at prefent omit, becaufe they are beftde the purpofe of this difcourfe, which is confined to the exammation of fuch queftions only as have a reference to life and manners j as whether friendQ.ip can fubfift among all forts of perfons, or only among the virtuous ; whether there are various kinds of fnend- ihip fpecifically different ; for thofe who think there is but one kind, becaufe friendihip admits of different degrees of warmth andimenfity, truft to a fallacious proof, fince other general terms as well as frlendililp comprehend divihons of thmgs fpecifically different from each other, and yet partakmg more or icfs in a ftrcno-cr or weaker degree, of the charaaerift;c quahty ' '^ „ „ ^ which υ υ 2 232 Aristotle's ethics. BOOK which the general• term dehotes. But of this fubjeit T^e have VIII. formerly treated ^ Chap. 2- ^^ illuftrate the nature of friendfliip, we muft examine what -■ • are the qualities by which it is excited or produced. Whatever objeas of' is an objeil of our friendfhip, mud promote either our good, fnendihip, q^j. plgafu^-e^ or our utiUty ; and as utility is defirable merely ties by which as the caufe of what is either good or pleafant, the caufes of duced. friendfhip ultimately refolve themfelves into goodnefs and plea- fare ; confidered, not abfolutely in themfelves, but in reference to the perfon in whom the friendfhip is generated; whether that perfon has jufl; notions of what is good and pleafant, or takesth ofe for real goods, which are only apparent. The qua- lities by which friendfhip is excited are not, when abftradtedly confidered, able to produce this amiable difpofition ; for that which is an objed: of friendfhip is loved on its own account ; and it is neceifary that between friends there fhould fubfift a reciprocity of aifedlion. Things inanimate therefore cannot be the obje£t of friendfliip. A drunkard indeed loves wine ; but it would be ridiculous to fay that he defires its good, although he indeed ■wifhes for its fafety, that he himfelf may drink it. . Mere good- will may fubfift on one fide, without m-eeting a return ; and perfons who have not any opportunity of being acquainted, may mutually bear to each other much good-will ; but friendfhip not only implies a reciprocity of affedion, but requires that this reciprocity fhould be known to both parties. Chap. 3. Friendfhip may be diftinguifhed into three kinds, according ; to the three qualities by which it is produced ; and in each of offriendlhip. the three there muft be a known reciprocity of aifedion de- pending on the caufe in which the friendfhip originates. When this caufe is utility, men love each other as long as mutual ad- vantage « See Analyiis, p. 65. & feq. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. ^r^ vantage refults from their friendflilp : a iunilar obfervatlon is Β GO Κ applicable when their aiFedtion is founded on pleafure. Neither the utility nor the pleafure which any man affords, conftitute an effential and unalterable part of his charafter ; and when on ac- count of th'^fe circumftances he himfelf becomes an objed of friendihip, he is fo, merely by way of acceffion or appendage to qualities not infeparably conneaed with him, and which being adually removed, he himfelf ceafes to be an objed of friend- ihip. Friendlhlps founded on utility prevail moft among per- fons advanced in years ; for intereft, not pleafure, .is their aim. Manhood, and even youth, often imitate too faithfully the felhih manners of age ; choofmg their friends according to views of in- tereft. Perfons of this charader delight but little in each other's fociety. Even their convivial hofpitality has perfonal advan- tage for its objea. Youthful friendihips however, for the moft part, are founded on pleafure ; for youth is the age of paflion, which purfues and prefers prefent and immediate gratification. But as our pleafures change with our years, youthful friendftiips are as eafily diffolved as they were fpeedily contrafted. Befides, youth is much addided to love, which is full of mutability, its principal ingredients being pleafure and paffion, fo that it varies many times in a day. Youthful attachments, wbile they laft, produce clofe and habitual intimacy, becaufe fuch friendftiips have no other foundation than the delight refulting from mu- tual intercourfe. The only perfed friendfliip fubfifts among thofe who referable each other in virtue, becaufe thofe who love their friends for their virtue, love them for what is not a temporary appendage, but a permanent effential in their charafters. The worth of a virtuous friend is not relative to circumftances, but univerfal and abfolute, comprehend- ing 334 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK iiig both pleafure and utility, and uniting all thofe qualities ^ X^^^i; ρ which either produce friendihip or render it unalterable ; but his ineftimable value cannot be fairly appreciated, except by thofe Λvho are his rivals in moral or intelledual excellence ; for men delight chiefly in thofe qualities which referable their own. Such friendihips ai-e rare, becaufe virtuous men are rare ; and even t/jey cannot perfe£tly know each other, until, according to the proverb, they have confumed many buihels of fait together. Time and familiarity are requifite for proving mutual affeition, and for creating that fteady confidence which cements friend- ihip. Friendly a£ls produce rather an inclination to friendihip than the thing itfelf, which muft be the effedl of time and habit operating on excellencies reciprocally exerted, and mutually ex- perienced, in thofe who are refpe£tively confcious of being the objeds of love and aifedion the one to the other. Chap. 4. Friendihips founded on utility and on pleafure bear a refem- — ; — blance to that founded on virtue ; for virtuous men afford both ent kinds of pleafure and utility to their friends. But friendihips of the. compared former kind are the more durable in proportion as they ori- ^'^h'^'"''^i^ ginate on both fides in nearly the fame principle, that is in rability. nearly the fame kind of pleafure or utility. Thus, they na- turally laft long between men recommended to each other by their companionable qualities, their wit and pleafantry ; they are lefs durable among lovers, when, as for the moft part hap- pens, the love on the one fide arifes from an admiration of beauty, and on the other from the attentions beftowed by the lover. When beauty is impaired by years, the admiration ceafes, the attentions are withheld, and the friendihip founded on this kind of love is fometimes at an end ; but many times alfo it lafts, when cemented by congenial manners, ftrengthened and ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. . 335 and confirmed by long habits of familiar intercourfe. Friend- β () C) κ fliips founded on the love of gain are of all the moft unftable ; ,_ __'ί' _, for perfons governed by this principle are not friends to each other, but both to their refpedive interefts. All perfons promifcuoufly, the good, the bad, and thofe of an intermediate charader, may feel tovv'ards each other that kind of fricndfliip which originates in pleafure or utility ; but good men only can be the objeds of friendfhip properly fo called, independent of circumftances and refulting from what is moft efien- tial and moft unalterable in the charader itfelf. The friend- ihips of the virtuous are not to be deftroyed by fortune, nor ihaken by calumny. What accident or event can change or difturb confirmed habits of virtue ? What calumny can prevail againft known and approved worth ? The friendlhip formed from intereft therefore, like alliances between ftates, and thofe formed from pleafure, like the friendftiips of our boyifh years, are called friendfhips only by way of fimilitude or metaphor ; and thofe metaphorical friendihips refemble other metaphors in this, that they do not naturally mingle, or eafily blend and unite ; for how feldom do we fee the fame perfons friends to each other on the combined principles of profit and of pleafure ? Such then are the different kinds of friendfliip. That formed by the virtuous alone deferves the name, the others are fo called merely by a figure of fpeech. Men procure the denomination of friendly as they do that of Chap. 5. virtuous, either from their adions or from their habits. Friend- „, "" 1 hech.rac- ly adions can take place only among thofe who are members of ters inoit the fame fociety ; but the habit of friendfhip may fubfift fnendlhip! ° among perfons widely feparated from each other, though, when their 336 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK ^^^'^^ reparation continues long, their friendfliip Is apt to be for- . ^^^• ^ gotten ; whence it is faid, " Long abfence often is the bane of friendfliip." Old perfons, and thofe of auftere charaiTcers, are, from this prin- ciple, but little difpofed to friendihip ; becaufe in them both the love of pleafure, and the power of communicating it, is com- monly fo much weakened, that they have not any great induce- ment to keep company with each other ; for as pleafure is the great aim of nature, the fociety of thofe who are capable neither of affording nor reliihing it, cannot poffibly be defired ; and if they occafion real and pofitive uneafmefs, Λνϋΐ not long be en- dured. Thofe who, without delighting in each other's fociety, are however refpedively the objeds of mutual approbation, may have great good-will towards each other with very little friendfhip; for nothing is fo produdive of friendihip as the habitual intercourfe of life. The wretched feek fuccour in fo- ciety, but the happy feek fociety for itfelf, and can leaft of all men bear folitude ; but the love of fociety itfelf is founded on the pleafure afforded by thofe with whom we live ; which pleafure implies that their charaders be agreeable, and much of the fame ftamp wath our own. Friendihip, therefore, as has been often faid, prevails chiefly among the virtuous, to whom only that is good and pleafant, which is good and pleafant ab- folutely and effentially, independently of any circumftances that may concur, or of any confequences that may follow ; and to whom the mutual enjoyment of their correfpondent excellen- cies is of all things the moft delightful. Chap. 6. Aged perfons and thofe of aufteie characters are unfit for Fri^^iid/hi friendihip in proportion to their aufterity, and to their averfion cannot at 8 jO ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 337 to fociety. Young people therefore fooner form friendihips BOOK than the old and auilere ; who, though they may often bear . .-'.j great good-will to each other, and ihew much readinefs in mu- °^;2^!i°^- tualiy conferring the moil eflential fervices, are yet flow and cold many ob- in fentimental attachment, becaufe they are averfe to that focial intercourfe in which chiefly it originates. Friendihip in its highefl: perfeftion cannot extend to many ; and for a fimilar reafon that it is impoflible for us to feel the paflTion of love for many perfons at once. There is an intenfity in friendihip as well as in love, which naturally confines it to one objeG:. Men have different taftes, each of which has fomething in it too pe- culiar to be alike pleafed with many ; and it is right that it ihould be fo. Friendfliip, befides, requires long and intimate knowledge, which is not eafily obtained of many charadters by one perfon, who cannot live in equal and clofe familiarity with them all. Friendihips of interefl: or pleafure are indeed fpeedily contraded, becaufe their offices may be fpeedily performed, and many are able to fulfil them. Of the two, thofe of pleafureN mofl: refemble true friendihip, efpecially when the pleafure is mutual, and refulting from the fame objeds and purfuits. Such are the friendfliips of youth, which are of a warmer and more liberal kind than thofe formed among money-getting men > on the cold principle of intereft. Men profperous in their cir- cumftances prefer pleafure to utility ; they choofe the fociety of agreeable friends, fince worth itfelf, joined with harihnefs and aufterity, foon becomes offenfive and irkfome ; but if they loved and preferred, as right reafon would direft, agreeable qualities only when ennobled by virtue, they would find in their friends all advantages united. Men inveiled with power have two The great diftina claflcs of friends ; the one chofen from tafte, the ^ζ^^ [.y^"^^^ ' V γ other of friends. VOL. I. XX ο 38 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK Other from intereft. The friends calculated to pleafe are not ^ _ ' . qualified to benefit them ; for as they feek pleafure diftindl from virtue, and p,urfue intereft diftinft from honour, merry buffoons are beft qualified for the firft purpofe, and dexterous knaves beft adapted to the fecond ; the man of virtue alone anfwering the double end of pleafure and utility. But a virtuous man cannot live in friendihip with the great unlefs they be as much difpofed to refpe£l his fuperiority of virtue, as he is difpofed to honour their fuperiority of fortune, becaufe the law of equality, which is the foul of friendihip, would otherwife be violated ; and as men in power are generally too much intoxicated with their profperity " to make this juft facrifice, they feldom enjoy the ineftimable benefit of virtuous friendihip. Such then are thofe kinds of friendihip in which men interchange either plea- fures or utilities on both fides, or exchange pleafure on the one fide for utility on the other. They refemble true friendihip in this, that they are productive of pleafure or profit ; but they differ from it in many other refpedls, and particularly in being eafily ihaken by calumny, and eafily fubverted by a change in the external circumftances of thofe between whom they pre- vailed. #lhap. 7. Friendihip, ftridtly fo ' called, requires, as we obferved, equality; but there is alfo a fpecies of friendihip which fubfifts friendihips : between perfons of extremely unequal conditions ; namely, that between fathers (or thofe Λvho hold the place of fathers) and children ; hufbands and wives ; rulers and thofe fubjed; to their authority. This fpecies of friendiliip admits of many fubdivi- i'lons : the friendihip of a father towards his fon, difters from that ' Non enim folum ipfa fortuna csca eft, fed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos, quos complexa eft. " Fortune is not only herfelf blind, but ftie, for the moft part, renders thofe alfo blind whom ihe embraces." Cicero de Amicitia, c xv. their limits. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 339 that of a hufband towards his wife, and that of a king towards Β Ο Ο Κ his people ; it differs alfo from that of a fon towards his father ; ^ for the parties ftanding in this and other relations, have each of them their refv^caive offices and their refpedive duties ; the ha- bitual performance of which can alone give ftability to their friendQ^p. When the pre-eminence is greatly on one fide, Λ^.hether in the power of bellowing profit or pleafure, the friend- fldp ought to be greater on the other, in nearly the fame pro- portion, that the rules of equal juftice may thus be maintained. But equality in point of juftice confifts primarily in this, that each man ihould have his due : tha the ihares iliould be nearly equal in quantity, is only a confequence that fometimes follows from this rule ; for when the perfons are equal in worth, then only their ihares ftiould be equal in value. But in point of friendihip, equality in quantity or worth is a primary confider- ation; for between perfons extremely unequal as to virtue, power, Avealth, and other caufes produdlve of diftindion, friendihip cannot eafily fubfift. The gods are the great bene- fadors of mankind, but they. are far too exalted for our friend- ihip. Kings do not choofe their friends among the loweft claffes of their people : nor do men eminently diftinguiihed by virtue and wifdom, affociate with perfons of no confideration or merit. It is impoffible accurately to afcertain the precife limits beyond Avhich the elevation of the one party becomes too great to admit of friendihip with his Inferior. The friendihip may iliU fubfift, after many advantages are taken from the one and accumulated on the other. But with the exaltation of the lat- ter to divinity, the relation of friendihip would unqueftionably ceafe ^ ; Λvherefore it is doubted, wdiether a man can wiih for the <• Does this bear any reference to the friendihip between Ailftotle and his pupil Alexander ? X X 2 340 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK the deification of his friend, fince this would be to wifh for the , _ _' __f deftrudlion of their friendfhip. Perhaps he does not even wiih for him all human advantages ; for a man defires that every good thing may happen to his friend, provided only what is a good to his friend be not an evil to himfelf ; and it would be a great evil to himfelf to lofe a good friend. Chap. 8. Moil people, through vanity, wiih rather to be beloved than to • ; love. They are therefore fond of flatterers ; who are, or rather naryfounda- pretend to be, a kind of unequal friends, that love more than equal 'friend- *^^7 ^^^ loved. Love is near akin to honour, which moil ^'ps• men defire, not indeed for its own fake, but for the advantages which accrue from it. They delight in marks of diilindlion from the great, which they regard as pledges of future and more folid bounties. Thofe who are ambitious of honour from per- fons well acquainted with them, and whofe charadlers are efteemed for equity, wifli thereby to confirm their good opi- nion of themfelves. They delight in thinking favourably of their own charafters, in confequence of this impartial verdidt in their favour ; and the pleafure which they take in being the objects of love and approbation, is the caufe for which they de- fire external marks of honour and refpedl. To be loved, there- fore, is better than to be honoured, and friendfhip is ftill more than honour ultimately defirable. The former however con- fifts more in loving than in being loved ; in proof of which we may allege the behaviour of mothers who give out their children to nurfe, pleafed with loving them and knbwing that they are well, without expelling or defiring any return of af- iectioru To love one's friends is a common topic of praife ; and the virtue of friendfhip depends on the ftrength and pro»- piiety of our aifeftion, which can alone render it permanent, levelling all thofe inequalities, and removing all thofe obftacles which ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 341 which might interrupt its duration. Such is the friendihip of BOOK virtuous men, who being ilable in themfelves, remain ftable in ._ ^"^• _. their relations to each other ; neither requiring nor admitting any aflbciation with the worthlels. Theie laft are inconftant in all their ways, and there can be no ilability in their relations to each other, fmce none of them a£ls uniformly or confiftently, nor remains long like unto himfelf. Their friendihip is but a league in villainy, which, for the moil part, ends when it ceafes to be profitable : when pleafure confpires with profit it is naturally more durable. The friendihips refulting from con- traries refolve themfelves into the principle of utility ; as thofe between the poor and rich, the learned and ignorant ; for a man is always ready to give fomething in exchange for that of which he ftands in need. In the fame clafs we may place, without much violence, the handfome and the ugly, the lover and the objeit of his affedlion. Wherefore fome lovers juftly incur ridicule when they expedl to meet with a return of love fimilar to their own. Were their perfons calculated to infpire a mutual paffion, their expedlation would be reafonable ; but when they are the reverfe, their pretenfions are ridiculous. Perhaps contraries do not primarily affeil each other, but both of them are fond of that intermediate condition which is pre- ferable to either. Thus what is dry loves moifture, only that it may attain an intermediate ftate ; and that which is warm afFeds cold, only that it may be reduced to a due temperature ^ But fuch queftions may be omitted, as befide the purpole of the prefent difcourfe. Juftice and friendihip, as we already obferved, fecm to be- Chap. 9. lonp; to the fame perfons, and to be converfant about the fame — ■ — u• Λ T^u u ι r J • n• Of the rcU- objetts. Ί hey are both round in every partnerihip or com- tion which friendihiu • bee Analyhs, p. iii.&ieq. juftice. 342 'ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK munlty, even among thofe who fail in tlie fame veffel, and ^^'^" thofe who fight under the fame ftandard ; and in proportion to the clofenefs of the partnerfhip or community, the more ^lofely and intimately is the friendfliip cemented. The proverb fays rightly, " that all things are common among friends ;" for friendihip refults from the community of goods, adΛ'antages, and pleafures ; it is moft perfeil among brothers and com- panions ; and in the fame proportion as the ties of the partner- fhip or connexion are loofened, and fewer things are common, the friendihip becomes lefs intimate, and even the rules of juftice feem lefs binding. It is a more heinous crime to rob our friends than our fellow-citizens, and our fellow-citizens than ftrangers. Not to fuccour a brother in diftrefs is more odious than to refufe fimilar affiftance to a ftranger j and to ftrike a father is the moft atrocious of crimes. Friendihip and juftice thus march hand in hand, and the vigour of the one is follow- ed by equal intenfity in the other. But all other connexions and partnerihips are but parts of the great partnerfhip of poli- tical fociety, which utility firft coUefted and ftill holds together. Public utility therefore is that chief and ultimate aim of which wife legiflators never lofe fight. To promote particular branches of this utility, all inferior aflbciations are formed ; fleets fail, armies march ; their aim is wealth or vidlory ; to invade, conquer, and plunder ; to fubdue provinces, and ftorm cities. Even the peaceful communities of tribes and wards, and thofe mirthful aflemblies which meet to feaft, to drink, and to dance, depend on the fame principle ; for legiflators have not merely prefent and temporary advantage in view, they look farther, to the permanent comfort and fure enjoyment of life, and there- fore eftablifh folemnities during which human induftry may repofe ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 343 f epofe from paft labours, and prepare for future exertions, by Β Ο Ο Κ which the gods are honoured, and the heart of man is glad- , ,«_j dened. The ancient folemnities of this kind were held to- wards the end of autumn, the feafon of greateft leifure, when men having gathered in the earth's produdions, might offer the firft fruits to the gods. Political fociety, then, comprehends all other partnerihips or affociations ; from the varieties of which the different kinds of friendihip refult. There are three juft forms of government, each of which Chap. lo. is liable to deviate into a corr-upt form, which is a counter- Qf"^f. feit refemblance of the former. The juft forms are royalty, ['I^^^J^'^'J^'' ariftocracy, and what may be called timocracy, becaufe all ment. men enjoying a certain income are entitled to a ihare in the government. This laft, moft writers diftinguiih by the general name of polity, or a republic. It is the worft of all legal go- vernments, as royalty is the beft. Tyranny is the corrupt re- femblance of royalty, for both. forms are monarchical ; but they differ moft widely, a tyrant confulting-only his own advantage, a king only that of his people ; for the latter does not deferve the name, if he be not in all things pre-eminent, independent, and all-fufficient in himfelf ; fo that with him perfonal confidera- tions being fuperfluous, he can have no other reafonable purfult but that of the public good. If kings are not of this defcription, they might as well be chofen by lot. Tyrants, on the other hand, purfue only their own intereft, and their government is the worft of all, fmce it ftands in dired oppofition to royalty, which is of all the beft. As kings may be corrupted into ty- rants, fo ariftocracies degenerate into oligarchies, through the corruption of the magiftrates, who make an unjuft diftribution of honours and emoluments, of which they ufurp and retain the greater 344 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK gi'eatcr part for themfelves, accumulating enormous wealth as the inftrument of exorbitant power, and continually narrowing, through felliihnefs, the bails of the government. Timocracy naturally degenerates into democracy, which is nearly akin to it ; fmce whenever men of limited fortunes are entitled to iliare the government, power will have a natural tendency to fall into the hands of the people. Democracy therefore is a lefs deviation from what is called a republic, than tyranny is from royalty, or oligarchy from ariftocracy ; and in this particular circumftance, it is lefs depraved and odious than the other two vicious forms of government. Of political revolutions we find the refemblances, and, as it were, the patterns in what pafles in families. The paternal authority is the model for that of kings, for children are their fathers' deareft concern. Whence Homer addreiTes Jupiter by the appellation of father, denoting the near affinity between royal and paternal power. But in Periia fathers are tyrants, treating their fons as flaves ; and Haves are treated merely as heft fuits the intereft of their mailers. This may be agreeable to the nature and principles of fervitude, but the Perfian fyftem, in extending thefe principles to children, is vitious in the extreme ; for different defcriptions of perfons re- quire different modes of governance. Domeftic authority is the heft model for ariftocracy, for the authority of a hufband is founded on the fuperiority of his abilities and his virtues. He cxercifes thofe fundlions which this fuperiority enables him beft to perform, leaving to female care thofe offices which women are beft qualified to fulfil ; fince if he ufurped all management to himfelf, his equitable ariftocracy would de- generate into an unlawful and rigid oligarchy. When women, being rich heireffes, acquire thereby more than their due ihare 5 of ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 345 of power, their authority alio originates in an unjuft oligarchi- Β Ο Ο Κ cal principle, fince, in their prepoilerous pre-eminence, wealth , is preferred to worth ; the gifts of fortune, to the diftindions of nature. Tirnocracy refembles the equal commonwealth of brothers, among whom there is no other diftindlion than that made by a flight difference of age ; for when this difference is very great, brotherly friendlliip cannot eafdy R^lbfift. Demo- cracy refembles thofe families which are without a head ; or in Avhich all avail themielves of the mailer's weaknefs, to affert equality, and to defy controul. Friendfliip, as well as juftice, varies with the different forms chap, i r. of polity ; fmce both ultimately depend on the different rela- tions in which men iland to each other in fociety. The relation tions ^7reby of a king to his fubjedts, is that of a benefador to thofe bene- pccafioned , , in the nature filed by his care. He provides for the welfare of his people, and intenfity as a ihepherd does for that of his flock : whence Homer calls Agamemnon the fhepherd of the people. Of a fimilar kind is the relation of a father to his children, but pre-eminent in the magnitude of benefits, fmce he is the caufe of their exiftence itfelf, which feems of the utmofl moment, as well as of their education and nurture. A father is naturally a king in his own family ; and the fame holds with regard to more remote an- ceftors and their defcendants, the former of whom are entitled to honour from the latter, and therefore the friendfliip between them is not that of equals, but is modified by the natural and Indelible fuperiority of the one party to the other.. The rela- tion of hufband to wife is fimilar to that which prevails in ariftocracies between the magiftrates and citizens. The honours and advantages belonging to the former, refult from the fupe- riority of their abilities and virtues. The hufband's honour is VOL. I. y Υ pre- 346 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK pre-eminent not abfolute, he has his duties as well as his rights ; both parties haA^e their allotted funftions, namely, thofe which are beft adapted to their refpe£tive charaders. The relation of brothers is that of equal companions, refulting from the near fimilitude of their ftrength and ftature, their common educa- tion, and fimilar manners. They refemble a republic, ftridly fo called, in which the citizens are treated juftly, when they are all treated alike ; and as they cannot all rule at once, the go- vernment is managed by rotation. Their juftice confifts in equality, and their friendfhip is that of equals. In corrupt go- vernments there is little juftice, and therefore but little friend- fhip. Tyranny, which is the greateft corruption of all, fcarcely admits of any friendihip at all. Since there is nothing commpn between the fovereign and fubjed, there is not any room for juftice, nor therefore for friendihip. The relation of a tyrant tQ his fubjeds is that of an artift to an inftrument, of the foul to the body, of a mafter to a flave. The intereft and fafety of all thefe fubfervient things are confulted by thofe who make ufe of them ; but there cannot be any friendihip nor any juftice be- tween living and inanimate objects, becaufe they cannot enjoy any thing in common. Neither can men have friendihips with horfes, cattle, or (laves, confidered merely as fuch ; for a flave is a living inftrument, and an inftrument a lifelefs flave. Yet confidered as a man, a flave may be an objedt of friendihip ; for certain rights feem to belong to all thofe capable of participating in law and engagement. A flave then, confidered as a man, may be treated juftly or unjuftly, and therefore may be a friend or an enemy. There is little friendihip and little juftice in ty- rannies ; but moft of both in republics, becaufe, among equals there are moft common rights, and moft common enjoyments. Friendihip, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 347 Friendililp, then, refults from the community of rights and BOOK enjoyments among perfons living in the fame commonwealth, - _' _, belonging to the fame tribe or diftridl, failing in the fame veffel ; Chap. 12. in which, and all fimilar cafes, the parties feem mutually en- ... Of friend- gaged to each other to maintain and uphold then- reciprocal (hips found- advantages. The friendihip arifmg from hofpitality is of the pinnui^y°oV fame nature ; but that depending on propinquity in blood, or '''°°''' congeniality of character, may perhaps be referred to a different principle. Friendfhips between relations, though they branch out into many kinds, may be all traced to one fource, namely, the aifedion between parents and children. Parents love their children as parts of themfelves, and children love their parents as the fource from which they fpring. The love of the former is the ftrongeft, becaufe they better know their children for their own, than the children can know them for their parents ; becaufe the produilion more belongs to its author, than the au- thor to his work ; and becaufe parents know and love their children for a longer time, that is, immediately from their birth, whereas children cannot begin to love their parents till they become capable of perception and intelligence. The love of parents for their children is merely an expanfion of felf-love, for they ftill regard their children as parts of themfelves ; but children have, in their own minds, a feparate and independent perfonality, diftind from that of their parents, which they are inclined, however, to revere as the fountain of their blood. From the common relationfhip of brothers to the fame father, they become mutually related to each other ; wherefore they are faid to come from the fame blood, which flows in different Itreams, or from the fame f^ock, which fpreads into different branches. Their friendihip is confirmed by nearnefs of age, famenefs of y γ 2 education, 348 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. Β ο ο Iv education, and fimilarity of purfuits. They are companions as \ r Γ f r . well as brothers, and therefore warmed with all that aifedlioa for each other, which confort and fociety is calculated to in- fpire. The connexion between other relations originates in the fame principle, and is more or lefs intimate in proportion to their proximity to the common fource. Children ihould love their parents as men do the gods, fince they are to them the au- thors of the greateft benefits; their life, nurture, and education ; and the friendihip between them, from their continual inter- courfe of life, contains far more than any other, whatever is fweeteft and moil ufeful. Brothers, we have faid, are compa- nions, whofe fellowihip will be the more intimate, in propor- tion to the fimilarity of their virtuous characSters and honourable purfuits, and to the confirmation which the affe£tion of their early years derives from confidence approved by lime and ex- perience. The friendihip between more diftant kinfmen de- pends on the fame circumftances, according to which it will Between either invigorate or decay. That between huihand and wife is wlfef" ^" ϊηοίΐ ftrongly prompted and enforced, by nature itfelf ; for do- meftic fociety is more natural than even the political ; fince it is prior and more neceffary, being efiential to the prefervatiou• of the fpecies, and common to all kinds of animals. But with the inferior tribes, this fociety is limited by the fole end of re- produdion ; in man it extends to all the oSces of life, which naturally divide themfelves between, hufband and wife, each fupplying what their refpedive qualities heft enable them to furjiifli for the accommodation and comfort of the other. . The induftry and excellencies of each are thus brought into the com- mon ftock of domeftic happinefs, which their diftindive virtues are calculated wonderfully to augment, fo that this kind of friendihip ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 349 frlendfliip is recommended and ftrengthened by every circum- BOOK ftance of pleafure as well as of utility. Their children too ^_ Z"^' _, form a new and powerful tie, being a common good, in which they mutually fliare ; and which has the ftrongeft effedt in binding them indiflblubly together. The varieties of friendfhip thus depend on the various kinds of juftice, which themfelves refult from the multiplied relations of men in civil fociety. For very different rights and very different duties have place between friends, ftridly fo called, and thofe who are partners in the fame concern, companions in the fame ftudies, or who are mere ftrangers the one to the other,. There are then tliree kinds of friendihip^ each of which de- Chap. 13,, pends on a different principle, and in each of which the friend- . '~~~ ihip may fubfift either between equals, or between perfons ex- tween . tremely unequal, not only as to their refpedive worth and theyoughr dignity, but as to the relative importance of their friendihip to jufted!'^ each other. When the friendihip fubfifts between equals, equal attentions and an equal degree of affedion ought, as much as poffible, to be aimed at ; but when the pre-eminence is greatly on one fide, the affedion and attentions of the inferior ought to rife in the fame proportion. The friendihip founded on utility is that which is by far the moft likely to produce between the parties mutual altercation, and often mutual reproach. When the con- nedling principle is virtue, friends are eager to benefit each other ; the only rivalihip between them is, vv^ho {hall do to the other moft good, and he who gains the viilory in this ami- eable conteft, is fo far from creating ill-will in his friend, that he only provokes him to new v\^orks of kindnefs. Nor are mutual accufations frequent where the fole end of the friendihip h pleafure. While this purpofe is attained, the parties keep com- pany 350 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK pany with each other ; and when it is not, a mutual feparation . ' . is fo eafy, that complaint would be ridiculous. But when utility is the principle, refufals on one fide muft be as frequent as exa£tions on the other, and both parties will think they are ill treated, becaufe each expefts more than his due. As law is either written or unwritten, fo friendihip founded on utility is either legal or moral ; the firft is where exa£t returns are fpe- cified, as if you give to me that, I will give to you this ; or where the agreement is more liberal than merely from hand to hand, and allowing a fpace of time to be interpofed before the fervice performed on the one fide is requited by an equal fer- vice on the other. When friendly confidence is repofed by one party in the other, an adlion at law is not granted by fome na- tions, for the fulfilling even of conditions, the reality of which admits not of any uncertainty ; for to them it feems equitable, that he who has imprudently trufted to the good faith of an- other, fliould not be entitled to correil by law the error of his own credulity. The moral friendihip founded on utility takes place, where fomething is given, or fome fervice is rendered, without the fpecification of any thing, or any fervice to be given or done in return. Yet by the party who has conferred the benefit, an equal, or even more than equal return is on many occafions expected ; and when this is not made, he complains of ill treatment. His complaint is occafioned by what occafions almoft all other complaints of breach of friendihip, his un- ileadinefs of principle, giving liberally, but craving like a niggard : affeciling the praife of generofity in the firft part of the tranfadlion, but fhewing in the laft that he is guided merely by intereft ; for moft men, though they love what is honour- able, prefer what is ufeful. It is honourable to ^o good with- 1$ out ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 351 out expeftlng a return ; it is ufeful to have every good adion BOOK requited with intereft. Yet thofe who have received favours . ought to requite them according to their abiHty, when fuch re- quital is defired by their benefailors, for no man's friendfliip can be obtained againft his will ; fo that when we have met with an a£t of generous friendihip, from one who afterwards appears not to entertain for us any friendly difpofition, we ought doubtlefs, when able, to make a fuitable return ; when this return is not in our power, even the interefted benefador himfelf would not be fo unreafonable as either to require or ex- pert it. When favours are conferred, we muft confider there- fore, both the man and his motives, in order to determine whether they ought to be returned, and in what manner the re- turn ihould be made. It is fometimes a matter of doubt by what ftandard this return ihould be meafured, whether by the^ benefador's good will, or by the advantage therefrom refulting to the perfon benefited. The latter is often inclined to ex-- tenuate his obligations, and to think the favours which he has received both flight in themfelves, and fuch as many others would have been ready to beftow on him. The benefactor on the other hand, reprefents them as the greateil favours that he could poifibly have done, fuch as none other would have con- ferred, and enhanced too by being bellowed in a moment of danger, or fome other exigency. Since utility is the fole bafis of fuch friendihips, and of the aitions proceeding from them, ought not the advantage accruing to the perfon obliged, to be regarded as the juft ftandard of the obligation incurred, and of the return to be made ? For his exigency required relief; a re- lief afforded to him in expedlation of an equal return ; and the aififtance beftowed on the one hand is exactly meafured by the benefit 3-52 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK benefit received on the other. His return therefore ought to . be equal to this benefit, or greater, which will make his condu£l laudable and honourable. In virtuous friendfliips there is not any room for fuch complaints. In them intentions, not confe- quences, form the ftandard of obligation ; for, as we have often obferved, the deUberate eleftion of the will is the principle by which all queftions concerning virtue and morals muil be de- termined. Chap. 14• Unequal friendfliips are extremely productive of altercations , ~~! and differences, each party defiring to have more than his due, fubjetSlcon- which has a tendency to difturb, and finally diffolve concord, xinucd. , ... He who IS pre-eminent in virtue and ability, claims a propor- tional fliare of regard and affedion ; thinking that men fliould always be confidered fuitably to their chara£lers. In the fame manner, he who is moil ufeful, expeds to be loved and re- garded in proportion to his utility ; faying, that friendfliip would be a burden if it were not returned on the one fide pro- portionally to the benefits conferred on the other. They think that the fame rule is applicable to friendfliip which holds in a partnerfliip in trade, where he who employs moft flock alfo re- ceives moft profit. The needy man holds a very different language, faying, that it is the duty of a friend to affift his friend in diftrefs ; and aiking what benefit could otherwife refult from the fo much envied friendfliip of the good and great. Both parties are partly in the right, fince both ought to have the ad- vantage ; the good and great in point of honour, the inferior and indigent in point of gain ; for honour is the meed of bene- ficent virtue, and gain is the cure of diftreiTing poverty. This rule obtains in ftates. Thofe who benefit the public, are ho- noured by the public, for honour is a public reward j but to expedt ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 353 expea from the public, both great honours and great gahis is BOO Κ highly unreaionable ; fince the public would thereby fubmit to 4 an inferiority of advantage in both points at once ; a difgrace- ful inferiority which every individual would fpurn. For reci- procal and proportional favours equalife and preferve friend- ihip, the good and great benefiting their friends as to their charaders or their fortunes, the needy inferior giving in return the only thing he can give, honour, and even of this not al- ways a full proportion ; fince it is impoffible fufficientlyto honour the gods and our parents : but thofe are commended who do it to the beft of their power ; for the returns of friendihip muft be limited by poffibility. Wherefore it is not allowable for a fon to renounce his father, though the latter may renounce the former. For the fon has to pay obligations, which are too great for him ever to difcharge ; he muft always therefore re- main a debtor. But the father, on the other hand, to whomi . the debt is due, may difcard and abandon a worthlefs fon^ though he will feldom do it, but for excefs of wickednefs ; fince both paternal aifedion and natural humanity ftrongly op- pofe fo cruel a meafure \ « The fubjea of this and the following Book is lefs fully treated in the feven laft chapters of the fecond book of the Magna Moralia ; and in the thirteen firft chapters- ef the feventh book of the Ethics to Eudemus. TOt. I. ^ ^ 'Μ ( 355 ) ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK IX. ARGUMENT. Fr'iendfd'ip does not admit of prec'ife rules. — Dijfolutiott of friend" Jhip when jufifable. — Analogy between our duties to ourf elves ^ and thofe to our friends. — Happinefs of virtue. — Wrctchednefs of vice. — Good-will. — Concord. — Exquifite delight of virtuous friendfhip. W HERE friends poffefs qualities totally diflimilar, and ex- BOOK tremely different in value, their friendfhip, as we have « -» faid, muft be equalifed and maintained by a due obfervance of Chap. i. thofe rules of proportion which obtain in the commercial inter- "ζ^ courfe of fociety : where the fhoemaker and weaver, and other to what rules . r 1 • r 1 r rv ^^ returns artizans, exchange the produdions of their feveral manuractures of friendfhip according to their refpedive values. That this might be done ^*mated. conveniently, the ufe of money was eftabliified, which lerved as a common meafure, with which all other things were com- pared, and by which their relative worth was eftimated. Lovers often accufe the objeds of their affedion, that they do not • meet their warmth of love with equal ardour, when perhaps there is nothing in themfelves that is at all lovely. The per- Ibns beloved, on the other hand, often accufe their admirers, ζ ζ 2 that 356 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK that they once made to them the moft magnificent promifes, ^ 1^1 _j but now totally deceive them. The origin of thefe complaints is, that the friendihip of the one party is founded on pleafure ; that of the other on utility : on delight which the one has no longer the power to excite, and benefit which the other has no longer the means to confer ; fo that as the caufesof fuch friend- iliips are variable and inconftant, the friendihips themfelves rnufl be deftitute of {lability ; which is the cafe with all others, except thofe fubfifting between virtuous men in confequence of their congeniality of charadlers. Thofe who are friends through intereft, not only are likely to difagree, when either of tliera ceafes to meet with a return, but when the return is not fuch as he either wiihed or expeded ; for an improper return is confidered as none at all. We have an example of this in him who promifed a mufician that he ihould be paid according to his performance, and being afked next day for the reward which he had promifed, faid that it had already been beftowed, fmce he had given one pleafure in return for another. But profit, not pleafure, was the return which the mufician ex- pedled ; for in order to obtain what they want, men willingly part with that which is either fuperfluous, or which they can moft eafily fpare ; which is the bafis of all commercial inter- courfe. It is afked, who ought to afcertain the mcafure of the return, he who has performed the fervice, or he who has re- ceived it ? The former feems to commit his intereft to the dif- cretion of the latter ; as Protagoras is faid to have done, for he defired his difciples to eftimate the value of what they had learned, and to pay him accordingly. In fuch cafes, fome ap- prove the rule, " clear bargains make fure friends." Thofe who receive payment in advance^ and then perform nothing worthy ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 2>S7 worthy of the magnilicence of their promifes, are liable to the Β Ο Ο Κ reproach of injuftice ; a reproach which perhaps the fophifts neceffarily incur, fnice unlefs they received their payment in advance, nobody would think their labours worthy of any pe- cuniary remuneration. In virtuous friendihips, there is not any room for complaint, becaufe each party defires only the iieart and afiedions of his friend ; and the only contention be- tween them is, which ihall be produdtive of moil good to the other. Such is the friendihip that ought to fubfift between thofe who teach and thofe who ftudy philofophy, the value of which cannot be appreciated in money ; and to the teachers of which no adequate honours can be affigned. Their fcholars muft honour them as they do their parents and the gods ; not fufficiently, for that is impoflible ; but in proportion to the extent of their ability ; iliewing to them all the refpedt they can, fmce they never can ihew to them enough. In thofe friendihips where certain and full returns are expeded, it is defirable that they ihould prove fatisfadory to both parties ; but when this cannot take place, it feems jufi: as well as neceifary, that he who has re- ceived the favour ihould determine the return moil proper to be made ; becaufe he is the beil judge of the value of the advan- tage which he has received, and of the value of the pleafurc which, he has enjoyed. It is thus in thofe bargains where con- fidence is repofed by the one party in the other ; for the fulfil- ment of which, the party difappointed is not entitled in fome countries to any legal redrefs ; his caufe muil iland or fall ac- cording to the good faith or diihoneily of him in whom he voluntarily confided. This rule is founded on the principle, that he who has received a favour is better qualified to afcertain its value, than he who conferred it : for men eftimate too highly the 358 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK the favours which they beilow, as they are apt to do all good ^^: ^ things which proceed from themfelves. The perfon firft bene- fited decides therefore what return he ihould make, becaufe he beil knows the value of the benefit which he has received ; but this benefit is perhaps more juftly eftimated by the value which he fet on it, while it was ftiil an objed of his defire, than by that which he continues to fet on it after it has been put into his poiTeifion. Chap. 2. A doubt may be ftarted as to filial friendihip, whether fathers -~~~ ought in all things to be obeyed ? In matters refpeding health, impoffible to ought a fon to follow the advice of his father or his phyfician ? rSfs"forThi In eleaing a general, ought he to prefer to him a perfon ikilled ci7''f r^^d" '^^ ^^^ ^ ^^ ^^^ ^^"^^ manner it may be doubted, whether fa- ^'P• vours are beft beftowed on friends, or on men of merit; and whether we ought to be grateful to our benefadors or liberal to our friends, when we have not the means of exercifing both gratitude and liberality. All thefe queilions are too indefinite to admit of fuch general folutions as may be pradically ufeful ; becaufe there is not any one cafe exadlly fimilar to another, but each is marked by circumftances peculiar to itfelf, and diftin- guilhable in their degrees of magnitude, as well as of propriety or neceflity. It is manifeft in general, that all advantages ought not to be accumulated on any one individual, and that before we are liberal to our friends, our debts of gratitude ought "to be difcharged towards our benefadors. Yet this rule will not always hold, as in the cafe of a man ranfomed from rob- bers, and whofe ranfomer, perhaps a perfon of no value, ihould afteiwards ftand in need of the fame favour, or, at leaft, ihould demand back his money. In both cafes, the man ranfomed, if his own father happens alfo to be in captivity, will prefer ran- foming ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 359 fomihc; his father, if his fortune does not enable him to acquit BOOK .... IX both obligations at once. Tliough it is faid in general, there- fore, that every kindnefs ought to meet with iis due return, yet cafes may be propofed in which generofity is, in point of pro- priety or neceiTity, a paramount duty even to gratitude itfelf. Sometimes the fame favours, done by different perfons, are of very different values ; and the benefadlor therefore has not always a right to expedl a precifely fimilar return. When a bad man obliges a good one, or a knave lends money to a man of property and probity, the perfons obliged may, with propriety, decUne to return exadtly fimilar favours ; fince thofe favours are, in different circumftances, of very different values. The knave by lending runs no rilk of lofing his money, but the honeft man would run this riik by lending to a knave ; nay, ihould he only fufpeil him of being either a knave or a fpend- thrift, he will not aft abfurdly in refufmg to return his favour in kind. It is evident therefore, as we have often obferved, that all rules concerning the pafllons and anions of men are precife, only in proportion as the fubjedls to which they relate are definite. We ought not (to anfwer the queftion firft ftarted) to have deference, in all particulars, even to our fathers, fmce all kinds of facrifices are not offered to Jupiter. Our parents, brethren, companions, and benefadtors, are feverally entitled to their refpe£tive marks of kindnefs and regard. This is fuffi- ciently indicated by general pradice ; for relations, principally, are invited to affift at marriages and funerals, as things effen- tially interefting to the whole family, and all its branches. To provide for the fubfiftence of our parents, who are the caufes of our being, is a duty as indifpenfable, and ftill more honour- able, than even that of providing for our own. We ought to honoui' 36ο ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK honour them too as we honour the gods ; but each parent is j ^• ^ entitled to diftindive marks of our refpeft, a refpeil different in kind from that beftowed on perfons unrelated to us, but emi- nently confpicuous for their abiUties or virtues. Our feniors, in proportion to their years, ought to be treated with more or lefs deference. With companions, familiarity and full freedom of fpeech is allowable ; with kinfmen, neighbours, fellow-citizens, in a word, with every defcription of perfons with M^hom we are conneited, it is incumbent on us to behave fuitably to the rela- tions of affinity or utility in which thofe perfons ftand to our- felves, as well as to their own perfonal merit and inherent virtues. When the relations between others and ourfelves are ftrong and intimate, the rules of our behaviour towards them are more eafily defined ; the ilrid limits of our duty are with more difficulty afcertained towards perfons remotely and faintly conneded with us. Yet we mufl not be deterred by this diffi- culty from invefligatiflg thofe rules of condudt which will enable us to behave towards all men with propriety. Chap. > Doubts are ftarted concerning the diifiilution of friendfhip between perfons whofe charadlers no longer remain the fame, grounds for or at leaft no longer continue to bear the fame relation to each ιώπ^^ο?'"' other. Where friendihips are contraded for the fake of pleafure friendihips. ^j. utility, it is not wonderful that when neither utility accrues to the one party, nor pleafure to the other, fuch friendships ihould of courfe be fubverted ; for the foundations are de- ftroyed on which only they flood. But a man may juflly complain of bad faith in him who affeiled to cherilfii his cha- rader and his virtues, while interefl: or pleafure were at bottom the fole grounds of his regard ; for differences between friends chiefly proceed from this, that they think their friendfhip founded ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. ^^^ founded on one principle, when it is really founded on anotlier. BOOK When therefore a man is deceived, and thinks without reafon , ^^ • that he is loved for his charafter and his virtues, he has him- felf only to complain of; but he may complain of the duplicity of his pretended friend, when the hypocrify of the latter is the fource of his own miftake ; and he may complain of him more juftly than men do of coiners and clippers, fmce he is defrauded by him in an objeft more valuable than money. But when our friend changes his manners, and contrafls by evil communica- tion a depravity of chara^er, ought we ftill to regard him with affedion ? Or, is it impoihble to love that which ceafes to be amiable ? " Like," we have faid, " draws to like ;" and a good man neither can nor ought to love a bad one. Are we then inilantly to renounce and forfake him ? Not unlefs he has unal- terably renounced and forfaken his charader ; for while he Is not totally incorrigible, it Is our duty to endeavour to reform his morals, a thing incomparably more important than alleviating his pecuniary diftrefs, and alfo more peculiarly the w^ork of friendihip. To detach ourfelves entirely from a friend who becomes worthlefs, has nothing in It unreafonable ; fince he is not in fad the fame man with whom we contracted the friendihip ; and when we find that there Is not any hope of his ever again becoming fuch, we naturally wlfh to have done with him. But what ihall we fay when one of the friends remains what he was, and the other changes for the better. Can their friend- ihip continue to fubfift ? Or is this alfo Impoifible ? The quef- tion will be beft anfwered by propofing a cafe where the differ- •ence is great in the extreme. Of two perfons who are friends in their early years, the one may remain a child in underftand- mg through life, and the other may become a man of the moil VOL. I. 3 A diftin- 3^2. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK IX. Chap. 4. The analogy between the duties which we owe to ourfelves, and thofe which we owe to our friends. The happi- Befsofvirtue. diftinguiflied abilities. What friendfliip can fubfiil between fuch different charafters, who can neither take any pleafure in each other's fociety, nor have any occupations and purfuits in common ? As all congeniality of mind is at end between them, their friendihip, it ihould feem, muil ceafe. Yet will the fuperior, if he is a man of humanity, treat the friend of his youth very differently from what he would do an abfolute ilranger. The remembrance of his early affe<3;ion will ilill cling to his heart ; and he will never entirely abandon an an- cient attachment, unlefs on account of extreme worthleffnefs in him who was its obje£t. The duties which we owe to our friends, feem analogous to thofe which each individual willingly pays to himfelf. We ought, it is faid, to wifli their good, or what appears to us to be fuch, and to promote it to our beft ability, merely on their own account. With this kind of difmtereiled affedlion, mothers are animated towards their children, and thofe friends towards each other, between whom fome difguft has arlfen which, though it interrupts their intercourfe, does not deftroy their mutual kind- nefs.. Others fay that friends muft fpend much of their time together, have the fame inclinations and purfuits, and fympa- thife with each other in their joy as well as in their forrow. On whichever or how many foever of thofe conditions friend- fhip principally depends, we ihall find that all of them belong to the affeiflions by which a good man is animated towards himfelf; and by which all men are animated in proportion as they either approximate, or only think they approximate, to an honourable and praifeworthy charadter ; which, in queftions concerning human nature, is juftly confidered as the fole un» erring ftandard. The virtuous man only is at peace within himfelf. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. ?6; hiinfelf, fince all the powers of his mind are aduatcd by the BOOK fame motives, and confpire to the fame end: always aiming at • , , -_ __» good, real and intrinfic, the good of his intellcdual part. To him exiftence is a benefit, which he earneftly wiihes may be preferved, efpecially the exiilence of the thinking principle within him, which is peculiarly himfelf ; for e\'^ery individual flrives after its own good, real or apparent ; which in the vir- tuous man only coincide : but could an individual love its change into fomething quite different from itfelf, the good of the latter would be to the former a matter of flight concern. In Deity all goods are accumulated, becaufe he is ever and in- variably that which he is ; and in man the thinking principle is the part that is properly and permanently himfelf. He who purfues the good of his mind, is pleafed in his own company, being delighted with the recolledion of the pail, as well as animated with the profpe£t of the future ; and having ever at command innumerable fpeculations, in which he exercifes him- felf with the moft exquifite pleafure. Both his joys and his forrows are refpeftively confiilent with themfelves, fince they invariably proceed from fixed and regular caufes ; for he does not delight at one time in what will excite his repentance at an- other ; and thus harmonized within his own breaft, he is fimilarly affedled towards his friend, whom he confiders as a fecond felf ; and his fympathy for whom, when it reaches the higheft perfection, refembles that internal concord which is ex- perienced in his own mind, when the various principles of his nature coalefce into one movement, and flow in the fame homo- geneous ftream of virtuous energy. Yet many men of very irre- The wretch- gularlivesfeem to be highly fatisfied with themfelves. Is this be- vice, caufe they miftake their own charaders ? It fliould fcem fo, fince 3 A 2 the 364 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK the complete villa in Is always vifibly at variance with hlmfeff j ,_ ^^1 f and all others are fimilarly aiFeded in proportion to their progrefs in wickednefs ; willing one thing, yet defiring and preferring another ; as thofe who allow themfelves to be fubdued by vicious pleafure, and who may be faid, with their eyes open, to rufh into voluntary deftruftion. In the fame manner others, through lazinefs or cowardice, avoid that condudt which they know moil likely to promote their happinefs. When men pro- ceed to the laft ftage of depravity, they become as odious to themfelves as they are deteftable to others, and therefore often deftroy their own lives ; and even before they arrive at this deplorable condition, they fly from, and avoid themfelves ; preferring any kind of fociety to that of their own refledtions ; , the paft crimes which haunt their memory, and the meditated guilt which is continually occurring to their fancy. As they have nothing in them that is amiable, they cannot be the objeils of their own love. Neither their joys nor their forrows are confiftent. Their whole foul is in fedition, dif- trafted between contending principles, the pleafure of one giving pain to another ; and when the worft principle prevails, a foundation is laid for the bittereft remorfe. If fuch be the wretchednefs of wickednefs, how ftrenuouily ought we to exert ourfelves to become good men, that we may live in friendihip with ourfelves, and be worthy of the friendihip of others. Chap. 5. Good-will refembles friendihip, but is not the fame thing.. ■ Good-will we may entertain for thofe not perfonally known to Of good- . . ... wilL US, and without being ourfelves confcious of it. This cannot happen with regard to friendihip, as we formerly obferved. Befides every ad of friendihip implies an affedion and expan- fion of the foul, it is alfo much conneded with cuilom ;, 5 whereas AHISTOTLE's ETHICS. 363 whereas mere good-will arifes fuddenly, as towards the com- BOOK batants in the public games, to one or other of whom we imme- . _ J . diately wiih well, though we would not make any great exer- tion in order to promote his viilory. Good-will, then, is but a fudden and fuperficial emotion ; and at befl: but an element of friendihip, as the firft element or beginning of love is the pleafure received by the eye ; without which, though the paffion of love cannot commence, yet that pleafure does not by any means conftitute this paffion, to which it is neceflary that we ihould not only delight in the objeft when prefent, but ex- ceedingly long for it when abfent. Speaking metaphorically, we may call good-will an incipient and indolent friendfliip ; which, through time and cuftom, naturally improves into friendihip ftridly fo called ; not that founded on pleafure or utility, which have but Utile to do with good-will, fmce he who has received a favour ought in juftice to return it ; and he who does a kindnefs in expeftation of meeting with a greater, has good-will only to himfelf. Good-will, in one word, is always excited by fome laudable quality, fuch as generofity, or courage : witnefs the manner in which we are affeded by the prize- fighters, abovementioned. Friendfliip implies concord, which is not merely agreement Chap. 6, in opinion. This latter may prevail among perfons totally un- , , , , o• , r- ,n. ., Of that kind known to each other; and what connection• has inendlhip with of concord famenefs of opinion concerning the heavenly motions, and frie',^j(hip other fuch fubjeds ? Concord prevails among cities and com- '"^P''"• monwealths, when they conceive the fame defigns to be con- ducive to the common intereft, and agree in the fame mcafures for promoting them. It relates therefore to pradical fubjects only, and thofe of a certain magnitude in themfclves, and bear- ing 3β6 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK ing an important relation to the parties concerned ; for exam- i_ -_-" _j pie, that the magiftracies ihould be eledive ; that an alliance ihould be made with the Lacedemonians ; that Pittacus ihould be archon, when he himfelf is willing to difcharge that ho- nourable office '. When each party willies* the fame thing for himfelf, then diflenfion enfues, becaufe the fadions in the ftate, though they agree in the objed:, yet differ as to the perfon. But genuine concord requires that each party and each indi- vidual ihould obtain his wiih ; as when both the people and the better fort agree in choofing virtuous men for their niagiftrates. This concord is, as we have faid, the bafis of political friendihip. It is converfant about matters eifentially ufeful to the com- fortable fubfiftence of men in fociety ; and can only be found among men of virtue, who being firm in their purpofes, and not variable like the Euripus, are alone qualified to maintain the relations of concord and amity with themfelves and others. As juftice and utility have long regulated their private behaviour, they carry the fame principles along with them into their pub- lic adminiftration. But neither concord nor friendihip can durably fubfift among diihoneil men, who will be continually ftriving to engrofs every advantage, and to ihift off every bur- den ; and who muft foon fall into fedition by their endeavours to compel others to comply with thofe rules of juilice which they themfelves difdain to pradice. Chap. 7. How comes it that men love thofe to whom they have done good, better than thefe love their benefadors ? Moil are of is more love opinion that this happens becaufe debtors are more concerned confer "brne" about the fafety of their creditors, than the creditors are about theirs, * Diogenes Laertius, 1• ϊ• feq. 75. tells ur, that Pittacus laid down the archonihip after he had held it ten years ; to which tranfaiilion Ariftotle feems here to allude. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 3^7 theirs, and that merely from motives of intereft ; which Epi- Β O^O Κ charmus^ perhaps, would fay, is judging of mankind by the , _^ worft examples among them. The accufation, however, is cer- J;;^tha,wa tainly too juft, for with regard to the fervices which they have receive them, received, the greater part are of weak memories, and more will- ing to receive benefits than inclined either to confer or to return them. Yet the queftion juft ftarted muft be folved on deeper principles than thofe of debtor and creditor, which imply no- thing of love or friendihip, but depend entirely on dull confi- derations of intereft. Thofe to whom we have done good, are objeds of our love and aft"edion, though they neither return, nor ihould ever be expeded to return, the obligation : for we are naturally difpofed towards them as artifts are towards their works; and particularly poets towards their poems; which they love as parents do their children ; that is, much more than their produdions, were they endowed with life and perception, would love them. For each individual loves every excellence proceeding from himfelf in proportion as he defires and loves his own exlftence, the energies of which are concentrated and preferved in his works. Befides, our own good adions are more pleafing fubjeds of refledion, than any paft benefits that we may have received : for the firft are honourable, and the fecond only ufeful ; and utility, however delightful in profped, is often forgotten with the occafion which required it ; whereas honour is permanent and unalterable ; and every praife-worthy deed is not only pleafing in profped, but delightful on remem- brance, above all moft tranfporting when adually exercifed ; giving fc A difclple of Pythagoras, who feems to have had better priiKiples ofmorality, than he is faid to have entertained of religion. Vid. Cicer, de Natur. Deorum, 1. i. and Mcnag. ad Diogen. Laert. !• iii• feet. 9. & feq. 368 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK gi^'ing to us a confcioufnefs of that kind of exlftence -which is ^^^ , moil pecuUarly agreeable to our nature, the happinefs of which relults not from paifive fenfations, but from adive exertions. Befides, whatever is obtained with much labour, is naturally regarded with much affedlion. Thofe who have acquired their fortunes, deliglit in them far more than thofe who fucceed to hereditary wealth ; and for a fimilar reafon, maternal tender- nefs often rifes to the higheft pitch. On fuch principles we may explain why the affedlion of thofe who confer benefits, which is commonly a work of fome exertion, fhould be ftronger than that of thofe who receive them, which requires no exertion at all. Chap. 8. I^ ^s doubted which we ought to love moft, ourfelves or our — — friends. Selfifhnefs is branded as a vice of the blackeft die, and ferent^fenfes thought to fmk deeper into each individual, in exa£t propor- in which a tion to the worthleiTnefs of his charader. A bad man has man is laid to love him- nothing but himfelf in view ; while a good one lofes fight of himfelf, and aims chiefly at friendly or honourable adlions ; and this the more in proportion to his progrefs in virtue. Yet thefe obfervations ill accord with what is commonly faid, that a friend wiilies to promote our good for our own fakes, and though we ihould ever remain ignorant of his good offices ; which is furely the difpofition of each individual towards him" felf, and comformable to this difpofition are all the other cir- cumftances, and all the proverbial expreffions by which friend- fliip is indicated and afcertained ; as that friends have but one foul, that all things are common between them, that friendihip is equality, and that the knee is nearer than the foot. But a man ftands in all thofe relations to himfelf, and being moft his own friendj ought moft to love himfelt Thefe contradidions cannot ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 3% cannot be reconciled but by diilinguifhing the different fenfes Β Ο Ο Κ in which a man is faid to love himfelf. Thole who reproach c, — ,-.^ felf-love as a vice, confider it only as it appears in worldlings and voluptuaries, who arrogate to themlelves more than their due ihare of wealth, power, or pleafure. Such things are to the multitude, the objefts of earncil concern and eager conten- tion, becaufe the multitude regards them as prizes of the higheft value ; and in endeavouring to attain them, drives to gratify its paffion at the expence of its reafon. This kind of felf-love, which belongs to the contemptible multitude, is doubtlcfs obnoxious to blame ; and in this acceptation, the word is ufually taken. But ihould a man affume a pre-eminence in exerciftng juftice, Sejf Ι^-νχ-, 1 II well iiHvicr- temperance, and other vu'tues, though luch a man has really itood, more true felf-love than the multitude, yet nobody would im- ^jJfjTj^'j'; " pute this affeftion to him for a crime. Yet he takes to himfelf the faireft and greateft of all goods, and thofe the mod: accept- able to the ruling principle in his nature, which is properly him- felf, in the fame manner as the fovereignty in every com- munity is that which moil properly conftitutes the ftate. He is faid, alfo, to have, or not to have, the command of himfelf, juft as this principle bears fway, or as it is fubjed to control ; and thofe ads are confidered as moil voluntary which proceed from this legiflative and fovereign power. Whoever cheriihes and gratifies this ruling part of his nature, is ilridly and pecu- liarly a lover of himfelf, but in a quite different fenfe from that in which felf-love is regarded as a matter of reproach ; for all men approve and praife an affcdion calculated to produce the greateft private and the greateft public happinefs ; whereas they difapprove and blame the vulgar kind of felf-love as often hurt- ful to others, and always ruinous to thofe who indulge it. A VOL. I. 3 Β ^^^ 370 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK bad man, we have fald, is really at variance with himlelf ; pur- ^_ -/- , _} filing a condu£l diredtly oppofite to what his own duty and his own intereft moil powerfully recommend. But the man of morals obeys and follows the didates of his intelleiTt ; and every intelleiit, when free and uncircumfcribed, neceffarily prefers and purfues its own individual good. The virtuous man in- deed ftrenuoufly exerts himfelf in the caufe of his friends and his country ; and readily lays down his life for their fake. He willingly refigns honours and emoluments ; but firmly defends the firft ihare of generofity and probity. The tranfports of one glorious day, he would not exchange for a whole life of liftlefs infignificance ; one year fpent in honourable exertion, he pre- . fers to ages vulgarly and cafually confumed ; nay, a fmgle effort of fplendid virtue is more valuable in his eyes than an inde- finite feries of fmall and ordinary adlions ; and, on fuch prin- ciples, he is ready to lay down his life in the caufe of his friends or country. He is ready alfo to employ his fortune in their fervice ; fo that, while they are enriched at his expence, he~~may acquire an unrivalled ihare of well-merited applaufe. As to offices and: honours he is fimilarly aife£led, eafily relinquiiliing them all ; nay, even the fame of illuftrious adlions, when it appears to him more praife-worthy, to give an opportunity to others of performing them, than to effedl them by his own. agency.. Thus, amidft all his liberalities, he is ftill moft felfiih, fmce he ftill claims for himfelf what is incomparably moft: valuable, that internal delight arifing from the. confcioufnefs of merit. "fihap. 9.. It is difputed whether or not happy men need friends., Hap- pinefs feems all-fufficient in itfelf without fuch auxiliaries ; Wb.nher , , r friendihip be whence they lay, KoodTn^pro- " WhenPortunc's goods abound, what boots a friend ?" fperiiyorin juet,' ^veriuv. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 37» Yet on the other hand, it appears abfurd, if happinefs includes Β Ο Ο Κ all good things, to deprive it of friendlhip, xvhich of external , ;__, goods is the greateft. Befides, if friendQilp, as we above proved, confifts rather in conferring favours, than in receiving them, and it is honourable to do good to thofe who are pecu- liarly recommended to our love in preference to all others, profperous and happy men muft ftand in need of fit objeds, towards whom they may- exercife their beneficence. It is dif- puted, therefore, in which of the two ftates men require friends the moft, the ftate of profperity, or that of adverfity ; the former needing favourites as much as the latter does benefadors. It is alfo abfurd to think that happinefs can be enjoyed in foli- tude ; man being a focial and political animal by the conftltu- tionof his nature itfelf ; without conforming to which, human happinefs cannot be attained ; nor fo completely attained in cafual or indiiFeront fociety, as in that of amiable and virtuous friends. What is the meaning then of the obfervation firft made, or by what arguments can it be juftificd ? The people re- crurd only thofe as their friends who promote their utility, and friends of this kind a profperous man does not need ; nor does he feem greatly to need thofe who may adminifter to his plea- fure, fmce his life being delightful in itfelf, he has not much occafion for adventitious enjoyment. Thofe two claiTes of friends being excluded as unneceffary, it is too haftily inferred that he needs not any friends at all. For we faid in the be- Theexqui- ginning, that happinefs is energy, that is, a thmg conliltmg m «, virtuous our own exertions, not refulting from our acquirements or '"oJfc.p. poileffions ; and the life of a good man confifts in a ferlcs of virtuous and delightful energies, which will be far more un- broken and uninterrupted, if he contemplates them not only in τ Β 2 himfelf, 572 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK himfeif, but in thofe who are around him, whofe behaviour her IX. is able to view more attentively and more fteadily than he can poffibly do his own '. Friends of this defcription, therefore, he requires, that he may fympathize with their fentiments, and participate in their aftions ; for a good man is charmed with good anions more than a ikilful mufician with the fineft me- lody J and as the latter is provoked by diflbnance, lb is the; former grieved by depravity. Befides, as Theognis" fays, virtuous friends exercife, improve, and perfeft each other. But if we examine the matter more deeply, we ihall find that one• good man is naturally an objed; ultimately defirable to another ;. for a good man delights in what is naturally delightful, and- values what is really and abfolutely valuable ; and as the life of animals confifts barely in fenfation, but that of man both in fenfatlon and intelledion, and that not merely in the capacities but principally in the exercife of thofe powers, for the fake of which the capacities are given to us, it is plain that the more widely we extend the fphere of our energies, our happinefs will be the more complete ; provided thofe energies be, like every thing that is good, definite in their nature, not variable and un- determined, like the lives of bad men, which appear under innu- merable forms of wretchednefs. But neither fuch lives, nor thofe overwhelmed by an accumulation of pains and forrows». (of which we Ihall fpeak hereafter,) are calculated to make us rightly «oil όταν atToi αιτ«ς S«>.v)Owf*i> •γ]ΐωνα> ίΐς το» ψΛΐΛ liovTtj ynu^io-aiftt» α», &C. " As when We •tviih to fee our own countenances, we muft view it in a looking-glafs ; in the fame manner when we wiih to know our own charaflers and virtues, we muit contemplate ihofe of our friend ; for a friend, as we fay, is another fclf." Magn. Moral. 1. ii. c. xv. p. 194. *■ ί he gnomic poet of Meg^a, fume of whofe fentenlious verfes are ftill preferred^ 15 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 373 rightly appreciate the value of exlftcnce, which to wife and good BOOK men is an objeit fo truly defirable. For when we fee or hear, , _ J j we are confcious of thofe perceptions ; and when we think and theorize, we are confcious of thofe intelledtions ; and the higher and nobler our thoughts are, the more pleafure we derive from the confcioufnefs of entertaining them. This confcioufnefs makes us feel the pleafure of exiftence ; for the energy of life itfelf, which, is of all things moil delightful, confifts in nothing elfe but perceiving and thinking. But a good man, being af- fedted towards his friend nearly as towards himfelf, derives therefore the higheft gratification from communicating his thoughts and reflexions with others like himfelf, and living with them in a perpetual participation of intellediual and moral en- joyments ; fmce he thereby attains nearly as clear a perception of their pleafurable exiftence as he has of his own. This indeed is human fociety properly fo called, in contradiftindtion to that of cattle, which confifts in feeding at the fame ftall. Since then his own life is, to a good man, a thing naturally fweet and ultimately defirable, for a fimilar reafon is the life of his friend; agreeable to him, and delightful merely on its own account, and without reference to any objedl beyond it ; and to live without friends is to be deftitute of a good, unconditional, ab- folute, and ultimately defirable ; and therefore to be deprived of one of the moft folid and moft fubftantial of all human en- joyments. Ought this reafoning to make us defirous of multiplying the Chap. ΐσ. :i;umber of our friends ? Or ought we to adopt as to friendlhip j^ Ζ ~ %hat feems to be well faid with regard to hofpitality, , kinds of friendlhip " For many guefts are ofien worfc than none." require dif- " terent limit- Jp ations as to number. 574 BOOK. IX. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. In the fame manner ought the number of our friends to be limited ? Of friends chofen from motives of utility or conve- vience, it undoubtedly ought ; for more thaff ferve our purpofe, are only ohftacles and hindrances ; arid it is impoflible for us to return the fervices or civilities of too numerous a lift. Neither need thofe chofen from motives of pleafure to be many ; for too much feafoning is pernicious in diet. But as to friend- ihips ftridly fo called, originating in fympathy of minds and congeniality of charaders, ought there to be defined limits, be- yond which that number ought not to extend ; any more than the populoufnefs of a city, which, for the fupply of mutual wants, requires more than ten, but, for the fake of wife regula- tion and gooil morals, ought not perhaps to exceed ten myriad* of inhabitants '? The number of friends, even virtuous friends, muft be limited by the extent of human adivity, which is in- capable of cultivating beyond a certain proportion, who muil all likewifc be friends to each other, on the fuppofition, which is neceflary, that they ihould fpend their time together in amicable concord. This cannot eafily happen to a great mul- titude, efpccially fmce fuch is the inftability of human affairs, that we cannot cordially fympathize with many perfons at once, for if we ought to rejoice with one, it will too often happen that we ought to grieve with another. Many friends, therefore, are neither to be defired nor expeded, and their number will be the fmaller in proportion to the clofenefs of the intimacy ; for intimate friendihip is almoft as exclufive as love, which ad- mits but one only objedl. Experience juftifies this obfervatlon, for the friendftiips moft celebrated have fubfifted between two iOnly. In political life we fee popular men, who feem to have innu- Η ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 375 innumerable friends. They are often flatterers of the multi- BOOK tude. But a public charader without flattery may, by his real ι ,_ .^ worth, recommend himfelf to the gratitude of many who are his friends politically. But friends, ilridly fo called, cannot be numerous. Happy is the man who finds only a few fuch ! Whether are friends moft defirable in profperity or in adver- Chap, i r. fity? Both conditions of life peculiarly require them; the ^v^ether tfte profperous, that they may have objeds towards whom to exer- company of t ί ^ J J ■> ^ our friends is cife th:'. beneficence; the unfortunate, that they may nave moft defira- fources from which they may derive relief. The neceflity for proiperity friends is greateft in the latter, who therefore feek perfons who "^/["tj""^ ^'^''" may be ufeful to them ; but the luftre of friendfhip ihlnes moil confpicuous in the former, who feek perfons with whom they may fpend their time agreeably, and whom it is a real pleafure to benefit. T!ie company of friends is delightful both in profperity and adveifity. In the latter, our grief is alleviated by their fympathy ; whether it be that they diiburden us of part of our fufferings, or that their fympathy is itfelf delightful. Both caufes feem to concur, for in misfortune theprefence of a friend affords a mixed pleafure. The very fight of him cheers our minds ; and if he has any dexterity, he knows how to ad- minifter to us that kind of comfort of which our tempers and charadters are moft fufceptible. Befides, we ourfelves, in his prefence, endeavour to moderate our forrow, that we may not be the caufe of fuffering to our friend ; and perfons of firm minds are careful how they impart their fecret misfortunes, and rejeit all excefs of commiferation as unfuitable to the dignity of.' their charadlers ; whereas women, and womanifli men, delight in Sichoing groans and fympathetic lamentations. In all things the beO. 376 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, BOOK beft charailers are the fit models for imitation ; and as amidfi. . i . profperity the beft men delight in the prefence and congratula- tion of their friends, which is agreeable to the benevolence of their nature, we ought therefore to be forward in calling thofe who love us to participate in our joy, but xery backward in calling them to participate. in our forrow; remembering " Their own misfortunes are enough to bear." Above all, we muft fummon their prefence \vhen, without o-iving much trouble to ourfelves, we may greatly benefit tbeai. But, on the other hand, to ad with laudable propriety, we mutl go readily and uninvited to the houfe of mourning; for it is as honourable as delightful to affift our friends in diftrefe, efpecially without any felicitation on their part, which might leiTen them in our efteem. It is our duty ftrenuouily to co-operate with fortune in promoting the profperity of our friend ; but to be flow and modeft in craving his afliftance ; yet without too faftidioufly rejeding his beneficence ; which has fometime* ;made a breach in very folid friend ihips. Chap. i2o As love enters firft by the eye, fo friendfhip is produced by the habitual intercourfe of life ; and as the fenfe of fight is that which lovers would be moft unwilling to lofe, fo habitual inter- courfe is the advantage which friends would be moil unwilling to refign. Friendfhip is a community of enjoyments ; and as a man delights in the energies of his own exiftence, fo he alfo does in thofe of his friend ; wherefore, in whatever thofe energies principally confift, their chief enjoyment refults from -exerting them in company ; fome drinking and playing dice together, while others make parties of hunting, pradife their exercifes, or cultivate philofophy. The friendihip of bad men Concluilon. 1 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 377 Is as corrupt and unftable as themfelves ; and is fo far from BOOK IX being advantageous to either party, that it tends only to plunge them both ftill deeper in depravity and wretchednefs : whereas virtuous friendfliips grow continually more firm and more in- timate, the exampje and admonitions of good men mutually improving and pertedling each other '. Thus much concern- ing friendlliip. It remains that we ihould next treat of pleafure. ' Ariftode quotes a few v'ords from Theognis which have this meaning. VOL. I. • 3 c ( J79 ) ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK X. INTRODUCTION. THIS Book treats of pleafure and happ'inefs. It is too con- BOOK: clfe to admit of abridgment, and fufficiently perfpicuous not to require elucidation. In the concluding chapter, Ariftotle ihews the infeparable connedion between Ethics and Politics ; and prepares the reader for an eafy traofition from the former to the latter. By way of conclufion to thefe ihort introduc- tions, I ihall obferve, that Ariftotle's Moral Philofophy is, per- haps, of all others the leaft liable to the following objedion, which has been often made by thinking men to the too faihionable philofophy of the times : " A profefled fceptic can be guided by nothing but his prefent paffions ; and to be mailers of his philofophy, we need not his books or advice, for every child is capable of the fame thing without any ftudy at all," — Gray. 3C 2 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 38^ BOOK X. ARGUMENT. ilurc. Tleafure — Its ambiguous nature — Defined. — Happitiefs — htel- ΙεδϊααΙ — Μο}•αΙ — Compared. — Education. — Laws. — Tranfition to thefubjeEl of FoUtics. \J7'^ proceed to treat of pleafure, a thing moil congenial to BOOK: ^ our nature ; and by which, therefore, and its oppofite, ^ ^; _^ pain, the motions of the minds of children are guided as by a chap. i. rudder. In morals the main point is attained, when our love and hatred, our grief and joy, are refpedively excited by natural picaV^^ ° and worthy caufes ; fmce thefe affedions are as extenfive as the multiplied alFairs of life itfelf, and their proper regulation is of the utmofi: importance to virtue and happinefs. For w^e are all prompted by nature to purfue plcafure, and to avoid pain ; the confideration of which ought not to be omitted in a treatife of this kind, efpccially as the opinions concerning them are per- plexed by much contradidion ; fome regarding plcafure as the higheft good, others calling it a thing contemptible in the extreme whether from the real convidion of their minds, (which perhaps may be the cafe with fome,) or becaufe they think it bell to fpeak of plcafure in terms of reproach, fmce moft men are tempted to difgrace themfelves by indulging in it immo- derately. Severe moralifts, therefore, think that they cannot too much ftigmatife pleafure, that thofe whom they wifli to benefit 382 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK X. Not to be too feverely condemned- Chap. 2. Different opinions concerning it. benefit by their difcourfes may be deterred from excefs, and con- fined within the bounds of propriety. They fliould take care how- ever, left this proceeding be not attended with effedts contrary to their expedtation ; for in pradlical matters, men pay lefs atten- tion to what is faid than to what is done ; and when opinions, jiift and reafonable within certain Umits, are carried to a length mani- feftly inconfiftent with experience, they are rejefted difdainfully and completely ; even the truth which they contain being over- whelmed and loft in the furrounding falfehood. Thus thofe detractors of pleafure, when they are obferved on any occafion to purfue it with much eagernefs, appear to the bulk of man- kind no better than hypocritical voluptuaries ; for the people at large are not capable of making diftinftions ; they confider things in the grofs, and therefore continually confound them. The truth, therefore, beft ferves not only to enlighten our under- ftandings, but to improve our morals. For when our dodrines are true, our lives will more naturally be conformable to them ; and our precepts being confirmed by examples, will produce convidtion, and excite emulation of our virtues, in thofe with whom we live. But enough on this fubjedl : we proceed to enumerate the opinions held concerning pleafure. Eudoxus * thought pleafure the chief good, becaufe he per- ceived it to be univerfally defired by all animals, rational and irrational ; that every thing is good in the fame proportion as it is defirable : that animals find out, each tribe, what is beft for themfelves, as they do their proper food ; and that therefore the ^ Eudoxus of CniduS thtov α>τι Etiioja Έυίαζον ίχαλΜ» ίια m» λαΐλ,'πςοτιιτα rvi fn/*u;. See his life in Laertius, B. viii. fedt. 86, &c. By a pun on his name, he was called " 11- luftrious." ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 383 the fupreme good muft confift in that which is univerfally and Β O^O Κ moil eagerly defired by them all. The regularity of his life added great weight to his arguments, for he was a man of fin- gular temperance ; fo that his commendation of pleafure did nor appear to proceed from any prejudice in Its favour, but rather to be extorted from him by the force of truth. His argu^ ment he confirmed by confidering pain; which, being the contrary to pleafure, all animals endeavoured to ihun and efcape. That is chiefly defirable, he remarked, which is de- fu-able ultimately and on its own account. This defcription peculiarly applies to pleafure, which no one defires for the fake of any thing beyond itfelf, nor finds the neceffity of affigning any reafon why he ihould enjoy it ; pleafure always carrying its own recommendation along with it, and rendering every objea, however valuable, to which it is joined, ftill more de- firable, not excepting virtue itfelf. As pleafure improves every other good with which it is combined, it is manifeftly a good in itfelf; a good not inferior to that which it heightens. Yet Plato employed a fimilar argument to prove that pleafure was• not the fupreme good ; fince pleafure, joined with virtue, is better than alone and feparate ; which cannot happen to the fupreme good, a thing incapable of augmentation, and difdain- ing admixture. But what is that good or happinefs which mankind, by the conftitution of their nature, are beft qualified for enjoying ? This only is the queftion with which we are concerned in the prefent treatife. Thofe who deny that which all defire, to be a part of this happinefs, ihould take care left they fall into an abfurdity. For that we fay is truth, which to all appears fuch ; and he who is diifatisfied with this kind of proof will not eafily meet with a better. If only creatures J, void ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. Chap. 3. The am- biguous na- ture ot plea- fure. void of underilanding purfued pleafure, much might be plau- fibly urged againft it : but what ihall we fay, when we find it an objed of defire with the beft and wifeft of the human race ? Nay even irrational animals may afford perhaps a ilrong argu- ment in favour of it, fmce in purfuit of what is beft for their nature, they are aduated by a wifdom far fuperior to their own''. The argument drawn from pain, which is the oppofite to pleafure, feems not liable to the objedlion made to it. The objedlors fay, that though pain be an evil, this is not any proof that pleafure, its contrary, is a good ; becaufe both contraries are often bad, and the good is often fomething intermediate between them. But this obfervation, though true in many cafes, is not applicable to the prefent. For if both were evils, both would be objedls of averfion ; but the one, we fee, is uni- verfally purfued as a good, and the other univerfally fhunned as an evil. It forms not any objedion to pleafure, that it is not one of thofe indelible qualities by which things are charaderifed and diftinguiihed; for neither to the clafs of qualities can the energies and operations of virtue itfelf, which are fo highly and fo juftly pralfed, in ftrld philofophical language, be afcribed : no, nor happinefs itfelf, which is of all things moft valuable. It is farther objeded, that pleafure is of a vague indefinite nature, admitting of various degrees of intenfity; wheieas whatever is truly good, ought to be uniformly perceived, and accurately de- fined '. But juftice, fortitude, and the other virtues admit of various degrees, when confidered as attributes of the perfons in whom thofe habits exift ; the fame is true of health ; yet the health of the mind, as well as that of the body, confidered abftradedly See Analyfis, p. 114. and Conf. p. 1 34. 5c feq. = See Analyfis, p. 112. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 3»5 abilraaedly in themfelves, are things fufficiently definite, though Β O^O Κ they do not, in each individual, reach that ftate of perfedion which properly conftitutes their nature \ The fame thing may pofliblv hold with regard to pleafure. It is further objeaed, that pieafure is motion ; and that all motions are imperfeft» fince they are only tendencies to certain ends'; whereas what- ever is abfolutely good, ought to be complete and perfed in itfelf, independently of any feparate purpofe for which it may ferve. But, that pleafure is motion, is not likely to be true ; for ^11 motion admits of ilownefs and celerity ; fince the motion of the univerfe itfelf, though it cannot be called fwift or (low, abftraft- cdly confidered, yet deferves the former of thofe epithets when compared with the peculiar motions which belong refpedively to its parts «i. But pleafure is not charaderifed by either of thefe qualities. We may indeed be fpeedily pleafed, as we are fpeedily made angry ; and as walking, growing, or any other motion, is performed with celerity, in the fame manner, we may rapidly change from a ftate of indifference or pain, to a ftate of pleafure ; but to the energy of pleafure itfelf, that is, to pleafure adually enjoyed, the epithets of fwift or flow do not apply. This energy is complete in itfelf in every inftant ; and is not perfefled by the accompliftiment of any diftind and feparate end, in which it terminates. It is therefore a thing totally different from generation or produdion, or motion of any kind ; fmce all of thefe are mere changes of material fub- ftances, paffing from one place, or one ftate, to another ; not indeed at random, but according to certain and fixed laws of motion and reft, generation and corruption ; fo that from tlic fauie " See Analyfis, p. 117. ' Ibid. p. 119. " h^i^. p. izo.k fcq. VOL. 1. 3 ^ 386 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. iiimc materials out of which any compound is generated, into the fame, that compound is, by corruption, diiTolved ^ If plea- fure then be generation, pain mull be corruption ; and that which Is generated by pleafure, muft by pain be diiTolved into the fame materials from which it was produced. But to fpeak thus of pleafure and pain, is to talk unintelligibly ; and to confouxid immaterial with material things. It is faid alfo, that pain confifts in natural deficiencies or wants, and that pleafure is nothing elfe but the fupplying of thefe wants. But deficiency and fulnefs are plainly affedtions of body ; and if pleafure is the fupply of corporeal deficiencies, that which receives the fupply ought to feel the pleafure, which therefore refides in the body ; a conclufion refulting from the premifes, but highly unreafonable. Pleafure, therefore, is not the fupply of bodily wants, though it accompanies this fupply ; as pain, on the contrary, accompanies the laceration or maiming of the body. The opinion feems to have arifen from confidering the pain of hunger, and the pleafure of feeding ; the latter of which muft always be preceded by the former. But all pleafures are not preceded by pain ; thofe, for inftance, of the intelledual kind ; and even thofe of the fenfes of fmelling, hearing, and feeing; befides innumerable enjoyments, refulting from pleafmg recolledions, as well as from agreeable and animating hopes. Of what deficiencies can fuch pleafures be the fupply, fmce previouily to their exiftence in us, there was not any thing de- fective ? With regard to grofs and reproachable pleafures, which our adverfaries may cite in proof of their erroneous theory, the very name of pleafures may, with propriety, be denied to them ; fmce they are acknowledged as fuch only by men of corrupt minds * Analyfis, p. 107. & feq. 10 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 38/ minds and perverfe fentiments. Perfons difeafed are not ik Β Ο Ο Κ judges of the reliili of wliolcfome food ; nor is that white, which appears fuch to thofe afflided with an ophthahny. It may be obferved alfo, that pleafure is not defirable, unlefs it proceed from an honourable, at lead an innocent fource ; any more than wealth is a good, when too dearly purchafed by dif- honefty. Diiferent pleafures are adapted to different charac- ters. Juft men only know the pleafure of juftice; as thofe only who have an ear for mufic, enjoy the pleafure of melody; the fame differences are obfervable in other particulars. The very diiTmiilar gratifications which we derive from friends and flatterers fhow, that either pleafure is not in itfelf defirable, or that there mufl be pleafures fpecitically diiferent from each other. A friend aims at promoting our good, a flatterer aims only at giving us pleafure ; and the behaviour of the one is as univerfally and as juftly praifed, as that of the other is uni- verfally and juflly condemned. None worthy of the name of a man, would choofe to have the underilanding of a child, that he might fpend his life happily in childiih amufements ; nor would he fubmit to do bafe aitions, whatever pleafure he might derive from them, and though affured that they ihould never afterwards be followed by pain or puniihment. But, on the other hand, he would defire moft earneftly to have the ufe of his eye-fight, of his memory, and of his underilanding, as well as to be endowed and adorned with virtuous habits, although no pleafure whatever refulted from the exercife of thofe capa- cities or powers. That this exercife is neceifarily accompanied with pleafure makes not any difference, fince it is an objeft of deiire on its own account, and independently of the delight which neceflarily attends it. It fecms plain, therefore, that 3 D 2 pleafure 388 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK X. Chap. 4. Pleafurecon- fifts in exer- ciling the proper energies of our nature, which it im- proves and perfci2s. plealure is not the fupreme good, nor that all kinds of pleafures are defirable ; and that whether or no pleafures are dehrable ultimately, and on their own account, depends on the fource from whence they fpring. Such are the opinions held con- cerning, pleafure and pain. But what pleafure is in reality, and under what clafs of things it ought to be arranged, will more fully appear from the following indudion. The ail of feeing is perfedt in every inflant of time, needing nothing to give to it the fpecific com- pletion and fulnefs of which its nature is fufceptible. Such alfo is pleafure, a whole, perfedl in each inftant, and not more per- fed: than at the firil inftant, how long foever it may be enjoyed, Pleafure therefore is not motion, becaufe all motion co-exifts with a certain portion of time ; and tends to a certain end, in which it terminates, being, from its very nature, imperfedl ; becaufe, as foon as the end is eifefted, the motion by which it was attained ceafes to exift^ Thus of the art of building, the end is a houfe ; and until the houfe is made, the building is im- perfedl ; but when the houfe is built, the action or motion by which it was produced ceafes to exift : and the parts of that adtion or motion are, until the whole is finiihed, each dif-» ferent from another, and each imperfe<3: in itfelf ; as rearing the walls, chamfering the pillars, building the dome ; all of which» as well as laying the foundation and adding the ornaments, are but parts of one ailion, which, taken together, conftitute a whole, when the work is completed. The fame holds, with regard to that kind of motion which confifts in change of place, and its various modes, namely, walking, jumping, flying, and others of that fort ; each of which confifts of imperfed parts, fpeci- fically ' Analyfis, p. 1J7. & feq. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. ^^g fically different from each other, and from the whole colleft- BOOK ively. Thus, in the Olympic race, a different part of the iladium is run over in each particle of time, till the goal is attained ; and as each part is different from another, fo muil the motions performed in them be all different ; nay, though the fame part be run over, yet if the racer proceed, in the one cafe, from the ilarting-poft to the goal, and in the other, from the goal to the flarting-pofl, a difference in the motions muil arife from the difference in their diredions. But concerning motion, we have treated accurately in another work*', Pleafure is manifeflly a thing quite different ; fince it is complete in each iiidiviftble tiow, that is, in each inflant ; not requiring for its perfection any the fmallefl portion of time : but motion, as we have elfewhere proved, cannot exift without time or fuc- ceffion. In the fame manner, the a£t of vifion, a point, and an unit, are things which have not any connection with genera- tion, nor any kind of motion ; every modification of which muil belong to things not effentially wholes, but partible ; and to them only. Of this kind is pleafure, effentially a whole, fmce effentially perfect ; accompanying the operation of each percipient with regard to the perceptible objedl, Avhen both the perceiving power is properly conflituted, and the perceptible obje£t the faireft and the befl on which that fpecilic adl of per- ception can poifibly be exercifed *■. To fay that the perceiving power exercifes its energies, or the fubflance in which that power refides, makes not any difference as to the prefent fubjedl. Pleafure accompanies every adt of perception by fenfe in a higher or lower degree, in proportion to the prevalence of the condi* tions above ilated ; and alfo every ad of reafoning or intelligence. But « Analyfis, p. 1 19 & feq. ^ Ibid. p. 51. & feq. 390 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. But as the phyfician and the medicines which he prelcribes, are in different fenfes the caufes of health, fo our percipient powers are enlivened and perfeded in a different manner by the proper objeds of thofe powers, and by the pleafure attending our per- ception of them. Each fenfe has its appropriate pleafure : the ^_ eye is delighted by fights ; the ear by founds ; and in propor- tion to the foundnefs and vigour of the fenfe itfelf, as well as the beauty and excellence of the object on which it is exercifed, the pleafure will be the greater ; but pleafure there always muft be, wherever the agent and the obje£t are naturally adapted to each other. Pleafure does not perfed our energifmg powers as a pre-acquired habit, but rather as a fupervenient end ; in the fame manner as beauty accom.panies the flower of youth. The powers of man are not capable of unceafmg aftivity, and there- fore our pleafures cannot be continuous, for they are infeparably connected with our energies. Things which delight when new, often ceafe to give pleafure, and that becaufe our attention is no longer roufed by their prefence, nor the energies of our mind called forth in contemplating them. They are difre- garded as an old and familiar fhov/ ; and in proportion to the weaknefs of our exertions, our pleafure is blunted. It may be fufpeded that all love pleafure, becaufe all are fond of life, which confifts in exercifmg the energies of our nature. Life then is energy, which each individual exerciles on thofe fub- jeds in which he moil delights ; the mufician, on melodies ; the mathematician, on theorems ; and others, on other fub- jeds. Pleafure therefore is naturally defirable, becaufe it per- feds our energies, that is our life, in the continuance of which all delight. But whether life is defired for the fake of pleafure, or pleafure for the fake of life, needs not at prefent be examined ; fmce ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 391 fince thefe two feem fo intimately combined as not to admit of BOOK reparation. Pleafure, then, cannot exiil without energy ; and ,_ __"-- __; our energies are ilrengthened and perfe£led by the pleafures ac- companying them. It feems to follow from thefe obfervations, that as energies or Chap. 5. a£lions widely differ from each other, fo muft alfo the pleafures by which they are perfetled. This holds in the feveral opera- tions both of nature and of art, the different kinds of which refpedlively terminate in different and appropriate ends ; namely, animals, plants, pi<3;ures, ftatues, houfes, and furniture. The aftion of the fenfes, or what is called perception by fenfe, mani- feftly diifers from the aftion of the underftanding ; and the pleafures refpedively accompanying thofe operations, bear a near affinity to the operations which they rcfpedively accom- pany ; for each operation or energy is encreafed, improved, and perfecled by a pleafui-e that is a-kin to it. Thus the exer- tions of the geometer, the mufician, and the architeit, are en- livened and invigorated by the delight which they take in their refpeftive purfuits ; and the cultivators of thofe fciences there- by improve themfelves gradually, until they attain the moft confummate ikill, and moil decided pre-eminence. But plea- fures, on the other hand, which are not a-kin to the operations which they accompany, are fo far from improving and per- fecting them, that, on the contrary, they weaken and obilruit them. Thus, thofe who are agreeably employed in reading or fludy, cannot, if they are lovers of mufic, perfevere in applying to their books and meditations, fhould they happen to hear at a diftance an agreeable melody ; for the two pleafures not being a-kin, the flronger overpowers the weaker. Wherefore, when we are much delighted with one thing, we cannot attend to any 392 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK any other. At a well aded play the mind Is fixed in delightful tranfport, but when the ilage players are bad, many fpedatovs amufe themfelves with fweetmeats '. Pleafures not a-kln to the operations which they accompany, have the fame effedt (though they produce it differently) with congenial pains ; for thefe alfo have a tendency to weaken and deftroy our energies. Thus, thofe to whom it is painful to write or to reafon, have little inclination to do either, and commonly do them incor- reftly. Of operations and the pleafures accompanying them, fome are laudable and refpeilable ; others are blameable and contemptible. The former are to be purfued, and the latter to be avoided. Pleafures are more a-kin to energies, than even the defires which precede them j for thefe defires are eafily diftinguifhable from the energies which they prompt, both iti their own nature and in point of time ; whereas pleafures and energies are fo difficultly feparated even in thought, that many fuppofe them to be one and the fame thing. They are indeed intimately connected ; but as energies both of fenfe and in- telleil are often not only unpleafant but painful, it is abfurd to think that pleafure and energy are the fame, though the former cannot fubfiil without the latter. But it is of more importance to obferve that the nature and qualities of our pleafures depend entirelv on the nature and qualities of our energies. In this manner the pleafures of the fight differ in purity from thofe of the touch ; and the pleafures of the ear from thofe of the palate; while the intelledt affords pleafures totally diifimllar to any refulting from the fenfes. As each animal is endowed with peculiar energies, each having his appropriate work to effedl, and his affigned taik to perform, fo each fpecies is deftined for the enjoyment of congenial and kindred pleafures ; thofe of a man * Ariftotle fays, '* they do fo mofb when the players are bad." ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 393 man diffenng fpecifically from the pleafures of the horfe or the Β O^ K. dog, the animals with which he is moft famiUar. As Hera- cUtus fays, an afs would prefer ftraw to gold, loving food more than money. But among individuals of the fame fpecies it might be expe£ted that the fame effeds iliould follow from the fame caufes ; and that there ihould be a complete community of pleafures as well as of pains. Yet in the human race we find the thing far otherwife ; one loving what another moft de- tefts, and that giving pain to one, which affords the moft ex- quifite pleafure to another. This however need not appear ex- traordinary, if we confider that the fame food has a very dif- ferent reliih to a man in health, and to another in difeafe ; and that the warmth agreeable to pcrfons of weak conftitutions, is unpleafant to thofe of a firmer temperament. Innumerable other examples to the fame purpofe will occur ; with regard to ail which, we affirm that only to be right, which appears fo to perfons rightly formed and properly conftituted. Virtue there- fore, and the man of virtue as fuch, is the only natural and correa ftandard ; and thofe only are true enjoyments, with which he is delighted. That the purfuits which be rejeds and fpurns, ihould to others afford gratification, is not to be won- dered at, fince human nature is liable to corruptions and de- pravities of many kinds; and each corrupt individual will delight in pleafures akin to the fpecific depravity under which he labours'; which are pleafures indeed to him, but to none be- fides. But the queftion is, what are the pleafures of a man in his natural and moft perfcd ftate ? That they are infeparably conneded with his energies, we have above proved ; fo that if ' Mala mentis Gaudia. Virg. vi, 78. VOL. I. 3 ^ 394 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. if there be peculiar works to be performed by a man, and pecu- liar taiks affigned to him, his proper and natural pleafures muft confift in the operations by which his work is done, and his talk accompliihed. Other pleafures are only fecondary, and feparated by a wide interval. Having examined the nature of virtue, friendihip, and plea- . fure, it remains to fpeak of happinefs, the end, as we obferved, Of happi- p£ gjj }^uman purfuits. Our difcourfe will be rendered more nels i ^ concife by refuming fome conclufions already ftated. Happi- nefs, we faid, confifts, not in mere capacity unroufed, or in mere habit unexercifed ; for were that the cafe, it might belong to a man who ihould remain for ever afleep, living the life of a plant, or involved in the greateft calamities ; fmce a man thus circumftanced might be endowed with the nobleft capacities, and moil excellent and moft honourable habits. Happinefs, then, muil be claiTed with operations or energies, fome of which, as we already remarked, are neceifary for the attainnient of farther and diftind ends, and others are defirable merely on their own account ; with which laft, happinefs is, manifeftly, to be numbered. Energies terminating in themfelves, and de- firable merely on their own account, include all the amiable and laudable adtlons which proceed from confirmed habits of' virtue ; they appear alfo to include thofe innocent amufements w^hich are fought fo entirely for their own fake, that men often purfue them to the prejudice of their health or fortune. In fuch amufements it is common for the wealthy and powerful to place the principal enjoyment of life, and perfons moil dexterous in promoting them are not unfrequently the higheil in efteem with princes ; fmce they are the beil qualified for fupplying them with thofe gratifications, of which they have the ilrongeft reliih. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 395 reliih. In fuch camufements the vulgar, too, are apt to place BOOK: happinefs, bccaufc they fee them purfued as fuch by thofe who, _ in the gifts of fortune, are greatly their fuperiors. But neither the vulgar nor the great ought to ferve for models. Virtue, in- telleit, ardent feelings of the heart, and exalted energies of the mind, are not appendages of greatnefs ; and though men in- verted with power, but incapable of tailing genuine and liberal pleafure, often feek delight in grofs gratifications of fenfe, this affords not any proof that fuch delufive purfuits are entitled to a juft preference. Children think all things inferior in value to their own childiih amufements ; and as different objeds pleafe inen and children, fo good and bad men might be expefted to have very different delights ; but, as we have often faid, thofe things only are truly valuable and truly delightful, which are recognized as fuch by men of virtuous habits ; for, as our habits are, fuch will be our pleafures and our purfuits. Happinefs, then, cannot confift in mere recreative paftime ; for it is ab- furd to think that all our ferious exertions and ilrenuous labours ihould terminate in fo frivolous an end ". We do not labour that we may be idle ; but, as Anacharfis juitly faid, we are idle that we may labour with more effedl ; that is, we have recourfe to fports and amufements as refreihing cordials after contentious exertions, that having repofed in fuch diverfions for a while, we may recommence our labours with encreafed vigour '. The weaknefs of human nature requires freqxient remiifions of energy ; but thefe refts and paufes are only the better to prepare us for enjoying the pleafures of activity. The amufements of life '' Neque enim ita generati a natura fumus, ut ad ludum et jocum fa£li efle videamur. Cicero de Offic. 1. i. c. 29. ' Ludo autem et joco, uti illo quidem licet ; fed ficut fomno et quietibus caeteris. Ibid. 3 Ε 2 intelledual ; 396 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. life therefore are but preludes to its bufinefs, the place of which they cannot poffibly fupply ; and its happinefs, becaufc its bufi- nefs, confiils in the exercife of thofe virtuous energies, which conftitute the worth and dignity of our nature. Inferior plea- fures may be enjoyed by the fool and the Have, as completely as by the hero or the fage. But who will afcribe the happinefs of a man to him, who, by his charader and condition, is dif- qualified for manly purfuits ? Chap. 7. If happinefs confiils in virtuous energies, the greateft human happinefs muft confift in the exercife of the greateft virtue in man ; which muft be the virtue or perfedtion of his beft part, whether this be intelled:, or whatever principle it be, that is deftined to command and bear fway ; having knowledge of things beautiful and divine, as being either divine itfelf, or at leaft that principle in us which moft approximates to divinity. The greateft human happinefs, then, is theoretic and intelledual ; which well accords with the properties which we formerly found, by inveftigation, to be eifentially inherent in that moft coveted objeft. The intelledl is the beft principle in man ; its energies are the ftrongeft, and the objedts about which it is converfant are far the moft fublime. The energies of intelled are alfo the longeft and moft continuous, fince we can perfevere in theorifing and thinking much longer than in performing any adtion whatever. Pleafure, it was obferved, muft be an ingredient in happinefs ; but contemplative wifdom offers pleafures the moft admirable in purity and ftability, and the pleafures of know- ledge continually cncreafe in proportion to our improvement in it ; certainty concerning the fublimeft truths aflbrding ftill higher delight in proportion to the intenfe efforts of intelledl by which they were difcovered. That all-fufficiency, which we remarked as a property of happinefs, belongs to intelledual energies ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 397 energies more than to any other ; for though the fage, as well BOOK as the moralift or the patriot, ftands in need of bodily accom- modations, yet in exerting his higheft excellencies, he is not like them dependant on fortune, both for his objeds and his in- ftruments ; for objefts towards whom he may exercife his virtues, and inftruments which may enable him to efFeduate his ends. Even unaiFifted and alone, though perhaps better with affiftants, he can ftill think and theorize ; poiTeifing in the energies of his own mind, the pureft and moil independant en- joyments. Thefe enjoyments are valuable peculiarly on their own account, fince they terminate completely in themfelvcs ; whereas all pradical virtue has, befide the pradice itfelf, fome diftindl and feparate end in view. The tranquillity of leifure is naturally more agreeable than the buftle of bufmefs ; we toil for the fake of quiet, and make war for the fake of peace. But the pradical virtues are moil confpicuouily exercifed in political and military fundions, the latter of which none but the moil favage and fanguinary minds would fubmit to from choice, con- verting friends into enemies for the mere pleafure of fighting with them. Politics, too, forms an operofe and troublefome oc- cupation, which would not be undertaken from the fole love of exercifmg political fundions, independently of diftind and feparate ends ; power, wealth, and honour ; in one word, pro- fperity to ourfelves, friends, or fellow-citizens. But intelledual energies are complete and perfed in themfelves, fupplying an exhaufllefs ftream of pure and perennial pleafure, which in its turn invigorates and enlivens the energies, and thus encreafes and refines the fource from which it unceafingly fprings ; all- fufficient, peaceful, and permanent, as far as is compatible with the condition of humanity. Were unalterable permanency added 398 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK added to fuch a life, its happinefs would be more than human ; • , but even within a limited term, its ineftimable delights may be enjoyed by thofe who attain the perfedion of their age and faculties ; living not merely as partners with a frail and com- pound nature^ but according to the fimple and divine principle within them, whofe energies and virtues as far tranfcend all others, as the intelledlual fubftance in which they refide excels . all other fubftances of which our frame is compofed ". We ought not, therefore, according to the vulgar exhortation, though mortal, to regard only mortal things ; but as far as poiTible, to put on immortality, exerting ourfelves to tafte the joys of the intelledlual life. This is living according to the beft part of what we call ourfelves, which, though feemingly fmall in bulk, is incomparably greater in power and in value than all things befides ". The intelleit indeed is the beft and fovereign part of our conftitution, and therefore ftriftly and properly ourfelves. It is abfurd therefore to prefer any other life to our own. AVhat was above obferved will apply here. The pleafure and good of each individual muft confift in that which is moft congenial to his nature ". The intelleilual life, therefore, muft be the beft and happieft for man ; fmce the intelled is that which is peculiarly himfelf. Chap. 8. The moral life follows next, both in fitnefs and in dignity ; for the pradice of juftice, fortitude, and other virtues, are highly ■" Analyfis, p. 50. & feq. " Ibid. " In the third chapter of the third book of the Topics, p. 209, there is an excellent praflical rule for diftinguifbing real goods from thofe merely of opinion, nui n το fxs» L•' tauTO, TO Ji, Ae T>i> ίοίαιι aifiTot' eim nyitia χαλλΰς, όξος οί TS» πξοζ ίϋ|α>, Toj ftriiiiCf ί7ϋ»;ιίοτος, ft»! at c-TraJcKrat ντταξχα). Things defirable in themfelves are to be preferred to thofe which are defired merely on account of the opinion entertained of them, as health to beauty ; but we may know what thofe things are that are good merely in opinion, by the following teft, " they are thofe about which we would not give ourfelves much trouble, if no perfon were to know that we pofleiTed them." and moral. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 399 highly fuitable to the nature of man, and eiTentially requlfite in BOOK focial intercourfe, that mutual wants may be fupplied, and mu- ,_ / ■. tual duties may be performed ; that individual paiTions may be regulated with propriety, and rendered as ornamental to thofe afFedled by them, as beneficial to the public. Moral virtue, then, is intimately conneded with the paffions and affedions, many of which have their origin in the body ; and, on the other hand, it is equally conneQed with the intelleaual virtue of prudence ; fince the firft principles of this pradlical wifdom originate in good moral habits ; and thofe habits only are good which prudence juftifies and approves. The moral virtues, therefore, are effentlal to the well-being of our compound nature ; but the virtues and happinefs of the intellea are, like the intel- ledt itfelf, feparate and independent : thus much only I fliall fay concerning it, for to treat more accurately of our intel- leaual part, belongs not to the fubjed of the prefent difcourfe. The happinefs refulting from its energies, requires but few Pre-emi- external advantages ; fewer by far than are requifite for the "h "^rmer exercife of political or moral virtues. The fage indeed, as Ρ^°ν=''• well as the patriot, muft be furniihed with the neceifaries of life ; and although the labours of the latter have more con- nedion with the body and its wants, yet this circumftance need not make any great difference in their perfonal accommoda- tions ; but it will make a difference of the greateft magnitude as to the exercife of their refpedive energies. For the man of liberality muft be furniihed with the means of beneficence ; and the man of probity or equity, whh the means of making, for received favours, fair and reafonable returns ; mere intentions are obfcure and doubtful ; and being often pretended, can only i)e clearly afcertained when carried into effed. In the fame 10 manner, 400 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK X. The exercife of intellec- tual energy the beft and firmeft por- tion of hu- man happi- nefs. manner, fortitude fliines moil confpicuouily wlicn armed with power to repel dangers ; and temperance difplays its brighteft charms, amidft temptations to vohiptuoufnefs. The vulgar controverfy, whether virtue confifts principally in adlion or intention, proves that both are requifite to its completion. But adlions are dependent on external circumftances ; and the greater and more illuftrious they are, they require, for their performance, the greater number of inftrurnents and auxiliaries. Speculation, on the other hand, is far lefs operofe ; it Avould be rather obftrudted than benefited by a cumberfome apparatus of externals ; which, how ufeful foever they may be for the dif- play of pradlical virtue, are not at all eifential to the exercife of intelleilual energy. That the latter compofes the beft and firmeft portion of human felicity may appear alfo from this, that it is difficult to conceive in what operation or energy befides, the felicity of the gods, whom unlverfal conient acknowledges moft happy, can poffibly confift. In the exercife of juftice? It would be ridiculous to fuppofe thofe celeftial beings employed in making bargains, reftoring depofits, or in performing any other adlions about which the virtue of juftice is converfant. There is, if poffible, ftill lefs room among them for courage. Can it redound to their glory, that they encouater dangers manfully ? Liberality cannot be afcribed to them, unlefs we fuppofe, abfurdly, that they make ufe of money, or fomething equivalent. The praife of temperance is beneath thofe who have not any unruly appetites to reftrain. Were we to go tlirough the whole catalogue of the moral virtues, we ihould find that they are converfant about adions totally unwortliy of the grandeur and fublimity of the gods. Yet we all believe thofe glorious beings to live exercifing the energies ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 401 energies of their nature, not flecping like Endymion. After BOOK what manner, then, can they be employed ? Not in praftical virtue, far lefs in productive induftry. It remains therefore that they live an intelledlual life ; which, as eflentially belong- ing to the gods, muft be pre-eminent in happinefs ; a happinefs pure and permanent, to which the life of man, in proportion as it is intelledlual, will more nearly approximate j and of which inferior animals, as they are deftitute of the divine principle of intelleft, can never in any degree partake. Happinefs is not an acceflbry to the energy of thought. It is connedled with it fubilantially and indivlfibly ; a rich ftream, unalterably flowing from an inexhauftible fpring. The fage indeed requires bodily health and bodily accommodations ; but the meafure of his external advantages needs not be large ; for fuperfluity will neither aifift his own exertions, nor iharpen his judgment concerning the performances of others. To difplay the beauty and gracefulnefs even of moral virtue, it is not neceifary for him to be mailer of the fea and of the land. A mediocrity of circumftances is fufficient for the exhibition of moral excellencies; which is evident from this, that they appear more frequently in private perfons than in thofe inverted with power. This me- diocrity, therefore, as it contributes moil to virtue, is moil con- ducive to happinefs. Solon well delineated the condition of thofe whofe happinefs he admired, faying, " that they had en- joyed a moderate proportion of the goods of fortune, per- formed moll illuilrious adions, and lived corredlly and foberly °." Anaxagoras feems not to have thought happinefs an attribute of wealth or power, when he laid '', that it would not furprife him, • See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, v. i. c. vii. p. 305 and 306. ρ In the Ethics to Eudemus, 1. i. c. iv. p. «97. the circumftance here alluded to is VOL. I. 3 t" ^°^^ X. 402 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK him, iliould he be deemed a very abfurd perfonage by the multi- tude; who judge, and who are capable of judging, only by externals. The opinions of wife men are likely to be con- formable to reafon ; but in pradlical matters, experience alone can afford convi£tion ; and thofe opinions only are to be approved, which the lives of thofe who hold them, confirm. There is ftill a farther reafon why thofe who moft cultivate their intelledlual powers ihould alio be moft happy ; for fuch perfons not only attain the beft temper of mind, and the higheft perfeftion of their own nature, but they are alfo the moft pleafmg in the fight of the Divinity. If the gods (as they ap- pear to do) concern themfelves about human affairs, it is reafonable to conclude that they ihould moft delight in the energies of intelled, which are the beft, and higheft, and moft congenial to their own ; and that they ihould remunerate and reward thofe who love and honour thofe exercifes and occupations which they themfelves hold dear ; and who, in preferring and adorning the intelledual part, adt rightly and honourably ". Having niore fully explained. " Anaxagoras of Ciazomene, being afked who moft de- ferved the epithet of happy ? anfwered, not fuch men as you would imagine, but, on the contrary, fuch perfons as to you would appear egregious fools. He pro- bably anfwered thus, becaufe he perceived him with whom he was converfing inca- pable of appreciating happinefs by any other ftandard than that of mere externals, power, wealth, beauty, &c. whereas he himfelf thought //;a/ man the happieft who lived exempt from pain or perturbation, pradifing juftice, and cultivating his under- Itanding." :efar:ors, why lefs beloved than thofe who have received benefits, 366, & f<-'qq, Buffon, criticifed, 126. CalUfihenes, his chara£ler, 23. Ca/i^f/i)', ftate of, what, 117. Caracaila deftroys the fchools in Alexandria, ■25. The pretended motive thereto, ibid. Categories, their nature and number, 59. Caufe:, their nature and divifion, 88. Infinite ptogreffion thereof impoltble, gi. Cercinus, his play of Alope, 321. Change, its different kinds, 107. Cicero mifreprefents Ariftotle's theology, 137, j'<8. His treatife on friendihip compared with Ariflotle's, 329. Clajjification, its rules, 63. Conmientaturs, Ariftotle's, their clafles, num- bers, and errors, 2, 3. Concord, its nature and definition, 365. Continence and temperance, their nature and differences, 324, & feqq. Contraries, feleftion of, 89. What, iii. Converfion of propofitions, rules thereof, 74. Courage, its definition and nature, 200. Five kinds thereof explained, 213, & feqq. Courtefy, and its contraries, 245. Ccwarclice compared with intemperance, 222. Crimes diftinguiihed from errors and misfor- tunes, 275, & feqq. Cudworth cited, 50. D Def.nhion, its nature, 66. Dtity, dodlrine thereof, 134. His attributes, '35• The fource of being, 136. Delos, its infcription, 163. Demodocus, his faying of the Milcfians, 323. Democriius refuted, 1 05. Oemonfirations, univerial and particular, 84. The former more fatisfadlory, and v/hy, 85. Depravities, unnatural, 316, & feqq. Defires, natural and adventitious, 22O. Differe.ce, fpecific, 65. Diogenes maintained air to be the firfl princi- ple, ^9. Grounds of his opinion, ibid. Di'uifion, its nature, 63. DoSlrinejAoMc, not found in Ariilotle, 138, Duty, analogy between that to ourfelves, and that to our friends, 362. Earth, analyfis thereof, 103. Ariftotle's doc» trine concerning it, 124. Education, its efficacy, 403. Eleilion, moral, its nature explained, 195, & feqq. Elements, analyfis thereof, 102. Their con- tinual tranlmutations, 103. Empedocles, his four elements, loO. Encyclopedic, its ftrarge account of Ariftotle's works, 38, note. Energy, ftate of, what, 118. Doflrine con- cerning it, 133. Fitft energy, 134, His attributes, 135. Equity, nature of it explained, 281. Ethics, foundation thereof, 194. Eudoxus, his ingenious argument in favour of pleafure, 168. Advocate for pleafure, 382. His temperance and regularity, 383. Exoteric and acroatic writings, their nature and difFerences, 19, & feqq. Difcourfes, 25. Experien:e, what, 97, E>periii ents, .'ariftotle's philofophybuiltthereon, J39• F FaceHoufnefs, and its contrarie?, 250. Faults, diftinguiihed from misfortunes and crimes, 277. Feelv-f, ethics not folely founded thereon, 194. Ferocity, and its oppofites, 307. Fire, nature thereof, 103. Fijhes, Ariftotle's wonderful knowledge con- cerning them, 129. /Όηίίκί//ί criticifed, 121. Form, what, p. 112. Species or fight, what, 115. Its different fignifications, 132. Friendfljip, what, 33. its beauty and utility, 329, & feqq. Doubts concerning it, 331. Divided INDEX. 413 Divided into three kinds, 333. Qi^ialities by which excited, ibiJ. & ieqq. Different kinds of it compared, 335. Peifoiis mod fufceptibleofit, 336. Its relation to juftice, 3}.i, & ieqq• Both relative to the diiFerent forms of government, 343. Unequal friendihips, their limit?, 339. Their found- ation, 340. Variations in the nature and in- tenfity of friendfliip, how occafioned, 34.5, & feqq. That founded on propinquity, 34.7. Between hufband and wife, 348. Di.'outes between friends, how to be atjuftcd, '^49, & feqq. How its returns are belt eilimated, 355' ^ '^iq• ^'5 exercifs does not admit of precife rules, 358, &(eqq. Juflifiahle grounds for its diiTolution, 360, & icqq. Rules con- cerning its difi'olution, 361. Whether moil defirablc in profperity or in adveiTity, 370. The exquifite delight of virtuous friendlhip, 371• Genus, what, 63. Gcii, his goodnefs, 137. Οοώ, wherein iheir happinefs conflfts, 401. Concern themfelves about human afTairs, 402• Thofe whom they love and reward, ibid. Good, Plato's notion thereof refuted, 156. The Supreme, delineation thereof, 158. Good-will, iis nature and definition, 365. Gray, his charadler of Ariftotle's writings, 143• Greek, diiHcuIty of tranilating it, 147. Grotius, his character of Ariltotle, 173. His tbjctlions to Arillotle's Ethics anfwcred, 174. Η Habits, moral, 206. Are voluntary, 207. Objeflions th reio, 2c8. Anfwered, ibid. & feqq. Intellectual and moral, their dif- ference, 257. Happinefs^ different opinions concerning it, 152. Properties afcribed to it, 161. Whether the gift of heaven or our oivn work, 164. Above praife, 168. Its nature, 394. In- telleitual 396. Moral, 398. Pre-eminence of the former, 399. Harris, his erroneous account of Ariftotle's doftrine of ideas, 60. Miftakes Ariftotle's philofophy, 85. Hearing, fenfe of, 43, & feqq. Heraclitus maintained fire to be the firft prin- ciple of things, 99. Grounds of that opi- nion, ibid. Herineias, tyrant of Atarneus, his charafier, 10. His fingular hiftory, ii,&feqq. His conneftion with Ariftotle, ii. Provokes the rcfcntment of Artaxerxes, ibid. Is deftinyed by Mentor the Rhodian, 12. Hermotimus firft introduced the dodlrine of mind, ιοτ. Herpylis, Ariftotle's wife, 32. Hffiod quoted, i 5 ?. ////>/!«/«/ maintained fire to be the firft prin- ciple, 99. Grounds of his opinion, ibid. Hobbes miftakes Ariftotle, 115, 116. //i?«fr quoted, 189, 19O. Honour, anonymous virtue refpecting if, 2fO. Hume, his principles of affuciation erroneous, 45• I Ichthyology, Ariftotle's, 129. Ideas, or perceptions, their affociation, 45. General, refutation thereof, 57 — 60. Imagination, its nature, 44, & id. P/eafure, the teft of virtue, 178. The love of it not to be too feverely cenfured, 381, Si feqq. Difterent opinions concerning it, 182, Scfeq. Its ambiguous nature, 384. What it is not, 385, & feqq. What it is, 388. Infeparably connedled with energy, yet different from it, 390, & feqq. Pliny giok\y miftakes Ariftotle, 137. Policy, general and particular, 296. Politics, fcience thereof, its objefl, 150. Pro- per method of treating it, 151. Polybius, his account of the origin of morals, 204. Powers, rational, irrational, and moral, 170, & feq. Principles, general, how formed, 57. Defini- tion thereof, 88. Privation, what, 112. Property, what, 64. Propofitions, their nature, 64. Their con- veifion and oppofition, 74, & feqq. Protagoras, his liberal bargain with his dlfci- ples, 356. Proxenus, Ariftotle's early protedor, 7. Prudence, its nature and objedt, 292. Pythagoras, his numbers, loi. Pythias, Ariftotle's firft wife, 14. Her death and laft requeft, ibid. Her afFedlionate re- queft gratified, 32. polity, the charailierifing, 120. ^iantity, what, 59. R Riid, Dr. miftakes Ariilotle's Organum, 77- Reminlfcence, its nature explained, 47, & feq. Rennet, Dr. 409. Retaliation does not apply to juftice, 268. Sceptics refuted, 94, & feqq. Scherer, h\s Aiitiphlogiftifche Chemie, 105. Science, treatife thereon, 90, & feqq. Its nature and obje£l, 290. Self-command, and its contraries, 309, & feqq. Self-love difTerent from felfiftinefs, 368, &c feq, Senfes, their nature and obje£ls, 41. Their exercife ultimately agreeable, 96. 5f«//>«i«/, juftnefs of, 299. Shame, nature thereof, 252. Sight, fenfe of, 43, & feq. Simonides, his proverbial avarice, 229. S?nitb, Dr. Adam, his miftaken account of ancient phyfics, 104. He expanded Poly- bius's moral refledions into a theory, 204, & feqq. Solon, his faying concerning the dead examined^ 166. His opinion of happinefs, 401. Soul, doflrine concerning it, 131. Space, what, 120. Species, what, 63. Speufippus, 9. His chara£ler, 10. Com- mended, 1 56» Stagira, its hiftory, 4, 5, 6. Sirabo, his account of the reftoration of the- peripatetic philofophy, 37, note. Sylla feizes Apellicon's library, 35. Tranf- ports Ariftotle's writings to Rome, ibid. Sylhgifin, its nature and ufe, 70. All f>l- logifms reduced to thofe of the firft figure, 73. Rule by which the juilncfs ot all lyllogifms may be tried, tbid. Tafle, fenfe of, 42. Temperance, its definition and nature, 21 3, & feqq. ; diftinguiihed from continence, 314, & leqq. Terms, general, hovir formed, 56. Tbaks • 4i6 INDEX. Thales maintained water to be the firft princi- ple, gg. Grounds of his opinion, ibid. TheodeSles, his tragedy of Phiiodetes, 321. Theology, what, 96. Theophrajlus, lb. Bequeathed Ariftotle's wri- tings to Neleus, 3^. Time, what, 120. Topics, defign thereof, 78. Touch, feme of, 42. Q^ialities difcovered thereby, ibid. Triad, definition thereof, 66. Truth, demonftrative, 82. Wherein it con- fifts, 83. Univerfal and particular, 84. Its exiftence and nature, 92. &: feqq. Tyrannion procures a copy of Ariftotle's writings, 36. U Un'ty, not number, 66. Under/landing, powers thereof, differ as widely as thofe of fenfation, 285, & feqq. Vice, its wretchednefs, 364. Fices milfaken for virtues, 188. Why, 189. /'7r/«i confifts in mediocrity, 185. Proved by indudion, ibid. & feq. Mirtaken for vice?, why, 188, & feq. Praiiical rules for its auainmcnr, 1 89, & fr q. Intelledual virtues, 287. Their utility in pradice, 301. Hap- pi..efs attending virtue, 363. Virtues, moral, not implanted by na(ure, ^75. Acquired by a£tion and cuftom, ibid. Rules for attaining them, 176. Whcicin they copfiil, 177. The fi.''.eft teft of virtue, 178. Four requifites to form a virtuous chara£ter, 188. That the virtues are not capacities nor paiuons, buthabitE, 181. The nature and eflence o: virtue, 182, & 'cq