， ， ， ， ， ！
، ، ، ، ، ، ، ، ،
• - C ）
s= ！！！
• • • • • • • • №e ſººs * * ***ergºse，
�،
، ، ، ، ، ،
© ： ·
！ ） ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
s • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ¶
، ، ، ، ، ، ، ، ، ، ، ، ، ،~
∞w w. • • • • • • • • • ►
• … • • • • § €， º sº v sº º e º sº s
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ► ► ► ► ► ► ► ► · · ·
∞：ſ.·
‹ ›› ‹‹.
º_º · @ z = <！-- *）（.* № ſe • • • • • • •
، ، ،
a º0 • •
quae q. ，z，t）
（ 3 ） ： • s）ssſsssſs: çizg::：::：::es:sº: º ;º） ！！！！！！
■ ■ ■ ■*** • • ¶ • • ► ►►£ € © · · · · · ©
< > ≡ ºº sºſae
ſ. №, º prº■ ■ ■ ■§ ¶ ¡ ¿
¿?, ¿º & Jae （X，• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
« · s · ø • • • • • •
€ £ © ®
œ Œ Œ œ œ œ
* ， , ， ，
º ： * * *
№ sºº • & S） ≤ ∞ √
Œ Œ
- e ſae es ·
∞©， ， ，a ' •º ，
№， „（...º.„… : „ …:…ººoºoºaeſe (sºoºoºº
¿??¿?
ſaevaeſſae
ſ · §， ， ， ºaegae » * * * * * * * * t;
№ſº Cººººººººººººº！！！！！！！
& - s.
× × × × × × ×
& • • • •
× × × × × × × × × × × ± •
ſºſ
∞∞ → ∞, ∞ √≠ ≤ & * & */* & * & * &
0 · · · ·º ： · · · · ·
¡ ¿ $ · · · · · · · · · · · · · • • • • • •
* * * * * * • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
، ، ، ، ، ،
، ، ، =
§ * & * & * & sae &
• d * ， ， ， ， » c.
، ،…
€ £ © ® ° ≈ ≠ ≤ ≥ ≠ ≤ ∞ și
*#:;&########-ſize:s-ſºſ
§ . . . . . . , „ …
« * * * * · ·：
ſeżałałºżżsººs sisſa:
£ €
∞
∞ √° √≠ ≤ r ≤ ∞ →
∞∞， ∞; ∞， ∞
• × ° € ← → · § .
& & {};
1.， º.ſ.v.s.， ſ.º. º. º.
zjg（x，z）！ſeº，!
¿¿¿.:} · · ·’:’， :, ’:’， ：,：
ºſłººwººººººººº, ºſ sraeg?！?;：ºrºsłe
∞ . №
º， ， ，
„ ' .. ° =
« sº : • s





'TEl E -
Wo RKS OF PLAT0.
A NEW AND LITERAL VERSION,
C III E FLY FROM TH E TEXT OF STA LL BAU M.
V O L. I. V.
CONTAIN ING
PII II, EIB US, HIPPIAS MINOR, *THE RIVALS,
CH ARM IDES, ~ I ON, * HIPPARCHUS,
LACHES, FIRST ALCIBIADES, " MINOS,
M EN EXICNUS, SECOND ALCIBIADES, - CLITOPHO,
HIPPIAS MAJOR, THEAGES, - THE EPISTLES.
BY GEORGE BURGES, M.A.
h
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
LONDON :
HENRY G. BOHN, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
MDCCCLV.
3 X 3
P4,
Z & 53
/ & 2 &
CONTENTS.
§ A&#.
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILEBUS * {-} © & º i
PHILEBUS, ON THE GREATEST Good . o & © 6 3
INTRODUCTION TO THE CHARMIDEs . • º º Q , 111
CHARMIDES, ON TEMPERANCE . e e e & t } 13
INTRODUCTION TO THE LACHES . º o & © & & 145
LACHES, OR ON ForTITUDE s º º sº 2 147
INTRODUCTION TO THE MENExENUs . º º & tº e 18]
MENEXENUS . • • tº • © g º t 183
INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPIAS MAJOR º e to º , 209
HIPPIAS MAJOR º º e o º g © º 21 1
NTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPIAS MINOR . o o © , 261
IPPIAS MINOR . . . . . . . . 263
lNTRODUCTION TO THE Ion º º º tº e e • 285
ION : •. o º -> e º e º 287
#NTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ALCIBIADEs . º º T e . 309
THE FIRST ALCIBIADES º e o : - s 3.11
Istropuction To THE SEcond ALCIBIADES o e . . 373
THE SECOND ALCIBIADES, ON PRAYING . © º 375
INTRODUCTION To THE THEAGEs º e s (* • , 399
THEAGES tº º • © o O a" e () e 40]
#y
CONTENTS,
INTRODUCTION TO THE
THE RIVALS
INTRODUCTION TO THE
HIPPARC HUS
INTRODUCTION TO THE
MINOS §
INTRODUCTION TO THE
CLITOPHO .
INTRODUCTION To THE
THE EPISTLES
RIVALs .
HIPPARCHUs
MINOS
... CLITOPHo
EPISTLes
&
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILEBUS,
OY
THE GREATEST GOOD.
Of this rather long, frequently corrupt, and therefore difficult
lialogue, the leading object may be expressed in a very few words.
It is to show, that the greatest happiness is to be found, not, as
Aristippus, in a lost work, seems to have asserted, in an unlimited
ndulgence in the pleasures of the body, nor even in those of the
mind, as laid down by the school of Pythagoras, but in the temper-
ate enjoyment of both, as being the best suited to the mixed nature
Df man, made up of matter and of mind.
In allusion to a similar union in a moral point of view of the
Epicurean and Religious systems of living, Dr. Dodd, when in
prison, wrote the following Epigram:
“Live whilst you live,” the Epicure would say,
“And taste the pleasures of the passing day.”
“Live whilst you live,” the sacred preacher cries,
“And give to God each moment as it flies.”
Lord, in my life let both united be ;
I live to pleasure, if I live to thee.
The unfortunate English divine had, like the more fortunate lyric
poet and satirist of Rome, probably learnt, that however pleasant
for a time is the Epicurean doctrine, “Carpe diem,” yet it was not
the one which could be followed through life, even were the
remark of Rochefoucault not founded on truth, that “we do not
22ave our vices, but they leave us.”
Fº
2 INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILEBUS.
With regard to the difficulties of the text, no better proof can
be given, than the fact, that Sydenham's translation is merely a
paraphrase, in many places so loose, as to preserve little trace of
the original; while Stalbaum, who has published two editions of
the dialogue, each with an elaborate commentary, has, in the one,
expressed opinions the very reverse of what are given in the
other.
The reader will therefore have no reason to wonder that I have
frequently been tossed in a sea of doubt, and unable to find the
haven of certainty,
PHILEBU.S.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
SOCRATES, PROTARCHUS, PHILEBUS.
SOCRATES.
$EE then, Protarchus,” what is the doctrine which you are
about to receive from Philebus,” and against what reasoning of
mine to contend, unless it has been stated according to your
mind. Dº you wish me to present each question in a summary
way ? r
Prot. By all means.
Soc. Philebus then asserts, that the (chief) good 4 to all ani-
mals is joy, and pleasure, and delight, and whatever else har-
onizes with such kind of things. But what I contend for
r: that it is not those things, but to be wise, and to under-
stand, and to remember, and whatever is of a kindred nature,
both correct opinion, and true reasonings, are better and more
acceptable than pleasure to all who are able to partake in them;
1 From the abrupt commencement of the dialogue one might be led to
imagine that something has been lost. But it may be said of Plato, as of
Homer, that he is wont to rush, according to the expression of Horace,
“in medias res.” Compare the similar exordium of the Túšt.
* Of this Protarchus nothing more is known, than that fié was a spp of
Callias, and a pupil of Gorgias, as stated in § 25 and 136.
* Not only is nothing known of this Philebus, but even the nameºs så
uncommon, that, says Stalbaum, it can scarcely be found except in Al-
ciphron Epist. iii. 50. *-- *
* According to the distinction made by Aristotle in Analyt. Prior. i.
49, between &Yafföv and rô dyaffèv, one would expect here rô dya 6&w
in lieu of dyabóv. But Stalb, has shown that the article is sometimes
omitted by Plato; of which however I confess I have my doubts.

4 PHILEBUS.
and that to those who are able to partake, it is of all things the
most advantageous (so to partake), and not only to those (al-
ready existing), but to those who are to come. Say" we not,
Philebus, each of us thus P
Phil. Most assuredly, Socrates.
[2.] Soc. Do you then, Protarchus, receive the view thus
given of the questions?
Prot. I must receive it. For Philebus, the handsome,"
shrinks from speaking. -
Soc. By every means then the truth respecting those ques-
tions must be arrived at. -
Prot. It must indeed.
Soc. Come then, let us in addition to these points agree in
this. |-
Prof. In what?
Soc. That each of us 7 should endeavour to set forth someº
habit and disposition * of the soul, which is able to procure for
every man a happy life. Is it not so? f
Prot. It is so. …
Soc. You then assert it is that of rejoicing; we, of thinking
rightly. / -
Prof. Such is the fact. -
[3] Soc. But what if there should appear some other
(habit) superior to both of these? Should, we not, if it ap-
peared more related to pleasure, be both ºf us vanquished by
a life, which possesses those very things firmly ; and a life ci
pleasure would be superior to one of intellect? \
Prot, Yes. 2^ .
Soc. But if (that superior state be more nearly allied”) to
{
f
* Instead of Náyopsy/Ast would read #Aéyopsy, from “ diximus’’ in Fi-
cin. Stalb. is contević with Náyousy. |
* Although the word ka)\og is frequently applied as a compliment, either
real or pretºed, to persons who either were, or fancied themselves to be,
handsgººſe, here one can hardly perceive its beauty. Ficinus has
“Pºſlebus noster,” which is far more intelligible.
‘....Instead of airów Sydenham suggested huòv, answering to “nos-
trušºn ºf £icinus. And so the three oldest MSS. But in airów some-
thirº, lies hid. Two MSS. omit both huāv and abrāv;
* According to Aristotle in Categor. § vi., and Metaphys. iv. 19, by Éic
is meant a permanent habit, and by Suá0soug a transient disposition of the
soul. S.
• Ficinus has, “Sin autem sapientiae sit propinquior,” as if from his
MS. "Av 65 ye ºppovăget påAAov čvyyevic, or from his own head. -

PHILEBU.S. J
º
intellect, a life of intellect would be superior to one of plea-
sure, and the last would be forced to yield. Sayye that it is
so agreed, or how 2
Prot. To me, at least,” it seems.
... [4] Soc. But how seems it to Philebus P What say you?
Phil. To me it seems, and will (always)" seem, that pleasure
is altogether the superior. And you, Protarchus, will be con-
vinced of it yourself.”
Prot. Having resigned, Philebus, to myself the debate, you
can no longer be the master of what should be yielded to So-
Crates, and the contrary.
Phil You say what is true. But, however, I have dis-
charged my duty; 18 and I here call the goddess herself to
witness it.
Prot. We too would be witnesses on these very points, that
you have said what you are saying.” But now let us en-
deavour, Socrates, to go through in order what is to follow
after this, whether with Philebus * being willing, or however
he may be willing.” /
[5.] Soc. Let us endeavour, (beginning)” from the very'

* In the Greek of this answer, 'Epioi yoijv Šokci, Stalbaum is uncertains'
whether we ought to read yojv or y'oïv. But the preceding oitwg—
Tràg would naturally lead to "Epovy” of rog 3 o'csi. l
* Ficin, has “semperque videbitur,” adopted by Sydenham. But
the * of paralel passages quoted by Stalb. the adverb is uniform
omitted.
o, On the formula airóg yyúget Stalb. refers to his note in Gorg.
J.05, C.
*. On the meaning of &poortočo 6aw Stalb. refers to Wyttenbach on Flu-
tarch, p. 489, ed. Ox, - i. 386, Lips., and to Leopold on Plutarch, Numa,
§ 10, p. 299.
* In such expressions as dºg rair’. Xsysc & Aéysic, the pronoun raiſra
is never introduced, except in modern writers, such as Nicolaus of Damas-
cug in Excerpt. Wales. p. 445, Ei-6éðpaka Taüra, & 6áðpara; while the
same verb is repeated in both clauses, as shown by Abresch and Blom-
field on AEsch. Agam.67, and myself in Cl. Jl. No. xv. p. 144; and to the
passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more. -
*-* Stalb. renders pusrā pixà9ov škówrog i örðc àv #9%xy by “cum
Philebo sive voluerit sive noluerit.” But Écôvroc could not be thus op-
posed to 67twc àv $68M). Hence, probably to avoid the tautology, Ficinus
translated “cum volente Philebo, vel quomodocunque vis.” But £rówrog.
could not be thus applied to Philebus, and iſ #08Xyg to Protarchus. Plato
probably wrote, ákowroc, i örog āv #6&n, i.e. “unwilling, or however
, willing in part.”
* Ficinus has “ab ipsa dea exordientes.” Hence Steph. proposed to in-
sert dipšápévot, which is similarly used elsewhere, as shown by Heusde on
§ PHILEBU.S.
goddess herself, whom this person says is called Aphrodité,
but whose truest name is Pleasure.
Prot. Perfectly right.
Soc. The dread, which I always feel as regards the names
of the gods, is not after the manner of men; but is beyond
even the greatest fear. And now I speak of Aphrodité by
whatever name may be agreeable to her. But how various a
thing is pleasure I know well; and, as I just now said, we
ought to begin from it, by considering upon and seeing into
its nature. For one may hear it called simply by one single
name. It has assumed however all sorts of forms, and even
such as are in a certain manner unlike to one another. For,
observe, we say that the intemperate man has pleasure; and the
temperate man has pleasure likewise "[in being temperate].”
Again, we say that the thoughtless man is pleased in being
full of silly opinions and hopes; and that on the other hand,
the thoughtful man is pleased with his thinking wisely. Now,
how could any one, who asserts that each of these pleasures
*- War. like to each other, not justly appear to be silly P
` [6.] Prot. These pleasures, Socrates, are indeed from con-
Atrary acts; but not in themselves contrary to each other.
.# or how could pleasure not be of all things the most similar
pleasure,” this thing itself to itself?”
Soc. Colour, too, thou happy fellow, differs not from colour,
least in this respect, that it is universally colour. And yet
* all know that black, besides being different from white, hap-
pens to be also the most opposite to it. So, too, figure is taken
singly the same with figure, in the general; but as to its
parts, some are the most opposite to others, and some happen
to possess an infinite diversity. And many other things we
shall find to be thus circumstanced; so that do not you trust
ly
Theaetet. p. 171, A. Stalbäum however says that repaivety row X6)ov is
to be supplied afterºrstparéov, and ÖtaXáysobat before drö— ‘:
*—-” The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation. ...
* This was the doctrine of Aristippus, who said pum Stapépstv jöovºv
ºčovic, “that pleasure does not differ from pleasure.” S. On the other
hand, Aristotle says in Ethic. Nicom. x. 3, quoted by Stalb., rift stösi &ia-
pépovauvai ijóovaí Érepat Yap ai & Tô Töv ka)\öv rāv diró rāv aioxpóv.
* I cannot understand the Greek Toijt’ abrö Šavrij, nor could Salvini,
who would read in Observat. Miscell. Belgic, v. 2, p. 244, kard Toijro airs
ãavrº, similar to kará ye airò Toijro, just afterwards; while Stalbaum
prefers ró ye aºró £avrº, answering to “quum sit eaclem ipsa sibi’’ in
Ficinus.



THILEBU.S.
to the reasoning, that makes things the most opposite tº
one 2 And I fear that we shall find some pleasures toº
quite opposite to others. *
[7.] Prot. Perhaps so. But how will that injure my arguº
ment 2 . i
Soc. *Because, we will say, you call things, dissimilar in
themselves, by another name.” For you call all pleasant things
good. Now that pleasant things are not pleasant, no one dis-
good, as we assert, yet all of them you call good, although
confessing them to be dissimilar, when one compels you by
reasoning (to do so). By what name then do you call that,
which, existing in evil pleasures equally with good, (causes)”
all to be a good? -
[8.] Prot. How say you, Socrates? Think you that any
person, after having laid down that pleasure is the good, will
agree with you? or will bear with you, while asserting that
*some pleasures are good, but others evil?” -
Soc. But you will at least acknowledge that pleasures are
unlike to one another, and some even opposite to others?”
Prot. By no means, as far as they are pleasures.
Soc. We are now brought back again to the same position,
Protarchus. We will say then that a pleasure does not differ
*—” The Greek is "Oru ºrpoorayopsieug airá divöpola Švra &#pte
phoopºev Óvápatu : where, since nobody has been able to elicit a satisfac-
tory sense, various alterations have been suggested by De Grou, Hein-
dorf, and Baumgarten Crusius; which, says Stalb., are unnecessary, if we
take, with Heindorf on Lysid. p. 45, Štěpºp Óvápart in the sense or
“ another, i. e. not its own, name.” But as Ārspog is never found in that
sense, we must still have recourse to conjecture. For the train of ideas ap-
pears to lead to "Oru trpoo'ayopsøeug Tait'd tâ &vr’ &vápot', & Årépp photopsy
ðvágart, “Because you call things really unlike by the same name, which
we should call by another.” Opportunely then has one MS. §vt’ &vówoua.
Stalbaum, in ed. 2, adopts the interpretation of Heindorf, but without be-
ing able to support it by a single similar passage.
* Ficinus has “bona quaedam,” as if his MS. read kai & Yaº & ruva,
what the sense requires, in lieu of kai &ya66 33—Compare $ 10, kai
&vóplotai Tuvèg airów.
* Stalbaum, in ed. 2, has laboured hard to support the construction.
For he did not perceive that 08pus wov had probably dropt out between
&ya6öv and sival, as is evident from 0#pswov jôovijv ćivat rāyaböv in the
very next speech of Protarchus. -
*—” This assertion is however made in Gorg. p. 499, C. =$ 118, quoted
by Stalb. after Heind.



PHILEBUS.
a pleasure, but that all are alike; and the instances,
now produced, inflict no wound upon us. But we will
'ake an endeavour, and say, what the meanest of speakers
ind mere novices in argument do.
[9.] Prot. What do you mean? -
Soc. (I mean,) that if by imitating you, and defending
myself, I should dare to assert that the thing the most unlike
is of all things the most like to the most unlike, I should say
the same as you do ; and both of us would appear to be more
of novices than is fitting; and the subject of dispute would
thus slip away and fall to the ground. Let us therefore back
water;” and perhaps by returning to similitudes,” we may
come to an agreement with each other.
Prot. Say how. - -
[10.] Soc. Suppose me to be questioned by yourself, Pro-
tarchus.
Prot. Concerning what? !
Pol. Will not intelligence, and science, and mind, and all
that I laid down at the commencement, and spoke of as being
good, when I was asked what sort of thing was a good,
be under the very same circumstances as is your argument?
Prot. How So 2
Soc. The sciences, taken together, will seem to be both
many, and some of them dissimilar to each other. Now if
sorae are opposite also, should I be worthy of holding a con-
versation with you, if, fearful of admitting this very point, I
should assert that no science was unlike (another) science?
For then the very question * would be, as if it were a mere
* This is the English phrase in rowing, answering exactly to diva-
kpoiso.6au in Greek; although not applied metaphorically, as the Greek
verb kpoija, and its compounds are to an argument or discourse; as I have
shown in Poppo’s Prolegomen. p. 180, and to the passages there quoted
I could now add as many more. On the word divakpotsobat, in Latin
“remis inhibere,” Stalbaum refers to J. F. Gronovius, Observat. iv. 26,
Yºkaner on Herodot. viii. 84, and Wesseling on Diodor. Sic. t. i. p.
4.18.
* In lieu of rāg Öpiotac, Sydenham suggests àpovárntaç, or rà èpowa.
For he says that Öpioiac could agree only with jöovåg, about which not
a word is said in what follows. Stalbaum understands Aagdg, supplied
in Phaedr. p. 236, C., sig rāg Öpotaç Aa3dg Móv6ag, similar to “easdem
in ansas,” in Ficinus.
*—” A similar expression is found in Theaetet. p. 164, D.-$ 56.
It was applied to such discourses as were brought to no end at all, or to
an unsatisfactory one. - -


PHILEBUS. 9
tale,” destroyed, and vanish, and we be saved” upon some
absurdity.”
* Prot. But this ought not to happen, except so far as
the being saved. And now with the equality in your asser-
tion and mine I am well pleased. Let then pleasures be
many and dissimilar; and let the sciences likewise be many
and different.”9
III.] Soc. The difference then between your good, Pro-
tarchus, and mine, let us not conceal; but, placing them be-
tween us, let us venture (to discuss),” "if (reasons) on being
examined will indicate (any thing),” whether we ought to
pronounce pleasure or intellect the chief good, or whether
there is any other third thing. For we surely do not now
desire to enter into a contest, in order that what I lay down,
or what you do, may gain the victory ; but we ought both of
us to unite in fighting for what is the most true.
Prot. We ought to do so.
[12.] Soc. Let us then fix still more firmly this point by
means of a mutual agreement.
Prot. What point?
Soc. That, which gives trouble to all persons who are
willing, and sometimes to some who are unwilling.
Prot. Speak more clearly.
Soc. I am speaking of that, which has just now fallen by
* In Legg. i. p. 645, B., the tale is said to be saved, and not the speak-
ers: but in Rep. x. p. 621, B., it is said not only to be saved itself, but to
save the speakers likewise. -
* Instead of tri—&\oytaç, one would prefer #Ti–0ü Xóyov axéðtag,
“upon some raft of not-reason,” similar to #Ti Toitov 6xoëpsyov, Čaºrép
étri oxediac, Phaedo, p. 85, D., where there is an allusion to the raft on
which Ulysses was carried in safety to land, after his vessel had been
broken up by a storm. Perhaps however &\oytag means “a quibble.”
*—” All within the numerals Schütz, in Opuscul. Philolog. p. 127,
assigns to Protarchus. And so six MSS., whom Stalb, follows in ed. 2.
* As there is wanting a verb after toxpºpuev, Ficinus seems to have in-
troduced “ discutere * out of his own head to fill up the sense.
*—” The Greek is àv zrn ÉXsyxópeyot unvāowou, Tórspow—where to
supply the substantive required by ÉXsy Xópevot, Winckelmann, in Praef. to
this Dialogue, proposes to read ŠAsyxópswow oi \óyot.—For Ó A6 yog is per-
petually thus united to pumvöst, as may be seen in Ast’s Lexicon. He
ought, however to have elicited tu from Tórspov. Stalbaum suggested
*\eyyápasyat, referring it to Ötapopff'rmreg understood; of which Schleier-
macher and Matthiae approved. But the substantive could hardly be
omitted.
$
HO PHIf, EBUS,
our side, of a nature somehow full of wonders. For that
many are one, and one many, is a thing wonderful to be as-
serted; and it is easy to controvert a person laying down
either of these points.
[13.] Prot. Do you mean, " that when any one says that I,
Protarchus, being by nature one, am again many, laying down
that the one, and persons opposite to each other, great and little,
and heavy and light, are the same, and a thousand other
things? 3%
Soc. The wonders, Protarchus, which you have now spoken
of, relating to the one and many, have become vulgarized; but
by the common agreement, so to say, of all men, it is laid
down that it is needless to touch upon such things; since they
consider them to be childish and easy (to be seen through),”
and great impediments to rational discourses; since not even
such things “(any one ought to say),” when, after having in a
*—” Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the Greek text;
out of which Heusde could not make sense, nor can I. Stalbaum
however asserts that the words "Otav rug #paş på IIpórapyov, Éva ysyo-
vóra pūost, troXAoûg sivat tróAtv, rovg #piè kai évavriovg puéyav kai
opukpóv rv6%puswoc, (so the three oldest MSS. in lieu of ru6spuévovg,) kai
Baptiv kai koi pov Tów airów, Kai äXXa pavpia, mean—“When any one says
that I, Protarchus, being by nature one, am many, laying down likewise that
those many, into whom I am as it were cut up piece-meal, are the opposite
to themselves, great and little, heavy and light, and what other things are
of this kind.” But even if there existed in the original, which is not the
case, words answering to the English in Italics, still it would be impossi-
ble to believe that točg could thus precede épé, or the singular påyav,
oplukpów, 3apüv, and koúðoy thus follow évavriovg. Moreover, in this
interpretation, no notice whatever is taken of TráAuv, in which not a
little of the difficulty lies. Ficinus has “cum quispiam me, verbi causa,
Protarchum, unum naturâ genitum, asserit, deinde me rursus multos at-
que contrarios praedicat, magnum, parvum, gravem, levem eundem homi-
nem, aliaque permulta;” by the aid of which Heusde proposed to read
Oray tug #paš ºff—troX\otic sivat, cai tróXtv Toàrovg #pº, kai čvavriovg
&AAñ\oug uéyav-I should, however, prefer Špač–éival troX\otic kai troX-
Aoûg TráAtv Špač, kai roëg #vavriovg &AAñ\otg—tów airów.—For thus kai
troAAoûg might easily have dropt out between tox\otic and träAuv, and
roëg #vavriovg &XXà\otg be properly opposed to Töv airów.
* Ficinus has “facilia cognitu,” which would lead to figöta etóēvat.
At all events 6¢6ta could hardly stand here by itself.
34–34. The Greek is simply Štrei pumóē rà rouáðs, where, says Stalbaum, we
must supply §si Aévely: to which he was perhaps led by finding in
Sydenham, “It is now also agreed never to introduce into conversation.”
But Plato is not wont to omit words requisite for the sense and syntax.
I suspect he wrote étrel sizrsiv rivá uměš rà rouáðs 6ei. For thus eirei,
rivá might have been lost through širsi, and Ögi through 38.
PHILEBUS 11
discourse divided the members and parts of each thing, he
shall confute the party, who has confessed” that all these are
that” one, and ridicule him, because he has been compelled
to make such monstrous assertions, as that a single one is many
and infinite, and many only one.
[14] Prot. Of what other things are you speaking, Socra-
tes, which have not, as being universally agreed upon, become
vulgarized, relating to the very same same subject P
Soc. When, young man, a person lays down that the one
does not belong to things generated and destroyed,” as we
have lately said.” For in that case, as we just now stated, it
tº been agreed that we need not confute a oneness of such a
id. But when a person attempts to lay down a oneness, as
|the case of one man, and one ox, one beauty, one goodness,
!pecting these and such-like onenesses, *much of attention,
gether with a division, becomes a controversy.”
Prot. How? .
* [I5.] Soc. In the first place, whether a person ought to
consider such onenesses as truly existing. In the next place,
how it is that these, every one of them being always the same,
and never receiving generation or destruction, are, notwith-
standing, with the greatest stability” this one. And after this,
* In lieu of Öuopio)\oymorépusvog, read in all the MSS., and acknow-
ledged by “quis—fatetur” in Ficinus, Schleiermacher adopted what the
sense evidently requires, Öuopio)\oymorépusvov, furnished by the two Basil
edd. Baumgarten Crusius says, however, that Öuopio)\oysio 6aw means, not
“to agree,” but to “cause to agree: ” whom Stalbaum follows in ed. 2,
and thus deserts the other scholar, whom he had followed in the 1st.
* I cannot understand Šksivo after rô £v. One MS. has Škstvº. Per-
haps Plato wrote Tö 'EAsaruköv Šv, in allusion to Zeno; as in Phaedr. § 97,
Töv 'EAEaruköv–Aéyovra-rá airá, épota kai &vópoua, kai év kai troXXá.
* By things generated and destroyed, says Stalbaum, are meant those
that are cognizable by the senses; for those, that are cognizable by intel-
lect alone, exist the same for ever, as stated in the Timaeus, p. 28, A.
* This is supposed to refer to a previous conversation. -
*—39 Such is the literal version of the Greek iſ troXA) atrovéi) perá
6taupégsøg &puptoghrmouc yiyvstat, out of which the reader is left to make
what sense he can. Schütz, in Opuscul. Philolog, p. 134, wished to in-
sert kai between garověn) and perá–But neither he nor Stalbaum, who
is content with the common text, saw that correct Greek would require
troX\) iſ a trové). Plato wrote, I suspect, #v troXX; otrověj pušyāXm
ëuaupéoswg dupwoºt-mouc yiyverau, i.e. ‘in the midst of much attention
a great controversy arises respecting a division.” For METAAH AI could
easily have been corrupted into META AI.
* Grou, in the notes to his French version, p. 239, was the first to Sug-




12 PHILEBUS,
we must lay down whether (oneness) is dispersed amongst
things generated again” and infinite, as having become many,
or is a whole itself, from itself apart;” which would appear
the most impossible of all, for the same and one to exist
in one and in many at the same time. These are the ques-
tions relating to such things as *the one and many,” and not
those, Protarchus, (mentioned by you,)* are, through their
being not well agreed upon, the cause of all difficulty in our
path ; but, by being properly (agreed upon), they would on the
other hand be (the cause) of our easy progress.
Prot. It is necessary, then, for us to labour at this point the
first. * .
Soc. So at least I should say. º “ . .
Prot. Understand then that all of us” agree with you
these points; and it is best, perhaps, not to stir up just 1
by interrogations Philebus, who is well put to rest.*
[16.] Soc. Be it so; but from whence shall one begin,
battle-field for controversy being so wide and various : Shº
it be from hence?
Prof. From whence 2 .
Soc. We surely assert, that one and many, being made by
reasonings the same, run round” every where according to
* . . .
gest 8s 3atórara in lieu of 3s,3avórnta; which he probably got from
“suáque in unitate firmissimam ” in Ficinus. But though 38.3avórara
is read in nearly all the MSS., yet the language of Ficinus would lead to
something else; for it is hard to understand the meaning of Taütag—cival
piav rai, rmv. One would have expected putav airm v.
* Ficinus omits at. Perhaps it is meant to follow però Taita,
** Baumgarten Crusius quotes opportunely from Parmenid. p. 131, B.
Ev ćpa by cat railro èv troX\oig kai Xopic oſſow &\ov ćua Évêa rat'
kai oftwg airò attoiſ Xalpig &v sim.
48–4° The words within the numerals Schleiermacher once considered
to be interpolation, but afterwards to be genuine. Stalbaum, who on
his authority had once expunged them, has subsequently restored
them.
* Sydenham has introduced, for the sake of perspicuity, the words—
“mentioned by you.” Perhaps he wished to read rà oð, Táong, in lieu
of diaráong,
* From the ords “all of us,” it is evident that there were presen
during the dialogue more than Philebus and Protarchus. ~
* The earliest allusion to the proverb Mij Kuveiv kaköv et keipievov is in
Soph. CEd. C. 510.
* This is a strange expression applied to a mere metaphysical abstrac-
tion; although it is repeated in Theaetet, p. 207, A., quoted by Baum-
garten Crusius. 1.




PHILEBUS. 13
each of the things made the subject of reasoning always.”
and formerly and now ; and this shall never have an end, nor
has it ever had a beginning at the present time. But there
is, as it appears to me, some such feeling in us, relating to
reasonings themselves,” of an immortal and ageless kind. For
when a youth has first tasted it, he is delighted, as having
found a treasure of wisdom, and being transported with de-
light, he tosses about every reasoning; and at one time he
rolls it (from this side)” to that, and mixes (all of it)" into
one ; at another unrolling it back again, and separating it into
parts, he throws himself first and foremost into a difficulty, T
and next the person ever nearest” at hand, whether he hap-
pens to be younger, or older, or equal in age, sparing neither
father nor mother, nor any one else, who will listen, and
scarcely the rest of animals, not men alone; since he would spare
not even one of the barbarians, could he but find some where
an interpreter. -
[17.] Prot. Do you not, Socrates, see the great number of us,
and that we are all young P And are you not afraid that, if you
rail at us, we shall, with Philebus, fall upon you all together?”
However, for we understand what you mean, if there is any
* Stalbaum says that \syopuévay &si is the same as Asyopévov škáq-
rote, an assertion more easily made than proved. He once proposed to
read Asyopévov sivat. But he subsequently rejected what seems to me
the preferable reading. Ficinus has “semper per singula, quae dicuntur,
et nunc et olim undique circumcurrere,”
in his MS., between Trávrm and ka9’ $kaorov.
* I cannot understand airów, which is omitted by Ficinus. -
* Stalbaum explains étri 6&rspa by “in alteram partem.” But the
idea of “another side ’’ would be unintelligible, without a reference to its
opposite one. Of this Baumgarten Crusius was aware; and hence he sup-
posed that Tórs Óá štri 0&tspa should be inserted, as in Sophist. p. 236, B.,
xaipei, Tórs uèv štri 0&rspa, röre 68 Štri 0&rspa toûg Aóyovg Akiyov.
... * The sense evidently requires the insertion of Trávra, as opposed to
Év. Instead then of Tórs Óā tróAuv, which could not balance rôté pºv
#tri 6&Tspa, Plato wrote, I suspect, Trávra, kai trčAuv–
* Instead of disi Tôv #xópswov, the sense nifestly demands röv dei
#xópevov—and so we must read in Rep. vii. p. 539, B., Točc dei TNmotov
instead of Točg TrAmotov &si—where there is a similar description of young
persons playing with reasonings.
* There is a similar playful threat in Phaedr. p. 236, C. § 27; and in
Horace, “Cui si concedere nolis Multa—veniat manus, auxilio qua Sit
mihi; nam multo plures sumus,” as remarked by Baumg, Crus, Stalb,
too refers to Rep. i. p. 327, C.
as if &ei had been written,
14 .*H.I.Y.EBUſg.
method or contrivance for this confusion to depart” from ºl,
somehow with a good will, out of the way of our reasoning,
and for discovering a road to reasoning better than this,
do direct your thoughts to it, and we will to the best of our
power follow. For the present debate, Socrates, is not a little
matter.
Soc. Indeed it is not, boys, as Philebus calls you. There
is and can be no better way (than that) of which I am ever a
lover; but often before now has it fled away, and left me de-
serted and at a loss.
Prot. What is it? Let it only be mentioned.
[18.] Soc. That, which to point out is not very difficult, but
to make use of is very difficult. For all the things that,
connected with art, have been ever discovered, have become
manifest through it. Consider then the way which I am.
speaking of
Prot. Only tell it.
Soc. Agift, asit appears to me, from godstomen, was, through
a certainl’rometheus, cast down from some quarter by the gods”
along with a certain * fire the most luminous; and the men
of old, being better than us, and dwelling nearer to the gods,”
* Ficinus has “ad hanc perturbationem—rejiciendam,” as if he had
found in his MS. &Trø6siv instead of &zrs}\6eiv.
* The Greek is troësy #k 0sóv. But by no process could the indefi-
nite troësy commence a clause after a parenthetical sentence; nor, if it
- could, would Plato have written 0säv–öögug—Ék 0sújv. There is some
error here, which I will leave for others to correct by the aid of the
Scholia of Olympiodorus, and my note on Hipp. Maj. § 46, p. 117.
* Although ruvu is supported by Numenius in Euseb. Praep. Evang.
xi. p. 539, A., & IIAérov tºy copiav Štró II popum0éwg $X68iv sig &v0p6-
rovg perá pavorárov ruvög ºrvpég #pm, yet it is properly omitted by
Julian Or. vi. p. 183, C., and Damascius, quoted by Suidas in Ağpog :
and since Clemens Alex. in Protrept. p. 2, C., has karáyopaev čá áva,0sy #
oùpavāv rºw &Améstav ćua pavoréry 'ppovăget, it is easy to see that in
#plot lies hid j čvvoua; for otherwise the nature of the gift would be un-
known; while j Švvota is plainly confirmed by Prom. 441, "Evvovg #0mxa
kai ºppsvöv šarm{86Xovg.
* Baumgarten Crusius considers the words, #yyvrépo 6861, oikoúvrég
to be taken from some poet; for they are similar to oi 6söv &yxia tropot
(kai) Znvög $yyög in Rep. iii. p. 391, E. He quotes too opportunely
Seneca Epist. Xc. 44, (Aureae aetatis homines) alti spiritus fuerunt, et, ut
ita dicam, a diis recentes: ” to which Stalbaum adds Cicero de Legg. ii.
27, “Quoniam antiquitas proxime accedit ad deos, a diis quasi traditam
religiorem tueri.”
PHILEBUS. 15
have handed down this story,” that, since the beings,” said
to be for ever, are produced from one and many, and have
in themselves bound and the boundless born with them, we
must therefore,” since things have been so arranged, ever lay
down the existence of some one idea respecting everything, and
on every occasion seek for it; for being there, we shall find it;
and if we lay hold of " it, we must after one look for two,
if two there are ; but if not, three, or some other number; and
again, in like manner * each of those that are one ;% until at
length a person perceives that the one at the beginning is
not only one, and many, and infinite, but also how many it is :
but that a man should never bring the idea of infinity to mul-
titude, before he shall have fully seen all its * number, which
lies between the infinite and the one; and then having dis-
missed each one of the all into infinity, we must *bid them
* Stalbaum here, and on Politic. p. 293, C., defends raûrmy påpunz
without the article rºv, with which Dawes in Miscell. Crit. p. 468,
was the first to show that of Tog could not dispense. In the present case,
since many MSS. offer phpºp, Plato probably wrote Taijt’ #v påply—
* The Greek is Švrov táv dei Xsyopuévov sivat. But Övrov could
not dispense with the article; moreover röv dºei Asyopuévay would mean,
“of things that happen to be ever said.” Plato wrote, what the sense
and syntax equally demand, Tóv Švrwy &ei Xeyopuévay sivat.
* Stalbaum defends 68tv oëv after dºg—#xóvrov—Ficinus has “quum
—habeant, oportet nos,” which leads to Ösi, found in one MS.; but in-
stead of omitting oiv with Stephens, we must read #vvotg—to answer
to ſi évvoua, restored just before.
* All the MSS. read pusta\á60psy. But from “comprehendamus ” in
Ficinus Stephens elicited karaXáſ?wpºev, adopted by Bekker, and by Stal-
baum too in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2.
*—” The Greek of this evidently corrupt passage is—rojv Šv škstvwy
#kagrov—where Schütz would read rô £v šksivov škagrov. Schleierma-
cher, Tújv čvóvrov škstvwy Śkaorov. Ast, rejv Šv škstvq Ākaorov: of which
Stalbaum approves in ed. 2, although in ed. I he had suggested Tajv šč .
£rsivov škaorov. Lastly, Klitzsche in Observ. Crit. in Phileb. 1841,
Zwiccau, has, it seems, suggested £vöv, “ones,” in lieu of Év šksívov, with
the approbation, he says, of Godfred Hermann. Ficinus has “et quod-
libet eorum, quae Sunt unum,” which leads, as Stalbaum saw, to kai rāv
£v Švrwv Škaorov. Correctly indeed as regards Šksiva)w, which has no
meaning here. But Plato wrote, I suspect, kai rāv Šv čvi Icelpiéva v.
Éxaorov, i. e. and each of the parts that lie in one (whole).
* I cannot understand airoi; ; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it.
* Instead of röre 3’ #öm, the three oldest MSS. read rörs Óá Šči, adopted
by the Zurich editors. But the continuity of the construction requires 6siv,
as Stalbaum has correctly remarked ; but he incorrectly prefers rôrs 3’
#ön, not aware that rôrs #3m could not be joined together, as I have
shown on Parmen. § 51, where in Agam. 940, the words rór’ fiv olò’ bi-
xog are printed instead of TóT', oió', fiv Wüxog—
16 PHILEBUS,
farewell. [19. The gods then, as I said. have granted us to
consider things in this way, and to learn them, and teach them
to each other. But the wise men of the present time introduce,
as it may happen, one, and many, more quickly and slowly
than is fitting, and immediately after the one, infinity, but (all)
the intermediate escape them; by which are kept apart the
methods of our carrying on with each other disputations in a
logical” and contentious manner.
Prot. A part, Socrates, I seem somehow to understand; but
of the other part I beg I may hear more clearly what you mean.
Soc. What I mean, Protarchus, will be "º evident in the
case of letters; and in these, through which you have been
taught, accept my meaning.
Prof. How 2
Soc. The voice, that issues through the mouth, is surely one,
and on the other hand infinite, not only in that of all, but of each.
Prot. How not 2
Soc. Now we are skilled (in voice) by neither of these
considerations, whether we know that it is infinite or one;
but (to know) how many and of what kind are (its parts), this
it is which produces in each of us the grammar-art.
Prot, Most true.
[21.] Soc. And further, that which produces the music-
art, is the very same thing.
Prot. How so 2
Soc. (Musical) sound,” tº and the thing according to that
art is one in it.08
* The Greek is Óuaksyūptorat—tráAuv. But as träAuv has no well-
defined meaning here, Heusde proposed to read #patra)\uv, which appears
equally unintelligible. Ficinus omits the word entirely, and so does one
MS. Plato probably wrote troXè—Respecting the two methods of dis-
putation, Stalb. refers to Sophist, p. 216, B. 231, E. and 253, C.
* I have translated, as if the Greek were £orat, instead of Écriv.
* In Greek pavi) means a sound proceeding either from the voice or
a musical instrument. Hence Plato supposes it to be a common genus,
divisible into two species; and so it is laid down by Nicomachus, in Har-
monic. Enchirid. p. 3, ed. Amst.—Tāg &v6ptotrivng poväg, oi, &trö roi;
IIv6ayopukoč Štěaoka)\stov Šào Épaakov, dºg ávög yévovg, sión Útrápxeuv'
kai Tô pièv ovyayêg ióíog dºwóplažov' ré Öé àuaormuarukóv. i. e. “The
writers of the Pythagorean school say, that of the human voice there are
two species, as of one genus. One they call peculiarly continuous, the
other separated by intervals.” The continuous is used in speaking; and
therefore called by Aristoxenus and by Euclid pavi) Aoyuki; ; but the other
is used in singing, and hence termed pov) pusX pèukň. S.
*—” Such is the 1 teral version of the received Greek text—kai ré
PHILEBUs. 17
Prof. How not ?
Soc. And let us suppose two kinds, the grave and the
acute, and a third, the homotonous;* or how Ż
Prot. In this way. .
Soc. But by knowing these facts alone you would not be
skilled in music; although by not knowing you would be, on
these points, worth, so to Say, nothing.
Prot. Yes, nothing.
Soc. But, my friend, when you shall have (correctly) 70
comprehended the intervals of sounds, with respect to their
being acute and grave, how many they are in number, and of
what kinds, and the limits” of the intervals, and how many
combinations are produced from them, which our predecessors
have remarked and handed down to us, who come after
them, by the name of harmonies,” and such other circum-
stances” as are in, (and) produced by, the motions of the body,
(and in words,”) which being measured by numbers, they say
2
rat’ #kstv.my rºv réxwmv šori pata čv airtà ; where, although kai rô are
omitted by the three oldest MSS., it is difficult to say how those words
could come here, and no less so to explain #y airó. Ficinus alone has
what is perfectly intelligible—“Una quodammodo et in hac arte vox est,”
thus omitting kai Tô and Év airfi, in which all the difficulty lies.
* Instead of Ópºrovov Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. pisać-
rovov, answering to his version—“tonus medius.” One would prefer,
however, juirovov. For the idea of a homotonic sound can have no part
here, if it be, as Sydenham asserts, that, which is produced from the string
of one instrument having the same degree of tension with the similar string
of another, or when two different voices give at the same time musical
sounds, neither of which is more acute, or more grave, than the other.
70 The word ka)\ög has been luckily preserved in two MSS. Compare
Pseudo-Plato in Hipparch. p. 227, C., Et tug 690&g \apſ3ávot Töv puxokspöß.
7: Plato in Rep. iv. p. 443, D., speaking of Ötrárm, “the lowest note,”
vàrm, “the highest,” and puéon, “the middle,” describes them as rpsic
àpovg &ppovíag, “the three limits of harmony.” S.
” When Plato and Aristotle speak of harmony, in the singular number,
they mean what is now called music. But when they speak of harmonies,
in the plural, they mean those different modes of harmony, the principal
of which were called Doric, Phrygian, and Lydian. S. 1.
* There is no word in English corresponding to the comprehensive
idea expressed by the Greek ºrá00c, by which, as Sydenham observes,
was meant any condition, situation, accident, or circumstance, in or under
which anything was said to be placed, or, as Taylor says, any participated
property of any being. I have generally rendered it “circumstances,”
unless where the idea of a positive suffering was to be conveyed.
* As there is nothing to answer to Év rs raig kuvilosow, Sydenham
would insert £v re 6%uagw. But one would expect rather Év rs raig roi;
gróparoc- For thus gºpia and grápa would be properly opposed to each
C
18 PHILEBUS.
again * we ought to call them rhythms and metres, and at
the same time to consider that we ought to thus look into
every thing that is one and many--when (I say 79) you shall
have comprehended all these things, in this manner, then will
you have become skilled; and when by considering in this way
any other kind whatsoever of being, you shall have compre-
hended it, you will have thus become intelligent respecting it.
But the infinite multitude of, and in, individuals causes you to
be infinitely far off” from thinking correctly, and to be 78 of
no account or number,” as you never look to any number
in any thing whatever.
[22.] Prot. Most beautifully, Philebus, does Socrates ap-
pear to me to have spoken in what he has now said.
Phil. And to me likewise the very same thing” (appears).
But how has this speech been spoken as regards us, and what
does it mean P
Soc. Correctly indeed,” Protarchus, has Philebus proposed
this question.
Prot. Very much so ; and do you give an answer.
Soc. This I will do, after I have gone through yet a little
(more) respecting these very points. For, as we said, that should
other; while a portion of the missing words is still to be seen in #61/ra,
which is quite superfluous, not to say unintelligible, thus coming before
Yuyvápasya. Stalbaum, too, seems to have felt some difficulty; for he says,
one would have expected here rijg (povijc in lieu of roi; oróparoc.
* I cannot understand aii, which Bekker and Stalbaum have edited in
lieu of aird, from the three oldest MSS. Ficinus acknowledges neither
airá nor ai. * -
; : * Since some MSS. read &rav rs, and others äravyāp, Plato probably
wrote 3raw, Aéyw—for he would thus resume by the verb Aéya, the thread
of the speech, which had been interrupted by a prolix parenthesis.
” From this version it would seem that Sydenham wished to read
ãºrsipov škagrário in lieu of ársipov škáorrors. With regard to the play
on àtreupoc, Baumgarten Crusius aptly refers to Timaeus, p. 55, C., rö
&rsipovg kóoplovc sivat Aéystv Švrwg direipov twog 66 ypta.
*—” In this passage, says Baumg. Crus., there is an allusion to the
oracle pronounced in ridicule of the people of Megara, who were said to
be otr Śv Aóyq, oùr’ &v dotôpºſ. See Schol. on Theocrit. Id. xiv. 48.
* I have adopted the reading raúrá ye raûra suggested by Stalbaum
in ed. 1, although rejected in ed. 2.
* The Greek is 690&g pièvrot : where, says Stalbaum, pèvrot indicates
the assent to an assertion. But uévrot could not thus follow Ó99öc, unless
épédic were found in the speech preceding, as is evident from the passages
quoted by Stalbaum here, and myself on Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2, to which I
could now add a dozen more. Plato wrote, I suspect, 699&c, pud rôv–
with the usual omission of 986, -
PHILEBUS. 19
a person lay hold of any one thing whatever, he ought not to
look at once upon the nature of the infinite, but upon some
number; so, on the other hand, when a man is compelled to
lay hold of the infinite,” he ought not (to look) at once upon
the one, but to a certain number, possessing some multitude
of individual things, (and) to think upon it ; and to end from
all in one. Let us then again lay hold of what I have now
said, in the case of letters.
[23.] Prot. How 2 -
Soc. From the time when some god, or godlike man, as the
story in Egypt goes, by saying it was some Theuth,” first
thought upon sound as being without limit, *the person has
been mentioned in history, who?” perceived that in the limit-
less* there were vocal (letters), not one but more; and again,
other (letters) not having a part of the voice, but of some
kind of sound;” and that of these also there was a certain
number. A third kind of letters he set apart; those which are
now called mutes by us.” After this he separated both the
* The Greek is pur) #Tri Tô ºv sióðc &AA’ ºr épºuov at riva TrAñ60g
#kaorov #xovrá ru karavosiv–on which Stalbaum has written, in his two
editions, two rather long notes; both of which, I think, he would have
omitted, had he seen, what was partially done by Baumgarten Crusius,
that {3\étrºuv is to be inserted from the preceding sentence after puj Štri to
£v et,0ög, and that Plato probably wrote dºptépôv TAñ9og ákáorww #xovrá
rt kai karavosiv : and Julian, in Epistol. p. 384, A. = 82, A., karavoſī-
oag öğ trag rö 6vágopov roi tpétrov kai 3Xétrov— not ºrpóg ; for troog and
Tpóg are constantly confounded in MSS.
* On this Theuth, the supposed inventor of language, see Phaedr.
p. 274, § 134. -
89–83 To avoid the anakolouthon, I have translated as if Plato had written
iorópmrau, äg—not og Trpastog—which Stobaeus, however, acknowledges.
* I confess I do not understand év tº &reipp, unless it be said that
there is no limit to the varieties of sound.
** A similar distinction is found in Cratyl. p. 424, C., rà povhevra
pºv ot, où pºvrot ye āq,60) ya: which Sydenham might have quoted to
defend his proposed reading, povijevra pièv ot-obtained from povăg pièv
ôvra oi in the margin of Gesner’s ed. of Stobaeus, Ecl. Eth. lxxix. p. 469.
Sydenham, however, subsequently saw that as pøvn) means the clear Sound
of a vowel, and p66) vog the not-clear sound of a semi-vowel, or, as he
should have said, of a consonant, no matter whether a mute or liquid,
there was no need of any alteration.
* Respecting the division of the Greek letters into vowels, semi-vowels,
and mutes, Stalbaum refers to Dionys. H. IIspi Xvv0so. 'Ovopi. # 14, p.
166—176, ed. Schaef., and to Sext. Empir, Adv. Mathem. § 5.
c 2
20 PHILEBU.S.
letters which are without any vocal sound, 87 clear or not
clear,8788 as far as each one,” and the vowels also and those in
the middle” in the same manner, until having comprehended
their number, he gave to each one, and to all together, the
name of an element. But perceiving that none of us could
understand any of them by itself alone, without (learning) them
all, he considered this bond between them as being one,
and as making all these in a manner but one thing; and to
them he applied the name of the grammar-art, calling it s
as being one.
Phil. 99These, taken by themselves and in relation to each
other,90 Protarchus, I understand more clearly than what was
said before. But there is still at present wanting, as before, the
very same trifling part of the discourse.
Soc. Is it not this, Philebus P what have these matters to
do with the subject 2
Phil. Yes. This is the verything which I and Protarchus
are for a long while in search of. - -
Soc. You are then for a long while, as you Say, in search,
when you have just now arrived at it.
Phil. How So 2
[24.] Soc. Was not the question originally between us
relating to intellect or pleasure, which was the more eligible?
Phil. How not P
Soc. We admit, however, that each of them is one
thing?
Phil. By all means.
Soc. This then does the previous subject demand of us;
how is each of them one and many ? and how is it that they
are not at once infinite ; but that each possesses somehow a
certain number before it becomes infinite 2 -
*—" This is perhaps the best way of rendering &#60) ya kai àºwua
Sydenham has “perfect or imperfect.” Ficinus, “liquidas mutasque.”
*—* I confess I cannot understand uéxpt évôg ékágrow: nor could Sy-
denham, who has omitted them. Ficinus has literally, “usque ad quod-
libet unum.”
* By pušora, says Stalb., are meant those mentioned above, as “not
having a part of the voice, but of some kind of sound.” - - -
*—” I have adopted the correction of Schleiermacher, airá re cai tro
ãAAmAa, in lieu of airá ye ºrpèg áA\m?\a, found in the majority of MSS.
Ficinus has “videlicet ipsa invicem comparata.”
PHILEBUs. 2}
Prot. Into no trivial a question, Philebus, has Socrates
thrown us, after having led us, I know not how, a round-about
road. And now consider, which of us two shall reply to the
question proposed. Perhaps, however, it would be ridiculous in
me, who have *stood as a reinforcement to your argument,
to order” you again to this business, through my being unable
to reply to the present question; but I think it would be
much more ridiculous for neither of us to be able. Consider,
then, what we are to do. For Socrates seems to interrogate
us respecting the (different) kinds of pleasure, whether they
do or do not exist; and how many and of what kind they are ;
and in like manner and touching the same points as regards
intellect. -
[25.] Soc. You speak, son of Callias, most truly. For since
we are unable to do this, as regards every thing, as being one,
similar, and same, and the contrary, as the past reasoning has
pointed out, not one of us would in any matter ever be worth
any thing at all.
Prot. Such, Socrates, very nearly seems to be the case.
But though it is a fine thing for a prudent person to know all
things, yet it seems to be a second step * for a person not to
be ignorant of himself. Why then have I now said this f I
will tell you. This conversation, Socrates, you have granted
to us all, and have given yourself up to us, for the purpose of
deciding what is the greatest good to man. For, after Philebus
had said, that it is pleasure, and delight, and joy, and all
things of the like nature, you said in opposition to this, that
it was not these things, but those which we often willingly
call to our recollection; and we are right in so doing, in order
that each question, being laid up in our memory, may be put
to the test. [26.] You assert then, it seems, that, what is to
be spoken” of correctly, there is a good, superior to pleasure,
*—” In the words Štrográvra öváðoxov and ºrpoorárrew, there are mili
tary metaphors, which I have adopted in the translation.
* The Greek is arXofig, “a sailing.” Respecting the proverb Öst repog
TrAoûg, found in Phaedon. p. 99, B. ; and Politic. p. 300, B. ; Baumgarten
Crusius refers to Gataker on M. Anton. ix. 2, and Bergler on Alciphron
i. p. 352, ed. Wagn., who have said all that is necessary. -
* I cannot understand the words rô Trpoopmémočplēvov Óp6&g ; nor
could Schütz, who wished to expunge them. I could have understood rô
arpooreupmóngópsvov Ópédic, i.e. “what is to be discovered truly.” Stal-
baum, in ed., 1, attributed to Ficinus “quod adjiciendum puto recte,” and
-->"
242 IPHILEBUS,
in mind, science, intelligence, art, and all things allied to
them, which one ought to possess, and not the others. Now
these positions being laid down severally on each side, as the
subjects of dispute, “we in a jocose way threatened, that we
would not suffer you to go home, before, of the questions so
defined, a sufficient limit had been reached.* To this you
assented, and to these points you gave yourself up to us. We
assert then, as children say, that of what has been given
fairly, there is no taking away. Forbear then to meet us on
what has been now Said in this manner.
Soc. In what manner P
[27.] Prot. By throwing us into a difficulty, and propound-
ing questions, to which we should not be able on the instant
to give a sufficient answer. For let us not fancy that the
present difficulty of us all is a finish (to the inquiry); but if
we are unable to do this,” you must do it, for so you pro-
mised. Wherefore advise yourself, whether you must distin-
guish the kinds of pleasure, as of knowledge; or leave them
alone, if perchance you are able and willing by some other
method to render plain somehow else” the question now in
dispute between us.
Soc. Nothing dreadful then need I fear any longer for my-
self, since you have said this. For the expression, “if you
are willing,” relieves me from all fear respecting each thing.
But, in addition to this, there seems some god, I think, to
have given me a recollection of some things.”
Prot. How, and of what things?
[28.] Soc. Having formerly heard, either in a dream or
broad awake, certain sayings respecting pleasure and intel-
finds fault with the version, as not corresponding to the Greek. Had he
looked into Bekker’s reprint, he would have found “quod recte appel-
landum erit,” similar to “quod recte dicendum sit,” in the note of
Baumgarten Crusius, which he praises, and has adopted.
*—* As nothing of this kind had been mentioned in the preceding
part of the dialogue, Stalbaum says it alludes to something which is
feigned to have occurred previously.
* Viz. “to extricate ourselves from the difficulty,” as remarked by
Stalbaum, who found those words in Sydenham’s translation. -
* The words trag äA\toc, clearly superfluous after ka0' répév ruva
rpótrov, are properly omitted by Ficinus. Moreover correct Greek requires
&AAwg arog— Plato wrote, I suspect, aratoriv čXX0g, i. e. “to children
merely.” - -
* Instead of uvâumv Tuva, the question of Protarchus evidently leads
to uvâpany riva," - -
PHILEBUS. 23
lect, I have them now again present to my mind, that neither
of them is of itself the good, but some other third thing, dif-
ferent from them, and better than both. Now if this should
appear to us clearly, pleasure is then removed from victory.
For the good would no longer be the same with it; or how
(say you) 2 -
Prof. Just so.
Soc. We shall have no need then, in my opinion, to distin-
guish the kinds of pleasure. And the thing itself,” as it pro-
gresses, will show itself more clearly.
Prot. Having begun so happily, proceed (with the same
success).”
Soc. Let us previously agree still upon a few little points.
Prot. What are those 2
[29.] Soc. Is it necessary for the condition" of the good
to be perfect or not perfect 2
Prot. The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.
Soc. What then 2 Is the good self-sufficient 2
Prot. How not ? and in this respect it excels all other
things existing.
Soc. And this too, I think, it is of all things the most
necessary to state about it, that every being that knows of
it hunts after it, and desires to catch it, and to have it about
itself, and cares for nothing else except such as are brought
to perfection in conjunction with good things.
Prot. There is no gainsaying this.
Soc. Let us then consider and judge of the life of pleasure,
and that of intellect, viewing them separately.
Prot. How say you ?
Soc. In the life of pleasure, let there be no intellect; nor
* All the MSS. read ºrpotov 6’ 3rt—östást : where it is strange that
Stalbaum should not have suggested ºrpotov 6' airó £rt—östást, after he
had in both edd. referred to the proverb airò 68tést, and its cognate 5mxoi.
He once approved of the correction of Cornarius, ºrpoióv 6’ #rt Ó Aóyog—
§eišst, which he confirmed by Östást 68 airā trpoidºw 6 Aóyoc, in Legg. vii.
p. 812, E.; but in ed. 2, he asserts that Östást can be used for abrö jetëst.
But of this I have a very great doubt.
* From this translation I infer that Sydenham wished to read Öuatrá-
pauv' et, in lieu of Övatépauve. For thus sº would balance céA\vara.
Opportunely then has one MS. 6tatspaíva). .
* To this passage Aristotle in Ethic. x. 2, alludes, as remarked by
Baumgarten Crusius. . . .
24 PHILEBUs.
in that of intellect, pleasure. For, if either' of them be tho
good, it need not want any thing additional from any other
quarter. But, if either of them appears to be indigent of
aught, this can no longer be the good.
Prof. For how could it 2
[30.] Soc. Let us then endeavour with you to try them
by a touchstone.
Prot. By all means.
Soc. Answer, then.
Prot. Say on.
Soc. Would you, Protarchus, accept the offer to live through
the whole of life enjoying pleasures the most exquisite 2
Prof. Why not?
Soc. If you possessed this completely, would you not think
that you still wanted something else?
Prof. Not at all.
Soc. *See now, is it not for the things that are wanting in
thought, and mind, and reasoning powers, and whatever are
the sisters of these, to see not even something f * -
Prot. And why? for I should in a manner possess all
things, in possessing joy.
Soc. Living thus continually through life, would you not
feel a joy in the most exquisite pleasures 2
Prot. Why not 2
Soc. Possessing neither mind, nor memory, nor science,
* Instead of Tpótºpov, Stephens proposed tróTspov, suggested by “al-
terum ” in Ficinus; and so the three oldest MSS. But Özrórspov, found
in three others, is the more correct reading.
*—” Such is the literal version of the common text—"Opa 6x) roi ºpo-
vsiv kai votiv kai Aoyić800at rá čáovra kai čo a rotºrov &ós) pā pitjy
pumöå Öpāv ri; out of which none of the learned have been able to elicit
a satisfactory sense. Ficinus has “Adverte itaque, num ipsa sapientia
indigeres et intelligentia et convenienti ratiocinatione et aliis, quaecunque
horum cognata, annon rei alicujus visu.” Now though it is evident he
found in his MS. Pov plmö& 6pāv ri, yet from his “indigeres,” it is equally
evident that he applied 3&ovra to a person, and not to a thing. Hence I
suspect that Plato wrote "Opa 67), roi; pgovsiv kai vosiv kai Xoyićsoôat rà
ëéovra, kai čoa toûtay dås}\pá, uðvo' ºša 6pāv šart; i.e. “See now, is
it possible for things that are wanting in thought, mind, and reasoning
powers, and whatever are the sisters of these, to do to you what is pleas.
ant 2'' To which the answer would be, Kai ri; “Why (is this) "
Stalbaum, however, Lehrs, and Winckelmann, would read uéjv pumáš Švap
ra, referring to obôé úvap ºrpárretv ºrpooiararat airoig in Theaetet, p,
173, D. But the mention of pleasure could hardly be omitted.
PHILEBUS; 25
, or a true opinion, it is surely necessary for you, in the first
place, to be ignorant, whether you had any joy, or not, being
void of all intellect.
Prot. It is necessary.
[31.] Soc. Being moreover in a similar manner not in pos-
session of memory, there is surely a necessity for you not even
to remember that you ever had any joy, or for not even the least
memorial to remain of a joy coming upon you on the instant :
and not possessing a true opinion, (a necessity) for you to think
that, when you are feeling a joy, you do not feel it; and de-
prived of the reasoning power, to be not even able to calculate
that you shall feel a joy in a time to come; and thus you
would live the life, not of a man, but of an animal called lungs,”
or of such marine substances as are endued with life, to-
gether with an oyster-like body. Are these things so 2 or
can we think otherwise concerning them f*
Prof. And how 2
Soc. Would, then, such a life be eligible?
Prot. This reasoning, Socrates, has imposed upon me si-
lence altogether for the present.
Soc. Let us not become cowards, but changing” (the view),
look upon the life of intellect.
[32.] Prot. What kind of life do you mean?
* The fish called in Greek Trvečpov or Tràgúpov, and in Latin “pulmo,”
seems to have been little more than a mass of gelatinous matter, with little
or no feeling, and belonging to the genus “Mollusca.” To this passage of
Plato there is an allusion in Plutarch, ii. p. 137, B., oùk &vépôtruvov &AA'
ôorpšov ruvög &of Trpoo’eolkóg : and in Synesius de Regn. p. 14, D., 8tov
&vrag 6a)\atriov arvsöpovog, quoted by Stalbaum after Fabricius on
Sext. Empiric. p. 216. Ficinus explains “pleumonis” by “sponge ;”
which is not an animal, but, like amber, the secretion from some animal,
* Sydenham has thus adopted ºrspi rajra from ed. Ald. Ficinus
found, what all the MSS. offer, trapá raira, as shown by his version—
“aliter praeter ista.” But diMAwg Twg is a manifest tautology after trapá
raita. Hence Stalb., in ed. 2, says, “one might suspect that in &\\wç
trug lies hid &\\0 ru, especially since the three oldest MSS. omit trang :
but nevertheless àXXwg artog does not seem to require any proof to sup-
port it:” an assertion, with which I at least am not satisfied; for to myself
it is evident that Plato wrote kakóg trag—
* Instead of Hera)\agóvrsg one MS. has ustaff&\\ovreg : from which
Bast correctly elicited pueraga)\óvrég, found in a similar manner below,
in § 114, and in Parmenid. p. 128, A., and Sympos. p. 204, F. Stal-
baum, however, who, in ed. 1, had adopted paraga)\óvréc, has, in ed. 2,
returned to pusra)\of$óvreg. Ficinus has “in medium adducentes,” as if
he found in his MS. śg piègov 3a)\óvrég.
26 PHILEBU.S.
_-
Soc. Whether any of us would choose to live, possessing
intellect, and mind, and science, and a perfect memory of all
things, but partaking of pleasure, neither much nor little; nor,
on the other hand, of pain; but being" wholly exempt from
all things of such kind.
Prot. To me, Socrates, neither life is eligible; nor would
it, I think, ever appear so to any other person.
Soc. What (seems) to you, Protarchus, a life" mixed up with,
and common to, both together?"
Prot. Do you mean of pleasure, and of mind and intellect?
Soc. In this way; and of such a life am I speaking.
Prot. Every person would certainly prefer such a kind of
life to either of those, “and, moreover, not one this, and an-
other that.”
[33.] Soc. Perceive we now what is the result of our pre-
vious reasoning 2
Prot. Perfectly well; that three lives have been placed be-
fore us, and that of the two, neither one is self-sufficient or
eligible for any one man, or animal.
Soc. Is it not evident then with regard to these, that nei-
ther of them possess the good? for (otherwise) it would have
been all-sufficient, and perfect, and eligible for all "plants and
* Stalbaum defends the omission of dºv against the doctrine laid down
by Porson on Hecub. 788.
*—' I cannot believe that Plato wrote à évvapºpórspoc — ## &pſpoiv
ovupux8sic, especially since Ficinus has “vita ex ambobus in unum
congredientibus mixta.” But what he did write, could not be guessed
at except by a bold conjecture.
*—8 All the words within the numerals Sydenham has omitted. For
perhaps he did not understand the formula, oùx à pièv, & 5 ot, with
which Blomf. on Pers. 807, oi ră uév, rå Ö’ ot, compares in Herodot. i.
138, où ré učv, rà è ot, dAA& Trávra, ii. 37, oùk 6 pºv, & 6 ot, d\\d
aráureg. Phocylid. Fr., Aéptov kakoi, oùx à pièv, Ög 6' oi, IIávrég. But
as Ficinus has “Unusquisque—eliget, neque unus optabit quidem, alius
minime, sed omnes pariter expetent,” Stephens suspected that some-
thing had dropt out. Besides he probably knew that rāg ought to follow
rather than precede oix 6 pºv, 66° ot. , Hence one would prefer IIög ºr
rig oi roi rév ys aiphosrat—oix 6 pºv, & 6' oi, &AX& Trávreg P Stalbaum
once wished to read Kai traig Óñtrov rotºrów Ye aiphosrat, comparing roi ro
§§ kāv traig y woim in Euthyd. p. 279, D.
*—” The Greek is rāori pºroic kai čáoug, “to all plants and animals.”
But are plants capable of living a life of sensual pleasure ? or brute ani-
mals, a life of science and understanding 2 We are therefore inclined to
think that Plato wrote träori roig Zúoug: for immediately he subjoins an
explanation of his meaning, and limits the word rāga, “all,” to such Galw
I’HILEBUS. 27
animals,” that are capable of living ever thus through life. But
if anyone should prefer other things, than what we do, he would
take it contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, not willingly, '
but through ignorance, or from some unhappy necessity.
Prot. Such seems to be the case.
Soc. That we ought not therefore to consider that goddess
of Philebus and the good to be the same, seems to have been
stated sufficiently.
[34] Phil. Neither, Socrates, is that intellect of yours
the good; but it will somehow have the same charge made
against it. g
Soc. Mine perhaps, Philebus, may ; but not, I think, that
intellect which is at the same time both divine and true ; but
it will be somehow in a different state. However, I do not
contend for the prize of victory, in behalf (of the life) of in-
tellect, against the common" one. But what we are to do
with the second prize, it is meet to see and to consider. For
the eause (of the happiness of) the common life, we each
assign to be, one of us, intellect, the other, pleasure. And thus
neither of these two would be the good. And yet a person
might suppose one or other of them to be the cause. Now on
this point I would still more earnestly contend against Phile-
bus, that in this mixed life, whatever is the thing, by possess-
ing which that life becomes eligible and good, it is not
pleasure, but intellect, which is more allied and similar to it.
And according to this reasoning it could not be truly said that
pleasure has any share in the first, nor even the second prize;
and it is still further from the third prize, if any credit may
be given for the present to that intellect of mine.
[35.] Prot. It seems to me in good truth, Socrates, that
pleasure has fallen (to the ground), struck down, as it were,
by your present reasoning; for after fighting for the prize,
it lies there (vanquished). But of mind, it seems, it must be
as are endued with reason. S. This idea Stalbaum once felt disposed
to adopt; but he afterwards rejected it; for he says that Plato attributes
life even to plants in Tim. p. 77, C. But this does not answer Sydenham’s
objection. Perhaps Plato alluded to the sensitive plants of the Mimosa
kind, the leaves of which when touched immediately curl up. And if so,
we must read kai ruot puroig kai trägt &@owg, i.e. “ and to some plants
and to all animals.”
* By common life, says Stalbaum, is meant, as indeed Sydenham had
translated, the mixed or middle.
28 PHILERUS
said, that it has prudently laid no claim for the prize; for it
would otherwise have suffered the same fate. But pleasure,
should it lose also the second prize, would meet altogether with
some dishonour from her lovers: for not even to them would
she appear any longer to be beautiful.
Soc. Why then is it not better to dismiss her directly, and
not to pain her, by bringing to her the most accurate touch-
stone, and convicting her ?
Prot. You are saying nothing, Socrates, to the purpose.
Soc. Is it because I spoke, what is impossible, of giving
pain to pleasure ? -
Prof. Not on that account only, but because you are ignor-
ant” that none of us will dismiss you, before you have come
to the end of these disputes by reasoning.
Soc. Ho! ho! Protarchus; for though the remaining dis-
course is plentiful, yet scarcely is any part of it very easy
now. For it seems that he, who marches out in defence of
mind, has need of another stratagem, and must have, as it
were, arrows different from those of former reasoning; per-
haps, however, some are the same. Is not this requisite?
Prot. How not ?
[36.] Soc. Let us then endeavour, when laying down the
principle, to act with caution.
Prot. Of what principle are you speaking 2
Soc. All things existing in the universe let us divide into
two, or rather, if you please, into three parts.
Prot. You should state, why so.
Soc. Let us take” some of the subjects already mentioned
Prot. What ?
Soc. We said somehow” that of things existing, the deity
has exhibited the limitless, and also the limit.
Prot. Very true.
* Sydenham has “sensible,” what the train of thought requires. He
therefore would have proposed perhaps to read si Ye vočig in lieu of
aywoëtc. -
* Instead of A&60psy, Schleiermacher and Heindorf wished to read,
&va\á3wpusy, similar to Sydenham’s “reassume : ” but Stalbaum, who, in
ed. 1, considered the correction as not admitting of a doubt, has, in ed. 2,
defended A430pusy by referring to A&Got above in p. 18, A. =\ 18, and to
Antràov below in p. 34, D. = $68.
* The expression #Xáyopév trov is designedly introduced, because in 3
18, the assertion had not been actually made in the same words as here
PHILEBUS; 2:
..Soc. Let us then take these two of the species (of things),”
and for a third, some one composed of those two mixed together.
But I am, it seems, to be laughed at as a person sufficiently”
distinguishing and enumerating things according to their
species.
Prot. What say you, my good man? -
Soc. It seems again that there is need of a fourth kind.
Prot. Say, what?
Soc. Of the combination of these with each other consider
then the cause ; and to these three species set me down this
for a fourth. • , -
Prot. Will there not be wanting a fifth too, able to pro-
duce the separation of something?
- Soc. Perhaps there may ; but not, I think, at present.
However, should there be a want of it, you will pardon me, if
I go in pursuit of a fifth [life].”
[37.] Prot. How so? --
Soc. Having, in the first place, of these four species, di-
vided” the three, *let us, after having seen each of two cut
into many parts and dispersed, endeavour by collecting again
each into one, to understand those two,” in what manner each
of them is, at the same time, one and many.
* The Greek is robrov 3:) rāv sióðv. But Ficinus has “Has utique
species duo illa esse ponamus,” from which Stalbaum was led to propose
rotra, for rotºrov. But he ought to have read likewise rà éión, unless he
meant rôv siódiv to depend upon the following Tà 660.
* Why Socrates should be laughed at for “sufficiently ’’ distinguishing
things according to species, Stalbaum could not understand, nor can I.
He therefore proposed, in ed. 1, to read oix ićavåg. But in ed. 2, he in-
troduces the idea of “being desirous to distinguish,” similar to Syden-
ham’s “pretending to distinguish.” Perhaps Plato wrote oilk #vvöwg, or
of ka?tic, instead of ikavaig. -
* In lieu of 3iov, which Schützwished to reject entirely, and Stalbaum,
in ed. 2, has enclosed in brackets, Schleiermacher happily suggested
** Oſºy, ~7 -
* Instead of 6ts\ópsvou, Ficinus seems, from his version “eligentes,”
to have found in his MS. śAópavou. Stalbaum too renders ðuéAópsvot
by “secernamus.” - - . . .
*—” Ficinus has “duoque ex tribus sic se habere consideremus wt
unumquodgue dworum sit multa dividuum insuper atque dispersum, rur-
susque in unum ducentes, cogitare nitamur,” where he either found in
his MS., or introduced from his own head, the words marked in Italics,
With regard to 6tsa'traopévov, which seems to be superfluous after troAAd
8terzºopévov, the “ dispersum ” in Ficinus would lead to Öusatrappièvov,
30 PHILEBUS.
ſ
Prot. If you would speak more plainly respecting them, I
might perhaps follow you.
Soc. I say then that the two, which I lay before you, are
those which I just now (spoke of); one the limitless, and the
other limit. Now, that the limitless is in some manner many,
I will attempt to show ; but let that, which has a limit, wait
for us a while. -
[38.] Prot. It shall wait.”
Soc. Consider now ; for what I order you to consider is a
thing difficult and doubtful. Consider it, however. With
regard to things hotter and colder, first see if you can con-
ceive any limit to them. Or would not the more and the less,
residing in the genera themselves of things, enjoin, so long as
they resided there, an end to be not in them P For if there
were an end, they are at an end themselves.
Prot. You speak most truly.
Soc. And we say that in the hotter and colder there is the
more and the less.
Prot. Very much so.
Soc. Reason then ever points out to us that the colder and
the hotter have no end ; and being thus without any end, they
are altogether limitless.
[39.] Prot. Wehemently so, Socrates.
Soc. Well have you answered, friend Protarchus, and re-
minded me, that the “vehemently,” which you now pronounced,
and the “gently,” have the same power as the “more” and
the “less.” For, wherever they reside, they suffer not any
thing to be just “so much ;” but infusing something more
vehement than the more gentle into every action, and the
contrary, they effect either “the more” or “the less;” but
cause the “just so much” to disappear. For, as it was just
now stated, if they did not cause the “just so much " to dis-
appear, but permitted both it and “the moderate” to be in
the seat of “the more ” and “the less,” or of “the vehement”
were it not that Šušo traorai kai Ötéoxtorat are found just afterwards, as
remarked by Stalbaum.
- p
* The imperative puswära, evidently requires here Mévei found in one
MS., instead of Mévst.
* From the allusion to the comparatives, perhaps the best translation
of ré régov, here and elsewhere, would be “the positive.” . Baumgarten
Crusius explains ré régov by “a definite measure of quantity,” which is
equally applicable to the idea of the positive and superlative.
PHILEBUS. 31
and “the gentle,” these verythings (would) flow” out of their
own place in which they were ; for if they admitted the “just
so much,” “the hotter” and “the colder” would not exist. For
“ the hotter,” and in like manner “the colder,” is always ad-
vancing forward, and never abides in the same spot; but the
“just so much " stops, and ceases to progress.” According
then to this reasoning, “the hotter” must be limitless; and
so must also be “the colder.”
[40.] Prot. So indeed, Socrates, it appears. But, as you
said, these things are not easy to follow. But subjects spoken
of again and again would perhaps show the questioner and
the questioned agreeing sufficiently together. -
Soc. You say well; and let us try so to do. But for the
present, see whether we will receive this as a sign of the
nature of the limitless, in order that, by going through all, we
may not be prolix.
Prot. What mark do you mean 2 -
Soc. Whatever things appear to us to be growing more or
less, or to admit of the vehement, and the gentle, and the too
much, and all such attributes, we ought to refer all these to
the genus of the limitless, as to one thing, according to the
previous remark which we made, that whatever things were
torn and cut into parts, we ought to collect, to the best of our
power, and put a mark on them as being of Some one nature,
if you remember.” -
Prot. I remember it. -
Soc. Those things then, which do not admit these attributes,
but admit their contraries, in the first place, the equal and
equality, and, after the equal, the double, and whatever other
relation one number bears to another, and one measure to
another, by reckoning up all these as relating to limit, should
we seem to do right? or how say you?
Prot. Perfectly right, Socrates. !.
[41.] Soc. Be it so. But the third thing, made up of the
other two, what idea shall we say it possesses f -
Prof. Yourself, as I conceive, will tell me.
* Baumgarten Crusius aptly refers to Aristotle, Categ. 4, où jokei ro
tróorov švöéx800at rô pučA\ov kai ré firrov, K. T. A. -
* By Éppet Stalbaum understands “pereunt.” But it rather means
“fluebant,” as shown by the preposition #k. Besides, there would be an
allusion to the doctrine of Heracleitus, that all things flow; while correc.
Greek requires Éppet rair'âv instead of Éppet raiſra. -
32 - PHILEBUS.
Soc. A deity (might); if any of the gods will hearken to
my prayers.
Prot. Pray, then, and take a survey.” -
Soc. I do survey: and some deity, Protarchus, seems now
to have become favourable to us. -
Prot. How say you this? and of what proof do you make
use 2
Soc. I will tell you plainly: * but do you follow my rea-
soning.
Prot. Only speak.
Soc. We mentioned just now the hotter and the colder ;
did we not *
Prot. Yes.
Soc. To these then add the drier and the moister, the more
numerous and the fewer, the swifter and the slower, the
larger and the smaller, and whatever things beside that we
previously ranked under the one head of a nature, that admits
of the more and the less.
Prot. You mean of the limitless. ".
[42.] Soc. Yes: and do you combine into this that which
we spoke of next afterward, the genus of limit.
Prot. What genus?
Soc. That, which, when we should just now have brought
together (as the genus) of the limit, formed in the same manner,
as we brought together the genus of the limitless, we did not
bring together. But now perhaps * you will do the same.”
* Here seems to be an allusion to the act of an augur; who, after utter-
ing a prayer, looked towards heaven to see if the god, to whom he had
prayed, answered, or not, with a favourable omen.
* I cannot understand here ÖAov čtv, and I have therefore omitted
with Ficinus 3rt. I could have understood &m}\öv et ru, i.e. “well making
something plain.” -
*—” This is the English for the Latin of Ficinus—“idem ages:” who
therefore found in his MS. rairów Śpáosig in lieu of rairów 6páost: which,
confess, I cannot understand; nor could Stalbaum originally; for in ed.
2, he considered as an interpolation all the words, d\\' towg kai viv rail-
röv Ópéast: Toitov duºporépay ovvayopičvov catapavºg kaiketvm yºvíos-
Tat. But in ed. 2, he says that rairów Śpáost has for its subject some-
thing not found indeed in the Greek, but which in Latin is “ipsum genus
finiti, cujus nondum subtilior definitio est proposita;” while to show that
an idea can be applied to the verb Öpāv, he refers to the expression, raû-
röv Óñ otpat 6pāoat àv kai rijv Špijv čvg|300Xàv. Perhaps Plato wrote
dAN towg, ei Y’ $viv uot roi to vijn Öpāv, goi, roëTwy dipºſporépov cºvva yo-
Hévov, katapavºg kaiketvm Yevågeral, i. e.“but pe haps, if it is permitted
PHILEBUS, 33
When both these are brought together, that too will become
manifest.
Prot. Of what (genus) are you speaking? and how 2
Soc. I speak of that relating to the equal and the double,
and whatever else causes things to cease at variance with each
other, and by introducing number,” moulds them into what
are symmetrical and harmonize with each other.
Prot. I understand. You seem to me to say that * if these
are combined” certain productions would somehow arise *
in the case of each.”
Soc. (Yes.) For I seem (to have spoken) correctly.
Prot. Say on then.
Soc. In the case of diseases, does not the right combination
of those two produce the state of health 2
Prot. Entirely so.
Soc. And in the acute and the grave, the swift also and
the slow, all being limitless, do not the very same thing, being
introduced, effect at the same time a limit * and render most
perfect all the Muse's art?
me to do this, (to bring together) that (genus) will, when both of these are
brought together, become manifest to you.” This at least would be in-
telligible; what can hardly be said of the present Greek text or of any in-
terpretation of it.
* For, as stated in Epinom. p. 978, A., quoted by Baumgarten Crusius,
where number is not, there is &\óyworóg re kai ärakrog, dioxhuwy, dippv6-
poc, &váppooróg ts popá.
27—27 Ficinus has “si ista miscentur.” He therefore found in his MS. st
putyvvrat Taijta, not putyvög Taira, with which Stalbaum was justly offend-
ed in ed. 1, but defends in ed. 2. Heindorf, on Phaedon. § 59, suggested
&v puyvögg Taijra.
* Instead of airów, omitted by one of the oldest MSS., and in another
placed in the margin or inserted by a second hand, the syntax and sense
require àv Trog—as I have translated. Ficinus too has “eventuras,” i. e.
ăv–0 vpſ3aivetv.
* Ficin. “ex edrum singulis,” which answers to &g' ékáo rav, found
in one of the oldest MSS. and adopted by the Zurich editors, and which
Stalbaum preferred in ed. 1, but has rejected in ed. 2.
30 How the limitless and limit being introduced can effect a limit, I
cannot understand, nor could Stalbaum ; who, in ed. 1, wished to read
#yyevopævn, and to refer that word to kouvøvía, as Ficinus did in his ver-
sion, “et ista terminum peperit,” omitting however Tavrá–Taijra, which
he saw would be then unintelligible. There is some error here. Per-
haps Plato wrote, "Ap oi, raûra èyyevopuévn Trávra àp #trepaoré
& Treupy&garo, i. e. “Has not it, being introduced, caused at the same time
all these to be delightful.” where äpt' #Trepaard differ scarcely by a single
letter from épa Trépag re.
D
34 PHILEBUS,
Prot. Yes, most beautifully.
Soc. Moreover it being introduced into cold weather and
hot, it takes off º' the very much, the too much, and the in-
finite,” but it effects the moderate and the symmetrical.
Prof. How not 2
Soc. And are not produced from them mild seasons, and
all whatever is lovely for us, the limitless and those which
have a limit being combined together ?
Prof. How not ?
Soc. A thousand other things I omit to state; as, for instance,
together with health, beauty and strength; and in the soul other
properties very many and very beautiful.” [43.] For the
goddess herself,” O thou handsome Philebus, looking down
upon lust, and all manner of vice in all persons, (and) * (see-
ing) no limit existing in them of pleasures and their full enjoy-
ment, has laid down a law and order, having a limit. And
* you said that she would wear down ; * but I maintain, on
the contrary, that she would preserve. But how, Protarchus,
does it (now) appear to you ?
*—” The Greek is rô pièv troXi Xiav kai & Tsupov. But the three old-
est MSS. read Agiov for Xiav. And so perhaps the MS. of Ficinus, whose
version is, “id quod multum et minus et infinitum dicitur.” Plato wrote,
I suspect, rö pºv TrAéov kai pºsiov &psi\eto, without àtreupov, which “the
more ” and “the less” have been shown to be. Stalbaum defends troXà
Atav : but those words, I think, are never thus united.
* Schütz, in Opuscul. Philolog. p. 138, conceived that something was.
wanting here. For the mention of the goddess of Pleasure could scarce-
ly thus follow the discussion relating to the combination of the limitless
and limit. Stalbaum however, in ed. 2, says, as Sydenham had trans-
lated, that the deity alluded to is Aphrodité, which in § 5 Socrates states
Philebus had identified with Pleasure, and that the goddess of Beauty is
here introduced, with reference to the beauty both of body and soul,
which had been just now mentioned.
* Instead of 0sóg, I should prefer # or 0.86c, as in § 5.
* To avoid the want of connexion I have introduced “ and ; ” and I
suspect that kai has dropt out after pi\m{38, for k and 3 are very similar
in MSS., as shown by myself at Tro. 935.
*—” The Greek is in some MSS. ātrokvåv Épng; in others, &trok-
vaig ; but in one, by a correction, &trokvaigau, thus confirming the con-
jecture of Porson, in Miscellan. Critic. p. 265, adopted by Stalbaum, who,
in ed. 2, renders the passage, “And you indeed think that the goddess
wears down, but I that she preserves.” But what is the thing worn down
or preserved, he does not distinctly state. More correctly has Sydenham
translated, “And this (the law) you said was to impair pleasure, but I,
that it was to preserve pleasure.” But in that case Plato would have
written, as he probably did, & Tokyaioav Špng Taijta (i. e. vógov kai
ráštv) at Tijv–not &trokvaioral épng airijv–
|PHILEBUS. 35
Prot. This, Socrates, is quite to my mind.
[44] Soc. I have mentioned then those three things, if you
cCmprehend.
Prot. I think I do. For one you seem to call the limitless,
and one, the second, the limit in all things; but what you
mean by the third, I do not very well comprehend.
Soc. Because the multitude, O thou wondrous man, of the
generation of the third, has amazed you. And yet the limit-
less has afforded you many genera; but as they were all of
them marked with the seal of the genus of the more and its
opposite they appeared one.
Prof. True.
Soc. And yet neither did limit contain many, nor did we
bear it ill that it was not by nature one.
Prof. How could we ?
Soc. By no means. But do thou say that by the third I
mean this one, *laying down all their progeny, from the
measures which have effected together with limit a generation
into being.8%
Prot. I understand you.
[45.] Poc. Now besides these three, we then said we must
look for some fourth kind, and that the looking for it was
common to us both. See then whether it seems to you necessa-
ry, for all things, which are produced, to be produced through
SOIO € C3 U.S62.
Prot. So it seems to me; for without that (thing),” how
should they be produced P -
Soc. The nature then of the thing making differs from the
cause in nothing but the name: so that the thing making and
the cause may be rightly deemed one.
Prot. Rightly.
*—” Such is the literal translation of the Greek, of which I can-
not elicit the meaning. I could have understood, Tuffāvra rö roörwy
ëkyovov Štrav, Tºy yévsaw eig obotav čk Töv pistó Tréparoc dirstpyaopévov
duérpov, i.e. “laying down, as their whole progeny, the generation into
being from the measureless working together with the limit: ” where
dipušTpov would be the synonyme of dºrsipa v.
* Instead of rottwy, which Stalbaum in ed. 2 defends, three MSS.
read toitov, which he had adopted in ed. 1. But neither rotºrov nor rotº-
row could agree with airíag. Plato wrote, I suspect, Xopic y’ airtov row—-
similar to the expression in Tim. p. 28, A., aráv Óé rô yvywópºst ov tºr'
airtov rivăg it diváykncytyvsgöat travri Yao děčvarov xwe'e ai-low
Yevsow oxsw. 2
I)
36 PHILEBUS.
Soc. So, likewise, the thing made, and the thing produced,
we shall find, as just now said, to differ in nothing but the
name; or how P
Prot. Just so.
Soc. According to nature, does not the thing making ever
lead the way ? and the thing made follow it into being 2
Prot. Certainly. -
£46.] Soc. Cause then, and that which is the slave of cause
for production, is another thing, and not the same.
Prot. How not P
Soc. Have not the things which are produced, and the
things out of which they are all produced, exhibited to us the
three genera 2
Prot. Clearly.
Soc. *The fourth then, which is the artificer of all these,
let us call the cause; * as it has been sufficiently shown to
be different from those.
Prof. Let us call it.
Soc. The four sorts having been now defined, it is well,
for the sake of remembering each one, to enumerate them in
order.
[47.] Prot. How not?
Soc. The first then I call limitless; the second, limit; the
third, what is mixed and generated from these ; and in saying
that the cause of this mixture and this production is the
fourth, should I do aught amiss?
Prof. How so?
Soc. Well now, what is the reasoning after this? and with
what design have we come to this? Was it not this? We
were inquiring whether the second prize was due to Pleasure
or Intellect. Was it not so P
Prot. It was so.
Soc. Since then we have thus divided these things, may
we not now better form a finished judgment about the first
Ynd the second, respecting which we disputed at first.
Prot. Perhaps so.
Soc. Come now, we laid down, as the conqueror, the com-
bined life of Pleasure and Intellect. Was it not so *
*—38 Ficinus has “Omnium autem istorum opificem quartum ponimus
causamgue vocamus,” as if he had found in his MS. riðspuév tára prov rai
Aśyousy rºv airíav : where Ašyopsy is found likewise in five MSS.
PHILEBUS, 37
Prot. It was.
Soc. Do we not perceive then somehow what this life is,
and of what genus 2
JProt. How not *
Soc. And I think we shall say, that it is a part of the third.
*For it is not combined with some two,” but with all the limit-
less linked by a chain with limit; so that this life, the winner
of the victory, may be rightly said to be a part of the third.
Prot. Most rightly.
[48.] Soc. Be it so. But that life of yours, Philebus,
being pleasant and uncombined, to which of the three can it
be rightly said to belong P But before you pronounce, answer
me first this question.
Phil. Propose it then.
Soc. Have Pleasure and Pain a limit? or are they amongst
the things which admit “the more ” and “the less?”
Phil. Assuredly, Socrates, amongst those (that admit) “the
more.” For Pleasure would not be wholly a good, if it were
not by nature limitless with respect to multitude and “the
more.”
Soc. Nor would Pain, Philebus, be wholly an evil; so that
we must think of some thing else than the nature of the limit-
less, which 49 is to impart any good to pleasures. Let then
this be the issue of the limitless. But to which of the before-
mentioned may we, Protarchus and Philebus, refer Intellect,
and Science, and Mind, and not be impious P For there seem
to me to be no little danger to us, whether we are right or
not respecting the present question.
Phil. You magnify, Socrates, that god of yours.
Soc. So do you, my friend, that goddess of yours. The
guestion, however, ought to be answered by us.
[49.] Prot. Socrates speaks correctly, Philebus, and we
must obey him.
*—” Such is the translation of Stalbaum's text. But in the notes he
prefers the correction of Schütz, who suggested pulcröv škeivo. similar to
the version of Ficinus, “neque enim quod, ex duobus quibusdam mixtum
sit, sed quod ex infinitis omnibus a termino nexis.” Klitzsche defends
purróg Éksivog by arguments, to which Stalbaum replies in the “Addita-
menta.” I confess however I do not understand how Šećeptévalv by itself
could mean “linked by a chain with—” -
* The reading 6, which Stephens elicited from “quod" in Ficinus
has been found only in one M.S. instead of ars,
33. PHILEBUS.
Phil. Have not you, Protarchus, taken upon yourself to
speak on my part 2
Prot. Certainly. But in the present case I am nearly 41 at
a loss; and I request of you, Socrates, to become yourself a
speaker for us, in order that we may not, by a mistake respect-
ing the combatant,” say something contrary to the measure.”
Soc. We must obey, Protarchus. For you enjoin nothing
difficult. But when I was magnifying, as Philebus says, (a
deity)* by way of a joke, I did in reality confuse you, by
asking of what genus were Mind and Science.
Prot. Altogether so, Socrates.
[50.] Soc. And yet it was an easy (question). For all the
wise, in reality extolling themselves, agree that Mind is to
us a king of heaven and earth.” And perhaps they say well.
But let us, if you are willing, make our examination of this
genus rather more at length.
Prot. Speak as you wish, taking no account of the length,
as you will not be disagreeable (to us). -
[51.] Soc. You have spoken fairly. Let us begin, then,
by asking a question in such way as this.
Prof. How P
Soc. Whether shall we say that the power of an irrational
(principle) governs all things, and that, which is called the
universe, at random, and as may happen P or, on the con-
trary, as our predecessors asserted,” that Mind and a certain
wonderful Intellect, arranges things together, and governs
throughout 2 -
Prot. Alike in nothing, Socrates, (are the two tenets).
For what you have just now mentioned seems to me to be
impious. But, to say that Intellect disposes all things in
order, is worthy of our view of the world, and of sun, and the
* Sydenham has, “I am much at a loss;” what the sense requires.
\{ence for puávrov oxe6öv Plato probably wrote puśya Tu oxeóðv–
* By &ywvworlìv, says Stalbaum, is meant Intellect, as opposed to
f’leasure. -
** Stalbaum quotes opportunely from Horace, “nil extra numerum
fecisse modumque Curas.”
* This word, absolutely requisite for the sense, is found only in the
version of Ficinus—“deum extollens jocando.”
* Stalbaum has given, from the notes of Wyttenbach on Phaedo,
11, and of Creuzer on Plotinus IIepi KöA\ovs, p. 90, a list of the Neos
latonists, who have referred to this dictum. -
* Plato alludes to Anaxagoras. See Walckenaer in Diatrib. p. 40, B,
PHILEB US 39
moon, and the stars, and the whole revolution (of heaven);" nor
would I ever say, or even think, otherwise respecting them.
[52.] Soc. Do you wish then for us to say something in
accordance with our predecessors, that such is the case, and
for us not merely to think that we ought to speak the senti-
ments of others without danger to ourselves, but that we should
run the risk together, and share in the censure, should a man
of mighty power” assert that these things are not in this state,
but in that of disorder 2
Prot. How should I not wish it?
Soc. Come now, look to the reasoning, which is advancing
towards us respecting these matters.
Prot. Only say it.
Soc. The things that surround the nature of all the bodies
of animals, (namely,) fire, and water, and air, and earth, we
somehow descry, as persons tossed in a storm say (of land),
existing in the constitution (of the universe).
Prot. And truly so; for we are really tossed about in our
present reasonings.
Soc. Come then, respecting each of those things in * us,
conceive some such thing as this.
Prof. What P
[53.] Soc. That each of those in us is little and incon-
siderable, and is no where and in no manner pure, and pos-
sessing a power worthy of its nature. Take them in the case
of one (element), and understand the same respecting all.
Fire in Some manner exists in us, and it exists also in the
universe.
Prot. How not 2
Soc. Now the fire, which is in us, is weak and inconsider-
able; but that which is in the universe is wonderful for its
multitude and beauty, and for every power which belongs
to fire.
Prot. What you say is very true.
Soc. What then Is the fire of the universe generated,
* Ficinus has “coelestis circuitus,” as if he had found in his MS.
Treptºpopäç oilpavoiſ, or otpaviaç.
* By this expression, says Stalbaum, is meant one of the Sophists, who
are called perpetually Öeuvot by Plato.
* Ficinus has “circa nos,” as if he found in his MS. Trept huāc, simi-
lar to trepi Tºv–pāow just above; but trap' juiv is repeated in the next
sentence, where Ficinus has “apud nos.”
40 PHILEBUS.
and fed, and ruled” by that which we have in us? or, on
the contrary, does mine and yours, and that in the rest of ani-
mals, receive all these things” from it?
Prot. You ask this question, which does not deserve an
a]] SWeT.
Soc. True. For you will say the same, I think, of the
earth, which exists here in animals, and of that in the uni-
verse; and so will you answer touching all the other things,
about which I inquired a little before.
Prot. For who in his senses would ever be seen answering
in another way ?
[54.] Soc. Scarcely not any one whatever. But follow us
to what comes next in order. Have we not, looking to all
those things just now mentioned, and brought to One point,
called them body ?
Prot. How not 2
Soc. Conceive the same thing then with regard to this,
which we call the world. For in the same manner, being
composed of the same elements, it would be body.
Prof. You speak most correctly.
Soc. Whether from that body wholly is nourished the body
with us, or that body from the one with us? and has it received
and does it keep whatever properties we have just now men-
tioned respecting them *
Prot. And this too is another point, Socrates, not deserv-
ing a question.
Soc. What then 2 Is this deserving 2 Or how will you say?
Prot. Say what it is.
Soc. Shall we not affirm that the body with us possesses a
soul?
Prot. It is evident, we shall affirm it.
Soc. From whence, friend Protarchus, did it obtain it, un-
less the body of the universe happens to be with a soul, and
possessing the same things as this, but in every way more
beautiful?
Prot. It is evident, Socrates, from no other source.”
* The Greek is Tošperat kai yiyveral. To avoid the to repov Trpórepov
I have translated as if it were yiyvstat kai Tpépétat.
* By “these things” is meant, says Stalbaum, the produced, nourished,
and ruled. -
* On the doctrine that the human soul is a part of the soul of the uni-
IPHILEBU.S. 41
[55.] Soc. *For we cannot surely, Protarchus, expect
that, while there are these four things, limit, the limitless, the
combination (of both), and the genus of the cause, amongst all
the four, it is permissible for that, which furnishes the soul in us,
and makes the body a tabernacle (for it), and, when the body
has met with a stumbling-block, cures it by the medical art,”
and on other occasions frames other constitutions, these should
be addressed by the name of wisdom, whole and of every kind;
but that, while these very same things exist in the whole of
heaven, and according to its great parts, and, moreover, while
they are lovely and without blemish, in these there should not
have been planned the nature of things the most beautiful and
held in the highest honour.
Prot. This would indeed have no reason on its side.
[56.] Soc. If this then be irrational, we may the better
assert, by following that reasoning of ours, that there is, what
we have often said, in the universe many a limitless, and a
limit sufficient,” and besides these, a cause, not inconsiderable
verse, Stalbaum refers to Xenophon M. S. iv. 3, 14; Cicero De N. D. ii.
6; iii. 11 ; Tusc. v. 13; De Divinat. . 49; and Fabricius on Sext.
Empiric, adv. Mathem. ix. 6l. Cicero, de Senect. § 21, says it was a
tenet of the Pythagoreans, that “ex universa mente divina delibatos animos
haberemus,” the origin of the “divinae particula aurae '’ in Horace.
*—" On this difficult passage Stalbaum wrote, in ed. 1, a rather long
note, in which he suggested alterations, repudiated in ed. 2; where he has
however failed to unravel the intricacies of the syntax, which must con-
tinue to baffle all the exertions of scholars; for neither syntax nor sense
can be made out of words evidently defective. To arrive therefore at
what Plato probably wrote, I have translated the passage as if the Greek
were Oil yáp ri trov Trpooëoköpiév ye, (j IIpórapys, Ött, Övta Tá têtrapa
êvijv Toijro oàpia okmyrºv trouoiſy—iatpuk? &koğpsyov kai––
t - - * * f
avvrièv, Trägav—in lieu of Oil yáp trov čokoúpušy ys, dj IIpórapys, rà Têt-
* * 2A
Tapa êvöv owpackiav špatrotočv——iarpukijv kai čv àA\oug &AAa
ovvrv6év kai dºkoúpusvov Trägav—where I have adopted Stalbaum’s Övra,
and altered Sydenham’s orkſjvoc into okmurjv, for thus oºpa okmyriv trovoúv
differs by scarcely a letter from owpackiav šparovoúv; while not only do
we get rid of Šv, which has no meaning here, but recover the usual con-
struction of Troutiv with two accusatives. With regard to the body being
considered a tabernacle for the soul, Sydenham refers to Tim. Locr. p.
100, A., and 103, C., Ocell. Lucan. in Stob. Ecl. Phys. c. 16, and Æschin.
Socrat. iii. 5, to which I will add Etymol. Xkāvog kai to cºpia, trapá rà
oxiivopua kai aſkmvriv sivat Tijg livyāg otov oikmråpuoy. Lastly, with re-
gard to Trpoo`oköpsy, I was led to it by finding in one M.S. tro, öokoupev.
For rw and ºrpo and ºrpoo are frequently confounded by the scribes.
* Instead of the unintelligible ikavöv, Winckelmann would read kºti
42 PHILFBKJS.
which puts into order and arranges the years, and seasons,
and months, a cause, which may most justly be called Wis-
dom and Mind.
Prot. Most justly, indeed.
Soc. Wisdom however and Mind could not exist without
Soul.
Prot. By no means.
Soc. You will say then that in the nature of Zeus there is
a kingly soul in a kingly mind, through the power of the
cause; and that in the other (gods)” there are other beautiful
attributes, according as it is agreeable for each to be called.
Prot. Certainly I shall.
[57.] Soc. Do not think, Protarchus, that we have spoken
this discourse at all in vain. For it fights on the side of
those persons of the olden time, who showed that Mind is ever
the ruler of the universe.
Prot. It does so very much.
Soc. Besides it has furnished an answer to my inquiry,<
that Mind is a relation” of that, which was said to be the cause
of all things; for of the four this was one.” For now at
length you surely have the answer.
Prot. I have, and very sufficiently. But it lay hid from
me that you were giving the answer.
Soc. *For play is sometimes, Protarchus, a remission from
serious study.”
Prot. Well have you said this.
couvèv, as in § 55, Trépag kai &rsupov kai kouvöv kai rô Tāg airtaç yévoc:
which Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt.
* Sydenham has thus anticipated Stalbaum in applying &\\oug to 680ig
understood, while Reisig on Soph. CEd. C. 44, Tåg Táv6' épôorac Eiſpuévi-
6ag ö y' \v6áð’ &v Eitrot Asºg viv' &\\a 3’ &AAaxoi ka?\á, has aptly refer-
red to this passage of Plato.
* The strange word 'yevočorng, which is acknowledged by Olympiodo-
rus, the Scholiast, Hesych., and Suid., and quoted distinctly from this
dialogue by the Etymol. M., Stalbaum conceives Plato to have coined
with the view of punning upon voijg : for that otherwise he would have
written ysvvärng: and he refers to a similar play on the same word in
§ 152, #xóvrwg £avröv Töv voy.
*7 I have adopted Stalbaum’s happy restoration of this passage, in lieu
of the common reading, röv retrópov, Öv fiv, where since div is omitted
by the three oldest MSS., he suggested Töv retrópov Ó fiv.
*—* This apophthegm has been adopted by Aristanetus, Epist. i. 26,
where see Boissonade.
FHILEBUS. 43
[58.] Soc. And thus, my friend, of what genus Mind is,
and of what power it is possessed, has been now shown toler-
Tably well for the present.
Prot. It has, completely.
Soc. Moreover in like manner the genus of Pleasure has
appeared before.
Prot. Very much so. -
Soc. Concerning these two then let us remember this also ;
—that Mind is a relation to cause, and is nearly of that genus;
but that Pleasure is both limitless itself, and is of that genus
which, of itself, neither has nor ever will have in itself, either
a beginning, or a middle, or an end.
Prot. We will remember. How not *
[59.] Soc. Now we ought to consider next, in which genus
either of these two exists, and through what circumstance
they are produced, when they come into being, first in the
case of Pleasure; (for,) as we previously tried by a touch-
stone its genus, so, with regard to these points, (we must try)
them previously. For, apart from Pain, we should never be
able fully to try Pleasure.
Prof. Nay, if we must proceed in this way, let us proceed.
Soc. Does it seem to you, as to me, as regards production ?
Prof. What P
Soc. Pain and Pleasure appear to me to be produced na-
turally at the same time as a common genus.
Prot. Remind us, friend Socrates, which of the genera
mentioned before, you wish to indicate by the word common.
Soc. This shall be done, O thou wondrous man, to the best
of my power.
Prot. You have spoken fairly.
Soc. By common, then, let us understand that, which we
reckoned as the third of the four. -
Prot. That which you mentioned after both the limitless
and limit; in which you ranked health, and also, as I think,
harmony.
[60.] Soc. You have said perfectly right. Now give me
all possible attention.
Prof. Only speak. -
Soc. I say, then, that whenever the harmony (in the
frame) of any animal is loosened, a loosening is made in
44 PHIL, EBU.S.
its nature, and at that very time the production of pains takes
place.”
Prot. You say what is very probable.
Soc. But when the harmony is properly fitted, and it re-
turns to its own nature, we must say that pleasure is pro-
duced, if it is requisite for arguments on matters of the
greatest moment to be despatched as quickly as possible in a
few words.
Prot. I think, Socrates, you speak correctly; but let us
endeavour to speak of these same things still more clearly.
[61.] Soc. Is it not most easy to understand things of
common occurrence and seen all around P
Prot. What kind of things?
Soc. Hunger, surely, is a loosening and a pain.
Prof. Yes.
Soc. And by eating, a filling-up is, on the other hand, a
pleasure.
Prot. Yes.
Soc. Thirst also, again, is a corruption and pain, "and a
loosening;" but the power of a liquid, by replenishing the
part dried up, is a pleasure. Again, the suffering a preter-
natural heat, being a separation and dissolving, is a pain:
but, on the other hand, "according to nature, a giving way
and cooling is a pleasure."
Prot. Most certainly.
Soc. And the coagulation of animal moisture through cold,
contrary to its nature, is a pain: but, on the other hand, a
return” to the same (state), according to nature, *of what
had departed and been separated (from it),” is a pleasure.
* The whole of this argument has been abridged by Nemesius, De
Natur. Homin. p. 229. Compare likewise Tim. p. 64, B. STALB.
69–80 The words kai Xàoug Schleiermacher rejected as being interpo-
lated, with whom Stalbaum agrees. Cousin however defends them, by
saying that the negligent style of Plato would perhaps justify their reten-
tion, p. 32, A.
*—" The very balance of the sentences proves that Plato did not
write what is found in the text at present; to say nothing of the uncer-
tain meaning of diróðogug.
* In lieu of Öğüg, the “reditus’’ in Ficinus leads to & vočog.
*—” Ficinus has “contra humido liquescente et in suam redeunte
naturam ;” which plainly show that he found in his MS. sig rmv Šavröw
$ tow divuávrov—what Schleiermacher elicited from the reading in St 5.
3.
TPHILEBU.S. 45
And, in one word, consider whether the reasoning is in mo-
deration, which says, that when the species, naturally pro-
duced with a soul from the limitless and limit, as I previously
stated, is corrupted, to it corruption is a pain; but that *the
road into their being, and the return back again, is of all a
pleasure.94
Prot. Be it so; * for it seems to have some stamp (of like-
lihood).”
Soc. Let us then lay down this as one kind of pain and
pleasure (as existing) under each of those conditions.
Prot. Let it so lie.
[62.] Soc. Lay down now the expectation of the soul itself,
regards the nature of these circumstances; one antecedent to
pleasures (enjoyed), a matter hoped for, "agreeable and full
of confidence ; the other, antecedent to pains (endured), a
thing of fear and anxiety.”
Prot. This is, therefore, a different species of pleasure and
pain, independent of the body, and produced through an ex-
pectation of the soul herself.
Soc. You have understood the matter rightly. Now in
these (feelings), "I think, according to my opinion at least,
being each of them, as it seems,” sincere and unmixed, of
pain and pleasure, there will be manifest that respecting
bacus, Ecl. Phys. p. 99, sig rºw airi)w pāoruv. But what he found in lieu
of Övakpunyopuévay is not equally plain. For though Bernhardy and Stal-
baum assert that rāy bypaſſy is to be supplied from rig typórntoc, yet I
wish they had produced one passage where Tå Öypå are said Övakpi-
vec{}aw.
°4—64 Stalbaum thinks that airów, and I presume Trávrov likewise,
are to be referred to the preceding #pºlyvyov eiðog.
*—6* Ficinus has “Widetur enim mihi hoc admodum verisimile,”
which is far more intelligible than the Greek—60kei Yap plot rôtrov yá
ruva #xsw: where, however, since one M.S. offers #xeuv oftw; perhaps
Plato wrote rôtrov —éx8w roi, sikórog.
*—" In these balanced sentences there is either one word too much in
the first, or one too little in the second. Stalbaum, in his Latin trans-
lation of the passage, has, in ed. 2, omitted $Nºrvéðusvov : although, in ed.
1, he had stated that one need not wonder at the expression ºrpoodókmpa
#Atružápswov.
*—” According to Faehse, there is in the tautology, oipat kará ye rijv
#puiv 0.6%av—óg jokei, “the negligence of an every-day discourse ex-
pressed to the life.” Stalbaum in ed. 2, defends it by quoting Sophist,
p. 225, D., Öokö–catá y vapuny Tºv šphy. Lach. p. 192, C., áuotys
©aiverat—dog #yºuaw. But he neither does, nor could he, I think, pro-
46 PHILEBUS.
pleasure, whether the whole genus is to be embraced, or this
is to be assigned to some genus different from those before-
mentioned; but that to pleasure and pain (it is allowable),”
like heat and cold, and all other things of this sort, for us
to sometimes embrace them, and at other times not to embrace,
as being not good in themselves, but admitting only some-
times, and some of them, the nature of the good.
Prot. You say most correctly that it is requisite for the
thing now pursued to be caused to go” some where in this
road. -
[63.] Soc. Let us then look together at this part first. Since,
if what has been said is really the fact, when those things are
being destroyed, there would be 79 pain, but being preserved,
pleasure, let us now consider respecting those which are nei-
ther being destroyed, nor being preserved, what condition must
there then be to each animal, when such is the case." Give
your earnest attention to this point, and tell me, is there not
every necessity for every animal at that time to be neither
pained nor pleased, either greatly or little P
Prot. There is a necessity.
Soc. There is then some third” disposition of this kind,
beside that of being delighted and that of being grieved.
Prot. How not P
Soc. Come then, be ready to remember this (decision). For
duce a single passage to support the tripled repetition of a similar idea.
What Plato really wrote, a person, conversant with Greek, might perhaps
elicit from the version of Ficinus, “ut mea fert opinio–liquido discer-
nemus.”
* Stalbaum says that jöovº kai Airp depend upon ovyxopmréov.
Ficinus has “competat, ut interdum amandum sit.” x
* In lieu of Öuatropévôijval, Ald. alone has preserved the elegant
reading 6ta0mpsv6āvat: which Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt.
For Plato thus perpetually employs metaphors derived from hunting, as
shown by Wyttenbach in Epist. Crit. p. 41, and Creuzer on Proclus and
Olympiodor. T. i. p. 177. Of the passages quoted by Stalbaum, the most
apposite is in Tim, p. 64, B., raûry yáp paraówkršov Trávra öga &Aéiv
$truvootjusy.
* Instead of &vagwºopévov, where the preposition is useless, the three
oldest MSS. read &v Štagočopévay: where evidently lies hid–áv ćin.
orwºopišvalv. -
7. That is, to be neither in a state of destruction nor preservation,
STALB.
* On the three states of pleasure, pain, and something intermediate,
8talbaum refers to Rep. ix. p. 583, C–E.
PHILEBUS. - 47
towards the verdict respecting pleasure, it will be not a little
thing for us to remember it or not. But let us, if you please,
go through this point in few words.
Prot. Say, what? -
[64.] Soc. To a person preferring a life of intellect, you
know there is no hinderance to his living in that manner.
Prot. Do you mean in the state of being neither pleased
nor pained P
Soc. Yes; for it was stated in our comparison of the
lives, that there was no necessity for the person, preferring
the life of mind and intellect, to be delighted either much or
little.
Prot. It was altogether said so.
Soc. In this way therefore it would be to him. And per-
haps it would be by no means out of the way, if that life were
of all the most godlike. ~
Prot. To me at least it seems unlikely that the gods feel
neither pleasure nor its opposite.
Soc. It is highly, indeed, unlikely. For each of these
things is unseemly. But let us consider further this point
afterwards, if it should be to the purpose; and we will apply
it towards (winning) the Second prize for mind, should we be
unable to apply it for (winning) the first.
Prot. You speak most correctly.
[65.] Soc. Now that other species of pleasures, which we
said is peculiar to the Soul herself, is all produced through
memory.
{*rot. How so P -- -
Soc. What memory is, we ought, it seems, to previously re-
member:7° and prior to memory, what perception is, methinks;
if, what relates to these points, is about to become, as is fit-
ting, clear to us.
Prot. How say you?
Soe. Of those circumstances, which are on every occasion
surrounding our body, lay down that some are extinguished,
before they enter thoroughly the soul, and leave it unscathed;
others going through both, bring on them, as it were, a kind of
earthquake, peculiar (to each) and common to both.
7* The verb &va\marréov, which means, 1. “To take up again bodily,”
2. “To take up again mentally,” i. e. to remember, Stalbaum conceives
to have been introduced here for the sake of a play on the word pavilyum.
48 PHILEBUS$.
Prot. Be it laid down. .
Soc. If we should say that those, which do not go through
both, lie hid from our soul, but that those which (do go)
through both, do not lie hid, should we speak most correctly
Prot, How not P
Soc, By no means understand that I am speaking of lying
hid, as being in that case somehow the production of forgetful-
ness. For forgetfulness is the departure of memory.” But
that has not as yet, in what has been said, been produced.
Now of that, which neither is nor has been, it is absurd to say
there is any loss. Is it not ?
Prof. How not 2
Soc. Only then alter the terms.
[66.] Prot. How?
Soc. Instead then of (saying that) a thing lies hid from the
soul, when it is unscathed by any violent shakings of the
body, call that insensibility, which you just now called for-
getfulness.”
Prof. I understand. -
Soc. In the soul and the body, when affected,” in common
by one circumstance, being moved also in common, you would
not speak wide of the mark by naming that motion a sensation.
Prot. You speak most truly.
[67.] Soc. Now then do we not understand, what we mean
to call sensation ?
Prof. How not P
Soc. And a person saying that memory is a preservation of
sensation, would correctly say so in my opinion.
A rot. He would correctly.
Soc. Do we not say that memory differs from recollection ?
Prot. Perhaps so.
Soc. Is it not in this 2
Prot. In what 2 -
Soc. When, what the soul has once together with the body
* A similar sentiment is found in the Banquet, p. 208, A. § 32, and
Phaedo, p. 75, D. § 54.
** Since Protarchus had not as yet mentioned the word Añ0m, Schleier-
macher and Heindorf suggested inva pur) \#0m v ka)\fig, “ that you may not
call it forgetfulness.” .
7° Sydenham acutely saw that yuyvápasyov should be corrected int:
Yuyvågsva. For a neuter plural adjective thus agrees with substantives
of different genders in the singular number, like ºvyºv and orajua.
PHILEBUS. 49
suffered, this it does itself by itself without the body, as much
as possible, recover, we say that it then recollects. Do we not ?
Prot. Entirely so.
Soc. Moreover, when the soul, after losing the memory of a
thing perceived or learnt, brings it back again, itself by itself,
in all these” instances too we speak of recollections, and
memories.”
Prot. You speak correctly. -
Soc. The reason, for which all this has been said, is this.
Prof. What?
Soc. That we may at the same time” understand as clearly
as possible * the pleasure of the soul apart from that of the
body, and, at the same time, desire. For both of these seem
likely to be made clear through those.
[68.] Prot. Let us then, Socrates, now speak of what is to
follow.
Soc. In treating of the generation of pleasure, and of its
every form, it is necessary it seems for us to look to many
points. For even now we must, it appears, consider,” what
desire is, and where it is produced.
Prot. Let us then consider; for we shall lose nothing by it.
Soc. Nay, Protarchus, we shall lose our doubt about them,
and this too, after having found what we are in search of.
Prot. You have well defended yourself. Let us then try
to discuss what is next in order to these.
Soc. Did we not assert just now, that hunger, and thirst, and
many other things of the like kind, were certain desires 2
Prot. Yes, strongly. ... •
[69.] Soc. Looking, then, to what thing, the same (in all), do
we call those differing so much (from one another) by one name 2
78 Ficinus omits £iputravra.
* As Plato had just before made a distinction between divápºvnoug and
uvium, he could not have united them here. This Sydenham saw, and
wished to read &vapºvilorsvg kai pºvăung &vakrāoreig. I should prefer
simply oi, in lieu of kai—
* The Greek is "Iva pu), in lieu of which Grou suggested "Iva Öſ),
adopted by Sydenham; but Heusde, Heindorf, and Schütz, "Iva arm,
adopted by Stalbaum. Plato evidently wrote "Iv’āpia, to balance the
subsequent kai äua— -
* Instead of Śri pāAuora kai śvapyéorata, we must either omit kai,
with three MSS., or read káA\tora from conjecture.
* Ficinus has “et nunc primo videndum,” as if he had read oxerrãov
instead of Amirršov, as remarked by Stalbaum.
E
50 PHILEBUS.
Prot. By Zeus, Socrates, it is, perhaps, not easy to say; it
must, however, be told.
Soc. Let us from thence” take up the inquiry again from
the same points.
Prof. From whence 2
Soc. Do we not constantly say that thirst is something? 84
Prof. How not 2
Soc. Is not this, to have an emptiness?
Prof. How not P
Soc. Is not thirst a desire?
85 Prot. Yes, for drink.
Soc. For drink 2 or for a repletion from drink?
Prot. For repletion, I suppose.”
Soc. Whoever of us then is emptied, desires, it seems, what
is contrary to what he is suffering. For being emptied, he
desires to be filled.
Prot. Most clearly so.
[70.] Soc. What then, is it possible that the person, who
is empty for the first time, should apprehend, from any quar-
ter, either from sense or memory, a filling of that, by which
he neither is at the present time affected, nor ever was af-
fected heretofore.
Prot. How can it be 2
Soc. But, however, the person who desires, desires some-
thing.
Prof. How not P
Soc. Now he does not desire that which he is suffering.
For he is suffering thirst, and that is emptiness; but he de-
sires repletion.”
* Ficinus omits ékeiôsv. Perhaps Plato wrote 'Ekeiôsv Ór) kai čk rāv
airóv–Stalbaum would defend 'Ekeiôsv čk rôv airów, by quoting
Euthyd. p. 271, C., Évreč0év troðév sigtv čk Xtov; and Phaedr. p. 229, B.,
#v6évôs pièvrot Troév &Trô roč 'IAtooroij. But after the indefinite Troésy,
assuredly the name of a definite place could not be thus inserted. Both
#k Xtov and &Trô roi; 'IXtorooij are evidently from a gloss.
* Ficinus has “Dicinusne sitire aliquem,” which leads to Atilijv trov
AéYousy £ráorroré ruva, and hence kevoijrat might be read with all the
MSS. but one, which offers kevoijo 0au, similar to “exhaustum esse,” in
Ficinus. Stalbaum, who, in ed. 1, had adopted 6thiv and kevoiſ00au, in
ed. 2 has preferred 6tlº-kevoirat.
*—” In the arrangement of the speeches Stalbaum follows Bekker, who
had followed some of the MSS. e -ºº º
* This was a Pythagorean doctrine, as stated by Jamblichus in Vit.
Pythag. § 205. Sée Mahne on Aristoxenus, p. 76, quoted by Stalbaum.
PHILEBUS. 5 §
Prot. True.
Soc. Something, therefore, of those belonging to the thirsty
person, would have a perception in some manner of repletion.
Prot. Necessarily.
Soc. Now the body is unable; for it is suffering emptiness.
Prot. True. -
Soc. It is plain then that it is left for the soul to have a
perception, by means of memory, of repletion; for by what
means could the soul have such perception ?
[71.] Prot. Nearly by none.
Soc. Learn we then, what follows from this reasoning?
Prof. What P
Soc. This reasoning shows us that desire is not produced
from the body.
Prot. How So 2
Soc. Because it shows that the endeavour of every animal
is opposed to its sufferings.
Prot. Very much so.
Soc. Now the inclination, leading to a point opposite to the
sufferings, indicates somehow the remembrance of things op-
posite to those sufferings. -
Prot. Clearly.
Soc. The reasoning then, having shown that memory leads
to the things desired, discovers the general inclination and
desire, and the ruling power of the soul in every animal.
Prot. Most correctly.
Soc. The reasoning then proves that by no means does our
body thirst, or hunger, or suffer any of such affections.
Prot. Most true.
[72.] Soc. Let us further observe likewise this, respecting
these very same things. For the reasoning appears desirous
of indicating a certain kind of life in those very things.
Prot. In what things? and of what kind of life are you
speaking f
Soc. I mean in the being filled, and emptied, and in all the
other things, which relate to the preservation and the destruc-
tion of animals; and whether one of us, being in either of these
states, (at one time)" feeks pain and another pleasure, accord-
ing to the changes (of circumstances).
* On the omission of rôrs pièv in the first clause, see Stalbaum
E 2
52 PHILEBUS.
Prof. I is SO.88
Soc. But what when a person is in the middle of them?
Prot. How in the middle 2
Soc. When on account of a suffering he is pained, and yet
has a remembrance of pleasures past,” 99 a part indeed of his
pain ceases; but pleasant things have not been filled up at
that time.” 9 Shall we affirm, or deny,” that he is in the
midst of two contrary states?
Prot. Let us affirm it.
Soc. That he is pained or pleased wholly?
Prot. By Zeus, he is afflicted by some double pain; accord-
ing to the body, by his suffering; according to the soul, by a
certain longing from an expectation.
[73.] Soc. How, Protarchus, have you spoken of a doubled
pain 2 Is it not, that at one time one of us, being empty, is in
the clear hope of being filled P and at another time, on the
contrary, is in a hopeless state 2
Prof. Very much so.
Soc. Does not the person, who hopes to be filled, seem to
you to feel a joy through the recollection (of fulness)? and
yet, being empty, at the same time to be in pain P
Prot. He must be so.
Soc. At that time, then, man and other animals are at the
same time pained and pleased.
Prot. It seems so.
Soc. But what, when a person, being empty, is hopeless of
obtaining repletion ? will there not be then that doubled
state respecting his pains, on which you just now looked, and
thought it was simply doubled.
Prot. Most true, Socrates.
[74] Soc. Now of this inquiry into these feelings let us
make this use.
* Schleiermacher justly remarks that, as this answer would require a
preceding interrogation, there is some error here.
* Ficinus has “voluptatum—praeteritarum,” which leads to yeyevnué-
vov, in lieu of yuyvopévov in three MSS., and Yevopévoy in others. .
*—” I have translated as if the Greek were traineral pièv rv Tijg &Aym-
§ovoc, retrahparat 6' jôéa pºſitro riff Tórs, not raiour’āv rác &Ayńöovoc
Treträſipwrat § pañºra, Tu Tórs. For Ficinus has “cessat quidem tristitia,”
from whence Stephens elicited traßeral pºv, adopted by Sydenham, and
by Stalbaum too in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2.
*—” The words within numerals are omitted by Ficºs.
I?HILEBUS. 53
Prot. What use 2
Soc. Shall we say that these pains and pleasures are
true, or false? or that some of them are true, and others
false 2 -
Prot. But how can pleasures or pains, Socrates, be false?
Soc. How then, Protarchus, could fears be true or false ?
or expectations, true or not? or opinions, true or false ?
Prot. Opinions, I would somehow concede, may be ; but I
would not the others.
Soc. How say you? We are however” in danger of
raising up a disquisition of not a little kind.
Prot. You say true.
Soc. But whether it relates to what has passed by, O son
of that 9% illustrious father, this must be considered.
[75.] Prot. Perhaps it ought.
94 Soc. It is meet then to bid farewell to the rest of the
disquisition,” and to whatever is said beside the purpose.
Prof. True.94
Soc. Tell me then, for a wonderment ever continuously seizes
* Instead of pièvrot Plato probably wrote pud rôv, with 686 v understood,
as usual.
* In lieu of trai kstvov rávöpôg Sydenham wished to read k\suroi,
&vöpög—But k\suróg is not found in prose. It would be better to
read k\8woë—For keivoc and k\swög are frequently confounded, as I
have shown at Philoct. 261. But as nothing has been said of the father of
Protarchus, Plato wrote, I suspect, Trai Östvoú y ávöpöc-For Östvög, as
shown by Stalbaum on p. 29, A. § 52, Östvög &vrip, was applied perpetually
to a Sophist, whose son Protarchus was feigned to be; while to show
that Östvög was spoken ironically, the particle ye was properly added.
Others perhaps would prefer oik divov row &vöpög, i. e. “ of some not
senseless man; ” but Östvoj y ávöpóg is far superior. Stalbaum, in ed. 1,
conceived that ēksivov Toij &vöpóg was said pointedly and with a ridicule
at the person. But £ksivog is never used except in the sense of praise.
Besides, as the father of Protarchus does not appear to have been present,
Socrates could not point to him. Stalbaum accordingly cancelled
this remark in ed. 2, from which I learn that C, F. Hermann, in a Dis-
sertation on Plato’s Republic, p. 3], conceives that & Trai kstvov távöpög
was a proverbial expression similar to pi}\m cepa)\ff. But this novel no-
tion Stalbaum is unwilling to admit; and he therefore prints of Trai
'retvov–with the view of avoiding the objection that keivoc is never found
in Attic prose; nor is #kčivog á ávrip in correct Greek, as I have shown
in Bailey’s Hermesianax, p. 78.
*—* All between the numerals Sydenham has omitted, although duly
found both in the Greek and in the Latin of Ficinus.
* On Auñrog applied by itself to a lengthy discourse, see Stalb.
§4. PHILEBUS.
me respecting those very doubts, which we have now brought
forward. -
Prot. How say you ? -
Soc. Are not (some) pleasures false, but others true F
Prot. How could they be?
Soc. Neither then is there” a dream by night or by day as
you hold, nor in fits of madness or silliness is there a per-
son, who thinks he is pleased, when he is pleased not at all ;
nor on the other hand, thinks he is pained, when he is not
pained.
Prot. All of us, Socrates, have conceived that all this is the
CâSe. -
Soc. But have they done so correctly? Or must we con-
sider whether this has been said correctly or not ?
Prot. We must consider, as I would say.
[76.] Soc. Let us then define still more clearly what was
just now said respecting pleasure and opinion. For it is
surely possible for us to hold an opinion ?
Prot. Certainly.
Soc. And to feel a delight.
Prof. Yes.
Soc. Moreover that which is held as an opinion, is some-
thing.
Prot. How not ?
Soc. And something too that, in which the thing delighted
feels a delight.
Prot. Most certainly.
Soc. The thing then that holds an opinion, whether it holds
the opinion rightly or not rightly, never loses the reality of
holding an opinion.
Prot. For how could it 2
Soc. The thing therefore that feels a delight, whether it
feels a delight rightly or not rightly, it is evident it will
never lose the reality of feeling a delight.
Prot. Certainly ; and such is the case.
Soc. In what manner then is opinion wont to be to us
* As the phrase otr Śvap of 6' tºrag is generally used absolutely, Stal-
baum wished to expunge éo ruv. On the other hand, Ficinus found some-
thing in his MS. wanting at present in the Greek: for his version is-
“Neque igitur revera falsove lastari aut tristari dicitur, uſ: tu ais—” un-
less he supplied “latari aut tristari” out of his own head,
...”.
JPEIILEBUS. 55
false and true; but pleasure only true? 97 for to hold an opi-
nion and to feel a delight, have both equally received the pro-
perty of a reality.”
Prot. (This) we must consider.
Soc. Is it that falsehood and truth are incident to opinion 2
and that through them it not only becomes opinion, but also
of what kind each opinion is P Say you that we must consider
this 2
Prot. Yes. -
[77.] Soc. And in addition to this, whether some things
are altogether of certain qualities; but that only pleasure and
pain are, what they are, and do not become certain qualities,
must we agree upon this point likewise 2
Prot. Plainly so.
Soc. But it is not difficult to perceive this, that they too
are of certain qualities. For we said of old, that pains and
pleasures become great and little, and each of them vehe-
mently so.”
Prot. By all means.
Soc. And if to any one of these there be added the quality
of evil, shall we not say that opinion has thus become evil,
and pleasure likewise evil?
Prot. Why not, Socrates?
[78.] Soc. What then, if rectitude, or the opposite to rec-
titude, is added to any of them, shall we not say, that opinion
is right, if it possess rectitude, and say the same of pleasure ?
Prot. Necessarily so.
Soc. But if what is held as an opinion be mistaken by us,
must we not acknowledge that the opinion is erroneous, and
not right, 9° and not rightly holding an opinion ?”
97–97 I have translated as if the Greek were Öočážsuv Yap rô Švrwg cai
xaipew &ppórspa Śpoiwg sixmps, instead of Öočáčew 6: Övtwc—for 68 and
yāp are constantly confounded; and rô, which is found in one MS. before
Öočáčew, has now its proper place before Švrwg, and sixmºps now re-
covers, what it has hitherto wanted, its object. -
* Ficinus has “magnas et parvas vehementes remissasque fieri.”
From whence Cornarius elicited usyáAat Te Kai opiukpai kai opoćpai kai
movy airspat, with the decided approbation of Stalbaum in ed. I, but
which he rejects as an interpolation in ed. 2.
*—99 This is the literal version of the Greek, obô’ épôāg 608&ovoav :
which is not very clear. Sydenham translates it “and that we are
56 PHILE BUS.
Prot. For how could we ?100
Soc. But what, if we discover (any) pain or pleasure mis-
taken about that, in which it is pained, or effected contrari-
wise, shall we give to it the epithet of right, or good, or any
other of honourable appellations?
Prot. It is impossible, if pleasure shall have been mistaken.
[79.] Soc. And yet pleasure seems often to be produced
in us, accompanied, not with a right opinion, but with a
false one.
Prot. How not? And the opinion, Socrates, in that case,
and at that time, we say ' is a false opinion; but the pleasure
itself, no man would ever call it false.
Soc. You very readily, Protarchus, support your argument
about pleasure on the present occasion.
Prot. (I do) nothing else but say what I hear.
Soc. With us, my friend, makes there no difference the
pleasure, accompanied with right opinion and science, and
that which is often produced in each of us, accompanied with
a false opinion and ignorance.”
[80.] Prot. It is probable there is no little difference.
Soc. Let us then come to the view of the difference between
them.
Prot. Lead by whatever road it seems good.
Soc. I lead then by this.
Prot. By what ?
Soc. We say there is a false opinion, and there is likewise
a true One.
Prot. There is.
Soc. Upon them, as we just now said, pleasure and pain
oftentimes attend ; I mean, upon opinion true and false.
Prot. Certainly so.
not right ourselves in entertaining such an opinion.” Ficinus has
“Et, si quod opinione comprehenditur, sit fallax, nonne opinionem
falsam potius quam rectam vocabimus,” from which it is evident that he
did not find in his MS. the concluding clause.
* I cannot perceive to what àv in Iſāg yáp àv is to be referred.
* Stalbaum would read Aéyopsy for £Aéyopsy. For the question is not
about a past act, but a present one.
* Ficinus, by his version “ignorantiam,” has alone led to the true
reading, dyvotaç, first elicited by Cornarius, in lieu of the incorrect divotag
found in all the MSS.
PHILEBU.S. 57
Soc. From memory and sensation is not opinion *and the
attempt to hold an opinion thoroughly * produced on every
occasion ?
Prot. Very much so.
Soc. Do we, then, deem it necessary for us to have our-
selves thus?
Proż. How P
Soc. Would you say that it often happens to a person look-
ing from a distance, on things not very clearly discerned, to
be willing to form a judgment of them P
Prot. I would say so.
[81.] Soc. Upon this, would not the person question him-
self thus P
Prof. How P
Soc. What is that, which appears to be standing under a
tree by the cliff there? Does it not seem to you that a person
would speak these words to himself, looking at some such
things as perchance appeared to him P
Prof. How not *
Soc. Hereupon would not such a person, as if giving an
answer, say to himself, speaking conjecturingly, It is a man 2
Prot. Certainly.
Soc. But carried beside (the truth), * he would perhaps
say of” the figure clearly discerned, that it is the work of some
shepherds.
*—” As the verb Övačočáčev is found only in this passage, its meaning
has been guessed at by Stalbaum, who translates it by “conjectando
discernere,” i. e. “to discern by conjecturing:” while Ficinus renders
kai rô 6taôočážstv Šyxsupeiv, (or §yxwpäiv, for both words are found in
MSS.,) “fitgue ut opinione pro arbitrio disseramus.” I confess myself at
a loss.
* So Stalbaum, with Ast, in ed. 2, understands trapevsyôsíg. But as at the
moment, when the party was thus conversing with himself, he is supposed
to be ignorant of the truth, there would be no allusion to it. In ed. 1, his
rendering is “he passed by,” i. e. “he approached passing by.” But he
who, after passing by an object, continues to walk on, instead of coming
nearer to it, only recedes farther from it. The sense evidently requires
troogevex0eig, as proposed, I suspect, by some scholar, against whom he
has directed his remark—“Temere tentaveris Trpoosvex0Fig.” Ficinus
has “mutata sententia.”
* Since the figure is supposed to be clearly discerned, and to be spoken
of distinctly as the work of some shepherds, one would expect that, as
shepherds are not generally carvers in wood, something definite would
be stated touching the figure carved by such hands. In lieu then of
58 PHILEBUS,
Prot. Certainly.
Soc. And if any one were present, he would express by his
voice to the person present, what he had said to himself,
and repeat the very same words; and thus, what we lately
termed an opinion, becomes a speech.
[82.] Prot. How not ?
Soc. But if he were alone, thinking continuously within
himself upon this very same thing, he walks on keeping it in
his mind sometimes for even a rather long period.
Prot. Assuredly.
Soc. Well then, does that, which takes place respecting
these things, appear to you as it does to me?
Prof. What is it 2
Soe. Thesoul in that case seems tometoresemble some book."
Prof. How P
Soc. The memory coinciding with our sensations, and those
affections which are about them, seem to me almost at that
time to write in our souls 7 speeches. And when this suffering”
writes what is true, there result from it true opinions, and
true speeches are produced within us; but when such a scribe
within us writes what is false, there results what is contrary
to the truth.
Prot. So it seems entirely to me; and I receive what has
been stated.
Soc. Admit likewise, that there is another workman exist-
ing at that time within us.
Prof. Who is he ſº
Soc. A painter, who, after the writer of what has been -
mentioned, paints of such things the representations in the
Soul.
Prot. How and when say we this person does "so
npoositrú, Plato wrote, I suspect, IIavög stºrw, for the human-like figure,
made by shepherds, would be that of their tutelary deity, Pan,
* In like manner Locke compares the mind to a sheet of paper.
* On the phrase Ypágºeuv čv /vyaig, see Menage on Diog. L. vi. p. 319
Valckenaer on Callimach. Fr. p. 246: Blomfield on Prometh. 814; my-
self on AEsch, Suppl. 168. Shakspeare has “And thy commandment all
alone shall live Within the book and volume of my brain.”
* I cannot understand Toito Tô Tráðmpa. Ficinus has “passionem hujus-
modi veram opinionem dicinus,” as if his MS. offered Toijro rò Trá6mpia
6óšav &Amóñ Aśyousy.
° In lieu of ai, which is quite unintelligible, one M.S. has oiv which
ieads to Öpfiv, answering to “agere,” in Ficinus.
PHILEBU.S. 59
Soc. (It is) when a person, having taken away from sight,
or from any other sense, what have been imagined by and
mentioned (to himself), sees somehow within himself the re-
presentations of what have been imagined by and spoken (to
himself). Or does this not take place within us?
Prot. (It takes place) very much so.
Soc. The representations then of true thoughts and speeches
are true ; but those of the false are false.
Prot. By all means.
[83.] Soc. Now if we have spoken thus far correctly, let
us still consider in addition likewise this.
Prot. What ? .
Soc. Whether it is necessary for us to be affected thus,
with respect to things present and past, but not the future.
Prot. With respect to all time in a similar manner.
Soc. Were not the pleasures and pains, felt by the soul
alone, asserted before to be such, that they would arise
prior to those felt by the body; so that it happens to us to
feel antecedently pain and pleasure, "about the time about to
be produced ?19
Prot. Most true.
Soc. Do then the writings and the pictures, which we laid
down a little before, as being produced within us, have regard
to the past and present time, but not to the future ?
Prot. Very much about the future." • .
Soc. Do you strongly assert that all these things are ex-
pectations of the future; and that we are, through all life,
full of expectations?
Prot. Entirely so.
[84.] Soc. Now then, in addition to what has been said,
answer this likewise.
Prof. What 2
Soc. A man just, and pious, and entirely good, is he not
god-loved 2
19—” I can scarcely understand puéA\ovra sivat yuyvöpsevov. For though
sivat Yuyvápasyov is correct Greek, as shown by Stalbaum, pláX\ov is not
elsewhere united to those words. Plato wrote, I suspect, trepi Tô &vá
röv påA\ovra Xpóvov sivat Yuyvópevov, i.e., “about the thing produced
in the course of time to come,” where rô divö might easily have been
lost through Töv.
* In lieu of opóðpa ye, Ficinus has, more correctly, “ad omnia,” al-
though opóðpa seems to be supported by opóðpa Aéyéug in the next
question of Socrates.
GO PHILEBUS.
Prot. How not ?
Soc. What then, is not a man unjust and entirely wicked,
the reverse of the other ?
Prot. How not P
Soc. Now every man, as we said just now, is full of many
expectations.
Prot. Why not?
Soc. There are speeches within each of us, which we cal;
expectations.
Prot. Yes.
Soc. And phantasies also are painted (in us). "For one
often sees a deal of money belonging to himself, and many
pleasures in addition to it, and he views himself painted
within himself, as highly delighted.”
Prot. Why not?
Soc. Of these phantasies, shall we say that the true are
painted and placed before the good, for the most part, on
account of these persons being god-loved, but the contrary
before the bad, for the most part? or shall we deny it?
Prot. We must assert it strongly.
Soc. To wicked men, then, likewise pleasures are present
painted within them; but these are of the false kind.
Prof. How not P
[85.] Soc. Wicked men, therefore, for the most part de-
light in false pleasures; but the good, in the true.
Prot. You assert what is most necessary.
Soc. According then to this reasoning, there are in the
souls of men false pleasures; imitating however, in a ridi-
culous way, the true ; and similar is the case with pains.
Prot. There are.
Soc. It is possible then for a person, who holds upon every
thing an epinion, to hold always an opinion really” upon things
which are not, nor have been, and, sometimes, on such as will
never be 2
Prot. Certainly.
12–13 Ficinus evidently found in his MS. something superior to the
common text. For his version is “Nam cuique licet fingere se cu-
mulum auri maximum possidere, oblectamentisque variis abundantem,
omni suavitate perfundi.” Here in the Greek, in lieu of $7t' airº, one
would prefer dir' airoij (Xpwoot), “from it—”
* In lieu of oitwg, Sydenham suggested övrag, and so three MSS.
PHILEBUS. 61
Soc. And these are they that effect at that time a false
opinion, and the thinking falsely. Is it not ?
Prot. Yes, it is,
[86.] Soc. Well then, must we not attribute in return to
pains and pleasures a state in them the counterpart” of that
in the others ?
Prot. How P
Soc. That it is possible for a person, who feels a delight
upon every thing, in any manner whatever, and at random, to
feel always really a delight, not only from things which are
not, and sometimes from things which never were, but fre.
quently too, and, perhaps, the most frequently, from things
which are never about to be 2
Prot. This, too, must of necessity be the case.
[87.] Soc. Would there not be the same reasoning as re-
gards fears and desires, and all things of that kind, that all
such are sometimes false ? -
Prot. Certainly.
Soc. Well then, can we say of opinions, that they are evil,
*[and advantageous, any otherwise than as being false?”
Prof. Not otherwise.
Soc. And pleasures, I think, we conceive are bad on no
other account, except by their being false.
Prot. It is quite the contrary, Socrates, (to what)" you have
said. For hardly would any man attribute to falsehood that
pains and pleasures are very evil, but that they fall in with
wickedness much and of many-kind by some other way.”
Soc. Of pleasures that are evil, and are such through wicked-
1* The word in Greek is divriorpopov, in allusion to the antistrophé in
the chorus of a Greek play, which is the counterpart of the strophé in
the number of lines, and of the number and kind of syllables in each line.
15–15 Stalbaum rejects the words kai Xpm 7tág as an interpolation.
Ficinus has, “Num opiniones ob aliud bonas vel pravas quam quod veræ
et falsae sint, appellamus P’’. From whence Cornarius supplied the next
sentence, à l'evösic kai &Am{}sig. But more correctly the margin of one
MS. has # 3rt &Amósic # //svösig.
* Stalbaum explains roëvavriov sipmkag by “you have said the con-
trary to what should be said.” He did not therefore see that Plato wrote, as
I have translated—Xókpatec, Éor'ſ sipmkag: for thus # follows Toivavri-
ov, in p. 35, A. § 69, and in the other passages quoted there by Stalbaum.
* Ficinus has, “in maximam ac multiplicem pravitatem aliter inci-
dentes.” He found therefore in his MS. psydºg 68 kai troX\, d\\ws
ww.gov/utruttotoag Tovmpig. 4.
62 PHILEBUS.
ness, we will speak shortly afterwards, if so it seem good to us.
But of those that are false and many and oftentimes existing
and produced in us in yet another way, we must say a word.
For perhaps we shall make use of it for our decisions.
Prot. How not? if indeed they exist.
Soc. And there are such, Protarchus, at least in my opinion.
But as long as this doctrine lies by us (unexamined),” it is
impossible for it to be disproved.
Prot. Fairly (said).
[88.] Soc. Let us then stand up, like combatants, against
this reasoning.
Prot. Let us come on. -
Soc. We said, if we remember, a little while before, that,
when what are the so-called desires remain in us, the body is
at that time laid hold of by its affections in two ways, and
apart from the soul.
Prot. We remember; (for) so it was said.
Soc. The soul therefore was that which desired a condition
contrary to that of the body; but that, which imparted any
pain or pleasure through any circumstance, was the body.
Prof. It was so.
Soc. Now reckon together what takes place in these.
Prot. Say what.
Soc. It takes place then, when such is the case, that at
the same time pains and pleasures lie by each others’ side;
and that at the same time the sensations respecting these,
being contrary, are by the side of each other as has just
now appeared.
Prot. It appears so.
[89.] Soc. Has not this also been said, and is laid down,
as having been agreed upon as before?
Prof. What ?
Soc. That pain and pleasure, both of them receive “the
more” and “the less;” and that they belong to the limitless.
Prot. It has been said ; what then 2
* Sydenham tacitly introduced “unexamined—” for he saw that with-
out that word the reasoning would be incomplete. One MS. has how-
ever preserved a most remarkable reading, although from correction, Éwg
àv cántal &véAeykrov, döövarov 3% trov tág kpigsig haiv sy, yiyvsø6at—
i.e. “as long as it remains disproved, it is surely impossible for our de-
cisions to turn out well.” This is the very sense required; while the
Greek is in every way worthy of Plato.
PHILEBUS. 63
Soc. (There is) then * some plan for judging of these cor-
rectly.
Prot. Where, and how 220
Soc. Does not* the design of our decision respecting them aim
at distinguishing them on each occasion by such marks as these,
which of them as compared with each other is the greater,
and which the less; and which is more and which (less)” in-
tense pain, as compared with pleasure, and pain with pain, and
pleasure with pleasure ?
Prot. Such these things are, and such is the design of our
decision. - -
Soc. Well now, in the case of vision, to see magnitudes
far off and near causes the truth to disappear, and makes us
to have false opinions. And does not the very same thing
happen in the case of pains and pleasures 2
Prot. Rather much more, Socrates.
Soc. What has happened now is surely contrary to what
occurred a little before.
Prot. Of what are you speaking 2
Soc. In that case the opinions themselves, being false and
true, infected at the same time pains and pleasures with their
own state of suffering.
Prot. Most true.
Soc. But now, through being on each occasion changed in
position, and viewed far off and near, and at the same time
placed by each other, the pleasures appear greater and more
intense as compared with the pains; and the pains, on the
other hand, compared with the pleasures (appear) the contrary
to those.
* In lieu of rig oiv we mustread Éor' oiv. For the indefinite rug can-
not commence a sentence in correct Greek, although Hermann, on Viger,
p. 730, whom Stalbaum has followed, says it can.
* Instead of trij, Heindorf and Schleiermacher suggested Troia—and so
Sydenham—“What way.” -
* Instead of si the MS. of Ficinus had oi, as shown by his “ Nonne—”
* Stalbaum, who in ed. l wished to read cai rig havyavrápa kai ric
opoëporápa, and in War. Lect. Hºov XaXapó, now defends kai play-
Aov, thus introduced between Mártov and opodporépa. I should
prefer rig påA\ov kai rig irrov. For these two adverbs are op-
posed to each other in the passages quoted by himself in ed. 2. Phaedo,
p. 93, B., puff}\\ów Ts—kai TAswy—firrów Ts kai éAátrov. Protagor. p.
356, A., TAsia kai éAátra kai uáXXov kai ittov. Hipp. Mag. p. 293,
D., past&ov—ij čA&rrow fi playov h fitto”.
64 PHILEBUS.
Prot. For such things to arise through such means, is a mat-
ter of necessity. -
[90.] Soc. As far therefore as each appear greater and less
than they really are, if you cut off what each appears to be,
but is not, you will neither say that it appears correctly, nor,
on the other hand, will you dare to say that the additional part
of pain and pleasure is correct and true.
Prot. By no means. - ,
Soc. Next then in order after these we will look, if we can
meet with * them here, upon pleasures and pains still more
false than those, which both appear to be and are in animals.
Prot. Of what are you speaking, and how -
[91.] Soc. It has been often said, that when the nature of
each thing is being destroyed by mixtures and separations, by
repletions and evacuations, by increase and decrease, pains,
and aches, and throes, and every thing else that bear such-
like names, do happen to be produced.
Prot. Yes, this has been said frequently.
Soc. But that when things return to their natural state, we
have received this recovery as a pleasure from ourselves.
Prot. Right.
Soc. But how is it, when none of these things shall have
taken place P
Prot. When could this be, Socrates?
Soc. The question, Protarchus, which you have now asked
is nothing to the purpose.
Prof. How So 2
Soc. Because it does not hinder me from putting again my
question to you. -
[92.] Prot. What question ?
Soc. If nothing of this kind, I will say, Protarchus, took
place, what must of necessity result to us from it 2
Prot. Do you mean when the body is not moved either
way? .
Soc. Exactly so.
Prot. It is plain, Socrates, that in such case there would be
neither pleasure nor any pain at all.
Soc. You have spoken extremely well. But I suppose you
mean this, that it is necessary for some of these things to
* Ficinus has—“in medium afferamus,” tº if he had found in his
MS. śtráywpusy instead of 4travröpiev.
FHILEBUS, 65
happen to us continually, as say the wise. For all things, go-
ing upwards and downwards, are in a perpetual” flow.
Prot. So they say indeed, and seem to speak not badly.
Soc. For how should they (speak badly), not being bad
themselves.” But from this reasoning, which is rushing
against us, I wish to secretly withdraw. I design then to
run away by this road; and do you fly with me.
Prof. Say by what road 2
[93.] Soc. Let us say, then, to these wise men, “Be it so.”
But do you give an answer to this—Whatever any animal
suffers, does it, while suffering, perceive that continually P and
neither while growing, or suffering any such (change), are we
unconscious of it? or is it quite the reverse 2 for almost
every thing of this kind has lain hid from us.
Prot. Quite the reverse.
Soc. That therefore which was just now said, was said by
us not correctly, that all changes, which take place up and
down, produce pains or pleasures.
Prot. Why not ???
Soc. In this way the assertion will be better, and less liable
to Censure.
Prof. How P
Soc. That great changes produce in us pains and pleasures;
but the moderate and trifling neither of them at all.
Prot. In this manner it is more correctly said than in the
other, Socrates. . .
Soc. If then these things are so, the life mentioned just
now would come back again.
Prof. What life 2
Soc. That which we said was without pain and pleasures.
Prof. You speak most truly.
[94.] Soc. From hence let us lay down for ourselves three
kinds of life, one pleasant, another painful, and one neutral.
Or how would you say respecting them ż
Prot. Not otherwise myself than in this way, that there
are three kinds of life.
* On this saying of Heracleitus see Cratyl. p. 402, A. § 42.
* So in Euthyd. p. 284, E. § 33, roëg yoãy lºvy poºg luxpág—pagi
6ta\#yegºat, Aristoph. Thesm. 168, 'O 3' at effoyvic lºvypoc &v livXpúc
7TOEL, w
* The phrase, ri paživ, which generally means “why so,” is here to oe
translated “why not,” as I have rendered it frequently elsewhere.
F
66 PHILEBU.S.
Soc. To feel no pain therefore cannot be the same thing as
to feel a pleasure.
Prot. How can it 2
Soc. When therefore you hear that to live through all
life without pain, is the most pleasant of all things, what do
you understand that a person” so saying means?
Prot. Such a person” seems to me at least to mean that it
is a pleasure not to feel a pain.
Soc. Of any three things, whatever you like, existing, lay
down, in order that we may adopt the names of things rather
pretty, one gold, another silver, and another neither gold nor
silver.
Prot. It is so laid down. t
Soc. Is it possible for that which is neither, to become
either gold or silver?
Prot. (No); for how could it 2
Soc. The middle life then being said to be” pleasant or
painful, would not be correctly thought to be so, should any
so think it ; nor, should any one so speak of it, would it be so
spoken of according at least to a correct reasoning.
Prot. (No); for how could it?
[95.] Soc. And yet, my friend, we perceive there are those,
who thus speak and think.
Prot. Certainly.
Soc. Do then those persons feel pleasure” at the time,
when they are not pained 2
* The person alluded to was probably Aristippus, who wrote a treatise
in defence of Pleasure. But as he and Plato were no friends, the latter
seems to have been unwilling to mention his name; and hence we can
understand who was meant by Četvoi, Y’ &vöpög, in § 74, as I have cor-
rected.
.” I have followed the MS. which alone reads 5 rouot tog instead of
ovt.og.
* Stalbaum justly objects to Asyópsvog, for it is at variance with the
subsequent supposition. Ficinus has avoided the difficulty by his abridged
version, “Vita igitur media, si quando Suavis vel masta dicitur aut ex-
istimatur, nequaquam recte vel existimatur vel dicitur.”
* I think we ought to read xaipovow oitou, instead of Xaipew otovrat.
For otherwise, in the next sentence, where xaſpstv otovrat is properly re-
peated, there would be a tautology. S. So too Schütz, in Opuscul, p.
133, suggested Ašyovoſt for otovraw, to answer to paori in the reply of Pro-
taréhus. But Stalbaum says that dawi yoiv is to be referred to otovrat
Yaipeiv
PHILEBUS. 67
Prot. So they say.
Soc. They think therefore they are pleased then; for
otherwise they would not say so.
Prot. It nearly seems so.
Soc. They have then a false opinion of pleasure, if the
natures of the two things, to be not pained and to be pleased,
are separate from each other.”
Prot. And different indeed they were.
Soc. Shall we choose then that there are, as (we said) just
now, three things, or that only two are to be mentioned, pain,
an evil to man, and deliverance from pain, a pleasure, as being
the good itself.” -
[96.] Prot. How is it, Socrates, that we are asked this by
ourselves at the present time 2 for I do not understand.
Soc. In fact, Protarchus, you do not understand who are
the enemies of Philebus here.
Prot. Whom do you call such
Soc. They, who are said to be very skilled in natural
philosophy, assert that pleasures do not exist at all.
Prot. How so P
Soc. (They say) that all those things, which the partisans
of Philebus call pleasures, are but escapes from pain.
Prot. Do you then advise us, Socrates, to hearken to them 2
Or how 2 -
Soc. Not so ; but to use them as a kind of diviners; who
divine not by any art, but, from the austerity of the not
ignoble nature of those, who had a great hate of the power of
pleasure, and have held nothing in her to be sound; so that
her attraction is merely a witchcraft and not ſtrue pleasure.
In this way then we should use them, especially if we con-
sider their other austerities. But afterwards you shall hear
what seem to me to be true pleasures, in order that, after
viewing from both accounts her power, we may place ourselves
(so as to come) to a decision.
Prot. You speak correctly.
Soc. Let us then go after them, as our allies, along the
track of their austerity. For I suppose they assert some
* Stalbaum quotes very aptly Aristoph. Thesm. 11, Xopic yöp abroiv
#karépov 'orriv piang, Toi unt’ &kočew ph9 Öpāv.
* I have translated, as if the Greek were airó rāya.061, and not at ris
roãro d'ya&ów— -
F 2
68 PHILE BtyS.
such thing as this, beginning from some point above,” that, if
we wish to know the nature of any species whatever of things,
for instance, of the hard, whether by looking to the hardest
things, should we thus better understand than to those endued
with hardness in the least. Now, Protarchus, you must give
an answer, as if to myself, to these austere persons likewise.
[97.] Prot. By all means; and I say to them, that (we
must look) to the first in magnitude.
Soc. If then we wish to know the genus of pleasure, and
what kind of nature it has, we must look not to the least, but
to those called the extreme and violent.
Prot. On this point every one would agree with you for
the present.
Soc. Do not the pleasures then, which are within reach,
and still more” the greatest, as we often say, belong to the
body?
Prot. (Yes); for how not?
Soc. Are then the pleasures, which existin, and are generated
about, persons in bad health, greater than those about persons
in good health 2 Now let us take care, lest we stumble by an-
Swering precipitately.
Prot. How so?
Soc. For perhaps we might say those about persons in good
health.
Prot. Probably.
Soc. But what, are not those pleasures the superior, which
the strongest desires precede.*
Prot. This indeed is true.
[98.] Soc. But do not both” they, who are in a fever, and
those afflicted with diseases of that kind, thirst more, and
shiver more, and suffer more all that persons are wont to
* The Greek is Tro8&v čva,08w. But in this formula the indefinite
arj6&v always follows the definite word, as shown by the passages quoted
by Heindorf on Phaedrus, p. 229, B. Plato wrote, I suspect, dipló0ev
Troběv, found in Gorg. p. 492, D. Legg. vii. p. 798, B.
** By reading kai Trépa ys for attrap kai, we meet the difficulty felt
by Stalb. in ed. 1. So kai Trépa ys in Philoct. 1271.
* H. Stephens, in Schediasm. War. ii. p. 26, was the first to read
Tpoyiyvovrat instead of Trpoolytyvovrat; which Stalbaum, in ed. 2, de-
fends, after he had rejected it in ed. l.
* Since the majority of the best MSS. read Šrt for oi, it is evident that
Plato wrote oi re–
PHILEBUs. 69
do in the body, and are more conversant with the want 36 of
those things, in which,” being supplied, they feel a greater
pleasure ? Or shall we deny all this to be true?
Prot. It appears to be altogether as now stated.” -
Soc. What then, should we appear to speak* correctly by
saying, that, if any one would know what are the greatest plea-
sures, he must not go and look upon the healthy, but upon the
sick P But be careful not to conceive that I am designing to
ask you this, whether those in very ill health feel more plea-
sures than those in good health; but conceive that I am
inquiring about the greatness of pleasure, and where (and)*
when the intensity belonging to such a feeling is on every
occasion produced. For we are to consider, we say, what is
the nature of pleasure, and what they call it, who assert that it
does not exist at all.
Prot. But” I nearly follow your argument.
[99.] Soc. Perchance, Protarchus, you will show” it not
*—” I have translated as if the Greek were čvésig—tºv, not #vösíg—
kai. Ficinus has “quo fit, ut magis indigeant, indigentiamgue replentes
vehementius delectentur; ” from which Stephens was led to droTAmpoë-
pus wou, adopted by Stalbaum in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2.
* Ficinus has “Omnino, ut dictum est, apparet,” which evidently leads
to ITávv påv ćivat, oiov jv Šmbév, paivetat, in lieu of IIávv pučv oſſºv viv
6m88w patveral, where Protarchus does not, as he should do, give a decisive
opinion. Hence Stephens was led to suggest épôāg before 6m8&v, as in p.
6], E., TIávv pièv oëv épéâc: of which Stalb. approved in ed. 1, but
silently rejects in ed. 2. -
* In the formula óp6āg ày pawóws9a Xéyovreg, the verb Aéyévy cannot
be omitted, as I have shown on Criton, $ 8, n. 10, and to the passages there
quoted I could add full twenty more. Ficinus seems to have found in his
MS. ºppovčiv pauvoiué0a, for his version is “sentire videbimur, asserentes.”
* Instead of Troiſ Trots, i. e. “ where in the world,” I have translated as
if the Greek were Troi kal Trórs— Stalbaum, in ed. 1, wished to read
oióv Trots, but he tacitly rejects it in ed. 2.
* In lieu of the unintelligible d'A\d, omitted by Ficinus, Plato wrote, I
Suspect, KaNdjg.
* Here too in Östáeig scholars are at a loss. Stalbaum, in ed. 1,
adopted 8stást, the conjecture of Heindorf and Schleiermacher, understand-
ing airó—But such an ellipse could not be admitted in correct Greek.
Of this he was no doubt aware; for in ed. 2 he rejects it, and is half in-
clined to receive Ópdosic, proposed by some critic not mentioned. Winc-
kelmann would read oëx fittov Šáñg, referring to p. 29, D., oxeóðv–
usrā Toàro Šćijg #Troö: but there čáñg belongs to pierå rotto, not to étrov,
I suspect that Plato wrote owy firrov et éésug, i. e. “you will be not the
less well off.” And thus et confirms, and is in turn confirmed by, KaNgc
just before.
70 PHILEBUs.
the less. For answer me—In a life of riot do you see greater
pleasures—I do not mean more in number, but exceeding in
intensity and vehemence—than those in a life of temperance?
Give your mind to the question, and tell me.
Prot. Nay, but I understand what you mean; and I see the
one that is greatly superior. For the saying that has become
a proverb, and which exhorts to “nothing too much,” on every
occasion restrains somehow the temperate who obey it. But
intense pleasure possesses even to madness the race of the silly
and riotous, and makes them in bad repute.
Soc. Excellent. For if this be the case, it is evident that
the greatest pleasures, and likewise the greatest pains, are pro-
duced in some wickedness of the soul and of the body, and
not in their virtuous state.
Prot. Certainly.
[100.] Soc. Ought then one not to select some of the plea-
sures, and to consider what condition they had, when we
called them the greatest ?
Prot. It is necessary.
Soc. Consider now what condition have the pleasures
arising from maladies of such a kind.
Prof. Of what kind 2
Soc. The unseemly; which they, whom we called the aus-
tere, thoroughly hate.
Prot. What pleasures?
Soc. For instance, the curing the itch by scratching, and
such others of a kind as need no other remedy ; for as to this
affection, forsooth, what, by the gods, shall we call it, pleasure
or pain P
Prot. This, Socrates, seems to be a kind of mixed evil.”
Soc. It was not however for the sake of Philebus that I
brought forward this argument; but without these pleasures
and those that follow them, unless they were seen, we should
have scarcely been able to decide upon the object of the pre-
sent inquiry.
* This introduction of the idea of evil Stalbaum explains in ed. 2,
by saying that Protarchus with some subtlety calls that an evil, which So-
crates wished to know whether it was a pleasure or a pain. But in ed. 1
he stated that Protarchus plays on the ambiguity in the word Trá60g, to
which caröv is to be referred; unless indeed it alludes to the idea of the
wickedness in the soul and body.
PIH II, EBUS. 71
Prot. We must then proceed to such as have an affinity
with them.
[10].] Soc. Do you mean those, that have some communion
by their mixture?
Prot. Certainly.
Soc. Of these mixtures then, some belonging to the body,
are in the bodies alone; others belonging to the soul alone,
are in the soul; but those of the soul and body we shall find
to be pains mixed with pleasures, called unitedly at one time
pleasures, at another time pains,
Prot. How P
Soc. When a person in a restored or decaying state suffers
at the same time two contrary affections, (and)” when shiver-
ing warms himself, and sometimes cools himself when heated,
seeking, I presume, to enjoy the one and to be relieved from
the other, “the so-called sweet mixed with bitter being pre-
sent with a difficulty of deliverance causes an impatience, and
a fierce standing together.”
Prot. And very true is what has been now said.
[102.] Soc. Are not the mixtures of this kind composed
some of pain and pleasure in equal proportion, and others of
either 4° in a greater one P
Prot. How not 2
Soc. *Say then that, when the pains are more than the
* It appears to me that correct Greek demands the insertion of kai
here; or else we must read 6%perat and pixeral in lieu of 0&pntal
and bºxmrat, similar to “calescit” and “refrigescit’’ in Ficinus.
*——44 Such is the literal English version of the unintelligible Greek—
rô 67) \éyòuevov Trukpº, y\vki pepuypiévov pietà èvoazra)\\akriaç
Trapöv &Yavákrmouv kai úo repov ščaraguy &yptav trousi: It appears
to me that to repov leads to Tpótepov : and that the words rô 3r)
Asyóplewov y\vicë Trukpº peputyuávov is an entire Iambic verse, and
Övoazra)\\aktiaç and &yptav Toei the ends of two others; and lastly,
that some words have dropt out, that should be opposed to Övo'atraX-
Aakriac, & Yavákrmouny and Šâaraguv, as read in some MSS., or éðvraouv,
in others. For otherwise there will be no proof of the trukpij YAvici
peputypiévov. To show however that Ficinus was as much in the dark
as others, I will give his version—“ quod utique dicitur amaro dulce
permixtum cum difficultate rejectiones assistens, molestiam ac deinde
forum congressum conficit.”
* Instead of Śrépov, “others,” Ficinus found in his MS. śkarépov, what
the sense requires, as shown by his version, “ex alterutro excedente.”
*—* Such is the literal English translation of the Latin version, made
72 PHILEBUS.
pleasures, those, which have been just now mentioned, belong
to the itch and to tinglings. When there is within that, which
boils and is inflamed, and a person by rubbing and scratching
does not reach it, but only diffuses what is on the surface, ther,
those inflatning the labouring parts, and by that very thing,
through the want of remedies, changing to the contrary, at
one time they procure immense pleasures, at another, on the
contrary, from the internal parts they bring to the pains of the
external parts, pleasures mixed with pains, according as a
thing inclines this way or that; because things mixed together
violently disjoin, or separated violently unite, and at the same
time place pains by the side of pleasures.”
Prof. Most true.
Soc. Hence, when on the other hand more pleasure is
mingled, according to all such things, the slightly-mingled
portion of pain 47 tickles and causes there to be a slight un-
easiness:47 but, on the other hand,” “the much greater plea-
sure being infused, puts on the stretch, and sometimes causes
to leap, and working out all kinds of colour, all kinds of posture,
and all kinds of breathings, it works out every stupor and
exclamations accompanied with madness.”
Prot. Entirely so.
{103.] Soc. And it causes, my friend, a person to say of
himself, and another likewise (to say), that, delighted with
Buch pleasures, he is, as it were, dying. And these pleasures
by Stalbaum in his second edition; where he conceives that pépovreg
sig trip does not mean “bringing to a fire,” but “producing an inflam-
mation.” The passage is very perplexing, and until better MSS. are
discovered, we shall perhaps never know what Plato wrote.
*—” Sydenham's freer translation seems to convey, what Plato in-
tended to say——“the smaller quantity of pain creates but a slight uneasi-
mess, and no more than what serves to tickle.”
* Instead of attijg Sydenham was the first to read at Tijg—found
subsequently in all the MSS., and similar to “iterum ” in Ficinus. The
emendation is attributed to Schleiermacher by Stalbaum. -
*—” Here again Sydenham’s vivid paraphrase will give perhaps a
better idea of the meaning of this passage, than can be obtained from any
literal translation: “The greater excess of pleasure spread throughout
convulses the whole frame, and sometimes causes involuntary motion,
producing also every change of colour in the countenance, every variety of
posture in the limbs, and every different degree of respiration, and within
the soul it energizes in transports uttered madly in exclamations.”
PHILEB U.S. 73.
by ºil means and for ever is he pursuing, so much the more,
as he happens to be more unrestrained, and less prudent; and
he calls them the greatest, and reckons him the happiest of
men, who lives the most in them.
Prof. You have gone through, Socrates, all that happens
to the bulk of mankind, according to their own estimate.
[104.] Soc. At least, Protarchus, as regards the pleasures
* which are in the common affections of the body alone, those
on the superficies and the body having been mingled.” But
with regard to those in the soul, "the contrary confer with
the body,” both pain towards pleasure, and pleasure towards
pain, so that both come to one mixture ; these we have de-
tailed before, as when * (a person), on the other hand, is
emptied, he desires repletion,” but being emptied he is pained.
To these points we did not then appeal as evidence ; but we
now say, that in all those cases, infinite in number, where the
soul is different from the body, one mixture of pain and
pleasure is produced and comes together.
Prot. You appear nearly to speak most correctly.
[105.] Soc. There is then among the mixtures of pain and
pleasure, still one remaining.
Prot. Of what kind are you speaking -
Soc. The mixture which we said the soul alone oftentimes
receives from itself.
Prot. How then do we say the same thing again?”
Soc. Anger, and fear, and desire, and lamentation, and love,
80–90 Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has “De vo-
luptatibus, quae in communibus corporis passionibus extrinsecus intrin-
secusve miscentur.” But in that case the syntax would require jöovov–
repagóstodiv in lieu of cepaorévrayv.
*—" A literal version of an intricate text, that Buttmann, Ast, Winc-
kelmann, and Stalbaum have been unable to unravel. They have all
suggested different alterations, none of which are perfectly satisfactory.
Ficinus has given this version of the passage, “De iis vero, quae miscentur
in anima, contraria quædam ad corpus conjiciuntur, voluptatem scilicet
cum dolore, et dolorem cum voluptate in unam mixtiomem concurrere,”
which is quite as unintelligible as the Greek.
*–5%. This is another difficult passage, for which Stalbaum proposes to
read, Ög 6tav påv TAmpdraft tug, Xaipei, Štav 6' at kevätaw, TNmptôoewc
ëTru60psi, i. e. “that when a person is filled; he feels delight, but when
emptied, he desires repletion.”
* Instead of airò Toâro, Ast would read, what Stalbaum considers a
specious conjecture, roër’ai-Plato doubtless wrote at Tabrö, as I have
translated.
74 PHILEBUS.
and emulation, and envy, and all other such passicna, do you
not lay down these as certain pains of the soul alone *
Prot. I do.
Soc. And shall we not find these very passions fraught
with boundless pleasures? Or need we be reminded of that,”
which leads a very prudent person to be harsh *[through
his passion and rage];” -
And which than honey dropping is more sweet; (Il. xviii. 107.)
and that in our lamentations and regrets, pleasures have been
mixed up with pains 2
Prot. No (we need not). But in this way and in no other
would these happen to be produced.
[106.] Soc. And do you not remember at the represent-
ations of tragedies, when persons weep in the midst of joy P*
Prof. How not P
Soc. And have you perceived the disposition of your soul
during a comedy, how that there a mixture of pain and plea-
sure is found P
Prot. I do not well comprehend.
' Soc. For it is not altogether easy, Protarchus, at such a
time, to understand a feeling of this kind in every case.
Prot. To me at least it is not at all easy.
Soc. Let us, however, lay hold of it so much the more, as
it is the more obscure, in order that one may be able in other
cases to discover more easily the mixture of pain and pleasure.
Prot. Say on.
Soc. The name just now mentioned of envy, will you set
it down as a sort of pain in the soul, or how P .
Prot. Just so.
Soc. And yet the man who envies will plainly appear to
be delighted with the evils of his neighbours.” -
Prot. Clearly so.
** By reading tºropup whoksabat airoi; instead of intropup whokégéat rô,
we shall restore at once the Syntax and Sense.
*—" The words within brackets are omitted by Ficinus in ed., pr.
. But his translation is in this passage much too free to enable the
reader to see what he really found in his MS. They were subse-
quently rejected by Fischer, whom Stalbaum and the Zurich editors have
followed.
* There is a similar idea in AEsch. Agam. 261, Xapá pº tºpépirst 64kpwoº
Reka)\ovpuévn, imitated from the Homeric Aakpwéev ye)&oraga.
* On the meaning of oi trčAaç, see Elmsley at Med. 85.
PHILEBUS. 75
Soc. Now ignorance” is an evil; and so is the condition
which we term stupidity. - -
Prot. How not ?
[107.] Soc. From hence perceive what is the nature ol' the
ridiculous. -
Prot. Do you only tell it.
Soc. A certain depravity is so called, in a few words, after
some habit. But of the total depravity, the contrary is that
affection, which is mentioned in the inscription at Delphi.
Prot. You mean, Socrates, the “Know thyself.”
Soc. I do. And the contrary to that saying would be, it is
plain, "if mentioned in any writing,” “Not to know oneself
in any respect at all.”
Prot. How not ?
Soc. Try now, Protarchus, to divide this very thing (self-
ignorance) into three kinds.
Prot. How, say you? for I shall not be able (to do it).
Soc. Do you say that I must make this division for the
present 2
Prot. I say it, and in addition to saying, I request you.
[108.] Soc. Is it not necessary then for each of those, who do
not know themselves, to be subject to this condition in three
ways 2
Prot. How P
Soc. First, with respect to property, to fancy themselves
wealthier than according to their substance.
Prot. Many persons, truly, there are, who are suffering this.
Soc. Yet more numerous are they, who fancy themselves to
be taller and more handsome, and, in all the things excelling,
that relate to the body, beyond the real truth itself.”
Prot. Very true.
, Soc. But the most numerous, I think, have, as regards
the third kind of those things in the soul, made a mistake,
by fancying themselves rather virtuous, although not being so.
Prot. Greatly so.
* The correct reading &yvoua, in lieu of divoua, has been again found
in the MS. of Ficinus alone, as shown by his version—“ignorantia.”
*—” The clause Asyóusvov intrö roi Ypápparog Beck wished to ex-
punge, as being spurious, whom Stalbaum followed in ed. 1, but in ed. 2
he retains it. Ficinus has “Oppositum huic esset, si forte praecipe-
retur,” which leads to si Asyópswov jv intró Tov Ypápparoc, i. e. “if it
had been told by any writing.”
* I have adopted Stephens’s airfig. For I cannot understand abroic
76 PIIILE BUS
Soc. 61 Among the virtues, is it not wisdom,” that the mul-
titude clutch at, through being full of contention, and of a
false opinion about wisdom P
Prof. How not P
[109.] Soc. Should any one then say that all such feeling
is an evil, he would say what is true F
Prot. Perfectly so.
Soc. This then, Protarchus, must still be divided into two
parts, if we are about, on beholding that child-like” envy, to
see the strange mixture of pleasure and of pain.
Prot. How then shall we cut them, say you ?
Soc. All such as foolishly hold this false opinion of them-
selves, *it necessarily happens that upon some of these, as
it does in the case of all men in general, strength and power
follow ; but upon others the reverse.
Prot. It does so necessarily.
[110] Soc. In this way then divide them. For whoever
of them are accompanied by weakness, and being such are un-
able, when laughed at, to revenge themselves, in saying that
these are open to ridicule, you will speak the truth. But in
calling those, who are able to take their revenge, persons to be
dreaded, and powerful, [and hostile, J% you would give to
yourself the most correct account of them. For ignorance,
accompanied with power, is hostile and base; for it is hurtful
to every one, both itself and whatever are its likenesses.”
But ignorance, without power, has obtained the rank and na-
ture of what is an object of ridicule.
Prot. You speak most correctly. But in these remarks
the mixture of pain and pleasure is not to me very apparent.
61–6. In lieu of Töv &psröv 3’ &p’ of oroptag trépt, I have adopted Töv
&pérôv Trépu, äp' oi, oroptag—which Stephens elicited from Ficinus, “Quan-
tum vero ad virtutes animi pertinet, nonne vulgus Sapientiam prorsus Sibi
vendicans—” Stalbaum, indeed, who in ed. I had rejected Tépt, now re-
tains it; he thinks that &pstic Trépt is used absolutely, and that airfic
is to be understood after &vtexópevov.
* I have translated trauðuköv, “child-like,” remembering the line of
Gray, speaking of children, who “ climb the knee, the envied kiss to
share *—of their parent on his return home. Sydenham renders it
“mirthful,” with reference to the fun in a comedy.
* After “ themselves,” there seems to be something wanting to complete
the Sense and syntax.
* Stalbaum would reject kai #x0poèg, omitted in three MSS., an-
shortly afterwards Heusde would read toxvpd for aioxpá.
* I cannot, I confess, understand the meaning of £ikóvec.
HºHIJ, EBU.S. 77
Soc. Understand then first the force of envy.
Prot. Only tell it. **
Soc. There is an unjust pain surely, and an (unjust) pleasure ?
Prot. There is so of necessity.
Soc. There is then neither injustice, nor envy, in rejoicing
at the ills of our enemies.
Prot. Certainly. How not? -
Soc. But sometimes, on beholding the ills of our friends,
to feel no pain, but on the contrary,” a pleasure, is not an act
of injustice? -
Prot. How not 2
[111..] Soc. Did we not say that ignorance" was an evil
to all P
Prot. Correctly so.
Soc. (Shall we say) that the false notion in our friends of
their wisdom, and beauty, and of whatever else we men-
tioned, while stating that they belonged to three kinds, is an
object of ridicule when weak, but of hatred when powerful?
or shall we deny, what I just now said, that this habit of
our friends," when a person possesses it harmless to others, is
an object of ridicule 2
Prot. Yes, very much.68
Soc. And do we not acknowledge this (false notion) to be
an evil, as being ignorance 2
Prot. Heartily. -
Soc. Do we feel pleasure or pain, when we laugh at it? .
Prot. It is plain that we feel pleasure.
Soc. Did we not say, that it is envy, which produces in
us pleasure at the ills of our friends? -
[112.] Prot. It must be (envy).
Soc. Our reasoning then shows, that, when we laugh at
what is ridiculous in our friends, by mixing delight with envy
we mix together pleasure and pain. For envy was acknow-
ledged long ago to be a pain to the Soul, but laughing a plea-
* Instead of &p' Sydenham seems to have wished to read ai, what the
sense requires.
67 Here too the correct reading &yvotav, in lieu of čvotav, is due to
Ficinus'; while shortly afterwards I have adopted pºpuev before à paſſ pºpev
from one M.S. after a correction.
* Instead of Trávvys, which I cannot understand, Ficinus has what is
perfectly intelligible, “Fatemur sane,” answering to “fatemur * in the
question; for so he translates popuév.
78 PHILEBU.S.
sure; but in these cases they arise, both of them,” at the
same time. -
Prot. True.
Soc. Our argument then points out, that in laments and
songs of joy,79 and not only in dramas, but in the whole
tragedy and comedy of life, and in a ten-thousand other cases,
pains and pleasures are mingled together.
Prot. It would be impossible, Socrates, for a man not to
acknowledge this, were he ever so fond of dispute against an
opposite opinion.
[113.] Soc. We have proposed (to consider) anger, and regret,
and lamentation, and fear and love, and jealousy and envy,
and such other passions, in which we said we should find
those mixed (feelings), that have been so often mentioned.
Did we not 2
Prot. Yes.
Soc. Do we understand that all, which relates to grief, and
envy, and anger, has been now despatched P
Prot. How do we not understand?
[114.] Soc. Is there not much yet remaining 2
Prot. Yes, very much. -
Soc. On what account, principally, do you suppose it was
that I explained to you the mixture (of feelings) in a comedy ?
Was it not from a belief, that it was easy to show the mixture
in fear, in love, and in the other (passions)? and that, after
you had admitted this to yourself, it would be meet to dismiss
me, and by no longer proceeding to the rest, that I might not
prolong the argument; but that you might receive, without
exception, this doctrine,—that the body without the soul, and
the soul without the body, and both together likewise, are, in
the things affecting them, full of pleasure mingled with pain.
Now therefore say whether you will dismiss me, or make it
midnight (before I finish). But I imagine that, after speak-
ing a little more, I shall obtain from you my dismissal. For
* Instead of rotiro Sydenham evidently wished to read roërw, for Fi-
cinus has “haec.”
7" In lieu of Tpaypôtaig, which could not be opposed to 6pm wouc, Orelli
proposed rpvyq,6ta.g. But that word, I suspect, is never found in prose,
and certainly not in Plato; who probably wrote, as I have translated,
i\appótawc, found in a passage of Aristoxenus, preserved by Athenaeus
xiv. p. 621. Hermann suggested w 6phyog re kai Év rpayq,6taug rai
swuqjöiang, which Stalbaum calls an egregious restoration.
PHILEBUS. 79
of all these things I shall be willing to give you an account
to-morrow ; but at present I wish to proceed on my course to
what remains towards the decision, which Philebus enjoins.
Prot. Well have you spoken, Socrates; and as to what re-
mains, go through it in whatever way is agreeable to yourself.
Soc. According to nature, then, after the mixed pleasures,
we will proceed in turn by a kind of necessity to the unmixed.
Prot. You have spoken most beautifully.
Soc. These I will endeavour in turn" to point out to you.
For to those, who assert that all pleasures are but a cessation
from pain, I do not altogether give credit. But, as I said be-
fore, I make use of these persons as” to the fact, that some
pleasures seem to be, but are by no means so in reality; and
that some others appear to be many and great, but are mixed
up with pains, and a cessation from the greatest pains, touch-
ing the difficulties of the body and the soul.
[115.] Prot. But what pleasures are those, Socrates, which
a person, deeming to be true, would rightly think so
Soc. Those which relate to what are called beautiful colours,
and to figures, and to the generality of odours, and to sounds, .
and to whatever that possesses wants unperceived, and that
without pain yields a repletion perceived, and pleasant, ”(and)
anmixed with pain.”
Prot. How, Socrates, speak we thus again of these things 2
Soc. What I am saying is not, indeed, directly obvious. I
must therefore try to make it clear. For I will endeavour to
speak of the beauty of figures, not as the majority of persons
understand them, such as of animals, and some paintings to
the life, but as 74 reason says, I allude to something straight and
” So Stalbaum renders pºstaga)\dºv, for which some MSS. read
pera Maſłóv. Sydenham, “with a little alteration.”
* In p. 44, C. § 96, the expression is puévrčot trpooxpijo 6at. And so
Schütz wished to read here in lieu of padºptval. The emendation adopted
by Stalbaum in ed. 1, is rejected in ed. 2 as specious rather than true.
For Socrates, he observes, is speaking figuratively But the reference to
the former passage in the words “as I said before,” shows he was speak-
ing not figuratively, but positively.
7°—” The Greek is kai jöstag ka9apåg Avrijv: where Schleiermacher
proposed to read kai ka0apág, similar to “et tristitia vacuas.” in Ficinus.
But to preserve the balance of the sentences Stalbaum would expunge
sa6apdºg Avrijv as a gloss for jöstag. - .
* Instead of dnaiv Ó A6).og, which Ficinus, not understanding, hed
80 PHILEBU.S.
round, and the figures formed from them by the turner's latle,
both superficial and solid, and those by the plumb-line and
angle-rule, if you understand me. For these, I say, are not
beautiful for a particular purpose, as other things are; but are
by nature ever beautiful by themselves, and possess certain
peculiar pleasures, not at all similar to those from scratchings ;
*and colours possessing this form beautiful and pleasures.”
But do we understand? or how
[117.] Prot. I endeavour (to do so), Socrates; but do you
endeavour likewise to speak still more clearly. ºf
Soc. I say then that sounds gentle and clear, and sending
out one pure strain, are beautiful, not with relation to another
strain, but singly by themselves, and that inherent pleasures
attend them.
Prot. Such is indeed the fact.
Soc. The kind of pleasures arising from odours is less di-
vine than those ; but through pains being not of necessity
mixed with them, and their happening” to be produced for
us by any means and in any thing, I lay down all this as op-
posed to those. But, if you observe, these are two kinds of
pleasures spoken of."
Prot. I do observe.
Soc. To these then let us still add the pleasures connected
with learning; if indeed they seem to us not to have a hunger
omitted, I have translated as if the Greek were àg pnow 6 A6).og: where
àg was lost through the preceding Ašyw.
*—” The Greek is kai Xptºpara ö) rotirov rov rátrov #xovra kaxá kai
jôováç. Ficinus has “colores item eadem ratione, pulchros atque gratos
esse,” as if he had found in his M.S. rpótrov—kai jöäa without Éxovra.
From the two united, one might elicit kai Xpºpuara övd rôv airóv Tów
rpóTrov #xovra rā ka?\ä kai jôovac. Schleiermacher suggested kai Xpº-
piara öfftrov toirov Töv rátrov ka)\á kai Éxovra jöovåg. He should
have read rather kai Xpºpuara àtra Ör) dud Toijtov rôy rpóTov Švra
ca)\d, kai Éxovta ºdovág. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, conceived that many words
had dropt out; but in ed. 2, would supply after śxovra, Aéya ka0' attà
ka)\d sivat kai jčovág oikstag #xévv.
* I have translated as if the Greek were kai rô 8try—rvXávstv, not kai
3try—rvyxávet. For the infinitive is required by ovupspatx9at, and -ó
before &Tº rvyxávstv, as in p. 28, D., Tó Ötry &rvXev.
” Instead of Asyopuévov, Heindorf suggested Aéyopsy rejv, Schütz, ÉXé-
yousy, from “collegimus ” in Ficinus, which, adopted by Stalb. in ed., 1
is rejected in ed. 2, for he says that śati is to be understood after sión,
and 5%' judº v after Aey opiévov.
>HILEBU.S. 8]
after learning, nor pains arising at the commencement,
through the hunger after learning.
Prot. But 7° so it seems to me.
118.] Soc What then if there should be to those, who have
been filled” with learning, losses subsequently through for-
getfulness, do you perceive any pains in those (losses)?
Prot. Not naturally, but through some reasonings respect-
ing the suffering, when, after being deprived, a person feels
a pain through a want.
Soc. At present however, blessed man, we are going through
the feelings arising only from nature, independent of any rea-
Sonings. * :
Prot. You are right then, in saying, that, in learning, a for-
getfulness frequently takes place, without any pain to us.
Soc. These pleasures, then, of learning, we must say are
unmixed with pains. But by no means do they belong to
the majority of mankind, but to the very few.
Prot. How must we not say so f
[119.] Soc. Since, then, we have tolerably well distinguished
between the pure pleasures and those which are almost rightly
called impure, let us *[in our account] 30 attribute to vehe-
ment pleasures immoderation ; to those that are not so, the
contrary moderation; and those that admit” the great and
the intensely, and contrariwise *(the little and the mildly),”
*such, let us say, do all of them ever* belong to the limitless
* I cannot understand &XXd thus used by itself in a confirmation.
* In lieu of TrAmpa,0sworów Schutz suggested TrAmpw88iouv, adopted by
Bekk. and Stalb., Faehse more neatly Tt 6' oil,-TAmpw8sic, Öv čáv
ytyvourau, ka00pg-i.e. “What, does not a person, having been filled with
learning, of which should there be subsequently losses—, perceive some
pains in those (losses)?”
*—” The words within brackets are omitted by Ficinus; who through
the whole of this speech found in his M.S. readings far superior to any
furnished by other MSS.
* Instead of Yuyvopuévag Heindorf was the first to suggest Ösyopévac,
obtained from the version of Ficinus, “ quae—suscipiunt.”
*—” The words within numerals have been preserved by Ficinus
alone, from whose version, “intentius, remissius, magnum, parvum, raro,
crebro,” Heindorf elicited tâg rö opiukpóv kai Tô putya, kai to opoëpöv at
kai Tô jpépua, but Schütz, Tág rö apóðpa aī kai ſãpépua, kai Tô 'uśya kai
uukpóv—But the balance of the sentence requires rather rāg kai Tô Héya
rai apóðpa, Kai Tô wukpóv kai pépua at-
*—84. The Greek is rouairac Trig Tpoo.66 psy attaic, whert, Ste-
G
82 PIIIT, EF3US.
genus, namely, the more and the less, borne along through
the body and soul ; but that those, which do not admit of these
properties, belong to the moderate.
Prot. You speak most correctly, Socrates.
Soc. Still further, in addition to these, we must look
thoroughly * subsequently into this belonging to them.
Prof. What 2
[120.] Soc. What it is meet to say contributes to truth.
Is it the pure, and sincere, and sufficient,” or the violent, and
the many, and the much
Prot. What do you mean, Socrates, in asking this?
Soc. That I may omit proving nothing relating to pleasure
and knowledge, whether in either of them a part is pure, and
a part not pure, in order that each being pure may come to a
trial, and enable myself and you and all these here to form a
decision more easily.
Prof. Most correctly (said).
Soc. Come then, let us consider in this way respecting all
the kinds which we say are pure; (and)" having first selected
Some one from among them, look at it thoroughly.
Prot. What then shall we select 2
Soc. Let us look, if you will, at the white kind amongst
the first. -
Prot. By all means.
[121.] Soc. How then, and what would be the purity of
white P whether, where there is the greatest and most, or
where it is the least mixed in that substance, in which there is
no portion of any other colourf
Prot. Evidently, where it is the most sincere.
Soc. Rightly (said). Shall we then, Protarchus, not lay
phens was the first to reject rijg, and Stalbaum Trpoo, and the latter to adopt
airdºg, found in a single MS. But it is easier, I think, to alter rijg into
&nj, and ºrpoo into traig, and 66 pew into pöpiev, and attág into dei trčoag.
* In lieu of Öta.0sréov, Heusde suggested 6ta6saréov, found subsequently
in a single MS. after correction, and adopted by Stalbaum.
.* By introducing kai Tô iravöv in this place, instead of the end of the
sentence, we not only preserve the balance of the sentence, but get rid of
the difficulty, which Stalbaum was the first to see, but unable to over-
COIſle.
* We must either insert kai with Stephens, or omit 6taokotrijpey with
Ficinus; who has, however, “in medium inducentes.”
PHILEBUS. 83
down this as the truest, and at the same the most beautiful of
all whites; but not that, where it is the largest, and most.
Prot. Most correctly.
Soc. If then we should say, that a little of pure white is
more white, and more beautiful, and more truly white, than a
great quantity of mixed white, we should say what is entirely
COrrect.
Prot. Most correctly.
[122.] Soc. Well then, we shall assuredly be not wanting
in any such examples in favour of our reasoning respecting
pleasure; but it is sufficient” for us to perceive from thence,
that in the case of pleasure in general, a portion small in size
and little in quantity, yet unmixed with pain, would be more
Sweet, more true, and more beautiful, than a portion large in
size, and great in quantity, *(mixed with pain).”
Prot. Greatly so, and quite sufficient is the example.
Soc. But what is one of this kind? Have we not heard
respecting pleasure, that it is a thing always generating, and
that of pleasure there is no existence at all ? For some clever*
persons, forsooth, to whom we owe thanks, attempt to point
out to us this kind of reasoning.
Prof. What is it 2 -
Soc. Shall I go through it before you, friend Protarchus,
and interrogate you ?”
Prot. Only tell it, and interrogate.
[123.] Soc. There are some two things; one itself by it-
self; the other always desirous of (something)” else.
Prot. How say you this?” and of what (are you speaking)?
Soc. The one is by nature most worthy of respect; the
other falls short of it.
87 Ficinus has “sufficiet.” He therefore found in his MS., &pkégst—
*—84. The words within numerals Sydenham first supplied in his English
version, and Heindorf in a note the Greek word peputypévng after pasya)\ng.
And so too Stalbaum in ed. 1, but he rejects the idea in ed. 2.
* In the Greek — kopºpoi, i. e. “ elegant,” in their reasonings and
discourses; subtle arguers, or fine logicians; a character which dis-
tinguished the school of Zeno the Eleatic. It will presently be seen, that
the persons here spoken of philosophized on the principles of the Eleatic
sect, and were probably some of Zeno’s Athenian disciples. S.
* So Ficinus correctly. Others take the speech positively.
* Ficinus has “alterum—quid,” which leads to d\\ov tot instead of
#XXov—
* The oldest MS. correctly reads roîto for Toârw—
G 2
84 PHILEBUS.
Prot. Speak a little more clearly. -
Soc. We have beheld young persons beautiful and good,
and seen their admirers.
Prot. Often.
Soc. Similar then to these two seek two others, *according
to all those things, which we say is the third to another.”
Prot. State more plainly, Scorates, what you mean.
Soc. It is nothing subtle, Protarchus. But our present argu-
ment is playing with us; and says, that of things existing
one thing is ever for the sake of something; and the other,
for the sake of which there is on every occasion produced
that, which is produced always for the sake of something.
[124.] Prot. I scarcely understand you, *through the
being said oftentimes.” -
Soc. Perhaps, however, we shall better understand, boy,
as the reasoning proceeds.
Prof. How not *
Soc. Let us now take these two different things.
Prof. Of what kinds P . -
Soc. The generating of all things is one kind; the exist
ence, another. .
Prot. I acknowledge these two, existence and generating.
Soc. Most correctly. Now, which of these shall we say
is for the sake of which P Shall we say, generating is
for the sake of existence, or existence for the sake of
generating 2
[125.] Prot. Are you now inquiring whether that, which
is called existence, is what it is for the sake of generating 2
Soc. I appear so.
*—” The Greek is karā trávra öga Ağyopsy sivat rô rpírov Šrápp. Stal-
baum and Cousin say, that Schleiermacher has well expressed the passage
in German ; which means, according to Cousin, that “the relation, which
one thing bears to another, is a third thing opposite to the two things.”
But the relation neither is nor could be opposite to any thing but a coun-
ter-relation. Had there been indeed an allusion to a geometrical ratio, I
could have understood the expression “a third to another,” or rather “to
either,” in Greek Škarépºp, as a mean between the two quantities men-
tioned. But at present I am quite in the dark; and so too Protarchus is
feigned to be ; for he bids Socrates state more clearly what he means.
*—* The Greek is 6tá rà troXXákug Asyôjvat: which I cannot under-
stand. I could have understood ówá Tó rv trouki)\wg arx8x6ivat, i. e.
“through something having been subtlely woven;” where there would
be a proper reference to the preceding troukix
PHILEBUS. 85
Prot. By the gods, *would you be asking me in ad-
dition ?95 ." -
Soc. I mean, Protarchus, something of this kind. Would
you say that ship-building exists for the sake of ships, or
ships for the sake of ship-building P and whatever things there
are of the like kind, Protarchus, I mean by this very (ques-
tion).
Prot. Why then, Socrates, do you not give an answer to it
yourself?
Soc. There is no reason why not. Do you however take
a share with me in the discourse. -
Prot. By all means.
Soc. I say then, that, for the sake of generating, medi-
cines,” and all instruments, and all matter is placed by the
side of all ; but that each act of generating is for the sake of
some individual existence, one for one kind and another for
another; but that generating taken universally is for the sake
of existence taken universally.
Prot. Most clearly. --
[126.] Soc. Pleasure then, if it be a generating, will of ne-
cessity be for the sake of some existence.
Prot. How not P
Soc. 97 Now that, for the sake of which the thing generated
for the sake of something would be always generated, is in the
portion of the good; but that which is generated for the
93–95 This is the literal version of the Greek, &p' àv Štravepwrāg pue.
But, as Stalbaum says in ed. 1, Protarchus would be a simpleton to in-
quire merely of Socrates, whether he was asking a question. Accordingly
he proposed to read, IIoiov dip’ #7taveporđg pus: for which, in ed. 2, he
substitutes Ti, trpèg 6sſºv, dip’ at #Tavépwrāg pus. . But ápa could not thus
commence a clause after the parenthetic Troög 686 v. Other critics too,
and among them Schleiermacher, Ast, Baiter, and Sauppe, have tried
their hands at corrections, which are equally unsatisfactory to Stalbaum
and myself. Plato wrote, I suspect, TIpêg 686 v, dipa traič Švr'éporác
pus; i. e. “By the gods, are you asking me, as if I were a child P’’ For
thus there would be not only an allusion to Socrates, addressing Protarchus
just before as a boy, but to the expression in Sophist. § 58, pºov–
6tmyeio 6au, travoriv dig oijov, juiv. Gorg. p. 499, B., kai śpioi, §orso
traiči, xoff. Prometh. 1022, 'Eksprópºngac Óñ0sv, dog traič’ 8vt’, #18:
Agam. 278, IIawóðg véac àg käpt' piouſlow ºppévag. Theognis, 'AAA
&gtrep purpov traida Nóyotg p' dºratic.
* I scarcely understand pāpuaka by itself. I could have understo
$60pāg påpuaka, i. e. “remedies against decay.”
86 PHILEBUS.
sake of any thing, must, my friend, be placed in another
portion.”
Prot. It is most necessary.
Soc. If then pleasure be a generating, shall we not in
placing it in an allotment different from that of the good, cor-
rectly place it?
Prot. Most correctly.
Soc. Hence, as I said at the beginning of this argument, we
owe many thanks to the person, who pointed out, respecting
pleasure, that it is a generating, but that its existence is not
any thing whatever. For it is plain that this person would
laugh at those who assert that pleasure is a good.
Prot. Very heartily.
Soc. And this very same person would certainly on every
occasion laugh at those, who place their ultimate end in ge-
neratings.
[127.] Prot. How, and what kind of men, do you mean P
Soc. Such as those curing hunger or thirst, or any of such
things as by generating cures are delighted on account of gener-
ating being a pleasure; and who declare they would not choose
to live without being thirsty and hungry, and suffering those
other things, which one might mention as following such kinds
of feelings.
Prot. They are likely (to do so).
Soc. Would not all of us say that destruction is the con-
trary of generation ?
Prot. It is of necessity so.
Soc. Whoever then chooses this, would choose destruction
and generation, but not that ti, ºrd life, in which it is possible”
*7-–97 I confess I am here quite at a loss. Ficinus has “Quod vero tale
est, ut ejus gratia fiat, quod Semper alterius gratia fit, in boni sorte locatur;
quod vero alterius gratia, in aliam sortem, O vir optime, reducendum vi-
detur: ” i. e. That which is such, that for its sake is produced, what is
ever produced for the sake of another thing, is placed in the portion of a
good; but that, which is produced for the sake of another thing, is to be
carried, my good man, to another portion.
* In the Greek ºppoveiv 68 jv Övvaröy dig oióvrs, Bekker would ex-
punge Övvaröv, and he is followed by Stalbaum; for they did not see that
it should be placed before ºppovčiv 5' jv instead of after these words
They ought rather to have omitted Töv before Šv (;, for it has nothing to
Nº. it can be referred, unless it be said that it is the remnant of rāA-
40’ſ'ſ) 19,
PHILEBUS. 87
for a person to be neither pleased nor pained, but to have
thoughts the purest possible.
[128.J Prot. Much absurdity, as it seems, Socrates, would
result, should any one lay down that pleasure is a good.”
Soc. Much ; since" let us discourse still in this way.
Prot. In what?
Soc. How is it not absurd for nothing good or beautiful to
exist, neither in the body nor in many other things, except in
the soul, and there only pleasure; and that neither fortitude,
nor temperance, nor mind, nor any of the good things, which the
soul has obtained by lot, should exist of that kind P' And still
in addition to this, that the person not delighted, but in pain,
should be compelled to say that he is then wicked, when he is
in pain, although he be the best of all men; and on the other
hand, that the person delighted excels in virtue so much the
more, as he is the more delighted then, "when he is delighted.”
Prot. All these suppositions, Socrates, are absurdities, the
greatest possible.
[129.] Soc. Let us then not endeavour to make an exam-
ination of pleasure at all ; nor appear to be, as it were, very
chary of mind and science; but let us spiritedly strike every
thing all round, if perchance it gives a cracked sound,” until
coming to the view of that, which is naturally the most free
from a flaw, we may use it for our decision, suited alike both
to the truest parts of these and of pleasure likewise.
* One would expect rather rāya.0óv, i.e. “the good.”
* This “since ’’ is absurd ; although širsi is acknowledged by Ficinus’
version “quandoquidem; ” but as he adds “et hoc praeterea ratione os-
tendere licet,” it is evident he did not find in his MS. Aśywpsy, but Aéysiv
#vijv. Plato wrote, I suspect, & Trai, as in § 124.
* I cannot understand rotojtov here.
*—” The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus—“At
eum contra, qui voluptatibus delinitur, quo magis gestit, eo virtute prae-
stantiorem dicere.” They seem however to be required, although not
easy to understand, to preserve the balance of the séntence; where tow
paſſ Xaigovra is opposed to Xaipovra, and d\yoïvra to Xaipei, and kaköy
to Ölaſpépětu Trpèg &pgrºv, and 3rav &Ayā to 6tav Xaípg. But as there
is nothing to balance kāv j čpuatog Trévrwg, Plato perhaps wrote 6tapép-
£uv ºrpèg &perºv Tórs, ātav xaſpy káktorog dºg, i. e. “excels in virtue then,
when he is delighted, although he is the most wicked.”
* I have adopted, in lieu of the scarcely intelligible Éxet, the more cor-
ect mixei, suggested by Steinbrüchel in Mus. Turicens. t. ii. p. 334, and
Wyttenbach on Plutarch, t. ii. p 64 P Despite, however, the array of
88 PHILEBUS,
Prot. Rightly (said).
Soc. Is there not, I think,” one part of the sciences relating”
to learning in general, connected with handicraft trades, and
another with instruction and nurture?
Prot. It is so.
[130.] Soc. Now in the manual arts," let us consider, first,
whether there is" one part more closely connected with science,
and another part less so ; and whether it is meet to reckon the
former as the most pure,” but the latter as the most impure.”
Prot. It is meet.
Soc. We must therefore take the leading arts apart from
each individual one.”
Prof. What arts P and how Ż
Soc. As if a person should, for example, separate from all
arts arithmetic, and mensuration, and weighing, the remainder
of each would become, so to say, inconsiderable.
Prof. Inconsiderable indeed. -
Soc. For after these there would be left for those only to
conjecture, and to exercise the senses by experience and prac-
tice, who by making use of the power of guessing, which the
many call art, have worked out" their strength by assiduity
and labour.
parallel passages produced in the note of Stalbaum, he says that the
correction is very elegant, but not necessary.
* There is some error in oiuau. For no person in asking a question
could say, “I think;” although he might say, “think you.” Ficinus
omits olpiat entirely.
* This is the correct meaning of pat)#para here, as remarked by Stal-
baum.
° Instead of Xewporéxvukaig Sydenham suggested Xstpotexvtawc: of which
Stalbaum disapproves at the very moment when he quotes Rep. ix. p. 590,
B., 3avavoria 68 kai Xeuporex via, which seems to give some support to
Sydenham.
* In lieu of Évº Sydenham suggested £ari, which Stalbaum attributes to
Schleiermacher. -
* * Stalbaum reads ka9apórara and &k8aptórspa, with the majority Cf
MSS. and Ficinus. But the balance of the sentence requires the same
degree of comparison in both clauses. I have therefore adopted ka9agó-
rara and diköaptórara. Sydenham has “more pure—more impure.”
* So Stalbaum in ed. 2, rejecting the correction of Stephens, Škáormv
for Ékdºarov, which he had adopted in ed. l.
* I cannot understand &Treupyaopuśvag found in nearly all the MSS. For
dºreovážsabau never means “adipisci” or “nancisci,” as translated by
PHILEBUS. 89
Prot. You say what is most necessarily (true).
[131.] Soc. *In the first place, (is not) the musical art
full (of conjecture), while adapting the harmony not by (a fixed)
measure, but by practice? and of it taken universally (do not)
hautboy-playing (and harp-playing) hunt out the measure
suited to each by the aid of (a mouth-piece and) string through
guessing merely, so that it has a great deal mixed, which is
not very certain, and only a little, that is sure.”
Prot. Very true.
Soc. Moreover we shall find that the medical, and agricul-
tural, and naval, and military arts are in a similar condition.
Prot. Very much so.
Soc. But the art of building (we shall find), I think, making
use of very many measures and instruments; which,” giving
to it great accuracy, make it more scientific than the majority
of arts.
Prof. How So 2
Soc. So too in ship-building, and house-building, and in
many other works of carpentry. For in these, I think, (the
art) uses the straight rule, and the turning-lathe, and the com-
pass, and the plumb-line, and the marking-line, and the level
properly formed.
Prof. You say very correctly, Socrates.
Ficinus and Stalbaum respectively. I have therefore adopted & Treupyad-
pus wovg—
*—” On this most difficult, because corrupt, passage, Stalbaum has
written a long note in ed. 1, and another still longer in ed. 2. From the
two I have selected what seemed to me to be the nearest to the truth. In-
stead therefore of peori)—ºrpt.jroy oil pºrpºp &\\& pusXèrmg oroxaopaq), the
text was perhaps psori)—groxaopioi-oil uérpºp—where puéori-Groxao-
uoiſ, suggested by Stalbaum and adopted by Winckelmann, is confirmed
by p. 62, B. § 148, povouki) v-jīv ÖXiyov šuºrpoo'08w Épapev Groxágswg
—usgräv. Next, in lieu of Šiputraga airfic, the sense requires évpatráong
airijg—For the whole of music was confined to the hautboy and harp; and
hence after ai)\ntuki), Stalbaum approves of kai Ki6aptatukij, found in one
MS. after correction: and as two instruments are alluded to, it is evident
that besides xopón, which is a part of the harp, there is required a word to
express a part of the hautboy; and hence popſ38tag has probably dropt
out before xopôňg: while to complete the syntax, $orov may be inserted
between 6mpeãovo at and āors.
* I have adopted Heindorf’s & for rā, obtained perhaps from “quibus.”
in Ficinus, or “which’’ in Sydenham. The reading was received by Stal-
baum in ed. 1, but is rejected in ed. 2.
90 PHILE EU.S.
[132.] Soc. Let us then place the artsso called into two kinds;
some following music, (and) possessing in their works a less
share of accuracy; others, building, possessing a larger share.
Prot. Let them be so placed.
Soc. And of these arts, that those are the most accurate
which we lately said were the prime (or leading).
Prot. You seem to me to be speaking of arithmetic, and
those other arts, which together with it you mentioned just
I\OW.
Soc. Just so. But, Protarchus, must we not say that each
of these, again, is twofold 2 or how 2
Prot. What arts do you mean?
Soc. Must we not say, in the first place, that the arithmetic
of the many is of one kind, but that of philosophers another ?
Prot. By dividing in what way, can a person lay down the
one and the other ?
Soc. The boundary, Protarchus, is not trifling. For of the
things relating to number, the many calculate by unequal
units; as two armies, two oxen, two things the Smallest, or
two the greatest of all things. But philosophers could not
follow them, unless a person should lay down an unit, differ-
ing in no respect from each of the units in ten thousand.”
Prot. Indeed you say very correctly that there is no little
difference amongst those, who occupy themselves in arithmetic;
so as to make it reasonable that there are two kinds.
[133.] Soc. And what of calculation in trade, and of men-
suration in building? "(Do these differ)" from the geometry
and the calculations made by students in philosophy P Shall
we say that each of them is one art? or shall we set down
each as two P
Prot. Following out the preceding remarks, I should,
according to my vote, lay down that each of these is two.
Soc. Correctly so. But do you understand for what reason
we have brought forward these matters between us?
* Such is the reading adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from the four
oldest MSS. The others offer poptov, similar to “partium ” in Ficinus.
*—” Stephens was the first to remark, that Öuapépét was wanting to
support the syntax and sense; for which Stalbaum in ed I suggested
8tapépovoa. But in ed. * be thinks that Plato had in mind Ölapēpēt, but
omitted to put it down.
PHILEBUS. 9 |
Prot. Perhaps I do. But I would wish yourself to lay open
the question just asked.
Soc. To me at least then this reasoning seems no less,
than when we commenced detailing it *by seeking some-
thing” the counterpart to pleasures, to have reached” to
that point, where it is possible to consider what science is
more pure than another science, as (one) pleasure (was more
so than another) pleasure.
Prot. This at least is very clear, that it attempted those
things for the sake of these.
[134.] Soc. What then, has it discovered,” in what has
gone before, that over others” one art is clearer than another,
and one less clear than another ?
Prot. Entirely.
Soc. And has not in these instances the reasoning, after
speaking of some art, of the same name (as another), led to the
opinion of both being one; and does it not then inquire, as
if being two, their clearness and purity, whether the opinion
of those who philosophize, or those who do not, is the more
accurate respecting them
"—" In lieu of &ntãy Stephens suggested Zārmour. He should have
proposed &mrojvrs, applied to the two speakers. For &ntsiv. is thus per-
petually said of persons engaged in a mental inquiry, as shown by Stal-
baum ; who in ed. l correctly saw that ru had dropt out after āvtia-
Tpopov.
* Although Schleiermacher, whom Bekker and Stalbaum in ed. 1
followed, acutely perceived that Plato wrote Trpoſłsºmešvat, and not
Trpoſłsſ}\mkéval, yet he did not perceive that ēvraúða would require iva,
lying hid in the tail of Trpoſłsºmkévau: and as one M.S. offers okotréiv
from correction for okotröv, it is evident we must read iva okotréiv Tráp-
eart Tig—instead of okotröv' &p' éori rug—, as I have translated. The
version of Ficinus would lead us to believe that his MS. was different
from any other since discovered. For it runs thus, “Disputatio nostra,
qua jamdiu proportionem quandam aqua divisionis conversione voluptatis
respondentem quaerit, dum indagat, num sit Scientia quaedam alia scientia
purior, quemadmodum voluptate voluptas.” -
* The Greek is in some MSS. &vsvpioket, in others ávsvptakew, but
in one from correction &vsvgåket : while Ficinus has “repertum est.”
From hence it is easy to restore &vsúpmks, namely, 5 Aóyog. -
* I cannot understand Ér' àXXoug, which Stalbaum translates “over
other things; ” Ficinus, “in alia re.” But the balance of the sentence in
the next clause, d\\mv čA\mc, proves that àA\ng &\\mv, found here in
some MSS., is the correct reading, while in Étr' lies hid eitrè—
92 FTIILEBU8.
Prot. And it appears to me to make this inquiry very cor-
rectly.”
Soc. What answer then, Protarchus, shall we give it?
[135.] Prot. To a wonderful extent of difference have we,
Socrates, arrived, touching a clear view of the sciences.
Soc. We shall therefore answer more easily.
Prot. How not? And let it be said, that these (leading)”
arts differ greatly from the others; and that from these them-
selves differ those, which engage the exertions of persons
philosophizing really with accuracy and truth on the subject
of measures and numbers.
Soc. Let this be according to your views; and trusting to
you, let us boldly give an answer to those, who are terrible in
tearing” arguments to pieces.
Prof. Of what kind P
Soc. That there are two kinds of arithmetic, and two of men-
suration, and many others of the same kind, following these
and possessing this duality, but having one name in common.
Prot. Let us, Socrates, with good luck give to those, whom
you say are terrible, that very answer.
[136.] Soc. Do we then affirm, that these sciences are the
most aCCurate.
Prot. By all means.
Soc. But the dialectic power, Protarchus, would repudiate
us, if we preferred any other science to hers.
Prot. Whom must we call by that name?
Soc. Plainly, Protarchus, her, who perceives all the (know-
ledge)” just now mentioned. For I am entirely of opinion,
that all persons, to whom even a small particle of mind has
been apportioned, must deem the knowledge, which relates to
* Instead of pad Xa the sense requires pu&A' ey. Compare $132, Kai pāAa
y’ st; Aéysic.
* Stalbaum with Sydenham understands by airau, “the leading
arts,” remarking at the same time, that this use of the pronoun is
rather harsh. Perhaps Plato wrote ai irpºrat, as in § 132, Ög—trøðtac
st tropičv.
* With Xóyov \kºv Stalbaum compares roëg Aóyovg #Aks, v in Theae-
tet. § 126.
* Ficinus has “quae omnem modo inductam peritiam noscit:” who
thus found in his MS. the word Štruoriºumv, wanting to complete the sense
and syntax.
PHILEBUS. 93
|
the really existing,” and that which is ever by nature accord-
ing to the same, to be by far the most true notion. But
what and how would you, Protarchus, decide?
Prot. I have often, Socrates, heard from Gorgias on each
occasion, that the art of persuasion excels by much all other
arts. For it would make all things its slaves willingly, and
not by violence; and therefore it would be of all arts by far
the best. Now I should not be willing to lay down what is
opposed to you or him.
[137.] Soc. You seem to me to say that, having wished for
arms, you are ashamed of having deserted them.
Prot. Let these matters be in the place, where it seems good
to you.
Soc. Am I the cause of your not correctly understanding 2
Prof. What 2
Soc. I did not, friend Protarchus, inquire this—what art
or what science is superior to all, by its being” the greatest,
and best, and benefiting us the most ; but what is that, which
looks upon the clear, the accurate, and the most true, although
it may be little and benefit but little. This it is which we are
now seeking. Look to it. For you will not become hateful to
Gorgias, if you allow his art to be of use *to the ruling of man-
kind,” ” but, what I just now said, to the busy occupation,”
as I then said respecting white, that if there be a little but
pure, it excels a large quantity that is not such, by the very cir-
cumstance of its being the most true. And now, having thought
greatly upon this, and reasoned about it sufficiently, and look-
* As Plato never elsewhere has rô 6v kai Tô &vrwg, but always rô
ëvrwg 6v, we must read so here, as I have translated.
* The infinitive sivat, which Stephens first perceived to be wanting
here, has been found in a single MS. after correction. It was adopted by
Stalbaum in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2, because he did not see that dope-
Aoûora could be easily changed into &gs\ijo'at, what sivat would require. In
defence of Túj-diſpºoja’a Stalbaum produces some passages collected by
Poppo in Prolegom. p. 150, and himself, all of which I have shown, or
could show, to be corrupt.
*—” I have translated, as if the Greek were trpèg Xpstav roë roëc
&v6pútrovg kpatsiv., and not trpóg Xpeiav roig &v0p6trowg kparsiv. For
Gorgias prided himself upon the power he possessed, and professed to
teach, of ruling mankind by the art of persuasion.
*—” The words within numerals I cannot understand, nor could Stal-
baum; nor Ficinus, whose version is, “Nihil enim Gorgiam lacesses, si
ejus arti utilitatis laudem praestantiamdue concedas, ei vero, quam ips?
modo narravi, facultati veritatis praecellentiam tribuas.”
94 PHILEBUS.
ing to neither the utility of sciences nor to their high repute,
but, if there be any power inherent in our soul to love the
truth, and for its sake to do every thing,” of this let us speak;
and having thoroughly searched out the purity of mind and
intellect, let us seek whether we can say that in all probability
we possess this, or any other power more powerful than this.”
[138.] Prot. Nay, I do consider, and I think it is difficult
to admit that any other science or art lays hold of truth more
than this.
Soc. Have you said what you have said now, after perceiv-
ing something of this kind, that the majority of arts, and such
as busy themselves about matters here, make use in the first
place of opinions, and with the mind on the stretch” are in
search of what relates to opinions; and if a person” thinks fit
to pry into the phenomena of Nature, you know that through.
life he merely searches into the matters relating to this world,
how it has been produced, and in what way it suffers, and in
what way it acts. Shall we say this, or how
Prof. Thus.
Soc. Such a person then has undertaken this study, not
about the things which exist always, but about those that are
in the course of being, and will be, and have been.
Prot. Most true.
Soc. What clearness then can we say exists in truths the
most exact respecting those things, not one of which has
possessed ever, or will possess, or possesses at present, the
state of sameness?
Prot. How can we ?
*—” Such is the literal version of the Greek; of which Stalbaum has,
in ed. 1, given a paraphrase, omitted in ed. 2. Ficinus has “hanc dixi-
mus perscrutantes puritate mentis et sapientia, considerandum an pro-
babile sit a disserendine Scientia maxime possideri, vel aliam potius hac
praestantiorem ista perquirere:” by the aid of which it would perhaps be
not difficult to recover what Plato wrote.
* So Grou and Heusde; whose conjecture of £vvratapévog for £vvre-
raypºvog has been found in one M.S. after correction. Stalbaum how-
ever defends &vvreraypºvog, and explains it, “in a compact body,” like
a troop of soldiers. Ficinus has “ex instituto.” But though, as Cicero
says, there is a kind of union amongst all arts, yet philosophical studies
are pursued separately, but with an intensity of thought.
* The persons here alluded to, called by Aristotle of pugikoi, “na-
turalists,” were probably Anaxagoras and Archelaus. See Xenophon in
M. S. i. 1, 11. S.
PHILEBUS. 95
Soc. How then respecting things, which do not possess any
stability whatever, can there be any thing stable in us?
Prot. By no means, I imagine.
Soc. Nor is there mind, nor any knowledge possessing the
greatest truth respecting them.
Prot. It is probable there is not ?
[139.] Soc. We ought then, both you and I, to leave and
bid farewell frequently to Gorgias and Philebus, and in our
reasoning to appeal to this as a testimony.
Prof. What?
Soc. That there either is respecting those matters the stable,
and the pure, and the true, and what we lately called the im-
maculate, as regards the things, which have the property of
existing ever in the same manner, and similarly perfectly un-
mixed; or secondly,” whatever has the most affinity with
them; but that of all the rest we must speak as secondary
and subsequent.
Prot. You speak most truly.
Soc. With respect then to things of this kind, is it not
most just to give the most beautiful names to things the most
beautiful?
Prot. It is at least reasonable.
Soc. Are not mind and intellect and wisdom the names
which a person would hold in the highest honour?
Prot. Yes.
Soc. These then, after having been formed accurately, may
be correctly given to the notions conversant about the things
really existing.
Prot. Perfectly.
Soc. And the things, which I formerly brought for our de-
cision, are not other than these names.
[140.] Prot. How not, Socrates?
* The Greek is Ósirspoc, which Schleiermacher says agrees with TrAoûc
understood. But such an ellipse would be here inadmissible. For
whenever Plato uses that proverbial expression, he always introduces, what
could not be omitted, the substantive. We might indeed read here i ö
Öst repoc trópoc—for trópog might easily have dropt out after—tspog.
But as Ficinus has “quod secundo loco,” Stephens suggested bettepov,
taken separately or united to #ksivov. Two MSS. offer Ösvrépog. But
in that case we must read Öevrépog påAtara ékéivalvö tu kori śvyyevég, as
in Tim. D. 58, B., audºuara-Sevršowc.
96 PHILEBUS.
Soc. Be it so If then a person were to say that, what re-
lates to intellect and pleasure, touching their mutual mixture,
is placed before us, as before workmen, from which or in
which they must fabricate something, he would make a com-
parison suitable to our discourse.
Prot. Very much so.
Soc. Must we not in the next place attempt to mix them P
Prot. How not ?
Soc. Would it not be best to mention beforehand, and call
to remembrance things of this kind?
Prot. Of what kind?
Soc. Those we have mentioned before. For the proverb
seems to be well, * “Twice and thrice what is well to turn
over * 3% in our discourse is meet.
Prot. How not f
Soc. Come then, by Zeus; for I think that what has been
stated previously, was said in this wise.
Prot. How P
[141.] Soc. Philebus affirms that pleasure has been estab-
lished as the proper aim for all animals, and that all persons
ought to aim at it; that this very thing is to all universally
the good; and that the two terms “good” and “pleasant” have
been correctly assigned to one thing and to one nature. But
Socrates denies this; and (says) that in the first place the
things are, like the terms, two ; and secondly, that the good
and the pleasant possess a nature different from each other;
and that intellect partakes in a share of the good more than
pleasure does. Is not this now, and was it not then, stated so,
Protarchus P
Prot. Strongly so.
Soc. And was not this (agreed upon) then, and should we
not agree upon it now Ż
Prof. What 2
Soc. That the nature of the good differs from the rest of
things in this 2
[142.] Prot. In what?
Soc. That whatever animal possesses it for ever, perfectly,
º,
32—32 There is an allusion to the same proverb, but in different words,
in Gorg. p. 498, E., Legg. xii. p. 957, A., and the other passages quoted
by Stalbaum.
PHILEBU.S. 97
and under all circumstances of time and place, such a being has
no want of any thing beside, but has what is sufficient and
most complete. Is it not so?
Prot. It is so.
Soc. Have we then not endeavoured in this discourse, by
placing each apart from each as regards the life of each, (to
leave)” pleasure unmixed with intellect, and in like manner
intellect possessing not the smallest particle of pleasure ?
Prot. It is so.
Soc. Did either of those (lives) seem to us at that time to
be sufficient for any person 2
Prot. How could it 2
[143.] Soc. But if at that time we were carried in any re-
spect beside the mark, let any person whatever, taking up again
the subject, say what is more correct, laying down that me-
mory, and intellect, and science, and correct opinion belong
to the very same species, and considering whether any one
would without those choose that any thing whatever should
happen to him, much less pleasure, be it the greatest in quan-
tity and most intense in kind, provided he had neither a true
conception of being delighted, nor knew at all by what things
he was affected, nor had a recollection of the circumstance for
any period whatever. And let him say” the same respecting
intellect likewise, whether any one would choose without all
pleasures, or” even the least, to possess intellect, rather than
with some pleasures, or all pleasures without intellect, rather
than with some intellect.
Prot. There is no one,” Socrates. And there is no need
to ask these questions frequently.
[144.] Soc. Neither one of these then would be the per-
ſect, and all-eligible, and consummate good.
Prot. For how could it 2
* To preserve the sense and syntax we must insert Šāv, which might
have easily dropt out before àpuktov. On the loss or confusion of Śāv see
my notes on Crito, $ 15, n. 27.
* Instead of Náys the three oldest MSS. offer Ašyw. From the two
Stalbaum, in ed. 1, elicited Asyéro, similar to sitário, towards the com-
Amencement of this speech. But in ed. 2, he prefers Aéyé.
* Instead of kai the sense requires à kai–
* I have translated as if the Greek were, what the sense requires,
&#x éarty eig, Xókpateg, instead of—to 26&pateg.
Kä
98 PHILEBU.S.
Soc. This good then we must comprehend clearly, or at
least some form of it, in order that we may have something
to give the second prize.
Prot. You speak most correctly.
Soc. Have we not taken then some kind of road to the
good P w
Prof. What road 2
Soc. As if a person in search of another should first hear
of his dwelling "[where he resides],” he would surely have
something great towards the discovery of the person sought.
Prot. How not ?
Soc. And now a reasoning has pointed out to us, as at the
commencement, not to seek the good in the unmixed life, but
in the mixed one.
Prot. Entirely so.
Soc. There is moreover a hope that the thing sought for
will be more conspicuous in the mixed than in the not
mixed.
Prot. Much more.
[145.] Soc. Let us then, Protarchus, make a mixing after
praying to the gods;* whether Dionysus, or Hephæstus,”
or whatever else of the gods, "has obtained by lot the hon-
our” (of presiding over) the mixing.
Prot. By all means.
Soc. And now, to us, as it were to butlers, stand (two)"
fonts ; the one of pleasure ** a person might guess to be of
37–37 The words within brackets are evidently superfluous. Instead of
ºva, ed. Bas. 2, has in the text 67tov, and one MS. 67Tov over tva : which
leads to dºr' oikšrov, “ from a domestic,” in lieu of 6trov oikei.
* Here is an allusion to the custom of making a libation and uttering
a prayer to the gods at a banquet before the first cup was tasted.
39 According to Stalbaum, Hephæstus is here alluded to, because he
is represented by Homer in Il. i. 595, as acting the part of a butler to the
gods. º o
40–40 This has reference to the myth, that the gods had obtained their
respective powers by casting lots,
* I have inserted “ two.” For the Greek was, doubtless, kpijval &
tº Altog: where 0 is one form in MSS. of 3, and would mean “two.”
* Pleasure is compared to honey, says Olympiodorus, because it pos-
sesses sweetness and the ecstatic. And hence the Pythagorean saying, that
souls fall into generation through honey (Övö kai IIv6ayópstog A6xoc, čud
HéAttoc Triºr rew eig Yévéow rāg livXág). But intellect is compared 3
water, because it is sober. T
PHILEBUS. 99
honey; but that of intellect, hard and healthful, sober and
wineless, to be of water; which let us be ready to mix to-
gether in the best manner we can.
Prot. How not ?
Soc. Come then (and say) whether by mingling all plea-
sure with all intellect we may in the *best way obtain the
doing it well.4%
Prot. Perhaps so.
Soc. But it is not safe. But how we may make a mixing
with less danger, I seem to myself to be able to put out a
notion.
Prot. Say what.
[146.] Soc. *There was formerly, as we truly thought,
one pleasure more pure than another; and one art more accu-
rate than another.”
Prot. Undoubtedly so.
Soc. One science too differs from another; one in looking
to things that are produced and perish ; another to things
which are neither produced nor perish, but exist with the
properties of the same, the similar, and the eternal. And
looking to the truth, we deemed this science to be more true
than the other.
Prot. Very correctly so.
Soc. If then, in the first place, after having mixed together
the truest particles of each, when we look upon them, (shall
*—43 The Greek is roi; ka Nãg àv påXtor' #7tutiºxopsy, where Wytten-
bach on Phaedo, $65, says that roi, ka?\óg is put for Toij kaxoiſ ; while
Stalbaum says that puyvövat is to be supplied after ka?\óg. In accord-
ance with his own notes on p. 18, A., 20, A., 62, A., he might have
suggested Spāv čv, and cáX\vara instead of pudºtara. For there would
thus be a play on ka)\ög and cáAAuota.
*—“ The Greek is "Hv juiv jôová rs &Ambóc dig oiépé0a pučA\ov šté-
3ag äXXm kai Ör) kai Téxvm réxvmg dikpuſ?so répa. Here Schleiermacher
was the first to object to d\méâg and to suggest &\m{}ºg. But, as Stal-
baum observes, pleasures were not said to be truer so much as purer than
one another; and hence the Zurich editors wrongly rejected pu&\\ov with
the three oldest MSS. Nor can àkpugeotépa be translated “sincerior,” as
Ficinus has done. Moreover, although Stalbaum has shown that kai Öm kai
are perpetually united, yet they never are, nor could be, where two sentences
are, as here, balanced. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were
"Hv juiv jöown Tórs, dog áXm0óg oiópºsóa, uá\\ov sixtkpwig ón, kai réx-
wn rēxvng dkptſłso répa : where rôte is still seen in Ficinus, “in Supe-
rioribus;” and we can now perceive from whence he got his “sincerior.”
For sixtkpwrig is the word constantly used before in that sense.
H 2 a &
100 PHILEBUS.
we say,)” that these, being mixed together, are sufficient to
enable us to work out” the most desirable life? or do we still
want something, and not of such a kind?
Prot. To me it seems we must act thus.
[147.] Soc. Let there be then a man having a notion of
justice itself, and knowing what it is, and having a language
following upon his notions, and thinking thoroughly in like
manner upon every thing else in existence.
Prot. Let there be such a person. - •,
Soc. Will now this man have a sufficiency of science by
knowing the nature of the circle, and of the divine sphere
itself, while, ignorant of the sphere, and of the circles made
by man, 47 he is making a bad use” in building, and in other
things similarly, of straight-rules and circles.”
Prot. Ridiculous we should call 49 our position here, So-
crates, if it existed only in the sciences relating to things
divine.
Soc. How say you? Must we throw and mix together in
common the art neither stable nor pure of the false straight-
rule and mason's chisel,” and mix them with the other in-
gredients?
Prof. Yes; for it is necessary, "if any of us is about on
each occasion to find the way home.”
[148.] Soc. And music too, which we said a little be-
fore was wanting in purity, as being full of conjecture and
imitation ?
** To complete the sense I have translated as if the Greek were do'
ëpoipuev, not simply apa, and &Tspyáoaqbal, not dººrspyagóps6a, found
orðat
in one MS. derived from the various reading dºrspyaoſépéva.
*—” The Greek is dyvoãv kai Xptºpsvog. But the train of thought
leads evidently to dyvoãv #v cataxptºpsvog, as I have translated.
* Every Scholar, who has written on this passage, confesses that kavágu
cai Toig kūk)\oug is a corruption. I suspect that Plato wrote cavóat kai
Tūkotg—as shown by Poivuku kavóvi kai rākouc ºppoopéva in Eurip.
Herc. 945, kavóvov twkiopiara in Tro. 814, and in Sophocl. IIpuépov
Fr., Tūkot, kavdºv, Tſixvg, Öta}#Tng kai oré0pm, evidently said of the
building of Troy. Of these builders’ instruments, the kavdiv, 6tagãrnç,
and otá0pm have been mentioned in $131. The Tūkog was the mason's
chisel. See Pollux, vii. 118, and 125.
* So Sydenham; as if he wished to read Ašyoupsy &v for \{yousy.
* Here again we must read Tökp for kök\p.
*-* I confess I do not understand Plato's meaning here.
PHILEBUS. }{}i
Prot. To me it seems necessary, if our life is to be in any
manner whatever a life.
Soc. Are you then willing, like a door-keeper, jostled and
forced by a throng of people, to yield and throw open the doors,
and suffer all the Sciences to rush in, and to be mixed together
*the wanting (in purity)* with the pure.
Prot. I cannot perceive, Socrates, how any one would be
hurt by receiving all the other sciences, if possessing already
the leading.
Soc. Let me then admit them all to come pouring into the
receptacle of Homer’s” poetical mingling of the waters in a
valley.
Prot. By all means. -
Soc. They are admitted. And let us now return to the font
of pleasure.” For when we thought of mixing them together,
the portions of the true had not been produced; but, from
our love of all science, we sent them in a crowd to the same
spot, and even before the pleasures.
Prot. You speak most truly.
Soc. It is now time for us to consult about the pleasures;
whether we should let them all come thronging in, or whether
we should admit those, that are true, the first.
Prot. It makes a great difference in point of Safety, to let
in first the true.
Soc. Let these then be admitted. But what after this?
Must we not, if some are necessary, mix together these as we
did those 255
Prot. Why not? at least the necessary, surely.
[150.] Soc. But if, as we held it harmless and useful to
know through life all the arts, we now assert* the same of
pleasures likewise, we must mix them all together, if indeed
*—" That Plato wrote évôsegrápav as opposed to ka9apá, I much
doubt. Ficinus has “cum pura passim deteriorem.”
58 Il. iv. 452.
* After observing in ed. 1, that there was something wanting here,
as Heindorf likewise suspected, Stalbaum, in ed. 2, says that all will be
sound, if we correct šásysvá0m into #syévé6’ huiv, and render ééeyévero
“it was lawful:” but that verb never has such a meaning.
* Instead of Šksi one M.S. has ākšívaig: which leads to Ékeivaç, answer-
ing to rairag. -
* One MS. reads Aéyopsy for Aéyopaev, as Stalbaum suggested in ed. 1.
102 PHILE BUS.
it is conducive to us and harmless for all to enjoy all kinds of
pleasures through life.
Prot. How shall we say then on these very points? and
how act? -
Soc. It is not proper, Protarchus, to ask us this question;
but the pleasures themselves, and intellect, by inquiring re-
specting each other,” some such thing as this.
Prof. Of what kind 2
Soc. Ye friends, whether we must call you Pleasures, or
by any other name whatever, would ye choose to dwell with
all Intellect, or without Intellect? To this I think it is most
necessary to say thus.
Prot. How P
[151.] Soc. That, as was said before, for any pure” kind
to be alone and deserted, it is neither very possible nor useful.
We deem it however that the best of all kinds should, one
above others,” dwell with us;–that one, which is able" to
know both all the rest "and itself likewise, and at the same
time each of us as perfectly as possible."
Prot. And well have ye now answered, we will say to them.
Soc. Correctly so. After this then we must inquire of In-
tellect and Mind. Have ye any need of Pleasure in your mix-
ture ? “[we will say on the other hand, interrogating Mind
and Intellect].” What pleasures? they would perhaps reply.
Prot. Probably. -
[152.] Soc. To such a question our language would be this.
Beside those true pleasures, we will say, do ye further want
* I cannot understand &AAñAtov Trépt: nor could Ficinus, who has
omitted these words. For the pleasures and intellect did not inquire of
each other, but both were interrogated by Socrates.
* Stalbaum, who, in ed. 1, had with Ficinus rejected sixukpwég, retains
it in ed. 2.
* On the phrase £v &v6' #vög, see Stalb.
* I have translated, as if the Greek were not rô roi; ytyväckstv, which
I cannot understand, but rô y' oiov Yuyvögkew, where oiov means “able,”
as we often find in Xenophon.
*—” The Greek is kai ağ Tiy airi)w jučv #káormy—where Heusde
was the first to see that the mention of knowing itself was required. I
have translated, therefore, as if the text were kai airó, itpia re juww—
#káormv.
*—” The words within brackets are evidently superfluous. They are
properly omitted by Ficinus; although his version here is too unlike the
Greek to be safely trusted
PHILEBUS. 103
pleasures the greatest and most intense to dwell with you ?
How, Socrates, they would say, should we want those, which
give a thousand hinderances to us by disturbing the souls,
where we dwell with maddening pleasures,” and do not
permit us to exist, and entirely spoil our children, there born,
by introducing for the most part carelessness through forget-
fulness? But the other pleasures, of which you have spoken,
the true and the pure, do thou consider as nearly related to us;
and beside these, such as are accompanied with health and so-
briety, and such also as are in the train of all Virtue in ge-
neral, as if of a goddess, and every where follow her, all these
do thou mix" (with us). But those that always accompany folly,
and the rest of depravity, it is a great absurdity for a man to
mix with Intellect, who desires to see a mixture * the most
beautiful, and the least disturbed, and to try to learn from
it what good is naturally, not only in man, but in the uni-
verse; and to divine what is the idea (of good) itself. Shall
we not say that Mind has, in answering thus, spoken pru-
dently, and with self-possession, in behalf of itself and memory,
and right opinion ?
Prot. By all means.
[153.] Soc. And this moreover is necessary, for not a sin-
gle thing could ever otherwise exist.
Prot. What is that ?
Soc. That, with which we cannot mix truth, could never,
be in existence truly, nor ever have been.
Prot. For how could it 2
Soc. By no means. But if any thing further be yet want-
ing for the mixture, do you and Philebus mention it. For to
me our present reasoning appears, like some incorporeal
world" about to rule correctly over an animated body, to
have been worked out.
* Stalbaum, objecting justly to ai jöoval—Tapártovo at Ötö jôovåg,
wishes, in ed. 2, to read ÉTru6-yptiag. Ficinus has “furiosae simply, as if
he had found in his M.S. pavukóg without jöovág.
* The Greek is putyvövrag ö’, which Heusde ingeniously altered into
uiyvv. Tag ö’—
* As paiśw kai kpāorty is an insufferable tautology, it is evident that
Mištv sai or #yovy, (as may be seen in Bast’s Palaeograph. p. 893, ap-
pended to Schaefer's ed. of Gregorius on Dialects,) is the interpretation of
|CO CLO'L7/.
P. Instead of kóguoc one would have expected Beög: for reasoning may
be compared to a deity, but not to a world. But perhaps kóopog means
here the “order,” that regulates the world, not the world itself.
104 PHILEBUS.
Prot. And to me say, Socrates, it has seemed thus.
[154.] Soc. Should we then, in saying that we are now
standing at the very vestibule of the good, and the residence
of a thing of such a kind, correctly perhaps in a certain man
ner say so P
Prot. To me at least it seems so.
Soc. What then would appear to us to be in this mixture
the thing most valuable, and especially the cause of such a
disposition being agreeable to all? For after having seen
this, we will subsequently consider whether to pleasure or to
mind it adheres the closer,” and the more intimately, in the
constitution of the universe. --
Prot. Right. For this will 68 conduce the most to our de-
C1SIOI].
Soc. And there is, indeed, no difficulty in discovering the
cause of mixture in general, through which it is worth every
thing or nothing.
Prot. How say you?
Soc. No man is surely ignorant of this.
Prof. Of what 2
[155.] Soc. That every mixture, whatever it be, and
whatever its quantity,” if it does not meet with measure and
a symmetrical nature, does of necessity destroy both the in-
gredients and itself. 79 For there exists not a tempering, but
a certain unmixed bringing together, (and) confused truly of
this kind on every occasion in reality to those who possess it."
* In lieu of Trpoop väg rs, Heusde suggested trpoo ºvéo repov, similar to
“cognatius ac propius’’ in Ficinus.
* Instead of āori, Cornarius proposed £orat, obtained from “conferet”
in Ficinus.
* The Greek is 6traorojv, “however it be made.” But the meaning
is this, that every right and good mixture must be made “in one certain
measure.” Plato probably wrote not 67twooijv but Özrog močv. So Sy-
denham; who got the idea from “quacunque et qualiscunque,” in Fi-
cinus. But Stalbaum says that ÖTwo'oùv is to be connected with the
preceding pum rvXojoa. But this I think the very collocation of the
words prevents.
70–79 Such is the literal translation of the Greek, where the words are
strangely thrown out of their proper places. How much clearer is the
version of Ficinus—“Neque enim temperies haec est, sed, tanquam in-
temperatus quidam passim fortuitusque concursus nobis accidere solet.”
Perhaps Plato wrote, Obós yāp kpāoric &Amºng Towattm yiyveral àvrwg,
&\\á rug &kpit we &vptrepopmplévn, Škágrote roig Kektmpévoig £vpuſhopā.
i. e. For such a mixture becomes not in reality a true one, but having
been brought together indiscriminately, it is on every occasion a calamity
°HILEBU.S. 105
Prot. Most truly so. -
Soc. The power then of the good has fled from us into the
nature of the beautiful. For surely every where moderation
and symmetry happen to be a beauty and a virtue,
Prot. Certainly. -
Soc. Now we have said that truth also was an ingredient
in the mixture.
Prot. Entirely so, - -
Soc. If then we are not able to hunt out the good in one form,
yet, taking it in three together, beauty, and symmetry, and
truth,” let us say that we can most justly consider these 7% as
one cause of the ingredients in the mixture, and that through
this, as being good, the mixture is itself produced of such a kind.
Prot. Most truly indeed. -
[156.] Soc. Now then, Protarchus, any person whatever
would be a competent judge respecting pleasure and intellect,
as to which of the two is more closely allied to the greatest
good, and in higher honour both amongst men and gods.
Prot. (The decision) is clear indeed; yet it is better to go
through it in our discourse.
Soc. Let us then compare each of the three severally with
pleasure and with intellect. For we are to see to which of the
two we must assign each of the three as being the nearer
related. . .
Prot. Are you speaking of beauty, and truth, and moder-
ation ?
Soc. Yes. Now lay hold in the first place, Protarchus, of
truth; and having laid hold of it, look at the three, mind, and
truth, and pleasure; and after waiting a considerable time,
answer to yourself, whether pleasure or mind is nearer related
to truth. º
[157.] Prot. What need is there of time? for I think they
differ greatly. For of all things pleasure is the greatest brag-
to those who possess it.” Respecting the Union of &\m0ng Övrwg, see
Stalbaum in ed. 2.
* Proclus, in Theol. Plat. p. 140, observes, “ that Iamblichus appears
to have bounded the intelligible in the three monads, symmetry, truth,
and beauty; and through these to have unfolded the intelligible gods in
the Platonic theology.” T. -
* Instead of rotiro Stalbaum, in ed. 2, says that one would have ex-
pected Taijta, applied to beauty, symmetry, and truth; but that no change
is to be made. The expression, however, of oiov čv would be cthºrwise
unintelligible. - -
106 PHILEBUS.
gart; and as the saying is, in the pleasures of Venus, which
seem to be the greatest, even perjury has obtained pardon
from the gods;” since pleasures, like children, possess not the
least particle of mind. But mind is either the same thing as truth,
or of all things the most like to it, "[and the most truthful..]”
Soc. Consider then after this in the same manner” moder-
ation, whether pleasure possesses more of it than intellect, or
intellect more of it than pleasure.
Prot. And this inquiry too which you have proposed, is
easy to be considered. For I imagine no person will find any
thing more immoderate than pleasure and extravagant joy;
nor a single thing of more moderation than mind and intellect.
Soc. You have spoken well. But however still mention
the third thing. Has mind partaken of beauty more than any
kind of pleasure, so that mind is more beautiful than pleasure,
or the reverse 2
[158.] Prot. Has then, Socrates, any man in a day-dream
or night-dream seen or imagined that intellect and mind is in
any matter or in any manner a thing that has been,” or is, or
will be unhandsome 2
Soc. Right.
Prot. But whenever we see any person whatever delighted
with pleasures, and those too the greatest, and behold the
ridiculous, or what is the most disgraceful of all things,
following upon them, we are ashamed ourselves, and by
putting them out of sight, conceal them by giving them, as far
as possible, to night and darkness, all such things as not being
fit for the light to look on.
Soc. To all then and every where 77 Protarchus, you will
declare, sending by messengers (to the absent),” and speak-
78. On the verse alluded to here, and partly quoted in Sympos. § 10,
Stalbaum refers to several critical scholars. It was 'Appoćiotog yap.
§pkoç oik Špºroivuog.
74–74 The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
* In lieu of dig oºrwg, Cornarius first suggested boatTwg. And so the
three oldest MSS. and Eusebius.
* Instead of Yuyvópsvov, Eusebius quotes yewópswov, adopted by Stal-
baum. Plato wrote yeyevnpuévov, answering to “fuisse” in Ficinus.
77 Instead of Trávrn, Eusebius offers travri, and Ficinus “cunctis,” from
which Stalbaum elicited Tāori. Plato, I suspect, wrote Tāot Trévrm Śrī:
for these words are constantly thus united.
* The balance of the sentence shows that roig & Troödi has dropt out
before Kai Tapoice
PHILEBUS. 107
ing to those present, that pleasure is a possession, neither the
first nor the second in worth, but that the first relates to modera-
tion, and that the moderate and seasonable, and all that it is
meet to consider as such, have 7°obtained the eternal nature.”
Prot. It appears so from what has been said already.
[159.] Soc. And that the second relates to symmetry and
beauty, the perfect and the sufficient, and whatever else is of
that family.
Prot. So it seems.
Soc. In placing, as my divination (says), mind and intellect
the third, you would not greatly pass by the truth.
Prot. Perhaps so.
Soc. And are not the fourth those things, which we assigned
to the soul herself, called sciences and arts, and right opinions f
80 that these are the fourth in addition to those three ; * if, in-
deed, they are more nearly related to the good than to pleasure.
Prof. Perhaps.
Soc. That the fifth are what we laid down as pleasures,
having defined them as painless, and denominated them pure ;
and following not* the knowledge of the soul, but its sens-
ations.
Prot. Perhaps so.
Soc.
Of the song the order in the sixth race close,”
says Orpheus. And our discourse seems to be now closed
*—” Ficinus has “sempiternam vocem approbationem dixisse putan-
ium.” He therefore found in his MS. tipija 0au, which Grou corrected
into ºpjoðat, found in the three oldest MSS. Moreover Stalbaum, in
ed. 1, could not understand atólov påouv, nor can I, as applied to moder-
ation. Some MSS. offer pâouv, answering to “vocem laudationemgue '’
in Ficinus. Others omit pāow entirely. Perhaps Plato wrote Tijv dićtov
36&ng ºpijabat pāow. On the phrase dióiov čáčng, see my note on Craty-
lus, Š 26, n. 73.
*—” I can discover no syntax in raûra sivat—rêrapra, si. I could in
raēta y áp sivat—Tétapta Öst, ei—
** By reading oi raig in lieu of airfig and $7two Tſipatg with one MS. after
correction, we get rid of all the difficulty. Sydenham proposed to expunge
#Trugrīpaug, and so after him Schleiermacher, whom Stalbaum has followed
in ed. 2, after rejecting in ed. 1, the words rig lºvyńg abrijg likewise.
* This verse is quoted in Plutarch, t. ii. p. 391, from this passage of
Plato. It was evidently taken from a Cosmogony, where man was feigned
to be created the last.
108 PHIT, ERUS.
with the sixth decision. After this, nothing remains for us
but to affix ** a head, as it were, to what has been said.
Prot. It is fit that we should.
[160.] Soc. Come, then, let us proceed in calling upon the
same reason, as if it were the third cup to the saviour god, to
bear witness.
Prot. What 2
Soc. Philebus has laid down that the good was wholly and
entirely a pleasure.
Prot. *The third you have, it seems, Socrates, said, just
now, ought to resume the original argument.*
Soc. Yes. But let us hear what follows. I, having seen
thoroughly what I have just now gone through, and disliking
the doctrine not of Philebus only, but of other thousands fre-
Quently,” asserted, that mind was a thing far better, and bet-
ter” for the life of man than pleasure.
Prot. That is the fact.
Soc. But then, suspecting that there were many other
things, I stated that if something” should appear better than
both of those, I would combat for the second prize, in behalf
of mind against pleasure; and that pleasure would be deprived
of the second prize.
Prot. So you said.
* From Sydenham’s “to affix,” obtained from “adhibeamus” in
Ficinus, Stalbaum was perhaps led to read #710sivat for dTroöojvat :
while instead of Kepax)y, I wish MSS. had offered coxopóva, similar to
roXopºv štri Tū-Aóyp 6m8&vrt, in Legg. ii. p. 674, C., and koxopóva
êtrutt0sig rà gopig, in Euthyd. p. 301, E. § 71, where see my note.
*—” I do not quite understand this. One MS. has after correction
rö Töv, which seems to confirm the conjecture of Stalbaum, who suggested
rö for rôv—
* I cannot understand troXXákug thus placed between äXXoy and
puvpiwy. Perhaps Plato wrote kai ka Növ traXXakiöwy pavpiwy, “many
thousand beautiful courtesans.” There are no doubt those, who would
translate troAXàkic pavpiwy, “many times ten thousand.” But as uvpiww
is the definite number for the indefinite, it would not require the addition.
On the other hand, the mention of traXXakiösc is properly introduced, for
such persons are especially the votaries of pleasure.
* I must leave for others to explain the difference between 3%), twov and
dipleuvov.
* Stephens first elicited ru from “aliquid” in Ficinus for rô, and so
the three oldest MSS. -
PHILEBU.S. * 109
Soc. Afterwards it very sufficiently appeared that neither
of these were * sufficient. '',
Prot. Most true. s
Soc. By this reasoning then both mind and pleasure Were
dismissed from being either of them the good itself, being de-
prived of self-sufficiency, and the power belonging to the
sufficient and perfect.
Prot. Very right. is
Soc. But when a third was discovered, superior to either of
those two, mind appeared a thousand-fold nearer related and
more closely adhering to the form of the conqueror than plea-
sure did. -
Prot. How not P -
Soc. The fifth 89 then would be, according to the decision,
which the reasoning has declared, the power of pleasure.
Prot. So it appears.
Soc. But the first place I would not yield up, not if all the
bulls and horses, 99 and all wild beasts whatever should assert it,
to the pursuit of pleasure;” trusting to whom, just as augurs
* Instead of $qāvm Eusebius offers ávspávn: which leads to sivat
8 ſpa v17. -
º An error has infected all the editions of Plato in this place. For
they all read Trépºrtov, “fifth,” instead of écrov, “sixth.” Now the fifth
rank was before assigned solely to the pure pleasures. The sixth and last
rank, therefore, remains to pleasure; which according to Philebus was the
chief good—pleasure in general, at random from any quarter, or, in Plato’s
own words, p. 40, trapátrav, Ötroo'oïv, kal sikā Xaipeiv. The very next
sentence of Socrates shows, beyond all doubt, that sensual pleasure is
here meant.—S. The error might have easily arisen from confounding &
with c. -
* Porphyry, IIspi 'Aroxijg 'Epſilºxov, iii. 1, says that “to certain per-
sons, who were disputing whether pleasure was the ultimate end of man,
Socrates observed, that, were all the Swine and goats in the world to join
in applauding the advocate for pleasure, he would never be persuaded that
human happiness consisted in being pleased, so long as mind excelled and
prevailed in all things.” If Porphyry alluded to this passage in Plato, he
would seem to have found in his copy orieg re kai Toàyou instead of £365g
kai ºrtroi. S.
* I have translated, as if the Greek were oink #4, my &v, obô' àv oi
Trávreg 3ósg—0mpia pāori, and not otö’ &v oi rāvrég-pºort. The error
seems to be of older date than the time of Eusebius; who quotes oik &v
ãºravtsg—pdjat; where however lies hid oilk #4, mw &v rávrég—Respecting
the corruption of Śāv in its moods and tenses, I have written in Class
Journal, No. 44, p. 376, No. 52, p. 367, on Plato's Criton, $ 15, n.
27.
1 IG PHILEBUS.
do to birds, the multitude decide that pleasures avail the
most for living well; and think that the loves of wild animals
are a stronger evidence, than the sayings of those who have
spoken prophetically on every occasion in the Muse of Phi-
losophy.9%
Prot. That the greatest truth has been spoken by you,
Socrates, we all now assert.
Soc. Now then ye dismiss me.
Prot. There is, Socrates, still a little left. For you will
surely not march off before us; and I will put you in mind9% of
what is left unsaid.*
* This seems to have been a poem called Moijoa pixóoropog, written by
Euthyphron, to which there is an allusion in Cratyl. § 57.
* There is some error here, which I have pointed out and corrected on
Hipp. Maj. § 49, n. 6.
* As a specimen of the ingenious trifling of the Neo-Platonic school,
it is worth while presenting the reader with the following extract from
Olympiodorus, as translated by Taylor; who evidently met with a MS.
more full than the one at Nuremburg, from which Stalbaum first printed
the Greek text. “To the question why this dialogue is without a begin-
ning and an end, Olympiodorus replies—'Shall we say that this is be-
cause the good is uncircumscribed, and has neither beginning nor end ?
But it may be said, that on the contrary it is necessary the good should
have a beginning and end; a beginning of such a kind, that there is not
another beginning prior to it, and an end, beyond which there is not any
other end. Perhaps, therefore, it is better to say with our preceptor, that
the mixt life has an end, and such a one as is adapted to all animals. So
that the dialogue is very properly without a beginning, for the purpose of
indicating that there is a certain good beyond that which it investigates.
And again, for the same reason, it is without an end; for there is also
another end more ancient than its end.’” T
INTRODUCTION TO THE CHARMIDES,
ON
TEMPERANCE.
IN this dialogue, which Schleiermacher, Ast, and Socher have
denied to be Plato's for reasons, that have failed to convince Och-
mann and Stalbaum, the object is to disprove what some of the
Sophists had asserted in favour of the value of Temperance, which
was considered one of the four cardinal virtues. By this, however,
the philosophers of Greece did not understand, as we do, the absti-
inence from corporeal pleasures merely, and especially those relating
to eating and drinking, but a steady self-control in the indulgence
of all the feelings and habits, which it is the business of a sensible
education to introduce; and hence, according to Xenophon, in M. S.
iii. 9.4, Socrates is said to have not distinguished it from wisdom.
But though it is defined in The Banquet, p. 196, C. § 22, as
being the mastery over pleasure and desire, yet on the present oc-
casion, instead of giving himself a definition, Socrates is represented
as evading the difficulty of a definition, and being content to
show that Temperance did not consist in what others fancied
it did.
Of the speakers one is Critias, the admirer and teacher of Char-
mides. Now as Socrates seems to have been ever anxious to with-
draw young persons from all connexion with those, from whom they
frequently derived more harm than good, he enters into a convers-
stion with Critias, and carries it on in such a way as evidently to
| 12 INTRODUCTION TO THE CHARMIDES.
wound the self-love of the individual, who fancied himself to be, and
was so considered by others, a man of no little talent. And as he had
probably conducted himself in a similar manner upon other occasions.
it was only natural for the person, who had been once a friend of
Socrates, to become his enemy; for it has been remarked by more
than one observer of human nature, that
No hate is so strong, as what from dead love springs.
CHARM ID ES.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUEe
$0CRATES, CHAEREPHO, CRITIAS, CHARMIDES.
[1..] THE day before yesterday I came in the evening
from the army at Potidaea, and pleased, like a person who had
returned after a long period, I went to my usual haunts for
passing the time; and I entered the wrestling-place of Tau-
reas,' which is opposite to the temple, close by the portico of
the court of the Archon-king.” Here I fell in with very
many persons, some unknown to me, but the greater part my
acquaintances. As soon as they saw me entering unexpectedly,
immediately from different sides they tendered at a distance
their greetings. But Chaerepho, as if he were mad,” leaping
from the midst of them, ran towards me, and taking me by
the hand said, How, Socrates, were you saved from the battle 2
For a short time before we (the Athenians) came away, there
was an engagement at Potidaea,” of which those present here
have just now heard.—And I answering him, said, Thus, as
you see.—[2.] Indeed, said he, it was reported here, that it
was a hard-fought battle, and that many of our acquaintances
had fallen in it.—And you were told, said I, what is very
much the truth.-But, said he, were you in the engagement :
* The Taureas alluded was probably the person mentioned by Demos-
thenes in the Midian Orat. p. 562, D. ed. R., as having been struck, when
he was a Choregus, by Alcibiades.
* This was the second Archon. *
* On Chaerepho’s violence of temper, see Apolog. p. 21, A. § 5.
* To this battle, which took place in Ol. 87. 3, Thucydides alludes in
ii. 58, but attributes the great loss of the troops rather to the plague
than to the battle.
T 14 CHARMIDE8.
.—I was.—Sit down here, said he, and tell us about it, for we
have not yet clearly heard the whole. And at the same time
leading me along, he seated me near Critias, the son of Callaes-
chrus. On sitting down then, I saluted Critias and the rest, and,
according as any one asked me, related what took place in the
army. And some asked me one thing, and others another. And
when we had had enough of such matters, I, in return, made
inquiries about affairs here, as regards philosophy, what was its
state at present; and respecting the young men, whether they
had been remarkable for wisdom, or beauty, or both. [3.] Cri-
tias then, looking towards the door, and perceiving some young
men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd
following behind them, said, It appears to me, Socrates, with,
regard to beautiful youths, that you will know something on
the instant. For those, who are now entering, are the forerun-
ners and lovers of one, who is thought to be the most beautiful”
of all at the present time. And it appears to me, that, having
advanced, he is already near.—But who, said I, is he, and of
whom the son 2–You surely know, said he—although he was
not yet grown up before you went away—Charmides, the son
of our uncle Glauco, and my cousin.—I know him indeed, by
Zeus, said I; for he was not then to be despised, although
but a boy; but now I think he must be almost a young man.
—You will immediately know, said he, of what age, and what
kind he is. And as he was thus speaking, Charmides entered.
—And I, my friend, had no rule to go by ; for with regard to
handsome youths, I am a white rule;” since nearly all young
men appear to me to be beautiful. [4.] But he then appeared
to me to be an object of wonder, both for his size and beauty;”
and all the rest seemed to me to be in love with him ; so
astonished and so disturbed were they, when he entered.
Many other lovers also followed among those, who were be-
hind him. And as to the men like us indeed, this was less
wonderful; but I also paid attention to the youths, (and saw)
* Ficin. has “honestissimus et speciosissimus,” as if he had found in
his MS. kax\torov kai épio'Tow—answering to ca)\ög kai &ya.0öc in § 5.
* The rule alluded to was a string rubbed with a piece of red chalk,
which, when applied to white marble, left a mark sufficiently distinct to
work by ; but if with white chalk, as it left none sufficiently discernibla,
"it failed to answer the purpose of a rule.
* Ficin.—“Corporis proceritate et egregia indole.”
CHARMII) ES. I 5
that none of them turned their eyes elsewhere than on him, not
even the Smallest among them, but all looked upon him, as on
a statue. And Chaeropho calling me, said, What does the
youth appear to you, Socrates? Is he not very beautiful?—
Surpassingly, I replied. — And yet, said he, if he were
to undress, he would appear to be faceless, so very beau-
tiful is his form. And in this all the rest agreed with Chaere-
pho. And by Hercules, I replied, you speak of a man not
to be conquered, if only one small thing still happens
to be his.-What is that ? said Critias.-[5.] If in his soul,
said I, he should happen to be well formed; and it is surely
ecoming, Critias, for him to be so, as being one of your
family.—And he is, said he, very beautiful and good [in this
respect].”—Why then, said I, do we not strip off this very
thing of his, and look upon it prior to his (external) form 2
For since he is of such an age, he will in every respect be
willing to discourse.”—Very much so, said Critias; since he
is a philosopher, and, as it seems both to others and himself.”
ery poetic."—This beauty, friend Critias, I replied, descends
tº you remotely, through your alliance to Solon.” But why
do you not call the youth hither, and present him to me?
For it would be no disgrace for us to discourse with him,
even if he were younger than he is, in the presence of your-
sºlf, who art his tutor and cousin.—[6.] You speak well, said
; and we will call him. And at the same time turning to
his attendant, Call, says he, Charmides, and tell him that I
wish to bring him in contact with a physician, touching the
* By the words kai Taira, Heindorf understands the soul. But as
krkXög kai &ya.0ög include the ideas of beauty bodily and mental, the
words kai Taijra are superfluous; unless it be said that Plato wrote Trávº
rd Nóg kai kará raûra : of which &ya6ög would be the interpretation.
* This reasoning is rather inconclusive. For a person might be beauti-
full both in body and in mind, and yet feel no desire to hold a conversa-
tipn. A similar difficulty exists in the word Tmkukowrog, whether it
is translated “ of such an age,” or “ of such a size.”
* Instead of Šavrº, Groen van Prinsterrer, ºn Prosopograph. Platonic.
p. 214, would read #pavrº, “to myself.”
* Why Critias should fancy that Charmides would be willing to con-
rse, because he was both a philosopher and poet, it is not very easy to
inderstand. Such persons would rather be desirous to express their ideas
writings than by word of mouth.
* According to Proclus on Timaeus, p. 25, this second Crit as was the
glandson of the first, who was the nephew of Scº on.






H 16 CHARMIDES.
weakness of which he lately spoke to me.—Critias then said
to me, Charmides lately has complained of a heaviness in his
head when he rises in the morning. What then should hinder
you from pretending to him, that you know of a cure for the
head?—Nothing, I replied ; let him only come.—And come
he shall, said he. Which was indeed the case; for he came,
and caused much laughter. For each of us that were seated
together, through eagerness to sit near Charmides, pushed his
neighbour, till of those that were seated at the extremity, one
we forced to rise up, and another to fall sideways on the
ground. But he came and sat between me and Critias. [7.]
*Then, however, friend, I was perplexed, and the former
confidence which I had felt, that I could easily discourse with
Charmides, was cut down. But afterwards, on Critias telling
him that I was the person who knew of a cure, he fixed his
eyes upon me in a perplexing manner, and brought himself
near as if to ask a question. Then all that were in the place
of exercise, immediately gathered round us; and when, my
noble fellow, I looked within his cloak, I was inflamed with
the view, and was no longer myself; and I thought that Cy-
dias” was most wise in amatory affairs; who, when º
of a beautiful boy, and giving a hint to another, said,
Gr
sº
* “Beware, when coming in the face of lion,
To take a portion of the flesh of fawn.” ” |
For I seemed to have been caught by an animal of this kind.
However, on Charmides asking me whether I knew of a 1:
medy for the disorder in his head, with difficulty I replie;
that I did know.—What is it? said he.—[8.] It is a certºir
*—” All within the numerals are omitted in the ed. l of Ficinus.
* This is the reading adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from nearl
all the MSS., in lieu of Kpuríav. For the same poet is mentioned, a
Bernhardy was the first to remark, by Plutarch and the Scholiast || 0
Aristophanes.
*—” Hemsterhuis on Lucian, Dialog. Mort. viii., was the first to r
mark, that there is an allusion here to some well-known story; wit
whom Ast agrees in Act. Seminar. Reg. et Societat. Philolog. Lips. t.
p. 255, who says that Hotpav aipeio 6at kpsûv means “to take a pºliº
of the prey;” not as Heindorf translated, “to be torn into pieces
flesh,” which Stalbaum adopts; for one party saw that the genius of 't
language required one interpretation, and the train of thought the othe
The fact is, there is something wanting here to unite the language wi
the thought correctly.












CHARMIDES, 117
leaf, I replied, and a certain incantation in addition to the
medicine, which if any one chanted and used at the same
time as the leaf, the medicine could perfectly restore him to
health ; but that the leaf would be of no use without the
incantation.—And he said, I will write down the incantation
from you.-I replied, Will you do this, whether you persuade
me or not ?—Upon this he said, laughing, I will, if I persuade
you, Socrates.—Be it so, I replied; and do you accurately
know my name 2—Unless I am doing wrong, said he ; for
there is no small talk about you amongst those of my age ;
and I can remember, too, that you associated with Critias
when I was a boy.—You say well, I replied. For I will now
tell you, with greater freedom of speech, what the incantation
is. But just now I was doubtful after what manner I should
show you its power. For this incantation is such, Charmides,
that it is able to make not only the head sound; but, as per-
haps you have already heard from clever physicians, when any
one comes to them with a pain in their eyes, who say that
they must not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is
necessary for them at the same time to attend to the head, if
the eyes are to be in a good state, and, on the other hand, that it
would be great stupidity to think of attending to the head alone
without the whole body. [9.] In consequence of this very
reasoning, they turn themselves to the whole body, and by
diet (and regimen) endeavour to attend to and cure the part
together with the whole. Or have you not heard that they
thus speak, and that this is the case ?–Entirely so, he replied.
—Does it then appear to you that it has been well said; and
do you admit their doctrine —The most of all things, said he.
—And I, on hearing him express his praise, took courage,
and my confidence was again a little excited and I revived;
and such then, I said, Charmides, is the power of this incant-
ation; and I learnt it there during the expedition, from one
of the Thracian physicians of Zamolxis," who are said to
render men even immortal. This Thracian said that “the
Greek physicians beautifully assert the same things as I now
assert. But our king Zamolxis,” said he, “being a god, says that,
as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the
head, nor the head without the body, so neither is it proper
* On Zamolxis see Valckenaer on Herodot. iv. 94, and Sturz on Hella- -
Ricus, p. 64, quoted by Stalbaum. i
18 CHARMIDES.
to cure the body without the soul; and that this was the rea-
son why many diseases escape the Greek physicians, because
they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be
paid ; for when this is not in a good state, it is impossible for a
part to be well. [10.] For all things,” said he, “proceed from the
soul, both the good and bad, to the body and to the whole man,
and flow from thence, as" from the head to the eyes; and that
it is therefore requisite to attend to that point first, and espe-
cially if the parts of the head and the rest of the body are to be
in a good state.” And he said, thou happy youth, “that the
Soul was cured by certain incantations; and that these in-
cantations were beautiful reasons; and that such temperance
was generated in the soul, which, when generated and pre-
sent, can easily impart health both to the head and to the
rest of the body.” Having then taught me the medicine and
the incantations, “Let none,” said he, “persuade you to cure his
head with this medicine, who shall not have first presented
his soul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the
fault, said he, of the present time respecting men is this, that
certain persons endeavour to become physicians without a
knowledge of either [temperance or health].”* [11.] And
he very earnestly enjoined me that no person should be so
rich, or noble, or beautiful as to persuade me to act otherwise.
I therefore—for I swore to him that I would obey him, and
hence I must—will obey him. And indeed if you are willing,
according to the injunctions of the stranger, to present your
soul first for me to enchant by the incantations of the Thra-
cian, I will administer also the medicine to your head ; but if
not, I cannot do any thing whatever for you, friend Char-
mides.—Critias therefore, on hearing me speak thus, observed,
This weakness in his head, Socrates, will be a godsend 19 to
the youth, if he shall be compelled to become through his head
better in his intellect likewise. I assure you moreover that
Charmides is thought to surpass all his equals, not only in his
* Instead of &garsp, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. doraúrwg
For his version is “similiter.” I certainly cannot understand āoºrsp.
* The words within brackets Heusde, with whom Bekker agrees,
was the first to reject as an interpretation of Škarépov; and they are
omitted in one MS. On the other hand, Ficinus omits écarépov.
* Such is the best translation of Eppiaiov, by which was meant literally
any thing of value found in the road, of which Hermes was the tutelary
deity. See The Banquet, p. 176, C. § 4.
CHARMIDES. | 19
form, but in that very thing for which you say you have an
incantation. Now you mean temperance. Is it not so?—
Entirely so, I replied.—Know then, said he, that he appears
to be by far the most temperate of those living at present
and that as regard all other points he is, as far as his age goes,
inferior to none.—[12.] And it is just, I replied, Charmides,
that you should excel the others in all such points as these.
For I do not think that any one of those here could readily
show two families among the Athenians uniting in the same
race, who could probably produce a more beautiful and ex-
cellent offspring than those from whom you are sprung. For
your family on the father's side, that of Critias the son of Dro-
pides, has been handed to us as being celebrated by Anacreon
and Solon, and many other poets, for its excelling in beauty, and
virtue, and the rest of what is called” good fortune. And
on his mother's side again in like manner. For not one of
those that dwell on the continent (of Asia) is said to have
been thought a man of greater beauty and size than your
uncle” Pyrilampes, as often as he went as an ambassador to the
great king (of Persia), or to any one else on the continent ;
and indeed the whole of his family on this side is in nothing
inferior to that on the other. It is likely then that, sprung
from such persons, you should be the first in all things.
Hence, with respect to your visible form, *you appear, thou
dear son of Glauco, to me to disgrace none of your ancestors;”
and if, according to the assertion of this person here, you are
sufficiently endued by nature as regards temperance and the
other virtues, *your mother, dear Charmides, has brought
you forth blessed indeed.” [13.] The case, then, is this: If
temperance is present with you, as Critias here asserts, and
you are sufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the
* Ficinus omits Xeyopišvn, a word apparently unnecessary.
* According to Pollux, iii. 22, the word 0siog, which generally means
an uncle on the father's side, is sometimes applied to one on the mother’s.
*—” In lieu of oióšva röv Trpoyóvov karatoxively, the two best MSS.
(Bodl. and Vienn.) offer a most remarkable reading, oběšva rajv ºrpè oroi,
#v obôsvi útrepòeſ}\nkšval. Plato probably united the two, by adding, after
tºrsp;38(3)\nkšvat, où68 viv as rā Tújv trgoyóvalv Karavoxêveuv, i. e. “not
eize of those before you has surpassed you in any thing, nor do you now
bring disgrace upon the deeds of your ancestors.” The error is to be
traced to the repetition of oióšva and oijöä vöv.
*—” Here is an allusion to Hom. Il. iv. 399; Od. iii. 95; iv. 25, as le.
marked by Heindorf.
| 20 CHARMIDES.
incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris,”
but the medicine for the head should be immediately given
--ou. But if you seem to be still in any respect wanting in
tl,” things, we must have the incantation before giving the
medicine. Do you then tell me yourself whether you agree
with this here (Critias), and affirm that you participate suf-
ficiently in temperance, or whether you are deficient. Here-
upon Charmides, blushing, appeared in the first place to be
still more beautiful—for bashfulness was suited to his age—
and in the next, he answered me not without spirit. For,
said he, It was not easy at present either to confess to or deny
what was asked: for, said he, if I say that I am not tem-
perate, it would be absurd for me to state so against myself,
and at the same time I should show that Critias has spoken
falsely, and many others, to whom I appear to be temperate:
but if, on the other hand, I say that I am temperate, by thus
praising myself, I shall perhaps give offence: so that I do not
know how to answer you.-[14.] To this I replied, You ap-
pear to me, Charmides, to say what is reasonable; and it seems
we should consider in common whether you possess or not
that, which I am asking about, that you may neither be com-
pelled to say what you do not wish, nor I, on the other hand,
turn myself without due consideration to the medical art. If,
therefore, it is agreeable to you, I am willing to consider this
matter together with you ; but if it is not, to leave it alone.—
Nay, but it is, said he, the most agreeable to me of all things;
so that for this matter at least do you consider it in whatever
manner appears to you to be the better.—In this way then, Ire-
plied, the inquiry respecting it seems to me to be the best, if
temperance is present with you, for it is evident that you have
some opinion about it; for it is surely necessary that if it is
really inherent in you, it must furnish some sensation of itself,
from which you would have an opinion respecting it, what it
is, and of what kind a thing is temperance. Or do you not
think so 2–He replied, I do think so.-And could you not
surely tell me, said I, since you know how to speak Greek,
24 Respecting this Abaris, see Herodot. iv. 6. He is fabled to have re
ceived an arrow from Apollo, by the aid of which he was enabled to find
his way through countries he had never before traversed. The arraw is
supposed by Salverté to have been a kind of mariner’s needle, that always
pointed to the north.
CHARMIDsº
what you think of it, and what it appears to you?—Perhaps
so, said he.—That we may therefore conjecture, whether it is
inherent in you or not, tell me, said I, what say you is tem-
perance according to your opinion ? [15.] And at f , in-
deed, he was shy and not altogether willing to answer. After-
wards, however, he said, that temperance appeared to consist
in doing all things orderly and quietly, both in walking and dis-
coursing in the public ways, and acting similarly in every thing
else; and, in short, Said he, a certain quietness appears to be
what you are asking about.—” Are you then speaking correct-
ly 2% said I. At least, Charmides, persons say that the quiet
are temperate. But let us see if they say any thing to the pur-
pose. For, tell me, is not temperance one of the things beauti-
ful?—He replied, Entirely so.--Whether then in a grammar-
school is it more beautiful” to write letters of the same size”
swiftly or slowly f—Swiftly.—And in reading, swiftly or
slowly 3–Swiftly.—And in playing on the harp, rapidly, and
in wrestling, briskly, than quietly and slowly f—Yes.—And
is there not the like in boxing, and contests where boxing and
wrestling are united 2–Entirely so.-And in running and
leaping, and all other actions of the body, do not those that
take place briskly and rapidly belong to the beautiful, and
those that are done *slowly, with difficulty,” and quietly, to the
not beautiful ?—It appears so. —It appears then to us, I replied,
that with respect to the body, not the quiet, but the most
rapid, and most brisk, are the most beautiful. Is it not so?
—Entirely so.-[16.] But temperance was something beauti-
ful?—Yes.—Not quietness, therefore, but celerity will be the
more temperate with respect to the body; since temper-
ance is beautiful.—It seems so, said he.—What then, I re-
plied, is a facility in learning more beautiful than a difficulty?
—It is.-But a facility in learning, I said, is to learn swiftly ;
*—” Here is some error in the words"Ap'oïv—st Aéysvg, which Hein-
dorf wished to correct by writing"Ap' otºv–But ápa, the indefinite par-
ticle, could not commence a sentence.
* In lieu of käXXtorov, Stephens suggested káXXtov from “pulchrius ”
in Ficinus, which Heindorf and Bekker have adopted; but Heusde and
Stalbaum prefer the other.
27 Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, explains àpota by “similar to the
copy set by the writing-master.”
*—” In the Greek 8paôéog påyug rs kai javyā, Heindorf proposes to
expunge 3paôéwg: but Stalbaum, pláyw. Ficin. “ignave remisseque.”
İğ.
*...*
:… .
* *.









and a difficulty in learning is to learn ſquietly andl” slowly.
—It is.-And is it not more beautiful to teach another swiftly
and, vehemently, than quietly and slowly 3–Yes.—What
theº, is it more beautiful 39 to recollect and to remember”
things quietly and slowly, or vehemently and rapidly —He
replied, Wehemently and rapidly.—And is not sagacity a cer
& tain acuteness, and not a quietness of the Soul?–True.—To
A understand then what is meant in the school of the gramma-
} rian, harpist, and every where else, not in the most quiet,
but in the most rapid manner, is the most beautiful.—Yes.—
Moreover in the investigations of the soul, and in deliberating,
not he, who is the most quiet, as I think, and deliberates and
discovers a thing with difficulty, is worthy of praise, but he
who does this most easily and rapidly.—It is so, said he.—
[17.] Hence all things, I replied, relating to the soul and the
body, and such as are performed with quickness and briskness,
appear to be more beautiful than such as are performed with
slowness and quietness.--It appears so, said he.—Temperance
then will not be quietness, nor will a temperate life be a quiet
one, at least from this reasoning; since a temperate one ought
to be beautiful. For one of two things must take place, that
either never, or very rarely, have quiet actions in life been
shown to be more beautiful than such as are swift and strenu-
ous. If then, my friend, not fewer actions, as quiet as pos-
sible, happen to be more beautiful than such as are vehement
and rapid, not even on this ground would temperance con-
sist at all the more in acting quietly, than vehemently and
rapidly, either in walking or in speaking, or in any thing else :
nor would a quiet [orderly]* life be more temperate than the
unquiet one; since by our reasoning, temperance has been laid
down as one of things beautiful; and things swift have ap-
peared to be no less beautiful than things quiet.—You appear
to me, Socrates, he replied, to have spoken correctly.—[18.]
* The balance of the sentence requires the omission of jovyi, kai.
*—” The difference between dvapupivñokso.6at and usuvijo.6au, is not
very perceptible.
* The Greek is jačxtog 3iog köopatog. Ficinus, “neque vita quieta
quam inquieta decentior esset et temperantior,” as if he had found in his
MS. joixlog 3iog roi; pur) jouxtov koopatºrspog kai orwppovéo repoc àvein,
Heindorf, in ed. 1, proposed to cut out côopulog, but in ed. 2 joix10g.
Stalbaum, with Schleiermacher and Schaefer on Gregor. de Dialect, p.
1002, considers kóopuog to be the intrusive word.


CHAIRMIDE. S. 123
- º
Again, therefore, I said, Charmides, be still more attentive,
and looking to yourself, consider what kind of a person tem-
perance, when present, causes you to be, and being what sort
of a thing itself, it would accomplish this. Teasoning, there-
fore, on all these particulars, inform me well, and in a manly
manner, what it appears to you.-And he, stopping a while,
considering the matter thoroughly with himself, said,” in a
very manly manner, Temperance then seems to me to make a
man ashamed and bashful : and temperance to be what shame
is.-Be it so, I replied. But did you not just now acknow-
ſedge that temperance is something beautiful ?—Entirely so,
said he.—Are not therefore temperate, good men —Yes.—
Will therefore that be good, which does not render men good
—It will not.—Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful, .
but good.—It appears so to me.—What then, I replied, will
you not believe that Homer speaks well, when he says, (Od.
xvii. 347,)
Shame ill accompanies a man in need 2
I do, he replied.—Shame, therefore, as it seems, is both not
good, and good.—It appears so.-But temperance is good;
since it makes those good, to whom it is present, but by no
means bad.—The case appears to me to be as you say.—Tem-
perance, therefore, will not be shame, if it happens to be a
good thing, while shame is not in any respect more a good
thing than a bad one.—[19.] It appears to me, Socrates, said
he, that this is rightly asserted. But consider this, what
seems to you on the subject of temperance. For I have just
now recollected what I had heard some one saying, that tem-
perance is to manage one's own affairs.” Consider, therefore,
this, whether he, who says so, appears to you to have spoken
correctly.—Thou vile youth ! I replied, you have heard this
from Critias, or from some other of the sophists.—It seems,
said Critias, from some other person; for he did not from me,
—But what difference does it make, Socrates, replied Char-
mides, from whom I heard it 2–None at all, said I. For we
are not to consider this, who said it, but whether it is said
* The words kai Trévv &vöpukåg ought to follow pm, as I have trans.
lated, not precede Trpèg Éavröv Óuagkell/dpuswoc, as is evident from the
command of Socrates, eitré si kai &vöpukåg.
* The same definition is given in Tim. p. 72, A., quoted by Stalbaum.
124 CHARMIDES.
correctly or not.—Now you speak correctly, he replied.--
By Zeus, I do, said I. But if we discover how this thing
subsists, I shall wonder: for it is similar to a certain enigma.
—On what account P Said he. Because, I replied, the person,
who said that temperance is to manage one's own affairs, did
not mean what his words expressed. Or do you think that
the teacher of letters does nothing when he writes or reads?
-I think (he does something), said he.—[20.] Does the
teacher of letters, therefore, appear to you to write and read
his own name only, or to instruct you boys 2 And are ye not
wont to write no less the names of your enemies than of your
friends?—No less, said he.—When, therefore, ye were doing
this, were ye busily employed, and not temperate 2–By no
means.—And, moreover, were ye not doing your own busi-
ness, if to write, and to read, is to do something It cer-
tainly is. And besides, my friend, to heal, and to build, and
to weave, and to effect by any art whatever any of the works
belonging to arts, is surely to do something.—Entirely So.—
What then, I replied, would that city appear to you to be
well regulated through a law commanding each person to
weave and wash his own garment, and to be the cobbler of
his own shoes, and (make) * an oil-cruse, and curry-comb,
and every thing according to the same reasoning, but not to
touch things belonging to others, but to [work and * manage
his own affairs 2–It would not appear to me so, he replied.—
However, said I, a city temperately regulated would be well
regulated.—How not? he replied.—For a man, therefore, to
do such things as these, and to manage his own affairs, would
not be temperance.—It appears not.—[21.] He, therefore,
who said, that to manage one's own business is temperance,
spoke, as I just now observed, obscurely; for he was surely .
not so stupid " (that his meaning should be the same as his
words).” Or did you, Charmides, hear some silly person as-
*, * According to Heindorf, the verb Trousiv is to be got out of Okvros
Topičiv. But as shortly afterwards we meet with épyáčeq6aí Te Kai
Trpártstv, two verbs perfectly synonymous, it is evident, to myself at
least, that épyáčeo 6ai Ts has lost its original place after oxvtotopeiv. '
*—” The words between the numerals, absolutely requisite for the sense,
have been preserved in the version of Ficinus alone, “ut idem ejus fuerit
sensus, quiet verborum sensus.” Stalbaum says that we are to under-
stand after “so stupid,” “as to think that temperance consists in managing
cºe's own affairs.” -
CHARMIDES. 125
sert this?—By no means, said he ; since he appeared to be
very wise.—More than any thing, therefore, as it seems to me,
he proposed this enigma, because it is difficult to know what
is the transacting one's own affairs.-Perhaps so, said he.—Can
you then tell me, what it is to transact one's own affairs?—By
Zeus, said he, I do not know. But perhaps there is nothing
to hinder the person, who said this, from not knowing what he
meant. And as he said this, he slightly smiled and looked at
Critias. And it was now evident that Critias, who had been for
Some while in an agony, and stimulated by ambition in the pre-
sence of Charmides and those there, and who had with difficulty
contained himself, was then no longer able to do so. And it
appeared" to me more than ever, that what I suspected was
true, that Charmides had heard this definition of temperance
from Critias. [22.] Charmides, therefore, being willing not
to support himself the reason for the reply, but that the other
(Critias) should do so, and urged him on himself,” showed
as if he thought him confuted. This Critias could not endure;
but appeared to me to be angry with Charmides, as a poet is
with an actor who exhibits his poems badly; so that, looking
at him, he said, Think you thus, Charmides, that, if you do not
know what he meant, who said, that temperance is to manage
one’s own affairs, he did not know 2–And I said, It is,
Critias, thou best of men, no wonder that Charmides, who is
but a youth, should not know ; but it is surely likely for you
to know, both on account of your age and attention to the sub-
ject. If then you agree that temperance is, what this person
asserts, and will take up from him the conversation, I shall
with greater pleasure consider with you whether what has
been said is true or not.—Nay, I do agree, said he, entirely,
and accept the conversation.—And you do well, said I. But,
tell me, do you admit what I was just now asking, that all
artists do something?—I do.—Do they appear to you to do
* From “visum est,” the version of Ficinus, and his own “videbatur,”
Cornarius seems to have wished to read #66ket for Öoksi. Compare kai
époi č6óket it spayovtåv, in Euthyd. p. 300, C., and kai époi #66ket—
&ywvtåv in Protag. p. 333, F. The present passage is imitated by Helio-
dorus in AEthiop. ii. 18, as remarked by Boissonade on Philostratus
Heroic. p. 605. -
* I cannot understand airóv šksivov, nor could Ficinus, who has
omitted the clause êtrekiyst at Töv šksivoy. I could have understood
ñºrskivet ékéivov kai airów Śvēēsikvvro dog āsāmāsyašvog sim, i. e. “urged
the other on, and showed that he himself had been confuted.”
126 CHAIRMIDE8.
only their own business, or the business of others likewise?
—Of others likewise.—[23.] Do they act temperately, there-
fore, who only do their own business?—What should prevent
them f said he.—Not myself, Ireplied, at all; but see whether
there be not a hindrance to him, who, after having laid down
that temperance is to transact one's own affairs, afterwards
says, that nothing prevents those who transact the affairs of
others from being temperate likewise.—For where, *said he,
have I confessed that they, who transact the affairs of others,
are temperate, like those, who I confessed make (something) Pº
—Tell me, said I, do you not say that to “make” a thing and to
do is the same thing?—Not I indeed, said he, nor “to work”
the same as “to make,” for I have learned (so) from Hesiod,
who says, “No work is a disgrace.”49—Think you, then, that
if he had called by the terms of “to work” and “to make,”
such acts as you were just now speaking of, he would have
said that there was no disgrace to a person being “a cobler, or
a seller of pickled fish, or of one who sits at a brothel ?”—You
must not think so, Socrates: but he I think did consider “a
making” as something different from “action” and “working;”
and that “making ” is a disgrace, when it does not take place
in conjunction with the beautiful; but that no “work” is ever
a disgrace. For things which are made beautiful and useful,
he called “works,” and “makings” of this kind workings and
doings. [24. You must say too that he considered such
things (good)* alone as belong to home ; but every thing
hurtful, as foreign. Hence, you must think that Hesiod, and
every other sensible person, calls him, who transacts his own
*—” I have adopted Troiſ, “where,” instead of trov, “surely,” and #
for fi, suggested by Morgenstern in Miscellan. Crit. Hildesiens. i. p. 91,
and introduced tu before trouoivrag. Ficinus has “an et eos, qui-faci-
unt,” as if he had found in his MS. ºi kai—
" The Greek in the Works and Days, v. 309, is "Epyov 6' oióēv čvsvöog.
But there, as remarked by Heindorf, Épyov does not mean “work” ge-
nerally, but only specifically “farming-work; ” nor does obôāv belong to
ëpyov, but to Švenčoc.
*—” The three trades alluded to were considered the lowest at Athens.
On the meaning of oikmpia, applied, by an euphemism, to a brothel, see
Harpocration, Poliux, and Hesychius.
* Stalbaum explains rà rouaira by the preceding rā ca)\gg kai dºps-
Atuog trototypesva. But the balance of the sentence indicates that àya.6d.
has dropt out after hysio flat; to say nothing of the subsequent remark of
'Socrates, 3rt Tá oikeió Te Kai Tà airoi; &yabá ka)\oing.
CHARMIDES, 127
affairs, temperate.—As soon, Critias, as you began to speak, I
perceived almost, that you called things belonging to home, a
person's own by the name of good, and “the making” of
things good, actions. For I have heard Prodicus, when speak-
ing of terms, make some ten thousand distinctions; and I will
allow you to lay down every term as you please; but do you
only clearly state, to what you would refer the term, of which
you may be speaking. Now therefore again from the begin-
ning define more clearly. Do you say that temperance is
the “doing,” or the “making,” or in whatever manner you
choose to call it, of good things?—I do, said he.—He therefore
is not temperate who acts badly, but he who acts well.—He
replied, Does it not, thou best of men, appear so to you ?—
Dismiss this question, said I: for let us not consider what ap-
pears to me, but what you are saying now.—[25.] Nay, said
he, I do not assert that he is temperate, who does not do good
but evil, *but that he is temperate, who does good and not
evil.” For I clearly define to you, that temperance is the
practice of things good. And perhaps there is nothing to
prevent you from speaking the truth. But nevertheless I
should wonder, if you thought that persons who conduct
themselves temperately were ignorant that they are temperate.
—But I do not think so, said he.—Was it not, said I, asserted by
you a little before, that there is nothing to prevent artists, who
make on the other hand “things belonging to others, from being
temperate 2–It was so asserted by me, said he ; but what
then P-Nothing. But tell me, does any physician appear to
you, while making a person to be in health, to do what is use-
ful both to himself, and to him whom he cures?—To me he
does.—Does not he, then, who acts thus, do what is fitting 2–
Yes.—And is not he temperate, who does what is fitting 2–
He is temperate.—Is it not then fitting for a physician to
know when he is curing usefully, and when not ? and for each
artist to know, when he will derive a benefit from the work
which he is doing, and when not ?—Perhaps not, said he.—
*—” All the words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and
consequently by Taylor.
* I cannot understand at here, nor could Heindorf, who thinks it was
owing to cat—I suspect that Plato wrote kai rā air-tov kai rā Tºv di)\\ww,
unstead of kai ai Tà rav ćMX ww. .
128 CHARMIDES,
Sometimes then, I replied, when a physician acts usefully
or hurtfully, he does not know himself how he is acting; al-
though, according to your doctrine, when he acts usefully,
he acts temperately; or did you not say so?—I did.—[26.]
Does it not then seem, I replied, that sometimes, when he acts
usefully, he acts temperately, and is temperate, but is ignorant
himself that he is temperate 2–But this, said he, Socrates,
could never take place; yet if you think that this necessarily
results from what I have admitted above, I would rather
retract some of those assertions; nor should I be ashamed to
confess * that I have improperly asserted something,” rather
than admit that the man, who is ignorant of himself, is tem-
perate. (For I almost assert, that to know oneself is temper-
ance ; and I agree with him who placed the precept upon the
temple at Delphi, as being an address from the god to the
comers, instead of “hail!” Since this last [to hail]* is not
a correct address, nor should we exhort each other to this,
but to be temperate. [27.] Thus the god addresses those
coming to the temple, in a manner somewhat different to
what men do; as he had in his mind, it appears to me, who
put up the inscription;” and he says to the person coming
nothing eise than “be temperate;” but, as being a prophet,
he expresses it more enigmatically. For “Know thyself.”
and “Be temperate,” is the same thing, as both the writings
and myself assert.” But perhaps some one may think it to
be different; which appears to me to have been the case with
those, who placed the subsequent inscriptions, “Nothing too
much,” and “A surety is near to calamity.” For they
*—” The Greek is 3rt pºſſ obyl, where Bekker would read 3rt 6)—
But pur) of thus follows &varí0spat in Phaedo, p. 87, A., and Meno, p.
89, D. He might have suggested ró ru for Ört. For thus Tö pur) oil are
perpetually found between two verbs. According to Stalbaum, there is
here a confusion of two constructions, one of which would require étu.
and the other reject it.
* The words roi; Xaipew are evidently an explanation of Toàtov: or else
we must read with one MS. Toij, xaipe, as just above, &vri Toij, Xaips.
* I cannot understand Ög 6tavootius wog án:#0mkºv 6 &vaðsic. I could
have understood &g 6tavooëpswog jv à & va6eig. Ficinus has “ut sensit
ille, qui inscripsit.” -
* Ficinus has “ut literae testantur, egoque interpretor,” which is evi"
dently more elegant.
** The authors of these apophthegms respectively are not known
for certain. See Menage on Diogen. Laert. i. 41.
CHARMIDES. 129
thought that “Know thyself” was a bit of advice, and not
an address from the god for the sake of the comers; and
then, that they might put up bits of advice not less useful,
they put up these inscriptions. Now the reason, Socrates,
for the sake of which I am saying all these things, is this—
(that) I give up to you all that has been said before; for per-
haps you have spoken more correctly about them; and per-
haps, too, I; and there is, of what we have said, nothing
very clear. But now I am willing to give you the reason for
this, if you do not concede, that temperance is to know one-
self. [28.] But, Critias, said I, you come against me, as if
I asserted that I had a knowledge of what I am asking about,
*and if I wish, having agreed with, you.” But this is not
the case. For I am seeking with you continually what is
placed before us, through being myself ignorant. Hence,
after having considered, I am willing to say whether I agree
or not. But do you stop, till I have considered.—Consider
then, said he.—I do consider, said I.-For if to know a thing
is temperance, it is evident that temperance would be some
science, and of some thing. Or would it not?—*It is, he
replied, and of itself.”—Is not then medical science, said I, the
science of that which is healthy?—Entirely so.-If then, said
I, you should ask me, for what is the medical science of
that, which is healthy, useful to us, and what does it effect,
I should reply, that it is of no small utility, because it effects
for us health, a beautiful work. Do you admit this?—I do
admit it.—And if then you should ask me, what work does
*—" The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, who
perceived, no doubt, that they were unintelligible. The Greek is, kai,
#&v 6m BoöAwpaw, ÖpioMoyàgavrog oot—But the idea of the future in Šáv
(30tºwpaw is at variance with the idea of the past in Öpoxoyńoravrog.
Ficinus has “offersque mihi te, si voluero, concessurum,” as if he had
found in his MS. ÖpioMoyńorovra at 6tówg. But that Critias was certainly
not likely to do. Heusde suggested 6poxoyhoovrog goi, which Stalbaum
is disposed to adopt. But the consent of Socrates, to be of any value,
ought to be the result of his reason, not of his will. Instead then of Ör),
which has no meaning here, I would read puri–i. e. “and even if I do
not wish it’—and, with Heusde, ŠpioMo'yūgovrog oot—“about to agree
with you.”
*—52 The Greek is "Earty dig #pm Šavrot, ys in one MS. But in all the
rest dig is omitted. Ficinus has “Est utique sui ipsius videlicet,” with-
out Épm. But as the question is twofold, so ought to be the reply. Plato
wrote "Eart rug, pn Šavrot rs—as Taylor has translated,
K
i80 CHARMIDEs.
house-building, which is the science of house-building, effect,
I should say, dwellings; and (I should reply) in a similar
manner with respect to other arts. [29.] Since then, Critias,
you say that temperance is the science of itself, you must,
when asked, be able to tell in behalf of temperance, what beau-
tiful work does temperance, being the science of itself, effect,
and which deserves to be mentioned. Come then, tell me.—Nay
but, Socrates, said he, you do not make the inquiry correctly.
For temperance is not naturally similar to the other sciences,
nor are the other sciences similar, some to some, and others to
others. But you make your inquiry, as if they were similar.
For tell me, said he, what work is there in the calculating or geo-
metric art, which is of the like nature with a dwelling, the work
of the house-building art? or with that of a garment, the work
of the weaving art 2 and in other works of such a kind, many
of which any one would be able to show, as belonging to many
arts P Can you in these show me any such work? You will
not be able.—You speak the truth, said I. But this I can
show, of what thing each of these sciences is the science, and
which is something different from the science itself. Thus, for
instance, the calculating science is the science of the even and
the odd, how they are situated as regards multitude, with respect
to themselves and to each other. Is it not ?—Entirely so, he re-
plied.—Are not, therefore, the even and the odd different from
the calculating science 2–How not ?—Moreover, the weigh-
ing science is that relating to a heavier and lighter weight; now
the heavy and the light are different from the weighing science
itself. Do you agree to this?—I do.—[30.] Tell me then,
of what is temperance the science, and which is different from
temperance itself?—This is that very thing, Socrates, said he,
to which” you have arrived by seeking in what point does
temperance differ from all (the other)* sciences: but you are
seeking after some similitude in it to other sciences. This,
however, is not the case. For all the other sciences are
sciences of another thing, but not of themselves; but this
alone is both the science of other sciences and of itself likewise.
And these things ought to be far from lying hid from you.
* Instead of Štr' airó, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. 6—For
his version is “quod quaeris—” Cornarius has “ad idem—redis,” which
would lead to #7ti rairò—
* Ficinus alone has “omnibus aliis;” in Greek tragöv Tóv àAAww.
CHARMIDES. 131
But I think you are doing the very thing, which you just
now said you were not doing : for you are attempting to
confute me, after leaving alone that, about which is our dis-
course.—What are you doing, said I, by your thinking that if
I should confute you as much as possible, I should do it on
any other account, than for the sake of thoroughly searching
out what I mean myself; as I am fearful lest, whilst I think I
know something, I am unconsciously knowing nothing P And
now I say I am doing this, while considering the argument,
principally indeed for my own sake, but perhaps also for
the sake of the rest of our friends. Or do you not think it
is a good, common for nearly all men, that each thing should
become apparent in what state it is 2–Very much so, Socrates,
said he.—[31.] Boldly then, said I, O give, thou blessed man, an
answer when asked, how the matter appears to you, and leave,
whether it is Critias or Socrates who is confuted, to go hang; *
but giving your attention to the reasoning itself, consider
whither it will go, when confuted.—I shall do so, he replied:
for you appear to me to speak with moderation.—Tell me then,
said I, what do you mean on the question of temperance?—I
mean then, he replied, that this alone, of all other sciences,
is both the science of itself and of the other sciences. Will
it then, said I, be the science of ignorance, since it is of
science?—Entirely so.-The temperate man therefore alone
will know himself, and be able to examine what it is he hap-
pens to know, and what he does not; and in like manner he will
be able to look into the rest of things, what it is that a person
knows, and thinks (he knows), "if indeed he knows,” and
what on the other hand he thinks he knows, but does not
know ; but no other person (will be able).” And this then
is to be temperate; and it is temperance, and the knowledge of
neself, to know what one knows, and what one does not know.
re these the things you assert?—They are, he replied.—[32.]
* This is the nearest English equivalent to £a Xalpêty.
*—" These words, simple as they are, I confess I hardly understand
he very balance of the sentences proves that they are not in their place.
* Ficinus alone has “poterit,” as if he had found in his MS. oiósig oióc
Stalbaum translates rejv Šē &AAwy obôsig—‘ ‘ust as no one of the
est of mankind.” But there is nothing to answer to “Just as, ’’ and it
here were, it would destroy the antithesis between uávog, just before, and
sv a.M.Awy ovč’ tic, here.
8.




















K 2
132 CHARMIDES.
Again then, said I, let us consider the third point” from the be-
ginning, as if it were (the cup) to the saviour deity. In the first
place, whether it is possible or not to know, with respect to what
a person knows, and does not know, that he does know, and
does not know ; and, in the next place, if this be ever so com-
pletely possible, what will be the utility of it, to us, who know
it.—It is requisite, said he, to consider this.-Come then,
Critias, said I, and consider whether you are more able to
find a way on these points than myself. For I am in doubt,
and where I am in doubt I will tell you.-By all means,
said he.—” The following consequence then will ensue,” I
replied, if there be, what you just now asserted, some one sci-
ence, which is the science of nothing else than itself and the
rest of the sciences, and of ignorance besides.—Entirely so.-
See then, my friend, how absurdly we have endeavoured to
argue. For if you consider this very same thing in other
matters, it will, I think, appear to you to be impossible.—[33.]
How and where?—In these. For consider, whether it appears
to you that a seeing power exists, which is not the seeing power
of those things, which are the objects of the rest of seeing
powers, but is the seeing power of itself and the rest of see-
ing powers, and similarly of not seeing powers; and though
it is a seeing power, it does not see any colour, but (sees)
itself and the rest of the seeing powers. Does it appear to
you that there is such a seeing power as this?—By Zeus, it
does not to me at least. What then (say you) to the hearing
power, which does not hear any sound, but hears itself, an
the rest of the hearing powers, and the non-hearing powe
besides 2—Nor yet this.—To speak briefly then, consider wit
respect to all the senses, whether it appears to you that ther
is any sense, which perceives other senses and itself, but per
ceives none of those things which the other senses perceive.
* I have translated as if the Greek were rô rptrov, Šotrºp rº, Xajript
not rô rpírov rift Xu'ript &gtrep.–For the third cup given to the saviour
god, as shown at Phileb. p. 66, D. § 160, is compared with the third in
quiry, as remarked by Heindorf; for the first was whether temperanc
consisted in managing one’s own affairs; the second, whether it consiste
in self-knowledge; and the third is now to be mooted.
*—” Such is Taylor's English version of the Latin translation of F
nus, “sequentur hac—” which was introduced to render intelligible t
Greek, "AX\o ri obv-Trávra raûr’ &v sin; literally, “Would all the
things be any thing else " I think, however, the passage is corrupt.










CHARMIDES. 133
It does not appear to me at least.—But does it appear to you
that there is any desire, which is the desire of no pleasure,
but is the desire of itself and of the rest of desires?—It does not.
—Nor, as I think, is there any will, which wills no good, but
wills itself alone and the rest of wills.—There is not.—But
would you say that there is a love of such a kind, as to be the
love of nothing beautiful, but which is the love of itself and
the rest of loves 2—Not I, said he.—Have you ever conceived
that there is any fear, which fears itself and the rest of fears,
but fears nothing fearful ?—I have not conceived, said he.—
[34.] And (have you conceived) any fancy, which fancies fan-
cies and itself, but which forms no fancy respecting those things,
which are the subjects of the rest of fancies?—By no means.
—But we say, as it seems, that there is a science of such a
kind, as to be the science of no learning, but the science of it-
self and the rest of sciences.—We do say so. —99 Would it not
be strange" if there were (such a science)? For let us not
strenuously assert that there is not, but consider if there be.—
Right.—Come then, there is this science, the science of some-
thing; and it does possess some such power, as to be the science
of something. Is it so?—Entirely so.--For we also say that
the greater possesses some such power, as to be greater than
something?—It does so possess.--Is it not then greater than
something less, if it is (greater)?—Of necessity.—If there-
fore we should find something greater, which is greater than
the greater and than itself, but which is not greater than any
f those things than which the rest of things are greater, it
ould surely be in this situation, that if it is greater than
tself, it would be also less than itself?—Of this there is, So-
rates, a great necessity, said he.—[35.] If therefore there is
any thing which is the double of the rest of doubles and of
tself, it will be the double of the rest of doubles and of itself,
n consequence of its being the half; for nothing can be the
ouble of any thing else than of the half—True.—But being
ore than itself, will it not also be less than itself? and being
eavier, be lighter than itself? and being older, be younger than
self? and similarly as regards all other properties P For
hatever has a power of its own with respect to itself, will it
ot possess likewise that existence, to which that power is re-
*—” I have translated as if the Greek were Oëk obv av drotov sin,
ăpa—not Ois obv drowow, si àpa–







134 CHAIRMIDES.
lated ? I mean some such thing as this. For instance, we say
that hearing is nothing else than a hearing of sound.—Is it not
so 2–Yes.—If therefore it could hear itself, would it not hear
itself, as having a voice? For otherwise it would not hear.—
This is perfectly necessary. — The sight too, thou best of
men, if it could itself see itself, must necessarily have some
colour. For sight would never be able to see any thing colour-
less.-It would not.—You see therefore, Critias, that the
matters we have gone through, appear to us to be, some of
them, altogether impossible; and of others it is greatly disbe-
lieved that they could have a power of their own with º:
spect to themselves. For as regards magnitudes, multi-
tudes, and things of this kind, it is perfectly impossible. Or
is it not ?—Entirely so.-[36. Again,” [that hearing (hears
itself), and sight (sees itself), andjº' that motion moves itself,
and heat burns (itself), and all other such like assertions,
would bring disbelief to some, but to some perhaps not.
There is then, my friend, a need of some great man to draw suf-
ficiently a distinction through all things on this point, whether
of existing things not one [except science] * has naturally
a power of its own with respect to itself, but with respect to
another thing, or that some have, and some not: and again, if
there are certain things, which (have a power) with respect t
themselves, whether amongst these is the science, which we
say is temperance. For I do not believe myself to be suffi
cient to draw such a distinction. Hence I am not able t
affirm positively, whether it is possible for this to take place
that there is a science of science; nor, if there is, will I ad
mit that temperance is that science, until I have considere
whether, being such, it would be useful to us, or not. For
divine that temperance is something useful and good. Do yo
then, son of Callaeschrus, since you lay down that temper
ance is this science of a science, and likewise of a not-science
—show in the first place this; that what I have just no
mentioned [it] is possible *[for you to show];” and in th
next place, in addition to its being possible, show that it i
*—" The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation. F
the question relating to hearing and sight has been already discussed.
* The words TAñy Štriotăpung were first rejected as an interpolatio
by Schleiermacher, whom Bekker and Stalbaum have followed.
*—* Ficinus has—“Ostende primum possibile hoc esse, quod sup


















CHARMIDES, 135
useful; and thus perhaps you will satisfy me that you are
correctly speaking about temperance, what it is.-[37.] On
Critias hearing this, and seeing that I was in doubt, he did, as
they do, who, through looking in the face of those, who are
gaping, are affected in the very same way; and he seemed to
me to be compelled by my doubting to be seized with a doubt
himself. However, being in great repute on every occasion,
he felt a shame before those who were present; and was
neither willing to concede that he was unable to draw the
distinction on points that I had proposed to him, nor did he
say any thing clearly, but concealed his perplexity. But, said I,
—in order that the discourse might proceed—if it seems good
to you, Critias, let us now concede this, that it is possible for
a science of a science to exist. But let us consider again
whether it is or not in this way. Come then, if it is in the high-
est degree possible, in what way is it the more possible to know
what a person does know, and what he does not ? For we
surely said that this is to know oneself, and to be temperate. Or
did we not ?—[38.] Entirely so, he replied; and this happens
in a certain respect to be the case, Socrates. For if any one
possesses the science, which knows itself, he will be such as
that is which he possesses. Just as when any one possesses
swiftness, he is swift; and when beauty, is beautiful; and
when knowledge, is knowing. So too when any one possesses
the knowledge, that knows itself, he will surely then become
knowing himself—To this I replied, I do not doubt that
when any one possesses that, which knows itself, he will be then
knowing himself; but, what necessity is there for the person
who possesses this knowledge, to know what he knows, and
what he does not know 2–Because, Socrates, this” is the same
with that.—Perhaps so, I replied; but I am near to being
always similar (to myself).” For I do not well" understand
67 how it is the same thing for a person to know, what he
dicebam ; ” whence Heindorf was led to reject & Troösiéat as, whom Bek-
ker and Stalbaum have followed. The fact is that dººročeišat is a va-
rious reading for £vösićat.
* Instead of rô airó, Cornarius proposed toiro, from Ficinus’ “hoc.”
* After Öpotog Heindorf supplies āpavrij. He should have read &st
ipoi powg: and in Sympos. p. 173, D. § 2, "Asi èpotog goi, & 'AtroAAó-
3alp', si, similar to “dispar sibi’’ in Horace; as I onght to have men-
tioned on that passage.
* In lieu of at Plato evidently wrote sº—
136 CHARMIDES.
knows, and to know what he does not know.”—How do you
mean f said he.—Thus, I replied. Since there is a science of
science, will it be able to draw a distinction more than this;
that of these things this is a science, and that is ignorance 2
—It will not; but thus far alone. —Is the science, then, and
ignorance of that, which is healthful, the same with the science
and ignorance of that, which is just 2—By no means; but the
one is, I think, a medical, and the other a political science;
but this is nothing else than a science.—How not ?—[39.]
He therefore who does not know the healthy and the just, but
knows only a science, as alone possessing a science of this,
that he knows something, and that he possesses a certain
science, would probably have a knowledge respecting both him-
self and the other things. Is it not so?—Yes.—But how will
he by this science know what he knows? For he knows the
healthful by medical science, and not by temperance; and the
harmonical by musical science, and not by temperance; and
house-building by house-building science, and not by temper-
ance; and so in every thing else. Is it not so 2–So it ap-
pears.-But how by temperance, if it is only a science of
sciences, will he know that it knows the salubrious, or house-
building 2—By no means.—The person then ignorant of this
will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.-So
it seems.—To know then what he knows and what he does
not know, will not be to be temperate, nor will it be temper-
ance, but, as it seems, only that he knows, and that he does
not know.—It nearly appears so.-Nor will this person be
able to examine another, who professes to know something,
whether he knows, or does not, what he says he knows; but
as it seems he will only know thus much, that he possesses a
certain science, but of what thing, temperance will not cause
him to know.—It does not appear it will.—[40.] Neither
then will he be able to distinguish one who pretends to be a
physician, but is not, from one who is a true physician; nor
any one else of those who are skilled or who are not. But let
us view it from these points. If a temperate man, or any
other person, intends to distinguish the true and false phy-
sician, will he not act in this way? He will not discourse with
him respecting the medical science; for, as we have said, a
*—” Stalbaum, who once differed from Schleiermacher, who conceived
this passage to be corrupt, now agrees with him.
CHARMIDES. 137
physician attends to nothing but the healthy and the diseased,
*(the salubrious and the noxious).” Is it not so?—It is.—
Bat of science he knows nothing; for this we have attributed
to temperance alone.—Yes.—The physician therefore will not
know any thing of the medical art, since the medical art is a
Science.—True.—And the temperate man will know, that the
physician possesses a certain science; *but some one else will
look into the science of the physician, what it is, and of what
things; which is then laid open, when it is known of what
things it is the science.” Or is not each science defined by this,
by not only being a science, but by being what, and of what
things?—Yes.—And the medical science has been defined to
be different from the rest of sciences by its being the science
of the healthy and diseased.—It is.-I41.] Is it not therefore
necessary, for the person wishing to consider the medical
science, to view it in the things in which it is ? For it is
surely not (to be considered)79 in things external, in which it
is not.—Certainly not.—He therefore who considers rightly,
will consider a physician, so far as he is a physician, in things
healthy and diseased.—So it seems.—In what is thus" either
said or done, he (will be) considering whether what is said is
said truly, and what is done is done correctly 2–It is neces-
*—” The words within numerals have been preserved by Ficinus alone
in his version, “ salubreque et noxium.”
*—” Such is the English of the Latin of Ficinus. The text by Bekker
is Štruxsupóv ć 6:) Treigav, Aaggiv, #rug #ariv ćAAo ru akšperat &vruvav :
where Étruyeupów is due to two MSS. This has been twice adopted by
Stalbaum, and translated each time in a different manner. So too
Heindorf has in his two editions made two different attempts to restore
the original; while Ast has made a third. Perhaps Plato wrote—iarpóv, on
#Truxeupāv Ór) rºw #1treuptav Aaffeiv, # rig Boriv, d\\oc rug aké:/srat rq,
Tuvalv sivat, i.e. “ whose skill some other person, endeavouring to com-
prehend what it is, will have a view of it by its being (the skill) in some
things—” where àAXog is due to “alius,” in Ficinus, adopted by Heindorf;
while ovruvay, which being without accents or breathings, in MS. Bodl.
gives the usual proof of a corruption, has been changed into rqi ruvan,
£ivat, found in the very next sentence; where however we must read ºf
où, Toârg, Öptorat ākāorm štriarhum rò pur) pièvov Štrugrīpum sivat, d\\d
rai rºm rig ruvøy tº sivat, as I have translated, instead of étructiipum, pur)
. #Trioriipum sivat, &AAd kai rig rº ruvov ćival, which I cannot under-
Stand.
* Ficinus has “quaerenda videtur,” as if he had found in his MS. oi,
ydp &mirov okétr+éov, not oil yáp 6%trov merely.
* Heindorf, justly objecting to roic of rug, properly suggested roic
rosotrowg, i. e. “in things of this kind.”
I38 CHARMIDES.
sary.—But could any one without medical science be able to
follow either method —Certainly not.—Nor yet can any
other person, as it seems, but the physician, nor truly” the tem-
perate man. For he would be a physician in addition to tem-
perance.”—So it is.-More than all, if temperance is merely
the science of a science, and of ignorance, it will be able to
distinguish neither the physician, who knows his art, nor him,
who does not ; the person who pretends to be, and him, who
thinks he is (a physician); nor any other person, who knows
any thing whatever, except a fellow-artist, as is the case with
other operatives.—It appears so, said he.—[42.] What utility
then, Critias, shall we derive from temperance, if it is of such
a kind? For if, as we laid down at the beginning, the temper-
ate man knew what he knew and what he did not know—the
former because he knows, and the latter because he does not
know—and if he were able to consider respecting another per-
son affected in the very same manner, there would, we assert, be
some vast utility to us in being temperate. For both we, who
possess temperance, and all the rest that were governed by us,
would have passed through life without fault; for we should
neither ourselves have endeavoured to do any thing, which we
did not know, but finding out those who did know, we should
have handed over those things to them; nor should we have
permitted to the rest of those, whom we commanded, to do any
thing else than what by doing they would do well; now this
would be that, of which they possessed a knowledge. And
thus a family governed by temperance, would be about to be
well governed, and a state (correctly) administered, and
every thing else, over which temperance rules. For error be-
ing taken away, and rectitude being the leader in every action, it
is necessary for the persons thus situated to act honourably
and well, and for those who act well, to be happy. [43.]
Were we not, Critias, speaking 74 in this manner about
temperance, saying how great a good it is to know what one
” Stalbaum has written an elaborate note about oits 6m thus following
oùrs. I wish it had occurred to him to suggest oit', oió' sº: for olò’
st would thus be properly opposed to dig £ouks.
* The introduction of Tā owpportivº, instead of rij odºppovi, seems very
Strange.
* Heindorf objecting to the version of Ficinus, “ dicebamus,” says that
‘diceremus,” in Cornarius, is more correct. But then äv would be
required; and so it would to answer to Stalbaum’s “dicturi eramus.”
CHARMIDES. 139
does know, and what one does not know?—Entirely so, he re-
plied.—But now, said I, you see that no such science has
appeared to us any where.—I see it, he replied.—Has not
therefore, said I, temperance, which we have now found to
be that, which knows both science and ignorance, this good,
that he who possesses it, will easily learn whatever else he
may attempt to learn, and all things will appear in a clearer
point of view to him, inasmuch as he is looking upon the
science, which relates to each thing he may learn ? And will he
not examine other persons better respecting what he may learn?
And must not they, who examine others without this, do it in
a more weak and trifling manner P Are these, my friend, the
things we enjoy through temperance? and do we look to some-
thing greater, and seek for it to be greater than it is 2–Pers
haps, said he, this would be the case.—Perhaps so, I replied ;
but perhaps too we have sought after nothing useful. [44.]
And I conjecture so, because certain absurdities distinctly
present themselves to me respecting temperance, if it be of
such a nature. For let us see, if you please, admitting that
it is possible for science to know,” and, what we laid down at
the beginning, that temperance is to know what it does know,
and what it does not know, let us not take this away, but con-
cede it; and having conceded all these points, let us still better
consider, if being such it will benefit us at all. For what we
just now said, that temperance would, if it were of such a nature,
be a great good, by regulating families and states, appears to
me, Critias, to have been not correctly conceded.—How So, he
replied.—Because, said I, we too easily conceded that it would
be a great good to mankind, if each of us performed those
things which we knew, and committed those, which we did
not know, to persons who did know.—Did we not then, said
he, rightly concede 2–To me, I replied, we did not appear so.
—You are speaking, Socrates, said he, really absurdly.—By
the dog,” said I, so it appears to me. And just now, look-
ing to these points, I said, that they seemed to me to be ab-
surd, and that I was afraid we had not rightly considered
* Heusde acutely saw that there was some error here; and by com-
paring p. 169, D. § 37, he wished to read yewäo Bai étriotăpunºv #Truaràung
ôvvaröv eival. He ought rather to have suggested #triotao'6ai ru 3i'
irrorium, étriorâunç, i. e. “to know something through the science of a
SC16I1C62,
" On this Socratic oath see my note on Hipp. Maj. § 18, n. ..
140 CEIARMIDES
them. [45. For in reality, if temperance be ever so much
of such a nature, it does not appear evident to me, what good
it will effect for us.-How is this? said he ; speak, that we
may also know what you mean.—I fancy, I replied, that I am
trifling; nevertheless it is necessary to consider that, which
presents itself to our view, and not carelessly to pass it by,
if any one takes the least thought of himself—You speak well,
said he.—Hear then, I replied, my dream, (no matter) whether
it has passed through the gate of 77 horn or ivory.” For if tem-
perance ruled us ever so much, would it not, being such as we
have now defined it, be acted upon according to the Sciences;
and neither would he, who boasts to be a pilot when he is not,
deceive us; nor would a physician, or a general of an army,
or any other person, who pretends to know that, which he does
not know, lie hid from us. But from this state of things
something else would happen to us; for our bodies would be
more healthy than at present, and we should be preserved,
when in danger at sea and in war; and all our utensils and gar-
ments, and all our shoes, and all the necessaries (of life), all
things else, would be made more scientifically through our
employing true artists. [46.] And if you are willing, let us grant
that prophecy is the science of that, which is to be ; and that
temperance, presiding over it, turns away the boastful diviners,
but appoints over us the true prophets of things to come.
Furnished then in this way, the human race would, I concede,
act and live scientifically. For temperance being our guard, it
would not permit ignorance to interfere and cooperate with us.
But that, by acting scientifically, we should do well and be
happy, this, friend Critias, I am not yet able to understand.—
But, he replied, you will not however easily find any other
method of doing well, if you despise the doing a thing scientifi-
cally.—Instruct me then still a little, said I, of what scientifical
doing are you speaking 2 Is it that of leather-cutting 2—By
Zeus, it is not.—Is it that of brass-work?—By no means.—But
is it that of working in wool, or wood, or any such things?—
It is not.—[47.] We do then, I replied, no longer persist in
the assertion, that he is happy, who lives Scientifically. For
77—77 Macrobius in Somn. Scip. c. 3, has preserved a fanciful explana-
tion given by Porphyry of the fiction in Homer, Od. xix. 562, relating to the
two gates of dreams, which the admirers of the Neo-Platonic school will
io well to consult.
CHARMIDES. 141
those artists, although living scientifically, are confessed by
you to be not happy; *but you seem to me to separate the
happy man from them, when they possess a science of certain
things.” And perhaps you call (happy) the diviner, whom I
just now mentioned, who knows all that is to be. Do you
mean this, or any other person —Both this, said he, and an-
other.—What other ? I replied. You surely do not speak of
the person, who knows, in addition to future events, every
thing past and present, and is ignorant of nothing; for let
us admit that there is such a man, you will not say, I think,
that any one lives more scientifically than he at least does.—
Certainly not.—But this also I desiderate—Which of the sci-
ences makes him happy 2 Or do all the sciences equally pro-
duce this effect?—By no means equally, said he.—But which
the most 2 Is it that, by which he knows some of things pre-
sent, past, and to come 2 Is it that, by (which he knows) the
science of back-gammon 27°–What back-gammon 2 he re-
plied.—But is it that, by which (he knows) the calculating sci-
ence?—By no means.—But is it that, by which (he knows)
things healthful.—Rather so, said he 2–(48.] *But is it, said
I, that, of which I am speaking especially, by which (he knows)
what?”—By which (he knows) good and evil.—O thou vile
man, I replied; * who for some while hast been drawing me
round in a circle, concealing from me, that to live scientifically
was not the causing” to do well and to be happy, nor belonging
78–78 This is the English of Stalbaum’s Latin version, to which he
seems to have been led by finding in Ficinus—“At forte e multis insci-
enter wiventibus unum quemdam certa ex Scientia scienter wiventem
beatum determinas;” who must have met with something very superior
to the common Greek text, which is literally, “but concerning some liv-
ing scientifically you seem to me to set apart the happy.”
* As in the game called trerreia, mention is made both of pebbles, or
dice, and of lines, it was probably something like the modern back-
gammon.
89–80 The Greek is 'Ekstvm 6', iiv \#yw padºugra, jv 6 #yd), j ri; out of
which both Heindorf and Stalbaum have failed to make a satisfactory
sense and syntax. Ficinus, “ Illa vero, quam dico maxime, quâ, quid
norim.” Perhaps Plato wrote ’Ekeivny 6' oiv \#y's; pad Xuora, jv Ö'éyò,
y ri; i. e. “Do you then state in the best way, said I, that, by which (he
knows) what?” where äketvmy is due to two MSS.
*—81 Here again the version of Ficinus differs greatly from, and is
in some respects superior to, the Greek—“jamdiume clam circulo reflectis
retrahisque ad id, ut beatum vivere non sit secundum universas scientias
wivere; immo Secundum unam quandam boni malive scientiam.”
142 CHARMIDES.
to all the other sciences, but to one (science) alone, relating to
good and evil. Since,” Critias, if you were willing to take
away this last science from the other sciences, the physician's
science will no less cause one to be healthy; and that of the
shoe-maker, to be shod; and that of the weaver, to be clad ;
and (no less) the pilot's science prevent one from losing one's
life at sea, and the general's science in war?—No less, said
he.—But, friend Critias, by this science being absent, it will
be no longer left for each of those (other sciences) to turn
out well and usefully.—You speak the truth.-But this sci-
ence, as it seems, is not temperance, but that, the work of
which is to benefit us: for it is not the science of sciences
and ignorances, but that of good and evil. So that if this
be useful, temperance would be something else than” useful.
—[49.] What then, said he, would not temperance be useful ?
For if temperance is as much as possible a science of sciences,
and presides over the other sciences, it will surely benefit us
by ruling over that science which relates to the good.—But
will temperance, I replied, cause us to be in health, and not
the medical science? And will this perform the rest of the
works of the arts, and not the rest, each its own work? Or
did we not some time since testify that temperance is a sci-
ence of science, and ignorance alone, but of nothing else?
Is it not so 2–So it appears.--It is not then the worker of
health.-Clearly not.—For health is the work of another
art. Is it not ?—Of another.—Nor is it, my friend, of util-
ity; for we attributed this very work to another art. Did
we not ?—Entirely so.-How then will temperance be bene-
ficial, since it is the worker of no utility ?–By no means,
Socrates, as it seems.—Do you not see then, Critias, that I
felt very properly some time since a fear, and justly blamed
myself, because I could descry nothing useful about temper-
ance P For that which is confessed to be the most beautiful
of all things, would not have appeared to us to be useless, i.
there were any thing useful in myself towards making a
search correctly. [50.] But now,” for we are vanquished on
every side, and unable to discover for what purpose the name-
* In lieu of the unintelligible Étrei, Heindorf proposes to read eitrè—
* Schleiermacher acutely supplied for the sense the m, wanting in al.
the MSS.
* On this aposiopesis see Heusde and Heindorf.
CHARMIDES. 143
founder* assigned to temperance this very name. And yet
we have conceded many things that did not result (correctly)*
from the reasoning. For we conceded, that there is a science
of sciences, although the reasoning neither permits nor asserts
this; and on the other hand, we conceded that we know by
this science the works of the other sciences—the reasoning per-
mitting not even this—in order that the temperate man might
be one, who has a knowledge of what he knows, because he
knows, and of those which he does not know, because he does
not know. This indeed we conceded very liberally, without
ever considering that it is impossible for a person to know in
any way whatever what he does not know at all. 87 For our
concession says that he knows those things, because he does
not know them.” And yet as I think there is nothing which
would appear more absurd than this. The inquiry however,
having met with us so very easy tempered and by no means
morose, is not a bit more able to discover the truth; but has
rather laughed at it so much, that, what we formerly conceded
to be temperance, and, after moulding it into some shape, laid it
down to be, this it has very saucily shown to us as being of no
use. [51.] On my own account then I am less indignant; but
for your sake, Charmides, I am, said I, very indignant, if you,
so beautiful in body, and most temperate to boot in mind, derive
no advantage from this temperance, and if it does not by its
presence bring to you any benefit during life. But I am still more
indignant for the sake of the incantation, which I learned from
* Instead of vopo6érng, Heindorf suggested 61,0paroBérng, similar to:
“nominum auctor’’ in Ficinus. The reading has been subsequently found
in five MSS., and though adopted here by Stalbaum, it has been uni-
formly rejected by him in the Cratylus. From this allusion to etymology,
one might suspect that this dialogue preceded the Cratylus, where the idea
cf uniting etymological with philosophical inquiries is more fully developed.
* I suspect si has dropt out before Šv–
*7–87 This is the literal versibn of the Greek—&ti yüp oikołós (pmoiv at-
rz sióšvat huérepa špoxoyia which Heindorf renders “Dedimus enim
eum de iis scire se ea nescire,” which I cannot understand. Stalbaum’s
version is “Concessimus enim eum scire nescire Seilla, quae nesciat,” i. e.
“We have conceded that he knows he does not know what he does
not know.” But neither scholar has taken any notice of Ött, while both
seem to have wished to read &rt ydp & oilk oiós pmoiv airów sióēvat. Fi-
cinus has “In hoc autem concessimus, videlicet aliquem ignorantem
aliqua, quod non cognoscat, cognoscere,” who thus took 6tt as a pronoun,
not àrt as a conjunction, and omitted airá, for which one MS. offers
7/
aúròg,
144 }HARMIDES.
the Thracian, if being a thing of no worth, I have learnt it with
so much labour. I do not then *[very much then]* think that
this is the case, but that I am a bad searcher; since (I con-
sider) temperance to be a great good, and that, if you possess
it, you are blessed indeed. But see whether you do possess
it, and do not require at all the incantation. For if you do
possess it, I would rather advise you to think me a trifler, and
incompetent to search out any thing whatever by a course of
reasoning, and yourself so much the happier, as you are the
more temperate.—But by Zeus, Socrates, said Charmides, I
do not know whether I possess it, or not. For how can I
know that, which not even you can discover what it is, as
you say yourself? I am not however much persuaded by you;
and I consider myself, Socrates, to be greatly in want of the
incantation; and no business of mine hinders me from being
daily enchanted by you, until you shall say that I have had
enough.-[52.] Be it so, said Critias. But, Charmides, if you
act thus, it will be a proof to me at least that you are temper-
ate, if you will give yourself up to Socrates to be enchanted,
and will not desert him for any thing, either great or small.
—(Consider me,) said he, as about to follow and not to desert
him. For I should act in a fearful manner, if I did not obey
you, my tutor, nor do as you bid me.—Nay then, said Critias,
I do bid you.—I shall therefore do so, said Charmides, begin-
ning from this very very day.—But what, said I, are ye two
deliberating to do?—Nothing, said Charmides: we have ceased
to deliberate.89—Will you then, said I, use violence, and not
grant me a previous inquiry —(Consider me) as about to
use violence, said he, since Critias commands me. Do you
therefore take counsel about what you are to do.—But no con-
sultation, said I, is left for me: for not one man will be able
to oppose you, when endeavouring to do any thing yourself
and forcing him.—Do not you then oppose me, said he.—I
shall not indeed, said I, oppose you.
88–88 The words within brackets Stalbaum rejects as arising from
an error in transcription. In the Greek letters Trávu pièv oſſºv lies hid
rávv &vspitaia: where àvepuaia, literally “wind-heavy,” is applied first
to what are called “wind-eggs,” in which there is no chicken; and Se-
condly, to arguments that have no reason in them. The word is used by
Plato in Theaetet. p. 151, E., 161, A., and 210, B.
* The perfect passive is used here as in Criton, p. 46, A., ovë 3ovXétéo-
8at £rt &ga, àXXà 3s,300Xsögóat, and means “to cease to do.” So in
Eurip. Hippol. 1457, Kekaprépmrai rāpā—is the reply to saprépét: and
so too in Virgil, “Fuimus Troes.”
INTRODUCTION TO THE LACHES,
OR.
O N F O R TITU D E.
As Plato had in the Charmides discussed the question relating to
Temperance, one of the cardinal virtues, so in the Laches he has
taken for his subject another, with the view of showing that it is
equally difficult to give a definition of Fortitude. Like the Char-
mides too this dialogue has been rejected by Ast as a spurious pro-
duction, fathered upon Plato, for reasons which Stalbaum asserts
are not of the least weight; and who correctly remarks that there
is such a similarity between the manner of the two dialogues, as to
show that they must have been written by the same hand; and
hence, until the Charmides can be proved to be not genuine, it is
needless to inquire into the authorship of the Laches. For though
there is some discrepancy in the view here taken of Fortitude, and
what is stated in the Republic, iii. p. 386, and iv. p. 427—430, yet
that, says Stalbaum, may be accounted for on the supposition that
in this dialogue we have the opinion of Plato, when he began his
career as a philosophical writer, but in the more elaborate work
the result of his matured reflection. Schleiermacher indeed con-
ceives that the Laches was a kind of supplement to the Protagoras.
But as it wants the subtlety to be found there, Stalbaum is disposed
to believe that it preceded rather than followed that dialogue.
Be however the author who he may—and I confess I can see no
reason for doubting its genuineness—the dialogue alludes to some
L
146 INTRODUCTION TO THE LACEIES,
curious circumstances not mentioned elsewhere, and which could
hardly be known except to a person contemporary with Plato;
who shows towards the end of the dialogue that the theory, which
he was contending against, emanated from the school of Damon,
the Pythagorean, of whom it would seem from the Protagoras, $ 20,
and Alcibiad. i. § 30, he had not so high an opinion as Pericles and
others had.
LAC HE S.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
LYSIMACHUS, MELESIAS,” NICIAS, LACHES, AND ran soxs
of LYSIMACHUS AND MELESIAS, AND SOCRATES.
LYSIMACHUS.
[1..] YoU have seen, Nicias and Laches, the man fighting
in armour;" but on what account I and Melesias here invited
you to see him with us, we did not then tell you; but now we
will mention it; for we think it is proper to speak freely to you.
There are, indeed, some who laugh at things of this kind;
and if any one consults with them, they will not say what
they think; but making a guess about the views of the per-
sons consulting them, they speak what is contrary to their own
opinion. Thinking however that you are sufficiently qualified
to know, and that knowing you would state simply what you
think, we have thus taken you as our associates in the con-
sultation respecting the matters we are about to communicate.
Now the question, about which I have made this lengthy pre-
* A son of Aristides the Just.
* A son of Thucydides, one of the political opponents of Pericles.
* A general of the Athenians, who, after a victorious career, perished
at last in the Sicilian expedition.
* An Athenian admiral, mentioned by Thucydides as a contemporary
of Nicias.
* Dacier thought that this fighting in armour was an exercise similar
to what is taught in fencing schools. It was more probably like the
riding schools for the cavalry, where the soldiers are taught the Sword
exercise. According to Athenaeus, iv. p. 154, E., the person who first
taught this fighting in armour was one Demeas of Mantinea.
L 2
148 I, ACHES.
face is this. These are our sons That youth, the son of
Melesias here, is called Thucydides, bearing his grandfather's
name; and this one here, Aristides, is mine, and bears my fa-
ther's name; for we call him Aristides. It has been determined
therefore by us to pay all the attention to them in our power,
and not to act as the many do who, when their children be-
come lads," suffer them to do as they please, but to begin already
to take care of them as far as we can. Knowing then that
you also have children, we have thought that there has been a
care respecting them to you, if to any one else, how they
might become the best by being attended to. If however
you have not frequently paid attention to this matter, we will
now remind you, that you ought not to neglect it; and we
call upon you to take upon yourselves, in common with us,
the charge of your sons. But from whence we have so de-
termined, it is requisite for you, Nicias and Laches, to hear,
although the narration be rather long.
[2.] I and Melesias here take our meals together, and these
lads have their food at our side. As I stated then at the
commencement of the discourse, we shall speak freely to you.
For both of us are able to relate to the youths many beautiful
feats of our fathers, which they did both in war and peace,
while they were administering the affairs of our allies and of
the state here. But neither of us have to relate deeds of our
own. For this we feel, in the presence of these youths, a
shame, and we find fault with our fathers because they per-
mitted us to live the life of rakes when we became lads, and
they were busily employed about the affairs of others. These
very things we point out to these youths, and tell them that
1f they neglect themselves, and do not obey us, they will be
in disrepute; but that, if they pay attention to themselves,
they will perhaps be worthy of the name they bear. They
say indeed they will obey us; but we are considering, by
learning what and pursuing it steadily they will become the
best of men. Now some one has introduced to us this kind
* The original pºstpákta seems to correspond to the English “lads.”
For according to the anonymous Greek interpreter of Ptolemy's books
De Judiciis, p. 166, the seven ages of man are 3pépog, traig, pºstpártov,
véoç, dump, Tpeogūrmg, Yêptov, i.e. “infant, boy, lad, youth, man, elderly
man, old man;” T. who might have referred to Solon Epigr., 14, the
counterpart of Shakspeare’s Seven Ages.
, LACHES. 149
of instruction, and said that it would be well for a young person
to learn to fight in armour; and he praised the party whom you
have just now seen exhibiting, and invited us to see him like-
wise. We determined then that it was requisite for us to come
ourselves, and take you along with us to the sight, in order that
you might not only be fellow-spectators, but fellow-counsellors
and co-partners, if you were willing, in the matter relating
to the care to be paid to children. These are the subjects on
which we wish to communicate with you. It is now, there-
fore, your part to advise about this kind of instruction, whe-
ther it appears they ought to learn it or not, and about the
rest, if indeed you are able to praise any kind of discipline or
study for a young man, and to state what you will do touch-
ing this matter in common.
[3.] Nic. For myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud
your notion, and am prepared to do this in common, and so I
think is Laches here.
Lac. You think with truth, Nicias. And what Lysima-
chus has just now said about his father, and the father of Me-
lesias, appears to me to have been very well said, both against
them and us, and all such as engage in political affairs. For
there nearly happens to them, what he says, both with respect
to their children and the rest of private concerns, that they are
considered of little account and treated negligently. On these
‘points, therefore, Lysimachus, you have spoken correctly.
But I marvel that you should call upon us to be fellow-coun-
sellors about the education of youth, and not call upon So-
crates here, who is, in the first place, of the same demus;" and
secondly, has ever his haunts there, where there is any thing
connected with the points you are in search of, relating to
young persons, either of instruction or an honourable pursuit.
Lys. How say you, Laches? Does Socrates here make any
thing of this kind his study ?
Lac. Very much so, Lysimachus. -
Nic. I too can assert this not less than Laches. For he
lately introduced a stranger to me, as the instructor of my son
in music, Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, a man most de-
serving of favour, not only for his skill in music, but in other
7 By “demus” is meant a parish, being a part of what would be called
in the city of London “a ward,” as I have shown in the Glossary to
my translation of the Midian oration of Demosthenes, p. 83.
150 LACHES.
respects worth what you will for young men such as these to
pass their time with.
[4.] Lys. No longer, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, do I
and my equals in age have any acquaintance with younger
persons, inasmuch as we for the most part pass the time with
our family on account of our period of life. But if, son of
Sophroniscus,” you have any thing to advise for the good of
this” your fellow-wardsman, you ought to communicate it:
and you are justified (in doing so); for you happen to be a
friend on your father's side; for I and your father were always
associates and friends; and he ended his days before he had
any difference with me: and some recollection came round
me as these persons were speaking ; for these lads, while
talking with each other at home, made frequent mention of
Socrates, and very much praised him ; but I never have asked
them whether they spoke of Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus.
Tell me now, children, is this the Socrates of whom you so
often made mention ?
Sons of Mel, and Lys. Yes, father, it is the same.
Lys. It is well, by Juno, Socrates, that you give a support"
to your father, who was the best of men, in other respects,
and this too, that your interests shall be mine, and mine yours.
Lac. And, moreover, Lysimachus, do not omit the acts of
the man; for I have elsewhere beheld him, not only giving a
support to his father, but to his country likewise. For, in the
flight from Delium,” he retired along with me; and I tell you,
that if the rest had been willing to be such (as he was), our
city would have stood erect, nor would so great a disaster
have befallen it.
[5.] Lys. This, Socrates, is indeed honourable praise, with
which you are extolled by men worthy to be believed, and (to be
praised)” for those verythings, for which they praise you. Rest
h I have preserved the Latinized name as being better known than
ere.
* By “this ’’ Lysimachus means himself.
* With the idea contained in the verb épôoiv may be compared the
expression in Eurip. Iph. T. 57, XtvMou yāp oikov traičág siow époevec.
* To the courageous conduct of Socrates allusion is likewise made in
The Banquet, $ 43.
* Ficinus has what the sense evidently requires, “qui in iisdem lau-
dandi et ipsi sunt, in quibus te laudant,” having no doubt found in his
MS. xai sic rabrå, sig & otitoi o' trauvoiſoruv, Štrauveto 6at. Ast theree
MACHES. 151
assured, then, that in hearing this, I am right glad that you
are in high repute; and do you consider me amongst those the
most kindly disposed towards you. You should therefore
have been the first to visit me, and to believe me your familiar
friend, as it was just for you to be. Now therefore, from this
very day, since we have recognised each other, do not do
otherwise, but be with me, and become the acquaintance of
myself and these youngsters, in order that you may preserve
our friendship. You then will do this, and we will again re-
call it to your memory. But with respect to the matters
about which we commenced, what say you? What, does it
appear to you that this instruction is suited to lads, or not?
*[the learning to fight in armour.]”
Soc. Nay then about these matters, Lysimachus, I will en-
deavour to advise, if I am able; and moreover to do all
that you invite me to. It seems however to me to be the most
just for myself, as being the younger, and the less experienced
in these matters, to hear first what these persons say, and
learn from them. And if I have any thing to say contrary
to what has been stated by them, then indeed to teach and
persuade both you and them. But, Nicias, why do not
*one of you speak the first?”
[6.] Nic. There is nothing to prevent it, Socrates; for it
appears to me that this kind of instruction is on many accounts
useful for youths. For it is well to pass the time not in another
place and in the pursuits, in which young men are wont to make
for themselves an occupation, when they are at leisure, but in
this, from whence they necessarily have the body in a better
condition ; for it is not inferior to any of the gymnastic
exercises, nor has it less labour; and at the same time both
the exercise and equestrian skill are especially proper for a
liberally educated man. For where we are the combatants in
fore justly finds fault with the Greek kai sic raiſra eig & otirot #Tatvoú-
ouv: which Stalbaum however would defend. Heusde too saw that
#Tratveio.6at had dropt out; but he incorrectly wished to insert rai
#Trauveia,0at after Truo reisobat.
im. The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of rô
atºmpta.
*—” The MSS. vary between arpórspoc, and trórspoc, and Örörspoc.
Plato wrote either Ašyst ırpórspog 6trórepoc, or else Aayeug ºrpórspoc,
similar to “ipse prior loqueris”—in Ficinus; which Stalbaum once ap-
proved of, but subsequently rejected.
152 LACHES.
a contest, and in those (exercises) in which a contest is pro-
posed to us, they alone contend who are exercised in these
very instruments relating to war. In the next place, this
instruction will be of advantage in battle itself, when it is ne-
cessary to fight in a rank with many others. But it is the most
useful, when the ranks are broken, and when it is necessary
in single combat either in pursuit to attack a person defending
himself, or in flight to defend oneself, while another is making
an attack. For he who is skilled in this art, will suffer nothing
at the hands of one, and, perhaps, not at the hands of many;
but will every where through this come off the best. And
still further, a thing of this kind incites to the desire of an-
other honourable kind of instruction. For every one who has
learnt to fight in armour, will also desire the instruction re-
specting the arrangements of an army; and having obtained
this, he will, through the love of honour in these points, press
forward to every thing connected with generalship. And lºit
is already evident” that he will attend to all instructions and
studies connected with them, both honourable and well worth
while for a man to learn and attend to, and to which this in-
struction has been the leader. And we will add to this, a no
trifling addition, that this very science will make every man
in no small degree more daring and brave in battle 19than he
was before.” Nor let us hold it in dishonour to say, although
it may appear to any one a rather small matter, that it gives a
man a graceful bearing, where a man should appear the most
graceful;" and where through this graceful bearing he will
at the same time appear more terrible to his enemies. To me
then, Lysimachus, it appears that, as I have said, we ought to
teach young men these things; and I have stated why it ap-
pears so. But if Laches has any thing to say contrary to this,
I shall hear him with pleasure. - -
[7. Lac. It is difficult, Nicias, to assert respecting any
*—” Heusde, justly offended with #6m Öij\ov, proposed to read ri Sei
8mVoiv, i. e. “why need one show.” Perhaps Plato wrote kai, & #6m
AñAtov, i. e. “ and what Delium knew”—For the very spot, where the
Athenians lost the day through their want of discipline, would be properly
appealed to as a witness to the truth of the present remarks.
*—” This is Taylor’s correct translation of airóg at Toij, united to a com-
parative, on which see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 452. --
* I have adopted siloxmpověoratov, found in two MSS. and similar to
“maxime aptum”-—in Ficinus.
Laches. 153
instruction whatever, that one ought not to learn it; for it
appears to be good to know all things; and especially this
science of arms; if it is a thing to be learnt, as those say who
teach it, and such as Nicias speaks of, one ought to learn;
but if it is not a thing to be learnt, and those are deceiving
us who promise to teach it, or if, being a thing to be learnt,
it is not of much worth, why should one learn it? this I say
concerning it, through looking to these points, that, if it were
of any value, I think it would not have lain hid from the
Lacedæmonians, who have no other care in life than to seek
and study that, by which they may surpass others in war. Now
if this art were concealed from them, yet this fact would not
have been concealed from the teachers of it, that the Lacedæ-
monians do, the most of all the Greeks, pay attention to things
of this kind; and by them he would be honoured for it, and be-
yond” all others he would make the most money, just as a tragic
poet is honoured by us. For he, who thinks that he composes
tragedies well, does not go about to other cities at a distance
from, and in a circle round, Attica, and make an exhibition
there; but he straightway comes hither, and exhibits himself to
the people here, for a very good reason. But I see that the per-
sons who fight in armour, consider Lacedaemon assacred ground,
not to be trodden; and do not walk upon it even on tip-toe ;
but they go round it, and rather exhibit themselves to all, and
especially to those who would acknowledge that many are be-
fore them in warlike matters. [8.] In the next place, Ly-
simachus, I have been acquainted with not a few of these men
during the work itself, and I have seen what kind of men they
are. And we may form a judgment of them from this circum-
stance. For, as if with a fixed design, not one of those, who
has applied himself to the science of arms, has ever become
illustrious in war; although in all other cases men have become
celebrated from among those, who have paid attention to
each science. But these men, as it seems, have been, as com-
pared with the rest, in this respect so very unfortunate. For
this very same Stesileus, whom you beheld together with me
exhibiting himself in so great a crowd, *and saying the great
* Instead of trapó, correct Greek requires Trépa- -
*—” The words within numerals are omitted by Taylor, although
found in Ficinus. - - * … - - -
154 ILACHES.
things in truth” which he said of himself,” I have seen him
truly displaying himself elsewhere, in a far better manner,
though unwillingly. For when the ship, on which he was
aboard as a marine, fell upon a merchant vessel, he fought
with a spear headed with a scythe, a weapon as different
*(from other weapons)” as he was himself from the rest *(of
the combatants.)” Other particulars respecting the man do
not deserve to be related; but how his plan of the spear in
addition to the scythe turned out * (must not be passed over
in silence);” for while he was fighting, (the weapon) became
somehow entangled in the tackling of the (enemy's) ship;
Stesileus therefore pulled in order to disengage it, but he was
not able to effect his purpose; and the one ship passed by the
other. In the mean time he followed the course of the ship
holding by his spear. But when the enemy's ship had sheered
off, and was drawing him in, as he was still holding by his spear,
he let the spear down towards his hands, until he had only
hold of it by the stump. Hereupon there arose a laughter and
shout from those on board the merchant vessel, at the figure
he made; and some one having pelted him with a stone that
fell just at his feet, he threw himself from the spear upon the
deck. And then indeed they who were in the trireme were
no longer able to restrain their laughter on seeing the spear
headed with a scythe hanging from the ship. [9.] Perhaps
therefore this art may be of some use, as Nicias says ; such
however are the circumstances which I met with myself.”
Hence, what I said at first, if it be a thing to be learnt, it
possesses but little utility; and if it be not, and persons say
and pretend it is a thing to be learnt, it is not worth while to
* Stalbaum endeavours, I think, unsuccessfully to defend $v rá áAmósíg
&c &Amóðg.
*—” Ficinus has alone preserved the words requisite for the sense in
his version, “instrumentum—ab aliis longe diversum.”
*—” The words within numerals Taylor added to complete the sense.
Plato probably wrote, not 8tapépov, but Öopvpópov; thus making a dis-
tinction between Öopvöpétravov and 66pv.
*—” Here again we are indebted to Ficinus for a supplement neces-
sary for the sense. His version is, “Hoc tamen non erit silentio praeter-
eundum.” Perhaps Plato wrote drooſłrivat of xprſ between dºré9m and
Maxópºevov.
* Jacobs supposes that the story alluded to took place when Laches
was the admiral of the fleet sent to Sicily, as stated by Thucydides, iii. 90.
LACHES. 155
endeavour to learn it. For it appears to me, that if any one
being a coward should think he ought to learn it, and through
it become more bold, it would become only more apparent
what he is ; but if a brave man (learnt it), he would through
being watched by every one have to endure, if he erred but
little, calumnies of a grievous kind. For the pretension to this
Science is exposed to envy; so that unless he surpasses others
n valour to a wonderful degree, it is not possible for him, who
asserts that he possesses this science, to avoid becoming ridi-
culous. Of such value, Lysimachus, does the pursuit of this
kind of instruction appear to be to myself. But it is requisite,
as I said at first, not to let this Socrates go away, but to re-
quest him to give his opinion as to the view in which the mat-
ter appears to him.
[10.] Lys. And I do indeed request you, Socrates: for
it appears to me that the consultation requires a person to
decide. For had these agreed, there would have been no need
of such a person. But now—for you see that Laches has given
an opposite (vote)” to Nicias—it will be well to hear from you
with which of the men you are a fellow-voter.
Soc. What then, Lysimachus, are you about to make use of
that, which the majority of us shall praise ?
Lys. What else, Socrates, can any one do?
Soc. And will you too, Melesias, act in this manner? And
if the consultation were about the contending art for your son,
*what he ought to practise,” would you rather obey the
many than one, who happened to have been instructed under
a skilful teacher, and had practised himself.
Mel. It is reasonable, Socrates, (to obey) him.
Soc. You would therefore obey him rather than us four
Mel. Perhaps so.
Soc. For that which is about to be judged correctly ought,
I think, to be judged by science, and not by a multitude.
Mel. How not P
Soc. It is meet therefore to consider now this very thing
in the first place, whether any one of us is an artist in the
matter about which we are consulting, or not. And if any of
us is, we should obey him, although he is but one, and dismiss
* After śvavríav supply pijpov.
*—” The words within numerals are omitted by both Ficinus, and
Taylor.
I56 LACHES.
the rest. But if not, we must seek some other person. Or, do
you and Lysimachus think that a hazard is run respecting a
trifling thing, and not respecting that very possession, which is
the greatest of all belonging to you? For by the sons being
good, or the contrary, the whole of their father's house will
be regulated in such a manner, as the children may turn out.
Mel. You speak the truth.
Soc. One must therefore have much forethought on this
point.
Mel. Certainly.
Soc. How then, what I just now stated, should we have con-
sidered, if we had wished to inquire which of us is most ex-
pert in the contending art? 27Is not he, who had learned and
studied, and to whom there had been good teachers of this
very thing?”
Mel. To me at least it appears so.
Soc. And prior to this, * (should we not have considered)
what the thing is,” of which we are seeking the teachers?
Mel. How say you ?
Soc. In this way, perhaps, it will be more manifest. [11.]
It does not seem to me to have been conceded by us at first,
*what is the thing about which we are consulting and con-
sidering,” which of us is (the most)” skilled, and for the sake
of this has taken masters, and which of us is not. ‘.
Nic. Were we not considering,” Socrates, about fighting
in armour, whether it was proper lads should learn it or not ?
Soc. Entirely so, Nicias. But when any one considers
about a remedy for the eyes, whether it ought to be applied
or not, whether think you should the consultation be about
the remedy, or about the eyes.
*7–27 Stephens alone has seen that the sentence is incomplete ; which
is thus supplied by Ficinus—“nonne eum perscrutati essemus, qui
et didicit et exercuit, cui videlicet idonei hujus rei praeceptores ex-
gtiterint.”
*—* Before rivog ávrog rotºrov, Stalbaum would supply, as Taylor
had done already, Šakotročjusy &v: but he prefers, in lieu of oi; &mtotiuév,
to read #&m Toiſutv.
28–29 Ficinus has more tersely, “quid illud sit, in quo perquirimus—”
* Taylor has adopted the superlative from “peritissimus ” in Fi-
CIIlllS.
* Ficinus—“quaerebamus” — which leads to $okoroúpew for gaos-
oupév.
LACHES. 157
Nic. About the eyes.
Soc. Hence too when any one is considering about a bridle
for a horse, whether it should be applied or not, and when,
he will then consult about the horse, and not about the
bridle.
JVic. True.
Soc. In one word then, when any one is considering any
thing for the sake of any thing, his consultation is about that
thing for the sake of which he is considering, and not about
that, which” he was seeking for the sake of something
else.93
Nic. Necessarily so.
Soc. It is necessary therefore to consider whether the
fellow-counsellor is skilled in that thing, for the sake of which
*we are considering what we are considering.”
Mel. Very much so.
Soc. Are we not saying then, that we are inquiring about
a thing to be learnt for the sake of the soul of the young
man Ż
Nic. Y S.
Soc. Whether then any one of us is skilled in the art
of attending to the soul, and is able to well perform this at-
tendance, and who has had good teachers, must be considered.
Lac. What then, Socrates, have you never seen persons
become more skilful in some things without teachers than with
them ż
Soc. I have, Laches; to whom however you would not be
willing to trust, if they said they were good artists, unless
they could show you some well-finished work of their art,
both one and many.
Nic. What you say is true.
[12.] Soc. And for us too, Laches and Nicias, it is requi-
site, since Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to a con-
32 To Cornarius is due à for oy—
* Thus the horse is that, for the sake of which a man considers about
a bridle; but the bridle is that, which is sought, for the sake of the
horse. T.
*—” Bekker has properly adopted okotroipuev & aroTroöpley, the emend-
ation of Matthiae in Gr. Gr. § 558, for okotroëpswot okotroëpusy, unsuccess-
fully defended by Stalbaum. For though a kottsio 6at and okotrsiv are used
by Plato indiscriminately, yet they could not be found thus united, where
the perpetual phrase, like okotroëpsy & oxotročplēv, is required.
158 TACHES, -
sultation with them respecting their sons, through their being
desirous that their souls should become the best possible, that
we, if we say we have had masters, should show who they
were, who "in the first place” being themselves good
teachers, and having attended to the souls of many youths,
appear in the next place to have instructed us likewise. Or,
if any one of us shall say that he has had no teacher, he ought
at least to be able to speak of his own works, and to show
what Athenians or foreigners, what slaves or freemen, have
become good confessedly through him. But if neither of these
is in our power, we must be ordered” to seek after others,
and not run the risk in the case of the sons of persons our
friends, of incurring the greatest blame from their nearest re-
latives for doing them a mischief. Now with respect to my-
self, I am the first to say, Lysimachus and Melesias, that I
have had no teacher in this matter; although, beginning from
my youth, I have felt a desire for such a thing. But I am
not able to pay the sophists their fees, who alone profess
themselves able to make me a man beautiful in body and
mind; and by myself even now I am unable to discover the
art. If however Nicias or Laches have either discovered or
learned it, I should not wonder; for they have a more money-
power than myself, so as to be able to learn from others; and
they are at the same time older, so that they may have already
discovered it (themselves.)” And they appear to me to be
able to instruct a (grown) man; for they would never have
so fearlessly expressed their opinions about pursuits good and
bad for a young person, unless they believed they had a suffi-
cient knowledge of them. Now as to the other things, I do
indeed believe them; but I have wondered that they differ
from each other. [13.] Hence, as Laches just now bade you
not dismiss but interrogate me, so now I make a request in
turn for you not to dismiss Laches and Nicias, but to interro-
gate them ; at the same time telling them, that Socrates says
he has no knowledge of the thing, nor is he competent to de-
cide which of you speaks the truth; for he is neither the in-
*—* The Greek is abrol Troörot. Ficinus has “quiet ipsi primum,”
from which Bekker obtained oi, and Stephens “primum.”
* I have translated as if the Greek were kexevorš' piv, not ceXetstv.
* The very antithesis in trap' àAAwy proves that airoi has dropt out
after digre. Compare just below pagóvre trapá rov—m aird, ééevpóvrs.
* Ficinus omits àv6pwarov.
LACHES. 1.59
ventor nor the teacher of any thing relating to such matters.
But do you, Laches and Nicias, one or the other, tell us what
man you have met with most skilled in the bringing up of
youth; and whether you have learnt from any one, or dis-
covered yourselves; and, if you have learnt, who was the
teacher to each of you, and what others are their fellow-artists,
in order that if amidst the affairs of the city you have no leisure,
we may go to them, and induce, either by gifts or caresses, or
both, to take care of our children and yours, that they may
not become depraved, and a disgrace to their ancestors. But
if you yourselves are the discoverers of such a thing, give us
an instance of what other persons you have had the care, and
whom from being depraved you have made beautiful and good.
For if you will now begin to give instruction for the first
time, you must reflect that the risk is run not in the case of a
Carian,” but in that of your own sons, and the sons of your
friends; and truly will it happen to you, according to the pro-
verb, for a pottery to be in a tub.” State then which of
these matters ye say or deny is in our power and suited to you.
This, Lysimachus, inquire of them, and do not let them off.
[14.] Lys. Socrates seems, my friends, to me to speak well.
But whether it is agreeable to you to be interrogated about
such matters, and to give reasons,” it is meet for you, Nicias
and Laches, to know ; for to myself and Melesias here it will
clearly be very agreeable, if you are willing to go through in
a discussion all that Socrates may ask. For at the commence-
ment I began speaking from that point, that we had invited
you to a consultation on this account, because we thought, as
was likely, that you had paid attention to these things, espe-
* Of the low estimation in which the Carians were held, the earliest
proof is found in Homer; while the Scholiast here quotes numerous pas-
sages from different authors where the proverb is found. To the other
references given by Spanheim on Julian. Caesar. p. 105, ed. Heusinger,
and Valckenaer on Herodot. v. 66, Jacobs adds Cicero pro Flacco, ; 27.
The modern medical phrase is “Experimentum in vili corpore.”
* This proverb, found likewise in Gorg. p. 514, E. § 149, was applied
to those, who attempt to do great things before they can do little; or, as
said of children, who endeavour to run, before they can walk.
* Stalbaum translates Aóyov by “answer.” But that meaning is not
supported by the passages he quotes from Phaedo, # 78, D. For there
y
Xóyov is “a reason:” and so it is here, as shown by Övöövreg kai Öexó-
uévot Aéyov, a little below. -
160 TACHES.
cially since your sons, as well as ours, are arrived at an age
to be instructed. If, therefore, it makes no difference to you,
speak, and consider the affair in common with Socrates, giv-
ing and receiving reasons from each other: for he says this
very properly, that we are now consulting about the most
important of our concerns. See, therefore, whether it ap-
pears to you that we ought to act thus.
Nic. You seem to me, Lysimachus, to know in good truth
Socrates only from his father, and not to have associated with
him yourself; unless, perhaps, when he was a boy, he came
near you, while following his father, amongst his wardsmen,
or in a temple, or some other congregation of the people; but
since he has grown older, it is evident that you have never
fallen in with him. 3
Lys. Why say you this especially, Nicias? -
[15.] Nic. You seem to me not to know that for him, who
happens to be near to Socrates, through a conversation, as if
through a family alliance, *[and approaches towards him by
conversing,14* it is a matter of necessity that, even if he shall
have previously begun to converse about any thing else, he will
not cease to be led about by the person here during the convers-
ation, until he falls into giving an account of himself, in what
manner he lives now, and what is the life he has previously
lived. And when he shall have so fallen, Socrates will not dis-
miss him, until he has tried, as by a touchstone, all these points
well and truly. But I am accustomed to him, and I know that
it is necessary for me to suffer thus at his hands; and I further
know well that I shall suffer now. For I am delighted,
Lysimachus, to draw near to the man; and I think it is no
bad thing to be reminded of what we have done or are doing
not correctly; and that for the subsequent period of life it
is necessary for the person to be more thoughtful, who does
not fly from such an examination, but is willing and thinks
it worth while, according to the saying of Solon,” to learn as
long as he lives, and by not imagining that age itself will come
42—42 The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of the
preceding #yyörara—Aóyp. Schleiermacher proposed to cut out àc trep
yévet : with whom Stalbaum at first agreed, but subsequently constirred
the text perfectly sound. -
* The saying was, Asi ympärke, troXAd &öaoköpisvoc
LACHES. 16?
bringing intellect along with it. To me, therefore, it is nei-
ther unusual nor unpleasant to be tested by Socrates. But I
have for some time known almost that our discourse, as So-
crates is present, would not be about the lads, but about our-
selves. Hence, as I said before, nothing as regards myself pre-
vents me from passing the time in discourse with Socrates in
the manner he wishes. But see how Laches here is disposed
about a thing of this kind.
[16.] Lac. With respect to conversations, Nicias, my state
is simple, or, if you will, is not simple, but double; for to a
person I should appear to be now a lover of talk, but again a
hater. For when I hear a man talking about virtue, or con-
cerning wisdom, if he be truly a man, and worthy the argu-
ments which he uses, I am delighted beyond all bounds, per-
ceiving at the same time both the speaker and what is spoken,
how they become and suit each other. And, really, such a man
appears to me to be a musician, who composes the most beau-
tiful harmony, not through” the lyre, or instruments of
play, but by living in reality” correctly, after having skilfully”
made” his life to accord by words to deeds like 40 the Dorian
strain, but not the Ionic, nor I conceive the Phrygian or Ly-
dian,” but that which alone is the Hellenic. Such a man,
therefore, when he speaks, makes me to be glad, and to appear to
any one whatever a lover of talk, with such avidity do I re-
ceive what is spoken by him. But he, who acts in a manner
contrary to this man, gives me pain ; and by how much the
better he seems to speak, by so much the more does he (pain
me), and make me on the other hand to appear a hater of talk.
Of the discourses of Socrates I have not yet, indeed, had any ex-
perieńce ; but of his deeds, as it seems, I have formerly had a
* I have translated as if the Greek were of AIA AY'pav, and not ob
AY'pav.
*—“Here too, where the whole question is connected with what is done
skilfully or not, the undefined dºtsylvåg could not be introduced in the
place of the defined Évréxvøg. Stalbaum, who once approved of the cor-
rection made by Cornarius, afterwards preferred the one suggested by
Heusde, and eventually proposed himself a third.
* Here again, by merely changing ºppoopévoc oil into et éipyagpiā-
voc, I have, I trust, restored the very words of Plato, who most assuredly
never repeated the same verb ſippoopévog in two consecutive sentences.
*—” The Ionic harmony was effeminate; the Lydian, doloful; the
Phrygian, vehement; but the Dorian, grave; and it was on this account
preferred by Plato to all the rest. See Rep. iii. p. 398, E. T.
162 I.ACHE8.
trial, and there I found him a man worthy of beautiful words
and all liberty of speech. If then he possesses these proper-
ties, I agree with the party here; and I shall with the great-
est pleasure be examined by such a person; nor shall I feel
annoyed at being a learner. But though I assent to the saying
of Solon, I will add just one thing, for I wish to be taught
many things as I grow old, but by the good alone. Let this
then be granted, that the teacher is himself a good man, that
I may not appear hard to learn, when I learn without pleasure.
But whether the teacher be younger, or not as yet in repute,
or possesses any thing else of such a kind, I take no thought.
I state then, as it were by the crier, to you, Socrates, that you
may teach and confute me in whatever point you please;
47 and to learn on the other hand what I know ;” for so you are
laid up in my thoughts, from the day in which you were my
companion in danger,” and gave such a proof of your virtue, as
it is meet for man to give, who is about * to give it justly.”
Say then whatever you please, and take no account of our age.
[17.] Soc. We cannot then blame, as it seems, your feel-
ings, as being not ready to consult and investigate with us
conjointly.
Lys. This then is our business, Socrates. For Iput you down
as one of us. Do you therefore consider, instead of me, in behalf
of the youths, what we ought to inquire of them ; and do you by
conversing consult for them. For, through my age, I have
forgotten the majority of things which I had intended to ask
them ; and moreover, I do not very well remember what I hear,
if any other conversation intervenes. Do you therefore speak
about, and discuss among yourselves, the things which we have
laid before you; and I shall afterwards hear (the result); and
having heard, I will, with Melesias here, do whatever shall
seem good to you.
Soc. We must, Nicias and Laches, obey Lysimachus and
*—47 Taylor, perceiving no doubt the absurdity of the clause within
the numerals, tacitly omitted them. Plato, in lieu of pav6ávew ai, pro-
bably wrote &vapuav6ávstv, “to unlearn :” which, as we know from
Horace, old persons are very unwilling to do.
* The fact alluded to is mentioned in The Banquet, $43.
*—” This I cannot understand. Ficinus has “quisquis juste pericu-
lum est facturus,” as if he had found in his MS. §. kivövvetoeuv.
The sense requires Čukaiwg 6tóáokeuv. For Laches had said just before
that a teacher ought to be a virtuous person.
LACHES. 163
Melesias. The points then, which we just now endeavoured to
consider, (namely,) who had been our teachers in such kind of
instruction, or what other persons we had made better, it will
not be improper, perhaps, to examine amongst ourselves. But
I think that a consideration of this kind tends to the same
point, "and would be almost and more from a beginning.”
For if we happen to know respecting any thing, that, when it is
present to any thing, it renders that thing better, to which it is
present; and, moreover, (if) we are able to cause that thing
to be present to the other, "respecting which we may be the
fellow-counsellors,” so that a person might acquire it in the
easiest and best manner—Perhaps you do not understand
what I am saying; but in this way you will more easily un-
derstand it. If we happen to know that the sense of sight,
when present to the eyes, makes those eyes to which it is pre-
sent better; and, moreover, if we are able to cause the sense
of sight to be present to the eyes, it is evident that we know what
the sense of sight is, respecting which we may be the fellow-
counsellors, so that a person may acquire it in the easiest and
best manner. For if we did not know this very thing, what
the sense of sight is, or what that of hearing is, we should be
not at all” counsellors or physicians worthy of any account,
respecting either the eyes or the ears, and as regards the man-
ner in which a person might acquire in the best manner the
sense of hearing or of sight.
Lys. You speak the truth, Socrates.
Soc. Do not then these persons, Laches, now invite us to
consult with them respecting the manner by which virtue, be-
ing present to the souls of their sons, may make them better?
Lac. Entirely so.
Soc. Ought there not then to be at hand the power, namely,
to know what virtue is P For if we do not know at all what
virtue happens to be, in what way can we become fellow-counsel-
ors to any one, so that he may in the best manner acquire it?
Lac. In no way, it appears to me, Socrates.
*—” This I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus; whose version is
‘et altius repetetur,” which cannot answer to oxsºv čá kai pax\ov šč
#pxijg &v sim. Taylor’s translation is equally wide of the Greek—“or
early it will be something which rather flows from a principle.”
*—" The words within the numerals are omitted by Taylor,
* Literally, “at leisure.” On oxox; thus used, see the commentators
n Soph, CEd T 434.




























M 2
164 LACHE8.
Soc. Say we then, Laches, that we know what it is?
Lac. Yes, we say so.
Soc. What we know then, cannot we also tell, what it is ?
J.ac. How not 2
[18.] Soc. Let us not, however, thou best of men, speculate
forthwith about the whole of virtue—for that perhaps would be
a rather great undertaking; but let us first see about a certain
part of it, if we are sufficiently able to know it; and thus,”
it is probable, the speculation will be more easy to us.
Lac. Let us do so, Socrates, since you wish it.
Soc. Which of the parts of virtue then shall we select 2
Or is it not evident that it is that, to which the instruction in
arms seems to tend ? Now it seems to the many to tend to
fortitude. Is it not so?
Lac. It seems very much so.
Soc. Let us then in the first place, Laches, endeavour to
state what fortitude is ; and in the next place, we will con-
sider by what means it can be present to young men so far
as it is possible for it to be present by study and instruction.
But do you endeavour to state what fortitude is.
Lac. By Zeus, Socrates, it is not difficult to state. For if
any one is willing to remain in his place, and defend himself
from the enemy, and does not fly, rest assured that he would
be a brave man.
Soc. You speak well, Laches; but perhaps from not speak-
ing clearly myself, I am the cause of your not answering what
I intended to ask, but something else.
Lac. How say you this, Socrates?
Soc. I will tell you, if I am able. A brave man, as yo
say, is one who, remaining in his place, fights with the foe.
Lac. So I say.
Soc. And I also. But what on the other hand is he, who
while flying,” fights with the foe, and does not remain in his
place 2
Lac. How flying?
Soc. Just as the Scythians surely are said to fight, no les
* Ficinus has “in hunc modum,” as if he had found in his MS
eiºrwg, dog Tà éikög, not merely dºg rö sikög—
* Jacobs refers to Horace, Od. i. 35, 9, “Scythas et versis animosu
equis Parthum.”










LACHES. 165
while flying than pursuing. And Homer some where, praising
the horses of Æneas, says, (Il. v. 225,)
Hither and thither swiftly to pursue
And fly they know ;
and for this very thing he praises AEneas himself, and calls
him, through his skill in flying, “in flight expert.”
Lac. And very properly, Socrates: for he is there speak-
ing of chariots; but you are speaking about the Scythian
cavalry; for so they fight; but the heavy-armed infantry of
Greece (fight) as I say.
Soc. Except perhaps the Lacedaemonians, Laches. For
they say that the Lacedæmonians, when they engaged with
the Gerrophori at Plataea,” were not willing to remain and
fight against them, but fled;” but when the ranks of the Per-
sians were broken, they rallied and fought like cavalry, and
thus won the battle.
Lac. You speak the truth.
19.] Soc. * This then I meant as the reason for say-
ing),” that I was the cause of your not answering correctly,
because I did not put the question correctly. For wishing to
ask you not only about those, who are brave amongst the
heavy-armed, but also about those in the cavalry, and in every
form of war, and not only about those brave in battle, but
also those in the dangers of the sea, and such as act a manly
part in diseases, in poverty, and in political affairs, and still
further, not only such as bear themselves bravely up against
pain or fear, but also bear themselves up against desires or
pleasures, both by remaining, or turning their backs—for there
are surely some men, Laches, brave in things of this kind
likewise. -
Lac. And very much so, Socrates.
* These were some Persian troops, who carried bucklers made of osier8
nd willows united, probably not unlike the targets, at which persons
hoot with a bow and arrows.
* This anecdote is not told elsewhere; although mention is made by
erodotus, in ix. 61, of an engagement, where a Lacedaemonian corps
ailed to make an impression on a body of Persian troops, who were
rotected by their so-called bucklers.
*—" This seems to be what Plato meant to say. But the Greek is
erely Toijro Toivvy airtov #Asyov. Perhaps it was roîto Toivuv ré airlow
w #Aeyov Aéywv. Ficinus has “Merito ergo dicebam * *






















166 LACHES.
Soc. All these, therefore, are brave; but some of them
possess fortitude in pleasures, others in pains, others in de-
sires, and others in fears; and others, I think, possess timidity
in these very same things.
Lac. Entirely so.
Soc. What then is each of these ? This is what I was
asking. Try then again to tell me, in the first place, what
is that fortitude, which is the same in all these. Or do you
nc' yet understand what I mean?
Lac. Not very well.
[20.] Soc. But I will speak in this way; just as if I had
asked, What is the swiftness, which happens to be present with
us in running, in playing on the harp, and in speaking, and
in learning, and in many other things, and we nearly
possess that, about which it is worth while to say any thing,
in the acts of the hands or feet, or mouth or voice, or mind.
Or do not you also say so?
Lac. Entirely so.
Soc. If, therefore, any one should ask me—What, Socrates,
do you call that, which you denominate swiftness in all things?
I should say to him, that I call by the name of swiftness that
power, which accomplishes many things in a short time, as
regards the voice, and running, and all other things.
Lac. And you would say rightly.
Soc. Do you then endeavour, Laches, in like manner, t
define fortitude. What is that power, which is the same i
pleasure and in pain, and in all the things in which we jus
now said it is, and is afterwards” called fortitude.
Lac. It appears then to me to be a certain endurance o
the soul, if one must speak of that, which exists connected
with fortitude taken universally.
Soc. And this must be, if we are to reply to the question
asked by ourselves. This then appears to me, that you do no
consider every kind of endurance to be fortitude. And I to
infer it from hence; for I nearly know, Laches, that you thin
fortitude to belong to the things which are very beautiful.
* I cannot understand £wsura ; nor could Ficinus, whose version
“fortitudinem per singula nominari,”—which leads to eig Trávra—simil
to eig & wavra in § 21, or $g ékaara. They, however, who wish for a lon
but unsatisfactory defence of £ºrstra, may turn to the note of Engelhard








LACHES. 167
Lac. Rest assured that it does belong to things the most
beautiful.
Soc. Is not, therefore, that endurance, which subsists in
conjunction with prudence, beautiful and good?
Lac. Entirely so.
Soc. But what of that endurance, which subsists with
folly? Is it not, on the contrary, hurtful and evil-working?
Lac. Yes.
Soc. Do you then say that a thing of this kind is beautiful,
though it is evil-working and hurtful ?
Lac. This, Socrates, (would be) not just.
Soc. You do not then acknowledge such an endurance as
this to be fortitude, since it is not beautiful; but fortitude
is beautiful.
Lac. You say true.
Soc. Prudent endurance therefore, according to your asser-
tion, would be fortitude.
Lac. So it seems.
[21.] Soc. Let us see then in what it is prudent; or whether
it is prudent in all things both great and small. Thus, for
instance, if some one endures to spend his money prudently,
knowing that, by thus spending it, he should obtain more,
would you call him a brave man 2
Lac. By Zeus, not I.
Soc. Or if some one, being a physician, while his son or
any one else is attacked with an inflammation in the lungs,
and requests him to give something to eat or drink, should be
inflexible and persist (in denying. Is this fortitude 2)
Lac. Not even this at all.
Soc. But in the case of war, where a man is enduring and
willing to fight, and reasoning prudently with himself, through
knowing that others will give him assistance, or that he shall
fight against foes fewer and of less account than those on his
own side, and, further still, that he has the advantage of the
ground, would you say that this man, enduring with such like
prudence and preparation, is braver than him in the opposite
army, who is willing to stand his ground and endure ?
Lac. The man in the opposing army seems to me, Socrates,
to be the braver. .."
Soc. And yet the endurance of the latter is more impru-
dent than that of the former. -
168 LACHES,
Lac. You say true.
Soc. And will you say that the man, who endures in a
cavalry engagement, with a knowledge of horses, is less brave
than him, who endures without science?
Lac. To me at least it appears that he is.
Soc. And he too, who with the art of a slinger, or archer,
or of any other kind, is enduringf
Lac. Entirely so.
[22.] Soc. And will you say, that such as are willing to
descend into a tank, and there to endure swimming, although
not skilled in that exercise, or in any thing else of that kind,
are braver than those who are skilled in them P
Lac. What else, Socrates, could one say?
Soc. Nothing, if indeed he think so.
Lac. But I do indeed think so.
Soc. And yet, Laches, such persons encounter danger and
endure more imprudently than those, who do this with art.
Lac. So they appear.
Soc. Did not then unseemly and imprudent boldness and
andurance formerly appear to us to be hurtful likewise 2
Lac. Entirely so.
Soc. But fortitude was acknowledged to be something
beautiful.
Lac. It was acknowledged.
Soc. But now on the other hand we say that the unseemly
thing, namely, imprudent endurance, is fortitude.
Lac. We seem so.
Soc. Do we then appear to you to speak well?
Lac. By Zeus, Socrates, not to me.
Soc. In your own language, then, Laches, you and I are
not Dorically harmonized; for our works do not accord with
our words. For some one, as it seems, would say in deed that
we have a share of fortitude ; but he would not say in word,
as I think, if he should hear us now discoursing.
Lac. You speak most truly. -
[23.] Soc. What then, does it appear to you to be beauti-
ful for us to be in this condition ?
Lac. By no means.
Soc. Are you willing then for us to yield to what we said,
to this extent?
Lac. To what extent, and to what assertion ?
LACHES. 169
Soc. To that which orders us to endure. If then you are
willing, let us persist in the inquiry, and endure, lest fortitude
itself should deride us for not bravely searching it out; if,
perchance,” endurance itself is fortitude.
Lac. I indeed, Socrates, am prepared not to previously
stand aloof, although I am unaccustomed to such like convers-
ations. But a certain love of contention against what has
been said has laid hold of me, and I am truly indignant that I
am so unable to tell what I have in my mind. For I seem to
myself to conceive what fortitude is ; but I know not how it
has just now escaped me, so that I cannot comprehend it in
words and say what it is.
Soc. But ought not a good huntsman, my friend, to keep
running in pursuit, and not to give up.
Lac. By all means.
Soc. Are you then willing for us to invite Nicias also to
the hunting, if perchance he is at all more ready to find a path
than we are P
Lac. I am willing; for how not ?
[24.] Soc. Come then, Nicias, and if you possess any
power, assist your friends, tossed, as it were, in a storm of
words and in doubt; for you see how pathless are our af-
fairs. Do you then state what you think fortitude is, and free
us from this doubt, and confirm by reason what you conceive
it to be.
JWic. You appear to me, Socrates, for some time past, not
to have well defined fortitude; for of that, which I have
heard you correctly asserting, you make no use.
Soc. What is that, Nicias2
Nic. I have often heard you asserting that each of us is
good, as regards the things in which he is wise, but bad, as
regards those of which he is ignorant.
Soc. By Zeus, Nicias, you speak the truth.
Nic. If, therefore, the brave is a good man, he is clearly a
WISé Iſla Ih.
Soc. Do you hear, Laches 2
Lac. I do ; but I do not very well understand what he means.
* Heusde after Abresch in Dilucid. Thucyd. p. 174, renders troX\ákic
by “perchance.” But how the word, which means literally an act fre-
uently done, can be applied to one rarely done, I cannot understand.
The notion has however been frequently adopted by Stalbaum.
170 LACHES.
Soc. But I seem to understand; and the man seems to me
to call fortitude a certain wisdom.
Lac. What kind of wisdom, Socrates?
Soc. Why do you not ask this of him?
Lac. I do.
Soc. Come then, Nicias, tell him what kind of wisdom for-
titude would be according to your reasoning; for it is surely not
that belonging to the hautboy.
Nic. By no means.
Soc. Nor yet that belonging to the harp.
Nic. Certainly not.
Soc. But what is it then, or of what is it the science 2
Lac. You very rightly interrogate him, Socrates; and let
him tell us what he says wisdom is.
Nic. I say then, Laches, that it is the science relating to
things of dread and daring, both in war and in all other things.
Lac. How absurdly, Socrates, he talks
Soc. Looking to what do you say this, Laches 2
Lac. To what? Wisdom is surely separate from fortitude.
Soc. Nicias does not say so.
Lac. He does not, by Zeus; and therefore he is a trifler.
Soc. Let us then teach, but not revile him.
Nic. It is not so. But Laches seems to me, Socrates, to
be desirous for me likewise to appear to say nothing to the pur-
pose, because he too appeared just now to be such a kind of
person.
[25.] Lac. Entirely so, Nicias; and I will endeavour to
show this. For you do say nothing (to the purpose); since, for
example, in diseases do not physicians know things of dread 2
Or do brave men seem to you to know this? Or do you call
physicians brave men 2
Nic. By no means.
Lac. Neither do you give that name, I think, to husband-
men, although they know things of dread in agriculture; and
all other artificers know things of dread and daring in their
own arts; and yet they are not in any respect the more brave
for this.
Soc. What, Nicias, does Laches appear to you to say? He
appears, however, to say" something.
* Instead of pièvrot, I should prefer fuotys, on account of the anti-
thesis in Nucia.
LACHES. 171
Nic. He does indeed say something, and yet not what is
true.
Soc. How so?
Nic. Because he thinks that physicians know something
more about the sick than the being able” to say that a thing
is healthful or unhealthful. Now they do know only so much
as this. But whether to be well is a thing of dread to any
one rather than to be ill, think you, Laches, that physicians
know this? Or do you not think that it is better for many
not to recover from disease than to recover ? For tell me
this. Do you say that it is better for all men to live, and that
it is not better for many to die?
Lac. I think that the latter is the case.
Nic. To those then, to whom it is an advantage to die, do
you think the same things are dreadful, as to those to whom
it is (an advantage) to live P
Lac. Not I.
[26.] Nic. But do you grant physicians to know this, or to
any other artificer beside the man, who knows what are things
of dread, tº and what are not,” whom I call a brave man?
Soc. Do you understand, Laches, what he says?
Lac. I do ; and I perceive that he calls prophets brave
men: for who else knows to whom it is better to live than to
die? And yet, Nicias, do you acknowledge yourself to be a
prophet,” or to be neither a prophet nor a brave man?
Nic. What then, do you think it belongs to a prophet to
know things of dread and daring 2
Lac. I do ; for to whom else does it 2
AWic. Much more, thou best of men, to him of whom I was
speaking; since it is necessary for a prophet to know merely
the signs of future events, whether there will be to any one
death, or disease, or the loss of property, or victory, or defeat,
either in battle or in any other contest. But which of these
* Such is Taylor's translation, as if he read with Stephens, oiot rs
tivat, and thus met the difficulty which Stalbaum seems to find here.
Stephens suggested likewise oióv Tu-
*—" The words between the numerals Bekker first restored from
four MSS. They were in the MS. of Ficinus likewise, as shown by his
version, “metuenda et non metuenda.”
* This is rather a hard hit at Nicias; who, as we know from
*Thucydides, Aristophanes, and Plutarch, placed no little confidence in
diviners.
172 - LACHES
things it is better for any one to suffer or not to suffer, how
does it belong to a prophet, more than to any other person, to
judge of? -
Lac. I do not understand, Socrates, what he means to say.
For he does not show whom he calls brave, either a prophet,
or a physician, or any other person, unless he says that this
brave person is a certain god. To me then Nicias appears
to be unwilling to ingenuously confess that he is saying no-
thing to the purpose; but he turns himself upwards and down-
wards, concealing his perplexity; and both you and I would
have been able to turn ourselves in this way, had we wished
not to appear to contradict ourselves. If, indeed, our speeches
had been in a court of justice, he would have had some reason
to act in this manner; but now in such a conference as this,
why should you vainly deck yourself with empty words?
Soc. For no reason, as it appears to me, Laches. But let
us see, lest Nicias thinks he is saying something to the pur-
pose, and does not assert this merely for the sake of talking.
Let us then inquire of him more clearly what he means;
and if it shall appear that he says any thing pertinent, let us
assent to him; if not, we will teach him better.
[27.] Lac. Do you then, Socrates, if you will, question
him ; for I have questioned him enough.
Soc. Nothing prevents me, for the questioning will be in
common, both on my account and yours.
Lac. Entirely so.
Soc. Tell me then, Nicias—for I and Laches unite in the
speech—do you say that fortitude is the science of things of
dread and daring 2
Mic. I do. -
Soc. But it does not belong to every man to know this;
since neither a physician nor a prophet knows it, nor will a
man be brave, unless he acquires this science. Did you not
say so 2
Nic. I do.
Soc. According to the proverb" then, in reality every sow
would not know this, nor would it become valiant.
Nic. It does not seem to me it would.
* The proverb—“This e'en a sow would know ’’—was applied to those
who could, although ever so stupid, still learn.
IACHES. 173
Soc. It is then evident, Nicias, that you do not believe that
even the Cromyonian sow" was brave. I do not say this
in jest; but I think it is necessary for him, who asserts this,
to admit that no wild beast is brave; or to grant that any
wild beast, a lion, or a leopard, or any boar, is So wise, as to be
born to know 97 what few men, through the difficulty of know-
ing, do. But he who lays down fortitude to be, what you lay
it down, must necessarily say that a lion and a stag and a bull
and an ape, are similarly formed by nature with respect to
fortitude.
[28.] Lac. By the gods, Socrates, you speak well; and do
you, Nicias, truly answer us. Do you say that these wild
beasts, which we all of us acknowledge to be brave, are wiser
than we are 2 or, in opposition to all, dare you to call them
not brave?
Nic. Indeed, Laches, I do not call either a wild beast or
any thing else brave, which through ignorance” has no fear of
things of dread, but (I call it) fearless and stupid. Or, do
you think, that I call children brave, who through ignorance,
fear nothing P But I am of opinion, “the fearless” is not the
same with “the brave.” For, I think, that of fortitude and
forethought very few have a share; but of confidence and
boldness, and fearlessness, together with the want of fore-
thought, very many men and women and boys and wild
beasts have. Those acts therefore which you and the many call
courageous, I call rash,” but the brave are the prudent, about
whom I am now speaking.
Lac. Behold, Socrates, how well this man bedecks himself,
as he thinks, with fine words; for those, whom all men ac-
* The sow of Cromyon, a village in the Corinthian territory, which
the animal laid waste, was killed by Theseus, as we learn from Ovid.
Metam. vii. Plutarch, in Gryll. ii. p. 987, has preserved an hexameter
taken from a poem on that subject—0mgei IIpáypara tróXX &rt 6m Mö
trapéoxév 0mpion, otoa.
* Instead of påvat, which Stalbaum would defend by passages hardly
in point, Plato wrote, as I have translated, Tepvkévau, as shown by the
subsequent repvkéval.
68 The reading of &Yvotag has been hitherto found only in the MS
used by Ficinus, as shown by his version, “propter ignorantiam.” All
the rest have &votag.
* To this passage has been referred the expression of Cicero De Offic.
1. 19, “Animus paratus ad periculum—audacia potius momen habent
quam fortitudinis.”
174 I, ACHES.
knowledge to be brave, he endeavours to deprive of this
honour.
Nic. Not I indeed, Laches; but take courage. For I say
that you and Lamachus" are wise, if you are brave, and
many others of the Athenians likewise.
Lac. Against this I will say nothing; although I could
say something, lest you should say that I am in reality an
Aixönean.”
Soc. Say nothing, Laches; for you seem to me to have
not at all” perceived that Nicias here received this wisdom
from our friend Damon; and Damon is very intimate with
Prodicus,” who appears indeed to distinguish the best of the
sophists’ such kind of terms.
Lac. For it becomes a sophist, Socrates, to be ingenious on
such kind of subjects, rather than the man, whom the city thinks
fit to place in a post of pre-eminence.
Soc. It does, thou blessed man, indeed become him, who
presides over things of the greatest consequence, to have the
greatest share of wisdom. But it appears to me a thing wor-
thy of consideration, with a view to what does Nicias thus
define fortitude.
[29.] Lac. Consider, Socrates, this yourself.
Soc. This I intend to do, thou best of men. Do not,
however, imagine that I shall dismiss you from your share in
the conversation; but do you apply your mind, and ponder
with me upon what has been stated.
Lac. Let it be so, if it seems to you to be necessary.
Soc. Nay, but it does seem. And do you, Nicias, tell us
again from the beginning. You know that "[at the begin-
79 Lamachus was one of the three generals of the Athenians united in
command with Nicias and Alcibiades, in the Sicilian expedition, where
he was killed. Of his answering to his name, which means, “Great-
Fighter,” a proof is furnished in the Acharnians of Aristophanes.
7* From hence it would seem that Laches was of the ward of Aixönes,
the people of which were noted for their evil-speaking. A similar cha-
racter has been given to the locality of Billingsgate in London.
* Instead of obôā pur), which is defended by Hermann, with whom Stal-
º, agrees, Jacobs on Athenaeus, Indic. p. 393, correctly suggested
ov Oapum.
* To the attention paid by Prodicus to the different meaning of names
Plato has made frequent allusion.
l *—” The words between the brackets are evidently an interpo-
ation.
LACHE3. I75
ning of our conference].7% we considered fortitude as a part
of virtue.75 -
Nic. Entirely so.
Soc. Did not you answer also, that it was a part, there
being likewise other parts, which, taken together, are called
virtue 2
Nic. How not ?
Soc. Are you then speaking of the same" parts as I am 2
For in addition to fortitude, I call temperance, and justice,
and certain other things of such kind, (parts of virtue). Do
not you too P
Nic. Entirely so.
Soc. Hoki,77 then. For in these we agree. But let us
consider about things of dread and daring, that you may not
think some of them one thing, and we another. What then
we consider such, we will state; and do you, if you do not
agree with us, instruct us. We consider then those to be
things of dread, which occasion fear; but those to be things
of daring, which do not occasion fear. Now neither evils
past, nor present, occasion fear ; but those which are ex-
pected: for fear is the expectation of a future evil. Or does
it not appear so to you, Laches, likewise?
Lac. Very much so, Socrates.
Soc. You hear then, Nicias, our assertions, that future
evils are things of dread; but future things, either not evil
or good, are things of daring. On these points say you in this
way or in another ?
Nic. In this.
Soc. But do you call the science of these things fortitude:
Nic. I do.
[30.] Soc. Let us then still further consider, whether, on
the third point, you think with us.
Nic. What is that? -
Soc. I will tell you. For it appears to me and to Laches
* Compare The Statesman, ; 44, p. 306, B., ávöpiav—uépog Év ćpe-
rijg gival.
* Ficinus has “eadem, quas ego, partes.” He therefore found in his
MS. raird, not raijra.
77 Hermann on Viger. n. 252, renders"Exe, “keep your mind upon what
we have said.” Heindorf on Gorg. § 35, and Protag. § 96, “Stop here.”
I have translated, “Hold,” as in Shakspeare: “Lay on, Macduff; And
damned be he, who first cries, ‘Hold, enough.’”
176 LACHES.
here, that of whatever things there is a science, there is not
one science of a thing past, 7% (so as) to know” how it has
been, another of things present, (to know) how they are, and
another (to know) how that, which has not yet been, may be
and will be in the most beautiful manner; but the science is
the same. For instance, with respect to healthiness at all
times, there is no other than medical science, which, being
one, sees what is, and has been, and will be healthy, and how
it will be so. And with respect to things constantly” growing
out of the earth, agriculture is in a similar state. So too, in
warlike concerns, you yourselves would testify that the sci-
ence of a general thinks beforehand in the most beautiful
manner of other things and of what is about to be ; nor does
it think it ought to be subservient to the prophet’s art, but to
rule over it, as knowing better what does and will take place
in war. And the law enjoins this ; not that the prophet
shall rule over the general, but the general over the prophet.
Shall we say so, Laches 2
Lac. We will say so.
Soc. What then, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the
same science has a knowledge of the same things, future, and
present, and past?
Nic. I do ; for so it appears to me, Socrates. .
[31.] Soc. Is not then fortitude, as thou, the best of men,
Sayest, the science of things of dread and daring 2
Mic. It is.
Soc. But things of dread and daring have been confessed
to relate, the latter to future good, the former to future evil.
Nic. Entirely so. .
Soc. But the same science is relating to the same
things, and to *[those about to be],” and existing in every
way.
*—” The Greek is sióšval simply, without any thing to govern it;
and hence probably it was omitted by Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote
êore sióēvat: for Čare might easily have dropt out after ysyovárog.
* Instead of ai, the balance of the sentence requires &si, to answer
to the preceding eig & Travrag roëg Xpóvovg.
*—” The words within brackets are evidently a partial interpolation;
but which was more full in the MS. of Ficinus, as shown by his version,
“earundem rerum, praeteritarum praesentiumque et futurarum,” who
however omits kai Trávrwg'éxóvrwv. On the other hand, Stalbaum was
the first to reject kai Trávrwg #xóvtwv, in the next speech of Socrates,
LACHES. , 177
AWic. It is so.
Soc. Fortitude, then, is not the science of things of dread
and daring alone; for it not only has a knowledge of future
good and evil, but also of things present and past, [and ex-
isting in every way] like the other sciences. -
Nic. So it seems.
Soc. You have therefore, Nicias, given us in your an-
swer some third part nearly of fortitude. And yet we asked
you what the whole of fortitude is. And now, as it seems,
according to your (former)* assertion, fortitude is not only
the science of things of dread and daring, but, as your present
reasoning on the other hand (shows), fortitude would be
that which nearly relates to all things good and evil, and
*existing in every way.” 8° To change again thus,83 or
how say you, Nicias 2
Nic. To me, Socrates, it seems good.
Soc. Does then such a person as this appear to you, blessed
man, to be deficient at all in virtue, if he knows every good,
and how in every point they are, and will be, and have been,
and every evil in the same manner P And do you think that
he is wanting in temperance, or justice, or holiness, to whom
alone it belongs in matters relating to gods and men to prac-
tise caution touching the things of dread and not, and to ob-
tain for himself what is good by knowing how to associate
in a proper manner (with others)?
Nic. You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the
purpose.
[32.] Soc. That then which is now, Nicias, adduced by
you, would not be a part of virtue, but virtue in general.
Nic. So it seems.
Soc. And yet we said that fortitude is one of the parts of
virtue.
* The antithesis in viv at just afterwards requires us to read here
kara Töv Trpiv orów Aóyov, not merely rôv gov—
*—" Ficinus has more fully, “omniumque simpliciter quomodolibet
sese habentium.” -
*—” This I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version is,
“Sicne modo an aliter judicas, Nicias.” Stalbaum however, after Engel-
hardt, says that in the Greek, Ośrwg at usrarí0soëat , Tràg Aéyetc, the
infinitive depends upon Aśyetc, i. e. “Say you that you change your
mind thus, or how f * But he forgot that to a bipartite question there
could not be a single answer.
N
178 LACHES.
Nic. We said so.
Soc. But that which is now said, does not appear to be so.
Nic It seems not.
Soc. We have not therefore, Nicias, discovered what for-
titude is.
Nic. We do not appear (to have done so).
Lac. And yet I thought, friend Nicias, that you would have
discovered it, since you had a contempt for myself, when I
answered Socrates; and I had very great hope that you
would discover it by the wisdom, which has come from Damon.
Nic. It is an excellent thing indeed, Laches, for you to think
it a matter of no moment, that just now you appeared to know
nothing about fortitude, and that you are looking to this,
whether I shall appear to be another such (ignorant person);
and it will be, as it seems, of no consequence for you together
with myself to know nothing of things, which it is fitting for a
man to have a knowledge of, who thinks himself something.
You therefore appear to me to act in reality after the general
manner of men, in looking * not to yourself, but to others. I
think, however, on the points which he have spoken about,
there has been said something in reason; and, if any thing has
not been stated sufficiently, it shall be afterwards set to rights,
with the assistance both of Damon, whom you somehow fancy
you are ridiculing—and this too, although you have never seen
him—and of others also ; and, when I shall have fortified these
assertions, I will instruct you too without grudging ; for you
appear to me to be in very great need of instruction.
Lac. You are, Nicias, wise indeed; but, however, I advise
Lysimachus here and Melesias to bid farewell to you and me
concerning the education of youth ; but not to dismiss this
Socrates, as I said from the first: for I would do the very
same thing, if my children were of a proper age.
Nic. I too agree with you in this, to seek no other per-
son, if Socrates is willing to take the lads under his care;
since most gladly would I intrust Niceratus” to him, if he
is willing; but when I put him in mind at all on this subject,
* I have followed Schleiermacher, who reads 3A; trov for 3Xétrew
which Stalbaum would defend by quoting Sympos. p. 180, D. But
there it is easy to alter ºppéoat into ºppégaç.
* This Niceratus is said to have been subsequently killed by the thirt
tyrants. Demosthenes alludes to another in Midian, p. 567, R. -
LACHES. 179
he recommends others to me, and is unwilling to (do aught)
himself. But see, Lysimachus, whether Socrates will hearken
more to you.
[33.] Lys. This at least, Nicias, is just ; since I should be
willing to do many things for him, which I would not be very
willing to do for many others. How say you then, Socrates?
Will you hearken to me and make an effort with us for these
lads to become the very best.
Soc. It would certainly be a dreadful thing, Lysimachus, not
to be willing * to make an effort for any to become the best.8%
If, therefore, in the conversations just now held, I have ap-
‘peared to know something, but these not to know, it would be
just to invite me especially to this employment; but now (not);
for we are all similarly in a doubt. Why then should any one
select any of us? To me indeed it seems that (he should se-
lect) none. And since this is the case, consider whether I
appear to advise you rightly. Now, men, I say it is requisite—
for there will be a carrying out into public of our discourse—
that we should all of us in common inquire, in the first place,
after the best master for ourselves—for we need one—and in
the next place for these lads, sparing neither money nor any
thing else; but to let ourselves be in the condition we now
are, I do not advise. And if any one ridicules us, because at
this time of life we think proper to frequent a school, it seems
to me that it will be meet to bring forward Homer in our
defence, who says, (in Od. xvii. 34,.)
“Shame ill is present to a man in need.”
We therefore, bidding a person go hang, if he says a word
against us, let us take care in common of ourselves and the
lads. -
Kys. To me indeed, Socrates, what you say is very agree-
able; and by how much the older I am, by so much the more
willing am I to learn together with the youths. Do you then act
in this way. Come to-morrow morning early to my house, and
do not do otherwise, in order that we may consult about these
very things. For the present let us break up the meeting.
Soc. This, Lysimachus, I will do; and, god willing, I will
come to you to-morrow morning,
*—* The words within numerals are omitted by Ficinus,
- * 2
INTRODUCTION TO THE MENEXENUS.
ALTHOUGH it is generally a matter of little moment, how the dia-
logues of Plato follow each other, yet it is not without a purpose
that I have placed the Menexenus after the Laches. For while in
the one there is a discussion on Fortitude considered abstractedly,
in the other are to be found convincing proofs of the manner in
which the Athenians conducted themselves, when their Fortitude
was put to the severest test, during their wars abroad, and dissen-
sions at home; and when, like some states of modern times, they met,
after a series of victories, with signal reverses, and found their very
capital in the hands of their enemies, and a new form of govern-
ment imposed upon them by the victors.
The object of the dialogue, or rather of the oration contained in
it, is to celebrate the country, and the deeds of those who were to
be honoured by a public funeral, after they had fallen in the fight
that took place near Nemea, according to Xenophon in H. Gr. iv.
2, 8, and to which Demosthenes alludes in Leptin. § 41, as the great
battle near Corinth.
But as that event occurred after the death of Socrates, Plato has,
it would seem with the view of showing that the whole is a fiction,
put the speech into the mouth of his master, and feigned, as
in the case of Diotima in the Banquet, that the philosopher had
been the pupil of Aspasia, and merely repeated what he had learnt
as a lesson from her.
With regard to the details of a public funeral at Athens, it will
be sufficient to refer to Thucydides ii. 34., who has there at-
tributed to Pericles what he had written, no doubt, himself, just
as Plato has done in the case of Socrates.
According to Dionysius, the Athenians commenced the practice
182 INTRODUCTION TO ...'PIE MENEXENUS.
of pronouncing funeral orations at the close of the Persian invasion
under Xerxes: and if any reliance is to be placed on Philostratus,
Gorgias wrote the one spoken over those who had fallen at Salamis.
And it was perhaps with the view of showing himself, if not supe-
rior, at least equal, to that celebrated Sophist, that Plato was induced
to compose his own speech; from the perusal of which Cicero was
led to declare, that had the philosopher chosen to become a pleader,
his style would have been at once fluent and grave.
Despite however the testimony of the Roman orator, who has on
various occasions alluded to this speech, and translated even a por-
tion of it, Schleiermacher, with whom Ast and Goettling on Aris-
totle's Polit. ii. 6, p. 328, agree, has ventured to call in question its
genuineness by arguments, to which Loers has in his edition given a
full and, as I conceive, a satisfactory reply. But as the discussion is
too long, even if it were requisite, for insertion here, it will be suf-
ficient to state, that, as the dialogue is twice referred to by Aristotle,
if it be not Plato's, it must be the production of some unknown
writer, who, living between the time of Plato and Aristotle, was
clever enough to imitate so completely the style of a man generally
considered inimitable, as to deceive not only his most ardent admirer
Cicero, but his perpetual opponent Aristotle.
With respect to one of the grounds on which the accusation of
spuriousness rests, that Plato has made some statements at variance
with the truth of history, Stalbaum acutely observes that such a
step was doubtless taken designedly; for Plato would otherwise
have failed to preserve the correctness of his ridicule of the orators;
who, with the view of tickling the ears of their audience, were guilty
of similar aberrations from the strict line of truth, as seems to have
been proved by Caecilius in his lost work, mentioned by Suidas,
IIspi rāv kará to ropiav trapá igropiav sigmuávov roig 5%roport—“On the
statements made by the orators according to history, or contrary to it.”
The first translation of the dialogue into English was by Gilbert
West, in 1749, which Taylor says he has followed, except where it
was not sufficiently close. The second was by myself anonymously
printed at Cambridge in 1835, to which I added a few notes on the
Greek text. A portion of it was translated likewise by Mitchell in
the Quarterly Review, No. 54, p. 399; and the commencement of it
up to the speech itself, by Shelley, is given in his posthumous Essays
and Letters, Ed. Lond. 1845.
MENEXENUS.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
SOCRATES AND MENEXENUS
SOCRATES.
[1..] FROM the Forum,' or from whence,” Menexenus?”
Men. From the Forum, Socrates, and from the Council-
Hall.4
Soc. What business had you especially at the Council-Hall ?
Or is it indeed evident that you deem yourself to have finished
your course of learning and philosophy,” and as being now all-
sufficient," you think of turning yourself to matters of greater
moment, and to become, O wonderful man, a ruler at your
age over us your elders," so that your family may never fail
in supplying us * with some person as a guardian 29
* Although “Forum ” is a Latin rather than an English word, yet it
has become almost maturalized, as answering the best to the Greek áyopä.
* This ellipse of ei, is similar to that of “es,” In Horace, “Unde et
quo, Catius P’’
* Of this Menexenus nothing more is known than that he was a
friend of the Ctesippus mentioned in the Euthydemus, and very captious
in argument, and that both of them visited Socrates when in prison. See
Lysis, p. 206, D., 211, B., and Phaedo, p. 59, B.
* The Council-Hall was near the Forum, as stated by Pseudo-Plu-
tarch in ii. p. 842.
* By traidsvorug kai pºooopia were meant all that a youth or man had
learnt, or ought to know.
* A similar sarcasm is in Clitophon, p. 407, B., directed against those,
who, having gone through the education of a youth, fancy themselves to
be quite sufficient for the duties of a life of virtue.
22 7 Melitus is similarly sneered at in Euthyphr. p. 3, A. § 1.
* According to Lucretius in i. 43, “Memmi clara propago,
“nunquam communi deesse Saluti.” . .
* The sneer in the word Étriplexntº will be best understood by a passege
3 y
See IIIS
184 - MENEXENUS.
Men. If you, Socrates, will permit it, and advise me how
to rule, I should be ready to do so; but if otherwise, not.
However I went just now to the Council-Hall, on hearing
that the Council were about to select 19 the party who is to
speak (an oration) over the dead. For you know they are
about to ordain a public funeral.
Soc. (I know it) very well. And whom have they se-
lected 2
Men. Not one. But they have put it off till to-morrow.
I think, however, Archinus * or Dion will be selected.
[2] Sop. In good truth, Menexenus, it appears on many
accounts to be very nearly a beautiful thing to fall in battle.”
For if a person dies so, although poor, he meets with a fine
and gorgeous burial, and with praise, if he be a person of no
Inark,” from men at once clever, and not extolling at random ;
but who, having had their speeches prepared for a long time,
eulogize so very beautifully that, by saying what is and is
not to the purpose upon each point, and making a beautiful
tissue of words, they bewitch our very souls, pouring forth in
every way encomiums upon the state, and upon those who
have died during the war, and upon all “[our ancestors],"
who have lived before us, and *[bestowing praise].” upon
us ourselves, who are still living, so that I feel myself, Menex-
enus, vastly ennobled in being praised by them, and Istand con-
stantly on tip-toe,” and am charmed; fancying that I have be-
in Aristophanes Plut. 908, IIác oëv Štěčng j tró0sv, uměv troudly; Töv
rific tróA&g £ip' étrupusXntijg trpayuárov Kai rāv ióiwy Trávrav. Xà ;
ri tra6% w; BoöXopat.
* According to Demosthenes, IIspi Xrepáv. p. 321, the people at large,
and not the Council alone, selected the speaker.
* On this Archinus see Walesius on Harpocration, p. 253. Photius, on
Bibliothec. cod, 240, says that Isocrates introduced into his Panegyric
much from a funeral oration of Archinus; while Dionysius Halic. p.
1027, ed. R., asserts that Plato imitated those two orators.
* So Horace, “Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.”
* Compare Cicero Pro Quinctio, $ 15, “Mors honesta turpem vitam
exornat:” and Shakspeare, Henry V., “For he, who sheds this day
his blood with us, Shall be my brother, be he ne’er so vile.”
*—". The words within brackets, roig trpoyóvovg, are evidently an in-
terpolation of roëg Épºrpog0ev. In like manner ºrpo)óvov has been in-
serted after röv čva,0sv £rt in § 5. t
*—”. The word #7tawoivreg is perfectly unnecessary after tº e press
ceding #ykwputóðovrég.
* I have adopted aiwpoipuevoc for dispotópswoc, the splendid restora-
MENEXENUS. 185
come on the instant "taller, and nobler, and handsomer (than
before);" and as is wont, ever some strangers accompany me,
and are fellow-hearers; to whom I appear to be immediately a
greater object of respect. For they too seem to be affected in
the same way as I am, both towards myself and the rest of the
state, being persuaded by the speaker that it is more worthy
of wonder than before. And this feeling of self-importance
remains with me for more than three days; so greatly does
the speech and even the tone of the orator ring in and sink
into my ears, that scarcely on the fourth or fifth day do I re-
collect myself, and perceive where upon earth I am ; and for
awhile fancy myself only not living in the isles of the blessed.”
So clever are our orators l
[3.] Men. You are always, Socrates, making fun with the
orators. For the present however I think the person selected
will have no easy task, for the choice is made altogether on
a sudden, so that the orator will be compelled to speak per-
haps off-hand.
Soc. How so, my good (friend)? The speeches of each of
these are ready prepared. Besides it is not difficult to speak
tion of Valckenaer on Callimach. p. 244, who refers to § 20, where aiw-
psitat is used in a sense not very dissimilar. With regard to the idea,
compare Eurip. Ion, 1180, §v 6' ékpovoſt £3&g trootv. El. 845, Śvvyag #7r'
dkpovg atág. Soph. Aj. 1239, YılâX #kóptretc kātr' àkpov tºoltrópstg:
where Musgrave quotes Libanius, i. p. 326, Št' àkpov tropsû808av Čak-
TöAwy : and Aristoph. 'AX. 581, kátretón) toiró rug sittow, Eö0ög 6ud roëg
orspávovg #T' &kptov táv Trvywóiwy Śká0mgös: where the Scholiast ob-
serves that oi śaraívalveig £avroëg ywopévov &kočovreg sitó0aou try arvyn)v,
Tig ka0éðpag ääaipeiv. Compare too Lucillius, Sat. viii. “Gallinaceu
quum victor se gallus in hostem Sustulit in digitos, primoresque erigit
ungues: ” and Virgil, “Constitit in digitos arrectus.” But the most
apposite passages are in Shakspeare, Henry W., “He that outlives this
day, and comes safe home, Shall stand on tip-toe, when this day is
named.” So too in Troilus and Cressida, “”Tis he, I ken the manner of
his gait; He rises on the toe ; that spirit of his In aspiration lifts him
from the earth.” Stalbaum defends dicpodºpuswoc by translating Éormica,
“I stand astonished.” But such is the meaning of ###armka alone,
which is found here in a solitary MS.
"—" This is well put into the mouth of Socrates, who was of small
stature, ignoble birth, and ugly face.
* This idea Plato got from Aristophanes in Xpmc. 640, Öor' voy'
mièavópany dicotov, kāv placápov ćukáčew airóg Édoša väootç, #66pévoc
Aśyovri : while Plato himself was probably in the mind of Milton, who
says in Comus—“Who, as they sang, would take the prison’d soul, And
lap it in Elysium.”
186 MENEX ENU.S.,
off-hand upon such topics. But if it were requisite to speak
well of the Athenians amongst Peloponnesians, or of Pelopon-
Inesians amongst Athenians, there would be need of a good
speaker to persuade (others) and gain (for himself) renown.
But when a man enters upon such a contest before those
whom he is praising, it seems not a great thing to speak well.
Men. Do you think it is not, Socrates ?
Soc. It is not, by Zeus. -
. Men. Do you think that you would be able to speak your-
self, if it were requisite, and the Council were to select you ?
Soc. It would, Menexenus, be nothing wonderful, if even I
were able to speak, whose teacher happens to be a woman by
no means contemptible in oratory; but who has made many
other persons good speakers, and, one superior to (all)” the
Greeks, Pericles,” the son of Xanthippus.
Men. Who is she? Or (rather), it is plain that you mean
Aspasia.”
Soc. I do mean her; and Connus too,” the son of Metro-
bius. For these two are my masters, he in music, and she in
oratory. Now that a man thus educated should be a skilful
speaker is nothing wonderful; since even he, who has been
worse educated than myself, *[having learnt]* music from
Lamprus,” and oratory from Antipho” of Rhamnous,” would
be able to gain a reputation by praising Athenians, at least in
the presence of Athenians.
[4.] Men. And what would you have to say, were it re-
quisite to speak? .
Soc. Myself perhaps nothing from myself. But only yes-
* Ficinus alone has “Graecorum omnium.”
* Respecting the oratorical powers of Pericles, see the commentators
on Phaedrus, p. 269, E., Aristoph. Ach. 476, Eupolis Añploug Fr. vii.,
and Quintilian x. 1, 82. - -
* For an account of this remarkable woman see the commentators on
Xenophon, M. S. ii. 6, Aristoph. Ach. 472, Maxim. Tyr. xxiv. and
xxviii., and Harpocration in 'Aoſtagia.
* Connus is again mentioned in Euthyd. p. 272, C., as the music-mas-
ter of Socrates.
*—” The word trauðev6eig is evidently unnecessary after #7tavāsū0m.
* Of Lamprus little is known except what is to be gathered from C.
Nepos in Epaminond. § 2, Plutarch ii. p. 1142, and Athenaeus ii. p. 44.
* Respecting this orator, see Ruhnken’s “Dissertat. de Antiphonte.”
According to Thucydides viii. 68, “he was the best to think upon a ques.
tion, and, what he had thought upon, to express.”
* This was one of the wards ºf Athens.
MENEXEN US. 187
terday I heard Aspasia going through a funeral oration on
these very persons. For she had heard what you tell me,
that the Athenians were going to choose the person to speak.
And then she went through partly on the instant what it
would be proper to say, and partly what she had formerly
thought of, when it seems she was composing the funeral
oration that Pericles pronounced,” and was glueing toge-
ther some scraps from that.
Men. Could you remember what she said P
Soc. Unless I do her wrong. At least I learnt it from
her, and I almost received some cuffs, because I was forget-
ting it.
Men. Why then do you not repeat it?
Soc. (I fear) my mistress may be offended, if I make her
discourse public.” -
Men. (Fear) not, Socrates, at all; but tell it, and you will
gratify me greatly, whether you choose to call it the speech of
Aspasia, or of any one else; only speak it.
Soc. But you will perhaps laugh at me, if I, an elderly man,
appear to be still acting the boy.
Men. Not at all, Socrates: but do speak it by all means.
[5.] Soc. Since then I must gratify you,” so as even,
should you order me, to undress myself and dance,” I will
gratify you ; since we are alone.” Listen then ; for she
spoke, commencing, as I think, with the mention of the dead
themselves in this manner.
As regards our acts, these here have received all the honours
due to them ; and after receiving them, are now proceeding
on their fated road, having been sent onward by the state in
** To this passage is to be traced the notion of Synesius, that the fu-
neral oration put into the mouth of Pericles by Thucydides, ii. 35, was the
production of Aspasia.
* On this use of Écºpépstv, see Fischer on Xenophon K. II., vi. 1, 5,
roïto ŚróXpumos ééévêykeiv. The Latin word is “efferre.” Cicero de
Orator. § 24, “Petamgue a vobis ne has meas ineptias efferatis.” There
is an º here to the secrets of the Mysteries. See Lucian in Nekvo-
avr. § 2.
p * This is said because Socrates feigned himself to be unable to resist
the charms of beauty in young persons. Compare Meno, $ 9.
* On the dancing of Socrates see Lucian II spi 'Opxmo. § 25, and Xeno.
phon, M. S., quoted by Athenaeus i. p. 21.
. º This formula is found in Aristoph. Thesm, 472, and in Plato, Parmen.
p. 137, A
188 MENEXENUS.
common, and individually by their families al.d friends . But
as regards our words, the honour still left undone the law
enjoins us to pay to the men; and it is meet to do so. For of
deeds performed nobly the remembrance by a well-spoken
speech is an honour paid to those, who have acted, from those
who hear. There is need then of such a discourse, as shall
praise sufficiently the dead, and kindly advise the living, by
exhorting the descendants and brethren of the dead to imi-
tate their valour, and by comforting their fathers and their
mothers, and whoever of their ancestors more remote are still
alive. How then shall such an oration present itself? Or from
whence shall we rightly begin to praise those brave men,
who, when living, delighted their friends with their valour,
and bartered their death for the safety of those who survive.
To me it seems that we must praise them on the ground of
their nature, as they were by nature good. Now they were
good by being sprung from the good.” Let us then celebrate,
in the first place, their noble birth; in the second, their nur-
ture and education; and afterwards let us show forth their
conduct in practice, how they proved it to be honourable and
worthy of those” (advantages). [6.] In the first place, the
commencement of their nobility was in the birth of their an-
cestors, not being in-comers, nor exhibiting their descendants
as foreign settlers in the land, *[themselves coming from
elsewhere, 1% but sprung from the earth,” and dwelling and
living in their own country really; (and) nursed, not like other
nations, by a step-mother,” but a parent, the very land which
$hey inhabited, and in which they now lie dead ; in the
* So Horace, “Fortes creantur fortibus.”
* Although Toàrov might perhaps refer to “birth, nurture, and edu-
cation,” one would prefer Šavrāv, as in Thucyd. vi. 40, TróAug #6s—ápav-
veirau &áiwg airijg,
*—” To the words āAA00sy opów jºcóvrov Dionysius was the first to
object. They are perfectly useless after Šarm) ve.
* On the boast of the Athenians, who called themselves Abróx909sc,
and wore, as the symbol of their birth, a grasshopper in their hair, see
Herodot. vii. 161, Thucyd. i. 2, and other subsequent writers. The
story is disbelieved by Livy, in i. 8, “natam e terra sibi prolem ementi-
ebantur;” and Macrob. Somn. Sup. i. 2; and is ridiculed by Lucian in
Philo-Pseud.
* A similar distinction between a mother and step-mother, as applied
to a country, is found in Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 760, ed. R., Welleius
Paterc. ii. 5, and Petronius, quoted by Gottleber.
MENEXEN US. 189
places” of the mother which begat and nursed them, and
received them (again) beneath her.” Most just then is it to
celebrate first the mother herself; for thus at the same time
it results that the noble birth of these here is made their
adornment.
[7.] And worthy is this land to be praised by all men, and
not by ourselves alone, on many other grounds, but on this
(the first and greatest, that she has the good fortune to be
#oved by the gods. And to this my assertion the quarrel of the
gods,” who contended for her, and their decision, bear testi-
imony. Whom then the gods have praised, how is it not just
{or her to be praised by all mankind 2 Her second praise
gºwould be justly this, that at the very time when the whole
earth sent up and produced animals of all kinds, both wild
beasts and cattle, this land of ours was seen to be unprolific
of, and free from, savage beasts; and of all animals selected
and produced man, who surpasses all the others in intellect,
Wand alone acknowledges Justice and the Gods.” Now of
this assertion there is a great proof in that this land has pro-
| duced the ancestors of these men, and ours also. Now every
* In lieu of TóTrouc, Ficinus has “visceribus;” which led West to
translate “bosom,” and myself to read kóAtroug : which is put beyond
all doubt by the Epigram in Demosth. TIEpi Xrspáv. § 289, Taia 6s tra-
Tpig #x' év kóATroug Töv TrAsiora kapıövrwy Xépara. Erycus Epigr. 12,
X06 w pus kai i kóAtroug Watara öséapévm. Epigr. Inc. 544, Taia pièv čv
kóAtroug kpāTrst Tööe gºpia TIAérovoc. Chrysostom. Homil. vi. p. 80,
E., ii kotyń Távrov juáv pairmp roëg kóAtrovg &rAdjoaga. Meleager
Epigr., Tâ–rāv travóóvorov 'Hpépua Goig kóAtroug, plárep, Švayka)\to au.
So too in the Latin Epitaph on Publ. Scipio, “Quare libens te in gre-
mium recepit Terra;” and Pliny, H. N. ii. 63, “Terrae propter eximia
merita cognomen inditum maternae venerationis—Quae nos nascentes ex-
cipit; natos alit; editos (read, ‘adultos’) sustinet; novissime complexa
gremio—ut mater operiens.”
* This is the correct explanation of Ötroöséapuśvmg, as seen by Schleier-
macher; who might have quoted AEsch. Cho. 127, Kai Yaiav airijv, i.
rd Trávra Tikrstat, €pélagó. T’aij6ug ràvös käpa. Aapſ3ávst : and Eurip.
Suppl. 536, Kai Trávra /īv 6péºpagav air' at Öst Aa3ew: , from whence
it is plain that at has dropt out between kai and iTroösšapuśvnv. Loers,
however, and Stalbaum, explain jTroöáx800au by “suscipere,” “to take
up.” But such a meaning is applicable only to a person taking up the
children deserted by their parents.
* On this contest between Athéné and Poseidon, see Ovid. Metam,
vi. 70.
* So Cicero Legg. ii. 8, “Nullum est animal praeter hominem, quod
habeat notitiam dei.”





190 MENEXENU.S.
thing that brings forth, possesses food fitted for that which
it may bring forth ; by which fact is clearly shown what
woman is really the mother, and who is not, but merely a
supposititious one, should she not possess the fountain” of
nourishment for the child. This very sufficient proof does
our land and mother afford of her having produced men; for:
at that time she alone and first brought forth the corn o
wheat and barley,” as the food of man, and by which the
human race is nourished in the best and easiest” manner,
as having in reality produced that very animal. And such
proofs it is fitting to receive rather in favour of the earth than
of the woman. For the earth did not in conceiving and pro-
ducing imitate woman, but woman imitated the earth; neither
did this land enviously withhold these her fruits, but dis-
tributed them to others. In the next place, she sent up for her
offspring the Clive, an assistance in toil; * and after she had
nourished and reared them up to manhood, she introduced to
them gods” for their rulers and teachers, whose names it is
fitting upon such an occasion” to omit. For we know who
have given the materials for life, by teaching us first” the
arts requisite for our daily subsistence, and instructed us in
the acquirement and the use of arms for the protection of our
country.
[8.] Thus born, and educated, lived the ancestors of these
persons, after having framed a polity, which it is well to
bring in a few words to your recollection. For a polity is the
nurse of men ; a good one of good men, and the contrary of
bad. It is necessary then to show, that our ancestors were
brought up under a good polity, through which both they
became good, and those also who are now ; amongst whom
* This expression Plato adopted perhaps from armyāg—puéoxwy in
Eurip. Iph. T. 162.
* This story is repeated by Lucretius, vi. 1.
** To avoid perhaps an hendyadis, Ficinus has “commodissime.” Plato
wrote, I suspect, káA\to Ta kai Öğata, not kai àptora—
* So in Protag. p. 334, B., Tô £Aatov—oºpart ápwyóv.
* The gods alluded to are Athéné, Ares, and Hephæstos, as shown
by Legg. p. 920, D.
* During a funeral; as is shown by Demosthenes in Timocrat, ric
38 (XspuéAmg) viðv čvra oi rpétrov šariv štri Toijós toū répov čvouá
80.7/,

* The word ºrpiórovg, which is an evident corruption, is omitted by
Ficinus.
MENEXENUS. 19|
the dead here happen to be a part. The same polity was then,
as it now is, an aristocracy; under which we still live as
citizens, and for the most part (have done so) from that time
to this. One person calls it a democracy, another by another
name, such as he pleases. But it is in truth ** a government
by the best, combined with a good opinion of the people.*
For kings have ever existed with us, at one time hereditary,
at another elected,” but the people possessing for the most
part the power of the state, has delegated the offices and go-
vernment to those, who were successively deemed to be the
best; and no man has ever been excluded from the want of in-
fluence or wealth,” or his ignorance of his parentage,” nor held
in honour for the contrary qualities, as is done in other cities;
but there was only one limitation; that he, who was deemed
to be wise and good, should possess the power and office.
Now the cause of this polity is the equality of birth. For
other states are made up of men of every country, and of
unequal conditions; so that their polities, as well tyrannies as
oligarchies, are of unequal character. They therefore live,
some considering each other as slaves, and some as masters.
But we and ours, born all brethren, from one mother, consider
ourselves neither the slaves nor the lords of each other; but
that the equality of our births, according to nature, compel us
to seek an equality of government, according to law, and to
yield to each other upon no other ground, except the reputa-
tion of valour and of mind. [9.] Hence it is that the
fathers of these men, and ours also, and themselves too, being
thus nurtured in all freedom, and nobly born, have ex-
hibited before all men many and glorious deeds, both in
private and public, deeming it their duty to fight for freedom
and in behalf of Greeks even against Greeks, and against
48–48 Such seems to be the meaning of the words pist' stöošíag tràff-
6ovg, &ptorokparta. Compare Thucyd. ii. 65, #yiyveró Te A6xp psy Öm-
Hokparia, pyp 68 WTö roi; ºrptºrov (or rather &ptorov) &vöpóg &oxii :
and Aristotle Polit. iii. 3, si rig #gruv, fiv ka?\oipuev &ptorokparta v, v' &
car'âperºv ai Tupai číðovrat kai kar’ détav.
* This alludes to the second Archon, called Baart)\sic, “king.”
* The same fact is mentioned by Thucyd. ii. 37. According to Plu-
tarch, Aristides was the person, who got a law passed to enable the
Archons to be selected from the poorer people, as well as the richer.
** To such ignorance Juvenal alludes—“Vos humiles, inquis, vulgi pars
*ltima nostri, Quorum nemo queat patriam monstrare parentis.”
192 MENEXENUS.
barbarians in defence of Greeks combined. But how when
Eumolpus and the Amazons” brought an army against
the country, and enemies even still before them, they de-
fended themselves, and how they defended the Argives
against the Cadmeans,” and the Heracleidae against the
Argives,” the time is too short to relate worthily; and poets
too have already hymned sufficiently their valour in verse, and
pointed it out to all; and should we now attempt to adorn the
same subject in a prose discourse, we should perhaps appear to
be only second to them. For such reasons then it seems right
to pass over these matters, especially since they have received
their due. But such acts, as no poet has yet thrown round”
them a renown suited to their worth, and which are still in
remembrance, all these it seems I ought by praising to call
to mind, and by introducing them to others make them a
subject for songs and other kind of poetry in a manner be-
coming the actors. Now of those to which I am alluding, the
chief are these. When the Persians were taking the lead in
Asia and attempting to enslave Europe, the children of this
soil and our forefathers arrested their course; whom it is both
just and necessary to remember first and to praise their valour.
He however who would praise it properly, ought to have been
born in word,” and lived an eye-witness at that very period,
* Valckenaer on Eurip. Phoen. 541, observes that Plato has been here
guilty of an anachronism. For the Amazons invaded Attica not in the
time of Eumolpus, but of Theseus, by whom they were conquered ;
whereas it was against Ere.'”heus that Eumolpus was engaged in war,
as stated by Thucydides, ii. 15. Isocrates has taken especial care to avoid
the anachronism in Panegyr. § 19, "HA601, eig Trºy Xúpav juáv €pdiksg
pºv per' Eºpºrov roi IIoostóóvog, Xkö9at 68 pist’’Apačávov, rejv"Apswg
6vyarépov, oil card Töv airów Xpóvoy; who has however in § 18 al-
luded to the story of the Amazons, which Strabo, in xi. p. 770, considers
to be merely a fable.
* The story alluded to is told briefly by Herodotus, ix. 27, and by
Isocrates, in Panegyr. § 15, and rather differently in Panathen. p. 524.
For the length of time doubtless made it difficult to arrive at the truth.
* On this story see the Heracleidae of Euripides.
* The Greek is \agdv: which I altered many years ago into 3a)\ww.
—For the poet does not “receive,” but “confer” glory, as shown by
“Dignum laude virum Musa vetat mori.” And though one would expect
Treptſła)\dov, as in Isocrat. Archidam. § 44, aioxêvaig påg repuſºaXeiv,
yet the preposition is omitted in Aśºrmv–3a)\eig in Soph. Phil. 67, and
(3.a)\sic Xapāv in Eurip. Ion, 75l.
* In lieu of Aðyq), omitted by Ficinus, Stephens suggested Aéyw, with
which may be compared pmui in § 10, and Ašyw in § #
MENEXEN US. 193
hen the whole of Asia was subject to its then third monarch.
The first of these was Cyrus; who after effecting the freedom
f the Persians, his countrymen, did through his high spirit
educe the Medes his (former) masters to slavery, and became
;he ruler of the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt. His son (Cam-
Dyses) subdued Egypt, and as much of Libya as it was possible
to march against. The third, Darius, made Scythia the bound-
ry of his empire by land, and by his fleet commanded the
ea and islands, so that no one presumed to be his opponent.
he very thoughts of all men were enslaved ; so many, and
reat, and warlike nations did the Persian power reduce to
subjection. .
[10.] Now Darius having accused us and the Eretrians of
lotting against Sardis,” made it a pretence for sending an
rmy of five hundred thousand men” ”in ships and transports,
nd a fleet” of three hundred sail, and ordered Datis, their com-
ander, to return and bring back the Eretrians and Athenians
:aptive, if he wished to keep his own head on. Datis Sailing
o Eretria against a people, who amongst the Greeks of that
ime were in the highest repute for the affairs of war, and not
ew in number, got these very men into his power in three
ays;” and that none might escape, he searched through the
hole country after this fashion. His troops having marched
to the boundaries of Eretria, and extending themselves from
sea to sea, they joined their hands, and thus went through the
country, that they might be able to say to the king, that not
a person had escaped. With the same design they sailed
down from Eretria to Marathon, as being an easy thing for
them to unite in the same fate the Athenians with the Eretri-
ans, and to carry them off. During these transactions, some
f which were done and others attempted, none of the Greeks
ave any assistance to the Eretrians; nor, except the Lacedae-
onians, to the Athenians; and they did not arrive till the
ay after the battle.* All the rest, struck with terror, and
* See Herodotus, v. 101. ... •
* Cornelius Nepos says there were only 200,000 foot and 10,000 horse.
Pausanias and Valerius Max. 300,000 foot.
*—" This repetition of £v re tràotoug kai vavoi, vaig óē Tptakooiac,
oes not look like Plato's style; to say nothing of trºoia in the sense of
transports.” The passage is evidently corrupt.
* Herodotus, in vi. 101, says in seven days.
* For according to Herodotus, in vi. 106, they were detained at home
©






















ES4. MENEXENUS.
contented with their present safety, kept themselves quiet.
Now a person living at that period would have known what
men of valour they were, who at Marathon sustained the
strength of the Barbarians and punished the pride of all Asia,
and fins erected trophies over the Barbarians, and became the
leaders and teachers to the rest (of Greeks),” that the power
of Persia was not invincible, and that all wealth and all num-
bers must yield to valour. I say then that these men were
the fathers, not only of our bodies, but of the liberty likewise
of ourselves and of all together on this continent.” For b
looking upon that exploit did the Greeks dare to hazard sub-
sequent battles for their own preservation, and to become the
pupils of those at Marathon. [11.] To these, then, must w
in reason assign the first honours; and the second to those, who
fought and conquered in the sea-fights at Salamis and Arte
misium. Now of the deeds of those men, one would have
much to tell, both as to what masses of troops, advancing b
sea and land, they stood up against, and how they repelled
them. But that, which seems to me to be their noblest act, I
will bring to your recollection; because they worked out th
deeds that followed upon those of Marathon. For they a
Marathon only proved thus much to the Greeks, that it wa
possible for a few of them to repel many of the Barbarians;
but by sea it was still uncertain. For the Persians had the
reputation of being invincible at sea, through their superiority
in numbers, and wealth, and skill, and strength. Truly then
was this deed worthy of praise on the part of those men, who
then fought at sea; inasmuch as they dispelled the dread, by
which the Greeks had been fast bound, and caused them no
longer to fear a multitude of ships and men; and it resulted
from those, who fought at Marathon and Salamis, that the
other Greeks were taught; and by learning from one party
on land, and from the other at sea, they became accustomed
to feel no fear of the Barbarians. The action at Plataea was
the third, I assert, in number and in valour, that took place
by a sacred festival; while the Scholiast says here that they were pre-
vented from marching, because the moon was not at the full.
* In lieu of roig &\\oug, the train of ideas evidently leads to roic àA
Aoic"EXAmoru, as just afterwards roëg àX\ovg "EXXmvag.
* By “this continent” is meant Greece. Without the deictic articl
it would have meant Asia. - -













- MENEXENUS. 195
(for)* the safety of Greece; in which the Lacedaemonians
and Athenians had a common share. Now this the greatest
and most difficult exploit did they all assist;" and for this
their valour they are both now celebrated by us, and will be
by those hereafter in the time to come. Subsequent to this,
many states of Greece still sided with the Barbarian; and
the king himself was reported to have a design of making
an attempt once more upon the Greeks. -
[12.]. It is just then for us to bear in remembrance those,
who to the exploits of their forefathers put the finish in our
deliverance, by clearing themselves from, and driving away,
the whole Barbarian power from the sea. Now these were
they, who fought in the naval battle at Eurymedon,” and they,
who were in the expedition to Cyprus,” and who sailed to
Egypt,” and to many other places. Of these we ought to
nave a recollection, and to acknowledge our thanks to them;
because they caused the king” to fear for, and to attend to,
his own safety, and not to be plotting for the destruction of
the Greeks. Now (the whole of)79 this war was endured to
he end?" by the whole power of the state in behalf of our-
elves and others, speaking a common language, in oppo-
ition to the Barbarians. But when peace” was made, and the
bity held in honour, there fell, as is wont, upon the successful,
st rivalry from men, and after rivalry envy, which placed
* As there is nothing on which rijg EAAmvukňg a wrmpiac can depend,
Ficinus seems to have introduced “causam ” after “salutis Graecia: ”
but of his own head; unless he found in his MS. Trépt after owtmpiaç.
* The Greek is juvvav, to which Gottleber was the first to object,
and in lieu of it he suggested #vvaav, what Stalbaum feels half dis-
posed to adopt. Bekker has edited juivayro, found in five MSS. Per-
haps Plato wrote Ütrépusway, i.e. “endure.”
* This took place in Ol. lxxviii. 3, B. c. 466. Thucydides, in i. 100,
says that the Athenians took thirty triremes, and destroyed in all about
two hundred vessels.
.*, * On these combined expeditions, see Thucyd. i. 94 and 104, and
iodor. Sic. xi. p. 459, ed. Wess.
.69 “The king” of Persia.
" Before aráog, Stalbaum ingeniously conjectures that träg has dropt
lit.
7. With öumvrXà0m 5 tróAsplog compare “bella exhausta” in Virgil.
” This is generally supposed to be the peace made by Cimon with the
ersians, to which there is an allusion in Isocrates, Aristides, and Plu-
urch. Some, however, of the scholars of Germany have asserted that no
ch peace was ever made. 2’ -



























196 MENEX ENU.S.
this city, although unwilling, in a state of hostility with the
Greeks. [13.] Hereupon a war breaking out, the Athenians
came in collision with the Lacedaemonians at Tanagra, and
fought in defence of the liberties of Boeotia; and as the battle
was undecisive,” the action afterwards” brought matters to
a decided issue. For some went away, leaving the Boeotians,”
whom they had been assisting ; while our troops, after obtain-
ing a victory, on the third day,” at CEnophyta, justly brought
back those, who had been unjustly driven out. These then
were the first after the Persian war, who, in behalf of liberty,
gave their assistance to Greeks against Greeks; and being
men of bravery, they freed those whom they were assisting;
and, held in honour by the state, were buried in this cemetery
here the first. After this, a great war arose, and all the Greeks
brought an army against us, ravaged our country, and un-
worthily repaid the obligation they owed to the state. But
our troops, after defeating them in a sea-fight, and taking the
Lacedaemonian 70 leaders prisoners in the island of Sphagia,”
did, when it was in their power to destroy, spare and give
them up, and made a peace, conceiving that in a war with a
fellow-tribe” one ought to carry on the contest only to the
point of victory, and not, through the resentment of a particu-
lar state, to destroy the common interest of Greece ; but
against the Barbarians to war even to utter destruction. Fit-
ting then is it to praise such men, who after being engaged
in that war, now lie buried here; because they showed that
” Thucydides says, in i. 108, that the victory was on the side of the
Lacedaemonians.
*..." alludes to the battle of CEnophyta, where the Athenians gained
the day. -
7* Bekker would expunge Bowroëg entirely. For the Lacedaemonians.
assisted the Thebans, and not the Boeotians. |
7" According to Thucydides, it was the sixty-second day. Hence in
lieu of Tpirg, Clinton, in Fast. Hellenic. p. 256, proposed to read rpírg
#", i.e. “sixty-third.”
* As not only the leaders of the Lacedæmonians were taken pri-
soners, but their whole army likewise, Stalbaum says we must either read
with two MSS. #ysºčvac kai Aakedaipoviovc or #yspóvac roic Aarºa-
povuovg—
77. This island near Pylus is more commonly called Xpakrnpig–and
read seven MSS. at least. .
* How the Athenians and Lacedæmonians could be called rô 6p164 v\ov.
I cannot understand. The sense requires rather rô Špiópwvov—as in § 12
l























MENEXENUS. 197
if any one doubted whether in the former war against the
Barbarians some others were (or not) superior to the Atheni-
ans, he doubted without reason. For they there proved,
when Greece was in a state of dissension, their superiority in
war, by their getting into their hands even those, who had
stood forward in defence of the other Greeks, and by defeat-
ing single-handed those, with whom formerly they had con-
jointly overcome the Barbarians. [14.] After this peace,”
there was a third war, unexpected and terrible, in which
many brave men fell, who lie buried here; and many too about
Sicily, after they had erected very many "trophies in behalf
of the liberty of the Leontines, to assist whom in accordance
with their oaths” they sailed to those regions; but when,
through the length of the voyage, the state was in difficulties,
and unable to minister to their wants, their hearts failed them,
and they were unsuccessful; *of whose temperate conduct and
valour their enemies and antagonists have poured forth greater
praise than have friends on the conduct of the others.”
Many likewise (fell) in the Hellespont,” after having taken
all the ships of the enemy in one day, and gaining many other
7° This peace of one year is mentioned by Thucyd. iv. 117.
* These, says Stalbaum, were the victories at Myle and Syracuse,
mentioned by Thucydides and Diodorus. But they were too few in
number to be called TrAsiata. I suspect however that Plato wrote k&M-
Avora—For though not many, they were still most honourable.
* This refers to the fact stated by Thucyd. in iii. 86, and vi. 19.
*—8° Loers and Stalbaum agree in rejecting all the words between
the numerals as an interpolation. I trust however I restored the author
o himself, in my edition of the Greek text, by simply altering Éxovot into
Éovat—where xástv is applied to praise, as “fundere” is to “laudes” by
ucretius. The origin of the metaphor is to be traced to Homer; who
as in OÖ. A. 432, aloxog Éxevs: in OÖ. E. 38, #Asyxeinu caréxswag : in
O6. X. 469, kar’ &veiðsa xstav. So too AEschylus—sikraia X80ögag in
Suppl. 631, and Eöoôíav—xéopiev in Glauc. Fr. Pindar likewise in Pyth.
x 86, Özra—ºrpoxsévrov : in Isthm. viii. 128, epivov–éxevav, after the
Homeric Xést troXàympvy douéâv: from whence Fritzsche has happily
corrected ióv Xéov for takxéov in CEd. T. 1222. With regard to the
sentiment, compare Suidas in Kpdºrspog—Kpértorog 3’ &p’ obtog, 3rov
ră răg dipëriñg £pya kai trapá roig #vavriouc rqī ātraivºp ovupwwotong
#xet. With respect to roig óA\otc, the allusion is to the Lacedæmoni-
ans, who had assisted the Syracusans, but had probably given offence
by the austerity of their manners to the more luxurious inhabitants of
Sicilv.
83 £ngelhardt refers this to the naval engagement at Cyzicum, (B, c.
410,) mentioned by Xenophon, Hellen. i. 1, 18.
198 MENEXEN US.
victories. But what I said as to the terrible and unexpected
nature of the war, by that I mean, that the other Greeks car-
ried to such an extent their feeling of animosity to this state,
as to dare to make overtures by an embassy to the king of
Persia,” their greatest foe, and to bring in again for their
particular interests that person against the Greeks, whom
they had, in common with us, driven out, and to collect an
allied army of all** the Greeks and Barbarians against this city.
Upon which occasion the strength and valour of the state be-
came very conspicuous. For when our enemies fancied it to be
already beaten down in war, and had intercepted” our ships
at Mitylene, then did these men, confessedly the bravest, go
in person on board the vessels, and giving assistance with
sixty sail, gained a victory” over the enemy, and delivered
their own friends; but meeting with unmerited misfortune in
not having their bodies picked up at sea,” “they lie where
they ought not.” These it is our duty ever to remember and
to praise. For by their valour we were victorious, not in
that engagement only, but through the rest of the war; for
through them the state gained the reputation, that it would
not be beaten down in war,” not even by all men (combined).
* This was Darius Nothus; whose name is not mentioned by Thucy-
dides in viii. 18, where the terms of the alliance are given.
* As the Athenians were themselves Greeks, the word Trávrag would
include them too amongst the others. Perhaps Plato wrote #7ttévrag—
For it was not sufficient merely to collect an army; but it should be
stated likewise that the troops marched against the city; and it was to
fill up this idea that Ficinus translated “ad hanc urbem obsidendam
Colligere.”
* By the Spartan admiral Callicratidas. See Xenophon Hellen.
6, 24.
* This was gained B. c. 406, near Arginusae, a small island between
Lesbos and the continent. Above seventy triremes were taken or de-
stroyed, and of the ten Lacedaemonian vessels only one escaped. *
* As the bodies were not recovered, they were left without the rites of
burial, which the Greeks held to be a great misfortune; and hence, for
their neglect, the Athenian commanders were tried, and six of them
executed.
*—" The Greek is keivrat #v6áðs. But as the bodies were not
picked up at all, they could not be lying at Athens. Hence Wesseling
wished to read oi ksivrat #v6áðs: in lieu of which I suggested, sixteen
years ago, keivraw, Év6' oi Ösi, as I have translated. To meet the difficulty,
Stalbaum considers the words oëk &vaupsøévrég #k rijg 6a)\érrng an in-
terpolation.
* This could hardly be said with truth in the face of the victory gaine 3 by





MENEXENUS. 199
And the reputation was founded in truth. We have been
beaten by our dissensions, not by others. By them at least
we are even now unsubdued. But we have subdued our-
selves, and (in turn) have been subdued. After these trans-
actions a calm ensuing, and peace made * with all the others,
a domestic war * was carried on in such a manner, that were
it fated for men to fall into dissensions, every person would
pray that his country might be no otherwise in disorder. For
how delightedly and familiarly did the people of the Piraeus,
and those of the city, mingle with each other And contrary
to the expectations of the other Greeks, with how much
moderation * did they lay aside their hostility against those at
Eleusis And for all these acts there was no other cause than
their real consanguinity, producing a firm friendship and
clanship, not in words, but deeds.
[15.] It is meet then to hold in remembrance those
too who died in that war by each other's hands, and to
reconcile them, as we best can, by offering prayers and
Sacrifices on these occasions to the deities,” who now have
them in their power, forasmuch as we ourselves are also
reconciled. For not through malice and hatred did they
lay hands upon each other, but through their evil fortune.
And of these facts we are ourselves the living witnesses; for,
being of the same family with them, we have forgiven each
other for what we have done and suffered. After this the
city had rest, and enjoyed a profound peace, pardoning the
Barbarians, who, having been ill enough * treated by this state,
Lysander at AEgos-Potamos, and which led to the occupation of Athens
itself by the successful Spartan commander—events on which Plato has
very cleverly said nothing.
* This alludes to the peace made with Lysander, by which the
* were forced to destroy the long walls that united the city with
the Sea.
* This refers to the period, when Thrasybulus acted against the thirty
s3-called tyrants, appointed by Lysander to govern the city.
* Of the moderation shown by the people towards the partisans of the
thirty tyrants who had retired to Eleusis, Cornel. Nep. in Thrasybul. §
2, gives a remarkable proof, by stating that when the peace was made, it
was agreed that no one but the thirty tyrants should suffer in person or
in purse.
* The deities were the powers below. Compare Eurip. Alc 257.
* Bekker would omit ikavijg after kakóg. But Engelhardt, with whom
Stalbaum agrees, defends it, as being balanced by otic evöeóc.
200 MENEXEN US,
defended themselves not insufficiently; but she felt a resent-
ment against the Greeks, when she remembered what a return
they had made, after they had been well treated by her, by
uniting with the Barbarians, and depriving us of the very fleet,
which had formerly saved them, and by pulling down our walls,
by which * we had prevented their own from falling. The city
then having determined not to assist Greeks, enslaved by each
other or the Barbarians, remained thus.” While then we
were in this mood, the Lacedaemonians, fancying that we, the
aiders of freedom, were fallen, and that now was the time for
them to enslave the rest, attempted to do so. [16.] But
what need is there to be prolix P For I should speak of sub-
sequent events that are not of old date, *nor before the time
of many men still living.” For we know that, to obtain the
aid of this city, there came terror-struck the leading men
amongst the Greeks, Argives, and Boeotians, and Corinthians;
and, what was the greatest miracle” of all, how even the king
came into such a difficulty, as to think there was no safety
from any other quarter than from this very city, which he had
199 previously, with great eagerness,” attempted to destroy.
And indeed, should any one wish to accuse the state on just
grounds, he would rightly accuse her by stating this alone;
that she is ever too full of pity, and the hand-maid of the
weaker party. For at that very time she was not able to be
firm, and to keep to her resolution, of not assisting those, when
in the act of being enslaved, who had injured her own citi-
zens:" but she was bent from her purpose, and did give assist-
* In lieu of &v6' div Ficinus found in his MS. $p' div, as shown by
his “quibus.” Boissonade however, on Nicetas, p. 322, defends &v6' div,
and says it is put for div6' oij.
* Instead of oitwg, I have suggested airwg, “at leisure.” Compare
Hom. IX. A. 133, abráp £p' airwg "Horóat Ösvópsvov.
*—” The MSS. vary between obôé Trpè troXXöv ćröv and oběš troXXów
&v0p6trov. Heindorf on Gorg. p. 448, A. § 3, suggested obôé troXXöv divu,
yevsöv. Bekker, où6° à tr' àAAww—By uniting the readings of the MSS.,
I elicited, sixteen years ago, où68 trpū ºrox\@v čv6pútrøv črt Övrov, as I
haye translated.
* This is the best rendering of 0&iov, by which was meant a thing sent
by a divine power, or was the work of one.
*—” In lieu of Trpo6üpıwg, Stalbaum has adopted trpó00ev from two
MSS. Plato probably wrote both, as I have translated.
* The pronouns orpäç abroëg are to be referred to troXtraç, which is to
be obtained from ºróXug
MENEXENUS. 2O1
ance; and by such aid so delivered them from slavery, that they
were free men, until they again made themselves slaves. She
did not however dare to assist the king, through a feeling of
reverence for the trophies of Marathon, and Salamis, and
Plataea; but, by permitting merely the exiles” and volunteers
to assist, she did confessedly preserve him; and after building
her walls and fleets, and undertaking a war, when compelled
to do so, she carried on hostilities with the Lacedæmonians for
the protection of the people of Paros.”
[17.] The king however being afraid of the city, when he
saw the Lacedaemonians declining a war by sea, and desirous
to withdraw himself, made a demand 4 for the Greek colonists
on the continent, whom the Lacedaemonians had previously
consented to give up,” if he were to join with us and our allies
in war; conceiving that, as we should not comply with it,
there would be a pretence for withdrawing himself. In the
case of the other allies he was deceived; for the Corinthians,
and Argives, and Boeotians, were willing to give them up,"
and entered into a treaty, and confirmed it by oaths, "[to give
up the Greeks on the continent, 17 if he would furnish the
money supplies. But we alone did not dare to give them up,
nor to be a party to the oaths. To such an extent was carried
the noble and liberal conduct of the state, at once solid and
* This alludes to Conon, who, after the destruction of the Athenian fleet
at Ægos-Potamos, fled to Euagoras, the ruler of Salamis in Cyprus; by
whom other exiles from Greece and Athens especially were favourably
received, as we learn from Isocrates in Euag. p. 302.
* Of the war undertaken by the Athenians in defence of the Parians
nothing is told elsewhere. Krüeger, in Histor. Philolog. Studien. p. 225,
would read "Počitov, referring to Xenophon Hellen. iv. 8, 20–25, and
Diodor. xiv. 94–97. Bentham thinks the allusion is to a naval victory,
gained by Chabrias over the Lacedaemonians between Naxos and Paros,
as mentioned by Xenophon, Hellen. v., and Diodorus, xv.
* See Thucyd. viii. 56.
* This was actually done subsequently at the peace of Antalcidas. See
Xenophon Hellen. v. 1. But the chronological order of events which
Plato has generally followed; makes such an allusion to be here out of
place.
* Schoenborn conceives that Plato alludes to the bribery, of which the
Corinthians, Argives, and Boeotians were guilty, when, as stated by
Xenophon in Hellen. iii. 5, Timocrates the Rhodian was sent by Tith-
raustes to purchase a confederacy against the Lacedaemonians; in which
the Athenians joined indeed, but with clean hands.
*—" The words within brackets are evidently superfluous.
202 MENEXENUS.
sound, and naturally a hater of Barbarians, through our being
of pure Greek blood, with no mixture of Barbarian. For
neither the * Pelopses, Cadmuses, AEgyptuses, Danauses,” and
many others, Barbarians by birth, but Greeks by law, are dwell-
ing with us; but we are very Greeks; not a mixed Barbarian
breed; and hence the genuine hatred of a foreign nature has
been instilled into the state. Designedly,” then, we were again 19
left alone, from our unwillingness to do a deed disgraceful and
unholy by giving up Greeks to Barbarians. Returning then
to the same condition as when we were formerly beaten down
in war, we did, with a god's assistance, lay down hostilities
more successfully than at that period. For we were freed
from it, possessing ships, and walls, and our own colonies;
and so too,” contentedly, were our enemies freed from it. We
lost, however, in this war some brave men, who met with a
difficult country” in Corinth, and with treachery at Le-
chaeum. Brave, too, were those, who freed the king, and drove
the Lacedæmonians from the sea.” These are the men I am
bringing to your recollection; and such as these it becomes all
of you to join in praising and investing with honours.
[18.] Such were the exploits of the men who lie buried
here, and of the rest, who have died for the state. But though
many and honourable are the deeds already related, still many
more and more honourable are those, that have been left (un-
told); for many days and nights would not suffice” for him,
*—” On the use of these plural proper names Loers quotes Theaet. p.
169, B., Hpakxésg re kai 6mo sg. Add Phaedr. p. 229, D., Topyóvary kai
IImyáowv. Lucian, in Micyll, Kékpotrag—i. Xuqi povg | Trºépovg. So
Shakspeare, “I think there be six Richmonds in the field:” and Milton,
“Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimeras dire.”
* In lieu of &plug, which I cannot understand, Plato wrote, I sus-
pect, as I have here translated, §vyówg. -
* It is not easy to state what was the previous occasion.
* Instead of oi rang, the sense requires, as I have translated, do airwg.
* This difficulty of the country may be inferred from Xenophon, in
Hellen. iv. 4, who states, moreover, that by the treachery of Pasimeles
and Alcamenes, Praxilas was admitted into Lechaeum, a harbour in the
bay of Corinth. -
* These were the troops, military and naval, under Conon, as shown
by Xenophon in Hellen. iv. 8.
* So Cicero, “Dies me deficiat, si, quae dici possint, coner exprimere.”
Athen., xi. p., 506, ŠtriNitrot u' àu pépa, quoted by Gottleber; who
might have added Hom. Od. A. 327, TIdoaç 6' oilk dip' #yd, uv6ágouas—
IIpiv Yáp rev kai vijá pésir' àpſ3porog. .
M. EN EXENUS. 203
who should go through them all. It is the duty then of
every man to bear those deeds in mind; and, as in battle, to
exhort the offspring of such men not to leave the ranks” of
their ancestors, nor, yielding to cowardice, to retire rearwards.
And I do myself both now exhort you, the children of brave
men, and shall hereafter, wherever I may meet with any of
you, remind and exhort you to be ever ready to be the bravest
of men. But for the present, I feel justified in telling you
what the fathers of these men enjoined me to proclaim to their
survivors, if they themselves suffered aught, when they had
determined to encounter danger. I will tell you then what I
heard” from them, and what, if they possessed the power,
they would now gladly say to you themselves, as I conjecture
from what they said then. Imagine, then, you hear them
speaking what I now relate as their messenger. These were
their words.
[19.] O children that ye are indeed the offspring of
courageous fathers the present deed itself declares. For
when it was in our power to live with dishonour, we chose to
die with honour, rather than bring you and those after you
into disgrace, and shame our own fathers and all our ances-
tors," conceiving that to him, who dishonours his family, life
is no life; and that to such a fellow there is no man or god
upon earth a friend, while (living),” nor under it, when dead.
It behoves you then to keep these our words in remembrance;
and if you practise any thing else, to practise it with valour,
well knowing that, deficient in this, all other possessions and
pursuits are base and wrong. For neither does wealth bring
honour * to him, who possesses it with a want of manliness,
since such a one is rich for another and not for himself; nor
do beauty and strength of body, when they dwell with the
coward and the knave, appear becoming, but unbecoming
* Compare Herodot. vii. 10; ix.48, Thucyd. ii. 87, and Demosth. Ol. iii.
* As Plato does not state when, where, or how he heard the subsequent
speech of the dead, there is probably some error in Škstvov.
17 There is a similar sentiment in Homer, IX. Z. 209, Mm68 yávog tra-
répov aloxãvepsy.
** To preserve the balance of the sentence, Švrt must be inserted be-
tween ott's and Étri—
* So I have translated to prevent the repetition of kaRAog. For Plato
wrote, I suspect, TXoirog ka?\öv pépet ri— -
204 MENEXENUS.
(rather), and make the possessor more conspicuous, and show
off his cowardice. Moreover, all knowledge, when separated
from justice and the other (parts) of virtue, appears to be
knavery” and not wisdom. On this account then endeavour
to have, as the first and last aim, through all time and by
all means, every readiness to surpass to the utmost ourselves
and ancestors in glory. For if not, rest assured that, should
we conquer you in valour, the victory brings disgrace upon
us; but defeat, if we are defeated, a state of blessedness.
Now we shall be vanquished the most, and you obtain the
victory, if you prepare yourselves not to abuse the glory of
your ancestors, nor to expend it wastefully; being convinced
that, for a person who thinks himself to be something, there
is nothing more disgraceful, than to exhibit himself as held
in honour, not on his own account, but the renown of his
forefathers.” For hereditary honour” is to descendants a
treasure honourable and magnificent. But to use up the trea-
sure of riches and renown, and from the want of one's own
wealth and good repute, *not to hand it down to posterity is
an act both disgraceful and unmanly.” Should you then
pursue these objects, you will come to us as friends to friends,
whenever your destined fate shall bring you below; but if
you disregard them and become debased, not one of us will
receive you kindly. Thus much let it be told to our children.
[20.] But our fathers and mothers, that are surviving,” it
is very meet to soothe into the supporting as easily as possible
their calamity, should any such happen to arise, and not to
lament with them—for they do not need any thing to pain
them—for their present misfortune is sufficient to produce
* So Cicero, Offic. i. 19, “Scientia, quae est remota a justitia, calliditas
potius quam sapientia est appellanda.” -
* Instead of Trpoyóvany, two MSS. and ed. Bas. 2, offer ºrporépov; an-
swering to “superiorum ” in Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote érépov, as
opposed to Šavròv–So Juvenal in vii. 70, “miserum estaliorum incum-
bere famae.”
* Cicero Offic. i. 23, “Optima haereditas a patribus traditur liberis—
gloria virtutis.”
*—” A similar sentiment is to be found in Thucyd. i. 71, ii. 62, and
Arist. Polit. v. 11. -
* Instead of oig sigi, where there is no syntax, one MS. has otou sloi,
which leads to §oot adjoi sial—
MENEXENUS. 205
that—but to heal and mitigate their sorrow, by reminding
them, that the gods have hearkened to what they especially
prayed for. * Since they did not pray for their children to be
immortal, but to be brave and renowned,” both of which, the
greatest of all blessings, they have obtained; although it is
not easy for every thing to turn out in the case of a mortal
in this life according to his wishes. By bearing too their
misfortunes like men, they will be thought to be in reality
the parents of manly children, and to be such themselves;
whereas by giving way they will raise a suspicion that they
are none of ours, or that the persons who praise us are tell-
ing an untruth ; neither of which things ought to be ; but
they ought rather to be themselves our eulogizers, exhibiting by
their acts *themselves as seeming to be in reality” the fathers,
men of men.” For the old proverb, “Nothing too much,”
seems to be well said ; and in fact is well said. ” For by
what person so ever all that leads to happiness, or nearly so,
is made to depend upon himself, and not upon others, by whose
well or ill doing his own acts are compelled to waver, by such
a one has the best preparation been made for living (well).”
This is the man of moderation; *this the man of courage and
prudence;” and this is he, who, whether his property and
children exist or are destroyed, will best obey the proverb;
for through trusting to himself, he will be seen to indulge
neither in joy nor sorrow overmuch.” Such men do we hold,
and wish, and assert our relatives to be ; and such we now
exhibit ourselves, by not feeling too much of reluctance, nor
*—” So Xenophon, on hearing of the death of his son, said, “I have
prayed to the gods not for my son to be immortal, but to be brave,”—as
we learn from Plutarch. Hence Addison makes Cato say, on a similar
occasion, “The gods be thanked; my boy has done his duty.”
*—” The Greek is airočg pavvopévovg rq àvrt trarápag övraç—
where Engelhardt alone has seen that pauvouévovg and Švraç could not
be thus united. Plato wrote, I suspect—aitotic, oil roëg pauvopévovc,
rtº 68 &vrt—i.e. “ themselves not the seeming, but being in reality—”
Compare Aristoph. Ach. 416, Eival pºv, Šotrep sini, paivsoôat 68 pain.
. * On this collocation of words see Heusde Specim. Crit. p. 129.
* The same proverb is alluded to in Charmid. § 27. - -
*—” The whole of this passage is translated by Cicero in Tuscul. v. 12,
and alluded to in part in Epist. Famil. v. 13.
* Between Živ and of raig I suspect sº has dropt.
*—” To these three virtues Cicero, De Invent. ii. 53, adds justice; and
the four together are called the cardinal virtues. - i
*
206 MENEXENUS.
too much of fear, should it be needful to die on the instant.”
We entreat then both our fathers and mothers to pass the re-
mainder of their lives in adopting the very same sentiment;
and to be assured that they will gratify us the most by not
lamenting and bewailing us; and that if the dead have any
feeling” for the living, they will be the least agreeable to us
by disfiguring* themselves and bearing ill their misfortunes,
but that they will please us the most by supporting them
lightly and with moderation. For our state is about to have”
an end, which is the most honourable among men; so that it
is becoming rather to glorify than to lament it. By acting
then as guardians and nurses to our wives and children, and
by turning their minds to such employments, they will in the
best way become forgetful of their misfortune, and lead a life
more honourable and more correct, and more agreeable to us.
Such does it suffice to tell our relatives from us. But we
would exhort the state to be the guardian of our parents and
children, by giving to the youth of the latter a well-regulated
education, and to the old age of the former a worthy support;
although we are well assured, that even if we did not so ex-
hort, there would be taken a sufficient care.
[21.] Such then, ye children and parents of the dead, did
they enjoin us to tell you; and I have, with the greatest readi-
ness possible, told you their message. And I do myself beseech
some of you to imitate your relatives, and others to feel a con-
fidence in yourselves, that we are all, in our private and public
capacities, about to support the old age of some, and to be
the guardians of others, wherever each one may meet with
any of them. And surely ye know yourselves the carefulness
* This sentiment is strangely put into the mouth of those already dead.
Instead then of si Ösi rºsvrāv, one would have expected si Ösi Öig rs2\ev-
rāv, “if it were needful to die twice.” See myself on Crito, $ 6, n. 4,
and the Commentators on “bis patiar mori’’ in Horace.
* A similar sentiment is to be found in Isocrates Euagor. p. 368,
Plataic. § 24, Lycurgus in Leocrat. § 136, Hyperides, quoted by Sto-
basus, p. 618, Galen. Protrept. § 7, and Sulpicius in Ciceron. Epist.
Famil. iv. 5.
* This alludes to the custom of women especially, disfiguring their per-
Sons, and beating their breasts, and tearing their hair, under the influence
of excessive grief for the death of those dear to them. . .
* The future #st seems strangely said of those, who had arrived already
al, the end of their life. The sense requires rather Éxes— -
MENEXENUS, 207
of the state, how that by laying down laws” respecting those
who have died in war, it takes charge of their parents and
children; and how it has been enjoined upon the magistracy,
that is the greatest,” to watch over them especially, above
all the other citizens, so that the fathers and mothers of such
may receive no injury; while it brings up together” the chil-
dren, through its great desire that their orphanhood may be
as little conspicuous as possible; since it stands in the place of
a father to them, while they are still children ; and when
they come to man's estate, sends them to their own homes,”
having first dressed them in a complete suit of armour, thus
pointing out and reminding them of the pursuits of their
fathers, and giving them the instruments of their fathers'
valour; and at the same time, by way of a good omen, (bid-
ding them)” commence their return to the paternal hearth,
about to command * with strength, as having been decked in
arms. The dead too it never fails to honour, by performing
each year the established rites for all in common, which have
taken place, as is fitting,” individually for each; and in ad-
dition to this, by appointing games both gymnastic and eques-
trian, and of all kinds of poetry; and by standing really in
the place of an heir and son to the dead, and in that of a
father to children, and in that of a guardian to parents and
such-like relatives, it takes upon itself all care of all for all
time. Keeping then these things in mind, you ought to bear
* According to Aristotle, in Polit. ii. 6, the law at Athens was the
imitation of a similar one first introduced at Miletus by Hippodamus.
* That is the first Archon, according to Meier, De Lite Attica, p. 44.
But Pseud-Ulpian, in Demosthen. Timocrat. p. 445, says it was the third
Archon, called IIoAépapxog. -
* This was in the Orphan-House, situated in the Acropolis, as may be
inferred from the Meno, p. 89, B., röv véwv Totºg áya.00%g rāg pào Eug &v
Trapaxagóvreg #pw}\árropuev čv 'AkpotróXet, iva,-Étretój &pikouvro tic
rºw ºucíav, Xpilotpot #yiyvovro. The fact is alluded to in Thucyd. ii.
46, but the place is not mentioned; and so it is in a fragment, probably
of Ælian, quoted by Suidas in 'Apivacréat.
* As the pronoun opérepag is reflective, it cannot be applied with pro-
priety to the homes of the youths. AEschines, in Ctesiph. § 154, has
more correctly & pimov rpétréo 6at #7th rá šavrāv.
* Ficinus has alone, what the sense requires, “jubet.”
* I cannot understand āpāovra. I could have understood trpáčovrár
ra, “about to do something.” a
* The Greek is ióíg Škáorq, tota where Bekker would expunge the
second tòia ; which I would alter into cia dei, as I have translated.
208 MENEXENUS,
your calamity more lightly; for thus you will be the most
dear to the dead and living, and most ready to give and to re-
ceive comfort. And now do you and all the rest, having in
common, according to custom, wept fully the dead, depart.
[22.] Such, Menexenus, is the speech of Aspasia of
Miletus.
Men. By Zeus, Socrates, you proclaim Aspasia to be a hap-
py person, if, being a woman, she is able to compose such
speeches as these.
Soc. If you do not credit it, follow me, and you shall hear
her speak it herself.
Men. I have often, Socrates, met with her, and know what
kind of woman she is. -
Soc. What then, do you not admire her, and owe you no
thanks to her for this oration ?
Men. I owe indeed, Socrates, many thanks either to her
or to him, whoever was the person who told it you; and be-
fore all others, to him who has now spoken it.
Soc. All will be well; but see that you do not say a word
against me, in order that I may hereafter tell you many and
beautiful discourses on state affairs.
Men. Be full of confidence. I will say nothing. Do you
only tell them.
Soc. So shall it be.
INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPIAS MAJOR,
OF all the dialogues of Plato, the Hippias Major is perhaps the
one best calculated to give a correct idea of the easy and playful
manner, in which Socrates, who confessed he knew nothing, was
accustomed to confute those, who pretended to know every thing.
But it is to be lamented that Plato should have done here, as else-
where, an injury to the cause he was espousing, by not keeping
strictly to the line of truth. For, as remarked by Ast, Hippias the
wise is represented as a very silly person; since such alone would
think of giving the absurd definitions of beauty put into the mouth
of Hippias. But in this very conduct of the writer, we have anº
internal proof in favour of the genuineness of the dialogue, which
some have called in question. For in consequence of similar mis-
representations, Gorgias called him “the modern Archilochus;" |
and even Socrates himself, after hearing the Lysias, exclaimed,
“Ye gods, what lies this young man tells.” It is possible, however,
that Hippias had in reality given some definitions of beauty, similar
to those which are here attributed to him, but which were wanting
in the precision of language, that alone gives value to a definition.
For unless this had been the case, the whole of the ridicule would
have been like the dart of Priam, “telum imbelle, sine ictu.”
Hence too I was led to suggest, that in the examples of beauty
selected by Plato, there was a parody of those which Hippias had
given, with the view of showing, what Sydenham was the first to
remark, that the Sophists intended to exhibit a gradation in four
different forms of beauty, of which the first was rational ; the se-
cond irrational; the third affecting the mind, through the medium
P
210 INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPIAS MAJOR.
of the body; and the last, affecting the body alone: and thus while
the speculative philosophers defined Beauty as existing, first, in the
Mind; secondly, in the Body; thirdly, in Morals; and lastly, in
Arts; the practical philosopher, Socrates, said, as shown by Xeno-
phon, in M. S. iii. 8.4–10, and iv. 6.9, that Beauty consisted in
utility and the fitness of things to their proposed ends; but that of
Beauty in the abstract we know nothing, as remarked by Plato in
the Parmenides, p. 134, C.
With regard to the theories of modern metaphysicians, viewed
either abstractedly, or with reference to objects of Nature and
Art, the inquisitive reader may turn to Burke “On the Sublime
and Beautiful;” and Payne Knight's “Principles of Taste;” and
Alison’s “Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste.”
To the editions of this dialogue by Heindorf and Stalbaum, is
to be added my own, published anonymously in 1831, under the
title of “Plato's Four Dialogues, the Crito, Hippias, Alcibiades,
and Sisyphus, with English Notes;” to which I have referred in
difficult and doubtful passages, or where the Notes were too long
or too learned to be given here entire, or even to be abridged with-
out detriment to their utility.
HIPPIAS MAJOR,
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
SOCRATES AND HIPPIAS.
SOCRATES.
[1..] O THOU, the handsome” and clever* Hippias, after
how long a time” hast thou now again” arrived at Athens !
Hip. I have had no leisure time, Socrates. For when Elis
wants to transact any business with any other" state, she always
comes to me the first, selecting me as an ambassador from the
* This dialogue is called “major,” to distinguish it from another
shorter one called “minor.” It is feigned, as remarked by Stalbaum, to
have taken place, probably when Hippias, according to Xenophon, in
M. S. iv. 4, 5, had, on his return to Athens after a long absence, a con-
versation with Socrates.
* Sydenham refers the appellation of ka)\ög to the beauty of Hippias’
apparel, mentioned in § 25, Hipp. Min., p. 568, B., and Ælian. War.
Histor. xii. 32; but Heindorf says it was merely a common form of ad-
dress. It seems however never to have been adopted except towards
those, who were remarkable for the beauty of their person or dress.
* Heindorf says that by oopóg is meant a sophist. But as Socrates
held the sophists in little estimation, he would rather address Hippias by
the name of “wise ;” and thus ironically put him even above Pythagoras,
who was content to call himself pixógopog, “a lover of wisdom,” rather
than oopóg, positively “wise.”
* Heind. properly remarks that dog Xpóvip means “after a long inter-
val.” Ficinus has incorrectly, “raro.”
* Ficinus, unable to understand juiv, has omitted it altogether. Per-
haps it conceals at viv, as I have translated.
6 The Greek is ruva röv tróXswv. Ficinus has “extermis gentibus,”
as if he had found in his MS. either Tuv' &\\oëatrújv TóNewv, or ris'
ãAAww tróAsov—
P 2
212 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
citizens, from her conceiving that I am the most competent to
be a Judge of the arguments urged by each of the states, and
to report upon them. Hence I have often gone to other
cities as an ambassador, but most frequently and on points the
most in number and of greatest importance to Lacedaemon.
Hence it is why, as regards your question, I do not often come
to these parts. -
[2.] Soc. This it is," Hippias, to be a person truly wise and
accomplished. For, as a private individual, you are able to
obtain no little money from young men, and to impart more
benefit than you receive; and as a public man are able” to do
your own state good service, as he should do, who would not
be held in contempt, but be in good repute with the many.
But, Hippias, what is the reason why those men of the olden
time, whose names are so renowned for wisdom, Pittacus, and
Bias, and Thales of Miletus, and his disciples,” and those who
come after, down to Anaxagoras, appear all, or most of them,
to have kept aloof 19 from public affairs 2
Hip. What else, Socrates, can you suppose than that they
were unable or not sufficiently fit to reach by their intellect to
both subjects, public and private P
[3.] Soc. Shall we then, by Zeus, affirm, that as the other
arts have improved, and the operatives of former times were
of no mark as compared with those of the present, so the art of
you, Sophists, has improved likewise; and that those of the
ancients, who were engaged in the study of wisdom, were per-
Sons of no mark in comparison with you ? -
Hip. You speak perfectly correctly.
7 Ficinus omits pièvrot, which he could not understand; nor can I.
Perhaps Plato wrote uá Töv-with the usual ellipse of 6861, or köva—
* @
* The repeated icavóg is omitted by Ficinus. One MS. has iravög:
which would lead to Ölavékóc, “perpetually,” found in § 48.
* Both Sydenham here, and Matthiae in Gr. Gr., § 583, and Stalbaum,
take the expression Tújv &pſpi roy—0a)\ffy as applied to Thales and his
disciples; Heindorf, to Thales alone.
* Cicero however says, De Rep. i. 7, “Eos septem, quos Graeci sapientes
nominaverunt, omnes poene video in media republica esse versatos: ”
where “omnes poeme * answers to Trávreg ºf oi troXXot in Plato. So too
De Oratore iii. 34, “Septem fuisse dicuntur—sapientes—hi omnes, prae-
ter Milesium Thalen civitatibus suis praefuerunt.” See likewise AElian
War. Hist. iii. 17, where it is stated that all the philosophers of antiquity
took a part in public affairs
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 313
Soc. If then, Hippias, were Bias to come now to life again,
he would be exposed to ridicule, as compared with you; just
as our modern statuaries assert that Daedalus, were he alive to
execute such works as those from which he gained his great
name, would become ridiculous.
Hip. It is as you say, Socrates. I am however accus-
tomed myself to praise highly the men of the olden time, or
even our immediate predecessors before," and more than the
moderns, acting with a feeling of caution as regards the envy
of the living, and of fear as regards the anger of the dead.”
Soc. Correctly, Hippias, as it seems to me, are you ºthink.
ing upon and considering” the matter. And I too can testify
that you are speaking the truth, and that your art has in reality
improved in enabling you to transact, public affairs conjointly
with private. [4.] For Gorgias,” the great sophist of Leon-
tium, came hither on an embassy % from his country, as being
the man most competent among the Leontines to transact public
affairs, and was thought to speak the best before the people here;
and at the same time, by making a display of his powers in pri-
* Instead of Trporépov, I formerly suggested ºrporápac, which the sense
requires; and so I have translated. -
* This alludes to one of Solon’s laws mentioned by Plutarch, i. p. 89,
E., Mr. Xéyévy kakajc Töv Ts6vmkóra, “not to speak ill of the dead.”
But this sentiment was of much earlier antiquity, as appears from Homer,
Od. xxii. 412, Oùx 60'vov pºpuévolouv št’ &vöpáguy sixeróaq6at, i. e.
“It is unholy o’er dead men to boast;” and Archilochus, Fragm. 18,
Oü yåp #00Xá karðavočov keptopusiv šir' &vôpact, i. e. “For against
dead men it is not good heart-cutting taunts to say.” This respect for the
dead arose partly from the notion that the ghosts of the departed had a
power to hurt the living, by haunting them. Hence Dido thus threatens
AEneas, (iv. 386,) “Omnibus umbra locis adero: dabis, improbe, poºr
nas.” S.
*—” Apparently to avoid the tautology in vopuičov Ts kai Ölavootpievog
Ficinus has “et sentire et loqui;” unless it be said that he found in his
MS. 6ta\syóplewog. But as thirteen MSS. read Övopué%tov, and one Övopué-
Čovrat without Ts, Plato wrote, I suspect, rà wouvéépéva si èuavooëpswog,
i. e. “you are thinking upon what has been established by law.”
* The character of Gorgias is painted by Plato at full length in a dia-
logue inscribed with his name. It will be sufficient for our present pur-
pose to observe, that Gorgias was by profession, like Hippias, an orator as
well as sophist, and set up teaching both philosophy and the art of
rhetoric. S.
* The object of the embassy was to obtain the assistance of the Athe-
nians in behalf of the people of Leontium against those of Syracuse, as we
learn from Diodorus Sic. xii. 53; and Pausanias v. 17, HEIND.
2 #4 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
vate, and associating with young men, he gained” and carried
away great sums of money from this city. Or, if you wish for
(another) instance, our friend,” Prodicus himself, has fre-
quently come hither in a public capacity from elsewhere: 18
but on arriving the last time, not long since, [publicly]” from
CeOS, and speaking before the Council, he was held in high
repute ; and by making a display of his powers in private,
and associating with young men, he gained a wonderful heap
of money.” But of those ancient sages, not one ever thought
proper to demand money by way of a fee for making a display
of their wisdom before persons of all climes. Such simple-
tons” were they, and so completely did it escape them, that
money was a thing of great value. Whereas each of the pre-
ceding” made more money from his wisdom, than has any
operative” in whatever trade you will; and even prior to these
did Protagoras.
[5.] Hip. You know nothing, Socrates, about these beau-
tiful* things; for if you knew how much money I have made,
you would be amazed. The other instances I pass by. But
having gone once to Sicily, while Protagoras was residing
* The price, which Gorgias demanded from each of his scholars, was
100 minae, equal to £32.2 18s. 4d. S.
* Socrates calls himself here the friend of Prodicus, as he does in
Protag. p. 311, A., Meno, p. 96, D., and Cratyl. p. 384, § 2. HEIND.
* The antithesis in Åk Kéo evidently requires àXX00sv, an adverb of
place, not àA\ots, of time.
* This repeated 6mpoo'íg is an evident interpolation.
* The price paid by each of his auditors was fifty 6páxpiat, or £1 12s.
3d. See Plat. in Cratyl. p. 384, and Aristot. Rhet. l. iii. c. 14. S.
* Such a simpleton too was Socrates himself, who gave instruction
gratis, as we learn from Xenophon.
* In Greek of roc, like “hic’’ in Latin, generally refers to the persons
last mentioned; but here it must be applied to the more remote, like “ille.”
* Plato uses the word Śmutovgyög rather than rexvukög, to mark his
contempt of the Sophist, who, in the dialogue so called, is ranked below
the meanest handicraft. S.
* The Greek is Tāv ka)\@y arspi rotºrov. But in the first place Tepi
ought to follow rather than precede Toârwy. And, secondly, as nothing has
been said as yet about things or persons of beauty, I suspect there is a
lacuna here, in which was originally found the connexion of ideas wanting
at present. It is true indeed that roërww is found in the two best MSS.
alone in lieu of Toijro ; which is omitted entirely in another. But from this
notning is gained. Ficinus has “Nihil egregium hag in re nosti.” Some
however will be perhaps content to render ka?&v fine,” without any
eference to beauty.
HYPPIAS MAJOR. 215
2"
there in high repute and rather advanced in years, I did,
although much younger, gain in a very short time more than
150 minae:” nay, from Inycum, a very small town, I took
above 20.” This, when I arrived home, I carried and gave”
to my father, so that it struck him and the rest of the citizens
with wonder and astonishment. And I almost think I have
made more money than any two Sophists together, whom
you choose to name.
[6.] Soc. You bring forward, Hippias, truly a good and
great proof, both of your own wisdom, and of the men of the
present day, how superior they are as compared with those of
the olden time. For of your predecessors, down to Anaxa-
goras,” great is proclaimed the folly, according to your state-
ment. For to Anaxagoras, they say, happened the very
opposite to what has befallen you. For of the great wealth
left him he took no care, and lost it all; in so silly a manner
did he act the sophist. And of the other ancient sages other
stories of a similar kind are told. You seem then to produce
this as a good proof of the wisdom of the moderns, as com-
pared with the ancients. And many indeed agree with you,
that ”the wise man should be wise for himself especially;”
and of such a person this is the one * definition—He who can
make the most money. [7.] Let this then suffice. And now tell
** Equal to £484 7s. 6d. English money. S.
* Equal to £64 lls. 8d. In these calculations, an ounce of the silver
coin of Athens is valued at 5s. 2d., and the Attic Čpéxplm is supposed equal
to the Roman denarius; although, as Arbuthnot observes, there is reason
to think it was of greater value. S. -*.
* Although pépov #60ka be correct Greek in itself, the phrase does
not express what Plato probably wrote, Tpopéia tº trarpi éðaſka, i.e. “I
gave to my father for my former maintenance.” Compare especially Legg.
iv. p. 717, C., áirorivovra öavetapata $7ttpusXetag to parents. AElian,
N. A. ii. 6, Tâ Tpopeia roig 60áipagly dºrsøtöov : and see Valckenaer
on Phoen. 44, Aaſºoy 6xhuata IIox{{34, Tpopsi Ötöðouv.
* The Greek is trepi 'Avačayópov : where Sydenham was the first to
reject ’Avažayópov : whom Heind. and others have followed. Plato
wrote, I suspect, pºéxpt 'Avačayópov, as in § 2.
*—” This alludes to the verse of Euripides, quoted by Cicero Epist.
Famil. xiii. 5, Mugaj oroptoſtºv, Šorig oix airq oropóg. Compare also
De Offic. iii. 15; Aristot. Eth. vi. 7. HEIND.
* The Greek is Špog Éariv ćpa bg—i.e. “there is a definition.” But
the sense requires, “there is one definition,” in Greek Špog Éotiv ćp' eſc,
§g—as I stated many years ago; where I shouk have quoted eig 6pog in
Menex. p. 238, D., and Thucyd. iv. 92.
216 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
me from which of the cities, whither you went, did you gain
the greatest money? Is it not plain it was from Sparta,
whither you went the oftenest ?
Hip. Not, by Zeus, from thence, Socrates.
Soc. How say you? The least then P
Hip. Never any thing at all.
Soc. A monstrous and marvellous account you are giving,
Hippias. But tell me, has not that wisdom of yours the
power to make those * who associate with you and learn it”
better as regards virtue.
Hip. Yes, very much so, Socrates. -
Soc. Were you then able to make the sons of the Inycians
better, but unable to make the sons of the Spartans ?
Hip. Far from it.”
Soc. Are the Siciliotes desirous of becoming better, but
the Spartans not ?
Hip. The Lacedæmonians are, Socrates, very (desirous, P
Soc. Was it then from their want of money that they
shunned your society P
Hip. By no means; for they have enough of it.
[8.] Soc. What then could it be, that although they were
desirous of virtue, and had money, and you were able to be-
nefit them to the greatest extent, they did not send you away
loaded with wealth P Was it that the Lacedæmonians can
educate their sons better than you? Shall we say this? and
do you concede it is so P
Hip. . By no manner of means.
Soc. Were you then unable to persuade the young men at
Lacedæmon, that by associating with you they would make a
greater progress in virtue than by associating with their own
people P Or were you unable to persuade their fathers that
they ought to hand over their children to you rather than
take that care upon themselves, if they had any regard for
*—” The Greek is roëg ovvövraçairfi kai pav6ávovrag—I have trans-
lated as if it were roëg ool ovvövrag kai air), pav6&vávrag. For thus
ooi ovvóvraç is similar to ovvov roig véoug twice in § 4, and to ool—ov-
vövtåg in § 8.
* To a bipartite question there could not be a single answer. There is
a lacuna here, to be supplied from Suidas, IIoMAoû 67) dāw kai Aéyéuv'
oswºrd : where, if we read ye for kai, we shall have an expression similar
to oilk &v pain v šywys in § 9, explained by owTrà.
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 217
their children? For surely they did not grudge their sons
becoming as virtuous as possible.
Hip. I do not think they felt any grudge.
Soc. In good truth Lacedaemon is a well-regulated city.
Hip. How not?
Soc. Now in well-regulated cities virtue is most highly
prized.
Hip. Certainly.
[9.] Soc. And to impart this to another you know the best
of all men.
Hip. By much so, Socrates.
Soc. Now would not the man, who could best impart the art
of horsemanship, be the most honoured, and acquire the most
wealth in Thessaly,” or wherever else in Greece” this art is
cultivated the most 2
Hip. It is likely. -
Soc. Will he then, who can impart instruction of the great-
est value with respect to virtue, be honoured the most, and
make the most money if he wishes it, not at Lacedæmon and
any other of the well-regulated states in Greece, but in Sicily.”
rather, as you think, my friend, or at Inycum ? Shall we, Hip-
pias, give credit to this? for if you command, I must (do so).
Hip. It is not, Socrates, the custom of the country for the
Lacedaemonians to disturb their laws, nor to educate their
children” contrary to established usages.
Soc. How say you? Think you 87 that it is the custom of
the country for the Lacedaemonians not to act correctly, but
to do wrong P
Hip. I would not say so, Socrates.
Soc. Would they not do right then to educate their sons in
the better way, and not in the worse?
[10.] Hip. (They would do) right; but it is not lawful for
* See Meno, $ 1. S.
* As there is nothing on which Tijg ‘EX\áðog can depend, I have trans-
ated as if the Greek were à Tijg ‘EX\áôog áA\09t—not Tijg ‘EX\áðog
kai d\\00w. *
* On the luxury of the Sicilians Sydenham refers to the Greek proverb,
Xikexuk) roëTreća in Plato, Legg. iii. p. 404, D., and the “Siculae dapes”
in Horace.
* Instead of véovg the two best MSS. have visig, similar to “filios,”
in Ficinus. -
* The two best MSS. have preserved oiet, wanting in all the rest.
218 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
them to give a foreign education. Since, rest assured that
if any one else ever took away money from thence by teaching,
I should have taken by much the most. For they delight
greatly * in listening to me, and give me praise. *But
what I am saying is not law.”
Soc. Say you, Hippias, that the law is an injury or a be-
nefit to a state P
Hip. It is enacted, I presume, for a benefit; but some-
times the law, when improperly enacted, does an injury.
Soc. What then, do not they who enact a law, lay it down
as the greatest good to a state 2 For without law it is im-
possible to live in a state of good government.
Hip. You speak the truth.
Soe. When, therefore, they who undertake to frame laws,
fail in procuring a good, they have missed 49 what is lawful
and law.” Or how say you ?
Hip. Accurately speaking, Socrates, such is the case; but
men are not used to give that name.*
Soc. Do you mean, Hippias, those, who know the truth, or
who do not know it 2
Hip. I mean the many.
Soc. Are the many then those, who know the truth?
Hip. Certainly not.
Soc. But surely they, who do know it, do in reality conceive
that what is to all men more beneficial is more agreeable to
law than what is less beneficial. Or do not you grant this 2
Hip. I grant that (they do hold so) in reality.
Soc. * Do not (things) exist, and are in the state,” as those,
who are knowing, conceive 2
Hip. Undoubtedly. - -
[11.] Soc. Now it is, as you assert, more beneficial for the
* In lieu of Xaipovou yotſu, where yotiv is useless, I have translated as
if the Greek were Xaipovo’ &yav—
*—” Such is the literal version of the Greek &AA’ 6 Aéya, où vópoc.
By comparing however Protag. § 80, it would not be difficult to recover
what Plato probably wrote.
40–49 I cannot understand vopuipuov kai vópov— The natural train of
ideas would lead to, “they fail in that, for which laws are laid down ''— .
* Here again I am at a loss, unless we read vopuiāstv, “to think,” in
.ieu of Övouáčeuv, “to name,” as I suggested long ago.
*—” The Greek is, Oùk oëv čort ye kai éxet of rag. To avoid the
tautology I suggested Oùk otiv ć Šart ye, Éxet oitwe. Stalb. has edited
ie ru re, from the two best MSS.
EIIPPIAS MAJOR. 219
Lacedaemonians to receive a foreign education under yourself,
than after the system of their own country.
Hip. And I assert the truth.
Soc. Because what is more beneficial is more conformable
to law. And this, Hippias, do you say?
Hip. I have so said.
Soc. According then to your reasoning, it is more con-
formable to law for the sons of the Lacedaemonians to be in-
structed by Hippias, and less so by their fathers, if perchance
they shall in reality be more benefited under you.
Hip. And benefited they would be, Socrates.
Soc. The Lacedæmonians then act contrary to law, in not
giving you their gold, and committing their sons to your care.
Hip. In this I agree with you : for you seem to produce
an argument in my favour, and there is no need for me to
oppose it.
Soc. We find then, my friend, the Lacedæmonians to act
contrary to law, and this too in matters of the greatest mo-
ment; they who are thought to be most observant of law.
And yet, by the gods, did they praise you, and were delighted
at hearing—what? Or is it not evident that the subjects
were those which you know the best, relating to the stars and
celestial events £43
Hip. Not at all. Such subjects they cannot endure.
Soc. But they delight in hearing something about geo-
metry.
Hip. Not at all; for many of them know not, so to say,
even how to reckon.
[12.] Soc. They are then far from enduring you, while
making a display on the keeping of accounts.”
Hip. Very far indeed, by Zeus.
Soc. But the subjects then were those, in which you can the
most accurately of (all*) men draw distinctions, respecting
the powers of letters and syllables, and rhythms and har-
monies.
Hip. What harmonies, or letters, my good man 2
Soc. What then are the subjects, which they gladly hear
* The Greek is trä0m. Ficinus has “progressus.”
* Ficinus, uncertain how to translate \oytoplojv, has ratiocinationes
eomputationesque; ” and hence Sydenham, “ of numbers and accounts.”
* Ficinus alone has “omnium hominum--".
22O HIPPIAS MAJOR.
from you, and commend? Tell me yourself, since I cannot
find them.
Hip. Respecting the genealogies,” Socrates, of their heroes
and men, and settlements (of tribes), (and)” how cities were
founded of old, and, in a word, to every thing relating to ar-
chaeology, they listen with the greatest pleasure ; so that I
was forced to learn my lesson myself thoroughly for their
sakes, and to practise myself well on those points.
Soc. By Zeus, Hippias, you were fortunate in that the Lace-
daemonians did not take a delight in hearing a man who could
reckon up our archons from the time of Solon. For other-
wise you would have had some trouble in learning the list.
Hip. How so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names only
once, I can repeat them from memory.
[13.] Soc. You speak the truth; but I did not bear in
mind that you had a system of mnemonics;* so that I un-
derstand” why, reasonably enough, the Lacedaemonians are
pleased with you, as being a person who knows many things,
and they make use of you, as children do of old women, to tell
them pretty stories.
Hip. And by Zeus, Socrates, I was lately in high repute
there by going through a lecture upon the honourable pursuits
to which a young person should devote himself. For I have
by me a very beautiful discourse upon that subject, "well put
together in other respects, and in the words.” The form and
* There is an article by Osann in the Rheinische Museum for 1843,
p. 495—501, on the archaeological writings of Hippias.
* I suspect dog has dropt out after kai–
* According to Pseudo-Plato in Hipp. M., in p. 368, D., the sophist had,
like Simonides, cultivated the art of memory; which, before the inven-
i. of printing, was necessary for every one who aspired to be a panto-
ogist.
* The Greek is Čor' #vvo㺗which seems rather strange after oik
ivevånga. Ficinus has “jam intelligo’—which leads to eig rô vöv 6”
8.7/1/O (9-
*—" The Greek is kai äAAwg så Ötaketusvog kai Toic àváuage. But
ôtaketusvog could hardly follow ovyketpsyog : and if it could, it would not
be united to the dative Óvápaou. . Besides, it is not easy to say, to what
àAAwg can be referred, as opposed to Óvápage. Ficinus has “verborum
elegantia pollet”—from which I formerly elicited sä 6takoop of psyog: but
I would now prefer Ötégkévaopiévoc, similar to Aóyou trapsaicsvaapāvol in
Menex. p. 235, D., while in kai äAAwg and kai roic lie hid, I suspect, kai
Avaiov-ka)\\to Toug &vóplagu. . For thus Lysias would be praised here
ironically, as he is in the Phaedrus.
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 221
commencement of the discourse is something of this kind.—
“After Troy was taken, the story goes, that Neoptolemus in-
quired of Nestor what were the honourable pursuits a young
man should follow to gain a good name. Upon this Nestor
is the speaker, and suggests a great many and very excellent
precepts laid down by law.” [14.] Of this dissertation*I made
a display there; and on the third day hence I intend to display
it here and several other pieces of mine, worth the hearing, in
the school of Philostratus.” For so has Eudicus, the son of
Apemantus, requested. See then that you are present your-
self, and bring with you others, who on hearing will be com-
petent to decide upon what is then said.
Soc. This, if a god is willing, Hippias, shall be. But at
present answer me a short question relating to it.” For you
have opportunely put me in mind of it. A certain person
has, thou best of men, very lately, during some conversations,
thrown me into a difficulty—when I was finding fault with
Some things as being ugly, and praising others as being beau-
tiful—by asking me, in a very saucy manner, “From whence
do you, Socrates, know, said he, what things are beautiful,
and what ugly f * Come then, tell me, * if you can say a
word, what is the beautiful?” And I, through my want of
wit, was at a loss, and had it not in my power to answer him
with propriety. [15.] So, quitting his company, I grew angry
with, and vented reproaches upon, myself, and threatened
that the first time I met with any of you wise men, I
would hear (his opinion) and learn it; and after studying
* According to Philostratus in the life of Hippias, p. 495, the dissert-
ation was in the form of a dialogue. Its title was Towukā or Hpaſtică–For
these two words are constantly confounded, as remarked by G. C. Lewis
in Cl. Jl. No. 76, p. 277, and No. 78, p. 190. So too in Schol. O6. A. 546,
instead of Öttö 6trorépov rôy Tpºwv, Bentley would read Hptºwy in his
letter to Davies, first published in the Monthly Review, vol. xiv. p. 202.
* I have adopted pi}\oorpárov, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of
betóootpátov–a word that seems scarcely compounded correctly. On
the other hand, the Philostratus here mentioned is probably the same as
the person nicknamed KvvaM&Trnē by Aristophanes in 'Izrtr. 1066.
* As there is nothing to which airoij can be referred, Plato wrote, I
suspect, Tspí yé tov, “about something.”
*—“The Greek is—'Eºrsi pépet éxoug &v sitrsiv–But #71st, “since,” has
no meaning here. I have translated, as if the words were—Eit’ oiv, pēp'.
tº Éxotç diversiv.
#4
222 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
it thoroughly, that I would return to my questioner, and fight
out again the matter with him. Now, therefore, as I said, you
are come opportunely ; and do you instruct me sufficiently
what is beauty in the abstract, and endeavour to give me as
accurately as possible your answers; in order that I may not
be confuted a second time, and pay the penalty of a laugh
against myself. For assuredly you know it quite clearly, and
it would be but a mite of the learning, with which you are
conversant on so many” points.
Hip. By Zeus, a mite indeed, Socrates; and, so to say, of
no value at all.
Soc. Easily then shall I learn it; and no one will hereafter
confute me.
[16.] Hip. Not one indeed. For otherwise mean would
be my profession, and suited to a common person.
Soc. By Juno, Hippias, you speak bravely, if we shall get
the man into our clutches. *But shall I be any hindrance
by imitating him, if I lay hold of your arguments, while
answering me, in order that you may exercise me the most.
For I am nearly skilful in laying hold (of arguments).” If
then it makes no difference to you, I am willing to lay hold
of them, in order that I may learn” with greater strength.
Hip. Take hold then : for, as I said just now, the question
is not a great one; and I will teach you to answer questions
much more difficult than this, so that not a single person will
be ever able to confute you.
Soc. Ye gods,” how bravely you talk | But come, since
you bid me, I will become him, and, as well as I can, try to
question you. Now, if you shall give the lecture you men-
** To avoid the incorrect Greek in Öv or rejv troXXöv, we must read
tºv ori otºrw troXXöv— The critics quoted by Stalbaum neither do, Ilor
pretend to, defend this union of the relative pronoun with the definite
article.
*—56 Such is the literal translation of the Greek. But how Socrates
could, by imitating the nameless saucy fellow, be any hindrance to Hip-
pias, I cannot understand.
* In lieu of pué00, which I cannot understand, I have suggested plux66.
For the idea of “mingling in fight º’ here correctly coincides with the
preceding &vapaxoſpºsvoc. Others perhaps would prefer #ppwpièvéo repov
us 66, i. e. “make myself of greater strength.”
* Instead of psû, which never, I think, precedes dig så Aéyéug, I have
translated as if the Greek were tº 080i.
HIPPLAS MAJOR. 223
tion, upon beautiful pursuits, he will, after hearing it, when
you have ceased speaking, inquire about nothing else except
about the beautiful—for such a habit he has—and he will say,
“Art not, (say) thou stranger from Elis, the just just through
justness?” Answer now, Hippias, as if he were questioning
you.
Hip. I answer,” through justness.
[17.] Soc. There is then such a thing as justness?
Hip. Clearly so.
Soc. Are not then the wise wise through wisdom ? and all
that is good good through goodness?
Hip. How not?
Soc. By those things existing really; for it is not surely
by their non-existing.
Hip. By their existing really.
Soc. Are not all things, that are beautiful, beautiful through
beauty 2
Hip. Yes, through beauty.
Soc. By such a thing existing 2
Hip. By its existing. For what should it be?
Soc. Tell me now, stranger, he will say, what is this
beauty 2
Hip. Does he, who asks this question, want to know what
is a beautiful thing?
Soc. I think not, Hippias: but what is beauty.
Hip. How does this differ from that?
Soc. Seems there to you no (difference)?
Hip. There is not any difference.
Soc. But, however,” it is evident that you know better.
* I have adopted &Tokpivopat, found in one MS., in lieu ºf &ztokpt-
voipsaw. Ficinus omits the word entirely.
* The Greek is 'AAAá pávrot 37Aov, where I cannot understand pièv-
rot : nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is “Constat autem.”
Hence I suggested, many years ago, 'AAA& putovti rq), “But to an
one blinking,” an expression similar to the Latin, “conniventibus oculis,”
and to the English, “with half an eye.” The phrase in Aristoph. Plut.
49, is 37Aov rvºp}\j, quoted by the Schol. on Plato, Sophist. p. 241, D.,
paiveral kai, Tô Asyópswov Ór), Tvºj: and is found in Rep. iii. p. 465,
D., and viii. p. 550, D. With regard to the verb uiew, which Plato has
used in Sophist. p. 239, E., 66ást rot učew ) tra" &raouv obk #xew Śpi-
Mara, and elsewhere, see Creuzer on Plotinus, IIepi KáA\ovc, p. 357
224 HIPPIAS MAJOR,
Consider, however, good sir, the question (well).” For he
asks you, not what is a beautiful thing, but what is beauty.
Hip. I understand you, good sir. And I will answer his
question, “What is beauty P” nor shall I ever be confuted.”
For rest assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, that a
beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing.”
[18.] Soc. By the dog,” you have answered, Hippias, beau-
tifully and gloriously.” Shall I then, when I answer thus,
have answered the question correctly P and shall I never be
refuted P
Hip. For how could you be refuted, Socrates, on that point
which seems correct to all the world; and where all who hear
you will testify in your favour that you are speaking properly 2
Soc. Be it so then, by all means. But come, Hippias, let
me consider again with myself what you are saying. For the
man will question me in some such manner as this : “Come,
Socrates, answer me, * if beauty exists in the abstract, all
And to the passages there quoted add Lucian in Rhetor. Praecept. § 11,
kāv pºiſov’rt—eitrov rug. Shakspeare says in Lear, “A man may see how
this world goes with no eyes.”
* After &6pet, it is pretty evident that si has dropt out.
* By comparing the expression of Socrates, où pai, Trots \sy X66, it is
quite certain that Hippias said oi, puff Trots \Syx6.jg.
* Ficinus has “virginem pulchram ipsum pulchrum esse,” as if his
MS. read trap6ávog kaxi) rô Ka}\ów, not trap6&vog ca)\!) ka)\óv.
* This was one of the oaths adopted by Socrates; another was, “by the
plane-tree,” as in Phaedrus, p. 236, D., and the third was, “by the goose,”
as we learn from the Scholiast on Aristoph. ”Opy. 521. To these might 'oe
added “the goat,” as appears from Tertulliam Apolog. 14, quoted by Gott-
leber on Phaedo, p. 99, A. “Socrate contentus, qui in contumeliam deo-
rum, quercum et hircum et canem dejerabat.” Of the different reasons
assigned for such strange forms of adjuration an account is to be found in
the notes of Menage on Diogen. Laert. p. 92. But as none of them are
satisfactory, the truth remains to be still found, if worth the search, else-
where.
* The Greek is sijöóšwg : which is never, I believe, thus connected
with the idea of an answer. I suggested long ago oi, Aočág, i. e. “not
obliquely,” referring to Suidas, Aošá' okóAta, kaputröAa, oùk ÉÉ st-
6stag Yuvépusva : and to Lucian, Vit. Auct. § 14, Öotrep & Aočíag obôāv
& trooapsic. Dialog. Deor. xvi. § 1, Aošā–Trpóg Ékárepov Tijg #porão swg
dºrokpwopaevog. Alexandr. § 10, &pſpuéó\ovg kai Aočovg Xpmoptotic ov) -
Ypépav : and I will now, add in Jov. Confut. § 14, \ošā kai étrapſporepi-
Lovra. See too Boissonad. in Eunap. p. 162, and 564.
*—68 Such is the literal version of the Greek text. But the train of
thought requires, “Come now, Socrates, and answer me this correctly. All
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 225
those things which you say are beautiful, would these be beau-
tiful?”6 And I will then say that, "if a beautiful maiden
be a beautiful thing, through which the things would be beau-"
tiful.”67
Hip. Think you then that he will still attempt to confute
you, (by asserting) that what you say is beautiful, is not so?
or that, should he attempt it, he will not be laughed down 2
Soc. That he will, thou wondrous man, I am well assured ;
but whether, after making the attempt, he will be laughed
down, the thing itself will show. However,” I wish to tell you
what he will say.
Hip. Tell it then.
[19.] Soc. What a sweet” creature, Socrates he will
say, you are. Is not a beautiful mare, which even a god ,
has praised in an oracle,” a beautiful thing? What shall we
answer, Hippias 2 Shall we say aught else than that "the
the things which you say are beautiful, if there be such a thing as beauty
in the abstract, would they not be beautiful ?” This in Greek would be
"I9 uot à Xtºkparec, &Tókpwat Tour' si. . Tà Trávra, & pig kaxó sival,
st ri šart airó Tô kaxov, où taúr' àv ćim kax4; Ficinus however has
“Age, responde mihi, Socrates, Quid est ipsum pulchrum ? quod si sit,
haec omnia, quae pulchra dicuntur, per ipsum pulchra Sunt,” which it is
uncertain whether he did or did not find in his MS. Sydenham however
was led from thence to suspect that Öt’ 6 had dropt out between rô
ica}\öv and Taijt’ &v–and so was Schleiermacher after him.
67–67 The Greek is 'Eyd, 68 61) śpä, öti ei trap6ávog kaxi) kaxóv ša ru,
ël’ 6 rair’ &y stn ka)\á. But the sense evidently requires us to expunge
the word si before trap6&vog, and to read Ött trap6évog ka)\} ca)\öv šart, k.
T. A. S. Heindorf says we must omit ei, or all the words after ka?\ów.
But the train of argument leads to something of this kind—“If there be
such a thing as a beautiful maiden, there must be the beautiful, by which
all the things beautiful would exist”—in Greek, El Trap6évog kaxów Śort,
£art rô caxów, 8t’ 6 Távt’ &v sim Kaká, as I stated many years ago.
* The origin of this proverb is told by the Scholiast on Theaetet. p.
200, E., who says, that when some person was going to cross a river, he
asked his guide whether it was deep ; to which the latter replied, “The
event itself will show.” -
69 Ruhnken on Timaeus, p. 132, says that y\vküç and jöög were used
ironically as a polite way of calling a person a simpleton.
70 The Oracle alluded to has been preserved entire by the Schol. On
Theocritus, Id. xiv. 48, and by Tzetzes, in Chil. ix. 291, and x. 330, and
: ". by Euseb. Praep. Evang. v. 29. For when the people of Megara
had inquired of the god to whom the palm of Superiority was to be as-
signed, they were told, amongst other things, that the mares of Thrace,
or as Tzetzes testifies, of Thessaly, were the best.
* 7: The Greek is rºw iTºrov kaxi}v siva, Tây ye kaxhv. And so
Q
226 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
mare is beautiful? at least the beautiful.” For how should
we dare to deny that a beautiful thing is beautiful?
Hip. You speak, Socrates, what is true,” especially since the
god rightly said it;” for with us there are mares very beautiful.”
Soc. Be it so, he will say ; but what, is not a beautiful lyre
a beautiful thing? Shall we allow it, Hippias?
Hip. Yes.
Soc. And after this he "will say—as, guessing from his
usual manner, I nearly know full well—My excellent fellow,
is not a beautiful soup-dish a beautiful thing?
JHip. Who is this man, Socrates? What an uneducated
fellow ! who thus presumes to express himself in words so
low in an affair so solemn.
Soc. Such is the fellow, Hippias, not a fine gentleman, but
a man of the mob, who cares for nothing but truth. He must
however have an answer; 74 and I appear speaking for him”—
Ficinus, “Pulchram equam nonne pulchram esse.” This, says Heindorf,
might stand; but ka?\öv sivat, suggested by Cornarius, is preferable. He
did not however perceive that, as the article could not be thus repeated,
it must be omitted before tararov; nor that ys Begga)\ºv lie hid in ye ka-
Añv, to answer to the Thessalian mare, mentioned in the oracle, accord-
ing to Tzetzes; and hence just before in lieu of 0ſ). Eva one would prefer
660 oaX), as I remarked many years ago.
”—” Such is the literal version of the Greek; which I confess I cannot
understand. For Socrates did not say what was true, because the oracle
spoke truth; nor did the oracle speak truth, because there were beau-
tiful mares in Elis. What Hippias meant to say is, that, as the oracle
had spoken of the beauty of mares, it had spoken of what an Elean, who
was a judge of such matters, would confess to be beautiful. Plato there-
fore wrote perhaps, as I suggested many years ago, -ëarsitov kai, 3 Öp6ög
Ö 6eóg eitrev, eitrov &v avròg, “ since, what the god has correctly said, I
would have said myself;” a sentiment that exhibits the vanity of Hippias
in i marked manner, as he thus puts himself upon an equality with the
god.
* As the chariot-races in the Olympic games were run in the country
of Elis, the people there had an opportunity of seeing the best horses,
and of becoming, like persons living at Newmarket and Doncaster in
England, the best judges of horse-flesh; while from the number of prizes
gained by mares, it was found that the female was better Suited than the
male for a long race, as remarked by Servius on Virgil, Georg. i. 59.
*—” The Greek is kai £ywys ºrpoatroſpatvopat: which would mean “I
give my opinion the first,” as shown by 'O IIpóðuks, ºrpoatrópmvat rºw or jv
Yvápany in Protag. p. 340, A. Ficinus has “Praefabor.” But this could
be said only if Socrates were going to reply, not to put a question. Plato
wrote, I suspect, kai Aéywv ye ºrpè airoi; paivopat, as I partly suggested
§: years ago, when I should have quoted Alcest. 336, ºrpo rotºrov-
syesv.
HIPPIAS MAJOR, 227
If the soup-dish be made by a skilful potter, smooth and round,
and well baked, like some of the beautiful soup-dishes with
two handles, containing six choes,” very beautiful,7° if he
inquires about such a soup-dish, we must confess it to be beau-
tiful. For how could we say that what is beautiful, is not
beautiful ?
Hip. Not at all, Socrates.
Soc. Is not a beautiful soup-dish them, he will say, a beau-
tiful thing? Answer.
[20.] Hip. But, Socrates, the case is, I think, this; even
such a vessel, when beautifully made, is a beautiful thing.
But this taken as a whole does not deserve to be considered
as beautiful, as compared with a mare, and a maiden, and the
other things of beauty.
Soc. Be it so. I understand you, Hippias, that we must
thus reply to the person who puts such a question. You are
ignorant, my man, that correct is the saying of Heracleitus,
That the most beautiful ape, as compared with another kind,”
is ugly; and that the most beautiful of Soup-dishes is ugly as
compared with the maiden-kind; as says Hippias the wise.
Is it not so, Hippias”
Hip. You have answered, Socrates, quite correctly.
Soc. Hear then—for I know well he will say after this—
What then, Socrates, should any one compare maiden-kind
* According to Arbuthnot's computation,the Attic Xoig contained three
uarts. S.
quº. This repetition of Tráyka)\at after the preceding röv kaxóv, justly
gave offence to a friend of Heindorf. But he did not see, as I remarked
many years ago, that in rāv kaxóv lies hid perhaps rôv Xuksåøy—for
Eubulus, quoted by Athenaeus, i. p. 28, C., mentions XtkéXukó (3arávta.
” The Greek is 3\\p yévet. But we ought to read div6pwarivº yévet,
as is evident from what is quoted presently after from the same Hera-
cleitus, &v0p6trov Ó oopérarog trpèg 0801. Tríðmkog paveirat. For how-
ever dark his writings were, there is no reason to think he wrote absurdly.
The absurdity is owing to the transcribers, who instead of a Tºp, an abbre-
viated form for &v6potivw, wrote àX\w. S. This correction, or rather
div6pwarsiq), which is more after Plato's manner, appears to be indubitable;
for we have thus a climax of ideas—“The most beautiful monkey is ugly,
as compared with a man: and the man most wise, as compared with a
god.” HEIND., who, in ed. 2, prefers &v6púzrwv, as Bekker does likewise.
But a single monkey would scarcely be compared with the whole race of
man. The true reading is probably aſſº êvi Ye, i. e. “to even a single
man. ” On a similar allusion to the monkey, see my note on The States-
man, ; 9, p. 205. *
Q 2
228 - HIPPIAS MAJOR.
with god-kind, would he not be in the same case, as when the
maiden-kind was compared to the soup-dish kind? Would
not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly 7 [21.] Or does
not Heracleitus, whom 7°you bring forward,” say 7° this very
same thing,” that the wisest of men, when compared with a
god, appears an ape in wisdom and beauty, and every thing
else?89 Shall we confess, Hippias, the most beautiful maiden
is ugly as compared with the god-kind?”
Hip. Yes; for who, Socrates, would gainsay this at least 2
Soe. Should however we confess this, he will laugh and
say, Do you then remember, Socrates, what you was asked 2
I shall reply, I do ; (it was this,) What is beauty in the ab-
stract? Whereupon he will rejoin—When you are asked
about beauty in the abstract, you answer (by mentioning)
8°that which happens to be, as you say yourself, not more beau-
tiful than ugly.” So, it seems, I shall say. Or what else, my
friend, do you advise me to say ?
Hip. This (I advise) you; * For that the human kind, as
compared with the gods, is not beautiful,” he will say the truth.
Soc. If I had asked you at the outset, he will say, what is a
78–78 Here is evidently a slip on the part of Plato. For, as remarked
by Sydenham, it was not Hippias, but Socrates himself, who had brought
forward the dictum of Heracleitus; unless we are to understand with
Heindorf, that the reference to Heracleitus must be supposed to be made
by the fictitious speaker, and not by Socrates. But this is at variance
with the preceding narrative. There is some disorder here, which I
might perhaps be able to cure; but the remedy, I am afraid, would be
considered too violent.
79—” As “this very same thing” is different from the preceding dic-
tum, we must read towośtóv Tv ŠtriNéyét, “Says in addition some such
thing as this,” in lieu of Taütőv Toito Xéyst.
* In this apophthegm of Heracleitus is to be found the original of the
idea in Pope—
Superior beings, when of late they saw
A mortal man unfold all nature’s law,
Admired such wisdom in an earthly shape,
And showed a Newton, as we show an ape. S.
* To avoid the impropriety of a single maiden being compared with
the race of the gods, it is easy to read ºrpèg 0s&v y’ Špowg, i. e. “similarly
as compared with a goddess,” instead of Trpèg 0861, yévog—
*—” i. e. “ that which is beautiful or ugly according as it may hap-
pen.”
*—* This I do not very well understand. For in the preceding ques-
tioning of Socrates by the fictitious person, nothing is said of a man being
beautifui or not, as compared with the gods.
HIPPIAS MAJOR, 229
thing beautiful and ugly, had you answered me as you have
done just now, would you not* have answered correctly?
And still” does it seem to you that the beautiful itself, by
which everything else is decorated, and looks beautiful; when-
ever that species (of beauty) is present to it, is a maiden, or a
mare, or a lyre?
[22.] Hip. If this, Socrates, he is seeking, it is of all
things the easiest for me 86 to tell him in answer what is that
beauty, by which all other things are decorated, and by which
being present they appear beautiful. "The man is the
greatest simpleton, and knows nothing about beautiful chat-
tels.” For if you tell him in answer, that the beautiful about v
which he is inquiring, is nothing else than gold; he will be
in a difficulty, and not attempt to confute you. For we all
surely know that wherever gold is present to a thing, how ugly
soever it may have seemed before, it will appear beautiful,
when it is decorated at least with gold.
Soc. You have no experience of the man, Hippias, how
difficult he is, and admitting nothing easily.
Hip. What matters it, Socrates? For what is correctly
asserted he must admit; or, not admitting it, be laughed at.
Soc. And yet he will not only not admit this answer, thou
best of men; but he will treat me with derision, and say,
O thou, puffed up with conceit, thinkest thou that Phidias was
a bad workman 2 And I shall reply, I think So by no manner
of means.
Hip. And you will answer rightly, Socrates.
[23.] Soc. Rightly indeed. Hereupon when I have con-
* Ficinus, displeased perhaps, as Heindorf was, with the interrogation,
omits àpa oëk—while to meet the difficulty Ast would read dip' oiv– .
But àp' otiv always, I think, begins a sentence. Plato wrote, I suspect,
Helpáktov Šp6āg &v rv škékpto’ 8v, i. e. “you would have been correctly
judged to be still a stripling.” See § 31, n. 17.
* Instead of £rt, the two best MSS. read 3rt. The sense seems to re-
quire, “But tell me, child,” in Greek sizré Öé, trai, which differs but little
from Ért Öğ kai—For it would thus be seen that Socrates was in the eye
of the fictitious person, not even a stripling, but only a child. On the
confusion of kai and Trai see Porson Orest. 614.
* In lieu of pièvrot, Plato wrote époi čveart, as I guess.
*—” Instead of krmudraw, five MSS. offer #parmuáTww: which led me
to suspect many years ago, as I still do now, the existence of a lacuna.
At all events the words between the numerals would be said better by So-
crates, who knew the fictitious person, than by Hippias, who did not.
-*
230 HLPPIAS MAJOR.
fessed that Phidias was a good workman, he will say, Do you
imagine then that Phidias was ignorant of that, which you call
the beautiful ?—Why (say you) this especially I shall reply.
—Because, he will rejoin, if?" Phidias has made the eyes of
Athéné not of gold, nor yet the rest of her face, nor the feet,
nor even the hands—since a thing of gold” would have looked
the most beautiful—but (not) of ivory,” it is evident that he
erred in this through ignorance, not knowing that gold is that,
which makes all things beautiful, wherever it is present.
When he says this, what answer, Hippias, shall we give
him P
Hip. The answer is not difficult. For we will say that he
acted rightly ; for ivory is, I presume, beautiful likewise.
Soc. Why then, he will rejoin, did he not make the middle
part of the eyes of ivory, but of stone P having found in the
stone a similarity as great as was possible to ivory. Or is a
beautiful stone a beautiful thing? Shall we say so, Hippias?”
Hip. We will say so, if it be becoming.
Soc. But, where it is unbecoming, it is ugly. Shall I con-
fess it, or not ?
Hip. Confess; at least when it (the stone) is not becoming.
[24.] Soc. What then, he will say; do not ivory and
gold, thou wiseacre, when they are becoming, cause things to
appear beautiful; but when not, ugly? Shall we deny this,
or acknowledge the man to be in the right?
5-Hip. We must acknowledge this, at least, that whatever is
becoming to any individual thing, causes it to appear beautiful.
Soc. When then, he will say, some one shall have cooked
the beautiful soup-dish, of which we have been speaking, full
* To avoid the difficulty in the text, of which Heindorf justly com-
plains, I have translated as if ei had dropt out after śpsi.
* Kühner, in Gr. Gr., says that Xpwooijv is to be referred to Arpá-
orwarov. But one noun could not be thus selected out of five, to all of
which the same epithet is equally applicable. Plato wrote, I suspect,
sizrep Xpwootiv yé ri Ör)—and &\\ }\sqāvruvov ot, as I have translated.
* All the other parts, not here mentioned, were of massive gold; as we
collect from Pliny’s Nat. Hist. xxxvi. 6. S. Respecting this statue, see
Junius Catalog. Art. Veter. p. 157, and Davis on Cicero Tusc. i. 15.
HEIND. To this union of gold, ivory, and marble, Virgil alludes in AEm.
i. 593, “Quale manus addunt ebor decus, aut ubi flavo Argentum
Pariusve lapis circumdatur auro.”
§ ". The sense requires, “Shall we say it, or not f° in Greek, phooué,
ow ;
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 23i
of beautiful porridge,” whether does a ladle of gold become it,
or one of fig-tree wood?”
Hip. By Hercules I of what kind of fellow, Socrates, are
you speaking P Will you not tell me who he is?
Soc. No ; for you would not know him, should I tell you
his name.94
Hip. But I know already that he is some ignorant fellow.
Soc. He is a man of much thought, Hippias. But, how-
ever, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles becomes
the porridge and the soup-dish 2 Or is it clearly the one of
fig-tree wood; for this makes the porridge of a pleasanter
flavour; and at the samé time, my friend, it would not by break-
ing the soup-dish let the porridge run out, and extinguish the
fire, and cause the guests, ju't about to feast on it, to be with-
out a very noble dish.” But all this the one of gold would do.
* According to Athenaeus, ix. p.,406, the Athenians were wont to bring
to table the very vessels in which she more exquisite soups were cooked.
The material of such vessels was a kind of porcelain, and their form not
unlike our tureens. The composition of some of their soups is to be found
in Athenaeus and Apicius Caelius, v. 3. S.
* The Greek is ovkivm ; but we ought rather to read ovkapitvm ; for
the wood of the fig-tree was so unfit for any use, that Horace calls it “inu-
tile,” useless; whereas the wood of the sycamore-tree, ovkápºwog, is said
by Theophrastus to be šūXov ºrpèg troXXà Xphorupov, Hist. Plant. iv. 2.
S. “But,” asks Heindorf, “is the wood of the fig-tree unfit for making a
soup-ladle? On the contrary, on account of its softness, and, as Plato
says, its sweet smell, I believe it was most useful. At all events a wood
of the least value ought to be mentioned, as opposed to gold.” But so far
from the mention of any wood being requisite here, it is evident, from the
words oik Öv ovvrpiilaqa rºw Xürpav, that the soup-stirring instrument
was made of something that would not readily break the vessel. What
Plato really wrote and meant, is detailed in the Excursus on Xürpa, ap-
pended to my anonymous edition of “The Four Dialogues of Plato.”
* “How could Socrates be sure of that ? Hippias might still have known
the man, if he really existed. There is probably here an obliterated al-
lusion to Homer’s Oñrug, the name assumed by Ulysses, when he de-
ceived Polyphemus. If so, Plato would have written Oğ yāp àv Yvoing,
ei oot sizroupw Oùruv roëvopa, i. e. No ; for you would not know him
if I were to tell his name, No-man.” Such was the note I printed
many years ago. And I will now add that the same word, Ottig, has
been corrupted likewise in Alcibiad. ii. § 23, and is there restored by
myself.
* Ficinus renders ðipov távv yewvatov by “obsonio pretioso.” But
as such is not the meaning of yewvaiog elsewhere, I still adhere to the
opinion I have ever entertained, that the reading yeyvatov is corrupt, al-
though it seems similar to Yevvaia oika in Legg, p. 844, E., and may he
coinpared with Yevvuköv kpéac in Aristoph. 'Itrir. 455.
232 HIPPIAS MAJOR
So that it seems to me, we ought to say that the one of fig-
tree wood is more becoming than the one of gold; unless
indeed you say otherwise.
[25.] Hip. It is indeed, Socrates, more becoming. But,
for my part, I would not converse with a fellow, who asked
such questions as these.
Soc. And rightly so, my friend; for it would not become
you to be polluted with such dirty words, you in a dress so
beautiful,” and with such beautiful sandals, and in such high
repute amongst all the Greeks for wisdom. But for me, it is
nothing to mix myself up with the dirt of the man. Teach
me then beforehand; and for my sake give a reply. For the
man will say, If the ladle of fig-tree wood be indeed more
becoming than the one of gold. is it not more beautiful ?
especially since you have confessed that the becoming is
more beautiful than the unbecoming. Shall we confess that
the ladle of fig-tree wood is lºore beautiful than the one
of gold 2
Hip. Do you wish me, Socrates, to say that, by saying
which, I think,” you will free yourself from his much
talking 2
Soc. By all means; but not before you tell me which of the
two ladles, that we have been speaking of, is the (more)” be-
coming and more beautiful.
[26.] Hip. Well then, if you will, tell him in answer, that
it is the one made from the fig-tree.
Soc. Now say what you was just about to say. For in
this answer, by which I assert that gold is the beautiful, gold”
will not, as it seems to me, appear to be at all a thing more
beautiful than fig-tree wood. But what do you now say is
the beautiful?
* The dress in which Hippias appeared at the Olympic games, is re-
lated by Plato in Hipp. Min. p. 368, B., who says that Hippias had made
himself every thing he then wore. AElian too, War. Hist. xii. 32, tells us,
that whenever the sophist appeared abroad he wore a scarlet dress; where
Kuhn refers to Apuleius Florid. ii. S.
* As the infinitive gival has nothing to depend upon, it is probably a
corruption of oipat.
* Ficinus has “decentiorem,” as if he had found in his MS. p &AAov
before arpétrovo av, to answer to ka?\\tw.
* But the last assertion was, not that gold, but that the becoming was
the beautiful. There is therefore probably some error here.
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 233
Hip. I will tell you. For you seem to me to seek to an-
swer a question of this kind—what is that beauty, which at
no time and in no place will appear ugly to any one.
Soc. By all means, Hippias. And now you understand
me perfectly well. .
Hip. Listen then. For rest assured, that if any man has
any thing to say against this, I will say that I know 19° no-
thing whatever.
Soc. By the gods, then, tell it as quickly as possible.
Hip. I assert them, that it is at all times, and to all persons,
and in all places, the most beautiful thing for a man, in wealth,
health," and in honour amongst Greeks, and having reached
old age, and having laid his deceased parents handsomely in
the grave, to be buried himself by his own children in a hand-
some and splendid manner.
Soc. Capitall Hippias. How wondrous well, and gorgeously,
and how worthy of yourself, have you spoken l and by
Juno I am delighted with you for the good-will with which,
as far as you can, you assist me. But we do not as yet
*reach the man's mind.” But he will laugh the most at us,
rest assured. -
[27.] Hip. Truly a silly laugh, Socrates. For when he
shall have nothing to say against this, and merely laugh, he
* Instead of trauvéiv, acknowledged by “laudaturum ” in Ficinus,
Cornarius and Muretus suggested $7tateuv, subsequently confirmed by
two MSS.
This mention of health is rather strange in a passage where a man
is said to be buried; unless by by waivovru is to be understood, sound
in mind, rather than in body.
*—” So Stalbaum renders roi &vöpèg oil rvyxávous v. But the ficti-
tious person had explained himself so clearly, that Socrates had no reason
to make such an assertion. Picinus has “virum nondum comprehendi-
mus,” which is similar to Stalbaum's version, if “comprehendimus ” is
to be taken in a mental sense; but if in a bodily one, it seems still more
strange; for the man was not going to run away. Sydenham’s version
is, “We reach not the point.” But roi; &vöpóg could not mean “a
point.” I suggested many years ago, what I still adhere to, row &v-
ëpöc oi ru #yxávoup.’ &v, i. e. “I shall not grin at the man.” For there
is thus a proper antithesis between roi dºvěpóg Éyxávoup' àv and tipitov
rarayexdorétat, as in Protag., p. 357, D., viv 68, Łón, putºv Katayº are,
rai judºv airóv karayekāo sobs. With regard to #yxavsiv, it is found at
ieast five times in Aristophanes, and once in a fragment probably of
Ælian, quoted by Suidas in MéXiroc.
23.4 HIPPIAS MAJOR,
will laugh at himself, and be the laughing-stock of (all)” who
are present.
Soc. Such perhaps will be the case ; perhaps, however,
after such an answer, there will be a danger, as I prophesy,
of his not merely laughing at me.
Hip. What then P
Soc. That, should he happen to have a staff in his hand,
unless I escape from him by flight, he will endeavour to reach
me with a smart blow.
Hip. How say you? Is the man a master of yours? and
will he not, for having done so, be brought to trial, and pay
damages? Or is your state not under the laws of justice,
and permits the citizens to beat each other unjustly P
Soc. By no manner of means does it permit them.
Hip. Will he then not suffer punishment, for striking you
unjustly
Soc. I think not, Hippias; not at all; if I gave such an
answer; but justly, as it seems to me.
Hip. It seems then so to me, Socrates; especially since you
are of that opinion yourself.
Soc. Shall I then state why I think I should be justly
beaten, on giving such an answer? Or will you too beat”
me without a trial? or will you receive a reason 2
Hip. It would be hard indeed, Socrates, if I did not re-
ceive it. But how say you?
[28.] Soc. I will speak to you in the same manner as I
did just now, when imitating that person, in order that I may
not say to you, what he will to me, words both harsh and pro-
ducing an angry feeling. For rest assured he will say, Tell
me, Socrates, do you think a person would receive blows un-
justly, who should chaunt such a long rigmarole, little in uni-
son with, and far distant from, the question proposed?—How
so 2 I shall reply. How? he will rejoin ; cannot you re-
member that I asked you what is the beauty, that enables"
every thing, to which it is present, to become beautiful, be it
stone, or wood, or man, or god, or any act, or any science.
* Ficinus alone has “omnium—”
* This “beat” seems strange; as if Hippias were likely to do, what
he had reprobated in the case of the fictitious personage.
* Instead of jarápxst, Ficinus found in his MS. trapéxel, what the
sense requires, as shown by his version, “efficiet.”
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 235.
For I am asking, man, what rs beauty in the abstract; and yet
I am no more able to bawl" any thing into you, than if you
were lying by my side a stone, and this too a mill-stone,”
without ears and brains. Now, Hippias, would not you be
annoyed, if I, in a fright, were to say after this (abuse), Nay,
it was Hippias who said that this was the beautiful; although
I asked him, as you do me, what is the beautiful to all persons
and things, and at all times?—What say you? will you not be
annoyed if I say so?
[29.] Hip. I am quite certain, Socrates, that what I said is
the beautiful in every case, will appear so.
Soc. But will it be so? he will say; for surely the beautiful
must always be beautiful. -
Flip. Certainly.
Soc. And always was so, he will say.
Hip. It was.
Soc. Did the Elean stranger assert, he will say, that it was
a beautiful thing for Achilles to be buried after his proge-
nitors, and for his grandfather Æacus, and the others born of
the gods, and even the gods themselves 2
Hip. What is this * Hurl him to the blessed (land) 18. Such
questions as these of the fellow, Socrates, are not to be spoken .
even, as being of ill omen.
Soc. How so It is surely no very ill-omened speech,
* Ficinus has, “tu vero non magis audisti”—as if he did not know
the meaning of yeywysiv, which is rarely found except in poetry; for
the prosaic word is yeywyíokeuv, found in Thucyd. vii. 76. See Heringa,
Observ. Crit. p. 64.
* The Greek is kai of rog pºvXiac. But a mill-stone, as I remarked
many years ago, is no more able to hear than any other stone. Plato
wrote º kai čvog rug uvAíag: where čvoç plv\iac means “an ass working
at a mill,” that becomes deaf and more stupid than other asses by the
noise of the mill. There is too a kind of pun in Xi80g and Övog—a word
by which the upper or lower mill-stone (for Helladius differs from other
lexicographers in this respect) was designated. Compare Soph. CEd. T.
379, TvøXóc rā T' dra, róv rs votiv rá tº Öppnar’ si.
*—" Of the different explanations given of this proverb, the one most
simple is that by Timaeus; who says that as the dead were called “the
blessed,” the land of the dead or blessed would be the grave. A similar
expression was Eig óN3íav, explained by Photius, sic piakapiav. The
Schol. on Aristoph. "It tr. 1148, compares BaxX' #g pakaptav with "Atray'
$g placaptav, and "Epp Šg, pakaptav. Sydenham prefers the novel inter
pretation suggested by Erasmus in Adag. ii. 1.98, and which, he says,
Schottus has given as his own in Schol. on Zenob. p. 42. -
*-...----
236 EIIPPIAS MAJOR,
2.
when one person asks a question, (for the other”) to say—Such
is the fact.
Hip. Perhaps so. -
Soc. Perhaps then you are the man, he will say, who as-
serts that it is a beautiful thing for every person, and at all
times, to be buried by his descendants, and to bury his
parents. Now was not Hercules one of the all ? and those
too whom we have just now mentioned 2
Hip. But I did not say it was so for the gods.
Soc. Nor for the heroes, as it seems.
Hip. Nor for such as were children of the gods.
Soc. But for such only as were not.
Hip. Certainly.
Soc. According to your reasoning then, it seems, that
amongst the heroes it was a grievous and unholy thing for
Tantalus, and Dardanus, and Zethus; but to Pelops, and to
the others so born,” it was a beautiful thing.
Hip. So it seems to me.
[30.] Soc. It seems then to you, he will say, what you
have lately denied, that to some persons and at some times, it
> is not a beautiful thing after burying" their progenitors to be
buried by their progeny; and further, as it seems, that this can-
not take place to all, and be a beautiful thing. So that this very
thing is in the same case as those before, namely, the maiden
and the soup-dish: and still more ridiculously, to some it is a
beautiful thing, but to others it is not beautiful: and even to-
day, he will say, you are unable, Socrates, to answer the
question, touching the beautiful, what it is. In these or such-
like terms will he reproach me justly, should I answer him in
this manner. For very nearly after this fashion, Hippias,
does he for the most part converse. Sometimes, however, as
* I have translated, as if the Greek were Épopévov Štěpov repov påvat,
not purwpévov Štěpov påvat: where popuśvov is due to the Bipont editor,
who elicited that reading from “percontante” in Ficinus; while Érepov,
evidently required by érépov, might easily have been lost when following
its correlative.
* By of Tw yeyováort Heindorf understands those born of mortal pa-
ients, but oita, could not have such a meaning. Besides, there is nothing
to which roig &\\oug can be referred. Perhaps Plato wrote roic àAAwc
rwg diró rov–i. e. “for those born in any other way from some one—”
* The Greek is 0&payri, which is without regimen. The syntax re-
quires 6ápagº to agree with #violc.
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 237
if in pity for my want of skill and learning, he proposes a
problem, and asks if such a thing as this seems to be the
beautiful; * or he (talks) upon any other subject which he
happens to have heard, and about which there is a talk.
Hip How say you, Socrates, this?
[31.] Soc. I will tell you.-Thou godlike Socrates, says
he, do cease to give such answers and on such grounds; for
they are very silly, and easily confuted. But consider now,
whether the beautiful lºbe something of that kind, which we
just now touched upon in the answer, when we said of gold,
that where it is becoming it is beautiful; but where not, it is
not so, and of all the rest likewise, to which the becoming
may be present. On the becoming then itself, and on its
nature, do you reflect becomingly,” whether this happens to
be the beautiful. Now, I am accustomed in such matters to
assent on every occasion. For I know not what to object.”
But does it seem to you that the becoming is the beautiful? 16
Hip. Assuredly, completely so, Socrates.
Soc. Let us reflect ; "lest we be cheated hike children
merely.”
Hip. It is meet to reflect.
Soc. Observe then. Do we call the becoming that which,
by its presence, causes each of those things, to which it may
be present, to appear beautiful? Or that which causes them to
be so really P & Or neither of these ?
12 On this difficulty see the note in my edition.
* Ficinus has “ipsum pulchrum,” in Greek rô Ka}\ov, not ka)\öv—
** By omitting Toij with the two best MSS., and reading arpétrov'rog for
arpetróvrwg, I have restored a play upon the words rô Trpétrov—arpetrów-
Twg o kózret. See at Phileb. § 57, n. 56. Add Gorg. p. 475, ka)\ác Špičst—
§pu%ópsyog rö kaxóv.
* Ficinus has, what the sense requires, “quid objician.” He there-
fore found in his MS. 6tt &vri)\éyw, not 6tt Aéyw.
* Here again Ficinus has correctly, “ipsum pulchrum,” in Greek rô
ca)\öv, not ca)\óv.
"—" The Greek, puff Trn ápa ščatrarðple6a. 'AAAá Xpſ) okotrsiv. Now
although trn ápa might be defended, the subsequently &XXà could not.
Plato wrote, as I remarked many years ago, pur) travóópua £atrard)-
puséa &AAwg. Xpm oxotréiv. For travóópua dAAwg mean “children
merely.” Compare Protag. p. 342, E., ágré paivsg0at—truſéâg puměw
BeXtio : where Heindorf quotes Theaet. p. 177, C., áots Trauðwy pumöèv
Suaq,épstv. Add Crito, $ 10, Taíðwv obôāv 6tapépovtsg. So pºstpákuov has
been before corrupted into dipa obre àv, as I have shown in § 21, n. 84.
*—” A gross blunder, unnoticed by all the translators, has corrupted
238 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
|
Hip. It appears so to me.
Soc. Whether 18 that which causes things to appear beau-
tiful? as when a person puts on clothes or shoes, which
fit him, he looks more beautiful, although he is a laughing-
stock.” [32.] Now, if the becoming causes things to appear
more beautiful than they really are, the becoming must be
a deception with regard to the beautiful; and it would not be
that, which we are seeking, Hippias. For we are in search
of that, by which all things beautiful are beautiful; as in
the case of the surpassing,” by which all things are great.
* [For by this all things are great, 1% and though they may
not appear so, yet, if they do surpass, they must of necessity
be great. So we say of the beautiful, by which all things are
beautiful, whether they appear to be so or not. Now this
cannot be the becoming. For the becoming causes things to
appear more beautiful than they really are, as your reasoning
(says), and does not suffer them to appear as they are. But, as
I said just now, that which causes them to be really beautiful,
whether they appear so or not, this we must endeavour to tell
what it is ; for this we are seeking, if we are seeking the
beautiful.
Hip. But the becoming, Socrates, causes by its presence
things both to be and to appear beautiful.
Soc. It is impossible then for things really beautiful not to
appear to be beautiful; at least when that is present, which
causes them to appear so.
Hip. It is impossible.
the Greek text in oióērspa, instead of which we ought to read &pſpörspa.
S. This alteration, says Heindorf, is of no value, although it is confirmed
by § 32; while to avoid the incongruity of a single answer to a tripartite
question, he suggests a new arrangement of the speeches; and so too does
Stalbaum by reading, IIIII. Éplotys Šokéi &ppórspa. X. &p' 6 trousi—paiv-
erat. ITIII. vaí. XX. oikoijv. But this does not meet the difficulty in
où6érepa. Perhaps Plato wrote, what I partly suggested many years
ago, i öööc Śrāpa toûtwv jv, i. e. Or is there a road different from these ?
* Ficinus, doubtless perceiving the incongruity here of yºoioc, trans-
ated, perhaps designedly, “deformis.” I once thought that Plato wrote
rāv j yeXoiog koxotóg, in allusion to the Æsopic story of the daw with bor-
rowed feathers. But I now think that Ficinus found his MS. xoMoſłóg,
i. e. “dwarfish ’’ or “mutilated.”
* Sydenham, justly objecting to rip titrépéxovri, would read ro tºrspéxov
rt. But as ru is unnecessary, he should have proposed likewise dºors-
For thus àore kai would be united to diváykmv (not &váykm) sivat—
*—” The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
º, HIPPLAS MAJOR. 239
£33.] Soc. Shall we then, Hippias, confess that all things
really beautiful, both institutions and pursuits truly beautiful,
are reputed to be beautiful, and appear so always to all men?
Or,” (must we say) quite the contrary, that they are unknown,
and that dissension and contest take place respecting these
points most of all, both amongst individuals privately and
publicly amongst states ?
Hip. In this way” rather, Socrates, that they are unknown.
Soc. This would not (have been unknown)**if the ap-
pearing to be beautiful had been added to the reality:” and
added it would have been, had the becoming been the beauti-
ful, and had caused things not only to be beautiful, but to ap-
pear so likewise: so that the becoming, if it were that, which
causes things to be beautiful, would be that beauty in the
abstract, of which we are in search, and not which causes
things to appear beautiful. But if, on the other hand, the be-w
coming merely causes things to appear only beautiful, it can-
not be the beautiful, of which we are in search; for this causes
them to be so really. Now to cause things to appear to be
beautiful, and to be really so, is not in the power of the same
thing, nor of any thing else whatever. Let us then choose,
whether you think the becoming causes things to appear beau-
tiful, or to be so really.
Hip. I think, Socrates, to appear so.
Soc. Alas! gone and fled away from us, Hippias, has the
knowledge of what the beautiful is; especially since the be-,
coming has been seen to be a thing different from the beautiful. §
Hip. So, by Zeus, it has, Socrates, and to me at least very
unexpectedly.”
[34.] Soc. Butletus not, my friend, give up seeking” for
* The two best MSS. read Öta\#yeagat instead of dyvosio 6at : from
which, many years ago, I elicited dei Aéyéuv, &yvočiobat, as I have here
translated,
* In lieu of otro, correct Greek would require Toiro–
* Ficinus supplies the ellipse by his “ignoraretur—”
*—” So Sydenham translates the Latin of Ficinus, “si, ut pulchra Sunt,
ita pulchra etiam apparerent,” as if he had found in his M.S. et yé arov kai
rô patveq6at ca)\oig o'ow airoic arpooijv, not et yé arov ré paivéo 6as
airoig trpooijv.
* I have adopted &akóww.c, found in three MSS., in lieu of diróirac.
Compare dokézrrag in § 48.
* In pubvrot lies hid, I suspect, uarečovre, as I have translated.

240 HIPPLAS MAJOR.
it. For I have still some hope that what the beautiful is will
appear again.” -
Hip. Altogether assuredly,” Socrates: for it is not difficult
to find. At least I know well that, were I to retire into
solitude for a little time and commune with myself, I should
describe it to you more accurately than accuracy itself.”
Soc. Hold | Hippias, talk not so big—you see what trouble
it has given us already—lest it should grow angry” with us,
and run away still further than before. And yet I am saying
nothing to the purpose; for you will, I think, easily find it
out, when you come to be alone. And do, by the gods, *find
it out in my presence; but if you are willing, seek it as now
with me.” And if we find it, it will be the best of all; but,
if we do not, I shall be content, I think, with my misfortune;
while you going away will find it easily. But if we find it
now, depend upon it, I shall not trouble you by inquiring
what that was, which you had discovered by yourself. *For
the present consider it, if it seems to you to be the beau-
* In lieu of Škºpavilosoflat, the train of ideas leads to at pavilosobat.
On the confusion of Ek and av, See at Prometh. 229.
* The formula Trávrwg 6%trov, expressive of an assent given from a
thorough conviction, could not be introduced here in answer to the ex-
pression of a hope merely. Hence I still abide by my original conjecture,
Trávrag ºff Attic, similar to "Atmg 0#8AXav Čáow in AEsch, Ag. 792, and
in Suidas Zei Xàrpa' &; pixia, i. e. Where boils the pot, There friend-
ship’s hot.
* The Greek is rig & Tráong. But in this formula, where a personi-
fication takes place, the language requires airfig Tig- See Porson on
Hec. 779, and myself on AEsch. Eum. 865. To the passages there quoted
I could now add many more.
* This is rather a violent prosopopoeia, Beauty in the abstract could
hardly be said to put itself into a passion. From the Greek words Öpyto-
8èv muſiv I long ago elicited &pweg ög gig 9apºvěv, “like a bird into a bush,”
and compared Rep. iv. p. 432, B., where Justice is feigned to fly like a
hunted animal eig 0&pavov. º
*—” These words are strangely put together. “Find it—if you will
—seek it with me.” But if Hippias found it, he need not seek for it with
Socrates. The words should have been, “Find it—but, failing, be willing
to seek it with me,” in Greek, ÉÉevps' si è uſ), 605Aov—ovčntsiv. There
is moreover a difficulty in &otsp viv, for which Ficinus found in his MS.
dºg trpiv, kai ai, as shown by his version, “ut hactenus, sic deinceps.”
*—º I cannot understand airè—Heindorf explains it by Šksivo. But
that is, to myself at least, equally unintelligible. For both airó and
$rsivo are applied to something already spoken of; whereas Socrates is
about to enter upon a new subject. The sense required is evidently to
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 241
tiful, I say that it is. But keep your eye on me,” and
give me all your attention, that I may not say any thing
silly. Let then that which is useful, be for us the beautiful.
And this I say from thinking on these points. The eyes, we
say, are beautiful, not when they seem to be such, but are
unable to see, but when they are able and useful for seeing. Is
it not so?
Płip. It is.
[35.] Soc. Say we not then of the whole body thus, that one
part of it is beautiful for running, another for wrestling 2 and
further, that all the animal kind, as a beautiful* horse, and
a cock, and a quail, and all utensils, and vehicles, for land and
sea, [ships and triremes,” and all instruments both for music
and the other arts, and pursuits and laws, and nearly every
thing we call beautiful, are in the same position; and looking
to each of them, in what way it has been born, made, or laid
down,” we speak of a thing which is useful, as being beau-
tiful in what it is useful, and for what it is useful, and when
it is useful; but another thing, which is entirely useless, we
call not beautiful. Does it not so seem to you, Hippias 2
Hip. To me it does.
Soc. Correctly then do we now say, that the useful hap- x
pens to be more than all beautiful.
Hip. Correctly, Socrates.
Soc. Now is not each thing, which is able to effect any thing,
useful, so far as it is able 2 but that, which is unable, useless 2
Hip. Entirely so.
[36.] Soc. Power then is beautiful, and want of power is
not beautiful.
Hip. Very much so. And the rest of things, Socrates,
this effect, “Do you then consider well, whether the beautiful seems
to you to be, what I say it is; and what I shall say, do you look into
thoroughly—” But whether Plato really wrote so, is another question.
* Instead of kaxév, which is here out of place, I suggested many
years ago, kai cuvièvov. For Plutarch combines the same four animals in
ii. p. 471, E., kävac—kai tºrtrovg kai éptvyag kai dAsKTpvóvac—quoted
by Heind. on Lys. p. 211, E., &ptvya i &Aškrováva—h introv # käva.
* The words TAoiá rs kai rpuffbsic are evidently an interpretation of
Öxhuara—rà év tá 6a)\árty. Plato had probably a recollection of Baxag-
góTAaycra—vavrixwy 6xhuata in Prometh. 477.
* Unless ksitat be said here in reference to the #trurmösöpiara and
vápot, one would prefer daröksurat, “are appropriated,”
B
J
\
242 HIPPIAS MAJOR,
N
testify in our favour that such is the case, but particularly as
regards matters of state. For of all things it is the most
beautiful for a person to be powerful in state-affairs, and in
his own city; but to be powerless, the least so.
Soc. You say well. By the gods then, Hippias, is not
wisdom on this account the most beautiful of all things, and
ignorance the least so?
Hip. What else?" do you think, Socrates?
Soc. Softly, my dear friend; since I have a fear about
what I am saying.
Hip. What do you fear, Socrates? For your reasoning has
proceeded very beautifully at present.
Soc. I wish it had. But do you consider this with me.
Could a person do any thing, of which he knows nothing, and
for which he has no power 2
Hip. By no means. For how could he do that, for which
he has no power P
Soc. Are then they, who err, and act wrong, and do a thing
unwillingly, * other than those, who” would not have so
acted, unless they had possessed the power Ž
Hip. It is evident.
[37.] Soc. But, however, they who are powerful are power-
ful through power; for assuredly it is not through want of
power.
Hip. Certainly not.
Soc. All then, who do any thing, are able to do what they do.
Hip. Yes. -
Soc. And all men, beginning from boyhood, do many more
evil things than good, and err unwillingly.
Hip. The fact is so.
Soc. What then, shall we say that this power and these
means, however useful they may be for the doing evil, are
beautiful? or do they want much of being so 2
Hip. (They want) much,” in my opinion, Socrates.
Soc. The powerful then and the useful, Hippias, are not,
it seems, the beautiful. -->
* I have translated, as if the Greek were "AAAo ‘ri oist, not 'AAAd ri oist.
*—” The Greek is &\\o tu oirot, si—which I long ago corrected, as
the sense requires, into &\\o ru ofirou fi oi, si—
* After Ösi at the end of the question, has dropt out bei in the com-
wnencement of the answer.
HYPPIAS MAJOR. 243
Hip. If" indeed, Socrates, it has power to do good, or is
useful for things of that kind.
Soc. Away then has fled” that thing, at once the powerful
and the useful, as being” without exception beautiful. Now
this was that very thing, Hippias, which our soul 48 meant to
say, that the beautiful consists in utility and the power to ºr
produce Some good.
Hip. So it seems to me.
Soc. Now this is the advantageous. Is it not ?
Hip. It is.
[38.] Soc. Thus then beautiful bodies, and beautiful insti-
tutions, and wisdom, and all these things we just now men-
tioned, are beautiful, because advantageous.
Hip. Evidently so.
Soc. The advantageous then appears to be, Hippias, to us,
the beautiful. s
Hip. Entirely so, Socrates. #
Soc. But the advantageous is that, which effects a good. --
Hip. It is. -
Soc. Now that, which effects, is nothing else than a cause.
Is it not ?
Hip. It is so.
Soc. The beautiful therefore is a cause of the good. --
Hip. It is so.
Soc. Now the cause, Hippias, * and that of which it is the
cause, are different.* *For the cause cannot surely be a
40 Instead of “If,” the sense requires “Unless.” In Greek not iáv,
but áv pur), as I remarked long ago.
* In rotvvy lies hid artápévov. Compare Legg. iii. p. 686, A., raûra
3:) rā usyáXa—ötétr+aro; and oixstat &rotrápuswoc in Sympos. p. 183, E.
* This use of sivat after oixstav seems scarcely correct Greek.
* Although the power of speech is given to the soul in Sympos. p. 192,
D., ;) iſ/wxi)–65 varat sizreiv, and in Soph. Antig. 227, lºvyi)—máča: yet as
nothing has been said of the Soul, unless we adopt the reading of the two
best MSS. in § 34, of ipvXà for Tüxg, but a great deal about xúrpa, it is
evident, as I remarked long ago, that Plato wrote here Xàtpa, and there
QU tº
X Pº, The Greek is kai oiſ àv airtov ºff to airtov, i. e. “ and that, of
which the cause is a cause.” But the sense requires, “and that of which
it is the cause;” in Greek, kai of av ºff to airvoy. Correctly then has
Ficinus, “Aliud vero est causa; aliud id, cujus causa est.”
*—45 The Greek is ró ys airtov airtov airtov. But Ficinus, “causa
ipsius causae causa:” from whence syenian “ the cause—the cause of
R
244 HIPPLAS MAJOR.
cause of a cause.” Considet it in this way. Did not the
cause appear to be a maker?
Bip. Clearly. -
Soc. That, which is made by the maker, is nothing else but
the produced; but is not itself the maker.
Hip. Such is the fact.
Soc. The produced then is one thing, and the producer is
another.
Hip. Yes.
Soc. *The producer then is not the cause of itself,” but
of that, which is produced by it.
Hip. Entirely so.
Soc. If then the beautiful is the cause of a good, such a
good must be produced by the beautiful; and for this reason,
as it seems, we attend to intelligence, and all other beautiful
things, because their work and issue are worthy of attention,
as being the good; and from what we are discovering, the
beautiful is near to being in the form (as it were)” of a father
to the good. -
Hip. Entirely so. For you speak beautifully, Socrates.
[39.] Soc. Say I not this too beautifully, that neither is
the father the son, nor is the son the father ?
Hip. Beautifully indeed. -
Soc. Nor is the cause the thing produced; nor is, on the
other hand, the thing produced the cause.
Hip. You say what is true. -
wr Soc. By Zeus then, thou best of men, neither is the
Abeautiful the good, nor is the good the beautiful. Or
does it seem to you from what has been said, that it is
possible 2 º
itself,” as if he wished to read airoi; in lieu of airtov. But the train of
thought requires, “that, of which there is a cause, cannot be itself a
cause ;” in Greek, Où yáp trov, 3rov y' Éaruv airtów ru, airó ré airtov
àv sim: where 3rov for ottuvog has been, as usual, the cause of error; as
I showed in my note printed many years ago, to which I will here refer
the inquisitive reader.
45–46 The Greek is Oilk &pa Tó y airtov airtov airtov ša riv. But
this is at variance with the chain of argument, which requires a reference
to the producer. Plato could have written only Oik épa Tó ys trouotiv
airwov airoij čariv, as I stated long ago, and have here translated.
* In revög si ióša, found in the two best MSS., lies hid ruvos doei ibia,
as I remarked long ago. -
FIIPPIAS MAJOR, 245
Hip. By Zeus, it appears to me not possible.
Soc. Does it then please us, and are we willing to assert,
that the beautiful is not good, nor the good beautiful?
Hip. By Zeus, it does not please me at all.
Soc. And, by Zeus, Hippias, to me too it pleases the least
of all the assertions we have made.
Hip. And reasonably so.
Soc. The assertion then, which just now appeared the most
correct of all, that the advantageous and the useful and the
powerful to do some good, was the beautiful, runs the risk of
not being so; but if possible, of being more ridiculous than
the first (mentioned), in which we conceived the maiden, and
each of the things before mentioned, to be the beautiful.
Hip. It seems so, indeed.
[40.] Soc. And I too, Hippias, have no longer where to
turn myself, but am at a loss. Have you any thing to say ?
Hip. Not at least for the present. But, as I said just now,
I know well that on reflection I shall find it out.
Soc. But, through my eagerness to know, I seem to myself
unable to wait your delay. *For after being somewhat in
doubt,” I think I have just now found out a way. For con-
sider, if we call that beautiful, which causes us to be delighted,
—I do not mean all pleasures,—but that which arises through
the hearing and the sight, *how and for what could we con-
tend ?49 For surely beautiful men, Hippias, and embroidery
of all kinds, and pictures of animals, and earthenware, do,
when they are beautiful, delight us, while we look upon them;
*and so likewise do beautiful sounds,” and music in general,
and conversations, and story-telling produce the very same
effect. So that should we say in reply to that Swaggering
*—” The Greek is kai ydip of v 3% ri kai—an accumulation of particles,
which defy an exact translation. Plato probably wrote Kai ydp & Tropów
ôň ru, as I have translated. -
*—” The Greek is trijg ri àp’ &v &yovučoiuséa. To avoid the doubled
interrogatives Sydenham suggested träg yöp &v &ywww.ouple6a ; or trečg
rí yāp—“For what purpose should we contend about it?”—But Heindorf
defends the two interrogatives by quoting five similar passages from Plato
alone. I suspect however we ought to read träg re kai Trpèg Tí—as I have
translated. See my note on AEsch. Suppl. 927, where to the passages
already quoted I could add as many more. *
*—” The Greek is kai oi (p60.yyoi oi ka}\ot—But the balance of the sen-
tence requires—kai of p80yyoi ai ca)\ot to answer to—oi ça)\oi ä, 6pwrot.
246 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
fellow—My man of mettle, the beautiful is that, which pro-
duces pleasure through the hearing, and the sight—-think you
that we should restrain him from his swaggering 2
Hip. What the beautiful is seems, Socrates, to me at least,
to be well defined.
[41.] Soc. What then shall we say, Hippias, that pursuits.”
and institutions being pleasant through the hearing, or
through the sight, are beautiful? Or have they some other
kind (of beauty)?
Hip. These beautiful things will, perhaps, Socrates, lie hid
from the man.
Soc. (But)” by the dog, not from the person, Hippias, before
whom I should be the most ashamed to trifle, and to pretend
to say something to the purpose, when I was saying nothing.
Hip. Who is he?
Soc. The son of Sophroniscus; who would no more suffer
me to * say off-hand * what has not been investigated, than
to speak, as if I knew what I did not know.
Hip. To myself too it appears, since you have mentioned
it, that the case is different as regards institutions.
Soc. Softly, Hippias. For we have fallen into the very
same difficulty respecting the beautiful, as we were in just now;
and we are in danger of conceiving ourselves to be in a pretty”
easy road. -
* After #Trurmögüpara is inserted rá kaxó, at variance with the lan-
guage and logic. On the other hand, tà kaAá have dropt out in the an-
swer of Hippias, where instead of kāv we must read Tá kaxá áv—and
so I have translated.
* “Before på is manifestly required &\\& : for otherwise Socrates
would seem to indicate that he was himself the fictitious person. On the
other hand, to the remark of Hippias, ‘This will perhaps lie hid from the
man,’ Socrates would well reply, “But not from the person before whom
I should be the most ashamed to talk nonsense.’” Such was the note
I printed many years ago, knowing that AAAA might easily have been
lost before MA. And thus we are relieved from the necessity of con-
sidering with Schleiermacher, whom Stalbaum follows, the question of
Hippias and the reply of Socrates, as interpolations. Of this passage
Cicero had perhaps a recollection when he wrote, “Hunc autem esse
unum hominem ex Omnibus, quo praesente, ego ineptus esse minime vel-
lem.” De Orator. § 24.
*—% Ficinus has “facile judicarem,” as if his MS. read kpivstv, not
Aéyeuv.
* The Greek is otsa'9at #v àXXy twº stºroptº sivat. But áA\g sūtropig
could not be opposed to Šv tº airſ, āTropig. Heindorf once considered
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 247
Hip. How say you so, Socrates? - -
Soc. I will state what to me * appears to be beautiful,”
if indeed I am saying any to the purpose. That which relates
to institutions and pursuits would perhaps appear to be not
removed from the sensations which arise through the hearing
and sight. But let us abide awhile by the definition, that
what is through those senses pleasant, is beautiful, without
bringing before us the question relating to institutions. [42.]
Now should the man I mentioned, or any one else, ask us—
Why have ye, Hippias and Socrates, separated from the
pleasant in general that species of it, in which ye say con-
sists the beautiful, and yet deny that what relates to the
other sensations (connected with) * food and drink and sexual-
intercourse, and all the rest of such a kind, are beautiful ? Or
do ye assert that (these)" are not pleasant, and that there
are no pleasures at all in such sensations, nor in any thing
else except seeing and hearing 2 What shall we say, Hip-
pias P
Hip. We will say by all means, Socrates, that in the other
things likewise there are very great pleasures.
Soc. Why then, he will say, do ye take away from (these)*
pleasures, really existing no less than those, their very name,
and deprive them of the property of being beautiful? Be-
cause, we will say, there is not one, who would not laugh at
us, were we to say that to eat is not a pleasant, but a beauti-
ful thing, and to smell sweet not a pleasant thing, but beau-
tiful. [43.] But with regard to sexual intercourse, all would
surely admit * that it is to us a thing the most pleasant; but
it is meet so to carry it on, if a person will do it, as that no
eitropia an interpolation; but subsequently interpreted £v ćXXg tuvu by
“ rursus in alia.” But that would be švāAAg aſſ, or rather without àAAg:
for which I would now read ca)\ff, with a play on the word ka??, just as
in ºrpetróvrwg in § 31. Ficinus has “dum putamus quiddam certi nos
habere,” and thus avoids all the difficulties of the text.
*—” I have translated as if the Greek were à y' àpioi ka)\d paiveral,
not 6 yé pou karapaiveraw. See the reasons for the change in my edition.
* To avoid the strange expression aio 6 hostg oitov, we may insert
£vska between trorów and kai–
* Ficinus has “dulcia haec,” as if he had found in his MS. oióē ráðs
#éa oběš– g
* Before jöovåg the antithesis in Škstvag requires rào'às—
* Instead of pâxouvro, which I cannot understand, I have translated
as if the Greek were divéxolyro, while juiv depends upon jóvorov–
248 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
one see him; since it is a deed the most disgraceful to behold.”
On our saying this, Hippias, he will perhaps remark,+-I now
perceive that you have been of old ashamed to say that
these pleasures are beautiful, because they do not seem so to
men. Now I did not ask what seems to be beautiful to the
multitude, but what is so in reality. Whereupon we shall,
I presume, state in reply, that we asserted that this part of
the pleasant, arising from the sight and hearing, was a beau-
tiful thing. "But have you it in your power to use the
reasoning for any thing?" Or shall we, Hippias, say any
thing else?”
Hip. Against what has been urged, Socrates, it is neces-
sary to say no other than this.
Soc. Truly do ye say well, he will reply. If then the plea-
sure, coming through the sight and hearing, be a beautiful
thing, that which does not happen to be a part of such”
pleasant sensations, it is clear cannot be beautiful. Shall we
confess it?
Hip. Yes.
[44.] Soc. Is then that which is pleasurable, he will say,
through the sight, pleasurable through the sight and hearing
(conjointly) 7% Or that which is pleasurable through the
hearing, pleasurable through the hearing and the sight (con-
jointly 2%. By no means, we shall answer, would that which
exists through either, exist through both ; for this you seem
to us to say ; whereas we assert, that each of these pleasur-
able things would be beautiful, taken by themselves and both
together. Should we not answer thus?
* Shakspeare—“He loved the deed of darkness; but he blushed To
bwn it.” Compare Phileb. p. 66, A. § 158. Plutarch Sympos. ii. p. 654,
B. : Cicero de Offic. i. 35; Pythagor. Fr. p. 710, ed. Gale.
*—” This is the literal version of the Greek, 'AAA' Éxstg ri Xpija Bas
rº, A6).9 : which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, whose version
is, “Tu vero, Hippias, quo te vertis P’’ as if he had found in his MS.
'AAA' Éxeug 6, Tu Xpj gavrº Šv tº A6'yºp, similar to 6, Tu Xpgo oavrºp in
Crito, $ 4. But the balance of the sentence requires Toârq, tº Xóyºp, to
answer to pur) &\\a—m Taijra in the reply of Hippias. Compare Demosth.
p. 590, ed. Wolf., #yd, Ö3 oilk #x00 ru Xphoroplat roig roštov pºdºptval,
quoted by Zeune on Viger, p. 323.
* The Greek is 6 p.m.) Toñro Tvyxável by rôv jôéwv. But Ficinus has
“quod per alium sensum delectat,” from which Stephens would elicit
roëtq). He should have suggested Tobrov—as I have translated.
*** The word lipº' has twice dropt out between $oruv and jöö.
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 249
Hip. By all means.
Soc. *Does then, he will say, any pleasure whatever differ
from any other pleasure whatever in this, namely, in being
a pleasure ? For (I ask not) whether any pleasure is greater
or less, or more or less; but whether any one differs by this
very thing, in one of the pleasures being a pleasure, but the
other not a pleasure. Does it not seem so to us?
Hip. For it does not seem so.”
Soc. For some other reason then, he will say, than because
they are pleasures, have ye selected these from all the rest;
and having some such view with regard to both, that they
differ in some respect from the rest, did ye not, looking to
this, say that they are beautiful? For seeing is surely not
a beautiful thing on this account, that it is through seeing.
For, if this were the reason of its being beautiful, the other
pleasure *[that through hearing]" would not be beautiful,
"as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of
seeing.” Shall we say, you speak the truth?
Hip. We will.
[45.] Soc. Nor, on the other hand, is the pleasure through
the hearing beautiful on this account, that it is through hear-
ing. For then that through seeing would not be beautiful,
"as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of
hearing." Shall we say, Hippias, that the man, in speaking
so, speaks correctly P
Hip. Yes, correctly.
Soc. But both, he will rejoin, are beautiful, as you assert,
For so we say.
*—” Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is manifestly
Corrupt.
*—" The words within brackets, ſi èuá rijg &koſig, are evidently an
explanation of Étépa.
*—” So Sydenham ; thus adopting the correction of Cornarius, oilk
oùoa Ért ye, which was suggested, probably, by the version of Ficinus,
“cum per visum nequaquam efficiatur.” The Greek is, kaxi oik oğv Éort
ys à épéog jöovň : from whence it is easy to elicit, as I did many years
ago, what the sense requires, ca)\{i : oi kouvów Śwri Tu Tà rs Óu' à l'étug
#60 w;, i. e. “to which there is nothing in common with the pleasure of
sight:” and a similar correction is requisite in § 45, where a similar
idea occurs.
*—" See the preceding note.
§
250 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
Hip. We do.
Soc. They have then something in common and the same,
which causes them to be beautiful, and which belongs to both
conjointly, and severally to each. For otherwise they would
not be beautiful conjointly and severally. Give to me a re-
ply, as if to him.
Hip. I answer, that it appears to me as you say.
Soc. If then these pleasures, taken conjointly, are affected
by any circumstance, but not so, if taken separately, they
could not, at least under that circumstance, be beautiful.
Hip. How could it be possible, Socrates, that when neither
are affected by any circumstance whatever, that both should
be affected by that *[by which neither is affected]?”
Soc. You think it is impossible.
Hip. *Yes; for a great want of acquaintance with the
nature of those things would possess me, and of speaking the
present speeches.”
[46.] Soc. (You speak) pleasantly, Hippias.” For I am
in danger equally of fancying I see something so circum-
stanced, as you aver to be impossible; but yet I see no-
thing (clearly)."
Hip. You are in no danger, Socrates; but you very readily
look aside.7%
*—" The words within brackets are an evident interpolation, and were
properly omitted by Ficinus in his version, “ut, quod neutra illarum pa-
titur, ambae perpetiantur.” Nor is this the only error here. For in one
of the best MSS. are found the remains of the following words, which
ought to close the next speech of Hippias: El yáp Škaarat, ÖAov 3rt
kai &pſpórspat retrov6viat àv siev, i. e. For if each had been so circum-
stanced, it is evident both would have been.
0°–89 Such is the literal version of the Greek; for which I think I
have suggested something more worthy of Plato in my edition.
” After jöéwg ys, there is either an accidental omission or a gram-
matical ellipse of Aéyèug : while in jôéog there is perhaps a play on the
words closely connected with the things conveying the sensation of
pleasure. On a similar play see § 31 and $ 41.
7. The Greek is Špſ, 33 obôév. Perhaps 6° sº should be read for Öğ.
Compare Eurip. Phoen. 165, 'Opéj čijt’ of gaſpög paj čá traig. Heracl.
495, Aéyév pièv oë gap&c, \éyét éé Trøg.
* Here again I have restored in my edition what Plato probably wrote.
Stalbaum's version is, “you purposely neglect the true reason;” but
**oiſtwc does not mean “purposely;” nor is there any thing in the Greek
to answer to “true reason.”
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 251
Soc. **And yet many things of such a kind appear to me
before my soul.” But I distrust them; because they do not
present themselves to you, who have made the most money of
all now famed for wisdom, but only to myself, who have never
made any. And I have an idea, my friend, that you are
playing with me, "and are willingly deceiving me; such
strong and so many.”
Hip. No one will know better than yourself, Socrates,
whether I am playing with you or not, if you will only en-
deavour to tell me, what are those things that have presented
themselves to you. For you will be seen to say nothing to
the purpose. For you will never find that both of us have
been affected by circumstances together, by which neither you
nor I have been separately.
Soc. How say you, Hippias P But perhaps you are speak-
ing something to the purpose, and I do not understand it. Do
you then hear from me what I wish to state more clearly.
7°For it appears to me, that what neither I have been under
the circumstance of being, nor am, nor, on the other hand, what
you are under such a circumstance, it is possible for both to
be; and on the other hand, that other things, which both of
us are under the circumstance of being, neither of us are.”
[47.] Hip. You appear to me, Socrates, to exhibit in your
answers again” still greater wonders than when you answered
before. For just consider, if both of us were just, would not
each of us be so? or if each unjust, would not both be so? if
both were in health, would not each be so P or if each were
wearied, or wounded, or struck, or were affected in any other
way whatever, would not both of us be affected in the
*—78 and 74–74 On both of these passages I must again refer the reader
to the notes in my edition. For they are too long, and perhaps too
learned, for the present work; especially as I could now add not a little
to confirm the views there brought forward.
7*—” Such is the literal version of the Greek, with which Stalbaum, in
ed. 2, is satisfied ; although, in ed. 1, he had transcribed Heindorf's
note, who saw with Sydenham that there was something wrong here.
But they do not appear to have seen that the train of ideas was originally
something to this effect: “For it appears to me that, what neither I nor you
have suffered, and what neither I am nor you are, this it is possible for
both of us to suffer and to be ; and on the other hand, what both of us
have suffered and are, for neither of us to have suffered and to be.”
* Instead of at Sydenham would read vöv, antithetical to 6\iyov trpá-
repow.
252 EIIPPIAS MAJOR.
same 77 way? Still further, if both of us happened to be made
of gold, or silver, or ivory, or if you will, well-born, or wise,
or held in honour, or old, or [young],” or in any state you
will, incident to man, is there not a great necessity for each to
be so 2
Soc. Most assuredly.
[48.] Hip. But neither do you, Socrates, consider things
as wholes, nor do they, with whom you are wont to converse.
For taking separately the beautiful and each of things ex-
isting, you discuss it in your discourses, cutting it into frac-
tions; and hence things of great size, and of continuous”
length escape your observation. And to such an extent have
they escaped you now, that you conceive there is something,
either circumstance or being, which, as regards two things
taken jointly, does exist, but does not, as regards them taken
singly ; or on the other hand, does exist, as regards each, taken
singly, but not as regards both, taken jointly. So illogically,
and inconsiderately, and sillily, and unreflectingly, do you
conduct yourselves.
Soc. Such is our condition, Hippias. It is not what a man
wishes, say the persons using everywhere the proverb,” but what
he can. But” you are always assisting us with your admo-
77 The Greek is toūro—But “idem,” in Ficinus, leads to rairò—
* “The words ;) véot are omitted by three MSS. correctly; for neither
Socrates nor Hippias were young when the dialogue is supposed to have
taken place. Should it however be said that the qualities, thus brought
forward as examples, have been taken at random, it may be replied that
Plato is not wont to speak without some definite design. In the words
Xpwooi, &pyvpoi, and éAépávtuvot there is an allusion to the subjects dis-
cussed in § 23; while in the words yewvaiot, oropoi, riputou, yépovreg,
Hippias alludes to himself as being of a good family, wise, honoured, and
aged.” Such is the note I wrote many years ago. But instead of re-
jecting # véot entirely, I would now consider Yépovreg véot as an explana-
tion of &ployépovrég, restored again to Plato in Euthyd. p. 272, § 3, by
myself in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 219.
* “In considering any subject, Plato is wont to speak of it in general
terms, and then to divide it into its several species; and after distinguishing
each species by its peculiar character, to arrive at the real nature of the
thing in question.” So remarks Sydenham; who might have referred for
a notable instance of this method, to the Sophist and Statesman through-
out, but more especially the latter, p. 258, B. § 2.
* The proverb in Greek was—Zépév yāp oix dig 0#Aousy &AA’ dig
8vváuséa, translated by Terence, “Ut quimus, aiunt; quando, ut volumus.
non licet.”
* I confess I cannot perceive here the requisite train of thought.
}
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 253
mitions. Since even now, *before I had been thus admonished
by you how sillily we conduct ourselves, shall I give” you
still a plainer proof, by stating what were our thoughts upon
those points? or shall I not?
Hip. You will speak to one who knows already, Socrates.
For I am conversant with each one of those who are engaged
in disputations, and how they are situated. Still, if it is more
agreeable to yourself, say on.
Soc. To me indeed it will be more agreeable. For we
were, thou best of men, so silly before you said so of us, as to
conceive with regard to myself and you, that each of us was
one person, and that both could not be what each was ; for
we are not one, but two persons. Such a simpleton was Il
[49.] But now we have been taught the contrary, that if both
together are two persons, each of us also is of necessity two;
and that if each of us be one, it is necessary for both of us to
be one. For by a continuous argument (respecting) being, *
it is not possible, according to Hippias, for it to be otherwise ;
but now having been persuaded by you, that whatever both
of two things are, this too each of them is, I sit down here.*
But first remind” me, Hippias, whether you and I are one,
you and I together; or you are two, and I two.
Hip. What mean you, Socrates? -
Soc. What I say. For I am afraid to speak plainly to
you, * because you are harsh with me, whenever you seem
to yourself "to speak something to the purpose.” But
82–82 This is rather strange language, “Before I had—shall I.” There
is some error here. Perhaps Plato—iv' àv rô Trpiv Štrö o'où raûr’ st;
vov0srn0ſjval pavā, i.e. “in order that I may be shown to have been
properly admonished thus by you.”
83 Such is the literal version of the Greek, Ölavskei Xóyºp Tijg oioiaç.
But Sydenham's, though less literal, is more intelligible, “by reason of
the continuity of being.”
84 Between äv0áðs and ká0mpat has dropt out, I suspect, káv001, “a
pannier'd ass.” The word is found in Aristoph. Xpmk. 179, and Eip. 81,
while its synonyme &voc is seen in the proverb alluded to in Plato The-
aetet. p. 146, A., § 68 &paptdy kai Ög &v dei &paprávº, ka0sösirau, äo-
Trep pagiv oi Taičeg oi o ºatpićovréc, čvoc.
85 Instead of Ötrópºvna ov, which can hardly suit with trórepov, I sug-
gested long ago Strophyvorov, similar to “memora,” in Ficinus.
86 In lieu of as Heindorf suggested oroi, answering to “coram te,” in
Ficinus.
87–87 But this could be no reason for Hippias having a harsh feeling
towards Socrates. What Plato probably wrote may be seen in my edition.
254 HIPPIAS MAJOR.
however tell me, is not each of us one 2 and so affected as to
be one P
Hip. Certainly.
Soc. If then each of us be one, each of us must be also
dd. Or think you that one is not an odd number 2
Hip. I think it is.
Soc. Are we then both odd, being two 2
Hip. This, Socrates, could not be.
Soc. But both together are even. Is it not so?
Hip. Certainly.
Soc. Now, because both together are even, is each of us on
this account even P
Hip. Certainly not.
Soc. It is not then necessary, as you said just now, that
what we both are together, we should be singly ; and that,
what each is, we should both be.
Hip. Not in these cases, but in those I spoke of before.
[50.] Soc. These are sufficient, Hippias; for we must be con-
Žent with these, since it appears that some things are so, but
others not. For I stated, if you remember, at the point from
whence this conversation diverged,” that the pleasures through
the sight, and through hearing, could not be beautiful in that,
by which each happened to be affected (singly) and not both
(jointly), or both (jointly) and not each (singly), but by what
they were affected jointly and singly. And hence you ad-
mitted that both together and each singly were beautiful. On
this account then I conceived that, by the existence which
follows upon both, they ought, if both were beautiful, to be
themselves” beautiful; but not by the existence wanting to
the other.99 And I think so still. But tell me, as if at the
beginning (of our inquiry), if the pleasure through the sight
and that through hearing are beautiful, both (jointly) and
each (singly), does not that, which makes them so, follow on
both (jointly) and each (singly).
Hip. Certainly. º
* The MSS. vary between Aéx0m, ÉX#yx0m, and Xéx0m. Plato wrote,
as I have translated, #718&yx0m.
89 ºted of aird the train of thought evidently requires Éxagra,
“each.”
* In lieu of Érspa, Sydenham correctly suggested Škárspa. Stalbaum
* £rspa “alterutrum.” But such is not its meaning in correc'
Tě6R,
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 255
Soc. Is it then because each singly is a pleasure, and both
too jointly, that they are beautiful? Or on this account alone,”
because all the other pleasures would be in no respect less
beautiful? For, if you remember, the latter were shown to be
pleasures no less than the former.
Hip. I remember it well.
[51.] Soc. But because these are through the sight and
hearing, on that account it was asserted they were beau-
tiful.
Płºp. It was so asserted.
Soc. See now, whether I speak the truth. It was stated,
as my memory serves me, not that the pleasurable of every
kind was beautiful; but such as was through the sight and
hearing.
Hip. It is true.
Soc. Does not this circumstance then attend on both taken
together ? but not on each taken singly 2 * For by no means
does each of them, as was said before, exist through both, but
both through both, and each not.” Is it so?
Hip. It is.
Soc. Each of them is not beautiful through that which does
not attend each. For the both does not attend upon (the)
either.” So that we can by the hypothesis call both beautiful,
but we cannot (call) either so. Or how say we ? Is it not
of necessity so P
Hip. So it appears.
[52.] Soc. Shall we then say that both are beautiful, but
deny that each is so P
Hip. What is to prevent it 2
Soc. This seems to me, my friend, to prevent it; *because
there were to us some things so appertaining to each, that, if
they appertained to both, (they would appertain)* likewise
* Instead of utv, which has no meaning here, Plato doubtless wrote
Hovov––
*—” Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is evidently
corrupt.
* Before Šicarépq, the article rº, has dropt. Compare $ 52, rô Škárepov
wal rô dpipórepov.
*—” Ficinus has—“ut, si ambobus adsunt, adsint et singulis”—thus
showing that he found supplied in his MS. the very words requisite for
the sense and syntax—eitrep—étriyiyvowro, Štruytyvowr' àv—
256 HIPPAAS MAJOR.
to ench ; and, if to each, * to both likewise—all such you went
through.” Is it not so?
Hip. Yes.
Soc. *But what I went through, (were) not so; of which
was itself the each and the both.96 Is it so?
Hip. It is.
Soc. Of what kind then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem
to you? whether, as you asserted, that if I and you are strong,
both are so; and if I and you are just, both are so; and if
both, so too is each; and similarly, if I and you are beautiful,
both are so; and if both, so too is each P Or is there nothing to
prevent it; as (in the case of numbers, where) some things
taken together being even, may be, when taken 9% singly, odd,
and perhaps even : *" or, when each, being taken separately,
is perhaps irrational, but taken both together may be ra-
tional, or perhaps irrational,” and there are other things of
this kind infinite in number, which I said presented them-
selves to me. [53.] Now, on which side do you place the
beautiful? On that, as it appears to me, or to yourself. For
it appears to me a great absurdity, for both of us to be beau-
tiful, yet each of us not so; or for each to be beautiful, yet
both not so ; or as regards any other thing whatever of such
a kind. Do you choose (to say)* in this way or that ?
Hip. In this way, Socrates.
Soc. And you do wisely, Hippias, in order that we may be
freed from a further search. For, if any of these things is
the beautiful, the pleasurable, which comes through the sight
and hearing, would no longer be the beautiful; for (the plea-
*—” The error in these words is corrected in the notes to my editicn.
*—” To point out all the difficulties in the words between the nume-
rals, and how they might be overcome, would require a longer note than
is suited to this place.
* For instance, the two odd numbers, seven and three, together make
the even number, ten; and the two even numbers, six and four, make
the very same number. S.
*—”, “Surd” quantities are called in Greek áppmra or àAoya, and in
Latin “irrationales.” To illustrate this passage Heindorf justly says that
V3 and V6 are àppmra; but V3 TGT is finróv. Sydenham, he observes,
translated finró and āppm ra by “commensurable and incommensura-
ble;” but that would be in Greek oriuperpa and &oipperpa.
§ * Instead of aipei, the two best MSS. read Épsi, which leads to cºast
gély-
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 257
surable)" that comes through the sight and hearing, causes
both, taken together, to be beautiful; but not either singly.
This however cannot be, as I and you, Hippias, have agreed.
Hip. We have agreed.
Soc. It is impossible then for that, which is pleasurable
through the sight and hearing, to be the beautiful; since a
thing being produced as beautiful exhibits something of the
impossible.
Hip. Such is the case.
Soc. Say then again from the beginning, he will say,
since you have erred in this, what, say you, is that beauty,
which (attends) upon both these pleasures, for the sake of
which you honoured them before the others, and called them
beautiful? [54] To me, Hippias, there seems a necessity
to say, that these are of all pleasures the most harmless,”
and the best, taken together and singly. Or have you to
state any thing else, by which they are different from other
pleasures?
Hip. By no means: for they are in reality the best.
Soc. This then, he will say, do you now assert the beauti-
ful to be, namely, pleasure that is advantageous P So it
seems, I shall answer. But what you ?
Hip. I too (the same).
Soc. Is not then, he will say, the advantageous that, which
is the efficient of good? Now the efficient, as shown lately,
is a thing different from the effect; and the reasoning has
now *come to you to the former reasoning;” for neither
would the good be a beautiful thing, nor would the beau-
tiful be a good thing; since each of these “is something else.*
This we shall more than all assert, if, Hippias, we are of
sound mind. For it is surely not just not to agree with him,
who speaks correctly.
* The word jöö has probably dropt out between rô and 6t', as is
shown by the train of thought.
* What are here called dowãorarat are described as ā9Xagaig in Rep.
ii. p. 257, D., and ka9apai in Phileb. p. 66, C.
*—" Ficinus has “relabimur,” in Greek &våket : while in #ksu ºptiv
lies hid #kst kvkAoûpaevog, as in English, “reasoning in a circle.”
*—" This is the literal version of the Greek. But Sydenham has what
the sense requires, “each of these being different from the other:
S
*
258 IEIIPPIAS MAJOR.
[55.] Hip. But what, Socrates, do you conceive to be all
this, taken together ? They are the parings and snippings,
as I said just now, of reasonings, separated into little bits.
But that is a thing both beautiful and of great worth, to be able
to put together well and beautifully a speech before a court
of justice, or the Council-Hall, or any other official tribunal,
before whom the speech may be addressed ; and after pro-
ducing conviction, to depart, carrying off not the least, but the
greatest, of prizes, in the preservation of oneself and one's
own property, and that of one's friends. These then you
ought to lay hold of, and to bid adieu to such petty disputes,
in order that you may not seem to be a simpleton, by taking,
as just now, trifles and inanities in hand.
Soc. You, my dear Hippias, are a happy man ; for you
know what pursuits a simpleton” should follow, and have fol-
lowed them, as you say, sufficiently." But the misfortune of
an evil genius, as it seems, lays hold of me, who am wander-
ing continually and in doubt. For when I make a display of
my doubts before you wise men, I am ever bespattered with
dirt by you 7 when I make a display. [56.] For ye tell me?
what you tell me now, that I busy myself about matters fool-
ish, trivial, and worthless. But when, on the other hand,
convinced by you, I say as ye do, that it is by far the best
thing to be able to put together well and beautifully a speech,
and to go through it before a court of justice, or any other
concourse of people, I hear myself ill spoken of in all ways,
both by some others here, but especially from that person.
who is always confuting me; for he happens to be my nearest
of kin, and lives in the same house.” Whenever then I enter
* As Hippias called Socrates &vómrov, I suspect he returned the com-
pliment by calling Hippias divovv, which would be easily altered into
diſov, the usual abbreviation in MSS. for &v0pwarov.
* Instead of ikavåg, Plato no doubt wrote, oi, keväg, in allusion to
the money that Hippias said, in § 5, he made by his lectures.
"—" There are several errors in the words between the numerals.
* Stalbaum justly remarks, that Socrates here discovers himself to
be the fictitious person so frequently alluded to. Hence we must read,
êy Yūtara Yévovg kai év tº avrò oikºp div : where oikog means not only
the house for the body, but for the soul likewise; for such the body was
supposed to be. . See at Phileb. § 54, n. 52. Add Etymol. M. X&pia"
otovei čápa rig buyiig.
HIPPIAS MAJOR. 256
my dwelling *[at home]," and he hears me talking in this
way, he asks me if I do not feel a shame in presuming to con-
verse about beautiful pursuits, after I have been so clearly con-
victed, that on the subject of the beautiful I do not know what
it is in the abstract. And how then, says he, will you know,
who has put together a beautiful speech or not, or (done) any
other (beautiful) act, while knowing nothing of the beautiful?
and when you are in such a situation, think you it is better
for you to live than to die? Thus it has happened, as I told
you, for me to hear myself ill-spoken of, and reproached by you,
and to be abused by him. But, perhaps I must endure all this
for nothing is out of place, if only I am benefited; and bene-
fited, Hippias, I think I am by my intercourse with both of
you. For I seem to myself to understand what the proverb 19
means, “difficult are the beautiful.”
*—” The word oticaës is an evident interpretation of sig #pavroij.
1° To this proverb Plato has alluded in Rep. iv. p. 435, C., vi. p. 497,
D., and Cratyl. p. 384, A. § 2. But as ca)\á in the proverb means else-
where “honourable,” but here “beautiful,” Socrates advisedly says he
seems to understand, that which was otherwise plain enough.
INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPIAS MINOR,
AFTER showing, in the Hippias Major, that the very person, who
had written and spoken on “the beautiful,” had very confused
ideas on that question taken in detail, and knew nothing at all of
it when considered abstractedly, Plato has, in the Hippias Minor,
represented Socrates as pursuing with no less keenness, though with
scarcely equal vigour, the same unhappy Sophist, at the very mo-
ment when he was thought by his admirers to have made a more
than ordinarily brilliant display of his intellectual powers.
Schleiermacher and Ast have condemned this dialogue as spu-
rious; though of the reasons which have led them to this conclusion,
I know nothing; nor can I imagine even what they are. They do
not appear, however, to have been very convincing; for they have
been called in question by Socher, and rejected by Stalbaum. For
both these scholars knew, what Sydenham was the first to remark,
that Aristotle has alluded, covertly, as usual, to a paralogism intro-
duced into this dialogue; and that Cicero obtained from the same
source his knowledge of some circumstances in the life of Hippias,
which it is not likely he found elsewhere. And hence it is fair to
infer, as I stated in the Introduction to the Menexenus, where
something similar occurs, that, if the dialogue were not written
by Plato himself, it must be the production of one, who could
imitate his style so completely, as to evade detection, till more
than two thousand years had elapsed after the commission of the
forgery. Winckelmann however conceives that the Hippias Minor
was written by Antisthenes, to whom has been attributed the Second
Alcibiades; while Zeller, in his “Platonische Studien,” Tübing.
1839, agrees with Schleiermacher in considering it as not a genuing
production of Plato.
HIPPIAS MINOR.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.
EUDICU.S.
[1..] WHY, Socrates, are you so silent, after Hippias has
made such a display ? and why do you not either join in the
praise of what has been said, or confute it, if he seems to you
to have spoken any thing not correctly; especially since we
are left by ourselves, we, who would lay an especial claim to
share in an exercise relating to philosophy. *
Soc. There are indeed, Eudicus, some things, which I would
gladly inquire of Hippias, touching the points, of which he has
just now been treating, relating to Homer. For I have heard
from your father Apemantus, that the Iliad of Homer is a more
beautiful poem than the Odyssey; and so much the more beau-
tiful, as Achilles is a better man than Ulysses; for each of
those poems, he said, was composed, one in honour of Ulysses,
and the other in that of Achilles. If then it is agreeable to
Hippias, I would gladly inquire on this very point, what he
thinks of those two persons, and which of them he says was
the better man; especially since he has exhibited a great
variety of other matter, relating to other poets, and to Homer
likewise.
[2.] Eud. Nay, it is evident that Hippias will not grudge
you an answer, if you ask him a question. If Socrates puts
a question to you, Hippias, will you give him an answer; or
how will you act?
IIip. I should act in a shocking manner, Eudicus, were
264 HIPPIAS MINOR.
I now to fly from a question put by Socrates—I, who, when I
go from my home at Elis up to Olympia to the general
meeting of the Greeks, at the period of the Olympic games,
constantly offer myself at the temple to speak upon any point
that any person may wish, relating to the subject which has
been prepared for my display, and to give a reply to any on 3
upon any question he may put.
Soc. Your case, Hippias, is a happy one indeed, if at each
Olympic festival you arrive at the temple, so full of hope touch-
ing the cleverness connected with the soul. For Ishould marvel
much, if any one of those engaged in bodily contests came
thither to contend in the body with so little fear, and with
so much confidence, as you say you do, in the case of intellect.
Hip. With reason, Socrates, is such my case. For, from
the time when I began to contend at Qlympia, I have never
met with a person my superior in any thing. y
[3.] Soc. A beautiful offering, Hippias, do you proclaim
your reputation for wisdom' to be to both the Elean state and
your own parents likewise. But what were you saying to
us about Achilles and Ulysses 2 Which of the two said
you was the better man, and for what? For when many
were within, and you were making the display, I missed what
was said by you ; for I feared to put a question, because
the crowd was great, and lest I might by asking be an impe-
diment to the display. But as we are now fewer in number,
and Eudicus here commands me to ask, state clearly, and in-
struct us, what you said about those two men, and how you
drew a distinction between them.
Hip. Nay, Socrates, I am willing to go through more clearly
than I did then, what I said about those men, and others too.
I assert then, that Homer has made Achilles the bravest of
those who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Ulysses the
most versatile.
Soc. Ho! ho! Hippias' will you grant me some such
favour as this? not to laugh at me, if I apprehend with diffi-
culty what is said, and ask you frequent questions; and do
you endeavour to answer me in a mild and good-tempered
IY) all Ił61”. .
Hip. (I will do so), for it would be, Socrates, a disgraceful
thing if I, who instruct others on these very points, and deem
* Ficin, omits Tijg gopiac—
HIPPIAS MINOR. 265
myself worthy to receive money on that very account, should,
when I am interrogated by you, not show pardon towards
you nor answer mildly.
[4.] Soc. You speak very fairly. For when you said that
Achilles was represented as the bravest, I seemed to understand
what you meant; and (so I did) when (you said) that Nestor
was the wisest; but when you said that the poet had repre-
sented Ulysses as the most versatile, by this, to tell the truth,
I did not thoroughly know what you meant. Tell me then,
if I can better understand from this way. Is not Achilles re-
presented by Homer as being versatile 2
Hip. The least of all, Socrates, but the most simple. Since
in “The Supplications,” when he represents Achilles and
Ulysses conversing with each other, Achilles says to Ulysses,
Son of Laertes, progeny of Jove,
Ulysses, full of many plans, ’tis meet
Curtly a speech to say, as I will do,
And to an end I think it will be brought.
Hateful to me, as are the gates of hell,
Is he, who one thing in his bosom hiding,
Another says. What I say, will be done.
Now in these verses he delineates clearly the habit of each
hero; how that Achilles was truthful and simple, but Ulysses
versatile and false. For he represents Achilles as speaking
these verses to Ulysses.
Soc. Now indeed, Hippias, I am near to understanding
what you mean by versatile. For you call, it seems, such a
person false.
Hip. Exactly so, Socrates. And such a person has Homer
represented Ulysses in many places both of the Iliad and
Odyssey. -
Soc. By Homer then, it seems, the man of truth was con-
sidered as one character, and the man of falsehood another;
but not (both)* the same.
Hip. How should they not, Socrates?
Soc. And are you too of the same opinion, Hippias 2
* The books of Homer are quoted by ancient authors with reference
to their subjects, not, as now, by their number. See at Cratylus, $ 95.
The passage here alluded to is in ix. 308.
* Ficinus has “neque utrumque eundem esse,” as if he had found in his
MS. āAA’ oix à airóc àpºpórspoc.
266 HIPPIAS MINOR.
Hip. Most certainly. For it would be a terrible thing if
I were not.
[5.] Soc. Homer, then, let us dismiss; since it is impossible
to inquire of what he was thinking, when he composed those
verses. But as you appear to take upon yourself his cause,
and, what you assert that Homer meant, seems to you like-
wise, do you answer for Homer and yourself in common.
Hip. So it shall be. Ask then briefly any question you
like.
Soc. By men of falsehood do you mean such, as are unable
to do a certain act, as persons labouring under sickness, or
such as are able.
Hip. I mean such as are very able (to do) many other
things, and likewise to put upon persons a deceit.
Soc. The versatile then it seems, according to your account,
are men able to do something. Are they not ?
Hip. Yes.
Soc. Is it through silliness and want of intellect that they
are versatile and deceivers ? or through knavery and a cer-
tain kind of intellect 2
Hip. Through knavery the most of all, and intellect.
Soc. They are then men of intellect, it seems.
Hip. They are, by Zeus, very much so.
Soc. Since they are men of intellect, are they ignorant of
what they are doing? or do they know it?
Hip. They know it very well. And through this they act
wickedly.
Soc. Knowing then what they know, are they untaught,
or wise P
Hip. Wise on this very point, to deceive.
[6] Soc. Hold now ; let us recollect what you have said.
You assert that men of falsehood are men of power, and in-
tellect, and knowledge, and wisdom, on those points where
they are men of falsehood.
Hip. I assert it.
Soc. And that men of truth and men of falsehood are differ-
ent, and opposed to each other.
Hip. This I assert.
Soc. Come then, amongst the men of power and wisdom,
some, it seems, are men of falsehood, according to your account.
Hip. Certainly.
HIPPIAS MINOR. 267
Soc. When you say that men of falsehood are men of power
and wisdom as regards those very things,” do you mean that
they are able to be false, if they wish it? or unable as regards
those things, in which they are false ?
Hip. That they are able.
Soc. To sum up the whole then, have men of falsehood the
wisdom and power to be false ?
Hip. Yes.
Soc. The man, therefore, who is unable, or has not been
taught (to be false), cannot be a man of falsehood.
Hip. Such is the case. --
Soc. Each person then, who is able to do what he wishes at the
time when he wishes, is a person of power. I am not speak-
ing of a person, prevented by some disease or any other thing
of that kind; but, I mean, (that he is able,) as you are,
whenever you wish, to write my name. Do you not call the
person who is in this state, a person of power?
Hip. I do.
[7.] Soc. Tell me now, Hippias, are you not skilled in
numbers and accounts 2
Hip. Most especially, Socrates.
Soc. Were a person then to ask you, “What number is
thrice seven hundred,” you could, if you would, say of all per-
sons the quickest and truest respecting it.
Hip. Certainly.
Soc. Is it because you are the man of the greatest power
and wisdom on those points 2
Hip. Yes. -
Soc. Are you merely the man of the greatest wisdom and
power? or are you the best” likewise with respect to those
points, in which you are of the greatest power and wisdom ?
Hip. The best assuredly, Socrates.
Soc. You would therefore, upon these subjects, speak the
truth with the greatest power possible. Is it not so?
Hip. I think so.
Soc. But what, are you not equally able to speak untruths
upon the very same subject P Answer me now, Hippias, as
* Namely, of falsehood, says Stalbaum. Ficinus has “ad eadem,” in
Greek sig aird Tattá– - e
* By “best * Sydenham understands “the most veracious.”
268 HIPPIAS MINOR.
you did before, nobly and with a high bearing. If then a
person were to ask you, “How many are thrice seven hun-
dred P’ whether would you be false the most, and say always
and according to the same circumstance what is false, if you
wished to be false, and never at any time to give a true
answer? Or would a person unskilled in accounts be better
able than yourself, if so inclined, to be false? Would not the
person unskilled, although desirous of being false, frequently
speak the truth unwillingly, by accident, through his know-
ing nothing P But you, being wise on those points, could, if
you were inclined to be false, be ever and according to the
same circumstances false.
Hip. Yes; the case is as you state it.
Soc. Whether then is the person, who is false upon other
points, not so in the case of numbers ? nor would he be false
in numbers ?
Hip. By Zeus, in numbers too.
[8.] Soc. Let us then, Hippias, suppose that there is a cer-
tain person false upon the subject of numbers and accounts.
Hip. Well. -
Soc. Now what kind of person must he be? Must he
not, as you yourself just now acknowledged, possess, if he in-
tends to be false, the power to be false ? for it was, if you re-
member, said by you, that he who wants the power to be false
would never be fall-
Hip. I remember; it was said so.
Soc. Were you not just now shown to possess the greatest
power to be false in the case of accounts? -
Hip. Yes; and this too was said.
Soc. And do you not possess the greatest power to speak
the truth relating to accounts?
Hip. Certainly.
Soc. The same person then possesses the greatest power to
say what is false and true relating to accounts. "Now he who
is the best on such subjects is the accountant.”
*—" The words between the numerals were considered an interpolation
by Bekker. But Stalbaum says that to dºya.0ög in this speech of Socrates
there is an allusion in the subsequent one of the same speaker; while he
§. &Ya6ög—ó Aoyuorukög with “bonos rationatores” in Cicero De
C. i. 8. -
HIPPLAS MINOR. 269
Hip. It is so.
Soc. Who else then, Hippias, is the man of falsehood" with
regard to accounts, than the good (accountant)? for he is the
person of power, and he too of truth.
Hip. So it appears.
Soc. You see then that the same person is on these points
both false and true ; and that he, who is true, is not a better
man than he, who is false: for surely he is the same, and has
not, as you just now fancied, qualities the most opposite.
Hip. It appears so in this case at least.
Soc. Are you willing then for us to consider the question
on another ground? -
Hip. [Otherwise],” if you wish it.
[9.] Soc. Are not you skilled in geometry likewise?
Hip. Yes, I am. -
Soc. What then, is it not so in geometry likewise? Is not
the same person, who has the greatest power to be false and
to speak the truth respecting diagrams, the geometrician 2
Hip. Yes. - -
Soc. Is there any other, who is good at diagrams?
Hip. No other. - . - -
Soc. The good and clever geometrician then has the great-
est power in both ways. And, if there be any one else, who is
false on the subject of diagrams, it would be the good one: for
he has the power; whereas the bad (geometrician) wants the
power to be false: so that he, who wants the power, could not
be false, as has been admitted already.
JHip. It is so. -
Soc. Let us now consider further the third instance, that of
an astronomer; in which science you conceive yourself still
* Aristotle, in Metaphys. v. 29, observes that there is here a paralogism;
for by psvößg, “a man of falsehood,” is meant a man Öuvápsvoc
Jºsiºso.6at, “capable of telling a falsehood; ” whereas the word properly
signifies a man apt to speak falsities through choice, and with the inten-
tion to deceive, and to beget in others false notions of things. Aristotle
however does not condemn Plato, whose name is not mentioned, as guilty.
of arguing unfairly; but appeals to this passage as a singular instance
of the improper use of the term psvörg, “false.” S.
* Bekker, with whom Stalbaum agrees, would expunge àAAwg, omit-
ted by Ficinus; whose version is, “ut lubet; ” but Graser, in Adversar. p.
99, would retain it. We might perhaps read d\\06, to answer to the
preceding d\\00s.
270 HIPPIAS MINOR.
more skilled than in those (mentioned) before. Is it not so,
Hippias”
Hip. Yes. - -
Soc. Do not the very same things hold good in astronomy?
Hip. It is probable, Socrates.
Soc. In astronomy likewise, if there be any one else who is
false, the good astronomer will be the man of falsehood, as
having the power to be false; for it cannot be the man, who
wants the power; for he is unskilled. -
Hip. It appears so. -
Soc. The same person therefore in astronomy likewise will
be the man of truth and falsehood.
Hip. It seems so.
[10.] Soc. Come then, Hippias, and consider freely in this
manner through all sciences, whether the case be otherwise
than this. Now you are of all men the most skilled in every
way in the greatest number of arts,” as I once heard you boast-
ing, when you were detailing your abundant and enviable wis-
dom in the market-place by the tables of the usurers." For
you said you once went to Olympia, having as the work of your
own hands all that you wore about your body:" first, the
ring which you had on your finger—for you began with that
—was your own work, proving your skill in cutting rings; and
you had another” seal of your own workmanship, and a strigil,”
* The origin of this universal knowledge in arts and sciences, Syden-
ham conceives is to be traced to the fact mentioned by Iamblichus in his
life of Pythagoras, that Hippias was for a short time a disciple of Agesi-
damus, a Pythagorean philosopher of Metapontum in Lucania; who
taught that the perfect man was airápkng, “self-sufficient.” But instead of
the mental self-sufficiency, which his master had in mind, Hippias con-
ceived that the doctrine had reference to all the conveniences, and even the
ornaments of life, and that the philosopher should know and practise the
arts and sciences by which he might become self-sufficient, and attain a
resemblance to the deity; for, according to Socrates in Xenophon, Mem.
i., “to want nothing is peculiar to the divine nature; and to have the
fewest wants is to approach the nearest to it.” S.
* Such is Stalbaum’s interpretation of Étri raig Tpatrážatc. But
I would refer it rather to the tables, which mountebanks made use of to
exhibit the tricks of their trade.
- - - "...ſom this passage Cicero drew the facts mentioned in his De Orator.
ll 1. e
* Instead of kai äXXmy I should prefer kai ka}\}v— -
* This was an instrument used by the Greeks to scrape the skin, and
similar to the modern flesh-brush (or rather, curry-comb). After using
HIPPIAS MINOR. 271
and an unguent-box, which you had made yourself; more-
over the shoes you then had on, you said you had cut out
yourself and made; and that you had woven the upper and
the under cloak which you then wore. But what seemed the
strangest thing to all, and a proof of the greatest cleverness,
was—when you stated that the belt which you wore round your
vest—and it was of the costly kind made in Persia—you had
plaited yourself; and in addition to all this, you came there bring-
ing your own poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, and many
and various compositions in prose; and that in the arts, which
I have just now mentioned, you had reached a pre-eminence
in skill above all the rest, and in accuracy on points of rhythm
and harmony, and grammar; and in addition to these (you
spoke of) many other things, as I appear to myself to remember.
But I had like to have forgotten, it seems, your art of memory,
in which you deem yourself to shine the most ; and, I presume,
I have forgotten very many others. [11.] But what I mean is
this—Do you, turning your eye upon your own (arts)—and they
are quite enough—and upon those of others, tell me—if per-
chance you can discover from what has been acknowledged by
myself and you—where is the man of falsehood and the man
of truth apart and not the same 2 Consider the matter in any
kind you please, of wisdom, or knavery, or whatever else you
delight to call it; and you will never find it, my friend; for it
does not exist; but (if it does), do you mention it.
Płip. I am not able, Socrates, thus on the instant, at least.
Soc. Nor will you, as I think, ever be able. If then I am.
speaking what is true, do you remember, Hippias, what results
from the reasoning?
Hip. I do not very well understand, Socrates, what you
IIlean.
Soc. For you do not perhaps at present make use of your
art of memory. For it is evident that you think there is no
need of it. But I will remind you. You know that you said
the strigil, they took a bath, and afterwards anointed themselves, espe
cially about their joints,with some perfumed oil. Thus the skin was cleans.
ed, the blood put into circulation, and the joints made supple and pliant.
S. The practice has been introduced from the East into England, under
the name of “shampooing.” Stalbaum refers to Persius v. 136, “I, puer,
et strigiles Crispini ad balnea defer;” and says that Boeckh, in his Domest.
CEconom. Athen. ii. p. 330, explains arXeyyig by “a comb.”
272 HIPPIAS MINOR,
Achilles was a man of truth, but Ulysses a man of falsehood,
and versatile.
Hip. I did so.
Soc. But you now perceive, that the man of truth and the
man of falsehood have been proved to be the same person; so
that, if Ulysses is a man of falsehood, he becomes no less a
man of truth: and if Achilles is a man of truth, he (be-
comes) likewise a man of falsehood; and the men do not
differ from, nor are they opposite to, each other, but are
similar.
Hip. You are always, Socrates, weaving some discourses of
this kind, and, cutting off that portion of the argument which
is the most difficult, you lay hold of it in the way of some-
thing minute;” but you do not grapple with the question as a
whole, respecting which the debate happens to be. For even
now, if you wished it, I could show from many proofs in a
satisfactory speech, that Homer has represented Achilles as a
man of greater bravery than Ulysses, and free from falsehood,
but the latter as crafty, and frequently false, and worse than
Achilles. And do you, if you will, place (your) reasonings op-
posite (to mine), (to prove) the other is the better man; and
(thus) the persons here will the better know, which of us
is the better speaker.
[12.] Soc. I have no doubt, Hippias, of your being cleverer
than myself. But I am ever accustomed, when any one says
any thing, to give my attention—especially when the speaker
seems to be a clever person—as being desirous of learning what
he is speaking about, and ask him questions, and I think over
the question again, and I put together what has been said, in
order that I may understand it. But if the speaker appears
to me to be a person of no mark, I neither ask him any ques-
tions, nor give myself any thought about what he has been talk-
ing. Now by this you may know what persons I consider to
be clever. For you will find me solicitous about what has
been said by such “a person, and making inquiries of him,
in order that I may be benefited by learning. Since even
1* The same complaint is made by the Sophist in Hipp. Maj. p. 301, A.
§ 48, and p. 304, A. § 55.
14 Instead of rotºrov Ficinus has “illorum,” as if he had found in his
M.S. rotºrwy. Sydenham prefers rototyrov—
HIPPIAS MINOR. 273
A
now I have been thinking, while you were speaking, that, in
the verses, which you just now recited to show that Achilles
was speaking, as if he were a cheat, to Ulysses, something
appeared to me to be strange; if, what you assert, is the truth,
that the versatile Ulysses no where appears to be a man of
falsehood, while Achilles appears to be versatile according to
your expression; at least he tells a falsehood. For Achilles hav-
ing spoken those very words, which you have just now recited,
Hateful to me, as are the gates of hell,
Is he, who one thing in his bosom hiding,
Another says—
he states shortly afterwards, that he would not be dissuaded
(from his purpose) by either Ulysses or Agamemnon; nor
would he stay at all in the Trojan land; but he says,
To-morrow, after paying holy rites
To Zeus and all the gods, I will my ships
Load well, and drag them to the deep; and then
Thou’lt see, if such thy wish, and such thy care,
At dawn of day my vessels sailing o'er
The Hellespont fish-feeding, and my sailors
Eager to ply the oar; and should the voyage
Prosperous the god, for shaking earth renowned,
Grant, fertile Phthia reach I the third day.
and still before this he says, while abusi' g Agamemnon, (in
Il. i. 169,)
But now I’ll go to Phthia; since ’tis far
Better to homeward wend with ships, * whose sterns
Are rounded; * nor, myself dishonour’d thus,
Think I, that here thou’lt yearly riches gain.
Now though he had said this at one time in the face of the
whole army, and at another to his friends, he no where appears
to have made any preparations, or even an attempt, towards
dragging down his vessels to the sea, as being about to sail
homeward, but very "nobly deemed it a little thing to tell the
truth.* I therefore, Hippias, proposed at the beginning the
question, as I was in doubt which of these two had been repre-
*—” Such is the conventional version of vnvoi kopoviot. But as ko-
pøvn is a kind of an aquatic bird, it seems more natural to understand by
wavori kopoviou, “ships” shaped like a sea-fowl.
*—” Perhaps Horace had in mind this passage of Plato, when he
wrote his “Splendide mendax.”
T
274. EIIPPIAS MINOR.
sented by the poet as the better man; and deeming both to be
very good, it was difficult to decide which was the better, as
regards falsehood and truth, and every other virtue; for in that
point likewise both seemed to be nearly on a par.
[13.] Hip. You do not consider the matter, Socrates, cor-
rectly. For, though Achilles tells a falsehood, he appears to
do so not with any fixed design, but against his inclination;
as he was compelled, by the distresses of the army, to remain
and give his assistance. But what Ulysses says falsely, is
willingly and with a design.
Soc. My dearest Hippias, you are deceiving me, and are
yourself imitating Ulysses. -
Hip. By no means, Socrates. But what are you saying,
and for what purpose ? -
Soc. Because you assert that Achilles told a falsehood no
designedly—he, who was such a juggler, and in addition to his
vain-boasting, a plotter, as Homer has represented, that he ap-
pears to have a higher notion of himself than of Ulysses to
such an extent, with regard to lying hid from him while
vain-boasting, as to dare in his presence to contradict himself.
And lie hid he did from Ulysses. At least Ulysses does not
appear to have said any thing to him, as (not)" perceiving that
Achilles had said what was false.
Hip. What is this that you are speaking of, Socrates?
Soc. Know you not that, on saying afterwards” to Ulysses,
that he would set sail in the morning, he says to Ajax, on the
other hand, no such thing, but tells him a quite different story.
Hip. Where?
Soc. Where he says, (Il. ix. 646,)
For of the blood-stain’d war I’ll take no thought,
*Till god-like Hector, thoughtful Priam’s son,
Shall reach of Myrmidons the tents and ships,
And, Argives slaying, set the fleet on fire.
But round my tent and dark ship Hector coming,
And eager for the fight, I guess, will stop.
17 Ficinus has “utpote qui mendacium non advertit,” what the sense
evidently requires. Stephens therefore proposed to insert pur) after &c,
which both Sydenham and Beck have adopted.
* The common reading was $o repow j dig, out of which as Ficinus
could make nothing, he omitted the words iſorspov 7–while Stephens
thought there was something wanting here. Bekker has edited from the
Amajority of MSS. §o repôv trac— - -
HIPPIAS MINOR, 275
[14.] Now do you imagine, Hippias, that the son of Thetis
and the pupil of the most clever Chiron was so forgetful, as
that, after previously abusing with the extreme of abuse those,
who speak what they do not mean, he would immediately say
to Ulysses that he would sail away, and then to Ajax, that he
would remain, and this too without a fixed design, or holding
Ulysses to be a simpleton,” and that he should get the better
of him by this very trickery and speaking falsely 2
Hip. It does not, Socrates, seem so at least to me. But
being dissuaded on these points by his own easy temper, he
spoke to Ajax in a different manner to what he had done to
Ulysses. But Ulysses, whenever he speaks truth, speaks always
with a fixed design, and so too, when he speaks a falsehood.
Soc. Ulysses then is a better man, it seems, than Achilles.
Hip. Surely, Socrates, the least of all.
Soc. Why, were not they, who speak false willingly, proved
to be better” than those (who do so) unwillingly P
Hip. But how, Socrates, can they, who do an injury will-
ingly, and plot against a person willingly, and do mischief, be
better men than those, who do so unwillingly ; to the latter of
whom it seems that pardon is greatly due, should any one uncon-
sciously do an injury, or tell a falsehood, or do any other wrong.
And even the laws are surely more severe against those, whº
do evil and tell falsehoods wilfully, than against those, who
act so unwillingly.
[15.] Soc. You see, Hippias, that I spoke the truth in saying.
how pressing I am in regard to putting questions to the clever.
And yet I run the risk of possessing this solitary good, the
rest that I possess being trifling. For in what manner things
are, I am at fault; nor do I know where they are. And of
this there is evidence sufficient for myself. For whenever I
* The Greek ápxaiog is used similarly in Euthyd. p. 295, C., and
Aristoph. Plut. 323.
* This is another instance, similar to the one noticed by Aristotle, of
an argument founded on the ambiguity of an expression. For the truth
of the position contended for, has indeed been proved; but Plato applies
it in this place to morals, of which it has not been proved, but the
direct contrary insinuated. S. We may quote in illustration of the
ambiguity of the word “good,” the passage in Shakspeare’s Merchant
of Venice, where on Shylock saying that “Antonio is a good man,” Bas-
sanio asks, “Have you heard any imputation to the contrary 2” to which
the Jew replies, “No, no ; my meaning, in saying that he is a good man,
is to have you understand me that h; is sufficient.”
T
276 HIPPIAS MINOR.
am in the company of any of you in high repute for your
cleverness, and for whom all the Greeks are witnesses of your
wisdom, I appear as one knowing nothing; for scarcely on a
single point, so to speak, am I of the same opinion with you.
And what greater proof can there be of a man's want of in-
struction, than when he differs from men of wisdom 2 Yet I
have this one wonderful good, which is my preservation; for I
am not ashamed to learn; but I make inquiries, and ask ques-
tions, and am very thankful to the person, who gives me an
answer; nor do I ever deprive any one of the thanks (I owe).
For I never deny that I have learnt a thing, by pretending that
what I have learnt was a discovery of my own; but I pass
encomium upon the person, who has taught me, as being a
clever man, by showing forth what I learnt from him. And
now I do not agree with what you assert, but differ very
greatly. And this, I know well, takes place through myself;
because I am such as I am, that I may not speak too highly
of myself. To me, Hippias, everything appears the contrary
to what you say. They then who hurt (other) persons, and
do an injury, and speak falsehoods, and deceive, and commit a
fault willingly, (appear to me)” to be better men than those,
(who act so) unwillingly. Sometimes, however, I am of a
contrary opinion; and my mind wanders on these points, evi-
dently through my knowing nothing. But at present there
has come around me, as it were, the periodical return of my
disorder; and they, who commit an error willingly, seem to
me to be better than those, who commit it unwillingly. And
for this my present state of mind I blame the previous dis-
cussion as the cause ; so that for the present it appears that
they, who do each of these things unwillingly, are more .
wicked than those who do them willingly. Do then indulge
me, nor grudge to heal the disorder of my mind. For you
will do me a much greater good by causing my mind to cease
from its ignorance, than my body from disease.” If how-
ever you wish to speak a lengthened speech, I tell you before-
hand, that you will effect no cure; for I cannot follow you.
* Stalbaum says that Öokoúat is to be supplied here from the preceding
§oksi, referring very appositely to Apolog. p. 25, B.
* So Macbeth, in Shakspeare, after inquiring of the Doctor, whether
he cannot minister to a mind diseased, and hearing that therein the patient
must minister to himself, rejoins, “Throw physic to the dogs; I’ll none
of it.”
HIPPIAS MINOR. 277
But if you are willing, as lately, to answer my questions, you
will benefit greatly myself; nor do I think you will receive
any harm. Justly then do I call upon you, Son of Apeman-
tus; for you have urged me to converse with Hippias; and
now if Hippias is unwilling to give an answer, do you inter-
cede with him in my behalf.
Eud. There will be, I think, Socrates, no need for my
intercession with Hippias. For nothing of such a kind has
been previously stated by him; but rather that he never shrunk
from the question of any man. Is it not so, Hippias 2 Was
not this what you said P
Hip. I did say so, Eudicus. But Socrates is always
making a confusion in the arguments; and he is like to a
person who is doing wrong. -
[16.] Soc. My very good Hippias, I do it not willingly—for
I should then be a clever and terrible fellow according to
your account—but unwillingly, so that do you pardon me; for
pardon, you say, is due to him who does wrong unwillingly. .
Eud. Nay, Hippias, do not act otherwise; but for the sake
of me, and of your own words previously, spoken, give an an-
swer to whatever Socrates shall ask.
Hip. Well, at your entreaty, I will give an answer. Ask,
then, what you like.
[16.] Soc. Truly, Hippias, I am very desirous to consider
thoroughly what has been just now mentioned—Which are
the better men, they, who err willingly or unwillingly. Now
to this inquiry I think we shall arrive by the most direct
road thus—and do you give an answer. Do you speak of
a runner as being good?” w - -
Hip. I do.
Soc. And (of one as being) bad?
Hip. Yes.
Soc. Is not he, who runs well, good P and bad he, who runs
badly? - - - -
Hip. Yes. .
* In the instances selected by Plato, the four first relate to the acts
that depend upon the structure of the body, such as running, wrestling,
dancing, and singing. To perform these exercises properly, there are re-
quisite agility, strength, gracefulness, and a musical voice; all of which
arise respectively from the elasticity of the fibres, the firmness in the fabric
of the bones, the pliantness in the joints, and the expansion and contraction
of the lungs and larynx, S.
278 HIPPIAS MINOR.
Soc. Does not he, who runs slow, run badly? but well he
who (runs) quick?
Hip. Yes.
Soc. In a race then, and in running, Swiftness is a good
thing; slowness a bad thing.
Hip. What else should it be 2
Soc. Which then is the better runner? he who willingly
runs slow, or unwillingly P
Hip. He (who runs so) willingly.
Soc. Is not to run to do something 2
Hip. It is to do (something).
Soc. And, if to do, is it not to perform some act 2
Hip. Yes. -
Soc. He then, who runs ill, performs in a race an act bad
[and unseemly].” -
Hip. Yes, bad; for how not?
Soc. Now he who runs badly, runs, you say, slowly.
Hip. Yes.
Soc. The good runner then performs willingly this bad act,
[and the unseemly]:* but the bad runner (does so) unwillingly.
Hip. It seems so.
Soc. In a race then, he who performs bad actions unwill-
ingly, is worse than he (who does so) willingly.
Hip. Yes, in a race.
Soc. And how is it in wrestling 2 Which is the better
wrestler? he who falls willingly, or unwillingly
Hip. Probably he who falls willingly.
Soc. Now in wrestling, is it worse and more unseemly to
fall, or to throw down? -
Hip. To fall. -
Soc. In wrestling then likewise, he who performs willingly
bad and unseemly acts, is a better wrestler than he who (does
so) unwillingly -
Hip. It is probable.
Soc. What then is the case in all the other uses of the body?
Is not he, who is (stronger and)” better in his body, able to
** The words within brackets are shown by the answer of Hippias
to be an interpolation; and the same observation applies, for the same
reason, to kai ré aioxpóv, just afterwards. They owe their origin to
aloxtov, a little below. - -
* From the words of Ficinus, “Nonne qui corpore robustior atque
HIPPIAS MINOR. 279
perform acts both strong or weak, and unseemly and beau-
tiful? So that when one performs acts, which as regards the
body are bad, he, who is better in body, performs them will-
ingly, but he, who is worse, unwillingly
Hip. It is probably so as regards at least the strength of
the body.
Soc. And what as regards a good conformation of the body,
Hippias 2 Does it not belong to the better body, to perform
willingly gestures unseemly, and bad; but to the worse,
(to do so) unwillingly or how does it seem to you?
Hip. In this way.
Soc. A bad conformation then, when voluntary, is on the
side of virtue; when involuntary, on that of vice.
Hip. So it seems.
Soc. And what say you as to the voice? Which do you say
is the better? that which sings out of tune willingly, or un-
willingly 2
Hip. That which does so unwillingly.
Soc. And (you say) the more wretched voice is that, which
.(sings out of tune) unwillingly.
Hip. Yes.
Soc. Would you choose to possess things” that are good or
bad 2
Hip. Those that are good.
Soc. Would you then choose to have your feet lame will-
ingly, or unwillingly
Hip. Willingly.
Soc. Is not lameness in the feet a depravity and a bad
conformation ?
aption est,” Heusde saw acutely that his MS. read, what the train of
thought requires,-oix à toxvpórspoc kai 38Ariov ré orópia—
* Plato's five next instances are taken from those parts of the body
which are the immediate servants of the mind: 1. The outward instru-
ments of motion, such as the feet, by which the will of the mind is exe-
cuted ; 2. The outward organs of sensation, through which the mind
perceives outward things; 3. That immediate source of motion and
sensation, the brain; to which Plato applies the metaphor of a rudder,
that steers the body as the mind pleases; 4. Those inward instruments
of motion and sensations, the nerves; which he compares to the strings
of musical instruments, braced up or let down by the passions of the soul,
and vibrating as they are touched by sensations from without or from
within ; and lastly, the organs of speech, signified by musical wind-instru-
ments, through which the mind expresses what is passing within itself. S.
280 HIY-FIAS MINOR,
Hip. Yes.
Soc. And is not indistinct vision a depravity in the eyes?
Hip. It is.
Soc. Which sort of eyes now would you choose to possess?
and with which to live? Those, with which a person willingly
sees indistinctly or squints, or unwillingly 7
Hip. Those with which (he does so) willingly.
Soc. Of the things, then, which are your own, you deem
those, that perform depraved actions willingly, better than
those, that (do so) unwillingly.
Hip. In things of such kind I do.
Soc. One reasoning then embraces all such things, as the
ears, and nose, and mouth, and all the senses, namely, that
those, which perform what is bad unwillingly, ought not to
be possessed, as being bad, but that those, which (do so)
willingly, ought to be possessed, as being good.
Hip. So it seems to me.
Soc. What then as regards instruments, with which is it
better to be familiar P those, with which a man performs badly
willingly, or those, with which he (performs so) unwillingly. Is
a rudder, for example, the better, with which a person shall
unwillingly steer badly, or that, with which (he shall do so)
willingly P
Hip. That, with which (he shall do so) willingly.
Soc. Is it not so with the bow and lyre, and hautboy, and
the rest of instruments 2
Hip. You say the truth.
[17.] Soc. What then,” is it better to have a horse of such
a spirit as that one may unwillingly ride him badly, or (such
as one may ride him so) willingly
Hip. Such (as one may ride him so) willingly.
Soc. Such a spirit then is the better.
Hip. Yes.
Soc. With the better spirit of the horse a man would per-
* From the just frame of the body, Plato proceeds to describe the
other parts of sing via, “a good natural disposition,” which he holds to
be the necessary foundation of virtue. He begins accordingly with the
passions, which, in the Platonic system, were $7.00puía, “ desire,” and Sv.
Pºg, “anger.” The first of these kinds is under the emblem of a horse,
and the latter under that of a dog: for although both these animals are
irrational, they are still manageable by and serviceable to man, when
their powers and feelings are regulated by his reason. S.
HIPPIAS MINOR. 281
form the mischievous acts belonging to such a spirit willingly,
but unwillingly (the similar acts belonging to the worse).
Hip. Certainly.
Soc. And is it not so with respect to a dog? and all other
animals?
Hip. Yes.
Soc. What then, as regards the talent of an archer ? Is it
better to possess that, which misses the mark willingly, or
that, which (does so) unwillingly
Hip. That, which (does so) willingly.
Soc. Such a talent then is the better for the archer's art?
Hip. Yes. *
Soc. And the talent then, which errs unwillingly, is worse
than that, which (does so) willingly.
Hip. Yes, in the case of the archer's art.
Soc. And how is it in the medical art? Is not the talent, which
causes willingly mischiefs to bodies more like the medical art?
Hip. Yes.
Soc. Such a talent then, in such an art, is better than that,
which is not *[like the medical art].”
Hip. It is better.
Soc. And how in the case of the talent devoted to playing
on the harp and hautboy, and all the other things relating to
arts and sciences? Is not that the better talent, which willingly
performs what is bad and disgraceful and commits errors,
while the worse (does so) unwillingly P
Hip. It appears so.
Soc. And moreover we should certainly choose to have the
possession of slaves with such talents, as would commit faults
willingly, rather than such (as would do so) unwillingly, as
(the former) is better for these things.”
Hip. Certainly.
Soc. What then, would we not desire to have our own
soul the best possible 2
Hip. Certainly.
Soc. Will it then not be better, if it did evil willingly, than
if it did so unwillingly P
28–29 The words within brackets Schleiermacher was the first to re-
•ect as an interpolation. For he saw they were omitted in the version of
Ficinus—“peritiorest quam illa, quae per ignorantiam peccat.”
* Ficinus has—“ad hac opera meliores,” which would lead to eig rà
ipya, i.e. “for their works.”
282 HIPPIAS MINOR,
, Hip. It would be a terrible thing, Socrates, if they, who
do an injury willingly, were better than those, who (do so."
unwillingly.
Soc. And yet from what has been said it appears so.
| Hip. But not so to myself at least.
[18.] Soc. To you, I thought, it had appeared so. An-
swer me then again—Is not honesty either a kind of power,
or knowledge, or both 2 Is it not necessary that honesty
should be one of these ?
Hip. It is.
Soc. If honesty then be a kind of power in the mind, the
more powerful the mind the more honest it is. For, my very
good man, the mind of such a kind, has surely been shown to
be the better.
Hip. It did so appear.
Soc. What then if it is knowledge? Is not the wiser mind
the more honest, but the less instructed the more dishonest ?
Hip. Yes.”
Soc. What if it is both 2 Is not the mind, which possesses
both knowledge and power, the more honest ; but the more
uninstructed (and powerless)* the more dishonest ? Is it
not necessary for such to be the case?
Hip. So it appears.
Soc. Was not the mind of greater power and wisdom shown
to be the better, and more able to perform both beautiful and
disgraceful doings, relating to every kind of action ?
Hip. Yes.
Soc. When therefore it performs the disgraceful, it does so
willingly, through its power, and its knowledge. Now these,
either both or either, appear to belong to honesty.
Hip. Probably.
Soc. Now, to do injustice is to do ill; but not to do in-
justice (is to do) well.
Hip. Certainly.
Soc. The mind then which is the more powerful and better,
* This answer of Hippias, first restored by Heusde from the version
of Ficinus, has been subsequently found in two MSS. from a correction.
* To preserve the balance of the sentences, Sydenham proposed to in-
sert kai &övvararápa after # 88 &pagearápa, but Heusde, kai 300ev
egrépa–and while Stalbaum would read # 63 uſ, instead of # 38 duaffeo-
répa, Beck considered the words i ö, äua6sorápa as interpolated from
what had gone before.
HIPPIAS MINOR. 283
when it does injustice does it willingly; but the worse
(does so) unwillingly.
Hip. So it seems.
Soc. Is not he, who possesses a good mind, a good man;
and he (who possesses) a bad one, a bad man?
Hip. Certainly.
Soc. It belongs then to the good man, to do injustice will-
ingly, but to the bad man, unwillingly; since the good man
possesses a good mind.
Hip. This moreover is so.
Soc. The man therefore who errs, and does things dis-
graceful and dishonest, willingly, if there be such a man, Hip-
pias, can be no other than the good man.
Hip. I know not, Socrates, how to agree with you in this.
Soc. Nor I with myself, Hippias. It must however of
necessity appear so to us at present, from the course of the
reasoning. But, as I said before, upon these points, I wander
up and down, nor do things ever appear to me in the same
light. Now that myself or any other unskilled individual
should be wandering thus, is not at all to be wondered at.
But if you, the wise, wander also, this will be to us a dread-
ful thing indeed; since we shall never cease from our wan-
derings, not even by coming to you.
INTRODUCTION TO THE ION,
IN placing the Ion next to the Hippias Minor I have followed
the example of Stalbaum, who doubtless perceived a marked simi-
arity in the two dialogues. For while in the one the pretensions
of Hippias are exposed, after he had made a display of his talents
as a lecturer upon Homer, in the other the scarcely less clever Ion
of Ephesus is similarly treated, previous to the exhibition he was
about to make as a Rhapsodist at the approaching Panathenaia
festival at Athens, after he had recently gained at Epidaurus the
first prize of victory in a similar professional contest.
As regards the object of the dialogue, it may be briefly stated that
it is intended to prove, that as a poet is born and not made, so is a
poet's interpreter—for partly such was the Rhapsodist of old—and
that all which art can do is to slightly improve the talents, given by
what Plato calls “a divine allotment.”
With respect to the conflicting opinions, promulgated by differ."
ent scholars of Germany touching the matter, manner, and genuine-
ness of the dialogue, Stalbaum refers to Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher,
Nitzsch, and Wiegand. Of these it seems that Schleiermacher
considers it a kind of supplement to the Phaedrus, and that only a
portion of it was really written by Plato; while Ast rejects the
whole as a spurious production—an opinion which not one of the
other critics appears disposed to adopt. For as Xenophon testifies
that Socrates considered the Rhapsodists to be the silliest of men,
It was surely very natural for Plato to feel a desire to embody the
ideas of his master in a dialogue; where, while every honour is paid
286 INTRODUCTION TO THE ION.
to Homer, none is given to those, who presumed in the case of the
“tale divine of Troy,” and its sequel the wanderings of Ulysses,
“To scent the lily, and to paint the rose.”
As Stalbaum laments that it has not been his good fortune to ob-
tain a sight of Sydenham's translation reprinted by Taylor, which
Müller has praised so highly, and of the notes, which the same
editor has frequently put into Latin, I have introduced in an
abridged form some of the latter; and should have occasionally
adopted a portion of the former, had it been as literal as is re-
quired by the nature of this work; and a similar observation is
applicable to the translation by Shelley, published in his Post-
humous Essays, Letters, Translations, &c. Lond. 1840. There is
likewise a French translation of the Ion by L’Abbé Arnaud in
Mémoires de L' Academie des Inscriptions, t. xxxix. p. 249–278,
which Stalbaum says he never saw ; and he therefore did not know
that the French translator has proposed to supply what he considers
to be a lacuna in § 4, by reading, Oikoúv Štreiðdv Ad3g rig kai (iXXnv
réxvnv jvruvotiv 8Xmv, 6 airóg rpótrog rig o'cèilswg trepi čksivng réxvng £ort
sai wept åragöv rejv rexvöv, in lieu of rig oxépewc tari Tspi &ragºv—
I O N.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,
SOCRATES AND ION.
SOCRATES.
[1..] HAIL" to thee, Ion; from whence have you come to
sojourn with us” for the present? Is it from your home at
Ephesus?
Ion. By no means, Socrates, but from Epidaurus, from the
feast of Æsculapius.”
Soc. Do the Epidaurians too” ordain a contest of rhapso-
dists,” in honour of the god?
Ion. They do; and other kinds of the muse's art likewise.
* In Greek Xatpew was used both by persons meeting or leaving each
other. The latter more commonly; but the former is found in Theocrit
Id. xiv. 1, quoted by Nitzsch.
* Stalbaum says that ſpiv is here, as elsewhere in Plato, a form of fa-
miliar address.
* AEsculapius, the god of physic, was the tutelary deity of Epidaurus,
now called “Epidavra.”
* This is said because the most celebrated contests of the Rhapsodists
took place at Athens during the Panatherlaic festival.
* The rhapsodists were a kind of itinerant minstrels, similar to the
Troubadours of the middle ages; who strung together and sung portions
chiefly of the Homeric poems. They wore a particular dress of scarlet or
purple—the latter to represent the colour of the sea, the former of blood–
while they were chanting portions of the Odyssey and Iliad respectively;
and when they had a contest, the victor gained a lamb as the prize; as
we learn from Eustathius, IA. A. According to Xenophon in M. S. iv. 2,
Socrates said they knew Homer indeed accurately enough, but were in
other respects great simpletons; and so after him does Maximus Tyr. in
Dissertat. xxiii.
288 .# ION.
Soc. *What then 2 did you contend ?
Ion. I do not deny it.
Soc. And how did you contend ?6
Ion. We carried off, Socrates, the first of the prizes.
Soc. You say well, come then, in order that we two may
win at the Panathenaea."
Ion. And this will be if a god is willing.
Soc. Often have I indeed, Ion, been envious of the art of
you rhapsodists. For that both your body" is decorated (so
as) to be always becoming to your art, and to appear the most
beautiful,” and at the same time that it is necessary for you to
be conversant with many other excellent poets, and especially
Homer, the best and most divine of all, and to learn tho-
roughly his meaning, not his words merely, is indeed a thing
to be envied. For a man would never be a (good)" rhapso-
dist, unless he understood what was said by the poet; for
a rhapsodist ought to be an interpreter to the audience of the
meaning of the poet; but this it is impossible to do well,
without knowing what the poet means. Now worthy is all
this to be envied.
*—" The Greek is Tí ošv hyovíčov ru muiv; kai Tràg ri yovíow. But
one MS. has rí oëv hyovićwy ré tu muiv. But as ºptiv is perfectly unin-
telligible, I have translated as if the Greek were Ti oiv; jºyovićov ru;
05 ru &vaivopua. Kai Trög ori Y’ vovíow ; Stalbaum too conceives there
is some deep-seated disorder here, and proposes therefore to omit ru myw-
víow : while Ficinus felt himself no less at a loss, as shown by his version,
“Soc. Contende ergo nobiscum. Ion. Quamobrem tecum contendam?
Primus, O Socrates, promiis potiti sumus.” Shelley has, “Soc. And in
which did you contend ? And what was the success of your efforts?”
7 This was an annual festival kept at Athens in honour of Athéné.
In every fifth year it was celebrated with more than ordinary pomp ; and
was then called the Great Panathenaea, to distinguish it from those held
in the intermediate periods, termed the Less. It was just previous to
the greater festival, probably, that Ion came to Athens. For says Lycur-
gus in his speech against Leocrates, c. xxvi, p. 223, ed. Taylor, (= 209, R.)
“Your ancestors conceived Homer to be so useful a poet as to make a
law, that in every fifth year of the Panathenaea his poems alone should
be recited by the rhapsodists:” and a similar account is given in the dia-
logue called Hipparchus, transcribed almost verbatim by Ælian in W. H.
viii. 2. S
* After kskoopijcóat it is evident that §ore has dropt out.
* In lieu of ka)\\toroug, which is without regimen, one MS. has ka?\io-
Oty
rouc, which leads directly to káAAwarov—
” Sydenham had inserted “good,” confirmed subsequently by a MS.
at Venice.
ION. 289.
Ion. You say, Socrates, what is true. At least this very por-
tion of my art has given me the greatest trouble. I fancy how-
ever I can speak most beautifully about Homer, so that neither
Metrodorus" of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus” of Thasus,
nor Glauco,” nor any one else of those who have ever existed,
had it in their power to express so many and such beautiful
sentiments as I can do, relating to Homer.
Soc. You speak beautifully, Ion. For it is evident that
you will not grudge me an exhibition (of your talent).
Ion. Indeed, Socrates, it is well worth your hearing how
well I have set off Homer; so that, I conceive, I am worthy
to be crowned by the Homeridae|4 with a golden crown.
[2.] Soc. I will make for myself still a leisure time to hear
you. But for the present, answer me thus much. Are you
skilled on the subject of Homer alone, or of Hesiod and Archi-
lochus likewise?
, Ion. By no means; on the subject of Homer alone. This
seems to be enough for me.
Soc. But there is that, about which Homer and Hesiod say
the same things.
Ion. There are, I think, many such.
Soc. Respecting these, can you better explain what Homer
says than what Hesiod does?.
* We are told by Diogenes Laert. ii. 3, that Metrodorus wrote a trea-
tise on the physiology of Homer, where, as it would seem from Tatian in
Aöy. Tooc"EXAmy he explained Homer's theology from the various oper-
ations and phaenomena of nature ; and thus gave a rational account of
the poet’s mythology, in lieu of the literal sense, in which it was received
by the vulgar. 'Nº. - -
* Stesimbrotus is mentioned with honour by Socrates himself in Xeno-
phon’s Symposium, as a master in explaining Homer; and his abilities
are contrasted with the ignorance of the rhapsodists. According to Plu-
tarch, he was exactly of the same-age with Cimon. S.
* Although a Glauco of Tarsus is mentioned by an old Greek scholiast
upon Homer in the Medicean library, quoted by Holsten. de Vitā et
Scriptis Porphyrii, c. vii., yet, as he seems to have been a grammarian of
a much later age, we are inclined to read TAańkoç. For Glaucus of
Rhegium flourished about this time, and wrote a treatise IIepi IIowntºv,
as we are informed by Plutarch, t. ii. p. 833, C., or IT spi rāv ćpxaiwu º
Troumråv re kai provouköv, as stated in t. ii. 1132, E. So Sydenham. .
Nitzch however refers to Aristotle Poet. § 25, where mention is made
of one Glaucon.
* By the Homeridae are meant here, as in Phaedr. p. 252, B., and
Rep. x. p. 599, F., quoted by Müller, the admirers of Homer, as Syden-. .
lam had translated. - **
U
290 ION.
Ion. Equally, Socrates, respecting those, where they say
the same.
Soc. But how, where they do not say the same 2 For in-
stance, Homer and Hesiod say something about the pro-
phetic art.
Ion. Certainly.
Soc. Well then, whatever those two poets say about the
prophetic art, either agreeing or disagreeing, could you ex-
plain better, or one of the clever prophets?
Ion. One of the prophets.
Soc. But if you were a prophet, would you not know, if
you were able to give an explanation where they agree, to
explain likewise where they disagree?
Ion. It is evident I should.
Soc. How then are you skilled as regards Homer, but not
as regards Hesiod, or any other of the poets? Does Homer
speak of other things than what other poets have, taken all
together ? Has he not gone through the greater part of sub-
jects relating to war, and to the intercourse with each other
of men, good and bad, and unskilful and practised in arts,
and relating to the gods, as having an intercourse, such as they
have, with one another and with human beings; and to such
as relate to celestial events and those in Hades, and the birth
of gods and heroes. Are not these the subjects, relating to
which Homer has composed his poetry
Ion. You say, Socrates, what is true.
Soc. Well then, and do not the rest of the poets (write)
about these very things?
Ion. They do, Socrates; but they have not composed their
poetry as Homer has his.
Soc. What then, in a worse way?
Ion. Very much so.
Soc. But Homer in a better 2
Ion. Better indeed, by Zeus.
[3.] Soc. Now, thou dear head,” Ion, when many persons
are speaking about numbers, and one of them speaks the best,
assuredly some person will know who speaks correctly.
lon. I admit it.
* On this Platonic formula, imitated from the Homeric Tsūkps, pi\n
espiºn, Stalbaum refers to Phaedr. p. 264, B., Gorg. p. 513, C., and
Euthyd. p. 293, E.
ION, 29 |
Soc. Will it be the same as he, who (knows) likewise
those speaking incorrectly, or some one else?
Ion. The same person, certainly.
Soc. And is it not he, who knows the science of arith-
metic P
Ion. Yes.
Soc. What then, when many persons are speaking about
wholesome food, of what kinds they are, and one speaks the
best, will one person know that he, who speaks the best, does
speak the best, and another (know) that he, (who speaks)
worse, (does speak) worse, or will the same person (know
both)?
Ion. The same person, clearly.
Soc. Who is he? What is his name 2
Ion. Physician.
Soc. Let us say then universally, that, when many are
speaking upon the same subject, the same person will always
know who speaks correctly and who incorrectly. For” if
a person shall not know the party speaking incorrectly, it is
evident that he will not (know) the party speaking correctly,
at least upon the same subject. -
Jon. Just so.
Soc. The same person then will be skilled respecting both.
^ Ion. Yes.
Soc. Did not you say that Homer, and the rest of the poets,
amongst whom there are both Hesiod and Archilochus, write
about the same things, though not in the same manner 2 but
that the one does so well, the others worse 2
Ion. And I said what is true. -
Soc. If then you know the party who speaks well, you will
know those likewise, who speak worse, that they do speak
worse 2 -
Ion. It is probable.
Soc. In saying then, thou best of men, that Ion is clever
on the subject of Homer and all the other poets, we shall
not err; since he acknowledges himself that the same person
is a competent judge of all such as speak upon the same sub-
jects, and that nearly all poets take the same subjects for their
poetry.
* So Sydenham, as if he wished to read rat Yêp in lieu of i-Ficinus
has & & et—” 2
U
292 ION.
Ion. What can be then the reason, Socrates, that whenever
any one is discoursing upon any other poet, I pay no attention,
and am unable to contribute any thing whatever (to the dis-
cussion) worth mentioning, and really begin to nod; but when
any one brings Homer to my recollection, I am immediately
awake, and give my mind to the subject, and am at no loss
what to say.
Soc. It is not difficult, my friend, to guess the reason of
this. For it is clear to every one that you are unable to
speak" about Homer by art or science. For if you were able
by art, you would be able to speak about all the other poets;
for the whole is surely poetry. Or is it not ?
Ion. It is.
[4.] Soc. When a man shall have laid hold of any other art
whatever as a whole," is there not the same method of view-
ing it (as) all the arts? Why I say this, do you, Ion, request
to hear from me?
Ion. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, I do ; for I delight to hear
you wise men. -
Soc. I would wish; Ion, that you were saying what is true;
but you surely are the wise men, you the rhapsodists and per-
formers,” and those whose poems you recite; whereas I speak
nothing but the simple truth,” as becomes a mere unskilled
person. Since the question, which I just now asked you, see
17 After ÖAmv, Ficinus seems to have found something supplied in his
MS., wanting in all the rest, to answer to his version—“aeque de omni-
nibus, quae sub arte sunt, judicat.” Sydenham, however, conceived they
were inserted by Ficinus himself, to preserve the justness of the reason-
ing, and he therefore proposed to read trepi & révrww rov rex wooivov.
For the question is not about arts, but artists. Shelley’s version is, “The
same mode of consideration must be admitted with respect to all arts, which
are severally one and entire,” omitting the clause at the commencement.
* Plato here, and in Rep. ii. p. 373, B., and iii. p. 295, A., joins the
rhapsodists with performers, as cognate artists. For according to Eusta-
thius, p. 5, 18, Bas., the rhapsodists used frequently to recite in a somewhat
dramatic manner. Hence in the Dionysia, or dramatic entertainments, the
rhapsodists had anciently a share; and one of the festival days was called
£opri) rāv Āail, pööv, as we learn from Athenaeus, v. p. 275. Hesychius
therefore well explains jail, pöoi, “rhapsodists,” by iTokpurai étröv, “act-
ors of epic poems.” S.
* Stalbaum says, that in lieu of Tä &\m.0ij, one would have expected
a word in Greek to answer to the Latin “vulgaria,” and “omnibus nota.”
Perhaps he would have preferred rà éví0m, similar to timóec Aéret, 6
toūto Aéyav, in Phaedon, p. 87, C.
ION. 293
how trifling it is, and suited to an unskilled person, and for
every man to know, namely, that, which I spoke of as pre-
senting the same view, when a person lays hold of the whole
of any art. ”Let us then lay hold in our discourse of paint-
ing; for” it is an art (whole in itself), is it not ?
Ion. Yes.
and bad?
Ion. Very many.
Soc. Now then, did you ever see any person who, as re-
gards Polygnotus,” the son of Aglaophon, is skilled in show-
ing what he paints well and what ill, but is unable to do so as
regards other painters? and whenever any exhibits the works
of those other painters, grows drowsy, and is at a loss, and has
not what to contribute to (the conversation); but when it is
necessary to declare his judgment about Polygnotus, or any
other painter you please, immediately wakes up and gives al
attention, and is at no loss what to say? -
Ion. Not at all, by Zeus.
Soc. Well then, in the statuary's art, did you ever see any
one who, as regards Daedalus,” the son of Metion, or Epeius,
the son to Panopeus, or Theodorus the Samian, or any other
single statuary, was skilled in explaining what each had ex-
ecuted well, but as regards the other statuaries, was at a loss,
grew drowsy, as having nothing to say?
Ion. No, by Zeus, I never knew such a person as this.
Soc. Nor, as I think, in the case of playing on the hautboy
*—” I have adopted Stalbaum's version of A&6wplow ydip rº, Xóyºp,
words that had given no little trouble to previous translators and editors,
and which Shelley entirely omits. To complete, however, the sense, it was
requisite to suppose that the author wrote 38—ypapukňv' fi Yáp, not ydp—
Ypapukň Y&p—
* This artist was, in the days of Socrates, called the Homer of painters.
He was the first to express the manners and passions by attitudes, and
| change of countenance, and to give a flattering likeness; and, amongst
other improvements, invented the method of showing the skin through
transparent drapery. See Aristotle, Polit. viii. 5, and Poet. ii. and vi.,
Pliny’s Nat. Hist. xxxv. 9, and AElian's War. Hist. iv. 3. S.
* Plato has purposely chosen three statuaries, famous in three differ-
ent styles of art, when he is proving the sameness of the principle in
passing judgment upon different poets. For Daedalus was celebrated for
is self-moving statues, mentioned in the Meno, p. 97, D. § 39; Epeius,
for the Trojan horse of a stupendous size; and Theodorus, for the minute-
ess of his works. See Pliny’s Nat. Hist. xxxiv. 8. S. -
Soc. Are there not, and have been, many painters good
2.




294 - ion.
or harp, and in singing to the harp, and in the recitations of
the rhapsodists, you never saw a man who, as regards Olym-
pus,” or Thamyris, or Orpheus, or Phemius the rhapsodist of
Ithaca,” is a skilful interpreter, but as regards Ion the Ephe-
sian, is at a loss and unable to give an opinion whether Ion
does well or not as a rhapsodist. -
Ion. I have nothing to say against you upon that point,
Socrates, but of this I am conscious to myself, that as regards
Homer I speak the best of all men, and am least at a loss, and
every body else says that I do speak well, but not, as regards
the rest. Consider then why is this.
[5.] Soc. I do consider, Ion, and I commence showing you
how this seems to me. This faculty of speaking well about |
Homer is not an art, as I said just now, but a divine power,
which moves you, like that in the stone, which Euripides”
calls the Magnesian, but the common people Heraclean.
For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but imparts a §.
to the rings, so that they are able to do the very same things
as the stone does, and to attract other rings, and sometimes a
very long series of iron rings,” hung (as in a chain),” one
*—* These four persons severally excelled in the four arts just before
mentioned. According to Plutarch and Maximus Tyr. Diss. xxiv.,
Olympus played on the ai)\óg, Thamyris on the kuéâpa, as stated by Hom.
Il. ii. 600, but without the accompaniment of his voice, as we learn from
Pliny; Orpheus was kièappèëc, playing and singing together; while
Phemius recited poems of the epic kind, touching his lyre at the same
time, as appears from Hom. Od. i. 153. S.
* The passage of Euripides has been preserved by Photius and Suidas
in Hpak\stav Aibov, both of whom probably derived their information
from the lost Scholia on this passage. It is a fragment of the OEneus—
rāg 3porów I'vºpag akotröv–óars Mayvijric Atôog Tºv 66%av Aksu kai
pué0íormow tróAuv–where Sydenham would supply 36” before &ors, but
Stalbaum 6c—According to Aristotle IIepi Yvyng i. 2, Thales was the
first to apply the attractive property of the magnet in the way of a philo-
sophical illustration; while a poetical account of the manner, in whic
five rings hang together, is given by Lucretius, vi. 910, who, says Ges
ner on the “Magnes” of Claudian, merely followed Plato. -
* Sydenham has thus adopted “ferreorum annulorum ” in Serranus'
version. For neither of them could understand otömpiou kai Öakrv\iwy
Nor could Shelley, who has, “a long chain of rings and other iron sub
stances.” But the whole question is about iron rings alone.
* Sydenham seems to have added this, with the view of showing tha
the iron rings were not united in the inside, as rings generally are, bu
merely touched each other on the outside, as appears partly from Lu
cretius–" Unus (annulus)"ubi ex uno dependet subter adhaerens; ” bu
\
ION. 295
from another; but from that stone depends the power in all
of them. Thus too does the Muse herself move men divinely
inspired, and through them thus inspired, a chain hangs to-
gether of others inspired divinely likewise. For all the good
epic poets compose all their beautiful poems, not by art,” but
by \being divinely inspired and possessed (by the Muse);
nd so too the good lyric poets, just as the Corybantes”
dance, not being in their sound senses,” compose their
beautiful lyrical poems, when they are not in their sound
senses; but when they go on according to the harmony and
rhythm, they become mad, possessed (by a god), as are the
priestesses of Bacchus, (who,) possessed by a god, draw
from rivers honey and milk; * but are unable to do so, when in
their senses ; and the soul of the lyric poets does that, which
they say they do. For assuredly they say to us, " that
(drawing) from fountains flowing with honey, and gather-
more fully from S. Augustine De Civit. Dei xx. 4, quoted by Kirchmann
De Annulis, C. 15, p. 97, as remarked by Müller. The words of the
Latin father are too remarkable to be omitted here. “Magnetem lapi-
dem novimus mirabilem ferri esse raptorem. Quod cum primum widi,
vehementer inhorrui. Quippe cernebam a lapide ferreum annulum raptum
atque suspensum; deinde cum tamguam ferro, quod rapuerat, vim dedis-
set suam communemgue fecisset, idem annulus admotus est alteri, eumque
suspendit atque, ut ille prior lapidi, sic alter annulus priori annulo cohae-
rebat. Accessit eodem modo tertius; accessit et quartus. Jamgue sibi
per mutua connexis circulis non implicatorum intrinsecus sed extrinsecus
adhaerentium quasi catena pependerat annulorum.”
* Plato however, in the Phaedrus, does not exclude art entirely, but
considers it only as the handmaid of inspiration. S.
* On the followers of Demeter, called Corybantes, and their doings, see
the authors quoted by Ruhnken on Timaeus, p. 163, and the commen-
tators on Crito, $ 17.
* After 6pxoiſvrat follow oira kai oi pusXotrotot, words evidently inter-
olated.
p * According to Euripides the honey and milk were obtained from the
ground and trees, not from streams. But Sydenham aptly refers to Aris;
tides, T. ii. p. 20, Jebb, who quotes a passage from AEschines, a disciple of
Socrates, so as to lead to the belief that this dialogue was written by that
philosopher. The words are, “The Bacchantes, when they become irº
spired, draw honey and milk from wells, out of which the rest of per
are not even able to draw water.”
*—” The Greek is diró komVijv pusXippūrov čk Movodiv khtra v ruv
rai vatrújv Ópetrópºsuot rā ué\m ºptiv pépovov, Šotrep ai pāXitrat. Fi
cinus has more fully, “a fontibus, quibus mel scaturit, haurientes, et a
Musarum viridariis collibusque decerpentes carmina, ad nos transferunt,
quemadmodum mel ex floribus apes,” as if he had found in his MS., áiré
spnvöv pusXippūrwv dpvrépus wou kai ék—ópetrópºevot àv0m, rà usAm—




296 TON.
ing (flowers) from the gardens and glades of the Muses, they
bring us their songs, as bees do (their honey),” and are ever *
too on the wing. And they tell us too what is true. For a
poet is a thing light,” and with wings, and sacred,” and un-
able to compose poetry until he becomes inspired,” and is out
of his sober senses, and his imagination is no longer under his
control. For so long as a person is in complete possession oºd
it, he is unable to compose verses or to speak oracularly.
Hence as they compose not by art,” they say many beauti-
ful things relating to their subjects, as you do about Homer;
but each is able to compose that alone through a divine
allotment, to which the Muse has impelled them, one to dithyr-
ambics,” another to panegyrics,” another to hyporchemata,”
another to epic verse, and another to iambic; but in the other
kinds each makes no figure; for they do not compose by art,
but through a divine power; since if they knew how to speak
by art upon one subject correctly, they would (be able to do so)
upon all others. And on this account a deity has deprived
them of their senses, and employs them as his ministers, and
oracle-singers, and divine prophets, in order that when we
!
&oºrsp puéAt ai puéAttraw, and so I have translated. Sydenham was the
first to see that puśM had dropt out here, quoting very opportunely from
Horace—“Ego, apis Matinae More modoque, Grata carpentis thyma per
laborem Plurimum, circa nemus uvidique Tiburis ripas operosa parvus
Carmina fingo.” With regard to the comparison between flowers and
songs, it is sufficient to refer to Valckenaer on Eurip. Hippol. 73.
* Instead of oijra, the author wrote, I suspect, dei Trots— -
* On the use of xpijaa the commentators refer to Aristoph. Lys. 678,
Theocrit. Id. xv. 83, and Valckenaer on Phoen. 206. º
* Why bees were considered sacred is shown by Virgil in G. iv. 150;
while poets were held so, as being under the protection of Apollo.
* Cicero de Oratore ii. 46, Saepe audiwi poetam bonum neminem, id
quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt, sine inflam-
matione animorum existere posse.” º -
* A similar doctrine is promulgated, in Apolog. p. 22, C. where poets are
mentioned as here with oracle-singers. For it seems that at different
oracular shrines poets were kept to put the answers of the prophetic
eity into verse, as we learn from Strabo, p. 642, A. -
#7 The author probably alludes to the lost dithyrambs of Pindar.
* Of the nature of the panegyrics a faint idea may be formed from
e lifeless hymns of Callimachus, whom Ovid has so happily described.
"by his “Quamvis ingenio non valet, arte valet.” .
* The hyporchemata were poems composed to accompany a dance un
connected with the drama. The great writer of them was Pratinas, a
fragment of whose poetry has been preserved by Athenaeus, xv. p. 617,





:ON. 297
near them, we may know it is not they to whom sense is not
present, who speak what is valuable, but the god himself who
speaks, and through them addresses us.” And of this asser-
tion Tynnichus * the Chalcidian affords the greatest proof;
who never composed any other poem, which any one would
think worth remembering, but the Paean, which every body
sings, of almost all hymns the most excellent, and as he him-
self states,
“An invention of artless Muses.”
For in him most especially does the god seem to me to point
out to us, that we are not to doubt about those beautiful poems
being not human but divine, and the work not of men but of
gods; and that poets are nothing else but interpreters of the
gods,” possessed by whatever deity they may happen to be.
And in pointing out this, the deity has through a poet the
most indifferent sung a melody the most beautiful. Or do I
not seem to you, Ion, to say what is true F
Ion. To me at least you do. For you somehow, Socrates,
touch my very soul by your arguments; and the good poets
seem to me, by a divine allotment, to be in this way to us the
interpreters of the gods.
[6] Soc. Now do not you rhapsodists interpret, on the
other hand, the writings of the poets? -
Ion. And this too you truly assert.
Soc. Do you not then become the interpreters of inter-
preters? -
Ion. By all means. e
Soc. Mind now, Ion, and tell me this ; and do not conceal
40 So Cicero de Divinat. i., “Deus inclusus corpore humano jam, non
Cassandra, loquitur.” S.
* Of this Tynnichus no mention has been found except in a fragment
of Ptolomaeus Hephæstion, preserved by Photius in Biblioth. p. 485,
and in an anecdote related by Porphyr. ITspi AtroXijg i. 18, where Æs-
chylus is reported as bearing testimony to his excellence as an old writer
of Paeans, a kind of hymn in honour of Apollo. MUELLER.
** The Greek is dréxvog sipmud, tu plovačv. But it is evident, that
Plato, in citing this verse, means by dréxvøg, “artlessly,” or, as Cornarius
renders it in Latin, “sine arte:” so Sydenham; who should have suggested
&réxvov, as I have translated. The verse is an Anapaestic Paroemiac.
Stalbaum refers to Fritzche in Quaest. Lucian. p. 128, where passages are
quoted not in point.
* So Orpheus is called “sacer, interpresque deorum,” by Horace,
Art. Poet. 391. S. - **
298 Ion
whatever I shall ask about. Whenever you are spouting well
any verses, and astonishing your audience the most, or when
you are reciting how Ulysses,” leaping on the threshold (of
his house), appeared manifest to the suitors, and poured out .
his arrows before their feet; or how Achilles rushed against
Hector; or tell any of the tales of pity relating to Andro-
mache, or Hecuba, or Priam ; at such times are you quite in
your senses, or beside yourself?” and does not your soul
fancy itself carried away in a state of ecstasy by the deeds you
are telling, whether they occur at Ithaca or Troy, * or how-
ever else the verses may be.”
Ion. How clear a proof have you, Socrates, produced For
so I will say, concealing nothing. For when I am reciting
any tale of pity, my eyes are filled with tears; * but when any
thing of horror, my hairs stand erect through fear, and my
heart leaps.” º
Soc. What shall we say then, Ion P that the man is in his
sound senses, when, decked in a many-tissued garb, and with
a crown of gold, he bursts into tears at festivals and feasts,
without having lost any of those (ornaments)? or feels a fear
when he is standing in the midst of twenty thousand men, all
friendly to him, and no one is stripping him or doing him an
injury Ż -
Ion. He is not, by Zeus, to confess the truth, Socrates.
[7.] Soc. Know you that you (rhapsodists) produce this
very same effect upon the majority of your spectators.
Ion. I know it very well. For I am constantly looking
down from my standing-place above upon those, who are
weeping, or looking fiercely,” or astonished, in unison with
* The passages alluded to are Od. xxii. 2; Il. xxii. 311, and 405,
and 437.
* So Cicero says of Æsop the actor, in Divinat. i. 37, “Vidi—in AEsopo
tantum ardorem vultuum atque motuum, ut eum vis quaedam abstraxisse
a sensu mentis videretur.” S.
*—” The Greek is # 37twg &v kai ră ărm éxy. But Ficinus has “seu
quocunque alio carmina rapiant te,” translated by Shelley, “ or wher-
ever else the poem transports you.” Ficinus, no doubt, found in his MS.
# 6trot o' àv rá širm āyg.
*—” Stalbaum quotes Sympos. p. 215, E. § 39, j kapóta Trnēš kai čá-
kova #vyčirat, and refers to Abresch on Aristaenet. ii. 5, Boissonad. On
Eunap. p. 257, and Jacobs on Achill. Tat. p. 833.
* This is the literal meaning of Östvöv. But why the audience
should look so, I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, Sydenham, or
ION, | 299
what is narrated. For indeed I must pay a great attention to
them, in order that, if I set them weeping, I may laugh on re-
ceiving their money; but if laughing, that I may weep my-
self on losing their cash. /
Soc. Know you not, then, that this spectator (of yours)” is
the last of the rings, which, I said, receive their power from
one another by means of the Heraclean stone 2, The middle
ring are you the rhapsodist and the actor; but the first ring
is the poet himself. By means of all these does the god draw,
wherever it pleases him, the souls of men, "having suspended
from each other the power.” And, as if from that stone, there
is suspended a very numerous series of chorus-singers and
dancers, and under-masters,” hang the rings' depending from
the Muse, hanging sideways.” But from one Muse one of
the poets hangs; another from another. **And this we call
by the expression “he is possessed;” for the (meaning) is very
}
similar; since he is held fast.” From these first rings some
Shelley, who have translated respectively—“graviter,” and, “as if horror
seized them,” and, “with eyes fixed earnestly on me.”
* So Sydenham, as if he wished to read Ó oog inskead of of roc.
*—” Such is the literal version of the Greek, &vaxpspavvæg #8 &XXà-
Awy rºw 55 yapuv. The sense requires, “having imparted the power of
hanging from each other.” . -
* The hindmost rows of the chorus sang an under part, and had pecu-
liar masters of their own to teach it them, called under-masters. S. Fi-
cinus has “discipuli.” But intročičágka)\og is a word acknowledged by
J. Pollux, iv. 106. !
* Why the rings should be said to hang sideways, I confess I cannot
understand. Ficinus seems to have found in his M.S. some words properly
transposed; for his version is, “series longa dependiet, quae latere gradatim
nectuntur hi, qui in choro Saltant, et praeceptores atque discipuli; hujus-
que catenae a Musa annuli suspenduntur.” But there too “a latere” is
equally unintelligible. .
*—" “The Greek is Óvopudićopsy & abró karéxerat” rô 6á čort trapa-
arMortov: #xera, yap : which is itself unintelligible, and is thus unintel-
ligibly rendered by Ficinus; “Vocamus autem 'id nos occupari, (altered
by Grynaeus into “mente capi,’) quod quidem ille proximum est: tene-
tur enim : ” and by Cornarius thus; “Hoc vero ‘corripitur’ nominamus,
quod consimile est: haret enim *—whom Bembo follows, omitting how-
ever Éxeral yáp. The passage will become quite clear by reading 6vonóżo-
psy 38 airò caréxerat, rö 6á šart, Trapazrāhotovºxerat: or, what is prefer-
able, by reading &vopláčoplew 68 airó karézéraft rô 6é šort, trapat)\hotov
#xsrat #xeral yáp. The omission of a word, where it is thus repeated,
is a common fault in manuscripts. So Sydénham ; whom Müller felt
half disposed to follow. Stalbaum thus translates the passage (in Eng-
lish)—“We call this caréxera, which comes near to that, which we said,

300 t ..ION.
of the poets hang, some from one, and others from others, and be-
come inspired by them ; some, for instance, Orpheus, others by
Musaeus; but the majority "are inspired by Homer, and held
fast by him.” Of this number, Ion, you are one, and are pos-
sessed by Homer. Hence when any one sings the verses of any
other poet, you fall asleep, and are at a loss what to say: but
when any one recites a strain of that poet, you wake up im-
mediately, and your soul dances (with joy),” and you are at no
loss what to say; for you say, what you say, about Homer, not
from art or science, but from a divine allotment, and through be-
ing possessed. (For)" the Corybantes have an acute perception
of such music Cºnly, as belongs to the god by whom they are pos-
sessed, and are not wanting either in gestures or words, adapted
to that melody, but care not for any other music. So you,
Ion, when any pne makes mention of Homer, are not at a loss,
but are at a loss (when mention is made) of other poets. And
this is the reason of that, about which you were asking, why
as regards Homér you are not at a loss, but are so as regards
other poets; because you are not by art, but by a divine allot-
ment, a skilful panegyrist of Homer. -
Ion. You say well, Socrates. I should, however, wonder if
you can speak so well as to convince me that I panegyrize
Homer through heing possessed and mad. NNor, as I fancy,
should I appear so to you, if you were to hear—me speaking
about Homer. *
[8.] Soc. And willing I am indeed to hear you; but not
before you shall have answered me this. On which of the sub-
jects about which Homer speaks, do you speak well? For sure-
ly it is not about all.
Ion. Be assured, Socrates, there is nothing but what (I
speak well about). --
Soc. Surely you'do not (speak) about those, of which you
happen to know nothing, but which Homer mentions.
Ion. And what are those, which Homer mentions, but
which I do not know?
3.
that he was suspended from a god, for he is held by him, if he karéxera, ’’
—and wonders that sº and Müller should have laboured so hard
in explaining the passage.
*—” From this passage; it is evident why caréxeral and #xerat are said
just before to be very similar in meaning. -
* In AEsch. Cho. 156, the expression is 6pxeiral pó94.
* Ficinus has “et—” but yāp has probably dropt out after &o rep-
YON. 30 A
Soc. Does not Homer speak much and often of arts; for
instance, the art of chariot-driving? If I can remember the
verses, I will repeat them to you.
Ion. I will recite them ; for I remember them. ;:
Soc. Recite me then what Nestor says to his son Antilo-
chus, when advising him to be careful respecting the turning
in the chariot-race, run in honour of Patroclus.
Ion. His words are these (in Il. xxiii. 335–340):
Thyself upon the polish’d chariot bend
To the left gently; but the right-hand horse
With goad and voice urge on, and somewhat yield,
Holding the reins; but let the left-hand steed
Come near the turn-post grazing, which almost
Of wheel well-made, let the nut seem to doubt
If it reach not ; but stone to touch avoid.
Soc. It is enough. Now whether Homer does or does not,
Ion, correctly express himself in these words, who would
know the better, a physician or a charioteer? *
Ion. A charioteer, undoubtedly.
Soc. Whether because he possesses that art, or for some
other reason 2 -
Ion. For no other than that (he possesses) the art. -
Soc. Has not to each of the arts this been granted by the
deity, to be able to know a work? for what we know by the
pilot's art, we shall not know by the physician's.
Ion. Certainly not.
Soc. Nor what (we know) by the physician's art, (shall we
know) by the builder's art.
Ion. Certainly not. *.
Soc. Is it not thus then as regards all the arts, that what
we know by one art, we shall not know by another ? But
answer me this previous to that. Do not you admit that there
is one art of one kind, and another art of another kind?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. Do not you make use of the same proof as I do, that
when there is a science, one of some things, and another of
other things, I call one by one name, and the other by ano-
ther; and do not you (call them) so?'
Ion. Yes.
Soc. For surely 57 if of the same things there were some
science,” why should we call one by one name, and another
*—” Thus I cannot understand.
302 ION
by another, when it would be possible to know the same
things from both 2 as, for instance, I know that these fingers
are five in number; and you know it, respecting them, the
same as I do. Now were I to ask you, whether it was by the
same art of arithmetic that both you and I know the same
things, or by another art, you would surely say, by the same
art.
Ion. Yes.
[9.] Soc. The question then, which I was lately about to
ask you, answer me now. Whether does it seem so to you,
as regards all the arts, in this way, that it is necessary for the
same art to know the things; and for a different art (to know)
not the same things? but whether, if (the art) be different, it
is necessary for it to know different things?
Ion. It seems to me, Socrates, in this way.
Soc. He therefore, who has not any art, will not be able to
know what is said or done well, relating to that art.
Ion. You speak the truth.
Soc. As regards the verses, then, which you repeated, will
you, or a charioteer, better know whether Homer says well or
not ?
Ion. A charioteer.
Soc. For you are a rhapsodist, but not a charioteer.
Ion. Yes.
Soc. Now the art of a rhapsodist is different from that of a
charioteer.
Ion. Yes.
Soc. If the science be different, it is conversant likewise
about different things.
Ion. Yes.
Soc. Well then, when Homer relates how Hecamede, the
concubine of Nestor, gave to Machaon, when he was wounded,
a potion to drink,” he says, composed
* Of Pramnian wine; and into it she grates,
With brazen grater, cheese from goat's milk made,
And for the potion onion as a relish; *
to know thoroughly and well whether Homer says this cor-
* After trivstv 6tówort the words kai Xéyst ırwg oirwg, which could not
bº inserted between ärav Aéyg and pmoiv, Ficinus has properly omitted
*—" In this quotation from Home. the author has brought together some
verses separated from each other by an interval of nine lines. See Il. xi.
630 and 639. To the same passage Plato refers in Rep. iii. p. 406, A.
ION. tº 303
rectly or not, does it belong to the physician's, or the rhapso-
dist’s art 2
Ion. To the physician's.
Soc. Well then, where Homer (in Il. xxiv. 80) says,
She to the bottom went, just like the lead,
Which near the horn of bull, in meadows living,
(Is placed upon the line,) and rushes eager,
To fish, on raw flesh feeding, bringing fate—"
shall we say that it belongs to the fisher's rather than to the
rhapsodist’s art, to decide on what he says, and whether cor-
rectly or not ?
Ion. It is evident, Socrates, to the fisher's art. |
[10.] Soc. Consider now, "you asking, if you asked me,"
Since then, Socrates, you discover what it is fitting for each of
these arts to decide upon in Homer, come, find me out, what as
relating to the business of a prophet and the prophet's art,
are the things which it is fitting for him to be able to know
thoroughly, whether the poet has done well or ill—consider
how easily and truly I could reply. For Homer, in the
Odyssey, speaks frequently on the subject. For instance,
where Theoclymenus the prophet, one of the race of Melam-
pus,” says to the suitors—
* Why by doom fated suffer ye this ill 2
Involved in the gloom of night are faces, heads,
And nether limbs; and * burns the loud lament”
Fiercely, and cheeks with many tears are wet.
Of ghosts the porch is full, and full the hall,
To Erebus in darkness rushing; and the sun
From heaven is lost, and luckless mists come on.*
* I have adopted kijpa, found in Homer, in lieu of its interpretation
ºriua, read here in all the MSS. but one. On the other hand, Éppishavia
here is far more elegant than épôsſłavia, read in the common text; which
has arisen merely from the perpetual confusion of w (ſ3) and u.
61–6. Such is the literal version of the Greek—oroń śpopuévov, si èpotó
pus, where si épouo is evidently the interpretation of goû popévov. Ficinus
has—“Si practerea me interrogares,” as if his MS. omitted ooij Špopuévov. ...
62 See Od. xv. 225. . ...!?.
63–64 On the mixed metaphor in oiuwyſ 6:6ms see my note on AEsch.
Prom. And to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more.
The most apposite is “clamore incendunt coelum ” in Virgil.
64–6. See Od. xx. 351–357, where however between the 4th and
5th verse is another, omitted here—“And walls and handsome rooms e-
smeared with blood.”
304 ION.
And often too in the Iliad, for example in the fight neaz
the mound-wall (of the Greeks). For there too he says (Il.
xii. 200–207):
To them, while eager to pass on, an eagle,
High-flying bird, appear'd upon the left, -
And the army check’d. For in its claws it bore
A Snake, of size enormous, with blood stain’d,
Alive, and gasping, but of fight not yet
Regardless. For on twisting round, it bit
The breast of the bird, that held it, near the neck;
Who, smarting with the pain, let go its hold,
And sent it to the ground; and midst the throng
It fell; and the bird with the wind screaming flew."
These passages, and others of the same kind, shall I say, it
belongs to the prophet to consider, and to judge of 2
Ion. Yes, if you say what is true, Socrates.
Soc. And you too, Ion, speak the truth, in this. Come then,
and, as I have selected for you from the Odyssey, and the
Iliad, such passages as belong to the prophet, and the physi-
cian, and the fisherman, so do you select for me, since you
are better versed in Homer than I am, such passages, Ion, as
belong to the rhapsodist, and to the rhapsodist’s art; which it
is fitting for the rhapsodist to consider and judge of, (better
than) other men.
Ion. "I say, Socrates, all things.”
Soc. You did not, Ion, say all. Or are you so forgetful ?
And yet it ill becomes a man, who is a rhapsodist, to be for-
getful.
Ion. Of what then am I forgetful? -
Soc. Do you not remember, you said that the rhapsodist’s
art is different from that of the charioteer 2
Ion. I do remember it. t
Soc. And did not you confess too, that, being different, it
would know things different -
Ion. Yes, I did.
* I have adopted Trétero, found in one MS., in lieu of Étrero.—For a
bird does not follow the wind, but flies with it; and especially when
wounded ; for it is then unable to make use of any muscular exertion,
nor is it necessary when it is flying with the wind.
*—” This I cannot understand, nor could Müller; unless Ion meant to
generalize the assertion, which Socrates had confined to the art of the
rhapsodist alone.
ION. 305
T11.] Soc. According to your own account then, the rhap-
sodist’s art will not know all things, nor even the rhapsodist
himself.
Ion. Except, perhaps, Socrates, things of such a kind.
Soc. By things of such a kind you mean such as belong
nearly to all the other arts. Now what will (the rhapsodist)
know, if (he knows) not all things.
Ion. He knows, I presume, what is proper for a man to
speak, and what for a woman; and what for a slave, and what
for a freeman ; and what for him, who is commanded, and for
him, who commands.
Soc. Do you mean that the rhapsodist will know better
than the steersman, what it is proper for the commander of a
ship, tost in a storm at Sea, to say?
Ion. No. This at least the steersman (will know) better.”
Soc. But what it is proper for a person governing a sick
person to say, will the rhapsodist know better than the phy-
sician P
Ion. Not in this case.
Soc. But what is it proper for a slave, you say.
Ion. Yes.
Soc. For example, do you assert that, what it is fitting for
a slave, who tends cattle, to say, when pacifying * cows that
are in a savage state, the rhapsodist will know, but not the
herdsman P -
Ion. Not I indeed.
Soc. But what it is proper for a woman engaged in wool-
work to say about working in wool P
Ion. No.
ſoc. But he will know what it is proper for an army-leader
to say, when exhorting the soldiers?
Ion. Yes. For such things the rhapsodist will know.
Soc. What then, is the rhapsodist’s art that of an army-
leader P - -
Ion. I should know * what it is fitting for an army-leader
to Say.
* The Greek is Oik’ &XAá 6–But one M.S. has 05' káXXtov Š--Ficinus,
“Non; sed gubernator melius hoc percipiet,” whom I have followed.
* Nitzsch aptly refers to Politic. p. 268, A. § 11.
* Instead of yuoimv yotiv ćp'—Sydenham suggested, Yvoimv yotiv čv,
and so Bekker from MSS. Ficinus has “Intelligerem equidem, si opus
edget.”
X
306 ION.
Soc. Because you have, perhaps, the art of a general, Ion.
For if you happened to be skilled in horsemanship and in
harp-playing at the same time, you would have known those,
who manage 79 horses well and ill. Now if I had asked you—
By which of those arts, Ion, do you know those who manage
horses well ? Is it by that through which you are a horseman,
or by that through which you are a harpist P what answer
would you make me?
Ion. I should (answer), By that through which I am a
horseman. -
Soc. If then you knew thoroughly those who play well the
harp, would you not confess that you knew them by that art,
through which you are a harpist, but not through that, by
which you are a horseman 2
Ion. Yes.
Soc. Since then you know the things relating to armies,”
do you know them by the art, through which you are a
general, or by that, through which you are an excellent rhap-
Sodist Ž
Ion. There seems to me no difference.
Soc. How say you that there is no difference P Say you
that the art of the rhapsodist and of the general is one P. Or
are they two P
Jon. They seem to me at least to be one.
Soc. *Whoever then is a good rhapsodist, he happens to
be likewise a good general.” *
Ion. By all means, Socrates.
Soc. And whoever happens to be a good general, is a good
rhapsodist too.
Ion. This, I think, on the other hand does not seem to
be true.
7" As itſ Trážsorbat is a verb deponent, it is evident that roºg has dropt
out after it trovg, similar to rotic sū it trażopévovg it trowg, in the very next
Senterice.
* Instead of orpartwrikā, Ficinus evidently found in his MS. grgarm-
Yuká, as shown by his version, “qua ad imperatorem spectant,” adopted
by Sydenham.
”—7” Such is the literal version of the Greek. But Sydenham has
what is preferable—“Whoever then happens to be a good rhapsodist, the
same must be also a good general ”—where “must be” has been obtained
from “erit,” in Ficinus. Sydenham's tacit alteration is supported by
the next remark of Socrates.
ION, 307
Soc. But the other does seem so, 78 [that whoever is a
good rhapsodist is also a good general.] 7°
Jon. Certainly.
Soc. Now are not you a rhapsodist, the best of the Greeks
Ion. Very much, Socrates. *
Soc. And are you also, Ion, a general, the best of all
Greeks 2
Ion. Be well assured, Socrates (of this); for I have learnt”
that too from Homer.
[12.] Soc. Why then by the gods, Ion, do you, since you
are amongst the Greeks the best, both as a general and a
rhapsodist, go about acting the part of a rhapsodist before the
Greeks, and not of a general. Does there seem to you a great
need of a rhapsodist, crowned with a golden crown, but none
of a general P
Ion. Yes. For our city, Socrates, is governed, and our forceſ,
commanded by your people, and there is no need of a general.
But your city, or that of the Lacedæmonians, would not choose
me for a general; for ye (both) conceive yourselves to be
competent for that.
Soc. Know you not, Ion, O best of men, Apollodorus of
Cyzicum?
Ion. Who is he ſº
Soc. He whom the Athenians have often selected as their
general, although a foreigner, and Phanosthenes too” of An-
dros, and Heraclides 7° of Clazomenae, whom this state, although
they are foreigners, appoints to the command of armies and
other offices in the government, through their having shown
themselves men worthy of notice.” And will she not choose
, *-* The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of
8K81.2/0,
74 So Sydenham from Ficinus, “hac enim in Homeri scriptis didici ?
who doubtless found in his MS. śpabov in lieu of pla801, . which may,
however, be united to si in the question of Socrates.
* As this Phanosthenes was sent against his countrymen to Andros
by the Athenians, according to Xenophon in H. Gr. i. 5, 18, about Ol.
93. 2, Ast conceives that this dialogue was written shortly after that
event.
7* Both Heraclides and Apollodorus are mentioned by Ælian in War.
Hist. xiv. 5, who however drew all his information from this passage, as
remarked by Perizonius.
” This praise Athenaeus, in xi. p. 506, A., considers to be ironical,
and hence he infers that Plato was *; content to speak ill of poets alone,
X
308 ION,
Ion of Ephesus as her general, honour him should he seem
worthy of notice? What, are not you Ephesians Athenians
of old 278 and is not Ephesus a city inferior to none P But as to
yourself, Ion, if indeed you say truly, that you are able by art
and science to praise Homer, you are doing wrong in that,
after professing that you know many fine things, relating to
Homer, and saying that you would make a display, you are
cheating me, and want much from making it; so that, al-
though I have been for a long time earnestly making the re-
quest, you are unwilling to mention those things, in which you
are so skilled; but you really become, like Proteus, of many
forms,” turning yourself topsy turvy, until at last you escape
me, and start up a general, in order that you may not show
how great you are in the wisdom relating to Homer. If then
you really are an artist, such as I just now spoke of, and after
promising to make a display relating to Homer, you deceive
me, you are an unjust man; but if you are not an artist, but
are, by a divine allotment, inspired by Homer, and although
you know nothing, are saying many fine things about the
poet, as I have stated respecting you, you are doing no wrong.
Choose then, whether you wish to be deemed by us a man
unjust, or divine, *- -
Ion. Great is the difference, Socrates; for it is much better
to be deemed divine. - - - -
Soc. Now this better thing, Ion, is in your power (to ob-
tain) at our hands, to be diviné, and a praiser of Homer, but
not from art. - - -
but of the Athenian people for the conduct they adopted to the persons
here mentioned. - -
* Ephesus was colonized by some Athenian emigrants under the
command of a son of Codrus. See Ruhnken on Welleius Paterc. i. 4.
* On the changes of form, which Proteus could assume, it will be suf-
ficient to refer to Hom. Od. iv. 455, Virgil, G. iv., and the commentators on
Plato, Euthyph. p. 15, D., &gtrepò IIpwretc.—orpspópevog áva kai cáre
INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ALCIBIADES,
SINGULAR, says Stalbaum, has been the fate of the dialogue that
passes under the name of the First Alcibiades. For after it had been
held in the highest honour by a long line of admirers, amongst the
Neo-Platonists of the olden time, attempts have been made during
the last half-century by Schleiermacher and Ast to displace it from
its former pedestal. So many and such gross faults, relating to the
matter and manner, say those two scholars, are to be found in the
dialogue, as to lead to the conclusion of its being quite unworthy
of its reputed author. On the other hand, Socher and Stalbaum
are of opinion that not a single substantial reason can be assigned
for doubting its genuineness; and with the latter I confess I am dis-
posed to agree; and shall continue to do so, until some definite
rules are laid down to enable us to assert that the men, who passed
their whole lives in the study of the philosophers of antiquity,
were cheated by a shadow, and unable, like the people of Cuma, in
the AEsopo-Socratic fable, to discover the long ears of an asinine
imitator, peeping out of the lion's hide of the original genius.
Be however the author who he may, the dialogue itself is well
worth the perusal of those, who, like Alcibiades, pride themselves
on the union of natural and artificial advantages; and of others too,
under less favourable circumstances, who fancy themselves fit to
appear in public life, and competent to direct the affairs of a state,
without having previously undergone that mental training, which
alone enables a person to govern first himself, and then his fellow-
men. And happy would it have been for his native Athens, and
indeed for the whole of Greece, and other countries, had Alcibiades
310 INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ALCIBIADES,
been as ready to practise the precepts of philosophy, as he was to
listen to them. For we learn from Xenophon, that, so long as he
was a follower of Socrates, his conduct was as praiseworthy, as it
was the reverse when, after leaving the pacific ocean of philosophy,
he embarked on the stormy sea of politics, in which he eventually
lost his character, his fortune, and nis life.
TER
FIRST AL CIBIADES.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.
SOCRATES.
[1..] You feel some wonder, I think, son of Clinias, that I,
who was the first of your admirers, am now, when all the
rest have ceased to be so, the only one who has not with-
drawn himself; and that, while the others were plaguing you
with their conversation, I did for so many years never
speak a word to you. For this behaviour of mine the reason
is to be found not in any obstacle arising from man, but from a
daemon, of whose power you shall hear hereafter. But as it no
longer offers any opposition, I have come to you now ; and I
am in good hopes that for the future likewise it will be no im-
pediment. By reflecting, however, during the interval, Inearly
thoroughly understand whatis your position with respect to your
admirers. For though they were many, and men who thought
highly of themselves, yet there is not one, who has not gone away .
from you, through their being surpassed by you in self-conceit.' .
Now the reason for your thinking so highly of yourself I am .
desirous of detailing. You assert then, that you are in nothing
inferior to any man. For what is your own, beginning from
the body and ending in the mind, is so great, as to stand in need
of nothing. [2] In the first place, you fancy yourself to be
According to Plutarch, the strongest of the passions in Alcibiades,
although all were strong, was a love of pre-eminence in every thing
AE'ian too, War. Hist. iv. 16, represents him in a similar light. S.
312 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
very handsome,” and of a great size. And in this it is evident
to every one, who can see, that you are not mistaken. In the
next place, you are of a family the most youth-like” in your own
city, which is the greatest of any in Greece; and that you have
friends here, and relations on your father's side, very numer-
ous and very powerful, ready, if need be, to assist you; and
those too on your mother's side are neither inferior nor fewer.
But greater than all I have mentioned taken together, is the
influence you possess through Pericles, the son of Xanthip-
pus, whom your father left as guardian to yourself and brother;
(that Pericles) who is able to do what he pleases, not only in
this city, but through all Greece, and with many and mighty
clans of Barbarians. And I will add too, that you are one of
the wealthy; although, on this point, you seem to me to value
yourself the least. Boasting yourself then highly on all these
advantages, you have acted the lord over your admirers ;
and they, feeling their inferiority, have become your slaves.
And of this you are very sensible; and hence I know full well,
that you feel a wonder at what I have in my thoughts, in that
I do not withdraw myself, and what is the hope I entertain
in remaining, when all the rest have gone away.
[3.] Alc. Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that you
have anticipated me a little. For I really had it in my mind
to come to you previously, and to ask you these very ques-
tions—What can you possibly mean, and looking to what hope
are you plaguing me, and, wherever I am, are perpetually
present yourself? For I do in truth wonder what your bu-
siness can be with me; and I should very gladly hear.
Soc. You will hear me then, as is likely, very readily, if, as
you say, you are really desirous of knowing what I have in
my thoughts. I speak then as to one “who will hear, and
stay.”
* That Alcibiades, says Proclus, was of large size and of great beauty
is evident from his being called the general object of love in the whole of
Greece; and from the saying of Antisthenes, that, if Achilles were not
such as Alcibiades is, he was not in reality beautiful; and from the fact
of Hermae being modelled after him. T.
* By vsavukwrárov Stalbaum understands “the most brave,” or “most
manly.” Ficinus has “nobilissimo”—what the sense requires. Plato
wrote, I suspect, psyak\ssorárov—in allusion to Megaclees, whose daugh-
ter, Deinomache, was the mother of Alcibiades. -
*—* Ficinus has avoided the $orspov trgötepov by translating, as
Plato probably wrote, “expectanti et auscultaturo.”
TIRST ALCIBIADES. 313
Ale. Entirely so. Speak then.
Soc. But mark, for it will be a thing not of wonder, if, as
I begin with difficulty, I should with difficulty likewise make
an end.
Alc. Speak, my good man, for I will listen.
Soc. Speak then I must ; and though it is a hard task for
an admirer to address himself to him, who is not inferior to his
admirers, yet I must dare to speak my mind. [4.] If, Alci-
biades, I had seen you satisfied with the advantages which I
have just now detailed, and that you conceived you ought to
pass your life amongst them, I should long since have with-
drawn myself from all the love I bear; at least so I persuade
myself. But I will now convict you of having other thoughts
relating to yourself; and by so doing you will know, how I
have continued keeping my attention directed towards you.
For you appear to me such that, if any god were to say to you,
“Are you willing, Alcibiades, to live possessing what you now
do, or to die instantly, unless you are permitted to possess
things still greater?” you would prefer to die. But in what
kind of hope are you now living 2 I will unfold. (For") you
conceive that, if you were to come rather quickly before a
meeting of the Athenian people—and this will take place within
a few days—you will be able to show that you are worthy of
being honoured in a way that neither Pericles nor any one else
of those, who have ever existed, (was worthy); and after you
have shown this, that you will possess the greatest power in
the state; and that if you are the man of the greatest influence
here, you will be so amongst the rest of the Greeks; and not
only amongst the Greeks, but amongst the Barbarians like-
wise, as many as inhabit the same continent with us.” And
further, if the very same god were to say to you that—It is
necessary" for you to be the master here in Europe, but that
it will not be allowed you to pass over into Asia, nor to con-
cern yourself with affairs there—it appears to me that you
would not even on these terms be willing to live, unless you
could fill the mouths, so to say, of all men with your name and
* Ficinus—“Putas enim,” which leads to ºvel yáp—
* By these are meant the Macedonians, Thracians, and others. For
otherwise of 36p3apot would mean the Asiatics.
* Since Ficinus has—“si deus—concesserit,” it is probable that he
found in his MS. not dei, but Övöoi, or öðy. -
314 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
power; and you would deem, I fancy, that no man ever lived,
except Cyrus and Xerxes, worth mentioning. Now, that
you do entertain such hopes I know full well, and speak not
from conjecture merely. [5.] Perhaps, you will say, as
being convinced that I am speaking the truth—What has all
this to do with the reason, which you said you would tell, why
you have not withdrawn yourself from me? I will tell you :
then, my dear son of Clinias and Dinomache. That to all
these thoughts of yours a finish should be put, is impossible
without my help; so great power do, I think, I possess with
regard to your affairs and to yourself to boot. Hence I have
long ago thought that the god” did not permit me to converse
with you; for whom I have waited, until he should permit.
For as you have a hope of 9 being able to show before the
state that you are worth every thing to it, and after having
shown it, that there is nothing that you will not be able to do
forthwith,” so do I have a hope that I shall possess the great-
est power over you, after having shown that I am worth every
thing to you ;" and that neither guardian, nor relation, nor any
one else, is able to procure you the power you desire, except
myself, with the assistance, however, of the god. While
therefore you were rather young, and before you were filled
with these hopes, the god, it seems to me, would not permit me
to discourse with you, lest I should converse in vain; but now
he has permitted; for now you will hearken to me.
[6.] Ale. Much more unreasonable, Socrates, do you ap-
pear to me now, since you have begun to speak, than when
you followed me in silence: and yet you were at that time
very much a person of such kind to "look upon. Whether
I have such thoughts, or not, you, it seems, know with cer-
tainty; so that were I to deny it, the denial would not avail.
me to persuade you an atom the more. Let it then be so.
But if I have such thoughts ever so much, can you tell me
* That is, the daemon of Socrates. T.
*—” Since all the words between the numerals are wanting in the
three oldest MSS., Buttmann was the first to reject them as an interpo-
lation from $4, and his idea is adopted by Schleiermacher and Stalbaum.
.” Sydenham was the first to remark that goi, requisite to preserve the
balance of the sentences, had dropt out; which the three oldest MSS,
have subsequently supplied.
* By “such a kind,” is meant “unreasonable.”

FIRST ALCIBLADES. - 315
how they will be accomplished through you; but without your
help they never can be 2 - . . . -
| Soc. Do you ask me, whether I am able to make a long
harangue, such as you are accustomed to hear? For if so,
such is not my ability. But yet I should be able, I think, to
show you, that such is the case, if you are willing to do me
only one small piece of service.
Alc. If you mean some service not difficult, I am willing.
Soc. Does it seem to you difficult to give answers to ques-
tions f -
Ale. Not difficult at all.
Soc. Answer then.
Alc. Ask. - - . -
Soc. Shall I ask you then as having the thoughts, which I
say you are thinking off
Ale. Be it so, if you will; in order that I may know what
you will say. -
[7.] Soc. Well then. You have it in your mind, as I said,
to go and consult with the Athenians within not a long time.
If then, when you were just about to mount the platform, I
were to lay hold of you, and to say—“Since the Athenians
are thinking, Alcibiades, about deliberating upon some matter,
are you rising up to give them advice 2 Is it, since” about
what you know better than they do P’ What answer would
you make?
Ale. I would assuredly answer—About what I know better
than they do. * . --
Soc. On those subjects, then, which you happen to know,
you are a good counsellor * -
Alc. How not ? •. - *
Soc. Do you know those things only, which you have learnt
from others, or found out yourself? . . .
Ale. What other things are there 2 -
Soc. Is it then possible that you should ever have learnt,
or found out, any thing, which you were not willing to learn,
or to search out by yourself?
Alc. It is not.
Soc. What then, have you ever beer willing to search out
or learn what you thought you knew P
* Ficinus, unable, it would seem, to understand āp' #Trevº), has omit-
ted #wetāj) entirely. Stephens, too, was equally in the dark. Plato
wrote, I suspect, apa otreiðstg—i. e. Do you hasten (to advise) -
316 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
Alc. Certainly not. - - |
Soc. What you now happen to know, was there a time,
when you did not think you knew .
Alc. Of course. -
Soc. Now, what you have learnt, I know pretty nearly.
But if any thing has escaped me, do you mention it. To the
best of my memory, you have learnt assuredly grammar, and
to play on the harp, and to wrestle: for to play on the hautboy,
you were not willing to learn.” These things are what you
know ; unless peradventure you have learnt something else
Secretly. And yet I think that you neither by day or night
*went out from within.14
Alc. I have never gone to the school of other masters than
of these. - - - ,
[8.] Soc. When therefore the Athenians are deliberating
about grammar, and how they are to write correctly, at that
time will you rise up to give them advice 2 -
Alc. By Zeus, not I. .
Soc. But when (they are debating) about striking (the
strings of) the lyre?
Alc. By no means.
Soc. But on the subject of wrestling they are not wont to
deliberate in a public assembly. -
Alo. Certainly not.
Soc. When then they are deliberating about what? For
assuredly it cannot be, when the subject is about house-
building.
Ale. No, certainly. -
Soc. For a house-builder would advise them better than
you could.
Ale. True. - -
Soc. Nor yet is it, when they are deliberating about divin-
ation.
* According to Plutarch, Alcibiades considered the playing on he
hautboy to be very ungraceful, as it distorted the muscles of the face; and
could not, like playing on the Kyre, be accompanied by the voice. See,
too, A. Gellius, xv. 17. So Sydenham ; who did not see that Plutarch
has probably preserved the words dig óñ0sv čveXEv0épov pyov ov, which
he found in his MS. of Plato.
14–14 Ficinus has, what the sense requires and is adopted by Syden-
ham, “exisse te domo nos latentem,” as if he had found in his MS.
ičić,” pi' \a.0ec àv, instead of ÉÉvºv čvö06ev.
FIRST ALCIBLADES. 317
Alc. No.
Soc. For a diviner would do so better than you.
Alc. Yes. -
Soc. And that too, whether he be a short man or a tall one;
whether handsome or ugly; and whether of a noble or ig-
noble family.
Alc. How not ?
Soc. For advice upon each subject belongs, I conceive, to
a person who knows it, and not to a man of wealth.
Alc. How not 2
Soc. And whether the man, who gives advice, be rich or
poor, it will make no difference to the Athenians, when they
are deliberating about the health of those in the city; but
they will seek for a physician to be their counsellor.
Alc. And reasonably so. -
[9.] Soc. When they are inquiring into what subject, will
you rise up, and after rising up, give them advice?
Ale. When they are inquiring, Socrates, into the state of
their affairs. - - -
Soc. Do you mean about building a fleet? and what kin
of vessels it is requisite should be built?
Ale. No such thing, Socrates.
Soc. Because you are ignorant, I think, in the art of ship-
building. Is this or any thing else the reason 2
Alc. There is no other than this.”
Soc. But when they are consulting about what affairs of
their own do you mean?
Alc. When they are deliberating, Socrates, about war or
peace ; or any other affairs of state.
Soc. Do you mean when they are deliberating with whom
it is requisite to make peace, and against whom to engage in
war, and in what way? .
Alc. Just so. .
Soc. Now is it not requisite (to do so) with whom it is bet-
ter (to do so)?
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. And at that time, when it is better?
Alc. By all means. -
Soc. And for so long a time, as it is better 2
is I have translated, as if the Greek were Oër àAA' fi oiiro, instead of
Obs, d\\á roiro. See at $ 29.
3.18 RIRST ALCIBIADES.
Alc. Just so.
Soc. If then the Athenians were deliberating with whom
it was requisite to wrestle and with whom to come to close
quarters, and in what way, would you give better advice than
the exercise-master P
Alc. The exercise-master assuredly.
Soc. Can you tell me now, by looking to what would the
exercise-master give advice, with whom it is meet to wrestle
closely, and with whom it is not ? and at what time, and in
what manner ? I mean something of this kind. Is it meet
to wrestle closely with those persons, with whom it is better (to
do so)? or is it not ? . *.
Alc. It is.
Soc. Whether to such an extent as it is better 2
Alc. To such an extent.
Soc. And at the time too when it is better?
Alc. By all means.
[10.] Soc. Moreover, a singer ought sometimes to play the
harp, and to move (his feet) according to the tune.
Alc. Just so. -
Soc. Ought he not (to do so) at the time when it is better (to
do so)?
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. And to such an extent as it is better?
Alc. So I say.
Soc. Well then, since you make use of the term better in
both cases, namely in playing the harp according to the tune,
and in close wrestling, what do you call “the better” in playing
the harp, as I call the better in wrestling by the term gym-
nastical? what do you call that? -
Alc. I do not understand.
Soc. Try then to imitate me. For I have assuredly an-
swered” you, (it is that) which, under all circumstances, is
correct. Now that is correct, which is done according to art.
Is it not 2 -
Alc. It is.
Soc. Now is not the art gymnastic?
Alc. How not P -
* Instead of &zekpiwápiny, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS.
ătrokpwatumv čv, as shown by his version, “responderem.” Ast, how-
ever, Buttmann, and Stalbaum, all are content with darskpwépunv: which
I confess I do not understand.
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 319
Soc. And I said, that the better in wrestling is gymnastical.
Alc. You said so.
Soc. And was it not well (said)?
Alc. It seems so to me at least. º
Soc. Come then, and say—for it would surely become you
too to discourse correctly—in the first place, What is the art,
to which belong the playing on the harp, the singing, and the
moving (the feet) correctly. By what name is the whole o
this art called P Are you not able to tell? :
Alc. Indeed I am not.
II 1.] Soc. Try in this way then. Who are the goddesses
to whom the art belongs? &
Alc. Mean you, Socrates, the Muses? -
Soc. I do. Consider now, what appellation has the art de-
rived from their name *
Alc. You appear to me to mean musical. - -
Soc. Yes, I meant so. What then is that, which is per-
formed rightly according to this art? Just as I told you,
that what was performed rightly according to art, was gym-
nastical. So what do you say is similarly in this case? How.is
it to be performed P
Alc. Musically, I think. -
Soc. You say well. Come then—What do you term the
better in the expressions, “the warring better,” and “in en-
joying peace (better)?” just as there” you made use in each
case of the term better,” (in one)” as being more musical,
in the other as more gymnastical. Try now in these cases
likewise to state what is “the better.”
Alc. I cannot tell at all. .
Soc. But surely it is a disgraceful thing, should any one,
* while you were giving advice respecting the kinds of food,
and saying,” that this is better than that, both as regards the
*7 Instead of Šksi, which seems to have been interpolated from the
preceding #ksi, one MS. has kai, which leads to §oºrsp ye kai–Ficinus
avoids the difficulty by his version, “in superioribus—”
“ In lieu of rqī āpasivovi, three MSS. and Proclus offer rô duetvov,
and thus confirm the conjecture of Cornarius.
* Ficinus has “in uno quidem, quod magis musicum,” as if he had
found in his MS., before &rt, #7ti rij uév, to answer to Étri Tºj črépºp. Ast,
however, Buttmann, and Stalbaum, are content with the ellipse of Étri rº
pºv in the first clause of the two balanced sentences.
*—” I have translated as if the Greek were avp;3ov\etovra trepi
320 FIRST ALCIBIADES,
present time and quantity, inquire of you, “What do you
mean, Alcibiades, by the better?” that you should, on these
subjects, be able to tell-him that it was the more wholesome—
and this, too, although you do not profess to be a physician—
but that on a subject, of which you profess to have a know-
ledge, and, after rising up, you will give advice, as if you
knew it, you are not, when questioned, ashamed, as you seem
to be, if you are unable to say anything? Or does this appear
to be not disgraceful ? -
Alc. Very much so.
[12.] Soc. Consider now, and be ready to state—To what
point tends “the better” in enjoying peace, and in warring
with those with whom it is meet 2
Alc. But though I do consider, I am unable to imagine
(what it is).
Soc. Know you not, when we make war, that” after ac-
cusing each other of some suffering, we proceed to hostilities,
and * by what calling it we proceed?”
Ale. I do. (It is) by our being deceived, or treated with
violence, or deprived of something.
Soc. Hold. How are they suffering in each of these
points? Endeavour to state what is the difference, this way
or that.
Ale. By the expression “this way,” do you mean, Socrates,
“justly” or “unjustly?”
Soc. This very thing.
Ale. And yet this is a difference wholly and entirely.
Soc. Well then, with whom shall you advise the Athenians
to war? with those, who do what is unjust, or with those,
who do what is just 2
Ale. You are asking a hard question. For even if any
man conceives that it is needful to war with such, as do what
is right, he would not confess it.
Soc. For this, it seems, is not lawful.
girlov kai Aiyovra öri, instead of A$yovra kai ovu}ovXešovra reo
ouriwy Śrt—
* I have translated as if the Greek were 3rt ru-trá6mua, instead of
3, re-tró0mpia.
*—” The words between the numerals I cannot understand; to say
nothing of the repetition of Špxóple6a. Ficinus has, what is at least in-
telligible, “et quomodo nuncupamus illud, quo ad bellum incitamur.”
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 32]
Ale. By no means is it so; nor does it seem to be honour-
able.
[13.] Soc. *With a view then to these points, and to what
is just,” you will make your speeches.
Alc. It is necessary (to do so).
Soc. Does then the term “better,” ”about which I asked
you just now, relating to the going to war or not, and with
whom it is meet (to do so), and with whom not, and at what
time, and when not, happen to be any thing else than” the
term “more just P” or does it not ?
Alc. It appears (to be nothing else).
Soc. How then, my dear Alcibiades, does it lie hid from
yourself, that you are ignorant of this 2 or have you lain hid
from me, while learning, and frequenting the school of a
master, who has taught you to distinguish between what is the
more just, and what is the less just? Now who is he? Tell
me, in order that you may introduce me too, as a frequenter
(of his school).
Ale. You are bantering, Socrates.
Soc. Not so, by the guardian-god of friendship” to both
myself and you, whom I would the least of all invoke” as
witness to a falsehood P If then you have (any master), tell
me who he is.
Ale. But what if I have not ? Think you that I could by
no other means have a knowledge of what is just, and what is
unjust 2
Soc. I think (you would), if you had discovered it yourself.
Ale. Do you conceive then I could not have discovered it?
Soc. You (would have done so) perfectly, had you sought
for it.
Ale. Think you, then, that I have not sought for it?
*—” The Greek is IIpóg rair’âpa kai or rô 6tratov—where Sydenham
has suggested the simple correction, which I have adopted, oi kai—for
by raira are meant, he says, the lawful and the honourable.
** I have translated as if the Greek were rô (3éArtov and kai pur), ſº
not {3}}\riov—kai pur), although I am quite aware that à)\\o ru is said by
some to be merely the formula of an interrogation. In the present case
1) is properly found in two MSS.
* On the name of pixwog applied to Zsig, who presided over friendship,
see the learned on Euthyphr. p. 6, B., and on Suid. pi\log.
* This is an allusion to Homer, IX. O. 39, whom Euripides has like
wise imitated in Orest 1531, as remarked by Porson.
Y
322 FIRST ALCIBIADES,
Soc. I (think you would), if you had thought you did not
know it.
Alc. Was there not a time, when I was” in that state 2.
[14.] Soc. You speak correctly. Can you then mention
the time when you did not think you knew what is just, and
what is unjust 2 Come, (tell me,) were you making the search
last year, and did you think then, or did you not, that you
knew them 2 Answer truly now, that our conversation may
not be in vain. -
Alc. Nay, I did at that time think I knew.
Soc. And did you not (think) so during the third, fourth,
and fifth year (preceding)?
Alc. I did.
Soc. But previously you were a boy.
Alc. True.
Soc. And even then, I know full well, that you thought
you knew.
Ale. How do you know it well ?
Soc. Often have I heard you, when you were a boy at
school, and in other places, when you were playing at marbles,
or any other game, speaking, as if you had no doubt respect-
ing what is just and unjust, but proclaiming loudly and boldly
about any of the boys who happened to be there, that he was
a knave, and not just. Say I not what is true P
Alc. But, Socrates, what else was I to do, when any one
did me an act of injustice 2
Soc. Right. But if you happened at that time to be
ignorant whether you were injured or not, would you have
said,” What were you to do?
Alc. But, by Zeus, I was not ignorant; but I clearly knew
that I was injured.
[15.] Soc. You thought then, it seems, when you were a
mere boy, that you knew what is just and unjust 2 -
Ale. I (did think) so ; and knew it too.
Soc. At what time did you discover it 2 for certainly it was
not when you merely thought you knew.
* From the version of Ficinus, “cum sic me haberem,” Sydenham
was the first to reject obk between Öre and sixov. And so Ast and others,
with nearly all the MSS.
* The Greek is rörs, Aéysic, ri as xor) trousiv. But one MS. offers
Aéreºv: which evidently leads to rór’, Asysg &v–xpñv troutiv; and so I
have translated.
FIRST ALCIBLADES, 323
Ale Certainly not then. *.
Soc. At what time then did you think you did not know f
Reflect; for "that time you will never find.”
Alc. By Zeus, Socrates, I am not able to tell.
Soc. You did not then know by finding it yourself.
Alc. It seems I did not.
Soc. But you stated however just now, that you knew,
even without learning. But if you neither discovered it nor
learnt it, how or whence did you know it?
Alc. But perhaps I did not answer you correctly by saying
that I knew by discovering it myself. *But the case is this.
I learnt it, I presume, as others do.” \
Soc. We are now come again to the same point. From
whom (did you learn it) P Tell me.
Alc. From the people.
Soc. In referring it to the people, you fly to no good in-
StructOrS. -
Alc. Why so? Are not they capable of teaching?
Soc. Not even the game of back-gammon (correctly) or not.
[16.] And yet I think that these subjects are of less import-
ance than those relating to what is just. Do not you think
so too º
Alc. I do.
Soc. Are they then unable to teach some things of less
importance, and some things of more?
…~
Alc. I think so ; at least they are able to teach many
things of more importance than playing at back-gammon.
Soc. What things are these ?
Alc. I learnt, for instance, from them to speak the Greek
language ; nor could I name my teacher on that subject, but
I refer to those very persons, who you say are not good
teachers. . -
Soc. But, my noble sir, on this subject, indeed, the people
are good teachers, and may be justly praised for their power
of instructing.
*—” This seems a rather strange assertion. For if Alcibiades could
never find the time, there was no need of Socrates telling him to reflect.
Instead of oil Plato probably wrote Troö—On the interchange of those
two words, see Porson on Eurip. Hec. 300.
*—” This arrangement of the speeches was first suggested by Butt-
mann, and has been adopted by Stalbaum. * *
}
|
- Y 2
324 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
Alc. Why so
Soc. Because on those subjects they possess what it is ne-
cessary for good teachers to possess.
Ale. What mean you by this? -
Soc. Know you not, that it is necessary for those who are
to teach any thing, in the first place to know it themselves?
Must they not? -
Alc. How not? t
Soc. And (must) not they, who know it, agree together
and not differ P
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. But would you say that they know the subjects in
which they differ?
Alc. Certainly not. " .
Soc. Of such things, then, how can they be good teachers?
Alc. By no means. -
[17.] Soc. Well then, do the people appear to you to differ
as to what is stone and wood P And should you inquire of any
one, do they not (all) * agree in the same opinion? and when
they wish to take up a stone, or a piece of wood, do they not all
rush to the same kind of things? and similarly (understand)
all things of such kind? For I very nearly learn that you
mean by this the knowing how to use the Greek language?
Is it not so?
Alc. It is. - -
Soc. On these subjects, then, as we have said, do not per-
sons individually agree with each other and themselves? and
publicly the states (of Greece) do not have a difference with
each other, by some of them meaning one thing, and others a
different thing (by the same words).
Alc. They do not. -
Soc. On these subjects, then, they would reasonably be
good teachers. -
Alc. Yes.
Soc. If then we wished to cause a person to have a know-
ledge on these points, we should do right in sending him for
such instruction to the people?
Alc. Perfectly so.
Soc. But what if we wished that person to know not only
* Ficinus has alone preserved this word, so necessary for the senge.
FIRST ALCIBIADES. . 325
of what kind are men and of what are horses, but what kind
of horses are fit for the race, and what are not, are the people
competent to teach this?
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. And is this for you a sufficient proof that they do not
finow and are not correct Ҽ teachers on these points, because
they do not agree with each other on these points 2
Alc. To me at least it is.
Soc. And what, if we wished that person to know not only.
of what kind men are, but what are healthy and unhealthy,
would the many be competent teachers for us?
Alc. By no means.
Soc. And it would be a proof to you that they are bad
teachers on these points, if you saw them disagreeing.
Alc. It would.
[18.] Soc. What then, do the many seem to you to agree,
themselves with themselves, or with each other, respecting per-
Sons and acts, just and unjust 2 - .
Alc. By Zeus, Socrates, the least of all.
Soc. What then, that they differ the most on these points?
Ale. Very much indeed.
Soc. You have never, I suppose, seen or heard of men,
differing so violently, about things wholesome and not, as on
that account to fight and kill one another ? -
Alc. Never. - -
Soc. But upon questions of justice and injustice, * (how
bitterly they differ)* I know well; and if you have not seen
it, you have at least heard from many others, and from Homer ;
for you have heard of both the Odyssey and the Iliad.
Alc. Entirely, Socrates. - -
Soc. Are not then those poems concerning a difference as
to what is just and unjust 2 * *
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And did not the battles and the deaths take place amongst
the Greeks and the other.” Trojans, and amongst the wooers
of Penelope, and Ulysses, on account of this very difference 2
* As the word końyvov is found only once even in Homer, and never
elsewhere in Attic poetry, much less in prose, it is probably a corruption;
which it would not be difficult to correct. - -
*—84. The words between the numerals are due to the version of Ficinus
alone, “quam acriter dissentiant—”.
* According to some scholars, āA\og is used pleonastically, without
326 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
Alc. You speak what is true.
Soc. And I conceive that to the Athenians, Lacedaemoni-
ans, and Boeotians who perished at Tanagra,” and to those,
who afterwards "" met in arms at Coronea, when 37 Clinias
your father ended his career, a difference upon no other ques-
tion than what relates to justice and injustice, caused “the
deaths and battles.* Is it not so 2
Ale. You are in the right.
Soc. Shall we say then that those persons had a knowledge
on the question about which they differed with such vehe-
mence, as by their contending with each other to inflict upon
themselves the extreme (of mischief)?”
Alc. It appears not.
[19.] Soc. Do you not then refer to teachers of such a
kind, as you confess yourself to know nothing 2
Alc. I seem (to do so).
Soc. How then is it likely that you should know what is
just and unjust on questions, about which so vague are your
ideas, and which you appear to have neither learnt from an-
other, nor to have discovered yourself?
Alc. From what you say, it is not likely.
Soc. See you again this, that you have not spoken, Alcibi-
ades, correctly?
Alc. What is it 2
Soc. In that you stated that I said so.
Alc. What, did not you say that I know nothing of what is
just and unjust 2 -
Soc. Not I, indeed.
Alc. But did I (say it)?
ASoc. Yes.
Alc. How so?
any definite meaning. But here, instead of āAAouc, Plato wrote, I suspect,
‘IAtsijou, of which Tpport was the explanation. Respecting the loss or
corruption of 'IXtsäg, see my note on Crito, § 14, n. 18.
* On this battle see Thucyd. i. 108, Diodor. Sic. xi. 81.
*—37 I have adopted the reading preserved by Proclus alone, Év Kopw-
veig avpſ3āow Śrs, in lieu of $v Kopovetº, #voic— On the battle of Co-
ronaea, see Thucyd. i. 113.
38–38. As the deaths would follow, not precede, the battles, Plato
adopted perhaps this iſotspov ºrpórepov to avoid the repetition of the col-
location aipayat kai oi 6&varot, found just above.
* Here again Proclus has alone preserved the words röv kaków, want-
ing in all the MSS. of Plato. - -
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 327
Soc. You will see it in this way, should I ask you about
one and two, which is the greater number, you will say that
two is.
A le. I shall.
Soc. By how much.
Ale. By one.
Soc. Which of us then is the person who says that two is
more than one by one *
Alc. It is I. -
Soc. Did not I ask the question, and did not you answer it?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. On these points, then, who appears to assert? Is it
I who ask, or thou who answerest ?
Alc. I.
Soc. What then, were I to ask how many (and what)" are
the letters in “Socrates,” and you were to state, which of us
(would be) the teller
Alc. Myself.
Soc. Come then, tell me in one word, whenever a ques-
tion and answer take place, who is it that asserts 2 he who
asks, or he who answers ?
Alc. He who answers, Socrates, as it seems to me.
Soc. Now through the whole of the conversation” was not
I the party asking?
Alc. Yes.
loc. And you the party answering 2
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. Well then, which of us two said what was asserted P
Alc. From what has been admitted, Socrates, I appear to
be the party.
[20.] Soc. Has it not been said that Alcibiades, the hand-
some son of Clinias, knew nothing about what is just and
unjust, but thought (he knew); and that he was about to go
to a public meeting to give the Athenians advice upon ques-
tions of which he knew nothing 2 Is it not so
* I have adopted Schleiermacher’s Tröga kai Troia, supported by the
parallel passage in Xenoph. M. S. iv. 4, 7, oiov repi Ypappudºrov, Šáv rug
éonraí as, Tróa'a kai Troia >wkpárovg $otiv : and so Buttmann in ed. 2, al-
though he had rejected it in ed. l.
* Although the three oldest MSS. offer roi A6 yov after ðið aravròg,
yet Buttmann, with whom Stalbaum agrees, would supply Xpóvov, similar
to “semper’ in Ficinus.
328 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
Alc. So it appears.
Soc. The saying then of Euripides has come to pass, Alci-
biades. You seem very nearly to have heard this * from
yourself, and not from me.” For it is not I, who say this,
but yourself; and vainly do you lay the blame on me. **And
indeed you speak correctly. For mad is the endeavour, O
best of men, which you have in your thoughts of attempting
to teach what you do not know and have neglected to learn.”
Alc. I conceive, Socrates, that the Athenians, and the other
Greeks, seldom deliberate whether things are more just or
unjust ; for these things they think are plain enough. Dis-
missing then (the consideration) of such points, they look to
what will be most conducive to those who act. For I imagine
that justice and interest are not the same things; since to many
it has conduced to their interest to have done things very un-
just, while to others there has been no advantage in having
acted with justice.
[21.] Soc. Then if justice happens to be a thing ever so
much of one kind, and interest of another, do you not surely
think you know what is a man's interest, and why it is so 2
Alc. What prevents me, Socrates? unless you ask me
again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it myself.
Soc. What is this you are doing? If you say any thing
not correctly, and it happens to be possible to prove it so by
the same arguments as before, you fancy forsooth that you
ought to hear something fresh, and other arguments; as if the
former had been worn out like dresses, and you could no
longer put them on, unless one should bring you a proof”
*—” Muretus, in War. Lect. v. 20, was the first to remark that Plato
alluded to oroú rā6°, oùk époi k\{sug, in Hippol. 352. -
*—* I have adopted with Stalbaum the arrangement of the speeches
suggested by Buttmann; to which he was led by the version of Ficinus,
and a remark of Proclus. -
* In lieu of Tékpºptov, Cornarius suggested orcsváptov ; while Ast,
with whom Buttmann agrees, would expel the word as an interpolation,
especially as it is not acknowledged by Ficinus. On the other hand,
Nurnberger and Stalbaum conceive that there is a kind of mixed meta-
phor, partly correct, and partly incorrect. Unless I am greatly mistaken,
in rekphpuov lies hid rô rékpumpiov pumpvópsvov, by which was meant what
we call the staple of flax or wool drawn out, as shown by Hesych., MJ-
pvépévov Škreuvépévov : while, as regards the metaphor, it may be com-
pared with the passage quoted by Porson in his Letters to Travis, “To
draw out the thread of verbosity finer than the staple of the argument.”
IIRST ALCIBIADES. 329
clear and without a stain. But bidding farewell to the quick
sallies of your speech, I will nevertheless ask you from whence
have you learnt, and how do you know, what is to a person’s
interest, and who was your teacher ? and all the former points
I now put in a single question. For it is evident that you
will come to the same point; nor will you be able to show
either that, by having discovered it, you know what is to a
person's interest, or that you have learnt it. [22.] But since
you give yourself airs, and would not pleasantly have a taste
of the same argument again, I bid farewell to the question, .
whether you do or do not know what is for the interest of the
Athenians. But whether justice and interest are the same,
or different, why have you not shown, by putting, if you wish
it, questions to me, as I did to you? or, if (you had rather)
go through the subject in a speech at your discretion.
Ale. But I know not, Socrates, if I should be able to go
through it before you.
Soc. But, my good friend, suppose me to be the assembly
and people. For there it will be necessary for you to per-
suade every individual. Is it not so f
Alc. Yes. - . . -
Soc. Does it not belong, then, to the same person to be able.
to persuade each individual, and many met together, about
what he knows? just as a teacher of grammar is wont” to
persuade one and many on the question of letters.
Alc. True. -
Soc. And will not on the question of numbers the same ,
person persuade both one and many ?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And will not he, who knows, be an arithmetician P
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. And are not you likewise able to persuade many on
those points, on which you (persuade) one *
Alc. It is probable.
Soc. But these subjects it is plain are what you know.
Alc. Yes. . . . .
Soc. Does then the person in a meeting like this differ from
the orator before the people in any thing else, than that the
* I have adopted £rst6s from many MSS. in lieu of Treiðst. For the
imperfect is sometimes used to convey the idea of a custom.
{
330 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
one endeavours to persuade persons collected together, but the
other persons taken singly.
Alc. It appears nearly so.
23.] Soc. Come then, since it appears that it belongs to
the same person to persuade many and one, practise your skill
on myself, and endeavour to prove that what is just is some-
times not to a person's interest.
Ale. You are very saucy, Socrates. .
Soc. And I am now from my Sauciness about to persuade
you the very contrary to what you are unwilling (to per-
suade, me.
Alc. Say on.
Soc. Do you only answer the questions asked.
Ale. Not so ; but do you say yourself.
Soc. Why so? Do you not wish to be persuaded as much
as possible?
Alc. By all means. -
Soc. Would you not, if you said that such was the case, be
entirely persuaded of it? .
Alc. So it seems to me.
Soc. Answer then ; and if you do not hear from yourself
that what is just is to a person's interest, do not believe any
one else who says so. -
Alc. Not at all. But I must answer. For I do not think
I shall come to any hurt. .
Soc. For you are like a diviner.” Tell me then. Say you
that of things, that are just, some are to a person's interest,
and some not ?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. What then, that some of them are beautiful, and some
not 2
Ale. Why ask you this?
Soc. Whether" has any one seemed to you to act basely
indeed, but justly 2
Alc. Not to me at least.
Soc. But (you think) that all actions that are just are
honourable 2
* To indicate a sneer Dobree, in Adversar. i. p. 153, suggested pave
rikóg y' dip'-—in lieu of pavrukög yāp—
* Since si is never used in a direct interrogation, we must, says Stai-
baum, supply §pwrū. - -
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 331
Alc Yes.
Soc. But what, as to actions, that are honourable? Whether
are all good, or some are so and some not ?
Alc. I indeed, Socrates, conceive that some honourable
actions are evil.
Soc. And that some base actions are good?
Alc. Yes.
[24] Soc. Do you mean such actions as these? For instance,
many men by aiding in battle a friend or relation have re-
ceived wounds and died; whilst others, by not aiding when
they ought, have come off safe and sound.
Alc. Very much so.
Soc. Such aid” then you call honourable with respect to
their endeavour to save those whom they ought. Now this is
fortitude, is it not 2
Alc. It is.
Soc. But (you call it) evil with respect to the death and
wounds.
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Is not fortitude one thing, and death another?
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. To aid a friend then is not honourable and evil in the
same respect? -
Alc. It appears it is not.
Soc. Consider now, whether it be not good so far as it is
honourable, as in the present case. For, with respect to for-
titude, you acknowledged that such aid is an honourable act.
Consider then this very thing, namely fortitude, whether it be
a good or an evil; and consider it in this way. Which would
you choose to have, good things or evil
Alc. Good things.
Soc. And would not (you choose) the best things the most 2
Ale. (Yes).”
Soc. And would you not choose to be deprived of them the
leastf
Alc. How not ?
48 Stalbaum here refers the reader to Xenoph. M. S. iii. 8. 5–7, as
exhibiting sentiments of Socrates very similar to those put into his mouth
by Plato.
** Between pièAtara and kai Dobree, in Adversar. i. p. 155, proposed
to insert A.A. kai : which Stalbaum has approved of, and I have adopted.
$32 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
Soc. How say you then of fortitude? at what price would
you choose to be deprived of it?
Alc. I would not accept even of life to be a coward.
Soc. To you, then, it seems that cowardice is the extreme
of evil.
Alc. It does, at least to me.
Soc. On a par, as it seems, with death.
Ale. So I say. - -
[25.] Soc. Are not life and fortitude the most opposite to
death and cowardice 2
Alc. They are.
Soc. And would you choose to have those the most, and
these the least 2 - - -
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Is it because you deem those the best of things, and
these the worst?
Ale. For this very reason.”0 ---
Soc. To aid, then, our friends in war, in so far as it is
honourable, with regard to the working out a good action,
namely, that of fortitude, you call an honourable thing.
Alc. Yes, I appear (to do so). ---
Soc. But with regard to the working out an evil action,
namely, that of death, (you call it) an evil thing.
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Is it not then just to denominate every action thus?
If, in so far as it works out an evil, you call it evil, ought it
not to be called good, in so far as it works out a good?
Alc. It seems so to me.
Soc. In so far, then, as it is good, is it not honourable 2 but
in so far as it is evil, (is it not) base?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. In saying then that the aiding our friends in a war
is honourable indeed, but yet evil, you speak in not a different
way than if you called” it good indeed, but yet evil.
* Stobaeus, in ix. p. 123, reads trävvys : and adds, XQK. Šv toig ópto-
roug dipa ori riyet divöplay sivat cai év roic kakio roug 6&varov. A.A.
#ywye: which Buttmann considers to be genuine; but Stalbaum an in-
terpolation. * ~ * *
* Instead of Trpositrec, Etwall and Sydenham suggested arpoositrec,
similar to “dixisses * in Ficinus; and so three MSS. collated subse
3. The restoration is attributed to Wolf by Buttmann and Stal-
all Iſle - .
FIRST ALCIBIATOES. 333
Ale. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak the truth.
Soc. Nothing then which is honourable, so far as it is
honourable, is an evil; nor is any thing which is base, so far
as it is base, a good.
Alc. Evidently it is not.
[26.] Soc. Consider now further in this way. Whoever
acts honourably does he not act well too?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And are not they, who act well, fortunate?”
Alc. How not ?
Soc. And are they not happy through the possession of
good things P -
Alc. Most certainly.
Soc. And they possess these good things by acting well.
Alc. Yes.
Soc. To do well then is a good?
Alc. How not ?
Soc. And is the doing well an honourable thing also?
Ale. It is.
Soc. Therefore the same thing has again been shown to us
to be both honourable and good? -
Alc. It seems so.
Soc. Whatever then we shall find to be an honourable
thing, we shall find it to be a good thing likewise,” accord-
ing to this reasoning at least.
Alc. It must be so.
Soc. What then, do good things conduce to one's interest,
or not ?
Ale. They do.
Soc. Do you remember now how we agreed about thing
that are just 2 R -
Alc. I suppose (you mean) that they, who do what is just,
must of necessity do what is honourable.
* The whole of the argument following turns, as remarked by Stal-
baum, upon the ambiguity of the expression & Trpárrew, which means
either “to act well towards another,” or “to do well oneself.” There is
a similar ambiguity in Charmid. p. 17.2, A. § 42, where see Heindorf.
Nurnberger refers to Aristot. Eth. iv. ré 68 st; &#v kai rô sº trpárrºw raû-
•ov štroXapſ3&vovoru rºi sãatpuovsiv.
* Instead of ka)\óv rs kai–Sydenham was the first to propose kaAöv, rai
—suggested by “idem quoque bonum” in Ficinus. The restoration, con.
firmed by MSS. and Olympiodorus, is attributed to Schneider by Stalbaum
334 FIRST ALCIBIAL)|ES,
Soc. And that they, (who do) what is honourable, (do)
what is good?
Alc. We did.
Soc. And that good things conduce to one's interest?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Things then that are just, Alcibiades, conduce to
one's interest. -
Alc. It seems so.
Soc. Well then, are not you the asserter of this, and I the
questioner P
Alc. I appear so, as it seems.
Soc. If then a person rises up to give advice to the people
either of Athens or Peparethus,” conceiving that he knows
what is just and unjust, and should say that what is just is
Sometimes an evil, would you not laugh at him 2 since you
too happen yourself to be the person asserting, that the
same things are both just and conducive to one's interest.
[27.] Alc. Now, by the gods, Socrates, I know not what
to say ; but I am really like a man in an absurd position. For
while you are asking questions, at one time I am of one opi-
nion, and at another time of another.
Soc. Are you then ignorant, my friend, what condition you
are in 2 -
Alc. Entirely.
Soc. Think you, then, that if a person were to ask you,
Have you two eyes or three ? and two hands or four P or put
any other question of such a kind, you would give one an.
swer at one time, and another at another time 2 or always
the same 2 º
Ale. I have indeed some fear for myself; but I think I
should give the same answer.
Soc. Is not the reason, because you know?
Alc. I think so.
Soc. Of matters then, where you give contrary answers
unwillingly, it is evident that you know nothing.
* Of this island, now called Piperi, one of the Cyclades, and near to
Scyrus, the earliest notice is found in Soph. Phil. 551, where it is de-
scribed as sigorpvg, and stowog by Heraclides of Pontus. Its wine was
however of an inferior quality, as we learn from Athenaeus, i. p. 29, F.
The place is here mentioned as being of little note, and therefore pro-
perly opposed to the better-known Athens. ..
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 335
Alc. Probably so.
Soc. Do you not say that about things just and unjust,
honourable and base, good and evil, to one's interest and not,
you waver in your answer 2 Is it not then evident, that
through your not knowing these subjects, you waver respect-
ing them P
Alc. (It is plain) to myself at least.
[28.] Soc. Is not then this the case ? When a man does
not know a thing, must not his mind waver respecting it?
Alc. How not ?
Soc. Well then, do you know by what means you can
mount up to heaven P
Alc. By Zeus, not I.
Soc. Does your opinion waver on this subject 2
Alc. Not at all.
Soc. Do you know the reason 2 Or shall I tell it?
Alc. Tell it. -
Soc. It is, my friend, because, not knowing, you do not
think you know.
Alc. How say you this?
Soc. Do you, in common (with me), look (at the matter).
About the questions, which you do not know, and are con-
vinced you do not know, do you waver? For instance, in
preparing sauces, you surely know that you know nothing.
Alc. Perfectly.
Soc. Do you then form any opinion respecting them, how it
is necessary to prepare them, and then waver (in your opinions)?
or do you commit them to the person who does know P
Alc. In this way (I act).
Soc. And what, if you were sailing in a vessel, would you
form any opinion, whether it was necessary to bring the rud-
der inwards or outwards, and waver as a person knowing
nothing 2 Or would you commit it to the pilot, and keep
yourself quiet 2 ſ
Alc. (I should commit it) to the pilot.
Soc. In matters then of which you are ignorant, you do
not waver, at least if you know that you know nothing.
Alc. I do not seem (to do so). ***
[29.] Soc. Do you perceive then, that errors in acting
arise through this very ignorance, namely, in a person thinking
he knows, when he does not know.
--~~"
336 FIRST ALCFBIADES,
Alc. How say you this again P
Soc. Wheneves we think we know what we are doing, then
we surely endeavour to do it.
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. But when persons think they do not know, then they
hand over the matters to others.
Alc. How not ?
Soc. Such then of those, who do not know, live free from
mistakes through their committing the management of such
matters to others.
Alc. True.
Soc. Who then are they, who make mistakes 2 for certainly
they are not the knowing.
Alc. By no means.
Soc. Since then they are neither the knowing, nor those of
the ignorant, who know that they are ignorant, are any other
persons left than those who are ignorant, but fancy that they
are knowing f
Alc. None other than these.*
Soc. This very ignorance, then, is the cause of their evils,
* and an absence of learning worthy of reproach.”
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. When therefore it relates to things of greatest moment,
is it not then the most mischievous and disgraceful ?
Alc. Yes, the most so.
Soc. Well then, can you mention things of greater moment
than the just, and honourable, and good, and conducing to
one’s interest ?
Ale. Certainly not.
Soc. Do you not say that upon these subjects you waver?
Alc. I do.
Soc. But if you are wavering, is it not evident from the
previous (reasoning), that not only you are ignorant of sub-
jects of the greatest moment, but that you think that, al-
though not knowing, you do know them?
Ale. I seem to be nearly so.
* So Sydenham; as if he wished to read Ośk &\\ot j of rot, instead of
oys &AA’ oitou. Ficinus has, “Non alii, sedisti,” i. e. Oik di)\\ot, d\\?
QUTOt.
*—” The words between the numerals are scarcely suited to the train
of argument.
f
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 337
pay
ſ30.] Soc. Ho, hol Alcibiades In what a state are you suf-
fering ! such as I am loth to name; but however, since we are
alone, it must be mentioned. You are dwelling, O best of
men, in a state of ignorance, the most disgraceful; since the
reasoning brings a charge * against you, and you are bearing
witness against yourself,” in that you are rushing to affairs of
state, before you have been taught (at all).” But this not you
alone have suffered, but the majority likewise of those, who
manage the affairs of the state, except a few, and perhaps your
guardian Pericles.
Alc. He, however, is reported, Socrates, to have become
wise, not from himself, but through his intercourse with many
wise men, and Pythocleides * and Anaxagoras;” and even at
his time of life he is, on this very account, intimate with
Damon.
Soc. What then, have you ever seen a person wise in any
thing, and yet unable to make another person wise in the same
things as himself; for instance, he, who taught you grammar,
was clever himself, and he has made you so, and whomsoever
he wished of other persons likewise. Is it not so
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And will not you too, who have learnt from him, be
able (to teach) another?
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. And as a harp-master, and a teacher of gymnastic
exercises, in like manner?
Alc. Perfectly.
[31.] Soc. This then is assuredly a fair proof that they,
who know any thing whatever, do really know it, when they
*—Sº I have adopted karapuaprupsi, preserved here by Olympiodorus,
as a various reading for karmyopsi. Plato wrote, I suspect, 6 Aóyog orov
karmyopti, kai katapaptvpsi at oautoiſ.
* I have translated, as if Tu had dropt out before trauðev6fivat.
* According to the Scholiast, Pythocleides was a Pythagorean, whose
disciple was Agathocles, the teacher of Lamprocles, of whom Damon was
the pupil. He is called a Cean in Protagor. p. 316, E. § 20. The object
of the sect was to teach moral and political truths under the mask of
musical science. Of the nature of their political tenets some idea may
be formed by knowing, as related by Plutarch in Pericles, § 4, that Damon
was expelled from Athens as a meddler in state affairs, and a friend to ar-
bitrary power. S.
** On Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Pericles in astronomy and natures
philosophy, see Valckenaer in Diatrib. p. 34.
Z
338 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
are able to produce "another person knowing it like-
wise.80
Alc. So it seems to me.
Soc. Well then, can you mention any one whom Pericles
has made clever, beginning with his own sons? -
Ale. But what, if the sons” of Pericles were silly fellows,
Socrates ?
Soc. Clinias, then, your brother ?
Alc. Why should you mention Clinias,” a man out of his
senses 2
Soc. Since then Clinias is a madman, and the sons of Peri-
cles were silly fellows, what reason shall we assign in the ease
of yourself, for his overlooking you, when you are in such a
state 2
Alc. I am, Ifancy, myself the cause, by not giving my mind
(to him).
Soc. But of the other Athenians or foreigners, mention
either a slave or a freeman, who can show a reason for his
having become wiser through his intercourse with Pericles;
as I can mention Pythodorus” the son of Isolochus, and Cal-
lias” the son of Calliades through Zeno; to whom each of
them paid a hundred minae,” and thus became clever and in
high repute.
Alc. By Zeus, I cannot.
[32.] Soc. Be it so. What then do you intend respecting
yourself? whether to leave yourself as you now are, or to
pay some regard to yourself?
Alc. "Let the consultation, Socrates, be common to both.”
*—” Such is the literal version of the Greek áA\ov—átriarápévov
Sut Ficinus has more correctly “alium quoque doctum ab ipsis,” i. e.
“ another person taught by them.”
* These were Paralus and Xanthippus; see Meno, $33; both of whom
were carried off by the plague, during the life-time of their father, as we
learn from Xenophon, M. S. iii. 5.
* On this Clinias see Protagor. p. 320, A. § 29.
* This is the party at whose house Plato lays the scene of the Par-
menides.—S.
* This Callias commanded the army sent by the Athenians for the reco-
very of Potidaea; but was slain in the first battle before that city. See
Thucydides, i. 61–63. S.
* In English money, £322 18s. 4d., the same sum that Protagoras and
gorgias demanded for their instructions in sophistry. S.
* In lieu of kotyń (3ov\; i, X6kparec, where the dative is without
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 339
For "I have something” in my mind, while you are speak-
ing, and agree to it. For they who manage the affairs of the
state, seem, except a few, to be uneducated.
Soc. And what then 2
Alc. If they had been educated, it would have been re-
quisite for the person attempting to be their antagonist, to go
against them, as if they were prize-fighters, after having
learnt and practised (the science). But now, since they pro-
ceed to state affairs raw and undisciplined, what need is there
for a person to exercise himself, and by learning to give him-
self any trouble P For I well know, that by my natural
abilities, I shall be very much their superior.
Soc. Ho! hol thou best of men, what a mighty speech is
this thou hast spoken. How unworthy of your personal
qualities, and of the other advantages belonging to you !
Alc. What especially (do you mean), Socrates, and why do
you say this?
Soc. I feel greatly hurt in behalf of yourself, and of the
love I bear you.
Alc. How so?
Soc. In that you think there is a fitting contest for your-
self against the men here.
Alc. Against whom then?
Soc. This forsooth is a question for him to ask, who fancies
himself to be a high-minded man
Ale. How say you? Is not my contest with these very
persons?
[33.] Soc. If you had any thought of steering a trireme
about to engage in a sea-fight, would it be sufficient for you
to be superior to your fellow-sailors in the art of steering P or
would you think that this ought to be at hand, and you would
look to those in reality your antagonists, but not as you now
do to your fellow-combatants? to whom it is assuredly” meet
regimen; I have translated as if the Greek were kown) BovXij Šorw, 26-
kpareg, similar to Éart kow) BovX") in Crito, p. 49, D. § 10, and kowº, Yap
£orat Trôa rig in Lach. § 27.
"—" The Greek is kairou ävvoú, where Stephens proposed to read kai ru
#vvoč. He might have suggested kai Yap ri-similar to “etenim ‘’, in
Ficinus. Stalbaum indeed says that ēvvoč is united to the genitive
siróvrocooij, in Rep. ii. p. 370. But there, as here, it is the genitive
absolute.
* Instead of Öti in Ald. and Steph. the two Basil edd. have 6), adopted
z 2
340 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
for you to be so much the superior, that they ought never to
deem themselves fit to contend against (you)," but, through
their being held in little esteem, to contend merely with
you against the enemy; if indeed you are thinking of exhibit-
ing any exploit in reality honourable, and worthy of yourself
and of your country.
Alc. Of such an act I am indeed thinking.
Soc. Is it then very worthy of you to rest contented, if
you are a better man than your fellow-soldiers merely,” and
not to look to the leaders of your opponents, "considering if
perchance you shall become somewhat better than they, and
exercising yourself in reflecting upon the things relating to
them.”
Alc. Who are the persons, of whom you are speaking,
Socrates ?
Soc. Know you not, that the state is constantly at war with
the Lacedaemonians, and the great king 27%
Alc. True.
Soc. If then you have it in your mind to be the leader of
this state, would you not think rightly in thinking that you
will have to contend against the kings of Lacedaemon and
Persia?
Alc. You are very near to speaking the truth?
[34.] Soc. Nay, but, my good man, must you not look to
Midias, the quail-feeder,” and others of that kind, who attempt
by Sydenham, suggested by Heusde, and subsequently found in nearly
all the MSS.
* In ovvavraytovížso bat, found in three MSS., lies hid oroi &vraywy-
t&so 6at, required by the balance of the sentence, as Schleiermacher was
the first to perceive.
70 Instead of orpartwrūv, Sydenham suggested ovarpattorów, to an-
swer to ovvaywwworóg just before.
71—” The Greek is Ótrórs #ketvov Bektíov yé yovac okotroëvra kai
&okoúvra trpèg #ksivovg: where Sydenham was the first to suggest 6trøg
for Ötrórs. Stalbaum also would read Širwg &v, and adopt Yévoto, found
in three MSS. But 67twg &v could not be united to an optative. Heindorf
proposed 6trm rs—yévolo. But the optative could have reference only to a
past act. Plato wrote, I suspect, ei Trots, ékéivov 38Xriov rv Yevhaeu, ako-
•rojvra kai &akoúvra rā ºrpèg ékstvovg, as I have translated.
* Such was the title of the king of Persia. See at Meno, $ 11.
73 What cock-fighting was once in England, quail-fighting was at
Athens; for small as the bird is, it is, like the male partridge and robin,
very pugnacious. According to Pollux, the birds were placed in a circular
pit, and the one that drove his opponent out of the circle was considered
FIRST ALCIHIADES. 3 #1
to manage the affairs of the state, and still wear, as the wo-
men would say, the slave-like cut of hair” in their souls,
through their want of a liberal education; nor having as yet
thrown it off, but acting still the part of barbarians,” they’
have come to the city, to fawn upon, and not to rule it.
*Ought you then to look to these men, of whom I am speak-
ing, and to disregard yourself,” and neither to learn what is
closely connected with learning, when you are about to enter
into a contest so great, nor to practise what requires practice.
and, after being furnished with every kind of preparation, to
proceed thus to the affairs of state?
Alc. Indeed, Socrates, you seem to me to say what is true.
I fancy, however, that the Lacedæmonian generals and the
king of Persia differ in nothing from other persons.
Soc. But consider, thou best of men, of what kind is this
fancy of yours.
Alc. With respect to what?
Soc. In the first place, whether you fancy you would take
the more care of yourself, when feeling a fear, and fancying
them to be formidable, or not ?
Alc. It is evident, if I fancied them formidable.
the conqueror ; this was called Óprvyopiaxia : but the Öprvyokotria con-
sisted in striking with the finger the head of the bird, or plucking from
it a feather; and the one that endured the torture without flinching, won
the sum staked by their respective owners. To this kind of sport Midias
was so addicted as to be called by the name of the bird, as we learn
from Aristoph. 'Opy. 1297.
* According to Olympiodorus, whose Scholium was first published
by Casaubon on Persius, v. l l 6, IIapoupata čort Yvvauköv štri Töv šXev-
6epovpiévov čot)\ov kai étrupsyón Twy Św Tà dovXozſpetreig, (not dow\eig,
as it is absurdly printed,) &rt Éxetg rºw divöpa Troöööm Tpixa Šv Tā kāpaxºſ,
roãr' ào ruv, Éri trºv čovXucijv šáuv (printed Tpixa, which is explaining
idem per zdem) #xsug. “The women had a saying, which they used to
slaves made free, but still retaining the manners which belonged to slaves
—You wear your slavish hair on your head still—that is, You still retain
your slavish habits.” It was applied, it seems, by the Athenian ladies,
to men whom they saw ill-bred and illiterate. So Sydenham ; who might
have quoted Aristoph. 'Opy. 911, Évreuta Työi (vulg. ôňTa) 60ii)\og dºv kó-
pumv šxetc, to prove that slaves were not permitted to wear their hair
hanging down.
* It would seem from hence that the family of Midias was of foreign
extraction.
76–7%. By taking, with Sydenham, the sentence interrogatively, we get
rid of the necessity of expelling 68, with Stephens and Bekker, or of
changing it into 3%, as suggested by Etwal, and Buttmann.
342 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
Soc. Do you fancy then that you would sustain any injury
by taking care of yourself?
Alc. Not at all; but be benefited even greatly.
Soc. This fancy then of yours has this one evil of so great
a kind.
Ale. You say the truth.
[35.] Soc. Consider then if there be not probably a second
namely, that it is false.
Alc. How so?
Soc. Whether is it probable that the better natures” are
produced from noble races, or not ?”
Alc. It is evident, from the noble.
Soc. And (is it not probable that) the well-born, if they
are brought up well, will thus become perfect in virtue 2
Alc. Necessarily so.
Soc. Let us consider then in comparing our condition with
theirs, whether the kings of Lacedæmon and of Persia appear
to be sprung from inferior races. Now know we not that the
former are descendants of Hercules, and the latter of Achae-
menes?79 and that both the family of Hercules, and that of
Achaemenes, are carried up to Perseus the son of Jupiter 28°
Alc. And my family, Socrates, (is carried up) to Eury-
saces; and that of Eurysaces” to Zeus.
Soc. And mine, my noble Alcibiades, is to Daedalus, and
his to Vulcan, the son of Zeus.” But in the families of the
77 Instead of phosic, found in only one MS., the rest have piasic :
which Sydenham elicited before Heusde from “naturas’ in Ficinus.
* So Aristotle in Polit. iii. 8, B8Ariovg sicòg Tobg #k Gºričvalv’ styé-
veta yáp Éorw &psri) yévovg. “It is reasonable for the better persons to
come from the better. For to be well-born is the virtue of a race.”
So Horace too says, “Fortes creamtur fortibus.” S. See Menexen. § 5,
and Cratyl. § 24.
* On this Achaemenes, see Herodot. vii. 11, and 150, and the Com-
mentators on Horace, Od. iii. 1, 44; Epod. xiii. 12.
* As Hercules, says Sydenham, was never supposed to be descended
from Perseus, it is evident that the passage is corrupt. He would there-
fore insert sic rôv Aia after rô 68 Hoak\éovg Ts yévoc—a suggestion which,
strange to say, has been overlooked by every subsequent scholar.
* This Eurysaces was the son of Ajax, by whom he was so called, from
being the heir to the broad shield of the hero of Salamis.
* With this ridicule of the folly of tracing back a long line of ances-
tors, may be compared something similar in a mediaeval Latin jeu
d'esprit, under the title of “Solyman and Marcolfus:” which it were
easy to prove was written originally by Socrates in Greek.
FiRST ALCIBLADES. 343
other parties, beginning from themselves, are kings sprung
from kings carried up to Zeus; some of Argos and Lace-
daemon, and the others of Persia for ever, and often of all
Asia, as they are at present: whereas we and our fathers are
only private individuals. If then it were requisite to ex-
hibit your ancestors in the person of Eurysaces, and Salamis
as your country, or Ægina as that of the still more remote
AEacus, of what ridicule do you fancy you would not have to
pay the debt in the presence of Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes 2
[36.] Consider besides, whether we are not inferior both in the
pride of birth, and in the rest of our bringing up. Know you
not how great are the advantages attendant upon the kings of
Lacedaemon P whose wives are watched in public by the
Ephori,” in order that as far as possible,” no king may be
secretly begotten except by one of the family of the Hera-
cleidae; while the Persian king is so greatly our superior, that
not a single person has the least suspicion that a king can be
born from any other than a king.” The consort, therefore, of
the king is under no guard but that imposed by her own fears.
Further, when the eldest son is born to him, who is then the
ruler, all those in the (palace) of the king over whom he rules,
have a feast, and subsequently at another period the whole of
Asia makes a sacrifice and feast, on the birth-day of the
king. But when we were born, Alcibiades, “our very neigh-
bours even little knew it,” as the comic poet” says. After
this the child is brought up, not by some nurse at a little price,
but by the eunuchs,” who are considered the best about the
* These were five in number, and formed the privy council of the
state at home; while the kings had little power, except at the head of an
army on foreign service.
* This limitation is designedly introduced in a conversation with Alci-
biades; who was reported, despite the watch kept by the Ephori, to have
prevailed, by the present of 4000 gold Darics, over the virtue of Timaea,
the wife of Agis, and to have had a son by her, called Leotychidas, as we
learn from Plutarch.
* Such is what the sense requires; but it can hardly be obtained from
the Greek Śā ai, Toij.
* According to the Scholiast and Olympiodorus, the comic poet was the
namesake of the philosopher; and the verse was, 'Epioi, Yapºoijvroc 6", où6á
yeirov joðero, as Dacier elicited from Plutarch in Phocion, $ 30, with
which has been compared the expression in Cicero, Cat. ii. 10, “corruant;
sed ita, ut non modo civitas, sed me vicini quidem proximi sentiant.”
* We learn from Herodotus, that eunuchs were highly valued at the
;
344 FIRST ALCIBLA LES.
king's person; on whom the duty is imposed of taking care
of the royal infant in other matters, and of contriving how he
may become as handsome as possible in his person, by mould-
ing his limbs,” and making them straight; and they who do
this (well”) are held in great honour. [37.] When the
young princes are seven years old, they are placed upon
horseback, and frequent the schools of the riding-masters, and
commence going a hunting. At fourteen years of age they,
who are called the royal preceptors, take the boy under their
care. Now these are chosen out from such as are deemed the
most excellent of the Persians, men in the prime of life, four
in number, excelling (severally) in wisdom, justice, tem-
perance, and fortitude. The first of these instructs the
youth in the learning of the Magi 99 according to Zoro-
aster,” the son of Oromazes,”— now by this learning is
meant the worship of the gods,”— and likewise in the art
of kingly government. The person, excelling in justice,
(teaches him) to be true in words and deeds through the
whole of life. He who excels in temperance, to be governed
by not a single pleasure of any kind, in order that he may
acquire the habits of a freeman, and be really a king, by
governing first his own appetites, instead of being their slave.
But the person who excels in fortitude, makes him fearless
and intrepid, since he, who fears, is a slave. But over you,
court of Persia, and purchased at a great price, on account of their re-
putation for fidelity in all things committed to their trust. S.
* According to Olympiodorus, the nose was made aquiline, as being the
mark of a kingly mind.
* So Sydenham; as if he wished to read rair’ si èpävreg in lieu of
raēta Öpóvtsg.
* On the learning of the Magi, see Hemsterhuis on Lucian. Ne-
cyom. § 6. It was perhaps from this passage of Plato that Cicero asserted
in Divinat. i., that no person could be a king in Persia, “qui non ante
Magorum disciplinam scientiamdue perceperit.”
* Who Zoroaster was, and when he fived, is unknown. According to
Oriental scholars, the word means “star-gazer.” Hence one might be led
to conjecture that Z is “the,” dipo, “see,” and aorp, “star.” In Me-
moires de l’ Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, t. xxxix. p. 689
and foll., there is an elaborate account of the religion introduced into
Persia by Zoroaster.
* According to Plutarch, in Isis and Osiris, p. 369, 'Qpo-pâ&ng was
the name given by the Persians to the author of all good.
* See Porphyry IIspi Atroxijg, v. p. 165, and Apuleius in Apolog. p.
290, ed. Elmenh., quoted by Stalbaum.
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 345
Alcibiades, Pericles appointed as a preceptor, Zopyrus of
Thrace, who was, through old age, the most useless of his
domestics. I could recount to you the rest of the bringing up
and instruction of your antagonists, if it were not a work of
time; and moreover, these are sufficient to show all the rest
that follow after them. But of your birth, Alcibiades, and
nurture, and instruction, or any thing else whatever, there is
a care to not one, so to say, of the Athenians; unless there
happens to be some admirer of you. But if on the other
hand you would turn your eyes to the wealth of the Persian
kings, and their luxurious living and apparel, and the trailing
of the trains of their dresses,” and the anointing of them-
selves with perfumes, and the multitude of their retinue and
servants, and the rest of their delicate living, you would be
ashamed of yourself, on perceiving how greatly you fall short
of them. [38.] And if, on the other hand, you would turn
your eyes to the temperance and orderly conduct of the Lace-
daemonians, their easy deportment and mildness of disposition,
and high-mindedness, and regularity, and manly bearing, and
endurance under suffering, and their love of labour, and of
contending, and of honour, you would deem yourself a child
in all these points. But if you turn your thoughts at all
to your wealth, and fancy that on this point you are some-
thing, let not this be left unsaid by us, if perchance you are
sensible in what rank you stand. If you are willing then to
look to the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you will know that
the lands here fall far short of those there. For the land
which they possess in their own country, and in Messenia, is
such, that not one of those here would contend (to be infe-
rior),” either in quantity or quality, or in the possession of
slaves of other kinds,” and of those called Helotes,” and of
* This was considered a mark of pride or effeminacy, in which not
only Alcibiades indulged himself, but his son likewise. See Wyttenbach
on Plutarch, S. N. V. p. 28.
* Buttmann was the first to remark, that something had dropt out
here; for he found in the version of Ficinus, “nemo utique dubitaret,
quin—nostros exsuperet.” But he did not see that $Xatroijafat had
probably dropt out between rä6s and tr}\#6st.
** By these were meant such as were acquired by purchase. S.
* The Helotes, properly so called, were descended from the ancient
inhabitants of Helos, a maritime town in Laconia, near the mouth of the
river Eurotas. On the town being taken by the Heraclidae, the Helotes
were compelled to till the lands of their Dorian conquerors, as their vas-
346 FIRST ALCIB1ADES,
horses, and such other cattle as pasture in Messenia. [39."
But to all this I bid a farewell. But as to gold and silver,
there is not so much amongst all the Greeks, as there is at
Lacedæmon in private hands. For already during many gener-
ations the metals have been coming thither from all the Greeks,
and often too from the Barbarians;* but there is no going out
to any place;” but really, according to the fable of Æsop,
where” the fox speaks to the lion, the impressions of coined
money at Lacedaemon, as it enters thither, one may see plainly
marked," but no where of its going out; so that it is easy
sals; and, in lieu of the produce, to pay a fixed rent to their masters, not
unlike the tenants in villainage under the feudal laws in after times. To
the like hard conditions did the Lacedaemonians subsequently subject the
conquered Messenians, who were often comprehended under the same
name, as appears from Pausanias, iii. 21, and Thucydides, i. 101, where
the Scholiast states, that the Lacedaemonians 5ud rô disi Öuagópovg sivat
EiX&raig, (for so we ought to read, in lieu of the absurd &\\?\oug,) were
wont to call their other slaves by the same name. S.
* Instead of Šk rāv, one would prefer Éx ruvøv, to balance ātrávrov—
* As the Lacedaemonians were prohibited by law from using any coined
money, of gold, silver, or copper, they adopted as the circulating medium
pieces of iron of a conical shape, and so peculiarly tempered as to be of
no other use. But as such money had no real value elsewhere, and only
a nominal one in Laconia, it would not pass elsewhere in exchange for
merchandise. On the other hand, all the corn produced and cattle bred
in the fertile fields and fine pastures of Messenia, all the copper and iron
dug out of the rich mountains of Laconia, and manufactured by the He-
lotes, and which was not wanted at home, was sent abroad and paid for
in gold and silver; which money was either deposited in the temple at
Delphi, or intrusted to the custody of their neighbours, the Arcadians, as
shown by Athenaeus, vi. p. 233; or much of it buried, (as silver is said to
be at Pekin,) or concealed in secret places, an instance of which is re-
corded by Plutarch in his life of Lysander. So Sydenham. Ast refers
to Xenoph. Rep. Laced. vii. 6, xiv. 3; and Stalbaum to Cragius de Rep.
Laced. iii. 10, and Boeckh. CEconom. Athen. i. p. 32, ii. p. 138.
* Instead of Öv, for which Buttmann suggested 67tsp, similar to “quem-
admodum ” in Ficinus, Boissonade on Babr. Fab. 103, where the whole
fable has, with the exception of a single line, been luckily preserved in the
Athos MS., proposes oi, which has led me to iv'; while from the passage
in Plato it is easy to see that Socrates, who was the author of the fable,
closed it with these verses spoken by the fox. Xóc Čij6t, pnouv' si è'
dºrsupil, ovyyvögel. IIoMAgiv Yap ixvn 6mpion, Épi' jka)\\'où. "Qw stováv-
rov tá ye yeypappuév' \v Óñ\a. Töv 6’ {{tóvrov oik #xetc., 6 pot 68tésug.
The omission of the verse was owing to the similarity in "Qv siguóvrwy
and Tújv ššuévrwv.
* In lieu of retpappuéva, which is superfluous after siatówrog, I have
adopted yeypappuéva, found in the three oldest MSS., unless it be said
that both lead to retpippašva, similar to “trita in pulvere * in Ficinus.
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 347
to know well that of (all)” the Grecians the richest in gold and
silver are the people there, and of them (the richest” is) their
king. For from sources of that kind the largest and most
frequent receipts go to the kings; and still further, the royal
tribute, which the Lacedæmonians pay to their kings, is not
a trifle. But though the wealth of the Lacedaemonians is
great, as compared with that of the Greeks, yet as compared
with that of the Persians, and their king, it is nothing. [40.]
For I once heard a person* worthy of credit, one of those
who went up to the king, who stated that he passed along a
large and fertile territory for nearly a day's journey, which
the inhabitants called the Queen's Girdle;” that there was
another called the (Queen's) Weil; and that many other fair
and fruitful countries were appropriated to provide the Queen's
apparel; and that each of those countries had its name from
the part of the apparel (it furnished). So that I think, if
any person were to tell Amastris, the mother of the (reigning)
king, and the consort formerly of Xerxes, that the son of
Dinomache had in mind to array himself against her son,
and that (Dinomache's) whole attire was worth perhaps fifty
minae,” supposing it to be of the most costly kind," and that
her son possessed in Ercheia" not even three hundred plethra.”
To the same fable there is an allusion in Horace, Epist. i. 1. 73, “Olim
Quod vulpes agroto cauta leoni Respondit, referam; quia me vestigia
terrent Omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum.”
* * Sydenham has thus adopted “omnium,” found in Ficinus, and
* the richest,” from his “pecuniosissimus.”
* This is supposed by §. and the Scholiast to be Xeno-
phon; who says in Anab. i. A. 9, that the villages, in which they encamped,
had been appropriated for the girdle of Parysatis (the queen). A similar
account is given by Diodor. Sic. i. p. 62, where Wesseling refers to Cicero
in Verr. iii. 33.
* There was the same custom in ancient Egypt, as stated by Herodo-
tus, ii. 98, where the city of Anthylla was assigned to supply the queen-
consort with shoes and slippers. S.
* Equal to £161. 9s. 2d. English money. S.
7 Meaning the most costly among such as were worn by Grecian wo-
men. S. But the Greek words si trčvv troXXoiſ, omitted by Ficinus,
mean rather, “if taken at the very highest value.”
* Ercheia was a ward of the tribe of AEgeus. See Harpocration in
"Epysia6ev.
* A Greek arX$6pov contained 10,000 square feet; an English acre
contains 4840 square feet. Hence the estate of Alcibiades contained
about 619 English acres. S.
348 FIRST ALCI]3IADES.
of land, she would wonder to what could Alcibiades be trusting,
so as to have in mind to contend with Artaxerxes ; and she
would, I think, say, it is impossible for this man to make the
attempt through trusting to nothing else than his carefulness
and wisdom; for these are the only things worth mention
amongst the Greeks. [41.] Since if she heard, that this
same Alcibiades is making so great an attempt," being in the
first place, not yet twenty years of age, and in the next place,
that he is utterly uninstructed; and besides this, (that)" when
his admirer told him he ought first to acquire knowledge,
and to pay attention to himself, and after some practice to go
in this way, when he was about to contend with the king, he
would not do so, but said that he was all-sufficient as he was,
then, she would, I think, be astonished, and ask, What is the
thing in which the youth puts his trust? If then we were
to say that (he trusts) to his beauty and size and family and
wealth, and to the natural faculties of his mind, she would
think us, Alcibiades, out of our senses, when she reflected
upon the advantages of such a kind on their side. And I
think too that Lampido,” the daughter of Leotychidas, and
the wife of Archidamus, and the mother of Agis, all of whom
became kings, would wonder, when she reflected upon the
advantages on their side, that you should have a mind to con-
tend with her son, while you have been brought up so ill. And
now do you not think it a shameful thing, that the wives of
our enemies should consider more prudently for us, than we do
for ourselves, what sort of persons we ought to be to attack
them. But do you, O blessed one, be persuaded by me and
the inscription at Delphi, “Know thyself;” since such are your
antagonists, and not those whom you fancy, and to whom you
would never be superior by any thing else except application
and skill; in which, if you are deficient, you will fail in that
renown amongst the Greeks and Barbarians, of which you
appear to me to have such a desire as no other person has of
any thing else.
[42.] Alc. To what then, Socrates, must I apply myself?
* Ficinus has “certamen tantum inire,” which leads to Tooroijrov
#Truxeupéiv instead of viv Štruxeupsi.
* So Sydenham; as if he wished to insert 3rt between rotºroic and
Poty—
* The word in Herodot. vi. 71 is Lampito.
FIRST ALCIBLADES. 349
Can you inform me? for you seem to me to say what is espe-
cially correct.
Soc. Yes, I can. But ºlet there be a joint consultation”
respecting the means of our becoming the best. For I do not
say that, as regards you, there is a necessity for instruction.
but not as regards myself; for there is no difference between
you and me, except in one thing.
Alc. What is that ?
Soc. My guardian is better and wiser than Pericles, who is
YUII’S.
Alc. And who is yours, O Socrates?
Soc. A deity, Alcibiades, who did not suffer me to converse
with you before to-day; and trusting to whom I assert that
your favourable appearance” (in life) will arise through no
one else than myself.
Ale. You are in jest, Socrates.
Soc. Perhaps so. I am speaking, however, the truth, (in
saying) that we are in need of application, *if not more than
all men,” yet very much so.
Alc. (In saying) that I (am in need of it), you do not say
what is false.
Soc. Nor that I myself am so.
Alc. What then must we do P
Soc. We must not hesitate, my friend, nor act a Soft part.
Ale. It is by no means, Socrates, becoming to do so.
[43] Soc. Indeed it does not; but we must consider in
common. Now tell me. We say that we wish to become as
excellent as possible. Do we not ?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. In what quality ?
Ale. Plainly in what men are good.
Soc. Good in what ?
Ale. Evidently in performing acts.
13–13 I have translated as if the Greek were kotyń (3ovX") orw, 26xparsc.
not kotyń 3ovXä, ö, Xókparsc, to avoid the juxta-position of two datives,
(3ov\ff, 5– See above, $ 32, and at Laches, § 27.
14 Schleiermacher remarks that the present is the only passage in Plato
where #7ſuſpávsta is found in this sense.
15–15 I have translated, as if the Greek were si puri pāA\ov i Trévre;
div6pwrot, and not påAAov učv (one MS. 63) tróvrec àv6owtrol : which
Buttmann could not understand, nor can I.
350 FIRST ALCIBIADrºſs,
Soc. What acts? Of horsemanship?”
Alc. Surely not.
Soc. For then we should go to jockies.
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. Do you then mean naval affairs?
Alc. No.
Soc. For then we should go to nautical men.
Alc. Yes.
Soc. What affairs then 2 and who are the doers ?
Ale. Such as the Athenians do, who are men of honour
and goodness.
Soc. By men of honour and goodness, do you mean those
with mind or without it 2
Alc. With mind.
Soc. In whatever, then, each is a man of mind, in that is he
good likewise?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. But in whatever he is without a mind, in that is he
bad likewise?
Alc. How not ?
Soc. Is not a shoemaker a man of mind, as regards the
making of shoes?
Alc. Very much so.
Soc. In this respect then is he good?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. But as regards the making of garments, is not the
shoemaker without mind?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. In this respect then he is bad.
Alc. Yes.
Soc. By this reasoning then the same man is both bad and
good.
Alc. It appears so.
Soc. Would you say then that the good men are also bad?
Ale. Surely not.
[44] Soc. Whom then do you mean by the good?
Alc. I mean such as are able to rule in the state.
Soc. Not the horses, surely?
* This allusion to horsemanship is made advisedly. For Alcibiades
was fond of that amusement, as may be inferred from Aristophanes, who
as drawn his character in the Clouds, under the name of Pheidippides.
FIRST ALCIBLADES, 351
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. But men P
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Men, who are sick?
Alc. No.
Soc. Those on a voyage 2
Alc. No.
Soc. Those harvesting 2
Alc. No.
Soc. Those who are doing nothing 2 or those who are doing
something?
Alc. I mean, who are doing something?
Soc. What? Endeavour to show to me clearly.
Alc. Those (I mean) who 7 come in contact with, and
make use of each other,” as we do, who are living in cities.
Soc. You mean then of persons using each other, (so as)”
to rule.
Alc. I do.
Soc. Do you mean of boatswains,” who make use of rowers?
Alc. By no means.
Soc. For this ability to do so belongs to the steersman.
Alc. True.
Soc. Do you then mean of men (able) to rule hautboy-
players, and by leading the song [to men],” and making use
of ballet-dancers ?
"—" The Greek is rāv kai orvpſ3a)\Aóvrov Šavroic kai Xpopušvajw
dMXàXoug: where Sydenham was the first to object to Šavroig, for which
he proposed to read &\\?\oug, similar to orvpſ3a)\\óvrov trgög d\AñAovç,
a little below. But d'AAñ\oug could not be thus repeated. We must
therefore retain Šavroic in the sense of d\\?\otc, as in Hesych. and
Suid., ‘Eavroic' &\\?\ovg: and read d\\?\oug for avoig in the next
speech of Socrates; and so I have translated.
* As &pxetv has nothing to govern it, Stephens proposed to supply ov-
vapiévovg from the preceding roëg Övvapiévovg—ápxeuv. But the reference
would be too remote. Ast and Stalbaum however have adopted the idea;
the latter of whom thus renders the whole speech: “Do you mean those,
who are able to rule men, by using the labour of men.” Ficinus has
“Nunquid imperare eos dicis hominibus, qui hominibus utuntur,” i. e.
“Say you then that those rule men, who make use of them 2 ” which is
perfectly intelligible indeed, but not a translation of the Greek.
* This is the correct nautical word in English for kºsvarºg in Greek,
and “hortator’’ in Latin.
* Sydenham, unable to understand &v6ptºtroug by itself, translated, “to
other men.” But the train of argument requires its rejection entirely.
352 FIRST AT, CIBIADES.
Alc. Not at all.
Soc. For this (ability) belongs to the ballet-master
Alc. Very much so.
Soc. *But of persons making use of what, do you say it is
possible for men to rule men 2%
Alc. Of those, I mean, who partake in a polity, and come
in contact with each other, (and are able)” to rule those in
the city.
[45.] Soc. What then is this art P As if I were to ask
you again, what I did just now—What is the art, which en-
ables (a person) to know how to rule those partaking in a
sailing 2
Alc. The art of steering.
Soc. And what is the science, that enables (a person) to
rule those, who, as was just now said, partake in a song 2
Alc. The teaching, as you just now said, of ballet-
dancing.
Soc. Well then, and what do you call the science (enabling
one to rule) those, who partake in a polity ?
Ale. I call it, Socrates, good counsel.
Soc. What, then, does the science of steersman seem to you
to be a want of counsel ?
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. But good counsel.
Alc. So it seems to me, at least.
Soc. For the preservation of those who are sailing.
Ale. You speak correctly.
Soc. But” what you call good counsel, for what is it (good)?
Alc. For the better administering” the commonwealth,
and its being saved.” •’
Soc. By the presence or absence of what, is it the better
administered to and preserved 2 As, if you had asked me—
By the presence or absence of what is the body the better ad-
*—” Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Stephens, Ast, and
Stalbaum all translate differently; but all are as wide of the Greek, as is
that of Ficinus, “Quid denique vocas imperare posse hominibus, qui
utuntur hominibus.”
* I have translated, as if the Greek were oiwu r 5urtov, not rotºrwu.
*—” I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches found in Ficinus;
of which Schleiermacher partially approved.
* To balance the subsequent Óvouksirai kai ord &srat, one would prefer
here Öioticeio'0at kai otºsa 6au.
FIRST ALCIBLADES. 353
ministered and preserved 2 I would have said—When health
is present, and disease absent. Do not you think thus?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And if you had asked me again—By (the presence or
absence) of what, (are administered the better and preserved)
the eyes? I would have answered in like manner—By sight
being present, and blindness absent. So likewise the ears,
when deafness is absent, and hearing present, are the better,
and better taken care of.
Alc. Certainly.
[46.] Soc. What then is the state 2 By the presence and
absence of what does it become better, and is better "[at-
tended to and 1% administered.
Ale. It seems to me, Socrates, when friendship exists to
them” with each other, and hate and dissension are absent.
Soc. By friendship do you mean the thinking alike, or not
alike P
Ale. The thinking alike.”
Soc. Now by what science do states think alike respecting
numbers ?
Alc. Through the science of arithmetic.
Soc. Well then, and do not individuals too through the
same (science):
A le. Yes. 4.
Soc. And does not each person (think alike) with himself
too º
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Now, through what science does each person think
alike with himself about a span and a cubit, which of the two
is the greater 2 Is it not through the science of mensuration ?
Alc. How not 2
Soc. And do not individuals with each other, and states
likewise 2
Alc. Yes.
*—” The words within brackets are omitted by Ficinus.
* According to Stephens, whom Buttmann and Stalbaum follow,
airoic agrees with troXiraug, which is to be got out of tróAug. But Fi-
cinus found, no doubt, in his M.S. doroic, as shown by his version, “inter
cives.” On the confusion of doroig and airoic, see Markland on Eurip.
Suppl. 365. #
º, So Sallust, “Idem welle atque idem nolle ea demum firma amicitla
£5%.”
2 A
3.54 FIRST ALCIBLADES.
Soc. And about weights? Is it not in like manner?
Alc. I say so.
Soc. But the thinking alike, of which you are speaking,
what is it, and about what? and what is the science that fur-
nishes it And is it the same in the case of a state, and an
individual, as regards both himself and another person 2
Alc. Probably it is.
Soc. What is it then? Do not be faint-hearted in giving
an answer, but be ready to speak out.
Ale. *I suppose I may say that friendship and thinking
alike is” that, by which a father and a mother think alike, in
loving their son, and a brother with his brother, and a man
with his wife.
[47.] Soc. Do you then, Alcibiades, suppose that a man
can think alike with his wife on the subject of weaving, he,
who does not know, with her, who does 2
Alc. By no means.
Soc. Nor ought he either. For this knowledge belongs
to women.” -
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. What then, can a woman think alike with a man on
the subject of shield-warfare, when she has never learnt it 2
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. For this you would perhaps say belongs to men.”
Alc. I would.
Soc. Some kinds of knowledge then belong to women, and
some to men, according to your account.
Alc. How not *
Soc. On these subjects then there is no thinking alike
amongst women and men.
Alc. There is not.
*—” The Greek is 'Eyd, uèvoluai pujuav re \#ystv kai épévotav. But
as Socrates had asked about Öpióvota, and not pu)\ia, it is evident that
ºptAtav re is out of place here. On the other hand, as he had told Alci-
biades not to be faint-hearted, but to speak out, it is probable that
Plato wrote—oipat #v &opa)\ei Ys—Aéystv, i. e. “I think I may safely—
assert.” Moreover as oipat—A$78w, cannot mean, as Buttman explains it,
the same as Aéyw, we may adopt sivat \#ystv, found in one MS., and
similar to “reor—esse—” in Ficinus, or rather Aëystv sivat, for thus kai
would be a remnant of £ivat.
* Compare Hom. IX. Z. 490, where Hector tells Andromache to go
into the house, and to attend to her business of the loom and distaff.
* Compare Hom. IX. Z. 492, tróXspoc 3’ divöpeogt pusXàoet.
FIRST ALCIBIADES, 355
Soc. Neither then is there any friendship, if friendship be
a thinking alike.
Alc. It appears not.
Soc. So far then as wives attend to their own business,
they are not beloved by their husbands.
Alc. It is probable.
Soc. Neither are husbands (beloved) by their wives, so far
as (they attend to) their own business.
Alc. It seems not.
Soc. Neither are states (well)” administered in this way,”
when every one attends to his own business.
Alc. I think so, Socrates.
Soc. How say you, when friendship is not present, through
the existence of which we said that states were well adminis-
tered, but otherwise not
Alc. But friendship seems to me to exist to them on this
very account, because every one attends to his own business.
[48.] Soc. It did not (seem so to you) just now. How then
do you now state the reverse ? Does friendship exist, while
a thinking alike does not exist? Or is it possible for a think-
ing alike to exist on subjects, which some do know and others
do not P
Alc. It is not possible.
Soc. Do persons act justly or unjustly, when each attends
to his own business 2
Ale. Justly. How not ?
Soc. When the citizens in a state act justly, is not friend-
ship produced amongst each other ?
Alc. It appears to me necessary, Socrates.
Soc. What kind of friendship then, or thinking alike, do
you mean, respecting which it is meet for us to be wise and of
good counsel, in order that we may be good men 2 For I am
unable to learn what it is, or in what things it exists. For
at one time it seems to exist in the same things, and at ano-
ther time not, according to your account of it.
Alc. Now by the gods, Socrates, I do not know myself
* From “optime ’’ in Ficinus, Sydenham was the first to suggest sº
in lieu of ai, confirmed by Olympiodorus. So too Heusde, Schleierma-
cher, and Ast.
* Instead of raûrg, omitted in one MS., Ficinus found in his rôre, as
shown by his version, “tunc.”
2 A 2
356 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
what I mean ; but I am in danger of having been uncon-
sciously for a long time in a shameful state.
Soc. But now you ought to take courage. For if you had
perceived you were so suffering at the age of fifty, it would
have been difficult for you to take care of yourself. But you
are now at the very time of life, in which it is meet for you
to perceive it.
Alc. What then must I do, Socrates, now that I per-
ceive it 2
Soc. Answer to what I ask, Alcibiades. And if you do
so, you and I, god willing, will be in a better state, if one may
trust to my prophetic powers.
Alc. Such will be the result, as far as it depends on my
answering.
[49.] Soc. Come then, (say,)—What is it to take care of
oneself?—in order that we may not be unconsciously, as we
often” are, not taking care of ourselves, although fancying
we are—and when does a man do so? When he is taking
care of what belongs to him, is he then taking care of himself?
Alc. To me, at least, it appears so.
Soc. What then, when does a man take care of his feet?
Is it when he is taking care of the things belonging to his
feet 2
Alc. I do not understand.
Soc. *Do you call by a name something belonging to the
hand 2 as, for instance, a ring 2 Would you say that it be-
longs to any other (part) of a man than his finger?
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. And (does) not a shoe (belong) to the foot in like
manner P
Ale. Yes. 34
Soc. When we are taking care of shoes, are we then taking
care of feet 2
Alc. I do not, Socrates, very well understand.
* Here, as elsewhere, Buttmann would render troAAákug “perchance,”
on the authority of the passages quoted by Heindorf on Phaedo, $ 11.
And so too Stalbaum.
*—” After Nat, Stobaeus supplies, in p. 178, as remarked by Gottle-
ber, XOK. Kai iuérva kai orptópata Toij čA\ov otºparoc; AAK Nat:
which Buttmann considers to be genuine; and so did T. Taylor in the Cl.
Jl. No. 41, p. 14 , but Stalbaum an interpolation. *
FIRST ALCIRIADES. 357
*
Soc. Well then, Alcibiades, do you call by any name the
taking a correct care of any thing whatever ?
Ale. I do.
Soc. When then a person makes any thing better, call you
that a correct care 2
Alc. Yes.
Soc. What then is the art, that makes shoes better?
Alc. The shoemaker's.
Soc. By the shoemaker's art then we take care of shoes.
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And (do we take care) of a foot by the shoemaker's
art, or by that by which we make the feet better?
Ale. By this last art.
Soc. And (we make) better the feet not by the art, by which
(we do) the rest of the body ?
Alc. So it seems, at least to me.
Soc. And is not this the gymnastic art 2
Alc. Especially so. cº
Soc. By the gymnastic art then we take care of the foot,
but by the shoemaker's art that, which belongs to the foot.
Alc. Exactly so.
Soc. And by the gymnastic art (we take care) of the hands,
but by the art of engraving rings, of what belongs to the
hand.
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. And by the gymnastic art (we take care) of the body,
but by the art of the weaver and other arts, what belongs
to the body.
Alc. Entirely so.
[50.] Soc. By one art then we take care of each thing,
but by another what belongs to it.
Alc. It appears so.
Soc. You are not then taking care of yourself, when yº)
are taking care of what belongs to yourself.
Alc. Not at all.
Soc. For the art, it seems, is not the same, by which one
takes care of himself, and of what belongs to himself.
Ale. So it appears.
Soc. Now then, by what kind of art can we take care of
ourselves?
Alc. I cannot tell.
358 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
Soc. So much, however, has been agreed upon, that it is
not the art, by which we render better any thing whatever
belonging to us, but that, by which (we render so) ourselves.
Alc. You say what is true.
Soc. Could we have ever known what art would make a
shoe better, if we knew not what a shoe was 2
Alc. Impossible.
Soc. Neither what art makes better finger-rings, if ignorant,
(could we have known) what a finger-ring was.
Alc. True.
Soc. Well then, can we ever know what art makes a man *
better, if we are ignorant what we are ourselves?
Ale. Impossible.
Soc. Does it then happen to be an easy thing to know one-
self? and was he a person of mean abilities, who put up that
inscription in the temple at Pytho?” or is it a difficult thing,
and not for every one (to discover) Ž
Alc. To me indeed, Socrates, it has often seemed to be (an
easy thing”), for every one (to discover), and often too, a
thing very difficult.
Soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it be easy or not, with re-
spect to us, the case is this. Had we known it, we should
perhaps have known to take care of ourselves; but not know-
ing, we can never (do so).
Alc. Such is the case.
[51.] Soc. Come then, by what means can a thing be dis-
covered what it is by itself? For so we might thus perhaps
find what we are ourselves; but being in ignorance on that
point, we are unable (to know ourselves).
Alc. You speak correctly.
Soc. Attend now, by Zeus. With whom are you convers-
ing now? Is it not * with myself?
* Instead of airów Ficinus found pu&g airroèg in his MS., as shown by
his version, “nos ipsos.”
* Pytho was another name for Delphi. The Scholiast here quotes a
distich, which Meineke on Menander, p. 576, ed. 1, attributes to Ion the
tragic writer : “To know thyself is in word nothing great; And a god only
knows it well in deed.”
* Ficinus alone has—“facile hoc,” as the balance of the sentence re-
UllréS.
q * Instead of āAAp ruvu j poi, Sydenham suggested &\\o ri i poi.
on account of the affirmative answer Naí; and so all the MSS. but one
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 359
24le. Yes.
Soc. And am I not conversing with you?
Ali Yes.
Soc. It is Socrates then who is conversing and arguing f
Alc. Quite true. 4.
Soc. And Alcibiades who is listening 2
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Is it not by a discourse that Socrates is conversing?
Alc. How not ?
Soc. And is not the same thing to converse and to use a
discourse 2
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. But is not the person, who uses a thing, different from
the thing, which he uses 2
Alc. How do you mean?
Soc. As a shoemaker, for instance, cuts leather with (a
semicircular) knife, and (a straight) knife, and other tools.
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Is not then the shoemaker, who cuts and uses (tools),
one, but the tools, which he uses, another ?
Alc. How not P
Soc. Would not in like manner the instruments on which a
harp-player plays, and the harp-player himself, be different 2
Alc. Yes.
Soc. This, then, I was lately asking, whether the person,
who uses a thing, seems to you always to be different from the
thing, which he uses.
Alc. He seems so.
Soc. What then shall we say of the shoemaker? That he
cuts with his tools only, or with his hands likewise?
Alc. With his hands likewise.
Soc. He uses them too.
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And does he not use his eyes too, when he is cutting
leather ?
Alc. He does.
Soc. Now we are agreed, that the person, who uses, isy
different from what he uses.
Bekker omits 7, because when äX\o ru is used interrogatively, the # is
not expressed. Buttmann however, and Stalbaum, prefer d'AA'p ra) m,
furnished by Stobaeus, despite the objection of Sydenham.
360 FIRST ALCIRIADES,
Alc. Yes.
Soc. The shoemaker, then, and the harp-player, are differ-
ent from the hands and eyes with which they work.
Alc. It is apparent.
Soc. And does not a man use also his whole body.
Ale. Certainly.
Soc. Now the thing using is different from what it uses.
Ale. True.
A Soc. A man therefore is a being different from his body.
Alc. It seems so.
[52.] Soc. What sort of being then is a man?
Alc. I cannot tell.
Soc. But you can (tell) that it is some being making a use
of its body.
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Does any other being make use of its body but the
soul?
Alc. None other.
Soc. And does it not so do by ruling (the body)?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. I suppose moreover that no man would ever think
otherwise than this.
Alc. Than what ?
Soc. That the man was one of three things.
Ale. What things?
Soc. Soul, or body, *or a whole, itself formed of both.”
Alc. How not ?
Soc. Now have we agreed that the being, which rules the
body, is a man.
Alc. We have agreed.
Soc. "[What being then is a man £140 Does the body
tself govern itself?
Alc. By no means.
Soc. For we said that it was ruled.
Alc. True.
Soc. This then cannot be that, of which we are in search.
*—” Instead of j čvvapºpórspov Tó 3Xov toãro, Schleiermacher, whom
I have followed, elicited j kai ść &p poréptov Tó 3Xoy oità, by the aid of
Ficinus—“aut totum ipsum ex utrisque compostum.”
*—” The words within brackets are wanting in the three oldest MSS.
and omitted by Bekker and Stalbaum.
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 36]
Ale. It seems not.
Soc. But does the compound being rule the body ? and is
this a man P
Alc. Perhaps it is.
Soc. Least of all so. For (of two parties), one not being a
joint-ruler, there are no means for both to rule jointly.
Alc. Right.
Soc. Since then neither the body, nor the compound of
both, is a man, it remains, I think, either that the being (man)
is nothing at all, or, if it be any thing, it results that the man
is nothing else than soul.
Alc. It is just so. -
[53.] Soc. Needs it then be proved to you still more clearly,
that the soul is man P -
Ale. It needs not, by Zeus: for it seems to me (to be shown)
sufficiently. -
Soc. If it be proved not accurately, yet moderately so, it is
sufficient for us. For we shall then perhaps know accurately,
when we shall have discovered, what we just now passed by,
through its being a matter of much consideration.
Alc. What is that ? -
Soc. That which was just now spoken of in some such way
as this; that we must first consider the self by itself; but now
* instead of “the self by itself,” we have been considering the
“each ** what it is ; and this perhaps will suffice. For we
could surely never say that any thing is more the master of
ourselves, than the soul.
Alc. Certainly not. -
Soc. Is it not then well to think thus ; that we are having
an intercourse with each, by making use of discourses, *Soul
with Soul ?42 - -
*—” The Greek is &vri Toij at Toij airò £kaotov: of which Schleierma-
cher has offered one correction, and Stalbaum two others. I have trans-
lated as if the Greek were, &vri roë—“airó ré airó,” rô “ékaorov *-to
which I have been led by the version of Ficinus, “nunc vero pro ed,
quod est ipsum quod ipsum, consideravimus ipsum unumquodgue.”
*—” The Greek is tº lux; Tºog rºw lºvyºv. But as the dative has
nothing to govern it, Dobree in Adversar. i. p. 156, suggested Tijv livXīv
Tpóg "vXhy: with which Stalbaum is dissatisfied for he saw, no doubt,
that the accusative is in a similar predicament. Perhaps Dobree in-
tended roig A6).owg Xpwpévovg rijg (/vXijg, remembering Pope's expression,
“the intercourse of soul with soul,” and the passages quoted on Hippias,
$37, where the soul is said to speak. Add Plato Epist. 2, p. 313, A.
!
!
362 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
Alc. Very much so. -
Soc. This then was what we were saying a little before
that Socrates is conversing with Alcibiades, by using speech,
not, as it seems, to your person, but by putting reasons to
Alcibiades; now this is his soul. -
Alc. So it seems to me at least.
[54.] Soc. He then who enjoins a person to know himself,
orders us to recognise a soul.
Ale. It is probable.
Soc. *Whoever then knows only the things belonging to
his body, knows the things belonging to himself, but not him-
Self.43
Alc. Just so. -
Soc. Not one therefore of the physicians, so far as he is a
physician, knows himself; neither does any master of ex-
ercises, so far as he is such a master.
Alc. It is probable.
Soc. Husbandmen then, and other workmen, are far from
knowing themselves. For these it seems do not (consider)*
even what belongs to themselves, but what are still more re-
mote from themselves, according to the arts which they pos-
sess. For they know the things belonging to the body, (and)
by which it is taken care of.
Alc. You say what is true. -
Soc. If therefore it is temperance” to know oneself, none
of these is temperate according to their (respective) arts.
*—” The Greek is Šaric dipa rāv roi ord parog yuyvöoksu, Tâ a broij, 3XX
oix' airów, Éyvºokev. To restore the syntax, Stephens would insert ru
before Töv, or change Töv into td.—But this is at variance with the rea-
soning; which requires the mention of the body itself, and not rà (or ri
rôv) Toi otºplarog, i. e. the things belonging to the body. Le Fevre and
Dacier seem to have been well aware of this, and have rightly translated
“son corps,” similar to “corpus” in Ficinus. Perhaps he found in his MS.
§oric àpa rô airoi; oºpa yeyvögket, rà airoij, &AA’ oby abrów, Éyvooksv-
similar to his version, “Quicunque igitur corpus agnoscit, sua quidem non
se ipsum novit.” So Sydenham; and so too Schleiermacher proposed to
expel Tāv, or to read 60 rug dipa Tö adjua ñ tºy roi; owpatóg Tu, where
adºplaróg ru is due to Stobaeus.
* Ficinus has inserted “ considerant,” but whether from his MS. or
not, is uncertain. -
* According to a Scholiast, owpportivn is here used in the sense of ppó-
vmouc, and hence Ficinus rendered it “prudentia;” whom Sydenham fol-
lowed; as do Nurnberger and Stalbaum ; who refer respectively to
Xenophon M. S. iii. 9. 4, and Plato Charmid. p. 164, D.
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 363
* ,
Ale. I think they are not.
Soc. On this account then these arts seem to be those of
handicrafts, and not the learning fit for a good man.
Ale. Entirely so.
Soc. Again, whoever takes care of his body, takes care of
what belongs to him, but not of himself.
Alc. It is nearly so.
Soc. And whoever takes care of his property, (takes care)
neither of himself nor of what belongs to him, but of what are
still more remote from what belongs to himself.
Alc. So it seems to me at least.
Soc. The money-making man *.does then not do his own
business.46
Alc. Rightly (said).
[55.] Soc. If then a person has become an admirer of the
body of Alcibiades, he is not in love with Alcibiades, but
with something which belongs to Alcibiades.
Alc. You say what is true.
Soc. But whoever is in love with you, is (in love with your)
Soul.
Alc. This appears necessary from the reasoning.
Soc. And hence he, who admires your body, when it ceases
to bloom, goes away.
Alc. It seems so. -
Soc. But the admirer of the soul does not go away, so
long as it goes on to what is better.
Alc. Probably so. -
Soc. Am I not then the person not going away, but re-
maining, when, the body ceasing (to bloom),” the rest have
departed?
Alc. And well have you done so, Socrates; and never may
you depart.
Soc. Be ready then to be the best possible.
Ale. I will be ready.
Soc. For the case is this. There never has been, it seems,
an admirer of Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, nor is there
48–46 Ficinus, apparently unable to understand rá attoiſ trpátret, has
“suis indulget.” Perhaps Plato wrote àp' àpwara Trpárret, not àp' ét,
Trpartet.
* Sydenham wished to insert àv6āv, as just before Añyet äv6oiv–Fi-
cin us has “senescente corpore—” -
364 ‘FIRST ALCIl SIADES.
now, but “one alone, and he worthy to be loved,” Socrates,
the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.
Alc. It is true. -
Soc. Did you not say that I had been a little beforehand
with you when I accosted you; for that you were about to
address me first, being desirous to ask me, why I alone do
not go away?
Alc. It was so.
Soc. This then is the reason ; for I alone am the ad-
mirer of you; but the others of what belong to you. Now
what belong to you are ceasing to bloom ; but you are begin-
ning to be in flower. [56.] If then you are not now spoilt by
the Athenian mob, and become ugly, I shall never forsake you.
For of this I am most afraid, that you may become a mob-
lover, and be spoilt by them. Since many, even virtuous
Athenians, have already suffered this fate. For * the mob of
the magnanimous Erectheus” has a fair exterior. * But you
ought to see it undressed.” Make use therefore of the cau-
tion, which I give you.
Alc. What caution ?
Soc. In the first place, my friend, exercise yourself,” and
learn what a person ought to learn, who is proceeding to
state affairs; but previously not ; in order that you may go
to them possessing an antidote, and suffer no grievous harm.
Alc. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak correctly. But
endeavour to explain in what way we may take care of our-
selves. -
Soc. Has not so much been gone through by us already?
For what we are, has been tolerably well agreed upon. In-
deed we feared lest, if mistaken on that point, we should be
unconsciously taking care of something else, and not of our-
selves.
Alc. It is so.
*—” Buttmann acutely saw here an allusion to Moûvog Édºu &yarnróc
in Hom. IX. B. 305.
*-* Here, as Gottleber remarked, is an allusion to Ajuoc 'Epsy6ijoc
Pueya)\hropog in Hom. IX. B. 547.
*—” For it would then appear, to use the words of Horace, “Intror-
sus turpis, speciosa pelle decorus.”
* Ficinus has “exue illum—" as if he had found in his MS. yüpı-
wagov—and referred the verb to the people.
FIRST ALCIBLADES. 365
Soc. And after this we ought to take care of the soul, and
look to it.
Alc. Plainly so.
Soc. And that to others should be handed over the care of
our bodies and our property.
Alc. How not ?
[57.] Soc. In what way then can we know these things the
most clearly 2 For, after we know this, it seems, we shall know
ourselves. Now, by the gods, do we not understand the Delphic
inscription we just now mentioned, as saying correctly?
Ale. What? What are you thinking of, and what do you
mean, Socrates?
Soc. I will tell you what I suspect this inscription means,
and what it advises us (to do). For it nearly seems that its
resemblance does not exist every where, but only with reference
to the sight.
Alc. How say you thus?
Soc. Do you likewise consider it. If it had said to our eye,
as to a man, by way of advice—“Behold yourself—” how and
what should we suppose it was advising P Would it not be to
look to that, by looking to which the eye might see itself?
Alc. It is evident. z
Soc. Let us then consider, by looking to what of things
existing we can see both it and ourselves? -
Ale. It is evident, Socrates, (by looking at) mirrors, and
other things of the like kind.
Soc. You say rightly. And in the eye itself, with which
we see, *is there not something” of such a kind?
Alc. Very much so.
Soc. You have observed then, that the face of him, who
looks at the eye of another, appears visible to himself in the
eye-sight of the person opposite to him, as in a mirror, which
we call the pupil,” being the image” of the person, wh
looks in it. .
*—º Instead of £v syri rāv rototrov, Ficinus found in his MS. Evsari
rt rôv Towośtwv, as is evident from his version, “inest hujusmodi
quiddam,” which Sydenham adopted, and F. A. Wolf subsequently sug-
gested in Miscell. Analect. p. 104.
* In lieu of kopuprºv, Dacier was the first to adopt kópmv, from “pu-
pillam ” in Ficinus; and so the three oldest MSS. and Stobaeus. So
too Bernard Martin, in Varr. Lect. iv. 3, and Viger on Euseb. p. 54.
* As the pupil is not the image itself, but only gives the imagº; it
& &
366 FIRST ALCIBIADES,
Alc. You say what is true. .
Soc. An eye therefore beholding an eye, and looking at
that, which is the best part of itself, with which it sees, may
thus see itself?
Alc. It appears so. * *
Soc. But if it look at any other part of the man, or at an
of things existing, except at that, to which it happens to b
like, it will not see itself. - -
Alc. You say what is true.
Soc. If then an eye would see itself, it must look at an
eye, and to that place of the eye where the virtue of the eye
is naturally seated; now this is surely the sight. -
Alc. Just so. -
[58.] Soc. Is it not true then, my dear Alcibiades, that the
soul likewise, if it would know itself, must look at Soul, and
especially at that place of the soul where wisdom,” the virtue
of the soul, is inherent, and to that other thing, to which
it happens to be like *
Alc. To me at least, Socrates, it seems so.
Soc. Can we mention any property of the soul more di-
vine” than that, about which knowledge and intelligence are
conversant 2 .
Alc. We cannot.
Soc. This therefore in the soul resembles the divine nature.
And a person looking at this, and recognising all that is
divine, both god” and intelligence, would thus know him-
self the most.*
Alc. It appears so.
Soc. And to know oneself, we acknowledge to be wisdom.”
Alc. By all means. -
is probable that Plato wrote stów) ov Štěoiſy ru, in lieu of stówkot
07/ T1-
* Heusde first proposed to expel oropta, as an interpolation ; with
whom Ast and Stalbaum feel disposed to agree. -
* In lieu of 6stórspov, the three oldest MSS. offer vospotspov, which
Buttmann would receive, but Stalbaum reject.
* Instead of 0sóv ré kai ºppóvnaſty, Heusde suggested ooſpíav re kai
ºpóvnow, similar to the preceding Tô sióēvat rs kai ºppovsiv. But Ast,
votiv re kai ºppóvnouv, referring to Julian, Or. ii. p. 68, D., vº kai ºppo
våget, pnoi (6 ITAérwy) kai, Tô 3Xov, rej Šv juiv 0s).
* I should prefer káX\tora to pu&\to ra.
* Here again gopporávn is used in the sense of ºppóvnauc, and so is
ow?povec a little below for ppóvipou. -
FIRST ALCIBIADES. 367
"[Soc. As mirrors then are more clear, and more pure,
and more brilliant, than the mirror in the eye, so the deity is
more pure and more brilliant than that, which is the best in
our Soul.
Ale. It is likely, Socrates.
Soc. Looking therefore at the deity, we should make use
of him, as the most beautiful mirror; but (of) things belong-
ing to man, to the virtue of the Soul; and shall we not thus
especially see and know our very selves 2
Ale. Yes.]60 : - -
Soc. By not knowing ourselves, and not being wise, can
we know what of things belonging to us are good and evil?
Alc. How could it be, Socrates?
Soc. For perhaps it appears impossible for him who knows
not Alcibiades himself, to know that what belongs to Alci-
biades does so belong to Alcibiades.
Alc. It is, by Zeus, impossible.
Soc. Nor that what are our own, are really our own, "un-
less (he knows) us."
Alc. For how should he f
Soc. And if not what are ours, then not what belongs to
OUII’S. -
Alc. It appears he cannot.
Soc. We did not then rightly admit, as we did just now,
that there were some, who know not themselves, and yet (know)
what belonged to them, but that others” (do not know) even
*—0° “The words within the brackets are quoted by Stobaeus, xxi. p. 181,
although the omission has not been noticed by any editor of Plato. The
original is, "Ap', Öotrep käroTrpa Gaſpéotspá čart Toij Šv tº Öp6a)\piq,
#vóTrpov kai ka0apútspá tê kai AaputrpóTspa, oftw kai Ö 680g roi čv rà
ripuštépg livX'ſ BeNTiotov kaðapótspów Te Kai \aputrpótepov rvyxáves
6v ; "Eoukš ye, & Xºkpareg. Eig Töv 0söv dipa (3Aštrovreg #ksivſp ca)\\to-
rºp &vóTTp(p xpºſué0' àv, kai Tây div600Tivov sig rºw livXfig óperiiv :
cal oftwc àv pu&\tora oix (pºpučv kai yuyvögſkouplev ſpag airoijg ; Nai.
The intelligent reader need not, I trust, be told, that, without this
beautiful passage, the dialogue is defective in its most essential part.” So
Taylor. Gesner had, however, already noticed the Supplement, which
is likewise found in Eusebius, Praepar. Evang. xi. 27, p. 551. It is re-
jected by Nurnberger, Schleiermacher, Ast, and Stalbaum ; but con-
sidered genuine by Gottleber, Wernsdorf, and Buttmann.
*—" In lieu of si pur) 6t' juág, Faber suggested si pumā’īpūg, which
he got from Ficinus: “misi prius nos ipsos.” The conjecture is confirmed
by nearly all the MSS.
* I have adopted with Buttmann the reading &X\ovg 68, found in Sto-
863 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
what belongs to them. For it seems, that it is the province
of one person, and of one art, to know himself, (and) the
things which are his, and what belongs to the things that
are his.
Ale. The fact is nearly so.
[59.] Soc. And whoever is ignorant of what belongs to
himself, would surely be ignorant likewise of what belongs to
other men.
Alc. How not ?
Soc. And if (he is ignorant) of what belongs to other men.
will he not be ignorant also of what belongs to states?
Alc. Necessarily.
Soc. Such a man therefore cannot be a statesman.
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. Nor fit even to manage a family.
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. Nor will he know what he is doing.
Alc. He will not.
Soc. And will not he, who knows not (what he is doing),
act amiss P
Alc. Very much so.
Soc. And acting amiss, will he not do ill, both in private
and public capacity ?
Alc. How not P
Soc. And is not he, who does ill, miserable 2
Ale. Yes, very.
Soc. And what are those, for whom he is acting 2
Alc. And they too are (miserable). -
Soc. It is not possible then for a person to be happy, unless
he be prudent and good.
Alc. It is not possible.
Soc. Bad men then are in a miserable state.
Alc. Very. -
Soc. Not even the rich man then is free from a miserable
state, but only the prudent one.
Alc. It appears So.
Soc. States then are not in want of walls, or ships, or
docks, if they would be happy, nor even of a multitude (of peo-
ple), or of extent (of country), without the possession of virtue.
basus, in lieu of &AA’ obôā—for thus rivac and d\\ovg are properly op-
posed to each other. - - -
FIRST ALCIBIADES. - 369
Alc. Not at all.
Soc. If then you would manage the affairs of a state rightly
and well, you must impart to the citizens virtue.
Alc. How not f
Soc. But how can a person impart what he has not himself?
Alc. How indeed P
Soc. You must therefore, in the first place, acquire virtue
yourself, and so must another, who would rule, take care not
only of himself and his own private affairs, but of the state,
and the affairs of the state.
Alc. You say true.
[60.] Soc. You must not therefore procure for yourself or
the state the power and dominion to do what you please, but
justice and prudence.
Alc. It appears so.
Soc. For by acting justly and prudently both you and the
state will act in a manner pleasing to the deity.
Alc. It is likely.
Soc. And by looking, as we said before, at what is divine
and bright, ye will do so.
Alc. It appears so.
Soc. And, moreover, by looking there,” ye will behold and
know what is your own good.
Alc. True. -
Soc. And will ye not then act both rightly and well?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And acting thus I will guarantee that you will be happy.
Alc. For you are a sure guarantee. .
Soc. But by acting unjustly and looking to that which is
godless and dark, ye will, it is likely, commit acts similar to
those things, through your being ignorant of yourselves.
Ale. It is likely.
Soc. For to the party, my dear Alcibiades, who has the
power of doing what he pleases, and does not possess a mind,
what is there likely to happen, either as a private person, or
in the case of a state?" as in the case of a sick person,
* The expression #wraú6a 3Aérovtsc is hardly correct Greek, for it
ought to be škstors; and if it were otherwise, yet here it could be scarcely
admitted, where the train of thought requires, sig Tà 6sia, as opposed to
the subsequent sig Tô d6sov—3Aérovtsg.
* Sydenham, perceiving that tróAst could hardly be thus opposed to
2 A
370 FIRST ALCIBIADES.
having the power to do what he pleased, but not possessing a
medical mind, and acting the tyrant, so that nobody would
chide him, what would be the consequence? Would it not
be in all probability that his body would be destroyed 2
Alc. You say the truth.
Soc. And do you see, in the case of a ship, if a person de-
void of mind and the talent of a steersman had the power of
doing as he thought proper, what would happen both to him-
self and to his shipmates?
Alc. I do ; that they would all be lost.
Soc. Does not, in like manner, in the case of a state, the do-
ing ill follow upon all offices and power deficient in virtue 2
Alc. Necessarily. -
[61.] Soc. It is not meet then, O best (of men) Alcibi-
ades, to procure a tyrant's power either for yourself, or for
the state, if ye would be happy, but virtue.
Ale. You say true.
Soc. And before possessing virtue, it is better for a man,
and not a child alone, to be ruled by his better, than to rule.
Alc. It appears so.
Soc. Is not the better more beautiful likewise?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And is not the more beautiful more becoming 2*
Alc. How not P
Soc. It is becoming then for a bad man to be a slave; for
it is better.
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. Now vice is a thing becoming only to a slave.
Alc. It seems so.
Soc. But virtue is a thing becoming to a freeman.
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Ought we not, friend, to fly from what is becoming
to a slave 2 -
Alc. Most especially, Socrates 1
Soc. Perceive you then in what state you are? Is it such
as becomes a freeman, or not ?
Alc. I think I perceive it very strongly.
Soc. Know you then, how you may escape from that, which
iðtºry, translated “to the state, if he governs it:” which has led me to
suggest that in tróAst oiov lie hid tróXsog trpoo rateúovtu, olov– For thus
argoorateúovrt would answer to rvpavvsúourt in the very next sentence,
* This doctrine is more fully developed in the Hippias Major.
FIRST ALCIEIADES. 371
is now around you? (I say this) that we may not apply that
name” to a man of honour?
Alc. I do.
Soc. How P
Alc. If you, Socrates, are willing.
Soc. You say not well, Alcibiades 1
Alc. But what ought I to say?
Soc. This, “if a god is willing.”
Alc. So I say then. And I will add to those words this
too ; that we shall be in danger, Socrates, of changing cha-
racters, I (assuming) yours, and you mine. For it is not pos-
sible for me from this day forward not to follow you, as if I
were your tutor, and you were my pupil.
Soc. My love then for you, my noble Alcibiades, differs in
nothing from that of the stork;67 if after having hatched for
you a winged love, it shall be administered to in return by
this love of yours.
Alc. And such is the case; and I will begin henceforth to
pay all attention to what is just.
Soc. I wish you may persevere. But I have a great fear,
not indeed through distrusting your natural disposition, but
through perceiving the strength” of the city, lest it overcome
both me and you.
* i. e. ÖovXottp:Tràg. To this passage Cicero is supposed to allude in
Tuscul. iii. 32, where he states that—“quum Socrates Alcibiadi persua-
Sisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse, nec quidquam inter Alcibi-
adem summo loco natum et quemvis bajulum interesse, quum se Alcibiades
afflictaret lacrymansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet
turpitudinemgue depelleret——” But as Plato says nothing about Alcibiades
Shedding tears, Cicero must have got the anecdote from some other
Source; unless it be said that he found here Aakpāwy jokój plot—not simply
Aokój plot—
* This alludes to the story, that the young stork is wont, during the
periodical migrations of the birds, to carry on its back its parent, when
unable to fly. The earliest reference to this fable is in Soph. El.. 1047,
and in Pseudo-Babr. fab. 13, where the Stork says of itself, sings}}ortarov
%tówu Töv Špačv ru6m vö Tarápa kai voom.Asúw. For other passages see the
note of Ast, -
* Sydenham translates 5%pumv, “torrent,” as if he wished to read 68-
pany, literally, “dragging along,” which would be a more vivid expression.
I will state here, what I forgot to do in the Introduction, that Winckel-
mann agrees with Schleiermacher and Ast, in considering the First Alcibi-
ades not to be a genuine production of Plato; for in p. 126, C. § 46, the
word a tru6apur) is found, which according to Moeris was an Hellenic word,
but Öóxpm the Attic one.
2 B 2
INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND ALCIBLADES,
ON PRAY IN G.
ALTHOUGH different scholars have arrived at different conclusions
respecting the author of the First Alcibiades, yet nearly all appear
to admit that the Second was not written by Plato. Clinton indeed,
in Fast. Hellenic. p. 225, seems to consider it genuine. For he pro-
bably did not so much forget, as designedly disregard, the state-
ment made by Athenaeus in xi. p. 506, C., that the dialogue had
been attributed to Xenophon. It is however quoted as Plato's by
AElian V. H. viii. 9, Priscian, p. 1148, Olympiodorus on Phileb. p.
265, and Thom. Mag. Eöxopat. But in the last passage some MSS.
rightly read dig ó IIAarovukög Aóyog 'AAkt3udông Triypapópsvog # Tspi
Hpogeuxāg. It seems moreover to be alluded to by Juvenal in x.
346, and Persius ii. 61. But Stalbaum denies the existence of any
such allusion, and conceives that the author was some philosopher
of Alexandria, who lived in the second or third century before the
Christian aera, and who was not only ignorant of Plato's manner of
carrying on a dialogue, but of the purity and peculiarities of the
language spoken at Athens, which neither the philosopher himself,
nor any of his contemporaries, would have failed to adopt. But as
the dialogue has come down to us in rather a corrupt state, as re-
marked by Dobree, and that there is, according to Stalbaum himself,
scarcely a sentence where something does not occur to offend, it
seems hardly fair to lay upon the author all the faults to be found
in the dialogue, instead of attributing some to the carelessness of
37.4 INTIRODUCTION TO THE SECOND ALCIBIADES.
transcribers, and others to the accidents of time. My own opinion is,
that as Antisthenes wrote, or rather dressed up, a dialogue under the
title of Alcibiades, as we learn by Diogenes Laertius ii. 61, and that
the same person spoke ill of the son of Clinias, as stated by Athe-
naeus v. 20; and as we find in this dialogue more frequent allusions
to the AEsopo-Socratic fables, than are furnished by any dialogue of
Plato, or separate work of Xenophon; and that Julian, in Orat. vii.
p. 390, testifies to the fact that Antisthenes was accustomed, like
Xenophon, to have recourse to fables in his philosophical discourses,
one may fairly assign to him the authorship of the Second Alcibi-
ades; where he has not only represented his master as acting the
part of a sensible philosopher, but Alcibiades in that of a mere
ordinary man, instead of being, what he fancied he was, the ther,
—iving sun of Athens and the cynosure of Greece.
With regard to the matter of the dialogue, the folly or inutility
of prayer, as practised by the generality of mankind, Gottleber re-
fers to Xenophon's M. S. i. 3, where Socrates is said to have prayed
the gods simply to give what was good, leaving them to decide, as
knowing better than himself, what was or was not for his good.
The doctrine was adopted by Marcus Antoninus in v. 7, who says
that we must either pray in general terms, or not at all; while the
latter alternative was chosen by the philosophers of Cyrene, who,
as we learn from Clemens Alexandrinus in Stromat. vii. p. 722,
asserted the inutility of prayer.
TIHE
SEC OND AL CIBIADES.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.
SOCRATES.
[1.j ARE you going, Alcibiades, to pray to the god?'
Alc. Just so, Socrates.
Soc. You appear to have a serious look, and to be direct-
ing your eyes to the ground, as if thinking upon something.
Alc. Of what should a person be thinking, Socrates ?
Soc. Of things, Alcibiades, of the greatest moment, as it
seems to myself at least. For come, by Zeus, do you not
think, when we happen to pray, either in private or in public,
that the gods themselves * sometimes grant some of those
prayers, and some not, and to some persons they (nod assent),”
but to some not *
Alc. Very much so.
Soc. Does it not seem then to you that there is need of
much forethought, in order that a person may not unconscious-
ly pray for great evils for himself, while thinking (he is
praying) for good; and that the gods may not happen to be in
such a disposition, as to grant whatever he happens to be
praying for 2 just as they say CEdipus did, in praying that his
* As the deity is not mentioned, Sydenham and Koeppen suppose it
was Zeus, but Gottleber Apollo.
* Buttmann would reject abrol, as being perfectly unnecessary. It is
however defended by Reinhold Klotz in Quaest. Crit. p. 24. I long ago
suggested dºvraiot, to answer to “malignis” in Juvenal x. 3, “Magnaque
numinibus vota exaudita malignis.” p
* In lieu of airtºv Ficinus seems to have found karavčijeuv, as shown
by his version, “annuere.”
376 SECOND ALCIBIADES.
sons might divide their patrimony by the sword; * (and) *
when he might have prayed for his then present evils to be
averted, he uttered a curse that others might be superadded ;
and thereupon both these were brought to pass, and after
these others too, many and terrible,” of which what need is there
to speak singly P
Alc. But, Socrates, you have spoken of a man who was
mad; for who, think you, of sound mind would venture to
make such a prayer P
[2] Soc. Does it seem to you, that to be mad is at all the
contrary to being in one's senses?
Alc. Perfectly so.
Soc. Do not men seem to you to be senseless and sensible?
Alc. Yes, to be so. -
Soc. Come then, let us consider who these are. For that
there are men senseless and sensible you have admitted, and
others who are mad.
Alc. It has been admitted.
Soc. Moreover, there are some men in a sound state of
health P -
Ale. There are.
Soc. And are there not others in a bad state of health 2
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. These are not the same with those 2
Ale. They are not.
Soc. Are there not others, who are in neither of those states?
Ale. Certainly not.
Soc. For every man must of necessity be either in a diseased
State Or not.
Alc. It seems so to myself at least.
Soc. What then with respect to intellect and non-intellect,
have you the same opinion ?
Ale. How say you?
* The curse is described by Euripides in Phoen. 70, 'Apāg &pārat traw-
oiv &voowtárag Gmicrº ovoſipºp 60 pa Śua)\axéiv Tóðs: where see Valc-
kenaer. - -
* Stephens suggested the insertion of kai from “cumque,” in Ficinus.
Buttmann, however, and Hommel on Sympos. p. 186, B., and Stalbaum
consider it unnecessary.
* For the whole family was destroyed. And hence Juvenal says in x.
7, “Evertere domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Di faciles.”
SECOND ALCIBIATOES. 37-
Soc, Does it seem to you to be necessary" for a man to
be sensible or senseless 2 Or is there some third and middle
state, which causes a man to be neither sensible nor senseless 2
Alc. There certainly is not. º
Soc. It is necessary then for him to be in the one or in the
other" of those states.
Alc. So it seems to me at least.
[3.] Soc. Do you not remember that you admitted this,
that insanity is contrary to being in one's senses 2
Alc. I do.
Soc. And that there is no middle or third state, which
causes a man to be neither sensible nor senseless P
Alc. I admitted this too. - -
Soc. But how can two different things be contrary to one
thing?
Alc. By no means.
Soc. *To be senseless then, and to be mad, seem to be nearly
the same thing.”
Z"le. They seem so.
Sec. If then we should pronounce that all fools were mad-
men, we should pronounce rightly, Alcibiades, For example,
ºf some of your equals in age, happen to be senseless, as in-
deed they are, and some of your elders likewise, "come, by
* The Greek is Aoksi oroi oióv Ts sivat, “Do you think it possible,”
&c. But Ficinus has “Opinaris hominem—esse oportere’—as if he had
read in his MS. Aoksi ool 68 in sivat, “Do you think that a man ought to
be.” Both readings interfere equally with the argument, which requires
us to read, Aoksi oot &vaykaiov sivat, as we have translated in English,
and Dacier has done similarly in French. S. From whence Buttmann was
led to Aoksi oot &váykm sivat. But Wex, in Commentat. de Menon, p. 43,
has suggested—öoksic àJöV (i. e. div6potov) 6Vra sival # ºppévipov fi
dippova : Stalbaum, Ei Öoksi ool uévov riv' sivat: and Sauppe, Eiðckéig
oùx oióv repur) gival. The reader is therefore left to take his choice.
* Although Érepov is acknowledged by “alterum ” in Ficinus, yet cor-
rect Greek requires ékárspov, “alterutrum,” as I have translated after
Sydenham.
*—" That the Stoics derived from Socrates their celebrated paradox Tráv
, rag Točg áºpovag plaívčo 6at, “all fools are mad,” is justly observed by
Cicero in Tuscul. iii. 5; where Davis refers to this passage in Plato. S.
But on the other hand Boeckh was led to believe that this dialogue was
written subsequent to the time of Socrates, when the ductrines of the Stoics
were more in vogue.
*—” Ficinus omits the words pēps Trpèg Auðg—
378 SECOND ALCIBIADES.
Jove,” do you not think that in this city there are few sensible
men, but the majority senseless, whom you call madmen 2
Alc. Yes, I do.
Soc. Think you then, that, living under the same state
with so many madmen, we should be delighted," or that we
should not be buffeted, and pelted, and have long since suffered
punishment for such acts as madmen are wont to commit 2
But consider, thou blessed man, whether this be the case.
Ale. What then could it be, Socrates ? For it appears
nearly to be not what I just now fancied.
Soc. Neither does it appear so to myself. But let us look
at the matter in some such way as this.
Ale. In what way do you mean?
Soc. I will tell you. [4.] We understand that some men
are in bad health ; do we not ? .
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. Does it seem to you necessary for every man in bad
health to have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia P" Or does
it not seem to you that a man, without suffering at all in this
way, may be ill in some other disorder? For diseases, we
suppose, are of many various kinds, and not these alone.
Ale. I suppose there are.
Soc. Does not every ophthalmia seem to be a disease ?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. But is every disease ophthalmia P
Alc. Certainly not, it seems to me. Yet still I am at a loss
about your meaning.
Soc. If, however, you will give me your attention, *by con-
sidering the matter, both of us together" will peradventure
discover it.
Ale. I am giving you, Socrates, all attention, to the best of
my power.
Soc. Was it not agreed upon by us, that every ophthalmia
was a disease; but every disease was not an ophthalmia P
10 Stalbaum translates Xaipovrag “impune’—But that use of the verb
xaſpsw is found only in a threat.
ii Although “ophthalmia” is a Greek word written merely in English
letters, it has now becom naturalized to express a peculiar disorder in
the eves.
.*. Here is an allusion to Hom. IA. K. 224, Xàv re 65' 3pxoſtévo-
from whence re has crept in, where the author wrote ye—The same allu-
sion is found likewise in the Banquet, p. 174, D. § 2.
SECOND ALCIBLADES. 379
4tc. It was agreed so.
Soc. And it seems to me to have been correctly agreed.
For all persons in a fever have a disease; but not all, how-
ever, who have a disease, are in a fever; neither have they
all I think the gout, nor ophthalmia. Every thing indeed
of this kind is a disease; and they, whom we call physicians,
say that diseases produce different effects. For all diseases
are not alike, nor do they all act similarly, but each according
to its own peculiar power; and yet they are all diseases, just
as we understand there are in the case of workmen; do we
not 2 *
Alc. Certainly.
[5.] Soc. Such as shoemakers, carpenters, statuaries, and
very many others, whom why need one mention in de-
tail P All these have divided amongst them portions of handi-
craftship, and yet all are handicraftsmen. They are not,
however, carpenters, nor shoemakers, nor statuaries, taken
altogether.
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. Just so have men divided folly amongst them. And
those, who have the largest share, we call madmen ; but those,
who have a less, silly, and thunder-struck.” But if we choose
to speak of such in good-omened language, some call them high-
spirited, but others simpletons; and others again, harmless
and inexperienced, and speechless.” You will also find, upon
inquiry, many other names. But they all mean non-intellect;
although they differ, just as one art has been shown by us
(to differ) from another; and one disease from another. Or
how does it seem to you ?
Alc. To me in this way.
Soc. *To the point then (from whence we digressed)” let
us return back again. For it was proposed, I think, in the
* In Greek, pſ3povtårovg: for the effect of lightning when attended
by thunder, and indeed of all electrical fire, is to stupify, at least for a
time, whatever animal it strikes. S.
* The Greek is Éveoig, a word properly applied to infants. Of these
three epithets, the first alludes to the wholly useless in any affair; the
next to the easy to be imposed on ; and the last to those who, from the
want of ideas, have nothing to say. S. But £veóg is rather said of a
person struck dumb, as shown by Ruhnken on Timaeus, p. 102.
*—” I have followed Ficinus, “Sed ut redeamus unde digressi stimus,”
rather than the Greek Očkočv &T'ékstvov ráAuv ŠtravéA6wuev, where
$rsivov has nothing to which it can be referred.
380 SECOND ALCIBIADES,
beginning of our conversation to consider who are the sense-
less, and sensible. For it was agreed that some such existed.
Was it not P
Ale. Yes, it was so agreed.
Soc. Whether then do you understand by the sensible,
those who know how to do and say what they ought 2
Alc. I do.
Soc. And whom (do you understand) by the senseless?
Are they not such as know neither of those things?
Alc. Those very persons.
Soc. Will not those persons then, who know neither of
those things, unconsciously say and do what they ought 2
Alc. It appears so. -
[6.] Soc. Now of these very persons, Alcibiades, CEdipus, I
said, was one. And you will find many of those living even
now, who, though not influenced by anger, as he was, pray for
things hurtful to themselves; not fancying them to be so, but
good (rather).” He indeed, as he did not pray for (good),
so neither did he fancy (he was doing so). But some others
there are, who have suffered the very contrary to this. For
I think that you, if the god to whom you happen to be going
should appear to you, and, before you had uttered a prayer,
first ask you—“Will it suffice for you to become a despotic king”
of Athens; ” and, if you thought this a trifle, *[and no great
thing,118 should add “and over all the Greeks; ” and, if he
should see that you fancied you would still have” too little,
unless he were 20 to appoint you king” of the whole of Eu-
rope; and should undertake not this alone, (but) that on this
very day, according to your wish, all should perceive that Al-
cibiades, the son of Clinias, is their autocrat—I think you
would walk away exceedingly delighted, as if you had met
with the greatest good. -
* Ficinus has “sed bona potius,” as if he had found in his MS. &AAá
puff}\\ov &ya.0á.
º Tº word rúpavvog every where in Plato signifies a despotic mon-
&TCI1. S. &
*—” The words uſ uéya ru are evidently an explanation of haüMov.
* Instead of #ysiv, the sense requires either éxety div or ééetv, as I
have translated.
*—” Since in lieu of intrograín goi, one MS. has caragrãoot, from the
two united I elicited, many years ago. &vakra karagrãosts oré, similar to
&sorrórat caréormoſav in Isocrates, p. 478, Bekk., and āpxovrag ka9tarāvat
in Thucyd. iv. 132.
SECOND ALCIBIADES. 381
Alc. I fancy, Socrates, that any one else whatever would
do so likewise, if such things were to happen to him.
Soc. You would not, however, be willing that the country
of, and absolute dominion over, all the Greeks and Barbarians
should be yours in exchange for your life.”
Alc. I suppose not; (for why should I?) when I was about
to make no use of them.
Soc. What then, if you were about to make a bad and de-
trimental use of them, you would not (be willing) even in
such a case ?
Alc. Certainly not.
[7.] Soc. You see then that it is not safe to accept at ran-
dom gifts when offered; nor for a person to pray that things
may take place, if he is about to be injured through them, or
be totally released from life. Many, too, we could mention,
who after having longed for absolute power, and laboured to
obtain it, as if about to enjoy some mighty good, have, on ac-
count of their tyranny, been plotted against and lost their
lives.” I think, too, that some events, which happened as it
were but yesterday,” have come to your ears, how that a
favourite?4 of Archelaus, tyrant of Macedonia, murdered his
admirer, through his being as fond of absolute power, as
the tyrant was of him, and with the view of becoming the
tyrant himself, and a happy man; but that, possessing the
power for three or four days, he was in turn plotted against
by some of his friends and destroyed. You see, too, of our
own fellow-citizens—for this we have not heard from others,
but know by being present ourselves—that such as have
longed for, and obtained, the command of an army, some are
even now exiles from the city, and others have ended their
lives; and such, as seemed to have fared the best, have passed
* In Alcibiad. i. p. 105, A. § 4, there is a very similar train of argu-
ment. But there the son of Clinias is represented as preferring power to
life. From the change in his feelings it is fair to infer that this dialogue
relates to a period, when he had become somewhat cooled down by age.
* The author had probably in view the fate of Peisistratus and Hip-
parchus.
* The phrase X61%& ré kai ºrpwižá is taken from Homer in I\, B. 303.
In Attic prose Greek it is x0&g kai Trpiónv, found in Gorg. p. 470. BUTTM.
* The name of the favourite is Kparsūag, in AElian W. H. viii. 9,
Kpérspoc in Diodorus, lxiv. p. 761, but Kparaiog in Aristot. Polit. v. 8, 11.
382 SECONID ALCIBIADES.
through many trying dangers and terrors” during the cann-
paign itself;” and when they have returned to their own coun-
try, have suffered from informers a siege not at all inferior to
that, which they have endured from foreign foes; so that some
of them prayed they had never been at the head of an army,
rather than to have borne a command. [8.] Now, if the
dangers and toils had tended to their benefit,” it would have
had some reason;” but now it is quite the reverse. And with
respect to children, you will find in the very same manner, how
that some persons, after having prayed for them to be born,
have, when they are born,” come into the greatest calamities
and sorrows. For some, whose children have been thoroughly
wicked, have passed the whole of their lives in sorrow ; and
some, whose children were well-behaved, have met with the
misfortune to be deprived of them, and have come into ca-
lamities in no respect less than the others, and, like them,
have wished rather that their children had been never born.”
And yet, although these, and many other instances of the like
kind, are so very evident to persons, it is rare to find a man
who would refuse what is offered, or who, if he is about
to obtain it by prayer, would cease to pray for it. Nor
would the majority refrain from absolute power, if offered
them, or the command of an army, or many other things,
which, when present, do more harm than good; but they
would, on the contrary,” pray for their possession, should
such things happen not to be present to any one. And yet,
after waiting a little time, they sometimes recant,” and pray
the reverse of what they prayed before. I have therefore my
* Instead of péſławy, Sydenham would prefer tróvov, as better suited
to kivövvoi Ts kai Tóvou, just afterwards.
* I have adopted #1 airff rij arpatig, which Ficinus found in his MS.
as shown by his version—“in ipso exercitu.”
*7–” The Greek is sixévêv— But as there is nothing to which the verb
can be referred, Ficinus introduced “hoc studium.” The author wrote,
I suspect, six) sixév čv– “a prayer would have had—”
* The word fjöm, which now precedes ysvěoffat, should be united to
7évopačvov. S.
* I have omitted here 7 yevão 6aw with Ficinus; whose version is, “ac
prorsus eligerent nunquam Se filios genuisse.”
* Instead of dºd, the sense requires &AA’ aſſ—
* Gottleber quotes opportunely Maxim. Tyr. xxx. p. 313, Miðaç—
roueirai traXtvq?diav Tijg sixfig.
SECOND ALCIBIADES. 383
doubts, that men do in reality accuse the gods unjustly, in
saying that their evils come from them; for either by their
own crimes or follies, we should say,
They griefs endure beyond their fated share.82
[9.] And that poet, Alcibiades, was near to being a sensible
person, who, when connected with some friends void of under-
standing, and observing them to do and pray for things which
it were better for them (not to have), but which appeared to
them (to be good), thought proper to use in common a prayer,
which he expresses somehow to this effect—
* Oh, Zeus, our king, whate'er is good vouchsafe
To us, if prayers we offer or do not;
But evil, when we pray thee to avert,”
Do thou ordain.”
To me indeed the poet appears to speak correctly and safely.
But if you have aught in your mind against this sentiment,
do not hold your tongue.
Alc. It is a difficult matter, Socrates, to speak against any
thing which is said correctly. But I am thinking on that
point, of how many evils to man is ignorance the cause; since,
as it seems, through it we are unconsciously doing to ourselves
the greatest mischiefs, and, what is the worst, even praying for
them; a fact which no one would fancy; but every one would
conceive this rather, that he is competent to pray for things
the best for himself, and not the worst ; for this would in
reality be like a curse, and not a prayer.
Soc. But perhaps, O best of men, some one who happens
to be wiser than you or I, would say, that we do not speak
correctly in blaming thus at random ignorance, unless we
add that of some things and to some persons and under
certain circumstances, ignorance is a good, as it is to them an
evil.
Alc. How say you ? Is there any thing whatever, of
* Here, as Sydenham remarks, is an allusion to Od. I. 32.
*—” The Greek couplet is found with some slight variations in Antho-
log. Epigr. 'Aóéotrot. 466, ed. Br. The same verses have been lately found
likewise in Orion Antholog. Gnomic. and published by Schneidewinn in
Conject. Crit. p. 48, as remarked by Sauppe, who refers to Proclus in
Platon. Rep. 402, 26, ed. Bas.
* Instead of kºsëst, which is unintelligible, Ficinus found in his MS,
kéAsve, as shown by his version, “abesse jube—”
384 SECOND A LCIBLADES.
which it is better for any person whatever, under any circum-
stances whatever, to be ignorant than to know?
Soc. So it seems to me at least; and does it not to you?
Alc. No, by Zeus.
[10.] Soc. I will not bring a verdict against you on the
point of your being willing to do” to your own mother, what
they say Orestes and Alcmaeon did, or whoever else may have
happened to act in the same manner as they did.
Alc. Speak, by Zeus, words of good omen, Socrates.
Soc. There is no need, Alcibiades, of your bidding that
person to speak words of good omen, who says that you would
not be willing to do such a deed, but much rather him, who
says the contrary. (But) * since the deed appears to you to
be so dreadful, that it ought not to be mentioned so easily,
do you think that Orestes, if he had been a sensible per-
son, and known what it was best for him to do, would have
dared to commit any such act?
Alc. By no means.
Soc. Nor would, I think, any other man.
Alc. Certainly not. f
Soc. * The ignorance therefore of what is best is an evil;
and to be ignorant of the best.”
Alc. So it appears, at least to me.
Soc. And to him, and to all other men.
Ale. So I say. \
Soc. Let us consider further this too. If it occurred to
you on this very instant to think it were a better thing for
you to take a dagger, and, going to the house of Pericles, your
guardian and your friend, to ask—Is he within—with the in-
tention of killing only him, and no other person, and that the
servants should say—He is within.—[11.] I do not assert that
* Respecting the murder of his mother Clytemnestra by Orestes, it will
be sufficient to refer to the Choephori of Æschylus, and the Electra of
Sophocles, and Euripides; and for that of Alcmaeon, to the Scholia on
Hom. Od. xi. 326; Servius on Virgil’s AFn. vi. 445; and Apollodorus iii. 6.
S. Who might have added the fragments of the Alcmaeon of Euripides,
some of which are to be found translated into Latin in Cicero’s Academics.
* I have adopted Buttmann’s conjecture, that 68 has dropt out after Öm.
Hommel however, on Sympos. p. 189, D., defends the want of connexion;
while Stalbaum would read & Teuta-
*—” In the words between the numerals there is a tautology wh'ch
Gottleber was the first to notice; but it was found in the MS. used by
Priscian, who quotes the whole passage in p. 1148
$ECOND A LCIBLADES. 385
you have an inclination to do any of these things; * but if, as
I think, it shall seem good to you, what surely nothing pre-
vents, that to him, who is ignorant of what is the best, an opinion
has at some time occurred, so that what is even the worst,
has been thought at some time to be the best.” Or does it
not seem to you it would be 2
Alc. Certainly so. -
Soc. If then, upon going within, you should see himself
there, but not knowing him, should think he was some other
person, would you still venture to kill him P
Alc. No, by Zeus; I do not think I should.
Soc. For you would not (kill) any person, who happened
to meet you, but only that very person, whom you wished (to
kill). Is it not so?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And if you made frequent attempts, but were always
ignorant of his being Pericles, *[whenever you were about
to do the deed, ° you never would make an attack upon him.
Alc. Certainly not. -
Soc. What then, do you think that Orestes would ever have
made an attack upon his mother, if in like manner he had not
known her ?
Alc. I think he would not. -
Soc. For he too had it not in his mind to kill any woman,
who might meet him, nor the mother of any person whatever,
but his own mother. - -
Alc. Such is the fact.
Soc. To persons then so situated, and having such fancies,
it is better not to know such things.
Alc. It appears so. -
Soc. Do you then perceive, that of some things, and to some
persons, and under some circumstances, ignorance is a good,
and not, as it seemed to you just now, an evil?
Alc. It is probable.
*—* Such is the literal translation of the Greek, out of which neither
Sydenham nor any one else have been able to make the least sense, except
by alterations more or less violent. Ficinus has, what is at least intelli-
gible, “Sed an videatur tibi, quod quidem nihil prohibet, ignoranti tibi,
quid sit optimum, adesse posse interdum opinionem, ut judices, quod
est pessimum, nonnunquam optimum esse.”
*—39 The words within brºke; are properly omitted by Ficinuſ.
C
386 SECOND ALCIBIADES.
[12.] Soc. Further still, if you are willing to consider what
is after this, it would perhaps appear to you to be absurd—”
Alc. What especially, Socrates?
Soc. That the possession of (all)* other sciences, so to
speak, is, unless a person possesses the science” of what is
best, very near to being seldom a benefit, but generally hurt-
ful to the person possessing it.” And consider in this way.
Does it not seem to you necessary that, when we are about to
do or say any thing, we ought to know, or previously fancy we
know, or know in reality, what we are about to say or do
rather readily P
Alc. To me at least it seems so.
Soc. Do not then our public speakers, either knowing how
to counsel, or fancying they know, give us their counsel on the
instant on every occasion, some about war and peace, others,
about the building of walls, or furnishing harbours; and, in
one word, whatever one state does to another state, or itself
by itself, all takes place from the advice of the orators.
Alc. You speak the truth.
Soc. See then what is after this.
*Alc. If I am able.
Soc. * You surely call persons sensible and senseless.
Alc. I do. -
Soc. Do you not (call) the many senseless, but the few
sensible 2
* Ficinus has “Praeterea si volueris—mirabile dictu discutere forte
probabile videbitur,” which Sydenham adopted; and from whence Butt-
mann elicited droºrov Óv, toog āv oroi Eikög 56&suev ćivat. Stalbaum once
proposed towg &v got Tu 66ásuev ćivat: and so Sydenham before him.
* I have adopted the “omnium” of Ficinus. For without that woró
the limitation of the universality in dog Étrog sitréiv would be unintelligible.
Otherwise we must omit dºg Étrog sitréiv, as Ficinus has done.
* Sydenham was the first to perceive that rijg was required here be-
tween ävév and Toij, as is evident from $ 15, where the assertion is re
peated. The correction is attributed to Schleiermacher by Buttmann.
* Instead of airá in all the MSS. but two, which read &vröv, Schnei-
der suggested airó, whom Bekker and Stalbaum have followed. The
credit of the correction is due to Sydenham, who was led to it by com-
paring $ 15. He likewise anticipated airág, formerly proposed by Stal-
baum.
* Instead of Trpärov, Ficinus seems to have read in his MS. Trpárepov,
answering to his “prius.” But irpárov is found again in § 14.
hº I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by
&llSºlès -
SECOND ALCIBLADES.
3
8
7
Ale. Just so.
Soc. And (you call) both so, with an eye to something.
Alc. Yes.
[13.] Soc. Would you call that man sensible, who knows
how to give advice, but without (knowing) whether a thing
is better, and in what it is better P -
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. Nor him, I think, who knows war abstractedly, but
without (knowing) when it is better, or for how long a time
it is better. Is it not so P
Alc. It is.
Soc. Nor if a person knows how to murder another, or to
take away his property, or to cause him to be an exile from his
country, without (knowing) when it is better, or to whom it
is better (to do so).
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. The man, therefore, who possesses any knowledge of
such a kind, unless the knowledge also of what is best follows
at his side—now this is surely the same as the knowledge of
what is beneficial—4°Is it not so?
Alc. Certainly it is.
Soc. Shallwe say that he is a sensible” and a competent coun-
sellor both for the state and himself; but that the man 47 who
does not do so, is the contrary of these ?” Or how seems it
to you ?
Alc. To me in this way.
Soc. What then, should a person who knows how to ride, or
shoot with a bow, or wrestle, or box, or engage in any other kind
of combat, or in any thing else which we know by art, by what
name will you call him, who knows what takes place the better
48—" The whole passage between the numerals Ficinus thus translates—
“hunc forte prudentem vocabis. Alc. Hunc ipsum. Soc. Pruden-
temque ipsum dicemus’—
47–47 The Greek is rôv Šē pur) Trovoúvra Tāvavria roërov. In lieu of
rotojvra, Sydenham suggested diſpexotivra, that is, diſpexéiv Štriotápévov,
or else rotoirov : which last conjecture Stalbaum attributes to Schnei-
der, and once called it “an egregious” one ; but he afterwards proposed
to omit Trotočvra entirely. I suggested many years ago–Töv Čš paſſ trai-
ovra robrov, rāvavria—but I should have corrected rather Töv Čš ºn trai-
ovrá ru roirov, similar to ru rotºrwu #7tateuv, in Theaetet, p. 145, D., i. e.
“but the person knowing none of these things, the reverse.” Sauppe would
read row 68 pur) voojvra—
2 c 2
388 SECOND AI, CIBLADES.
according to each art?” (Will you not call him, who knows)
according to the equestrian art, an equestrian P
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And him (who knows) according to the boxing art, a
boxer 2 but him, according to the hautboy-playing art, a haut-
boy-player; and in the rest of cases surely analogously to
these ? Or how otherwise?
Alc. Not otherwise than in this way.
Soc. Does it then seem to you necessary that the person
knowing any of these, is a sensible man? Or shall we say that
he wants much of being sof
Alc. Much indeed, by Zeus.
[14.] Soc. What kind of a commonwealth do you think
there would be, composed of good bow-men and hautboy-
players, and still more of athletes” and other artists, and of
those mixed with such as we have just now mentioned, who
know how to war "in the abstract, and to murder in the ab-
stract;” and, moreover, of orators puffed up with the states-
man's swell,” but all devoid of the knowledge of what is best,
and of that, which knows when it is better to make use of
each one of those things, and against whom P
Ale. A bad one, Socrates, I think.
Soc. And you would say, I think, when you saw each one
of these men full of ambition, and giving the greatest share he
has in the commonwealth to that point,
Where he may happen to be best himself.”
* In lieu of kará raûrmy rijv réxvny, Ficinus found in his MS. kará
*ēxvny, as shown by his version—“in arte.” Buttmann suggested ka9’
#káormy triv réxvmy, which I have adopted,
* We have no word in English to answer to &0\mrijg, by which was
meant a person contending in all kinds of bodily exercises.
* Ficinus twice omits airò–
* The cant English word “swell” answers exactly to the Greek på-
&mpia. Stalbaum has given here a facetious anecdote, preserved by Eu-
stathius on IX. X. p. 1151 == 1205, who states that when Demeas, the son
of Diomedes by a female hautboy-player, was acting the swell as an Orator,
Hyperides stopped him by saying, Will you not be silent, nor swell your
cheeks more than your mother did? -
* The author alludes to a passage quoted by Plato in Gorg. p. 481,
E., from the Antiope of Euripides; where instead of Tijg aroXvreiaç, is
found juápac : and hence in lieu of troXttsiac I should prefer Tpaypa-
Tetag, especially as Cicero has in Rep. i. 22, “Cum in suo quemgue opere
artificem, qui quidem excellat, nihil aliud cogitare, meditari, curare
videam, nisi quo sit in illo genere melior.”
SECOND AI.CIBIADES. 389
I mean that which becomes best according to his own art,”
*but of that which is the best for the state, and himself
for himself having missed for the most part, as having I think
trusted without intellect to opinion.* Since then such is the
case, should we not speak correctly in saying that such a com-
monwealth was full of great disorder and of lawlessness?
Alc. Right indeed, by Zeus.
Soc. Did it not seem to us to be necessary that we ought
previously to fancy we know, or to know in reality, what we
are about to say or do readily P*
Alc. It seems so.
[15.] Soc. *Should then a person do what he knows, or
thinks he knows, and there follow that we have ourselves be-
neficially and profitably both to the state and himself to him-
self, is not—”
Alc. How not ?
* So Sydenham, as if he wished to read card rºv attoiſ Téxvny, instead
of cat' airi)w rijv Téxvnv, “according to art in the abstract,” which I
cannot understand.
*—” Such is the literal translation of the Greek, where I am now, as
I was many years ago, quite in the dark. For I cannot see, nor could
Stephens, how airòy can be united to tróXst by a copulative conjunction;
nor how airów can be said of the thing meant by 38Attorov, nor on what
the accusative Óumpiaprikóra depends; nor, lastly, why there should be
any mention made of a person trusting to opinion without intellect; al-
though it is true that there is a reference to this passage in § 15, but
there all is as clear as it is here the reverse.
* In § 12, the word is Tpoxetporépog, where Sauppe prefers Tpoxsipwg,
as read here. -
*—" Here again a literal version will best show that it was not without
reason that Sydenham wrote a very long note, and closed it with pro-
posing to read Oikoúv, kāv pièv Tpérry Tug, à oičev, TapáTmtat Öé à Toi
{33}\riotov Štrigrhum, #66ket juiv \vours}\otivtwg #éew tº TóAët kai attöv
aúrg, i. e. Should then a person do what he knows, and should the
knowledge of what is the best accompany (the act), did it not seem to us
that he would be in a condition advantageous to the state and to himself?
To these emendations Sydenham was led by finding in Ficinus, “Nonne,
Si quis agit quidem, quod novit, aut nosse existimat, addit autem. Scientiam
optimi, Sequitur ut utiliter agat, et ad se ipsum et ad rem publicam.”
From whence Buttmann too wished to elicit trapáTrn Tav Šâ h Toà & ſheXtpov
#Truotſium, referring to § 13, 60 rug dipa Tu Töv Tototroy oióev, Šáv pièv
Trapéirm rat ā Toij (38Xriotov Štrigrhum—airm 68 jv air.) &#Tov #Tºp kai
i) Toij (bºčAiptov. With regard to my own refiction of the passage, to
which I still adhere, I will refer the reader to my edition of this
dialogue.
390 SECOND ALCIBLADES,
Soc. 57 But if (he does) I think the contrary of these,”
there (will be a benefit) neither to the public nor himself.
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. What then does it seem to you now P In the like
manner,” or somehow otherwise ?
Alc. Not otherwise than this.
Soc. Did you not say that you called the many senseless,
but the few sensible 2
Alc. I did. .
Soc. And do we not say again that the many have missed
of what is the best, by having generally, I think, trusted to
opinion without intellect 2
Alc. We say it.
Soc. It is for the interest then of the many neither to know
anything, nor to fancy they know, if they shall be more ready
to do what they know, or fancy they know, and by doing so
are about” to be still more injured than benefited.
Ale. You say what is most true. -
Soc. 90 Do you see then” that when I said, that the pos-
session of the other sciences is, unless a person possesses the
science of what is best, very near to being seldom beneficial,
and generally hurtful to the person possessing it, did I not
appear to be speaking in reality correctly f
Ale. If not then, yet now it seems so, Socrates.
[16.] Soc. It is requisite then for "a state, and a soul that
*7–97 The Greek is 'Edv 65 y', oluai, Tāvavria roštov– But as the
sentence has reference to the preceding remark of Socrates, to express
the required sense, we ought to read Eów 0° àyvota (sc. roi; &q&tuov
Trapé Turat), rāvavria toûtwy—i.e. “But if the ignorance of what is useful
follows, the contrary of this will happen.” So Sydenham ; who did not
perceive that the ellipse was to be thus supplied—’Eáv Óé yé (ºrpárry)
rávavría Toârgov, oùre rà TróAët oft' airów airp (AvoureXoëvrwg £ew)
—and hence we can see the necessity of either omitting oipal with Ficinus,
or altering it into Éviv, and placing it after airò.
* Instead of dooraútwg, the očTwg in the reply requires here likewise
oùrwg, answering to “ita” in Ficinus. -
* The Greek is {3\átrteq 0au Tà TrAsia pučN\ov —But as there is
nothing to govern B\67Treo6au, Schneider suggested puéA\ovoſt for pâXXov.
But, says Stalbaum, # cannot follow Tó TrAsia). We may, therefore, read
frt TrAsia)—and so I have translated, answering to Ficinus, “nocebunt
crebrius quam conferent.”
*—” The words āpāg of v 3rt are properly omitted by Ficinus; for they
cannot precede the interrogation at the end of the speech—&p’ obyi—
*—" This union of a state and a soul is a rather strange combina,
SECONI) ALCIBIADES. 391
is about to live correctly," to cling to this science ; just as a
person in sickness does to a physician, or a person about to
sail in safety does to a steersman, 0°by so much as the soul
may not previously have a favourable wind, either respecting
the possession of property or the strength of body, or any
thing else of such a kind,” by so much the greater errors is it
necessary, it seems, to arise from them; and he who possesses
what is called much learning and much art, but is destitute
of this very science, and is carried along by each of the others,
will he not in reality justly "encounter a violent storm, inas-
much as he is, I think, continuing at sea without a steersman,
a time not long life of gods;* so that it seems to me that here
too suits the sentiment of the poet, which he expresses, while
he is bringing a charge against some one that
Trades many knew he; but knew badly all.”
tion of ideas; and no less, so is the syntax, where the singular rºy pièA-
\ovoay follows TróAuv and lºvyºv : while neither the state nor soul can be
fairly said “to live correctly.” What the author probably wrote may be
seen in my edition, together with the reasons for the alterations proposed.
*—” Such is the literal version of a passage, which Dacier said was one
of the most difficult in Plato. The first person who appears to have had
a glimpse of the right reading, was Sydenham; who saw that two sentences
had been transposed; and so after him did Schneider, to whom the credit
of the discovery is given by Buttmann, whose conjecture of Nagpörspov
for pur) ºrpórspov Sydenham had already anticipated; while Stalbaum
would prefer either Wex’s pur) Tpgórspov, or his own puri Aguárepow. In
my own edition I stated that the sense was perhaps something to this
effect—“For without this knowledge, by how much the more does for-
tune with a favouring wind urge on a headlong disposition;” and that
the whole passage concealed a fragment of tragedy. Sauppe suggests
$gq, yāp àv \agpörspov štrovptop td. rāg Túxng divew raûTng # Tspi—
where rôxmg for livXijg is due to Dacier.
*—” Here too is another corrupt passage, which has hitherto defied
the Sagacity of scholars to restore it satisfactorily. And perhaps the same
remark will be applied to my own attempt in the edition already referred
to. Ficinus has in the concluding clause, “quippe cum absºlue guber-
natore oberret in pelago brevi tempore periturus,” to which he was led,
I suspect, rather by the sense, than what he found in the MS. before him.
* This verse is taken from a mock-heroic poem, called the “Margites,”
to which Aristotle refers in Poet. c. 4, and Nichomach. Eth. vi. 7. Other
references are to be found in Fabricius Biblioth. Graec. l. ii. c. 2, § 24. S.
The poem seems to have been a parody of the Odyssey, where Ulysses is
represented as the model of wisdom; while the matter of it was, like the
Batrachomyomachia, an imitation of, and cento from, Homer. Thus the
line, IIóAA’ Trioraro èpya, kakajg 3’ Triorato Trávra, is not unlike
roXAá ré ºn Mál, in IA. B. 213, and it would be still more like, if the
392 SECONT) ALCIBIADES.
Ale. But how, Socrates, does the verse of this poet suit
here? For to me it seems to say nothing to the purpose.
Soc. Nay, it is very much to the purpose. But this poet
writes enigmatically, and so do nearly all the others. [17.]
For the whole of poetry is naturally enigmatical; and it is not
for a person who is to be met with any where, to understand it;
and in addition to its being such naturally, when it seizes upon
a man of a grudging disposition and unwilling to make himself
known, but desirous to conceal, as much as possible, his wis-
dom, it seems to be difficult beyond measure to understand
what each of those poets mean. For you cannot, Surely,
think that Homer, a poet most divine and clever, was ignorant
how impossible it is for a person to know a thing badly; for
he it is, who says that Margites knew many things, but knew
all badly; but he speaks enigmatically, I suppose, by intro-
ducing the word “badly” instead of the word “bad,” and
“he knew” instead of “to know.” There is then a sentence
composed, unshackled by the metre, and it expresses what he
meant, that “He knew many trades; but that to know all was
to him an evil.” It is evident then, that if to know many
things was to him an evil, he himself was someworthless fellow ;
at least if we must give any credit to the reasonings previously
produced.
Alc. And so it seems, Socrates, to me; for I should hardly
give credit to other reasonings, if not to these.
Soc. And correctly does it seem so.
* Ale. Again it seems to me.”
Soc. But come, by Zeus, for you surely see, how great
reading were, as quoted by a Scholiast, IIoWAd pièv jösa £pyav, kakóg 68
pad X’ jöes Trávra. -
* The Greek is, divri roi kakoú; but we suspect the right reading to be
&vri Toi “ caköv,” that is, &vri roi Övöpatoc “kaków,” instead of the
noun “evil :” as āvri Toij čTrio Tao'6au, just after, means &vri Toi dºra-
pépparov 'EIIIXTAX0AI, instead of the infinitive “to know.” S.
* The whole of this argument is evidently a ridicule of some of the so-
phists, who were accustomed to draw inferences from isolated passages in
Homer, but not without giving them a forced meaning, and one better
suited, than the common interpretation, to their own views. -
*7—67 The words between the numerals, found in Ficinus, and all the
MSS. but one, Stalbaum says are excessively silly, whether they are
assigned to Alcibiades, or, as in Ficinus, to Socrates. What the author
wrote, may be seen in my edition, together with the reasons requisite to
support my views. - -
SECOND ALCIBIADES. - 393
and of what kind is the difficulty and doubt, in which you
too appear to me to have a share; as you never rest at all
in changing your place up and down ; * but what may have
seemed especially to you, this to have gone secretly away
again, and so seems no longer in a similar manner.” [18.]
Should the god then, to whom you happen to be going, appear
to you even now, and ask you, before you had prayed for any
thing whatever, whether it would be sufficient for you, if any
of those things, mentioned at the beginning, were to take
place; or should he leave it to yourself to make a request,
how, think you, could you avail yourself of the opportunity?
either by accepting any of the things offered, or by praying
yourself for something to happen?
Ale. Now, by the gods, Socrates, I should not know what
to say in such a case. But it seems to me to be a violent”
thing, and in good truth one of caution, in order that a person
may not unconsciously pray for things evil, while fancying
them to be good; and then after waiting, as you said, a little
time, recant, and pray the reverse to what he did at first.
Soc. Did not then the poet, whom I mentioned at the be-
ginning of the argument, know somewhat more than we do,
when he begged 79 (of Zeus) to avert terrible things from (us)
when praying 2
Alc. So it seems to me.
Soc. The Lacedaemonians, therefore, Alcibiades, having
admired this very poet, or having so considered themselves
the matter, put up on every occasion in private and in public
*—% The Greek is &XX 37"sp &v pu&\tora got 66án, Toijro kai čkösöv-
kšvat aij kai oikštu do attog jokéiv. But as there is nothing to govern
#kösövkévau and Öokéiv, Buttmann suggested #köéðvksy aî, and Öoksi,
found in a single MS. And as there is some uncertainty about the mean-
ing of Šköövstv, Stalbaum says the author fancied it meant the same as
&vaôā806au, “to retract,” in Theaetet. p. 135, C., and diváðvouc, in Euthyd.
p. 302, E. There is some error here corrected in my edition.
* The Greek is papyov, which Buttmann renders “insanum,” i. e. “a
mad wish.” Ficinus has more fully—“ insanum quiddam mihi videtur,
temere deum precari ac diligenter considerandum—” Dobree, in Adver-
sar. T. ii. p. 393, suggests piéya £pyov or poèpyöv (i. e. plot Épyov) tº
§oksi-I have proposed oi, Mapygirov plot jokei cival, in allusion to § 17.
Ast—uſſy Épyov—Heindorf piéppºspov, a word found in Hipp. Maj. § 24.
70 The verb kexeiety is used here and elsewhere in this dialogue in
the sense of requesting. See too Thucyd. ii. 81, 85; iii. 7; iv. 108.
394 SECOND ACIBIADES.
"" a similar prayer, by requesting the gods to grant them ever”
things honourable in addition to what are good;" and no
one has ever heard them pray for any thing more. Accord-
ingly, up to the passing time, they have been fortunate less
than none. And even if it has happened to them to be not
fortunate in every thing, it was not on account of this prayer
of theirs; but it is for the gods, I presume, to grant what a
person happens to pray for, and the reverse. [19.] And I
am desirous of telling you something else, which I once heard
from certain elderly persons, how that, when differences arose
between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, it so hap-
pened to our city, that whenever there was a battle, by land
or sea, it was unsuccessful, and never able to gain a victory.
Thereupon the Athenians, brooking ill their doings, and at a
loss for some contrivance to find an escape from their present
evils, held a council; and it seemed to them that it would be
best to send to Ammon,” and inquire of him, 74 and in addi-
tion, this too likewise,” on what account do the gods always
ive the victory to the Lacedaemonians, rather than to us; who,
of (all) the Greeks,” bring them sacrifices the most numerous
and the most beautiful; and have decorated their temples
with offerings such as none else have done ; and are wont to
make to the gods processions the most costly and the most
Solemn, each year; and to expend money, such as all the rest of
the Greeks never did together; whereas the Lacedaemonians
have never paid the least regard to any of these things; but
conduct themselves in so slighting a manner towards the gods,
as to sacrifice on each occasion animals, maimed even ; and in
all other matters fall far short of us not a little in honouring
the gods, although possessing property not less than our state.
*—7. On the prayer Tä ka?\á štri roig &ya.0oig, Lobeck, in Aglaopha-
mus, p. 12, refers to Plutarch in Laconic. T. 8, p. 253.
* I have adopted Buttmann’s disi in lieu of ač, although I still adhere
to the emendation proposed in my edition for the reasons assigned there.
* This allusion to the oracle of Ammon, situated in Africa, is pecu-
liarly appropriate; for we learn from Plutarch i. p. 531, E., that when
Alcibiades was exciting the Athenians to engage in the Sicilian expedition,
some persons, who had been sent on a holy embassy to Ammon, re-
turned with an oracle, stating that the Athenians would get all the peop.e
ºf Syracuse into their power.
*—” The words within the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.
* So Sydenham; as if he wished to read tâvrwv Tów ‘EXAhvøy–
SECOND ALCIBIADES. 395
[20.] When the messenger had thus spoken, and had inquired
of the oracle what they ought to do to find a deliverance from
their present evils, the prophet made no other answer;”—for
it is evident the god did not permit him—but calling (the mes-
sengers),” said,—To the Athenians thus saith Ammon.” He
saith, that he prefers the good-omened address of the La-
cedaemonians before all the sacrifices of (the rest of)79 the
Greeks,—These words he said, and nothing more. Now it
seems to me, that by a good-omened address the god means
only that prayer of theirs; for it is in reality much superior
to the prayers of others. For the rest of the Greeks are wont,
some of them, after placing (by the altar) oxen with gilded
horns,” and others presenting the gods with offerings to be hung
up (in temples), to pray for whatever they happen (to desire),
whether it be good or evil. The gods therefore, on hearing
their impious addresses, accept not their costly processions and
Sacrifices ; so that there is need of much caution and con-
sideration as to what is to be spoken and not. And you will
find in Homer likewise other expressions similar to these.
[21.] For he says, that the Trojans, on taken up their night
quarters,
The perfect hecatombs to th’ Immortals gave, **
and that the winds carried the savour of the fat to heaven
Sweet-smelling ; but the blessed gods refused -
To taste it; for by them was hated much
The holy Ilion, and Priam too,
And of the careful Priam Subjects all:
so that it was of no use for them to sacrifice, or to expend
presents in vain,” when they where thus hated by the gods.
76 Ficinus, perceiving that àA\o obôāv would be scarcely intelligible by
itself, has given “non multa.”
77 Instead of airów I have translated as if the Greek were rôv &yyºov.
* On the formula, råås Āšyst "Applwy, Gottleber refers to Diodor. xvii.
51, and Buttmann to Arrian vii. p. 305.
7° Ficinus has “reliquorum—Graecorum,” as if he had found in his
MS. rāv &\\ov ‘EX\fivov, not simply Töv EAA#vov,
89 Gottleber refers to Plin. H. N. xxxiii. 3, “Deorum honori—auratis
cornibus hostia—immolabantur.” Add from Virgil, “aurata fronte ju-
vencum; ” and Callimachus, ÉXápovg—kepāov 6' dºrs).éputrero Xpwoºg.
* The passage, as here quoted, has been found in none of the MSS. of
Homer. Barnes was the first to insert the Supplement in its proper place,
IX. 0. 458.
* Compare Eurip. Tro. 1241, Oùk #pso'ev 080ig Tu, TXiju oipoi aróvoa,
Tpota re tróAewv Éckpurov utgovpavn Márnv 6' #3ov0v1 iſſuev.
396 SECOND ALCIBLADEs.
For the divine nature, I conceive, is not such, as to be se-
duced by presents,” like a knavish judge.84 But we are giv-
ing a silly reason, if we think to get the better of the Lacedæ-
monians in this way. For it would be a dreadful thing
indeed, if the gods looked to gifts and sacrifices, and not the
Soul, should a person happen to be holy and just. Nay, (they
look) much more, I think, (to this), than to expensive proces-
sions and sacrifices; for which there is nothing to prevent
those from having the power to pay each year, either indi-
viduals or states, who have sinned greatly against the gods,
and greatly too against men. But they, as not receiving
bribes, disdain all such things as these, as says the god, and the
prophet of the gods. [22.] It seems, then, that justice and
prudence are near to being honoured above all things by the
gods, and by men too, that have any sense. Now the sensible
and the just are none other than such as know what it is meet
to do and say both towards gods and men. But I should be
glad to hear from you, what are your thoughts upon this
subject.
Alc. To myself, Socrates, the matter seems to be in no other
way, than it does to you and the god. For it would not be
reasonable for me to vote contrary to the god.
Soc. Do you not remember, then, saying that you were
much at a loss, lest you should unconsciously be praying for
evil things, fancying them to be good?
Alc. I do. .
Soc. You see then, that it is not safe for you to go to the
god with the view of praying, in order that, should it so hap-
pen, he may not hear you speaking impiously, and receive no
part of your sacrifice, and you perchance meet with some-
thing different. It seems to me, therefore, that it is best to
keep quiet. For through your high spirit—for that is the
* Stalbaum refers to Persins ii., 48, to which he might have added
Plato, Legg. iv. p. 601, x. p. 885, D., and Cicero de Legg. ii. 16, “Donis
“impii ne placare audeant deos.”
* I have adopted Gedike's reading, Šukaar)w, “judge,” for Tokugºrjv,
“usurer.” The allusion is to an AEsopo-Socratic table in Latin, which I
have given at length in my edition from a MS. in the British Museum.
That it was found likewise in Greek is shown by an allusion to it in
Plutarch de Solert. Animal. ii. p. 973. B., where lies hid the commencement
pf a Chyliambic fable—Kovpság Tror’ £rpeps 9aiju' àgov Tu Troxvptóvov
Kirrng, rá T' &vöpāv #rig sixs kai 0mpāv povăuar’āvratroötöðval.
SECOND ALCIBLADES. 397
fairest of names for folly—I think you would not be willing
to make use of the Lacedæmonian prayer. It is necessary,
therefore, for a man to wait, until he has learnt how he ought
to conduct himself towards gods and men. .
[23.] Ale. But when, Socrates, will that time be? and who
is he that will instruct me? for I should be very glad, I think,
to see who the man is.
Soc. It is he, of whose care you are the object.85 But it
seems to me, as Homer (Il. v. 127) says of Minerva, that she
removed the mist from before the eyes of Diomede,
That he might clearly see both gods and men;
so must he in the first place remove from your soul the mist,
that now happens to be present there, and then apply those
things, through which you will be about to know both good
and evil. For now you seem to be unable (to do so).
Alc. Let him then remove the mist, or any thing else that
he pleases; as I am prepared not to fly from any thing or-
dered by him, whoever he may be, if I am about to become
a better man.
Soc. And yet he has a very wonderful eagerness in your
behalf.
Alc. Till that time then it seems to me to be best to put
off my sacrifice.
Soc. And rightly it seems so to you. For it is safer than
to run so great a risk.
[24.] Ale. But how,” Socrates? However, since you seem
to me to have given good advice, I will put this garland 87
* This is usually applied to Socrates, as in Alcibiad. i. p. 122, B. § 37,
rig óš o fig travöstag—obôsvi puéAst, si pur) si tug #paoric oroij twyxávet Öv.
But there, as here, the indefinite rug could not be said of a person known
positively. To meet this objection, Bekker was led perhaps to adopt here
Oāróg £orty from some MSS., in lieu of Ojrog rig £orty in others. From
which I elicited long ago Oijrig tug £oruv, “There is one No-man,” in
allusion to the Homeric Oñrug, which I have restored to Hippias Major,
§ 24. For Socrates in both places is speaking covertly. And, hence too
in the first Alcibiades I should have suggested si pur) Oùrug, Ög—
* Buttmann justly considers this a strange way of passing from one
subject to another. What I suspect the author wrote may be found in
my edition. .
* Amongst the Greeks, they who went to a temple to pray to a god,
carried a garland, which they wore while praying; and hence Socrates
knew, on meeting Alcibiades, whither he was going. S.; who might
have referred to Eurip. Hippol. 72.
398 SECOND ALCIBLADES,
round your (brows);* and to the gods we will then present
crowns,” and all the other customary offerings, when I be-
hold that day arrive; and it will in no long time arrive, if
they are willing.
Soc. Well, I accept both this, and 99 I would see myself
readily accepting” any thing else given by you. And as
Creon, when he sees Tiresias wearing garlands, and hears
that he had obtained them as the first-fruits of spoils taken
from the enemy, is made by Euripides (in Phoen. 865) to say,
This crown, as a happy omen, have I worn ;
For well you know how tempest—tost we lie—
so do I place on myself this opinion” on your part as an
omen of good. For I seem to myself to be in no less a
storm than Creon; and I would gladly be a victor over your
admirers. -
* So in the Banquet, p. 213, § 37, Alcibiades is represented as putting
a chaplet on the head of Socrates. The rite is ridiculed by Aristophanes
in Itzr. 1262, where Demus decks the Sausage-maker, after his victory
over Cleon, with a crown of sausages, saying, as I corrected on AEsch.
Suppl. i. 'AAAávris Zsiſ, göv rô vukm rmptov; i. e. “Thine is the victor's
chaplet, Sausage-Zeus.” -
* Potter, in Archaeolog. Graec. ii. 4, infers from this passage that the
garlands worn by suppliants during their prayers were, on their leaving
the temple, put on the head of the deity who had been addressed; and -
hence Alcibiades is represented as giving to Socrates the honour he had
designed for the image of Jupiter. S.
*—” The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, to whom
Stalbaum might have referred; for he says that nothing can be more
absurd than the whole clause, kai äXXo 68–Špavröv– Perhaps the au-
thor wrote ióoug &v, “you would see.”
* In lieu of 36&av, Buttmann suggested 660 w, and myself Aššu, com-
paring Iph. A. 607, "Opwu6a pièv róvá' giguov trowośpie6a Tö orów ré Xongrèv
kai A6) ww eiºmpliav. But perhaps 66%av means here “glory” or, “re-
putation.”
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAGES,
IN placing in a consecutive order the Theages, Rivals, and Hip-
parchus, I have followed the arrangement adopted by Stalbaum.
For he conceives that they were written, if not by the same hand, at
least by a kindred mind, and are all equally unworthy of Plato, de-
spite the attempt made by Socher and Knebel to reverse the judg-
ment of Boeckh, Heindorf, Schleiermacher, and Ast. For though
some of the arguments brought forward by the impugners of the dia-
logue have been refuted, says Stalbaum, by its defenders, yet there
still remains evidence enough to prove its spuriousness. For not
only is it in matter and manner at variance with the subject and style
adopted by Plato, but it contains likewise such remarkable instances
of plagiarisms rather than imitation, as to leave little doubt of the
writer being only a Plato in disguise; to say nothing of some pecu-
liarities in language, not to be found in the writings of the philoso-
pher and his contemporaries. The dialogue is, however, reckoned
amongst the genuine works of Plato by Diogenes Laertius, iii,
57, on the authority of Thrasyllus, a Platonist of the time of Tibe-
rius, as we learn from Suetonius in Tiberius, Š 14, and the Scholiast
on Juvenal,vi. 576; and it is quoted as such by Ælian, W. H. viii. 1.
While Lamprias, in the list of the works of Plutarch, n. 68, men-
tions one, “On the Theages of Plato.”
According to Stalbaum, Wympensee, in Diatrib. de Xenocrate,
p. 96, conceived that the author of the dialogue was perhaps the
philosopher of Chalcedon. But Stalbaum himself feels disposed to
refer it to Antipater, who flourished about A. c. 150, and who was
the teacher of Panaetius, and the disciple of Diogenes of Babylon,
2400 INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAGES.
and who wrote, as appears from Cicero de Divinat. i. 3, a work on
the wonderful divinations made by Socrates, of which there are some
curious instances given in this dialogue; and as both Cicero, and
Plutarch in his treatise, On the Daemon of Socrates, seem to have
made use of the work of Antipater, so probably did the author of
this dialogue.
THE THEAGES.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
DEMODOCUS, SOCRATES, THEAGES.
DEMODOCUS,
[1..] I wanT, Socrates, to speak with you in private" about
some matters, if you are at leisure; and if your want of lei-
sure be not very great, for my sake however make leisure.
Soc. Nay, I am at leisure in other respects, and on your
account very much so. If then you wish to say any thing,
it is in your power (to do so).
Dem. Are you willing then for us to retire out of the way,
to the portico of Zeus Eleutherius” hard by ?
Soc. If it seems good to you.
Dem. Let us go then, Socrates. All natural productions,
growing out of the earth, and other animals as well as man,
appear to subsist in nearly the same manner. For to such of
us as cultivate the ground it is a thing the most easy in the
case of plants, to prepare every thing prior to planting, and
even the planting itself. But when what has been planted is
in a living state, the care of it becomes great and painful, and
difficult. The same thing appears to take place with respect to
human beings likewise. I form this conjecture as regards other
things from my own affairs. For of this my son, whether one
must call it the planting, or the procreating, it is the easiest of
all things; but his education is difficult, and I am continually
* The word ióvox.oysio 6a, says Stalbaum, is not found elsewhere in pure
Greek; and he refers to Suicer in Thesaur. Eccles. i. p. 1434.
* This portico was in the Ceramicus, as shown by Meurslus de Ceramic.
§ 4, quoted by Staib. 2
ID
402 THEAGES.
in fear about him. On other points much might be said; but
the desire which now possesses him alarms me very much
It is not indeed an ignoble one, but it is dangerous. For he
desires, Socrates, as he says, to become a wise man. I suspect
that certain youths of his own age, and of the same ward, have
been going down to the city, and repeating certain discourses,
and disturbed his mind very much. Of these he is emulous;
and for a long time is giving me great trouble, thinking it fit
that I should pay attention to him, and pay money to some of
the sophists, who might make him a wise man. For the
money indeed I care less than nothing," but think that, in
going whither he is hastening, he is running into no small
danger. Hitherto I have by soothing restrained him; but
as I am no longer able (to do so) I think it best to yield to
him, lest by frequently associating (with others)” without me,
he should be corrupted. Hence I am come for this very pur-
pose, that I may place him with some one of those, who are
considered to be sophists. Opportunely then for us have you
appeared, with whom, as I am about to engage in affairs of this
kind, I wished very much to consult. If then you have any
advice to give respecting what you have heard from me, it is
both lawful and needful (to do so). r
[2.] Soc. Counsel, Demodocus, is said to be a sacred thing.”
If then any other consultation is sacred, this is so, about which
you are now considering. For there is not a thing, about which
a person may consult, more divine, than about the instruction of
himself and of those related to him. In the first place then, let
you and I agree together as to what we think that thing is, about
which we are consulting; lest I may not perchance” take it
to be one thing, and you another; and we afterwards perceive,
"—" I have translated as if the Greek were not kai éAarrow, but ÉAarro,
ºf uměšv, as in Theaetet. § 92, firrov–m pumášv. AEsch. Prom. 974, 'Eps?
'#Aaogov Zmvög pumāśv puéAët.
* Taylor has adopted “with others,” from “cum aliis,” found in Fl
cinus. But ovyyevópuévôg Tºp, “associating with some one,” found in all
the MSS., is more correct. \ -
* The Scholiast, who vainly attempts to give a satisfactory account of
this proverb, says it was found in the Ampniaraus of Aristophanes; while
Zenobius, Proverb. Cent. iv. 40, attributes it to Epicharmus. It is found
likewise in Plato Epist. 5. . It was probably a saying, addressed to those
who came to consult an oracle.
* On this sense of troAAákug, see at Alcib. i. p. 27, E. $.49.
THEAGES. 403
* when the conference has proceeded far," that we are an ob-
ject of ridicule, both I who give, and you who request, advice,
in not thinking the same upon any thing.
Dem. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak correctly; and
it is meet so to do. g
Soc. And speak I do correctly, but not entirely so; since
I make a trifling alteration. For I am thinking, that perhaps
this youth may not desire that, which we think he desires,
but something else; and in that case we shall be still more
absurd in consulting about something different. It appears,
therefore, to me to be the most correct to begin by inquiring
of him what the thing is, which he desires.
Dem. It appears very nearly to be the best to do as you say.
[3.] Soc. Tell me then what is the name of this handsome”
youth P what must we call him 2
Dem. His name, Socrates, is Theages.
Soc. You have given your son, Demodocus, a beautiful and
sacred-like name. Tell us, Theages, do you say that you desire
to become a wise man? and do you think it fit for this your
father to find out the acquaintance of such a person as may
make you wise? -
Thea. Yes.
Soc. Do you call those men wise, who are skilled in that, re-
specting which they have a knowledge, or those, who have not
Thea. Those, who have a knowledge.
Soc. What then, has not your father caused you to be in-
structed, or taught you (himself),” what others are taught, who
are the sons of fathers good and honourable;* for instance,
letters, to play on the harp, to wrestle, and other exercises?
Thea. Yes, myself. -
Soc. Do you think then there is still a want of some know-
ledge, to which it is proper for your father to pay attention
for your sake?
"—" Such is Stalbaum’s version of Tróppa Tijg ovvovortaç, who quotes
opportunely Sympos. p. 217, D., ÖusXeyópiny Tóppa, Tây vökruv.
* So Taylor, as if he wished to read, what the sense requires, ka?g in
lieu of ka?&ny—
* To preserve the difference between Övöáoksg0at and travösöstv, I have
inserted “ himself.” Ficinus has simply “edocuit,” omitting kai étraid-
evosv, which he probably considered superfluous.
* By ca)\oi kai &ya60i are meant what we should call persons both
handsome and of polished manners. 2 -
2 D
404 THEAGES.
Thea. I do.
Soc. What is it? Tell us it, that we may gratify you.
Thea. My father knows it, Socrates; for I have often men-
tioned it to him. But he designedly says this to you, as if
truly he did not know what I desire; for in this and other
matters likewise he opposes me, and is unwilling to place me
with any one.
[4] Soc. But all that you have hitherto said to him, has
been said, as it were, without witnesses. Now therefore make
me a witness and state before me what is the wisdom you
desire. For come now, if you should desire that wisdom, by
which men steer ships, and I should happen to ask you—What
is the wisdom, Theages, of which being in want you blame
your father, because he is unwilling to place you with a man,
through whom you might become wise? what answer would
you give me? What would you say this wisdom is 2 Is it
not the pilot's art?
Thea. Yes. -
Soc. And if you desired to be wise in that wisdom, by
which persons direct' chariots, and afterwards blamed your
father, on my asking you what this wisdom is, what answer
would you give me? Would you not say it is the charioteer's
art 22
Thea. Yes.
Soc. But is the wisdom, of which you have now a desire,
nameless, or has it a name *
Thea. I think it has (a name).
Soc. Whether then do you know it, but not its name? Or
its name likewise 2 -
Thea. Its name likewise.
Soc. Say then what it is.
Thea. What other name, Socrates, can one say it has, shan
that of wisdom P
Soc. Is not then the charioteer's art wisdom likewise? Or
does it appear to you to be ignorance?
Thea. It does not.
* Schleiermacher objects to the expression kv3spvāv rá áppara. But
though the phrase is not elsewhere found in Plato, the metaphor might
fairly be adopted here, just as AEschylus has #v ºrpūpavy tróNewg Oiara
wwpºv in S. Th. 2.
* With the whole of this passage compare Alcibiad. i. p. 125, § 44.
THEAGES, 405
Soc. But wisdom ?
Thea. Yes. -
Soc. For what do we use it? Is it not for that, by which
we know how to manage horses when yoked P
Thea. Yes.
Soc. Is not then the pilot's art wisdom likewise?
Thea. To me at least it appears so.
Soc. Is it not that, by which we know how to manage
ships ?
Thea. It is.
Soc. But what is the wisdom of which you are desirous?
What by it do we know how to govern ?
Thea. By it we know, it seems to me, how to govern men.
Soc. What, sick men 2
Thea. No.
Soc. For that wisdom is the physician's art. Is it not ?
Thea. Yes.
Soc. Is it that then, by which we know how to regulate
singers in choirs?
Thea. It is not. -
Soc. For this is the musician’s art.
Thea. Certainly.
Soc. But is it that, by which we know how to regulate
those, who are engaged in gymnastic exercises?
Thea. No.
Soc. For this is the gymnast's art.
Thea. It is.
Soc. Is it that of those, who do what? Be ready to state
it to myself, as I have the preceding to you.
Thea. It is that, by which persons (do something) in the
city. -
- še. Are there not then in a city persons who are sick?
Thea. Yes. But I am not speaking of these only, but alsc
of the others in the city.
Soc. Do I then understand the art of which you are speak-
ing? For you appear to me to say it is not that, by which
we know how to govern mowers, and grape-gatherers, and
planters, and sowers, and threshers; for it is the husband-
man's art, by which we govern these. Is it not ?
Thea. Yes.
Soc. Nor are you speaking of that, by which (we govern,
4ö6 THEAGES.
sawyers, and planers, and turners; for does not this belong to
the carpenter's art 2
Thea. Yes.
Soc. But perhaps you are speaking of that wisdom, by
which we govern all these, and husbandmen, and carpenters,
and all artificers skilled and unskilled, and men and women.
Thea. Of this wisdom, Socrates, I have for a long while ago
been wishing to speak. -
[5.] Soc. Can you say, that Ægisthus, who slew Aga-
memnon at Argos, had dominion over what you have men-
tioned, artificers skilled and unskilled, and men and women,
all taken together, or over some other things?
Thea. No ; but over these.
Soc. What then, did not Peleus, the son of Æacus, have do-
minion over those very kind of persons in Phthia?
Thea. Yes. -
Soc. And you have heard that Periander, the son of Cyp-
Selus, was a ruler in Corinth.
Thea. Yes.
Soc. And did he not rule over the very kind of persons in
his city ? - -
Thea. Yes. -
Soc. What then, do you not think that Archelaus,' the son
of Perdiccas, who was lately” the ruler in Macedonia, had
dominion over the same kind of persons f -
Thea. I do.
Soc. And over whom do you think that Hippias, the son of
Pisistratus, ruled in this city ? was it not over these kind of
persons?
Thea. How not ?
Soc. Can you tell me then, what appellation Bacis,” and
the Sibyl,” and our countryman Amphilytus,” bore ?
* Of this Archelaus mention is made in Gorg. p. 471, D.
* This “lately ’’ refers to about five years previously.
* Bacis was a prophet, who, long before the invasion of Greece by
Xerxes, predicted what would happen. Some of his prophecies are given
by Herodotus in viii. 20. He is likewise frequently mentioned by Aristo-
phanes, and in company with Xiſłv\\a in Eip. 1119, and l l 16. DACIER.
* From the fact of finding the same three oracle-chaunters similarly
united by Themistius Or. iii. p. 46, A., where the Sibyl is called “the
Erythrean,” it has been inferred that the writer had read this dialogue
amongst those ascribed to Plato. -
* Respecting Amphilytus see Wesseling and Valckenaer on Herod. i. 62
, TFIFAGES. 407
ſºng
Thea. What else, Socrates, than oracle-chaunters?
Soc. You speak correctly. But endeavour to give me an
answer as to what appellation Hippias and Periander bore
through the same kind of dominion ? -
Thea. Tyrants, I think; for what else (could it be)?
Soc. Whoever then desires to have dominion over all the
men together in the city, desires this very same dominion, the
tyrannic, and to be a tyrant.
Thea. So it appears.
Soc. Do you then say that you desire this dominion ?
Thea. It seems so from what I have said.
Soc. O you wicked (youth) I Do you desire to tyrannizC
over us? And have you for a long time blamed your father,
because he did not send you to the school of some tyrant-
teacher?' And are not you, Demodocus, ashamed of yourself?
who, having known a long time ago what this youth desired,
and having likewise the power of sending him, where you might
have made him that skilful artist in wisdom, of which he is
desirous, have, notwithstanding, begrudged him this, and are un-
willing to send him 2 But now, you see—since he has spoken
against you before me—let us consult in common, you and I,
to whose school we may send him; and through associating
with whom he may become a wise tyrant.
Dem. Let us, by Zeus, then, Socrates, consult; for it ap-
pears to me that there is need of no despicable counsel in this
affair.
Soc. Permit us first, thou good man, to interrogate him
sufficiently. .
Dem. Interrogate him.
[6.] Soc. What then, Theages, if we should make use of
Euripides 2° For he some where says, -
Tyrants are wise, by converse with the wise.
If then some one should ask Euripides—In what say you,
Euripides, do tyrants become wise by the conversation of the
wise? just as if he had said, .
* In defence of ÖtöaokáXov, which Schleiermacher, with whom Beck
agreed, wished to expunge, Stalbaum refers to Lobeck’s “Disputat. iii.
de Nominibus Adjectivis et Substantivis Ambiguis,” p. 12.
* This verse is elsewhere attributed to Sophocles in Ajac. Locr. Fr.
but given to Euripides by Plato in Rep. viii. p. 568, A.
408 THEAGES.
Farmers are wise, by converse with the wise-
and we had asked him—In what are they wise? What would
he have answered? Would he (reply that they are wise) in
any thing else than in things pertaining to agriculture?
Thea. In nothing else but those.
Soc. But what, if he had said,
Cooks become wise, by converse with the wise—
and we had asked him—In what are they wise? What would
he have answered? Would it not have been—In things per-
taining to cooking 2
Thea. Yes.
Soc. Again, if he had said,
Wrestlers are wise, by converse with the wise—
and we had asked him—In what are they wise ? Would he
not have said—In things pertaining to wrestling 2
Thea. Yes.
Soc. But since he says,
Tyrants are wise, by converse with the wise—
upon our asking him—In what say you, Euripides, are they
wise 2 What would be his answer P
Thea. By Zeus, I do not know. -
Soc. Are you willing then for me to tell you?
Thea. If you are willing. -
Soc. It is that, which Anacreon says Callicrété knew
Or do you not know the song?
Thea. I do.
Soc. What then, do you also desire the conversation of a
* This was a virgin who employed herself in teaching politics, as Aspa-
sia, Diotima, and some others, did after her. The verses of Anacreon
alluded to are lost. DACIER. Ficinus has, “Callicratem.” But that was
the name of a man. Bergk in Anacreont. Relliq. p. 264, would read
Ka}\Aukpirmv and Ka}\Aukpirm, found in one MS. I should prefer XaXt-
kpārmy. For the word XaXukpfirm would mean “wine-mixed,” an epithet
better suited to the lady by whom Anacreon, the wine-drinker, was in.
structed. The epithet is applied to otrovéal, “libations,” in AEsch. Fragm.
158. On the other hand, Egeria, the Nymph by whom Numa was in-
structed, was a water-drinker, as may be inferred from Juvenal, who
speaks of a fountain dedicated to her.
THEAGES. m 409
man, who happens to be a fellow-artist with Callicrété the
daughter of Cyané, and who knows the art of a tyrant, as th
poet says she did, in order that you may become a tyrant over
us and the city ?
Thea. You have for some time, Socrates, been laughing at
and playing with me.
Soc. What then, do you say that you do not desire this
wisdom, by which you may rule over all the citizens? And
doing this, would you be any thing else but a tyrant?
Thea. I would pray, indeed, I fancy, to be a tyrant over
all men, or, if not of all, of the greatest part; and I think
that you, and all other men, would do the same, and perhaps
still more, to be a god." But I did not say that I desired
this.
[7.] Soc. But what then, after all, is this which you de-
sire? Do you not say that you desire to rule over the citizens?
Thea. Not by violence, nor as tyrants do; but I desire to
rule over the willing, in the same manner as other men of
note in the city. -
Soc. Do you mean, as Themistocles, and Pericles, and Ci-
mon, and such as were skilled in state affairs
Thea. By Zeus, I mean those. -
Soc. What then, if you happened to be desirous of becom-
ing wise in horsemanship, by going to whom do you think
you would become a skilful horseman 2 would it be (by going)
to others than those skilled in horses?
Thea. By Zeus, not I.
Soc. But (you would go) to those very men, who are skilled
in these matters, and who possess horses, and who continually
use both their own and many that are the property of others.
Thea. It is evident I should.
Soc. What then, if you wished to become wise in the throw-
ing of darts, think you not that you would become skilled by
going to those engaged in the art of dart-throwing, and who
possess darts, and continually use many darts, both their own
and those belonging to others?
Thea. It appears so to me.
Soc. Tell me then, since you wish to become wise in state
* Theages here alludes to what Socrates was wont to say, that men
should endeavour to become similar to the deity.
* 10 THEAGES.
affairs, think you that you will become wise by going to any
others than those statesmen, who are skilled in state affairs
themselves, and who continually make use of their own state
and many others, and have an intercourse both with the Greek
and Barbarian states? Or do you think, that by associating
with certain other persons, but not with these, you will be-
come wise in those things, in which they are wise ?
Thea. I have heard the discourses, Socrates, which persons
say you have spoken," how that the sons of those very states-
men were in no respect better than the sons of shoemakers:
and you appear to me to have spoken most truly, from what I
am able to perceive. I should be senseless then, if I thought
that any one of these could impart to me his wisdom, when
he could not in any respect benefit his own son; if indeed he
were able on these points to benefit any person whatever.
Soc. What then, O best of men, would you do, if you had
a son, who should give you trouble of this kind, and say that
he desired to become a good painter, and blame you, his father,
because you were not willing to expend money for the sake of
these things, while he was despising painters, the artists in
this very matter, and unwilling to learn from them; or if, being
desirous to become a piper or harper, he should act in this
manner towards pipers or harpers? In what way would you
treat him, and whither would you send him, when thus un-
willing to learn from those persons?
Thea. By Zeus, I (do not know).”
Soc. Now then, as you are doing these very things to your
father, do you wonder at and blame him, if he is in doubt
how he shall treat you, and whither send you? For we will
place you with whomever of the Athenians you wish, the most
skilled” in state affairs, and who will be with you gratuitous-
ly;” and at the same time you will not lose your money, and
* Stalbaum here refers to Protag. p. 319, Gorg. p. 518, C., Meno, p. 93,
U., and Alcibiad. I. p. 118, C.
* So Taylor, for the sake of the sense, in lieu of “By Zeus, not I.’”
* Instead of ka)\öv kai &ya6&w, which are never, I suspect, thus united
to an accusative, as Östvög and ooſpèg are, Ficinus has simply “praestan-
tissimorum,” adopted by Taylor; and though the expression in the text
is repeated just below, yet there Ficinus has correctly merely “ex bonus.”
For Socrates could not be numbered amongst the kakoi, although he might
be amongst the dya 60i. w
* Stalbaum refers to Apolog. p. 19, E., § 4.
THEAGES. 411
likewise be in greater repute with the many than by associat-
ing with any one else.
[8.] Thea. What then, Socrates, are not you one of the
excellent men? For if you are willing to associate with me,
it is sufficient, and I seek no other."
Soc. Why say you this, Theages?
Dem. He does not, Socrates, speak badly; and at the same
time by doing this you will gratify me. Since there is nothing
I should consider a greater piece of good luck than for my son
to be pleased with your society, and for you to be willing to
associate with him. And indeed I am ashamed to say how
very much I wish it. I entreat both of you, therefore, you,
Socrates, to be willing to associate with him, and you, my son,
not to seek to associate with any other than Socrates; and
you will thus release me from many and dreadful cares. For
I now very much fear for him, lest he should meet with some
other person able to corrupt him.
Thea. Do not, father, feel any longer any fear for me, if you
can but persuade Socrates to permit me to associate with him.
Dem. You speak very well. And after this, the conversa-
tion, Socrates, will be directed to you. For I am ready, so
to say in few words, to give up to you both me and mine, and
the nearest related, whatever, in short, you may require, if you
will take this youth to your bosom, and benefit him as far as
you can.
[9.] Soc. O Demodocus, I do not wonder that you are so
importunate, if you think that your son can be especially be-
nefited by me. For I do not know any thing about which he,
who is endued with intellect, ought to be more anxious, than
how his son may become the best of men. But from whence
it has appeared to you that I am more able to benefit your son
towards his becoming a good citizen, than you are yourself,
and from whence he has thought that I can benefit him more
than you, I very much wonder. For, in the first place, you
are older than I am ; and in the next place, you have held
many offices, and those the greatest among the Athenians;
and you are honoured by the people of the Anagyrusian ward,”
* A similar compliment is paid to Socrates in Lach. p. 200, C. § 33.
* According to the Scholiast, this was a ward of the tribe of Æan-
tis; but according to Harpocration and Stephen. Byz., of Erectheus
412 THEAGF.S.
by much the most, and no less so by the rest of the city. But
neither of you can see any one of these things in me; and next,
if Theages here despises the society of statesmen, and seeks
after certain others who profess themselves able to instruct
young men, there is Prodicus of Ceos, and Gorgias the Leon-
tine, and Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are
so wise, that they go to cities and persuade the noblest and
wealthiest of the young men, who are permitted to associate
gratuitously with any one of the citizens they please, they
persuade, I say, these to give up those of their own city, and
to associate with them, and to put down moreover a consider-
able sum” of money, and, as a remuneration, to give them
thanks besides." Of these, then, it is reasonable for your son
and yourself to select some one; but (to select) me it is not
reasonable; for I know none of that blessed and beautiful
learning, although I wish I did ; but I am always somehow
asserting that I happen to know, I may say, nothing but a mere
trifle relating to matters of love.” But in that kind of learn-
ing I lay claim * to being more skilled than any one man of
the past or present time.
[10.] Thea. See you, father, how Socrates does not appear
to me to be very willing to pass the time with me. For, as to
myself, I am ready, if he is willing. But he says this, playing
with us. For I know some of the same age with myself, and
(others) a little older, who, before they associated with him,
were worth nothing; but when they had been with him, in a
very little time they appeared to be better than all, to whom
they were previously inferior.
Soc. Do you know then, son of Demodocus, how this is 2
Thea. Yes, by Zeus, I do; and that, if you are willing, I
too shall be able to become such as they are.
Soc. Not so, thou excellent youth; but you are not con-
Stalbaum refers to Boeckh Inscript. Graec. No. 210, and Grotefend De
Demis Attic. p. 18.
"—" The whole of this, says Stalbaum, has been taken almost verbatim
from Apolog. p. 19, E. § 4.
* Instead of troXèv, Beck suggested troAt, obtained from “multum,”
in Ficinus.
* Stalbaum refers to Sympos. p. 177, D. § 5, and Lys. p. 204, B. § 2.
* Here trouoipat is improperly used for trpoo trototpat, as remarked by
Stalbaum. sºr
THEAGES. 413
scious how this occurs; and I will tell you.' There is, by a
divine allotment, a certain daemon that has followed me, be-
ginning from childhood. This is a voice, which, when it ex-
ists, always signifies to me the abandonment of what I am
about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if
any one of my friends communicates any thing to me, and
there is the voice, it dissuades me from that very thing, and
it does not suffer me to do it. Of this I will produce you
witnesses. You know the beautiful Charmides, the son of
Glauco. He once happened to communicate to me that he was
about to contend for the stadium” at Nemea ; and imme-
diately, on his beginning to say, that he meant to contend,
there was the voice. And I forbade him, and said, While
you were speaking to me, there was the voice of the daemon;
do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, said he, the voice sig-
nified to you, that I should not conquer; but, though I should
not be victorious, yet, by exercising myself at this time, I
shall be benefited. Having thus spoken, he engaged in the .
contest. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire of him, what
happened to him after this very act of contending. And if
you are willing to inquire of Clitomachus, the brother of Ti-
marchus,” what Timarchus said to him, when, being about to
die, “he went right against the daemon,” both he and Euathlus,
the runner in the stadium, who received Timarchus when he
was an exile, will tell you what he then said.
Thea. What did he say?
Soc. O Clitomachus, said he, I indeed am now going to
die, because I was unwilling to be persuaded by Socrates.
* Here is another passage transcribed, says Stalbaum correctly, from
Apolog. p. 31, D. § 19.
* The stadium was the course appointed for those who contended in
the foot-race, as shown by an AEsopo-Socratic fable, quoted by Galen in
Protrept. § 13.
* I suppose this is Timarchus of Charonèa, who desired to be interred
near one of the sons of Socrates, who had died a little before. I could
never find any vestige of this history elsewhere. DACIER. Nor has any
one since his day been more fortunate. -
*—" The Greek is si65 roi; 6aipoviov: which Ficinus has omitted,
either from his not understanding those words, or not finding them in
bis MS. Serranus—“adversus daemonii mandatum ”—of which Ruhn-
ken approves on Timaeus, p. 127. But ei,6ö is never said of a single per-
son; only of a place, or many persons. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, correctly
observes, that there is some error here.
414 THEAGES.
But why Timarchus said this, I will tell you. When Timar-
chus rose from the banquet, together with Philemon the son
of Philemonides, with the view of murdering Nicias the son
of Heroscomander, they two alone were cognizant of the plot;
and Timarchus, as he rose, said to me, What do you say,"
Socrates? Do you continue drinking; but I must rise up
(and go) some where. I will, however, return shortly, if I
am successful. And there was the voice. And I said to him,
By no means, said I, rise up ; for there has been to me the
usual daemon signal. Upon this he stayed. And after a
slight interval, he was again going away, and said—Socrates,
I am going. And there was again the voice. Again, there-
fore, I compelled him to stay. The third time, wishing to
escape me unnoticed, he rose up without saying any thing to
me, and escaped unnoticed, having watched me, while I had my
attention otherwise engaged; and thus departing he perpe-
trated the acts, through which he went away about to die.
Hence he told his brother, what I have now told you, that he
was going to die, through his not believing in me. Furthel
still, you will hear from many respecting the events in Sicily,
what I said concerning the destruction of the army.” And
the things that are past, you may hear from those that know
them; but you may now make trial of the daemon signal, if
it says any thing to the purpose. For on the departure of
Sannio the beautiful” for the army, there came to me the
signal; and he is now gone with Thrasyllus,” to carry on
the campaign right through Ephesus and Ionia. And I think
* As no mention is made of a previous conversation, it is not easy to
understand Ti Aéystg.
* By comparing this account with that in Thucyd. viii. 1, it would seem
that Socrates proved his damon to be a truer prophet than were the
oracle-chaunters, who predicted that the Athenians would gain possession
of the whole of Sicily.
* I have adopted Stalbaum’s notion, that roi; ka Moi, means the “beau.
tiful,” not, as others, from the time of Ficinus, have rendered—“the son.
of Kalus.” For that adjective is never found as a proper name. Be-
sides, we can now better understand why Socrates, who admired hand-
Some young persons, took an interest in his fate.
* The expedition against Ephesus under Thrasyllus, described by
Xenophon in Hellen. i. 2. 1, took place in Ol. 92.4, = 409, A. C., when,
as we learn from Plutarch in Alcibiad. t. i. p. 39, § 29, the Athenians were
defeated under the walls of the town and a trophy of brass was erected
by the conquerors. S.
THEAGES. 415
that he will either die, or that he will meet with an end"
something near to it. And I very much fear for the rest of
the enterprise. [12.] All these things have I said to you,
because this power of this daemon is able to effect every thing
with respect to the intercourse of those, who pass their time
with me. For it is opposed to many; and it is not possible
for those to be benefited by passing their time with me, so that
it is not possible for me to live with them. With many, how-
ever, it does not prevent me from conversing; and yet they
are not at all benefited by being with me. But they, whom
the power of the daemon assists to the intercourse, are those
whom you have noticed ; for in a short time they make a pro-
ficiency. And of those, who make a proficiency, some have
the benefit firm and lasting ; but many, as long as they
are with me, advance in a wonderful manner; but when they
separate themselves from me, they again differ in no respect
from any person whatever. This did Aristides, the son of
Lysimachus and grandson of Aristides, suffer; for, while pass-
ing his time with me, he made a very great proficiency in a
short period ; but afterwards an expedition took place, and
he went away, sailing with it. On his return he found Thu-
cydides,” the son of Melesias and grandson of Thucydides,
passing his time with me. Now this Thucydides, the day
before, had felt some ill against me during a conversation.
Aristides, therefore, after he had seen and saluted me, and
other matters had been talked of, observed—I hear, Socrates,
that Thucydides thinks highly of himself, on some points, and
is angry with you, as if he were really something. It is so,
said I. What then, said he, does he not know what a slave.”
he was before he associated with you? By the gods, said I,
it does not seem that he does. But I too, said he, am in a ri-
diculous situation, Socrates. What is it 2 said I. It is, said
* In lieu of #Mºv, which is never found in prose Greek, the two oldest.
MSS. offer yeMay, from which it is easy to elicit re)\siv, the Attic future
for re)\éoeuv. - - - .”
* Both Aristides and Thucydides are alluded to in Lach. p. 179, A.
§ 2, as being the unworthy scions of a virtuous stock. • . * *.
* By comparing Xenophon in M. S. iv. 2. 39, quoted by Stalbaum, it
would seem that Euthydemus and Aristides had been shown by Socrates
to be no better than slaves, as Alcibiades is in Alcib. i. p. 135, D. § 61 ;
but that, instead of lamenting the fact, they took umbrage at the truth of
tha language applied to them by their teacher.
416 THEAGES.
he, that, before I sailed away, I was able to converse with any
man whatever, and not to appear inferior to any one in argu-
ment, so that I sought the society of men the most elegant;
but now, on the contrary, I shun any one, whom I perceive to
be instructed, so ashamed am I of my own littleness. But,
said I, whether did this power leave you suddenly or by de-
grees? By degrees, he replied. When was it present with you,
said I? Was it present while you were learning something
from me, or was it in some other way? I will tell you,
said he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but
true. I never, at any time, learnt anything from you, as you
know. I made, however, a proficiency when I associated with
you, even if I was only in the same house, though not in the
same room; but more so when I was in the same room with
you; and I seemed to myself (to improve) much more when,
being in the same room, I looked at you, when you were
speaking, than when I looked another way. But I made by
far the greatest proficiency, when I sat near you and touched
you.' Now, however, said he, all that habit has entirely
oozed away. [13.] Of such kind then is, Theages, the inter-
course with myself; for, if it is pleasing to the god, you will
make a very great and rapid proficiency; but if not, not. See,
then, whether it is not safer for you to be instructed by some
one of those, who have a power over the benefit, with which
they benefit men, than by me, who (have the power) to do
only whatever may happen.
Thea. It appears to me, Socrates, that we should act in
this manner, namely, to make a trial of this daemon by as-
sociating together. And, if he is favourable to us, this
will be the best ; but if not, then let us immediately consult
what we shall do, whether we shall associate with some other
person, or endeavour to appease the divine power, that is pre-
sent with you, by prayers and sacrifices, or any other method
that the diviners may explain.”
Dem. Do not, Socrates, oppose the lad any longer on these
points; for Theages speaks well.
Soc. If it appears proper so to act, let us act so.
* Stalbaum aptly refers to Sympos. p. 175, F. § 4.
* On the technical word ##mysio 6at, “to explain a religious rite,” see
Ruhnken on Timaeus, p. 111.
INTRODUCTION TO THE RIWAIS,
THIS is another of the dialogues considered to be spurious by the
generality of modern scholars; and even with Thrasyllus, who lived
in the time of Augustus, its genuineness was a matter of doubt, as
we learn from Diogenes Laertius ix. 37. Sydenham, however, was
so impressed with the conviction of its being really the production
of its reputed author, as to remark, that although the dialogue is
short, it is nevertheless of considerable value, and exhibits “a fair
sample of the rich and plentiful repast provided by Plato in his
longer productions; and it has this singular beauty, that the figures
of the persons brought forwards are sketched in so exact and lively
a manner, that painting itself could scarcely surpass it.” On the
other hand Stalbaum asserts, while confessing that it exhibits a style
of writing at once so pure, chaste, and elegant, as to put it on a par
with the writings of Plato and Xenophon, that its matter is such as
fully to justify its repudiation by Boeckh, Schleiermacher, Ast,
and others; while as regards the notion that Democritus was per-
haps one of the anonymous persons alluded to in the dialogue,
Stalbaum says it is too absurd to be entertained for a single moment.
For he doubtless remembered, although he says nothing to that ef-
fect, that, according to Diogenes Laertius, Demetrius Phalereus had
denied that Democritus ever visited Athens.
The title of the dialogue is generally 'Epaarai, “the Lovers:”
and so it is quoted by Olympiodorus. But Proclus calls it 'Avre-
paarai, “the Rival Lovers;” and this is the name it ought to bear,
as shown by the testimony of competent witnesses, produced by
Menage on Diog. L. iii. 5, and his decision has been adopted by all
subsequent scholars.
2 E
418 INTRODUCTION TO THE RIVALS.
The object of the dialogue is to show, that they, who profess to
know just so much of difficult arts and sciences as is suited to a per
son of liberal education, possess that very kind of knowledge, which
to all practical purposes is perfectly useless.
The most recent English translation of this dialogue, as far as I
know, is to be found in an anonymous work, published at London
in 1827, under the title of “A Narrative of an Excursion from Corfu
to Smyrna.” Like Shelley, in the case of the Banquet and the Ion,
the author has been more anxious to give an elegant than a close
translation,
THE RIVALS.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
SOCRATES, AND TWO ANONYMOUS RIVALS.
SOCRATES.
[1..] I ENTERED the school of Dionysius," the teacher of
grammar,” and I saw there those of the young men, who were
deemed to be the most remarkable for their personal appear-
ance and the good repute of their fathers, and their admirers
likewise. Two of the youths happened to be disputing, but
about what I did not very well hear. They appeared how-
ever to be disputing about Anaxagoras,” or CEnopides;* as
* This person, according to Diog. L. iii. 5, had been Plato’s grammar-
master.
* The reading Ypappuartoroij in lieu of Ypapparukoi, first adopted by
Forster from a single MS., has been subsequently found in all. By
7papparukög was meant “a critical grammarian,” not merely “a teacher
of the elements of grammar,” in Greek Ypapparvo Tàg, respecting whose
office Knebel refers to Protag. p. 325, E.
* Respecting Anaxagoras, the reader may consult Diogenes Laertius,
Stanley’s History of Philosophy, and similar classical works.
* Of this OEnopides, Proclus, on Euclid. ii. p. 19.78 and 87, has made
mention, when giving a brief sketch of the rise and progress of geometry.
He says that Anaxagoras touched on many questions relating to geometry,
and so did OEnopides of Chios; both of whom Plato has mentioned in
the Rivals, as having obtained a reputation for learning. After them
Hippocrates of Chios, who discovered the squaring of the meniscus, and
Theodorus of Cyréné, who was * junior to Anaxagoras, became
2 e
420. THE RIVAI S.
they were describing" circles, and imitating by their hands
certain inclinations,” with great earnestness And I, for I
was sitting near an admirer of one of the young persons,
nudged him with my elbow, and asked—On what were the two
youths so earnestly engaged 2 and I said, Surely it is a subject
important and beautiful, on which they have bestowed so
Serious an attention.—What call you" important and beauti-
ful? said he. They are prating” about things above in the
sky, and trifling away their time in philosophizing.—And I,
in wonder at such an answer, said—Do you think it, young
man, to be a disgraceful thing to philosophize? or why do
you speak so harshly 2—But another person,” who was a rival
admirer (of the youths), and happened to be sitting near, on
hearing me asking the question, and the answer, said—It is
not for you," Socrates, to ask this man, whether he thinks
it disgraceful to philosophize. Know you not that he has
spent all his time in being throstled,” and cramming
conspicuous for their knowledge of the same science; for the Squaring
of the meniscus is attributed to Hippocrates of Chios, by Simplicius, (on
Aristot. Phys. fol. 12,) who has shown how it is to be done geometri-
cally. But as no mention is made of Theodorus by name in this dialogue,
Proclus (according to Sydenham) imagined that Theodorus was one of
the nameless Rivals.
* To avoid the repetition of $gauvé00mv, Heusde proposed to read kū-
k\ovg yotiv Ypápolyrag orgatpac, similar to “circulos describentes et inflex-
iones * in Ficinus, who omits éqauvéoën v.
* Forster shows, from Diodorus i. § 98, that CEnopides had learnt in
Egypt that rôv iiNtaköv cik\ov \očºv šxswy rºv tropsíav; and that Anax-
agoras knew of the inclination of the poles of the earth. - -
7 To avoid the pleonasm in eitrs and Épm, Sydenham suggested pºc;
but where Troiov is thus used to express surprise, a verb is rarely found,
as shown by the mass of passages quoted by Reisig in Conjectan. p. 74;
and though Épm is thus inserted after troiov in Euthyd. p. 304, E., yet
there eitre is not added likewise.
* On &öoxsoxsiv and perstºpov, see the commentators on Aristoph.
Nép. 188, Plato Phaedon. p. 70, C., Phaedr. p. 270, A., Cratyl. p. 401, B.,
Rep. vi. p. 488, C., and Xenoph. M. S. i. 2, 31.
* According to Diogenes Laert. ix. 37, Thrasyllus fancled this person
to be Democritus, the philosopher of Abdera. See in § 2, n. 21 and 29.
* In the formula trpèg o'où, the verb troueig is not elsewhere found. I
have therefore omitted it. Ficinus has correctly “Non expedit tibi.”
* On the verb roaxm?\tá800au, as applied to wrestlers, Sydenham re-
fers to Lucian’s Anacharsis; Stutzmann adds Plutarch in Anton. i. p.
97, B. § 33, 6ta\apſ3ávov roëc vsavigkovc &rpaxi.At&s: and Diog. Laert,
#º Tvyóvrog kopaotov Toaxmxićerat, quoted by Stephens in Thes,
Te -
THE RIVALS. 421
himself, and sleeping 2* so that what other answer think
you he would give, but that it is disgraceful to philoso-
phize 2–Now this person had employed his whole time in
mental cultivation,” but the other, whom he abused, in
bodily exercises. It seemed then to me that I ought to dismiss
the one, who had been interrogated,” for he did not pretend
even to be skilled in words, but in deeds; and to interrogate
thoroughly the other, who pretended to be rather clever,
in order that I might, if I could, be benefited by him” in
knowledge. I said therefore to him, that I had proposed my
question in common for all; but if you think” you will give a
better answer, I put the same question to you as I did to him,
Whether you think it honourable to philosophize or not?—Just
as we were conversing thus, the two youths, overhearing us,
became silent; and ceasing from the dispute, became listeners.
Now, what their admirers suffered, I know not; but I was
struck with astonishment. For I am always struck so in the
case of the young and handsome. One of them, however,
seemed to me in no less an agony than myself; and he an-
swered with the air of a person eager for honour.—Should I
ever," Socrates, said he, consider it disgraceful to philosophize,
I should no longer deem myself a human being ; nor, indeed,
any one else, so disposed, pointing to his Rival, and speaking
with a loud 18 voice, so that the objects of their admiration
might hear.—To you, then, said I, it seems honourable to
philosophize.—Most highly, replied he.—[2.] What then, said
* Plutarch, in Philopoemenes, i. p. 375, C. § 3, and Galen to Thrasybul.
c. 37, quoted respectively by Sydenham and Forster, give a similar account
of the life of prize-fighters.
* According to Plato, in Rep. ii. p. 246, and Legg. x. p. 795, education
was divided into two parts, bodily, Yvpuyao Tukň, and mental, govaukň.
ForsTER. -
* In lieu of Épépusvov or épôpisvov, found subsequently in many MSS.,
Mudge suggested £ppwpuévov, but Schleiermacher épwrūpswov, from “quem
prius interrogaveram,” in Ficinus.
* Compare Hipp. Minor, $ 12.
* Here is a transition from the narrative to the dramatic style. S.
There is a remarkable instance of a similar transition in Xenophon in
Anab. i. 9. 25.
” Instead of Ötrórs, Ficinus found in his MS. st.Trors, answering to his
version, “si quando.”
* Stutzmann was the first to suggest psyāXg, subsequently found in the
four best MSS. Stalbaum, however, is content with piéya, supported by
r; ºwvij pušya Aéywv, in Protag. p. 310, B.
422 THE RIVAL3.
I; does it seem to you possible for a man to know any thing
whatever, whether it is disgraceful or honourable, who does
not know at all what that thing is?—No, said he.—Know you
then, said I, what it is to philosophize –Perfectly, said he.
—What is it then f said I.--What else, (said he,) than ac-
cording to the sentiment of Solon? For Solon says somewhere,”
Even as I grow old, still much I learn.
And it appears to me that the man, who would philosophize,
ought to be always learning some one thing at least, when he
is either young or old, in order that he may during life learn
the greatest number of things.-At first it seemed to me that
he had said something to the purpose; but afterwards, on
thinking thrice,” I asked him, whether he considered philoso-
phy to be much learning 2–Completely so,” said he.—And
do you consider, said I, that philosophy is only honourable?
or good likewise?—It is likewise very good, said he.--Do you
perceive this to be something peculiar to philosophy 2 or does
it seem to you to be the case in other things likewise? For
instance, do you consider a love nf gymnastic exercises to be
not only honourable but good likewise, or not?—To this *he
said very ironically two tings.” To this man let it be said,
that it is neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be
both honourable and good.—(I then asked him), Do you think
that in these exercises the undergoing much toil is a love of
exercise 2–By all means, said he ; just as in philosophizing, I
consider that much learning is philosophy.—Do you think
then, said I, that the lovers of those exercises desire any thing
else than that, which will cause the body to be in a good state?
—That very thing, he replied.—Do then, said I, many la-
* The same verse is quoted in Lach. p. 188, B., and Rep. vii. p. 536, B.
* Instead of trog, one MS. has trap. The two seem to lead to rpig :
for thus “tris’ is used by Virgil in AEm. i. 109, “Tris Notus—torquet
—tris Eurus—urget:” and Tpig in AEsch. S. Th. 727.
* From this answer Sydenham was led to believe that Democritus
was the speaker. For, according to Clemens Alexandr. in Strom. i. p.
357, ed. Potter, he prided himself upon his extensive learning.
*—” Such is the literal version of the Greek, pëAa sipovskiög eitre Óðo,
which I cannot understand. For the reply, so far from being ironical, is
perfectly straightforward. There is evidently some error here; which it
were not difficult perhaps to correct by the aid of Épm, read in the three
oldest MSS. in lieu of sizrs. Sydenham renders sipovukajg “facetiously;”
Knebel, “Suam magnopere dissimulans sententiam.”
THE RIVALS. 423
bours, cause the body to be in a good state 2—Certainly, said
he ; for how should a person have, from little labour, his body
in a good state?—Here I thought it best to call” upon the
lover of gymnastics, in order that he might assist me through
his knowledge of the gymnastic art. And I asked him, Why
are you silent, O best of men, while this person is talking
thus? Or to you likewise do persons seem to have their
bodies in a good state from much labour or little –” For my
part, Socrates, said he, I thought he had known” the saying,”
that moderate labour is best for the body.”—” How so?
(said I).—(I speak) not of a man” sleepless, and foodless, and
having his neck not worn down” and attenuated by care.”
On his saying this the youths were delighted, and burst into
a laugh; but the other party blushed.—I then said, What then,
* So Sydenham. Ficinus has—“provocandus”—as if he found in his
MS. k\mréog, in lieu of kivmtéog: on which see Heind. at Lys. p. 225, A.
*—* Ficinus has merely “Equidem, O Socrates, asserere ausin—”
For his MS. was either deficient; or else he saw that there was nothing
in the shape of a proverb, to which the phrase rö Asyópsyov Ór) could be
referred. Accordingly Knebel would supply to pumööv ćyav, to which
Plato alludes in Menex. p. 247, E. § 20, and Protag. p. 343, B. 82.
* After Toijro Schleiermacher would insert rovtovi–But the disease
is seated somewhat deeper.
* Cornarius quotes opportunely Hippocrates on Epidem. vi. 6, Tróvot,
outta, Trotá, #7twog, &ppočígua, Trávra piérpta.
27—" The Greek is, Tró0sy Ö); oixi ävópa ys—Ficinus has, “Unde 2
inquam; non virum vigilantem dico—” as if he had found in his MS.
Tró0sv, *w 6' #yð; oixi ävôpa Aéyw &ypv7rvov– Forster, whom Sydenham
follows, would insert Ópág after obyi– Heusde however, who says that
the whole passage is wretchedly corrupt, would read—tró08v Šà oðxi;
àvöpa—storpaſ}}. But sigrpaſ}}c is found no where else in Greek; nor
in the formula tró0sv, used either by itself or with oil in a negative sense,
dowe meet with oùyi. Schleiermacher prefers, XOK. Tró0svö’oix oi troX\ot;
"Avôpa ye—whom Beck follows in part. But the whole passage still re-
quires correction.
* All the MSS. but one offer &rptſ?; in lieu of &gtpaşī. Ficinus has
—“insuetam spinam habentem”—from which it is difficult to discover
what he found in his MS. Stalbaum translates &rpuffſ, röv Tpéxm\ov
#xovra by “collum nullis pugnis committentem.”
* To give additional support to the notion that Democritus is here
alluded to, Sydenham refers to the Epistle of Hippocrates, where the phi-
losopher is described as being very pale and wasted in flesh; that he was
found with a book which lay ſº on his knees; and that other books
lay by him, some on each side; that by turns he wrote, poring over his
writing with earnest attention; and by turns rested, por dering very
much within himself.
424 THE RIVALS.
do you now concede that neither much nor little labour causes
human beings to have their bodies in a good state, but only
what is moderate? or will you contest with us two 2–Against
him, said he, I would enter the lists with much pleasure, and
I know well that I should be competent to support the pro-
position I have laid down, if I had laid down one weaker than
this; for he is nothing. But against you I beg not to con-
tend in favour of a paradox; and I admit, that not many, but
moderate exercises” procure for men a good habit of body.—
And what in the case of food? said I. Is it the moderate, or
much 2–He admitted it in the case of food.” And thus I
compelled him to confess that, in the case of all the other
things relating to the body, the moderate is the most bene-
ficial, and not the much or little. *[And he confessed
the moderate]* and all this he granted me.—What then, said
I, as regards the soul ? Of the things applied to it do the
moderate or the immoderate benefit it?—The moderate, said he.
—Is not learning one of the things applied to the soul?—He
admitted it.—Of learning then, the moderate quantity bene-
fits, but not the great.—He assented.—[3.] Of whom then,
making an inquiry, should we justly inquire what kind of ex-
ercise and of food are moderate for the body? We all three
agreed that it is a physician or a master of exercise.” And
* A similar sentiment is attributed to Socrates by Xenophon in M. S.
i. 2. 4, as remarked by Sydenham.
* The Greek is Kai rā ouria diploxóyst. But we must either insert
do airwg, or some other word of like import, or else in lieu of rā ortría
read Tö puérpta—that the concession here may tally with the two subse-
quent concessions. S. Schleiermacher, with whom Knebel agrees, con.
siders the whole clause to be superfluous. -
*—” The words within the brackets are evidently an interpolation.
* “Although IIauðorpiðng properly signifies the person who teaches
youth their exercises, yet Plato here, and elsewhere, uses the word to
signify the Yvpavaormic, “gymnastic physician; ’ i. e. the person, who
knows what exercise is suited for each disease. Such a person was Hero-
dicus; who, says Plato, in Rep. iii. p. 406, A., Trauðorpí8mg &v špuśs
yupuyaorukňviarpukj. But the trauðorpiðng and yupuwaarijg afterwards be-
came the same; although in process of time they were different professions,
But in the time of Aristotle the knowledge of what sort of exercise was
suited to each particular habit of body was attributed to the trauðorpiðng,
as well as to the yupwagric; which last word we beg leave to read in
Aristot. Politic. iv., instead of yupwaorukóg.” So Sydenham; who refers
to Mercurialis De Arte Gymnastica i. 12, and to Faber in Agonist. ii. 6;
and he might have added Perizonius on AEian W. H. ii. 6.
THE RIVALS. 425
of whom (shall we inquire) about the sowing of seeds? About
this, we confessed the husbandman. But inquiring of whom,
should we justly inquire respecting the planting and sowing
of learning in the soul, how many, and of what kinds of it
are moderate? We were here all full of difficulty. Upon
which I said, by way of a joke, Since we are all at a loss, are
you willing for us to ask these youths here? Or perhaps we
are ashamed, as Homer (Od. xxi. 285) says the suitors were,
who deemed that no one else was fit to stretch the bow.
Since then they now seemed to be dispirited on the ques-
tion, I endeavoured to view it in another light, and I said
—What kinds of learning do we best conjecture those are,
which a philosopher ought to learn? since they are not all or
many. Whereupon the wiser person, taking up the discourse,
observed that the most beautiful kinds of learning, and (the
most) becoming, are those by which a person would obtain
the highest reputation for philosophy; and that he would ob-
tain the highest, if he seemed to be skilled in all arts; * and,
if not all, at least in as many as possible, and especially those
of the greatest account, after having learnt such of them as
are fitting for freemen to learn, and are connected with intellect,
and not with a handicraft merely.—Do you mean in the same
way, said I, as in carpentry? For there you may purchase
a tip-top carpenter for five or six minae;” but you could not
(buy) an architect even for ten thousand drachmas;* so
few of these are to be found amongst all the Greeks. Are
you speaking of some such thing?—And he, on hearing, ad-
mitted that he was speaking of such a thing.—[4.] I then
asked him, if it was not impossible for one person to learn
thus” only two arts, much less, many and great.—Do not
understand me, Socrates, said he, as if I were saying that a
philosopher ought to know each of the arts accurately, as he
does, who makes it his profession; but to be able, as becomes
* Here is another trait, which Forster and Sydenham apply to Demo-
critus, who had, according to Diogenes Laert. ix. 37, a skill in all kinds
of arts; where Sydenham would read tragöv for tragav, to suit better
with the words here.
* Less than £20. For the Attic pºvá was equal to £34s. 7d. English. S.
* Equal to £32.2 18s. 4d. For the pºvá was worth 100 6páxpat. , S.
It differed from the Roman “libra” by only four drachmae, as remarked
by Stutzmann.
* After oira has dropt ka?\óg, or Something similar.
º
426 THE RIVALS.
a person of a liberal education, to follow better than the persons
present, what is said by the handicraftsman; and to give his
opinion so as to appear, in what is said and done relating to
the arts, to have a finer taste, and more knowledge, than those
who happen to be present.—Then I–for I was still doubtful
what he meant by his speech—said to him, Do I conceive
rightly what kind of person you call a philosopher? For
you seem to me to speak of a person, such as are the compe-
titors in five kinds of contest, compared with the runner, or
the wrestlers.” For the former fall short of the latter, as
regards the contests of the latter, and are second to them;
but of all the other competitors, they are the first, and are
the victors.” Some such thing you mean perhaps that the
study of philosophy effects in those, who pursue it, in that
they fall short of the first prize,” in the intellect relating to
the arts, but in attaining the Second, they are superior to all
the rest; so that he, who has studied philosophy, becomes in
every thing a person under the tip-top” man. Some such
person you seem to me to point out.—You appear to me,
Socrates, said he, to understand correctly what relates to a
philosopher, in likening him to a competitor in five contests.”
For he is really such a man, as not to be a slave to any thing;
nor has he laboured upon any one thing with such accuracy, as,
* Clericus, in Silv. Philolog. c. 10.4, was the first to substitute traX-
aworóg for Trextagrãc; and so three MSS. subsequently collated.
* Forster quotes Longinus, $34, where Hyperides is stated, from the
variety of his talents, to hold the second place amongst the first-rate
orators, but the first amongst the second-rate.
* In lieu of Trpºrav, the antithesis in Ösvrepsia requires ºrpwrstwy, as
I have translated.
* According to Stalbaum, #7takpog is not found elsewhere in Plato.
But as Longinus makes use of it in the passage just quoted, it is evident
he found it here, and considered it a good Greek word.
* Sydenham gives here in a corrected form a translation of what
Diogenes Laertius has, in xi. 37, quoted from Thrasyllus. “If the Rivals
be a dialogue of Plato, says Thrasyllus, the anonymous person there intro-
duced as the friend of those, who were disputing about CEnopides and
Anaxagoras, must be this Democritus; who, in the conversation he had
with Socrates concerning philosophy, there related, says, that a philoso-
pher is like a competitor in five contests. Now he was himself a five-
contest competitor in philosophy. For he had cultivated physics, and
ethics, and mathematics, and all the common learning of those times,
and had some experience in all the arts.” . .
THE RIVALS. 427
through his attention to that one thing, to be deficient in all
the rest, as are handicraftsmen, but he has touched moderately
upon all.
[5.] After this reply, I was anxious to know clearly what
he meant, and I inquired of him, whether he considered
good persons to be useful or useless.-Useful, surely, So-
crates, said he.—If then the good are useful, are not the
bad useless?—He agreed.—Well then, said I, do you deem
philosophers to be useful, or not?—He acknowledged they
were useful; and moreover he said, that he deemed them the
most useful (of all persons).”—Come now, (said I,) let us see
whether you say what is true. How can these second-rate
men be of any use to us? For it is plain that the philosopher is
inferior to each of those who possess their respective arts.—He
acknowledged it.—Come then, said I, if either yourself were
unwell, or any of your friends, for whom you have a great re-
gard, would you, being desirous to recover health, introduce
that second-rate person, the philosopher, to your family; or
take a physician.—Both of them, said he.—Do not say both,
I replied; but which in preference, and the first 2–No man,
said he, would hesitate about this, that (I would take) the
physician in preference and first.—What then, in a vessel tost
in a storm * To whom would you rather intrust yourself and
your property To a pilot, or to a philosopher ?—To a pilot,
for my part, said he.—And so, too, in all other affairs; so
long as there is a person of skill in a profession, the philoso-
pher is of no use.—It appears so, said he.—The philosopher,
therefore, said I, is some useless person; for there are surely
persons of skill in (all) professions. But we have agreed that
the good are useful, and the wicked useless.—He was forced
to own it.—[6.] “What then, said I, shall I ask you about
what comes 44 after this? or is it not rather rude to put a
question?—Ask what you please, said he.—I desire nothing else,
said I, than to repeat the concessions already made. Now the
matter stands thus. We have conceded that philosophy is an
honourable thing, and that we are ourselves philosophers;
and that philosophers are good; and that the good are useful,
* Ficinus alone has “omnium.”
*—44 The Greek is, ri oiv pistă rotto èpopuat; Stephens suggested,
Ti ov; rô pºstd toiro èpopuat—which Stalbaum approves of, and I have
translated.
428 THE RIVALS.
and the wicked useless. Again, on the other hand, we have
conceded that philosophers are useless, as long as there are per-
sons of skill in any particular profession; and that such per-
Sons are existing at all times. For was not all this conceded ?
—Certainly, said he.—We concede, therefore, agreeably to
your own reasoning, that if it be philosophy to be skilled in
arts in the manner you state, such 4° persons are wicked and
useless as long as there are artists.” But see, my friend, if
the case be so, and that to philosophize is not to attend to arts,
nor to busy oneself about many things, nor to be living like a
workman, bending over his work,” nor to be learning many
things, but something else? Since I thought, it was a reproach
for persons, much occupied in arts, to be called operatives.”
[7.] But we shall know more clearly by this means, whether
I am speaking truly, if you will answer me this. Who know
how to punish horses correctly? Whether they, who make
them better, or others?—They who (make them) better.—
Well then, do not they, who know how to make dogs better,
know how to chastise dogs properly 2–Yes.—The same art
then makes better, and chastises properly.—I agree, said he.—
Well then, is the art, which makes better and chastises pro-
perly, the same as that which knows the good and the vicious,
or is it a different one 2–It is, said he, the same.—Are you
then willing, said I, to concede this, in the case of human
beings likewise, that the art, which makes men better, is that,
which chastises properly, and knows the good and the bad?—
By all means, said he.—Does not then the art which (applies)
* Instead of airočg, Heusde would read at roëg pixogópovg—I have
translated as if the Greek were rototrowg—Knebel says that airoëc
agrees with pixo~6povg, to be got out of pu)\oo opeiv.
* I have followed Heusde, who correctly suggested rexvirat in lieu o'
Texvat.
* Such is the literal meaning of kvarrážstv.
* In Greek, 3&vavoog is one who works by means of a furnace. Fol
so Hesychius: Bavavoria, Tāoa Téxvm Öuá ºrvpog, kvpiwg 68 m trepi rāg
captivovg. Plato seems to allude to the metallurgic and the chemical ex-
periments of Democritus; whose treatise, IIspi rāg Atôov, related perhaps
to the magnet, or loadstone, which, for its peculiar virtues, was called “the
stone;” and it was no doubt through fusion by fire that he converted com-
mon stones into precious, and carried on his other chemical experiments
The word, however, seems to comprise all those arts we call mechanical;
and the chain of reasoning requires it to be used here with the same lat-
tude. S.
THE RIVALS. 429
to one (apply) to many too, and that which (applies) to many
(apply) to one likewise? And so too as regards horses and
all other things?—I confess it, (said he.)—What then is the
science, which chastises properly the licentious and the law-
less in civil states ? Is it not the judicial science?—Yes.
—Do you mean by justice” any other science than this?
—No other.—Do not then men know the good and the bad
by that science, by which they chastise properly 2–By that.
—And he, who knows one, will know many ?—Yes.—And
whoever does not know many, (will not know one.)—I
confess it.—If then a horse, as being but a horse, knows
not good and bad horses, he would not know of which kind
he is himself?—I admit it.—And if an ox, being but an
ox, knows not good and bad oxen,” he would not know
of which kind he is himself?—True, said he. — And so
too, in the case of a dog?—He admitted it.—What then, if a
man knows not the good men and the bad, would he not be
ignorant whether he is good or bad, inasmuch as he too is a
man?—He agreed.—Now to be ignorant of oneself, is it to
be of sound mind,” or not sound 2–Not sound.—To know
then oneself, is to be of sound mind.—I admit it, said he.—
To this then, as it seems, the Delphic inscription exhorts,
namely, to exercise a sound mind, and justice.”—It seems
so.-And by the very same science we know too how to
chastise properly.—I admit it, (said he.)—Is not then justice
that, by which we know how to chastise properly 2 but sound-
ness of mind that, by which we have the skill to know our-
* Stalbaum says that the writer has confounded legal justice with jus-
tice in the abstract; or, as we should say in England, law with equity. '
* Ficinus has “quisint boni aut mali boves.” From which Bekker
wished to insert (30ijg, wanting in all the MS.
* No words are more puzzling to translate than ord, ppov and its de-
rivatives. For they are employed in different places in different senses;
and there is no word in English answering to them every where. Hence
to express their precise meaning, different words must be used in different
places. In Homer, owppooſivm means prudence, or discretion, as in Od.
xxiii. 30. Its true etymology is oróa ppmv, “a sound mind; ” and so
Porphyry says in Stobaus xxi. p. 185, Gesn., kai Yûp owppoo tºwn oraoppo-
orūwn rug. And so too Plato, in Charmid. p. 164, D., by owppoorium un-
derstands “soundness of mind;” and both Xenophon, in M. S. i. 16, and
Plato, in Rep., oppose it to pavia, “madness.” Most commonly, however,
Plato applies it to one of the cardinal virtues. S.
* The same interpretation is given in Charmid. p. 164, D. § 27, and
Alcibiad. I. p. 124, A. § 41.
43() THE RIVALS.
selves and others?—It seems so, said he.—Justice then, said
I, and soundness of mind are the same thing.”—It appears so.
—[8.] In this way, said I, states are well governed, when they,
who do wrong, suffer punishment.—You speak the truth.-The
same Science too, said I, is that of the statesman.—He as-
sented.—What then, when a single man administers correctly
the affairs of a state, he is not a tyrant, and a king?”—I admit
it.—Does he not administer affairs by the art of the king?
or the tyrant?—Just so.-These arts then are the same with
those.—They appear so.-Well then, when one man adminis-
ters the affairs of a household correctly, what is his name 2
Is it not steward, or master?—Yes.—Whether by justice
would he administer the affairs of a household correctly? Or
by any other art?—By justice.—The same kind of person
then, it seems, is a king, a tyrant, a statesman, a steward,
a master, a man of Sound mind, and a just man; and one is
the art of the king, of the tyrant, of the statesman, of the
master, of the steward, of the just man, and the man of sound
mind.—So it appears, said he. [9.] Is it not then disgrace-
ful for a philosopher, when the physician is speaking about
persons who are ill, not to be able to follow what is said, nor to
give an opinion on what is said or done, and similarly, when
any one skilled operative (is speaking)? and when a judge, or
a king, or any one else of those whom we have just now enumer-
ated, (is speaking of things belonging to his office,) is it not
disgraceful for a philosopher not (to follow what they say or
do,) nor to be able to give an opinion respecting them 2–
How, Socrates, said he, is it not disgraceful for him, to be
able to give no opinion on subjects so important?—Shall we
assert then, said I, that on these points the philosopher must
be a competitor in five contests, and be second-rate, having
* According to Polus the Pythagorean, quoted by Stobaeus, ix. p. 105,
justice is the mother and nurse of the other virtues; for without it no one
can possess temperance, fortitude, or prudence. S.
* Although the Greek, ripavvóg rs kai 3aot}\sic, is “both a tyrant and
a king,” yet Plato does not mean, that “tyrant” and “king ” are synon-
ymous; so far from it, he says in the Statesman, p. 276, E. § 18, that “a
tyrant and a king are divopotórarot, i. e. most unlike one another; ” and,
Rep. ix. p. 580, C. § 6, that “the best of all governments is the kingly, and
the worst the tyrannic.” By Túpavvog, “a tyrant,” he meant, an arbitrary
monarch, governing not according to established laws, but his own will ;
by §agiNetic, “a king,” governing according to law written or customary, S,
THE RIVALS. 431
the second prize after all, and be useless, so long as there
exists any of the first-rate º Or must he in the first place
not commit his household to another person, nor have the
second place in that business; but ought himself to chastise
after being the judge, if his household is about to be adminis-
tered correctly.—In this he agreed with me.—” And then,
said I,” should his friends submit an award to him, or the
state order him to decide upon any thing, or to act the judge,
would it not, my friend, be disgraceful for him to appear in
such cases to be second or third, and not to take the lead 2–
So it seems to me. To philosophize therefore, thou best of
men, wants much of being great in learning, or the busying
oneself about arts.—On my saying this, the wise man, ashamed
of what he had before asserted, was silent; but the illiterate
person said, it was in that way,” and the rest approved of
what had been stated.
*—º In lieu of Étretrá ye Şătrov, a combination of particles not to be
found, I suspect, elsewhere, Stutzmann suggested £aretta 63 y' sitov, simi-
lar to—“Atque ego addidi’’ in Ficinus.
* In #ketvwg there is, I suspect, some error. For many MSS. read
#ksivog. Perhaps the author wrote épm, ei kai ävovg, sióēval, i. e. “ said
he knew, although he was a simpleton.”
INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPARCHUS,
ALTHough this dialogue is found in the list given by Diogenes
Laertius, iii. 50, of the genuine productions of Plato, yet even be-
fore the time of Ælian, there was some idea of its being spurious.
For after quoting it in W. H. viii. 2, the writer adds, “if it be in
reality Plato's.” Carrying out this hint, Walckenaer was the first
to prove, on Herodotus v. 55, that it was not written by its pre-
viously-supposed author; and his decision has been admitted by
Wolf in Prolegom, Homer. p. cliv., and all the subsequent scholars
who have written upon Plato, with the exception of Taylor; who
says he “cannot find any thing in its manner or matter, for which
its authenticity deserves to be called in question.” Boeckh indeed
attributes it to Simon the shoemaker, who was a Socratic philoso-
pher, ridiculed probably by Aristophanes, in the Clouds; but Stal-
baum would bring it down to the time, when schools of rhetoric
were in vogue towards the decline of Greek literature, and he con-
siders it inferior to even the Theages and Rivals, despite the pre-
servation of the anecdote relating to Hipparchus in § 4, who has
given the name to the dialogue, and was once thought to have been
introduced as a speaker, until, to avoid the anachronism, an un-
known friend was substituted in his place.
THE HIPPARCHUS.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
SOCRATES, AND A FRIEND.
SOCRATES.
[1..] WHAT is the love of gain, and who are its lovers?
Fr. They seem to me to be those, who think it worth while
to make a gain from what is nothing worth."
Soc. Whether then do they seem to you (to do so), while
knowing that the things are of no worth, or not knowing 2
For if (they do so) not knowing, you call the lovers of gain
senseless.
Fr. Nay, I do not call them senseless, but thorough knaves
and villains, the slaves of gain, and who know indeed that the
things are worthless, from which they dare to make a gain,
but yet through their shamelessness they dare to have a love
of gain.
Soc. Do you then call a person of this kind a lover of
gain 2 For instance, should a husbandman, while planting,
and knowing the plant to be worthless, nevertheless think to
make a gain from it when grown up, do you call such a
person a lover of gain P
Fr. The lover of gain, Socrates, thinks he ought to make a
gain from every thing.
Soc. Do not thus answer me at random, like a person in-
* To such persons Horace alludes in his “Rem, si possis, recte; si mon,
quocunque modo, rem; ” so well translated by Coleman—“Get money, if
you can with honesty; if not, get money.” With regard to the play
on the words āśiñow—ášíov, see at Phileb. § 57, n. 56; $ 65, n. 74;
Charm. § 49; Hip. Maj $41, 45.
2 F 2
436 HIPPARCHUS.
jured' by some one, but, giving your mind, answer me, as if I
were questioning you again from the beginning. Do you no
agree with me, that a lover of gain knows the value of that,
from which he thinks it worth while to make a gain?
Fr. I do.
Soc. Who then is he, that knows the value of plants, and
in what time and place it is worth while to plant them 2 that
we also may introduce something” from the words of the wise,
which the clever in law-suits employ for the sake of elegance.
Fr. A husbandman, I think.
Soc. Do you then mean by the expression—It is worth
while to make a gain—any thing else than to think that one
ought to make a gain P
Fr. I mean this.
Soc. Now do not you, who are so young, endeavour to de-
ceive me, your elder, by answering as you do at present, what
you do not think; but tell me truly, do you think that a
husbandman exists, who knows it is not worth while to plant
a certain plant, and yet fancies he will make a gain” by such
a plant 2
Fr. By Zeus, not I.
Soc. What then, think you that a horsedealer, who knows
that the food which he gives a horse, is of no worth, does not
know that it destroys the horse?
Fr. I do not.
Soc. He does not think then that from such worthless food
he will make a gain.
Fr. He does not.
Soc. What then, do you think that a pilot, who has fur-
nished his ship with sails and a rudder of no worth, does not
know that he will sustain a damage, and be in danger of perish-
ing himself, and of losing the ship and all it carries?
Pr. I do not.
Soc. He will not think then that he will make a gain by
worthless articles.
* Stalbaum justly objects to jôukmpévog. For most assuredly an injured
person would give an answer not at random, but with bitterness, or in an
-saveemly manner. Hence in lieu of sikſ one would prefer disukň–
* This alludes to the play on the words āpa and xúpa, which it is im-
possible to preserve in a translation.
* Ficinus has “lucraturum,” which leads to kepôavčiv, or kepôaivetv ſiv,
and similarly all through afterwards.
HIPPARCHUS. 437
Fr. He will not.
Soc. But does the general, who knows that his army carries
worthless arms, think he will make a gain, or that he is
worthy to make a gain by them P'
Fr. By no means.
Soc. But if a hautboy-player possesses a worthless haut-
boy, or a lyre-player a lyre, or a bowman a bow, or, in short,
any other artist or skilled person possesses instruments or any
other apparatus of no value, does he think he will make a gain
by these?
Fr. It appears he will not.
[2] Soc. Whom then do you call lovers of gain f For
surely they are not those, whom we have already mentioned,
who, knowing what are things of no value, think they must *
make a gain by them. And thus, O wonderful man, according
to what you say, no one is a lover of gain.
Fr. But, Socrates, I mean to Say, that those are lovers of
gain, who, through insatiable avidity, are perpetually and
beyond all measure, greedy after things that are small and
worth little or ° nothing, and thus have a love of gain.
Soc. But surely, thou best of men, they do not know this,
that they are worthless; for we have proved against ourselves,
that this is impossible.
Fr. So it seems to me.
Soc. If then (they do so) not knowing it, it is evident that,
not knowing it, they fancy things of no worth to be of great
value.
Fr. It appears so.
Soc. Do not the lovers of gain love gain?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. But do you say that gain is contrary to loss 2
Fr. I do.
Soc. Is it therefore a good to any one to suffer a loss?
Fr. To no one.
1–1 The Greek is oisrat &Trô rotºrwy kepôauveuv kai &étoi kspöaivetv.
But the phrase is here constantly oterat kepôaivetv, not détoi kepaivetv,
which was interpolated from $ 1.
* One MS. omits siv, as in the preceding passages, where the same
formula is repeated.
* I have translated as if the Greek were, 6Xiyov čáta ºi kai občevög, not
zmerely āśva kai–
438 HIPPARCHUS.
Soc. But it is an evil?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. Are men then injured by a damage?
Fr. They are injured.
Soc. Is then damage an evil?
Fr. It is.
Soc. But gain is contrary to damage?
Fr. Contrary.
Soc. Gain is therefore a good?
Fr. It is.
Soc. Do you then call those, who love a good, lovers of gain?
Fr. It seems so.
Soc. You do not then, my friend, call the lovers of gain
mad-men. But do you yourself love what is a good, or not
love it 2
Fr. I do.
Soc. Is there a good which you do not love, but an evil
(which you do)?
Fr. By Zeus, there is not.
Soc. But you love all good things equally
Fr. I do.
Soc. Ask me, if I also do not. For I also shall acknow-
ledge to you, that I love good things. But besides I and you,
do not all the rest of men appear to you to love good things,
and to hate evil?
Fr. To me it appears so.
Soc. But have we not acknowledged that gain is a good?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. In this way then,' all appear (to be) lovers of gain; but
that, in which we before mentioned, no one was a lover of
gain. By employing then which assertion, would a person
not err 2
Fr. Should, Socrates, one rightly apprehend what a lover
of gain is, *I think it is right to consider him a lover of
gain * who earnestly applies himself to, and thinks it worth
* Instead of at one MS. has otiv, similar to “igitur" in Ficinus. One
would prefer otiv sivat—paivovrat.
*—” So Taylor with Ficinus, “eum, ut puto, lucri cupidum arbitra-
bitur.” The Greek is, épôāg 6' àort roijrov #ysia.0at (pt)\okspôň. But
after et rug—óp6āg \apſ3évot, the particle 68 could not thus follow the re-
peated &p6äg. The author wrote perhaps épôāg Özi tor’—
HIPPARCHUs. 439
while to make a gain from those things, from which the good
do not dare to make a gain.
[3.] Soc. But do you not see, O sweetest' of men, that
we just now acknowledged that to make a gain is to be bene-
fited P
Fr. What then P
Soc. Because this also we previously admitted, that all men
always wished for good things.
Fr. We did. -
Soc. Do not, then, good men wish to possess every thing
gainful, since such things are good?
Fr. But not the things, Socrates, by which they are about
to be hurt.
Soc. By “to be hurt” do you mean “to be damaged”? or
something else?
Fr. No, but I mean “to be damaged.”
Soc. Are persons damaged by gain, or by damage?
Fr. Through both. For they are damaged by damage,
and through iniquitous gain. -
Soc. Does it then appear to you that any thing useful and
good is iniquitous 2
Fr. To me it does not. -
Soc. Did we not then a little before acknowledge that gain
is contrary to damage, which is an evil? . -
Fr. We did.
Soc. And that being contrary to evil, it is a good?
Fr. We granted this. -
[4.] Soc. You endeavour then, you see, to deceive me, by
designedly asserting the contrary to what we just now granted.
Fr. By Zeus, I do not, Socrates; but you, on the contrary,
are deceiving me; and I know not how, in your reasonings
you turn things topsy-turvy. - - -
Soc. Speak fair words. For I should not act correctly, if
I were not persuaded by a man good and wise.
Fr. Who is he and why particularly (say you) this?
Soc. My fellow-citizen, and likewise yours, Hipparchus,
* Although Plato uses y\vköc, in Hipp. Maj. p. 288, B. § 9, in an
ironical sense, for “a simpleton,” as remarked by Ruhnken on Tim. p.
131, yet this, says Stalbaum, is the only place where the superlative is
found.
440 HIPPARCHUs.
the son of Pisistratus, one of the Philaidae,” and the eldest
and wisest of the sons of Pisistratus; who exhibited many
other illustrious acts of wisdom, and was the first who intro-
duced” into this land the poems of Homer, and compelled the
rhapsodists during the Panathenaea to go through them suc-
cessively * and in order, just as you know they do at present ;
and having sent for Anacreon, the Teian, a ship of fifty oars,
brought him to this city, and always had about him Simonides
of Ceos, having induced him (to stay) by great rewards and
gifts. And this he did, wishing to instruct” the citizens, in
order that he might rule over them being the best of men ;
nor thinking, that he ought to begrudge wisdom to any man,
as being himself a highly educated person. And when such
of the citizens as were living around the town had been edu-
cated well, and admired him for his wisdom, he likewise laid
down a plan to instruct those in the country; and he set up for
them statues of Hermes" along the roads, in the middle of
the city and of each of the wards; and afterwards selecting
from his wisdom, on points he had partly 7 learned, and partly
discovered himself," what he deemed to be the cleverest idea, he
put them into elegiac verses, and engraved them (on the Her-
mas) as his poems, and specimens of wisdom ; in order that
in the first place the citizens might not wonder at those wise
inscriptions (on the temple) at Delphi, “Know thyself,” and
“Nothing too much,” and the rest of that kind, but that they
* So Meursius in Peisistratus, $ 1, in lieu of pixatówwog. For the Phi-
laidae was a ward of the tribe of AEgeus, as stated by the Schol. here
and Step. Byz. in puxatóat. See likewise Corsini Fast. Attic. i. p. 246;
Heringa Observat. p. 236; Spon. p. 38.9, quoted by Porson in Miscell,
Crit. p. 264. . -
* According to Thucydides in vi. 54, Hippias was the eldest son. * *
* This is attributed by other authors to Solom or Peisistratus. See
Perizonius on AElian W. H. viii. 2; Heyne Excurs. ad Il. T. viii. p.
809; Wolf Prolegom. Homer. p. xcix.—cxl.
* On the expression #8 baroſłoxic or à jaroM, psog, see Wolf Prole-
gom. Homer. p. cxl., and Hermann Opuscul. T. v. p. 300.
* Instead of treiðeuv, four MSS. read trauðsiew, similar to “instruere”
in Ficinus. - -
* In lieu of “Hermas” Ficinus has, apparently from a Scholium, “co-
lumnassive quadratos lapides,” as in Thucyd. vi. 27. - -
"—" So Taylor, following Ficinus, “quam partem didicerat, partim
ipse invenerat,” who perhaps found in his MS. àv iipa tº Épabs kai úpt'
abrèc Śāsūpe, not #v r" #1a6s kai jiv airóg iſſeåps. *
EIIPPARCHUS. 44 l
might deem the words of Hipparchus still wiser; and, in the
next place, that passing by them, up and down, they might
read them, and have a taste of his wisdom, and come from
the fields' and be instructed in the remaining branches of
learning. And there are two epigrams. In Some upon the
left-hand sides of each of the Hermae there is sculptured
a *Hermes, saying that he was standing midway between
the city and the ward;” and in others upon the right-
hand sides he says:—“This is the memorial” of Hippar-
chus. Go on, having just thoughts.” There are also many
other beautiful poetical descriptions on other Hermae ; and
there is this in the Steiriac" road, in which he says —
“This is the memorial of Hipparchus. Do not deceive
your friend.” I would not then have dared to deceive you,
being my friend, and disobey so great a man; after whose
death, the Athenians were tyrannized over by his brother
Hippias; and you have heard from all the old men, that only
during those years did there exist a tyranny at Athens, and
that during all the other period, the Athenians lived nearly as
when Saturn reigned.” But it is said by rather clever persons,
that he did not die in the way which the multitude have thought,
through the "dishonour done to the sister (of Harmodius) re-
specting the carrying the sacred basket"—for that is a silly
reason—but that Harmodius was the bosom friend and pupil of
Aristogeiton, who valued himself highly upon "instructing a
man," and fancied that Hipparchus would be his rival. But
at that time it happened that Harmodius was the lover of one
of the handsome and nobly-born youths—whose name persons
have mentioned, but I do not remember—and that this young
* Ficinus has “ex agris et silvis,” as if he had found in his MS. śk
rāv &yptov kai ÜNøv. #
*—” According to Stalbaum, both Boeckh in Indic. Lect. Berolin. 1824,
and Osann in Syllog. Inscript. p. 241, conceived there was an Hexameter
likewise, answering to the words given here in prose—Aéywy & Eppijg 6tt
#v puéop roß &orsog kai roń &#pov $ormkev–from which it is easy to
elicit Ajuov tº Év puéog sip' Eppiág kai Fáoreog. ša rēg. To these Her-
mae placed by Hipparchus Hesychius alludes in 'Itrirápxswog ‘Epplic.
* In lieu of pavijua one would expect here flipia—
* According to the Scholiast and Steph. Byz., Steiria was a ward of the
tribe of Pandion. -
* So Ovid, “Quam bene vivebant, Saturno rege—”
*—" The dishonour alluded to is explained by Thucydides vi. 56.
"—" In the Greek, travösögat àv6patrov, is an error, which it were
perhaps not difficult to correct. -
£
442 HIPPARCHUS,
person did for a time admire Harmodius and Aristogeiton, as
wise men; but afterwards associating with Hipparchus, he
despised them; and that they, being very much annoyed at
the dishonour, slew Hipparchus.
[5.] Fr. You run the risk, Socrates, of either not con-
sidering me a friend; or, if you do think me a friend, of not
being persuaded by Hipparchus: for I cannot be persuaded
that you have not deceived me 'in I know not what man-
ner," during the discourse.
Soc. But indeed, just as in the game of backgammon,” I
am willing to put back whatever part you please of the asser-
tions already made, in order that you may not think you have
been deceived. Whether therefore shall I retract this asser-
tion for you, that all men desire good?
Fr. Not for me.
Soc. But that to be damaged, and damage itself, is not an
evil?
Fr. Not for me. -
Soc. But that gain, and to make a gain, are not contrary
to damage, and to be damaged P
Fr. Nor this neither.
Soc. But that to make a gain, as being contrary to evil, is
not a good P
Fr. Retract nothing of this kind at all for me.
Soc. It appears to you then, as it seems, that of gain one
part is a good, and another an evil.
Fr. Yes, to me.
Soc. I retract therefore this for you. For let it be, that
one kind of gain is a good, and another kind an evil; but that
gain itself “is not more good than evil. Is it not so?
Fr. Why do you ask me?
Soc. I will tell you. Is there food good, and bad?
Fr. Yes.
*—" The Greek is obic oió’ 8v riva pièvrot rpótrov. But Stalbaum
has omitted pièvrou, not remarking that the author of the dialogue had pro-
bably in mind a similar introduction of pièvrov in the passages quoted by
Boissonade on Aristanetus, Epist. ii. 2, and the commentators on Phaedr.
p. 236, E.
* On the metaphor in retrešov see the mass of passages quoted by
Valckenaer in a MS. note printed by myself on AEsch. Suppl. 14.
* I have adopted with Taylor abrö in Stephens in lieu of abrów-
Ficinus has—“nihil tamen magis hoc quam illud lucrum est—” The
#. came from the next question of Socrates. But there the syntax is
ifferent. - - - -
HIPPARCHUS. 443
Soc. Is therefore one of them more food than the other ?
or are both of them similarly food? and does the one differ in
no respect from the other, so far as each is food, but so far as
one is good, and the other bad?
Fr. Just so." -
Soc. And is it not as regards drink, and all other things
which are parts of things existing, that some at least are so
circumstanced as to be bad, and others, good; and that they
differ not at all from each other, in that they are the same;
just as one man is good, and another bad?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. But one man is, I suppose, neither more nor less a
man than another, neither the good than the bad, nor the
bad than the good.
Fr. You speak the truth.
Soc. Shall we not then think in like manner respecting
gain, that both the good and the bad are similarly gain P
Fr. It is necessary.
Soc. He, therefore, who has a good gain, does not in any
respect make a gain more than he, who (has a) bad gain: for
neither of these, as we have granted, appears to be more a gain
than the other.
Fr. True.
Soc. For to neither of them is the more or the less present,
Fr. It is not.
Soc. But in a thing of this kind, to which neither of these
accidents is present, how can any one do, or suffer, more or less 2
Fr. It is impossible.
[6] Soc. Since, then, both are similarly gain and gainful,
it is requisite that we should still further” consider this—
why do you call both of them gain? and what do you see to be
in both the same? "Just as if you had asked me about the re-
cent question,” why I called both good and bad food similarly
| Ficinus has “Est, ut dicis; ” for he saw that a single answer,
Nai, could not be given to a bipartite question.
* Ficinus has “hoc deinceps,”—in Greek roit’ &rt, as in Stephens,
more correctly than touri in Bekker, from four MSS.
*—" The Greek is &garsp &v si à oð pus ºptºtaç, where Stalbaum rejects
à with Ficinus; whose version is “veluti si ipse modo me rogavisses.’
But perhaps the author wrote, àoºrsp &v si, & #yd as Tā viv Óñ, at #|ſs
#pºrac. Compare Alcibiad. I. p. 114, B. § 22, Športºv Šple, éatrep #yd, gé
For the reference is to p. 230, A. § 5, as remarked by Stalbaum.
444 HIPPARCHUS.
food, I would have said—Because each is a dry aliment of the
body, on this account I (called them so). For that this is
food, you would surely acknowledge; would you not ?
Fr. I would.
Soc. And there will be the same manner of answering re-
specting drink; that for the moist aliment of the body, whether
it is good or bad, the name is drink; and for the rest of things,
in like manner. Do you therefore endeavour to imitate me,
by answering thus. ' When you speak of good gain and bad
gain, as being both of them gain, what same thing do you per-
ceive in them, that this too is gain P' But if you are not
able to answer me in this way,” reflect, while I am speak-
ing. Do you call a gain every acquisition that a person ob-
tains, when he either spends nothing, or when, after spending
less, he receives more ?
Fr. I seem to myself to call the latter gain.
Soc. Are you therefore speaking of such things as these ?
If a person after having been feasted and spending nothing,
and indulging in good living, should become diseased ?
Fr. Not I, by Zeus.
Soc. But if he should obtain health after feasting, woul
he obtain a gain or damage? .
Fr. Gain. ~. . -
Soc. This then is not a gain, to obtain any acquisition what-
©Ver.
Fr. It is not.
Soc. *Whether will he, who obtains what is an evil, or at
least what is not a good, not obtain a gain Pº
Fr. “It appears so, at least if it be a good.”
*— Ficinus has what is far more intelligible, “Quidnam idem in lucro
bono et malo cernis, propter cujus praesentiam, utrumque lucrum nomi-
nas P’’ But whether he found in his MS. the Greek answering to hiº
Latin, is another question. . . . .*
* Instead of airóg one MS. has oftwg, which I have adopted to answer
to the preceding of twc. :
3–3 I have translated into English the Latin version of Stalbaum. The
Greek is, éâv kaköv iſ obč' àv dyadèv, for which Cornarius would read
#áv re caköv, Šáv re àyaôov, founded on “sive bonum seu malum ” in
Ficinus. -
*—4 Stalbaum observes that the answer ought to have been, “It ap-
pears not; but if it be a good.” I cannot however understand the
limiting clause, “at least, if it be a good;’’ nor could Ficinus, who has
omitted it. . -
HIPPARCHUS. 445
Soc. But if (he obtains) an evil, will he not obtain a
damage?
Fr. To me it appears So.
Soc. See then how you are again running round to the
same point? For gain appears to be a good, but damage an
evil.
Fr. I really am at a loss what to say.
Soc. Nor unjustly are you at a loss. But, answer me
still further this. If any one after having spent less, obtains
more, do you say this is a gain?
Fr. "I do not say it is an evil,' but if after having spent
less of gold or silver money, he receives more.
Soc. I too am about to ask you this. For come, (tell me,)
should a person spending half a pound” of gold, receive double
this weight of silver, would he obtain a gain or a damage?
Fr. A damage surely, Socrates; for, instead of a value twelve
times as much, the silver is only twice as much.
Soc. But yet he has received more. Or is not double more
than half P
Fr. But silver is not of (the same)* value as gold.
Soc. It is requisite then, as it seems, that this, namely, va-
lue, be added to gain; for in this case do you not say that the
silver, although being more than the gold, is not of equal value?
*the gold, although being less, you say, is of equal value.”
Fr. Very much so: for such is the fact.
Soc. Value, therefore, is gainful, whether it is small or
great; but that which is valueless is gainless.
Fr. Yes.
1–1 I confess I cannot perceive the relevancy of this answer; nor the
reason of the subsequent limitation, thus introduced by the words āNN'
idºv—
* So Taylor translates arabuðv. But whether ora6p10c in Greek, “li-
bra” in Latin, and “pound” in English, are all of the same weight, I
am unable to state. Stalbaum refers to Boeckh in OEconom. Athen. i.
30, and to Letronne’s “Considerations Generales sur l’ Evaluation des
Monnaies Grecques et Romaines,” Paris, 1817.
* Instead of Ośrt rā āśig, Ficinus found in his MS. Oirt rā airá
&#ig, as shown by his version, “Non ejusdem dignitatis ac pretii—”
4–4 The Greek is détov—ášuov. But two MSS. offer &váčvov–Čičvov,
which evidently leads to &vráčvov—dvráčvov, where the first &vráštov
answers to “aeque aestimandum et dignum ” in Ficinus; who properly
omits the repeated pºg álval.
446 HIPPARCHUS.
Soc. By “value,” do you mean any thing else than what it
is worthy to acquire?
Fr. I do not.
Soc. But by the expression “it is worthy to acquire,” do
you mean the useless, or the useful?
Fr. The useful, certainly.
Soc. The useful, therefore, is a good.
Fr. Yes.
Soc. Hence, thou most manly of all men, has not the lu-
crative come to us again a third or a fourth time, as being an
acknowledged good?
Fr. So it seems. -
[7.] Soc. Do you remember, then, from whence this dis-
course of ours originated 2
Fr. I think I do.
Soc. If you do not, I will remind you. You contended
that good men are not willing to make every kind of gain, but
of gains the good (alone)" but not the iniquitous.
Fr. It did originate from this.
Soc. But has not reason forced us to acknowledge, that ai.
kinds of gain, both small and great, are good?
Fr. It has forced me, Socrates, rather than persuaded.
Soc. But perhaps after this it will also persuade you.
Now, however, whether you are persuaded, or in whatever
manner you may be affected, you agree at least with us, that
all kinds of gain are good, both small and great?
Fr. I do agree. .
Soc. And do you agree with me, or not, that all good men
wish for all things that are good?
Fr. I do.
Soc. But you said that bad men love gain of every kind,
both small and great.
Fr. I did say so. .
Soc. According to your assertion, then, all men, both good
and bad, would be lovers of gain.
Fr. It appears so.
Soc. If then any person reproaches another with being a
lover of gain, he does not correctly reproach him; for the very
person so reproaching happens to be such a character himself.
* I have introduced “alone ** from “duntaxat,” in Ficinus
INTRODUCTION TO THE MINOS,
IN placing the Minos in juxta-position with the Hipparchus, I
have followed the example of Boeckh; who published in 1810 those
two dialogues, together with four others of the Pseudo-Platonic list,
under the title of “Simonis Socratici, ut videtur, Dialogi,” &c., after
he had proved in a preceding work, printed in 1806, that the Minos
was not written by Plato; although it had been considered genuine
by Bentley, and had been quoted as such by him on Phalaris, t. i.
p. 327, ed. Dyce. Nor had Fr. Patricius any suspicion of its spu-
riousness, who, in his Discussion. Peripatet. p. 338, speaks of it as
having come down to us in an imperfect state. But according to
Stalbaum, so numerous and glaring are the proofs of its being not
Plato's, that he is only astonished at the fraud having lain unde-
tected so long; and similar it would seem are the sentiments of
Schleiermacher.
The dialogue is however, says Boeckh, alluded to by Plutarch in
Theseus, i. p. 7, A., and by Clemens of Alexandria in Strom. i. p.
151. 33; and ii. p. 158. 13; to say nothing of the references
made to it by Maximus Tyrius, Servius, Proclus, Stobaeus, and
Alexander Aphrodisiensis in Aristot. Elench. Sophist. fol. 51, b.
According to Boeckh, the author was the shoemaker Simon. Fol
we learn from Diogenes Laertius, that he wrote some short dia-
logues comprised in one volume, IIspi Atkatov, and IIspi 'Aperfic, and
IIspi Náuov, and IIspi (pixoképôovg. Now as amongst the confessedly
spurious dialogues there are two on the two subjects first mentioned,
Boeckh conceived that those two, together with the two others,
the subjects respectively of the Minos and Hipparchus, made up the
four alluded to.
448 INTRODUCTION TO THE MINOS
But specious as this induction is, it failed to satisfy Stalbaum, who
has contested at considerable length the theory of Boeckh, and
eventually arrives at the conclusion, that the author of this dialogue
was some Alexandrian writer, who lived in the time of the Ptolemies,
a period rife with such forgeries; and that, although he might have
drawn something from the work of Simon, yet his great storehouse
was the acknowledged writings of Plato, which, unable to imitate,
he has been content to travesty.
With regard to the divine origin of law, Taylor observes that
Zoroaster ascribed the laws he gave the Persians to Oromazes;
Hermes Trismegistus, the Egyptian, to Mercury; Minos, the Cre-
tan, to Jupiter; Charondas, of Catana, to Saturn; Lycurgus, the Ia-
cedaemonian, to Apollo; Draco and Solon, of Athens, to Minerva;
Numa, the Roman, to Egeria; Zamolxis, the Thracian, to Vesta; and
Plato, when he gave laws to the Magnesians and Sicilians, to Ju-
piter and Apollo.
With respect to the title of the dialogue, it has, like the Hippar-
chus, obtained its name, not from any of the speakers, but from the
person whose doings form the chief subject of it; a fact not known
to Boyle, who fancied, as remarked by Bentley, that Minos, the law-
giver of Crete, was one of the Interlocutors.
THE MINOS.
PE R SONS OF THE DIALOGUE
SOCRATES AND A FRIEND.
SOCRATES.
[1..] WHAT thing is law with us?
Fr. Of what kind is the law are you asking about?
Soc. What, is it that law differs from law, according to this
very thing, in being law P. For consider what I happen to be
asking you. For I am asking, as if I should inquire what is
gold 2 and if you should in a similar manner ask me, about
what kind of gold am I speaking, I should think you would
not rightly ask. For neither does gold differ in any thing
from gold, so far as it is gold, nor a stone from a stone, so far
as it is a stone. And in like manner, neither does law differ
in any thing from law; but all laws are (as laws) the same.
For each of them exists similarly (as law); nor is one more,
and another less so. I ask you, therefore, this very thing as
a whole, what is law 7 and if you have an answer at hand,
state it.
Fr. What else, Socrates, can law be, than the things estab-
lished by law Ż
Soc. Does speech too appear to you to be the things which
are spoken? or sight, the things which are seen 2 or hearing,
the things which are heard? Oris" (not) speech one thing, and
* I have translated as if the Greek were h oilk, and rot simply; so
that one negative may refer to allº: following questions.
G
#50 MINOS.
the things spoken another? Is (not) sight one thing, and the
things seen another ? Is (not) hearing one thing, and the things
heard another ? And is (not) law one thing, and the things
established by law another ? Does it appear to you in this
way? Or how 2
Fr. It now appears to be another thing."
[2.] Soc. Law therefore is not the things established by
law.
Fr. It does not appear to me that it is.
Soc. What then can law be 2 Let us consider it thus. If
some one had asked us respecting the things just now spoken
of-Since you say that things seen are seen by the sight, by
the sight being what, are they seen 2 we should have answered
—by that sense, which through the eyes manifests colours to
us. And if he had asked us again—Since things heard are
heard by hearing, by the hearing being what, (are they heard)?
we should have answered—by a sense, which through the ears
manifests sounds to us. In like manner, if he had asked us,
—Since things are established by law, by the law being what.
are they thus established 2 Is it by a certain sense, or mani-
festation, in the same manner as things learnt are learnt by
some art rendering them manifest through some discovery just
as things discovered are discovered; as, for instance, things
salubrious and noxious are discovered through the medical
art; and what the gods have in their thoughts, as the diviners
say, through the divining art. *For art is with us the disco-
very of things:” or is it not ?
Fr. Entirely so.
[3.] Soc. Which of these then may we especially under-
stand law to be 2
Fr. Decrees and votes, as it seems to me. For what else
| Such is the version of the Greek, "AAAo plot viv špévn, suggested by
Stephens, in lieu of 'AAA' àpowdy viv špaym, and confirmed by two MSS.
Ficinus has, “Sicne an aliter videturf MIN. Sic utique,”—as if he had
found in his MS. oijrwg º Tràg oot 60ksi ; Oštwg.
2–2 Ficinus has, “vaticinium namgue rerum talium inventio est,” as
if he had found in his MS. pavrukij Yāp trov ºptiv čápsoig $ort rototrav
rów Trpaypadºrwy. But as Havruki has just preceded, perhaps the author
wrote airm yáp trov iſ réxym, not Yáp trov réxym, as found in MSS.
Leid. and Tub., which is however adopted by Boeckh and Stalbaum,
who retain rāv, and consider the remark as applicable universally.
MINOS. 451
can any one say law is P So that it nearly appears that law,
about which you were asking, is, taken as a whole, the decree
of a state.
Soc. You call, as it seems, law, a state-opinion.
Fr. I do.
Soc. And perhaps you speak well; but perhaps we shall
know better in the following manner. You call some persons
wise P
Fr. I do.
Soc. Are not then the wise, wise by wisdom ?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. But what, are the just, just by justice?
Fr. Entirely so.
Soc. Are not then the lawful, lawful by law P
Fr. Yes.
Soc. And the lawless, lawless by an absence of law Ż
Fr. Yes.
Soc. And the lawful are just 2
Fr. Yes.
Soc. But the lawless unjust?
Fr. Unjust.
Soc. Are not justice and law therefore things most beau-
tiful ?
Fr. They are.
Soc. And are not injustice and lawlessness the least beau-
tiful ?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. And does not the former preserve cities and every
thing else, but the latter destroy and overturn them P'
Fr. Yes.
Soc. It is necessary then to consider the law as something
beautiful, and to seek it as a good.
Fr. How not P
Soc. Now have we not said that law is a decree of the city ?
Fr. We have said so.
Soc. What then, are not some decrees good, and some evil P
Fr. They are.
Soc. Law however is not evil.
Fr. It is not.
Stalbaum compares Euthyph. p. 14, B. § 16. Add Soph. Antig. 669,
* G 2
452 MINOS.
Soc. It is not correct then to answer thus simply, that law
is a decree of the city.
Fr. It appears to me it is not.
Soc. Nor is it suited to reason for an evil decree to be law
Fr. Certainly not.
[4.] Soc. Law however appears to me too” to be a certain
opinion. And since an opinion is not evil, is not this evident,
that it is a good one, if law is opinion ?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. But what is a good opinion ? Is it not a true one 2
Fr. Yes.
Soc. Is then a true opinion the discovery of that which is ?”
Fr. It is.
Soc. Law therefore would be" the discovery of that
which is.
Fr. How then, Socrates, if law is the discovery of that
which is, do we not always use the same laws about the same
things? since things that are have been discovered by us.
Soc. The law nevertheless would be the discovery of that
which is. But if men do not always, as we think,” use the
same laws, they are not always able to discover that which law
wishes, namely, that which is. But come, let us see if it will
hence become evident to us, whether we always use the same
laws, or some at one time, and others at another; and if all
(use) the same laws, or different persons different laws.
[5.] Fr. But this, Socrates, it is not difficult to know, that
neither do the same persons always use the same laws, "nor
different persons always different laws.” Thus, for example,
* On this use of &ppióTrew, Stalbaum refers to Plato's Epistol. viii. p.
356, D.
* In lieu of airó pot, Stephens proposed aird plot, suggested by “mi-
hi quoque * in Ficinus; and so six MSS. subsequently collated.
* Here, as elsewhere, Ficinus translates rô 6v by “veritas.”
* Ficinus has “inventio esse vult.” He therefore found in his MS.
(30t)\état cival, as read in twelve MSS., in lieu of Éarty. On this use of
BoöAétat in the sense of ué\\st Boeckh refers to various passages, and
compares it with a similar usage in #0é\st.
* Instead of Öokoúpsy one MS. has Óokū, which would meet the ob-
jection started by Stalbaum.
"—" Ficinus, whom Taylor properly follows, has, what the sense re-
quires, “nec alii semper aliis; ” for he doubtless found in his MS. oire
ãAAot &si äXXouc, in lieu of oits àA\ot ys in two MSS. And though ye
is read in all the MSS. after &\\ot, I confess I do not understand it; nor
MINOS, 453
it is not a law with us to sacrifice human beings, but it is an
unhcly act; but the Carthaginians sacrifice them, as being a
holy and a lawful act with them; so that some of them sacrifice
their sons to Kronos," as perhaps you too have heard; and not
only do Barbarians use laws different from ours, but also those
fellows in Lycaea,” and the progeny of Athamas,” what sacrifices
do they perform, although they are Greeks! In like manner you
Surely know by hearsay yourself what laws we formerly used
concerning the dead, by cutting the throats of the victims be-
fore the dead body was carried out, and sending for the women
who collect the bones” of the dead in jars; and those, who still,
antecedent to them, buried the dead at home; but we do none
of these things. Ten thousand instances of this kind one might
mention; for wide is the field of demonstration, that neither
do we always have customs in the same manner amongst our-
Selves, nor do men amongst each other.
Soc. It is by no means wonderful, O best of men, if you
are speaking correctly, this has lain hid from me. But
as long as you by yourself declare what appears to you in a
long discourse, and I again do the same, we shall never, as I
think, come to an agreement. But if the inquiry be laid down
in common, we shall perhaps think alike. If then you are
willing, ask me some question, and consider with me in com-
mon. Or, if you wish it, give an answer.
Fr. Nay, I am willing, Socrates, to answer whatever you
choose (to ask).
[6.] Soc. Come then, do you think that what is just is un-
just, and what is unjust is just 2 Or that what is just is
just, and what is unjust is unjust 2
did Boeckh, who suggested &\\ot rs, adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum :
for otts in one clause is followed sometimes by te simply, not otte, in
another.
1 On this practice see Wesseling on Diodor. Sic. xx. 14.
* This was a town of Arcadia, as shown by Steph. Byz., and probably
situated near the mountain Lycaeus, where the tutelary deity was wor-
shipped with human sacrifices; to which Plato alludes in Rep. viii. p.
565, D.
* On the story of Athamas, see Ovid. Met. iv. 467; Fast. vi. 489; and
Pausan. ix. 34.
* So Boeckh understands the word #yxvrpuaorpiac, applied by the
Schol. on Aristoph, Xpnk. 288, to the women who poured libations on the
dead from jars.
454 MINOS.
Fr. I indeed think that what is just is just, and what is
unjust is unjust.
Soc. Is it not so held by all persons as it is here?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. Among the Persians also 2
Fr. And among the Persians too.
Soc. But is it really always so?
Fr. Always.
Soc. Whether are things, that draw the greater weight,
thought by us here to be the heavier, but those that draw the
less, lighter? or the contrary 2 •
Fr. No ; but those that draw the greater weight, are the
heavier, and those that draw the less, are lighter.
Soc. Is this the case, therefore, in Carthage and in Lycia?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. Things beautiful, as it seems, are every where held to
be beautiful, and things ugly to be ugly; but things ugly are
not (thought to be) beautiful, nor things beautiful to be ugly.
Fr. It is so.
Soc. In the case of all things, so to say, the things, that exist,
are held to be, not the things that do not exist, both with us
and with all others.
Fr. It appears so to me.
Soc. He, therefore, who errs in that which is, errs in that
which is lawful.
T7..] Fr. Thus, Socrates, as you say, the same things al-
ways appear lawful both to us and to others. But when I
consider, that we never cease altering the laws up and down,
I cannot be persuaded.
Soc. For perhaps you do not bear in mind that these
things, being put into a changed place,” are the same. But
look at them thus with me. Have you ever met with any”
book relating to the health of the sick?
Fr. I have.
Soc. Do you know then to what art that book belongs?
Fr. I know (it belongs to) the medical art.
Soc. Do you then not call those skilled in these matters
physicians ?
* On the metaphorical use of arstreisty, see at AEsch. Suppl. 14.
* Boeckh has acutely seen that Tuvu has dropt out after Švyypáp. Hari,
as shown by “librum aliquem ’’ in Ficinus. t
MINOS. 455
Fr. I do. t * ~
Soc. Do then the skilled think the same about the same,
or do some think one thing and others another ?
Fr. They seem to me to think the same.
Soc. Do then Greeks alone think the same with Greeks
about things of which they know 2 or do Barbarians likewise
(do so) with each other, and with Greeks?
Fr. There is a great necessity for both Greeks and Barba-
rians, who know, to think the same with themselves and
each other."
Soc. You have answered correctly. Do they not then
always (do so) f
Fr. Yes, always.
[8.] Soc. Do not physicians also write about health what
they think to be (true)?
Fr. Yes. -
Soc. Things relating to medicine and medical laws are the
writings of physicians.
Fr. Things relating to medicine, certainly.
Soc. - Are not then the writings relating to agriculture
agricultural laws?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. Of whom then are the writings and institutes relating
to gardening 2
Fr. Of gardeners.
Soc. These then are the laws about gardening.
Fr. Yes.
Soc. Of those, who know how to manage gardens P
Fr. How not ?
Soc. But gardeners possess this knowledge.
Fr. Yes.
Soc. And of whom are the writings and institutes relating
to the dressing of savoury food?
Fr. Of cooks.
Soc. These, therefore, are the laws of cookery.
Fr. Of cookery.
*— I have adopted the emendation of Boeckh, abroëg airoic ré kai
&\\?\otc, in lieu of airoic simply ; who aptly compares Alcibiad. I. p.
111, C., áA\{\oug Te ÖpoMoyoãot kai abroi ağroic, and E., ÖuoMoyeiv at-
rci Šavroic fi &\\?\ouc.
456 MINOS,
Soc. Of those, as it seems, who know how to manage the
dressing of Savoury food.
Fr. Yes.
Soc. But cooks, as they say, know.
Fr. They do know.
Soc. Be it so. And of whom are the writings and insti-
tutes concerning the administration of a state P Are they not
of those, who know how to govern states?
Fr. It appears so to me. Y-
Soc. But do any others than statesmen and kings know?
Fr. They alone."
[9.] Soc. Those writings then relating to a state, which
men call laws, are the writings of kings and good men.
Fr. You speak the truth.
Soc. Will then they, who know, write one thing at one
time, and another at another, about the same things?
Fr. Certainly not. 4.
Soc. If then we see certain persons doing this at any place
whatever, shall we say that those, who do so, are skilled or
unskilled P
Fr. Unskilled.
Soc. Shall we then say that what is right is in each case law-
ful, whether it relate to medicine, or cooking, or gardening 2
Fr. Yes. -
Soc. But that, which is not right, we shall no longer assert
to be lawful. -
Fr. No longer.
Soc. It therefore becomes lawless.
Fr. Necessarily so.
Soc. Hence, in writings concerning things just and unjust,
and, in short, concerning the orderly arrangement of a city,
and the manner in which one ought to administer it, that,
which is right, is a royal law ; *but that, which is not right,
is not a (royal law), because science is wanting: for it is.”
* So Taylor, after Ficinus—“Isti soli’”—as if he had found in his
MS. oirot puévot in lieu of Ośrot pºv obv.
*—” Such is Taylor's English translation of the Latin of Ficinus—“Non
rectum vero nequaquam lex regia, quia scientia deest, esse videtur,
quippe cum illegitimum sit.”—But the Greek is rô 6: pº) épôv oë 6orsi
vóplog sivat roig ur) sióóow' orw yöp divopov : i.e. but that, which is not
right, does not seem to be a law to those not knowing; for it is lawless,
MINOS. 457
Fr. Yes.
Soc. We have rightly therefore acknowledged that the law
is the invention of that which is. -
Fr. So it appears.
[10.] Soc. Let us still further consider it in this way like-
wise. Who is skilled in distributing the seeds to the earth?
Fr. The husbandman.
Soc. Does he then distribute seeds proper for each soil 2
Fr. Yes.
Soc. The husbandman therefore is a good distributer of
these things, and his laws and distributions in these particulars
are right.
Fr. Yes.
Soc. And who is a good distributer of pulsations for tunes,
and distributes' such as are proper ? And whose laws are
right?
Fr. Those of the piper and the harper.
Soc. He then, who acts most according to law in these
things, is, in the greatest degree, a piper.
Fr. Yes.
Soc. But who is the best to distribute nutriment to the
bodies of men 2 Is it not he, who (distributes) the proper ?
Fr. Yes.
Soc. The distributions therefore and the laws of this man
are the best ; and he, who acts the most according to law in
these things, is the best distributer.
Fr. Entirely so.
Soc. Who is he 2
Fr. The training-master.”
Soc. Does he know how to feed *the flock of the human
body” in the best manner ?
Bekker however has inserted from one MS. 6 between ot, and Öoksi :
which I cannot understand. I could have understood óv, si kai Öoxei
—i. e. “ is not, even though it seems—”
* Boeckh has altered vsipat into vépist on the authority of “impertit”
in Ficinus; for vsipat, he says, could hardly depend upon &Ya3óg.
* Instead of trauðorpiðmc, the natural train of ideas seems to demand
watóorpópog: although it is true, that when young persons were put under
the training-master, he did, like the Yvpavaarijg, decide upon the quantity
and quality of the food to be given. See The Rivals, $ 3.
*—” Stalbaum has well exposed the impropriety of this expression,
which seems to have been got from the Statesman. -
458 MINOS.
Fr. Yes.
Soc. And who is the best to tend a flock of sheep?
What is his name 2
Fr. Shepherd. -
Soc. The laws therefore of the shepherd are the best for
the sheep.
Fr. Yes.
Soc. And those of the herdsman for oxen.
Fr. Yes.
Soc. And whose laws are the best for the minds of men f
Are they not those of a king 2 Tell me.
Fr. I say so,
[11. J Soc. You speak well. Can you therefore tell me,
who among the ancients was a good maker of the laws relating
to pipes 2 Perhaps you have him not in your thoughts. Are
you then willing that I should remind you?
Fr. By all means.
Soc. Was not Marsyas said to be so, and his loved Olympus
the Phrygian."
Fr. True.
Soc. The pipe-playing of these men is most divine, and
alone excites and shows forth those who are in need” of the
gods; and it alone remains to the present time as being di-
VIIle.
Fr. Such is the case.
Soc. And who amongst the ancient kings is said to have
been a good law-maker, and whose institutions remain even
now as being divine P
Fr. I do not recollect.
Soc. Do you not know, which of the Greeks are making
use of laws the most ancient 2
Fr. Are you speaking of the Lacedæmonians, and of Lycur-
gus the law-giver ?
Soc. These institutions, however, are perhaps not three
hundred years old, or a little more. But do you know from
whence came the best of their laws?
* On this allusion to Marsyas and Olympus, Boeckh refers to Sympos.
p. 215, C. § 39, and Schol. on Aristoph. 'Itrir. 9.
* In lieu of Xpsig, Cornarius suggested Xopsig, by which he probably
understood the divine dancing, excited by the pipe, called évôovata ſp. );
by Aristotle in Polit. viii. 5.
MINOS. 459
Fr. They say, from Crete.
Soc. Do not they of all the Greeks make use of laws the
most ancient?
Fr. Yes.
[12.] Soc. Do you know then who among these were good
kings? (Were they not) Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons
of Zeus and Europa, by whom those laws were made 2
Fr. They say, Socrates, that Rhadamanthus was a just man,
but that Minos was rustic, morose, and unjust.
Soc. You are telling, O best of men, a tale of Attica, and
of tragedy."
Fr. What, are not such things told of Minos?
Soc. Not by Homer, at least, and Hesiod; and they are
more trust-worthy than all the tragic poets, from whom you
have heard what you are saying.
Fr. But what do they say about Minos?
Soc. I will tell you, that you may not, like the many, be
guilty of impiety. For there is not any thing more impious
than this, nor of what we ought to be more cautious, than of
sinning against the gods, either in word or in deed; and next,
against divine men. But you ought to take ever a very great
care, when you are about to praise or blame any man, that
you speak correctly ; and for the sake of this, it is meet to
learn how to distinguish good and bad men. For the deity
feels indignant when any one blames a person similar to him-
self, or praises one dissimilar; *for this is the good man.”
For think not that stones, and wood, and birds, and sel-
pents are sacred, but that men are not so ; for a good man
is the most sacred, and a depraved man the most defiled of all
things. [13.] Now then, since Homer and Hesiod pass an
encomium on Minos, on this account I will speak, in order
that you, being a man sprung from a man, may not sin in word
against a hero the son of Jupiter. For Homer, (in Od. xix.
* Boeckh believes there is an allusion to some plays of Sophocles and
Euripides, where Minos and the affairs of Crete were introduced.
*—” The Greek is £ott 6' oitog á áya.0óg; in lieu of which Boeckh
would read Éott ö’ Špotog 6 &ya:00c, similar to “Dei vero similis est vir
bonus” in Ficinus. For he says that otrog would refer, like “hic ’’ in
Latin, to the party last mentioned, but Ékéivog, like “ille,” to the one
before. Stalbaum however defends the impropriety of the usage of oğrog
by referring to Schaefer on Demosth. i. p. 541, and v. p. 322. Perhaps
the author wrote here £ort 68 0s; 6ptowog á áya6óc.
#60 MINOS.
174,) speaking of Crete, says, there are many men, and ninety
cities in it ;
Amongst them Knossus, a great city, where
Reign’d Minos, who each ninth year converse held
- With mighty Zeus.
This then is Homer's praise of Minos, expressed in few words,
such as he has not given to even one of his heroes. For that
Zeus is a sophist," and that the art itself is all-beautiful,
he shows in many other places, and here likewise. For he
says that Minos conversed in the ninth year” with Zeus, and
went to be instructed by him, as if Zeus were a Sophist. That
Homer, then, does not bestow the honour of being instructed
by Zeus upon any other hero, than Minos, is praise indeed to
be wondered at. In the scene of the Odyssey, too, relating to
the Dead, ° Homer has represented Minos as a judge, and
holding a golden sceptre; but not Rhadamanthus as judging
there, or conversing with Zeus any where. On this account
I say that Minos is extolled by Homer beyond all other
heroes. For to have been instructed merely by Zeus, when
he was the son of Zeus, carries with it no excess of praise.
[14] For the verse—He reigned, and each ninth year con-
versed with Zeus—means that he was the associate of Zeus;
for by Šapot is meant “discourses,” and by Öaptoric, “an as-
sociate in discourse.” Hence at each ninth year, Minos went
to the cavern of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show forth
others; which, during the preceding period of nine years, he
had learnt 4 from Zeus. There are, however, some who un-
derstand by 6aptatic, “the associate” of Zeus in drinking and
sport; although any one may make use of this as a proof to
show that they, who thus understand the word, say nothing
* The word is here taken in its original sense, of a person endued with
wisdom. See Blomfield on Prom. 62.
2 Such is the literal version of the Greek évárp £rst, by which Boeckh
understands “during nine years.” But according to Valerius Maximus,
i. 2, “Minos, Cretensium rex, nono quoque anno in quoddam praealtum
et vetusta religione consecratum specus secedere solebat et in eo commo-
ratus, tanquam a Jove, quo se ortum ferebat, traditas sibi leges praero-
gabat.” Hence, as remarked by Stalbaum, the author should have written
here 6t' #várov £rovg, as he has done just afterwards.
* By Nskvia is meant what is now called book xi. To the same pas-
sage Plato alludes in Gorg. p. 526, C.
* Ficinus has “acceperat,” who read therefore in his MS. Hepia"#ket,
subsequently found in others likewise. -
MINOS. 461
to the purpose; for although both the Greeks and Barbarians
are numerous, there are none, who abstain from banquets, and
the sport to which wine belongs, except the Cretans, and next
the Lacedaemonians, who were instructed by the Cretans. But
in Crete this is one of the other' laws, which Minos laid
down, “not to drink with each other to intoxication.” And
it is evident, that what he deemed to be beautiful institutions,
these he laid down for his own citizens. For Minos did not,
like a knave, think one thing, and do another, contrary to
what he thought; but his intercourse with Zeus was, as I
assert, through discourses for the attainment of virtue. Hence
he laid down those laws for his citizens, through which Crete
has been for all time prosperous, and Lacedæmon likewise,
from the time when it began to make use of those laws, as
being divine. [15.] But Rhadamanthus was indeed a good
man; for he was instructed by Minos. He did not however
learn the whole of the royal art, but that part of it, which
ministers to the royal, as far as presiding over courts of justice;
from whence he was said to be a good judge. For Minos
employed him as a guardian of the laws in the city; but Ta-
lus for those through the rest of Crete. For Talus thrice
every year went through the villages in order to preserve the
laws in them, and carried with him the laws written in tables
of brass; from whence he was called “brazen.” Hesiod too
asserts respecting Minos, what is closely relate to this.
For, having mentioned his name, he says,
Most regal was he of all mortal kings,
And o'er the most of neighbouring people ruled,
Of Zeus the sceptre holding, *king like him; *
and he too means by the sceptre of Zeus, nothing else than
the instruction of Zeus, by which he regulated Crete.
[16.] Fr. On what account then, Socrates, was the report
spread against Minos, of his being an unlearned and morose
man? .
* In lieu of &\\ov one would prefer traXavöv, “old.” -
*—” The Greek is tº kai tróXsov 3aoriNevs : where Boeckh, whom
Bekker and Stalbaum follow, suggested troXétov. But troXéwy seems
scarcely admissible after trxstorøy. I have translated, as if Hesiod had
written—roi kai TréAag öv 3ao'íAsve: while the first line of the fragment,
found no where else, has been restored to its original metrical form by
Boeckh. -
462 - MINOS.
Soc. On that account, through which you, O best of men,
if you are prudent, and every other person to whom it is a care
to be in good repute, will be cautious never to incur the anger
of a poet. For poets are able to effect much as regards reput-
ation, in whatever way they may represent acts, by praising men
and blaming them. On which ground Minos erred, when he
made war upon this city; where there is much of other wis-
dom, and poets in every other kind of poetry, and in tragedy
likewise. Now tragedy here is of an old date, not beginning
as persons fancy from Thespis, nor from Phrynichus; but, if
you are willing to turn your thoughts to it, you will find it is a
very ancient invention of this city. [17.] Now, of poetry
(in general),” the most pleasing to the vulgar and the most
soul-alluring is tragedy; to which we, applying our minds,”
have revenged ourselves upon Minos, for the tribute he com-
pelled us to pay. In this then Minos erred, by incurring our
sunger; from whence, in reply to your question, he became in
Father bad repute. For that he was a good man, a friend to
law, and a good shepherd of the people, as I have before ob.
served, this is the greatest proof, that his laws have been un
changed, in consequence of his having discovered correctly
the truth of what is, with reference to the administration of a
State.
Fr. You appear to me, Socrates, to have stated a probable
I’63 SOIR. .
Soc. If then I am speaking the truth, do not the Cretans,
the citizens of Minos and Rhadamanthus, appear to you to
have made use of laws the most ancient 2
Fr. They appear so.
Soc. These therefore were the best lawgivers of the an-
cients, and distributors and shepherds of men; just as Homer
likewise says, that a good general is “a shepherd of the
people.”
Fr. Entirely so.
[18.] Soc. Come then, by Zeus, who presides over friend-
ship, if any one, who is a good lawgiver and shepherd of the
* I have adopted kakmyopoivreg, found in two MSS., and similar to
“ad vituperandum,” in Ficinus.
* The Greek is—Éart Öğ Tijg trouñosa.g—But Ficinus has “ex universa
poesi,” as if he had found in his MS. śati 6’ 6Amg rijg trouhoswg.
* This is Taylor's translation of Évretvovréc,
body, should ask us—What are those things, which a person
by distributing to the body will make it better? we should
well and briefly answer, that they are nutriment and labour,
by the former increasing, and by the latter exercising and
knitting together the body.
Fr. Right.
Soc. If then he should after this ask us—What are those
things which a good law-giver and shepherd will, by dis-
tributing to the soul, make it better?—by making what answer,
should we be not ashamed of ourselves, and of our age 2
Fr. This I am no longer able to say.
Soc. It is however disgraceful to the soul of each of us
to seem not to know the things pertaining to them, and ir
which their good and evil consist, but to have considered those
pertaining to the body, and to other things,

INTRODUCTION TO THE CLITOPHO,
THIS dialogue, like some others already mentioned, has been con-
sidered spurious. But it was reckoned amongst the genuine by
Thrasyllus, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius iii. 50. It is dis-
tinctly alluded to by Arrian on Epictetus iii. 22, and Themistius
Or. xxvi. p. 320, D., and covertly by Dio Chrysost. Or. xiii. p. 222,
D., and Aristides, T. i. p. 78; ii. p. 378, as remarked by Ruhmken
on Timaeus in Tpayuki) gºnvi), and Wyttenbach on Julian, p. 42. It
contains a summary of the leading doctrines promulgated by So-
crates; the greater part of which have formed the subject of sepa-
rate dialogues by Plato and others. Its commencement alone has
been preserved; for the remainder was probably lost by its having
been written at the end of the Codex Archetypus, that contained
the rest of the existing dialogues of Plato; for it would thus be
exposed to the greatest chance of suffering from damp and the other
accidents to which books are liable in the lapse of years: I say the
Codex Archetypus; because it is evident that all the MSS. that have
been hitherto collated, are to be traced to such an original ; of
which the one used by Ficinus was in a more complete state than
any that have been examined by Bekker and others, as may be seen
from the notes appended to the dialogue.
CLITO PHO.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUIEa
SOCRATES AND CLITOPHO,
SOCRATES.
A CERTAIN person has lately told me that Clitopho,' the
son of Aristonymus, has been conversing with Lysias, and
blaming the passing the time with Socrates, but been praising
immoderately the intercourse with Thrasymachus.”
Clit. Whoever he was, Socrates, he has not accurately re-
lated to you the conversation I had with Lysias about you.
For in some things indeed I did not praise you, but in others
I did. But since you are evidently blaming me, although
you pretend to care nothing about the matter, I will most
willingly go through the conversation myself, especially since
we happen to be alone, in order that you may the less ima-
gine that I am ill disposed towards you. For now perhaps
you have not heard correctly; so that you appear to be more
harshly disposed towards me than is fitting. But if you will
grant me the liberty of speech I shall most cheerfully accept
it, and am willing to speak.
Of this Clitopho, who is not mentioned elsewhere by Plato, the reader
will find all that is known in the useful and learned Onomastic. Aristophan.
appended by Holden to his recent edition of the dramatist.
* Of this Thrasymachus, who was a friend and admirer of Gorgias, see
particularly Plato in Rep. p. i. p. 336; where his character is delineated
in vivid colours. Other passages are quoted by Groen van Prinsterer in
Prosopograph. Platon. p. 107—l lº, 2
H
468 C.I.I.TOPHO.
Soc. Nay it would be" disgraceful for myself, when you are
willing to benefit me, not to bear with you. For it is evident
that, when I know in what respect I am better and worse, I shali
pursue some things, and avoid others, to the utmost of my power.
Clit. You shall hear then. [2.] For while I am with
you, Socrates, I am often astonished on hearing you; and you
appear to me, as compared with other men, to speak most
beautifully, when, reproving men, you exclaim like a god upon
a machine”—“Whither are ye borne along? And —Are ye
ignorant, that ye are doing nothing that ye ought, ye, who
make every exertion how ye may get money, but neglect your
children, to whom ye are to leave it, and the means whereby
they may know how to use it justly ; and do not find for them
teachers of justice, if indeed it can be taught,” and who, if it is
to be made the subject of meditation and exercise, may suffi-
ciently exercise them in it. Nor yet do ye previously attend to
yourselves; but, seeing that both ye and your children have
learnt sufficiently grammar, and music, and the gymnastic arts,
which ye have considered as the perfect discipline of virtue, yet
afterwards that ye become no less depraved with respect to
riches, why do ye not despise the present mode of education,
and seek after those, who will cause you to cease from this illi-
beral line of life? And yet it is through this neglect of what is
right, and indolence, and not through the foot being out of time
with the lyre, that brother himself arrays himself against brother,
and states against states, and, out of all measure and harmony,
are stirring up strife and war upon each other, and do and suffer
the extreme of ill. But ye say, that they, who are unjust, are
unjust not through the want of instruction, nor through ignor-
ance, but voluntarily ;” and again, ye dare to assert that injus-
tice is disgraceful and hateful to the gods. How then can
any one voluntarily choose so great an evil? He (does so) ye
Say, through being conquered by pleasure. Is not this then
an involuntary act, since to conquer is a voluntary one? So
4 & * Instead of pºv, Ficinus found in his MS. āv ºv, as shown by his—
esset.” *
* Upon the expression “Deus ex machina,” see the commentators on
Horace, A. P. 191, “Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus; ”
and Ruhnken on Timaeus, Toayuki) oknvi).
* Compare the Meno, where the question is mooted at length, whether
virtue in general, of which justice is a part, can be taught or not.
* This doctrine is discussed at length in the Gorgias.
CLITOPHO. 469
that reason perfectly convinces us, that to act unjustly is in-
voluntary; and that every man privately, and all cities pub-
licly, ought to pay more attention than they do at present to
their conduct.”
[3] When therefore, Socrates, I hear you perpetually
speaking so, I am greatly delighted with you, and pay you in
a wonderful manner the tribute of praise. And when you
say what follows in order upon this, that they, who cultivate
their bodies, but neglect their soul, do something different of
this kind," in neglecting that which is to govern, but busily
attending to what is to be governed ;” and when you assert
that it is better for him, who does not know how to use a
thing, to leave alone the use of it; for” if a person does not
know how to use his eyes or ears, or his whole body, it is bet-
ter for him not to hear, nor see, nor to use his body for any
need, than to use it in any way; and in a similar manner with
respect to art. For it is evident (as you say)" that he, who
does not know how to use his own lyre, will not (know how
to use) that of his neighbour; nor will he, who (knows not how
to use) the (lyre) of others, (know how to use) his own, nor
any other instrument or chattel whatever; and this your dis-
course ended beautifully (by inferring)," that for him, who does
not know how to use his soul, it is better to be at rest with
respect to his soul, and not to live, than to live and act ac-
cording to his own caprice; but, if there is any necessity for
such a person to live, that it is better for him to lead the life
of a slave, than of a freeman. For" that this is to deliver
*—" The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, because
they were omitted by Ficinus, who probably could not understand them ;
nor can I. For though Érspog is sometimes taken in the sense of caköc,
as shown by Valckenaer in Diatrib. p. 112, C., yet here such a sense would
be out of place. The author wrote perhaps d'AAótpuov, “strange.”
* The middle voice, dipčápasyov, is to be taken passively. For a mass
of middle verbs used similarly see Monk on Eurip. Hippol. 1458.
* Instead of Ör), two MSS. have jä, i.e. yāp, as shown by the pas-
sages quoted by Schaefer in the Index to Porson’s Euripides in Táp.
* Taylor has introduced “as you say ” from “ut ipse ais” in Ficinus,
to which there is nothing to answer in the Greek.
* Here again Ficinus has “ut inferas;” nothing similar to which is to
be found in the Greek.
* After ðukatoo’iyymy in the Greek are two words, dºg Éott, omitted by
Ficinus, whom I have fol'owed; although they probably contain soine
hidden error.
470. CLITOPHO.
the rudder of the mind, like that of a ship, to another, who
has learnt the art of governing men; which, Socrates, you
have often called the statesman's art, and said it is the same as
that of the judge and justice. [4.] To these, and many other.
and very beautiful reasonings, in which it is asserted that
virtue can be taught," and that a person ought above all
things to pay attention to himself, I have scarcely at any
time said a word in opposition, nor do I think that I shall ever
say. For I deem them to be very exhortatory and useful,
and really awakening us, as if we were asleep. I have there-
fore given my mind to them, as one about to hear what is to
follow ; and I have asked at first, not yourself, Socrates, but
your equals in age, or fellow-thinkers, or friends, or in what-
ever name one must call the (party)” thus disposed towards
you. For among them, I have first of all asked those, who
are thought by you to be something, by inquiring what would
be the discourse after this; and laying down a subject” after
your manner, I have said to them—How are we to receive for
the present, O best of men, the exhortation of Socrates to
virtue 2 as being merely a word,” but that it is not in our
power to follow it up in deed, and to comprehend it tho-
roughly 2 And will this be our employment through the
whole of life, to exhort those who have not been exhorted as
yet 2 *and for them (to exhort) others?” Or is it requisite
for us after this to inquire of Socrates and each other, since
we confess that this should be done, what is to come next 2
How, say we,” ought we to begin the discipline relating to
justice? As if some one had exhorted us to pay attention
to the body, on perceiving that we, like boys, had no no-
tion that the care of the body belongs to the gymnastic
* This Socrates never asserted; at least if any reliance is to be placed
on the Meno.
* I have translated as if yśvoc or püAov had dropt out after rö rotočrov—
* Instead of rpótrov, Ficinus seems to have found Tötrov in his MS.
For his version is “quaestionem exposui.”
* The Greek is dig óvrog påvov robrov. But though rotºrov might be
referred to Trporporſic, yet the subsequent Trpáypart plainly shows that
the author wrote, as I have translated, dig óváparog ávrog uðvow y airoij.
For Švopia and #pyov are thus perpetually opposed to each other. See
Porson on Phoen. 512.
*—" The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.
* Ficinus omits papev, which is here quite unnecessary.
CH.ITOPHOe 47
and medical arts, and afterwards reproached us by saying,
that it was disgraceful to pay every attention to wheat and
barley, and vines, and such other things as we labour to
obtain for the sake of the body, but that we search after no
art or device, so that the body may be rendered in the best
condition, and this too when there is such an art. If then
we inquired of the person so exhorting us—Do you say there
are such arts as these? perhaps he would say, There are the
gymnastic and medical arts. "And what now, we said, is the
art that relates to the virtue of the soul? Let it be mentioned."
£5.] *But he, who seemed to be of the greatest strength for
giving an answer to these questions, said to myself, that the
very art, which you have heard Socrates mention, is no other
than justice. And on my saying—Tell me not merely the
name of the art, *but explain it further in this way.” There
is an art called the medical. By this two things are effected;
one, that physicians are always forming other physicians in
addition to those already existing; the other, to effect health.
Now of these one is no longer an art, but the work of the art,
which teaches and is taught, which we call health. And in
the case of carpentry, there is the building and the art; one
the effect, and the other the teaching. So too of justice, one
part is to make persons just, as each (of the arts mentioned)
above (makes) artists. But what shall we say is the other
work, which a just man is able to do for us? State it. One
person* has, I think, said in answer to us, that it is “the con-
ducible;” another, that it is “the becoming;” another, that
it is “the useful;” and another, that it is “the profitable.”
But I rejoined by saying, that these very names exist in each
of the arts, namely, to act rightly, profitably, usefully, and the
like. But that, to which all these tend, each art will state
itself. Thus, the art of carpentry will say, that “the right,”
"—" Ficinus has what is very different from the Greek—“eodem pacto
nunc, quam artem circa anima virtutem versari censeamus, respondeat,
quisquis peritissimus horum sibi videtur;” which Taylor has adopted,
with the exception of the concluding clause.
* Instead of airów, two MSS. offer aird, which leads to airº, as I
have translated.
*—” The Greek is simply &AA’ &6s.—But Ficinus has more fully—“sed
ulterius sic exponas;” which I have adopted.
al * Instead of oirog, Ficinus found &\\oc, as shown by his “Respondit
ius—”
472 CLITOPHO.
“the beautiful,” “the becoming,” (tend to this,) that wooder.
furniture may be (aptly)" made; which is not art, (but the
work of art).” Let in like manner be mentioned the work of
justice. [6.] At last one of your friends, Socrates, who ap-
peared to speak most elegantly, answered me, that this was
the work peculiar to justice, which does not belong to any
other science, namely, to cause a friendship amongst states.
But he, on the other hand, on being interrogated, said that
friendship was a good, and by no means an evil. But on
being asked about the friendships” of boys and of wild ani-
mals, for by that name we call (their attachments), he did not
admit that they are friendships; for it happened that such
(friendships) of theirs 4 were for the greater part hurtful rather
than advantageous; and that those, who call them so, call them
falsely; but that friendship existing really and truly was most
clearly an union of sentiment.” But on being asked whether
he meant by an union of sentiment, an agreement in opinion
or science, he repudiated the agreement in opinion ; for many
and hurtful agreements in opinion are compelled to take place
amongst men; but he conceded that friendship was entirely a
good, and the work of justice; so that he said, an agreement
in sentiment was the same as science really existing, but not
opinion. But when we were at this part of our discourse,
the parties present being in a state of doubt "were competent
to find fault with him,” and to say, that the reasoning had run
round to the point first mooted; and they affirmed that the
medical art is a certain agreement in sentiment; and so are
all the other arts; and that they are able to state about what
they are conversant; but that the art called by you justice, or
G * Taylor has here followed Ficinus, whose “apte” is not seen in the
reek.
* Here again Ficinus supplies what the train of thought requires, but
is wanting in the Greek, “sed artis opus.”
* The word in AEschylus Prom. 501, is a répym6.pa. On the feelings
felt by animals for each other, see the commentators on Virgil, G. iii.
517, “arator Marentem abjungens fraterna morte juvencum.”
* In lieu of abrº, two MSS. offer airów, which I have adopted.
* So Sallust, “Idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum est firma ami-
citia.” Compare Polit. p. 311, B., 351, D., and Alcib. I. p. 127, A.,
eitrep pu)\ta èpuévoua jv.
*—" The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, because
they are not found in the version of Ficinus; while in lieu of ikavoi joav,
the oldest MS. offers a remarkable various reading in Štrexéipmoav–
CLITOPHO. 473
an agreement in sentiment, it had escaped them as to whither
it tends, and that it is not manifest what is its work. At last
I inquired of yourself, Socrates, upon these points; and you
told me that it is the work of justice to injure enemies, and
benefit friends; but afterwards it appeared to you, that the
just man will never injure any one, but will act to the ad-
vantage of every one in all things. [7.] Having endured
this not once, nor even twice, but for a length of time, and
being urgent with you, Socrates, I was tired out; thinking,
indeed, that you effected in the best manner of all men, the
exhortation to the study of virtue; but that one of two things
(must take place), either that you are able to effect thus much
alone, but nothing further—which might happen in the case
of any other art—as, for instance, that he who is not a pilot,
may exercise himself in praising the pilot's art, as a thing of
great value to man; and similarly in the case of other arts
—so a person may perhaps apply the same remark on the sub-
ject of justice to yourself, as not having a greater knowledge
than others of its nature, because you praise it in a beautiful
manner. * Such however is not my (opinion), but (as I say),”
one of two things (take place); either that you do not know
(what justice is), or that you are unwilling to impart (the
knowledge of it) to me. On this account then, I think I shall
go to Thrasymachus, and wherever else I can, as being in
doubt, *(and where I hope I shall be freed from doubts; nor
should I betake myself elsewhere,)” if you were willing to
finish your exhortatory discourses to me. Now, for instance,
if I had been exhorted on the subject of the gymnastic art,
that I ought not to neglect the body, you would state to me
what comes next after the exhortation-speech, what is the
nature of my body, and what attention it requires. And let
"—" Taylor has adopted what he found in the Latin of Ficinus, “e du-
obus alterutrum necesse est;” which would be in Greek, Övoiv Čš Čsiv
6árepov gival, not simply §voiv čá 6&repov—
*—” I have followed Ficinus, who has supplied what was necessary to
unite the unconnected members of the sentence, “Ego autem non sic
existimo; e duobus enim alterum inquam.”
*—” All the words within the numera's are to be found only in the
Latin of Ficinus, “speraveroque a dubitationibus liberari; neque vero
alio me conferrem—” Something similar to which must have been read
in his MS., for it is hardly possible to believe that he supplied them him.
self to complete the sense
474 CLITOPHO.
this be done at present. Lay it down then that Clitopho ac-
knowledges it to be ridiculous to pay attention to other things,
but to neglect the soul, for the sake of which we labour in other
things; and imagine that I have really' spoken upon all other
points, next in order to those, which I have just now gone
through. I beg of you not to act in any respect otherwise,
that I may not (hereafter),” as at present, partly praise you
before Lysias and the rest, and blame you likewise in part.
For I will say, Socrates, that you are worth every thing to
the man, who is not yet exhorted; but to him who has been
exhorted, you are nearly an impediment to his arriving at
the end of virtue, and becoming happy.
* I have adopted övrwg from one MS. in lieu of oirwg.
* Ficinus has “quemadmodum nunc ita et posthac;” what the balance
of the sentence evidently requires. He found, I suspect, in his M.S.,
iva ur) kai at 6ic, ka94trip viv–
INTRODUCTION TO THE EPISTLES.
THE last portion of the works of Plato, that have been considered
by some scholars to be spurious, and genuine by others, are the
Epistles. These, according to Diogenes Laertius, iii. 61, were thir-
teen in number; and just so many have been found in different
MSS., and addressed to the parties mentioned by Diogenes, with the
exception of the 10th and 11th ; which, he says, were written re-
spectively to Aristodemus and Leodamas, instead of Aristodorus and
Laodamas, as found at present—a discrepancy evidently arising from
a literal variation merely.
Out of the whole number, all but 1, 10, 11, 12, have been quoted
distinctly, or covertly alluded to, by different writers, commencing
with Cicero, and ending with some of the Greek fathers. One,
however, the 12th, addressed to Archytas, is reported in some MSS.
to be spurious; although Diogenes, in viii. 79, states it was written
in answer to the letter there preserved from Archytas to Plato.
As scarcely any thing has been written upon the Epistles, with
the exception of the notes of Stephens, based for the most part on
the version of Ficinus, I have been compelled to say more than I
should otherwise have done, with the view of directing attention to
passages, where, from the corruptions in the text, I have been un-
able to see my way clearly.
EPISTLES OF PLATO,
EPISTLE I. 1
JION TO DIONYSIUS—PROSPERITY.”
WHILE I was passing so long a time with you and admin-
istering the affairs of your kingdom the most faithfully * of
all, who took in hand your interests,” I had to endure calum-
nies really grievous. For I know that nothing of a rather
cruel kind you ever thought proper to do with my consent.
And of this all, who have taken a part in the state with your-
self, are my witnesses, with many of whom I have been engaged
in a contest, after I had freed them from no trifling calamities
And when in possession of the sole power, I had often preserved
for you the state, I have been sent away in a more ignominious
manner than it became you to drive out a beggar, and you have
ordered me to sail away, after I had resided with you for such
a length of time. With regard to my future conduct, I shall
consult my interest, somewhat more like a human being :
* Although this Epistle appears to have been written by Dion, it is
ascribed to Plato in nearly all the MSS. but the one used by Ficinus. The
whole of the Superscription is however omitted in one MS., and the word
IIAárwv alone in another.
* On the address så Trpárrsty, adopted by Plato, see Epist. iii. and the
elaborate notes of Menage on Diog. L. iii. 61.
* I have adopted tre+rvorsvpuśvag, in lieu of arstructsvpušvog, as suggested
by the Bipont editor.
* Such seems to be the meaning of rāc diſps}\stag ipêv \apſ3avóvrw, .
But Napſ3ávstv is not, I suspect, to be found elsewhere in this sense,
Ficinus has “utilitates vestras captantibus.”
478 |EPISTLE I.
* While you,
A tyrant of that kind, shall live alone."
As to the splendid gold, which you gave for my departure,
Baccheius, the bearer of this epistle, brings it back; for it was
neither sufficient for my travelling expenses, nor useful for the
rest of life, and it would bring the greatest disgrace upon you as
the giver, and not much less upon me, as the receiver. But it
evidently makes no difference to you, either to give or receive
as much gold as this; so that after getting it again, prove by
it your attention to some other of your associates, as you did
to me. For you have paid sufficiently an attention to me.
And now one may mention opportunely the sentiment of Eu-
ripides, that
* When thy affairs shall otherwise fall out,
Thou’lt pray that such a man were standing by thee.”
But I wish to remind you, that the majority of other tragic
poets, when they introduce a tyrant, dying at the hands of any
one, make him call out,
By friends deserted, do I hapless perish; *
but no one represents a tyrant perishing through the want of
gold. To those too, who possess any mind, that piece of poetry is
thought to be not ill said,
- Not glittering gold, 'mongst men” most rare
During a life of hapless care,
Nor steel" nor couch” with silver dight,
By mortals” valued, strike the sight,
"—" In the words at 6: Totoirog (ºv Túpavvoc oikhostg påvog, there is
evidently a dramatic fragment, as I have translated; and so there is in the
preceding words, #yd pièv oëv—&trav6patrörepov, which it would require
no great talent to elicit.
* In \aputrpov there is a latentirony, and so too in the subsequent iravöc.
*—” In this distich, as detected by Barnes, I have with Stephens adopted
àAX(wg, the correction of Cornarius, in lieu of āXX0V.
* Compare the sentiment in Gray,
“Deserted at his utmost need,
By friends his former bounty fed,”
when alluding to the death of Richard the Second.
* One MS. has #v 0Varoic, which seems preferable to Év 9Varqī or iv
6varðv in the other. **
* Taylor translated &öápac by “diamond,” an error into which some
other scholars have fallen. -
* I have adopted k\iva, found in one MS., in lieu of k\ivat.
* Here too I have adopted &v60%zrwv. from the margin of one MS., in-
stead of div6pwarov. -
EPISTLE II. 479
****
Nor fertile furrows of the earth's wide plain
Such self-sufficient power e'er obtain,
As of good men the mind, that thinks the same."
Fare thee well, and know that thou hast erred thus much as
regards us, in order that you may conduct yourself better to-
wards others.
EPISTLE II.
PLATO TO DIONYSIUS PROSPERITY.
I HAVE heard from Archedemus, that you think that not
only I ought to keep quiet myself, but my familiar friends like-
wise, on matters relating to yourself, and neither do or say any
thing to your disparagement; but that you make an exception
in the case of Dion. Now this assertion, that Dion is to
be excepted, signifies that I have no power over my con-
nexions. For if I had a power, as well over others as you
and Dion, a greater good would be the result both to all
of you and the rest of the Greeks, as I assert. But now I am
great through rendering myself a follower of the dictates of my
reason. And this I say, because Cratistolus and Polyxenus
have not given you sound information; for one of them as-
Serted, says common report, that he had heard at Olympia of
many of my associates having spoken ill of you. But perhaps
he heard more acutely than I did. *For such a thing I have
not heard.” But it is requisite, as it seems to me, for you to
act thus for the future, whenever any one says any thing
about any one of us, by sending a letter to inquire of myself;
for I shall neither be afraid or ashamed to tell the truth.
But to you and me such is the state of circumstances with re-
gard to each other that we are neither of us unknown to any one,
so to say, of the Greeks; nor is our intercourse passed over
in silence; nor let it be concealed from you, that it will not be
* From the word áuoqipóðuavitis fair to infer that p(Awu re have dropt
out after &ya.0óv, for, as Sallust says, “Idem velle atque idem mollé est
—amicitia;” and a similar sentiment is to be found in Pseudo-Plato, Cli-
toph. § 6, and the passages quoted there.
*—” The words between the numerals are omited by Taylor.
480 EPISTLE II.
passed over in silence in the time to come; so many have ob-
tained a knowledge of it, as having been neither little nor
quietly carried on. But why do I say this? I will now tell
you, beginning from events far back.
Intellect and great power naturally tend to the same; and
these two always pursue, and seek after, and unite with each
other. In the next place, men are delighted to speak about
these subjects themselves, and to hear about them from
others in their private conversations, or in the writings of
poets. Thus for example, when persons discourse about
Hiero, and Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, they are delighted
in bringing forward the intercourse of Simonides with these
men, and what he did and said to them ; and they are accus-
tomed to celebrate together Periander of Corinth, and Thales of
Miletus; and Pericles, and Anaxagoras; and Croesus, and Solon,
as being men of wisdom, and Cyrus, a person of power. Poets
too, in imitation of this, bring together Creon and Tiresias,
Polydus and Minos, Agamemnon and Nestor, Ulysses and
Palamedes; and, as it appears to me, for the same reason, the
first men brought together Prometheus and Zeus; and they
sing of some of these, as having a difference, and others a friend-
ship with each other; and again, of some as having at one
time a difference, and at another friendship; and having si-
milar feelings on some points, and different upon others.
Now all these things I mention, as being willing to show that
men will not be silent respecting us, when we are dead; so
that we ought to pay an attention to them. For we must, as it
seems, pay some regard even to the time to come ; especially
since it happens that the most slave-like persons do by a kind
of nature, neglect it entirely; but persons of a more elegant
mind do every thing in order that they may be spoken well
of hereafter. And this I consider an argument that the dead
have a certain perception' of things here. For the most ex-
cellent minds divine that this is so, but the most depraved
deny it. Now the divinations of god-like men are of greater
weight than of those who are not so. And I conceive that if
it were permitted for those persons of a former age, to whom I
am alluding, to correct aught in their intercourse, they would
earnestly endeavour that better things be said of them, than
* This doctrine is laid down only hesitatingly in Menexen. § 20.
EPISTLE II, 481
at present. This however it is still permitted us to say, god
willing, that if any thing has been done not correctly during
our former intercourse, either in word or deed, we may cor-
rect it. For on the subject of philosophy I assert that a true
opinion will be formed of us; a better one if we are persons of
worth, but the contrary, if we are worthless. And indeed, if
we pay attention to this, we shall not do any thing more pious;
nor any thing more impious, if we neglect it. But how this
ought to take place, and how it is just, I will explain.
When I came to Sicily, I had the reputation of excelling
very much in philosophy; and I wished on my arrival at Sy-
racuse to have you a witness in my favour, in order' that phi-
losophy might be honoured by the multitude. But this did
not turn out prosperously.” I do not however assign that as
the reason which the many would say, but because you appeared
unwilling to put implicit confidence in me; but willing to send
me away and to send for others, and to inquire what my busi-
ness was, by this, as it seems, distrusting me. And they, who
were proclaiming loudly these matters, were many, affirming
that you had a contempt for myself, and were seriously apply-
ing yourself to other things. Such were the reports at that
time bruited abroad.
Now hear what after this it is just to do, in order that I
may reply to your question, how you and I ought to conduct
ourselves to each other. If then you have a contempt for
philosophy, bid farewell to it. But if you have heard from
another, or discovered "yourself any thing more excellent”
than what you have from me, honour it. But if what (you
have heard) from me please you, then must you honour
highly myself likewise. Now, therefore, as from the begin-
ning, do you lead and I will follow. For being honoured by
you, I will honour you (in return); but not being honoured,
I shall keep quiet. Further still, if by honouring me, you
* I have translated as if the Greek were—oré plot, tva Ör)—not ore, iva
Öh plot—where plot has no meaning.
* Why siayåg is thus rendered by Ficinus and Ast, I cannot under-
stand. The word is learnedly illustrated by Hemsterhuis in a note
printed by Gaisford on Markland’s Eurip. Suppl. 662.
*—” I have adopted, in lieu of 38Ariova sipmkaç—ékéiva from one MS.
BéArtov sipmkóg Tu, and #ksivo, similar to “Si quid novisti rectius istius.”
in Horace.
3 :
482 EPISTLE II.
;
take the lead in this,' you will seem to honour philosophy;
and that very thing, * which you are considering even other-
wise,” will bring you the reputation of being considered by
the multitude a philosopher. But by honouring you, when
not honouring me, I should seem to be admiring and pursu-
ing wealth ; but this we know has a name dishonourable
amongst all men; and, to sum up, by your honouring me,
there will be an ornament to both of us; but by my (honour-
ing) you, a disgrace to both. And thus much on these mat-
tel’S.
But the little sphere” does not answer; and this Archidemus
will show you, when he arrives. Moreover, you must explain
to him very distinctly respecting the matter, which is far more
honourable and divine than this, and respecting which you
sent as being in doubt. For you say, according to his report,
that there has not been a sufficient demonstration respecting
the nature of the first. I must speak to you by enigmas, *in.
order that, should the tablet meet with any accident in its folds
by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand.” For
such is the case.
“As regards the king of all, all things are his, and all are for
his sake, and he is the cause of all that is beautiful. But about
a second are the secondary things; and about a third the third.
Now the soul of man is eager to learn respecting these things
of what kind they are, looking to what is allied to itself,
none of which it possesses sufficiently. "But respecting the king"
(himself)" and those of which I have spoken, there is nothing of
this kind. But of that, which is after this, does the Soul speak.
But of what kind, son of Dionysius and Doris, is your inquiry
* I cannot understand rotºrov : nor could Ficinus; whose version is—
“honorare prius me caeperis.” Perhaps Plato wrote, airóg or of ro–
*—” Here again I am at a loss, and so was Ficinus. For he has—
“quod tu imprimis cupiebas.”
* What this little sphere was is uncertain. Perhaps it was a kind of
orrery. T. See Epist. 13.
*—4. In the Greek words between the numerals lies hid a tragic distich,
"Iv' &v Tu 6é\rog Év TrvXaig tróvrov Šía"H yig Trá07, pur) yuq, rö yoãppia
rug rvXóv : as may be inferred from Eurip. Iph. T. 1744, ed. Monk.
* I have followed one M.S. that reads Trávr’ #ketvov šo ru, instead of
Trávt’ £ort kai ékéivov–
*—9 Ficinus has—“sed in rege ipso et in his,” as if he had found in
his M.S. roi; 68 (3aot)\éwg abroë—in lieu of row 68 (3aotAëwg trèpt—
EPISTLE II, 483
concerning what is the cause of all things evil." Or rather, is
it not a kind of labour-throes on this point, which are pro-
duced in the soul, and which if a person does not take away
from it, (the Soul) will never meet with truth existing in
reality.
And you told me that you had thought of this in the
garden under the laurel trees, and that it was your dis-
covery. And I said, that if this appeared to you to be
the case, you had freed me from a long discussion. I said
however that I had never met with any other person, who
had discovered it, but that it had been a great source of
trouble to myself. But perhaps you have heard this from
Some one; but accidentally impelled in this direction by a di-
vine allotment,” you have not kept firm hold of the demonstra-
tions on this point, and pinned them down ; * but you are
dashing on, at one time in this way, and at another in a dif-
ferent way, to what is the object of fancy; but such it is
not. Nor has this occurred to you alone; but be well assured,
that no one, when he first hears me, is otherwise affected than
thus “in the beginning.” And one having more trouble, and
another less, are with difficulty liberated from it; but nearly all
of them have of it not a little. Such then having been, and
is still the case, we have in my opinion nearly discovered that,
about which you sent to me, namely, how we ought to be
affected towards each other. For since you are testing (my doc-
trines) by associating with other persons, and "placing them by
the side of those (promulgated) by others, and (considering)”
1 In lieu of kakºv, Proclus, in Theolog. Platon. ii. 4, p. 103, offers
raX&v, adopted by Taylor ; and so one MS. collated by Bekker. The
other however is the preferable reading. Unless it be said that Plato
wrote both, KaNāv rekai kakijv. For Dionysius, like many philosophers
before and after his time, was puzzled with the origin and continuance
of evil, introduced by one or more powers, the authors of all good. -
2 The expression 9sia uoipa would now be applied to what we call
“genius,” or “gift of nature.” - 2 - -
3 so i have translated karáðngag. Ficinus has “protulisti,” which
would lead to caréðetéaç— -
4–4 Ficinus omits kar’ &pxãc, probably deeming them superfluous
after ºrpºrov &Kočoavri. Perhaps Plato wrote kará rapaxáç, “ by some
confusion.” º
5–5 The Greek is trapa.0sópsvoc. But there is, I suspect, no such
compound in Greek. Ficinus has “cum—comparaveris,” from which
Faefise was led to trapabéuévoc, which I have adopted, and translated as
if Geºgsvog had dropped out before º ka.0' aird.
2 I
J
484 EPISTLE II.
them by themselves, they will, if the touchstone be true, still
stick to you, and you will be at home with them and us."
How then shall these things, and all we have spoken of, not
take place 2
You have therefore done well in having sent Archedemus ;
and hereafter, when he shall have reached you, and told you
my message, other doubts will perhaps lay hold of you. If
then you take counsel of yourself properly, you will send Ar-
chedemus to me again; and he, like a travelling trader, will re-
turn again to you. And if you do this twice or thrice, and
test sufficiently what is sent from me, I shall wonder, if your
former doubts be not very different from what they are now.
Act then thus boldly ; for neither will you send, nor Arche-
demus act the part of a travelling trader, in a manner more
beautiful or more acceptable to the deity, than by a trading of
this kind. Be careful, however, that these things do not fall
peradventure among men devoid of instruction; for, as it ap-
pears to me, there are scarcely any doctrines” which will ap-
pear more ridiculous to the multitude than these ; nor on the
other hand any more wonderful, and producing a greater en-
thusiasm in those who are well disposed. But when they are
often mentioned, and continually heard, and this for many
years, they are scarcely at length, and with great labour, pu-
rified like gold.
*But hear what is wonderful there;” for even a good many
persons have heard these things, who are able to learn and
"—" Ficinus, apparently not understanding the meaning of Trpoopio stat,
has thus given the general sense of the passage—“modo rectum examen
peregeris, consentientem nobis te et nostris praebebis; ” which Taylor
was content to translate literally into English. With regard to oikeiðg,
the phrase “at home * keeps closer to the Greek than its usual version,
“a familiar friend.”
* The Greek is dicotoplara, literally “hearings.” For previous to the
invention of printing, the philosophers of old promulgated their principles
partly by writing, but more frequently by word of mouth, before
persons who listened to their intellectual “ displays,” as they were then
called; but which would now be called “lectures,” a word that means
literally “readings,” and is applied sometimes to discourses spoken even
extempore.
*—" The Greek is 6 &# 6avuaorèv airoi; yé yovey, &kovorov : where I
cannot understand abroë. Ficinus has “Nam, quod in hac re mirabile
contingere consuevit, id audi.” One MS. omits airoij. Perhaps Plato
>/
$7:04.9 ºf $73-->
EPISTI.E II. 485
able to remember, and after testing every thing in every way,
to come to a decision, being already old men, and who have
heard these things for not less than thirty years; and who
asserted lately that, what formerly appeared to them to be the
least worthy of belief, now appears the most so, and perfectly
clear; but what was most worthy of belief then, is the very
reverse now. Directing therefore your mind to this, be careful
lest it repent you of what has now unworthily fallen from
you. Now the greatest guard in this case is in not writing
but learning; for what is written, it cannot be but that it will
get abroad. On this account, then, I have never at any time
written any thing about them; nor is there any composition
of Plato (by name), nor will there be; but what has now
* been said belong to Socrates, who was, even when young, a
handsome person." Fare thee well, and be persuaded by me;
and, after frequently reading this epistle, burn it. And thus
much on these matters. -
With respect to Polyxenus, you have wondered that I did not
send him to you. But I say now, as of old, respecting Lyco-
phron, and the others who are with you, that, both naturally,
and from the method of your discourse, you very much excel
them in the art of speaking; nor is any one of them confuted
willingly, as some suppose, but unwillingly ; and you appear
indeed to have treated them with great moderation, and to
have bestowed upon them (honourable)” presents. So much
"—" The Greek is rā Śē vöv Asyóplewa Xokpárovg £ori ka Moff cat vãov
yeyovórog. But Julian in Orat. vi. p. 189, A., quotes pépépéva, which,
says Wyttenbach in Epist. Crit. p. 16, answers better to dTopspópuswat
#porão sig, in Theaetet. p. 148, E. But how Socrates could be said to be at
any period of life “a handsome man,” I cannot understand. For he was
not only the reverse, but even prided himself on being so. Wytten-
bach indeed asserts that the expression ka?\ög kal veóg is well suited to
Socrates, as being #potukóc. But a person may easily be športicóg with-
out being at the same time ca)\ög kai véog. As however the passage is
quoted in its present form by Aristides, T. ii. p. 288, and Stobaeus cik. p.
355, it seams hazardous to suggest any alteration; else one would suspect
that Plato wrote rà è vöv pspópewa 6tá Xokpárovg #or' obic ävov, kai
véov yeyovórog, Asyópsva, i.e. “but what has now been published is
spoken through the mouth of Socrates, who was, even when young, no
fool.” To obviate probably the difficulty in ka)\oiſ, Ficinus translated it
“virtute claruit.”
* Ficinus has “et honestis eos muneribus prosecutus,” as if he had
found in his MS. kai kakóc Čečwańaëat-
486 EPISTI,E III.
º
on these matters, which for such matters is much. But if
you make use of Philistion at all, make a great use of him;
and, if you can, lend Speusippus (something)," and send him
away. Speusippus too stands in need of you. And Philistion
too promised me, that he would very willingly come to Athens
if you would dismiss him. You have likewise done well in
dismissing him” from the stone quarries. But trifling is the
request both respecting his domestics, and Hegesippus, the
son of Ariston; for you sent word to me, that if any one in-
jured either him or them, and you knew of it, you would not
overlook it. And of Lysiclides it is worth while to speak
the truth; for he alone of those, who came from Sicily to
Athens, has caused no change as regards our intercourse with
each other, but ever continues to say something good, and
what is for the best respecting what has occurred.
EPISTLE III,
*PLATO TO DIONYSIUs.”
HAVING put in a letter “all hail,” can I have truly found
the best address ** or rather "by writing, according to my
* Ficinus, not aware that Xpriorov comes from Xpáw, “I lend,” translates
“Speusippi opere utere,” whom Taylor has followed as usual. It is evi-
dent however that ru has dropt out after XTrevoritrarip. For Plato meant
to say, that without some assistance in the shape of a loan, Speusippus
could not leave Syracuse.
* After röv Stephens suspected that pixóēsvov has dropt out, or the
name of some other person.
*—” I have adopted, what Ficinus seems to have found in his M.S., as
remarked by Stephens.
* With the idea contained in these words may be compared the ex
pression in Eurip. Med. 663, Mijösta, Xaigs' roñés yáp roi ºpoupliov
KáAAtoy oiósig oiós.
*— The Greek is # puči)\\ov Kará ràv Špijv ovvi,0sway yoãpwy & Trpár-
rstv čo Trep stw6a $v raig #Trugro)\aig roëg pi\ovg trpooſayopsistv. But
Ficinus has “an quemadmodum ego Solitus sum scribere ad amicos,
bene agere,” thus omitting the words kará ràv šuñy ovvi,9stav and $v
raig & triotoxaig. On the other hand Menage, on Diog. L. iii. 6], rejects
&a trep stw8a as an interpretation of kará ràv špºv avvá0slav. Plato
wrote, I suspect, in pa)\\ov Kará ràv Špijv ovvi,6eway ypſºpou' à?", “ss
EPISTLE III, 487
custom, “Prosperity,” as I am accustomed to address friends
in my letters.” For you, as they who went on a sacred em-
bassy," related, addressed the god at Delphi, by this very flat-
tering expression, and wrote, as they say,
Hail, and preserve the tyrant’s pleasant life.
But I would exhort not even a man, much less a deity, by an
invocation, to do this; not a deity, because I should give a
command contrary to his nature, since the deity is seated far
from pleasure and pain; nor a man, because pleasure fre-
quently begets mischief, ” and pain produces” in the soul in-
docility, and forgetfulness, and silliness, and insolence. And
thus much let it be said by me on the subject of the address;
and do you, after having read this, receive it as you are will-
ing to receive it.
Not a few report, that you stated to certain persons sent to
you, that, when I heard you saying that you were about to
establish Grecian cities in Sicily, and to relieve the people of
Syracuse by changing the government from an absolute to a .
limited monarchy, I prevented you from doing *so ; although,
as you assert, you were very eager on the matter; but that
now I have taught Dion to do the very same thing himself;
and that, according to your motions, we are depriving you of
your power. You indeed know whether you are benefited
by such assertions. You are however injuring me by stating
the contrary to what really occurred; for I have been sufficiently
prejudiced by Philistides and many others in the eyes of the
hired troops and the mob of Syracuse, through my remaining
in the Acropolis; while they without (I think) *would, had any
error taken place, have turned it all against myself, by assert-
trpárrstv,” #v raig #Two roMaig trpèc pi\ovg trpooayopetºwy, i. t or rather
shall I write according to my custom “Prosperity,” while addressing
friends in my letters.
* On the word 9sopsiv see Blomfield’s Prom. 118.
*—* I have translated a if the Greek were ysvvi, kai Ağırm, not kai Xi trn
yevvá. For thus while pleasure begets mischief (to the body), pain
affects the soul in a similar manner.
* In lieu of āpa, Ficinus found in his MS. 6pāv, as shown by his “ne
faceres.”
* Stephens was the first to remark that there is nothing to govern rotºc
##w6ev: to preserve therefore the syntax, I have translated as if oipat had
dropt out after śća,6ev, and āv after rpétreuv. -
488 EPISTLE III,
ing (tenaciously) that you were persuaded in all things
by me. But you knew yourself most clearly, that of my own
accord I meddled very little with politics, except at first, when
I thought I might do something beneficial, and that I was
moderately engaged in some other trifling matters, and upon
the Prooems of the Laws, with the exception of what you and
some one else have written as an addition; for I hear that some
persons after you have been tampering with them.” Each por-
tion will however be plain to those, who are able to distinguish
my manner. But, as I just now said, I do not stand in need
of calumny before the Syracusans, and certain others, if you
can persuade them (by speaking) in this way; but I am much
more in want of an apology against the former calumny, and
that, which has now been produced after it, both greater and
more violent. -
Against these two (calumnies) therefore, it is necessary for
me to make a two-fold apology (by saying), in the first place,
that I properly avoided taking a share with you in the affairs
of the city; and in the second place, that "I know it was not
my advice, as you have asserted, that exhorted you, nor” was
I an impediment to you, when about to establish the Grecian
cities. Hear then first the commencement of those matters,
about which I have spoken the first.
I came to Syracuse invited by yourself and Dion, who had
already passed an ordeal with me, and had been of old my
guest; and who was of the middle and staid period of life—
(men) of whom there is altogether a need to such as possess
* The Greek is in some MSS. ori pāorkovrag rivac, where Stephens
would omit ruvag, not found in Ficinus, nor in three other MSS. One
however has as rivac póg covraç, which leads to drévèg pàokovraç crè,
where dºrsvåg is a Platonic word, found in Rep. vii. p. 547, E., ársveig
àvöpag, and explained by Suidas, ovvexéc—āyavioxvpūg: while Ruhnken
on Timaeus, p. 53, has given some instances of its loss and corruption.
* If after the laws of Plato had been thus tampered with, the author
himself never put forth an unadulterated edition, it will be difficult, de-
spite what he says in the next sentence, always to separate the genuine
from the spurious matter. -
*—” The Greek is obk Špiriv rairmy sipmkag ovpſ3ovX,jv obôs 6takóXvow
.#AAovri in some MSS., but in others ðuakwºosuv, and in one 6,6aoka)\tav.
Ficinus has “meum illud consilium non fuisse, quod tu ais, ut suaderem
tibi—” From whence I have elicited oik Špiriv rairmv, #v sipmkaç, orvp-
(3ov\riv sival oióa 6takeX&ovoav obôā—where 6takeMečovgav, is confirmed
by kexetww in p. 319, B.
FPISTLE III. 489
even a little intellect, when they are about to consult about
affairs such as yours were then ; while you were very young,
and had great inexperience on those points, in which it behoved
you to have been skilled, and you were perfectly unknown to
me. After this, some man, or god, or fortune, did in conjunc-
tion with yourself drive out Dion, and you were left alone.
Think you then at that time I would have held any commu-
nion with you on affairs of state, when I had lost a sensible
partner P and when I saw a senseless person was left with
many and wicked men, not ruling in reality, but fancying
himself to be a ruler, although he was ruled over by men of such
a kind 2 Under these circumstances, what ought I to have
done? 'Is it not of necessity, from what occurred afterwards,'
just what I did do? To bid farewell to state affairs, and to be
cautious of the calumnies arising from envy, and to endeavour
to make all of you, although separated and at variance, friends
as much as possible to each other. And of this you are the
witness, that in bringing this about I never abated a jot. And
though with some difficulty, it was nevertheless agreed that I
should sail homewards, since a war detained you; but that,
when peace took place, I and Dion should come to Syracuse
again, and that you should invite us. Such were the circum-
stances that occurred, touching my first sojourn at Syracuse,
and of my safe return home.
On peace being made, you invited me a second time; not,
however, according to the agreement; but you wrote to me
to come alone; and said that you would send for Dion after-
wards. On this account I did not come, and displeased Dion;
for he thought it would be better to come and hearken to you.
In a year after this a trireme arrived, and letters from your-
self; and the language of the letter began (by saying), that
if I would come, the affairs of Dion should be settled accord-
ing to my mind; but the contrary, if I did not come. I am
ashamed to say, how many letters then came both from you
and others through you from Italy and Sicily, to myself and to
such as were my relations and acquaintances, all of them
exhorting me to go, and begging me by all means to yield to
your request. It seemed therefore good to all, beginning from
}. that I should set sail, and not act the coward.” And
"—" The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.
* Compare Epist. 7, p. 329, B., karapax0aktobeig kai diročet)\vdiv.
490 EPISTLE III.
yet I put forward before them my period of life; and I
strenuously urged with respect to yourself, that you would
be unable to defend me against those calumniating us, and
wishing us to become foes. For I saw then, and I see now,
that the great and over-swollen property of private persons and
almost monarchs, that the greater they are, the more do they
nourish calumniators many and mighty, and who associate for
the sake of pleasure, together with mischief of a shameful kind;
an evil greater than which neither does wealth produce, nor the
influence of any other power. Bidding, however, farewell to
all these ideas, I came, after thoroughly reflecting, that not
one of my friends would have to accuse me, in that through my
negligence, their interests had been, when they might have
been safe, destroyed. On my arrival—for surely you know
all that occurred thereupon—I thought it right, according
to the compact made in your letters, that you should in the
first place bring back Dion and restore him to your familiar
intercourse ; such familiar intercourse, I mean, as that, by
which,' if you had been persuaded by me, something better,
than what has taken place, would have happened to yourself,
and Syracuse, and the rest of the Greeks, at least as my
opinion divines. And then I thought it right that the rela-
tions of Dion should have his property, and that those, whom
you know” did divide it, should not have divided it. Moreover
I thought that what was customary should be sent to him each
year, and rather more, and not less, be sent on account of my
being present. But succeeding in none of these demands, I
determined to depart. After this, however, you persuaded
me to remain a year, by saying that you would sell” all the
property of Dion, and send one half to Corinth, and leave
the residue to his son. I could relate many other things, not
one of which, after promising, you have performed ; but, on
account of their multitude, I will cut them short. For after
you had sold all the property of Dion, without having per-
* In lieu of ºv, which has nothing to govern it, the sense and syntax
require ºff; and just afterwards, 38Artów ru rôv—éoxe, in lieu of 38Artov
rāv–šo'Xs.
* Instead of oio 6a, Ficinus seems to have found some other word in
his MS. ; for his version is “praefeceras — ” - .
* Ficinus, disregarding the difference in meaning between &roðoivas
and dºtroë600aw, renders & Troööusvog by “redditurum;’ and he is fol-
lowed, as usual, by Taylor.
EPISTLE III. 491
suaded him to that step, although you said you would not do so,
without first persuading him, you have put, O wonderful man,
a most glorious' finish * to all your promises. For you dis-
covered a plan neither honourable, nor clever, nor just, nor
advantageous, to frighten me, as being ignorant of what had
taken place at that time, in order that I might not require the
money to be sent. For when you were intending to banish
Heraclides, an act that did not seem just to the Syracusans,
or to myself, and on that I did, together with Theodotus and
Euribius, request you not to do so, you laid hold of this as a
sufficient pretext, and said that I had evidently been for some
time past caring nothing for you, but only for Dion, and his
friends and relatives; and that since Theodotus and Hera-
clides are now calumniated, as being the relatives of Dion, I
am devising in every way for them not to suffer punishment.
And thus much on the subject of the intercourse between you
and myself on state affairs. And if you have seen any
estrangement in me towards yourself, think it only reason-
able for all this to have happened in this way, and do not
wonder at it; for to any one possessing any intellect, I should
justly appear to be a knave, if I were induced by the great-
ness of your power, to betray an old friend and guest, when
doing badly through you, and being, so to say, not inferior to
yourself, and to prefer you, when committing an act of in-
justice, and to do whatever you ordered, for the sake, it is
evident, of money; for no other reason would any one have
assigned for this change in me, if changed I had been. But
these events, occurring in this way, have through yourself
produced a kind of wolf-friendship,” and a want of cordiality
between you and me.
Literally, “most youth-like.” Compare veavikóc póðog in Eurip.
Hipp. 1204, which is explained by “vehement.” I suspect, however,
that vsavuktórarov here conceals some corruption, as weavukwrárov does
in Alcib. I. § 2, where I have suggested pleyak)\esorárov, in allusion to
the grandfather of Alcibiades on his mother’s side.
* Literally, “Colophon ’’—On the meaning of the metaphor, see at
Euthyd. § 71.
* This is, I suspect, an allusion to an AEsopo-Socratic fable, in which
a shepherd forms a friendship with a wolf; who, after being taught
to carry off the sheep of other owners, feasts on those of its own
friend. Something similar is still extant in MS. Flor., in No.
105. Ficinus, not aware of this circumstance, has translated, “suc-
censendi”—Gataker, however, on Marc. Antonin. xi. 15 says the allu-
492 YEPISTLE ITU.
The discourse has now come nearly to the point, con-
nected" with what has just now occurred, and for which I said I
must in the second place apologize. Attend therefore dili-
gently, and consider whether I appear to you to tell a false-
hood, and not the truth. For I assert that you did, when
Archedemus and Aristocritus were present in the garden,
about twenty days before my departure homewards from Sy-
racuse, find fault with me on the points you have just now
mentioned, how that I was more concerned for Heraclides,
and all the rest, than for you. And you likewise asked me
in their presence, whether I remembered that on my first
coming to Syracuse, I exhorted you to establish the Grecian
cities. And I acknowledged that I did remember; and, even
now, it appears to me that it is best (to do so). I must like-
wise relate, Dionysius, what was said at that time after this.
For I asked you whether I advised you (to do) this
alone, or something else besides this. But you answered me
in a very angry and insulting manner, as you thought ; and
on this account the insult of that period has become *a day-
dream, instead of a night one.” For *you said laughing in
not a feigned manner, if I remembered, that you had exhorted
me, after I had been instructed, to do all these things or not.” I
replied, that you had very properly reminded me. You then said
—Was it after being instructed in geometry P or how 2 After
this I did not say what it came into my mind to say, through
sion is to Æsop. Fab. 237, and would read here &kouvøvnoriaç, in lieu of
dkotvw.vtaç, which he says is not a correct Greek word; while the other
is found in Aristotle, Polit. ii. 3, and in the letter of Cornelius, bishop of
Rome, preserved by Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. vi. 43, rºv &kouvøvnotav airoij
kai Avkopu)\iav. Gataker quotes likewise Menander, Fr. Inc. 203,
Avkopi)\to puév eiouv ai 6taXXayat.
*—" The Greek is sic A6).ov—Aóyoc—évvexlic. But Ficinus has “op-
portune sermo,” omitting entirely £vvexrïc rq vöv 67 yewouévºp. Hence
Stephens supposed that Ficinus found in his M.S. sig ka)\}v in lieu of sic
Aóyov. I have translated as if the Greek were sic Törov—Aóyog—Évvexi;
—to which I was led by finding £vvexeig, i.e. £vvexijg, in one MS. On
the loss of Tótrov I have spoken elsewhere.
*—” i. e. “a true vision instead of a false one.” On the expression
trap &vr' Övsiparoc, see at Phileb. § 75.
*—* This I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version is
* Rogasti autem me—si bene quid memini—an ista praecepissem tibi quasi
docto an non; ” but whether he found the Greek in his MS. corresponding
to the Latin may be fairly doubted. There is evidently something
wrong here, which better MSS. alone will enable us to correct.
EPISTLE IV, 493
the fear that, on account of a trifling word, the sailing-away,
which I expected, "would be in a narrow instead of a wide
space." This then is for the sake of all what has been said
by me.” Do not calumniate me by saying that I did not per-
mit you to colonize the Grecian cities, subverted by the Barba-
rians, and to assist the Syracusans by your changing to a limited
monarchy instead of an absolute one. For you cannot state any
falsehood against me, which is less suited to myself than this.
If there appeared to be any where a sufficient power of de-
ciding, I could give in addition to these, arguments still
clearer, (to prove) that I exhorted you to act in this way, but
that you were unwilling to do so. And in truth it is not dif-
ficult to show clearly, that had this been done, it would have
been the best for yourself, the Syracusans, and all the Sice-
liotes.” If then you deny you have said so, after you had so
said, I have a right of action against you. But if you con-
fess you did (say so), consider after this that Stesichorus
was a wise man, and imitating his recantation,” betake your-
self from a false assertion to a true one.
EPISTLE IV.
PLATO TO DION OF SYRACUSE—PROSPERITY.
I THINK that my readiness with respect to events as they
occur, is apparent at all times, and that I give much of a serious
attention to their being brought to pass for the sake of nothing
*— The words Mī plot o'revög yévout' divr' sipvXwptaç evidently con-
ceal an Iambic verse, Mă plot yévout' &vt’ eigvXwptaç crevóg, which even-
tually became a proverb amongst the sea-faring Athenians; who knew,
as the English do, that there is little danger as long as there is plenty of
sea-room; and that it is only in a strait, or in shallow water, that a sailor
feels any fear.
* Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has “casterum
ad illudjam redeamus, quo tendunt ha-c omnia.
* The indigenous inhabitants of Sicily were called XukeXoi: the foreign-
ers, who settled there, Xuksåtårat.
- * To the same recantation of Stesichorus there is an allusion in the
Phaedrus, $ 44. See Blomfield in Stesichor. Fragm. 5, in the Museum
Criticum, T. i. p. 263. -
494 EPISTLE IV.
else rather than a love of honour in the case of things honour-
able. For I consider it just, that they, who are in good
truth worthy men, and who act in this manner, should obtain
the renown due to them. At present, matters are, to speak
with god's will, doing well; but in those that relate to the future
there is the greatest contest. For to excel in fortitude, swift-
ness, and strength, would seem to be in the power of some
others; but to excel all the others in truth, justice, magnifi-
cence, and the graceful bearing relating to all these, any one
would agree to honour in reason those, who establish their
claim to qualities such as these. Now then what I am say-
ing is manifest. But at the same time we ought to remind
ourselves, that it is proper * to excel the rest of men, whom you
know more than boys.” Hence we ought to become manifest,
as being such as we say; especially since, so to say, with god's
will, it will be easy: for to others it has happened that it was
necessary for them to have wandered in many a place, "if they
were about to be known.” But that which is now existing about
you is such, so that persons from the whole of the inhabited
(earth), if one may speak in rather an arrogant style, are looking
to one spot, and in that spot to yourself especially. Since then
you are beheld by all men, prepare to exhibit yourself, as that
celebrated Lycurgus of the olden time, and Cyrus, and if there is
any one else, who has ever been thought to excel in moral and
political (virtues); especially since many, and indeed nearly
all here say, there is a great expectation that, when Dionysius
is taken off, affairs will be in a ruinous state, through the am-
bition of yourself, and Heraclides, and Theodotus, and others
of your acquaintances.
Let then, the most of all, such a person not exist. But if he
should exist, do you appear as a healer, “and ye will proceed
* I confess I hardly understand here £répov ruvøv. -
*—” Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I cannot under-
stand; nor could, I suspect, Ficinus, whose version is, “oportere nos, ut
te non latet, plus ab aliis quam viros a pueros differre—” unless it be
said that he found in his MS., as remarked by Stephens, Tpogūkst TAéov
# traičov čvöpag, Tāv &\\ov &v0p6trav Štapépsty, dig oio.6a 6htrov.
*—” The Greek is si w8XXovat Yuwa 6ivat. Ficinus has “ad id conse-
quendum.”
*—4 Such is the translation of the Greek. But Ficinus has “ut res
in melius deducantur,” as if he had found in his MS. Trpèg rô (3£Artov
&v čA60. trāv, not trpèg Tô BéArtarov šA6out' div. One M.S. subsequently
collated reads {3}\rtov.
EPISTLE W. 495
on to what is best.” It appears perhaps to you ridiculous for
me to mention these things, because you are yourself not ig-
norant of them. But I see that in the theatres the combat-
ants are incited by children, to say nothing of their friends,
whom one might suppose would through a kind feeling cheer
them on with earnestness. Now then do you enter the con-
test, and send me word by a letter if you require at all my
assistance. Affairs are here very nearly as when you were
present. Inform me too what has been done, or what
you are now doing; for though we hear many things, we
know nothing. And now letters from Theodotus and He-
raclides have come to Lacedaemon and Ægina. But we, as
has been stated, although we hear many things about those
here," know nothing. Bear in mind that you seem to some to
be less attentive than is fitting. Let it therefore not escape
you, that by pleasing men it is possible to do (something);
but that austerity has its dwelling in a desert. May good
fortune be thine.
EPISTLE V.
DION” TO PERDICCAs—PROSPERITY.
I HAVE advised Euphraeus, as you enjoined in your letter,
to occupy himself about all” that is a care to you. And I am
justified in giving you advice, suited to a host, and what is
"—" The words trepi rāv ráðs, which are at variance with the train of
ideas, are omitted in five MSS. Ficinus has what is at least intelligible
—“audientes multa de rebus vestris nihil aperte percipimus.” Perhaps
the author of this letter wrote trapá ràv ráðs—i. e. from persons here.
* Taylor has here tacitly followed the earlier editions, where this letter
is ascribed to Dion; and in the Classical Journal, No. 60, p. 305, he says
that, from the mention of Plato in it, the writer must have been some other
person. It is however quoted as Plato's by Cicero in Epistol, ad Divers.
i. 9; but that, says Stephens, might have happened, not because Cicero
conceived Plato to be the writer, but because it alluded to something said
in his person.
* Instead of raira, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if
the Greek were travta.
496 EPISTLE. Y.,
called holy," respecting the other things “ of which you may
speak,” and how you ought for the present to make use of
Euphraeus. For the man is useful in many ways, but mostly
so in that, where you are through your time of life deficient,
and through there not being many counsellors of the young
on that point. Now there is a voice from each form of polity,
as it were from certain animals; one from a democracy, an-
other from an oligarchy, and another again from a monarchy.
Very many persons assert that they understand these voices.
But, except a few, they are very far from understanding them.
Whichever then of these polities speaks with its own voice,
both to gods and men, and produces actions, correspondent to
its voice, it flourishes ever, and is preserved ; but when it
imitates another voice, it is destroyed. For this point then
Euphraeus will be useful to you in no small degree, although
he is possessed of fortitude in other things likewise; for I hope
that he will discover the reasons for a monarchy not less than
those who are in your employment. If then you make use of
him for this purpose, you will be benefited yourself, and greatly
benefit him.
But if any one on hearing this, should say, Plato, as it seems,
professed indeed to know what is conducive to a democracy;
but though he might have spoken amongst the people, and
given them the best advice, yet he never got up and addressed
them. To this it may be said, that Plato was born late in his
paternal land, and that he came amongst a people, already grown
rather old,” and accustomed by those prior to him do many
things contrary to his advice; for he would have consulted
most willingly for its good, as for that of his own father, had
he not thought he should vainly expose himself to danger.
And I think he would do the same thing (with respect to)"
* On the expression ispá čvpſ3ovXm, see at Theag. p. 122, A. § 2. From
the union of Ševikſ) v kai ispáv, it would seem as if the advice were
called “holy ’’ from its being given and received by persons connected
by the sacred bonds of hospitality.
*—” The words Öv čv ºppé%gg are rightly omitted by Ficinus; unless
it be said that the author wrote div disi éppačg.
* If Cicero's quotation is to be depended on—“quum offendisset (Plato)
populum Atheniensem prope jam desipientem senectute,” it would lead
to Öttö yńpwg kpovuktórepov in lieu of trpsoſłątepov.
* Ficinus alone found in his M.S., as remarked by Stephens, the prepo-
º Tspired uisite for the syntax; as shown by his version, “circa meum
ÇOilSli lll: i) . -
EPISTHLE VI. 497
my advice; for if we should appear to be incurable, he will
bid a long farewell to us, and will abstain from advising either
me or mine. May good fortune be thine.
EPISTLE VI.
PLATO TO HERMIAs, ERASTUS, AND CORISCUS.—PROSPERITY.
IT appears to me, that some god has kindly and abundantly
procured for you good fortune, if you will only receive it pro-
perly. For you live neighbours to each other, and have
need to benefit each other in the greatest degree. To Her-
mias, (I say) that neither a multitude of horses, nor of any
other alliance for war, nor of gold present to him, would be
of greater power for every emergency, than of friends, who
are firm and possess a sound moral conduct. But to Erastus
and Coriscus I say, although I am an old man, that besides
the beautiful wisdom, relating to species, there is a need of
that wisdom, which possesses a guardian and defensive
power against the base and unjust; for they are inexperienced
through their having passed much of their life with us, who
are men of moderation and without guile. On this account
I have said, that they stand in need of those two ºthings, in
order that they may not be compelled to neglect tiſſue wisdom,
and pay more attention than is proper to human and necessary”
wisdom. But Hermias appears to me to have received this
power 4 from nature, which is not yet cognate,” and from art
through experience. What then do I say? To you, Her-
mias, do I, having made a greater trial of Erastus and Coris-
* In lieu of troXépukňg ovppaxiac, Ficinus seems to have found in his
MS. TroXspukňg trapaoksvijg—for his version is “belli apparatus—”
* I have adopted Taylor’s “those two;”—the Greek was probably
rotrow ºrpoolºsiv 6voiv, not simply rotrow ºrpooësiv-
3 Coray in a note on Levesque's Thucydides iv. 117, would read ºn
dvaykaiaç—
*—" Such is Taylor's translation of påget, Śga uſitro £vyyeyovátt, as if
a masculine participle could agree with a noun feminine. Ficinus, un-
able, as I am, to understand the parenthetical clause, has omitted it by
translating “natura usque et atteºtting likewise 6t' #1trepiac.
R
498 EPISTLE VI.
cus than you have, assert, indicate, and testify, that you will
not easily find habits more worthy of confidence than those of
your neighbours. I advise you, therefore, to hold to yourself
by every honest means men of such kind, nor to consider it an
act of secondary moment. And on the other hand I ad-
vise Erastus and Coriscus to stick close to Hermias, and to
endeavour, by such grapplings' with each other to arrive at
one common bond of friendship. But if any one of you
shall determine to dissolve this (union), for human affairs
are not altogether stable, send hither to me and my friends
* an accusing letter of blame.” For I think that the reasons
sent by those here, (and based) on justice and a feeling of
respect, will, unless the rupture happens to have been very
great, weld" and bind you together better, than any incanta-
tion,” into your pre-existing friendship and communion; by
which,” if all, both we and you, philosophize as far as we are
able, and it is permitted to each, what has now been oracularly
delivered will be ratified. But I will not say the same,"
should we not act in this manner; for I divine a good omen,
and I say, that if a god is willing, you 7 will do all good deeds.
It is requisite for you to read this letter all three together;
but if not, two in common, “as often as you can, (and) as it is
* I have adopted this word, remembering the expression in Shak-
speare,
“Grapple him to thine heart with hooks of steel.” -
*—* Ficinus has “accusatoriam delinquentis epistolam,” translated
literally by Taylor, “an epistle containing an accusation of the delinquent.”
Did Ficinus find in his MS. roi; pepp6évroç karīyopov #7rtoro)\ºv, in lieu
of uoppijg karīyopov šartoroXijv 2
* I have translated as if the Greek were orvpupvaijaaw, not orvpupija'at,
remembering the expression in Sympos. p. 192, D., avvrijčat kai orvpºpw-
wijoat. The Latin word answering to ovpaqvaav, and used similarly in a
metaphorical sense, is “conflare.” Ficinus omits ovuſpija'at, it being pro-
bably unintelligible to him.
* Compare Hippol. Eurip. 478, Eioriv 6' tripóai kai Aóyot 08Xkräptot—
* Instead of jiv, which is without regimen, two MSS. read #–From
the two I have elicited 3–
* In lieu of Tó, one MS. had rotiro, which evidently leads to raré —
Ficinus has “nihil equidem praefabor,” translated by Taylor, “I will not
relate the consequences.” -
* Ficinus found in his MS. ipſic, confirmed by another subsequently
collated, instead of juág.
*—". The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. They are
not only unnecessary, but present an insufferable tautology.
EPISTI, E VII. 499.
issible,” and to make use of a compact, and a decisive law,
which is indeed a just thing, and at the same time [taking an
oath]" with attention, not devoid of taste,” and amusement,3 the
sister* of attention, and swearing by the god, who is the ruler
of all things present and future, and by the father (and) lord of
the ruler and cause, whom, if we philosophize truly, we shall all
clearly know, as far as is possible for men under a good genius."
EPISTLE VII.
PLATO TO THE KINDRED AND FRIENDS OF DION.—PROSPERITY,
YE have written to me, that I ought to think your senti-
ments" are the same as those which Dion held ; and, more-
over, you exhort me to make a common cause, as far as I can,
in word and deed. If ye have the same opinion and desires
with him I agree to unite with you ; but if not, to take fre-
quent counsel with myself. Now what his sentiments and
desires were, I can tell pretty nearly, not by conjecture, but
by having known them clearly.
For when I came originally to Syracuse, being then nearly
forty years old, Dion was of the age that Hipparinus is now; and
the opinion he then held, he has still continued to hold, namely,
that the Syracusans ought to be free and live according to
the best laws. So that it is by no means wonderful, if some
god has caused the latter to agree in the same opinion with
the former on the subject of a polity. But what was the me-
thod of producing this, is a thing not unworthy for the young
* I cannot understand étropºvěvrag here. It seems to have come from
the end of the sentence, where one MS. omits it.
* This is the only version I can give here of puj duotorq).
* To this passage Wyttenbach, in Epist. Critic., p. 14, says Lucian al-
luded in Amor., p. 455, a Trovãriv–Kai Trauðuáv stipuovorov.
* On the metaphorical use of dēs), póg see Ruhnken on Tim. p. 2, and
Blomfield on AEsch. S. Th. 343.
* Such I presume is the meaning here of sióaupiðvøv. -
* Ficinus has “eandem mentem in republica esse v2bis conservandam,”
as if he bad found something in his MS., wanting at present in all the
rest.
2 k 2
500 EPISTLE V11.
and not young to hear; and I will endeavour to relate it to
you from the beginning; for the present events offer the
opportunity.
When I was a young man, I was affected as the many
are. I thought, if I became quickly my own master, to be-
take myself immediately to the public affairs of the state.
Now some such circumstances as these fell out relating to
state affairs. Of the polity existing at that time, when it was
abused by many, a change took place; and over the change
one and fifty men presided as governors, eleven in the city,
and ten in the Piraeus; and each of these had a jurisdiction
about the Agora,' and whatever else it was necessary to regu-
late in the cities,” while thirty of them were invested with
supreme authority. Some of these happened to be my rela-
tives and acquaintances; and they forthwith invited me (to
attend) to state-affairs, as being a suitable pursuit. And
how I was affected is, on account of my youth, not at all won-
derful. For I thought that they would, by leading the city
from an unjust mode of living to a just one, * administer it in
the way it was meet;” so that I diligently gave my mind to what
they did. But when I saw these men proving in a short time
that the previous form of government had been (as it were)
gold,” "and that they committed other acts (unjustly),” and
sent my friend Socrates, advanced in years, whom I am not
ashamed to say was nearly the most righteous man of those then
living, together with certain others," against one of the citizens,
* This probably alludes to the office called 'Ayopavópoc, or “controller.
of the market,” of which there were five for the Piraeus, as stated by Har-
pocration on the authority of Aristotle.
* By the cities are meant the towns in Attica, that, like cities and bo-
roughs in England, had previously their own municipal officers.
*—” The Greek is 6voikhorstv Óñ–But Ficinus has “debere convertere,”
as if he had found in his MS. Öuoukhorstv Šsiv. From the two I have
elicited j čáov—
* In lieu of Xpwo fiv, Hemsterhuis on Lucian Necyomant. § 4, would
read Xpwoºv: and so two MSS. subsequently collated ; for that is the
perpetual word in this expression. Boissonade however on Eunapius, p.
483, and Stalbaum here, are content with Xpwojv.
*—* I have followed the version of Ficinus—“et alia multa injuste
fecerunt.” The Greek is simply ré ré àAXa—
* By these “certain others” are meant the “tipstaffs,” or “policemen,”
as they would be called in England; but whose name at Athens was
rošórat, from the bow and arrows they carried, or Xkö0at, from their na-
tive country.
EPISTLE VII. 5O1
and to bring him by force, in order that he might be executed,
so that he (Socrates) might have a share in their deeds, whether
he wished it or not, and that he did not comply, but ran the risk
of suffering every thing, rather than take any part in their
impious acts—all this when I saw, and other similar acts of
no trifling kind, I felt indignant, and withdrew myself from
the evil men of that period. -
Not long after this, the power of the thirty fell by a revolution,
together with the whole of the then existing form of government.
Again, therefore, but somewhat more slowly, did a desire still
drag me on to engage in public and political affairs. Now in
these, as being in a troubled state, many things took place, at
which any one might be indignant; nor was it wonderful, that
in revolutions the punishment of hostile factions should have
been rather severe in the case of some ; although they who
returned acted with considerable clemency." But by some
chance some of those in power brought before a court of justice
our friend Socrates, laying upon him an accusation the most un-
holy, and belonging the least of all to Socrates. For some
brought him to trial, and others gave their vote against him,
and destroyed the man, who had been unwilling to share in
the unholy act of a removal relating to one of his then exiled”
friends, 3 when the exiles themselves were unfortunate.” On
reflecting then upon these matters, and on the persons who
managed political affairs, and on the laws and customs, the
more I considered them, and I advanced in years, by So much
the more difficult did it appear to me to administer correctly
state affairs. For it is not possible to do so without friends
and faithful associates; whom, existing at that time, it was
not easy to find—for our city was then no longer administered
according to the manners and institutions of our fathers—and
it was impossible to acquire new with any facility; while the
written laws and customs were corrupted, “and (unholiness)
was increasing to a degree how wonderful!“
* According to C. Nepos in Thrasybulus, $ 2, only the thirty tyrants
themselves suffered.
* So Ficinus renders pswyðvrov. But perhaps the word means here,
“put on their trial.” For psûyov is thus opposed to Öttöktov, “the pur-
suer,” in Scottish law-phrase.
3–3 The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. For he
could not very well understand them ; nor can I.
*—” The words kai étréðiðov (lavuaa Tóv 60 ov are omitted by Ficinus,
502 EPISTLE VII.
So that I, who had been at first full of ardour towards
engaging in affairs of state, did, upon looking at these things
and seeing them carried along in every way and on every
side, become giddy; but not so as to withdraw from consider-
ing how at any time something' better might take place re-
specting these very matters, and likewise the whole form of
government, but to be wisely” waiting continually for oppor-
tunities of acting. “At last I perceived” that all states exist-
ing at present were badly governed. For what relates to
their laws is nearly in an incurable state, without some won-
derful arrangement in conjunction with fortune. I was there-
fore compelled to say, in praise of true philosophy, that
through it we are enabled to perceive all that is just as regards
the state and individuals; and * hence that the human race
will never cease from ills, until the race of those, who philoso-
phize correctly and truthfully, shall come to political power,
or persons of power in states shall, by a certain divine allot-.
ment, philosophize really.”
Holding these sentiments Iarrived in Italy and Sicily,” when
I first came there.” But on my arrival, the life, which is there
called happy, pleased me at no time or manner; (a life) full of
the tables prepared by Italiotes and Syracusans; and where
one is filled twice a day; and never lies alone by night, and
(has) such other pursuits as follow a life of this kind. For
from these habits, no man under heaven, having such pursuits
from his youth, would ever become prudent, "not even if he were
because, I suspect, he could not understand them; nor could I have done
so, had I not seen that Tö Avôotov was to be restored probably after
6avpiaotov Šoov. With this use of Šoov after an adjective compare oilpa-
viov čoov in Aristoph. Barp. 78. •
* The Greek is dipºsuvov &v yiyvouro. But Ficinus has “melius quid
eveniret.” He therefore found in his MS. āpswov čv rv yiyvouro.
* I have adopted sº, found in one MS., in lieu of a 5–
*—” Ficinus has “tandem vero compertum est mihi,” as if he had
found in his MS. rexévröv Čš Švömoa instead of rºsvrövta Öğ voijo at—
*—” On this celebrated doctrine of Plato, which is repeated in different
words ºn Rep. v. p. 473, D., § 18, it will be sufficient to refer to Ruhnken
on Rut, ius Lupus, p. 21.
*—" The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.
"—" The Greek is oix o'ra, 6avpagră pâost spaghosrau, where I can-
not understand oby otºrw, nor could, I suspect, Ficinus; whose version is
“quamvis natura mirabili sit,” which has led me to obô’ si bºró rek 6 tº
9aupuaarg pàost kpa Bào's Tat
EPISTLE VII. 503
mixed up with a wondrous nature by some god;" "but to be-
come temperate it will never be his care.' And the same
thing may be said respecting the remaining portion of virtue.
Nor will any state rest quietly according to any laws what-
ever, while men conceive that it is proper to waste every
thing on excesses, and deem that they ought to be idle in
every thing except good living and drinking, and the laboured
exertions made for sexual intercourse. But it is necessary
for such states never to cease changing their tyrannies, oli-
garchies, and democracies, and for the powerful in them not
to endure even the name of a polity just and with equal
laws. -
With these and the above-mentioned sentiments I passed
over to Syracuse; perhaps through an accident of fortune;
at least it seems that by the planning of some superior being
a beginning was laid of the doings, that have lately taken place
relating to Dion and of those too relating to Syracuse, and,
there is a fear, to still more persons, if you do not yield to me,
when giving advice a second time. How then do I assert that
my journey to Sicily was the beginning of all the then doings?
For while associating with Dion, then a young man, and
pointing out to him by words that, what seemed good to me
would be the best for mankind, and counselling him so to act,
I was nearly ignorant that I was unconsciously planning in
some manner the dissolution of a tyranny. For Dion being
very docile, both with respect to other things, and the reasons
urged by me, he heard so quickly and attentively, as not one
ever did of the young men whom I had fallen in with ; and he
was desirous of passing the remainder of his life in a manner
superior to the majority of the Italiotes and Siceliotes,” by
loving virtue * rather than pleasure” and the rest of luxuries;
"—" Here again Ficinus has led the way to the truth by his version,
“temperatus esse certe nunquam curabit.” For the Greek is at present
oróppov 68 obó' àv pusXXàgaw Tror; yewsq6al. But it was originally, I sus.
pect, crºppovi čá obóēv pusXàget Tror: Ysvågøat ; where pusXhost is supported
by pusXàgal in two MSS.
* By the “Siceliotes” were meant foreigners settled in Sicily; the
name of the natives was “Sicilians,” in Greek XukeXot.
*—" Such is Taylor's version of rept Trºstovoc in Greek, and of “po-
tius quam ” in Ficinus. But until a parallel passage is produced of trºpi
tr}\etovog thus used in the sense of TAéov or puči)\\ov, I shall continue to
believe that Plato wrote àperºv rept row \ſovog—“a virtue relating to
something better than pleasure—”
504 EPISTLE VII,
and hence he lived rather odious to those, who passed their
lives according to tyrannical institutions, until the death of
Dionysius occurred. Subsequently, however, he perceived
that the Sentiments, which he held under the influence of
correct reasoning, did not exist in him alone, but in some
others; not numerous indeed, but amongst some, one of whom
he thought would be probably Dionysius (the younger),' if the
gods assisted ; and should this take place, that both his own life,
and that of the other Syracusans, would turn out to be beyond
all measure happy. He thought, moreover, that I ought by all
means to come as quickly as possible to Syracuse, to take part
in these doings; for he remembered how our mutual intercourse
had easily worked him up to the desire of a life the most
beautiful and best ; which if he could but accomplish, as he
was attempting to do, in the case of Dionysius, he had great
hopes that he could, without slaughter and death, and the evils
which have now taken place, make, in the whole of the country,
life to be happy and rational.
With these correct sentiments Dion persuaded Dionysius to
send for me; and he himself requested me by all means to
come as quickly as possible, before certain other persons,
associating with Dionysius, should turn him aside to a life
different from the best. *But it is necessary to relate what
he requested, although” it is a rather long story. What oppor-
tunity, said he, shall we wait for, greater than that through a
certain divine fortune? and giving a statement of their com-
mand over Italy and Sicily, and of his own power in it, and
of the youth of Dionysius, and of the desire he felt so vehe-
mently for philosophy and instruction, and saying how his
cousins and kindred were to be easily exhorted to the reason-
ing and mode of life ever laid down by myself, and that they
were most competent to exhort Dionysius, so that now, if
* Taylor has introduced this word from “juniorem ’’ in Ficinus, al-
though wanting in the Greek; while he has omitted “if the gods assisted,”
duly found in the “ Diis bene juvantibus ” of Ficinus.
*—” The Greek is \{yov čá ràós éðeiro, si, where Stephens suggested
ësiro, ä kai, and translated, “His dictis addebat preces, quas longum
esset commemorare;” to which he was led by finding in Ficinus “co-
hortationem insuper precibus longam adjunxit.” I have translated as if
the Greek were Aéystv Šà Tââs, & #68 iro, öei, si, to which Taylor led me
by translating, “It is necessary to relate—”
EPISTLE VII. 505
ever, all the hope would be fulfilled of the same persons be-
coming philosophers and rulers of mighty states. Such then
and many others of a like kind were his exhortations. But
a fear still possessed my mind, as to how, perchance, the con-
duct of the young men would turn out; for the passions of
such persons are hasty, and are often borne along in a di-
rection contrary to themselves. I knew, however, that Dion
was naturally of a steady disposition and of a moderate age.
Hence, while I was considering and doubting 'whether I ought
to go, or how,' the balance inclined” that I ought (to go). For
if perchance any one should attempt to give effect to my ideas
upon laws and a form of government, I ought to attempt it now.
For by persuading only one person, I should work out every
good. With these ideas and confidence, and not from what some
imagined, I set sail from home; feeling for myself the greatest
shame, lest I should seem to myself to be altogether mere talk,”
and never willing to lay hold of any thing to be done; and run
the risk of betraying first the hospitality and friendship of
Dion, exposed in reality to no small dangers; and should he
suffer aught,” or, being driven out by Dionysius and his other
enemies, fly to us, and, making an inquiry,” say—“I am come
to you, Plato, an exile; but I am neither in want of cavalry nor
of heavy-armed soldiers to ward off my enemies, but of words
and persuasion ; by which I know you are especially able to
turn young persons to what is good and just, and to place
them on each occasion on terms of friendship and fellowship
with each other ; through the want of which on your part I
have now left Syracuse, and am present here. What relates
to myself indeed will bring upon you less disgrace; but the
philosophy, which you are always praising, and which you
"—" Ficinus has “utrum eundum parendumque foret, necne,” answer-
ing to Tórspow sim Tropévršov kai intrakovaršov joi in Ald., which, as re-
gards ſì ot, is preferable here to fi trčg. For the question is not about
the manner of going, but of going or not. -
* The verb éppells is here used impersonally.
* Compare Eurip. Herc. F. l 11, where old men are called ÉTrea piévov,
“words merely.”
* In ei trč0ot ru is the usual euphemism for “should he perish.”
* I cannot understand &vápotro, nor could Ficinus, why has omitted
it; unless it refers to the question feigned to be put subsequently by
Dionysius -
506 EPISTI, E VII.
say is held' in dishonour by the rest” of mankind, how is it
not now betrayed by you together with myself, as far as de-
pends upon you? If, indeed, we had been inhabitants of
Megara, you would surely have come to me as an assistant for
what I had called you, or I should have considered you the
meanest of men. But now, excusing yourself by the length
of the journey, *and the danger of the voyage, and the great-
ness of the trouble,” think you that you shall avoid perchance
the charge of cowardice P It will be far from this.”
To language like this, what would have been a becoming
answer P “There is none. But 4 I came with reason and
justice, as much as it is possible for a man, having left my
own pursuits, which were not unbecoming, under a tyranny,
which was neither suited to my discourses nor myself. But
by my coming I liberated myself (from any charge), and ex-
hibited myself to be unreproved by Zeus, who presides over
hospitality and the allotment of philosophy, which would have
been exposed to reproach, had I acted an effeminate part, and
through cowardice shared in disgrace and shame. On my
arrival then—for there is no need to be prolix—I found all the
affairs of Dionysius full of sedition and calumnies on the part
of a tyranny respecting Dion. I defended Dion, therefore, to
the utmost of my power; but I was able to do but little. But
nearly in the fourth month after my arrrival, Dionysius ac-
cused Dion of plotting against his power, and putting him on
board a small vessel, sent him out with dishonour. Where-
upon all of us, who were the friends of Dion, were fearful lest
he should accuse and punish some one of us as an accomplice
in the plot of Dion. And a report went abroad at Syracuse,
that I had been put to death by Dionysius, as being forsooth
* In lieu of pépé00at, Plato wrote either pºstpea 6at, “wanders,” or
orpépsoëat, “tost about.”
* The phrase in Plato is perpetually rāv ćXXov. Hence for Notzrwy
I should prefer d\óywv, “irrational—”
*—” The Greek is kai rô pièys60g 67) roi; tr}\oi kai roi tróvov. But
Ficinus has “periculumque navigationis atque labores,” as if he had
found in his MS. kai rāv kivāvvov roi tr}\ot kai roëg tróvovg. The three
genitives however require each its own distinctive noun. Compare kivāv-
wou kai tróvot in Alcib. II. p. 142, B.
*—" The Greek is of k #gruv' d\A' |\0ov. Plato wrote oix #orriv ćMAn
* Abov, i. e. There is no other than that I came—
EPISTLE VII. 507
the cause of all that happened at that time. But on perceiving
that we were all thus * disposed, and dreading lest something
of greater consequence should arise from our fear, he received
all of us most kindly into his favour, consoled me, and exhorted
me to be of good cheer, and requested me by all means to
stay; for there would be an advantage to him from my not
flying away, but from my remaining; and on this account he
pretended to make an urgent request. We know however
that the requests of tyrants are mingled with necessity. By
a contrivance, therefore, he prevented my sailing-away. For
taking me to the Acropolis, he made me reside there; from
whence no ship-master could carry me off, not through Dio-
nysius forbidding it merely, but unless Dionysius himself sent
a person with an order, commanding him to lead me out. Nor
was there any foreign trader, nor even one of those having
jurisdiction over the departures” from the country, who would
have overlooked my going away alone; but he would im-
mediately have laid hold of me and brought me back again to
Dionysius; especially since it had been already bruited abroad
contrary to what had been done before, that Dionysius was
again holding Plato to his arms in a wonderful manner. And
indeed this was the case, for it is necessary to speak the truth.
He did indeed hold me to his arms, ever as time went on, more
(and more) in respect to the intercourse” of my manner and
habits. But he wished me to praise him more than Dion, and
to hold him as a friend in a far greater degree than the other;
and for such an end he made wonderful efforts. But the way
by which this might have taken place in the best manner, if
it took place at all, “he omitted; for he shrunk” to become
familiar and to associate with me, by "hearing and learning”
* By “thus ” is meant “in a state of alarm.”
* From this it would appear that there was at Syracuse an office, where
Passports were given to those leaving the country with the permission of
the government, who had the power of issuing, what in England would
be called a writ “ne exeat regno.” -
* Ficinus has here what is more intelligible, “et gaudebat moribus
nostris et consuetudine.” Perhaps Plato wrote karū triv-Gºveouv, “ac-
cording to his knowledge—”
*—“The Greek is in some MSS. dºcyst dog 67), in others ðkvst towg 67).
But as Ficinus has “neglexit; haec enim fuerat—” he probably found in
his MS., what the sense requires, stage àkvet ydp—
*—" Ficinus has avoided the iſotºpov Trpárepov in pav6&vajw kai
508 . EPISTI, F, WIY.
liscourses on philosophy, through the fear lest, (according)" to
the language of calumniators, he should be shackled, and Dion
administer all affairs. However I endured every thing,
keeping to the original sentiments, with which I arrived, if
by any means he should come to the desire of a philosophic
life. But he, by his pulling in a contrary direction, obtained
the victory. In this way then happened to turn out the first
period of my sojourning and pursuits in Sicily. After this
I went away and came back again, through Dionysius having
sent for me with all earnestness. But on what account (I
came),” and what I did, as being reasonable and just, I will,
having first advised you what you ought to do, after what has
just now taken place, subsequently relate in detail, for the
sake of those who are inquiring with what view I came a se-
cond time to Sicily; and that deeds of no moment may not
happen to be mentioned as deeds of moment.
*I say then something what I ought to say.” For the party,
who gives advice to a sick man and to one whouses a diet impro-
per for good health,” it is especially necessary in the first place
to change the mode of living, and to recommend to the patient,
willing to comply, the other things that are proper;” but if
he is unwilling, I consider that he, who retires from advising
such a person, acts like a man and a physician ; but that he,
who stays, like a person unmanly and devoid of art. The same
is the case of a state, whether its master be one or many. If,
while the government is proceeding in a right road according to
the constitution, it takes counsel about what is conducive to its
interest, it is the part of a man with mind to give to such parties
dikoúwy by translating “in audiendis addiscendisque,” whom I have with
Taylor followed.
* The Greek is poſłośuevog Točg—Aóyovg uſ trn— But Ficinus has
“timens me, quemadmodum asserebant calumniatores”—He therefore
found, I suspect, in his M.S. poſłośpisvog, kard rotic—Aóyovg, piñ Trn—
* Ficinus has alone what the sense requires, “quam vero ob causam
rursus accesserim,” as if his MS. read Övöä vska &vij\0ov.
*—” The Greek is Aéyd, Örj Tę08' 3-yd). But as there is no verb to which
êyd can be referred, I have translated as if the Greek were Ašyw 87) ru,
6 6&7 Aśystv. The verb supplied by Ficinus is “reor.”
* In lieu of d\\o ru, which Ficinus has omitted as unintelligible, and
Stephens attempted to correct by reading, what Stalbaum approves of,
&A\a re kai Öru, Plato wrote, I suspect, pláXtora, as I have translated.
* The sense manifestly requires à, or j, Öst in lieu of jön.
EPISTLE VII. 509
advice; but in the case of those, who are proceeding entirely
out of a straightforward polity, and not at all willing to walk
in its steps, and who proclaim to the adviser to leave alone the
form of government, and not to disturb it—since, if he does
disturb it, he shall suffer death—and at the same time exhort
him to minister to their wishes and passions, and to advise in
what way these may for all time to come be gratified,' I should
consider the person, who endures to give such advice, unmanly;
but him, who does not endure, a man.
Holding then such sentiments, whenever any one consults
with myself about any thing of the greatest moment relating
to his life, such as the acquisition of wealth, or the care” of his
body or soul, I readily advise with him, if he appears to me
to live day by day in an orderly manner, or is willing to be per-
suaded by me when giving advice, nor do I desist, as if I have
gone through merely a formal rite.” But if either he does
not consult me at all, or is evidently not about to follow my
advice, I do not go self-called to such a person to counsel him,
nor would I do so by compulsion, even if he were my son.
But I would give advice to a slave, and force him, even
unwilling, (to follow it.) I should however think it not holy
to force my father or mother, unless they were, through dis-
ease, afflicted with silliness. But if persons are living an estab-
lished mode of life, pleasing to themselves, but not to me, I
should not, when admonishing them in vain, dislike them, nor
yet by flattering, minister to them, and afford them the means
of gratifying their desires, which if I were to embrace, I should
not wish to live. With the same sentiments respecting a state
a prudent man ought to live, and speak out, if it appears to him
not to have a good form of government, (and) if he is about not
to speak in vain, nor to lose his life by speaking; but never to
apply violence “to his country on account of “a change in the
form of government, unless it cannot become the best without
* In lieu of ytyvouvro the train of thought leads to Yavûouvro–
* Ficinus has “corporis vel animi purgationem,” as if he had found in
his MS. ka94pgswg, instead of ÉtripáAstav, which would lead to fi trºpi
oùuarog #TripušAsiaç i livXīg ka0áposaic.
* Ficinus, whom Taylor follows as usual, has “non prius desino, quam
initium proviribus usque ad finem perduxerim.” On the use and mean-
ing of dipogloio 6at, see Ast on Legg. vi. p. 752, D. . . -
4–4 The Greek is trarpiðt. But one MS. has trarpi čić, which evi.
dently leads to trarpiðt Öuá–
510 EPISTLE VII.
the banishment and slaughter of persons; but leading a quiet
life, to pray for the good both of himself and of the state.
In this very manner I would advise you (to act); and so
did I together with Dion advise Dionysius to live day by
day, so that in the first place" he might be about to become
the master of himself, and acquire faithful friends and associ-
ates, in order that he might not suffer what his father did;
who, after he had got possession of many and great cities in
Sicily, which had been laid waste by the Barbarians, was not
able to establish and preserve in each of them forms of govern-
ment, faithful under his associates, or strangers * coming from
any part whatever,” or brothers, whom he himself had brought
up as being younger, and had made them rulers, after being
merely private persons, and remarkably rich, after being (very)
poor. For among these he could not attach to himself a single
one as the sharer of his dominion, although working upon them
by persuasion, and teaching, and kindnesses, and alliances; and
he was sevenfold worse off than Darius; who, placing a trust
in persons not his brothers,” nor brought up by him, but in
those alone associated with himself in their mastery “over
the eunuch," divided amongst them seven parts of his do-
minions, each larger than the whole of Sicily, and made use
of them as faithful associates, and attacking neither himself,
nor each other; and gave likewise an example of what a
lawgiver and a king ought to be. For he established laws, by
which he has preserved even now the Persian power; and be-
sides this the Athenians, although they had not colonized them-
selves many Grecian cities, which had been overturned by
the Barbarians, but merely got hold of them, when already
inhabited, preserved their empire over them for seventy years,
through having persons friendly to them in each of the towns.
*— The Greek is {jv uévrot rô Ka8 inépav trgårov. But five MSS.
omit rô, and two ºrpärov. Ficinus has “ea videlicet ratione quotidie
vivere,” as if he had found in his MS. §v ka0' juápav rotºrov rov
rpótrov.
º Instead of āXAøv Óñ Troéev, correct Greek requires àAA00s, 8%
ºr Otjč??.
* I have adopted the idea of Stephens, who unites oilk with dôEX poig,
not, as others do, with trio retorag.
*—" The Greek is rig roi, Mm60v rs kai sãvoúxov. But Máčov re kai,
or Mićov rs kai, as Ficinus found in his MS., is evidently an incorrect
explanation of roi sùvoúxov, whose name vas Smerdis, as we learn from
Herodotus iii. 61.
RTISTLE VII. 511
But Dionysius having through his wisdom brought together the
whole of Sicily into one state, yet, through confiding in no one,
was with difficulty saved. For he was poor in persons friend-
ly and faithful; than which there is no greater sign as re-
gards virtue and vice, than in being destitute or not of men of
that kind. I therefore and Dion advised Dionysius, since
what he had received from his father had come to him un-
acquainted with instruction, and unacquainted too with befit-
ting associates, in the first place to proceed in that direction,
to procure for himself friends, different from his relations, but
both his equals in age and in accordance with him respect-
ing virtue. But we particularly advised him to be in accord
with himself; for that he was wonderfully deficient in this
we asserted, not indeed in such clear terms—for this was not
safe—but in hints and contending in our discourses, that in
this way every man will preserve both himself and those
over whom he is the ruler; but that by not turning himself
in this direction he will bring to pass every thing the very
reverse. But if, after going on, as we said, and rendering him-
self prudent and temperate, he peopled the cities of Sicily, that
had been made desolate, and bound them together with laws and
forms of government, so as to be of one family with himself
and an assistance to each other against the Barbarians," he
would not only double his ancestral dominion, but make it in
reality much larger. For if this were done, it would be much
more easy to enslave the Carthaginians, than was the slavery
effected by them during the reign of Gelon; *but not as now
on the contrary,” his father fixed the tribute he was to carry
to the Barbarians.
This is what was said and the advice given to Dionysius by
us, who were plotting against him, as the reports were cir-
culated on many sides. Such, that after prevailing with Dio-
nysius, they caused him to drive out Dion, and threw myself
into a state of terror. But, that I may bring to a close not a few
events “which occurred in a short time,” Dion, departing from
* I have translated, as if the Greek were rà, not rāg, for 3om6etaç
must belong to the cities in Sicily.
*—” The words &AA’ oix & a trºp viv robvavríov I cannot understand.
Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, “contra quam accidit patri —”
*—” Such is the translation of Trpáypara rà év 6\typ Xpóvg. But Fi-
cinus has “non pauca in paucis—” as if his M.S. cmitted rà èv–Taylor
translates the whole phrase “in short—”
512 EPISTI, E VII.
Peloponnesus and Athens, admonished Dionysius indeed."
Since then (Dion)” had liberated and twice restored the town
to the citizens, the Syracusans were affected in the same
manner towards him, as Dionysius had been, when he endea-
voured by educating and bringing him up to make him thus a
worthy partner of his power through the whole of life.
But "(he gave his ear)” to those that were calumniating Dion,
and saying that he was doing all that he did at that time, while
plotting against the absolute power of Dionysius, in order that
the one, being lulled in his mind by his attention to instruc-
tion, might neglect his kingdom, and commit it to Dion, and
the other make it his own by fraud, and cast out Dionysius
from his dominions.
These reports being then bruited a second time among the
Syracusans prevailed by a victory very absurd and disgrace-
ful to those who were the causes of it. For how it happened
it is proper for those to hear, who are calling upon me on the
subject of the present affairs.
Being an Athenian, and the associate of Dion, and one who
had battled with him against the tyrant, I arrived, that I might
produce a peace instead of a war; but while battling against the
calumniators I was overcome. But Dionysius, attempting to
bribe me by “honours and riches,“to become on his side a wit-
ness and a friend, touching the propriety of his casting out
Dion,” failed in all of these things happening to him. And
Dion afterwards, on returning home from exile, brought with
him two Athenian brothers, who had become his friends, not
through philosophy, but through that acquaintance, which runs
through "the generality of friends," and which they formed
"—" Here is evidently something wanting to preserve the connexion of
ideas in the narrative.
* The Greek is 'ETretër, 6' oiv—But two MSS. #7tei oijv — Ficinus
has “Cum ergo Dion—” He therefore found in his MS. śirst 6, Attov,
and subsequently &oroic for airoic, as shown by his version, “civibus.”
*—” To complete the sepse and syntax Cornarius proposed to insert
ërriorsvs after § 68–Perhaps Plato wrote à è #ów ré oig toig–as I have
translated.
4–4 Ficinus has “non verbis solum sed pecuniis etiam et hono-
ribus.” -
* I have translated as if atrº yiyvsgöat followed 6thpaptev, not Atto-
vog, where those words are unintelligible.
*—” Although TAstorwy pi\ww might perhaps stand, yet one would pre-
fer tra agróg pi\ov, as I suggested in Bailey’s Hermesianax, p. 155, ccm
EPISTLE VII. 513
from paying the rites of hospitality, and from being "Mystae
and Epoptae." Moreover these two, by having brought Dion
back, had become his friends, and, from such causes, and the
assisting him in his return from exile, his companions. But
when, on their arrival in Sicily, they understood that Dion had
been exposed by those Siceliotes, who had become free through
him, to the calumny of plotting to become a tyrant, they not only
betrayed their associate and guest, but became, as it were, the
perpetrators of a murder, in that, with weapons in their hands,
they stood by to assist the murderers. However, I neither
pass by this base and unholy deed, nor do I detail it; for to
many others it (has been)” a care to hymn it, and it will be
so at Some future time.
But the charge, which has been alleged respecting the Athe-
nians, how that it was they, who bound this disgrace around the
city, I will take away. For I say that he too was an Athenian,
who did not betray this very person, when it was in his power
to obtain wealth and many other honours. For he did not
become a friend through a shop-mate friendship, but through
the communion of a liberal education; to which alone he, who
is endued with mind, ought to trust, rather than to the alliance
of souls” and bodies; so that those two were not fit to bring
disgrace on the city through having murdered Dion, as being
persons of no account at any time. All this has been said for
the sake of the advice given to the friends and kindred of Dion.
I give you besides the same counsel, and for the third time
address you three in the same words. Do not place Sicily, or
any other city, as a slave under persons with despotic power,
but under laws; such” at least is my dictum. For this is not
the better either for the enslaving or the enslaved, or for their
paring of pur) arXagrăg &\\? §vrwg pixógoſpot in Sophist, p. 216, E.,
and d\mbóg kai oi, Tu TrAao Tüç in Legg. i. p. 642. D.
*—". On the Mysta” and Epoptae see at the Banquet, $34, n. 46.
* Ficinus has “narraverunt atque narrabunt,” as if he had found in
his MS. #7ttpusXèg jv—pusXhost. But who are the parties alluded to as
having hymned these events, is not, I believe, mentioned elsewhere.
* This disparagement of a friendship formed by kindred souls seems
rather strange in the mouth of Plato. There is an error here, which it
would be not difficult to correct by the aid of the proverb in Suidas,
Zei xúrpa, Čij puxia, i.e. “Where boils the pot, There friendship's hot.”
Ficinus has “animorum conjunctioni et corporum consanguinitati.”
." Instead of 8 y’—Stephens suggested dºg y'—similar to “ut—” in Fie
CºllūS. 2
1.
5 : 4 - EPISTLE VII.
children or their children's descendants; but the experiment
is altogether a destructive one. For souls, whose habits are
little and illiberal, love to seize upon gain of this kind, as know-
ing nothing of what is good and just for the future and present
time, nor of things human and divine. Of this I endeavoured
to persuade Dion first, and secondly Dionysius, and now I do
you the third. Be persuaded then by me, for the sake of Zeus
the third saviour." In the next place look to the case of
Dionysius and Dion; the former of whom by not being per-
suaded is now living not honourably; whereas the latter, by
being persuaded, died honourably. For it is a thing altogether
correct and honourable for him, who aspires after things the
most honourable both for himself and his country, to suffer
whatever he may suffer; for not one of us is naturally im-
mortal; nor, if this should happen to any one, would he become
happy, as it seems he would to the multitude. For in things
inanimate there is nothing either good or evil worthy of men-
tion; but good or ill will happen to each soul, either existing
with the body or separated from it. But it is ever requisite to
trust really * to the sacred” accounts of the olden time, which
inform us that the Soul is immortal, and has judges of its con-
duct, and suffers the greatest punishments, when it is liberated
from the body. Hence it is requisite to think it is a lesser evil
to suffer, than to do, the greatest sins and injuries. This, indeed,
the man who is fond of money and poor in soul does not hear;
and should he hear, he laughs it down, as he imagines, and im-
pudently snatches from all sides whatever he thinks he can, like
a wild beast, eat or drink, or can contribute (aught)* to the mis-
called pleasure of sexual intercourse, at once Servile and grace-
less. *(For) being blind, he is not able to see how great an evil,
ever united to each act of wrong, follows the never being satisfied
with the unholy perpetration of such snatchings; ” which it is
* On the expression Zečg oor.jp rptrog, see at Phileb. § 100.
* Ficinus, “revera,” answering to Övrwg found subsequently in all
the MSS.
* Here is probably an allusion to the Orphic hymns, real or pretended,
which were in circulation during the time of Plato.
* The pronoun tu seems to have dropt out before Tropusiv, or else be-
fore trepi, for otherwise tropusiv will want its object. -
*—" In this most intricate passage Ficinus has been of signal service, by
showing that the words airp Tº pur) trip. TXao 6at were in his MS. found
in a different place to where they are commonly read. For his version
EPISTLE VII. 5 i 5
mecessary for him, who has acted unjustly, to drag along with
himself, both while he is moving about upon the earth, and
when he takes' under the earth a journey without honour.
and thoroughly miserable in every way.
By detailing these and other reasons of the like kind, I was
enabled to persuade Dion. And I should have felt most justly
against those, who murdered him, an anger, in a certain man-
ner, almost as great as against Dionysius; for both had injured
myself and all the rest, so to say, in the highest degree. For”
the former had destroyed a man, who was willing to make use
of justice; while the latter (was) unwilling to make use of it
through the whole of his dominions, although possessing the
greatest power. In which (dominions) had philosophy and
power existed really, as it were * in the same (dwelling), they
would have set up amongst all men, both Greeks and Barbari-
ans, an opinion not vainly “shining, (and) in every respect the
true one, that neither a state nor a man can ever be happy,
unless by leading a life with prudence in subjection to jus-
tice, whether possessing those things themselves, or by being
brought up in the habits of holy persons their rulers, or in-
structed in justice.
This injury did Dionysius inflict. But the rest would have
been a trifling wrong, as compared to these. But he, who
murdered Dion, did not know that he had done the same deed
is, “et quasi cascus non cernit se frustra contendere inexplebilem explere
concupiscentiam ; neque rursus cernit, quantum sit impietas malum qui-
busque insit rebus, semper injustitia mixta.” In other respects however
his translation is too loose to be a safe guide. The Greek was perhaps
originally to this effect, TvøNög (ºv ydpoix éxet Öpºv dog kaköv j\trów
disi asr’ &öukňparoc àkáorov čvvérérat abrº rip pum tripiträagóat rāv ćip-
Traypad.rwy &voototypyig : and so I have translated.
* On vóorog and voorsiv, taken in the sense of going, not as usual of
returning, see my note on Philoct. 43. Here, however, the idea of a re-
turn is to be kept in mind. For the dead are said to return to the earth.
See at Menexenus, Š 6, and compare the language of Walter Scott, who
says of the person, who has no love for his father-land, that he
“Living shall forfeit fair renown,
And doubly dying, shall go down
To the vile dust, from whence he sprung,
Unwept, unhonour’d, and unsung.”
* To preserve the syntax jv must be inserted after obôév—
* Ficinus has “vere in idem quasi domicilium ”—he therefore found 3%
his MS. 5urwg dºg Év Tairº oikip, not merely āvrwg #y rairº–
* The Greek is here icavág, *; º requires of keväg–
- L
516 EPISTLE VII.
as Dionysius. For I clearly know, as far as it is possible for
one man to speak confidently of another, that if Dion had
retained his power, he would never have changed it to any
other form of government than to that, by which he first
(caused) Syracuse," his own country, after he had delivered it
from slavery, to look joyous, and had put it into the garb of
freedom; and after this, he would by every contrivance have
adorned the citizens with laws both befitting and the best ; and
he would have been ready to do what followed in due order after
this; and have colonized the whole of Sicily, and have freed it
from the Barbarians, by expelling some and subduing others,
more easily than Hiero did. But if these things had taken place,
through a man just, and brave, and temperate, and who was
a philosopher, the same opinion of virtue would have been
produced amongst the multitude, as would have been amongst
all men, so to say ; and have saved” Dionysius, had he been
persuaded by me. But now some daemon surely, or some
evil spirit, falling upon” with iniquity and impiety, and, what
is the greatest matter, with the audacity of ignorance, in which
all evils are rooted, and from which they spring up, and after-
wards produce fruit the most bitter to those, who have begot-
ten it,” this” has a second time subverted and destroyed every
* By omitting with six MSS. kai before patópúvac, the syntax is in-
leed completed; but there is still some error in the words pièv trpärov,
which it is not difficult perhaps to correct.
* Such is the literal version of dºréawors. But Ficinus—“ quae et salva
re—viguisset,” as if he had found in his MS. Ért okowo ro, where the
pluperfect passive would want, as it often does, its augment; as shown
by Matth, Gr. Gr. 165.
* The Greek is Špitrsadv, which I cannot understand; nor could Taylor,
who translates “replete,” as if he was thinking of Épiträäwg. Ficinus
has “his sese objiciens.” But patriart'suw does not mean “se objicere;”
and if it did, there is nothing to answer to “his.” Perhaps Plato wrote
&\ttàptog ovutréodov &vopuig. On the corruption of ovy into spa, see
Schaefer on Dionysius TIspi Xvy680. p. 147, and in Index under Xóv.
* Instead of roig yew wilgaou, Ficinus has “qui producentur ;” as if he
had either read in his MS., or wished to read, roig rijg yévvng oijat-
* Stephens justly objected to air) : which cannot be applied to the
preceding daipawv or &Authpwog. But he did not perceive that if we read
# 68& rig #Aarſipuog in lieu of m tug d'Avrilowog, and place those words be-
fore #8 fig, the pronoun will recover the noun to which it belongs, and
6ed: #Aarhpuog will be a proper description of the Fury, whose business it
is to urge on evil-doers to their ruin. But even thus the passage is not
restored to its original state, nor will it be perhaps, till better MSS, are
discovered. - -
FPISTLE VII- 517
thing. However, let us, for the sake of a good augury, keep
for the third time a well-omened silence.
I advise therefore you, my friends, to imitate Dion, in the
good-will he felt for his country, and in his temperate mode
of living, but for the better. But! ” under what auspices you
ought to endeavour” to fulfil his wishes, and what they are,
you have clearly heard from me. But upon the person, whº
is among you unable to live according to his country’s cus.
toms in a Dorian fashion, but adopts the life of the murderers
of Dion, and what is followed in Sicily, do not call; nor believe
that he will in any thing ever act faithfully and sincerely. But
call upon the rest to form a settlement of the whole of Sicily,
and introduce both from Sicily itself and all Peloponnesus an
equality of laws, and do not fear the Athenians; for men are
there, who surpass all others in virtue, and who hate the daring
of guest-murderers.
But if these things be done at a later period, and the
differences, produced each day by factions, are many and of all
kinds and hasten you on, it is requisite surely for every man,
to whom a divine fortune” has imparted even a small degree
of correct thinking, to know that there will be no cessation of
evils to those engaged in revolts, until the victors in battle
and in the banishment and slaughter of persons shall cease to
have a recollection of wrongs, and to turn themselves to the
punishment of their opponents; but, having a mastery over
themselves, shall lay down laws common to all, and no less
acceptable to themselves than to the vanquished party, and
compel them to use these laws, by the two-fold necessity of
fear and shame; of fear, through their being superior, by
showing their strength; and of shame, on the other hand,
through their seeming to be superior in the being both willing
and able to be (the masters)* over pleasures, and the slaves of
* Ficinus has “magis magisque complectentes.” For he was not per-
haps aware that uupleio 6at is united to two accusatives, and that étri Tô
Atjov follow here pupieio 6aw, as štri Tà aioxia, precede putpovuévac in
Politic. p. 297, C., and #tri ră yeXotórspa follow pepupampiéval in Phileb.
. 40, C.
p *—” Ficinus has “quibus auspiciis.” For his MS. read not dog but ºv,
found subsequently in all the others. It read likewise treupé06at dºrorexeiv
#öst—ai 68, as shown by his version, “perficere conandum vobis sit.”
* Ficinus has “sors—divina,” which would be in Plato 6sia poipa–
* As roic véuoug depend upon Öov\eteuv, so to balance the sentence
518 EY-ISTLE VI.
the laws. For it is not possible otherwise for a state, divided
against itself, to cease from ills; but divisions and enmity,
and hatred and distrust, are ever wont to arise in states thus
arrayed themselves against themselves. It is then ever re-
quisite for those, who have gained the power, when they are
desirous of preserving it, to choose from amongst themselves,
in preference to the rest, such as they hear are the best; in the
first place, old men, who have children and wives at home," and
ancestors the most in number and renown, and all possessing
a competence. ” Now for a city of ten thousand persons fifty
such will be sufficient.” These should be sent for from their
home with prayers and the greatest honours possible ; and
* they, who have sent for them, should take an oath, and beg
and request them * to lay down laws, and give not more to the
victors than to the vanquished, but what is equal for, and
common to, the whole state; and when the laws have been
fixed, “all things are in this.” For when the victors exhibit
themselves more subject to the laws than the vanquished, all
things will be full of security and felicity, and there will be
an escape from every ill. But if not, call not upon me or any
other to take a part for him, who is not persuaded by the pre-
cepts now conveyed. For these are the sisters of what I and
Dion did with good intentions attempt to do for Syracuse;
although they were, on the second occasion; for the first were
those, which were first attempted to be done in conjunction
there ought to be a verb united to trepi rāg #8ovåg. Hence Ficinus has
“tum in voluptatibus superandis tum in legibus observandis,” as if he
had found in his MS. iTrép rs raig jöovaig-5 vyāpus wou sival kai ÖovXsi-
sty. For thus tival kai might have been easily lost after Övvápévot,
* Instead of oticot, Ficinus found in his MS. olcov, as shown by his
version, “domicilium.”
*—” Such is the literal translation of this passage; which Taylor has
thus misrepresented: “But ten thousand and fifty inhabitants will be suf-
ficient for a city of this kind.”
*—” The Greek is pºst-atreptibapiévovg 6p3oavrag ösioôat, of which I
have given a literal translation, that I cannot understand. Nor could
Ficinus, as shown by his version, “evocantes autem precari atque jure-
jurando astringere;” where he has given to pustairspºlapuśvovg a passive
meaning, at variance with the genius of the language, and translated
Öpiógavrag as if it were Öpicógavrac. What Plato wrote can only be
guessed at.
*—" Here again I am at a loss in the words #y Tobrºp 6) rā trivra
$orw. I could have understood—#v rift abrºv Šsi ră răvra éorávas
—“all things must needs stand in their own place.”
FPISTI, E VII. 519
with Dionysius, a common good to all. But a certain fortune,
superior to man, scattered them all. Do you then attempt
to accomplish all at present more prosperously, with the
aid of some kind destiny, and a luck god-sent. And thus
much be it said about my advice and letter, and first visit to
Dionysius.
But in my second journey and voyage to Sicily, how reason-
ably and carefully they took place, he, who feels any interest
may hear what followed. For the first period of my sojourn
in Sicily passed away, as I have stated, before I could advise
the relatives and associates of Dion. But subsequently I per-
suaded Dionysius, as far as I was able, to let me go. But
on peace being made—for there had been then a war in
Sicily—we both came to an agreement; for Dionysius said that
he would send for Dion and myself again, after he had estab-
lished for himself a state of affairs connected with his govern-
ment more securely than before ; and he thought it proper for
Dion to understand that this was not a banishment at that
time, but merely a change of residence." And on these con-
ditions I agreed to come.
On peace being made, Dionysius sent for me; but he re-
quested Dion to stop” another year; but he thought it proper
for myself to come by all means. Dion then exhorted and
entreated me to set sail. For a strong report had gone abroad
from Sicily, that Dionysius had become again wonderfully
eager after philosophy at that moment; and, on this account
Dion earnestly begged of me not to decline the invitation.
But I knew that many such things happen to young men in
the case of philosophy. However it seemed to me to be more
safe, at least at that time, to bid a long farewell to Dionysius
and Dion; and I gave offence to both by answering that I was
an old man ; and that nothing of what was now being done
had taken place according to the agreement. But after this it
seems” that Archytas” had betaken himself to Dionysius; now
* Ficinus adds here “certo tempore rediturum,” as if his MS. were
fuller than the rest.
* Instead of $7ttoxeiv, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. & Trov-
atav ráoxety. For his version is “absentiam tolerare.”
* Ficinus has “audiwi,” as if he had found in his MS. ākñkoa instead
of £ouke—
Of this Archytas, who, as appears from the line in Horace, “Te
et terrae numeroque carentis arenae,” attempted to measure the
520 EPISTLE VII.
before my departure having made a hospitable and friendly
acquaintance with Archytas, and certain other Tarentines,
the guests and friends of Dionysius, I sailed away." There
were likewise certain other persons at Syracuse, who had
heard some of the doctrines of Dion, and among these some
others, filled with wrong notions about philosophy, and who
seemed to me to attempt to discourse with Dionysius about
things of this kind, as if Dionysius had heard all such matters
as I had in my thoughts. But in other respects he was not
without natural talent or the power to learn, and had a love of
honour in a wonderful degree. Perhaps then the discourse of
these men was pleasing to him, and he was manifestly ashamed
that he heard nothing from me when I was sojourning there.”
Hence he came the same time to the longing to hear me more
clearly, and at the same time his love of honour urged him
on. But on what account he did not hear me during my first
sojourn, I have detailed in the account given above.
After I had returned home safe, and refused on his inviting
me a second time, as I have just now mentioned, Dionysius
appeared to be thoroughly *on fire through his love of honour,”
lest I should seem to some persons to hold him in contempt, and
that, as being acquainted with his nature and habits, and mode
of living, I was unwilling to be annoyed by going to him. But
I am justified in speaking the truth, and in enduring,” if any
one, on hearing what had occurred, should despise my philo-
sophy, and think that the tyrant possessed a mind. For Dio-
nysius sent to me the third time a trireme for the sake of
making easy the voyage. He sent also Archedemus,” whom he
quantity of matter contained in the earth, little is known ; but of that
little the whole is to his credit; especially the fact of his being the means
of saving the life of Plato, when he was near losing it by the orders of
Dionysius.
* Ficinus omits &trérèsov, which seems superfluous after trpiv & trušvat.
But in that case we must read #troimoa, in lieu of trouhaag, similar to
“adduxeram,” in Ficinus.
* Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has “cum ad eum profectus sum.”
But such is not the meaning of Štruđmpletely.
*—” Out of pixorum0ijvat, which I cannot understand, it is easy to elicit
ºptAorpuig &@6;ival, from “honoris Sui causa ardere,” in Ficinus. Com-
º a similar metaphor a little below, #&mplpiävog biró pu)\ooroptag, ào trip
ºr by &
p famo understand Ütropišvstv, nor “ferre aequo animo,” in Ficinus.
I could have understood & Traptively, “to repel.”
* Stephens tacitly reads here 'Apyéðmuov, instead of 'Apxiðapov, con-
YEPISTLE VII. 521
thought I valued the most of all the associates of Archytas,
who were then in Sicily, and others of his (own)' acquaintances.
And all these told to us the same story, that Dionysius had
wonderfully increased in * philosophy. He sent too a long
letter, well knowing how I was affected towards Dion, and
that Dion was desirous I should set sail and come to Syracuse.
With a view to all these particulars, therefore, the letter was
composed, and at the commencement it said somehow to this
effect—“Dionysius to Plato.” After saying what usually fol-
lows, he said nothing previous to this, except that—“should
you at my persuasion come now to Sicily, in the first place
the matters relating to Dion shall be put into a train in the
way you may wish yourself; for I know that you wish what
is moderate, and I will accede to them; otherwise *nothing
that relates to the affairs of Dion,” nor upon other points, nor
as regards himself, will take place.”—This is what he said.
But the rest that was said would be here prolix, and foreign to
the purpose. Other letters likewise came to me from Archytas,
and others at Tarentum, speaking in high terms of the love
of wisdom shown by Dionysius; and that, unless I came now,
I should bring into a state of calumny the friendship existing
with Dionysius, which had been effected through me, and
which was of no little moment to their political affairs.
Such then being the state at that time of the sending for
me, some of those from Sicily and Italy dragging me thither,
and others at Athens pushing me away plainly by their en-
treaties, the same reason returned,” that I ought not to betray
Dion, nor my guests and friends” at Tarentum; and it oc-
ceiving no doubt that the person here alluded to is the same as the one
mentioned in Epist. 3, p. 319, A.
* I have inserted “own,” in allusion to Dionysius. To avoid the tau-
tology in Töv čvyys) ovórwv, and Yvopipovg, Ficinus has “nobiles,” but
that is the meaning of styévéig, not of yuwpipovg. Hence attoi has
probably dropt out before àA\ovg or rāv.
* Ficinus has “deditum esse.” But that would be in correct Greek
38ówkdºg, or ēvösöwkòg, not $truðsowkóg.
*—” Ficinus—“ nihil impetrabis quae pro Dione optas,” which is not the
Latin for obôév oot Töv trºpi Aitova Śāst trpaypºdrov. Perhaps he found
in his MS. oi rāv trepi Atova & siów Śāstg.
* Instead of ficev, Stephens proposed joet, suggested by “ratio dicta-
ret” in Ficinus. But one MS. has correctly, tróAuv ficev, i. e. “re-
turned.”
* Bekker has adopted traipovc in lieu of £répovg, found in only
one MS.
522 FPISTLE VII.
curred to me, that it was nothing wonderful that a young man,
who had heard incorrectly of things worthy of mention, should
come with a docile spirit to the love of the best life; and that
I Ought to prove clearly, in what state the matter stood, and
not by any means to betray it, nor to become myself the cause
of a disgrace so truly great, if the case was in reality such as
reported. Clothing myself then in this reasoning, I departed,
fearing much, and prophesying, as it seems, not altogether
well. Arriving then the third time, for the saviour this at
least I did in reality." For I was again” luckily saved. And
for this it is meet for me to give thanks to Dionysius, after the
deity, because, when many were wishing to destroy me, he pre-
vented them, and gave up to pity some portion of my affairs.
When therefore I arrived, I thought I ought first to obtain
some proof whether Dionysius was in reality touched by phi-
losophy, as by a fire, or whether this great report had come
to Athens in vain. Now there is a certain method of making
an experiment upon matters of this kind, by no means ignoble,
but truly adapted to tyrants, and especially to such as are full
of incorrect notions; which, as soon as I arrived, I perceived
was very much the case with Dionysius. To such it is re-
quisite to show what (philosophy)* is, and of what kind, and
through how great deeds how great a labour it demands.
For he who hears this, if he is truly a lover of wisdom, and
related to it, and worthy of it, as being a divine person, thinks
he has heard of some wonderful road, and that he ought
forthwith to betake himself to it, and that life is not to be
endured by him, who acts otherwise. After this he does not,
putting both himself and his leader on the stretch, give up
the road, until he puts a finish upon all things, or obtains a
power so as not to be unable to conduct himself without a
person to show the road.
1––. Such is the literal version of the Greek riff orotijou Toiró ye oiv
#Tpaša Švrwg : which I cannot understand. For riff owtjpt is without
regimen. Ficinus has “Profectus—sub servatore; id enim revera con-
secutus sum.” What Plato said, I think, originally, was, that he made
a sacrifice in honour of the deity, who had saved him from the perils
of a sea-voyage.
* Three MSS. have TréAuv for TréAat, agreeing with “ rursus ” in
Ficinus.
* Ficinus has alone preserved the word “philosophy,
the sense.
5 §
necessary for
EPISTLE VII. 523
In this way and with these thoughts does such a person
live, acting (correctly)' in whatever transactions he may be
engaged; but before all things perpetually keeping close to
philosophy, and (making use of)” that food for the day, which
may especially render him quick to learn, and of a good memory,
and able to reason in himself.” by abstaining from wine; and
by which he becomes the hater of a practice contrary 4 to this.
But they, who are not lovers of wisdom in reality, but have
a coating of colour in their opinions, like those, whose bodies
are sun-burnt, when they perceive how many things are to be
learnt, and how great is the labour, and what temperance in
daily food is requisite for that thing, they deem it too diffi-
cult and beyond their powers, and become unable to attend to
it at all. But some of them persuade themselves that they
have sufficiently heard the whole, and want no further exer-
tions. This kind of experiment is clear and the most safe,
when employed in the case of those living luxuriously and
unable to endure labour, through the person throwing the
blame not upon the guide but on himself, as being unable to
attend to all that is requisite for the matter in hand.
In this way was, what has been now stated, mentioned to
Dionysius. But neither did I detail them all, nor did Diony-
sius require it. For many things, and of the greatest moment,
he pretended to possess sufficiently himself through the incor-
rect notions he had heard from others. And I hear that he
afterwards wrote about what he had then heard, as if he were
composing what was his own art, "when there was nothing of
his own,” as I hear. However, of this I know nothing. But
I know that certain others have written about the same things,
but who they are "not they themselves."
* I have inserted the word si, which has evidently dropt out before év–
* Ficinus has “victu quotidiano utitur ;” thus supplying the verb re-
quisite for the sense.
* I scarcely understand Év attº.
* The feminine, #vavríav, seems to agree with trpáčw, to be got out of
Trpáčeot just before; or else 666, has dropt out before oi 68–
*—” Bekker’s text, adopted by Stalbaum, is obôév táv airòu div
&kotov : which I cannot understand. Ficinus has “cum nihil tamen
horum revera ipsorum inesset, ut equidem audio.” For he found, no
doubt, in his MS. &c &koúw, as read in three others, and probably oióēv
:#rdºv airoij čv–an absolute sentence, in lieu of ovčevög—övtoc, to
avoid the accumulation of genitives.
*—" Here again I am in the dark. Ficinus leaves the difficulty as he
524 EPISTLE VII,
Thus much however I can say about all, who either have
written, or shall write, and state that they know about what
things I am occupied, whether they have heard from my-
self or others, or have discovered themselves, that it is not
possible for them to know any thing according to my
opinions upon the matter; for there is not, and never will
be, any composition of mine about them. For a matter of
that kind cannot be expressed by words, like other things to be
learnt; but by a long intercourse with the subject and living
with it a light is kindled on a sudden, as if from a leaping
fire,' and being engendered in the soul, feeds itself upon
itself. Thus much I know, however, that what has been
written or said by me, has been said in the best manner;
and moreover that what has been written badly, does not pain
me in the least.
But if it had appeared to me that such matters could be
written or spoken of sufficiently before the masses, what could
have been done by us more beautiful in life than to impart a
great benefit to mankind, and to bring nature to light before
, all? I think, however, that the attempt *in favour of such
being promulgated,” would not be beneficial except to a few,
who are able with a little showing to make discoveries for
themselves. But of the rest, some it will fill not correctly with
a contempt by no means in reason, and others with a lofty
and vain hope, as if they had learnt something solemn. And
it has now come into my mind to say something further still.
For perhaps by what I am about to say a portion of what has
been said will become more clear. For a certain true account
is the antagonist of him, who dares to write any thing what-
ever about matters of this kind; and which, although it has
been stated by me frequently before, seems it must be stated
at present likewise.
found it, by his literal version, “quicumque vero hi fuerint, ne ipsi qui-
dem seipsos.” Taylor—“but without understanding what they wrote.”
* By “a leaping fire,” Plato meant perhaps “a flash of lightning,” or
else what is called “ignis fatuus,” “a will-o-the-wisp,” or “jack-a-lan-
tern,” that rises from marsh lands, and is seen to move from place to
place. I suspect however that for armóñoravrog we ought to read TEA&-
3.
oavrog, “being near :” for one MS. has arm?Afforavrog.
*—” The Greek is trepi airów Aeyopuévnv. But Ficinus has more cor-
rectly—“in his edendis,” as if he had found in his MS. trºpi rotra v Aeyo-
uévov, and so I have translated.
EPISTLE VII. 525
There are three things belonging to each of those, through
which it is necessary for science to be produced. But the fourth
is science itself. And as to the fifth, it is requisite to establish
that which is known and true. Of these one is its name; the
second its definition;' the third its resemblance; the fourth
its science. Now if you are desirous of understanding what
has been just now asserted respecting one example, take it, and
imagine thus” respecting all. A circle is called something, to
which there is the name we have just mentioned. Its definition
is the second thing, composed of nouns and verbs. For that,
which is every where equally distant from the extremes to the
middle, would be the definition of that, to which the name is
of a round, and a circumference, and a circle. But the third is
the circle, painted or blotted out, and made by a turner's wheel,
or destroyed. By none of which accidents is the circle itself, of
which all these properties are predicated, affected, as being of a
different nature. But the fourth is science and intellect, and a
correct opinion about them. And the whole of this again
must be laid down as one thing, which exists neither in voice,
nor in a corporeal figure, but is in the soul; by which circum-
stance it is manifest, that there is something different from
the nature itself of the circle, and the three previously men-
tioned. But among the number of these, intellect, by its re-
lation and similitude, approaches the nearest to the fifth ; while
the rest are more remote. The same is the case with respect to
a thing straight, and circular, and with figure, and with colour,
and of a thing good, and beautiful, and just, and of every body,
both fashioned by the hand, and produced according to nature,
and of fire, and water, and all things of that kind, and of every
animal, and of the habit in souls, and of all actions and pas-
sions. For unless a person does, after a certain manner, un-
derstand of these things all the four, he will never perfectly
participate in the science relating to the fifth. Moreover
these (four) no less endeavour to show forth the quality, as
respects each thing, than the being of each, through the want
of power in words. On this account, no one possessing a
mind will ever dare to *place under the same view, and this
* So Taylor has translated Aóyog by “definition.” Ficinus here, as
elsewhere, when in doubt, introduces two words, “oratio sive ratio.”
* Ficinus has “similiter,” which leads to do airwg in lieu of oirwg.
*-* The Greek is eig airó ru6ávas rä vsvompiéva kai rajra sig ópera-
526 EPISTLE VII.
too never to be changed, the objects, which are perceived by
the mind, and those, that are represented by figures, which is
the case with those four.”
And this again, what has just now been said, it is requisite
to learn. Every circle described by its doings,' or fashioned by
a turner's wheel, is full of that, which is contrary to the fifth ;
for it every where * touches upon the straight line.” But we
assert that the circle in the abstract has neither more nor less
in itself of a contrary nature; and we assert too, that there is
no fixed name for any thing; for there is nothing to prevent
things, that are now called round, from being called straight,
and those straight, round; nor will there be any less stability
in them, when they are changed and called * by a contrary
name. The same assertion is likewise true of a definition, that,
since it is composed of nouns and verbs, “there is nothing
stable in a sufficiently stable manner.” And there is an infi-
nity of reasons respecting each of the four, that it is uncertain.
But what is of the greatest moment is, that since there are,
as I have stated a little before, two things, being and quality,
when the soul seeks to know, not the quality of a thing, but
kivmtov, 6 &m trăoxst rā yeypappušva rötroug: which I cannot understand,
nor could Ficinus, whose version is “in idem atque id immutabile referre,
qua ab ipso intelliguntur, atque quatuor illa; quod utique patiuntur, quae
designantur figuris.” From which it is evident that he found in his MS.
sic raûrö, kai raúra, &piérakivmtov, rā vēvompiéva kai Tà têtrapa. But
the words kai rā Tétrapa, by which are meant the four mentioned above,
ôvoua, Xóyog, siówkov, and Štruo Thum, all of which are represented by
figures in the shape of letters, belong to Tráoxet, and are opposed to the
wevompiéva : and so I have translated.
* Ficinus, unable it would seem to understand Év raig trpáščouv, has
“inter hominum manus—” Perhaps the expression answers to the Eng-
lish “practically.”
*—” By this Plato meant, I presume, that no circle formed materially
is perfectly true; and if so, some part of it touches upon a straight line.
So the moderns assert that it is impossible to make materially a straight
line ; for it touches some where upon a curve.
* Instead of kaxoijou, which is here unintelligible, we must read k\m-
6eiot— Ficinus has “nominibus in contrarium permutatis.”
*—" The Greek is pumöèvicayóg (38.3atwg civat 3:3atov : which I can-
not understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version is “cum ex nominibus
verbisque componatur, nullam omnino habentibus firmitatem :” which is
perfectly intelligible indeed, but not to be got from the Greek. The
words incavāg 6é6alog ought to follow pavpiog á Aóyoc in the next sen-
tence. For though there might be an infinity of reasons it should be
ststed that they were sufficiently firm.
EPISTLE VII. 527
what it is, unless each of these four previously sought for by
the soul through reason and effect, and at last turns out cor-
rectly discussed by the senses, through all things that are
said and shown," it fills every man, so to say, with all doubt
and uncertainty.
In such cases then as through a depraved education we are
not accustomed to seek the truth, but the image of it, which is
placed before us, is sufficient (for us to touch upon),” we do not
become ridiculous to each other, the interrogated to the inter-
rogating; but we are able to bandy about those four, and to
examine them. *But in such cases as we compel a person
to exhibit that fifth, any one of those, who are able to reply,
and to overthrow, is the superior,” “and causes him, who is ex-
plaining (this fifth) either by speech, or writing, or answers,
to appear to the multitude of his hearers entirely ignorant of
the things, about which he attempts either to write or speak,
persons being sometimes ignorant, that it is not the soul of the
writer or speaker that is confuted, but the nature of each of
the four (spoken of),” when it is existing improperly. *But
the procession through all these, while changing its place to-
wards each upwards and downwards, scarcely at length ge-
nerates the knowledge of a thing existing naturally well in a
person existing naturally well.” But when it exists naturally
"—" Such is the literal translation of the Latin version by Ficinus, who
could not understand the Greek, nor can I, Tó 68 pur) &mroëpswov škaorov
Töv terrápov ºrporsivoy Tà livX; X&Yq, re kai kar’ ºpya ato'0mguy si-
{\eykrov Tórs Asyópswov kai Ösucvápisvow &si trapsyópevoy #kaorov–where
the reading trpórepov, found in his M.S. for trportivov, and aio 6 horsouv for
aio 6 mouv, have been confirmed by two others. What Plato wrote, re-
mains still to be discovered.
* This was added apparently by Ficinus to fill up the sense.
*—” The Greek is #v oic 3’ &v rô Tréparrow &trokpívao.6at kai 6m)\otiv
dºvaykáčopsy, 6 (3ovXópſevog rāv čvvapiévov &varpétrauv kparsi. Ficinus
has “Ubi vero necessitas cogit quintum ostendere, quivis eorum, qui
possint subvertere atque retractare, pervincit; ” where he has omitted
dTokpivac 6at in the first clause, and introduced “retractare * in the se-
cond, as if his MS. read: something wanting at present in the Greek.
Taylor translates & Tokpívao.6at “to separate :” but that is &vakpivstv.
I have translated as if &rokpivac 6at kai were inserted before diva-
rpétrew.
*—* Plato appears to give here a description of the method, by which
the Sophists seemed to confute their opponents, and as he did themselves.
*—” Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I cannot under-
stand, nor could Ficinus, as shown by his paraphrase—“Traductio vero
528 EPISTLE VII.
ill, as exists naturally the habit of the soul of the multitude,
with respect to learning, and to what are called morals, and
these" are depraved, not even "Lynceus himself can cause
such as these to see.” And in one word, neither docility in
learning nor memory will cause (a person to do so), who is not
germane to the matter; for they are not originally inherent
in foreign habits; so that neither they, who are not naturally
close to, and allied with, what is just, and the other things that
are beautiful, but are docile and of a good memory, some with
respect to Some things, and others to others, nor they, who are
allied, but are indocile and of a bad memory, will ever learn,
as far as is possible, the truth relating to virtue and vice. For
it is necessary to learn these, and at the same time the false-
hood and truth of the whole of being, with all exertion and
much time, as I stated at the commencement But after each
of these have been rubbed together, names and definitions,
and the sense of seeing, and (the other) senses, and have been
tried by tests in a kindly spirit, and by questions and answers
without a feeling of envy, there has with difficulty shone forth.”
an intellectual perception respecting each, and a mind putting
itself on the stretch, as far as it is possible for human power
to do so.
On this account, let every careful man be very far from
writing about things truly 4 worthy of care, lest at some time,
by writing amongst men,” he throw (himself)" into envy and
per omnia illa Sursum deorsumque in unumquodgue discurrendo perve-
niens, wix tandem scientiam parit intrinsecus; scientiam inquam ipsius,
quod naturaliter bene affectum est in animo, ad ipsum quoque bene
naturaliter affecto.” mº
* Instead of rà è 6tépôaprat, Plato wrote, I suspect, Tă 68 0 (i.e. tºr-
rapa) 6tépôaprat.
*—” Here is some error here. For Lynceus had only the power to see
acutely himself, not to cause others to do so. -
* The metaphor in rpuſ?ópsva–éééAapups will be best understood by
comparing Rep., iv. p. 435, A., rpiðovrég, ğazrsp #k ºrvpsia v, Šk\ápºpas
roliigalpusy rijv Šukatooivnv.
. “From “revera,” in Ficinus, Faehse suggested övroc instead of
O?/7(1):19.
* This mention of “men” seems rather strange; as if a person would
write for others than men. In lieu of a Jolſ; we must read divouc, i. e.
“without mind.” In a similar spirit Pindar says that he “wrote for the
intelligent what, in the case of the many, would require an interpreter.”
* After karaśāAg is required an accusative. Read therefore airów in
lieu of rore—
EPISTL E VII. 529
difficulties." But, in one word, it is requisite to know from
hence, when any one sees the writings of another, either of a
legislator upon laws, or of any person whatever” upon other
subjects, that these are not those, on which he has been the
most careful, if he is himself a careful person ; but that the
objects of his pursuit are situated some where in a country
the most beautiful. But if the subjects, on which he has been
the most careful, are committed to writing, then not the gods
but men themselves have their own intellect destroyed 3
Now he, who follows this story and digression, will under-
stand correctly whether Dionysius has written any thing of
the highest and first kind respecting nature, or any other person
inferior or superior to him ; since, according to my reasoning,
he has neither heard or learnt any thing sound about what he
has written ; for he would have venerated them equally with
myself, nor have dared to cast them forth into a state unfit-
ting and unbecoming ; nor has he written about them for the
sake of remembering them ; since there is no fear that any one
will ever forget them, if he has once comprehended them by
the soul; for of all things they lie in the smallest compass.
But 4 (perhaps he did so)* for the sake of base ambition, con-
sidering them as his own, or as sharing in a kind of instruc-
tion, of which he was unworthy, and loving the renown aris-
ing from such a participation.
If however this occurred to Dionysius after one meeting,
the fact may be so. But let Zeus,” says the Theban, know
how it occurred. For I went through these matters, as I have
said, only once; and never afterwards at all. In the next
1 What Plato says of writing, Euripides applies to learning and speak-
ing in Med. 287–296. The doctrine, which evidently emanated from
the school of Pythagoras, is touched upon more in detail in Protagor. p.
316, B. § 20.
2 Instead of &rt’ oiv, which are never thus united in Greek, correct
language requires àrovoiv, opposed to vopo6érov.
s There is here an allusion, as remarked by Stephens, to a line of Ho-
mer, Eß &pa 6% row travra 6soi ppévag dºsaav airoi : while as regards
the clause 9soi pºv oi, (3poroi 38, see Dobree on Aristoph. Plut. 555.
4—4 The Greek is starsp ºvska, without any apodosis to the sentence,
which is not required by the version of Ficinus, “Forte vero—id fecit,”
which would lead to #vska—étroisi ru Ypéppia, “he composed some writing.”
3 The allusion to the Theban oath is in the use of irrao for torw, which
cannot be expressed in English. To the same form Plato refers in
Phaedo, p. 62, A. § 16. 2
M
530 EPISTLE VII.
place, he, who is interested in discovering what occurred re-
lating to those matters, and how it occurred, ought to consider
through what reason it was we did not go through them a
second and a third time and oftener; whether it was that
Dionysius, having heard them only once, thought he knew
them, and did know them, sufficiently P or that he discovered
them himself, or had learnt them previously from others, or
that what had been said was trifling 2 or thirdly," that they
were not according to his standard, but greater; and that
thus * he would not be able to live, if he paid any regard to
prudence and virtue 2 For if *(it be said that he considered)?
the matters frivolous, he will oppose many witnesses, who assert
the contrary, and who are much more competent to judge about
things of this kind than Dionysius; but if, that he discovered
or learnt them, and that they are worthily suited for the in-
struction of a liberal soul, *how should he, not being a won-
drous man himself,” have so readily dishonoured the leader
and the lord in these matters ?
And how he did dishonour him, I will relate. After an in-
terval of no long time, although he had previously permitted
Dion to possess and enjoy his property, he did not permit his
guardians to send it to Peloponnesus, as if he had entirely
forgotten his letter; for (he said) it was not Dion, but Dion's
son, of whom, as being his own nephew, he was according to
law the guardian. Such were the transactions of that time
that took place up to this period. And from these occurrences
I clearly saw the desire Dionysius had for philosophy; and it
was lawful for me to be indignant, whether I wished it or not.
For it was already summer at that time, and ships were sailing
out. But it seemed I ought not to be more offended with
Dionysius than with myself, and with those, who compelled
me to come the third time to the strait about Scylla,
* As three alternatives have been stated already, it is evident that for
rptrov we must read rêraptov.
* I have adopted £ival, read in one MS. after ka9' &jröv, and of raig,
found in two MSS., in lieu of oğrwg.
3—4 The words within lunes are found only in the version of Ficinus,
“existimasse dicatur.”
*—” Although Stephens had correctly pointed out the error in the
translation of Ficinus, “quis non id mirum putet Dionysium sic af-
fectum,” Taylor has been content to follow it implicitly.
EPISTLE VII. 531
“And dread Charybdis measure still again.” "
and to tell Dionysius, that it was impossible for me to stay
with him, while Dion was treated so dirtily. But he soothed
me, and begged me to stay, thinking it would not be well for
him should I be so swift a messenger of such doings; but
unable to persuade me, he said he would prepare the means of
sending me away. However, I determined to go on board
and Sail amongst the vessels outward bound,” being enraged,
and thinking I ought to suffer every thing, if he should attempt
to stop me, as I had been injured, although I had plainly done
no injury. But on seeing that I had no desire at all to stay,
he devised a plan of this kind, for delaying my sailing away.
On the day after this had taken place, he plausibly addresses
me. From myself and you, said he, let Dion, and the affairs
of Dion, be removed out of the way, for the sake of our (not *)
being frequently at variance about them. For I will, said he,
thus act on your account, to Dion. I think it right for him
to take away his property and to reside in Peloponnesus, not as
an exile, but as one, who may come hither, when it shall seem
good to him, to me, and to you who are his friends; and this
shall be, if he forms no plot against myself; and you, and your
relations, and his here shall be his sureties; and let him give
you a guarantee; and let the property, which he takes away, be
deposited in Peloponnesus and at Athens, with those you shall
think fit; and let Dion enjoy the use of it, but not the power
to take it away without your consent; for I have not any very
great trust in him that, if he can use the property, he will be
just towards myself; for it will not be trifling. But I have
greater confidence in you and yours. See, therefore, if this
is agreeable to you, and remain on these terms for this year,
and then depart to your well-doing,” taking with you the pro-
perty; and well I know, that Dion will be greatly indebted
to you for having managed matters in this way on his be-
half.
On hearing this speech I felt indignant; but still I said I
* Odyssey xii. 428. -
* This, I conceive, is the exact translation of darooróAotc.
* I have inserted pur), which can hardly be omitted. See Hermann on
Wiger, n. 17. "...
* On the phrase eig ópag & Triśvat, see Casaubon on Athenaeus, p. 112,
and the commentators on Aristor, Barp. 380.
M 2
532 EPISTT,E VII.
would take counsel of myself until the following day on these
points, and communicate my resolves. This was our compact at
that time. I hereupon, being all alone, and very confused,
took counsel of myself. And this consideration first presented
itself as taking the lead in my designs. What, if Dionysius
intends to do nothing that he says, but on my departure
both he and many others of his friends should write' in a
plausible manner to Dion, what he has now said to me, that
Dionysius indeed was willing, but I unwilling, for him to do
what he urged me, and that I entirely neglected his (Dion's)
concerns; and moreover should Dionysius be unwilling to send
me away, and himself give no orders to any master of a vessel
(to take me), and easily signify to all men, that I was sailing
away without his consent, what sailor would be willing to take
me on board, while I was hastening from the dwelling of Dio-
nysius P For in addition to other evils, I dwelt in the garden?
which surrounds the dwelling, from whence the porter would
not be willing to let me out, unless an order were sent from
Dionysius. And should I remain a year, I could indeed send
an account of these doings to Dion, and in what state I was, and
what I was doing. But should Dionysius do aught of what
he says, my conduct would be not entirely ridiculous ; for
perhaps the property of Dion, if one rightly values it, is not
less than a hundred talents.” But if what is now looming"
should, as is likely, take place, I shall be at a loss how to con-
duct myself. At the same time it is perhaps necessary for me
to labour for a year longer, and to endeavour to prove the
designs of Dionysius by his deeds.
Having thus determined with myself, I told Dionysius on
the following day that I had made up my mind to stay. I hold
it right however, said I, for you not to consider me as the
master of Dion, and that you should, together with myself, send
letters to inform him of the determination, and to ask him
whether he was satisfied ? and if not, whether he wished for
| After airoi; the Greek has 6takeXevöpusvog, which I cannot under-
stand; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted the word. I could have under-
stood, airg, Ör, kêevópºevou, i.e. “being ordered by him,” and thus one
can account for airów, found in four MSS.
* Elsewhere it is said that Plato was confined in the Acropolis.
* i.e. upwards of £13,300.
* This is the meaning of Özropaivetv, which is applied to the appear-
ance of the morning before the Sun has risen above the horizon.
FPISTLE VII. 533
and demanded any thing else? and to send word as soon as
possible; but that you should do nothing new in his affairs.
This was said (by me), and this agreement did we make nearly
in the manner just now detailed. *
After this the vessels sailed, and it was no longer possible
for me to depart; when Dionysius, while speaking, remem-
bered that the half of Dion's property ought to remain with
his son, and that the other half should be sent to Dion; and
he said he would sell it, and after it had been sold, deliver
one half to myself to send to Dion, and leave the other half
for his son; for that this would be the most equitable ar-
rangement. Astonished at the statement, I thought it would be
very ridiculous to say any thing further. I told him however,
that we ought to wait for the letter from Dion, and again send
him an account of these matters. But Dionysius immediately
after this did, in a very bold” manner, sell the whole of Dion's
property at what time, and in what manner and to whomso-
ever he pleased ; nor did he say any thing whatever about it
to myself; and in like manner I said nothing to him about the
affairs of Dion; for I thought I should be able to do nothing
more in the matter.
Thus far was assistance given by myself to philosophy and
my friends. But after this, I and Dionysius were so living,
that I, like a bird, was (always)” looking out, and longing to
fly away; while he was devising in what manner he might
frighten me off," and give up none of the property of Dion.
We gave out however through the whole of Sicily, that we
were friends forsooth. -.
Dionysius had attempted to reduce the pay of the veteran
mercenaries now to a lower rate than according to the custom
of his father; and the soldiers, being enraged, collected to-
gether in a body, and declared they would not permit it.
"—" The Greek is #pavā00m Aéytov, where Stephens suggested Aéyéuv,
to answer in part to the version of Ficinus, “quasi nonnihil praetermissi
reminiscens—inquit.”
* The Greek is vsavukåg: where I should prefer rvpavvuküç, as a lit-
tle below—puéAa rvpavvukóg—Épm. -
* Ficinus has “semper,” as if he had found here in his MS. āst—
* The verb &vago&siv is applied to scaring away birds, as in Aristoph.
'Opy. 34, ‘Hpusic—oi goſłońvrog oiásyög 'Averrópºsača, or starting wild
game, as in Lysis, p. 206, A. § 7, ei dvoo'o60i 0iip' idºv kai Övera)\wro-
répav Trºv ćypay Totoi. Ast however, with Ficinus, translates it “to re-
strain,” a meaning it never has.
534 EPIS', 'LE VII.
Dionysius therefore endeavoured to force them, by closing
the gates of the Acropolis ; but the soldiers immediately
rushed to the walls, raising a kind of barbarous cry and war-
like paean; at which Dionysius being terrified, conceded all
demands, and even more to those of the light-shield-bearers,
who had been collected together. But a report was quickly
spread, that Heracleides was the cause of this disturbance. On
hearing which, Heracleides took himself out of the way and
disappeared, while Dionysius endeavoured to lay hold of him;
but being in a difficulty, he sent for Theodotes to come to the
garden, in which I happened to be then walking. Now of the
rest of their discourse I neither knew nor heard; but what
Theodotes said in my presence to Dionysius, I both know and
remember. For, said he, Plato, I am persuading Dionysius
here, that if I am able to bring Heracleides hither to a con-
ference respecting the charges now laid against him, and if
it does not seem good (to Dionysius) for him to dwell in Sicily,
I think it is proper for him to take his wife and son, and sail
to Peloponnesus, and reside there, doing no injury at all to
Dionysius, and enjoying his own property. I have therefore
sent to him already, and I will now send to him again. But
whether he hearkens to my first or second application, I deem
it right to request of Dionysius, that "if any one falls in with
Heracleides, either in the country or here, no ill shall happen
to him, but that he shall be removed from the country, until
Dionysius shall decide upon something else. To this, said he,
do you accede 2 addressing Dionysius. He answered, I do
accede ; nor shall he suffer any ill, contrary to what has now
been stated, should he make his appearance at your house.
However, on the evening of the following day, Eurybius
and Theodotes came to me in great haste and wonderfully
alarmed ; and Theodotes said to me, Plato, you were present
yesterday at the compact which Dionysius made with me and
you respecting Heracleides 2 To which I replied, How not ?
But now, says he, the soldiers with light shields are running
all round seeking to lay hold of Heracleides; and it appears
almost that he is some where here. Follow us then, by all
means, to Dionysius. We went therefore and came to him ; and
they indeed stood silent and in tears, but I said, These persons,
*—" The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and
Consequently by Taylor.
YEPISTLE VII, 535
Dionysius, are afraid lest you should do something of a novel
kind' to Heracleides, contrary to the compact made yesterday;
for it seems to me, that he has returned and is clearly some
where here. And he, on hearing this, burnt with rage, and
*assumed all kinds of colours” such as a person in anger
... does. But Theodotes falling at his feet, and laying hold
of his hand, burst into tears, and implored him not to do any
such thing.” Then I, taking up the discourse, consoled him
and said, Cheer up, Theodotes; for Dionysius will not dare
to act contrary to the compact made yesterday. But he look-
ing at me, and in a very tyrannic manner, With you, says he,
I made no compact, either great or small. By the gods, said
I, you (did agree not to do) what this man now requests you
not to do. After saying this, I turned from him and went out.
After this Dionysius endeavoured to hunt down Heracleides.
Theodotes, however, sent messengers to him, and exhorted
him to fly. But Dionysius sent Tisias and the soldiers with
light shields, and ordered them to pursue him. Heracleides,
however, as it is said, anticipated them, and escaped in the
small part of a day into the dominions of the Carthaginians.
Hereupon the old plot for his not giving up the property of
Dion seemed to Dionysius to offer a plausible pretext of en-
mity against myself. And in the first place he sent me from
the Acropolis, framing an excuse, that it was requisite for the
women to perform some ten-day sacrifice in the gardens where
I resided. He therefore ordered me to remain out during that
period with Archidemus. While I was there, Theodotes sent
for me, and felt very indignant respecting the transactions
of that time, and found fault with Dionysius; who, hearing
that I had been with Theodotes, made this another pretext,
and the sister* to the former, for enmity against me, and sent
a person to ask me, whether I had really been with Theo-
dotes on his sending for me? and I readily replied, I had. The
* In veðrepov is an euphemism for kaków. See the commentators on
Eurip. Med. 37.
*—” On this expression Stalbaum refers to Boissonade on Aristanetus,
p. 396.
*Unless rotoirov is to be referred to the preceding veðrepov, one would
prefer tº deviatov. For diviaTov would be thus used as an euphemism
for 6&varov, as āvāksarov is in Thucyd. iii. 39, 45.
* On the metaphorical use of &ös}\póg, see Ruhnken on Timaeus, p. 3,
Porson on Aristoph. Pºut. 550, Blomfield on S. Th. 343.
536 EPISTLE VII.
party therefore said, Dionysius has ordered me to tell you,
that you are acting by no means correctly in always making
much of Dion and the friends of Dion. This is what was
said; and after this Dionysius never again sent for me to his
residence; as it was now clear that I was the friend of Theo-
dotes and Heracleides, and his enemy; and he no longer con-
sidered me well affected towards him, because the property of
Dion had been consumed entirely.
After this I dwelt out of the Acropolis among the merce-
nary soldiers; but others, Athenians, and some likewise my
fellow-citizens, who were in the service of Dionysius, came
and told me that I had been calumniated by the light-
shield soldiers, and that certain persons had threatened to
kill me, if they could lay hold of me. I devised therefore the
following plan for my preservation. I sent to Archytas, and
other friends at Tarentum, telling them in what state I hap-
pened to be ; and they, making some pretext of an embassy
to the city, sent a ship of thirty oars, and Lamiscus,” one of
my friends; who, on his arrival, made a request to Dionysius
on my behalf, saying that I wished to depart, and begged
of him *not to act otherwise.” And he consented, and sent me
away after providing me with means for the voyage. How-
ever, I neither asked for the property of Dion, nor did any
one give it me.
On reaching Peloponnesus at the Olympic games, I met
with Dion, who was a spectator there, and I told him what
had happened. And he, calling Jupiter to witness, imme-
diately declared to me and my relations and friends, that he
would prepare to revenge himself upon Dionysius, both for
his having deceived me, his guest—for thus he spoke and
thought—and for his own unjust expulsion and banishment.
On hearing this, I advised him to call upon his friends, if
they were willing. But as for myself, I said, you together with
others had by force caused me in some manner to share in
the food, and the hearth, and the sacred rites of Dionysius;*
who perhaps has thought, in consequence of many calumniat-
* Ficinus has “Salmiscum,” similar to XaXaptorov in three MSS.
*—” The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.
* Ficinus has a supplement here, marked in Italics, not found in the
Greek—“suasi ut—me putaret guasi medium quemdam aquumque titrinque
esse debere, praesertim cum—”
EPISTLE VII 537
ing me, that I was plotting in conjunction with you against
him and his tyranny, and yet he did not put me to death, but
treated me with respect. Besides I am of an age to take a
part with scarcely any one in war; but I would be a common.
friend to you all, if at any time in want of a friendly feeling
towards each other you should wish to do any good; but if
you are desirous (of doing) evil," call upon others. This did
I say through a feeling of disgust to my wandering about
Sicily, and adverse fortune in it. -
By *not obeying and being not persuaded” by the reasonings
(urged) by myself, they have been themselves the cause of all
the evils that have at present happened to them ; of which no-
thing, humanly speaking, would have occurred, had Dionysius
given Dion his own property, or had been perfectly reconciled
to him. For I could easily have restrained Dion from both
by my will and power.” But now they have rushed against each
other, and filled all things with evils. And yet Dion had the
same wish, which I would say both myself and any other moder-
ate person ought to have, “who should consider, touching his
own power, and that of his friends, and of his own city, how, by
doing a benefit when in power, things of the greatest moment
would be in the greatest honour." But this will be,” not if a
person enrich himself and his friends and city, by laying plots
and bringing together conspirators, when he is poor and has
no command over himself, through his yielding to cowardice," as
1 Here again the Latin of Ficinus is more full than the Greek—“quam-
diu vero odiis certabitis, ad hac tanquam propugnatores alios advoca-
bitis—”
*—” I must leave others to explain the difference between &rev6oivréc
and oi, Trev6ópus wou.
* Ficinus has “voluntate mea et consilo et auctoritate,” as if he has
found in his MS. Tj BoöX806a, kai tº 3ovXsúsq6at kai rº, öövao.6au.
Perhaps Plato wrote SovX&eq6at after Ötivao.6at. At least one MS.
reads 3ov\eteorðat for £80i)\806at,
*—4 The version of Ficinus is here so different from the Greek, as to
render it impossible to ascertain what he found in his MS.
* Instead of Éart 68, the sense evidently requires Égrat 68 rāös, similar
to “neque vero id fit” in Ficinus.
* Although 68t)\tag seems to be defended by the expression in Eurip.
Phoen. 600, TAoûrog jv pixólºvyov kaköv, yet one would rather expect
here ÖovXstag. For not only would there be an oxymoron in mTrmuévoc
tarô 6ovX stag, but a more natural flow of ideas likewise in ÖovX&tag ric
rpóg jôovác than in Öst)\iac Tijg Tpóc jčovác. For persons are said to
be slaves, rather than cowards, as regaids pleasure.
538 EPISTLE VII.
regards pleasures, and subsequently by destroying those, who
possess property, and, calling them enemies, scatters the wealth
of such persons, and exhorts his fellow-doers and friends (so
to act)," that no one shall, by saying that he is poor, bring a
charge against him. After the same manner, he who benefits
his city, will be honoured by it, in consequence of distributing
by voting” the property of a few among the many; or when
any one being the president of a great city, and one ruling over
many lesser cities, unjustly distributes to his own city the pro-
perty of the lesser. For in this way, neither Dion, nor any
other person, will ever voluntarily proceed to power, pernicious
to himself and family for all time, but to a form of govern-
ment and the establishment of laws, the most just and best,
and effected through the fewest deaths and banishments.
This conduct did Dion lately adopt, by choosing to suffer
rather than to do unholy deeds, yet taking care lest he should
suffer; still, however, did he stumble, after he had arrived at
the very point of being superior to his foes. Nor did he suf-
fer any thing to be wondered at. For a man holy, temperate,
and prudent, will never be deceived entirely “respecting un-
holy things, respecting the soul of such.” But it would per-
haps be not wonderful, should he suffer the suffering of a good
pilot,” from whom a storm about to be has not entirely lain
hid; but from whom the violence unusually great and unex-
pected of tempests may have lain hid, and, having lain hid,
have by their force overwhelmed him. The same thing upon a
small scale” caused Dion to stumble. For they, who tripped
* Between trapaks), simtat and 3rog there seems to have dropt out
Taürö trouñoat, a fact that appears to have escaped Ficinus; who has con-
sequently given here a translation not answering to the Greek.
* As this wºrö 'pmduoptérww is at variance with the subsequent pur) card
Öikmv, and the preceding mention of acts of violence done by the victori-
ous party during a revolution, one would prefer tºr' of lymptopuérov, “by
not—voting,” i.e. by power.
*—* The Greek is Šalog yöp &v6pwrog &voorian, Trépt, and at the end
of the sentence Tijg lºvyńg röv rototrow ºrépt: which I cannot under-
stand. The version of Ficinus is, “Pium enim virum temperatumque
et prudentem omnino quidem in rebus ejusmodi impii nunquam fallunt.”
From which it is easy to see that he found in his M.S. not divoo ſwy Trépt,
but trap' divogia, v, i.e. “by unholy persons,” to whose unholy doings is
to be referred the expression Totoirwy Trépt.
* So I have translated 6t' ÖXuyiqrary, which Bekker has rejected,
with one M.S., although acknowledged by “aliquantum ” in Ficinus.
EPISTLE VIII. 539
him up, did not lie hid from him, as being wicked men; but
what a depth of ignorance, and of the rest of depravity, and
of greediness insatiable they possessed, this did lie hid; and
stumbling on this point, he lies (dead), and Sicily wraps in
sorrow infinite.
What therefore I advise you to do, after the facts just now
detailed, has been nearly told, and let them be told." But it
appeared to me necessary to show, why I undertook the second
journey to Sicily, *and, as it were, of somewhat a compulsory”
kind, on account of the absurdity and irrationality attached to
the transactions. If then what has been now said has appeared
to any one to be more reasonable, and it seems to any one that
the excuses for what have occurred are sufficient, what has
been now said will have been (said) moderately and suffi-
ciently (well).”
EPISTLE VIII.
FLATO TO THE RELATIONS AND FRIENDS OF DION.—
PROSPERITY.
By considering what matters (correctly)* you will do well
in reality, I will endeavour, according to my power, to go
through in detail. And I hope I shall advise what is condu-
cive not to you alone, "especially at least however to you,”
Plato wrote, I suspect, 6t’ &Aoytotov, “through things not to be calculated
upon,” similar to the preceding & Trpooëókmrov.
"—" The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.
*—” Ficinus has “quasi compulsus,” as if he had found in his MS.
āpiśw rºv čevrépav kai tu &vaykaiov oiov, in lieu of āºpuštv Tijv Ševrépay
&vaykaiov sivat—where Stephens was the first to object to the pleonasm
in &vaykaiov sivat and the subsequent 3siv. -
* In lieu of sin, the sense requires sº sim, as I have translated.
* Stephens endeavours to defend "A 68 thus placed at the commence-
ment of a letter, not aware that 38 s a corruption of Eij, for thus st;
6tavom6ávrég would be properly balanced by et Tpárrotre.
*—" The Greek is pu&\torá ye pºv piv, which I confess I cannot un-
derstand. Ficinus has “sed vobis quidem maxime.” I could have under-
stood rá čvpupépovra pučAvata, kará Ye votiv špov, i. e. “most conducive
according to my mind:” where lies hid a dramatic fragment, MáXtc ra
suppépovra kará Ye votiv Špačv.
540 JºBISTLE VIII.
and secondly to all those at Syracuse, and thirdly to your
foes (at home) and enemies (abroad), unless some one of them
shall have been guilty of an unholy act. For these things
are incurable, nor can any one ever wash them out." But
bear in mind what I now say.
The tyranny having been dissolved through the whole of
Sicily, there is now with you an universal strife about these
very things; some wishing to resume the former go-
vernment; but "others to put the finish to the escape from
tyranny.” Now the counsel relating to such matters appears
on each occasion to the multitude to be right, that it is requi-
site to advise what will effect the greatest evils to foes, and
the greatest good to friends. It is however by no means easy
for him, who inflicts many evils on others, not to suffer many
himself. Nor is it necessary to go far to see this clearly ;
but what has taken place “here and there” relating to Sicily
would suffice; * while some are attempting to do, and others
to ward off the doers; and by relating them as a tale to others;
ye would become on each occasion competent instructors. In
these matters then there is scarcely any difficulty. But what
would be conducive to all, both foes and friends, or the least
of an evil to both, this it is neither easy to see, nor for a per-
son seeing to accomplish. The consultation of such a kind
and the attempt to speak look like a prayer. Let it then
be in every respect a prayer. For it is meet to begin from
the gods in every thing, both in speaking and thinking;
and may it eventually indicate to us some such discourse as
this.
* Although there appears at first sight little to offend in the words obs
&v troré rig airá škvilysts, yet on such an occasion there should be a re-
ference not to a person washing out a stain, but to a river, as in Soph.
CEd. T. 1218, Oluat yápotºr’ &v "Iorpov otºrs pāow &v Nilai ka9appiq,
rāvös rºv greyi)w. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, Oùk áv Tror' "Iorpog
airá y' \kvitlistsváv, which was a line probably of Sophocles, imitated
by Seneca in Hippol. 715, Quis eluet me Tanais ?
*—” The translation of Ficinus is too remarkable to be omitted, “alii
tyrannidis memoriam omnem prorsus extinguere.”
*—” The Greek is rā6s airoi trepi. Ficinus omits the words ráðs
airoij, which he could not understand, nor can I. Hence I have translated,
as if the Greek were Tijós T'airoi Ts trepi—
* Ficinus has, what the sense requires, “satis exemplo nobis esse possint,’
to which there is nothing to answer in the Greek, unless we read—dºp-
soin fiv, a &\\oug—in lieu of 6 kāv ć)\Aoic—
EPISTLE VIII. 541
From the time that the war began, nearly cne family has
been ruling over both you and your enemies; whom your
fathers established firmly, when they came into all kinds of
difficulty at the period, when there was to that part of Sicily
under Greeks a danger extreme of their becoming Barbarians,
through their being entirely overthrown by the Carthaginians.
At that time they chose Dionysius, as being a person young
and warlike; for the affairs of war suited him; but Hip-
parinus, his superior in age, as an adviser; and both, for the
Safety of Sicily, with absolute power, calling them, as they
say, tyrants. Now whether any one is willing to think that a
divine fortune and a god, or the talents of the rulers, or both,
together with the citizens of that time, were the cause of the
safety of Sicily, let this be as he conceives. Safety however
did take place to the men of that time. As then they were
in such a state, it was surely just to return thanks to their
preservers. But if the tyranny did in after-times use some-
what improperly the gift of the city, for this it has partly had
accusations' against it, and let it partly suffer the punishment.
But what accusations would have been necessarily correct
after what had occurred to them. For if you had been able
to escape from them easily and without great danger and
trouble, or they to recover easily again their power, it would
not have been possible to give the advice about to be spoken.
But now it is requisite for both of you to bear and call to
mind, how often each of you have been in the hope of fancy-
ing yourselves to want only a mere trifle towards the accom-
plishment of every thing according to your mind. Now, this
very trifle happens on each occasion to be the cause of great and
numberless mischiefs; nor has yet any end been reached; but
the old end” seems to be ever combining” with a new beginning;
and by this circle (of events), the whole of the tyrannic and
popular kind (of government) will be near to be destroyed;
and the whole of Sicily, should some event probable, but to be
deprecated, take place, will come to nearly a desert, as regards
1 In lieu of Öikag rāg, three MSS. read Öukaarāg : and so Ficinus
found in his M.S., as shown by his “judices,” contrary to the genius of
the language.
*—” The Greek is £vvárrst—rexévrij Šokoúca. The sense requires, as
I have translated, §vyárrºw—ts\svrij ºv čokoúca.
542 EPISTLE VIII.
the language of Greece, by being transferred to some Phoeni-
cian or Opie" dynasty and power. Against this it is requisite
for all the Greeks, with all readiness, to prepare” a remedy.
Now if any one has any thing more correct and better than
what will be said by myself, let him bring it forward, and be
justly called a lover of Greece.
But what now presents itself to me, I will with all free-
dom of speech, and making use of a mediatory and just dis-
course, endeavour to point out. I declare then. speaking in
the manner of an arbitrator,” to two persons, one ruling over,
and the other ruled by, a tyrant, my old advice, as if given to
each singly.” And now my language of advice would be for
every tyrant to fly from the name and the thing itself, and
to change his power as a tyrant, if possible, into that of a king.
And possible it is, as the wise and good Lycurgus showed by
his acts; who, on seeing that the family of his relations in Ar-
gos and Messene had proceeded from kings to tyrants, and had
been destroying both themselves, and each his own city, felt a
fear both for his country and race, and applied as a remedy the
government of elderly men, and the bond* of the Ephori, as
a preservative of kingly rule; so that it has been preserved
for so many generations with glory; since law became the
lord and” authorized king of men, and not men the tyrants
over the laws. To this my discourse now exhorts all men,
aiming at tyranny, that they turn away themselves, and fly
with celerity, from the felicity of men insatiably" hungry and
without mind, and that they endeavour to come round to a form
of kingly government, and to become subservient to laws
made by a king, and thus to obtain the greatest honours with
the consent both of men and laws.
* The Opici were the ancient inhabitants of Campania, in the southern
part of Italy.
* Literally “to cut.” On the phrase répyetv páppakov see Blomfield
on AEsch. Agam. 16.
*—” Ficinus evidently did not find in his MS. what is here read in
the other MSS., for his version is, “quemadmodum jamdiu consuevi, tam
exercenti quam patienti tyrannidem, consulam—”
* I have adopted from a var. lect. in one MS., Ösopov in lieu of Öaopuðv
which Ficinus has omitted. Taylor translates it “division—”
* I have followed Stephens, who proposed to insert kai before 3aouxsic—
* Instead of dººr\fforq, Heusde suggested &rAñorwg, found subse-
quently in two MSS.
EPISTLE VIII. 543
But those, who are in the pursuit of free institutions, and
are flying from a servile yoke as an evil, I would advise to
be cautious lest, through an insatiable desire for unseasonable
liberty, they fall at some time into the disease of their ances-
tors; which the persons of that period suffered through an
excessive anarchy, from making a bad use" of their measure-
less love of freedom. For the Siceliotes, who possessed the
power” before Dionysius and Hipparinus, lived as they
thought happily, because they lived luxuriously, and ruled
over even rulers themselves; for they pelted and stoned to
death” the ten military chiefs prior to Dionysius, having
judged them according to no law, in order that they might
not be the slaves of any one either with justice or law as the
despot, but be in every way entirely free. From hence
arose the tyrannies over them. For slavery and freedom,
when excessive, are each an evil; but, when moderate, alto-
gether a good; for moderate is the slavery to a god, but that
to a man immoderate; and, to temperate men god is a law, but
to the intemperate, pleasure.
Since then such is naturally the case, what I am advising,
I exhort the friends of Dion to proclaim to all the Syracu-
sans, as the common advice of Dion and myself. But I will
interpret what, had he been living and able, he would have
said4 to you. What then was the reasoning, some one may say,
which the advice of Dion shows forth to us touching the pre-
sent state of affairs? It was this.
“Receive, O Syracusans, before all things such laws,
as appear to you not about to turn your thoughts or de-
sires to money-making and wealth ; but as there are three
things, soul, body, and moreover wealth, put the worth"
of the soul in the place of highest honour; that of the body
* Ficinus has “abusi,” as if his MS. read karaxpúpus wou, not Xptºptevou.
* Bekker has adopted àpáávrov from two MSS., but Stalbaum has re-
tained &pgavrec: which Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by “qui-
gubernabant—”
* Ficinus has “deposuerunt atque pepulerunt,” as if he had found in
his MS. karéX voav čkſłóXXovrsg. But Bekker has edited more correctly
from other MSS. karéXévoſav 3&\\ovreg—
* From “diceret,” in Ficinus, Stephens suggested eitrev čv in lieu of
sizrev–The correction is attributed to Bekker by Stalbaum.
* Taylor’s translation is, “it is requisite that that care of the soul
should rank:” who has thus followed the text of Stephens, ŠtrupuéAétav
#xeuv Šei, in lieu of which six MSS read dipërjv čvrºporárºv trotoivreg—
544 - EPISTLE W III.
in the second, but under the soul; but in the third and
last, that of wealth, as being the slave both of the body
and soul. Now the institution, that effects this, will be a law
rightly laid down by you, and render those, who make use of
it, truly happy. But the language, which calls the rich happy,
is itself unhappy, as being the senseless language of women
and children; and it makes those who are persuaded of it of
the same kind.' Now that I am exhorting you to what is
true, you will know in fact, if you shall try what has now
been said by me on the subject of laws, by having received
such laws,” which appears to be the truest test in all cases.
For since danger is keeping down Sicily, and you are neither
sufficiently the conquerors nor manifestly the conquered, it
will perhaps be just and conducive to all of you to take a
middle path, both those who are flying from the severity of
power and those who desire to have it again; the ancestors of
whom did in their time, what is a thing of the greatest mo-
ment, preserve the Greeks from the Barbarians; so that it
is now lawful to hold discourse about a form of government.
For had they perished then, there would have been left no
where nor any how either a discourse or hope. Now then, let
there be to some a liberty combined with kingly government;
but to others a kingly government under control, by the laws
having a despotic power not only over the other citizens, but
over the kings themselves, should they act contrary to the law.
And in addition to all this, do ye together with the gods, in a
spirit guileless and sincere, appoint a king; first my own
son on account of two-fold favours, from myself and father.
For he at that period freed the city from the Barbarians; but
I have now done so twice from tyrants, as yourselves are the
witnesses; and make him the second king, who has the same
name as his own father, I mean the son of Dionysius, for the
sake of the assistance which he now affords, and of his pious
conduct; who, born from a father who was a tyrant, has volun-
tarily made the city free, and obtained for himself and his race
similar to “virtutem animi maxime anteponant” in the genuine version
of Ficinus.
* i. e. “ senseless.”
* I have united the words Šešápsvot 68 roëg rototrovc vöplovc, and
changed 68 into 31), to avoid the necessity of an absolute sentence, and to
carry out the train of ideas.
EPISTLE VIII. 545
ever-living honour, instead of a tyranny lasting for a day,
and at the same time unjust. To become the third king of
Syracuse it is proper to invite Dionysius the son of Dionysius,
if willing, over a willing city, who is now the general of the
enemy’s army; if he will consent of his own accord to change
himself into the form of a king, while fearing his fortunes and
commiserating his country and the want of attention shown
to sacred rites and sepulchres, and lest through a love of con-
tention he shall destroy everything in every way, and become
an object for Barbarians to rejoice over.
These three kings do ye, whether giving or depriving them
of the power they possess at Lacedæmon, by common con-
sent establish after some such manner as this, which has in-
deed been mentioned to you before ; but still do ye hear it
now again. If the family of Dionysius and Hipparinus are
willing for the safety of Sicily to cease from their present ills,
and to obtain honour for themselves and family, both for the
future and the present time, on this condition, call them as I
have said before, (to power,) appointing as ambassadors with
full powers for the reconciliation, whomsoever they wish ;
whether they are from their own country, or strangers, or both ;
and as many as they shall agree to. And let it be for them
on their arrival first to lay down laws, and a form of govern-
ment, such that in it the kings are to be with full power over
things sacred, and whatever else it is fitting for those, who
are the benefactors of their country; and to make guardians,
thirty-five in number, of the laws; and for these, together with
the people and senate, to have the rule on questions of war
and peace ; and to establish different courts of justice, some
for one purpose, and others for others; but for the thirty-five
guardians of the laws to be the judges of death and banish-
ment; and that in addition to these for jurymen to be chosen from
those, who during the last year have been in office, one from
each office, who may have been voted the best and most upright;
and that these during the following year are to decide on such
points as relate to the death and imprisonment and removal
of the citizens; but for the king to be not permitted to be a jury-
man in such matters, as being a priest, and undefiled by murder,
bonds, and banishment. These things I, when living, intended
* Ficinus alone has “ad regnum.”
2 N
546 EPISTLE V III.
to take place for your benefit, and so I intend now ;' and then
indeed, after having with you overcome my enemies, I should,
had not foreign” furies prevented me, established matters in
the way I intended; and subsequently, if deeds had followed
upon thoughts, I would have colonized the rest of Sicily,
after depriving the Barbarians of the land which they now
occupy, with the exception of such as had fought for a common
liberty against tyranny ; and Iwould have reinstated the former
inhabitants of Grecian places in their ancient and paternal
abodes. The very same things do I even now advise you to
think upon and to execute, and to invite all to these doings;
but to consider the person, who is unwilling to do aught, as a
common enemy. Nor is this impossible. For he who judges
those things to be impossible, which happen to be in the souls of
two persons, and which it is easy to discover from reasoning
are the best, does not think correctly. Now by the two, I
mean the soul of Hipparinus the son of Dionysius, and that of
my son. For if these two agree together, to the rest of the
Syracusans, and all who have any care for their country, I
think (the same things)” will appear to be correct. But pay-
ing to all the gods honours combined with prayers, and to
others also, whom it is proper, together with the gods, do ye
persuade and exhort both friends and those at variance, gently
and altogether,” nor stand apart, until what has now been
stated by us, like god-Sent dreams standing over those awake,
you shall work out clearly, and bring to a happy end.”
* This would seem to be a strange expression in the mouth of a dead
person, were it not that the ancients thought as it would appear that the
dead had the same feelings and pursuits as they had when living, as shown
by Virgil in AEn. vi. 653.
* I cannot understand Ševukai épwvösc, nor could Ficinus; whose ver-
sion is “externi furiaeque,” as if he had found in his MS. śćvow kai épty-
vögg. But the disorder, although seated somewhat deeper, would not,
I think, be difficult to cure.
* To complete the sense and syntax, I have translated as if rairá had
dropt out before toig óA\oug: where rs in one MS. after roic and rs in
another, have unitedly preserved a portion of the missing word, while àw
has dropt out after traouv.
* In tråvrag there is an evident error.
EPISTLE IX. 547
EPISTLE IX.
PLATO TO ARCHYTAS OF TARENTUM–PROSPERITY.
ARCHIPPUS and Philonides' have come to us, bringing
with them the letter which you gave them, and relating the
state of your affairs.” Such things then, as appertain to the city,
they have accomplished without difficulty; for they were not
in every respect laborious. But as to what relates to yourself,
they said that you bear it ill in not being able to be released
from your close attention to public affairs. Now that it is in-
deed the most pleasant thing in life for a man to attend to
his own affairs, especially if he chooses to do what you are
doing, is evident nearly to every one; but you ought also to
consider this, * that each of us is not born for himself alone;
but that our country claims one part of our birth, our parents
another, and our friends the remainder.” Much too is given
to the occasions, that overtake us in life. Since then your
country calls* you to public affairs, it would perhaps be ab-
Surd not to hearken;" for at the same time too it happens that
(you) leave a place for inferior men, who take the road to
politics not for the best. But of these things enough. At
present we are taking care of Echecrates,” and shall do so for
* Although the phrase of trept ruva sometimes means the parties attached
to any person, yet here it is to be applied to the person himself. See at
Hipp. Maj. § 2.
* Ficinus has “de rebus tuis.” For his MS. read, no doubt, trepi in-
stead of trapá, and omitted Trapá oroi, just afterwards, as he does.
*—” To this saying of Plato Cicero refers, De Offic. i. 7, 22: “Prae-
clare Scriptum est a Platone, “non nobis solum Inati Sumus, Ortusque nos-
tri partem patria vindicat, partem amici:’” and again, De Finibus, ii. 14.
But as in both passages he omits all mention of the parents, it is evident
that he quoted from memory; nor did he know that Plato merely put into
prose, what he found in the following tristich, probably of Euripides—
"Ekagrog juáv yé yovey oix airº pºvov; Tô pºv yap ºpºv ºff Trat pig
pspížstat. Tö 6' oi rskóvtsc, rô 6’ 3rt Nottröv oi (pi\ot. Whence we
must read rô 6’ 3rt Nottröv in lieu of ré 6' oi Novºroi (pi\ot, where oi Novºroi
is perfectly unintelligible. A similar idea is to be found in Lucan ; who
says that Cato, “Non sibised toti natum se credidit orbi.”
* On a voice thus given to one’s country, see Cicero Catilin. i. 7.
* Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I cannot think
Plato wrote.
* Of this Echecrates mention is º in the Phaedo, p. 88, D. § 85.
2 N
548 EPISTLE X. XI.
the remainder of the time both for your sake, and that of his
father Phrynion, and of the young man himself.
EPISTLE X.
PLATO TO ARISTODORUS—PROSPERITY
I HEAR that you are now amongst the chief of the friends
of Dion, and have been all through exhibiting a conduct the
most wise in things relating to philosophy. For I assert that
firmness, fidelity, and integrity, is true philosophy. But as to
the rest of wisdom and skill, which tend to other things, I con-
ceive that by calling them elegant subtleties, I am giving them
a correct appellation, But now farewell; and abide in the
conduct in which you are now abiding.
EPISTLE XI.
PLATO TO LAODAMAS–PROSPERITY.
I HAVE written to you before, that your coming to Athens
makes a great difference with respect to all you say. But
since you assert it is impossible, the second step after this is
for myself to come, if possible, or Socrates," as you have said
in your letter. Socrates however at present labours under
the infirmity of a strangury; and it would be unseemly in
me to come and not accomplish that, for which you are in-
viting me; but that such will take place I have not great hopes;
but why (I Say so) would require a long letter, were I to go
through all the reasons. Moreover I am on account of my age
not sufficiently well in body to be wandering about and to
risk the dangers, which (a person) meets” with by land and sea;
and at the present every thing in travelling is full of danger.
* This Socrates is supposed to be the one mentioned in the Statesman,
* I have translated as if rug had dropt out after &tavrá.
EPISTI,E XII. 549
I have it however in my power to advise you ! and the co-
lonists' what Hesiod through me, as the relater, says,
To fancy’s easy, to think deep is hard.
For if they fancy that a city can be ever well put into order
by the mere laying down of any laws whatever, without some
person” in authority having the care of the daily manner of
living in the city, in order that it maybe, in the case both of slaves
and of free-born, temperate and manly, they do not think cor-
1ectly. But if there are persons worthy of this very office,
this should take place. But if there is a need of some one to
instruct them, I think there are not amongst you either a per-
son to teach, or those to be taught ; it remains then for you
to pray to the gods.”. . . . For nearly in this way have cities in
former times been put into order, and subsequently well ad-
ministered,” during the concurrence of matters of great mo-
ment, which have happened amidst war and other transac-
tions, when a man shall have arisen on such occasions, with
bodily and mental qualifications, and in the possession of large
powers. But previously it is meet to feel a readiness (to act),
and it is necessary to think deeply upon what I am saying,
and not to behave sillily through thinking that you can do any
thing off-hand. Be good fortune thine.
EPISTLE XII.5
PLATO TO ARCHYTAS OF TARENTUM–PROSPERITY.
How wonderfully delighted did we receive the memorials
which came from you, and admired in the greatest possible
"—" The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although
found in Ficinus.
* Six MSS. read Tuva, in lieu of ru, answering to “aliquis” in Ficinus.
* Here is evidently a lacuna. The sense of the missing words was
to this effect, “to send some divine teacher, and disciples with minds will-
ing to be taught.”
* In lieu of ºfficmo av, five MSS. offer ºrigðmaav, similar to “excultae
Sunt '' in Ficinus.
* The genuineness of this letter has been contested, as we learn frcm
all the MSS.
550 EPISTLE XIII.
manner "every thing of the writer's." To us he appeared a
man worthy of his celebrated ancestors. For they are said
to have been ten thousand” in number; and they were, as the
story handed down declares, the best of all” those Trojans, who
during the reign of Laomedon removed themselves from their
native land.
With respect to the memorials in my possession, about
which you have sent to me, they are not yet in a sufficient
state. However, such as they are, I have sent them to you.
With respect to the safe cure of them, we are of one mind, so
that there is no need of exhortation.
EPISTLE XIII.
PLATO TO DIONYSIUS, TYRANT OF SYRACUSE—PROSPERITY.
*LET the commencement of the letter and at the same time
the symbol, be that it is from me.*
When you were once feasting some young men of Locri, and
were reclining at table at a distance from myself, you rose up
(and came) to me, and courteously addressed to me a kind
word, as it seemed to me and to the person reclining by me.
Now he was one of the handsome youths, who said at that
time—Surely, Dionysius, you are benefited much, with respect
to wisdom, by Plato. Whereupon you observed—And with
respect to many other things; especially since the time of my
*—" In lieu of roi, Ypápavrog airá, which is hardly intelligible, I have
translated as if the Greek were rà roi Ypáil/avtog Trávra-
* Instead of pºpuot, Diogen. Laert. viii. 81, offers Mvpaiot, i. e. the
people of Myrae, a town in Lycia. One MS. has uvêaiot.
* The Greek is oirot 3' joav Tóv—áya.0ot. But five MSS. & tróvrov
for röv, similar to “omnium ” in Ficinus; from whose “praestantissimi’”
it is easy to see that in oirot, which could not be thus repeated, lies hid
fuáAuora, to be united to dya Boi.
*—" The Greek is 'Apyri ooi kai äua £ipſłokov—Éort. But cor-
rect language would require à dipx?)—kai—rö £ipſ?oxov—ijket. Moreover
I have some doubts about àpia : in lieu of which I should prefer juiv–
for the oripiſo}\ov was known to both Plato and Dionysius—or else kai
row; &#130Åov. With regard to the nature of the očugo}\ov, Bentley
conceived it was the superscription at v 6eqi, mentioned below.
EPISTLE XIII. 551
sending for him, through this very thing "[because I had
sent for him].' I have been benefited forthwith.
This then I must keep in mind, in order that our mutual
benefit may be to us ever on the increase. And in prepara-
tion for this event I am sending *a person of the Pythagorean
and the divisions,” as it seemed to me then, of whom both you
and Archytas, if indeed Archytas has come to you, will be
able to make use. His name is Helicon; his family is of
Cyzicum ; and he is a disciple of Eudoxus; with all of whose
doctrines he is elegantly conversant; and still further, he
has associated with one of the disciples of Isocrates, and with
Polyxenus, one of the friends of Bryson; and, what is more-
over a rare thing, he is neither disagreeable to meet with, nor
like an ill-mannered person, but would seem rather to be vo-
latile and of an easy temper. I say this however with some
fear, as I am expressing an opinion respecting a man, who is
no mean an animal, and one easily changed, except in the
case of some few persons and on a few points; and with
respect to him I am thinking with fear and without confidence,
as I have met with him myself, and made inquiry of his fellow-
citizens, and not one of them has said a bad word against the
man. Do you therefore reflect yourself, and exercise caution.
But above all things take lessons from him, and study philo-
sophy upon any other points, if you have any leisure; but if
not, set him to teach some one,” so that you may, when at
leisure, by learning become better, and in good repute,” in
order that in your being benefited by myself there may be, in
your case, no remission.
"—" The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
*—” The Greek is rejv 6taupéosov, for which H. Walesius wished to read
røvöl aipéosov or rövös aipégeov. But the deictic pronoun would be here
unintelligible. Nor can I understand kai ävöpa. Perhaps Plato wrote
Tøv 'Ira)\ig aipéosov iravöv čvöpa, i.e. “a man sufficiently versed in the
Pythagorean doctrines and the sects in Italy.” Compare Plutarch De
Socratis Genio, ii. p. 579, viii. p. 289, R., ávöpa yewvaiov—perä yevvaiac
-á%typévov rijg trpoaupégswg—áč 'Ita\tag rejv IIv6ayopikºv.
* In lieu of ruva, which is not sufficiently definite, I should prefer
Yövata. For amongst the ancients not a few women, such as Aspasia,
and Diotima, and others, were given to philosophy; a list of whom has
been collected by Menage, and appended to his notes on Diogenes
Laertius.
* I cannot understand here siłóočjc. I could have understood śvöeiège,
“you may show—”
552 EPISTILE XIIHe
With regard to the articles you bade me send you, I have
caused to be made the Apollo," which Leptines is bringing, by
a young and clever workman. His name is Leochares. There
was another work by him, very elegant, as it appeared to me.
I therefore purchased it, wishing to present it to your wife;
because she had attended me both in health and sickness in a
manner worthy of me and you. Present it then to her, un-
less it seems otherwise good to you. I send you likewise
twelve jars of Sweet wine for your children, and two of honey.
But I came too late for putting up the dried figs; and all the
myrtles, that had been put up for you, have rotted. I will
however take better care at another time. Leptines will tell
you about the plants.
The money in silver for these things” and for the contribu-
tions of some persons to the state I have received from Lep-
times; and told him, what appears to me to be the most be-
coming and true to state, that, what I had expended on the
Leucadian vessel, amounting to nearly eleven minae, was mine.
This therefore I have taken; *and after taking, I have made
use of it myself, and I have sent away these to you.” As to
what follows with regard to the money, hear how the cas:
stands. I shall make use of your money, as I told you then
in the same way as I do that of my other acquaintances; bu
I use it in as small quantities as possible; (for)* such things as
seem to be necessary or just or becoming to myself or to the
person, from whom I may receive it. Now something of this
kind has happened to me. Of my nieces, who died at the
period, when I was not crowned, although you had ordered
it, there are four daughters living ; one is of a marriageable
age; another eighteen years old; another a little more than
1 The statue of Apollo, here alluded to, is, I suspect, the one still exist-
ing under the name of the “Apollo Belvidere.”
3 The Greek is sic raúra #vska re roërov kai sigqopóv. But Évéka
rojray is superfluous after eig raûta. Plato, I suspect, wrote, what I have
translated, eig Taira kai Tà éio popév ruvøv.
3–? I confess I cannot understand kai Aaſºv airóc rs $xpmočpany
kai juiv rair’âtréirsuiba. The sense evidently required is kai TáAAa
Xağdy of rag #xpmočiumv cai úpiv rá Xout' étrºpºpa, i.e. “ and having
taken the rest of the money, I have employed it in this way, and have
sent you the remainder.”
* In lieu of 30a, correct Greek requires sig 60a–On this use of eig,
see Aristoph. Plut. 983, Öpáxuag—eikoo w Eig tuártov. Ökrö, Ö' àv eig
intročáHara.
FPISTLE XIII. 553
three years old; and another not yet one year old. All
these it will be for myself and friends' to give out in mar-
riage, should I survive them; but let those, whom I do not
survive, *fare as they may ;” while for those, whose fathers
may become richer than myself, I shall not have to provide.
At present however my means are greater than theirs. For
the marriage of their mothers likewise I have provided with
the aid of others and of Dion. One of them is married to
Speusippus, of whose sister she is the daughter. For this
one there is need of not more than thirty minae; since the
marriage portions given by myself are moderate. Moreover
should my mother die, there would be need of not more than
ten minae for erecting her tomb. Such are the sums requisite
at present for what are almost necessaries. But should any
other expense occur, of a private or public nature, through
my coming to you, it will be requisite, as I stated then, for
me to labour” and to make a vigorous effort for the expen-
diture to be the least possible; but where I am unable (to do
aught), for the expense to be yours. “What I mean after this
touching the expenditure on the other hand” of your money
at Athens," is in the first place this;" that should it be need-
ful for me to expend any thing on a choregy," or any office of
that kind, there is no friend” of yours here, who will advance
it for you, as I imagine; since even if it made a great differ-
ence to you, that a sum would, if expended, be a benefit to
you, but an injury, if it were not expended and delayed,
until some one should arrive from yourself, such a circum-
stance would turn out” disgraceful in addition to its being
detrimental. For of this I have a proof by having sent Eras-
tus to Andromedes of Ægina; from whom, as being your
* Amongst these was probably Dion, who, as we learn from Diogenes
Laertius iii. 3, furnished the means to enable Plato to undertake a cho-
regy at Athens.
*-* In Greek Xaips is used in a good sense; but Xaupéra in a bad one;
just as in Latin “vale,” and “valeas.”
* I have translated as if the Greek were arovsiv, not trouéiv.
*—" The Greek is rô 6m pºra Taüra Aéyw—Tspi rāv gév at Xpmuárov–
where I cannot understand pietà Taijra, and still less at-
"—" I have translated as if the Greek were £ort roi to trpárov pºv, 3rs
#dv—not 3ru Tptorov–
* On the choregy and all the matters connected with it, see Donaldson’s
Theatre of the Greeks.
* Literally “a friend connected by ties of hospitality.”
* The Sense requires éora, what I have translated, not ori—
554 EPISTI,E XIII.
friend, you ordered me to get, what I wanted, as you wished
him to send even more than you had stated by letter. But
he said, what was reasonable and as any person would do,
that he had previously laid out money for your father, and
had with difficulty got it back again; and that he would now
advance a small sum, but nothing more. Thus Ireceived a some-
thing from Leptines; and for this it is proper to praise Leptines,
not only for having advanced the money, but for doing so
readily; and he was in other respects, by speaking of you, and
performing what he could, evidently a friend to your interests.
For it is meet, respecting such matters and the contrary, for
me to tell you in what light each person has appeared to me
as regards yourself. On the subject of money, at least, I shall
speak with freedom; for it is just ; and at the same time I
shall be speaking about persons near you, of whom I have
some experience; who, after previously stating on each
occasion what they think they shall expend for you, do not
subsequently mention' the subject, as if forsooth they should
be disagreeable to you. Do you then accustom them and even
compel them to speak upon these points and others too. For you
ought to know the whole, as far as you can, and to be a judge,
and not to fly from knowing. For this will be the best for your
government. For, as regards other things, and the possession
itself of money, *you too have said, and will say, that it is
good to know,” that the expenditure is made correctly and cor-
rectly accounted for. Let not then those, who profess to care
for you, bring a reproach upon yourself in the eyes of man-
kind. For this appears to be neither good nor fair to your
reputation, “in the case of your agreements.”
"—" The Greek is oi ºrpoo'ayyáA\ovreg—eiorayyáXXsty, oùk #6&Movors
wrpooayyáAAew. But arpooayyáXX8w could not be thus repeated; nor, if it
could, would eioa.) VéXX8w be thus introduced between the repeated
verb. Stephens' version, for the whole epistle is wanting in Ficinus, is
“Qui tibi assidue pollicentur se de iis sumptibus, quos faciendos arbitran-
tur, te admonituros, admonere tamen nolunt—” which has led me to Sug-
gest that eioayyáXXsuv is a corruption for sic rā od &v rs2\siv–For rexéiv
is thus perpetually used in the sense “ of paying,” as shown by Ast in
“Lexicon Platonicum ; ” while to preserve the balance of the sentence,
we must read ºrpoayyáA\ovreg as opposed to arpoo'ayyáA\suv: and so I
have translated.
*—” Instead of kai or 67) ºg áya.001. kai pågsvg, which I cannot under-
stand, the sense evidently requires kai ori, y' #png &ya.0öv eiðval kai
phoevg—
*—” In lieu of Öokei Šēpſ30Åov, three MSS. read Öoksi aig £5p30Åov, four
IºE’ISTLE XIII. 555
In what follows I shall speak of Dion. Upon other points
I am not able to speak, before the letters, which" you have
mentioned. arrive from yourself. But upon those, which you
did not permit me to mention to him, I have mentioned no-
thing, nor conversed at all. I have merely tried whether he
bears ill or easily *what is reported; and it seems to me that
he will not brook it quietly, if it should turn out a fact.” But
in other respects Dion appears to me to use moderation both
in word and deed.
Let us present to Cratinus, the brother of Timotheus, and
my friend, a breastplate of the handsome kind worn by the
heavy-armed foot soldiers, and to the daughters of Cebes three
outer-dresses, seven cubits long, not, however, of the expen-
sive kind from Amorgus,” but of Sicilian linen.4 With the
name of Cebes you are duly acquainted; for he is mentioned
in the Socratic dialogues, as holding, together with Simmias,
a conversation with Socrates [in the dialogue]* respecting the
soul, and as a man of the same clique with, and well disposed
to, all of us.
Of the symbol relating to my letters, I think you have a
recollection touching such as I write with care and such as I
do not; nevertheless, reflect upon it, and bear it in mind.
For many persons insist upon my writing, whom it is not
easy to put off. The more important letter a god commences,
but the less, gods.”
§oksiv aig £ipſ30Åov, and two Óoksi &ipſ3ovXov. Hence it is easy to elicit
Öokei sig £vpuſ?6Aata, as I have translated.
* The Greek is 60 trap Épng—Stephens’ version is, “quas dicis,” as if
he wished to read &otrep #pmg.
*—” I cannot understand otost yuyvouévalv–si yüyvouro. I have trans-
hº as if the Greek were otoel Tô Asyópºevov, which is at least intel-
igible.
* Amorgus, one of the Cyclades, was famous for its fine flax or cotton,
as We learn from the Greek Lexicographers quoted by Berkelius on Steph.
Byz. "Apopyog. •
* This allusion to the flax of Sicily is rather strange. For that island
was celebrated rather for its wool; unless it be said that Plato wrote
Amvéov, not \vdiv. For Hesych. has Añºvel' piq, from AEsch. Eum. 44.
* The Greek is #v tº Tspi puxāg \6) p. But Šv rqi A679 could not
be thus repeated after Šv roic Xokparstowg \óyotc.
* Had Plato meant to say, as Bentley supposed, that the more import-
ant letters were indicated by the words ov 05:5, and the less by giv 6soig,
some reason would have been given, I think, for this change of number.
Hence in lieu of 6soi, I would read 684. For by the masculine 6ség was
556 EPISTLE XIIHe *
The ambassadors likewise have requested me to write, as
was natural. For they very heartily praise both you and me
every where; and not the least Philagrus, who at that time,"
had something the matter with his hand; and Philaides, who
has come from the great king,” has spoken about you; and
if I had not had matter for a long letter, I would have written
down what he said; but at present inquire of Leptines.
: Should you send the breastplate or any thing else, about
which I have written, intrust them to any you wish ; or
otherwise to Terillus.” He is one of those, who is continu
ally sailing (to and fro), and is attached to myself, and upon
other subjects, and those too relating to philosophy, is a person
of elegant mind, and is a relation of Tison,” who was, at the
time when I sailed away, the prefect of the city.”
May you increase in health and philosophy, and convert
others, who are younger, to it; and embrace for me all our
fellow-sphaerists,” and enjoin the others and Aristocritus,
meant the superior power of mind; but by the feminine 683, the inferior
power of matter. *
* Here, as elsewhere in this letter, by Tórs, “at that time,” is intended
the last sojourn of Plato in Sicily; unless it be said that Tórs is some-
times put for Trots, an idea first promulgated by Markland on Eurip.
Suppl. 551, Iph. A. 46, and adopted by Brunck on Aristoph. Thesm. 13,
Plut. 1117, Soph. El. 278, and Schaefer in Julian. Praef. p. iv.
* By “the great king,” is meant the king of Persia.
* Although Tnpi\\p might perhaps stand here, yet the word was pro-
bably TImpi}\\p, the name of the Sicilian machinist, who invented the
brazen bull for Phalaris.
* The person here called Tiowy is, I suspect, the same as Tugiag, men-
tioned in Epist. 7.
* Lobeck on Phrynichus, p. 681, refers to Mazochi Tabul. Heracleens.
p. 205, where the verb Troxlavousiv is found. It would seem that at Syra-
cuse there was an officer called IIoMuavópog, similar probably to the
“Praetor Urbanus” at Rome, the “Mayor” in borough towns in Eng-
land, the “Préfet ’’ in France, and the “Burgomaster” in Holland.
* So I have translated ovoſpaptorác, in allusion to the little sphere
mentioned in Epist. 2, about which there had probably been a meeting
of Syracusan “Savans,” forming an astronomical and geographical So-
ciety; for it appears that Eudoxus, whose disciple was the Helicon, men-
tioned above, was the first to introduce the knowledge of the Sphere,
which he had acquired in Egypt, to the Greeks. But as the latitude of
Syracuse was not the same as of Alexandria, one can easily understand,
why the sphere did not answer so well its purpose at one place, as it did
at the other. For this idea I am partly indebted to Scaliger's note on
Manilius, p. 155.6, ed. 1579. Ast, with Stephens, translates “in pile ludo
collusores.”
EPISTLE XIII. 557
should any message or letter arrive, relating" to you, that
they take care you know of it as quickly as possible, and that
they put you in mind of it, in order that you may attend to
the matter mentioned in the letters. And for the present do
you not neglect the repayment of the money to Leptines, but
repay it as quickly as possible, so that others, looking to him,
may be the more ready to minister to myself.
Iatrocles, who at that time was, together with Myronides,
dismissed as a freed-man by myself, sails now with the things
sent by me; keep him in your pay, as being well disposed to-
wards you, and make use of him in any way you please,” and
know yourself either the letter itself, or if a memorandum of
it is preserved.”
* I have translated, as if the Greek were, what the sense requires, trepi
wi, not, as at present, trapá ot—
*—” The words between the numerals I cannot understand. Stephens’s
version is “et epistolam aut Ipsam, aut, e1 ipsius exemplar servatur, tute
cognosce.” But intrópavnua is not the Greek for “exemplar,” but for
“commentarius.” The Greek is kai rjv Štructoxrïv m airriv 7, si ütrö-
plvmpia airfig ord &srat, kai airóg to 6v. One MS. however has & airiv :
two omit ei: one reads abroic for airijg, and one kai 6 airóg : all
which are proofs of some deep-seated disorder here. The sense seems to
have been originally something to this effect, “and acquaint yourself with
the letter from itself, or, if it be not preserved, from the memorandum of
the person who has heard it”—in Greek, kai rjv Šartorox,\v m abrºv 7,
ei pº othéerat, Šud rô ditrópºvnua airijv roß &knko6tog to 0. So in Euri-
pides, Iphigenia is represented as telling the contents of the letter she is
putting into the hands of Pylades; for tº use her own words in v. 744,
iv påv čkatóagg ypapºv, Airm ºpégst otyöga rātreataxpéva "Hv 3’ &v
9a)\égay Ypáppar &gavigøj ráðs, Tô alôpia atºgac, roic Aóyove atºgetc
*Plot. l. e.
“If you preserve the writing, 'twill itself
The matter of the missive silent tell;
But if by the sea the writing disappears,
Saving your body, you will save my words.”
As the foregoing Epistle was considered by Serranus to be spurious,
Stephens was led to defend it by observing that it was referred to by
Plutarch in T. ii. p. 533, B., and Theodoret, p. 27, ed. Sylb. So too
when Collins had in his “Discourse on Free Thinking” reiterated the
opinion expressed by Cudworth in his Intellectual System, p. 403, ed.
1678, of the Epistle being spurious, Bentley in his Remarks, p. 41 l, ed.
Dyce, observed that the internal character of the letter exhibits all the
marks of genuineness; for it is not a mere mass of common-place, such
as the letters forged by Sophists generally are, but one of business, and
with the circumstantial account of persons and things, suited to the writer
and the times in which he lived; * the passage, where allusion is mads
O
㺠EPISTLE XIII.
to an Apollo, sculptured by Leochares, who, as we learn from Pliny, H.
N. xxxv. 2, and Pausanias, i. 1 and 3, v. 20, became a celebrated artist, sub-
sequent to the period when he was spoken of by Plato as a young man; and
that the letter is quoted by Eusebius in Praep. Evang. x. 13, p. 530. From
these remarks of Bentley Fabricius was probably led to say that he could
discover no proofs of spuriousness, when his opinion was asked by P. Wes-
seling; who, in his “Epistola ad Venemam,” p. 36, has produced fresh
testimony in its favour by appealing to Plutarch in Dion, T. i. p. 966, E.,
and ii. p. 474, D., where Plato is referred to. He conceives, however,
that two Epistles have been moulded into one ; and that the first ended
just before the mention of Leptines, bringing with him the Apollo of
Leochares; for Plutarch, in ii. p. 533, speaks of the words quoted from
the Epistle, as being towards the close of it. And so far is Wesseling
from believing the Epistle to be not genuine, that he calculates it was
written about Ol. ciii. 4.
Despite, however, the proofs thus brought forward by Stephens, Bent-
ley, and Wesseling, with whom Wyttenbach on Phaedon, p. 108, agrees,
Meiners has, in Commentat. Societat. Reg. Gottingen, A. D. 1783, endea-
voured to show its spuriousness by arguments to which Tennemann has
replied in his “Lehren und Meinungen der Sokratiker tiber Unsterblich-
keit,” Iena, 1791, as I learn from Harless on Fabricius Biblioth. Gr. T.
iii. p. 106. On the other hand Taylor, in a note on the 12th Epistle, says
that he has omitted the 13th as being not genuine, from the allusion there
made to the difference between one and many gods—an argument to which
I have replied by supposing the existence of a corruption, antecedent even
to the time of Eusebius. -
END OF WOL. IV.
LONDON : PRINTEn BY WILLIAM CLOWE8 AND SONS, LIMITED,
DUKE STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E., AND GREAT WINDMILL STREET, W.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
H
opiºiewed by Pººvatºr 2001


→ ·
--- - - - - - -[+ ）ſå ſåſaeſſºſiºſ
0 • • • • •• • •-; : º.·~~~~*~~~~******® ° º ！·-№∞ºlae
-№ ：Caesae … • • • • •-∞·~• •
، ، ، ،·© ： C， C. C.--ſaeſ·· ：·ººº，）
*«№. ：º ， , ， ， * ！:::::::：：::ſ.ſ.º· * * * *§！-·-----·
:：: ***$$$$$$$$$ſ··-···
**********æss • -ø （º.a.• • • • • • • • • • • • •
* * · * （•…
º * * …º º* - º ！ … • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • ！… „ …º ， ！
m.* ， ， , ， ，
， ， ， ，º • • • • • •I 5 ：' * • • • • • • • • • • • • • •·v • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •·
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •∞ √∞ √º ſº • • •-ſ ºs~،ſ · · ·
-r-， ， ， ， º-●·•••• • ¶ • • • • • • • • • • • • •«; •Li • • • • • • • • • • •
·∞ √° √-∞·
• • •
~~ ~
º ： * • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • ** *« »… • • •
* * * * · * */··„ ” º
， ！• • • • • • • • • • •
* • • • ••••• • • •|-
·• • • • • • • •·
-•-º • • • •
* √° * * * * * * * * • • • • • • • • • • ►-·：
* • ** • • • • • • •·
* * （º.
œ •• • ••：-）• • •·
：∞º aeº • • •
، ، ، ، ،º • • • • • • • •* * * * * * * • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••* • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
·•º ~， ， ， ， ，∞ «*** • • • • • • • • •=…|
-∞-* •， ！：~
• ×·• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
، ، ،-·
º ·-：■ ■∞
º* • • • • • • ►*** ••••• • ••••••• • • • • • ... • • • • • • .
* * • • • • • • • •----·© ： e •• • • • • • • • • • • • • •º•• • •
* w：·• •m.， ， ， ， ， ，№
■ ■
• • • • •ºrºſººººººº
···， . .D！
IF • • •-------
*： < ： • •* *• • ••••• • • • • • • • • • •
∞ √° √≠ √：·
■^ * * * *， º* e * • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •
***** • • • •••• • • •، ، ، ، ، ،
، ، ،º ſº º « »
* * * * * *•••• • • • • • • • • • •
： ： ：
• • • • • • ► ► ►ſaeD
·Œ œ|-* * * * • ** • • • • • •-
：º ， • • •i.
& • • • ， ， ，-·…·. --8°. . .
s į* .-·-• • • • • •
~~~~~ < ∞, ∞<<！--
* • • • • • • •
º : » ：
： • • • C •
*****<（es.： «o es « »，
·•-，• • • • • • •، ،！， ， ， .
••• • • • • •••º • • • • • • • • • • •-****** • • • • • • • • • •
∞∞ √·~--~[׺ • • • • • • • • • • • • ×
rj• •----، ،…·
w • s-• .،
• • • • •●：* … • ·-----
***********ºvº ••••••••• • • ►， ， ， ，…„ “.
·•， ！
• • • • • • • • •• • • ► | ►►ºw ºſ, , º
|－，ºººº ！ ºººººº • • • • • • •，，
·C)• • • ►^ * * .ſuae
-|-·|-，~^-，-----~---.--－>
··-·• •： ~~• • • • • • •
^ * • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .-' º ~~~~ • • • • • • • • • • …………*:）*） * * · · · • • • • • • • • •
-----… ：• - …-
o ae• • •·
• 3. ***
* * • • • • • • • •
• • ► ► ► ►
• • • • • • • ►
•* •
• • • • •-, L. L.
~º ：·
， … … . . .·-- ·…
• • • • • • ………. ”e ºsc： a
* * .„ ” – „
· *
• • • • • • • • • • • • •º * * * * *
• • • • • • •• *G + ！
∞·• • • • •
* * · · ****** • • • ►sºs šºssee-š’）, ‘ ’ …“ „“ „“
·！ 8：* < • • •
·n• • • •， ，∞
، ، ، ، ، ،： ： ： ：，
£ €• • • • • • • •
º ‘ ： » ：
• • •• • • • •
*** **<; • • • • • •
C
w №w
• • • și
← •· -， ，^·
• • • ••••••• • •-·-|-|-'.··
ºwºsº），
·ae
* º * * * * * · · · • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
：~
* * * */
w.
• №.：-）·§. . • • • . .
:：：*?） ***（.****șeș••••• • • • • • ► ► ► ► | ► | ►
' * * * * * · * * · · · · · · · * * · * * *
··* （ w----
* … • • • • • ► -
shºws （ „ “， º.ſ.º.º.）
a **** •
∞
： ~ ~ ~·
• • •
@ : • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
•■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■، ، ،
·! ！ ' « ' ■）;∞
* * * ··-* √∞º ： » ： « ， » » »， ， ， ， ，
：--··-*** • • • • • • • • • • • • • •■< …
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .W , ， ，, º º.، ،
w №wº ſºº ：5-----<！----º ſºº • • • •
* - * * · · · · · · • • • • • • • • •ſº ºº → **••••••••º ： * ·，·，≤ ∞∞∞
· * （ . ）Wººd ， «... »،* * · · · · · · · · · · · · · -
•.. ' •
***** • • • • • • • • • •
∞ √∞