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HAATQNO^ 0AIAQN 
 
nAATQNOI 0AIAQN 
 
 THE PHAEDO OF PLATO 
 
 EDITED 
 
 WITH INTRODUCTION NOTES AND APPENDICES 
 
 RT DT^RCHER-HIND, m.a. 
 
 FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 
 
 Hontron 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 1883 
 
 \^The Right of Translation and Reproduction is reserved] 
 
 
 
/^CORNE 
 UNIVERSITY 
 LIBRARY^ 
 
 dLawbttOst : 
 
 PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. & SON, 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 
 FA 
 
 j>h 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 So many editions of the Phaedo are already in existence 
 that the appearance of a fresh one would seem to require a 
 word of explanation. The object of the present edition is 
 to assist those who are beginning in earnest the study of 
 Plato's philosophy, and who have advanced far enough to 
 appreciate the peculiar difficulty of his writings. Accordingly 
 my chief aim has been to elucidate the philosophical contents 
 of the dialogue, to indicate as clearly as I was able the con- 
 secution of its thought, and to determine its position in the 
 Platonic system. It has therefore been no part of my purpose 
 to enter minutely into points of language for their own sake. 
 But since it is utterly impossible to follow Plato's thought with- 
 out a thorough mastery of his language, I have not abstained 
 from dealing with such points, so far as seemed necessary for 
 the right understanding of Plato's meaning, or where I thought 
 that they had been insufficiently treated by previous editors. 
 Among existing editions I am most indebted to the notes of 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 those admirable scholars Wyttenbach and Heindorf. And 
 since I have frequently had occasion to express dissent from 
 the views of Prof Geddes, I am anxious to take this opportunity 
 of acknowledging the advantage I have derived from his 
 scholarly and lucid commentary. 
 
 Finally and above all my thanks are due to my friend 
 Mr Henry Jackson, to whose untiring kindness I owe far more 
 than I can possibly acknowledge : the references to him in the 
 notes very imperfectly indicate how fully he carries out the 
 principle koivo, to, twv ^lXcov. 
 
 Trinity College, Cambridge, 
 3 November, 1883. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 § I. Scope of the dialogue. 
 
 A CAREFUL student of the Platonic dialogues can hardly fail to 
 notice a certain peculiarity in their structure : he will observe that for 
 the most part we find not one but several motives underlying the whole 
 composition and artistically interwoven ; so that if we put the question, 
 what was Plato's object in writing any one dialogue, the answer can 
 rarely be a simple one. These several motives are indeed formally 
 subordinated to one definite end— for a Platonic Ao'yos is always ^Sov 
 crwOTTos — but this end is not always, nor indeed often, the most im- 
 portant result of the dialogue or that which Plato had most at heart in 
 its composition. A very good and simple illustration of this is supplied 
 by the Sophist. The declared object of that dialogue is to define the 
 sophist (218 b); and this object; amid all the intricacies of the argu- 
 ment, is held steadfastly in view until its final accomplishment, when 
 the sophist is tracked down, captured, and bound hand and foot in the 
 humorously labyrinthine paragraph which closes the Eleate's discourse. 
 But as a means of obtaining this definition Plato employs his method 
 of StatpEo-is ; and the extreme elaboration with which this process is 
 worked out, together with the high value which we know Plato set 
 upon it, leaves no doubt that the exposition and illustration of this 
 dialectical method is one of the motives of the dialogue. Thirdly, a 
 point suddenly turns up, quite by accident, as it were, and without the 
 slightest premeditation (236 d) : the sophist, on the point of being 
 convicted as a dealer in shams, takes shelter in the old puzzle about 
 /Ai; ov : which puzzle must be solved before the definition can be 
 accomplished. Now it will be observed that the material and formal 
 importance of these three motives are in reverse order. The definition 
 of the sophist, the formal object of the dialogue, is simply a piece of 
 pungent satire ; but the method by which this object is attained is a 
 matter of high interest and significance. By far the most momentous 
 issue, however, is that which turns upon /*i; ov : the searching criticism 
 of ov and /m; ov, as conceived in various philosophies ; the masterly 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 analysis of the five ■yei'i;, which clears up the problem of predication ; 
 the solution of the hitherto hopeless enigma concerning false judg- 
 ments ; all this constitutes one of the most memorable achievements of 
 the human intellect : a science of logic is now first founded, and 
 philosophy is placed upon a new basis. Yet in form this all-important 
 metaphysical inquiry is merely an accidental difficulty involved in the 
 definition of the sophist, which need not have arisen, had not the 
 sophist turned out to be a sham. We see then how Plato proposes 
 to himself an end mainly for the sake of the means : we may be sure 
 that he cared little about defining the sophist, but very much about the 
 metaphysical questions to which the process of definition was to give 
 rise. Now this indirect way of going about his work is a peculiarity of 
 Plato's which must be steadily kept in mind if we are to have any hope 
 of understanding him at all. Also we must remember that Plato is 
 before all things a metaphysician : ethics, politics, logic, physics are to 
 him so many forms of applied metaphysics ; and if we would rightly 
 follow the current of his thought, it is from a metaphysical source that 
 we must seek to trace it. 
 
 Bearing this in mind, let us see what is the result of a similar 
 analysis applied to the structure of the Phaedo. Most persons who 
 should be asked to describe this work would probably reply that it was 
 a treatise in which Plato endeavours to prove that soul is immortal ; 
 and this is no doubt a correct account of one motive of the dialogue. 
 But the demonstration of immortality is neither the express purpose 
 nor the most important philosophical result ; it holds a position more 
 nearly corresponding to that of Siatpco-t? in the Sophist. As to the 
 main subject of the dialogue Plato leaves us in no uncertainty. Sokrates 
 makes two statements, which appear to Kebes to be mutually conflict- 
 ing : (i) in this life we are under the protection of good and wise gods, 
 (2) the philosopher will be glad to quit this life. Simmias adds that it 
 seems a little unkind of Sokrates to be pleased at leaving his friends. 
 Sokrates admits that it is only fair that he should clear himself on both 
 these charges. Then, after an interruption on the part of Kriton, 
 which is clearly designed to mark that the serious business of the 
 dialogue is now about to begin, Sokrates proceeds in the following 
 words : ' Now I desire to render an account to you my judges and to 
 show that it is reasonable for a man who has passed his Hfe in the true 
 love of wisdom to be of good cheer on the threshold of death and to 
 be hopeful of enjoying the greatest blessings, when he is dead, in the 
 other world. How this may be the case, Simmias and Kebes, I shall 
 try to tell you (63 e).' Thus we see that the leading motive is to 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 show that the wise and virtuous man will meet death with cheerfulness, 
 on the ground that his lot will be happy in the world of the departed. 
 And, as in the Sophist, Plato never once loses sight of this motive from 
 beginning to end of the work. 
 
 Now let us observe how the other subjects are connected with this. 
 The line of defence adopted by Sokrates is as follows : The philosopher 
 is not concerned with the gratification of bodily appetites nor with the 
 pomps and luxuries of this world ; the pleasures of the intellect alone 
 are precious in his sight, and to the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom 
 his whole life is devoted. Such being the case, the body which is his 
 soul's constant companion not only brings him no advantage but is a 
 positive hindrance and annoyance, impeding by its importunate affec- 
 tions the free action of the soul in her search for the truth. Accord- 
 ingly he accustoms his soul to be as independent of the body as is 
 possible, to withdraw from communion with it, and to act by herself — 
 by processes of pure thought without aid of the senses. But this 
 deliverance of the soul, her purification from all corporeal taint, can 
 never be perfectly accomplished during this earthly life ; consequently 
 in this life the perfect fruition of intelligence can never be attained. 
 There is but one thing which separates soul from body altogether ; and 
 this is death : death extricates the soul from her corporeal entangle- 
 ment and sets her free to exert her unfettered powers upon the highest 
 objects of cognition. Death then is the realisation of the philosopher's 
 dream ; it is the fulfilment of that intellectual enfranchisement which 
 by a lifelong struggle he has but in some scanty measure attained : how 
 then can he fail to be of good cheer when the hour arrives of his release 
 from the close confines of his bodily prison into the wide pure air of 
 free intellectual life ? 
 
 Very well, replies Kebes ; but you are assuming that the soul con- 
 tinues to exist as a conscious and inteUigent being after her separation 
 from the body. How do we know that she is not extinguished at the 
 moment of dissolution? Before we can accept your defence it is 
 absolutely necessary that you should satisfy us on this point. Sokrates 
 freely admits the justice of this criticism and says he will do his best to 
 fill up the lacuna in his theory. 
 
 We see then that immortaUty is a distinctly secondary issue, sub- 
 ordinate to the principal theme of the dialogue. The particular mode 
 in which Sokrates has chosen to defend his main proposition demands 
 a demonstration of the soul's immortality as a necessary condition, and 
 that is all ; so far as regards the purposes of this dialogue Plato is 
 concerned to prove the soul immortal only in order to prove that the 
 
 I — 2 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 true philosopher will not fear death. It is to be noticed that as soon 
 as ever the demonstration is, or seems to be, accomplished, Sokrates 
 at once proceeds to enlarge on its ethical bearings in relation to the 
 main proposition, 8i a foil., 107 c foil. 
 
 Having thus determined two motives, let us see whether an inspec- 
 tion of the pleadings for immortality will disclose any more. Sokrates 
 begins with two arguments which areH:o be regarded as two halves of 
 one proof. The first is based upon a law of alternation or reciprocity 
 in nature : given two opposite states, all things which have come to be 
 in either state have passed into it from the opposite state ; thus what is 
 now better has become so from being worse ; and between every such 
 pair of opposites we have transition in either direction, between hotter 
 and colder, greater and less, sleeping and waking, &c. Now the op- 
 posite to living is dead : between these two we daily see the process in 
 one direction, from life to death, the other we do not see. But though 
 we see it not, it must exist. For since living souls are continually 
 being born into the world, and since they cannot come out of nothing, 
 clearly they must come from the souls which have quitted this life. 
 These then must exist after their departure from the body ; for if they 
 ceased to be, they could not come again into being. Therefore our 
 souls exist after death. The second argument rests upon reminiscence. 
 All sensible objects remind us of certain ideal types, whereof they are 
 likenesses : they are but adumbrations of these types, faintly reflecting 
 them but incapable of representing them with perfect accuracy. We 
 compare these objects with their types and judge that they fall short of 
 them ; whence it is evident that at some time we must have had appre- 
 hension of the types. Now we cannot possibly have gained this know- 
 ledge since our birth ; we mugt then have possessed it before we were 
 born. Therefore our souls possessed intelligent existence before birth. 
 Putting these two arguments together, we find that our souls existed as 
 intelligent beings before we were born and will continue so to exist 
 after we are dead. 
 
 Seeing that his young friends are still doubtful whether the condi- 
 tions for the operation of this law of reciprocity are necessarily satisfied 
 in the case of soul, Sokrates pushes forward to new ground. He urges 
 that if a thing is to be decomposed, it must first have been composed ; 
 that which has no parts therefore cannot be subject to dissolution. 
 This is the fundamental distinction between the objects of sense and 
 the objects of intelligence ; the former are composite and perpetually 
 suffering resolution into their constituent parts; the latter are simple 
 and therefore indissoluble. Ideas are changeless and eternal, particulars 
 
INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 are ever-changing and transitory. To which of these natures is soul 
 more akin ? cleE^rly to tlie simple and changeless ideas, which are her 
 proper object of cognition, and which she apprehends by virtue of her 
 likeness to them. Moreover she is mistress over the body, being in 
 her divine simplicity far more powerful. Yet even the body is under 
 certain conditions very durable; how much more lasting then shall 
 the soul not be ? 
 
 Before proceeding let us pause to mark the stress laid on the affinity 
 of the soul to the ideas, for this will presently play an important part. 
 
 We may pass over the objection of Simmias with its refutation as 
 being immaterial to the main argument, and proceed at once to the 
 criticism of Kebes on the foregoing theory. It amounts to this : the 
 above reasoning only makes it probable that soul is much more durable 
 than body and may last a very long time ; it does not show that she is 
 actually imperishable nor that she has in her own essence an inalienable 
 principle of vitality. This takes us to the very heart of the matter j 
 Sokrates must trace the causes of generation and destruction down to 
 their very roots. 
 
 I do not mean in this place to give any analysis of the marvellously 
 subtle reasoning which serves for the final demonstration, but only to 
 call attention to its fundamental principles. After pointing out the 
 inadequacy of all previous and contemporary theories of causation, 
 Sokrates declares the Ideas to be the sole causes of all things and the 
 sole objects of knowledge. The truth of the Ideas is eternally sure, 
 and whatever inference can be certainly drawn from the ideal theory is 
 verily true. Now everything in nature is what it is by virtue of the 
 immanence of some idea informing it : and so intimate is the connexion 
 of particular with idea, that the former can never give admission to an 
 idea incongruous with the latter. Accordingly if we take any pair of 
 opposite and mutually exclusive ideas, a particular informed by such 
 opposite, or by any idea involving such opposite, can never receive the 
 other opposite : we cannot have cold fire or even three. But soul— 
 vita:l principle — is soul by virtue of the idea of life inherent ; therefore 
 she can never admit the opposite to life, which is death ; else we should 
 have dead soul, which is no less impossible and irrational than even 
 three. Soul therefore has in her inmost essence a source of hfe that 
 can never fail her. 
 
 A very moderate familiarity with Plato's ways of working will now 
 enable us to see where we are to look for the very heart of the dialogue. 
 The assertion of the Ideas as the causes of existence and the objects 
 of cognition ; the affirmation that they constitute the ultimate reality 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 upon which all sound reasoning must be based — this is the most signi- 
 ficant metaphysical result of the Phaedo, and this beyond doubt was 
 Plato's dearest purpose in composing it. And yet, so far as form goes, 
 this is only subsidiary to the establishment of a doctrine which has 
 turned out to be necessary to the maintenance of the primary propo- 
 sition. We saw however in the Sophist that the chief formal motive is 
 by no means necessarily Plato's principal end ; and again we have to 
 seek the chief end in what is technically but a means. 
 
 Such being the three strands intertwined in the thread of which the 
 fabric of the Phaedo is woven, let us examine their relations a little more 
 narrowly. 
 
 The question of immortality is interesting and important just so far 
 as it is connected with the cognition of the ideas. True knowledge, 
 says Plato, is concerned with the ideas alone, because they are simple, 
 changeless, and abiding : concerning the complex, changeful, and fleeting 
 objects of sense there can be nothing better than opinion. Soul alone, 
 acting by processes of pure thought, can apprehend the ideas, because 
 of her likeness to them : she too is simple and self-identical ; and like 
 is known by like. But during her association with the body she never 
 has free play for her own activity : the body with its passions and 
 appetites, its pleasures and pains, its maladies and weaknesses, is ever 
 hampering and hindering the movements of the soul to such a degree 
 that even the wisest of mankind can only in part rise superior to these 
 influences. Consequently the ^joy of pure .and untrouble d contem- 
 pktion_ranjeTCr^^jJafited-byih^_,S(^^^ 
 
 continues ; only by release from its harassing companionship can she 
 hope for the full fruition of knowledge. So if her existence is ter- 
 minated at the dissolution of soul and body, she never can attain true 
 knowledge at all : immortality then _ is._an inevitable, condition of- the 
 free cognition of the ideas. For this immortality she is justified in 
 hoping by the very affinity to the ideas which enables her to apprehend 
 them ; nay she is assured of it by the indwelling idea of life itself which 
 informs her very essence. Thus are immortality and knowledge mutually 
 interdependent. Schleiermacher, who has some excellent remarks on 
 this subject, sums up as follows : ' so ist denn die Ewigkeit der Seele 
 die Bedingung der Moglichkeit alles wahren Erkennens fiir den 
 Menschen, und wiederum die Wirklichkeit des Erkennens ist der 
 Grund, aus welchem am sichersten und leichtesten die Ewigkeit der 
 Seele eingesehen wird.' In the words of Simmias, eig /caXov yc KaTa<^eij- 
 -yei o Xo'^o'i ets to 6\t,Qiwi eicai Tqv te ijrv^cqv i;/x<j3v Trpiv yevidOai tj/JMs, 
 Koi T^v oucrtav, ■^v ot) vvv Xe'-yeis. 
 
INTRODUCTION. J 
 
 Su ch then is the value of itnmQEtaJity^ as. prnmising na an py.- 
 igtence under conditions_more favourabIe--tQ_iiit£llectuaL.activity. I 
 think however Plato intends to turn it to another not unimportant, 
 though minor, use. In the true Platonic system of ethic s immortality 
 plays no part. Plato's mo.rality is founded in the very depths of his 
 ontology ; for the principle of good and the principle of being are one 
 and the same. It matters nothing whether we live or die : that alone is 
 good which is like the idea of good. But to deduce ethical science 
 from the avVo ayaSov calls for a most consummate philosopher : for the 
 great mass of mankind it is simply out of the question. So then, since 
 they cannot frame a moral code for themselves because they do 
 not know the idea of the good, the best they can do is to accept one 
 from the philosopher who does know it, as Plato insists in the Republic. 
 But the philosopher must hold _out some Jnducement for the people Jo 
 r eceive his t eaching ; and this inducement _nmy_be_derivgd_fraaaJ 
 Qiortalit^ Sokrates himself says 'if the soul is immortal, she needs our 
 care not only during the period to which we give the name of life, but 
 for all time; and now it is that we see how grave is the danger of 
 neglecting her.' The philosopher will persuade the people to follow 
 his precepts by showing that a life of intelligent virtue is the forerunner 
 of ft ge intellectual e njoyment in the invisible world, but a life of vice 
 ^an_onlyJead_a|ter_deatli_to heIpess~di^lnpTor15o3ily^piIeasures which 
 are out of reach. So 'by deducing immortality from the ideal theory, 
 Plato uses that theory to provid e a working code of morals^jbrjthosy 
 Tjlio_areincapable of rising to the only true and rational virtue. // 
 
 But while we affirm thaFliiF"cEierTesult"of the Phaedo is the es- 
 tablishment of the ideas as the true principles of causation and objects 
 of knowledge, in place of the superficial physical laws and incogitable 
 phenomena which did duty for causes and realities with the Ionian 
 philosophers; and while we recognise that the proof of immortality 
 derives its sole value from its bearing on the cognition of the ideas, we 
 must not leave out of sight the original proposition, that the wise man 
 will cheerfully meet death. This, though overshadowed by the superior 
 interest of the metaphysical issues to which it gives rise, is yet far from 
 unimportant in Plato's sight ; and this is what gives artistic unity to the 
 dialogue. As a framework in which to set his vindication of the dignity 
 of the ideas Plato could have chosen nothing better than a description 
 of the cheerful fortitude displayed by a man whose life has been de- 
 voted to intellectual research. The lesson which Sokrates inculcates by 
 his precepts and arguments he enforces still more vividly by his living 
 example. From his first pleasant moralising on his own fsstter-cramped 
 
8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 limbs to the last half-conscious injunction to fulfil a pious duty, he 
 shows us the very ideal of that character at which he would have us 
 aim. Never was the Platonic Sokrates more genial and gentle, more 
 ready and subtle in argument, more patient of opposition and skilful in 
 encountering it, never more rich in poetry and imagination, than on 
 that last day of his life. It seems as if Plato had determined to use all 
 the resources at his command in bringing home to us the lesson that in 
 philosophy lies the sovereign charm against the terror of death : he 
 appeals to the intellect by the subtlety of his arguments, to the imagina- 
 tion by his fanciful and beautiful myth, and to the emotions by that 
 death-scene which stands alone in all literature. It is in this way that 
 we may recognise the connexion of the myth and the last scene with the 
 main body of the dialogue. The myth is no mere poetical embellish- 
 ment, nor does the death-scene share only the unity which belongs to 
 the various stages of one coherent narrative. Both are linked by a ' 
 deeper unity to the remainder of the work, being by different methods 
 subservient to the same purpose. We see then in the Phaedo an 
 affirmation of the ideas as causative and intelligible existences, from 
 which, through the inference of immortality, the ethical deduction is 
 drawn that the philosopher, secure of his well-being in the region of 
 the departed, will meet death with calmness and confidence ; and the 
 impression thus conveyed is rendered more vivid by a description of 
 the earth and the underworld and an account of the adventures of the 
 disembodied soul; and finally it is yet more earnestly enforced by a 
 picture of philosophic fortitude taken from actual history. All these 
 elements, argumentative, imaginative, and narrative, are harmonised by 
 Plato in one consummate work of art and jointly directed to one com- 
 mon end. 
 
 § 2. The relation of the several arguments for immortality. 
 
 How the several arguments are mutually related, and how many 
 proofs of immortality are contained in the Phaedo, is a question on 
 which most diverse opinions have been entertained : on one estimate 
 all the proofs are reduced to one, while another reckons as many 
 as seven. I do not propose to criticise these various enumerations, 
 which have been ably treated by Bonitz in his admirable ' Platonische 
 Studien': I shall simply examine the relation of the several argu- 
 ments, and then from the results thus obtained consider whether they 
 are to be regarded as constituting one or more demonstrations. With 
 
INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 the views of Bonitz in the main I thoroughly agree; but I think 
 it is possible to give a somewhat preciser statement than he 
 has done. 
 
 First then as concerning the argument of aVrairdSoo-is 70 c — 72E. 
 This seeks to deduce the soul's immortality from a universal law of 
 nature, or rather from two laws. The first is yeVetrts e| ivavrmv, which 
 is simply an application of a principle with which we are already 
 familiar in preplatonic philosophy, e. g. the dSos av<a koL Karoy of Hera- 
 kleitos. A yeveo-is is a process between opposite states; whatever 
 we see at one pole, as the result of a yeVto-ts, has passed over from 
 the other pole. The two poles with which our argument is concerned 
 are ^Sv and TeOvrjKo's : ^<uv we define as a state of union between 
 soul and body, TeOvrjKos as a state of separation. We know that the 
 soul passes to the state tcAvtjkos from the state t,iav, and we deduce 
 from the law of alternations that she passes to the state t,£v from the 
 state TE^vijKo's. Therefore the soul must have existence in the state 
 TeOvrjKO's, in virtue of our second law, which is that the sum of all 
 things is constant ; in Aristotle's words ovSlv yiyverai Ik /ai; ovtos, ttoIv 
 8' £^ OVTOS. This principle, which the physicists, as Aristotle goes 
 on to observe, agreed in affirming of matter, is here affirmed of thought 
 by Plato, for whom matter is but a phase of thought. It is this which 
 is the most important element in the present argument, and to which 
 we shall hereafter have occasion to recur. The result we obtain then is 
 that our soul in passing from ^mv to reSi'ij/cos is not annihilated in the 
 process, but retains her existence in the state tcOvt/jkos: in popular 
 language la^nv iv AtSov. 
 
 The argument from dvd/xvrjcni 72 e — 77 a, in supplementing the 
 former, introduces us to the ideal theory. By an ingenious process of 
 reasoning Plato shows that our soul must have had cognition of the 
 ideas, and that this cognition must have been attained before our 
 present life : our soul then must have been in existence before she was 
 incarcerated in human form and born into this life. The result then is 
 the antenatal existence of the soul. 
 
 But, it might be asked, what more do we gain by this argument of 
 dvdfji,vrj(ni? For though the only result which Plato expressly draws 
 from aVrajroSoo-ts is that the soul exists after death, it would also be 
 a perfectly fair inference that she existed before birth : for the soul that 
 became C<Sv at a human birth must previously have been TeOvrjKos, that 
 is, existent in a state of separation ; else we should have yeVeo-is Ik iijrj 
 OVTOS. This is true ; but ava/ivjjo-is makes two important contributions : 
 (i) what we have to prove is ws icrri re ij i/'ux»7 ^^ AiBov koL Svvafuv 
 
lO INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Kol <f>p6vq(Tiv exei: of this only the first half can be deduced from 
 tt'vTaTroSocrts, the latter is supplied by d.vdfwrja-i's, which shows that the 
 soul had cognition of the ideas ; ai/TairoSocrts shows that reOvqKos is 
 a mode of existence, dvafj-vrjai? that it is a state of intelligence : 
 (2) dvdfji,vr]cn's attaches the demonstration of immortality to the theory 
 of ideas, upon which it is finally to be based. Thus we see that the 
 two arguments are mutually complementary. 
 
 In fact there is no more surprising feature in the literature to which 
 the Phaedo has given occasion than the fact that many scholars, not 
 only in the face of Plato's explicit declaration (77 c), but in the face of 
 plain reason, have accounted these two arguments as two distinct 
 proofs. For if we allow that aVraTroSoo-is furnishes a proof <us ecrrtv rj 
 ^vyr] iv AiSou, and ava/AVJ^cris a proof (OS Bvva/jLiv kol (ftpovrjaiv ei.)(£ 
 Trplv yivia-Oai -qftas, it is self-evident that the two must be combined 
 in order to constitute a proof oJs eort re 17 "/'^x'^ ^ AiSov koI SvvafjLiv 
 Kou (l)p6vr]crLv ix^i. We derive from avraTroSoo-ts evidence that the 
 soul exists in the same state {TiOvrjKos) before birth and after death ; 
 from dvdp.vTjcn's we have evidence that this is a conscious and intelli- 
 gent state. 
 
 So then, whatever number of proofs we may finally decide to exist 
 in the Phaedo, it is clear that the two foregoing arguments do not 
 amount to more than one. But even before any objections have been 
 urged, Sokrates proposes to offer further evidence, as though what he 
 has already brought forward were inadequate. Let us see then in 
 what particulars the demonstration seems to be incomplete, in order 
 that we may know what we should expect to be supplied in the 
 sequel. 
 
 A severer scrutiny will detect a weakness in each member of the 
 proof. In the first the soul's continued existence is a simple deduc- 
 tion from a natural law, which is assumed to work with invariable 
 uniformity. But we must recollect that the operation of any cause 
 depends upon the conditions under which it acts : by the same law 
 lead falls earthward and vapour streams upward ; and it is conceivable 
 that somewhere in the universe there might exist a set of conditions 
 under which the same law might produce exactly the opposite results. 
 Now if in addition to our knowledge of the law we had a perfect 
 and exhaustive acquaintance with the conditions under which it acts 
 in every conceivable instance, we might be certain of its operation 
 in all cases. But as a matter of fact we have not and never can have 
 such an acquaintance with the conditions. An astronomer, from the 
 data before him, calculates that a planet ought to revolve in an orbit of 
 
INTRODUCTION. ii 
 
 a certain shape in a certain time : observation, however, shows that the 
 facts do not correspond to the calculation. Then comes another 
 astronomer with a larger telescope and discovers that the irregularity is 
 due to the proximity of another body which was invisible to his prede- 
 cessor. And if his discovery exhausts the number of influences at work 
 on the planet, he will be able to calculate its orbit with accuracy, but 
 not otherwise. Similarly although the law of alternation may afford a 
 strong presumption that our souls return from the dead, this does not 
 amount to certainty, since we cannot tell that our knowledge of the 
 conditions is complete. The very fact that in this case we are unable 
 to perceive one of the twin processes, which elsewhere are both visible, 
 is enough to awaken our suspicion : we do not know the conditions to 
 which soul is subject after our dissolution, and they may be such as to 
 nullify our calculations. We cannot then be satisfied with simply 
 inferring this immortality of the soul from the uniformity of nature, 
 we must prove that imperishability is a necessary and inseparable 
 attribute of her being'. 
 
 Such I conceive to be the cause of the dissatisfaction felt with 
 the argument from avTaTroSocrts. I have dwelt upon it at some length, 
 because, though by no means obvious, it has hitherto, I believe, failed 
 of being noticed. I now pass on to dvdfuvija-i^. 
 
 We have already seen that dvafivrja-is does not by itself prove the 
 imperishability of the soul; and now since dvraTroSocris has proved 
 insufficient to accomplish this satisfactorily, the original defect remains 
 unsupplied. We may have enjoyed apprehension of the ideas before 
 our birth, but it does not follow that we shall exist to apprehend them 
 again after our death. But the point to which I would draw attention 
 is that we have so far failed to make the proper use of the soul's 
 cognition of the ideas : the only conclusion we have drawn is that 
 the soul must have existed to apprehend them ; this is far short of the 
 inference which on Platonic principles is not only justified but peremp- 
 torily required. What this is, we shall presently see. 
 
 1 That such is the defect of the argu- may yet be disturbing forces, on which 
 
 ment is indicated by Plato himself at we have not calculated, which interfere 
 
 77 D in the words /*i7 o5s dXi)9ws o cbefios with its operation : the accident of a 
 
 avTTiv iK^alvomav Ik toO (xufmros Sia^vcrg. tempest at the time of the soul's egress 
 
 Kal SicuTKeddvvvinv, dWus re Koi orav rixv may produce conditions which render the 
 
 Tis /ii? iv vriveii.lt}, a'W iv fieydXii) tlvI law null and void in the case of that 
 
 Tveiiian dir<ievri<TKOiv. That is to say, particular soul, 
 our law may be perfectly sound, but there 
 
12 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 We now perceive what we are to look for in the ensuing argument : 
 (i) the establishment of the soul's immortality upon a necessity of her 
 own nature and no mere external cause, (2) the deduction of the re- 
 quired inference from her cognition of the ideas. 
 
 IrTThe argument extending from 78 b to 80 d we have the universe 
 divided into the visible and invisible worlds : the former includes all 
 sensible objects, which are composite, and therefore subject to disso- 
 lution and change ; the latter contains the ideas, which are incomposite, 
 and therefore changeless and indissoluble. Now the body is visible, 
 and obviously belongs to the class of things which suffer change and 
 dissolution ; the soul, being invisible, should naturally seem to belong 
 to the world of real existences, incomposite and indissoluble. This 
 behef is confirmed if we consider the soul's attitude in regard to the 
 sensible and intelligible worlds respectively. When dealing with 
 sensible objects she is filled with bewilderment and strays giddily 
 through the ever-fleeting stream of inconstant phantasms, where she can 
 find no rest for the sole of her foot : but when she turns to the ideal 
 world she feels herself at home; the ideas she can contemplate in 
 serene repose, seeing that she herself is akin to them ; and she then shares 
 the constancy of the objects of her meditations. Additional confir- 
 mation is supplied by the observation that soul commands and body 
 obeys ; the former is the function of the divine, the latter of the mortal ; 
 therefore we infer that the soul most resembles this divine, deathless, 
 simple, indissoluble, changeless, selfidentical essence. Furthermore 
 we know that parts of the body, inferior as it is, or the whole body 
 when embalmed, may last for a practically unlimited time; a fortiori 
 then the soul must be still more abiding. 
 
 With reference to this argument it is to be observed (i) that it is 
 professedly a sequel to the preceding, IBai Se aireXtTro/icv iTravekOw/jnv 
 78 B: (2) that the requisite inference from cognition of the ideas is now 
 expressed in the words I have italicised : (3) that the proof now rests 
 upon the essential nature of the soul. Like knows like : therefore since 
 the soul knows the ideas, she must be hke the ideas. But the attributes 
 of the ideas are simplicity, unchangeableness, and imperishability ; the 
 soul then must resemble them in these attributes. We are no longer 
 dependent upon an external law, with whose workings we are imperfectly 
 acquainted, to establish the soul's immortality ; for we are able to class 
 her with an order of substances to whose essence belongs eternity; 
 and this we are enabled to do by reaUsing that the soul's antenatal 
 cognition of the ideas involves not merely her existence before our 
 birth, but her likeness and affinity to the ideas themselves. Thus by 
 
INTR on UCTION. 1 3 
 
 following to its logical conclusion the train of thought suggested by 
 dvdfj.vi^a-i's, Plato has raised the theory of immortality from the dim and 
 doubtful twilight of physical speculation to the clear sunshine of meta- 
 physical certainty. This present argument is in fact intended both as 
 a correction and a development of the previous reasoning. We no 
 longer put our trust in the physical law of yevea-i^ i^ ivavrtuiv, which, 
 although it may be perfectly sound and may afford a strong pre- 
 sumption of the soul's immortality, yet is incapable of offering us the 
 assurance we require; and we have legitimately deduced from dvd- 
 fjivrja-L's a result which may serve as a secure ontological basis for our 
 proposition. 
 
 But now we are suddenly brought to a stand. The whole edifice 
 which we have been at such pains to erect collapses in a moment before 
 the criticism of Kebes : we have been building it upon sand. There can 
 be no mistake about this : the objection raised by Kebes is utterly 
 destructive of the theory in its present form. Let us put it to the 
 test. 
 
 Surveying the demonstration which has last been summarised, we 
 see at the first glance that it is purely tentative and approximate; 
 it does not even pretend to be more than an argument from probability. 
 
 In the first place the eternal objects of intelligence are invisible, 
 while the perishable objects of sense are visible ; the soul is invisible, 
 and therefore we have assumed that she belongs to the rank of intel- 
 ligible and eternal existences. But this assumption is unwarrantable. 
 All that is eternal is invisible; but it does not follow that all which 
 is invisible is eternal. We may say that the soul's invisibility affords a 
 certain presumption in favour of her eternity, but nothing more.' 
 Secondly, the soul apprehends the ideas, therefore she is like the ideas. 
 True ; but we are not justified in concluding that this likeness neces- 
 sarily includes the attribute of eternity : she may, for aught we know, 
 be sufficiently like the ideas to apprehend them and yet not possess all 
 their properties. Thirdly, the plea that she is like the divine because 
 she rules over the body is still less satisfactory : she may possess many 
 divine qualities without sharing the divine attribute of eternity. Fourthly, 
 when we argue that, since body may last a very long time and since 
 soul is far more potent and permanent than body, soul must last a yet 
 longer time, the conclusion is most inadequate of all. In fact the 
 argument, considered as a proof, breaks down at every point : the most 
 that can be obtained from it is in fact the very inference that Plato 
 draws : TrpocnJKei i/'^xW '''° Tapairav dSiaXvTco etvai ■^ iyyvi Tt tovtov. But 
 this is very different from the certainty we were seeking. Moreover 
 
14 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 since, as we saw, this argument corrected, summed up, and developed 
 the previous reasoning, retaining all that was cogent in it and confirming 
 it by fresh evidence, it follows that in losing this we lose all : our whole 
 case utterly collapses. As Kebes justly says, we have shown that the 
 soul must have existed before her present incarnation ; we have made 
 out a case of strong probability that she is very durable and may 
 survive many incarnations and dissolutions ; but we are no whit the 
 nearer to proving that she is imperishable : we are in fact just where 
 we were. The whole demonstration must be begun over again coo-Trep 
 Jl apx^s. 
 
 Is then all the discussion up to this point utterly fruitless? Most 
 assuredly not. The case stands, as I conceive, thus. The objection 
 of Kebes divides the debate on immortality into two distinct portions, 
 the former of which is purely preparatory to the latter. It would have 
 been impossible to proceed at once to the actual demonstration, which 
 on Platonic principles is conclusive, without clearing the way and 
 preparing the ground for it by these preliminary investigations. In 
 them we gradually feel our way to the right standpoint from which to 
 attack the question. Starting from the notion of immortality as a 
 consequence of a natural law, we soon make an advance so far as to 
 connect it with the cognition of the idea — dva/AV);o-is gives us the germ 
 of the principle which ultimately grows to reasoned certainty; and this 
 nascent conception assumes form and substance in the psychological 
 argument that immediately follows : thus, though we fail to gain the 
 assurance of eternity which we seek, we now see pretty well in what 
 direction to look for it. We do not flee all empty-handed from the 
 ruins of our fallen theory ; we carry with us two priceless possessions, 
 first the principle that the sum of existence is constant, next the con- 
 sciousness that the proof of the soul's immortality must stand or fall 
 with the existence of the ideas. Still what I desire specially to empha- 
 sise is that not one of the arguments in the first half of the dialogue 
 is a proof of immortality, and not one of them is intended by Plato 
 to be so. Plato never wastes his words. Had he believed that any 
 of these arguments in the first part demonstrated the soul's immortality, 
 he would have stopped there ; the addition of the final argument shews 
 that the former were not conclusive. On the other hand Plato would 
 not have introduced the preliminary arguments, had they not been 
 necessary : they do not indeed directly demonstrate immortality, but 
 they enable us to rise to that stand-point from which the demonstration 
 is possible : they are a necessary propaedeutic for the proof which is 
 based directly on the theory of ideas. The long interval which inter- 
 
INTRO D UCTION. 1 5 
 
 venes between the arguments I have been discussing and the ultimate 
 proof serves to mark very clearly that they are to be taken by themselves 
 as forming one division, while the final demonstration itself constitutes 
 the other. Plato generally gives some tolerably plain external mark 
 of his divisions : take, for instance, the criticism of Protagoras in the 
 Theaetetus. The earlier objections urged against that philosopher's 
 dogma are highly inconclusive, not to say frivolous ; so much so, that 
 Protagoras is at last provoked to put up his head from the shades below 
 and to expostulate with Sokrates for condescending to such a method 
 of controversy. After this the debate assumes quite a different cha- 
 racter : the arguments put forward are all of a solid and substantial 
 nature. Now there can in my judgment be no doubt that in that part 
 of the criticism which precedes the remonstrance of Protagoras Plato is 
 expressing merely popular objections, which might be urged, and 
 perhaps had been urged, against the fj^irpov avOpmiros from the stand- 
 point of ordinary common sense ; these he was unwilling to leave 
 unnoticed, although he was conscious that they did not really invalidate 
 the theory of Protagoras. But in the subsequent portion he is arguing 
 from his own point of view and defining what he considers to be the 
 limitations of the doctrine : while, to mark the distinction, he adopts the 
 artistic device of bidding Protagoras emerge from the shades in order 
 to make his own defence. The case of the Phaedo is not an exact 
 parallel : for in the earlier part Plato is not bringing forward arguments 
 which are not his own ; the reasoning is sound so far as it goes ; and 
 though it does not amount to proof of immortality, it materially ex- 
 pedites the discovery of such a proof. But there is a similar reason for 
 marking off the arguments into two separate divisions ; and Plato has 
 taken pains to make a broad and conspicuous line of demarcation'. 
 
 1 The extent of this interlude and its speak out boldly, 84 C — 85 D. Then 
 
 varied character will be at once made Simmias states his objection, and Kebes 
 
 obvious by a brief summary of its con- follows with his, 85 E — 88 B. After this 
 
 tents. After five chapters of ethical com- a short conversation between Echekrates 
 
 ment, 81 B — 84 B, we have a narrative and Phaedo is introduced, and the latter, 
 
 passage, describing how, amid the reve- resuming his narrative, describes the effect 
 
 rent silence that fell on the company of these objections on the audience and 
 
 when Sokrates had ceased, Simmias and upon Sokrates ; after which follows the 
 
 Kebes were heard conversing apart. In- philosopher's warning against liiaokoyla, 
 
 terrogated by Sokrates they confess that 88 c— 91 c. The refutation of Simmias 
 
 they are not satisfied, but do not like to occupies three chapters more, 91 c— 95 A ; 
 
 press their objections in his present situa- next Sokrates restates the objection of 
 
 tion. Sokrates replies with his famous Kebes, and not till 95 E does he begin 
 
 simile of the swans, and exhorts them to the critique of physical speculation which 
 
1 6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 It remains to say a few words concerning the final proof. This 
 depends directly upon the existence of the ideas as apxat, or principles 
 of causation. Physical causes explain nothing : at best they are facts, not 
 reasons. For a real cause we must pierce through the phantasmagoria 
 of matter to that invisible essence, of which the sensible universe is the 
 outward expression : we must look for the explanation of each thing in 
 its idea. The whole existence of a particular thing is derived from the 
 inherence of its idea ; and so long as the thing exists it can never be 
 severed from its idea, nor admit anything inconsistent with that idea : 
 should it admit such an inconsistent idea, it ceases to be that which it 
 is. Now in most cases this may occur : snow may melt, fire may be 
 quenched; for their indwelling ideas do not involve indestructibility. 
 But with soul this cannot be : informed by the idea of life she can only 
 perish by admitting death ; but this would be to admit the opposite of 
 her inherent idea, which is impossible: her extinction would involve 
 a direct contradiction in terms, namely dead vital principle'. 
 
 This demonstration, which is worked out with a completeness, clear- 
 ness,, and subtlety peculiarly Plato's own, is on Platonic principles 
 perfectly incontrovertible : given the eternal ideas as causes of exist- 
 ence, the eternity of soul is an inevitable inference. But though com- 
 plete in itself it utiHses some of the inaterials of former arguments : the 
 principle that the eternity of soul is inseparably bound up with the 
 existence of the eternal ideas has been the chief feature of dvdfwrjcn'; and 
 the psychological argument : in this last proof it is precisely formulated, 
 handled in a new manner, and pushed to its logical conclusion. 
 Secondly, the whole argument has for its ultimate premiss the con- 
 stancy of the sum total of existence : o-^oX^ yap av n aXA.o (jyOopdv /iij 
 Sexo'TO, et y£ to dOdvaTOv diSiov ov ^Oopdv Bi^erai. And this we saw to 
 be the fundamental proposition laid down in the argument of dvTawo- 
 Soeris. Moreover ava/^ivjjcrts is Still valid to prove the existence of the 
 ideas and the soul's intelligent activity apart from the body. 
 
 I conceive then that there are in the Phaedo three arguments, culmi- 
 nating in a single proof: but that a continuous connexion can be traced 
 through all. The first, consisting of two portions, bases immortality partly 
 on a natural law, partly on the soul's connexion with the ideas : the 
 second, being a development of the first, drops the natural law and lays 
 
 is preliminary to the final demonstration ^ A detailed analysis of this demonstra- 
 
 starting from 99 E. In all this inter- tion is reserved for the commentary upon 
 
 mediate portion includes fifteen chapters, the passage in question, 
 forming nearly one-fourth of the dialogue. 
 
INTRODUCTION, 1/ 
 
 stress solely on the connexion with the ideas, but does not attempt to 
 do more than make out a case of probability : the last takes up the same 
 principle and treats it so as to evolve not a mere probability but a posi- 
 tive demonstration, which ultimately rests upon the law of conservation 
 of energy as laid down in the first argument. So the dialogue proceeds 
 like an advancing tide, each successive wave sweeping higher than the 
 preceding. We must not regard any of the arguments as put forward 
 and then discarded for a stronger ; rather the argument is first offered 
 in a tentative form, afterwards developed and corrected, and finally 
 remoulded and brought to its consummation. 
 
 In conclusion I must briefly advert to two views which are in my 
 opinion gravely erroneous and misleading. Steinhart treats the ethical 
 passages, founded on the doctrine of immortality, as intended to furnish 
 additional proof of that doctrine. The direct proofs, according to him, 
 are in themselves inadequate, and require a surer foundation in ethics. 
 This is a vicious circle so obvious that criticism is superfluous : we are 
 establishing the soul's immortality in order to justify certain ethical 
 principles, and then we employ these very principles as evidence for the 
 theory whence they are deduced. Moreover this view involves a radical 
 misconception of the purpose and structure of the dialogue. 
 
 The second opinion against which I feel bound to protest is that 
 the refutation of the objection raised by Simmias constitutes an argu- 
 ment for immortality. This is propounded by Ueberweg, with whom 
 I am sorry to find Prof. Geddes agreeing. Surely nothing can be more 
 untenable than such a proposition. Simmias suggests that all the facts 
 established by Sokrates concerning soul — viz. that she is invisible, in- 
 corporeal, divine, &c. — are compatible with the theory that she is a 
 harmony. Now if soul is a harmony, it is clear that she cannot be 
 immortal : therefore it is absolutely necessary that Sokrates should show 
 that this theory is inconsistent with the conclusions on which they are 
 already agreed. But in disproving this proposition Sokrates does not 
 prove the soul's immortality, nor is he one inch the nearer to proving it. 
 If I wished to ascertain that a certain crystal was not soluble in water, 
 I should gain very little by a chemical analysis which assured me simply 
 that the substance was not saltpetre : and similarly it is no evidence for 
 soul's immortality that she is not identical with one particular thing of 
 which immortality can never be predicated. Even could we make an 
 exhaustive list of all things known to be mortal, and could we prove 
 that soul was not identical with any one of these, we should still not 
 have established her immortality : she might yet be an additional kind 
 of mortal existence, different from the rest. It is therefore illogical to 
 
 P. 2 
 
1 8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 regard the refutation of the harmonic theory as in any sense an argu- 
 ment for immortality. The proposition of Simmias is one which has 
 ^oras. prima facie plausibihty, and which would be absolutely fatal to the 
 notion of immortality : its confutation is therefore imperative, but con- 
 tributes nothing, even incidentally, to the main argument: this is in 
 precisely the same position after the overthrow of Simmias as it was 
 before his objection was propounded. The whole episode of harmony, 
 though necessary, is in fact parenthetical. The criticism of Kebes, on 
 the other hand, touches the most vital issue and tends directly to the 
 reconstruction of the argument in that shape wherein alone, as I have 
 tried to show, Plato regards it as a complete and final demonstration 
 that soul is immortal. 
 
 § 3. Plato's attitude regarding immortality. 
 
 (i) The form in which Plato upholds the soul's immortality next 
 demands our attention : it is of all the most scientific and most philo- 
 sophical : it is that for which there is the most to be said, and against it 
 the least. His theory predicates eternity of universal soul, and of 
 particular souls metempsychosis. ' The Metempsychosis ', says Hume, 
 ' is the only system of this kind that Philosophy can hearken to": and 
 so too thought Plato, who does not deem any other theory worthy of 
 consideration. Universal spirit neither has been nor shall be, but is 
 eternally : particular souls have been without a beginning and shall be 
 for ever. In the infinite lapse of their existence they have passed, it 
 may be, through manifold and diverse incarnations, rising and falling 
 now to higher now to lower spheres of intelligence : but the substance, 
 the conscious- personality, is unchanged and unimpaired by all these 
 mutations; and though the shock of each successive embodiment 
 destroys more or less the recollection of what has passed, still each life 
 is haunted by memories of a former existence, ready to be awakened by 
 the sights and sounds that fill our present consciousness". 
 
 ^ Essay on the immortality of the Soul, istence, the theory would be satisfied as 
 
 * In treating of this view which I have well as by a succession of incarnations, 
 
 termed metempsychosis, it is to be ob- And in fact both in the Phaedo and in the 
 
 served that the actual transmigration is Phaedrtis Plato seems to hold out the 
 
 only an accident of it. All that is es- hope that a soul that has successfully 
 
 sential is the limitless duration of the passed all her probationary trials will 
 
 soul's existence : her perpetual reimbodi- attain to a permanent state of the highest 
 
 ment in various forms is not necessarily intellectual fruition possible for a finite 
 
 involved. If an individual soul can find existence, 
 some permanent and final mode of e.\- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 Thus Plato will have no one-sided immortality : the everlasting life 
 of our soul extends backwards into the infinite past as well as forwards 
 into the endless future. It is just herein that the strength of his posi- 
 tion lies : thus he escapes the inextricable perplexities which beset the 
 defenders of other views of immortality. The creational theory perhaps 
 never presented itself to his mind ; certainly, if it did, he dismissed it 
 as unworthy to be seriously entertained : it is in fact repugnant to the 
 first principles of his argument. On this view the soul of every being 
 that is newly born into the world is a fresh creation out of nothing ; and 
 as all souls previously created exist for ever, the aggregate number of 
 souls is for ever multiplying ; that is to say, the quantity of spirit in the 
 universe is continually and ceaselessly on the increase. This is of course 
 directly opposed to the great principles that the sum of force is con- 
 stant and that generation out of nothing is impossible, which form the 
 groundwork of Plato's arguments for immortality. Once allow that a 
 soul has a beginning, and we lose our only guarantee that it shall not 
 have an end : nay it must have an end, for only that which is without 
 beginning is without end ; only the uncreate is imperishable. It is in 
 fact impossible to bring forward any sound arguments for the future 
 existence of the soul which do not also involve its previous existence, 
 its everlasting duration. The creational theory is matter of dogmatic 
 assertion, not of philosophical discussion. 
 
 Not only on metaphysical grounds has Plato's conception so great 
 an advantage; but from the standpoint of practical ethics its superiority 
 is equally decided. The fundamental law of Platonic morals is 8pa- 
 o-avTt Tra^Eii/. ' There is indeed no such thing as vengeance in his 
 scheme, but there is an immutable and inexorable sequence of cause 
 and effect. No impunity exists for vice : every act of indulgence is 
 another bar in the soul's prison-house ; it drags her from the pure intel- 
 lectual sphere which is rightfully hers down to the gross and pestilent 
 atmosphere of sensual delight. From this doom none may escape ; the 
 consequences of every action are as inevitable as the laws of the 
 universe. If a man sin, he shall pay for his sin in spiritual degradation; 
 repentance avails nothing, reformation alone can slowly recover the lost 
 position. Now within the span of a single life we know that a man 
 often suffers in his latter days for the vices of his youth : how infinitely 
 wider then is the application of this principle, if we regard that single 
 life as but one out of an endless series. As Plato himself says, we 
 have to consider the effects of our actions not only for this life but for 
 all time : our present state is conditioned by causes stretching we know 
 not how far back into the remotest past, and what we do now will influ- 
 
 2 — 2 
 
20 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ence our destiny throughout unknown cycles to come. The indestructi- 
 bility of force comes terribly home to us here. Now it will be observed 
 that in this reference metempsychosis supplies the Platonist with a 
 ready explanation of the apparent injustice which prevails in the ordering 
 of things — an answer to the question, if the gods are good and care for 
 the affairs of men, why is virtue so often afflicted and vice triumphant? 
 An advocate of the creational theory is forced to reply that the balance 
 will be rectified in another Hfe : suffering virtue will be rewarded, and 
 the insolence of vice will be brought low. But such an answer is idle. 
 No future recompense can undo injustice that has once been done : 
 wrong may be redressed but never cancelled — twv -ireirpayft.evuiv h Si/coi re 
 kolL 'Trapa Sixar diroLrfTov owS* av yfpovoi 6 irdvTiav Trarrjp Swatro uefnev epymv 
 teXos. To the Platonist however the solution is easy. No injustice 
 has to be atoned, for none exists. The conditions obtaining at any 
 given time are the inevitable, and therefore perfectly just, result of an 
 infinite series of causes : we must look for the antecedents not in this 
 life only, but in a limitless cycle of prior existences ; and what might be 
 unjust relatively to a man's conduct in his present life may be the irre- 
 sistible effect of his action in some bygone period. It is true that the 
 answer is not complete without reference to ontological and physical 
 principles, which however cannot here be entered upon. 
 
 Thus the theory of metempsychosis supphes not only an explanation 
 of this inequality in human affairs but also a most powerful incentive to 
 virtuous action. A man shall be what his deeds and thoughts make him : 
 if he degrade himself by vice, his restoration must be effected, not by 
 some deathbed repentance or compulsory purgation, but by his own 
 laborious endeavour, by living according to the best of his lights in the 
 inferior state to which he has fallen. For Plato never leaves him without 
 hope The fanciful description of the soul's migrations at the close of 
 the Timaeus (92 a) represents a definite ethical doctrine. The soul 
 that has swerved from the course of pure intellectual virtue may inhabit 
 forms of bird or beast, or even fish and mollusc, ' when it is defiled with 
 all manner of iniquity and therefore in place of inhaling the fine and 
 clear element of air is condemned to the turbid and gross respiration 
 of water '- Yet even in this most degraded state there is a chance of 
 retrievement : for these vicissitudes are determined vov koI avoias airo- 
 ySoXiJ KOI KTifo-ei. A life well spent according to the conditions of even 
 the lowest rank may enable the soul to rise a step in the next incarna- 
 tion ; and the recovery of the whole intellectual inheritance is always 
 possible. The hopeless reprobation of the incurable criminals described 
 in the myth of the Phaedo belongs simply to the pictorial presentation: 
 
INTRODUCTION. 21 
 
 we find it only when Plato is pressing popular legend into his service; 
 not when he is presenting his own views undisguised by this veil of 
 tradition. I have said that a permanent mode of existence for the soul 
 is not excluded by the Platonic theory. But such permanent mode is 
 only possible when the soul has attained the highest perfection of which 
 she is capable : good may be stable, but evil never. 
 
 Among theories then which maintain the personal immortality of 
 particular souls it would seem that Plato's is metaphysically the most 
 defensible and ethically the most fruitful ; and while it attaches the 
 heaviest penalties to immorality, it offers the strongest encouragement 
 to any endeavour after improvement. It is not of course contended 
 that this view is exempt from objections and difficulties; merely that 
 these apply with greater force to any other method of defending indi- 
 vidual immortality. 
 
 (ii) But how far do Plato's arguments tend to prove the immortality 
 of particular souls, as distinct from the eternity of the universal soul ? 
 It must, I think, be replied that they go but a very short way indeed. 
 If we examine the several demonstrations, we shall find that what they 
 amount to- is that vital principle is indestructible, not that its manifesta- 
 tion in this or that personality is permanent. The result of the argument 
 from dvTairoSotris is that, if all things are not to be brought to nought, 
 the sum of vital essence can suffer no abatement; but it offers no shadow 
 of proof that this constant amount of vitality will continue to be distri- 
 buted into the same conscious personalities : we know by experience that 
 separate conscious personalities continue to be produced in the world, 
 and therefore we conclude that the vital force which constitutes them 
 cannot perish at the dissolution of soul and body; but we have no right 
 to conclude that these personalities retain their individual consciousness 
 after death. Indeed from this argument we cannot infer that vital 
 force will always continue to exist in the form of particular intelligences : 
 that belongs to another aspect of Plato's metaphysics. Proceeding to 
 aVa/ivijtns, although on a bare literal interpretation Plato's language may 
 imply that the soul existed individually before birth, yet this is not at all 
 involved in the principle of the theory : the particular soul retains the 
 Vnnwled ge of truths which ar e, t he possession of soul at large, not neces:, 
 sarily of this soul in a former personal existence . A similar examination 
 of the remaining arguments of the Phaedo will show that individual 
 immortality is not fairly deducible from any of them. The same applies 
 to the brief but pregnant demonstration in Phaedrus 245 c foil. There 
 the case for the eternity of soul is stated with unequalled force and 
 clearness ; but it applies to the universal soul alone, and nothing can be 
 
22 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 deduced from it regarding the permanence of particular souls. The 
 strikingly subtle argument beginning Republic 608 e contains a remark- 
 able expression (611 a), hrvo&i otl del av etev al avrai, SC. at xpvxai. 
 This seems at first sight like an assertion of the continued existence of 
 the same personalities. A closer examination however shows that this 
 is not the case. Plato simply means that if the whole vital force of the 
 universe is distributed into a certain number of souls, no addition to this 
 number is possible, else the sum total of vitality would be increased, 
 which is inadmissible. We cannot draw from that argument the con- 
 clusion that this universal vitality must needs be for ever manifested in 
 a given number of souls ; and even if it must, that would not neces- 
 sarily involve continuity of personality. The whole strength of Plato's 
 reasoning is expended in demonstrating the eternity of soul as such : 
 there is nothing to prove that particular souls on their departure from 
 the body are not reabsorbed in the universal spirit, merging their proper 
 consciousness in that common force of nature which is ever manifesting 
 itself anew in the forms of individual life. 
 
 (iii) Such being the case, it is not irrelevant to raise the question, 
 did Plato really and literally maintain the personal immortality of par- 
 ticular souls ? This certainly would seem to be the teaching of the 
 Phaedo, and this is the view of the vast majority of Platonic students : 
 but the contrary opinion is supported by the great authority of Hegel 
 and has recently been defended with much ingenuity by Teichmiiller ; it 
 is not therefore to be dismissed without ceremony. I will discuss the 
 statements of the two critics separately. 
 
 First however I must point out a difficulty under which an editor of 
 the Phaedo labours in approaching this question : it does not belong to 
 the treatment of the Phaedo at all, but to that of the Timaeus ; and we 
 can hope to attain a satisfactory solution only after a minute investiga- 
 tion of the profound and difficult metaphysics of the latter dialogue. 
 Such an investigation is obviously out of place here, since o Xdyos 
 irdpepyog (uv irXeov av epyov wv evexa Xeyerai irapdcrxoi. At the same 
 time it does not seem desirable to leave the subject altogether unno- 
 ticed, and I shall therefore treat it as briefly as I am able. 
 
 In his statement of the Platonic philosophy Hegel expressly assigns 
 the permanence of particular souls to the region of the mythical. We 
 think of the soul, he says ', as a physical thing possessing divers attri- 
 butes, one of which is thinking — thinking determined as a thing that 
 can pass away and cease. But with Plato the immortality of the soul is 
 
 ^ Hegel's JVer^, vol. xiv p. 107 foil. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 23 
 
 inseparably bound up with the fact that the soul is that which thinks — 
 thought is not a mere attribute of it. We are addicted to thinking of 
 the soul as if it were a thing that could exist without imagination or 
 thought. To Plato, on the other hand,_thg si gnificance o f immortality 
 consists in this, that thought is not an attribu.te-.of-Jbfi-^flJiLb.ut itS-Sab^.^ 
 stance — soul is iust tho ught.. Thought is the substance of soul as 
 gravity is the substance, not an attribute, of body. Take away gravity, 
 and body is no more ; take away thought and soul is no more. Thought 
 is the activity of the universal, which reflects itself into itself and 
 is identified with itself: this self-identity is the unalterable and 
 abiding. Alteration is when one thing becomes another and does not 
 hold fast by itself in the other. Soul on the other hand consists in the 
 retaining itself in the other — in the process of apprehension the soul 
 has to do with external matter, which is other, and yet it retains its self- 
 identity. ImmortaUty Jias not for Plato the interest it has for us in a 
 religious aspect; it depends upon the nature of thought and its inner 
 freedom. With reference to the Phaedo Hegel observes that we have 
 hardly any line of demarcation between the outward representation 
 and the inward idea, but this is far from sinking to the crudity of concep- 
 tion (Rohheit), that represents the soul as a thing, and inquires about 
 its duration and existence, as concerning a thing. 
 
 Now it appears to me that the foregoing criticism amounts to 
 something like this. Hegel, analysing the conception of immortality, 
 seizes at once upon that which he regards as essential to the Platonic 
 philosophy : this kernel he instantly drags to light, rejecting the husk 
 of ' Vorstellung'. Whether an individual consciousness shall continue 
 to exist as such is to Platonism of no metaphysical importance what- 
 ever : what is of importance is to grasp the true nature of eternity. 
 The soul's real immortality lies in the operation of thought : eternity 
 is in the nature of thought and has nothing to do with duration. Such, 
 I conceive, is Hegel's point. Now that the duration of the individual 
 is of no metaphysical importance I am willing to admit : Plato's philoso- 
 phy in no way involves it. I do not however see that it is thereby 
 excluded; provided the really essential point is maintained, it seems 
 to me that the question of individual duration is an open one for 
 Plato ; whether a particular consciousness continues for one life, or 
 for a score, or for an unlimited time, does not appear to affect the 
 question. 
 
 Teichmiiller however goes further, and declares that Plato could 
 not maintain individual immortality without grave inconsistency ; from 
 which preiniss he most justly draws the conclusion that Plato did 
 
24 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 not maintain it'. For I cordially agree with him that any interpre- 
 tation of Plato which attributes inconsistency to him stands self- 
 condemned. It may be very well for writers of Cicero's philosophical 
 calibre to talk of Plato as 'inconstans'; but when modern historians 
 of philosophy impute to this greatest of philosophers self-contradictions 
 of which the merest novice would be ashamed, one cannot but sus- 
 pect them of seeking to lighten their own labours at Plato's expense : 
 it is easier to accuse him of inconsistency than to work out his 
 meaning'. 
 
 Teichmiiller's criticism seems to resolve itself mainly into two 
 points : (i) Plato's reasoning applies only to universal, not to par- 
 ticular soul, (2) the admission of individual immortality makes Plato's 
 philosophy into a system of monadism, not monism. The first point 
 has been already conceded; but it is no proof that Plato did not believe 
 in the permanence of individual souls. The second objection, if sus- 
 tained, I should regard as fatal, holding as I do that Platonism is 
 essentially a monistic system. But I doubt whether it has been 
 proved. The contention is that, if particular souls are eternal, we 
 have as the ontological basis of the system not one universal thought, 
 but a number of distinct and independent substances or forces, re- 
 sembling "the monads of Leibnitz. But in the first place it must 
 be remarked that eternity is not claimed for particular souls : the 
 individual, qua individual, cannot possibly be eternal : all that is 
 claimed is the indefinite prolongation of their existence in both direc- 
 tions ; but no extent , of prolongation is one step nearer eternity ^ 
 Severance from what we term our body can make no difference; if 
 a particular soul continues her separate existence at all, the conditions 
 of her limitation oblige her to remain in the sphere of ycvco-ts : did she 
 pass to the voi/toi/ she would necessarily be merged in the universal*. 
 
 1 The works of Teichmiiller which I koX t6 t' ijy to t' IjTai. xpo'""" yeyovora 
 
 have consulted on this subject are 'die eiSri, d Sij ipipovres \avddvonev iirl Trjv 
 
 ^latonische Frage' and ' Studien zur alSi.ovov<Tiavo\jic6p0a5.\iyo/ji.ei>yi.pS-q(is^v 
 
 Geschichte der Begriffe.^ Ian re xal (ffrai, tj Si rd (ffn piyov Karb, 
 
 '^ As I shall presently have occasion to roc 0X17617 \070c irpoa-riKa. And again 
 
 remark, Plato's dialogues indubitably 38 B to piv yip irapaSeiypja itavra alwva 
 
 show a development in his system. But iaTiv 6v, S' av Sia t^Xous tok aTavra 
 
 this development involves no inconsist- xpovov yeyoviis re ical dv Koi iffofievos. 
 
 ency, even though the expression of some ^ Teichmiiller's objection seemsdirected 
 
 thoughts needs modification: rather it against the existence of a plurality of souls 
 
 brings to light the hidden connexion be- in the intelligible world : cf die platonUche 
 
 tween ideas hitherto unharmonised. Frage p. 23 ' Vielheit aber in das in- 
 
 ' Plato most explicitly recognises this, telligible Gebiet zu versetzen, heisst Ato- 
 
 Timaeus 37 E toxto. Si irwiTa idpi) vp^vov, mismus, nicht Platonismus.' Very true ; 
 
INTRODUCTION. 25 
 
 Finite intelligences are for Plato simply manifestations of the universal 
 voSs : they are not self-existent monads, but evolved from the universal, 
 a mode of whose existence they are. Now if, as we may gather 
 from the Timaeus, the universal vovs has this mode of existence in 
 perpetuity, can it matter to Plato's doctrine whether each finite intel- 
 ligence preserves the same thread of consciousness throughout, or' 
 is merged in the universal on the conclusion of a given term of 
 existence? One view may be more probable than the other, but 
 neither seems to me to involve monadism. If souls are to be 
 monads they must be as individuals eternal and self-existing j prolon- 
 gation of their existence, even in perpetuity, will not suffice. 
 
 Moreover, although I am convinced as firmly as any one of Plato's 
 consistency, I hold it for certain that we have represented in the 
 dialogues a regular development of Plato's thought, whereof the Phaedo 
 does not belong to the latest stage. We cannot therefore bring every- 
 thing in the Phaedo into severe conformity with the matured pantheism 
 of the Timaeus. In the latter it is probable that personal immortality 
 does more or less recede into the region of the mythical : it enters only 
 in an extremely allegorical guise. But while in the matured Platonism 
 all is coherent and consequent, in the still maturing Platonism of 
 the Phaedo there are to be found views, as we shall see, which Plato 
 afterwards considerably modified : and even were it shown that personal 
 immortality is inadmissible in the Timaeus, it does not follow that it is so 
 in the Phaedo. 
 
 In the interpretation of a writer so much addicted to figurative 
 speech as Plato there must needs be here and there difference of opinion 
 as to where the line is to be drawn between symbolism and substance : 
 and in this case I cannot but think that Teichmiiller has drawn the 
 line too high. And I cannot acquiesce in his naive assumption that 
 the mere fact that a doubt exists is decisive in favour of a non-literal 
 interpretation. The onus probandi, I take it, lies with those who do not 
 interpret literally; and in general the proof is not hard to find. 
 We have no hesitation in regarding the creation of the universe by the 
 SrjfiLovpyo's as purely mythical, because a literal acceptation would 
 reduce Platonism to a chaos of nonsense : we pass a similar verdict 
 on the endless punishment of criminals in the vIkvmi of the Phaedo, 
 Republic, and Gorgias, because it is incongruous with the just and 
 benevolent spirit that pervades Plato's ethics, and because it only 
 appears when Plato is clothing his thoughts in a legendary form. In the 
 
 but the individual soul, as such, whether not belong to the 'intelligibles Gebiet' 
 its continuance be perpetual or not, does at all. 
 
26 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 present case however I do not think the incongruity is made out. 
 Moreover the direct and circumstantial seriousness with which the 
 doctrine of immortality is put forward is totally unlike any of the 
 mythical or figurative representations of Plato's thought elsewhere : 
 Hegel himself observes ' wir trefifen hier am wenigsten geschieden die 
 Weise des Vorstellens und des Begriffes ; ' and certainly if Plato is 
 not here in earnest with individual immortality, he may fairly be charged 
 with having passed from mysticism to mystification. 
 
 I have made this defence of the literal interpretation not because 
 I consider that the continued existence of the individual is of any real 
 importance in the Platonic system — I should not go so far as to affirm 
 that it was retained to the last — but because, in order that we may 
 follow historically the development of Plato's thought, it is important 
 for us to determine precisely what he means to set forth in each 
 dialogue. And the conclusion which seems to me the soundest is that, 
 although Plato knew very well that neither he nor any one else could 
 demonstrate the immortality of individual souls, yet he was strongly 
 disposed to believe, at least at the time the Phaedo was written, that 
 every soul on its separation from the body will not be reabsorbed in the 
 universal, but will survive as a conscious personality, even as it existed 
 before its present incarnation. 
 
 § 4. Theory of Soul in the Phaedo^. 
 
 Adopting the view defended in the preceding section, we have next 
 to deal with a question arising from a comparison between the psycho- 
 logy of the Phaedo and that of some other Platonic dialogues. Such a 
 comparison will bring to light two points wherein Plato's teaching is at 
 first sight inconsistent and is regarded by Grote and others as distinctly 
 self-contradictory. The object of the present section is to show that no 
 such inconsistency exists. 
 
 In the Phaedo (a) the soul is essentially simple and incomposite ; 
 and this simpUcity is urged as an argument for her imperishability 
 (compare 80 b with 78 c foil.) : (/8) IpwTcs iin6v[i.(ia.i. ^6^01 and the hke 
 are referred to the body as their origin, whence arising they intrude 
 upon the soul and trouble her contemplations, (66 c). On the other 
 hand (a) in certain passages of the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus 
 
 1 The substance of this section ap- may refer the reader for a more detailed 
 peared in a paper printed in the Journal statement. 
 af Philology, vol. x, p. 120, to which I 
 
INTRODUCTION. 27 
 
 the soul is represented not as a simple but as a triple nature, {Phaedrus 
 246 A, Republic 439 d, Timaeus 69 c) : (y8) in the Fhilebus it is ex- 
 pressly declared that all passions have their origin in the soul, body 
 being in itself incapable of giving rise to any sensation ; and this posi- 
 tion is also consistently maintained in the Timaeus, (Fhilebus 35 c, 
 Timaeus 64 b, c). The problems we have to solve then are (i) how 
 can we reconcile the simplicity of soul in the Phaedo with her tripartite 
 nature in the other three dialogues, and how does the argument for 
 immortality affect the three parts severally ? (ii) how can we reconcile 
 the assignment of passions to body in the Phaedo with their assignment 
 to soul in the Fhilebus i 
 
 (i) Of the first problem only two solutions seem possible, (a) that 
 two distinct views were entertained by Plato at different periods, 
 (/8) that the tripartition of the soul is purely metaphorical". 
 
 The first alternative cannot be accepted. For reasons which will be 
 discussed hereafter it is impossible to regard the Phaedo as belonging to 
 a different period from the Republic ; and there are good grounds for 
 assigning the Phaedrus to the same group. We are bound therefore to 
 expect that these dialogues will agree in all important doctrines. 
 
 Moreover there is a remarkable fact to be noticed. The simplicity of 
 i/fuxv, so far from being a theory peculiar to the Phaedo, is one which 
 pervades the whole series of the Platonic dialogues from beginning to 
 end, not even excepting those in which the triform nature appears. This 
 is not only conclusive evidence that we are not dealing with doctrines 
 held at successive periods, but it affords strong presumption that the 
 tripartition of i/tjx'? is a figurative expression. 
 
 Let us examine the nature of this tripartition. In the myth of the 
 Phaedrus the soul is likened to a car driven by a charioteer and drawn by 
 two winged steeds. Of this pair one is vicious and unruly, the other 
 generous and docile, aiding the charioteer in subduing his refractory 
 companion. This parable is thus explained in the Republic. In every 
 soul there are two eiSij or ju-epi;, Xoyco-TiKoi' and aXoyoi', the latter being 
 subdivided into ^v/A0£t8es and hnQvikiyriKov. So we have the soul distin- 
 guished into three parts or kinds, rational, emotional, appetitive. We 
 see however that the main division is dual not triple; the three parts 
 are not coordinate but made out by the subdivision of the aXoyov : this 
 it will be well to bear in mind. 
 
 But if this analysis is to be understood as literally signifying that the 
 soul is composed of three distinct parts, the results are truly bewil- 
 dering. The entire argument of the Phaedo is not merely demolished 
 root and branch, but is shown utterly unmeaning and irrelevant. For 
 
28 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 when we dreaded lest the soul on quitting the body should be 
 scattered to the winds and dissolved, we were comforted by the 
 assurance that as she had no parts she could not be divided; 
 simplicity cannot admit dissolution. But now she has three distinct 
 parts, therefore into those parts she can be resolved : and what is to 
 become of them ? do they continue to exist separately ? or does one of 
 them, or two, or all perish? And what becomes of the soul's likeness 
 to the ideas, in virtue of which she claimed to apprehend them and to 
 belong to the region of the invisible and eternal ? All this is swept away 
 at one stroke. If we answer that it is the Xoyio-riKov alone with which 
 the argument of the Phaedo is concerned, we are shutting our eyes to 
 the fact that there is not a single passage in Plato where the term i/fux'7 
 is applied to the highest eTSos as distinguished from the two lower : nor 
 have we a right so to apply it here. And if the three etSj; all are classed 
 as i/fvx^, it must be in virtue of some common principle : what then is 
 this principle ? what is the bond of union, what the differentiation of the 
 three ? The fact that we are led into so helpless a maze of perplexity is 
 ample cause for deciding that the literal interpretation is entirely inad- 
 missible. 
 
 But the case is still further strengthened by the statement in the 
 Timaeus. The created gods are described as implanting in a body the 
 human soul, imitating the manner of their own creation by the Srifiiovp- 
 yo's. The divine element, Oetov, which they received from the hands of 
 the creator, they placed in the head : this is the Xoyio-TiKov of the Jie- 
 puHic. Then, Plato proceeds to tell us, they fashioned another kind of 
 soul, to which he applies the remarkable term ^vjjtoi/. This is the abode 
 of vehement passions, pleasure and pain, confidence and fear, wrath and 
 hope and love, and all unreasoning sensations. And lest they should 
 sully the divine principle, they placed this mortal soul in another region 
 of the body: and since it was twofold, they divided the two kinds by a 
 partition, setting the spirited portion in the heart, that it might readily 
 hear and obey the commands of the reason ; while the appetitive they set 
 in the belly, that it might care for the nourishment of the body. Here 
 the OvriTov eiSos corresponds to the aXoyov of the Republic and includes 
 the ^v/ioeiSes and hnBv\>.iYnKav. 
 
 If this too is to be understood literally, confusion is tenfold worse 
 confounded. For to the three parts are assigned different habitations in 
 the body; all three therefore have extension in space : yet we know 
 very well that for Plato i^ux'J is unextended and immaterial. Again the 
 lower £i8i; are mortal ; that is, vital principle can admit destruction : a 
 declaration not only subversive of all the reasoning in the Phaedo, but 
 
INTROD UCTION. 29 
 
 flatly opposed to the whole of Plato's convictions concerning soul : 
 nay it extinguishes once for all his hope of discovering a sure basis of 
 knowledge] for if the principle of life and thought can under any 
 conditions cease to be, what is there that shall abide? 0vi;tj; ^vyri, 
 understood literally, is indeed the most absolute contradiction in 
 terms that his vocabulary could furnish. And, as if to bring out this 
 contradiction in the most glaring light, Plato declares (Phaedrus 245 d) 
 Tracra i/'uxv d^avaros, all soul, without reservation, is immortal ; and 
 presently we have an elaborate statement of the tripartite nature, that is 
 of a mortal and an immortal soul conjoined. 
 
 All this constitutes not merely justification but positive necessity for 
 treating the tripartition of soul as wholly metaphorical; and the interpre- 
 tation of the metaphor is simple enough. The three £1817 of the soul 
 are not different parts or kinds, but only different modes of the soul's 
 activity under different conditions. The two lower etSr; are consequent 
 upon the conjunction of soul with matter', and their operation ceases 
 at the separation of soul from matter. Soul, as such, is simple, she is 
 pure thought; and her action, which is thinking, is simple. But soul 
 immanent in matter has a complex action; she does not lose, at least in 
 the higher organisms, all the faculty of pure thought; but she has another 
 action consequent on her implication with matter: this action we call 
 perception or sensation. The main division is, as we have seen, dual : 
 koyuTTLKov expressing the action of soul by herself, SXoyov has action 
 through the body. The iraB-q belonging to aXoyov Plato classifies under 
 the heads of 0u/toetSes and iTriOvfiriTiKov. We see too that the terms of the 
 Timaeus, Oelov and 6v7]t6v, are abundantly justified. Soul is altogether 
 imperishable : but when she enters into relation with body she assumes 
 certain functions which are terminable and which cease when the rela- 
 tion comes to an end. ©vijtov then is the name given to soul acting 
 under certain material conditions; and soul may in that sense admit 
 the appellation, not because she ever ceases to exist gua soul, but 
 because she ceases to operate ^ua emotional and appetitive soul. Soul 
 exists in her own essence eternally, in her material relations but for 
 a time. 
 
 ^ This is indubitable. In the myth of conditions of individual existence are not 
 
 the Phaedrus the gods have the three necessarily identical with ours ; e. g. the 
 
 (ih-q, but the gods are corporeal {246 d). gods and superior spirits have <riS/to, but 
 
 That they are so is interesting : it shows not awiia. ■yii.vov ; but such an existence 
 
 how fully Plato recognised that the limi- involves in some sense materiality : the 
 
 tations of individual consciousness pre- individual belongs to yhesK. 
 elude a purely immaterial existence. The 
 
30 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Soul then is simple and uniform, the one and only principle of life. 
 All forms of life are manifestations of her, from the highest to the 
 lowest; from the activity of the noblest intellect to the faintest vestiges 
 of vegetable growth'. The degree of intelligence varies inversely 
 according to the degree of implication with matter. In the highest 
 forms of individual existence thought has free scope for its activity, and 
 the lower modes of consciousness are in due subordination : but as the 
 material bonds grow tighter, the supremacy of thought wanes, and the 
 dominion of sensation and appetite strengthens; finally reason and 
 thought, even the higher modes of sensation, vanish, and nutrition and 
 growth alone remain. But all these organisms are vitalised by one sole 
 principle of life. 
 
 We now have reached a standpoint whence it is easy to solve the 
 difficulties which we encountered at the outset. Once recognise that 
 Plato knew of but one kind of soul, and all is smooth. The essential 
 nature of soul is simple, as much in the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus 
 as in the Phaedo. Hence it is beside the point to ask which of the 
 three parts is immortal : Plato is seeking to prove that soul herself is 
 eternal, not that certain relations and functions of soul are perpetual. 
 The vital principle which manifests itself in these modes is imperish- 
 able, but the modes themselves are temporary and transient. 
 
 (ii) The answer to the second question is to be found with no less 
 ease. The whole argument of the Phaedo, as we have seen, deals with 
 soul qua soul. With this of course bodily appetites have nothing to do : 
 accordingly Plato assigns them to the body, because they only belong to 
 soul in her bodily relation and through this affect her. Nothing would 
 be gained by pursuing the analysis further; rather the course of the 
 discussion would be hampered by the introduction of matter which had 
 no bearing on the question at issue. In the Philebus it is different; 
 there it is Plato's business to give a psychological analysis of the passions 
 in question : accordingly they are assigned to soul, which is the only 
 seat of consciousness. Each dialogue is justified from its own stand- 
 point : the Phaedo in attributing passions to the body, because they 
 arise from the corporeal relation of soul ; the Philebus in giving theni 
 to the soul, because body, as such, has no consciousness. There only 
 appears to be a discrepancy, because the analysis of the Phaedo is in the 
 Philebus carried out more thoroughly : these passions belong to body, 
 because without the bodily environment they could not arise ; to soul, 
 because it is by soul alone that they can be felt. 
 
 ' See Timaeus 77 A foil. 
 
INTROD UCTION. 3 1 
 
 Thus it appears that if we insist upon treating Plato's allegorical 
 language as plain prose, we are lost in helpless perplexity ; while by a 
 reasonable interpretation of the metaphor we are released from all diffi- 
 culty and show Plato's teaching to be perfectly consistent and philo- 
 sophical. There cannot, I think, be much doubt which method to 
 choose. As Hegel observes, ' wenn er [sc. Plato] von der Seele des 
 Menschen sagt, dass sie einen verniinftigen und unverniinftigen Theil 
 habe : so ist dies ebenso im Allgemeinen zu nehmen : aber Plato be- 
 hauptet damit nicht, dass die Seele aus zweierlei Substanzen, zweierlei 
 Dingen zusammengesetzt sey.' 
 
 I conclude this section with a brief summary borrowed from the 
 paper to which I have already referred. 
 
 In Timaeus 69 c — 72 D we have a Bv.ov cTSos and a OvrjTov cTSos of 
 ij/v^ : of which 6eLov= XoyiortKoy, Ovyjtov = ^v/xoeiSts + iin6viJi,rjTLK6v. Now 
 i/'uX'?') ^s such, is dOdvarov : therefore the word Ovrjrov can only refer to a 
 particular relation of i/'i'X'? ^^^ crw/ta, or operation of ij/vxo through o-oJ/na. 
 ©vfioeiSki therefore and iTnOvfjuriTLKov are not different parts of ^vxij, but 
 only names for different modes of its action through a-wfia : thus 6v- 
 jnoetSes and eiri0v/*i;TiKov are OvrjTo,, because, when the conjunction 
 between i/'iixv and crw/xa ceases, they cease also. 
 
 Thus the apparent discrepancy between the Phaedo and Philebus is 
 reconciled. In the one IkiOv^um are ascribed to cr(3/*a, as arising from 
 conjunction of i/'v^'} and (T&ii.a. : in the other they are more accurately 
 ascribed to i/'i'X'?) because they are an affection of i/'i'x7 through o-u/ia. 
 Also the argument of the Phaedo is entirely unaffected by the threefold 
 division. All soul is simple, uniform, and indestructible; but in con- 
 nexion with body it assumes certain phases which are temporary and 
 only exist in relation to body. Thus though the iTnOv/jLrjTiKov and 
 Ovjxoii^k, as such, are not immortal, because they depend for their 
 continuance upon body, which is mortal; yet the vital principle, which 
 under such conditions assumes these forms, is immortal and continues to 
 exist, though not necessarily in the same mode. For the modes in 
 which vital force acts under temporary conditions are transitory, but the 
 acting force itself is changeless and eternal. 
 
 § 5. Position of the Phaedo in the Platonic System. 
 
 The whole philosophy of Plato is, as I am fully convinced, set forth 
 in his extant dialogues. It is a system which in its final development 
 forms a harmonious and consistent whole, worked out with unfailing 
 
32 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 logical precision from its fundamental principles. But we can hardly 
 suppose that this system sprang all at once in its mature completeness, 
 like a new Athene, from its creator's brain. Plato is not indeed wont 
 to write down his ideas before they are well thought out : but when we 
 reflect where he took philosophy up and where he left it, it would seem 
 wonderful indeed if a series of compositions extending over a long life 
 belonged to one and the same stage of thought. Of philosophy, 
 properly so called, Plato is the originator and creator. The earher 
 Greek thinkers in their struggles up to the light had struck upon 
 divers principles of profound and vital importance : the names of 
 Herakleitos, Parmenides, and Anaxagoras are associated with truths 
 which form the very framework of philosophy. But each of the earlier 
 philosophers dwelt exclusively on his own peculiar principle, till in its 
 isolation a truth became a falsehood ; they advanced one aspect of the . 
 truth as if it were the whole : those on one side of the shield declared 
 that all is convex ; those on the other, all is concave. Philosophy first 
 became possible when there arose a o-in'OTrriKos o.rr\p, who saw that 
 these truths are complementary, that each is realised in the others. 
 And here I cannot forbear once more to quote a remark of Hegel's : 
 ' We are not to look upon Plato's dialogues as if it were his concern 
 to give expression to sundry philosophies, nor must we suppose that his 
 philosophy was an eclectic system constructed out of the former : 
 it rather forms the knot in which these one-sided abstract principles 
 
 are truly unified in concrete form In the Platonic philosophy we 
 
 see manifold philosophemes of earlier times, but taken up into Plato's 
 principles and therein unified.' Platonism in fact realises by concilia- 
 tion principles which in their separation were null and void. 
 
 From this point of view we should expect to find in Plato's 
 exposition of his system (i) a phase wherein the necessity of such 
 a conciliation is recognised and its accomplishment more or less 
 effected, while at the same time imperfections and gaps yet remain, 
 (2) a phase in which Plato's severe self-criticism has revealed to 
 him the weak points in his earlier theory, and his unparalleled meta- 
 physical insight has suggested to him the remedy. To leap at once 
 from the one-sided crudeness of preplatonic thought to so profound 
 and comprehensive a philosophy as the later Platonism would seem 
 beyond the power even of such a genius as Plato's : there are few 
 indeed who could have reached the intermediate stage. We may 
 expect to see, and I believe we do see in the dialogues evidence of 
 development in Plato's thought, which passes through definite stages, 
 enabhng us to distribute the Platonic writings into three distinct 
 
INTRODUCTION. 33 
 
 periods, which I shall term the Sokratic, the middle, and the 
 later. 
 
 Upon the precise nature of this development an entirely new and 
 most important light has been thrown by Mr Jackson in a masterly 
 series of essays recently published in the Journal of Philology, vols, x 
 and XI. His results, so far as he has yet proceeded, I cordially 
 accept in the main; and it is from the standpoint which his re- 
 searches have empowered us to reach that I now propose to indi- 
 cate a classification of the Platonic dialogues. I am only concerned 
 to give such a general outline as will enable me to define the period 
 to which I conceive the Phaedo to belong ; a full analysis would not 
 serve the present purpose. 
 
 At the time he first met Sokrates, the unsatisfactory result of 
 previous speculation had in all probability inclined the young Plato, 
 like most of his contemporaries, towards philosophic scepticism. 
 Sokrates gave a new impetus to his thought ; it was- from him that 
 Plato derived, along with the interrogatory method) the principle 
 which afterwards bore such abundant fruit — the principle that know- 
 ledge is of universals. This is the great contribution of the unmeta- 
 physical Sokrates to metaphysics ; but it is in the hands of Plato, 
 not of Sokrates, that it attained its true significance. And even with 
 Plato it at first remained barren. In his earlier dialogues Plato exer- 
 cises the exuberant Strength of his growing thought in the Sokratic 
 method of definition: we find abundant promise of the matchless 
 artistic power that is to come, but little or no advance on the position 
 of Sokrates. Such dialogues are the Euthyphron, Chamiides, Laches, 
 and others, mostly of small compass and of slight philosophical 
 importance. They culminate in the Protagoras, the longest and most 
 brilliant of the series. These dialogues constitute the Sokratic period ; 
 in them we do not yet find Plato. 
 
 But Plato was a true scholar of Herakleitos : he saw that in things 
 which abide not, but ever fluctuate and fleet away, there can be no 
 stable truth nor basis of knowledge. Knowledge is of that which 
 abides firm and changes not, if there exists such in the universe. 
 And now Plato despairs no longer of finding this existence, he sees it 
 in the principle of universals. But not in the universals as he received 
 them from Sokrates ; a change must pass upon them before they will 
 serve his end. Sokrates had said, if we would know a thing we must 
 clear our conception of it from all accidental attributes which may 
 be peculiar to particular specimens of the class : if we would know 
 what is a tree, we must obtain from the completest comparison that 
 
 P. 3 
 
34 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 our experience enables us to make an exhaustive catalogue of those 
 attributes which are not peculiar to any particular tree but which are 
 common to all, and lacking any one of which a thing would not 
 be a tree. Thus we shall have framed in our mind the definition 
 or concept of a tree, and now we have such knowledge of it as is 
 attainable. But this concept is simply a thought in our own mind, 
 it has no existence of its own : it is, as Protagoras might tell us, 
 doubly unsubstantial ; for it is formed from the impressions produced 
 by an ever-changing object upon a subject that is never constant: 
 the image of a flitting insect in running water is not more shadowy 
 than the perceptions from which our definition is formed. Knowledge 
 demands for its object a constant self-existent verity. This led Plato to 
 the hypostasisation of the universal. In place of a mental concept 
 derived from particulars he gives us an essential idea prior to the parti- 
 culars, whereof it is the cause. These ideas, being veritably existent, 
 can be objects of true knowledge; and they served Plato as a 8«o-/^os 
 wherewith to mediate between the immovable unity of Parmenides 
 and the limidess plurality of Herakleitos. We cannot, says Plato, clear 
 at one bound the gulf between tv and aireipo, between the primal unity 
 and the infinite multitude of particulars ; we need, as intermediates, 
 TToXXa, i.e. a definite number of classes, proceeding by gradually 
 widening generalisations from the infimae species to the all-embracing 
 unity : and each of these classes represents an idea. 
 
 This is the stage of the middle Platonism : as yet the ideas are 
 simply hypostasisations of every logical concept. Consequently we 
 find in the Republic an idea of every group of objects denoted by a 
 class-name. We have at the top of the scale the amo dyaGov, we 
 have ideas of Ka\.6v hUaiov, &c., ideas of natural objects, ideas of 
 crKeuaaTa, beds, tables, &c., ideas of relations, great, small, equal, &c., and 
 ideas of Kaxdv o.8lkov and the like. The particulars in every group derive 
 their nature and existence from the immanence, irapova-ia, of the idea. 
 The Republic is the chief exponent of this phase of Plato's metaphysics : 
 it is also represented by the Phaedrus, Symposium, and others : 
 its main distinguishing characteristics are the assumption of an idea 
 for every group of particulars, and the inherence of the idea in 
 the particulars, also expressed as the participation, /xe^c^ts, of the 
 particular in the idea. 
 
 But Plato presently finds reason to be dissatisfied with this expres- 
 sion of his theory: the difficulties and deficiencies he sees therein 
 are stated with overwhelming force in the earlier part of the Parmenides. 
 The points which chiefly demanded correction were the contents of the 
 
INTR OD UCTION. 3 5 
 
 ideal world and the relation between ideas and particulars. The list of 
 ideas is largely reduced, though it is not easy to say precisely to what 
 extent : instead of an idea corresponding to every group of particulars 
 we now have only an idea for every group which is naturally and 
 not artificially determined ; thus all ideas of o-Kcvao-ra are abolished. 
 Next relations are reduced from the rank of ideas to that of universal 
 predicates, or, as Aristotle would say, categories ; so that we no longer 
 have ideas of great and small, equal and double, and so forth. Finally 
 ideas of negations are abolished, such as evil, unjust, &c. Therefore 
 one great criterion of the stage to which a dialogue belongs will be the 
 nature of the ideas that are assumed in it. 
 
 The second point is no less important, the relation between the 
 ideal and the material world. In the middle period the idea exists 
 (a) transcendentally, Iv r^ ^vaei, (j8) immanent in the particulars. 
 In the period to which we have now come, the transcendental existence 
 of the idea alone is allowed : the particulars no longer participate in the 
 idea, but are regarded as copies, /it/Aif/oiaTa, of the ideal type, irapd- 
 Sety/jux. In this way the objections formulated in the Parmenides 
 against the earlier account of the relation between idea and particular 
 are avoided. Other characteristics of the later Platonism, as the analy- 
 sis of ovra. into irepas and a.'Treipov in the Philebus, and the still subtler 
 analysis of the Timaeus, need not detain us here ; since the object of 
 the foregoing statement is merely to indicate the development of Plato's 
 system so far as is necessary for fixing the position of the Phaedo. The 
 later metaphysic is unfolded in the Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus, 
 and consummated in the Timaeus. 
 
 Guided by these landmarks we shall find it no hard matter to 
 determine the bearings of the Phaedo. In this dialogue we have 
 an idea of lo-ov (74 a), //.eya (100 b), a-fiiKporrj^ (loo e), &c. Also we 
 have the idea described as iv ■q/uv as well as iv tjj ^vcrei (102 d). That 
 is to say, in the Phaedo (i) we see ideas of relations, though ideas 
 of o-Ket/acrra do not occur, and (2) the ideas are- immanent in particu- 
 lars. These are two unmistakable marks that the dialogue belongs to 
 the Platonism of the Republic. 
 
 The metaphysical doctrine of the Phaedo is in fact identical with that 
 of the Republic, although it is less precisely formulated. The cardinal 
 point in each dialogue is the existence of the ideas as the sole principle 
 of causation and the one object of true knowledge. In the Phaedo 
 indeed Plato does not bring out in definite language the subordination 
 of the other ideas to the oxtq dya66v as the supreme source of all 
 existence. But this is not due to any discordance of theory, but only to 
 
 3—2 
 
36 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 a difference in the immediate object. The supremacy of the auro 
 cJya^oV in the Phaedo is plainly indicated in the fact that to ySeXTto-Tov 
 is postulated as the ultimate oXtLo., to which all other causes are merely 
 subsidiary. Moreover a synthesis of these two dialogues will show 
 us that Plato is working on precisely the same lines which he afterwards 
 follows in the Philebus and Timaeus. In the Phaedo he declares that 
 all things are ordered by vov% working hv\ to- piXTia-Tov. But what is the 
 'best'? by what standard are we to determine it? The answer is indi- 
 cated in the Republic : the efficient and final causes are indistinguishably 
 blended in the avro d'^aOov. This identification is pregnant with a 
 significance which is not fully brought to light until we come to the 
 Timaeus ; where, behind the veil of poetical, embroidery, we behold the 
 universe as the self-evolution of absolute vovi, according to the immuta- 
 ble laws of its owH' nature. The standard of to /SeXTLorov then lies in 
 the nature of voCs : and i/ovs in operating iirl to piXno-Tov is working 
 out its own being. This is why the philosopher must seek to base his 
 morality upon cognition of the dyaOov itself; for there is no other 
 standard of excellence than the laws of true B»ing.. 
 
 The thoroughly Herakleitean conception of the phenomenal world 
 is also quite in keeping with the Republic. In the shadowy realm of 
 the sensible the soul goes astray bewildered and befogged in the whirling 
 eddy of unsubstantial phantoms — a/tcvjjra Kap-qva — that throng around 
 her. In this doubtful region, midway between being and not-being, she 
 can only grope her way under the treacherous guidance of opinion. 
 And here we may note another characteristic of the middle period, in 
 the absence of any really serious attempt to account for the existence or 
 apparent existence of phenomena. Plato does not flatly deny the exist- 
 ence of the visible world, as the Eleatics did; he assigns it a sort of 
 ignominious half-existence : but he gives us no explanation of it beyond 
 such vaguely metaphorical phrases as ' participation in the ideas ', It 
 is not until his latest dialogues that he sets himself resolutely to deal 
 with this problem. He never recedes from his Herakleitean view of 
 phenomena ; but he recognises that their appearance is a fact requiring 
 the most thorough investigation. 
 
 The position of the Phaedo with respect to the vexed question of 
 predication is very interesting. In the earlier days of philosophy, for 
 fault of adequate logical analysis, the perplexity surrounding this subject 
 was so great that thinkers of most opposite tendencies had been forced 
 to deny the possibility of predication altogether — at most identical pro- 
 positions could be admitted. From the first Plato perceived that there 
 could be no sound logical or metaphysical basis for a dogma which 
 
INTRODUCTION. 37 
 
 would render reason useless and language impossible. In Phaedo 102 b, 
 we have his earlier view on the subject. Whatever we predicate of an 
 object is predicable of such object by virtue of the immanence of the 
 idea therein; we call it by a name denoting the attribute of the idea: 
 Tovrcov toXKo, fieTaka/jL^dvovra, avTwv tovtoiv Tqv iTraivvfj-iav itrxeti'. In 
 fact when we say ' Simmias is small ', this is merely a convenient ex- 
 pression for ' Simmias partakes of the idea of smallness '. Accordingly 
 the two statements ' Simmias is small ', ' Simmias is great ', though con- 
 tradictory (OS Tois prjij-aa-i Xeyerai, are not contradictory in fact ; for they 
 only signify that Simmias participates in both ideas : in comparing him 
 to Sokrates we designate him by the iirwvvixia of fiiyeOos, to Phaedo by 
 that of a-fiLKpoTT]?. Moreover the expression ' Simmias is smaller than 
 Phaedo ' is only a conventional phrase signifying that the (r/xtKpoT7;s in 
 Simmias is smaller than the /xe'ye^os in Phaedo \ 
 
 Now however superior this conception may be to that of Antisthenes 
 and others who denied predication, it is plain that it does not really 
 touch the vital point. The whole puzzle arose from erroneous notions 
 about ov and /xrj 6v; the copula eo-ri was conceived to denote identity 
 and veritable existence, while ovk ia-ri implied absolute negation — 
 abstract non-existence. This is the problem which is handled with 
 such consummate skill in Sophist 240 B onwards. But in the Phaedo 
 Plato is so far from approaching this question that he does not even 
 betray the slightest consciousness that just herein lies the difficulty; 
 he has in fact evaded, not solved, the aVopta. Here again the Phaedo 
 ranks itself with the Republic. In the latter (477 a foU.) we have the 
 division into ov, ii-q ov, and to /Meraiv, being respectively the objects of 
 yj/cSorts, dyvao-ia, and Sofa. In this classification ov signifies absolute 
 existence, /ui? ov absolute non-existence, while to /teTa^ii comprehends 
 all phenomena. Now although a sensible object is declared to be afw. 
 ov T€ /cat ju.7; ov (478 d), this is simply because it lies fiera^v tov ei\iKptv(3s 
 ovTOi Kol TOV TrdvTdii fj-rj ovtos — it is an ambiguous semi-reality : but there 
 is no glimmer of the significance in which Plato afterwards declares 
 
 {Sophist 259 b) that it iroXXa^iJ p.h> la-ri, 7roXXa;;^jj 8' ovk (.(tti. When 
 
 the Sophist was written, he did not shrink from affirming that to ov, 
 ocrairip io'Ti to. dXXa, KaTO, Toa-avra ovk eo-Ttv. exeiva yap ovk ov €v filv avTo 
 i(TTLV, OTripavTO, Be tov dpiOfiov TaXXa ovk to'Tiv av (257 a). But in the 
 Republic and Phaedo there is not the slightest evidence either that Plato 
 had made the logical analysis which led him to this conclusion or that 
 he was alive to the necessity of making it^ 
 
 ' A confusion of course arises from the this we are not at present concerned, 
 assumption of ideas of relation : but with ^ The difference between Plato's earlier 
 
38 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 On this ground also then the Phaedo must be classed along with the 
 Republic in the middle period. Which of these two dialogues was prior 
 in order of composition is a question which I think is hardly possible to 
 determine. Plato's voice in the Republic is clearer, fuller, and more 
 confident. The ontological theory which is somewhat vaguely sketched 
 in the Phaedo is in the Republic very precisely formulated. But this 
 admits of a double interpretation. We may either suppose that the 
 Phaedo contains as it were the first draft of a scheme which is afterwards 
 fully matured j or else that Plato is briefly adverting to a theory which 
 he has already thoroughly expounded. We might point to the more 
 confident tone of the Republic with regard to the attainment of know- 
 ledge as arguing an advance upon the Phaedo : but, it must be remem- 
 bered, Plato recognises in the Timaeus that an approximation to know- 
 ledge is all for which the human intellect can hope : albeit the Phaedo 
 does not strike one as intermediate between the Republic and Timaeus 
 in this respect. 
 
 The doctrine of dvdfivri(rL^, though it does not occur in the Republic, 
 is conspicuous in two other dialogues of the middle period, to wit the 
 Mem and Phaedrus. Jt is remarkable that this thought, dormant through 
 nearly all the later period, finally reappears, under an altered form, but 
 still easily recognisable, in the Timaeus. 
 
 So much for the metaphysical relations of the Phaedo, which enable 
 us with perfect certainty, if we accept the theory of development which 
 I have indicated, to assign it to the middle Platonism; in fact it con- 
 stitutes, along with the Republic, our chief source of information upon 
 the fundamental principles of that period. Its ethical relations are 
 discussed in appendix I, and therefore need not here be dwelt upon : 
 moreover they are of very slight comparative importance for our present 
 purpose. It is absolutely impossible to fix the position of any Platonic 
 dialogue by its ethical contents : the metaphysical significance alone 
 constitutes the very soul of Plato's works ; and this is the guide we must 
 follow, if we would determine the order of their development. 
 
 § 6. Persons of the dialogue. 
 
 (i) EcHEKRATES the Phliasian is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius 
 (viii 46), along with his countrymen Phanton Diokles and Polymnastos 
 and the Chalkidian Xenophilos, as the last of the Pythagoreans. These 
 
 and later views on predication is very paper on the Parmenides, Jotimal of 
 clearly brought out by Mr Jackson in his Philology, vol. xi p. 287 foil. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 39 
 
 men, according to the same authority, were scholars of Philolaos and 
 Eurytos, and were still alive in the time of Aristoxenos, the musician 
 and Peripatetic, who was a contemporary of Theophrastos. An Eche- 
 krates, the son of Phrynion, is mentioned in the gth Platonic epistle, 
 358 B, but there is nothing to show whether he is identical with the 
 Echekrates of the Phaedo : there was, according to the catalogue given 
 by lamblichos, a Tarentine Pythagorean of that name ; Prof Geddes 
 suggests that Echekrates may have been an ItaUan by birth who settled 
 at Phlius ; but the Phliasian occurs as a distinct person in lamblichos' 
 list of Pythagoreans '. 
 
 Plato's choice of Echekrates as the auditor of Phaedo's narrative 
 is judicious. A hearer was required who should be in sympathy not 
 only with the character and fate of Sokrates, but also with his teaching. 
 The theory of ideas plays the most important part in the arguments 
 ascribed to Sokrates, and none would be so likely as a Pythagorean 
 philosopher to turn a friendly ear to this theory. The Pythagorean 
 doctrine' of numbers, as Aristotle tells us, bore a considerable resem- 
 blance to Plato's ideal theory : and we may well suppose that a due 
 amount of a-Ki^is Iv tois Xo'yois would render an intelligent Pythagorean 
 a ready recipient of Platonism. 
 
 (ii) Phaedo was a man of much greater note. A native of Elis, 
 he was taken prisoner in the war waged by Sparta and Athens upon 
 his country, B.C. 401. He is said to have been brought as a slave to 
 Athens ; but his servitude cannot have been of long duration, since in 
 399 we find him a member of the Sokratic circle : according to Aulus 
 Gellius (11 18) he was ransomed by Kebes, and, in the words of 
 Diogenes, TovvreiiOev IKevOepiias e<^iXocro(^et. He seems to have possessed 
 genuine philosophic ability ; and after the death of Sokrates he returned 
 to his own country, where he founded the Elean school; the same 
 which, after its transplantation by Menedemos, became better known as 
 the Eretrian. Nothing definite seems to have been recorded regarding 
 the views of Phaedo ; but probably they bore a considerable resemblance 
 to those of Eukleides, with whom he is classed by the satirist Timon in 
 a passage quoted in Diog. Laert. 11 107 : 
 
 aW ov /tot TOVTOiV <j}\eS6v<av fieXei' ovSe yap aWov 
 oiScvos, ov ^atSttfi/os, oris ye fiev, ov8' ipiSdvTeto 
 EvKXeCSov, Meyaptva-w os ep-^aXe Xvcra-av epurpov. 
 
 1 Echekrates, a Lokrian Pythagorean, one of Plato's teachers, he is obviously a 
 occurs in Cicero de finibus v § 87 : if different man. 
 Cicero is correct in saying that he was 
 
40 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 A tendency to ipurixo's certainly characterised his Eretrian successor 
 Menedemos. Phaedo composed dialogues, whereof the names of 
 several are given by Diogenes Laertius ii 105 : of these however only 
 two are said by Diogenes to be undoubtedly genuine, Zwirvpo? and 
 St/xtuv. A fragment from one of his works is thus translated by Seneca 
 e/iisf. xciv 41 : minuta quaedam animalia, cum mordent, non sentiuntur : 
 adeo tenuis illis et fallens in periculum vis est : tumor indicat morsum, 
 et in ipso tumore nullum volnus apparet. idem tibi in conversatione 
 virorum sapientium eveniet : non deprehendes, quemadmodum aut 
 quando tibi prosit, profuisse deprehendes. The neatness of this simile 
 would lead us to suppose that Gelliu^ w^s justified in the epithet ' ad- 
 modum elegantes ', which he applies to Phaedo's writings. 
 
 Phaedo was evidently a special favourite with Sokrates and seems to 
 have been highly esteemed by the other Sokratics : of whom Aischines 
 is said to have composed a dialogue called by his name. The chrono- 
 logy of his life is unknown; at the death of Sokrates however he 
 appears to have been little more than a youth. 
 
 (iii) Concerning Apollodoeos of Phaleron we know Uttle beyond 
 what Plato has told us. He was a man of impulsive and passionate 
 temperament, which had gained him the name of o fmviKoi (cf Sym- 
 posium 173 d), fervently attached to Sokrates, but frequently, it would 
 seem, not very good company to others {Symp. L 1. o-aurm re icat tois 
 aXXois a.ypioiva.% irXrjv SfOKparoDs). Xenophon refers to him twice : once 
 in memoraUlia in xi 17, where he is said to be inseparable from 
 Sokrates; and again in the apology § 2%, where Xenophon again testifies 
 to his strong affection for his master, but stigmatises him as aAXcos 
 einQOrjis. He is of no philosophical importance. 
 
 (iv) SiMMiAS was a native of Thebes, where he attended the 
 lectures of the Pythagorean Philolaos. How long he had been a com- 
 panion of Sokrates is unknown, but both he and his friend Kebes were 
 at the time of their residence in Athens very young men (vcavta-Koiv, 
 89 a) : afterwards he seems to have acquired a considerable reputation. 
 He is mentioned in the Phaedrus 242 b : Sokrates vows that no one has 
 caused the production of more Xoyoi, whether composed by himself or 
 by others, than Phaedrus; always excepting Simmias — StjU.ju.tai' -yap 
 i^aip(5 Xoyov. In CriYo 45 B Simmias is said to have brought to Athens 
 a sufficient sum to effect the release of Sokrates. The meagre notice of 
 him in Diogenes Laertius 11 1 24 is merely a catalogue of twenty-three 
 dialogues of which he was said to be the author. , In Plutarch de genio 
 Socmtis § 7 Simmias is made to say that he studied philosophy 
 at Memphis in company with Plato and Ellopion of Peparethos. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 41 
 
 This is pretty nearly the sum total of our information concerning 
 him. 
 
 (v) Of Kebes equally little is known, beyond what we learn from 
 the Phaedo. Diogenes says merely Kej3r]^ 6 ©lyjSaios. zeal tovtov <j>ipov- 
 rat StaXoyoi rpeis* IltVaf, 'EjSSo/tij, <&pwtxos. A composition purporting 
 to be the IltVaf of Kebes is still extant; but there can be no doubt that 
 it is spurious. Xenophon mentions him twice (fnem. i ii 48, in xi 17), 
 but adds nothing to our knowledge. He, like Simmias, offered to 
 furnish funds to secure the release of Sokrates (Crifo 45 b). And this 
 is all there is to tell of him. 
 
 Yet this Theban pair, little as is known of their lives, will always be 
 full of interest in our eyes, because of the important part they play in 
 this dialogue. They are both alike painted as ardent lovers of philo- 
 sophy, keen and eager searchers after truth. Both evidently enjoyed the 
 esteem of Plato in a high degree; but the philosopher has succeeded 
 with a few light and subtle touches in thoroughly individualising the 
 two men: we cannot read the Phaedo without being conscious of a 
 marked difference in their temperament. Simmias is somewhat dreamy 
 and prone to mysticism ; he is intelligent and sympathetic, but not free 
 from vagueness ; he is apt to be misled by superficial likenesses, e.g. on 
 the subject o.f harmony; and he sometimes Xav^avet lavrov ouSev 
 tiKuV, as in 76 d. But the intellect of Kebes is bright and keen as a 
 sword: he has an admirable faculty of seeing the point and making 
 straight towards it ; all his criticisms are definite and precise and aimed 
 at the heart of the matter; he possesses the invaluable quality of always 
 knowing exactly what he himself means, and he will not put up with any 
 haziness of thought in others. He is notable for his wpay/iareta, for 
 tenaciously cUnging to the question until it is sifted to the very bottom : 
 he is the hardest of all mortals to convince, yet perfectly open to 
 conviction when once a satisfactory argument has been found. It 
 is always Kebes who at every important point influences the course 
 of the dialogue : he gives the message from Euenos which starts the 
 whole discussion (60 d) ; he insists on being told why suicide should 
 be unlawful (61 d), and how Sokrates can welcome death without con- 
 tradicting his own principles (62 c); he points out that the question of 
 the soul's immortality must be raised (70 a); he suggests the theory 
 of ova/^ivTjcris (72 e) ; and finally he brings forward the objection in 
 87 A, which shows that he -has fully grasped the previous argument 
 in all its bearings and perceives exactly what is required for its 
 completion. Thus every important issue turns upon some pertinent 
 remark of Kebes. The chief contribution of Simmias is the discussion 
 
42 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 on harmony; which is indeed a theory that must needs be debated, but 
 which, as I have shown, does not affect the position of the demonstra- 
 tion; nor does it show that he has mastered the argument like his 
 clearer-headed companion. Yet, as Sokrates says of him, oh KfiavXa^ 
 eoLKev dirTO[i,iv(o tov Xo'you : he is a sincere and zealous lover of truth, 
 and not unworthy to share the immortality which Plato has bestowed at 
 least upon the fame of these two Theban friends. 
 
 (vi) Of a personage so well known as Kriton it is needless for me 
 to say much : a few words concerning him will complete this account of 
 the interlocutors. He was the oldest and dearest friend of Sokrates, a 
 man of wealth and position and of high character. His sympathy 
 with Sokrates was probably much more personal than intellectual; 
 Plato's picture of him is as of a sensible and kindly man of the world, 
 looking upon life from the point of view of an honest Athenian gentle- 
 man, but without any capacity for philosophy. Indeed, if the anecdote 
 in Euthydemus 304 d foil, has any foundation on fact, he may sometimes 
 have remonstrated with his friend for his philosophical eccentricities. 
 Diogenes Laertius however (11 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues 
 attributed to him, some of which have such ambitious titles as irepX tov 
 yvwvai, n to liria-Taa-Oai : we can hardly suppose that they contributed 
 much to the solution of these problems. Diogenes sums up the true 
 interest of the man when he says ovtos /j-dXia-Ta ijuXoaropyoTaTa StiTeOri 
 •jrpos 'XuiKpoLTrjV, koI ovtoi'S hrefiekelTO avTov, (0(rTe fJirjBejroTe Xeiweiv Ti t<ov 
 wpos Tijv )(pdav. 
 
 (vii) The other companions of Sokrates who were with him at the 
 last, but who do not speak, are Kritobulos, the son of Kriton; Hermo- 
 .genes, son of Hipponikos, a speaker in the Cratylus ; Epigenes, son of 
 Antiphon; Aischines, son of Charinos a sausage-seller, or, by another 
 account, of Lysanias ; he was a noted Sokratic and the author of eight 
 dialogues (Diog. Laert. 11 64); Antisthenes, founder of the Cynics; 
 Ktesippos, a youth introduced in the Euthydemus ; Menexenos, son of 
 Demophon, who gives his name to a dialogue ; Phaidondes, of whom 
 we know only that he was a Theban ; Eukleides, founder of the Me- 
 garian school ; and his friend Terpsion, also a Megarian. Of these all 
 but the last three are Athenians. 
 
INTHODUCTION. 43 
 
 I append a list of editions of the Phaedo and other works of which 
 I have made use. 
 
 Platonis Phaedo ed. Wyttenbach 
 ,) „ „ Heindorf 
 
 >> >> j» ASt 
 
 „ ,, „ Geddes 
 
 „ „ „ W. Wagner 
 
 „ „ Stallbaum's edition as remodelled by 
 
 Wohlrab. This is really a variorum 
 edition, containing notes by most 
 previous editors and by Wohlrab 
 himself. 
 Platon's Phaedon fur den Schulgebrauch erklart von Martin 
 
 Wohlrab. 
 Schanz's critical edition of the Phaedo. 
 Hirschig's „ „ „ 
 
 Schleiermacher's introduction translation and notes. 
 Plato's Phaedo literally translated by E. M. Cope. 
 Olympiodori Scholia in Phaedonem. 
 Hermann Schmidt. Kritischer Commentar zu Plato's 
 
 Phaedon. 
 Bonitz. Platonische Studien. 
 Ast. Plato's Leben und Schriften. 
 Hegel. Geschichte der Philosophic, Plato. 
 Zeller. Philosophic der Griechen. 
 Teichmiiller. Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, and 
 
 Die platonische Frage. 
 Schanz's critical writings on Plato's text. 
 
 Since this in no wise pretends to be a critical edition I have thought 
 it needless to give the mss. readings in full : this would have been 
 merely a reproduction of other men's work. For all who are interested 
 in the text of Plato the edition of Schanz is indispensable ; and the 
 readings of other mss. are given by Stallbaum and Bekker. Remem- 
 bering nevertheless how much it is to the reader's convenience that he 
 should know exactly how far he can trust the text before him, I have 
 drawn attention in the notes to every case in which my reading ma- 
 terially differs from the mss. I have also marked all noteworthy points 
 of difference from two of the editions which are in most common use, 
 
44 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 viz. those of Stallbaum and of the Zurich editors. Also, seeing that my 
 text is based upon that of Schanz, I have noted all my departures from 
 his readings. Wherever I have had occasion to refer to the four mss. 
 quoted by him, I have adopted the symbols which he has employed to 
 denote them; these are as follows : 
 
 B = Clarkianus sive Oxoniensis sive Bodleianus. 
 
 c = Crusianus sive Tubingensis. 
 
 D = Venetus 185. 
 
 E = Bessarionis liber sive Venetus 184. 
 
 Stallbaum and the Ziirich edition are denoted by St. and Z. respec- 
 tively. Where I have deserted Schanz, it has usually been in the direction 
 of a return to the mss. The chief blemish in the text of the Fhaedo is 
 interpolation, which is not wonderful, considering that few products of 
 Greek philosophy have been read more widely and less intelligently. 
 There are no small number of instances in which words or sentences 
 have indubitably been inserted by some copyist or annotator out of 
 sheer inability to grasp the connexion. But this cannot justify the 
 reckless handling of Hirschig, who cancels or rewrites passages whole- 
 sale, for no apparent reason but that they are not such Greek as he 
 would have written himself. The result in many such cases is a deep 
 thankfulness in the reader's soul that Plato, not Hirschig, was the author 
 of the dialogues. Schanz, though a far sounder critic, has, I think, in 
 several cases unduly deferred to Hirschig; and in others has himself 
 bracketed passages without having in my opinion sufficient cause. In 
 matters of orthography I have for the most part followed his guidance. 
 And I cannot conclude without an expression of gratitude for the 
 invaluable work he has given us : indeed only those who have engaged 
 in the task of editing any of the dialogues can fully appreciate the boon 
 which has been bestowed on Platonic students by Martin Schanz. 
 
^AIAQN 
 
^AIAON 
 
 [5 TTfpl '^VX'JS, ^dlKOs] 
 
 St. p 
 
 5? 
 
 TA TOT AIAAOrOT nPOSfiHA 
 
 EXEKPATHS, ^AIAON, AnOAAOAOPOS, SOKPATHS, KEBH2, 
 
 SIMMIAS, KPITQN, 
 
 TON ENAEKA TnHPETHS 
 
 j^ I. AvT09, CO ^aiBcov, Trapeyevov "XtoKpaTei, eKelvr) rr} i^/xepa, ^ 
 TO ^apfiuKOV eiriev iv Toa Beo'/MOOTTjplqs, rj aXKov tov rlKovaw; ; 
 $AIA. Avt6<;, S 'ExeKpaTe<;. 
 
 EX. Tt odv Bi] icrnv curra elirev 6 dvrjp irpo tov BavaTOV ; koX 
 TrS<i ETeKevTa ; ^Sew? 70/3 av ijc^ aKovaaifii. koX jap ovTe twv 5 
 •jtoXitSv ^Xiaaicov ovSel? irdw tl iirijacopid^ev rd vvv 'Adijva^e, 
 B OVTE Tts ^ivot d^iKTat ■^povov <TV)(yov i/ceWev, octtk dv rifuv cra^i<; 
 
 57 A — 59 c, cc. i, ii. Prologue. 
 Echekrates, the Phliasian, begs for infor- 
 mation respecting the last moments of 
 Sokrates. Phaedo assents, and, after 
 explaining the circumstances which de- 
 layed the execution, gives a list of the 
 friends who were present at that last 
 meeting, where sorrow and gladness were 
 so strangely mingled. 
 
 I. oiros] Echekrates merely desires 
 to know whether he can depend upon the 
 account of Phaedo as that of an eye- 
 witness : this remark would have been 
 needless, but for the strange comment of 
 Hermogenes the rhetorician : 6 /liv yhp 
 fipeTO lis 0av/j,d^v Kal naxapl^iov tov 
 irUpayeyo/icvov, 6 Si aireKplvaro aefivvvo- 
 /teyos Kal jxiya (ppov&v. 
 
 6. ^XiacrW] in apposition to tuv 
 iroXiTiiii'. The insertion of rue is alto- 
 
 gether needless ; the article is continually 
 omitted before national names by all 
 Attic writers. Stallbaum compares 
 Apology 32 B, Meno 70 B. 
 
 7. ooTis d'v] 'who would have been 
 able to tell us '. In a phrase of this sort 
 I conceive that no definite protasis is in 
 the mind of the writer. I cannot see 
 what is gained by supplying ' si venisset ' 
 with Riickert, or ' wenn er gefragt wor- 
 den ware' with Wohlrab. The words 
 which follow show that communication 
 between Athens and Phlius did exist, for 
 some Athenian visitor brought the news 
 of Sokrates' death. It seems needless 
 therefore to speculate whether intercourse 
 was suspended by the war with Elis 
 (Stallbaum), which ended in the year 
 Sokrates died ; or by the Corinthian war 
 (C. F. Hermann), which began five years 
 
48 HAATilNOS [S8 
 
 Tt ayyeiKai ol6<; r rjv irepl tovtwv, 7r\ijv 76 Sr) 2x4 ^dp/iaKov irimv 
 aTToOavot' T(Sv Se aXkmv ovSev el)(€v (ppd^eip. 
 
 'I'AIA. OvBe rd Trepl t^? Bi/cr]'; apa eirvOeade ov rpoirov 58 
 ejevero ; 
 5 EX. Nat, ravra fiev '^fuv rlyyeiXe ti?, koI eOavfid^ofiiv ye on 
 iraXac yevofievrji; aiiTTJ<; iroWa v<7Tepov ^aiverai, diroGavaiv. ri 
 ovv rjv rovTo, S ^aiSav ; 
 
 <I>AIA. T^v-xp] Tt? avTm, S 'E;y;e/t/3aT€9, crvvi^r)' eVv^e ydp rfj 
 Trporepaia t^? BiKrj<; rj irpvfiva iaTefMp,ev7] rou ifkoiov o eh AijXov 
 lo ^KOrjvaloi, irep.irovcriv. 
 
 EX. TouTo Se hfj ri iariv ; 
 
 <I>AIA. Tovt' ecTTt TO ifKolov, w? <paaiv 'Adrjvaioi, ev w ©Tycrei/s 
 TTore 6t9 K.pijT'Tiv rov<; St? eirrd eKei,vov<! a)-)(ero ayccv Koi eeracre re B 
 Koi avTo^ ecrwOr). tS ovv ^AttoWoivi ev^avTO, £U9 Xeyerai, Tore, el 
 IS acoOelev, eKdcnov eVov? Qewplav dird^eiv et? AfjXov' rjv hr] del koX 
 vvv 6TI i^ eKeivov Kar iviavrbv t&5 Bern -Tri/Mirovcnv. eTreoBdv ovv 
 dp^covrai Tfj<; Oea)pia<;, vojxo'; ecrrlv avrol^ ev rS -^pbva tovt^ 
 Kadapeieiv ttjv itoXiv koi Br]fj,oaia p,7]Beva diroiCTivvvvai, irplv av 
 6t? ArjXov re dcpiKrjTai to irKolov Kal irdXiv Bevpo' tovto B' iviore 
 20 ev TToXXai j(p6va> yiyverab, orav TV')(coaiv avefiot diroXa^ovTe^ 
 avrov'i. dp-)(ri S' ecrrl Tijv decopiai;, eTreiBdv 6 lepevg tov 'AttoX- C 
 Xmvo'i a-re^frr] rrjv irpvfivav tov ttXolov' tovto S' eTv^ev, mtTirep 
 Xeyco, TJj irpoTepaiq, t^? BiK7]<; yeyovo';. Sid, tuvtu koi ttoXi)? 
 'X^povo^ eyeveTO tw XtoKpaTei ev tS Sea-fKOTrjpitp 6 fiera^ii t^s Swti;? 
 25 re Koi rov OavaTov. 
 
 II. EX. Tt Be Brj Ta irepl avrov tov OdvaTov, w ^aiBav ; ri 
 rjv TO. Xe')(6evTa Kal Trpa^Bevra, Kal Tive'i ol irapayevofievoi twv 
 iTriTrjBeuov rm dvBpu ; ^ ovk e'lav ol dp'xpvTe'; -Trapeivai, aX\' eprifio<; 
 ereXevTa (plXav ; 
 30 «I>AIA. OvSafiw<;, dXXd Traprja-dv Tive'i, Kal ttoXXoI ye. D 
 
 EX. Tavra Brj irdvTa 7rpo6vp,r]67]Ti &5s a-a^earaTa ijfiiv diray- 
 yelXai, el p-r) tL's croi da'^oXia Tvyx^dvei ovaa. 
 
 4>AIA. 'AWcJ a')(oXd}^ai ye Kal ireipda-op,ai vpXv Birjyija-aa-dai' 
 
 afterwards. The events of the last day in and seven youths, according to the legend, 
 
 prison were of course known but to a who were delivered every nine years to 
 
 small circle. the Minotaur. 
 
 6. iroW$ lioTspov] Thirty days : 18. )i.i)8^va aTroKrivvvvai] So Xeno- 
 
 Xen. mem. IV viii 2. phon /./. 
 
 13. Tois 6Vs kwri] the seven maidens 
 
59] ^ATAflN. 49 
 
 Kai yap to /iSfivrja-dai %aKpaTOV<s koX avTov XijovTa Koi aXXov 
 aKovovra efiotye del iravTtov ■I^Bicrrov. 
 
 EX. AWa fi'^v, CO ^aiSmv, Kal tov? dKovcrofiivov; je roiov- 
 T0U9 eripovi exei,<s' dXKd iretpm w? dv Bvvy aKpi^ea-rara Bie^eXOeiv 
 ■n-dvra. S 
 
 E $AIA. Kal firjv eymye Oavfidcna eiraOov 7rapayevofievo<;. 
 aire yap w? davar^ irapovra fie dvSpo? eVtTT/Set'ou e\eo? elcryei,' 
 evoalfjLmv yap jjuot dvrjp icjialvero, to 'E^j^e/e/oare?, Kal tov rpo-jrov 
 Kai Twv \oytov, to? dSe<B9 Kal yevvalax; ereXevTa, ware fioi eKelvov 
 irapicTTaadat fiijS' eh "AtSov lovTa dvev 6eLa<; ixoLpa^ levat, dXKa lo 
 59 Kal eKeicre d<j)iK6fievov ed irpd^eiv, etirep rt? Trcoirore Kal aXXo?. 
 Sva Sj) ravra ovSev irdvv /loi eXeeivov elayei, (bs etKos dv Bo^etev 
 ewat, irapovTi Trevdei' ovre av rjBovrj «? ev <^C\.oao^la rjp.wv ovrav, 
 mo'irep elccdei/Mev' Kal yap oi \6yoi toiovtoC Tive<; fjaav' aXX' 
 aTe'xyS)<i droTrov ri /moi irdOo'i Traprjv Kai rts drjOrji; Kpderi? diro re is 
 T'^S rjBovr]^ avyKeKpafievrj ofiov Kal diro t^s Xvtt'J??, ivOv/jLovfievm 
 oTi avTiKa eKeivo'} efieWe TeKevTav. Kal irdvTe'; ol irapovre'; 
 (j'Xehov Tt o^TO) SceKeifieda, ore fiev ye\wvTe<;, evLore Ze BaKpvovTe<;, 
 el<} Se '^fimv Kal Sia^epovra^, 'AttoWoSw/jos' olcrda yap irov tov ' 
 B dvSpa Kal rov Tpoirov avrov. 20 
 
 EX. IleS? yap ov ; 
 
 ^AIA. 'E/ceuio? re toivvv Travrdiracnv oiit(o<; el')(ev, Kal auros 
 eywye eTeTapdyp^rjv Kal ol dXKou 
 
 EX. "Eri/p^oi' Si, m ^alScov, Tive<; Trapayevoftevoi ; • 
 
 $AIA. OuT09 re S?) 'ATroWo'Soj/jo? rwv eir 1,^(0 piwv irapijv Kal 25 
 
 KjotTO/SouXo9 «at o iraTrjp avrov Kal en 'Eip/jioyivr]^ Kal 'E-Triyevr]^ 
 Kal A.lcr')(l,v'q<i Kal ^ Avria-devrj?' -^v Be Kal lLrr)cnmvo<; 6 Ilaiaviei)i 
 
 3. ToioiJTOus Ir^poDS] i.e. they take 13. iropovri ir^vBei] 'as would seem 
 
 equal pleasure in the recollection of So- natural for one who was present at a scene 
 
 krates : compare below 59 A Kal yap of mourning'. For the two datives com- 
 
 01 \6yoi TMOVToL tivcs ^jav, referring to pare Phaedrus 234 C t^! \lyyif\at>,^avovTi,, 
 lis iv 0i\o(ro0f{i T]ji£iv ovtwi : and 79 c 'to one who takes a rational view '. 
 
 Kai aur^ ifKavarai, xal IXiyyiq, uurirep fae- Iv <|>iVo(ro(|)Cij] The nearest parallel in 
 
 06ov(Ta, are roioiroiv 4tpairTO/Jk4vri. Plato to this remarkable phrase seems to 
 
 8. EvSaCfiuv vdp] Here the key-note be Protagoras 317c KaWoi. iroWd ye ilS-q ^ti) 
 
 of the dialogue is struck. Its express elfil 4v r^ t^xvv '• cf. Hid. 319 c, Phaedo 
 
 object is to show ws elKiriJis ivTjp T(f ovn 84 A, Republic jSi E. But in all these 
 
 iv <l)i\oa-o<f>i(f diarplij/as ■ rbv piov Bappei passages the phrase expresses devotion to 
 
 p.i\\o>v &Tro6aveL(r0a(. : and at the very some particular pursuit ; not, as here, 
 
 outset we are introduced to Sokrates as a the occupation of a certain time, 
 
 living illustration of his own belief. 25 'AiroXXoSiDpos] Compare 117 D. 
 
 P. - 4 
 
so HAATIiNOS [59 
 
 Koi Mevi^evo'i koI dWoi rivef twv iiri'X^ctipiav' HXdrcou Be ol/iat 
 rfadevei,. 
 
 EX. 'Sivoi Si Tivei •jraprjaav ; C 
 
 <I>AIA. Na^ XififiLai; re 76 o ©rj^am koX, Ke^rj^ koi ^at~ 
 £ SoSj/St;?, Kal MejapoOev Ev/cXet'S?;? re Kal Tep\}rici}v. 
 
 EX. Tt Se; 'ApLcmmro<i koI K\e6fi^poro<; <ov> Trapeye- 
 vovTo ; 
 
 ^AIA. Ov S^ra" eV A.lyivr] jap iXeyovro elvai. 
 
 EX. "AXX05 Se Ti? Traprjv ; 
 10 $AIA. S^eSoz/ Tt oZ/iat tovtou? •jrapayevea-dai. 
 
 EX. Tt ovi' Stj ; TtVe? i/)^? jjo-av ot \6yoi, ; 
 
 III. ^AIA. 'E70) aoi i^ o.p'^rj^ Trdvra ireipdaofiai hirfyrj- 
 craffOai. del yap hrj Kal ra? rrpoaOev ■^fiepa^ elw9eifiey ^oirdv D 
 Koi iydo Kal oi aXKoi irapd rov "^toKpdrr}, crvKKeyofievoi, eadev 
 15 ets ro SiKaa-rr)piov, iv & Kal rj BUr) eyevero' ifKujaiov yap ^v rov 
 Bea-/ia)rr)piov. iTepiefievop,ev ovv eKocrrore, eco<; dvoi'x^deiT) r6 Bea- 
 ixwrrjpiov, Siarpi/3ovre<; /J,er dXK'^Xcov' avemyero yap ov irpto' 
 iireihrj Be dvoiyOevt}, ela^p,ev rrapd rov "ZfOKparrj Kal rd TroXXa Bitj- 
 fieperjofiev fier avrov. Kal Srj Kal rare Trpaiairepov avveXeyrj/jLev. 
 20 rrj yap rrporepaiO, \rjpjepa\ eireiBrj e^rj\Oop,ev ek rov Be<Tp,an7]piov 
 ecrirepa<;, eirvOofieda ort ro ifkolov Sk AijXov d(f)i,yp.evov eirj. E 
 Traprjyyeikafiev ovv aXXjjXot? rjKeiv m? rrpcoiairara et? to etw^o'?. 
 Kal rjKOfiev Kal rjfuv i^eXdoov 6 6vpa)p6<i, oa-irep elmOei vrraKOveiv, 
 elrrev irepipiiveiv Kal p-rj irporepov irapievai, ew? dv avro<i KeXevcrrj' 
 
 1. nXaTwv 84] There is but one other after Cobet. St. and Z. omit it. 
 
 passage in which Blato mentions himself, 8. Iv AlyCvr)] This has usually been 
 
 Apology 38 B ; nxdroii' 5^ oSe, u ai^S/ies considered to convey a reproach: see 
 
 'ABrivatoi, Kal Kpkoiv Kal Kpiri^ovKos Kal Diog. Laert. Ill 36, cf. II 65. 
 
 'Air6W6Siapos KeKeioval fue TpiaKovra fi.vS>v 59 c — 60 C, c. iii. On the morning 
 
 TiH'/i(raff6ai, avrol d' iyyvairffai. Forster after the return of the sacred vessel from 
 
 suggests that the present language im- Delos the friends meet earlier than usual 
 
 plies that Plato's sickness was due to at the court-house near the prison. After 
 
 excessive grief. I see nothing however to some delay they are admitted and find 
 
 justify the inference : but doubtless Plato Sokrates relieved of his fetters and in 
 
 was anxious to explain his absence. company with his wife and child. Xan- 
 
 4. 4'ai8<i»v8iis] I have retained this thippe, unable to control her grief, is led 
 
 form on the analogy of other Theban out ; and Sokrates chafing his cramped 
 
 names and on the authority of Xenophon leg falls to moralising on the intimate 
 
 mem. I ii 48: perhaps too the Theban union of pain and pleasure, which he says 
 
 termination as should be restored. would have made a good subject for 
 
 6. <ov>irapeY4vovTo] 01) is not in Aesop, 
 
 the best mss. but is inserted by Schanz 7.4. irepi|j.4vEiv] This reading seems 
 
6o] 
 
 OAIAXIN. 
 
 SI 
 
 \vov(Tt yap, e^rj, oi evSexa "taKpdrri koX irapw^yeKKovvw 07ra)<; 
 av TfjBe rf} rjfiepa re\evT7]erri. ov "jroXiiv S' ovv '^povov itna'Xjmi 
 60 rJKev KOi eKekevev j^/ta? elcnevai. el(TeK66vre<i oSv KareXafi^dvo/iev 
 Tov p,ev ZioKparr] apn XeXvfiivov, rrjv Se WtavdiTnrrjv, ryiyvmcrKei'i 
 'y'-P' ^%oi;o-az/ re rb TraiBiov avrov ical TrapaKadrjfiivrjv. m ovv 5 
 eiSev 'fjfia<; rj aav6 iiriTT] , dvev^'^firja-e re Kal roiavr drra elirev, 
 oca orj elddaaiv ai lyvva'iKe';, on S 'ZwKpare<;, iaTarov Si; ere irpoa- 
 epovcri vvv ol eTnr-rjSeiot Kal <rv rovTov;. Kal 6 'S,(OKpdrri<i ^h^a<} 
 ets TOV KpiTCOva, w Kpirmv, €(p7], aTrayeTO} Tt? avTrjv o'lKaSe. Kal 
 
 B eKecvTjv fiev dTrrjryov Tive^ t&v tov 'K.p(T(ovo<; ^oma-dv re Kal kottto- io 
 fiev7]v' 6 Be liOiKpdT't}'; dvaKadi^6fjLevo<; eh Trjv kXLvtjv (rvvmafi'^e 
 Te TO cr/ceXo? Kat, i^erpiyfre rfj x^ipi, Kal Tpl^wv afia, to? aTOwov, 
 e^t], (0 dvBpe^, eoiKe ti elvai tovto, o Ka\ov<nv ol dvdpcoTroi i^Bv' 
 cus 6avp,aaia)<s ire^VKe T-poi; to Bokovv evavTiov elvai, to Xvjrrjpov, 
 to afia fiev avTW firj iOeXeiv Trapayiyvecrdac tw dvQpwTrm, idv Be is 
 Ti? Blcokj) to sTepov Kal Xafi^dvy, a-')(eB6v ti dvayKa^eaOai Xap,- 
 ^dveiv Kal to STepov, (hairep ck fj,id<; Kopvtjifj'} a-vvTjfi/ieva) Bv' ovTe. 
 
 C KaL fiot, BoKet, e(fyr), el evevotjaev avTa Ata-coTro?, fivdov av avvdeivai, 
 
 to me certainly right. Bonitz, quoted 
 by Wohlrab, accurately distinguishes be- 
 tween the usages of irepipAvav and iTi/ii- 
 VHV in Plato : the former means ' to 
 await ', the latter ' to remain ' in a given 
 condition. Cf. below 8o c, and Theae- 
 tetus 179 E. So far as I am aware, the 
 nearest approach of iTri.iJ,4veip to the mean- 
 ing of vepifiheiv is in Republic 361 D 
 ivToiM Si Toioiroiv oiSiv in, lis iyif/iai, 
 Xa\eT6i' iirs^eKBeiv tQ Xiyiff, ofos iKdrepov 
 pios iin/iivec. If iirinivcw be read with 
 Hermann, we should translate : ' he bade 
 us stay where we were and not come in 
 untjl he summoned us '. 
 
 I. irapaYY^^ovo-iv] I agree with 
 Prof. Geddes in taking these words : 'are 
 giving directions that he may be put to 
 death to-day ' ; the directions being given 
 to the officers of the prison. If, as is 
 usually done, we take Sokrates to be the 
 object of vapayy{KKov(nv, the clause oVus 
 av...TeXeuT^(r2; becomes nonsense. Wohlrab 
 ■ (in his Latin edition) has a note which is 
 utterly beyond my comprehension. 
 
 5. ri iraiBCov] no doubt his youngest 
 son Menexenos. 
 
 15. TO 6t|j.a f.iv\ The usual reading is 
 TV, and this is confirmed by Stobaeus, 
 who cites this'passage, eel. 1 1104. This 
 would = ' by refusing '. But tA is found 
 in the Bodleian and two other mss. and 
 is abundantly justified by Riddell, eli£^est 
 of idioms § 85. I have therefore followed 
 Schanz in retaining it. ' How wondrous 
 is the relation between pleasure and its 
 seeming contrary, pain ; that the pair 
 will never come to a man together '. 
 
 18. Ato-uTTos] It is worth while here 
 to notice the consummate skill with 
 which Plato allows the dialogue to unfold 
 itself as in the natural course of conver- 
 sation. By this simple reference to Aesop 
 Kebes is reminded that Euenos was 
 anxious to know what was the object of 
 Sokrates in versifying the fables of Aesop. 
 In answering the question Sokrates sends 
 a kindly message to Euenos and bids him 
 follow to Hades as soon as he may. The 
 surprise of Simmias at this message draws 
 
 4—2 
 
52 
 
 HAATflNOS 
 
 [60 
 
 w? o 060? ^ovKo/ievoi; avra BiaXKd^ai iroXefiovvTa, eTreiBt] ovk 
 iovvaro, <rvvrj>^ev ek ravrov avToi<; Tci? Kopv(f)d<;, koL hia ravra 
 fd av TO erepov irapayevrjrai e-jraKoXovOel varepov koL to erepov. 
 wairep ovv koI avra> /jlol eoticev, iireiBrj vtto tov Sea-fiov ^v iv rai 
 
 5 cr/ceXet to dX/yeivov, rjKeiv Si] ^aiverai eiraKoKovOovv to rjhv. 
 
 IV. 'O ovv K.e^ri<! viroXa^cov Nj) tov Am, <S Sco/cpaTe?, e<f)ri, 
 ev 7' i'rrolrjcra'; dva/jLv^a-ai; fie. irepl yap tol tSv voLrjfjjaTcov wv D 
 "TTeiroirjKa's ivTeivaf toi)? tov Alaoiirov \070u? koI to eh tov 
 AttoWg) irpoolfMov koI aXkob Tive<; fie rjZr) rjpovTO, drrdp koX 
 
 10 Eiijvo? "Trpanjv, ti iroTe Siavorjdeh, eireiSri Bevpo rfkOe'^, eTroirjaa'; 
 
 from Sokrates an expression of his belief 
 that the true philosopher will meet death 
 gladly in the hope of being happier in 
 Hades than on earth ; and in support of 
 this opinion, as we shall see> the whole 
 argument that occupies the remainder of 
 the dialogue is evolved. 
 
 3. liraKoXoiiSei: vtrrepov] In these ob- 
 servations of Sokrates we may find the 
 germ of the Platonic theory of pleasure 
 as a KardcTTans. See for instance Ti- 
 maeus 64 C t6 ^ijkv rapci, (piaiv koX piaioir 
 yiyvoixtvov d,$p6ov Tap' tiiuv viSos dXyei- 
 pov, Tb 5' els tpitnv aTibv irdXtv ddpoov rjBi. 
 Cf. Philebus 3 1 D &c. The Kaffapal -nSo- 
 val are exceptions, Philebus sib; but, 
 so far as concerns physical pleasures, only 
 apparent exceptions, Timaeus 65 A. 
 
 60 D — 61 c, cc. iv, V. Kebes : This re- 
 minds me that Euenos and others desire to 
 know what led you to compose verses 
 during your confinement in prison ? 50- 
 iraies; It was not with any thought of 
 rivalling Euenos as a poet, but because I 
 have been frequently warned in a dream 
 to practise ' music '. This I always un- 
 derstood as an encouragement to perse- 
 vere with philosophy ; but in case music 
 in the popular sense might be meant, I 
 thought it well to be on the safe side. 
 So I took the fables of Aesop, because 
 I knew them best, and turned them into 
 verse. Tell this to Euenos and bid him 
 farewell and follow me as soon as he 
 can. 
 
 8. tvTttvas] ' putting into verse ". The 
 
 term is used of setting words to music, 
 Protagoras 326 B ; of putting thought 
 into words, Philebus 38 E. The last ex- 
 ample seems to me conclusive that the 
 notion of the word is not, as Prof. Geddes 
 considers, derived from stretching a string, 
 but implies fixing in a certain form or 
 position. Cf. Meno 87 A, where it is 
 used of inscribing a triangle in a circle. 
 
 9. irpoo{|i.vov] This word is applied 
 by Thucydides, m 104, to the Homeric 
 hymn to Apollo : such irpool/ua were 
 strictly speaking preludes either to a 
 longer poem (of/ii?) or to a religious cele- 
 bration. Specimens of verses attributed 
 to Sokrates are to be found in Diog. Laert. 
 II 42. 
 
 10. Et!t)vos] Euenos of Paros was a 
 sophist and poet. From Apology 20 B 
 we learn that he taught d/jer^ for five 
 minas ; from Phaedrus 267 A that he was 
 the inventor of new rhetorical figures : 
 Thv hk KdWitTTov Uapiov ^ihjvov els n^txov 
 oiK ayo/iev, os v7ro5)7X(i)(r&' re irpwros eSpe 
 Kal irapeTalvovs ; oJ 5' airbv kbX vapa\j/o- 
 70US <l>aalv iv iiiTp<p Xiyeiv, /w/ifiris xdpiv 
 (Toiposyhp dv^p : where see Dr Thompson's 
 note. From both passages we may infer 
 that Plato did not think much of him. 
 The few fragments that remain of his 
 elegiac poems are given in Bergk's fioetae 
 lyrici. Bergk however remarks 'quae 
 hie unius Eueni nomine comprehendi, 
 rectius duobus attribui videntur'; and the 
 other epigrams, chiefly erotic, given in 
 the Anthology under the name Euenos, 
 
6i] <I)AIAnN. 53 
 
 avTci, irporepov ovSev iroiTroTe TrotT/cra?. el avv rl croi /liXei tov 
 e'X^eiv e/Me ^VTjva awoKplvacrdai,, arav fie av0i<; ipmra, ev olSa yap 
 on eprjaerai, elire, tI ')(prj Xijeiv. Aeye roivvv, e<^r), avrS, do 
 Ke/Si;?, ToXijOfj, '6ri ovk eiceiva /3ovK6fjievo<; ovSe rots iroiij/iaaiv 
 E avTov avrlre'^voi; elvai eiroirja-a ravra' f/heiv <yap «? ov pdSiov evrf 5 
 dXK evviTVicov nvwv diroireipwixevo'i tI Xeyet, Kal d<pO(Tiov/jLevo^, 
 el 7roWa«t? Tavrrjv Trjv fjiov(T(,Krjv fioi eVtraTTOt iroielv. rjv yap 
 Sr) CLTTa ToiaBe' TroWa/ct? fiot ^oiTwv to avro evvirviov ev ra> 
 irapeXOovTt /8tM, aXKoT ev dWrj o-^et <}>ai,v6fievov, ra avra Be 
 Xiyov, m "ZcaicpaTe^, e(f)r}, /Mover ik'^u iroiei Kal epyd^ov. Kal iyoa lo 
 ev ye rm irpoaOev Xpov^ ovep eirparTov tovto vireKdii^avov avro 
 61 P'Oi irapaKeKevecrdai re Kal eTriKeXeveiv, mairep oi rot? Qkovai 
 BiaKeXevofievoi, Kal ifiol oiito) to evvTrviov oirep eirpaTTOv tovto 
 eiriKeXeveiv, fiovaiKrjv nroielv, «? (f)iXoa'0(f)ia<; fikv ovarr)<; fieyia'Trj<! ^ 
 fiov(nKf)^,i/j,ov Be tovto •n-pdrTOVTO'i' vvv S' iiretBrj rj re BLkt] iyevsTO 15 
 Kal Tj TOV deov eopTtj BieKcoXve fie dirodv^a-Keiv, eBo^e ')^prjvcti, el 
 dpa TToWa/ct? fiot irpoa-TaTTOi, to evvirviov tuvttjv Trjv BrffiooBrj 
 fiovaiKrjv "TTOielv, firj dTreidrja-ai avTw, dXXa iroielv. aa^aXeo'Tepov 
 B ydp elvai fjufj dirievai, irplv d(f>o(7i(oa-aa0ai iroirjcravTa 7roirjjj,aTa 
 Kal iretOofievov tcS ewjrvLm. oiiroy Brj irpaiTov fiev el<s tov 6eov ^o 
 
 are undoubtedly the work of different vto-nis (i.ov«nKt]s] Wagner well quotes 
 
 authors. Laches 188 c foil. See also Laws 689 D 
 
 5. us oi p4Siov] After us BD give Sri, 17 KaWUrrri Kal fieylffT-ri tQiv (vii^x^viiiv 
 
 which Schanz brackets and I omit. fieyla-T-r] SiKoiorar' dv X^yoito cro^La. Cf. 
 
 7. A iroXX.dKis] 'if perchance'; as in Republic 411 C foil., 548 B Sioi ro Trp 
 
 61 A. d\i;flij'^s Mou(7i;s Trfs fiera Xoyiok t6 koI 
 
 12. irapaxAtvar9a.C re koI IttikeXswiv] ^iKocro^ias iifukriKivM. 
 ' to urge and cheer me on '. Each of the 17- ttiv ti\yji&i\ (iouotkii'v] in the 
 three compounds used by Plato in this ordinary Greek sense of artistic and lite- 
 passage has its distinct shade of meaning, rary culture; whereas Sokrates under- 
 irapaKeKeieneaA., which is the term fre- stood by iiovaiK^ the philosophic life, 
 quently applied by Thucydides to a gene- 19. a4)Oo-it6(ra(retti] ' to satisfy my 
 ral's address to his soldiers, means 'urge conscience'. This anecdote well dis- 
 to make an effort'; ivi-Kekeuea/ , which is plays the simply religious character of 
 .a much rarer word and occurs nowhere Sokrates not without a tinge of supersti- 
 else in Plato, ' encourage while the effort tion. a(f,o<Ti.u>ira<sBai is to clear oneself 
 is being made ' ; as in Euripides Electra from all taint of impiety ; cf. Phaedrus 
 1224. In SiaKeXeuo/tei-OT the preposition 242 C; Phikbus 12 B aVKa yh-p a^o«- 
 has a distributive force : ' as the partisans oOp-ai, ' I wash my hands of it '- 
 of different runners cheer on their favour- 20. Kol ira96y.iVov\ Schanz brackets 
 ites'. Cf. Herodotus ix 5 SmKeXevaaij^vfi Kai. 
 Sk yvv-i] yvvauci. eU tov Oeov] Another mark of 
 
 14. a% 4»'^'0<ro<f>Cas (J-lv oiio-iis ttjs |Jie- Sokrates' old-fashioned piety. Prof. 
 
54 
 
 HAATIINOS 
 
 [6i 
 
 eirolrjo-a, oS rjv rj nrapova-a Qvaiw fiera he top 6e6v, evvorjo-ai oil, 
 t6v iroitfTrlv Bioi, e'iirep /teWoi TTOtijTj)? etvai,. iroielv fivdov<}, aXK 
 ov Xoiyon?, Kal auros ovic rj fivdoXojiKo^, Bia ravra Brj ov? irpoxei- 
 pov<; el')(pv fivOov} Kal i]'!ri,(rTd/irjv toi)? Alaolnrov, tovtov; eirourjcra, 
 
 S ol<i TrptBTOt? iveTV)(pv. 
 
 V. TavTa ovv, w Ke^r]<;, Evrjvtp (ftpd^e, Kal ippwaOai Kal, av 
 a-(oj>povfi, ijMe BicoKeiv <»9 rayiara. aTreifii, Be, w? eoiKe, rrjfiepov' C 
 KeXevova-i yap 'A6r)vaioi, Kal 6 Sifi/Mia^, Olov "jrapaKeXevei, e<pr], 
 TovTO, w liCOKpaTe'i, Evrjvai ; 7roX\a 'yap rjSr) evTeTvxv"^ ''"9' avSpi' 
 
 lo cr^eSoi' ovv i^ wv ijo^ ycrdrifiai ovB' Sttcoo-tiovv croi eKoyv eivai 
 
 Geddes has some interesting remarks on 
 the special connexion between Sokrates 
 and Apollo, cf. 8s A. I cannot how- 
 ever agree with his suggestion that the 
 irpooljuov was a thanksgiving for the 
 thirty days' reprieve; which would be 
 totally inconsistent with the attitude of 
 Sokrates in the face of death i cf. ii6 E. 
 
 2. |i,ij6ovs oXX' ov Xoyovs] 'fiction 
 and not fact '. This distinction is estab- 
 lished by Gorgias 523 A, okove S^, 0acr(, 
 juaXa KttXou \byQV, ov ai fikv Tiyqcrei ^v6ov, 
 cijs ^7<i oTiiai, iyi) di Xoyoy' lis dXTjB-^ 
 yap ovra aoi \i^u & fiiWia Xiyeip ; then 
 follows the myth about the judgment of 
 souls ; cf. Zaws 872 D. iw$os is defined 
 by Aphthonios, quoted by Wyttenbach, 
 as X070S ^evd^s elKovi^uv aXr/Beiav. Plu- 
 tarch, de gloria Atheniensium § 4, says 
 that Pindar was rebuked by Korinna, «s 
 a/Mviroi' o<TO Kal /li] iroirnvra nvOovs, 
 T^s TrMijTiK^s Ipyov elvai avfiPe^Tixe ; fur- 
 ther on he says Si fivdos ehai jSouXeTat 
 X670S \j/evSris ioiKiis aXijSu'i?. Compare 
 Aristotle's distinction between laTopla, 
 and irolrjcris, poetica 1451'' 4, toutv dia^i- 
 peL tQ rov p.kv t& yevoixeva X^yeiv top bi 
 oXa av yivono. Of course \6yoi in its 
 wider sense includes pSiBoi, as we have 
 in 60 D ToOs Tou Alffilnrov '\6yovs. 
 
 3. ofls irpo^eCpovs ttxov] i. e. in his 
 memory; there is no evidence that the 
 fables of Aesop had been published in 
 writing up to this time. Aesop is said to 
 have been a contemporary of Solon ; and 
 
 the story of his death is told by Plutarch, 
 de sera nummis iiindicta § 12 : there is 
 also an allusion to it in Herodotus 
 
 n 134- 
 
 7. I|xi SiuKEiv (Is TaxuTTa] This in- 
 junction must be considered as modified 
 by the proviso added below, ov pAvroi 7' 
 i<Tuis ^idireTai, avTov. Schmidt finds a 
 ' dilogia ' in the words, and Prof. Geddes 
 takes the same view. But it appears to 
 me that such a premature reference to the 
 fieXirri Bavdrov is thoroughly unplatonic. 
 It is futile to omit the words as rdxi-iyTa 
 with Heindorf ; in any case they must be 
 implied, else we make Sokrates give 
 Euenos the superfluous advice to die some 
 time or other. 
 
 61 c — 62 c, cc. v, vi. Simmias : Eue- 
 nos is not likely to take such advice as 
 that. Sokrates: Yes he is, if he is a. 
 real philosopher; not that he ought to 
 take his own life. Kebes: This seems 
 inconsistent; you first say that the phi- 
 losopher will be glad to die, and then 
 that he may not kill himself: why may 
 he not ? Sokrates : I only know what I 
 have been told. According to one ac- 
 count we are in custody here and may 
 not make our escape. This is a hard 
 saying ; but there is a more obvious rea- 
 son, that we are the property of the gods, 
 who are as justly indignant if we destroy 
 ourselves as you would be, should one of 
 your slaves do so. 
 
6i] 
 
 <E>AIAON. 
 
 55- 
 
 treia-erai. Tl Be ; 7] S' o?" ov ^iX6aoj>o^ Evj;z/o? ; "Efioije Soicei, 
 ecftt) 6 liififiia^, 'EOeXijcTei rolvvv Kal 'Evrjvo'} koX 7ra? oto) a^iax; 
 TOVTOV rod ■jrpa/y/iaTO'i iieTeaTiv. ov /Mevrot iaci}<; ^tdaerai, avroV 
 ov <yap ^aa-i de/jtirov elvai. Kal afia Xijcov ravra KadrjKe rci, 
 
 D ffKeXi] iirl T-qv yrjv, koI icaOe^6/ji,evo<; ovTm<; rjSr] rd Xotrrrd SieXijeTO. 5 
 TJpeTO odv avTov 6 Ki^rjr IIcu? rovro Xiryei<;, S Sw/K/aare?, to p,rj 
 6efiir6v ehai eavrov ^la^eaOai, idiXeiv S" dv rm diroOvrjaKOVTi 
 rbv <f>i\6a-o<f)ov ewea-Qai; Tt he, w Ke/37??; ovk dKtjKoare (fh. re 
 Kai 2,ififii,a<i -jrepl rmv Toioireov ^iXoXdo) crv'yye'yov6Te<; ; OvSev 
 je aatpw';, a ZccKpare';. 'AX,Xa firjv Kal ijai ef aKOTJ's irepl avrmv 10 
 XeyW d fj,ev ovv Tvyxdvca dKrjKoay;, ^Oovo'i ovBeh T^Ijeiv. Kal yap 
 
 E t«r(B9 Kai, fiaXiara Trpeiret /xiWovTa e/ceicre aTroBij/jbeiv BiaaKoirelv 
 T6 KUb fivBoXoyeiv irepl rrj'i diroBrffiia^ rrj^ e/cet, Troiav rivd aiiTrjv 
 oiojxeOa elvai' ri jdp dv ti<; Kal iroioZ aXKo ev rm fiexpt rfXiov 
 hva-fjbwv "x^pova ; . ij 
 
 vl. Kara rt Orj ovv Trore ov (j)a(Ti, defiirov elvai avTov eavrov 
 airoKTivvvvai, to ZiCOKparef ; fjhr] yap eycoye, oirep vvv hrj crv rjpov, 
 Kal ^iXoXdov TJKOvcra, ore rrap rjfuv Siyrdro, ■^Si] Se Kal dWcov 
 
 3. TOVTOV Tov irptt^iiaTos] Sc. (pi.'Ko- 
 (TOiplas. 
 
 4. ov ydp <|>a<ri] It is worthy of note 
 that the whole of this rather superficial 
 reasoning against suicide, which is quite 
 outside the main argument of the dialogue, 
 is carefully and repeatedly marked as 
 secondhand. It seems as if Plato wished 
 to avoid any prejudice and misrepresenta- 
 tion which his panegyric of death might 
 bring upon him; while his slight and 
 rapid treatment of this subject would 
 show that he did not feel strongly upon 
 it. That he did not in all cases disap- 
 prove suicide is certain : cf. Laws 854 c 
 Kcd iav fiijf (Toi Spj^VTC ravTa \ct)(p^ n to 
 voffyjiia. — si 5^ /aiJ, KoXKioy SdvaTov (TKe^d- 
 /icpo! ardXKaTTOv tov piov. Also 873 C 
 OS an iavTov Kreirri, firiTe iroXeois ra^curris 
 SiKy, nijre irepioiSvi'iji acpmrif irpoffireaoiari 
 Tilxtl avajKaaBels, lirjdk aiirxui")s Ttvos 
 diropov Kal ci^iov nerdKaxv", apylq, Sk Kal 
 avavSpias SeiKtq, iavri^ dUriv aSiKov exi6^. 
 
 9. <E>i\oXau] From this it is evident 
 that Philolaos spent some time at Thebes, 
 
 where Kebes and Simmias attended his 
 lectures. We have absolutely no au- 
 thentic information about the life of this 
 eminent Pythagorean ; and the genuine- 
 ness of the fragments ascribed to him has, 
 I think, been once for all disposed of by 
 Mr Bywater, Jmirnal of Philology vol. I 
 p. 21 foil. 
 
 ovS^v 7« <ro<J)(3s] ?Sos 171' rots Hu- 
 Oayopdots St' alvcyfidrup X^yeiVj says 
 Olympiodoros, whom the editors all re- 
 peat. I think Plato's meaning is that 
 the arguments of Philolaos against suicide 
 were not conclusive enough to satisfy the 
 irpayiiarela of Kebes. 
 
 12. Siao-KOTTtiv T£ Kal |i.v6oXo7«iv] This 
 is an accurate description of the conver- 
 sation that is to come : when reason has 
 done all she can, fancy comes to her aid 
 with a myth. 
 
 13. TTJs «Kei] Schanz brackets these 
 words : Hirschig proposes iKc^ire. 
 
 14. li^xP'' 'n^'o" 8t)(r|i<3v] before which 
 execution was not legal; cf. 116 E. 
 
56 
 
 nAATflNOS 
 
 [62 
 
 TivtSv, (B? ov Beoi TovTO iroietv' <Ta(pe<; Be irepl avTciv ovoevo^ 
 TTcoTTOTe ovBev oKijKoa. 'AXkd irpoOvixelcrdai, XPV, e^'?' '''^X"' 7«P ^2 
 av Kol aKoiiaai^. t'o-M? fievroi OavfiaarTop aoi (pavecrai, el tovto 
 fiovov Twv dXKmv dirdvTcov dirXovv ia-rlv-ical ovBeirore Tvyx^avei 
 
 5 rm dvdpeaircp, Sa-irep Kol TaWa, 'ecrriv ore Kol oh ^eXriov TeOvdvai 
 7j ^rjvA oh Be ^iXriov reOvdvai, davfiaa-rov lacoi croi ^avelrai, el 
 rovTOi'i rot? dvdpooTToiii iltj oaiov avTov<i iavTOVi ev iroielv, dXKa 
 aXKov Bel -Trepifieveip evepyeTTjv. koI 6 KeySiy? vpdfia e7riye\daa<;, 
 "Ittco Zev<;, e<f>'rj, ry avTov (fxavy elircov. Kat 712/3 dv Bo^eiev, 'e<l)7) 
 
 10 ScoKparr)';, o'6to} 7' elvai dXajoV ov /MepTOi dXK' 'iaca 7' e%6t B 
 
 3, «l ToijTo |j.dvov] Of this locus vexa- 
 tus I shall first give my own interpreta- 
 tion before mentioning other views that 
 are held upon it. I accept the text pre- 
 cisely as it stands without alteration or 
 omission. The first thing to be done is 
 to fix the meaning of tovto. It can 
 hardly be doubted that tovto means here 
 exactly what it does in 62 c, iW cIkSs, 
 l(pTI 6 Ki^ris, tovto ye ^aiveTai : where 
 the context clearly requires that tovto = 
 fiTj BefUTOv elvcu avTov ^avTov diroKTi-V- 
 vvvai. Taking it in that sense here I 
 should translate : ,' perhaps you will be 
 surprised if this question alone of all 
 admits a simple answer — if the same 
 thing does not happen to man in this 
 as in all other cases ; I mean that to some 
 m^ at some time death is better than 
 life: and for whom deatji is better, you 
 will perhaps think it strange that they 
 may not do themselves a good turn but 
 must wait for some other helper '. I con- 
 ceive the clause kuI ovSiiroTe...^'^v to show 
 how it is that the question is not dirXouy. 
 Unless death were sometimes better than 
 life the question whether suicide were 
 sometimes lawful would never be raised, 
 for no one would dream of committing 
 it. wcrtrep Kal raWa, i. e. as in other 
 cases either of two opposites may be 
 better according to circumstances. The 
 whole sentence amounts to this : you will 
 think it strange if in the case of suicide 
 we can lay down an invariable rule; that 
 there are no persons for whom it is better 
 
 to die than live ; and if there are, that 
 they may not release themselves from life. 
 Mr Jackson, in a paper read before the 
 Cambridge Philological Society Dec. i, 
 i88r, has a most searching examination 
 of this passage. Understanding tovto 
 as I do, he is of opinion that the clauses 
 Kal oiSiTToTe Tvyxavei.-.^'^i' and OavfrncrTov , 
 t<Tias...ai'Opuirois are interpolations. My 
 interpretation, which differs from all 
 those that he criticises, seems to me to 
 meet many of his objections ; and though 
 I am far from affirming that he may not 
 be right in rejecting these words, I am 
 loth to do so when I believe they afford a 
 reasonable sense. As regards certain 
 phrases to which he objects, I think ovSi- 
 TOTe is simply in antithesis to IffTiv ore ; 
 and may we not with Mr Cope translate 
 T$ avSpiiwifi ' mankind ', a universal ex- 
 pression which is afterwards qualified by 
 
 ^ffTtV oh ? 
 
 Prof. Geddes has an elaborate note, 
 but I am entirely unable to agree with 
 his view. He seems to regard Kal ovdi- 
 TTore as beginning an independent sen- 
 tence. There is no difficulty about ou 
 after dav/uurioi' el, cf. 97 A. 
 
 Schanr places a full stop after raXXa 
 and inserts dXKa before (<ttiv. If the 
 text is to be altered, I should prefer Mr 
 Jackson's plan. 
 
 7. (11^ oo-iov] Z. and St. add iffnv, 
 which is wanting in B pr. m. 
 
 9. Cttw Zevs] This little provincialism 
 was doubtlesf a favourite mode of em- 
 
62] 
 
 «I)AIAflN. 
 
 57 
 
 Tivd \6yov. 6 fiev ovv iv atropprjToi'i \€j6fJ,evo9 'rrepX avTwv \6yo<; 
 CBS ev Tivt ^povpa icrp,ev oi avOptoiroi koI ov Set Si) eavrbv e'/c 
 ravTrj'; \veiv 0118' airohbhpdaKeiv, fMeyw; re rk fwi <f)aiveTai, Koi 
 ov paSto<; SuSeiV ov fMevroi dXXd roBe ye fioi Soicet, m Ke/Si;?, ev 
 Xiyeo'dai, to 6eov^ elvai rjjjLwv toi)? e'7rifieX,ovp,ivov<i Kal rjp,d<s toi)s 5 
 dvdpcoTTOv; ev tSv KTrj/jbdrav TOb<; 6eol<; elvaf rj <to\ ov BoKei o'vt(o<; ; 
 C "^/Moiye, ^ijo-lv 6 KeySi??. Ovkovv, ^ S' '6<;, Kal (xv dv rmv cravTov 
 KTrj/MUTtov et Tt avTO eavrb diroicrLvvvoi, fj/rj o-rjfMjvavro^ aov on 
 ^oiiKei aiiTO reQvdvai, j^aXsTratVot? dv avTw, Kal el riva e'xpi'i 
 rifiwpiav, Tificopoio uv\ Haw y, e^r/. "Icra? toivvv ravrr) ovk lo 
 dXoyov, /Mrj irporepov avTov diroKTtvvvvat Beiv, vrplv dvdyKrjv Tivd 
 6ed<; iTriirefiyfrr}, wcnrep Kal rrjv vvv rjixlv irapovaav. 
 
 VII. 'AXX' et/eo?, e^r} 6 KejS???, rovro ye (paoveTat. o jxivroi 
 
 phasis with Kebes, and well known to his 
 friends as characteristic. 
 
 I. Iv diroppi^Tois] The ancient com- 
 mentators explain that the Orphic tradi- 
 tions are meant. This seems more pro- 
 bable than any reference to the Eleusinian 
 mysteries. 
 
 ■i. iv Tivi ({>poijp$] 'in ward'. We 
 might translate ' on a sort of garrison 
 duty ', following Cicero, Cato maior 20 : 
 vetatque Pythagoras iniussu imperatoris, 
 id est dei, de praesidio et statione vitae 
 decedere. But the common Pythagorean 
 notion was that the body is the soul's 
 prison, whence she may not come forth 
 until her term is fulfilled: compare A- 
 thenaeus IV xlv 157 c ir/jos -riv Ka/jceios 
 i<l,r\, Euf/ffcos d TTvBayopcKos, <S SUiov, us 
 (fniai, KXiapxos jre/jiirOTijri/cos 4v Stvripif 
 piavj IXeyev ivSeSiadai, tQ a-ii/j-an Kal 
 T<p T'yde pif rks aircwTiiiv ipuxits nfiupias 
 Xa./)«', nal Stelwaadai, to;' $e6v us, el M7) 
 /levovcFiv iirl tovtois lus av iKua/ avTovs 
 \mri, irKion Kal fiel^oaiv ip,ireaovvTai. 
 Tore Xii/tais. Sid iravras evXa^ov/iivovs rijv 
 Tuv Kvpiuv avaraaiv ^o^eicrdai Tov ^rfv 
 cKovras iKpTJvai fwvov re tov iv ri^ yvPf 
 Bdvarov cunraalus wpolirTaixSai, Treirei.cTfji.i- 
 vovs Tijv airb\v<nv t^s ^vxv^ /ierd ttjs tuv 
 Kvpluy yiyveff&ai yvwfiTjs^ Cf. Phaedrus 
 250 c, with Dr Thompson's note; Cra- 
 tylus 400 c, Gorgias 493 A. 
 
 4. ou p^Sios SiiStiv] ' not easy to 
 see through '. Sokratic elpavela : evi- 
 dently he does not think this theory 
 worth much. Olympiodoros, with perhaps 
 unconscious sarcasm, observes avayKT\ ovv . 
 fivaaL TOV piJWovTa dedaaadai avTbv. 
 
 6. iv TOV KTT||ldT(l)v] Cf. LoWS 906 A 
 
 ^vp.pi.axot Si Tjfiiv ffeoC re dfia Kal SaifLoves, 
 T^fiels t' au KT'ijpi.aTa 6euv Kal daifiovuv : 
 also 902 B. Elsewhere man is called the 
 plaything of the gods : Laws 803 C av- 
 BpwTTov Si, oirep etiropiev ^fiirpoadev (644 D, 
 e), 8eoS Ti iralyviov ii.eixr)xavqiJ,ivov, tovto 
 avTov tS ^iXTLiTTOv yeyovivai. 
 
 1 1 . irpVv dvdyKt\v] Although dv may 
 very easily have dropped out before dvdy- 
 KTiv, I have not thought proper to insert 
 it against all the mss. I am not satisfied 
 that Plato could not write irplv alone with 
 the subjunctive; and in Timaeus 57 B it 
 is not easy to account for the loss of dv : 
 \v6iieva ov waveTai, irplv rj iravTdiracriv 
 udovp.eva koX SiaXvdivTa iKtpvyri irpos to 
 ^vyyevis, ^ ViKr/BivTa, iv iK iroWuv o/ioiov 
 Tifi KpaT^<ravn yevo/ievov, avTov ^vvotKov 
 lielvy. Cf. Laws 873 A. 
 
 62 c — 63 E, cc. vii, viii. If this be so, 
 replies Kebes, it seems inconsistent to 
 say that the vrise man will be glad to 
 die. For only a fool would desire to run 
 away from wise and good masters and 
 guardians, such as the gods are to us. 
 
S8 nAATIlNOS [63 
 
 vvv S^ eXeye?, ro roi)? (f)iXoa-6<f>ov<; paSico^ av iOeXeiu aTroOv^a-Keiv, 
 eoiKev rovTO, w "ZoiKpaTef, aroTrai, etirep o vvv S^ iXejo/iev ev\6yci}<; D 
 e^et, TO Oeov re etvau rov eirifieXovfievov i^/mwv koI jj/ia? ixeivov 
 KTrjfiara elvac. , rd lyap firj ayavaKrelv Toii'; ^poviixardrowi Ik 
 5 ravTr)<s t^? 6epaTreia<; dirtovra';, ev § iiTKnaTOvai/v avrwv o'lirep 
 apia-Tot elo'iv tSv ovtcov eTriffTarai, 0eol, ovk e^et \6yov. ov jdp 
 TTOV avToif ye avrov OLerai a/ieivov iTrifieXijcreo'dai i\ev9epo<; yevo- 
 fievoi;' aXX,' dv6j]T0<; fiev dv9panro<; rd-^ dv olijOeir] ravra, cj)evKT€ov 
 eivao aiTo rov heairdrov, koL ovk av Xoyi^oiTO oti ov Set diro ye E 
 
 10 TOW aya6ov ^evyeiv, dXX' ti fidXiara irapajjbevew, Sio dXoyiar(o<; 
 av ipevyoi, o Be vovv eywv iirtdv/ioi irov dv del elvat, irapd ra 
 avTov ^eXriovi. KaiTOi ovra)<;, to StB/c/oare?, rovvavnov elvat elK6<; ' 
 ^ o vvv 8r) iXiyero' toi)? fiev yap <ppovifiovg dyavuKTeiv dirodvp- 
 (7K0VTa<; irpeiret, toi)? Se d(j}pova<; 'xaipeiv. d/covcra<s ovv 6 ^mKpdrr]'; 
 
 IS rjaBrjvai re /j,oi eBo^e r§ rov Ke/SiyTO? irpayfiarela, Ka\ eiri^Xe'^a'i 63 
 elk rip,d<i 'Aei roi, e<pr], o KeyS?;? Xoyov^ rtvd<; dvepevva, Kal ov rrdvv 
 ev9e(o<; eOeXei ireidecrOai o ri av Tis e'iirri. Kat d 'Zifi/jiia<i 'AWa 
 /xr^v, e(f)r), w '^a>Kpare<;, vvv ye /j,oi, BoKet ri Kal avrm Xiyeiv K.e0r}^' 
 ri yap av ^ovXofievoi, dvBpes (ro<pol to? dXrjffco^ Beairora'i dfieivov<; 
 
 20 avrwv (fsevyoiev Kal paBico<; diraXXdrroivro avrdov ; Kal fioi, BoKei 
 KeySiy? ets tre reiveiv rov Xoyov, on ovtco paBico<; <f)epei,<; Kal ■^fid^ 
 diroXeiirav Kal dp')(ovra'i dyaOovi, oj? avro^ ofioXoyei^, 6eov<s. B 
 
 To this Simmias agrees, and upbraids Schanz brackets these words. 
 Sokrates for being too ready to leave his 15. irpa-yjiareC^] 'insistence'. The 
 
 friends. Well then, answers Sokrates, word is used in a somewhat unusual 
 
 since I am thus arraigned, I must try to manner here. Plato frequently denotes 
 
 defend myself before you more persua- by it a pursuit followed with care and 
 
 sively than I did before the jury. As he earnestness, generally philosophy, but 
 
 is beginning his defence he is interrupted sometimes the ordinary business of life, 
 
 by Kriton : the attendant, says he, has as in Republic 500 c. Compare irpaypia- 
 
 been warning me that talking is apt to TetdSi] waiSuiy, Parmenides 137 B. 
 hinder the operation of the poison. Never 16. X070VS Tivds dvep««v^] ' he is 
 
 mind, replies Sokrates ; only let him be always hunting for some principle or 
 
 prepared to repeat the potion as often as other', 
 may be required. 19. avSpes <ro((>oV us dXi]6<os should 
 
 3, TO iiiv T« etvoi] Sokrates had be taken together, 
 used the plural, as Kebes himself does 21. els irk reCveiv tAv Xoyov] Olym- 
 
 directly afterwards. Plato, when he uses piodoros remarks, not without acuteness, 
 
 the word popularly, without any meta- cwa^alperai ivreOSev on TcXeioVe/jos K^;8i)S 
 
 physical significance, seems to employ Xi/ifdov, because Kebes raises a universal 
 
 6eos or Seal indifferently. question, while Simmias o-wo7et ^ttI tov 
 
 8. ^euKriov clvai diro tov SEO-TroTOv] SuKparovs. 
 
^3] 4)AIAflN. 59 
 
 Aiicaia, e^r], Xeyere. otfiai, yap vfid<; Xiyeiv on j^jOjJ fie 7rp6<; 
 ravra diroXoyijaaa-dai, wcnrep iv hiKaaTrjpiw. JIdvv fiev ovv, €<pr) 
 6 %iij,iiia<i. 
 
 VIII. €>6pe hrj, rj S' 09, Treipadw TTiBavoorepov 7r/30? vfia'j 
 aTToXoyrja-acrdai, rj irpo'; tov<s BiKacrTd<;. iyoi yap, e(f>r], w liip.jjLia 5 
 re Kai, Ke^r]';, el p.ev firj mfirjv rj^eiv •n'pwTOV fiev irapd 0eov<: dWovf 
 crotpovi re Kai aya6ov<;, eireiTa Koi Trap dvOpcoTrov; T€Te\evTr]K6Ta<; 
 a/ietvov; t&v iv0dBe, ■^Blkovv av ovk dyavaicrwv t&5 davdrat' vvv 
 
 C Be ev tcTTe on, irap av8pa<; re eKiri^oi d^L^eaOat dyaOov'i' Koi 
 TOVTO fiev OVK dv irdw hucrj^vpiaaifirjv' '6n fiivroi Trapd 6eov<; lo 
 SetTTTOTa? nrdvv dya0ov<; i^^eiv, ev tare en, e'ltrep tc dWo twv 
 roiovTcov, huayypia-aifiTfv dv Kai tovto. S)(TTe hia ravra 01^^ 
 ^Trms dyavaKja, aXX' eveXirk elfii eXvai n rol<; rereXevrrjKoa-i Kai, 
 wcrrrep ye Kai rrakat \eyerai,, iroXv dfieivov to(9 dyadol<; rj rot? 
 KaKOi^. Tt ovv, ecprj 6 '^i,fifiia<;, to 'ZcoKpare'; ; avro^ ^X^^ ''"^^ '5 
 
 D Bidvoiav ravrrjv ev vm e^efi airievai, rj kuv rjp2v p,eraBolrj'i ; kolvov 
 ydp Brj efioiye BoKei Kai rjfuv elvai dyadbv rovro, Kai dfia col 
 dwoXoyia earai, edv cnrep Xiyei<; ^fim ireiarj^. 'AXXd Treipaa-o/iac, 
 e<prj, rrpwrov Be Kplrcova rovBe crKeylrcofieda, ri io'nv o /SovXeaOai 
 fioi BoKel irdXai elirelv. lY, w Sco/c/sare?, e^r) 6 K.pira>v, dXXo ye 20 
 rj TrdXai /ioi Xeyet, 6 fieXXiov vol Bcoaeiv rd (pap/iaKov, '6n XPV 
 
 6. irapd fleois oiXXovs] Sokrates statement about their association with 
 follows the popular distinction between one another : all he is quite sure of is 
 the oipdvioi and x^wioi 6eoi. Mr Cope that, whatever their condition, they are 
 translates ' in the company not only of under the care of good and wise gods. 
 Gods wise and good, but next also of 11. ■fjjeiv] We cannot supply iXirlS^oi, 
 men '. I think however the meaning is because Sokrates is confident that he will 
 settled by Zaws 958 D to /ih irepl to be in the company of gods, not that he 
 Beta vijuixa t&v re iirb 7^5 Beui' km tuv hopes to be. But the infinitive construc- 
 TTjSe : and soon afterwards, 959 B, we tion is carried on from the previous sen- 
 have exactly the same phrase as here ; tence, although the particular force of 
 rrapb, Beoiis dWovs dirievai BtiaovTa \lyyov, the governing verb is no longer appro- 
 wliere deoiis dWovt can only mean ' other priate. Perhaps however Schanz is right 
 gods '. in bracketing ii^eiv. 
 
 9. Trap' avSpas ts] The proper apo- 14. irdXai Xey'^'"'''] ^^ the current 
 
 dosis to the re has been displaced by the traditions of Greek religion. 
 
 parenthesis xal tovto dua-xvpiffalfivi't 'S- oiros 'i\o)v] 'are you minded to 
 
 which modifies the form of the succeed- depart keeping this persuasion to your- 
 
 ing clause. The meaning of the paren- self? ' 
 
 thesis seems to be that Sokrates does not 19. irpurov Si KpCruva] This little 
 
 feel sure enough as to the exact condition episode serves to mark the conclusion of 
 
 of souls after death to make any positive the introductory matter. 
 
6o 
 
 HAATfiNOS 
 
 [64 
 
 aoi ^pd^etv to? ekd-^iara BiaXejeaffai ; (fyrja-l jap Bepiiatveadai 
 fxaXkov BiaXeyofiivovi, Seiv Se ovBev tolovtov 'irpoa-cf>epeiv ra> (fiap- 
 fiaKtfi' el Be fj,rj, eviore dvajKa^ecrOai koX St? Koi Tpl<; irlveiv tov? e 
 Tt TOLOVTOV iroiovvTwi. KoX 6 'Za>KpdTi)<}, "Ea, ecfii], ^(alpeiiV avTOv' 
 5 aWa fiovov to eavTov irapacrfeeva^eTco oS? Kot St? Smcrap, eav Se 
 Ber), KoX Tpl^. 'AWa a-x^eSdv /J,iv Ti rjBrj, e^r] 6 K-piTcoV aWd 
 fiot [vraXat] irpdjjAaTa 'irape')(ei,. "Ea avTov, ecf>7). a\\' vfilv S?) 
 Tot? Bi,KaaTal<! ^ovKofiai rfBr] top \6jov diroBovvai, du? /jloi ^alveTai 
 elKOTWi dvrjp tw ovti ev ^iXoaocfyia BiaTptt^a<i top ^iov Oappelv 
 
 lo fjLeXKaiv dirodavelaOai Kol eveXTrt? elvat eKel fJuejio'Ta oXaeadat, 64 
 dyadd, i'TretBdv TeXevTija-r}' ttw? dv ovv Brj Toys' oUtco'; e'xot, co 
 2t/i/it'a re koi Ke/S?;?, 67QJ Treipda-o/Mai (f>pdaai. 
 
 IX. ^LvBvveiovcn rydp 'baoi Tvyx^dvovcriv 6pdoo<; aTTTOfievoi 
 (f>iXo(ro(pia<! Xe\r)6evai toi)? dXXov;, oti ovBev ciXKo avToi eiriTr}- 
 
 15 Bevovaiv fj dirodvrjaKeiv re kol TeOvdvai. el ovv tovto aXij^e?, 
 aTOTTov Bi]Trov dv e'er) •jrpodv/j.elaOai fiev ev ttuvtI tS ySt'o) firjBev 
 
 5. TO lavTov is needlessly bracketed 
 by Schanz. 
 
 7. [irdXtti] The mss. are uncertain 
 about this word, which Schanz brackets. 
 Z. and St. retain it. 
 
 63 E — 64 A. After the interruption 
 Sokrates restates the thesis which he has 
 to defend : that the philosopher will meet 
 death with good courage, in the confident 
 hope that he will enjoy the greatest 
 blessings in the other world. 
 
 8. ois (1.01 <))aCv6Tai] At this point 
 the main business of the dialogue begins : 
 all that precedes has been merely pre- 
 paratory to this thesis, and all that 
 follows is logically evolved in its de- 
 fence. 
 
 64 A — 67 B, cc. ix — xi. The philo- 
 sopher's whole life is nothing else than 
 the study and practice of death ; how then 
 shall he be dismayed when that comes 
 for which he has alwfiys been striving? 
 This paradox is explained as follows. 
 First we define death as the state of 
 separation of soul and body. Now the 
 philosopher's aim is the attainment of 
 knowledge and wisdom. But the body 
 is for ever thwarting his endeavours ; ( i) 
 
 by its pleasures and appetites, (2) by the 
 intrusion of sensual perceptions, (3) by 
 its weaknesses and maladies. All these 
 hinder the free action of the soul and 
 prevent her from gazing calmly on the 
 truth. Accordingly so long as the soul 
 is in union with the body, she can never 
 attain to perfect wisdom ; only death, by 
 setting her free, enables her, if ever, to 
 reach the truth. But the true philosopher 
 will do all he can during life to anticipate 
 this condition : he will withdraw his soul, 
 so far as may be, from all communion 
 with the body : its pleasures and pains he 
 wUl scorn, its perceptions he will ignore ; 
 and so when the hour of release arrives 
 the soul will be pure and unsullied by 
 material taint; she will be fit to enjoy 
 the free life of intelligence that is now 
 before her. 
 
 15. diroOv^o-Kciv TE Kal TeBvdvai] 
 ' dying and being dead '. i,iro8vxi<rKeai 
 represents the philosophic training, the 
 gradual emancipation of the soul from 
 bodily passions ; TeBv&vai. the perfected 
 philosophic S^is, the complete independ- 
 ence of soul, so far as is permitted by the 
 conditions of corporeal life. 
 
64] ^AIAON. 61 
 
 aWo rj TOVTO, r,KOVTO<; Se Brj avrov djava/cTeiv, b nraXai irpoedv- 
 fiovvro T€ Kol iTTeTijSevov. koi 6 %i/MfjuLa^ yeXdcra'; N^ top Alu, 
 
 B e(j)rj, w SftJ/cparey, ov irdvv 76 fi€ vvv Sj) ryekacreiovTa iiroirjcrai; 
 jekda-ai,. ol/J,ai, jap dv roii^ ttoXXoi)? avrb tovto aKovcravTa^ 
 SoKetv ev irdvv elprjcrOai, eh toi)? <f>iXocro<f>ovVTa<s KoX ^vfKpdvai, dv S 
 Toi)? fiep Trap' rnuv dvOpdvovi; koX irdw, oTi tw ovti ol ^CKoao- 
 <j)0VVTe'i OavaTwai Kal a-(})d<; ye ov XeX'^daaiv '6ti d^ioi eltrip rovro 
 irda'xeiv. Kal dXrjdrj y dv \ejoiev,-w "Siifi/jbia, ifKrjV je tov cr^d^ 
 firj XeXijdevai. \eXrj6ev rydp avTOV<i rj re davaT&ai Kal § a^iov 
 elaiv davdrov Kal oXov Bavdrov ol tos aXi?^tus (piXocro^oi. eoTTCOfiev 10 
 
 C ydp, e<f37), 7r/>o? '^fidi; avrov<i, "xaipeiv eiirovTe^ eKeivoK' i^yovfieOa 
 Ti TOV ddvarov elvai ; Hdvv ye, e<prj vTrdXa^wv 6 '^ijjbjxia'i. ''Apa 
 firj aXKo ri 7j rrjv ttj^ •x^vj^^? diro tov a-wfiaTO<} d7raX\ayi]v ; Kai, 
 elvat TOVTO to TeOvdvai, %eB/3t? /xev dirb Trj<; ■v|fv^^9 dTraXkayev 
 avTO Kaff" avrb to <7co/j,a yeyovevai, %(»/3l? Be rrjv ■\lrv)(riv dird tov 15 
 <7(B/taT09 diraXkayelcrav avTrjv Ka& avTrjv etvai ; dpa firj dXXo 
 Ti lff\ 6 Qdvaro^ fj tovto ; Ovk dXXd tovto, ecf)Tj. ( ^K€'\lrai Sij, 
 a dyaOe, idv dpa Kal aol ^vvSoKy d-irep ifipi. eK yap tovtwv 
 
 D fj^dXXov oljMai riiJbd<; e'icrea'Oai irepl av (TKOTrovfiev. ^ai,veTaL aoi 
 d)iXo(76cf)OV dvBpo^ etvai io'irovSaKevai trepl ras JjSom? KaXov^eva<i 20 
 Tas TOitdaZe, olov (roTcov Kal iroToav ; "HArtcrra, w XcoKpaTei;, ecf>r] 
 6 'Siififiia'!. T/ Be; ra? tSv dtppoBia-ieov; OvBafiw<!. Tt.Se; ra? 
 dXXa<; ra? irepl to aSfia Oepaireia'; BoKel <Tpi, evrlfiov; 'qyelaOai 
 6 TOLOVTO^ ; olov IfiaTLCdv Bta<pep6vTa)v KTtjcrei'i Kal vTroBrjfidTCOv 
 Kal Toi"; dXXovi KaXXavia-fuiv'} toi)? 'rrepl rd awfia iroTepov Ti/idv 25 
 
 E BoKei a-oi rj dnfid^eiv, Kaff oaov firj TroXKrj dvdjKrj /xere^etv avrwv ; 
 ^Ari/id^etv e/J-oiye BoKei, e^r], ye (»s dXr)6w<; ^tXocro^o?. Ovkovv 
 
 6. Tovs |i6V irap' ii|J.tv] In the mouth tive. For in a question we can hardly 
 of Simmias I think these words must accept Heindorfs suggestion, 'ante iit) 
 refer to the Thebans: cf. Sophist 242 D intelligi potest SeSof/care'. 
 
 t6 aJ Trap' -riiuv 'EXeOTiKic IBvoi. ' The 20. irepl tAs iiSovas] Olympiodoros 
 
 majority would think what you say of classifies those here mentioned as (i) 
 
 philosophers excellent — my countrymen ivepyelai (jtvaxal Kal dpayxaiat, (2) ipviri- 
 
 would give an especially cordial assent'. Kal /j^v oix avayKoiai. 3e, (3) oiiTe (pvaiKal 
 
 Simmias is glancing at the proverbial oire ivayKaiai. This however, as Wytten- 
 
 dulness of the Boeotian mind. bach points out, is an Epicurean distinc- 
 
 7. Kal o-<|>tts] Sc. T0i5! Trap' rj/uv. tion : cf. Cicero definibus I xiii § 45, and 
 I J. 'Y^'yov^vai... etvai] Note the signi- Diog. Laert. x 149 : where the examples 
 
 ficant change of word. do not correspond with the present pas- 
 
 16. dpa ni\ dWo Ti] If a be right, sage, 
 it can only be a ' deliberative ' ^ubjunc- 
 
62 
 
 HAATflNOS 
 
 [65 
 
 o\ffl? BoKel crot, e<f)r), rj rov toiovtov 'Trpayfiareia ov trepi to amfia 
 elvai, aWa KaO" '6aov Svvarai d^eardvai, avTov, tt/jo? Be rr^v 
 '^v'xrjv rerpd^dai ; "Efiotye. 'A/j' ovv wpSiTov fiev iv rot? roiov- 
 Tot? BrjXo'; icTTiv 6 <f>iX,6ao(f>oi diroXvav 6 ti fidXia-ra rrjv •^V)(rjv 65 
 5 OTTO T^? Tov a-WfiaTO'i KOivccvia^ Bia(j)ep6vTCi)<; rcSv uXXcov dpffpa- 
 •jTcov ; ^aiveTai. Kal hoKel ye Zrjirov, m Xifi/J,ia, to2<; TroWoi^ 
 uvdpwTroi'i, & firjiev rjBii twv roiovrtov firjSe y[46Te%6i avTwv, ouk 
 d^iov elvai ^rjv, dW' iyjvg ri reiveiv tov TeOvdvai 6 firjSev ^poi'- 
 Ti^mv Twv ■^BovSv at Bid tov (Twp,aT6<i el<riv. Tldvu fiev ovv akridrj 
 
 X. Tt Be Brj irepl avTrjv Trjv Trj^ (f/povrjcrea)!; KTrjcriv ; TroTepov 
 ifiTToSiov TO crwfia rj oil, idv ti<; avTO iv Trj ^rjTijcrei KOivavov 
 a-vfnrapaXap^^dvT) ; olov to toiovBb Xiyco' dpa e^et akr]6ecdv Tiva B 
 oyjn<; re Kal aKorj rot? avOpoj'Troii, r) ra ye toluvtu koi oi TTOirjToi, 
 IS yfilv del 6pv\ov<7LV, OTi ovt aKOVOfiev dxpt^ei ovBev ovje opajfiev ; 
 Kai/TOi eif avTai twv irepu to awfia alaOrjcreoiV firj dxpi^eti eicnv 
 
 1. dcfxo-ravai oiTov] With the whole 
 of these three chapters should be com- 
 pared Timaeus 87 c — 90 D. It would be 
 an error to suppose that Plato, with all 
 his contempt for the body, was a friend 
 of asceticism. In the passage of the 
 Thnaeus above mentioned he says that a 
 due balance should be maintained be- 
 tween soul and body ; a vigorous soul 
 ought to have a vigorous body for its 
 vehicle. Accordingly the body should be 
 kept in good health and condition for the 
 sake of the soul : for no less emphatic- 
 ally than in the Phaedo he declares that 
 all is to be subordinate to the free exercise 
 of Intelligence ; see especially 90 A foil. 
 
 8. e77ws Ti T«£v«iv] 'verges pretty 
 closely on the state of death', Cope. 
 Here Plato marks the vulgar error already 
 referred to in 64 B XiXriSev yap airois k.t.X. 
 The majority have no conception of the 
 philosophic reBvivai. ; if one lives without 
 bodily pleasures, they think he may as 
 well be dead. Such is the judgment of 
 Kallikles, Gorglas 492 E oi X(9oi yhp hi 
 ourci) 7e koX oI vexpol eiSainoviaraToi, eUv. 
 Sokrates retorts that the life of the plea- 
 sure-seeker is a wtdov pto! and afterwards 
 
 Xa-paSpiov, 494 B. Cf. PhUebus 21 C. 
 
 9. 8id ToB (ru|taTos] This phrase 
 would indicate that there is no real dis- 
 crepancy between the doctrine of the 
 Phaedo and of the Philebus on the subject 
 of pleasure. For the preposition 61a 
 implies ' those pleasures [which the soul 
 feels] by means of the body ' : see intro- 
 duction § 4. 
 
 14. 01 TTOiigral iijxtv del OpvXoviriv] 
 e. g. Empedokles 49 — 53 (Karsten) : 
 dXX' a7e, aSpn irafiToKd/MTi vr; SrjKov 
 
 iKaarov, 
 p.'/ire Tiv' otpui tx"^" vtarei irXiov rj Kar' 
 
 aKov^Vj 
 /i^r' oKoV ipldoVTTov virip Tpavti/iaTa 
 
 y\(i(7a-r]!, 
 /J-rire n tuiv aWuv oirTij Tripos iarl 
 
 voijffcu' . 
 yvluir irlo-Ttv Ipvxe, vbei S' j StjXov 
 iKacTov. 
 Cf. 108 : 
 
 Tr]ii (TV voif SipK^v, files' oniiacLv rjao 
 
 TeBTjTiis, 
 
 also the line of Epicharmos : 
 
 voSs Spy Kal mvs aKoiif raWa Kwipk 
 
 kbX TUlt>K6,. 
 
6s] ^AIAflN. 63 
 
 fir]Be ffa^et?, cr'^oXfj a" lye aXKai' iraaai, '^dp irov tovtcov i^av- 
 Xorepai elaiv rj trot ov SoKovaiv ; Tldvv fiev ovv, eipr). Hore ovv, 
 rj S' 0?, ^ '<|fi'%'7 T77? dXri6eia<i aiTTerat, ; OTav /tej/ 7ajo /iera tov 
 cr(6fiaT0<; iiri'^^etpT] ti crKonretv, SijXov oti Tore i^airardrai iir 
 
 C avTov. 'AXtjO'Ij Xiyei^. 'A/j' ovv ovk iv t& Xoyi^eaOai, et-rrep ttov 5 
 dXXodt, KardBrjXov avry jlyveTuC ti tSv ovtcov; Nai. Aoyl^eTai, 
 Be rye -ttov Tore KoXXtcrra, orav avTrjv roxnav /jbrjSev "TrapaXvirfj, 
 fLrjTe aKoq /MijTe oifrc; fiijre dXji^Bwv /j/rjSi Tt? '^Sovij, dXX' o tu 
 fxaXiara avrrj KaS" avTrfV <yi'yV7]Tai e'cScra ')(alpeiv rd aw/j,a, KoX 
 KaO^ oaov Svvarai, firj Koivavovaa avra firjS' dirrofiivrj opiyTjTat, 10 
 TOV ovTO<;. 'EffTi Tavra. Ovkovv koX evravOa r) tov ^iXoa6<f)ov 
 
 D '^u%') fidXicrra drifid^ei to awfia koX ^ev<yei dir avTov, ^rjTei 8e 
 avTr] KaO' avTrjv yiyvecrOai, ; ^aivcTat. T^ Se Brj to, TOtdBe, <3 
 %i/jb/j,la> ; ^a/jbev tl etvai Blicaiov avTo rj ovBiu ; ^afjiev /livTot vrj 
 Aia. Kat KaXov ji ti koI dyadov; IltSs B' ov ; "HSj; ovv irwtroTe 15 
 TJ Twv TOLOvTcov Toit; 6<p6aXfioi'i elBe? ; OvBa/j,w^, rj K 2?. 'AW 
 aXXr) TivX alaQrjcrei tuiv Bid tov adfiaTO^ i^')]yjr(0 avjwv ; Xeym Be 
 nrepl •jrdvTcov, olov fiejidov; irepi, iyieia<;, l(Tj(yo<;, koX twv dXKcov 
 
 E evX Xoycp dirdvTcov r-rj^ ovaia<;, o Tvy')(dvei, exacTTOv ov' dpa Bid 
 TOV TWfiaTO's avTCOv TO dXrjOicrTaTov deonpelTai, ■^ wSe e'X^et,' 0? dv 20 
 fjidXiaTa rifiav koI dxpi^ecrTaTa irapacTKevdg-riTai avrb eKacTTOv 
 BiavorjOrjvai, irepl ov (TKoireX, ovto<; dv iyyvTaTa Xoi tov yvwvat 
 eieaa-Tov; Udvv fiev ovv. 'Ap' ovv eKelvo<; dv tovto Trotrjcreie 
 
 I. <f>av\<STepai] Sight is distinguished is merely because for the present pur- 
 
 as the noblest of the senses in Timaeus pose Plato is not concerned to differenti- 
 
 47 A o^is 5^ Kwrh. riv ifiiv Xbyov airia ate it : the criticism of Anaxagoras, 98 
 
 TTJ! neyloTTis itxpeXeias yiyovev -qfuv : hear- C foil., shows that in the Phaedo the auTo 
 
 ing comes next, 47 c, D. Cf. Phaedrus dyaSby must occupy the same position as 
 
 250 D Stl/is yhp ■qjuv d^vrdrrj riav Std rod in the Republic. In the Repitblic itself 
 
 <riili.aTos ipx^rai alcrS-^ffeav. -^ ayadov is several times apparently classed 
 
 7. irapoXiiiTTJ] ' annoys by its intru- with the inferior ideas, c. g. 476 A. 
 sion'^ this sense of Tropoi is not uncom- 18. [leY^Oous vipi] Here is the first 
 mon in Plato : cf. below 66 D irapavt- decisive indication that the Phaedo be- 
 wTov ; Timams 50 E Tra/jc/i^oicoy. longs to the middle phase of Platonism, 
 
 8. y.r^i tis ^Sovij] This is the read- along with the Republic. For iiiyedos is 
 ing of the Bodleian, and seems to me riiv irpos n, uv 06 cjiaixev ehai Ka.9' avTO 
 right. iXyndai/ p.riSi ns riSovTi all belong yhos. (Arist. metaph. I ix.) 
 
 to the last /t^Te. Z. has /wjre ns. 22. SiavoTidrivai] is opposed to alir- 
 
 10. op^YriToi] ' reaches after '. eivfadai, : ' to apprehend intellectually 
 
 15. KaX6v yi ti KaV ayaSov] Here the essence of each object of his investi- 
 
 the airb a7a9oi' seems placed on the same gation '. 
 
 level as the other ideas. This however 
 
64 
 
 nAATIlNOS 
 
 [66 
 
 KaOapciraTa, oo'ti'; o tl /idXiara avrfj rf} Stavola toi e^' eKacnov, 
 fiTjTe TTjp oyjriv 7rapaTidefievo<; iv ra> Siavoei&Oat fitjre riva aX\r)v 
 alcrdr/aiv i(f)eX.KCov fjbrjhefilav f^era tov Xoryia-fiov, a\\' avry Ka0' 66 
 avTTjv eiXiKpiv§L Trj Biavola '^pw/jLevo'; avro KaB" avro exXiKpive.'; 
 5 SKacyrov iiri'^^eipol drjpeveiv tcSv ovtcov, aTraXKajei,^ o ri fiaXicrra 
 L^dcbkjjLwv re Kal wtcov koI co? eVos ehreiv ^vp/iravro'i tov arc6fiaro<;, 
 as rapaTTOVTO^ koI ovk iwvTOi Trjv ■yjrv'xrjv KTijaaadai aXijdeidv 
 re Kal (fjpovrja-iv, orav Koivcav^, dp' ov'X^ ovto^ iariv, a ^ifi/Mia, eiirep 
 Ti<; Kal dWo';, 6 rev^o/ievo'i rod ovto<; ; 'T7rep<j)uS<;, e<f>r] 6 Xififiia^, 
 10 w? dXjjdrj \ejei<;, a 'ZaiKpaTe';. 
 
 XI. OvKovv dvdjKT], eifyr], e/e iravTwv rovrav iraptaTaaOai b 
 So^av TObdvSe Tivd to2<; yvrjcrlo)'; ^i\ocr6<j>oi,9, Sare Kal tt/so? oXXt]- 
 \ov? TocavTa drra Xejeiv, on KivSvvevei rot Sairep drpairo'; rt? ' 
 
 I. aurfj TTJ SiavoCa] The distinction 
 of the Republic between coBs and Siavoia 
 is not drawn here, since for our present 
 purpose it is unnecessary. 
 
 7. a\ij6»dv re Kal «|>povr)(rtv] d\^- 
 6eia is objective truth, <t>p6vriins the mental 
 iradriiia which apprehends it ; cf. Refublic 
 Sii B. 
 
 13. oSinrEp arpairos] Olympiodoros 
 insists that this refers to a Pythagorean 
 maxim (jxv-^iiv rets XeM^Apous, whereby 
 he has largely contributed to the per- 
 plexity of this passage. I believe orpa- 
 irJs properly means not so much a byway 
 as a short cut: what then is this short 
 cut ? We are here drawing an inference ^k 
 irdvrav rovrwv, i. e. from the various con- 
 siderations which induce the philosopher 
 to withdraw his soul from communion 
 with the body. Now to this state of se- 
 paration, towards which the philosopher 
 struggles during life by a long and tedi- 
 ous process, there is but one short cut, 
 namely death; which therefore I hold 
 with Schleiermacher is meant by the arpa- 
 ir6s. So far then we get a perfectly good 
 sense : ' the inference which genuine phi- 
 losophers will draw from the foregoing 
 considerations is this : it seems that death 
 is a short cut to the goal of our life's 
 endeavour'. But what of nerh toO Ao'^ou 
 iv ry (fKiipei which in the mss. follow 
 
 iKipipeiv? The unmeaning superfluity 
 and intolerable clumsiness of this addi- 
 tion surely ought not to be laid to the 
 charge of Plato. A glance at the notes 
 of the various editors is enough to show 
 the hopelessness of extracting any sense 
 from the phrase as it stands in the texts. 
 Again, as I think, the acuteness of Schlei- 
 ermacher has solved the difficulty. If, as 
 he proposes, we place the words after 
 IX'-'P^", they are perfectly appropriate 
 and restore the balance of the sentence, 
 which will then run ' it seems that a kind 
 of short cut brings us to our goal ; because, 
 so long as we have the body as a partner 
 with the reason in our search for truth, 
 and our soul is mixed up with this plague, 
 we shall never fully attain the object of 
 our desires '. Cf. 65 E /i^re rriu o\j/ai 
 irapwnBiiievoi h T<fi SiavoeiaSai. /J^re rwa 
 SKKriv atffdiinv i^^Kuv UTiSc/ilav p,era 
 TOV XoyiaiioO. As evidence of confusion 
 in the mss. it may be noted that the posi- 
 tion of -films varies; on which account 
 Hermann brackets it. Possibly we should 
 translate tov \6yov 'our theory', not 
 ' reason', because in the latter sense 
 Plato usually says jnerci X670u, not /leni 
 TOV \6yov : cf. Timaeus ii A, Protagoras 
 324 B. But in Timaeus 70 A we have 
 ToC \070u KwrqKoov. I still feel doubtful 
 whether some words have not fallen out: 
 
6;] a)AIAfiN. 6s 
 
 iK(f>epeiv 'rjfid<;, on, &>? av to a&fia e-^eo/jyev fierd rov \6<yov iv 
 rfi (r/ceylret, Koi (rv/nre^vpfievi] ■y rjfiwp 'T] "^v^ fieTci roiovrov kukov, 
 ov fir] TTore KTrja-cofieda Ixav^^ ov iiridvfiovfieV (fiaiiev Se rovTO 
 elvai TO d\r]de<;. /jbvpia^ fiev <yap ij/juv dcrj(pK[at; irapej^ei ro cr(Sp,a 
 
 C Bia TTjV dvayKabav rpotfyrjv eVt Se av Tti^e? vocroi irpoairia-axnv, S 
 ifiTToSi^ovcriv rjfimv Trjv tov ovto^ Orjpav. ipcoTcov Be koX i-TrtOvfiLoov 
 KoX ^o^cDV Kol eiSccXav TravToBaTrwv KaX (pXvaplai; ifiTriTrKijatv 
 r]fid^ TToWrj^, coare to Xeyofievov cus dXrjdw^ rm ovtl vir' avrov 
 ovSe (ppovrjcrat rifuv e<y<yi<yveTai ovBmoTe ova^v. Kal jdp iroXe/Movi 
 Kai (TTaaeii Kal fia^^ai ovSev dXXo •Trapi'^ei rj to aS/ia Kal at ro 
 TOVTOV eTriOvfiiai,. Bid yap Tr)v roov ')(^p7]/j,dTa)V Krrja-iv Trdvre'; ol 
 TToXefioi jijvovrai, rd Be 'X^p^/Mara dvayKa^ofieda Krdaffai Bid to 
 
 D (TWfia, BovXevovTe'i ry tovtov depaireia' Kal eK tovtov dff'X^oXiav 
 ayonev ^iXoaotpia^ irepi Bid irdvra rama. to B' e(T')(aTov irdvTav 
 oTi, idv Tt? '^niv Kal (T'XpXy yivtjTai dir ainov Kal Tpavco/ieBa i5 
 TT/jos TO (TKOireiv Ti, iv Tat? ^TjTrjcrecriv av Trai'Ta^ou irapaTrhrTov 
 Oopv^ov Trapi'yei koI Tapax^v Kal eKTrXijTTei, axTTe (ifj Bvvaa-dai 
 vtt' avTov KaOopdv TdXrjde^, dXXd Tm ovTi rjfuv BeBeiKTai oTi, el 
 fieXXo/jiiv TTOTe KuOapw^ ti e'icrecrBai, diraXXaKTeov avTov Kal avrfj 
 
 E TTj '^V'xri OeaTeov avrd Td TrpdyfiaTa' koi Tore, tu? eoixev, rjiuv 20 
 ecTTai ov eTTidv/iov/Mev Te Kai (pafiev epaaTal ehai, ^povrjaewi, 
 iireiBdv TeXevTijercofiev, co? o \o7o? arjfiaivei, ^Scnv Be oi. el yap 
 jjirj olov Te fieTd tov aoo/MaTOi firjBev Ka6apoo<s yvSvai, Bvolv ddTepov, 
 7] ovBafiov evTiv KT'^craaOai to elBevai rj TeXevTrj<raaiv' TOTe ydp 
 67 avTrj Kad" avTrjv r) '^jrvx^j ecTTai %(»/3t9 tou acofiaTO^, irpojepov S" 25 
 OV. Kal iv & av ^aiftev, ovtco's, co? eoiKev, iyyvraTco ecrofJieOa tov 
 elBevai, idv ti fidXiaTa firjBev ofiiXwfiev tw acc/iaTi fiTjBe koivco- 
 vcofiev, Ti firj irdaa dvayKr], firjBe dvaTrifnrXw/jieda t^? tovtov 
 
 drpairos seems to require definition ; and citatis locis addi '. He might have added 
 
 possibly the misplaced phrase extruded that Plato uses these words when he is 
 
 something like d Bdvaros after iK^ipeiv. giving the popular phrase a deeper mean- 
 
 For the use of iK(j>4pei.v Heindorf quotes ing, as here and in Phaedrus 256 B twk 
 
 Soph. Ai. 7 : and somewhat similar is rpiav nakaiaiwrav rav lis aXi)9i3j 'OXv/i- 
 
 the use of the passive in Cratylus 386 A. ih.ii.kSiv. 
 
 5. 8id T11V dva^KaCav Tpo(|>T)v] Com- n. 8id vclp tiiv tmv xP^HOtuv ktijo-iv] 
 
 pare Timaeus 43 B— 44 A. cf. Republic 373 D. 
 
 9. 0118^ <|>povT]<rai] This, as indicated 20. aJrel tA irpa-yiiara] ' the reali- 
 
 by TO \ey6iJi.evov, was no doubt a common ties of things ', i. e. the ideas. For this 
 
 phrase, to which Plato has given a turn of use of irpayixaTa compare 99 D p\iTwi> 
 
 his own. Wyttenbach observes ' nondum irpos to, Trpdyfiara. 
 
 satis cognitum, us aKtiOSs et item ry oi/ti 
 
 5 
 
&6 HAATDNOS [67 
 
 ^vffeto^, dXX^ KaOapevcofiev air avrov, eias av . 6 6eb<! airoXvtry 
 jj/ias" zeal oiira /lev KaOapol diraXKaTTOfievoi Trj^ tov o-w/^aro? 
 d<f>po(rivr)<}, loi to ei/eos, /lera toiovtcov re itro/ieOa koX i^vaa-ofieOa 
 Si rjfiwv avTwv trav to etXiKpive^. [tovto S' iffrlv ftrto? to oKt}- B 
 5 0e<s.J iirj KaOapw yap Ka6apov i<j>dirT€a'6at, firj ov 6efiiTov y. 
 ToiavTa o2fJi,ai, to "Sii/jifiia, dvcr/Kaiov elvai irpd'i dWijXov} Xeyeiv 
 T6 Kol So^d^eiv •irdvTa<i Tox)<i opdm^ ^iXo/ia6eh' ^ ov Bo/cei aoi 
 ovTm^; navTo? 76 fiaXXov, eS XuKpaTei. 
 
 XII. OvKovv, e(f>7) 6 ^coKpaTrj'}, el TavTa dXrj&rj, w iruipe, 
 
 10 iroXXr] iXirli d^iKO/ievai ol iym iropevofiai, ixei iKavw, ehrep ttov 
 aXXoffi, KTTjcraa-Oai tovto ov eveKa ij ttoXXt^ irpayfiaTeia 'qfilv 
 iv TO) irapeXdovTi ^im ykyovev, Sa-Te rj ye aTvohrnila rj vvv fioi 
 Trpoa-TeToy/jLevrj fjueTci dr/aOrj^ iXirlSo<; yiyvsTai Koi aXK^ dvBpi, C 
 09 rjyelTai ol irapecrKevdadai Trjv Siavoiav wcTTTep KeKaOapfieUrjv. 
 
 15 Tldvv p.ev odv, e(j>r] 6 'Zip.fila'i. Kddapcri<; Se elvai apa ov tovto 
 ^vfi^alvei, oTTep irdXai iv Tm Xoym XiyeTai, to j^copi^eiv o tj 
 /idXiaTa dtro tov a-(6jjuiT0i Trjv yjrv^rjv Koi eOicrai, avTrjv KaO' avTrpi 
 TravTa')(pOev iic tov <T(6fiaT0<! (TwayeipeaOaL Te ical d0poi^e<rdai; Kal 
 oIkbIv KUTd TO BuvaT^v Kal iv t&) vvv irapovTi Kal iv tm eireiTa 
 
 10 fJ>6vr}v Kaff avTTjv, iKXvofiivrjv aairep Sea-p,mv iK tov o-tB/iaro? ; d 
 Udvv p,ev ovv, e^t]. Ovkovv tovto ye 6dvaT0<; ovofid^eTai, Xviri^ 
 Kal ■^(opio'p.b'; yjrv'xr}'! dirb aeofiaTO';; HavTairafri ye,^ S' 2?. Aieiv 
 Se ye avTrjv, cb? (jsafiev, irpodvfiovvTai del fidXi<7Ta Kal fiovot ol 
 {piXoo'o^ovvTe'; 6pdw<;, koI to p^XeTrj/ia avTO tovto iaTiv t<5v <})iXo- 
 
 I. 6 Beos] Z. and St. add avros. contact with the body and accustoming 
 
 3. (lerd TOio«T<i)v] sc. KaBapSv. I her to dwell apart by herself; for death 
 take this to be neuter ; i. e. the contents is the consummation of her release from 
 of the ideal world. Cf. Phaedrus 249 c body. Were it not strange if the wisp 
 Trpos yip iKelvois deJ i<m ^U'WB "■/»! oh-rep man shrank from that which all his life 
 0eos dv SeUs iirn. long he sought; freedom from his foe the 
 
 4. [toIto 8' eo-rlv ta-as to ctXT|6^$] body, and fruition of wisdom his love? 
 I have bracketed these words, which I Shall a man meet death gladly in hope 
 believe to be a mere gloss on cl\tKpi.v4s, of reunion with some earthly love, and 
 derived from 66 B ^a/^y di tovto itvai rd for the sake of his divine love shall he 
 aXriSh. fear to die ? 
 
 5. |i^ Ka6ap^] 'for I doubt it is 20. £k\vo|i^vt)v] notice the present: 
 not lawful for the impure to reach the ' working out her deliverance '. 
 
 pure '. woTTcp 8ecr|i,<5v] Z. has ix Sctrfiuy. 
 
 67 B — 68 B, c. xii. So then he will 23. (laXurra koI |xovoi] "chiefly, nay 
 
 meet death with a good heart who has only, the philosophers '- 
 purified his soul by withdrawing her from 
 
68] ^AIAflN, 6^ 
 
 ao^oav, \i5(7t5 Kal ')(Ci}picni6<! i^i»^^? dird coJ/iaTO?, 77 ov ; ^aiverac. 
 OvKovp, oirep iv dpx§ eXeyov, ryeKotov civ eir/ dvBpa irapacrKevd^ovff' 
 E eavTov iv to) ^itp on eyyvrdro} ovra tov reOvdvai o'tlitco ^rjv, 
 KUTreiff" r)KOVTO<s avrm tovtov d/yavuKTeiv ', [ov jekoiov,] lift)? 
 S' ov; To3 ovri apa, e^rj, m %ifi/j,ia, oi opOm^ (f)Lkoao^ovvTe<; 5 
 airodvyaKSiv fie\eTw<7i, xal to reOvdvai rJKicTTa avroif dvOpdircov 
 (fio^epov. etc TwvSe Be a-Koirei, el yap Bta^i^Xrjvrai fiev •jravra'xrj 
 T(p (TmixaTt,, avrrjv Se Kuff" avrrjV eiriBviiovai ttju '^V')(^v e^ew, 
 TOVTOV Srj yiyvo/iivov el (po^oivTO Kal dyavaicTolev, ov ttoXK^ dv 
 dXoyla e'ir}, el /i?) da-/j,evoi, eKelcre 'loiev, ol d(j)iKO/ievoi<; iXirl'; iaTtv 10 
 68 ov Sid Piov rjpcdv TV)(eiV rjpav Se ^povrjaewi' w re Ste/Se/SXijvTo, 
 TOVTOV dTTTJKKd'ydai, avvovToi avToli ; rj dvdpcoirivtov fiev iraihiKwv 
 Kal yvvaiKcov Kal vlecov dirodavovTosv ttoKKoI hrj eK6vTe<} rjQeKrjaav 
 eU" Kihov ikdelv, viro raurij? dyofievoi Trj<; iKTriSo<;, t^s tov o-\jre- 
 crOal, re e/eei mv iireOvfiovv Kal crvvea-ea-dai' cftpovrja-eai'; Be dpa 15 
 Tt9 Tw ovTi epwv, Kal Xa^wv a^oBpa Trjv avTrjv TavTrjv iXirlBa, 
 fi7]8afiov dWodi evTev^ecrOai, avTrj a|ta)? Xoyov 17 iv "AiSov, dya- 
 B vaKT^crei re dirodvyo' koov koI ov^ da/j.evo'i etatv avToae ; oXeaOai 
 ye vpi], idv T& OVTI, ye f, w eTaipe, <f>t\,0(70<f)0<;' enpoSpa yap avTm 
 TavTa Bo^ei, /jtrjSa/jLOV dWoOi KaOapw^ ivTev^eadai, ^povrjo-ei dXk' 10 
 rj iKei. el Be tovto oStws 6%6t, STrep dpTi eXeyov, ov iroXKrj dv 
 akoyia eXr], el ^o^oIto tov OdvaTOV 6 toiovto's ; UoWr} p,evT0i vrj 
 Aia, rj B' 09. 
 
 XIII. OvKovv iKavov a-oi TeKfirjpiov, ecf>rj, tovto dvSpo'; ov dv 
 
 9. TOVTOV 8ii] mss. 54, corr. Madvig. the multitude is spurious : for they endure 
 
 I follow Schanz in adopting ffi}, since the evils only to avoid greater evils, they 
 
 vulgate gives a somevchat ill-balanced forego pleasures only that they may enjoy 
 
 sentence: thus we may translate, 'if they greater pleasures ; thus fear is the source 
 
 are at feud with the body on every issue of their courage, indulgence the source of 
 
 and desire to keep the soul to herself, their temperance. But the fount of all 
 
 then, should they fear and fret on the real virtue is wisdom: this is the only 
 
 attainment of this object, were it not the true currency; virtues that arise from 
 
 height of perversity, not to go thither balancing pleasure against pleasure and 
 
 with gladness, where on their arrival they pain against pain, apart from wisdom, 
 
 hope to possess that which they loved all are worthless and slavish. Virtue is the 
 
 their life long?' Z. and St. retain 5^. purification of the soul ; the true philoso- 
 
 2 1 . oirep fipTi JXeyov] referring to ov pher is he whose soul is purified and ini- 
 
 TToXXi) an dXoyla etij. tiated into the holy mysteries of wisdom, 
 
 68 B — 69 E, c. xiii. Therefore the phi- and he it is who shall dwell with the 
 
 losopher alone is truly brave and tem- gods in the other world. Such is the 
 
 perate. The courage and temperance of defence of Sokrates, 
 
 5—2 
 
68 HAATXINOS [69 
 
 iSri<; dryavaKTOvvTa fieWovra dirodaveicrOai, on, ov/c ap ^v <f)i,\6- 
 ao<j>o';, dWd res ^iXoawfiaro? ; 6 ai^To? Si irov oSto<; rvyx^dvei, wv C 
 Koi (piKoxPV/J'aTO's Kal ^tXoTt/io?, ijrot rd erepa rovrav rj dficfioTepa. 
 Tldvv, e(pr], ex^i ovtw^ ea? Xefyet?. 'Ap' odv, e<f>i], m Xo/J-fiLa, ov Kal 
 6 rj ovopja^o/jbevr} dvBpeia T0t9 ovra SiaKei/Jt,ivoi,i} fidXia-ra irpoariKei ; 
 TidvTWi hrjirov, e(f>r]. Omovv Kal r) crco^pocrvvr}, rjv Kal ol iroXKol 
 cvopA^Qvai a-03(f)pocrwr]v, t6 irepl Ta9 eTTt^u/itas /^j} eTTTOrja-dai, aXX' 
 o\iywpco<} e'^eiv Kal Kocrpieov, dp ov rovTOi<i p,6voi<i irpoai^Kei,, toi<; 
 fidXicrra rov croofiaTo''! oXtyapovcrlv re Kal iv <j)iXoa-o(f)ia ^wauv ; D 
 ' 10 'AvdjKrj, e<f)i]. Et yap idiXei?, ?f S' 2?, ivvorja-ai ti]v ye tSv dX\a>v 
 dvSpeiav re Kal aaxppocrvvrjv, So^ei aoi elvai droiro';. llw<s hrj, w 
 ZcoKpaTE'i ; OlaOa, rj K 09, on top Odvarov r^yovvTai irdmei ol 
 oKKob rwv peydXeov KaKwv; Kat (jloK! e(p7j. Ovkovv (f>60q) fj,ei^6vaiv 
 kukSv viropkvovcnv avrwv ol dvhpeloi top Odparop. orap viropevo)- 
 
 15 aip; "E«7Tt Tavra, Tm SeSievai, dpa koI Slet dvhpeloi eiai, iravre's 
 irX-fjp ol <j)i\oao(poi,. Kalrot, aXoyop ye Biei ripd Kal BetXla dpSpeiov 
 elvat. Tldvv fiev ovv. Tt he ol Kocrpioi avrmv ; ov ravrbp tovto E 
 ireirovdao'LP' aKoXacria rivl aw^pove^ elcnv; Kalrot (f)apev ye dhv- 
 parov elvai, dXX' oficoi avToi<; avfi^aipei, tovto) opoiov to •ird6o<; 
 
 20 r^ irepl ravrrjp rrjv evrjOrj am^poavvqp' (po^ovfiepoi, yap eriptov 
 rjhovwv a-Teprjdrjvat Kal eindvpQVPTe'i eKelvav, dXXwp dire'XppTai, 
 VTT dXkcov Kparovpevoi, Kalroi KaXoval ye aKoXaalav to vtto twv 69 
 rj^ov^p dp')(eardai' aXlC ofico^ avp^aipei auTol'i KpaTovpepoi'i v^' 
 ■:^SovSv Kparecp dXXcov rjhovwv. tovto S' ofioiop iaTip S pvv hrj 
 
 1$ iXiyero, Tat rpoirov Tipd Si aKoXaaiap avTovi (rea-m^poviaOai. 
 '%0lKe yap. 'XI paKapie 'Zip/Mia, prj yap ovy^ avj-q 17 r; 6p6fj Trpbi; 
 dpeTrjp dXXayr], rjSopd'i "Trpoi j58oi'a9 Kul Xv'7ra<; TTpdi; Xinrai Kal 
 (po^ov 7r/309 ^o^op KaToXXdrreaOai, Kal pel^w 77/309 iXdrfco, wairep 
 
 3. 4>i\oxpT]|J,aTOS Kal 4ii.\6ti|i.os] Cf. aiiiian SiOiSe/SXTjiU^cois. 
 
 82 C : these correspond to the oXiyapxiubs lo. e84\eis] Z. has i6e\-^creis. 
 
 and nfiOKpaTiKbs &vfip oi Repablic IX. 15. t^ ScSUvai apa Kttl B^ei] Schanz 
 
 5. 1] dvo|i.aJo|j,lvr] dvSpeCa] The phi- well compares 78 B rQ i>Jkv avvredhn re 
 
 losopher faces death with calmness and Kal avvBhif. 
 
 abstains from bodily indulgence; there- 24. oXXuv ijSovwv] Schanz brackets 
 
 fore he is courageous and temperate even SXXav, which, he says, is omitted in the 
 
 in the popular sense, although his courage citation of this passage by lamblichos. 
 
 and temperance arise from ■-- widely dif- I think however it is wanted, 
 
 ferent source to that of the vulgar, rois q6. irpis tipcTri'v] ' in respect to virtue ' :> 
 
 ovToj Stanei.fiii'ois, i. e. the character de- the preposition is not used in quite the 
 
 scribed in the preceding chapter, rots r^ same sense as in the words that follow. 
 
69] 
 
 4>AIAfiN. 
 
 69 
 
 vofiicTfiaTa, dkX fi eKeivo fiovov to v6/ii<Tfia 6p96v, avrl oS Set 
 B airavTa Tavra KaToWaTTecrOai, ^povrjcni^ Koi tovtov fiev trdvra 
 Kai fiera tovtov wvovfievd re kol iviTrpacrKOfji^eva toi ovti § koX 
 avopeia KaX cw^poavvr] icaX SoKaioavvrj koI ^vXKrj^hrjv dXrjd^'; dpeTrj 
 7} fiera ^povijaeco^, koi irpoaji.yvofJ'ivaiv Kal dTTojiyvo/iivcov koi S 
 rjSovcov Kal (f>6^a)v Kal tcov aXktov TrdvTCOV toov toiovtwv' %(»jOf- 
 ^ojjLeva Se ^povijcreai'; dWaTTOfieva oi'tI dWijXaiii ^rj (XKiaypa- 
 ^ia Tt? y rj TOiavTr] dpeTrj Kal toi ovti avSpairoScoBrj^ re Kal 
 
 2. Kal ToiJTOu |i^v] 'and that all 
 that is bought for this and with this — 
 that and that alone is in reality, whether 
 it be fortitude or temperance or justice ; 
 and in a. word that true virtue only 
 exists when accompanied by wisdom'- 
 I Cope, /aercl TovTov= ' along with this ' : 
 it is the presence of (pp6vTi<ns which gives 
 all virtue its value. If we press the 
 metaphor too hard, it breaks down ; for 
 money is of value only for the sake of 
 what it can buy. Plato however merely 
 means that (j>p6vri(Tis is the only true cur- 
 rency; all else is base coin. 
 
 4. aXi]6i]S dp€Tii J] I have followed 
 Schanz, after Heindorf, in adding y after 
 apcTTi, although it is not in B, and is not 
 absolutely required. But the ri of CD is 
 in favour of it, and it certainly improves 
 the sentence. St. omits it. 
 
 5. [iCTa ijjpoviicreusl The true nature 
 of the philosophic dperri can only be 
 understood by studying the latter part of 
 the sixth book of the Repablic. ^povqaii 
 is cognition of the truth, that is, of the 
 ouTo ayaSov. Plato found his escape from 
 utilitarianism by identifying the source 
 of morality with the source of- existence ; 
 his ethics are the outcome of his ontology. 
 All things are good in so far as they are 
 like the idea of the good ; therefore to 
 him that would be really good knowledge 
 of the idea is indispensable. With the 
 conception of dvSpeta in this passage 
 compare the definition in ReptMk 442 B 
 KoX dvSpeiov Sri, otpui., Toirip t$ p,^peL 
 KaXoOfiev iVa 'iKaffrov, orav aurou fb dvfxoei- 
 5h Siaixili^ri Sia re Xuttu)' Kal tiSov&v rb iirb 
 
 ToO \6yov irapayyeXBh deivbv Kal pe^. 
 
 7. (rKi.tt7ptti{>£a] ' a rough sketch '. 
 dKiaypaipla was a kind of painting meant 
 to produce its effect at a distance and not 
 to be inspected close at hand : see 772^- 
 aeietus 208 E ^TreiSij ^77115 uiffirep CKiaypa- 
 tfyrjfiaTOS yiyova rod \eyoiUvov, ^wiTj/xt. 
 ov5^ ffp.iKpbv' ^us Sh d^effr^/CT; Trbppudei/ 
 kipalverb n pt,oi XiyeaSai.. Also Parmenides 
 165 C (^ov i<rKiaypa<j>Tjn4va dwoardvn ixhv 
 ^v irdvTa tpatv6fieva rairbv tpaiveadat 
 ireirovBivai. Kal Sfioia elcai. irdfv ye. irpoa- 
 eXBoi'Ti di ye iroWd Kal Irepa Kal rp toO 
 ir^pou ^avTaaixari erepoTa koX dv6p.oLa 
 iavTois. Compare ^4^aW2V 523 B. From 
 Aristotle rhetoric III xii 1414^ 8 it seems 
 to have been a sort of scene-painting, as 
 Mr Cope translates it: ii fikv ovv S-rifir]- 
 yopiK^ Xi^is Kdl iravTeXQs ^otKe ttj fXKia- 
 ypaiplf oaif yap dv ttXcIuiv 'q 6 o'xXos, 
 TTopparipw t] 6ia, Sib to, dKpL^TJ irepiepya 
 Kal x^^P'^ (palverai in ofjuporipois. Cf. 
 metafk. A xxix 1024'' 23 rot Sk &aa Icrl 
 /liv ovTa, iri(j>VKe pihroc ipalveirBai ij /it; old 
 iffTtv ^ a /iTj ianv, otov i] (TKiaypaipla Kal 
 Td iruirvM' raOra ydp icrl ixh Ti, d\X' 
 o\>x ">' ifJi.iroLei Trtf (pavraalav. The mean- 
 ing therefore is that on a superficial view 
 the popular virtue seems identical with 
 the philosophic, but on closer examina- 
 tion is found to fall far short of it. 
 
 8. dv8pairo8w8T]s]^ cf. RepuUic 430 B 
 Sofceis 11,01 TTjv opBiipi Shi,av irepl t&v air&v 
 Toiriav &vev iraiSelas yeyovviav rqv re Brj- 
 pic65ij zeal avSpairoSdiSr] offre irdvu vifu/iov 
 ^yetaBai SKKo t4 tl ^ dvSpelav KaXelv. 
 Olympiodoros says koXci Sk 6 liXaTw/ rds 
 IJkip (pvjiK&s dperds duSpaTroSiliSeis, lis Kal dp- 
 
70 
 
 HAATIINOS 
 
 [69 
 
 ovBev vyih ovB' dXrjde^ e'^t), to S' oKridef tw ovtl ■§ KaOapah ti<s C 
 TtSi* ToiovTCOv iravrcov, koX tj erwtjipoa-vvr) kol tj hifKaioaivrj kuI dvBpeia 
 Kol avrrj rj (fypovqai'i iir) Kadapfioi; ti<s y. koX KivSvvevovai Kol 
 01 Tai} TeXera? i^fiiv ovTot KaTaaTrjaavTe'i ov ^avKoi etvai, dWa 
 i Tw bvri TrdXai alvirTeaOai art 09 av dfivrjTo<i Kal dre\6aro<; el<i 
 "AiBov dipiKrjTai, iv ^op^opm Keiaerai, 6 Be Kexadapfievo^ re Kal 
 TeTeke(Tfievo<! ixeiae dcjuKOfievoi; p,eTa dewv olicrjaei. elalv ydp Bij, 
 to? (fiaalv 01 irepl rd^ Te\eTd<;, vapOrjKO^opoi p,ev iroWoi, ^dK')^oi 
 Si re iravpoV oStoi, S" elcylv Kara Trjv ifirjv So^av ovk dXKoi rj oi D 
 
 10 ire^iXoao^KOTev 6p6w^. wv Bij Kal eya Kara ye to Swarov ovhev 
 airekiirov iv rm ^i(p, dXKa iravrl Tpoiro) irpovdvp.'rjdTjv lyeveadai' el 
 S' op6ca<s irpovOvfirjd'qv Kai Tt ■^vvcra/jLev, eKeicre iXdopre'} to cra^e? 
 el<rop,e0a, dv 6eo<i edeXrj, oXiyov varepov, (a? ifiol Soxei. ravT ovv 
 eyco, 6(j>ri, cS liifi/Mca re Kal Ke/Si;?, diroKoyovixai, «? elK6r(0<i vfid^ 
 
 15 Te airoKeiTTCov Kal tov<s evddSe BecriroTa'; ov ^aXeTrcS? <^epai ovh 
 dyavuKTOo, rjyoii p.evo'i xdKel ovSev ^ttov f\ ivffdBe Seffirorat^ re e 
 dyaQdh evTev^eadai koI ejaipoi'; [rots Se ttoXXoZ? diriiTTiav irape- 
 ^6t]" et ri ovv v/MV iridavc6T€p6<i elfii iv rfj diroXoyia fj toi^ 
 'AOrjvalcov ZiKaaraK, ev dv exoi'- 
 
 dpairSdois Bwafi^vas i/irapx^^Vj r^s 5^ ■fjOcK&.s 
 aKcaypatplas ' rb on yhp fiSvov '^xovffi,^ ffKih Sk 
 rb Sti. toO diOTi. The distinction between 
 ilffiKal and (pvci-KaX however is not made 
 in the present passage. For a discussion 
 of this whole subject of popular virtue see 
 appendix I. 
 
 1 . ovSiv 1i71.es] After this some mss. 
 insert eXvai, which Schanz retains within 
 brackets. It is obviously wrong and 
 ought not to cumber the text. 
 
 TO 8' dXT]9^s] ' but the reality is actu- 
 ally a process of purification from all 
 such things, and temperance and justice 
 and wisdom itself are a completed purifi- 
 cation '. Tuv Toioirwv, i. e. the worldly 
 considerations on which the dTj/ioriKii 
 d/jerr) is based. KaSa/xris is explained 
 above in 67 c; Ka$apixbs is a completed 
 KiSapais. to oKrjBis is opposed to crKia- 
 ypa^ia, 
 
 4. Tcls T«XeTOs] It seems probable, 
 as Stallbaum says, that the Orphic tra- 
 ditions are in Plato's mind, not the Eleu- 
 
 sinian mysteries. The line iroWol ixiv 
 vapBriKo^iopoi pdxxoi Si re Travpoi. is said 
 by Olympiodoros to be Orphic. Plato is 
 fond of borrowing terms of ritual, as in 
 Phaecirus 250 c. Laws 759 C, Timaeus 
 44 c. 
 
 6. Iv PopPopij)] cf. Republic 363 D 
 Tois Si ayoirlovs av Kal dSlKovs els wrj\6» 
 Ttva KaTopirTovaiv h "AtSou. 
 
 10. cSv] ' of whose number '. 
 
 12. ijvtlo-aiJiev] I have retained the 
 reading of the best mss., which also 
 seems to give the best sense : ' if I have 
 been right in my desire to join the com- 
 pany of philosophers, and if we (0! ire^i- 
 Xoffo^T/KOTes) have profited aught by our 
 philosophy '. In this way we avoid any 
 harshness in the change from singular to 
 plural. Schanz and Z. give ■qmrdpiriv. 
 
 17. [tois 81 iroXXots dirio-Ttav irap^- 
 X€i] Ast is undoubtedly right in bracket- 
 ing these words, which are utterly point- 
 less, and clearly interpolated from 70 A. 
 
 6g E — 70 c, c. xiv. All this were very 
 
7o] 
 
 <E>AIAr2N. 
 
 71 
 
 XIV. EtTTorTO? B^ Tov "tirnKpoLTovi TavTU virdKa^mv 6 KeySi;? 
 etfyrj' 11 "ZcoKparei;, to, /lev aXKa e/ioiye BoKel KaX(5<i Xiyeq-dai, to, 
 70 Se Trepl t^? ylrv^Vf iroWrjv d-rrKTriap irapiy^^ei roll dv6panroii, firj 
 i-rretBdy dirdWayy tov ad)p.aTO<i ovSafiov en fj, aW' eKelvrj ry 
 rjfiepa [Bi,a(f>9elprjTai re Koi aTToXXvijTat], fi av 6 avOpcoiro^ S 
 airodvyaKri, eiiOi'i dTraXKaTTO/ikvij tov adfiaTO? Kal eK^aivovaa 
 Qxrirep Trvevfia rj Kairvoi BiaaKeBaaOelaa o'l'^rirai SLairTOfiivt} 
 Kai ovBev en ovSafiov y. etrel, eXirep elt) nrov avrrj Ka6' avTrjv 
 (TvvrjBpoicrfiiv'q KaX dirrjWayfievrj tovtwv tSv KaK&v &v trv vvv 
 
 B oj) BirfkOe'i, iroXKyj av eXTris e'lr) Kal KaXrj, a ^(OKpaTe';, m<; 10 
 a\7}6fj icrnv a av \kyei^' dXKa tovto Brj iVw? ovk oKiyrjii 
 TrapafwOia'} Belrai Kal Trto-rea)?, oj? ecrTi re y '^vj(ij diro- 
 6av6vTo<; rod dvOpwirov Kai Tiva Bvvafitv e'^ei Kal <j)p6vr)<nv. 
 'AXiy5^, e^r], Xe^ei?, 6 '2,a)KpdTrj<;, w Ke/Siy?* dWd tI By irom- 
 fiev ; y irepl avTwv tovtcov ^ovXei Biafiv6o\oyoofiev, e'lTe et/co? 15 
 ovrci)<i e'^eiv eire /ly ; "£701)76 ovp, e<j)r] 6 Ke/Siy?, yBeta<; av ukov- 
 a-aifxi,, rjvTiva Bo^av e^ets irepl avrcSv. Ovkovv y' dv olfiai, y B 
 
 C OS o %(OKpdTri^, ehrelv Tiva vvv aKovcravTa, ovK el KcofiqsSioTroio'} 
 
 ■well, replies Kebes, if we were sure that 
 death did no more than release the soul 
 from her bodily prison. But how do we 
 know that on quitting the body she does 
 not vanish away like a breath ? we need 
 some strong assurance that the soul has a 
 conscious and intelligent existence after 
 death. True, says Sokrates, and no more 
 fitting subject of discourse could be found 
 for one so near to death as I am. 
 
 Thus we distinctly see that the question 
 of the immortality of the soul turns up, 
 not as the main subject of the dialogue, 
 but as arising out of the principal thesis. 
 
 3. (ii) lireiSdv] Various devices have 
 been resorted to by several editors to 
 avoid the intolerably harsh asyndeton in 
 this sentence. The mildest remedy is 
 that of Heindorf, who puts a comma after 
 TOV (TiiiiaTos, thus joining ciTroXXaTTOyit^c); 
 with the previous clause. But it seems 
 to me that we cannot divorce aTraWoTTo- 
 fihri and iK^alvovaa. Schanz brackets 
 otxijTai...oiSaiioO y, the last words closely 
 resembling oiSa/jioS ft-i 5 just above and 
 
 being repeated verbatim at 84 E. But 
 this subsequent repetition seems really in 
 their favour, where Sokrates is expressly 
 referring to the apprehension which is 
 uttered here and which then seems to 
 have been lulled to rest. Moreover if 
 these words are omitted the rhythm of 
 the sentence halts lamentably. I agree 
 with Hirschig in suspecting Sia05efpi)ra£ 
 Te Kal diroWvriTai to be the intruders : 
 the words are superfluous and suspici- 
 ously like a gloss. 
 
 12. irapa)iv6Ca$] 'reassurance'. Cf. 
 115 D raOra /mi, Soku aurijj aXKus \4yeiv, 
 trapa/jivSoviievos a^a iih vyiios o/ia S' ifiav- 
 Tov. And see Euthydemus 290 A, Laws 
 720 A, 773 E. 
 
 us So-Ti Tc r\ ^J/uxij] Note that there 
 are two distinct propositions to be 
 proved, (i) that the soul exists in Hades, 
 (2) that she has faculties and intelligence. 
 
 18. K(i)|MaSioiroi6s] Notwithstanding 
 the friendly treatment of Aristophanes in 
 the Symposium we see in Apology 18 B 
 foil, how deeply Plato resented the attacks 
 
72 
 
 nAATHNOS 
 
 [70 
 
 eirj, W9 a8o\eo"^(3 Kol ov TrepX irpoarjKOVTav toi)? "Xor^ovi Troiov/iai. 
 el ovv SoKei, 'xprj BiaaKOTreiaffai. 
 
 XV. tKe-fwtieOa Be airo ryZe irri, eir apa iv"AtSov elcrlp 
 at ijrvx^al TeXevTrjcravTcov rwv dvOpanrwv etVe Kai ov. irdXaio^ fiev 
 5 ovv ecTTi Tt? X6709, ov fiefji,v>]/ieda, w? ela-lv evOivSe a^ncopbevat sKet, 
 Kol iroKiv lye Zevpo d<f>iKvovvTai, kol ylyvovrai, i/c twv redvecnTcov' 
 Kal el TovS" owTft)? e')(ei, iraXiv r^l/yveadai, i/c tSv dTroOavovrccv 
 TOi)s ^oovra^, aXXo to rj elev av al ■\^V)(aX t^/mcov eKel ; ov jap av D 
 irov iraKiv ejiyvovTO jxr) ovcrai, Koi tovto Ikuvov reKfirjpiov tov 
 
 made by the comedians upon Sokrates : 
 cf. especially the reference to the Clouds 
 in 19 c. 
 
 1. dSoXecrxw] Eupolis, quoted by 
 Olympiodoros, calls Sokrates tov tttuxov 
 dSoKia-xVi and no doubt it was a favour- 
 iLe epithet with the comic poets. Plato 
 has adopted the word, apparently in sheer 
 defiance; and wherever dSoXeo'Xf''') a- 
 SoKiaxti) ddo\e<rxla occur in the dia- 
 logues, we may be sure the term is applied 
 to the genuine philosopher. A very 
 notable instance is Sophist 22S D, where 
 in seeking the sophist we stumble upon 
 somebody very like Sokrates : compare 
 too Theadetus 195 B, c, Phaedrus 269 E 
 (where see Dr Thompson's admirable 
 note), Cratylus 401 B, Parmenides 135 D, 
 Republic 488 E, Politicus 299 B. The 
 strict meaning of the word is fairly given 
 in oi jrepl irpoarjicdyTai' Tois 'Soyovs irocoO- 
 p.ai. 
 
 70 c — 72 D, cc. XV — xvii. Tradition 
 says that the souls of the dead come back 
 from Hades and live again on earth. 
 That this belief is reasonable we may 
 argue in the following way. All nature 
 shows the generation of opposite from 
 opposite ; thus greater arises from less, 
 worse from better, swifter from slower. 
 And between each of such pairs of op- 
 posites there are two processes, one in 
 either direction ; as between greater and 
 less are increase and decrease, and simi- 
 lar processes between every other pair. 
 Therefore since life and death are such a 
 pair of opposites, we shall expect to find 
 
 two similar processes between the living 
 and the dead. We see one such process 
 take place before our eyes ; the living 
 pass over to the dead : if then nature's 
 work is not here left incomplete, there 
 must be the other process that we do not 
 see, and the dead pass over to the living. 
 A yet stronger confirmation is this : did 
 all things travel in one direction and 
 were there no return, in the end all living 
 things would die and remain dead, and 
 life would be swallowed up in death. 
 But if it be true that souls return again 
 from the dead, they must be somewhere 
 after their departure from the body; for 
 certainly if they perished utterly, they 
 could return ag^n no more. 
 
 We have here one half of the first 
 stage of the argument, which is comple- 
 mented by the inference from remini- 
 scence that follows. It is true, this argu- 
 ment of avTairbSoais implies the ante- 
 natal existence of the soul, but it is 
 used mainly as evidence of her existence 
 after death. Note also that it proves ws 
 tsTiv ^i^uxr) iv "Ai5oi», not «s Biva/jtiv Kal 
 (ppivr](riv ^X"- 
 
 4. nroXaiis f-hi ovv i<m tis Xoyos] 
 Heroylotus II 123 states that the Egyptians 
 believed in the immortality and trans- 
 ration of the soul, and adds : roirif 
 tQ Xivy ehl oj "EXXiJ^'wc ixf^iravTO, oJ /iiu 
 irphT^pov ol 8k vo'repov, ws ISitfj iuvTuy 
 iSyTi' Twp ^yC) €l5(j}S rd. oOvd/xara oi5 yp6,(j>(a. 
 He doubtless refers, as Grote says, to the 
 Orphic and Pythagorean sects ; to whom 
 may be added Empedokles. 
 
70] 
 
 «l>AIAflN. 
 
 73 
 
 TavT elvai, el tc3 6vti, ^avepop jiyvoiTO oti, ovSa/j,66ev aX\o0ev 
 ryi.jvovTai ol ^fSyTe? ^ eK rmv reOvecoTayv' el Be fu.T) eari tovto, 
 aWov av Tov Bioi X070U. Haw fj^ev oiv, e<^r) 6 KeySij?. Mj) 
 Toivvv kut' dvdpcoTrwv, rj S" 0?, a-Koirei fiovov tovto, el fiovXet paov 
 fiadeiv, dWd Kot Kwrh ^acov irdvTccv Kol <f)VTWv, koX ^vWij^Brjv 5 
 oaairep e^ei ^yevecnv, irepX ird.vTcav 'ISca/iev, dp" ovTcoal jliyverai, 
 E iravTa, ovk dWodev rj eK twv evavTiav ra evavTia, 'oaoi<; Tvyxaveb 
 bv TOiovTov Ti, olov TO KoXov tS alcT'^^pS ivavTiov irov koI Sixaiov 
 aSiKW, Kal dWa 877 fivpla oi^Tffls ^X^'" tovto ovv aKe'y^cofieda, dpa 
 avw^Koiov, b(70ts ecrTU tl evavTiov, p,r]Bap,66ev aXXodev avTo 7171/6- 10 
 aOai, rj eK tov avrm ivavTiov. olov OTav /lel^ov rt jljvrjTai,, dvdyKr) 
 
 5. dXXd Kal Kard, t<^<i>v irdvTuv Kal 
 ^vrav] It is true, as Olympiodoros re- 
 marks, that we cannot from this particu- 
 lar sentence infer rbv HXATOva iraa-av 
 i/vxh" dBavari^eLV. But since Olymp. 
 implies that Plato did not hold all soul 
 to be immortal, it may be as well to point 
 out that he did ; cf. Phaedrus 245 c. 
 Moreover a glance at any passage treating 
 of metempsychosis (e. g. Phaedrus i\i) b) 
 will show us that Plato was not so irra- 
 tional as to deny immortality to the souls 
 of beasts, while conceding it to those of 
 men ; and Timaeus 11 P^ foil, proves that 
 he was not so unscientific as to draw a 
 hard and fast line between animal and 
 vegetable life. 
 
 In the present passage Plato appeals 
 to the uniformity of nature. If the 
 presence of a given condition in any of 
 the yiyy6iJi.eva is the result of a y^vea^is, 
 it must be a yiveais from the opposite 
 condition, where such an opposite exists : 
 if a thing has become cold it must have 
 been warm and so forth. We observe 
 moreover that in all instances there exist 
 yev^ffets in both directions, whence we 
 infer that alternation is a law of nature. 
 And since we see that this law is in force 
 in all cases which fall under our ex- 
 perience, it is fair to assume that it is in 
 force in all cases where our experience 
 fails us. Accordingly when between a 
 pair of opposites we observe one yhecii 
 
 occurring, while the other yiueats is from 
 the nature of things beyond our observa- 
 tion, we may infer that the latter also 
 occurs though we cannot perceive it. 
 
 II. ToO oirm ivavriov] I see no 
 necessity to read avrQ with Z. from 
 Baiter's conjecture. 
 
 |j.etJov] The use of the comparative 
 throughout denotes that the condition 
 is the result of a yimcris. We shall pre- 
 sently see the application of this. The 
 positive, in such terms as fiiya — (TjUKpov, 
 Taxi — Ppadi, though these all express 
 relations, implies no self-regarding rela- 
 tion. We must therefore use the com- 
 parative to denote a relation between 
 two successive conditions of the same 
 object. But any positive which neces- 
 sarily implied a relation of one and the 
 same object to itself in another condition 
 would answer just the same purpose as 
 the comparative. Such a positive we 
 actually find in the word reSvriicos, which 
 logically implies fi3v as a previous con- 
 dition of the object. Therefore whatever 
 generalisation we establish between fiet^ov 
 — ¥\aTTov, BaTTov — PpaSvrepov &c., holds 
 good also of f5y and reBv-qKos. And 
 since we affirm that between every pair 
 of these comparatives two yeviaeis take 
 place, therefore between ^wv and reBvriKos, 
 besides the yiveais that we see, viz. 
 awoBvTiaKuv, there must be another yhe- 
 (Tis that w.e do not see, viz. avapuliaKea-Bai ; 
 
74 HAATUNOS [;r 
 
 irov i^ iXdrrovo'} ovtov irporepov eireira fiei^oy yljveaffai ; Na/. 
 OvKovv Kav eXarrov '•/Ir^vrfrai, eK fiei^ovo'i ovro<s irporepov va-repov 71 
 e\aTTOv lyevija-erai ; "E.o'tiv oirw, e<f)r). Kat firjv ef la-'xypor^pov 
 t6 daOevea-repov Koi e/e ^paZvripov t6 darrov; Tldvv ye. Tl 
 5 Be; av ri ')(elpov yi'yv7}Tai, ovk e^ dfjuelvovo^, koi dv BiKaiorepov, 
 ef dhiKunepov; IltS? yap ov ; 'I/cai'ta? ovv, e<j)r], e^ofiev tovto, on 
 •Travra o'vtco jiyverai, ef evavrimv rd evavria irpdyp^ara ; Xlaj/u ye. 
 Tt S' av; ea-Tt, tl koi roiovSe ev avrol<;, olov fiera^i) dfi^orepav 
 nravTcov twv evavriaiv Bvoip ovtoiv Svo yeveaei<;, dirb fiep tov 
 
 10 erepov eiri to erepov, dirb 8' av tov eripov irdXiv eVt to erepoV B 
 fiei^ovo^ p,ev irpdr^pLaTOts Kol i\dTTovo<; fiera^i) av^i^crii Kal (f>0ia'i,^, 
 Kol KuXovfiev o'^Tco Td fiev av^dveaOai, to Se (f)Otveiv ; Nat, e(j)ri. 
 OvKovp Kal BiaKplvecrOai Kal avyKpivea-dai, Kal ■\jrv'^ea-dai Kal 
 Oepp^alveadai, Kal irdvTa ovtw, kov el p/rj '^pwp,€0a rots ovofiaaiv 
 
 IS iviaj(pv, aX\' ipyv yovv iravTaj^pv ovt(o<; e')(ei,v dvayKolov, yiyve- 
 aOai re avTa i^ dW'jXav yeveaiv re elvai i^ eKaTepov el<s aXKrjXa ; 
 ILavv p,ev ovv, rj b 09. 
 
 XVI. Tt o^v ; e<j>r}, rm ^rjv ecm n ivavrlov, Sawep tm eyprj- c 
 yopivai to KaOevBsiv ; Yldvv p,ev ovv, e<f)r]. Tt; To reQvdvai, e^. 
 
 20 OvKovv i^ dXXijXcov re yiyveTai Tavra, eiirep evavTia eariv, KciX 
 al yeveaeii etViv avTolv p,eTa^v Bvo Bvoiv ovtoiv ; Ilto? yap oil ; 
 Trjv fiev Toivvv erepav av^vyiav cov vvv Br] eXeyov iym aoi, ednj, 
 epw, 6 %(OKpdTr}<;, Kal avTrjv Kal ra? yeveaeK' ai) Be p,oi ttjv erepav. 
 Xeyco Be to fiev KadevBeiv, rd Be iyprjyopevai, Kal eK rov KadevBeiv 
 
 25 TO iyprjyopevat ylr/vea-dai Kal eK rov iypijyopevai to KadevBeiv, Kal D 
 Ta? yeveaeK avroiv rrjv fiev KaraBapOdveiv elvat, rrjv S' dveyel- 
 pecrdai. iKavw<; <roi, e<j)r], rj ov; Haw fiev ovv. Aeye Brj fioi Kal 
 (TV, ejir}, oiru) irepl ^0^9 Kal Bavdrov. ovk ivavrlov fiev ^j?? tm 
 ^rjv TO reOvdvai elvai ; "EyMye, Tiyvea-ffai Be e'f dXXijXmv ; Nat. 
 
 30 'E^ ovv rov ^wvTO'} tI to yiyvofievov ; To reOvrfKo^, ecfyrj. Tt Be, 
 
 if we are to suppose that the operation stationary on one side or the other, 
 of nature is uniform. The comparatives 16. 4J eKar^pov] Schanz brackets these 
 
 in fact show under what circumstances words: they are not indeed necessary 
 
 yei>4aei,s talce place, i.e. between opposite but the pleonasm seems to me Platonic, 
 
 conditions of the same thing. and their omission seriously impairs the 
 
 14. K&v A (Ml] i.e. the processes exist, rhythm, 
 even in those cases where we have no 22. iyii o-oi, ¥<j)i], cpu] Sokrates pur- 
 names to describe them. The argument sues the same plan in 105 B foil. Kal /tij 
 is that were there no alternation of pro- /loi 6 &v ipiariS airoKpLvav, aWh ni/wi/icvos 
 cesses we should have all things at last i/ii. 
 
72] 
 
 ^AIADN. 
 
 75 
 
 r) 8' 09, 6K Tov TedvewTOf, 'AvajKalov, ecjir), o/jioXoyeiv on rb ^(Su. 
 'E/c Twv TedvewTcov dpa, m Ke/Sij?, ra ^mvTa re koI ol ^wvTe<} 
 
 I'^lr^vovrai; ^aiverai, e^trj- EiVtz/ dpa, e4>rj, al ■fvxcd VJ^^v iu 
 Aioov. "EioiKev. OvKovu Kal rolv ryevecreoiv rotv TrepX ravra rj 
 7 erepa <Ta^rj<; ovaa Tvyxavei, ; to lydp airoOvrjcrKeiv cratpei; B)]7rov, 5 
 57 ov ; Tlavv fiev ovv, e<f)r]. IIcS? ovv, rj 8' 0?, TTOitjcro/jLev ; ovk 
 avTairohaxTOfiev rrjv ivavrlav yivea-iv, aXXci Tavry %ft)X9) earai 
 T] if>vcn<; ; ^ dvdjKT) aTroSovvai rm dirodvri<TKeiv evavTuav rivd 
 jevea-iv; UdvTco'; irov, e<f)r). Tiva TavTTjv; To dvaj3i,a>a-Kea-0at. 
 Ovicovv, r) S' b?, eiirep ecrri to dva^maKecrOai, e« t&v TeOvecorav 10 
 
 2 dv eiTj yevecn.<; eh Toii'i faSi/Ta? avrr), to dva^iwcTKea-Oai ; lldvv <ye. 
 Op.oXoyeirai dpa rjjjiiv KaX ravTij tov'; ^rnvTW} Ik r&v reOvewTcov 
 yeyovevai ovBev tjttov rj toi)? TedvewTw; ek twv ^covrmv' tovtov 
 Se ovTOS iKavov irov iBoicei reKfirjpiov elvat oti, dvajKaiov Ta? tcov 
 reOveoormv '\frv'X,d'} etvai irov, odev Bfj irdXiv jiyvea-Oai. AoKel 15 
 fjioi, e(f>r), (0 Sffl«joaT6?, e« twv (e/j,oXoyi]fiev<av dvayKalov o5^t6j? 
 ex^iv. 
 
 XVII. 'ISe Toivvv oJJtw?, e^i?, to K.e^rj% on Otis' dBUaii 
 (OfioXojrjKa/iep, eu? ifiol SokeX. el yap firj del avTairoBiBolr] rd 
 
 2. iK Tc3v TeOveMTBv] It is necessary 
 to remember the exact sense of the two 
 opposites, according to the definition 
 given in 64 c Kal eXpM toSto t6 TeSvdvai, 
 X<^pls fji^p aTb TTJs ^vxvs ciiraWay^v auro 
 KaB' airro to o-fi/ia yeyovivai., x^/jIs Sk rijv 
 ip^Xh^ "^""O T'ou ff(i/Aaros airaKXayetffav 
 avTTjv Kadl^ avTTjv eTvat. ^wy then is ap- 
 plied to (soul and body united, tcBviikos 
 to soul and body asunder. ' A very similar 
 use of the word j^av is to be found in 
 Soph. Oed. Col. 999, ols i-^ia oihi t^v 
 irarpos \ ^vxv" ^Iv oTfuu ^Cxjav avrenreiv 
 i/iot. The soul of Laios is certainly not 
 regarded as extinct, therefore ^S<rav can 
 only mean 'if it returned to bodily 
 life'. 
 
 12. Kol TailTfl] i.e. by demonstration 
 as well as by tradition ; cf. 70 c. 
 
 14. ISoKci] 70 T>. 
 
 18. ISi ToCvvv ofirus] In this chapter 
 we have a statement of the fundamental 
 principle on which not only the foregoing 
 argument but all Plato's reasoning in 
 
 favour of immortality is based ; viz. that 
 the sum total of spirit is a constant 
 quantity. Plato has seized upon this 
 principle of 'conservation of energy' as 
 the only rational method of defending the 
 indestructibility of soul : he has applied 
 to spirit the axiom which previous philo- 
 sophers laid down for matter ; as Anaxa- 
 goras expresses it, yiviacKeiv xpv "" irAvra 
 ovdiv iXdffffd) lanv oiSi ttX^W ou y&p 
 dvvffrov Tovroiv ttX^w eXvaL, ciWi^ Troi^Ta 
 lira aUl. Similarly the rvKvoiais Kal 
 apataaii of Anaximenes, the 65ds Scu Kal 
 Kara of Herakleitos, the aiyKpiais Kal 
 5iaKpi.(Tis of Empedokles, all implied that 
 yiveffis was not creation out of nothing 
 but a passing from one form into another. 
 Cf. Aristotle metaph. K vi 1062'' 23 to 
 yhp ii,i\6iv iK p.T) Svtos ylyveaBai irav 5' 
 i^ BvTos, (Tx^Sov iravTUv karl koivov Boyfut 
 tQv irepl <pi<reiiis. 
 
 19. (I 7dp \i,T\ d«£] 'for if there were 
 not a perpetual correspondence between 
 the two in generation, just as if they re- 
 
76 HAATflNOS [72 
 
 erepa rot? eTepot<; ytyvofieva dxnrepeX kvkKui TrepuSvra, aXV evOela B 
 Ti? etr] rj ryiveaii; e'/c tov irepov fiovov el<s to KaravTiKpv koX fJ,rj 
 avaKafiTTTOi, ttoKlv eVt to erepov firjBe icafnrrjv ttoioito, oicrd on 
 iravTa TeKevr&VTa ro avTO (7)(rjfia av o")(pirj koX to avTO iraoof 
 5 av m-aOoi kol iravaaLro '^u^vofieva ; lid)? Xi'^e.i'i ; e^J/. Ovhhi 
 'XoKetrov, y S' o?, ivvotjcrai o Xeyai' aW' oloj' et to KaraSapdavecv 
 fiev etrj, to S' dveyeipeadai jxtj dvTairohtZoir) yiyvofievov i/c tov 
 KadevZovTO<;, olcrd' on rekevTwvra iravr <av> Xrjpov tov El's!;- C 
 fiiava aTToSei^eiev koX ov8a/iov av (fiaivotTO, Sid to kui TaXXa 
 
 10 TrdvTa TavTov eKeivai -irewovOevai,, [/ca^eiiSetv]. Kav el crvy/cpLvOiTO 
 fiev TrdvTa, SiaKpivoiTO Be fji-q, Ta^i) dv to tov 'Ava^ayopov yeyov6<; 
 e'er), ofiov irdvra j^^ptj/j^TU. cocravTQ}<; Si, c3 <f)l\e Ke^Si;?, el airo- 
 OvrjaKot fjuev irdvTa, oaa tov ^rjv (lerakd^oi, eTreiSrj Se diroOdvoi, 
 fievoi iv Tovra Tm o-xTj/iaTi Ta TedvewTa Kal firj -iraXiv ava^ico- 
 
 15 aKoiTO, dp' ov •TroXKrj dvdy/cr) TeXevTwvTa irdvTa TeOvdvai kol 
 firjSev ^rjv ; el yap etc fiev tSv dWcov Ta ^wvTa ylyvoLTO, Ta Se D 
 ^oSvTci, OvrjCTKOi, TL's pL7]')^avfj p,rj ov Trdvja KaTavaXcodr/vai, el<; to 
 TeOvdvai,; OvSe fita /j,oi, SoKel, e^i] 6 KeySi;?, w XcoKpaTe<i, dXka 
 [lot SoKel<; iravTairaa-iv dXrjOfj Xeyeiv. "Ecttiv yap, 6^97, o) KeyS?;?, 
 
 20 CO? ifiol SoKel, •jravTot; /j,dXXov oiiTco, Kal rjfiel'i avTa TavTa ovk 
 e^aTraTuip^evou ofioXoyovfiev, dXX' ecrTt rS ovTt, Kal to dva^tcoaxe- 
 
 volved in a circle '. Cope. avraTroSidotri gloss, and it was condemned by Dobree : 
 
 is here intransitive, as in Aristotle meteor. the editors however retain it. 
 xi 347*" 32 us S' ^K" X"'^"f<'i ii'TaCBa 12. 6(jiov irdvro xpilK-iTa] The 6/iOio- 
 
 ovK avTairoSlbuMTi to S/ioiov. Cf. below ixepij of Anaxagoras, infinite in number 
 
 72 B. and infinitely divisible, were mixed in 
 
 1. evfleia tis] This of course im- formless confusion until voOs i\duy avra 
 
 plies that the straight line is finite, i.e. dieKoiriiTia-ev. 
 
 there is not an indefinite quantity of soul 16. ck |i.^v tuv oXXwv] i.e. iic rap foj 
 
 in existence, nor can fresh souls be created reBveiliTOip, as Heindorf saw. If ra ^ayra 
 
 out of nothing. Plato has taken his were derived from a, reserve store of 
 
 metaphor from the dlavXos Sp'o/ios. existence which had not passed through 
 
 4. TO ourd o^'ilia] compare P/iae- life and death, in time this store would 
 
 drus 245 D ^ vavra re ovpavov iraakv re be exhausted and all be absorbed in 
 
 yivetriv aviiireaovaav crr-^vai Kal yti^TroTe death. The converse is stated in Repiblic 
 
 auffis ^X^'" '^^^'' Ki,vr]Oivra yevri<reTai. 611 A toCto li^v rolvvv, ^v 5' iyiii, oilrws 
 
 8. iravr' av] I have followed Schanz ix^ra. el S' ?xei, ivvoeis oVt [oi tj/vxc-i] 
 
 and others in supplying &v. diroSd^eiev dei &v eUv a! aural. oUre y&p &v iXirrovs 
 
 could hardly stand without it, since the yivoi-VTo /ii)8e/*ias 6,ToKKv/j.iviis oiSre av 
 
 subject of <j>alvoiTO is different. Z. omits irXelovr el yap otiovv tuv iSaydrari Tr\iov 
 
 it. yiyvoiTQ, dtffd^ 6ti. ix tqu Ovtjtou yiyvotro 
 
 10. [KaBeiiSsiv] This seems to be a Kal ir&vTa Av etri TeKevTuvra addvara. 
 
72] 
 
 <E>AIAnN. 
 
 n 
 
 a-Qat, KaX ex rmv reQvewTcav toi)<} fcovra? lyiyvecrOai, Kal ra? twv 
 TedpecoTcov ■yp-V')(ai elvai. 
 
 XVIII. 'Kal jjurjv, ecfiT] 6 Ke/S?;? viroka^aiv, kol Kar i/ceivov 
 ye TOP \6jov, w SoJKjOaTe?, el dXr}9)^<; icrriv, ov eri) e'lwda^ Oafia 
 Xeyeiv, on rjfiiv rj fiddr]a-i<; ovk aXKo rt rj dvafipriaa Tvyx^dvei 5 
 ovaa, Kai Kara tovtov avayict] irov Tafia's ev irpoTepm nvl yj>ova 
 
 I. rds TWV Te9v£(oT0)v <|fux"^* tTvoi] 
 
 After these words the mss. have koX tois 
 jitv y (or ii.kv) &yaBaU &iJ.eivov dvai tois Sk 
 KaKois K&Kiov, The inconsequence of this 
 stupid interpolation is so glaring that I 
 have ejected the clause bodily from the 
 text : its author, whose memory is sounder 
 than his logic, was doubtless prompted 
 by 63 C iroki &iJ£ivov rots &yaBots r\ tois 
 KOKois. The words are retained by Her- 
 mann and the Ziirich editors, bracketed 
 by Stallbaum and Schanz. 
 
 72 E — 76 D, cc. xviii — xxi. KgSes 
 observes that another line of argument 
 tends to show that our souls are im- 
 mortal, the theory that learning is remi- 
 niscence. If questions are properly put, 
 the right answers are elicited, showing 
 that the knowledge sought exists in the 
 mind of the respondent ; as we see in the 
 case of geometrical truths. For the 
 satisfaction of Simmias Sokrates adds the 
 following demonstration. Reminiscence 
 we define as recalling to mind something 
 we formerly knew but had forgotten. 
 For instance, a lover on seeing a lyre 
 thinks of his beloved who used the lyre ; 
 similarly a picture of a lyre or a horse 
 may remind us of a man, a picture of 
 Simmias may remind us of Kebes, or 
 finally a picture of Simmias may remind 
 us of Simmias himself: so that we see 
 reminiscence may be effected either 
 directly or indirectly. Now if it is effected 
 directly, that is, if the object we perceive 
 is similar to that which it calls to our 
 minds, we cannot fail to notice how far 
 the resemblance is exact. For example : 
 we affirm that there is an idea of equality, 
 which is called to our minds by our per- 
 ception of sensibles which are equal. That 
 this idea is something distinct from the 
 
 equal sensibles is clear ; for the sensibles 
 may appear equal to one observer, un- 
 equal to another ; but about the idea of 
 equality no difference of opinion can 
 exist. Now we are to observe that all 
 sensible equals appear to us as falling 
 short of the standard of absolute equality, 
 which plainly shows that our knowledge 
 of absolute equality is prior to our per- 
 ception of the sensibles. And whereas 
 (i) this sense of deficiency in the sensibles 
 has been present so long as we have had 
 any perceptions of them, (n) our percep- 
 tions of them date from the moment of 
 our birth, it inevitably follows that our 
 knowledge of the idea must have been 
 acquired before ouj birth (75 c). Now 
 this of course applies to all ideas as well 
 as to that of equality. Since then we 
 have obtained this knowledge, two alter- 
 natives are open : either we are bom. in 
 full possession of it and retain it through 
 life, or we lose it at birth and gradually 
 regain it. The first must be dismissed 
 on this ground : if a man knows a thing 
 he can give an account of it, but we see 
 that men cannot give an account of the 
 ideas : it follows then that the second 
 alternative is true ; we lose it, and all 
 learning is but the recovery of it. And 
 si nce our souls certainly did not acquire 
 this^ knowledge, during Jheir human life 
 they mustjiave gained it before our birtll_ 
 and at birth lost it. 
 
 The argument from av6,iiv't]<ns proves 
 the existence of the soul before birth ; 
 thus supplementing avTaTrbSaris which is 
 chiefly used to show her existence after 
 death. Moreover dydfirr]<ns shows, what 
 dvTaTr6Sotri.s did not, that the soul Siva/iLV 
 KoX (ppovr](ri.v Ix^i apart from the body. 
 
 4. ov o-i elii)9as] This must not be 
 
7S HAATONOS [73 
 
 fiefiadrj/cevai a vvv dva/jbifivrjcrKO/ieda' rovro Se dSvvaTov, el firj 
 rjv "TTov rj^iv ■q "^v^V """plv iv rmSe r& dvOpcoTrivm el'Set i^evkaOai. 73 
 wcrre Koi ravTy dOdvaTov i; '^v)(r] ti eoiKev elvai, 'AWa, w 
 Ke/Si;?, '4^ 6 Xififjiia'; virdXa^cov, iroiai rovT(ov ai dirohei^ei<s ; 
 6 VTTOfiVTja-ov fie' ov lydp a^oBpa iv r& irapSvrt fiefivrjfiai. 'Evl 
 fiev Xoym, e<j)r} 6 KeyS?;?, KaWla-ro), 'Srt ipcorcofievoi oi dvdpeo-jroi, 
 edv Tt? KaX&'i epmra, avToX Xiyoveriv irdvTa y ^X^^' *''^TOt el firj 
 ervy^^ai'ei' avTdi<s eviCTrifM) evovcra Koi 6p6o<; \6'^o';, ovk av oloi 
 r rjaav tovto Troirjcrai' iirei roi edv Tt? iirl rd Staypafi/jLara ar/rj b 
 
 10 T) dXXo ri Twv TOMVTwv, ivravda aa^eaTara Karrpjopel on tovto 
 ovTOXi ey(ei. Et Se firj TavTy ye, e<f)t], ireWei, S ^ifi/iia, 6 "^ayKpoLTrj^, 
 tTKe^jrai Srj TySe Try croi dv erKO'irovfievcp a-vvSo^jf. diTKTTei^ yap 
 Stj, TTcS? ^ KoKovfievT] fidOrjai^ dvd/ivr]<ri<; iaTiv ; 'Attjo-tw fj,ev aoi 
 eytoye, 57 S' o? o 2tytt/i/a?, ov, avTO Se tovto, e^rj, Beofiai iraOelv 
 
 IS irepl ov o Xdyos, dva/ivrjadrjvai,. Kal (T^eSov ye i^ &v K.i^r]'; 
 eirej^eipn^ae \eyeiv rjhr] /lifivrjfiai, Kal TreiOofiaf ovSev /MevTav ■^ttov 
 a/covoifii vvv. Try ai eTrexelprjO'a'; Xeyeiv. TyS' e^mye, 97 S' o?. C 
 ofioXoyovfiev yap Btjttov, e? rw ti dvafivrja-dijcreTat, Selv avTOV tovto 
 •jrpoTepov iroTe eTrlcrTaaOai. Udw y etpTj. 'Ap' ovv Kal ToSe 
 
 20 ofioXoyovfiev, OTav i'lna-TijfiT] "Trapaylr/vrjTac TpoTrco toiovto), dvd- 
 /MvrjcTiv eivai; "keyoa Se Tiva Tpoirov TovSe' edv Tt? ti [Trjoorepov] 
 
 regarded as true of the historic Sokra- H. Schmidt has much to say against 
 
 tes. Heindorf and for the vulgate ; but the 
 
 7. idv Tis KoXus Ipura] Olyrapio- cogency of his argument is not propor- 
 
 doros' explanation of koXSs deserves per- tionate to its length. Iweira is retained 
 
 petuation : dpB&s Kal IIXcituwkus Kal /iij by Z. St. and Schanz. 
 
 neptirantTtKus Kal /4^ pa/ioXoxm. Plato's rd 8ia7pa'|i|i.aTa] mathematical dia- 
 
 views will be best understood by compar- grams. The interrogation of the slave 
 
 ing Theaetetus 149 A — 151 D with Republic in Me.no 82 B foil, is of course a case in 
 
 518 B — D. point. 
 
 9. TTOitjo-ai] I have followed Schanz 10. KorriYopel] Subject the same as 
 in adopting Hirschig's emendation. I ofa77;: it has been suggested that kotij- 
 cannot believe in such a construction as 70/16? is impersonal, but there is not a 
 oXol re Toi-Ziffeiv, and not a single instance shadow of authority for such a use. 
 has been adduced in its defence. The 14. iraBeiv] mss. ixaBelv, which is re- 
 fact that KivSvviidv sometimes is followed tained by Wohlrab and defended by 
 by the future infinitive is quite irrelevant. Schmidt. But iraBetv is so much more 
 Z. and St. have iroufiaeiv. pointed and the alteration is so slight, 
 
 liret Toi] So Heindorf for (weira. that I have followed Schanz and most of 
 
 This seems absolutely required by the the later editors in adopting it. 'I desire 
 
 sense : surely the geometrical demonstra- personal experience of the very thing we 
 
 tions are meant to furnish an instance of are talking about '. 
 
 what Kebes has just been saying, not an 21, edv t£s ti [irporepov] It is possi- 
 
 additional piece of evidence for avd/ivriffi!. ble to defend irporepov, since the percep- 
 
74] ^AIAON. 79 
 
 rj IBwv ^ oLKOvera'i ■^ rtva qXKtjv aiaQujaiv Xa^av /Jirj /lovov eicelvo 
 yvm, aXKd Kal erepov ivvoi]<ry, oS firj rj ainrj iTria-ryfirj a\X' aWrj, 
 Spa ov)(l TOVTO SiKalox; iXeyo/Mev '6ti dvefivpcrdt), ov rrjv evvoiav 
 eKafiev ; IltS? \ejei<s ; Otov ra roidSe' aWr] irov eTnariqfiT] dvdpm- 
 irov Kal Xvpa<;. IIw? ydp ov ; OvKoyv olaOa '6ri, oi epacrral, orav s 
 iS(oa-iv \vpav rj ifidriov rj aXKo rt ot? ra iraiBiKci avrwv e'icode 
 ■Xpfjffdai, irdajfovcTL tovto' eyvcocrdv re ttjv Xvpav Kal iv rrj 
 Siavoia eXa^ov to elBo<; rov TratSo?, ov riv r] Xvpa ; tovto Be icrTiv 
 dvdfivrja-i^' Sa-Trep Kal "Zip-fiiav ti<s IB(^p TroWaKt? Ke/3'»;T09 dve- 
 fivya-drj, Kal dXXa irov fivpia toluvt av eirj. Mvpia fievroi vrj Aia, lo 
 e(f)r] 6 XififJi'iai;. Ovkovv, rj B' '6<s, to toiovtov dvdfivrja-i'; Tt? eVrt ; 
 /JLaXiffTa fiivTOi, UTav ti<s tovto irddy irepl eKeiva a viro 'x^povov 
 Kal Tov firj iin<7Koireiv rjSrj iireXeXrja'To ; Haw p,ev ovv, e^v- 1"' 
 Be; ^ S' OS" ecTTiv "irirov yeypafi/j,evov ISovTa Kal Xvpav y&^payi,p,evr(v 
 dvQpaTTOV dvajJLvrja-Orjvai, Kal "^ififilav IBovTa yeypa/jufiivov K.e/3r]T0<; 15 
 dvafivrjcdrjvai ] lidvv ye. Ovkovv koI 'Siififiiav IBovTa yeypafi- 
 fiivov avTov %ififiiov dvafivga'drjvai ; "Eo-rt fievTOi,, e(f>r]. 
 
 XIX. 'Ap' ovv ov Kara irdvTa TavTa crv/M^aivei Trjv dvdfivrjo'iv 
 elvai fiev dj> ofioicov, elvai Be Kal diro dvo/ioiav ; %vp,^aivei. 'AXV 
 iTav ye diro tSv 6/ioicav dvafiifivy(rKrjTai T^i n, dp" ovk dva/yKotov 20 
 
 tion must precede the reminiscence. But descending scale : it is surely more re- 
 there is no point in this, and the word markable that the picture of a lyre should 
 seems to have crept in from irporepov remind us of some particular human being 
 irore itriaTaaOai above. than that a picture of Simmias should 
 
 2. dXXa Kol ?T«pov lwoi](rj|] This is remind us of the living Simmias. But 
 
 probably the earliest mention of virhat has the explanation is simple, if we remember 
 
 been known since Locke as ' association of how Plato intends to apply his analogy, 
 
 ideas'. Compare Aristotle irepl /iKjf/iijs The particulars, by which we are re- 
 
 KoX ivafiv^eui II 451'' 16, where he re- minded of the ideas, stand in much the 
 
 fines upon the simple classification of same relation to the ideas as the painted 
 
 Plato (o0' ofioltav ml avoiialav) by starting Simmias to the real Simmias : hence by 
 
 the sequence o0' o/*o(ou koX Ivavriov koX this arrangement of his examples Plato 
 
 TOV (riveyyvi : he deals too with the pro- emphasises exactly the right form of the 
 
 cess as an act of volition. analogy. This is one of ten thousand 
 
 13. iirA(h]<rTo] Compare the defini- proofs of the astonishing carefulness of 
 
 tion in Laws 732 B dm/jivriins S' iarlv Plato's writing. Also it is worth noticing 
 
 imppoi] (ppoiiriaeus diroXetTroiaris. that although the relation between ideas 
 
 16. ouKoSv Kol Zi|Ji|JiCav l8(5vTa] The and particulars is in the Phaedo, as in the 
 
 order in which these illustrations are Republic, still undefined (see 100 d), this 
 
 arranged seems at first sight strange. For passage distinctly foreshadows the doc- 
 
 instead of working up from the simpler trine of fil/iv<ri!, which is evolved in the 
 
 and more direct cases of association to the Philebus and Timatiis. 
 more complex, we have, as it were, a 19. etvai (ilv d<|>' o[^oC(l>v] as In the 
 
8o 
 
 HAATXINOS 
 
 [74 
 
 ToSe TrpoaTrdcT'X^eiv, iwoelv eore ti eWetTret tovto Kara Trjv ofioto- 
 rrjra etVe /u.^ eKeivov ov dvefip^aOij ; 'AvdyKr], e(f>r]. Anoirei h-q, rj 
 S 2?, el ravra ovTm'i e^^ei. (pafnev iroi Tt elvai Xcrov, ot ^vKov 
 Xejeo ^vXp ovSe Xidov XWm ovS" dXXo twv rotovrcov ovSev, aWa 
 S irapd ravra rravra erepov ri, avrb ro la-ov' (fiwfiev ri elvai fj 
 /irjBiv; ^(SjjLev fihroi vfj Al', e<^r] 6 'ZififJtia<;, Oavfjbaarw'i ye. 'H B 
 Kal eTTiardjieda avro ecrriv ; Haw ye, ^ 8' 09. 1169 ev Xa^ovre^ 
 avrov rrjv iircar^iM'rjv ; dp' ovk i^ Sv vvv Brj eXeyop,ev, fj ^vXa ^ 
 XiOov} 7) aXKa arra iBovrei Xaa, e'/e rovrav eKetvo ivevotjo-afiev, 
 10 erepov ov rovrwv ; rj ovj(^ erepov aot (fialverai ; a-Korret, Se Kal rfjBe. 
 ap^ ov X1601 p,ev Xaoi Kal ^vXa eviore ravrd ovra rm fiev Xcra 
 (paiverai, toj o ov; liavv /lev ovv. It be; avra ra icra ecrriv 
 
 last example of the previous chapter. 
 Reminiscence of the ideas by means of 
 the particulars is avd/ivriais d0' o/ioiav. 
 
 7. \aP(SvTcs airoB ti^v 6irioniji.T|v] 
 This does iiot mean that the knowledge 
 of the idea is derived from the particulars, 
 vphich is in itself impossible and is con- 
 tradictory to 75 B : but the knowledge 
 that we possess of the idea is awakened 
 by the perception of the particulars. 
 ^foM is the more accurate word used 
 later on. Cf. 74 C t'^ ixurTriii^v imcvoii- 
 Ka's Te Kal etXtjipas. The simile of the 
 aviary in Theaetetus 197 D would not be 
 unapt here : knowledge of the idea is our 
 possession, but it is not actually in our 
 grasp until awakened by ii>i,ji,vi\aix. 
 
 10. o-Koirci 81 Kal T^Se] The follow- 
 ing sentences furnish proof TDf the inde- 
 pendent existence of the idea; in 74 D 
 begins the proof that our knowledge of it 
 must have been prior to our observation 
 of the particulars. 
 
 1 1. TM |j.^v] So Schanz with B. The 
 ordinary reading is Torh iiiv...TOTk Si, 
 which Schleiermacher approves on the 
 ground that the defective equality of the 
 particulars appears in their seeming to 
 the same observer now equal now un- 
 equal. Prof. Geddes takes the same 
 view : 'Plato is not reasoning from the 
 variety of judgments among men gene- 
 rally : his argumentation proceeds as if 
 
 there was but one soul in the universe 
 to hold converse with the outer world '. 
 Surely this is quite unnecessary. The 
 existence of a conflict of opinion is suffi- 
 cient to establish the difference between 
 the particulars and the idea ; in the case 
 of the latter no such conflict does or can 
 exist. TOT^ has inferior ms. support and 
 is clumsy after More. 
 
 12. avrd TO. iira] This very strange 
 phrase has a parallel in Parmenides 129 B 
 el phi y&p avTa to, Sfioia tis airi^aivev av6- 
 ixoia yLyv6ft€va ^ Ta,a.v6p.oiaSii.oia,Tipasav, 
 olnai, rji>. In the present passage various 
 explanations have been given : (i) that of 
 Olympiodoros, that the plural represents 
 the idea as thought by several minds; 
 this is adopted by most commentators: 
 
 (2) that it represents the idea as exem- 
 plified in several sets of equal particulars ; 
 to this approximates the view of Schneider, 
 that outA ra lira means the separate ideas 
 of equal logs, equal stones &c. But who 
 ever heard of the idea of an equal log? 
 
 (3) Doederlein supposes that aira rb, ha 
 means perfectly equal objects, such as 
 can be conceived but do not exist in na- 
 ture. But this makes Sokrates ask ' do 
 things, which ex hypothesi seem to you 
 equal, seem to you unequal ? ' besides 
 there is no point in the introduction of 
 these imaginary equals. (4) Heindorf 
 seems to me to come much nearer the 
 
74] 
 
 <i>AIAflN. 
 
 8i 
 
 C ore avicra aoi i(f)dvr}, -t} t] laoTrj^ avtaortji; ; OvSeTTcoiroTi 76, w 
 XcoKpare'j. Ov tuvtov dpa ia-riv, 17 S' 2?, Tavrd re to, 'iaa koX 
 avTo TO la-ov. OvSa/jbw<; /jloo (^aiverai, 00 'ZaiKpaTet, 'A\X<i /tJjv 
 etc TovTcov 7 , e(f)r], twv la'wv, irepcov ovrav eKeivov tov ictov, ofta^ 
 avTov TTjv i7na-T7}/M7]v ivvev6r]Kd<} re Koi et'k7j<f)a<i ; 'AXtjOiarara, ecjyr], 5 
 Xeyeif. [Ovkovv fj ofiolov 6vto<s tovtoi^ rj dvo/ioiov ; TLdvv je. 
 Aia<f>6p6t Be <ye, ^ S" 0?, ovBev' e<us dv dXKo IBcov (xtto Tavrrji; rrjg 
 
 D offremf dWo evvorjarj'i, elVe '6fioiov elre dvofiotov, dvaynalov, ecjirj, 
 aVTO dvdfiv7]cnv yejovevac. Hdvv fiev ovv^ Tt Se; ^ S' o?' rj 
 •7raa-')(pfiev rt toiovtov irepl rd iv toZ? ^v\oi<i koI oIs vvv Bfj eKe- 10 
 
 truth. After quoting the Parmenides 
 he adds ' multitudinis numerus adhiberi 
 in his potuit, quoniam aequalitatls vel 
 similitudinis notio non unum continet, 
 sed ad duo certe refertur '. When Plato 
 asks ' does the idea of equality seem equal 
 or unequal?' the implied . comparison 
 compels him perforce to use the plural ; 
 not that he thinks there are more ideas 
 of equality than one, but because to ask 
 whether one thing is equal or unequal is 
 sheer nonsense. He immediately explains 
 the unusual phrase in the following words, 
 ' I mean, does equality ever appear to 
 you inequality?' By the time Plato 
 wrote the Parmenides he had got rid of 
 these unfortunate ideas of relations: for 
 in the passage quoted Sokrates is stating 
 the earlier form of the ideal theory : and 
 probably he there used the plural not 
 without the intention of pointing to the 
 contradiction which such ideas involve. 
 Schleiermacher takes aura ra iSra to be 
 the particulars ; but his explanation is in 
 itself very unsatisfactory and requires an 
 alteration of the text. 
 
 2. TauTa T« tA tl<ra] i.e. the equal 
 particulars. 
 
 5. cvvcv6r]K<is T£ Kal el'\i](fias] ' you 
 have recalled and gained'; see on 73 c. 
 
 6. [o{iKO«v TJ ojioCov ovTos] From 
 the passage enclosed in brackets I have 
 utterly failed to extract any meaning. 
 Plato has just completed his proof that 
 equal particulars carry back our minds to 
 
 P. 
 
 an idea of equality which is distinct from 
 the partic^^lars ; next he is about to show 
 that our knowledge of the idea must have 
 been prior to ovir observation of the par- 
 ticulars. But between these two neces- 
 sary links in his argument we find inter- 
 posed an irrelevg.nt remark to the effect 
 that the process is called ivd/ivrja-is whe- 
 ther the object of perception is like or 
 unlike the object of reminiscence. In 
 tljie present context the repeated defini- 
 tion of ayd/ivTiffis is surely pointless ; and 
 worse than pointless is the re-introduction 
 of the ofioiov Kal dvo/ioiov : for the remi- 
 niscence of the idea Ijy means of the par- 
 ticulars is necessarily d<p' o/iolov. I am 
 therefore cqmpeljed to treai the words 
 down to irdvv nh ovv as an interpolation : 
 a conclusion at whiph I find Susemihl 
 and Schmidt have also arrived. Stallbaum 
 has an elaborate defence of the words, 
 which might possibly have been more 
 successful had he understood the difficulty. 
 Prof. Geddes (not however on this pas- 
 sage) suggests that particulars may re- 
 mind us of other ideas besides that to 
 which .they belong. But the whole force 
 of the argument comes from the fact that 
 this kind of reminiscence is d0' ofiolav, 
 for in this case alone are we conscious of 
 a defect in the resemblance (74 a); and 
 our consciousness of this defect is our sole 
 warrant for inferring that we must have 
 known the ideas before we perceived the 
 particulars (74 e). 
 
 6 
 
82 nAATIINOS [;5 
 
 •yofiev T0{? KTot?" apa tpalverai rjfiiv oino)<s tcra elvat mairep avro 
 o ecTTiv rj ivBei Ti eKeivov tov toiovtov elvai olov rd iffop, fj ovSiv ; 
 Kat -TToKv rye, e<f>ri, ivSei. Ovkovv ofioKoyov/iev, orav rlf ri IBav 
 evvoTjarj, on ^ovXerai /lev tovto, o vvv iym 6pm, elvai olov aXKo 
 5 Tt rwv oprav, ivSei Be Kal ov Bwarai toiovtov elvai olov i/ceivo, E 
 aW eariv tpavXoTepov, dvayxatov ttov rbv tovto ivvoovvTa TV^^eiv 
 TrpoeiBoTa eicetvo <p <l>rjcriv avTb irpoaeokKevai fiev, evBeecrTepeoi Be 
 e)(6iv; 'AvdyKt}. Tt ovv, toiovtov ireirovOafiev Kal r)fiel<;, fj ov, 
 irepi Te to, 'iaa KaX avTo to Xaov ; YlavTCfrracTL ye. ^Avayicalov apa 
 
 lo jj/ia? irpoeiBevai t6 taov irpb iicecvov tov 'X^povov, ots to irpairov 75 
 iB6vTe<; Tci 'icra evevor]<rafiev, '6ti, opeyeTat, fiev irdvTa TavTa elvai 
 olov TO 'iaov, e'xei Be evBeeaTepco<;. "EaTi Tavra. 'AWa fi,rjv Kal 
 ToBe 6p.o\oyovp.ev, fMrj dXkodev avTo ivvevorjKevai p-TjBe Bwutov 
 eivai ivvorjaai aW' ^ eK tov IBeiv fj a^^aaOai fj ex Tivo'i d'Wij? 
 
 15 Twv alcr6r](7ea)v' tuvtov Be TrdvTa Tavra Xeyeo. TavTOV yap ecrTiv, 
 CO StB/c/Jares, tt/jo? 76 ^ovKeTai BrfKooaai 6 \0709. 'AXKa fiev Bi] 
 eK ye twv alcrOrjaewv Bel evvofjaai '6ri irdvTa to ev Tai<; aladrjaeaiv 
 eKeivov Te opeyeTai tov o eoTiv 'Iaov, Kal avTov evBeecrrepd eaTiv' B 
 rj TTco? \eyo/Mev ; Ovtco^. Upo tov dpa dp^aadai rip,a,<; opdv Kal 
 
 20 OKOveiv Kal TaXXa aladdveaOai TV^^eiv eBei ttov ei\T]<f)6Ta<; eVtcTTJ?- 
 fir]v avTov tov 'ia-ov o ti eaTiv, el i/j£\Xo/jiev Ta eK twv alaOrjaewv 
 iaa eKelae dvoiaeiv \oti irpodv/ieirai fiev irdvTa ToiavT elvai olov 
 CKeivo, ecTTiv Be avTov ^avXoTepa^. 'AvdyKr] eK twv irpoeipijfjLevtav, 
 
 I. (oinrcp avTo 8 Jo-tiv] St. adds count all these sensations as the same 
 
 fo-oz/, which Z. has within braclcets : but thing' •- as is shown by the following 
 
 the word is absent in the best mss. sentence ; not, as Wagner says, ' I say 
 
 •i. TJ IvSei Ti iKilvov] 'or does it fall the same of all these', 
 short of the idea, that is of being similar 17. iravra to. iv rats alo-flijcreo-iv] 
 to it'. This is the reading of Schanz, Since all sensuous perceptions do not re- 
 which seems quite satisfactory and is very mind us of equality, Madvig would insert 
 close to the mss. The common reading lea niter oiVS^creo-iv, Schailz brackets Icrov. 
 is Tij) ,147; toioCto;' elvai, which is excellent Against bracketing tcov I would urge that 
 sense, but /ti) is almost destitute of autho- it is premature to apply the present argu- 
 rity. Madvig would read ^iced'ijjT^ToioOT-oK ment to all ideas: that is first done in 
 clvai, 'does there lack anything to that 75 c: while the notion of equals so ex- 
 quality of being like ' : a specimen of Greek clusively engrosses our attention through- 
 composition which one would not rashly out the present chapter that Madvig's 
 impute to Plato. insertion seems needless. 
 
 5. TOIOVTOV ttvoi] The mss. add 22. [oti irpo6v|j,EtTai ... <|)ttxiXoTepo] 
 
 iaov, which is clearly a gloss. Schanz Schanz following Hirschig brackets these 
 
 retains it within brackets. words : Mr Jackson independently takes 
 
 15. TUVTov 8J TrdvTtt Tavra \^'Y<d] 'I the same view. The objections to them are 
 
75] 
 
 ^AIAfiN. 
 
 83 
 
 w Sw«paT6?. OvKovv ryevofievoi eii0i<i iaprnfiiu re koX '^kovo/jlev 
 C Kal Ta? a\\a9 ala-d^<rei<; ei'xp/iev ; Haw ye. "ESei Si ye, (f)a/Mev, 
 Trpo TO^TWV rfjv tov Icrov iirioTi^/irjv eiXr]<f>evai ; Nat. Jlplv yeve- 
 adai. apa, a5s eoiKev, dvdyKr) rjijuv avTrjv el\if)^evai. "^oiKev. 
 
 XX. OvKovv el /lev Xa^6vTe<; avTrjv irpo tov yeveadai eyovre'i 5 
 eyevofieOa, rjina'TdfieOa Koi m-plv yeveadai KaX ev0v^ yevo/ievoi ov 
 fiovov TO Xaov Kot TO fieL^ov Kal to ekaTTOv aXKd koI ^vfiTravTa 
 Ta TOiavTa ; ov yap irepX tov lerov vvv 6 \6yo<i rjplv paXKov Ti rj 
 Kai Trepi avTOv tov koXov koI avTov tov dyadov Kal BiKaiov Kal 
 D offLov Kal, oirep Xeyco, irepl dirmnrnv ot? eiria(f)payi^6p,e0a t6 o 10 
 kcTTi, Kal iv rats ipmT'jcrea-tv e/XBTtui/re? Kal iv rat? dtroKpia-ea-iv 
 aTTOKpivopevoi. (Bcrre dvayKalov rnuv tovtcov iravTtov Ta? evrt- 
 a-Tr]pa<; tt/jo tov yeveaOat, el\7]^evai. "Ectti TavTa. K.al el p,ev 
 ye XaySwres eKaaTOTe p,^ i'jn\ekr}a-p,eda, elhoTa'i del ylyvea-Oai Kal 
 
 (i) that they are irrelevant and inapposite, 
 (2) that the use of TrpoBv/x.elTai is most 
 strange. I fully acquiesce in the judgment 
 of these scholars that the clause is an 
 unintelligent gloss upon iKelae. 
 
 3. irpo ToiiTwv] i.e. before our per- 
 ceptions of sight, hearing, &c. 
 
 5. OVKOVV el |i4v XoP<5vT£s] 'if then, 
 having received this knovifledge before 
 birth, we were bom in possession of it'. 
 As yet Plato is merely putting the case, 
 without expressing an opinion about it : 
 presently we shall find that we were not 
 bom possessing it, ekcept in a. dormant 
 state. We now go on to apply the re- 
 sults gained for t<rov to all the other 
 ideas. 
 
 10. oirtp Xi^u] just above, ^iinravra. 
 TO, Toiavra, 
 
 ots 6irio'<j)paYiJoneflo] 'on which we 
 stamp the character of essence'. ^(tti, 
 is Plato's technical term to denote the 
 essentiality of the ideas. Plato never 
 descends to forms like ourocu'ff/JWTros, 
 which are common in Aristotle : he would 
 say auTO ((ttiv ai/Spaxos. 
 
 11. iv Tats Ipunjo'EO'iv ... diroKpivo- 
 |icvoi] i.e. in our dialectical discussions. 
 The conversational method was as dis- 
 tinctive a peculiarity of the form as the 
 
 ideal theory was of the substance of 
 Plato's philosophy ; and so intimately are 
 the two connected that Sia\eKTiK% pro- 
 perly 'the science of dialogue', means 
 nothing less than 'the science of ideas'. 
 The Sokratic method of examination was 
 distinctly aimed at obtaining a definition 
 or Xo'yos of the object in question ; and 
 this definition was peculiarly the out- 
 come of the method. Plato, in developing 
 the logical concept into a metaphysical 
 essence,scrapulouslypreserved the method 
 by which the former was attained. 
 
 12. dvaYKatov iJlJi'iv] Z. adds eTcai 
 with some mss. 
 
 14. eKduToTt] i.e. 'and if after re- 
 ceiving it we have not, in every instance 
 of our doing so, forgotten it, we are 
 always born in possession of this know- 
 ledge and retain it through life'. I do 
 not think it necessary to insert yiyvo/ievot 
 after iKdffTore with Heindorf, although I 
 fully agree with his interpretation. Prof. 
 Geddes' rendering can hardly stand, and 
 he, rather than Heindorf, seems to have 
 mistaken the argument. 'If we have', 
 he says, 'in all the crises of our history, 
 retained this knowledge '. But Plato does 
 not say 'if we have retained', but 'if we 
 have not forgotten': and though it is 
 
 6—2 
 
84 HAATilNOS [76 
 
 ^la 0LOV elBevai' to yap elBevai tovt ecrrlv, Xa^ovra rov iiri- 
 arrjiMTjv e^eti' Koi /i^ airoKaikeKivat' rj ov tovto \ij6rjv Xeyofiev, co 
 Xififila, e7rt(TTJ7/Ai;? ajro^oKriv ; TldvT(o<i Sijttov, e(j)r], S Zco/cpaTe^. E 
 Et Be ye olfiat \a^6vTe<; irp\v yevecrOai ytyvo/Mevot, aircoXecrafiev, 
 S 'vtTTepov Be rat? alaOrjcreai ^paj/ievot irepX ravra eKeiva's avaXafi- 
 ^avojJLev TO.!; i'jria-Trjp.a^, a? irore koX irplv el')(pfiev, dp ov^ o 
 KoXovfiev p,avOdveiv olxelav iTria-Tijfirjv dva\ap,^dveiv av elrj; tovto 
 Be TTov dva/j,ifj,v'paice(T0ai 'keyovTe's opdcSg av \iyoi/j,ev ; Hdvv ye. 
 AvvaTOv yap S?) tovto ye i(f>dv7], alado/Mevov Tt ■^ IBovTa r\ aKOv- 76 
 
 10 aavTa rj Tiva aXXrjv aia-drjcnv Xa^ovTa eTepov ti a-KO tovtov 
 ivvorjcrai 8 eTreXiX/rjCTTO, ^ tovto eirX/rjala^ev dvofioiov op r) m 
 'o/u.oiov' wcTTe, o-Trep Xeya, Bvoiv to, erepa, rjTOi iincTTaixevob ye 
 aiiTa yeyovafiev Kal eiricrTdp.eda Bi,d ^lov Trai/re?, r} vaTepov, oS? 
 (pafiev fj,av0dveiv, ovBev aXX' rj dvafiifivpaxovTai ovTot., Kal rj fia- 
 
 15 drjai's dvdfivrjcni; av etrj. Kat p,a\a Brj oi5t(»? e%6t, « %(OKpaTe<;. 
 
 XXI. TloTepov oSv aipei, m ^ifip,La ; iirtcTTafievovii r)p,d<; 
 yeyovivai, rj dvafMifiv^a-KeaOai HcTTepov Sv TrpoTepov errKTTrnjLrjv B 
 elXrj^oTe^ fip,ev ; Ovk ex^> ™ %a>KpaTe';, iv tS irapovTi eKea-Qai. 
 Tt Be ToBe ; ejjjet? ekecrOai, Kal irfj aoi BoKel Trepl avTov' dvrjp 
 
 10 €7n(7Tap,evoii irepl wv eTTiaTaTai e')(pi dv Bovvat, \6yov rj ov ; 
 
 sense to say 'if we have retained it in all 9. c<|>dvT|] in 73 c. 
 
 the crises', it is not sense to say 'if we 10. ^Tepov ti diri towtov] 'to derive 
 
 have not forgotten it in all the crises'; from this a conception of something 
 
 since we have forgotten it once for all, different that he had forgotten, with which 
 
 and that, as Heindorf says, at our birth. this was associated, whether unlike or 
 
 I think in fact that ^/cciffT-oT-e is to be taken like'. CoPE. <p refers to Srepov n 5 
 
 in close connexion with Xa^d^res : ' in iire\4\7ia-To, tovto to tovtov. I see no 
 
 every instance of our receiving it, we have sufficient reason for bracketing the second 
 
 not forgotten'. (Prof. Geddes is also <? with Schanz. Here there is nothing 
 
 scarcely accurate in saying that iTurT'q/j.rj amiss in the introduction of the o/ioioK 
 
 is dva/ivri<ns : Plato says p,a6Tf<ni is avafx- and dra/uoiov, for Plato is expressly re- 
 
 vqvis, which is another thing.) The per- peating the statement in 73 c. 
 
 feet ^TTiXeX^cr/ieSo, as Wohlrab rightly 20. Sovvai Xiyov] 'to give an ac- 
 
 observes, shows that Plato still expresses count ' ; that is an accurate description of 
 
 no opinion. the thing defined, marking its logical 
 
 5. irepl tovto] This reading seems differentia. A passage quoted by Wohlrab, 
 
 necessary, although ouTci has stronger ms. .ff«/«/5/jV 534B, explains the phrase very 
 
 authority, raura means the objects of well: fi Kal SiaXeKTiKbv KaXets rov \6yov 
 
 sense, in antithesis to ixelvas. Wohlrab iKa<rTov \anpdpoPTa t^s omlas; Kal top 
 
 retains aurd but does not inform us how /*i7 ?x<»"'''> '^''^' ^(rox oi* /mJ ixo ^yov 
 
 he proposes to make sense of it. out^j re Kal oXXy SiSovai, KaTO, to(Tovtov 
 
 7. oIkcCov] 'a knowledge that is vovv irepl tovtov ov <j>rj(rei.s Ix^tv; where 
 
 already ours'. we may translate X6701' rfjs oiatas 'the 
 
76] OAIAfiN. 85 
 
 IToW^ dvajKr], e^rj, m '^coKpare'}. 'H xal Bokovctl trot iravrei 
 e^etv SiBovai \6yov irepX tovtcov cov viiv hrj iXeyofiev ; ^ovXoifirjv 
 fj-ep Tav, e^r) 6 'ZififiLa'i' oiXka iroXv fiaXKov <^o^ovfiai, firj avpiov 
 T7)viKdSe ovjcin § dvOpwTrcov ovhe\<i d^imf ol6<; re tovto Troirja-ai. 
 
 C OvK apa SoKOvcrl aoi iirlaraaOal ye, €<f)ri, m 'Xifi/jiia, iravTev avrd ; 5 
 Oi5Sa/A63?. 'Ava/jLifivya-KOVTai dpa d ttots ejiadov ; ^AvdyKT]. Hore 
 Xa^ovaat ai yjrv^^al rjiimv rrjv iTrKTrt] firjv avrtSv ; ov yap Sr) a0' ov 
 ye avOpcoiroi, yeyova/iev. Ov Srjra. liporepov dpa. Nat. 'H<7ai/ 
 dpa, (S 'Siififiia, at ylrvxal ical irpoTepov, irplv elvai iv dvdpcoTTov 
 eiSei, %<u/3t? <T(OixdT(ov, koX (j>p6vt]<Tiv et')(ov. Et jjii) dpa yiyvofjbevot lo 
 Xafi^dvo/Jbev, m 'ZwKpare'j, TavTa<; ras iTriaTijfia<}' ovto^ yap Xet- 
 
 D Trerai ert o 'X^povo^. Etev, to eraipe' a7roWu/tev Se avrdii iv iroLai 
 dXKcp XP°^V > °^ J^P ^^ exovTe^ ye avtd^ ytyvofieOa, w? dpTi 
 (OfioXoyi^a-afieV rj iv Tovr^ aTroXKvfiev, iv (pirep kol Xa/M^dvofiev ; 
 •fj exet<; dWov Tivd elirelv xfovov ; OvBafidSf, S 'Zwicpare';, dXXd is 
 eXaOov ifiavTov ovSev elircov, 
 
 XXII. 'Ap' odv ovTa)<; exei, e4>r}, ijfjLiv, & %ififiM ; el /xev ecmv 
 a 6pvXov/j,ev dei, KaXov re Kal dyaObv Kal irdaa rj Toiavrr) ovaia, 
 Kat iirX TavT'r)v ra e'/c fStv alad^creaiv iravra dvacpipofjuev, [yirdp- 
 
 E ^pvcav TTpoTepov dvevpla-KOVTe^ ijfj.eripav ovcrav, Kal ravra eKeivy 20 
 
 principle of its being'. Compare also pare ^^«Wir 621 a, where the souls that 
 
 53 1 E. Below, 99 E, there will be more are on the point of returning to earth 
 
 to say about \oyos. must drink of the river Ameles. In com- 
 
 2. irepl TouTwv] i.e. the ideas. paring this passage, as Prof. Geddes does, 
 
 10. xi'P^s orci)|jidT«v] This does not with Wordsworth's famous ode, it ought 
 
 necessarily follow : Plato however simply not to be left out of sight that there is a 
 
 means apart from the human bodies in fundamental opposition between them, 
 
 which they now dwell: cf. 114C, where According to Wordsworth we are born 
 
 the purified souls are said to live oj-cu with the antenatal radiance clinging about 
 
 (ru/idrui' rb vap&irav, although the con- us and spend our lives in gradually losing 
 
 ditions of their existence are obviously it ; according to Plato we lose the vision 
 
 conceived as material. The body from at birth and spend our lives in gradually 
 
 which they are freed by death is the recovering it. 
 
 ■yTlwov (TUfia of Phaedrus 246 C. In the 76 D — 77 B, c. xxii. The outcome of 
 
 following words koX <j>p6vriini' etxov Plato the preceding argument is this : the pre- 
 
 marks the additional result he has gained existence of our souls is inseparably bound 
 
 by the appeal to dm/ivrja-i.s. up with the existence of ideas and the 
 
 12. air'<)XX\i|ji.€v 8e] Simmias suggests former stands or falls with the latter, 
 
 that the knowledge may be acquired just Simmias heartily assents to this and 
 
 at the moment of birth ; Sokrates replies, affirms his unshaken conviction that the 
 
 it is impossible, for that is the very mo- ideas. do exist and consequently that our 
 
 ment at which we lose it : we cannot souls existed before our birth. 
 gain and lose it simultaneously. Com- ig. [{nrapxoDtrttvirpoTepov] Mr Jack- 
 
86 
 
 HAATfiNOS 
 
 \77 
 
 aTreiKa^ofiev, dpayKaiov, oiirto'}] wa-irep koX ravra Itrriv, oSrax} koI 
 rrjv ij/ierepav yjrvxijv elvai koX trpiv yeyovevai '^fia,<}' el Se firj eart 
 Tavra, aWw? av 6 \0709 ovto<; elpTj/ievo^ elt] \ ap' oi/TW? ej^et, icaX 
 lar) ava'^KT) ravTO, re elvai KaX T<i? riiJ,eTepa<; ■\^V')(a<} irplv Kal ^fia^ 
 5 yeyovivac, Kal el p-rj ravTa, ovBe rdSe ; "Tvep^vmi;, tS %u>Kpar€<t, 
 e<pr} 6 Xip,/j,ia^, SoKei p,oi rj avTrj avar/KT] eivai, KaX eh koXov ye 
 Kara^evyet 6 "Kojo? eh t6 opoico^ elvai rijv re -y^-^fiv '^pwv irpXv 77 
 yevea-ffai rjpa<i KaX rrju ovalav rju 'a-v vvv XeyeK. ov yap e^xto 
 eycoye ovBev ovtco pot evapye<; ov (b? tovto, to iravra ra ToiaVT 
 
 10 elvai 0)9 olov re paXccrra, KaXov re KaX ayaOov KaX raXka irdiiTa a 
 av vvv St) e\eye<i' Kal, ep,oX BoKel, iKavmg diroSeSeiKTai, Tt Se Br] 
 K.efirjri ; etjsr) 6 'l.coKpdTr]^' Set yap Kal K.e0rjTa ireiOeiv, 'iKavSv, 
 6cf)r} 6 Ai'PpM';, to? 670)76 olpai' Kalfoi KaprepcoraTO'; dvdpwirav 
 icnXv Trpt<; ro airia-reiv TOi? X6yoi<;' dXX' olpai ovk ivBem^ tovto 
 
 15 'jre'jreiadac avTOV, Sn irpXv yevia&ai rjpd^ ^v rjpwv r) ^Jtv^tj. B 
 
 son, in the paper before mentioned, 
 maintains that the words from virkpxovaav 
 to avayKoXov oStois are spurious. In this 
 opinion I concur for the following reasons: 
 (i) the clause virdpxovcrav irpiiTepov avev' 
 plaKovTei TiiiiTipav oSirav would seem just 
 the same kind of clumsy misapplication 
 of Plato's phraseology of which we have 
 already seen too much : Plato says 
 (75 e) that the knowledge of the ideas 
 is our own ; but where does he say that 
 the ideas themselves are our own, and 
 what is the sense of saying so ? (2) 
 raOra iKeivy d.7reLKd^ofj,ev is a pointless 
 repetition of M Tairrjv dva/pipo/iev : (3) 
 TttSra there means sensibles ; presently 
 ToOro three times refers to the ideas. 
 Wyttenbach, on this very ground, pro- 
 poses to read ouVi; Iffriv ; (4) though the 
 repetition of oiVws may be defended, it 
 certainly sounds very awkward here. 
 Accordingly I have bracketed the words. 
 With this omission the sentence will 
 stand : ' if these ideas exist which are 
 for ever on our lips, absolute beauty and 
 goodness and all other absolute essence, 
 and if it is to this essence that we refer all 
 our sense-perceptions, as this surely exists, 
 so surely did our soul exist before our 
 
 birth '. clvcu will then depend upon ovras 
 
 2. €l hi (iij i<m Tavra] 'if these 
 ideas do not exist ' ; not as some take it, 
 ' if this is not so ', Cf. below fcnj dm-yKri 
 Tavra re etyai, 
 
 5. cl (M^ TavTO, oiSk TaSe] i.e. if the 
 ideas do not exist, neither did our souls 
 exist before birth. 
 
 6. els KaXov yt] ' And our argument 
 has found an excellent refuge in the posi- 
 tion that the pre-existence of our soul 
 rests on the same assurance as the exist- 
 ence of the ideas '- Wagner should not 
 have supplied Kaipbv with koKov, which 
 is explained by the sentence in apposition, 
 els t6 d/iofus elvai. 
 
 8. ijv (TV vvv X^YCis] vSp is omitted 
 in some mss. and Schanz brackets it. 
 
 II. KaC, IpLol SoKci, iKavus otiroS^SeiK- 
 Tai] This reading has the best authority, 
 and Schanz defends the parenthetical use 
 of i/ju)l SoKei by citing 108 B, Protagoras 
 314 c, Menexentts 236 B. Z. and St. give 
 t/ioiye iKayQs iirodideiKrai, 
 
 77 B — D, «.. xxiii. But, continues Sim- 
 mias, reminiscence only proves that our 
 soul existed before entering into a human 
 body: tt does not prove that the soul 
 
77] ^AIAflN. 87 
 
 XXIII. Et fievToi Koi iireiBav aTroOdvco/iev 'irt ecrrai, ovZe 
 avra fioi Boicei, e<f>r}, w %d>KpaT6<;, dvoBeSeix^cti, aXX' ert iviaT7]Kef> 
 b vvv Bri Ke;87j9 e\eye, rg twv TroWav, otto)? firj aTroOvycrKovTo? 
 Tov avdpwirov StacrKeBavvvrai r/ ^frv^V Kcd tivTrj rov elvat, tovto 
 TeXo? y. ' TL yap KcoXvet yuyveaOai, jjuev avfrjv teal ^vviUTaa-Oai 5 
 dfiodev iroOev xal elvat, trpXv KaX eh dvOpooireiov a-w/ia d^iKea-6ai, 
 iTrebBdv Be dcjjiKTjrai kuI diraWaTTTjTat tovtov, Tore Kal avrrjp 
 
 C reXevrdv Kal Bia(f>0eipeci-dat ; Eu Xeyei^, eipv, to "Ziftfiia, 6 Ke/Sri^. 
 (jiaipeTai yap &airep rjfMav d'KoBeBel')(6ai, ov Bet, on irplv yevecrdai 
 ■^ficii Tjv riiJLwv rj •^V')(ri' Bel Be irpoa-aTToBel^ai on Kal iireiBdv 10 
 aTToOavcofiev ovBev yrrov earat r] irplv yeveo'Oab, el /leXXei T6\o? ^ 
 diroBei^i'; ep^jew. ' AiroBeBeLKrai /j,ev, etf>r}, m %ifi/j,La re Kal K.el3r]<;, 
 6 ACOKpdTTjf;, Kal vvv, el, OeXere avvdetvai tovtov t6 tov \6yov et? 
 TavTOv Kal ov Trpo tovtov cofioXoy^crafiev, to yiyveaOai, irdv to ^wv 
 iK tov Te9vewT0<;. el yap eanv jj^ev -q '^vx^V Kal irpoTepov, dvdyKrj 15 
 
 D Be avT^ el<i to i,rjv lovcrrj re Kal yiyvofiivy firjBa/MoOev dXXodev rj e'/c 
 davdTov Kal tov TeOvdvai, ylyveadai, ttco? ovk avdyKr) avTrfv Kal 
 eireiBdv diroOavrj elvat, eiretBr) ye Bel av6t<s avTrjv yiyvecrdat ; diro- 
 BiBeiKTai fjtev ovv oirep XeyeTe Kal vvv. 
 
 on leaving the body may not be dissi- 6. dfioOcv iroiiv] This is Bekker's 
 
 pated and perish. Kebes agrees tliat correction of aWoBeii, which is retai'fled 
 
 immortality is only half proved. So- by Z. and St, 
 
 krates replies that the other half is sup- 13. «l Qtkere o-vv6etvai] I do not un- 
 
 plied by the argument from alternation derstand how, in the face of this express 
 
 of opposites, which proved that the soul statement of Plato's, some have regarded 
 
 must exist after death. ovTaTTodoffis and amfivrja-is as two distinct 
 
 4. Siao-KESavvvTai] The indicative demonstrations of immortality. As he 
 can hardly be right here because we have says, they are two halves of a demonstra- 
 3) in the next clause, and the change of tion ; one showing the pre-existence, the 
 mood would be meaningless. A parallel other the after-existence of the soul, 
 form is the optative 7n;7J'DT0 in ri8 A. I 77 ^ — 7^ B, c. xxiv. Yet, says So- 
 do not see on what ground the accentua- krates, you and Simmias seem still to 
 tion SiauKeSavvvTai (as subjunctive) and have a lurking fear lest the soul on leaving 
 irriyvvTo can be defended, since the forms the body be scattered to the winds. Per- 
 are clearly contractions. Z. and St. have haps, replies Kebes, there is a child 
 diaffKedapuvrai.. within us that still needs to be soothed ; 
 
 5. t£ Yap K<i)\«6i] ' What reason is and soon there will be no man living who 
 there why she should not come into being can soothe it. Do not despair, says So- 
 and union from somewhere or other and krates; wide is Hellas and wider is the 
 exist before she enters a human frame, but world; you must spare neither pains nor 
 when she has entered one and is in act of riches to find such a man, not omitting to 
 leaving it, she should not at that moment search among yourselves. 
 
 herself come to an end and perish ? ' 
 
HAATONOS 
 
 [78 
 
 XXIV. "Ofiax; Be fioi SoKei<; av re Koi Xifi/jiia^ j/SeM? av Kal 
 rovTov BiaTrpay/MaTeiKTaadai, top \6yov en fiaWov, Kal SeBievai to 
 rmv iraiScov, firj oj? akrjOS? 6 avefMOi; avTrjv iK^alvovcrav ex rov 
 (Tccfiaro^ Biaipvcra, Kal BtaaKeBavvvaiv, aXka<i re Kal brav rv'^J] Tt? E 
 5 fMrj iv vrjvefiia dX\' iv /jbeyakq) rivl irvevfiaTi diroOvycTKav. Kal o 
 Ke/S?;? eTriyeXaaa^ 'fl? SeBwrmv, e(j>r}, w '^(OKpaTe<;, rreipw dva- 
 •jreideiv' fidWov Be /*i) oJ? rjfiwv BeBiOTOav, aW' !f<7a)? evi rts /cat 
 iv rifuv iral'i, ocrrt? rd Tocavra (po^eiraf rovTov ovv 7retpc6fi,e6a 
 ireideiv firj BeBievdi rov Bdvarov (hairep rd fiopfioXvKeia. 'AXKd 
 
 16 XPVy ^^V 2«/cjoaT'779, iiroBeiv avra e/cacrrij? i^fiepas, eai's dv 
 i^eirdcT'qTe. TloBev ovv, €01?, m %wKpaT6';, twv toiovtwv djadov 78 
 i-7rq>B6v \7)-\lr6fie6ai eireiB^ crv, e^rj, ri(id<; diroXehreK ', IIoW?; jiev rj 
 'EWa?, 'i^rj, m Ke^rj?, iv y eveial ttov dyadol avSpei}, TroXXd Be 
 Kal rd TWV ^apjSdpcov jevr], ov? 7rdvTa<; ■x^prj BiepevvdaOai ^rjTovvTa'; 
 
 15 ToiovTov iiraiBov, firjTe j^^prifj.drmv (peoBofievov; p.rjTe irovmv, a5? ovk 
 ecTTiv el<; o Ti, <dv> dva^KaiOTepov dvaXiaKoiTe 'x^prjfiaTa. ^TjTeiv 
 
 2. Siairpa^iiaTcijo-airSai tov \6yov 
 in ndXXov] I think the' iriisgiWngs of 
 Simmias and Kebes arise thus. We h'ave 
 indeed seen that the recurrence of soul is 
 a law of nature ; but we are not sUfficieritly 
 acquainted with the laws of nature and 
 the conditions of their interaction to be 
 perfectly sure how they will work in every 
 particular case. So we are still haunted 
 by the doubt that a soul may; under cer- 
 tain circumstances, be dissipated and de- 
 stroyed : this doubt can only be satisfied 
 by proving that the eternity of soul can 
 be deduced not only from a universal 
 law but from her own inherent nature. 
 Next dva/Mpriffis has placed the eternity of 
 soul on the same footing of assurance as 
 the existence of the ideas : but this is 
 done indirectly ; we desire to be con- 
 vinced that soul not only has had cogni- 
 tion of the ideas, but that she possesses 
 such an affinity with their nature as will 
 justify us in believing that she shares 
 their attribute of eternity ; see introduc- 
 tion § 2. 
 
 4. Sia(rK€Sdvvv<n.v] Hirschig would 
 read Siaa-KeSavvvxi. But here the indicative 
 is clearly right. What we fear is, not'lest 
 
 the wind should blow the soul away, but 
 lest it is a fact that it does so. 
 
 8. Iv ij|j.iv irats] 'there is a child 
 within us ' ; not of course ' among us '. 
 
 11. «|6ir4o-r)Te] ' until you have charm- 
 ed him out of you'. This reading is due 
 to Heindorf; the old editions and the 
 best mss. have i^idffrjTai, Heindorf's 
 admirable emendation is confirmed by 
 one ms. 
 
 12. liTEiSi] a-i, i^r\\ For the repetition 
 of l(pTi Wohlrab compares 89 c, 103 c, 
 118 A. 
 
 14. TO. TOV Pappdpuv ■yevT]] Plato's 
 travels had caused him to form a more 
 liberal estimate of barbarian possibilities 
 than was usual in his time. Compare 
 Republic 499 c e^ roivvv cLKpots els tpiKoaO' 
 ^iav 7r6Xet6sTts ayayK7jiinfi£\T]6fjvai7] y^o- 
 vev iv Tifj direlpcfi T<fi TrapeXiiXvBoTi xP'""fi 'J 
 Kal vCv ianv Iv nvi ^ap^apiK^ Toirif, iroppw 
 irov ixrhs ovtl t^s ii/ieripas iiri^eas, Tj Kal 
 ^ireiTa yefqaerai, irepl tovtov stoiixol t^ 
 Xoyifi SiaiidxeaSai., (is 7J7o»'e» ^ elpyj/ihri 
 TroXnela Kal (an Kal ysv^fferal ye, orav 
 auTt) fi Moi)(ra TroXews iyKpariis yivrirai. 
 Cf. Symposium 209 E. 
 
 16. av dva7Kai6T£pov] So Schanz with 
 
5^8] 
 
 «)AIAnN. 
 
 89 
 
 Se j(prj Kot avToiti fier dXK^Xccv to-w? yap &v ovB^ paBieo<! eipoire 
 fiaSXov vfiwv hvvafievQWi toSto TroLeiv. 'AWa ravTa fiev S?;, e'<f)Tj, 
 
 B virap^ei, 6 Ke/Si;?" o0ev Se aTreKiirofieu iiraveXdoifiev, ei' croi ijSo- 
 /tei/ffl ia-Tiv. 'AXKA firjv iqSoftiva) ye' TTtSs yap ov fieXKei ; KaXcu?, 
 e<f>r), \iyei<}. 5 
 
 XXV. OvKovv TOiovBe Ti, '^ B' o<; 6 %aKpdT7]<;, Bel ?;/ta? 
 ipeadai eavTov<s, rm iroLw tivX apa irpocrriKei tovto to irddo^ 
 traa'^eiv tov BiaffKeSdvvvadai, koI VTrep rov nroiov Tivo'i BeBievat 
 fir) irddr} avTO, KaX rm irol(p rivl <ov>' kcu fierd tovto av iirc- 
 cTKe'^acrdai, iroTepov rj '^V'^ij iaTCV, Koi e«r tovtojv Oappelv rj 10 
 BeBiivai VTrep t^? i^/j,eTepa<} ■^1'%^?; 'AXrjdrj, ecfyrj, \eyec<;, 'Ap' 
 
 C ovv Tm fiev crvvTeSevTi re koX avvdeTqi ovti <pvcrei irpocrrjKei, tovto 
 Trda-xeiv, BiaipeOrjvai TavTrj yirep crvveTedt]' el Be ti Tvy^dvei ov 
 a^iivdeTov, TOVTcp jxovm irpoa-ijKei, fMrj irda-^eiv TavTa, e'iirep Tm 
 
 c : BD omit dv. Z. and St. give av ei- 
 KMpoTepov with E. 
 
 78 B — 80 E, cc. XXV — xxix. The ques- 
 tion is then, wliat kind of things are 
 liable to dissolution and what are not? 
 and to which class does soul belong? 
 That which is composite and consists of 
 parts may doubtless be resolved again 
 into parts ; but if we can discover some- 
 thing which is incomposite and without 
 parts we may safely af&rm that this, if 
 anything, is indissoluble. To the class of 
 incomposites we should assign whatever 
 is constant and changeless ; to that of 
 composites all that is ever-changing. Now 
 this is precisely what constitutes the 
 difference between the contents of the 
 ideal and of the phenomenal world re- 
 spectively : the ideas are changeless, 
 simple, apprehensible by pure intelli- 
 gence ; phenomena are ever-changing, 
 manifold, apprehensible by mere sen- 
 sation. Let us term the former the in- 
 visible, the latter the visible world : to 
 which sphere shall we assign soul and 
 body respectively? (i) the body is visible, 
 the soul is invisible : (2) when the soul 
 apprehends by means of the bodily 
 senses, she deals with the ever-changing 
 and is herself filled with confusion and 
 
 uncertainty ; when she apprehends by 
 herself, she deals with the changeljCss, 
 and her own reflections are constant and 
 sure : (3) when soul and body are to- 
 gether, the soul is mistress, the body is 
 servant ; and to command is the function 
 of the divine, to obey is that of the mortal. 
 For these three reasons we decide that 
 the affinity of soul is to the divine and 
 changeless and indissoluble, the world of 
 ideas ; that of body to the mortal and 
 changeful and dissoluble, the world of 
 phenomena. Hence we should infer that 
 while the body quickly decays the soul 
 is nearly if not quite indissoluble. And 
 as even a body that is embalmed lasts 
 for an indefinite time, how much more 
 enduring then should we expect the soul 
 to be? 
 
 9. T$ iroCtp Tivl oil] oil is not in the 
 mss. but was supplied by Heindorf. It is 
 certainly necessary. 
 
 12. Kol o-uvfl^Tcp] As Prof. Geddes 
 remarks, avvBirif denotes the state which 
 is the result of the process expressed by 
 (rwTfSivTi. Wagner wrongly takes <j>i<rei 
 with itvv64ti^ : it belongs to irpos'^Kei. 
 
 14. €l!ir€p T(j) oiXXo)] It is to be noticed 
 that the present line of argument aims at 
 nothing more than establishing a proba- 
 
90 
 
 nAATfiNOS 
 
 [78 
 
 aWp ; AoKet fioi, e^rj, ovrtov ^X^''^' ° Ke/Si;?. Ovkovv ^.Trep del 
 Kara Tavra koi, maavTm<i e^ei, ravra fidXia-Ta elxd^ elvav tcL 
 a^vvOera, a he aWor aXXo)? koX firjSeiroTe Kara ravrd, ravTa Bk 
 avvdera; "E/jLoiye SoKel ovtw?. "I(o/ieu Sr], ecfyrj, ctti tuvto, i(j) 
 5 cLTrep iv r& eiJitrpoadev Xoyp. avTrj •q ovcrla ■^'s \o<yov SiBofiev rov D 
 eipai Kal epoJTwvTe^ koX aTroKpivo/jievoi, iroTepov waavTWi del e;^et 
 Kara Tavra fj aXKoT oWw? ; avTo to Xaov, avTo r^ koKov, aiiro 
 eKacTTOv b ecTtv, to ov, fiij ttotc fieTa^oXrjv Kol rjVTivovv evZe-)(eTai ] 
 rj deX avTwv eicaarov eaTi, fiovoeiSe^ ov avrd xad' avTo, waavTW^ 
 
 10 KaTa TavTO, e'^et kol ovSi'jroTe ovBafifj ovSafiwi dWoiao'iv ovSe/j,lav 
 ivBi'x^eTai ; 'flcrauTft)?, 6<j)r], avdyKt], 6 Ke/S?;?, KaTa TavTO. e'X^eiP, «3 
 XcofcpaTe'}. T( Be T(Sv iroXkwv [/taXtSz/], olov dvOpanrmv fj XirircDv 
 rj ifiaTiwv rj aXKcav (ovtivwvovv toiovtqjv, rj icreov rj koXwv rj irdvTwv E 
 Twv eKeivoiM bficovvfimv, apa KaTa TavTO, e'x^et, rj irav TovvavTiov 
 
 15 eKelvoi<; oiiTe avTci avTolf oure aWijXoiv ovBiirore, o5? eTros ei-ireiv, 
 ovBafjL<S<; KaTa TavTa ; Ovtco<;, e(j)r} 6 JLe^rj^' ovBeiroTe waavTos'i 
 
 bility that soul is immortal ; and as Kebes 
 afterwards points out, it merely shows 
 that soul should be much more durable 
 than body, not that she is inherently 
 eternal. I consider the chief importance of 
 this part of the dialogue to consist in the 
 opening it gives for the objections of Sim- 
 mias and Kebes. The former brings in 
 a theory of soul which would be fatal to 
 Plato's view, were it not refuted; the 
 latter necessitates the final investigation, 
 to which I conceive the present argument 
 is merely preliminary. At the same time 
 we are here first endeavouring to establish 
 a direct connexion between the soul's 
 nature and that of the ideas. 
 
 I. OVKOVV oirep del Kard ravrd] 
 Change in any object is the result of 
 transposition, compression, or separation 
 of its parts, or of increase or decrease in 
 their number. Consequently that which 
 has no parts cannot suffer change. All 
 material things have parts, therefore the 
 immaterial objects of reason are alone 
 changeless. 
 
 5. ev r^ {(j.irpoo'Sev XoYu] 75 D. 
 
 ■ffi \670v 8(So|i.Ev rov elvai] 'as whose 
 principle we assign being'. Xo7o>' = its 
 
 definition, notion, rou cXvai. is descrip- 
 tive genitive after "Kiyov. Madvig proposes 
 TO elvai, -which Schanz adopts : but ms. 
 authority is entirely against him, and 
 there is no real difficulty in the genitive. 
 Here again we have a marked association 
 of the ideal theory with the conversational 
 method. 
 
 1 2. rMV iroXXwv [koXiov] KaKwv is an 
 obvious interpolation : we are not con- 
 cerned merely with beautiful particulars ; 
 and presently we have ^ f<rui» -^ koKov tj 
 TT&VTUv t5>v iKeiyoLs oficavvfiiov, *all the 
 particulars which share the name of the 
 ideas'. The particulars are oiiavviia as 
 being copies of the ideas : see Sophist 
 234 B luiXTi/iaTa Kal oixiivvixa rav oVtuk 
 OTrep-yo^^ecos tj ypa<(>iK-j Tix'V- Cf. 
 Timaeus 41c. 
 
 15. oiirs avrd avrovs] ' they hardly ever 
 preserve any constant relation either to 
 themselves or to each other'. This is one 
 of many passages which show that Plato 
 thoroughly accepted the doctrines of 
 Herakleitos and Protagoras so far as re- 
 gards the material world. 
 
 16. ovTws, 2<t>ti 6 K^Prjs] Z. and St. 
 have ouTus aj, Ic^jj, raura, K^jSt/s. 
 
79] ^AIAflN. 91 
 
 79 ej^ei. Ovkovv rovrav fikv k&v ciflrato kolv tSot9 kov rat? aWat? 
 al<T6rj<rea-iv aXaOoio, rmv Se Kara ravTo, i^ovrmv ovk eariv 'Srqt 
 •KOT av aXK(p iiriXa^oio rj t^ t^? Biavota'; Xojofffim, dW' icrrlv 
 deiSrj TO, Toiavra kol ov'^ opard ; Havrdiracrtv, ecfyrj, dXr/drj Xiyeif. 
 
 XXVI. ©mjJLev ovv ^ovKei, e(f>r], Bvo e'iSrj twv ovtcov, to /j,ev s 
 oparov, TO Se aeiSe? ; ©m/iev, etjitj. Kat to fiev deiBh del Kard 
 TavTa e'^ov, t6 8e oparov /jbTj^eTrore Kara Taiird ; Kal tovto, e^rj, 
 dwfiev. $6/36 Si], ^ B' '61, aWo Ti riiiwv avrmv to fJ-ev awfid ean, 
 
 B TO Se ■yjrvxj] ; OvSev aWo, e<p7]. Horipq) ovv ofioiorepov tw eiBet 
 (fiaifiev av eivai koL ^vyyevecTTepov to aS/Ma ; HavTt, e<jy>], tovto ye 10 
 BrjXov, '6ti tS 6paT(S. Tt Be r) f^vxij ; opaTov rj deiBii ; Ov'X^ vtt 
 dvdpcoTTcov ye, m 1.caicpare<;, e^V- 'AWa r]fie'i<; ye Ta opard Koi ra 
 fjurj rrj Twv dvdpanrwv <j)va-ei Xeyofiev' rj aWr/ rivl o'cei ; T^ rwv 
 dvdpcuirmv. Tt ovv irepX ifrv^rji Xeyofiev ; oparov rj doparov elvai ; 
 Ov)(_ oparov. 'Aei,Be<; dpa; Nai. 'Ofioiorepov dpa yfrv^'^ aa)fiar6<s ts 
 
 C i<rriv r& deiBel, to Be rw oparat. Hacra dvdyicrj, w 'S/COKparei. 
 
 XXVII. OvKovv Kal ToBe nrdXai, iXeyofxev, on rj ^jrv^^, orav 
 fiev Tw ercofiari Trpocrp^jO^Tat ei? to aKOirelv ri rj Bid rod opav rj Bid 
 rov dKOveiv fj Bi aWij? rLvo<; alaOrjaew^ — rovro yap ecrriv to Bid 
 Tov erwfj,aT0<;, to St' alcrdijcrecov a-KOireiv ri — , rare fiev eXxerai viro 10 
 
 3. Tip Tijs SiavoCos Xo7io-|i,$] Cf. is aeiSis. No doubt the motive which 
 
 Phaedrus 247 c axpiifo-ros re Kal daxv- ^^^ Plato to choose deiSis instead of the • 
 
 fidruTTos Kal ana^s oicrla, optws mVa, direct verbal opposite abparov was the 
 
 ^vxv^ Kv^eppryrri fiovcfi Bearri v^. See etymological coraiexion of the former 
 
 also Timaeus 28 A. with"Ai5i)s : as if he would say that "kiirp, 
 
 5. 6u|i£v o4v povXji] Z. and St. have far from being the abode of death and 
 
 il povXei. nothingness, is the region of true existence 
 
 TO (iJv opaTov tA S^ dciSis] Compare alone. That he did connect the words is 
 
 the division of the universe into oparov clear from 80 D, 81 c, in spite of Cratylus 
 
 and vtyiyrov in Repiblic 509 D. 404 B. 
 
 8. oXXo Ti i^HwvavTcov] 'of ourselves 17. TroXai €X^70|iev] 65 b foil, 
 
 is not one part body, the other soul?' I 20. totc |iiv 2\KtTai] 'then she is 
 
 agree with Heindorf and Stallbaum in dragged by the body among things that 
 
 taking TiP-Civ aijQiv with to p.kv...ro S4. are never constant, and she herself loses 
 
 Ast would join it with oXXo Tt, on ac- her way and is filled with confusion and 
 
 count of the reply, ovdiv SXKo. But why dizziness, like one that is drunk ; for of 
 
 should special emphasis be laid on the such nature are the things that she 
 
 exhaustiveness of the division ? grasps'. ToiovTUv=ir\avap^vwv &c., cf. 
 
 15. ovx 6pttT6v] No distinction is in- 58 D. Plato means that when the soul 
 
 tended between ovx oparbv and aeidh. makes her investigations by the aid of 
 
 Plato has made his division into oparov the body, she necessarily is concerned 
 
 and AeiZis, and since soul is not oparov, it with sensible phenomena ; and since these 
 
92 
 
 nAATfl^OS 
 
 [79 
 
 rov o'cifiaro'! et? ra ovBinrore Kara tuvt^ e^x^ovra, Kal avrrj 7r\a- 
 varai Kal TapaTTerai Kol tXiyyi-a Sffirep fiedvovaa, are TOiovrmv 
 itfyaiTTo/jiivT] ; Hdvv ye. "Orap Be ye avrrj Ka& ainrjv <rKoiry, D 
 BKeiare o'iyeTui elv rb KaOapov re Kal del ov Kal aOavuTov Kal 
 
 5 maavTa)<; e^ov, Kal m? avyyevrj<; ovcra avrov aei fier eKeivov re 
 ylp/verai, iravirep ainrj Kaff" avrrjV yevrjTai, Kal i^y avTrj, Kai 
 ireiravTaL re rov irXavov Kal rrepl eKelva del Kara ravra (oaavTO)<} 
 e-xei, S,re roioirtov e^airroiMevr)' Kal rovro avrTJ<; ro TraOrjfJLa ^po- 
 vr]cn<; KeKXrjrai; ILavraTraaiv, e<l>7}, /caXto? Kal aXrjdi] Xeyeiv, c3 
 
 10 %a)Kpare<i. Uorepeo ovv aZ aoi BoKei rm e'lBei Kal eK raJi' eiMirpoaOev 
 Kal eK rwv vvv Xeyofievwv '^w^^ 6/J,oi6repov elvai Kal ^vyyevecr- E 
 repov; Ha? dv /loi BoKei, ^ B' o?, avyxcoprjcrai, w 'ZouKpare<;, eK 
 ravrr}^ t^9 fieQoBov, koX 6 Bv(Tfia6eararo<;, ort oXat Kai iravri, 
 ofioiorepov ecrrt '^v')(rj rm del aaavrw; e'xpvrt fiaXXov rj rm /jltj. 
 
 15 Ti Be ro awfia ; To5 erepw. 
 
 XXVIII, "Opa Brj Kal rfjBe, ort,, eireiBdv ev rm avrm toai 
 
 have nothing stable or sure in them, 
 there is a like want of stability and cer- 
 tainty in her perceptions. 
 
 6. KaV ■nivavraC t€ toi) irXctvov] ' she 
 has rest from her wandering, and in 
 dwelling with them is ever constant, since 
 the things that she grasps are constant'. 
 So in Republic 500 c it is said of philo- 
 sophers, (U TCTOr/ixiva arra Kcd Kara 
 TavTci del §x^^^ opwvras Kal OeojfjUvovs 
 ovt' iSiKovvra out' adiKovfisva vir' aXXi?- 
 Xwc, KofffUf Si v&vTa Kal Kara, "Koyov 
 ^X0*'7"tt, ravra fiLfieicrOal re Kal o ri fm- 
 Xicrra a^o/u>iova8at. For vXdvov com- 
 pare Parmenides 135 E ouk elai iv tois 
 opc^fi^POLS ov8i irepl ravra ttjv TrXdvrjv iiri- 
 ffKoirelv. 
 
 8. TOVTO awTTJs TO ira9i]|Jia] ' this con- 
 dition of hers is called wisdom '■ Olym- 
 piodoros is much exercised as to how 
 4>p6viiiais can be a irddrjua, how an activity 
 of the soul can be denoted by a passive 
 term. But Aristotle, for whom cognition 
 was emphatically an Mpyeia, says, de 
 anima ill iv 429^ 13, el Si) i(Tri rh voeiv 
 uxrwep TO altrddveaSai ^ Ttd,(7xei-v ri, of efr) 
 inrh rov voryroS ij n roiovrov (repov, I 
 think however that vaB-qjia here means 
 
 nothing more than condition : compare 
 Republic 5 1 1 D, where the term iraSijuara 
 is applied to the four mental states corre- 
 sponding to the four segments of the 
 line. 
 
 12. Ik ToiiTT]s Tijs nefloSou] ' from this 
 way of approaching the question '. /liS- 
 oSos is frequently used by Plato for ' scien- 
 tific method ', especially dialectic : cf. 
 Republic 510 B, Politicus 286 D. 
 
 13. SXu Ka\ iravrt] Prof. Geddes ex- 
 plains 'both in the general and in the 
 particular ' ; which I think is a needless 
 refinement. It is only a strong expres- 
 sion for 'altogether' and is not uncom- 
 mon: see Republic 469 C, 527 C (with 
 the article). Laws 779 B, Craiylus 43^ A. 
 In Laws 734 E we have the reverse order 
 T^J itavrl KoX oX(f), and in 944 C we find 
 oXox Kal rh iron in precisely the same 
 sense. In Lysis 2 1 5 c is the remarkable 
 phrase api ye o\<p rivl i^awariiixeBa ; 
 
 16. optt 84 Kal TflSe] After showing 
 that the soul resembles the ideas (i) in 
 her invisibility (2) in her affinity to the 
 changeless, we now come to the last piece 
 of evidence : that she is mistress over the 
 body and uses it as a slave. Cf. Timaeus 
 
8o] <E>AIAnN. 93 
 
 80 ■>/^i'%i7 KaX awfia, rm fikv BovXeveiv koX ap'^^eadai 7) (j)vcn<; irpoa- 
 raTTei, rfj Be ap')(eiv Koi Seairo^eiv' Kal Kara ravra av irorepov aot 
 BoKei '6fiOiov tq3 Beim elvai, Kal iroTepov tm OvrjTm ; rj ov Boicel aou 
 TO /iev Qelov olov apye.LV re Kal •^'yep.ovevei.v ire^vKevai, to Be SvrjTov 
 ap')(ea6ai re Kal BovXeveiv ; "E/^ofye. Horepo) ovv ?J '^V'^r) 'ioiKev ; i 
 A^Xa Br), to ^WKparei, on rj fiev "^vxrj T<p deiw, rh Be aSifia rco 
 6vr)Tw. SwoTrei Br], e^t], w K^/S?;?, el e'/e irdvTwv r&v elpTjfievcov 
 
 B rdBe riiuv ^vfi^alvei, rm fiev Oelo) Kal d6avdroa Kal votjto) Kal 
 fiovoetSel Kal dBtaXvTm Kal del waavTCi)<s Kara ravrd e')(pvTi eavra 
 ofiotoTarov elvai -yfrvyriv, tc5 Se dvdpunrivcp Kal dvrjTa) Kal TToXveiBel 10 
 Kal dvorjTU) Kal BiaXvTm Kal ixrfBeiroTe Kara ravra e'xpvri eavrm 
 ofioiorarov av elvau crwfia. exofnev n rrapd ravra aXXo Xiyecv, oa 
 ^iXe Ke/S?;?, fj oO;^ ovra'; e^yei ; Ovk e'xpfiev. 
 
 XXIX. Tt ovv; rovrcov ovtm? exovrav dp ov'^i, awfiari fiev 
 raj^y BiaXveaOai irpoaijKei, '^v'^^rj Be av ro "Trapairav d^iaXvrcp 15 
 
 C elvai rj iryyv'i n rovrov ; IIcu? jap ov ; 'Evvoei<; ovv, e(f)r], eTreiSdv 
 dTroOdvy 6 dii9pa3Tro<;, rb fJiev oparbv avrov, ro aaifMa, Kal ev oparm 
 Kei/jLevov, b Bf) veKpbv KaXovfxev, w irpocyrjKet BuaXveaOai Kal Bia- 
 Trlirreiv, ovk evdii^ rovrcov ovBev Treirovdev, dXX' emeiKW (JV)(ybv 
 iirijievei, ^(povov, idv fiev rt<s Kal ')(^apievrco<; e')((ov ro coSfia reXev- -20 
 
 34 C yeviaa Si Kal dper-^ irporipav Kal ros absurdly understands 'intelligent'. 
 
 irpea^vripav ^vx^'' c'^MIto! ws deavdriv Another rare usage is that of dirWavos in 
 
 Kol ap^ov<Tav ap^ofihov X^venTriaaTo. Parmenides 133 C, = ' incredulous'- Con- 
 
 3. 9e£co...9vTiTcu] Below, 80 B, we have sidering the exact correspondence of every 
 
 the contrast BAi^ — av6ponrlv(fi : but the word in one list with the antithetical word 
 
 antithesis Betov — evtyrbv occurs Timaeus in the other, Hermann ought not to have 
 
 69 c and D. wished that the mss. gave alaOririf. 
 
 10. 6|JioioTaTov etvanl/vxijv] I have 16: rj lyy^s ti tovtov] Here is a dis- 
 
 ' adopted this reading notwithstanding that tinct confession that the foregoing is only 
 
 there is much stronger ms. authority for an approximate demonstration : we have 
 
 ^vxnt which Schanz Z. and St. retain. made out a case of probability, and that 
 
 ipvxv can only be construed by supplying is all. 
 
 ^v/iPatvei again, which is intolerably 17. Iv opara k€C|j.£vov] ' situate in the 
 
 harsh. Such instances as Philebus 55 A region of the visible '. 
 
 troKkr] Tis oKoyia ^vfi^aivei. ylypeo-dai are 18. Kal StoirCirreiv] Z. and St. add 
 
 nothing to the point : such a construction Kal diavveia-dai which is found in the cita- 
 
 is common enough, but here we have rade tions of Stobaeus and Eusebius, but not 
 
 as the subject of ^v/ipaivei. in the best mss. Hermann justly says 
 
 I r . dvoiJTtji] i. e. 'not the object of ' imperite ab anima ad corpus translata 
 
 intelligence ' : a sense which, I believe, esse apparet '. 
 
 avbr/Tos bears nowhere else ; it is however 20. «dv f.iv tis] It seems to me that 
 
 placed beyond doubt by j-oiiTip in the needless difficulty has been raised over 
 
 opposite catalogue, by which Olympiodo- this sentence. xopi^iTws ixi^v simply 
 
94 
 
 HAATXINOS 
 
 [80 
 
 Tf)(Tig Koi iv roiairy &pa, koI irdvv fioKa, trv/i'Trecrov yap to trcofia 
 Kal rapixevOiv, wa-jrep oi iv Klyinrr^ Tapi,xev6evre<;, oXlyov oKov 
 fievei dfiijyavov Saov ^/ooi'oi'. evia Se fieprj tov crcu/iaro?, Kai av'O 
 (TaTrg, oara re Kal vevpa koX tcl TOiavra iravra, OfKa 019 eVo? 
 
 S el-rrelv dOdvard iariV rj oil; Nai. 'H Be '^vxn dpa, to detSh, to 
 ell ToiovTov Toirov eTepov ol'X^ofievov yevvalov Koi Kauapov Kai 
 deiBrj, et9 "AtSoi/ w? dXrfdm, ■irapd tov dyadov Kal if>p6vtfiov 0e6v, 
 ol, dv 6ecK edekrj, avTiKa Kal Ty ififi y^uxfi Itsov, avTt] he. S?) r)pA,v ?J 
 TOMVTV) Kal ovTco '!re(f>VKVia diraWaTTOiMevr} tov a-oofiaTO'i ev6v<i Bia- 
 
 10 7re(j>va7]Tai, Kal aTroXaiXev, w<; ^aaiv ol ttoWoI dvdpcoTroi ; woXKov 
 ye Set, a ^iXe Ke^Siy? Te Kal Sifi/iLa, dWd ttoWoJ fiaXKov e*8' E 
 ej^et" idv fiev Kadapd aTraWaTTrjTai, fiijBev tov creo/totTO? ^vve- 
 <^eKKOvaa, are ovSev Koivwvovcra avTm iv tS ^ia> eKOvera eivai,- 
 dXKa (f)evyovcTa avTO Kal avvrjdpoia'/j.evr) [avT'i] et? avTrfv], liTe 
 
 15 fJLe\eTm(ra del tovto — toOto he ovBev aXXo icrrlv rj opOcoi <j)iXo(ro- 
 
 means ' having his body in a good state ', 
 and to this ToiavT-g refers. If the body 
 •were in a healthy condition at death and 
 at a healthy age, it would hold out longer, 
 says Plato, against decomposition. Mr 
 Cope, I think, is quite correct in transla- 
 ting : ' if a man die with his body in a 
 vigorous state and at a vigorous period of 
 his life, a very consideirable time in- 
 deed '. The following sentence (rv/iireffiv 
 ...Xpirov is bracketed by Schanz after Ast. 
 I see no sufficient reason for doing so; 
 the y&.p is certainly not very obvious, but 
 may be explained thus, ' (nor is this the 
 strongest case, ) for if a body is embalmed, 
 it remains nearly whole for an incredible 
 time'. Hirschig brackets u(Twep...Tapi- 
 XevBhres : very superfluously. Plato says 
 (i) the body of a healthy man who dies 
 in the prime of life lasts a good while, 
 (2) an Egyptian mummy lasts an indefi- 
 nite time, (3) even without this some 
 parts of the human frame are almost in- 
 destructible. 
 
 3. Kal dv iraiiTJ] i. e. to aXXo crdfia. 
 
 7. «ls "A180U (5s dXr|6<3s] To Hades 
 rightly named, the abode of the unseen. 
 Cf. Gorpas 493 B. 
 
 80 E — 81 E, cc. xxix, XXX. We cannot 
 
 then believe that the soul when she leaves 
 the body is scattered and dispersed ; nay, 
 if she departs pure and untainted of the 
 body, because she has never willingly 
 held communion with it during life, she 
 is freed from its follies and passions and 
 reaches the abode of the invisible, where 
 she dwells vrith the gods for ever. But 
 if she has been the companion of the 
 body, sharing its pleasures and desires 
 and thinking that alone to be real which 
 she can apprehend by it, then she departs 
 tainted and clogged with the material ; 
 and in fear of the viewless region, weighed 
 down by her earthy load, she flits about 
 the visible world. Hence it is that ghosts 
 are seen about places of burial ; they are 
 such gross spirits as cannot rise from 
 earth, but wander about it, until for their 
 love of the material they once more enter 
 a bodily form. 
 
 14. Kal <rvvT|9poi(r|iEvT|] Schanz 
 brackets these words, but they are in 
 the best mss. , and I see nothing against 
 them. He omits air^ ds air-fiv, which 
 words have much slighter ms. support. 
 I have thought it sufficient to bracket 
 them. 
 
8 1] ^AlAnN. 9S 
 
 81 tjiovaa Kal rm ovn TeOvdvai /leXeraicra [paiSto)?]' ■^ ov tout av eirj 
 fieXeri] davarov ; HavTO/iradL ye, Ovkovv oirco fiiv 'i'xpvaa el<; to 
 ifjLotov avTy to aetSe? d'irep-)(eTai, to Oelov re Kal dddvarov Kal 
 (f>p6vi/iov, ol d(f)iKOfievy virdp'^^ei, avrfj evZaijiovv elvai, irXdvT]^ Kal 
 avoia<; Kal (po^cov Kol djplmv epvaraiv Kal tSv dWav KaKwv tcSv S 
 dvOpaireiav d7rr]Wayfj,evrj, wcnrep Se Xiyerai Kara t&v jxeiivrjiJLevaiv, 
 (6<; dXi]6mi Tov Xotirov '^^povov fieTci, t<Sp 6ewv Biajovar); ovtco 
 (fxSfiev, w Ke/S???, rj dXXa)<; ; 
 B XXX. OUtco vr] Ala, e<^7} 6 Kg/St;?. 'Eaz' Se ye ol/j,ai, fiefii- 
 aajxevrj Kal dKddapTO<; rov crcofiaTOi diraXXaTTrjTai, are tq) awfiaTi lo 
 ael ^vvovcra Kal tovto Oepairevovo'a Kal epwaa Kal ryeyorjTevfj.evri 
 VTT avTov vtro re rmv i-TrtOvfiiav Kal ■^Sovwv, Sxtts firjBev dXXo 
 BoKeiv elvai dkrjBei dXX' rj to crQ}fiaToeiBe<;, ov tk av 'd'^aiTO Kal 
 iSoi Kal irioi Kal (jidryoi Kal Trpo? rd d(ppoBiaia ■)(p')](7aiT0, t6 Sk 
 TOt? ofifiacn <7K0T(BSe? Kal detBe<;, votjtov Se Kal <pi,Xocro<j)iq, aiperov, i$ 
 TovTO Be eldicrfievr) fiiceiv re Kal rpifieiv Kal ^evyeiv, oiiTO) Brj 
 C e'X^ovcrav o'lei '^v^-rju avTrjv Ka& avTr\v elXiKpivr\ diraXXd^eo'dai ; 
 OvB' oTraxrriovv, e<f>T]. 'AXXd Kal BieiXrjfifiivijv ye olfiai inro rov 
 ca/JLaroeiSov^, o ainfj rj o/juiXid:^ re Kal crvvovirla tov <TWfiaTo<i Bid 
 TO del ^weivat Kal Bid Trjv iroXXrjv fieXerrjv iveiroirja-e ^vfi^vTov ; 20 
 
 1. ptfZlai savours of the margin, and Geddes' citation of Phaedrus 241 D, 
 
 I have followed Schanz and Hirschig in where however Schanz reads XiyovB' for 
 
 bracketing it. \4yav. Not one of the constructions 
 
 J. aYpW IpuTCDv] a. Republic 'I'j'i'B given in Riddell, digest of idioms § 271 
 
 Suvov Ti Kal aypiov Kal avoixov itriOvtitav foil. , at all justifies this, which is not an 
 
 cTdos ^KcuTTip hean. anacoluthon but a solecism. It has been 
 
 7. SioYoiio-!]] I have ventured to suggested to connect Sidyovffa with air^p- 
 
 follow Heindorf and Hirschig in reading x''"'") ^^^ I think this is hardly possible, 
 
 thus. The mss. all have 5ia7ou(7a, which 13. oS tis av ai|/aiTo] Ql. Theaetelus 
 
 most editors retain, but which I cannot 155 E oi ouS^y aX\o ol6/j,ivoi ehai ■^ ov an 
 
 believe that Plato wrote. It is idle to Sivavrai, dirpl^ roiv x^P"^" ^apiirOai, and 
 
 quote Thucydides VII 42 § 2 : for in the Sophist lAfi A. 
 
 first place it is rash to argue that a con- 18. Siei\i]|i,[ii.4v>]v] ' interpenetrated '- 
 
 struction found in Thucydides is there- The notion of this word is the mixture of 
 
 fore possible in Plato ; secondly, it is not two substances so that the particles of 
 
 a parallel case. When Thucydides says one are held apart by those of the other. 
 
 2iJ/)a/coo-Iois KaT&TXri^is iyivero, and after The soul's substance is as it were adulte- 
 
 a subordinate clause resumes with bpdv- rated by a material alloy. Z. and St. 
 
 res, the shock is not very great ; but that omit Kal, which is however in the best 
 
 after the regular datives evSal/iovi, airijk- mss. 
 
 Xa7^^yB Plato should end with this un- 20. 5i!|jh|)dtov] 'ingrained'. The soul's 
 
 grammatical Smyovira is quite a different perpetual communion with the body has 
 
 thing. More to the purpose is Prof. so inseparably blended the material and 
 
96 HAATflNOS [82 
 
 Udvv ye. 'EiJ,^pi6e<s Be rye, m ^IXe, tovto oUcrBai XP'^ """^^ *«^ 
 fiapv Kal yew8e<! koL oparoV 8 hfj koX exovtra rj roiavrri yjrvxv 
 ^apvveTal re koI eXKerai iroKiv el<s tov oparbv roirov, <f)6^a) rod 
 deiSovs re Kal"AiSov, cca-irep Xeyerai,, -jrepl to, fivrjtiaTd re koI tov<}D 
 
 S rd(})ov<! KvXivBovfievT], Trepl a Srj koI W(j}dr] arra i^u^wi' CTKioeiBrj 
 ^avrda-fiara, ota Trapexovrai ai Toiavrai ifrvxal eiScdXa, at fir] 
 Ka6apw<; diroXvOelaai dWd tov oparov fierexovcrai,, Bio Kai opwvrai. 
 Et«os ye, « 2(w«paTe?. Et«:o9 fievTOi, w Ke/Si;?* Kal ov ri ye ra? 
 Twv dyaQ&v ravra? elvai, aXka ras twv <pav\<ov, at irepi, ra 
 
 10 Toiavra dvayKa^ovrat, irkavaaQab Blktjv rivovcrai Tyi irporepa^ 
 rpo^rj^ KaKrji; ov<Trj<;' Kal jJ-expi' ye tovtov irXavwvTai, ea)9 av ry 
 TOV ^vveiraKoXovBovvTO'i tov o-asp.aToeiBov'i eiridviiia trdXiv evBe- E 
 Owcrtv el<; aco/jia. 
 
 XXXI, 'EvBovvrai Be, wa-jrep elKot;, eh roiavra ijdrj oiroV 
 
 15 aTT av Kal fiefieXeTrjKViai TVX(ocnv ev tw /3ta). Ta Tiroia Brj Tavra 
 Xeyei<;, w StuKpare? ; Olov toi)? fiep yacrrpifiapyla^ re Kal v^peit 
 Kal <})t,XoTroaia<; fiefieXeTr/KOTai Kal p/rj BievXa^rjfievovi €(.9 Ta twv 
 ovcov yevri Kal tqjv TOiovTWV Brjpiaiv etKO^ evBveaOai' rj ovk olei ; 82 
 ILdvv p,ev ovv elKO'i Xiyet^, Toi)? Be ye dBiKiaq re Kal TvpavviBa^ 
 
 the spiritual that they become virtually sufficient to inspire the soul with bodily 
 
 one nature ; hence even when separated desires but cannot afford means to gratify 
 
 from the body she is not yet freed from them: so that the longing grows more 
 
 matter. and more intense until the soul is once 
 
 3. papweraC T£ KoV ?\KeTtti] Cf. /!4ae- more confined in her earthy prison. 
 drus 248 c. 81 fe — 82 B, c. xxxi. These souls pass 
 
 5. TTspl i£ 8i^ Kal (o<t>6T|] This is an in- into the bodies of animals whose habits 
 
 teresting illustration of the manner in are likest to their former way of life ; the 
 
 which Plato will take some popular be- sensual into asses, the cruel into wolves 
 
 lief, as he often takes some popular ex- and hawks ; while they that have lacked 
 
 pression, and fill it with a deeper meaning philosophy but led humane and harm- 
 
 of his own. In Laws 865 D we find less lives pass into bees and wasps and 
 
 another current opinion about ghosts, ants, or even into the human form 
 
 here however without any special Platonic again. 
 
 turn : that if one man killed another the With this chapter should be compared 
 
 spirit of the slain wandered about his the remarkable passage Timams 91 D 
 
 accustomed haunts, terrifying and tor- foil. The other principal statements of 
 
 menting the homicide so long as he re- Plato on metempsychosis are in Timaeus 
 
 mained there. 41 e — 42 D, Republic 618 A — 620 c, 
 
 II. Tpo(|)tis] ' mode of life '. Ph(udrus ia,^-&. Wyttenbach has a long 
 
 ?<os dv] ' until by craving after that and learned note on the subject, deahng 
 
 bodily nature which is their companion chiefly with neoplatonist views, 
 they are again confined in a body'. 17. [ii] SiEuXaPi)|j.4vovs] 'who have 
 
 The presence of this material alloy is not taken heed to their ways '. 
 
82] 
 
 ^AIACIN. 
 
 97 
 
 Kai ap'jraya'} irpoTeriiJbrjKOTa^ eh to, twv Xvkcov re Kol lepaxav koX 
 LKTivavryevT)' rj Trot av aXXocre ^x^fJ-ev ra? roiavTa<i Uvai; ^AfiiXei, 
 6^9? 6 Ke/Sij?, eh ra Toiavra. Ovkovv, tj S' o?, hrjXa Zrj KaX raXXa, 
 ol av eKaara loi, KaroL Ta<; avrSv o/iotoTi/ra? t^? fieXirr]!; ; AijXov 
 Sij, e^Tj' TTtus S' oij ; Ovkovv evhai/iovea-TaToi, e(f>rj, kol tovtcov elerl S 
 Kai 619 ^ekricrTOV tottov tovre'i ol Trjv BrjfioriKrjv koI -TroXLTiKrjv 
 
 B dpeTrjv CTrtTeTT/Sei/KOTe?, ^v B^ xaXova-i, a(o<^pocnjV7}v re icaX ZiKaio- 
 crvvrjv, i^ e6ov<! re Koi fieXeTr]<; yejovv^av avev <f)iXoao<j)ia<; re KaX 
 vov ; Hf] St] ovTOi evhaiiiovearaToi, ; Tt ; ov rovTOVf eiKo^ iariv eh 
 ToiovTov TTaXcv a<f)iKvei<Tdai, irdXiriKov re KaX Tj/juepov yevos, ^ irov lo 
 fieXiTTwv rj a-tfyr/Kwv rj fjLvpixrjKcav, rj KaX eh ravrlv ye traXiv ro 
 dvOpdj-mvov 761/09, KaX yiyv'ecrQat, e^ avrwv dvBpa<; fieTpiovi. Et/<:o9. 
 XXXII. Et9 Se ye Oeojv yipo<; (irj ^iXo(To<^rjaavTi KaX TravTeXwv 
 
 C Kadapm aTriovri ov 6efJ,i<! d^iKvelcrdat, aXfC rj rm ^iXofiadel. dXXd 
 
 2. ^a,\Uv] So Schanz with the best 
 mss., joining dv with Uvou. Z. and St. 
 ipcufiev. 
 
 4. Kard. Ttts oiruv a|Jioi.6TT|Tas] 'ac- 
 cording to the peculiar affinities of their 
 pursuits'. Cf. Timaeus 42 C Kara t\v 
 o/toioTijTa T^s ToC rpoTTOv yeviaeas. 
 
 6. Stdiotiki^v Kal iro\iTi.Ki]V dpcTrjv] 
 As to this popular and social virtue see 
 on 69 B and appendix I. InRefiublkCi^c 
 we find that this class of people are in 
 great danger of making a bad choice at 
 the aip€(ris plom. One who chose a ty- 
 rant's life was tCov iK toO oipavov tjkoptcov, 
 iv rerayfi^vy iro\tT€lg, iy ry ■jrpoT4p<p ^i(p 
 ^e^naKOTttj ^dsi avev <pt\o(ro^las aper'^s 
 fieTeiXTj^OTd, us Sk Kal elireLj/ oiiK Aarrous 
 etvai h> Tots toiovtols a\i.(TKoiJ,hovs rois Ik 
 Tov oipavov ■iJKOVTas, are irovuiv ar/vixviff- 
 
 TOVt. 
 
 9. t£ ; ov Toirovs] So Schanz : B has 
 Sri oi. St. and Z, give on Toirovs. 
 
 els toioStov] ' to another social and 
 gentle race like themselves'. In Ti- 
 maeus 91 D we have another class of 
 harmless but unphilosophic men with a 
 different destination: t6 5^ tuv ipviuv 
 (l)v\ov neTeppvBiil^iTO, avrl rpixOiv rmph, 
 ipiiv, iic Twv dxaKUy dvSpav kov^uiv di, Kal 
 fiSTeupoXoyiKuv /liv, rfyov/iii'ai' Si 81,' iyj/eus 
 ris Tepl TOVTUV mroSel^ets /SejSaioraros etnai 
 
 P. 
 
 Si' ei^Seiav. Who these are we learn in 
 Republic 529 A — 530 C: viz. astronomers 
 who fancy that observation of the heavenly 
 bodies is in itself important, apart from 
 its bearing on philosophy. 
 
 13. £vSpas (lerpCovs] 'worthy citizens'; 
 men who practise dTjfioriKi] Kal iroXirt/c^ 
 dperri and discharge their social and do- 
 mestic duties creditably. They belong 
 to a decidedly higher grade than the 
 character described in Republic 554. 
 
 82 c, D, c. xxxii. But to the company 
 of the gods only the true philosopher can 
 come. For this cause he keeps himself 
 pure from vice, not from the worldly 
 motives that govern the vulgar, but be- 
 cause he will not resist philosophy when 
 she offers freedom and purification to his 
 soul. 
 
 13. els 8e' 76 9ewv y^vos] ' but to the 
 company of the gods none may approach 
 who has not sought wisdom and departed 
 in perfect purity ; none but the lover of 
 learning'. The words aXX' ^ ry 0iXo- 
 p-aBei are appended as though foi 0iXo- 
 <ro07)(rai'ri Kal irai/TeXffls Ka6ap(f diri6vTi 
 had not preceded: they are certainly 
 pleonastic, but perfectly natural and in- 
 telligible. I see no cause to insert aXXij), 
 far less to adopt such a violent transposi- 
 tion as Wyttenbach suggests, ^iXo/iafl^s 
 
 7 
 
98 
 
 nAATIiNOS 
 
 [82 
 
 TOVTCOV evsKa, w eraipe "^ifjiiiia re koI Ke/Si;?, 01 opdco? <j)iXoao- 
 ^ovvTe'i direj(pvrai, twv Kara to crcSfia i-Trcdv/Jiiwv diracraiv Kal 
 Kaprepovcri koI ov TrapaBiSoacriv avTois eavrov^, ov ri olKo<f>0opiav 
 re Kal ireviav <f>o/3ovfj,6voi, wairep ol "koXKoX koI ^iXo'^^p^fiaToi' 
 5 ovBe aS drtfiiav re Kal dSo^iav fio-)(6r)p£a<s BeSioTe^i, wairep 01 
 <l)iXap')(pl re Kal (ftiKorifioi, eireira dire'^ovTai avTUiv. Ov <^dp av 
 TrpeiToi, e(j>Tj, w %d)Kpare'i, 6 KeySi;?. Ov fievroL fid Aia, rj S' o?. 
 ToiydpToi TovToii; jiev airacriv, m KeyQij?, eKelvoi, ot9 ti fieXei t^? D 
 eavTwv '^w%^?, dX\a firj adofid rv TrXdrrovre^ ^£(7i, ^(aipeiv elirov- 
 10 res ov Kara ravrd TropevovTai avTOK, (u? ovk elSocriv oiry epy^pvrai, 
 avTol Se i^yov/jLevoi ov Beiv ivavria ry <j)i\o(TO(f>ia TrpaTTeiv Kal Ty 
 eKeivr)<} Xvaei re Kal KaOapfiw Tavrrj rpetrovrab eKelvrj iirofievoi, y 
 eKelvi] v^TjyeiTai,. 
 
 and ipCKdao(j>os are frequently identified 
 by Plato, especially in the passage quoted 
 by Heindorf, Republic 376 B t6 7e ^iXo- 
 li.a.9k% KoL ^iX6(roipo» Tairov, St. gives 
 aXXy Tj. 
 
 g. o-iuna Ti irXctTTOVTes] Literally 
 ' moulding a body ', i. e. spending all 
 their care on tending the body. Cf, 75:- 
 maeus 88 c tov re oS (ru/^a ^Tri/teXffis 
 TrXarroiTa rdis rrp ^ux?s avTairodoTioP 
 Ko'^ffeis. Also Republic 377 c koX ifK&T- 
 Teiv Tas ^vxas Tois /liOoiS iroXi /jiSXKov 
 rfl TO. ffihfiaja rats x^P^^^- The usage of 
 the word in the present context easily 
 arises from that in the two passages 
 quoted, where it signifies the develop- 
 ment of the body by nourishment and 
 training and in each case is opposed to 
 the culture of the soul. The reading of 
 BCD is ixiiiian, whence Fischer sug- 
 gested (TW/ua Tt, which with the Ziirich 
 editors I have adopted : the n seems to 
 add a touch of contempt. E has aiiixara, 
 retained by Stallbaum. Ast's o-u/tari 
 vp&TTOVTet, 'working for the body', 
 is a very strange expression, by no means 
 justified by the use ofirpdao-eiv in Thucy- 
 dides. Schanz adopts Heindorf's bold 
 alteration Xar/jeuopres, which I cannot 
 approve ; far less Madvig's coinage TreXo- 
 
 83 D — 84 B, cc. xxxiii, xxxiv. Philoso- 
 
 phy, finding the soul a prisoner in her 
 bodily abode, strives by persuasive admo- 
 nition to set her free; telling her that 
 she is deluded by the body and its sen- 
 sations: from such she should withdraw 
 herself and trust to herself alone ; for 
 she alone can behold the invisible and 
 apprehend the true. And the soul that is 
 discreet listens to the voice of philosophy, 
 for she sees that indulgence of bodily pas- 
 sions has this fatal result. Whatsoever 
 awakes in us the strongest pleasure or 
 pain, fear or desire, this we think to be 
 most surely true. So if she share the 
 body's pleasures and pains, she virill also 
 share its beliefs concerning truth; and 
 being the body's close companion through 
 life will leave it at death contaminated 
 by its nature: therefore she will never 
 reach her home in the invisible but must 
 enter again into another body. For this 
 reason the philosopher is virtuous ; not 
 from any common motive ; but because, 
 when philosophy is delivering his soul, 
 he will not undo her work by indulging 
 the body's appetites. So his soul has 
 peace from its troubling and lives apart 
 from it; and at death she returns to her 
 divine abode, fearing not at all lest as 
 she departs she be scattered by the 
 winds and exist no more. 
 
?3] 
 
 ^AIAflN. 
 
 99 
 
 XXXIII. IIco?, CO Sw/epare? ; '£70) epw, e^rj. lYiyvcocrKova-i, 
 yap, fj S' 0?, ol ^CkofiaOel<; 'oti irapaXa^ovaa avrwv rrjv -y^v^^v 17 
 
 E <f)iX,oa-o<f>ia aT6;!^i'£0? BiaBeBefievrjv iv tw aoofiaTi koI irpoaKeKoXkTj- 
 fiivrjv, dvayKa^o/iivriv Be ciffirep Bia eipyfiov Bia tovtov (TKOiretadat 
 Ta ovra dXXd firj avTrjv Bt avrfji;, koI iv Trdarj ajxaOia kvXiv- 6 
 Bovfievrjv, Kal tov eipyfiov ttjv Beivorrfra KariBovcra '6t(, Bi eiridv- 
 fiiai ecnlv, w? dv iidXiara avTO^i 6 BeBe/J-evo^ ^vKKriTTTcap etrj rm 
 83 BeBiadai, — oTrep ovv Xeyeo, yiyvwaKovcnv ol <})iXoiJLa6e2<! on ovtco 
 TrapaXajSovaa 17 (ptXocro^la ej(^overav avrwv Trjv '^v'^rjv ijpi/jLa 
 vrapa/jLvdeiTai koX Xveiv iiri'x^eipei, evBeiKvvfievq oti diraTrj'; /lev 10 
 fie<nri rj Bid Tmv ofi/idrmv (TKi^L<i, dTrdrr]^ Bk rj Bid rwv ancov koX 
 r&v dXKcov aladrjaeayv, ireiBovaa Be ix tovtqjv fiev dvaywpelv otrov 
 fjirj dvdyKT) avT0i<; ^(^prjcrOai, avrrjv Be eh avTrjv ^vWiyeadai koX 
 adpoi^eadai irapaKeXevofievr], iricTTeveiv Be /iTjBevi dWeo dW' fj 
 avrrjv avTy, Tt, dv vorjcrri avTrj Kaff avTrjv avrd Kad' avro rdov 15 
 
 B ovTCOv' o Tt 8' av Bi dWmv crKoirf) iv aX\.oi<; 6v dWo, firjBev 
 rjyelcrOai dXrjdh' elvai Be to fiev toiovtov aicrOjjTov re koI oparov. 
 
 4. Sid. «ip7|jioii] ' through the bars of 
 her prison ', She can indeed see rd 
 ovra, but only in the material symbols 
 by which alone they reveal themselves to 
 the senses. 
 
 5. KvXivSov|i^vT]v] ' wallowing in utter 
 ignorance '. Stallbaum compares PoHHczts 
 309 A, Theaetetus 1 72 c. 
 
 6. oTi Si' eiri6v|jiCas arrW] I take the 
 literal translation of this sentence to be 
 as follows : ' that it (the prison) exists 
 by means of lust ; just the way in which 
 the captive is most apt to aid and abet 
 his own incarceration ' ; in other words, 
 the prison is the dungeon of lust, wherein 
 the prisoners are accomplices in their 
 own imprisonment — ws I understand as 
 a simple relative, ' in which way '. The 
 phrase St' iiriffv/ilas larlv is understood 
 by Stallbaum as a periphrasis for iiriBv/iel, 
 by Heindorf for imSvixetTai. The former 
 makes the clause iii av /wXiffTo, express 
 the object of the iiriBvida, which comes 
 to this: the prison (i.e. the body) de- 
 sires to find out how the soul may most 
 aid her own imprisonment. But this is 
 downright nonsense. Heindorf rightly 
 
 interprets the cis av fi,d\urTa clause, except 
 that he makes tiis = ioa-re. But Si' iinSu- 
 fiias itrrlv = iindufieiTaL is surely very 
 questionable ; moreover it is not the body 
 but bodily pleasures which the embodied 
 soul desires. The interpretation I have 
 suggested precisely agrees with 83 D : 
 the prison of lust is just that very one of 
 which the soul shuts the doors upon 
 herself : for each act of indulgence is the 
 shooting of a fresh bolt. The translator 
 in the Engelmann series alone takes the 
 same view : ' weil er auf der Sinnenlust 
 beruht, auf welche Weise der Gefangene 
 selbst hauptsachlich Heifer seiner Ge- 
 fangenschaft sein muss '. 
 
 7. T^ SeS^irSai] So all the mss. Schanz 
 and Z. after Heindorf s conjecture read 
 TOV. But since (rvWa/i^dveiv continually 
 takes a dative there is no reason why the 
 verbal irvWrjirTiiip should not be followed 
 by the same case : the alteration seems 
 gratuitous. 
 
 8. ovra goes with ^x"'"^"-''- 
 
 16. Si' aWwv] i. e. tuv dia aajxaToi 
 aicrBrjaeijiv. iv d'Wois ov aXXo, ' varying 
 with varying conditions '. 
 
 7—2 
 
100 eaathnos [83 
 
 b Be avTrj Spa vorjrov re Kal aetSe?. TavTrj ovv rfj Xvaei, ovk 
 OiOfievTj Beiv ivavriovaOab r) tov oSs akr]6Si<; <piXocr6(j)ov '^v'x^rj ovt(o<! 
 airiy^^erai twv rjBovcov re Kal iinOvfimv Kal XvttSv xal ^o^ccv KaG" 
 '6<rov Bvvarai, Xoyi^o/iivrj Sri, iiveiBdv rt? (T^oSpa riaOfj rj ^o^Tjdfj 
 £ 7] iTTiOvfiijar), ovSev roaovTov KaKov eiraOev air avTwv &v av Tts 
 oiTjQeiri, olov rj voarj(Ta<; 17 Tt dva\aiaa<i Bid ra? eiTLOvfiia'i, a\X' C 
 TrdvTcov /jifiyio'TOV re kukov koI ea^^arov ia-ri, tovto Traix^et Kal ov 
 Xoyi^erai avTo. Tt tovto, tu 'Xa)KpaTe<; ; e^rj 6 K.e^r]<!. "Oti ^jrvxv 
 iravTCx; dvOpwirov dvayKa^eTai afia re i^adrjvai rj \vTrrj0ijvai, a^S- 
 
 10 Bpa eVi TO) Kal rjyeiaOai, irepl o av /MaXiaTa tovto irdcr'XTj, tovto 
 ivapyea-TaTov re elvai Kal dXrjQeaTaTov, oiij(^ ovTto? e'xpv' TavTa Be 
 fj,a\i,(rTa <Ta> opaTa' rj ov; Haw ye. Ovkovv ev tovtw tw 
 irddei fidXiffTa KaTaBelrai '^v)(rj viro crcofiaTO'; ; Iltos B>] ; "OtiD 
 eKdcTrj riBovrj Kal Xvttt} uxyirep rjXov e^ovaa TrpocrrfKol avrriv wpo'; 
 
 15 TO xTrnfJua Kai 7rpo(nrepova Kat TTOiei (Tco/j,aToecBrj, Bo^d^ovaav TavTa 
 aX/rjdrj eivai airep av Kai to aoofia <j)y. eK yap tov ofioBo^elv t& 
 (yd>iLaTi Kai toi^ avToi^ ^(aLpeiv dvajKa^eTai o2/j,ai ofioTpoTro'; Te Kal 
 6fi6Tpo(f)o<; yiyveaOai Kal oia (jLtjBiiroTe eh "AiBov Ka9apa><i d(f>i- 
 Keadai, aXkd del tov awfiaTO'i dvaTrXea e^ievai, &(TTe Tayy iraKw 
 
 20 TTiTTTeiv ets aWo aaifia Kal wairep aireipoiievrj ifii^vecrdai, Kal eK 
 TOVTWV dfioipo^ eivai t^? tov Oeiov Te Kal KaOapov Kal fj,ovoeiBov<! E 
 a-vvovaia<;. 'A\7]0e<TTaTa, e(f)rj, Xeyei^, 6 K.e/3r]^, w StBK/jare?. 
 
 4. XoYiJon^vT]] The soul reflects that TXavKuv, /liyas, oux oVos SoKet Schanz, 
 vehement passions of pleasure, pain, fear, against the mss., writes iir' airav : but 
 or desire so absorb the attention that diro may equally well be said; 'arising 
 nothing seems so real as the object in- from them '. 
 
 spiring them. Therefore if she is strongly 6. otov tj voo-ijcras] the considerations 
 excited by bodily affections of this kind on which the Sri/wriKij dper-ri is based, 
 she will be forced to think nothing so 8. 8ti '|n'X'i] ' that the soul of every 
 real as these material things : so that in- man in the act of feeling some vehement 
 stead of seeking truth in the changeless pleasure or pain is at the same time con- 
 verities of the intelligible she will look strained to believe that whatsoever most 
 for it in the everchanging flux of phe- strongly excites such feelings, this is 
 nomena. most vivid and true; whereas it is not 
 
 ijo-efj if <|>opTi9fj] Z. and St. add ^ so'. 
 XujnjflS, but these words are not in BCD, 12. rd 6paTd] Heindorf supplied ret, 
 
 and the other mss. are not agreed as to which is missing in the mss. 
 their position. 15. tovto oXtiStj] So Schanz for 
 
 5. ovS^v TOo-oiJTOv] ' not on the scale raCra : rightly, I tliink. 
 
 that one might suppose'. For too-oBtov 17. 6|i.oTpoirosTEKaV6)i6Tpo(f>o$] 'like 
 
 virtually = ' so little ' compare Republic it in her ways and nurture '. 
 608 B niyai yap, dprpi, dyiiv, (3 ^iXe 
 
84]' 
 
 $AIAnN. 
 
 lOI 
 
 XXXIV. TovTcov Tolvvv eveKa, m Ke/Si;?, ol BiKam^ (ftiXo- 
 fjiadeK KocrfjiLoi elcri koX dvSpeioi, oi5% Sv oi iroKKoi eveica, ^acrbV 17 
 84 <ri) olei; Oi) hrjra ejcoje, Ov yap' dW' oiiTco Xoyiffair av '^V)(rj 
 dvhpo'i ^CKo<t6(^ov, Koi ovK av olrjdeirj Trjv /lev <j>i\oao^iav y^pfjvau 
 eavTrjV \veiv, Xvov(7rj<; Be eiceivrji} avrrjv •KapahtBovai rail TjSoi'at? s 
 Kal XviraK eavrrjv irdXiv av ijicaTaBeiv koi dvrjvvTov epyov irpdr- 
 Teti/, Ti.rjveK&Trrj'; rivd ivavTicos la-rbv /J,eTa'X^ei,pi^ofiev7]V dXXd 7a- 
 Xijvrjv TOVTWV irapa<TKevdKpv<Ta, e-irofievr} rm Xpyccr/Mm Kal ael iv 
 TovTft) ovaa, to dXriOe^ Kal to delov Kal rd dho^aarov OetofikvT] Kal 
 B vTT eKeivov Tpe^oixivt], ^rjv re ohrai ovra Secv, e«a? dv ty, Kal 10 
 eireiSav reXevrijerrj, et? to ^vyyevev Kal eh ro toiovtov d<J3iKOfiev7) 
 airrjXXa'^dai, rmv dvOpwjrivcav KaKwv. eK Brj t^9 TOiavTr]<i rpo(f>rj<s 
 ovSev Beivov /at) (jyo^rjOr}, ravrd 7' eTnTriBeixracra, m ^ifi/iia re Kal 
 
 2. ov\ c5v 01 iroXXol Hvixd ^a<n,v] 
 
 ' not for the reasons which the many as- 
 sign for being so '. Schanz brackets (j>a(!lv, 
 and Heindorf proposes (paivovrai., both, 
 as I think, needlessly. Stallbaum rightly 
 supplies Kocfuoi elvai Kal dvSpeloi. 
 
 3. oi ydp' dXX' oiiru] This punctua- 
 tion is clearly right here as in Phaedrus 
 276 D. 01} yap aXKa gives just the wrong 
 sense. 
 
 5. Xvovo-rjs 8' ExeCvi]s] 'and while 
 philosophy is loosing her to give herself 
 up to pleasures and pains that they may 
 bind her fast '. The appended infinitive 
 iyKaraSeti' is a very common idiom, and 
 why Madvig should wish to expunge 
 TrapaSiSopai. I cannot see. Schanz how- 
 ever brackets it. 
 
 7. |j.eraxe>'pi.|a|j,^VT]v] This is doubtless 
 the right reading, although the mss. are 
 stronger in favour of jiieTax«/)ifo/x^n;s : 
 the genitive is however, as Prof. Geddes 
 says, easily accounted for by the proximity 
 of nijveXoxris. The soul works at a kind 
 of Penelope's web, only in tlie opposite 
 way. Penelope, to preserve her virtue, 
 undid at night the work she wove by 
 day; the soul weaves again the web of 
 lusts which philosophy has been unravel- 
 ling to set her free. Prof. Geddes would 
 govern HijveXdvrii by ivavHias : but I 
 believe Plato never uses the genitive with 
 
 this adverb; for in 112 E, to which Prof. 
 Geddes refers, roirov is governed by 
 KaravTiKpi. St. has lieraxeiptl^oniviis. 
 
 8. TOVTUV] SC. T)S0VaV Xal TyVTUV. 
 
 Iv ToiiTa>] See on 59 A. 
 
 10. -im' tKiCvov Tp«<j>o|ilvT)] Compare 
 Phaedrus 248 B off 5' 'ivcfC t) iroXX-Jj ffTrouSi) 
 t4 Ski\Bda^ IdeTu Tre8iov off iarlv, iji re Br) 
 Trpocr-^KovfTa ^vxvs Ttp Aplo'Tip voixi] iK ruO 
 imt Xeiyufiyos Tvyxavei ovaa, ij re ToO 
 irrepoS (piais, <} ^vxv Kov(f>ll^€Tai., roircp 
 Tp4<peTai. The souls which cannot reach 
 the plain of truth t/)o0S So^aa-r^ x/'wyrai. 
 Compare the still more striking meta- 
 phor in Timaeus 90 A iKeWev yip, SSev 
 i] irpdn-T) TTji i'vxvs yiveaii (ijiv, t4 Beiov 
 T-qv Ke(pak7iP Kal pi^av tjh&v avaxpefiavviii 
 dpBot irav t6 <tCjim. 
 
 11. toiovtov] Sc. &\7i6h Kal Beiov Kal 
 &S6^a(TT0v. 
 
 13. oi'SJv Beivov (11^ <|)opT|eTi] For this 
 unusual phrase compare Republic 465 B, 
 Apology 28 B, Gorgias 520 D. Also Aris- 
 tophanes Ecclesiazusae 650 oiyl S^os jU^ ai 
 0tX^cri7. 
 
 TavTa y' eiriTi]S«!o-oo-o] mss. raOra d'. 
 Many editors, beginning with Forster, 
 have regarded these words as a gloss 
 upon iK TOiaiTTjS rpoip^s, and Schanz 
 brackets them. This view may be right ; 
 but I think there is hardly sufficient evi- 
 dence for bracketing. If the words are 
 
I02 
 
 nAATflNOS 
 
 [84 
 
 Ke/Si;?, OTTW? fifj 8ta(rTra(76eicra iv rj] diraWayg toD accfiaro'; viro 
 r&v avejxcov hia^va-rjOela-a koI BiaTrrofjievr] o'ij(7]Tai koX ovBev en 
 ovSa/xov fi. 
 
 XXXV. "^ir/rj oiiv ijevero ravra eltr6vT0<; tov 2,aKpa.T0V<! iirl C 
 
 S 'TToKiiv y^povov, Kol avTO'! re tt/sos rm elprj/iivq) Xo^m ^v o %aKpdrri^, 
 M? Ihelv i(j>alveTO, Kal rjfiwv ol ifKeicrTOi. K.e^7}9 Be Kal %i/i/ji,iai 
 (TfiiKpov Trpo? dXX^Xeo BieXejio'Orjv' Kal 6 ^a)KpdT7)<; IBwp avrd^ 
 ijpeTo' Ti; e^i;, ip,lp rd Xe^devra fiwv iirj Boxei eVSeros Xiyea-dai ; 
 TToXXa? yap Brj en e^et viroyp'la'! Kal dvTiKa^d<s, eX ye Br) tk avrd 
 
 10 fiiXXei iKavoo<s Bie^ievai. el fiev ovv ri dXXo crKoirelaOov, ovBev 
 Xiyio' el Be ti irepl rovrav diropelrov, /xrjBev dTroKVrjariTe Kal avTol 
 el-jrelv Kal BieXdeip, el irrj v\uv (fialverac ^eXriov <av> Xe'xOrjvai, T> 
 Kal av Kal ifie (rvixirapaXa^elv, eX ti fjidXXov oXeaOe jier efiov 
 einroprjcreiv. Kal 6 '^i/ifiia^ ^i>V' ■^'^' /^'i^j <^ ^WKpaTe<;, rdXrjdfj 
 
 genuine, 5k needs correction. Wyttenbach 
 has ToOrd t'. 
 
 At first sight the concluding words of 
 the chapter seem to imply that a, soul 
 that is pure is less likely to perish than 
 the impure. But since this is not the 
 case, we must understand Plato to mean 
 that the pure soul alone is exempt from 
 fear. The impure soul, having cast in 
 her lot with the body and having no con- 
 ception of existence apart from it, may 
 well suppose that corporeal life is a con- 
 dition of her being : but the pure soul, 
 who has lived apart from the body so far 
 as she may and feels her own independent 
 power, has no misgivings lest the com- 
 pany of her slave be necessary to her ex- 
 istence : the body may dread dissolution, 
 but she is secure. 
 
 84 c — 85 D, c. XXXV. Silence ensues as 
 Sokrates ceases : but presently Simmias 
 and Kebes are heard conversing apart. 
 Are you discussing any doubtful matters 
 in the argument? asks Sokrates, for there 
 must be many remaining. Simmias: 
 There are points on which we should 
 like further satisfaction; but we shrink 
 from troubling you at so sad a time. 
 Sokrates : If I cannot convince you that 
 I do not consider my present situation sad, 
 I shall find it hard indeed to persuade the 
 
 rest of mankind. You think I am more 
 foolish than the swans : for they sing 
 sweetest just before they die ; not, as men 
 say, that they are lamenting their ap- 
 proaching death, but because they are 
 Apollo's birds and know the good things 
 that are in Hades ; wherefore they sing 
 in gladness of heart. I too am the ser- 
 vant of Apollo, and I depart this life no 
 less cheerfully than they : speak then, if 
 you have anything to ask. Simmias : I 
 will speak : the truth of the matters we 
 have been discussing is hard to discover, 
 nevertheless it were fainthearted to aban- 
 don the search. So in default of some 
 divine word we must strive by all means 
 to find the surest theory that human reason 
 can furnish, as it were a raft to bear us 
 over the sea of life. Therefore, I tell 
 you, Sokrates, that the foregoing proof 
 does not seem to me complete. 
 
 5. irp6s Tta Elpr||i^vu \6yco] ' was ab- 
 sorbed in the foregoing discourse '. 
 
 1 2. P^Tiov dv \ex.6ijvai] The insertion 
 of ai", which could easily drop out after 
 ^iXnov, seems to me necessary. Prof. 
 Geddes observes that verbs of thinking 
 often take a bare infinitive, to express 
 duty. This is true : but ^alverai is not a 
 verb of thinking. 
 
8s] ^AIAnN. 103 
 
 (TOi ep(o. •TToX.ai yap rjfiwv mdrepo^ airopSv tw erepov irpoaOet 
 Kai KeKevei epecrdai Scd to iiriOvfielv fiev aKovaai, oicvelv he o')(\ov 
 'Tape'^eiv, /ir) aoi ar)Sei y Bia rrjv irapovaav (TV/i^opdv. ical o? 
 aKova-ai iyeXaa-iu re '^pifia Kal (fyr/crcv, Ba^ai, w "Siififita" rj ttov 
 
 E 'yaXe'Trcoi av Toi)? aXKov<; dvOpwirovi irelaaifit w? ov ■<TVfi<j)opdv 5 
 rjyov/iai Trjv ■jrapovaav TV^V^i ore ye /iiyS' Vfid<; Bvva/J,at •ireideiv, 
 aXXa ^o^elade, firj SvcTKoXmrepov n viiv SiaKeifiai rj ev r^ irpoadev 
 pi(p' Kai, w? eoiKe, rmv kvkvcov Bokw {j)avX6Tepo<} Vfuv elvai Trjv 
 fiavTiKrjv, oi iireiBdv atcrOmvTai on Set avToiii dtroOavevv, aBovrei 
 85 Kol ev Tw irpoa-dev j^povta, Tore B^ TrXeia-ra ical /MoKta-Ta aBovai, 10 
 yeyrj0oTe<! on fieWovcn irapd rbv 6eov dinevai,, oSirep elcrl depd- 
 irovTe':. 01 B dvOpwirot, Bid to avTcSv Beo<s tov Oavdrov /eat r&v 
 KVKVCOV KaTayjrevBovTai, Kai (pacriv avTov<; OprjvovvTa'i tov ddvaTOv 
 viTO XvTTjj? e^dSeiv, Kal ov Xoyi^ovTai on ovBev opveov aBei, OTav 
 ireivy rj piym r] Tiva dXkijv Xv-Trrjv XvTrrjrai, ovBe avTrj 77 t6 drjScov 15 
 Kal 'x^eXiocov Kal 6 e7roi/r, d Bi] (jiaat Btd Xinrrjv OprjvovvTa dBeiv' 
 aW ovre TavTa fioi cfjaiverai, Xvirovfieva aBeiv ovre ol kvkvoi, aW' 
 
 B are oiiiai, tov ATroXXa)vo<; 0VTe<; fiavTiKOu re etVt Kal irpoetBoTe? rd 
 ev ' AiBov ayadd aSova-i Kal- Tepirovrat, eKeovrjv Tr]v ■^fiipav Bia- 
 (^epovTco^ 7] ev tS efiirpoadev 'X^povm. iyw Be Kal avTOi ttov olfiai 20 
 ofJ-oBovXaf TB elvai TtSv KVKveov Kal lepo'i tov avTov 6eov, Kal oil 
 "Xelpov eKelvwv Trjv fiavnKrjv e%etw irapd tov BecnroTov, ovBe BvcrOv- 
 fjLOTepov avToov tov yStou diraXXdrrecrdai. dXXd tovtov y eveKa 
 Xeyeiv re ')(^prj Kal ipcoTav o rt dv ^ovXTjaOe ews 'Adrjvalaiv iwcriv 
 dvBpet; evBeKa. KaXa)?, '4(^7], Xeyet?, 6 Xififila';' Kal eyoa re aoi epw 25 
 
 C b UTTopm, Kal av oSe, y ovk diroBe^x^erai ra elpTj/iiva. e/j,ol ydp 
 
 7. SiaKajiai] Heindorf takes this for 24. ews 'AflTjvaCwv] Cobet proposes 
 a subjunctive, and Hirschig reads SiaK4<a- lois ca> oi li>S£Ka, kSxsiv. I do not conceive 
 fiai: but, even if Sifci/aai could be a sub- that any person who has ears to hear will 
 junctive, that mood would be positively prefer Cobet's sentence to Plato's : nor, 
 wrong here. Sokrates says ' you are apart from this, would one willingly sacri- 
 afraid (not lest I should be, but) lest I am fice the grave courtesy of Sokrates' Ian- 
 more peevish than heretofore'. Contrast guage. I regret that Schanz determines 
 this with the words of Simmias, /ii} aoi to bracket the clause; still omission is 
 dijS^s ^, where the subjunctive has its preferable to mutilation. Prof. Geddes 
 proper reference to the future. justly says dvSpes ^xSeKo is to be regarded 
 
 10. Kal |idXia-Ta] Schanz reads Kd\- as one expression, and compares 69 E 
 
 XioTo, after Blomfield'sconjecture. I have toU 'ABrivalui' SiKaarais. The common 
 
 reverted to the reading of the mss. reading is eus av ol, but &•> ol are wanting 
 
 23. TOVTOV yi c'vcKa] ' so far as this is in the best mss. 
 concerned '. 
 
I04 
 
 HAATflNOS 
 
 [85 
 
 So/cet, (B "SitoKparei!, Trepl TtTv toiovtcov taw's wcnrep koX croi to /lev 
 aa^ei} elSivai iv rm vvv /Stw rj dSvvarov eivai rj jrayxaXeTrov ri, ro 
 fievTOi av TO. Xey6/J,eva Trepl avrSv firj ov'^l Trai/rl rpoTro) eXeyx^'V 
 xal firj •7rpoa(j}iaracrdai, irpXv av iravTaxy crKowSv aTrenry tk, 
 
 5 irdvv fia\6aKov elvat dvSpoi' Beiv yap irepl avra ev ye Tt tovtcov 
 SiaTrpd^acrOai, rj fiaOelv oirr) e^^ei rj evpelv rj, el ravra dBvvuTOP, 
 TOP yovv l3e\Tiffrov twv dvOpcoirlvav Xoywv Xa^ovra Koi Bvae^e- D 
 XeyKTOTUTOv, sttI tovtov 6')(pvfievov watrep eirX o-T^eSta? KivBvvevovra 
 SiaTrXevcrai rov ^iov, el fir] rt? BvvaiTO acxi^dXearepov Kai okiv- 
 
 10 BvvoTepov iirX ^e^aiorepov 6')(i]/iaT0<}, Xoyov Oeiov tiv6<;, Bia-rropev- 
 Orjvac. Kal Si) Kal vvv eycoye ovk iTrai,(T'xyvdi]crop,ai ipeadai, iiretBrf 
 Kal ad ravra Xeyei';, ovS" ep,avTov alridaofiat iv vaTepco XP°^V "^ 
 vvv OVK elirov d ifiol BoKei. i/j,ol yap, <p %coKpaTe<;, eTretBrj koI irpo<} 
 ijxavTov Kal irpo^ rovBe aKoirm rd elprjfiiva, ov nravv tpatverai 
 
 15 iKavw'i elprjaOah. 
 
 XXXVI. Kat o liCOKparrji}, "Iaa)<; yap, e<f)rj, w eraipe, dXrjO^ E 
 
 4. Kal (iij irpoa4>C(rTa(r6ai] Hirschig 
 wrongly brackets ^^. The words TravH 
 ...Tpoa^laTairBai. are all qualified by /U'^ 
 oix^: or as Heindorf puts it, we may 
 regard Kal ii.t\ Trpoa<pt<rTao-6ai, as equivalent 
 to /lii irpoatpurTa/iirnvs. We have here a 
 very strong case of /i^ ov after a word 
 which only implies negation : cf. Sympo- 
 sium 210 B troKkT\ avoia. /xtj oix l" re Kal 
 Tairbv ijyeurSai,. 
 
 6. TJ lutSetv] i. e. either to learn from 
 another or to discover by our own re- 
 searches : cf. 99 C. Hesiod says, Works 
 and Days 2gi, ovtos fih iravipiciTos, 6s 
 airis irdvTa yo^irij, | iadXbs S' av /cdfceixos, 
 
 05 ev clvbvn irlBifrai. 
 
 10. X670V 6eCov] ' a divine doctrine ' ; 
 such as the Orphic traditions. The Py- 
 thagorean Simmias, whose mystical ten- 
 dencies are well contrasted with the 
 clear and acute intellect of Kebes, natu- 
 rally gives a Betas \byos the preference over 
 dialectical demonstration. Cf. 107 A. 
 Olympiodoros explains it, airoTTiKbs voOs 
 
 6 Seifi Tif oi'Tt, (rvviiv. But the other in- 
 terpretation is more natural and more 
 dramatically appropriate. The mss.have 
 5j \byov, Schanz brackets 17 : I have fol- 
 
 lowed Heindorf in omitting it. That ^ is 
 ever explanatory I do not believe : it 
 certainly is not so in the passages cited by 
 Prof. Geddes. Plato would have used 
 Kal. St. retains ij. 
 
 85 E — 86 D, c. xxxvi. Simmias states 
 his objection. All the terms that have 
 been applied to soul and body may be 
 transferred to harmony and the lyre. 
 The harmony is invisible, immaterial, 
 beautiful, divine ; the lyre is material, 
 composite, earthly, perishable. Might we 
 not then on the same principle maintain 
 that the harmony must survive the de- 
 struction of the lyre? yet we know it 
 does not. Now suppose the doctrine to 
 be true, that the soul is a harmony of the 
 body, arising from the due proportion and 
 temperament of its parts; will she not, 
 let her be ever so divine, vanish away if 
 these bodily conditions cease? will she 
 not, like other harmonies, cease to be, 
 long before the body itself suffers dis- 
 solution ? 
 
 As I have pointed out in the intro- 
 duction, the refutation of this theory does 
 not constitute an argument for immor- 
 tality. To refute a doctrine which would 
 
86] 
 
 OAIAXIN. 
 
 105 
 
 (7ot (jiaiverai' aXka XSye, OTrrj Sj) ov'x, lKavw<;. TavTrj ejji,ot,iye, 9j S' 
 09, y Brj Koi irepl dp/j.oiia'i av Tt? koX \vpa<; re Kol ^o/aScSi' rov 
 avTov TovTov Xojov e'liToi, (u? 77 fiev dpfiovla doparov ri Kal aaco- 
 86 fiUTOv Kal TrdjKaXov tv koX Belov eariv iv ry ripfjuoafievrj Xvpa, avrrj 
 B' ri Xvpa Kal al ')(^opSal craJ^ara re Kol awpiaToeihr} Kal ^vvOera 5 
 Kal yecoSrj e'crrt Kal rov dvrjTov ^vyyevrj. iTtetBdv odv rj Kard^y rt? 
 Tr/v Xipav rj BtaTefir] Kal BLapprj^rj ra? 'x^opBd^, e'i T4? BiKyxypi^ooTO 
 Tft) avT(p Xojo) UKTirep av, ws dvd/yKrj en elvai rfjv dpfioviav ixeLVijv 
 Kal /Mj diroXaXevai' ovBefiia yap fjLTj'^avrl dv eirj ttjv fiev Xvpav ert 
 elvai Bieppccyvi&v rwv 'XppBaiv Kal Td<i ')(ppBd<s 6vrjToeiBet<; olaa'i, 10 
 TTjv Be dpp,oviav diroXcoXivai, ti)j/ tov Oeiov re Kal dOavdrov ofio^vrj 
 B re Kal ^vyjevrj, irporepav rov dvrjrov diroXop.evyv' dXXa (fiairj 
 dvdjKr] en ttov eXvab avrrjv rrjv dpfioviav, Kal trporepov ra ^vXa 
 Kal Ta9 ■^opBd'i KaraaaTrrjcrecrdai, rrplv ri eKelvqv rraOeiv, — Kal yap 
 ovv, to '^(OKpare<i, dlfiai eyooye Kal amov ae rovro ivredvp-rjadai, 15 
 on roiovrov n p^dXiara VTroXa/M^dvo/xev rrjv "^v'xtjv elvai, wa-rrep 
 
 be fatal to immortality is not the same as 
 to prove immortality. Plato justly con- 
 sidered that a view so Vifidely entertained 
 and so hostile to his ovfn, must be dis- 
 posed of; but its overthrow leaves the 
 argument precisely where it was at 81 A. 
 
 2. 'g 811] So Forster for ^St). 
 
 7. SiaT^ii'gl Schanz brackets this 
 word : needlessly, I think. 
 
 A Tis Sn(j\vp£joiTo] The apodosis 
 never comes. Prof. Geddes finds it in 
 opa ovv, 86 D. This is not strictly ac- 
 curate; for the subject of Sucrxvpi^oLTo is 
 supposed to maintain that the harmony 
 survives the lyre, while the subject of 
 iav Tis a^ioT maintains that the soul is the 
 first to perish. In fact the protasis idv 
 TIS d^ioi is substituted for the original 
 protasis. 
 
 10. Si£ppw7iii»v T«v xop8<3v is brack- 
 eted by Hirschig, whom Schanz follows : 
 again I see no reason. 
 
 16. irTro\a|iPdvo|Mv] The use of the 
 first person by Simmias would seem to 
 imply that this doctrine was Pythagorean. 
 But there is little or no evidence to that 
 effect, and it is irreconcilable with the 
 Pythagorean dogma of transmigration. 
 
 Aristotle de anima I iv ^of'i'j mentions 
 the theory as iriffaxij ttoWois, but without 
 assigning it to any particular school or 
 thinker. Macrobius ascribes it to Py- 
 thagoras and Philolaos ; but the testimony 
 of so late a writer is worthless. Prof. 
 Geddes remarks that it seems more 
 Eleatic than Pythagorean: and there cer- 
 tainly is some resemblance between this 
 dp/iovia and the conception of ^ux'7 as 
 a KpaiJ,a attributed to Zeno by Diogenes 
 Laertius IX 29. The view of Parmenides 
 is expounded by Theophrastos de sensu 
 §§ 3, 4 : it is however merely a theory of 
 perception. The opinion that soul is a 
 harmony was certainly held by Aristo- 
 xenos the musician, as we learn from 
 Cicero Tusc. I 10 : and Lucretius in con- 
 troverting the theory (ill 94 foil.) evi- 
 dently had him chiefly in his mind; cf. 
 Ill 131 redde harmoniai Nomen ad or- 
 ganicos alto delatum Heliconi. But 
 Aristoxenos was a pupil of Aristotle, not 
 a. Pythagorean. On the whole then it 
 seems probable that Simmias is not 
 speaking as a Pythagorean, but making 
 himself the exponent of a widely received 
 opinion. Kebes, who is equally a Py- 
 
io6 
 
 HAATONOS 
 
 [86 
 
 ivTerafievov rov a-(ofiaTO<} ^(jLwv koI a-xn>ej(pfievov vtto depfiov koI 
 "^jrv^pov KoX ^rjpov Kal vypov Koi toiovtiov rivmv, Kpaaiv eivai Kav 
 apfiovlav avTwv tovtcov rrjv ■\lrv)(rjv 'qp.wv, iireiZav ravra KaXdSi Kal C 
 fierpico'} KpaOf} Trpov aWrjXa. el ovv Tvy'xavei rj i^vx/j ovaa 
 S apfiovia TK, BrjXov '6ti, Srav j^aXao-^ij to crmp,a i]/j,cov dp.irpco<i rj 
 eiriTaSf} vtro voawv Kal aXKcov KaK&v, Trjv fiev ■\jrirxTjv dvdyKr] 
 ev6v<i vTrdp'^ei diroXcoXivai, Kaiirep ovaav OeiOTaTrjv, (ocnrep Kal ai 
 aXXai dpfioviai a" t iv rot? <fid6yjo(,<; Kal al ev Tot? tcSj/ Brj/iiovpjwv 
 epyoi'i nrdo'i,, rd he Xei^frava tov awfiaTO? eKaarov TroXbv 'xpovov 
 10 TrapajxeveiV, eat av fj KaraKavOrj rj Karaa-avy, '6 pa ovv Trpos D 
 TOVTOV TOV Xoyov tI (jjrjcrofiev, edv Tit a^iol Kpaaiv ovaav Trjv 
 yp-vxrjv Twv iv Tft) (Too/iaTt iv tqj KaXov/ievm OavaTm TrpcoTrjV avoX- 
 Xvadai. 
 
 thagorean, professes his disbelief in the 
 doctrine, 87 A : but on the other hand it 
 is a favourite theory with Echekrates, 
 88 D. 
 
 2. Kpao-iv] 'a temperament'. Com- 
 pare the lines of Parmenides quoted by 
 Theophrastos /. /. (Karsten 145 foil.) : 
 
 (is ya,p eKoffTijj Ix^i Kpaffis iiiKioni iroXv- 
 
 •n\6.yKT(av, 
 Tiis vboi anSpunrouri wapiaTijKeV to y&p 
 
 avTO 
 iarlv oirep ^povin fie\iuy tpvffi^ avBpuj' 
 
 iromi 
 Kal iraa-iv Kal iravrl ' to ycip ttVoi' iffrl 
 
 voiifia. 
 
 That is to say, the character of the per- 
 ception is dominated by the preponder- 
 ating elements of the percipient. As 
 Theophr. remarks, Parmenides does not 
 distinguish between (j>povSv and al<rBd- 
 DcffBai. 
 
 The word ap/wvla is generally used 
 to denote a succession 'of musical tones, 
 not their simultaneous accord, for which 
 (TV/itfiueia is the ordinary term. The 
 former meaning is however here clearly 
 unsuitable ; and in fact dp/jovfo is a general 
 term expressing the relation between 
 musical sounds, in itself signifying neither 
 succession nor accord. 
 
 4. (JicrpCus Kpa6{j] Cf. Diog. Laert. 
 
 IX 29 ^vxv" Kpafia VTrdpx^iv Ik tSv 
 dprip,ivoni, Kara /iriSems rovrutv iiriKpa- 
 
 10. irapa(Ji6V€i.v] 'remain with us'. Cf. 
 62 E. The word occurs again and again 
 in this sense; yet Ilirschig must needs 
 alter it to iinij,ivav. 
 
 86 D — 88 B, c. xxxvii. Sokrates defers 
 his reply to Simmias until he has heard 
 the objection of Kebes, which the latter 
 states as follows. I think our argument 
 is no further on than it was : I admit that 
 the antenatal existence of the soul has 
 been fairly proved, but the evidence of 
 her existence after death seems still in- 
 sufficient. Not that I agree with the ob- 
 jection of Simmias ; but all that has yet 
 been proved is that the soul is more 
 lasting than the body. Suppose a weaver 
 were in the habit of making his own. 
 coats ; in the course of his life he would 
 wear out many coats ; but when his time 
 came to die, the last coat would exist 
 after him ; yet we do not deny that the 
 weaver is more durable than the coat. 
 Similarly the soul in the course of a 
 man's life may wear out many bodies : 
 that is, so fast as the body wastes, she 
 may renew it like a garment that needs 
 mending ; but when the time of her dis- 
 solution comes, she perishes and the body 
 as last renewed by her exists after her. 
 
87] 
 
 $AIAnN. 
 
 107 
 
 XXXVII. Aiaj3\6-\/ra; ovv 6 Sw/c/Jari;?, wcnrep tA iroWa 
 elwdei, Kol fj,ei8ida'a<;, AiKaia /Mevroi, ecj^rj, Xiryet 6 S(/U/i>(a9. el ovv 
 Ti,<; v/jlwv eviropcoTepoi} ifiov, ri ovk cnreKpivaTo ; KaX yap ov <j)avXm<s 
 koiKev aTTTOfievo) tow Xoyov. Soxei fiivTOi fioi '^prjvai, irpo t^? 
 E diroicpl<reai<i en Trporepov Key3i;T0s aKOva-ai, ri av oSe iyKoket t& S 
 \6y(f>, 'iva ')(jpavov iyyevofiivov ^ovkevawfieOa ri epovfiev, e-jreira Se 
 dKoiKTavTai rj crvyjfcapelv avTol';, idv TV Bo/cScri TrpocraSetv, idv Se 
 fjurj, ovTW? '^Srj vTrepBiKeiv rov Xoyov,' dXX' aye, ^ B' o?, w Ke^Si;?, 
 Xeye, rt ■^p to <re av Opwrrov {ain.aTiav 7ra/o4%et]. Aiyco Bi], rj B' 
 09 6 KeyS?;?. ifiol yap <f>alveTai eTi iv r^ avTm 6 Xoyot elvai, Kai, 10 
 87 '6-jrep iv toi'j irpoa-Qev iXeyo/iev, tovtov eyKXrjfia ey^eiv. oti /lev 
 yap Tjv rip,6i)v rj '^V'^rj Kal irplv ei<; ToBe rb eiSo? iXdeiv, ovk dva- 
 ridefiai jMrj ov')(i irdvv ■)(apievTa)<s Kal, el fjufj iira')(6e^ iaTiv elrrelv, 
 irdvu iKavrnt a-jroBeBel'xdai' to? Be Kal dirodavovreov i^/mwv en irov 
 earai, oil fiob BoKel TrjBe. to? fiev ovk lajfvporepov Kal iroXv^povici- 15 
 
 Or to grant you even more : let us sup- 
 pose that she wears out many bodies, not 
 only in the span of one life, but in many 
 lives; and that at the separation she con- 
 tinues to exist in Hades ; yet we have no 
 assurance that this goes on for ever; after 
 repeated incarnations she may gradually 
 be wearied out, and some one of them 
 will be her last. Therefore it is not 
 enough to show that the soul is ever so 
 much stronger and more lasting than the 
 body: you must show that in her own 
 nature she is altogether indissoluble and 
 eternal ; else our hope of immortality is 
 but foolishness. 
 
 I. SiapMi|ras] 'with a piercing glance'. 
 This rare word well describes the penetra- 
 ting gaze of Sokrates'prominent eyes{TAe- 
 aetetus 143 e) from under the gathered 
 eyebrows : much the same is expressed by 
 ravpridbv iTop)^\//a! in 117 B. The pre- 
 position seems to have the same force as 
 in one usage of SM^alvw — i.e. with eye- 
 lids far apart: cf. Aristotle tie insomniis 
 462*13 ivloii y&p tQv veorripav Kal Ti/i- 
 Tav Sia^XiTovny (with eyes wide open), 
 ii,v 3 (TKOTos, tpatvovrai et5u\a iroXXdi 
 Kivov/Aeva, (ajT' iyKaXvirreffdat TroKXdKts 
 (papoviiAvovt. Compare Xenophon Sym- 
 
 posium V V s, where Sokrates says ouVu 
 ^kv tjStj Tolvvv ol ifiol 6^6a\fiol KaWloves 
 av r(Zv <rQv etTjffav. irus 5^ ; on ol fi^v crol 
 rb Kar* evdu ii6vov opuffiVy ol S^ ifiol Kal 
 Tb ex irKaylov Stot rb iwnr6\ai,ot ehai. 
 
 4. dirTO|ilv<i>] 'he is one, it seems, 
 who takes the question in hand after a 
 thorough-going fashion'. I think this 
 rendering is more agreeable to Plato's use 
 of the phrase aTrreaBai. \6yov than that 
 of Mr Cope and Prof. Geddes, who take 
 it to mean 'attack'. Cf. Euthydemus 
 283 A, Republic 538 c. 
 
 9. T(5 <t\ oi OpaTTOv] In order to re- 
 tain the words diriaTlav irap^x^i, some 
 editors have altered rb into 0. I have 
 judged it better to follow Hermann and 
 Schanz in bracketing them as a gloss. 
 This abbreviated form ofTapdrreiv is more 
 than once used to express a misgiving as 
 to the validity of an argument : cf. Theae- 
 tetus 187 c, Parmenides 130 D. 
 
 10. iv Tu auT^] i. e. just where it was 
 at the end of the discussion of ava/iptia-is. 
 ICebes is perfectly right : the reasoning 
 contained in chapters 25 — 29 at best affords 
 a mere presumption in favour of immor- 
 tality : see note on 78 c. 
 
 13. liraxB^s] 'arrogant'. 
 
io8 HAATXINO^ [87 
 
 repov '^v)0 <Tc6/j,aT0^, oii ^vyyapw r^ ZifJ'fJ'iov dvTiXijyJreL' BoKei 
 rydp jjioi iraa-L tovtok; iravv rro'Kv Sia(f)ipeiv. Tt ovv av i^auT) 6 
 Xdiyo? ert airtcTTet?, eVetS^ opf'^ dwoOavovTO^ rod dvdpwTTov to ye 
 daOeviarepop eri, ov ; to Se 'iro\v')(^povia>Tepov ov Soxel aoi dvajKaiov B 
 
 S elvao eTi aw^eadat iv tovtw tS ■)(^p6v<p ; irpo'; Brj tovto ToSe eVt- 
 aKe-^ai, el ri Xeyw elic6vo<; yap tivo<;, to? eoiKev, Kdym Sairep 
 ZiififjLLa<; Biofiai. ifiol yap SoKei ofioicoi; Xeyeadat ravTa, wairep av 
 Tt? irepX dvOpanrov vcjjdirov irpecr^VTOv dirodavovro's Xiyoi tovtov 
 Tov Xoyov, OTi ovK aTToXcoXev 6 dvdpojTTO'i aXX ean irov o"a)?, TeK- 
 
 10 fitjpiov Se 'Trapi^oiTo doi/idTioii o rifnrei')(eT0 outo^ v((>7]vdfievo<;, oti 
 ea-Tl amv xai ovk d-TToXoiXev, koI el ti^ dtiLGToLr] avTw, dvepcoTwr] 
 TTOTepov 'n'oXv)(^povLcaTep6v eari to yevo<; dvOpanrov rj ifiaTLOv iv C 
 'X^peia re ovto<; koI (jiopovfievov, d'TroKpivafj.evov Se tivo^ oti ttoXv to 
 TOV dvdpccTrov, otoiTO diroSeSel'xdai, oto iravTCK; dpa /u.aXXov o ye 
 
 15 avdpa)Tro<s tJcS? earlv, eVetS?} to ye oXuyo'XpovLWTepov ovk dTToXwXev. 
 TO S' olfiat, to Xi.fip,ia, ovj^^ outcb? e;^et' atcoTrei yap koX <7v a Xeyco. 
 TTfJ? 70^3 av viroXd^ob oti evr)6e<; Xeyei 6 tovto XeywV 6 yap 
 v(f>avT'rj<; ovro^ iroXXd KaTaTpl-^jrwi Toiavra Ipbdria Kot vipijvdfievo'; 
 eKelvav fj,ev vaTepo's d-TroXwXev TroXXav ovtcov, tov Se TeXevralov D 
 
 20 oifiai Trporepo?, Kal ovBev ti fidXXov tovtov evexa dvdpa)ir6<i icrTtv 
 ifiaTLOv cpavXoTepov ovS' dadevearepov. Trjv avTrjv Be ol/j,ai elxova 
 Be^aiT av 'yj^vy^rj 7r/30? acofia, Kai Tt? Xeycov avTo, ravTU Trepl avToiv 
 
 I. ou Ji'TX"?'"] Again we may ob- 9. Joti ttov <r(3s] I adopt without 
 serve the superior acuteness of Kebes. hesitation Forster's admirable emenda- 
 The objection of Simmias is ingenious tion, which by a very slight change ma- 
 and plausible, but somewhat flimsy : it terially improves the sense, iauis seems 
 crumbles away at the first touch of the to me quite inappropriate, notwithstand- 
 elenchus : moreover its refutation adds ing Heindorfs defence of it and its re- 
 nothing to the argument. That of Kebes tention by Z. and St. 
 goes straight to the root of the matter, 10. avTos v<j»)vd|<.evos] The weaver is 
 and obliges Sokrates to put forth his chosen as the closest parallel to the soul, 
 whole argumentative strength ; while its who is perpetually renewing the body 
 disproof constitutes the crowning argu- that is her vesture, 
 ment of the dialogue. 11. dirioToCi)] mss. &in(TTuiv which 
 
 SoKct Yop] 'for I think soul is far cannot stand, since the question would be 
 
 superior in all these respects'. pointless in the mouth of an opponent. 
 
 7. 6|xoC(os Wveo-Ooi] 'for I think your The av which belongs to \iyoi. also does 
 
 argument is exactly parallel to the asser- duty for jrap^xotro, dvepuriln], and oiloiTO. 
 
 tion one might make about a weaver who 16. to 8^] 'but in fact this is not the 
 
 died at an advanced age'. Heindorf case'. CL Tkeaeleius i^l'B, Sophist 2^^ A., 
 
 would insert el, but this is not necessary. Laws 642 A.. 
 
88] 
 
 $AIAnN. 
 
 109 
 
 fiirpi' av fioi (^aivokTO \iyeiv, w<s -q jxev '^V'^rj TroXvxpoviov iarc, 
 TO Se (Tcofia dadevicTTepov koX oXvyo'X^poviaiTepov' dWd. yap av (pair) 
 eKaa-TTjv rav yjrv^mv iroXka (7(0fiaTa Kararpl^eiv, aXXto? re Kal el 
 TToWa err) ^iwr]' el yap pioi to crwjMa Kal diroWvoiTO en ^oovTOt 
 E Tov dvQpwirov, dXK' 7; "^vxrj del t6 KaTaTpi,^6jji,evov dvv(paivoc, 5 
 dvayKaiov fievrap e'trj, oiroTe aTroKKvoiro rj '^V')(r], to reXevralov 
 ^^acTjjba Tv^eiv avTrjv e-)(ov(Tav Kal tovtov /jlovov irporepav airoX- 
 Xvcrdai, dTro\,op,ivri<; Be ttj? '^v'X^fj'i tot rjhr] Trjv <f)v<7i,v Tr}<} da0e- 
 veia'i iirtSeiKvvot, to (rwfia Kal Ta^i) aairev Sioi'^oiro. ware tovto) 
 tS X0701) ovirco d^iov irKTrevaavTa dappeiv, oS?, eireihdv diroQa- 10 
 88 vaifiev, en trov rjfiuiv rj ^jrv)(rj Mcttiv. el yap Tts Kal ifKeov en rm 
 Xeyovn [rj] a av Xeyei<; crvyxcopTjeretev, Bov<i avTw fir) p,6vov ev rm 
 irplv Kal yeveadai riiJ,d<; 'x^povq) etvat, rjfjiwv rat ■y^v)(a<;, dJKka p>rjSeu 
 KcoKveiv Kal iireiBdv diroOdvcofiev eviwv en elvai Kal ecrecrOai Kal 
 TToXXaKt? yevqaeadai Kal diroOavelaOai av6it' ovno yap avrb (pvaei 15 
 la"xyp6v elvav, w(ne TroXXaKt? yiyvofievrjv ifrvxrjv avre'^eiv' Soz)? Se 
 TauTa eKelvo fjLrjKen avyxcopol, firj ov iTove.lv ainrjv ev Tal<; TroXXaw 
 
 3. iroXXd (rM|j.aTa KararpCPciv] i.e. 
 within the limits of a single human life. 
 Kebes puts his case in two forms : the 
 superior durability of the soul is con- 
 sistent with the supposition (r) that 
 during the ordinary span of human life 
 she wears out many bodies, perpetually 
 restoring them as they suffer waste ; (2) 
 that after separation from one body she 
 may survive and enter into another and 
 another. Yet in the first case she may 
 become extinct on separating from the 
 body ; in the second she may after several 
 incarnations be worn out by her labours 
 and at some one separation perish utterly. 
 Therefore we cannot argue that because 
 the soul outlasts the body she is neces- 
 sarily immortal. 
 
 9. lirtSciKvioi] Prof. Geddes is not, 
 I think, right in referring this optative to 
 indirect speech, though Soph. F/iil. 617 
 would justify it (not the other passage he 
 cites). As Stallbaum points out av is 
 easily carried on from above, onayKiuov 
 /ievT&r. 
 
 II. 1] ij/vxi^ ^oTiv] Schanz adopts larai 
 
 from Hirschig, for which I see no sufficient 
 reason, since Icrnv is general. Note that 
 Kebes treats the whole of chapters 25 — 29 
 as intended to supplement di'dfi.vriais by 
 showing the after-existence of the soul : 
 he recurs to the objection he made at 
 J 7 c, against which Sokrates appeals to 
 avTairoSoffis, but nevertheless proceeds to 
 bring fresh evidence. 
 
 T^ X^^ovTi [t(] Madvig proposed to 
 strike out ■q, and Schanz seems right 
 in bracketing it. For (i) t^J \4yovn 
 wants an object, (i) Kebes offers to grant 
 not more than what Sokrates says, but 
 more than he has himself just said. He 
 will grant not only that the soul may 
 have existed before birth and may wear 
 out many bodies in this life before perish- 
 ing, but also that she may survive the 
 severance once or many times before she 
 herself succumbs. 
 
 15, oijTO) •ydp avTo] aufo, referring to 
 ^vxw, seems to be attracted into the 
 gender of l<rxvp6v. Prof. Geddes com- 
 pares 109 A Tri/i/ieyi Tt elmi airi, sc. rrfi) 
 ■yijv. 
 
1.10 
 
 nAATflNOS 
 
 [88 
 
 yeviffecTiv Koi reXevTwo'dv ye ev rivi twv Oavdrcov rravrairaaiv 
 dvoKKvadai' tovtov Se rov ddvarov koX tovttjv rrjv ZidXvaiv tov B 
 tTt6/j,aTo^, V tIJ "^XV ^epei oXedpov, fJLijBeva (pairj elBivaf dBvvarov 
 ydp elvai ormovv aladdveaOai rjfiwV el Be tovto ovra'i e^ei, ovBevl 
 
 S irpoarjKei Qdvarov dappovvTi firj ovk aw^jTtB? Oappelv, 09 dv firj e^y 
 diroBel^at on ea-Ti "^vxv iravrdiraa-iv dOdvarov re koi dvcoXedpoV 
 el Be firj, dvdyKtjv elvai del tov fieXKovra diroQavela-Oai BeBiivat 
 virep Tfj<; avrov '^vxfj'i, /"■'} ev rrj vvv tov o-dS/iaros Bia^ev^ei iravTO- 
 iraaiv aTToXijTM. 
 
 10 XXXVIII. HaKTes ovv aKovaavTei; elirovTtov avTwv aiySaJ? C 
 BieTedrjfiev, tu? iicrTepov iXeyo/iev tt/so? dWijXov;, oti, vtto tov 
 efivpoaOev Xoyov a^^oBpa ireireicrfievovi rifid<; irdXiv iBoKOvv dva- 
 Tapd^ai Kol el<s dtrKniav KaTU^aXeiv ov fiovov rot? irpoeiprj/jLevoi,'; 
 T^yoif, dWd Kol eh Ta vcrTepov fieXKovTa pTjdrjo-ea'dai, firj ovBevof 
 
 IS a^ioi elfjbev KpiTol rj koi ra irpdy/iaTa diria-Ta y. ■ 
 
 EX. N?) Toi)? 0eoi;9, w ^a'lBmv, <Tvyyv(i>p,r)v ye ej^oj vfilv. Kal 
 
 ■i. TOTJTov 8^ TOV 9avaT0v] Since no 
 one knows how often his soul has already- 
 been incarnate, he cannot tell whether or 
 not she may survive the termination of 
 his present life. 
 
 4. el Si toCto ovtus Sx"-] ''^ '^^^ 
 hypothesis I suggest be true'. Few who 
 have read through this forcibly stated 
 argument will agree with Wagner that 
 'it gives the reader the impression that 
 Kebes is represented as an awkward 
 speaker, because he is not a clear 
 thinker '. 
 
 88 C — 89 C, c. xxxviii. Phaedo pauses 
 to describe the effect of these objections 
 upon the audience : how their confidence 
 is shattered in the argument and in their 
 own judgment. Echekrates sympathises, 
 adding that the conception of soul as a 
 harmony has always had a strong attrac- 
 tion for him. He desires to know how 
 Sokrates behaved. Never,replies Phaedo, 
 did Sokrates appear to greater advantage: 
 he showed neither irritation nor dismay ; 
 he cheered and encouraged us, as a gene- 
 ral rallies his broken forces. In illustra- 
 tion thereof Phaedo narrates a little by- 
 play which passed between Sokrates and 
 
 himself. 
 
 By interposing this interlude Plato de- 
 sires to mark in the most emphatic man- 
 ner that an acute crisis has arrived in the 
 discussion. The whole position has to be 
 reconsidered, and the argument, as Eche- 
 krates says, started again almost from 
 the beginning. The exact situation of 
 the argument at this point is dealt with 
 in the introduction § 2, where I have 
 tried to show as clearly as possible the 
 relation between the earlier and the later 
 part of the demonstration. A short dia- 
 logue between Phaedo and~ Echekrates is 
 similarly introduced at 102 A to mark the 
 completion of an important step. 
 
 13. Tois irpoci,pT||Uvais X6'yois] go- 
 verned by iiruTTlav. 
 
 15. airio-ra ■fl] Schanz, following 
 Heindorf, reads et-n against the mss. 
 But the change of mood is nothing re- 
 markable, as the instances cited by Stall- 
 baum will show. The subjunctive repre- 
 sents a more vivid conception of the 
 contingency : see Prof. Goodwin's excel- 
 lent article in the journal of Philology, 
 vol. VIII p. 18. For er/i£i> BCD cor- 
 ruptly give ^/nex. 
 
89] ^AIAHN. 1 1 1 
 
 yap avTov fie vvv aKovaaina crov toiovtov ti Xeyeiv wpo? ifiavrov 
 D eirkp')(eTaC rivi ovv en TrKrrevcrofiev Xoym; co? yap <r<f>6Bpa iriOavo^ 
 mv, ov 6 SoJAcparij? eXeye Xoyov, vvv ei? diriarrlav KaTaireiTTCoKev. 
 Sav/iaarrw yap fiov 6 \6yo^ ovtoi dvriXa/ji^dveTai, ical vvv koI dei, 
 TO dp/ioviav nvd rjixwv elvai ttjv "^v^VV, koX wairep virifivrjcrev 5 
 fie prfOeXf '6ti icaX avroj fiot ravra irpovhehoKro' KaX irdvv Siofiai 
 irdXiv Sa-irep ef dp'xfi^ dXXov tivo^ Xoyov, os /le ireicrei w? tov 
 airo6av6vT0'} ov avvairoBvyaKet rj '^vj(r). X&ye odv '7rp6<! Ato?, 7r0 
 E Sft)«/>aTi79 (lerfjXde rov Xoyov ; koI iroTepov KOKeivo^, &cnrep vfidi; 
 (fyg'i, evSrjXoi ti iyivero d-)(jd6p,evo'; rj ov, dXKa irpdwi i^orjdei 10 
 TO) Xoym ; koI licavm^ i^otjdrja-ev rj eVSecS? ; iravra riplv BieXde «? 
 Svvaaai aKpi^ecrrara. 
 
 $AIA. Kal fi'^v, w 'E^e/cpare?, •jroXXaKi's davfidawi "ZeoKparri 
 89 ov nranrore fidXXov r]yd<rdrjv rj Tore vapayevofievoi. to fiev ovv 
 eyeiv o ti, Xiyoi eKeivoi ifo-o)? ovBev droirov' dXXd eycoye fidXicna 1$ 
 iOavfiacra avTov irpayrov /lev tovto, <u? rjBeeo'j KaX evfievwi KaX 
 dyafievoK} t&v veaviaKcov tov Xoyov aTreSefaro, eireiTa rmwv w<s 
 ofew? fjcrOeTO o ireTrovdeifiev viro twv Xoyav, eireiTa cb? eu rjfia? 
 Idaaro KaX mairep •ire(f)evy6fa<: kol rJTTrjfMevovi dveKaXia-aTo KaX 
 •jrpovTpe^^ev irpo^ to irapenrecTdai re KaX avaKoirelv top Xoyov. 20 
 
 EX. nw? B^ ; 
 
 $AIA. 'EyM epw, eTv^ov yap iv Be^ia avTov Kadijfievo'i 
 B irapa Trjv kXIvtjv SttX ■y^afiai^rjXov tivo^, 6 Be iirX -TroXi) vyjrrjXoTepov 
 rj iyw. KaTa^lr^cra'; odv /j,ov Trjv «e^a\^y KaX (yvfiiriecra? ras iirX 
 Tw av^evi Tpi')(a<i — elcoOei ydp, oiroTe tv')(oi, irai^eiv fxov eh Ta9 45 
 TpL')(a^ — Aiptov Sij, e<f)ri, 'iao)<;, eo ^alBcav, to? KaXd^ Kofia^ diro- 
 Kepel. "^oiKev, f]v B' iyoo, c3 Zid>KpaTe<s. Ovk av ye ifioX ireidrj. 
 'AWa Ti; ^v S' iym. Ttj/iepov, ecfirj, Koyoa ra? i fid's koX a-v Tot/ra?, 
 eavirep ye ■fjfilv o X6yo<i TeXeVTrjcrrj koI firj BvvwfieOa avrov dva- 
 
 1. lis vclp <r<|>d8po] ' for how strongly 15. ti X^7oi Iwtvos] The subject is 
 
 persuasive was that theory which Sokrates placed in the relative instead of the main 
 
 maintained, and yet it has now fallen into clause, 
 
 discredit'. 17. ms ojews '((o-Oero] as is shown by 
 
 4. aVTiXaiiPoverai] ' has a wonder- his admonition against ' misology ' in the 
 
 fully firm grasp of me '. It never seems next chapter. 
 
 to have occurred to Echekrates that his 26. rds KaXds K<5|ias] Z. and St. 
 
 favourite theory was fatal to the soul's with some mss. have t4s koK&s Ta&ras 
 
 immortality and to metempsychosis. KSftas. 
 
 10. iv8i]\(5sTi] Heindorf rightly says ig. ovopuiiirao-eai] This transitive 
 
 that Tt belongs to Ax^d/ifvo!. use of the word occurs again Crito 48 c. 
 
112 
 
 nAATHNOS 
 
 [80 
 
 ^LwaaaOai. koI eycoy av, el aii e'i-qv Kai /le Bia^evyoi 6 X070?, C 
 evopKov av 7roii]a'aifi'r]v wavep 'Apjeloi, firj irporepov KOfiijo'eiv, 
 Trplv av viKijca avafia'xpiievo'; rov "Zififilov re Koi Ke/37;TO? Xoyov. 
 'AXX', ■^v S' iyoi, TT/oo? Svo Xeyerai ovS' 6 'HpawX^? 0Z09 re elvat. 
 
 5 'AXXa Koi efJbe, ecjyrj, rov 'loXecov irapaKaXei, eto? eVt </)cu? eariv. 
 HapaxaXcS roivvv, ejirjv, ov^ «9 'Hpa/cX'^?, aXX' ta? 'loXeooi; rov 
 UpaKXfj. OvSev Siotaet, eiprj. 
 
 XXXIX. 'AXXa Trpmrov euXa^rj6wfiev ti ttclOo^ firj iraOwfiev. 
 To iroiov ; r\v B' iyoo. M.tj yevcofieda, 17 S' 09, fiiaoXoyoi, Sairep 01 D 
 
 10 fiiaavOpairoi yiyvofievoi,' w? ovk ecrriv, e(f)rj, o ri av Tf? fiel^ov 
 TOVTOV KUKOV "TTaffoi rj Xoyovv fiiarjcra';. ylyvenrav Be eK tov avrov 
 rpoTTOv fiiaoXoyia re Kal fJnaavdpwKia. rj re yap fJiiaavOpanria 
 ivBverat e« tov crcfioBpa rivl iriaTeiKrai avev re'^yr}';, Kal i^y^a-aaGai 
 •jravTairacri ye aXr)6!j elvai Kal vyiij Kal Triarov tov avOpanrov, 
 
 15 etreiTa oXiyov vaTepov evpelv tovtov •Trovrjpov re Kal dina-Tov Kal 
 aS0i^ eTepov' Kal Stuv tovto 'rroXXdKi<; irdOri tj?, koI vmo tovtcov 
 fidXtaTa oOv av rjyrjaaLTO oLKeiOTaTov^ re Kal eTaipoTarovi;, TeXev- E 
 Twv Brj OafJLo. irpocKpovcov fiiaei re •jrdvTa'i Kal yyelrai, ovBevo<: 
 
 2. ii(nrep 'Ap7«Ioi] referring to the 
 story told by Herodotus i 82. The Ar- 
 gives, foiled in their attempt to recover 
 Thyreai from the Spartans, vowed not 
 to let their hair grow till they reconquered 
 it. Prof. Geddes remarks that the Ro- 
 mans on the contrary showed grief by 
 letting their hair grow long. 
 
 3. ava)iiaxo|Ji€vos] ' renewing the 
 battle'. 
 
 4. 01)8' 6 ' HpaKXrjs] We find the le- 
 gend in Euthydemus ig'j c. Herakles, 
 while fighting the hydra, was assailed by 
 a big crab, against which he called in the 
 aid of lolaos. Cf. Laws 919 B. Pre- 
 sently Schanz after Cobet brackets rbv 
 'MpaxXTJ. 
 
 £. ?(i)S tn <j)i5s irrCv} because at sun- 
 set he must drink the poison. 
 
 89 D — ^90 D, c. xxxix. Sokrates con- 
 tinues : we must beware lest we become 
 haters of arguments as some become 
 haters of mankind. For when one has 
 been repeatedly deceived in others, whom 
 he believed to be good and true men, he 
 
 falls sometimes into distrust and dislike 
 of the whole human race. But this is 
 owing to his ignorance of human nature : 
 he does not reflect that extremes are rare, 
 and that the very good and very bad are 
 equally few in number. It is the same 
 with arguments : if we have come rightly 
 or wrongly to distrust one argument after 
 another, we must not hastily conclude 
 that no valid argument is to be found ; it 
 is our own want of skill that we should 
 rather blame. We ought to take warning 
 by those contentious disputants, who 
 assert that there is no stable truth in 
 anything, and fancy themselves prodigi- 
 ously clever to have found this out. Yet 
 it were sad indeed, supposing there is 
 such a thing as truth, and that we might 
 discover it, if, instead of laying the fault 
 where it is really due, we quarrelled with 
 philosophy and thus deprived ourselves 
 of all chance of attaining truth. 
 
 II. r\ X670VS (i.i(ri]<ras] ' than by con- 
 ceiving a hatred for arguments ' ; expla- 
 natory of To&rov. 
 
9o] 
 
 OAIAXIN. 
 
 "3 
 
 ovBev vji,e<; etvai to irapdirav. rj ovk fiaOrjaai <tv tovto yiyvofievov ; 
 aw 76, rjv o ejw. Uvtcovv, tj o o?, ai<Tj(pov, Kai orjAov on avev 
 ri'^vrji T^? irepl rdvBpmireia 6 roiovTO^ ^(^prla-dai iin'xeipei to2<; 
 dvdp<o'7roi<; ; el lydp irov fierd re^vi?? i'^pfJTO, wairep e%et, ovTa)<i dv 
 90 r)'yr)aaTO, tov<; fiev 'X^prjo-Toi/'; Kol irovrjpov'i cr<f)6Spa oXiyov; etvai 5 
 eKarepov!, toi)s Se fiera^v TrXeto-Tous. 11 ca? \ejei<} ; e^7)V iyci. 
 "Slairep, ri S" o?, vepl rav crcjjoBpa crfxiKpav Kal /leydXcov' oiei ri 
 (TiraviaiTepov elvai rj (T<j)6Spa fiejav rj <7(f)6Bpa fiiKpov i^evpeiv 
 dvdpwKov rj Kvva rj dWo oriovv ; rj av ra'xvv rj ^paBvv, rj alcr'x^pov 
 fj KcCKov, rj XevKov rj fieKava ; rj ovk ■yadrjaai on irdvrav twv toi- io 
 ovTcov rd fiev dxpa tSv e'cj^aTWi' airdvia Kal oXlja, rd Be fiera^v 
 d<j)6ova Kal TroXXd; Udvv ye, rjv B' iyoo. Ovkovv o'lei, e^rj, el 
 B irovrjpta^ dyd^p irporeBeir], irdvv av oXiyov^ Kal ivravda rov<} 
 TT/awTou? ipavfjvai ; Et/cti? 76, ■^v B' eyco. Ei/fo? ydp, e<pr]' aXXa 
 TavTTj fiev 01;^ ojJLOioi ol Xoyoi toi^ dvOpmirot^, dXXd <tov vvv Brj 15 
 irpodyovro'i eya i<pe<7ir6fii]v, dXX' eKeivrj, fi, eireiBdv rt? TricTTevay 
 X6ya> Ttvl dXr]6ei elvat dvev Trj^ irepl toi)s \670us Te')(yrj';, Kaireira 
 oXiyov va-repop avrm B6^ •>JrevBrj<; elvai, iviore fi.ev wv, eviore B' 
 OVK av, Kal avQt,<; erepoi Kal erepof' Kal iidXicrra Brj 01 irepl tov<s 
 
 oSs dv iJ7iia-aiTo] 'whom he would 
 naturally think '. av of course belongs to 
 iiy^ffaiTo. 
 
 1. '[|'cr6T|<rai <rv toCto] Z. has outu 
 
 TOUTO, St. OVTti} TTWS TOVTO. 
 
 2. alffxpov is bracketed by Schanz. 
 &viv T^VTis] i.e. without a knowledge 
 
 of mankind. 
 
 5. Tois ii^v \pr\(rToii9 Kal irovripovs 
 <r<j>oSpa] Although the order of the words 
 inclines us to take <r(p6Spa with Sfdyovs, 
 I think the sense requires that it should 
 be joined with xjiriaTois Kal rrovripoii. 
 Heindorf would double (r^iiSpa ; but it is 
 not really wanted with oXlyoiis. 
 
 II. TO (iJv d£Kpa Tiov foyJiTav] 'the 
 extremes in both directions '. The ^ffxa- 
 ra are the two opposite qualities, a.Kpa 
 the extremes of these. Thus if we con- 
 ceive \evKbi> and piiXap to be represented 
 by a straight line, the central portion is 
 occupied by shades of grey ; the lo-xara, 
 or parts remote from the centre, by white 
 and black ; and the mcpa or ends of the 
 
 P. 
 
 line by the highest degree of each. 
 
 14. aWd Taiirij |i^v] Sokrates has 
 been led by the question of JPhaedo into 
 a digression upon the nature of the an-exvLa 
 shown by misanthropes, which consists in 
 their forgetting that extremes are seldom 
 met with. But this does not constitute 
 the analogy between ixiiravdpairla and 
 /ua-oXoyla. The real analogy is that when 
 we have been several times disappointed 
 in a X470S we jump to the conclusion that 
 all X6yoi are worthless, without stopping 
 to consider whether the fault may not lie 
 in our unscientific treatment. 
 
 16. eiTEiSav Tis iri<rT€\i<r{|] The apo- 
 dosis never comes ; Plato finishes the 
 sentence as if he had not written y, which 
 Schanz, at Madvig's suggestion, omits. 
 
 19. 01 irepl Tovs dvTtXoYiKois X070VS] 
 Plato may refer to the Ephesian school, 
 ol piovTis of the Theaetetus : perhaps also 
 to sophists of the type of Dionysodoros 
 and Euthydemos, such as he seems to 
 have in view at loi E ; and to the Cynics. 
 
 8 
 
114 HAATilNOS [91 
 
 dvTiXoyiKoii? Xoyov! BiarpiyJravTei; oicr0' &ri reXeuTtSz/re? o'iovrai, G 
 co^ooraroi yeyovivai re koI naTavevorjicevat fiovoi Sti ovre twv 
 "TrpayfiaTcov ovSev^i} ovSev vytei ovBe ^e^acov oUte t&v Xoymv, 
 dXXa iravra ra ovra aTe')(ya)<s wcnrep ev ^vpitrcp aveo koL Karm 
 i <rTpi(j)eTai koL ')(^p6vov ovSeva ev ovSevl fievet. Udvv p-ev o-dv, etjiijv 
 iy(6, dXr}d'fj XeyeK. Ovkovv, w ^alSosv, e<fyrj, olicrpov av e'lr) to 
 TrdOo^, el ovTO'} Si] rivof d\r]9ov9 koX ^tfiaiov \6yov koI Svvarov 
 Karavorjaai, eireira Sid t6 irapcuyiP/veaOai TOiovroi<s rial Xoyof; D 
 Toif avTOK Tore p,ev SoKovcnv dXrjOeaiv elvai, rare Se fiij, firj eavrov 
 
 10 Tt? alriano p/qhe Trjv eavrov dre'^viav, dXXd reXevrcov 8ia to dXyeiv 
 darfievo^ eVt rov<i \070t;? d^' eavrov rrjv alriav diroxraiTO xal rjSr) 
 rbv Xonrdv ^lov /jiia-wv re Kal XoiSopwv BiareXoi, rwv Se ovrmv 
 rrj^ dXrj6eia<s re Kal eiriari] p,r)<; trreprjOeiT), N^ rov Aia, fjv S' eym, 
 olxTpoi/ Bfjra. 
 
 15 XL. UpMTov /J,ev rolvvv, e^rj, rovro evXa^7]6a/iev, Kal jifj 
 rraplcofiev eh Ttjv -yjrvxyjP, fflS rmv Xoymv KivSvvevei, ovSev vyie^ E 
 elvai, dXXd ttoXv /idXXov on i^fieK ovirto vyiw^ ej^O/ttev, dXXd 
 dvBpia-reov Kal irpoOvfiTjreov vyimf e')(eiv, <70t /juev o3v Kal rot? 
 d'Wot? Kal rov eiretra yS/ou 7ravro<s eveKa, ifiol Se avrov evexa rov 
 
 20 Oavdrov' co^ KtvSvvevco eywye iv rm irapovri irepl avrov rovrov ov 91 
 
 2. <ro<|)<0TaTOi yiyovivai] Cf. Sophist object was to make a sensation, must be 
 
 251 C ivTuyxavets y&p, (5 Geafrijre, lbs classed apart from disputants of the Cynic 
 
 iy/f/iai, TroWaKis t4 Toiavra kairovtaKbinv, and Megarian schools, whose paradoxes 
 
 ivlore irpea^vripoLS AvBpiiTois, xal iitb rested upon logical and metaphysical 
 
 Treylas rfji irepl ippbvqau/ KTrjceas rd, Toi- errors which were genuine difficulties at 
 
 avTa TeBavpidKbai, Kal St} ti Kal iriaaoipoi' the time ; which in fact required all 
 
 oiofiimis tovt' aiiTO dvevpriKivai. Clearly Plato's genius to clear away, 
 
 a hit at Antisthenes. 90 D — 91 c, c. xl. Let us beware then, 
 
 4. av<i) Kal koItci) irTp^(|>ETai] Com- says Sokrates, lest we rashly charge our 
 
 pare the invective of Theodoros j^ainst argument with being faulty, when the 
 
 the Ephesians, Theaetetus 179 E foil. fault is our own. The question is of deep 
 
 Besides these Herakleiteans (with whom interest to us all, and to me especially : 
 
 Plato had really little or no quarrel, so indeed I feel less like a philosopher than 
 
 far as regards the phenomenal world), like those who at^e not for truth's sake 
 
 the principal (anCKar^iKoi were Antisthenes but merely that their opinion may pre- 
 
 with his school, and some later Sophists, vail ; only I am more anxious to persuade 
 
 who had caught up the trick of the Sokra- myself than you. However, if my belief 
 
 tic method of question and answer and is true, it is well ; if not, it will at least 
 
 used it to force on the unwary the accept- make me better company for you while 
 
 ance of the most preposterous paradoxes. I am with you. For your part, you must 
 
 Their habits are admirably described in think more of the truth than of Sokrates ; 
 
 the Euthydemus. These men, whose only and you must not accept my reasoning 
 
91] 
 
 4>AIAXiN. 
 
 IIS 
 
 (piXocroffxoi e')(et,v, aW' Sa^rep ol iravv drrralBevToi (piXovel/ca^. 
 Koi lyap eKetvoi orav irepl, tov dfjL^UT^rjrmcriv, oirrj fiev ej^et "Trepl 
 cav av 6 \6iyo<i y ov <^povTL^ov<Tiv, '6irw<; Be a avTol edevro ravra 
 Sofet TOK irapovcrip, rovro TrpodvfiovvTai. koX iyco (lot, Sokw iv 
 Tm irapovTi rocrovTov fiovov eKeivav Btoia-eiV ov yap oirw'i Toi'i 5 
 Trapovffiv a iym Xeyw So^et dXtjOrj elvai irpoOviJ,7)6i]aoiJ,ai, ei fir/ eor/ 
 irapepjov, aXV ottoj? avrm ifiol o Tt fiaXKrra Bo^ei oi/tm? e')(ei,v. 
 
 B Xoyi^oiJiai yap, w <f)iKe eratpe, deatrai «? 'TrkeoveKTiKw'i' el fiev 
 Tvyx^avet, dXr)0f) ovra a Xiyoa, Ka\S^ Srj ej^et t6 ireiaOrivaL' el Se 
 firjSiv icTTi Te\evTr]cravTi, aW' ovv tovtov ye tov '^povov avrov tov 10 
 irpo TOV davdrov tjttov rot? irapov<nv drihri<; ecro/iai 6Bvp6fi6V0<;. 
 r) Se Br) dyvoid fioi avTrj ov ^vvBiaTeXei, kukov yap dv ■^v, dXX' 
 oXLyov iHTTepov diroXeiTai. TrapecrKevaa-pAvo'i Br}, e^, S "Zififjila 
 Te KaX K.e^T]<;, ovtoxtI ep^ofiai iirl rov Xoyov' vp,el<s /JuevToi, dv ifiol 
 
 C TreiOr/crde, afiiKpov <f>povTi<TavTe<; ZwKpdTOVS, t^9 Be dXrjOeia'; ttoXv is 
 fidXXov, idv fjuev ti v/uv Bokm dXrjOe^ Xeyeiv, avvoixoXoyrjaaTe, el 
 Be fj/Tj, iravrX Xoya dvriTelveTe, otto)? firj eym virh "Trpodv/ilai; 'djia 
 
 until you have fully tested it ; lest I de- 
 part like a bee leaving my sting behind. 
 
 I . 01 it&vv dTraCS(VToi] The language 
 suggests the Cynics; cf. Theaetetus 155 E 
 tlaX y&p, <3 irai, /t<£\' ev a/iov<roi ; cf. Sophist 
 246 D, and Arist. metafk. H iii 1043' 24 
 oX 'AvTurO^veLoi Kal ol ovtus &7ralSevT0L. 
 Sophists of the eristic type are no doubt 
 included. 
 
 6. fi [M^ eHr) irdpep^ov] ' unless it were 
 merely by the way'. It is surprising 
 that Prof. Geddes has adopted against 
 all the mss. Hermann's most infelicitous 
 conjecture ei /iti el ir&pepyov. Had el 
 been found in the texts, one would have 
 felt strongly inclined to alter it to etti. 
 
 8. Xo7Cto|j.ai yap] ' for I am reason- 
 ing, my dear companion — see how self- 
 ishly '. All this is Sokratic elpaveia : 
 Sokrates and Plato were the last men to 
 persuade themselves that a belief was 
 true, because it was pleasant. 
 
 II. ^TTov Tois irapoCiri] 'I shall be 
 less likely to annoy the company with 
 lamentation', tittov of course qualifies 
 all the words that follow : it will less be 
 
 the case that I shall annoy them by 
 lamenting. The passage would not have 
 required a note but for the strange mis- 
 conception of Wagner, who seems to think 
 that /lir) is wanted before dSvp6p.ei'os. 
 
 12. 11 8i 81) avvoia] Sokrates means 
 that one way or another his doubts will 
 be cleared away; he will not go on ex- 
 isting in doubt whether his existence will 
 continue. For at death he wiU either 
 find assurance of immortality or he will 
 cease to be, and in neither case is he 
 subject to dyvoM. SKlyov vcrepov means 
 shortly after the present moment, not 
 after death. Si; ayvoia is Fischer's sugges- 
 tion for Si&voM, which is the reading of 
 the best mss. : the rest have dvoia. 
 
 15. o-ftiKpov <|>povT£o-avT£s SwKpdTovs] 
 Cf. Republic 595 c dXX' oi yap irpb ttjs 
 d\T]6eLas TifitiTios Avrip : and Arist. Nic. 
 Kth, I iv 1096^ 16 ap/pQiv yap ovtoiv 
 tpiXoLV 6(nov irpoTipm' t^v akrideiav, 
 
 17. oirus jiTi] The editions general- 
 ly have ei\a^oiiievoi otws : but the parti- 
 ciple is absent in BCD and omitted by 
 Schanz. 
 
 8—2 
 
ii6 HAATONOS [92 
 
 ifiavrSv re kuI vfia^ e^a'Trar'^a-a'} aa-Trep /jdXiTTa to xivrpov 
 eyKaToXnrwv ol')(riaofiai. 
 
 XLI. 'AW' Ireov, e<})7j. trpmTOV fte viro/iv^craTe a iT^yere, iav 
 fir] (f>aiv(o/Mai fie/j.vrjfievo';. %(,fi/ila'; fiev yap, ffl? iya/iai, dinaTeL 
 5 T6 nal <f)o^eiTat, /irj 1] '^v')(r) ofiw; koI Oeiorepov koX koKKiov ov 
 Tov crc6fiaT0<; irpoa'jroWvrjTai iv dp/iovlaq eiSec ovaa' KeySiy? Be D 
 fioi eSo^e TovTo jiev ifiol crvyxapeiv, iroKvxpoviwrepov ye elvat, 
 ■yjrv'x^'^v (rc6/j,aT0<s, dWd ToSe oBrjXov iravTi, firj iroXXd St) (TwiMara 
 KM iroXXaKi'; Kararpl^acra rj ''^vyrj to TeXevTalov <7Wfia KaTaXc- 
 
 10 TTOvcra vvv avTrj aTroXXvrjTai,, koI rf avTo tovto ddvaTO^, ■^i/;)^^? 
 6Xe6po<;, eirel awfid ye del diroXXufievov ovBev iraveTai. apa aW' 
 ■f] Taur' ia-Tiv, S Xififiia Te Koi KeySi;?, a Bel rjiicvi iiria-KOweia-Oai ; 
 ^vvco/jioXoyeiTfjv Bij TavT elvat dfi^eo. TLoTepov ovv, 6^1;, irdvTa's E 
 Xov<i ep/irpocrde \070v9 ovk d'TroBi'^eaOe, fj toO? fieu, toi)? B' ov; 
 
 15 i-Ov<i p,ev, e<paTr}v, tovi o ov. it ovv, rj o?, Trepi, ejceovov tov 
 Xoyov XiyeTe, iv m etpafiev Trjv /xdffrjaiv dvd/Mvrjcnv etvai, Kal 
 TovTov o^Tcoq ey(pvTO<i dvayKaica e')(etv oKXodi irpoTepov rip,wv elvat 
 Trfv '<{rv'xr]v, irplv iv to3 crdifiaTt ivBeOfjvat ; 'Eyes fiev, e<j>7] 6 K.e^rj's, 92 
 KaX TOTe 6avfJia(TTa<i cos itreicrdriv vir avTov Kal vvv ififieveo cos 
 
 20 ovSevl Xoyq). K.al jj/rjii, e<f)'r} 6 2f/i/u.tas, Kal auros o^tqx; e%a), Kal 
 irdvv dv 0avfMd^oip,t, e'l fiot irepl ye tovtov dXXa iroTe Bo^etev. 
 Kal 6 ^(OKpdTrj';, 'AXXd dvdyKT] crot, ecfirj, m ^ive @r]j3ate, dXXa 
 
 I. cftavT^v] This reading has the to be a rational hypothesis, while the 
 
 best authority : Z. and St. give iavrSv. other is merely a plausible analogy. 
 
 iiinrtp \UkvrTa\ The commentators The first refutation is addressed to be- 
 think this is borrowed from the line of lievers in av&ii.vq<ns and pre-existence of 
 Eupolis concerning Perikles, rb Khrpov the soul; it appeals therefore only to 
 ijKariKmre rdis iKpoufihois. The expres- Platonists or Pythagoreans, 
 sion seems likely to have been proverbial. 6. iv dp|xoyCas «t8«i] Cf. Timaeus 30 c 
 
 gi c — 92 D, c. xli. Sokrates briefly tSv /i,h ovv iv /iipovs etSei /iriSeyl Kara^iiiiroi- 
 
 restates the objections of Simmias and nev. Also Republic 389 B ; Cratylus 394 D. 
 
 Kebes : he then points out to the former 8. iroXXd St) o-t^para koI iroXXaKis] 
 
 that he must make his choice between the We might take TroWd to refer to the 
 
 doctrine that soul is a harmony and the exhaustion of many bodies during our 
 
 doctrine that learning is reminiscence. human life, and ttoXXiIkis to the repeated 
 
 The theory of reminiscence presupposes incarnations of the soul ; the two cases 
 
 that the soul existed before the body ; put by Kebes. But the following words 
 
 but a harmony comes into existence after koX ^...iraitTU seem to show that So- 
 
 that which produces it : either therefore krates had the first case only in view ; 
 
 soul is not a harmony or she has had no and for the purposes of his argument there 
 
 precognition of the ideas. Simmias ad- is no difference between them, 
 
 mits this and declares without hesitation 22. oXXa 8d|ai] So Stallbaum and 
 
 in favour of reminiscence, which he affirms Schanz ; Z. has Sojdio-ai with the mss. 
 
92] a)AIAflN. 117 
 
 oo^ai, idvirep fitivri ^Se rj otricn<{, t6 dpfiovLav fikv eivai trvvderov 
 irpwyfia, y^rr)(rjv Se dpfioviav tivcL e'/e TtfSi' Kara, t6 crS/ia evrerafievrnv 
 
 B avyKeia-Oai. ov yap irov aTroSe^ei, ye avTov \eyovTO<;, to? irpoTepov 
 yv apfiovia crvyKeifievr], irplv eKelva elvai e'f Sv eSei avrrjv a-vvre- 
 Oijvaf r] diroBe^ei, ; OvSa/icS?, e<f3r}, m "Zwicpare^. Atcrddvet, ovv, s 
 rj S' 89, on, Tavrd croi, crvfi^aivei \eyeiv, orav ^^5 yUrei/ etvai rrjv 
 yfrvxrjv trpXv koX eh dv6p(oirov elSo? re koX a-cofia d^CKicr0ai, elvai 
 Se avrrjv avyKeifievrfv iu twv ovSiiro) ovtcov ; ov yap Si) dpfiovia 
 ye aoi toiovtov eartv o dfTretKa^eK, dWd irporepov koI rj \vpa 
 Kat at, y^ppSai Ka\ ol (pdoyyoi en dvdpfioo'Toi ovre<i yl/yvovTai, 10 
 
 C reXevTalov Se irdvTav ^vvia-Tarai »; dp/iovia ical irpSrov diroWv- 
 Tai. ovTO<s o5v (TOb 6 \0709 eiceivcp ttw? ^vvacrerai; OvSa/jLm<;, 
 e(f)r] 6 Zitfi/iia'!. K.al firjv, rj S' 89, irpeirei ye etirep ra aWp \6ya 
 ^vvaSm etvai KaX tw irepX dp/jboviaf. Tipeirei yap, 'e<f)r) 6 St/i/ttta9. 
 O1/T09 Totvvv, e(f)r), a-ol ov ^vvaSo';, a\V opa' iroTepov aipel twv 15 
 Xoycov, rrjp fiddr/criv avdjivqaiv elvai rj ■\^v')(rjv dpfioviav ; IloXt) 
 fioKXov, e(f>r), eKelvov, <o 'ZmxpuTei;. oSe fiev yap /mc yeyovev dvev 
 
 D diroSei^eaxs jierd elicoro'i Tti'09 KaX evTrpeirela?, oOev KaX T0t9 7ro\- 
 Xot9 SoKel dvOpcoiroi's' eyco Se toi<; Sid twv eiKorcov Ta9 diroSei^eK 
 Troiov/jievoi<; \6yoi'; ^vvoiSa ovaiv d\a^6criv, koI dv rt? avToi)<s fit) 20 
 (f)vXaTTi]Tai, ev fioKa e^aTraraai, KaX iv yecofierpia KaX ev tok 
 aX\ot9 diracnv. 6 Se irepX rrjv dvafivtjtreeo'; koX fiaO-^crem'i \0709 
 Si V7ro9earea<; d^ia<; diroSe^aa-dai e'lprjrai. eppr)6rj yap irov oi^Tft)9 
 
 6. ToCra o-oi a-v|iPaCvci] ' this is what not distinctively Pythagorean, 
 your statement amounts to '. Schmidt 23. lpfnfii\ yip irov] ' for we said, I 
 
 proposes oi raird, i, c. you make contra- think, that the existence of our soul 
 
 dictory statements. This would do well before she entered the body rested on 
 
 enough, had it ms. authority; but the the same assurance as that of the very 
 
 ms. reading is equally good sense. raOra substance that has the title of absolute 
 
 = itpl>Tepov...<TvvTedrjvai. essence'. I have followed Schanz in 
 
 9. S diTEiKo^cis] 'harmony is not what adopting the emendation of Mudge, ofirr; 
 you represent it ', i. e. it is not such a for airrjt. Retaining airi^s we make 
 thing as soul. This is the reading of the Plato affirm that the pre-existence of the 
 best mss. and gives a simpler construction soul is assured inasmuch as her substance 
 than the ordinary if. is absolute existence. But Plato never 
 
 10. 01 <|>6(5yYoi] i. e. the tones of the said anything of the sort : he merely said, 
 several strings before they are combined as surely as the ideas exist, so surely did 
 into harmony. the soul, 76 K Heindorf in an acute 
 
 18. |J.£Td eIkotos Tiv6s] 'through a note defends the vulgate, taking aiiT^s as 
 
 certain analogy and plausibility '- possessive j ' as surely as absolute exist- 
 
 Tots iroWots] Another indication that ence belongs to her ', i. e. was cognised 
 
 this was a widely spread popular opinion, by her; referring to the words in 76 e 
 
Ii8 
 
 HAATXINOS 
 
 [93 
 
 ij/jiMV etvai Tj "^vxrj koX Trplv et? awfia d^iKiadai, &(r7rep avTrj 
 haTvv rj ova-la e'^^ovaa rrjv iirmvv/iiav Trjv rov o ea-Tiv. iym Se E 
 ravTTjv, (B? ifiaxndv ireCOa, lKavw<; re Kal 6pddS<; aTroBeSeyfiai. 
 avarjKi} ovv fioi, m? eoiKe, Bta ravra fir)Te efiavrov fitjre dWov 
 
 5 arroBi'^ea'dai Xiyovro^, (»? '^V')(i] iariv apjMvla. 
 
 XLII. T/ Se, 17 K 09, (B XifJifila, TrjSe ; SoKet aoi dpjiovla 'fj 
 dWrj Tivl (TwOeaet irpoarjKeiv aXXw? tto)? e')(eiv rj co? av eKeiva e-)(ri 93 
 ef &v av crvyKerjTai ; OvSa/ji,w<;. OvBe firjv TroLelv rt, w? ijmfiai,, 
 ovSi Ti irdcf^eiv aWo Trap" a dv eKeiva fj iroifj rj irda'xrj ; Swe^ij. 
 
 10 OvK dpa rjyelaOai ye irpoaijKei dp/Moviav tovtcov i^ cov av avvTedy, 
 aW' eTreaOai,. ^vveSoKei. TloXKov dpa Sei ivavria ye dpfiovia 
 
 {nrdpxov<rai' irpbrepov avevpldKOVTes fi/ieri- 
 pav olScrav. But (i) this interpretation 
 supposes a very awkward ellipse of 4crrlv 
 in a relative clause, (2) the sense of avTTJs 
 is severely strained: could Plato say 
 ' absolute existence is hers ', meaning 
 ' absolute existence is cognised by her ' ? 
 (3) we have already seen reason to doubt 
 the genuineness of the words in 76 E. 
 Hirschig also adopts airri. 
 
 3. iKavus] 'on adequate proof. 
 
 92 E — 94 B, 6. xlii. Again a harmony 
 must conform to the conditions of the 
 materials which produce it ; consequently 
 the completeness of the harmony is in 
 exact proportion to the completeness 
 with which these are brought into tune. 
 It follows then that there are degrees 
 in harmony, corresponding with the con- 
 ditions of the materials. But in soul 
 there are no degrees ; each soul is just as 
 completely soul as every other. Further- 
 more we say some souls are virtuous, 
 others vicious ; and we define virtue to be 
 a harmony, vice a discord of the soul. 
 Now supposing that souls are harmonies, 
 they are harmonies which admit of no 
 difference in degree, since we have ad- 
 mitted that there are no degrees of soul. 
 But a virtuous soul, being a harmony, has 
 in her another harmony, while a vicious 
 soul has a discord ; therefore the virtuous 
 soul is more of a harmony, that is, more 
 of a soul, than the vicious. But this being 
 
 contrary to our premisses, we are forced 
 to conclude that no soul is more virtuous 
 or vicious than another ; or rather that all 
 souls, being complete harmonies, are com- 
 pletely virtuous : a reducHo ad absurdum. 
 
 The second argument vrill reach those 
 who accept neither dvd/ivTjffis nor the ideal 
 theory, but who do accept the view that 
 virtue is a harmonious state of the soul. 
 It is to be observed (i) that the premiss 
 in 93 A ToWov dpa Set k.t.\., of which a 
 different use is made in the next chapter, 
 here is simply brought in to show that 
 the perfection of the harmony depends 
 upon the tuning of the strings &c., and 
 consequently that as these may be more 
 or less in tune, the harmony admits cor- 
 responding degrees of completeness ; (2) 
 the argument might seem to be complete 
 in 93 B, where it is allowed that, while 
 harmony admits degrees, soul does not. 
 But we should regard all the earUer part 
 of the chapter as collecting the materials 
 for the refutation which proceeds consecu- 
 tively from 93 D : moreover Plato had to 
 guard against the rejoinder that, although 
 harmony, as such, admits of degrees, 
 there may yet be particular kinds of har- 
 mony, whereof soul is one, which do not 
 admit of degrees. 
 
 II. IvavrCa yt dp|tovCa] ivavria is of 
 course accusative plural. Plato means 
 that the harmony is entirely the outcome 
 of its constituents and is conditioned by 
 
93] 
 
 <I)AIAnN. 
 
 119 
 
 KiVTjOrjvai r) ^dej^aa-Oat rj Tt oKXo ipavricodrjpai rot? avrrji; fii- 
 peaiv. HoWov fievTot, eiprj. Tl Se ; ov'^ ovrco^ apfiovla 7re(j)VKev 
 eivai eKaaTTj dpfiovia, oS? av dp/ioaOfj ; Ov fiavBdvco, ec^ij. Ov'x^i, 
 
 B ^ S' 89, av /Mev fiaXXov dp/jbocrdy koX eiri irkeov, eiirep eVSe^jjjerat 
 TOVTO yliyvea'dai, fiaXKov re av dpfiovia e'ir) koi irKeitov, el S" rjTTov 6 
 re Ka\ eV eXarrov, tjttov re Kal iXdrTcov ; Haw ye. 'H ovv ecrri 
 TOVTO Trepl ■yjrv'xijv, m<7Te Kal KaTO, to crfiiKpoTaTOV fiaXXov eTspav 
 eTepa<; 'y]rv'XTJ<; em irXeov ical /jbaXXov tj eir eXaTTov Kal rJTTOv avrd 
 TOVTO elvai, -^vx/jv ; OvS' ottoxttiovv, e<j)rj. ^ipe Sij, e(f)7j, tt/so? 
 
 C Ato?" XeyeTai ^Jrvxr} rj p,ev vovv re e'xetv Kal dpeTrjv Kal elvai 10 
 ayoBrj, rj Se avoid]/ re Kal fiO'xOrjplav Kal elvai KaKr) ; Kal TavTa 
 aX7]0do<! XeyeTai ; 'AXr]9co<s fiivToi, Tmv o^v Oe/ievmv ■yfrv^frjv dp- 
 
 them, having no independent existence : 
 as you tighten the string the tone rises. 
 On this ground it would be impossible 
 for a soul to be in a harmonious state, i.e. 
 virtue, independently of the physical con- 
 ditions of which she herself Is the result. 
 
 4. |iaX\ov dpiioo-O j Kal eirl irXeov] There 
 must be some distinction between fmWov 
 and iirl TrXiov. I think /mWov may apply 
 to the degree of completeness in which 
 the (riv0e<ns is accomplished, and iiri 
 TrKiov to the character of the <riv0e(ns 
 itself. To take an illustration from 
 music (i) the two notes forming an octave 
 may be more or less in tune ; (2) the 
 octave and the fifth are more perfect 
 concords than the fourth and third. This 
 view, I find, is in a manner supported 
 by Olympiodoros : iwoTWerai /li] elvai 
 apixovlav dp/iovtas TrXefu /xridi iXdrrco, AWd, 
 liijdi fuiWoi' firiSi ^ttov. i(TTi Sk rb fiiv 
 irpuTOV irepl ttjj/ irocrdTTjra rwp Sittarr)- 
 fidruiv Kal rdv avaTinxiTUV ij y&p Sci, 
 Teaa&pav oi5k av yivoiTO oSre iv trXdoffiv 
 oifre iv ^Xdrrofftv t6 5^ SeOrepov irepl 
 T^v aveaiv Kal Tf\v iirWanv kot' airrb 
 y&p ri etSos oiSeida hpixovla oire Avlerai, 
 oike iiriTdverai. That is, a particular 
 harmony, e.g. the fourth, cannot be har- 
 monised ^ttJ irKiov or iiaKXov: since (i) it 
 cannot comprehend more than a fixed 
 number of tones, (2) it cannot (if it is to 
 be a true fourth) admit any tampering 
 
 with the pitch, koto tov ap/ioviKov \6yov. 
 The Pythagoreans, he says, cvWa^&v fiiv 
 Ka\ov(riTrjv Sii, Tecraapav &pfwvtav ws iJKiffTa 
 &pfioviay KaTaKopeCTi/rtijv d^ Triv Bih traffSiv 
 lis imKuxra. As to the ii-aXKov Kal rjrrov he 
 remarks ixu y&p iKcurrri ap/iovla TrXaros Tt 
 Kark T'^v at<r97jffiV,oi p/^v Kara rbv apfiovLKbv 
 \byov : that is to say, although one pre- 
 cise ratio alone constitutes a true octave, 
 there is a certain margin of variation 
 within which the ear will accept the 
 interval as an octave. 
 
 7. (idXXov IWpav Irepas] I have re- 
 tained iwXKov with all the mss. It is 
 bracketed by Schanz and expunged by 
 the Ziirich editors. naKKpv however is 
 not seldom used by Plato to strengthen 
 another comparative : <cf. Timaeus 87 c 
 diKOtbrepov yap twv dryadtov irepl p.aXKov 
 17 TWV KaKiSv iffxeiv \6yov. PoHticus 2^^ C 
 TTjs B^ yvojffTLKTjs iioXkov 7J Trjs x^t/JOTex^'" 
 Krjs Kal 8\(iis TrpaKnKTJs ^oi\ei rbv §aaCKia 
 (piSfiev olKeidrepov cT^at ; Gorgias 487 B 
 alcxwroripu p^Wov rod d^ovTos. The 
 present case is, it is true, a stronger one, 
 since the word piaWov is actually re- 
 peated; but this is softened by the inter- 
 position of irl irKiov, and the pleonasm 
 seems to me not unnatural. Some editors 
 would insert ^vxw before ^ux'?s : but, as 
 Schmidt observes, this is superfluous on 
 account of the preceding words ^ ow 
 lirn TOVTO repl ^\)xl\v. 
 
I20 HAATXINOS [94 
 
 jxoviav elvai rl ti,<; <jii^crei ravra oma etvai ev rak -^wj^at?, tjjj/ 
 re dpeTrjv koI Trjv KaKiav; irorepov dp/ioviav av rtva dWtjv Kal 
 dvap/ioarlav ; koI Trjv fiev ripp^oaOai, Trjv ajaOr)v, xal e')(eiv ev 
 avrfi apjjLovia oiia-rj aWrjv apfioviav, Trjv he dvapfiocnov avTijv re 
 
 5 elvai Kal ovk e')(ei,v ev avTrj oKXrjv ; Ovk e%(» eywy', e^tj 6 AtfJ'/J'lai, 
 eiiTrelv SrjfKov S' '6ti tomvt utt av Xeyoi 6 eKelvo viroOefievo';: D 
 'AX\a Trpoco/ioXoyrjTai., e<f>rj, fi-ijSev /iaXXov firjS' rjTTOv erepav eTepai; 
 yfrvx^v "^vx^^ elvaf tovto S' ecrn t6 ofioXoyrjfia, /j/tjBev fiaXXov 
 firjS' eVt TrXeov firjS^ tjttov (ir}K etr eXaTTov eTepav eTipa<; apfioviav 
 
 10 dp/jLovia'i elvai' ^ yap ; Haw ye. Hrjv Se ye /irjSev fiaXXov firjSe 
 rjTTOv dpfioviav ovcrav jJitjTe /moXXov fi'^Te fjTTOv rjpfioaOai' eaTiv 
 ovTWi ; "Eo-Tti'. 'H Se jJ^rjTe fiaXXov fiijTe tjttov ■^pfioa-fiivrj ecTTiv o 
 Ti "TrXiov rj eXaTTov dpfiovia'; fieTe'x^ei, fj to Xaov ; To 'Icrov. Ovkovv 
 "^vyrj, eTreiBrj ovBev fidXXov ovS' rJTTOv aXXr) aXXr/^ avTO tovto E 
 
 15 y^vxv e<TTiv, ovhe hr) fidXXov ovSe tjttov rjpfiocTTai ; Ovras. To5to 
 Se 76 TreiTovdvla ovhev irXeov dvapfiocrTias ovSe dp/iovia<; /MeTe'Xpi 
 av ; OtJ yap ovv. Tovto S' aS ireirovOvla dp dv ti irXeov leaKia^ 
 rj apeTrjf fieTe')(pi erepa eTepai;, e'iirep ■q /j,€v KaKia dvapfiocrTta, rj 
 Se dpeTrj dpjiovia ew; ; Ovhev wXeov. MaWoi/ Se ye irov, w %tiJ,/j,ia, 
 
 20 KaTa Tov opdov Xoyov KUKiaf ovhep-la '^V')(ri fieOe^ei, ecirep dpfwvla 94 
 icTTiv' dpfiovia yap hrjTrov iravTeXw'i avTO tovto ovaa, dpfiovta, 
 
 ■z. dpiiovCav aS riva aX\T]v] The ^uxV ^"x5' i" agreement with eripav 
 
 conception of virtue as a harmonious Mpas. But this prematurely anticipates 
 
 condition of the soul is peculiarly Pla- the conclusion in E oixovv TJ/vxh--Al>l">''- 
 
 tonic. Compare the description of Sixat- rai. The train of reasoning is thus. We 
 
 oaiivq in Republic 443 D /*i) i6.(Ta,vTa. riX- agree that one soul is as much soul as 
 
 \bTpia irparrav (KaaTov iv airQ /ii/Si any other. Assuming soul to be a har- 
 
 TTokvirpayiioveiv irphs SXKriKa ret iv t% ipvxy mony, this amounts to saying that all 
 
 yhfi, dXXd r^ 6vti tix otefo ev difievov these harmonies, which we call souls, are 
 
 Kal ap^avra airbv airov Kal Koa-pt'^iTavTa equally harmonies. Now equal harmo- 
 
 Kal (plKov yevbp,evov kavr^ Kal ^vvappii- nies are equally harmonised and have an 
 
 a-avTa rpla 6vTa, aairep Spovs rpeis &p/io- equal portion of harmony. Therefore 
 
 vias aTexvois, veoTTjs re Kal viraTtis Kal souls, being harmonies, are equally har- 
 
 pticTTis. And in Sophist 228 B we hear monised. In other words, if souls are 
 
 that vice is a o-Toiris of the soul. harmonies, they are equal harmonies ; 
 
 8. toBto 8' ?<rTi rd 6|i,o\6Yii)jia] ' the but equal harmonies cannot be more or 
 
 admission amounts to this, that (in saying less harmonised one than another ; nei- 
 
 one soul is not more soul than another) ther therefore can souls. There is no 
 
 you affirm that one harmony is not more difficulty about dp/iocfas, if we under- 
 
 a harmony than another '. Schanz, fol- stand ' that particular harmony which is 
 
 lowing Madvig and Schmidt, brackets soul'. 
 ip/iovlas, so that we must understand 21. irovTtXus] Soul is complete and 
 
94] 
 
 4)AIAnN. 
 
 121 
 
 avapfioa-Tia<! oi^wot' av fierdcr'^oi,. Ov fievroi. OvSi je Sjjttow 
 "^frvxr), ova-a TravTeXw? '^v'yr], KUKia^. Ilffl? yap eK 7e twv irpoet- 
 prjfievmv, 'Ek tovtov dpa tov \6yov rjpHv iracrai ylrv^al irdvTOiv 
 ^cpwv 6fiola)<s diyaOal eaovrai, einrep Sfiolo)^ ylrv^al •7re(pvKaa'iv avTO 
 TovTo, i^v)(al, elvai. "^jjLoiye ZoksI, e<pr}, w XooKpaTei. 'H xal s 
 B KaX(S<! BoKei, ■^ S' o?, ovtw XeyecrOai, koI Traxryeiv av Tavra 6 
 X070?, el 6p6ri rj vTrodea-i's rjv, to ■\^v^r]v apjjboviav elvai; OvB' 
 oirtoaTiovv, ed>r). 
 
 XLIII. Tt Se ; ^ S' 09' rmv iv dvOpwir^ Travrcov ea-ff" tl 
 aXko Xeyeti dp'^eiv fj '^v')(riv, akXa}<; re Kal (ppovifiov ; Ovk eymye. 10 
 Tiorepov avyx^copovirav roi<; Kara rd atSfia traO'qfiacn.v fj leal evav- 
 Tiovfievrjv ; Xeyoo Se to roiovSe, ws Kavjiaro^ ivovrof xal Btyjrovi; 
 eTrl rovvavriov 'ekKeiv, to firj iriveiv, Kal TrewTji; ivova7]<; eVt to fir} 
 
 perfect soul, as such ; therefore complete 
 and perfect harmony : no discord then, 
 and consequently na vice, can exist in 
 her. 
 
 4. «|nixal irEc|>tiKa(riv] Schanz brackets 
 \pvxai, following Heindorf. But the 
 clause is of general application : ' seeing 
 that it is the nature of souls to be this 
 precise thing, namely souls, in the same 
 degree'. 
 
 5. ij Kol KoXus] ' do you think this is 
 a worthy conclusion ? or that our theory 
 would have been in such a predicament, 
 had our premiss been correct, that soul 
 is a harmony ? ' 
 
 6. irdtrxeiv av] The mss. omit ao, 
 which however occurs in the citation of 
 Stobaeus. It is certainly necessary, since 
 e^..^;'='if our premiss had been cor- 
 rect ' : which it is not. 
 
 94 B — 95 A, c. xliii. Lastly we see 
 that the soul rules the body, often thwart- 
 ing its desires and controlling its affec- 
 tions; whereas we saw that a harmony 
 could not act in opposition to its con- 
 stituent elements. Soul therefore cannot 
 be a harmony. 
 
 The last argument rests neither upon 
 the ideal theory nor upon the doctrine 
 that virtue is harmony : it is simply an 
 appeal to common sense. Aristotle's 
 
 views on the subject will be found in 
 lie anima I iv §§ 2 — 9. In the lost dia- 
 logue Eudemos he argued against har- 
 mony, (i) that harmony has an opposite, 
 viz. avapfioaria, but soul has no opposite 
 — an ohviovis peiiiio princi/in ; (2) that 
 the opposite of dp/wda (rii/jiaTOi is dvap- 
 fuxTTta adifiaros : the dvap/ioffHa is dis- 
 ease, weakness, and deformity, therefore 
 the dp/iovla is health, strength, and 
 beauty ; none of which is soul. See 
 Bernays, Dialogs des Aristoteles p. 26. 
 
 II. iroTspov oTJYXwpoOo-ov] The mss. 
 are in confusion here. Schanz gives iri- 
 Tepav [(TUYxwpoCffoi'] roh Kari. to trup-a 
 irdBeaai ivavTiovpihriv [ToS^/iairi]; which, 
 omitting the brackets, is the reading of 
 BCD. Schanz considers that the con- 
 fiision arose because the copyist was 
 puzzled by the use of irdrepov with a 
 single interrogative. The sentence, as 
 he reads it, seems to me however some- 
 what bare ; and I have reverted to the 
 text of Z. and St. In the next sentence 
 lis el is found in B, wirei in CD. oiov is 
 in Stobaeus and many inferior mss. us 
 is in the margin of B, and was approved 
 by Schanz JV. C. p. 150, though he now 
 prints [tcHrel]. St. and Z. give oTov. 
 
 13. Iiri roivavrlov ^K£iv] Cf. J?e- 
 public 439 B foil. 
 
122 nAATflNOS [95 
 
 etrOieiv, Kal aX\a fivpia irov opwfiev ivavTi,ovfievr]v rrjv -^vxriv rot? C 
 Kara to a-dofia- fj oii ; ILdvv fiev ovv. Ovkovv av anoXoyija-afiev 
 iv TOL<} irpoa-Qev fi'^iror dp avrrjv, dpfioviav 76 ovcrav, evavriu aoeiv 
 oh eTTiTelvotTo koI j(aXa)To Koi TrdXKoiro koX aXKo oriovv iraOo'i 
 
 S 7ra<7^of eKelva i^ wv rvyx^vei ovaa, aXX' eireaaai, eKeivoK teal 
 ovTTOT av i^ye/jboveveiv ; 'D,fio\oy)]a-afiev, e(j)r]' irm yap ov ; Tt 
 oSv; vvv ov irdv rovvavriov r\iuv (jtalverai ipya^ofievr], rjyefiovev- 
 ova-d re eKelvcov irdvTmv e^ Sv ^rjffi Tif avrrjv elvai, Kal evavriov- 
 fievrj oXlyov rravra hid iravro^ rov ^lov Kal hea-iro^ova-a •rrdvra<! D 
 
 10 rpoirov;, rd fiev 'xaXe-jTWTepov KoXa^ovaa Kal fier dXyTjBovcov, rd 
 re Kara rrjV yv/j,vaa-riK'^v Kal rrjv larpiKrjV, rd Se irpaorepov, Kal 
 rd jxev direCKova-a, rd Se vovderovaa, ralf i'iri6v/iiai<; Kal opyaK 
 Kal <^b^oi<; q5? dXkT) ovaa aXXp Trpdyfiari BiaXeyo/jiivT] ; olov irov 
 KaVOfii/jpoi} iv 'OBvaaeia rrewoiTiKev, ov Xeyei rov 'OBva-aea 
 
 15 crrrjdo'} Be rrXr^^a's KpaBirjV rfvirrarre im)6<(i' 
 
 rerXaOi Brj, KpaBirj' Kal Kvvrepov dXKo rror erXr)^. E 
 
 dp" o'lei avrov ravra iroirja-ai Biavoovfievov &)? apfwvia<{ avrrjs 
 ovarji; Kal oia<; dyetrdat viro rwv rov awfiaro'; iradrnv, aXK ov% 
 oXa<; clr^eiv re ravra Kal Becnro^etv, Kal ovcrij<! avrrj'i iroXv Oeiorepov 
 20 riv6<i irpdyfjiaro^ ■f) Kaff' dpfiovCav; N^ Aia, to 2,(0Kpare<;, efioir/e 
 BoKei. OvK dpa, m dpurre, rijuv ovBafiy KaXm e')(ei i^v')(y}v ap/io- 
 vlav rivd <f)dvat elvai' ovre yap dv, ax; eoiKev, 'Ofi'^pa deiai ■jroirjrfj 95 
 bfioXoyol^ev ovre avrol rjfiiv avroi^. "E^et ovTto<;, k^. 
 
 3. iv Talis irprfo-Bev] 93 A. St. and Z. 390 D, 441 B. 
 
 give iimpoaBev. 22. 'OiMipu] In the same half-serious 
 
 4. ots eiriTtCvoiTo] i. e. ^KelvOK a, manner Plato professes to trace the doc- 
 cognate accusative, 'it can never give a trine irdi'Taper back to Homer: Theaetetus 
 sound contrary to the tensions and relax- 152 E Airiiv y&p 'SlKeav6v tc BeQv yiveaiv 
 ations and vibrations and all the other koX ntyripa. 'iriBiv, ir&vTa clpriKev ^Kyova 
 conditions of the materials from vfhich it poijs re Kal Kivriffeus. Cf. 1S3 C. 
 
 arises '. 95 a — E, c. xliv. Having thus disposed 
 12. rats liri6ii|j.Cais] The construction of the theory of harmony, Sokrates pro- 
 is usually regarded as following d7rfiXoC<ro ceeds to deal vpith the objection of Kebes, 
 rather than vovBcroma. Heindoif com- v^hich he first recapitulates. If the philo- 
 pares Isokrates Areo/i. 149 c (§ 48) and sopher is to feel any reasonable confi- 
 Lysias against Andokicies % 33. But it dence that his life in Hades will be the 
 is surely evident that iin.8ufi,laK k.t.X. happier for his devotion to philosophy on 
 depends on 8id\eyonii''ii, as Schleier- earth, we must prove that the soul is 
 macher takes it. absolutely indestructible. It is not enough 
 15. oTTJBos 8J irXijIas] Ot/yssejixx 17. that she is strong and godlike, nor that 
 The passage is quoted also in Republic for ages before our birth she enjoyed an 
 
95] 
 
 «|)AIAI1N. 
 
 123 
 
 XLIV. Etei* Bt], ^ S' 0? %a)KpdTr)(}, rd- /juev 'Apfiovia<i rjfuv 
 TT?? ©ifj^aiK-fji iXed ttw?, to? eoiKe, fierpieoi} yiyove' ri Se hrj rd 
 KdB/iov, e^t], CO Ke/S»;?, ttcS? iKaa-ofieQa koI tLvl "Koym; 2v fioi 
 SoKel'i, e<f)7] 6 K.i^r]^, i^evpijcreiv' tovtovI yovv rbv \6yov rbv iTp6<s 
 Trjv dp/iovlav Oavfiaar&'i fioi eiTre? (»<; trapd ho^av. Iiifjujiuov ydp 5 
 B \eyovTO<; o ti rjiropei, irdvv iOavfia^ov, el ri efet rt? 'x^pijcracrdai t£ 
 \0709 avTOv' irdvv fiev ovv fioi aroTrs)? eSo^ev evdi>g Trjv irpmrrfv 
 e^oBov ov Be^aadai tov o'ov \6yov. ravrd, S^ ovk dv dav/ideraifit 
 Kal TOV TOV KaS/iou Xoyov el nrdOoi. 'Xi ^yade, e^j; 6 ^w/cpaTij^, 
 firj fiiya Xeye, firj Tt? ruiiv ^a(TKavia "TreptTpeiJrr} tov Xoyov t^v 10 
 
 intelligent existence. This does not prove 
 her immortality : the very incarnation in 
 a human body may be the first symptom 
 of her coming dissolution ; it matters not 
 whether she undergo one or many such 
 incarnations ; if vf e cannot show that she 
 is actually imperishable, our hope of a 
 future life is vanity. 
 
 1. Tcl, )i,^v ' ApiiovCas] Sokrates play- 
 fiiUy personifies the theory of his Theban 
 friend as Harmonia the Theban heroine. 
 She had threatened the argument with 
 destruction, but the persuasive tongue of 
 Sokrates has propitiated her. Harmonia 
 naturally suggests Kadmos, who is made to 
 personifythe objection of Kebes. Manyand 
 marvellous are the interpretations which 
 various commentators have forced upon 
 this simple piece of pleasantry, which ill 
 deserves such treatment. But even the 
 laboured absurdity of Olympiodoros com- 
 pares favourably with such trifling as 
 Stallbaum's ' Simmiae ratio facilior, Ce- 
 betis difficilior ad refellendum fuit. quam- 
 obrem facile ilia uxori haec marito tri- 
 buitur'. Supposing the 'ratio' of Sim- 
 mias had been ten times more difficult 
 than that of Kebes, to whom but Har- 
 monia could it have been assigned? 
 Heindorf sensibly says ' hinc ad alteram 
 illam Cebetis itidem Thebani transituro 
 sponte se Cadmi offerebat mentio '. Mr 
 Jackson has suggested to me that tKea 
 conveys the notion of ' bidding farewell ', 
 iXo&i having the same sense addressed to 
 
 a deity as xoipe addressed to a mortal : 
 this view he supports by Cicero de natura 
 deorum I § 124 deinde si maxime talis est 
 deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum 
 caritate teneatur, valeat ; quid enim dicam 
 ' propitius sit ' ? This seems to me very 
 probable : X\a,9i. certainly is a, form of 
 farewell in Theokr. xv 143, where the 
 lady ends her song with XkaGi. vvv <pl\' 
 "ASuw, Kal is v4wt' evOv/j.'^tTais. Compare 
 ApoUonius Rhodius IV 1773 tXar' dpi.- 
 aritwv iiaKopuv yhos ; the poet is taking 
 leave of his heroes. 
 
 6. o Ti ijiropei] So Schanz after 
 Forster. I have adopted S ti mainly 
 because Xiyovros seems to want an ob- 
 ject. If Sre be retained we must trans- 
 late : ' while Simmias was speaking, at 
 the time he was stating his difficulty '- 
 Kebes did not agree with the theory of 
 Simmias, but apparently did not see his 
 way to refute it. 
 
 10. PacKavCa] ' lest some malign in- 
 fluence should put to confusion our dis- 
 course that is to come '- ^aa-Kavla ex- 
 presses the prevalent superstition that 
 over-confidence on the part of man drew 
 down on him the resentment of super- 
 human powers. Cf. Verg. Eel. vii 27 
 aut, si ultra placitum laudarit, bacchare 
 frontem Cingite, ne vati noceat mala 
 lingua futuro. The 'mala lingua' of 
 Codrus vents its malice, not in abuse, 
 but in extravagant praise exciting super- 
 nal wrath. This feeling has found its 
 
124 
 
 HAATflNOS 
 
 [95 
 
 fieWovra eaecrdai. akXa hrj ravra fiev tw 0em fieXija-ei, ■^fiei<! Se 
 'OjjuripiKW'i iyyv'! l6vTe<; Treipwfieda el dpa ti 'Ki'^ei<i. ecrri Se Srj 
 TO ne^aXaiov wv ^i/ret?' d^iOK iirtSei'^Brjvai, rjfiaiv rrjv ylrvxtj^' 
 dvooXeOpov re Koi dOdvarov oSaav, el ^iXoo'o^o'i avrjp fieXKav C 
 
 5 diroOavelaOai., Qappwv re koX '^yov/ievo<; diroOavmv eKSi ev irpd^eiv 
 Sia(j>ep6vra39 rj el ev dtWou ^la> /Stovs ereXevra, firj dvorjTov re koI 
 rfXldiov 6dpcro<; Oapprjaei. to he diroi^aiveiv on, Icrxvpov tI ecrnv 
 V '^''^XV *^*^ deoei8e<s Kal tJv en trpoTepov, irplv rjiid^ avOpcoirovi 
 'yeveaOai, ovSev KcoXveiv (j)r]<; irdvTa ravra p/qvveiv ddavaaiav fiev 
 
 10 /i??, on Be TToXuxpoviov xe ianv i^vj^rj Kal •qv irov irporepov dfirj- 
 ')(avov ocrov ^(povov Kal ySei re Kal eirparTev iroXXd arra' dXKa B 
 rjdp ovBev Tt /jb&Wov rjv dddvarov, dXKci Kal avro to eh dvdpwirov 
 (TW/JLa eKdelv dp'xrj 7]v avTy 6Xe6pov, Scrwep v6cro<;' Kal Tokanrapov- 
 fjLepT) re S?) rovrov tov ^iov ^(pij Kal TeXevrwcrd lye ev rm KaXovfiev^ 
 
 1$ davarm dtrotCkuovro. Siacfjepei Se By, ^179, ovSev evre mra^ eh 
 
 most perfect expression in Caliban upon 
 Setebos, e.g.' Meanwhile tlie best way to 
 escape His ire Is, not to seem too happy. 
 'Sees, himself. Yonder two ilies, with pur- 
 ple films and pink. Bask on the pompion- 
 bell above : kills both ' Plato however, 
 when speaking seriously, is careful to 
 repudiate the popular notion of 6e(av 
 (fiBbvot : cf. Timaeus 29 E ir^adhi ^v [sc. 
 6 riSe tA irav JwiirTiis], &ya$<f Si oiSels 
 irepl oiiSeKij ovdivore (yylyveTai <t>8l>vos. 
 See too Phaedrus 247 A <j>6bvos yb.p l^ia 
 6eLov xopou iararai,. Aristotle also denies 
 it, metaph. I ii 983^ 1. ri/up is Hein- 
 dorfs correction for iifiSv, which seems 
 too far removed from toi' \6yov. 
 
 I. ^o-eo-Sai seems suspicious, and is 
 bracketed by Schanz. As it has strong 
 ms. support however I have retained it. 
 \4ye(r6ai has hardly any authority. 
 
 3. '0(i.T|piKi3s] Prof. Geddes rightly 
 translates, ' as Homer's heroes do ' : not, 
 as Wagner, ' in Homeric phrase '. 
 
 4. €l i|>iX6(ro<(>os av^ip] Note that 
 Plato once more carefully marks the 
 proof of immortality as merely sub- 
 ordinate to this main thesis. 
 
 6. Iv a\X(i> pCcii] i.e. iv piifi yu{) ipiXo- 
 a-i<p(f. 
 
 7. TO 8J diro(f>aCvEiv] ' but as for prov- 
 ing that the soul is a strong and godlike 
 thing and that she existed even before we 
 were born as men — there is nothing, you 
 say, to prevent all this from showing, not 
 indeed her immortality, but that she is 
 long-lived, &c.' That is to say, Kebes 
 does not object to the reasoning of 
 Sokrates, so far as it merely shows that 
 the soul is very durable ; but it is none 
 the nearer to showing that she is im- 
 mortal. 
 
 13. dpx^ ijv ovTtj oX^Spoip] Kebes did 
 not put it quite in this way ; Sokrates 
 amplifies his expression in 88 A Tovetv 
 airrji' iv rdts ttoXXois yeviaeai. 
 
 1 4. JcpT)] The change of mood is readily 
 understood if we transfer the words from 
 reported to direct speech. The two im- 
 perfects would naturally be used by Kebes 
 in making his statement: 'for all your 
 reasoning, she was none the more im- 
 mortal' (riv—TJv dpa); 'the incarnation 
 was the beginning of her dissolution': 
 while the two optatives would in his 
 mouth be present indicative; f^ and 
 dir6XXuTai. As Ast says, the construction 
 follows on : cf. g6 B, where oVi is never 
 actually expressed. 
 
96] 
 
 4)AIAnN. 
 
 125 
 
 (Tmfia ep')(eTat elfre TroWa/et?, tt/sos 76 to eKacnov rifiwv ^o^eta-dai' 
 •Kpoa-rjKei ryap <j)o^€ia-dai, el /jurj dv6r]T0<} eir), tw fjirj elSoTi /wjSe 
 e'xpvTi Xoyov ScBovai, &5? dOdvarop icni. toiuvt drra ia-rlv otfiat,, 
 E CO K.e^rj'i, a Xi'yeL's' koI i^eirirrfie'i -iroXkaKi,'; dvaXafi/Sdvo), tva p,ri 
 Ti Bia^iijTj ri(jid<i, e'i re Tt ^ovKei, 7rpoa-0'§<; rj dcjteXrji;. koL 6 Ke07j<s, 5 
 Aw ovoev eywye iv rm irapovTi, ecfirj, oiire d<f>e\eiv ovTe irpoo'Oelvai 
 Siofiai' e<TTi Se ravra a Xejm. 
 
 XLv. O ovv ZaKpdrrj'i <rv')(vov ')(p6vov eTrto-^wj/ koI 7rpd<; 
 eavTOv Ti a-Ke'xjrdfievo'i, Ov (pavXov Trpdry/Ma, e(pri, m Ke/3jy?, ^7jTei<s' 
 oXws ydp Bel "jrepl yevea-eax; /cat <j)6opd<i rrjv ahiav Biairpajfiarev- 10 
 96 (TacrOai,. ijo^ ovv aoi Sleifit irepl avTwv, edv ^ovXrj, rd lye ifid 
 
 4. TToWaKis dva\a|j.pav(i>] This ex- 
 treme care in preparing the indictment 
 serves to remind us of the vital importance 
 of the coming struggle. All that pre- 
 cedes has been, so to speak, mere skir- 
 mishing : from this point the main battle 
 begins; the whole strength of the ideal 
 theory must be put forth to secure the 
 victory. 
 
 95 E — 97 B, c. xlv. This demands an 
 investigation into the causes of generation 
 and decay, on v?hich subject Sokrates 
 proposes to relate his ovfn experiences. 
 In his youth he vifas strongly fascinated 
 by the old physical philosophy; he in- 
 quired virhether heat and cold were the 
 universal generative forces ; whether the 
 blood were the source of intelligence, or 
 fire, or air, or the brain. But finally he 
 came to the conclusion that he had no 
 aptitude for such speculations, and even 
 lost his faith in the knowledge he before 
 supposed himself to possess. Formerly 
 he rested comfortably in the belief that 
 eating and drinking were the cause of 
 growth ; nor did he shrink from saying 
 that one man was taller than another by 
 the head, and that ten are more than 
 eight because of the addition of two. But 
 now he cannot satisfy himself that the 
 mere juxtaposition of separate units is a 
 sufficient cause for their being two; all 
 the less because the same result is pro- 
 duced by the precisely opposite process 
 
 of division ; nor can he even tell why one 
 is one ; but he is forced to reject the 
 physical method as affording no real ex- 
 planation of anything. 
 
 10. oX«s vdp] The airopla of Kebes 
 necessarily raises the question propounded 
 in Timaeus 2'j s, ri rb ov del yiveaLV di ovk 
 ^XO"! i""^ ''^ ''^ yiyvd/jxpov ii.iv ov Sk 
 oiSiirorre ; The immortality of the soul 
 can only be proved by means of the theory 
 of ideas ; and in order that we may fully 
 understand the bearing of that theory, it 
 is put in sharp contrast with the ahlai. of 
 previous philosophies. 
 
 11. Tci Ye e|j.d irdSi]] It has been main- 
 tained that we have here a piece of actual 
 history ; that the mental development of 
 the real Sokrates is here described. This 
 is however highly improbable. We know 
 from Xenophon (mem. i i 11 — 15) that 
 Sokrates had the utmost distaste for 
 physical speculation ; nor does Xenophon 
 say one word which leads us to suppose 
 this was the result of fruitless study. 
 Such inquiries must have been always 
 alien to the strongly practical genius of 
 Sokrates. Plato may be merely de- 
 scribing in its supposed effect on an in- 
 dividual mind the development of philo- 
 sophy to the theory of ideas ; but it is 
 not impossible that he is recounting his 
 own experience. Nothing can be more 
 probable than that a mind so insatiably 
 thirsting for knowledge should have 
 
126 
 
 HAATflNOS 
 
 [96 
 
 "Kodtf eireiTa av ri croi XPV'''''H'0V tfyaivrjTai, wv av \670), Trpo? t^v 
 veiOa irepl &v av Xeyrji} ')(^pri<7ei. 'AWa firjv, e^ 6 K.e^i^<;, ^ov- 
 Xofial ye. "Akove Toivw oj? ipovvTO^. eyco yap, e<f)7), & Ke^i;?, 
 veo'i mv Oav/jiaarSi w? iireOvfirjcra TavTrj<; t^? ao^ia'i, rjv hrj 
 S KaXovcn vepl ^vo-eto? iaroplav. virepijtpavo^ yap /moi eSoKei elvai, 
 elSivat ra? alrLa'; eicaarov, Sta rt ylr/verai maarov Kal Sia tI 
 diroXkvTat. Kal 8id ri eari,' Kal TroXXaKK ifiavTov avto ko/tw jieje- B 
 ^aXkov (TKOTrdiv rd roidSe, dp' eireihdv rb Oepfiov Koi to '^')(pov 
 a-Tj-rreBova Tivd Xd^y, &<; rtve? eXeyov, rare S^ rd ^wa o-wrpiipeTai: 
 10 Kal "KOTepov TO alfjid ia-Ttv a ^povovfiep, 7] 6 drjp rj to TTvp, -q ToiTWV 
 fiev ovBiv, 6 S' iyKe<j)aX6<s eaTiv 6 to? alaOrjaei'i 'jrapi'^tov tov 
 
 already sought it from every existing 
 source, and that when he met Sokrates 
 his disappointment in all should fast be 
 leading him to philosophic scepticism. 
 But in the lack of direct evidence it 
 would be rash to speak positively. 
 
 ■i. <5v av X^7T|s] i. e. whatever you 
 may have to say after hearing my reply. 
 iov \4ycis would refer to the statement 
 already made by Kebes ; but this has less 
 ms. authority. 
 
 8. TO Oepiiiv Kal t& <|'vxpov] This 
 was held by several philosophers, first 
 perhaps by Anaximandros, of whose 
 aireipov, according to Plutarch and Sto- 
 baeus, the first determinations were these. 
 Simplicius assigns to him other ivavrii- 
 Trp-es among the first determinations, such 
 as ^rjpop and vyp6v. To Anaxagoras this 
 classification is attributed by Theophrastos 
 de sensu 59 ; and to Archelaos by Diogenes 
 Laertius 11 16. Compare Aristotle de 
 gen. et corr. 11 ii 329''24 Bep/wv di xal 
 \jn}xpi>v Kal vyphv Kal i^pov rk p.iv Tifi 
 iroiTiTLKa etpai ret 6^ r^ iradTjTiKa X^- 
 yerai,. Schanz gives rb Sep/xov [Kal 
 i/uxp6v}. 
 
 9. <rt|ir«8ova] 'fermentation'. The 
 ayjireSdv would take place by the action 
 of Oepniv, cf. Aristotle de gen. anim. v 
 iv 784''6 ytverai Si ffrjtj/is Sih, Bep/iliTriTos 
 piv iraaa, 01) t^s (!vp,<j>vTov hi. Decompo- 
 sition of matter in one form must pre- 
 cede its recomposition in another. 
 
 10. TO alfia] See Empedokles 315 
 (Karsten) : 
 
 aip,aTos iv ireKayeacFi TeBpap,iiii>7t ap,- 
 
 IplBpO&VTOi, 
 
 Ty re vbrip,a p,£Kuxra KVKKlnKerai av- 
 
 Bpiiiroimv ' 
 atp,a y&p avSpiiirois nepiKiipSmv ian 
 
 voTip.a. 
 
 6 di]p] This too was the view of 
 more than one philosopher. Air was the 
 apx^ of Anaximenes. Diogenes of Apol- 
 lonia said the soul was dry hot air ; as 
 in a. passage quoted by Simplicius, Koi 
 iroifTtav TWP ^(^tov di 17 ^oxv rb airh iffTLV, 
 arjp Sepp^repos p.hi tov S^a, iv (p dpAv, 
 TOV liivToi irapk tov ^jeXiou ToWbv tj/v- 
 Xporepos : and again avSpoiiros ydp Kal rd, 
 dWa ^a avairviovTa fwet t^ aipi, KoX 
 TovTo avTo'iai koX ^uxv ^'f' t"! vorins. 
 Cf. Theophrastos de sensu 39 — 45. 
 
 TO irCp] This was held by Herakleitos, 
 who considered the soul as a ^ripd. axoffu- 
 pXoffis. Cf. Arist. de anima I ii. 
 
 11. oS'^Y'^^'I'O'Xos] Itisvery doubtful 
 to whom this doctrine must be assigned. 
 Possibly it was merely a popular opinion, 
 as Wyttenbach thinks. It has been as- 
 cribed to the Pythagoreans; but this rests 
 only on a statement of Diogenes Laertius 
 (viil 30), which has a suspiciously post- 
 platonic appearance. R. Hirzel (Hermes, 
 vol. XI p. 240) endeavours to trace it to 
 Alkmaion of Krotona ; but his evidence 
 
96] 
 
 OAIAON. 
 
 127 
 
 aKoveiv KM opav xal oa^paiveaOai, iic Tovrav Se yliyvoiTo fivr)fMj 
 KOI Bo^a, i/c Be /jLvi]fJir]<; koX Bo^tj'; Xa^ova-rji; to ■ijpefieiv tcarci ravTo, 
 •yiyveaOai iTTKrrijfi'qV koL av roiirav ras <j)0opa<; (tkoitoov, koI ra 
 
 "Trepl t6v ovpavov koI ttjv jrjv TrdBr), reXevrmp ovTtB? ifiavr^ eSo^a 
 irpo^ ravTTjv Trjv <yKei^iv d^vrj'i elvai, to? ovBev ■)(^pfjfj,a. TeKfirjpiov g 
 Be (Tot ipw iKavov' iydi ydp a icai irporepov (rasa's Tjiria-rd/u.'rjv, w? 
 76 efiairrm icaX rot? a}0^oi,<i iBoKOVV, Tore viro ravTrj<; t^s cr^ei^ea)? 
 onTft) a<p6Bpa irv^XcoOrjv, oocrre direfjuadov koX a irpo tov co/jurjv 
 elBevat, nrepl dWav re iroWwv koa, Bid ri avOpairo'i av^dverai. 
 TOVTo yap wfiTjv nrph tov iravT), Brjfkov eXvav, on Bid to eaOieiv koI 10 
 
 D TTiveiV iireiBdv yap e« twv (tituov raw fiev aap^l adpne'i wpoa-- 
 
 hardly amounts to proof. Theophrastos 
 de sensu 26 does indeed say of him that 
 he affirmed dirdcros rets alffBijireis avv- 
 tlpr^aSal iruis irpos tw iyiti<pa\ov, but 
 this is not very definite. It may be ob- 
 served that the brain is not ^ ^povov/iev, 
 but o ris aiVfl^ffeis irap^x'^v : and the view 
 of Hippokrates is not far off this. In a 
 passage quoted by Heindorf, de morbo 
 sacro 17, he says of the brain, outos v^p 
 y]juv iarX rCcm otto toC ^^pos yevo/jJvdiv ipfuj- 
 peis, -qv iyialvav Tvyx^vy ttjii Si (j>p6- 
 vijaiv auT^ 6 dvjp irapix^rai. Thus Hip- 
 pokrates may be said to have held that 
 air is y ippovov/iep and the brain is t&s 
 aiffS'^creis irapixav. Still as the brain is 
 introduced as an alternative to air, not as 
 supplementary, probably no special refer- 
 ence to Hippokrates is intended. Plato's 
 own view is that the brain and spinal 
 marrow form the medium through which 
 the soul acts on the body: Timaeus 
 73 c, D. 
 
 ■i. XaPoi'in]s TO i]p6|i.Etv] Cf. Meno 
 97 E KoX y&p al S6^ai oi dXi/flcis, Smv p,h 
 av XpiSfoc irapa/j^viaai,- KaMp rb XRVI^f^t 
 Kai iravra rwyaOi, ipr/d^ovTai,' irdKip Si 
 Xp6pop oiiK i6i\ov<n irapanipeip, dXXd 
 Spairereiovcriv ix riji ^vxtJs tov dpBpiiirov, 
 wtTTe oi 5roXXoO dfiat e/irtc, las dv tis 
 a&rds Sriari alHas \oyi.ff/i(}..J'!rei,dci,p Si 
 SeSdcri, irparop nip ina-r^/Mi ylypoprai, 
 Iweira /idpi/ioi. Kal Sti, raSra S^ niuarepop 
 iiruTT'^/iri 6p8^s Sifijs icH, Kal Sia^4pet 
 
 Seap,$ itrurrrifi.ri 6p9^s Sd^rjs. Also Aris- 
 totle anal. fost. II xix 100° 3 iK nip oBc 
 alcrdrjcreais ytverai nvTmn), wairep \iyop,ev, 
 ix Si /Ui'Tj/tijs 7roXXd/«s toO avrov yipo/UprjS 
 ip-veipla' al yap TroXXal iwriiiai. t<^ &pi8fj,i^ 
 ifiweipla iarlp. ix 8' i/j,Tapla! rl Ik Tracris 
 ■^pefi'fliyavTos T0« Kad6\ov iv rg ^vxVt tov 
 ipbs Tapa to TroXXd, op ip aTacrip ep hy 
 ixelpois tS airbf rix^ris Apxv xal im<rrrip,ris, 
 idp phi irepl yipeaip, TixfVh ^dp Si irepl ri 
 OP, iiruTTTJiMTis. See also metaph. 1 i 980'' 28. 
 To Plato the difference between Ship, 
 and inaTt]pjri was fundamental, the one 
 dealing with yi.ypop.epa, the other with 
 
 OI'TO. 
 
 5. d<|>viqs etvai] 'nothing in the world 
 could be more stupid in such studies than 
 myself. Cope. 
 
 6. d Kal TrpoTEpov] There are three 
 stages to be discriminated in the irdflij of 
 Sokrates : (i) the period when he was 
 content with the ordinary beliefs of the 
 unreflecting many concerning yipeais kuX 
 ^8opA : (2) when he sought some more 
 scientific theory in the speculations of the 
 physicists : (3) when, disappointed in this 
 and failing, in his search for the ultimate 
 alHa itself, he fell back upon his system 
 of X6701. 
 
 II. Tais |i.iv o-apll o-dpKEs] This is 
 commonly understood as alluding to the 
 theory of Anaxagoras. But I cannot 
 imagine that any such reference is meant. 
 Sokrates says that his physical studies 
 
128 nAATflNOS [97 
 
 •yevmvTai, Tots he oareoK ocrTa, ical o^Tto Kara tov avrbv Xoyov ical 
 Tot? aXXot? Ta avTwv ol/ceia eKa,(TTOi,<; irpoo'yivTjTat,, Tore Srj tov 
 oXiyov O'^Kov ovra vcTepov iroXvv r^erjovkvab, koI ovtco ylyveadai 
 TOV trfiiKpov avOpanrov fi&^av' ofJrtBS TOTe mp/qV ov SokS croi 
 5 p.eTpi(o<i ; "^/jLoiye, ecftrj 6 KeyS???. 'ZKe^ai hrj ical TaBe eVt. dp,r]v 
 <yap iKavS<; fioi Bo/cetv, OTrore rt? (pabvoiTO dvdp(07ro<! irapao'Ta's 
 /ie'yas a-p,iKpm, /lei^mv elvai avTov Ty Ke^dXrj, ical itttto? iirirov ical 
 'sTi ye TovTcov evapyeaTepa, to, Beica /tot eSoicet rcSv oktco ifkeova E 
 elvai 8id TO Biio avTot'; irpoaOelvai, ica\ t^ Bltt'ij'^v tov irij^vaiov 
 
 10 p,el^ov eivai Bia to rjpjiaei avTov vTrepe')(ei,v. Nui' Se Br], ecjyrj 6 
 KeySj;?, tI croi Boicei rrepX avTwv ; Tioppoa irov, ecfyrj, vrj Aia e/ie 
 eivai TOV oXeadai irepl tovtosv tov ttjv alTuav elBevai, b? ye ovk 
 anToBe')(pp,ai i/iavTov ovBe <b?, eireiBav ivi rt? irpoaQfj ev, f] to ev a 
 TrpocreTedT] Bvo yeyovev, rj to irpoaTedev kclI m irpocreTeOr) Bia Trfv 97 
 
 15 Trpoadecriv tov eTepov Tm eTepa Bvo eyeveTO' 0avp,d^eo ycip el, 'bre 
 p,ev eiccLTepov avTwv ')(<op)i<i aXKri\(ov ^v, ev apa eKorepov fjv Kal ovk 
 rj(TTr]v TOTe Bvo, eirel S' iirXr)a-laaav dXXTjXot?, aiiTij apa alTia 
 avTol'i eyeveTO Bvo yevecrdai, r\ ^vvoBoi tov wXtja-iov oXKtJXcov 
 Tedfjvai. ovBe ye to?, eav Ti<i ev Biaa-x^Lcrrj, Bvvap,at eVt Treideadai 
 
 20 o)? aiiTTj av ahia yeyovev, rj (r')(l(Ti<;, tov Bvo yeyovevai' evavTia yap 
 
 not only brought him no fresh knowledge B be added to A, has A become two, or 
 
 but made him sceptical of that which he £, or are A + B two because of their 
 
 fancied he already possessed. This belief juxtaposition? Schanz follows him. I 
 
 therefore is one that he held, not only caimot see that Plato is bound to express 
 
 before he made acquaintance with the this in fcU, and therefore I have reverted 
 
 works of Anaxagoras, but before he en- to the ms. reading, 
 tered upon any physical speculations 18. i] |vvo8os] 'the juxtaposition caused 
 
 whatsoever. It is probably the view of by their approximation '. tou ifK^alov 
 
 popular common sense, that the human iXKifKwv reBijvai. is explanatory genitive 
 
 frame is composed of the food consumed, after JwoSos : compare Timaeics 58 B ^ 
 
 without any reference to the i/ioio/iepTJ. Sri ttJs TriX^o-ews luVoSos. The right ex- 
 
 7. ftillav etvai oijtov] The mss. have planation, according to Plato, is not 
 
 airy. I have accepted Wyttenbach's juxtaposition but participation in the idea 
 
 correction (i)because the following words, of duality : it is irrational to speak as if 
 
 Kal frTTos iwirov, seem to require that the the mere approximation of two objects 
 
 object of comparison should be expressed one to the other had anything to do with 
 
 here also, (2) because airy seems super- the question. 
 
 fluous with TJ) KE^oXi?. If we retain OUT J, 20. evavrto 70P ^C^ veroi] The fact that 
 
 we must translate 'just by the head '. Cf. two opposite processes produce the same 
 
 loi A. result shows that neither of them can 
 
 14. TJ t4 irpooTtO^v] Wyttenbach really be the explanation of the result; 
 
 writes these words twice over, arguing they are cvvalna, not afna, 
 that the question should be put thus ; if 
 
97] 
 
 ^AIAflN. 
 
 129 
 
 B jljveTat rj Tore alrla rov ivo ylryvea0ai' tots filv yap on crvvijyeTO 
 7rXr](ri.ov dWrjXwv Koi irpocreriOero erepov erepq), vvv S' on aira- 
 lyerat, koi '^wpl^eTai erepov d^ erepov. ovBe je Bi '6 n ev yuyverat, 
 (MS eirLaTajxai en ireiQm e/iavrov, ov8' aXXo ovBev evl X6ja> St' '6 n 
 yijveTai f) diroXXvTat 7} ecrn, Kara rovrov rov rpoirov t^9 jieOohov, 5 
 aXXa nv aWoi/ rpoirov avTOf elKy <f>vpco, tovtov Be ovSafifj irpocri- 
 e/iai. 
 
 XLVI. 'A\X' dKova-a'i jAev irore e'/c ^i^Xlov nv6<s, w? e(f>7], 
 
 C Ava^ajcpov dvayiyvwo'KovTO'i, koL XejovTO^ «? dpa vov<; eanv 6 
 BiaKoafMwv re koi rravTCOv a'lno^, Tavry S^ ry alrla ^crdrjv re Kal 10 
 
 5. kwtA tovtov t6v Tpoirov] i.e. the 
 
 method of physical speculation. 
 
 6. awds eiKtj ifiilpu] ' I mix up every- 
 thing at random according to another 
 method of my own '. Such is the literal 
 translation of this difficult phrase, but the 
 meaning is not so easily fixed. Wytten- 
 bach, sajdng that the ideal theory cannot 
 possibly be meant, takes ipipoi as virtually 
 a past tense, and explains ' alium modum 
 ex male intellecto Anaxagora susceptum 
 commentus sum'. Prof. Geddes trans- 
 lates ' it so chances that I form to myself 
 another method '- He says ^ipia is ' I 
 work up ', like dough, and quotes Aristoph. 
 Birds 482 'irpoTe<pvpaTai. X670S eh iwi : 
 and so Heindorf takes it. But 0u/)ti) is 
 not the same as ipvpaoi: Plato always 
 uses the former word in the sense of 
 'confusing', see below loi D, Gorgias 
 465 D &c. For 'kneading' he uses the 
 proper word ^vpdoj, cf. Timaeus 73 E, 
 Theaetetus 147 c. The exact phrase 
 occurs in Aeschylus Prometheus 450 ?0u- 
 pov eU^ TrdvTa. Wyttenbach's explana- 
 tion will not do ; we have the present 
 tense running through the whole passage. 
 Nor does Sokrates represent his view as 
 arising from that of Anaxagoras. I be- 
 lieve Sokrates is speaking half ironically, 
 half in earnest. We must remember 
 that the Platonic Sokrates took refuge, 
 not in the theory of ideas, which he 
 failed to reach, but in the method of \6yoi, 
 cf. 99, E. This method is then what he 
 
 P. 
 
 means by tiv' SXKov rpoirov. In loi c 
 he advises Kebes to leave divisions and 
 additions and such subtleties to those 
 who are cleverer than he. There the 
 irony is obvious; and here with the 
 same irony he says that being unable 
 to follow any of the infallible methods 
 of the physicists he was forced to blunder 
 on after a fashion of his own. And 
 although he does not seriously mean to 
 disparage his own method in comparison 
 with theirs, perhaps he does hint some 
 dissatisfaction that he is still unable to 
 work on the more perfect principle. 
 
 97 B — 98 B, i. xlvi. Afterwards So- 
 krates hears a passage of Anaxagoras, 
 wherein that philosopher declares that 
 mind is the universal cause. His hopes 
 are thereby raised to the highest pitch ; a 
 system which takes mind for its principle 
 caimot, he thinks, be otherwise than teleo- 
 logical. Anaxagoras will surely point out 
 that mind must order all things for the 
 best, and he will seek no other cause why 
 each thing is as it is, but that it is best so. 
 He will first inform us of the shape and 
 position of the earth and then explain how 
 that shape and position were the best; 
 and similarly with all other natural phe- 
 nomena, assigning as the cause the best 
 for each and all. So he read the book 
 with eager anticipation. 
 
 8. dXK' dKovo-as] 'but once when I 
 heard a man reading from a book, as he 
 said, of Aiiaxagoras.' 
 
I30 HAATflNOS [98 
 
 eSofe jjiot rpoTTOv rivci, ev '4')(eiv ro rhv vovv elvai irdvTtdv alriov, 
 Kol T^yTja-dfiTjv, el tov6' oZto)'; e-x^ei, rov ye vovv Kocr/iovvra Travja 
 {jcoaiietv^ KoX exacrTOV TiOevai ravrr) oTrr) dv ^eXriara e'Xj/' el ovv 
 Tt? jSovXoiTo T'TJv alrlav evpelv irepi exdaTov, 'oirrj <ylp/verai rj aTroX- 
 S Xvrai 7/ €(7X1, TovTo Setv irepl avrov evpelv, oirr) ^eXrio'Tov avrw 
 eariv rj elvai rj aXXo Stiovv vdcry^^eiv rj troielv' e« Se ^rj rov Xoyov D 
 rovTov ovBev aXXo crKOiretv irpoa-'^Keiv dvOpdir^ koL irepl avrov 
 eKeivov koX irepl aXXav, dXX' ■/} to dpiarov KaX to ^ekTicrTov. 
 avayKotov Be elvai top avrov tovtov koI to 'X^eipov elSevaf rrjv 
 
 10 avTrjv yap elvai, e7rt<TTi]/irjv irepl avrwv. ravTa Stj Xoyi^6fj.evo<s 
 dcriJ,evo<; evprjicevai, wfirjv BiSdo'KaXov Trj<i alrlai; irepl twv ovtcov 
 Kara vovv ifiavrw, rov 'Ava^ayopav, Kai p,ot ^pdaeiv irpooTOV fj,ev 
 TTorepov rj yrj irXareid ia-nv rj arpoyyvXr), eireiBrj Be ippdcretev, 
 eirenBirfyricreQQai rrjv alriav teal rrjv dvdyKrjv, Xeyovra to djxeivov E 
 
 IS Kal OTt avrrjv dfieivov rjv roia^rrjv elvai' Kal el ev fJiearq) (palrj elvai 
 avrr/v, iireKBiriyrjo-edOai a5? d/Meivov ^v avrrjv 4v fiecrea elvai' Kal e'i 
 jJbOi ravra diro^aivoiro, irapeaKevdap/rfv (B5 ovKeri iroOea-o/Jbevoi; 98 
 airlai dXXo etSo?. Kal Sjj Kal irepl riXiov ovrco irapecKevdcrfirfv, 
 waavTco^ irevo'op.evo'i, koI aeXrjvr)^ Kal twv .dXXcov darpav, ra^ov? 
 
 20 Te irepi irpo<i dXXrjXa Kal rpoiroSv Kal rSv dXXmv iraOrjjjidrmv, 
 irrj irore ravr djxeivov eariv eKaarov Kal iroielv Kal irda^jfeiv a 
 ira<T')(ei. oil yap dv irore avrov ^P'ljv, (ftdcTKOvrd ye viro vov avrd 
 
 1. Tpoirov Tiva] 'in a certain way', 'Kara vovv, secundum mentem, Anaxa- 
 but not, as we presently see, in the way gorae placitum significat, et vulgo usurpa- 
 of Anaxagoras. tur, gratum, ex animi nostri sententia' . 
 
 2. irdvra [KO(r|i.£iv]. Hermann is 13. irXareW Icrriv 1} crrpoyyvXi)] For 
 probably right in bracketing Kocr/ieiv. various views on this subject see Aristotle 
 Translate: 'if mind orders all things, it de caelo 11 xiii 294^29. Thales thought 
 places each thing severally as is best', i.e. the earth floated like a piece of wood; 
 we must not, as Anaxagoras did, assign Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Demokri- 
 d^pes and aWipes as causes of various tos said it was flat. The P)rthagoreans 
 phenomena, if we assign vovs as the cause held that it was a sphere. 
 
 of the whole. 15. Aiv lUcra] Aristotle de caelo 293' 
 
 7, irepl avTov lK«tvov] So the best 15. This view was almost universal : the 
 
 mss. Schanz brackets outou, Z. and St. give Pythagoreans seem to have been the only 
 
 avTov, omitting tKdvav. I think the ms. exception. They believed the earth to 
 
 reading will stand: it refers to the kKam- revolve round the central fire. 
 
 Tou above; 'he will seek this cause both 21. ir'Q irore Tavr' ofjisivov] The final 
 
 for the particular object of his inquiry and cause of the movements of the heavenly 
 
 for everything else'. bodies is declared in the Timaeus, see 
 
 12. Kard vovv I|i.ovt$] As Wytten- especially 39 B foil, 
 
 bach points out there is a play on couK : 22. i|>da-KovTa ^c viri vov] If an in- 
 
98] 
 
 ^AIAIIN. 
 
 131 
 
 KeKoafirjirdai,, dWrjv Tiva avToh alriav iweveyKeiP rj on ^eXTicrrov 
 B avTo, ovTa)<s ej^eiv icrTlv wairep e^et" eKaa-rm ovv avTov aTroSiBovra 
 TrjV' alriav Koi Koivy iracrt to eKaarm ^eXria-TOV S/m7]v icai to KOtvov 
 •Traari iireicSiTjjijcrecrOat djaOoV koi ovk av a'7reS6/j,r]v ttoWov ra? 
 i\iriBa<;, dWci. iravv a-irovBy Xa^cov ra? /3t/3Xov9 «? Td-)(t,(j-Ta olo'^ 6 
 t' ^ dv&flr/vm'TKOv, 'iv (b? rdj^^UTTa eliel/qv to ^eXTiaTov kol to 
 
 Xeipov. 
 XLVII. 
 
 'Atto 8^ OavfiaffTrj^ eXTTt'Sos, (S iralpe, wj^^ofirjv ipepo- 
 
 telligent cause ordered the universe, it is 
 inconceivable that it should not design the 
 best in all things : and this is oiir proper 
 object of investigation, not the mere phy- 
 sical agencies which immediately produce 
 the phenomena. Plato's own system is 
 perfectly consistent with this principle: 
 by making the avro dyaBov the ultimate 
 cause he keeps his ontology strictly teleo- 
 logical ; and again his teleology is strictly 
 ontological. The cause of each thing 
 is its indwelling idea; this idea is a 
 form of the dyaBov, therefore the dyaBov 
 is the cause why each thing is as it is. 
 The /S^XriffToc is not merely the design of 
 a creative intelligence ; it is the very idea 
 which is symbolized in the particular. In 
 the Timaeus Plato teaches that the entire 
 universe is the self-evolution of absolute 
 I intelligence, which is the same as abso- 
 lute good. This is differentiated into 
 finite intelligences, subject, through their 
 limitation, to the conditions of space 
 \and time. Sensible perceptions are the 
 jfinite intellect's apprehension, within these 
 (conditions, of the idea as existing in 
 absolute intelligence. Thus the percep- 
 tion is the idea, as existing under the 
 jform of space. Therefore the idea, which 
 lis a form of the good, is the cause of the 
 /perception's existence : that is, as was 
 Isaid above, the dyaBhv is the ultimate 
 \alTLa of each thing. But only the first- 
 /begiimings of this theory are to be found 
 \in the Phaedo. 
 
 \ 08 B — 99 D, c. xlvii. Bitter was hisi 
 disappointment when he found that] 
 1 Anaxagoras did not really use mind as 
 
 cause, but accounted for phenomena by 
 the agency of merely physical forces. Ex- 
 actly similar would be the conduct of one 
 who, after saying that Sokrates acted by 
 intelligence, should maintain that he sat 
 there in prison because he had muscles 
 and sinews and joints which enabled him 
 to do so; instead of assigning the real 
 cause, that he thought it right to submit 
 to the judgment of the Athenian people. 
 So far as his bones and muscles are con- 
 cerned, he might have been at Megara by 
 this time ; only he thought it his duty to 
 remain. To call such things causes is folly ; 
 although they may be termed instruments 
 without which the cause would not pro- 
 duce its effect. But just this confusion of 
 cause and instrument is made by those 
 who suppose a vortex or some other phy- 
 sical force is what keeps the earth in the 
 centre, instead of the true cause, that it is 
 best for it to be there. About this su- 
 preme cause, the good, Sokrates would 
 gladly have learnt, could he have found a 
 teacher : as it is he was obliged to content 
 himself with the second best method. 
 
 8. dird 8ij 6atJ|i,a(rTT]s eXirCSos] 'from 
 what a height of hope was I hurled down, 
 when I went on with my reading and saw 
 a man that made no use of mind '. Hein- 
 dorf takes hihfia=Tov avSpa : but the above ■ 
 rendering seems preferable. The meta- 
 phor in (i>x6iir)V tpepajxevot is surely falling 
 from >• height; not, as Wagner has it, 
 I starting from great hope, I was sailing 
 along' : a most feeble saying. The same 
 charge is brought against Anaxagoras by 
 Aristotle, metaph. I iv 985" 18. ' kiia%aA 
 
 9—2 
 
132 nAATONOS [99 
 
 fievo'i, iirethrj Trpo'icov koI dva/yijvwcrKmv opw dvBpa t& jiev va> 
 ovBev ■x^pciofievov [ovSi Tiva<; alria'; eiraiTicofievovl eh rh SiaKocrfietv 
 TO, irpdyfiara, depa<; Se kol alOepa<; Kal iiBara aiTi(6fiei/ov Kai aXKa C 
 iroWa Kal cnoira. Kai p,oi eBo^ev ofioioTarov TrewovOevat axTTrep 
 
 5 av ei Tt? Xiymv '6tl liODKpaTrj'i irdvTa 'oca irpdrTei vw Trparrei, 
 KaireiTa iiri'^eipijcra^ Xeyeiv to? ahla^ eKocrrav cov irpaTTca, \ejoi 
 •trp&Tov fiev oTi Bid ravra vvv ivOdBe Kdd'qfiab, '6rt, avyKevrai fiov 
 TO aoSfia i^ oaTewv Kal vevpeov, Kal to. fiev oard iariv arepea Kai 
 Bia^vd^ e^ei ^w/st? utt dWijXmv, Ta Be vevpa ola iirneiveaOai, Kal D 
 
 10 dvieaOai,, ivephap/ire.'j^pvTa rd ocrrd fierd twv crapK&v Kal SepfiaTCi 
 o avve')(ei avrd' alwpovpAvav ovv rwv oareiov iv rats avrcov ^W/f- 
 ;So\a4? ')^a\wvra Kal avvTeivovra ra vevpa Kap/rrTecrOai, irov iroiel 
 olov r elvab e/te vvv rd fieXr], Kal Bid ravTTjv Trjv airiav avy- 
 Kafj,^0el<s evOdBe Kd6r)p,ai' Kal av irepl rov BiaXeyeff0ai Vjuv eTepa<i 
 
 15 TOiavTa'i alTta<; \iyoi, ^(ovds re Kal dApai Kal aKodf; Kai oKSm 
 fivpia ToiavTO alTiwjxevo'i, dfieXijaw; ra? co<; dXrjdw^ alrla'i Xiyeiv E 
 '6ti, eireiBrj 'A6r]vaioi<s eBo^e fieKriov eivai i/Mov Karay^i^^iaaaOai, 
 Bid Tavra Brj Kal i/xoi ^eKriov av BiSoKrai ivOdBe KaOrjcrOai, Kal 
 BiKaiorepov irapafievovra inre'x^eiv ttjv BiKrjv fjv dv KeXevacoaiV eTrel 
 
 20 vrj rov Kvva, 60s iy^/JMi, irdXai dv ravra rd vevpd re Kal rd hard rj 99 
 
 yopas re yap ii.rfxav% xprjrai. T<f v^ irpos such a rendering; there is but one real 
 
 TTJV KocfioToUaVf Kcd orav dtrop^ffTj 5ta riv* cause, that is I'ois. 
 
 alrtav e| acayitijs eori, to'tc ?rapA/tei avTW, 9. 8ia<|>i)ds ^ei \(i)pls aw' dXXijXwv] 
 
 ev 8^ rots AXKois iravTo. fioXKov oiTtaTai twv 'joints to separate them one from another', 
 
 yirfvop-ivuv 1? vovv : compare Laws 967 B, c. and so render the limbs flexible. Sia^u^ 
 
 Schan'z brackets Kal before dvayiyndiiiKoiv, and apdpov regard the joints from opposite 
 
 but this causes a harsh collision between points of view ; the former as breaking 
 
 the two participles. the continuity of the bones, the latter as 
 
 2. ov8^ Tivas otrCos eiroi.Ti«|Mvov] I knitting the frame together, 
 
 concur with Mr Jackson in regarding VEvpa here, as always in Plato, 
 
 these words as 'an unmeaning interpola- mean sinews or muscles, not nerves. Of 
 
 tion. The sole complaint Plato has a- the nerves he had no knowledge. Cf. 
 
 gainst Anaxagoras is that he made no use Timaeus 74 D. 
 
 oivovv. what then are these aWot that he 19. 'jjv av keXevo-uo-iv] Hirschigmost 
 
 ought to have introduced? We cannot unnecessarily brackets these words. It is 
 
 understand it as explanatory of tQ iih vif trae there is now no doubt what the sen- 
 
 oiUv xpdf'^o'', ' making no use of mind, tence is ; but Sokrates expresses in general 
 
 that is alleging no real (primary) causes', terms that he deems it best to submit to 
 
 (i) because the distinction between pri- whatever may be the judgment of the 
 
 mary and secondary causes has not yet Athenians : compare rjiiTtv Sv Tarry below. 
 
 been made, so that a reference to it would 20. irciXai olv Tavra] The bones and 
 
 be unintelligible, (2) the plural is fatal to muscles cannot be the cause; for they 
 
99] 
 
 ^AIAflN. 
 
 133 
 
 •rrepl Miyapa 17 Botwroi)? ^v, vtto So^ij? <l>ep6/ieva rov j3eXrlarov, el 
 firj SiKaiorepov ai/i7]v ical koXXiov elvai irph tov ^eiiyeiv re Kal 
 diToSiSpda-Keiv VTri'^etp rrj irokei BUrjv rjVTLv av TaTTj}. aW' ahia 
 (lev rd ToiavTa icaXeiv Xiav aroirov' el Be Ti? Xejoi, '6ti dvev tov 
 ra TOtavra e'^eiv, Kal otTTo, Koi vevpa koI oaa aXKa e')(po, ovk av s 
 olo'i T 'ijv iroielv rd BS^avrd fioi, aK7)drj dv Xeyof w? fievToi Bid 
 B ravTa irom a irotw, koI ravra v& irpdrrmv, aX\' ov rrj tov jSeX- 
 TicTTOv alpeaei, iroWrj koX fxaKpd padv/ila dv e'irj tov Xoyov, to yap 
 firj BieXeadai olov t etvat oti dXXo /lev tI eaTi to a'iTtov tS ovti, 
 dXXo Se SKetvo dvev ov to oltiov ovk dv ttot e'lrj u'lTiov' Si] fioi <f>ai- 10 
 vovTui -ylrrfXa^oovTe^ 01 iroXXol Sairep ev CKOTei, dXXorpico ovofiari 
 ■Trpoa-'^pco/ievot,, w<; atTiov avTo Trpoa-a/yopeveiv. Std Srj ical 6 fiev Tt? 
 
 would have acted in a. precisely opposite 
 way had a diflferent Sofa tov ^ekridTOV 
 prompted them. 
 
 I. vith 86^1]$ (|>£p^|ji,Eva] Prof. Geddes 
 justly remarks that it is 56|o not ^TrurTrnjiri 
 TOV ^cKtIcttov that could urge Sokrates to 
 escape. 
 
 3. dXX* a^Tia ^\v to, ToioCra] Cf. 
 Timaeus 46 c tuvt ovv iravT San twv 
 ^vvaiTiu)]/ oZs deos vwqperovin xprjTai. ttjv 
 TOV dptffTov KaTcL TO SwaTov ISiav aTOTe^wy 
 do^&^eTOi Sk viro tCjv TrKeiaTtnv ov ^vvaiTLa 
 oXV ofria etvai twv itdvTav, ^vxovto, Kal 
 BepficdvovTa iniyvvi'Ta tc koX Stox^oxro Kal 
 oVa TOLavTa airepya^ofieva. \6yov 5^ ov- 
 d4va oiSi vovv els ovSh dwaTa Sx^iv iaH, 
 Presently he distinguishes these two classes 
 as wpuTai and Sevrepat alriai. In 46 E he 
 says TO, i/Jkv ovv o/i/iaTUv ^v/ifieTaina irpbs 
 
 TO ^€iV TTJV SvvafUV, 7}V VVV et\7jQ(EVj clpTJff- 
 
 6w TO Si piyuTTOv avTwv els w(pi\eLav 
 <^pryov. Si Sebs avff ■q/uv SeSoiptirac, /ieTo, 
 
 TOVTO \eKTioV. 
 
 7. Kal ravra v^ irpdrTcav] So Schanz 
 after Heindorf. The mss. have irparToi, 
 which may be thus rendered : ' to say that 
 it is because of these that I do what I do, 
 and at the same time that I do it by in- 
 telligence, is an extremely slovenly mode 
 of speaking' ? i.e. to assert simultaneously 
 that Sokrates acts thus because of these 
 subsidiary causes and also through intelli- 
 gence, is a very confused statement. But 
 
 though the ms. reading can be defended, 
 I think it probable that Heindorf 's neat 
 and simple emendation restores what Plato 
 wrote. Z. and St. have tou'tj; vi^ irpaTTw. 
 8. ri yoLp [ii^ 8ieXI<r6oi] The con- 
 struction is either an anacoluthon or an 
 indignant aposiopesis. Cf. Symposium 
 
 177 C TO ovv TOLOVTOIV fikv TT^pi IToXXtJp 
 
 atrovSriv Toi^crairfei, "Epoira Si fj,TjSiva via 
 dvdptVTOjv TeroKp/fjKhai els Tavrtjvl ttjv 
 Tinipav d|fti)S vp,v7J(Tai, dXV ovtois '^pAXufrai 
 ToaovTos 9e6s; Similarly Xen. mem. I iv 
 12, IV iii 5. Wyttenbach suggests to S' 
 dp' rjv 11.71 SieXio'Bai, which is neat ; but no 
 change is needed. 
 
 10. & 8t] p,oi cjiaCvovTai] ' this is what 
 they seem to me to be handling blindly, 
 asif in thedark'. S=to imalnov. dXKo- 
 Tplip ovo/iaTi, they call it by a name which 
 does not belong to it, i.e. airiov. The 
 reading ofinan is quite out of place. 
 
 12. o \Uv Tis 8Cvt]v] Empedokles con- 
 ceived the earth to be kept in its place by 
 the rapid rotation of the universe, as, 
 when a cup of water is whirled swiftly 
 round, the water is retained in the cup; 
 so Aristotle explains, de caelo II xiii 295^ 
 16, oi S' wawep 'E/itcSokX^s, Trjv tov ovpa- 
 vov (popav KvK\tp irepidiovo'av Kal Owttov 
 ^epo/iivr/v TTpi TTJs yris <popav KwKveiv, KaBd- 
 Tep TO iv TOis KvdSocs ilSup' Kal yap toito 
 kvkXip tov KvdSov (pepofiivov iroXXaxts Kara 
 TOV xoXkov ■yivbp.evov o/iois ov tpiperai kotw 
 
134 
 
 HAATIINOS 
 
 C99 
 
 Bivrjv TreptTt^et? t§ yfj viro tov ovpavov fiiveiv Br] iroiel ttjv 
 yrjv, 6 Be wffTrep KapBoirm •KKaTeia jSddpov tov depa vvepeLBet,' 
 Trjv Be TOV ft)? olov re j3eXTiarTa avTo, Tedrjvat Bvva/iiv ovToa vvv C 
 KelaOai, TavTTjv oi/'re ^r]Tov<Tiv ovTe Tivd oXovTai Baifioviav i<r')(pv 
 5 e'^eiv, dWd ■^yovvrai, tovtov "ATXavTa dv iroTe Ic'^ypoTepov Kal 
 ddavaTcSTepou koL [xaXKov arravTa avvexovTa e^evpelv Kal m 
 dXrjdcoi} t6 dyaddv Kal Beop ^vvSeiv Kal avvexeiv ovBev oiovrai. 
 iyw /jbev ovv t^9 TOtavTir; aiTLdi, oirrj ttotc exet, fiadrjTrj^ otovovv 
 rjBicTT dv ryevolfir/v' eVetS^ Sk ravTrj's eaTeprjdrjv Kai ovt auro? 
 10 evpeiv ovTe Trap' dWov fiaOeiv oto^ re iyev6fir]V, tov BevTepov ttXovv D 
 
 7rc0UKos (jyipeaBai Sia Trjv airriv cUHdv. 
 Anaxagoras too supposed a irepixiipv^ts, 
 in order to effect the separation of the 
 6/toio/tep'5; but he did not utilize it to 
 steady the earth. 
 
 I. iiro TOV ovpavov should be con- 
 nected with i^ivea/. 
 
 1. hk oio-n-ep KapS6ir(a] 'another sets 
 the air as a basis of support beneath the 
 earth, which is like a flat kneading-trough'. 
 This view is attributed by Aristotle to 
 Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Demokri- 
 tos; cf. de caelo II xiii 294* 13. 'Ayaft- 
 /i^y))S S^ KoX 'Ana^ayopas Kal AijuoKpiTos rb 
 TrXdros atnop elval (pan rov fUveiV avT'^v. 
 oi yap T^fiveiv a\X iiri.TUp,aTl^(i,v tov aipa 
 rbv KdruQeVj oxep tpaiverat to, ttX&tos ^x*"'" 
 Ta TcHv aojp^aTwv iroLGiv. That is to say, 
 the earth does not sink in the ocean of air, 
 but rests upon the surface like a lid. 
 
 3. Tl)v hk TOV US olov TE PcXTlO^a] 
 
 As Heindorf says, the words must be con- 
 strued T^v Si Siva/uv TOV ouVus vvp aird, 
 Ke'urdai. lis olov re piXnara reBrjiiai,. The 
 distinction between TeB^jvai. and vvv KetaOac 
 should be noticed : 'as it was best for them 
 to be placed by mind, so they are now 
 situate '. 
 
 5, to*!tov] i. e. tov us oTov re ^iXnara 
 KetffBai. They think that in their purely 
 physical theories they can find an Atlas, 
 i. e. a system to explain the universe, more 
 potent than the final cause which Sokrates 
 postulates. 
 
 7. t6 0,7060 V Kol 8fov] 'the good and 
 the binding'. There is a play on the 
 
 double sense of Siov. cf. Craty/us 418 E 
 &ya6ou yi,p IS^a ovaa to Siov ipalverai. 
 Se<rp,bs elvai, Kal Ku)\v/ia <popas. All this 
 critique of Anaxagoras is a. propaedeutic 
 to the ideal theory. The main fault of 
 Anaxagoras is that 'the good' is not the 
 ultimate cause in his system. Plato sup- 
 plies his defects (in the Republic first and 
 still more in the later dialogues) \\) by 
 making ri i,ya6hv the principle of all ex- 
 istence, so that such thing really exists in 
 proportion as it is perfect; (2) in that 
 vov%, instead of being a merely external 
 motive power, is actually the universe : 
 causation is ultimately identity. 
 
 9. eiTEiSi) 8J TavTi]S loTepij6T|v] Sokrates 
 here expressly confesses that he has not 
 succeeded in tracing the genesis of the 
 universe to the idea of the good : and it 
 is most important to bear in mind that 
 what follows is only a description of the 
 devTepos irKovs. In the Republic Plato is 
 bolder and sets forth imder a similitude 
 the relation between the i,ya6ov and the 
 ideal and material worlds ; but not until 
 .the Philebus and especially his crowning 
 achievement, the Timaeus, does he at- 
 tempt fully to expound the supremacy of 
 the airh 6,ya6bv, 
 
 10. t6v 8e«T£pov irXovv] i. e. the next 
 best course. The origin of this proverb 
 is shown by a passage of Menander which 
 Wagner quotes : SeiTcpos vXovs Io'tI 
 S'^Tov \ey6fji,evos, dv dirorixv "' vpwTov 
 iv Kiiwauri irXetv. Heindorf quotes Eus- 
 tathius : de&repos ttXoCs 'Kiyerai., ore drro- 
 
99] 
 
 a)AIAnN. 
 
 135 
 
 iirl Tijv T^? alria^ ^i]T7]<nv y TreTrpayfiaTevfiai, ^ovXet aoi, e^rj, 
 eirihei^vv iroirjawfiai, m Ke^i]<i ; "Tirep^vw fiep ovv, e^, co? 
 ^oiXofiai. 
 
 XL VIII. "ESofe ToLvvv fioi, y) S' o?, /Aera Tama, l-neiZr) d-rrel- 
 prjKa TO, ovra <yK0irmv, Seiv evXa^TjOrjvat, jMri irdOoifii, oirep oi top S 
 rjXiov eKKeiiTovTa OewpovvTef Kal a-Koirovfievoi,' Sia^deipovrai yap 
 iTov evioi TO. ofi/iara, idv firj iv iBari i] Tivi rotovTo) aicoTrSvTat 
 E T'ijv elxova avrov. toiovtov ti Kal iym Bievoijdrjv, Kal eSeicra, (if) 
 TravTairacri Trjv '^V'Xrjv rv^XcodeiTjv iBXiirmv vrpo? rd Trpofyfiara 
 Tot's ofifiacn Kal eKaaTT) twv alaOrjaecov iirtxeip'Sv ^TTTecrdai avTwv. lo 
 eho^e Srj /jioi ^(^prjvai et? toi)s Xoyovi KaTa<j)vy6vTa iv eKeivoi^ 
 
 Tvxdy Tis oiptov KiSnrais irX^j; KaT& Uav- 
 aavlav. Plato uses it again, Politicus 
 300 c, Philebus 19 c. Compare Aristotle 
 Nic. Eth, II ix 4 ^TTci mv tov iiAaov Tvxeiv 
 dxpus xtt^sTo'', kotA rbv Seiirepov, (paal, 
 vKovv T& i\6,xuTTa Xryirriov tSui xaKW. 
 Also politics III viii 6 (Susemihl) I284''r9. 
 
 99 D — 100 A, c. xlviii. Since then, con- 
 tinues Sokrates, I have been forced to 
 abandon the search for the true cause, 
 and fearing lest, as those who rashly take 
 observations by gazing on the sun him- 
 self, instead of his reflection in the water, 
 are bereft of their bodily vision, my soul 
 should be blinded in the endeavour to 
 behold truth herself, I bethought me of 
 contemplating her image, by which I 
 mean definitions or notions. And yet 
 this comparison is scarcely fair : for he 
 that investigates truth in notions certainly 
 does not see her in a similitude more 
 than he who observes sensible objects. 
 Anyhow this was the course I took; 
 assuming the best definition I could form, 
 I regard whatever agrees with that as 
 true, and whatever does not I reject as 
 false. I will presently explain my method 
 more clearly. 
 
 From the foregoing analysis it will be 
 seen that my interpretation of this ex- 
 tremely difficult passage differs widely 
 firom that of other editors. My objections 
 to their, views and defence of my own 
 will be found in appendix II, as requiring 
 
 too much space for a note. 
 
 {. Tol ovra] 'realities'; i.e. from 
 Plato's point of view the true causes, 
 T&ya8l)v Kal Siov, 
 
 8. Ti]V clKova avrov] Cf. Republic 
 Si6a. 
 
 9. Ti)v ilraxi^v Tu<|iX<i>9ehiv] Com- 
 pare the metaphor in Republic 527 D rb 
 S' i(7Tlv oi irdvv ipavKov, &Wa xaXejroi' 
 irnTTeCtrai, on ^v toutois tois im6'^/mi,(TU> 
 iKdcTTOv opyavov n ^vx^s ^KKadaiperai re 
 Kal dpa^uTTvpeirat. diroKKvp^vov koX ru- 
 <p\ovfievoy viro tuv SKKoiv iTnrijSevii&njjv, 
 KpeiTTov ov ffaSijvai fivplav ifi.fi.iTwj'' /ui- 
 v<fi yap ouriy dXiJffeio opdrai. 
 
 irpos Ta irpa^iMiTa] i. c. the ideas 
 themselves. Cf. 66 D avr-fi ry i'vxS 
 Beariov aird rd irpdypuiTa. The idea is 
 called vpayiia in virtue of the antithesis 
 between ' thing ' and ' shadow '. 
 
 10. iKctcTTj) Twv ol(r0r(r<(iiv] This is 
 of course metaphorical, like pX4wuv,= 
 with all the powers of the soul. But with 
 respect to this clause see appendix II sub 
 fiw. 
 
 11. ets Tois XoYovs] The meaning of 
 this can be fully understood only after a 
 very careful study of Republic 506 — 518. 
 Briefly however it is this. The Sokratic 
 method of definition was, by comparison 
 of a number of particulars which we 
 designate by the same name, to ascertain 
 what attributes were merely accidental in 
 various particulars, and what were es- 
 
136 
 
 HAATflNOS 
 
 [lOO 
 
 (TKOireiv tSv ovtcov rrjv aXrjOeiav. Xcras'i fiev ovv at etKci^co rpoirov 
 Tivd ovK 'ioi,K€V' 01) jap irdvv crv<y')(a)pm rov iv rot? XoyoK (tko- 100 
 TTov/juevov Tti ovra ev eiKocri fiaWov a-icoireiv rj tov iv rot? epyoii. 
 •«\\' oSv St] Tavry je wp/irjcra, koX VTro0eiJbevo<; eKaa-TOTe Xoyov ov 
 S av Kplvo) ippo)/j,evicrTaTOV eivai, a fiev av fioi Soktj tovtw ffVfi- 
 (fxovelv, riOrj/Mi w<; dXr/dTJ Svra, koL trepl alriai koX irepl twv dXKwv 
 dirdvTwp T&v ovrmv, a S' av fiij, 0)9 ov/c oKrjOrj. ^ovKopMi Be aoi 
 aa^earepov eliretv a Xkjco' olfiai yap ere vvv ov iiavddveiv. Ov fid 
 TOV Aia, e(j)r) 6 Ke/St;?, ov ertpoSpa. 
 ■Id XLIX. 'Aw' ^ S' OS SBe Xeyco, ovBev Kaivov, dXlC dwep del B 
 
 sential to the class : thus in defining a 
 horse we must distinguish between those 
 qualities which some horses possess and 
 others do not, and those without which 
 the animal would not be a horse. The 
 definition thus formed is the X67os, the 
 concept or general notion. Now in the 
 earlier stage of the ideal theory, wherever 
 there is such a Xoyof, there is also an 
 idea, corresponding to every group of 
 particulars called by the same name (Re- 
 public 596 A). The principal difference 
 between the "Koyos and the ISia is (i) the 
 \o70! is a mental concept, having no ex- 
 istence but in our thought ; the lUa is a 
 self-existing essence, independent of our 
 thought: (2) the Xo'7os includes all that 
 we can discover about the class by ob- 
 servation ; the ISia includes all that there 
 is to be known about it. Therefore from 
 the Platonic point of view the \oiyos is 
 our conception of the ISia, the reflection 
 of it in our mind ; which reflection only 
 imperfectly represents it, inasmuch as it 
 is derived from an imperfect apprehension 
 of particulars, which themselves are only 
 imperfect likenesses of the idea. In this 
 sense it is that Plato regards the Xoyos as 
 ekwc TOV ovTos. This matter has been 
 admirably cleared up by Mr Jackson, 
 journal of Philology vol. x p. 13.2 foil. 
 See introduction § 5. There is an in- 
 teresting use of Xo7os in Laws 895 D, ^ 
 where the Athenian says ap' oiK av idiXon 
 irepl (Ka<rTov rpla voetv ; . . . Sv /liv rijv owlav, ( 
 ?c Bi Trjs oiatas tok \6yop, Sv Si to ovo/m. 
 
 The approximation of ouirfa to the Aris- 
 totelian sense is also notable. 
 
 1. ilo-cos ]ilv ovv] Sokrates stops to 
 guard himself against conceding too 
 much. The Xayoi axe indeed only elxoves, 
 but so also are the sensible particulars ; 
 and the latter are the less trustworthy. 
 He then who seeks truth iv rots \6yois 
 does not deal with images any more than 
 the physicist who investigates natural 
 phenomena. For ^ bcde give ws, which 
 perhaps should be retained. 
 
 3. TOV Iv Tots Sp70is] Ipya here= 
 the particulars. The word is used be- 
 cause of the familiar antithesis with Xo'- 
 701s: not, I think, with a view of de- 
 noting the particulars as works or products 
 of the ideas whence they derive their ex- 
 istence. 
 
 4. dXX' oSv 811] 'however that maybe'. 
 Sokrates does not propose here to debate 
 the issue raised in the preceding sentence. 
 
 viroBliiEvos] The method is more fully 
 explained in the next chapter. For ex- 
 ample, Sokrates by examining a number 
 of instances of SIkmov forms his VToBeais 
 as to the nature of 6iko(0(ti5>'i;. This 
 VToBeins is his conception of the auro, 
 SUaiov. Then he compares with this 
 iiroSens particular SUaM, or whatever 
 professes to be such, and admits or rejects 
 each in so far as it agrees or disagrees ■ 
 with the vToSeffis, 
 
 100 B — lo^A, c. xlix. My method is 
 nothing new, he proceeds : it starts from 
 \he ideal theory which is familiar to us ; 
 
lOO] 
 
 a>AIAnN. 
 
 137 
 
 Kai oKKoTe ical iv rm irapeXriKvOori Xoiycp ovSev Treirav/jiai Xejmv. 
 ep')(pfiai yap Srj iiri'x^etpmv crot iiri8ei^acr6ai, t^? alria^ t6 etSo? 
 ireirpayfiaTevfiai, koI el/Mi iraXiv eir ixeiva to, iroXvdpvXrjTa Kal 
 dpj(pp,ai air eKeivav, inro6e/Mevo^ elvai Ti koXov avTo Kad' avrd Koi 
 ayaObv Kal fieya Kal raWa Trdvra' a et fMoi StSco? re Kal avy- S 
 'X^copei'i etvai ravra, eKTri^co aoL ex tovtcop rrjv alrlav eirbhei^eiv Kal 
 
 C dvevpijcreiv, (u? dOdvaTov rj a/tu^t;. 'AXXa firfv, e^rj 6 Ke/Sij?, cJ? 
 StSoi'TOs croi ovK av ^6dvoi<; irepalvav. 2«07ret Srj, etj)7], rd 1^^? 
 eKeivoK, idv crot ^vvSoKy wcrirep ifioi. ^aCverai yap /loi, e'l n 
 eariv dXKo KaXop, ovBe Bi ev aXXo KaXbv etvai fj SioTi fierej^ei 10 
 eKeivov rov koKov' Kal Trdvra Si) o{;t«bs Xiyco. ry rotaSe atria 
 <7vy^copei<; ; "Sivyxcopw, e<f)rj. Ov roivvv, rj S' 2?, en fxavOdvo) ovSe 
 hiivafiai, Ta? aWa? atrial rd<; ao^d'; ravra<; yiyvcoaKeW aXX' edv 
 
 U Ti? fiot Xeyr) Si o ri kclKov iariv oTiovv, 7J ■^pmfia evav9e<i e^ov rj 
 a-'^rjfia rj dXXo oriovv rSv roiovrcov, rd fiev dXXa 'yalpeiv iw, 15 
 rapdrrofiai ydp iv rot? dXXoi<; rrdcri, rovro Be aTrXeS? xal drexv(o<; 
 Kal IVffls ev'^deoi e'^co irap' e/j,avrm, on ovk dXXo ri irotec avrb 
 
 and' by means of this theory I hope to 
 prove^the soul's immortality. Starting 
 from the assumption that there are idfeas 
 of beautiful and just and great &c. , I 
 simply af&rm that all particulars possess- 
 ing these qualities possess them through 
 the idea, whether by participation, pre- 
 sence, or communion, or however you 
 may define the connexion. All other 
 causes are beyond my comprehension ; 
 I cling simply to my safe reply, that the 
 idea of the beautiful is the cause of beauty. 
 If you accept this, you will never consent 
 to say that one man is greater or less 
 than another by a head, but by greatness 
 or smallness ; nor that ten are more than 
 eight by two, but by multitude. Similarly 
 when one is added, to one, or divided, the 
 cause why the two are two is not addition 
 or division, but the idea of duality : all 
 other causes you would leave to wiser 
 heads than yours. Again if you were 
 forced to give an account of your hy- 
 pothesis, you would proceed to a higher 
 generalisation, and again to another ; as- 
 cending till you reached one that was 
 adequate : and you would beware of falling 
 
 into the confusions of thought, of which 
 sham philosophers are guilty. Here 
 Echekrates interrupts to express his ad- 
 miration of Sokrates' clear exposition. 
 
 The upshot of this chapter is that uni- 
 versals alone can be known. For the 
 present however these universals are in 
 the form of \6yoi or iiroB^ffeis, which are 
 not objects of toCs proper. When dialectic 
 is made perfect \6yoi will be exchanged 
 for iS4ai, uTToWtreis for dpx"'- 
 
 2. Sp\o|i,ai ^dp 8i\ eiri\cip(av] As 
 Heindorf observes iirix^ipSv iinSel^aaSaj, 
 has virtually a future force, whence it 
 takes the place of iiridei^onevos, which 
 would be the ordinary construction. Cf. 
 TTieaetetus 180 c oVep §a ipuiv. 
 
 8. ouK S.V c|)6dvois] 'you cannot be 
 too quick in proceeding to the end '. This 
 is not an uncommon formula. Cf. Sym- 
 posium 185 E, Eurip. Iph. Taur. 245, 
 Xen. mem. 11 iii 1 1 . 
 
 13. rds o-o(|)ds TaiiTos] i. e. the causes 
 of the physicists. 
 
 17. Sti ovk oXXo Ti TToitt] TWs is 
 the passage referred to by Aristotle de 
 gen. et corr. 11 ix 335''9 aW ol iih iKav^v 
 
138 
 
 HAATfiNOS 
 
 [lOO 
 
 KaXov 7] rj eKeivov rov koKov eire irapovaia eire KObvavia e'lre Sttj; 
 or) Kal Stto)? iTrpoayevofievr)]' ov yap 'in rovTo SiKT^^vpi^o/iai, aX)C 
 OTi Tw KaXm TO, KoXa ylr/veTai, KciXa. tovto yap /j,oi Boxel da^a- 
 Xeararov elvai xai ifiavrm d-jroKpivao'dai, Kal aXXq>, Kal tovtov 
 S e')(pfj,evo<; rjyoviiai ovk av Trore ireaelv, aW' dcr^aXe? elvai Kal e/jbol E 
 Kal oTcpovv aXKo) d/iroKpivaadat, on t& koXw to, koXcl Kokd' rj ov 
 Kai, crob BoKel; AoKet. K.al /leyeOei apa rd fieydXa fieydXa Kal 
 ra fiei^co fiei^m, Kal (TfiiKpoTr^n rd iXdrTO) iXaTTO) ; ^ai. OvBe 
 av dp dv aTToBe'x^oto, eX tI<; nva <f)alrj erepov krepov rfj Ke^aXf} 
 
 i^97)aav ahlav etvai irpos to ylveaBai rrjv 
 tQv elSiov (pvcriv, dairep 6 iv rlf ^aiSom 
 '2iiiiKpi,Tt)i ' Kal yap iKeivos, iirm/iriffas Toh 
 aWois lis oiSiv eipriKoaui, iiroTlderai, us 
 Ian TiSv ovTimi rd iih eiSt) to. Si /icBeK- 
 TiKcL T&v elSSv, Kal on etvai fikr iKoarov 
 \iysTai. Kara to eWos, ylveaOai, Si Kara 
 Trjv fieTdXiiJpiv xal (pBelpeffOai, Kara Tvv 
 dTTOjSoX^Ji'* Wffr* ei ravra aKrjdij, Tk c^St; 
 oterai, i^ avdyKTjs atna elvai Kal yevdceus 
 Kal (pBopas. Another reference is in me- 
 taph. I ix 991'' 3. 
 
 I. ctre on"r| Si) kuI oirus [irpoirY<va- 
 |i.^vi]] This participle Tpoa-yevo/iivri has 
 given much trouble to the editors. Wyt- 
 tenbach proposes irpoffayopevop^rj, which, 
 though accepted by the Zurich editors, is 
 hardly satisfactory. Schanz and other 
 recent editors bracket efre, which is pre- 
 cisely the word I should most wish to 
 keep. For surely Plato is suggesting some 
 alternative to irapovirla and KOiviavla, not 
 merely some mode of their existence : 
 moreover irpoiryepofi^i/rj is not properly 
 applied to those two nouns. Ueberweg's 
 IT parry evofiivov is much better, and I 
 should be content to adopt it, but that 
 Mr Jackson's suggestion to omit irporrye- 
 vop,iv7i seems to offer a better solution of 
 the problem. irpoaytyveffBai. is a familiar 
 word as applied to the connexion of ideas 
 and phenomena; cf, Hippias maiar 28gD, 
 292 D, Parmenides 153 E, and is especially 
 common in later writers; we may there- 
 fore easily suppose it to be a marginal 
 note upon ottj; Kal Sirus. On the other 
 hand, had Plato written Trpoa-yevo/iivov, 
 
 there seems no obvious reason for its cor- 
 ruption into -17. A very similar use of 
 oirji Kal Sims is found in Laws 899 B 
 Seois aircLS etvat ^■jffopsv, elre iv aiSifianv 
 ivovffat, fi^a iJi^a, KOfffioufft wdura oiipav6v, 
 elre Sjrg re Kai oiras. I should add that 
 Olympiodoros in quoting this passage 
 omits irpocryevofiivTj. 
 
 2. ov ydp 'in tovIto] ' for I do not 
 proceed to insist upon that point ', i.e. all 
 he insists upon is that the idea is the 
 cause; he does not specify the mode of 
 its operation. This phrase is an indica- 
 tion that Plato at this period did not 
 entertain a view of the relation between 
 ideas and particulars definitely distinct 
 from that expounded in his later writings ; 
 but that he had not as yet applied himself 
 to working out the question. In the later 
 dialogues he does not so much alter his 
 view as define it ; the definition however 
 necessarily leads to important modifica- 
 tions in the theory of ideas, and to the 
 decisive rejection of the doctrine of va- 
 povala, towards which he had hitherto 
 chiefly inclined: see on 73^: compare 
 Parmenides 133 D toi trap' i)/uv efre ofwi^- 
 fiara etre ottt; SiJ ns airi, rlBerai. 
 
 7. (ley^Sa ilpo] The words lUyeBos 
 and <riuKpiTr]S are sjmonymous with licij^ov 
 and (\aTTOv in 75 C. 
 
 9. Tg KE(|>aX'g] Plato here clears up 
 a logical confusion. The fact that the 
 dative is used to express both cause and 
 manner gives the d,vn\oyiKlis his oppor- 
 tunity. If A is said to be taller by a 
 head than B, he insists upon understand- 
 
lOi] <I)AIAnN. 139 
 
 101 fiei^a eivai, Ka\ tov eXaTTCD ra> avrS Tovrm iXdrTm, dWa Sca- 
 fiaprvpoio av on (ti) fiev ovSev dWo Xeyei^ fj ort ro fiet^ov irdv 
 erepov iripov ovSevl d'Wp fiet^ov ia-rtv rj ^,€^€060, Kal Std tovto 
 fiei^ov, Ski to iJ,eye9o<;, to Se 'iXarrov ovSevl aXXq) eXarrov rj 
 a-fiiKpoTrjTi, Kal 8id tovto ekuTTov, Bid Trjv o-jjit.icpoT'qTa, <f)0^ov- 5 
 jxevo'; oifiai, firj tI<s croi evavTio<i \6^o<; diravTrjar), edv Trj Ke<j}aXy 
 fiei^ovd Tiva (j)f}<s elvai Kal ekaTTca, irpatTov /lev tcS avTa to p,el^ov 
 fiel^ov eivai Kal to eXaTTov 'iXaTTov, eirena Trj Ke^aXf/ a/MiKpa 
 
 B oiia-r] TOP p,el^m jxei^m elvat, Kal tovto Btj Tepa<; elvai, Th <Tp,iKpS 
 TLVi fiiyav Tivd elvai,' fj ovk av (fio^oio raura ; Kal 6 K.ij3ri<; 10 
 yeXaa-a<;, "Eymye, e<p7j. Ovkovv, ■^ S' o?, ra SeKa twv oktw Bvolv 
 TrXetft) eivai, Kal Sia TavTrjv Trjv aWlav virep^aXXetv, (po^oto av 
 Xeyeiv, aXXa firj 'irXr}dei Kal hid to irXrjOo'i ; Kal t6 BiirrjjQ) tov 
 TTTj'^vaiov rjfjjurei fiei^ov elvai, dXX' ov fieyeOei ; 6 avT6<; yap irov 
 (f>6^o<;. lidvv y e<f)r). Ti Be; ivl ez/o? irpocrTedevTO^ ttjv Trpoa- iS 
 Oecriv aiTiav elvai tov Bvo yeveadai fj Biaa')(i<T9evT0'i Trjv ayjcnv 
 
 C OVK evXa^oio av Xeyeiv ; Kal fiiya av ^oa>rj<; '6ti ovk olcrQa aWaj? 
 TTW? eKacTTOv yiyvo/jievov fj fieTa<r)(pv Tfj<s iBia<s ovaia'i eKaaTov ov 
 dv fj,eTdcry(rj, Kal ev tovtoi<; ovk e'xei's dXXrjv Tivd ahiav tov Bvo 
 yeveo'dai dXX fj Trjv ttji BvdSo^ /MeTaa'^eaiv, Kal Beiv toi^tov 20 
 fieraa-x^eiv Ta fj,eXXovTa Bvo ecreo-dai, Kal fiovdBo<; o dv /J-eXXrj ev 
 eaeaOai, ras Be a''x,icrei<i TavTa<i Kal irpocrdeaei'; Kal ras dXXat; Td<i 
 TOiavTa^ KOjJ/y^eia's ewi?? dv ^(aipeiv, 7rapel<! diroKpivaaOai toi<; 
 
 D eavrov ao^coTepoK' av Be BeBim<; dv, to Xeyofievov, t^v eavTOv 
 cTKidv Kal Trjv direipiav, i'^^o/ievo'; eKeivov tov dcr^aXow t^s vtto- 25 
 
 ing ' by the head ' as denoting the cause, why is a rose beautiful ? we shall not 
 
 just as in the phrase ' Sokrates acts by attribute its beauty to the colour, shape, 
 
 intelligence ', y$ vp&Trei. disposition of the petals, and such /co/ii- 
 
 6. ^ovtCos Xoyos] Inasmuch as (i), ^eiat, for all these are merely ^walria : 
 
 if A is taller by a head than B, B is we shall say it is because the rose partakes 
 
 shorter than A by the same head, namely of the beautiful. Now it is of course 
 
 A's ; which is therefore the cause of both the idea which is the cause of the rose's 
 
 tallness and shortness; (2) the head is beauty; the Xd7os is not the cause, but it 
 
 small compared with the rest of the body, is the conception of the cause which, for 
 
 therefore it is absurd to say A is large fault of direct apprehension of the idea, 
 
 through a small part of himself. we have formed by generalisation from 
 
 25. TOV d(r(f>a\oiis Tijs iiroBlcrews] particulars. Only when we know the 
 
 ' clinging to the safeguard of your hypo- ideas shall we have a true insight into 
 
 thesis '. The iir6ee<Tis is the notion or causation ; until then \6yoi are the best 
 
 definition, \6yot, under which the object substitute. The term uTroSeo-is, as well 
 
 to be explained falls. If we are asked, as the method, may be traced to Sokrates: 
 
I40 
 
 nAATHNOS 
 
 [lOI 
 
 ^etreo)?, o'vTWi airOKplvaio av. [et Se rt? avTr}<; rrj^ v'iro6e(reca<s 
 e'^oiTO, ^(alpeiv imrj^ av ical ovk diroKpivaio, eo)? av ra air iKeivi]<i 
 opfi'qdevTa aKe\lraco, eo croi dWijKoi'i <7v/j,(f>(ovec rj Sta^toi'et'] iTreiSrj 
 Se eKeLvrj'; at/r^? Seoi ae SiSovai \6yov, wcravrco^ av SiSoirj'i, aXXrjv 
 6 aS v'ir6de(nv vwoOefievoi;, i]TK tSv avadev ^eXrla-Trj (palvoiTO, 
 
 cf. Xen. mem. IV vi 13 el Si tis air^ vept 
 Tov dyriX^oi /iriSiv 'ixi^" ua^^s Xiyeiv, iW 
 &P€V d7ro5et|ews tjtol ffo^t^repov ^do'Ktai' 
 ehai ov airhi \iyoi tJ jroXiTiKuiTepov t] i,v- 
 Spetorepof rj £XXo rt t(6v TOLoinaVj ^Tri t^v 
 vToSeffuf ivavriyev &v wavTa rbv \byov uSi 
 vw. In illustration we have an inquiry, 
 what is the dyaBos ttoXItiis. It is used in a 
 similar sense in Gorgias 454 c dXXi ffi rci 
 aavTov Kara ttjv vtrodeffiv ottws & |3oi)X^ 
 irepaiv7}s. 
 
 1. \A Si TLS avTTJs rfjs viroS^ccus 
 ^XoiTo] The difficulty of retaining ix°'-'''° 
 in the sense of 'attack' has been per- 
 ceived by most editors, and Madvig pro- 
 poses to read icpoiro, which Schanz adopts. 
 But the objections to the passage are by 
 no means thus exhausted. A discussion 
 of them will be found in the article of Mr 
 Jackson's before mentioned, Journal of 
 Philology vol. X p. 148. I shall state 
 them as follows; (i) Ix"""" J" ^ sense 
 entirely unparalleled following immedi- 
 ately upon the ordinary use. Wagner 
 indeed finds ' a certain acumen ' in this ; 
 but wherein it consists he fails to inform 
 us. (2) If we acquiesce in ^xoito or accept 
 ?0oiTO, the words el di tis...^X'"''<' ^^^ 2. 
 clumsy and tautological anticipation of 
 iireidi) Si ^/cefcijs airrrjs Siot, ire SiSovai, 
 \6yov. Ast, seeing this, most ingeniously 
 suggests el Si tis oXXt/s iirodiaeoK ^oito. 
 But, as Mr Jackson observes, there is 
 grave difficulty in applying the term utto- 
 .fleffts, which is throughout reserved for 
 the Sokratic method, to the principle of 
 an opponent, who would doubtless term 
 it alrla. Moreover the introduction of a 
 rival method is here irrelevant. Finally 
 Ast's emendation does not meet the most 
 serious objection of all, which is (3) that 
 the words im (Ji'...5ia0wm are inconsis- 
 
 tent with the method indicated in &aaiTiiis 
 av SiSoItjs k.t.\. and are in themselves 
 sheer nonsense. If a hypothesis is pro- 
 posed to account for a given set of facts, 
 we proceed to observe, not whether the 
 facts are consistent with one another, but 
 whether they are consistent with the hy- 
 pothesis ; and this is precisely what So- 
 krates professes to do in 100 A cS /iiv ai> 
 SoK^ TOVT(p ^Vfi^taveiv, TidrjfiL ws dXT;^^ 
 Svra, where he is supposing the truth of 
 his hypothesis established. And presently 
 we see that the validity of a doubtful hy- 
 pothesis is tested, not by examination of 
 particulars, but by the ascent to a more 
 general hypothesis. The word opp,ri6itna 
 too strikes me as betraying a writer who 
 had no sense of the difference between 
 aorist and perfect participles : below we 
 have wp/iijfiirap. On these grounds I 
 fully agree with Mr Jackson in regarding 
 the passage el Si Tis...Sia<f>aveT as an in- 
 terpolation; probably, as he suggests, by 
 the same hand that inserted rats fiiv y' 
 dyaSais k.t.\. in 72 D. 
 
 4. u<ravTci>s dv Si8oCr]s] i.e. as when 
 we are asked to explain a group of parti- 
 culars we form by generalisation a concept 
 or definition, uTroffeo-is, which includes 
 them all, so if we have to explain our uiro- 
 Beffis we form a wider generalisation which 
 includes that and other vTodia-eis corre- 
 sponding to other groups of particulars. 
 We proceed from particulars to species, 
 from species to genus, from genus to a 
 more comprehensive genus, and so ascend 
 step by step until we arrive at one that 
 will satisfy our needs. 
 
 5. TJTis T«3v dv(i>6ev] 'whichever of 
 the higher generalisations seems most 
 adequate', tuk ai/ui0ev means the more 
 comprehensive vwoBitreii, farther removed 
 
I02] 
 
 ^AIAfiN. 
 
 141 
 
 3 ew? iiri tl Ikuvov e\0oi';, Stfia Se ovk av ^vpoif aairep ol avriKojiKol 
 irepl re ttj<; ap;^^? Sia\e<y6iJi,evo<; koI rSv e'f eKeivri<i wpfir)fieva)V) 
 el-irep jSovXoio rv tmv ovtcov evpelv. iKelvot^ fiev lyap Hereon ovBe eh 
 irepX TOVTOV X6705 ov8e ^povrk' ixavol yap virb a-o(f)ia<i ojiov irdvTa 
 KVKwvre'i o/uo'i BvvacrdaL avrol avToi^ dpecrKeiv' av S" e'iirep el . 
 
 2 Tcov <j)iKoa'6ipa)v, ol/J,ai av W9 ey^ Xeyw ttojow. ^ AXrj6e(7TaTa, e<pr], 
 Xeyei'i, re 'Ztfip'ia'i afia Kal 6 KeySi;?. 
 
 from the particulars. So Aristotle anal, 
 post. I XX 82^ 23: \iyoi Si avia iitkv t^v 
 ivl rb Ka66\ov, kotw di t^v iwl t4 Kara 
 liipos. Cf. metaph. B iii 998'' 17 eJ fihi 
 yap on to Ka^oXov fi,S,Wov apxal, (pavepov 
 on TO dvoiTaTOi t(2v yevmi..,TavTa yap \i- 
 yerat. Kara TavTOJv. 
 
 1. £(DS etrl Tl iKavSv SXOois] I agree 
 with Prof. Geddes, though for very dif- 
 ferent reasons, in holding that Uavbi/ 
 does not mean the avrb dvaffw. In this 
 passage Sokrates is avowedly setting forth 
 his Seirepos ttXoCs : he has declared his 
 inability {99 D) to attain to the avrb aya- 
 86v. Now if iKavbv means the avrb 
 aya66v, we have here described no Sev- 
 repos ttXoBs, but the perfect dialectic of 
 which Sokrates at present despairs ; and 
 we ought to exchange the term iirbSeais 
 for dpxv- By the superior method we 
 use our iiroBiaeii merely as steps to the 
 avrb ayaSov : having reached this we are 
 enabled to descend step by step, verifying 
 every one of the virodiaeis by which we 
 ascended: so that the knowledge of the 
 airo dyaBov is essential to the real know- 
 ledge of all our generalisations from the 
 highest to the lowest. But since the 
 inferior method only is attempted here, 
 iKavov must merely mean a iiroBeais com- 
 prehensive enough to satisfy the antago- 
 nist or our own doubts. Olympiodoros, 
 though his phraseology is sadly confused, 
 means rightly when he says &p,ei.vov Si, to 
 oei op.o'KoyoiiJ.evov ipdvai xal Tois airo- 
 iriarovs iirodiaeis re Kal dpxas. 
 
 a|J.a 8i OVK &v ifi^pois] i.e. you 
 would not make a confusion between ar- 
 guments intended to prove your iirodea-i.s 
 
 and arguments applicable to deductions 
 therefrom : e.g. in the case that follows, 
 you would not confuse a demonstration of 
 the ideal theory with a demonstration of 
 the immortality of the soul, which is a 
 corollary from the former. In other 
 words the processes which are not to be 
 confounded are (i) the establishment of 
 the iirodia-eis, (2) the comparison of the 
 wpixTlliiva with the viroBens, cf. 100 A. As 
 Grote says, 'during this debate [on the 
 wpiiriiiiva] Plato would require his op- 
 ponent to admit the truth of the funda- 
 mental hypothesis provisionally. If the 
 opponent chose to impugn the latter, he 
 must open a distinct debate on that ex- 
 press subject. Plato insists that the dis- 
 cussion of the consequences flowing from 
 the hypothesis shall be kept quite apart 
 from the discussion on the credibility of 
 the hypothesis itself. In the sarcastic 
 remarks that follow Plato indicates the 
 difference between the aim of the (jyiKo- 
 (ro(po(, and that of the dvnXoyiKoL : the 
 former seek twv optui' n eipeiv, the latter 
 avTol avToh dpiaKuv. This spirit of self- 
 satisfaction is exorcised by dialectic ; cf. 
 Theaetetus 177 B. (pipois is Madvig's cor- 
 rection for (pvpoco, which is retained by Z. 
 and St. oiiK av ipipom means ' you would 
 not get muddled ', but the active gives a 
 preciser sense. 
 
 102 A. Plato brings in this brief inter- 
 lude with his usual skill. The emphatic 
 approval expressed by Echekrates of the 
 principles just laid down serves to im- 
 press on us that by them we must stand 
 or fall. We have staked all upon this 
 last effort; we have chosen our own 
 
142 
 
 nAATflNOS 
 
 [102 
 
 EX. N^ A/a, (o ^aiBav, ei/coro)? 'ye' 0av/jia<7TQ)<; yap jioi 
 
 ooKel w? ivapy(S<; too koI a-fiiKphv vovv e')(pvTi eliretv eKeivo<s ravra. 
 
 $AIA. Haw fiev ovv, eS 'Ei^i/cpaTei;, Koi iraai rot? irapovaiv 
 
 eBo^ev, 
 
 i EX. K.al jap rjfiiv rot? airovai,, vvv Se axovovcnv. aXKA riva 
 
 B^ ^v TO, fierd ravra Xexdepra ; 
 
 L. $AIA. 'O9 fiev iym olfiai,, iireX avrm ravra a'vve')(wpr)dri, 
 Kai aifioKojeiro elvai ri eKaarop rSv elBav koI rovrasv raXka B 
 fieraXafi^dvovra avrSv rovrcov rrjv eirtavvfilav la^^^eiv, ro S?) /jierd 
 10 ravra rjpcora, Et Si], rj S" 09, ravra o^ra^ \eyeK, dp' ov'X^, orav 
 'Zifi/ilav "^mKpdrov; </)^s fiei^co elvai, ^alBcovoi; Be eXdrrco, XeyeK 
 ror eivai iv rat 'Sii,fj,/j,ia dfi^orepa, Kal fieyeOo'i Kul a-fjLiKporrjra ; 
 Eiytorye. AXXa yap, rj B' 0?, 6/ioXoyei<; ro rbv "Sitfifjuiav VTrepi'xeiv 
 
 battle-ground, on which alone we can 
 hope for victory. Nothing could better 
 mark the gravity of the crisis than this 
 momentary pause in the narrative. 
 
 102 A — 103 A, c. 1. Assuming then 
 that ideas exist corresponding to the hy- 
 potheses, and that by participation in 
 them particulars possess their attributes, 
 Sokrates proceeds thus. When we say 
 Simmias is bigger than Sokrates and 
 less than Phaedo, we are speaking loosely: 
 in reality Simmias partakes of the ideas 
 of great and small ; and it is greatness 
 in him which is bigger than smaUness in 
 Sokrates, and smallness in him that is 
 less than greatness in Phaedo. For it 
 has nothing to do with the personality of 
 Simmias Sokrates and Phaedo, as such, 
 that one is greater or less than another. 
 We observe then that (i) two opposite 
 ideas can coexist in the same subject, 
 although (2) such opposite ideas cannot 
 combine with each other, either (3) as they 
 exist absolutely in nature, or (4) as they 
 are manifested in concrete particulars. 
 And this incapacity of one opposite idea 
 to take upon it the nature of the other is 
 true of all pairs of opposite ideas as well 
 as great and small. 
 
 Setting aside the metaphysical objec- 
 tions to the doctrine of ideas of relation, 
 which we have here in its most pronounced 
 
 form, it conveniently serves Plato's pur- 
 pose to show that in particulars contradic- 
 tory ideas may coexist. In 103 D we pass 
 on to the next stage. We are here deal- 
 ing with the participation by particulars 
 in ideas which are not essential to their 
 nature. Greatness and smallness are not 
 essential to a man as heat is essential 
 to fire and cold to snow. With this 
 chapter it is well to contrast Parmenides 
 1 50 A foil. 
 
 7. eird avTu raSro o'Wex<>'P^S^] 
 Sokrates now assumes the existence of 
 the ideas, though at present he is unable 
 to attain cognition of them : that is, he 
 assumes that his iiroBi(reis more or less 
 faithfully represent the substantial realities. 
 Taking then the ideas as the true ahlai, 
 vepl yey4<reois Koi <j>Bopas, it remains to 
 examine whether the immortality of the 
 soul is a legitimate deduction from this 
 theory. 
 
 8. rdXXa] i.e. concrete existence. 
 ToXKa is constantly used thus in the Par- 
 menides. 
 
 II. X^YCis tot' etvoi] The ideas are 
 the cause of comparison, as of everything 
 else. It is through partaking of the ideas 
 of great and small that Simmias is com- 
 parable in point of size with other men. 
 
 13. rd Tdv 2i|i|i.Cav virep^X"'''] '^ ^° 
 Simmias being bigger than Sokrates, you 
 
I02] 
 
 ^AIAflN. 
 
 143 
 
 2itoKpaTov<! ovx M? Tot? pijfiaai Xiyerat o{5t<b Kal to d\ri9e<; e%eti/. 
 
 C ov yap TTov TreifyvKevai "Zifi/xiav V'irepk')(et,v tovt^ tm "Zififiiav elvai, 
 aXKa tS fieyedec o Tvyx^dvei e^j^wv" ovS" av XcoKparovi; V7repey(eiv, 
 OTi liCOKpdTTj'i 6 S<»«|OaTJ?? icTTiv, oKiC oTi (TfiiKpoTrjTa e')(ei 6 
 'SiCOKpaTrji; Trpo? to iiceivov fieye6o<} ; 'AXij^^. Ouhi ye av viro 5 
 OatStuvo? virepexea-Oai t^ ort ^aiScov o ^aiStov ia-riv, d\X' on 
 fiiyedoi; e^ei 6 ^aiSmv Trpdt rrju 'Zifi/Aiov a-fiiKporrjTa ; "Ecrri ravra. 
 OiiTco'} dpa 6 'Zi/J'fiut'i eirmvvfiiav ep^et afiiKpo^ re Kal nkya<; etvai, 
 
 D ev fiecro) wv dfi^oTepmv, rov fiev rm fieyedei VTrepi'^eiv ttjv crfiiKpo- 
 TTjTa vTre'xmu, rw he to /jiiye6o<; t^? (TfitKpoTrjTOi; 'irape')((ov virepe'^pv 10 
 Kai cifia fxeiBida-ai;, "KoiKa, eiprj, Kal ^vyypa(f>iKoo<; epeiv, aXV ovv 
 6j^€t ye TTOv (B9 Xeyft). "Zvvi^rj. Aiym Se tovS' evexa, ^ovX6/j,evo<; 
 
 admit the truth is not as expressed in the 
 words'. Strictly speaking Simmias is 
 not bigger than Sokrates, for the person- 
 ality of two men cannot be compared in 
 respect of size. The only things that can 
 be so compared are great and small: 
 therefore it is the greatness in Simmias 
 which we compare with the smallness 
 that is in Sokrates. But to say that Sim- 
 mias ^ua Simmias is greater or less than 
 Sokrates fua Sokrates, would be non- 
 sense. 
 
 8. ^irci>w|i,Cav ?x'^] because he par- 
 ticipates in the two opposite ideas. This 
 predication of opposite attributes exhibits 
 particulars in sharp contrast to the ideas, 
 of which no such contrary predication is, 
 to the Sokrates of the Phaedo, possible : 
 cf. Parmenides 129 B el piv yap avrd rd 
 6/j.oLa TLs dir^ipaivev dvofiota yiyv6fieva 'rj 
 TO. dvofioia OfJLOia, ripas dv, olfiai, ^v el 
 Si rd TOiTiiiv ii£rixovTa dfi,(poT4poiv ofiipo- 
 Tepa diroipalveL ireirovBoTa, ovSh ^/wtye, 
 m TiTivoiv, droTTOV SoKeT elvcu. The. whole 
 passage 129 A — 130 A should be com- 
 pared, where Sokrates is stating the earlier 
 Platonic doctrine, which in the latter part 
 of the dialogue Plato criticises with a view 
 to its modification. 
 
 9. •nqv <r|JiiKpiSrr]Ta vir^wv] This 
 reading is due to Madvig, who thus ren- 
 ders the sentence: 'alterius magnitudini 
 exiguitatem suam superandam subminis- 
 
 trans, alteri magnitudinem exiguitatem 
 superantem praebens'; i.e. Simmias sub- 
 mits his smallness to be exceeded by the 
 greatness of Phaedo and presents his 
 greatness to exceed the smallness of 
 Sokrates. On the whole this seems the 
 best attempt to disentangle this trouble- 
 some sentence that has yet been made. 
 The ordinary reading is virep^xi^y, which 
 is thus translated by Mr Cope : ' exceeding 
 the shortness of the one by excess of 
 height, and lending to the other by com- 
 parison a size exceeding his own short- 
 ness'. The grave objection to this reading 
 and interpretation is that in the first 
 clause virep4xi>'v is followed by the accu- 
 sative, in the second iirepixov by the 
 genitive. The verb may, it is true, take 
 either case; but surely Plato would not 
 use both constructions in the same breath. 
 Wyttenbach, Heindorf, and Ast recon- 
 struct the passage each in his own 
 way: Madvig's remedy is however the 
 simplest. 
 
 II. ^vYYpa(t>iKus ip&v] 'it seems I 
 am going to talk in the style of an in- 
 denture '. ivyy pa^ is the regular term 
 for a legal document, especially a bond 
 or covenant. Sokrates makes fun of the 
 clumsy sentence he has just uttered, which 
 he compares to the cumbrous pedantry of 
 legal phraseology. 
 
144 
 
 nAATflNOS 
 
 [102 
 
 oo^ai (Tol oirep i/j,oL ifiol yap ^alverau ov fjuovov avTO to /juiyedo'; 
 ovheiroT ideXeiv S,/J.a fieya Kal a-fjiOKpop etvat, dWa Koi to iv ijfitp 
 fieyeOo'i ovSeTrore irpoaSixea-Oai t6 crfitKpov ov8' ediXeiv vnrepe- 
 Xe(r6ai, dXka, Svotv to erepov, rj (fievyeiv Kal VTreic^copeiv, orav avrm 
 6 irpoa-irj t6 evavTiov, t6 afjLtKpov, rj 7rpoae\d6vro<; eKeivov cnrokm- E 
 Xevat: VTrofxevov he Kal Be^d/j,evov Trjv aixiKpoTT^Ta ovk iOiXeiv elvai 
 erepov rj owep fjv. wcrwep iyco Ze^dfievo<; Kal iirofjiielva^ ttJv afii- 
 KpoTTjTa, Kal en mv oa-irep elfii, odroq 6 avro? cr/j,i,Kp6<; elfif eKelvo 
 oe ov TeroKfjbtjKev fjueya ov cTfiiKpov elvaf co? K a^Tmi; xal to 
 10 er/MiKpov TO iv Tjfiiv ovk ideXei iroTe i^kya yiyveadai, ovBe elvai, ovS" 
 aWo ovSev tSv evavTicov eTt, ov cnrep ^v a/jLa TovvavTiov yuyveaOai 
 
 1. ou |i6vov airb to |j,^7e6os] Ac- 
 cording to the earlier Platonism, the idea 
 exists (i) absolutely apart from the sen- 
 sible world, x&iptffT-^, (2) inherent in 
 phenomena, to which it imparts their at- 
 tributes. Not only are opposite ideas 
 incapable of communion, as existing apart 
 by themselves, but also as informing par- 
 ticulars. The importance of this point 
 becomes manifest when the argument is 
 applied to ij/vxri- 
 
 4. 4{ i))6iiYei.v Kol {nr6KXi>p6lv] If any 
 object that was great becomes small, the 
 idea of greatness either withdraws from it 
 and goes elsewhere or is extinguished ; 
 and the idea of smallness takes its place. 
 But under no circumstances can the idea 
 of greatness remain in the object and ac- 
 cept the attribute of smallness, thus con- 
 tradicting its own nature. 
 
 6. woii^vov] Schanz has adopted 
 Hirschig's vTrojj^Ti'av, against all authority. 
 The change of tense is however perfectly 
 proper. Awaiting the approach of the 
 other idea is a prolonged process, ac- 
 cepting it is an act performed once for 
 all. In the next sentence UTro/tieivas de- 
 notes the actual completion of the process 
 in a specified instance. 
 
 OVK I6^\ei.v] 'it will not consent to 
 abide and accept smallness and thus 
 become different from what it was, in the 
 way that I accept and abide smallness 
 
 and still remaining the man I am, without 
 losing my identity am small ; whereas it 
 has never submitted, while remaining 
 great, to be small'. That is to say, if 
 Sokrates S^erai ff/uKpoTTiTa, we have a 
 small Sokrates, which involves no in- 
 congruity nor loss of identity; but if 
 greatness S^x"""' CyMK/JOTijra, we have 
 small greatness, which is incongruous 
 and impossible. Schmidt {&Hi. Comm. 
 II p. 41) discusses this passage at great 
 length : he would read ovk i8iKuv eXvai. 
 in oirep rp, comparing 103 E Se|a/u.c»oc 
 r^v ^vxfiOTTfa 'in ehai Strep r/v, irvp Kal 
 tj/vxpov. There is much to be said for 
 this ; but I think the vulgate may be de- 
 fended, as indicating that in the one case 
 a change of identity is involved but not 
 in the other : the incongruity in fact lies 
 in the supposed retention of its identity 
 by the idea under circumstances which 
 render its retention impossible. ff/iiKpav 
 /iiysBos would remain fiiyedos but yet be 
 Srepov. Moreover Schmidt's reading an- 
 ticipates the point made in /liya on criu- 
 Kpov dvai. On the whole therefore it is 
 better to make no change. 
 
 8. o^Tos 6 avTos o-)i.iKpJs Afxl 'I, 
 this same Sokrates, am small'. 
 
 9. TCTd\|i,T]KE] as in 103 D ToKpJjcrew. 
 The perfect expresses the fixed constitu- 
 tion of the idea : it has been ordained by 
 nature not to endure smallness. 
 
103] 
 
 a)AIAnN. 
 
 145 
 
 103 T6 KoX elvai, aW' rjTOL onrep'xeTat, rj aTroWvTai, iv Tovrtp tw iraOrj- 
 (lari. Jiavrairaaiv, e(j>ri 6 Ke^Sj;?, ovrco ^aiverai fioi. 
 
 LI. Kat Tt? etTTe twv irapovToav dicovara'} — ocrTi? S' '^v, ov 
 «ra0c3? jjiefivqiiai — II/do? dewv, ovK iv TOi^ irpoa-Qev -qfuv 'K6yoc<; avT6 
 TO iuavTiov rmv vvvl Xeyofjiivav w/ioXoyetTo, e« tov iXdrTOVo'i to 5 
 fiel^ov ylr/ve(j6ai kclI iic tov fiei^ovof to tkaTTov, koI dje')(i>&<i a^Tt) 
 elvai r) yiveai'i T04? evavTloi'}, ix twv ivavTiav; vvv Se fioi, BoKe2 
 Xiyeo'dai '6ti tovto ovk dv iroTe ykvovro. Koi 6 Sw/c/xxtj;? trapa- 
 B ^aXmv Trjv Ke<})aXrjv ical dKovaa<!, 'AvSptKoS';, e<^rj, direnvqfiovevKa'i, 
 ov fievTot ivvoel'i Td hia^epov tov Te vvv Xejofiivov koX tov tots. 10 
 TOTS /lev yap eXeyeTO e'/c tov evavTiov irpdyfiaTo<; to ivavTiov 
 •Trpar/fia ylyvea-dai, vvv Se '6ti avTO to ivavTLOV iavTiS ivavTiov ovk 
 dv TTOTe yevoiTO, ovTe to iv rjiilv ovTe to ev Trj <f>vcrei. tots fiev 
 yap, to <})lXe, TTepl twv i'ypvTOiV tu ivavTia eXeyojiev, iirovofid^ovTe's 
 avTa Ty ixeivav eTravv/iia, vvv Be irepl i/ceivav avTWV wv ivovToav ij 
 
 I . Iv ToiiTM Tu 7ra6i]|i.aTi] i. e. iv 
 
 Tt^ TrpoffLivtu avT(^ TO ivavriov, 
 
 103 A — c, <r. li. One of the company 
 suggests that this doctrine is inconsistent 
 with our former theory of generation 
 from opposites (70 c foil.)- Sokrates re- 
 pUes that then we were speaking of par- 
 ticulars possessing the attributes of such 
 opposites, but now we deal with the ab- 
 solute opposites themselves. The former 
 can pass from one to the other of two 
 opposite conditions ; but the opposite itself 
 can never put on the nature of its opposite. 
 
 8. irapoPaXcuv n^v Kec|)o\i]v] 'bend- 
 ing his head to listen'. As Heindorf 
 suggests, the objector probably spoke in 
 a low voice through diffidence. 
 
 9. avSpiKus] Sokrates is never with- 
 out a word of praise for any mark of 
 interest or intelligence in his listeners. 
 Plato is fond of the word dvSpiKas and 
 its cognates to express staunchness in 
 argument : cf. Theaetetus 204 E, Phaedrus 
 265 A, Republic 454 B, Laws 752 B : in the 
 last two instances ironically. 
 
 10. 01) (i^VToi tvvoets TO 8ta<|>Epov] 
 The distinction is clear enough. The 
 concrete particular is not in itself opposed 
 to either of the opposites, therefore it can 
 
 admit either of such opposites without 
 contradicting itself; but the opposites 
 themselves are so mutually exclusive that 
 neither can admit the other without self- 
 contradiction. Hot water can become 
 cold, because water is not itself opposite 
 to hot or cold, nor is any attribute es- 
 sential to it which is opposed to either. 
 But hot cannot become cold without 
 manifest contradiction of its own nature. 
 Similarly, when we generated fuv from 
 TeBuTiKos, we did not mean that death be- 
 came life, but simply that things that live 
 have passed over from a state of death 
 into a state of life. In the next chapter 
 however we shall see that a further re- 
 finement must be made. 
 
 13. OVTE tS cv TJ|iiv] Simmias can be 
 small and- great by participation in the 
 ideas of small and great ; but the idea of 
 greatness in him can never have the 
 quality of smallness, so that Simmias 
 should be small by virtue of its imma- 
 nence. For iy ry fpiaei compare Par- 
 menides 132 D Ta fiMv ttit\ Tavra. uavep 
 TtapaSdyixara eardvai hi ry 0i5ire(. 
 
 15. T^ IkcCvciiv lir(i)w|j,Cf ] Here Plato 
 propounds a theory of predication. When 
 we say that Sokrates is small, we do not 
 
 10 
 
146 
 
 nAATXlNOS 
 
 [103 
 
 hj^ei T'Tjv i-rrcovv/iiav ra 6vo/jia^6/x,eva' avra S' eKeiva ovk av irore 
 <f>afiev ideXrjcrai, yivecriv dWijXcov Se^acrdai. Kol S.fia ^\eyjra<! Trpo^ C 
 rhv Ke/Sijra elirev, ''Apa jjirj ttov, w Ke/S?;?, e'^i?, koX ere tc toutcou 
 irdpa^ei/ &v ohe elirev ; 6 S' <Ovk> av, e(f>7j, 6 Ke^Si;?, ovrco<s e')(co' 
 
 5 KULTOi ov ri \eja) cos ov TroXkd (le rapdrreir. 'ZvpaifioXoyriKafj.ev 
 apa, 17 S' 09, aTrXw? tovto, firjBeiroTe evavTiov eavra to evavTiov 
 haecrBai. IJavrdiraaiv, e^rj. 
 
 LII. "Ert StJ fioi Kal roSe cr«6i^at, etfyrj, el apa o'VPOfioXoyijcreiv. 
 Bepjjiov Ti KaXei<; Kal yfrvx^pov ; "Eyco'ye. ^A/5' oTrep 'yiova Kal irvp ; 
 
 16 Ma A" OVK eyoj^e. 'AX\' erepov ti irvpo^ to 6epp.ov Kal erepov ti d 
 'X^iovo's TO ■yfrvx^pov ; Nat. 'AXXa ToSe 7' otfiai SoKei aoi, ovteiroTe 
 Xiova odcrav Be^a/ievijv to 6epp,6v, axrirep iv Tot? kfiirpoadev eXe- 
 <yo/j,ev, eVt eaeaOai onep rjv, ■^lova Kal Oepfiov, dXXa TrpoaiovTo^ tov 
 
 mean that Sokrates and small are the 
 same thing, but we call Sokrates after the 
 name of the idea whose attribute he pos- 
 sesses. To mark this point was necessary 
 because of the confusion into which An- 
 tisthenes and others had fallen in the 
 matter of predication. The difference 
 between Plato's treatment of the subject 
 in the Phaedo and in the Sophist has been 
 dealt with in the introduction § 5; 
 
 4. ouK a5] ' no, not this time '. The 
 mss. are corrupt here ; I have adopted the 
 text of Schanz, except that he brackets 
 6 K^/377S. Z. and St. have ovk au, ?0i; 6 
 
 103 c — 104 c, t. lii. The mutually ex- 
 clusive opposites, hot and cold, are not 
 identical with fire and snow; yet we see 
 that fire will not admit cold, nor snow 
 heat. Whence we infer that there may 
 be an idea which is not one of a pair of 
 opposites, but which may exclude one of 
 such opposites. For instance, the idea of 
 odd is opposite to that of even, and ex- 
 clusive of it. Also the idea of three, 
 though not opposite to even, excludes it, 
 because the idea of three necessarily carries 
 with it the idea of odd. Similarly the idea 
 of even and the idea of two exclude the 
 idea of odd. Thus it appears that there 
 are (i) opposite ideas which are mutually 
 
 exclusive, (2) other ideas, not identical 
 with any such opposite but necessarily 
 partaking of it, which, equally with that 
 opposite, exclude the other opposite. 
 
 After establishing in the fiftieth chapter 
 that opposite ideas cannot enter into com- 
 munion, Plato's next task is to show that 
 this incommunicability extends to other 
 ideas, which, though not themselves op- 
 posite to anything, are insepa;rably com- 
 bined with one of such opposites and 
 therefore necessarily exclude the other. 
 
 9. OTrep \iava KaV irup] Plato at first 
 speaks of hot, cold, fire, snow, without 
 distinctly specifying whether he means 
 ideas or particulars : presently however he 
 gives a precise statement : we have in 
 104 A (i) T^ipvnbv, the idea of odd, (2) 
 Tpi6.t, the idea of three, (3) Tjoio, the three 
 particulars informed by the rpids. 
 
 12. xiova ofio-av] Schanz writes X'^ca 
 twice, which is far from euphonious and 
 surely unnecessary, the subject being 
 readily supplied from the preceding sen- 
 tence. 
 
 iv Tois ?|jnrpoo-86v] 102 E. 
 
 13. X'"'"' ""^ 66p[i6v] 'at once snow 
 and hot '. The sense is perfectly right, 
 and I cannot understand why Schanz 
 should bracket xal Bep/jUir, as he does Kal 
 xjivxfiiv in E. For the phrase xiiva. kbI 
 
103] 
 
 4)AIAnN. 
 
 147 
 
 Oepfiov rj VTreKXdiip^a-eiv [avTo] ^ diroXelcrOai, Haw ye. Kal to 
 irvp ye av •n-po<n6vTO<; rov ■<^vxpov avTw rj vire^ievat, rj dirdkelcrdai, 
 ov fievToi TTOTe ToXfn](Tet,v Be^dfievov Trjv ylrv^poTrjTa en elvao '6irep 
 E fjv, irvp Kal -y^vxpov. 'AXridrj, e(f>rj, Xejei<;. "Eanp dpa, rj S" o?, 
 irepi evia r£v toiovtqsv, mare firj jjuovov avro to etSos d^iovaOai 5 
 Tov avTov ovojjbaTO'! eh tov del ^povov, dXXd Kal aXXo ti, o ea-Ti 
 (Lev ovK eKelvo, exet Se tj)i/ eKelvov (loptfy^v del oTavirep y. eVt Be ev 
 ToiaSe ia'Oi)<i eaTai aa^ecTTepov o Xeym. to yap irepiTTov del ttov 
 Set TovTov TOV ovofiaro^ Tvyxdveiv, '6irep vvv Xeyofiev' rj ov ; Haw 
 ye. 'Ajoa fiovov twv ovtcov, tovto yap epcoTw, rj Kal aXXo ti, o 10 
 
 6epiJLbv is explanatory of the whole clause 
 Se^a/iinrii' t6 Bsp/ibi' ft-t laeaSai oirep rjv, 
 the result of which process would be pre- 
 cisely what Plato says, hot snow. Schanz 
 seems to refer it to the owep rjv alone. 
 Hirschig goes so far as to bracket all 
 three words; also ttO/) koX tpvxpov below. 
 I cannot see that the shadow of suspicion 
 attaches to them. 
 
 I. diroXeio-flai] That which 6,rr6\- 
 \vTai is of course not the idea, which is 
 as imperishable existing ^y ry x'-f""- as 
 existing iv rg 0i5ffet : what perishes is the 
 quality of snow which the particular pos- 
 sesses by the immanence of the idea of 
 snow — the sensible form of snow, such 
 as those described in Timaeus 50 C as 
 eiaibvTa Kal i^iovra : this however is to 
 explain Plato's words by means of an 
 analysis which he had not yet made. 
 
 4. 2<rTiv opa, iq 8' os] ' it is the case 
 then with some ideas of this kind that not 
 only do we recognise the right of this 
 idea itself to the same name in perpe- 
 tuity, but also that of some other idea, 
 not being identical with it, which, when- 
 ever it exists, always possesses the form 
 of the other '. For the construction. ^o-riK 
 wffre cf. 93 B. 
 
 6. TOV auToC ovojiaTOs] So Schanz: 
 rightly, it would seem ; cf. below, to ykp 
 weptTTiv Aei 5rou Sei tovtov tov fod/uoros 
 Tuyxdveiy. In support of iavroO Prof. 
 Geddes refers to 104 A /teri rop eauroO 
 ivo/mros. But there, as well as in ry re 
 
 alirrjs ivo/iaTi. below, a comparison is in- 
 volved which is absent here. Z. and St. 
 give eavTOv. 
 
 7. T^v ckeCvov |i.op<f>i]v] On this 
 Wyttenbach observes 'notatur alius ver- 
 borum usus: quo etSos ut universalius 
 habetur, iiopipT] minus universale et quasi 
 commimio toO cfSous : velutl Humerus im- 
 par eZ5os dicitur, tria autem illius [iop^^v 
 habere'. But this distinction cannot 
 be maintained ; for, as Wyttenbach him- 
 self points out, in 104 D Plato says 5} 
 kva.vria. IMo. iKelyig ttj fiopipy tj dv tovto 
 an-epyi^Tai, where p.op^y = TQ trepiTTif. 
 In fact iiopip^, el8os, and I8ia are in the 
 present passage interchangeable words. 
 ' The species has the p.op<j)ri of the genus 
 present, with whatever else that /to/)0^ may 
 be combined', says Prof. Geddes, rightly. 
 
 in S\ iv ToiorSe] No fresh point is 
 introduced here : Plato is merely illus- 
 trating his proposition more fully. From 
 his second example he again draws the 
 inference stated in 103 E, which he gives 
 in a more complete form in 104 B. 
 
 BO. TOVTO yip epwTu] ' for this is the 
 point of my question'. These words 
 direct the attention of the hearer to the 
 proposition on which most stress is laid: 
 viz. that there are ideas \yhich are not 
 logically opposite to anything, but which 
 nevertheless contain the principle of some 
 opposite and therefore refuse to combine 
 with the rival opposite. The vital im- 
 portance of this we shall presently see. 
 
 10 — 2 
 
148 
 
 nAATIlNOS 
 
 [104 
 
 ecrn ftev ov'x^ oTrep to irepiTTOv, 2/ia)? Se Set avTO [lera rov eavrov 104 
 ovofiaro'i koI tovto KoXelv del, Sid to ovtco 7re<pvKevai, (ocrTe rov 
 TrepiTTOv /irjSi-iroTe dTrdXeiireaOat, ; "Keyay Be avro eivai olov koX •q 
 Tpia<s ifeTTovOe KaX aXKa iroXkd. (ncoirei Be Trepl t^? rpidBoi}' dpa 
 S ov BoKei (TOi T^ re avTrj^ 6v6/jiaTt del irpoawyopevrka elvai koX tS 
 Tov irepiTTOv, ovto^ ov-^, oiirep t^? TpidBo<} ; dXk' o/ira? o^ra ttw? 
 irecjiVKe koX t; r/stas koX rj -irefiTTTd^ Koi 6 yfiia-v^ tov dpidfiov a-rra^, 
 &(jTe ovK wv oirep to irepiTTov del eKa<rTo<i avTwv eaTi ireptTTO's' B 
 Kai av TO, Svo koX to, TtTTapa KaX aTra? 6 erepo'; a\i aTU'Xp'i tov 
 
 10 dpi0/Mov OVK wv oirep to dpTiov 'S/xco^ eKaaTO<i avTwv apno? eanv 
 aei avy^^^o) pei<i rj ov ; llo)? yap ovk ; e<p7), U tolvvv, e(prj, pov- 
 Xofiai BrfKwo'ac, ddpei. eaTiv Be ToBe, '6t(. (paiveTai ov jmovov eKetva 
 Ta ivavTia dWi^Xa ov Be'xpfieva, dXXd koI '6aa ovk ovt dXkrjKoi'; 
 evavTia e%et del TdvavTia, ovBe TavTa eoiKe Be'^^ofievoi^ eKeivrjv Tfjv 
 
 J 5 IBeav 7] av Tr) ev avToh ovcrrj evavTia §, aXV iTriovcrr}<; avTrj<s rJTOi, 
 diroXXvfieva t) vTreK)(mpovvTa. rj ov ^t]<rofiev to, Tpia Kal diro- C 
 
 2. Kal ToijTO KaXctv] sc, Trepa-rbv. 
 
 7. 6 TJ|jit<rus TOV api.6|jiov airas] ' the 
 entire half of the set of numbers' Cope. 
 For the construction cf. Thucydides vill 
 8 ris i}fji,uTetas rdv veuv. ToXis is simi- 
 larly used, Thuc. I S rbv irKetaTov tov 
 piov : and other like idioms are given in 
 Wagner's note. 
 
 12. ov [l6vov cKEiva rd ivavrCa] ' not 
 only those original opposites refuse to 
 admit each other, but also those, which, 
 though not opposite one to another, 
 always contain the opposites, seem no 
 more likely to admit the idea which is 
 opposite to the idea they contain, but on 
 its approach they either perish or with- 
 draw'. That is to say rpias is not oppo- 
 site to Svds, but it contains an opposite, 
 irepiTTov, to the idea, apriov, contained in 
 Svds. Therefore rpias equally with ire- 
 piTThv excludes apnov and 5uis excludes 
 vepiTTOv, 
 
 16. diro\Xv|icva i][ iircKxupovvra] As 
 Ast says, the construction is as though 
 ipalveTai had been written instead of 
 totm. 
 
 104 c — 105 B, c. liii. Let us define 
 these ideas more closely. Such an idea 
 
 is not itself one of two opposite ideas ; 
 nevertheless, into whatsoever particulars 
 it informs it carries along with it one of 
 these opposites; so that the particulars 
 are called not only by the name of their 
 own idea, but by the name of this oppo- 
 site also; nor can they admit the other 
 opposite without ceasing to be what they 
 are. For instance three particulars are 
 three by participation in the ideal triad ; 
 but they are also odd, because the triad 
 always carries with it the idea of oddness. 
 Consequently they can never admit the 
 idea of even without ceasing to be three. 
 Of this a number of other examples are 
 given. 
 
 It might be thought that in the last 
 chapter we had already a sufficient ac- 
 count of these ideas. But in the present 
 chapter one important addition is made. 
 Now we not only say of the aXV drra 
 that they ?x« rk ivavrla, but also that 
 they iiTKpipei, ri, ivavrla els n av Ka- 
 Tciirxn- This is a necessary corollary to 
 the foregoing ; but Plato desires to bring 
 it out as prominently as possible, because 
 this is the point at which the whole ar- 
 gument is aimed. Thus the gist of this 
 
I04] 
 
 OAIAnN. 
 
 149 
 
 \eia6ai, irpoTepov KaX aXko otiovv ireia-ecrOai, irpiv virofielvat, eri, 
 rpla ovra dpria yeveadai ; Jldvv /lev ovv, e(f>i] 6 Ke/Sij?. OvBe 
 firiv, T] 0?, evavTiov je ea-Tt ova? TpiaOL. KJv <^ap ovv. KJvic apa 
 fiovov TO. e'iBrj to, ivavTia ov'X^ virofievei iwiSvTa aW'qXa, dWa koI 
 aXX' drra rd evavTia ov^^ inro/iivei iiriovra, 'AXijOeaTara, e(f>r], S 
 \e76i?. 
 
 LIII. Boi^Xet ovv, 17 S' 09, idv olot t cofiev, opiaaifieda cmoia 
 
 D ravrd ianv ; Udvv je. ''Ap' ovv, e<j)7f, w Ke^rj^, rdBe e'it] dv, a '6 
 Tt dv Kardcr')(ri firj fiovov dvayKd^et rrjv avrov ISiav avro ccr')(eiv, 
 dXKd KoX. ivavTiov del tivo<; ; Uco<s Xeyet? ; "Ha-irep apri eXiyofiev. 10 
 oiaffa yap B^irov on a dv rj twv Tpiwv IBia KaTd(T')(rj, dvdyKr) 
 avToii ov fiovov Tpicrlv elvai dXKd koX 7repiTT0i<;. Tldvv ye. 'Etti 
 TO TOiovTov Bij, ^afiiv, rj evavria ISia iiceivri rfj fjLop<f>r], fj dv tovto 
 direpyd^rfTai, ovBiiroT dv e\6oi. Ov yap. ^Ipyd^ero Be ye 4 
 irepiTTOTT)'; ; Na/. 'Evavria Be ravry rj tov dpriov' Nai. 'Eirl 15 
 
 E TO rpia dpa rj tov dpriov IBea ovBiiroTe ^^ei, Ov Brjra. "A/x,oi,pa 
 Brj TOV dpTLOv T« rpla. "Afiotpa, 'AvdpTio<; dpa jJ Tpid<i. Nat. 
 
 chapter lies in its application of the prin- 
 ciple to concretes. 
 
 8. fi o Tt av KaToo^u] ' which, what- 
 ever they occupy, compel that to have not 
 only its own idea, but always that of some 
 opposite as well '• The word Kardaxv 
 marks the fresh point : what the idea occu- 
 pies or informs can be nothing else but 
 particulars. 
 
 9. Ti]V a^TOv IS^av] i.e. iKehov H n 
 av Kardcxv- Wohlrab strangely remarks 
 ' ouToD bezliglich auf den Plural a '. To 
 say nothing of the grammar, this makes 
 sheer nonsense, representing the idea as 
 the idea of itself. Plato's meaning is 
 plain enough. The ideal triad, for in- 
 stance, occupying the concrete three, forces 
 the latter to receive not only the special 
 idea, rpids, but also the idea of a certain 
 opposite, irepirrbv. 
 
 10. ivavriov ad, tivos] There is so 
 much confusion in the mss. that it would 
 be rash to assert confidently what is the 
 true reading. This however gives pre- 
 cisely the sense required and differs from 
 the best mss. only in the omission of airif. 
 
 Notwithstanding that out^J has over- 
 whelming ms. authority I cannot believe 
 it genuine. The only plan for making 
 sense of it is to read Sei with Schmidt for 
 del. But the phraseology 'but it also has 
 need of some opposite' is so glaringly in- 
 appropriate that it is incredible that Plato 
 wrote it. I have therefore with the Ziirich 
 editors ejected avrQ, which Schanz re- 
 tains within brackets. Ast's del Srj rtvos 
 is not bad, possibly accounting for the 
 corruption StJ^-os. 
 
 13. IkeCvt] Trj |iop<t>j] see on 103 E. 
 
 14. dpydX,ero 8 J i] irepiTTOTus] The 
 ms. reading 77 irepirrti is surely indefen- 
 sible. Plato never uses such a phrase as 1; 
 vepiTT^ I5^a, which would indeed be some- 
 thing very like nonsense. Probably he 
 wrote either ij tov irepiTrov or i} irepiTTo- 
 Tris: the latter, which was suggested to 
 me by Mr Jackson, I have ventured to 
 adopt, as the mildest remedy I can find 
 for an evident corruption. Compare 105 c 
 
 OVK ip<2 <J l^" T'epiTTOTTIt. 
 
 15. eirl Tci TpCa] i. e. three particulars. 
 17. dvapTios apo 1] Tpids] The word 
 
ISO 
 
 HAATflNOS 
 
 [los 
 
 "^O Toivvv ekeyov oplaaaBai, irola ovk ivavTia tivI ovra Sfiax; 
 ov Se^^erat avro to evavriov, olov vvv rj rpiu'; rm apricp ovk ovcra 
 evavria ovBiv ri fiaXkov avrb Bi'^^^erai, to yap evavriov del avraj 
 iiri^epei, Kal rj Sua? toJ irepma) koL to iriip tS ^jrv^pp ical aXka 105 
 
 S Trd/MiroXXa — dW' cpa Brj, el of/TW? Spinet, firj fiovov to evavTiov to 
 ivavTiOv firj he')(e<T6ai, dWa koX i/celvo o dv i-jritf)epij tl evavriov 
 eKeivfp, ecf)' o ri av avrb 'irj, avro rb eiri^epov rfjv rov eirKpepofievov 
 ivavriorrjra /irjBeTrore Be^etrdai. irdXiv Be dvapLifivrjaKov' ov yap 
 ')(eipov TToWo/ct? d/coveiv. rd irevre rrjv rov dpr'iov ov Be^erai, 
 
 10 ovBe rd Bexa rrjv rov nrepirrov, rb BiirXdaiov rovro fiev ovv Kal 
 avrb dWo) <ovk> evavriov, ofiw; Be rrfv rov Trepirrov ov Be^erai. 
 ovBe rb rjixioXiov oiiBe rdWa rd rotavra, rb rj/iiav, rrjv rov okov, B 
 
 anafnoi is used instead of TreptTrri to de- 
 note the opposition to apriov involved in 
 the number three: the full significance of 
 this mode of expression will be clear when 
 we come to take the case of ^vxv- 
 
 1. 2\«7ov 6pCa-a(r6ai] Heindorf says 
 ' IXeyoi" in his, ut saepe, idem fere est quod 
 iKi\evov '. Cf. Aeschylus Agamemnon 955 
 X^u Kar' SvSpa, fi-^ Beov, ai^eiv i/U. 
 
 2. ov Several o«t6 t4 Ivavrtov] 
 There seems no reason for omitting to 
 havrlov. 'The opposite itself is dis- 
 tinguished from the idea which is not, 
 but implies, an opposite: and this is all 
 that is meant by the word avro. Cf. 103 B. 
 This seems to be the view of H. Schmidt 
 (krit. Comm. II p. 58), who understands 
 avTo 'nicht in dem streng philosophischen 
 Sinne an sich '. Stallbaum's plan of tak- 
 ing TO ivavTlov in apposition to aiiro is 
 clumsy. 
 
 5. 6pa 81] cl oiircDs opCjei] resumes the 
 sentence begun at rolvw ^Xeyoc oplaaa- 
 Bai, the construction of which is left im- 
 perfect. 
 
 |j.i) piovov TO evavrCov] 'that not only 
 does the opposite refuse to admit its 
 opposite, but whatever imports an oppo- 
 site into that to which itself comes — that 
 very importing idea can never admit the 
 opposite of that which is imported'. 
 Sokrates here speaks highly ^vyyptKpiKuis. 
 
 Not only will odd refuse to admit even, 
 but the triad, which imports the idea of 
 odd [iKetvo 5 av iwKpipTj ti ivavrlov) into 
 whatsoever it enters, will itself (outo to 
 ivKpipov) never admit even, the opposite 
 of oddness which is imported by it (rriv 
 Toi! itn(j>^pop.ivov iyavTioTr/Ta). cKilvif is to 
 be joined with eiri^4pr). The present defi- 
 nition differs from that in 104 B in the 
 introduction of the word hiri(j>ipeai, which 
 denotes that the principle is now being 
 applied to concretes which are informed 
 by the ideas. 
 
 to. TovTO |x^ oSv Kal avTo aXX(^ 
 < oiJK> IvavrCov] The insertion of ovk is 
 absolutely necessary : there is no sense in 
 which the number ten can be said to be 
 contrary to anything else. Cf. 104 C dXXo 
 KoX otra OVK ovra aWriXots eyavria. ^x^* ^^^ 
 Tavavria: and 104 E. Stallbaum's defence 
 of the vulgate apparently fails to satisfy 
 even himself. 
 
 12. o«8i t6 i?iu6\tov] 'nor will | 
 and the rest of the fractions whose de- 
 nominator is 2 accept the idea of whole ; 
 nor yet will J and the fractions whose 
 denominator is 3 '. These last examples 
 do not seem very felicitous, since we have 
 no such definite contrast of opposites as 
 in the case of odd and even. We must 
 however take it thus : | and I are not 
 opposites to anything ; they contain how- 
 
105] 
 
 4>AIAnN. 
 
 iSi 
 
 Kai, rpirrjfiopiov av koI irdvra ra roiavra, elrrep eirei re koX crvv- 
 ooKei a-oi o{5t(U9. Haw <T<p6Spa xal crvvBoKec, ei^rj, koI e-jrofiai. 
 
 LIV. TiaXov hrj fioi, eijir], e'f dp')^i]f Xeye. koI firj fioi o av 
 epcoTO) aTTOKpivov, dWd fiifiovfievo's ifie, Xiym Be "Trap' fjv t6 
 TrpwTov kXejov diroKpiaiv, rrjv dcr<pa\r} eKelvqv, iic rcSv vvv Xeyo- 5 
 (xevwv aXkrjv opwv dcr^dXeiav. el jdp epoto fie, a> av tI \ev Ta\ 
 C cwfiaTi ejyevTjTai, 6epp,ov earrai, ov rtjv da-(pa\rj croi ipm diTOKpicnv 
 €K€tvr]v Trjv dfiaOlj, on a dv Oepfiorrj';, dWd KOji'^OTepav eic rav 
 vvv, OTI, w dv TTvp' ovBe dv epy, a dv crcofiart to ejyivrjTai, vocnjaei, 
 
 ever the idea of fraclionality, which is 
 opposite to that of integrity, therefore they 
 will never admit the latter. 
 
 TO T|)ii,(ru, Schanz brackets tliis as a 
 gloss. 
 
 105 B — D, t. liv. We are now en- 
 abled to advance beyond our first sim- 
 ple and safe hypothesis. When we are 
 asked what by its immanence makes a 
 thing hot, we shall no longer answer heat, 
 but fire : similarly we shall assign fever 
 as the cause of sickness, not disease ; the 
 monad as the cause of numerical imparity, 
 not oddness. Applying this rule, when 
 asked what is the cause of life in the body, 
 Kebes answers soul ; for soul contains in 
 her the principle of life which is opposite 
 to death ; whence soul can never combine 
 with death. 
 
 We now see the significance of Plato's 
 insistence on his point that some ideas 
 which are not opposites yet refuse to com- 
 bine with certain opposites. Soul is not 
 opposite to anything : but she stands in 
 the same relation to the idea of life as 
 fire does to that of heat and the triad to 
 that of oddness. 
 
 It is to be noted that a fourth term is 
 added in this chapter. Hitherto we have 
 had three, e.g. wepiTT6Tris,Tpids, rpla: the 
 general idea, the special idea and the par- 
 ticular informed by the latter : now in 
 addition to these three we have <rwiia in 
 which the particular resides; the fever 
 that seizes on us is not the idea of fever, 
 but a particular fever, which corresponds 
 to rpia, while the idea of fever corresponds 
 
 to rpias. Similarly the soul that quickens 
 a particular body corresponds to rpia. 
 Now since this fourth term is itself in no 
 wise material to the argument, — it matters 
 nothing to the immortality of soul whether 
 or not she resides in a body — I conceive 
 the point of it is to emphasise the fact 
 that these particulars too, Trvpero! and 
 'pvxri, cany with them the ideas of v6(tos 
 and fuif, and consequently refuse to ad- 
 mit their opposites. Hitherto it has only 
 been the special idea which iin<l>ipet the 
 general idea. 
 
 3. Kal |Jiij (loi. 8 oiv IpoiTw] 'and do not 
 answer in the terms of the questions I put, 
 but following the examples I shall give 
 you' i.e. to the question, what makes a 
 thing 8fpfx6v? the answer must be, not 
 ffepporrjs, but irSp. The reading in the 
 text has the best ms. authority and gives 
 the best sense. 
 
 5. T7)V d(r<|>oiXi) iKelvr\v] Cf. 100 E 
 dff^aXh elpM /cai e/ioi Kal ot(jIovv aKK(j) 
 dTTOKptvaffOac otl r^ KaX<^ rh Koka yiyveTcu 
 Ka\d. For the use of otr^aWs cf. Timaeus 
 50 A p.a.Kpt^ Trpos dXi^Beiav &fftl>aK4ffT€pov 
 eiiretv, otl x/>wff6y. 
 
 6. A Y"P ^poio |j.€] ' were you to ask 
 me what must be inherent in a body to 
 make it hot '. Stallbaum seems right in 
 bracketing ev tQ : we thus have the same 
 phrase three times over, with a slight 
 variation in the order of the words. 
 Schanz and others include aii/ian in the 
 bracket; but it seems quite as much in 
 place here as in the two passages below. 
 
152 
 
 nAATflNOS 
 
 [los 
 
 oiiK epa '6ti w av v6ao<}, aX\! m av "jrvpeTo^' ov8' & av dpiBfiw rl 
 iyyevTjrai, TrepiTTOv ecrrat, ovk ipco m av irepiTTOTrji;, aW' m av 
 p,ovd<;, Kal rdWa oi5t«»9. a\\' opa, el ^Sjj iKavws dlcxff o ri ^ov- 
 "Ko/iac. 'AWa vrdw iieavm<i, e^r). ' KvoKplvov hq, ^ S' 09, w av ri 
 5 eyyivrjTai acofiari, ^wv earai; 'lit av yjrvxv, e^v- Ovkovv del 
 TovTO ovrwi exei ; lltB? jap ov^i; ij o 09. i± YV^r} apa o ri avD 
 
 with it. The whole point of this sentence 
 
 1 . ^ fiv iruptTos] i. e. he will specify 
 the particular kind of sickness instead of 
 Wsing the general term : as Prof. Geddes 
 puts it, the species is substituted for the 
 genus. 
 
 2. 3 S.V novos] Similarly, instead 
 of assigning irepiTTorii! as the cause of 
 oddness in a number, he will assign the 
 idea of that particular odd number, what- 
 ever it may be: /iovds, like Tvperos, is 
 merely given as an example. 
 
 6. Ti dv avTii KardcrxT]] It is to 
 be noted that the usage of Karacrxv here 
 is different from that in 104 D. The soul 
 does not occupy the body in the sense in 
 which rpioj occupies rpla. : the triad is the 
 cause why the three are three, the soul is 
 not the cause why body is body, but the 
 cause why it is alive. The difference lies 
 in this : the triad is the idea of three ; the 
 soul which quickens the body is not the 
 idea of soul, but a particular soul, just as 
 the fever is a particular fever. Thus we 
 have the following terms ( i ) the idea of 
 life, (2) the idea of soul, which carries the 
 idea of life to particular souls, (3) the par- 
 ticular soul, which vivifies the body, {4) the 
 body in which is displayed this vivifying 
 power. It is true that an idea of soul is 
 a metaphysical monstrosity ; but we can- 
 not escape it here, first because otherwise 
 Plato's elaborate parallel breaks down, 
 secondly because in the earlier Platonism 
 an idea of soul is inevitable. Wherever 
 there is a group of particulars called by 
 the same name, we are told in the Repub- 
 lic, there is an idea corresponding : there- 
 fore since there are particular ^vxal, there 
 must be aM S eim ypvxv- This is one of 
 the errors which Plato rectifies in his later 
 dialogues; for the present we must bear 
 
 is that not only the idea of soul but also 
 a particular soul iiri^ipei i^unjv, and ac- 
 cordingly ri havrlov if airii iwiipipei ael 
 oi /iij voT€ Si^Tirai. 
 
 105 D — 106 D, f. Iv. As then that which 
 will not admit even is uneven, so that 
 which vnll not admit death, namely soul, 
 is deathless. Now if the negation of even 
 or of heat or of cold necessarily implied 
 Indestructibility, then three and snow and 
 fire would not perish at the approach of 
 the opposite to the idea contained in them, 
 but would merely withdraw from it. This 
 however is not the case : these negations 
 do not imply indestructibility; therefore 
 three and snow and fire can cease to 
 exist at the approach of the opposite. 
 But the negation of death does imply 
 indestructibility : soul therefore, on the 
 approach of death, not only refuses to 
 admit it, but also refuses to perish : soul 
 is thus not only deathless but indestruc- 
 tible. Indeed if the eternal principle of 
 life could perish, then there is nothing in 
 existence that should not perish. 
 
 We have seen that irvp and rpia, on 
 the approach of cold or evenness, had 
 two alternatives open to them, either 
 uTrc/fXW/Dei)' or &Tr6\\v<T$aL : what is not 
 open to them is Six^a-Oai t6 ivavrlov. 
 Therefore if in any case &vb\Kvts8(u 
 were identified with S^x*"'^"' ''^ ivavHov, 
 it would necessarily be precluded. In 
 the foregoing instances this is not so : 
 dTTo'XXwffai is not identical with Six^ffSai 
 \j/vXpov nor with Six^aBai, apnov. Con- 
 sequently both alternatives are open to 
 Tfvp and rpla. But in the case of fvxri 
 this identification actually occurs : Six^aBaj. 
 rb ivarriov is for the principle of life 
 
io6] 
 
 <DAIAnN. 
 
 153 
 
 avTTj KaTa<Tj(ri, ael ^K6t eir eKelvo ij>epov(Ta ^(orjv ; "H«et /MevTOi, 
 e^Tj. UoTepov S' ecrri ti ^mfj ivavriov rj ovBiv; "Eariv, e(f)r]. Tt; 
 ©ai/aro?. Ovkovv "^v^^tj to ivavriov w avrrj ivKJiepei, del ov /j,t} 
 TTOTe Si^r]Tat, to? e« tSv Trpoa-Qev d)[io\6<yr]Tai ; Kat paXa a-<f)6Bpa, 
 e(f)r} 6 Ke/8???. 5 
 
 LV. Ti oiJv TO firj Ze')(pfievov rrjv tov dpriov IBiav ; to vvv Brj 
 TavTa covofia^ofiev ; 'AvdpTtov, e^i;. To Be BUaiov fjurj Be'X^ofievov 
 E Kal av /iova-iKov firj Be')(r]Tai ; "A/novaov, e<f)ri, to Be dBiKOV. Elev. 
 b B' dv OdvaTov fJ^rj Be'^rjTai, Tt KaXovp^ev ; ^KOdvuTOV, e(j}rj. Ovkovv 
 V "^"X^ °^ Be')(eTai OdvaTOV ; Ov. ^AOdvuTOV dpa rj yjrv^r] ; 'Add- lo 
 vaTov. Elev, ecjjr)' tovto p-ev Brj diroSeBeixScii, ^wfiev' rj 7rc3? BoKei; 
 Kal pd\a 76 Uavoo'i, w 'ZasKpare-;. Tt' ovv, rj 8' ^9, w Ki^rjv ; el 
 106 Tm avaprup avayKaiov '^v avco\edp(p elvat, dkXo Tt ra Tpia rj dvc6~ 
 XeOpa av rjv ; Iltos r^dp ov ; Ovkovv el Kal to d6epp,ov dva'^Kolov 
 -^v dvcoXeOpov elvai, oiroTe Tt? eTrl '^cova 6epp,av eira'yd<yoi, inre^^jei 'S 
 av J? ^twi/ ovcra crtS? Kal ottjkto^; ov ydp dv diraiXeTO ye, ovB' 
 
 Six^iySai BivaTov : AvoWvaBai is the same 
 as Six^irBai B&varov : therefore, since 5^- 
 Xea-ffai Sdvarov is precluded, so also is 
 &ir6\\v(r6ai, ; else we should find soul 
 doing what we have agreed is impossible, 
 viz. admitting the opposite idea to the 
 idea contained in it. 
 
 6. tC vCv 811 TaCra] ravra is in BCD, 
 omitted by Z. and St. Schanz cites 
 Alcii. / 109 c irpht Tavr' apa, rb SUaiov, 
 Tois \6yovs Troi^irei. 
 
 10. aSdvarov apa 1] \|/vxii !] It is neces- 
 sary to distinguish very carefully the mean- 
 ing of ABAvarov. All it denotes here is 8 
 dv Bdvarov /j.^ S^X'7'''"' it '^ 'h^t which 
 contains the opposite idea to Bavaros, as 
 AvaprMv contains the opposite idea to 
 dpnov. It signifies in fact not what soul 
 is but what she is not ; and for the pre- 
 sent we must dissociate the word from 
 the positive notion of imperishability. We 
 are now merely expressing the particular 
 ivavriov which soul will not admit ; that 
 the exclusion of this ivavriov involves 
 indestructibility is an inference we do not 
 reach until we declare that &6avaTov = 
 dviiXeBpov. Wyttenbach accurately says 
 ' Adavwrov hie dicitur S av Bdvarov pA] 
 
 S^XIi""' : AviiXeBpov, quod superveniente 
 contrario o6k airoXKvrai,'. For a somewhat 
 similar subtlety compare Aristotle iojiica 
 VI vi I45''2i foil, where ABdvarov is re- 
 garded as logically distinguishable, though 
 not actually separable, from a<j>SapTov. 
 
 1 1 . TOVTO \iJkv Si] diroSESeixSai ^mjuv] 
 What has been demonstrated is, not the 
 eternal existence of soul, which is a sub- 
 sequent inference, but that soul contains 
 the opposite idea to death. Dead soul 
 would be analogous to cold fire or even 
 three. It must be borne in mind that 
 ^vxTi means the principle of life : a dead 
 vital principle is a contradiction in terms. 
 That this is only a preliminary step to 
 the final induction is marked by the 
 
 TOVTO pAv. 
 
 14. cl TO a6ep|j,ov] If tA aSep/ioi' were 
 necessarily indestructible — that is, if 
 6\e8pos were the opposite idea to dBepp,ov, 
 then snow, as containing dBeppov, would 
 not have the alternative of perishing on 
 the approach of its opposite ; it must 
 withdraw whole and unmelted. x'^" 
 avoXofiivT] would then be as impossible as 
 Xic!))' Beppij is now. 
 
rS4 
 
 HAATfiNOS 
 
 [io6 
 
 av iirofievovcra iSe^aro av ttjv OepfiorrjTa. 'AXrjOt], e(f)rj, XiyeK. 
 naavTcof, olfiai, kolv el ro oAjrvxpov dvccXeOpov ijv, onroTe iirt to 
 iTvp yfrv^^^pov n eTrrjei, ovttot av d-Trea^ivvvro ovS' aTrwWvro, aXKa 
 (tSv av direKdov oK^ero. ^AvajKr], e(j}r]. Ovkovv Kal w8e, e(^r}, 
 5 avajKr) Trepi tov adavdrov elirelv ] el /xev ro dddvarov Kal ava>- B 
 XeOpov icTTiv, dSvvarov '^V)(^, orav ddvaTO<! eV avrrjv tr;, d-TroX- 
 XvaOai' Odvarov /j,ev <yap Srj e'/e tcSv irpoeipTjiMevwv ov he^erai ovB' 
 6<7Tai TedvTjKvla, wairep to, rpia ovk eVrat, e<pa/Mev, dpriov, ouSe 7' 
 av ro irepirrov, ovSe Bi] irvp •yjrv'x^pov, ovBe je rj iv to3 Trvpi, Oep- 
 
 io/4oTi;9. dXXd ri KcoXvei, ^alrj dv ri<;, dpriov fiev ro rrepirrov firj 
 rylyveadai eVtwro? rev dpriov, &<T'irep wfioXoyrjrai, airoXofievov Be 
 avrov dvT ixelvov dpriov jeyovevai ; rm ravra Xeyovri ovk av C 
 e)(oifiev Biafidxea-daL on ovk diroKXvraf to yap dvdpriov ovk ava>- 
 XeOpov e<7riv' iirel el rovro wfioXoyrjro rjfuv, paBico^ dv BiejiaypiieOa 
 
 15 ori, irreXQovTOt; rov dpriov ro Trepirrbv Kal rd rpia oX^erai amovra' 
 Kai rrepl irvph's Kal ffepfiov Kal rwv dXXwv ovrco'; dv Bie/ia'x^o/xeda. 
 rj ov ; TLdvv jxev ovv. Ovkovv Kal vvv irepl rov ddavdrov, el (lev 
 rjfiiv ofioXoyelrai Kal dvwXedpov elvai, '^v)(rj dv e'ir] Trpb<! rS a6d- 
 
 2. el TO ai|/vxpov] The correction 
 a^vxpov, suggested by Wyttenbach, seems 
 to me certain. In order to formulate his 
 antitheses with the utmost precision, Plato 
 has coined the words avapriov and adep- 
 fiov, to express the direct opposites of 
 apTiov and 0ep/i.6v : it seems hardly doubt- 
 ful that he also coined the word d-.j/vxpov 
 to express the direct opposite of \j/vxp6v. 
 a\j/VKTOV, as Wyttenbach says, is the coun- 
 terpart of aBipnavTov, not of aBepptov : and 
 in a passage where Plato is choosing his 
 terms with such extreme nicety the 
 slightest failure in fitness is not to be 
 tolerated. It is surprising that Wytten- 
 bach's admirable correction has been so 
 completely ignored by subsequent edi- 
 tors. Mr Jackson, independently of Wyt- 
 tenbach, made the same emendation. 
 a\(ivxpov is confirmed by the corrupt read- 
 ing \j/vxp^v in Stobaeus eel. 1 814. 
 
 5. cl [tiv ri dOavarov] The inference 
 that soul is immortal is not yet definitely 
 drawn, but is based upon the two state- 
 
 ments made in this sentence, (i) soul is 
 idivaTov, i. c. she cannot combine with 
 death and so become dead soul ; (2) there- 
 fore if idaraTov involves dviiXcSpov, soul 
 is dviiXedpov, i.e. she cannot perish. When 
 these two propositions are put side by 
 side, it becomes obvious that the refusal 
 of the soul to admit death implies her 
 indestructibility, since we know that dffa- 
 varov does involve ai/ii\e6pov. 
 
 7. 0i58' %0-Tai TE6vi]Kvia] It is note- 
 worthy that TeBrqKvXa. has a different 
 sense here from that of tcBviikos in the 
 discussion at 71 C : there it implied 
 merely the state of separation of soul and 
 body, but here denotes the actual de- 
 straction of the soul. 
 
 14. el TOUTO ci|j.o\6Yr]To] sc. t6 amp- 
 TioK civui\e8pov eTvai : that in the case of 
 dvapriov, diroWvcrSat is equivalent to 
 Six^aBai ri ivavrlov, sc. apnov. 
 
 18. irpis Tu dBdvaros] At last we have 
 the inference definitely stated. Since soul 
 will not admit the opposite of its imma- 
 
ic6] 
 
 <J)AIAnN. 
 
 155 
 
 D varo^ eivai /cat dvooXedpof el Be fii], dWov av Seoi \6yov. 'AXX' 
 ovoev oei, e<^7], rovrov <ye evexa' a-xp\fj yap av ri dWo <^6opa.v fjirj 
 oeji^otTO, elf ye to aOavarov dihiov ov ipdopav Bi^erai. 
 
 nent idea, and since that opposite is 
 death, soul, being deathless, must be 
 imperishable. 
 
 2. irxoXfi ydp av] Here we have the 
 fundamental postulate on which the whole 
 argument rests : viz. that energy cannot 
 be annihilated. All other things being 
 but forms of energy, may make way for 
 their opposites, since their conversion 
 into the opposite state involves not de- 
 struction but simply modification of ener- 
 gy. But vital principle is energy itself, 
 therefore its conversion into the opposite 
 state would mean conversion into non- 
 energy, i.e. annihilation of energy. Plato 
 is simply applying to spirit the principle 
 which the older physicists laid down for 
 matter, and which Lucretius formulates in 
 the words ' ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil 
 posse reverti'. Similarly we have in 72 D 
 el ykp iK fJL^v Twv dWiov ra fwyra yiyvotro, 
 tA dk ^wvra BvrjffKoi, tIs /A?;;^ac7; f/.^ oi5;^l 
 wavTa KaravaXcjdTJvai cts rb TedvavOLi ; 
 Compare Phaedrus 245 D toOto 5' out' 
 kkI^KKvuBox oiire yiyveffdcu Svvarbv, ^ Traz/- 
 TO re oipamv irairav re yiveaiv av/nre- 
 troiKTav ffT7/vai Kal firjiroTG avdii ^xetj* oBgv 
 KivrjdifTa yevT)ireTai. 
 
 [IT] 8^x'"''''°] I' 's easier to feel 
 the correctness of ii.yj than to explain it 
 grammatically. The meaning is ' hardly 
 could there be anything else incapable of 
 admitting destruction, if the immortal, 
 being eternal, will admit it', jti^ d^xoiro 
 <t>0ophv is in fact equivalent to e?7j to fiij 
 Sexo/J^i'oi' (pBopav. Wohlrab compares 
 Cratylus 429 D jrfis yh.p av, w SuKpares, 
 'Xiyav yi tls tovto, X^7e(, M17 ™ ov 'Kiyoi ; 
 Add Gorgias 510 D rlva av rpovov iyu) 
 fiiya Swalp-riv Kal /iiidels /ie ddiKolrj. 
 
 3. ri . . . S^gsTat = e J iOiXei. or /iAXet 
 Si^etr9ai. The distinction between d with 
 future indicative and idv with subjunctive 
 is apt to be overlooked. The former is 
 
 constantly used as an equivalent to d iiiX- 
 \ei, or even el XP''I> with infinitive; and 
 the substitution of i&v would be, as here, 
 impossible. It were easy to multiply in- 
 stances, but one may suffice : Aristopha- 
 nes Progs 1460 eilpKTKe i^ AC, ettrep ava- 
 6i)<rei iriXiv, ' you must find something, if 
 you mean to go on earth again'. Cf. 
 Timaeus 3 1 A. This usage is recognised 
 by Prof. Goodwin, moods and tenses % 49, 
 r, note 3: he however regards a number 
 of cases as falling into the class of ordi- 
 nary future conditions equivalent to iw 
 with subjunctive (§ 50). I cannot but 
 think that such cases are very rare : nearly 
 if not quite all of the instances he quotes 
 might be taken the other way : especially 
 Isokrates Archidamos § 107, where el hk 
 (po^rim/ieBa is, I conceive, precisely paral- 
 lel to ^v i64Xup,ev dirodvTjffKeLi/ ; 'if we 
 mean to be cowards '. 
 
 Here it may be convenient to give 
 concisely a synopsis of the reasoning in 
 chapters 1— Iv. After agreeing that the 
 truth of immortality will be best estab- 
 lished if we can show that it is a legitimate 
 deduction from the theory of ideas, we set 
 forth thus: (i) particulars partake succes- 
 sively, or even simultaneously, of contrary 
 ideas, but the idea itself can never admit 
 its opposite, but at the approach thereof 
 either withdraws or perishes: and this 
 applies both to ideas as existing in nature 
 and as immanent in particulars: (2) there 
 is a second set of ideas, not being them- 
 selves opposites, but containing opposite 
 ideas ; no such idea can admit the opposite 
 of the idea it contains, but either with- 
 draws or perishes ; e. g. the triad contains 
 the idea of odd and cannot admit that of 
 even : (3) particulars which one of this 
 second class of ideas informs can never 
 admit the opposite of the contained idea ; 
 e. g. three things can never be even : (4) if 
 
156 
 
 HAATnNOS 
 
 [107 
 
 LVI. 'O Se 76 0eo?, olfiai, e^rj 6 '^coKparr]';, Kal avro to t^? 
 ^wr}^ etSo? Kal e% ri aWo dOavarov eo'Tiv, irapa iravTcov av o/io- 
 XoyrjOeirj firj^eiroTe cnroWvadai. Tiapa iravTcnv fiivToi vr] At" 6^7; 
 dvdpooTrcov re ye Kal en fiaXXov, w^ eyaifiai, trapa 6edov. 'OTrore S;; 
 
 5 TO dddvarov Kal dBidcf)0op6v iariv, aXXo ri yfrv^rj ^', el dOdvaro'; e 
 Tvy^dvei ovaa, Kal d.vooKeOpo'i av eXr\ ; IIoXXt; avayKt). 'ETTioz'TO? 
 apa OavaTOV eTrl tov dvQpaiTov to fiev OvrjTov, a)<i eoiKev, avTov 
 dtroOvriaKei, to B' dddvaTov a&v Kal aSid<pdopov oX-)(eTai dwiov, 
 VTreK'x^coprja-av tw OavdTO). (paiveTUi. Ilaj/TO? fj,dWov dpa, e<j}T},'w 
 
 10 Kc/St;?, '^vx'O dOdvaTOV Kal dvwXedpov, Kal tw ovri eaovTai, rjp.(tiv 107 
 ai ■tfrv^al iv "AiBov. Ovkovv eyaye, do ACOKpaTe';, e^rj, 'ij((o irapd 
 ravTa ciXXo ti Xeyeiv ovSi irr) aTria-Telv toIv Xoyoii;. dXX' el Bij ti 
 Stya/A^a? T] Tis dXXo^ e-)(ei Xeyeiv, ev e)(et, firj Karacnyrjcrai' «? ovk 
 olBa 649 oVTivd Tts dXXov Kaipov dva^dXXoiTO rj tov vvv irapovTa, 
 
 in any such instance refusal to admit the 
 opposite necessarily involved indestructi- 
 bility, we could predicate immortality of 
 that which refused to admit it; e.g. if re- 
 fusal to admit evenness involved inde- 
 structibility, three would be imperishable ; 
 but since this is not so, three may perish 
 at the approach of evenness : (5) but in the 
 case of soul refusal to admit the opposite 
 of its contained idea does involve inde- 
 structibility, since the contained idea is 
 life, whose opposite is death; and that 
 which will not admit death is imperish- 
 able: soul therefore on the approach of 
 death has not the option of perishing, but 
 must adopt the other alternative, vircKxa- 
 petv. Else, if the principle of life perished, 
 nothing could be found to resist destruc- 
 tion. 
 
 106 D — 107 B, c. Ivi. Thus from the 
 general principle that all things which re- 
 fuse to admit death are indestructible we 
 infer that soul can never perish : when 
 death comes upon a man, his mortal part 
 perishes, but his soul withdraws, making 
 way for death, while she herself is saved 
 alive. It must be then that our souls live 
 in Hades. Kebes is now fully convinced: 
 Simmias cannot controvert the reasoning 
 of Sokrates but still feels misgivings; 
 
 whereupon Sokrates encourages him to sift 
 the matter until he is thoroughly satisfied. 
 
 1. 6 SI yi Oeds] We must identify 
 6eis with absolute universal mind, the vovs 
 paffiXeis of the Phihbus, the mythical S-q- 
 /Movpyis of the Timaens. Eternity cannot 
 be ascribed either to the deities of popular 
 worship or to those of Plato's cosmology : 
 see Timacus 4 1 A, where they are thus 
 addressed by the creator : St' d /cai iirelTep 
 yeyiv7)ff6e, dOafaTot fikv ovk iffT^ ov5' a\v~ 
 roi TO iriinrav, o# ti iiJkv St) \vOijffeaOi 
 ye ovSk rei^effSe Oavirov fwipaSf ttjs ifiTjs 
 /3ouXij<rews fiei^vos h'i Se<rnoS Kal Kvpia- 
 ripov \axovTes iKehav, ots St' iylyve<rBe 
 fweSeicrffe. In the final development of 
 Plato's system we find that God, the 
 idea of life, and universal soul are iden- 
 tical : ^vxn alone of all things is airoKl- 
 vr/Tov Kal aSivaTOV. This identification 
 however is not to be found in the Phaedo: 
 it belongs to the consummated idealism 
 of the Philebus and Timamis. 
 
 8. dTToBvTjtrKei] Here again the word 
 denotes annihilation; not as in 71 c. 
 
 Kal d8id()>6opov] The distinction made 
 in the last chapter between aBavarov 
 and &vi!i\€6pov must be carefully borne in 
 mind. 
 
 14. els ovTiva...dvapdXXoiTo] It is 
 
107] 
 
 ^AIAnN. 
 
 IS7 
 
 Trepl TiSv TOiovTCDV ^ovXofievo'; rj ti elireiv rj aKoverai. 'AWd fiiji; 
 ^ S" o<; 6 "Zififiiai;, ovB' avrb^ e^w ottj? dTrtaTw gk je twv XeyofMevojv' 
 viro fievToi tov fieykOovi irepl wv ol \6<yoi elaiv, Koi Trjv dvOpw- 
 B "TTcvTjv acrQkveiav drifid^oiv, dvajKa^ofiai, aTnariav ert e')(eiv irap 
 i/MavToi Trepl raiv elprjfievav. Ov jjuovov 7' 6^7;, « "Zififila, 6 Xa- S 
 KpaTT)^, aWa ravrd re ev \67et?, Kal ras VTrodicret<; rdi TT/sajra?, 
 Kai, ei TTiaToi v/uv elaiv, iifica eiruTKeirrea aa^iarepov' Kal idv 
 
 needless, as I think, to insert oj-: this use 
 of the optative both in direct and indirect 
 questions is established by a number of 
 indubitable instances, and probably ought 
 to be retained in some other cases where 
 the editors introduce d'c. It seems rash 
 to assume in the face of much strong ms. 
 evidence that the old use of the optative 
 had entirely died out in Attic Greek. 
 With the present example Wohlrab com- 
 pares Euthydemus 296 E oi)/c ix<^ ^\uv ttws 
 a/iipuT^rp'oiriv. A case in direct interroga- 
 tion is Goi'gias 492 B tI t^ aKrjBelf aiax'-o" 
 KoX Ka.Ki.ov etrj; In both these passages 
 some would insert ai>; but it is not so 
 easy to dispose of cases like Aeschylus 
 Choephoroe 172 and several other passages 
 in tragedy. In Soph. Oed. Col. 170 the 
 Laurentian has Trot ns tppovrtSos i\Boi; 
 The force is very much the same as that 
 of the ' deliberative ' subjunctive ; but there 
 is a distinction closely analogous to that 
 drawn by Prof. Goodwin between ^ai' 
 yivriTai, and el y4miT0 : the optative ex- 
 presses a conception less vivid and more 
 vague. The following words rj tw vvv 
 irapovTO, are very needlessly bracketed by 
 Hirschig. 
 
 3. Ti]V dv6p(i>irCvT|V do-BcvEiav aniid- 
 Jwv] ' through distrust of human fallibili- 
 ty'. Of. 85 D. The contrast between 
 the clear-headed logician Kebes and the 
 somewhat vague-minded Simmias is well 
 brought out here. Kebes, sceptical as he 
 is, has found an argument that in his judg- 
 ment is free from flaw ; he therefore freely 
 accepts its consequences: Simmias still 
 hesitates, not because he can find any de- 
 fect in the reasoning, but rather because 
 
 the 'child in him' cannot be soothed by 
 reason. A good piece of dialectic does 
 not come home to him as to his friend. 
 Sokrates, it may be noticed, while com- 
 mending his caution, points out what it 
 ought to lead to ; not to sighing over 
 human weakness, but to a vigorous ex- 
 amination of the moSiaeii. 
 
 5. ou |i,6vov 76] 'yes, Simmias, and 
 not only so, but, besides what you have 
 just so rightly suggested, you should also, 
 however secure they may seem to you, 
 nevertheless reexamine our first premis- 
 ses'. Cope. There seems no sufficient 
 reason for ejecting TaCra re el5 X^7eir as 
 Hirschig would do : nor can Ast's TaCra 
 76 d \iym be commended, 
 
 7- o|i.(i)5 luKTKCirr^a a-a(|>E<rTcpov] I 
 have followed Schanz in accepting this 
 correction: the vulgate iiruTKeirTiai in- 
 volves an anacoluthon so harsh as to 
 amount to bad writing. 
 
 Kal edv oiToCs] 'and if you succeed 
 in analysing them satisfactorily, you will 
 follow up the reasoning, so far as it 
 is possible for man to follow; and only 
 when the result becomes perfectly plain 
 will you cease to prosecute your search '. 
 K&v tout' airb ffa^h yivijTai., i.e. if the 
 security of the iJxoWo-eis and the validity 
 of the deductions from them become plain, 
 then only you will be justified in relaxing 
 your efforts. 
 
 107 B — 114C, cc. Ivii — Ixii. Now fol- 
 lows the myth setting forth the confor- 
 mation of the earth and the fate of souls 
 in the underworld. Seeing that the soul 
 is immortal, earnest indeed should be the 
 care we bestow upon her training; for 
 
158 
 
 nAATONOS 
 
 [to; 
 
 avTOi l/capoo'i SieKrjTe, to? iyw/iac, aKoKovOrjaere to5 Xo'^a, icad' 
 taov Suvarov /j^aXierr dvOpanrm iTra/coXovdrjcrai' Kav tovto avTO 
 cra<pe^ r/evrjrai, ovSev ^TjnjcreTe TrepaiTepm. 'AXTjdrj, e^, Xe^ety. 
 
 LVII. 'AWa ToSe 7' e<j}r], w dvBpe^, hUaiov SiavorjOrjvac on, C 
 
 6 e'lirep rj ■\lrv)(rj a6dvaT0<;, ein^eKeia^ Zfj Beirai ov^ inrep tov 'X^povov 
 
 TOVTov fiovov, iv cS KoXovfLev TO ^fjv, d\X' virep tov iravTO'i, Kal 6 
 
 /ciVSwo? vvv Brj Kal So^eiev dv Beivo^ elvai, ei Ti? avTrji a/jLeXtjaei. 
 
 el (lev jdp ^v 6 ddvaro'i tov iravTO^ diraWajy, epjiaiov dv rjv toI<} 
 
 upon that will depend her happiness and 
 misery for all time. The ways of Hades 
 are many and intricate ; but the soul that 
 has studied death will find herself at home 
 there, and guided by her attendant genius 
 to the place of judgment will pass her 
 appointed sojourn in the companionship 
 of gods : but the impure will be without 
 friend or companion. To realise what 
 regions the soul enters after death, we 
 must understand the true form of the earth. 
 It is a sphere in equilibrium at the centre 
 of the heavens: the part we inhabit is 
 but a small cavity on its surface, filled with 
 the coarser sediment of air which gathers 
 in it. We have no idea that we dwell in 
 such a hollow, but fancy we are on the 
 surface and that our atmosphere is the 
 true air : but could we mount to the sur- 
 face, we should see how murky and im- 
 pure is our dwelling compared with that 
 bright region. We should see the earth's 
 surface splendid with zones of the most 
 brilliant colours, of which ours are a faint 
 image, glowing with flowers and trees and 
 precious stones, all bathed in purest aether, 
 untouched by decay : and the dwellers 
 thereon are free from age and sickness, 
 and the gods come to dwell among them. 
 There are many other hollows on the earth 
 besides ours, greater and less, having sub- 
 terranean communication; but the great- 
 est of all is called Tartaros, which is 
 pierced right through the earth from side 
 to side. From this all rivers issue forth 
 and into it they all return : and a great 
 pulse sways up and down Tartaros, carry- 
 ing with it all the air and liquid that are 
 
 therein, and it replenishes now the rivers 
 that are on one side the earth, now those 
 on the other. All the rivers fall again 
 into Tartaros at a lower point than they 
 flowed out ; but not lower than the centre, 
 from which in all directions it is an 
 ascent. Of these rivers the four greatest 
 are Okeanos, Acheron, Pyriphlegelhon, 
 and Styx, which flow in many tortuous 
 windings, some beneath the earth and 
 some on its surface. So when the souls 
 of the departed come to judgment, they 
 whose lives have been moderately good 
 proceed to Acheron and dwell there till 
 they are cleansed of any guilt that clings 
 to them ; but they whose wickedness is 
 past cure are hurled into Tartaros, whence 
 they come forth no more. All whose 
 guilt is heinous but not yet beyond reme- 
 dy dwell in Tartaros for a year, and then 
 are cast forth by one of the rivers, on 
 whose banks they meet those they have 
 wronged. Then if they can win the par- 
 don of these, they come forth and are 
 purified ; but if not, they return to Tar- 
 taros for another period; and this they 
 continue to do until they have gained 
 their pardon. But all that have lived in 
 perfect holiness ascend to the earth's true 
 surface, where they dwell henceforth in 
 bliss and purity. 
 
 6. iv If Ka\ov|Jiev to Sijv] a short ex- 
 pression for ev (f ^ffTiv 5 KoXovixev to ^v. 
 The editors quote several similar phrases: 
 Wyttenbach says he could fill a book 
 with them. 
 
 7. et Tis ovrijs dneXiJirei] ' if we mean 
 to neglect her '- 
 
107] 
 
 4>AIAnN. 
 
 159 
 
 KUKOK diroBavovcn tov re awfiaro'; a/x.' diTrfKkd')(dai koX t^? avrwv 
 KaKla<; fiera t^? a^wi^^?' vvu S' eVetSr) dddvaro'; ^aiverai, ovaa, 
 
 D ovhefiia av e'er) avTrj dWr] diroi^vyrj Kaicwv ovhe acoTTjpia irKfjv tov 
 tu? ^eXrlcTTTjv re Kal (^povijxccraT'qv '^eveadai. ovhev jap dWo 
 eypvaa eW Kihov r\ ^{rv^rj ep^erai ttXtjv t^? TratSeia? re kol rpo^rji;, s 
 a Srj Kal fieyiara Xiyerai, co(f)e\eiv rj ^XdirTeiv tov TsXevrijaavTa 
 evdv'i iv dp')(7j Trj<; eKelue iropeia'i. Xiyerat Be oyro)?, m? dpa reXef- 
 TijaavTa eKacTTOV 6 kicdaTov Bai/Mav, oairep ^covTa €lXrjj(ei, olto<; 
 ayeiv i'iri,')(eipel et? Sj; tlvu tottov, ol Bel toi)? avXXeyevTav B.a- 
 BiKacrafiivov; et? "AiBou iropeveaQai [leTO, rjye[i6vo<; melvov eS Bfj lo 
 
 E irpocneTaKTaL TOV'i ivdevBe e/cetcre Tropevaai' TV')(pvTa<; Be ixei wv 
 Bel Tvx^elv Kal fieivavTa^ ov XPV XP°^'^^ aXXo? Bevpo irdXtv rjyefiaiv 
 KOjjbi^ei ev TToXXat? ')(p6vov Kal fiaKpal<; TrepioBoi'i. eaTi Be dpa rj 
 
 I. airi]WdxSai Kol Tiis ovtuv ko- 
 kCos] a vicious soul would be well rid of 
 her vice even at the cost of her existence. 
 But in Laws 958 A death is regarded as a 
 remedy for those whom milder measures 
 will not serve : oXai Si o^'tw! kviKsKKaaixi- 
 vat [al S6Jai], Bivarov lajxa. rais ovra Sia- 
 TeBelaaii \l'vxais Siavi/wi^es. And in 
 854 c suicide is recommended to the in- 
 curable sinner as his only relief: Kal ehv 
 fiiv ffol hptavTi Tavra \(x}^i^ tl to voiTTjliO. — ■ 
 el Si jj.'q, KaWiia Bavarov o-zte^ajnepos aTroK- 
 XoTTOu TOV piov. We may perhaps regard 
 death as offering a chance of turning over 
 a new leaf. 
 
 4. oijS^v yap dWo iyfovtra} Cf. Gor- 
 gias 523 E KoX TOV KpiT-^v Sei yvfivov etvai, 
 avTrj T% tpvxV "■VT-ijv Tr/v ^uxi?" BeupovyTa 
 e^alipvTis airoBavovTos cKOLffTov, ip-qfwv ttoj/- 
 Tuv Twv iTvyy^v^v Kal KaTdXiirovTa eirl yyjs 
 iravTa iKitvov tov Koa-fiov, Xva SiKala ^ Kpl- 
 ffis 5. 
 
 8. 6 liaiiTTOv Satfiuv] Olympiodo- 
 ros denies that each soul has a distinct 
 Sal/iuiv for sundry reasons, one of which is 
 on TOV piov \vBivTos dpy-^rrec Xax^v eKel- 
 rr/s SioiKelv tov ^lov. But there can be no 
 doubt that he is wrong : cf. Republic 620 
 D iKelvQv S' ^KacTif ov etKeTo Saljxova, tov- 
 Tov j^v\aKa ^viJ,ir4/nreiv tov ^lov Kal diro- 
 irKripioTTiv twv alpeBivTUV. We have a dif- 
 ferent sort of daemonic supervision in 
 
 Politicus 274 B Tr\% tov KeKTfjpAvov Kal 
 v4fiovTos ^^as SaifAovos dTepTjfiOjd^vTes iTL- 
 yueXcias. In Timaeus 90 A, the rational 
 part of the soul is said to be a man's Sal- 
 fiav. In Laws 730 A we find a ^4vios 
 iKdffTav Sat/juiiv Kal Beos, who protects 
 strangers. 
 
 ooTrep tfivTO, €lXijx«i] In Republic 
 617 K, on the other hand, we read ovx 
 VIJ.S.S Sal/JLUV \T]^eTai, dX\' ifieis Salfiova 
 alprqiTe<rBe. But, as Olympiodoros ex- 
 plains, a Saip,oiv was assigned to the life 
 chosen by the soul, so that either phrase 
 might be used ; though where Plato is so 
 strongly insisting upon the perfect free- 
 dom of choice, he naturally selects Saijiova 
 alpeiaBai. No doubt the other was a 
 popular phrase, cf. Theokr. IV 40 a'.ai 
 Tw o'KXtjpixj fid\a Saifwvos, 8s /jie XeXoyxet- : 
 and Plato there takes the opportunity of 
 protesting against it. 
 
 10. nem ii76|i.ovos] The two -qyejioves 
 are evidently distinct from the Salp,uv, 
 whose duties seem to cease when he has 
 conveyed the soul to the place of judg- 
 ment. In 61 Sei above, the form of the 
 adverb is determined by Tois ^vXKcyivTas, 
 though in sense it belongs quite as much 
 to SiaSiKaffanivovs. 
 
 13. EV iroWats xp£vov Kal (laKpats 
 irepiiSSois] Plato does not here specify 
 the number and length of these periods : 
 
i6o 
 
 nAATXlNOS 
 
 [io8 
 
 iropeia ov^^ to? 6 Al(T)(y\dv T?;\e<^09 Xeyet" iK€tvo<; fj,ev yap anXrjv 108 
 ot/io'v <f)r]cnv et? "AtBov ^epeiv, r) S" ovre dirXr] ovre fila <f)aiveTeil 
 fioi etvat. ov^e jap av rjyeiJLovwv eBei' ov yap irov Tt<; av Bia/idpTOi 
 ovSa/j,6(re /Mid^ oBov ov<7i]<;. vvv Be eoiKe a-x^iaeii; re koi irepioBov^ 
 S TToWas ej(eLv' dirb rwv oalcov re Kal vop^ifieov Ta>v ivOdBe reK/iac- 
 pofievoi Xe7&). ^ p,ev Koafiia re Kal <pp6vt.p,o<; '<^v)(ri eireTai re ical 
 OVK dyvoel rd irapovTa' r] B' e'iri6v/u,'rjTiKw<; tov o-co/iaTO'; e^ovaa, 
 'vrrep ev tg3 efiirpocrffep elirov, irepX iiceivo ttqKvv 'X^povov iirTorj/jLevrj B 
 Kal irepl rdv oparov tottov, iroKkd avTirelpaaa Kal TToWd iraOovaa, 
 
 10 /3ia Kal fioyK vtto tov irpoareraynevov Baifiovo<i oXyerai dr/ofievr). 
 a^iKOfiivrjv Be odiirep at dXXai, rrjv fiev aKaOaprov Kal rt ireTroir)- 
 Kvlav TouovTov, fj (j)6vav dBiKcov i^/ifievr)v- rj a\\' arra TOiavra 
 elpyaa-fievrjv, d roinav dBeX<f>d re Kal dBeX<f)wv yfrir^Sv epya ri/y- 
 ')(dvei ovra, ravrrjv fiev aTra<; ^pevyei re Kal VTreKxpeirerai, Kal ovre 
 
 15 ^vvifiTTopo'; ovre -^ye/icov edeXei yiyvecrdai, avrr) Be irXavarai ev 
 Trdaj) i^ofievr) airopia, eto? dv Br) rcvef 'x^povoi yevcovrai, wv eXQov- C 
 rwv vrr dvdyKr}<i ipeperai et's r^v avrfi rrperrova'av ollKojcnv' r) Be ""^ 
 
 but in Phaedrus 248 E foil, we learn that 
 each soul must fulfil ten millennial periods, 
 except that of the philosopher, who is let 
 off with three. Cf. Pindar Olyrnp. II 68 
 oVoi S' hokit-aaav ijrpU \ iKaripwBi /lel- 
 vavTcs diro ird/nrav aSUuv Ix^iv | ^vxiHv, 
 ^TeiXav Aids oSoy irapa Kp6cou Tvpaiv. In 
 Republic 615 A we have also a x''^'^''''?' 
 TTopela, and the reason for this number is 
 assigned. Every man must be requited 
 tenfold for his good and evil deeds; and 
 calculating human life on the liberal esti- 
 mate of too years, Elato devotes 1000 to 
 his reward and punishment. The Egyp- 
 tians made the period 3000 years (Herod. 
 II 123); Empedokles goes as far as 30000 
 for a murderer, evri rts d/x7r\aK%(ri 0di'4> 
 iplXa yvta I^WV I Tpts fuv /ivplas upas ajrd 
 IMaKipui/ a.\d\ii(r$at \ yewoiitvov vavrdia 
 Sih XP^" eiSea BvrjTuv. 
 
 1. dirXiiv oljjiov] This expression 
 seems to have been proverbial. The 
 verse of Aeschylus has not been pre- 
 served. 
 
 5. diro Tuv dorCuv re Kal vo|tC)Ji(i>v] 
 'judging by the funeral offerings and 
 ordinances on earth', oirio Kal v6/ufi.a 
 
 are the offerings made in honour of the 
 departed. As these were made on the 
 shrines of Hekate at the rpioSoi, Plato 
 seems to infer by analogy that the road to 
 Hades is also forked. Cf. Gorgias 524 A 
 ovToi ovv, kvnSdv reXcvrijffoxri, SiKdaovffiv 
 EK T(f XeL/iun, ev tJ rpioStp e{ tjs (piperov 
 ruj oSciJ, 1) fjikp ets iiaKapuv v^(rovs, ^ S' els 
 riprapov. The old reading 0v<nuv is now 
 universally discarded. 
 
 7. OVK aYVOEi tA irapovTtt] Wytten- 
 bach well observes ' agnoscit earn sibi iam 
 antea meditatione mortis et philosophia 
 cognitam '. 
 
 8. oirtp ev T(y 2|iiTpoo-6«v etirov] 81 C 
 ?X/tc70i TraXi;' els tov bparov Toirov, (j>o^ip 
 TOV deiSoiis Kal "AiSou, uffrep Xiyerai, irepl 
 TO, /ivT^fmri Te Kal TOi)s ra^ous KvXivSov/i^vri. 
 Plutarch de genio Socratis § 2 2 in a curious 
 myth expands the notion of the present 
 passage : his imagery is however chiefly 
 borrowed from the Phaednis. 
 
 II. oSiircp ai aWai] so the mss. 
 Schanz adopts Cobet's oXirep. 
 
 1 5. aiiri) %k irXavarai.] ' she strays by 
 herself. 
 
I09] 
 
 4)AIAnN. 
 
 i6i 
 
 KaBapwf re KaX fierpimf rbv ^iov Ste^eXBovcra, Kal ^vvefiiropav koX 
 ijyefiovmv Oewv TV^ovcra, mKfjcrev top avrfj eKaarr) roirov irpocr- 
 rjKovra. elcrlv Se ttoWoI Kal 6avjx,aaToX Trjf y^^ tottoi, Kal avrr} 
 oiire oia ovre oar} Bo^d^erai inro rcav irepl 7^? elcodorcov Xeyeiv, w? 
 iyoo viro Ttvoi ireireia-fiai,. 5 
 
 I* LVIII. Kal 6 "Zi/M/ilai;, IltS? ravra, e(jyr], XeyeK, w Sa)«/3aT69 ; 
 Trepl yap rot yrj^ Kal avTOi ttoXXo, Sj) dKrjKoa, ov fikvToi ravra a ae 
 Treidei' ^JSew? ovv av aKovaaifii. 'AXXd fievroi, m "Siififiia, ov'^l 
 TXavKov Texvi] ye fioi SoKel elvai Biijy^a-aa-dao & y icrriv' m 
 fievTOi dXrjdrj, ■^aXeirooTepov /loi (fsaiverat rj Kara TrjV TXavKOV 10 
 rt')(v'r]v, Kal afia /lev iya> 'icmi ovS' av ol6<s re e'liTjv, cifia Be, el Kal 
 •iJTriaTd/jiTjv, 6 ^lo<; fiot BoKei 6 e/id?, m "Zififiia, t& fiijKei rov Xoyov 
 E ovK i^apKet. rrjv fievroi IBeav rrj^ yrj<s, o'lav irkrreva-yi.ai elvai, Kal 
 rov<i Toirovi avr-fj^ ovBev fie KcoXvei Xeyeiv. 'AW' 6^17 6 'Zififila'! 
 Kal ravra dpKel. TlerreKT/Mai roivvv, rj B' 'i<s, eyci, cof irpcSrov fiev, 15 
 et ecrriv ev fie<ra> rm ovpavm rrepi^eprit ovaa, /irjBev airy Belv p/rjre 
 109 aejoo? tt/oo? to /irj Tre<relv fii^re aXXr)^ dvdyK7)<s fir]Beftid<s roiavrr]^, 
 dXXd iKavTJv elvai avrrjv i<r')^eiv rrjv ofioiorrjra rov ovpavov avrov 
 
 4. otiTc oirr\ Sa|dJcTai] i.e. not so 
 small as is supposed : cf. 83 B oiSiv rocr- 
 ovTop KaKov eiradev, and Sophist 2 1 7 E. 
 
 5. viro Tivos ir^ireurjioi.] Some think 
 that Anaximandros is meant, because he 
 first made a map of the world. But there 
 is no evidence that his description of it 
 had anything in common with Plato's; 
 and it seems very doubtful " whether a 
 reference to any definite person is intended. 
 Plato is fond of giving an air of antiquity 
 to his fables by referring them to some 
 supposititious author; e.g. the At7U7rTios 
 \iyyo% in JfAaedrus 274 c, and the legen- 
 dary war between Athens and Atlantis, 
 Timaeus 24. Wagner strangely takes rixis 
 to be neuter. 
 
 8. o4x^ rXavKov T^VT]] The origin 
 of this proverb is obscure. Wohlrab 
 supposes that the sea-god Glaukos is 
 meant, the patron of sailors. None of 
 the ancient authorities however take this 
 view, but oscillate between various arti- 
 ficers bearing this name ; the most distin- 
 guished of whom seems to have been 
 
 P. 
 
 Glaukos of Chios, mentioned by Herodo- 
 tus (I 2s)i who invented the art of solder- 
 ing metal. The diverse theories will be 
 found in Heindorf's note. 
 
 12. |i.oi SoKct] see on 77 A. 
 
 18. TT|V 6|ioioTT|Ta Tov ojpavov] 
 Plato's assumption is that the earth has 
 no natural tendency to move in any one 
 direction ; and the substance of the uni- 
 verse, being homogeneous, offers it no 
 inducement to move this way or that : 
 were the surrounding mass of various 
 density in different parts, the earth might 
 move in the direction where the least 
 resistance was offered ; as it is, it remains 
 poised in the centre of a uniform mass. 
 It must be observed that Plato is putting 
 this forward, not to show that the earth 
 must necessarily abide in the centre, but 
 that there is no reason why it should not. 
 A similar theory is attributed to Anaxi- 
 mandros by Aristotle de caelo 11 xiii 1^^ 
 1 1 fiffi Si Tives ot Si& Tijv o/ioioTTfra ifiaaa/ 
 o^V li^vav, wavep twv &pxalav 6 'Ava^l- 
 /iavSpor juSXXoi' /xiv yap oiBh dvu rj Kara 
 
 II 
 
1 62 HAATflNOS [109 
 
 eavTw travrri koI ttjv 77? aVTrji; rrjv la-oppoirlav' laoppotrov yap 
 irpdyfia ofioiov r/ro? iv jiiatp reOev oi);\; e^ei frnWov ovS' yrrov 
 ovBafioae Kkidrjvat, 6fioi(o<: S' ^^(pv d.KXive<; ptevet. irpooTOV fiev, rj 
 S' 05, TOVTO TreTreicTfiai,. Kat 6pda><i rye, 6^17 6 Xtfifiiai;. "En toivvv, 
 
 5 e<pr], Triififieya, ri eivat avTo, Koi ^fid<; olKeiv Toi)? p-e'^^pt 'UpaKXeiav 
 CTTJjXcSi' dirb ^ouTiSoi; iv a-fiiKpm rivi jJ,opLa>, mairep irepX reX/ia B 
 fivpp,7]Ka<; rj ^aTpax^ov<;, Trepl rrjv QaXaTjav oIkovvto^, koi aX\ov<} 
 aWoOi TToXXoi)? iv TToWot? TOtovVoi? tottok oiKeiv. elvai yap 
 iravTayjj trepl ttjv yijv TToXKa Kol\a Kal "TravTohaira Kal rav lSea<i 
 
 10 Kal TO, /ieye07f, eh a ^vveppvrjKevai to re i/Swp Kal rijv o/iixXrjv koI 
 Tov aepa' avrrjv Be rrjv yijv KaOapdv iv KaOapm Keladai tw ovpavai, 
 iv (pirep icnl ra acyrpa, ov hrj alOepa ovofid^eiv roii^ ttoWov? t<bi/ C 
 irepi Ta roiavra eloaOorav XeyetV ov Srj VTTocrTadfJ-rjv ravra elvat 
 Kai ^vppeiv aei et? ra KoTXa rfj<i yrj<i. i^fidv ovv oIkovvtu^ iv rot? 
 
 15 KoiXoi,'; avrrjv XeXrjOevai Kal o'ieaOai dva i-jrl r^y 7^? oIkcIv, Syairep. 
 av et T4? iv fieacp ra) 7rvd/j,evi tov ireXdyow; oIkwv o'Ioito re iirl Trj<; 
 6aXdTTri<} oiKeiv Kal Bid tov SBaro^ opdSv tov tjXiov Kal Ta dXXa 
 darpa ttjv OdXarrav rjyobTO ovpavbv elvai, Bid Be ^paBvrrJTd re Kal 
 dadeveiav p.rjBeirw'Trore eVi rd dxpa rrj^ 6dXdTT7j<; d^i,yp,evo<; fiijBe D 
 
 20 eeopaKco<; eir), e/cSu? Kal dvaKV'^a'; e« t^9 daXdrTT]'; eh tov ivOdBe 
 TOTTOv, oacp Kadapoorepo'i Kal KoXXimv Tvy)(avei, atv tov wapd (r(f>iai, 
 IJ,r]Be dXXov darfKOw; e'lr) tov empaKoro';. ravrov Brj tovto kuI rj/iai; 
 •jreTTOvOevai' oiKOVvTat yap ev rivi KoiXm t^? 7779 oiea-ffai iirdvo) 
 avTrj<i oiKelv, Kal tov depa ovpavov KaXeiv, w? Bid to^tov ovpavov 
 
 rj eU rh, TrXrf^to <j>ipeis6ai irpotrriKec to iirl are of course cut off from all communica- 
 
 Tov iiAatf ISpviiivov Kal o/iolus irphi ra tion with their inhabitants, ^s well as 
 
 ^(TXara ?X'^''> ^A"* ^' ASifarov eh ravavrla with the dwellers on the true surface. 
 
 iroietaffai rijp Kivriaiv uitt' i^ hiayK-rii Evidently Plato's estimate of the earth's 
 
 lUvav. Compare Timaeus 61 E el yap dimensions was immense. 
 Ti Kal (TTepebv etri Kara fUrov roO vavTos it. aiTT)V 8i niv Ytjv] i.e. the real 
 
 laoTaXh, els oidiv av rore TiSy iax^^i^" surface of the earth, as distinguished 
 
 ivex^ei'^ 5tA Ti^y iravTTj 6/j.oi6Tr,Ta avTuv : from the hollows. 
 
 the theory of the Itmaeus is however 13. o5 Sij •u7roorTd6|ir)v] i.e. our at- 
 
 different. mosphere is the sediment of aether, which 
 
 6. iv <r|iiKp^ Tivi itopCu] We are collects in the depressions on the earth's 
 
 conceived as inhabiting a depression or surface. TavTa=vSup koI o/dxKiiv Kalaipa. 
 cavity scooped out of the earth's surface, 24. tov dipa, ovpaviv KoXctv] We 
 
 small and shallow when compared with are in the same plight as the supposed- 
 
 the extent and mass of the earth; but dwellers at the bottom of the sea; who,, 
 
 still wide and deep enough to prevent us looking up through the water at the stars, 
 
 from ever scaling its sides. Many other would fancy that the^ sea above them was 
 
 such hollows exist on fhe earth, but we the heaven : so we, looking up through 
 
no] 
 
 ^AIAflN. 
 
 163 
 
 ovTOf Ta darpa j^copovvra' to Bk [elvat ravrov,] v'rr a<r6eveia'i ical 
 E ^paSvTT]To<! oi5^ OLOVi re etvai riiJ,a<; hie^ekdeiv eV ecr'xarov rbv 
 aepa' eirel, el ti<; avrov eir dxpa e\0oi rj tttj/vo? yevo/xevoi dva- 
 •JTTOiTo, KUTiBeiv dvaKv^fravTa, wairep evOdhe 01 eK t^? daXaTTT]? 
 f)(6ve<; dvaKV7rT0VTe<; opwcn to, evddSe, oiJts)? dv riva koX to, eKel 5 
 KariBelv, Koi el ^ ^i/<rt? iKavfj eirj dvi'^eaQai dewpovaa, lypcopai av 
 110 OTI e/eewo? ecTTiv 6 d\r)6(S'; ovpavo<; kuX to d\r]d&<i ^w? koX r) w? 
 aXTjOaJi '^rj. r)Se (lev yap ■^ yjj Kal oi \idoi Kal airaf 6 t6ito<s 6 
 evOdSe Sie<j)dap/ieva iffrlv Kal KaTa^e^pmfieva, &airep rd iv t§ 
 OaXdrry v'tto t^5 d\fji,r}<!, Kal ovre <f)veTac ovSev d^iov \6yov iv ry 10 
 OaXd-TTrj, oiire TeXeiov, m? ctto? elrrelv, ovBev iari, arjpayye<i he Kal 
 a.fifio'i Kal iri]X6<} dfiij'^avoi Kal ^op^opoi ela-iv, ottov av Kal yfj 
 y, Kai TT/ao? Ta Trap' rjfitv KdXSjrj Kpiveaffai ov8' ottwcttlovv a^ia' 
 eKelva Be ad rwv trap rjpZv irokv dv en irXeov (fiavelij Bia(})epecv. 
 B et yap Bel Kal pAjQov \eyeiv, d^iov aKovcrai, m ^inixla, ola Tvyx/ivei 15 
 Ta iirl T^9 7^5 WTTo Ta5 ovpavm ovra. 'AWd fjurjv, e^rj 6 Ai/J'P'iai;, w 
 XcoKparei, vp.ei'i ye tovtov tov fwOov jJSew? dv dKovaaifiev. 
 
 LIX. Aeyerai toivvv, e<f>r}, a eralpe, irpwrov fiev elvat Toiavrr) 
 17 yrj avTrj IBelv, et Tt9 dvtodev demro, mairep at BcoBeKaaKvroi. 
 
 the air, fancy it is that wherein the stars 
 move, and that the air is heaven. 
 
 I. - TO S^ [(tvai TavTov] No satisfac- 
 tory defence of the words etvai rairbv has 
 been made : nor is Heindorf's to S' tXvai 
 ToiovTov attractive. Hermann, after Bai- 
 ter, reads to Sk Seivdrarov : but there is 
 no special aptness in this. Hirschig sug- 
 gests rah-iov, but I think Schanz, follow- 
 ing Riickert.-is right in bracketing elcwi 
 To^ov and retaining to S4, which is 
 exactly the connecting link we want : 
 ' but the truth is that '. to Si occurs in 
 this sense Tkeaetetus 157 A, Sophist 244 A, 
 Laws 642 A, 967 A, Meno 97 C, &c. flrat 
 Tairoii might be the insertion of a copyist 
 who did not understand the idiom. 
 
 3. et Tis ouTou] i.e. if we could 
 either climb the sides of the hollow in 
 which we dwell, or fly up through the air 
 to its surface and peep up, as fishes do 
 out of the sea. 
 
 4. KariSctv avaKvi|>aVTa] Most edi- 
 tors have OK avaKi\j/avTa, but av is want- 
 
 ing in the mss. It could, it is true, easily 
 have fallen out in that position; but 
 since KaTiSetv is presently repeated with 
 dv, it seems to me hardly necessary to 
 insert the particle here. 
 
 12. oirov ttv Kal yij ^] Schanr retains 
 ■q yrj vrith the best mss. But the meaning 
 is, whenever any earth is present in the 
 sea, the result is pSp^opot. 
 
 15. A ydp 8«i Kal |iv6ov X^eiv] After 
 this some mss. and editions have the 
 pointless addition KoXdv : the word how- 
 ever is absent in the Bodleian and other 
 mss. and is certainly to be omitted. 
 
 19. (Sinrep at SuSeKdo-Kvroi (r<f>atpai] 
 The number twelve refers to the twelve 
 signs of the zodiac, as is clear from 7j- 
 ntaeus 55 C h-i Si oSirris ^varrdireas yuias 
 TrifiTT7}S, iirl TO irav 6 deos airy Karexp^- 
 fftiTO iKcivo SLa^tijypa^uv : *and whereas 
 there remained yet a fifth figure, God 
 used it as a model for the universe in 
 describing its signs'. The iriiiirTi/) Irfirra- 
 (Tis was the dodecahedron: cf. Timaeus 
 
 II — 2 
 
1 64 HAATflNOS [no 
 
 <T<f)aipat, ttoiklXj}, ^pcofiacnv Siec\7]fj,fievi], tov km ra evBaBe eivai 
 Xpoofiara Sa-irep Seiyfjiara, oU Brj ol 'Ypa(f)ei'; Kara'x^pwvTai,' e/cet C 
 Se Traaav rrjv fyrjv eK roiovraiv elvai, kol ttoXv btl eK Xap-irpoTepeav 
 Kal KaOapcoTepmv rj tovtcov' ttjv fiev yap aXovpyfj elvai koX 6av- 
 5 fiaaTrjv rb KtiWo?, rrjv Be 'X^pveroeiSr} , rrjv Bk octt) \evKrj yvyjrov 
 fj ')^i6vo<; XevKorepav, Kol ix rwv aXKwv '^pw/jidrav a-vyKei/iivriv 
 wcravTco^, koX eVt irKeiovcov Kal KaXXiovcov rj '6aa '^/j,ei<; imptzKafiev. 
 Kal yap avrd ravra to, KoTXa avTrj<! vBaTOt re Kal depo<; eKifKea 
 bvra, ')(^pc6fj,aT6<! rt etSo? irapejfeaQai ffrtX^ovra iv ry rwv aXXcov D 
 
 10 ■^pio/u.aTayv voiKiKia, Scrre ev Ti avT^? etSo? <TVve')(e<! iroiKtKov 
 <f)avrd^e(76ai. ev Be raiiTrj ovar) Toiavry dva \6yov rd <f)v6fieva 
 (jivecrOai,, BevBpa re Kal av0rj Kal toi)? Kap7rov<;' Kal av rd opr) 
 cocravTco^ Kal toi)? XlOov; e'y^eiv dvd tov avrov Xoyov T-qv re 
 XeioTTjra Kal rrjv Bia^dveiav Kal rd 'x^pci/juara KaWim' mv Kal rd 
 
 IS evddhe XidiBia elvai, ravra rd dr/aTreofieva fiopia, adpBid re Kal 
 Idcj-TTiBa^ Kal (TfiapdryBovi Kal irdvra rd roiavra' exel Be ovBev 8 E 
 Tt ov roiovrov elvai Kal en rovrmv KaXXlco. rb S' atriov rovrov 
 elvai, on eKelvoi ol Xidoi elcrl KaOapol Kal ov KareBTjBea-fievoi ovBe 
 Biecj)0apfievoi Scrrrep ol evddBe vvb (TTjireBovo's Kal aXfi7]<; [iJtto] rwv 
 
 Locrus 98 E ro ik SaSticaeSpov eUova tov observer viewing the earth from above 
 
 TtavTOi iaraaaTO, iyyiara, o^alpas iov. even such hollows as that wherein we 
 
 The last words, ^yiara cr^aipas iov, axe dwell would appear as patches of colour, 
 
 a foolish addition by the compiler of the iridescent we may suppose ; so that the 
 
 Timaeas Locrus: for the dodecahedron many-coloured surface would not be 
 
 has nothing to do with the shape of the marred by any blots of obscurity, o-wex^s 
 
 universe, which is a perfect sphere mo- is regarded by Heindorf and others as 
 
 delled after the image of the airra fyoc : adverbial : perhaps however we might 
 
 it merely affords the type for the duo- treat elSos ffwexh as practically one word, 
 
 denary division of the zodiac. In the which is qualified by irmKlXov. 
 present passage the daSeKoa-KiiTos ff^aipa, 15. Tavra rd d-yairiilifva] 'the stones 
 
 a ball covered with patches of leather that here are so much prized'. For this 
 
 variously coloured, is used to represent sense of dyawSv compare Politicus 286 D 
 
 not only the twelve signs, but also the dcvrepov oKK 06 irpuTOV \byoi iyaTon 
 
 variegated surface of the earth. A great itapayyiWei. 
 
 store of erudition on the virtues of the fp. virh <rr|TreS6vos Kal aX|i.r|$] If 
 
 number twelve is to be found in Wytten- the common reading is genuine, we must 
 
 bach's note. translate : ' marred by the corruption and 
 
 8. Ka'i 7dp avrd raJra] ' even these brine produced by the sediment that has 
 
 very hollows, being full of water and of gathered here'. But the repetition of 
 
 air, display a kind of colour that gleams vvo before twv SeSpo ^meppviiKin-uv is 
 
 amid the dazzling diversity of the rest ; rather awkward. Schanz brackets vwb 
 
 so that the earth's form appears as one (rrjTreSovos Kal a\itris as a gloss upon iwo 
 
 unbroken surface of varied hues '. To an tOv Sevpo ^vvcppvriKOTuiv. Heindorf inserts 
 
ill] 
 
 ^AIAfiN. 
 
 i6s 
 
 Sevpo ^vveppvrjKOToov, a koI XIOok ical yfj koI toi9 aWot? fmot? 
 Te Kal tfivroK ai<r')(7) re xal v6<7ov^ irapi'X^ei. ttjv Be yijv ainrjv 
 KeKocTfirjcOai roiroi'i re Hiraai, Kal en 'x^pvcrtp km dp^vpo) koX 
 Jll TOt? aX\oi9 aiJ to(? roiovroL<;. eK(^avri yap avra 7Te(f>VKivai, ovra 
 iroKXa rrX'qOei Kai fieydXa Kal TroXXop^oO t^? yrjv, ware avrrjv IZelv 5 
 elvai Oeafia evBaifiovav Bearaiv. ^aa S' eV avry elvat dXKa re 
 •TroXKd. Kal dvdpd>'irov<s, rov<! fiev iv fieaoyaia olKovvra<;, toi)? Se 
 irepl rov depa, ma-jrep rip-elf irepl ttjv Odkarrav, toi)? S' iv vrjaoii; 
 a<s rrepippelv rov depa ■7rpd<; ry rjTreip^ ovaa'i Kal evl X07&), Trap^ 
 rjfuv rb SSmp re Kal rj OdXarrd icrri 7rpb<s rrjv rifierepav ^petai/, 10 
 B rovro eKel rov depa, o Se rjiuv dr)p, eKeivoi'i rov aiOepa. rd<; Sk 
 clipa<i avrrj<s Kpatriv e'X^eiv roiaiirr)v, ware eKeivov^ dvoaou? elvai 
 Kal 'X^povov re ^rjv ttoXu "TrXeico rwv evOdhe, Kal o^jrei Kal dKorj 
 Kol ippovrjaei Kal traai rot? roiovroi<; rjfiwv d(peardvai ry avrfj 
 diroardaei, ^irep aijp re vSaro^ a^earrjKev Kal aldrjp depo<; rrpcK 15 
 Kadaportfra. Kai Srj Kal 6ewv dXar] re Kal lepd avroc<; elvat, iv 
 
 Te after the second iva, and Stallbaum 
 substitutes aird. I have followed the 
 suggestion of Wyttenbach in bracketing 
 the second Oiro only. 
 
 4. cK<f>avTJ 7op] they are exposed to 
 view on the surface, not, as with us, 
 hidden in mines. 
 
 7. Tois 8^ irepl rdv aipa] i.e. round 
 the edges of the hollows, which are filled 
 with air. Others again dwell on islands 
 amid the aerial ocean, their bases plunged 
 beneath the air but their surfaces encom- 
 passed with aether. 
 
 11. aijp] The article is wanting in 
 the mss. and supplied by Bekker. I 
 have, on the suggestion of Schanz, written 
 it as a crasis. 
 
 12. Kpao-iv ?X"''' Toia^JTTjv] Compare 
 the description of the climate of ancient 
 Attica, Timaeus 24 c, where Athene 
 chooses the site of her city rfiv eixpaffiav 
 Tuv dpiSv iv avrQ KaTiSou<Ta, Stl (pponiia- 
 TOTovs dvdpas otaot. 
 
 13. oi|/« Kal dKoj Kal (|>povi{a-ei] 
 This reading has the all but unanimous 
 support of the mss. Heindorf with one 
 ms. reads 6<r^p^<rei for <l>povriati, saying 
 'ingenii praestantiam non sane tarn 
 
 obiter uno verbo memorasset Plato, nee 
 post <t>povi](Teui mentionem addidisset haec 
 Kal iraiTL rots toioi>tois'. These arguments 
 do not seem very cogent ; and it is hardly 
 credible that Plato should have omitted 
 to ascribe superior (ppourjins to his dwellers 
 in aether. Schanz justly compares Repub- 
 lic 367 C oXmi opal' OKoveiv (ppoveiv. In 
 fact o\j/ei, Kal dKO§ stand for alaBi)aei. ' In 
 sight, hearing, and intelligence [i.e. both 
 in bodily and mental power] they' excel 
 us in the same proportion as air excels 
 water and aether air in purity'. Z. adopts 
 dff^/Oiiiret. 
 
 16. iv ols Tu ovTt otKt]Tas BeoiJS 
 elvai] i.e. in these temples is the very 
 presence of the gods themselves ; whereas 
 we have but their statues. 'And they 
 had groves and temples of the gods, 
 wherein the gods in very truth were 
 dwellers, and voices and prophecies and 
 visions of them, and of this kind was 
 their communion with them, face to 
 face'. TotouVas = personal communion. 
 airoh Trpos airois should be taken in 
 the most emphatic sense, literally 'the 
 people themselves with the gods them- 
 selves'. 
 
166 HAATflNOS [m 
 
 oh To5 ovTi ottcrjTa'i deov<s elvac, KaX <j)')]fiav re xal fiainela^ Kal 
 aladrjo'eii} rwv 6ewv koI Totaura? trvvovcria^ yl/yveerdai avToi<; tt/jo? C 
 avTov<i' Koi Tov 76 rf^iov koX aeKrjvqv KaX aarpa opaaOai vif 
 avToSv ola Tvyx^dvec ovra, teal rijp aWrjv evSatfiovlav tovtwv cLko- 
 S \ov6ov elvai. 
 
 LX. K.al oXrjv fiev hr) rrjv fyrjv ovrco ire<j)VKevai Kal rd irepl 
 TrjV yrjv' tottous S' iv avrrj elvat, Kara to eyKOiXa avTrji; KVK\a» 
 •Kepi 'oKr}v ttoWov?, tovv fiev ^aOvTepovi; Kal dvaTreinafievovv 
 fiaXXov fj iv m rj^iei'i otKOVfiev, toi)s Be jSaOvTepovi ovTa<; to ^(cutijm 
 
 10 avT&v eXaTTov exeiv tov trap rjiilv tottov, eari S' ov? Kal fipa- 
 ■yvrepov; Tm 0ddei tov ivdaSe elpai Kal irXaTVTepovi' tovtovs Se D 
 iravTaf; viro yrjv eh dWijKovi avvTeTprjaOal re TroWaj^^ Kal KaTci 
 aTevoTepa Kal evpvTepa, Kal Bt,e^6Sov<; e'xetv, y iroXi) fiev {iBap 
 peiv i^ dWrjXcov eh dW^Xovi Sa-irep eh KpaTfjpa<;, Kal devdmv 
 
 15 TTOTafiwv dfj.^'x^ava /jieyeOr] viro ttjv yrjv Kal depfiav vBaTtov Kal 
 ■^v^poSv, iroXij Be irvp Kal wpot /ieyd'\ov<} iroTa/iov<;, ttoWov? Be 
 vypov irrfKov Kal KadapooTepov Kal ^op^opeoBeaTepov, &a-7rep iv 
 XiKeXia 01 irpb tov pvaKo<i irrfKov peovrei iroTafiol Kal avTO<; 6 E 
 pva^. mv Brj Kal eKd<TTOv<i Toi)? tottov; irXrjpovaQai, w? av eKa- 
 
 20 aToi'i TV'Xrj eicdaTOTe r/ irepipporj yiyvofiivr]. TavTa Be iravTa 
 Kivecv ava> Kal Kara) Sairep almpav Tivd ivovaav iv Trj yy' eaTt Be 
 dpa avTTi rj aldpa Bid ^vaiv ToidvSe Tivd. ev Ti twv ■x^aa/idrcov 
 
 9. ri \aT\i.a avrflv] There is a subterranean channels, lis ai» is Stall- 
 slight anacoluthon ; the regular construe- baum's correction for uy av, which Z. 
 tion would be txovrai. For airSm B D E retains. 
 
 give a&ravs, which Wyttenbach illus- 21. ^inrcp alupav] ' all these are moved 
 
 trates by Xen. Cyrop. I iii 13 irapa.ao)im, backwards and forvifards by a kind of 
 
 or^aBSiv linriuiv KpaTKTTOS ur lirireis av/i/M- oscillation which exists in the earth '. 
 
 X^Tv airif. There is no lack of instances aliSipa properly signifies a seesaw move- 
 
 of a redundant pronoun, but the effect ment, like that of a pair of scales equally 
 
 here is harsh. Schanz reads rb airOiv balanced. It is the name given to a kind 
 
 xdcf'a, Heindorf to xofc/"! airSii', which of gymnastic machine like a swing. By 
 
 latter I have adopted, as being nearly the force of this aliipa the volume of air 
 
 identical with the reading of c, to \aiTiJ,a and fluid in Tartaros is perpetually sway- 
 
 aiirim. ing to and fro like a pendulum. When 
 
 19. i3v 81) Kol iKao-TOvs ToOs T^iroDs] the mass which is axu surges towards the 
 
 ' wherewith each of the places is filled in centre, the mass that is Karu is necessarily 
 
 turn as the stream in its course round driven towards the extremity: then the 
 
 chances each time to reach it ' Cope. latter in its turn recoils towards the 
 
 The stream, when replenished by the centre and forces the former towards the 
 
 aluipa presently to be mentioned, makes opposite extremity. 
 a circuit of these hollows through the 
 
112] <i>AiAnN. 167 
 
 Ttj<} 77? aX\,a)<s T6 /jbeyiarov rvyxafet 6v Kol Sta/i7repe? Tefprjfiivov 
 112 Bt oXtj? t^? 7^?, TovTO 07re/)"0^ij/30? elire, Xeyeov avro 
 
 TrjXe fiaX' r/;)^i ^dOia-rov vtto ■x^dovot icrri ^epeOpou' 
 
 b Kal ciWodi Kal e/ceivo? koI aXXoi ttoWoI twv itoitjtcov TdpTapov 
 K6K\,rjKa(7iv. et? yap tovto to 'x^off/ia arvppeova-l re Traz/re? oc 5 
 irorafiol ical ex tovtov iroKiv eicpeovaiv' ylr/vovTai Be eKacrrot 
 TotovToi ot oiat av Kal T75 7^9 pecocnv. rj Be alria iarlv tov 
 
 B eKpelv re evrevdev Kal elcrpeiv irdvTa rd pevfiara, oti, TTvOfLeva 
 ovK ejfeb ovBe ^aaiv to vypov tovto. almpeirai Btj Kal KV/Maivev 
 av(o Kal KaTco, Kal 6 drjp Kal to irvev/Ma to irepl avTo TavTov "Kotec 10 
 ^vveireTai yap avTm Kal OTav eh to eireKeiva t^s 7'^s opfirja-r] Kal 
 OTav et9 TO eirl TaBe, Kal acmep twv dvairveovTcov del eKirvel re 
 Kau avairvel peov to irvevfia, ovtco Kal eKel ^vvaieopov/jbevov tw vypS 
 TO TTvevfia Beivov<i Tiva^; dvefiov^ Kal d/irj^^dvovi irapi'X^eTai, Kal 
 
 C et,(7iov Kai e^iov. OTav re ovv VTro')((aprjcrri to iiBcop eh tov tottov 15 
 
 I. Siafiircpis TETpr)|ji.^vov] Tartaros 
 differs from all the other ^mCKa, not only 
 in its far greater magnitude, but in being 
 pierced right through the earth from end 
 to end ; whereas the rest are merely de- 
 pressions more or less deep. The physi- 
 cal theory of the present passage is simple 
 enough. Let us suppose for the sake of 
 clearness that Tartaros is a chasm pierced 
 from the north to the south pole ; and let 
 us concede so much to popular usage as 
 to call one hemisphere, say the northern, 
 6.vti> and the other k&tu. For each of 
 these hemispheres the centre of the earth 
 is the lowest point, towards which all 
 things gravitate. Out of Tartaros ramify 
 a number of channels in all directions 
 through the earth, some reaching to the 
 surface, some subterranean throughout 
 their whole length. Now the aliipa puls- 
 ing up and down Tartaros carries with it 
 all the fluid that is therein ; and when it 
 rushes northwards, it forces the liquid into 
 the channels of the northern hemisphere ; 
 then returning southward it fills those in 
 the southern. Thus the stream' is vio- 
 lently impelled through the channel by 
 the force of the alwpa: but when this 
 
 force is spent, it obeys the law of gravita- 
 tion and makes its way back to Tartaros 
 at a lower level than that whence it started. 
 It can however never pass beyond the 
 centre, since that is the absolutely lowest 
 point from whatever direction it is ap- 
 pToached, and an ascent from it would be 
 contrary to the force of gravitation. 
 
 2. Sirsp "0)i.T]po$ eIite] Ih'aii via 14: 
 of. viii 481. 
 
 8. on irv6|Uva ovK ^ei] The cause 
 of the aldpa is that there is no bottom or 
 foundation on which the liquid mass can 
 rest. Were there a solid platform at the 
 centre of the earth, the fluid on either side 
 would settle there and remain stationary. 
 Of this passage a doubtfully accurate state- 
 ment and a certainly unfair criticism is 
 made by Aristotle meteorologica 11 ii ssji^ 
 32 foil., cf. I 349'> 28. Plato's doctrine of 
 gravitation, which is incomparably more 
 scientific,' than anything to be found in 
 Aristotle on that subject, is very clearly 
 expounded in Timaeus 62 c — 63 E. 
 
 15. OTav Tt oSv viro\ap^tr(\] Many 
 editions, including Z. and St., have op/jirj- 
 cav after ovv : but since it is absent from 
 the best mss. I have omitted it. 
 
1 68 
 
 HAATilNOS 
 
 [lI2 
 
 Tov Si) KUTm KaXov/jLevov, [toI';'\ kwt eKeiva to, pevfiara Sia rf}<s 
 7V? elirpet re KaX irXripol avTo. &<T'irep ol iiravrXovvre^' orav re av 
 eKeWev fiev diroXiirrf, Sevpo Bk op/irja-r), rd, evddSe irXr/pol av6i<;, 
 ra 8e ifK'qpmdevTa pet hid rmv o^er&v koI Sid t^? yr}<;, Koi et? 
 
 5 Toiji} TOTTOf? eKoara d<j>iKvovfieva, eh oi)s eicd<rTov<s oSoiroieirai, 
 OdKaTTa's re koi \i[iva<i Kal iroTa/iov<s koi Kprjva<i iroiet' evrevOev 
 Se irdXiv Svofieva /card rr}^ yrj^, rd fiev fiaKporipov; tottov? rrepi- D 
 eXBovra koi ifkelov;, rd he ekdrrov^ Koi fipa'xyrepov<;, nrdXiv eh 
 rov Tdprapov e/i^dWei, rd fiev ttoXv Karcorepto rj eTrrjvrXeiro, rd 
 
 10 Be oXlyov' ' irdvra Be viroKareo eicrpei rr}^ eKpofjt;. koI evia fiev 
 KaravriKpi) rj elapel e^eireaev, evia Bk Kara ro avro /iepo<;' earn 
 
 I. t6v Si^ KdTo) KaXov|i,cvov] Plato 
 considers the expression incorrect, as is 
 indicated by 5^. Cf. Timaeus 62 c 0i5(7e4 
 7&/3 5i5 Ttvaff jiyKov^ Sio etvat Si€i\T]^)6ras 
 Sixv ■'■^ "■"'' ivavrlovs, rhv fiiv xcEru, irpos 
 Of ^ipcTM irAvS' 8(ra Tixa aiijxaroi 6yKov 
 ^X«i TOP Si OKU, irpos ov amvirlas Ipxerai 
 irdvj ovK opdov ovSaii'Q vofd^eLv. For some 
 very curious reasoning on the other side 
 see Aristotle de caelo 11 ii 284'' 6 foil. 
 
 [tois] kot cKcIva to, pevfiara] If 
 the text is sound we must translate 'it 
 (to vSoip) flows into the parts about those 
 streams' ; unless with Prof. Geddes we 
 take TOIS as an instrumental dative, which 
 is hardly probable. But either way the 
 phrase is a singularly awkward one and 
 can scarcely, I think, have been written 
 by Plato; though H. Schmidt defends it, 
 translating ' das zu jenen Stromen Geho- 
 rende '. Madvig's il<T<t>pet, which Schanz 
 adopts, leaves the sentence as clumsy as 
 before. Wyttenbach reads totc for rots, 
 which may be right : Ast brackets tois. 
 Mr Cope translates ' it flows through the 
 earth to the neighbourhood of those 
 streams and fills them, as it were by a 
 pump '. But surely 841I t^s 7^5 describes 
 the progress of the water after it has en- 
 tered the channels: it would be a strange 
 expression to apply to its surging up and 
 down Tarlaros. 
 
 3. rd 4v9a8e] i.e. the rivers in our 
 hemisphere. We are regarded as living 
 
 in the 'upper' hemisphere: and so said 
 the Pythagoreans, cf. Aristotle de caelo 
 1%^ 21. Aristotle himself said our hemi- 
 sphere was the lower : to Plato of course 
 the distinction is meaningless. 
 
 9. 4iri]VTX6iTo] i.e. were pumped into 
 the charmels : it is needless to read i^- 
 TjPTXeiTo with Heindorf. 
 
 1 1 . KaravTiKpi •g cUrpet] i.e. Karavn- 
 Kpi T^s x'^P"'^ V el(r/)er. This seems to 
 mean that a stream which issued forth 
 from Tartaros, say in an easterly direction, 
 may, by a circuit of the earth, re-enter it 
 on the western side. Aristotle's version 
 of this {meteorolo^a 356=9) is ra hk narav- 
 TiKpii tS 64<7ei T'^s iKporjs, ofoc et fictp ^p^arro 
 K&TuBev, dv(i)8ei> ixpiXKeiv. This is usually 
 regarded as a misstatement on Aristotle's 
 part: but H. Schmidt {krit. Comm. 11 
 107 foil.) ingeniously endeavours to recon- 
 cile it with Plato's words. He lays stress 
 on the fact that Aristotle says, not ai/w 
 and (cdru, but Sviaffev and KdraSev; and 
 he explains it thus. A river may issue 
 from Tartaros in the southern hemisphere 
 and in the course of its wanderings pass 
 into the northern, finally discharging itself 
 into the very centre of Tartaros. Thus 
 after rising in the southern hemisphere 
 {KdroiBev) it enters Tartaros from the side 
 of the northern {dvaBev) ; but since it dis- 
 charges itself at the centre, it has not vio- 
 lated the law /tt^xP' '''•'' /"^fou KaBUvai, 
 iripa, S' ov. The weak point in the expla- 
 
"3] 
 
 ^AIAHN. 
 
 169 
 
 Be a iravraTrao'iv KVKktp irepieXdovra, rj anra^ r] /cat TrXeova/et? 
 irepieXi'x^OevTa irepi rriv <yr]V mairep oi oifteif, et? t^ Bwardv KaToo 
 E KaOevra iraXiv ifi^aXKei. Bwarov Be icmv eKaTepmere p^XP'' ''"°" 
 fiiaov Kadievai, vepa B' ov' avavre<i yap irpoa-co dfitjiOTepoii rot? 
 pevp,aat t6 eKarepaiOev rylyverai fiipoii. S 
 
 LXI. Ta p,ev ovv Brj aXKa iroSXa re Kal p,ejdXa Kai travro- 
 Batra pev/jLaTo. ecrrf rvy^'ivet B' apa ovra iv tovtoi<; rot? •jroWoi's 
 TSTTap arra pevp,aTa, mv to p>ev fierjKrrov KaX e^coraTO) peov \TrepX\ 
 KVKkm 6 KaXovp,evo<; 'D,Keav6<i eariv, tovtov Be KaravriKpi) koI 
 ivavriwi peaiv 'Axepav, o? Bt ip^p,a>v re tottcov pel dXXmv kol 10 
 jl3 S)) Kal viro yrjv pecov eh r-f\v Xip,vrjV MJjiKveiTai, rrjv 'A)(epovcndBa, 
 ol al Twv TereXevTTjKorav i^V)(aX toov ttoWwv d<j}iKV0VVTai Kai 
 Ttva'i eifiapp,evov<; ;)^jOoi'ov? /juelvoffai, al p,ev fiaKporepov;, al Be 
 ^pa^yTepov;, iraXiv eKirep^TTovTai eh ras twv ^mcov yevecreK. TpiTO<; 
 
 nation seems to me this. When the 
 stream has once reached the northern 
 hemisphere, it is subject to precisely the 
 same laws of gravitation as the rivers of 
 that hemisphere ; and there is no reason 
 why it should be compelled to descend to 
 the very centre any more than a stream 
 which has risen in the northern hemi- 
 sphere : yet, if it does not, it has passed 
 beyond the centre, relatively to its source. 
 Schmidt's theory in fact breaks down, un- 
 less we can understand the words /ii^i 
 Tou /liiTOv, iripa ff 0^ relatively to the 
 direction of the stream after it has once 
 begun its downward course, irrespective 
 of its point of issue. Perhaps however 
 Plato had not thought of the case of a 
 river passing from one hemisphere to 
 another while on the surface of the earth: 
 or, as exact science is hardly to be ex- 
 pected in a myth, the rivers may be pro- 
 hibited from crossing the plane which 
 divides the two hemispheres. Aristotle's 
 paraphrase sounds like a reproduction of 
 the Platonic passage based on an imperfect 
 recollection of it. The notion, entertained 
 by some, that Karapnicpi j elffpei means 
 that the stream on discharging itself crosses 
 Tartaros and emerges on the opposite side 
 is assuredly untenable. Schanz, against 
 all mss., has i^iireaev elirpet. 
 
 3. Ka6ivTa] This word comes to be 
 practically intransitive similarly to ^/i/3oX- 
 Xei : the river is conceived as a power 
 which pours down and discharges its 
 waters. Ka6lrip.i. is similarly used of a. 
 wind, as we see in Aristophanes Knights 
 430 ?{«/iii Ya/) ffot \ainrp6s riSr/ Kal fUyai 
 KaSids. 
 
 4. avavTcs ydp irpoo-w] so Heindorf 
 for wpos. Z. and St. omit Trpotrw. 
 
 8. T^TTttp* oTra pEtl)iaTa] Homer 
 Odyssey x 511, 
 
 v^a fiiv avTov k Acrai ^n-' 'CiKeavQ ^aSvSlva, 
 txiros 5' els *Aide(i} Uvai d6fiov e6ptI)evTa' 
 li>$a fih els 'Ax^povra Hupi^XeyiSar' re 
 
 piovcriv 
 KaKVTosff, OS S^ Sruyos xlBaros iariv dwop- 
 
 pii^. 
 
 [uepV] kvkXij)] The only passage cited 
 in defence of this phrase is Plutarch 
 SpuTiKos X 5, where Didot's edition has 
 TepiKiKK(f. The latter is the reading of 
 the best mss. here; but Heindorf justly 
 denounces it as 'monstri simile'. Stall- 
 baum's reference to Laws 964 E is totally 
 irrelevant. Heindorf proposes iripi^, Her- 
 mann has iripi, adverbial: but it seems 
 probable that the word has crept in from 
 the margin. 
 
 12. 01 TWV TeTt\«llTt]KOT<l)V] Cf. 1 14 A. 
 
170 
 
 HAATHNOS 
 
 [113 
 
 Be voTafi6<s TovTtov Kara /lecroj/ eK^dWei, koX ifyi)<! t^s e/cySoX,^? 
 elairl/irrei eh tottov fieiyav TrvplwoKK^ Kaio/ievov, Kal Xifivrjv iroiei 
 fiel^o) Ttji Trap' rjiuv daXdTT7)<!, ^eovcrav vSaro^ Kal irr)\ov' evrevdev 
 Be X'^P^^ KVK\q> 6o\ep6^ Kat.jTTT/XfflSi;?, "KepieknTofievo'i Be [ry yy] B 
 
 S aXXo(Te re d(j)iKveiTai Kal vap eaxara t^9 A')(,epovcTidBo<; \ifji,vr}<;, 
 ov (TVfifiiyvvfievo^ rai iiBari' "jrepieXixdel^ Be TroWaKts virb 7^? 
 ifi^dXKei KaTrnTepa tov Taprdpov' ovtoi B' eailv ov eirovo/id^ovaiv 
 Uvpi^XeyidovTa, oS Kal 01 pvaxef d'lrocrirda-fiaTa dva^va&aiv 'Siry 
 av ru;^o)<rt t^? 717?. rovTov Be av KaravTiKpy 6 TerapTo^ eKviirret 
 
 10 61? TOTTOV TrpmTov Beivov re koI dypiov, ta? Xeyerai, xpwfia S' e^ovra 
 oXov olov 6 Kvav6<}, ov Br} eTrovofid^ova-i, '^riyiov, Kal rrjV XipAiriv, C 
 7)v TTOiei 6 TroTa/i6<} efi^dWmv, ATvya' 6 S' ifiTreacov ivravda Kal 
 Beivd<; Bwdfiet^ Xa^mv ev t<S HBari, Si)? Kara t^? 7^?, TrepieXiT- 
 Tofievoi X®/"^' ^vavTio<; tS Hvpi^XeyedovTi Kal aTravra ev ry 
 
 1. iKpdXXei] 'issues forth'. In the 
 passage of Aristotle already quoted ix^oK- 
 \ea> has the opposite sense, 'discharges 
 itself ; it is in fact equivalent to i/ipdWei 
 in Plato's account. Aristotle follows the 
 ordinary usage, whereas Plato has formed 
 his compounds to fit his present descrip- 
 tions. 
 
 3. iiovirav vSaros Kal irT|Xov] 'boil- 
 ing with water and mud'. The genitive 
 is joined with the verb as describing the 
 material: cf. Anthol, Planud. iv 39 
 
 KoX iredia ^eiovTa iroKvcrirepiiitv ' AyapTfvuy, 
 
 4. irEpicXiTT6|ievo5 8i [•qj 7^] Of 
 the three writers who quote this passage, 
 Stobaeus Theodoret and Eusebius, tJ 7^ 
 is found in the first alone : the words are 
 however in all the mss. The objection 
 to them is that they seem to make Pyri- 
 phlegethon flow on the surface of the 
 earth, which, Schmidt notwithstanding, 
 cannot be allowed. Stallbaum retains tj 
 yS, and explains that Pyriphlegethon en- 
 circles the earth beneath its surface. But 
 this seems scarcely a natural interpreta- 
 tion; and I have thought it better to 
 bracket the words, which the Zurich edi- 
 tors expunge. 
 
 7, KaruTepcD tov Taprdpov] 'into a 
 
 lower depth of Tartaros '. 
 
 12. ^v iroKi 6 irorafAi] ^v is absent 
 from most mss. but is rightly added from 
 Theodoret and certain mss. by Heindorf, 
 who compares Laws 683 A. The construc- 
 tion is indeed familiar enough. 
 
 Srirya] Plato's conception of Styx 
 as a lake differs from that of the older 
 authorities : cf. Hesiod Theogonia 786 foil, 
 where Styx is a river, a branch (x^pos) of 
 Okeanos: and Homer /./. makes Kokytos 
 a branch of Styx. 
 
 1 4. diravT^ Iv Tg ' Axepovo-idSi XCp.vx|] 
 The convolutions of these four rivers are 
 a little perplexing. They issue from Tar- 
 taros on four different sides : Okeanos 
 emerges to the surface and encompasses 
 the whole earth ; of its return to Tartaros 
 we are told nothing. Acheron, issuing 
 from the opposite side, flows in the con- 
 trary direction, partly on the surface, partly 
 beneath the earth ; and before re-entering 
 Tartaros forms the Acherusian lake. Pyri- 
 phlegethon, rising half-way between the 
 two former, not far from its source forms 
 the boiling lake, and after many windings 
 skirts one end of the Acherusian lake be- 
 fore plunging into the profoundest deeps 
 of Tartaros. Its course is entirely subter- 
 ranean. Kokytos, flowing in the opposite 
 
"3] 
 
 ^AIAON. 
 
 171 
 
 'A'xepoveridBc Xifivy i^ ivavrla';' xal ovSe to tovtov vSap ovSevl 
 fiiyvvrai, dXKa koI oiitoi; kvkK^ irepieXO^v ifi^dXkei eh top Tdp- 
 rapov ivavTio^ tS> HvpiipiKeyiOovTi' ovofia he romm earlv, ta? ol 
 •jToiriTal Xeyouffiv, Kwkvto^. 
 
 D LXII. TovTcov Be ovrcov ire^VKorav, iveiBdv d^UcovTat oi 5 
 TereXewTT/KOTe? et? rov tottov ol 6 Baifiav eKaarov Ko/ii^ei, irpmrov 
 p^v SieBiKaaavTO ol t€ KaXw? koI ocrlm^ ^i,waavTe<i koL ol p.r). koi 
 o'l p,ev dv Bo^axn. p,eam<; ^efiiaxevai, wopevdevTei iirl tov 'Ay(^epovTa, 
 avafidvTe<! a Br) avTol<; o'Xijfiard eaTtv, iirl tovtcov d(j)iicvovvTat elf 
 Ttjv Xifivrjv, KOI ixei olKovai re Kol Kadaip6p,evoi rmv re dBcK7]p,dTcop 10 
 BiBovre^ SiAca? dTroXvovrai, el' Tt? Ti rjBiKrjKev, twv re evepye(Tiwv 
 
 E Tifid<; ^epovrat Kara Trjv d^iav eKaarof o'i B' dv Bo^cocrtv dvMTOx; 
 'i'Xeiv Bid rd fieyedr} rwv dp,apTTjfidTav, ^ lepoarvXla(; ttoWo? Kal 
 fieydXai rj <^6vov<; dBiKovi Kal 'irapav6p,ov<; ttoWow e^eipyaa-piivoi, 
 rj dX\a oaa roiavra rvyxdvec ovra, tovtov^ Be r) irpoa-riKOva-a 15 
 p,olpa piTTTei eh rov Tdprapop, oOev ovtrore eK^alvowiv. o'l B' dv 
 ld<Tip,a fiiv, fieydXa Be Bo^ooiriv ri/iapTrfKevai, d/iaprijpMTa, olov irpof 
 irarepa ^ p^rjTepa vir opyrjf ^laiov Ti irpd^avTe<i, Kal fiera/jieXov 
 
 direction, ascends to the surface, where it 
 spreads into the Stygian lake ; then diving 
 into the earth, it reaches the Acherusian 
 lake from the contrary side to Pyriphlege- 
 thon ; and making another circuit enters 
 Tartaros opposite to that river. Styx, it 
 will be noticed, is on the earth's surface, 
 whereas the other two lakes are subterra- 
 nean. 
 
 6. 6 SaCfuov] Cf. 107 D, 
 
 9. avapdvTcs] 'going on board ves- 
 sels which, it is said (Sij), are provided for 
 them '. 
 
 12. dviaTdis ex*''''] These incurables 
 were cast into Tartaros, not in retribution 
 for their crimes, but as warnings to others ; 
 since to Plato punishment is always either 
 remedial or exemplary. So Gorgias 525 c 
 oXS h) Tti, ^irxccTa iZiiHiaiiKsi Kal 5ii Toiavra 
 dSiiefiimTCL avlaroi. yhuvTai, ix tovtojv ra 
 irapaSelynaTa ylyverai, Kal ovtoi airol iikv 
 ovKSTi ovivavTai ovd^v, are avlaroi ovres, 
 aWot Si ovlvavrat ol roirovs opuvres Sict rets 
 ajxaprrlas tA niyiara Kal oSuvripliTaTa Kal 
 (po^epdraTa irdOrj wacrxooras tov acl xpovov, 
 
 drexvCii irapaSely/iaTa avrnynj/j^yovs eKciev 
 AXSov ev tQ SefffitiiTTjpii^j tois dei tujp dSf/cofi' 
 dtpiKvovixhois Beafiara Kal couffer^/toTa. 
 Cf. Republic 616 A. 
 
 13. lepocniXCas] This was a peculiarly 
 heinous offence: cf. Laws 854 A, where 
 the law thus addresses the sacrilegious, (3 
 8aviia<rie, oix avBptlnnvhv ae Kaxhv oiSi 
 Baov Kivel to yw iirl rriv Upoavklav vporpi- 
 wov Uvai, otffTpos S4 ai tis ip^vdfievos ix 
 7ra\a(ui/ xal aKadapTtav Toti dvdpiorois d5i- 
 K-qii&TUiv, irepupepifienos a\iTripi(iSr]s, 
 
 16. o6ev ouiroTE lKpaCvov(riv] In the 
 viKviai of the Republic and Gorgias also 
 incurable criminals are doomed to eternal 
 punishment: and this is natural where 
 Plato is weaving up popular tradition 
 with his own phantasy. But in Timaeus 
 42 c it is evident that the degenerate soul 
 at any period of her transmigrations has 
 the chance of reformation and final re- 
 storation to her original purity ; nor is 
 this possibility excluded in Phaedrus 248 c 
 foil. 
 
 18. Kol |i.(Ta)t^av avTots] 'and who 
 
1/2 
 
 nAATilNOS 
 
 [114 
 
 avroK rbv aXkov ^Lov jSitSaip, rj dv^po^ovoi Totot/rp tivX aXKm 114 
 rpoirm yivcovrai,, rovrov<s Se ifiireo'e'lv fiev et? rov Tdprapov avcvyKij, 
 e/iTretrovTa? Be outoi)? Kal ivtavrov exel yevo/aevovi} eK/3aWei to 
 KVfia, Toi)? fiev dvSpo<j>6vov<; KarcL rdv K.(i)kvt6v, tou? Se irarpaXoia'i 
 
 5 KoX /MTjTpaKola? KarcL rov lilvpt<})\eyedovra' eTreiBdv Se (^epofievot 
 yevavrai Kara t^i' XifLvrjv rrjv 'A'^epovcridSa, ivrav&a ^owal re Kal 
 KaXovaiv, oi fiev od drrexreivav, oi he ov<i v^picrav, KaXecravref B 
 iKerevovart Kal Beovrai idcrat a^d<i eK^rjvai eh rrjv Xifivi^v Kal B 
 Bi^aadat, Kal edv ftev ireia-oyo'iv, eK^aivoval re Kal X^yovai rwv 
 
 10 KaKwv, el Be firj, (f>epovrai avOtf eh rov Tdprapov Kal eKeldev irdXiv 
 eh Toi)s iroTafj,ov<!, Kal ravra Trdaj^ovref ov irporepov rravovrai, 
 rrplv dv ireiatoaiv ov<s rjBiKrjaav aiirt] yap rj Blkt] vtto rmv BiKacrrSv 
 avToh erd')(jSri. ot Be Srj dv Bo^wai Bia^ep6vra)<i ■("7r/)o? ro 6aiai<i 
 
 have lived the rest of their days in a state 
 of repentance '. The participle /t,eTa/ii\oi> 
 is used absolutely. 
 
 X. TOlOVTCp TLVl oiXXu Tpoiru] 2.e> 
 
 their offence is similar to that of the 
 iraTpaXoiai, in that it was committed in 
 sudden passion and followed by repent- 
 ance, and different to that of the ^bvovs 
 ddUovs Koi irapavi/iovs iroXXois i^eipyaiy- 
 
 3. TO Kv|Jia] i.e. t] aldpa. 
 
 4. irarpaXoCas Kal |i.r|Tpa\o(a5] 
 These terms apply not only to parricides 
 and matricides, but to any one who strikes 
 a father or mother. 
 
 6. Kard tiJv X£|»viiv] It will be re- 
 membered that both these rivers enter the 
 Acherusian lake. 
 
 12. irplv liiv TrcCtrucriv o€s 'nStKT|(rav] 
 This was no doubt suggested by the 
 Athenian law which enacted that a person 
 guilty of involuntary homicide must ap- 
 pease the family of the deceased before 
 he could return from exile : cf. Demosth. 
 Aristokr, p. 644 -rov &\6vt' iv &Kova'l<p 
 (p6y(fi ^v TKTiv elpijfj^vois XP^^^^^ dirsKBuv 
 raKT^v iSbv Kal (pciyeiv, ?«s ai* aliiarfral 
 Tiva [? Tts] Twv iv yivei Tod ireTovdoTos, 
 It would appear that the injured family 
 could not insist upon more than a year's 
 exile, which was called dreviavriafw!. 
 Pialo adopts this period in Laws 869 E 
 
 (I)S &kov(tIov yeyovoTOS Tov ^ovov ot re 
 KaOapfiol ytyviirBwrav tQ dpdffavTi, Kal 
 iyiauTos eh IffTU t^s iKdrj/das iv vofjup, 
 cf. 865 E. In Laias 872 E we are told 
 that in another life it shall be done to the 
 wilful homicide as he did to his victim: 
 Tou yhp Koivov ficavd4vTos aifiaros oitK elvai 
 K6,dap(riv dXKrjv oiiS* ^ktXvtov iO^Xeiv yiy- 
 peffdoL rb fuav0^p, irplv ipbvov ipovip 6fioi(p 
 SiJ.oi.ov r) dpdxraffa ^vx^l TUrrj Kal iritnjs Tr)s 
 |i;77eve£as t&v dvfihv d<pi\affaf/Jv7j KOifdffri, 
 cf. 870 E. 
 
 13. So^cixri Si.a<(>cp6vT<iis irpis TO oarCus 
 Piuvai] The text is certainly corrupt. 
 Stallbaum's attempt to make /Siwai do 
 double duty is futile, and his quotations 
 are transparently irrelevant. Schanz, 
 following Heindorf, inserts from Theo- 
 doret irpoKeKpluBai. after /Siwat. This has 
 some support from Clement of Alexan- 
 dria, who reads irpoiceKX^irffat ; but it is 
 not satisfactory. For while it is sense to 
 say 'who are deemed to have lived 
 holily', it is not sense to say 'who are 
 deemed to have been judged to have 
 lived holily '. I suspect that Theodoret's 
 irpoKeKplaBai, is merely a clumsy attempt 
 to supply a deficiency which existed in 
 his copy; and that Plato's real word 
 has been lost : possibly ix^iv after dtaipe- 
 povTus, unless we should read irpbs rii 
 iatov. 
 
114] a>AIAnN. 173 
 
 ^iwvat-f, ovTol elcTLv ol rdovSe fiev twv totto)// twv ev ry jr} ikev- 
 C Oepovfievoi re Koi diraWaTTofievot, axrirep Be<r/jia)Tr}piaiv, dva> Be ei? 
 rrjv Kadapav oiKijaiv a<^iKVOv fievot koX iirl 7^9 oiKt^o/jievoi. tovtcov 
 oe avTwv ol <l>LKocro(f>ia Ikuvooi; Ka9r]pd/j,evoi, avev re atofiaTtov ^(Scri 
 TO irapairav et? tov kireiTa '^povov, koI et? olK^a-eis en rovrmv 5 
 KaWiovf acfjiKvovvrai, a? ovre paSiov BrfKcuaat ovre 6 •)(^pQVO<; iKav6<! 
 ev T& irapovTi. dXKa rovrwv hrj eveica ■x^prj wv hieKr)\v6ap,ev, m 
 Ziififiia, irdv iroielv, &<TTe dperr]<; koI ^povrjaew; ev rm jSt'p fiera- 
 cXeiv KoXov yap to ddXov koI 'q eXTTt? fieydXrj. 
 D LXIII. To fiev ovv Tavra Sucr'xypla-atrdat ovtco'; ey^eiv, tu? 10 
 6700 SieX'^Xvda, ov "rrpeirei vovv e'XpvTi dvBpi oTt fievToi ij Tavr 
 eaTlv 7j ToiavT aVra Trepl Ta? ^ff^v)(a'i rjfiwv KaX ra? olK>]crei<;, 
 eireiirep dddvarov ye r) '^vj(rj ^alveTai ovcra, tovto koi irpeireiv fioi 
 SoKel Kal d^iov KivSwevaai olofievm ovTa)<; e')(eiv KaKo<; ydp 6 kIv- 
 Svvo<i' Kal 'X^prj TO Toiavra Sairep iTroBeiv eavT&, Si,b Srj eryaye Kal iS 
 irdXai fjLTjKvvo) tov puvOov. dXXd tovtwv Srj evexa dappeiv XPV 
 Trepl Trj eavTOV '^vvjg dvBpa, bcTt? ev tS /3t« ras /jLev aWa? rjSovd<i 
 E Tas vepl t6 (ToSfui Kal tov? Koafiovt e'iaae '^(aipeiv, (»9 dWoTpiov^ 
 T6 6vTa<; Kal irXeov OaTepov '^yrja-d/jLevo^ direpyd^eaOai, Taf he trepl 
 
 3. «rl ^rjs] so all mss. Eusebius, true virtue. And now, continues Sokra- 
 Theodoret, and Stobaeus have M ttjs tes, my hour is at hand ; and I will go to 
 7^s : but the article is not required. bathe my body for my burial. 
 
 ' Upon the earth ' means of course on the 10. ri |iiv oSv rawa Sii<r\vpC(ra(r0ai] 
 
 true surface, distinguished from the hoi- Plato lays no stress upon the exact details 
 
 low wherein we dwell. of his description : indeed he is never at 
 
 4. Ka8r]pd)iEvoi] a genuine reflexive any pains to make his variotis accounts 
 middle: 'who have purified themselves '- of 'die letzten Dinge' precisely corre- 
 
 ovtv T£ o-wiiaTuv] I conceive this spond : all he is really concerned about 
 
 to mean ' without earthly bodies ' : for is that the virtuous soul is better off in 
 
 the most exalted of finite spirits, even the other world than the vicious, 
 
 the gods, must have body of some sort; 15. lirijSciv lavr^] cf. 77 E d\X4 XP^ 
 
 that is, they are subject to the conditions ivij.Sea> aircf iKaarris ■rifiipas, lois ay i^e- 
 
 of space and time. Cf. PhaedrMs 246 C. irq.ariTe. 
 
 avev ffa/idTuv to Plato signifies freedom Sio 81] ?Ywy£ Kal uaXai fi,i\Kiv<i> tov 
 
 from bodily appetites. |tS6ov] This phrase would seem to bear 
 
 114 D — IIS ■*> '^- I*"'- To insist that out the view of the myth given in the 
 
 all these details are strictly accurate were introduction, p. 8. 
 
 folly ; yet something like this is the fate ig. irXiov Oarepov ii7Titr<{|i6vos airtp- 
 
 of the soul and her habitation after death. •yaJco-Oai] 'thinking that they do more 
 
 Wherefore it is well worth while for a harm than good '. For this use of eirepov 
 
 man to bestow all care upon his soul cf. Euthydemus 280 E, 297 D. Also Pin- 
 
 during this life, that she may be free dar Pythia lii 34 halp-uv d' irepot. 
 from bodily passions and adorned with 
 
i;4 
 
 HAATflNOS 
 
 [115 
 
 TO fiavOdveiv etrirovhaae re xal Kocrfirjaaf ttjv ■^u^^v ovk dWorpiO) 
 aWa rm avrr}^ Koa-fim, aa^poavvr) re Kal ZiKaioavvr) koI dvSpeia 
 Kai eXevdepia ical aXr)Oela, o&to) irepifievei Trjv et? "AiSov Tropelav, 115- 
 w? iropevcTofievoi; 'Srav rj eifiap/J>ivr} KoXrj. iifielt /Mev ovv, €<f)r], m 
 5 liififila TS Koi Ke/39;? koI oi aXkot, el<jav6i,<; ev rivi xp6v<p eKaarot 
 •JTopevcrecrde' ifie Se vvv rjSrj KoKei, <pair] av dvrjp Tpa/yiKov, r) elfiap- 
 fievTj, Kol a-x,eB6v to fiot &pa TpaireaOai irpo'i to Xovrpov' Soxei yap 
 Brj ^eXnov etvai Xovad/nevov irielv to (jidpfiaKov koI firj TrpdyfiaTa 
 Tat? yvvai^l irapi'^eiv veKpdv Xovetv. 
 lo LXIV. lavTa Srj elir6vT0<s avTOV 6 'K.piTmv, Etev, e<f>r), a 2ft)- B 
 KpaTe<i' tI Se tovtoi^ r) ifiol eiricrTiXXet^ fj irepl twv iralSmv rj irepl 
 dXXov Tov, o Tt dv (TOb iroiovvTe's ■J^fjueX's ev 'xapiTi fidXtcTTa -Troiotfiev ; 
 ' Ktrep del Xeya, e^rj, m K.pLTav, ovBev KatpdTepov' '6ti vfi£v avTmv 
 
 3. IX«v6cpC^ Kol oXriOet^i,] 'with free- 
 dom and truth'. These terms practically 
 correspond to ^povrins or <ro^la. i\ev- 
 Bepla is that state of liberation from the 
 body which enables the soul to grasp 
 dX^^eia. 
 
 5. ^KaiTToi TTopeiio-eo-Se] so nearly all 
 mss. Schanz writes iKoiiToi after Stall- 
 baum. 
 
 6. (|>a(r| av dvi]p rpayiK^s] 'to speak 
 like a hero of tragedy '- The good taste 
 of this parenthesis is admirable. Stok ^ 
 d/iap/j^vri KoKet is in perfect keeping with 
 the eloquent passage which is its context : 
 but in applying the phrase to himself 
 Sokrates instinctively feels the risk that 
 it may sound high-flown. And so with 
 these words he passes simply and natur- 
 ally from his lofty flight of moralizing to 
 the homely, but eminently characteristic, 
 ilipa TpairiaBcu, irpos tA \ovrp6y. 
 
 8. KoX ]i.fi irpdYpiaTa rats 7vvai|l 
 irap^X'iv] 'and not to give the women 
 the trouble of washing my corpse '. This 
 piece of thoughtfulness for others is 
 admirable evidence of the perfect serenity 
 with which Sokrates awaits his doom. 
 
 lis A — 116 A, c. Ixiv. Kriton now 
 inquires of Sokrates what are his last 
 injunctions. Only that you will take 
 good heed to yourselves, he replies, and 
 
 put into practice the principles affirmed 
 in our late discourse. But how are we 
 to bury you? asks Kriton. Sokrates 
 answers with a smile, As you please, 
 provided you can catch me. It would 
 seem that all my words have been thrown 
 away, and I fail to persuade you that this 
 Sokrates who now speaks to you will 
 presently take flight to the company of 
 the gods, and that all you will bury is his 
 forsaken body. So, my friends, be surety 
 for me to Kriton, not this time that I 
 shall stay, but that I shaU verily depart. 
 But seriously such incorrect language is 
 mischievous : say then that it is my body 
 which you bury, and bury it as seems to 
 you best. 
 
 II. 4iri<rr^XX€is] ' proprium de extrema 
 morientiumvoluntate'. Heindorf. Cf. 
 116 B ^TTioTeiXos OTTO ipoiXcTO. 
 
 13. oirep cUi \iya] ' what I am always 
 saying ; nothing fresh : that if you take 
 good care of yourselves you will best please 
 me and mine and yourselves also in what- 
 ever you do, even though you make no 
 promise now ; but if you are negligent of 
 yourselves and will not guide your lives 
 along the track of our present and our 
 former discourse, though your promises 
 be never so many and earnest at this 
 moment, you will profit nothing', ^ti- 
 
IIS] a)AiAnN. 17s 
 
 iirifieXojifievoi v/iet? xal e/iol koI rot? ifiolf Kot v/uv avTot'i iv 
 
 •X^apiTi irotijaeTe arr av Troir^Te, Kav fir) vvv o/Mo'Ko'yrja-rjTe' eav Se 
 
 Vfiwv /lev avTWV d/ieXfJTe, koX firj 6e\rjTe, &crirep kut 'ix^V *<*''■« Ta 
 
 vvv re eipr/fieva Kot rd iv rm efivpoadev Xfiovm ^rjv, ovSe eav irohXd 
 
 C ofioXoyijarjTe iv tw TrapovTi Koi a^oSpa, ovSev irkeov iroir^aere. s 
 
 Taura fiev toIvvv 7rpo9v/ir]67]a-6fieda, €(j>rj, ovtco iroielv' daTrrafiev 
 
 Be <xe TLva Tpoirov ; "Ottw? av, €<f)r), ^ovXrjaOe, iavirep je Xd^rjTe 
 
 fie Kal fifj iK<f)V'y(i} vfid<i. ye\da'a<; Be lifia ijo'v^J) i^o-"^ ttjOo? r)fid<i 
 
 aTToBXeyJraii elvev, Ov TrelBu), w dvBpe'i, Kpircova, w? iyw eifii oiiro'; 
 
 o "SituKpaTifi, o vvvX BiaXeyofievoi;, Kal BiardTTav eicaa-rov rcSv Xeyo- 10 
 
 fievasv, aXX o'ierai fie iicelvov elvai, ov o'^erat, oXlr/ov varepov 
 
 D veKpov, Kol ipana Br], ira)<i fie OdirTrj, on Be iyw irdXai iroXiiv 
 
 Xoyov ireiro^nfffiai, o5?, iireiBdv iria) t6 (f)dpfiaK0V, ovjciri ifitv irapa- 
 
 fievw, aXX' ol')(r)o-ofiai, diriwv eU fiaicdpcov Brf Tiva<; evBaifiovM^, 
 
 ravTa [fioi] Bokw avrm aWm? Xeyeiv, irapafivdovfievo^ dfia fiev 15 
 
 v/ua?, hfia B' ifiavTov. iyyvrfa-aade ovv fie •7rpo<; ^piTava, e<f)ri, rrjv 
 
 ivavriav iyyvTjv rj rjv oiito'} irpo<; tov<; St^acTTa? rjyyvdro. ovto<; 
 
 fiev yap tj firjv irapafievelv ifielf Be rj firjv firj irapafievelv iyyvq- 
 
 E aaaOe, iireiBdv diroQavm, dXXd otyfj'^eaQai diriovra, Iva YLpirav 
 
 paov 4>epr), Ka\ fir) opdSv fiov to awfia rj Kaiofievov rj KaropuTTOfievov 20 
 
 dyavaKTy v-jrep ifiov ca? Seivd ■jrdcrj(pvTO<;, firjBe Xeyy iv rrj ra(f)y, 
 
 W9 rj irpoTiderai, %mKpdT7j rj iK<j>epei rj KaropvTTei. ev yap laOi, ^ 
 
 /ueXoUjUefois taking heed to your ways, elcai ri twv vcKpup triiiiwra, top S' Brra 
 that you may live virtuously and ration- '^fiSv IkairTop ivras iSdvarov etvai, 'puxw 
 ally. Cobet would omit KOTct before tA, iwovona^ii^vov, wapb, Oeois oXXous ainivai. 
 vvv, but Schanz cites Euthyphron 2 c 15. ToiiTd [noi] 8oK<e airlf aXXus 
 ipX^"^ KaTTiyopriauv piov iIis irpbs fiijrepa Xlyciv] Schanz brackets /joi after Mad- 
 vpis ripi VoXiK. vig. We can indeed construe /tot with 
 9. lis 17(0 etjii] 'I cannot persuade So/cu and airif with X^7«i' : but this 
 Kriton, my friends, that the real " I " is gives hardly so good a sense, 
 that Sokrates who now converses with 17. oStos irpis toOs SiKaoTos ^YYutiTo] 
 you and duly arranges every part of his Kriton was bail for Sokrates in conjunc- 
 discourse ; he imagines I am that which tion with Plato and Kritobulos and Apol- 
 he will presently see as a corpse ; and he lodoros. Apology 38 B. 
 actually (517) inquires how he is to bury 22. tS ^dp tcrOi] 'for you must know 
 me'. The article is omitted before Su- that incorrect speech is not only offensive 
 KpdTTis in the best mss. and by some edi- on that score alone, but engenders mis- 
 tors. In that case we should take Su- chief in our souls'. An inaccurate mode 
 Kpdrrii as in apposition to oJtos. Wytten- of expression is apt to produce a loose 
 bach appositely quotes Laws 959 A tA Si and careless habit of thinking : Sokrates' 
 ffw/m lvSaK\6)ixvov iiit,wv ixacTTOts iireaBai, great object was to find out what things 
 KoX Te\evTri(rdvT(i)V \4y((r9iu xaXaJs efSwXo really are and call them by their right 
 
1/6 
 
 HAATHNO^ 
 
 [ii6 
 
 8' 0?, w dpurre Kplrav, to jxrj KaXw<i Xiyeiv ov fiovov eh avrb tovto 
 7rX,r]fifie\ev, dWa koI kukov ti ifnroiel ratf ■<^v')(ak. oiXKa dappeiv 
 T6 ')(^pri KOI <f)dvai, tov/mov crwfia Odirreiv, Kol davreiv o^tw? '6irm<} 116 
 av (701 <^iKov j] KoX fidXlura rjry^ vofJ,ip,ov eivai. 
 5 LXV. TaOr' elirav iKelvo<; p,ev dvla-Taro et? ol/crj/ia ri a)9 
 Xovar6/j,evo<;, koI 6 Kptrwi' e'Ctrero avrm, i^fid^ S' eKeXeve irepcp,dvei.v. 
 "Trepiefievofiev ovv vpb<s riiia.<s aJrot)? SLokeyofievoi irepi twv etprj- 
 fiivmv Koi dvaaKOTrovvTei, Tore S' av irepl t^? ^vfi(j>opd<} Bte^iovrei, 
 0(771 rjiJLiv yeyovvia eXr), dre^i'M? riyovp^voi, S(T7rep iTaTpci <7repr]- 
 
 10 0evT6<; Bid^eiv 6p(j}avol top eireira ^lov. iireiS^ Se iXovaaTo Kai B 
 rjvi'xBrf Trap avTov rd -iraiSla — Svo yap ainm viel<} afiiKpol 7](7av, 
 el<i Se p,eya<i — koI at olKeiai yvvaiKev d<j}(icovTO, [eKeivai'}] evavriov 
 rov KptTtBvo? StaXe'x^Oeli; re koi i'jri(7TeCka<! arTa i^ovXero, rai /lev 
 yvvaiKai koX rd •jraiBla dirievai eKekevcrev, avTb<; Se rjKe irap rjfj,d<;. 
 
 IS Kal 'ijv rjBf] iyyv<; rfxiov hvap,mv' j^povov ydp •jroXvv Buerpir^ev evSov. 
 
 names, by obtaining a precise definition 
 of each thing. That which we speak of 
 as Sokrates is his soul, not his body; 
 although, since the body is all we see, 
 popular usage applies the name to the 
 body even when the soul has quitted it. 
 But, says Sokrates, not only is this in 
 itself a slovenly mode of speech, but it 
 may habituate us to thinking that the 
 body is all that exists of a man. 
 
 3. OdiTTsiv oBtws] Most of the re- 
 cent editors make Bdirreiv depend upon 
 4>djiai. There seems to me no valid 
 reason for doing so ; and it makes better 
 sense to take it with XPV' 
 
 116 A — 117A, t. Ixv. Sokrates retires 
 to the bath, and on his return takes leave 
 of his children and household. After a 
 little farther conversation with his friends 
 he is warned by the servant of the Eleven 
 that the hour of his death is at hand. 
 The man warmly testifies to the noble 
 character of Sokrates and departs in tears. 
 Sokrates, after, a few kind words con- 
 cerning him, bids the poison be brought. 
 Nay, remonstrates Kriton, the sun is yet 
 on the mountains ; many prisoners have 
 put off drinking the hemlock till far on 
 into the evening : there is no haste. They 
 
 acted after their kind, answers Sokrates; 
 but I were false to myself, were I so 
 covetous of the little remnant of my life : 
 therefore bring the poison. 
 
 11. Suo Top ovTu] cf. Apology 34 D 
 olKeiol fu)l elffi KoX i/Ieis, w avSpes 'A6tiv(uoi, 
 Tp6£s, els fih fiecpiKiov tJSij, dvo Si ircuSla, 
 In Diog. Laert. 11 26 we are told~ that 
 the name of the eldest was Lamprokles 
 and those of the two younger Sophronis- 
 kos and Menexenos< 
 
 12. at oUetai 'yvvatKEs] i. e. the women 
 of his family. Probably his wife was not 
 among them, else Plato would have men- 
 tioned her. Some suppose that this 
 expression gave rise to the absurd fable 
 that Sokrates had two wives living at the 
 same time ; of whom the second, Myrto, 
 daughter or grand-daughter of the famous 
 Aristeides, was the mother of his two 
 younger children : see Diog. Laert. /. /. 
 
 [iKcCvms] IvavTiov] The mss. vary 
 between iKelvais and iKcTvcu, and also 
 in the position of the word, which in 
 many follows hiavrlov. Since iKeivai. and 
 the position after ivavrlov are alike im- 
 possible, I read as above; bracketing 
 however ^xetvois as highly suspicious. 
 
 15. JvSov] sc. h Tifi olK'^fnari. 
 
ii;] ^AIAflN. 
 
 177 
 
 ikOaiv S" iKade^sTO XeXovfiivo?, Kal ov ttoXXci fierd ravra BieXex^Vi 
 Kol r]Kev 6 T&v evBeKa virrjpeTt]^ km (rra'i irap' avTov, 'O "S.coxpare'i, 
 
 C e<j)r}, ov Karayvmaofjuai aov oirep aXXcov KaTayiyvwa-Kco, on fiot 
 XaXewaiVOva-i koX Karapavrai, eireiZav avTolii •jrapayyiXX.m iriveiv 
 TO (pdpfxaKov dva/yKa^ovrcov tcbj/ dpxovTcov. <re Se iy(o Kal aWco? - 
 eyvcoKa iv rovrw rm xpovm yevvaioTarov Kal Trpaorarov koI dpia-rov 
 avopa ovra tSv TrwTrore Sevpo d^iKO/iipcov, Kal Srj koI vvv ev olS' 
 Sto ovk ifiol -xaKeiralvev;, yiyvciaKei<; yap toi)? alriovi, oKXd eKei- 
 voi<;. vvv, oiaOa yap d ^Xdov dyyeXXav, %at/>e Te Kal ireipa w? 
 
 D paara (jiepeiv ra dvayKaia. Kal afia BaKpvcra'; /Mera(rTpe<f)6fjLevo^ j^ 
 diryet, Kal 6 StB/tjOar?;? dva^Xe'^a'i ■yrpoi avrov, Kal (rv, e<f)r}, 
 X'^'ipe, Kal ^fieli ravra nroiija-ofiev. Kal dfia 7rpd<: rjfid^, 'fl? atrreto?, 
 e</>J7, dvdpavo^' Kal irapd rrdvra fioi rov -xpovov rrpofrrjei, Kal 
 oieXeyero iviore Kal rjU dvBpwv Xmaro<;, Kal vvv «? yevvaiw^ fie 
 aiTohaKpvei. dkX! aye Zrj, tu KpLrav, ireiOm/ieda avrm, Kal ivey' ^, 
 Kara rt? ro (papfiaKov, el rerpiTrraC el Be fir], rpf<{rdrca 6 dvdpcaTro';. 
 
 E Kal 6 Kpirav, 'AXX' oifiat, €^17, eymye, w 'tcoKpare^, en ^Xiov elvai 
 em roi<} opea-iv Kal ovttco BeBvKevai. Kal afia eyci olBa Kal dXXov; 
 iravv c^e mvovraf, eireiBav irapayyeXdr) avrol<;, Beiirvrjcravrd'i re 
 Kau TTiovrai ev fiaXa, Kai ^vyyevofievov<i y evLov; aiv dv rvyaxriv 
 emOvfiovvre's. dXKa firjBev eirelyov' en yap iy^fwpel. Kal 6 2a>- 
 Kparrfi, Ei/coTtos ye, ecjirj, w Kpirav, sKeivoi re ravra rroiovcnv, oi)s 
 (7v Xeyei<s, oiovrai yap KepBavelv ravra nroiijaavre^, Kal eywye 
 117 Tavra elKoruni ov •n'oi'^a-co' ovBev yap olfiai KepBavelv 6\ir/ov vcrrepov 
 
 3. ou KaraTvcao-oitai] ' I shall not really the cause of his death : this is 
 
 have the complaint to make of you that I something outside his experience, 
 
 make of others'. 9. & ^X6ov oty^Xiov] So the best 
 
 8. oiSk €|i.ol xaXeiraCvEis] Some read mss. Schanz needlessly reads (l77e\(2i» : 
 
 XoXeTroceis, but the present is found in but d77AX(tK' is equivalent to iyyeXiaii 
 
 the best mss. and gives the best sense. (f^pav which we have in Crito 43 c. 
 
 'I know it is not with me that you are 12. us do-Tstos] 'how courteous the 
 
 angry, but with them ; for you know who good fellow is ; throughout all this time 
 
 are to blame for it '. There is a subtle he used to come and talk to me now and 
 
 dramatic propriety in these words which then, and was the best of men : and now 
 
 is one of the finer touches of this match- how honestly he mourns for me '. iiroSa- 
 
 less narrative. This man must have had Kpiei /i.e as below 117c &TiK\aioi' i/mvrov. 
 
 a large experience of criminals and been 21. ?ti 709 lyX^P''] ''°' there is 
 
 accustomed to look on the baser side of still time to spare '. 
 
 humanity. He could however appreciate 24. ravra tlKOTws ov iroiiio-u] Hirschig 
 
 the nobility of Sokrates, so far as it is condemns riraVur, for no reason that I 
 
 directly brought before his eyes ; but he can see, though Schanz brackets it. 
 
 never thought of Sokrates as bearing no ovSiv 7ap oljuu KcpSaveiv] The ms. 
 
 ill-will even against those who were authority is stronger for KepSalveiv, but 
 
 P. 12 
 
178 
 
 nAATXiNOX 
 
 [ii; 
 
 iTcaiv aXKo ye ^ jeKcora 6cf)\ijt7e(,v Trap" i/iayro), r^Xiypiievoii rov ^rjv 
 KoX (peiSo/j.ei'o^ ovBevoi eVt ivovTO^. aX\' Wi, e^i?, iridov Kai fii] 
 SXKa)<; iroiei. 
 
 LXVI. Ka^ 6 K/atTMi' dicovcra'i evevae rm iraiZl •jrXrjat.ov 
 
 5 eoTtCTt, Kal 6 iral'i e^e\6wv koX av)(ybv 'x^povov BiaTpt,ylra<; rjicev 
 dyav TOP /liWovTa BoSovai to (jidp/xa/cov, ev kvXiki ^epovra rerpifi- 
 fievov' IStov Se 6 '%wKpaTq<} rov avdpcowov, EZev, e^i?, (S ^ikriaTe, 
 ail jap TOVTCov eTrtaTijp,(ov, to 'X^prj ttouiv ; OvSev dXKo, e<^i?, rj 
 TTiovTa, •nepiikvai, eta? dv aov ^a.po<; iv rot? aKeXeai yevrjTai, eweiTa B 
 
 lo KaraKeladat,' Kal o'6to}<; avTO iroirjaei. koX Hfia iSpe^e Trjv KvKiKa 
 TO) AWKpaTei,' Kal o? Xa^av Kal fiaXa tXew?, w 'E'^eKpaTe^, ovSev 
 Tpeaa<i ovhe Bia<l)deipa<; ovt€ tov ')(pcoft,aToi; ovts rov irpoawirov, 
 a\X' wairep elccdei TavprjBov vtro^Xh^as •irpb<; tov dvOpwirov, Tt 
 Xeyet?, 60?;, trepl rouSe tov "TrcofiaTOV irpo^ to dirocnrelaai Tivi ; 
 
 15 e^ecTTip, rj ov ; ToaovTov, e(f)r], w SfflK/Jare?, Tpt^ofiev, oaov ol6fie6a 
 fierpiov elvai wielv. ^avOavm, rj B' o?" dW' ev'X^sadai ye ttov rot? 
 6eol<; e^ecTTb re Kal XP^> "^^^ fieTOLKrjatv ttjv ivOevBe eKelare evTV)(rj S 
 yevecrOai,' a B^ Kal iym €vj(pp,al, Te Kal yevoiro ravTrj. Kai, a/jr 
 ehrwv ravra eTna-'^^ofievo'i Kal /laXa evx^pwi Kal evKoXeo'i i^eiriev. 
 
 here I think Schanz is right in accept- 
 ing the future. Prof. Geddes defends the 
 present by a reference to Herodotus IX 
 106; but tliere Abicht reads i/ifievhiv re 
 Kal /I47) dTroo-TTJcreffffai: besides which the 
 construction is different. Plato could 
 .very well , say oiSiv olfiai nepSalveiv dX\4 
 6<p\y'i(reu>, but oiSiv aXXo KipSalvnv ii 
 i<p\i]<reiv seems very doubtful Greek. 
 
 ■i. (f>EiSo)i.Evos oiSevos ?Ti evovTos] 
 ' being chary when the vessel is empty'; 
 a proverbial expression which we find 
 in Hesiod works and days 367 ixeaaoBi 
 ipetdeaSat, SeiK-r] 5' ^vl irvd^vi 0e(dc^. 
 
 117 A — 1 18 A, cc. Ixvi, Ixvii. The last 
 moments of Sokrates. 
 
 10. avTO iroiii(r£i] 'the poison will act 
 .of itself- TroieiK is used in this technical 
 sense by medical writers : Heindorf cites 
 Dioscorides l 95 TroieJ irpbi <pu.piJt.aKa, 'is 
 efficacious against poison '. The lexicons 
 also give Strab'o 234 \ovrpa KoKXiffra 
 
 TTOLOVVTCt irpo% vitCOVi* 
 
 11. KaV £s Xa^uv] 'and he took it 
 right cheerfully, Echekrates,. without a 
 
 shudder or any change of complexion or 
 countenance; but looking on the man 
 with bent brows, as his manner was, he 
 asked, What say you of this potion as to 
 pouring a libation to some deity? is it 
 permitted or not?' Notice the earnest 
 emphasis thrown on the words ^aXa VXeus 
 by the following u> 'Ex^Kpares. StaipBelpat 
 = changing for the worse, as Prof. Geddes 
 says : the partitive genitives strengthen 
 the force of the negation. Tavpr/Sbv iiro- 
 /SX^^as describes the fixed piercing gaze 
 habitual to Sokrates,, cf. 86 D. For the 
 use of Tr/ws Stallbaum compares Symfosir 
 um 174 B, 176B. The man's matter-of- 
 fact reply and his conduct throughout 
 serve to heighten the pathos: he does not 
 mean to be unfeeling, but familiarity with 
 such scenes has produced a certain pro- 
 fessional indifference; he seems not to 
 have been personally influenced by Sokra- 
 tes like the servant of the eleven. 
 
 19. iirwrxoiitvos] 'putting it to his 
 lips'. The active imffx^Tv is used of giv- 
 ing a draught to another. 
 
1 1 8] ^AIAIIN. 179 
 
 Kot rifi,av 01 TToXkoX Tew? ij,ev itrieiKW dtoL re rjaav icaTe')^eiv to fir] 
 BaKpveiv, <u? Be eiSofiev ttivovto. re Koi ireiraiicoTa, ovKert, aXX' ifjiov 
 lye ySta kui avrov dcTTaKTi e')(aspeb to, BaKpva, Sare ijKaXvtlrdfj.evo^ 
 aireKkaiov ifiavTov' ov jdp Srj eKelvov 76, aWa Trjv ifiavTov rv')(7jv, 
 
 D OLov avBpoi; eralpov icrrep'rifievo'; e'irjv. 6 Se Kplrcov eri, irpoTepo^ 5 
 efiov, iiretBrj 01};^ oto? t 'qv Kark-^eiv Ta Bdicpva, e^avea-rr). 'AiroX- 
 \oS(UjOOS Be KaX ev t&3 e/iTrpocrBev ')^p6va) ovBev eVaueTO BaKpvcov, koX 
 Brj KoX Tore dva^pv^rjo'dfievo'i KKaiwv Koi djavuKroSv ovBeva ovriva 
 ov KareKXacxe rwv irapovrav, 'jrXrjp rye avrov "^(OKparovf. iicelvo^ 
 Be, Ola, e^rj, rroielre, w Oavfidacoi. i^yo^ fievroi oi3^ ''qKicrra rovrov 10 
 €V€Ka rd^ jwaiKa'; dTre-jre/M^Ira, 'Iva jMrj rouavra •jrXrj/MfieXoleV Kal 
 
 E ydp dKr}icoa, on ev ev(f>r]fjLia ■)(^prj reXevrdv, aXA,' rjavx^iav re dyere 
 Kai Kaprepelre. Kal rip.el'i dKovaavre<; rjaj^vvOrjiiev re Kal eirea'^o- 
 fiev rov BaKpveiv. 6 Be rrepieXdiov, erreiBrj ol ^apvvecrdai et^iri rd 
 trKeXrj, KareKXiO-q v7mo<;' oiirco <ydp eKeXevev 6 dv6pcoTro<;' Kal dfia 15 
 e(t>aTrrofievo<; avrov o5to9 o Soi)? to ^dpfiaKov BtaXtircov 'X^povov 
 eTreaKorrei rovi; TroBai Kal rd crKeXr], Kcnveira a^oBpa Trtecra? avrov 
 rov rroSa ^pero, el alaOdvoiro' 6 S" ovk e^r)' Kal fierd rovro av0i<; 
 J18 rd<; Kvi]fia<;' koI erravKtiv ovra^ •q/uv eireBeiKvvro, on yjrv'^oiro re 
 Kal rrriyvvro, Kal avroi jjirrero Kal elrrev on, iireoSdv tt/so? r^ 20 
 KapSia jevrjrai avrm, rare ol'^rjaerai. TjBr} ovv a"xeB6v n avrov 'qv 
 
 1. KttTsj^eiv] 'we were able to re- is used as here. The old editions had 
 
 frain from tears'. This usage of Kari- KariiiKavffe: Stephanus conjectured kot^- 
 
 Xeiv is rare: cf. Soph. Oed. Tyr. 781 Kkaae, which was afterwards discovered 
 
 Ka-^ii ^apvi'dels ttjv liiv ovaav ■^/j.ipav fioXis in certain mss. 
 
 Kariffxov, Below we have the common 12. aKtJKoa on ev ««4"llf'"J XP'i ''''^"'" 
 
 use, Kaiix^iv rd SaKpva. xdv] According to Olympiodoros it was 
 
 ■i. dXV e[iov 7€ pCij Kttl avTov] 'but a Pythagorean precept, 
 
 in spite of myself my tears began to flow 15. oiiTco -ydp sKeXevev] i.e. vittlov 
 
 in torrents'. Cope. KaTaxKiOrivai. 
 
 7. Kal 8i^< Kal ToT£ dvaPpv)(i](rdjxe- 16. oiStos o 8ovs to (|>dp|ji.aKav] Schanz 
 
 vos] ' then above all bursting into loud brackets these words, but I think they 
 
 sobs, by his weeping and lamenting he are justly defended and retained by 
 
 utterly broke down every one of the com- Heindorf. 
 
 pany, save Sokrates himself. Hirschig 20. irif^vvro contracted from ir-qyvioi- 
 
 would omit KKalwv Kal ayavaKTuv, Schanz ro, cf. 77 B. 
 
 brackets KXaluiv koI : but can any one Kal avris rjuTeTo] Sokrates himself 
 
 read the sentence without feeling that its did the same as the man. This seems 
 
 rhythm is hopelessly ruined by either of to be mentioned simply as evidence of his 
 
 these needless and mischievous omissions? perfect calmness. Forster proposes aZets, 
 
 With KariKKaire Heindorf compares the supposing that the subject of ^Trrero is 
 
 Homeric KareK^daerj <pi\ov ^op: and 0. Solis to ^dpii,aKov, z.n& Schanz reads 
 
 Stallbaum quotes two passages of Plutarch, oiT, presumably on the same hypothesis. 
 
 Perikhs 37, Demosth. 22, where the word Neither alteration is to be commended. 
 
 12 — 2 
 
i8o 
 
 HAATfiNOS *AIADN. 
 
 [ii8 
 
 T^ irepl TO rjTpov ■^v'xpfieva, koX iKKaXv^dfj,evo<;, eveKeKoKvirTO i^ap, 
 
 enrev, b Brj reXevraiov e<f>6ej^aTo, 'fl 'Kplrwv, e'^97, tw 'AaKKT^irim 
 
 o(f>eiXofiev okeKrpvova' oKKa d-TroSoTe koI fir) dp^Xija-tjTe. 'AX\a 
 
 ravra, e(f>7], earai, 6 K-pircov' dW' opa, e'i rt dWo Xejei?. ravra 
 
 5 epofievov avrov ovSev eVt drreKpivaro, aXV oKi'yov -^povov BiaXiirwv 
 
 eKivrjOrj re koX 6 dvdpmiro'i l^eKaXv^ev avTov, Koi os rd o/i/Mara 
 
 eaTTjo-ev' IBwv Be 6 Kpirav crvveXa^e r6, <TT6p,a koi toi)? 6(p9a\/j,oii<!, 
 
 LXVII. "HSe 97 TeXeuT);, m ^^■^eKpaTe<;, rov iraipov rjpXv eyi- 
 
 vero, avBpo<}, co<s ij/ieK tjjalp^v dv, rwv rare wv eTreipdOripev dplaTov 
 
 10 Kai aWcB? (ppovi/jLCOTaTov Kal BiKaioTdrov. 
 
 2. T<p 'Ao-KXt|iri$ o(t>cCXo|i,cv a\eK- 
 Tpv6va] It might have been supposed 
 that the conception of life as a 'fitful fever' 
 was familiar enough to spare us all the 
 unprofitable ingenuity that has been ex- 
 pended on this passage. The last words 
 of Sokrates are in perfect harmony with 
 the whole tenor of his foregoing discourse. 
 His soul is on the point of being liberated 
 from the body and all its attendant infirmi- 
 ties and will presently be restored to her 
 primal purity and health. Corporeal ex- 
 istence is in fact a morbid condition of the 
 Boul, for which death is the remedy; 
 wherefore Sokrates vows to Asklepios the 
 sacrifice customary on recovery from sick- 
 ness. Prof. Geddes aptly quotes Timon 
 of Athens v i ' my long sickness of health 
 and living now begins to mend'. So 
 Olympiodoros : ha ret veviXTriKbra Trji 
 ^vxrjs iv ry yevia^i ravra i^idarp'ai : he 
 speaks too of an oracle which declares ri,i 
 ^vxas dvayofiivas rov Trcunca fSeiv. 
 
 6. lKivt)6i]: 'he stirred': probably 
 some slight spasm or shudder at the mo- 
 ment of dissolution. iKir^Bt] is far too 
 mild a word to signify convulsions, as 
 some would have it. 
 
 8. TJ8e r\ TtXtun]] The last three 
 lines of the dialogue have been variously 
 assailed by different critics on divers 
 grounds. First Wyttenbach, offended 
 by r6re, proposes rwv irdirore. Heindorf 
 would have ttoi'tui', rire us iveipiBri/iey. 
 Schanz brackets a\\us, Hirschig is ac- 
 
 tually prepared to cancel all after iyiv^ro. 
 I believe that every word stands exactly 
 as Plato wrote it, and that not one could 
 be altered or omitted without marring the 
 sad music of this solemn close. Wytten- 
 bach supports his rwv wunrore from Plu- 
 tarch, but the Platonic passages he quotes 
 have yevoiiivav, a<piKoii.evoii' &c, which 
 makes all the difference. Moreover he 
 introduces a tone of panegyric, which, 
 though not perhaps exaggerated, is quite 
 discordant with the subdued simplicity 
 which is the chief charm of this wonder- 
 ful scene, and with the studiously modest 
 us ri/iiTs tjtatixev av : this has been remarked 
 by Prof. Geddes. ran ToVq as Stallbaum 
 says, 'solemnis est formula in eiusmodi 
 praeconiis ', meaning ' of all his contempo- 
 raries ' ; and for the reference of rare to 
 a recent period he cites Politicus 263 e. 
 But probably, as Grote suggests, Plato 
 used the word rather from his own point 
 of view at the time he wrote than from 
 that of the supposed speaker. diXXus has 
 reference not to ruiv rare, as Heindorf 
 thinks, but to dpltrrov : ' In other respects ' 
 is practically equivalent to 'moreover', or 
 ' besides ': it merely serves to mark the tran- 
 sition from the vaguer to the more definite 
 expressions of praise. Preserving the sen- 
 tence intact I should translate: 'such 
 was the end, O Echekrates, of our com- 
 panion — a man, as we should say, among 
 all then living whom we knew the noblest, 
 ay and the wisest and most just'. 
 
APPENDIX I. 
 
 Br]fji,OTiKr} Koi TrokmKT] dperij. 
 
 To the student of Plato's ethics it is obviously important to deter- 
 mine exactly what is to be understood by the popular, as contrasted 
 with the philosophic, dper^, and should there prove to be more than one 
 variety of the former, to distinguish between them. With a view to 
 this, I propose to examine briefly Plato's principal statements on the 
 subject Besides the passages in the Phaedo, 68 d foil, and 82 a, the 
 following extracts seem to me to contain a complete exposition of 
 Plato's views. 
 
 1. Republic 554 C. dp ovv ov toijto) S^Xov, on iv rots aXXots ivfi^o- 
 Xatots o ToiovTO's, iv ots eiSoKt/tci Sokwv Stxatos elvai, ixitiKei rwl iavrov ^ux 
 KaT£\ei aXAas /ca/cas iiTLOvfji.Cag, ov ireWtav on ovk dfieivov, ovS' ■^p.e.pwv Xoyia, 
 a AX dvayK-g koI <j)6j3(o, Trepl t^s aWrji; over tots TpifJi.<iiV ; Kat Trdw y, ifjyrj. 
 Kat VT^ Ata, ^v 8' eyo), <3 fftLke, TOts ttoXXois ye auT<3v evpifceis, OTai/ 80; 
 rdXXoTpia dvaXio-Keiv, ras rov Krj<f>'^voi fuyyevets ivoveras iTnOvpLias. Kat 
 fidXa, r/ 8 OS, <7<l>68pa, Ovk ap av eii/ ao-rao-iacTTOs d TOtowos ev eaurcS, oiSe 
 els, aXXa 8«rXoi)s ri<s, hm6vjji,Las 8^ iin6vp.iMV los to ttoXii Kparova^a'S av 
 l^ot )SeXTtovs )(e.ipovmv. Eo-Ttr odtus. Amx TaDra Si;, oip.ai, eva-)(r]fiovi<T- 
 Tepoi av TroXXJJi/ o TOtovTos eh;' op.ovorqTiKrj% hi. koI ■qpp.oo'jj.iVfj'i frjs ^v\fj(i 
 aXi/^iJs apeTT] Tropp(o Trot eK^svyoi ay avTov. 
 
 ii. Republic 506 A. ot^nat yoSv, etTroi/, tiKaid t£ /cat KaXa dyvoov/xeva, 
 oirrj TTore dyaBd laTiv, ov ttoWov tivos d^iov ^uXaKa KSKTrjcOai av eavTtSv 
 rov rovTO dyvoovvra' pwreiofuxi Se /jLTjSeva avrd Trporepov yvwa^icrOai iKai'iSj. 
 
 iii. Republic S°° i'- ""' "^^ ''■'Sj etTrov, ovt<3 [sc. t<3 ^tXoo-o^o)] 
 avayKfj yivrjTai a iKii opa. p,i\errj(TaL ets av6p(airwv fjOr) Kat t8t'o Kat hr]fjLO(rLa 
 riOcvai Kat /ii; fwvov iavrov TrXciTTetv, apo kokoV Brj/jLiovpyov avrov oiet 
 ytvi^<T€<rdai (r(a<j>po(Tvvr]s re Kat SiKaioavvr/g Kat avp-Tcdfrrji T^i Srj[ioTiic^s 
 dperrj^; "HKtora ye, ^ 8' os. 501 A. hrara, otfw.1, aTrepya^o/icvot TruKva 
 av- eKarepwcr ciTro/JXeVotey ?rpos tc to tfivcTU StKoiov Kat KaXoi' Kat <Tia<ftpov Kat 
 iravra rd roiavTa sat irpos cKctko av, o Iv Tots ai'^ptoffots cp-Trototev, ^v/i- 
 
1 82 APPENDIX I. 
 
 iu.fvvvT€<i T£ /cat KCjoavnVres hi rav eirtTi/Sev/taruv to avSpeiKeXov, o S17 Kai 
 "Ofirjpos cKaXco-ev ev ToTs avSpcojrow eyyiyvo/ievov 0£OeiSes re (cai deoeuccXoy. 
 
 iv. Laws 710 A. KA. ^a><l>poa-vvrjV /tot SoKct ffipa^eiv, <o MeytXXc, 
 Setv eivat tiJi/ ^veiro/j.efrjv 6 iivos' rj yap ; A0. Tijv 87]p,ioS7] ye, Z Kkeivia, 
 Koi ov^ rpr Tts (rep,vvvu)V av Xeyot, dW oirep evdvi iratcrt Kat OrjpCoi^, rots /;iev 
 axpaTois e;(£iv irpos tcis Tjoovdi, ^\ip.<^VTOv hravOei, toTs 8e tyKpoTOS' o Kat 
 fjLOVovfJicvov eipapLtv T(3v iroXXuiv aya^olv ouk a^tov cti'at Xoyov. 
 
 V. Meno 99 E. et Se vv'V rip-vs iv iravrl T<a Xoyoi Tovrm KaXcos i^rjrrj- 
 crafiiv re koI iXiyopiev, dper^ av e'r] oi/re <j>v<rei ovre StSaKTor, aXXa 6aa 
 fLoipa. Trapayiyvop-ivr) av€v vov, ois av vapayiyvqrai, et p-rj Tts tit] toiovtos t<3v 
 ■jToXtTtKuJi' acSpcov, oTos Kat aXXov iroiTJO'ai ttoXitikov. et Se et?;, trp^eSoi' av Tt 
 pvTos XeyoiTO ToioBros ev rots ^iStnv, otov ttj>rj "O/xi^pos iv rois jtOveiocn. 
 Tetpecrtai' eti/at, Xcycov irept avTov on otos triirvvTai twv ev AtSou, at Se 
 cTKiat dicraovcri. ravrov av Ka\ cvdvi Totovros, oia-Trep Trapa cr/ctas uXtjOk av 
 irpdypa, eiij irpos aptrrjv. 
 
 j.'Vi. Laws 642 C. povoi yap avfv avayKiji avTO^vws Biia polpa 
 dXrjOw'S Koi ov Tt ttXoo'toJs eto-tv ayaOoL 
 
 vii. Repuilic 619 C. cTvat 8e ovtov [sc. 'rov ti}v p.e.yi(jTfpr TupawiSa 
 eXo/*£Vov] Tcov ex toI ovpavoC t^kovtwv, iv TiTay[i.ivri troXiTilq. iv tw Trporcpto 
 ySto) jSeyStUKOTa, e^et ayev cj>iXoiro<f>t.ai apeTrj<s /terEtXij^oTO. ids 8e Kat ein-etv, 
 OVK eXarTovs eti'at iv TOts TotouTotg aXto'KO/t.ei'ovs tous eK tov ovpai/ov 
 ^KOVTas, are ttovcov dyvp.vdarovi. 
 
 viii. Republic ifii E. tojv •KapaXe.nropivwv koX p,^ kuXus Sjyptoupyij- 
 6eVT(tfv ^ p,i; KaXuJS <l>vvTii>v o^vTar av alcrddvoLTO 6 eKet Tpa<^eis cos eSei, Kat 
 op6(3s SiJ ^aipwv Kat Svo-xepati/o)!/' Ta p.£v KaXa eTratvot Kat KaTaSe^^opevos eis 
 Tiji/ ^vxijv Tpi<f>oiT av air' avTW Kat ytyvotro koXos Te Kayaflos, ra S' aio-^pa 
 i^e'yot t' av opSujs Kat ptcot en veos <ov, irpXv Xo'yov Sui/aTos etyat Xa^iiv, 
 iX66vTOi 8e ToS Xoyov oo-Tra^oiT av avTOV yv(opi^<ov BC dp.oidTijTa p.aXto-Ta o 
 ouTM Tpa^ets. 
 
 Other passages might be quoted more or less bearing on the subject, 
 e.g. Republic 409 a, 430 b, Phaedrus 256 e, Protagoras 355 c foil., 
 but none, so far as I am aware, which throw any additional light upon 
 it. 
 
 In the extract first quoted we have, it is clear, precisely the same 
 conception of the vulgar sort of virtue as in Phaedo 68 d. Plato has 
 been describing, in one of the most scathing passages he ever penned, 
 the character of the o'Xtyapx"cds av?;p. Such a man sets lucre above all 
 things, he scrapes and hoards and denies himself, subduing all other ap- 
 
 * I have followed the text of the Zurich editors. 
 
APPENDIX I. 183 
 
 petit'es beneath the master-passion of amassing wealth. And since such 
 habits tend in the main to outward orderliness of conduct, he acquires 
 the reputation of being a worthy respectable man. Yet he is filled with 
 a swarm of 'drone lusts', which are commonly held down by the strong 
 hand of avarice, but are suffered to riot unchecked, if this may be done 
 at another's expense. And all this happens because he has paid no 
 heed to his education. Here we have a perfect picture of a man 8t' 
 (xKoXao-iav cre(r(i)(f>povia-iJi,ivoi: in that he controls his sensual appetites he 
 is so far a-iat^ptav, but he controls them only because he is aKoXao-Tos in 
 the indulgence of unbounded avarice. In ii again Plato insists upon 
 the point which is so strongly emphasised in the Phaedo; that no real 
 knowledge of things just and beautiful can exist which is not based on 
 knowledge of the good. We see then in these passages that the l-r]p.o- 
 ■tLKq dperq is a morality formed by the mass of mankind for themselves 
 on strictly utilitarian principles, by balancing pains and pleasures, and 
 without knowledge of the good. We observe also that for this Plato 
 has nothing but scorn and sarcasm : he would not indeed deny that a 
 temperance which is the effect of intemperance is better than no tem- 
 perance at all; but it is at best a base and sordid counterfeit of true 
 virtue. 
 
 But in iii we have quite a different picture. Here we see the phi- 
 losopher himself, as prophet and teacher, creating the S-^/xotiki; dper-q in 
 the souls of his fellow men, by moulding their characters after the image 
 of that justice and beauty whereof he beholds the eternal ideas. As the 
 painter's glance passes to and fro between his model and his canvas, so 
 is the gaze of the philosopher turned now to his ideal archetype, now to 
 the human image of the divine that he is fashioning. Now it is evident 
 that this virtue can no longer be a contemptible thing, since it is worth 
 the philosopher's while to pause in his study of the truth, that he may 
 implant it in the hearts of men: it is indeed the highest that the great 
 mass of mankind can hope to attain, who live and die in the darkness 
 of the cave. Again this is no longer an ethical code which the multi- 
 tude frame for themselves; it is one which the philosopher frames for 
 them : nor does he construct it on any utilitarian basis, but out of his 
 knowledge of ideal truth. Yet as held by them it is still utilitarian, for 
 they accept it on utilitarian grounds: they receive it, not because they 
 know why it is good, for they are without knowledge of the good, but 
 because the philosopher convinces them that it is for their advantage to 
 do so ; that by submitting to its restrictions they avoid great evils. As 
 they hold it therefore, it is utilitarian ; as he conceives it, not so : thus 
 they are still, though in a far more refined sense, St' oiKoXaaCav aea-tocjipo- 
 
1 84 APPENDIX I. 
 
 na-fiivoi. Plato acknowledges that the morality of the multitude must 
 be utilitarian, since none other is attainable save by the highly trained 
 metaphysician. Therefore, however superior the morality of those who 
 obey this code may be to that of the oligarchical man, it is sundered 
 from that of the philosopher by a fathomless gulf — it is avev <j>pov7}creii>i. 
 
 In the next three quotations Plato is speaking of an innate virtue, 
 not springing from reason or any system, but from natural instinct. 
 The most interesting and important of these passages is that from the 
 Meno, which with its context gives a pretty full statement of Plato's 
 view. This instinctive virtue is due to no effort of its possessor but to 
 the dispensation of heaven j 6eia. /xoCpa.^ ■Trapayiyvofi.tvr] — a phrase which 
 is explained in vi by avTO(f>vw'i'. Some men are so happily endowed 
 by divine favour that without consciously striving after virtue they lead 
 virtuous lives; they do right without knowing the difference between - 
 right and wrong. Now this natural virtue seems at first sight difficult 
 to classify along with either form of Stj/iotikjJ aptnj before described. 
 But a closer examination will show that, however much more attractive 
 it may be, it does not in principle differ from the first. For we observe 
 (i) that the virtue which these Oeloi follow by the impulse of their own 
 hearts is the ordinary utilitarian virtue, (2) they are just, temperate, &c, 
 simply because these virtues are more natural and therefore more easy 
 and pleasant to them than the opposite vices, not because they choose 
 them as being better : their virtue, when analysed, is an amiable form of 
 selfishness. Therefore they must, harsh as it seems, be classed with ol 
 Si* aKoXaa-Cav o-£o-ci)^povicr/i,«Vot, and with the first variety, since their 
 virtue is of themselves, not from the philosopher. 
 
 The whole discussion in the Meno brings out two points very clearly : 
 (i) the fundamental difference between popular and philosophic dpeTrj 
 is the same as that between true opinion and knowledge; (2) true 
 opinion, where it is present, leads in the same path as knowledge: 
 the iStojTJjs who has a true opinion about what is right will act in the 
 same way as the ^tXocro<^os who knows what is right^ Therefore the 
 
 1 A careful investigation into the mean- ^uJjs apcrii with that which is the result of 
 ing of the phrase Belif nolpf will be found hriarifiJai, in the Meno he merely notes 
 in Zeller's Philosophic der Griechen II i that aper?) is no inbred attribute of human 
 p. 497 note (3rd ed.). See also Dr Thomp- nature, but where it occurs without kiri- 
 son's note on Gorgias 506 E oix ouVwj cW/"?! it is bestowed by special favour of 
 elKTi KiXKurra irapaylyverai. the gods. Cf. 89 B. 
 
 2 This seems at first sight to conflict ' The ISiuTtis and the ^iXoo-o^os are 
 with the opposition of Belif nolpf with tpi- aiming at precisely the same thing, viz. 
 cei in the Meno. But I think that while the good : only the (piKluroijios seeks it as 
 in the Laws Plato is contrasting the aiiro- it really is, the Mtwrijs as it is adumbrated 
 
APPENDIX I. 18S 
 
 popular virtue in its highest conceivable form leads to the same conduct 
 as the philosophic virtue. The difference is that we can trust the latter 
 and not the former : we cannot ensure that a man will always have right 
 opinions; they may at any moment slip away from him like the statues 
 of Daidalos. But the knowledge of the philosopher can never fail him : 
 thence it is that he must come forward as the instructor of mankind ; 
 they must not be left to their good instincts, which may betray them, or 
 to their utilitarian codes, which must lower them : they must accept a 
 morality founded on the philosopher's sure and abiding knowledge of 
 the good'. 
 
 In vii we have a slight distinction. Here is one who is virtuous by 
 habit and convention. There is however no specific difference between 
 him and the ^eioi of the Meno: his conduct is equally influenced by 
 unreflecting impulse, and we must conceive him as naturally well dis- 
 posed. Plato notes however that this unthinking obedience to custom 
 and tradition may lead to 'the most disastrous consequences, when a 
 man is placed in a situation where custom and tradition are of no avail. 
 How little value Plato set on this conventional virtue may be gathered 
 from Phaedo 82 b, where those who have lived virtuously l^ tOovi re 
 Kot /itXcTijs av€v (^(Xoo-o^ias re Kal vov pass at death into the form of 
 some social and peaceable animal, bee, wasp or ant, or at best live again 
 as decent and orderly citizens. 
 
 In viii we have the description of a child who is receiving a true 
 education. He is to be surrounded from infancy with an atmosphere 
 of the purest morality, <jxnrep avpa i^tpovaa airo ^(prjcrTiSv roirmv vyUiav, 
 till he insensibly glides into harmony with fair reason; music is to sink 
 into his soul, filling it with a love of concord and order : and thus being 
 habituated to all that is noble and beautiful, while still too young to 
 understand the reason why it is so, when in maturer years he at last 
 attains knowledge of the reason, he welcomes it with joy, because all 
 his previous training has fitted him to receive it. Thus we see that the 
 SrjiionKr] apirrj in its highest form serves as a propaedeutic for dpirrj 
 /iem ff)pov)ja-€tjK. That is to the philosophic child but an early stage 
 which to the unphilosophic many is their journey's end; the highest 
 level their maturity attains is for his youth a starting-point to the know- 
 ledge of the good. 
 
 The result then of our investigation is this. While all Sij/aotikj; 
 
 in his own mind : the demotic good is, as \6y<f xal <os ok ^/son/uos oplaeiev. Nic. 
 
 Plato says, the shadow of the philosophic. Eth. II vi 15. Cf. Eud, Eih, III v 1232a 
 
 1 Thus we see the Platonic origin of 36. 
 Aristotle's conception of aper^ CifiujiAvn 
 
l86 'APPENDIX I. 
 
 dpcTi^ is radically distinguished from philosophical morality by the fact 
 that it is avev (^povryo-etos, we may I think discern two well-marked 
 varieties of it, represented by extracts i and iii; regarding that of v vi 
 and vii as not specifically distinct from i. The first is an ethical code 
 formed (i) by the multitude for themselves, (2) on utilitarian principles, 
 (3) without knowledge of the good; the second is (i) formed by the 
 philosopher for the multitude, (2) not on utilitarian principles, (3) with 
 knowledge of the good, but (4) accepted by the multitude on utilitarian 
 principles and without knowledge of the good. The first Plato regards 
 with unmixed contempt; the second he recognises as the best which 
 the great majority of mankind can attain, and by it he hopes to super- 
 sede the other : nay, so much importance does he attach to this, that 
 his philosophers must take it in turns to desist from their own medita- 
 tions and give their minds to instructing their fellow citizens. We must 
 beware of regarding these two varieties as two successive conceptions by 
 Plato of the Stjiiotiktj apeTnj: they are two distinct kinds, of which one is 
 utterly condemned, the other positively enforced upon the masses. 
 
 Finally it may be noted that the perfection of philosophic virtue is 
 only to be found in the perfect philosopher in whom all knowledge and 
 wisdom are consummated, os ^iXoao^tas iir' uKpov a7ra<n;s cA.7yA.r5c. 
 Plato did not pretend that he or any one else had reached such know- 
 ledge; therefore he would admit that his moral code was necessarily in- 
 complete and tentative. But this is only to say that no ethical system 
 based on metaphysical research can be perfect until the object of that 
 research has been fully attained; until, that is, absolute knowledge has 
 been won. And though such knowledge may be unattainable, Plato 
 has still consolation : if philosophy's advance in cognition of the truth be 
 endless, endless also must be her progress in virtue. 
 
APPENDIX II. 
 
 The ordinary interpretation of chapter xlviii represents Sokrates, 
 after failing to unravel the secrets of nature by the methods of the 
 physicists, as betaking himself to the contemplation of nature through 
 the medium of Xo-yoi. This view has been set forth with such clearness 
 and precision by Prof. Geddes that I cannot do better than give it in 
 his words. ' Having failed in his first voyage, under the guidance of 
 the physicists, Socrates says that he set out by himself on a second 
 voyage of discovery in search of a solid basis of Being, not by gazing 
 on the outward world of matter, but by meditating on the inner 
 world of thought'....' Socrates had stated that the study of the external 
 world by the senses simply would not conduct to knowledge of causation, 
 and that the effect of such study would be like looking at an eclipse of 
 the sun with the naked eye; viz. dizziness under the dazzling maze of 
 phenomena (cf. IXiyyiS, in 79 c, rapaTToixai in 100 d). Therefore, he 
 goes on to say, as one uses a medium in looking at an eclipse, such as 
 the reflection in water, or the like, so we must proceed regarding the 
 external world, by studying phenomena through media or images, 
 which images can be nothing else than 01 Xoyot, /. e. principles or 
 reasons intellectually apprehended. This simile however has the dis- 
 advantage of representing the intellectual world as the shadow, and 
 not the reality ; and therefore Socrates at once anticipates and corrects 
 a misimpression that might arise from the use of such a simile. Perhaps 
 however the process I refer to (viz. to Iv Xoyois o-Kon-eii') is in a certain 
 respect not parallel with that to which I compare it. For I do not at all 
 admit that the man who looks at things in their principles sees things a 
 whit more by images than one who looks at them in their external effects ', 
 "Although it is true," says Socrates, "that those who look at the 
 sun's reflection in water see a reflection and nothing more, I do not 
 admit that those who study to obtain a knowledge of Being through 
 
 ' The italics are Prof. Geddes's own. 
 
1 88 APPENDIX II. 
 
 the medium of the principles in the intellect (oi Xoyoi) perceive mere 
 reflections of things, and not realities. Therefore the simile I have 
 used is simply an illustration indicating that transition in which I 
 turned from the blinding spectacle of to epya, as studied by the 
 physicists, to the less remote, but not less real, world of ot \6yoi, or the 
 intellectual principles of things ".' 
 
 Now the first remark I have to offer upon the above exposition is that 
 the representation of Scvtc/jos irXods as a ' second voyage of discovery ' 
 is not consistent with the perfectly correct explanation of that proverb 
 given by Prof. Geddes himself a little earlier ; ' it signifies a " second 
 resource in default of a better ", and is applied, not to what is absolutely, 
 but to what is relatively, best '. Ast indeed denies this : but that such 
 is the meaning is conclusively determined, not only by the origin of 
 the proverb, but by its use in every one of the passages where it occurs. 
 Sokrates means that having failed in the highest object of his endeavour 
 he betakes himself to this method of Xoyot as the closest feasible ap- 
 proximation to it. 
 
 But what is this highest object, the TrpaJros irXous? Certainly not 
 the investigation of phenomena by means of physical science. On the 
 study of phenomena Plato is perpetually heaping the most contumelious 
 epithets, especially in the period to which the Phaedo belongs : even 
 in the Timaeus, great part of which is occupied with physical specula- 
 tions, the most Plato will say for such pursuits is that they are a sober 
 and harmless recreation in the intervals of more serious studies (59 c). 
 Neither in matter nor in our opinions about it is there any certainty, 
 stability or truth : matter therefore cannot be meant when Sokrates says 
 a.Trdpi\Ka. to. ovra (tkoitiSv. It is true that he guards himself by the pro- 
 vision ov yap TTcivv ^yxuipw K.r.\., but this very fact is inconsistent 
 with the theory that phenomena are the ovra which Sokrates failed to 
 reach : the Xoyot must in some sense be eiKoVcs of something, else what 
 is the point of the comparison ? Apart from this, Sokrates has in the 
 previous chapter given us two perfectly precise statements : (i) that he 
 had actually tested and discredited the methods of the physicists, (2) that 
 his hope was to discover rdyaddv koX Siov as the ultimate ahCa ; in other 
 words, to construct a teleological theory of the universe. This then 
 is the 'great and wondrous hope', which the physicists could not 
 gratify, and which he himself failed to fulfil; and this it is for which 
 the method of Xdyoi offers a substitute. 
 
 I conceive then that Prof. Geddes has fallen into error as to the 
 nature of the irpojTos irXoCs by failing to keep a firm hold upon the 
 meaning of SevTipos irXous : for I cannot imagine he would maintain 
 
APPENDIX II. 189 
 
 that Plato even for a moment could speak of the study of \oyot as 
 inferior to the study of phenomena. But I have another very grave 
 objection to his interpretation. He speaks of the ' dazzling maze of 
 phenomena', 'the blinding spectacle of ra 2pya, as studied by the 
 physicists ' ; and in his exposition the sun symbolises material particu- 
 lars. But where shall we find such language in Plato ? If we turn to 
 a part of the Republic with which our present passage is intimately 
 connected, we shall see something very different. In 508 c we read 
 o<l>6a\[j,ol 6l(t6' OTi, oTav fjLyjKer iir iKiivd tis ovtov's rpiirg &v ay rets ;^oas 
 TO Ti/xepLvov (j)<j}i kiriyqi, aWa uv WKTipiva ijiiyyr], a/x^XviaTTOVCTL re kol 
 tyyi'S <t)aivovTai rvijiXiov, uKnrep ovk ci'ovcrijs KaOapa.<s oi/'ttus. koX fiaXa, 
 l^j;. OTttV Se y, oi/xoi, Siv 6 rfkioi; KaTaXdfiTrri, tTa<j>w? dpucrt, koI tois 
 auTOts TovTOLi ofifJi.a.(Tiv tvovcra (^atVcTat. Tt //ijv ; ovto) toiwv Kai to t!}i 
 ^v)(rji (uSe vocf orav juev ov KaTaXajXTrei aXrjOeia t€ kol to ov, €ts tovto 
 airepcwnjTai, evorjvi re KoX eyvio avTO koX vovv £X*"' ^"'"'stoi' oTav Se 
 cTTt TO Tu (7K0T0J KiKpafiivov, TO yiyvo/^evov TE Kai aTroX\iJ/;icvov, oo^aZ^et t£ 
 Kat d/x;8Xv(0TTei av(i> Kai KctTO) Tag So^as ft-era^aWov Kai eoikci' au vouv 
 ouK l;)(oi'Ti. Again if we turn to 516 A we find the very same metaphor : 
 the sun moon and stars represent the ideas, and their reflections in 
 water represent these very Xo'yoi with which we are dealing in the 
 present passage. It is to me absolutely incredible that Plato should 
 have inverted his metaphor, should have reversed the relation of 
 thought and matter. Thought is always to him the region of truth and 
 hght, matter of dimness and uncertainty : and that he should even 
 for a moment represent thought as a medium to temper the blinding 
 glare of material existence is in my judgment unnatural and incon- 
 sistent with the whole tenor of his language on this subject. Prof. 
 Geddes appeals to the use of tXiyyia and TapaTTOfiai, but Plato tells us 
 {Republic 5 1 8 a) oti haToX Kai ajro SiTTeov yiyvovrai iiriTapd^en o/A/iacriv, 
 cK T€ tjxnTos eis o^KOTOs fied lO'Tajj.ivmv koI Ik (tkotovs eis <^(3s. Moreover 
 in the interpretation I am criticising Xoyoi are used as helps to the 
 contemplation of phenomena, whereas Plato always treats them as helps 
 to the contemplation of the ideas. 
 
 The passage, as I read it, has the following significance. I attempted, 
 says Sokrates, to discover to aya^w as the ultimate cause working in 
 nature. But when, after long endeavour, I failed in the struggle, I 
 began to fear that by fixing my gaze too intently on realities I might be 
 blinded in soul, as men are bereft of their bodily vision by gazing on 
 the sun. So I bethought me of framing in my own mind images or 
 concepts of those realities which I desired to study, and in them safely 
 to examine the nature of their types. Bijt though I admit these concepts 
 
I90 APPENDIX IL 
 
 are but images of the realities, mind I don't allow that they are so in any 
 greater degree than material phenomena: both in fact are images; 
 but whereas phenomena are the images presented to us by our senses, 
 concepts are the images deliberately formed by our understanding ; 
 concepts therefore are more real than phenomena in proportion as 
 understanding is more sure than sense. Be that as it may, I did form 
 these concepts and used them as a standard to estimate the truth or 
 falsehood of particulars. 
 
 Sokrates in fact, since he despairs of actually grasping the eternal 
 ideas, of which all natural phenomena are symbols, endeavours to form 
 from those symbols, mental concepts or universals, which shall represent 
 the ideas to him : they are the ideas as reflected in his intelligence. 
 The verity of these concepts cannot be thoroughly ascertained, as the 
 Republic tells us, until the ideas have been actually apprehended and 
 compared with them : meanwhile they afford the best working hypo- 
 thesis that can be obtained. No prospect of this verification is held 
 out in the Phaedo; in the Republic however Plato speaks more hope- 
 fully- 
 
 This interpretation, as it appears to me, establishes the right relation 
 between the Sevrepos ttXous and the wpwros irXous, gives to Plato's illus- 
 tration its natural and customary significance, and brings the passage 
 into complete harmony with the Republic. The objections which I con- 
 ceive are most likely to be felt to it would no doubt be based upon the 
 sentence pXeirwv irpos to T-payfuna. k.t.X. The difficulty of the passage 
 arises, I think, partly from the ambiguity of the term to ovra, partly 
 from a fusion of the symbol with the thing symbolised, and from a 
 general lack of that precision of language which our familiarity with the 
 sixth book of the Republic induces us to expect. But we must remember 
 that Plato is not here professing to give a systematic exposition of his 
 theory, such as we find in the Republic ; we have only a general outline 
 of the method which is copiously explained in the other dialogue. 
 Accordingly Plato, while setting up an antithesis between realities and 
 images, does not stop at this point to explain what realities are opposed 
 to the images ; hence the uncertainty attaching to ra ovto., which the 
 physicists would refer to sensible, Plato to supersensual existences. 
 The meaning he assigns to it is only parenthetically conveyed to us 
 by his saving clause later on. My reference of to Trpdyiiara to the ideas 
 I should defend by the use of avra to Ttpayimra in 66 e ; and we are in 
 no wise bound to assign the same meaning to r-payiwra and to epyots. 
 The words eKdcrrr] Twi/ al<r6'^(remv are, I consider, to be regarded as purely 
 metaphorical. In the passage icrais /iev ovv k.t.X., Plato seems to betray 
 
APPENDIX II. 191 
 
 & consciousness that the absence of precision in his previous statement 
 is likely to lead to misconceptions : he therefore inserts a parenthesis 
 warning us against supposing that the realities of which he speaks are par- 
 ticulars; these, he says, are ctKoves just as much as the Xoyoi. But he 
 does not dwell on this point ; and his immediate resumption of his 
 narrative with a\X' olv S17, ' be that as it may ', shows that it is not his 
 present purpose to emphasise it- 
 
 The views of other editors agree in the main with that of Prof. 
 Geddes, but show some minor points of difference. Fischer, followed by 
 Stallbaum, regards both Xdyoi and Ipya as Akovv;, and translates Iv tois 
 Ipyots ' ex effectis alicuius rei '. Ast and H. Schmidt understanding 
 Ijo-yot? of material objects, deny that \6-^oi are tiKoVes : and the former 
 expressly, the latter by implication, denies that SevVcpos irXous signifies 
 an inferior method. I think the two latter are right about epyots, but 
 in respect of the Xoyoi and the Sevrepos TrXoijs Fischer and Stallbaum are 
 unquestionably nearer the truth. But all these views are in my judg- 
 ment radically vitiated by failure to recognise that a theory of final 
 causes is that which Sokrates had hitherto vainly attempted to reach by 
 apprehension of the ultimate airia itself, and to which he now hoped to 
 make an approximation by the aid of his- logical method. 
 
 The foregoing exposition assumes the genuineness of every word in 
 the passage. Mr Jackson however has suggested to me that one sentence 
 is open to grave suspicion of interpolation. The whole trouble arises 
 from the words ^Xiiruiv irpos to, Trpayjuaro tois ojiixafri KoX iKaaTr] rtav 
 aia-dT^a-ewv liny^iipiav airTecr^at avTwv. Had these words been absent, 
 there would not, I think, have been two opinions as to the interpretation 
 of the passage, which would then run thus. ' Exhausted by the effort 
 to grasp realities ', says Sokrates, ' I felt I must beware lest I suffered 
 the fate of those who observe an eclipse of the sun directly and are 
 blinded for their pains. I feared my soul might be blinded by 
 direct vision of the truth: and so I thought it prudent to content 
 myself with the consideration of Xoyoi, which are the reflections of the 
 truth in my thoughts. Yet for all that, these thought-images are just as 
 real as the material images of nature : so I am in at least as good a posi- 
 tion as the physicist who occupies himself with the symbols of sense '. 
 Nothing can be more plain and simple than the sense thus obtained. 
 Now if we examine the obnoxious sentence, we shall see that it is in 
 itself confused and inaccurate. After rqv i/'ux'?" 'rv<j>Xio9cir]v, which gives 
 us the thing symbolised, we have a sudden and perplexing transition to 
 the symbol in pxirrwv Trpos to. Trpdyfrnra rots oft-fj-acri : the mind's eye and 
 the body's eye are jumbled most incoherently together ; for the depri- 
 
192 APPENDIX II. 
 
 vation of mental vision is given as the result of action on the part of the 
 bodily organ. And in the next breath we have skoo-ti; rZv ala-6-^a-etav 
 iirv)(€ip<av awrta-Qai avVcut', which is not even germane to the metaphor. 
 Surely these are two serious defects. And since we find that the very 
 sentence which hampers the interpretation of the entire passage is in 
 itself, quite apart from the general context, open to damaging criticism, 
 it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the whole clause from pxiiriav 
 to avTuiv is from the hand of the same hazy-minded interpolator who has 
 on some other occasions foisted his own ineptitudes upon Plato. The 
 sentence is precisely what we should expect him to introduce, imagining 
 (as he was quite certain to do) that the irpcoros irXoCs was the observation 
 of particulars '. 
 
 But although I think there are strong reasons for supposing these 
 words to be spurious, I do not in the least rest my interpretation of the 
 chapter on their rejection. The omission renders the passage a much 
 better piece of exposition ; but in any case it seems clear to me that the 
 meaning is the same. On this ground I have refrained from bracketing 
 the words in question, since I do not wish it to appear as if my explana- 
 tion in any degree depended upon expunging them. 
 
 ^ It is possible that the bracket ought may be noted, the blindness is not said to 
 to begin with (Sewa, The words /hi) trav- a,rise from excess of light. The onvission 
 Tciiraffi Trjv ^vxnv Tv^\ii>8elrii> are not in- of these words gives a satisfactory sen- 
 deed open to the objections which apply tence : toioStov n xal iyii dievo^Oriv, Kai 
 to the following, but they are not necessary ^Soje S?) /wi xp^Koi. I do not feel how- 
 since the same meaning is conveyed in ever that the clause lSeiaa...TV(p\u6cir]v 
 /Hj iraBoi/u k.t.\. Our interpolator may is at all on the same footing as the con- 
 have borrowed from 96 C uird Tairrjs t^s eluding words of the sentence, 
 (TKiijieiiit ofirti) C(j>oipa iTV^^ddrjv, where, it 
 
GREEK INDEX. 
 
 &yairu>iiei>a \MSi.a, 164 
 
 ieiSh, gi 
 
 iSdvaTor, distinguished from iviUKeSpov, 
 
 m 
 
 &eepiMr, 153 
 
 'ABrpiaiuv avSpes hSexa, 103 
 
 "AtSij!, 94, 96 
 
 aW^p, 162 
 
 AlaxiXov TrjXeipos, 160 
 
 aUpa, 166 
 
 aKpa Tuv iax&TW, 1 13 
 
 dXXa7^ TTpis dper'^v, 68 
 
 a/i68ev voSiv, 87 
 
 a/ivrp-os Kal iriXeffros, 70 
 
 ay, omission of, 57, 157 
 
 in/a^uitratiBai, transitive, 1 1 1 
 
 ivapiaxTKeadai, 75 
 
 ii>aPpvx'>l<rdiJi,ei/os, 179 
 
 afanvriait, 77 foil. 
 
 avaweiTTapUi'ovs, 166 
 
 avapTios, 149 
 
 ajiSpaToSuSr]! dpeT'^, 69 
 
 dvaip-tff, opposed to yoriTif, 93 
 
 dvolaeiv, 82 
 
 ovTaTroSiSicai, intransitive, 75 
 
 drrtXoyt/fot, 114 
 
 avuBev, 140 
 
 a7rewouT«r/iis, 172 
 
 dirX^v ot/iof, 160 
 
 OTrOjSoXTj iirwr^iiri!=\'^dri, 84 
 
 O7ro9<'ii(rf^"'i 75 
 
 dvoppTjfTOii, 57 
 
 OTroffTrefcrai, 178 
 
 'Ap7etot, 112 
 
 apiwvla, its meaning, 106 
 
 'A(r)(Xi)5r($ d<pet\oiJ.cr oKiKrpvbva, 180 
 
 P. 
 
 'ATXovTa, 134 
 
 arpairis, 64 
 
 avrd rd fira, 80 
 
 ovT^ or oiIt^s 1; oiala, 118 
 
 oi!t4, referring to feminine substantive, 
 
 109 
 avToavBpwvro!, not Platonic, 83 
 avro^vujs, 184 
 a/f>oiTiov<rdai, 53 
 
 'Axipuv, 169 
 
 ayjivxpov or a^vKTOv, 154 
 
 B 
 
 PaKXol, 70 
 
 ^ap^pav yivri, 88 
 
 PtUTKavla, 123 
 
 P^TUTTov, Plato's conception of, 36, 731 
 
 /36pj3opo(, 163 
 
 ^eXairciojTa, 63 
 
 yii>e<Tis i^ ii'avTim', 73 
 
 yiveffis, as conceived by the physicists, 
 
 7S 
 rXaiJKoi/ t4x''Vi 161 
 y£\l'ov, 164 
 
 Sal/iav, 159 
 
 SeSiivai Kal diet, 68 
 
 Sety/iara, 164 
 
 SeiX^ 5' ^ci wBiiivi ipeiSii, 1 78 
 
 S^oi', double meaning, 134 
 
 Seirepos ttXoCs, 134, 187 
 
 dTtfioTiKTI Kal a-oXiTi/c7j ct/ieT;}, 97, 181 
 
 Sid Tou ffu/iaros, 62 
 
 13 
 
194 
 
 GREEK INDEX. 
 
 Sia^Xifas, I07 
 Siayoia-fi or Suiyov<ra, 95 
 Siaypafiixarat 78 
 SiaxeKtieaBai, 53 
 5ia\6im/o}, 83 
 Si.aiJi,v8o\oyCiiJ.ev, yt 
 Stao'KeSoi'i'Oroi, 87 
 5i.a<j>ms, 132 
 
 Si' einBvfdas iart, 99 
 
 Si'"!", 133 
 SoDi^at X67oy, 84 
 SwSeKaff/cvTOi tr^atpat, 163 
 
 E 
 
 iyymiaaaBe, 175 
 
 ^77iJs Tt Te£i'6i» ToC TeBuavai., 62 
 
 eiKT? 0up6), 129 
 
 eljMpiiivii, 174 
 
 ^K Mias KOfiV(j>ris <rwriii.ii.iv a, 5 1 
 
 iK^dWeiv and Ifi^aXKeiv, 170 
 
 iXevBeplg. Kai d\i;9e£f , 1 74 
 
 ^/uoi SoK€?, parenthetical, 86 
 
 ^1/ ei^fiiilq. XPV reXevrav, 179 
 
 ^c rwi (ppovpg.^ 57 
 
 ^K ToiavTy upf, 93 
 
 & <j>i,\o<ro4>l<t ivTwv, 49 
 
 ^K ^ KttXoO/if x t6 fjjj', 1 58 
 
 iuavrlov ad Tivoi, 149 
 
 ivvoeiv, 79 
 
 ivrelvas, 52 
 
 i^eTrq.(r7iTe, 88 
 
 iirfSeiv, 88, 173 
 
 ^xeJ TOi or gireira, 78 
 
 ^iriKfXeuEffSat, 53 
 
 ivilihav, 51 
 
 iiri.<T<l>payi.^li.eBa, 83 
 
 ^ir((rXiS/'f>'os, 178 
 
 iirupipeai, 150 
 
 lpXop.at imxeipdv, 137 
 
 ^crni' uiTTe, 147 
 
 Ei/)(7r(}i, 114 
 
 ?0?;, repetition of, 88 
 
 IXo'.To, ^0oiTo, 140 
 
 Z 
 
 tiovtrav vdaros Kal TrrjKov, 170 
 fw", 9> 75 
 
 H 
 
 ^Bov 077^X111^, 177 
 
 'qpudXcov, 150 
 
 ^s X670!' SlSofiev tov etvat, go 
 
 e 
 
 BavaTUiTi, 63 
 
 Barepov, in bad sense, 173 
 
 Se/f p.olpg,, 184 
 
 SeioK — BvTifrbv, 93 
 
 ffeTos X670S, 104 
 
 BpaTTOv, 107 
 
 Ixaviv n, 141 
 i!\ea, 123 
 l\iyyi.g,, 92 
 Icoppoirla, 162 
 ?rrw Zeiis, 56 
 
 K 
 
 KaBap/Us, KtlBapcris, 70 
 
 KaBTjpdfievoL, 173 
 
 KaBUvai, intransitive, 169 
 
 /taXiSs, explained by Olympiodoros, 78 
 
 KafiTijv troioiTo, 76 
 
 KapSoirif vKaTelq., 134 
 
 /ca7& ris afiriS^'o/ioioTip'OS T^s fteX^TTjs, 97 
 
 Karaa-xciv, 149, 152 
 
 /caTa^cras, in 
 
 /car^/cXa{re, 179 
 
 KOT-^X"", intransitive, 179 
 
 K^vrpov h^KaraXiTrtjiV, 115 
 
 icpa<riK = temperature, 165 
 
 Kpani, 105 
 
 KT^/itt Twc 5e(3x, 57 
 
 KUKUTOS, 170 
 
 \apoi<rris t6 ■^pep.etv, 127 
 
 Xi}9i;=^7ri(rTi}/ii)s dTTOjSoXi), 84 
 
 X670(, 135 
 
 Xd7o>' Sowai, 84 
 
 Xo'7os and fiSBos, 54 
 
 X070U deiov, 104 
 
 Xi/KUK Koi lepiKuv Kal IktIvwv, 97 
 
GREEK INDEX.. 
 
 195 
 
 M 
 HaOeiv or iraBeli), 78 
 lidBriJis = &V(ifi,vr)i7is, 84 
 lidKurra or KtfXXiora, 103 
 /iSXXov reduplicated, 119 
 liS,XKoi> Kal iwl irXiov, 119 
 M^yapa rj BoiWTorfs, 133 
 M^fcjis, 34 
 
 jieKir-q Bavdrov, 67, 95 
 fieXiTTwy ^ ff^ij/cu!/ ^ it.vpii.'fiKiav , 97 
 (!*■); o^x' after /j.a\8aKov, 104 
 luniliara, 35 
 /illivns, 79 
 fufiov/ievos l/i4, 151 
 jUKToXoyia, 112 
 livqiiaTa Kal rdipovs, 96 
 /ioi 5om, parenthetical, 161 
 liovds, 152 
 /iop/ioXuKeia, 88 
 Mo/)0i 147 
 Mowo-iKi}, 53 
 /uCdoi — Xo'70t, 54 
 /i-vpiiilKas ^ parpdxovs, 162 
 
 N 
 
 vapSriKo^opoi, 70 
 ^/eu/jo, 94 
 v6p.iap.a 6pB6v, 69 
 vouj', play on, 129 
 
 
 
 S ^ITTIV, 83 
 
 d ijiu<rvs Tov dpi8p,o\i, 148 
 olKetav iiritTT-/ifji,TjVj 84 
 dXi70/)xiKis av^p, 182 
 6X^ /cat TravTi, 92 
 d/tou TTiijTa xP^/J'i'Ta, 76 
 6p.<iyvna, go 
 oparov—aeiSh, 91 
 6V))=as small as, 161 
 diriaii' Te Koi vop,t/j,(ai', 1 60 
 6(r^p:^ff£i or <j>povi](rei,, 165 
 oi)8f 0/)o;'^(rai, 65 
 oiS^K Seiviy lUT) (fio^riBy, loi 
 ofe a? (pBdvoiS, 137 
 
 II 
 
 irapaSeiy/ia, 35 
 
 irapoKeXeuco-flai, 53 
 
 wapaKvTeiv, 63 
 
 irapafivBla, 61 
 
 irapovTi irevBeij 49 
 
 irapova'ta, 34 
 
 irepiKVKKif, i6g 
 
 irepcfiheiv, 50 
 
 TrepcTTOTtjs or TreptTT^, 149 
 
 Tnyyvvro, 179 
 
 TrXdi'oi;, 92 
 
 nXarup, 50 
 
 TrXarrei;' au/xa, 98 
 
 woBeirofiems, 130 
 
 jroieic, in medical sense, 178 
 
 irovTiplas d-ydv, 113 
 
 7rpd-y/iaTa= ideas, 65, 135 
 
 vpayp,a.T€la, 58 
 
 Trpl;/ without ok with subjunctive, 57 
 
 vpoKeKplaBai, TpoK€KKTj(r6cu, 172 
 
 irpoolfuov, 52 
 
 irpoSTo offlas ^iSvai, 172 
 
 irpoiTTjXoT, 100 
 
 irpocnrepovq., 100 
 
 ThipupXeyiBoni, 170 
 
 ^ua^, 166 
 
 z 
 
 ira8tjij,a, 92 
 
 aeaoiippovlaBat, St' dfcoXa(7£a;', 68 
 
 a-iiTeSova, 126 
 
 (TTjTreSOTos Koi oKP'tls, 164 
 
 ciipayyei, 163 
 
 CKiaypa^la, 69 
 
 (r/UKpiv <(>poyTL<ramet Swfcparous, 115 
 
 StuJ, 170 
 
 <Tuyypaipi,KSs, 143 
 
 cuXXi^TTTOip, 99 
 
 aviiex^s ttoi.kIKov, 164 
 
 avvoSos TOV TrKrjawv TeBrjucu, 128 
 
 auvTeBivTi. Kal awBirif, 89 
 
 (TX^Slas, 104 
 
 <rffl/4ti Tt TrXdrrocTes, 98 
 
 TaXXa= particulars, 142 
 laprapos, 16 J 
 TapiX'^vBivm, 94 
 
196 
 
 GREEK INDEX. 
 
 ravpijSbv iTTOjSWfos, Ij8 
 
 TcBvriKbi, 9 
 
 Ti\na, 162 
 
 TeriX/iijKe, 144 
 
 t4 Si, 162 
 
 TO di eTvai rairby, 162 
 
 ToiovTos, 49 
 
 Tols Kar' imXva rh peiiiara, 168 
 
 TO(rovTov=s,o little, 100 
 
 TpiTti/iipiov, 151 
 
 TV tfyn, 65 
 
 iirix'^v or iirepix'^i't 143 
 uirij/j^Tij! tC* ft'Se/co, 177 
 VTrop\4<//as, 178 
 vir68e<ris, 139 
 vtroariBiiTiv, 162 
 vip&VTOV, 108 
 
 tpavT&iTnaTa, 96 
 
 (peiSbnevos oiSiv in ivbvTos, 177 
 
 ^ims KoL /jtavTcias Kal oiirfl^irets, 166 
 
 0iXo/to957S=0iXi5o'o^oj, 97 
 
 0t\o(rii/iaTO!, 58 
 
 ij>pov!)(Tu or dtr^pijiTei, 165 
 
 (pptvijaii, 69 
 
 <t>povp&, 57 
 
 ipipois or (pipoio, 141 
 
 011^(11, ipvpda, 129 
 
 XapiivTUS ix'^" ™ "'w/ta, 93 
 
 * 
 
 \j/Jl\a^iivTes, 133 
 
 '0Kca;»4F, 169 
 
 wpo, 93 
 
 (is dXijffiSs, 65 
 
ENGLISH INDEX. 
 
 Acheron, 169 
 
 Aesop, 54 
 
 Alkmaion, 126 
 
 Alternation of oppbsites, 9, 73 
 
 Ameles, 85 
 
 Analogies deceptive, 117 
 
 Anaxagoras, 130 
 
 ApoUodoros, 40, 49, 179 
 
 Argives, 112 
 
 Aristotle, his dialogue Eudemos, 121 
 „ misrepresents Plato, i68 
 ,, his conception of virtue, 185 
 
 Aristoxenos, 105 
 
 Article omitted before proper names, 47 
 
 Asklepios, i8o 
 
 Astronomers, 97 
 
 B 
 
 Birds do not sing for sorrov\r, 103 
 Browning cited, 124 
 
 Causation, 130 
 
 Child, training of, 185 
 
 Cock offered to Asklepios, 180 
 
 Colours of the earth's surface, r64 
 
 Composite and incomposite, 89 
 
 Concepts, 33 
 
 Conservation of energy, 75, 155 
 
 Conversational method, 83 
 
 D 
 
 Delos, embassy to, 48 
 
 Development of Platonic system, 33—35 
 
 Earth, her position in the universe, 133, 
 161 
 ,, mythical description of, 162 
 Echekrates, 38 
 Egjrptian mummies, 94 
 Egyptians, their belief in immortality, 72 
 Elean school, 39 
 Embassy to Delos, 48 
 Endymion, 76 
 Epicharmos cited, 62 
 Equilibrium, 162 
 Euenos, 52 
 
 Everlasting punishment, 171 
 Extremes rare, 113 
 
 Future indicative after ei, 155 
 
 G 
 
 Generalisation, 140 
 
 Genitive of material with verb, 170 
 
 Ghosts, 96 
 
 Glaukos, i6i 
 
 Gravitation, 167 
 
 H 
 
 Hair, cutting off, as token of grief, 1 1 2 
 
 Harmonia, 123 
 
 Harmony, 105, 117 foil. 
 
 Hegel, 22 
 
 Herakles, 111 
 
 Hippokrates, 127 
 
 Homer quoted by Plato, 122, 167 
 
 Homicide, Attic law concerning, 172 
 
198 
 
 ENGLISH INDEX. 
 
 Ideas, sole causes, 5 
 
 ,, earlier theory of, 34 
 
 ,, of relations, 35, 81, 142 
 
 ,, their simplicity, 90 
 
 , , their relation to particulars, 138 
 Immortality, its position in the Phaedo, 
 
 3.6. 7 
 „ its relation to knowledge, 6 
 
 ,, individual, 21 — 26 
 
 , , extended to all living things, 
 
 73 
 Incurable offenders, 171 
 Innate virtue, 184 
 Interpolation, (i(>, Jo, 77, 81, 82, 85, 132, 
 
 140, 191 
 lolaos, 112 
 
 Jackson, 33 
 
 Juxtaposition and separation, 128 
 
 K 
 
 Kebes, his criticism, 38 
 
 ,, his life and character, 41' 
 Knowledge of universals, 33 
 
 ,, and immortality, 6 
 
 Kokytos, 170 
 Kriton, 42 
 
 ,, rebuked for incorrect language, 
 175 
 
 Lamprokles, 1I6 
 Lava, 166 
 
 M 
 Menexenos, 176 
 Metempsychosis, 18, 96 
 Monadism, 24 
 Myrto, 176 
 
 N 
 Neuter, by attraction for feminiiie, 109 
 
 O 
 
 Okeanos, 169 
 
 Parmenides, 106 
 Penelope's web, loi 
 Phaedo, 39 
 Phaedo, structure of, 2 
 
 ,, relation of argument?fii, 8 
 ,, its position in Plato's system, 31 
 ,, compared with ^c/kWjV, 35 
 Philolaos, 55 
 
 Philosopher, as teacher of the masses, 183 
 Plato, his indirect method of exposition, 1 
 
 ,, his mode of marking off his argu- 
 ments, 13 
 
 ,, development of his philosophy, 33 
 
 ,, his Herakleiteanism, 36 
 
 „ his teleology, 131 
 
 ,, mentions himself, 50 
 Pleasure and pain, 52 
 Predication, 36, 145 
 Punishment, Plato's view of, 171 
 Pyriphlegethon, 170 
 
 R 
 
 Reminiscence, 9, 77 foU. 
 Ritual terms, 70 
 
 Schleiermacher, 6 
 
 Schmidt, 168 
 
 Seneca quoted, 40 
 
 Sight, the keenest of the senses, 62 
 
 Signs of the zodiac, 163 
 
 Simmias, 40 
 
 ,, compared with Kebes, 41 
 
 Sokrates, his prominent eyes, 107 
 
 „ his patience of objections, 1 1 1 
 „ his dislike of physical specula- 
 tion, 125 
 ,, his three sons, 176 
 „ his alleged second wife, 176 
 ,, his influence on the servant of 
 
 the eleven, 177 
 ,, his last words, 180 
 
 Sokratic method, 33 
 
 „ period of Plato, 33 
 
 Sophist, structure o^ i 
 
 Sophokles cited for use pf iijc, 75 
 
ENGLISH INDEX. 
 
 199 
 
 Sophroniskos, 176 
 
 Soul, simplicity of, 26 
 „ tripartition of, 27 
 ,, her affinity to the ideas, 12, 91 
 „ does not admit of degrees, 119 
 
 Steinhart, 17 
 
 Styx, 170 
 
 Subsidiary causes, 132 
 
 Suicide, 55 
 
 Sun, symbol of true being, 189 
 
 Swans, 103 
 
 Tartaros, 167 
 
 Teichmiiller, 24 
 
 Theaetetus, criticism of Protagoras in, 15 
 
 Timon quoted, 39 
 
 Timon of Athens quoted, 180 
 
 Transmigration, 96 
 
 U 
 
 Ueberweg, 17 
 Universals, 33 
 Utilitarianism, 68, 187 
 
 Virtue, philosophic and popular, 6g, 181 
 ,, a harmony of the soul, 120 
 ,, innate, 184 
 ,, conventional, 185 
 
 W 
 
 Weaver, simile of, 108 
 Wordsworth, 85 
 
 X 
 
 Xanthippe, 51 
 
 Zodiac, 163 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: TRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. AND SON, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 

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