a eters Ete Re ge i: Sieh doe i ae ee eee ke ee ee °PFrot ae lll eet tiated cet al et iia iia i 1 ‘ : € ; Fe eet tel ane sages = AO ag ago a a i hel CO i a eek est ore drei mete ie ede s a beers 4 he i Sieh tiie Baie e ad - * * ate a . ES Pre Pretrial tts Cee teetebads ee oy re ro cea e a Pts , 7 Tet. ere) * — =< oF vaos _— ooey = a Perera ar on - “ ees | ay a, am Pe rats a : ri i oy ¥ # nds a) ae Td mera? as 2r< Py Pea Oe : ee wc Se aed * aT TPT y ayy eT ee te gree eS ee eee2 hie aes lke ; or ; rl : i : 4 5 i. ; I f, : | : ie i Py i ; : t t f 4 Fs 1 Ema tl hoot teed ~ a iN ae ee eT i a a a ee aed eben a oe 2 Ce ee e* ie Feo tal * -Prerevre ry es terete: Le * ~ rer ree ts eet. ~ Sa taisds: ee Pe eS ee ee ee ‘< ** ie i] bs « 7 - he, — ¢ * _ Mite fee Se= Se rece ee ee a" getesvre eben e gt 4 = pte igée e ed eerbaneczé “ ov. ve Ts te er.- CRIRPSEVEVIS PS d=7 = 2 SE et ee oe oe ee ee Oe ee ee ca dl me : | i : : | y | : : : 7 ; 7 latent poe Fate RR te a le tle eo eee eae et it rate o * adwa wert iT ror view ee Te | a Air or 4 oa] Waite it tees Ste ie eed a a so i CS — ——=— ha = . Oe oie Aer 4 alae rma Paneer irene: GN agg agate: Nam Nhe ent + . | | ars eae “Es, =, cao> 7 ~ ro LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA GIEd OF COUNCIL OF THE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS OF THE Ft P pl oe . ts i MI 4 oe ‘ o fe y B: we re a 4 rey 4 , i 4 La 7 7 a ; , a \ MN " a i by 7 : * | : ‘ 1 4 : t 1 rfl M ry | " : c ] Fy : | “ i t TTIAT T (7M wT cory TIT) Cc i. T* 1 an) i UNL LOW SoLlAlno Ut MJ ERICA, 7 1 k iN 7 . ® Tt Fie tS A sm Dente ct Ld lta tE TUTTE Ce Ct rt tit pee Te et re ee ete see vty Petr ere sy te] rerrrl et. “vcr = — ae ~ Sc eu pease OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT a es saeey es Caws - Fy ae seen ne a eo Pee ee Te ee oe - ee ee ee es we a = inch te Sie abdebobe at, eee oe 2 wey |pre ee a es ee eR ee he hl eee ee ee ee 2s er ta ‘ 7 t ~ ig ? { ) | t H H F 3 : ——— ir i atte ee eee a EE a a a a le lee ze Se ee ee sl a eae | « @* :a ~ -« io ? 7 a Tata] eet Pet te eee eet ee eee el OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT By FELIX MORLEY FELLOW OF THE ECONOMIC SOCIETY (ENGLAND), AUTHOR OF “UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF IN GREAT BRITAIN” ere tT re pet PST. Pee tr) ree eS With an Introduction by Tar HONORABLE HENRY MORGENTHAU eet anypencaexy ices on esa pe Sh SR toa Ae YOR ees Eee ee “ee yy eae TM = s a LY eS ~~ fa xn he ‘. 4 ’ | iM Cha eNO =o a . “ flor? aL \ ag ae? + Eee Y Eee Pee eee ‘ , i oes yy a Hee wan Ws eee ‘ ' : ist e ' hee walk = ey4 wre : S s ’ ‘ ~~ g ad RE SUNUAS FS i R= re wr ire oa © ay be & ee c: os COUNCIL OF CHRE i ALS tAesocta i HON S ee Z ¥ ~*~ eas / Student Council, Y. W. G’ A., 600 Lexington Avenue Student Department, Y.M.C.A., 34y ai Avenue f ne > | New York City \ ig oo Hi Pye re ee et ee a eee ee en ee ee ~ecrerewrSeegeieesrs Distributed by ASSOCIATION PRESS New York: 347 Mapison AVENUE 1926 oe et Cy tere ee ee oea 7 ee 5 ane a oe i = LI SISTEMIE + b24 ra 7 =r a COPYRIGHT, 1926, By FREDERICK HARRIS Printed in the United States of America ; ; 4 a : fs t - FS : [fe F Ht : 3 } 4 4 ‘ } Hi } i - Fi Fa i ee eel el leet ill Pa illite od a 7 re a rh aTo YosHiIo Nitosé and Tang Man-not Old Friends Who Helped Me toa Better Understanding of Japan and China Pry Pere rr er rere ese = piaeceuee re rete eee aod ee i— _— ere ey St | a i Po wil ennai a _— Se es a —_— Seles rey ee ——— = ee rn eee err ae) ey . Hm, cs ee ns a - ae cee ee ty tere ee ea ee eee ee ee eee * so -star asstetse ss a 3 ad > laa en cient teenie Bien tae Dil Deane tied eae tome Ek ae ee he Be ee a dl al healed 1 : , i : = Oe sa lt ed - = = ee ee ee Tc ee te leh eat inal << Cate recs a eee es arate:INTRODUCTION The United States must adjust itself to the position it has acquired through its activities in, and as a result of, the Great War. It is rapidly becoming the great Central Power Station of the world, with influence radi- ating North, South, East and West. Before very long our commercial relations with the lands across the Pacific will be as important as those we now have with the European Powers. It is, therefore, highly essential that we become better acquainted with our Pacific neighbors, the Filipinos, Japanese and Chinese. Our woeiul ignorance of their present conditions and great potentialities must be supplanted by real knowledge. This knowledge can be obtained through visits of ex- perienced investigators to these countries and the pub- lication of their observations in as interesting and as instructive a form as Mr. Felix Morley has achieved in this book. It happens that I have myself recently been over almost the same territory; and while not agreeing with all of Mr. Morley’s conclusions, I find that he shows wonderful powers of penetration and has adopted a judicial manner in impartially appraising the various conflicting influences that are at work in Japan, China and the Philippines. To readers who realize that the United States is des- tined to become the financier of Japan and China, while continuing to fill this rdle for the Philippines, and to those who foresee that we may well become the builders of China’s new railroads and purveyors of many of her basic industrial and agricultural supplies, this treatise will prove a most valuable guide. It clearly analyzes Vu etsy eT eT TTP ore te Ped eT re tet ets ty ere Tt x2 ware sessed —— ee oe Ts — 4a an! eer yf ey - * 2 ao Se te ee ner are 2 and the * beauty the * ak FUJIYAMA e S ) I 5 ich ] wl untain O mM tie es - ma] The _— Pree etre ti e ete seer san = 7 ete tT ete Sts rere | he ere 3es%5858 rere ns Ts. “a tk Naw oe = +f, a] = oe et ee ee ee ee re eS Se Pe eT eo . Seesdokote tet a _ i. es et oo or obs 2.42 Pi ee ea is ee *testares ee Se ee o ee lt at ed Ce ba Ree ee Be ee ee el ed a ' : i 4 1 ij ; f : 1 i = — Ta i a al ea ian ema arena le eT kD Fe mt ae SS . P pa Pe tiie eile a o =THE ADVENT OF DEMOCRACY 13 are still active that Japan struggled safely out of the pe- riod of feudal collapse by her ability to unite the spirit of patriotism with worship of the ruling dynasty. In spite of widespread social unrest springing from unsat- isfactory economic conditions, it would take a bold prophet to visualize Japan as anything but a monarchy during the lifetime of any who read these lines. None the less there are tendencies which show that in politics, as in all other lines of organized endeavor, modern Japan is caught by the same stream which has swept all the white nations toward democracy, regard- less of whether or not they are content to regard that system as a final goal. The Constitution may state that the Emperor is “inviolable,” but the populace can- not be kept ignorant of the fact that Yoshihito, suc- cessor to the Emperor Mutsuhito, is a hopeless invalid who, in 1921, of necessity proclaimed the Crown Prince Hirohito as Regent in his stead. The anomalous situ- ation weighs against continuation of the popular belief that the Emperor is absolute, though collapse of this idea, of course, would not lead to abolition of the mon- archy any more than it has done in England. A very much more important dissolvent of absolutist belief, promising in time not merely to dissipate the awe in which royalty is held as a political factor, but also to modify and alter Japanese policy in many ways, is the coming of fairly complete manhood suffrage. The law bringing this great change went into effect in 1925, though the new voters will not be able to exercise their right of franchise until the next general election. Seldom in history has there been an enfranchisement act of greater magnitude than this one, increasing the electo- rate of the country more than threefold at a single step. Under the original Election Law of 1890, the qualified voters of Japan numbered only about 500,000 out of a population of 42,000,000—less than 1.25 per cent. The a) Pere ¥ rae ¥ -. a] . re eg —— * aT ~ oe “ome te tT Te ed demic imate —— eee er Tee Sy eee | en Sa 7 NTR Ee 22 - trees: ee Se re ee ee ae ee ee ee ean henna a ee ie asé76% ere ett ttt eye +35 ces] cS eae Es ee ee Scet Ses Sera te L, a] POT po ee ey 7} . - =a} ae 2 Ti PU Te a help er tn a i a am hn i it a a ce ah it ni al i a ll te th al iene ee eas at diene oe Te ee ae, 5. +24 =: — ee a -- - ag alias aliments ee = ies — - = a . - < > cm eel . - . . . “4 z a eo 14. OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT minimum voting age was twenty-five, which has been maintained, and there was a drastic property qualifica- tion, limiting a voice in government to those who paid at least 15 yen ($7.50) per annum in direct national taxes. A revision of the law in 1900, lowering the prop- erty qualification somewhat, increased the electorate to about 1,500,000. In 1920 the requisite national tax pay- ment was reduced again, to only 3 yen, and the electo- rate augmentéd thereby to nearly 3,000,000. Under the new law of 1925, eliminating the relationship between enfranchisement and property ownership, it is estimated that the total electorate will number well upwards of 11,000,000, or nearly 20 per cent of the total population of Japan proper. Inevitably, the sudden addition of 8,000,000 new vot- ers will mean far-reaching changes in Japan. Many are now learning for the first time that the machinery of rep- resentative government exists for them in their country. Among the millions in whom a rigid social system and perpetual poverty have combined to induce a fatalistic outlook there is dawning the realization that they have in their own hands the means to shape destiny somewhat. If there is still tremendous political apathy and ignor- ance among the Japanese working class there is at least none of the disillusionment and cynicism found where suffrage after long trial has proved no panacea for human ills. Politically speaking, Japan is very youthful and naive. Her newly enfranchised voters are on the whole disposed to enter the untrodden field of democratic ex- periment hopefully and with enthusiasm, The implications of the new manhood suffrage law ap- pear equally important to the traditional governing class, though in this case the feeling is one of doubt and anxiety rather than optimism. The Japanese House of Representatives has not the same constitutional power as our own, and it is open to question that a more radi-THE ADVENT OF DEMOCRACY 15 cal parliament, if elected, would be able to exercise very positive power in the control of national policy. The negative power of the House, however, is sufficient to cause a bureaucratic government great annoyance. The old freedom of the military leaders in determining policy cannot be recaptured now that there is a watchful elec- torate ready to check up on any ministry that places swashbuckling above national welfare. One evidence of the change is the probability that the famous Council of Genro, or Elder Statesmen, will not be revived after the death of its sole surviving member, Prince Salonj1. Until the death of Marquis Okuma, in 1922, the influ- ence of this extraconstitutional and strongly conserva- tive body in influencing national policy was very great, but the efforts to create a new Council of Genro have met with strong opposition from all liberal spokesmen. The new suffrage act, in all probability, will assist the quiet abolition of this totally undemocratic device. No class in Japan, however, has greater personal in- terest in the working out of manhood suffrage than those who are primarily concerned with commerce. The Jap- anese business man, for all that he has contributed so mightily to the strength of his nation, is still apt to be regarded as a social parvenu. Though the tax burden falls most heavily on his class, he has had in the past little political control over the spending of his money. Recognizing that Japan must compete more actively and successfully in world markets in order to maintain ade- quate national living standards, the leaders in trade nevertheless have been powerless to prevent a huge ex- penditure on armaments which the country can ill afford. It is with growing discontent that they have watched the national debt increase from $1,120,000,000 in 1912 to $2,500,000,000 in 1926. There is a real clash of interest between the military and business groups, the former still believing that they Se we ee ee Te Tee Pere eee ers vi Petrevett Pe rity i tite ts iio rete re + - es sy) SS ee te ee ee eg ee eerie sels oe Sr eae ee ee ee ee eee eo eee ee ey ee ee ee, ee — ieSiete ce ae Re ee ee et ln a Lee eee ee ial be ed Re de ee *e-r1 s¢/stasatr e PS wat: -* a « - : * " ~ : / — i . oi. "ee? n i —— - ce i) eal " rq ¥ | \ ay a re i “ a i" ” Vt Lad a \ mer e+ Gey is | Co * i A i a ae il al a Ea ae ae sonar daria inset i ina diat sedate tires tead se 16 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT are the authentic heirs of the Samurai spirit; the latter maintaining that it is not great armies and fleets which make a modern nation strong, but commercial organiza- tion. At present, government in Japan is still largely in the hands of the aristocracy. Business men, who favor economic expansion rather than military aggression, are anxious to see the balance shifted to the middle class. And if the wage earners agree with the thesis that em- ployers and employed have a solidarity of interest as against those who are anxious to sink all surplus revenues in armaments, the new enfrancisement act will greatly forward political domination by the bourgeoisie. There are, however, Japanese who feel that the in- terests of employer and employed are far from being common and who would utilize the millions of new voters to develop a strong Labor, rather than a strong Liberal, party. Their effort is sufficiently significant to merit close attention, both in its political and economic aspects.CuaApter III THE JAPANESE LABOR PARTY On December 1, 1925, the very day of its formal or- ganization in Tokyo, the first Socialistic political party to be launched in Japan was dissolved by order of the Home Minister. The edict of dissolution was based on Article 8 of the Public Peace Police Law, which severely limits the partial guarantees of freedom of speech, as- sembly, and press established “within the limits of law” by Article 29 of the Japanese Constitution. Article 8 of the comprehensive Police Law reads: In case it is deemed necessary for the maintenance of peace and order, the police can either restrict, prohibit, or break up outdoor meetings, mass movements, or crowds of people. They can also break up indoor meetings. If societies organized fall under the purview of the foregoing paragraph, the Home Minister can veto them, One who may consider that his rights are infringed by such action on the part of the Home Minister may file a suit in the Court of Adminis- trative Litigation. Japanese radicals have their full share of the in- genuity which is a national characteristic. Realizing that the fundamental reason for the government’s action was the activity of communist intriguers within their ranks, they began immediately to revamp the outlaw organization. On March 5, 1926, a second Japanese Labor party was organized in Osaka, much more than Tokyo the industrial center of the nation. The gov- ernment has put no obstacles in the path of this new pro- letarian effort. On the contrary, men who are high in 17 _- & + = + —s T , xh Set ma] on * ee a Sa a cry Fo vee yk FSS eos S vas sFedohaseKeS2I2IITs - ere te te Pet ow Pet iY} ad ee eT ~ a ee Bese sesat 6 & . ee ee Se ee ee ee aed istic patriotism to think about. 24 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT steadily and necessarily Japan is becoming industrial- ized, drawing the raw materials and semi-finished prod- ucts of other nations to her shores, then re-exporting them as articles which native skill and craftsmanship much more than shoddy cheapness stamp as desirable. The transformation from the self-contained feudal coun- try of seventy-five years ago is staggering and, naturally, the mental change has been less marked than the phys- ical transformation. In many ways this is desirable, for none would wish to see the spiritual beauty of old Japan stamped out by the machine. In other ways it is unde- sirable, for the power given by industrialization should be fettered by the free spirit and open self-criticism of democratic rule. Unquestionably, the establishment of a workers’ party in autocratic Japan is symptomatic of the blossoming of mental freedom among her people. It is as indicative of the future in that country as the mobilizing of three thousand police to “keep order” at a mass meeting of eight thousand Tokyo laborers on May Day of 1926 is indicative of the past. Whatever line solution of the labor problem takes, its existence, even in fairly acute form, is more encouraging than otherwise. Here is one, and not the least, of the abundant signs that Japan is modernized in many other ways than armaments, and has many other things of more importance than jingo-CHAPTER IV JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS “You have only to consider the trade statistics,” Vis- count Goto told me during my stay in Tokyo, “to real- ize how vital to Japan is the continuation of friendly relations with America. Even if no higher motives were involved, commercial interdependence would constitute for us an overpowering argument in favor of trans- Pacific peace.”’ The more one examines this subject the more apparent it becomes that business considerations are operating steadily and increasingly to mold Japanese foreign policy along peaceful lines. An index to Japan’s inter- national commitments in behalf of friendship with other powers is shown by the growth in value of her foreign trade from $13,000,000 in 1868 to approximately $2,500,000,000 in 1925. With no other country are good relations so important to Japan as in the case of the United States. This country is not merely her largest customer; we also supply a larger percentage of Japan’s imports than any other nation. Taking around 40 per cent of Japan’s exports in every year since the war, and providing her people with from one-quarter to one-third of all their imports, the United States has the same rela- tive commercial importance to Japan that all of Europe has to the United States; and though this parallel is striking, it does not adequately bring out the supreme importance to Japan of uninterrupted trade relations with America. The natural resources of Japan are not 29 Po oes Sy ere - Se ee ee ae ee ne ee - tite eT. eee ee ee ee 4 Perr ere re a eae rs 7 Oe ead ee Pe erat ey oe zs Ss es Se | _ ee at e ee ee ee od ime Sd Res — cot. acai be éa4s-42ony a a le a ik Le ea dil dll Le rte ee eae) eT i Sad Re Tk OS Fe wy de ciara art ei ae ak iain i Neen eee nee nn ne ene nnn ee ee - = 5 r a — . oa od a bd ~ oe ~* . I iors 26 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT to be compared with those of the United States and her people are in every economic respect less self-sufficing and more dependent on the results of overseas com- merce. The foreign trade statistics of Japan proper for the last four years, measured in yen (par value 49.8 cents), are given in the following table. It also shows the value of exports to and imports from North America, which would be completely cut off in the event of hostilities with the United States. The reader will notice, more- over, how much America helps toward rectifying a per- sistently unfavorable trade balance. Exports (in thousands of yen) Imports To North From North Year Total America Total America 1008 eee 1,637,449 748,500 1,886,389 619,767 LO Zee eect civ 1,368,799 622.643 1,922,239 536,804 erase «eles 1,807,031 764,499 2,450,856 712.790 LODE eee ak 2,305,588 1,032,693 2,570,590 704,973 Japanese exports to the United States fall largely in the luxury class. We purchase from her dealers enormous quantities of raw silk—over $400,000,000 worth in 1925, representing 94 per cent of the total of this commodity sent abroad by the island empire. In addition America is a heavy buyer of Japanese grass rugs, tea, brushes, camphor, pottery, toys, and em- broideries. Turn from this list of non-essentials to con- sider the character of American exports to Japan. Ac- cording to figures compiled early in 1926 by E. R. Dick- over, United States Consul at Kobe, the United States supplies 35 per cent of Japan’s total imports of raw cotton, 80 per cent of imported lumber, 37 per cent of imported steel products, 40 per cent of imported wheat, 54 per cent of imported leather, 50 per cent of importedJAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS 27 machinery, and 88 per cent of her imported automobiles, a, manufacture in which Japan is only just beginning to engage, Those are basic commodities, the uninterrupted supply of which is vital in time of peace, and absolutely essential in time of war. The increasing dependence of Japan on the United States for these articles signifies, moreover, steadily in- creased insurance against war. It cannot be convincingly argued that Japan could readily turn to other sources of supply, when it is realized that in the case of iron and steel products, as an example, the percentage of imports taken from this country is more than double what it was in 1913, while in-the case of both Great Britain and Ger- many the percentage of imports over the same period has been halved. At this point it is worth mentioning that the Russo-Japanese treaty, signed on January 21, 1925, and restoring normal diplomatic and trade relations be- tween Japan and Soviet Russia, after eighteen months had not succeeded in restoring the almost negligible volume of pre-war commerce between the two nations. And while China is an immensely valuable source of supply to Japan, the chaotic republic could scarcely, even if willing, fill this role alone in case of war. If business means anything, and whether or not we like the fact, trade is a determinant of increasing im- portance in the foreign policy of every modern nation; it means that talk of war between Japan and the United States is dangerous nonsense. In Japan the subject is seldom given consideration by any rational person. It need be regarded seriously only because a jingoistic and ignorant minority in both countries is disposed to play with the idea. If war should come, it will be because that type has been allowed to become numerous enough to force it. Fortunately, nearly every Japanese now realizes that the substitution of active hostility for - - 7 i age Pee e ty ote ebedractstreacizscsers To —s a 7 Pete tier Tey Tt “T+ Sspsiassiese ~ - ~ eee tire Ss = es ~— . SEre SE TEE a hing ae pe ee Oe a ee ee) a ee te =... ~—s oe - - el eoer ee ee ye ee ee ee ee ee SD ed Si ey ere Te ee Cee 4 1 -:2@a Ct alterna eT ak ee ee Pe eee el Le ee eS ee ee ee het ee oe a “FSP -S-e oe se erate . F ad he ~4 :" - - im . a ~ ~ « - a . a * - = i Ey le rier ti rt a iD keel eteetinl ia net a i der asl a i ie lasted oa *® te Ga a hae les - * - a — ee - 28 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT friendship would be completely ruinous to his country, irrespective of the military outcome. Among Americans excessive emphasis is laid on the authority of the mili- tary and naval cliques in Japan. It is high time that recognition be given to the way in which the growth of democratic sentiment and the weight of commercial con- siderations are bringing fundamental alteration to the old arrangements. There can be no doubt, moreover, that American par- ticipation in the World War has influenced the prevalent Japanese attitude toward the United States. As in Great Britain there is a new and vivid consciousness of the rise of the United States to the status of a leading world power, reflected in the former country by estab- lishment of such friendship-making organizations as the Einglish-Speaking Union, and in Japan by the attention given in high quarters to the America-Japan Society. After a recent visit to Japan, Henry Morgenthau, our former Ambassador to Turkey, in an interview analyzed this new attitude on the part of her leaders as follows: Where they used to regard us as an overgrown, provincial, smug, and self-satisfied nation with no military capacity, they have now come to recognize fully our enormous potentialities in peace and war. The Japanese statesmen, who are as keen and adroit as any in the world, fully appreciate the changed condi- tion, and that we now hold the balance of world power. There- fore, they are now anxious to remove the notion entertained by some that they want to attack us, or covet any of our Pacific possessions. Instead, they emphasize their great and sincere ad- miration for America. To call that attitude propaganda is to misconstrue the word as ordinarily used. It is, rather, a nat- ural outcome of increasingly close relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, it must not be overlooked that increas- ingly close relations are apt to lead to increasing irrita- tions. The outstanding, and indeed the only logical, cause of direct friction between Japan and the UnitedJAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS 29 States at the present time is, of course, our Immigration Act, or rather the superfluous and provocative Japanese exclusion clause contained therein. It is superfluous be- cause if Japan had been placed on the same quota basis as the European nations only 100 immigrants from that country would have been admitted annually; and it is provocative because of the direct racial discrimination, which applies equally, however, to the Chinese and other Asiatic peoples. Passage of this Act by the United States Congress in May, 1924, while the wounds caused by the great earth- quake only eight months previous were still raw, has been a severe blow to the justified self-esteem of Japan and has unquestionably done lasting injury to America’s reputation in that country. Among the older generation, in particular, the absolute ban placed against Japanese emigration to the United States will always be regarded as a hostile action, Ample evidence could be cited to support that statement, but it will be sufficient to quote here part of a statement made to me by Viscount Shi- busawa, the “grand old man” of Japan, who from the vantage point of eighty-six years has special qualifica- tions in singling out what is significant and what is ephemeral in international relations. He said: The sudden breaking of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, in order to classify Japan with those people whom you discriminate against, has spoiled a splendid international relationship. ‘The resentment aroused in my country has done much to wipe out the memory of past friendships, and it 1s well to remember that this resentment is as strong now as when the immigration act was passed. A proud and sensitive people are doubly offended if it is assumed that they can easily forget what seems a direct and personal affront. On the other hand, many of Viscount Shibusawa’s younger, but no less keen-minded, countrymen are fully cognizant of the fact that Japan herself long maintained an exclusive attitude, firmly prohibiting foreign owner- 7 — - - a, a re es " = ee by ee ry a > a ee . epee sya — Sep 2 See ert Pere re rier ste ete Ls beet et Sh Serre ries] es ow a a - mag iv. ~~ PT ets ere ts tT a a or ce) Sees es 'ee ee SO ca ks i ~ ayes asgessaees SesHtin’ — Teves, eed eS ae ee Oe ee ee eee ee ae ee ne ne et lstie bas _« Ce Pa * o-* a el Sl ae elie ah aati tiated ie Se ie el ee ee ee Reelin ele leek let ee ele ee ee Shop ep es eT ePepecces ras ea Et la ile aa aa Age ie ae Si 4 ta ae a het Na tert te St Bo i a At a idl le lore arti tee = os _ _ 30 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT ship of land, excluding foreigners from holding shares in certain of her companies and banks, and giving such slight encouragement to naturalization that change of allegiance is extremely rare except among the Chinese in Formosa. During the 1926 session of the Diet, how- ever, legislation was passed abolishing all restrictions on alien land ownership, without regard to discriminatory land laws against Japanese in other countries. This characteristic action of present-day liberal Japan cer- tainly heaps coals of fire upon American heads. But it does not alter the impression that what is objectionable in our Immigration Act in reference to Japan is not exclusion so much as a phrasing which made the recog- nition of a racial difficulty appear to the Japanese as an assumption of racial superiority. Wise men waste no time on the idle question of whether the white race or the yellow is “superior,” the answer to which must depend almost entirely on what standards of valuation are uppermost in the mind of the interrogator. The issue of whether severe restrictions on the commingling of the two races is not desirable for both is subject to more scientific analysis. In this con- nection a confidential letter written in 1892 by Herbert Spencer, for the advice of Count Ito, the then Premier of Japan, is still worthy of extensive quotation. It is also noteworthy that Lafcadio Hearn, reprinting this letter as an appendix to his finest and most penetrating book on Japan,? strongly approves the advice given, though himself a naturalized Japanese subject married to a woman of that race. The great English biologist and philosopher wrote: Respecting the further questions you ask, let me, in the first place, answer generally that the Japanese policy should, I think, be that of keeping Americans and Europeans as much as possible at arm’s length. In presence of the more powerful races, your “Japan, an Interpretation.”Viscount E1IcHI SHIBUSAWA A great Japanese Liberal who tells his countrymen that “our friend across the Pacific has re- cently shown in her attitude toward Japan that she is not over-eager for the friendly rela- tions we desire.” ¥ tf A YOKOHAMA IN 1926 Three years after complete devastation by the earthquake, Japan’s most famous seaport is rising slowly from its ashes. : e¥eaticizvipas rrr Perri seers = a ed rs acute sedes a er ee le ns ee ee i es ee es 5 es at a ead ee — — i eat g¢utpeets nee geresere sees ss tesa wouter ~- - “+ eT ee he et et eee ee - " eee Ps Sant ts _ =is es Sa ee * = er ert ee Ea ee ee Se eB ok a te ak 0 ee ae ; i f ‘ t \ 5 f aes es eee deeded Sl eaten FN ann Sai etek le a ae on” eel eee eed te Be iad oP eS Ct i Ed oe & # S * . ~~ * —— + — a2.e¢ iJAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS ol position is one of chronic danger, and you should take every pre- caution to give as little foothold as possible to foreigners. It seems to me that the only forms of intercourse which you may with advantage permit are those which are indispensable for the exchange of commodities—importation and exportation of physical and mental products. No further privileges should be allowed to people of other races, and especially to people of the more powerful races, than is absolutely needful for the achievement of these ends. Apparently, you are proposing, by revision of the treaty with the Powers of Europe and America. to open the whole Empire to foreigners and foreign capital! I regret this as a fatal policy. Ji you wish to see what is likely to happen, study the history of India. Once let one of the more powerful races gain a port d’appuw, and in course of time there will imevita bly eTOWw up an aggressive policy which will lead to collisions w ith the Japanese; these collisions will be represented as attacks by the Japanese which must be avenged, as the case may be; a portion of territory will be seized and required to be made over as a foreign settlement; and from this there will grow eventual subjugation of the entire Japanese Empire. I believe that you will have great difficulty in avoiding this fate in any case, but you will make the process easy if you allow of any privileges to foreigners beyond those which I have indicated. In pursuance of the advice thus generally indicated, I should say, in answer to your first question, that there should be, not only a prohibition of foreign persons to hold property in land, but also a refusal to give them leases, and a permission only to reside as annual tenants. To the second question I should say decidedly prohibit to foreigners the working of the mines owned or worked by govern- ment. Here, there would be obviously liable to arise grounds of difference between the Europeans or Americans who worked them and the government, and these grounds of quarrel would be followed by invocations to the English or American governments or other powers to send forces to insist on whatever the European workers claimed, for always the habit here and elsewhere among the civilized peoples is to belheve what their agents or sellers abroad represent to them. In the third place, in pursuance of the policy I have indicated, you ought also to keep the coasting trade in your own hands and forbid foreigners to engage init. This coasting trade is clearly not indicated in the requirement I have indicated as the sole one to be recognized—a requirement to facilitate exportation and im- portation of commodities. The distribution of commodities brought to Japan from other places may be properly left to the Japanese themselves, and should be denied to foreigners, for the reason that again the various transactions involved would bee come sO many doors open to quarrels and resulting aggressions. oe re re a Pe Sra ae co — a a ~- ra . . Se epee yer ye se rea, ber ev tt sare trier: a — a sere Pe eS — ee aes ee ee rs ae a) eres. aes : _— ii. a! a ra | — « _— _ . = oa Mayet ty t4 Ss0: Vet ee EER SEE ETE Gath seveees ee a ee Nt etl Kee eeleteieeeltna mas Seb es amr ide *aliadieedd ahem ied ew ee ieee ee ee OPAL EE a ee ons bo sti me wre =A . £ _—* ae 1 : “Ore aL me & xo Senne ae ieee eee Ce altace Tk ae a en ed ta le vad lip ats Ee ne Be td Sa tl a O2 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT To your remaining question respecting the intermarriage of foreigners and Japanese, which you say is “now very much agitated among our scholars and politicians” and which you say is “one of the most difficult problems,’ my reply is that, as rationally answered, there is no difficulty at all. It should be positively forbidden. It is not at root a question of social phi- losophy. It is at root a question of biology. ‘There is abundant proof, alike furnished by the intermarriages of human races and by the interbreeding of animals, that when the varieties mingled diverge beyond a certain slight degree the result vs wnevitably @ bad one in the long run. . . . The physiological basis of this ex- perience appears to be that any one variety of creature in course of many generations acquires a certain constitutional adaptation to its particular form of life, and every other variety similarly acquires its own special adaptation. The consequence is that, if you mix the constitution of two widely divergent varieties which have severally become adapted to widely divergent modes of life, you get a constitution which is adapted to the mode of life of neither—a constitution which will not work properly, because it 1s not fitted for any set of conditions whatever. By all means, therefore, peremptorily interdict marriages of Japanese with foreigners, I have for the reasons indicated entirely approved of the regu- lations which have been established in America for restraining the Chinese immigration, and had I the power I would restrict them to the smallest possible amount, my reasons for this decision being that one of two things must happen. If the Chinese are allowed to settle extensively in America, they must either, if they remain unmixed, form a subject class standing in the position, if not of slaves, yet of a class approaching to slaves; or, if they mix, they must form a bad hybrid. In either case, supposing the. immigration to be large, immense social mischief must arise, and eventually social disorganization. The same thing will happen if there should be any considerable mixture of European or Ameri- can races with the Japanese. You see, therefore, that my advice is strongly conservative 1n all directions, and I end by saying as I began—keep other races at arm’s length as much as possvble. Whether its influence on government was direct, or indirect through its accordance with the reasoning of Japanese statesmen during the transformation, Herbert Spencer’s advice has been followed in spirit and is still to a large extent influential in Japanese policy. Its value is most obvious by consideration of contemporary conditions in China, where the progressive seizure ofJAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS 3d privileges by foreigners has contributed so greatly to present-day chaos. Holding the white man “at arm’s length,’ Japan has come successfully through her testing period and risen with wonderful celerity to a position where she need fear the foreigner no longer. Does that mean that the underlying racial difficulties are solved? The proportion of Japanese who think so is as small as that among Americans; but the proportion who would bring tact and friendliness to ease the rough corners of the problem seems to be larger there than here. Pe ee Pore oe a ee ett ere tl Pe es ie) ee — 4 ” | " i P - 7 J a) eas. / me) phe Aer ede | ro = be Be Re Aone ae hen = —— Serr t ith et et ee ors - < eS a 36 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT tions from the decadent Manchu dynasty at Peking. Founded as a Russian joint stock company, the Chinese Eastern Railway was given power to acquire land which the Czarist government deemed necessary for the “con- struction, operation, and protection of the line,” which sweeping preliminary was followed by clauses granting the company “the absolute and exclusive right of admin- istration of these lands,” and the right to erect buildings and construct telegraph lines. Russian officials, tech- nicians, and laborers swarmed in and settled throughout the railway zone to an extent which made it virtually a Russian colony, despite the provision that eighty years after the completion of the road it should revert to China without payment. The tendency toward covert annexa- tion was strengthened when after the Boxer rebellion Russian Ee ae sent on the pretext of guarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, remained, not merely in the concession zone, but throughout all of the three Man- churian provinces. The failure of Russia to withdraw these troops and restore Chinese authority in Man- churia, coupled with St. Petersburg’s obvious policy of economic and political encroachment in Korea, was the main cause of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Contrary to popular impression, this war was by no means the sweeping victory for Japan that has been pic- tured. The Japanese delegates to the Portsmouth peace conference faced the Russians not as dictators, but as negotiators fully conscious that continuation of hostilities might see the tide of battle turn against them. For that reason ohene could be no chance of expelling Russia from Manchuria. The Russian rights in the Liaotung Penin- sula were transferred to Japan, as was the South Man- churian branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, running from Changchun to Port Arthur, with its connections, China consenting in a special treaty with Japan. The main line of the Chinese Eastern Railway remained Rus- 3 a lt ee it el oo ee ee oe TE od OL een ty eee hl ett ht : gpl Soh ge EES! Pe . - . bs ss = - a a a a — int Oe A ee ee eS eee oe) -_ “we ae S aelh ieendl aE eel” lenae deel ———— eo Sie so ~ at ees ee Oe ek HEELS rt Oud ~ rs bed iu a ial - +e aeJAPAN IN MANCHURIA od sian, as did the section from Harbin to Changchun. Russian influence in North Manchuria remained as strong as ever, strengthened, if anything, by concentration, and the net result was the division of the Three Eastern Provinces, as Manchuria is known in China, into two spheres of foreign influence instead of one. Germany, with a strong foothold in Shantung; France, expanding her influence from Indo-China into Yunnan; Great Britain, owning Hongkong, leasing Weihaiwel, dominating the Yangtze Valley from Shanghai, and anxious to keep Russia from protesting her aggression in Tibet—these three nations readily concurred in the new arrangement in Manchuria. The United States, alone interested in preserving the territorial and adminis- trative integrity of China, was the only great power to view the partitioning of Manchuria with distrust. A test of sincere interest in the preservation of Chinese sovereignty was put up to the other powers when Secre- tary of State Knox, in November, 1909, proposed re- demption of the Manchurian railroads by means of an international loan to China, administration of the lines to be handled by a joint international commission dur- ing the period of the loan. Both Russia and Japan reg- istered strong opposition to the plan, while Great Britain and France were careful to refrain from indorsing a pro- posal so at variance with their own policies in China. In consequence, the division of Manchuria remained a fait accompli, with Russia in the north and Japan in the south steadily solidifying the political and economic power given them by the untrammeled railroad conces- sions. Manchuria is a huge, underpopulated, and un- developed country. Its area of 363,700 square miles is approximately as great as the combined areas of the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jer- sey, Ohio, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Its population, by the most gen- ri - | - _——_ * Ps a z ees Bat teat =3 a Pa ‘ a * “ Sop ary rer ere wie Chinese Governneer Meilroads 7) ve ae ee oe PoE ere ee eT es NeSo be — Deine cath. uillitentit Hema’ peta nae al ieee os 7-4 — ~— Ve eee 9 si eae eee e3 t og Lo a of a id S an . a #4 eg po wp a M "J — - : oe al lieth meet nl in tt el BS SES ok id ola eh Py tT, gt on oe allies _ ne , an ee Y . , : in ste sheet te ? ie ns 8 Tn ee ry diel mga | 4 ee ee * Ct aD baa oaks inet dee eee a ee ee ee ee aL Ieee ee ie Rie ee hte tn ele ete ee ene ne ad eT ae a - rd — > n a Pa SC FE RSS SS FH Pe Pte a eee eerste sees. reer e al Sal a hie hk ae ee e bopete cers Pee ty ery oe ee ee ee a ee en ee taal ~HEP ky ae ad ~ er ’ Pr) ioe wea ees a Se i a) oa Ley oe - = oe a ho le nated) ek ln oodh te oe Bem il rts ie ee ee ee ee Le el aie Tet ttt tote t rete tr Cre a i e 3 - a ~~ ” _ ed il = + sd — s = m - Sa ~ — A gs ro = ae Fetes —— Sxtstc¢g rem otk pee a es ee a el - fi E ‘we. ras ae _ . phat es Bt BE a ee ee a CHapter VI “OTATES’ RIGHTS” IN CHINA To most Americans and, it must be added, to a sur- prisingly large proportion of the foreigners resident in China, the politics of that country appear as a vicious and incomprehensible muddle. Vicious they often are; incomprehensible they need not be. That confusion arises is partially due to our shallow custom of identify- ing contemporary movements with the men who seem to exemplify them. Ordinarily, this is easier than the more logical course of studying the forces underlying great popular eruptions, letting the so-called “leaders” fall into their places afterwards. When such unfamiliar appellations as Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, Sun Chuan- fang and Feng Yu-hsiang are to be memorized, the per- sonality method becomes a boomerang for those who would learn speedily. We can see the fallacy of undue personification in our own history. Nobody contends today that Jefferson Davis was more than a by-product of the Civil War, and even in the case of George Washington, where ideali- zation has been concentrated for generations, we know that the man was made by the upheaval, not the other way around. In China, where the individual counts for much less than in the Occident, we should be equally realistic. In present-day China, moreover, it is not merely that the names of outstanding personalities are hard to remember. The causes of unrest are also diff- cult to analyze in a way flattering to white pride of race. 48“STATES’ RIGHTS” IN CHINA 49 These factors combine with the scarcity of impartial news, the remoteness of the country, and other causes to make it easy to disregard what is happening across the Pacific. Apathy, however, is patently inconsistent with our increasing political, financial, and spiritual im- plications in China, a nation whose invaluable contribu- tions to civilization richly merit American appreciation even without the more prosaic arguments for better understanding. In considering the problems of China in terms of move- ments rather than men, it is of prime importance to visualize the continental nature of the country. Con- siderably larger in area than the United States and all its possessions, China has only about six thousand miles of railroads, approximately the same mileage as the Baltimore and Ohio system alone. The difficulties of communication must be understood, for they are basic obstacles to’ every phase of national regeneration. It is well to remember, for instance, that even in normal times it takes as long to travel overland from Peking to Can- ton as to go from New York to Moscow. Again, the Chinese, even disregarding outlying dis- tricts of the unwieldy republic, are not a homogeneous race. Without considering the many ethnical elements brought together by distant wars of conquest and migra- tions, we can readily see geographical causes for hetero- geneity. Superimpose the map of China to scale upon that of North America and it will not merely exceed the breadth of the United States at its widest part, but will extend from the latitude of southern Alaska to that of Guatemala. Within this vast territory dwell some four hundred million people,: about one-quarter of mankind as a whole, who are divided into at least five distinct physi- cal groups. These groups, differing from one another *'The Chinese Post Office estimate for 1923, generally regarded as somewhat high, gives a total population of 436,094,953. — mle “ ~ _— - - e —a ed a 4 Tek oat aoe “ee beg i | ed ae ewes or rhrer 7 E — foeeT Te Te Titi eo tt “= ba aie ex Seresees ete ett treet. = = ere y= ee TRS Re ee i et ee lee eee eT eS th ee ee ee ee ae ny ee lel 3 Ronn ae)ie ome Dl Bl 9 fe ~ jg id M * +5 Se ao: et at Ft oe pat oe a in a Pam Se) - * - ee he SS es ee ae ly ket Dee rR ok a , el = Pee FT TAS 1 SRESTH ISAS THRA SPL SHH DO ESE oP HSS — ~ a — ~ a a ae se * ——_ - - eh cote ep * Satie mae - aoe artnet arch ae sonnet terete Silica tei, dd 22s: tasters Sts dest eee So decree tee die <2-<3--2>*- ensue. eC HdS8: _—— wd Soh i sp aoa Seton a Etec dete Se eae ee o0 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT as much as the Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean races in Europe, are symbolized by the five-bar flag of the Chinese Republic. In that flag the red stripe represents the Chinese proper, the yellow the Manchus, the blue the Mongols, the white the Tibetans, and the black the fifteen to twenty million Mohammedan members of the huge Chinese family. Stretching from the fifty-third degree of north lati- tude, where Manchuria and Mongolia indent Siberia at widely separate points, to the eighteenth degree, where the great island of Hainan lies on a level with Bombay, it is natural that there should be physical differences between the Chinese of the north and the south. The average Cantonese is between three and four inches shorter and far slighter than his compatriot from Peking, a spread in stature which, since the majority of Chinese in this country are from Kwangtung Province, has given rise to the false conception that the nation is undersized by our standards. Mental differences are as pronounced, the southern Chinese being as a rule more ageressive, nervous, fiery, and mentally alert than those of the north. Whatever government may be in power in Peking, it is a commonplace that most of the admin- istrators there are likely to be from south of the Yangtze, the great river which divides China proper into two nearly equal segments. As is well known, moreover, the spoken language differs so that highly educated Chinese from Canton and from Peking will often find it easiest to converse with one another in English. Food, clothing, architecture, and many other details of living all differ from north to south in China as much as the appearance of the countryside, ever ver- dant in the semi-tropical south, but brown, desolate, and arid during the northern winter months. Yet, under these superficial differences, all the essential conditions of national unity are present, as“STATES’ RIGHTS” IN CHINA ol those who would split China into spheres of foreign influence have experienced to their cost. The spoken language, where the Mandarin is not used, may vary so much as to make the people of different provinces unintelligible to one another; but the written lan- guage is everywhere identical. Railroads traverse only a fraction of the country, and run precariously at that; but the government postal system, the tele- graph, and now even the wireless as well, bind the country together intellectually, if not physically. In ethical ideas, cultural background, and social arrange- ments there is pronounced uniformity throughout the republic, the cleavage being between indigenous and foreign systems rather than geographical. Historically, no other existing nation can claim any- thing like the political continuity that China shows, with her recorded story of four thousand years of na- tional existence. When Cesar was invading Britain, the boundaries of China had been laid down much as they exist today. Before that, when ancient Greece was establishing a pocket of civilization on the fringe of barbarian Europe, the Chinese had spread a cul- ture, quite as interesting and in many ways fully as worthy of modern respect as that of Greece, over an area greater and a people far more numerous than those of pre-Christian Europe. It is a small wonder that the Chinese for centuries regarded the white race as crude and uncivilized. Nor is it surprising that their tradition of greatness in the past unifies the teeming millions from Manchuria to Kwangsi, from Szechwan to Chekiang, in a way which cuts deeper than surface disorders and transient civil warfare. The proof of this, in terms which the west can under- stand, was given when anti-imperialist risings flamed out all over China following the shooting of demon- strators by British police in Shanghai on May 30, 1920. = ae - a a erate Peete ted Peri eee ee ee eee res et eres. ev ctr it eee Baas SETH ESS — eo. x a 7% a + - a 7s eer es te es Pe Te ans = vaebekte seas | PER gba de Pas ee Pe ne ey i a re eoereee rey ci es eberare ree oe, ” _ : P oe St ek eel bad Cees oe ee oe ee Pa Se Nan el ka a abate eel Sees Pe AR Ae lh ele os 3 et e: Ea aaa -—— errT==2 ae ict ie eee Ee te a ee ta a a oly — = ESS P32 et eee ee ; Sn Sol Ta (Sets lees sapeses a a = . _ - a - . “= —— 4 he od re \ os @3 4,06. ey re - 32 al 7 ae Pe o2 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT No reasonable observer claims that Russian influence caused these widespread protests, however much Soviet propagandists may have abetted them. They were es- sentially the reflection of an outraged national unity, no less deep than our own unity because moulded along less assertive and more mellow lines. Fundamentally, we must agree, China possesses all the conditions requisite for development as a national en- tity in the modern sense of the phrase; but this de- velopment must follow lines natural to the conditions and traditions of the country rather than systems im- posed by or blindly copied from Occidental states, Japan could imitate where China cannot, partly because of the enormous geographical differences between the two countries, partly because the Chinese character has always resisted imitation, even where materially profit- able, as much as the Japanese has leaned toward it. Worth remembering is the fact that before Japan began to westernize herself. Chinese literature, philoso- phy, and social codes were models for the island empire. One reason why the Japanese worry so much about “Bolshevism,” while most Chinese regard communist propaganda almost with indifference, is the relative im- munity of the latter country to external influence, as opposed to the marked susceptibility of Japan. Cer- tainly, it is a tribute to China’s inherent strength that she remains the only non-white nation which has not succumbed, whether by conquest or by imitation, to the spirit of avprandizement which has brought all the rest of the world to the ac GOBUOD of Occidental methods. Politically, China has for centuries been the loosest imaginable Fon m of federal union, with each of the proy- inces preserving complete autonomy over its domestic affairs, and such outlying districts as Tibet, Turkes- tan, and Mongolia quasi- -independent i in char acter. The alien Manchu dynasty, which ruled in Peking from 1644“STATES’ RIGHTS” IN CHINA oo to the abdication of the last Emperor in 1912, was dur- ing its early period of power too wise to stir hostility by gratuitous interference in local affairs. The prov- inces, which are delimited much as they stand today in the oldest maps of China which have any pre- tense of accuracy, saw an increase rather than a limi- tation of their ‘States’ Rights” in the two centuries from 1650 to 1850. The Imperial representatives appointed by Peking collected such relatively small taxes as the central government demanded, of course adding a per- centage for personal “squeeze,” which is as much an accepted custom in China as the taking of round rents or mineral royalties is in Anglo-Saxon countries. This small financial levy, coupled with an occasional foray by Manchu troops, if necessary to preserve civil peace, was about the extent of federal authority until foreign penetration combined with a succession of feeble rulers to force the cumulative changes which underlie the pres- ent chaos in China. It frequently has been pointed out that it was not territorial aggression, but insistence on the right to engage in commerce which was the objective of the Chinese policy of the foreign powers during the early years of the nineteenth century. Even so the destruc- tive effect on the Chinese form of government was pro- nounced. The preliminary aim of the powers was to force the recognition and acceptance of their envoys by Pe- king, long resisted by the Manchu court not entirely, 1t 1s legitimate to surmise, out of “cussedness,” but from the same close reasoning based on observation which caused Herbert Spencer, years later, to advise the Japanese to “keep other races at arm’s length as much as possible.” + Distrust was not misplaced. No sooner were foreign diplomats securely established in Peking than they be- gan to demand that the central government insure pro- *See pp. 30-32. sna se a@tery eetit Pee PLiaT etry thts —— Severe re Pi tery ert rete Cie ee rere 2. ss. reer ee Sere ett! Re ee Se] _ id — a s > ae rey ey ee Oe ee ee eS ee -_ ee ee ee ee ee ee ow goer * SS Teo ~ * 5 2 ae S o ie ie ae ns > hi ie we gs Se ee ek a et weet ke ae el eek eee eee ene ek ee ek 8 Le ok lal el ci ee a ee ams ie ae aoa a nsw Ee etd a ees — 7 eA art a — a ran] Sal “* Dt tel bun spel a arate dened ll en apa a ae eee Sage ora bs a £2es tieFafer rete s = oA OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT tection to their uninvited nationals in every part of China. The pressure had begun to break down that local self-government based on family and guild organi- zation which was so natural and basic to the Chinese system. Some of the worst injuries the white race has brought to China have been implicit rather than overt. Tang Shao-yi, the first Prime Minister of the Chinese Repub- lic, told me that when he was a boy in Kwangtung he never saw a policeman, and that the absence of the disciplinary side of government was taken for granted by people accustomed to regulate their actions by ethical standards rather than by laws. Nothing, of course, is easier than to picture the past as idyllic, regardless of the fact that such bloody interludes as the Taiping Re- bellion can be found in every “golden age” of Chinese history. But evidence is irrefutable of the ability of the Chinese to order their lives industriously and happily with a minimum of the evil of government. The student need only refer to the maxims of Confucius to realize the emphasis which his countrymen lay on the avoidance rather than the forceful suppression of controversy. The difference between Confucianism and Christianity in this respect is that the former has written its ethics much more deeply in the daily life of its followers. A good illustration of what is meant by an implicit injury to China is found in the effect of the Boxer indemnity in plunging the country into political chaos. There is no question that the Boxer rebellion was an insane and terrible outbreak, though no impartial his- torlan can deny that there was great provocation for the rising in the progressive encroachments of foreign powers on Chinese sovereignty. With polemics on this issue, however, we are not here concerned. ‘The in- sufficiently realized point is that the indemnity of over $300,000,000 imposed on China led by direct and per-“STATES’ RIGHTS” IN CHINA D0 ceptible stages to the revolution of 1911 and the estab- lishment of a nominal Republic for which the country was in no way fitted or prepared. To raise the first installments of this huge indemnity, a central govern- ment which had shown itself helpless to check shameless foreign aggression was forced to increase tax levies and otherwise interfere in local affairs at the very moment when the inherent Chinese dislike for the Manchus was beginning to harden. Whether or not the reform movement to which the Manchu dynasty gave belated support might have mod- ernized the Chinese government with as little disorder as occurred in Japan is now an academic speculation. A careful plan was promulgated in 1908, designed to alter the existing autocracy to a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral elected Parliament after nine years of pro- eTessive preparation. The alien character of this program and the enormous extent of illiteracy in China might alone have defeated the end sought. But beyond this the reforms were so planned as to continue and amplify the centralization policies to which the Manchus had become committed. In any event the time was past for saving a monarchy which had become identified with @ progressive surrender of territory and sovereign rights to foreign aggression. Tzu-hsi, the formidable old Empress Dowager, might have been able to postpone the revolution by her per- sonal ability and prestige, but she died in November, 1908, only a few months after the initiation of the reform program. The same week died also her nephew, Kuang- hsu, the nominal emperor, who for ten years had been kept a virtual prisoner by the Empress Dowager because of his eagerness to revise the Chinese system of govern- ment along western lines. The new occupant of the Dragon Throne was four-year-old Prince P’u-yi, whose reactionary guardians quickly proceeded to make the i rT Sy, ss Sees eis ieee Z=Ge9 te Terres etch oe et re eater er. oe et. ret te fe ee! pyr ee wipe stecegs sot Seer rs. ss) ts. oe i a a ee ~ ne ee a eee she8 an ad Se PT ey ee ee ee a ee De Oe s-be De a a iCet oe a ee a ee ee Lede male tncaiedl. aacieiedinslin ds ‘aed diene Bicensieieedetiad ee Sealand teed tet ae eer) enars ee ee ee oe wt. ree Te - Sd eae ent ete pe ioe eae aed am a sesso scngstes a Ce a oe a M4 he ee a ~~ + - ~ re as coe o os, rs 2 ice gee eee eed ous 5% A Saeed oad “ — a 4 ps + — ne seth ete cede ile reo ee ee ER ae eS Te ee Feehe gets aaa as nt tl te ae ee ek oe els = eesee 5 Houde pee-g-Re Leal od nei nagem ge De | oe Dataset , Sees ies sts Po ong Oe Bees 7” . - = ar-* F * & + hee aaa = i — —— = * " 66 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT the parliamentary bribery referred to on page 63 the first objective was achieved. The military unification plan failed like all its predecessors and successors pat- terned on that line. This in spite of the fact that open discord in South China had resulted in the temporary overthrow of Sun Yat-sen, enabling Chihli influence to be considerably extended south of the Yangtze River. The story of Wu Pei-fu’s collapse in 1924 is impor- tant, because it shows how unnatural is the recent mariage de convenance between him and Chang Tso-lin, old enemies who have been brought together by a mutual dislike of Feng Yu-hsiang and the encroachments of Soviet Russia which the Christian General has tolerated, if not welcomed. It is hard to see permanence in an alliance based on such negative reasons, and it is quite impossible to see any real patriotism in the anti-Russian attitude of Chang, deeply distrusted throughout China because of his years of cooperation with Japan. During 1924, an obstacle to Wu’s consolidation eam- paign developed in the possession of the native city of Shanghai, metropolis of Kiangsu Province, by the military governor of Chekiang, who found possession of the mouth of the Yangtze valuable because of the reve- nue derivable from opium smuggling. In September, 1924, the Tuchun of Kiangsu, supported by Wu, moved to recover Shanghai, and occupied it after a brief cam- paign. Wu and Chang had been steadily drifting in the direction of war, the former through his enforcement of centralization, the latter by reason of his insistence on Manchurian independence. With unofficial Japanese support, the assistance of Czarist Russian officers, and the aid of a British military adventurer (General Sut- ton), Chang Tso-lin had built up a huge armament of trench mortars, machine guns, and mobile artillery, sup- plemented with bombing and scouting airplanes and other thoroughly modern war material. Still smarting2. Peeriry Tye S) ene Pyre tr rere. st aed Te 74 t Fo oe sasyes pa te ene pe Spksteest yep sy 243% a eee ss | -_= = Se ta. et a ee ss — oh —pseteses ~ a] Se te eee: ae ee ee ee a a tn 2 rn ee tae + ee eee Se (2 rededs ios * = Pe. ous ee besosa ete ~ — += + Te BSAC TS SBS S461 PSs SIs Caps dee > | lh ciel tie he ordi ied nae [— i Sten dil ete tee ited mae gene el =~ + J iy ; he ws si 4 7 J ‘i Ss dope ee ee ek ee = ee etd rare = penal A SOLDIER OF THE KUOMINCHUN Regarded by foreign militarv observers as the equal of any Occidental troops in discipline and courage. THE INTERNATIONAL TRAIN Not Treaty Clauses, but white paint and a liberal display of flags are relied upon to keep communications open to Peking In wartime.wa ke THE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE 67 under his defeat by Wu two years previous, the Man- churian war lord seized the fighting around Shanghai as pretext to move south on Peking. The Chihli leader welcomed the gage of battle, and poured division after division of his troops up to the battle ground at Shan- haikwan, the narrow seacoast pass where the Great Wall of China drops from impassable mountains to the Gulf of Pechihli on the Yellow Sea. At this crucial moment in the military situation came the famous defection of the Christian general, whose well-trained army of 30,000 men held the line south of Jehol and was regarded by Wu Pei-fu as his left wing. It is overstrong, considering the sawve qui peut attitude of all Chinese militarists, to define Feng’s action as “treachery” toward Wu Pei-fu. The whole story of what occurred prior to the fateful day of October 23, 1924, has not yet been revealed, but it is certain that Marshal Feng decided, with probably as much sin- cerity as human beings generally show in times of crisis, that the civil war was following senseless lines certain only to impoverish the country further and strengthen Japanese penetration in Manchuria. So on that day Feng’s army ceased to be subordinate to Wu Pei-fu and became the Kuominchun—the “People’s Na- tional Army” of China, pledged not to individual ambi- tions but to national welfare, the bulk of it composed not of drafted coolies, but of patriotic volunteers who marched into Peking singing Christian hymns and, strangest anomaly of all in modern Chinese warfare, took nothing for which full payment was not made. A few days later Wu Pei-fu, furious and helpless, but too courageous to follow the customary Chinese practice of flying to a foreign concession in time of trouble, re- treated openly to his base outside Hankow and there began to plan for the revenge which he took in the spring of 1926. 5 fib ob ae en wt rors errr ee rt i Seay — = stecviageeateeis eera=psbaasr sce a ae = a eres a. es 4 pe ks304 24Sa Sern 53 aes ee" Mig n 4 ‘ — ee ts *» >+ see es eo oS eet ee Te Sa = os = “ee Pee ee ee — = es ae ee ae ee ee ee eee St sy er eece 2 9 See eei ts. 4 a FL = Tart 425 - ee pS SEE Seat PS PD ST HIST SES SIT DS GHD SE SP eee se ge y — tee eet’ ety ik nde et oe ee ee DS — -_ _ —_ = bo Pe oe oe — ~~ oe re ho oa het ah ak ne ein . « J &>s. eC. a ae i. po 2d ~ - ae an — eet gis SoS Ss lad adh, eit Siechendiea eee ates: eed ke ea a 68 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT The Kuominchun—a modern Chinese counterpart of Cromwell’s Ironsides, imbued with an Old ‘Testament religious fervor, disciplined like the Prussian guard, loyal to their commander and loyal to China—remained in power in Peking for eighteen months, from October, 1924, to April, 1926. During that period there was perfect order and safety for foreigners of every nation both in the capital and in adjacent territories controlled by Marshal Feng. Living far outside the Legation Quarter in Peking during January of 1926, I no more hesitated to wander about alone at night than if it had been an American city. With a large sum of money in my pocket, a friend and myself, both of course unarmed, traveled from the Great Wall to Peking in a freight car alone with soldiers of the Kuominchun to experience nothing worse than courteous and friendly interest. Every foreigner in the territory controlled by the Chris- tian General during this period would, if honest, testify to hundreds of evidences of like security. Why, then, was there such assiduous foreign propaganda to spread the downright slander about Feng Yu-hsiang which has been popularized abroad? The answer is not difficult to find. The Christian Gen- eral had not been a month in power before he showed that his policy was diametrically different to that of the generality of war lords. His aim was not to weaken China for personal aggrandizement, but to strengthen his country by calling a truce to hostilities. Instead of encouraging his soldiers to have loot and rapine as their chief ambition he sent them from the drill ground to road building and afforestation projects, filling their spare time with lectures on the contemporary history of China and general instruction along adult education lines. The morale built up among the Kuominchun by these methods was truly marvelous. Several times I offered private soldiers in that army gratuities, trivialTHE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE 69 yet equivalent to a month of their meagre pay, for services rendered. Always the tips were refused with courteous dignity, even though there was none to over- see the transaction. This alone, though disconcerting to those who claim that China is sodden with corruption and cannot be regenerated by native effort, would not account for the vicious foreign hostility to Feng Yu-hsiang, in which the English in China took the lead. The real cause for this enmity was Feng’s efforts to “deepen the revo- lution” and thereby forward its original aim of ridding China of the encroachments on her sovereignty. This, coupled with the fact that he was anxious to decentralize rather than strengthen the central government, was the Christian General’s unforgivable sin. The “deepening” of the revolution took several forms, of which the most superficial was the expulsion from the Forbidden City in Peking of Hsuan Tung, last of the Manchu emperors, who by the abdication agree- ments had been allowed to retain the shadow of mo- narchical state within the imperial palaces. Plain Henry P’u Yi, as this youth now prefers to be known, took refuge in the foreign concession at Tientsin, where his proverbial ‘Chinaman’s chance” at restoration 1s somewhat strengthened by the inability of presidents and premiers to retain office. This action by the Chris- tian General, however, aroused little or no popular oppo- sition, in contrast to the disappearance of many of the palace treasures which accompanied it, a stain on Feng's record perhaps comparable with that of the Teapot Dome scandal during the Harding administration. Of far greater importance was the tacit alliance estab- lished by Marshal Feng between the Kuominchun, or People’s National Army, and the Kuomintang, or Peo- ple’s National Party, the oldest and perhaps the only effective political organization in China. The Kuomin- Ps ate ne —_ _ = ead tee ot siete roe eT ee Te tr = Ts TT eX rSsastadesecisseseiss s _ a eve ets ore) ty fe Se tee. ess - ee > Pe es oe oe eee os $stpbakteseorse i oe ee ee er ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee a ‘are Getecvrs reages-elP?~~ ee en ea ge a ie ieee - iat ew ese pee ee Deed oh eh ee eee a ee Puy eatas Te ao 5 pe jean ae | - . ; i. : 3 ‘ - we a - = * po el tte ey det ie ee ee Ee ee twtr eal A Shah inte Re a ead og Oe a 8 Pal nen ei ie ose ti éea ce se ag ee fe > a a c= 70 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT tang, of which we shall have more to say in the next chapter, was in large part the creation of Dr. Sun Yat- sen, and its leaders were the effective force behind the revolution. It has two wings, practically uniform in their domestic platform, which stands for Constitu- tionalism, abolition of the military governor system, sup- pression of the war lords, decentralization of government, and provincial autonomy. In foreign policy the left wing favors summary abolition of the unequal treaties and close cooperation with Russia, the right wing being more conservative on both these issues. Always strong- est in Canton, the Kuomintang has branches throughout all China, and among Chinese abroad, its total member- ship at the present time being half a million by con- servative estimate. A very large proportion of university students, whose active participation in politics has cre- ated both interest and resentment abroad, belong to it. The Kuomintang is not communistic, there being a sepa- rate numerically negligible party of that flavor, but the orientation of the left wing in recent years has been distinctly pro-Russian. The real word to describe the Kuomintang is “nationalistic.” That in itself means “Bolshevistic” to many foreigners in China. To the impartial observer it will seem perfectly proper, if indeed laudable is not an equally permissible word, that Feng cooperated with the Kuomintang, even to the extent of placarding his barracks with such slogans as the one reading: “The People Subjected to Foreign Im- perialism Are No Better than Homeless Dogs.” Nor can his relations with Soviet Russia be called discreditable. When he bought munitions from that country, it was primarily because he did not possess well-equipped arsenals like Chang and Wu, and was cut off from other foreign sources of supply open to them. He did not, like the other war lords, actively interfere with the conduct of civil government in Peking. ThoughTHE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE 71 he imprisoned Tsao Kun, Wu’s nominee who had been “elected” President by flagrant corruption, the day after his coup d’etat, he maintained Tuan Chi-jui of the Anfu party as Premier and “Provisional Chief Executive.” Absolutely unprecedented in Chinese post-revolutionary history is the fact that the first cabinet formed after Feng’s seizure of Peking did not contain a single minis- ter nominated by him. Early in 1925, the impossible feat of a Reorganization Conference, which would bring both Sun Yat-sen and Chang Tso-lin to the support of Tuan’s government, was attempted; but Dr. Sun, whose closing years had seen a decided drift toward extreme radicalism, died at Peking during its sessions, and Chang Tso-lin was glad of the excuse to withdraw his delegates from a conference which sought disarmament of the war- ring factions as one of its aims. The Shanghai shootings of May 30, 1925, naturally strengthened the influence of the Christian General, as the outstanding nationalistic leader, and in December of that year occurred a dramatic episode which, in the opinion of many competent to judge, almost succeeded in stabilizing the politics of China along the lines worked for so arduously by the Kuomintang. General Kuo Sung-ling, one of the Manchurian war lord’s chief sub- ordinates, revolted against Chang in behalf of the nationalistic program of the Peking government. Wu Pei-fu, stranded without money or men in central China, was powerless to intervene, and all Feng had to do was to go to the aid of Kuo in Manchuria in order to finish off Chang Tso-lin, perhaps the most disruptive influence in China, for good and all. In occupation of Tientsin, controlling the only railroad from Peking to Mukden, was General Li Ching-lin, an ambitious ex-Tuchun who had served Chang well in the past and had now no in- tention of seeing Feng upset a balance of power which well suited his own schemes. ~ _ - a ee ating aliedt ate Ee s Teas ike Perv TTT eT Oe tia ee te a | Ete eye tere Pe pert ete rote, ~ rer teers te ee ee eee eee TPT ee ee + age * te | o> ~- - or re pe ee Se ey eee ee ee ee ee eee Ee ee ee te Oe re oe —— ae ae ee oe oe a $aad —— tonne eel ech eld. veh lees Ree Se eth the oe el ee eee Eee ee ee) ol Bl il et eee ee ee ee ke ee es - - 7 - woe «+ 4 = ad ad _— seated ” - ~ ~ eT i M4 fe eae or) ” “ x ar : * ¥ . - : f Bg - 2a a; — ee, Pe sfsnis paar ee te Si. tees eroress i ett ota ag gp ane -_ _ sie Ge tan Be Ok Re ee ee he a wpe Slt lei teal ee 72 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT For a few days Feng hesitated, knowing that his enemies would hail intervention in behalf of Kuo as evidence that all of his work for peace and disarmament was insincere. The delay was fatal. Not merely was Chang Tso-lin able to rally, encouraged by the Japanese announcement that civil war would not be permitted along the South Manchurian Railway, but Li Ching-lin was able to defend Tientsin with a most modern system of entrenchments in which the hand of foreign military advisers was apparent. ‘Then, in one of the bloodiest battles of modern China, the Kuominchun showed its mettle. On Christmas Eve of 1925, after several days’ preliminary fighting, Feng’s first army, though far defi- cient to that of Li in artillery, bombs, and ammunition, stormed the defences of Tientsin with the bayonet. It was an exhibition of disciplined courage which drew gasps of admiration from every foreign military observer in Peking, but it was fruitless. On the very day that Tientsin fell to the National Army, Kuo Sung-ling was defeated, captured, and beheaded three hundred miles to the north. Deeply upset by a slaughter which on both sides cost some ten thousand casualties—the dead were thick on the battlefield when I passed over it on Christmas Day—Feng announced his retirement from public hfe. After a heroic effort at regeneration, the way was open for the next move in Chinese disintegra- tion. A month after the battle of Tientsin, I interviewed Marshal Wu Pei-fu at his Hankow headquarters, and was told by him of his intention to overthrow the Kuo- minchun because ‘Soviet influence flourishes wherever its troops are established.” Regardless of the portion of truth in that asseveration—which might just as logi- ally have induced him to attack Chang T'so-lin because Japanese influence flourishes wherever his troops are established—the famous Marshal did not give me theTHE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE 73 impression of being anything more than a courageous and efficient soldier. With famine and banditry rife in the area of China under his control, his entire mind was concentrated on the old myth of unifying China by force. “Disarmament,” Wu told me, “is too expensive to be considered now. It will come when a legitimate central government is established in Peking.” The trouble is that what is legitimate to Marshal Wu is illegitimate to half his fellow countrymen, and vice versa. Financed by Chang Tso-lin, Marshal Wu moved his army north from Hankow soon after my talk with him. Simultaneously, Chang marched south from Manchuria, while his allies, Li Ching-lin and Chang Tsung-chang, advanced west from bandit-ridden Shantung. Against this circular attack the Kuominchun, lacking Feng’s leadership, greatly outnumbered, and short of munitions, nevertheless put up a heroic resistance. After a number of severe battles, in several of which the unnatural allies were defeated, the Kuominchun withdrew in good order, first to Nankou Pass, northwest of Peking, and then to the Mongolian border, where it still remains intact. The taking of the capital at the end of April, 1926, was marked by grave looting and other excesses, par- ticularly, it is reported, on the part of Chang Tso-lin’s ‘ brigade of Czarist Russians. Four months after the capture of Peking by Wu and Chang, there was still no civil government functioning there, Dr. W. W. Yen, one of the ablest of the neutral Chinese statesmen, hav- ing found it impossible to retain the premiership because oi conditions arising from the scarcely suppressed rivalry between Wu and Chang. So rests the thoroughly depressing political situation at Peking at the time of writing (August, 1926). Cen- tralization by force is again being attempted, but this time by rival militarists who have in the past been bitter —" = as ry + r ae 2 er et ee ee Lay aw e ‘ ony a “am, p = 2 CaaS. L. Perret tee Tee ee Be oe ee i a De Syleceeregagsi St gas TT est tr _— T tape Cn cab cae gh tat il Sea Bere Se Fa bt 95Et> — es ee ee ee a) ee — - Pas] ee ys ee es ee ef a ee ee ..¢ i 22 es is% Poet ew ee oy eee Se ee ee a eoee in ie Fe a ted eee ek ei le ee eee ee ee Ee 2 8 od ool el eee ee ree Tt Se ee , - . - : . selcims a aary t t - pce i ee Ex SARS: 7 ; . —$ id - ‘- 3 ¥ = : pi i . é a P ead > - = i _ s ty —— ao a a ie _ P— — " _— a Oe ae a fm Saab ae \ ] } } j 7) i) . is ¥ a aa A i it Ri a ye wi Pas | La wee) Le cs on a oe i a dee aan b ir fe ty a -_ a Pe ~ - > tye te etefes itil hy ea 74 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT enemies. As a military hegemony in China has always failed before, so, it may be confidently predicted, it will fail again. Feng, product of the simple-minded peasant class, has retired to Moscow, where his past tolerance toward Soviet Russia is likely to be converted to a much more active sympathy. He will not stay in Russia. The Kuominchun awaits his return, while the collapse of Wu Pei-fu before the northern march of the Canton armies shows how hollow are that general’s hopes of restoring order by a victorious war on “radicalism.” Meantime, obscured by the confusing political kaleido- scope at Peking, important tendencies in China are steadily taking permanent shape. Having discussed the failure of centralization, let us consider the possibilities of provincial autonomy, as illustrated by the work of the Canton government. The trip from Peking to Can- ton is, for the reader, a matter of the turning of a page. Let us remember always that the latter city lies two thousand miles due south of China’s nominal capital, and that the traveler is lucky, nowadays, 1f he can make the journey in less than two full weeks.Cuaptrer VIII KWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN While much of northern and central China has been wasting its substance in meaningless civil war, and the banditry encouraged thereby, a definite and rational philosophy of government has been spreading its influ- ence from Canton throughout southern China. There has been bloodshed, loot, and disorder in full and heaping measure among these southern provinces but, in contra- distinction to the north, one faction has preserved real continuity and a truly patriotic aim. That faction is the Kuomintang, or People’s National party. Its aim is the establishment of a really sovereign Republic of China, formed by a Federal grouping of semi-autonomous provinces. Canton, with an estimated population of 1,400,000, is a larger and commercially much more important me- tropolis than Peking, just as _ Kwangtung Province,? in the heart of which the southern capital les, is much richer and more fertile than Chihli. In Kwangtung one- tenth of China’s 400,000,000 inhabitants are concen- trated, and there the Kuomintang has nearly half of its 500,000 members and a large proportion of the peasant “sympathizers” which this well-organized radical move- ment is seeking to win over. In the brief period since June, 1925, when the Kuomintang, heir to Sun Yat-sen’s life work, secured * Not to be confused with Kwangtung, the Japanese leased terri- tory on the Laiotung Peninsula in South Manchuria. 75 hacia SO ae ad | 1 Ui * an 5 vo ins) He ha rok cree ttt rere ts Poets ye | i — es ey Se Ne Ae: SOS Se ee PPS eee Nee er PP eee see eS hy pares ee re Pere oe Tt te aa tt ts “ere =" _ — ~s eee ees —— ~ Mes oe reel} ee Ce ee ee ee a ae en re ee eee-_ ee ah ee eee es oe le eee eee tee Ee Po el ee ee oo eee eee ee ee ee ee ee rf 2 F iii alanis = apni ry te _— ~~ . Pe ae] a * =* > i2*,' Fe % - i lilinad - ~ * - : 2 i q — : + we ial ~~ ~~ * ~ On eet Sil pee — i m5 eee" Co eb pee; ae oe eee ts ia LG) Bd a - 4 parse ‘s. “ya Serrofast dete seis seredr a — ny — — pr ns ng nn Fs etl ieee wt a — ee ee Oe =~ < Se be ad Fe ee ee 76 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT unchallenged control of Canton, its gains have been re- markable. During that time, the entire province of Kwangtung has been brought under the strong rule of the provincial capital, and Kuomintang influence ex- tended into the four adjacent provinces of Kwangsi, Hunan, Kiangsi, and Fukien, containing, with Kwang- tung, a population as numerous as that of the United States. Truly, the fighting throughout China, which is practically all we hear about in the fragmentary news dispatches from that country, may give a very Incom- plete and misleading impression of what is significant to the Chinese as a people. We little realize that the last twelve-month in Canton has seen the evolution of a very capable civil government which at present controls the military arm in a way unknown elsewhere in China, and which runs its finances on an efficient budget systern. Most of the information about Canton abroad has come through the neighboring British colony of Hongkong, against which for the same twelve-month period there has been maintained a ruinous boycott hardly conducive to a temperate opinion of its sponsors. To sift out the truth about Canton between the abso- lutely conflicting statements which fill the air there and in Hongkong is no easy matter. But one comprehensive statement may be made with absolute certainty. The present Canton government is well grounded, growing in strength, in fact if not in name completely independent of Peking, assured of whole-hearted support by Soviet Russia, and completely contemptuous of foreign treaty ae s. lf it were not so powerful it would not be so vell liked, nor so much hated. "The Canton government may legitimately be called Bolshevistic in the loose sense of the word. It has wel- comed revolutionary Russian advisers and military in- structors. It has sanctioned uncompensated seizures of private property and established government monopo-KWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN 77 PT Payer? Teer eat eee « = vrs ee eUrna OUTER MONGOLIA ~ 4 ie = ty \ 4 Th Vu ) ap we! = =KANSB oS , ~ ew7 TIBET ~L, 4 c eae i? SHENSI ~ a = Sei ‘Y « a? SZECHWAN Chungking ae leno ¢_2CHEKIANG cones al at ! ay ~ q*t c ed \ i a Rie er wa ‘ HUNAN s \ANGSD 7 raed KWEICHOW 5 \ / + f y FUKIEN Miles __ 64980 it 520 Haran Tslana (Kwangfan 3) ‘ ¢ Pease esesgecvasuse Peee eT ere Th re ee eed a ors eS) se 4 a oe = ey a - ee ee ee ee - — | age F ee ae) ‘ —— Te Sette ay Ss Sosw se oecuceegyererscéesesss PROVINCES AND RAILROADS OF CHINA FE ge Maen aah ee ee ee ee ee: Se fens Senge ame alm eS ee ae ee ee a ee ee er ee ee ry yasPet ah etal adh at ee ah er te cet ee ee lta ae ere Le f amiga Pia te ee ae ee ee ee eel — pele em — —S— ee a a ee 5 alee tints ST ebendhge -tclpal > CSeVriesselesaprss> M J 23,6. aa oa a 78 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT lies by fiat. It rules by a frank and open dictatorship of a minority party which glorifies the manual worker in proper soapbox spirit. It arms striking coolies with modern rifles and takes good care to see that disgruntled merchants shall not be similarly protected. Without the slightest hesitation it interferes with private trade and commerce, Chinese or foreign, for political ends. And it is rather more than neutral in its attitude toward anti-foreign, anti-capitalist, and anti-Christian agita- tion. Nevertheless, the Canton government is not Com- munistic. Nor can it be said to have severed all con- stitutional relationships with Peking, with which city there is as yet no rail connection. The five-bar flag of the Chinese Republic still flies above the Customs Building in Canton, in contrast to the sunburst banner of the Kuomintang which predominates everywhere else in Canton, and customs revenues, or a part of them, still accrue to the credit of the National government. That this 1s so is partly due to the care taken by Michael Borodin, chief of the Russian Advisory Commission, not to draw too much foreign attention to what is happen- ing in Canton, and partly due to the tact, good judg- ment, and firmness exercised by Hayley Bell, an Englishman who is Commissioner of Customs there, in handling an extremely difficult, delicate, and (as an assault on him has shown) dangerous job. Customs revenues are also collected for Peking, against strong local opposition, at Swatow and other Kwangtung ports, though authority in this sphere is the only point on which Kwangtung acknowledges the theoretical Fed- eral sovereignty, As long as they do not attempt, for the duration of the boycott, to trade in British goods or with Hongkong, Chinese merchants in Canton are free to carry on their business without any serious restrictions. There areKWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN 79 heavy taxes, levied, as T. V. Soong, the youthful Har- vard graduate who is Minister of Finance, thinks nec- essary. But as there are no illegal military exactions, as in so many parts of China, and as the national char- acteristic of “squeeze,” or petty official graft, has been ereatly reduced, little grumbling has occurred on this score. Indeed, the Canton Chamber of Commerce and other business organizations have more than once financed adequately secured municipal loans. The Canton government has declared an oil monopoly, seemingly designed to favor Russian oil, which is coming in from Vladivostok and even the Black Sea in increas- ing quantities. An undue proportion of revenue goes to the Russian-directed military academy at Whampoa and to the labor unions in one form or another. The avowed tendency of these last to dictate what wages shall be paid, what contracts shall be let, who shall be employed, and similar industrial matters is not to be ignored. But it is necessary to remember that these symptoms reflect tactics of the local Chinese Communist party, which 1s now more hostile to than allied with the Kuomintang. The students in Canton, it is interesting to notice, are coming out in active opposition to native Communism. Recently those at Canton Christian College voted, 484 to 32, to rid themselves of three Communist members of their body, practically forcing American members of the faculty to approve the expulsion, in which the Chinese teachers concurred. Canton, in other words, has lived so close to Communism that a natural reaction first to its methods and then to its doctrines has set in. This has been demonstrated by the withdrawal from the city of half of the twoscore Russian agents who were operating there during my visit, in February, 1926. They had made the mistake, customary with all foreign advisers in China, of regarding themselves as the direc- oye ea 217s sd Terre ee rt iT ee Faprereece . See Ce ee ee ee) tee of ~ ae ne ace es Prete ry ete tea el te fe ere 2 a Mt Se Base SETS ESS or es oT ee gre? ute eee Se ee ee ee eee ee erersrhe get sr4ecees es = = ee ee ee ee ee— = =e ee . ™ o . “a~@ hen - oS ad r ot a re Sa Ral de oe ek le a De ene eh ih le ee eee ee el a dll alee aed pa ah sere ert em ih ed pele oleh a aF t m4 ee Pi) = = _ . -- sale _ . So aregenll . oe ae ei — — net - = ~~ = - _ val ta <2 > tose e esse rs anes Fe ei lee ee en nlp a Dee See eee ae ak SOF oS plat etind Pept Sel tenia hed é22 rece a a ~- be ms oe Trt Tt at 80 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT tors rather than the employees of those who had taken them into service. The outstanding question regarding Russian influence in Canton is the objective behind the painstaking effort which the Soviet Government has been making at this central point of southern China. Like every other policy to which Moscow has committed itself since 1917, it is probable that a dual motive enters. Comrade Borodin was invited to Canton by Sun Yat-sen in 1923, and he and his staff have as much right to be there as tech- nical advisers as the Americans, British, Japanese, and representatives of other nationalities who fill similar posts in Peking. I do not think it would be hard to prove that the Russian staff in Canton has been just as interested in building a stable government as any of the foreigners in service under the administration at Peking. Judging from results alone, the Russians have been easily the more efficient of the two groups. On the other hand, it is not to be doubted that the Russians in Canton are also there as Communists, in- terested in stirring the Chinese to active hostility against capitalistic imperialism. For this purpose Canton is an excellent base. The map on page 139 will indicate the strategic importance of Kwangtung Province in the ad- mitted Russian scheme of spreading unrest among sub- ject peoples, From the great island of Hainan, brought under the control of the Canton government early in 1926, after a campaign planned by Admiral Semenoff, its Bolshevik naval adviser, the lone coast of French Indo-China is less than a day’s sail distant. Extension of Kuomintang control to Hainan coincided with a tightening of police regulations in this French territory. Just beyond Indo- China lies Burmah, another former Chinese vassal state, annexed by Great Britain in 1886. Within easy reach of the Kwangtung coast to the southeast and to the eastKWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN 81 lie respectively the Philippines and Formosa, important dependencies of the United States and of Japan. From Kwangtung, in other words, it should theoretically be possible to foment trouble for every one of the four imperialistic powers which in the past have demonstrated readiness to take arms against Soviet Russia. Far- fetched as this sketch of possibilities behind the Russian ‘influence in Canton may seem, there is sufficient cir- cumstantial evidence about it to justify serious consider- ation. But the impression must not be given that the vigor and enterprise which dominate Canton today are dependent upon Russian influence. There is no doubting either the patriotism, the sincerity, or the ability of the local Chinese leaders who are building good govern- ment in Kwangtung as an initial step towards the re- generation of their country and the complete abolition of one-sided foreign privilege. The Nationalist government of Canton, which 1s in substance a board of commissioners with dictatorial powers subject only to the National Executive of the Kuomintang, was established on July 1, 1920. Its great aim, as announced at the time, was the unification of Kwanegtung Province, then controlled by half a dozen virtually independent generals and overrun by a horde of bandits and river and coastal pirates. In the short space of seven months political unification was accom- plished. Plenty of banditry and piracy remain, but there is no doubt that the military can gradually stamp this out. It is characteristic of the administration that action to this end is taken slowly, on the theory that the only way to solve the bandit problem permanently ‘s to establish first a normal civil life into which men driven to robbery by social chaos can be reincorporated. Very remarkable for China, and a great personal trib- ute to General Chiang Kai-shek, the youthful military genius of the provincial army, is the fact that the army - eer ree iad dt ak ae — eat ae > rer ere yrs: ee e yea treet tert ttt ete er rs ~ Saeeu cece bas = * eee ee a tes a eT ee ee ee ae are eee fe Pe rx bhi dsReEgbe cedeete Ce ee lt. ee ee Phas et ERT Ee al Nt Ne Plea il etl el ee ee ee ol a a a Ee ed tered 7 a ae ge enn ge oi Rete eR et Oh a he eer EY Jn) TO cae eee Some any eh eek pg oe ee ed 82 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT is held in complete control by the civil authorities at Canton. The troops are well officered and disciplined, partly due to the ceaseless efforts of the Russian drill masters at Whampoa Military Academy. The equip- ment is good, and the people of Canton no longer bother to look up as the cadet aviators from Whampoa fly bombing and scout airplanes over the congested city streets. From sources hostile to the government comes the admission that there was little or no plundering during the military unification of the province. Side by side with the re-establishment of order, finan- cial reform has gone steadily and constructively forward. Before the Kuomintang asserted authority, a great part of the revenues of Kwangtung Province were being seized for selfish purposes by any military commander or offi- cial who could get hold of them. Now, taxes are col- lected by responsible officials and turned into the provincial treasury under comparatively strict account- ing methods. There is no more issuance of the debased currency which was helping to make economic condi- tions in Kwangtung chaotic and the Treasury has built up a large cash reserve to insure stability for domestic note issues. A budget system is installed, and without increasing taxes the government was able, through offi- cial honesty and efficient collections, to quadruple its revenue within eight months of taking control. It is not so easy to state specifically what is being accomplished in the important field of judicial reform. C. C. Wu, son of the famous Wu Ting-fang, now Mayor of Canton and an influential member of the govern- ment’s inner circle, has directed a commission working on this task, having his experience as a qualified mem- ber of the London Bar to serve him in good stead. The system of penology in Canton has been brought more in accord with western ideas than is the case In most large provincial Chinese cities. Clearly theKWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN 88 Kuomintang government is quite as anxious as that of Peking to do its part in removing all valid excuse for continuation of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It has also pledged its word to abolish likin, the inland transit tax, which is supposed to be terminated throughout China coincident with the promulgation of complete tariff au- tonomy, tentatively scheduled for January 1, 1929. Vessels of more than twelve-foot draft cannot safely berth in Canton harbor, so the government is endeavor- ing to develop the port of Whampoa, seven miles down the river towards Hongkong, which can now be reached by ships drawing up to twenty feet. Under the boycott no British ships, nor those of any nationality which have touched Hongkong en route, are allowed at Wham- poa. Nevertheless, a steady stream of ocean-going cargo steamers now plies to and from the port of Canton. During the early months of 1926, an average of more than ten steamers a week came up to Canton from Shanghai without stopping at Hongkong, an omission almost unknown in the old days. In addition, Canton’s direct trade with foreign countries, in foreign bottoms, is increasing. Japanese shipping greatly predominates, with Russian, Norwegian, and German tonnage compet- ing for second place. The American merchant marine is also represented, the Dollar Line conducting a regular freight service between Whampoa and Pacific Coast ports. During 1925, the boycott reacted to cause a 20 per cent decline in the foreign trade of Canton, but it 1s claimed that the present year will show recovery in the export and import statistics. The scheme for the improvement of Whampoa harbor to make it a permanent rival of Hongkong calls for an expenditure of some $15,000,000. Only a trivial part of the proposed construction work has so far been at- tempted, lack of funds preventing. This instance has applicability to many local schemes. There is much diol. add ~~ tre J Pe eas) cee ae er oes LeRpeseis=* SoS a er Pe eee SIST Pe ST SdH Se cesscissuseeeSris ig Uys 8° a Pree terete 2oeayp ted — er eS ee Pe ee Ye en ee ee ee a “ ~~ oe) ee Siem ee i ee Oe ee ee 2 ef Pe Sle, eee pe Sg are eae a eal Pe ere ee Ee ad el all SSte see " et ot eee — Serer ead nl eerie er eke eS ee he ak ek eal ae SREB s Pee HF er Ci yr assess — - Feasen Lee a Pele Ses tse sige seeesss be ee i ——=— ——_— pnt rate sase a ‘ ipa , Se-te~ cal _—— Pa Geore 22Sis? Oe ed > ee ee ee Sf en gerne) 5 lei Shea - a _ ie - a * pen Hef ma et ge en Se eee ee ee ee 4 bebe 84 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT frothy talk in Canton about what the government is going to do in the way of port improvement, industrial development, and general betterment of commercial and agricultural organization. Numberless committees have been appointed, grandiloquent plans drafted, and all sorts of resolutions passed and given as much publicity as possible. In fact, it will take many months before economic ambitions can evolve from the blueprint stage, for one good reason because the authorities have been spending so large a proportion of their revenues on 1m- proving the army and enforcing the boycott agaist Hongkong. There is much promise of, and little money for, social and economic improvements. Months of delay were allowed to pass before the completion of so basic a project as a good road irom Canton to Whampoa. And, except for the military and foreign-supported schools, less is being done for education than in other provinces which do not advertise so freely about their good intentions. Yet, in spite of all shortcomings, it remains apparent that the provincial government of Kwangtung is the most capable that any part of South China has seen since the 1911 Revolution; that it is following a line of development in general suited to Chinese tempera- ment, conditions, and traditions; and that its actual accomplishments give promise of further successes as the foundations settle into place. For a time the con- tinuation of the experiment was threatened by the suc- cess of the Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin alliance in the north, but geographical considerations, aside from other factors, will probably preserve the Canton government from military overthrow now that it has won its firm establishment. Troops adhering to Marshal Wu, indeed, have shown utter inferiority when faced by Kwang- tung forces. If Canton can solve three problems, each calling for a high degree of statecraft, its notable con-anpyve@retsine: CANTON’sS ARMY = Re we S58 413 a A machine-gun detachment departing for ich ni, action against the war- lords of North China. awe ! Hl is + ee ee eee! = os Se ra pa a = — a Pe ee eee 2 a | ea Se eee = OLDER [HAN CHRISTIANITY a ee Pa The Great Wall of China climbing the mountains beyond Nankou Pass. A camel caravan laden with munitions for the Kuominchun is passing through the gate in the lower right-hand corner. a aa ee eS ae ee yaeo rece poe - ae ee ek ee ee ad eel eh ah ie tole a = calle tlre a. aon asian ieee eed amen tart lm ll my - - i i 4 ‘, ne & | 7 mers ek ee se eee =z Patna ee cl cag ie eet Seated tens aaKWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN 85 tribution to the regeneration of China as a whole will probably be permanent. The first of these 1s the gradual elimination of a Russian influence which has been so pronounced as to make Chinese protests against other “imperialisms’”’ sound rather silly. Most of the real leaders in Canton recognize this, and papers of dismissal are being gradu- ally prepared for the Soviet advisers who still remain. But the existence of a general foreign hostility as well as the real services rendered by Borodin to constructive development makes it difficult to dispense altogether with Soviet support. The second problem is government control of the Strike Committee, in charge of the Hongkong boycott. This committee operates independently of the govern- ment. It maintains a picket organization of some 30,000 men who are supported by the taxpayers, terrorize re- spectable Chinese merchants, and line their pockets with surreptitious “squeeze.” As recently as June 27, 1926, five Chinese seeking to travel from Canton to Hongkong were shot dead by these organized ruffans. There is little doubt, however, that the government has the upper hand in the matter and that the negotiations for boycott termination will be carried through success- fully. Certainly the great majority of Cantonese are anxious to see normal trade relations with Hongkong resumed. The third problem is the decision as to whether Kwangtung shall be an efficient provincial government under loose federal control; whether it shall take the lead in forming the separate Republic of South China which has so often been discussed; or whether through the agency of the Kuomintang it shall take the grave risk of trying to gain control of Peking by military operations. The first of these possibilities was the one indorsed until Wu Pei-fu went on his recent rampage. It a+ ~ ~ —-_ - os - 7 * - * a a al nat ed ; Pea ST ete) abuso¥e ras ig ses atbeeossiss Poe Pt ee eee = pe an ~ a eye tt tt fy es! suapeeaeseees — 7 - ee a a pe ts4seSen © o7a bss ee ee ee ks ivzaenepe ne : Fy ———- ——— i ail eee ee re eT ae ee ee ee nT a te elind eee eee er ee os86 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT should be clear from what has been written that the best hope of extending the constructive nationalism of Kwangtung throughout China lies in providing an in- spiration for other provinces rather than in subjecting them to a conquering southern army. oe. Se ae _ ar ee. : es —— — Sec aed te nee ie eerie a ae ee eee oe eerie ad ol alae ee ee ce oon ees aad Sa te nop A { &- i s 4 p J ait ei, i ee i Ss teed teal penal oer a eh — = sam are et - al Cet ee te! =_-=- = ah hte Toe ee tk Se ah ete Baten! nn De - = al Fi steen ae + ae — a « an Ps ——— ete a ene Gor aes ge A en ae age AR ay EE a ae a fs ‘ , ‘ Ra hedet bP) at ek | Oe et era ; : Ay * vei ee ae eeCHAPTER LX SHANGHAI We have examined the background of the situation at Peking, where fifteen years of effort to establish a strong central government by military force have proved utterly futile and vicious. We have critically studied the government of Kwangtung, an outstanding example of what the Chinese can accomplish when they decide to approach the problem of regeneration from a local rather than a national standpoint. Logically, the next step in gaining a reasonable conception of Chinese prob- lems is to journey 850 miles up the China coast from Canton to Shanghai, where foreign resistance to native grievances is concentrated and crystallized. My own first visit to Shanghai was by way of the broad Yangtze River from the interior. Much more than if arrival is by sea, one obtains in this manner a correct impression of the difference between Shanghai and China proper. The enormous volume of foreign shipping in the harbor, the majestic office buildings, banks, and clubs along the Bund, the Occidental nature of the foreign concessions with their three miles of river frontage and 8,100 acres of area—all combine to show what foreign enterprise can do in China when a free hand is given, or assumed. In harmonizing with the life of the country in which it 1s situated, Shanghai is no more Chinese than China- town in San Francisco is American. Nor is the difference merely one of material surroundings. The 5,879 British 87 ett trie eee eaatd eu Sts eee te te Sard ae ae eh oh eel es - af —_ a Pe Ey Eirstle 3edctpeeds (2 paere SE SR ED oe ee ee Ty pe at ene eee te ees eer ly — a ed Savors eke: = ee gn re en eee a se ee= Bh a Te ld alk eS lh ee kid eh lar CARE RS Ty egrtse Ss 2 oe ee i ee ‘me Peat ol ae a a pa ag eal Sd nah ie oP lh alm eal a a Sai lien 7 —_— ae a . ar a pie ke ee oe BL ne ee ae Cinta eed tate cies gles , LS ‘Se €¢ 2, 6¢- .- i er ri a, eee | hy 88 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT and 1,942 Americans listed in Shanghai by the 1925 cen- sus live for the most part completely isolated mental lives. ‘There are hundreds of these expatriates who would not think of having any social relations with Chinese, who have lived in Shanghai from five to twenty years without attempting to learn the language, who never set foot within the encircling Chinese cities, with their population of some three million people of the yel- low race. Yet in spite of his incredible isolation from and ignorance of the vital currents in Chinese life, the average white resident of the Shanghai concessions con- siders himself an authority on China and the Chinese and most bitterly resents any opinion favoring Chinese aspirations from, say, mission workers who have spent their lives in acquiring understanding of the real China. The situation is made worse by the fact that many of the Anglo-Saxons in Shanghai are men who would never have forged ahead at home, and who exhibit their “inferiority complex” by the most brazen insults and affronts to natives of the country which provides them with handsome livings. There are other causes than the effrontery prevalent among Shanghai whites, and the pronounced dissipa- tion and mental shallowness of foreign life there, which have made the city, despite its modern sanitation system, as much a plague spot as any cholera-infected native dis- trict. If we summarize, step by step, the political ageres- sion in China which Shanghai has for three-quarters of a century taken into its own hands, we will come to realize that’the-fatal outbreak there on May 30, 1925, fas an entirely natural Sccurrence In 1842 t] Le" “Treaty of Nanking, following the so-called “Opium War” between Great Britain and China, forced the Reach: sovernment to recognize that “British sub- jects shall be allowed to reside for the purpose of carry ing on their mercantile pursuits, without violation ( T l¢SHANGHAI 39 restraint,” at Canton, Amoy, Fuchow, Ningpo, and Shanghai. The same agreement gave the British gOV- ernment the right to appoint consular officers “to be the medium of communication between the Chinese authori- ties and the said merchants,” Two years later the United States inaugurated our fairly consistent policy of getting as much out of China as Great Britain, while letting that nation bear the onus for methods employed. Caleb Cushing was sent by President Tyler as Minister to China with a letter to the Emperor which is a classic of American diplomatic literature. It began: “I hope your health is good. China is a great empire, extending over a great part of the world. The Chinese are numer- ous. You have millions and millions of subjects. The twenty-six United States are as large as China, though our people are not as numerous.”! This schoolboy note is still a source of somewhat bitter amusement to the Chinese, but it obtained its end. In 1844, the United States, followed by France and other European nations, obtained treaty rights similar to the British and began concerted development of Shanghai, the most central and commercially promising of the Treaty Ports. In 1863, the British and American concessions were amalga- mated, forming the basis for the present International Settlement, from which only France, with her separate large concession in Shanghai, hag held aloof. From these small and temperate beginnings, extorted from a justifiably dubious Peking government at the cannon’s mouth, has developed the present anomalous situation, more pronounced than that at any other Treaty Port. For Shanghai, though nominally still Chi- nese territory, is in fact today a completely self-govern- ing foreign community, resolutely opposed to giving * Quoted by Dr. H. H. Gownn, in “Asia, A Short History.” Dr. Gowen notes that “the letter has been attributed to Daniel Webster.” ~ * pa oe “* ~—— “ « Se fe y PWwreettrtig. iets koe ro 2 eta — = *} ee eee ree ee en ~ as Pt ee PT Ee eye i) t = cd Z< Pees = = id ™ ——e on re s _ ae ee ee ee ee ee es) a - = : 7 es ~~ a aq oe ee ee eee | cr? _ ee ee ee Oe ee ee _ - . ~ 2 » are” « ae eager Peron 5 ag ot Py ee ee ee ne en eee lila lind - *bSalasetsed-cbesee en et ee ee ee eee eee ee bl hb teehee ee eern re Le LLL eee. 2 eo) oe. ae ~ ~ — - ~ - - a ae pe =a oo a _ a pe pete een é a a . 4 = - — “ : on “ fe y ; = : a ‘ ” ‘ : aie ‘ on & oe bs - Ti a + - - - ae a = - - ¥ - on - - . re a” Cl = _— Se = | aN ee eee de | ESE ee ee Ce ee el pe ee — or % a 90 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT native leaders even a share of control, unless forced to do so, and with an attitude towards the diplomatic corps in Peking almost as contemptuous as that shown towards the Republic of China. The steps by which Shanghai has been made into a virtual “Free City,” unsupervised by the League of Na- tions or any other body outside its confines, have been taken gradually. It must also be said that these steps have been coincident with a material development which is truly remarkable when one visualizes what a few thousand foreigners have brought about in three-quarters of a century. As early as 1854 a municipal council was established by the white residents, without consulting Peking on whether the treaty rights made such a step legal, and eight years later was broached the first pro}- ect for the complete independence of Shanghai, under the joint protection of Great Britain, the United States, France, and Russia. The diplomatic authorities vetoed the idea. But two succeeding generations of foreign busi- ness men, a fair number of them descendants of the orig- inal settlers, have now achieved much of the objective in everything but legal sanction. In space available, the way it has been done can be chronicled only in summary form.t That controversial judicial body, the Shanghai Mixed Court, was launched in 1864. In 1869 the municipal government was strength- ened by new regulations, and Chinese were excluded from participation therein. This step was presented to the Chinese government as a fait accompli, providing a use- ful precedent for further encroachments. In 1881 further revision of the original “Land Regula- tions” gave the municipal council power to compel the 1The whole story is related in A. M. Korsney’s excellent work on “Shanghai, Its Mixed Court and Municipal Council,” the chief defect of which is its special pleading in behalf of foreign encroachments.SHANGHAI 91 surrender of land for road construction, conferred on the police arbitrary authority in the matter of arrest and search without warrant, and organized the famous Shang- hai Volunteer Corps, a formidable little army with a present strength of about 1,700 men. Two years after these regulations were adopted, they were, as a sort of afterthought, submitted to the diplomatic corps at Peking for approval. That plastic body, seeing how far the Shanghai municipal council was departing from the letter and spirit of the treaties, stiffened its attitude and forced modifications reasserting consular authority to some ex- tent. But foreign Shanghai generally knows how to make its will effective over the doubts of the legations. Measure after measure was quietly adopted tending to give the city the status of de facto independence. In 1900 it was settled that no Chinese soldier bearing arms, even as a military escort to Peking officials, could enter the In- ternational Settlement. Since then the right of expelling any Chinese viewed as undesirable has been successfully asserted, and the viewpoint that natives are only allowed in the city on sufferance constantly reiterated. Some- time, perhaps, the Chinese residents of Shanghai will take this attitude at face value, and march out of the International Settlement in a body. If they do, grass will be growing over deserted docks and streets within six months. Berate them as they will, the foreign resi- dents of Shanghai are absolutely dependent on Chinese help for the success of every one of their activities. In spite of that, the Chinese are taxed without being allowed representation on the council, and are excluded from the parks and playgrounds which they help to support. There is even a ruling that no measure taken by the local Chinese authorities with respect to their countrymen shall be valid in the International Settlement without approval by the foreign council. 3 —— ey ae eS es ee oe eee - et a _ ar = ‘een “ ‘J = eS a 6 rep or TT er Te rie st et ee be Pee hee a Pre ryt eet, ere ty ty fe Se Tae a a _— aa . Ps a a —Te. sk) ee ee te ene et et ee — | ne . shee — = eee te ey ey ee ee br decabecadiendckvbeds iebats se rccecere ec geteetes abs: abe ke wot ee re te ry- a 2 4 ie ae Rod wes ae, deel BO = a aa eg i baad i oe & Cre Se bs ¥ wey oe -* led 92 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT "ee te ee ee eS F ge Oy ted elliot HPSS GH Reese ed Hee? Siete pp iin Ht oh aetna amelie he the eee nda oe eel a a eee ed Fa eet le delete tea gers es fy i eo ed ed eee ae ae ee ee eS | a le dll naa eee ee | ite aS a i, On one point only has the Chinese government been able partially to check the steady encroachments of what is not altogether jocularly called the “Shanghai Free State.” Since the boundaries of the International Set- tlement were last extended in 1898, all efforts to increase the area of this virtual republic have been denied by Peking. From 1900 to 1925, moreover, the foreign pop- ulation in Shanghai has increased from 6,774 to 29,947, while the Chinese inhabitants, exclusive of the Chinese city, have gone up in the same period from 345,276 to 1,099,540. This ratio of thirty-six Chinese to one for- eigner explains much of the nervous attitude underlying, and doubtless helping to cause, the attitude of white superiority in Shanghai now. Moreover, 13,804 Japanese and 1,154 East Indians together constitute half of the total foreign population. The increase in numbers of Japanese in Shanghai has been pronounced. A quarter- century ago the Japanese residents were one-quarter as numerous as the British. Now they outnumber the British more than two to one. The Chinese check to the expansion of territory ruled by the Shanghai municipal council is not, however, en- tirely successful. Month by month, year by year, the council acquires title to more and more land in unbuilt sections outside the concession boundaries. Then come well-paved streets and roads, then come foreign houses and foreign residents, then comes an incorporation into the International Settlement in all but name. Thus arises another cause for future controversy, where in case of trouble the Chinese can say the foreigners have no right where they have built, while the latter retort that their investment creates a right. The story of the Shanghai Mixed Court, the present status of which is one of the issues like a powder mine in China now, is one which richly deserves attention. In its evolution to a condition of complete foreignSHANGHAT 93 control is found further evidence of the steady tendency to detach Shanghai from all trace of Chinese sovereignty, against which the patriots of that country are quite naturally and properly in rebellion. Originally all foreign offenders within the confines of the concessions at Shanghai were brought before their respective consuls as part of the system of extraterri- toriality. In the case of Chinese lawbreakers those ar- rested in the settlement were sent to the nearest Chinese magistrates for trial and punishment. The enormous growth in the Chinese population of the concessions by influx of refugees during the Taiping Rebellion rendered this arrangement unsatisfactory. But in 1863 an agree- ment between the American Consul at Shanghai (G. E. Seward) and the Imperial Representative said plainly: “The right of jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities over their subjects resident within the Settlement (American) is acknowledged to be indefeasible, but no arrests may be made except on warrants stamped by the municipal authority (American Consul).” The difficulty of handling criminals, particularly sail- ors, from nations without consular representation in Shanghai led to a request, after amalgamation of the British and American concessions, that the municipal council be given authority to deal with such offenders. This was readily granted by the Chinese officials. But, as so frequently in China’s relations with foreign powers, a conciliatory attitude merely opened the way for fur- ther encroachment, In this case it was a plan for es- tablishing a municipal police court in the settlement with power to deal with Chinese offenders. Thus was the present status of the Mixed Court foreshadowed a full half-century ago. At the time, however, Shanghai did not dare to be as dictatorial to the diplomatic corps in Peking as it 1s to- day, and after long debate the local foreigners revised —_— * - alle i la Oe Otte oe CSTR ES. - Pena er eee Te ee er re ee yn nn ieee oe pe i a 2 Se Sear 2 “— -< se PET Ce TTT PICT Te ee eh dL ae rere ts tr Prt ~ eee ey oT Seeeas: a es nd a Se ne eS Ey rsct - ——_ Se ott one ee ee ee ee a ma Thr tinny ea iain Te rl i ee me eR ke es Pe ee CT ad hal oe a ee o's 4g e eo 4 - reel eal a ~ eee —— = al alee : a = ~ Ss ” ay “ 5 3 o - a U al 4 a 4 « _ toyacede te rSeietees see Pe nen hd deat ewe ool a ad ete sah ate al — tai Sn Raat ide Tindale ePeF Tie Gages tees ee os — * f ' | :* - i a tle ac A, ig — . 4 +? ‘ Tv 94 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT their plan. The new suggestion was a Chinese court in the International Settlement with the foreign consuls holding a watching brief, as legal assessors, in all cases between native litigants which could be interpreted as in- volving foreign interests. The establishment of this court is particularly noteworthy for three things: 1t went beyond the system of extraterritorial jurisdiction to in- ject foreign supervision into a distinctively Chinese court trying only Chinese defendants; it was created at a time when the United States government was deeply absorbed in the Civil War at home; and there is scarcely any evidence available of the negotiations whereby Sir Harry Parkes, then British Consul at Shanghai, obtained Chin- ese permission for this far-reaching step. It is certain, moreover, that from the beginning the first British as- sessor, Chaloner Alabaster, interpreted his position as one approaching at least equal judicial authority with the Chinese magistrates. There is a note of pathetic bewilderment in the report to Peking of the Shanghai Imperial Representative in November, 1865. “Now,” he wrote, ‘‘all Chinese are sentenced by the foreign off- cial to hard labor and the circumstances of the cases are never reported to the city magistrates.” As the Chinese awoke to what was going on, a partially successful effort was made to restrict the power of the assessors to a watching brief in behalf of foreign in- terests. It will sound strange to ears accustomed to tales of the brutality of Chinese justice that other early changes in the procedure of the Mixed Court were due to native protests against the severity of sentences read- ily agreed to by the foreign assessors. This tendency to assert Chinese authority, perhaps coupled with the re- entry of America into the Far Eastern diplomatic field after the Civil War, helped to prevent further foreign usurpation of the Mixed Court during ensuing years. Meanwhile there were many improvements in detail andSHANGHAI 95 equipment, Better premises were built, modern prisons were erected, and beyond question an administration of justice much better by western standards than anything of native origin was gradually evolved. In all the pro- ceedings of the court Chinese and not foreign law was and is followed, to which Chinese now point as evidence that their system is not so incomprehensible to foreign minds as is frequently asserted. A seemingly minor point which has aroused much bit- terness among the Chinese was the decision, taken in 1905, to employ Sikh constables in the Mixed Court. All told, there are now nearly five hundred of these huge, bearded, savage-looking Indian police in the Interna- tional Settlement, and to see them patrolling the streets with rifles slung in readiness is to realize how little Chinese good-will has to do with the continuation of foreign domination. The continued employment of these Indians after it was discovered that they dislike the Chinese and have, in the past, been easily able to intimi- date them is an example of the veiled terrorization on which most of the white residents of Shanghai rely to maintain their political and economic power. The revolution of 1911 gave Shanghai its quickly seized opportunity to secure absolute control of the Mixed Court. In that year, taking advantage of the ab- sconding of two of the Chinese magistrates with funds deposited by litigants, and of the generally chaotic con- ditions, the consular body took control of the court, and has retained it to the present time. In doing so, three vital innovations were made: (1) The Mixed Court was completely separated from the Chinese judicial system, the magistrates of that race now being appointed by the consular officers. (2) Foreign assessors, as had orig- inally been attempted, were introduced for purely Chin- ese civil suits, when there is a native defendant and a native plaintiff, and when foreign interests are in no t7 : aed ST 4 Pd BT hts —— ree oer eet re pee rere yet re Ss te Peete eres re etter ete et ele ¥ vir) tat st) a See Te. Ss - - * - a ee ee ee . my on : > 2 — a ee oe tapetesects ~ eee ee ee ee re he ee ee ee ee ee ee ied. - = - 2 B25 SF es ay = pape gt 3 Ss eT el a et as a regen CPPS S CE SOT E SA ITSS ATS tS SSS HST SSS SPSL HK Boe seek os re ‘ = ae pn oot ae er 4 eh 4 24 oe PES - * — a a Sree we See Ee fab ae Ses ee ow habeabedenat Lied sere ce pw ———— Bh Pe tel eet ears ieee ean a AP Pe Ope hs ae Bh ee he Oa 96 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT way involved. At the same time the assessors completely dropped the pretense of being in any way subordinate to the native magistrate, assuming the authority to pass sentence themselves on Chinese offenders. (3) A munici- pal foreign officer, the registrar, was appointed to take charge of all court receipts. Since 1911, corporal punishment has been reinstituted by the Mixed Court, the Chinese effort to establish a court of appeal from its decisions has been denied, and jurisdiction has been extended both to roads and to the rivers outside the foreign settlement boundaries. Whether or not there is any truth in the very serious ac- cusation that some of the foreign assessors have fre- quently accepted bribes from Chinese litigants, I do not know. There is strong circumstantial evidence behind the charge, and an American assessor answered my question on this point enigmatically by saying that “the atmos- phere is favorable to it.”’ Personal observation of both criminal and civil cases in trial before the Mixed Court gives the impression that the general procedure is clean, efficient, and fair. But the real issue about the Mixed Court is not whether its procedure is good or bad, but whether its seizure by the Treaty Powers has any moral or legal justification. The answer to that question is easy. The usurpation of the Mixed Court is a clear and brazen encroach- ment on Chinese sovereignty by the foreign community of Shanghai which all the Treaty Powers, the United States as much as any, have condoned and abetted. As Professor W. W. Willoughby has said: 2 Since 1911 the Mixed Court, at Shanghai, has been absolutely controlled by the Treaty Powers. The assumption of this con- trol was justified by no treaty right and the Chinese authorities have repeatedly, but vainly, urged that this control be surren- dered. “In a paper on “Extraterritoriality in China,” read at the Conference on American Relations with China, at Baltimore, September 17-20, 1925.SHANGHAT 97 The history of Shanghai 1s worth careful study. Much more than any Russian propaganda it has been responsi- ble for the growth of anti-foreign, particularly anti- British, sentiment in China. To the average white man in Shanghai the success of his aggression is a subject to be joked about between drinks. To the Chinese it is : lesson, already more than half learned, that those who tear up treaties to rule by force can best understand the same methods in retaliation. Under the circumstances, no development of foreign policy in China is of greater basic importance than the agreement reached in July, 1926, between the consular body and delegates of Marshal Sun Chuan-fang (the local generalissimo) to arrange early rendition of the Mixed Court to Chinese control. This agreement, vehe- mently denounced by foreign lawyers who make their living practicing before the court, awaits approval of the diplomatic body in Peking at the time of writing. It is none the less an encouraging indication that the foreign population of Shanghai is not to be allowed to carry aggressive tactics to the stage where reprisals by the Chinese become inevitable. exobogsizsipssigseseies ~~ eo ae a est rt fy. ~iet Se Rey, s Prt eee ek — Peres ee eT. ‘- St sekeseovcacsciases ad -_ — — pa = =~ te = Pee Sesh is i a oe Perret ee Pee ee eeritnl iteinenieeiei 4 az J * e i hg i a ad my i? ee al— a — ~ a i ath altel on a eee eee 2 Ok ak ee | _ 2 —~ — —— a Fh: nae ee te ed ee ee gn — o_o mae oe fa — nt nae ingot bh ne aes iol andi een 2 ta ie _ Ne ee A a 4 wa = | ey a ee ee ee ey A Ni em ets ge = aie ate eal ie teen ae as ee a aati a a - CHAPTER X CHINA HITS BACK As one looks back on the succession of outbreaks which made the early summer of 1925 so terrible a period in China, the difficulty of assessing fairly the significance of what occurred is uppermost in mind, for other ele- ments than foreign aggression were involved, and vitally involved. The long period of political chaos i China has weakened the moral fiber of the nation, encouraged acts of violence, and stimulated the more debased ele- ments of the population to robbery and looting. The World War, with British, Germans, French, Austrians, and other belligerent nationals reviling one another on Chinese soil, has brought home to every Chinese of in- telligence the weakness and division among the European powers, which provide his country’s opportunity. The blocking-off of Russia from Europe—her loss of Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Bes- sarabia—followed by the ill-judged attempt at a cordon sanitaire, has naturally resulted in increasing Russian interest and intrigue in China, not now in concert with the other powers, but opposed to them. ‘To these ob- vious factors must be added many others: the growing bitterness over the white assumption of racial superiority ; the hot-headed activities of immature students too sud- denly released from the old disciplines which the changes of late years are sweeping away; the contrast between the idealistic slogans of the war period and the disillusion- ment of the present; last but not least, the introduction 98+4 - a) 7 ony ep a ay 4 S* er ES | ee eas ne ere ee ree ere ee ee Dd alee CHINA HITS BACK 99 of a new element of unrest as a result of the industriali- zation now taking place in many Chinese cities. As an extreme example of the extent to which large-scale pro- duction in China is taking root, statistics of the cotton- mill industry in the Shanghai district may be cited. In and around Shanghai there are now operating no less than 58 of these large, well-equipped factories, 32 of them Japanese, 22 Chinese, and 4 British in ownership. They employ approximately 117,000 work people, an average of slightly over two thousand employees to each mill. In one of these Shanghai mills, significantly enough, was lit the flame which showed how tinder-dry for con- flagration is all of contemporary China. A strike at one of the Japanese-owned concerns resulted in disturbances in the course of which a native workman was fatally shot by a Japanese overseer defending the company property. A few days later, on Saturday, May 30, 1925, a large, though unarmed, demonstration was staged under stu- dent leadership in the International Settlement of Shanghai. Several students were arrested for disorderly conduct and taken to the Louza police station, just~eff the Nanking Road, in the very heart of the ‘concession: Shortly afterwards the crowd, now grown to mob: SpirH? and size, forced its way to the gates ofthe station houke;= threatening violent entry. The British) polige officers | in charge gave the order to shoot—in\English. From tgn to fifteen seconds afterwards, by admission of the,authore ities, a volley was fired which killed seven Chinese. and wounded many more. The following day there4yere fur- ther clashes with the police and several moré~Chinese were killed. The municipal council placed the city under what amounted to martial law, and 250,000 Chinese workers of every variety went out on a completely spon- taneous general strike. Never was the underlying unity of China more strongly = - - = - sate th)? ig itt a Nl Se ee ee eee en | ee a oe Peete ee eet ed, ee ey es ee ee seerere rs gerestce es ere ty Tare ee ee ekoY ead ue oe nay ee ain ogee) * B22 OE EE ded onl she eel enh air eee ee - pe nn a oe t—2++ slid — _— a lara re Pl a a nN a ER aloe oats rma eS ey gg : . » , ne oe ee te ee BT ke Ee ee sg ~ * vt - . i SS a - a — - 100 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT demonstrated. During the first week in June enormous protest meetings, for the most part orderly, were staged in Peking, Hankow, Tientsin, Nanking, Changsha, Swa- tow, and most of the other larger cities. On June 4 the diplomatic corps in Peking replied to protests of the Waichiao Pu* with a note stating that “the responsibility of the events . . . rests upon the demonstrators and not upon the authorities of the concession.” Immediately thereafter a new and uglier tone entered the nation-wide protest meetings, not checked by a subsequent decision of the foreign ministers to make a thorough inquiry on the scene, which eventually resulted in sharp censure for the Shanghai authorities. But long before that, on June 11, there was an outbreak of mob violence in Hankow in which shops in the Japanese concession were looted, a Japanese murdered, and an attempt made to storm the foreign banks, resulting in the killing of eight Chinese by foreign naval forces landed from gunboats in the Yangtze. At Kiukiang a Japanese bank was burned, and the Japanese and British consulates damaged. Then, on June 23, in Canton, came the most terrible of all the incidents in this significant uprising. It had been preceded by a general strike of Chinese workers in the neighboring British colony of Hongkong, which for nearly a month made the white residents of this community dependent on their own efforts for every- thing. As the Chinese servants and operatives of every kind began to trickle back to work, in spite of opposition sometimes amounting to terrorization by labor union heads, a huge protest meeting against the Shanghai kill- ings was called in Canton. After that meeting, at which Incendiary speeches were numerous, over twenty thou- sand Chinese, for the most part school children, members of workers’ guilds, and college students, but including some two thousand armed soldiers and cadets from * The Chinese Foreign Office.ed ohio. ~~ Sra Le oo ~ > -% Tere ee ee ee " eee tes -4 Sats eee = ae 2aees a a 7 " Pa a a | 7 a a > a = “4 bs =! lJ - I po +. Roe a -eeepe = ee ee ee Se ee _ ese a . ee ee ee a = eee ee ee ee oe)i a - a } “epee = tom panne — - Se eee ete ee Ea ee Te ok el ee ee ee Le Se 7 ~ nt lh ee te te athe et —_— eee line FOREIGN BANKS IN Financial institutions of the United States. the Yangtze River at Hankow, deep in the heart of the eras es ee ake tare eR ee i ed a tlie feet eam ee: See are dino = — con + penn a ns Sl a ia ‘> ~} Ree ae f y ieee a pa aie pk Britain and Japan Republic. 4 vi i WHuite TRENCHES i | Ale | A corner of the foreign concession as it looked after the fatal Twenty-third of Se ee = eee anes Fee ee ee) IN CHINA Shameen (Canton)CHINA HITS BACK 101 the Whampoa Academy, began their fatal march along the Bund opposite the little island of Shameen. On Shameen,! which is the foreign concession of Canton, were detachments of British and French marines and perhaps a hundred armed civilian residents. In antici- pation of a Chinese attack, both of the bridges connect- ing Shameen with the mainland had been closed with barbed-wire entanglements, and the whole side facing Canton was (and is) entrenched and protected with sandbags. Virtually all the women and children from the concession had been sent down to Hongkong. It has not been felt safe as yet for them to return to Canton. Just after three o’clock on the afternoon of June 23, 1925, when the bulk of the parade had passed Shameen and the Chinese troops were opposite the island, firing started. On Shameen a Frenchman was killed, and three English, three Japanese, and two Frenchmen wounded. Among the Chinese demonstrators 52 were killed and 117 wounded, 22 of the dead and 53 of the injured being armed soldiers. The immediate effect of the tragedy was to rally all of Canton to the Russian-advised Kuomin- tang government, then just coming into power, and to turn the strike at Hongkong into a carefully organized boycott which has now continued ior over a year and nearly prostrated that once flourishing British colony. By most Cantonese this terrible disaster is regarded a a, cold-blooded “massacre,” for which the British in par- ticular are held responsible. By a majority of foreigners in South China, regardless of nationality, the incident 1s regarded as a barely frustrated attempt by Chinese troops to seize the foreign settlement of Canton by force. The issue will probably go down as one of those which his- tory can never answer with certainty. I myself am sat- isfied that Russian-officered Chinese mounted machine *Literally, “Sand Bank.” It was exactly that until foreign enterprise converted it into a pretty little island. a) a ee a Pasi tae ~~ Ferry ee Peer ht err, nyareas eee eo oe a ee "i Meal oa a > se ~ - a 7 102 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT guns on buildings overlooking Shameen some time be- fore the parade started. Shakee Creek, which separates Shameen from the water-front street of Canton where the parade was marching, is not a hundred feet in width. Yet a majority of the bullet holes with which the buildings on Shameen are spattered are, as I ob- served on two visits there, more than twenty feet from the ground and of a downward incidence. Without the accounts of trustworthy eyewitnesses and other circum- stantial evidence, it would be strongly indicated by this that firing on Shameen came from prepared snipers’ nests on roofs in the Chinese city. The concentration of native bitterness against the British is also strongly in- dicative of Russian influence, for the French, with whom it suits the Soviet government to be on good terms at present, unquestionably did as much firing and caused as many Chinese casualties as did the English. But re- garding the question of which side fired first there can be no certainty. What is certain is the fact that this culminating trag- edy of a series which may at any time be reopened has stirred China to a policy of resistance which deserves the closest attention abroad. ‘This resistance has been most strongly expressed in the concerted and sustained effort to ruin the British colony of Hongkong. The present civil warfare precludes any attempt at nation- wide, armed opposition. But the civil wars themselves are hardening the Chinese people and enabling them to approach equality in that military efficiency on which the Occident mainly relies for its assumption of superiority in China. As an American military observer in Peking remarked to me: “It is a senseless provocation for us to retain a few hundred soldiers here now. The situation is totally different to what it was at the time of the Boxer rising, when the foreign troops were opposed by S72 BOSSA SPS SRE BOE eTK Fee gi ne a4 i al oe eh ae ceri ail i eats ee Be Lcd : = ee eee a ctl Winter at le eee po ne ios i - Co Seems ello ee et ay a a a Do nie a nh 5 alin al STE Ss oe Bebe a eet el * ot wa Sh a ae - peat ned Sg Rt ' - | def) a ee a“ <-- led 4a mob with antiquated arms and entirely ignorant of modern warfare.” Less spectacular than armed resistance, the Chinese boycott of Hongkong, carried on with a complete con- tempt of foreign treaty rights, is none the less significant, even though the casual visitor to that British port does not immediately see its grim effects in full. The mind is naturally first occupied by the remarkable skill and energy which the British have shown in converting, within a span of eighty years, a precipitous mountain- side into one of the world’s greatest ports. And the shipping in the harbor, though cut down by more than half since the boycott started, is still sufficient to give a, false impression of bustle and prosperity. In 1842, the island of Hongkong, then desolate and sparsely inhabited by fishermen, was ceded to Great Britain by the treaty of Nanking. Following her sec- ond war with China in 1860, chiefly remembered by the Chinese for British and French vandalism in burning the beautiful Summer Palace near Peking, Great Britain annexed Kowloon Peninsula on the mainland opposite Hongkong. In 1898, when Russia, Germany, and France were all busy acquiring slices of Chinese territory and the United States was taking the Philippines, the British acquired a ninety-nine year lease on an area adjacent to Kowloon known as the New Territories. The whole dis- trict is now heavily fortified and, pending the construc- tion at Singapore, is Great Britain’s most important naval base in the Far East. Counting Kowloon Peninsula and the leased territory, the colony of Hongkong has an area of 345 square miles and a population of over 700,000, of whom less than 9000 are British and about 4,000 other foreigners. The island of Hongkong, itself, where the officialdom, com- merce, and major portion of the population concentrate, is but eleven miles long and, in average, three miles in + ad = a ri PPes eas) eee: wETrti di ter. a ee aie CHINA HITS BACK 103 fe St hagideassecssensos Zebedee tases a SSeS 52 7 — —— eee ree eer ee Peizeueye: te a > a ‘Tee. st — a =e = =~ d ee ee te osceree sg Peters cS uke s se rei wy a =. at | a SS a re tee ee . Pa ee ee noe ae oe es' a r= he tet oe me * a a pa ee _ — ee Sie i a on a ees Re dheke eet thet ee eee es Te oe OEE eee Seta lied includ aioe a - o od ’ " . a " . els fee oy sn ma al daar at lk eNom eh el Be dain i " ~ a . . a - . . . ae eran, _ pn po a i 225 De ee he Be ln hse ail idler tle ted Te Th ee haat - — = — 7 ti éon belt ead 3F . a SS are a a 104 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT width. In substance it is a chain of rugged mountain peaks, rising sheer from the sea to an elevation of two thousand feet. Along an artificial shore line, which Brit- ish ingenuity has constructed where once was deep water, and up tortuous roads which have frequently been hewn from the cliff, clusters a beautiful and cleanly tropical city. There are many islands along the China coast as desolate and barren as Hongkong was a century ago. Many have harbors which could be made as fine. But the Chinese knew very well that they could not possibly accomplish by themselves the engineering which Great Britain has done to make Hongkong important as a focal point of world commerce. The British in Hongkong are naturally sensitive about letting it be known how hard the Chinese have hit them through the rigid boycott which followed the Shameen tragedy, One learns, however, that the import and ex- port trade of the port, which is almost the sole source of Hongkong’s livelihood, was during the last quarter of 1925 almost fifty per cent less in value than during the corresponding months of 1924. During 1924 an average of 210 vessels of all types arrived at Hongkong daily. After July, 1925, the average dropped to 34 vessels a day. It is not merely small junks which, under orders of the Kwangtung provincial government, are passing Hong- kong by. The total tonnage cleared from the port has been more than cut in hall. Naturally, individual and firm losses have been enor- nous, though the Chinese merchants of Hongkong have on the whole suffered more heavily than the Eng- lish. The banks have been severely strained and, in spite of a special loan of £3,000,000 advanced by the British government, business men have for months found it almost impossible to obtain credit. Everyone in the colony is hard up and the courts are congested with bankruptcy cases. Nevertheless there is little doubt ra eR aged mer I NEI ca meneame meCHINA HITS BACK 105 that Hongkong can hold out indefinitely, though in severely straitened circumstances, against this economic pressure. That, indeed, is the only course possible. The hot- beads in the colony who advocate a British punitive expedition against Canton are, fortunately, powerless without a support which the home government is un- likely to give. Such retaliation would, in the long run, result in complete disaster for British interests in China. Let alone, the boycott will eventually peter out; 80 per cent of the Hongkong strikers had returned to work by the first anniversary of their quitting, in June, 1926. On the other hand, attempts to force a resumption of normal trade relations by military action can only re- sult in hardening the Chinese resistance. You cannot make your enemy purchase at your store by kicking him. A problem of extreme delicacy for the colonial govern- ment of Hongkong has been rendered still more difficult by the impossibility of ascertaining just what concrete aims the Kwangtung government is seeking in the boy- cott. Reinstatement of and strike pay for those who leit their jobs in Hongkong as far back as June, 1920, can no longer be regarded as a serious objective. Some of the political demands are reasonable, such as Chinese repre- sentation on the legislative council of the colony. Some are unreasonable. No restrictions on Chinese for resi- dential purposes, for instance, would simply mean that the far wealthier Chinese merchants would be able to oust the British from homes which they have gradually engineered far up on the precipitous “Peak.” Then there are demands that the Chinese in the colony should have “absolute freedom” of meetings, parades, public speeches, publications, etc., and that the power of banishment should be entirely rescinded. At first glance it looks as though Canton wants to force the rendition of Hong- Sree Saeed ao es. —* — r e¥aSrazixyieas Pree eee te tere ert oer te? ee tet ry ee a Tester T rts ~~ se. Fy et ad a ee ee —_—_ eon i) >a Std ao] — at —e™ - ge gerne 7lstes-s ad ewawepetcrscrenirs> oom pt ae eat ee et en ee PE sere ery, Pe ee" . ae os > oy oo SFR S Sd s i Pe le et Ree eel et aie al na ead co Midd pelidind Neat sided i itd te Lent ll dell algae eens oS - « + 7) De le tnt alee Ss a = ee ae $2 2E%5 5 Pp cee Se ed Bo Sod | ieee ee ee 8S 2S e=e~s2>> Sacked cette Seated iene ea OS AS ES hi cella ten Pe eg 106 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT kong to China, but this is not a serious purpose except in the minds of a few extremists. The actual aims of the moderate leaders in Kwang- tung, and they are gaining in power as Russian influence wanes, are about as follows: Furst, to teach the British, and through them the other Treaty Powers, that the dominant race in China is the Chinese, and that for- elgners are there on sufferance just as much as Chinese are in England, or America, or France, on sufferance; second, to stimulate the Chinese to develop their own country for themselves, and to encourage a racial pride, with modern military force to support it, which will no longer passively submit to foreign impositions; third, to hasten tariff autonomy and abolition of extraterri- torial jurisdiction by making it evident that one large section of China is no longer disposed to wait around as a suppliant on these issues; fourth, to oppose the effort towards overcentralization in China by showing her people that a single province—Kwangtung—can accom- plish more towards stemming foreign encroachments by acts than the so-called national government at Peking has ever done by talk. This last aim was achieved in July, 1926, when the Hongkong colonial government tacitly recognized the independence of Kwangtung by sending an official delegation to Canton to open negotia- tions for terminating the boycott. Well before these negotiations started, however, there was no doubt that the Kwangtung government was ready to call the boycott off, even on a basis of “honors easy.” The chief obstacle has been the authority given in this matter to the strike committee, as already discussed.1 These strikers, acting on the Russian theory of the rights of proletarians, have been responsible for virtually all the serious disorders which have continually smirched the record of the Canton government. The armed *See p. 85.CHINA HITS BACK 107 strike pickets like the domination which has been given them, and like to live at public expense. They like to loll around in the sun with rifles, shooting Chinese bour- geoisie who disagree with them. They like the countless opportunities for bribes which come their way. This absurd apotheosis of debased and ignorant coolies has come near to proving the Frankenstein of the Kwangtung government—its penalty for being too ready with lip service to Russian doctrines. In this juncture Hongkong is fortunate in possessing, in Sir Cecil Clementi, a colonial governor who knows China and the Chinese, is very sympathetic to their rea- sonable claims, and who is personally a most charming, cultivated, and keen-minded English gentleman. It was his appointment to Hongkong which gave most hope for constructive solution of South China’s most acute problem in international relationships. Indeed, at this period of rising Chinese antagonism, increasing Chinese sensitiveness, and changing Chinese conditions, no duty is more imperative for Occidental governments than to see that their diplomatic and consular representatives in China are of the highest grade, chosen for their advance knowledge and understanding of the acute problems which they will be called upon to face. More important than warships and regiments for the protection of for- eign lives and property in China is the presence there of clear-visioned envoys. In this class, fortunately for American prestige, belongs the American Minister at Peking, J. V. A. MacMurray. Whether his power to act along lines in full accord with America’s traditional Chinese policy is equal to his ability to visualize the desirable course is, however, another question. ae, ea aie A Pa She a Soperesecwts —s Se eT = rm — — Ts Siena Pe ee ph ee . 2 ee tee ee a ieereuasercacecisandes Peyve rt Pt rt ee a Tee Re = a ~ > * a aaa er ss oe pe Ca a zea w2reim ee ee ee ee eee asses Boe eer ee ewe ry er Peele sal 7 Pes a AP ree eye te i Peal | a po — mre — Mia set oe be . oe a = + _ - iad ‘ ee 7 . «: i es hy a Pg pt si th rt a se ~ 6 a i - oY ey F rf wl 4 boat ¥) eo fp. ‘* ag 4 "+ ' PF ( h| +) h y rt ¢ 5 c + 1 bi iu f t L oF Hi ay i ie bo nf ~ : 1 ii ok et hehe load bets dd easier ies Se ee ee en el ee ee ——————— ee ie Pie Oe ee eS ee Pe ee ded na CHAPTER XI WHAT CHINA DEMANDS It is a seeming paradox, much harped upon by for- elgners in China, that native insistence on the abolition of one-sided foreign privilege in that country should have increased part passu with accumulating indication that the Chinese are unable to form a stable national government. ‘There is that degree of half-truth in the criticism which makes further examination imperative if the justice of the Chinese claims is to be fairly as- sayed. In the first place it is a very natural human charac- teristic, by no means limited to Chinese, to be most sen- sitive about personal dignity when circumstance has placed one in an undignified position. In China this at- titude, known as “saving face,” is carried to lengths which to us often seem extreme. The Reverend Arthur Smith, in his charming book on “Chinese Characteristics,” notes many instances of the peculiarity. It was first brought home to me by my ricksha boy in Peking, who without understanding an address given to him in Eng- lish would continually dash off in the first direction that came to his mind rather than admit that he did not com- prehend. “Face-saving” undoubtedly accounts for some of the Chinese sensitiveness at this period of disintegra- tion. Incidentally, did not Poland insist on having a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations just before Pilsudski’s revolution showed her incapable of solving domestic problems by constitutional means? 108WHAT CHINA DEMANDS 109 But the actual, convincing logic behind the essential Chinese demands is so strong that the influence of half- amusing, half-irritating racial characteristics may fairly be ignored entirely. Stripped of non-essential claims, put forward for the bargaining purposes so deeply rooted in all international diplomacy, China lays claim to just three reformations in the policy of the powers on her soil. Those three demands are: (1) rectification of the situation in Shanghai; (2) tariff autonomy; (3) aboli- tion of foreign extraterritorial privileges so far as they interfere with the “fundamental principle of public law, recognized by all modern civilized States, that every sovereign political body has the exclusive right to exer- cise political jurisdiction within its own territories.” ? Whether or not the Chinese problem is to become increas- ingly more dangerous from the foreign viewpoint de- pends primarily on whether or not the justice of the Chinese claims in these three points of controversy is adequately apprehended abroad. Let us consider them seriatim, sticking to fundamentals and avoiding the mist of extraneous matter with which the issues are frequently befogged. On the first point, the local situation in Shanghai, little need be added to what has been said in Chapter IX. The barefaced and totally illegal assumption of foreign con- trol over the Shanghai Mixed Court would have been a clear-cut casus bells to any nation less pacific in its for- eign relations than China. It may be said that the American Minister in Peking, and many of his colleagues, are firmly convinced of the complete justice of the Chi- nese claim for a surrender of consular control over this court. The steps looking toward this end which have now been taken by the Shanghai consular body are be- lated—all the more reason why there should be no further delay in eliminating an act of aggression which *Dr. W. W. WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. +e : 2 = —s a Srl rete ee tT eh ee ee ee Sy ipsesegasz é. = a. = ane ee ss ree bly ee Leaves _ ty. SyTBopSISSEL EL Fe HT SSRIS TALI ECID oT ess ~~ a — i ee + — So ee ee ee eee Pay ee ee ee re ne ee et ee te) ee ey ee = “Shes eiees- ek eee et et oe ee ee ee oe eee or ees ee ee ee eee eee “ . a neh pe od eh Le bees yt eee eens eo ee Pe ee st Coney amen. Cel bey md —y=eSe= =z — — - SS ESS i ete inl me a a) Sipe ee eed eo eo ee ee Ye ie Oe | ee ee ee eS ee p ee ia 32,.¢" 5 testes - a = - a a eee 120 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT During the autumn Chinese detectives, who seem to be quite as efficient as their American counterparts, located one of the junkmasters in Hankow and promptly ar- rested him. His ship was the one from which only a small portion of the cargo had been lost and he pro- tested that the wreck was caused by a spring ireshet, that he had stolen nothing, and that only fear oi pun- ishment by the foreigners had made him run away. Regardless of the argument he was clapped in jail, held there several months without a hearing, and produced for trial on the day when I happened along as an inter- ested observer. As the case involved American interests, the United States Consul at Hankow sat with the Chin- ese magistrates as an assessor, his interpreter beside him in case of need. The Standard Oil Company was rep- resented by a youthful but keen member of its local American office force, the Chinese head of its Hankow shipping department, and a very alert Chinese lawyer. There was a court stenographer and there was the man on trial, without counsel or other assistance. No wit- nesses of the event appeared for either side. The affair was over in little more than half an hour, following the Chinese legal theory that an accused man is to be considered guilty until he proves innocence. The corporation presented its case, with the strong cir- cumstantial evidence that the junkmaster had delib- erately wrecked his ship and stolen part of the cargo. The accused, shabby, pale from confinement, and for- lorn looking, then reiterated his story at considerable leneth, with an occasional searching interrogation from the magistrate, who seemed possessed of competent ju- dicial mentality. Finally the man was sent back to prison for another month, on the understanding that 1f his colleague did not appear within that period he would be held responsible for the entire loss. Lacking attach-WHAT CHINA DEMANDS 121 able goods, this would probably mean a two-year jail sentence. Now the moral of this incident, as it appeared to me, is not that the course of justice in China is particularly corrupt, or inefficient, or dilatory. It is, rather, that the foreigner, with his easily mobilized battery of technical and legal assistance, and his Consul at hand to stiffen the magistrate, 1s so well content with the present treaty ar- rangements that the very idea of change, regardless of whether other factors make it desirable, annoys him ex- ceedingly. As Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman observed? in his official capacity as American Minister to China, shortly before leaving to become Ambassador at Berlin: The conservative tradition of the Treaty Ports is averse to modifying the present system of extraterritoriality and indeed deprecates all discussion of it. It is an extreme position and with the lapse of time will in my opinion become more and more untenable. It is indubitable that the Chinese judicial system is still primitive beside that of the Anglo-Saxon race; that “squeeze,” in the shape of unrecorded monetary transactions, is often helpful in hastening its operation; and that most of the provincial prisons would seem bar- barous to hardened social workers. It is also unques- tionable that present political chaos is a chief factor in delaying steps by the privileged foreign powers to abolish extraterritoriality. None the less, as much cooperation as circumstances permit in meeting this third point in the Chinese demands is desirable. The objections to the system outweigh the advantages of continuation. *TIn an address before the Anglo-American Association, Peking, January 20, 1925. oad Se tind i — ay hey Sa eR py rts st ae Te ee ee ee a = en a re ee es ee ek oO ris | — — —— eee Pee ee Oe ee a 7 - cd = atid = rea 4% i rat. iit Peer ee PP) Per ert Pere rer ee eS al Pe Peers tt ye fe tr ee. ees - — — ~ — _* © a ee pe Pe ee et ee eee ee er ee ee esLee ee ee ee eee oe ee ree Leola wh lind pl hs a ad oe ee ee et ee -—F ae Sa alle ieetiaeedl call ee ee ib ae a ng ~ Ss pa | eae ee ee ee fe ee ee es oes — Pe I “= = Sele tila od Sd at Pron 1) ry a + me nd 5 el te hea a ete hd ek eld th ee hee aed et ee el ee ee eee ee ee a et = = ee : = ee te oe a a a cs CHaptTrer XIT FACTORS IN UNIFICATION In spite of the chaotic political conditions in China during recent years, the maritime customs revenue of that country, measured in Haikwan taels, has increased steadily year by year since 1918. The general trend is pronouncedly up even when fluctuations in the value of this monetary unit are fully discounted. Converted to gold dollars we see an advance in Chinese customs rev- enues from under $35,000,000 in 1912 to almost $65,000,- 000 in 1925. The Chinese market, in other words, is steadily expanding. The tendency is for more and more foreign products to be sold there, regardless of local fluctuations due to warfare, boycotts and unrest. And as the purchasing power of the country gains, so also gains the interest of the foreign business man in China: That is one side of the picture, helping to explain why opposition to giving China tariff autonomy has strength- ened out of fear that thereby the present rising tide of foreign trade with that country might be impeded. The other side is that emphasized by Chinese statesmen who see that in the five-year period, 1920-1924, their coun- try’s merchandise imports averaged $752,000,000 per annum in value, while merchandise exports in the same period had an average annual value of only $528,000,000.* In the long run this normally unfavorable trade bal- *During the fiscal years 1920-1924 the merchandise imports of the United States averaged $3,767,000,000 in value; the average annual value of merchandise exports being $5,333,000,000. 122FACTORS IN UNIFICATION 123 ance means foreign loans to make up the deficit, and foreign loans to China have almost invariably stimulated foreign political interference. Every Chinese of intelli- gence realizes today that approximately one-quarter of his country’s imports are cotton textiles, and this con- tinues although every factor suitable to domestic manu- facture, from good land to good labor, is present in abundance. If cotton goods now imported from Great Britain and Japan were manufactured at home behind a reasonable tariff barrier (this is the argument of modern China), a long step would have been taken towards equalizing import and export statistics and in freeing the country from foreign political pressure. The attitude as- sists in showing why Great Britain and Japan have come in for so large a portion of the so-called anti-foreign ani- mus in China recently, Economic as well as political motives are involved. The advent of modern industrialization in China is partially responsible for, and partly caused by, the new economic reasoning, in which the returned students of course are playing a predominant réle. It is easy now to exaggerate the extent to which the factory system has taken root over there. It is probable that a full three- quarters of the entire population is still engaged in purely agricultural pursuits, and it is certain that not 1 per cent are as yet wage earners under modern indus- trial enterprise. The tendency towards modern methods of manufacture is, however, pronounced. It is a unify- ing and stabilizing force of the greatest importance, steadily expanding under the surface chaos which gives so unfair a picture of present-day China as a whole. Modern industrial enterprises, many of them of sizable scale, are now reported from over fifty different centers. They are no longer confined either to the Treaty Ports, or to developments of foreign origin. From current pages of the Chinese government’s Economic Bulletin could EeSeiac4esheesis Tr * er? eo ee ee ee ie oe ee ee DETTE Pt re Pet erie LL oe ee eel a ee: ~ _ eg TRA te Pee eee’ eee a Ee ee ee ee — ys IN Te | — od — —. ee eet a ee ee a ee ee Pe é <= —. é ee aT re es ee SE ee a a =ed eg ee & * pd 2 ht fee oa mt Pd u - oe ey _ _ 7 S al hla ied pais deni tle op ont Hist SL dite tian —hiip—mtetate) ak tein hed ah tenn eee ee ee eee ee a ee oe kona. 2 oo oe a ee eee ee z ° - a = - - - - ” sie Canaan - ee rane So a or ime hii - sent ; “oe & a ones totem i 6 Spa FElSSSST IEPs cgapepeser seta Fp sees Sear cese sels ease et 124 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT be culled an instructive list of the manufactures steadily springing up in all sections of the country. They are literally of almost every variety. Here, for instance, is the Eastern Model Cigar Manufactory in Shanghai, es- tablished and financed by Chinese and producing be- tween 5,000 and 6,000 cigars a day, the raw materials for which are purchased from Manila. Here is the Kwang Hwa Match Factory in Hangchow, employing 1,100 workpeople and doing an annual business of half a mil- lion dollars. Here is the Chung Hsing Button Factory of Wuhu, where 120 operatives turn out daily upwards of 20,000 buttons, manufactured from the shells of mus- sels which in themselves form an important local food product. Here is the Pootung Electricity Supply Com- pany, furnishing day and night lighting and power ser- vice to homes, factories, and docks in Pootung, its capital stock all held by Chinese, and its officers and technicians also of that nationality. Here is the Fukien Industrial Company of Foochow, where 700 men are em- ployed in the tanning of leather and the manufacture of various forms of leather goods. These examples are chosen absolutely at random, with the sole provision that every case cited must be origi- nated, managed, and financed by Chinese alone. Even with this qualification hundreds of similar instances of industrial development, most of them prospering and nearly all of them started within the past decade, could be mentioned. Enough has been said to illustrate the salient point, which is the steady, and no longer neg- ligible, progress in industrialization. In its train this will bring, and is bringing, new social problems. But the most important immediate effect is the stimulus to na- tional self-confidence, the demand for the establishment of sovereign political rights to foster the trend, and the consciousness of national unity in the modern sense which is being forwarded. It will not be forgotten thatFACTORS IN UNIFICATION 125 federalism in the United States was not proved success- ful until the expanding markets of our factories broke down political provincialism in behalf of national strength. Behind industrial development lies the question of natural resources. Rich as China is in the possession of mineral wealth, her assets in this direction have prob- ably been overestimated in popular opinion. In such common metals as copper, lead, zinc, and silver the coun- try is deficient, pronouncedly so in relation to the im- mense territory and population, Nor does prospecting so far accomplished indicate any notable petroleum re- sources. In antimony and tungsten, on the other hand, China alone, in both cases, now produces half of the en- tire world supply. It is worth noticing in passing that the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act levies a duty of about 100 per cent on Chinese tungsten, making an in- teresting contrast with the 5 per cent duty Chima is al- lowed to levy on American imports. Another example of this unfairness is seen in the lace-manufacturing center of Wusih, where production has been cut in half since enactment of our tariff law. No American industry will be found similarly injured by Chinese customs duties, likin included. With regard to the two basic industrial minerals— coal and iron—China is also very rich, particularly in coal. Studies now generally regarded as far too conserva- tive estimate the total Chinese coal reserves at from forty to fifty billion tons, sufficient to supply the country for over two thousand years at present consumption rates. Coal is produced in every province, with the provinces of Chihli and Fengtien (in Manchuria) at present getting out about five million tons a year apiece, and Shantung following with an annual output of over two million tons. Anthracite, said to rank with that of Pennsylvania in quality, is found in large deposits in Shansi and any Es — Scaizt ETE ee ee size PS Tnt se) —— omy eee es Ss i ee —— =——~ — te maeso seh eS Pee este eeke — - Lat al eee a ee oe ee ee ee eee oa Pet ere it tt rr ss citys’ — ca a as sapangs nee oe r — Peres et) ae = — Pete Gpecae ee a-2-ee ee ae Le bl tebe a ee earns eet ot Seat ee. te oe ee 2 ~ = ieee A . - - ~~ ee ’ % * - = a din “es a a al _ es eae a Sa a ected dele aed Seb green ee es a ee — Saar teens dee ele iat tena ——— re enemas eo ma De ee ee Pee ee a ee P| _ aoe pane Sa ina a, ic ee a Si i a ay a Rs i. 2 see tSess ae 4 4 ~* pe te i rad we an — Fe = 126 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT Honan, its presence in the former having assisted that relative prosperity which has made Shansi known as the “model province.” From 1912 to 1923 the annual production of coal in China nearly doubled, rising from thirteen million tons the former year to almost twenty- three million tons a decade later. The Kailan Mining Administration in Chihli Province, formed by amalgama- tion of British and Chinese companies, was producing about eight thousand tons a day during the disturbed months of the spring of 1926, which is not far below the ten thousand-ton-per-diem mark of the Japanese- operated Fushun mines in Manchuria.! While these two largest Chinese mines are largely for- eign controlled, it is noteworthy that well over half of all the coal produced is extracted by purely Chinese com- panies. Of these may be mentioned the Chungshing Company in Shantung, which increased its output from 918,000 tons in 1918 to 728,000 tons in 1923; and the Liu Hu Kou Company in Honan, which in the same period raised output from 118,500 tons to 444,500 tons. A number of other Chinese-owned and Chinese-managed mines rival these two in production. During the period 1920-1923 the coal imports of China remained almost stationary, while her coal exports increased over 50 per cent, Japan taking most of the increase. The upward trend in export is continuing. MOAI Scien tiie sins s% 1920 1921 1922 1923 Imports (tons)...... 1,338,356 1,361,781 1,151,392 1,366,108 Iyxports (tons)...... 1,970,187 1,886,398 2,377,443 3,108,682 Most of the iron mining in China is done in the Yangtze Valley, the ore production averaging over a mil- lion tons a year. Relatively little of this is smelted in the country, however, and Japan, again, receives most of “See p. 45,FACTORS IN UNIFICATION 127 the exported ore. As the following figures? show, the importation of iron ore to China has now virtually ceased, while exportation is rapidly increasing: VIRDEE ae keg Cite Lich dierveWarsretels 1917 1920 1923 RITIIOFES CLOTS). « 6:4 Sicieve wieiereic Seeinae,« 28,022 20,102 3,084 BISTIOECSCCEONS) os cc ciclo mec cilcacveus 309,107 682,660 727,603 It is evident, therefore, that in the exploitation of her mineral wealth, as well as in the establishment of nearly every form of modern factory production, China is go- ing ahead with reasonable rapidity, regardless of civil strife and political overturns. Indeed the trend is so pronounced, and the Chinese themselves are playing such a, leading part in bringing it about, as to indicate that much of the opprobrium cast on the republic by for- eigeners for its inability to maintain order does not cut deep. In this connection a contemporary study ? by the National Bureau of Economic Research, in New York, is thought provoking. It shows that in the pre-Republican period, for the years 1888 to 1910, China enjoyed on an average only 6.84 months of prosperity for every year of business depression. But by adding eight years of Re- publican rule, taking the period 1888 to 1920, the ratio becomes 7.80 months of prosperity for every year of de- pression. It does not matter so much that by this grading China ranks low—though above Austria and Brazil. What is significant is the business improvement which the republic, with its breaking of old fetters, has brought about. Beyond doubt this will become more rather than less pronounced in future, as the growth of a modern business class tends to bring about a national unification which the war lords have tried to force pre- maturely and by destructive methods. But even their *The statistics on coal and iron are taken from the “China Year Book” of 1925. *Entitled “Business Annals.” ae eee en ake a yo a a eee ess 7 J Sorte rer iti el tt ieee ek hs pe cores. 2 eo ect to) ced ct ne “bea esac ied Spessb shel et Fee me asOre save Slat Bers SBE —_ 7 y xy er heina — = oe - — r ye Peearcesens ores vied ee eee ee ee ee en ee > _. + oO eo ._ te a 1 ee sf diel aa © eS A a ol &zi% _ ed help het Sale tna ts teh ok hm eh ee ek te ee ee Ee Le 2 da ed he ee eee ee ee 5 r 2 - 5 é es # n . Pia oe Soccer. Fee rcyae ere _ Ne ike ee a Ee Sa a a a i tn ei el See ca a wer tal ** a lB ail a at a al ae le ot ot ot ele tits, tt hs, 7 a kai oa sh geen Po ek ee ebelcestess Let tal hea ‘; \- ie on i ee ert ks ee eek ott a _~ ~ + ir to 3 132 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT difficult to comprehend. In the month of December, 1925, the Ministry of Education, which is theoretically charged with the supervision of the modernization of in- struction in China, received as its share of federal in- come something under $2,000. Clerks and typists whose salaries had been in arrears for as much as twenty months were rewarded for their patience with individual pay envelopes with contents averaging about two dol- lars each. It is obvious that state-aided institutions are likely to be in a sorry situation in a country where the central government has no money at all for education, and where a great majority of the provinces and townships are in exactly the same position. Unquestionably many of the excesses which conceal the value in student agitation are partially due to a lowering of morale caused by acute financial difficulties at the government universities. But these excesses are secondary to the self-sacrifice in be- half of learning which intelligent youth in China today accepts as a matter of course. During an inspection of the National University at Peking in mid-January I commented to my student guide on the piercing cold of libraries and class rooms. He replied, as though it were a casual matter, that confronted with a choice between having coal and having textbooks, the undergraduates had unanimously petitioned for the mental form of fuel. I could not help contrasting this with the prevalent Treaty Port argument that the Chinese are not to be trusted with the increase of revenue which tariff au- tonomy would bring, While institutions nominally “state-aided” are strug- gling along without either aid or anything that can legitimately be called a state as Occidentals understand the word, the status of most of the missionary colleges and schools is changing. Though the financial worries of the latter are not similarly acute, their position isFACTORS IN UNIFICATION 133 rendered difficult by the increasing student objection to foreign control over curriculum and by the develop- ing scepticism, if not actual hostility, towards Chris- tianity, at least as practiced by the modern churches. The Chinese Anti-Christian Union, which seeks to de- fine Christianity as the spiritual arm of foreign economic imperialism, is nothing like as powerful as its adherents claim. But a conviction that Christian doctrine is not a, vital factor in the policy of western nations, and that foreigners are more anxious to see the Chinese practice it than to observe it themselves is practically universal among the nationalistic students with whom I have spoken. Most of the educational missionaries appre- ciate the strength of evidence behind this viewpoint, and are rising handsomely to meet the problem by pro- sressively relinquishing control in their schools to the Chinese. But the transition period, for all its vital importance, is not one leading to the best educational results. In spite of all these difficulties the interesting fact remains that the passion for learning among the Chinese people was never more adequately met by educational facilities than is the case today. Just prior to the Revolution of 1911 there were but fifty institutions above high-school grade in China, with a total enrolment of under nine thousand students. The number of colleges in this classification has now grown to 125, with about forty thousand students. Before the revolution not 1 per cent of the population was able to read and write. Now, after fifteen chaotic years, the literacy average for the entire country is closely estimated at lo per cent, rising to 50 per cent in the “model province” of Shansi. And it must be remembered that it means something to be literate in China, where a familiarity with four thousand separate characters is necessary for everyday reading. _ Se ie ate rere ye ee ets | | a ans Sli o rere TT rei? tet itr tS eset tt rt | ee = | tt a te ee Ey Pa os ee? oe Pere ret) aad ee tt ey ae ee ee ee ee ee a ; - -~% : a et ee ee re Se = ee eee ee et ee ee ee ee ee ee te ee cebsress:-_ oi - a ae ee a iat Stach a Pte ey eee) m~ . P a Sed rd ae ive el i a lace lied ahh hin s pel ah di 5 tdi Lagee aa ot ek eo ed rover ee ter etedeesd Stat -sflme i: Teentaal — pt gh eet ~~ s ale me pe S ne m F ~ E32 L.FESCST SS TETL Te Popes eser less sp sr ee Sess A r sil, abhi 2 a - . Ye ee es -tee é ’ 1 ye ~ * 4 i om a a ee ee i ——— 2 ieee — - ae ee) ——— - Ad nt = ; P a a vob 4 » i - 134 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT How progressive improvement in both elementary and higher education can coincide with a progressive deterio- ration in the authority of government is an interesting problem for students of political science. The seeming paradox certainly exists in China. But if one bears in mind the Chinese mistrust of and distaste for centralized government, it will go far to explain how a remarkable educational advance has been achieved in spite of the powerlessness and poverty of unstable administrations in Peking. The Ministry of Education directs a gen- eral scheme of public instruction, but professional edu- cators and other volunteer workers determine to what extent the bare scheme shall be put in force in the localities where they work, and also to what extent it shall be improved upon. Thus one finds now operating in most of the larger cities of China, and to some extent in rural districts also, the “Thousand Character” adult education move- ment, designed to give illiterates who have no other educational facilities available a foundation for reading in four months’ time. This movement, carried on with governmental sanction, and varying provincial support, was originated by the Chinese YMCA for the Chinese abor corps in France during the World War, and is now carried on by voluntary local committees. Many of the war lords, particularly the Christian General, have encouraged the project because of the benefit accru- ing to soldier students. And while the difficulty of link- ing those who have taken the courses with systematic continuation work is unsolved, the general success of this spontaneous local movement against illiteracy is indubitable, Then, at the other end of the educational ladder, are found such organizations as the recently organized “China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture,” of which Fan Yuan-lien, a former Ministerry FACTORS. IN UNIFICATION 135 of Education, is director. Operating on funds at pres- ent largely obtained from the last American Boxer in- demnity remission, this foundation allocates a part of its income, setting aside the remainder for endowment, to the forwarding of scientific research in institutions of standing throughout the country. In between these two samples of current educational activities, selected merely as illustrations from many that might be cited, come numerous local, provincial, and national efforts, of, by, and for Chinese, designed to train the national intelligence to cope with modern problems. Most of them are coordinated and, so far as desirable, unified through efforts of the Chinese National Association for the Advancement of Education. And in not a single year of the protracted political disorder has any province failed to send its delegates to the confer- ences of the National Federation of Provincial Educa- tional Associations. Education, commerce, labor—to cite but three out- standing forces—are surely and steadily knitting China together. It is more than advisable—it is essential— to remember when accounts of civil strife and disorder are nearly all one reads in the daily press from this great country, that under the surface these great movements are making headway all the time. —_— - a Tk —— Som fom 5 P- roe a yr ere ee Bsesait i ° -= — po Petre ye et te pe tere oe Stee pete err eT rr Le te eh et SD ate pCeer eee tt es a EwEae Aer 2S eS BE TELE — ~- a 4 ee oy ¥ : ae i a ae - —- : se ne - - oe . aa he en “ie oe aig 8 , - * * 1 i a my Aa em NSS = So ata me! — ee ee tar : er aE ee Te ee ee ne ee ey ee ae Ed ‘ . - iis eee — ba != - ye saA ATES 5 ay ll ~ i | Poa —T “a A ia 3 p< +e +d oF Beh aria be im gp Se pl tg * a, — fone ™ . oe De ee em ied deh be lt ee ee atadhaad pgm tet ned — o Ss tel tote de lem OE ke tine tine lt a kk wl ee pe ae preoeesteeracRers a at Lk lh a herent Se me nm ne 138 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT of British North Borneo. The Philippine Archipelago, containing 7,083 separate islands, large and small, and extending 1,152 statute miles from north to south, is geographically the southern half of the great chain of islands paralleling the coast of Asia from Siberia to the equator. This key position athwart all Oriental trade routes gives to the Philippines strategic and commercial] importance potentially greater than that possessed by Japan, forming the northern half of the aforesaid island chain. It is easy to underestimate the size of our great dependency in the Far East. The total land area of the archipelago is 115,026 square miles, almost identi- cal with that of post-war Italy, or with the eombined areas (land and water) of the states of New York, Penn- sylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland. Luzon, the big- gest island of the archipelago, is as large as Denmark, Belgium, and Holland combined. Mindanao, the second island in size, is about equal in area to Portugal. Ten of the Philippine Islands contain more than one thou- sand square miles each. Compared with most of the adjacent countries, the Philippines are not thickly inhabited. The last official census (December 31, 1918) showed a total population of 10,350,640, and the present-day figures are probably not much in excess of 11,000,000. While this is a greater population than that possessed by Canada, and far greater than that of huge Australia, its density is much less than that of Japan, China, India, or the Dutch East Indies. At the same time it is worth remembering that the Philippines average about ninety-five persons to the square mile as against less than forty to the Square mile in the United States. With the exception of the Chinese, of whom there are some 90,000 in the islands, controlling a very large proportion of all retail commerce, the foreign population is small. There areOUR OWN To - /2Z0° PEKING ° Hpankow COLONIAL PROBLEM AS Y Bonin oa Talands .s (Taran) Canton ae fe Ce PA CiIALLS ) besten Tslan seuZn ocean (Carl ‘ “ @Guam Chine § mad —" Sea wo ; s} * Caroline Ishands Si Ss ‘ (Jarax) | z (Taran) fe e ’ Cee ; 111)|| <== (DyTC H) 29 ae ceaeetl qushe 139 Petree eT otter se Peres tr ry Tey ere 53° neg Po 8 $2S53855255 56 ots “<3 roe eto “s 3 = —, a a oawe Geez ees oO * q Kea Sea a — i teat dade Ses he iveazyee 7 = ~— a] ebtpbatsicsr= me egetsrere eset sR? — THE FAR EAST The map covers the area from 60° north latitude to the Territory subject equator, and from 110° to 150° east longitude. to white nations ts shaded. es es ee _ a ee Se eS eee ee ee ee eee ee ee ee estt «a nl es Sere ee eee = eS . ar " lial a) i one“ A ie ee wee te tl te er) ek hed oh ee ee pe Bi mee ge geil rStetesairas Iwate fe Ss. ee ed — i — pir mate nag = 5 eas i a na on ant — fl ad es es — Pel tSses Sets verepesever ress rp soe seere , a seal - “ e j 4 - ’ * eal rom oe | a ny — 140 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT about 7,000 American civilians, less than 8,500 Japa- nese, 4,000 Spaniards and 1,000 English. People of other nationalities are negligible in number. There are, however, close to a million Filipinos of mixed blood, known as Mestizos. Over half of these represent the Chinese admixture, while those with a considerable proportion of Spanish or other European blood come next in frequency. The American Mestizos are not yet a factor of considerable importance, not because such children are rare but because it is not yet a generation since the American annexation. There is little doubt that relative to total numbers the Chinese and Spanish Mestizos furnish a disproportionately high ratio of leaders in every line. The Chinese strain seems to contribute a business acumen and energy lacking in the pure Malay stock. The Spanish strain seems to provide a brilliancy and egoism which is often irritating to the less showy Anglo-Saxon nature. How the Ameri- can Mestizo will turn out the future will show. In gen- eral this mixture does not appear very promising, though the furtive nature of the parental union rather than biological causes 1s probably responsible for this. Much effort has been spent in trying to prove that the Filipinos are not a homogeneous race. The thesis is dificult to maintain, except in so far as the Moham- medan and semi-savage Moros are concerned. What- ever may be said against the Spanish policy in the islands the fact remains that three and a half centuries of Spanish rule both Christianized and unified the Malay population to a high degree. The Spanish churches, many of them beautiful old buildings, are still the focal point of civie life in towns and villages throughout the islands, and outside Manila the influence of the Spanish period is still much more pronounced than that of the American régime. The Moro problem and the different dialects prevalent in different sections are cited withOUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM 141 more energy than effectiveness to prove that the Filipinos are not to be trusted with a greater degree of seli-gov- ernments. The former is diminishing in intensity every year, which is natural when one considers that the Chris- tian Filipinos outnumber the Mohammedans more than twenty to one. And the language difficulty has been greatly exaggerated, most of the eighty-seven different dialects on which such stress is laid being very closely related to one another. At present, about one-quarter of the population reads or understands English, which in another generation will have become the universal lan- guage, with Spanish probably continuing as a second tongue among the educated for literary and social purposes. On the character of the Philippine people the report of the Wood-Forbes Mission of 1921 is particularly valuable, because the general conclusions of this docu- ment cannot be called sympathetic to Filipino claims. In the section of this report dealing with national char- acteristics Governor-General Wood and former Gov- ernor-General Forbes, both firm advocates of retention, wrote as follows: * The Philippine people possess many fine and attractive qualities —dignity and self-respect, as shown by deportment, complete absence of beggars, personal neatness and cleanliness, courtesy and consideration to strangers and guests, boundless hospitality, will- ingness to do favors for those with whom they come in contact. : . They are happy and carefree to an extent seldom found among other peoples, keen to own their land, strongly attached to their homes and their children, proud of and devoted to their beloved Philippines; they are free from worries arising from inter- national difficulties and responsibilities; they are refined in man- ner, filled with racial pride, lighthearted and inclined to be impro- vident, as are all peoples who live in lands where Nature does so much and people require so little. In many positions they have shown marked capacity and have done better than could reason- 1The latter part of this section of the report is omitted, as points therein are covered elsewhere in this and succeeding chap- ters. The footnotes on the report are mine. ~ Perera Pore TT errs a PSSSPRSTISS eG Sass dese cess esesee= os —s =~ = Tirole t ss" — 73 oes sl 4 << . e a me E 2 = ahe hom? - es pietpecte eres - ee — i thbobemelsca a oe ey ee — = Bi ong i nl pene rape mtis —— SA este oe ee ee Riedie adsorbed slebete sere oeceepesyettrsseabeoT = ca ad + ~* eee oe ee oo = a - = a a i ee a At ~ po Bt AF a a nemo Sond ot Me aie sheet dae sed ol elie eee ene BS ee er ge ee Bee Sk ee ee ial a s i i a - * = ileal ined as ~ = _ a 4 a - pa P pe in peste sowd steam: ph tng rn Semmens Pea Se Peo 2 Le ok rr a) od hae fa . i bs r ‘ ‘ * eo 1 4 a oe ee il Se ee ad t~* ar - Ca . - a I i a ‘ ; a ‘~ a an =_ . 142 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT ably have been expected of an inexperienced and untried people. There are many holding high positions in the judicial, executive, and educational departments who would be a credit to any govern- ment, They are proud, as they well may be, of the advance they have made since the beginning of American control of the Islands, for it can be safely stated that no people, under the friendly tutelage of another, have made so great a progress in so short a time. They possess active minds, their children are bright and pre- cocious and learn rapidly. The whole people have a consuming thirst for education, and, as is common among those who have had little opportunity and much hard work, there is a leaning towards the learned professions or occupations which do not involve severe manual labor, and a tendency to underestimate the importance of agriculture and the dignity of labor, and to overestimate the standing given by the learned professions. Their support and aid in the building up of public education is beyond praise. They have sacrificed much that their children might be able to go to school, and the interests of an entire family are often subordinated to sending the selected member to a higher school or university. Schoolhouses are often constructed by voluntary contributions of labor, money, and material. There is a serious lack of educated public opinion, for as yet the Philippine public is not a reading public, and there is a lack of a strong independent press, although there has been a great advance in this respect during recent years, and there are several outstanding in- dependent papers of great local influence. The daily total circu- lation of all Island papers is a little less than 140,000, and in the remote provinces people still depend largely upon the circula- tion of news by word of mouth* The Philippine people are readily led by those who understand them. They make brave soldiers, and under good leaders make excellent troops. Due to the lack of a well-informed public opinion they are easily swayed by their leaders. As a result of generations of disregard for sani- tary measures, they are still rather Oriental in their attitude toward diseases and questions of public health and sanitation. This indifference is being rapidly corrected? The Filipino woman is a strong and dominating influence in every home and community; she is modest, loyal and hard work- ing, and while not much in evidence she is nevertheless always to be reckoned with. . . . The establishment of a large number of women’s clubs, that concern themselves with hygiene and other clvl¢ matters, is a most encouraging sign of the times. * Total newspaper circulation now (1926) is estimated at 200,000. The literacy of the Filipino people is about 40 per cent, or more than twice as high as that of China. * Under native health officers the death rate (17.5 per 1,000 in 1923) has been brought lower than that of Japan, Spain, or Italy.OUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM 143 But more important than the character of the Philip- pine people, in the eyes of many Americans, is the char- acter of Philippine resources. It hardly needs to be stated that the campaign to nullify our repeated prom- ‘ses of eventual independence for the islands has inten- sified pari passu. with appreciation of their commercial value. As yet, as the following foreign trade statistics for representative years indicate, this potential value is far from being realized: U.S. Fiscal Year Pienaar Other Imports| Total Imports rk el ee $ 5,761,498 €95.114.852 | $ 30,876,350 Tria cale.s 10 10,775,301 26,292,329 37,067,630 POR eit cic eveie'si f= 22,394 381 22 085,480 44.479, 861 BOZO tr cteic's a aia aie = 80,374,530 42.757 ,581 123,132,111 WOO iaysraictoid. <1, 6 «14 64,466,117 52,765,548 117,231,665 MO rancisios eceie 0 (= 69,957,871 47 679,241 117,637,112 U. S. Fiscal Year|Exports to U. S| Other Exports} Total Exports DOO Fis aicetaicics ise. s $ 15,668,026 $16,684,589 $ 32,352,615 UW es aqonnnorcr 18,741,771 21,122,398 39,864,169 LS eo aoor 23,001,275 27,913,786 50,915,061 UAL ireisteisieteis cle.s's 84,186,048 68,195,193 152,381,241 Zee claictoists dieie.s 101 254,536 38,822,269 140,076,805 AOZG He ace cco case 102,831,205 38,213,229 141,044,430 The mineral resources of the islands, believed to be of sizable quantity in gold, coal, and iron, though de- ficient in nearly all other metals, are still a virtually unexploited field. The production of gold is at present most important, but the value of this mineral extracted was only $1,330,000 in 1921, and $1,711,000 in 1923. Coal production is second 1n importance among the min- eral industries, yet is in fact virtually negligible. The entire island output during recent years has averaged little over 40,000 tons per annum, OTF about the same naar Peat +.” 2 rot Pie t peo LT bad peer er re errr) rit SPSFGREIST PEST Sass aves ceciTenaees a! + —y Sedatseuss -— poe eee. ess reo ee ee ee ee ee oe Ce] sect> ea Be ee) taf gtatade ead ebriess bedbete se sceucurn ee yetssscecs — a F cet ty ary oe ee’ x = eth eat ae ta * &* . ged 4 “a oe _°— “4 eee > - - —— - hadeieinan-tndeetiod-tel il a el antag) a Im? Fa=

oo - - J co) CHAPTER XIV AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT American unfamiliarity with the constitutional status of the Philippines is well illustrated by the surprise with which many learn that the Prohibition Amendment has no force whatsoever in the Archipelago. Neither has any other amendment, nor the original body of the Consti- tution, except in so far as parts of it may have been specifically legislated for the Philippines. Constitu- tionally the Philippines are not a part of the United States. Yet they are American territory and other na- tions cannot deal with them as a separate government. As has been said: “The Government of the Philippine Islands is a government foreign to the United States for domestic purposes, but domestic for foreign purposes.” 2 Filipinos are not American citizens, but owe allegiance to, and are under the protection of, the United States, Since the Philippines are subject to the United States, but without the guarantees of the American Constitu- tion, it follows that the power of Congress over the Islands is absolute. At any time, by a mere majority vote in both Houses followed by the customary Presi- dential approval, our Congress can completely alter the basic law and political status of the Islands. “Congress,” as one oi the leading Filipino authorities on constitu- tional law has written, “can keep the Philippines in perpetual dependency, convert it into a State of the * Quoted by Kataw: “The Present Government of the Philip- pines,” p. 112. 150 ed oe oe eeAN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT 151 Union, or declare it free and independent.”* T he record shows that our Federal Legislature has so far been scru- pulously careful to exercise this enormous power over an alien people cautiously. But the fear of what Con- press may do—a fear which is quite comprehensible in view of the general ignorance of our Senators and Rep- resentatives on Philippine sentiments and conditions— is a constant source of anxiety to the educated islanders. Much of the energy of the so-called “Independence Mis- sion” in Washington is occupied with combating ill- judged bills on Philippine matters. Such legislation, of course, can at any time be introduced at the behest of interested American groups. There is something patently un-American in our fail- ure to give any constitutional cuarantees or safeguards to the people of the Philippines. The advertised au- tonomy of the Islands cannot be regarded as very real when one remembers the unlimited power which Con- press reserves to undo at a stroke the accomplishments of the Philippine Legislature. The Jones Law stipulates (Section 19) that “all laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature shall be reported to the Congress of the United States, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same.” The Insular Legislature itself could, it appears, be wiped out of existence if the President of the United States and a bare majority of Congress felt at any time that such a reactionary step was desirable. Nominally autonomous, the Philippine Islands have in reality much less-guaranteed seli-gov- ernment than an American state. They have not even a vote in this Congress which 1s a sword of Damocles above their heads, for the Resident Commissioners chosen by the Insular Legislature can speak, but cannot par- ticipate in a division on the floor of the House of Representatives. 1 Maximo M. Kataw, op. cit., p. 113. ae 2 He Ee te fe efeur . Paes ee a —— a. —) ee ne ee ett SY ert stacz- rs : a Ep ey ey a: —— ~ Pm ae Senge _ oes ene F PPK el eesgeeeags- Ee eee ee ee et ery a Pr ee a ee a a So *. S29225 892 si esacaiz? ree te pe ered etre eee ees ts es ers _ eae a a — Minne a | +m ~ ce ee one le Se eT es — ie era + ~ " —— erat esaser "se Ee eee hs S Tete | ee a oe ey ee tsF+d se ak ee +2 a a a i a ee eh an at il ee ee em gD ———— eel el Aelia eed temetaatet Sell intel aan Ait eee ald alan e@e ae) oy a ls peg ns ne Fesepagcser serra sy tres Seer ee : Ceo < ee a es a 3 ‘h Sa Ss ere eo : - ee ae eee eS et ‘= rs — Sah me oe a - - 152 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT Historically, it would appear that the reason for the absence of any constitutional status for the Philippines is our oft-reiterated pledge to give them complete in- dependence. Permanent guarantees would have been superfluous for the temporary American administration which was designed. And that the design was for purely temporary American control there is not the faintest shadow of doubt, the only issue originally being as to the length of time for which that control should be exercised. The advocates of independence are able to quote numerous statements of acceptance in that end by Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, which is perhaps not quite fair unless certain qualifying observations (fully quoted in their turn by advocates of retention) are included. Moreover, expressions of executive opinion, as Europe has come to realize since the Treaty of Versailles, are in no way legally binding on the United States. The preamble to the Jones Law, passed by both Houses of Congress in 1916 and approved by President Wilson on August 29 of that year, may, however, be legitimately regarded as the definite pledge of the American people on the subject. That preamble, fol- lowing a title which defines the law as, “An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for those islands,” reads as follows: Whereas it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipiency of the War with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial agegrandizement; and Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and Whereas for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given themAN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT 153 without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental pow- ers, they may be the better prepared fully to assume the respon- sibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence: Therefore Be it enacted, . . .« etc. At the present time it is being argued, in a way un- pleasantly reminiscent of the famous “scrap of paper” incident, that the preamble of a law is not a part of that law, and has, in consequence, no legal force. Even though true, the technicality is not wholly effective. The issue is one in which Philippine opinion ought to be consulted as much as American. To the Filipinos the Jones Law is more than an organic act establishing a semi-autonomous government in the Islands. It is re- garded as a Treaty in which the Title and Preamble, deliberately set down and passed by Congress, are as important as what follows. And, so the dangerous argu- ment may now be heard, if the preamble to the Jones Law is not binding on America, neither are certain pro- visos of that law necessarily binding on us. The refer- ence, generally, is to that part of Section 22 of the Act which states specifically that: “All executive func- tions of the government (of the Philippine Islands) must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the Governor-General.” It is at this point that—entirely regardless of the in- dependence issue—the Jones Law breaks down as & permanent instrument of government. This organic law provided for the establishment of a Legislature, com- posed of a House of Representatives with ninety-one members and a Senate with twenty-four members.t It 1Nine members of the House and two Senators, all from the non-Christian districts, are appointed by the Governor-General. The remainder are elected under manhood suftrage. ~ — _ ee ee Ra ee ~~ po Pa gs a ae ee ee om ae ee ee ee Te. — hom a eee" . " = # , - ee died. eae eras We Pd Tt Tt rere ee ee 7 ore tt es fe oer’. Tht eT SEeCwSTE SETS ES - — —— *Jcawe Se riage Seda eEye, ra ee ae ee ee Pe ee Pe ee ee ee ee ee ee ee re ee ery ee Ye te eee ets— Se ee ete ee ee 1d ih de eked ed hee eee ee ok ik eS ee res wae pe ee ee —* es aie 9 a - = i i oe rs a 7 —— . eek, ae oe - ier dtd ied nad a ee oh mk ee a ee a a Oe ee ree de Ra She Pate cers op LEELA SS IIE GF LTE SPP Se Fa leash Shae a a i es an or . nt) re ech a a akan tall ca illee: ape “ie a so ih ot f ei — A Po Go y ro) fy ae * bd Pe aa ie Pow 154 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT authorized improvement in the executive side of gov- ernment so that there were subsequently established six departments,t with subordinate bureaus, corresponding to the principal domestic purposes of a modern nation. But it failed to settle in any clear-cut way the basic issue of the responsibility of the department heads. The secretaries were at one and the same time made subject to the influence of the native Legislature, and told that in their executive functions they were completely subordinate to the control of the American Governor- General. Most obviously such a system could only work well as long as there was complete harmony between Legis- lature and Governor-General. There was such harmony under Francis Burton Harrison, Governor-General from 1913 to 1921. There has been anything but such har- mony under the régime of Major-General Leonard Wood, Governor-General since 1921. The reason for this dii- ference is not primarily a matter of individual per- sonality, mistakes, or virtues. It lies primarily in the fact that Harrison did his utmost to forward the Fili- pino claim to control over the executive, which Wood has as persistently blocked. The former sought to reduce the practical values of his office in favor of the cere- monial, conceiving this to accord with the spirit of the Jones Law. The latter has refused to abdicate any part of the functions which the letter of the Jones Law entrusts to him. Shrewd observers will see in the con- trast between the two administrations, each of them quite defensible under the organic Act, a proof that this Act will not serve much longer as the basis of Philippime sovernment. Indeed, the unsettled constitutional status of the Phil- ippines must be appreciated before justifiable criticism 1Tnterior, Public Instruction, Finance, Justice, Agriculture and Natural Resources, Commerce and Communications,AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT 155 of American administrative methods out there can be passed. The very rapid Filipinization of the islands under the Harrison régime was bound to make the task of the present Governor-General a thankless one. Judg- ing purely by the policy followed during President Wil- son’s two terms of office, the most logical action for Mr. Harrison’s successor would have been to pull down the American flag and pack up. “Reactionary” is after all a, relative word, and it is well to realize that General Wood is reactionary to the Filipinos not so much be- cause he pulls backward, as because he gives a con- servative rather than a liberal interpretation in all the vexed cases where varying interpretations of the Jones Law are legitimate. Illustrative of the point is Governor-General Wood’s frequent use of the veto power, which was exercised by ‘Yovernor-General Harrison just five times during the five years of his stay after the passage of the Jones Law. General Wood has no scruples about employing his veto power lavishly, even in matters of purely domestic con- cern, but maintains that he has never used it without the most complete confidence that his action was justi- fied. And it does seem significant that while the Philip- pine Legislature can by a two-thirds vote send a vetoed bill directly to the President of the United States for decision, such action was taken with only one measure out of all those blocked by Governor Wood up to the 1926 session of the Legislature. Shortly after the con- vening of the 1926 session, however, a resolution calling for a plebiscite on the independence issue was promptly repassed by both houses of the Legislature after veto by the Governor-General as outside legislative authority. 1 General Wood vetoed twenty-one bills in the first two sessions of the Legislature under his administration. In the 1925 session the proportion was approximately one bill vetoed out of every three sent to him for signature. a ~~ as — -——<«,F7 © 4. i ba ree Te, pW rSsgers beset saas2ise Pre rt teri tt te as Sede taeytace? ae tS Ali a ee tee eee Ae oe ee ee et i eS age cpm ee ee errs el ee es ee ee - cd ee ee ee Ses «cgereesre sbrss ail ee ee eee ee ee ee eee ye Pe ee ee a eeethe 4h ee re tee @. Tee tage 2 ae. > o's urea ees eT — Pe a a ee ee nl leche ia Be eae aol ad aon es raid ee oe el: Olas ~ oe Ce ae - now eens -_—— Pee TS OS areas eeeezees ae Sasi let atopeypepersr sess sp se aot 3 ha pce a | SS A ea ee St te Teed ym - cm me em a 156 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT This issue of the exercise of veto power is really a fundamental in the whole Philippine problem. When the Governor-General vetoes a bill which may, even re- motely, affect legitimate American interests he in no way contravenes the spirit of the Jones Law. But when he vetoes measures of purely domestic concern, as in the recent effort to revise the divorce laws of the islands, he makes himself a predominant part of the Philippine legislative machinery in a way which certainly seems inconsistent with the degree of autonomy the Philippines theoretically possess. It has been Governor-General Wood’s viewpoint that the Filipinos are only poten- tially, not yet actually, capable of self-government and that he is, therefore, completely justified in blocking their legislative course at any point where his reason tells them they are in shoal water. It is the Filipino view- point that whether their elected representatives always show impeccable wisdom in purely domestic matters 1s none of the Governor-General’s business. Feeling in this issue has become very bitter, and will become in- creasingly so until the constitutional uncertainty which surrounds it is clarified by the American Congress. It may be stated without qualification that the Fili- pino people will never be a satisfied and contented com- munity within the American Empire until they are given real home rule. And the form of home rule must be based upon the English system of cabinet responsibility to the legislature rather than the American system of divided author rity. The racial difficulty plays its part in deciding this choice, for the Filipinos will consider themselves a subject people as long as an American Governor-General is allowed to hold the whip hand over a native legislature. But rational political theory which has not failed to notice the grave defects arising frometre ra Pt tree ete ete te! kee et . — aoa [sea Sees — = a sad NE ts ee a a = 5 te ebacxpis teres - ee es mE = ee Pe et ee ee ed ee ee nape aes ta fi ee ee " eeee rer ys Mrs? o = fa cs teem oe 4<2¢ Se oe es) —*ie y« ae A Pe rm cat . its a. ea tied * tee ket ed tat hed, Fh cl kaa ede ek ae eee ited - Fag eet eet taiier aeetie Ee Sl lh ht hel nt aed ae ee = SS ¥ - rina , me = t- i hel on ham a io Eo aa cpeoserses= CA eS eee s ~ As bs ark = +4 Pa | — dea ey ; SENATE PRESIDENT QUEZON ~ The brilliant leader of the Inde- pendence Movement relaxes on ship- board during an inter-island propa- ganda trip. Mrs. Rosa SevituA DE ALVERO The president of a girls’ semi- nary in Manila who urges her countrywomen to work peacefully but ceaselessly for independence.ee i te oe AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT 157 our separation of governmental powers* plays a more important role. Moreover, the parliamentary system of cabinet re- sponsibility, now nearly universal among all nations with democratic government except the United States, is rooted in Philippine political tradition. The Malolos Constitution of the short-lived Philippine Republic pro- vided for an outright parliamentary system of govern- ment. The Philippine Commission, which governed the islands from 1901 to 1916, combined executive and leg- sclative functions. The fact that the present system does not adequately harmonize with the trend of native political thought was mainly responsible for the crea- tion of the Council of State during the Harrison régime, on which the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House as well as Department secretaries were rep- resented. The present Supreme National Council is an- other instance of the ceaseless effort to reduce the authority of the executive, failing constitutional provi- sions to make him responsible to the Legislature. Just as the English parliamentarians of the past worked cease- lessly to limit the authority of the king and make him a largely ceremonial figure, so will the Filipino spokesmen work to contravene dictatorial powers of the Governor- General until such time as answer is given to their plea for an executive responsible to the people through the agency of a duly elected Legislature. When this constitutional situation is understood, and not concealed by stupid attempts to stigmatize the native leaders as “politicians’”—absurd when we recall that it is our own “politicians” who in the last analysis have 1Bryce, in his “American Commonwealth”; Beard, in his “American Government”; Ford in his “Rise and Growth of American Politics,” and a host of other authorities have com- mented at length on the problems arising from our balance of power between executive and legislature. " r ‘Te os Ga ke es Lee pt Peet ea eae eT ree ete rte ee et c— a a. cee Saad £4 =G 5843 . " en — Pannrecn as ers 4 ao et Re ey — . es ee eee - ~* - ‘ie e —= =e? ee rT te Ty ee re Mee Seo eter st ee reer errry ee eres men Se ee taal4 r r * 7 * ~ Zur b4 RoR EF Ae? “ae a gee |= P ie ‘ leon ee oe 2 eee aed ee ee Ee eet eh a ek ee nk eek eid i | eo red gee es ‘o . 5 me ee el ee ee Pew w= Ep ie Fe ae i ek hein ie ee ee — eee i, ee i al Rall te Kets Porapeger er sr se ey sT eT SLsee a eee > = «-¢-* bs By he = Se a 158 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT absolute power over the Islands—it becomes desirable to analyze the various alternatives which lie open. The first possibility is continuation of the status quo, the chief argument in favor of which is that the Jones Law has on the whole worked well during its ten years of operation. As opposed to this, however, is the fact that the present organic law is admittedly an ad interim measure, which will not serve indefinitely as the instru- ment of Philippine government. It has served its experi- mental purpose, and sooner or later must be improved upon in the light of experience. Knowledge by both Americans and Filipinos that the change must come is probably doing more to retard the economic development of the islands than would be the case if outright inde- pendence were granted. There is, in the second place, the possibility of giving the Philippines a territorial status, similar to that of Hawaii or Alaska, a course strongly advocated by certain business interests because it would take from the natives virtually all control over their own affairs. Such a “so- lution” would be so diametrically opposed to all our pledges with reference to the Philippines, so certain to create an enduring and righteous hatred of America among all patriotic Filipinos, that it is almost incredi- ble to find the course quite widely supported. While it is unlikely that American public opinion would ever subscribe to such a betrayal, the fact that it can be seriously considered helps to illustrate how crucial the Philippine problem has become. A third possibility is to give the Islands the status of an American state, perhaps with certain qualifications such as freedom from the operation of the Federal In- come Tax, or military conscription in time of war. There is certainly more to be said for this scheme than for that of territorial status, and early in the century it was advocated by the Philippine Federal party. That partyAN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT 159 disappeared, however, when it could find supporters neither in the Islands nor in the United States. One of the many difficulties behind this possible solution 1s found in the problem of congressional representation. The population of the Philippines is as great as that of the state of New York, and increasing at least as fast. What would be the effect on our politics and public opinion (both white and colored) if a body of fifty brown-skinned legislators were given full powers in the House of Representatives? Then there is the possibility of complete and un- trammeled independence. That if this were granted the Filipinos would run their government at least as effi- ciently and as capably as is the case with the majority of Latin-American Republics is not open to serious doubt. That their continued independence, if not already assured, could be guaranteed by treaties of neutrality between the powers interested in the Far East is certain. By the fair minded the effort to make it appear that Japan would seize the islands if we left them must be regarded as in large part propaganda which, consciously or unconsciously, serves to obscure the real issues. ‘The tropical climate of the islands is an absolute bar to Japanese colonization. Japanese economic penetration, as shown elsewhere in this book, ‘s directed in an entirely different direction. And the balance of power in the East would not permit Great Britain to sit idly by 1 Japan made any move of ageression against an independent Philippines. The real argument against Philippine independence 1s not the chance that the natives would not be able to maintain it if granted, but the abundant evidence that essential Philippine desires and essential American in- terests can be harmonized without as yet attempting so drastic a solution. Opposition to independence may 1See Chap. V. a a os - y ae —_— = a a aT ahaa <7 as t 3 retat- ee | es ae oe were ti te ti teri ttt te te e¥edsazisiegs sigtissts Pe pa eye - Cee ee ee ee —— = PS ee eat ea LS ate rh lid a nm Sets tebstes ar ne To ———" ES Fetes ee —een ee a Ot ak oe = 4 ak ae ee et ee ee ed ok ok ee bY — peat gh - a Fc am e ~ a ee ie hn eee te Sn eto hema ele i aera at Fs abi — Se ae ee in kal —_ peereoee) es at : ee ee Se ee oe eC eYorepeseswerrest. fp ty er seporessse 3 eS - ot ie Sal 4 ta BD Ee ell ahs Paes _ 4 4 o eR A ye ww BO) ind i ped e oi ~ ~ a a — de an ad ee ae init py “4 papa = ars wT St ge aR i SE _ een es en ge A | ad n ’ ee ee 160 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT further be quite legitimately supported by the thesis that if the Islands obtained political freedom they would soon become economically subservient to some more business- like race; and by the argument that the problem of pagan minorities, while becoming less important every year, would still prove a grave difficulty for a fledgling republic. Most of the other points raised in opposition are based on biased self-interest rather than dispas- sionate facts. There remains the possibility of Philippine autonomy under American sovereignty, a status which may be defined as Dominion Home Rule, because in all essen- tials akin to that enjoyed by Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa within the British Empire. Under this arrangement an American Governor-General would continue in office at Manila, but his powers would be supervisory rather than executive. The Filipinos would exercise their own executive authority in all do- mestic affairs through the agency of a Premier (or President, if they preferred that title) who with his Cabinet would be responsible to the Philippine Legisla- ture. The American Governor-General would have more than ceremonial functions to attend to, for the United States would retain complete direction of the foreign policy of the Philippines. For that reason the Governor- General’s veto power over Legislative acts would con- tinue, but with the vital distinction that it could be exercised only against insular legislation legally defin- able as non-domestic. In specific controversies on de- batable ground here it would seem that the United States Supreme Court, rather than the President of the United States as at present, should serve as arbiter for an overridden veto. * An excellent source book on Dominion Home Rule is provided by H. E. Ecsrton’s “Federations and Unions in the British Empire.”was" 3% AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT 161 In addition to reserving to the United States complete direction of Philippine foreign policy, and a limited veto power, the proposed arrangement would provide for the continuation of American military and naval bases; for a perpetuation of the present customs union insuring permanent free trade between the United States and the Islands; and for special American jurisdiction for a limited period over the non-Christian tribes. As has been stated, the Moro problem is one which is being automatically solved, in the main peacefully, by the steady Filipinization of the Mohammedan districts. For this reason any such legislation as the ill-judged Bacon bill, aiming to create a permanently separate American- dictated administration in the southern (rubber-grow- ing) provinces should be dismissed. An ironic commen- tary on the alleged high purposes of this measure was provided when Carmi A. Thompson, personal repre- sentative of President Coolidge, visited Mindanao in August, 1926. To quote The New York Times of August 24: Some of the Datus (Moro chiefs) spoke against the Bacon bill and none for it. Sultan Rambin said, “Mindanao will fight and die rather than be separated from the Philippines.” He added that the religious differences between the Moros and the Chris- tian Filipinos had been exaggerated and were diminishing. This viewpoint must not be taken as typical, for the Datus who favor American as against Filipino rule are in the majority. But as the real desire of most of these primitive, not to say savage, tribesmen is to oppose any civilizing tendency, the Bacon bill cannot be regarded as according with their wishes. American supervision in the domestic affairs of most of Mindanao, however, 1s unquestionably more desirable than in the other islands. Perfection is not claimed for the Dominion Home Rule 2Tntroduced in the House, June 11, 1926, by Representative Bacon of New York. i bi +04 at Pack CS rh | aT | Sate Ee : a ba ed tee Perro rTP Tie te rh rar ee Ter ee: 2. ae Fr =$S5GSS7653 CS SS Serer > 4 ae sese he Tr. ee eg a ae en et ait a paren on ee OE - “ ‘i—_— 2 - = ~ - S ‘ Se oe a - ie ° a pee ee co td Sen oe eee es eT ee ee ay ee ee ee Re ee eeereeses. ees oy ere oy os os-—. y _* $ = Bek dnc edihabt ci-geied tnd on pe eee oe ee ee Le Ee pe | yi 25 - -_*> — pe - a sd - - .* - . —- - Saree! a ne nn Ee i i eal == cela aed rover ee te pedate a a OE le eet See rch an es oh ee ee —— = I Cand ma a ee ee a — see eYsPepeseszr S tA a a EP = a 7 a i ie ee ere 162 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT solution of the Philippine problem, but it 1s the writer’s firm conviction that to all concerned it offers more advantages and fewer disadvantages than any other plan as yet brought forward. It would keep the Ameri- can flag, and all beneficial American influences, in the islands. It would provide certainty instead of the pres- ent uncertainty for all legitimate and honorable business enterprise. It would give the Filipinos that command over their own affairs which is the just ambition of this peaceful, law-abiding, and lovable Christian people. It is in accord both with our public protestations and our past policies in the development of Philippine self-gov- ernment. It would harmonize with the natural tread of the highly intelligent Filipino political thought, and it would at the present time be a solution entirely agree- able to a great majority of the people of the Islands and their leaders. Only an Act of Congress, improving and rectifying the Jones Law in the light of a decade’s expe- rience with its shortcomings, would be necessary to Initiate the new régime. The danger in the situation is that the present oppor- tunity to secure a solution of the Philippine problem, permanently giving the United States more authority and privilege than we have in Cuba, may well be tran- sient. No accurate parallel with the Irish difficulty as it developed for Great Britain can here be drawn. But there is much which Americans can learn from a con- sideration of the Irish settlement which would have been welcomed in 1890, and that which was made after so much bloodshed and bitterness a generation later. The Filipinos have before them clear-cut evidence that the Coolidge Administration seeks to curtail such autonomy as has been granted to them. There is Mr. Coolidge’s suggestion to Congress that “more authority should be given to the Governor-General.” There is the Kiess bill (H. R. 10,940) to confer upon the American auditor forAN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT 163 the Philippines powers greater than those possessed by our own Comptroller General. There is the second Kiess bill (H. R. 11,490) to provide the American Governor- General with special funds over which the Legislature shall have no control—a bill, said to have been sug- gested by General Wood, which strikes at the basic democratic principle of public control over the execu- tive purse. There is the Bacon bill (H. R. 12,772) al- ready referred to, which would detach a huge area of the most valuable Philippine territory from any sem- blance of popular control to open it for unhampered American exploitation. And there is the active cam- paign for curtailing Philippine self-government now car- ried on by the New York Herald-Tribune and other powerful administration newspapers. Faced with many indications of a reactionary trend in the Philippine policy of the United States, it is small wonder that the Filipino position has hardened as ours has hardened; that the campaign for complete and un- trammeled independence is being actively and success- fully pushed to offset the American campaign for a reduction of native liberties. ‘Soon, very soon, as the tides are flowing, the old American relationship of friendly guardian to the Philippines will have gone for good. It will be the guns of our warships and the su- perior equipment of our soldiers which will keep the Stars and Stripes flying above an embittered subject race. — nal oath dt a2 eae ee rl ages yee 4 eae seteeia< z Pet tert Pitter tr eee Le Sd =~ Tr Toa or et eye ss — ~— = =f * ed Stee tr ir PROSE te TS te he ¢udares ea ee 7 - | wtpbaktescrrssse rt ee ee es Oe ee etantebosdsishes--e- See an ea B.| a “- a eer ap ce” ra ve | a) its r | a | es oe] rd @ eo ~~ a i ve ' hard—— — oe : a Be dl neh leak dee Aah ate Aedl oe oe Se aed ee a ra ek ne te ee oe seine) eth Seti en dlh go Lam st < pea Te rs a 7 a. = re es - 2 7 —_ ee resets Ct ee et a eg — — o Fal acon att eet eee oc CSePr Sets Pesepeseser ests fp £24 eee ee Kf Ba st. CHAPTER XV “PEACEFUL REVOLUTION” IN THE PHILIPPINES On February 22, 1926, the newly formed Supreme National Council, dedicated to the cause of Philippine independence, gave the first public demonstration of its power. The day was deliberately chosen because of its association with George Washington and his rec- ord as the leader of a people striving against alien domination. On that “National Prayer Day” Filipinos throughout the length and breadth of the archipelago were asked by their own leaders to gather round the clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, and pray to “Almighty God, the Father of all Nations,” for com- plete political separation from the United States. In hundreds of thousands, on all the sizable islands from Luzon to Mindanao, they did so. A paragraph of the prayer, recited with equal fervor by American-educated professional men and barefooted rural children, is worthy of remembrance by all who would visualize the first really serious colonial problem which imperialistic America has been called upon to face. It ran: We entreat Thee, O most Gracious Father, stay Thou the hand that would smite our liberties. Send forth Thy Spirit unto our rulers across the sea and so touch their hearts and quicken their sense of justice that they may in honor keep their plighted word to us. Let not the covetous designs of a few interests pre- vail in the councils of the sovereign nation nor sway its noble purposes toward our country . 164“PEACEFUL REVOLUTION” 165 There was contained in that prayer all the dignity, the piety, and the aspiration of a people who, whatever their shortcomings, are gentle, kindly, and lovable beyond most in this world. The wave of irritation which swept the Filipinos of Manila when an American paper there ridiculed their method of political protest was something unpleasant to witness. It made one realize the signifi- cance of statements made by old residents in the islands: that a definitely hostile attitude is replacing the friendli- ness and admiration in which Americans were once quite widely held. On the same day, February 22, there was focussed on the Luneta, in Manila, where the Day of Prayer cere- monies centered spiritually if not numerically, a formid- able American military parade in honor of Major-General James H. McRae, then about to end his term of service as Commanding General of the Philippine Department. By eleventh-hour negotiation the cathering of the thou- sands who sought spiritual fortification for the inde- pendence campaign, and the gathering of those pre- pared to resist rebellion with machine guns were held at different times on the same holiday. But just as Governor-General Wood thought that it was “damned impertinence” for the Filipinos to choose Washington's birthday for their demonstration, so Senate President Quezon thought it “the tactics of a bully” to overawe the quiet native demonstration with military might. And there again is represented the racial hostility which erows apace in the islands under the present tension. Two days later, on February 24, | boarded the little coasting steamer Cebw for a week’s trip through the Phil- ippine Archipelago with the more prominent members of the Supreme National Council. It was the first propa- ganda trip of this body since, in January of 1926, it was created by a coalition of the two political parties in the islands with the express purpose of bringing the a. E lS a + ae Se ef eee PP ee eee rere yee ee Pt eh ey Ee e285 EeFiée eS ee ee fd a ee ey ee ee ee ee . a . tied i ~ Seeeee Sees ees Ss ts — se a Fs —t ee i raat. ; fi en Ay te eA atti itieal ail spam wt ae ee ee ee en ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee tgeee-fsrrinrat eset 444 Deeg pet dd edhe siecle dhieven sil ee te ae el a ete ee Ser ee ae ee ee ee ee Cs - - pa aes ~_ a - ane aii te a ~ - ee Leese a eee ee ee ee ee Fh I i ee ee eh ves pee eSe Sr eS efor eyes ers t= Fp al * cn ee aes: = * ie any oh ey ee eta te 166 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT independence issue to a showdown. And on this journey it was impossible not to realize the real tragedy of the Philippine problem, which is the way in which the native leaders are being forced to campaign for an end (inde- pendence), which many of them do not really want, because of the accumulating evidence that the United States seeks to deprive them of the degree of autonomy so far obtained. It is a natural bargaining process to ask for more than you expect in order to secure the golden mean. The danger in this case is that the Filipino people are being very successfully stirred up in behalf of complete independence at just the time when the President of the United States is publicly favoring measures designed to curtail native self-government. As a means of solidifying and crystallizing Filipino public opinion in behalf of complete self-government, the scheme on which the Supreme National Council is working has pronounced theoretical impressiveness. It involves three objectives, each of them noteworthy in itself: first, the attraction of Filipinos of prominence in all walks of life to the independence campaign, in- volving the seeming subordination of the politico element which has heretofore been overprominent; second, the decentralization of the campaign, so that the provinces, where American influence is little felt, may take a con- trolling part heretofore reserved for Manila; and third, an attempt at gradual and peaceful usurpation of the executive power legally vested in the American Governor- General. In short the program is distinctly, though quietly, revolutionary. At the center of the new independence drive is the Supreme National Council itself, composed of ten mem- bers of whom at least eight must be elected members of the Legislature. These eight, half from the Nacional- ista and half from the Democrata party, are virtually ex officio appointees, so that the general direction of“PEACEFUL REVOLUTION” 167 the campaign is vested in the hands of those who have been most prominent in the political development of Philippine autonomy. The eight men in question are the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House (Quezon and Roxas) ; the majority leaders in both houses (Osmefia and Aquino); the minority leaders in both houses (Tirona and Recto); and another outstanding minority member from each of the two branches of the Legislature (Sumulong and Avelino). The two remain- ing members are designated respectively by the national committees of the two parties. Directly under the Supreme Council is the National Solidarity Central Committee, composed of all the elected Senators and Representatives and all the elected provincial Governors. Thus the legislators from the non-Christian provinces, appointed by Governor-General Wood, are automatically excluded. T his is not the only ‘nstance in which a sort of stigma is made to attach to those Filipinos who show wholehearted cooperation with Americans in the government of the islands. The Cen- tral Committee is a sort of general policies body, designed to give coherent direction to the progress of the independence campaign in the provinces. As the Nacionalistas have twice the representation of the mi- nority party in both House and Senate, and also count a healthy majority among the elected Governors, this body is comfortably controlled by those who are most radical on the independence issue. Under the Central Committee have been established, in all provinces except the few where Governors are appointed by the American Governor-General, organiza- tions known as National Solidarity Provincial Com- mittees. It is their function to work up independence sentiment, and to further economic measures looking to that end, throughout the length and breadth of the Phil- ippine Islands. Here the effort to attract substantial Pea Te re Teer ee Tt Pe Se ee es er ra as See SS et er ee eee tee ee ee ee ee ee ere calieeiinie Saal eal a ata dala loth pie tp Df edbebrboss bases 14 ee cee wSe Ss GEUSSICSER « gs ete | * pb elieaecss2 est weer os Sa ae Ape eg ae82445Stearman ate eh he eet eer e SES ELSE ELE Re oe Oe : we Wa me ace ho fee i oo = wat toe ~_ a ape pe 4 ba ns me el a tad rt ee lilies a el al Line larder diene eed eed pia at a Eel hn re a ne oe Sr ¢ * £72 FESESES ISAS ALS Seeetses ap ees Fp Ae , ea -~* ~ &- ~~ 2 a a . a ‘ eh, oe meh ow nal ‘ 168 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT Filipinos not previously active in the independence cam- paign is stressed. Each Provincial Committee is com- posed of (1) the Governor and members of his Provincial Board, or junta; (2) the Municipal Presidents (mayors) of incorporated towns in the province; and (3) a quota of prominent citizens equal in number to (2), half of them selected by the provincial organization of each political party. Under each Provincial Committee in turn come the National Solidarity Municipal Committees, plann d on a similar division of political and business leadershi». Their initiation, in towns touched en route, was part of the program of the Supreme Council’s trip which I ac- companied as an interested observer. And behind the Municipal Committees are to be established, in theory at least, Barrio or township committees designed to give the smallest hamlets opportunity to participate in the campaign for political freedom. In addition to this comprehensive organization for stimulating public opinion on the independence issue the Supreme Council possesses a formidable executive arm in its National Advisory Committee. This board of twenty-five members, all of whom are business or pro- fessional men of a type not heretofore actively identified with politics, is now well organized in Manila. And it is beginning to engage in schemes of national de- velopment altogether without legal sanction under the powers of government granted to the Filipinos by the United States Congress. Here is another example of what Speaker Manuel Roxas calls the “peaceful revo- lution” now started in the Philippines. The root issue in the Philippine problem is not in- dependence. As has been stated, the intensification of native propaganda for that nominal objective is due primarily to the intensification of American propaganda aiming at a closer incorporation of the islands under our dominion. What the Filipino leaders are reallyPere ee rt TT te i Peet Tr Y. Stree ee a Se oer. Ss A PRAYER FOR INDEPENDENCE The population of Talisay, as in hundreds of other Filipino towns ind villages, turns out on Washington’s birthday to ask fulfillment of America’s pledges. = ca Sacer ges CBSS BETS ~ e —~* ” 4 rAd ae, %,* ; ww — bn er é nee ln el a achive mn me ai —— as ss a. sere er HEP SEOs: ss at =; 2 7 = Pe ee ee ee tm LoyALty To THEIR Own In Bacolod, on Negros Island, “the people honor the Constitution of the Supreme National Council,” which seeks to force the issue on Philippine independence, tin tetubotote PS = ee ae eos eee eeeoe eel nee ge vores eet >< =~ ae - oe ae a * =a al ge oe -—— eases tess bai he ee dled Sache Lec it eh el el fe r i ‘ Ne t iy erypoevaso ds ar St aoa ene Sete te od et ee de i i i ag co ee Se ee eed TECK cP PSP eRe sep sys p Ss s J peg ny el eet eS ene EN Eee a Ty dB Ek dd a169 “PEACEFUL REVOLUTION” seeking and what, by fair means or foul one might almost say, they are determined to get, is control of the executive power so far as purely domestic policy is concerned. As long as the American Governor-General can veto not merely complete legislative measures, but even spe- cific items in the annual appropriation bills, and as long as he can treat the department heads as minor bureaucrats responsible to him rather than to the Leg- islature, the power which the latter body appears to possess is unreal. The entire trend of Filipino politi- cal thinking in recent years has been in the direction of supplanting the American executive with one amena- ble to the control of the Legislature. The effort, at the risk of repetition, is towards substitution of the ‘British system of an executive deriving all his powers from the support of Parliament, and away from the American system of divided executive and legislative authority. We may point to Filipino shortcomings. We may argue that they are unfitted for self-government. But we can- not deny that the division-of-powers idea works none too well under the most favorable conditions in the United States; and ean scarcely be expected to function smoothly where the executive is SOT by the dominant race and the legislature elected by the subjects. So far as efficiency in government goes: an outl right alien dictator- ship would admittedly be preferable in theory. The underlying function of the National Advisory Committee of the Supreme Council, it may now be said, is quietly to arrogate executive P ower into Filipino hands in a way which will be exceedingly difficult to counter without seeming to put the American Governor-General in an openly tyrannical position. How this is likely to come about can easily be appreciated by dwelling for a moment on the nature of this Advisory Committee. None of its members, nor members of the subsidiary $39224 6946 23s5032% Core pars ret are st) SeerTerTer ys Tes ts Pe ers at et = ——_ ca a Peretry eee Press al a _ a = ms — e ~ ae - See ~ we er PO ee Re Sete Ses, oo co =~ sr Pere eS Te ee eae ee ee et ee ee ee gut ee ee 7 re So een cee~— = dl ats —_ -_ a na Ca al te Rie re ok eT ne ees ee te ie ese . se ee eS a 4 a x a Po SS Re 0 SE SP TEP ARAFAT EOS SRST HST FED SPS VS HS Bee Se KER s +2 eee eee , a eats! bm rev2esvere Se cane 7 ck Nl, tite, ite dem Se ee a ae ee Ls pee bk hee be DEE. aa a eto — oe 170 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT commissions organized to carry out the executive powers which it is attempting to assume, can be members of either chamber of the Legislature. And while they are all men and women of standing, the primary purpose is not to give the Supreme Council the nominal support of an array of prominent personages. It is, rather, to work out the long-range plans of government which is the duty of the executive arm, and then to submit these plans to the Legislature after they have been approved by the Supreme Council. As party government ceased to exist in the Philippines with the formation of the Supreme Council—elections are no longer contested—and as the Legislature may be expected to indorse without oppo- sition anything approved by the Council, the importance of this entirely extra-legal advisory committee is clear. It aims to take over, by quiet encroachment if possible, at least a part of the executive power of the American Governor-General. The point is further clarified by examination of the fifteen commissions which the National Advisory Com- mission has already established in Manila. They fall naturally into two groups—those which are in reality embryonic ministries or government departments, and those of lesser importance which are in reality integrat- ing rather than initiating commissions. Obviously in the first class are the following: Commissions on National Defense; Public Works and Communications; Finance; Agricultural Development; Public Instruction and Na- tional Language; Health and Public Welfare; Justice and Law Revision; Immigration and Industrial Rela- tions. The remaining seven commissions, more or less supplementary to those just named, are: Independence Campaign; Development of National Resources; Gov- ernment and Civil Service; Economic Strategy; Protec- tion of Native Industries; Labor Organizations; Women’s Organizations.President of the United States ‘a m2 @ — oy J Oo O wn oD _, 3 Ww 2 oO D as =| — ee mH oo * —_— SO x oS Peal | & I 7 OS D 2 Oo asst] 3 3 HR > OLA o sae | | & c ta pA o ippine Phil Legislature National Supreme Council | on @t @D aac Shean a og AP oso o fae fis Oo 5 oO AOS ae Saas Muooee QD aoa ~ 3285 BOGE wy WS AAs o a as 781128 OQ f Quy a th ee EA a eae ~ —s - eee te Se teistplssgassesesy rr re ey ase es ror werd ote Ti tes er ee ss my 7 = Cal ir - inser wee ee ee ee __— a . wr ewes ee ees ee ae ee ea Se ee eee ee ee a ea pe ee ey a= > = 7 het etre. Se ee a - es. deg o , - . F “oo wwe SeeGe Reg se eey ea 7 lak a ah tra nh ol koh sed Pah oh it Sh Re ted ee ek ee ok ed p= e- ee tie om ree im a ae a SL eps Sel CEs s See eee eee ses esr te Fp sr eT Spe del ee ad iting — a inde oe “3 - a 172 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT It is not surprising that this very comprehensive and ambitious scheme has as yet received so little publicity. The Filipino leaders, perhaps contrary to national cus- tom, prefer working towards its fruition rather than talking about it. And then again its complicated nature, though well worth understanding, does not lend itself to newspaper treatment. What is surprising is the rather offhand way in which the Supreme Council and its sub- sidiaries seem to be regarded at Malacafiang, the seat of American authority in the Islands. This may be due to policy, or to the deep-rooted belief that the Fili- pinos as a people are clever in drawing grandiose schemes and incapable in carrying them out. At the same time it is very difficult for an impartial observer to believe that this plan, which has been months in the building and which follows the logical trend of Filipino political philosophy under our rule, is doomed to collapse by reason of the incapacity of its sponsors. The men who are behind it, particularly those on the National Advisory Committee, are too substantial. The treasurer of the Supreme Council, to cite only a single individual, is Alejandro Roces, one of the wealthiest men in Manila, owner of three newspapers printed respec- tively in English, Spanish, and Tagalog, and, incidentally, a close personal friend of Governor-General Wood. But, as In our own Civil War, the issues involved in the struggle of the Filipinos for complete self-government cut deeper than personal relationships. One more illustration—a plan drafted for financing the work of the Supreme National Council—should be cited to indicate the thought-provoking manner of this campaign. A comprehensive taxation scheme, losing none of its significance from the fact that payments would nominally be “voluntary contributions,” has been given serious consideration as the best means for meet- ing all expenses, including the dispatch of special mis-“PEACEFUL REVOLUTION” 173 sions to Japan and other foreign countries to study technical aspects of Philippine self-development, The proposed taxation plan consists of five different assessments, at least one of which would touch virtually every Filipino, while many of them would be expected to contribute under two or three of these extra-legal imposts. There is planned: first, an annual per capita assessment of 50 centavos (25 cents) on every adult who is not a public charge; second, an assessment of 12 pesos ($6) per annum on all professional workers, third, a property assessment of one-tenth of 1 per cent of the tax valuation of all privately owned real estate, payable annually; fourth, a sliding-scale assessment, varying from 1 to 5 per cent, on the annual salary of every public employee; fifth, a profits assessment on all Fili- pino corporations of one-half of 1 per cent of annual net income. It is hoped by such levies to do away with all the “drives” whereby the independence campaign has been financed hitherto. The mere fact that so compre- hensive a scheme, lacking even any pretense ol legal authority, can be drawn up for consideration is an excel- lent index of the welcome which the Filipino public is in general extending to the Supreme Council. That welcome, in the course of my trip through the archipelago with leading members of the Council, there was ample opportunity to observe. In all the towns visited, whether on the big islands of Negros and Panay or on little Romblon, the receptions staged were a strik- ing refutation of the assertion that outside of Manila there is no interest in the campaign for independence. It was not so much the size of the crowds that turned out everywhere, the decorated arches of welcome, or the patience with which audiences would stand three hours or more in the tropical sun listening to relays of speak- ers attack Governor-General Wood’s “interference” with legislation of purely Filipino concern, and applaud refer- ee i» oa ey Tt Pek at ML aia . . eee eee te PTT ee eee et vee aoe ee ye ene eben doeas: = —_ > — ed Pree e re Ser eh ty | guRrertegeo I PRT = AP Os Ors 3S Se ee oe = as = oni i et — ae . Se ee ee ee ee oe ee en ee ee enoa = oumiacaieeal puso ty md ree eTe eee She Pelee ee sd Setefereci ue es arse De ee re Ee a eee eel led eal — ee ees ae | UL -. ro h r 4 a fe di Go a ws ~ a ee ok oe Bees lee ee ie hw ys aa sts S2 a +e a - + as Me SS oe nS it Cale ay — ‘ e a - a an ea _ - Sa ce ie te ee ee ete ee ee eee ee Ee ee oe ae oe, ch lel nt “ - gpa eT —* - mm ee i ee 174 OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT ences to American pledges on withdrawal from the islands, that was impressive. It was, rather, the seem- ing enthusiasm shown by local leaders of prominence in turning their attention to the difficult and unspectacu- lar work of furthering the Supreme Council’s far- reaching plans. The working out of this campaign will, as their leaders admit, show whether or not the Filipinos possess the staying qualities in which we have always claimed they are deficient. It may show, also, whether we have de- layed too long in combining common sense and idealism to solve the Philippine problem in a way according with our interests, our traditions, and the spirit of our plighted word.BIBLIOGRAPHY The following suggestions for further reading is not intended as a catalog of sources drawn upon for this book, which is primarily the result of personal investigation in the Far East, supplemented by pamphlets and periodicals not easily obtainable in America. Moreover, certain books, the utility of which I have acknowledged in footnotes, are not mentioned hereunder. The purpose of this list is simply to chronicle easily obtainable read~- ing matter for those interested in following the general subject further, a line of comment being added on the nature of the volume cited. The endeavor has been to make the list as rep- resentative as is compatible with brevity. It is, of course, im- possible to include all the books on the Far East which may properly be considered desirable reading. And some which may be counted as undesirable are mentioned because their viewpoint is important. JAPAN Ayusawa, I. F. Industrial Conditions and Labor Legislation wn Japan (Geneva, The International Labor Office, 1926). A brief but careful study in handy and readable form con- taining data on working conditions and details of Japanese social legislation. CHAMBERLAIN, Basiu H. Things Japanese (London, John Murray, 1898). ; An encyclopedic, yet very compact, survey of social and cultural Japan. Out-of-date in a few particulars, but full of interest and useful information. Hearn, Larcapio. Japan, An Interpretation (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1924). A new edition of a book well called “a classic in sociological appraisement.” The most matured and least emotional of all the delightful studies by this close student of Japanese civilization. Hearn’s Kokoro, essays treating of the inner life of the Japanese people, is also to be recommended, though first published thirty years ago. 175 i.~-§ 4 a | a ree a) Se emt ge $5 3255 0e3 244 ~~: Pree ee eee ee er ee err Crea WSIS Smee e ere caw sF ee SESS e eet ye ee a | = 2 eee eee eo oe et ere se 7 a oo ro | ~ ee “> a oe ai ne . ee ae aes : sath Bae eet mrt al Se ena ee er- - «~ e aes a a > ee - me = ad - or) - ers = oe a a - a “>. ae ot ee > | pee ee ok em a hema el ee et ek oe ee LS tint ee eS ee bee 2 Rasen ler e-so2= sa a seal et alee ieee deme cine aaa ———— —— ee a Se Se de wlialnal Sel eScekrSets ties ° ue oe Fe ma ai aheligs 176 BIBLIOGRAPHY Kaxuzo, O. The Book of Tea (New York, Duffield, 1925). A new edition of a charming little volume, examining and explaining the extent to which the conception of living as @ fine art in itself is imbedded in Japan. Kawakami, K. K. The Real Japanese Question (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1921). An argument for better understanding of Japanese prob- lems by a trained journalist of that nationality long resident in America. Mr. Kawakami’s study on Japan’s Pacific Pokcy is also worthy of attention. Loncrorp, JosepH H. Japan (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923). An up-to-date, authoritative, and stimulating history. Nitros, Inazo. The Japanese Nation (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1921). All of Dr. Nitobé’s books about the Japanese people and their ideals are instructive reading. This one is perhaps par- ticularly designed for foreign consumption. Paris, JoHN. Banzai (New York, Boni and Liveright, 1926). This novel, like the author’s Kimona and Sayonara, is a readable story which goes out of its way to emphasize the real and imaginary vices of the Japanese character. “John Paris” is the pseudonym of a British diplomatic officer who knows at least one aspect of Japanese life thoroughly. Taken with the adulatory writings of Lafcadio Hearn these three novels help to form a balanced ration. Either author is misleading when taken alone. Of course “Paris” is not to be compared with Hearn either as a writer or as a student of Japan and its people. Sucimoto, Etsu Inagaki. A Daughter of the Samurai (New York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1925). A charming autobiography revealing the daily life of an aristocratic family in provincial Japan and indirectly explain- ing many of the differences between East and West which make misunderstandings easy. TAKENosU, Y. (Editor). The Japanese Year Book (American Agent: Dixie Book Shop, 140 Greenwich St.). A valuable annual of general and statistical information on Japan. The 1925 edition has a special section devoted to the great earthquake of September, 1923. The Trans-Pacific (published by The Japan Advertiser, Tokyo). This journal is, as claimed, “a weekly review of Far East- em Political, Social and Economic Developments.” As the leading American periodical in the Orient it ranks as some- thing rather more valuable than the above bald statement indicates.BIBLIOGRAPHY CHINA Franck, Harry A. Wandering In Northern China (New York, The Century Company, 1923). Mr. Franck goes everywhere, sees everything, and writes of it comprehensively, entertainingly, and without bias. For that reason this book, like his Roving Through South China, can be highly recommended in its field—which is reportorial and not editorial. Gruss, Hersert A. The Civilization of China (New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1911). One of the “Home University Library” handbooks, in which a well-known English authority outlines the long course of Chinese history and concludes that the motives of the people are the same as those which actuate Anglo-Saxons. Gooppnow, Frank J. China, An Analysis (Baltimore, The J ohns Hopkins Press, 1926). The author, now president of Johns Hopkins University, was legal adviser of the Chinese Government in 1913 and 1914. This little volume, picturing Chinese life against the background of our own civilization, is full of shrewd and pene- trating observations. Hopexin, Henry T. China in the Family of Nations (London, Allen and Unwin, 1923). A sympathetic study, urging foreign patience and toleration, by the Secretary of the National Christian Council of China. Mavucuam, Somerset. The Painted Veil (New York, George H. Doran Company, 1925). An extremely sordid but powerful picture of life in a for- eign community in China, set against the background of a cholera epidemic. Mr. Maugham’s collection of literary vignettes: On a Chinese Screen, is far prettier reading. Merwin, SamueL. Silk (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923). A pleasant historical novel of the days when the civiliza- tions of Rome and China met in a barbarian world. Mr. Merwin’s tales of modern China: The Hills of Han and In Red and Gold are equally readable. He is one of the very few American novelists who seem able to utilize the wealth of literary material in China without giving a hope- lessly sentimentalized and distorted picture. Muuarp, Tuomas F. Conflict of Policies in Asia (New York, The Century Company, 1924). An assessment of American interest and an effort to de- termine the desirable American policy in China. Mr. Millard knows China and the Chinese as well as any foreigner living, < ra eS ea yg — pt eee eee eer er re eee ete el | Eee es rete et es ss = Pee er? To ee Te a apres ee ee ret eee ares ae ee Se ee oe eo Oe eS ee ~ — oe : a ee ed es Rd Dee ee ee ee eS= + lhe A whist tnt agTat ha = ee ae -— Toe Sn mee —_ =< he gl Eo a poet SS ~ Sl ee ae oo ma Par Pe SS Pood 28s oe lel ele ee $b O37 BEES * eae sani —Nec lee nti el oh ihe “cle lect omen eet eet ae i ee eer erie ee ee ee ee ae ek ol El Bil eae ein at 4 es a “- ‘ ' i ~t * D i al a a ie Se . - - 178 BIBLIOGRAPHY but couples with his knowledge an inveterate suspicion of Japan. Pan, SHu-tun. The Trade of the Umted States with China (New York, China Trade Bureau, 1924). A technical study with a good deal of interest to the lay reader because of its careful tracing of the development of Chinese-American commercial relations, and its endeavor to interpret their future trend. Porter, Lucius C. China’s Challenge to Christianty (New York, Missionary Education Movement, 1924). A thoughtful study by one who is thoroughly familiar with the mighty cultural heritage of China, and the conse- quent necessity for “respect and appreciation” from those who would win her people to Christianity. Due tribute is paid to the great missionary accomplishment, and reasons why the control of missionary enterprises is being steadily relinquished to the Chinese are set out. Smitu, ArtHur. Village Infe in China (New York, Fleming H. Revell Company, 1899). This book is notable not merely as a classic in the field of interpretive writing, but also because of the hght it throws on the subject of conservative, not to say primitive, rural China. The author’s book on Chinese Characteristics has a delightful freshness equally undimmed by the years since it was written. Wratz, Putnam. Why China Sees Red (New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1925). A somewhat jumbled but informative account of the present turmoil. The section describing the Chinese press is its most valuable contribution. “Putnam Weale” is the pseudonym of Bertram Lenox Simpson, who has lived in China for many years and written a number of journalistic books thereon. WiuiaMs, Epwarp T. China: Yesterday and Today (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923). A thorough historical, social and economic study by an extremely well-qualified authority. Wiititovucusy, W. W. Foreign Rights and Interests in China (Bal- timore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1920). With the advantage of his experience as adviser to the Chinese Government as background, Dr. Willoughby herein provides a description of foreign ‘unilateral privileges in China. It is the most convenient study of a subject basic to understanding of contemporary Chinese feelings. WoopuHeap, H. G. W. (Editor). The China Year Book (American agent: Brentanos, New York). Perhaps the most complete, authoritative and careful annual published anywhere. An indispensable reference book for all who are deeply interested in modern China.BIBLIOGRAPHY io The Chinese Economic Monthly (Peking, Chinese Government Bureau of Economic Information). A completely non-partisan publication providing excellent studies of current economic and industrial questions in China. The Bureau announces that “inquiries on subjects of this nature from responsible persons or organizations will be attended to gratis.” ZucKkm, A.B. The Chinese Theater (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1925). A beautifully prepared monograph which throws much in- cidental light on Chinese character and customs. THE PHILIPPINES Impartial studies of the Philippine question are very scarce, and promise to remain so as long as political issues are s0 tensely drawn. Through the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, Washington, D. C., can be obtained official reports and documents on all matters pertaining to insular government, the field covered being too great for discrimination here. The Philippine Mission, Investment Building, Washington, D. C., is glad to furnish ma- terial. most of which will be found to be biased in behalf of independence. Several of the books listed below are sharply con- tradictory in evidence and findings, but taken together give @ well-rounded basis for conclusions. Guann, Isa. Heat (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1926). A readable novel of American life in Manila. Filipino characters hardly enter the story, but the resistance of the country to Americanization and the influence of the tropics upon the “army set” are excellently pictured. Harrison, Francis B. The Corner Stone of Philippine Inde- pendence (New York, The Century Company, 1921). Herein the much-criticised Governor-General states his side of the case, in a narrative of seven years’ official experi- ence at Manila. Kavaw, Maximo M. The Present Government of the Philippines (New York, The Century Company, 1921). An excellent study of the principles and machinery of Philippine government by the leading insular authority thereon. Mr. Kalaw is head of the department of political science at the University of the Philippines. Laupacu, Frank C. The People of the Philippine Islands (New York, George H. Doran Company, 1925). A sympathetic study by an American missionary who ls thoroughly familiar with his field and who regards the Philip- eee rT re eer ere Tre ee eee ee CPP ees ee rs ee as —— ~ - Tee eer. - a ee ae ee ee -_ a Sa 26t=2 ee F; eee ye ce ee age ee - re = — eae ea o ee ee ee en eS eeeet eh ees 2 ee cee =? 47 ¢% ee ee ee - _ — a a — pe —soe =o lela a gna ir nl tora sn conte ed Wet aa a a ee oe din tel eth ee eet el ee ee ee eine ee Ee a eT oe Sh od ea SS e =: f. pe dicpatiech “ile eninge Sonte s oo m a a ” "i i a ~ ~ i z ae Sa Ea 1 t : Yaar ‘ am fy rf i a Pte Me ee oe eek Sis a ee ae oe >= - - TT : ~-— tm i “= 7. - - ~~ ed ee ee — a = 180 BIBLIOGRAPHY pine people as wards rather than colonial subjects of the United States. Wuurams, D. R. The United States and the Philippines (New York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1924). ; The most authoritative and effective presentation of the case for permanent retention of the islands. The author is a former member of the Philippine Commission. He fre- quently spoils his argument by bitter and vitriolic denuncia- tions of those who hold viewpoints opposed to his own.Abé, Isoo, 22 Alabaster, Chaloner, 94 American population in the Philippines, 140 Anfu party, 63 Anglo-Japanese Alliance termi- nated, 7 Aquino, Representative, 167 Avelino, Representative, 167 Bacon bill, aim of, 161, 163 Bell, Hayley, 78 Borodin, Michael, 78, 85 Boxer indemnities, political ef- fects of, 54-55; remitted funds spent on education, 8, 130 Boyé, Dr., 118 British Empire, not a Federal Union, 58 British Government restricts rubber exports, 145 Canton Christian College, votes to expel communist students, 79 Canton, population of, 75; events of June 23, 1925 in, 100-101 Canton Strike Committee, in- dependence of, 85; responsi- PUY of, for disorders, 106- Chang Tso-lin, concludes treaty with Soviet Russia, 39; de- feated by Wu Pei-fu, 65; pro- claims Manchurian independ- ence, 65; captures Peking, 73; nosey to organized labor, INDEX 181 Chang Tsung-chang, 73 Chiang Kai-shek, 81 China, railroad mileage of, 49; population of, 49; racial groups in, 49-50; customs under British administration, 114; customs revenues of, 122; foreign trade of, 122; industrialization in, 123-124; natural resources of, 125; la- bor movement in, 128-130; emancipation of women in, 131; education in, 131-130; literacy in, 133 Chinese Eastern Railway, his- tory of, 35 et seq.; rivalry with South Manchurian Rail- way, 40 et seq.; gauge of, 43 Chinese Government Bureau of Economics Information, 128 Chinese in the Philippines, 138 Chinese Parliament, none now in existence, 60; dissolution of in 1917, 62; bribery of, 63 Chinese Revolution, outbreak of, 56; “deepened” by Feng Yu-hsiang, 69; enables for- eigners to control Shanghal Mixed Court, 95; results in greater national prosperity, 127 “Christian General,” see Feng Yu-hsiang Chu Chao-hsin, 117 Clementi, Sir Cecil, 107 Communism, strength of, in Japan, 19; party in China, 70, 79 OR oF tag 8 * Fes “ roe}. era oh " r} ‘ She GaSsG Ss cece Sonse te as{sisg ips slsaessese Freed da 3 — ee ee ee eee —— Tei tery oe ee eee es oe PR aT a et ae ny coe - de Payee nan eon ig Sete = cag oo - or ; it ci lata ee ad a ee a ee Pe ee Sen tk te- ~ = ee “etre. T.3 ef oF oy ) a - ed ore re eee te ee oe —- = -_— ne eh ee ete ee ee ee a Ee ee ad ed ak Bal deel tall an - - - ll ri ill - Si Se a al ta oe Pe ead eee Toisap iets res. te lovato = ate eee ie ietiael ce ei ee heat alco ened a Ss ee ed eS lh ct ae et ink PE SE mented aaah -*s . eas : 7 lie a ® a oe has ~ 182 INDEX Confucianism, 54 Congress (United States), pow- ers over Philippines, 150- 151; resident Commissioners in, 151 Consortium agreement, 5 Coolidge, President, 161, 162 Council of State (in Philip- pines), 157 Cushing, Caleb, 89 Customs Conference in Peking, 110 et seg. Dairen, trade of, 45 Datus, 161 Democrata party, 166 Dickover, E. R., 26 Dollar Line, 83 Educational Institutions in China, 133 Empress Dowager, 55 Extraterritorial Rights in China, lost by Austria, Ger- many and Russia, 117; mean little to Japan, 117; safe- guards on abolition of, 118; Treaty Port attitude on, 121 Fan Yuan-lien, 134 Federal Party in Philippines, 158 Feng Yu-hsiang, Tuchun of Shensi, 65; occupies Peking, 65; breaks with Wu Pei-fu, 67; policy of, 68-70; foreign dislike of, 69; cooperates with the Kuomintang, 70: obtains munitions from So- viet Russia, 70; retires from military command, 72; goes to Moscow, 74; encourages adult education, 134 Fessenden, Stirling, 110 Filipinos, a Christian people, 140; proportion speaking English, 141; character of, 141-142; literacy of, 142: death rate among, 142: de- sire for home rule, 156; trend of political thinking among, 169 Forbes, former Governor-Gen- eral, 141 Formosa, annexed by Japan, 3; Japanese population in, 4; distance from Philippines, 137 Fushun Coal Mines, 45 Gaimusho, 45 Genro, Council of, 15 Gold Frane Controversy, 110 Goto, Viscount, 21, 25 Gowen, H. H., 89 Hankow, riots of June 11, 1925, 100; an extraterritorial hearing at, 119-120 Harrison, Governor~ General, 154, 155 Hawaii, area and population, 145; Filipino emigration to, 145 Hearn, Lafeadio, 30 Hirohito, Crown Prince and Regent, 13 Hongkong, population of, 103; effects of Chinese boycott, 104; colonial government negotiates with Canton, 106 Hsu Shu-tseng, 65 Hsuan Tung, Emperor, see Prince P’u-yi Hu Shih, Dr., on the “Chinese Renaissance,” 131 Hukuang railroad loan, 56 Independence Mission (Philip- pine), 149, 151 Ito, Count, 30 Japan, area of, 3; international cooperation by, 8; popula- tion, 3, 46; constitution of, 10-11, 17; “extraordinary military expenditure” ac- count, 12; compulsory mili- tary service in, 12: manhood suffrage in, 13-14; police lawof, 17; Labor Party in, 17 et seq.; political corruption in, 20-21; trade union strength in, 22; foreign trade of, 25- 26; removes alien land own- ership restrictions, 30; new policy towards China, 45 Japanese Farmers’ Association, 21 Japanese population in the Philippines, 140; in all for- eign countries, 46 Jones Law, preamble of, 152- 153; subordinates Insular Legislature to Congress, 151; vests executive functions in Governor-General, 153 Kagawa, Toyohiko, 22 Kailan Mining Administration, 126 Karakhan, Ambassador, 118 Kato, Premier, 4 Kensekai party, 20 Kiaochou, captured by Japan from Germany, 4 Kiess bills, 162-163 Knox, Secretary of State, pro- poses redemption of Manchu- rian railroads, 37 Korea, annexed by Japan, 3; Japanese population in, 4 Kotenev, A. M., 90 Kuang-hsu, Emperor, 55 Kuo Sung-ling, revolts against Chang Tso-lin, 71 Kuominchun, a disciplined and patriotic army, 67-68; cap- tures Tientsin, 72; is beaten by Wu-Chang alliance, 73 Kuomintang, China’s national- istic party, 70; membership, 75; authority in Canton, 81; sponsors the National Labor Association, 129 Kwangtung Province, popula- tion of, 75; government of, 76-79; aims of leaders in Hongkong boycott, 106; at- INDEX 183 titude towards Customs Con- ference, 115 Kwantung, see Liaotung Penin- sula Lansing-Ishii Note, 46 Li Ching-lin, defeated by the Kuominchun, 71-72; allies with Chang ‘T'so-lin, 73 Li Yuan-hung, succeeds Yuan Shih-kai as President of yhina, 62 Liaotung Peninsula, Japanese leasehold on, 3, 5; Japanese population in, 4, 46 Likin, abolishment pledged by Kwangtung government, 83; China agrees to abolish, 111; analyzed as a form of taxa- tion, 112 Luzon, size of, 138 MacMurray, J. V. A., 107 Malacanang, 171 Malolos Constitution, 157 Manchu dynasty, early politi- cal philosophy of, 53; adopts centralization policy, 55; ab- dication of, 60; attempt at restoration, 63 Manchuria, Russian influence in, 36, 39- 40; area of, 37; pop- ulation of, 38: resources of, 45; Japanese population in, Manila, population of, 137; Times newspaper quoted, 137 McRae, Major-General James H., 165 Mestizos, characteristics of dif- ferent types, 140 Mindanao, area of, 138; as rub- ber-producing district, 146; American supervision desir- able, 161 Mission Colleges in China, in transition, 133 Morgenthau, Henry, on Japan- ese attitude towards America, 28 + eee eee Tee ee eT eee en Tee eS ed. = es BZeGsGeas 7 ee eee eet ee eres ere < " a rs : * bi PC ee es ee ~—_ - ee ee ee re ee ee ee ee ea ee er ee ee ee ee eS ee ee ee en ee teeel ee ete ee ee EO DN ae ee be | 2504 G-4 © @ a ied coe d ates er eee 7 =: © ‘ =) “ ad oe ete! oe --* a a elie . - a inalillinn = ‘ ee ere ee > Sa 2 rl ; . - ak 4 z, : zs i res ee ae Sg eT a Sho ann pp en eh De a inn ih eet a i +] hme eRS MnP poe Po toeces srs evaso iets setetees!e a ee ee ak et ee Ente ei a a nt beh te Pee oo he eed 7 ‘ a ~ a oe on : wa el toes Som ae a O et 184 INDEX Moros, a small minority in Philippines, 141; majority fa- vor American rule, 161 Moser, Charles K., on likin, 113 Mutsubhito, Emperor, 12, 13 Nacionalista party, 166, 167 Nanking, Treaty of, 88, 113 National Bureau of Economic Research (New York), study on trade cycle in China, 127 National Prayer Day (in Phil- ippines), 164 Nishihara loans, 5-6, 64 Okuma, Premier, 5 Osmefia, Senator, 167 Ostroumoff, M., 43 Parkes, Sir Harry, 94 Perry, Commodore, 10 Pescadores, annexed by Japan, 3 Philippine Archipelago, area and location, 137-138; popula- tion of, 138; people to the square mile in, 138; dialects of, 141; newspaper circulation in, 142; mineral resources of, 143- 144; value of agricultural products, 144; land under cultivation in, 145; rubber, production of, 146 Philippine Commission, 157 Philippine Legislature, composi- tion of, 153 Philippine Public Land Law, 147 Poland, Pilsudski’s revolution in, 108 Prohibition Amendment, not in force in the Philippines, 150 P’u-yi, Prince, 55, 69 Quezon, Senate President Man- uel L., 167 Rambin, Sultan, 161 Recto, Representative, 167 Registrar, of Shanghai Mixed Court, 96 Roces, Alejandro, 171 Roxas, Speaker Manuel, 167, 168 Russian Soviet Government, in- fluence in Chinese Eastern Railway, 39; concludes sepa~ rate treaty with Manchuria, 39-40; helps to detach outer Mongolia from China, 65; strategic interest In Kwang- tung, 80-81; pushed towards China by cordon sanitaire, 98 Saionji, Prince, 15 Schurman, Dr. Jacob Gould, on extraterritoriality, 121 Selyukal party, 20 Semenoff, Admiral, 80 Seward, G. E., 93 Shakee Creek, Canton, 102 Shameen, 101-102 Shanghai, area of foreign con- cessions, 87; foreign popula- tion of, 87-88, 92; Municipal Council, 90 et seq.; formation of International Settlement, 89; Mixed Court, 90 et seq.; Volunteer Corps, 91; Chinese population of, 92; cotton mills in, 99; nots of May 30, 1925, 99; Chinese demands in, 109-110; labor unions in, 129 Shansi, the “model province,” 58; literacy in, 133 Shibusawa, Viscount, on Ameri- can Immigration Act, 29 Siberia, international invasion of, 6 Sikh police in Shanghai, 95 Smith, Rev. Aree 108 Soong, ave South Macnkaaan Railway, ac- quired by Japan, 3; Japanese investment in, 35: “feeder” lines to, 40-43; mulitary pro- tection of, 72 Spain, influence of in Philip- pines, 140 Spencer, Herbert, views on race problem, 30- 32Standard Oil Company of New York, 119-120 Stevens, John F., 38 Strawn, Silas H., 115 Sugiyama, Motojiro, 22 Sumulong, Senator, 167 Sun Chuan-fang, moves to re- cover Shanghai Mixed Court for China, 97 Sun Yat-sen, named Provisional President of China, 60; forms independent government at Canton, 64; helps to found the Kuomintang, 70; dies in Peking, 71; invites ‘Borodin to Canton, 80 Supreme National Council, ob- jectives of, 166; composition of, 166-167; subsidiaries of, 167-170; plan for financing, 171-172 Sutton, General, 66 Suzuki, Bunji, on Japanese La- bor Party, 22-23 Taiping Rebellion, 54, 93, 111 Tang Shao-yi, 54, 64 Thompson, Carmi A., 161 “Thousand Character” move- ment, 134 Three Eastern Provinces, see Manchuria Tirona, Senator, 167 Trotsky, Leon, 39 Tsao-Kun, bribery in election of, 63; imprisoned by Mar- shal Feng, 71 Tuan Chi-jui, Premier of China, 64; “Provisional Chief Exec- utive,” 71 Tuchuns, their confiscation of taxes, 62 “Twenty-one Demands,” 4-5, 8, 40, 62 Tyler, President, 89 Tzu-hsi, Empress, see Empress Dowager Unilateral treaties, eliminated in Japan, 3 INDEX 185 United States, Japanese trade with, 25-26; Immigration Act, 29- 30: share in financing Chinese Eastern Railway, 38; condones seizure of Shang- hai Mixed Court, 96; incon- sistency of, in Chinese tariff policy, 113-114; rubber, con- sumption of, 145 Vladivostok, benefited by Chi- nese Eastern Railway, 35; mace a free port by Russia, Waichiao Pu, 100 Washington Conference, 6-8 Washio, Dre SS. son Japanese character, 2 Webster, Daniel, 89 Whampoa, port of, 83; Military Academy, 79, 82 Willoughby, W. W., on extra- territoriality, 109; on seizure of Shanghai Mixed Court, 96 Wood, Governor-General Leon- ard, on the Philippine people, 141- 142; use of veto power, 155 Wu, C. C., 82 Wu Pei-fu, defeats Anfu lead- ers, 65; defeats Fengtien army in 1922, 65; collapse of his army in 1924, 67; inter- viewed by author, 72; cap- tures Peking, 73; defeat of, by Kwangtung forces, 74; at- titude towards labor, 130 Wu Ting-fang, 64 Wusih, effect of American tariff on lace industry of, 125 Yen M4Hsi-shan, Shansi, 58 Yen, W., temporary Premier of China in 1926, 73 Yoshihito, Emperor, 13 Yuan Shih-kai, inaugurated President of China, 60; his centralization policy, 61; death of, 62 Governor of 1 (eee ee ALL im a retiree 4 eT a * - e _— all —— - & e al a.) >see a Pe Peet Pe eee ee ee te ee ee ee Se ee Pind ee ee tee ye ees Sy eee Se aS as a _ Pe ee ees J — sedpeeses ents - r ; ss i a ey ee et ee ee ee ee ee a ee TT oe. fe. oe eeat eng tee boa ~~ _- oe eis i iF YD ‘ tae oT ‘ t “) “ Jk . poe — SN oe ee os ak see aol peat, Sal Po ee J > a -—* sr oe eee ood te a eel athe ial So eh rd ek et ete deel ated eeree) te ied eres ee. ee Pe ef ee ee ee = _— a — = - ee ee ee -s od sure Pars Toe ee a _ “aR e — - es => +, 4 4 "fh rE) a A id e ts ee ee — ee ed ee —— a = Se eee ee ee eg a ee =tents te | tha der rs eae pat as ad i le a ge a aida ch eed So pe ema Saeed Sah tn aed <2: i tena he peel a i by ry “4 4 * A ; | + a . i eng lo ie — ns ee oe ee oe i ee ae et gies oe ti 3ee eS eee ee oe ee ey ee I Stee _ — tf Ba nM 3 4 Ad is & c a : & © Ld A H a = ae —_ fee eS Oe a — - ee ee ee eee ee ee od ee ae oe ee aepa tai 4 < — aw -. a a i-_ * a * _— = =. . == ated hel tnt > — F 4 yf ry: ‘is G2 2e¢" 2r2-r1ereseee a i a a ret em oe a oe an epeyverr my Pee | 2. @e— od aieliiieetl Kage gs SP ret 37 FS FOS SBS TE St TSA SD o re . f ” saeaetere tt tet 2 eee Fa Dae ae a asreestesscsaeansesct oe * bs - — Uy e i) oe ~ ” i , i * . tee 2 % ip a eS a - Set ee ee ee oe én bid wd nhrdods bepase cert esesraer, a ae Pv. 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