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AMERICAN OPINION
OF

FRANCESOME RECENT BORZOI BOOKS
ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

 

 

 

 

ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN FRANCE
DURENG THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

By Henri See, Professor at the University of Rennes

 

EUROPE FROM WATERLOO TO SARAJEVO
Base, aseley

 

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RHINE

By Hermann Stegemann

 

THE DECLINE OF THE WEST
By Oswald Spengler

 

THE LIMITATIONS OF VICTORY
By Alfred Fabre-LuceAMERICAN OPINION
OF FRANCE

 

From Lafayette to Poincare

 

Bae

ELIZABETH BRETT WHITE

PH. D. * URSINUS COLLEGB :COLLEGEVILLE : PENNSYLVANIA

 

EFT I ES LIE ET LT EP TE EN ED

MEW YORK: ALFRED A - KoreCOPYRIGHT 1927 BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC.

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MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED SA Es
OF AMERICA

 

 

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Rui ia) HRvares susan atte at IN Rae SH Watt lth? my ae ’ . He
‘Pele Abad alls i Jide ni . peTO
THE MEMORY OF
MY FATHER AND MY MOTHER,
WHO LOVED TRUTH, JUSTICE,

AND PEACE> vil ~~

 

 

Fg E ia 7a Cake

HE material used in this book is largely taken from official records
of facts. Partly also it is taken from personal documents, biograph-

ical and autobiographical, from public addresses, and from newspapers and
periodicals. Journalistic material has been especially emphasized, since the
object of the writer was to discover and to present what the people thought
about any occurrence or series of occurrences, and why they thought as they
did, rather than to prove that their opinions were right or wrong.
The American Antiquarian Society Library, the Congressional Library, the
Libraries of Clark University, the University of Pennsylvania, Williams
College, Bryn Mawr College, and the Widener Library of Harvard Univer-
sity, have furnished particularly valuable sources, and special thanks for
courtesy and assistance are due to Dr. Louis N. Wilson of Clark Univer-
sity, Mr. Asa Don Dickinson of the University of Pennsylvania, Mr. W.
B. Briggs of Harvard University, and Mr. Clarence S. Brigham of the
American Antiquarian Society.
The earlier chapters were first written at Clark University, in satisfaction
of the thesis requirement for the Ph.D. degree. Revised, and with several
chapters added, the manuscript received the Justin Winsor Prize Award of
the American Historical Association. Further revisions and additions
have since been made.
Professor George H. Blakeslee, head of the department of History and In-
ternational Relations at Clark University, has made the work possible

through his unfailing interest and encouragement, and has criticised allPe Ratio eas alate) sie DS Sens Ae SABA Sees Bea asses ronenetNees Ss eketpaSaes a leraaadesades e cieaaeaeahaeg aed

PREEAGE

 

 

of the material. Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes of Smith College has also read
the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions. Mr. C. Grove Haines, of
Ursinus College, has been of great assistance in various details of the work,
and I am indebted to Mrs. Robert R. White, Jr., for a careful reading of
the proof.> 1X >

 

 

GONTENEs

INTRODUCTION

1 THe War oF 1812 AND THE CLOSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA
2 RELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS—EARLY STAGES
3 RELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS—LATER PERIOD
4 Tue REIGN oF Louis PHILIPPE

5 FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III

6 THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WaR

7 THe THIRD REPUBLIC

8 SIGNS AND PoRTENTS

9 FRANCE IN ARMS

CoNCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

xi

35
65
94

130

208
235
268
310
315

33]DEAS SSee ee SEED BISSRAAS OAL

he

eresserseitieXI

 

 

INTRODUCTION

NTERNATIONAL relations are governed not alone by economic laws

or by selfish interests, but by those subtler forces which have to do
with community of thought and of ideals. Psychological study has of late
years developed much information as to the reactions of individuals to
various stimuli. It is possible to make a similar study of a nation, im-
perfect of course, yet contributing something to the understanding of the
sources of international friendliness or prejudice and therewith some of
the motives which determine international action. The relations of any
country with any other, that is, lend themselves to such analysis as will
indicate what qualities each group of people admires or dislikes, and what
behavior most easily stirs irritation or encourages friendly codperation.
The relations of the United States with France offer a problem of peculiar
interest. We fought the World War side by side with France and in the
enthusiasm of that period we revived old tales of Lafayette and of that
alliance which so heartened and aided us in the dark days of the Revolu-
tion. We declared that France and America were traditional allies, were
bound together almost in blood brotherhood, and we rejoiced that fighting
in France we might serve the cause of our first friends at the same time
that we settled our own grievances. The War has been over eight years.
We are to-day as critical of France as of Germany, and the old alliance
has not made us willing to serve French interests in afterwar settlements,
in spite of the fact that we fought a common foe, and that our battle-cry
was the sacred name of Lafayette. As a result we are charged with ingrati-
ith bad faith or with fickleness, and to some even of our own folk
our policies appear to be unstable and capricious. As we look back over
our history, however, we find that such fluctuations in our sympathies,
contradictory as they are, have not been infrequent, and that they are by
no means so baseless as they appear to be. Perhaps if we analyze with
care the relations of France and the United States in the past, we may serve
the cause of present and future harmony, by providing material for the
better evaluation of the considerations upon which our actions have been
based, so that we may see more clearly which of them have been worthy
and justifiable, and which have been only evidence of our shortsightedness

tude, wSarasa eds est Nee ne Sy che ES eA SP EAN A USN aE SSNS LIS ata ee aaa aa

INTRODUCTION

 

 

or lack of full understanding of the situation. Only by thoughtful studies
of human relations shall we ever be able to establish such bases of com-
prehension and justice as shall resist surface irritations and provide a firm
foundation for the building of future and lasting peace and harmony.

Between France and the United States there was, to begin with, greater
probability of friction than of friendliness. Generations of European ri-
valry had fixed in the consciousness of Anglo-Saxon and Gaul a pattern of
dislike and distrust. Among the early colonists this was made more marked
by the clash of interests along the Great Lakes and in the valleys of the
Ohio and the Mississippi. It appeared natural to continue in America
quarrels begun on the continent. These early wars left a deep imprint upon
the hearts and minds of the settlers, especially in New England and the
Middle Atlantic States, where French use of Indian allies envenomed the
border raids. Nor did Puritan Massachusetts and French Catholic Canada
tend in any case toward harmonious relations. The “Bostonnais’” were
ceaselessly active in the attempt to break up the French control in Acadia
and in Canada at large, and the line of New Brunswick and Maine was
always disputed, with frequent murderous raids from both sides. The first
two attacks on Quebec were at the instigation and with the active par-
ticipation of the New England states. Pepperell’s siege and capture of
Louisbourg in 1745 was carried out by colonials alone, and they shared in
every British expedition except the last. The history of the Ohio Valley
shows no greater friendliness between the colonists and the French, and
in Georgia, at the time of the signing of the Peace of Paris in 1763, the
following ode, published in an influential newspaper, reflects the popular
aversion in its bearing upon relations between the provinces and the mother

country :—

“Whence, Britons, these desponding cares,
This vain accusing of your fate?
Whence these unnecessary fears,

While George is guardian of your fate?

What then can generous Britons dread,

Their leagues preserved, their faith unstained?
If to the choice of peace they’re led,

Their power, their rights shall be maintained:
If war their choice, revolving oer

Hawke’s deeds, and1 Abram’s glorious field,
Again they'll waste the Iberian shore,

Again the crafty Gaul shall yield.

a ae
1 The plains near Quebeck” x
XilINTRODUCTION

 

 

Who fears the schemes of Gallic art?
Who shall of Carlos’ arms complain?
While Heaven its aid shall still impart,
And George shall live and rule the main?
(Georgia Gazette, Apr. 28, 1763)

In Pontiac’s War which broke out soon after peace had been made between
the French and the British, common report credited the French with com-
plicity. “In short, Monsieur is at the bottom of it . . . we have undeniable
proofs of this,” wrote the settlers at Detroit.

When the Revolutionary War was upon us, however, we sank our old
hatreds in the pressing necessity for aid, and did not scruple to stir up
all possible European difficulties for Great Britain. With especial clever-
ness American envoys played upon the desire of France to weaken her
great rival, and depended upon French interests far more than upon French
altruism, as the story of Franklin’s negotiations abundantly witnesses.
Washington himself, though most willing to entertain a favorable opinion
of the new ally, warned openly against an excess of confidence, or an ex-
pectation that France would go further than would best serve her own
ends.

John Jay, working in Madrid for a Spanish alliance, felt himself ham-
pered by French intrigues intended to assure that while the activities of
American rebels should embarrass England the colonies themselves should
not grow strong enough or independent enough to interfere with French
or Spanish domination in the New World. Said John Adams, in his
Diary,—

“Mr. Jay likes Frenchmen as little as Mr. Lee and Mr. Izard did. He says they
are not a moral people; they know not what it is; he don’t like any Frenchman;
the Marquis de Lafayette is clever, but he is a Frenchman. Our allies don’t play
fair, he told me.” 1

Adams himself, after some friction with the French court, went to Holland
to “try if we can do something to make us less dependent upon France,”
and Washington’s writings indicate that in spite of the general popular
enthusiasm for “our generous ally” there was a strong party in Congress,
led by the Lees and the Adamses, which never trusted the French, and
that the practical working of the alliance in America had its serious diffi-
culties and was accompanied by considerable friction at times.

Much dissatisfaction was caused by the various French intrigues which
accompanied the negotiations for peace, and which finally led the Amer-
ican commissioners to disregard their Congressional instructions and work
out independent agreements with the British through which they were

Pea ee
1C. R. Fish, American Diplomacy, 34,
X111

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INTRODUCTION

 

 

able to obtain for this country more advantageous terms than would have
been possible if they had permitted the French to dominate the situation.
Nor were the French themselves any too generous in their commercial
arrangements with the new commonwealth.

All this, however, did not prevent the close association with France during
the Revolutionary period from influencing in many ways American thought
and customs. A better understanding existed between the two peoples than
had ever before been the case, and many a warm personal friendship grew
up. When the French Revolution occurred, it was hailed with enthusiasm
in America, especially by Jefferson and other leading democrats, but also
by the general public, which saw it as harmonizing with their own ideas
and actions, the promise of another victory for the principles of liberty and
self-government. As they watched the course of events, however, American
observers were shocked by the violence of the revolutionists. They tried to
excuse the occurrences of which they could not approve, to think of them
as inevitable and natural consequences of the great evils of the old régime,
and as representing only a temporary, if regrettable, aspect of a movement
otherwise wholly praiseworthy, but nevertheless a reaction. of horror was
inevitable. The religious sensibilities, too, of many were antagonized by
the free-thinking or atheistic tendencies so marked in the French leaders.
Then the arrogance of the representatives of the French Republic who
were sent to the United States touched the pride of the Americans, and
their interference in domestic affairs and attempts to dominate our foreign
policy led to the development of a strong anti-French sentiment on the
part of many, a sentiment which was in conflict with the pro-French sym-
pathies of others. Party politics in America came to reflect every change in
the French situation, thus augmenting the difficulties already inherent in
the business of erecting and stabilizing a new commonwealth. Relations
with France became so strained as to amount practically to a state of war,
though it was never formally declared.

It is not proposed to offer in this study any detailed treatment of the
period before 1812, but a few citations from current newspapers may serve
to connect the years of “our partial war with France” with those which fol-
lowed, and to suggest the shifts in American sentiment which were so

important and so marked.

“Americans, be just. Remember ... who stood between you and the clanking
chains of British ministerial despotism. ... Let us... make it known that while
we prefer a state of neutrality and peace, yet we cannot but feel an anxious solicitude
for the success of the glorious struggle which the French are now making to obtain
that heavenly jewel which we so justly prize.”
(New York Journal, cited Georgia Gazette, July 18, 1793)
X1VINTRODUCTION

 

 

Resolutions, New York Chamber of Commerce, August 6, 1793,—

_.. “Resolved, that the President of the United States is the only organ through
which the national will can be made known to foreign powers; and that any attempt
of the said powers or their ministers to communicate with this country upon na-
tional objects, otherwise than through him, is an indignity to our constitution and
offence to the nation, and ought to excite the apprehension and displeasure of all
good and orderly citizens.”

Resolutions adopted by a popular meeting at Richmond, Virginia, Aug. 17,
1793,—

. “Any communication ...or any interference of a foreign minister with the
political parties of this country would violate the laws and usages of nations, would
be a high indignity to the government and people of America, and would be a great
and just cause of alarm... leading to the introduction of foreign gold and
foreign armies, with their fatal consequences of dismemberment and Partition.”

Chancellor Wythe presided over this meeting, and the resolutions were
sponsored by John Marshall.

“If the French suppose the people of America will oblige the government to be
passive under any and all kinds of injuries from France and that in the case of a
rupture they will put on tri-coloured cockades they mistake the temper. of our people
most egregiously. ...If France should be the aggressor, France will find the
Americans foes: except the democrats, who like the Tories in the late revolution
would, spaniel-like, kiss the rod... . J American sympathy has been universally in
favor of the French Revolution, so far as its object was to destroy tyranny and re-
form abuses... . Yes, Frenchmen, it is interest alone that has united France and
America; and be on your guard that you do not make it our interest to dissolve the
connection.”
(New York Herald, cited Washington Gazette, July 9, 1796)

The Connecticut Courant, very influential in New England, published in
1796 a summary of recent Franco-American relations, emphasizing the
French “perfidy” at the time of the making of the peace treaties. Sections
of this editorial run as follows,—

. “we acquired [through our separate negotiations with England] more than we
expected, and certainly much more than France intended we should have.” French
conduct was “of a piece with this” down to the dissolution of their monarchy. .. .
“Nor can it, alas! be said that ‘regeneration’ has made France any better for us,
or less a deceiver and troubler of nations than she had been for ages betoress. ...
We were entitled to her good offices with the Barbary pirates, but their agent has
laid obstacles in the way of our negotiations, “and had his means happened to have
been sufficient, our prisoners might have rotted in their chains, and our commerce
have been sacrificed to pirates in order to depress the American Marine, and
monopolize the Levant trade. . . . There have been unceasing efforts to distract and
destroy our national government. Disunited, the states would feel their weakness

XVINTRODUCTION

 

 

and would be more manageable by intrigue; might be played off against one another
and at any time plunged into a foreign or a civil war.”
(Cited Danbury Republican Journal, Nov. 28, 1796)

“Doubtless, Citizen Adet, as you have made a publication by way of an address or
appeal to the people, you wish to know what effect it has and expect an answer.
Know, then, that we are as little flattered as deceived by your opening a corres-
pondence with us. Having ordained and dignified our well-beloved President to re-
ceive and answer ministerial addresses, and whose heart you will find sound enough
and head long enough, for the trust, it is insulting us, that you do not confine your-
self to him... . You might have learned something from your predecessors. . . .
One thing we have sense enough to know, that halters are not the cords of love.”
(Connecticut Courant, in Washington Gazette, Dec. 14, 1796)

... “Why are we so often reminded of the debt of gratitude? Is it really because
more than gratitude,—because compensation—is expected to cancel it?”
(Danbury Republican Journal, Mar. 6, 1797)

 

 

XVI. Der tory]
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AMERICAN OPINION
OF

FRANCEee ee cee
Dig Nit Bt uy MOCHA Ee tM Te Eee ee isha Totes ta Vea a RECHAPTER 1

The War of 1812 and the Close
of the Napoleonic Era

HE military achievements of Napoleon and the autocratic form of
his government could not have failed to create an unfavorable im-
pression in the United States, but when, in the pursuit of his ambitious
aims, he showed himself utterly unscrupulous in regard to the rights of
neutrals, American irritation became acute. Yet the United States was ill-
equipped to carry on an open war with a powerful enemy, and wisdom
dictated the maintenance of a policy of conciliation for as long a period as
possible. As the Napoleonic aggressions increased, this became ever more
difficult. President Madison’s Message of November 5, 1811, reflects the
unenviable situation in which his administration found itself :—

“The justness and fairness which have been evinced on the part of the United
States toward France, both before and after the revocation of her decrees, authorized
an expectation that her government would have followed up that measure by all
such others as were due to our reasonable claims as well as dictated by its amicable
professions. No proof, however, is yet given of an intention to repair the other
wrongs done to the United States and particularly to restore the great amount of
American property seized and condemned under edicts . . . founded in such unjust
principles that the reparation ought to have been prompt and ample.” 1

Matters were complicated by the fact that Great Britain, determined to
defeat Napoleon, also attacked neutral commerce. Far more powerful on the
sea than France, Great Britain could do much more concrete damage to
the interests of America, and by the unconciliatory language she employed
in diplomatic discussions she concentrated upon herself much of the enmity
which otherwise would naturally have been turned against France. No one
pretended that France was not guilty; but the question resolved itself into
a decision as to which of the belligerents was more culpable and which
could most effectively be punished. Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina,
well known in state and national politics, and a close friend of the Ad-
ministration leaders, wrote,—‘The Devil himself could not tell which gov-
ernment, England or France, is the most wicked.” ? And the country at
large took somewhat the position expressed in a Forxth of July toast of-ee eae ret ate Peete ares aera aotinosrde staat testes raaraa ps laee eee aks Rae SO ae Sa NOSES Er a ct

AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

fered at Raleigh, N. C., in 1811:—‘“The French Tiger and the British
Shark,—Paring to the nails of the one and a file to the teeth of the other.” *
Some ardent patriots did not hesitate to say that war should be declared
against both France and Great Britain, but the majority realized that the
United States was not prepared, from a financial, military, or naval stand-
point, to prosecute war successfully against one antagonist, to say nothing
of two. The lot fell upon Great Britain, and the conclusions through which
this decision was reached, and having been reached was justified, are full
of interest. In April, 1812, Jefferson wrote a long letter to an old friend in
England, discussing quite fully the position of the United States as it ap-
peared to him. He said that he thought the overwhelming power of Great
Britain on the sea, and the strength of France on the land, were both
destructive to the prosperity and happiness of the world. Both should
be reduced. Bonaparte’s claim to be fighting for the freedom of the seas was
on a par with England’s claim to be fighting on land for the liberties of
mankind. Both were fighting to gain their own ambitions at the expense
of the rest of the world. “We resist the enterprises of England first because
they first come vitally home to us. And our feelings repel the logic of
bearing the lash of George the III for fear of that of Bonaparte at some
future day. When the wrongs of France shall reach us with equal effect,
we shall resist them also. But one at a time is enough; and having offered
a choice to the champions, England first takes up the gauntlet.” * Jefferson
characterized as “Quixottic” the idea of “choosing to fight two enemies at
a time rather than to take them in succession.” > “It would prevent our
eastern capitalists and seamen from employment in privateering, take away
the only chance of conciliating them, and keep them at home, idle, to swell
the discontents: it would completely disarm us of the most powerful
weapon we can employ against Great Britain by shutting every port to our
prizes, and yet would not add a single vessel to their number; it would shut
every market to our agricultural productions, and engender impatience and
discontent with that class which in fact composes the nation; it would
insulate us in general negotiations for peace, making all the parties our
opposers, and very indifferent about peace with us, if they have it with
the rest of the world.” ® To General Thaddeus Kosciusko he wrote that
France had “kept pace with England in iniquity of principle, although not
in the power of inflicting wrongs on us. The difficulty of selecting a foe be-
tween them has spared us many years of war, and enabled us to enter into
it with less debt, more strength and preparation.” 7

President Madison, who was accustomed to avail himself freely of the
counsels of his predecessors in the executive office, John Adams and Jeffer-
son, wrote to the latter :—

2THE WAR OF £812

 

 

“The business becomes more than ever puzzling. To go to war with England and
not with France arms the Federalists with new matter and divides the Republicans
some of whom... make a display of impartiality. To go to war against both,
presents a thousand difficulties, above all, that of shutting all the ports of Europe
against our cruisers who can do so little without the use of them. It is pretty certain
also that it would not gain over the Federalists, who would turn all those difficulties
against the Administration.” §

Governor Plumer of New Hampshire, in his address to the Legislature on
June 6, just after the President’s message to Congress had indicated that
the declaration of war against Great Britain would not long be postponed,
expressed the opinions of many throughout the country, when he said:
“From both France and England we have long suffered and still continue
to suffer, great injustice. They have unjustly captured and condemned our
commerce, imprisoned and held in servitude our seamen, and grossly vio-
lated our national rights; whilst towards both these nations the government
of the United States has steadily and uniformly pursued a course of
conduct founded in the strictest justice and marked throughout with the
most impartial neutrality.” The government of France, he added, had in
some measure changed its attitude, which encouraged us to hope for
eventual justice from that country. If these hopes should end in disappoint-
ment, he did not doubt that our government would take the necessary steps
to secure our rights. In the meantime, Great Britain’s crimes appeared the
worse, and fully justified the war.®

The editor of that unique and influential journal, Niles’ Register, wrote in
reply to an article in the Boston Centinel condemning the policy of the
government :—

“It is an unhappy circumstance that while we have so many just causes for com-
plaint against England, France is highly culpable. But we must act as any individual
would do, were he assailed by two persons at once. He would endeavor to separate
them, and first attack the one he believed could be attacked effectively. This being
done, he could devise means for annoying the other, if his wrongs were still unre-
dressed.” 1°

Just after the declaration of war, he summarized the situation thus:—

“The injuries received from France do not lessen the enormity of those heaped upon
us by England: nor can the crimes of one nation palliate the offences of the other.
In this ‘straight betwixt two’ we had an unquestionable right to select our enemy.
We have given the preference to Great Britain, not only for our supposed ability to
coerce justice from her, but also on account of her more flagrant wrongs. For putting
her on a par with France as to her violations of our commercial rights, what shall
we say of impressment, of the murders by the Indians, of the mission of Henry?
Besides, France is invulnerable to us. We might as well declare war against the
people of the moon as against her; but Great Britain is tangible in her tenderest

3

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

points. It is contended by some that if one of these powers does us justice, the other
will follow her lead. Though we do not subscribe to this doctrine in its fullest extent,
we cannot suffer from making an experiment of that which it was impossible to
avoid.” 11

The Governor of Delaware followed much the same line of argument in his
Message to the Legislature, closing with the statement that the “correct
conclusion would be to repel wrongs when perpetuated against us by one
nation, in such a manner as to render others cautious how they offer us
either injury or insult.” 2? Samuel Perkins in his History of the Late War,
published in 1825, says that “‘in selecting Great Britain as an enemy, when
equal cause of war existed between her and France, it was considered that
the latter had no assailable points, no colonies on the continent of Amer-
ica, no Islands in the West Indies unoccupied by the British, no commerce
on the ocean to invite and reward the enterprise of American privateers.”
A declaration of war against her could then be no more than an “empty
threat’ with no practical result except to force the country into “an un-
equal and dangerous alliance with Great Britain.” +%

The debates in Congress of course reflected the sharp differences of opinion
which prevailed throughout the country on the question of ‘“‘choosing an
enemy.’ The speeches of Clay, Grundy, Calhoun, Randolph, and others,
in the debate on the Embargo, April 1-3, 1812, Randolph’s speech against
the war, May 29, and Josiah Quincy’s speech in the debate on the pay of
the army, Nov. 21, are conspicuous illustrations. The House Committee on
Foreign Relations, in the report presented in October, justified the action
of the government in selecting Britain as the enemy, but nevertheless stated
that ‘‘the committee does not hesitate to declare that France has greatly
injured the United States, and that satisfactory reparation has not been
made for many of these injuries. But that is a concern which the United
States will look to and settle for themselves.” *4

Sentiment throughout the country was firm in the conviction that accept-
ance of the British challenge must in no way be construed to mean con-
doning of the French offences, or the abandonment of the right to resent
them in whatever way and at whatever time the country should see fit. The
President recognized this in his Message of June 1, when he said:—

 

 

“Having presented this view of the relations of the United States with Great Britain,
and of the solemn alternative growing out of them, I proceed to remark that the
communications last made to Congress on the subject of our relations with France,
will have shown that since the revocation of her decrees, as they violated the neutral
rights of the United States, her government has authorized illegal captures by its
privateers and public ships; and that other outrages have been practiced on our
vessels and our citizens. It will have been seen also that no indemnity had been pro-
vided or satisfactorily pledged, for the extensive spoliations committed under the

4

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ENTHE WAR OF 1812

 

 

violent and retrospective orders of the French government against the property of
our citizens, seized within the jurisdiction of France. I abstain at this time from
recommending to Congress definitive measures with respect to that nation in the ex-
pectation that unclosed discussions between our minister plenipotentiary at Paris
and the French government, will speedily enable Congress to decide, with greater ad-
vantage, on the course due to the rights, the interests, and the honor of our coun-
try:” 15

Monroe, the Secretary of State, had written a year earlier to Joel Barlow,
the American Minister in France, that pressure on that country would not
be diminished by any change which might take place in the relations be-
tween the United States and England, no matter to what extent that change
might be carried, since the nation was acting from a strong sense of injury
in both cases. President Madison now wrote to Barlow that the conduct
of the French government would “‘be an everlasting reproach to it” and
that if the difficulties with England should be arranged, “the full tide of
indignation with which the public mind here is boiling” would be directed
against France, and if due reparation for wrongs should not be made by
that country, war would be called for “by the nation almost una voce.”
Even without a peace with England, the President said, the further refusal
or prevarication of France upon the subject of redress might be expected
to produce measures of reprisal in the next Congress. ‘This result is the
more probable, as the general exasperation will coincide with the calcula-
tions of not a few, that a double war is the shortest road to peace.” He
warned Barlow to be prepared to withdraw from France on short notice,
even before the next session of Congress if the policy of France continued to
be as provoking as it had been, and advised him to inform the French gov-
ernment fully of the temper of the Americans.‘7 When Monroe officially
notified John Quincy Adams, then American Minister at St. Petersburg, of
the declaration of war against Great Britain, he took occasion to speak also
of the strained relations with France, and to remark significantly that even
if a satisfactory settlement should be obtained, it was not likely to produce
anything in the nature of an alliance. “It is not anticipated that any event
whatever will have that effect.” *®

At the popular demonstrations occurring in different parts of the country
fiery resolutions breathing defiance to France were frequently adopted. At
a meeting in Baltimore of democratic delegates representing the city and
its surrounding precincts, the resolutions advocated the war with Great
Britain, but went on to say that the conduct of France had been “scarcely
less atrocious than that of England,” and that if the present negotiations
should fail to bring about an honorable adjustment “we have full con-
fidence that our government will direct the most active hostilities to be

5sere plain o AU Taf angen athe at gates theege einen gai alae tle eben steel tien tbe etanercept

AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

commenced against her.” 1° A Fourth of July gathering in Pendleton Dis-
trict, South Carolina, applauded warmly the sentiment that “Viewing the
conduct of France as scarcely less hostile than that of Great Britain, we are
highly gratified by the government’s determined resolution of manifesting
an equal resistance.” *° The Cavalry Troop of Duplin, N. C., resolved
“That the declaration of War against Great Britain and her dependencies
meets with our decided approbation, and that unless France makes repara-
tion for the depredations committed on our commerce, a similar measure
ought to be adopted against her.” 74 The people at the Fourth of July cele-
bration in Carthage, Tenn., were “ready to shew the infamous Napoleon
that notwithstanding his success with most of the powers and potentates of
Europe and a few of the demagogues of faction here, yet the people of
America, the great sovereigns of the nation, are firm and united, impatient
under injuries, and jealous of their honor to the last punctilio, with
whom there can be no shuffling prevarication. Seven millions of freemen
will never yield a tame submission to the arbitrary, audacious alterations
and modifications of the law of nations, at the mere will and caprice of
a foreign despot.” ?* And the editor of the Carthage Gazette, a few days
later, reported that the Senate had declared in favor of the recall of
Barlow from France if justice was not speedily done. The Hornet might
be sent out to bring home the minister and consuls, “or a fair and hon-
orable settlement.” If a breaking of diplomatic relations should come, “the
government would be true to the feelings and spirit of the people. That
spirit breathes war against France if France denies us justice.” 23
Governor Barbour of Virginia, in his address to the Legislature, expressed
the same feeling, though in more moderate terms. Calling upon the people
to be loyal in their prosecution of the war against Britain, he gave as a
reason “the long catalogue of unredressed wrongs” on the part of France,
“for which little hope is now entertained of an honorable reparation by
pacific means, and which in due season should be avenged by the most
energetic measures.” ** The Ohio Legislature, in passing its resolutions in
support of the war, did not fail to add:—“And be it further resolved, that
we have seen with emotions of much concern, the protracted delay of the
French government to render justice to this nation for its outrageous dep-
redations upon us, and that we will afford to the constituted authorities
in whose wisdom and firmness we place confident reliance, our utmost sup-
port in their efforts to sustain the honor of the nation, and to obtain
suitable satisfaction for its injuries.” *> Perhaps the most vigorous pro-
nouncement of this sort came from Governor Hawkins of North Carolina,
a faithful and most valuable adherent of the Administration, who spared
no effort to create a strong support for the war measures.PHEOWAR OF fe)

 

 

“While we are vigorously pursuing the course which our government has been com-
pelled to adopt against Great Britain, it may be essential to our safety to guard
against the wiles and intrigues of a no less inveterate enemy to our rights and
liberties—the emperor of the French. Our differences with him, as the President of
the United States in his recent communication to Congress has informed the nation,
are yet in an unsettled state. He has furnished incontrovertible evidence of his supe-
rior claims to a pre-eminent practical knowledge of all the vices and enormities
which render a human being odious in the eyes of God and man. Crimes and in-
trigues the most wicked, the most shocking to humanity, he has resorted to, in order
to accomplish his nefarious purposes, and gratify his boundless ambition and insa-
tiable thirst for universal dominion. ... From such a character, ...have the
United States reasonable grounds to expect restitution for the multiplied injuries and
spoliations they have experienced at his hands? Knowing the governing principles of
his actions, the United States would be lost to a sense of everything conducive to the
preservation of their honor and best interests, were they to enter into an alliance
with him on any conditions or in any manner whatsoever. ... It is not to be
doubted that an open and direct war with the French nation is an evil less to be
dreaded than an entangling alliance which would not fail to produce the most hu-
miliating effect upon our national character, and from which we should not be able
to extricate ourselves but by an appeal to arms.

“Therefore, gentlemen, as Americans, let us unite in vigorously prosecuting the war
against England, and as Americans, let us unite in demanding justice from, and
guarding against the intrigues of France. Let us teach both these nations, that the
condition of our friendship is the redress of our wrongs.” 26

Here, even from a friend of the Administration, we have an indication
of the criticism which was to prevail until the end of the war. The charge
of “French influence,” of a “French alliance” was coupled with a hatred
for Napoleon, and a prejudice against France and against everything
French which amounted almost to hysteria sometimes. The shade of “French
influence” dogged the footsteps of the government unfailingly. It had to
be debated in every discussion of any importance that occurred in Con-
gress. It embittered politics even in local elections. It was offered as the
explanation of every unfortunate military or diplomatic occurrence. Most
public addresses and many a sermon dealt with it. Madison had foreseen
this to some degree, but he could not have dreamed how bitterly it was
to annoy and embarrass him.

It will be noticed that the citations given above, to illustrate the war
spirit, which show such strong anti-French feeling, come from the West
and South, the districts which most strongly supported the war with
Great Britain. From these states came most of the young Republican
leaders who had forced the war decision: Henry Clay, the brilliant young
Speaker of the House, and William Johnson from Kentucky, Felix
Grundy from Tennessee, Calhoun, Langdon Cheves, and Lowndes, from
South Carolina. And the Administration was still the “Virginia dynasty.”

7er ae eee tee Peete ete ears neater seam tar ieaie araicatntae aceon at a ates nee oa Re ea ea a ea aT sthagatad

AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

In the New England States, where large elements were strongly against
the policy of the government, for party reasons and because its measures
interfered with their industries, the Administration and the French govern-
ment were linked together on all occasions and both were anathema. It
was, the critics declared, an alliance with a nation “whose touch is pollu-
tion, whose embrace is death.” The United States, it was urged, had but
one plain path to pursue. The despotism of France must be recognized
as an “implacable enemy,” “essentially and passionately hostile” to Ameri-
can institutions and prosperity. No concessions should be made to pro-
pitiate this despotism, and no trust could be placed in professions of
friendship emanating from it. “To be incessantly on the watch against
the wiles and intrigues of France,—to contribute in no way to the aug-
mentation of her strength or to the promotion of her schemes, to cul-
tivate industriously in the minds of the whole American population”
as a means of self-defence ‘‘the most lively feelings of hate and jealousy,”
“to seek the friendship of England, which is the only shield against French
invasion,—this is wisdom and is a duty also to the cause of liberty and
of civilization.” ?7

The Massachusetts and the Connecticut Legislatures both protested against
the war. The Connecticut body said:—‘That nation of the two is selected
which is capable of inflicting the greatest injury. In this selection we view
with the deepest solicitude a tendency to entangle us in an alliance with a
nation which has subverted every republic in Europe, and whose connex-
ions, wherever found, have been fatal to civil liberty.” 2° The New Jersey
Legislature disapproved the war, condemned the methods employed in
conducting it, and declared that it viewed “with inexpressible concern,
the course of that destructive policy which leads to a connection with
the military despotism of France . . . And if it should so happen that a
convention or confederacy with that power either exists or is intended we
do not hesitate to declare that such an event will be considered by us
more dangerous than the war itself, and as tending in its consequences
to the dissolution of the United States.” 7° The minority in the United
States Congress issued a letter signed by thirty-four persons, and addressed
to their constituents, in which they asked whether, with full knowledge
of the wrongs inflicted by the French, the government of this country
ought to aid the French cause by engaging in war against the enemy of
France.*°

Amos Kendall, later well-known as a Jacksonian Democrat, wrote at this
time,—“Had it been consistent with our honor and the preservation of
our rights to have sided with Great Britain, it would have been more
consonant to the feelings of every friend of liberty.” ** The New Eng-

 

 

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land leaders went much farther, and echoed Rufus King, New York’s
Revolutionary leader and politician——“How absurd that we should talk
of the Repeal of the French Decrees! Congress should declare immediate
war against France and make peace with England.” ** Or, as he expressed
it on another occasion: “Mr. Madison may make a French alliance. If
he dare, I fear he would: The country will not bear it, . . . But come the
worst, let the French alliance be made, and French troops introduced;
the certain, and I think the immediate consequence will be a civil
war and the introduction of English troops. No event would be more
calamitous.” °°

Pulpit and platform speakers found the topic a fruitful one. Governor
Caleb Strong of Massachusetts perhaps pointed the way when in his mes-
sage enjoining the day of fasting and prayer called for by the President
soon after the opening of the war, he spoke of England as the “bulwark
of our religion.” The Rev. S. J. Gardiner, Rector of Trinity Church, Bos-
ton, is said to have taken for a text, in allusion to Madison, a portion of
Mark 10: 41,—‘“They began to be much displeased with James.” * In
a powerful sermon preached on the day of the “Publick Fast” he said,—
“The war is ruinous because it involves a French alliance, an alliance
with the enemy of the human species, a monster redeemed by no virtue.” *
Timothy Dwight, the honored President of Yale College, preached a series
of very scholarly discourses, in which, buttressed by many an erudite
quotation and developed with profound care, he demonstrated thoroughly
the arguments against France. She is atheistic, or, where she admits
the claims of religion, Romish, which is almost worse. Her govern-
ment is a military despotism of the most abominable type. Her people
are sunk in immoralities of all sorts. For her sins, the wrath of God will
fall upon her, and all nations joined with her partake of her sins and
will share in her punishment. “Come ye out from among them; and be ye
separate; touch not the unclean thing!” ** In a discourse at Byfield, Elijah
Parish said: “Have you concluded, for yourselves, your children and
children’s children, to subject to greater commercial restrictions, volun-
tarily to submit to the miseries now endured by a hundred million slaves
in Europe? Then, it is suitable and fit that you should be slaves. You
are strong, and are able to hew wood and draw water for French Ty-
rants.” 87 And Peter Whitney of Quincy urged that in forming an alliance
with that wicked nation the country was digging with its own hands the
grave in which its liberties would shortly be laid.** Examples of such
utterances are available in large quantities. Here it will suffice to add one
more, a portion of a sermon delivered by William Ellery Channing, the
“father of Unitarianism,” at Boston.

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“I am not prepared to deny that the orders of England are infractions of our rights,
but when I consider the atrocious and unprovoked decrees of France, on which these
orders were designed to retaliate; the unprecedented kind of war, which these orders
were designed to repel,—when | consider the situation of England, that she is con-
tending for existence, while her enemy is avowedly contending for conquest,—and
when I consider the conduct of our own government in relation to the two bel-
ligerents—the partiality and timid submission they have expressed toward the one,
the cause of suspicion they have given the other . . . | am unable to justify the war
in which we are engaged.

“We are linking ourselves with the acknowledged enemy of mankind, with a govern-
ment which can be bound by no promise—no oath—no pledged faith—which pre-
pares the way for its armies by perfidy, bribery, corruption—which pillages with
equal rapacity its enemies and its allies—which has left not a vestige of liberty where
it has extended its blasting sway. . . . Into contact and communion with this bloody
nation, we are brought by this war—and what shall we gain by building up its power?
What, but chains which we shall deserve to wear?

“On this subject too much plainness cannot be used. Let our government know, we
deem alliance with France the worst of evils, threatening at once our morals, our
liberty and our religion. The character of that nation authorizes us to demand that
we be kept from the pollution of her embrace—her proffered friendship we should
spurn—from her arms, stained, drenched with the blood of the injured and betrayed,
we should scorn to receive aid or protection.” 39

The Rev. John Giles of Newburyport endeavored to refute the arguments
of the Federalists, these “deluded citizens,’ as he called them, who “twist
and turn all the patriotic measures of our Executive, as being under
the controul of French influence! Which their own conscience cannot
subscribe to, neither do they themselves believe so. But . . . this outcry
against French influence is raised as a mist to blind the eyes of the public,
and to subserve the design of pulling down our present rulers, and to
raise themselves on their ruin.” (Sermon, August 12, 1812). The opposi-
tion party took the trouble to print this speech in pamphlet form, with an
appendix full of invective, for distribution.

If it was thus difficult for the government to defend its choice at the mo-
ment of declaring war, it was natural that its position should become
more difficult as the struggle progressed. The inglorious campaigns of
the American armies, relieved only by an occasional naval success, the
evident incapacity of some officials, the inevitable results of the conditions
of unpreparedness under which the war had been initiated, but for which
the Administration could not reasonably be held wholly to blame, all
offered opportunity for sharp criticism. Moreover, the French government
did not show a disposition to grant the reparations so clearly demanded
by public sentiment. Napoleon continued to evade, to provoke, and to
procrastinate. Our Minister to France died suddenly, and negotiations
came to a standstill till his successor could be accredited. President Madison

10

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found himself totally unable to carry out his undertaking to secure a
speedy and satisfactory agreement. His reports on the French situation
had to be confined to brief statements that there was no change in the
relations as previously announced, although he continued to hope for
favorable results. The facts therefore lent themselves easily to the charge
of French influence, which continued to be reiterated on all occasions. To
read the proceedings of Congress is to read a succession of debates over
resolutions involving requests for information from the President as to
when and how he received the information of the Napoleonic decrees, on
what ground he believed his information genuine, how he explains the
disappearance from the archives of the State Department of a certain
letter of unpleasant tenor, written by the French Minister Turreau, a
letter written some years ago and now published in the newspapers; why
the letter was withheld from publication when it was received; why
secrecy in regard to various other matters involved in the French situa-
tion was observed; and what his latest information on the subject com-
prised. The Administration had to defend its relations with France when-
ever it wished to pass a measure for raising a larger army, for building
more ships, for getting money to pay its bills. The charge became
also steadily more concrete. It ceased to be merely a recognition of the
obvious, and for party purposes, useful, fact that whatever embarrassed
an enemy of Napoleon benefited him. It took on a specific character, and
included direct aspersions against the honesty and the character of the
government.

Governor Gilman, taking office in New Hampshire, in his first address to
the legislature, asked sarcastically,—‘‘And may we not, without being liable
to the charge of justifying the conduct of Great Britain, enquire. .
whether our professions of strict and impartial neutrality in the
important contest between Great Britain and France had been constantly
maintained, and whether there had not been a manifest difference in our
resentment, and in the language and manner of our seeking redress for
wrongs, exhibiting an unwarrantable partiality for France?” *#° Said Elijah
Parish, in one of his public addresses, which was quite widely quoted,—

“The President wages war from humane motives, to protect our seamen... . If he
be so humane, why does his house ring with joy at the success of the Corsican Mo-
lochr . . . Let him, in some tender moment, when the ice is melting round his heart,
express one sentiment of horror, or utter one word of emotion, at the rivers of blood
shed by his friend Napoleon . . . French influence rests on the firmest possible basis,
on congeniality of character, on unity of opinion, on mutual contempt of Christian-
ity. Here is a bond of union infinitely stronger than sameness of origin or sameness
of language. Time will not weaken it; injuries will not dissolve it; nothing but a
radical change in the character of our government can dissolve the fatal charm... .

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

Which sooty slave in all the ancient dominions, has more obsequiously watched the
eye of his master; or flew to the indulgence of his desires, more servilely, than they
[at Washington] have waited and watched and obeyed the orders of the great Napo-
leon?” 41

Part of a poem read before the Washington Benevolent Societies of
Brookfield, Mass., and adjacent towns on July 5, 1813, runs as follows:—

“When Washington, our staff of strength and good,
The nation’s fearless firm supporter stood,

We were, what we professed ourselves to be,

One people, independent, sovereign, free.
Dependent then we were not upon France

For skill to lead a maddened country’s dance;

We all preferred, all foreign bias far,

Old Yankee Doodle to their Ca Ira:

Nor did our tickled rulers then aspire

To be the string-led babes of any Gallic Sire.

If England look askance, we boil with rage;

And blood, blood only, can the wound assuage;

Yet, whipt, robbed, kicked, and spit upon, by France,
We treat her with the greater complaisance.” 42

Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts was one of the most unfailing critics
of the government policies. In 1812 he wrote a series of letters which were
published in the Boston Repository, letters full of invective and of charges
of French influence. Niles’ Register reprinted them, with the editorial
comment that there were three reasons for doing so: ‘“‘first, because one
political section of the people of the United States look up to him as an
oracle, esteeming him one of the most honest and intelligent of men;
second, because another and greater portion of the citizens regard him
as a prejudiced, superannuated and babbling old gentleman, whose ab-
surdities amuse them; and thirdly and chiefly, because both parties for
a time read his productions.” *® Some interest therefore attaches also to
a second series of his letters, which appeared in the Salem Gazette, be-
ginning in March, 1813. These outlined the position which he expected to
maintain as a member of the next Congress. Said Mr. Pickering :—

“I have long entertained the opinion that the few men who, for the last twelve years,
have moved all the springs of public action, . . . intended to involve us in a war
with Great Britain, to indulge their inveterate hatred of that country, to subserve the
views of France, and to secure themselves in the possession of power. For to the
passions and prejudices of the people in favor of the French and against the English,
which these men have zealously and perseveringly excited and cherished, they are
deeply indebted for the power now in their hands. This is so true that for many years

12THE WAR- OF f8t2

 

 

past, their partisans have deemed it sufficient to ruin any man in the eyes of the
people to pronounce him a friend of Great Britain. . . . And this is the lot of any
independent citizen who expresses his abhorrence of the abominable acts of the
French, and condemns the mischievous and unwarrantable measures of his own gov-
ernment.” 44

In the Salem Gazette at about this time also, there appeared an attack
on Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, who had been men-
tioned as one of the commissioners to represent the United States, if the
Russian offer of mediation between America and England should be
accepted.

“Signior Abramo Alberto Gallatini, it is now ascertained, is appointed an Ambas-
sador to negotiate a Peace. This gentleman is of foreign extraction—came to our
shores about 30 years ago—taught our citizens the French tongue, and the French
doctrines of the ‘holy right of insurrection-—was pardoned by General Washington—

has had the care of the surpluses of the Revenue ...and has accumulated a
princely fortune from his liberal salary and by other thrifty means in which
foreigners generally excel. . . . Since it is a fact, that native-born citizens are ex-

cluded from office and honor, and this War is a Foreign War on account of
Foreigners only, no man can certainly be so well qualified to treat about these
foreign affairs as Mons. Gallatini.” 45

The indignation of the victims of these attacks was extreme. Had they
really been partisans of Napoleon in spirit, their position would not have
been so galling. But they were not. The Administration leaders disliked
and distrusted the French government even more cordially, if that were
possible, than did their opponents, for they knew intimately, and with-
out question or surmise, the difficulties and disasters it had caused them.
They were being accused of crimes they had not even wished to commit,
and they had no adequate proof of their innocence. They could not, even
for purposes of argument, accept the challenge and defend Napoleon, for
his crimes and those of Great Britain resembled one another too closely,
and the sentiment of the country would in no degree have supported them.
They had gone as far in this direction as was possible in fixing the quarrel
upon Great Britain in the first place. The means of defense was limited.
They might, if they had sufficient self-control, maintain a dignified silence,
but this would not be effective in maintaining the public morale. They
might, and frequently did, try to out-do their rivals in hurling invective
at the French,—a somewhat difficult matter in view of the rich and
varied vocabulary at the disposal of the New England orators or of such
a veteran debater as John Randolph of Roanoke, who was numbered with
the opposition. This proved most effective, perhaps, when coupled, as the
Raleigh Register advised, “with the lie direct.” “No republican print” says
13

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iAMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

this editor, “has ever dared defend the conduct of the French government to-
ward this country. Has it ever been defended? Not to our knowledge. On
the contrary, that government has received on all hands the tribute of
execration it so justly merits for its unprincipled and rapacious conduct
toward us.” *®

In the same paper a little later is this vigorous discussion of the question,—

“Because while the French People were struggling for a free government like our
own, and all the powers of Europe were united in their exertions to perpetuate the
tyranny of the Bourbons,—because at that time the friends of liberty in this coun-
try wished success to the Republicans of France and defeat to the Royalists of
Europe, they have been accused even down to the present day of partiality for
France. This accusation is unjust and untrue. When the flame of liberty was suffered
to be extinguished in France and a military despotism erected in its place, we no
longer felt that sympathy for the French that one free people will and ought to feel
for another, and that we once felt for them. . . .” 47

The Secretary of State, Monroe, thought it advisable that the Adminis-
tration should issue a categorical denial of the charges.

 

“It was anticipated by some, that a declaration of war against Great Britain would
force the United States into a close connection with her adversary, much to their
disadvantage. The Secretary of State thinks it proper to remark that nothing is more
remote from the fact. The discrimination in favor of France, according to law, in
consequence of her acceptance of a proposition made equally to both powers, pro-
duced a difference between them in that special case, and in that only. The war with
England was declared, without any concert or communication with the French gov-
ernment; it has produced no connection between the United States and France, or
any understanding as to its prosecution, continuance, or termination. The ostensible
relation between the two countries is the true and only one. The United States have
just claims on France for spoliations on their commerce on the high seas and in the
ports of France, and their late minister was, and their present minister is instructed
to demand reparation for these injuries, and to press it with all the energy due to
the justice of the claims and the character of the United States.” 48

The debate in the House of Representatives on the bill for increasing the
size of the army and improving its equipment, the “New Army Bill,”
lasted from December 29, 1812, to January 14, 1813. Both the opposition
party and the friends of the Administration included in their speeches
evidence of marked anti-French prejudice. Gold (N. Y., Fed.) said that
in uniting forces with France against England the United States had “joined
in a baleful conspiracy.” Sheffey (Va., Fed.) spoke of uniting our efforts
with those of “the great destroyer of mankind.” Kent (Md., Fed.) said that
men on both sides had admitted that the provocation from France had
been “‘ample,” and asked how with such an “overflowing cup” of injuries
anyone could “‘justify our relation to that destroyer who, devising death
14

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to all that live, sits like a cormorant on the tree of life, who cannot be
glutted, nor tired, with human carnage; the impersonation of death, him-
self an incarnate death.” Archer (Dem.) replied that he beheld with as
much “‘detestation and abhorrence the conduct of the French Emperor as
anyone could possibly do . . . trusted that the vengeance of heaven would
arrest his career,” and was certain that the Administration would never
“so engulph us” as to become entangled in a French alliance.4? Macon
(Dem.) characterized the charge as “degrading to the House and dis-
graceful to the nation.” “What,” he continued, “in the name of God, is
there in the administration of our government, or in the known principles
and character of the men who administer it, like the administration
of the French government or the principles and character of the men who
administer that? The principles of their abominable government are not
more unlike ours than the men who administer it are unlike the men
who administer ours. . . .” He followed this by a detailed comparison
of French and English influence in the country, showing the English as
the more dangerous and the more powerful.*°

One of the most influential of the young leaders of the war party was
Langdon Cheves, who became Speaker of the House when Clay was sent
abroad as a member of the Peace Commission. Speaking on the New
Army Bill, Cheves said dramatically,—‘‘But gentlemen say that their great
aversion to this war comes from the danger of French alliance. . . . Do
we want the armies of France, or if we did, could they reach our shores?
Do we want her navy? Has she any that dare venture out to sea? Where
can she aid us? Where can we unite? . . . Gentlemen would resist France,
would declare war against France, merely to show their indignation at
her perfidy and injustice, and here I confess my feelings go with the
gentlemen—I would do so too had we no other enemy to contend with.” ™
Calhoun’s contribution to this discussion ran,—

“An attempt has been made to shake our fortitude with a cry of French alliance.
It has been boldly said that we are already united with that country. We united with
France? We have the same cause? No; her object is dominion, and her impulse am-
bition. Ours is the protection of the liberty of our sailors. But, say our opponents,
we are contending against the same country. What, then? Must we submit to be out-
lawed by England, in order that she may not be by France? Is the independence of
England dearer to us than our own? Must we enter the European struggle not as an
equal, consulting our peculiar interest, but be dragged into it as a low dependent, the
slave of England? The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Randolph] has told us that
we are contending against religion in the person of England—that she is, in a word,
the patroness of Christianity. Unhappy country! Doomed to submission to pre-
serve the purity of religion! Doomed to slavery that England may be independent!
Because Bonaparte is not a Protestant, you must surrender your rights! Because he
is a despot, you dare not resist!” 52

15re Sees

AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

From Henry Clay we have frequent phrases like this,—“I will concede
to gentlemen everything they ask about the injustice of France towards
this country. | wish to God that our ability was equal to our disposition to
make her feel the sense we entertain of that injustice.” And the following
rather full expression of his position may serve as well to illustrate that of
the government adherents in general.

“During all this time, the parasites of the opposition do not fail, by cunning sar-
casm, or sly innuendo, to throw out the idea of French influence, which is known to
be false, which ought to be met in one manner only, and that is by the lie direct.
The administration of this country devoted to foreign influence! The administration
of this country subservient to France! Great God! What a charge! How is it so in-
fluenced? By what ligament, on what basis, on what possible foundation does it rest?
Is it similarity of language? No! We speak different tongues, we speak the English
language. On the resemblances of our laws? No! The sources of our jurisprudence
spring from another and a different country. On commercial intercourse? No! We
have comparatively none with France. Is it from the correspondence in the genius of
the two governments? No! Here alone is the liberty of man secure from the despo-
tism which everywhere else tramples it under foot. . . . Preposterous and ridiculous
as the insinuation is, it is propagated with so much industry, that there are persons
found foolish and credulous enough to believe it. You will, no doubt, think it in-
credible (but I have nevertheless been told it as a fact) that an honorable member
of this house, now in my eye, recently lost his election by the circulation of a silly
story in his district that he was the first cousin of the Emperor Napoleon. The proof
of the charge rested upon the statement of facts which were undoubtedly true. The
gentleman in question, it was alleged, had married a connection of the lady of the
President of the United States, who was an intimate friend of Thomas Jefferson, late
President of the United States; who, some years ago, was in the habit of wearing red
French breeches.

“, . The opposition has been distinguished, amid all its veerings and changes, by
another inflexible feature, the application to Bonaparte of every vile and opprobrious
epithet our language, copious as it is in terms of vituperation, affords. He has been
compared to every hideous monster and beast, from that mentioned in the Revela-
tions, down to the most insignificant quadruped. . . . If gentlemen ask me if I do not
view with regret and horror the concentration of such vast power in the hands of
Bonaparte, | reply, that I do. I regret to see the Emperor of China holding such im-
mense sway over the fortunes of millions of our species. I regret to see Great Britain
possessing such uncontrolled command over all the waters of the globe... . I have
no fears of French or English subjugation. If we are united we are too powerful for
the mightiest nation in Europe or all Europe combined. If we are separated and
torn asunder, we shall become an easy prey for the weakest of them.” 53

Another important debate was that running from June 10 to June 21,

1813, upon a resolution offered by Daniel Webster, asking the President

when and how he received information in regard to the lifting of the

Milan and Berlin Decrees. The object was to show that if all the informa-
16THE WAR OF 1812

 

tion in the hands of the Administration had been published, England
would not have been fixed upon as the enemy. Hanson (Fed.) said:—

“We, the minority, contended that there had been a positive violation of a plain
law to favor France and embroil us with England,—that a palpable juggle had been
practiced to induce a state of insurmountable repulsion in our relations with one
belligerent, as a manifestation of our partiality to the other, and finally with a view
to connect our destinies with France.”

Grosvenor (Fed.) thought that the honor of the country could not long
survive “the dark and pestilential vapors” which hung around it. Shipard
(Fed.) said he had no confidence in the promises of “our loving friend,
this cut-throat Emperor.” Gaston (Fed.) thought the wrongs of both Eng-
land and France should be resented, or the wrongs of neither. Pearson
(Fed.) said that though reams of remonstrances had been directed to Eng-
land, the insults of France had not even been protested against properly.
McKee (Dem.) who had in 1812 actually introduced a motion to declare
war against France, defended the Administration, but declared that France
was “insincere, base, and abominable.” Felix Grundy (Dem.) said, “Great,
indeed, are the injuries and insults which we have received from the French
government.” Montgomery (Dem.) said that both France and England
had “violated our perfect rights, and we had a right to select our enemy.’
Telfair (Dem.) would despise more than he could express an administra-
tion allied with France. Such a charge “is the bitterest insult that could
be offered.” And Calhoun, steadily defending the government’s course,
said that he should “ever deem the conduct of France to have been
improper.”

The debate on the extension of enlistments, Jan. 14-18, 1814, brought out
similar remarks; that on the accrediting of an American Minister to France
did the same; and the Loan Bill, February 9 to March 3, furnished the
opposition with an especially good opportunity to challenge the Adminis-
tration’s relations with France. Said Bigelow (Fed.), “Until, sir, my mind
is better satisfied upon this subject, I will vote for no loans, I will vote for
no men or money to prosecute this war.”’ In the debate on the report of the
Ways and Means Committee, Oct. 22-25, Daniel Webster sums up these
charges :—

“Whether the measures of this government grew out of a previous stipulation, signed,
sealed, and interchanged with that of France, or whether in these matters it had
acted gratuitously and only followed the bent of its own inclination . . . these
measures were brought into play precisely at the moment when they were most
likely to aid in the overthrow of Governments and the subjugation of the nations of
Europe.” 54

17AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

c

Discounting, therefore, the utterances of members of both parties to allow
for political animosities, it is clear that the mass of the American people,
both those who favored the war with England, and those who opposed it,
were unanimous in their distrust and dislike of France, and whether they
were or were not pro-British, were definitely anti-French.

Meanwhile the situation on the continent had been undergoing a change.
News still travelled very slowly, and it was not until long after the retreat
from Moscow had occurred that the United States understood the magni-
tude of the disaster. As the power of Napoleon gradually gave way, after
this, under the pressure of the coalition, the Americans, first incredulous,
since the idea of Napoleonic domination had become fixed, received with
rejoicing the news of his downfall. As Gouverneur Morris, New York’s
famous orator and politician, wrote to Harrison Grey Otis, “Everything
which contributes to depress and much more to destroy the power of
Bonaparte, is in my opinion a benefit, and therefore a proper subject of
rejoicing to mankind.” ®> In Boston, April 10, 1813, there was a dinner,
with Harrison Grey Otis as the speaker, and the Russian consul as the
guest of honor. Otis, an active Federalist and a bitter opponent of the
government, said that the United States had for several years exhibited
a “coincidence in the measures and a conformity to the plans of Napoleon
too plain to be mistaken,” and that in the fall of Napoleon the basis of
this disastrous policy was undermined and the country rescued from its
greatest danger.*® At a similar dinner at Georgetown, in June, Robert
Goodloe Harper, then prominent in Virginia and Maryland politics, is
said to have coined the phrase “Alexander the Deliverer,’’ which became
a great favorite with all those who saw in the Russian Emperor the prime
cause of the overflow of the French.°? Timothy Pickering recorded in his
diary that he went from Washington to Annapolis with several other
congressmen to attend a celebration of the victory of the allies.5®

An oration by Thomas Snell illustrates the way in which these new de-
velopments affected the criticism of the government policy.

 

 

“What evidence stands upon record in the secrets of our cabinet, that our servile aid
has been pledged, and our independence bound to the altar of Napoleon’s ambition
to be sacrificed, I will not presume to conjecture. But the friends of peace, for the
purpose of undeceiving the public and saving our beloved country from impending
ruin, would contribute millions, for a fair exhibition of the diplomatic correspondence
between France and America for the last twelve years. Nothing of this correspond-
ence but garbled extracts have we ever been permitted to see: while every syllable
of that between Great Britain and ourselves has been permitted to the public. Why
this difference in the cases? . . . Why? if there be not hidden iniquity, that would
alarm the public mind and consign its authors to merited infamy? Such continued
secrecy excites just suspicion. And in the present case, this suspicion is strengthened

18THE WAR OF 1812

 

in the public mind by the consideration that Mr. Madison, as well as his predecessor
in office, is understood to be a citizen of France... .

“I cannot refrain from congratulating my fellow-citizens, that the bonds of enslaved
Europe are bursting asunder: that the natives are asserting their independence and
casting off the yoke of oppression; that by the singular interposition of Heaven the
arms of Russia have completely triumphed over the boasted strength of the despot.
_.. What influence this singular change in Europe will have upon the policy of
our rulers and the state of our country is still uncertain. While it may raise the de-
mands of England in settling a peace, and animate her to a more vigorous prosecu-
tion of the war, must it not destroy the confidence of our administration in the
French Emperor as invincible, and induce them to abandon his commercial system
as a desperate cause?”

The newspapers had much to say of the relation of the new situation
abroad to American affairs. “Nothing decisive will be done,” said the
Georgetown Federal Republican, “by our government towards an accom-
modation with Great Britain, until Mr. Madison is satisfied that the war
power of France is at an end. Whenever he is so satisfied, we have not a
doubt a treaty of amity and commerce will be negotiated. . . . France
forced us into this war, and while she is able to supply the force to keep
us in it, there is no hope of getting out of it.” *® From the Newburyport
Herald came the following effusion,—

“That baleful meteor which has for years carried in its train pestilence and war,
blighting the hopes and confusing the prospects of the whole Christian world, is now
extinguished, leaving nought but the effects of its noisome exhalations and odious
deformity for (it is hoped) the benefit of all mankind, and a salutary lesson to
posterity. .. . Well may it be for our rulers if they should escape the just and
merited fate of their beloved master.” °°

The Boston Centinel, one of the most bitter critics of the Administration’s
policy, said,—

“From 1800 to a late day, France (i.e. Napoleon) has in fact ruled this country.

__. For her we checked our trade with Britain; for her we... laid a perpetual
embargo and kept it as long as we could bear it. For her we declared war. For her
we adopted the colonial system and interdicted British goods. . . . For her we have

robbed our own citizens. For her, we have incurred immense debts. For her we have
destroyed, or attempted to do so, the liberty of the press. For her we have adopted
the most odious taxes, ten times as grievous as those to avoid which the revolution-

ary war was undertaken. . . . Such are the privations and evils, which France has
either required or brought upon us. She did not do it by coaxing, or flattering us.
She did it by the lash of a scorpion. . . . She plundered, and whipped, and insulted

us, and we were submissive in proportion to her insolence, injustice, and cruelty.”

Said the Providence American,—

“The recent intelligence from France... justifies the opinion that the throne of

19AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

the Bourbons will no longer be profaned by a plebeian exotick usurper. . . . The
calamities she [Paris] must now experience may chasten the corrupt morals, reform
the lax principles and discipline the sanguine temper of her inhabitants. They may
teach her that the career of vice is seldom successful, and that the sturdy unostenta-
tious virtues deserve and command more genuine regard than all the delirious
splendors of embroidered vice.” 62

Charles Carroll of Carrollton, the famous signer of the Declaration of
Independence, who had manifested throughout the period a strong antip-
athy to France, and a belief that the policy of the American government
was bound up with that of Napoleon, declared,—“Till Bonaparte is
defeated so as to be forced to relinquish all his conquests and to make
peace,—or, what would be more desirable, till death rids the world of the
tyrant, I am persuaded no peace will take place between this country and
England.” ** Rufus King “cared nothing about the Bourbons” but thought
that their reéstablishment might and probably would bring about a gen-
eral peace, and therefore hoped earnestly that the Allies would persevere
until Bonaparte was expelled from France.

The sermon of Samuel Cary, to the “Ancient and Honorable Artillery
Company” at their anniversary celebration in Boston, on June 6, created
a sensation and was quoted far and wide, receiving liberal quotas of both
praise and blame. It was a scathing indictment of the Napoleonic system,
coupled with a vigorous application of the old charges of “‘base servility”
and of “French influence.” The Fourth of July address of Rev. Daniel
Dana at Newburyport was also considered an important effort. “Do any
object,” he said, “that to rejoice in the recent triumphs of the allied
powers is to rejoice at the success of our enemies? . . .” But nothing
but good, he thought, could come to the country from the defeat of Napo-
leon. At the opening of the Massachusetts Legislature in June of this year
Governor Strong spoke of the dissatisfaction that the war had caused
in that state, but added that the changes in the European situation
would soon bring it to a close. The two houses of the legislature responded
in a similar strain. The Senate reply said:—“The arm of the mighty
oppressor, in whose cause Our government seemed disposed to engage, is
broken. Europe is delivered from thraldom, and our liberties ransomed
from his grasp. The . . . despotism which had nearly exterminated free-
dom from the earth ... is at length overturned.” ** The lower house
congratulated his Excellency upon “the entire prostration of that mon-
strous military despotism.” “Upon this subject we can scarcely command
language to express our feelings.” °°

Perhaps it will not be amiss to include here a somewhat full description
of the most notable celebrations which expressed the popular enthusiasm.

20THE WAR OF 1812

 

 

The Boston Centinel of June 4 had carried what were huge black head-
lines for a newspaper of that day.

“GLORIOUS NEWS FOR EUROPE! Bonaparte Banished to Elba— The Ancient
Family and Ancient Boundaries of France Restored— A General Peace in Europe
made!”

On the following days it summoned the citizens of Boston to a “Splendid
and Solemn Religious Festival” to be held in the Stone Chapel, on June 15.
On the appointed day the chapel was filled to the doors. Among the guests
were the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor, the City Council, and
a number of members of the legislature. The elaborate program included
“A full organ Voluntary,” “A Solemn Invocation,” “Music from Handel,
with the chorus, ‘The Lord shall reign forever and ever’ sung by a choir
of more than a hundred voices and accompanied by the organ and various
instruments,’ “Very appropriate and sublime Lessons from the Holy
Scriptures,” “Music from Handel, with the ‘Hallelujah Chorus’ sung and
accompanied as before,” a Prayer, and “An Ode, written by request of the
Committee of Arrangements” sung as a solo, “the repeats accompanied by
the whole choir” :—

“France! at the throne eternal

Of Great Jehovah bow!

For Heav’n’s avenging thunderbolt

Has laid thy tyrant low!

The bloody, baleful star shall guide

The monster’s way no more,

Where the slain, o’er the plain,

Lie weltering in their gore,

And through a thousand thousand streams,
Life’s ebbing torrents pour;

. . . .

The hand of Heav’n whose vengeance
Is ’gainst the despot hurled,

To France her rightful king restores,
And Freedom to the world.

Hosannas to the King of Kings

Let Freedom’s voice bestow;

Again raise the strain,

Till the patriot’s heart shall glow,
And Heaven on high approve the song
Of grateful man below.”

> . ° ° . ° 2

A sermon by Rev. William Ellery Channing followed, then a Psalm, sung
by the whole congregation, with the organ and choir. After the conclud-
2]ain:nioiessintaiabelnieineein sittin Beat

AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

ing prayer and benediction, the following resolutions, introduced by Sena-
tor Gore, in an “impressive speech,” were adopted with much enthusiasm.

“Resolved, that the citizens of Massachusetts here assembled, contemplate with un-
feigned joy the emancipation of the French people from the usurped power of a
ferocious military adventurer, and they rejoice in the prospect that thirty-five mil-
lions of their fellowmen have a reasonable expectation of being blest with temperate
liberty, adapted to their state of society and habits, and a constitution and ad-
ministration of government, apparently conformed to their wishes. They con-
gratulate the venerable head of the house of Bourbon on his restoration to the throne
of his ancestors, to which he is called by the entreaties of his people, and from which
he has been excluded by a series of crimes at which humanity shudders. They remem-
ber the language of their own revolutionary sages and patriots, glowing with affec-
tion and respect towards the late unhappy and injured possessor of the throne of
the Bourbons; nor can they forget that the good understanding between this country
and France was never interrupted so long as that family were in power, but that in-
juries and insults, such as no nation ever before submitted to, have been heaped
upon it by all their successors, from the transient despot of a day, to the more
permanent tyrant clothed with imperial authority. . . .”

The resolutions further congratulated Holland, Germany, Italy, Switzer-
land, Prussia, Spain and Portugal on their liberation, and highly compli-
mented the “Great Head of the Confederacy” ‘Alexander the Deliverer.”
In the evening the State-House was “most brilliantly illuminated” “by
about 2000 lamps,” and a band played national tunes in the “Colonade.”
Several hundred rockets, and other fire-works, were set off on the Com-
mon. From the Neck “heated shot and 40 or 50 carbonic comets” were
set off. The mansions of the late Governors Hancock and Bowdoin on each
side of the State-House, bore in the attic windows, the one a fleur de lis,
the other a transparency with the words “In honor of the Allies.” %
The Boston Patriot disapproved of this demonstration, and remarked
scornfully that several attempts were made to raise a general huzza, but
they were unsuccessful, as the people did not know what it was all about.®
The Essex Register, too, thought that the great body of citizens, even in-
cluding Federalists, were not in favor of the celebration, and did not care
to share in it. °° The Philadelphia Aurora approvingly quoted an editorial
from the Baltimore Patriot——‘The Bostonians are about to have a festi-
val,—and why? Because the British have, by a change abroad, been en-
abled to send twenty-five thousand troops (to begin with) to spread deso-
lation, if practicable, over our land! . . . The whole history of the world
never presented an instance of such absolute fatuity, out of the walls of
a mad house.” The New York Columbian took the same attitude, 7°

At Hartford, Conn., the celebration took the form of a dinner, with the

22THE WAR OF 1812

 

usual addresses and toasts. Among the latter was:—‘The people of the
United States. As they have learned that the tyrant was not invincible,
may they also learn that his adherents are not infallible!” ** The Essex
Register, again critical, remarked that the Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
every member of Council except a certain Federal editor, and most of the
House of Representatives, declined to attend this dinner.
The Federalists of New York were not to be outdone by Boston. Rufus
King acted as chairman of the committee on arrangements, and it is some-
what significant to note that when he wrote to John Jay inviting him to be
present, he said, “Mr. Morris is to deliver an oration. Notwithstanding
our admiration of his rare talents and extensive information, I should, I
confess, like that you and I should see the discourse before it is pronounced
—cannot this be brought about?” 7? Mr. Jay was ill and unable to be
present, but sent word that he sincerely rejoiced in the downfall of Napo-
leon, and regretted that he could not be with his friends on “so joyful an
Occasion:” °°
The ceremonies opened with a dinner, at which all the foreign consuls were
present, except the British consul, who was not invited, and the French,
who declined the invitation offering as excuse the statement that he “had
not yet received instructions from his court to rejoice”! The hall was
elaborately decorated with the arms and colors of the allied powers,
except England. Austria, Prussia and other German States, Russia, Spain,
Portugal, Switzerland, the Papal States, Holland,—the flags of all these
were entwined with that of the United States and with the white flag of
the Bourbons. A Temple of Concord, its pillars wound with laurel;
wreaths; festoons; flowers; allegorical representations of historical in-
cidents; portraits of Washington and of other heroes of liberty,—every-
thing that could be devised to increase the gala effect, had been included.
Among the toasts at this dinner were:—“France, the first friend of America:
may the recall of her king become the harbinger of concord at home, and
the restoration of her antient rank among the nations of the world.”
“Louis 18, King of France and Navarre, heir-at-law to American grat-
itude.” There were toasts, too, to the Emperor of Russia, the King of
Prussia, and to all the European rulers except the English king. Unfortu-
nately, in spite of this carefully correct attitude, the rumor got abroad that
the British flag had been placed above the American in the decorations.
A mob gathered, cries of “Tory” were heard, the guests were the recipients
of insulting remarks, and some stones were thrown. Several arrests had
to be made before peace was restored.
On this occasion Gouverneur Morris delivered one of his most important
23=

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the bn we PoP ae
feats ipsa

sscuuaneRoeebes Serra ecet

 

AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

addresses. The opening phrases were copied far and wide, and the whole
speech created an unusual sensation. For years afterward it was quoted by
both friends and enemies.

“’Tis done! The long agony is over. The Bourbons are restored. France reposes in
the arms of her legitimate prince. We may now express our attachment to her con-
sistently with the respect we owe to ourselves. . .. Thank God, we can, at length,
avow the sentiments of gratitude to that august family, under whose sway the fleets
and armies of France and Spain were arrayed in defence of American liberty. We
then hailed Louis the Sixteenth Protector of the Rights of Mankind. We loved him.
We deplored his fate. We are unsullied by the embrace of his assassins. ... But
where, my country! O where shall I hide the blush, that these monsters were taken
to your bosom? I retract the charge—Nations of the earth! believe not the imputa-
tion. The virtuous sons of America were not guilty of ingratitude... . |! Jo! holy
martyr! their grateful bosoms reéchoed thy dying groan. In humble submission they
viewed events whose mystery they could not comprehend, and waited the develop-
ment of eternal wisdom. . . . The Bourbons are restored. Rejoice, France! Spain!
Portugal! You are governed by your legitimate kings. Europe! Rejoice. The Bour-
bons are restored. The family of nations is completed. Peace, the dove descending
from Heaven, spreads over you her downy pinions. And thou, too, my much-wronged
country, bleeding as thou art, rejoice. The Bourbons are restored. Thy friends now
reign. The long agony is over. The Bourbons are restored.” 74

Typically American is the comment which the New York Columbian
made on this address: “‘ ‘It is done—The agony is over—the Bourbons are
restored,’ This is the bold onset of Gouverneur Morris’ oration. But he did
not tell us how far the restitution to the Bourbons was to extend, and
whether the Hon. Gov. Morris himself is to restore the furniture of the
unfortunate Louis XVI he purchased for assignats. No doubt the patriotic
orator will deliver up the gorgeous plate, the splendid tapestry, the noble
clock etc., etc., formerly belonging to the royal household, and gotten from
the regicides by him for a song! If ‘the king must have his own again’
surely the plunder of the Thuilleries must be embraced in the general res-
titution, and the royal orator find the agony not quite over yet!” 75
Evidently not all the people of the United States found themselves able,
in spite of their strong prejudice against Napoleon, to rejoice whole-
heartedly in the successes of the allies. Their satisfaction over the mis-
fortunes of the Emperor were accompanied by serious misgivings as to
the effect they might have on the war with Britain. They also showed
an interest in the future fate of France herself. In February, 1814,
William Wirt, the well-known Maryland lawyer, wrote to his friend Judge
Carr,—

“What effect will Napoleon’s reverses have on us? Some think that Britain
will take if not higher, at least more obstinate ground against us on
account of her triumphs. Others, again, think that having gotten the

24THE WAR OF £812

 

 

Emperor down, she will be anxious to devote all her powers to his annihila-
tion, and therefore be the better inclined to have peace with us. My own
notion is that she has no intention of giving up any point in the quarrel.
. . . As for Napoleon, I care no more for him, in himself considered, than
I do for any other tornado that is past. But will France, drained and
exhausted, be able to make head against this northern hive, or will she
share the fate of Poland? I am curious to see the character of France in
this new situation in which she is placed.” 7* Calhoun thought that Eng-
land might have lost by the changes which seemed to be so much in her
favor. She could at least no longer claim to be fighting for her existence,
and justify all her deeds by this excuse. Moreover, the charge of “French
influence’ must be decidedly weakened.*7 Most of the Republican editors
agreed with him in this. The Philadelphia Democratic Press thanked God
that the “extinguisher” had been finally put upon this “stale charge.” “It
can no longer be made an excuse for holding back that we are at war to
aid Napoleon; he is to all political purposes dead and buried. Whatever
doubts may have existed as to the motives or objects of the war, there can no
longer be any doubt as to the necessity for its being vigorously conducted.
There can no longer be admitted to be any parties in the United States
other than an American and a British party. “Those who are not for us
are against us.’” *® Niles’ Register “heartily desires that the fate of the
invaders of Russia shall be the fate of the invaders of France.” The editor
feels that British pressure has made the terms given to Napoleon unduly
hard. He believes that the allies will yet experience the most signal disas-
ters that have marked the pages of history, and will deserve them. They
have abandoned all the great principles they affected to support, and
calamity may teach them not to do to others what they would not should
be done to themselves.*®

John Quincy Adams, writing from Reval to his mother, May 12, also
fears “what use the Avengers will make of their Victory” and especially
that the policy of crippling France will be carried too far.*° The Americans
who had been sent abroad as Peace Commissioners all felt that the dis-
asters of France would have an unfavorable reaction upon their task.
Gallatin wrote to Clay:—‘‘You are sufficiently aware of the total change
in our affairs produced by the late revolution, and by the restoration
of universal peace in the European world, from which we alone are ex-
cluded. A well-organized and large army is at once liberated from any
European employment, and ready, together with a superabundant naval
force, to act immediately against us. How ill-prepared we are to meet it
in a proper manner, no one knows better than yourself.” ** Bayard wrote
to Clay in the same vein, and Crawford, the Minister at Paris, sent the

25

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Commissioners a long, anxious letter. The instructions from home bore
the same troubled note.
In the Boston Patriot of May 18 appeared this statement :-—

“The federalists manifest the most extravagant joy at the idea of the restoration of
the Bourbons in France; but if the allies should succeed in re-establishing the old
dynasty what would be the effect upon the United States? If the Bourbons should
be restored a general peace would probably take place throughout Europe, and
England become the predominating power of the world. In truth, the restoration of
the Bourbons might be considered the conquest of France by England; England
being the soul of the coalition through which that event would be effected. Having
no longer any object in Europe against which to direct her arms, she might send her
fleets and armies to Canada, and from thence march them into the very heart of the

United States. . . . We would therefore advise the federalists to moderate their joy,
and weigh well the consequence before they so fully indulge in the wishes of the
British cabinet for the total overthrow of Bonaparte. . . . We caution them not to

be too outrageous in their prayers for the downfall of Napoleon and the restoration
of the corrupt and immoral Bourbons.”

The General Repository struck a note which was to become frequent
after the return from Elba: The allies, said this journal, had no right to
dethrone the Emperor and reinstate the Bourbons. “After the defeats the
armies of Bonaparte have met with, the French people can, if they please,
get rid of their tyrant themselves. If they do not wish to do this, no
foreign power has the right to interfere.” ** Other papers show the trend of
conservative public opinion. The Boston Patriot,—

“Louis, bred up in England, amid all the prejudices of the Britons, and owing to
that country his fortune, his prosperity, nay, his very throne, . . . cannot of course
become ungrateful to her. England will sway every action of the court of France;
she will rule her councils, govern her king, and steer the nation by her own chart
and compass. Louis will be but the shadow of the French government, England the
substance.” 88

The Philadelphia Aurora,—

“The late intelligence from Europe is of such a character as to awaken the patriotic
feelings, and to fill with anxiety the breast of every American. A revolution which
defied all human calculation to have foreseen, has been brought about through the
corrupting agency of our enemy... . France, governed by a British pauper, must
from necessity as well as policy, be for some time nothing more than a province of
England.” &

The National Advocate,—

“Hence we could not bring ourselves to rejoice at the victories of Russia, who was
fighting the battles of our enemy. Whether the invader or the invaded, we could re-
gard her in no other light than as shedding her blood in the cause of Britain.” 5

26WAR OF 1812

 

 

The Albany Argus,—

“French influence is producing astonishing changes in the opinions of federalists. But
a short time since, Talleyrand was an archfiend second to none but Bonaparte; the
French generals mere upstarts and the French nation a parcel of infidels, cut-throats,
and frog-eaters! They have suddenly undergone a surprising transformation; and
are now all considered good and loyal subjects of his most Christian majesty Louis
XVIII. What has brought about this remarkable change in federal opinion? French-
men have ceased to make war against England!” 86

These are the main lines of argument in the newspapers. From the “elder
statesmen” a few quotations must be included, for they had known the
French alliance, had seen the Revolution in all its phases, and had watched
the Napoleonic Empire rise and wane. It was against these men that the
Federalist orators had been most bitter, and Jefferson especially received
a constant flow of invective as a partisan of France. Yet in his correspond-
ence we find frequently repeated the statement that Napoleon is an un-
principled tyrant, whose defeat must be a cause for rejoicing. But,—and
he makes this point very clear,—the Emperor should not be so weakened as
to keep him from chastising England. He did not wish to see Napoleon
conquer Russia, but he did wish to see him close the Baltic to the British.
And when the success of the allies was evident, and the sentence of banish-
ment was issued, he wrote,—

“The Attila of the age dethroned! the ruthless destroyer of ten millions of the hu-
man race, whose thirst for blood appeared unquenchable, the great oppressor of the
rights and liberties of the world, shut up within the circle of a little island in the
Mediterranean, and dwindled to the condition of an humble and degraded pensioner
on the bounty of those he has most injured. . . . How meanly he closes his inflated
career! ... 1 own that while | rejoice, for the good of mankind, in the deliverance
of Europe from the havoc which would never have ceased while Bonaparte should
have lived in power, I see with anxiety the tyrant of the ocean remaining in vigor,
and even participating in the merit of crushing his brother tyrant.” 87

And John Adams said,—

“Napoleon is a military fanatic like Achilles, Alexander, Cesar, Mahomet, etc... .
But is it strict to call him an usurper? Was not his elevation to the empire of France
as legitimate and authentic a national act as that of William the III or the House of
Hanover . . . or as the election of Washington to the command of our army, or to
the chair of the states? ... I wish that France may not still regret him. . . but I
agree with you that the milk of human kindness in the Bourbons is safer for man-
kind than the fierce ambition of Napoleon.” §8

The forebodings as to the effect of the French defeat were only partially

fulfilled. The parleys indeed dragged on until the end of the year, but the

huge British reinforcements which were feared did not reach America,
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and the glorious victory at New Orleans filled the country with enthusiasm
and hope. The genius of the Peace Commissioners proved equal to the
occasion, and the peace which they signed was far better than anyone
in the early days of the war could have hoped. And even though there was
criticism, and plenty of it, and the fate of Moose Island and of the fisheries
caused warm discussion, yet the war was over, somehow, and everyone
was glad. The nation drew a long breath, and set itself to the rebuilding
of its prosperity, and the payment of its debts. Even the party animosities
slackened somewhat and the newspapers found it possible to include more
news and less abuse. Napoleon, so far as anybody thought or seemed to
care, was “Czsar, dead and turned to clay” and rarely did anyone even
recall the ghost of his troublesome “influence.”

And then, without a hint of warning, there came, in the last days of
April, the news of what had happened nearly two months before,—the
return from Elba. At first, so great was the astonishment that no one
thought of praise or blame, or of political results that should concern
America. The magic of the Napoleonic name reasserted itself. This was
news only, news of the greatest, demanding the biggest type and all the
space the details could fill. These details were eagerly gathered, from
masters of incoming ships, from returning travellers, from personal letters,
and from rare copies of French newspapers, hastily translated in the office
of the first paper that received them and shared with friendly editors all
over the country.

The first clear reaction, which appeared in newspapers of all shades of
political affiliation, was the recognition of the probability of a renewal of
the continental war, and the strong feeling that the United States must
maintain a strict neutrality. The fear, too, was expressed that a renewal of
the continental war might mean a renewed series of provocations on the
part of England which would make necessary the reopening of war with
that country. ®® Next, the anti-British feeling showed itself in the recogni-
tion of the fact that a strong France would limit the power of England, and
might for this reason be welcomed. ®° The Federalist papers at first showed
a surprising moderation. They seemed to be dazed by the overwhelming
success of the plot, and to feel a sort of hopeless resignation. Moreover there
was an amazing lack of enthusiasm over the Bourbons. With the celebra-
tions of the previous year in mind, one would scarcely expect to find this
in the New York Evening Post,—

“We certainly feel and may be allowed to express our deep regret at what has hap-
pened to the throne of the Bourbons; we lament the reverse of fortune which has

befallen this amiable, but we are compelled to say, weak prince. . .. The Bourbons
have given, not only evidence of imbecility, but there is too much reason to fear
28WAR OF 1812

 

there was a subservience to England. Evidence of this appears in the decree they
passed, preventing American vessels from entering the ports of France, which had
captured any British vessel on the passage, although her prize might have been
taken to a port in the United States.” 91

This from the Boston Centinel, also, differed somewhat from previous
utterances.

“The Journal de Paris gives many addresses to Napoleon, with his laconic answers.
Though short, these answers show him to be a totally altered man. ‘Sweet are the
uses of adversity!’ We see now no tirades against England; nothing about con-
tinental systems; not a lisp about conquering the freedom of the seas or other
ci-devant nonsense, but everything (on paper at least) is as liberal as air and as
correct as truth.” 9

A violent attack on this article from a correspondent brought out the
further comment,—

“The ‘head and front of our offending,’ it seems, is that we have remarked that the
answers of Napoleon to the addresses made to him on the last of March, shewed him
to be a ‘totally altered man.’ ... We have no evidence that these were not his
sentiments at the time he uttered them, notwithstanding they are much at variance
with his former language and conduct. Reformations as astounding as this would be
have taken place. ... He may yet repair some of the wrongs he has done to the
world. .. . The French people have had a recent sample of the governing talents of
a Bourbon and a Corsican and it certainly cannot be unworthy an American citizen
to hope they may have a fair opportunity of choosing which of them to serve.” 95

Rufus King thought France could be ruled only with the sword, and
“The poor Bourbons were without the means as they seem to have been
without the talents to rule the country.” ** And Gouverneur Morris, of all
people, said —“Louis deserved, in some measure, what happened. I an-
ticipated trouble and turmoil, though not so great a catastrophe.” %

Before very long, however, as it became evident that the allies were
ready to unite in the strongest measures against Napoleon, the Federalist
papers resumed their abuse of him, and continued this until after Water-
loo. But it is to be observed that there were no elaborate festivities on
this occasion. Throughout the country there was a strong feeling that the
French people had a right to decide for themselves who should be their
ruler, and that while the allies might be justified in defensive measures,
they had no excuse for a second dethronement of Napoleon. He had re-
turned; the people had received him willingly. If they preferred him the
choice was theirs; and the cause of human liberty demanded that they
should be undisturbed in their decision. Even the Federalist papers showed
this feeling to a degree. ®* Jefferson illustrated it in his letter of June 14,
1815, to his friend Mr. Leiper. He had made comments not at all flatter-
ing to Napoleon, then added a postcript,—

29

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“Before I had sent my letter to the post-office, I received the new treaty of the
allied powers, declaring that the French nation shall not have Bonaparte, and shall
have Louis 18 for their ruler. They are all then as great rascals as Bonaparte himself.
While he was in the wrong, I wished him exactly as much success as would answer
our purposes, and no more. Now that they are wrong and he in the right, he shall
have all my prayers for success, and that he may dethrone every man of them.” %7

And to John Adams, a little later, he wrote,—

“At length Bonaparte has got on the right side of a question. From the time of
his entering the legislative hall till his retreat to Elba, no man has execrated him
more than myself... . But at length, and as far as we can judge, he seems to have
become the choice of his nation. At least, he is defending the cause of his nation,
and that of all mankind, the rights of every people to independence and self-
government.” 98

The National Intelligencer said — (May 6)

“The will of the French nation is to stand for nothing ... and the first of the
allies who chooses to let slip the dogs of war, is privileged to stain the fields of
Europe in blood. . . . It is not simply a question between this or that man, between

him who calls himself a legitimate sovereign and him who is stigmatized as an
usurper, but between the French people and the kings of Europe, whether they shall
choose a king for themselves, or have one forced upon them. . . . Bonaparte is to
be the ruler not of the Russians or the English, but of the French only.”

The National Advocate declared,—

 

 

“The principles upon which he regained his throne are the only ones on which any
just or free government can exist. . . . Now that the object of the coalition must
be to extinguish the last glimmering light of freedom in that quarter of the globe,
and to degrade the whole human species to vassals of a few hundred bipeds, we
will not hesitate to avow that we wish success to France. Her cause is no longer
the personal cause of Napoleon, but the cause of national independence and
freedom.” 9°

Niles’ Register was emphatically for Napoleon, for all the reasons which
have been given; and also because the editor thought he had constructive
qualities needed for the prosperity of France, and most especially because
“If ever there was a ‘legitimate king’ (which I doubt) that king is Napoleon
Bonaparte, for the people have willed freely and frankly that he should
have the supreme authority.” *°° The Lexington Reporter thought the
“league against the rights of man” very formidable, and was sorry that
the United States “are not a hundred years older, that they might help
to demonstrate that the rights of the people are not to be ignored.” ** The
Carthage (Tenn.) Gazette said: “If the allies dare to strike against the
rights of independent France we hope that they will, like the battle-
30

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ments of the Bastile, be prostrated in the dust and ashes.” 1° The North
Carolina American Recorder declared that the “Proclamation of the allies
against Napoleon is indeed the most wicked and diabolical state paper
we have ever read.” 1° When the news of Waterloo came, these champions
of liberty refused as long as they could to believe it. When they were at
last convinced, little sympathy for Napoleon in person was shown, but for
France the feeling was:—

“We cannot forbear the expression of our profound regrets, principally on account
of the state of anarchy and confusion in which it involves the French Nation. If
the report prove true, then has France begun a retrograde march of five and twenty
years in the science of government. Her trials are beginning rather than ending; and
she is menaced, we fear, with the extinction of her very name from the map of
Europe.” 104

“The nation appeared to be for him, and the army adored him. . . . He nearly ex-
terminated two armies by his masterly maneuvres and the fury of his troops; when
treachery seemed to have effected an explosion, which was the signal for his retreat,
and the prelude to his fall—but firmness and magnanimity gave dignity to his
descent. If his resignation preserves the independence and prevents the devastation
of France, it is well! But of this we have feeble hopes... . France has not been
faithful to the man who was fittest to protect her. . . . If any talent could uphold
her, it was his. The money and the intrigues of the British government, more effec-
tive than the allied armies ... have moved everything. ... At any rate, the en-
emies of freedom have triumphed. . . . Bonaparte has lost all except honor—France
seems likely to lose even that.” 1°5

Henry Clay was in London when the Battle of Waterloo was fought. It
is said that he dined with Lord Castlereagh, and the question of Napoleon’s
going to America was raised. “If he goes there,” said Lord Liverpool, “will
he not give you much trouble?” “None whatever,” instantly replied Mr.
Clay. “We shall be glad to receive such a distinguished though unfortunate
exile, and we shall soon make a good democrat of him!” 2° So, for the
United States, ended the glory of Napoleon.

Looking back over the varieties and changes of public sentiment during
this period, we see that it has been largely influenced by American in-
terests and by American party struggles, and that no firm foundation for
a policy of friendliness with France has been laid. It is true that on
a question of Liberty, that principle so dear to the hearts of Americans,
and so near to their experience of the moment, sympathy for France was
quick; but recent injuries lay unrepaired and unforgotten, and the temper
of the day held for the ally of a few decades earlier both criticism and
suspicion. Friendly relations were possible, but irritation and sharp
difference of opinion were probable, and there was no background of mu-
tual understanding and confidence to smooth the way for conciliation.

31

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NOTES AND SOURCES

1E, Williams, Statesman’s Manual, |: 287.

2 Macon to Nicholson, Mar. 24, 1812. Henry Adams, History of the United States
to 1820, V1: 196.

8 Raleigh Register and North Carolina State Gazette, July 5, 1811.

4 Jefferson to Jas. Maury, Apr. 25, 1812. From Writings of Thomas Jefferson, P. L.
Ford, ed., IX: 349. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam’s Sons, Publishers, New York and
London.

5 Jefferson to Madison, June 6, 1812. 7b., 1X: 355.

6 Jefferson to Madison, May 30, 1812. /b., 1X: 354.

7 Jefferson to Kosciusko, June 28, 1812. /b., IX: 361.

8 Madison to Jefferson, May 25, 1812. From Writings of James Madison, G. Hunt,
ed., VIII: 191. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam’s Sons, Publishers, New York and London.
9 Niles’ Register, 11: 273-4.

10 Niles’ Register, 11: 207.

11 [b., 284.

12 Jb., [11 : 439-40.

18S. Perkins, History of the Late War (New Haven, Conn., 1825), 51.

14T. H. Benton, Abridgment of Debates in Congress, 1789-1856, 1V: 544-550; Niles’
Register, 11: 259-266; Benton, 1V: 586; American Review, 1V: 79-80. (Appendix).
15 American Review, 1V: 71. (Appendix).

16 Jas. Monroe, Writings. S. M. Hamilton, ed., V: 199; American State Papers, III:
517.

17 Madison to Barlow, Aug. 11, 1812. Madison, Writings, Hunt, ed., VIII: 209-10.
18 Niles’ Register, V: 348-9. Monroe to J. Q. Adams, July 1, 1812.

19 Niles’, 11: 202. May 21, 1812.

20 Niles’, 11: 412. July 4, 1812.

21 Raleigh Register, July 7, 1812.

22 Carthage (Tenn.) Gazette, July 18, 1812.

23 Jb. July 11, 1812. Daniel Webster, in a Fourth of July Address before the Wash-
ington Benevolent Society of Portsmouth, spoke in similar tenor. Geo T. Curtis,
Life of D. Webster, 1: 105.

24 Niles’, II1: 246-8. Nov. 30, 1812.

25 Niles’, 111: 855. Jan. 4, 1813. Similar pronouncement from the Pennsylvania legis-
lature, Dec., 1812, Niles’, III]: 343.

26 Niles’, III: 214.

27 Timothy Dwight, July 23, 1812, Fast Day Sermon at Yale College (Pamphlet):
Francis Blake, July 4, 1812, Oration at Worcester, Mass. (Pamphlet); American Re-
view, III: 157.

28 Niles’, 11: 273-4; Perkins, History of the Late War, 61.

29 Niles’, I1: 213.

80 Niles’, 11: 309-315.

81 Amos Kendall, Autobiography, 72.

82From Rufus King, Life and Correspondence, C. R. King, ed., V: 290. King to
Gouverneur Morris, Oct. 28, 1812. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam’s Sons, Publishers, New
York and London.

33 [b., V: 279. King to Christopher Gore, Sept. 19, 1812.

32WAR OF 1812

 

384 Duyckinck, Cyclopedia of American Literature, 1: 536.

35 July 23, 1812. (Pamphlet).

86 July 23, 1812; August 20, 1812 (Pamphlet).

87 July 23, 1812. (Pamphlet).

88Same date, (Pamphlet).

89 July 23, 1812. (Pamphlet).

40 Niles’, 1V: 250. June 5, 1813.

41 Elijah Parish, Discourse at Byfield, Mass., Apr. 8, 1813 (Pamphlet).
42 Charles Prentiss, Poem (Pamphlet).

48 Niles’, 11: 197. Pickering Letters, Ib., 11: 155-6, 185-6, 201-2.

440, Pickering and C. W. Upham, Life of Timothy Pickering, 1V: 230-231.
45 Salem Gazette, Apr. 10, 1813.

46 Raleigh Register, Feb. 5, 1813.

47 Raleigh Register, Aug. 13, 1813.

48 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 11: 612. July 12, 1813.

49 Benton, Abridgment, IV: 611-702.

50 Raleigh Register, Mar. 12, 19, 26, 1813.

51 Niles’ Register, 1V: 199; Benton, 1V: 699-670.

52 John C. Calhoun, Works, Crallé, ed., I]: 53-54. Jan. 14, 1813.

88 Raleigh Register, Feb. 25, 1813; Henry Clay, Life, Correspondence, and Speeches,
feGolton, ed, V: 55-57. Jan. 8, 1813.

54 Benton, V: 17-57, 65, 125-160, 163-166, 174-287, 293, 343-55.

B5 Jared Sparks, Life and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, III: 288.

56 Niles’, 1V: 89-90.

87 Duyckinck, Cyclopedia of American Literature, 1: 638-9.

68 Pickering and Upham, Pickering, 1V: 248-9.

69 January 3, 1814.

60 June 7, 1814.

61 July 9, 1814.

62 Quoted, New York Herald, with approval, May 27, 1814.

83 Kate Rowland, Life of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, 11: 282-303, 307. Jan. 16,
1814.

64 R. King, Life and Correspondence, King, ed., V: 394. May 24, 1814.
65 Boston Centinel, June 8, 1814.

66 Jb., June 11, 1814.

87 Boston Centinel, June 18, 1814.

68 Boston Patriot, June 18, 1814, and on dangers of allied success, /b., June 22;
July 6; July 13.

89 June 17.

70 June 20. New York Columbian, June 18.

™1 Connecticut Mirror, quoted in Boston Palladium, June 17.

72 King to Jay, June 20, 1814. Jay, Letters, V: 374-5.

78 Jay to King, June 23, 1814, /b., V: 375-6.

74 New York Herald, July 1, 1814.

7 Quoted, Boston Patriot, July 9, 1814.

76 William Wirt, Memoirs, J. P. Kennedy, ed., 1: 329-330. Feb. 15, 1814.
77 Calhoun, Works, Crallé, ed., II: 88. Feb. 25, 1814.

78 Democratic Press, quoted in Boston Patriot, June 18; /b., June 4.

79 Niles’ Register, Apr. 2, 1814. VI: 81.

33

 

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80 Letters of John Quincy Adams, in American Antiquarian Society Proceedings,
XXIII: 168-9.

81 Gallatin to Clay, London, Apr. 20, 1814. Clay, Works, Colton, ed., 1V: 30; Bayard
to Clay, Apr. 20, 1814, Jb., 1V: 28-9.

82 General Repository, 1V: 144-5. July, 1813.

83 Boston Patriot, June 1; June 4, 1814.

84 Philadelphia Aurora, June 27, 1814.

85 National Advocate, cited with approval, Aurora, June 6.

86 Albany Argus, cited with approval, Boston Independent Chronicle, June 30; Ib.,
June 24.

87 From Jefferson, Writings, Ford, ed., 1X: 422-3; Ib., 443-6. Courtesy of G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, Publishers, New York and Boston; Jefferson, Works, H. A. Wash-
ington, ed., VI: 352-3. Yet the New York Herald, quoting an article in the Richmond
Enquirer in which fear was expressed lest the fall of Napoleon should strengthen Eng-
land, could say, “Well may Thomas the Philosopher of Monticello lament, for in the
destruction of Bonaparte he has lost the ‘former god of his idolatry.’” New York
Herald, June 2, 1814.

88 Jefferson, Writings, Washington, ed., VI: 358-9. See also Madison’s Message,
Statesman’s Manual, |: 320.

89 National Intelligencer, quoted in New York Evening Post, June 12, 1815; New
York Evening Post, Apr. 27, 1815; Boston Centinel, Apr. 29; May 10, 1815; Monroe
to J. QO. Adams, May II, 1815, Monroe, Writings, Hamilton, ed., V: 380.

90 Pennsylvania Republican, quoted in National Intelligencer, May 25, 1815; Niles’
Register, VIII: 159.

81 April 29, 1815.

82 May 6, 1815.

23 May 10, 1815. But Bonaparte was a “common outlaw,” according to the Boston
Gazette, May 15, 1815.

24 King to J. Trumbull, May 22, 1815, King, Life and Letters, King, ed., V: 479.

95 Gouverneur Morris, Diary and Letters, A. C. Morris, ed., I]: 589-90.

26 Boston Centinel, May 6; Boston Gazette, May 8.

97 Jefferson, Works, Washington, ed., VI: 466-7; 458-9.

98 Jb., VI: 490-91. August 10, 1815.

29 National Advocate, quoted in National Intelligencer, May 15; Baltimore Ameri-
can, similar, quoted in National Intelligencer, May 13, 1815.

100 Niles’, VIII: 159.

101 June 28, 1815.

102 August 22, 1815.

103 June 30, 1815, and quoting Philadelphia Democratic Press.

104 National Intelligencer, Aug. 9, 1815.

105 New York Columbian, quoted in National Intelligencer, Aug. 24, 1815.

106 E. L. Magoon, Living Orators in America, 140.

34S 35 >

 

 

GHVACR Ese 2

Relations with the Restored
Bourbons—Early Stages

ITH the re-establishment of the Bourbons upon the throne of

France, Franco-American relations entered upon a new phase,
radically different from that which had preceded it. Neither government
had anything to gain from an unfriendly attitude. Both saw advantages in
conciliation, the French in the creation of support for a badgered and
isolated state, the United States in providing a counterpoise to Great
Britain.
In 1815, the return of Crawford to America left the United States
without a Minister in Paris. To fill the vacancy President Madison chose
Albert Gallatin, who was then on his way home after acting as one of
the American Commissioners in the negotiation of the Treaty of Ghent.
Mr. Gallatin’s authority as one of the leaders in American politics, to-
gether with his known tact and diplomatic skill, contributed to make
him especially well fitted for the post. Moreover, his Swiss birth, which
had laid him open in America to attacks as a “foreigner,” and a tool of
“French influence,’ made him acceptable in France. His family, though
without title in democratic Geneva, was of the old French noblesse. He
had many friends in that country, among them Madame de Stael, who
was distantly related to him and whose daughter married the Duke of
Broglie, influential in French affairs. Gallatin had an insight into po-
litical conditions on the continent, and an appreciation of the difficulties
to be met, unusual among the American leaders of the day.1 Largely
because of this knowledge, however, he at first declined the appointment.
He wrote to Jefferson, November 27, 1815, that he was satisfied that at the
moment nothing could be accomplished in France, and that he was re-
luctant “to be on a mission to a degraded monarch and to a nation under
the yoke of foreign armies.” ? But the administration urged him to re-
consider his decision. In December Monroe wrote saying that he had not
published Gallatin’s letter of refusal and he hoped the latter would con-
sent to withdraw it. “The prospect of a separation of France from Eng-
land, and a better understanding between France, Russia and the UnitedAMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

States,” he argued, “has made it probable that the situation of our minister
in Paris will be more eligible than circumstances seemed to admit when
you were here. The appointment of the Duke of Richelieu as foreign
minister was made in direct opposition to the British Cabinet, and was
resented in an open and harsh manner by the Duke of Wellington. It is
understood to have been made at the instigation of the Emperor Alex-
ander.” These facts Monroe thought indicated a division between Russia
and England, and might contribute to the independence of France. “Since
you were here,” he added, “I have received a letter from the Duke of
Richelieu announcing his appointment, and expressing in strong terms a
desire to establish a good understanding between the United States and
France.” * This argument had weight with Gallatin, and finally, January
2, 1916, he accepted the position. Just before he sailed, in April, Jefferson
wrote to him:

“I sincerely rejoice that you are going to France. | do not think with you that noth-
ing can be done there. Louis XVIII is a fool and a bigot, but bating a little duplicity
he is honest and means well. He cannot but feel the heavy hand of his masters, and
that it is England which presses it, and vaunts the having had the glory of effecting
their humiliation. His ministers too, although ultra-royalists, must feel as French-
men. Although our government is an eyesore to them, the pride and pressure of
England is more present to their feelings, and they must be sensible that, having a
common enemy, an intimate connexion with us must be of value to them. England
hates us, dreads us, and yet is silly enough to keep us under constant irritation in-
stead of making us her friends. She will use all her sway over the French govern-
ment to obstruct our commerce with them, and it is exactly there you can act with
effect by keeping that government informed of the truth in opposition to the lies
of England.” ¢

 

Gallatin described his first greeting from the Duke of Richelieu as
“friendly, even cordial’ and that from the King, a few days later, as
“what is called gracious.” °

Louis XVIII, in his turn, chose wisely his diplomatic representative to
America. Serrurier, who had been Napoleon’s minister during the War of
1812, was withdrawn early in 1816 and in his place was sent M. Hyde de
Neuville. The new minister was not a stranger in this country. A con-
vinced and loyal royalist, descended on his father’s side from an English
family exiled for its Stuart sympathies, he had narrowly escaped the
guillotine during the French Revolution. He had been concerned in plots
to rescue the royal family, had assisted in the escape of aristocratic refugees,
shared in the Vendeean uprising, and conspired against Napoleon, who had
ordered him to be taken dead or alive. In 1807 he fled to America, with
his family. Here he travelled, studied medicine, and settled for a time in
New York, where he became well known through his generous interest

36

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in the other French refugees who came there, many of whom were quite
poor. He founded an “Economical School” for the children of these exiles,
and to aid in its support he published a little magazine, and organized
various “benefits” of a social nature. The United States government recog-
nized the value of this enterprise, and granted it an appropriation. In 1811
he purchased a small farm in New Brunswick, N. J. and made it his home,
dispensing therein a pleasant hospitality to his many friends, both French
and American, until the fall of Napoleon, when he hastened back to France
to assist in the restoration of his legitimate king. M. de Neuville, then,
possessed an advantage similar to Mr. Gallatin’s, of previous contact and
helpful acquaintance in his new field of labor. In character and tempera-
ment he was also well fitted for his task. After three years of close associa-
tion, part of the time under circumstances especially trying, John Quincy
Adams wrote of him,

“In all the intercourse that I have had with European statesmen, I have not met a
man of higher sentiments of honor, of kinder and more generous feelings, or of a
fairer and more candid mind.” ®

And again,

“He is a man of singularly compounded character,—a mixture of ultra-royalism and
republican liberality; frank, candid, honorable, generous, benevolent, humane, ador-
ing his country ... adhering upon principle to his party, but detesting the for-
eigners by whom his king was restored, and most especially the English. He is
flighty but not inconstant in his sentiments; accessible to reason, but not powerful
as a reasoner; quick but placable in his temper; . . . somewhat vain, and manage-
able chiefly by his vanity—altogether a safe man with whom to transact business,
and one whose good qualities greatly outweigh his failings.” 7

M. de Neuville understood that his mission was of exceptional importance.
He was instructed to endeavor to regulate in an orderly and durable man-
ner the relations between the two countries, which had suffered so severely
from the disorders in France; to cultivate good feeling; and especially to
prepare the way for France to use her good offices in averting a conflict
between the United States and Spain in the matter of the colonies.* The
cultivation of even formally friendly relations was no easy task. So long
had the French been the subject of abusive comment from all parties in
the United States that the habit seemed to be firmly fixed. People com-
monly applied to the Bourbons such terms as “besotted,” *® “bloody,”
“cruel,” “treacherous,” “‘tyrannical,’*° and “usurpers of the people’s
rights.” 1+ “Imbecile Bourbon” was used so frequently as to represent
less an epithet than a name.’? King, of Massachusetts, in a speech on the
Direct Tax Bill, declared that it was just that the French should pay “‘drop
37

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for drop of blood; life for life; till the same measure of suffering which
they have meted to other nations should be meted back to them again,
heaped up and running over.” ** Such vindictiveness was rare, but the
feeling was general that France had fallen on evil days. Henry Clay, in
the same debate on the Direct Tax, declared that she was “blotted out of
the map of Europe,” that her power, as a counterpoise to that of Great
Britain, was “annihilated—gone; never to rise again, I believe, under the
weak, unhappy and imbecile race who now sway her destinies.”’ **
Governor Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey, in his Address to the
Legislature, said that “the humbled and degraded state of France, while
it claimed the tear of sympathy for suffering humanity,” should teach
us to be thankful for our freedom, and to deserve it by our behavior.*
Governor Simon Snyder of Pennsylvania drew a similar moral from the
situation. “United, they would have stemmed the tide of invasion, and
turned back the waters of bitterness.” Now, “France, the first and most
faithful ally of the United States, is devastated and dismembered by foreign
arms” and suffers the evils of civil war. *°

Niles’ Register reported the celebration of the Fourth of July by the
American colony in Paris. One of the toasts was,—‘‘France, our oldest
ally; all our wishes are for her happiness and prosperity.” The editor
commented thus:

“France seems the natural counterpoise of England, and we heartily wish her
restoration to ‘happiness and prosperity.’

“A distinguished French gentleman, one of the old nobility, I believe, and holding
an office under Louis the Eighteenth, observed to one of my friends some time ago,
that he felt surprised at the apparent hostility of representative Americans to the
Bourbons. ‘I never did believe you loved Bonaparte, as the English reported of
you,’ said he, ‘but why hate Louis?’ ‘We are opposed to Louis,’ said my friend, ‘as
well because we believe that he was imposed on the French people for their king, as
because we do not believe that he is king. We think the Bourbons a weak and
imbecile race, entirely unfit to direct the destinies of a great nation like France;
better calculated for the cowl than the crown. If in these we are deceived—if they
shall come out from under the foreign bayonets and cast themselves upon the love
and affection of their people, giving them in return for it, a liberal constitution, and
doing their utmost to make France independent, as she ought to be—you will find
that all of us will become Bourbonites.’” 17

 

 

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The Philadelphia Aurora said:

“Britain has at last accomplished the great object for which she has so long and
anxiously contended. She has reduced France to the condition of a tributary
province,” 18

38RELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS

 

 

 

 

Criticism of the measures of the French Government was constant through-
out the year 1816. Derisive comments were frequently added to items of
news. For example:

“Marshal Count Grouchy has made his escape from the ‘deliverers’ and is safe in
Baltimore!” “30,000 persons are said to be confined in French prisons, ‘suspected of
being suspicious.’” 19 “Glorious is the return of the Bourbons. . . . To the dungeon,
is the order of the day.” 2°

After the execution of Labédoyere,

“Though Louis le Desiré cared nothing for the body or life of Labédoyere, he seems
to have had a tender concern for his soul! . . . It is undoubtedly true that the King
sent the sum of 600 francs to each of the principal churches in Paris to pay for
masses for its repose.” 71

Sharp criticism was applied to “legitimate rulers,” 22 to royal ceremonial
and extravagance, ?* to the religious intolerance, ** and to the arrests and
punishments which characterized the restoration of order.25 The discussion
of the execution of Marshal Ney may be taken as fairly typical of the
general sentiment of the country during this year. Most of the newspapers
manifested strong disapproval. The Eastern Argus (Portland, Maine).
called it “Murder most foul!” “to appease the blood-thirsty Bourbons.” *°
Niles’ Register said:

“The gallant and accomplished Ney is no more! It is to be feared that his fate will
be the fate of every great man in France. Talents must be rooted up, before the

7 OF

tree of legitimacy can flourish there.” 27

And the Georgia Journal :—

“A braver man or better general France could not produce. Indeed, in the present
state of things, the possession of these qualities, combined with a large share of
popularity and patriotism, were alone, with the timid but cruel monarchists, sufficient
to constitute guilt and ensure punishment. . . . Let not his epitaph be written until his
country shall have escaped from foreign domination, and taken her stand among the
nations of the earth.” 28

A few Federalist papers defended this execution and other repressive acts
as proofs of the strength and stability of the French government. “It
proved that Louis was not a king of dough as he had been reported.” 7°
They said that the republican form of government had been shown to be
unsuited to the French temperament. It had been a tyranny. France, re-
lieved from it, and from the Napoleonic despotism, was entering now upon
an era of peaceful and loyal devolopment. They minimized the accounts
39

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of disorder and friction, to which the other papers gave importance, and
reported regularly,—“France is tranquil.” *° “Quiet, not tranquil,” was
the retort, “the ominous and awful stillness of despotism.” *

There seemed to be a wide-spread belief in the United States that the
Bourbon government could not last; certainly not without further con-
cessions in the way of self-government on the part of the people, and the
expulsion of the foreign control. “The time is fast approaching,” said the
Eastern Argus, “when the distinguished exiles who have sought refuge
on our happy shores will be called back to support the independence of
their country, and to assist in raising the French name from the degrada-
tion to which these puny Bourbons have reduced it.” *? Jefferson said:
“France has now a family of fools at its head, from whom, whenever it
can shake off its foreign riders, it will extort a free constitution, or dis-
mount them and establish some other on the solid basis of national
right. . . .” *° And later,

“That nation is too high-minded, has too much innate intelligence and elasticity,
to remain quiet under its present compression. Sampson will arise in his strength
and probably will ere long burst asunder the cords and webs of the Philistines. . . .
Whatever may be the convulsions, we cannot but indulge the pleasing hope that
they will end in the permanent establishment of a representative government, a gov-
ernment in which the will of the people will be an effective ingredient.” 34

John Quincy Adams, writing from London to James Monroe, in April of
this year, struck an extremely pessimistic note. He thought there was
little prospect of the dissolution of the European combination against
France, and felt that the impatience and desperation of the French peo-
ple would break out in abortive insurrections, which would lead to further
dismemberment and the final partition of the country. “It is scarcely pos-
sible,” he said, “that France should escape the fate of Poland. The man-
ner in which this event is to be consummated and the distribution of the
spoils will form perhaps for some years the great subject of negotiation and
discussion among the allies.” ** Occasionally one of the American papers
remarked that “of course the form of the French government does not
really make any difference to us, anyway. France is our oldest ally and a
natural friend. Our commercial interests are bound to draw us together.
Naturally it would be more agreeable to us to see in such a nation political
institutions of which we could approve, but we must not sacrifice a
profitable relationship on that account. The critical feeling of individuals
on the subject will necessarily find expression sometimes, but the govern-
ment has nothing to do with such effusions, nor should they in any way
affect diplomatic intercourse.” *

 

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However, it can hardly be considered surprising that the French failed
to view the matter in this calm light. One of the French papers complained
because President Madison did not mention the Restoration with approval
in his Message to Congress, and accused him of ingratitude, party spirit,
and bad policy. The Baltimore Patriot retorted sharply:

“Do these French parasites of ‘legitimacy’ think that Mr. Madison has nothing
better to fill his messages with than approbatory notices of the accursed events in
Europe, which have destroyed the best hopes of general freedom, and debased
France to the condition of a British colony?” 87

At Gallatin’s first interview with the Duke of Richelieu the attitude of
the American newspapers was mentioned. Gallatin explained it as actually
due to hatred of Great Britain or apprehension of her power, 88 and this
analysis of the situation seems to be borne out to some degree by the
evidence. Through a not unusual psychological process, criticism of the
Bourbons was caused, in many cases, by hatred of the British who were
believed to control them.

American travellers and merchants in France complained of a great change
in the treatment they received. Whereas under the Bonapartist rule and
under the first Restoration they had been treated with great favor, in
strong contrast to the English, so that they often wore the tricolored
cockade or the American eagle in their hats to protect themselves from
being taken for English and insulted, °° they now found, at least among
the royalist cities, and in Bordeaux especially, constant friction. A riot
even developed in the latter city because an American captain, in hanging
his signal flags to dry, inadvertently included a tricolor. The people thought
it a direct and intentional insult, and threatened to hang all the Americans
in the city, including the consul, who afterwards had to be withdrawn.
The Mayor said that reports were in circulation that Bonaparte had landed
in France at the head of 50,000 Americans. The United States was called
“the Botany Bay of France,” and the people designated as “pirates.” The
Duke of Richelieu refused to recognize the American consul at Nantes,
“because his politics are so obnoxious,” and he also had to come home. *°
“Much sensibility,” wrote Gallatin, “is on every occasion expressed on the
subject of the hostility to the government of France, apparent in most
Administration newspapers in America. This is not brought as an official
ground of complaint, the extent of the liberty of our press being under-
stood, but is stated as an evidence of unfriendly disposition. | mention this
because several paragraphs in the Moniteur ... may in some degree
be considered as a kind of retaliation for certain pieces in the National

Intelligencer.” *
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M. de Neuville, the French minister, was irritated to the point of allowing
one instance of American free speech to assume the proportion of a diplo-
matic incident. The Postmaster at Baltimore at a Fourth of July celebra-
tion gave as a toast, ‘““The generals of France in exile: the glory of their
native land—not to be dishonored by the proscriptions of an imbecile
tyrant.” This was evidently intended as a compliment to one of the guests,
the exiled General Lefebvre-Desnouettes, who responded with: “To the
generous citizens of the United States! Every unfortunate stranger finds
here a family and brothers.” 4? The newspapers reported these toasts among
others without noticing anything extraordinary about them. But M. de
Neuville believed that he had here something which might be dealt with.
The American press and the speech of American individuals as such could
not probably be restrained. But here was a government official,—a Post-
master. In this case surely the government could and should act. He sent
therefore a sharp protest directly to the President, demanding the removal
of the offender from office. Both President Madison and his Secretary of
State, Monroe, resented the action and considered it entirely unwarranted.
Said Madison:

“Mr. de Neuville could not have given a greater proof of want of judgment than
in putting the amity of the two countries on such an issue, or of a personal wish to
flatter the ultra-royal Bourbons who may ere long accede to the throne. The proper
answer to him will be facilitated by his undertaking to dictate the precise reparation
in the case. Common delicacy would have demanded an adequate one in general
terms, leaving the mode to the Government, and the arrogance of the manner in
which he has disregarded it, forfeits the respect that might otherwise be due to his
complaint. . . . It would seem as if De Neuville hoped to hide the degradation of
the Bourbons in Europe under a blustering deportment in a distant country.” 43

 

The French minister continued to press for the punishment of “this
outrage,” “this crime,” urging “the dismissal, or at least the removal” of
the culprit, who “has permitted himself a coarse insult and the most
dastardly calumny against his Majesty Louis XVIII.” 44 Receiving no sat-
isfaction he reported the matter to his government. Gallatin was in-
structed to present conciliatory explanations in Paris, but to concede
nothing. He was told to explain that from the nature of our institutions it
would under no circumstances seem feasible to remove the offender from
office for the cause alleged, and that the peremptory tone of the French
minister had made it in this case utterly impossible. The United States
could not allow a foreign minister to dictate measures to it, particularly in
a case so closely connected with the principles of its government. The
Fourth of July is always a day of festivity when our citizens relax,
42

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assemble and express their opinions freely on all subjects. Public officials
under these circumstances lose their official character in that of citizens.
The government of this country and all its public measures are regularly
attacked. And we always read the Declaration of Independence and Great
Britain has never protested. Moreover, without alluding to any existing
sovereign in amity with the United States, this government must ab-
solutely decline the responsibility of protecting the characters of all
sovereigns who occupy the thrones of friendly powers “against all re-
proaches however justified by truth and notoriety!” *°

The Duke of Richelieu was inclined to view the matter seriously, and said
that he could not understand how “‘any government could detach itself
from its agents, and while professing regard and consideration for a friendly
sovereign, permit him to be wantonly and openly insulted by one of those
agents and refuse any reparation for such open insult.” *®° Some further
communications passed between the two governments on the subject, in the
course of which the French threatened to remove their consul from
Baltimore, as it was a scandal to leave him in a city where his sovereign
had been insulted with impunity. It was also suggested that the affair would
have an unfavorable bearing upon the question of indemnity for injuries
under Napoleon, which the United States government was undertaking to
press.47 The “affair of the Postmaster” did not get into the papers in
America until November when it was practically over. Then the National
Intelligencer carried an editorial which was widely copied, though usually
without comment. It said, in part,

“No other language, nor half so bad, has been applied to the sovereign authority of
France, in the toast which is quoted, than is daily applied without censure or pun-
ishment, to the members of our own government, by our public prints opposed to
the administration, and by hundreds of individuals: and the government can no
more control the language of those whom it invests with office, than of any other in-
dividuals in society. It cannot even secure itself from the censure of its own officers:
much less can it claim to chain their tongues and seal their lips in relation to all the
foreign powers. . . . It is enough, it appears to us, if the Executive conducts itself
in its intercourse with foreign powers, with a due regard to their rights and feel-
PSs 6 olan Se

And a little later, in commenting upon the subjects likely to engross the
attention of the Congress soon to open, the editor added that it was not
probable that the reported demand of the French minister would be suf-
fered to disturb the peace between the two nations who had at present no
real cause for enmity, and whose governments would not suffer an im-
aginary one to disturb their tranquillity.“° The Philadelphia Aurora, al-
ways given to speaking its mind, scorned the idea of giving satisfaction for

43

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a toast “which there is not a friend of liberty or virtue in the universe
would not repeat.” 5° A few other papers added phrases of criticism, and
the matter was dropped. ®t M. de Neuville himself, in conversation with
Monroe, finally admitted that he saw that it would be very difficult for
the government to take any action in the case.*?
While the behavior of the French minister in entering upon this argument
is generally condemned as a diplomatic error, it seems probable that his
desired end was actually in some degree accomplished. That is, the at-
tention of the Administration was forcibly drawn to the effect of the un-
guarded utterances of the citizens of the country upon the attempt to
cultivate friendly relations with France. Whether due solely to this realiza-
tion or not, there is to be noted a sudden and marked change in the tone
of the papers friendly to the Administration. For the next four years they
usually print items of French news without abusive comment. The editor
of Niles’ Register is an exception to this rule. He may be classed as an
“irreconcilable” who seldom missed an opportunity for a slighting re-
mark. Political events of importance in France occasionally called out a
contemptuous criticism of the Bourbons, and the American people in gen-
eral continued to doubt their stability and to distrust their motives. Yet
there are to be found an increasing number of articles favorable to France.
M. de Neuville spared no pains to demonstrate his anxiety for friendly
relations, and his undoubted sincerity and his personal worth soon began
to bear fruit. In March, 1817, Crawford wrote to Gallatin: ‘““Mr. de Neu-
ville has conciliated the people of this place and the members of Congress
very much during the winter by a prudent course of conduct. The news-
papers have laid aside their asperity and if the foolish affair of the toast
at Baltimore could be well disposed of, I believe there would not rise any
further cause of collision. His wife is very amiable, and is highly
respected for her excellent qualities.” 5* And in July Gallatin reported to
Monroe that although the communications first made by the French min-
ister to his government had produced in France a very unfavorable effect,
those which he had lately sent must be of a very different character, “and
the effect is perceivable.” *4
One of M. de Neuville’s most serious responsibilities in the first years of
his stay concerned the behavior of the Napoleonic exiles in the United
States. The men who had served under the Emperor flocked to America
in great numbers. Some of them were under sentence of death in France;
others were exiled by order of the king; and still others found them-
selves impoverished and without prospect of office or advancement. As
the British minister, Charles Bagot, wrote to his friend Sneyd,—

44RELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS

 

 

“All the ragamuffins of the earth are in the United States—more especially the
French ragamuffins. .. .
Joseph the Just, Iberia’s King,
Lefebvres-Desnouettes,
Grouchy, Clausel, St. Angely,
And all the patriot set
Who, ’scaped from Louis’ iron sway,
Have reached this happy shore
And live upon tobacco quay
In lower Baltimore!” 55

The number of exiles in the country was really remarkably large. The
name of Joseph Bonaparte was naturally the most conspicuous on the list,
but we must add to Bagot’s enumeration such names as those of the
brothers Lallemand, Rigaud, Bernard, and Vandamme, all Napoleonic
generals; the well-known Garnier de Saintes; Count Real, who had been
prefect of police under the Emperor; the two sons of Marshal Grouchy;
Joseph Lakanal, a scientist of note; and a host of lesser lights. They were
always received with enthusiasm, partly because of America’s traditional
function as a refuge for the oppressed, and partly because honor to these
especial exiles amounted to an expression of opinion in regard to the
Bourbons. The arrival of a distinguished refugee was noted in the news-
papers as an event of importance, his movements were chronicled with in-
terest, and he was toasted and entertained with the utmost friendliness,—
although the Executive maintained an attitude of official correctness and
avoided giving the audience to Joseph Bonaparte which he seemed at first
to expect.*®

Recalling his own recent experiences as a refugee M. de Neuville was in-
clined to be more sympathetic and tolerant of these men than the govern-
ment at home showed itself. He treated them with great kindness and took
pains to urge the repatriation of those whom he believed would be loyal to
the administration of Louis if allowed to return.*’ As a political factor, how-
ever, he was uneasy about them. There were frequent rumors of attempts
to rescue Napoleon, for whom much sympathy was expressed among
Americans as well as French. The Napoleonic officers were naturally rest-
less and ambitious. They could scarcely be expected to beat their swords
at once into ploughshares. Joseph Bonaparte kept open house for all
exiled Frenchmen, and his name was a natural rallying-cry for conspirators.
De Neuville feared an enterprise which should take advantage of the un-
settled conditions in the Spanish-American colonies to free Napoleon and
found for him a new Empire in the new world. “The liberality of this
government frees these refugees from all police surveillance, and their acts

45AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

from all control,” he wrote to the Duke of Richelieu, and felt therefore
a double necessity for watchfulness on his own part.°®
In the fall of 1816 a number of French exiles joined in organizing a “So-
ciety for the Cultivation of the Vine and the Olive,” and planned to make
a settlement somewhere in the West. Several of them went to Pittsburgh
and down the Ohio into Kentucky, but found no place which satisfied them.
They then conceived the idea of asking Congress for a grant of land in
the territory recently acquired through the treaty with the Creek In-
dians on the Tombigbee River in what is now Alabama; and by an act
passed March 3, 1817, they received for a nominal sum the right to a
district four townships in extent. The act included restrictions intended
to insure actual settlement and to prevent speculation, and allowed the
colonists fourteen years in which to complete their payments. General
Charles Lallemand became president of the company, and among the
shareholders were Marshal Grouchy and his sons; Generals Henri Lalle-
mand, Clausel, and Lefebvre—-Desnouettes; Lakanal; and other prominent
French exiles.°? De Neuville at first approved of this idea, but both he
and the authorities at home became suspicious of it before long, fearing
lest it should prove only a cover for some dangerous conspiracy. It
certainly provided an organization through which conspirators could
communicate with one another freely, collect money, and purchase sup-
plies.®°
In August, 1817, some papers intended for Joseph Bonaparte were inter-
cepted, apparently by French agents, and came into the possession of the
French minister. They purported to have been written by Lakanal, and
outlined a plot to invade Mexico, to conquer a province there and to
proclaim Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain and the Indies. Much excited
by this discovery, De Neuville hastened to lay it before the State Depart-
ment, with an urgent request for action. The American authorities thought
the documents almost too absurd for credence, filled as they were with
vague high-sounding phrases, and conveying little in the way of definite
plans. In so far as the scheme was defined, it seemed to include the raising
of a force of 900 men to be known as “Independent Troops of Mexico.”
Of these, 150 were said to be already enrolled. The force was to be increased
by recruiting, undertaken in the District of Columbia and the Western
states and territories of Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Illinois,
Michigan, Mississippi. Joseph was asked for assistance in financing the
enterprise, but was assured that he would not be involved in its difficul-
ties and dangers, but would rather be supposed to know nothing of it
until it had been carried to a successful completion.”
Spurred by the anxiety of the French representative the State Department
46

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somewhat reluctantly undertook an investigation and did succeed in dis-
covering enough evidence of military activities among the exiles to make it
seem advisable that the government should take all necessary precautions
to prevent the plots from developing into anything which would involve the
United States in a charge of the violation of neutrality. Joseph Bona-
parte himself, however, maintained an attitude of the greatest correctness,
and was not proved to be connected with any of the schemes. But it was
demonstrated that several of the shareholders in the Tombigbee enterprise
had been raising money by speculating in their lands, contrary to the in-
tention of the Congress in making the grant, and that this money was being
expended in military supplies. Adams had an interview with General
Charles Lallemand, who though the president of the Tombigbee company
seemed to be the leader in the new schemes, and advised him strongly
against undertaking anything with which the government would have to
interfere, and Lallemand emphatically denied that he was engaged in any-
thing except the cultivation of the vine and the olive. By the latter part
of the year the French Minister professed himself satisfied with the pre-
ventive measures carried out by the government, and convinced that
nothing dangerous was on foot.

An expedition to Texas was nevertheless actually carried out early in the
year 1818, but so dismal a failure was it that it merely served to effectually
discourage any similar attempts. Charles Lallemand, with General Rigaud,
succeeded in getting some four hundred persons, including the wives of
a few of the officers, to Galveston, Texas, and thence to a place on the
Trinity River, where they declared they intended to establish a colony,
to be known as the Champ d’Asile, which was to be agricultural and com-
mercial, and military only in self-defense. The colonists were by no means
all French, but Spaniards, Mexicans, Americans and Poles; pirates, ad-
venturers, and vagabonds of all sorts. The famous pirate Lafitte, then
operating in the Gulf of Mexico, welcomed them and helped to outfit
them. The United States government, which had early information of the
plans of the expedition, but considered that its poor organization, its
small numbers, and its lack of resources doomed it to failure, found itself
compelled by the complaints of the French minister to take action. A
commissioner was sent in June to find out exactly where the settlement
was being made and under what national authority the colonists professed
to act. He was to warn them that they could not make settlements within
the United States without the consent of the government. He was also to
try to find out whether their funds were coming from Joseph Bonaparte,
from the Spanish minister, or from both, and whether they were having
any intercourse with the Viceroy of Mexico. The Spanish minister had

47

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officially protested against the enterprise as directed against Spanish
sovereignty, but was believed by the United States government to be se-
cretly aiding it in order to strengthen the military forces along the border
to prevent possible seizure by the United States. The British minister
was also disturbed, on the ground that “if there was a Bonaparte in
it” his government would certainly think it important. When the agent
reached Galveston, he found that the colony had already been broken up
by Spanish forces, and that the miserable remnant desired nothing more
than to return to civilization. Lallemand returned to New Orleans with
him, with the avowed purpose of getting aid and purchasing supplies,
leaving Rigaud in charge of the colonists. After a terrific storm which
swept over Galveston had caused still further suffering among them, the
latter, through the assistance once more of the generous pirate Lafitte,
succeeded in getting back to New Orleans also, with most of the surviving
adventurers. And here the enterprise ended.*

To demonstrate the seriousness with which the plans of the exiles were
viewed at the time, it will be worth while to cite here the following editorial
from the Federal Republican: *°

“We have Joseph, the ex-king of Spain, already in this country. To be sure his
majesty is to all appearances acting the character of the exiled Cincinnatus—he has
exchanged a kingdom for a farm, and although he has not been guilty of scribbling
such wretched poetry as Lucien has done, yet he is to all appearance a very mild
and peaceable man; nay he had actually forgot that he ever was in the possession of
a crown and sceptre at all. Meanwhile crowds of adventurers arrive from Europe—
men as familiar to blood and carnage as they are to the sight of their hands, who
by an airing of 3000 miles on the Atlantic are suddenly changed into contemplative
philosophers; they only wish now to cultivate the bosom of the earth, to raise pinks,
roses, jessamines and daffa-down-dillies. These men have followed the fortunes of
Joseph when he seized the crown of Spain—they have risked their lives in his serv-
ice and braved the blasts of the cannon, and so great is the influence of the royal
master’s example, that in imitation of him they have suddenly been transformed into
soft-sighing shepherds, who are ready with crooks in their hands to sit down on the
banks of our native streams to sing pastorals together. Now in opposition to all this
Arcadian argument, it seems that the allied monarchs reason thus—that heads which
have once been encircled by royal diadems of which they have been deprived are
very apt to ache for the same bandage again; that nothing has ever yet been found
capable of effecting a cure for this headache except another application of the same
bandage. They think that Joseph Bonaparte is still affected with the king’s evil;
.. . Spain has renounced King Joseph and adopted her own monarch, King Ferdi-
nand—the Spanish provinces in South America have renounced King Ferdinand, now
(quoth Joseph) would it not be a most capital substitution if they would only sub-
stitute me! What! Why would not a South American diadem become me as well as
a Spanish one! . . . and the deuce is in it if the mines of Mexico will not furnish
diamonds enough to make a crown as brilliant as Ferdinand’s. Upon my word |
think this crown a very comfortable thing and worth looking after! Now suppose

48

 

 

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brother Napoleon could be liberated from his cage, put himself at the head of the
South American patriots, and bluster as loudly as he once did about the rights of
the people. After he had acquired a quantum sufficit of popular confidence, it is only
for him to say, that by the rights of the people, he meant the rights of kings,—words
which mean the same in his dictionary. But how shall I without alarming the
jealousy of the American government, if it has any, call to my standard my faith-
ful friends, dispersed all over the continent of North America? It is necessary
gradually to consolidate my strength and this must be done in such a manner as not
to put my enemies on the alert also. The best plan that I can devise is to throw out
to the world ideas of emigration—I may inform Congress, for example, that the poor
and oppressed emigrants from Europe wish to preserve their own customs that have
been handed down from their ancestors—we will say for example that we wish to
purchase a tract of territory for the sake of planting vines—Congress will be flat-
tered by an application of this kind and will undoubtedly lend their patronage to
the proposal. We may thus gradually collect all our strength, and after our force is
once collected and prepared for action, what astonishment we shall excite in the
natives at the number of vines we shall plant; they shall see whether blood will not
run faster than the juice of the grape.”

More and more during this period affairs concerning Spain and her Ameri-
can colonies had been acquiring importance in the eyes of Americans.
Revolutionary activities similar to those through which the United States
had passed only a few decades ago would have aroused attention under
any circumstances. Such movements in Europe were always followed
with the greatest interest and sympathy. But the South Americans were
linked with us more closely. As citizens of the new world, as inhabitants of
a continent physically connected with that occupied by the United States,
lying so near that the fortunes of the one must inevitably affect those of the
other, it is not strange that as the struggle increased in intensity, and as
it appeared possible that the great European powers might intervene to
decide it, our thoughts and our sympathies should have become deeply
involved.

The United States had, moreover, a quarrel of its own with Spain. When,
in 1803, the Louisiana Purchase was made, the boundary lines to the east
and the west were imperfectly defined. The original object of negotiation
had been the purchase of Florida, or “the Floridas, east and west,” as
the district was known at the time,—together with New Orleans and such
land as might guarantee free passage of the Mississippi. The purchase
of the Louisiana territory was a makeshift, accepted only because it
opened the Mississippi, and because Spain refused at the moment to cede
the Floridas either to the United States or to France, which also wished
them. The Louisiana district had already changed hands several times.
It had been British as well as French and Spanish. Yet its boundaries
had never been fully explored, much less marked out or surveyed. Every

49

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conveyance had been the conveyance of an uncertainty, and everyone knew
it. The purchase by the United States was moreover strictly speaking ille-
gal, since France had never carried out the conditions on which she had
herself acquired it from Spain, and Spain immediately protested against
the transfer.
The terms of sale were “‘the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same
extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, that it had when France
possessed it and such as it ought to be according to the treaties subse-
quently passed between Spain and other states.” °*
The United States authorities in their eagerness for the Floridas resolved
to construe the boundaries as broadly as possible, and arguing that the
whole district as far east as the Perdido River had once been called Louis-
jana, they declared that this river marked the eastern limits of their
purchase. This included most of the section known as West Florida, and
the Spanish authorities refused to recognize such a claim. With the idea
of reinforcing their position, the Americans inquired of the French com-
missioner sent to take over the province from Spain, what the French
construction of the boundaries was. He replied that West Florida was not
included, farther than the Iberville River, which lies near the Mississippi,
though on the west the boundary ran to the Rio Bravo, which would in-
clude Texas. His reply was official, because based on the instructions given
him when he was sent out.®® Talleyrand supported this construction of the
eastern boundary but attempted to becloud the issue on the west, stating
that the limits there had not been clearly defined, but would have been the
subject of negotiations between Spain and France, if the latter had kept
the district, and “France could not even take upon herself to indicate to
the United States what ought to be that precise limit.” * And in 1816 the
Duke of Richelieu stated that France ought not to be relied on in sup-
port of the American claims beyond what was just in itself; that she did
not cede to the United States West Florida; that her cession was limited
to the east by the River Iberville and the Lakes Pontchartrain and Maure-
pas, but was undefined to the West, in fixing which latter boundary she
felt no concern.®”
This dispute, dating from 1803, had been constantly agitated, and the
discussions were growing ever more acrimonious. Into its intricacies it
will be unnecessary here to enter. The question was complicated by the
) fact that the Spanish authorities had so little control over the contested
districts that they could be used as bases for all sorts of lawless enter-
prises, such as that of the Champ d’Asile, already mentioned, for piracies
and freebooting exploits without end, and for filibustering expeditions
connected with one or another of the Spanish colonies. White, negro, and

50

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Indian outlaws infested the borderlands, and acts of violence unrestrained
went unpunished; or, if punished, as in the case of the Seminole War,
aggravated a situation already acute. Complaints, recriminations, and
claims for indemnity abounded on both sides, and the chorus was swelled
by those European states whose nationals happened to be involved in the
acts of some of the lawless adventurers whose ships sailed the Gulf of
Mexico, or who made the Gulf ports their headquarters. From such intol-
erable conditions, there were only a few alternatives of escape. Spain
might so strengthen her control over the district as to produce orderly
conditions and by a firm and independent policy put an end to the dispute.
She might transfer her claims to some stronger European power, who
would energetically press matters to a settlement. She might be forced,
persuaded, or paid to surrender her claims amicably to the United States.
Or friction might easily increase to such a degree as to bring war between
the two countries. It was this latter contingency which seemed to the
European countries probable, and which was most feared.

Great Britain offered her mediation, which was refused promptly and de-
cidedly. “The United States in justice to themselves, in justice to that
harmony which they earnestly desire to cultivate with all the powers of
Europe, in justice to that fundamental system of policy which forbids them
from entering the labyrinth of European politics, must decline soliciting
or acceding to the interference of any other government of Europe for
the settlement of their differences with Spain.” °* Spain applied to France
for her good offices, which the latter was most anxious to give. She felt
it distinctly to her interest to avert serious trouble between Spain and
the United States inasmuch as the immediate consequence probably would
be the recognition of the independence of the South American colonies
by America, and of this she most strongly disapproved. Erving, the Amer-
ican minister in Spain, wrote to Adams that he thought France very reason-
ably alarmed at the least symptom of discord anywhere. She knew that
the smallest spark might produce a conflagration and that France was
most combustible. “The government of France sees,’ too, “that in the
event of a rupture between the United States and Spain the natural
progress of things will necessarily lead to an alliance or at least a
very dangerous concert of measures between the United States and Great
Britain. °°

Richelieu wrote to De Neuville that Europe could not remain indifferent
to the propagation of an anarchistic system which threatened to invade
all the new world. And De Neuville replied :—

“If Europe wishes to be tranquil, if she wishes to improve, but not to destroy, the
institutions of her fathers, she will bring all her wisdom to bear to prevent the rise

51

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of a colossus in this hemisphere in direct opposition to her customs and habits. Thus
it seems to me that under the double aspect of the peace of nations and of our
especial policy, we cannot desire that the two Americas tend too much to nar-
rowly unite and to render themselves almost independent of the other continent, for
it is certain that as long as the interest of the North Americans leads them to search
for friends in Europe, it will be France and always France which they will wish to

conciliate.
“If nevertheless nothing in Europe opposes it, it is more than probable that the
Republic of Buenos Ayres will be recognized by the United States. ... Then

the Floridas will be occupied and never returned.” 7°

Yet it was evident that French mediation would be no more acceptable
to the United States than would that of Great Britain. Although, in 1816,
Monroe thought it seemed probable that France might render to the
United States essential services in this negotiation, “provided her gov-
ernment adopts just ideas on the subject,” “1 when Richelieu in 1818 sug-
gested to Gallatin that Spain had applied for the good offices of France,
Gallatin replied that while we were disposed to give her as a common
friend frank and full communications of our views, the mediation of no
foreign power, not even of France, could be accepted, and the best office
France could render Spain would be not to encourage her in her preten-
sions, and to urge the importance to her of an early arrangement.

In reporting this to Adams, then Secretary of State, Gallatin said,—

 

“Although, so far as can be judged from appearances, France is in earnest to promote
an arrangement, it is consistent with that plan to induce us to lower our pretensions,
and, although I have tried to discourage that attempt, she may perhaps think her-
self under the necessity of making some representations through her minister at
Washington. Her great object in what she may do will be to serve Spain, and the
knowledge and fear of our influence in the affairs of the Spanish colonies are the
principal motives of her interfering in any respect.” 72

However, M. de Neuville had been steadily gaining in popularity in
Washington. His simplicity of manner, his kindly courtesy, and his open-
hearted hospitality, had made him many friends. He was on good terms
with the political leaders, and he resolved to attempt an informal media-
tion, since it was recognized that no formal one would be considered. This
was a proceeding which required both tact and perseverance, for his first
moves were not welcomed with any enthusiasm by Mr. Adams. Most men
would have become discouraged and given up the undertaking, or would
have made some false step which would have done harm. It is most in-
teresting to trace the steps by which doubtful tolerance, bordering on re-
sentment, ripened into confidence. One element contributing largely to his
success is to be found in the difficulty experienced by the Spanish minister
and the American Secretary of State in conferring with one another.

52

 

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Adams considered Sefior de Onis cold and haughty, and distrusted him
thoroughly, while the directness and quick temper of Adams antagonized
the Spaniard. De Neuville could talk with either without offense.

A few citations from Adams’ Diary will demonstrate clearly the earlier
stages of this informal mediation.

Jan. 22, 1818, “Hyde de Neuville talked with me more than an hour, urging that we
should settle our affairs with Spain, flattering and cajoling me.”

April 30, “ ... De Neuville suggested a possible settlement.”
May 5, “He called, . . . urging a settlement.”

July 8, “A note from Hyde de Neuville asking for an interview. A discussion of our
taking Pensacola.”

July 10, “I had an interview at the office with Hyde de Neuville, the French minister,
all about our affairs with Spain. ... He urged this subject very strenuously for
more than an hour.”

July 16, “... went to my office, and received Mr. de Neuville. He is extremely
anxious for the preservation of peace, and desirous of contributing to it.... He
offered to use his influence with Onis.”

July 19, “ ... found Mr. de N. had been at my house and expressed a strong de-
sire to see me. He had left a request that I call at his house. I went, and we passed
an hour there.” They discussed the Spanish affair. “He would go to Bristol” and use
his influence on Onis... . “I promised to show him the letter for Onis when it
should be prepared.”

July. 22, “My letter to Onis being now prepared, | sent for Mr. Hyde de Neuville,
who came to the office, and gave it to him to read. He professed to be very well
satisfied with it, and said he would go to-morrow morning to his seat in the Jerseys,
and would spend two or three days with Onis, at Bristol, on his way. He would use
all his influence to persuade him to make his proposals, and urge his conviction that
if they are not made it will be impossible to get through the next winter without a
war between this country and Spain. He added that Onis had said something to him
about an article stipulating not to recognize the South Americans, but he thought he
could not insist upon that. I told him it must be altogether out of the question.”
August 24, “Mr. de Neuville came to tell the substance of a letter he had received
from Onis. He urged concession on the part of the United States on the question of
the boundary west of the Mississippi.”

November 17, “The French minister came to talk with me about our negotiations
with Spain and to urge our yielding further upon the western boundary of Louisiana.
_.. ] told him that I would, however, give him a certificate that he was a faithful
liege to the King of Spain. He said Onis would give him a counter-certificate that he
was a true American.” 78

By this time, nevertheless, De Neuville’s position as mediator was estab-

lished. Other members of the Cabinet and of Congress talked over Spanish

affairs with him, and no important step was taken in the dispute by either

side without his advice. Of this Mr. Adams’ Diary for the latter part of

1818 and the early months of 1819 gives abundant evidence."* His method
53

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EAMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

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with De Onis may be illustrated by one of his letters, dated January 24,
1819, in which he warns the Spanish minister that the more one delays the
United States, the more they demand, like one of their great rivers, which
if held back undermines its banks. What they would offer a year ago is not
obtainable to-day. What one can get from them to-day is less than they
will give to-morrow.”®

On February 22, 1819, Sefor De Onis, for Spain, and Mr. Adams, for the
United States, signed a treaty covering all the points of dispute between
the two countries. The United States received the Floridas, but gave up
all claim to Texas. Two days later the treaty was ratified by the Senate,
and immediately afterwards by the President. It was then sent to Spain
for ratification, the provisions of the agreement specifying that such rati-
fication must take place within six months.7® Almost at once, however,
arose a difficulty. Certain large grants of land in the Floridas had been
made by the Spanish king to some of his favorites, grants so large that
they covered most of the otherwise unsettled lands. No actual colonization
had been made in these districts by the grantees, who were holding them
chiefly as a speculation, and the United States did not wish to recognize
their title as valid. It had been suggested that they be excluded by name
in the treaty, and De Onis had objected, on the ground that this would
place the king in an unpleasant position. It was finally agreed that the
treaty should recognize as valid all grants made before a specified date,
and declare invalid all those made later. The United States representative
understood that this clearly excluded the undesirable grants, but immedi-
ately after the treaty was signed a rumor was heard that it did not.
Mr. Adams promptly applied to M. de Neuville, since he had been con-
versant with all the details of the negotiation, asking what his understand-
ing of this point had been. De Neuville replied clearly and unequivocally
that both he and De Onis had understood the objectionable grants to be
excluded. Throughout the days of delay and disagreement which followed,
he firmly maintained this stand, and his testimony was of the greatest
value to the United States since Spain seized upon this question as an ex-
cuse for failing to ratify the treaty.”

M. de Neuville’s behavior in this matter is discussed and analyzed rather
interestingly in Adams’ Memoirs, as follows,—

 

“He intimated to me that his principal motive in dispatching Bourqueney now to

France was to give his Government further and more complete expositions relative
to the eighth article of our late treaty with Spain, and to induce them to interpose
by direct influence upon Spain to prevent her making any question upon that article
in relation to the grants; particularly to state in detail the evidence which he has
repeatedly told me he had from Onis during the negotiation, that the Spanish govern-
ment itself knew the grants were null and void....

34

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Tee aa Siti Heya : Panna nibaraneanit Hatha * ry i
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“De Neuville’s great earnestness upon this affair may be ascribed to various motives,
some highly honorable and generous, others partaking of those virtues that begin
at home. (1) To a sense of pure justice and unsullied honor: knowing the professed
intention and clear understanding on both sides that no error committed or decep-
tion attempted by Onis should have any effect possible to defeat it. (2) To vindicate
his own integrity in the transaction, that article having been most particularly dis-
cussed between him and me, and the principles settled between us, that bona fide
settlers should not be excluded, even though with grants not entirely regular, but
that no fraudulent grants should be confirmed. (3) To strengthen his interest with
his own government by interesting that of the United States in his favor, which he
cannot fail to do by bearing testimony decisively for them upon a point of con-
siderable importance. (4) To make a merit hereafter for himself or his government
of the part he takes in this affair, as having rendered essential service to the United
States, and acquiring claims to favor in return; and (5) Finally, to make himself
important, and have an agency in the transaction which may add to his individual
or political consequence. There is probably a mixture of all these ingredients in his
impulses, and I am willing to believe that the pure and disinterested portion of them
predominates in a scale adjusted by the standard of their comparative excellence.
De Neuville is not a profound or gigantic genius, but he is a fair and honorable
man.” 78

Meantime, in the spring of this year, the French minister, conceiving
that his most important charge was accomplished, and feeling that there
were questions which it would be advantageous for him to discuss in
person with the authorities in France, especially in view of some political
changes which had occurred there,—anxious too for a sight of the homeland
from which he had been, either through duty or through necessity, for
nearly ten years an exile, asked his government for a leave of absence.
Acknowledging a notification to this effect, Adams wrote,—

“I am directed by the President to assure you of the great satisfaction which he
takes in bearing testimony to the propriety and friendliness of your conduct and
deportment since you have resided here as the representative of France, and of his
peculiar sensibility to the interest which, as the organ of your Government, you have
taken in promoting a conciliatory adjustment of the long-standing and complicated
differences between the United States and Spain.” 7°

Of greater interest and value to us in forming a judgment of the real
importance of the French mediation is this unofficial and unique testimo-
nial contained in a letter to Richard Rush dated six weeks later:

“No foreign minister accredited to the United States since their existence as a nation
has ever in serving his own government rendered at the same time a service so
transcendently important to this country as Mr. Hyde de Neuville. This termina-
tion of the late negotiation with Spain (so far as it has terminated) is, I am en-
tirely convinced, in a great measure owing to his exertions. Immediately after my
letter of the 12th of March, 1818, to Mr. Onis, he began to take a part in the
negotiation, and from that time he pursued with great earnestness and zeal the

55AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

object of having it brought to an amicable and mutually satisfactory close. ...
You remember the mediation of Great Britain and afterwards of the allied powers
was proposed by Spain and declined by us. France without offering her mediation
instructed her minister to use his good offices, and they were faithfully rendered.

| Their great efficiency was in the operation of their influence upon Spain. He operated
upon Spain, first, by his counsels to Mr. de Onis, and secondly by persuading his
own government to act directly upon that of Spain. ... But whether ultimately
successful or not, Mr. de Neuville’s efforts have been as active as his intentions have
been sincere, and his conduct through the whole process has impressed me with a
high sense of his integrity of heart and his friendliness of disposition.” 8°

Frpesals Han

ibe panerd:
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This tone of appreciation is reflected in the social functions arranged
in Washington for the De Neuvilles when their approaching departure was
announced. The National Intelligencer described a ball given for them on
the 18th of May as an “Entertainment never surpassed.’ Among the deco-
rations we find the French and American flags entwined, and a brilliant
transparency with the arms of the two countries and the device “First
Allies in the cause of Liberty.” The band played Revolutionary tunes, and
the Lily and the Pine “carried the thoughts back to that glorious period
when the gallant French battled with us and for us; and renewed in all
present the feelings of regard for the brave people who shed their blood in
supporting our independence.” Mrs. Seaton, wife of the editor of this paper,
gives us in her diary a spirited bit of description, with a more personal
touch:

 

“There has been more gayety than | have ever known here in the summer, caused by
the farewell dinners, the public and private balls, given to M. and Mme. de Neuville,
who have by their unaffected kindness to their equals and their munificence to the
poor won upon the popular esteem and gratitude. . . . The public ball was a great
success, M. de Neuville making a very impressive little speech of thanks to the
citizens. William, with five other married men, officiated as master of ceremonies,
and I was pleased that he had an opportunity of testifying respect for the worthy
old couple. . . .’’ 82

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Among the Fourth of July toasts, always fair indications of the sentiment
of the country, we may note,—

“France, the friend of our youth. A friend in need is a friend indeed!” 82

Crawford wrote to Gallatin that the French minister was quite a favorite

with the administration and no less so with the citizens, and deservedly.

He added that but for De Neuville’s good offices the Spanish negotiations

would probably have been postponed for years.** The papers in general

do not speak of any French influence upon the treaty, although the Georgia

Journal of February 23 said it appeared that the French minister favored
56

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the cession. In August, in commenting upon a Spanish decoration awarded
to M. de Neuville, the National Intelligencer said,—

“It is probable that this act may be traced to the late negotiations at Washington,
in which it is generally understood Mr. de Neuville was unwearied in his exertions to
contribute to an amicable adjustment of the difficulties existing between the United
States and Spain.” 84

This “amicable adjustment” which everyone greeted with so much satis-
faction, and which everyone hoped was safely concluded, nevertheless was
fated to remain in doubt for many months. The Spanish ruler and his ad-
visers seized the excuse of the debatable grants as a cause for delay, not
because they thought the contention sound but as a cover for their con-
viction that the ratification of the treaty would be the signal for the recog-
nition by the United States of the South American republics. The King
postponed his action therefore from week to week, and finally notified
the United States that he would send a special envoy, to obtain some
“explanations” in regard to the terms of the agreement. In vain the
American authorities protested that the treaty was perfectly clear as it stood,
that it needed no explanations, but that if the King conceived that any
were required, the new minister to Spain, Mr. Forsyth, was perfectly
competent to give them. The Spanish government held to its decision,
and also was slow in sending the envoy, so that the patience of the United
States, strained by the long uncertainty, threatened to give way.** Occupa-
tion of the Floridas, without waiting any longer for Spain to make up her
mind, was proposed. This would have been equivalent to a declaration of
war.

Watching these developments, France realized in dismay that the catas-
trophe of a serious break between the United States and Spain, which she
had so earnestly endeavored to avert, might at any moment become a
fact. Gallatin found the diplomats in Paris anxious to further any ar-
rangement which might lead to ratification, and to bring all available
pressure to bear upon Spain to induce her to abandon her dilatory atti-
tude.** They urged, too, that the United States should not endanger the
success that was almost within its grasp by any hasty or intemperate meas-
ures which should take from it the sympathy of the powers now advocat-
ing their cause. Russia was acting in close harmony with France in this
matter, and Great Britain, though she had been believed by the United
States to be antagonistic, was yet showing a disposition to favor the rati-
fication of the treaty. Spain now appeared to be wrong, in the esti-
mation of these powers, but violent action on the part of the Americans
might make them seem the aggressors.*?

57

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Monroe, much disturbed over the situation, had taken a course unprec-
edented, at least in American annals, and one which manifested more
strongly than anything else could have done his confidence in the French
mediation, informal though it was. He had directed Adams to write to the
French minister, then on the point of sailing, asking him to defer his de-
parture and arrange to spend the winter in the United States. The request
is couched in the strongest terms.

“If you could, without a grave inconvenience, defer your departure for France, you
would serve the pacific and benevolent views of your government, the interests of
humanity, the ardent wishes of the American government, and before everything
the interests and the honor of Spain. . . . It would be especially useful if you could
be here when the envoy from Spain arrives. .. . According to the wishes of the
American government, | submit to your heart and that of his Majesty the King
of France, the consolidation of the peace of the world. . . .” 88

To such an appeal M. de Neuville could not be deaf. He felt it his duty to
stay and try to give further proofs of the friendly disposition of his gov-
ernment. Regretfully, for he had anticipated with much pleasure the visit
to France, he cancelled his passage and returned to Washington. Mme. de
Neuville said disappointedly, “France seems the Promised Land! We can
vision it, but not reach it!” *°

The envoy from Spain, General Vives, did not arrive until April, 1820,
and the period of waiting continued to be one of tense anxiety. De Neu-
ville steadily urged moderation and patience, but toward the end of the
year, while not regretting that he had stayed, he became convinced that his
presence was useless, and that probably nothing would avail to keep the
peace. His advices from home showed clearly that although the Spanish
minister would speak of the grants, the key of the situation was the ques-
tion of the Spanish-American colonies. Spain certainly intended to ask
for a promise of non-recognition; and on this point the United States
would not yield an inch. Indeed if the request appeared at all in the nature
of a demand it would probably become public, and would then be met in-
evitably by a refusal even to discuss the matter, and an announcement
that the Spanish provinces would be recognized as independent whenever
it should be deemed advisable.®°

The President was persuaded, however, to agree to await the arrival of the
envoy before taking any direct or irrevocable action, and the Presidential
Message of December 7, which when first drafted contained some very
strong expressions of sympathy with the revolting colonists, was toned
down considerably before it was sent to Congress.°* This Message, speak-
ing of the action of Spain, said,—‘It is satisfactory to know that they
have not been countenanced by any European power. On the contrary,

58

 

 

 

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the opinion and wishes both of France and of Great Britain, have not been
withheld either from the United States or from Spain, and have been un-
equivocal in favor of the ratification.” ®
Early in February, 1820, General Vives arrived in Paris, and remained
there for three days before proceeding to Liverpool from whence he ex-
pected to sail for America early in March. M. Pasquier, the new French
minister of foreign affairs, arranged a meeting between him and Mr. Galla-
tin. Vives said that the chief points of his instructions were “to see that the
honor of the Crown should be saved in the matter of the grants and to re-
ceive satisfactory evidence of our intention to preserve a fair neutrality
in the colonial war.” Both Pasquier and Gallatin endeavored to point out
to him the seriousness of the situation and the probable consequences of
any provocative or unduly dilatory measures. Pasquier explained that it
would be most inadvisable to ask any promise not to recognize, and said
that “Spain could only rely on the moral effect which a solemn treaty, ac-
commodating all her differences with the United States, would have on their
future proceedings.” °°
The President’s Message in March, after repeating that France and Great
Britain were employing their good offices to bring about a ratification by
Spain, stated that the governments of France and Russia had expressed an
earnest desire that the United States would for the present take no step
on the principle of reprisal which might possibly disturb the peace, and
added that there was good cause to presume that this wish was founded
in a belief that such extreme measures would not be necessary to attain
the desired result.°* It is worthy of note that from no quarter, during
all this period, do we hear one word in condemnation of the French ac-
tivity. Even Clay, who was most willing to embarrass the administration,
and who at this time bitterly attacked the government for listening to
Russian and British persuasions, and thus encouraging foreign interference
in American affairs, did not name France in this connection.*° But the
French influence had begun to wane. In the first place, it had ceased
to be so effective in Spain, for the successful Spanish Revolution of Feb-
ruary, 1820, had thrown out of power all the extreme royalists who had
been in close touch with the Bourbon government in France. The revolu-
tionary leaders were disinclined to accept advice from beyond the Pyrenees.
France, too, was threatened with a similar explosion. The murder of the
Duke of Berry brought on a ministerial crisis which gave the Ultras the
control of the government, and left the country filled with dissension
and restlessness. For the moment the authorities were too absorbed with
their own difficulties to carry on a vigorous foreign policy.°°
In America, the questions which concerned the United States and France
59

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directly, began to press for settlement. Thrown into the background by the
exigencies of the Spanish situation, they had nevertheless been the subject
of considerable discussion and controversy. Gallatin had never been able
to obtain any satisfaction in the matter of the indemnities for damages done
under Napoleon. The United States realized that France was not in a
position to pay these claims during the early days of her rehabilitation,
certainly not while she was maintaining foreign troops upon her soil, but it
seemed just that she should accept responsibility for them, and agree to
settle them at some future date. This the French government showed it-
self unwilling to do. Instead, it put in a counterclaim for special commercial
privileges in the ports of Louisiana, under a clause of the Purchase Treaty
of 1803. The general regulations affecting commerce between the two states
seemed hopelessly involved. M. de Neuville, after remaining long enough to
talk with General Vives, who arrived in April, left Washington for his re-
turn to France late in May. His departure was the occasion for renewed
expressions of great esteem, both from the President and in the press.®’
President Monroe directed Gallatin to advise the French government that
M. de Neuville had acquitted himself entirely to the satisfaction of the
administration in this country “and the members of Congress. His deport-
ment has been conciliatory, and in our concerns with his country and also
with Spain, in which he has taken a part, we have had much reason to be
satisfied.” °°

Yet, in this same month, a few weeks earlier, the United States Congress
had passed an act laying a practically prohibitive duty on French vessels
trading with American ports, a duty which the French government
promptly met with a countervailing tax laid upon American vessels in
French ports. With these matters the following chapter will deal in greater
detail.

Once more, too, in the American papers appeared frequent criticisms of
the French government. Discussing the Spanish Revolution the Concord
Patriot remarked,—“Degraded France breathes out heavy sighs for a like
deliverance.” *® On May 18, in the Baltimore Patriot, appeared the state-
ment :—“France begins to find that she has gained less than nothing by
the compelled restoration of a feeble Bourbon and a corrupt aristocracy.
She has lost respectability without gaining peace or quiet.” °° And, finally,
among the toasts on July Fourth, in contrast to that quoted from the pre-
ceding year, we find:

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“Bonaparte: the only legitimate sovereign of Frenchmen; may he soon and long
rule over them!” 101

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While, therefore, official relations during the first part of the reign of
Louis XVIII showed a distinct improvement, this improvement was not
very far-reaching, since it did not lead to a prompt solution of the points
at issue between the two countries. Moreover, it had been dependent
largely upon the personal influence and assistance of M. de Neuville.
The knowledge of his aid and the appreciation of it was to a great extent
confined to Administration circles, and could not to any degree modify
public opinion, which continued to show itself in general distinctly anti-
French, or at least anti-Bourbon. This attitude was based on a deeply-
grounded and sincere disapproval of the reactionary policy and practice
of the French government, and was to be intensified rather than lessened
by the events of the next few years.

NOTES AND SOURCES

1Henry Adams, Life of Albert Gallatin, 562-3.

2 The Writings of Albert Gallatin, Henry Adams, ed., |: 667.

8 Gallatin, Writings, 1: 675-6; The Writings of James Monroe, S. M. Hamilton, ed.,

V: 334-35.

4 Gallatin, Writings, 1: 692.

5Jb., 11: 1-2.

6 Adams to Richard Rush, May 2, 1819. The Writings of John Quincy Adams,

W. G. Ford, ed., VI: 547.

7 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, C. F. Adams, ed., 1V: 303. March 17, 1819.

See, for another description, Rowland, Life and Correspondence of Charles Carroll of

Carrollton, \1: 323.

8 Baron Guillaume Jean Hyde de Neuville, Mémoires et Souvenirs (Paris, 1888), Ii

184, 202-3.

9 American Watchman and Delaware Republican, April 20, 1816.

10 Georgetown, D. C., Messenger, Sept. 18, 1816.

11 St. Louis, Mo., Gazette, Oct. 19, 1816.

12] ouisville, Ky., Correspondent, June 10, 1816, quoting Richmond Enquirer.

18 Benton, Abridgment of Debates in Congress, V: 576-7.

14 Clay, Works, Colton, ed., V: 85, 93.

15 Niles’ Register, 1X: 415.

16 Niles’ Register, 1X: 382.

17 [b., X11: 33-34.

18 Quoted in Georgia Journal, Sept. 25, 1816.

19 Niles’, 1X: 404, 374.

ZONE N31:

21 American Watchman, January 6, 1816.

22 National Intelligencer, September 25; and quoting National Advocate; St. Louis,

Mo., Gazette, August 10, 1816.

23 Niles’, X: 331.

24 National Intelligencer, September 18, October 9, November 18, quoting Philadel-
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phia Aurora; Savannah Republican, September 19, and New York Columbian
quoted; Baltimore American, quoted in Boston Independent Chronicle, January 4;
Winchester, (Ky.,) Advertiser, October 5.
25 Georgetown, D. C., Messenger, June 15; Niles’, 1X: 374-5; X: 364; X: 403, etc.;
National Intelligencer, October 4, and quoting New York Columbian.
26 January 31, 1816.
27 Niles’, 1X: 403.
28 Georgia Journal, February 7, 1816. For articles of the same tenor, Concord, (N. H.)
Patriot, February 6; Boston Independent Chronicle, January 4, January 29, quoting
New York Columbian and September 19.
29 Boston Centinel, March 9, 1816; Boston Gazette, January 29; Boston Palladium;
Philadelphia Democratic Press.
80 Baltimore Federal Republican, November 15, 1816; Boston Centinel, March 9,
July 10, September 7; Connecticut Courant, January 23, August 13, December 10;
Boston Gazette, July 1; Kennebunk (Me.,) Weekly Visiter, May 24.
81 Niles’, XI: 124.
82 December 5, 1816. Similar articles, National Intelligencer, October 10; Georgia
Journal, December 25.
33 Jefferson to Benjamin Austin, January 9, 1816, National Intelligencer, March 22,
1816. See also Jefferson to Lafayette, May 17, Jefferson, Writings, Memorial Edition,
A. Lipscomb, ed., XIX: 240.
34 Jefferson to Lafayette, February 9, 1816, Jefferson, Writings, Washington, ed., VI:
553-4.
35 Adams to Monroe, April 9, 1816. John Quincy Adams, Writings, Ford, ed., VI:
9-10.
86 Virginia Argus, quoted in National Intelligencer, June 29; Georgetown Messenger,
September 21.
87 Baltimore Patriot, quoted in National Intelligencer, March 26.
88 Gallatin to Monroe, July 12, 1816. Gallatin, Writings, I1: 1-2.
89 National Intelligencer, May 18, 1815; March 20, August 29, 1815; January 19,
1816; Niles’, 1X: 97-114.
40 Niles’, 1X: 375; X: 124; Boston Patriot, quoted National Intelligencer, April 13,
23; Aurora, June 17; American Watchman, July 6, 1816.
41 Gallatin to Monroe, September 25, 1816. Gallatin, Writings, II: 9.
42 National Intelligencer, July 14, 1816.
43 Madison to Monroe, August 28, 1816. The Writings of James Madison, Gaillard
Hunt, ed., VIII: 362-364. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam’s Sons, Publishers, New York
and London.
44 Hyde de Neuville, Mémoires, Il: 261-2.
45 Monroe to Gallatin. Monroe, Writings, Hamilton, ed., V: 388-389, 390. Septem-
ber 10, 1816.
46 Gallatin to Monroe, November 21, Gallatin, Writings, Il: 19-21; January 30,
1817.
47 Ib.; Hyde de Neuville, 11: 262.
8 National Intelligencer, November 9, 1816.
49 7b., November 27.
50 Aurora, November 8, 1816.
51 Georgia Journal, November 27, quoting New York Columbian; Niles’, X1: 169;
Louisville Correspondent, December 2, 1816, quoting National Register.

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The Federal papers ignore the matter or treat it as an unimportant rumor. Boston
Gazette, November 18, Trenton Federalist, November 25.
52 Monroe to Gallatin, November 26. Monroe, Writings, Hamilton, ed., V: 389.
53 Crawford to Gallatin, March 12, 1817. Gallatin, Writings, I1: 28.
54 Gallatin to Monroe, July 12, 1817. Jb., 11: 40.
55 Bagot to Sneyd, June 12, 1816. Josceline Bagot, George Canning and bis Friends,
II: 24.
56 Jesse B. Reeves, Napoleonic Exiles in America, 19-21 (In Jobns Hopkins Studies
in History and Political Science, Series XXIII, Nos. 9-10).
Vevey, (Indiana), Register, quoted in National Advocate, July 15, 1815; New York
Commercial Advertiser, Sept. 9, 1815; New York Gazette, Sept. 12, 1815; American
Watchman, July 13, Niles’, X1: 77, Sept. 28, 1816; National Intelligencer, Oct. 10,
Nov. 19, 1816; July 27, 1818; Boston Centinel, July 6, 1816; Winchester (Ky.) Ad-
vertiser, Oct. 5, 1816; Mar. 29, 1817.
57 Hyde de Neuville, 11: 206-210, 272.
88 Hyde de Neuville, 11: 206-7.
59 Reeves, Napoleonic Exiles, Ch. 111; National Intelligencer, Nov. 12, 1816; Dec. 17,
1816.
60 Adams, Memoirs, Nov. 9, 1817, [V: 18-19; Jan. 12, 1818, IV: 40.
61 Reeves, Chs. IV, V; Hyde de Neuville, 11: 267, 319-325; John Quincy Adams,
Writings, V1: 190-193, 195-198; Memoirs, 1V: 9, 11, 18-20, 36, 48, 84, 100.
62 Reeves, Chs. VI-VII; Niles’, XIV: 393-4, August 8, 1818; Adams, Memoirs, IV:
38-40, 64, 83-84, 97, 100-101; Writings, VI: 289, 299-300, 310.
Onis to Adams, May 7, 1818, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 1\V: 494.
63 Quoted, New York Gazette and General Advertiser, July 19, 1817.
64 Madison to Livingston. Herbert B. Fuller, The Purchase of Florida, 126.
65 Madison to Livingston, Jan. 31, 1804. American State Papers, \1: 574.
66 Talleyrand to Gravina, Aug. 30, 1804. Cited, Henry Adams, History of the United
States, 11: 299; Talleyrand to de Santivanes. Cited, Fuller, 140.
87 Monroe to Gallatin, June 1, 1816. Monroe, Writings, Hamilton, ed., V: 384.
68 Adams to Onis, Mar. 12, 1818, National Intelligencer, March 16, 1818; Niles’ XIV:
59-60.
69 Erving to John Quincy Adams, October 22, 1818. Cited Fuller, 296-7.
70 Richelieu to De Neuville, July 19, 1817, De Neuville to Richelieu, December 11,
1817. De Neuville, 11: 326, 331; Gallatin to Adams, Nov. 5; Nov. 21, 1818. Gallatin,
Writings, 11: 75-82, 87; Monroe, Writings, V1: 94-96.
71 Monroe, Writings, V: 387.
72 Gallatin to Adams, August 19, 1818. Gallatin, Writings, 11: 70-74.
73 Adams, Memoirs, 1V: 48, 83, 87, 105, 106, 110-112, 115-116, 124-127, 168-170,
172.
74 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 1V: 621, provide a further illustra-
tion.
7 De Neuville, 11: 390.
78 American State Papers, \V: 625-6.
77 Correspondence transmitted to Congress with Message, December 7, 1819. Niles’,
XVII: 255-6, 267-8, 270. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 1V: 652-654, 657-
660.
78 Adams, Memorrs, 1V: 329, 331. April 12, 1819.
79 Adams to De Neuville, March 31, 1819. American State Papers, V: 157.

63

 

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80 Adams to Rush, May 2, 1819. John Quincy Adams, Writings, V1: 547-8. Courtesy
of The Macmillan Co., Publishers, New York.

81 National Intelligencer, May 26, 1819; Niles’ XV: 238; Miss Seaton, W. W. Seaton,
A Biographical Sketch, 143.

82 National Intelligencer, July 7, 1819.

88 Crawford to Gallatin, July 24, 1819. Gallatin, Writings, I]: 112.

84 National Intelligencer, August 25, 1819.

85 American State Papers, 1V: 650-703.

86 Gallatin to John Quincy Adams, July 6, 1819. Gallatin, Writings, 11: 109; To
Forsyth, July 9, /b., 110-111; To J. Q. Adams, 29, Jb., 118-119.

87 Gallatin to J. Q. Adams, September 24, 1819. /b., 121; October 26, 1819. Jb., 125-
6; December 8, /b., 128-9.

88 John Quincy Adams, Writings, (October 23), VI: 557-8; De Neuville, 11: 400-402,
October 26, 1819.

89 De Neuville, 11: 404—5.

90 [b., 407-8, November 28; Adams, Writings, V1: 559; Memoirs, 1V: 453-5, No-
vember 27, 1819.

®1Jb., 456462, 465-7, December 4; John Quincy Adams to William Lowndes,
December 21, 1819. Writings, V1: 562-4.

92 Monroe, Writings, VI: 3.

®8 Gallatin to John Quincy Adams, February 15, 1820. Gallatin, Writings; I]: 133-
136.

94 Monroe, Writings, VI: 117-118.

%5 Clay, Life, Correspondence, and Speeches, Colton, ed., V: 207-9, April 3, 1820;
242-3, May 10, 1820.

%6 Adams to Gallatin, May 28, 1820. Adams, Writings, VII: 35-36.

87 National Gazette, quoted in National Intelligencer, May 29, 1820.

88 Monroe to Gallatin, May 26. Gallatin, Writings, II: 141.

89 Concord Patriot, May 30, 1820.

100 Baltimore Patriot, May 18, 1820. See also New York Commercial Advertiser,
quoted in Baltimore Patriot, same date; Essex Register, May 10; Boston Centinel,
April 26; Niles’, XVII: 421; XVIII: 58, 74, 263, 414-15.

101 National Intelligencer, July 12, 1820.

 

 

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GUAP LE Res

Relations with the Restored
Bourbons—Later Period

LTHOUGH in the early years of the Bourbon Restoration relations
were Officially friendly, and the United States authorities had every
reason for considerable gratitude toward the French for their support in the
matter of the Florida Treaty, certain questions of a practical nature
had not been satisfactorily arranged, and the discussions in regard to
them developed considerable acerbity on both sides.
The earliest of these in origin was the American claim for indemnity,
based on the damages done to commercial interests in the time of Napo-
leon.1 A convention signed in 1803, at the time of the Louisiana Pur-
chase, provided for most of the claims dated before 1800. A few classes
not covered by this agreement, and an additional mass of cases dating
mostly from 1803 to 1805, had never been adjusted. The questions in-
volved were extremely complex. Various decrees issued by the Emperor
in person, without legislative concurrence, could be cited to justify the
French action. But how far should such decrees apply to neutrals? And
how far, even if they could fairly be applied, could they be recognized as
retroactive, or to be applied without due notice? Were vessels judged and
condemned by a prize court to be paid for on the same basis as vessels
arbitrarily burned at sea? How far did the responsibility of the Bourbon
government for Napoleonic misdeeds extend? These questions, and others,
formed the basis of innumerable conferences and communications. When
Gallatin went to Paris as minister, he was instructed that his first duty
was to present the indemnity claims and press for a settlement, or at least
for an acknowledgment of their justice. The French declared themselves
perfectly willing to discuss, but also perfectly unable to pay. They could
scarcely pronounce the claims entirely inadmissible, inasmuch as pre-
cisely similar ones had been allowed in the treaties with the European
governments; but they made every effort to avoid or postpone any definite
recognition of indebtedness. This attitude was favored by the unwillingness
of the United States to urge immediate payment from a country whose
financial situation was precarious, and which needed time to organize its

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resources after the prodigious events of the last two decades. The in-
stability of the French ministries after 1818 also contributed to delay,
for whenever a new minister took charge of the portfolio of foreign af-
fairs, he professed to know nothing of the claims and required time to find
and study the documents on file, and to consult other authorities, so that
before he was prepared to give any reply, there might be another minis-
terial change, resulting in further delay. Frequently the French simply
took refuge in silence, and the only answer given to inquiries of the
American minister might be a mere formal acknowledgment of the re-
ceipt of his communications.”

Moreover, the French had counter-claims, which they pressed actively.
The most important of these was in regard to commerce in Louisiana.
They asserted that under the eighth article of the Purchase Treaty they
were granted in perpetuity the rights of the “most favored nation,” but
that the United States, in granting to Great Britain after 1815 the right
of entry without the payment of discriminating duties, while French
vessels continued to pay a tax, had committed an infraction of this agree-
ment. The United States law of 1815, to which this contention referred,
provided that in case any country should consent to receive American
vessels on the same terms as those of its own nationals, the United States
would grant a like privilege to the vessels of that country. Great Britain,
and later some other countries, accepted this offer. France did not, but
continued to collect very heavy dues on American vessels in French ports,
much to the advantage of French commerce. Therefore, said the United
States authorities, Great Britain was in no sense in the position of a
“favored nation,” but was receiving a privilege for which she had paid,
and which France, on making the same payment, might likewise receive,
and which would be available in all American ports. Moreover, France
could not in any case receive special privileges in the ports of Louisiana
without a violation of the Constitutional provision that all duties, imports,
and excises, should be uniform throughout the United States.

A further French claim was that of the heirs of Caron de Beaumarchais,
for an unpaid balance due him on account of purchases made for the
United States government at the time of the Revolutionary War. This case
was complicated by an uncertainty regarding a sum paid Beaumarchais by
King Louis XVI, for the benefit of the colonies, and unaccounted for.
Various minor disputes had also to be considered. As Baron Pasquier
expressed it to Mr. Gallatin in 1821, there was a fatality attached to these
affairs which tended perpetually to impede an arrangement by throwing
in the way incidents of the most irritating nature.* In 1820, officials of
the revenue services seized a French vessel, the Apollon, on the Spanish

66

 

 

 

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ait RU Rea i i ah f ib a a

suiteRELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS

 

 

side of the St. Mary’s River, in Florida, on a charge of attempting to evade
the tariff regulations of the United States; and an American war ship, the
Alligator, in carrying out its orders to prevent slave trading on the Afri-
can coast, captured several French ships, the best known being the Jeune
Eugenie. Questions of consular rights, of port dues, of traiffs, of desert-
ing seamen, and of pirates, were injected into the discussions of the main
issues.

In 1821, after it had become evident that Gallatin, in France, could
find no way out of the impasse, it was agreed to transfer the commercial
negotiations to Washington, and M. de Neuville was directed to return
and conduct them. So great was the French confidence in his skill and
his popularity in America, that his instructions provided for a stay of
only a few months in the United States, after which he was to proceed to
Brazil as minister to that country, and to clear up some difficulties there.
He arrived in Washington just at the time that the authorities there re-
ceived the Spanish ratification of the Florida Treaty, and he was tendered
a personal welcome of the most cordial variety. The negotiation of the
commercial agreement, however, proved by no means so simple as his gov-
ernment had expected. The Americans absolutely refused to admit the
Louisiana claim, or even to discuss it as a part of a tariff convention. They
insisted upon the principle of complete reciprocity in the matter of port
dues, and in general showed themselves quite immune to diplomatic bland-
ishments, so that it was not until June 24, 1822, that a treaty was finally
agreed upon, and even then it was offered merely as a temporary arrange-
ment, intended to break the trade deadlock which had existed since the
summer of 1820, when the United States, in an effort to compel the French
to abandon the heavy dues they were imposing upon American vessels,
had laid prohibitive duties on French ships in American ports. The only
result had been to arouse the Gallic obstinacy and pride, and lead to the
prompt imposition of even heavier dues. The new treaty proved unex-
pectedly satisfactory, however, and was allowed to remain in force. It
equalized the port dues, and provided for their gradual extinction. It
defined standard weights and measures, fixed charges for pilotage, etc.,
and provided for the arrest of deserting sailors.

The other questions dragged on until 1831, when Jackson’s vigorous
policy, coupled with the fact that the Revolution of 1830 in France brought
into control an element friendly to the United States, made it possible for
William C. Rives, then our minister at Paris, to negotiate a treaty under
which the indemnity claims on both sides were settled, the United States
paying 1,500,000 francs to cover all claims in behalf of French citizens,
and receiving 25,000,000 francs, in payment of all damages due from

67

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HaiAMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

France. France also relinquished her contention in regard to commerce
with Louisiana, in return for some favorable tariff adjustments. This
treaty was ratified in 1832, but the French legislature failed to make the
appropriations necessary to carry out its provisions, thereby leading to a
crisis in 1835.
The official documents bearing on these questions are very full, and these
together with the numerous other references to the subject to be found in
the writings of Monroe, Gallatin, and Adams, show the great importance
which the government attached to the settlements, and manifest also quite
clearly the feelings of impatience and irritation which arose in the course
of the discussions. The character and degree of public sentiment may be
gauged somewhat by the Presidents’ Messages, which regularly reviewed
the situation. Those of Monroe were calm and dispassionate, expressing
the hope for a satisfactory settlement of disputed points in the near future,
but without recommending any active measures.® Personally, Monroe felt
rather strongly especially on the question of the Apollon case, as is shown
in his correspondence with Adams.® Some members of the cabinet, Craw-
ford in particular, differed from the governmental policy, and in conver-
sations with De Neuville helped to strengthen the French position. Craw-
ford wrote to Gallatin in 1822, referring to the capture of the slave-trading
ships, that in his opinion a commercial agreement might be made “un-
less our determination to support every officer in violating the orders, laws,
and constitution of the government and nation should oppose an insur-
mountable obstacle to it.” He added, “A disposition to discuss has always
characterized our government; but until recently an appearance of modera-
tion has marked our discussions. Now our disposition to discuss seems to
have been augmented, and the spirit of conciliation has manifestly been
abandoned by our councils. We are determined to say harsher things than
are said to us, and to have the last word.” Gallatin agreed somewhat with
this estimate.’
In May, 1824, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Mr. Forsyth, reported that the committee had received several
petitions, memorials, etc., and had studied with care the correspondence
between the United States and France. The report states:

 

 

“The committee have seen, with surprise, that although the attention of the present
government of France was especially invited to this subject in 1818, and has been
repeatedly recalled to it since that time, France has not yet thought proper to
enter into a discussion of it [the indemnity question]. The committee are of opinion
that measures ought to be taken to impress upon France the necessity of an early
and definite adjustment.”

68

 

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The committee would offer such measures if they did not hope that
France would take action during the coming summer. The committee felt
that France must be careful not to place a neutral in a worse position than
an enemy, “unless she intends to instruct other powers that in all future
wars in which she may be engaged with a formidable rival, it will be more
prudent to be her enemy than her friend.” *

Monroe’s Message the next December might have been expected to re-
flect somewhat this energetic tone. That it did not, may have been due
to the hope it expressed, that Charles X, who had just ascended the
French throne, might be more amenable to reason than Louis XVIII. The
presence of Lafayette in Washington at the time may also have had its in-
fluence.

Adams, who as Secretary of State had been charged with the duty of
carrying on the negotiations and knew better than any one else how
little success had attended them, included in the first draft of his Presi-
dential Message of December, 1825, the statement that in his judgment
the United States would be entirely justified in the use of force to bring
about a settlement, but that the Administration did not approve of this,
and would persevere in its diplomatic methods. The members of the
Cabinet disapproved of this phraseology, saying that it was equivalent to
announcing that the United States would under no circumstances resort
to force, which would amount to an abandonment of the claims. They
suggested that he advise that measures of reprisal be undertaken. The
Message finally reads that “several objects of great interest” . . . are left
unadjusted, “‘and particularly a mass of claims . . . for property taken
or destroyed under circumstances of the most aggravated and outrageous
character. In the long period during which continual and earnest appeals
have been made to the equity and magnanimity of France in behalf of
these claims, their justice has not been, as it could not be, denied... .
They have been presented and urged hitherto without effect. The repeated
and earnest representations of our minister at the court of France remain
as yet even without any answer. . . .”° The Message of 1826 reported no
change in the situation. That of 1827 recalled the fact that our relations
with France go back to the first year of our existence. “We do not forget
them. . . . We should hail with exultation a moment which should in-
dicate a recollection, equally friendly, on the part of France.” In 1828
the matter was still “the subject of earnest representation and remon-
strance. 1°

Jackson’s first Message was characteristically blunt and aggressive. The
indemnity was still unsatisfied, “and must therefore continue to furnish a

69AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

subject of unpleasant discussion and possible collision between the two
governments.” The President “cherishes a lively hope that the injurious
delays of the past will find redress in the equity of the future,” and. has
instructed the minister of the United States in France to press the claims
in a spirit which will win respect. In 1830, he coupled with flattering re-
marks about the new French government the statement that ‘‘the sense
of this injury has had and must continue to have a very unfavorable
effect’’ upon the commercial intercourse of the two countries. And in
1831, after the signature of the treaty, he said:

“Should this treaty receive the proper sanction, a source of irritation will be stopped
that has for so many years in some degree alienated from each other two nations
who from interest as well as the remembrance of early associations, ought to cherish
the most friendly relations. . .. An encouragement will be given for perseverance
in the demands of justice by this new proof that if steadily pursued they will be
listened to, and it will be a warning to other powers to deal justly with the United
States.” 11

Press comments on these subjects are rather rare. In 1819, November 25,
a correspondent of the /ndependent Chronicle and Boston Patriot wrote
from Paris a criticism of the French commercial demands, and said,
“Such a treaty our government will certainly never listen to.” 2 August
12, 1820, the National Intelligencer said:

“Great excitement has been produced in France by the passage of our act imposing
new tonnage duties on French vessels. From the friendly feeling of this country to
France, that act was passed reluctantly, and will be cheerfully suspended, according
to the provision it contains authorizing that course, when the government of France
shall think fit to reciprocate with us the liberality of our commercial relations.
The measure seems to have produced as much sensation as if it were unexpected.
But what else could they have looked for? Our minister to that country had been
long enough entreating them to reason and put off by evasive answers. . . . France
will not disdain to be as wise as England, and by a relaxation of her system, avail
herself of the opportunity now offered to her of placing herself in our ports on the
footing of the most favored nation.” 1%

The Southern Patriot said:

“France is the aggressor in this war of commercial restriction, and she should be the
first to evince a disposition to conclude a treaty of peace in the spirit of peace.” 14

In 1824 the North American Review had two long editorials by Edward
Everett reviewing the history of the spoliation claims, and declaring that
national honor demanded that energetic steps should be taken to ensure
their settlement.*®

The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1824, above men-
tioned, elicited this comment from the New York American:

70RELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS

 

 

“It is to be borne in mind by Americans, that while every petty potentate in Europe
has been able to obtain from the French government complete remuneration for the
wrongs inflicted by Napoleon, this government has been left for years without even
the civility of an answer to its reclamation of indemnity for spoliation more unjust
and unprincipled than has ever before been submitted to by a free and powerful
people. ... The title of Roman citizen was a protection anywhere in the world.
Why should the title of American citizen afford less protection to those who bear it,
or cause of apprehension to those who set it at naught?” 16

The National Intelligencer thought that payment had been “too long
withheld, in defiance of every principle of justice and comity.” *7 The
“favored nation” plea in regard to Louisiana, the New York American
characterized as “unjustifiable”; and on October 13, 1825, urged stern
demands instead of supplication, and added,—“If justice unarmed can-
not be heard by European courts, they should see that a sword can at
need be supplied, and used, too.”** The New York Gazette said,—
“France is able to pay, and France must pay.” 1* Niles’ Register, how-
ever, deprecated this warlike spirit, and while reporting popular meet-
ings arranged in Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, and other places, by
those interested in the claims, took the position that while it was correct
to keep the claims alive, and to urge them by all amicable means, it could
only create antagonism and delay the settlement, to talk of compelling
payment.”°

Faith in the good will of “regenerated France” after the Revolution of
1830 was general.2* The prompt appointment of a committee to investigate
the claims, with George Washington Lafayette, son of the General, as a
member, confirmed this belief. There was surprise and disappointment
when the committee, reporting in April, 1831, upheld the French claims to
Louisiana privileges; justified the imperial aggressions by the actions of
Great Britain and the United States; agreed to pay only when the im-
perial system had been abusively or irregularly applied; and finally, de-
clared 10,000,000 francs the utmost they would pay.?? But an amicable
arrangement, representing a compromise of the disputed points, soon
followed. The Annual Register, reviewing the whole history of the claims
and the terms of settlement, said that the delay had resulted chiefly from
an unwillingness on the part of the French government to recognize any
claims in favor of a government whose liberal institutions were regarded
as a standing condemnation of its own principles and policy.** The terms
of the Treaty were sharply criticised by opponents of Jackson, and by
some of the commercial interests, as providing for too small a payment on
the part of France, and also as exceeding the treaty rights of the Execu-
tive, in that they included an alteration of the tariff, but the agreement was
ratified without difficulty.”*

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These difficulties after all affected comparatively few persons, and con-
tained in their early stages little of the emotional element. Very influential
in forming public opinion in regard to France were the international con-
ditions which touched the United States only indirectly or potentially, but
out of which developed the Monroe Doctrine. Interest in these events seems
to have been at first based largely on an idealistic sympathy with the
struggle for liberty, a sympathy which has ever been strongly marked in
the American temperament, and easily roused. In all the revolutionary
movements of the early nineteenth century, the people in the United
States unhesitatingly chose and vigorously supported the side of the
revolutionists. This had been the case in regard to the Revolution of
1820 in Spain. It had been hailed with satisfaction and watched with
interest. From the first, it had been conjectured that the Bourbon govern-
ment in France might wish to intervene, and there had been few illusions
as to the ultimate purpose of the “‘cordon sanitaire.” 2° When in 1822 King
Ferdinand appealed to the Holy Alliance for aid in restoring his absolute
rule, and at the Congress of Verona the Duke of Montmorency made it
evident that France was eager to be the instrument of his “liberation,” 7°
a storm of criticism swept through the United States, increasing in force
as the occupation was undertaken and carried out. If there had existed in
any quarter any lurking friendliness for the Bourbons, or confidence in
their good behavior, this “unheard-of usurpation” would have sufficed to
destroy it. Hopes were widely expressed that the expedition would fail,
and that its failure would be the signal for the outbreak of a revolution
in France.

A typical editorial on the subject is the following, from the Providence
American:

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“There can be but one opinion respecting the principle on which it is commenced
and the purpose which it is intended to accomplish. The canting professions and
hypocritical pretences under which France and her allies aim to conceal the iniquity
of their unprovoked attempt upon the infant liberties of Spain, will fail to mitigate
the deep and pervading sentiment of indignation which must be aroused by their
unholy crusade to arrest the progress of free principles in Europe and to revive the
existence of an intolerant and odious government. That the Holy Alliance may be
defeated in their projects must be the ardent prayer of the friends of freedom
throughout the world.” 27

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“A more unjustifiable war was never waged by any nation than this on

the part of France. In such a war, the feelings of all just men are upon

the side of Spain.’’ Thus says the Connecticut Courant.?® The Richmond

Enquirer, in a scathing review of the war proclamation of King Louis

XVIII, described the project as a plan to abolish the Spanish Constitu-
72

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tion, “restore the imbecile Ferdinand to his unlimited powers, crush the
germs of rising greatness in that fine country, and quarter upon her
bands of foreign troops until her patriots are beheaded or banished and
her people disciplined to slavery.” *°

The Trenton Emporium referred to Louis XVIII as a king “Whose cow-
ardly hands are stained with the blood of Frenchmen and Spaniards”’; °°
and the Windsor (Vt.) Journal described the war as “one of the most un-
justifiable and unrighteous . . . which was ever waged by civilized na-
tions.” *1 It is to be noted, too, that this judgment remained fixed through
the succeeding years. Nowhere was the French intervention in Spain spoken
of save in terms of the strongest condemnation. In 1830, long after any
emotion of the moment had died out, in such thoughtful journals as the
Annual Register and the North American Review these phrases appeared:
—‘“A palpable interference with the internal affairs of another state for
the worst of purposes,” and “The invasion of Spain was a measure which
can have excited only one feeling in the minds of all lovers of liberty or
justice.” *? The message of the Governor of Virginia to the legislature,
December 1, 1823, contained a striking phrase reminiscent today of a cer-
tain German pronouncement at the opening of the World War. “The peo-
ple of Old Spain have yielded to superior force, and the parchment of their
Constitution has been put aside by the point of the bayonet.” ** In the ut-
terances of the other leaders of thought at that time appeared the same
spirit. John Quincy Adams wrote:

“The situation in Spain is full of terror... . It is tasking severely the patience of
the human race to hear Louis the Eighteenth of France proclaim in the face of the
world that he who had not legs to stand upon will send 100,000 Frenchmen into Spain
to ravage the land with fire and sword, to teach them to receive their liberties from
the hand of Ferdinand the Seventh. This doctrine cannot be much longer maintained
in Europe. It grows too absurd.” *4

This was written in April, 1823. In the same month Monroe wrote to
Jefferson, —

“When it is recollected that he, his whole family, and all those around him, were
twenty-six years in banishment and poverty, and restored more by accident
and the folly of a man then at the head of affairs than the gallantry or wisdom of
all Europe embodied against him, and when we also see that the position of this
King is unsettled and precarious, gaining strength more by habit, and time, taking
off gallant spirits to the grave, than by any merit of his own... it is difficult to
express one’s feelings when he declares ‘that any rights which the people enjoy are
derived from him.’” 5°

Jefferson, in a letter to Thomas Leiper, May 31, said:
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SaatAMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

“Tam all alive ...to the war of Spain and its atrocious invasion by France. |
trust it will end in an universal insurrection of continental Europe, and in the estab-
lishment of representative government in every country of it. We surely see the

finger of Providence in the insanity of France which brings on this great consum-
mation.” 36

Calhoun regretted that the resistance of Spain was not equal “to her
ancient renown or her noble cause.” *? Perhaps the most striking arraign-
ment of France at the moment, certainly one of the most frequently
quoted, was a speech of Clay’s, delivered in Philadelphia in March, soon
after the news had reached America that the French armies were actually
on the march. After praising the Spanish for their moderation in the early
days of the constitution, Clay continued,—

“And France comes to check her in her noble and patriotic career. . . . She would
restore the absolute sway of the monarch, and, | suppose, all the blessings of the
Inquisition! . . . One pleasing effect upon the people of this country, with regard
to this war, will be that unlike the late wars of Europe, it will create no divisions
of opinion among us. In spite of our partiality to France, in spite of all the grateful
recollections with which her name is associated; in spite of our sincere desire to
maintain with her especially the most amicable relations, there will be here
but one feeling and one hope as to the issue of this wanton and unprovoked

contest. We shall, in regard to it, be ‘all federalists, all republicans, all Spanish;
none, no, not one, French!’ ” 38

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At the close of this address Mr. Clay gave the toast, “Success to the
cause of the country under whose auspices the New World was dis-
covered!” And, said the reporters, ““This address was received, and the
toast drank, with the most fervid expression of deep feeling for the glori-
ous cause of Spain.” Some uneasiness was manifested in the United States
as to the security of the Florida Treaty, so lately ratified by the Constitu-
tional government of Spain. Might the king, restored to his full powers,
attempt to withdraw it? The general feeling was, however, that it could
not be disturbed, “and the less, because it had the full approbation of
the king of France, the tutor and champion of his cousin of Spain.” 3°
The action of the French fleet, blockading Cadiz, in stopping the vessel
which was carrying the new Minister to Spain, Mr. Nelson, to his post,
and compelling it to turn back to Gibraltar was sharply resented.*? Identi-
fication of the cause of European liberty with the cause of American
liberty was immediate, and it was even rumored that an attempt would
be made upon the freedom of the United States. The National Intelligencer
declared that it was our turn next. We had not returned to a dominating
religion, or to legitimacy. “This is a war against Liberty.” 4 It was. re-
ported, and even believed, at Buenos Ayres, that France, Spain and Eng-
land had entered into a coalition “to compel North America to accept of a
74

 

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king, from some of the reigning dynasties!” 4? “It may not . . . be re-
quired that the American people should engage on the side of the Spanish
nation; but her cause is virtually ours . .. since all the doctrines the
allies attack we firmly hold.” #* The Detroit Gazette printed a letter from
a correspondent “in a high quarter” in Paris, stating that the Powers were
determined to crush Liberty in the United States, as well as in Europe and
South America, cost what it might. “Prepare yourselves to see a most
formidable attack on the United States within a few years. Spies will soon
swarm all over your land.” 44 Calhoun declared that the United States
must be vigilant and prudent, since the Holy Alliance “regards our
government with jealousy and hatred. . . . So long as we are safe and
flourishing, that despotism, which it is their object to support, is in
danger.” *°

It may be doubted whether many persons seriously expected such an
attack, but these comments are indications of the uneasy and sensitive
character of public sentiment at the time, a sentiment which manifested
an extreme susceptibility to rumors of all sorts and an especial readiness
to credit anything which should link in a suspicious way the policy
of France with the fortunes of the Americas. “The royalists are all on
tiptoe. . . . They expect the commencement of a new era in the affairs of
Spain . . . and the restoration with French aid, of the colonies!” “We
wait, with some impatience, to be assured of the fact, whether France, at
the instigation of the ‘holy alliance’ has really dispatched vessels to Mex-
ico, Colombia, La Plata, Chili and Peru, to command the people of these
countries to return to unlimited obedience to Spain.’ *® Very persistent
was the rumor that Spain had ceded Cuba or Porto Rico, or both, to Eng-
land as payment for help against France, or to France in payment of the
expenses of the occupation.*7 It was known that France was trying to
establish Bourbon princes as rulers in the old Spanish provinces.*®

The President’s Message of December, 1823, must be considered there-
fore, not only in its character as a reasoned public document, issued after
careful study of a delicate international situation, but also as expressing
the suspicions and uneasiness of the nation, based it is true more upon
intuition than upon a full knowledge of the facts, but keenly sensitive to
considerations which touched its sympathies or its interests. It is not pro-
posed to enter here into a discussion of the development and application
of the Monroe Doctrine, a topic which has been the subject of much careful
research, especially in late years.4° It is intended rather, avoiding in
this case citations from diplomatic correspondence and public documents
and from the opinions of those who were actually concerned in directing
the affairs of the nation at this period, to reflect the temper of the press,

75

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and of the people in general, bearing particularly upon the feeling of
Americans toward France.

It was recognized that of the members of the Holy Alliance, France was
the one who could most effectively interfere in Latin-American affairs.
Against such interference the declaration of the President, coupled with
the opposition of the British, raised a barrier, and “against these positive
manifestations . . . we apprehend that France will not choose to come
Quixotting, for the divine right of kings, on this continent, . . . but if she
does, she comes at her peril.” °° The President’s Message “is likely to meet
the general wishes of our citizens.” ©! It “has been received throughout the
country with a warm and universal burst of applause. We have seen it
noticed in a great variety of papers from all the States this side of the
Carolinas, and with one solitary exception it has been noted with marked
respect and applause.” * “It is the universal sentiment of the American
people.” °° “It must be received in Europe as a distinct expression of the
firm purpose of the people of this country.” °* “The independent govern-
ments of Mexico and South America must not, shall not, fall under the
grasp of despotism.” *° “If the Holy Alliance attempt to control the des-
tinies of South America they will find not only a lion, but an eagle in the
way.” °° The Maryland Legislature passed a strong resolution of approval
and support. They hope it will prove a salutary warning, but “feel a
confident assurance that the people of the United States will be prepared
to make good the warning, and will feel assured that, in employing their
energy, power, and resources in defeating such machinations . . . against
the independence of their neighbors, they are most effectually securing
their own.” °7

The report that France was under treaty to aid Spain in recovering the
Latin-American provinces, and that she was fitting out war vessels for this
purpose, continued to be mentioned in 1824,5° however, and was revived
with renewed strength in 1825. Early in this year the House requested the
President to transmit any information he had on this subject.*® There was
especial anxiety in regard to the designs of France on Cuba and other
West Indian islands. To appreciate this we should recall Daniel Web-
ster’s statement. “Cuba,” he said, “is placed in the mouth of the Missis-
sippi. Its occupation by a strong maritime power would be felt, in the
first moment of hostility, as far up the Mississippi and the Missouri as
our population extends. It is the commanding point of the Gulf of Mex-
ico. See, too, how it lies in the very line of our coastwise traffic, inter-
posed in the very highway between New York and New Orleans.’ °°
Many prominent men felt that sooner or later Cuba must be annexed to
the United States; and our government had declared that under no cir-

76

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cumstances could it be allowed to pass from the hands of Spain to those
of any other European power. For years Great Britain’s interest in the
island had been known and feared: France was believed to be only a
little less eager to acquire it, and to be now, with her superior influence
in Spanish affairs, in a most favorable position to do so. Matters were fur-
ther complicated by the schemes of Mexico and Colombia to assist Cuba
in securing her independence, since this promised them the double ad-
vantage of freeing themselves from the menace of a Spanish base so near
at hand and of adding this island, and perhaps Porto Rico, to their
own system of states. Spain would certainly be unable alone to defeat
such measures, and might be even more likely than before to consider
ceding the islands to France.*t The transfer of a few United States ships
from one station to another brought out the headline “Is it Spain, France,
or what is it?” ® and when first a few French warships and then a con-
siderable fleet really appeared in the West Indies, conjecture ran riot, and
pronounced objection was manifested.

“The course pursued by France is at best equivocal and suspicious, as it re-
gards Mexico and South America,” said the Baltimore Federal Gazette,
in an indignant editorial.

“The United States and England will consider the interference of any government
with the independence of what was formerly Spanish America, that of Spain alone
excepted, an act of hostility towards them, yet we find France doing everything
but what is to be considered an act of open, actual interference. If the navy of
France convoys Spanish troops in safety to that point from which they can most
effectively operate against the new states, is it not merely one step short of abso-
lute hostility against their independence? . . . Here we see the French navy convoy-
ing Spanish troops, and some accounts say in thousands, to Havana, to the very
threshold of Colombia and Mexico,—convoying them in safety in face of the
Colombian cruisers; convoying them to a port from whence, when their plans are
matured, they may slip out in the night and reach the Colombian coast before the
patriots can receive intelligence of their movements. And will any man say that
this is neutrality?” &

The New York Evening Post stated that a treaty had certainly been
signed between France and Spain for the occupation of Cuba and Porto
Rico. Of 16,000 French soldiers then in the West Indies, 3000 were to go
to Cuba, 4000 to Porto Rico, a French general was to become governor
of Cuba, and both islands were to be held by France till all danger of
insurrection was over. The Baltimore American said that France had been
gradually concentrating forces, both military and naval, in the islands,
and probably intended to use the excuse of a temporary occupation to
cover her taking possession for all time. This was a very serious matter,
and the cabinets of both the United States and Great Britain should in-
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vestigate it. “France, if this intelligence be correct, will be enabled by the
cession of Cuba, to command all ingress and egress from the Gulf of
Mexico.” °

The New York Evening Post for August 4 gave credence to the idea of
the occupation of Cuba by French forces, and thought the Spanish flag
would be employed to cover the truth.** The New York Spectator was also
much excited over the news.®°* The New York American said that it had
not up to this time believed that the island had actually been ceded, or
that the French fleet intended to attack it, but the recent events were “a
little calculated to shake our faith,’ and the country should remember that
any change would be*distinctly against the interest of the United States.®
The Commercial Advertiser, while insisting that it did not believe the
reports, yet admitted that they gave strong ground for suspicion, and said
of the French fleet,—‘‘But suppose the next news we hear of it is that it
has peaceably passed the Moro, and is snugly in command of the
Havana? ... France claims an indemnity for sustaining the tottering
throne of Ferdinand, and it may be true that that monarch has consented
to part with the richest jewels of his crown, for the privilege of wearing
the tinsel which remains.” ®

Little credit was given to France when she recognized, in the autumn of
1825, the independence of Haiti. The terms of the document were declared
to be equivocal, and the sincerity of the French government doubted. The
Richmond W hig quoted with approval an article from a New York journal
running as follows: “That France has at all times, from the earliest period
of her history, been distinguished for her perfidy, her disregard for the
opinion of the world, and her destitution of principle, is, we think, uni-
versally conceded.” ® The Annual Register spoke of the “artful treaty”
negotiated with Haiti, “nominally a recognition of independence, but
substantially an assertion of sovereignty.” 7°

The possibility of allied intervention in the case of the Greek Revolution
was also viewed with extreme disfavor, since it was considered certain that
any intervention from this quarter could only bode evil for the Greeks.
‘“‘We infer this, because the Alliance never met in one instance, but Liberty
bled. They never held a conference or a congress, but immediately the
dearest rights of man were sacrificed.” 72 “This band of despots would
sooner tear in tatters the banner of the cross, burn their bibles and turn
Turks than see a free Republican government established in Europe.”
“We do not see how this ‘Holy Alliance,’ consistent with their own

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' Greeks and the Turks. . . . The Porte is a ‘legitimate sovereign.’ ” ** The
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of the behavior of the allies, and especially of the invasion of Spain by
France. Webster made a strong plea for the cause of liberty, declaring that
the acts of the Holy Alliance were condemned by the general sense of
justice of the civilized world, and that this must finally have its effect.
“It is nothing,” said he, “that the troops of France have passed from the
Pyrenees to Cadiz; it is nothing that an unhappy and prostrate nation
has fallen before them; it is nothing that arrests, and confiscations, and
executions, sweep away the little remnant of national resistance. There is
an enemy that still exists to check the glory of these triumphs. . . . It
follows the conqueror back . . . shows him... . that . . . his victory is
a barren spectre; that it shall confer neither joy nor honor, but shall
moulder to dry ashes in his grasp. . . . It wounds him with the sting
which belongs to the consciousness of having outraged the opinion of
mankind.” 7* Even when the French did send their army to the Morea
to codperate with the Greeks, opinion in the United States remained
scornful, and showed a curiosity as to what the price of the aid would be,
and whether France intended to retain the freed districts as her share of
the spoils.?°

Midway in this decade, during the years 1824 and 1825, Lafayette re-
visited America for the last time. He came on the invitation of the United
States government, and was entertained as the “nation’s guest” during
his entire stay. His welcome was unique in its warmth, its unanimity, and
its sustained enthusiasm. Since the name of Lafayette has ever been one
to conjure with, and his personality one of the most secure links between
the peoples of France and the United States, the sincerity and generosity
of his welcome on this occasion are often cited as proofs of the sympathy
existing between the two countries. But, in the light of the actual relations
which have been mentioned, the true conception of the significance of this
event must be quite different. Far from being a celebration of Franco-
American amity, it emphasized most clearly the lack of harmony between
the ideals of France and the United States at this time. Lafayette was
received as the hero of the Revolution,—as one of the founders of the
Republic; and Republic and Revolution were alike anathema in France.
Lafayette was the incarnation of the spirit of Liberty and the champion of
all oppressed peoples. Liberty was in France a forbidden word, and the
French government would crush its expression in other countries wherever
possible. A member of a political minority, the old patriot was at the mo-
ment excluded from the Chamber of Deputies for the too decided disap-
proval he had manifested of the reactionary tendencies of the majority,
and only for this reason was he willing to be absent from the country which
he was forbidden to serve. The festival of Lafayette’s coming was to the

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Americans in part purely national,—a glorification of the days when
against bitter odds the United States had struggled into being, and of the
half-century of almost phenomenal progress which had followed,—but it
was also in part an opportunity to assert their principles and to give to a
reactionary Europe a striking proof of their unswerving devotion to the
ideals of Liberty. It is on such a basis that Lafayette’s triumph in America
may be truly explained.

We have abundant material from which to form a just estimate of this
remarkable visit. Aside from formal accounts, such as that of Lafayette’s
secretary, Levasseur, who accompanied him on the journey, the memoirs
and reminiscences of those who shared in the festivities are in existence
in numbers, and the newspapers and magazines of the day contain exceed-
ingly full descriptions. Everywhere, throughout the whole country, the
leading characteristics of the welcome were the same. Let us look for a
moment at the decorations which formed the holiday attire of the cities
and towns honored by his presence. Occasionally the tri-color and the fleur-
de-lis appeared, but the stars and stripes, the Goddess of Liberty, and the
American eagle, dominated the scene. The civic arches along the way bore
with the names of Washington and Lafayette those of Revolutionary heroes,
and portraits, too, of these men were frequent. Revolutionary mottoes,
“Washington,—Lafayette,—Justice,—Liberty,” “The rights of man, 1776,”
“A nation’s thanks to freedom’s friend”; names of the battles in which
Lafayette served, “Brandywine, 11 Sept., 1777,” “Yorktown, 19 Oct.,
1781,” appeared often; and the names and symbols of the original Thirteen
States. Army and navy trophies formed part of the decorations, W ashing-
ton’s tent was brought out for Lafayette’s use, and Revolutionary relics
were exhibited everywhere, while the veterans of the War were guests of
honor on all occasions.** Among the gifts with which the General was
showered, we find that of the General Assembly of Maryland,—a copy of
the Declaration of Independence, of the Bill of Rights, of the Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom, and of Washington’s Farewell Ad-
dress.*7

In the addresses, the toasts, and the press reports, there is observable a
note of recognition that the festival of Liberty in America could but be
unwelcome to the Europeans. Niles’ Register makes it evident when the
editor says, soon after Lafayette’s arrival,—

 

| “The king and priest-ridden population of the European continent, the white slaves
of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and the degraded people of France, with the
miserable wretches . . . that inhabit Spain . . . cannot have anything more like a
just conception of our feelings, as associated with the arrival of General Lafayette,
than a Hottentot possesses of algebra!” 78

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Jefferson wrote to Richard Rush that the welcome would have a good
effect for Lafayette with the people of Europe, but probably a different one
with their sovereigns.”® General Harper, speaking at Baltimore, said that
the nation was giving its testimony in favor of those principles of gov-
ernment for which Lafayette had fought and suffered. Europe was now
divided into two great parties, one striving to uphold and perpetuate
absolute power, the other struggling for equal rights and constitutional
government. It would encourage the friends of the good cause to see the
unanimity of spirit in the United States.®° “Proof against the menaces of
bloody factions, and against the siren voice of royal and imperial seduc-
tion and power, Lafayette stands like a consoling and guiding light in that
deep darkness which has overspread the political horizon of Europe.” *
“General Lafayette and the rights of man. May Europe practice the lesson
he has taught!’’®? “The holy alliance between Liberty and Lafayette. May
it prove destructive of the unholy alliance of crowned heads against
the rights of man!” §* Frequent among the toasts were expressions of sym-
pathy with the Greek, the Spanish, and the South American patriots; and
often the names of Washington, Lafayette, and Bolivar, were linked to-
gether. Toasts to France are not often found. When they do appear, their
implications are not always complimentary. “France: Too beautiful for
tyranny, may its shores soon resound with glorious hallelujahs to freedom
and independence.” * “France: absolute or free, in glory or decay, she is
still entitled to our gratitude, for her generous support in the day of diffi-
culty and trial.” *° “The Liberty of France!” ®° “We thank France for
her son: May America not forget, and Europe feel to good purpose, the
influence of his bright example.” *’
Lafayette himself did not hesitate to express his belief in and his love for
republican institutions. At the celebration in New Orleans, the French resi-
dents begged him to note that they were members of the Union in good
standing, with a full measure of liberty, and that the wise and temperate
use which they had made of it was a triumphant answer to those who had
“proclaimed them unfit for freedom, and stigmatized you for laboring
to confer upon them the greatest of blessings.” In his reply, Lafayette
agreed to this, and referred feelingly to “those deplorable excesses which
have hitherto retarded the establishment of freedom in France.” ** At Hart-
ford he urged that Americans cherish with care their republican principles,
as there was such a powerful opposition abroad to our free institutions.*®
In Philadelphia he said that American Republicanism had “begun the era
of the new and only true social order, that founded on the inalienable rights
of man.” ® In Boston, he gave as a toast: “The city of Boston, the cradle
of Liberty: may Faneuil Hall ever stand as a monument to teach the
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world that resistance to oppression is a duty, and will under true re-
publican institutions become a blessing.” ®t At a dinner in honor of Rush,
in Philadelphia, he paid a tribute to Monroe, whose “happy message” had
“at once checked the plots of several European powers against the inde-
pendence and freedom of South America and Mexico.” ®? When the time
for his departure came, President Adams made a formal address of fare-
well, in which he spoke of France as “the land of brilliant genius, of
generous sentiment, of heroic valour,” etc., but included no word which
could be construed as praise for France as the Bourbons ruled it; and
Lafayette in his reply declared that in his visit he had recognized “a
glorious demonstration to the most timid and most prejudiced minds of
the superiority over degrading aristocracy or despotism, of popular institu-
tions founded on the plain rights of man, and where the local rights of
every section are preserved under a constitutional bond of union.” He held
the success of this nation to be a “pledge of the emancipation of the
world.” *

Still further light is thrown upon the situation by the attitude of the
French government toward Lafayette’s visit, and the way this behavior
was commented on in the United States. In September, 1824, the New
York Commercial Advertiser carried a long editorial, describing the cir-
cumstances connected with the General’s departure from France. It stated
that a delegation of residents of Havre went out a few miles to meet and
escort him into the town. “The American consul, and all the American
gentlemen and captains of ships in the harbor, intended also paying that
compliment to the General, but the Sous-Prefet noticed to the consul that
the Americans must not do so.” When the General arrived the roads were
crowded, and a strong body of gendarmes accompanied him in. At the
city gates, the police stopped all but Lafayette’s immediate party. After
some delay, the others were admitted, but one at a time, the police taking
their names. In the morning the police kept away from the boat, and even
from the pier, those who wished to bid farewell to the traveller, and they
even had the boat’s flag hauled down, and would not allow it to be hoisted
while the General was in the boat. “How mean—how contemptibly mean
—were the vexations thrown in the way of the old veteran and those who
wished to do him honour, by the little tyrants of the police... . The
patriotic hero is allowed only to quit the country of his birth and for which
he has so often bled, amid contumely and insult, because through good
and evil report, he has shown himself the firm, consistent, and unwavering
friend of national freedom.” This account was widely copied, with indignant
comment.

Just at this time, the censorship of the press in France took on new rigor,

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chiefly, it was believed in this country, to prevent the journals from
publishing the accounts of Lafayette’s welcome in the United States.*°
Certainly it was applied to accomplish this result. “After particular papers
had gone to press, these myrmidons of tyranny interfered, and ordered
the intelligence respecting Lafayette’s arrival to be suppressed.” °° Niles’
Register quoted a letter from a correspondent in France, saying,—‘We had
announced in our paper to-day the arrival of General Lafayette in New
York, . . . The censorship struck out this article excepting three lines

_ which doubtless were passed over inadvertently. . . . Be good enough
to communicate this fact in America, whence they may be enabled to
judge of the absurd tyranny that is exercised here over the newspapers.” °7
Said the New York American:

“The Courier (France) of the 29th contains some extracts from the accounts given
in our papers of the reception and progress of LaFayette, which it interlards with
all sorts of insolent sneers and scoffing jibes. A paper which sees nothing ridiculous
or unseemly in the absurd and ostentatious funeral rites of such a corrupt mass of
mortality as the late king Louis 18th; which is not at all shocked at the pageants
of woe and artificial sorrow that royalist France is made to exhibit on so melancholy
a loss... such a paper is consistent with itself and its employers in seeking to
ridicule these unbought effusions of a people’s gratitude and love.” %

In the same paper we find this lively bit:

“The censors would not allow the Paris journals to announce the arrival of General
Lafayette in the United States, though his departure from Havre was publicly stated
in all parts of Europe. The editor of the Courier Frangais having spoken to the
Secretary of the commission respecting this suppression the latter observed that
‘General Lafayette was now dead to this world.’ ‘Be it so,’ replied the editor, ‘There
can be no objection then to my announcing his arrival in the other!’ ” 99

Charles X signalized his accession by relaxing the censorship somewhat for
a time, and the Liberal journals all seized the opportunity to print accounts
of the celebrations in America. The ministerial press tried to counteract
the effect of this by continued “insulting criticism.” *°°

During the time that Lafayette was being entertained in Washington,
the French minister and official circle were in mourning and out of society
for three months. This probably prevented some embarrassing incidents,
as it was generally understood that the minister had received orders not
to extend any civility to the General. The French consul in Boston was
reported to have involuntarily returned Lafayette’s bow, but to have after-
ward expressed deep regret for doing so. “When we consider the efforts
making by ‘legitimate’ tyrants to check the progress of liberal principles,
it no longer surprises us that the members of the Holy Alliance should in-
struct its minions to show a marked disrespect for the friend of the Rights

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: of Man. . . . But even this meanness is not without its salutary effects—
z the darkness of Despotism serves to exhibit by contrast the more glorious
a and glowing light of Freedom. . . . The intelligence of this nation’s grati-
i tude must sound through Europe . . . how pitiful must appear the French

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government, which ordered its police to insult him when about to embark
from Havre!” *°* The French squadron lying in Hampton Roads when
the enthusiastic celebration at Yorktown took place, “remained coldly aloof
from a festival which ought to have been regarded as a family féte of
the two nations.” “We cannot well conceive of anything more unnatural
than an order given by the French ministry to the officers of a squadron
of Charles the Tenth to refuse to join the Americans in 1824 in commem-
morating a victory gained by the codperation of the armies of his brother
in 1781.” *°? The master of the mint in Paris struck off medals in
honor of the visit of the Dey of Tunis to the establishment, but was said
to have refused to strike some with the head of Lafayette on them,
“though the minister of the United States proposed to defray the expense
of it.” A French engraver struck off a Lafayette medal without authoriza-
tion, and was arrested for it, though he said it was only tin, and merely a
proof of a souvenir intended to be sold in America.2°
Considerable anxiety was expressed from time to time as to the General’s
safety when he should return to France. “It is not probable,” said the
Concord Patriot, “that the besotted government would suffer him to go
at large.” It was urged that he would be wise to make his permanent home
in the land of freedom, where a grateful people would see that he should
want for nothing.’ Adams recorded in his Diary that he gave instructions
to the commander of the Brandywine as to the course he should pursue in
case any difficulty or obstruction should develop when Lafayette was
landed in France. It was impossible, he said, to foresee everything, but
he advised the captain to be prepared for trouble, and to remember that
the President relied upon his firmness and prudence to meet it properly.2°
It was indeed rumored in the United States that the authorities at Havre
had orders to prevent any demonstrations in honor of the General when
he should arrive, and also that it was very uncertain whether the American
frigate would receive the ordinary salute, lest this be construed as a greet-
ing to Lafayette.1°%° It was also rumored that the French consul at Wash-
ington had refused to sign a bill of health for the frigate, and had thrown
other obstacles in the way.*®* “We will not brook the slightest disrespect
which may be offered to our flag,” said the American papers. They praised
highly Lafayette’s courage,—‘“‘Though returning to a region of aristocracy
and despotism he yet dares to denounce their existence,” #°* and said that
the rainbow which shone on his departure was a good omen, a symbol of
84

 

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Liberty, “proclaiming to Lafayette and the friends of freedom, that the
same light which has been shed abroad over this western hemisphere,
shall ere long extend itself across the wide Atlantic, and illumine even the
vine-covered hills of France.” #°® Fortunately the Brandywine on her arri-
val at Havre was received with all necessary courtesy, but the American
papers were indignant over the attempts of the police to interfere with the
popular demonstrations in the hero’s favor, and especially over the fact
that the crowds, which were well-behaved enough, were several times
charged by the gendarmerie with drawn sabres, injuring many people
severely.1*°

The press in the United States continued to follow with interest the for-
tunes of Lafayette after his return to France, and when the Revolution of
1830 took place it was a source of much gratification to find him recognized
as one of the leaders. Jefferson, in 1824, when a gift to the General
was under discussion, had foreseen that this would be the case, and had
favored it for this reason. “There will be a change in France,”
he said, “and Lafayette will be at the head of it, and ought to be easy
and independent in his circumstances, to be able to act efficiently in con-
ducting the movement.” 14? Adams recorded that he tried to dissuade the
old patriot from taking part in revolutionary projects, “but there is fire
beneath the cinders.” 11? “His character has now acquired a moral force
which will be felt on the continent,” said the Richmond Enquirer, “He
will be the leader of all liberals.” 14% Lafayette’s connection with the Revo-
lution thus disposed the Americans to look upon it with favor, although it
would have been approved in any case, as a movement in defense of con-
stitutional principles, and as marking the downfall of the “imbecile Bour-
bons.” Criticism of the latter had been steady throughout the decade.
Aside from the international matters and affairs of foreign policy already
discussed, the domestic policy was the subject of strong disapproval,
centering about the censorship of the press, the law of sacrilege, and the
interference with the freedom of the individual in general.*!*

When Louis XVIII died and was succeeded by Charles X, there had been
a great deal of scornful comment upon the “mummeries” of the funeral,
the exaggerated grief of the royalists, and the “frivolities’’ and “odious
ceremony” of the coronation.*> It was not believed that France would
long submit to Bourbon rule, and although it was recognized that the suc-
cess of the intervention in Spain had strengthened the reactionaries for
the moment, the policies of Charles X were clearly seen to be leading to
destruction. The news of the July Revolution reached New York Sep-
tember 3, where it was hailed with great enthusiasm, and declared to have
been the “almost inevitable consequence of those insane measures,” “those

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besotted counsels.” At the theatre in the evening the Marseillaise was
loudly called for and was sung both in French and in English, and received
with rapturous applause, the audience joining in the chorus. Several public
celebrations were held, over one of which ex-President Monroe presided,
and in which the students of “Columbia College,” with their President and
faculty, participated.\° The New York American had announced the event
in an “Extra” and other newspapers in different parts of the country did
the same. Rejoicing was general, and there was especial praise for the mod-
eration and order shown by the revolutionists. There was also an immedi-
ate recognition of the fact that the spirit of revolution would probably
prove contagious, and that disturbances of greater or less importance must
be looked for in other European states. It was considered possible, but not
probable, that there would be intervention by the “despots” to restore the
rule of Charles X, or the Bourbons, “a proud and imbecile race, hardly
reasoning animals” +17 “to whom we regard the throne of France as forever
lost, by their imbecility or wickedness.” 8 The Boston Daily Advertiser
summed up the situation with some sympathy:

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“Charles X wished to be a despotic king. . . . He was so for one day, the 26th of
July,—the length of time necessary for Paris to read the ordonnances. The next day
he fell. That fall was just... . Unhappy family! which has made itself the elect
and the predestined of absolute power, and which perishes with it without redemp-
tion! . . . The Bourbons, heirs and martyrs of an idea which reigned a long time in
the world but which has now fallen irrevocably! . . . There is a fatality here which
constitutes in their wanderings a kind of majesty.” 119

The National Intelligencer, while admitting that the French people would
have been “‘abject slaves” had they failed to resent the unconstitutional
practices of the king, said that “the Bourbons are not odious to the United
States,” and thought that there was a habitual sympathy in the hearts of
this people for the people of France, which had been increased by the
visit of Lafayette, and that the ministers in this case were more to blame
than the king himself.12° The plan for a celebration in Richmond this
paper criticized as premature, for “If the blood which has flowed shall
have been shed in vain, or to no valuable result we should hardly illu-
minate for it.”” The only illumination in Washington the editor recalled
had been in February, 1815, when the signing of the Treaty of Ghent was
celebrated. The Virginians, however, refused to allow their enthusiasm to
be dampened. “It challenges all history and all times for a parallel!” cried
the Richmond W hig.

 

“Fellow citizens of Richmond! Shall this sublime and immortal achievement of the
people against their Tyrants pass by without a public demonstration of our affection
for the good old cause, without a word of admiration or of sympathy? Not so was

86RELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS

———

 

 

the dawn of the French Revolution received by our ancestors. Is the spirit dead
within us? Have we no longer sympathy for the human race struggling with their
tyrants and oppressors?

“Hail, redeemed, regenerated France! Virginia, the mother of Liberty, hails a sister.
Hail, Lafayette, Virtue’s champion! ... Light your houses, sing, shout and be
merry. Down with the Bourbons, up with the tri-colored flag. Hurrah for old La-
fayette and France!”

Who could resist such appeals? The celebration “went off with great éclat,”
with “bushels of tri-colored cockades, French flags everywhere,” wonder-
ful illuminations, a long parade, and much oratory embellished with
fervid adjectives.12t A fortnight later, Philadelphia, somewhat more so-
berly, but with deep feeling, recorded her sympathy. In connection with
the celebration, a committee, of which Nicholas Biddle was a member, was
appointed to draw up resolutions to be sent to Lafayette with the request
that he make them known in France. The resolutions stated that “Whereas
France, our first and faithful ally . . . has at last succeeded by an un-
animous and heroic effort, in shaking off the yoke of bigotted and tyran-
nous rulers, and establishing a government of her own choice . . . this
meeting cordially participates in the joyful feeling which has been ex-
cited throughout the United States. . . .”*?* At Baltimore, late in Octo-
ber, there was a “military and civil procession” and an address by William
Wirt. A feature of the occasion was the presentation of a French flag to be
sent to Lafayette with greetings.1?* On the 28th of this month, the Capital
staged a brilliant demonstration, which partook of an official character,
inasmuch as in the parade appeared not only the citizens of Washington,
but military detachments, with the President of the United States, the
Vice-President, chiefs of Departments, and several of the foreign minis-
ters, at their head. The French minister and suite appeared in full dress
uniforms, wearing the national colors. General Bernard was Marshal, and
carried the flag which the French Convention had sent to the American
government forty years before. Tri-colored flags, badges, and decorations
were much in evidence, and there was a splendid ball in the evening.***
The President’s Message in December included references of the most
friendly nature to the great events in France.

“The important modifications of their government, effected with so much courage
and wisdom by the people of France, afford a happy presage of their future course,
and have naturally elicited from the kindred feelings of this nation that spontaneous
and universal burst of applause in which you have participated. ... The deepest
sympathy was to be expected in a struggle for the sacred principles of Liberty,
conducted in a spirit every way worthy of the cause, and crowned by an heroic
moderation which has disarmed revolution of its terrors. Notwithstanding the strong
assurances which the man whom we so sincerely love and justly admire has given
to the world of the high character of the present king of the French, and which
87AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

if sustained to the end, will secure to him the proud appellation of the Patriot
King, it is not in his success but in that of the great principle which has borne him
to the throne,—the paramount authority of the public will—that the American
people rejoice.” 125

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It might have been expected that the sentiment in the United States would
demand a republican form of government in France. That it did not,
seems to have been due partly to the general confidence in Lafayette’s judg-
ment in the matter, and perhaps partly to a feeling that the constitutional
monarchy was better suited to the French temperament. Favorable notices
of “Louis Philip’’ are frequent. His democratic habits are praised, and his
intelligence and financial skill.1** Niles’ Register quoted with approval the
story that when the king was advised not to entrust artillery to the national
guard, because it would place him at the mercy of the citizens, he
replied, “I will be a national king or no king. I will reign by the will of the
people, or I will not reign at all!” 127

The Bourbons had been forced on the nation by foreigners, “a reproach
which stuck to them like a poisoned garment.” This handicap the new
king would not have to fight,’** but the National Gazette pointed out that
the throne of Louis Philippe was nevertheless unstable, since it was a
“hybridous government, the offspring of royalism and republicanism” and
lacked the security of either.1?® A consciousness of this weakness is evi-
dent in the press notices, as they describe the difficulties, both domestic
and foreign, with which the new government had to contend. In Adams’s
Diary we find a touch of the same feeling, when he records his difficulty
in writing a letter to send to Lafayette by General Bernard, who was re-
turning to France. It was somewhat hazardous, he thought, to express
at this time opinions upon the recent revolution to Lafayette, who had
himself been so conspicuous an actor in it. New and great changes were
to be expected in France at no distant time, and while it might be proper
to share in the general joy and approbation, it was still prudent not to be
dazzled with visions of glory which might never be realized.1*°

But a gleam of friendliness had at last brightened a decade which in the
United States had been marked by uncertainty and suspicion.**! How po-
tent the common enthusiasm for Liberty might prove in creating a per-
manent harmony, or in overcoming the discordant elements which marred
the relations of the two countries, only the test of time could manifest.

 

NOTES AND SOURCES

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‘ 1 For an analysis of these cases, see John Bassett Moore, A History and Digest of
3 the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, V:
4
iB 4447-4485.
: 88
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SEG ddlla Cay cLRELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS

 

 

2 Adams, Life of Gallatin, 566-567; Gallatin, Writings, 11: 275-282; American An-

nual Register, V: 28-32.

3 Gallatin to Adams, Nov. 16, 1821. Gallatin, Writings, Il: 213.

4 Annals of Congress, 16th Congress, Ist Session, 1820, I]: 2245-6; 2nd Session, 1820-

1821, 1263, 1243-44.

American State Papers, V: 23-36, 149-213, 222, 282-483, 640-674.

Adams, Gallatin, 573-583 ff.

John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, 1V: 58-59, 127, 160, 170, 316-320, 357, 504-6.

J. Q. Adams, Writings, Ford, ed., VII: 71-73, 75-81, 101-104, 118-119, 123-126;

137-160, 160-164, 178-179, 210-212.

Gallatin, Writings, 11: 2, 6-7, 15-16, 38-40, 122-125, 130, 132, 143.

Monroe, Writings, VI: 313-314, 162-3, 178-9.

De Neuville, 11: 464-5, 456-7, 490-491, 506, III: 17.

John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law, 1: 249-50; V: 257-260.

5 Nov. 14, 1820, American State Papers, 1\V: 644-6; Mar. 5, 1821, Monroe, Writings,

VI: 169: Dec. 5, American State Papers, 1V: 736-40; Dec. 2, 1822, Ib., V: 141-5;

Dec. 2, 1822, Ib., V: 245-250; Dec. 7, 1824, Benton, Abridgment, VIII: 94.

6 Monroe, Writings, VI: 185-191. (July, 1821.)

7 Crawford to Gallatin, May 13, 1822. Gallatin, Writings: II: 241.

8 Benton, Abridgment, VIII: 86-87.

® Adams, Memoirs, VII: 59-61; American State Papers, V: 760.

10 Dec. 5, 1826, Benton, Abridgment, 1X: 247; Dec. 4, 1827, Ib., 470; Dec. 1, 1828,

X; 200.

11 Benton, Abridgment, X: 405; XI: 112-113, 349.

12 Independent Chronicle and Boston Patriot, Feb. 23, 1820.

13 National Intelligencer, August 12, 1820; Same article, Nashville Whig, August 12,

and Cleveland Herald, August 29.

14 Southern Patriot, quoted in National Intelligencer, August 25.

15 North American Review, XXII: 136-162; XXIII: 385-414.

16 New York American, June 2, November 12, 1824.

17 National Intelligencer, August 21, 1824.

18 New York American, March 18, October 13, 1825.

19 New York Gazette, quoted in Richmond Whig, October 4, 1825. See also Whig,

October 11, 14.

20 Niles’, XXIX (1826): 305-6, 366, 417-418; XXXVI (1829): 162, 182, 203-4, 234,

274; Knoxville Register, July 29, 1829.

21 Niles’, XXXIX (1831): 319; XL: 92, quoting Boston Patriot; American Annual

Register, V: (1829-30), 28-32.

22 Niles’, XL: 362, quoting Richmond Enquirer, 454.

23 American Annual Register, V1 (1831): 39-43. Also Niles’ XL; 24-25, quoting New

York Mercantile Advertiser, and National Intelligencer.

24 Boston Daily Advertiser, September 17, 1831; Washington City Statesman, No-

vember 17, 1830; New York Journal of Commerce, quoted in Connecticut Courant,

September 20, 1831; Niles’, XL: 24-25, quoting Salem Gazette; 396, quoting United

States Telegraph.

25 Petersburg (Va.) Republican, October 1, 1822; Niles’, XXIII: 231. December 14,

1822.

26 John H. Latané, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and the Spanish
89

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American Republics, 69; F. E, Chadwick, Diplomatic Relations of United States and

Spain, 1: 174-178.

27 Providence American, March 14, 1823.

28 Connecticut Courant, March 18.

29 Richmond Enquirer, March 18.

80 Trenton Emporium, quoted in Hartford Mercury, August 19, 1823.

81 Windsor Journal, March 24, 1823.

To show the wide extent of this feeling, a representative group of citations is here

appended, all of which express substantially the same sentiments, and all of which

are from the year 1823.

Niles’ Register, January 18, March 15, March 22, June 28, August 9, quoting New

York American, September 13, September 20, November 15; Mississippi Republican

(Natchez), Mar. 13; New York American, March 15; Providence Gazette, March 29,

December 3; Little Rock (Ark.) Gazette, April 1, quoting Charleston, (S. C.)

Advocate, April 29, quoting New York Daily Advertiser, June 17, July 22, quoting

Federal Gazette, July 29, quoting Washington Republican, September 11, quoting

New York National Advocate; Concord Patriot, April 14; Richmond Enquirer, May

27, November 13; Cheraw Intelligencer, June 3, June 5, quoting New York Statesman,

New York Daily Advertiser, Charleston Courier; Eastern Argus, June 24; Lexington,

(Ky.) Gazette, August 7; North American Review, October.

82 Annual Register, 1V: 242; North American Review, XXV: 174.

83 Niles’, December 20, 1823.

84 John Quincy Adams to Daniel Cony (or Corry), April 28, 1823, Writings, VII:

368. Courtesy of The Macmillan Company, Publishers, New York.

85 Monroe to Jefferson, April 14, 1823, James Monroe, Writings, E. M. Hamilton,

ed., VI: 306. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam’s Sons, Publishers, New York and Lon-

don.

86 Jefferson to Leiper, Jefferson, Writings, Ford, ed., X: 254. Courtesy of G. P.

Putnam’s Sons, Publishers, New York and London.

87 Calhoun to J. E. Calhoun, August 24, 1823. Correspondence, Jameson, ed., Amer-

ican Historical Association Report, 1899, 11: 213.

38 Richmond Enquirer, April 8, 1823; Niles’, April 12.

89 Niles’, Nov. 20, 1823; Boston Centinel, quoted in Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 23;

Knoxville Register, Feb. 18, 1825; Ib., quoting National Journal, Feb. 25.

40 Monroe, Writings, VI: 321-2; 330.

41 National Intelligencer, March 20, 1823, Aug. 5, 1824, quoting National Gazette.

42 Niles’, March 20, 1824.

48 Maine Gazette, quoting National Gazette, March 21, 1823.

44 Detroit Gazette, April 16, 1824.

45 Calhoun to H. A. A. Dearborn, June 8, 1824. Correspondence, Jameson, ed., 218-19.

46 Niles’, XXV (1823): 171, 196.

47 [b., 210 (Dec. 16); National Intelligencer, Dec. 5, 1823, quoting New York Gazette;

National Advocate, quoted in Concord Patriot, Dec. 8, 1923.

48 Concord Patriot, Dec. 15, 1823, quoting Mobile Register; John Quincy Adams,

Writings, VII: 426, 432, 447.

49 For discussion of the development of the Monroe Doctrine, and its application

during this period, see: Albert Bushnell Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, An Interpre-

tation, Chs. III, IV, V, VI; James Morton Callahan, Cuba and International Rela-

tions, Ch. V; William R. Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United

States and Mexico, 89-165; F. E. Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain,
90

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Diplomacy, I: 174-223; J. B. Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, 299-365;
W. F. Johnson, America’s Foreign Relations, Ch. XII; John H. Latané, The Diplo-
matic Relations of the United States and Spanish America, 56-104; etc.

50 New York American, Dec. 31, 1823; also similar phrases, Dec. 9, Dec. 13, Jan. 9,
1824.

51 Connecticut Courant, Dec. 16, 1823.

52 Fastern Argus, Dec. 16, 1823.

58 Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 30, 1824, quoting Baltimore Federal Gazette.

547b., quoting Columbian Star, Jan. 27.

58 Boston Statesman, quoted in Hartford American Mercury, Dec. 16, 1823.

56 Boston Centinel, quoted in Hancock Gazette and Penobscot Patriot, Dec. 31, 1823.
57 Niles’, Dec. 20, 1823.

58 Niles’, March 6, March 13, 1824.

59 Concord Patriot, Jan. 3, 1825.

60 Webster, Works, Everett, ed., III: 207-8. Speech on the Panama Mission.

61 Richmond Whig, May 10, 1825, quoting National Journal, May 27, quoting New
York Daily Advertiser, April 29; Richmond Enquirer, May 17; New York Evening
Post, Sept. 26.

62 Richmond Enquirer, March 1, 1825.

63 Baltimore Federal Gazette, quoted in Norfolk Herald, May 11, 1825.

64 New York Evening Post, and Baltimore American, quoted in Richmond Whig,
June 3, 1825; also Jb., April 1; New York American, New York Mercantile Advertiser,
Philadelphia Franklin Gazette, Baltimore Federal Gazette, quoted in Richmond En-
quirer, March 1, 1825.

65 New York Evening Post, August 4, 1825.

66 New York Spectator, August 10, 1825.

87 New York American, August 11.

88 New York Commercial Advertiser, quoted in Cheraw Intelligencer, August 19. See
also Richmond Enquirer, August 9. Less sensational treatment, National Intelligencer,
August 16, and quoting Boston Centinel.

69 Richmond Whig, Sept. 20, 1825. Also critical, New York National Advocate, Aug.
15; New York Daily Advertiser, Sept. 24, and quoting National Gazette and New
York Evening Post; Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 30, Oct. 7.

70 American Annual Register, 1: 227-238.

11 Bridgeton (N. J.) Whig, July 31, 1824.

72 Arkansas Gazette, September 7, 1824.

78 Niles’, October 5, 1825.

7 Webster, Works, Everett, ed., [1]: 78-79. Niles, XXV: 344-345, 346, 352.

75 Niles’, September 27, 1828.

76 Philadelphia and Baltimore, Niles’, XX VII, 101-112; New York, /b., XVI: 401-402;
Boston and Providence, XXVII: 12-14, 23, New York, XXVII: 41-43; Cincinnati,
Concord Patriot, Sept. 20, 1824.

77 Richmond Whig, January 25, 1825.

78 Niles’, XXVII: 144-147.

79 Jefferson to Rush, Works, Ford, ed., X: 322.

80 Niles’, XXVII: 107.

81 Niles’, XX VII: 117-120.

82 Concord Patriot, Sept. 13, 1824.

88 Jb., June 27, 1825.

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84 Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 6, 1825.

85 ]b., May 31, 1825.

86 New York American, August 24, 1824.

87 Oct. 2, 1824, Niles’; Trenton True American, Oct. 9, 1824.

88 Richmond Enquirer, May 20, 1825.

89 American Mercury, Sept. 7, 1824.

80 New York American, Oct. 1, 1824.

91/b., Sept. 1, 1824.

82 Niles’, XXVIII: July 30, 1825.

93 Niles’, Sept. 17, 1825.

84 New York Commercial Advertiser, quoted in Nashville (Tenn.) Gazette Sept. 17,
1824; quoted from United States Gazette, in Natchez (Miss.) Republican; from
Boston Courier, in Concord Patriot, Sept. 13, Sept. 15.

95 National Intelligencer, Sept. 30, 1824.

°6 Richmond Whig, Oct. 22, 1824; Natchez Republican, Sept. 15.

97 Niles’, Oct. 23, 1824, quoting New York American.

98 New York American, Nov. 3, 1824.

89 New York American, Nov. 12, 1824.

100 Philadelphia National Gazette, Nov. 12, 1824; Detroit Gazette, Dec. 3; Niles’, Jan.
29, 1825, March 26, 1825.

101 Seaton, Biographical Sketch, 169-170; Concord Patriot, Sept. 6, 1824.

102 Edward Everett, in North American Review, 30: 216-237, reviewing Levasseur’
book on Lafayette in America.

103 New York American, Sept. 9, 1825; Niles’, Nov. 6, 1824.

104 Concord Patriot, Sept. 6, 1824; New York Statesman, quoted in Cahawba Press,
Dec. 24, 1824; Nashville Gazette, Sept. 17, 1824.

105 Adams, Memoirs, VII: 48.

106 Niles’, Oct. 29, 1825.

107 New York Commercial Advertiser, quoted in Richmond Whig, Oct. 4, 1825.

108 Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 6, 1825.

109 Richmond Whig, Sept. 20, 1825.

110 Niles’, Nov. 19, 1825; Detroit Gazette, Dec. 20, 1825; Niles’, Dec. 3; Annual Reg-
ister, I: 234.

111 Thomas H. Benton, Thirty Years’ View, 1: 29-31.

112 Adams, Memoirs, VII: 49.

113 Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 6, 1825.

11¢ Typical criticisms of French policy: Niles’, Dec. 21, 1822; Feb. 18, Apr. 26, Aug.
9, Dec. 20, 1823; Apr. 17, May 1, Oct. 9, 1824; Apr. 16, Apr. 29, 1825; Oct. 31,
Nov. 7, 1829; Richmond Whig, Apr. 22; July 15, 1825; Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 14,
1824; Detroit Gazette, Apr. 16, 1824; New York American, Sept. 4, Oct. 18, 1824;
North American Review, XX: 178-9; American Register, |: 227-238; Adams, Life
and Writings of Jared Sparks, |: 285.

115 Niles’, Oct. 30, 1824; June 25, July 16, 1825; Detroit Gazette, quoting Portsmouth
Journal, Nov. 26, 1824; Richmond Whig, July 19, 1825; Boston Spectator, quoted in
Richmond Compiler, Apr. 7, 1825; Vermont Journal, Aug. 1, 1825.

116 New York American, Sept. 3, 1830; E. N. Curtis, The French Assembly of 1848
and American Constitutional Doctrines, 94.

117 Providence Journal, Sept. 4; Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 7.

118 Niles’, Sept. 4, 1830.

92RELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS

 

 

119 Boston Daily Advertiser, Sept. 23, Sept. 7, 1830.

120 National Intelligencer, Sept. 8, Sept. 6, 1830.

121 National Intelligencer, Sept. 14, Sept. 17, 1830; Richmond Whig, Sept. 7, Sept.
10, Sept. 12; Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 10; Niles’, Sept. 18, 1830.

122. New York American, Sept. 30, 1830.

128 Niles’, Oct. 30, 1830; J. P. Kennedy, Life of William Wirt, 11: 307-8.

124 National Intelligencer, Oct. 28, Oct. 30, 1830; National Journal, Oct. 30; Niles’,
Nov. 6.

125 Benton, Abridgment, XI: 112-113.

126 Burlington Sentinel, Sept. 24, 1830; New York Evening Post, Sept. 6; Niles’,
XXXIX: 185, August 27, 1831; Richmond Whig, Sept. 12, 1830.

127 Niles’, Nov. 27, 1830.

128 Natchez Gazette, Oct. 6, Oct. 13, 1830.

129 National Gazette, quoted in Mobile Register, Dec. 16, 1830.

130 Adams, Memoirs, VIII: 253. The New England wing of the Anti-Masonic party,
it is said, disapproved of the Revolution on the ground that the destruction of
established institutions would be productive of atheism and disorder. Charles Mc-
Carthy, The Anti-Masonic Party, in American Historical Association Annual Re-
port, 1902, I: 546.

181 Friendly notices of the Revolution, representative types:—Boston Courier, quoted
in Vermont Journal, Sept. 11; Boston Patriot, quoted Ib., Sept. 18, 1830; New York
American, Sept. 10, Sept. 15, Sept. 20, and quoting Albany Daily Advertiser, Sept. 9,
13, 17, American Annual Register, V: 250-394; Detroit Courier, Dec. 23, 1830;
Connecticut Courant, Oct. 5, Sept. 28, 1830; Concord Patriot, Sept. 27; New York
Daily Advertiser, Sept. 20; Albany Argus, quoted in Burlington Sentinel, Sept. 10;
Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 6; Philadelphia Enquirer, United States Telegraph, New York
Courier, quoted in Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 14; Providence Journal, Sept. 6, Sept. 9.
See also article by Eugene N. Curtis, “American Opinion of French Nineteenth Cen-
tury Revolutions,’ American Historical Review, XXIX: 249-254.

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GHA PT ER4
The Reign of Louis Philippe

HE relations of the United States with the government of Louis

Philippe opened most auspiciously. The Orleans monarchy, consti-
tutional in type, headed by a man whose temperament and previous life
seemed to argue a faithfulness to free democratic ideals, and sponsored by
Lafayette, who was claimed by Americans as one of their own national
heroes, was welcomed in friendly fashion; and France was deemed to
have advanced materially toward the status of a self-governing state. It
was, moreover, an especial pleasure to the United States that the new
French administration showed itself amenable to reason in the long-
standing dispute about indemnities, and readily negotiated a treaty which
gave on the whole adequate satisfaction for American claims.
But the new monarch was early beset with factional disturbances, and it
soon became evident that the Revolution of 1830, if it had brought into
being a constitutional state, had not created a harmonious one. The Treaty
of 1832, designed to settle the indemnity dispute with the United States,
became one of the subjects of popular attack, and was sharply criticised,
on the ground that the concessions made by it were unnecessarily great.
There was a demand for its revision, and the government dared not press
in the Chamber of Deputies the appropriation bill necessary to meet its
provisions. The first instalment of the payments came due, and was not
met. President Jackson, under whose authority the treaty had been nego-
tiated, felt that his own reputation was bound up with its enforcement. He
therefore allowed the Secretary of the Treasury, McLane, to draw upon
the French minister of finance for the amount, but since no legal provision
existed to meet such a draft, the bill was allowed to be protested, and was
returned, unpaid, through the Bank of the United States. This attempt at
enforcing payment was deeply resented in France, where dissatisfaction
was also caused by the publication of some remarks made by Mr. Rives,
who had represented the United States in the treaty parleys, implying
somewhat boastingly that he had gotten the better of the French in the
bargaining. The opposition thus tended to increase rather than to decrease,
and Louis Philippe did not secure the passage of the appropriation bill

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during the ensuing year, although he gave to the United States his assur-
ance that he would do all that lay in his power, and that the provisions of
the treaty would certainly be fulfilled in time.

Jackson, however, thought the delay unnecessary and unjustifiable, and his
Annual Message of December, 1834, was distinctly belligerent in tone.
After describing the satisfactory character of the foreign relations of the
United States in general, he said: “It becomes my unpleasant duty to in-
form you that this pacific and highly gratifying picture of our foreign
relations does not include those with France at this time.” The United
States was most desirous, he continued, of conciliating her “ancient ally
and friend” and could not see without regret an interruption of friendly
relations. If such an event should occur, it was most unfitting that it should
be caused by any fault on the part of this country. Therefore “‘the whole
course of this Government has been characterized by a spirit so conciliatory
and forbearing as to make it impossible that our justice and moderation
should be questioned, whatever may be the consequences of a longer perse-
verance on the part of the French Government in her omission to satisfy
the conceded claims of our citizens.” But ‘“‘near a quarter of a century has
been wasted in ineffectual negotiations.” The circumstances connected with
the arrangement of the treaty were next reviewed, the terms recalled, and
the later stages of the dispute described. Then followed the energetic state-
ment that although peace and friendly intercourse with all nations were
most desirable, they could not be secured permanently by surrendering the
rights of our citizens, or permitting solemn treaties for their indemnity, in
cases of flagrant wrong, to be abrogated or set aside.

“It is my conviction that the United States ought to insist on a prompt execution
of the treaty, and in case it be refused or longer delayed take redress into their own
hands. ... | recommend that a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French
property in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt at the ap-
proaching session of the French Chambers. Such a measure ought not to be con-
sidered by France as a menace. Her pride and power are too well known to expect
anything from her fears and preclude the necessity of a declaration that nothing
partaking of the character of intimidation is intended by us. She ought to look upon
it as the evidence only of an inflexible determination on the part of the United States
to insist on their rights.” 2

In Perley’s Reminiscences we are told that some members of the Cabinet,

thinking this language too strong, had prevailed upon the President's pri-

vate secretary to modify it somewhat, but that when Jackson discovered

this, “he flew into a great excitement, and when Mr. Rives entered the

private office to obtain it for printing, he found the old General busily

engaged in re-writing it according to the original copy. ‘I know them
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French,’ said he, ‘They won’t pay unless they’re made to.’” * Whether this
tale be true or not, it probably expresses with some accuracy Jackson's
view of the matter. The message created much excitement throughout the
country, and opinion was sharply divided as to the wisdom or the neces-
sity of the President’s action. Gallatin, in whose hands the early stages
of the negotiations had rested, and who was thoroughly conversant with all
aspects of the matter, discussed the question fully in a letter to Edward
Everett. He doubted the efficacy of reprisals, and thought sufficient con-
sideration had not been given to the difficulties under which the French
king labored. “The fundamental error, on the part of our Government,
consists in not having been sensible that, in the present situation of
France, the real power is not with the King, but with the popular branch.”
“There is no evidence,” he added, “that public opinion is such at this time
as to compel the representatives of the people to pursue a course so fatal
to the general interests of the United States as a war with France would
be.” He had witnessed various critical periods, and knew how spontaneous
public excitement manifested itself. The complete apathy, which pre-
vailed long after the refusal by the French Chamber to comply with the
treaty was universally known, was a strong evidence both that public opin-
ion on that subject was unbiased, and that there was nothing in the tran-
saction which affected the honor and character of the nation.®

Col. Wm. B. Lewis, a prominent Democrat, and close friend of Jackson,
wrote,

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“The opposition leaders are at a loss what to do in relation to that part of the
Message which speaks of our affairs with France. They have the disposition to assail
it, but I think they are afraid of the effect it may have both upon our country and
France. Besides, many of the leading opposition men are directly or indirectly inter-
ested in these claims, and it is believed, if strong opposition is made to the Message,
it may encourage France to delay the payment.” 4

BEE rSIEee

This letter suggests a fact which became evident at once, that with the
strong party feeling existing at the moment in the United States, it was
inevitable that the Message should become the subject of party recrimina-
tions. For this reason it is somewhat difficult at first to be certain of the
real feeling of the country on the matter. The Washington Globe was the
organ of the Administration, and it undertook to support the President's
position whole-heartedly and completely. The Globe characterized the
critics of the Presidential policy as traitors, and declared that their position
amounted to ‘‘a proffer of support to France in case it should persist in
refusing justice.” Other influential papers which approved the Message
were cited. Among the more important of these are the New York Times
(Dem.), the New York Evening Post (Dem.), the Albany Argus (Dem.),
96

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the Richmond Enquirer (Dem.), the Connecticut Times (Dem.), the Balti-
more Republican, and the Louisville Public Advertiser. This quotation
from Bicknell’s Reporter is fairly typical:

“Public opinion appears to be much divided upon the subject, but we have con-
versed with no one who has not admitted the propriety of decision and firmness on
the part of the American government,—who has not expressed the opinion that the
conduct of the French has been anything but high-minded and magnanimous or
worthy a great and honorable nation. No matter whether the President is right or
wrong in his views . . . he will be sustained by a large majority of the American
people.” 5

A few other papers gave unqualified indorsement, such as the Arkansas
State Gazette (Dem.), which said,—

“With that nation a rupture seems inevitable, from her unpardonable faithlessness
in deferring the payment of the $5,000,000 . . . unless she promptly renders us that
justice which has already been too long delayed... . The firm and energetic lan-
guage used by the President on this subject cannot fail to be received with appro-
bation by any American who feels a proper regard for the honor of his country.” §

Chief among the critics of the Message was the influential National Intel-
ligencer, then the chief organ of the Whig party.

“We see in this part of the Message, the spirit of the old soldier, resentful of injury,
real or supposed, impatient of delay, and reckless of the consequences in pursuit of
redress for it... . It is now to be ascertained whether our fellow citizens are so
enamored of battle and bloodshed as to follow their leader headlong into a war with
‘our ancient friend and ally’; or whether they will draw back and survey the width
and depth of the gulf.”

That France was in the wrong, the National Intelligencer agreed, but the
case did not yet affect the honor of the United States, the difficulties of the
French government should be recognized, and menaces could only do harm.
“A disapproval of the measure and mode of redress recommended by the
Executive toward France, coupling the expression of that disapproval . . .
with the strongest condemnation of the conduct of France” should not be
considered as “‘taking sides with France.”

“We only ask the admission that Reprisals by our ships of war, in the broadest ex-
tent of that measure, would be war; which, we presume, no man will deny. We say,
that Congress is not ready to make war in the present state of the case; nor are
the People. That is, they do not so keenly desire a war as to rush into it without
necessity. We desire it to be understood by the people that such is the feeling of
Congress. We desire it to be understood, in France, that the people in this country
do not thirst after the blood of Frenchmen, any more than their Representatives do.
. . . Do we desire anything unreasonable, or incompatible with the nation’s honor?” 7

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The National Intelligencer made a quite thorough poll of the press, and
quoted many expressions substantially in accord with its own. The New
York Journal of Commerce called the idea of reprisals “cowardly and rapa-
cious.” The New York Evening Star (Whig), while admitting that an ap-
peal to arms seems at first glance necessary, added,—‘‘But we are a think-
ing people, and a more considerate and close survey has caused many to
pause and hesitate. We should hear both sides; no violent attack or dis-
courtesy is necessary.” “It is not easy to bring a man to reason if you
double your fist in his face, nor is it easy to force a brave and powerful na-
tion to do what is demanded by justice, if accompanied by threats of ven-
geance,’ remarked the Philadelphia Gazette. The New York Mercantile
Advertiser (Whig) and several others insisted that while there was much to
complain of in the conduct of France, restrictive tariff regulations or a non-
intercourse law would represent the utmost degree of retaliation which could
be required. “A paltry ground for war,” “injudicious,” “bad taste,” legal-
ized piracy,” “coarse and offensive,’ are phrases which appear. The Balti-
more Chronicle was outspoken in its condemnation.—‘‘The policy of this
country is emphatically pacific, and nothing but necessity should cause
her to deviate.” ®

The editor of Niles’ Register was also pacifically inclined. He said that the
government of France had for years avoided action on our claims, in a
manner that was “very reprehensible’; “yet we totally disapprove of the
recommendations of the President in this respect,—regarding the dispute as
more about a matter of money than as one affecting the national honor.”
If this is so, then its amount must be compared to the cost of a war. The
Message will stand in the way of action in France, “it being “human na-
ture’ to resist the doing of simple justice on compulsion.” France ought to
pay, but “something is due to her peculiar situation and the parties or
factions, and uncertainties, with which she has been vexed.’”’ There is some
dispute about the treaty-making power in France. We think the legislature
ought to “have charge of the purse-strings” and be “able to stop the wheels
of the government.” Our own conduct in money matters is not above re-
proach,—the Beaumarchais claim was put off year after year by Congress,
—yet in the late treaty it is admitted to be entirely good. Of course this
claim had not been admitted by treaty before, but France had pressed it,
the President had recommended it, and Congress “‘in its own proper right,
refused an appropriation to quiet it.” Nor have we satisfied the claims of
our own citizens for spoliations occurring before 1800. The responsibility
for payment of these claims rests entirely upon us, by the terms of the
earlier treaty with France, yet they are not paid. We have neglected or
refused this justice for more than twenty-four years. Why should we be

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so indignant with France for doing the same thing? The cases should be
considered in a spirit of forbearance, “if not of self-humiliation.” It is un-
wise for either France or the United States to force a war. Certainly we are
not justified in reprisals. If retaliation is to be considered at all, it should
be by means of the tariff.

The National Gazette (Whig) declared that the United States must insist
upon the fulfilment of the treaty. “We have negotiated enough,—more
than enough: we are indisputably in the right . . . and the French gov-
ernment in the wrong. . . . The American people will, we doubt not, ratify
this sentence of the Message.”’ But the Gazette frankly balked at the idea
of giving the President the war power implied in the reprisal suggestion.?®

“The great body of the American community will look to the cause, and ask if all
honorable means of avoiding this last extremity have been used. Every true Amer-
ican, whose thoughts are sometimes turned to his own glorious Revolution, will
especially require this, as an indispensable condition, before he gives his consent to
taking up arms against an old friend, the only nation in this wide world who was
not afraid to encounter the wrath of the proud British Lion in coming to the aid of

a distant confederacy of feeble colonies struggling for freedom. ... There is no
war feeling in this people against France, and the President will find that he is
unable to get it up, powerful as he is in the affections of his party. . . . Kentucky is
the last state to submit to any indignity put upon us by any foreign power... . All

that we require before we begin to cut the throats of Frenchmen is that we may
feel justified in the sight of men, in our consciences, and in the sight of that
great tribunal before which all nations must bow.” 14

The New York American declared:

“We hold that right is on our side throughout, that we have been trifled with by
France, that it was the duty of the President to express strongly, as the Message
does, the sense entertained by the country of the backwardness of France in ful-
filling the treaty, and to indicate a decided purpose not to let the matter linger
longer in doubt.”

But reprisals were thought “untimely” and “‘inexpedient.” Tariff regula-
tions, or at most non-intercourse, would be quite sufficient. 1?
The New York Spectator thought that the French government had shown
itself “more faithless than ever,” but disapproved of warlike action on the
part of America.** The New York Courier and Enquirer (Whig) strongly
condemned the President’s course, though it believed that the treaty should
be enforced, and would support the President in any dignified measures.
War, and especially with Jackson as President, would be most unfortunate.
“But this forms no just plea for Louis Philippe’s neglecting to comply with
the solemn stipulations of a treaty.” ™*
The Boston Evening Gazette called attention to the fact that while France
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had unjustly delayed the payments, she had not refused them. We were
not therefore justified in threats or in reprisals.1* The Boston Daily Ad-
vertiser (Dem.), after stating that in its opinion the situation did not call
for an attitude of menace, gave space to a humorous presentation of the
subject, under the title of “A Chapter in the History of Uncle Sam.” After
describing the troubles that sprang up when “old Lewis Baboon” was
kicked out of doors by “an impudent squatter called Napoleon” who then
took over the farm and ran the whole concern, we are told how this inter-
loper got into trouble with a neighbor, John Bull, and how in the course
of the quarrel some of Uncle Sam’s wagons were damaged. Then, when
the Baboon family finally succeeded in regaining possession of the place,
Uncle Sam began to dun for the value of his property. “Lewis, who was a
very polite man, either took no notice of the matter, or bowed and said it
was all very well! And so things went on for about twenty years, and no
money was forthcoming.” At last one Andrew, “a choleric, crusty fellow,”
was appointed Uncle Sam’s major-domo, and he made a settlement with
Mr. Baboon. But, very unfortunately for all concerned, Lewis had ven-
tured on this important step without consulting his wife. This old lady was
a cross-grained individual, who kept the keys of the strong-box in her
pocket. “Lewis, who was mortally afraid of her, thought it best to wait
for a little sunshine before he asked her for the money,” but when he did
finally try it, a hurricane came about his ears. So he wrote to Andrew that
his wife had gone on a little trip to the country, but that the moment she
returned everything should be done which was in the power of man to do,
and doubtless with perfect success. Andrew replied, “Can’t you send for
the old woman and make her pony up? . . . Send an expatch for her rite
away, and let her know that if she is not soon out of her tantrums, by
jingo! she'll hear from me. I won’t bear it no longer—that’s the plain
English on’t!” He had even made up his mind to take some of Lewis's
wagons, and let the Baboon family go to law about it if they liked. “But
the more prudent of the tenants were of the opinion that there would be
evil to pay when this resolution came to the ears of Mrs. B., and said that
you might do something with such an awful temper by coaxing, but the
very spirit of evil himself couldn’t drive her.” *°

Sentiment throughout the country in regard to the President’s Message,
then, held that the claims of the United States against France were just,
and should be maintained. The peculiar difficulties of the French adminis-
n received some sympathy, although doubt of the sincerity of the
King was expressed in some quarters. Money, not the honor of the United
States, appeared the point at issue, and the constitutional right of the
French Chambers to the control of finances was recognized, with, however,

100

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the feeling that they were morally bound to support the action of the
King in the matter. The language of the Message was thought to be
menacing, and it was felt that France might reasonably resent it. It was
believed that the resources of negotiation were not exhausted, and pa-
cific measures were decidedly preferred to warlike ones. Almost no strong
advocacy of reprisals can be found, and hasty action of any sort was
deprecated. Against France there was no popular clamor, though reproba-
tion of her behavior was general. This represents the consensus of opinion
of practically all of the opposition papers and even a majority of the
Democratic journals.

Attention now centered on Congress. Would this body support the President
or not? In the Senate the reply was prompt. Henry Clay, as Chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee, reported on January 6th. His report
is a carefully-reasoned document, truly statesmanlike in quality. Firm,
temperate, dignified and tactful, it was framed for both an American and
a European audience, and calculated to express at the same time the
unyielding determination of America to see the Treaty fulfilled, and her
disposition to pursue her ends by all reasonable pacific means. The argu-
ments do not differ greatly from those generally expressed in the news-
papers. The Report concurs entirely with the President as to the justice of
the claims, and accepts his judgment that the amount stipulated in the
Treaty falls short of the sum which was fairly due, but recalls that the
settlement as arranged was considered acceptable. Congress, it is recalled,
made immediate provision for fulfilment of the obligations required of the
United States in the Treaty, the settlement of the claims of French citizens
and the reduction of the tariff on French wines. France must also meet her
obligations. If she should finally refuse to do so the United States must
compel her to act justly. The President thinks that this point has been
reached, and the Committee, in order to clarify their judgment in the
matter, have carefully examined all the correspondence relating to the
negotiations. The Report then reviews these documents and the events
connected with them, manifesting considerable sympathy with the French
point of view. The proposal for reprisals is dismissed as a measure leading
inevitably to war, and as unwarranted by the circumstances of the case.
Moreover, it would be certain to be construed as an attempt at intimida-
tion, which might even serve as “‘an apology to France for disregarding
the obligations of national faith and justice.” The Report concludes with
an expression of confidence in the sincerity of France, and equal confidence
in the ability of the United States to cope with any emergency which
might arise, and with resolutions denying to the President the reprisal
power for which he had asked.17

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In the debate which followed, Tallmadge (Dem.) of New York dissented
from the Report, and tried to have action delayed until the French re-
action to the President’s Message should be known. Clay replied that if
Congress should not determine on reprisals the sooner this fact was
known in France the better. James Buchanan made a lengthy speech in
defence of the Presidential position.

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“France is a brave and chivalrous nation; her whole history proves that she is
not to be intimidated, even by Europe in arms; but she is wise as well as warlike. To
inform her that our rights must be asserted, is to place her in the serious and
solemn position of deciding whether she will resist the payment of a just debt by
force. Whenever she is convinced that this result is inevitable, the money will be
paid; and although I hope I may be mistaken, | believe there will be no payment
until she knows we will assume this attitude. France has never appeared to regard
the question in this serious light.” 18

Several speakers emphasized the point that it would be unwise so to frame
the resolution as to bind Congress not to act, if future developments should
make it seem advisable; but with this reservation, Webster and Calhoun,
the Whig leaders, Cuthbert (Dem.) of Georgia, King (Dem.) of Alabama,
and others of both parties, declared themselves in sympathy with the
Committee recommendations and anxious that their views should be en-
dorsed unanimously. Clay made an earnest speech in which he expressed
his entire concurrence with the President except in the idea of reprisals.

“But when he declares the confidence which he entertains in the French government;
when he expresses his conviction that the executive branch of that government is
honest and sincere in its professions, and recites the promise by it of a renewed ef-
fort to obtain the passage of a bill of appropriations by the French Chambers, it
did appear to the committee inconsistent with these professions of confidence that
they should be accompanied by the recommendation of a measure which could only
be authorized by the conviction that no confidence, or at least, not entire con-
fidence, could be placed in the declarations and professions of the French govern-
ment. Confidence and distrust are unnatural allies. If we profess confidence any-
where, especially if that confidence be only for a limited period, it should be un-
accompanied with any indication whatever of distrust—a confidence full, free, and
frank.” 1°

A slight amendment was made in the resolution, so that in its final form
it read: “Resolved, That it is inexpedient at present to adopt any legisla-
tive measure in regard to the state of affairs between the United States
and France.” 2° And in this form it was passed by the Senate, January 14,
without a dissenting vote, even from the Democratic members.

In the House, which was more largely Democratic than the Senate, quite
different conditions prevailed. December 9, Clayton (Dem.) of Georgia
moved to refer this part of the Message to the Foreign Relations Committee

102

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with instructions to report that it was expedient to await the further action
of the French Chamber “inasmuch as the delay seems to have proceeded
from the complicated character of the claims and their long standing . . .
rather than from any desire to impair friendly relations or to evade the
performance of justice.” A sharp debate at once ensued. Clayton supported
his motion in a speech of considerable length, in which he severely con-
demned the suggestion of reprisals, as amounting to a practical declara-
tion of war, which the country did not desire, especially for this cause.
He “felt assured the American people would approve of no such war.
Virginia would never do it. Mt. Vernon would never allow it. Yorktown
would not consent to it. All the South was opposed to it.” Claiborne
(Dem.) of Virginia agreed with this. He had no hesitation, he said, in
asserting that so far as he had been able to ascertain public opinion it
was averse to war, and he would not favor granting war power till it was
demanded by dire necessity. The French debt was fairly owed, and should
be collected, but we should use the language of friendship. Wayne (Dem.)
of Georgia, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, objected to
having the Committee instructed. They should be allowed to canvass the
case thoroughly, and recommend whatever measures seemed to them wise.
He defended the Message, as did also Johnson (Dem.) of Kentucky, and
the matter was finally referred, without instructions. In committee, it
remained for some time. Wayne was nominated for the Supreme Court
Bench, and resigned from the House. Everett (Whig) of Massachusetts,
whose name stood next on the committee list, claimed the chairmanship,
but was ousted by a vote of the Committee, 4-3, electing Cambreleng
(Dem.) of New York. This dispute was threshed out on the floor of the
House, with Adams championing the cause of Everett, and as a result
of the wrangle, party and individual feeling within the Committee ran
high.??
Before the withdrawal of Wayne, a vote had been taken in the Foreign
Relations Committee, resulting in a decision against the Presidential
reprisal plan. Under Cambreleng’s leadership, a majority was still against
reprisals, and refused to make a report, on the ground that if they were
“determined to do nothing, they ought to say nothing.” 2? On February 7,
+n answer to a call from the House, the President sent some further portions
of the correspondence dealing with French relations, and John Quincy
Adams moved that this be referred to the Committee, “with instructions
to report forthwith.” Cambreleng said it would be impossible to report
immediately any measure which would meet the wishes of the Committee
or of the House. Then followed the most sensational speech of the whole
debate on this subject. Adams, traditionally at enmity with Jackson for
103

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both political and personal reasons, strongly urged that the matter be
brought before the House for discussion. The problem was one with which
he himself had wrestled, and in which his own feelings were deeply en-
gaged. Adams “did not undertake to say that what the President had
recommended would be the wisest and most proper course, but he would
say this much, that he believed it was the duty of the House to act upon
this subject, and declare whether they would comply with the proposal
of the President or that they would do something to sustain the rights,
interests, and honor of the nation. .. . Whatever might be said of the
Presidential Message, he, for one, would say as once was said of Lafayette,
that whoever censured its imprudence must yet admire its spirit. . . . It
would go forth to all mankind as the sustainer of the rights, the honor,
and the interests of this country.” And he begged the House to take action
without further delay. Later in the discussion he added that it did not
follow that he deemed a war necessary, nor did it follow that repris-
als should be made. But the question should be before the House for
action.

Cambreleng still maintained that the time for action should be left to the
discretion of the Committee. He himself would have preferred bolder ac-
tion, but unanimity was the essential. He felt, however, that they were
every moment approaching the period when forbearance would become
pusillanimity. Everett favored an immediate report. While not in favor of
reprisals he felt the subject to be one of imminent importance, demanding
a strong utterance on the part of the House. “Having shown the justice
of our claims, we could have expressed our resolute determination to stand
upon our rights under the treaty; our firm purpose not to relax one tittle,
nor recede one inch; and we could have adduced the reasons,—and reasons
there were—in support of the opinion that France would yet do us
justice.” The report should be “bold, firm and pacific.” Clayton said that
the Senate had declared action inexpedient. Any hasty action on the part of
the House would bring about a collision between the two bodies. He would
certainly not favor any warlike measures now. McKinley (Dem.) of Ala-
bama said that the time for forbearance had passed. “There has been
nothing but forbearance on the part of the United States and nothing but
aggression on the part of France. Can friendship be preserved by such
humiliating submission?” Lytle (Dem.) of Ohio, favored action, to “let
the world know that that power which attempts to cavil with, to special
plead with, to juggle with, the United States of America has made a serious,
and, for itself, unfortunate, mistake.” Johnson of Kentucky talked of
“violation of faith, gross, pointed, and flagrant,” of ‘wilful, premeditated
wrong.” On the whole, however, the consensus of opinion was not in favor

104THE REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE

 

 

of immediate and decisive action, and the Adams motion “to report forth-
with” was lost, although by a very narrow margin,”*
In Adams’ Diary, under date of February 22, 1835, we find this entry,—

“The remainder of this day was absorbed in writing upon the present state of our
dispute with France—a subject upon which my anxious feelings have outstripped
the necessity of the case. My apprehension is not of war, but that the rights of the
claimants under the treaty, and the honor of the country, will on this subject be
ultimately sacrificed and abandoned. The fear of this has urged me prematurely
to press the consideration of it upon the House of Representatives, and now spurs
me to renew the call upon them for action. I have failed, and the occasion has
been seized successfully to turn the election to the United States Senate against me
for what I have said in the House on this occasion. Cautious perseverance, support
me! 24

The resentment in France caused by the President’s Message manifested
itself in the failure of the appropriation bill which the Chambers had been
considering, the recall of Serrurier, the French representative in the United
States, and the offering of passports to the American Minister in Paris,
Livingston. But the French Cabinet also announced that it would not
allow its just indignation at the American behavior to interfere with its
own appreciation of the right, and that it would re-introduce the appropria-
tion bill and press it to a passage. Livingston was instructed by his govern-
ment to await the result of this action, and to withdraw if the bill was
not passed. On February 25 the President sent the correspondence covering
these events to Congress, and the following day Cambreleng, at the wish,
he said, of a majority of the Committee, brought in a report and resolutions
to the effect that it would be incompatible with the rights and honor of the
United States further to negotiate with France in relation to the Treaty,
and that preparations ought to be made to meet any emergency growing
out of the situation. Everett offered a minority report. The discussion which
followed was dominated by Adams, in a powerful speech which, as the
Philadelphia Gazette said, explained all his former course, convinced the
House of his sincerity, and won him the confidence of all parties. “The
situation of the two countries,” he said, “is not such as to make proper a
declaration that we will not negotiate. When a nation in a controversy
says this, there is nothing left but war. . . . The United States will take
nothing but an absolute fulfilment of the treaty. If, together with negotia-
tion, this will not preserve peace, | am for war.” He believed that the
interest and honor of the country were at stake. The measure suggested
by the President was imprudent, but it was not unjust nor unwarranted
by the laws of nations. “I approve the spirit of the President and applaud
the prudence of the Senate. The compound of both, each tempering the
105

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other, may possibly prevail on the French Chambers to make the ap-
propriations which it is their duty to make.” The House, now about to be
dissolved, can insist on nothing. It can only express its opinion, and sustain
the President in his determination to uphold the rights and the honor of
the nation. “Let our rights be maintained to the last drop of our blood,
but do not let us say that we will have no negotiation.”
Moved by these arguments, the House amended Cambreleng’s first resolu-
tion to read: “That in the opinion of this House, the Treaty of the Fourth
of July, 1831, should be maintained, and its execution insisted on,” and
adopted it unanimously.”° The resolution favoring provision for a possible
emergency also passed, and Cambreleng promptly introduced a bill ap-
propriating $3,000,000 “to be expended, in whole or in part, under the
direction of the President of the United States, for the military and naval
service, including fortifications and ordnance and the increase of the navy:
provided such expenditure shall be rendered necessary for the defence
of the country prior to the next meeting of Congress.” This bill passed the
House in spite of the opposition of Adams and other influential members.
The Senate had, meanwhile, debated the French relations further, and the
Foreign Relations Committee, after considering the President’s message
of February 25, had again declined to recommend action. The $3,000,000
Fortifications Bill, when it came to the Senate, therefore, was immediately
rejected. The House sent it up again. The Senate adhered to its previous
decision. A compromise committee finally reduced the amount to $300,-
000 for arming certain fortifications, and $500,000 for repairing and
equipping some warships, which amounts the Senate accepted. Cambreleng,
in the House, declared that the amount was “‘totally inadequate if needed,
and more than was necessary if it should not be.” The report was returned
to the House late in the evening of March 3, when apparently a quorum
was not obtainable, and no action on it was taken. Subsequently, the
responsibility for the loss of the Fortifications Bill was the subject of
much controversy.Ӣ
The public had followed with the greatest interest the action of the
legislature. Clay’s Report of January 6 met with general approval. The
Philadelphia Gazette characterized it as ‘ample and luminous.” “Its tone
is throughout American, and while it does not sustain the suggestion of
the Executive, it shows France that Congress will stand by the country,
should it be found necessary in the last resort to support our claims to
justice by an appeal to arms. But the committee see no necessity for such
a course.” 2? Madison wrote to Clay, congratulating him on his “able
document” “laudable in its object of avoiding war without incurring
dishonor.” ** Adams’s action brought down upon him much unpleasant
106

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criticism and was misunderstood and misrepresented. The New York
Spectator spoke of his speech of February 7 as “warm and animated,” and
as giving opportunity to many of the “war hawks of the President,’ but the
editor goes on to mention his later “‘pacific explanation” and adds,—‘The
unscrupulous friends of the Administration are doubtless ready to plunge
the country into a war at any moment, and for any cause. . . . But true
friends of the nation should watch them carefully. There is little danger
of too forbearing a spirit in the American people. . . . Let France deny
us justice unequivocally, and there will be but one sentiment in the nation
as to the course we shall pursue.” 2? The most noticeable phase of the
comment at this period is the marked anxiety of both parties to throw
the blame for a war, if one should come, on the other side. The Whig
argument was that the ill-judged and ill-advised threat of the Executive
was responsible, while the President’s friends blamed the opposition for
encouraging the French by their criticisms.*°

March 18, 1835, the appropriation bill was reported favorably in the
French Chambers, and late in April was passed, with, however, a condition
attached that actual payment should be withheld until satisfactory ex-
planations of the President’s language should be received. Livingston
wrote a vigorous note of protest against this clause, and withdrew. In
the United States the fact that the bill was actually passed tended at first
to obscure the awkwardness of the demand for explanations.*! By the end
of the year, however, it had become evident that this difficulty would not
easily be surmounted. Jackson’s Message of December detailed the cir-
cumstances, stated that no insult had been intended, and declared that no
apology could be given. It also stated that Mr. Barton, the American
chargé des affaires in Paris, had been instructed to ask for the payment
and if it was refused to return to the United States. Sentiment in the
country had remained pacific, and there had been considerable anxiety
in regard to the temper of the President’s Message. “There are many who
hang around the President .. . who. . . are anxious to have the ‘old
Roman’ send in to Congress a flaming war message; but it is believed
that the wiles of these bad characters will not avail.” *? There was therefore
a feeling of relief when the Message was found to be in general pacific,
and hope obtained that the explanations offered in the document would be
satisfactory to the French.**

But a special message followed early in January, 1836, stating that Barton
had obeyed his instructions and asked for the payment, and had been told
that only an official, written, declaration from the United States, to the
effect that it regretted the misunderstanding and that it had never in-
tended to call in question the good faith of France, nor to menace her,

107

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would suffice. Barton had then claimed his passports, the French chargé
in the United States was being withdrawn, and diplomatic intercourse was
entirely suspended between the two countries. Jackson proposed the
prohibition of commercial intercourse with France.** Now indeed the situa-
tion became really tense, and hot words were uttered that threatened to
lead to deeds. The Boston Courier (Whig) may serve as an example of
this group of Americans:

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“France has robbed us of our commerce, imprisoned our citizens, insulted our flag
and set us at defiance; and as a last wrong has refused to carry into effect the con-
ditions of a Treaty concluded five years ago, and even has the temerity to ask us to
make a humiliating apology and record ourselves a nation of liars.” 35

Livingston’s return increased the tension, for he was fully in sympathy
with the Executive, and urged that “no apology, no concession” should be
made, and that the United States could not “purchase payment by national
dishonor.” His presence and his attitude stiffened the Democratic cause.**
The Senate debated a bill making appropriation for armament, and
Buchanan made a war speech, ending,—‘“‘We must remember that France
may yield with honor; we never can without disgrace!” ** Calhoun, on
the other hand, fiercely attacked the President, and said that he felt “a
deep conviction that neither justice, honor, nor necessity, impel to arms”;
and that a war with France at any time, and especially at the present,
would be “one of the greatest calamities that could befall the country.” **
In this conviction the mass of public sentiment concurred. Said the
Baltimore Patriot:

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“If it should appear in the end that even one of the parties is truly desirable of an
honorable adjustment without a resort to the arbitrament of the sword, there is
still room for hope that it may be adjusted. ... Our hope is that there shall be
found enough of justice, good sense, and discretion, in the ruling powers of both
countries, to compass an honorable adjustment of the question without resort to
arms.” 39

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The New York American (Dem.) declared:

“Our voice is not for war, not for non-intercourse, not for action of any kind by
Congress, always provided no aggression be committed by France, until we hear
the effect of the President’s Message. .. . Delay cannot put us in the wrong, and
it may shield us from self-reproach.” 4°

And the Richmond Whig, —

“Were ever two nations on the point of hostilities for so silly a cause! France says
‘Say that you regret the differences existing between the two countries—that you
do not impugn the good faith of France and did not mean to menace her,—and

108

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the money is ready!’ General Jackson says that he will not say so to France. In
two separate messages he tells us and all the world precisely that, but will not tell
France so—and for this we are to go to war.... The most miserable tyro in di-
plomacy would have no difficulty in settling the whole affair in half an hour!” 44

With this feeling widely prevalent, it was natural that the American
public should receive with satisfaction the information that Great Britain,
through Charles Bankhead, the British chargé, had proffered mediation,
and that the offer had been accepted by both France and the United
States. The American acceptance was accompanied by a reasoned review
of the case, together with a statement that since the President’s message
to a Congress is a “consultation” between two branches of the government,
it is therefore a private matter, with which no other nation may be con-
cerned: and also with the reservation that the American government would
under no circumstances offer to France an explanation or apology. France,
however, weakened in her demand, and after a short time signified her
willingness to consider as sufficient the explanations presented in the
President’s Message of December, 1835, and the incident was declared
closed.*2 The first payments were made in May, and the others followed
regularly as they fell due. Thus Jackson in his Message at the end of the
year was able to announce the ending of a dispute which had served for
nearly a quarter of a century to vex and to cloud the relations between
France and the United States.*2 His party acclaimed it as a triumph of
firmness and sagacity. The opposition felt that an unfortunate war had
been barely avoided.

Even though the attitude of Americans on the indemnity question was
determined largely by party affiliation, the very acrimony of the dispute
served to attract attention to France, and encourage among both Democrats
and Whigs a critical spirit in regard to French affairs in general. In 1835
the North American Review published an article on the Revolution of
1830, which emphasized the idea that this movement offered to the French
people an opportunity to establish firmly the principles and practices of
liberty, both for France herself and for other nations, but that “these
splendid destinies have not been fulfilled.” #* The Democratic Review in
1837 carried a similar article:

“Louis Philippe was called upon to solve one of the most difficult problems in his-
tory, and has but deferred its solution. He bade the nation stand still, because he had
not the courage to go on with her; and his administration, so far from resting on a
firm and popular basis, derives its security only from the weakness of the leader of
the opposition. . . . We consider the appearance of Louis Philippe as a mere inter-
lude in the history of France, resembling some of Shakespear’s clowns, introduced
to relieve the gravity of the drama; a mere pause in the Revolution. .. . He has

109

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taught all the countries that they themselves must be the guardians of their
liberties.” 45

The Democratic Review a few years later carried a series of studies of
“France, its King, Court, and Government,” written by Lewis Cass, then
Minister at the French court. These appeared shortly after in book form,
and were widely read. The general tone was friendly to the king, though
somewhat patronizing.** Somewhat more light is thrown upon the feeling
in America by the Diary of M. de Bacourt, who was the representative of
France in Washington during the administrations of Van Buren, Harrison,
and Tyler. De Bacourt had never been in America before, and his only
diplomatic experience had been as Secretary to Talleyrand. Narrow, pre-
judiced, and credulous, he could scarcely have contributed to the creation
of harmony between the two countries. In fact, since the time of De Neu-
ville, France had apparently been singularly unfortunate in her choice of
Ministers in this country. Serrurier was connected with the unpleasant
memories of the War of 1812. The Count de Menou, who was chargé for
eighteen months, was said to have been removed because he did not write
to his government once during the entire period. M. Pageot, who served
for ten years, partly as chargé, and partly as Minister, won little favor in
America, and Pontois, who immediately preceded De Bacourt, left little
trace of his influence. De Bacourt said:

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“The Yankees are English at heart, in spite of the contempt they profess for them.
They go to England to acquire their tastes, their morals, their customs, their

fashions, and to encourage their antipathies to France and the French. .. . In the
Southern states their sympathies are French; but I am sorry to say it is only our
revolutionary ideas they sympathize with. . . . I have already seen that they do not

think much of us: notwithstanding their complimentary speeches, they do not feel
the slightest gratitude for the aid given them by the French in their War of Inde-
pendence, and the indemnity of 25 millions given five years ago has finished us in
their opinion. They see that we can always be duped. .. . The only fault of Bos-
ton in my eyes—but it is a great one—is that the inhabitants of this elegant and
charming city hate the French, and what is worse, they despise them . . . this would
make my stay here for any length of time insupportable.” Van Buren “is very well
disposed toward France, and is very courteous to me. His politeness is perfect; it is
the perfect imitation of a gentleman.”

He praised the National Intelligencer, as having been less hostile to France,
especially at the time of the indemnity dispute, than most papers. Calhoun,
he said, “is one of the very few who are favorable to us. . . . He is from
South Carolina, where the feeling toward France is better than in the
other states.’ Sumner, too, from the same state, is spoken of as friendly.
Webster is described as “a great partisan of the English, and consequently
anti-French.” Clay’s “proclivities are very French.” He “was particularly
110

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polite to me, probably on account of the reputation his party have for
being anti-French. He had told me before that he had been badly received
by the elder branch of the Bourbons when he was in Paris in 1814. Is
it not delightful to see a democrat who has been badly received by a king
nurse this grievance for twenty-six years! He was, however, very anxious to
show his high opinion of the present king, praising his great intelligence,
his liberal ideas, and finding him ‘worthy of governing a republic’! He
described a speech of Clay’s in the Senate, denying that he was hostile
to France, and eulogizing Louis Philippe as having “the honor of being
the elect of the people and not one of those idiot kings, reigning by the
absurd right of legitimacy.” But Clay disproved his supposed pro-French
sympathies by advocating an augmentation of duty on.French wines and
silks, a measure which was shortly after adopted. 47

A series of incidents connected with the Monroe Doctrine led to further
dissatisfaction with France, on the part of Americans. Early in 1838 the
French, in order to enforce the collection of some claims against Mexico,
inaugurated a blockade of that country. This might have been expected
to evoke some disapproval in the United States, but no protest was made.
The explanation of this indifference seems to lie in the fact that we also
had claims against Mexico, which we might wish to enforce, and in our
sympathy with Texas in the struggle then being carried on for her in-
dependence. Mexico’s troubles, said the papers in the United States, were
brought on by her own imbecility and obstinacy.** With the French
blockading fleet the relations of the American squadron in the Gulf of
Mexico were friendly.*® Some irritation over the strictness of the blockade
and its interference with trade was manifested by the commercial
interests; °° and Caleb Cushing, one of the leading members of the Whig
party, introduced in Congress a resolution asking information on the sub-
ject. Cushing’s resolution was based on the Monroe Doctrine, and Pickens
(Dem.), speaking in support of the motion, said that “a question of great
importance might arise, in which the south-western states would feel a
deep interest, and we could not look to it too soon.” ** Henry Clay wrote
to Nicholas Biddle that the French blockade operated most advantageously
for Texas, by protecting her against attacks from the Gulf, and by giving
her time to strengthen herself against Mexican attack by land, but he
feared that out of the situation there might develop some sort of European
interference in the affairs of Texas which the United States would not
approve. The National Intelligencer showed anxiety lest the complete
subjugation of Mexico should be the result of the French action, and
suspected the French government of far-reaching designs. The Intelligencer
also connected the withdrawal by Texas of its proposal for annexation

111

 

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to the United States with French support, and urged that close attention
be paid to these movements.** In general, however, the French activities
produced little criticism or even comment, at this time.

But by 1844 these suspicions had become certainties, and it was known
that France, in conjunction with England, was exercising strong pressure
on Texas to prevent her annexation to the Republic of the north. The
correspondence between Calhoun, who was then Secretary of State, and
King, the American Minister in France, on the subject, was published
with the President’s Message in December, 1844. From this time on, we find
the press of the United States watching closely the utterances of foreign
political leaders, and reproducing fully articles from English or French
papers which might throw light on the situation. February 20, 1845, the
Globe published a violent attack on France and Great Britain for their at-
tempt to maintain the status quo in Texas, and inquired,—‘““What is this
but asserting a supremacy over the states of this continent?” Buchanan, re-
placing Calhoun in the State Department, wrote to King that the United
States government was painfully disappointed at the behavior of France,
since the king had declared in July, 1844, that his government would take
no hostile steps, yet the French government was now attempting to paralyze
and obstruct the free action of the people of Texas, and this was surely un-
friendly to the United States.°* In April the Baltimore American, referring
to the report that England and France had united in a proposition to
guarantee the independence of Texas and pay her debt, on condition that
she agreed not to be annexed to the United States, said,—

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“If Texas, left to her own action, should prefer to remain separate and independent,
it would be well. Her freedom of choice would be respected. But every act of inter-
ference by an European power—every demonstration by diplomacy, intrigue or any
other sort of influence to defeat annexation, whether emanating from desires of ag-
grandizement on their part or from jealousy of the growing powers of the United
States, will have the effect of strengthening and concentrating the determination of
this country to carry its point at every hazard. As between Texas and ourselves we
could be forbearing; but the interposition of a foreign power presents an adversary
to whom nothing will be yielded. Such, we take it, is the temper of our people at
this time.” 55

 

The editor of Niles’ Register said that the European backers of Mexico
would be called upon to decide whether, if their interference could prevent
it, the United States should be arrested in its territorial projects. He
thought they might adventure a step too far in sustaining Mexico against
annexation, and thereby bring on a general war. “British, French, and
Texian agents are all represented as moving heaven and earth to prevent
annexation, and induce Texas to remain independent.” He thought it quite
natural that England and France should make such endeavors, as the
112

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independence of Texas was distinctly to their interest,—“But now comes
the question: annexation will be consummated, unless a war can prevent it
—will England and France, or England alone, urge Mexico to a war?” “We
have evidently arrived at the crisis. These powers must now immediately
decide to allow the United States to steer her own course in relation to
annexation, or they must promptly interpose.” When, in July, came the
news of Guizot’s speech advocating a balance of power in America, this
editor was quick to recognize the importance of the issue, and to say that
“this requires the head of every denomination of American statesman and
patriot.” °°

The general disapproval of French interference was reflected in the
President’s reference to the subject in his Annual Message. Speaking of the
annexation of Texas, he said:

“It is not to be forgotten that this result was achieved in despite of the diplomatic
interference of European monarchies. Even France, the country which had been our
ancient ally—the country which has a common interest with us in maintaining the
freedom of the seas—the country which, by the cession of Louisiana, first opened
us access to the Gulf of Mexico, the country with which we have been every year
drawing more and more closely the bonds of successful commerce—most unex-
pectedly, and to our unfeigned regret, took part in an effort to prevent annexation
and to impose on Texas, as a condition of the recognition of her independence by
Mexico, that she would never join herself to the United States.” °7

President Polk went on to discuss the balance of power theory, and to deny
that it could ever be applied in American affairs.

Early in 1846 a rumor was current that an attempt was to be made to
restore the monarchy in Mexico under a Spanish princess who was to be
married to one of Louis Philippe’s numerous family.°* The //limots State
Register, discussing the probabilities of French and English interference be-
tween the United States and Mexico, said that it was well known that these
countries interfered between Texas and the United States while the an-
nexation negotiations were pending; and referred with strong approval to
the Monroe Doctrine and to Polk’s interpretation of it. “This sentiment,”
the editor added, “has been universally adopted by the American people,
and has now become a permanent, sacred, American principle, in opposi-
tion to the odious ‘balance of power’ doctrine of Europe. It is the founda-
tion of American liberty, and must be maintained, if need be, even at the
expense of the best blood and richest treasure of the land.” °* The Mobile
Register noted the report that France had ordered a fleet to the Gulf of
Mexico, after the war between the United States and Mexico had broken
out,—

“This is another matter of some delicacy. It may be a precautionary step for the
protection of French commerce in the state of blockade in which the Mexican ports

113

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have been placed by our fleets,—and even in that view, it has an ostentatious air,
as if the French were ready for a fight with us at once. If it be a part of Mr.
Guizot’s machinery for preserving a balance of power on this continent, it has marks
of a presumptuous interference, which will soon make, if it do not find too soon,
the occasion for a conflict between the fleets. It is by no means certain that this
fleet is destined for the Gulf, but such are the probable conjectures. We hope
otherwise, not only from a desire that all chances for a breach of the peace between
the two countries may be avoided, but because the appearance of a French fleet,
however harmless its acts may be, would produce upon the public mind in this
country a feeling of sourness and irritation against a presumed attempt to dictate
or overawe.” ®°

It should be remarked that Britain was regarded as the chief aggressor,
and France as in a large degree only her echo and tool, in Texas and
Mexico, and also in the entire Caribbean area. France might act with
England. She was considered scarcely likely to undertake any very im-
portant operations alone. In regard to Cuba, England was constantly
under suspicion, while the apprehension in relation to France was dis-
tinctly less. The press in America noticed a French pamphlet urging
European intervention to restore order in Haiti, and remarked that when
a French writer spoke of the necessity of European intervention he usually
meant French intervention. Niles’ Register thought that the French were
giving marked evidences of a desire to resume authority in that island,
and that the scheme probably involved French consent to British occupa-
tion of Cuba.*t A plea from certain Cuban planters that America should
take Cuba quickly, in order to prevent its seizure by France and England,
who would certainly emancipate the slaves, received favorable comment
in a Florida paper.

In 1836 a revolution broke out in Uruguay, which soon led to intervention
on the part of the Argentine Republic. The French residents in Montevideo
took the part of the revolutionists, and gave them active aid, and as a
result of this the French government became involved. The struggle de-
veloped into a very bitter one, and before long Great Britain entered it
first as a mediator, then as an active participant with the French against
Rosas, the Argentine dictator, and the party in Uruguay which he favored.
Brazil also joined the contest, in the hope of obtaining a portion of
Uruguay as a reward for codperation with the Anglo-French force. A long-
drawn-out contest ensued, lasting until after the Revolution of 1848, at
which time the French attention was directed to other and more promis-
ing interests. The intervention was complete and undisguised, involving
the capture of the Argentine fleet, the blockade of the La Plata, the oc-
cupation of forts on the mainland and of large sections of the country,
and constant fighting with the Rosas forces. No infraction of the Monroe

114

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JiTHE REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE

 

 

Doctrine could have been more pronounced, yet the government of the
United States made no real effort to interfere with it. To a degree this in-
difference may be explained by the absorption of the United States in
important questions nearer home. In part also it may be laid to the pre-
vailing lack of stability in the Latin-American states, which produced a
doubt of their fitness for self-government, and a corresponding lack of
sympathy. As the American Whig Review put it, the South American Re-
publics “still present the aspect of nations in their elementary state.” They
show no stability except under a dictator or when “foreign nations inter-
fere to preserve peace while knowledge can be disseminated among the
masses. It is with pleasure we hail the first movement in this latter policy
in the union of England, France and Brazil to put an end to the atrocities
perpetrated by the contending factions along the banks of the Rio de la

Eiata. °*
But the New York Sun met the issue squarely on the basis of American

solidarity.

“The interference of European monarchies in the partizan conflicts of this hemi-
sphere has aroused the people of the South American republics to the importance
of union and harmony among the great American republican.family of nations... .
In justice to ourselves we must resist every attempt of European monarchies to dic-
tate to the feebler republics of the South; and we are not without hope of a friendly
alliance among all the American republics for mutual protection and encourage-

ment.” &4

The Boston Courier, too, spoke with disapproval of “this extraordinary
interference of the European powers” and agreed with the Buenos Ayres
Packet, which it quoted, that the question at issue was of the greatest im-
portance to all the states of America, in that it would determine whether the
Argentine Republic and the other republics of America were free states or
whether they were mere fiefs of the crowned heads of Europe.*® The New
York American said that we had allowed the frequency of quarrels in
the South American states to blind us to the fact that the European
nations were exercising a control which was naturally the duty of the
United States. The excuse given for foreign interference is dismissed as
flimsy, but “The sore point with us is not that this should be done, but
that it should be done by Europeans. It becomes this Republic, the oldest
born and the greatest on this side of the Atlantic, to be the peacemaker
on our own continent whenever it becomes proper that such an office should
be performed.” The Monroe Doctrine “is a very good principle, but if we
do nothing to maintain our proper position towards our sister republics,
nothing to establish a wholesome influence over them,—if we show no
sympathy with them in their troubles and manifest no disposition to per-
115

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

form friendly offices for them, we need not wonder if other leading nations,
more vigilant than ourselves and more prompt to meet their responsibili-
ties, should interpose and reap the advantages of such interposition when-
ever circumstances seem to require it. . . . Our own supineness is to
blame that we ourselves did not interfere in such a way at least to show to
the nations of Europe that there was need of no other mediator, and that in
the affairs of this continent no interposition from the other side of the
water was at all requisite.” °°

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“It behooves the people of the United States to take these things into seasonable and
serious consideration. Shall the people of the United States stand by and see the
British-Asiatic policy acted over again among the independent republics of South
America? Is Buenos Ayres to become as Madras? ... If not, then at what point
in its progress should this armed European interference in American affairs be
made to encounter the deliberate and solemn protest of the people of the United
States? ... It is of high concernment to our most practical national interests that
British and French influence and predominance on the banks of the La Plata should
find an antagonist and a counterpoise in the public sentiment of this country. Our
commercial stake in the region of that river is too great to permit us to see it
sacrificed. It is of yet more vital concern to our avowed national policy to keep this
continent safe and sacred from aggressive foreign dictation.” ®7

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Late in the year 1845 the United States chargé at Buenos Ayres made
a formal protest against the blockade, but of course without in the least
affecting the situation.°* In the following January the matter was under
discussion in the United States Senate. As far back as 1840 Caleb Cushing
had protested against the blockade, at the same time that he criticised the
activities of the French in Mexico.®® Now Allen (Dem.), Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a resolution supporting the ut-
terances of the President’s Message of the preceding December on the sub-
ject of the balance of power and the interference of Europeans in Amer-
ican affairs.7° Calhoun opposed the motion, and based his objection on the
South American situation. He said that he strongly objected to the “im-
proper interference” of the European powers in that quarter. He declared
that so far as his information went, the behavior of the two nations, Great
Britain and France, was “an outrage, high-handed in its character, and
without precedent in the history of nations.” But he did not think it pos-
sible that the United States could take under her guardianship the whole
family of American States, and pledge herself to extend to them protection
against all foreign aggression. No wise man would, by a declaration, he
said, engage himself to do that which was beyond his power of execution.
Certainly if this resolution passed, the Government should at once inter-
vene in behalf of Buenos Ayres, take her under our protection, and repel

116

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the interference of France in her concerns.’! Lewis Cass (Dem.) supported
the resolution and thought the time most opportune for it, especially be-
cause the intervention in South America should be checked. The principle
asserted by Guizot was being practically applied upon the La Plata, in the
furtherance of designs of commercial and political supremacy over that
district. “They seek the establishment of a balance of power which shall
establish their own power, and enable them to hold in subjection one of
the most magnificent regions upon the face of the earth.” 7? But the Senate
refused to take action on the subject, and Allen, probably largely because
of this, shortly after resigned from the Chairmanship of the Foreign Re-
lations Committee.

The American Whig Review, in February, 1846, published an article by
a Mrs. Jenkins, who had lived in the Argentine, attacking the despotism of
Rosas, and upholding the English and French intervention. The Review,
however, accompanied this with an editorial note which while admitting
that the character of the rule of Rosas might justify intervention, yet
showed little confidence in the quality of the European interference.

“It has been affirmed that France and the Prince de Joinville have the most am-
bitious designs upon Brazil and as much more of South America as can readily be
brought under their influence. . . . We confess that we observe with deep suspicion
the proceedings of both these civilized powers, whenever they come in contact with
half-civilized or savage nations too weak to keep possession of their country by
force, and too ‘uncultivated’ to diplomatize with skill.” 78

The Democratic Review also showed strong disapproval of the war, and
printed an article by Caleb Cushing, in which the question was viewed on
the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, and attention was called to the fact
that European intervention threatened both Americas. The writer wished
success to the Argentines who “were fighting in the common cause.”
About this time speeches in the British Parliament mentioned the entente
between France and Britain which would keep peace throughout the world,
and the Tallabassee Floridian commented satirically :

“This cordial understanding between France and England which is to keep the world
at peace has been the great characteristic of Louis Philippe’s government, and dur-
ing that time France has had a war with Mexico, two wars with the Argentine Con-
federation and a continual war with Algiers. . . . France and England are certainly
peace-loving countries, so bent upon peace that they are ready to fight for it at any
moment. What we are to expect from the union of these countries for the express
purpose of keeping the peace may be seen by their proceedings on the La Plata.
Certain belligerent forts there they proceeded to batter into the most peaceable
rubbish—and many men disposed to raise a row in defence of their country were put
to entire repose.” 75

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It is evident, therefore, that public opinion was far from indifferent to
this infraction of the Monroe Doctrine. The strongest official action on the
subject we find in the note sent from the State Department March 30, 1846,
to Mr. Harris, the representative of the United States in the Argentine.
After referring to “the great American doctrine which is opposed to the
interference of European governments in American affairs,’ and to the
late Message of the President emphasizing this point, the note continues,—

“That Great Britain and France have flagrantly violated this principle by their
armed intervention in the La Plata is manifest to the whole world. Whilst existing
circumstances render it impossible for the United States to take part in the present
war; yet the President desires that the whole moral influence of this Republic shall
be cast into the scale of the injured party. We cordially wish the Argentine Republic
success in its struggle against foreign interference.” 78

In June of the following year, Mr. Harris filed a very vigorous protest, and
continued to press the matter until the blockade was raised.%7

Prejudice against the French was manifested also in the discussions of the
Oregon question. The French press took the British side in the controversy
and this created some ill-will. Moreover a French explorer, M. de Mofras,
had visited the Far West, and published a book on the subject which was
quoted in support of the British position, and a story was current that
Louis Philippe had presented a copy of this book to the King of Sweden,
who had been suggested as a mediator, thus endeavoring to bias him against
the American cause.”®

At about this time, too, the operations of the French in the Pacific attracted
some attention and criticism in the United States. Tahiti, in the Society
Islands, had been Christianized through the efforts of the London Mis-
sionary Society, a Protestant organization. Roman Catholic missionaries
from France tried to settle there in 1836, and were sent away. As a result
the French occupied the islands and forced the admission of the Catholics
and the concession of trading privileges. The frigate L’Artemise, which
was concerned in this, went on to Hawaii and tried to repeat the process
there. News of this affair was received with indignation in the United
States, especially as the action had been accompanied by discourteous treat-
ment of American missionaries.

“The sentiments expressed by the American officers attached to the Columbia and
Jobn Adams in relation to this affair, are highly honorable to them and to the coun-
try. In our judgment, the insult offered to this nation in the person of its citizens
by the Artemise, demands an explanation from the French government, and we
trust our minister in France will be instructed to obtain it.” 79

The North American Review, in October, 1840, reviewed the case, strongly
condemning the French behavior; *° and the Democratic Review later
118THE REIGN OF EOU KS Prlveler se

 

 

 

carried a similar article.*t Continued activities of the French and British
in the Sandwich Islands led in 1849 to an official note from Clayton, Sec-
retary of State, to Rives in Paris, to the effect that the United States did
not wish to believe that the French intended to pursue in these Islands the
policy which they had followed in Tahiti, but that it must be understood
that the government of this country could in no case be indifferent to the
seizure of the Sandwich Islands by any other power.’? Meantime the
French had taken the Marquesas Islands, which Admiral Porter had once
occupied in the name of the United States. In Tahiti there had been a
controversy with the British, caused primarily by the expulsion of the
English missionaries, which ended in the deportation of Mr. Pritchard, the
chief missionary adviser of the Tahitian Queen Pomare, and the estab-
lishment of French sovereignty in the island. Much sympathy was mani-
fested in the United States for the unfortunate Queen, “this distressed
but heroic woman, whose . . . sufferings have made her forever known
to the American and European public.” **

While, therefore, no single incident of great importance embittered the
relations between America and France during the reign of Louis Philippe,
after the indemnity question was settled, numerous points of friction ex-
isted, and prejudices which had been formed were in no way lessened.
When the Revolution of 1848 brought to an end the rule of “that great
swindle” as Emerson called Louis Philippe, there were few to sympathize
with him in the disaster. Instead, there were many who condemned the man
himself, his advisers, and his administration. History and experience, it was
said, should have protected him against those errors which led to his down-
fall. He had played the part of a petty tyrant and a bad man. Selfish and
despotic, he had richly earned his misfortunes, and his behavior had
justified the Revolution.** Popular celebrations, as in the case of the Revo-
lution of 1830, were arranged in various communities, but the French
people shared the odium of their ruler, and a certain lack of spontaneity
and enthusiasm was to be observed, together with doubt of the ability of
the French to establish a wise and stable government in place of that
which they had overturned. The German, Irish, Polish, and other foreign
elements in the population rejoiced because they thought the revolution in
France presaged success for liberal movements in their own countries.
A very few newspapers expressed unqualified praise for the action of
the French people, the most important of these being the iabaer des
Union. 2

James Russell Lowell wrote an enthusiastic “Ode to France” in which fe
defended the violence of the Revolution, on the ground that the people had
been goaded beyond endurance, and

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“They did as they were taught; not theirs the blame
If men who scattered firebrands reaped the flame.

O broker-king, is this thy wisdom’s fruit?
A dynasty plucked out as ’twere a weed
Grown rankly in the night, that leaves no seed!
Could eighteen years strike down no deeper root?

Not long can he be ruler who allows

His time to run before him; thou wast naught
Soon as the strip of gold about thy brows
Was no more emblem of the people’s thought.

Since first | heard our North-wind blow,
Since first I saw Atlantic throw

On our fierce rocks his thunderous snow,
I loved thee, Freedom.

And surely never did thine altars glance
With purer fires than now in France;
While in their bright white flashes,
Wrong’s shadow, backward cast,

Waves cowering o’er the ashes

Of the dead, blaspheming Past.” 86

A large open-air celebration in New York City, April 3, was presided
over by the mayor; and the usual speeches, poems, resolutions, illumina-
tions, and fire-works, are recorded. But “the leading citizens were con-
spicuous by their absence.” A little later, however, a military ball was
held, and a “velvet-and-gold liberty cap” was presented to the city of
Paris, represented by the French vice-consul, in the name of the city of
New York. On this occasion an enthusiastic letter from Martin Van
Buren was read. In Washington, both houses of the legislature adjourned
their sessions, April 24, in honor of the celebration conducted by the mayor
and other officials of the city, and graced by the presence of the Marine
Band and the Washington Light Infantry. But President Polk refused to
be directly identified with the affair, and public officials in general followed
his example.*?

The Richmond Southerner said frankly that French ideas of liberty were
not such as to fit them to exercise it, but would lead instead to anarchy
and thence to despotism. The lack of education among the masses, the
immorality prevalent in society, and the lack of a deep religious sense,
would be a bar to successful democracy. “The preservation of Republican
government must depend upon virtue and knowledge. There is not enough
of either in France.” 8° The National Intelligencer feared, as did many

120THE REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE

 

 

others, a return to the Reign of Terror which followed the establishment
of the First Republic. “A Republic in France,” said this editor, “has been
but a sort of social volcano, rocking and blasting with its convulsions its
own foundations, and sending forth streams of lava to desolate abroad all
that they reached.” The Gallic spirit, he continued, delighted in war, in
military glory, and lacked the better and in the true sense braver instincts
which founded and supported law, right, and freedom. Any man who
promised the French military glory could lead them. Many papers, prais-
ing the deposition of Louis Philippe, and the establishment of the Repub-
lic, added qualifying phrases, such as “If well followed up—as God grant
it may be!” “If the provisional government does not give way to the mere
mob” or “There is danger of forgetting how much remains to be done, and
how much wisdom and foresight and patriotism are demanded to carry
into successful operation the work which has commenced so well.®® George
Ticknor of Boston, who was in France during the progress of the Revolu-
tion, wrote home that he questioned seriously whether the French work-
ingman would know how to make good use of his power. He thought little
but disappointment and mischief was to be expected from the irresponsible
mob which was in control, and that a military dictatorship was sure to be
necessary for the restoration of order. There was little real democracy in
France, and little constructive ability. No good could come, “as wise men
in the United States saw from the first,” from the destruction of the in-
stitutions of society, which would have to be reconstructed by force. ‘“Re-
publics cannot grow on the soil of Europe.” *° Emerson, in Paris, wrote
that the boulevards had lost their fine trees, cut down to make barricades.
“At the end of the year we shall take account and see if the Revolution was
worth the trees.” (Emerson, Journals, VII: 452.) But Bancroft, writing
from Paris also, said—‘‘At home Boston is frightened out of its wits. Mr.
Harrison Grey Otis thinks Louis Philippe a deeply injured man; Mr.
Webster condemns the Revolution in toto, as the work of communists and
anarchists. The Daily Advertiser is alarmed.” * Evidently Bancroft
thought his compatriots overly conservative.

Officially, the sympathy of America was expressed very promptly by
Richard Rush, the Minister of the United States in Paris. Mr. Rush re-
ceived an intimation from the provisional government on Saturday the
26th of February, before any official notices of the change had reached
the diplomatic corps, that his personal presence at the Hotel de Ville, “‘to
cheer and felicitate” the new administration, would be highly appreciated.
Without waiting for instructions from home, he answered the appeal on
the following Monday, believing, he said, that he was acting in support
of a great cause, and “in the spirit of my government and my country.”

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The other diplomatic representatives criticised Mr. Rush’s action as un-
necessarily precipitate. His government, however, endorsed his decision,
and told him that the American people had hailed “the late glorious
revolution” “with one universal burst of enthusiasm.” Secretary of State
Buchanan also urged Rush to give all possible aid in the period of or-
ganization. In Congress Senator Allen introduced a resolution of sympathy,
the last of March. But the bill did not meet with immediate approval.
Underwood of Kentucky said that his heart was with the French in their
struggle for liberty, and he had rejoiced in every advance they had made
toward a republican form of government, but he was “‘admonished to
caution by the fact that in all their previous efforts they have signally
failed.” Calhoun thought the proposal “premature,” since there was not
yet any assurance or evidence that the Revolution would serve the cause
of liberty.

“Much remains to be done. The real task to be performed is yet before them. They
have decreed a republic, but it remains for them to establish a republic. If the
French people shall succeed in that . . . if they shall really form a constitution which
shall on the one hand guard against violence and anarchy and on the other against
oppression of the people, they will have achieved, indeed, a great work. ... But if
they fail, what then? ... Can there be a more important inquiry? If the French
fail, under what sort of government will they find themselves? . . . France may find
herself in the embrace of a military despotism. Such a result would furnish no
ground for congratulation either on our part, or that of the civilized world....A
revolution in itself is not a blessing, The revolution accomplished by the French
people is indeed a wonderful event, . . . but it may lead to events which will make
it a mighty evil.”

Other remarks in the same vein were made. Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois,
however, insisted that sympathy was needed now, rather than after success
was assured. President Polk issued a statement in which he said that the
assertion by the French of the right of liberty and self-government was
an “interesting and sublime spectacle.” Senators repeated this sentiment,
and argued that France, in the critical period of the American Revolution,
had not withheld her sympathy, nor conditioned it upon success. Could the
United States be less generous? Full, prompt, and cordial, should be the
good wishes of the sister Republic. These arguments prevailed and the res-
olution was passed. In the House the deliberation on a similar motion was
vexed by the attempt of Ashmun of Massachusetts to attach to the resolu-
tion a clause congratulating the French on doing away with slavery in all
their colonies, as they had announced they were doing. This of course pro-
voked a long-drawn-out and bitter debate on slavery in all its forms and
in all countries, by no means excepting the United States, and placed the
question on a partisan basis. Finally the objectionable clause was voted
122HEHE REIGN OF LOUTS PH'EUEEE

 

 

 

down, and the resolution passed. In both Houses there had been insistence
that the phraseology should be so careful as not to commit this country
to approval of any future action by the new French Republic, in which
even its friends lacked confidence. The final form, therefore, as adopted by
both the Senate and House, is of some interest. It runs,—

“tendering the congratulations of the American to the French people upon the suc-
cess of their recent efforts to consolidate the principles of liberty in a republican
form of government.” ®2

As time went on, the forebodings of the pessimists were felt to be justified,
especially by the terrible ‘June Days” and the dictatorship of Cavaignac
which followed. The new republic, said the critics, was proceeding in the
track of the old. Excesses were being followed by reaction; liberty must
be controlled, for it had degenerated into licentiousness. The press was
to be censored, and the government was to be absolute, as the only way to
prevent class warfare. “Frenchmen have never consented once to study
our system of government,—they have plunged ahead like madmen, with
a wild recklessness of consequences.” They need a series of checks and
balances. ““A Republic of France is utterly impossible, the way the leading
men are going on. We could not, even in America, keep one up on their
sandy foundation.” ** Can France be a Republic? More and more fre-
quently the question was asked in the United States. The first attempt, it
was said, had failed. The Republic could not maintain itself without the
help of 250,000 bayonets. “Invoking the popular will in its daily declara-
tions, it is compelled to go into the streets every day, and smite the
popular masses with the edge of the sword. . . . The want of practical
knowledge is their great defect, and they seem destined to remedy this by
studying in a school of disaster.” (Boston Courier, July 17, 1848.) The
menace of radical socialism threatened on the one side; on the other that of
a restoration of the monarchy or even of the Empire. Republican symbols
might be retained for a time, but what of the reality? The French Presi-
dential elections approached, and chief of the candidates appeared Louis
Napoleon Bonaparte. Radicals and conservatives both supported him, the
one group looking toward the overthrow of the Republic and the sub-
stitution of communism, the other hoping that his election might lead to
a royalist revival. Bourbonism, Orleanism, red Socialism, Bonapartism, all
joined in his support. Charles A. Dana, writing from France descriptions
of the march of events, and strongly sympathetic with the French working-
classes, said at once of Napoleon, “He would rather be emperor than
president.” ** “It is a Republic,” said the United States watchers, “of
military traditions and imperial recollections.” “If he is elected and can
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get control of the army, the world may again witness in Napoleon II what
it witnessed in Napoleon I, all the perils and blood and sacrifice of the
revolution made to serve for the aggrandizement of an individual and
the establishment of a dynasty.” * “It is not Louis Napoleon who is elected
President of France; it is the name of Napoleon. . . . Who can say that
the people of France have not voted back the Empire? . . . We speak of
the illusion of Napoleonic glory. Is not rather France, as a republic, the
illusion?” °° Yet, “No man can rule France without the confidence of the
people.” °’

“Not only General Cavaignac and Dictatorship, but Socialism, Lamartinism, Red
Republicanism, Legitimacy, Orleanism, and all that have in succession overthrown
each other in France, are for the nonce utterly upset; and in their place, by the
most decisive declaration of a people’s will ever seen, uprises we know not what—
an enormous phantom of imperial power, jumbled with a republican title; of
hereditary glory with reputed personal incapacity; of an unprecedented popularity
oddly directing itself upon one for whom France cared nothing a few years ago;
whose only public attempts had deserved and incurred her derision; whose only
merit consists in his being the nephew of a man whom he in no manner resembles;
whose only service to the country consists in his having lived out of it. 7) and
finally, whose sole success is obviously formed out of the failure of others.” 98

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“They have expelled a king as unworthy to govern them,” said the North
American Review, in the course of a careful essay on the causes and the
results of the Revolution,—an article which is throughout not at all com-
plimentary to the French,—‘‘and now they learn that they are incapable
of governing themselves. Yet this is what France has come to through its
perversely exaggerated ideas of liberty and democracy, and from lending
too ready an ear to the eloquent demagogues, who as they could not obtain
a place in the government have succeeded in overthrowing it... .» It mate
ters not how long the mere forms of republicanism are preserved in France:
it is obvious that the great majority of the people are heartily tired of
their second trial of a republic, and would hail nothing more heartily
than a restoration of the monarchy.” ®® And the Democratic Review well
summarized the general sentiment thus: “A year ago the French made a
Revolution glorious in its birth, and great for its democratic principles;
a reaction followed that bloodless insurrection, caused by the wants of the
poorer classes, and originated by the amalgamation of different parties.
Next came a Dictatorship; and now a Napoleonic Republic, which will
end in a constitutional monarchy, or with a new and bloody revolution.
France has abjured her institutions and principles.” *°° And said Emerson,
“The old Adams and Jay ... think as I think about the French, that
they have no morale.” *°

 

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NOTES AND SOURCES

1 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 111: 100-107.
2 Perley's Reminiscences, 1: 112-113.
3 Gallatin to Everett, January, 1835. Gallatin, Writings, Il: 478-501.
4Col. Wm. B. Lewis to Col. Jas. A. Hamilton, Dec. 10, 1834. Hamilton, Remi-
niscences, 283.
5 Washington Globe, Dec. 5, Dec. 8, Dec. 11, Dec. 18, 1834, Jan. 10, 1835. The Globe,
Albany Argus, and Richmond Enquirer were the three leading Democratic papers of
the day.
6 Arkansas State Gazette, Dec. 30, 1834.
1 National Intelligencer, Dec. 4, Dec. 6, Dec. 11, Dec. 22, Dec. 29, 1834.
8 National Intelligencer, Dec. 8, Dec. 11, Dec. 17, Dec. 23, Dec. 25, Dec. 30, 1834.
Of similar tenor, and also cited in these numbers, are the utterances of the New York
Commercial Advertiser (Whig), Albany Daily Advertiser, Ulster Co. (N. Y.) Whig,
Baltimore Patriot, Pennsylvania Inquirer, Providence Journal, Delaware State
Journal, New England Review, Political Arena (Md.), Kent (Md.) Bugle, Charles-
ton Mercury, Kentucky Commentator, Georgia Federal Union, Recorder (Ga.), and
Constitutionalist (Ga.), Augusta (Ga.), Chronicle, Augusta Sentinel, Washington
(Ga.) News.
® Niles’ Register, Dec. 13, Dec. 20, Dec. 27, 1834, Jan. 3, 1835.
10 National Gazette, cited in Globe, Dec. 6, 1834.
11 Lexington Observer and Kentucky Reporter, Dec. 17, 1834.
12 New York American (Dem.), Dec. 10, 1834.
13 New York Spectator, Dec. 8, 1834.
14. New York Courier and Enquirer, cited in Globe, Dec. 5, 1834.
15 Boston Evening Gazette, Dec. 6, 1834.
16 Boston Daily Advertiser, Jan. 3, Jan. 7, 1835. See also similar arguments in Con-
necticut Courant, Dec. 8, Dec. 15, 1834; Litchfield (Conn.) Enquirer, Dec. 11, Dec.
18, 1834; Philadelphia Gazette, Dec. 5, Dec. 10, 1834; New Haven (Conn.) Columbian
Register; Portland (Me.) Evening Advertiser.
117 Reports of Committee on Foreign Relations, 1789-1901, V1; 47-68.
18 George Ticknor Curtis, Life of James Buchanan, |: 236-237.
19 Niles’ Register, XLVI: 335-336.
20Niles’, XLVII: 318-319; Congressional Globe, 2nd Session, 23rd Congress, 95,
125= 127,
21 Congressional Globe, 2nd Session, 23rd Congress, 22-26.
22 Raleigh Register, Feb. 5, 1835, and citing National Intelligencer.
23 Congressional Globe, 2nd Session, 23rd Congress, 213-219.
24 Adams, Memoirs, IX: 207-210; Niles’, XLVII: 425, 432-433.
25 Congressional Globe, 2nd Session, 23rd Congress, 298-99, 301-303, 309-314, 318-
323. Niles’, XLVII: 451, XLVII: 5-12; Philadelphia Gazette, Mar. 4, 1835; Adams,
Memoirs, 1X: 210-213.
26 Reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 1789-1901, VI: 69-71; Niles’,
XLVII: 26-27; Frederic A. Ogg, Life of Daniel Webster, 265-8; Buchanan, Life, |:
241-242.
27 Philadelphia Gazette, Jan. 8, Jan. 12, 1835; National Intelligencer, Jan. 7, Jan. 8;
Connecticut Courier, Jan. 19; Niles’, XLVII: 315; 344-52. Unfavorable comment,
Jan. 8, Jan. 24, Feb. 2, Washington Globe.

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28 Madison to Clay, Jan. 31, 1835, Clay, Works, Colton, ed., 1V: 388-9. Also see
N. Biddle to Clay, and Eleuth. Cooke to Clay, /b., 387-88.

29 New York Spectator, Feb. 12, 1835.

80 New York Courier and Enquirer, Feb. 19; New Haven Columbian Register,
Mar. 7; Connecticut Courant (Whig), Feb. 23; New York Evening Star (Whig),
Jan. 11, 1836; Benton, Thirty Years’ View, 1: 590-596.

81 Adams, Memoirs, 1X: 238; Scioto (Ohio) Gazette, June 3, 1835, Niles’, XLVIII:
217, 220, 253, 275-6, 308.

32 Mobile Mercantile Advertiser (Whig), Dec. 18, Dec. 22.

33 Connecticut Courant, Dec. 14, New York Evening Star, Dec. 29, Dec. 31; Provi-
dence Journal, Dec. 11; Georgetown, (D. C.) Metropolitan, Dec. 9; Scioto Gazette,
quoting National Intelligencer (critical), Dec. 23, 1835; Boston Gazette, Dec. 9,
Dec. 26; Richardson, Messages, II]: 152-160; Benton, Thirty Years’ View, 1: 569-
590.

34 Richardson, \11: 188-213.

85 Boston Courier (Whig), Jan. 25, Jan. 28, Feb. 1, Feb. 4, 1836.

86 Hunt’s Life of Livingston, Ch. XVII, contains a detailed and interesting descrip-
tion of Livingston’s mission to France and of his action on this question.

87 Buchanan, Life, 1: 243-280.

88 Calhoun, Works, Crallé, ed., 11: 15, 27.

39 Baltimore Patriot, Jan. 11, 1836.

40 New York American, cited Jb.

41 Niles’, XLIX: 385; See also Connecticut Courant, Jan. 25, 1836; New York Eve-
ning Star, Jan. 12; Boston Daily Advertiser, Jan. 7; Clay, Works, Colton, ed., 1V:
403-404.

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42 “Says Richard to Thomas,—‘Can your wit solve me soon
Why Old England sends hither the ship Pantaloon?’
Quick Thomas in answer,—'Its very name teaches:
The errand was only—to repair our breaches!”
Philadelphia American Sentinel, quoted Niles’, XLIX: 442.

For comment on the mediation see Niles’, XLIX: 405, 442-446; Boston Courier.
Feb. 8, Feb. 15, 1836; National Intelligencer, Jan. 30, Feb. 8; New York Enquirer,
Jan. 30; Congressional Globe, Ist Session, 24th Congress; Benton, Thirty Years’
View, 1: 600-603; Richardson, Messages, II]: 215-224.

48 Richardson, 111: 236. For summaries of the facts in the controversy over the
indemnity, in this stage, see Moore, International Arbitrations, V : 4460-4485; Moore,
International Law, VII; 123-129; Sumner, Jackson, 402-408; Schurz, Life of Henry
Clay, 11: 52-58; Johnson, America’s Foreign Relations, 1: 373-376; McMaster, His-
tory of the People of the U. S., V1: 236-241, 299-303; Schouler, 1\V: 239-244 Bassett,
417-419; McDonald, Jacksonian Democracy (American Nation Series), XV: 204-209.
For a full discussion, quite partial to Jackson, C. G. Bowers, Party Battles of the
Jackson Period, Ch. XIV. This chapter contains some especially interesting cita-
tions from the Congressional debates on the subject.

44 North American Review, XL (1835): 269-298.

45 United States Magazine and Democratic Review, | (1837): 125-128.

468 Jb., 1V (1840).

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47 Chevalier de Bacourt, Souvenirs of a Diplomat (Translation), 52, 68, 89, 95, 109-
110, 133, 150, 171, 181-2, 185, 190, 192-3, 194-5, 218, 248-9.
48 Scioto Gazette, Jan. 10, 1839.
49 Niles’, LIV: 455; New Orleans Bulletin, July 6, July 25, April 28, 1838; New Or-
leans Bee, July 6, 1838.
50 Boston Courier, Aug. 15, 1838; Niles’, Jan. 19, 1839; Globe, Jan. 21, 1839.
51 Congressional Globe, 3rd Session, 25th Congress, 82-83; New York Spectator, Jan.
7, 1839.
84Clay to Biddle, Sept. 14, 1838. Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle dealing with
National Affairs, 1807-1844, McGrane, ed., 332.
53 National Intelligencer, cited in Boston Courier, Nov. 1, 1838.
84 Curtis, Buchanan, 1: 584-5.
55 Baltimore American, cited in Savannah Georgian, April 29, 1845. Similar criticism,
Washington Globe, May 20.
56 Niles’, LX VIII: 193, 225-226, 272, 289. See also New Orleans Picayune, cited
in Boston Courier, May 5; Washington Union, May 31; Globe, July 7.
bY Niles’, LXIX: 217-219, 221. See also Senator Allen speaking on his resolution in
support of this Message, Jan. 26, 1846. Congressional Globe, \st Session, 24th Con-
gress, 245.
58 [b., 336, 403.
59 Illinois State Register, July 3, 1846, Mar. 6, July 10.
80 Mobile Register, June 29, 1846. For statements as to the actual French interference
in Texan and Mexican affairs, see such references as: George Lockhart Rives, The
United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, 1: 538-9, 592; II: 81-84, 89-94; Justin H.
Smith, The Annexation of Texas, 261, 382-391, 397-413; Justin H. Smith, The War
with Mexico, 1: 121-122, 324, 325-6, note 8, p. 523, note II, p. 525-6; II: 295-297,
304-305, notes 12, 13, p. 503, note 22, p. 505, notes 26-29, p. 506, note 30, p. 507;
Ephraim D. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846, 20-22, 24-5,
123, 158-160, 167-169, 170-171, 178-182, 190-191; Ch. IX, 204-5, 210-11; Niles’,
LXVII; 247-8; LXVIII; 177, 273; LXX: 25-27.
61 Niles’, LXV: 99 (October 14, 1843).
62 Jacksonville News, May 20, 1848.
638 American Whig Review, 1: 327, (Mar., 1845).
64 New York Sun, May 30, 1845.
85 Boston Courier, Sept. 22, 1845.
66 New York American, quoted in Niles’, 69: 113.
87 Jb.; Mobile Register, Nov. 14, 1845.
68 Niles’, LXIX: 240.
69 Jb., LVIII: 316,
70 Congressional Globe, \st. Session, 29th Congress, 197.
71 Congressional Globe, \st. Session, 29th Congress, 197-198.
72 [b., 240-241.
78 American Whig Review, 11: 160.
%4 Democratic Review, XVIII: 163-184.
™5 Floridian, Mar. 14, 1846. Further criticisms, S. F. Streeter in North American Re-
view, LXIX: 43-93 (July, 1849); Mobile Register, July 17, 1846; Niles’, LXX: 33, 36,
144; LXXI: 66.
7 Herbert Kraus, Die Monroedoktrin, 288. Buchanan to Harris.

127

 

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717 North American Review, cited above.

78 New York News, cited in Georgia Constitutionalist, Jan. 3, 1846; Indiana State

Journal, Feb. 4, 1846.

79 New York Journal of Commerce, In Niles’, LVIII: 145.

80 North American Review, LI: 503-515. F. Bowen.

81 Democratic Review, XIII: 3-16.

82 Edmund J. Carpenter, America in Hawaii, 94-95.

83 Boston Courier, Mar. 16, May 1, 1846; Boston Advertiser, in Niles’, LXV: 66-67;

Niles’, LX VII: 18, 65; LXVIII: 322-323.

84 Boston Courier, Mar. 23; Louisville Examiner, Mar. 25; Apr. 1; New Orleans

Picayune, Apr. 1; Arkansas State Gazette, Apr. 13; New York Spectator, Mar. 23;

Alexandria Gazette, Mar. 24, and citing New York Commercial Advertiser.

85 Union, Mar. 29; Connecticut Courant, Apr. 1; Cist’s Cincinnati Advertiser,

Mar. 26.

86 | owell, Poetical Works, 92-94.

81 Philadelphia Ledger, quoted in Mobile Register, Mar. 29; Mobile Register, Mar.

29; New York Spectator, Apr. 6; Polk’s Diary, I11: 425, 432; Curtis, The French

Assembly of 1848 and American Constitutional Doctrines, 94-95.

88 Southerner, Mar. 25, 1848.

89 Saco (Me.) Democrat, Apr. 4; New York Weekly Herald, Mar. 25, Apr. 11; Prov-

idence Journal, Apr. 1; Kennebec Journal, Apr. 7; New York Express, Mar. 21, Apr.

22; Arkansas State Gazette, May 4; Charleston Evening News, Mar. 23; New Orleans

Picayune, Mar. 27; Baltimore Patriot; Harrisburg Democratic Union, cited in Na-

tional Intelligencer, Mar. 25; Baltimore Sun, Mar. 29. Buchanan to Rush, Mar. 31,

1848, Niles’, LXXIV: 98-99; Clay to Haight, Clay, Works, Colton, ed., 1V: 560.

90 George Ticknor, Life, Letters, and Journals, 11: 230-236.

®1 Bancroft, Life and Letters, 11: 91. (April 22, 1848.)

22 Calhoun, Works, Crallé, ed., 1V: 451-4: Congressional Globe, |st Session, 30th

Congress, 568-570, 573-576, 579-580, 590, 599-603, 609-616; Appendix to Congressional

Globe, 1st Session, 30th Congress, 458-467, 477-482; Richardson, Messages, 1V: 605-6;

Saco Democrat, Apr. 11; Charleston Courier, Apr. 7; President Polk’s Message,

Apr. 3, Richardson, 1V: 579-80; Curtis, The French Assembly of 1848, 69-96. A

later resolution was passed, also, providing for the gift to the new republic of a

series of standard weights and measures, copies of American archives, laws, etc.,

drawings from the Patent Office of new inventions, maps, and other material which

it was thought might be useful.

23 New York Express, July 13, 1848.

84 J. H. Wilson, Life of Charles A. Dana, Chs. IV, V.

5 Globe, Dec. 23, 1848.

96 Philadelphia North American, Jan. 2, 1849.

97 Providence Journal, Jan. 12, 1849.

98 National Intelligencer, Jan. 9, 1849.

28 F. Bowen, in North American Review, LX1X: 277-325, Oct., 1849.

100 Democratic Review, XX1V: 566-567, XXV: 90-91 (1849). Other typical criticisms

of this period, in general agreeing with those quoted,—

Boston Courier, Dec. 18; New York Courier and Enquirer in Kennebec Journal, Dec.

21; Connecticut Courant, Dec. 16; New York Herald, July 8, Dec. 16, 1848; New

York Express, Jan. 1, Jan. 4, Jan. 13; New York Tribune, Jan. 1; Washington Union,

Jan. 2; New York Spectator, Jan. 3; Saco Democrat, Jan. 9; Globe, Jan. 10, 1849.
128ea

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American Life in Paris, by M. L. P., written 1851. Atlantic Monthly, Jan., Feb., Apr.,
June, Sept., 1871: 92-101, 232-240, 468-477, 715-725, 276-287. See also citations in
Eugene N. Curtis, “American Opinion of French Nineteenth Century Revolutions,”
American Historical Review, XX1X: 254-262.

101 Emerson, Journals, VIII: 249.

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France under Napoleon III

HE election of Louis Napoleon as President of the Second French

Republic had been regarded in the United States as a step toward
the return to a monarchical form of government, and when this view was
borne out by the coup d’état of December 2, 1851, and the proclamation a
year later of the Empire, little surprise was manifested; but the popular
belief that the French character was not suited to democratic principles
was strengthened. Officially the United States approved the position of
its Minister, Mr. Rives, who after the overthrow of the Constitution, re-
frained from attendance at the Presidential receptions until the act had
been ratified by the vote of the people. “You sympathize, in this respect,”
wrote Mr. Webster, who was then Secretary of State, “with the great body
of your countrymen. If that overthrow had become necessary, its necessity
is deeply to be deplored, because, however imperfect its structure, it was
the only great republican government existing in Europe, and all Amer-
icans wished it success. We feel as if the catastrophe which has befallen
it may weaken the faith of mankind in the permanency and solidity of
popular institutions.” Yet if the popular vote should be favorable, he
continued, the only course open to this country would be to recognize the
new order, for, since Washington’s day, it had been our principle that
“every nation possesses a right to govern itself according to its own will,
and change its institutions at discretion.” *
In answer to calls for information, President Fillmore, on January 20,
1852, and President Pierce, on March 21, 1853, sent to Congress the official
correspondence on this subject, but no Congressional resolutions, either
of sympathy or of condemnation, were adopted. In the Senate, January 2,
1852, a memorial from the “Industrial Congress of the City of New York”
was presented, asking for the recall of the United States Minister from
France, and the suspension of diplomatic intercourse, on the ground that
Louis Napoleon had “proved treacherous to the trust imposed in him;
violated and trampled underfoot the constitution he had solemnly sworn
to support, and in various ways proved recreant to humanity.” The United
States, the memorial argued, had been the first to recognize the Republic,

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and it was fitting that we should enter our “‘sternest protest against the
flagitious tyranny of the usurper.”’ In the discussion which followed, the
general feeling seemed to be that no action could be taken, but that
the situation clearly showed that the French people were incapable of
self-government, and had been demonstrating this for the last half cen-
tury.”

Newspaper criticism followed the same lines, not at all flattering to the
French. The National Intelligencer characterized the coup d’état as a very
grave event, of deep interest to the whole world, in its bearing upon the
whole problem of democratic government. The act was one of the “clear-
est usurpation” and could in no way be defended. Many Americans would
feel it advantageous, as tending to give France the stability and tran-
quillity which she seemed unable to attain under popular government, but—
“We have ourselves, in a life not very long, already witnessed three French
Revolutions, and now witness a fourth. They do not appear to us to im-
prove in quality as they increase in number, but the fifth may be better.”
“While for them we hope all things, we yet fear all things.” * The New
Hampshire Statesman remarked, “Louis Napoleon, we perceive, .. .
‘accepts the Empire’—that is, takes it with the relish a famished wayfarer
does a sumptuous dinner,” but the French people have tasted most forms
of known government, and should be able to judge of what is best for
them. * The Boston Courier said hotly that “no event to which the present
century has given birth has offered so melancholy, mortifying and dis-
heartening a spectacle to the eyes of the friends of liberal and constitu-
tional government as the political change now taking place in France. . . .
The French . . . have spent an infinity of blood and treasure, they have
blackened the pages of their national history with an infinity of folly and
crime, but they have learnt nothing.” That the present rule is according
to the will of the people is admitted, and they are “sincere in their ap-
plause of the usurpation; they worship success, and are ready to legalize
any violence or injustice that is crowned with success. . . . They are sin-
cere in blowing hot and cold upon the same thing. . . as sincere as
Frenchmen can be.” ° The New York Weekly Day Book declared that the
French people had shown that they were devoid of all aspirations for con-
stitutional freedom and incapable of appreciating its blessings or under-
standing its responsibilities. “Vain, fickle, and drawn away by the glitter
of royalty, they would prefer chains and slavery” rather than be deprived
of the pomp and splendor of royal courts. “It is fustian to talk about Louis
Napoleon smothering the spirit of liberty in France; if there were rational
ideas and any love of liberty there, it could not be stifled in such an easy
and expeditious manner.” ° The New York Herald said that the rule of

131

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the Emperor would be of distinct advantage to France. He would put
down the radicals, protect and develop business, and control a corrupt
legislature. Political liberty cannot prosper among a people “whose char-
acter does not possess a single element of republicanism.” “A press whose
only notion of freedom is the right of propagating rank treason, and who
summon an excitable mob to arms to increase their own circulation”
should be restricted.7 A writer in Harper's Monthly mentioned the cor-
rupt methods used in the election, but thought that in spite of this, the
overwhelming majorities showed that it was the popular choice. “Thus, if
the government be a despotism, it is a despotism that has been created by
the popular will, and what true believer in the sovereignty of the people
will deny them the right to govern themselves, by means even of a des-
potism, if they see fit so to do?” * The New York Sun, on the other hand,
emphasized the political manipulations employed, the intimidation of
press and of voters, and declared the result a “barefaced imposition on
the French people, who did not know the true state of things, while the
Prince-President was building a despotic throne through perjury and
treason.” ®

Marked hostility to Napoleon III, “this bizarre shadow of the great man,
this Napoleon the Little,” *° continued through his reign. We find the pa-
pers delighting in such stories as this, that on the occasion of the Emperor's
triumphal progress through France the decorations in a certain little town
included an Imperial crown hung beneath an arch, with the device, “He
well deserves it!” Before the Emperor arrived, however, a wind had blown
away the crown, leaving only the rope by which it had hung, and the in-
scription! + Whittier, in his “The Peace of Europe,” used the scathing

phrase:

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“Base gambler for Napoleon’s crown,
Barnacle on his dead renown.” 12

James Russell Lowell, who had written in 1848 a most sympathetic “Ode
to France,” full of hope for a future based on liberty and democracy, wrote
in 1859 “Villa Franca,” the Fates to Italy saying:

“Wait a little: Do we not wait?
Louis Napoleon is not Fate.

eseeHNit

Wait, we say; our years are long;
Men are weak, but Man is strong;
Since the stars first curved their rings
We have looked on many things;
Great wars come and great wars go,
Wolf tracks light on polar snow;

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We shall see him come and gone,
This second-hand Napoleon.

Spin, spin, Clotho, spin!

Lachesis, twist, and Atropos sever!

The Bonapartes, we know their bees
That wade in honey red to their knees.”

In 1862, in the Biglow Papers, he expresses his feeling thus:

“We might ha’ ben now jest ez prosp’rous ez France,
Where politikle enterprise hez a fair chance,

An’ the people is happy and proud at this hour

Long ez they hev the votes, to let Nap hev the power.” 13

Charles A. Dana wrote, “No one can predict when the great edifice of
fraud, violence, plunder, political pretence, and incapacity which consti-
tutes the Second Empire will come to an end. The result is certain: the
time and the mode depend upon accident. But we know that Louis Na-
poleon has outlived his proper period, and we may at any hour be called
upon to witness the closing catastrophe of this strange, eventful, unenviable
Career.’ 14

“Napoleonic Ideas,’”’ written by the Emperor in his days of exile, long be-
fore he was even President of the Republic, appeared in translation in
the United States in 1859. The Atlantic Monthly, in reviewing the book,
remarked that its publication was timely, as helping to form a true esti-
mate of the writer’s intellectual capacity. “Nothing is more unwise than
to assume that a man’s brain must be limited because his moral sense is
small. . . . Napoleon III may play an important part in History, though
by no possibility an heroic one. In reading this little volume one cannot
fail to be struck with the presence of mind and the absence of heart of
which it gives evidence. It is the advertisement of a charlatan, whose sole
inheritance is the right to manufacture the Napoleonic pill, and we read
with unavoidable distrust the vouchers of its wonderful efficacy.” *5 In
the same magazine somewhat later appeared a history of Napoleon III,
and an analysis of his character. While not uncomplimentary to his
ability and his achievements, the spirit of the article is manifested in the
concluding paragraph, in which the author says:

“Considering the good that he has done, and the evil that he might have done and
yet has refrained from doing, he will compare advantageously with any living ruler;
and mankind can overlook his errors in view of his virtues,—save and except those
men whom he vanquished at their own weapons, and whose chief regret it is, that
being no better political moralists than was the Prince-President, their immorality
was fruitless, while his . . . gave him empire. . . . He is not without sin; but if he

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shall not die until he shall be stoned by saints selected from governments and
parties, his existence will be prolonged till doomsday.” 16

Ht

It is to be noted also that Americans of this period had a very definite
idea of the fundamental traits in French character. This idea was largely
“made in America’ and evolved from the tales of student life and tourist
life in Paris with which those who were fortunate enough to travel de-
lighted in shocking and entertaining their friends. A writer in Appleton’s
Magazine, defending the French home life and French morals in general,
said that the average opinion on these subjects among Americans was
something like this:

“Why, sir,’ says General Andrew Jackson Jenkins of the New York militia, stand-
ing in the courtyard of the Grand Hotel, and ejecting at the same time a quid from
his left cheek, ‘these Frenchmen don’t know what home is. They haven’t got any,
poor devils! They live on the boolevards, eat at the restoorants and sleep in the
garrets of their own houses, hiring the best apartments to Roosians and Americans
who can afford to pay for them. I’ll tell you what—Paris is a fine-looking town; but
it is like a shirt that’s all frill!’ ” 17

 

In “The Education of Henry Adams” we find the idea phrased some-
what differently. Speaking of the months he “squandered” in Paris in
1860, Mr. Adams says:

“From the first he had avoided Paris, and had wanted no French influence in his
education. He disapproved of France in the lump. A certain knowledge of the
language one must have; enough to order dinner and buy a theatre ticket; but more
he did not seek. He disliked the Empire and the Emperor most particularly, but
this was a trifle; he disliked most the French mind. To save himself the trouble of
drawing up a long list of all that he disliked, he disapproved of the whole, once for
all, and shut them figuratively out of his life. France was not serious, and he was
not serious in going there.

“He did this in good faith, obeying the lessons his teachers had taught him; but the
curious result followed that, being in no way responsible for the French and
sincerely disapproving them he felt at liberty to enjoy to the full everything he dis-
approved. Stated thus crudely, the idea sounds derisive; but as a matter of fact,
several thousand Americans passed much of their time there on this understand-
ing.” 18

An excellent summary, apparently, of contemporary opinion in the United
States, is a study of French character found in one of the magazines,
in which the following points are prominent. The French, in every
phase of life, manners, and action, manifest an excellence in detail and
process, and a deficiency in practical skill and in consistent moral senti-
ment. They have “abundance of talent, but no faith; gayety, gallantry,
wit, devotion, dreams and epigrams in perfection, without the solid foun-
dation of principles and the efficient development in practice either of
134

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polity, a social system, or religious belief.” The redeeming grace of the
nation is to be found in its wholesome sense of the enjoyable, in its adapt-
ability to the realities of life without being materialistic. The love of
pleasing, the love of posing, the influence of women, and a frivolous tem-
per, characterize them always and everywhere. They are easily satisfied
with illusions, fertile in superficial experiments, but lack directness, candor,
and a recognition of truth in its broad and deep sense. Their powers are
not disciplined; they are childish in their love of amusement and excite-
ment, and they are without self-dependence, courage, or efficiency. They
submit easily to authority, partly because it is a trouble to think, and
partly because they are unaccustomed to assuming responsibility. In
colonization, they adapt themselves to native customs, rather than lift
the native to a higher civilization. They do not have a sense of personal
duty. “The social evils and kinds of crime in France are referable in no
small degree to the absence of great motives, the limited sphere and hope-
less routine involved in arbitrary government, unsustained by any elevated
sentiment. Such a rule makes literature servile, enterprise mercenary, and
manners profligate; all history proves this.” It is not rational to infer
from the apparent want of ability to take care of national affairs that ca
military despotism is justifiable. Such a sway, by indefinitely postponing
the chance to acquire the requisite training, keeps down and throws back
the national impulse and destiny. The man who thus abuses power is
none the less a traitor and a parricide.” *°

With such an impression of the French nature prevalent, it was perhaps
not to be expected that the Americans should show any marked friendli-
ness toward their “ancient ally” in political affairs. Nor, on the other
hand, since the character and the government of the French were obviously
their own affair, was there any cause for an active antagonism, unless in a
specific instance the welfare of the United States should be threatened.
In the decade running from 1850 to 1860 the international relations of
the United States included only occasional contacts or conflicts with the
ambitions of the French. Most of these were connected to some degree
with the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, which had not as yet, how-
ever, been accepted by all American leaders as an article of faith. By far
the most important field of contact was the Island of Cuba; but Haiti,
Mexico, Central America, and the Sandwich Islands contributed in turn
to the popular uneasiness. Cuba had been for some years a sensitive
spot in the national consciousness. British interest in the Caribbean was
feared, and France also was jealously watched. A strong expansionist
tendency was developing, much talk of “manifest destiny’ was heard,
and many looked eagerly for the detachment of the Island of Cuba from

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Spain and its annexation to the United States. Both commercial and
strategic reasons were urged in support of this desire. The Southern
planters favored annexation because it would extend the area of slave-
holding districts, yet feared somewhat lest a prosperous Cuba, with access
to the markets of the United States, might prove a dangerous competitor
to the South. Northern abolitionists decried the extension of slave ter-
ritory. The Cubans themselves complicated the situation by periodic
revolutions, aimed at independence from Spanish rule. A free Cuba, in
which in all probability slavery would immediately cease to exist, was an
unpalatable idea to many Americans, yet the weakness of decadent Spain
made it unlikely that she would be able much longer to maintain her
title, unless she should in some way obtain help from one of the stronger
European nations. This would almost certainly involve a lien on her
island possessions, and while many in the United States felt it a duty
not to interfere with the Spanish ownership, the conviction was strong
that no European state could be allowed to become her successor.

In the years 1850-1852, many filibustering expeditions were directed from
the United States toward Cuba, some organized by enthusiastic individuals
whose sympathy with the Cubans was accompanied by the feeling that
if their independence should be accomplished by United States aid,
gratitude and necessity would link their fortunes closely with those of the
great American Republic; others by adventurous souls who expected to
enrich themselves through the possession of estates taken from the Spanish
in the island. In spite of strict enforcement of the law against these in-
fractions of neutrality, several such enterprises took shape. The most
famous was that led by Narciso Lopez, in the summer of 1851. He had
made several previous attempts, all of which had failed, and this trial
ended also in disaster, the leader himself and many of his men being
captured and executed by the Spanish authorities. When the news of this
reached the United States, anti-Spanish riots of some magnitude occurred
in New Orleans, where the expedition had been organized, and there was
some excitement throughout the country. The Spanish became alarmed,
and appealed to Great Britain and France for protection against American
designs, receiving prompt support in the form of strengthened squadrons
in the West Indies and a notification to the United States that these
powers would interfere, by force if necessary, to prevent “the landing of
adventurers from any nation in the island of Cuba with hostile intent.”
The official replies of Crittenden, Acting Secretary of State, and of Webster,
the Secretary, deprecated most strongly such action as was indicated by
the European powers, and insisted that it could not be carried out with-
out the visitation and search of vessels flying the American flag, which

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would be absolutely inadmissible; and would almost certainly lead to
abuses and collisions which would threaten the existing peace. The letter
to the French pointed out that the difference between the government of
America and that of European states is of a type to create mutual sus-
picion and aversion, and that knowledge of this creates in America a
jealousy of European interference. French intervention in this case, then,
could not fail to produce some irritation, if not worse consequences. ene
French cruisers, sailing up and down the shore of the United States to
perform their needless task of protecting Cuba, and their ungracious
office of watching the people of this country, as if they were fruitful
of piracies, would be regarded with some feelings of resentment, and the
flag which they bore ... would be looked at as casting a shadow
of unmerited and dishonoring suspicion upon them and their govern-
ment.” President Fillmore in his annual Message said decisively, “Nor
can there be allowed any watch by the vessels of any foreign nation over
American vessels on the coast of the United States or the seas adjacent
thereto.” ?°

The French and English assured the United States authorities that there
would be no encroachments upon American privileges, and the incident
was closed. In the course of the following year, however, the Cuban ques-
tion was reopened by a proposal from these two powers that the United
States should join them in a tripartite agreement that they would under
no circumstances take Cuba. Everett, who had become Secretary of State
at the death of Webster, declined to become a party to such an arrange-
ment, basing his refusal chiefly upon the inequality of the compact, since
Cuba was and must ever be of much greater importance to the United
States than it could be to any European state.” He referred frankly also
to the “law of American growth and progress” which could not be ulti-
mately arrested by such a convention; and said that no United States
Administration could “stand a day under the odium of having stipulated
with the great powers of Europe that in no future time, under no change
of circumstances . . . should the United States ever make the acquisition
of Cuba.”

Everett had further based his position upon the Washingtonian theory
of the avoidance of entangling alliances. This principle, and the whole
doctrine of the inadmissibility of European interference in American
affairs, was being at this very moment negatived by the fact that the
United States had actually undertaken a joint intervention with Great
Britain and France in the affairs of the Island of Haiti. In this turbulent
country, a civil war was in progress, between the two republics of Haiti
and San Domingo. The Haitians controlled the smaller portion of the

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island, but were the better fighters, and the Dominicans were driven to
appealing for help to the larger states. They applied first to the United
States, then to Great Britain, and finally offered France a protectorate,
together with the cession of Samana Bay, their most important port. The
French were very willing to accept the offer, and only the protesting
watchfulness of the British and American authorities prevented their doing
so. In the latter part of 1852 and early in 1853 it was freely rumored in
the United States that they had actually taken possession of Samana.
Finding, however, that it was improbable that any power would be able
to act alone, the Dominicans suggested a joint intervention, to which
proposal the French and British promptly agreed, and the United States
saw nothing better to do than to follow suit. Webster had designated Robert
M. Walsh as Commissioner, and instructed him to codperate with the
representatives of the other powers. The intervention, however, came to
nothing, all three of the powers being apparently unwilling to coerce
the Haitians, and the mission was withdrawn without any more definite
result than a half-promise from the Haitian “Emperor,” Soulouque, to
refrain temporarily from fighting.?*

In still another field at this moment French aggression was feared. A
French adventurer, Raousset de Boulbon, gathered a band of followers
in California and Mexico, and settled in the Mexican state of Sonora,
close to the boundary of the United States. Shortly afterward he started
a revolution, and declared the district annexed to France. The enterprise
was shortlived, the Mexican authorities promptly suppressing it, and
executing most of the participants, but it was long enough to create a
flurry of excitement in the United States and to show how easily suspicion
against the French could be aroused, for it was widely rumored that De
Boulbon had not been acting on his own initiative, but in connivance with
the French authorities.2* Some suspicion also was caused by French in-
terest in the schemes for an inter-oceanic waterway. In the early days of
the exploration of the Americas, French adventurers were among those who
looked for a gateway to the West. The first plans for cutting a channel to
take the place of the natural opening which they learned did not exist,
interested all the western European governments. As early as 1735 the
French are known to have sent out scientists, who reported that a canal
was feasible. In the 19th century, when interest in the subject had greatly
increased, French promoters were active in securing franchises and making
plans. The government of Louis Philippe seriously considered undertaking
the enterprise, and there was so much discussion in France that Louis
Napoleon, in prison in the fortress of Ham, begged to be released to under-
take it, and later wrote a pamphlet urging that the canal be built. After

138

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his accession to power the canal scheme was superseded by other interests,
but never forgotten, and on several occasions the Napoleonic backing of
French adventurers who were interested in the question, or the per-
sonal attempts of the Emperor himself to acquire franchises, attracted
the attention of the United States government and led to diplomatic
warnings.

In studying the effect of these incidents upon American opinion, we must
recall that 1852 was a presidential election year, when in this country
all issues are likely to be embittered by partisan feeling, and that this
particular election involved important problems in domestic affairs, espe-
cially those of the extension of slave areas and the growing bitterness
between the North and the South. The parties were sharply differentiated,
and feeling ran high. The Whig policy, represented by President Fillmore,
was in general conservative in foreign matters and disposed toward peace
with all nations. It minimized occasions of dispute with other countries,
and deprecated an aggressive national policy. It therefore disclaimed any
immediate designs on Cuba, treated the stories of the French seizure of
Samana and Sonora as improbable, and discouraged filibustering expedi-
tions.24* The Seward wing of the party was more in favor of expansion, and
inclined to question whether, as the American Whig Review put it, the
policy of the party had not been too meek. “Has the imperial usurpation
of Louis Napoleon struck a damp into the heart of American as well as
European republicans?” 2* The Democrats were in favor of a vigorous
foreign policy. American expansion was to be given full sway. The “weak,”
“craven,” “pusillanimous” methods of the Fillmore administration were to
give place to a glorious and triumphant advance. America should come
into her own. No longer might she be bullied by European nations; in-
stead she should dictate the fortunes of the western world.?° The Newark
Daily Advertiser, a Whig daily, sarcastically described the Democratic
platform, after the elections had shown decisively that it was a program
that appealed to the electorate:

“How comes it that our Government allows the subjects of Napoleon III to speak
French almost within cannon shot of our boundary? Thank heaven, their reign [the
Fillmore Administration] will cease in two short months and then we shall see if
England will be allowed to sail her ships of war in company with the French in the
Caribbean Sea. Long before we had existence as a nation European Powers were
masters of the West India Islands; but the United States have at length appeared,
and shall any foreign state be suffered to utter a word now about Cuba and San
Domingo? The French flag was seen hovering a few days ago around Samana...
yet the President did not attack it. Will not Senator Cass, or Douglas, or Mason, or
Soulé or somebody call for papers? ... We consider that the people, by their
recent suffrages, have decided most unequivocally and intelligently for active par-

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ticipation of the United States on all these points... . We suppose we must con-
cede, though we do it with reluctance, that Great Britain has a title to the posses-
sion of Canada at present, as not within the Monroe Doctrine; but we cannot
imagine the reason why she and France want little Greytowns and Honduras Islands,
Samanas and Sonoras here and there and everywhere. We can never consent to it,
for we want them all ourselves.” 27

To the Democrats, the proposal for a West Indian patrol after the Lopez
incident was “insolent, in the highest degree, to the United States.” ?* The
Monroe Doctrine should be fully upheld, and this demanded a strong army
and a strong navy, and an army of observation on the Rio Grande, to
prevent any coup d’état in that region. “The present Congress intends to
assume the initiative in supporting the new administration in taking bold
and high ground in its relations with the strong powers of Europe and the
protection of the weak powers of the earth. . . . It would not at all surprise
us to see the appropriation of five or ten millions of dollars, to be placed
in the hands of General Pierce, for the preservation of peace and the honor
of the republic in the approaching crisis.” #® The Democratic Review was
especially anxious that the United States should keep a close watch on
Louis Napoleon and block his enterprises in the Caribbean and Mexico.*%°
In the Congressional debates the Democratic leaders expressed with force
and frankness their views on expansion and on the Monroe Doctrine.
Mason, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, saw in the proposal
for a tripartite guarantee of Cuba evidence that France and England were
strongly opposed to the possession of the island by the United States, and
had chosen this method of announcing their interest and their determina-
tion to act in unison in the matter. “And I wish further to declare,” he said,
“that whenever the hour comes when in good faith and with due
regard to national honor, we can incorporate Cuba as one of these United
States, it will be done, and Europe may find it best then to hold her
peace.” *t Cass, a pronounced imperialist, declared that all the maritime
nations of Europe were jealous of American expansion, and determined
to block it in any possible way. This gave importance to such an intrigue
as that in Sonora. He cited French propaganda, which urged the coloniza-
tion of northern Mexico, “as the only means of checking the rapid and
formidable growth of the United States and preventing forever the ac-
quisition of a railroad from the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean” and as the
“surest dyke against the usurpation of the American race.” As to Cuba,
there could be no mistaking the designs of England and of the Napoleonic
Empire, and the United States must be prepared to resist their encroach-
ments.*2 Soulé of Louisiana was eager that the United States should take
Cuba, and in spite of his French birth, correspondingly bitter toward both
140FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III

 

 

nations which interfered with his ambition. ** Gwin of California thought
that Texas and California would be apt to look carefully into the question
of French seizure of Sonora, and, if the news proved true, might “go out
on a buffalo hunt soon.” *

Seward’s position in these discussions was somewhat difficult, for he was,
and was known to be, in sympathy with expansion. He said that he did
not believe that the French government had any official connection with
the Sonora affair, and that in Cuba all that she had really done was just
what the United States had declared was correct, to uphold the sovereignty
of Spain. In fact, we had no proof of any actual aggression, either in the
Caribbean or anywhere else. He “‘would submit to no real wrong, but on
the other hand would seek no factious cause of controversy.” If we were
to outstrip our European rivals, it should be by peaceful means, by the
development of our resources, and the increase of our commerce, especially
on the Pacific side. He thought it unnecessary to reaffirm the Monroe
Doctrine at the moment. The ambitions of France and England could
not be disregarded, but if they should make an attempt to renew or restore
their power in the New World, they would immediately discover that it
was impossible, therefore provocative declarations on our part were in-
expedient.’ Other Whig leaders, like Underwood, of Kentucky, who ex-
plained that the reason why Louis Napoleon was dignified with the title
of Emperor was because the people felt safer in the hands of one generous
robber than in the hands of forty thieves,*° showed plainly their aversion
to Napoleonic aggression.

In fact, throughout the course of the group of incidents which we have
been discussing, American opinion was more harmonious in regard to them
than a study of the party platforms would indicate. Everett’s letter on the
proposal for the tripartite action in Cuba was firm in its assertion of
American leadership in the destinies of the western world, unhampered
by any European interference. The Whigs were delighted with it; and
although it emanated from a Whig cabinet, the Democrats found it entirely
satisfactory.37 The National Intelligencer (Whig), though it insisted that
the French had not occupied Samana, yet defended the intervention in
Haiti, on the ground that it was necessary to prevent that island’s falling
into the hands of any European power.** The Washington Union, official
organ of the Democratic party, was pleased with the intervention,*® and
the criticism that it should have been made alone, instead of with any
European power, came from both sides.*? The Mexican incident is an even
clearer index to the popular sentiment toward France. It is not to be
classed with ordinary party squabbles in Mexico, says the New York
Herald. “It has a deeper meaning, and is pregnant with more important

141

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consequences. For some years past the French government has, for motives
to which we now find the clue, encouraged the emigration of a class of
the most unruly and adventurous of its citizens to this portion of Mexico.”
It has given them official support there, and now, “By connecting this
annexation movement with that in the Republic of Dominica. . . it will
appear beyond all doubt that they form two grand links in the design
which the French government are evidently endeavoring to carry out on
this continent. . . . We expect that Congress will take immediate measures
to frustrate these designs.” 4 The Union declared that whether directly
supported by the French government or not, the recent occurrences in
Sonora and at Samana were a strong warning to this government not to
shrink from its policy, nor to slumber at its post.4* The Boston Transcript
said, “If, behind all these incidents, there is a purpose of French
colonization or conquest, it grows at once into the gravest public ques-
tion of the day.’** The New York Times said it had important docu-
ments which proved the plan to be official, and to aim at erecting a bar-
rier to American growth in the direction of the Pacific.“* The Providence
Journal spoke scornfully of American filibustering, but thought that at
any rate a similar move on the part of the French in North Mexico would
have to be blocked. Our border provinces must not be threatened by a
European neighbor. #® The Newark Daily Advertiser recalled that French
colonization in America had always been unlucky, and thought this at-
tempt would be no exception. *® In short, it is evident that the spirit of
“Young America” demanded an energetic adhesion to the principles of the
Monroe Doctrine.

In the later years of the decade, an attempt was made to carry into effect
the expansionist ideas of the Democratic leaders. Every effort was made to
obtain for the United States that Bay of Samana which the French had
been so unprincipled as to desire, together with such other concessions as
would give this country a commanding influence in Santo Domingo. France,
Great Britain, and Spain consistently blocked each move. ** Unwilling to
commit open robbery, and accept the consequences, the United States tried
by every means to persuade Spain to sell Cuba, or at least to recognize
her independence. Backed steadily by the other powers, Spain as steadily
refused; but not until the Civil War broke out were the negotiations even
temporarily abandoned.** To describe in detail the progress and the in-
cidents of these attempts would be manifestly out of place here. A few
Jlustrations, however, of the fact that the American public was sufficiently
aware of the march of events to resent the interference with American
ambitions, and to continue to hold toward France an attitude of criticism
and suspicion, may be cited. In the fall of 1854 the French consul at San

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Francisco was compelled to go to court to testify in regard to the activities
of the raiders who had gone from California to Mexico. He protested that
this was an invasion of his rights, and was excused from testimony, but
carried his complaint to his home government, which made the matter the
subject of representations at Washington. The National Intelligencer in
its account of the affair declared that the wrong,—‘‘and there was out-
rageous wrong in this business,”—was on the side of France, since French
adventurers, with the connivance of the French consul, had organized a
filibustering attack on Sonora, in defiance of our laws, and the consul’s im-
munity from the witness-stand had made it impossible to convict the cul-
prits.*® Early in 1854 Lord Clarendon, speaking in the British Parliament,
announced that the alliance made between France and Great Britain for
the Crimean War extended to all questions of policy. In such matters, he
said, “There is no part of the world, in either hemisphere, in which we
are not entirely in accord.” °° Somewhat later, Louis Napoleon took occasion
to make a similar statement on the part of France. He spoke of the firm
bond created by common victories, and by “the same views and the same
intentions, animating the two governments in every part of the globe.” ™
American critics seized on these declarations as being specifically directed
against this country, in the matter of Cuba. Cass referred to them several
times in the Senate, and in a lengthy speech on February 20, 1855, said that
France and England had been for some time acting in concert against our
foreign policy:

“They seem to have followed us over the world, watching, counteracting, and oppos-
ing, from the loading of a cargo of guano to the acquisition of a kingdom. At the
Sandwich Islands their influence has been in constant operation, openly used and
pertinaciously exerted. In Dominica they tracked us, and frustrated, it is said, a
very reasonable arrangement to which there could be no proper objection except that
it was useful and acceptable to the United States... . At the Gallapagos Islands,
where interests far more reasonable than any views of acquisition were struck down
by the same interposition, . . .” etc.

Other examples could easily be obtained from the newspapers, Cass said,
and he had a profound distrust of the Caribbean operations of the two na-
tions.°2 Mason followed with an arraignment even more detailed and bit-
ter. A cloud had been gathering, he said, for some time in the relations be-
tween these countries and the United States. It had been visible in both
seas, the Atlantic and the Pacific, and showed a joint policy of interference
in matters with which the American people believed they had no right
to interfere. In the Sandwich Islands they had acted to frustrate American
negotiations. When the United States was negotiating a guano treaty with
Ecuador, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador had been instructed
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by his government to give to the United States authorities an account of
the remarks of the French chargé, who had said, in referring to the treaty,
that he was surprised that the government of Ecuador would seek the
protection of a nation whose ambitious views and unscrupulous desire of
extending its territories were notorious, which was shown by the annexa-
tions of Texas and California, and its designs on the Sandwich Islands and
Cuba. He said also “that in so far as France was concerned, the Emperor
was resolved to curb that spirit; and although, under present circumstances,
it did not suit the policy of his government to undertake anything against
the United States; yet, upon the conclusion of the war with Russia, the
Emperor would turn his attention to the United States, and that he con-
sidered a war between the two countries unavoidable, as it was desired by
the French Government.” This meant, Mason said, that the French con-
suls and diplomatic functionaries on the American continent were expected
freely to defame this country and to intimidate the powers to which they
were accredited, in order to break up American commercial treaties and
other connections. He recited the grievances connected with Santo Dom-
ingo, and showed how here the diplomatic agents of France and England
had undone all the United States had tried to do.**

About this time the New York Atlas carried an editorial on the Anglo-
French alliance, which “will prove a humbug and do no harm to the Czar.”
Louis Napoleon, “if he wishes to damn himself to eternal infamy (he can-
not help it anyhow),” should join the Czar against England, which
would give him a brilliant opportunity to avenge Waterloo. The Czar
will probably win anyway, “in which case God help and save Napoleon
le Petit, for the French people won't.” °* Emerson said that Napoleon’s
policy was bolder than the English would have chosen. ‘He means to teach
them how robbers rob.” (Journals, VIII: 559.)

Occasional references have been made to the French activities in the
Sandwich Islands. It will be recalled that some years earlier, when they
took possession of Tahiti, they gave evidence of a desire to extend their
influence to the Hawaiian Islands also, to which action the United States
objected. The matter remained unsettled, and through the early fifties there
was considerable friction in this area, and the idea, emanating from the
Hawaiians themselves, of annexing the islands to the United States in
order to prevent their occupation by the French or British, was agitated.
Webster, in 1851, gave these countries official notice that the United States
could not consent to European occupation and would protect the islanders
against it.*° The general public, however, seems to have taken little interest
in the matter, but have felt that the islands,were far away, and not of
sufficient importance to be of great concern to this country, certainly not

144

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in comparison with the Caribbean interests. Naturally, the Californians
showed more interest than anyone else, for they were in a position to know
the value of the territory better. In a speech in the House, August 30,
1852, Representative McCorkle of that state made a vigorous plea for the
annexation of Hawaii. He spoke of the French aggression, which had
driven the natives to ask protection from this country, and emphasized the
strategic value to the entire Western coast of such a port as the islands
could provide. The Pacific and the Asian trade, too, must benefit largely
from its possession. European interference should no more be allowed to
hamper American expansion in the Pacific than in the Atlantic or on the
continent. To reject such an acquisition because it “‘might displease France”
was craven and dishonorable. The people of California, he concluded, were
united in the demand for Hawaii, and their voice should not be disre-
garded.** Senator Gwin, from the same state, in the debate on the Monroe
Doctrine, said that the United States had interests in other islands be-
sides Cuba. “There are a set of islands called the Sandwich Islands, which
we in California look upon as our summer residence, and when the Senator
from Virginia talks about ripe fruit, it ought to be known that that fruit
is ripe also, and ready to fall.” °7 But it must be doubted whether Hawaiian
affairs had much influence upon American sentiment in regard to France.
More and more indeed as the year 1860 approached, the imperialistic
ambitions of Americans were subordinated to the more pressing, more vital
question of the survival of the Union. It was impossible to be deeply
interested in the acquisition of islands in the Pacific or harbors in the
Atlantic when there might before long be no United States of America to
which they might be added. Even Cuba, so long the dream of the eager
expansionist, could count but little when weighed against Virginia or South
Carolina; and in so critical a time it would be little short of madness to
be led into a war with any European power for any cause short of necessity.
The elections of 1860 came and passed, and the choice of Lincoln was the
signal for secession, to be followed quickly by the outbreak of the Civil
War. And now we hear no more talk of defiance. Both North and South
earnestly desired the friendship of the world, and both did all that in them
lay to smooth over causes of friction and so to order their ways as to win
the approval of the watching nations, upon whose action much depended.
For the North, Seward, the Secretary of State, whose first impulse had been
to irritate France and England into an attack which would, he thought,
bring an end to dissension and unite the country against the common foe,
saw almost immediately the futility of such a hope, and abandoned it in
favor of a masterly policy of watchfulness and conciliation. The South
‘sent various commissioners abroad, of whom Mason and Slidell were the
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most important, to carry on an active propaganda in the interests of the
Confederacy. France and England had promptly recognized the Southern
States as a belligerent, and proclaimed their neutrality in the war, but
hesitated whether officially to admit the existence of a new and independent
nation, though they fully believed that the North could never force the
seceded states to return to the Union. Both in England and in France there
was a willingness to see the separation accomplished, for it weakened a
nation whose swiftly growing power had threatened their ambitions; and
the aristocratic government in Britain and the imperial ruler in France
were more than willing to see the republican form of government
proved a failure. But in neither country was a strong popular senti-
ment behind the administration in this preference for the success of
the South; and without it they hesitated to act. Early in the struggle
the two states had agreed to act together in whatever concerned the
war, and Britain showed clearly a desire to await a military decision
rather than to take action which might prove premature. The Emperor
Napoleon III urged recognition of the South and the breaking of the
blockade of the Southern ports which prevented the export of cotton. Before
long, too, he urged intervention in the form of joint action on the part
of England, France, and Russia; but the other two refused. The Southern
commissioners were well received and were allowed to make arrangements
for the building of the ships so much needed by the Confederacy; and the
South was allowed to give its adhesion to the Declaration of Paris with a
reservation permitting privateering; but recognition and active aid were
postponed.*®

The feeling of Unionists early in the war in regard to the probable be-
havior of the French may be illustrated by this excerpt from the Baltimore
Clipper, (Jan. 18, 1862) :—

“The French are naturally the friends of this country but controlled as they are by
the present Emperor whose will alone directs the affairs of the nation, there is no se-
curity against any sudden whim he may entertain to carry out his ambitious ob-
jects. He is in close alliance now with England, but she has no confidence in the
stability of his friendship, and her statesmen know that he will suddenly turn against
her whenever the favorable moment presents itself. He has been strongly suspected
ever since the commencement of our troubles, of being desirous of inducing the Eng-
lish Government to break with the United States, in the hopes of crippling the naval
power of the former by a war with us; or by drawing off her attention in this
direction he would be left more free to carry out his desired plans in regard to...
Italy. Prince Napoleon, however, who recently visited this country, appears to be
a true and outspoken friend to the United States, and the Paris journal, the Opin-
ion Nationale, which is known to be his organ, is almost the only one in Paris which
has shown a frank and fair disposition toward us.”

146FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III

John L. Motley wrote to Oliver Wendell Holmes,—‘‘Louis Napoleon is
capable of playing us a trick at any moment.” And to Bismarck he said :—

“I suppose there is no doubt whatever that L. N. [sic] has been perpetually, during
the last six months, provoking, soliciting, or teasing the English cabinet to unite
with him in some kind of intervention. . . . Moreover, L. N. is the Heaven-appointed
arbiter of all sublunary affairs, and he doubtless considers it his mission to ‘save
civilization’ in our continent, as he has so often been good enough to do in the rest
of the world.” 59

In the South also uncertainty and dissatisfaction prevailed. The Richmond
Examiner said:—

“The policy of Europe has forced the Confederate States into a line of warfare most
injurious to European interests. It behooved those powers . . . that this war should
be short, sharp, and decisive. They have pursued a policy, however, to give it the
greatest possible duration. They have already lost two cotton crops; and no states-
man can predict how many more are likely to slip away from them. They are likely
to lose more heavily from the illegal blockade which they have sanctioned than even
the Confederacy.” ®°

And the Mobile Evening News, speaking of the rumors of intervention,
said: —“‘We have been deceived and suffered too much already by indulging
in false hopes of succor from abroad. Confederate victories are the only
reliable interveners.” ®

Late in 1862, after the British and Russians had “saved the United States
the trouble” of refusing their mediation, Louis Napoleon concluded to
attempt this alone. Accordingly, in January, 1863, he sent to Washington
a formal proffer of his good offices, an offer which was courteously but
firmly refused.°? Seward wrote to Dayton, telling him to inform M. Drouyn
de l’Huys that the country was firmly determined to preserve the Union,
and that the government was steadily advancing toward success. The
proposal that “while this country is engaged in suppressing an armed
insurrection, with the purpose of maintaining the constitutional national
authority and preserving the integrity of the country, it should enter into
diplomatic discussion with the insurgents upon the question whether that
authority shall not be renounced” was obviously inadmissible, he said.
European statesmen were making a grave mistake, he added, in thinking
the country demoralized. The government “has not the least thought of
relinquishing the trust which has been confided in it by the nation,” and
can admit no laxity, no discouragement, in the prosecution of its duty.
The Cabinet and the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations concurred in
this judgment.®* But the time had not been ill chosen. This was for the
North the gloomiest period of the war, when military failures and political
dissension threatened to wreck the Administration. Greeley said that the

147

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general opinion in Europe was that the North could never win, and that
the attempted mediation simply gave an opportunity to arrange a “just,
satisfactory, and conclusive separation.” ** The opposition papers jeeringly
said that “if we cannot or have not put down the rebellion, we cannot
expect nations which suffer much by our quarrel to look on as disinterested
spectators forever,” and “it is now the government at Washington, more
particularly than that at Richmond, that is casting prayerful eyes across
the Atlantic for help. .... They want peace, but lack the moral courage
to propose it themselves! They are praying for such a formidable demon-
stration from abroad as will afford them an excuse.” ® The New York
Herald said the plan was “most significant of an evil intent towards our
Union. It is, we fear, the last move before the recognition by France alone
of the Davis Government.” The Herald thought that Louis Napoleon would
be driven by the French need for cotton to decisive action, and would soon
attempt to raise the blockade. The ironclads then in the Gulf were “not
needed for the Mexican expedition.” °° The New York Evening Post de-
clared the tone of the Emperor’s letter insulting, and the plan proposed by
him equivalent to giving up the principles for which the war was being
prosecuted. The Emperor’s motives were analyzed, and the suggestion made
that he expected the South to win and wanted to curry favor with the vic-
tors. Or he might, knowing the aristocratic tendencies of the South, hope to
be in a position to furnish a monarch for the new principality from the Bon-
apartist stock. It was possible, too, that he hoped his action would so
strengthen the opposition in the North as to end the war. In this he was
mistaken. “The spirit of our nation will not endure the interference of a
foreign power in our domestic affairs.”’ °”

On the Confederate side the offer of mediation with its accompanying
possibility of intervention, was received with enthusiasm, and the Charles-
ton Courier thus discussed the situation :—

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“The inhabitants of Yankeedom are greatly disturbed over the apprehension of
foreign intervention. ... The watchful cowards are confident that the Imperial
ruler of France meditates evil designs against the United States ... though with
their accustomed bravado they insist that they can whip France and the Confederate
States with the greatest ease in the space of 60 or 90 days. What most disgusts their
minds, however, is the formidable preparation Napoleon is making for the execution
of his designs against Mexico. ... They think one third of the number could do
the work in Mexico, and say that when Napoleon does strike a blow against them,
he will strike ‘quickly and to the purpose. We think that the Yankees have good
ground for their suspicions as to the intentions of Napoleon toward the United
States. .. . Napoleon will not abandon his intention of bringing this terrible strife
to an end. The great potentate is sagacious, foresighted and firm beyond all living
statesmen. He is not the man to hesitate and falter after determining to pursue
a measure. . . . He is powerful enough and courageous enough to carry out the pur-

148

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poses of his own mind in the way that common sense, humanity, and justice unite
in commending.”

The Courier two weeks later showed less confidence in the firmness and
wisdom of the Emperor. The editor thought Napoleon might intervene, and
that there was a better chance of it than there was of help from any other
quarter, but “further than this our past disappointments admonish us not
to venture.” If France should simply address “‘a note of a certain kind” to
the Secretary of State, the United States would yield, as it did in the Trent
case. Later still the Courier was frankly pessimistic. “There are few who
have not ceased to look for assistance from any nation across the sea.
Doubtless there are some who listen with eager ears for good tidings from
the Emperor of the French but their hopes are probably vain.” Still, when
friction between Seward and the French minister was rumored, in another
fortnight, the Courier remarked hopefully that “the French are not a peo-
ple who are accustomed to submit to insult, either collectively or indi-
vidually”; only to drop again into gloom a month later with the state-
ment that “We are no longer subject to the annoyance arising from the
expectation of receiving aid from any European power. That expectation
has been so often disappointed, and has mortified, angered, and injured us
to so great a degree that we are not moved by the most plausible reports
concerning the action of foreign nations in regard to our Confederacy.”
The South must learn to depend on itself and believe that it can win with-
out European aid.** The North Carolina Standard took the same position.
Quoting a speech of President Davis, in which he said, “We should not
look to Europe for aid, for such is not to be expected,” the Standard said
that this was the truth, and begged “the demagogues” to do no more talking
about speedy French intervention but to bend every effort toward strength-
ening the Southern army. “Skulkers and cowards base their hopes on
foreign intervention.” * The Richmond Enquirer agreed, but the Rich-
mond Whig longed for a foreign alliance, and was unwilling to offer any
commercial advantages to France to obtain it.

“Eyen if we should win every battle for the next twelve months, the demoralization
and waste of life and treasure in one year of war would be cheaply purchased by a
stipulation to deliver to France for the next fifty years every bale of cotton and
every pound of tobacco raised in the Confederate States. . . . We know it is very
much the fashion in official circles to speak with contempt of any assistance, but
we... shall be glad of substantial help from any quarter. No matter how able we
may be to scourge our enemies from our territory, help would enable us to do it
easier and quicker and with less damage to ourselves. . . . We would not spare any
means, while it is yet time, to procure the aid of that powerful friend.” 7°

Napoleon’s failure to follow up his offer of mediation by active inter-
vention must have been exceedingly trying to the Confederate leaders,
149

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

Judah P. Benjamin, their Secretary of State, writing in March, 1863, to
Slidell in Paris, speaks scornfully of the Emperor’s allowing himself to be
restrained from decisive action by “alternate menaces and assurances ut-
tered with notorious mendacity by the leaders of the frantic mob which
now controls the government of the United States.” 74 President Davis, in
his study of the War, said that the Confederacy could not complain be-
cause France and England declared their neutrality, but he was convinced
that the “declared neutrality was delusive, not real; that recognized neu-
tral rights were alternately asserted and waived in such manner as to bear
with great severity on us, while conferring signal advantages on our en-
emy.” He spoke with especial bitterness of the recognition of the blockade
by the neutral states, claiming that the blockade was so ineffective that it
should not have been considered as valid. “Thus, while every energy of
our country was evoked in the struggle for maintaining its existence, the
neutral nations of Europe pursued a policy which, nominally impartial,
was practically most favorable to our enemies and most detrimental to
us.” President Davis condemns also the agreement by which France and
England were to act together in regard to the War, since this “placed it in
the power of either France or England to obstruct at pleasure the recog-
nition to which the Confederacy was justly entitled, or even to prolong the
continuance of hostilities on this side of the Atlantic, if the policy of
either could be promoted by the postponement of peace.” ”

The attitude of Napoleon III in regard to recognition of the Confederacy
or the maintenance of neutrality was not the only phase of French policy
which caused anxiety on this continent. The intervention in Mexico created
a problem, most difficult of solution, and under the circumstances intensely
inconvenient for the North. As Turkey is the sick man of Europe, so
Mexico may not unjustly be considered the confirmed invalid of the
Western hemisphere. With unlimited natural resources which she has been
unable to develop without foreign aid; with the bulk of her population
made up of ignorant, superstitious, and poverty-stricken Indians, Mexico
has been at the mercy of corrupt and adventurous chieftains, and her
government has been subject to frequent revolutionary changes, in the
course of which her own people have suffered cruelly, the interests of for-
eigners have invariably been damaged, and the country’s already heavy
burden of debt increased. With good government, Mexico could meet all
her obligations and prosper, but she has seemed unable to find a way out
of the vicious circle of misgovernment, revolution, debt, more misgovern-
ment, more revolution, more debt. That these conditions should create
difficulties with the nations interested in Mexican development was in-
evitable. We have seen that in 1838 France blockaded the Mexican coast,

150FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III

and even occupied Vera Cruz in the effort to collect indemnity for some
of her injuries, and that the United States, herself suffering from similar
grievances against her turbulent neighbor, made no objection. The pres-
sure upon Mexico from one or more of her creditor nations has been almost
constant throughout the last century. It is perhaps no wonder that the
Mexican temperament has grown somewhat hardened to this condition. The
period just preceding the Civil War had been one of extreme disorder in
Mexico. There had been much revolutionary activity, and there had been
some aggravated cases of insults and injuries to foreigners and damage to
their property. The United States had been one of the worst sufferers, and
had seriously contemplated intervention to obtain redress. The Constitu-
tionalist leader, Juarez, had been recognized, however, and there was a
disposition to give him an opportunity to see if he could develop an or-
derly government. But Great Britain, France, and Spain had also been
injured, and the government of Juarez further antagonized them by de-
claring all payments to foreign creditors suspended for two years, and by
confiscating the huge holdings of the Church. These three states, therefore,
prepared to force a settlement of their claims, and agreed to act in unison.
Upon such a formidable scheme for intervention the United States looked
with apprehension, and bent its energies toward finding a way to prevent
it. A plan was devised for lending Mexico the money necessary to satisfy
the interest on the European debt, the loan to be secured by a lien on
some of the resources of the four northern Mexican states, Lower Califor-
nia, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa. But the Mexican state was slow in
agreeing so to mortgage its lands, and the United States Senate also
thought the undertaking inadvisable, so that the treaty was not even ready
for action before the European occupation had become a fact, after which
any action of the sort would have been considered an infraction of neu-
trality. The allies in their agreement, at the suggestion of Great Britain,
had bound themselves not to seek to obtain any acquisition of territory or
peculiar advantages, or to interfere with the right of the Mexicans to
“choose and freely to constitute” their own government. They also recog-
nized that the United States had claims against Mexico, and invited her to
join them in the intervention. This invitation was purely formal, as they
also agreed not to delay their action by waiting for American codperation.
Seward’s reply to the suggestion was a recognition of the right of the three
nations to determine the extent of their grievances and the method of ex-
acting reparation. He made it clearly understood, nevertheless, that the
United States would strongly disapprove of any permanent occupation or
any permanent influence over the affairs of the Mexican nation. For the
United States, he referred to the fixed policy of not acting in alliance with
151

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foreign nations, and said that American good will toward Mexico was such
that the government did not wish further to embarrass her at a moment
when she was already torn by internal dissension and exposed to foreign
war. The action of the United States was undoubtedly especially circum-
spect because the allied proposal came in the height of the excitement about
the Trent affair, when the tension between the North and England, with
France almost certainly following England’s lead, was very great, and any
misstep might produce a catastrophe in the form of a declaration of war
from these two countries. As a matter of fact, in view of the clearly ex-
pressed intention of the allies, the United States had at the opening of
the undertaking no real basis for an objection, for mere dislike and sus-
picion could not serve as ground for action under the circumstances.

The British and Spanish loyally maintained their engagements, and in
April, 1862, after making an agreement with the Mexicans, withdrew their
forces. The French early gave evidence of an entirely different intention,
and entered upon an extensive series of operations in the interior of
Mexico, which could be construed only as a movement toward conquest,
and in July, 1863, they occupied the capital city, and proceeded to re-
organize the government. In their official communications they continued
to insist that their intentions were entirely correct, and contemplated
nothing more than the establishment of a stable government, with which
other nations could treat. Harassed by the pressure of the Civil War, and
unwilling to bring about an open break with the Emperor, Seward con-
tinued to hold the position that “France has a right to make war against
Mexico, and to determine for herself the cause. We have a right and inter-
est to insist that France shall not improve the war she makes to raise up in
Mexico an anti-republican and anti-American government, or to maintain
such a government there. France has disclaimed such designs, and we,
besides reposing faith in the assurances given in a frank, honorable man-
ner, would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not anticipate, a viola-
tion of them.” 7° The continued activities of the French made this attitude
increasingly difficult to maintain, and this was particularly true after the
French-controlled Mexican assembly declared for the establishment of an
empire, and invited Maximilian of Austria, who had been chosen by
Napoleon III, to be the new ruler. Seward’s effort, consistently and suc-
cessfully carried out, even in the face of hostile criticism at home, was to
keep the principles of United States objection to foreign dominance clearly
before the Emperor, and to reserve the right of future action for this
country whenever in our judgment those principles should demand it, but
to avoid incurring his active enmity during the critical period of the Civil
War. Thurlow Weed wrote from Paris, April, 1862, “Your dispatch on

152

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Mexican matters breaks no eggs. It makes a record, and there, | hope, you
arerat rest. ‘*

The general feeling that the expedition violated the Monroe Doctrine was
combated by a few. The National Intelligencer, which had always been
anti-expansionist, said in 1861,—“The right of European Powers to wage
war with American States, or to acquire their territory by purchase or
conquest, was never questioned by Mr. Monroe.” *° Less than a year later,
this paper was condemning the behavior of the French, and calling Gen-
eral Forey’s letter promising self-determination to the Mexicans “a specious
appeal.” * As late as the fall of 1863, General Sherman, in a long and
confidential letter to General Halleck, wrote:—

“I never have apprehended foreign interference in our family quarrel. Of course,
governments founded on a different and it may be an antagonistic principle with
ours naturally feel a pleasure at our complications, and, it may be, wish our down-
fall; but in the end England and France will join with us in jubilation at the
triumph of constitutional government over faction... . I do not profess to under-
stand Napoleon’s design in Mexico, and | do not see that his taking military pos-
session of Mexico concerns us. We have as much territory now as we want. The
Mexicans have failed in self-government, and it was a question to what nation she
should fall a prey. That is now solved, and I don’t see that we are damaged. We
have the finest part of the North American Continent, all we can people and
can take care of; and, if we can suppress rebellion in our own land, and compose
the strife generated by it, we shall have enough people, resources, and wealth, if
well combined, to defy interference from any quarter.” 77

Such an utterance is quite exceptional. The Philadelphia Inquirer more
nearly expressed the general feeling when it rejoiced because the Mexicans
had issued letters of marque, saying that this was one way in which she
could in spite of her weakness injure the “three big bullies’ who had
attacked her. ** The Baltimore Clipper praised Seward’s masterly circular”
on the question, and said it would give the nations to understand that al-
though it might seem that we had our hands too full at home to pay much
attention to their doings, “our government is wide awake enough in regard
to the attempts of foreign despots to introduce their system of government
at our very doors.” 7° The Boston Post (May, 1863), said:—“The tri-
partite alliance of England, France and Spain for the destruction of the
liberties of Mexico is now virtually at an end: but France alone has un-
dertaken the hazardous task of forcing a monarchical government on the
unwilling people.” *°

The New York Evening Post rejoiced in the letter of its Paris correspond-
ent to the effect that the report of the French Minister of finances showed
the Mexican expedition to be proving very costly to France :—

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“The Empire has gained neither victories nor honor by its incursion into the vast
territory of a weak republic, but it has had the comfort,—if it be regarded as a
comfort,—of paying out no less a sum then 83 million francs during the year 1862.
In American currency this is equivalent to about 16% million dollars,—so that
Napoleon is already paying rather dearly for a whistle that he cannot blow.” §t

The same paper published a clever bit of satire, headed, “Friendly
Mediation Needed.” This was at the time when France had just made the
offer of mediation between the North and the South. Mediation between
France and Mexico should by all means be offered, the editor said, “on the
grounds of humanity and to stop the useless effusion of blood. France has
undertaken a task which she cannot complete, or which she will be able to
complete only at a fearful sacrifice of life and treasure,’—practically the
identical reasons Napoleon gave for his offer to the United States. Further,
Drouyn de |’Huys, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, “kindly
hinted” that “in spite of the superior resources of the federal government
the conditions of soil and climate seemed to interpose invincible arguments
to the progress of the war.” How much more true this is of Mexico! And
while foreign military experts have seen fit to criticise our military re-
verses, in comparison with the success of the French in Mexico they do
not appear so badly. “Will there be any end to the war? . . . Is it not
our business as a Christian nation to stop it?” In a final, more serious,
paragraph the writer urged that we really ought to intervene, for the sake
of our own interests and for the sake of our brother republicans in Mex-
ico.82 The New York Herald at about the same time commented with
severity upon the French policy, saying that at first it had been supposed
that France was more friendly than England, but that now it was steadily
being proved that she was really inimical :—

“We have the assertion from the Emperor himself, who says that France must stay
our progress on this continent, and who chivalrously undertakes the task at a
moment when we are hampered by a gigantic rebellion. . . . The French desire to
mediate was persisted in with a bad grace, knowing as they do how offensive to
loyal Americans would be any foreign intervention or meddling. ... We would
warn our authorities at Washington to exercise the greatest caution and delicacy
in handling M. Mercier [the French Minister], and the most untiring expedition
in building ironclads, for if we must have a foreign war, let us by all means be
prepared for it.” 8°

Gideon Welles, in his Diary, under date of July 27, 1863, commented on

the extinguishing of the Mexican Republic and its replacement by an

empire. “But for this wicked rebellion this calamity would not have oc-

curred.” He did not rate very high the Mexican ability for self-

government, “but | don’t expect an improvement of their condition under
154FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III]

the sway of a ruler imposed on them by Louis Napoleon.” ** Charles Sum-
ner, who was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at
this time, delivered a very important address on the foreign relations of
the United States, at Cooper Institute, New York, September 10, 1863.
In this he spoke with great frankness in regard to the grievances of this
country, showing the injuries which England had imposed upon us, and
those of France. He characterized the Emperor as desirous of playing in
American affairs the part which Maria Theresa played in those of Poland.
If he should succeed in his ambition to partition the United States, it would
be the greatest crime of the century. ““Trampler upon the Republic in
France, trampler upon the Republic in Mexico, it remains to be seen if the
French Emperor can prevail as trampler upon this Republic.” This speech
is said to have had a strong influence in strengthening the hearts of those at
home, and, from its semi-official nature, in discouraging unfriendly plans
abroad.*® The Atlantic Monthly carried a strong article on the French
struggle for naval and colonial supremacy :—

“In comparison with our national misfortunes all besides seems trifling. Else nothing
would so fasten our attention as the French invasions and conquest of Mexico. A
dependency of France established at our door! The most restless, ambitious, and
warlike nation in Europe our neighbor! Who shall tell what results, momentous and
lasting, may follow in the train of such events? . . . This particular enterprise comes
close to us. It affronts our pride and tramples upon our political traditions... .
Louis Napoleon has said,—‘We have an interest, indeed, in the Republic of the United
States being prosperous; but not that she should take possession of the whole Gulf
of Mexico, thus to command the Antilles as well as South America, and to be the
only dispenser of the products of the New World!’ This covers a distinct threat,
and explains the Mexican expedition.” °°

The illustrations which have been given will sufficiently demonstrate the
feeling in the North in regard to the intervention in Mexico from its in-
ception through the year 1863. For the feeling on the Southern side there
is less evidence available. We know that Slidell, in his conversations with
Napoleon in the summer of 1862, offered an alliance offensive and defen-
sive for Mexican affairs. Slidell himself said that he had no definite in-
structions in regard to this, but that he had large discretion, which is prob-
ably true, as he seems to have been authorized to make practically any terms
he could with the Emperor as the price of an alliance. Mason is known to
have approved of such a plan, but how far this was a matter of preference,
and how far it must be regarded as a purely war measure, is difficult to
say.87 It must be recalled that many of the leaders of the Confederacy
had been at no distant day leaders in the Democratic party, with all that
is implied in the way of expansionist sympathies at that time. They must
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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

have changed radically if they could sincerely wish to see a French empire
established in Mexico. Certainly it is well established that the Confederate
government was in the fall of 1863 profoundly suspicious of French in-
trigues in Texas. A letter from Benjamin to Slidell, dated October 17, was
captured by the Federals and published in the Northern papers, and in
this Mr. Benjamin described the inquiries of the French consul at Gal-
veston addressed to the Confederate governor of the state, suggesting the
advisability of the restoration of Texas as an independent state. Similar
inquiries were reported from the French consul at Richmond. The Con-
federate authorities had inferred, said Benjamin, that the French govern-
ment had some sort of scheme on foot to detach Texas from the Con-
federacy and make of it a buffer state between Mexico, which they would
conquer and hold, and the Confederate States. The new state would then
be dependent on France to a great degree, and would immensely strengthen
her hold of the districts she had seized. That the Confederate government
must “view with alarm” such an enterprise goes without saying, and
Benjamin advised Slidell to bring the matter to the attention of the
British, as he was sure they would be unwilling to permit the French to
carry out the scheme.**

The Richmond Examiner in 1863 recognized the value to the Confederacy
of anything which created difficulties between the government at Wash-
ington and the French:—The blockade of the Mexican ports proclaimed
by the French the editor considered unnecessary except to hinder United
States action. The action of Mr. Corwin, the representative of the Wash-
ington government, in following Juarez when he left Mexico City, proved
conclusively that

“the moral force of the United States—their material force being at present fully
occupied elsewhere—will be exerted in opposition to the new order of things. Secret
assistance of all sorts will be given and intrigues will be used to thwart the purposes
of the French Emperor so far as can be done without serious danger. The mainte-
nance of a rigid blockade will close the door to much of this underhand interference
and facilitate the quiet adjustment of the machinery necessary to start the young
empire fairly on its course. . . . For ourselves, it is clearly our interest that Mexico
should speedily pass under her permanent form of government. The movement is
calculated to aid us in our own struggle; and the embarrassments which will inevi-
tably beset the Government of Lincoln, from the various questions arising out of
it, increase the chances of benefit to the South.” §°

Embarrassments from this cause did certainly beset the Administration.

In the winter and spring of 1863-1864 the popular indignation over the

Mexican invasion steadily increased as the purpose of the Emperor was

made more manifest, and both friends and enemies of the Lincoln régime
156FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III

 

 

joined in declaring that the United States must not allow the occupation
to become permanent. Yet the diplomatic difficulties remained. France, on
a specious pretence, had allowed the building of some powerful ironclads
destined for the Confederate navy. The history of the Alabama was a
sufficient warning of the consequences if these vessels when completed
should actually be turned over to the Confederates, and the State De-
partment was doing everything possible to prevent it. No worse time, in
the judgment of Lincoln and Seward, could be chosen for forcing a crisis
in the Mexican affair. But the Administration was bitterly assailed because
it did not. Congress was very hard to hold. Senator McDougall of Cali-
fornia introduced resolutions in which he said that the French interven-
tion was unfriendly to all free institutions everywhere, and “‘not only
unfriendly, but hostile’ to this country. He demanded that the United
States at once take action to force the withdrawal of the French army.
Sumner met the issue frankly. “If these resolutions mean anything, they
mean war.” “Have we not enough war already on our hands without need-
lessly and wantonly provoking another?” He urged that the real way to
drive out the French was to defeat the rebellion, for after that American
influence would be powerful enough to control all matters of importance
on the continent. The Senate referred the resolutions to the Foreign Re-
lations Committee and refused to consider them further. In January, 1864,
Senator McDougall again forced the issue. He moved that if the French
government did not withdraw its troops within a reasonable time after
the United States demanded their removal, . . . “on or before the 15th
day of March next it will become the duty of the Congress of the United
States to declare war against France.” The Senate again, on Sumner’s in-
itiative, refused to consider this motion.*® The House, less tractable, passed
unanimously, on April 4, 1864, joint resolutions declaring that the Congress
of the United States “are unwilling by silence to leave the nations of the
world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the
deplorable events transpiring in Mexico, and think fit to declare that it
does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any
monarchical government erected on the ruin of any republican government
in America under the auspices of any European power.” ** The newspapers
in general approved of this action. The Boston Courier said,—“The House
could act no otherwise, in view of public sentiment throughout this coun-
try,” but admitted that the result might be grave.%? The New York Times
said the resolutions expressed “the universal feeling of the people.” The
real object of the Mexican expedition, the 7imes continued, was to prevent
our expansion. This the Emperor had admitted, and this made it neces-
sary for us to deal with it, though as the Mexican people were all against
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the French, the new throne would be a weak one anyway.** The Washington
Chronicle said,—“All parties concerned may as well understand that every
word of the resolution is pregnant with meaning, and that it is a very mild
expression of American sentiment in the premises.” °* The Cheshire Re-
publican (Keene, N. H.), remarked that it was two years since this scheme,
“so derogatory to the interests of this country,” was inaugurated, and this
was the first protest which the country had been allowed to hear from any
branch of the government.** The New York World went farther :-—

“It is a direct censure of Secretary Seward and his foreign policy, and probably
marks a new era in the political contest. There is a feeling among the more earnest
Republicans as well as the Democrats that the country has not had justice done
its dignity in Mr. Seward’s foreign policy, and they are of the opinion that the
United States is now strong enough to show a bold front to Europe. It may be that
upon this foreign-policy question President Lincoln may yet be outgeneraled in
the June Baltimore Convention.” %

The Monroe Doctrine is “right in principle, right in theory, right in prac-
tice, and now that events transpiring in Europe show beyond a doubt that
a monarchy is to be established in Mexico . . . it is meet and proper that
the United States should speak out the sentiments of its people.” °* “As
for Frenchmen, who have thrust their hands in every man’s pie all over
Europe, it is the height of the ludicrous for them to protest against our
deep interest in the maintenance of republicanism on this continent.” °*
But the Administration was not to be so easily stampeded. On May 23
H. W. Davis of Maryland, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations
Committee, who had pushed the resolutions of April, read in the House the
following excerpt, translated from the Paris Moniteur, the official jour-
nal:—

“The Emperor's government has received from that of the United States satisfactory
explanations as to the sense and bearing of the resolutions come to by the House
of Representatives at Washington relative to Mexico. It is known, besides, that the
Senate had indefinitely postponed the examination of that question, to which in any
case the Executive would not have given its consent.”

Full of indignation, the House immediately called for the papers to which
this passage referred,°® and promptly received a group of letters which
created a sensation. The first was from Secretary Seward to Dayton, the
American Minister in Paris, dated three days after the passage of the
resolutions. In this Seward said that the French representative had lost no
time in asking him for explanations. “It is hardly necessary,” the letter
continued, “after what I have heretofore written with perfect candor for
the information of France, to say that this resolution truly interprets the
unanimous sentiment of the people of the United States in regard to
158FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON( III

 

 

Mexico. It is, however, another and distinct question whether the United
States would think it necessary or proper to express themselves in the
form adopted by the House of Representatives at this time. This is a prac-
tical and purely executive question, and the decision of it belongs consti-
tutionally not to the House of Representatives or even to Congress, but to
the President of the United States.” The resolution, he explained, was a
joint one, which meant that it required the concurrence of the Senate and
the President or to be passed over the veto of the latter. “While the Presi-
dent receives the declaration of the House of Representatives with the pro-
found respect to which it is entitled as an exposition of its views on a grave
and important subject, he directs that you inform the Government of
France that he does not at present contemplate any departure from the
policy which this Government has hitherto pursued in regard to the war
which exists between France and Mexico . . . and the French Government
will be seasonably apprised of any change of policy upon this subject
which the President might at any future time think it proper to adopt.”
Next was a letter from Dayton to Seward, dated April 22, before he had
received the note quoted above. Dayton here described his interview with
Drouyn de I’Huys, immediately after the news of the resolution was re-
ceived in Paris. The French Minister greeted him with the words,—‘Do
you bring us peace or bring us war?” explaining that this question was
dictated by the tenor of the House resolutions. Dayton told him that he
did not think the French need infer that we meant war, since the resolu-
tions contained nothing which had not been told them from the first. “That
I had always represented to the Government here that any action on their
part interfering with the form of government in Mexico would be looked
upon with dissatisfaction in the United States, and they could not expect
us to be in haste to acknowledge a monarchical government built upon
the foundation of a republic which was our nearest neighbor.” Dayton
added that the French Minister seemed to think the resolutions serious,
however, and that the Confederate representatives were making all possible
use of them to arouse ill feeling. In a later letter he described his presenta-
tion of the instructions contained in Seward’s note, and said that “‘the
extreme sensitiveness which was manifested by this Government” when the
resolutions were first brought to their notice had to a considerable extent
subsided.?°°

A storm of criticism followed the publication of these letters. ““Seward’s
apology,” as it was called, “shows the depth of humility to which this Ad-
ministration is bringing the nation. . . . The President will manage this
affair, and he has concluded to let the Emperor establish as many new mon-
archies on this continent as he pleases, and let the people help themselves

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if they can.” 1° The New York Evening Post had a hot article on “truck-
ling,” “running after European favor,” and so on. Seward’s letter was writ-
ten in too much of a hurry. If the French want explanations let them ask
for them. The voice of the American people has a right to be heard. It
would have been a good thing to let these resolutions make the tour of Eu-
rope unaccompanied by any explanations. “It is eminently fit that the world
should know what the American people think upon so important a matter
as the causeless invasion and overthrow of an American republic by a
European despot.” 1°? The New York Herald said that a good deal of indig-
nation was being expressed, and that the correspondence had placed us in a
humiliating position. ‘““With the suppression of the rebellion the United
States will assume more than its former position and influence . . . and
the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine will be demanded with a unan-
imity which will sweep from power any party opposing it, as well as the
bogus governments which, taking advantage of our domestic difficulties,
foreign nations are endeavoring to establish.”?°* The Cincinnati Daily
Gazette carried a strong article:—

“In regard to the general question, we will now repeat what we have before declared,
that while the very existence of this nation is at stake, it cannot afford to increase
the peril by undertaking a war against a great naval and military power to protect
another nation; but that does not make it necessary that we should disclaim those
national rights and interests in the integrity of a neighboring state; nor that we
should encourage its destruction by assuring the aggressor that it is no concern of
ours, and that whatever he may do to a neighboring republic, our traditional policy
forbids us to protest or interfere. We have no such traditional policy. .. . It was a
monstrous falsehood to assert that we have. And to declare it under such circum-
stances was cowardice and national dishonor. .. . Our policy is known to be ex-
actly the reverse. . . . Since when has it been that Congress, which has power to
make war and conclude peace, has no power to declare the opinion of the nation on
the destruction of a neighboring state, or on any of our foreign relations? . . . Our
rights . . . should not have been disclaimed, whether or not we were prepared to
insist on them by war. ... We could have made our protest, used our moral in-
fluence, and reserved our rights, leaving to a more convenient season the asserting
of them.” 1°4

The National Intelligencer, however, approved of the Administration’s ac-
tion,?° and the Boston Advertiser entered upon the defence :—

“There is no term in the English language that precisely corresponds to the French
phrase enfant terrible, but there are few households, however well ordered, wherein
there has not been at some time or other a ridiculous and even unfortunate posi-
tion of affairs, caused by the indiscretion of a little miscreant, who blurts out some
family secret, or reveals the parental comments on a visitor, to the astonishment
and confusion of the whole company. Mr. Winter Davis has on more than one oc-

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casion assumed the character of the political enfant terrible, and having a position
on the House Committee of Foreign Relations, his capacity for mischief seems to
be limited only by his disposition.

“That the House should have passed its resolution about Mexico, which has caused
so much trouble, at this precise moment, instead of hustling it under the table,
can only be accounted for by the fact that members, on finding it introduced, felt
themselves to be in a dilemma where they must either vote against their convictions,
or incur the danger of seriously complicating our relations with France. Many of
them doubtless chose the latter alternative in the hope and expectation that the
French Emperor ‘did not take the papers’ and might never hear of the resolution;
or, if he did, that diplomatic dealing would prevent any real danger. Mr. Seward
clearly managed the case as well as anyone could. He told the simple truth, which
satisfied the French minister, and the efforts and the hopes of the secessionists in
Paris were completely frustrated... .

“That sensible legislators should take the present time, when our foreign relations
are in so critical a situation .. . to take issue with the State Department and the
President on the management of our diplomatic relations with the ablest sovereign
in Europe, relating to a matter of great delicacy, and to offensively proclaim what
we think among ourselves of his course, and to make threats of future proceedings,—
is certainly as poor a specimen of far-reaching prudence and common sense, as
could well be exhibited in any government of the least pretension to statesman-
ship.” 208

This was a Presidential election year, and the party platforms reflect the
popular sentiment. The first to appear was that of the “Radicals,” the Re-
publican critics of the Administration, who nominated John C. Fremont
as their candidate in a convention held at Cleveland on May 31. Their
program included a straight endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine, and a
statement that “the establishment of an anti-republican Government on
this continent by any foreign power cannot be tolerated.” *°7 The next was
the “Union” party, meeting at Baltimore, June 7, which renominated
Lincoln, and endorsed the Monroe Doctrine in a carefully worded state-
ment which approved the position taken by the Government “that the
people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt
of any European power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud”
republican institutions on the western continent, and “will view with
extreme jealousy, as menacing the peace and independence of their own
country” all such efforts. The platform also stated that harmony in na-
tional councils was necessary, and that only those who endorsed the prin-
ciples of the platform were worthy of public confidence and official posi-
tion.1°° These phrases were hailed as a rebuke to Seward, as they were
probably intended to be, and the framers of the platform evidently hoped
that a firmer foreign policy would result. The New York Evening Post was
especially jubilant over this “blow between the eyes” for Secretary Seward,
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who had hastened to give explanations to “the French despot and burg-
lar.” °° Thurlow Weed, in a letter to the Albany Journal, replied to this
attack :—

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“The ultras at the Convention threatened to break out in violent denunciation of
the President and Secretary of State on the Mexican question. To prevent such an
exhibition, the Committee on resolutions presented the matter in the modified and
milder form that appears. But even this concession—or rather the necessity which
constrained it—is to be regretted, for in the present aspect of our affairs it is more
than folly gratuitously and wantonly to invite foreign hostility. We are in no con-
dition to fight the battles of the Mexican Republic, having our hands full in the
effort to preserve our own. Why, then, unnecessarily provoke a war for which we
are unprepared? Why does the Post, in language and taste unbecoming a decent
journal, stigmatize the Emperor of France as a ‘burglar’r’’ 11°

Some further efforts were made in Congress to force the hand of the Ad-
ministration, but to no effect. Lincoln in his letter accepting the nomina-
tion had made it quite clear that he intended to retain his freedom of
action in the Mexican affair,1*! and he had sufficient political strength to
accomplish this. Henry Winter Davis, in the House, and McDougall, in
the Senate, led impassioned discussions and offered resolutions in the
summer of 1864, but the only concrete result was the passage in December
of a resolution declaring that the House had a constitutional right to
express itself with authority in foreign affairs, and that the Executive
ought to respect such a deliverance.1!? There is abundance of newspaper
evidence of the popular feeling, often expressed in a typical American way,
as when the New York Times headed its description of the arrangements
planned by Maximilian for the Mexican throne—“Good Gracious, Max!”
and went on to say that he need not worry about the succession in Mexico,
—‘there is little chance of his having a throne to leave to anybody!” *** Or
when the Folsom Telegraph told how the French were driven away from
Mazatlan by the accurate fire of one gun in the fort, and thought this gun
was probably served by some Yankee tar who was giving the Mexicans a
little artillery practice and enjoying himself.**

But while all this enthusiasm for the Monroe Doctrine was prevailing
among the Federals, and the Napoleonic stock was distinctly below par,
what of the situation in the Confederacy, where as we have seen there
had been some disposition to support the Mexican enterprise for the sake
of the much-needed French aid? A spirit of disappointment and disillu-
sionment, with a touch of bitterness, characterized the Southern newspapers
in this later period. Hope that in some way the Mexican imbroglio might
turn to the advantage of their cause had not entirely disappeared, but it was
fast dying, and the old spirit of national pride was still active. So that it is

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clearly to be seen that, save for its possible diplomatic value, the French
intervention was really distasteful to the South, and that for the Emperor,
who had led them on with fair words, only to fail them again and again,
there was an only half-concealed scorn and antagonism. The Richmond
Whig, in April, 1864, had an article on the Southern Commissioners in
France. When they went over, there were cheering indications, said the
editor. We hoped much. We believed that Napoleon would seek by recog-
nition to conciliate the Confederacy and bind us to his Mexican plan.
Lately we have been hoping that Maximilian would recognize us,—but
look at the way Poland has been treated. In the face of this, why should
any European nation be supposed to help Freedom, when they stifle it at
home? Interest controls them all. Napoleon has successfully “‘overreached
the Confederate States and taken possession of Mexico.’’ His mediation
suggestion was only to find out whether England would fight him. The
ruin of America is joy to all Europe.1?® “How will Maximilian be received
by his American neighbors, and what will be his policy toward them?”
asked the Richmond Sentinel. European accounts say he intends to be neu-
tral—‘‘But does this imply a refusal to recognize the Confederation which
is his neighbor, and is disposed to be friendly to him, and whose govern-
ment is older than his own?” The decision may be quickened by the House
resolutions. “What they have said—and it is a good deal—they say
unanimously. . . . We confess we did not expect so much spirit at Wash-
ington. It almost commands respect—for it really reads as if they felt
they had something of the dignity of the old United States to maintain.”
It is probably only a passing impulse,—but “It is an affront to Napoleon
and to his friend and protégé which will necessarily offend both” and may
aid the Southern interest.***

Slidell in Paris tried to obtain an interview with Maximilian, but was re-
fused. This news was not particularly palatable to the South. The Ricb-
mond Dispatch commented on it thus,—

 

“If true, it is of littlke moment, but it is very doubtful. The recognition of the
Emperor of Mexico is of little moment to us, except as it may involve that of the
Emperor of France. Indeed, Maximilian stands more in need of our recognition than
we do of his, though a polite bow from either to the other just now could confer
no material advantage, and could only give assurance of that sympathy and friend-
ship which we all know must exist by force of circumstances. We all know that that
power by whose aid alone Maximilian can become firmly fixed on his throne is
decidedly friendly to the Southern Confederacy, and that nothing will grow out of
the Franco-Mexican policy that can be prejudicial to us. . . . Even the Yankees can-
not chuckle . . . as they know these facts as well as we. Moreover they find enough
in their own relations with Mexico to absorb their attention. ...So the Con-
federacy is easy—has nothing to fear from Mexican relations—while the Yankees are
neither easy nor inapprehensive.” 117

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—

“Who is this Maximilian, and what is his empire, that we should court his notice and
invite him to give us so cool a cut? Our government has existed three years; his
empire is not quite born. Ours has stood alone, emphatically and gloriously alone,
—his cannot walk, and must be carried for many a day in the nurse’s arms. We
have sustained, for three years, the shock and tempest of war, so potent and ter-
rible, that the one-tenth part of it, directed against him, would sweep him, crown and
all, back into the Atlantic Ocean... . It is very much more important to the
Empire to be recognized by the Confederacy than for the Confederacy to be
recognized by the Empire. . . . The world should not be taught by our own agents
to regard the Confederacy as a drowning man catching at straws. . . . On the whole,
even should it be true that Mr. Slidell has exposed us to a rebuff, it will do us no
harm to be thus taught, once again, that we have no reliance in the world but our
own unconquerable will to be free, the blessing of Providence, and the edge of the
sword.” 118

Discussing the House resolutions of April 4, the Richmond Dispatch said
that if the North had not driven the South from the Union, the present
humiliating situation would never have arisen:—By the aid of Southern
troops and Southern generals the Mexican War was won. If the South
could be conquered, and the aid of Southern troops secured, it might be
done again, but the very existence of the Confederacy protects Maximilian.
Napoleon has seen his opportunity in a divided United States. “Had the
old Union remained entire, neither he nor any other European nation
would have dared to engage in such an enterprise. By forcing the Con-
federates into war for their own protection, the Yankees threw away for-
ever the only chance they ever had of seizing upon the rich spoils of the
Mexican Republic . . . threw away the whole vast continent, from Texas
to Cape Horn, which, had they never been checked, they might have oc-
cupied in the course of time.” Now, the South will not fight for the Monroe
Doctrine. It may make an alliance with Maximilian, “with Yankee Doodle,
never!” 2° The Sentinel was bitter over the ease with which Maximilian
had obtained recognition from European powers, compared with the diffi-
culties met by the Confederacy. “Yet this going-to-be-king over a country
which he has never seen, and which is at war against him, is recognized
without a day’s delay, by the powers of Europe, by the same powers that
hold our recognition as inadmissible and improper.” **° “As respects the
Yankee race,” said the Whig, “the Confederate States and Mexico have a
common fate. If we should be beaten, the conqueror would strike on south-
ward . . . till Mexico too should yield to his sway. If Maximilian stands
aloof from us coldly, it is cowardice. We fight his battles with our own. He
is bound by moral obligations, honor, and safety to recognize us at once,
and give all the influence he can on European monarchies to the same
end. More we do not ask. Less would be impolitic and unmanly.” ™
164FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON IF!

 

The Richmond Examiner of June | in a very able article reviewed the
foreign policy of the Confederate States. The Examiner spoke of the
“hallucination” of French friendship which led to the belief that the ves-
sels built in France would be allowed to sail. “Innocent people in Rich-
mond had kept saying to themselves and to one another, over and over
again, that the French Emperor loved us—at any rate that our friendship
was necessary to his Mexican scheme of empire, and that the recognition
of the Confederacy ought to form, might, could, would, or should form a
part of the security of Maximilian’s throne.” But after Dayton gave his
proofs that the shipbuilding was known to the United States, construc-
tion was abruptly halted. The Emperor has never been sincere. He has
meant simply to alarm the United States into compliance with his plans
by threatening them with a formidable Confederate navy, but he does
not wish a real break with the North, which might be troublesome,—
“So Mr. Dayton is appeased . . . our ships lie moored by head and stern
in the Loire and the Garonne;—Maximilian refuses an audience to Mr.
Slidell ;—and the Emperor Napoleon is enabled to assure the Government
of Washington, and with perfect truth too, that he never had any idea
of recognizing the Confederacy at all!’ 122 And the Charleston Courier,
writing in the same strain, ended,—‘‘Our ships there have not been allowed
to be finished, and are sold. The Rappahannock, so far considered beyond
their recognizance, is cooped up in Cherbourg and not allowed to leave. So
much for Louis Napoleon’s sympathy!” 225

In the winter of 1864-5 Francis Blair, one of the well-known political
leaders in the North, believed that the Mexican question could be used
to bring about the end of the war, by persuading both sides to agree to an
armistice, during which a joint expedition into Mexico should be made,
to drive out the French. He asked permission of Lincoln to bring this
plan to the attention of President Davis, and was given a passport
through the lines. Davis heard the scheme with some interest, and it was
made the excuse for arranging a conference at Hampton Roads, when
Lincoln and Seward met three Southern commissioners and discussed
terms of peace. The Mexican scheme, however, was not taken seriously by
either side.1**

The Southern writers judged correctly when they said that the empire
of Maximilian would not long outlast their own. As the Civil War drew
to an end and men had time to think of other things, the demand for the
expulsion of the French became more and more insistent.**° The only ques-
tion was as to the method. The military men—Grant, Sheridan, Schofield,
—and many of the people, wished the army to do it, and in spite of
Seward’s efforts to maintain neutrality, the army did undoubtedly do

165

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much to hasten the departure of the French.1?* Another favorite idea was
that the war veterans should emigrate to Mexico, enlist in the Liberal
army, and accomplish the desired end without involving the government
in any diplomatic difficulties. It was believed that many Confederates as
well as Northerners would be drawn into such a scheme, and recruiting
for this purpose was actually under way in several cities before it was
stopped by lack of funds and by a government warning that neutrality
would be enforced.127 Some fear was expressed that escaping Confederates
would join the French, but though undoubtedly some did cross the border
with this intention, the precarious situation of Maximilian was so evident
as to dissuade most from such a plan. The most serious move of the sort
was a scheme sponsored by Ex-Senator Gwin, to colonize the district of
Sonora under the protection of the French army, and develop the mines
in that district. This idea appealed to the French as offering an opportunity
to get a permanent interest in this state, and as opening a possibility of
improving the financial condition of the Mexican Empire, but it was
undertaken too late.12° Seward saw very clearly that with patience it would
be possible now to dislodge the French by diplomatic means without, by
an immediate ultimatum, forcing them into a position in which their
pride would make it necessary for them to resist. Many of the soberer
citizens were with him,22® Congress as before tried to compel immediate
action,!°° but Seward finally had the satisfaction of seeing his course justi-
fied by results, and the French withdrawn from Mexico without a diplo-
matic break with this country.’** With the details of this long diplomatic
contest, which lasted almost from the beginning of the Civil War to the
death of Maximilian in the summer of 1867, we are not concerned in this
study. But so ended the attempt to reéstablish the French colonial power
on the American continent. For Napoleon, the enterprise had been one of
his dearest dreams, and its failure was a large factor in his final ruin. To
Americans, the Mexican scheme was the climax of a long series of aggres-
sions carried on by an imperial usurper and despot, under whose leader-
ship our “ancient ally” successfully blocked our ambitions in the Carib-
bean, and made more difficult the preservation of the Union. Americans
found it hard to forget that in our darkest hour, France offered us jealousy
and intrigue, instead of friendship.

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NOTES AND SOURCES

1 Senate Executive Document No. 19, 32nd Congress, Ist Session. Rives to Webster,
Dec. 18, 1851; Webster to Rives, Jan. 12, 1852; other correspondence on early rela-
tions of the United States with the government of Napoleon III, Senate Executive

166

   

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Document above cited, and Senate Executive Document No. 7, 32nd Congress,
Special Session.
2 Congressional Globe, \st Session, 32nd Congress, 184-186.
3 National Intelligencer, Dec. 22, 1851.
4New Hampshire Statesman (Concord), Dec. 11, 1852.
5 Boston Courier, Dec. 6, 1852.
6 New York Weekly Day Book, Dec. 11, 1852.
7New York Herald, Nov. 27, 1852; see also Connecticut Courant, Jan. 8, 1853.
8 Harper's Monthly, V: 636-645, 1852:Alexandria Gazette, Dec. 25, 1852. (Similar) ;
New York Atlas, Jan. 18, 1853.
® New York Sun, Jan. 8, 1852; also Newark Daily Advertiser, Dec. 2, 1852; Demo-
cratic Review, XXV: 403-405.
10 San Francisco Herald, Jan. 17, 1853.
11 New York Tribune, cited in Arkansas Whig, Dec. 30, 1852.
12 John Greenleaf Whittier, Poetical Works, 198. “The Peace of Europe.” 1852.
13 James Russell Lowell, Poetical Works, 382, 270. See also his Political Essays, 128-9.
14 Wilson, Life of Dana, 398. Courtesy of Harper and Brothers, Publishers, New
York.
15 Atlantic Monthly, 1V: 384. (Sept., 1859.)
16 Jb. VII: 682-697. (June, 1861.)
17 Appleton’s Journal, 1: 114, 245, 277. (1869). Series on “French Morals and Man-
ners” by Edwin Lee Leon.
18 The Education of Henry Adams, An Autobiography, 96.
19 Atlantic Monthly, V: 257-271. March, 1860.
Typical articles on the French are those on “Life in Paris,” Harper's Monthly, V:
748-763: VI: 195-199, 488-493; VII: 381-89; VIII: 305-315; IX: 671-674. Also those
on “Louis Napoleon,” /b., XV: 208-214, and the “Empress Eugénie,” XXVII:
409-12.
20 Senate Executive Documents, 32nd Congress, Ist Session, No. 1; National Intel-
ligencer, Dec. 6, 1851; Richardson, Messages, V: 117-118; Henderson, American
Diplomatic Questions, 369; Latané, Diplomatic Relations of the United States and
Spanish America, 108-113; Callahan, Cuba, 224-231; James Ford Rhodes, History of
the United States from the Compromise of 1850, 1: 216-222; McMaster, History of
the People of the United States, VIII: 142-144.
21 Senate Executive Documents, 2nd Session, 32nd Congress, Doc. 13; National Intel-
ligencer, Jan. 5, 1853; Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, 370-374; Rhodes,
I: 204-296: Latané, 113-116; Callahan, Cuba, 231-237; Richardson, Messages, V:
165: Hart, Monroe Doctrine, 131.
22 Mary Treudley, The United States and Santo Domingo, 238-243; F. L. Paxson,
A Tripartite Intervention in Haiti, 1851. University of Colorado Studies, I: 4, 323-
330: Kraus, Monroedoktrin, 288-9; Senate Executive Documents, 33rd Congress,
Ist Session, No. 12; 32nd Congress, Ist Session, No. 112
23 Los Angeles Star, Oct. 30, 1852.
24 National Intelligencer, Jan. 1, Jan. 5, Jan. 6, 1853; Boston Courier, Dec. 7, 1852;
Alexandria Gazette, Dec. 15, Dec. 18, 1852; New York Weekly Day Book, Jan. 14,
1853. (Whig papers.)
25 American Whig Review, Dec., 1852.
28 Mississippi Free Trader (Natchez), Dec. 22, 1852, Dec. 29, 1852; Concord Patriot,
Dec. 1, 1852; Callahan, Cuba, 238-259; Rhodes, 1: 384-7.

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27 Newark Daily Advertiser, Jan. 7, 1853.

28 New York Herald, Dec. 6, 1851.

297Tb., Dec. 4, Dec. 18, 1852. See also a strong article in New York Sun, quoted
with an editorial on the Sonora incident, in Stiff’s Radical Reformer (Gadsden, Ala.),
Feb. 26, 1853. Mobile Herald and Tribune, in Ib., Dec. 4, 1852; Mississippi Free
Press (Natchez), Jan. 8, 1853.

80 Democratic Review, XXX: 234-252, XXXI: 88-96, 443-456, 624-628.

31 Congressional Globe, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 140. (Dec. 23, 1852); New Or-
leans Picayune, Jan. 2, 1853.

32 Congressional Globe, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 139-140. (Dec. 23, 1852); Na-
tional Intelligencer, Jan. 22, 1853, report of speech of Jan. 15.

33 Speech of Jan. 25, 1853, National Intelligencer, Feb. 1.

84 Congressional Globe, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 146 .

86 Speech of Jan. 26, National Intelligencer, Feb. 3, 1853; Bancroft, Life of Seward,
1: 467-469; Seward, Works, G. Baker, ed., III: 605-618.

36 Congressional Globe, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 143.

87 New York Weekly Mirror, Jan. 7, 1853; New York Spectator, Dec. 7, 1852; New-
ark Daily Advertiser, Jan. 6, 1853; Providence Journal, Jan. 7; Arkansas Whig, Jan.
27; New York Atlas, Dec. 16, 1852; New York Tribune, Jan. 7, 1853; New York
Times, Jan. 7; New York Express, Jan. 7; New York Courier and Enquirer, Jan. 8;
New York Herald, Jan. 7, 1853, Dec. 25, 1852; Baltimore Sun, Jan. 6, 1853; Harper's
Magazine, Feb., 1853.

38 National Intelligencer, Dec. 24; Connecticut Courant, Dec. 18; Republic, Dec.
18; Worcester Transcript, Dec. 16, 1852.

89 Washington Union, Dec. 17; Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 21, 1852; San Francisco
Herald, Jan. 23, 1853. This paper dislikes the Mexicans and has no objection to the
Sonora raid.

40 Congressional Globe, Appendix, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 73-76; New York
Spectator, Dec. 30, 1852.

41 New York Herald, Dec. 11, 1852.

42 Union, Jan. 5, 1853.

48 Boston Transcript, Dec. 11, 1852.

44New York Times, cited in State Capital Reporter (Concord), Dec. 24, 1852.

48 Providence Journal, Dec. 14, 1852.

46 Newark Daily Advertiser, cited in National Intelligencer, Dec. 14, 1852. Also Con-

necticut Courant, Dec. 18, 1852; Worcester Transcript, Dec. 21, 1852; New York
Atlas, Dec. 12, 1852.

47 Treudley, 243-252.

48 Latané, 117-134; Callahan, 256-328.

49 National Intelligencer, Nov. 21, 1854; Richardson, Messages, V: 278, 302, 335.

5° Congressional Globe, 33rd Congress, Ist Session, 483.

51 Congressional Globe, 33rd Congress, 2nd Session, 826.

52 Congressional Globe, 33rd Congress, Ist Session, 484; Jb., 33rd Congress, 2nd
Session, 826-8; Union, Mar. 18, 1854.

58 Congressional Globe, 33rd Congress, 2nd Session, 830-833.

54 New York Atlas, Dec. 10, 1854.

55 Carpenter, Hawaii, 102-105.

58 Congressional Globe, Appendix, 32nd Congress, Ist Session, 1084-1085.

57 Congressional Globe, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 146; National Intelligencer, Dec.

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2, 1854. For the Hawaiian question in full, Carpenter, Hawaii, 95-105; Moore, Inter-
national Arbitrations, 1: 447-483; Richardson, Messages, V: 120; Johnson, Amer-
ica’s Foreign Relations, 313-314, 517-522: Fish, American Diplomacy, 403.

58 Bassett, 521, 589, 643; Schouler, VI: 114-122, 269-274; T. K. Lothrop, Life of
W. H. Seward, 290-4, 296-7, 290-300, 313-317, 350-351; Gideon Welles, Dairy, |:
494-5, 339-40.

59 Motley, Correspondence, II: 63; Motley and His Friends, 133-138.

60 Richmond Daily Examiner (Confederate), cited in Charleston Daily Courier (Con-
federate), May 16, 1863.

61 Mobile Evening News (Confederate), July 10, 1862.

62 National Intelligencer (Union), Dec. 2, 1862.

63 Seward, Works, V: 376-381; Welles, Diary, 1: 235-6; Storey, Sumner, 241-242;
Lothrop, Seward, 353-355; Reports of Committee of Foreign Relations, 1789-1901,
VI: 219-221.

64 Horace Greeley, The American Conflict, \I: 484.

65 Philadelphia Evening Journal, Jan. 2, 1863, and citing Washington Republican
and New York Tribune.

66 New York Herald, Jan. 5, 1863.

61 New York Evening Post, Feb. 18, 1863.

68 Charleston Courier, Jan. 1, Jan. 13, Feb. 12, Feb. 28, April 3, 1863.

68 North Carolina Standard (Confederate), Oct. 23, 1863.

70 Richmond Whig, Mar. 5, 1863.

71 Pierce Butler, Life of Judah P. Benjamin, 305-307.

72 Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Il: 369-371.
73 House Executive Documents, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, No. 54: 530.

14 Nicolay and Hay, V1: 30-48; VII: 306-405; Lothrop, Seward, 388-392; Bancroft,
Seward, 11: 419-442; Schurz, Reminiscences, 11: 280-283, 288-292; Storey, Sumner,
220-221; Schouler, V1: 260-269, 427-429: Latané, 221-247; Henderson, 71; Rhodes,
IV: 345-6: McMaster, VIII: 440 ff.; F. H. Seward, Life of W. H. Seward, III: 85.

75 National Intelligencer, Nov. 30, 1861.

76 Jb., June 5, June 19, Oct. 21, Oct. 30, 1862.

11 Personal Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, 1: 369; See also a very flattering
article on Maximilian, praising his friendly feeling for the United States, and saying
that if a foreign prince is to be imposed on Mexico, “no more conscientious man,
no better neighbor, could have been selected,” by F, L. Sarmiento in Harper's Mag-
azine, 27: 831-834, (1863).

78 Philadelphia Inquirer, cited Baltimore Clipper, Dec. 14, 1861.

19 Baltimore Clipper, May 6, June 3, 1862.

80 Boston Post, cited in Maryland Republican, May 10, 1862.

81 New York Evening Post, Jan. 28, 1863.

82 Jb. Feb. 11, 1863.

83 New York Herald, cited in Charleston Courier (Confederate), Feb. 13, 1863.

84 Welles, Diary, 1: 385.

85 Charles Sumner, Works, VII: 367-373. Article by Sumner on Slidell in Atlantic
Montbly, VIII: 36-38, (1863), also illustrates his attitude toward the French. Storey,
Sumner, 250-253.

86“The French Struggle for Naval and Colonial Power,” G. Reynolds, Atlantic
Monthly, X11; 626-636. Hastings (Minnesota) Independent, Dec. 3, 1863, against the
French in Mexico.

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87 Butler, Benjamin, 303-304; Rhodes, 1V: 346.

88 Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, VIII; 268; Butler, Benjamin, 294-299: New York Her-
ald, Feb. 13, 1863; New York Times, Jan. 18, 1863; Jas. M. Mason, Public Life and
Diplomatic Correspondence, Virginia Mason, ed., 552-560,

8° Richmond Examiner, cited in Mobile Daily Advertiser and Register, (Confeder-
ate).

®0 | othrop, Seward, 392; Storey, Sumner, 238-9: Congressional Globe, 37th Congress,
3rd Session, 694-5; Edward McPherson, Political History of the United States of
America during the Great Rebellion, 348-9; Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, VII: 407-410.

®1Lothrop, Seward, 392-395; Congressional Globe, |st Session, 38th Congress, 1408.
82 Boston Courier, Apr. 7, 1864.

83 New York Times, Apr. 5, 1864.

84 Washington Chronicle, cited in Alexandria Gazette, Apr. 9, 1864.

°5 Cheshire Republican, Apr. 13, 1864.

6 New York World, cited Ib.

*7 Weekly Pioneer and Democrat (St. Paul, Minnesota), Apr. 25, 1864.

®8 New York Evening Post, May 11, 1864.

°° Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, Ist Session, 2427.

100 Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, Ist Session, 2475. The French Government
shortly after published the substance of Seward’s explanation in a circular which
was sent to all French agents in foreign ports. Richmond Despatch, June 25, 1864,
cited this in full. McPherson, 354.

101 Cheshire Republican, June 1, 1864.

102 New York Evening Post, June 1, 1864. Similar, Boston Courier, May 28.

103 New York Herald, cited in Mobile Daily Tribune (Confederate).

104 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, June 2, 1864.

105 National Intelligencer, June 2, 1864.

108 Boston Advertiser (Semi-weekly), June 11, 1864.

107 McPherson, 413.

108 /b., 406-7; Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, 1X: 69-71.

109 New York Evening Post, June 15, 1864; Philadelphia North American and United
States Gazette, June 11, 1864; Cincinnati Daily Gazette, June 9, 1864.

110 Albany Evening Journal, June 18, 1864.

111 Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, Nicolay and Hay, eds., II: 538.

112 House of Representatives, Reports of Committees, 38th Congress, Ist Session,
II: No. 129; Senate Executive Documents, 38th Congress, Ist Session, No. 11;
Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, Ist Session, 3339-40, 3359-60, 2458, 3499-3500;
38th Congress, 2nd Session, 48, 50, 52, 55, 65-67.

118 New York Times, Apr. 30, 1864.

414 Folsom Telegraph (Cal.), May 7, 1864. Other typical articles, G. Reynolds, in
Atlantic Monthly, July, 1864, on Mexico; New York Times, Apr. 15, Apr. 22, 1864;
Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 4, Apr. 30; Richmond Sentinel, Apr. 28, reporting speech
of United States Military Governor of Texas; Philadelphia North American, June
21; New York Atlas, Dec. 17, Dec. 24, 1864.

415 Richmond Whig, Apr. 6, 1864.

118 Richmond Sentinel, Apr. 11, 1864.

117 Richmond Dispatch, Apr. 12, 1864.

118 Richmond Examiner, cited in New York Weekly Post, Apr. 27, 1864.

119 Richmond Dispatch, Apr. 14, Apr. 16, June 25, 1864.

170FRANCE UNDER. NAPOLEON: ITI

 

 

120 Richmond Sentinel, Apr. 20, 1864.

121 Richmond Whig, Apr. 28, 1864.

122 Richmond Examiner, June 1, 1864.

123 Charleston Tri-weekly Courier, Dec. 13, 1864.

124 Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, X: 93-100, 164; Alexander H. Stephens, A Constitu-
tional View of the War between the States, 11: 601-604, 608, 618; Davis, Rise and
Fall of the Confederate Government, 11: 612-620; Daily Confederate (Raleigh,
N. C.), Feb. 13, 1865; Schouler, V1: 535-537.

125 Philadelphia North American, Feb. 17, 1865.

126 Welles, Diary, I1: 317, 332-3, 338, 367, 485-6, 622-626, 648; Lieut. Gen. John
M. Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army, 378-393; Gen. Philip H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs 11: 210, 213-228; Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, II:
545-547; Alexandria Gazette, May 13, 1865; Knoxville Whig, citing Albany Evening
Journal, May 24, 1865; New York Evening Post, Dec. 21, 1865.

127 Mobile Evening News, citing New York Herald, May 27, 1865; St. Louis Demo-
crat, May 9; Baltimore Clipper, May 5, 1865, May 13, citing Philadelphia Inquirer ;
Philadelphia Press, May 4; New York Evening Post, May 6, 9, 10; New York Daily
News, May 6; New York Atlas, May 13; Alexandria Gazette, May 22; Alexander K.
McClure, Recollections of Half a Century, 75-8.

128 National Intelligencer, May 6, 11; New York Times, May 1; Baltimore Clipper,
Jan. 31, 1865; New York World, June 19; Dr. Gwin’s Plan for Colonization, Evan J.
Coleman, Overland Monthly, XVII; 497-519, 593-606; XVIII; 203-213.

129 Schurz, Reminiscences, 11: 301-302; National Intelligencer, May 12, 1865; New
York Times, May 9, 1865; California Weekly Alta, Aug. 19, 1865.

130 Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, Ist Session, 17, 19, 22, 70, 77, 106, 170, 811,
1068, 3217-3218, 39th Congress, 2nd Session, 267, 458-459, 487; Richardson, Messages,
VI: 438, 455-6.

131 Fuller accounts of later stages of French attitude toward the United States and
of the Mexican affair, as well as of the American feeling and action in regard to
these incidents——Rbhodes, VI: 388-390; Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, VII: 405-423;
VIII: 266-280; Schouler, V1: 429-435; Latané, 247-265; Bigelow, France and the
Confederate Navy; James D. Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States
in Europe; J. M. Callahan, The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy;
Messages and Documents of the Presidents, 1862-3, Part 1: 307-441, “France and the
Confederacy”; Messages and Documents, Department. of State, 1864-5, Part III: I-
254, “France and the Confederacy, Mexico”; Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part
II: 689-762, same, continued; Senate Executive Documents, 38th Congress, 2nd Ses-
sion, I: No. 11; 30th Congress, Ist Session, I: Nos. 5, 6, 8, 11: Nos. 54, 56; Thur-
low Weed, Memoirs, I1: 390-399; Lothrop, Seward, 394; William Cullen Bryant,
Prose Works, Parke Godwin, ed., I]: 237-241; Philadelphia Inquirer, July 1, 1867;
Philadelphia North American, July 4, 1867. Bryant was very bitter in regard to
Maximilian, whom he characterized as “Napoleon’s hired assassin,” and whose tragic
death he did not condemn, since it should “serve as a lesson to future invaders of
unoffending republics, and teach the monarchs of the Old World to respect the
liberties of the New.”

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GHAPTER 6

The Franco-Prussian War

| a reign of Napoleon III drew toward the end. Observers on the con-
tinent and in the United States recognized the insecurity of the
Empire,—recognized that the flame of its brilliance flickered. Yet none
might guess how soon it would be spent. The Napoleonic tradition shielded
absolutism. The material prosperity of France mocked at criticism. Ad-
ministrative concessions served to placate democratic instincts, and the
Imperial rule was endorsed in a plebiscite by an overwhelming majority.
American sentiment remained suspicious and critical. John Hay, then Sec-
retary of the American Legation in Paris, wrote in his diary, August,
1865, burning verses expressing his aversion and scorn.

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As the swift, sure seasons roll.

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Comes the time of the brave and true
Freedom again shall rise

With a blaze in her awful eyes
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“The Charlatan whom the Frenchmen loathe
And the cockneys all admire.

Afraid to fight and afraid to fly

He cowers in an abject shiver;

—The people will come to their own at last,—
God is not mocked forever!”

His description of Napoleon is singularly vivid.

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“Short and stocky, he moves with a queer, sidelong gait, like a gouty crab; a man
so wooden-looking that you would expect his voice to come rasping out like a
watchman’s rattle. A complexion like candle tallow,—marked for Death, whenever
Death wants him. ... Eyes sleepily watchful,—furtive—stealthy,—rather ignoble;
like servants looking out of dirty windows and saying ‘nobody at home’ and lying
as they say it.”

In 1868 he wrote,—

“France still lies in her comatose slumber,—but she talks in her sleep and murmurs
the Marseillaise. And God has made her ruler blind drunk, that his Helot antics may
disgust the world with despotism.” 1

Shortly after this Hay came home, and in 1870 he joined the staff of the
New York Tribune, writing editorials on European affairs. He “particularly
excelled in the castigation of Napoleon III, for whom he cherished an
unquenchable loathing.” ?

John L. Motley, then United States Minister at Vienna, wrote in 1866
of the

“Prince of Darkness, who for the time being has thought proper to assume the ap-
pearance of a Sovereign of France and to inhabit the Tuileries.” $

Jefferson Davis, released from prison and travelling to regain his health,
was invited in 1868 to meet the Emperor and Empress, but refused, feeling
that Napoleon had not been sincere with the South. Davis “did not wish to
say anything uncivil” but could not meet him with cordiality.*
This critical spirit, as always, was extended to include the French people
as well as their ruler. Henry James, passing through on his way to Italy,
dismissed them briefly as “poco simpatica,” § and Lydia Maria Child jus-
tified George Sand by saying that she was too sincere to draw anything but
“true pictures of life as she has seen it in that false, corrupted France.” °
And yet, more and more Americans were falling under the spell of Paris.
Some were tourists or casual visitors; others became for a longer or shorter
time members of the “American colony.” The Paris Exposition of 1867
drew many visitors, who spoke with enthusiasm of the cultural and scien-
tific achievements of the French. As the arbiter of taste, the cultural guide,
French leadership was becoming noticeable.” One of the kindliest of critics
was John Sherman, brother of the General. He was at this time Chairman
of the Committee on Finance in the House, and a well-known authority
on financial matters. He described the French as mercurial, tasteful,
and economical, able to live comfortably on half of what an American
would need.
“It is impossible,” he says, “for an American to visit Paris without enjoy-
ment and instruction. The people of Paris are always polite, especially to
173

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Americans. The debt of gratitude for the assistance of France in our War
of the Revolution is never forgotten by a true American. . . . The Ameri-
cans are liberal visitors in Paris. They spend their money freely, join
heartily in festivities, and sympathize in the success and prosperity of the
French republic. If | was not an American I would certainly be a French-
man. | have visited Paris three times, remaining in it more than a month
at each visit, and always have been received with civility and kindness.
_. . Science and art have here reached their highest development. We
may copy all these, but it will require a century to develop like progress
in America.” §

When the war between France and Prussia broke out, in July, 1870, it
was Officially stated at once that the United States would remain neutral.
The formal proclamation of neutrality was not, however, issued until
August 22.° Unofficial and informal statements emanating from members
of the government scarcely conformed to the idea of neutrality. Hamilton
Fish, Secretary of State, was quoted in the newspapers as condemning
France.1° When the declaration of war was announced in the House of
Representatives, there was applause, apparently in favor of Prussia.™
President Grant was openly pro-German. At a meeting of the Cabinet on
August 5 he instructed Assistant Secretary of State J. C. B. Davis to in-
form M. Berthemy, the French Minister, that it was the intention of the
United States to maintain strict neutrality, but “that he must not be sur-
prised if a strong feeling manifested itself among the people in favor of
the Prussians; the people had good memories, and they remembered that
while the Germans sympathized with the Union and took its bonds freely
during the war, the French people had manifested no sympathy for the
Union but had negotiated a loan for the Rebels, and the French Govern-
ment had sent an expedition into Mexico which had been construed by
the people as an act hostile to this country.” }?

At this same Cabinet meeting news of a French defeat was received. It “did
not seem to make anyone less cheerful,” said Mr. Davis.'* The influence
of George Bancroft, the American Minister at Berlin, was steadily and
very actively exerted in favor of the Prussian cause.1* The government,
however, carefully and firmly resisted the attempts by Bancroft and by
the German Minister, Baron Gerolt, to bring about a formal alignment on
the side of Germany. For example, Secretary Fish did instruct Minister
Washburne, in Paris, to use his good offices to get the decree of expulsion
of Germans from France revoked or mitigated in the interests of humanity,
if possible, but at the same time warned him not to protest formally, as
France was entirely within her legal rights. Baron Gerolt was informed
of this action, and asked the United States to make a public statement

174THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

 

in regard to it. This was promptly refused, in the interests of neutrality.
When the Baron persisted, Assistant Secretary Davis told him that he
would not permit any foreign minister to advise as to the management of
the Department of State... “that it was for this government to judge
whether it would or would not make public its acts.” 15
Major-General Dix, who was the American Minister to France from 1866
to 1869, had been friendly to Napoleon III, saying that he had always
found him liberal and just, and believed him to be patriotic. He thought
him a great deal better than the ministers who surrounded him.1® In this
judgment Elihu B. Washburne, the next Minister, concurred. Washburne
deprecated the war, and condemned Napoleon’s eagerness to maintain his
dynasty and to win prestige, but said that if the Emperor had been left
to himself war would have been averted. ‘“‘Courtiers and adventurers
brought it on, quite unnecessarily.” 17
At the request of Prussia and of other German states, the American lega-
tion took over the protection of their interests in France during the war.
This was a difficult task, but Mr. Washburne undertook it with such good-
will toward both sides, so much tact and good judgment, that he was able
to conduct it to the entire satisfaction of both the Germans and the
French.1®
General Phil. Sheridan was attached to the Prussian army as an observer
during the war. Sheridan, in his Memoirs, said that when he applied to
President Grant for permission to go, Grant asked him which side he wished
to study. He replied that he wished to be attached to the Germans, “for
the reason that | thought more could be seen with the successful side, and
the indications pointed to the defeat of the French. My choice evidently
pleased him greatly, as he had the greatest contempt for Louis Napoleon
and had always denounced him as a usurper and a charlatan.” +® Wash-
burne, however, said that he received instructions from the State Depart-
ment saying that Sheridan wished to be attached to the French army, and
directing him to try to arrange for this; and that not till after this per-
mission was refused by the French government, was Bancroft in Berlin
asked to use his good offices to obtain the privilege from the Germans.?°
At any rate, Sheridan’s reports are all very friendly to the Prussians.
At the opening of the war Louis Napoleon was in the opinion of many
Americans the perpetrator of a crime, the chief villain in the piece.
This was due to a firm conviction in the minds of many that, as Lowell
put it, he was “an impudent scoundrel,’ wantonly selfish, and utterly
unscrupulous.** W. Stillman wrote a letter for the Boston Post describing
his own experiences in diplomatic service in Europe, and declaring that
wherever there was an opportunity for intrigue and for despotism, there
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had appeared “this devil’s deputy,” who instigated insurrections, and
then abandoned them as soon as his own purpose was served.

“Everywhere an intriguer, a murderer in his own country and a butcher in any
other, a breeder of wars and the cause of debts and burdens unknown in all past
time . . . our own worst foe in our days of trouble; always the friend of insurrec-
tion, but the foe of benevolent insurrection.” ... America should “throw its utmost
moral influence against him, and in favor of that Germany which was our honest
and unfaltering friend when we had none other sincere . . . not as against the French,
but as against the despot who has for nearly twenty years played with the blood of
nations and pushed back civilization for the gratification of his personal ambi-
tions.” 22

The New York Independent said :—

“His line ought to cease at once and forever. Napoleonism belongs to the past. The
future has need for a different type of statesmanship. . . . Icy, sleepless, cruel, tyr-
annous, he knows no human emotion save ambition. . . . Never in the history of
nations did a monarch draw a sword so causelessly, so absolutely without pretext,
so manifestly against reason and right, as France in challenging Prussia.” 2%

He “hates liberty, has suppressed the press, has frequently forsworn his
oaths,”—and the “average American loves justice, and whatever his own
shortcomings may be, he has a righteous contempt for deceit and double-
dealing in others.” He is a crafty, treacherous, insolent ruffian, who has
betrayed the republic and bullied other nations. He has secretly cherished
this design against Prussia for years. “His whole career has been that of a
tyrant.” He represents “a past of crime and a future of despotism.” His
demands on Prussia are “sheer impertinence,” “insufferably arrogant”, “an
audacious example of his unscrupulous and domineering character,” ** “this
great intermeddler and international gamecock stands in need of a whole-
some lesson from somebody.” 2° The war is “the greatest crime of the age.”
“France should be severely chastised for precipitating it.” “The powers
should unite to dethrone the criminal who is responsible for it and either
exile or cage him.” “What is our civilization worth if one man can flood
a continent with carnage on a pretext so slight that there is an actual dis-
agreement as to what it is?” 7°

Not all critics were content with abuse. Some sought to analyze Napoleon’s
motives, and give explanations of his “will to war.” He had brought on
the struggle, many thought, because of the precarious situation of his
government, which made the restoration of his prestige through a success-
ful war necessary, both for his own safety and for the maintenance of the
succession. One of Thomas Nast’s cartoons depicts the French throne with
bayonet spikes bristling in the seat and through the back and sides, and

176THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

labeled ““The Seat of War.” The legend runs, “Napoleon trying to seat the
Prince Imperial.” 27
The desire for war, as the only means by which he might be able to carry
out his long-cherished plan to enlarge the Empire through the addition of
the Rhine Provinces, was deemed by some an important element in the
Emperor’s decisions. He had tried to accomplish this expansion by diplo-
matic negotiations, and had failed.?8 Emphasis was laid by others upon
his fear and jealousy of the growing unity of Germany, and his anxiety
to maintain the balance of power in Europe. “Napoleon,” said the Wash-
ington National Republican, “has always recognized that France has ever
profited from the division in Germany. And now that signs of reviving
unity are appearing there, he wishes to destroy Prussia, for Prussia is
Germany. We apprehend that . . . he is already too late. The Germans
are already a unit, and their cause being just and holy, the God of battles
will not forsake them.” *°
The San Francisco Monitor published an article headed “American In-
gratitude,’ and regretting that so many American journals should seem
to take the Prussian side. The next day the Morning Bulletin of the
same city replied with a summary of the situation in which it denied that
Americans were ungrateful for the help given us in Revolutionary times,
and added,—‘“But they cannot sympathize with Napoleon, whose selfish
ambition overthrew the Republic of 1848, which he had sworn to defend;
whose intrigues have kept Europe in a ferment and converted it into an
armed camp; who sought to persuade England into a recognition of the
Southern Confederacy; who tried to plant Imperialism in our sister re-
public of Mexico as another menace to the United States; and who is
believed to have precipitated the pending war mainly to advance the
prestige of his dynasty. They admire his able and astute administration,
and some of them think that, with the recent modifications, his govern-
ment may be better suited to the present conditions of the French than
republican forms. Yet they regard him as the author of a war which
shocks humanity.” Americans, the Bulletin went on to say, feel sympathy
with German unity, and for this reason would be glad to see Prussia hold
her own, but we are not passionately partizan. We do not credit all that
is charged against Napoleon, and do not wish to see the gallant people
whom he rules humiliated. We have ourselves too lately known the hor-
rors of war to rejoice in it, and we are bound to both countries by ties
of friendship.*°
Very few voices were at this time raised in the Emperor’s favor. A few,
however, did, as the Bulletin suggested, praise his success as a ruler of
177

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France, while condemning his character and principles. The Atlanta
Daily New Era said :—

“He has had one object always in view—himself; he has never scrupled to employ
any means, however fraudulent and violent, which enabled him to realize his darling
dream of power. When it was popular he was a Republican; when it was necessary
he was a liar and a murderer; when policy required it he was a despot, and when
the Genius of Progress descended upon his Empire . . . he yielded . . . with the grace
of a courtier and the benevolence, almost, of a kind and loving father whose only
desire was the welfare of his children... .

“He disappointed his people in their political hopes, but he gave to them the best
government for France. He knew that a French Republic was a fanciful and flimsy
fabric, and so he gave the people an Empire. . . . Amid all the wrong, the treacher-
ies and the inconsistencies of his career, one fact looms up,—he has, in serving his
own selfish interests, always advanced the material interests of France... . While
Napoleon lives, France is a thing of life and power. When he dies, perhaps another
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American sympathy in the war was not, however, based wholly upon the
current opinion of Louis Napoleon. Other considerations weighed largely,
and some of these are typically American. War without just cause, it was
argued, is always to be deplored. In this case France was held to be the
aggressor, and she must then necessarily be in the wrong. We sympathized
with “the party that tried to avoid the fight,” and “being in a state of
war, or getting ready for war, seems, as we run our eyes back over history,
to be the normal condition of France.” *

The German character and German civilization were highly praised, and
their harmony with American ideals was urged. James Russell Lowell wrote
to Charles Eliot Norton, August 28, 1870,—

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“If the Prussians don’t win, then the laws of the great game have changed, for a
moral enthusiasm always makes battalions heavier than a courage that rises like an
exhalation from heated blood. Moreover, as against the Gaul, I believe in the Teu-
ton. And just now I wish to believe in him, for he represents civilization. Anything
that knocks the nonsense out of Johnny Crapaud will be a blessing to the
world’... 2935

“Whatever government,” said the Baltimore American, “secures equal
rights to all its citizens, protects them in their lives and property, gives
them a common school education . . . is an object of interest and admira-
tion to the people of the United States. Prussia is the very home of free
inquiry and free thought. Her scholars and thinkers have startled the
world with their bold inquiries and learned speculations. Her system of
public schools is a model from which the States of this Union have copied,
but have not excelled. Her religion is liberal and tolerant, and her press
178

   

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eeis free, able, and vigorous. The only tyranny complained of is the military
conscription. . . . But a kingdom which is pressed on all sides by rival
powers and has been the battle-ground of Europe must have a large
standing army. . . . The Prussian constitution and laws contain some of ;
the best features of Republicanism. She is the friend of Republics.” °* | :
This friendly judgment, it was admitted, was due largely to the presence in
the United States of large numbers of German-American citizens, who
were loyal to the Union during the Civil War, and gave it valiant service,
and whose industry, thrift, and orderliness had made them a most desirable
element in the country.*°
It was due, too, to the fact that Prussia had been friendly to the Union.
“Our representatives at Berlin received a ready sympathy and courtesy
which was extended to them in no other European capital save St. Peters-
burg.” Prussian capital was liberally invested at this time in United States
bonds, and “our financial interests abroad would suffer infinitely more in
case of a German defeat than from any other result of the war. Germany
holds, according to Secretary Boutwell’s estimate, nearly a thousand mil-
lions of dollars worth of American bonds, and if Germany were pros-
trated . . .” these bonds would be thrown on the market, their value would
be depreciated, and American interests would suffer. Anything which
tended to interfere with our financial security, or to check the regular flow
of our European trade, or the steady influx of German immigrants, or to
interfere with the safe and rapid transit of our mails, carried in German
ships, must concern Americans.*° Certainly the essential aid given in both
the military and civil services by German-Americans, during the Civil
War, and their assistance in preserving to the Union the State of Missouri
and other doubtful districts, could not have failed to influence Americans.
As Louisa M. Alcott, caught in Vevay at the outbreak of the war, put it in
writing to her mother,—'l side with the Prussians, for they sympathized
with us in our war. Hooray for old Pruss!” *7
The memory of French enmity during the struggle between North and
South was a potent argument in the determining of American sympathies.
Frequent references were made to these French activities, from the build-
ing of ships intended for Confederate use and the intrigues directed
toward the recognition of the independence of the South, and the Maxi-
milian affair, to the purchase of Confederate bonds. “French insincer-
ity’ was found in the war censorship of news, it being charged by
Americans that war information emanating from French sources was un-
trustworthy, that it had been manipulated in such a way as to seem
favorable to the French cause, or that it was “one universal and long-
179

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR |

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

continued brag of what France is doing, what she is going to do, what she
expects to do, what she feels sure of doing, and what no one need calculate
to prevent her doing.” **

Nevertheless it must not be assumed that sentiment was unanimous in
favor of the Germans. The very arguments that created friendly feeling
toward them in the North, militated against them in the South. Even
though French aid had been halting and uncertain, Confederates could not
forget the moral support and the active advantage of French sympathy,
nor overlook the service of the many German-Americans in the Northern
ranks. In August, 1870, Grant wrote to Elihu Washburne, the American
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“The war has developed the fact here that every unreconstructed rebel sympa-
thizes with France, without exception, while the loyal element is almost as univer-
sally the other way.” 39

The Macon (Ga.) Telegraph, July 26, said—‘‘We of the South are a
unit in favor of France,’ and based this sentiment not only on recent
events, but on those of Revolutionary times. It called attention also to the
fact that many Southerners were of French descent, and that the Southern
temperament resembled that of the French, and concluded;

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“True, France did not help us in our late terrible trials, but then, she was polite
when declining, and really had not the least objections to seeing us thrash the
Yankees. There were no French generals or regiments on the other side. We cannot
say so much for the Germans either in 1861 or in 1776.” 4°

The Charleston Daily Courier said :—

“Not Napoleon, but France is fighting to-day. She has drawn the sword, as if in-
spired by an all-wise Providence, to humble, not the German people, but the arro-
gant Hohenzollern family, who only needed the services of a crafty Bismarck to keep
in chains the Germany of 1848 and to maintain... the system of European feudal-
ism and the ‘divine right of kings’” . . . “The principles of our time and of civili-
zation march under the banners of the French.” 44

Senator Carl Schurz, who was influential with the Administration, and
was very active in Congress and in the country at large in organizing
pro-German sentiment, came in for much criticism at the hands of the
French sympathizers. The Courier called him “that renegade . . . whose
head would have been chopped off if he had remained in Prussia in 1848,”

. “muddlehead,” and “greatest of political scamps.” The Savannah
Morning News deplored the probability that his membership in the Com-
mittee of Foreign Affairs would cause foreign powers to “look on this
blatherskite as the mouthpiece of public opinion,” and said that although

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Louisiana had a large French population and was strongly in favor of
France, demonstrations there had been dignified, and not the “foaming
ebullitions” of German-Americans in northern cities, “frothed up by such
gaseous compounds as a Schurz or a Siegel.” *?

The editor of the Richmond Whig said that it was impossible to be neutral
when watching any contest.

“One cannot look on at a dog-fight without sympathizing with one or the other of
the combatants.”

This was the case with the American public, he declared. Both the con-
testants were despots, but everyone supported one or the other. Yet it was
easy, he thought, to see why, quite aside from French aid in the Revolu-
tionary War, American sympathy should be pro-French rather than pro-
German.

“Prussia, the most barbarous of all the German principalities, .. . by force or fraud
has deprived other states of their liberties. Hanover, Sleswick, Nassau, Frankfort,
Saxony, Darmstadt, the Palatinate, and the Free City of Frankfort, have been com-
pletely absorbed while Baden, Bavaria, and the rest of the Southern states are
threatened with speedy extinction... .

And after describing the process of militarization forced by Bismarck and
the King without the consent of the legislature, he said, “Such a force in
the hands of an ambitious, aggressive, and unscrupulous Power, necessarily
created uneasiness in all Europe, and especially in every neighboring state.”
Prussia failed to keep faith with Austria after the Danish war, and
failed to hold the Schleswig plebiscite promised in the Treaty of Prague.
“And the dirty intrigue by which it attempted to foist a Prussian colonel
on the Spanish throne, is only one of many evidences of its unscrupulous
and intermeddling disposition.” “The line of the Rhine would satisfy
French ambition, for it would render the country secure, and nothing else
will: while all Southern Europe would not stay the rapacity of Prussia.”
The Germans in this country came to “escape from the clutches of the king
for whose triumph they are now praying.” *°

Since the South was in its political affiliation Democratic, we may expect to
find the anti-Administration and Democratic newspapers in the North
also pro-French, and this is in fact largely the case. The Chicago Times
said the “majority of the brains, conservatism, and decency of the coun-
try” was in favor of France, and praised French civilization and character
as far superior to Prussian despotism, greed, selfishness and aggressive
tendencies. The Philadelphia Day said: “We cannot shut our eyes to the
truths of history and do not choose to falsify them.” France is the more
liberal of the two countries, “and the only country in Europe that chooses

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its own ruler.” Red republicans in this country and in France might prefer
a return to the reign of terror, but Louis Napoleon has governed France
well, and has been sustained by the people. Only last May they “endorsed
his reign of twenty-two years by a majority of nearly 22,000,000 of votes,
Will some of our American censors point out to us when and where a vote
of the people of Germany was ever cast in favor of any of the rulers of that
country?” 45

The New York World said:—

“The government of Prussia under King William has gradually become . . . the most
autocratic in Europe. As such it has repeatedly dealt with grave questions in a
spirit more nearly akin to that by which the unfortunate Czar Nicholas brought
down upon himself and his people the calamities of the Crimean War than the just
and deliberate temper in which it is felt by the free nations of our time that public
questions should be debated and decided. . . . That a power which has thus behaved
. should be met at once with the sword when her government repels the legiti-
mate demands of an equal state with autocratic insolence is perfectly natural.” 48
“If Napoleon has shown an ambitious spirit and pursued a tortuous path, are Prussia
and her rulers clear of like faults? .. . The whole policy of Bismarck since 1850
has been a cheat and a deception, intended to deceive other nations, while Prussia
was preparing to obtain concentrated power. . . . Prussia’s plundering propensities
rank with any nation in ancient or modern history.” 47
“The power thus gained by Prussia so elevated its views that nothing short of a
conceded position as the first nation on the continent would answer its expecta-
tions. .. . As Prussia would never have consented to the imposition of a French
prince upon a Teutonic throne without consulting its people, so France is justified
in resisting a Prussian prince over a Latin country like Spain, France being at the
head of the Latin countries as Prussia is of the Teutonic.” 48

Some attempt was made to give a religious aspect to the contest, and to
insist that Protestants should support Germany, and Catholics France.
This argument, however, seemed to carry little weight with most people,
and its flaws were promptly pointed out. “Both countries endow both
churches, and in both men of either faith may hold office.” “Religion,
whether liberal or ultramontane, is about the last thing Louis Napoleon
would fight for.”’ “Seventy per cent. of the people in Bavaria are Catholic,
and one-third of the Prussians.” “Napoleon has steadily opposed the doc-
trine of papal infallibility.” “Baron Gerolt, the Prussian ambassador at
Washington, is a Catholic.” “It is an error to suppose that religion has
anything to do with this war.” 4°

M. Berthemy, the French Minister, analyzed the feeling in the country
as it appeared to him, and said he thought the Republicans were all
pro-German and the Democrats pro-French."° It is true that of the papers
cited as pro-German, practically all are Republican, and that most of the

182THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

 

 

Democratic papers are pro-French.™ In confirmation of this theory, also,
are the acts of various Republican groups, for example, the central
Republican Committees of New York, Indiana, California, and Maryland,
which adopted resolutions of sympathy with Prussia. The Pittsburgh
City Council (Rep.) passed similar resolutions. The Democrats declared
vehemently that the Republicans were not sincere in this, but were only
playing for the German vote in the coming fall elections. Some Republican
papers, like the New York Times, took the same view. These critics spoke
of “sheer buncombe” “insulting to the administration,” which was trying
to maintain neutrality, of “political demagoguery” and so on.”

There are to be noted certain exceptions, also, such as the St. Louts
Republican (Dem.), which had a German foreign editor, and was neutral
in policy, the Milwaukee News (Dem.), with a solid German constituency,
which was pro-German, and the Boston Traveller (Rep.), which was out
and out for France :—

“France could no more permit the setting up of a Prussian royal family in
Madrid than we could afford the setting up of a French royal family in Mexico. . . .
The Spanish business was entered upon by Prussia deliberately, and with the pur-
pose and intent to have a diversion on the side of Spain against France. . . . The
facts are not all published yet, but . . . we have no doubt they will go far to justify
the pertinacity of France... . She would not otherwise be safe on her southern
border for a month.” 58

Of greater significance is the fact, which stands out more and more clearly
as one studies the newspapers of the period, that the great majority of
Americans were not governed purely by party affiliations in this case,
but exercised their judgment independently, on the basis of available
information, and condemned now one side, now the other, or both at
once. So that it is quite possible to find in a paper on one day a strong
pro-German article, and then a few days later, based on some new infor-
mation, a strong pro-French one. It is not at all unusual to find such
a statement as this of the New York Standard, that the war is “unnecessary,
cruel, selfish—simply one grasping, unscrupulous power throwing its
great strength against another power, whose history is the same.” The
Little Rock Daily Republican quoted approvingly the statement that
Spurgeon, in a recent sermon, had said that he wished kings would do
their own fighting, instead of getting soldiers to do it, and had added,
“It would not be such a bad idea if the King of Prussia and Napoleon
would come over to England and fight it out. | am quite sure the police
would wink at the matter, and for my part, I would be willing to hold
their coats, and I would cheer each one on, and say, ‘Hit him hard, I

think he deserves it.’ ”’
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And this thoughtful article from the Richmond Whig is quite typical:—
It is headed, “Not a bruise, but an old sore!”

“Let no one deceive us into thinking that this is a war only between monarchs.
There are old hatreds behind it, and the war will be national in its scope. . . . Each
has inherited a legacy of hate against the other; each has military disgrace to wipe
out; each has invasion and spoliation to avenge. The one remembers how the Corsi-
can adventurer encamped in the walls of Berlin; the other has never forgotten how
the Landwehr and Kaiserliks destroyed the fields of Alsace and Lorraine, and how
Prussia’s marshal fired his cannon down the boulevards of Paris. There is no hate
between nations like that which has passed from father to son. Time intensifies it;
delay of vengeance embitters it.” 54

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As the war proceeded, too, this independence of judgment became more
marked. Many who had been pro-German in July and August did not
hesitate in September to welcome with enthusiasm the French Republic
and to warn the Prussians that Americans would not sympathize with a
continuance of the war, nor with a peace whose terms were too harsh.
From Davis’ Journal we learn that when the Prussian representative,
Baron Gerolt, called at the State Department, August 29, the Assistant
Secretary told him that it was his personal opinion that the people of the
United States would not look favorably on the conquest of Alsace and
Lorraine.®> September 6, Secretary Davis told the French Minister, Berth-
emy, that he did not think the division of the country into pro-German
Republicans and pro-French Democrats was correct, and said that while
undoubtedly the people had little sympathy with the Napoleonic dynasty,
he thought their antagonism was personal to Napoleon and his family,
and not against France or the French people.*®

The United States government was the first to recognize the Third
Republic in France, and did so on September 7, only five days after
Sedan, and immediately after the news of its proclamation was received in
this country. Minister Washburne carried out his share in the ceremony
with marked sincerity and cordiality. “It affords me great pleasure,” he
wrote to Favre, “to advise you that I have this morning received a tele-
graphic communication from my Government instructing me to recognize
the government of the National Defense as the government of France.
.. . In making this communication to your Excellency, I beg to tender to
yourself and to the members of the Government of the National De-
fense the felicitations of the Government and the people of the United
States. They will have learned with enthusiasm of the proclamation of a
Republic in France, accomplished without the shedding of one drop of
blood, and they will associate themselves in heart and sympathy with that
great movement, confident in the me of the most beneficial results to the

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French people and to mankind.” ** This friendly attitude was much ap-
preciated by the French people and Washburne recorded the visits of
various delegations to him to express their gratitude.

President Grant, in his Annual Message, December 5, referred in most
sympathetic terms to the change, saying—

“While we adhere to our traditional neutrality in civil contests elsewhere, we can-
not be indifferent to the spread of American political ideas in a great and highly
civilized country like France.” 58

The French government asked the United States to mediate, with the aim
of bringing about an early peace. Bancroft, our representative in Prussia,
was instructed to find out whether the Germans would accept the good
offices of the United States if they were offered. He replied in the negative,
and made it evident that he himself was anxious that nothing should occur
to deprive the Teutons of the fruits of their victory. Bancroft indeed
continued to use every effort to persuade the United States to come out
openly in favor of Germany. For example, in one of his letters to Assistant
Secretary of State Davis, who was his nephew, he said that he hoped that
Secretary Fish would issue “some good strong word, not violating neu-
trality, but perhaps expressing a complaint of a declaration of war so
injurious to commerce and without a cause. . . .” He thought the United
States ought in some way to “mark strongly a sympathy with the Germans,”
expressed fear lest neutral states in Europe might exert pressure unfavor-
able to Germany when peace terms were being made, and urged that our
State Department consider “whether we could, and if we can, whether we
should, exercise a counter-pressure.” Davis’ reply to this, (dated September
23, 1870), is most significant :—

“I don’t see how Mr. Fish could have done more than he did do to manifest our
individual sympathy for the German cause. .. . There was throughout the country a
deep-seated feeling in their favor until it was believed they showed a determination
to prolong the war for the sake of acquiring territory inhabited by a population
that does not wish to come under their sway. When the public got this idea, which
may or may not have been correct, they ceased to feel the intense sympathy which
they had previously exhibited, and an attempt by the administration to interfere
in any way in their favor, or to swerve from a rigid neutrality, would have been
resented by the good sense of America..... There has been a studied and persis-
tent pressure from the German Legation since the beginning of the war to force
us into an attitude toward the French inconsistent with our neutrality. Baron
Gerolt has spared no effort to entrap me into improper positions. . . . He grew
angry when I told him of open violations of the neutrality laws by his consul in
New York, and refused at first to take any warning. .. . In spite of all this, we have
always construed and without giving France cause of offence, that the sympathies
of the Administration are with Germany. I think I may safely say that the whole
country is satisfied with the course Mr. Fish has pursued in this matter.” 5°

185

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The news of the downfall of Napoleon and the establishment of the Repub-
lic was received with instant and warm enthusiasm in this country, how-
ever. “It is hailed by republics everywhere as a favorable omen,” said
the Baltimore Sun, and added that the general congratulations even from
those who favored Prussia because they thought her success would tend
to the overthrow of monarchy, ‘‘show where the hearts of Americans really

Fi alee
i Frank Leslie’s Magazine had a generous word for the fallen emperor, “He
: has done much for France and history will recognize it . . . for ourselves,

we will not intentionally be numbered with the asses that kick at the dead
lion.” —But nevertheless it congratulated the French heartily on being rid
of his militarism and ambition, and said they might be depended upon
now to “do all that a gallant nation can” to repair the disasters which
have come upon them through Napoleon’s mistakes. “Now . . . the cur-
rent of American feeling is very naturally turning actively toward the
French millions who are trying to reintroduce the Republic.” Leslie’s
printed a full-page cartoon, headed “Out of the Depths,” showing the
Republic as a rock surrounded by angry waters. France is attempting to
climb to safety, and Columbia leans down to lend a helping hand. The
accompanying verses run:—

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“Across the watery waste, Columbia speaks
Benignant welcome to her sister France!

And calmly, strongly bids her take good heart,
And firmly hold her own against the world!

‘All hail, new Commonwealth, to thee all hail!

That from the dead monarchic ashes lifts

A proud fair head to look on Freedom once again!’
So cries Columbia; her sons do swell the cry!

With Liberty’s dear cap on thy young head,

With Liberty’s strong sword girt at thy side,

With Liberty’s great heart within thy breast,

Thine own, O France, thou shalt regain and keep!

So, o’er the ocean, loudly as itself,

From out her mighty heart Columbia greets thee,
Takes thee unto that heart, and cries, ‘God speed!’” &

“Prance,” said the Leavenworth Bulletin, “instead of standing before the
world as a despotism waging an unprovoked and unholy war of conquest,
has now assumed the position of a people struggling to throw off the
shackles of despotism at home and to resist the invasion of monarchy
from abroad. In this attitude the sympathies of the liberty-loving people
of all nations are with her.”

sacnepeeiasetes meena essety

186

 

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The Bulletin thought that “William has builded better than he knew; the
torch that fired his victorious gun at Sedan lighted a conflagration that
is already flashing its ominous glare above every crowned head in Europe”;
and hoped that the spirit of freedom might reach the court at Berlin, and
every other “centre of despotism.” °
The Providence Journal said that there were those who argued from previ-
ous failures that a republic in France was impossible. “But there is some-
thing vital in an institution which after every revolution comes uppermost.
_.. In France, in fact, nothing is legitimate but the Republic.” °
The Richmond Whig defended Napoleon’s rule as at least based on the
will of the people, while “Prussia is a despotism, which recognizes no
right in any human being below a noble,” and America should sympathize
with the Republic, unless Americans are “afraid of offending the mighty
King William, the champion of feudalism and the Divine right of
Kings.” °*
The Rocky Mountain News thought that any doubt of the success of the
Republic was ““ungenerous and we believe unjust.” France is fit for self-
government, and “the conduct of the French people in this time of trial
and defeat has been most admirable.” °°
“Out of the humiliation of a military defeat France has now wrought
a great political victory,” said the New York Tribune, “and we congratu-
late her with all our hearts upon the prospect of happiness and glory which
opens before her. . . . We are rejoiced that America has been so prompt
and so hearty in extending the hand of fellowship to the new Republic.
_. . There is no people in whose welfare we have a warmer interest than
in the people of France.” °°
One very marked element in the new sympathy for France was the feeling
that this change should end the war. If the struggle had been forced by
Napoleon, and Prussia was fighting only to preserve herself against his
ambitions and not for purposes of conquest, the fall of the arch-criminal
should be all that was asked or needed.
Longfellow wrote to Charles Eliot Norton,—“Your opinion of France and
Prussia is also mine and that of most Americans. Now that the Empire
is no more, let there be war no more, and ‘Vive la Republique!’ for as
Emerson sings, ‘God said, I am tired of kings.’”’ °* Joseph H. Choate, who
had thought the slaughter of the earlier fighting “a very dear price to pay
for even so good a thing as the overthrow of Napoleon and his gang would
be,” wrote at the time of the surrender of Strassburg—‘“The French are
being pressed now a little beyond reason, and the sympathy of all but the
Germans will soon be fully aroused for them.” ®* John L. Motley, whose
sympathies had been markedly German, wrote to Bismarck, September 9,
187

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expressing his high admiration for the German Emperor, and his interest
in the accomplishment of German unity. He emphasized his detestation of
Napoleon, and his great satisfaction over the downfall of “that odious
personal government which after eighteen years of what fools thought
material prosperity, had left the gallant and intellectual French nation
naked to your terrible assaults, after so recklessly provoking them” and
then he came to what was evidently his purpose in writing the letter:—

... “But I implore you, for the sake of humanity, of your own great fame, and the
best interests of your government and of Germany, to be moderate, and if possible
expeditious. . . . The world is shuddering at the possibility of a siege of Paris, and
assault. .. . | cannot bear the thought that the lustre of what is now the pure and
brilliant though bloody triumph of Germany should be tarnished by even a
breath .. .” France, it is evident, must accept Prussian terms, “but he would be a
sincere friend of Germany who should modestly but firmly suggest that the more
moderate the terms on the part of the conqueror at this supreme moment, the
greater would be the confidence inspired for the future, the more secure the founda-
tions of a durable peace, and the more proud and fortunate the position and char-
acter of United Germany.”

Bismarck wrote on the margin of this letter—‘‘Damn confidence!” °°
The Democratic papers naturally took the lead in welcoming the Republic
and demanding a just and early peace. Their position was well expressed
by the Nashville Republican Banner (Dem.), which said:—

“If Prussia insists on unreasonable and humiliating exactions, and even goes
so far as to dictate the sort of government the French people shall have, it is not
hard to determine how the sympathy of the world will become enlisted. Forgetting
the original cause of the war, the heart of humanity will throb in unison with the
struggling Republic as against an Imperial dynasty.” 7°

The Richmond Whig thought that Prussian military despotism threatened
all other European states, which could find nothing to reassure them in the
past history of the Hohenzollern family or in the personal character of the
present representatives, who were vain, ambitious, and brutal. The war was
now in conflict with all the enlightened principles of the age, and was aimed
at the conquest, dominion, and even dismemberment of France. “Can
the civilized world look without abhorrence at its continuance?” ** The
Baltimore Sun, uncertain as to the success of the Republic under the cir-
cumstances, was sympathetic “with every smallest germ of the Republican
plant” and had sharp criticism for William for withholding recognition
and refusing to treat with the Republic. “In view of his declaration that it
was Napoleon and the Empire alone on whom he made war, it is strange

enough . . . to hear of the royal hospitality which the King of Prussia
bestows daily upon Louis Napoleon, while he has only bayonets with
188THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

 

——

which to entertain the French Republic, . .. feeding Napoleon with
dainties while he feeds the French with bombshells. . . . The king is in-
different to the pleadings of the combined world, and will only permit
France to speak when she has fallen upon her back, and then, with his
foot upon her breast, he will hear what she has to say.”

If Prussia attempts to crush the new Republic, said the New York World,
she will find no sympathy in America, and “we trust the King’s presump-
tion will meet the Emperor’s fate.” ** King William’s behavior is the
“pot calling the kettle black,” said the New Orleans Times,’* and the
Chicago Times thought that even America might be called on to help to
“teach those audacious scamps the propriety of good behavior.” 7° Such
utterances from Democratic journals, or those which had from the first
favored France are not surprising. More significant are the editorials
from papers which were pro-German in the earlier stages of the conflict.
The New York Sun, heretofore a most outspoken partizan of the Germans
“fighting in self-defense,” said,—

“Now that Napoleon is utterly destroyed, while France, no longer aiming at for-
eign conquests, contends simply for her own national existence, and now that she
has proclaimed herself a Republic, and put her destinies in the hands of new men,
whose devotion to Republican principles cannot be questioned, the whole situation
is transformed. Our sympathies are again with France, and our prayers and good
wishes are all for her complete success. Her chastisement is more than equal to the
fault she has committed, and we desire ardently that she may be able to maintain
herself and to beat back the enormous armies that are marching upon her capi-
tal.” 76

The New York Herald, also warmly pro-Prussian up to this time, said
hotly :—

“We have no sympathy with a German monarchy warring against a French re-
public. Our German fellow-citizens, if they were truly in heart and soul citizens of
this republic, would to-day feel themselves nearer to that republic in Paris than to
the semi-despotic Power that is in the field against it, and to escape from which
Power so many of them first came to this country.” 77

The Providence Journal declared that the new Republic would receive
cordial support from the Republican party in the United States, and its
best wishes that no “needless humiliation may be imposed upon a gallant
people.” The Journal flatly disapproved of the occupation of Paris and the
“dismemberment of France.” Such action it called revengeful and wrong,
and tending to destroy faith in Germany.” The Nation urged that Prussia,
taking precautions against French militarism, should be satisfied and
withdraw. Napoleon was dethroned, “not for making war, but for not hav-
ing made it successfully. But in the interests of future peace, Germany
189

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

—

should show moderation. All absorption of territory whose inhabitants are
not German in feeling as well as origin, will not only lay Prussia open
to a charge of rapacity in carrying on the war, but furnish France with
a good excuse for renewing it.’ Germany should exact the cost of the
war, and might hold Strassburg and Metz for a term of years, but no
more. And “to capture Paris would be a paltry act.” 7° The Nation,
however, feared the radical tendencies of Rochefort and Gambetta, and was
skeptical of the success of the Republic. In this, and in urging Prussia
to offer a fair peace at once, the Pittsburgh Gazette agreed. “We have
sympathized with Prussia and the Germans in this war. . . . But there
is an end to sympathy whenever a cause, no matter how high and holy
it may have been at the outset, becomes converted into an unreasonable
measure of oppression and extermination.” *°

The Cincinnati Daily Chronicle said strongly that Germany might well ask
indemnity, but not land. When Bismarck speaks of taking Alsace and
Lorraine he “shows his claws.” When he refuses to recognize the Republic,
and talks of restoring Napoleon III or the Bourbons, he is interfering
unwarrantably with French rights. Alsace and Lorraine, if given a
plebiscite, would show clearly that they wished to remain French; France
will resist to the last rather than submit to Prussian conquest, and all the
world will be with her in spirit; Prussian behavior in occupied territory
is brutal in the extreme;—‘Possibly it is good policy, but not for those
who have not lost all hope in the principles of humanity and honesty,
and who believe that a certain respect for the feelings of decency is not
a superfluity.” ** The Philadelphia Ledger, doubtful at first of the success
of the Republic, yet showed no hesitation in condemning a continuance
of the war and the forced cession of Alsace and Lorraine, and by Septem-
ber 20, after Favre’s circular had reached this country, came out
strongly in favor of France. The New York Tribune insisted that while
Germany might demand reasonable guarantees against another French
attack and perhaps compensation for the costs of the war, “she has no
right to make France her vassal, nor to subject its capital and all its
provinces to the devastation inseparable from war.” ... If she does
this . . . “the names of Bismarck and of William will be exposed to the
just execration of mankind.” °°

The Detroit Free Press said that William would not recognize the Republic
because such recognition of the right of the people to a voice in their
government would make a bad precedent for the Germans. He would pre-
fer to restore the Bourbons, since they were rulers by divine right. But to
accomplish this he must of course hold military possession of France till
the spirit of the people should be quite broken. The Free Press added :—

190THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

 

“Such a crusade against a republican form of government is of course a direct in-
sult to the United States, and though it may not be resented by a declaration of
war, it cannot but give rise to an embittered state of feeling between the two coun-
tries .. . and it will leave France no alternative but to banish all idea of submission
or peace and enter on a desperate struggle for national existence.” 8%

The trend toward friendliness for France was made stronger by the
activities of the large element in the United States which desired universal
peace and disarmanent. The Civil War with all its suffering and its sorrow
was yet fresh in the minds of Americans. They knew, as the people of
this country had not known since the Revolutionary War, what such
conflicts must involve. With a full appreciation of the evils of war, they
earnestly desired peace, for themselves and for the world at large. This
deep personal consciousness was reflected in their early condemnation of
France as responsible for beginning the war, and in the sharpness of the
criticism in regard to this responsibility. It helps, too, to explain why the
blame was so readily transferred to Germany when it appeared that she
was needlessly prolonging the struggle and intensifying its severity. Among
the leaders in the peace movement was Julia Ward Howe. High and clear
had been her vision in the testing days of her own country, and eager now
was her conviction that the present war was cruel and unnecessary. She
had bitterly disliked and distrusted Louis Napoleon, and could not regret
his downfall, but she “loved France and the French people; the over-
whelming defeat, the bitter humiliation suffered by them filled her
with sorrow and indignation.” She sent out a call for a World’s Con-
gress of women in behalf of international peace. William Cullen Bryant and
other influential persons encouraged the undertaking. A mass meeting
was held December 23, at which Lucretia Mott was one of the speakers,
and an organized peace movement, promoted largely among women, and
led by Mrs. Howe, developed and continued to exercise considerable
influence.**

Charles Sumner, too, threw his influence in the same direction. Sumner was
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1869 to
1871. He was by no means a “peace at any price’ man, as his record
clearly shows, but he did believe in the settlement of international dis-
putes by arbitration, and did look forward with hope to a day when the
war system should be discarded and the nations should disarm. He had
aided Lincoln and Seward to avoid war at the time of the Maximilian
affair. Now he used the Franco-Prussian war as an argument in favor
of the international methods he desired to see in use, and as an example
of the wrongness and failure of the war method. His speech in Boston,
October 26, 1870, has been widely quoted, and it is worth quoting once

191

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

more, as a clear illustration of the way in which many thinking Americans
judged the conflict.

“The Duel Between France and Germany, with its lesson to civilization,”
is the title which he used. He blamed the French government for the
initiation of the war, although he gave credit to the republicans and
moderates who sought to avert it. Napoleon had no real grievance against
Prussia. He had no right to interfere in the matter of the Hohenzollern
candidacy, and the English efforts to mediate should have been
accepted,—

“Such a war stands forth terrific in wrong, making the soul rise indignant against
it.... It is a war of pretexts, the real object being the humiliation and dismember-
ment of Germany, in the vain hope of exalting the French Empire and perpetuating
a bawble crown on the head of a boy, . . . to overthrow parliamentary government,

. and reestablish personal government . . . thus making triumph over Germany
the means of another triumph over the French people.”

Sumner reviewed with full and bitter condemnation the career of
Napoleon III. But “‘a great hour for Humanity sounded when the Republic
was proclaimed. And this I say, even should it fail again; for every
attempt contributes to the final triumph.” The fall of the Emperor was
just retribution, continued Sumner, for “they that take the sword shall
perish by the sword,” but “with the capitulation of the Emperor the
dynastic question was closed. There was no longer pretension nor pretext,
nor was there occasion for war.” Let Napoleon fall, “but not the people
of France. Cruelly already have they expiated their offence in accepting
such a ruler.” “Why march on Paris? Why beleaguer Paris? To what end?
If for the humiliation of France, then must it be condemned.” The peace
conditions should give Germany security for the future, but should not
wound needlessly the sentiments of the French people, nor offend public
law. A moderate indemnity would be just, but Germany would be wrong
to claim Alsace and Lorraine. Europe would not be protected by dis-
abling France; if the object is retaliation, it is barbarous; it can contribute
nothing to the defence of Germany, since it will keep France in chronic
irritation, and the provinces would be “strongholds of disaffection rather
than defence, to be held always at the cannon’s mouth.” This is not the
way to lasting peace for Germany. It is, rather, a “brutal policy belonging
to another age.” Such a transfer could not be legal or lasting in any event,
since the people are unwilling to be transferred. “National unity is not less
the right of France than of Germany, and these provinces, though in
former centuries German, and still preserving the German speech, belong
to the existing unity of France.” Disarmament should be required of
192Ss

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THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

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France, and the other nations should disarm also, for the benefit of civiliza-
tion. German philosophers and German workingmen had been in favor of
peace, but William, with his belief in divine right, was no friend to modern
Reform. ‘The venerable system of war and prerogative is part of his in-
heritance handed down from fighting despots, and he evidently believes in
it.’ Bismarck, too, is a devotee of militarism. He has intellect, courage, and
will, but “is naturally hard, and little affected by human sympathy.” The
address closed with a firm declaration of faith in democracy and of love
for humanity, and the expression of a warm desire for international com-
prehension and harmony.*®

Among the many newspaper comments on the Sumner address possibly
one of those worth noticing is that of the New Orleans Commercial Bulle-
tin, which criticised the speaker for proposing to force the disarmament
of France, but not of Germany. This would leave the latter, said the
Bulletin, ‘doubly armed for the accomplishment of her well-known pur-
pose to acquire the whole sea-front, from the Baltic to the English Chan-
nel, including Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. Than such an arrange-
ment there could scarcely be conceived a more effective guarantee of
future war.” °°

Some Americans, naturally, despite the general interest in the establish-
ment of the Republic, continued to rejoice in Prussian victories. Francis
Ticknor, with warm memory of pleasant days in the diplomatic circles
of Central Europe, wrote cordial congratulations to his friend the King
of Saxony.’? Emerson, who had written in his Journal in the early days
of German success,—‘“Montesquieu’s prediction is fulfilled, ‘La France se
perdre par les gens de guerre” wrote in January to his good friend
Grimm :—

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“I give you joy, the New Year, on these great days of Prussia. You will have seen
that our people have taken your part from the first, and have a right to admire
the immense exhibition of Prussian power. Of course, we are impatient for peace,
were it only to secure Prussia at this height of well-being.” 88

Thomas Nast continued his caricatures of the war, with such sketches as
the one entitled “Dead Men’s Clothes soon wear out,” showing the defeated
Louis Napoleon clad in a very tattered uniform once belonging to the
first Napoleon.** A few newspapers, in the fall of 1870, retained a strong
pro-German bias. Leslie’s, indeed, was much more German in senti-
ment than it had been, for Mr. Leslie returned from an absence of
some months in Europe, and took over in person the editorship of the
paper, whose policy shortly before had been sharply changed, presumably
upon his orders, to a more marked friendliness toward Germany. Leslie’s
193ses

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

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denied the possibility of any of the atrocities attributed to the Germans,
blamed the new French government for being too militaristic and not
making peace promptly on German terms, thought Alsace and Lorraine
German by race and by right, and their cession necessary to assure Ger-
man security; and bitterly assailed French character and behavior. When
the surrender of Metz came, Leslie’s said :—

“This seals the fate of Paris. . . . She will fret and fume and brag and lie a little
longer, but . . . before the first of December the City of Folly will be in German
occupation. The Roman Empire, in its rottenness, was something vital and strong
as compared with the debauched and debilitated empire of the Third Napoleon.
We cannot deny our pity to France, but our sympathies must go with our judg-
MCT Ce ae

The plea that we should be grateful to France for Revolutionary aid
should have no weight, the editor thought, because the early intervention
was really for selfish reasons, or else it was the work of a few sentimental-
ists who counted little. The total of French assistance “contributed as much
to our success as the celebrated fly on the coach-wheel toward raising the
dust of the village’’ and certainly does not make it necessary for us,
“after the lapse of a century, to hug the whole French nation to our bosom
as friends and brothers.” The simple truth is that the French people are
“profoundly ignorant and profoundly selfish” and now divided with
faction and without any firm foundation in principle. France is “neither
a republic nor a nation. It is a punctured windbag.” Its leaders are
“impostors, incapable of telling the truth; only a little less flagrant than
the Imperial debauchees and sensualists they have displaced.” °°

The Trenton Gazette thought the German demands not unreasonable, and
saw no reason for changing its early attitude of condemnation of
France:—

“They have never shown any regret for commencing the war, nor disclaimed or
apologized for the motives that caused it. We thought this attack upon Prussia
unjust, uncalled-for and wrong. We think so still... . We are not bound to sym-
pathize with all contests waged by Republics. That would be to establish the dogma
that Republics can do no wrong, a principle that is obnoxious and dangerous. . . .

And the so-called Republic is one only in name... . / A more pitiable burlesque of
representative government has never existed. It was not established by a vote of the
people and has never been ratified by them. . . . It is in the hands of a few men,

who wield almost absolute power, and who hold position by virtue of that power.
They dare not submit the question to a vote of the people, and they maintain
the war as the only means of their retention in authority.” 4

The Hartford Courant, too, had only the harshest criticism for the
Republic in its early days. The Courant thought the French too volatile
194

Sa Tyo aa Sra Sr aT Tea ae ar a cree ons eon reat errTHE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

 

 

and uncertain in temperament to maintain a democratic government.
Granting the brilliance of French military and intellectual achievement,
this editor thought German education far more thorough and intelligent,
and believed that only a few Frenchmen were capable of doing more than
wishing for a Republic and thinking that it could be obtained by “pro-
claiming it from the Hotel de Ville.” So, too, J. G. Holland declared that
“there is not enough of intelligence, virtue, and principle in France to
sustain a republic.” The people are irreligious and fickle, with “no faith
in God or man.” *

Yet the New York Times furnished an example of the way in which anti-
French prejudice was being undermined. This paper had usually expressed
strong approval of the Prussians and equally strong disapproval of the
French :—

“A Teutonic instead of a Latin race leads Europe, and nationalism instead of Cesar-
ism, parliamentary institutions instead of personal government, peaceful development
under constitutional forms, rather than military glory and Imperial rule, will now
be the models presented to the world. Teutonic seriousness, Teutonic love of lib-
erty in Church and State, and the Teuton’s disposition for peace (unless he feels
his rights trampled on) will be the qualities of the ruling race. The Latin races have
done their part,—and not always an inglorious one—in the world’s history. Now
more earnest and moral and free races must guide the helm of progress.”

Another article in the same tenor was found in the issue of September 12,
in which, concluding a recapitulation of the reasons why many Americans
had sided with Germany, the Times said:—

“As between a people devoted to plodding industry, thrifty and intelligent, earnest
and wise in their aspirations after liberty, seeking no further territorial aggrandize-
ment, but simply the quiet consolidation of minor states which the selfishness of
petty sovereigns had kept divided . . . and a people destitute of practical ideas of
freedom, with no national purpose but the glory of France, incapable of the self-
government which is at the root of popular government ... it was impossible long
to pause.”

Yet the Tzmes now called upon our government to help in bringing about
peace, declaring that a reasonable gratitude for Revolutionary aid from
France made such action imperative. No one could now suppose that
German unity was threatened, or that German soil need fear invasion.
The ends of the war were gained, and hostilities should stop at once.
It was earnestly to be hoped that the moderation of King William would
prevail over the extremist counsels of his advisers.” %

The Cincinnati Daily Gazette, another strong pro-German paper, on
September 7 carried a most sarcastic article on the founding of the new Re-
public, crediting it wholly to mob activity, and denying that it was

195

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characterized by any high ideals or real or intelligent patriotism. ‘“Cer-
tainly the scaliest origin that any French Republic ever had.” But on
September 9 the same paper heartily approved Favre’s circular, and de-
clared that it proved the new government to be actuated by a sense of
justice and uprightness and ready to make peace on “any conditions that
are consistent with the integrity of the territory of France and with the
continuance of her national independence.” The declaration does refuse,
and rightly, cessions of French territory, and if Germany refuses to make
peace on such conditions she alone is responsible for the continuance of
the war, and it will be evident that she is fighting for the purpose of con-
quering French territory and increasing the already threatening military
preponderance of Prussia, and at the same time destroying the free re-
publican government of France.®* Similarly various other periodicals ex-
pressed their doubts of the success of the Republic, and their continued
sympathy for Germany. They questioned the quality of the French leaders,
distrusted their motives, called them “greedy notoriety seekers” and feared
that they lacked prudence, executive ability, and honesty. “The French
must if they are to succeed be under the guidance of men capable of know-
ing the truth, telling the truth, and living the truth.” The people of France
are vain and self-confident, “a nation of balloonatics.” They are fickle and
worship only success. It was not magnanimous, but it was natural to them
to reject the Emperor the moment he failed. At any rate, they are beaten
now, and must pay the bills. The lesson was needed, and may be salutary.
They should make peace at once, no matter what the terms, for a con-
tinuance of the war could only identify them with the Emperor’s crimes,
and would be suicidal. But almost without exception even the most un-
friendly of these critics urged Germany to magnanimity, and warned her
positively not to interfere with the internal affairs of France.** Just as
Americans after Elba became pro-French, believing that the Coalition
meant to partition France or to impose a government which was not the
choice of the people, so now even those who had most love for Germany
and least faith in France were on guard when the principles of liberty
and self-determination seemed threatened, and when the militarism which
they had feared and detested in France before the war now appeared to
dominate the counsels of the conqueror. Taken all together, the evidence
shows clearly that from the time of the proclamation of the Republic,
he spirit of the American public, and that in the
nd wide-spread sentiment was developing in favor
France and against the continuance of the
war in an aggressive spirit by Germany. Most particularly was there an
unwillingness to see the cession of Alsace and Lorraine or any other

196

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French territory, or any dictation by Germany in the domestic affairs of
France. And the charge of militarism and of absolutism was applied less
frequently to France and more frequently to Germany.

It has been asserted that this change was only temporary, and that the
balance swung back toward Germany as the war progressed.®* But this
conclusion does not seem to be borne out by a careful study of the facts.
On the contrary, the siege of Paris demonstrated the good qualities of
the French, and compelled some Americans who had hitherto remained
unmoved, to concede to the suffering inhabitants a heroism, a steadiness
of purpose, and a high patriotism, which had not previously been ad-
mitted.

It is not claimed that sentiment in the United States ever became unani-
mous in this regard, nor that a universal chorus of praise of the French
rose from all parts of the country. There always have been and always
will be differences of opinion and different points of view on any subject.
International relations particularly have always given good ground for
argument. But we are attempting to ascertain the general trend of
American opinion over a century of time, and it is undeniable that during
this period of little more than a year, occurred a noticeable change. The
reasons for this are evident. They are inherent in the character and the
mental habits of the American people. The importance of this change
must be judged in the light of later events.

It is improbable that such a variation was realized to any very great
degree by those who shared in it. Certainly it must be, like any slow
drift of the sort, much more clearly visible from a distance than it could
have been at the time. It is easy to find those whose fixed and settled
opinions showed no wavering. Lowell, for instance, wrote to Thomas

Hughes, February 7, 1871:—

“As for the war in Europe, I am a Prussian, and believe it to be in the interest of
civilization that a public bully (as France had become) should be roundly thrashed.
The French will never be good neighbors till the taint of Louis XIV is drawn out
of their blood. If the Prussian lancet shall effect this I shall rejoice. The misery
I feel as keenly as anybody, but | remember that it might have been, but for Ger-
man energy and courage, even worse on the other side of the Rhine. The Gaul has

never been an amiable conqueror.” %7

A group of newspapers, chiefly made up of those which had been pre-

viously unfriendly, expressed no regret at German severity, and most of

them reminded the public that the terms of peace were no worse than

those given by France in previous wars when she had been victorious.*®

President Grant sent a special message to Congress, February 7, in which

he referred in most friendly terms to the consolidation of the Empire of
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Germany, spoke of the “intimate and cordial relations’ and the common
interests of the two countries, and praised the constitution of the new
state as “an attempt to reproduce in Europe some of the best features
of our own constitution.*®

At about the same time, a joint resolution was introduced in Congress to
provide for the sending of a relief ship from the United States to
Europe for the benefit of the sufferers from the war. The bill as offered
by Senator Pomeroy of Kansas (Rep.) was framed to include both French
and Germans. Senator Howard of Michigan (Rep.) moved to strike out
“and Germans,” saying that he did not understand that Germany needed
any help, but that the French were now little more than a conquered
people,—‘‘our old allies in distress for bread as well as for arms and
soldiers.” Senator Pomeroy replied with a defence of the Germans, who
had been modern allies, during the Civil War, quite as truly as the French
had been allies in our early days. Senator Howard said that his own
sympathies during the war had been with Germany, but that under the
present circumstances he felt that it was France which needed aid. Sena-
tor Morton (Rep.) of Indiana said that although he too felt that the
French were responsible for inaugurating the war, he could now sym-
pathize with the French people, who were in no way responsible for it.
Senator Fowler (Rep.) of Tennessee thought that it was unjust to deny to
France the gratitude which was certainly due her, and added that he could
not see that Germany had ever been our ally. Certainly during the
Revolutionary War, German soldiers fought with the British. In the
recent struggle large members of American citizens of German birth aided
the North, but there was no particular assistance from the German
government, and “so far as their government is concerned, in its raid
upon the people of France since the battle of Sedan, | have no sympathy
with it.’ Senator Stewart (Rep.) of Nevada reminded him of the large
numbers of United States bonds taken by Germans during the Civil War,
when our credit was not good in either England or France. Senator
Fowler retorted that this simply showed that the Germans were good
business men. He had never seen any effort on the part of Germans to
establish free and independent governments anywhere. On the contrary
‘toward a concentration of despotic power.” “The French
le on the continent to-day, and have been the only
people on the continent that have been struggling for free institutions.”
Sumner brought the discussion to a close with a Bey tactful expression of
gratitude and friendliness for both countries. If I were compelled to
determine the question of comparative obligation to France and Germany
on the part of the United States, a hesitate, and what American

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could do otherwise? . . . France contributed to our national independence,
Germany to our national strength and life.” But this question was simply
one of charity, he reminded them, and should not be clouded by political

controversy.?°°
In the House, Mr. Sherman offered an amendment running :—

“And be it further resolved that the President of the United States is hereby re-
quested to communicate to the French Government the profound sympathy of the
people of the United States for the people of France, now suffering under unex-
ampled misfortune; and he is hereby requested to extend to them every aid, assis-
tance, encouragement and support consistent with the laws of nations and our
treaties with other Powers, in establishing upon a firm basis a Republican Govern-
ment.” 101

After some discussion, in the course of which Mr. Sherman said that he
supposed sympathy in this country had been largely pro-German till after
Sedan, the amendment was declared too political in tenor to be attached
to a relief bill; and here, as a day or two later in the Senate, the resolution
passed without amendment. It is unnecessary to say that the relief plan re-
ceived the generous support which Americans have always given to such
undertakings.

As the siege of Paris progressed and the final catastrophe of surrender and
a harsh peace were recognized as inevitable, the great mass of the news-
papers steadily became more friendly. Appleton’s Magazine, for example,
which said on January 21 that France had fallen because her entire social
system was rotten, on February 11 carried a wholehearted defence of the
French character. This article declared that current American notions of
France were superficial, based on a slight knowledge of Paris and of a few
French authors such as Voltaire and Rousseau. Generalizations represent-
ing the Frenchman as a giddy, extravagant, immoral being are quite
fallacious. France must not be judged wholly by the gay life of Paris.
She has produced great men of quite a different type from the boule-
vardier and the sensational novelist. “Calvin, the root of a vast and sturdy
religious democracy, Descartes, the great reformer and liberator of
European intellect; . . . Pascal, than whom no English moralist is more
pure, more grave, precise, and searching.” “The truth is, the great renown
of France is the result of the variety and keenness, the gravity and depth,
the vast and multiform genius, she has engendered on her soil and nour-
ished by her civilization.” 1°? oe

The Hartford Courant, February i expressed faith in the future of the
Republic, led by the men who had served it so well in the last trying
months. “Our old conceptions of French character must be revised,” said
the Courant. “We had not dreamed of such steadfastness and such ability

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to endure; and the presence of these qualities goes a good way in demon-
strating a capacity for self-government.” 1°

“France has made heroic exertions, which, though ineffectual for defence,
have redeemed her character,” said the Cincinnati Daily Gazette. “All
that honor can require a people to do in struggling against superior forces
and overpowering calamities has been done.” Such a nation must win
the respect of the world. It can never be permanently subjugated or
humiliated. Let them but wait in patience, and German arrogance will
give them an opportunity to regain their position.?°*

“In the very face of their enemies, almost within sound of cannon and
musketry, they reared on the ruins of a prostrate Empire the fabric of a
republic, flung away the ensigns of Imperialism ... and raised the em-
blems of Liberty.” “That it may result in the firm establishment of free
institutions, a wise and liberal policy, and bring with it peace and pros-
perity, is the wish of all who appreciate the worth of France to the world
and who have witnessed with regret the events that threatened her very
existence.” 2°5 Surely this article from the Trenton Gazette, dated January
31, represents a change of heart :—

“France falls with arms in her hands and with her face to the foe. There is no dis-
grace or taint of dishonor in her failure, and she will come out of this fiery ordeal
purified from the dross of reckless ambition and vainglorious arrogance. . . . Hum-
bled and made wiser .. . she will now be able to devote those vast energies and cap-
abilities which have been wasted on the tinsel and useless magnificence of Imperial
display to the cultivation of the arts of peace. . . . Rightly directed, the great men-
tal, moral, and physical forces of France will produce one of the mightiest and hap-
piest nations in the world.” 106

A steady indignation in regard to the cession of Alsace and Lorraine must
be chronicled. “The fair fame of the great German nation is tarnished,”
said the Philadelphia Ledger. The cession admits the principle that a
conquest of this kind is a legitimate object of war in modern times, said
the Boston Daily Advertiser. This is a pernicious doctrine, and, with all
that it connotes in this case, makes Germany a menace to Europe. “Cruel
and impolitic,” said the Pittsburgh Commercial,—“humiliating to the
French people,” “unjust to the inhabitants of the ceded districts,” and “will
lead inevitably to further wars.” The Richmond Whig thought that per-
haps it would be after all a benefit to France, for the recovery of the prov-
inces would become an absorbing object to all French hearts. This would
prevent factional disputes, consolidate the nation, and animate it with a
single will. The Philadelphia North American regretted the transfer because
the people were French in feeling, in habits, and to a large extent in lan-

200THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

—
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guage, and “the institutions of France allowed them a liberty that they
cannot look for under the iron rule of Prussia.” *°7

Accompanying the protests over the alienation of territory from France
were strictures on Prussian militarism. The Cincinnati Enquirer declared
that all nations in Europe would have to arm in self-defense, since their
safety was endangered by the “aggrandizement of Prussia, directed by an
unscrupulous and ambitious man of talent like Bismarck.” “An iron-
handed, despotic power . . . forging the bonds of her own people and tak-
ing the best blood of the only nation in Europe which is striving for
free government.” The Washington National Republican said that the
king who was trying to build his Empire on a conquered and humiliated
France was not likely to be the ruler of a democratic Germany. There
is in the events of these days “‘a deep and ominous significance to all
liberty-loving Germans.” The Philadelphia North American warned the
small states of Europe to look well to their defenses, for their turn would
come next, and said that although French folly and ambition precipitated
the war, it was evident now that Germany had been making incessant and
thorough preparation for such a contingency, and now constituted a stand-
ing menace to all Europe. The Mobile Register thought the synopsis of the
new German constitution would make sorry reading for those honest Ger-
man democrats in this country who hoped that German unity meant free
institutions. “The constitution of the French empire just overthrown was
much more liberal than the provisions of this document’ which only
“forges new links to the chains which bind them to a reactionary
dynasty.’ 1°°

As a final example of the trend of public opinion let us return to Leslie's
Magazine, which has been cited as one of the bitterest critics of France
and the French. As late as February 18, Lesle’s was still being sarcastic at
France’s expense. The journal for this number carried a cartoon called
“The Fifth Act,” with this dialogue :—

“Noble (but Temporary) Dictator. ‘What! Paris capitulate? Then I'll kill myself
to-night and issue a proclamation to-morrow.’ Stabs himself and falls (tempo-

rarily).
“Grand (but Impersonal) General in Paris. ‘1 don’t know precisely whether | am
Ducrot or Trochu but I may as well shoot myself beside Gambetta.’ Falls
(vaguely).
“Bourbaki. ‘I kill myself at the head of my army, and I hope to dine comfortably in
Switzerland to-morrow. (Falls into Switzerland precipitately and avalanchi-
cally.)
“Voice of Prevost-Paradol (Behind the Scenes). ‘I killed myself too far back on the
stage. Nobody is looking at me. I’ve a mind to come forward and have another great
death at the footlights!’”

“Tableau. Curtain.”

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This number criticised the Pomeroy resolution for relief and called it
“silly sentimentality” and generally revamped all the various types of
vituperation which had been applied to the French from any source since
the opening of the war. Yet on March 4 even Leslie’s had a different
attitude, with this poem,—“Call off the Dogs!”

“Had royal hunter e’er more royal game

Than this that these trained war-dogs have pulled down
While his hosts crowned their master, by the name

Of Kaiser, with the Reich’s Imperial Crown?

Was e’er great hart more stanchly run to death

After long agony of hopeless fight

Than this, that now draws agonizing breath

With draggled skin and eyes of tearful light?

There have been hunters, famous ones of old,

Rent by their own dogs, by a master rash

Roused to strange wrath under too tight hold

Of leash, too savage smarting of the lash.

Kaiser for King thou art; but they that gave
Imperial robe and crown can take away;

Strength based on fraud or force still finds its grave
Dug by the hands that vied its base to lay.”

And on March 18, the cartoon of the week showed a court scene, with
Bismarck presenting France as a criminal at the bar. Justice, sitting as
magistrate to hear the plea, was represented as saying,—“‘I sit here to-day,
Herr Bismarck, but I hope to vacate soon, in favor of Merey,;72e2

NOTES AND SOURCES

1 William Roscoe Thayer, Life and Letters of John Hay, “Sunrise on the Place de la
Concorde”; “The Sphinx of the Tuileries,” |; 225-228, 235-244, 313, (Hay to Bigelow,
Vienna, Apr. 27, 1868).

2 Royal Cortissoz, Life of Whitelaw Reid, 1: 164: Thayer, John Hay.

$ John Lothrop Motley, Correspondence. G. W. Curtis, ed); 165225,4231-232.

4 Mrs. Varina Davis, Life of Jefferson Davis, 11: 809.

5 Henry James, A Little Tour in France, 211.

® Letters of Lydia Maria Child, 205.

7 Johnson, America’s Foreign Relations, 11: 116-117: Horace Greeley, Essays Designed
to Elucidate the Science of Political Economy, 152; Eugene Benson, “French and
English Illustrated Magazines,” Atlantic Monthly, June, 1870; Elihu B. Washburne,
Recollections of an American Minister to France, 1869-1877.

§ John Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate, and Cabinet. |:
402-406.

® House Executive Documents, 3rd Session, 4lst Congress, Vol. 1: 45-47.

10 Philadelphia Evening Star, July 16, 1870.

202THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

 

 

11 Washington Daily Globe, July 17, 1870; Philadelphia North American, July 16;

Wilmington Daily Commercial, July 16.

12 Jeannette Keim, Forty Years of German-American Political Relations, 8, citing

Davis MS; Andrew D. White, Autobiography, 1: 154; New York Standard, August 6,

1870.

13 Keim, 8.

14 House Executive Documents, 3rd Session, Vol. 1: 197-198, Bancroft to Fish, July

16, 1870, on the declaration of war; 198-199, 200-202, Bancroft to Fish on the secret

treaties regarding Belgium and Luxemburg; Keim, 7 ff.: Howe, Life and Letters of

George Bancroft, 252 ff.; Clara Eve Schieber, American Sentiment Toward Ger-

many 11-12.

18 Keim, 18-20, citing Davis Journal, August 13, 1870.

16 Washburne, Recollections, 1: 34; General John A. Dix, Memoirs, Morgan Dix, ed.,

I]: 156-157.

17 Washburne, Recollections, I: 34.

18 Washburne, Recollections; House Executive Documents, 3rd Session, 41st Con-

gress, Vol. I.; Correspondence of E. B. Washburne, Franco-Prussian War and I[n-

surrection of the Commune, No. 44; Adolf Hepner, America’s Aid to Germany in

1870-1871; Keim, 8; Col. Wm. H. Crook, Through Five Administrations, 171.

19 Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, 11: 358-359.

20 Washburne, Recollections, 1: 56-57.

21 Lowell to Th. Hughes, June 11, 1870; July 18, 1870. Letters of James Russell Low-

ell, Charles Eliot Norton, ed., I]: 59, 60.

22 W. Stillman, in Evening Post, cited in Cincinnati Daily Chronicle, July 22, 1870.

23 Independent, cited in Baltimore American, August 12, 1870.

24 Bridgeport Daily Standard, July 16, 1870; Baltimore Daily American, July 20;

Trenton Daily Gazette, July 23; Hartford Courant, July 16; Rocky Mt. News

(Denver, Col.), July 20; Worcester (Mass.) Daily Spy, July 15; Philadelphia Eve-

ning Star, July 12; New York Herald, New York Post, New York Commercial, cited

in Washington Evening Star, July 16; Pittsburgh Gazette, July 20; Cincinnati Gazette,

cited in Pittsburgh Gazette, July 25; Providence Journal, July 18.

25 Philadelphia North American, July 16.

26 Raleigh Daily Standard, July 18; Boston Evening Journal, July 16: Milwaukee

Sentinel, July 19; New York Sun, cited in Baltimore American, July 26.

27 Albert Bigelow Paine, Thomas Nast, His Period and His Pictures, 147-148; similar,

Worcester Spy, July 30; Leslie’s Magazine, March 19, July 30.

28 Milwaukee Sentinel, July 23; Rocky Mt. News, July 20; Springfield, (Ill.), Daily

State Journal, July 16; Philadelphia Age, July 16; Washington Evening Star, July

14; Chicago Tribune, July 14, July 16.

29 Richmond Dispatch, July 16; Washington National Republican, July 18; Phila-

delphia Ledger, July 8; New York Tribune, cited in Pittsburgh Gazette, July 25;

Pittsburgh Gazette, July 14, July 28, 1870. The Philadelphia North American, July 23,

emphasizes the German struggle for unity for “German” districts held by neighboring

states,

80 San Francisco Morning Bulletin, August 1.

81 Atlanta Daily New Era, August 3; Boston Daily Advertiser, July 16.

For other criticisms of Louis Napoleon, compare Schieber, American Sentiment

Toward Germany. Ch. I.

82 Kansas Tribune, July 16; Baltimore American, July 16, 19, 20, 21, New York Trib-
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une, cited in Washington Evening Star, July 16; Philadelphia ‘Ledger, July 14; Cin-
cinnati Chronicle, July 16; Pittsburgh Gazette, July 22.

33 Lowell to Norton. James Russell Lowell, Letters, C. E. Norton, ed., II]: 62-63.
34 Baltimore American, July 21; The Nation, July 21; Pittsburgh Gazette, July 22;
Pottsville, Pa. Miners’ Journal, July 23.

35 Resolutions of Pittsburgh City Council, July 25, Pittsburgh Post, July 27; Kan-
sas Tribune, July 16; Baltimore American, July 19, July 29; Frank Leslie's Magazine,
Aug. 6; Hartford Courant, July 22; Schieber, 1-2, citing Faust, The German Element
in the United States.

86 New York Tribune, cited in Baltimore American, July 28; Baltimore American,
July 19, July 20; Pittsburgh Gazette, July 22; Trenton Gazette, July 13.

37L. M. Alcott, Letters and Journals, Ednah B. Cheney, ed., 244; Hartford Courant,
July 22; Bridgeport Daily Standard, Aug. 15; Pittsburgh Gazette; Baltimore Amer-
ican, July 19.

38 Philadelphia North American, July 20; L. M. Alcott, Letters and Journals, loc.
cit. Compare Keim, 7. See also summary in Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United
States as a World Power, 197.

39 General Grant’s Letters to a Friend, 68.

40 Macon Telegraph, cited in Pittsburgh Gazette, July 26. Strong article, similar
tenor, Richmond Whig, July 19.

41 Charleston Daily Courier, July 26.

42 1b., Savannah Morning News, July 25.

43 Richmond Whig, August 6.

44 Chicago Times, cited in Milwaukee Sentinel, August 24, Sept. 1.

45 Philadelphia Day, cited in Pittsburgh Post, July 26; New York Commercial Ad-
vertiser, cited in Richmond Whig, August 23.

486 New York World, cited in Pittsburgh Post, July 19.

47 Philadelphia Age, July 21.

48 Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, July 16.

Other strong pro-French utterances: Hartford Times, cited in Savannah Morning
News, July 26; Mobile Register, July 13; Rocky Mt. News, July 20; Boston Post,
July 13, July 18; New York Express, cited in Washington National Republican,
Aug. 1; Pittsburgh Post, July 27; Aug. 20; Philadelphia Press, cited in Pittsburgh
Gazette, July 21; Louisville Courier-Journal; St. Louis Times. See also Schieber, 18,
19.

49 Washington National Republican, July 25, Sept. 5; Baltimore American, July 29,
August 2, August 16, citing New York Tablet; Cincinnati Chronicle, July 23, citing
New York Evening Post; Milwaukee Sentinel, July 23.

50 Davis Journal, Sept. 6, cited in Keim, 8.

51 Cincinnati Chronicle, July 22, citing Chicago Post; Cincinnati Enquirer, July 23;
Pittsburgh Gazette, citing Washington Chronicle, July 23, July 26, citing Chicago
Republican; August 26; Miners’ Journal, Sept. 3. (Statements asserting this division
of sentiment.)

52 New York Times, July 22; New York World, Aug. 12; Baltimore Evening Bulletin,
July 20; Savannah Morning News, July 27; Richmond Dispatch, July 28; Rocky
Mt. News, Aug. 17; Baltimore American, Aug. 12, July 19, 20; Pittsburgh Post, July
22, 25, 27; Richmond Whig, July 26.

53 Boston Daily Traveller, cited in Cincinnati Daily Chronicle, July 20.

®4 New York Standard, cited in Pittsburgh Gazette, July 23; Little Rock Daily Re-
publican, Aug. 31; Richmond Whig, Aug. 4.

204THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

Other examples of this type, blaming both sides, or illustrating how the jour-

nals varied their criticisms at will, and without paying attention to party align-

ment:—(All these in July or early August)

Nashville Republican Banner, July 16; Baltimore Sun, July 19; Springfield (Ill.),

State Journal, July 19; Detroit Free Press, July 17, July 28, Philadelphia Ledger,

July 16, 21, Aug. 1; Washington Evening Star, July 15; Savannah Republican, July

16, July 19, New York Sun, July 22; Charleston Daily Courier, July 25; Mobile Reg-

ister, July 19; New York Times, cited in Pittsburgh Gazette, July 23; Cincinnati

Daily Gazette July 21; Pittsburgh Post, July 20; California Daily Alta, July 12, 28;

New York Commercial Advertiser, July 22; Chicago Tribune, cited in Pittsburgh

Gazette, July 25; Harper's Weekly, cited in Cincinnati Enquirer, July 27; St. Paul

Dispatch, July 16; Philadelphia North American, July 12, July 28; Washington Na-

tional Republican, July 27; Cincinnati Daily Chronicle, July 27; Providence Journal,

July 22.

55 Davis Journal, Aug. 29, 1870, cited in Keim, 16.

56 Davis to Washburne, Sept. 7, 1870, House Executive Documents, 3rd Session, 41st

Congress, 1: 67-68; Davis Journal: Keim, 9.

57 Washburne, Recollections, 1: 120-124; House Executive Documents, 3rd Session,

4lst Congress, I: 67; II]: 116-118; Johnson, America’s Foreign Relations, \1: 118;

Joseph B. Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 11: 192-3.

58 Richardson, Messages, VII: 96-97.

5° Citations from Davis Journal and from the correspondence of Bancroft, Keim,

11-17, 25, 26-29; Schieber, 11; House Executive Documents, 3rd Session, 41st Con-

gress, I: 207-208, 210-211, 214.

60 Baltimore Sun, Sept. 9; John Spencer Clark, Life and Letters of John Fiske, 1:

379.

81 Frank Leslie's Magazine, Aug. 27, Sept. 24, Oct. 1.

62 Leavenworth Bulletin, Sept. 7.

63 Providence Journal, Sept. 7.

64 Richmond Whig, Sept. 9.

85 Rocky Mt. News, Sept. 14, Sept. 28.

66 New York Tribune, cited in Baltimore American, Sept. 12.

Other very friendly utterances, San Francisco Bulletin, Sept. 8; Washington Na-

tional Republican, Sept. 7; Cincinnati Daily Chronicle, Sept. 6; Detroit Free Press,

Sept. 6, Sept. 9; Illinois State Journal, Sept. 6, Sept. 7.; Philadelphia Age, Sept. 10;

and citations from New York Independent, Nation, Cincinnati Daily Gazette, New

York World, and Boston Post, in Schieber, 23-4, See also the Letters of Mary Corinna

Putnam (Dr. Mary Putnam Jacobi), in the American Historical Review, XXII: 836-

841, and Eugene N. Curtis, “American Opinion of French Nineteenth Century Revo-

lutions.” American Historical Review, XX1X: 263-270.

67 Longfellow to Norton, Life of H. W. Longfellow, Sam’ Longfellow, ed. II]: 155.

88 Life of Joseph Hodges Choate, Edward Sanford Martin, edi [i:5 292. 204:

6° John L. Motley and his Family, Susan and St. John Mildmay, ed., 288-293.

Courtesy of Dodd, Mead and Co., Publishers, New York.

70 Nashville Republican Banner, Sept. 8, Sept. 10, 13, 24.

1 Richmond Whig (Dem.), Sept. 6, 19.

72 Baltimore Sun, Sept. 7, 15, 16.

78 New York World, cited in Trenton Gazette, Sept. 7, and Richmond Whig, Sept. 15.

74 New Orleans Times, cited in Philadelphia North American, Sept. 14.

"5 Chicago Times, cited in Philadelphia North American, Sept. 14. Other Democratic
205 :

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papers, similar in tenor: Philadelphia Age, Sept. 7, and cited in Philadelphia North
American, Sept. 14; Boston Post, cited Ib.; Pittsburg Post, Sept. 5, Sept. 12.
76 Nashville Republican Banner, Sept. 10.
77 New York Herald, cited in Pittsburg Post, Sept. 10.
78 Providence Journal, Sept. 8, Sept. 28.
79 Nation, Sept. 13, Sept. 15, Sept. 27.
80 Pittsburgh Gazette, Sept. 5, Sept. 8, Sept. 9.
81 Cincinnati Daily Chronicle, Sept. 10, 15, 16, 20, 26, Dec. 17, 19, 21.
82 Philadelphia Ledger, Sept. 5, 8, 20; New York Tribune, Sept. 29; and cited in Rich-
mond Whig, Sept. 15.
88 Detroit Free Press, Sept. 15, Sept. 19. Other articles at about this time showing
friendly feeling toward France, condemning Germany for militarism and undue
harshness in prosecuting the war and in the proposed peace terms:—Boston Courier,
cited in Pittsburgh Post, Oct. 12; Washington Daily Patriot, Dec. 10, Dec. 15; Kan-
sas Tribune, Sept. 9; Milwaukee Sentinel, Sept. 13; San Francisco Bulletin, Sept. 13;
Leslie’s Magazine, Sept. 3; Wilmington Daily Commercial, Sept. 8, New York
Standard, cited in Detroit Free Press, Sept. 8.
84] aura E. Richards and Maud Howe Elliott, Julia Ward Howe, 11: 301-306.
85 Charles Sumner, Addresses on War, Edwin D. Mead, ed., 250-319.
86 New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, Oct. 5.
87 Francis Ticknor, Life and Letters, Sept. 29, 1870. 11: 489-90.
88 Emerson, Journals, X: 329. To Grimm, Jan. 5, 1871, 85-86.
89 Paine, Thomas Nast, 147-8; 202.
90 Frank Leslie’s Magazine, Oct. 1, Nov. 5, Nov. 12, Nov. 19, 1870. Somewhat sim-
ilar, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 30, 1871.
91 Trenton Daily Gazette, Sept. 5, 6, 7, 10.
82 Hartford Courant, Sept. 5, 8, 10; Scribner's, 1: 106-7, 342, 450, II: 206-7.
93 New York Times, cited in Little Rock Republican, Aug. 31, Sept. 12; cited in
Baltimore American, Sept. 12.
94 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, Sept. 5, Sept. 7, Sept. 9.
95 Boston Evening Journal, Aug. 6, Sept. 7, 8, 9; St. Paul Dispatch, Sept. 8, Sept.
12: Baltimore American, Aug. 30, Sept. 5, 9, 10, 14, 17; Washington Evening Star,
Sept. 6; Bridgeport Daily Standard, Sept. 5, 7, 8, Dec. 12, 17; Worcester Spy, Sept.
8, 12, 15; Boston Daily Advertiser, Sept. 6, 7, 9; Little Rock Daily Republican,
Sept. 16, Nov. 18; California Daily Alta, Sept. 16, Oct. 3; Appleton’s Magazine,
Sept. 24, Oct. 8, Nov. 26; Pottsville Miners’ Journal, Sept. 17, Dec. 31; and others
cited in Schieber, Ch. I.
96 Schieber, 14. Miss Schieber throughout her chapter appears to have exaggerated
the pro-German bias in America.
°7 James Russell Lowell, Letters, C. E. Norton, ed., Lowell to Hughes, Feb. 7, 1871.
ES ZAK
98 Worcester Spy, Jan. 31, 1871; Milwaukee Sentinel, Feb. 28; Nation, Feb. 2;
Knoxville Daily Chronicle, Jan. 28; Richmond Enquirer, Mar. 4; Detroit Free Press,
Jan. 31; Louisville Daily Commercial, Jan. 31; Springfield Daily State Journal, Jan.
30; San Antonio Express, Jan. 31. Others cited in Schieber; 32-33.
99 Keim: 29-34; House Miscellaneous Documents No. 210, Pt. 7, 53rd Congress, 2nd
Session; Richardson, Messages and Documents, VIII: 120.
100 Congressional Globe, 41st Congress, 3rd Session, Pt. 2, 1870-71, 954 ff.
101 Congressional Globe, 41st. Congress, 3rd Session, Pt. 2, 1870-71, 869-870.

206

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102 Appleton’s, Jan. 21, 1871; Feb. 11, 1871.

103 Hartford Daily Courant, Feb. |, 1871.

104 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, Jan. 30.

105 California Daily Morning Bulletin, Jan. 30.

106 Trenton Gazette, Jan. 31, 1871.

107 Philadelphia Ledger, Feb. 9; Boston Daily Advertiser, Jan. 31; Pittsburgh Com-
mercial, Feb. 6; Richmond Whig, Jan. 31; Philadelphia North American, Feb. 25;
Washington Evening Star, Jan. 30; Leavenworth Bulletin, Mar. 1.

108 Cincinnati Enquirer, Feb. 1, 6, 13; Washington Daily National Republican, Jan.
2, 27, Feb. 3; Philadelphia North American, Jan. 28, 30, Feb. 25; Mobile Register,
Jan. 7; Also Pittsburgh Post, Jan. 20, Mar. 3; Philadelphia Age, Jan. 30, 31, Mar.
3; Philadelphia Ledger, Jan. 11, 17, 23, 30. Other papers similar in tenor to those
quoted—generally more friendly in tone, though not without criticism:—Pittsburgh
Commercial, Feb. 21, 22, Mar. 10; Baltimore Sun, Jan. 27, Feb. 1; Mobile Register,
Jan. 31; Atlanta New Era, Jan. 10; Baltimore American, Jan. 30; Nashville Repub-
lican Banner, Jan. 28; Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 2; Mississippi Pilot, Jan. 25, Feb. 10;
Santa Fe Post, Jan. 28; Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 31; New Orleans Commercial Ad-
vertiser, Jan. 31; Savannah Republican, Jan. 31; and others cited in Schieber, 24.
Praise for Germany, Little Rock Republican, Jan. 30; Knoxville Daily Chronicle,
Mar. 4.

108 Jeslie’s Magazine, Feb. 18, Mar. 4, Mar. 18, 1871.

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CHA PoE «7.
The Third Republic

HE outbreak of the Commune early in 1871, before the peace terms

with Germany had been definitively settled, reacted unfavorably upon
the judgment of the American observers. The United States Government
instructed Minister Washburne to continue to recognize as the legal
authority the organization of which Thiers had been chosen the chief
executive. When this government was driven from Paris by the insur-
rectionary movement, it was necessary that the diplomatic corps should
accompany it, in order to continue proper official relations; and, like
his colleagues, the American minister secured a room at Versailles for
use as temporary headquarters. Unlike the others, however, he resolved,
and so informed his government, that he would return to Paris each day,
and continue to occupy the actual legation. He was thus the only foreign
minister who remained in Paris during the days of the Commune,—he
had also been in the city during the siege and bombardment by the Ger-
mans,—and he had an unequalled opportunity to see and to know all the
sinister details of the struggle. His reports to the government, and his later
published Recollections, could not fail to impress Americans.’
A few individuals of vision, like Wendell Phillips and Julia Ward Howe,
and a few friendly papers, recognized that behind the revolution were
some sincere and worthy impulses: the earnest wish to maintain the
Republic; the desire to save France from dismemberment; the distrust of
the great monarchist majority in the Assembly and the conviction that
it had made a dishonorable peace; and even the principle of decentraliza-
tion, of local self-government, as against the absolutism of a central power.
But even these expressed regret that there had been recourse to force, and
were horrified by the excesses committed. As the California Daily Alta im-
patiently put it, “Nothing, apparently, can be done in France without
force. . . . No one thinks of solving the problem by free discussion in the
press and public meetings.” ?
Many persons saw only the mob element, and allowed it to confirm or re-
vive their former prejudices. The number of advanced Socialists and
Anarchists among the leaders of the Commune increased the distrust. ThereEHE TGHAURD REPUBEEC

 

 

was little, if any, comprehension of the economic situation and of the
difficulty of reconstruction in the stricken city.’
Said the Trenton Gazette, virtuously,—

“No greater curse could fall upon a dissolute and wicked city like Paris than to
abandon it to its own evil passions.” 4

A continued occupation of Paris by the Germans, according to the St. Paul
Dispatch and the Providence Journal, would be the best thing for the city,
for it would guarantee order and protection from demagogues. The Journal
added :—

“It is this irrepressible passion for insurrection and for street barricades that makes
the Parisian populace the worst possible foe both of liberty and of public security.
On the slightest disaffection .. . they rush to their Hétel de Ville and set up a new
government, and to make their proceeding as vicious as possible they always call
it a republic. The very name becomes hateful, from its continual prostitution by
this Parisian mob. They proclaim themselves the people and everybody else is a
tyrant, and an aristocrat, and an enemy to the people’s cause. Republican liberty
has suffered more from the hands of these mobocrats than from all other foes put
together.” 5

These papers, except the Providence Journal, which was pro-French, had
been unfriendly during the war, changing to greater friendliness after the
establishment of the Republic.

The harsh measures taken by the government for the final suppression of
the Commune brought criticism also, together with doubt of the perma-
ence of a success won by such means.® And there were scattered instances
of the old spirit of invective, best illustrated by the following excerpt from
the Richmond Dispatch (Dem.):—

“The malady which has fastened upon the Latin races seems to be incurable... .
France alone upheld the glory of the Latin name. .. . This splendid military power
of yesterday is now torn asunder territorially, rent with factions among her own
citizens, her world-famous capital made a byword and a hissing. . . . The empire has
failed; the republic has failed; and she is reduced to such straits that she looks back
to the Bourbons for a ruler. The problem of France seems to be incapable of solu-
tion. ... What else could they expect? They gave themselves up to their appetites,
philosophized (as they called it) away everything that restrained them, abolished
God, Christianity, Home, and the Family institution, custom, law, everything. They
undertook ... to find out something better than Revelation, a higher humanity; and
they ended by shooting or starving Archbishop Darboy, by destroying the Tuileries
and the Hotel de Ville, by firing the Louvre, by burning one-fourth of Paris, by
planning to burn all the great cities of Europe. It is not strange that France is
added to the list of departed empires. She defied the cause of Religion and good
morals with more boldness than any nation of modern if not of ancient times... .
The civilization of northern Europe is bound to sweep over the south. The organi-
zation, the practical common sense, the wealth, the culture, the progressive spirit

209

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

of England, Germany, and Russia are bound to extend their ideas over France,
Spain, and Italy. There is a common element of weakness in all the Latin races.
They do not seem adapted to modern times. The English-speaking races, the German-
speaking races, and the Slavic races only remain to dispute the sovereignty.” 7

John L. Motley wrote to Oliver Wendell Holmes, August 13, 1872, that he
had just visited Bismarck at Varzin, and had a very great admiration
for him and his achievements. He added that he thought it very advan-
tageous to substitute the “solid, healthy, Teutonic influence for the Latin-
ized Celtic” in the control of Central Europe. Far better to have things in
the hands of a “united nation of deep thinkers and straightforward honest
strikers for liberty and Fatherland” than in those of a race devoted to
“la Gloire” and avowing that their grandeur must necessarily be built on
“the destruction and disintegration of other nations,’ ®

These specimens deserve especial attention because they embody the idea,
never abandoned by many Americans, that, largely for the reasons therein
stated, France was incapable of ever again becoming one of the great
powers, and that her place would be taken by Germany.

Over against them, however, must be set the judgment, freely expressed
even in the dark days of reconstruction, that France had learned her les-
son, and was now setting her feet firmly in the paths that lead to safety.
The Wilmington Daily Commercial, for example, declared that having
conquered the turbulent Paris mob the Republic had little to fear, even
though there would certainly be factional troubles.

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“Gay, volatile, fickle Paris is dead, let us hope, with the destruction and desolation
of the war. Since she no longer is the imperial city of Luxury, Wealth, and Pleas-
ure, we may trust that from among her ruins will issue a purer and a steadier, a
higher and nobler life. A nation that produced Fénelon and Calvin ought not to
be deficient in religious self-control, and one that has had among her sons Lafayette
and Montesquieu should not be found wanting in sound patriotism and truly repub-
lican principles.” 9

Appleton’s Magazine spoke of the steady democracy of the French peasant,
thought that the elections gave proof of ‘‘chastened moderation and promise
of regeneration, and believed that the “old, false glare of imperialism” no
longer dazzled. France “may astonish the world with a self-conquest more
glorious than the victory of the Germans, which, with the genius of her
people, will enable her speedily to recover her place among the leaders of
civilization.” Germany must not allow herself to be led by the ideas she
now has of “French levity, French ignorance, French vanity, and the
special French passion for ‘la Gloire’ ”’ into underestimating the calibre of
her neighbor. A constitutional monarchy, Appleton’s thought, under a king
from the Orleanist branch, was more probable than the permanence of the
210

 

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republic, but there was no danger of a Bonapartist return. Warm apprecia-
tion was also manifested for the self-sacrifice and devotion which the
French were showing in their efforts to reorganize the government and to
pay the indemnity.’®

The Milwaukee Sentinel after analyzing with care the faults and the vir-
tues of France declared its full faith in the future of the Republic. “The
nation has a vitality that cannot be destroyed.” “The evils will be remedied
and means found to meet the exigencies.” 14 Herbert Tuttle, in the Atlantic
Monthly for May, 1872, insisted that “democracy is a true passion in
French nature.” It explains the revolutions, and many of the sufferings of
the country are due to the attempt to suppress it. So far it has lacked or-
ganization and has made many errors, but,—‘““The Republic alone can
abolish general ignorance.” It “must be established, because there is no safe
alternative.” 22 Charles Eliot Norton wrote, “Her troubles are not hers
alone: they are but symptomatic of the evils that exist everywhere in
modern society.” 1%

The chronicle of William H. Seward’s visit to Paris in the summer of
1871 is interesting. He believed that France was to blame for beginning
the war, but this did not prevent his being keenly interested in her after-
war recovery. He visited the French Assembly and thought the debates
disorderly. He took dinner with Thiers on the day on which the Assembly
had designated him as President of the Republic, and considered it an
especially good sign that the choice had been made of a civilian and a
statesman rather than a soldier or one under the influence of the militarists.
He liked Thiers and thought him fully worthy of respect. He recognized
the seriousness of the factional struggles, and the difficulty of paying “‘in-
demnities as great as the most rapacious of French armies ever extorted
from foreign states,” but came away with “‘a stronger hope than ever” of
the country’s future, and a sigh of thankfulness that since it seemed to be
necessary for nations to change their rulers now and then the people of
the United States had found a legal and orderly means for doing it,—
“Every four years they can turn him out!” **

James Russell Lowell spent the winter and spring of the year 1872-3 in
France, and wrote that “the French are the most wonderful creatures for
talking wisely and acting foolishly that I ever saw.” But he had “at least
pretty well shaken himself clear of one of his pet antipathies.” He had
“even learned to like the French after a fashion.” But he added :—

“I feel... that they are a different breed, for whom | am in no way responsible.
_. . | watch these people as Mr. Darwin might his distant relations in a menagerie.
Their tricks amuse me. . . . I don’t believe they will make their République (a very
different thing from a republic, by the way) march, for every one of them wants to

211

 

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

squat on the upper bar and to snatch the nuts from their fellows. Esprit is their
ruin, and an epigram has twice the force of an argument. However, I have learned
to like them, which is a great comfort, and to see that they have some qualities we
might borrow to advantage.” 15

During the war there had been much criticism from German-Americans
and German sympathizers concerning the sale of arms to France. These
were surplus stores left after the Civil War. Congress had authorized their
sale, without restrictions, and the government had been selling them off
wherever it could find a purchaser. French agents acquired a considerable
quantity of them, though after a time sales to persons known to be repre-
sentatives of France were ordered discontinued. In February, 1872, Sumner
introduced in the Senate a resolution demanding an investigation of these
sales, the immediate cause being charges of fraud emanating from French
sources, to the effect that the United States had not delivered all the arms
that the French had paid for. The Sumner resolution gave opportunity for
a good deal of discussion and for expression of opinion as to the relative
merits of French and Germans, but nothing new was brought out, and the
speeches were so evidently made for purely political purposes that they
are of little value for this study except perhaps to show how thoroughly
domestic affairs had displaced matters of European politics in the public
interest.*®

The San Antonio Express in 1870 printed an anecdote which may also
serve to illustrate the trend of American thought at this later time. Two
countrymen met a third, and asked him what he thought about the war.
“War? What war?” said he. “Why, the war in Europe. They are fighting
there fearfully.” “There, by gum, I said it! I always said it! I always said
that if we sot the nigger free we'd have another war, and I knowed it
would be so!” 3”

Since our international relations were on the whole sufficiently smooth,
an amiable indifference was manifested toward foreign questions in
general, and in the case of France in particular this indifference
developed into a habit, prevalent throughout the succeeding decades.
It was usually friendly, often touched with contempt, and only occasion-
ally roused to active condemnation or praise by some event which loomed
large enough to attract our attention. Reasons for this attitude are
not far to seek. Our own interests grew apace. In the development of
great industries, in problems of trade, of transportation, of tariffs, of
monetary standards, of labor difficulties, in all the manifold ramifica-
tions of great business and national enterprises, we found enough to
absorb our energies and our minds. We were building a great educational
system, working out a great series of schemes for social welfare; and in

212THE THIRD REPRUBELG

a haphazard fumbling way creating a colonial empire and a tangle
of imperialistic interests. Busy, eager, intense, proud of our accom-
plishments, confident of our future, fearing no one, sufficient unto our-
selves, we had not grown into realization of the close interrelation which
binds together the interests of the whole world and makes the problems of
one country the problems of all.
There were no important points at which the interests of the United States
and France clashed. Such differences as arose were either negligible in im-
portance, or were capable of easy settlement, both sides showing a desire
to bring about friendly adjustment. This in itself indicates a certain im-
provement in relations, inasmuch as if feeling on either side had been
actively unfriendly, governments and peoples would have had a tendency
to magnify injuries or place obstacles in the way of adjustment. In mat-
ters concerning the Monroe Doctrine, a far sharper tone had to be em-
ployed with both England and Germany than with France, and in Pacific
affairs, France was not an obstacle to our policy to any serious degree,
nor had we occasion to view her with the suspicion which we had for
Japan, Russia, or Germany.
France herself was not, moreover, involved in any international difficulties
on a large scale which challenged criticism or invited partisanship in this
country. The diplomacy of the Third Republic has been of vital import-
ance to world peace, but the development was so gradual and the sig-
nificance of each step so imperfectly realized at the moment, that there
were few occasions when the United States was tempted to take a definite
stand. On these rare occasions, this country showed a friendliness which
was in some contrast to previous years. This is largely to be explained
by the feeling that Germany had become, not only the energetic, efficient
business rival of the United States, whose activities must be respected if
not always praised, but also the great military power of Europe, showing
a tendency to rule with a strong hand. As between the two, France and
Germany, it came to be true that American sympathy would be directed
toward France, for militarism, wherever it appears, never fails to evoke
the disapproval of the great mass of American citizens.
In regard to French internal politics, we had a certain impatience, a sort
of annoyance because the French did not, according to our ideas, settle
down and behave themselves. We could not see why a republic should
continue to be so unstable, and for explanation fell back on our old ideas
of French fickleness and French immorality. In this field of domestic af-
fairs our old prejudices were most likely to reappear. Fixed ideas remain
fixed unless some one has a definite interest in changing them, and even
the French themselves made for some time no especial effort to do this. On
213

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the whole, however, American opinion was more tolerant because better
informed. Many international prejudices are based upon misunderstand-
ing, and the increase of international contacts due to improved means of
communication led to more intelligent, and therefore more just judg-
ments.

Before turning to a brief discussion of some of the questions which af-
fected the mutual interests of the two countries, a word may be said in
regard to the French spoliation claims. A number of United States citizens
had claims against France for damages incurred before 1800. In 1801 a
treaty was ratified which extinguished all outstanding claims between the
two countries. It was understood on both sides, and the United States so
stated, both then and later, that there was no intention to deny the justice
of the claims, but that they were merely to be cancelled as against France
by counterclaims put forward on behalf of French citizens against the
United States. It was correspondingly understood that each country would
then investigate and attend to the claims of its own citizens. But in the
United States the matter became involved in congressional debates, and
although again and again it was up for discussion, and pages of speeches
on the subject adorn the Congressional Record, nothing was done till 1885,
when a bill was passed providing for investigation of the claims, though
without any assurance that they would be paid. The matter was finally
cleared up only a few years ago, but the payments then made were without
interest.

Large sums were involved, and many persons were affected. Claims eighty
years dormant were difficult or impossible to prove. Some had lapsed be-
cause no representative of the injured party was available to press them.
France was in no way responsible for this delay and injustice, but because
the claims were known as the “French spoliation claims,” and because
every time they were under discussion the story of the original in-
juries was repeated, it is not unnatural that some of the resentment
and irritation which were connected with them should have passed to
France rather than to the rightful culprit, the United States Government
itself.1®

Among the matters in which France was concerned at this time one which
attracted considerable attention was the question of Liberia. This little
negro state on the west coast of Africa had been colonized by freedmen
from the United States, with much aid from individuals and from state
and federal authorities. The United States had disclaimed any protectorate
over the colony, however, and in 1847 it had been recognized by most of
the European countries as independent. The formal act of recognition was
delayed in this country until 1862, apparently because of unwillingness to

214

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receive colored envoys. Liberia lies between the British possession of Sierra
Leone and the French Ivory Coast, and was early subjected to pressure
from both sides, since both France and Great Britain desired to extend
their African holdings as far as possible. The boundaries of the Liberian
state were not clearly delimited, and this fact, together with the inability
of the Liberians to keep the native tribes in order, provided excuse for
constant encroachments. Large foreign loans and bad financial conditions
also encouraged foreign interference.

In 1879 rumors that France had suggested a protectorate were brought to
the attention of the State Department, which promptly took up the matter
through Mr. E. F. Noyes, the American Minister at Paris. In asking Mr.
Noyes to find out the facts, the acting Secretary of State said that as the
United States had ‘founded and fostered” the little native state, it was
evident that this government must feel a peculiar interest in its continued
independence.?® Mr. Evarts, the Secretary of State, wrote in the spring of
1880 to Mr. Noyes that the Government had included in the volume on
Foreign Relations for the year a large amount of the correspondence bear-
ing upon Liberia, because it was suitable that the great powers should know
that America recognized her peculiar relations with the little state and was
prepared to take every proper step to maintain them.”°

In 1884, while Great Britain and Liberia were in dispute over the boun-
dary line along the Mannah River, it was said that the French had occu-
pied an island in the river. This led to energetic representations on the
part of Frelinghuysen, who was then Secretary of State, to the effect that
the United States would consider such an act as threatening “the integrity
and tranquillity” of Liberia; that the United States would claim the right
to use its good offices in settling any disputed boundaries; and that denial
of this right “could not but produce an unfavorable impression in the
minds of the government and people of the United States.” ** France dis-
avowed this act, as she had previously disavowed the attempt at a
protectorate.

During the succeeding years, nevertheless, France and Great Britain did
gradually seize large portions of Liberian territory, paying little attention
to the reiterated protests made by the American government. Cleveland’s
Annual Message, in 1886, took note of these encroachments, reviewed the
circumstances of the organization of Liberia, and the reasons for special
interest on the part of America, and said further,—

“Although a formal protectorate over Liberia is contrary to our traditional policy,

the moral right and duty of the United States to assist in all proper ways in the
maintenance of its integrity is obvious, and has been consistently announced dur-

ing nearly half a century.” 22

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Popular interest is reflected in this sentence from the History of Liberia,
by J. H. T. McPherson,” brought out as one of the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Studies in 1891 :—

“The United States might well exercise some protecting care, might now and then
extend a helping hand, and let the aggressive powers of Europe see that Liberia
is not friendless and that encroachment upon her territory will not be tolerated.” 23

Matters came to a crisis in 1909. The Liberians the previous year, after
a particularly flagrant seizure of land by the French, had decided to send
a commission to the United States to implore aid. President Roosevelt
and Secretary Root received the envoys in a most friendly manner, and
asked Congress to provide funds to send a committee to Liberia to in-
vestigate the situation thoroughly, and make recommendations as to the
best way in which the United States could give assistance. Both declared
that it was imperatively necessary to meet the emergency. Plans for send-
ing the commission were completed by the incoming President, Mr. Taft,
and by Secretary Knox, both of whom expressed themselves as being in
full sympathy with the move.”*

Popular interest had been growing *® and much sympathy with Liberia
was now expressed.?° It is fair to note, however, that England’s aggressions
were considered quite as reprehensible as those of France. The commission
went over to Africa in the summer of 1909, and the report published after
its return was most favorable to Liberia. The report stated that the coun-
try was not bankrupt, as some European sources had tried to insinuate,
but could without great difficulty be placed upon its feet financially, and
urged that the United States should undertake this responsibility, thus
relieving the Liberians of the pressure brought by foreign creditors. They
advised a reorganization of the army under United States direction, so
that the charge that the government could not keep order could not be
employed as an excuse for outside interference; and recommended Amer-
ican assistance in settling boundary disputes. Active steps were at once
taken to carry out these recommendations and others looking toward the
improvement of the country industrially and educationally. There is abun-
dant evidence that this was satisfactory to Americans. As the World’s Work

put it,—

“This means, in effect, that Liberia remains on the map of Africa, and there are
at least two European governments who will not welcome the information.” 28

At one time during this same period another African affair created some
216PE PRD REP URE NG

 

 

interest in the United States. After the French occupation of Madagascar,
John L. Waller, an American consul, remained on the island at the expira-
tion of his official term, and undertook to develop some business conces-
sions. He got into trouble with the French authorities, was arrested, and
sentenced to a twenty-four year term in prison. He appealed to the United
States government, which took up the case. The matter dragged on for some
time, and President Cleveland was criticised for not handling it with more
energy, his “‘spirit of indifference” being “at variance with the spirited
traditions of the State Department when in Republican hands.” It was
asserted that the charges brought against Mr. Waller were devised simply
to oust him from concessions which were desired by French promoters.
Mr. Cleveland, apparently, saw no cause for excitement, and proceeded
to obtain his release in an entirely pacific spirit.?®
If we turn to matters nearer home, we find some questions involving the
Monroe Doctrine. The first of these, a real infraction of the sacred tenet,
attracted no attention at all in the United States. France bought from
Sweden the little island of St. Barthélemi, in the West Indies, in 1878.79
As negative evidence, this has some value. In the early decades of the
century, or in recent years, such transaction could not easily have been
completed.
A quarrel between Venezuela and France, beginning in 1880, engaged the
attention of our government to some extent until 1883, when through the
good offices of the United States a settlement was arranged. The matter
concerned a debt due France, and several times there appeared to be dan-
ger that a blockade would be instituted and custom-houses seized, in order
to force payment. The United States was most anxious that this should not
occur, and Secretary Evarts and his successors, Blaine and Frelinghuysen,
earnestly urged moderation upon the French.*°
It is interesting to note that in 1906, when France again had trouble with
Venezuela, the sympathy of the press in the United States was definitely
pro-French, and the fullest confidence was expressed that “whatever steps
France felt obliged to take in support of her rights and her dignity, her
government would use the greatest care to avoid giving any grounds of
offence to the United States and would not in any way violate the prin-
ciples and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine.™
Among the most important of the questions which might have led to
serious trouble between the United States and France was the project for
building a trans-oceanic waterway at some point in Central America. It
will be recalled that the canal scheme appeared very soon after the
Spanish discovery of the Pacific, and that interest in the plan and in-
217

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vestigation of possible routes had been continuing steadily, not without
considerable friction between the United States and the other countries
whose attention had been attracted to the same field.

After Napoleon III had made several attempts to gain a foothold in Cen-
tral America,*? President Grant went on record with a decisive statement
that in his judgment it was of very great importance that no European
government should be in a position to control an inter-oceanic canal in this
district.38 He also appointed an Inter-oceanic Canal Commission, and
through it undertook thorough surveys of the various routes which had
been proposed. The reports of these surveys favored a Nicaraguan route,
and steps toward acquiring the necessary rights were begun. It was realized
also that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain, negotiated in
1850, in which both countries agreed not to try to obtain exclusive control
of any canal, but to maintain the absolute neutrality of any work which
should be constructed, was a barrier to any undertaking of the kind on
the part of the United States government, and that it must be modified
or annulled before the growing desire of Americans to see such a work
carried out through American initiative and under American management
could possibly be realized. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty then became an
object of increased attack on the part of the State Department. It had
never been popular. We had never accepted the British interpretation,
and the treaty now became so definitely obnoxious that successive efforts to
do away with it were continued until it was at last, in 1901, replaced
by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.**

The anxiety to dispose of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was distinctly in-
tensified by the renewed French interest in the Isthmian question. Between
1875 and 1878 various adventurers obtained concessions or announced
schemes. The Société Geographique of Paris undertook a study of the
various routes; and finally an influential group of Frenchmen belonging
to the Bonapartist party undertook to revive the idea of imperial great-
ness by this means, and obtained concessions for several routes, notably
one from Colombia for a canal anywhere on the Isthmus of Panama. Lieu-
tenant Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse was the chief of this group, and
General Tiirr was another important member. But more important still
was the veteran engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps, builder of the Suez Canal.
After some investigation, De Lesseps decided to try to develop the Panama
route, as marked out by Wyse and another French engineer, Reclus. In
order to get popular backing for his undertaking, he called an “Inter-
national Engineering Congress” at Paris, to consider the whole question of
canal routes. While the Congress was called “Scientific,” the majority of
the members, chosen by De Lesseps himself, were not scientists at all, but

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politicians, capitalists, and speculators. Official representatives of other
countries had been asked, and the United States sent a group of men well
informed on the subject. One of these, Lieut. Menocal, reported that out
of the seventy-two votes cast in the end for the Panama route, only nine-
teen were those of engineers, nine of these being connected with the Suez
organization, five others not practicing engineers, and only one of the whole
number had ever seen the Isthmus. “Of the five delegates from the French
society of Civil Engineers, every one either voted ‘nay’ or stayed away at
the time the vote was taken.’’ However, the vote was acclaimed as a de-
cisive endorsement of the plan already decided upon, and a company was
at once formed to take over the Wyse concessions and begin the work.*®
The news of this definite action aroused a prompt resentment in the
United States. Resolutions were introduced in Congress, protesting against
the scheme as a clear infraction of the Monroe Doctrine, and declaring that
it would represent “an obtrusive interference with our home affairs .. .
which the citizens of the United States would never tolerate”; that ‘“when-
ever, however, or by whomsoever” such a canal was constructed, the Amer-
ican government should insist that the right of the United States to possess
and control it would be asserted and maintained; and that a refusal by
any Power to recognize such a right, through the acquisition of any part
of any state on the American continent would be regarded and treated as
“dangerous to our peace, prosperity and safety.” ** Lig
Secretary Evarts made a declaration which has since been recognized as a
very important part of the Monroe Doctrine, when he said that the
“paramount interest” of the United States in inter-oceanic communications
had been recognized by European states, and implied that they must al-
ways do so. And President Hayes took a step in advance of this position,
and a very important one, when he stated that the policy of the United
States was a canal under American control, and that the country could not
surrender this control to any European power, for such a channel would be
“virtually a part of the coast line of the United States.” *7
President Garfield and Secretary Blaine in the following year took substan-
tially the same position, and Blaine was most energetic in his attempts to
dispose of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in order to clear the ground for
American action.**
Another reaction to be noted was the revival or inauguration in the United
States of rival canal schemes. To these the De Lesseps plan gave a de-
cided impetus. In connection with one of them, a Nicaraguan project
sponsored by Lieut. Menocal and Rear-Admiral Ammen, (both of whom
had assisted in government surveys and had attended the Congress at
Paris), General George B. McClellan, Levi P. Morton, and other well-
219

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known and well-informed men, Ex-President Grant, in an article in the
North American Review, declared that “practically considered” the Pan-
ama plan had but little to recommend it, “either as a commercial con-
venience or as a financial success.” The engineering difficulties were so
great that the cost would be prohibitive, and “no American capitalist
would be likely to look for dividends on an investment like this.” But the
Nicaragua concession was practically and economically sound, and :—

“The concession is made to Americans, ... the corporators are Americans, and
the act of incorporation is asked of an American congress. Every step of this
project recognizes the right of the United States to guard with jealous care the
American continent against the encroachment of foreign powers.”

He declared that the French government would never have allowed an
American company to build the Suez, even if it had maintained a branch
office in France, as De Lesseps was then doing in America, and he thought
our policy should be the same. The Monroe Doctrine had been maintained,
and should be maintained, and he wished to emphasize to Congress and
to the American people the high value of this work of building a Canal,
and to remind them that if not accomplished by Americans, it would
certainly be carried out by some rival nation.%°

The Nation, July 31, 1879, said:—

“Whenever and wherever it [the Canal] is constructed, it will become the most
sensitive and vital part of our interstate and international communication system,
and we must be prepared to protect it from the evil of local revolutions and
foreign aggressions, to seize it when necessary, and successfully defend it against
the two greatest naval powers in the world.”

And, again, Feb. 5, 1880, the Nation argued that the French denial of
official concern in the scheme counted for nothing, for “nobody ever sup-
posed that the present government of France would unnecessarily incur
the ill-will of the United States by avowedly espousing it.” But it must
protect a company of its citizens working under its laws, and it would
be very easy to make excuses for action at any time. The Canal Company
would certainly dominate the weak state in which it operated. “A great
power like ours, with two long coasts and with complex commercial inter-
ests on both oceans, is bound to see that these advantages are not put in
peril of any kind.” Moreover, the United States, bound by treaty with
both Nicaragua and Colombia to guarantee the nationality and neutrality
of the Isthmus, would merely make that duty more costly and burdensome
if it allowed the establishment of an enterprise which must almost in-
evitably lead to infractions of neutrality. Instead, America should “find a
way” to exert the “preponderating influence to which nationally, geographi-
220ABP ied eden tts

PRE THIRD REPU BETTE

 

cally, and commercially we are entitled.” And, quoting Senator Bayard, we
should “‘seize the day” and “act promptly and efficaciously” to the end
that “neither the French nation nor any other power shall acquire a dan-
gerous foothold at our doors.” 4°
The Canal, if constructed, said the North American Review, in a strong
editorial, would vitally affect the relations of the Pacific and the Atlantic
territories of the American Union, and would inevitably require the pro-
tection of some great power. No other power has the right to divide this
responsibility with us. “If the principles of the Monroe Doctrine . . . do
not directly and forcibly apply to the question of an Isthmian Canal as
that question has of late been brought before us by M. de Lesseps, to
what conceivable question connected with American affairs can those prin-
ciples ever so apply?” *#
The Pittsburgh Post, strongly in sympathy with the attitude of the Govern-
ment, referred to the De Lesseps cable, in which the engineer tried to min-
imize the effect of the Hayes pronouncement by saying, “The message
of the President assures the political security of the Canal’ and adds,—
“That’s so. It secures American control, or no canal. Dog in the manger policy it
may be, but not unnatural under the circumstances.” 42
It is not surprising that this feeling should have been manifested. What
is More surprising, in view of the really great importance of the questions
involved, is that there was so little of it. The public in general showed a
surprising indifference to the whole affair. The vigorous Congressional
resolutions failed to pass, and did not even arouse active discussion. What-
ever popular excitement had arisen died down very promptly. President
Hayes was even criticised for being “needlessly agitated,” and the House
resolutions called “buncombe,” “windy pronunciamentos,” “inexpressibly
silly.” The New York Tribune carried an article by Professor Woolsey, an
authority on international law, showing that the De Lesseps plan was in
no sense a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, since it was wholly a private
enterprise, and until the French government tried, through the Canal, to
dominate the people of Colombia in their choice of a government, the
Doctrine “should not even be referred to in connection with it,” and argu-
ing the improbability of any French intervention which would be ob-
noxious.*®
No real obstacle was placed in the way of the French company, and work
on the Canal was actually begun in February, 1881.
The apathy shown by Americans is variously to be explained. Undoubtedly
one cause of it was the propaganda carried on by De Lesseps in this coun-
try. He came over with the definite purpose of conciliating America. While
he was unable to change the opinion of the Executive, his social position
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and international prestige carried weight in many quarters, and he made
clever use of all his resources. He persuaded the Secretary of the Navy to
resign from the Cabinet to take charge of the American branch of his
company, and placed its financial affairs in the hands of influential bankers.
Moreover, as the accounts of the company later showed, large sums were
spent in this country for lobbying, for subsidizing the press, for influencing
public opinion in every way possible.**

But more weighty with Americans in general was the wide-spread lack of
faith in the success of the enterprise. Why worry over a scheme which was
doomed to disaster? The leading American engineers were convinced that
the Panama route was impracticable. They continued to emphasize the en-
gineering difficulties and the huge cost involved; the more, because the
delegates who had attended the Paris conference all testified that the de-
cision there taken was based on inadequate or unsound data, manipulated
for the interests of the clique which already held the concession. From the
first, American accounts spoke of the “ludicrous assurance,” “conceit” and
‘lack of appreciation of the magnitude of the work” manifested by De
Lesseps and his friends, and their “bewilderment on economic as well as

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engineering” problems.*®
As the work progressed, this contempt did not lessen. American observers

visited the Canal and reported the slowness of its progress, the inability of
the engineers to cope with the Chagres River or the slides at Culebra, and
the great loss of life due to unsanitary conditions. The reports, bulletins,
and advertising matter issued by the company were carefully scrutinized,
and the flaws pointed out. The fraud, inefficiency, extravagance, and im-
pending bankruptcy were apparently fully realized in the United States
earlier than in France. “Whatever can be tested, in the bulletins, fails to
stand the test.” The plan was classed as “conceived in vanity and prose-
cuted without seriousness and without intelligence,” and pity was expressed
for the small investors who had been swindled. “They, and not he [De
Lesseps] will suffer by the failure of the canal, for his cheerful spirit is
not to be quelled by the misfortunes of others.’’ *°

The Nation came to take the position that the failure of the Canal might
lead to the overturn of the French government, which would be a great
calamity. The belief was generally held, according to this paper, that “De
Lesseps will never finish the canal, that no private company will ever fin-
ish it, that the present company will become utterly bankrupt,” which
would be “the greatest financial disaster of modern times,” and would shake
the French state to its foundations. It was to the interest of America to see
the plan completed, and by no means to her interest to see the French
Republic fall. There should be no real objection to the use of French
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capital. “If we are strong enough to hold that of Nicaragua and keep it
open, we shall be strong enough to seize that of Panama” in time of need.
This was in 1886 and 1887. In 1889, “the thought of reviving the Panama
plan may seem laughable in the United States,’ but the scheme, in spite
of its difficulties, seemed not impossible of completion, and the French word
was that America was crying it down only to be able to buy it in for a song.
When the crash finally came, and the French company admitted its bank-
ruptcy, Congress seized the opportunity to prevent future enterprises of a
similar nature, and the Senate passed a resolution expressing American
disapproval “of any connection of any European government with any
canal across any American isthmus.” This declaration received an almost
unanimous vote. A few weeks later, Congress went further, adopted a
definite protest against French control in Panama, and appropriated
$250,000 to be used by the President in protecting American rights and
interests on the Isthmus.*?
As we look back upon the period, it seems probable that the intensity of
the partisan politics of the day had much to do with the American atti-
tude. Hayes was the strongest champion of the “American control’ idea,
and Hayes was President only by a compromise which had left unusually
hard feelings in its wake. Moreover, by his policy in appointments and in
administration he had practically split the Republican party, and had at
least alienated many of its influential members. De Lesseps could have
chosen no more fortunate moment, for it was well-nigh impossible at that
time to gain united popular support for any executive action. At any rate,
whatever crisis there was or might have been, passed, and it does not
seem that the French attempt left any appreciable or lasting bitterness in
the United States.
Turning from the Monroe Doctrine to a matter which touched American
interests in a somewhat different way, we should mention, although briefly,
the tariff difficulties with France, covering a period of some twenty years,
beginning about 1881. The first phase, and the only one which created any
serious feeling in the United States, concerned what M. Ribot, then French
Minister of Foreign Affairs, called “l’affaire des petits cochons,” when
France and Germany prohibited the importation into their countries of
American pork. The reason assigned was the alleged presence of trichine,
making the product a menace to the health of the consumer. It developed
that a far more weighty reason was the desire to protect the native agri-
cultural industries against American competition. But, as the American
Ambassador to France remarked, there is a difference between protection
and prohibition, and after some argument the French recognized this, and
substituted for the obnoxious laws high tariffs based to some extent upon
223

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the principle of reciprocity. The controversy was handled throughout in a
friendly spirit, quite different from the acrimonious tone which the govern-
ment was compelled to employ in the negotiations with Germany upon the
same subject. For example, Whitelaw Reid, who later secured the with-
drawal of the undesirable French laws, called attention in his first official
address as American Ambassador in Paris, (1889), to the fact that both
countries were then celebrating anniversaries, France the centenary of her
Revolution, America that of the Constitution and the inauguration of
Washington. These anniversaries, he said, revived old memories of friend-
liness, and—‘“I am instructed that there is not the shadow of a question
in dispute between the two great Republics to cloud the historic friendship
which has endured for a century.” *®

Ten years later, however, the “historic friendship” was somewhat clouded
by the French disapproval of American intervention in Cuba and the strong
pro-Spanish feeling manifested by France in the war which followed.
Americans were not pleased by the criticisms in the French journals, nor
by the cartoons such as that in La Silhouette, which pictured the United
States as the wolf in the fable, and Spain as the lamb, with the legend
“Will might be right yet again?” *°

Most Americans were nevertheless tolerant enough to admit that both
sentimental and economic reasons would naturally impel the French to
side with Spain. Politically and strategically the relations between the two
countries had been close for years, too, and for the safety of France must
continue to be so. Both were Catholic in religion, and both of the Latin
race. France was the largest holder of Spanish bonds and a Spanish defeat
would therefore be reflected by a business depression in France. The Nation,
reviewing these points, added that both countries attached greater import-
ance to good manners than did the United States, which was prone to think
that formalities mean affectation. The Outlook called attention to the fact
that some portions of the French press did not represent the people any
more than did the yellow journals in the United States, but were controlled
by financial interests. “Sooner or later,” it added, “that keen intelligence
which is sometimes obscured but never wholly destroyed in France must
discern the facts in the Cuban situation and our motives in attempting to
change the situation.” The New York Sun deplored the rumors of American
retaliation by a refusal to participate in the Paris Exposition planned for
1900, and said such action could only harm the United States. The Phila-
delphia Ledger agreed and regretted that any unfriendliness should appear,
when Americans had “for more than a century had only the warmest and
most cordial feeling” for France, “a feeling which has been strengthened

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by her adoption in 1871 of a Republican form of government, so much
like our own.” °°
American journals were quick to note the improvement in the French atti-
tude as the war progressed. “We have no cause for serious complaint,” said
the Review of Reviews. The French were “humbugged by their mercenary
newspapers” but are “rapidly seeing their mistake.” Probably, as Madame
de Hegermann-Lindencrone reported, the tact and cleverness of General
Horace Porter, the new Ambassador to France, had much to do with the
change.**
Commendation was given, also, to the French government for the irre-
proachable neutrality and friendliness maintained in spite of the pro-
Spanish predilections of the people; and it was partly in recognition of
this fact that the good offices of the French, exerted most tactfully through
M. Cambon, the Ambassador at Washington, were accepted for the open-
ing of peace negotiations. Finally, it was the French capital which was
selected as the place for concluding the peace treaty. In his Annual Mes-
sage for 1899 President McKinley spoke of the very full participation
planned by Americans in the Paris Exposition of the following year, and
of the enthusiasm of the preparations.*?
After the acquisition of the Philippines and Guam American interest in
Pacific affairs grew apace. At the opening of the Spanish-American war we
had accepted the Hawaiian Islands, which had long hung like ripe fruit
ready to drop into our hands, and were now recognized as providing an
essential naval base. We revised the Samoan agreement, and made our in-
terests there independent of international control. Looking eagerly beyond,
to the almost untouched riches of the Far East, we revived and strength-
ened the “open door” policy; and we built the Panama Canal at last, as a
gateway between our eastern and our western shores and as the strategic
guard for our oriental holdings and desires. In all these undertakings
there was remarkably little friction with France, who did not appear as
rival or as antagonist. In fact, as Francis Regal, the editor of the Spring-
field Republican, suggests, France was to some degree “out of focus,’ and
our attention was directed instead toward England as the great sea power;
or, with more antagonism, toward Germany’s rising imperialism; or even
toward Japan, as a new and formidable factor in world politics.**
We praised French behavior at the Hague Conferences, and we signed
various peace and arbitration agreements with her without demur.®* When
the Hay treaties of 1904 were before the Senate, the New York Evening
Mail remarked that it would be hard to imagine a disagreement between
France and America which would really menace the vital interests, the in-
225

 

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dependence or the honor of either, and the Literary Digest in making its
poll of the press on the subject declared that feeling was so cordial that
most of the newspapers had to branch out into generalities to find any spe-
cial significance or real worth in such a treaty between France and Amer-
ica.®> And in 1910 Archibald Cary Coolidge, summarizing America’s rela-
tions with France, declared that never during the last century had the
relations between the two countries been on so satisfactory a basis, “and so
far as we can judge, there is no good reason why they should not continue
to be excellent.” °°
On frequent occasions opportunity was found for manifestation of this
cordial feeling between the two countries. Together they celebrated several
anniversaries. There was a revival of interest in the heroes of the Revolu-
tionary times, and there was an exchange of gifts and memorials based
upon these common interests, such as could not have occurred between
countries whose relations were other than friendly.
In 1881, the very year when De Lesseps’ canal scheme was taking definite
shape, and the year, too, when the French had prohibited the entrance
of American pork, the United States celebrated the centenary of the
Battle of Yorktown, having as guests of the nation a distinguished dele-
gation of foreigners representing the countries and the families which had
sympathized and helped on the occasion of the battle. President Arthur,
in his address, expressed warmest appreciation of their generous aid, and
at the dinner in their honor in New York, Secretary Evarts responded to
the toast of “The French Alliance.” “The amicable relations between our
two countries, founded in 1778 by the Treaty of Amity and Commerce
. cemented in blood in 1781, renewed by this visit of our distinguished
guests, will we trust be perpetuated through all time.’’ He made humorous
reference to those manifestations of the spirit of amity which consisted
in shutting out as many as possible of each other’s products, but said that
an exchange of goods was necessary,—‘‘and we both know it.” He declared
that the friendship of the United States with France was closer even than
that with England. It represented “two Republics united against the
world. . . . Nothing can limit it; nothing can disturb it; nothing shall
disparage it.’ 5? A striking contrast, this, to that other celebration of the
Yorktown victory when Lafayette was in America in 1824 and the
feeling was so unfriendly that French warships lying in the harbor ignored
the occasion, and officers and members of the crew were forbidden to
share in the rejoicings.
One of the best-known examples of international courtesy is the statue
of “Liberty Enlightening the World,” which stands in New York Harbor.
The idea for this is said to date back to a time before the Franco-
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Prussian War, when among a group of friends at the home of Laboulaye,
the host suggested that because of the common interest and the sympathy
between France and the United States, it would be fitting if they should join
in building a memorial to the War of Independence. The sculptor Bartholdi
was present, and was interested in the thought. He was an Alsatian, and
after the war, unwilling to return to his home, he decided to go to Amer-
ica for a temporary stay. Visiting Laboulaye before he left, Bartholdi re-
ferred to American sympathy with Prussia, and Laboulaye declared his
faith that this did not represent the true feeling of the Americans, who, he
was sure, had real gratitude and friendliness for France. “Propose to our
friends over there,” he said, ‘to make with us a monument, in remem-
brance of the ancient friendship of France and the United States. We
will take up a subscription in France. If you find a happy idea... we
are convinced that it will be successful on both continents, and have a
far-reaching moral effect.” Bartholdi sailed with this in mind, and the
plan for the statue came to him as he entered New York Harbor on his
arrival. He was in the country six months, and made many friends among
prominent Americans. On his return to France, a Franco-American com-
mittee was organized, the understanding being that the French would
secure the money for the statue, and the Americans would provide the site
and the pedestal. Washburne, the American Minister, took a keen interest
in the plan. The French committee included descendants of Lafayette and
Rochambeau, and prominent Republicans like Laboulaye. Wm. M. Evarts
was chairman of the American group, and John Jay and other leading
Americans were interested. Enthusiasm was increased by the fact that the
United States was preparing to celebrate in Philadelphia the hundredth
anniversary of its independence.
A memorial was sent to Congress asking for approval and support and
President Grant sent a special message recommending such action. Feb-
ruary 22, 1877, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President
to accept the statue, to choose a suitable site on Bedloe’s Island, and to
make arrangements for its installation with “such ceremonies as shall
serve to testify the gratitude of our people for this expressive and felicitous
memorial of the sympathy of the citizens of our sister republic.” 58
The work, said Chas. de Kay in Scribner’s Magazine, is “designed to draw
closer the natural bonds of sympathy between Frenchmen and Americans,
and . . . to remind all men of the early alliance between the two peoples,
as well as the political action and reaction they have at various times
exerted upon each other.” °°
The money for the statue was raised in France by popular subscriptions
from all classes of people, 100,000 different individuals contributing, and
227

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on October 24, 1881, the anniversary of the victory at Yorktown, Levi P.
Morton, the United States Minister to France, drove the first rivet in the
statue. On July 4, 1884, M. de Lesseps, as Chairman of the French Com-
mittee, formally presented the work to Mr. Morton for the United States.
Meantime, in this country, the money for the base and pedestal was being
raised, rather slowly, so that the New York World finally undertook a
campaign through which a fairly large proportion of the whole amount
was collected. The base was completed in 1884, and in his Annual Message
of that year President Arthur called attention to the expected arrival of the
“senerous gift of the people of France” and suggested Congressional action
in recognition of it and in aid of the completion of the pedestal.®°

In June, 1885, the Bartholdi Statue arrived at New York. It was sent
over from France in a warship, the Jsére. As the boat came up the harbor
it was escorted by the North Atlantic Squadron, the Despatch, with the
Secretary of the Navy on board, leading. The Mayor, with the Pedestal
Committee, the French consuls of New York and Chicago, and many
guests, went out to meet it, and numbers of excursion boats, crowded with
passengers, followed. All the vessels in the harbor were decorated with
bunting and with French and American flags. Salutes were fired from the
forts at the Narrows,—Fort Columbus, Castle William, and Fort Wood.
The committee and the French representatives landed on Bedloe’s Island
where choral societies sang the “Marseillaise” and “Hail Columbia.” Then
they crossed to the Battery and paraded through crowded streets, gay with
flags, and with roofs and windows filled with onlookers, to the City Hall.
Three regiments of the New York State Guards led the procession, and
delegations from various organizations were in line. A banquet, in the
Governor’s Room, in the City Hall, followed, with speeches and compli-
ments of the warmest. Evarts made a felicitous address, and was followed
by General Horace Porter, who spoke to the toast,—

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“The French Alliance; initiated by noble and sympathetic Frenchmen; grandly
maintained by the blood and treasure of France; now newly cemented by the
spontaneous action of the French people; may it be perpetuated through all
time.”

When America lay prostrate, France aided her, said General Porter, “and
now that America has risen in her strength and stands erect before the
nations of the world . . . she always stands with arms outstretched to-
ward France in token of the great gratitude she bears.” **

On October 28 of the following year, 1886, the formal unveiling of the
statue took place. No effort was spared by the United States Government
to emphasize the international character of the ceremony and to give it

228

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all fitting dignity and importance. President Cleveland and the Cabinet
occupied the reviewing stand at Madison Square, while a large and im-
posing parade passed. There was a naval demonstration, with some 300
ships in line, led by French and American warships. At the hour of the
unveiling of the statue by Bartholdi, cannon salutes were fired at every
military post in the States and Territories, by order of the Federal
Government. A distinguished delegation of French guests had come over,
including the Premier, the Minister of Public Instruction, and members
of the French legislature and of the Paris municipal council. Addresses
were made, as usual, De Lesseps speaking for France, and President
Cleveland responding. Among the other speakers was Chauncey M. De-
pew. That night there was an illumination of the harbor craft, but the
drizzling rain which had fallen all day spoiled the display of fireworks
which had been planned.®?

The poll of the press reported by Public Opinion showed without exception
the greatest cordiality and appreciation. All the comments exhibited the
kindliest feeling toward France.** President Cleveland in his Annual
Message in December, took pains to comment upon the gift and the friend-
ship which it symbolized.*4

In 1889 the American colony in Paris presented to the city a reduced
replica of the Bartholdi statue, Whitelaw Reid, then Ambassador, acting
as spokesman at the presentation, which was made on July 4.°% In 1900,
on the Fourth of July, a statue of Lafayette, the gift of American
school children, aided by an appropriation from Congress, was unveiled
at Paris.°° In 1902 a distinguished group of Frenchmen came to Wash-
ington to share in the ceremonies connected with the unveiling of the
Statue of Rochambeau, also a gift from France, and placed by the
United States in a position of honor, directly across from the White
House. Again the tone of the press was very friendly. The World’s
Work spoke of the service rendered by M. Cambon at the close of the
Spanish-American War, and said that in view of this, American friend-
ship could not be merely negative. We are in the debt of France, con-
tinued this article, intellectually and esthetically, as well. “It is she that
brings us into contact with Latin habits of thought and clearness of
vision.” The Literary Digest, citing appreciative remarks from American
sources, cited also the French newspapers on the topic, including a phrase
from the Journal des Debats to the effect that “even Senator Lodge spoke
of gratitude.” °7 3

In the fall of 1902 M. Cambon was replaced as French Ambassador,
and Elihu Root in his farewell address spoke not only of the gratitude
of this country for M. Cambon’s kind Offices, but of “the new republic,

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whose footsteps we have all followed with hopes and prayers for its success
and its permanency as during these thirty years it was proving itself a
most important, most significant stronghold of popular rights, of popular
sovereignty and of hopes for the future of the peoples of the earth, of the
plain peoples of the earth in Europe. Through all the long course of the
centuries, the French people have been doing, with pain, with travail, with
infinite labor and sacrifice, the work of civilization and liberty.” °°

In 1904, the Congress of the United States voted that the Secretary of
State should cause to be struck a medal to commemorate the 200th
anniversary of the birth of Benjamin Franklin, and that one single im-
pression should be made in gold and presented to the Republic of France.
The medal was designed by Louis and Augustus St. Gaudens, and the
formal presentation to Ambassador Jusserand for France was made in
Philadelphia, April 20, 1906, under the auspices of the American Philo-

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Fa sophical Society, before a representative audience of Americans. Secretary
3) Root again made the address. He said:—

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“Take it for your country as a token that with all the changing manners of the
i passing years, ... Americans have not forgotten their fathers and their fathers’
t friends.

“Know by it that we have in America a sentiment for France; and a sentiment,
enduring among a people, is a great and substantial fact to be reckoned with.
_.. We feel a little closer to you of France for what you were to Franklin.
Before the resplendence and charm of your country’s history—when all the world
does homage to your literature, your art, your exact science, your philosophic
thought—we smile with pleasure, for we feel, if we do not say: Yes, these are old
friends of ours; they were very fond of our Ben Franklin and he of them.
“Made more appreciative, perhaps, by what France did for us when this old phil-
osopher came to you, a stranger, bearing the burdens of our early poverty and
distress, we feel that the enormous value of France to civilization should lead
every lover of mankind, in whatever land, earnestly to desire the peace, the pros-
perity, the permanence, and the unchecked development of your national life.

“We, at least, cannot feel otherwise; for what you were to Franklin we would be
—we are—to you; always true and loyal friends.” ®°

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At about this same time the return from France to America of the body of
John Paul Jones furnished an occasion for the expression of very cordial
feeling, both in Paris, where French and American sailors paraded to-
gether for the first time, and in Annapolis, where the body was interred.
President Roosevelt, Ambassador Jusserand, Governor Warfield of Mary-
land, and General Horace Porter, through whose efforts the body was
discovered and returned, were among the speakers on the occasion.”

In 1909, in return for the compliment of the Franklin medal, the French
struck’one for San Francisco, rebuilt after the earthquake. In 1910, the
State of Virginia presented the French Republic with a bronze duplicate

230

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of the famous Houdin statue of Washington which stands in the State
House at Richmond. In this year the French celebrated the fortieth anni-
versary of the establishment of the Third Republic, and received friendly
congratulations from this country. In 1911 the Sons of the Revolution
erected at Annapolis a granite shaft in honor of the French soldiers and
sailors who were killed in that war.”

Finally, in 1912, the tercentenary of Champlain’s explorations was cele-
brated in the United States. The states of New York and Vermont united
in making and carrying out the plans, which included the Champlain
Memorial Lighthouse at Crown Point, and a statue of the explorer at
Plattsburg. France expressed a desire to share in the ceremonies through
the presentation of a sculptured figure of “La France,’ the work of
Rodin. This beautiful piece was brought to America by a committee led
by Gabriel Hanotaux, and was received with the warmest appreciation.
Typical of the comment is the editorial in the New York Sun which calls
attention to the fact that this celebration follows closely Anglo-French

ceremonies on the Riviera:—

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“The American celebration will thus have the character of the recognition by the
other half of the Anglo-Saxon world of the large and growing friendship between
two of the world’s great races... .. The friendship with France is the oldest of
American international relationships. It no longer has the character of an alliance
or an agreement intended for warlike uses. But its value as an agent for peace
has gained rather than lost thereby, and each celebration such as the present must
serve a useful as well as a sentimental purpose, useful because it demonstrates the
possibility of permanent international amity, sentimental because it recalls an
ancient association in an honorable triumph.” 7?

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NOTES AND SOURCES

1 Washburne, “Reminiscences of the Siege and Commune of Paris,” Scribner's Maga-
zine, 1. (Later published as a part of his Recollections); Correspondence of E. B.
Washburne, Franco-Prussian War and Insurrection of the Commune; Moore, Di-
gest of International Law, |: 128.
2 Nation, July 13, 1871; Richards and Elliott, Julia Ward Howe, 11: 308-9; Cali-
fornia Daily Morning Bulletin, May 23, 1871; Philadelphia North American, May
13, 1871; Leslie’s, May 6; California Daily Alta, Mar. 11, 1871.
3 Leslie's, Apr. 8, Apr. 29, July 1, 1871.
4 Trenton Gazette, Mar. 12, 1871.
5 Providence Journal, Mar. 4, 1871; St. Paul Dispatch, same date. Pittsburgh Post,
Mar. 22; Philadelphia Ledger, Apr. 7, 1871.
6 Boston Daily Advertiser, May 30; Washington Evening Star, May 30; Hartford
Courant, May 30; Washington Daily National Republican, June 6, 1871.
7 Richmond Dispatch (strongly pro-French, before this), May 23, June 10, 1871;
Washington Daily Patriot, May 29; T. G. Appleton, “The Flowering of a Nation,”
Atlantic Monthly, Sept., 1871.
8 J. L. Motley, Correspondence, G. W. Curtis, ed., I]: 349-52.

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

® Wilmington Daily Commercial, May 27, 1871.
10 Appleton’s, August 12, Oct. 21, 1871; Apr. 20, 1872.
11 Milwaukee Sentinel, June 7, 1871.
12 Herbert Tuttle, “French Democracy,” Atlantic, XXIX: 560-565.
13C. E. Norton to Frederick Harrison, Dec. 24, 1872. C. E. Norton, Letters, ed.,
S. Norton and M. A. deWolfe Howe. |: 446.
14W. H. Seward’s Travels around the World, Olive Risley Seward, ed., 750-768.
15 James Russell Lowell, Letters. 11: 87. Lowell to Geo. Putnam, Dec. 12, 1872; 91,
Lowell to Miss Norton, Mar. 4, 1873; 96, Lowell to Leslie Stephen, Apr. 29; and
101, 102, 104.
16 Savannah Republican, Jan. 22, Feb. 4, 1872; Keim, 20-23; Leslie’s, Mar. 30, 1872;
Sumner, Memoirs and Letters, 1V: 504-514; Wm. Dudley Foulke, Life of Oliver P.
Morton, 11: 227-253; Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Pt. 2. 1871-2.
17 San Antonio Express, Sept. 8, 1870.
18 For a brief and clear exposition of the history of these claims and the de-
lays involved in their settlement, see Edward Everett, “The French Spoliation
Claims,” North American Review, CXL: 551-556.
19 Foreign Relations, 1879, 341.
20 American Journal of International Law, IV: 222, Supplement.
21 Moore, International Law Digest, V : 772-3.
22 [b., 774-5.
28 History of Liberia, J. H. T. McPherson, Jobns Hopkins University Studies,
IX: No. 10.
24 American Journal of International Law, III: 958-63, Oct., 1909. R. P. Falkner, Jb.
IV: 529-45. July, 1910; Jb. IV, Supplement.
25H. H. Johnston, “Future of Liberia,” Independent, Oct. 11, 1906; Bishop Scott,
“To the Rescue of Liberia,” /b., Sept. 26, 1907; J. J. Dossen, “Past, Present and Fu-
ture of Liberia,” /b., Jan. 2, 1908.
26 F. A. Forbes, “Can the Black Man Stand Alone?” World’s Work, Oct., 1909; W.
F. Walker, “Why Liberia Wants America’s Help,” Independent, July 8, 1909: Jb,
263-5, July 29, 1909; E. L. Scott, “Liberia’s Crisis,” Aug. 19, 1909. Outlook, Mar. 13,
1909, 575; Ib. Aug. 7, 1909, 822-3.
27 Independent, Mar. 31, 1910, 710-11, /b., Apr. 7, 1910, 775-6; Ib., Apr. 3, 1913, 742-6;
Nation, Apr. 21, 1910, 392-3; World’s Work, May, 1910, 12872-3; Outlook, May 7,
1910, 5-6; Review of Reviews, Oct. 1910, 483-4. “Documents on the Liberian Ques-
tion,” American Journal of International Law, 1V (1910). Supplement, 188-229.
28 Harry Thurston Peck. Twenty Years of the Republic, 408-9; Richardson, Mes-
sages, IX: 628.
29 Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, 113.
8° Moore, International Law Digest, V1: 584-6, 711-13; Richardson, Messages,
VIII: 42; Fish, American Diplomacy, 384-5.
81 Harper's Weekly, Feb. 10, 1906; Review of Reviews, Feb., 1906, 138.
82 See Ch. V.
83 Johnson. Four Centuries of the Panama Canal, 73.
34 Johnson, /b., 75, 86-93. Summary of earlier history of Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
{b., Ch. IV; Edwin Erle Sparks, National Development, 213-215, 221-22: Hart,
Monroe Doctrine, 168-176; Foster, Century of American Diplomacy, 456-58,
463-5; Fish, American Diplomacy, 379-83; Johnson, America’s Foreign Relations,
II: 309-15.

232THE THIRD REPUBENG

 

85 Sparks, 203-7; Johnson. America’s Foreign Relations, Il: 307-8; Hart, Monroe
Doctrine, 169; Johnson, Four Centuries of the Panama Canal, 73-80.

36 Sparks, 212-13; W. E. Curtis, The United States and Foreign Powers, 113; Con-
gressional Record, 46th Congress, Ist Session, 2312; 46th Congress, 2nd Session, 12-14,
779, 1392.

37 Richardson, Messages, VII: 585-6; Hart, Monroe Doctrine, 170-71; Sparks, 216-18;
Johnson, Panama Canal, 81-84; Johnson, Foreign Relations, 11: 308.

38 Hart, op. cit., 172-4; Johnson, Panama Canal, 87-93.

89 North American Review, CXXXII: 107-116. Feb., 1881; Sparks, 211-12; Johnson,

Panama Canal, 80, 85-6.
40 Nation, XXIX: 70-71; XXX: 90-91. Official French disavowal, Hart, Monroe

Doctrine, 342.
41 North American Review, 130, 499-511. May, 1880.
42 Pittsburgh Post, Mar. 9, Mar. 11, 1880.
43 Philadelphia Times, Mar. 1, citing New York Tribune; Philadelphia Times, Feb.
1, 1881; Philadelphia North American, Mar. 10, 1880; Feb. 9, 1881.
44 Johnson, Panama, 80-81, 84-85; Sparks, 208-10; Pittsburgh Post, Mar. 19, 1881;
Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, 73-75.
45 Nation, XXIX: 70-71; Coolidge, United States as a World Power, 272-4; Hart,
Monroe Doctrine, 171-2; A. B. Menocal, “Intrigues at the Paris Canal Congress,”
North American Review, CXXIX: 288-293.
46 Geo. C. Hurlbut, “The Panama Canal from Within,” Forum, 1V: 279.
47 Nation, XLV: 367; XLIII: 91-2; XLIX: 385. See also Stuart F. Weld, Popular
Science Monthly, XXXI: 323; Atlantic, LXIII: 348; Popular Science Monthly,
XXXII: 447; Johnson, Panama, 95-97.
48 Richardson, Messages, VIII: 106-7, 171, 202, 331, 609; IX: 82-3, 110; Fish, Amer-
ican Diplomacy, 388-9, 470-71; Moore, International Law Digest, VII1: 474-635;
Johnson, America’s Foreign Relations, 11: 129-30; E. C. Stowell and H. C. Munro,
International Cases, 1: 292; Royal Cortissoz, Life of Whitelaw Reid, \1: 125-6,
130-31, 136-39, 145-51, 168.
49 1a Silhouette, reproduced Review of Reviews, July, 1898; Cortissoz, Reid, 11: Ch.
XIII; Latané, America as a World Power, 63; Keim, 218-220; Fish, American Diplo-
macy, 426; Elbert J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-
American War, 215; Paul L. Haworth, The United States in our Own Times, 239;
Johnson, America’s Foreign Relations, 11: 254-6, 262; Brooks Adams, “The Spanish
War and the Equilibrium of the World,” Forum, XXV: 641-651.
50 Nation, Apr. 28, 1898, 315; Outlook, May 28, 1898; New York Sun, cited in Phil-
adelpbia Ledger, May 22; New York Tribune, in Philadelphia Ledger, Apr. 4;
Ledger, Apr. 26, May 11; Peck, Twenty Years of the Republic, 545-554; L. M. Sears,
“French Opinion of the Spanish-American War,” Hispanic American Historical Re-
view, Feb., 1927, 25-44.
51 Review of Reviews, XVIII: 21. July, 1898; Mme. de Hegermann-Lindencrone, The
Sunny Side of Diplomatic Life, 262; Century, LVI: 776-80, and editorial comment;
Independent, July 21, 1898.
52 Philadelphia Ledger, May 14, 16, 18; Cortissoz, Reid, cited above; Coolidge,
188: Latané, 65, 67; Peck, 581; Fish, 494; Johnson, Foreign Relations, 11: 262-4;
Richardson, Messages, X: 143-4.
53 Francis Regal to the writer, July 3, 1922; Fish, 403, 454-60; Coolidge, 189-93.
54 Review of Reviews, XIX: 149; Ib. XXXVI: Ib. XXXVII: 279; America,
233

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July 23, 1911; North American Review, CXCV: 1, Jan., 1912; Latané, 249, Ze
Fish, 475; Johnson, America’s Foreign Relations, 11: 377-9.

55 New York Evening Mail, cited in Literary Digest, Nov. 12, 1904.

56 Coolidge, United States as a World Power, 188-9.

57 F. W. Seward, Recollections of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, 449-52;
W. M. Evarts, Arguments and Speeches, Sherman Evarts, ed., II]: 403-10: Mod-
ern Eloquence, T. B. Reed, ed., II] : 457-62.

88 Richardson, Messages, VII: 427; Public Opinion, 11: 52. Oct. 30, 1886: Report of
Jos. W. Drexel, Chairman of Executive Committee, to Bayard, Secretary of State,
Apr. 27, 1886, in Foreign Relations Committee Reports, 1V: 57-63.

59 Charles de Kay, “The Bartholdi Statue,” Scribner's, June, 1877.

80 Richardson, Messages, VII: 237; Public Opinion, 11: 52; Drexel Report, cited
above.

$1 Modern Eloquence, I\1: 89; Pittsburgh Post, June 20, 1885; E. Benjamin An-
drews, History of Our Own Times, 523-527.

62 Foreign Relations Committee Report, 1V: 57; Andrews, op. cit., 527.

63 Public Opinion, II: 69. Nov. 6, 1886.

64 Richardson, VIII: 498.

65 Cortissoz, Reid, Il: 130-31.

% Foreign Relations, 1900, 456, 468, 471, (Rochambeau monument, Vendome).

87 Fish, 467, 494-5; World’s Work, 1V: 2257 (1902); Literary Digest, June 21, 1902,
732-5, 847.

®8 Elihu Root, Miscellaneous Addresses. James Brown Scott and Robert Bacon,
eds., 146. Courtesy of Harvard University Press.

8® Root, Miscellaneous Addresses, 141-2, Courtesy of Harvard University Press;
Jules Jusserand, With Americans of Past and Present Days, 309-316.

70 April 24, 1906.

71 Jusserand, 315-6; America, Aug. 27, 1910; Outlook, Oct. 1, 1910; America, Apr. 18,
1911,

72 New York Sun, Apr. 27, 1912; Literary,Digest, May 11, 1912; America, May 4,
1912; Outlook, May 8; New York Herald, May |, May 4; Deseret Evening News,
May 2.

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Signs and Portents

F the actual relations between two countries consisted solely in those

which are official and are thus governed to a greater or less degree by
the existence or non-existence of possible causes of conflict, this study
might well have been concluded with the summary of official relations, in
the last chapter. But for a clear understanding of the disposition of
Americans toward France during this period it will be necessary to con-
sider also some less tangible but equally potent factors.
The current of opinion in any country is determined largely by the trend
of thought in intellectual circles. In the early years of American history
French educational systems exercised a great influence upon our schools
and French intellectual achievement was highly respected.t In the last
forty years of the nineteenth century German influence in this field had to
a very great degree become predominant and the Germans were generally
spoken of as the originators and leaders in science and learning.”
This tendency could not be wholly justified by the genuine and undoubted
progress made by Germany since the Franco-Prussian War. Other Eu-
ropean nations had been progressing too, and each could present un-
deniable evidence of achievement. The explanation is largely to be found
in the fact that practically everyone who was trained abroad during this
time studied in Germany, under professors who believed and enthusias-
tically maintained that in all intellectual matters Germany’s place in the
sun was an accomplished fact, and that no other nation could hope to
compete. The returned students, leaders in American intellectual circles,
consciously or unconsciously spread this propaganda.
The flow of students to German universities is in its turn to be explained
in part by the fact that in American academic circles advanced degrees had
become important factors in success, and the German schools placed by
far the fewest restrictions and difficulties in the way of foreign students
who wished to obtain such degrees. In France in particular the regulations
until within the last few years were practically prohibitive, inasmuch as
to be eligible for a higher degree one should hold the lower one from a
French institution. Degrees from standard American colleges and uni-

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versities were not acceptable. Americans naturally did not care to spend
years of foreign study without being able to show for them something
tangible and something which. would advance them professionally in their
own country.

In making the restrictions the French had in mind the fact that their
educational institutions were practically a part of their civil service sys-
tem, since they fitted their graduates to hold state offices, and it was de-
sired that government officials should be trained from the beginning under
French auspices. The value of attracting foreign students was not realized
and foreigners came to feel that it was difficult, almost impossible, to
obtain academic recognition in a French institution. It was therefore
entirely natural that Americans should flock to German universities, where
they were welcomed and honored, and that they should carry away with
them a feeling of gratitude and loyalty, should condemn the rigidity of
the French regulations, and conclude that the country was not so far
advanced intellectually as Germany.

Moreover, this meant that French works, in the original or in translation,
were not assigned for study in American universities, nor cited so fre-
quently as they should have been; French scholars and scientists of high
rank were not adequately known, and French researches not justly con-
sidered. And the thinking and writing of American professional men in
all fields reflected this inequality.®

A change, however, was on the way. In spite of the strong ties which
bound them to German leadership, American investigators could not allow
their field of thought to be held permanently within such narrow limits.
Instead they wished to develop along international lines, searching for
the best wherever it was to be found, and according without bias or
prejudice due honor to good work no matter where or by whom it was
produced. Achievement, rather than nationality, was to become the accepted
test.

An American lawyer, Mr. Harry J. Furber, made an investigation in
1895 of the Sorbonne, the Collége de France, the Ecole des hautes études,
and of other schools in Paris. He found in the art schools more Americans
than in any other European center, but the number in general cultural
courses or in the various fields of science was extremely small, and in view
of the quality of training offered, he thought this regrettable. The reason
seemed to lie in the hampering governmental regulations above mentioned.
He promptly took up the matter with the French authorities, through M.
Poincaré who was then minister of public instruction. Several prominent
Frenchmen became interested and undertook to codperate. In America a
group of leading educators joined in the movement. Among them were

236SIGNS AND PORTENTS

 

 

Presidents Angell of the University of Michigan, Dwight of Yale, Eliot
of Harvard, Gilman of Johns Hopkins, G. Stanley Hall of Clark, and
Schurman of Cornell; also Carroll D. Wright, W. T. Harris, United States
Commissioner of Education, S. P. Langley of the Smithsonian Institution,
Andrew D. White, Simon Newcomb, and Seth Low. Their purpose was
declared to be “to facilitate closer educational affiliation” between French
and American schools. As a result the vexatious French regulations were
changed.*

Interest, in the United States, was at once much stimulated. It is worth
while in this connection to compare the brief and superficial account of
French schools of history and politics written in 1887 by Andrew D.
White with the thorough, thoughtful, and in the main favorable study of
the same subject offered in 1897 by Charles Homer Haskins.®

American observers criticised the close government supervision of the
schools and their linking with politics. This was thought to interfere with
the development of individual initiative and likely to react unfavorably
upon national progress. They found the organization of the educational
system unnecessarily complex, and characterized to some degree by a lack
of coordination between related subjects. The unrivalled material, espe-
cially the manuscript collections, in the French libraries was not well
catalogued nor readily enough accessible. Some doubted whether life in
Paris could be morally healthy for the immature student. The French
schools seemed lacking in the qualities of human sympathy and comrade-
ship and in the love for an alma mater which characterize American
ones, but this was attributed to the fact that learning, with the French,
“Is not an accomplishment, but an honorable and arduous profession.”
But, said Barrett Wendell,—

“Could our graduate students who propose to devote their lives to learning come
more frequently under the influence of the combined industry and intelligence
of modern scholarship in France, the American universities of years to come might
be at once more solid and more stimulating in their atmosphere than now seems
quite likely.”

And Frederic E. Farrington, in his study of the French secondary school
system (1910), declared that the progress made in France since the Franco-
Prussian War was “‘quite without a parallel within the same length of time
in the educational history of the world.”

The qualities most praised were the seriousness, precision, and devotion
of French scholars and students, the “directness, simplicity, and clarity”
with which they presented their results, either in lectures or in written
work; their steadily increasing accuracy and thoroughness, combined with
a very just sense of proportion and a “certain originality and freshness

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

of view.” The exceptionally high standard required for the Doctor’s dis-
sertation was emphasized.®
After 1898 a system of exchange professorships grew up which has greatly
aided in bringing about a better understanding. In 1897 Ferdinand
Brunetiére gave a course of lectures in French on French poetry and
drama at Johns Hopkins University. The lectures were notable in quality
and attracted considerable attention.’ He spoke also at Harvard. Partly as
a result of this and partly because of the enthusiasm for French literature
which Professor Ferdinand Bécher was able to arouse in his students, the
Cercle Francaise at Harvard, which had been founded in 1886, and had
been giving annual presentations of French classic dramas, established
the custom of inviting each year a distinguished French man of letters
to lecture at the University. This undertaking was due largely to the
initiative of James Hazen Hyde (Harvard, ’98), and was made possible
through his generous aid. Mr. Hyde in 1904 arranged to send American
lecturers to French universities, first to Paris, and later to the provincial
schools. In 1909 the lectures under the Hyde foundation became regular
university courses, and in 1911 the exchange professorships were taken
over by the Harvard authorities and the French department of public
instruction. The lecturers when in this country of course addressed general
as well as university audiences, in most cases, and their success encouraged
other French persons of note to undertake a similar personal contact with
the American public.
The idea of exchange professorships found favor in several American in-
stitutions. The lectures of Professor Henri Bergson at Columbia attracted
especial attention. The Alliance Francaise, founded in 1902, again largely
through the influence of Mr. Hyde, who has found much pleasure in
acting as an informal liaison officer between France and America, has been
especially active in bringing to this country French lecturers of distinc-
tion. About 1903 Baron Pierre de Coubertin provided foundations for the
study of French literature in Princeton, Tulane, the University of Califor-
nia, and Leland Stanford University. French students were encouraged to
study in American universities, and various fellowships for Americans in
French schools were established.® There was a steady increase in the number
of academic honors exchanged, as in the admission of the nationals of one
country to membership in the learned societies of the other. William James
called his election to the French Institute “the greatest honor to which
I could have aspired.” ®
The importance and the influence of such intellectual contacts must be
obvious. From the exchange professorships have resulted, too, such valu-
able and widely-read books as Barrett Wendell’s France of To-Day,
238POEs etree toe estper ata es ets nearacoat fo REO ENT TERRES ESE Me Ceol Pea Dea aC MEL ea

SIGNS AND PORTENTS

 

——s

Archibald Cary Coolidge’s The United States as a World Power, Henry
Van Dyke’s The Spirit of America, John H. Finley’s The French in the
Heart of America, and André Tardieu’s France and the Alliances.
American periodicals show an increasing recognition of French accomplish-
ment, and an increasing number of articles, in English or in translation,
by French writers. It would have been impossible under any circumstances
to ignore the work of the Curies, of Pasteur, of Fabre. At the St. Louis
Exposition in 1904 a “World’s Congress of Arts and Sciences” was held.
It had been announced that so far as possible the addresses would be
prepared by “the highest living authorities in each and every branch,”
In the list of foreign speakers the French divided honors quite evenly
with the Germans, and among the French names were to be found such
authorities as M. J. G. Darboux, who was honorary vice-president of the
Congress, Professors Emile Picard, Henri Poincaré, Charles Eulart, Pierre
Langevin, and Pierre Janet.
Perhaps the most striking single example of the change in the American
point of view is to be found in the book, “Science and Learning in France,”
edited by Dean John H. Wigmore of Northwestern University. This was
planned in 1915 and sent to the printer just before the United States
entered the World War. It was frankly intended to influence American
public opinion in favor of France, not, however, by making an attack upon
Germany, but by the expression of a sincere and matured judgment in re-
gard to the achievement of France in all the varied fields of science and
scholarship. Nearly a hundred American authorities in the various fields
contributed to the statements it contains, and they are men whose intellec-
tual honesty cannot be questioned and whose judgment must be respected.
The name of Dean Wigmore as editor would itself be a guarantee of the
value of the work, and we find him supported by Ex-President Eliot of
Harvard, who writes the preface, and by such men as Professor George
C. Hale in the field of astronomy, Professors Charles Homer Haskins, Teale
Shotwell, and Dana C. Munro in the history group, John Dewey in that
of education, Dr. T. C. Janeway and Dr. Morton Prince in medicine, etc.
Some nine hundred other educational and professional leaders allowed their
names to appear as “sponsors” of the work.
Appreciation of French literature in this country has been retarded in no
small degree because Americans have condemned its quality of extreme
realism and its emphasis upon questions of sex. Many have believed that
these characteristics reflected a fundamental corruption and degeneracy in
the French people. The charge is not new, nor is it confined to any single
period. It has always recurred when there was occasion for criticism of
French behavior. In preceding chapters various examples of this attitude
239

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE
have been given. The feeling was strongly marked at the time of the
Franco-Prussian War, it will be recalled, Julia Ward Howe said,—

“Erench literature has done much to corrupt American women. Unhappy France
has corrupted the world. She is now swept from the face of the earth.” 1

The same idea continued to be voiced throughout succeeding years, even by
critics in many ways most friendly. Thomas Sergeant Perry, in an article
in the Atlantic, in 1879, said casually,—

“There has been so complete a lack of French novels that could be recommended
to any but a hardened class of readers—.. .”

and, in a later number of the same magazine,—

“Imagination and decency are two things that will probably survive even M. Zola’s
prolonged and repeated attacks.” +1

Theodore Child, in Harper's, spoke of

“the malady of style... artists of admirable talent who... do not deign to
think what results their writings may have, or what germs of corruption their
stories may disseminate ... heedless of purity, of honesty, and of justice....

French artistic superiority does not condescend to work deliberately for good and
to fight against evil.” 12

Public Opinion (Aug. 30, 1886), quoted from the Theatre Magazine a
scathing article on French drama:—

“Firstly, a subject as revolting as possible to a wholesome moral sentiment

_a heroine in every respect everything that a woman ought to strive and pray
not to be—but she is, nevertheless, the most charming of creatures... . A few
amiable weaknesses she has to be sure. The ten commandments she habitually uses
as curl-papers. This may seem irreverent, but then it shows esprit. She lies, she
steals, she forges—but dear, dear, how divinely she plays on the piano! . . . Doubt-
less this played its part among the causes that brought France to her knees before
the feet of Germany. Woe be to any land that adopts such poison for its drama.” 38

George McLean Harper spoke of the “preoccupation” of French novelists
with sexual relations, “preferably immoral.” **

When Hugues LeRoux lectured in America he proposed to establish a
depot for the distribution of the best French literature, in order to vin-
dicate its character. He said,—

“The American public has come to regard modern French novels as immoral pro-
ductions of the worst kind.... The result is to check the influence of French
thought in the United States and to create a prejudice against France and French
ideas.”

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SIGNS AND PORTENTS

American periodicals, commenting on this, took pains to say that Amer-
icans understand the difference between the French traditions and their
own, and that they do appreciate the fine qualities of the best French work
and have confidence in the sound moral basis of French character as a
whole.*®
James Hazen Hyde, in his lecture on “French Literature in the United
States” brings out the same idea.%¢
Americans have, in fact, been steadily broadening their acquaintance with
French literature, and their criticisms have been growing more discrimi-
nating and more just. The increasing ease of communication between the
two countries has of course contributed to this; and much credit is due
to the departments of literature and of language in our educational in-
stitutions. Members of these departments have carried out and published
extensive literary studies, have translated and edited French texts, and
have in general done much to make possible criticism which is based upon
knowledge, and which avoids sweeping generalizations which mislead be-
cause they are only partly true. Professor Boécher of Harvard, already
mentioned, was one of the pioneers in this field. His collection of books .
on Moliere and other 17th century dramatists is now a valued part of the |
Harvard Library. Professor Adolphe Cohn, formerly of Harvard, and
later of Columbia, Professor Raymond Weeks of Columbia, Professors
T. F. Crane of Cornell University, Albert Schinz of Smith College, H. P. {|
Thieme of Ann Arbor, C. H. C. Wright of Harvard, Brander Matthews of
Columbia, and many others, have helped in this way to build up American
culture.
An excellent example may be found in Professor Wright’s History of
French Literature, in the preface of which occurs the statement that the
author considers each historian entitled to his individual judgment, and
that he himself prefers the classicists and rationals of the 17th and 18th cen-
turies to some of the romantics or emotionalists of the 19th, and believes
that the “modern eccentrics” are not characteristic of ‘French common-
sense’ “any more than the false convention of adultery in the novels and
plays, or the revelations of certain ‘dionysiac’ women writers, are typical of
French morals and manners.” He goes on to say that in spite of certain
unfavorable criticisms which he must make, it is his opinion that “French
literature, taken as a whole, overtops in richness, artistic quality, and
historical influence, all literatures since those of Greece and Rome.” 17
The writings of Henry James, of Brander Matthews, of Huneker, of
Santayana, represent a wide variety in viewpoint and expression, but a
common recognition and appreciation of the salient qualities of French
241

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work,—its beauty of diction, its brilliance of form, its clarity of thought,
and delicacy of distinction. Its insight and sincerity, its vitality and power,
and the universality of its appeal, are generally conceded. Brander Mat-
thews says,—‘French is still the second language of every educated man,
whatever his native speech . . . French literature has won its way all over
the world.” 78

French music, like French literature, had to contend in America with cer-
tain fixed ideas. The French were popularly declared to be amusing, but
not serious, possessed of mental agility, but not of depth. The opéra com-
ique was typically French, and French music was expected to be charming,
harmonious, vivacious, sometimes brilliant, but light. Where more lasting

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i Many French composers, said our critics, lacked sincerity and courage.
#4 They tried only to please “a grossly ignorant French public.” Henderson,
: in his Story of Music, published in 1897, emphasized this point. Criticising
i) Gounod, he said,—

: “There are passages in Faust, unhappily too few ... which seem to me to come
fi nearer to the ideal music drama than anything outside of the last scenes in Wag-
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permanent influence on operatic art only because of Gounod’s concessions to the
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While individual composers, then, were often highly praised, much French
music was deemed to be “pleasing, rather than deep,” or even “meaning-
less ravings” of “harmony-jugglers,” and to call for “some musical Ros-
stand” “beside whose simple force the unclear utterances of the present
school will lose their factitious importance.” ?°

For great music Americans looked to Germany, and only in the last
decade before the war did they begin to understand and truly appreciate
the intellectual quality, the originality, and the richness represented in the
compositions of Cesar Franck, of Debussy, and the others of the modern
French school.**

In the fields of painting, of sculpture, of architecture, and of the decora-
tive arts, French achievement has long been appreciated in America, and
French influence has helped lafgely to determine the form and content of
American accomplishment. It is true that some have identified a love
of beauty with weakness, and have been prone to declare that a nation
which knew so well the laws of taste and of grace could not deal seriously
with matters of material importance. It is true, too, that French realism,
in art as in literature, sometimes has shocked the conservatives, and that

242

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the Latin Quarter, with its gayeties and its freedom, provided ground for
unfavorable criticism.??
Americans did not react at first in friendly fashion to the experiments of
the newer schools of French art, with their “flinging paint-pots in the
sacred features of tradition.’”” But they came in time to realize that the
work of the artist who turns his face only to the past will never be more
than an echo of that past and to accept the sincerity, the vision, and the
color possibilities which the best of the impressionists offered.?*
There was full realization, too, of the fact that in France was to be found
the best opportunity for artistic training, since “there is no thought-wave
in modern art that does not emanate from Paris or finally reach Paris,” **
and for the past fifty years practically all the leaders in the field of art
in America have drawn knowledge and inspiration from this source. The
genius of the great French masters of line, of color, of design, has struck
an answering fire in America, and the realization of their common love
for these finer things of life has helped the two peoples to comprehend and
to respect one another.?®
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the number of Americans who
travelled or who sojourned for a time in Europe continued to increase. The
American tourist, a type well-known on both sides of the water, was a
source of much misinformation, sometimes, but was usually keenly ob-
servant, interested, and appreciative. There were numerous well-informed
representatives of good American families, who had maintained and en-
larged upon the old tradition that European travel was a necessary “‘finish’’
to an education; there were cultured individuals who loved the flavor and
the picturesqueness of the older civilization; and there were many business
men who sought new outlets for their capital or new openings for their
trade. Newly-rich families went abroad to win social prestige, and many
an earnest school teacher spent her summers following the lure of an-
cient song and story. Tourist and diplomat, artist and capitalist, teacher
and student, and all the other diverse types who wandered through
town and countryside in France reflected each in his own way what
he saw, and the sum of their experience broadened American under-
standing.
One result of this was that instead of turning our ridicule always upon
the foreigner, the ‘‘mounseer,’’ whose manners and whose ways appeared al-
ways absurd and mistaken, we caught some glimpses of our own narrow-
nesses and crudities, and occasionally could laugh at ourselves. For
instance, the Century for June, 1885, had a cartoon entitled “Mr. Newrich
in Paris’ and showing four Americans seated at a café table.
243

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“Mr. Newrich (who does not trust himself to the pitfalls of the Gallic tongue):
‘Waiter, sandwiches!’

“Waiter: “Bien, m’sieur, quatre?’

“Mr. Newrich: ‘Oh! yes, I suppose cat is as good as anything we'll get in this for-
saken country!’”’

Other examples in this vein abound. Charles Battell Loomis wrote a series
called “Some Americans Abroad” for the Century, (1901). In it he satirized
several of the good old mental habits of Americans. Says one of his travel-
lers, whose favorite slogan is, ‘““There’s only one Noo York,”—

“I can tell by their looks that what they are saying to each other isn’t fit to
print. ... Oh, it’s the language that does it. No one can get away from the
English language and expect to be anything as a man....I don’t believe he
actually said anything. He chattered like a crow in a cornfield, but no one could
talk as fast as he pretended to. He just wabbled his tongue at me, but I’d shown
him that Americans can’t be imposed upon, and I came away. ...I give France
three years and six weeks to get to perdition.” 26

The Moulin Rouge and the Rat Mort might continue to represent Paris to
a certain class of Americans,?” but more and more in books and magazines
appeared just, sincere, and informing accounts of French life and customs.
For example, we have Henry James’ Portraits of Places and his A
Little Tour in France, sympathetic, appreciative, confident that everyone
must feel the charm of France, of the capital city, which “we are accused
of being too apt to think the celestial city,” of “that perfect tongue,” the
French language, and of the “completeness of French life, and the lightness
and brightness of the social air.” Edith Wharton describes pleasantly her
“Motor-Flight Through France”; Clifton Johnson pictures his rambles
“Along French Byways,” which gave him “an increased respect for the
French people. There is a good deal of humbug in this talk about ‘decadent
nations’”; Ida M. Tarbell tells us of “The Charm of Paris,” with its
“beauty of harmonious colors and outlines’ and its “perfection of municipal
housekeeping”; Mary King Waddington and Frances Wilson Huard give
intimate and friendly reminiscences of chateau and country life, of “sleepy
little cities,” of weddings and Christmas festivities, of all sorts of homely
details.

Thomas A. Janvier tells of “Honfleur the Sedate’ and of the Chateau
Gaillard; Harold and Madeline Howland describe their wanderings through
“The Pleasant Land of France’; Ernest Peixotto paints intriguing pictures
of the Chateau Country, of Albi and of Carcassonne, and of the honest,
generous, gay and kindly folk he meets; Joseph N. Pennell and Elizabeth
Robins Pennell journey with pen and pencil, along the Marne, across to
Toulouse, in and out of old cathedrals, with many a good word for French

244

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SIGNS AND PORTENTS

ways and people. André Castaigne, Jules Guerin, and many another painter
in color or in words help to lay the magic touch upon blind eyes.”*
Others gave special attention to French character, to conditions affecting
the general social welfare, and to methods of administration. Of some im-
portance is W. C. Brownell’s study of “French Traits,” which appeared
first in Scribner's Magazine, and later in book form. He discusses with
some care such topics as “The Social Instinct,” “Sense and Sentiment,”
“Manners,” “Intelligence,” “French Women,” and “The Art Instinct.”
Mr. Brownell’s interpretation is friendly and on the whole favorable. He
holds that France has always had a strong interest in community welfare,
and has accomplished much in this field; that “measure,” in speech, de-
meanor, taste, and habits, “is a French passion”; that the French are the
“least poetic and the sanest of modern peoples.” Their politeness is not, as
Americans frequently suppose, excessive, but is due to the idea that “there
is greater pleasure to be got out of the lubrication than the friction of
points of contact between individuals.” Manners therefore are carefully
systematized and artistic, but the French are “as sincere as any other
people.” ““A compliment is taken seriously only by the savage.” “They are
frank; they are gay and gentle, but they are above all else impersonal.”
As to their intelligence, “nowhere does action follow thought so swiftly,
and nowhere is so much thinking done.” Precision, truth, order, harmony,
clearness, these are the traits which seem to this writer most characteristic.?®
The excellent chapters on French universities and on French literature in
Barrett Wendell’s The France of To-Day, have already been mentioned.
This book, the result of thoughtful observation, combines sympathetic ap-
preciation with well-balanced criticism. Professor Wendell’s study of family
life is especially informing, with its explanation of the differences between
French and American ideals, and its conclusion that to the Frenchman the
family “has a dominant, supreme claim to devotion for its own sake,”
which compels the individual to think of society before he thinks of self.
The extremes in dress which under the Empire accented the impression
of frivolity have disappeared, he declares, and “‘the vivacious, erratic
Frenchman of traditional fancy is . . . obsolete.’”’ The Frenchman of to-
day is frank and open in manner, but possesses a high degree of personal
reticence and of self-control. He is ardent, intense, emotional, loving system
and fact so passionately that any deviation from ordered harmony becomes
a crime, and the younger generation in particular is austerely in earnest
and deeply serious.*°
Among magazine articles in this field may be mentioned Elizabeth Shepley
Sergeant’s description of the ‘Standards of a Bourgeois Family.” The roots
of this family, considered an average one, “were nourished, in this sup-
245

 

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posedly inconstant Paris too, by the rich soil of a consistent and nobly
serious theory of life.’ Monsieur thought that American girls lived in
“une ideé colossale de pique-nique.” Madame found excuses for them—
they had not been taught as French girls are from early childhood, to con-
sider every day as a link to be carefully wrought into the chain of the
years. One of her favorite stories was of an American delegate to a scientific
congress, who had desired her father to take him to Maxim’s. “‘Pensez donc,
mon ami. Papa at Maxim’s! Papa, who had to be dragged from his
test-tubes to his meals, and resented even the time he had to give to his
lectures at the Collége de France!” #4
Thomas A. Edison, after a vacation in France, gave also friendly judg-
ment. The formula of French thrift “is as simple as sunlight. Be indus-
trious, be frugal, give and enjoy in proportion to your means, and always
lay by a fifth of your income for capital. Result, a whole nation pros-
perous, contented, and happy.” *
Studies of yet another type deal with French institutions, with the interest-
ing cooperative experiment among the iron workers at Guise, the industrial
art schools, the municipal laboratory at Paris. Frederic A. Ogg, in his study
of social progress in contemporary Europe (1912), gives careful attention
to the agricultural progress of France, to industrial conditions, to progress
in matters of social welfare, such as insurance against sickness and against
occupational accidents, and to old-age pensions. He describes, too, the de-
velopment and significance of socialism in France. On the subject of social-
ism, also, Richard T. Ely wrote with considerable fullness. Among
magazine articles one notices such discussions as Walter B. Scaife’s re-
marks on work, wages, and labor legislation in France, and Charles Mul-
ford Robinson’s contribution on municipal art in Paris. Albert Shaw wrote
on Paris as the “Typical Modern City,” and praised the pioneer work done
in transforming “‘the labyrinthine tangle of narrow, dark and foul medieval
alleys” into modern thoroughfares, saying—‘“French public authorities,
architects, and engineers were the first to conceive effectually the ideas
of symmetry and spaciousness, of order and convenience, of wholesomeness
and cleanliness, in urban arrangements.” The art of city planning, the
organization of city administration, with attention to all the varied needs
of the people of a great city,—in these fields all countries are indebted to
French enterprise.**
Serious and impartial studies of the government of France have steadily
been added to our sources of genuine information. We have, for example,
such a careful delineation as appears in President Lowell’s Governments
and Parties in Continental Europe. Here the criticism falls largely upon
the lack of a stable executive, and the difficulties brought about by the
246Peer AOE ERS ee oe NSCS A SRR Tat ea POR Tae CRSA RT GC UCR GSES Ge KARR GR Eee LS ea suse eH 4

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SIGNS AND PORTENTS

 

 

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frequent cabinet changes and the lack of a firm sense of responsibility
on the part of the individual citizen. Frederic A. Ogg, in his Social Progress
in Contemporary Europe and in his Government of Europe, gives a
thorough and just analysis of the process through which representative
government in France was developed and of the characteristics of govern-
ment under the Republic. His incisive summary is representative of
thoughtful American judgment in this field :—

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“Once having cut loose from her ancient moorings, the nation became through
many decades the plaything of every current that swept the political sea. It is
only within our own generation that she appears definitely to have righted her-
self for a prolonged and steady voyage. The constitution of the Third Republic is
a product, not of orderly evolution, but of disruption, experimentation, compro-
mise. It represents a precarious balance which has been struck between those forces
of radicalism and conservatism, of progress and reaction, for whose eternal conflict
France pre€minently has furnished a theatre since 1789.” 34

In the field of politics, since 1873, we have offered to France both praise
and censure. We began to speak once more of “‘our ancient ally,” *° but
this did not in the least inhibit our condemnation of anything which seemed
to us intolerant, irreligious, unstable, or militaristic. It will be recalled that
at the close of the Franco-Prussian War much sympathy for the new
Republic was being expressed, while there were also many who doubted
the political courage or the sincerity of its leaders. Herbert Tuttle, in the
Atlantic, commented upon the “‘fierceness” and “indiscipline” of French de-
mocracy. French patriotism, he said, while brave, loyal, and optimistic,
must always “mix politics with passion,” is permeated with the spirit of
the “revanche” and is characterized by an extravagant and unreasoning
chauvinism.*® Albert Rhodes, describing a day in the French Assembly,
while expressing appreciation of the quality of some of the French leaders,
recognized the menace of the monarchist intrigues, and criticized sharply
the interference with the press intended by the royalists to weaken the
republic, and the tendency to the “abuse of power” which was, he thought,
“the bane of the nation, for the authorities hunt down opposition till they
drive it into open revolt.’ °”

George William Curtis emphasized substantially the same criticism in one
of his addresses in which he cited France as the example of a country where
party spirit was carried to an extreme, where it “Denies the patriotism
of its opponents” and regards them “as public enemies,” “‘as a conspiracy
plotting the overthrow of the government itself’ instead of recognizing
them as legitimate critics, exercising a constitutional right to differ. “His-
tory is lurid with the wasting fires of this madness.” To Curtis, France was
also an example of militarism. Addressing the New England Society on

247

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the Puritan principle as the master principle in American development, he
turned aside to recall that many nationalities are represented in American
history. “‘I remember, surely, the lily—too often the tiger-lily—of
France’ (laughter and applause).” *

The personality and the accomplishment of Thiers, Gambetta, and other
republican leaders received in time a full meed of praise. Especially well
did Americans understand the devotion and skill shown in the financial
rehabilitation of France after the war with Prussia. This achievement
James A. Garfield called a “brilliant example” which should be an in-
spiration to the United States.*® France, “impoverished by war,” said Rus-
sell Sturgis, “but newly enriched by industry,” is “strong and growing
stronger, prosperous and happy perhaps beyond any nation in Europe; as
much surprised and gratified by her success in self-government” as she
was in 1870 “surprised and shocked by her failure in arms.” *°
Factionalism, clericalism, or radicalism; or, on the other hand, a too
great centralization, or intolerance and irreligion on the part of the anti-
clericalists, met ready criticism. Some thought the expulsion of the Jesuits
wise, others condemned it as intolerant.4t An example of extreme criticism
in the period running up to 1890 may be taken from the writings of An-
drew D. White, whose judgment may in some degree have been colored by
his known predilection for things German. After praising some eminent
Frenchmen whom he had met, he went on to say :—

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“It is a thousand pities that a country possessing such men is so widely known to
the world, not by these, but by novelists and dramatists widely retailing filth,
journalists largely given to the invention of sensational lies, politicians obeying
either atheistic demagogues or clerical intrigues; and all together acting like a swarm
of obscene, tricky, mangy monkeys chattering, squealing, and tweaking one an-
other’s tails in a cage... it saddened me to see the nobler element...
thwarted by such feather-brained creatures.” 42

Far more characteristic of the average American comment for the same
period, however, is the article by George Merrill, just cited, which analyzes
very carefully the changes since the Second Empire, brings out the same
points of doubt already illustrated, but recognizes the government’s neces-
sity to resist clericalism, and gives friendly warning that republican lead-
ers must accept the responsibility of the situation, must educate the people
wisely for intelligent progress, must not unnecessarily alienate conserva-
tives, but instead must by word and deed conciliate all the reasonable and
patriotic, of whatever party. Mr. Merrill’s conclusion follows :—

“The chiefs of the existing government certainly combine to a remarkable degree
great dignity and integrity of character, a thorough knowledge of men and af-
fairs, moral courage, largeness of view, and a desire for progress, energy, tact,

248

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SIGNS AND PORTENTS

and eloquence, while the ability displayed by the French ministers of finance
since the close of the Franco-German war has been the wonder of the world.” 43

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An unusual tribute is recorded in the Life of Joseph H. Choate. In a
letter to his wife Mr. Choate speaks of having attended a dinner at General
Sherman’s, to meet the Comte de Paris and the Duc d’Orleans, but he
says that Chauncey M. Depew and Levi P. Morton declined to be present,
“because of the hostile attitude of the Count to the French Republic.” **
All of the preceding comments on French political questions date between
1873 and 1890. The decade between 1890 and 1900 provided events which
accentuated and brought out into clearer relief the American point of view.
In 1891 the Franco-Russian entente took shape; in 1893 the Panama
Scandal was made public; in 1894 President Carnot was assassinated by
an anarchist; in 1898 and 1899 the Dreyfus Case held the center of the
stage.

The first reports of the Russian alliance revived sharply the tradition of
French militarism. The Boulanger case had of course also contributed to
this. The Review of Reviews said :—

“Everyone is delighted that France should be humored. She has sulked so long in
the corner, eating her heart out in sullen discontent. ...As she can never again
have the reality of the power which she so misused in the past, we are all only
too glad to allow her the semblance of consolation. But of course it is only a
semblance. The French Foreign Office, whatever amicable arrangement it may
have effected for mutual support in China, is under no mistake as to the absurdity
of the popular delusion that France has an ally in Russia for the furtherance of
her aggressive designs on Germany. ... France is tranquil, and professes to de-
sire peace, therefore the Czar extends a cordial greeting to his effusive visitors.
But let France propose to make war, and she will be very rudely awakened.” 45

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The French excitement over the new understanding apparently gave color
to these suspicions. It was reported that one thousand one hundred men
had to be arrested in Paris before a performance of Lohengrin could be
given, this indicating “feverish hopes of an early realization of their ag-
gressive designs.” The Boulanger attempt would never have had a chance
of success “if the French had not been a little bored with the republic
which seemed to produce only taxes, jobs, and worthless wars.” But Alexan-
der may be depended upon to be the “‘peace-keeper.”” The Republicans are
torn by faction; there is a strong radical minority; the reactionists are still
undiscouraged; anti-clericalism has made many enemies for the republic;
the financial policy has produced a deficit together with increasing taxa-
tion; too much pomp and ceremony has crept into the administration; and
the military element is “dangerous and pernicious.” The French are . .

“fooling themselves with the delusion that Russia means war,” the tempta-

249

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

tion to use the army, which is in perfect condition, “would probably be
overwhelming were their only ally less cautious, prudent, and resolute for
peace than Alexander III.” *6

The Panama Scandal, said the Nation, was not the only reason for the
fall of the Loubet ministry and the great disorder in French political circles,
It “simply brought to the boiling point the public indignation over the long
series of weaknesses and failures on the part of the ministry” and especially
their inability to handle the Socialists and anarchists effectively, due to
their fear of a Conservative and Radical combination to overturn the
republic.*7 The whole story of the Panama enterprise was retold, as a
“wild speculation that developed into a systematic swindle.” *® Said the
Review of Reviews scornfully :—

“It is impossible to conceal from the world that a large portion of French society,
financial, legislative, and diplomatic, has for years past been wallowing in a cess-
pool of corruption. . . . The result is an object lesson in the consequence of repu-

diating the moral law.” But, “when the evil is being exposed, it is in process of
cure,” 49

The assassination of President Carnot was made known to the United
States Congress by President Cleveland, in a special and most sympathetic
message. Both the Senate and the House passed resolutions of condolence,
to be sent to Madame Carnot. In the President’s Message of December 3,
1894, Mr. Cleveland spoke of the friendly relations existing between the
two countries “so long bound together by friendly sympathy and similarity
in their forms of government,” and added that “the recent cruel assassina-
tion of the President of this sister Republic called forth such universal
expressions of sorrow and condolence from our people and Government
as to leave no doubt of the depth and sincerity of our attachment.” 5°

New York State was holding a constitutional convention when the news
of Carnot’s death arrived. A resolution of sympathy was at once intro-
duced, and Elihu Root made an eloquent speech in favor of it. After
drawing attention to the fact that in both countries constitutional govern-
ment offered the only guarantee of individual liberty and safety, he de-
clared that it was therefore more than fitting that an American constitu-
tional convention should express warmly and sincerely its abhorrence of
this crime of violence. He spoke of the aid of France in Revolutionary
times, and added that

“under difficulties and surrounded by evils of which we know nothing; surmount-
ing almost insurmountable obstacles, triumphing in the midst of successive and
apparently irretrievable defeats for twenty years, the republic of France has stood
erect, unshaken, consolidating and making perpetual the foundations of free con-
stitutional government.” 51

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The Review of Reviews praised the “calmness and unanimity” with which
France had met the crisis, and said :—

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“The murder created a perfect explosion of sympathy throughout the world, and
France, for the first time in this generation, found herself overwhelmed with
demonstrations of sincere sympathy.” 52

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This friendly attitude was maintained also in 1895, when Casimir-Perier

resigned from the presidency and was replaced by Felix Faure. The “splen-

did civil service,” said the papers, might be relied on to provide the

necessary stability in administration, and the prompt choice of a new

president “of probity and patriotism” was declared to be an “object- |
lesson to captious critics.” **

One quite “captious critic’ at this time, however, was Mark Twain.

Paul Bourget had just been lecturing in America, and Mr. Clemens wrote

on “What Paul Bourget Thinks of Us.” The article is, of course, witty,

but it carries a sting which is rare in Mark Twain’s writings. He says

Americans seemed to expect the French writer to teach us something.

But what had a man educated in France to give to Americans? Certainly ig
nothing in the field of mechanical skill or scientific invention. |

rises,

“Religion? No, not variegated enough for our climate. Morals? No, we cannot

rob the poor to enrich ourselves. Novel-writing? No, M. Bourget and the others

know only one plan, and when that is expurgated there is nothing left of the 4
book.”

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The prospect for American improvement through French instrumentality
appeared, he thought, “dark; almost Egyptian, in fact.” **

The famous Dreyfus case furnishes the best index to the trend of American
opinion at this period, for it brought French affairs into the foreground,
and called forth both criticism and defense. The question of the guilt of
this Alsatian Jew, convicted by a court-martial in 1894 of selling French
military secrets to Germany, was a burning one in France for twelve
years, and its political and moral influence lasted even longer. The main
lines of the story are familiar to most persons. It was generally believed at
first that the prisoner’s guilt had been proved, and that his military deg-
radation and sentence to life imprisonment on a tropic island was a just,
if severe, penalty. But in 1896 Colonel Picquart, who was attached to the
Intelligence Department, declared that the evidence in the possession of
the Department pointed in the direction of a certain Major Esterhazy, as
the criminal, instead of Dreyfus. From this time on until the Court of
Cassation, the highest civil court, in 1906 declared Dreyfus innocent,
popular excitement and partisanship in France ran high. High officials in

251

sareiianisAMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

the army and in the government were concerned in the affair, and mon-
archists, clericalists, radicals, and militarists joined in declaring that “for
the honor of the army” no further investigation must be made and the
judgment against Dreyfus must stand. Only a few devoted and earnest
souls with larger vision and higher courage continued to fight for a thor-
ough sifting of the affair and for absolute justice, until in the end they
succeeded.®®

Sympathy in America became strongly pro-Dreyfus. The political com-
plexion which the affair took on, the repeated refusals of the government
to reopen the case, the hasty acquittal of Esterhazy, the attempts to
suppress the evidence found by Picquart, his persecution, Zola’s convic-
tion “for defamation of the government” after the publication of his
letter “J’accuse,” the revelations of the sinister power of the army and of
corruption in high places,—all helped to convince America that a great
injustice was being done. The wave of anti-Semitic agitation which swept
France, the indications of mob spirit, the suppression of freedom of
speech, and the evidence of the spirit of revenge toward Germany, increased
the disfavor in which France was held. In 1897 Hon. J. B. Eustis, late
United States ambassador to France, had deprecated the Franco-Russian
alliance, on the ground that France was “too liberal, free, and enlightened,
to be a good working partner of Russia.” °* Now France appeared
militaristic, bigoted, intolerant, unjust.*?

The press throughout the United States was practically unanimous in con-
demnation. The /ndependent spoke of the case as the “most disgraceful
episode of modern political and military life,” and declared that France
had “pursued honor and disdained justice.” 5* Scribner's spoke of the
Anglo-American understanding which had grown out of the Spanish war
as meaning, not an alliance, but an emphasis of identity of understanding

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about public affairs. . . . “For example, the Dreyfus case is regarded in
London and in Chicago with the same incredulity, bordering upon stupe-
faction.” °°

A typical article in the Political Science Quarterly declared that the
French judicial procedure, with its absence of a habeas corpus act, its
permission of domiciliary visits and of secret evidence, was entirely foreign
to the American conception of democratic justice.

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“Every English-speaking person finds it revolting that a man, however base, can,
after a secret trial, be consigned to a living death on evidence he had no chance
to answer. We cannot understand how a people can be sane and tolerate a system
where there is a possibility that an individual may suffer horrible injustice ‘for
reasons of state’ or because his case is a ‘chose jugée.’ . . . When the state is merged

252

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SEGNS AND PORTENTS

 

in the army, there can be no guaranty of civil liberty. ... The government of
France ... is indeed called a republic; but after we have read of the Dreyfus
case and the Zola trial, it can kindle no spark of fraternal sympathy in the
heart of any genuine American.” 6°

Finley Peter Dunne, writing in the Chicago Journal under the name of
“Mr. Dooley,” interpreted well the popular feeling :—

“The Frrinch are a tumulchuse people... not steady ayether in their politics
or their morals. ... The throuble is... that it ain’t been Cap Dhryfuss that’s
been on thrile, but the honor of the nation and the honor of the arrmy....
Because some la-ad on the gin’ral staff got caught lyin’ and had to lie some
more to make the first wan stick, and the other gin’rals had to jine him f’r fear
he might compromise thim . . . and they was la-ads rrunnin’ newspapers in Paris
that needed to make a little money out of the popylation, ye said ‘Th’ honor iv
th’ Frrinch people an’ th’ honor iv th’ Frrinch arrmy is on thrile.” ... Th’ honor
iv Frrance an’ th’ honor iv th’ arrmy’ll come out all right, . . . but it wouldn’t do
anny harrm f’r to sind th’ honor iv th’ Frrinch gin’rals to th’ laundhry. .. . So
long as ivry man looks out f’r his own honor, th’ honor iv th’ counthry'll look out
fr itsilf.... Ye’re afraid. That’s th’ thruth iv th’ matther. Ye’re like a lot iv ol’
women that thinks ivry time the shutter creaks burglars is goin’ to break into th’
house. Ye’re afraid iv Rothschild, an’ th’ Imperor iv Germany, and th’ Dook
d’Orleans, Vik Bonaparte, an’ Joe Chamberlain, and Bill McKinley ... an’ ye're
afraid iv each other.” &

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The decision for the retrial at Rennes in 1899 brought approval. The
Outlook, for example, which thought that “nearly the whole world” be-
lieved Dreyfus the victim of injustice, hailed it as a proof that the French
were learning the lessons of self-government, and that “there are always
courageous and able men to resist popular pressure and stand for right
action.” The Outlook published, too, a careful and friendly editorial on
“The Elements of Stability in France,’ warning Americans not to be
so absorbed by the alarming manifestations of the moment as to forget
the counteracting forces such as the splendid development of common-
school and higher education, the fine quality and moral value of the
best French literature and art, the philanthropic activity of the people,
the loyalty and independence of the majority of the bench and bar, the
faithfulness of many officials. “A nation which is left undisturbed by
sO many ministerial and presidential changes must have within itself
forces of intelligence and stability which English and American observers
have not adequately recognized.” ®?

The Review of Reviews declared that France was entering upon the new
year “with the increased strength that comes from a hard-won moral
victory.” °* The Nation said :—

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253AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE™

 

 

“Never was there a more notable demonstration of the truth that there is a power
in human society which makes for righteousness. . . . Slow and faltering human
justice has at last caught up with the divine judgments which are ‘true and right-
eous altogether.’ ” 64

Enid

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These utterances were predicated on the belief that the retrial would cer-
tainly result in the vindication of Dreyfus. Robert Underwood Johnson
struck a somewhat different note in his fine poem, “The Keeper of the
Sword.”

“Hail to that Breton law by which a lord,
Fate-hounded—he whose sires had sought the Grail,—
Left with the State his sword, as Honor’s bail,

While on a western isle he won reward
Of his brave patience, in a golden hoard;—
Speeding from exile (the wide sea a jail
If but the wrong wind filled his yearning sail!)

To claim once more his heritage and sword.

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France, dost thou heed the omen? ’Twas at Rennes!—

Where one who loved thee, cruel,—loved thee, blind—

Now fronts thee proudly with the old demand.

Oh! ... thou hast broke it! ... Haste! the fragments find,
And in the forge of Justice weld again

That undishonored blade for his forgiving hand.” 6

But the new trial resulted in the disappointing verdict of ‘‘guilty, with
mitigating circumstances,” and this brought forth more criticism. The
Independent published a strong series of articles.*® The Nation, while con-
ceding that the Court of Cassation had shown itself upright, that the
government had done and risked everything to secure revision, and that
the “mind and conscience” of the country had come nobly to the support
of Dreyfus, yet spoke of the “flaming passion of the misled populace,
the malice of wicked journalism, and the frenzied fear lest anything be
done to impair the prestige of the army.” The verdict was characterized
as “French military justice, which the world now understands to be the
grossest injustice under the forms of law.”

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“France stands disgraced before the world by this terrible denial of justice... .
That the mass of the people hail the verdict; that royalist and Catholic news-
papers acclaim it as the judgment of God; that the army is frantic with joy...
that the populace... have only scoffs and hisses for the sufferer at Rennes,
strong in his own innocence, these are the things which look black for France,
and which will make men look askance at her for many a day.” 87

Haar cites

et

“Mr. Dooley,” with keen sarcasm, described the trial at Rennes:
254

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“Th’ coort . . . was followed be th’ gin’rals in the Frrinch arrmy, stalwart, fear-
less men, with coarse, disagreeable faces. Each gin’ral was attinded be his private
bodyguard iv thried and thrusted perjurers, an’ was followed be a wagon-load iv
forgeries, bogus affidavies, an’ other statements iv Major Esterhazy. After this come
th’ former ministers iv th’ Frrinch governmint, makin’ an imposin’ line, which
took three hours passin’ a given point.” ... After th’ coort had kissed th’ wit-
nesses, th’ proceedin’s opined.” 6

SET SESS TERRES

Seeger sesevrecersr
APES aS Tey per eeerel

It is significant, however, that in spite of the ‘storm of indignation over
the unrighteous verdict” there were not wanting those who had a good
word for France. John T. Morse, Jr., writing in the Atlantic, had already
called upon Americans not to be too pharisaical in their satisfaction “that
we are not as the Frenchmen are,” but instead to be thankful that America
had no Semitic problem, and that we lacked the dangerous neighbors
which were an excuse for the French desire for a strong army.®® The
same magazine now published a pertinent article on “French Open-minded-
ness,’ by Alvan F. Sanborn, calling attention to the willingness of the
average Frenchman to admit his own defects, and to the teachableness and
generosity which accompanied this frankness and modesty. France, he
said, had been willing, for example, to learn from Germany scientific
accuracy, and had then achieved thoroughness without the German un-
couthness, “without the sacrifice of a single iota of French clearness,
luminousness, neatness and perfection of literary form.”

“France does not now merit the word chauvinist, and has not for a quarter-
century.... If ever a country has been given over to self-examination, self-blame,
and the search within and without for the wherewithal to remedy her defects, . . .
France is that country to-day.” 7°

Jacob Schoenhof, in the Forum, said,—

“If we accept the contents of the American and English papers, including the letters
addressed to the editors, the resolutions of societies, and the utterances of public
men—as indications of the views of the people as a whole, then we are led to be-
lieve that Anglo-Saxondom has resolved itself into one great areopagus, with the
self-imposed mission of passing judgment on France.”

It is wise, therefore, he continued, to recall what we owe to France in
democratic ideals and in intellectual fields; and to remember that all
countries are likely to be subject to waves of anti-Semitism, while France
is ordinarily entirely just to her Jewish citizens, even in the army. “France
has two hundred eighty commissioned officers and more than one thousand
non-commissioned officers of Jewish descent, while Germany has none.”
“Dreyfus, in another country, might never have been cleared, while France
had a Zola, a Scheurer-Kestner, an Yves Guyot, a Labori, a Picquart . . .”
to rise in his defence.
255sa fetaaaisatesceal

AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

An editorial in the Century, after a temperate review of the case, con-
cluded,—

“But are we always so good ourselves? We blame France for resenting the flood
of foreign criticism. Would we like it? Public opinion in America is not always
calm, correct, unprejudiced, our courts not always correct in judgment. We have
had cases where groups of men, moved by misinformation, or touched by pride
or false notions of honor, have stood on the side of falsehood and worked sad
injustice.” 72

Estezerbesteregeee td etecaatat

In 1904 Dreyfus, who had been pardoned and released, but was still
officially guilty, asked to have the case reopened, on the ground that
new evidence in his possession was strong enough to prove his in-
nocence. The government acceded to this request, and Americans com-
mented on the fact that “generous France” was permitting a man who
had been twice convicted to present a new fact and to prove his guiltlessness
if he could, while American law would never go so far.”$

Two years later the Court of Cassation revised the case, finally affirmed
the innocence of Dreyfus, and restored him to full military and civil
standing, and thus ended the long struggle. Said the Review of Re-
views :—

Sitty

#
wa
ca |
:
ai

an

“When France does things well, there is always an instinctive feeling of satis-
faction in America. The French mind recognizes justice in the ideal and in the
abstract, and however far short in practice French institutions have come of meet-
ing the ideals, there is always the effort to bring life into harmony with truth
and justice.

“For nearly twelve years this terrible miscarriage of justice has held France up to dis-
honor in the eyes of the world. ... It is not Dreyfus alone who has been vin-
dicated,—it is France herself. . . . Out of the agitation over Dreyfus and the bitter-
ness of the religious prejudice that was aroused has come the church separation
law and a new, tolerant, regenerated France. Another Dreyfus case would be im-
possible. It is not likely that in the future the French army will ever claim to be
anything but the servant of the republic.” 74

And Robert Underwood Johnson expressed the thought of the many
Americans who loved justice and had watched with sympathy the soldier
“in the darkness fighting leagued wrong, ’—

“Soldier of Justice—fighting with her sword

Since thine was broken! Who need now despair
To lead a hope forlorn against the throng!” 75

That the Dreyfus case led to any active ill-will against France in America

would be too much to say, but that it made a very bad impression and

led to a good deal of patronizing disparagement is undeniable.

In France, one of the most important effects of the case was the formation
256

 

ie re Tt
BER aaaER eeeseats

SIGNS AND PORTENTS

of a strong group of republicans and socialists, pledged to reduce the
political power of the army, which had so nearly succeeded in dominat-
ing the civil power, and of the Roman Catholic Church, which had sup-
ported the militarists.

Since the organization of the Republic there had been hostility between
the government and the clericals. The Church saw in the Republic the
enemy of authority, of the established order, of faith. It wished to restore
the monarchy, and had allied itself with certain elements of the army to
this end. The government, on the other hand, became bitter against the
Catholic leaders, whose teaching was felt to be injurious to the Republic,
and took measures to remove the menace. Members of religious orders
were forbidden by law to teach in the public schools; then, through the
Associations Act (1901), the authorities sought to suppress religious or-
ders deemed obnoxious, together with the various educational and philan-
thropic activities under their control. The enforcement of this law by
Premier Combes was rigorous, and much friction arose. Further measures
aimed at complete separation of Church and State, and contained pro-
visions which though liberal from the standpoint of the government, were
extremely distasteful to the church authorities.”°

The Roman Catholics naturally were warm in espousing the cause of
their church. They had early been prejudiced to some degree against
France by the excesses of the First Republic. This prejudice now be-
came more marked, and undoubtedly contributed largely to the wide-
spread American belief in French irreligion and immorality.

Examples of this reaction on the part of Catholics may be found in the
Literary Digest ‘Poll of the Press,” for August 16, 1902. The Pittsburgh
Observer (Roman Catholic) hotly condemned the turning of nuns out of
their convents for failure to observe the provisions of the Associations
Act, characterizing the procedure as a

“crime that cries to heaven for vengeance. We hear of it as a piece of news in
the newspapers, along with the heartless and sinister comment that this is but the
means which the French Republic takes to protect itself against its arch-enemy,
Clericalism, Have done with the lie—It is simply religious persecution, the out and
out malice haters of the Church . . . vindictive and diabolic.”

The Milwaukee Catholic Citizen praised the riots led by Paris Catholics,
as a “sign of vitality.” The Boston Pilot (R. C.) trusted that

“the French Catholics, awakened at last, will resist the decrees to blood and
death if need be... all sorts of infidel secret societies are free to meet and con-
spire against religious and civil authority while good men and women may not
join together in the name of God to feed the hungry and clothe the naked and in-

257

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struct the ignorant except under the most arbitrary conditions . . . France alone,
of all the civilized nations of the earth, licenses the abandoned woman and expels
the Sister of Charity.”

The Register (Catholic weekly, New York), proposed that all Catholics in
the United States and Canada boycott French goods, on the ground that
greed for church property had led to the attacks, so that “touching their
pockets” would be a proper punishment.””

America, also a Catholic periodical, was especially bitter, missing few
opportunities for harsh criticism of the French government, not only in
regard to its management of religious affairs, but in any field of activity.
This “unchristian horde” can do nothing well. A typical article is the
summary, January 6, 1912, of French policy for the preceding year.

area ee

SL MMi rae

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parese

“A record of tyrannical government, graft, and perjury .. . the courts are gagged,
religion is persecuted, the army is swayed by politics, the population is declining,
the accidents in the navy are causing consternation everywhere, the host of office-
holders is assuming alarming proportions, the leaders in the government are shame-
fully incompetent, the country’s external policy is a mockery, the railroads are
in a state of collapse. .. .” 78

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Harper's Weekly showed such strong sympathy with the Catholic position
that it called forth criticism from a correspondent, coupled with a sharp
defense of the French authorities, and the comment that “there is at this
time sharp competition among periodicals as to which can de the most
to conciliate Roman Catholic readers.” 7°

Alvan F. Sanborn, summing up “The Year in France” in the Atlantic
(1904), declared that “concrete liberties are violated in the name of liberty
in the abstract,” and “tolerance is abrogated in the name of the modern
spirit,” but “persecution is no less persecution when practiced in the
name of Infallible Reason than when practiced in the name of Infallible
Church.” “The sentiments of a vast majority of the people are outraged,
and their wishes overruled, by the vigorous and united action of a per-
fervid minority.” He suggested that if M. Combes, after his retirement,
should publish his autobiography, a suitable title would be:—

“M. Combes, The Perfect Tyrant.
or
The Curious Apathy of a Great People.
An Autobiographical Study
Treating of the
Tyranny of Democracy

by an

Ex-Tyrant.” 8°
258

 

TPR
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aeSIGNS AND PORTENTS

 

The St. Louis Christian Evangelist thought the law “not unreasonably
rigorous,” but the method of enforcement calculated to alienate even those
who might approve of the government’s general position. The Outlook
said that many of the schools closed were ‘“‘not only dear to the church,
but dear to the people,” and ‘‘are said to be among the best in France.”
The Outlook could understand the government’s laying its hand on priests
who had carried on propaganda against the Republic, but not its punish-
ing the children and the people at large.*

Frank A. Vanderlip, in an article published in Scribner’s, reviewed the
situation dispassionately, blaming both sides in the controversy. He
thought it

“undoubtedly true that the traditional attitude of the church and of the clerical
party has been reactionary and generally unfriendly to the Republic, that the
character of the teaching by the orders has been open to the most reasonable
and vigorous objection . . . that the church has been active in public affairs, .. .
and perhaps a menace to the tranquillity of the state.”

He thought that the great wealth of the Church, the withdrawal of this
wealth from taxation, and its use for political purposes, opened the way for
valid criticism. The government was fighting a strong, well-organized,
wealthy group, backed by tradition and religion. But “a great and re-
sponsible minority” disbelieved sincerely in the wisdom of the restrictive
legislation.

“There has seemed to be undue haste and needless harshness. ... The government
_..has met intolerance with intolerance .. . has come dangerously near violating
fundamental rights and liberties.” 82

Most understanding and sympathetic is the chapter on the “Question of
Religion” in Barrett Wendell’s France of To-Day, with its call for tolerance
and mutual forbearance and its admission that “as yet there is little
sign that the French are willing to learn this lesson. Until they do, the
question of religion in France must remain one of action and reaction—
of recurrent intolerance, as one side or another chances to possess national
power.” ®

The non-Catholic religious papers showed a tendency to support the action
of the French government, on the ground that the clerical authorities had
shown in regard to the Dreyfus case a harmful intolerance, and that their
political activity had been culpable. These papers argued that no schools
which conformed to the law need be closed, and that the law was reason-
able. Few Americans would deny, they thought, that the Church’s educa-
tional and philanthropic agencies should submit to regulation and in-

spection by the state.**
259

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

The New York Times, New York Mail, and most of the secular journals,
having both Catholic and Protestant readers, endeavored to remain neutral.
The New York Tribune, however, stoutly defended the French government,
and (1906) declared it to be “‘as resolute as it has been tactful and con-
ciliatory, and it unquestionably is supported by the overwhelming majority
of the people.” *° The /ndependent and the Nation also favored the separa-
tion movement.®*® The North American Review printed a discriminating
article by Walter Littlefield, showing sympathy with the Catholic position,
but ending :—

“The truth of the matter is that the Dreyfus case revealed to intelligent Frenchmen
a monstrous Politico-Religious Trust, which, while monopolizing public educa-
tion, threatened the existence of all democratic government. They have crushed
this trust in the most effective manner.” 87

The Review of Reviews also supported the Associations Act warmly, and
thought the separation of Church and State an indication of revived faith
and religious progress, and to be defended since it would “‘free the State
from undue ecclesiastical influence and liberate the Church from financial
dependence on the State.” **

In the last decade before the Great War, a counterpoise to any criticism
engendered by France’s domestic policy was found in the growing American
distrust of Germany. Miss Clara Eve Schieber in her American Senti-
ment Toward Germany has shown clearly that from 1885 or thereabouts,
when trouble over the Samoan question first developed, the United
States drifted steadily into disapproval of German manners and methods.
We disapproved of her behavior in China, almost came to blows with her
in the Philippines, feared her in the Caribbean and in South America,
disliked her general policy, and refused to be soothed by the various
German attempts to gain our friendship. This situation reacted quite
definitely upon our relations with France, Germany’s neighbor and rival.
In previous years comparisons between the two countries, usually un-
favorable to France, had been frequent. The growing comprehension and
appreciation of French character and achievement had lessened such
comparisons, and they were now definitely brought to an end. In their
place, to emphasize our disapproval of German militarism and imperial-
ism, we showed a marked approval of French policy, especially in foreign
affairs.

The Morocco question is a case in point. Had France been disputing this
district with England or with Italy, it is conceivable that American
sympathy might have been pro-British or pro-Italian, and we might
have accused France of militaristic ambitions. Since the dispute was with
Germany, our sympathies were whole-heartedly French. In her discussion

260SIGNS AND PORTENTS

of this case Miss Schieber has brought out very clearly our antagonism to
Germany, and the very great importance to France of the American
friendship.*® We not only refused to share in the Algeciras Conference un-
less we were assured that it was satisfactory to France ®° but President
Roosevelt, to a far greater degree than was generally known at the time,
exercised pressure upon the Kaiser in favor of the French contentions.
Said Roosevelt :—

“1 desired to do anything I legitimately could for France; because I like France,
and | thought her in this instance to be in the right.” 9

Henry Cabot Lodge, writing at this time to President Roosevelt upon the
subject of Morocco, remarked that he was very anxious that we should
do all that was possible to encourage amity with the French. France, he
thought, should be “with us and England,—in our zone and our combina-
tion.” Such an alignment would, he thought, be sound economically and
politically. “It would be an evil day for us if Germany were to crush
France,” he concluded.

Abundant evidence from the press is available to show that friendliness
in this case was not confined to official quarters. Andrew Carnegie, writing
on “An Anglo-French-American Understanding” spoke in warm terms
of the rapprochement which appeared to be developing among the three,
thought the separation of Church and State in France would better rela-
tions with America, and declared

“America owes so much to France that there is not a request France is ever
likely to make that America would not deem it her duty to meet.” %

The Philadelphia Public Ledger praised Delcassé’s management of French
foreign affairs, saying that it was due to him that France had “again
taken her place in the world’s councils to which her history, her wealth
and her position entitle her.” France, this paper thought, had behaved
“with great reserve and dignity” in the face of the Kaiser’s “rough in-
tervention” at Tangier.*

The Nation thought that M. Rouvier had evinced in his handling of the
Moroccan Conference question “an admirable example of straightforward,
considerate, and enlightened diplomacy.” °* The Review of Reviews said:—

“With all the Mediterranean powers, including Great Britain and the United
States, approving her position, France has little to fear from an international
conference.”

The “moderation” and “justice” of France were approved, together with
her “great work for civilization” in her colonial ventures.
261

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| AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE
“While Germany is far outstepping France in population and in magnitude of
industrial development, France stands higher now than at any time in her his-
tory in the world’s admiration and regard.” %

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Harper’s Weekly, at first inclined to be pleased to have the Kaiser prevent
“any Tunisification of Northwest Africa,” swung over to entire willing-
ness for French control in Morocco, sharply criticised German aggressive-
ness, and after the 1911 settlement wrote:—

“The clear gain of prestige that France has made is very acceptable... the
heightened respect France has won by her firmness and dignity. She has proved
again the strength of the Third Republic. She has proved that she is not incapable
of recovery after humiliation comparable even to Germany’s own glorious victory
at Jena and Auerstadt. In contemplating it we are sufficiently old-fashioned to re-
member the ancient friendship between Lafayette’s country and Washington’s.” 96

Such a friendly note, such a revival of old kindly feeling, formed a hope-
ful conclusion to the first hundred years of direct relations between the two
countries, and it contributed much to the readiness with which Americans,
in the decades immediately following, accepted the close association
brought about by the World War.

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NOTES AND SOURCES

1 Charles Franklin Thwing, A History of Higher Education in America, Ch. VIII.

2 1b., 318-322; John H. Wigmore, A Proposal to Restore the True Status of French

Science and Learning in America. (Pamphlet, 1916).

3 Dean Wigmore, pamphlet previously cited.

4Prof. James Geddes, Jr., “Educational Advantages in France,” in Science and

Learning in France, published by the Society for American Fellowships in French

Universities, John H. Wigmore, ed., 1917, pp. 347-371. First published in Bostonia,

1903-4. Reprinted, 1908, 1913.

5 Andrew D. White, “European Schools of History and Politics,” in Johns Hopkins

University Studies in History and Political Science, Dec. 1887, 12-17; C. H. Haskins,

“Opportunities for American Students of History at Paris.” Address, Annual Meet-

ing of American Historical Society, Cleveland, 1897. In American Historical Re-

view, III: 418-430.

6 Barrett Wendell, France of To-day, 45; Ch. 1; Courtesy of Charles Scribner’s Sons,

Publishers, New York. F. E. Farrington, French Secondary Schools, Preface, VII;

F. E. Farrington, The Public Primary Schools of France; Simon Newcomb, “France

as a Field for American Students,” Forum, May, 1897; Charles Homer Haskins, op.

cit.; Frank A. Vanderlip, “Government Education in France,” Scribner's, XXXVII:

338-353: Charles F. Thwing, “The University of Paris,” Harper's, CXVI: 423; James

Geddes, Jr., op. cit.; Anne Tolman Smith, “Higher Education of Women in France,”

Forum, XXX: 503-512.

7 American Review of Reviews, XV: 694. June, 1897.

8 Science and Learning in France, 368-371; J. H. Hyde, L’Université Harvard, in
262

 

ra
ST .SIGNS AND PORTENTS

Journal de Vuniversité des annals, June 1, 1918, 547, 551-553; R. Withington, “Our
Academic Ties with France,” Harvard Graduates’ Magazine, XX: 286-93.
French speakers under the Hyde Lectureship and the Harvard exchange plan, in
the period up to 1914, included MM. René Doumic, Edouard Rod, H. De Régnier,
Gaston Deschamps, Hugues LeRoux, L. Mabilleau, A. Leroy-Beaulieu, R. Millet,
A. LeBraz, A. Tardieu, le Vicomte G. d’Avenel, A. LeFranc, Emile Boutroux, Ch.
Diehl, H. Legouis, F. Baldensperger. For the Alliance Francaise appeared MM.
G. Martin, Mabilleau, A. Michel, Leroy-Beaulieu, F. Funck-Brentano, R. Millet,
J. Tiersot, LeBraz, le vicomte d’Avenel, L. Madelin, Marcel Poéte, J. Bédier, C.
Eulart, C. LeVerrier, G. Fougéres, G. Michaut, Diehl, G. Lanson, L. Hourticq,
Firmin Roz, P. Vitry, A. Bellesort. American lecturers in France, under the Hyde
plan and the Harvard exchange system, were Barrett Wendell, D. Santayana, Archi-
bald Cary Coolidge, George Pierce Baker, Henry Van Dyke, Bliss Perry, J. H.
Finley, W. M. Davis, George Grafton Wilson, M. Bocher, Jesse Macy, and Claude
H. Van Tyne.
9 James Hazen Hyde, op. cit., 554.
10 Richards and Elliott, Julia Ward Howe, 11: 308. Diary, Jan. 20, 1871. Detailed
article, same tenor, Appleton’s, Aug. 5, 1871.
11 T. S. Perry, “Some French Novels,” Atlantic, XLII: 296-304; T. S. Perry, “Zola’s
Last Novel,” [b., XLV: 699.
12 Theodore Child, “Literary Paris,” Harper's, LXXXV: 491-2.
13 Public Opinion, 1: 418.
14 George McLean Harper, Masters of French Literature, 31.
15 Nation, Sept. 26, 1907; Literary Digest, Oct. 5, Oct. 12, 1907; Dial, Nov. 16, 1907.
See also, Barrett Wendell, France of To-Day, Ch. V.
16 James H. Hyde, La Littérature Frangaise aux Etats-Unis.
17C. H. C. Wright, History of French Literature, V\I-IX, preface; 836-9.
18 Brander Matthews, Gateways to Literature and Other Essays, 65; Irving Babbitt
Modern French Criticism, XI1.
19 W. J. Henderson, The Story of Music, 163-4, 194.
20 Arthur Elson, Modern Composers of Europe, 114-136.
21 Compare also Edward Dickinson, Syllabus of lectures on the History of Music,
109-13. Rupert Hughes, Contemporary American Composers, 29, 357-360; Waldo S.
Pratt, History of Music, 445-452, 550-555, 581-584, 640-41.
22 Samuel Isham, “French Painting at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,”
Scribner’s XXXVIII: 381; S. G. W. Benjamin, “The Practice and Patronage of
French Art,” Atlantic, Sept., 1875; by same author, “Contemporary Art in France,”
Harper's, Mar., 1877; Ralph Adams Cram, The Ministry of Art, 125. Mr. Cram de-
clares that French socialism and irreligion prevent the development of a truly great
art. Materialism and immorality kill spiritual qualities on which art is founded.
28 James Huneker, Promenades of an Impressionist; Walter Pach, “Pierre Auguste
Renoir,” Scribner's, L1: 606.
24 Charles H. Caffin, Story of American Painting, Chs. VII-XII.
25 Royal Cortissoz, Art and Common Sense; Kenyon Cox, Old Masters and New;
Kenyon Cox, Classic Point of View. Same author, Painters and Sculptors; Charles
H. Caffin, American Masters of Sculpture; A. L. Frothingham, Modern Archi-
tecture, 1V: 331; Paul W. Bartlett, Léonce Bénédite, Louis Gillet, in Les Etats Unis
et La France; Russell Sturgis, “A Great Hall and its Decorations,” Scribner's,
XXXVIII: 509; John La Farge, “Puvis de Chavannes,” Scribner's, XXVIII: 672-
263

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684; The Field of Art, Scribner's, XIX: 125 (Monet); Jb., XXIII: 125-8, (Rodin);
Will H. Low, “Mural Paintings in the Pantheon and Hotel de Ville,’ Scribner’s,
XIII: 661-677.
26 Charles Battell Loomis, Century, LI: 472, 507-510. Compare also Richard Harding
Davis, “Americans in Paris,” Harper's, 1895; and Anne Warner, “Seeing France
with Uncle John,” Century, L: 289, 459, 549, 741, 832.
27 Gaston Deschamps, “America and France,” North American Review, CLXXIV:
751; R. H. Davis, “The Show-Places of Paris,’ Harper's, XC: 125.
28 Henry James, A Little Tour in France; Portraits of Places; Edith Wharton, A
Motor Flight Through France; Mary King Waddington, Chateau and Country Life
in France; Clifton Johnson, Along French Byways; Ida M. Tarbell, “The Charm of
Paris,” Scribner's, XXVII: 387; Frances Wilson Huard, Scribner's, XLII: 551, 652;
XLV: I, 330; Thomas A. Janvier, Harper's, CVII: 659; CIX: 338; Ernest Piexotto,
Scribner's, XXVI: 737; XXVIII: 246; XXIX: 234; XLVI: 41; Elizabeth Robins
Pennell, Joseph R. Pennell, Harper's, LXXXVII: 707; Century, L: 186, 516; Harold
and Madeline Howland, Outlook, LXXXVIII: 185-99, 417-25, 707-15; LXXXIX:
161-74.
Friendly and discerning criticism of the newer type is found in J. Mark Bald-
win’s article on French and American ideals, in the Sociological Review, V1: 97-
116 (1913).
29 W. C. Brownell, “French Traits,” Scribner's, Il: 106; III: 94; IV: 619; V: 74, 241,
(1887-1889). Editorial comment, Jb., XIII: 824; same general tenor, John Sherman,
Recollections, 11: 1047-8.
30 Barrett Wendell, The France of To-day, Chs. II-IV. Review of book, Nation,
Nov. 28, 1907.
81 Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, “A Frenchwoman’s Lessons to American Girls,” Scrib-
ners, LIT: 98-107, (1912).
32 Editorial, “French Thrift,’ Century, LXXXII: 945; same tenor, John Durand,
“French Domestic Life and its Lessons,” Atlantic, XLVIII: 164; Ethel Dean Rock-
well, “The Feminists of France,” Century, LXXXV: 116.
33 Frederic A. Ogg, Social Progress in Contemporary Europe, 100-101, 110-11, 113-15,
123, 174-182, 279-283, 312-323, 340-347, 356-7; Richard T. Ely, French and German
Socialism in Modern Times; E. Howland, “The Familistére at Guise,’ Harper’s,
LXXI: 912; Jacob Schoenhof, “The Example of French Industrial Art Schools,”
Forum, XX XIII: 297; Ida M. Tarbell, “The Paris Municipal Laboratory,” McClure’s,
July, 1898; Walter B. Scaife, “A Century’s Labor Legislation in France”; “Work and
Wages in France,” Forum, XXVIII: 220; C. M. Robinson, “Municipal Art in Paris,”
Harper's, CII]: 200; A. Shaw, “Paris, The Typical Modern City,” Century, XLII:
449.
34 A. Lawrence Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, |: Chs. I,
Il; Frederic A. Ogg, Social Progress in Contemporary Europe, 5-62; Governments
of Europe, 289-353; Theodore Stanton, “The French Electoral System,” North Amer-
ican Review, 1892; Hon. Hannis Taylor, “Powers of the French President,”
North American Review, 1897; Walter B. Scaife, “Legislative Elections in France,”
Ib., 1898; James W. Garner, “The Presidency of the French Republic,” /b.,
1913.
35 Albert Shaw, article cited in note 33; Grant, Personal Memoirs.
86 Herbert Tuttle, “The Chauvinisme of the French,” Atlantic, XXX: 478-482,
(1873); Leslie’s Magazine, Aug. 30, 1873.

264SIGNS AND PORTENTS

37 Albert Rhodes, “A Day in the French Assembly.” Scribner's V1: 717-725, (1873).
88 George William Curtis, Orations and Addresses. 1: 274-5, 244-5; Public Opinion,
I: 511 (1886), quoting Atlanta Constitution.
39 Rhodes, cited note 37; Geo. M. Towle, “Thiers,” Scribner's, XV: 112; articles on
“Gambetta,” “Louis Blanc,” et al., Century, VII: 708, etc.; Andrew D. White, Auto-
biography, 1: 154, Ch. XXIX; James A. Garfield, Works, 11: 273; George Merrill,
“The French Republic,” Harper's, LXII: 573-82; H. Tuttle, cited note 36.
40 Russell Sturgis, “The Fine Arts at the Paris Exposition,” Scribner's, XVIII: 161-82.
41 A. Bowman Blake, “French Political Leaders,” Harper's, XLIV: 338, 355; Editorial,
same magazine, “The New French Minister of Public Instruction.”
42. D. White, Autobiography, 1: 566 (1880).
43 Merrill, cited note 39; similar, Edward F. Noyes, “The Progress of the French
Republic,” North American Review, CXXXIV: 232-3.
44 life of Joseph H. Choate, E. S. Martin, ed., 1: 408.
45 American Review of Reviews, Oct., 1891.
48 Review of Reviews, 1V: 376, 421, 426, 435 (quoting Theodore Stanton in the
Arena), 506; XI: 13.
47 Nation, LV: 426-7.
48 Forum, XV: 12-23; North American Review, CLVI: 136; See also Joseph Bucklin
Bishop, “The French at Panama,” Scribner's, LII1: 25-45 (1913).
49 Review of Reviews, VII: 142-5.
50 Richardson, Messages, 1X: 478, 525.
51 Elihu Root, Miscellaneous Addresses, 149-50. Courtesy of Harvard University
Press; same tenor, Henry Haynie, “Is the French Republic a Failure?” National
Magazine, Aug., 1897, cited in Review of Reviews, XVI: 346-7.
52 Review of Reviews, X: 131, 142; somewhat less flattering, Richard Harding Davis,
“Paris in Mourning,” Harper's, XC: 700.
53 Review of Reviews, XI: 131-134.
54 Mark Twain, “What Paul Bourget Thinks of Us,’ North American Review,
CLX: 48-62.
55 A good brief summary of the Dreyfus Case may be found in J. S. Schapiro,
Modern and Contemporary European History, 248-256.
56 J. B. Eustis, “The Franco-Russian Alliance,” North American Review, 1897.
57 Outlook, Oct. 1, 1898; LX: 825; Forum, XXIII]: 448-462; XXVI: 257-278; Review
of Reviews, XVII; 309-320; XVIII: 377; Nation, LXVI: 180, 359; LXVII: 181;
Literary Digest, XVII: Nov. 12: Ib., XVI: 121-2, citing New York Times, New
Orleans Picayune, Chicago Inter-Ocean, Syracuse Journal, Baltimore News, et al.
58 Independent, L: 715-6; LI: 427.
59 Scribner's, XXV: 251-2.
60 Frederick W. Whitredge, “Zola, Dreyfus, and the Republic,” Political Science
Quarterly, XIII: 259-272, June, 1898. See also Edmond Kelly. “The French Law of
Evidence,” American Law Review, X1X: 385.
61 Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley in Peace and War, 256-7, 200; Mr. Dooley in
the Hearts of his Conutrymen, 240-276, 282.
62 Outlook, Nov. 5, 1898; LXIII: 624-5; Apr. 8, 1899.
63 Review of Reviews, X1X: 20.
64 Nation, LX VIII: 432.
65 Robert Underwood Johnson, Poems, St. Gaudens, an Ode, and Other Verse, 236.
This poem is dated August 7, 1899.

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66 Independent. LI: 2467, 2659, 2865.

87 Robert Ogden, Nation, LXIX: 200; Ephraim. Emerton, /b., 257. Same tenor,
G. W. Steevens, Harper's, XCIX: 792; W. Cunningham, Atlantic, LXXXIV: 236.
68 “Mr, Dooley in the Hearts of His Countrymen,” 242-257, 264, 267, 277.

69 John T. Morse, Jr., “The Dreyfus and Zola Trials,” Atlantic, LXXXI: 589.

70 Alvan F. Sanborn, “French Open-mindedness,” Atlantic, LXXXIV: 589.

71 J. Schoenhof, “What the World owes to France,” Forum, XXVIII: 283.

72 Century, LIX: 154; Review of Reviews, XIX: 396-7.

73 Review of Reviews, XX1X: 366, citing Richard Walden Hale, in the Green Bag.
74 Review of Reviews, XXXIV: 134, 147

75 Robert Underwood Johnson, Poems, op. cit. “To Dreyfus Vindicated.” Mr.
Johnson sent a copy of this poem to Picquart, and received a very appreciative
reply from him. (R. U. Johnson to the writer, July 12, 1922.) Edmund Clarence
Stedman wrote to Mr. Johnson in regard to the ode that it seemed to him that
“Justice herself had been bound and gagged by mailed hands” “when Dreyfus
was crucified.” E. C. Stedman, Life and Letters, 11: 396-7.

76A contemporary account of this religious struggle in France may be found
in J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, Development of Modern Europe, \1: 166-172.
This may be accepted as a typical description of the situation as it appeared to
informed and impartial Americans.

77 Cited in Literary Digest, Dec. 22, 1906.

78 America, VI: 296, Jan. 6, 1912. Other typical utterances in regard to France, in
this periodical, IV: 52, 76, 171, 219, 243, 267, 315, 399, 508; V: 207, 278-9,
533-535; VII: 183, 320, 350. Compare also Mrs. Bellamy Storer, ““The Decadence of
France,” North American Review, CXXI1: 168-84.

79 Harper's, Aug. 22, 1903.

80 Atlantic, XC: 652-663.

81 Literary Digest, XX XIII: 923-4. The Outlook, however, supported the separation
of Church and State. There were frequent editorials to this effect in 1905. See
also Goldwin Smith, “The Church Question in France,” Outlook, Feb. 2, 1907.

82 Frank A. Vanderlip, “Political Problems of Europe as they Interest Americans,”
Scribner's, XXXVII: 1-18.

83 Barrett Wendell, op. cit., Ch. VI and pp. 350-4.

84 literary Digest, Aug. 16, 1902.

85 [b., Dec. 22, 1906.

86 Independent, Oct. 11, 1906; Nation, Jan. 3, 1907.

87 North American Review, CLXXV: 533.

88 Review of Reviews, XXIV: 137; XXVI: 272; XXXII: 378; XXXIII: 20;
XXXIV: 134, 147.

89 Schieber, 198-203.

80 Cortissoz, Life of Whitelaw Reid, II: 325-333.

91 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, 1: 468-505; Schieber,
198, 200.

92 North American Review, CLXXXI: 510-517.

93 April 23, Sept. 30, 1905.

94 April 5, 1906.

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5 Review of Reviews, XXII: 17; XXXIII: 271; XXXIV: 135, 532-3; XXXVIII:
665-6; XLI: 8; XLIV: 155-6. Especially striking pro-French cartoons, from Detroit
News, Baltimore American, New York World, New York Press, etc., in Review of Re-
views, XX XIII: 286; XLIV: 292 and ff.

°6 Harper's Weekly, Apr. 7, 1906, Aug. 24, 1907, Nov. 14, 1908, Aug. 5, Aug. 12,
Dec. 30, 1911.

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eee by their ocean barriers from the apprehensions and
disturbances which have for centuries troubled the peace of Europe;
directly concerned in none of the alliances which marked the fears or
the ambitions of continental powers, the people of the United States re-
ceived without serious forebodings the news of the murder of Franz
Ferdinand. They saw in it no menace to themselves, nor did they clearly
envisage an immediate or a general European war. It is true that they
were not unaware of the significance of Triple Alliance and Triple En-
tente. They knew something of the complex interests centering in the
Balkans, and understood in a measure the imperialistic competition upon
which the great Powers had entered. They had observed with deep dis-
approbation the ever more threatening military and naval equipment which
characterized the clash of interests. Yet they catalogued the Sarajevo in-
cident as another Balkan murder, and few prophesied serious results from
it. By the time the Austrian ultimatum was issued, press comment upon
the affair had almost ceased. That Administration circles were somewhat
more sensitive than the general public to the tenseness of the European
atmosphere in the summer of 1914 is evidenced by Colonel House’s peace
mission abroad, undertaken before the Balkan crisis had developed. And
even he reported a general disposition to codperate, and was sure that
in France in particular the leaders had abandoned all idea of aggression
or of revenge.*

The ultimatum startled us into fuller realization. The Philadelphia North
American spoke caustically of Secretary Bryan’s faith that his arbitration
treaties “ought to make war impossible,” and added that only a sublime
and unthinking optimism could fail to be shaken by the European situa-
tion. The New York Tribune pinned its hopes for peace on Russia, “power-
ful enough to prevent further spoliation in the Balkans by Austria-
Hungary” and the unwillingness of all the powers to face the financial
crash which would inevitably follow a great war. Said the Chicago Daily
Tribune :—

 

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“The appalling consequences of a general war not only warrant but compel the
belief that no power will rashly or lightly cross the line that separates a limited
reprisal from a ruinous and discreditable war.” 2

When the early days of August found the great struggle fairly under
way, our reaction was one of sharp condemnation of “militarism” and
all its works. The war is “amazing, almost incredible.” We “read with
loathing and a sense of shame” of such a “breakdown of civilization.”
The European alliances ‘‘are laying a hand of death upon all Europe,’—
“Their bonds are called safety, but are really a peril and a curse.”
“No great principle of justice involved, . . . warring powers that fight
for greed, for pride, for revenge, for hate, for the inextinguishable lust
of national aggrandizement.” ‘“‘Every European nation has for a generation
been heading straight for war or national bankruptcy, due to excessive
military preparations.” * In view of the later insistence upon the righteous-
ness of the Allied cause it is interesting to note how very few there
were who felt, as Senator Lodge later declared he did, that ‘‘nothing less
was at stake... than the freedom and civilization of the Western
World,” or that, as the Outlook suggested, the contest was “‘in its funda-
mental analysis, between liberalism and monarchical imperialism.” 4
Generalizations did not long content us. The ambitions and intrigues of
all nations had contributed to the war. But its flaming forth at this par-
ticular moment could not have been the result of spontaneous combustion.
Someone had touched a match to the tinder. Who was to blame? “The
nation that unsheathes the sword is put instantly upon the defensive in
the court of public opinion.” > Russia’s interest in the Balkans was recog-
nized as dangerous, but this was overshadowed by Austria’s apparently
provocative behavior. “Austria-Hungary has maneuvred deliberately to
set Europe by the ears.” ® Germany’s militarism had for some time an-
tagonized us, and we were prepared to believe her guilty. Moreover, we
recognized her strength, and paid her the compliment of believing that she
could dictate the policy of her weaker ally. The American judgment was
“that this at least is quite clear, that if Emperor William did not directly
cause and desire the war, he at least failed to prevent it when it would
have been easy for him to do so.” 7 Of very great importance, too, appeared
the fact that

. “in each crisis Germany has taken the aggressive... .In making the case
upon which she will be judged, she has been outmaneuvred by the deliberation of
Russia, the forbearance of France, and the patience of Great Britain. She has as-
sumed the role of international autocrat, while giving her foes the advantage of
prosecuting a patriotic war of defense.” §

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“When the war began it had very little meaning, . . . brought on by intrigues
of rival despotisms. . . . Belgium alone could fight with clean hands. . . . But the
invasion of Belgium changed the whole face of affairs. As by a lightning-flash
the issue was made plain: the issue of the sacredness of law; the rule of the
soldier or the rule of the citizen; the rule of fear or the rule of law.” ®

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Granting, said the Nation, that England and France had consulted what
to do if Belgium were invaded—“What does it all boil down to? That
Germany violated a law because some one else was going to. If anybody
was going to murder Belgian neutrality, she was going to be first on the
job.” #° Richard Harding Davis’ account of the burning of Louvain, Brand
Whitlock’s description of the Belgian situation, and the many stories of
vandalism and cruelty that reached this country helped to injure Ger-
many’s cause. When Rheims Cathedral was first bombarded, the papers
were full of indignant protest, and Robert Underwood Johnson wrote,—

“Though they should boast a thousand victories,
This is their dire defeat.” 12

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The public judgment absolved France definitely from war guilt. “This is
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: want it.” “France, . . . throughout the diplomatic controversy, sincerely
: worked for peace . . . and made every reasonable concession in the hope
E of preserving peace.” “For the last forty years, France has sought only
| peace and security.” “Alsace-Lorraine . . . has been more of a national

political fetish than anything else, and the idea of a war for revenge has
never seriously entered into her politics.” Her preparations “have been de-
termined by the most elementary principles of self-preservation.” *” Or, as
Theodore Roosevelt put it :—

“It is utterly impossible to see how France could have acted otherwise than as
she did act. She had done nothing to provoke the crisis, even though it be admitted
that in the end she was certain to side with Russia. War was not declared by her,
but against her, and she could not have escaped it save by having pursued in
the past, and by willingness to pursue in the future, a course which would have
left’ her as helpless as Luxemburg, and Luxemburg’s fate shows that helplessness
does not offer the smallest guarantee of peace.” 15

In the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, while recognizing its bearing upon the
system of alliances and upon the persistence of hard feeling between France
and Germany, most critics were not inclined to blame France for her
action in regard to it. Rather, it was felt that Germany should have
shown wisdom and tact in adjusting the difficulty. The German seizure
of the provinces “led to a natural desire of France to unite with Russia
in attacking Germany in case of a general war,” and was “an incurable
blunder.” “The most serious weakness of all” in Germany’s foreign policy,
270

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wrote William A. Sloane, “is Germany’s tenure and treatment of Alsace-
Lorraine.” Bismarck’s work was “flawless,” said Leon Dominian, “so long
as he added only Germans to the Empire.” But he “erred grievously’ in
adding Frenchmen in Alsace-Lorraine, for he thus created the bitterness
which led to the Russian alliance. The Review of Reviews asserted that
Germany, in her own interests, should have reopened the question in a
spirit of generosity and common sense, and redrawn the map so as to
throw the French-speaking districts back into France. This might have
saved the peace of Europe for generations, for without it “the whole
French nation has unitedly, without wavering, clung to the purpose at
some time to rectify that frontier.” +* Only a few leaned toward Germany.
Albert Bushnell Hart, soon to become one of France’s most uncompromis-
ing advocates, remarked that the French had been ready for war with
Germany for the last forty years, and accepted the opportunity when it
came without hesitation and with very little effort to avert it, and Louis
E. Van Norman wrote,—“To protect her investments in Russia, and to
consummate her revenge on Germany for the humiliation of 1870, France
cannot break with the Muscovite.” Ernest F. Henderson defended Germany
against the charge of militarism, and declared that France had meddled in
a conflict that did not concern her.*® But the great mass of popular sym-
pathy stood squarely with France on the question of responsibility.

Nor did sympathy stop here. French culture and French character came
in for their share of praise. Edward S. Martin, editor of Life, in a series
of editorials later published as The Diary of a Nation, wrote:—

“(This time France must be finished, so that she will make us no more trouble’
say the German managers. ... But... all the rest of us prefer France in the
unfinished French state as heretofore... . It is not popular, this idea of ‘finish-
ing’ France. France is too valuable to be ‘finished.’ For one thing, she is charm-
ing. For another, she is a laboratory of civilization. .. The American mind
records and discloses with hardly appreciable dissent, the impression that the
English, French and Russians are fighting in this war in behalf of the liberties
of all the world.” 16

“We had doubted,” said Frank H. Simonds in the New York Evening Sun,
“whether France, so long deemed decadent by those who knew least and
spoke most about her, . . . could endure the strain of another terrible
struggle in which defeat was the initial circumstance on every field. 4.
We now know... that the nation which could endure adversity with
calmness, as the French did in August, may be defeated, but that the
France that the whole world loves . . . will not die.” +? “Indomitable
spirit,” “fine resilience,” “an addition to the moral assets of the world,”
came the ringing phrases.?® Without underestimating the importance of the
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German-American, Scandinavian, and Irish sympathy for the Central Pow-
ers, it can easily be demonstrated that the weight of American sentiment
was in the early months of the war decidedly pro-Entente, and with en-
thusiasm for France far greater than for England or for Russia.2® Aside,
however, from a few impulsive persons such as Charles W. Eliot, who on
August 6 sent to President Wilson a letter proposing intervention ‘‘to
rebuke and punish Austria-Hungary and Germany” (a letter, be it said,
which he withdrew almost immediately, on cooler thought, although he
continued to be an earnest champion of the Allied cause) and various
Americans who were in France or Belgium and so had sympathy stirred
by seeing the distress of invaded districts, the people of the United States
showed at this time no desire to depart from the neutrality proclaimed
by the President.?°

Discussion of war responsibility in 1915 showed sharp differences of opin-
ion in regard to the behavior of Great Britain and Germany, but the
French continued to hold popular sympathy. Among the more thoughtful
analyses may be mentioned an article in the American Political Science
Review, by E. R. Turner, which concluded with the statement that the
causes of the cataclysm “must be sought in the curse of militarism, the
spoliation and resentment of France, the envy and apprehension of Eng-
land, the arrogance and prosperity of Germany, the weakness of Austria,
the rise of the Balkan states, and the glowering menace of Russia.” 22
Ellery C. Stowell’s Diplomacy of the War of 1914 condemned the German
seizure of Alsace-Lorraine as ‘‘a constant irritant in the body politic of
Europe,” said that the formation of the Dual Alliance “tended to restore
the balance of power and prevent any further French ‘bleeding,’”’ declared
that France had no active intention of revenge, knowing that an attempt
could not succeed, and added :—

“It is very possible that the French and English statesmen might have hit upon
some plan to prevent the outbreak of the war, but my thorough examination of the
documents and my study of European politics has not made it possible for me to
discover wherein that possibility lay.”

For the outbreak of trouble, he blamed ‘“‘first, Austria, second, Germany,
and to some slight degree, Russia.” 8

Agnes Repplier well expressed the consensus of popular opinion, when she
wrote :—

“The plain truth remains that England did not violate Belgium’s neutrality, and
Germany did; that France did not march her armies across Belgium’s frontier,
and Germany did; that France promised to respect the treaty she had signed, and
Germany refused to give such a promise. How can we argue on the basis of what
might have happened, instead of what has happened?” 24

272FRANCE IN ARMS

 

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It will be recalled that our Ambassador in London, Mr. Page, advised
that the Dacia, transferred from German to American registry, should be
seized by the French rather than by the English, on the ground that our
good-will toward France was such that “Americans will stand even out-
rages from France without getting excited.” The result showed him quite
correct in his analysis of our reaction. The Review of Reviews remarked
casually that France had violated international law, but it was “a fair
case for later settlement by friendly arbitration, and will involve no
trouble.” 2°

The Outlook for May 12, 1915, carried an article entitled “Plain Words
from America to Sister Nations in Europe,” by “Civis Americanus.” To
France, the writer said :—

“We shall never forget your friendship and help in the days when we won our
freedom. ... We cannot see that this war is in any way one of your choosing
or of your making. No threat of yours, no claim of yours, entered into the
witches’ caldron.” ...

France showed, he said, respect for Belgian neutrality, and willingness to
work for a peaceful settlement, and,—

“You have not talked much, but you have fought well. You have suffered enor-
mously, but you have not lost your nerve. ... Your silent General, your silent
soldiers, your sober, self-sacrificing people, have made a splendid record.”

Wayne MacVeigh, in the North American Review, July, 1915, said,—

“I know nothing more sublime in all history than the passion for liberty which
animates to-day the children of France in their combat for their country and for
the world against the crushing forces of Attila’s Huns.”

France was praised frequently for not carrying on the campaign of propa-
ganda that Britain and Germany had undertaken; she was praised as shar-
ing American ideals of democracy; she was praised because her actions
had disproved notions current in America of her decadence, corruption, and
instability. We were frankly surprised to find her so “quiet and stub-
born.” 2° We expected enthusiasm and audacity,—

.. “the stirring thing is that France the frivolous, France the debonair, France
the carefree and laughter-loving, has met the supreme ordeal of her existence in a
manner to teach the whole world lessons of steadiness, of sobriety, of dogged
courage, of concentrated efficiency, and of uncomplaining sacrifice.” 27

The studies of the war published in 1916 show marked partisanship in

most cases. C. E. Seymour, in his The Diplomatic Background of the

War, 1870-1914, accepted casually enough the thesis that Germany forced

the war upon France. Arthur Bullard, describing the Diplomacy of the
273

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Great War, presented a thoughtful and reasonable analysis, distinctly more
sympathetic toward France than toward any other nation of which he
wrote. C. H. C. Wright, in The Third French Republic, absolved France
of any aggressive action,—

“So far as the outbreak of the war in 1914 is concerned, France stands with a
clear conscience. She had nothing to do with the disputes between Austria and
Serbia, or between Austria, Germany, and Russia. Once war proved inevitable France
faithfully accepted the responsibility of the Russian alliance. Against France
Germany was an open aggressor.” 28

James M. Beck’s “arguments” in favor of the Allies, especially France,
were fulsome in their enthusiasm. Samuel P. Orth’s The Imperial Impulse
was better balanced. He analyzed the character and the motives of each of
the warring nations, bringing out both good and bad points in each. He
did not wish German “brute force’ to overwhelm France, but her motive
in the war, he said, was “‘revenge, a very childish, but a very human
motive.” 2° Frederic C. Howe, Why War? blaming privilege as the cause
of the war, and imperialism as the policy interpreting it, indicted all
nations alike, and as to France, said that colonial expansion was a national,
rather than a purely administrative policy, since French peasants were
accustomed to invest their savings in overseas enterprises; and in France
imperialism was

“a slumbering desire for the recapture of Alsace-Lorraine, for the humbling of
Germany, the protection of billions invested in Russian bonds, the maintenance

of concessions in the Balkans and the Near East, and the preservation of the
colonies on the Mediterranean.” 3°

A unique example, for this period, is the pro-German argument of Roland
Hugins, who declared that he had “no German blood, and, incidentally, no
Irish,” “American since 1690.” His book, Germany Misjudged, brought
together many of the charges that since have become more common.
France

‘is living in a dream, wrapped in illusion. Because she suffers much, she thinks
her cause is just, and because her soul is high she imagines her deed is good.
Every nation at war tends to idealize its motives, and this is particularly true
of this world war,—possibly just for the reason that most of its causes were selfish.”

It is gratifying to vaunt the glory of France, he said, and to talk of wicked
Germany,—

“not so gratifying to talk of secret treaties, of Russian securities held by French
investors, of the subjugation of Morocco, or of the intrigues of the colonial
party . .. the whole question simmers down to this: why were you in alliance with
Russia?”

274FRANCE IN ARMS

oe

It could not have been, he thought, because of sympathy with the Russian
government. It could not have been fear. Germany would not have at-
tacked. It could only have been for revenge, and France is “the most
pitiable figure in the world, because you suffer so much and with the
least need,” “lent, body and soul, to the designs of the Russian autoc-
macy. °?
That this was far from being the view of the general public is borne out
by such articles as that of George Harvey in the North American Review
for April, 1916; by Roosevelt’s “France has shown a heroism and a lofti-
ness of soul worthy of Joan of Arc herself”; by Allen Tucker’s enthusiastic
declaration,—‘‘France carries the civilization of the world in her hands,
_ and knows that she is fighting to save it.” We should let France
understand, said Tucker,
“that we, as a people, give her our respect, our admiration, and more than all,
our love, ... in spite of luxury and materialism, there is an America still, and
that America understands that France is carrying the hope of the world.” $2

Arthur Bullard suggested that France was our best ally. Britain was too im-
perialistic. France was our first friend. We had from her a wealth of ideas,
more valuable even than her military aid. She was the most democratic of
peoples, with ideals similar to ours.** There were stirring poems, too, to
France. One of the most widely known is Henry Van Dyke’s The Name
of France.

“Give us a name to fill the mind
With the stirring thoughts that lead mankind.

A name like a star, a name of light.
I give you, France!” 84

It is to be borne in mind that since the opening of the war relations be-
tween the United States and Germany had been steadily growing embit-
tered. By virtue of this irritation against Germany there was a tendency
on the part of many to account her enemies our friends. Yet Great Britain
had committed many infractions of our neutrality, and comparatively few
were willing to go as far as Ambassador Page in condoning these offences.
France, however, without a powerful navy, and needing every ounce of
energy for the struggle on land, left most naval questions in Britain’s
hands, and the diplomatic correspondence shows that her interferences with
our mails and our commerce, with the life and happiness of our citizens,
were negligible as compared with those of Germany and Britain. More-
over, she had been invaded: her sufferings were very real, her courage and
sacrifice undeniable. She furnished a satisfactory outlet for our emotions
and our sympathies. Since the very first days of the war, American volun-
275

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teers had been serving with the Allied forces, principally the French and
the Canadians. Alan Seeger and some fifty others joined the Foreign
Legion before the war was three weeks old, and many more, representing
often the best-known families in America, followed. The Lafayette Flying
Corps, all Americans, was organized in the French aviation service as
early as March, 1915. These enlistments may have been largely for love of
adventure, but the young soldiers soon came to look upon their enterprise
as a crusade, and their burning devotion communicated itself to those at
home. Said the Chicago Herald, April 16, 1915,—

“The volunteers fighting for France ... We never hear of volunteers fighting for
Germany, Great Britain, Russia, Austria. ...It is always for France that the
strangers fight. Why? There is only one answer. Because she is France. . . . Of all the

nations, France is the only one which has no need of arguments, of affirmations, of
proofs to make an impression on the stranger. It is enough for her to exist.”

There were casualties, too, among these young zealots,—Kiffin Rockwell,
who wrote, “I pay my part for Lafayette and Rochambeau”;—Norman
Prince ;—Victor Chapman;—Alan Seeger, at first only impulsively loyal
to the Paris which he loved; later, ‘“‘doing my share for the side | think
right,” declaring that there should be no neutrals, and calling upon Amer-
ica to forget her selfishness and join to serve the world.*®

Nor were these all whose stories tore at our hearts. Americans had thrown
themselves heart and soul into relief work, not only through the Red
Cross, always ready to aid, but through innumerable services designed es-
pecially to meet the emergency in Belgium and France. The American Am-
bulance Service, which Robert Bacon, former Ambassador to France,
was organizing efficiently, and in which some five thousand Americans
served, from first to last, many of them young students from Harvard,
Yale, Princeton, and other eastern colleges, was early in the field. Edith
Wharton was building up the American Hostels for Refugees and Chil-
dren. The American Relief Clearing House, the American Fund for French
Wounded, and many others, were in active operation. And these workers,
too, were not merely offering charity. They were offering themselves and
often all they had, as

“a concrete expression of our sympathy with the French people, our belief in the
justice of their cause, our hope in its ultimate triumph... . In this war France
has committed no moral blunders, has laid herself open to no criticisms, has
violated no treaties, has trespassed upon none of the established conventions of
warfare. .. . The whole world to-day does reverence to France and recognizes her
as a combatant without fear and also without reproach.” 36

This effort “expresses not sympathy alone, but a sense of the majesty of
France and the sublimity of her effort for the highest ideals of civiliza-
276FRANCE IN ARMS

 

tion.” ** Many aspects of the attitude of our government “toward the
great struggle between absolutism and democracy” are humiliating to
Americans, said the Outlook, ‘‘but there is nothing to regret in the devotion
to France in her hour of need of many young Americans, nor in the
finely conceived and finely organized service of American women to the
sufferings and sorrow of France.” *

With such a background, and with the submarine menace daily more
threatening, it is not strange that there should have been many who felt
with Elihu Root,—

“No man has fought for liberty during this century and a half, in all this world,
who has not been cheered and strengthened by the example and the spirit of our
free America; and if that spirit is not dead, as I know it is not, that spirit
is with the Allies who are fighting our battles. 39

And then, suddenly, we were with them in fact and deed. The President’s
message had called for war; Congress had sanctioned it; and we were
receiving in America an Allied mission to arrange for codperation. The
British delegation was received with friendliness and decorum, the French
with surpassing enthusiasm. April 26 was officially designated as “France
Day” by the Governor of New York State. It was the anniversary of
Lafayette’s departure from France in 1777. From one end of New York
City to the other the Tri-color floated. In the schools, in public gatherings,
on the streets, one heard the Marseillaise. Brooklyn dedicated with digni-
fied ceremony a new Lafayette memorial. Wreaths were piled high about
the Lafayette statue in Union Square. Enthusiastic speeches recalled the
days of the “First Alliance,’ and promised to repay the debt, a debt
doubled by the fact that for two long years, while we slept, the soldiers of
Britain and France had fought to protect our constitution and our liberties.
Country-wide spread the contagion. The Senate received the French en-
voys with a demonstration unequalled since the days of Lafayette’s return
in 1822. The House shared the excitement. Staid Philadelphia gave to Joffre
a marshal’s baton with a piece of one of the rafters of Independence Hall
inset. In Boston and Springfield, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas, wherever the
envoys went, they received ovations. “No mission of this kind,” said the
papers, “could have been more successful in winning the confidence and
respect of an entire nation.” Viviani gave “a vivid impression of his own
earnestness and the indomitable spirit of his people.” And as for Joffre—

“Perhaps never before in our history has a foreign visitor appealed so directly
to the innate American love of human strength, bigness, and courage as exemplified
in the individual man.”

“The victor of the Marne and thus the savior of civilization.”

“In that modest, massive, indomitable personality we shall see France,”

277

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It was more than a personal tribute to these men, said the observers. It
was an offering to the spirit of France—a glorified, canonized France—a
France which had shown almost superhuman resilience and endurance,
and a marvellous appreciation of the supreme values in life; a France for
whom American affection was instinctive and spontaneous. This was the
nation, said enthusiasts, which rallied from disaster and defeat to save
the cause of international faith and democracy.

“There was a splendor, there was a glory, about the French resistance at the
Marne unlike all else in modern history.” 4°

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“It was the time of our despair,
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Franklin K. Lane declared that we fought Germany, not only for our own
injuries, but because of Belgium, because of France,—

Sci ae ti

Sirah

“invaded, desecrated France, a million of whose heroic sons have died to save
the land of Lafayette. Glorious golden France, the preserver of the arts, the land
of noble spirit, the first land to follow our lead into republican liberty.” 42

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Brand Whitlock, speaking at the Lafayette tomb on July 4, said:—

“To-day, as we stand here by the tomb of him who in his youth went forth alone
to join his colors across the seas, we hear the tread of a million youths of
America, sons of his spirit, marching to the ships that bear them hither to join
their colors on this new front of Liberty.” 43

Steir

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“The reunion of hearts is complete, but the reuniting of hands cannot be complete
until the American army places the Stars and Stripes in the forefront of France's
far-flung battle line.” 44

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Thus we come to the climax of American enthusiasm for France. Never
before in our history had there been so glowing an ardor for another na-
tion. It is true that this emotion was predicated upon a variety of circum-
stances. Some of it may have been unconscious self-glorification, since the
vindication of French motives and action now appeared to vindicate our
own. Some of it may have been quite unjustified by the facts. Neverthe-
less, it existed. It was wide-spread. It owed very little to French propa-
278

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ganda, and was entirely genuine on the part of the mass of the American
public.*® Unfortunately it blinded us somewhat to actual conditions, and
thus led to expectations which, failing of realization, created disappoint-
ment and bitterness. We assumed far too easily that our Allies, having a
common enemy, sought identical ends with ourselves; that our ideas of
justice and security would in the final settlement be theirs.

Here and there, however, appeared a suggestion that idyllic harmony had
not quite been attained. The New Republic in a summary of the situation
said that we might quite reasonably subordinate our ideas as to men and
supplies to the greater knowledge of facts possessed by the Allies, but that
we must be careful not to allow political subordination. We could not be
the vassals of European diplomats, and the peace for which we fought
must be a just and final one.*® Lothrop Stoddard, writing on “Present-Day
Europe,” devoted a chapter to French war and pre-war psychology, and
used not infrequently the phrase “neo-imperialism.” *7 Senator Borah, in a
characteristic speech, announced that he did not vote for war out of sym-
pathy with France,—‘‘much as I sympathize with and greatly as I admire
that brave and chivalrous people.” In his view, we were fighting, not for
anyone else’s interests or colonies, but for the United States alone, because
we must protect the lives and rights of our citizens. “It is,” he said, “an
American war, to be carried on, prolonged, or ended, according to Amer-
ican interests, and to be adjusted upon American principles.” Since we had
entered, it could no longer be considered a European war to settle European
affairs.*®

Another phase is brought out by the hints of Herbert Adams Gibbons,
Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, and others who wrote from Paris suggesting
that Americans in France would be wise not to criticise too much, not to
boast of things American and patronize their Allies, not to spend so
lavishly as to encourage French overcharging and then complain that they
were robbed, but to really try to understand French traditions and habits.*®
From the first, it had ‘been recognized that one of the French war aims
was the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine. On this point, in spite of general
condemnation of Germany’s original seizure, American opinion was not a
unit. Charles Downer Hazen, in Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule
declared for unconditional restoration. “The twentieth century must redress
the greatest iniquity of the nineteenth.” By far the greater number of
writers on the subject took the position that some sort of a compromise
settlement, based upon racial and strategic lines, and giving due recognition
to the wishes of the inhabitants, should be worked out, in the interests of
permanent peace. As the Review of Reviews put it, the question could no
longer be considered as involving France and Germany alone. The peace

279

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of the world was dependent upon the finding of a permanent settlement.
“The world cannot tolerate the continuance of feuds that endanger the
general peace.” “If French intelligence is not blinded by passion it
will be seen that this permanent basis of peace is what France is really
fighting for.’’ °°

After President Wilson in the “Fourteen Points” committed the Admin-
istration to the return of the disputed districts, the bulk of press comment
swung over to this point of view. H. H. Powers even went farther,
and declared for annexing the Rhineland provinces, including the Pala-
tinate as well, on the ground of economic unity. Senator Lodge’s argument
on the point touched on the same consideration, from another angle. Alsace
and Lorraine must be returned, without conditions and without deduction,
not only because it was just and right, “but because it is essential to our
own self-protection that the iron mines of Lorraine, which are said to con-
tain five-sevenths of the German iron, must be taken from Germany for-
ever. Without these mines she would have found it difficult to prepare for
this war. She must never have control of them again.” +

America in 1918 was largely occupied with her own share in the war.
There was much general discussion of possible peace terms, and especially
of devices to prevent future wars. There was less direct discussion of indi-
vidual countries than before our own efforts so largely absorbed our in-
terest; more interest in the A. E. F. than in the French army; more to be
said about American sacrifices and plans than about anything else. Public
speakers now and then made courteous and friendly references to France:
we celebrated Bastile Day as an opportunity to show our “spiritual solidar-
ity,” and celebrated it, be it said, with all due enthusiasm, and all due
protestations of undying loyalty to France, and pledges to restore the lost
provinces; but, on the whole, the spontaneity and ardor of a twelvemonth
earlier were lacking. And this was natural enough under the circumstances,
and proved no lack of real appreciation of “suffering, unyielding, towering
France” as she still appeared to us.5? Most histories of the war were now
dominated largely by government propaganda material, and were wholly
favorable to the Allies.**

The most interesting and significant utterances are those bearing upon
certain aspects of the probable after-war settlements, which indicate the
gradual development of some new points of view. We begin to find refer-
ences to the secret treaties, which were considered reprehensible and tend-
ing to neutralize the possibility of a just peace.** We find the war char-
acterized not as a contest between the Central Powers representing
imperialism and the Allies standing for democracy, but as a contest be-
tween progressive and reactionary forces everywhere, so that we must be

280

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on our guard lest the Entente use a victory to carry out their own im-
perialistic plans. America gives notice that she fights in Europe
“solely on the understanding that we are to have henceforth a world safe for small
peoples; a league of democratic self-governing nations; the principle of trustee-
ship over backward regions, rather than that of possession and exploitation.” 55
Ambassador Page’s suggestion in March, 1917, that “a gift of a billion
dollars to France” would “‘fix Franco-American history all right for several
centuries” had not met with favor, but generous credits and large loans to
all the Allies by the United States had created a problem whose adjust-
ment was beginning to attract attention. H. H. Powers, after saying that
“only with a blush’ could America accept payment of the French debt
to us “while unable to pay our debt to her” naively suggested that the
French colonies in the Pacific be transferred to us, thus lightening the
French burden and saving French pride! °* The New Republic (Sept. 7,
1918), boldly declared for cancellation, in view of the Allies’, and especially
France’s “gallantly sustaining month after month, year after year, the
tremendous weight of German aggression.” It will not be enough to drive
the Germans from French soil, break their militarism, and restore Alsace-
Lorraine. The burden of debt and of reconstruction will be too heavy. It
will surely be the American will to “wipe out the French debt” and we
should allocate the costs of war in such a way as to give France justice.
Her loss has been far greater than that of any other nation. She has been
acting for the common good, and should be set even with her partners
when peace comes. The Nation, on the other hand, urged that France
would not wish to be an object of charity, nor would she be so exhausted
as to make it necessary.5? As to reparations, a question always so closely
connected with that of financial rehabilitation and interallied debts, the
New Republic insisted that while they be made to cover “the things that
no nation cherishing its honor” would do in war, as “launching invasion
through neutral soil, wanton destruction of civil property and enslavement
of civil population, thrusting aside the poor safeguard thrown by conven-
tional laws of war around life and property at sea,’ the payments be not
made to cover plans for revenge, nor set so high as to create desperation in
Germany.*®
As the time for the Peace Conference approached, it became increasingly
evident that American ideas as to a just peace would not correspond with
those of European leaders. Both the British and the French administra-
tions were publicly declaring that Germany must pay the entire costs
of the war. Advices from Paris indicated that France would maintain the
validity of the secret treaties made during the war; that she would call
for concerted action against the Russian Soviet government, and would en-
281

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deavor to establish a strong and militaristic Poland and a chain of armed
succession states to curb both Russia and Germany. She would call for the
confiscation of all German colonies and their allocation among the victors;
and for herself she would not be satisfied with the return of Alsace-
Lorraine, but would demand the annexation of the Saar Valley and the
extension of the French frontier to the Rhine. On December 30, 1918,
Clemenceau, in the French Senate, declared that the first requirement of
France was security, and that in his judgment “an old system . . . known
as the balance of power” worked out through firm alliances, offered the
best guarantee of safety. “Certainties,’ not dreams, France demanded. To
Americans who had seen in the pre-war system of ententes and alliances the
source of much of the distrust and the militarism that brought on the war,
such a programme and such statements were ominous, and a wave of dis-
satisfaction swept over the country. “The balance of power was an or-
ganized immorality,” declared the New York Times (January 1, 1919), “It
looks like a head-on collision between France and America,” said the Lit-
erary Digest (January 11, 1919). Americans might concede something of
their independence to a general league, thought the Seattle Times, but they
“will concede nothing to an alliance.” °* “Concerning Tigers in Peace
Times,” remarked the Cincinnati Enquirer, this policy of nationalism does
not march with “the eminently fair rule of mutual concessions.” “The
American army .. . will never be used to defend a Rhine frontier pur-
chased by the future subordination of millions of Germans to French mil-
itary law.” “American soldiers will not go to France in order to protect
French occupation of the Saar Valley.” The temper of France “seems trans-
formed.” It seems now “narrow, self-centred, grasping, and, toward the
Germans, vindictive.” Our feeling toward France will undergo a revulsion
“if we come to think that she has eyes and ears for nothing but her own
national safety and aggrandizement.” °° If the French want certainties,
said the Baltimore Sun, here are a few:—It is certain

. “that the balance of power is an ineffective instrument for maintaining) the
peace ... that the seizure and holding by any nation of territory containing a hos-
tile population is a constant source of trouble and danger to that nation . . . that
you cannot exact indemnities from a defeated nation unless the latter has the money
or is allowed to make the money wherewith to pay the indemnities.” ®1

The feeling against the “Hun” was very strong in the United States, how-

ever, and majority opinion clearly favored a “strong peace” and the exac-

tion of the fullest possible penalties from Germany. Frank Simonds de-

fended the French policy as directed toward safety only, and not imperial-

ism. He thought cession of the Saar to France just compensation for the

destruction of the Lens mines. Senator Lodge advocated “ample and com-
282Feiantee

HERR Saree

 

 

FRANCE IN ARMS

plete” indemnities for France,—‘“compensation to the utmost limit.” She
should have Alsace-Lorraine, and “other barriers if necessary to make her
impregnable to German assault” for our sake as well as hers, for “on the
strength of France more than anything else, because she is the neighbor
of Germany, rests the future peace of the world.” Simeon Strunsky, in the
New York Evening Post, reminded us that France could hardly in four
months have changed from the “nation that bared its breast for the defence
of humanity” to “a profiteer and a menace to peace.” In view of French
suffering and French danger, by no means ended, it is manifestly unfair,
he continued, to treat France as if she were suffering from self-induced
shell-shock, “a neurotic woman giving herself up to the delights and
profits of hysteria.” France has deserved sympathy and support from us.*?
When the Versailles Treaty was completed and signed, the situation was
complicated by a bitter political struggle, and especially by the feud be-
tween President Wilson and the Senate. The President had also many per-
sonal enemies, and numerous critics of all political complexions. The
League of Nations, his especially favored device, to establish which he
had sacrificed many of his most cherished beliefs, became the principal
focus of attack by his opponents. The fight over ratification of the Treaty
in the Senate was made almost entirely against the Covenant, and, save for
a few special provisions like the Shantung question, hardly touched upon
the Treaty proper, although, as they were inseparable, failure to ratify the
one automatically killed the other. Public discussion followed the same

lines, with the general trend favoring acceptance of the Treaty, though

sharply critical, in some quarters, of the League plan. The Outlook poll of

the press was said to indicate that “only pro-Germans and radicals of the

academic type,’ objected to the peace terms. This is probably a fling at

the Nation and the New Republic, both of which did object, vigorously,

along the lines of their previous criticisms of French policy. The Literary

Digest also reported general approval. Typical comment is :—

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“The Germans don’t like the peace terms, but they ought to remember that if they
did nobody else would.” 63

A better criterion of the American attitude toward France is found in
the reaction to the proposed guarantee treaty, in which the United States
was to agree to aid France in case of unprovoked aggression on the part
of Germany. This it will be recalled was one of the important compromises
of the Peace Congress, growing out of the French insistence upon the
Rhine frontier as a strategic necessity and the unwillingness of Great Brit-
ain and the United States to create such a new and dangerous Alsace-
Lorraine. British and American guarantee treaties were offered and
accepted as a substitute. President Wilson favored the French alliance

283

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

strongly, did not see it as entangling, thought it justified by circumstances,
and said it “would be one of the handsomest acts of our history” to enter
into it. The treaty was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, and
never taken up and never reported out. Senator Lodge, the Chairman of
that Committee, said later that it would have been quite useless to do so, as
even if the Committee had favored it, the Senate would never have voted to
accept it. Senators of neither party would have been willing “to bind the
United States irrevocably with agreements to go to war again under certain
prescribed conditions.” ** Popular opinion was divided apparently quite
evenly on the subject. Approval was based upon the belief that the treaty
was necessary for the safety of France and therefore for world safety; that
by assisting in stabilizing the situation it would give opportunity for the
League to become established; or that, whether actually necessary or not for
the safety of France, she had thought protection necessary, and we were un-
der so great a debt of gratitude for ancient and recent aid that as Hamilton

Holt of the Independent said,—

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“Surely the American people can grant pretty nearly anything that France would
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The arguments of the opposition were more varied. Friends of the League
disliked it because it implied that the League was not strong enough to
keep the peace, and because setting up another agency to share in this
duty would make it still weaker. Moreover, based on the old principle of
the balance of power, it was a negation, said the critics, of all for which the
League was intended to stand and for which American lovers of peace had
been striving. Borah said it was “based on the theory of war, made in the
expectation of war, and, like all such alliances, a war alliance.”” Oppon-
ents of the League decried the fact that it must be approved by the League
Council to be effective, and might be ended when the League thought
itself competent to prevent aggression. It took from Congress its consti-
tutional right to declare war, and was clearly precisely “the kind of en-
tangling alliance against which every American statesman from Washing-
ton to Wilson had repeatedly warned us.” It was “an effort to prop up a
wobbly League with a reactionary alliance.” “Who is to determine when
aggression is ‘unprovoked?’ ” We know too well how diplomats can justify
themselves. In short, as the Baltimore Sun put it,

“The President unquestionably has got to do a lot of talking before he convinces
the American people of the wisdom of this alliance.” °°

This, however, is to be noticed throughout the discussion. In spite of the

caution shown, in spite of the suspicion of old-world diplomacy in gen-

eral, the feeling toward France is almost without exception kindly, and
284

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again and again we find the assurance that actual need for aid on the
part of France would meet with a sure response in America. Even that
most captious of critics, the New Republic, which was almost alone in
reading into the treaty the erection of a military dictatorship for France
upon the Continent, remarked half-apologetically that it put us in an
awkward position, inasmuch as “nobody much wants the alliance and few
wish to say no to France, or know how to say it.” ®

Closely connected with the ingrained American unwillingness to be bound
in an entangling alliance was the fact that the A. E. F., which had gone to
France under the impression that “the French wore wings and the Ger-
mans horns,” had experienced a considerable disillusionment in that fair
land. They had received an enthusiastic welcome, but the French were too
busy with matters of life and death to provide a continuous ovation. Too
busy, also, to endow life in their country with any of the graces and
courtesies for which they were famed. The doughboy by the time of the
armistice had his own idea of the French, and it was not flattering. He
thought the French had rudimentary knowledge of sanitation (he particu-
larly disliked the manure heaps in front of the thrifty cottager’s door):
he thought them inefficient, immoral, and exceedingly extortionate. Over-
charging was in fact the worst count against them. And, anyway, they
weren't like himself, and everything they did and said was “queer.” They
called water “lo,’ and were themselves called “frogs,” plus, frequently,
an uncomplimentary adjective. Friction between the officers of the Allied
armies existed, too. The French tendency to instruct too much and too
patronizingly, and above all their desire to use the American troops as
replacements rather than as a separate and respected entity, caused much
irritation, and any number of other annoyances, avoidable or not, were
recognizable. After the armistice, the American army wanted to go home,
was sick and tired of rain, dirt, and “‘cooties,” and had plenty of time to
find fault. Moreover, the troops sent to Luxemburg and to Germany found
themselves in clean, comfortable billets, were well treated, and often de-
cided that they really liked the Germans better than the French. The
returned soldier was wont to state with firmness that he would never fight
in France or for France again.

In the spring of 1920 a situation developed which focused American atten-
tion sharply upon France. Germany, which had been unable since the war
to establish a stable government, was disturbed by a Communist outbreak
centering in the industrial district of the Ruhr. Under the Versailles Treaty
this section was demilitarized. The German government requested from
the Allies permission to send troops in to quell the trouble. The French
took alarm, insisted that the permission be refused, and declared that the

285

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

whole disturbance was a device of Germany to bring about concentration
of troops near the frontier for a renewal of the war. Without waiting for
concerted action, moreover, as soon as it became evident that the German
government was sending soldiers under the guise of special police into the
Ruhr, France herself entered Germany and occupied Frankfort, Darmstadt,
and other important towns, giving notice that she would remain until
German troops had evacuated the Ruhr. Public opinion on the continent
and in the United States was much stirred. The general belief in this
country appeared to be that France was justified. The Germans were show-
ing every disposition to evade the Treaty. France had received neither the
Rhine frontier nor the Anglo-American guarantee for her safety, and she
could permit no infractions of the Treaty in general, and in particular
could risk no German military movements along the Rhine frontier.**
Administration circles, however, showed anxiety. The State Department
sent a vigorous protest and administration newspapers all characterized
French action as “questionable,” “tactless,” or “militaristic.” President
Wilson allowed himself the indiscretion of writing to Senator Hitchcock a
statement, promptly made public, to the effect that throughout the Peace
Conference a militarist party, under influential leadership, had endeavored
to dominate French policy, but without success. Now, however, they were
in control, and—‘I am as intolerant,” he said, “of imperialistic designs
on the part of other nations as I was of such designs on the part of Ger-
many.” © “France has frankly returned to militarism,” said others. She is
determined to obtain “‘by hook or by crook” the Rhine frontier, and if pos-
sible the Ruhr and Essen. Perhaps she is even attempting to accomplish
the break-up of Germany, a thing which she would gladly bring about.
It is in any case a dangerous move, this invasion of German territory. It
“puts in jeopardy the peace of Europe.” If serious trouble grows out of it
“the burden of responsibility will be upon France for having again drawn
the sword.” 7 The argument was ended, but not the effect of the incident,
when France was persuaded by the British to withdraw, and did so on
May 18, the German troops having most of them been recalled prior to
this time.

Thoughtful observers had come to see much cause for disquiet in the whole
European situation, and without of course blaming France wholly for it,
held her largely responsible. Bernard Baruch, in his account of the making
of the reparation and economic sections of the Treaty, showed how bit-
terness and fear had dominated the French will, and how they had im-
posed their determination “Que l’allemagne paye d’abord” upon all dis-
cussion of this phase of the peace terms. He thought the resulting
provisions unsatisfactory in many ways, but hoped that the Reparations

286FRANCE IN ARMS

 

Commission might be able to serve as an instrument for correction. Charles
Homer Haskins and Robert E. Lord, in their Some Problems of the Peace
Conference, discussed some of the more serious difficulties of the political
provisions of the peace settlements. These men, like Mr. Baruch, knew well
their ground, having been among the American experts who were called to
Paris to assist in framing the Treaty. They emphasized the honest effort
which they believed had been made to secure a just and durable settlement,
thought the arrangements in the main satisfactory, and considered that the
League offered an adequate medium for the correction of errors and imper-
fections. But the evidence of dangerously conflicting national aims and of
the instability of the attempted settlements was impressive, and no one
could fail to note how much the successful working of many important
provisions depended upon the behavior of France. John Foster Bass, writ-
ing on The Peace Tangle, reviewed the war aims of the Allied powers, and
stressed the importance of the secret treaties, as revealing how far their
plans and ambitions differed from the ideals of justice, liberty, and the
freedom of small peoples, which they so earnestly professed. He blamed
the Germans more than the French for the pre-war jealousies and fears,
and for the actual outbreak of the war, and sympathized with the French
feeling of isolation and frustration when in the Peace Conference they
found themselves unable to obtain what they thought were adequate guar-
antees for their future safety and adequate reparations for their losses. But
he also condemned their leaders at the Conference as lacking in a spirit
of international codperation and conciliation, and for the employment of
underhanded methods to defeat the idealism of President Wilson. Of the
Treaty as finally drawn he said that it “almost compels France to seek
its enforcement with arms if she is to obtain the benefits which should
accrue to her under it and of which she is in pressing need.’ He thought
that in enforcing the Treaty France was alienating her friends, since the
policy of keeping Germany weak, destroying her economic prosperity, and
surrounding her by a cordon of hostile nations, did not suit the needs of
the other countries who would be better served by a revival of German
prosperity, and would find more wisdom in a policy of codperation than
in one of continuing antagonism. He touched too upon the fact that
France was pursuing a course of doubtful sagacity in the Near East, and
was in particular continuing her old imperialism by the costly and insecure
Syrian venture.”*

Ray Stannard Baker, defending President Wilson’s actions at Paris, laid
the blame for an unsatisfactory peace squarely upon “the wearing strug-
gle, chiefly with the French,” which characterized the discussions, and espe-
cially upon Clemenceau, who “had no illusions left, nothing but a kind of

287

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burning flame of passion for France,” and was “against the President on
every real issue that arose.” He declared that only the President’s threat to
leave the Conference blocked the French insistence upon annexation of
the Saar and the Rhineland, and he spoke with bitterness of the campaign
of attack and abuse which filled French newspapers after it became evi-
dent that Mr. Wilson would not lend himself to French ambitions.7? Said
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“The Treaty was dictated in a paroxysm of hate. In trying to enforce it strictly,
France will increasingly as time passes find herself in opposition to those great moral
forces through which the Allies won the war.” 73

An editorial in the Nation, on “The Other France” says that the word
“France” has been “an inspiration, a symbol of high idealism, of interna-
tional achievement, of generous emotion, in past years,” but to-day
France is

“the inheritor of the Prussian mantle. It is the hearthstone of reaction in Europe,
the nursery of counter-revolutionary conspiracies among exiled dukes and financiers,
the hope of the Hungarian dictator Horthy, of the Cossack bandit-chief Wrangel,
and of the Polish imperialist Dmowski; the great obstacle to European reconstruc-
tion.” 74

AESLELESE Dees Tasso SSMS RSPAS ERIT CER PEM Ras

Authors of historical works published between 1918 and 1921 do not in
general, however, show a disposition to depart from the accepted canons,
whether they are writing syllabi for use in educational institutions, formal
histories, brief or detailed, of the war, or studies of general European his-
tory. Arthur Pearson Scott, in his /ntroduction to the Peace Treaties,
published in 1920, began with a summary of war causes and war aims.
His position was more extreme than that of most of the group.

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“It is important therefore to remember that the war which began the last week in
July, 1914, was directly, deliberately, and solely forced by Austria-Hungary and
Germany on nations which made every possible effort to avoid it.” .. . They could
have “secured the redress of every legitimate grievance, and the satisfaction of every
reasonable ambition by accepting the offers of the Entente. Instead they chose to
strike for everything. They lost. And now they are held to accountability. In esti-
mating the peace settlement this fact should never be overlooked.”

Graham H. Stuart’s French Foreign Policy is warmly pro-French
throughout. He is convinced that France’s desire for peace in 1914 was
genuine, and that her foreign policy, in spite of an occasional flaw, “is
rooted in right and faces the stars.” Raymond L. Buell’s Contemporary
French Politics is dispassionate and balanced, sympathetic, but impar-
tial.75

One of the most original and challenging productions of the year was
Professor Sidney B. Fay’s series of articles on the “Origins of the War”

288FRANCE IN ARMS

 

 

published in the American Historical Review (July, 1920-January, 1921).
From the appearance of these articles dates the active “revisionist’’ move-
ment, which in the light of documentary evidence not available at the
opening of the war, has undertaken a reallocation of the war-guilt. In this
series, the discussion concerns chiefly the Central Powers and Russia. His
conclusions as to France will however illustrate the new note:—

“As to France, however much she may have encouraged the Russian militarists, in
the months preceding the crisis, by her adoption of the three-year term of military
service, by her exchange of military and diplomatic visits (Joffre, Grand Duke Nich-
olas, Poincaré), by her naval convention, by her jingo press, and by her close rela-
tions with England, and however much by these same measures she may have
aroused the suspicions of Germany, there can be no doubt that when the crisis came
she sincerely did her best to avert it.” 76

Popular discussion of the Peace Conference continued to be lively, with
opinion sharply divided upon the League and upon Mr. Wilson’s share in
the negotiations, and a growing disapprobation of the Treaty. Fuel for
arguments was furnished by the publication in 1921 of Ex-Secretary
Lansing’s apologia, House and Seymour’s What Really Happened at
Paris. Tumulty’s personal narrative, and other books of more or less par-
tisan nature. None of them helped the French case.”

The question of payment of interallied debts began to come to the fore-
ground. Up to this time there had been quite general agreement that
France should be allowed to recover her financial equilibrium before she
was asked to pay even the interest upon her indebtedness.** But in the
United States the afterwar industrial depression had made itself felt.
Taxes, rents, and living expenses in general were high, and inquiry was
heard as to when we might hope to receive some portion of the large Euro-
pean debt which was due. The general disposition, however, so far as France
was concerned, continued to be one of patience, and even of generosity.
More arguments for cancellation than for collection appeared.

Pierrepont B. Noyes, for over a year American member of the Rhineland
Commission, published after his resignation a pessimistic study of the
post-war European conditions. He emphasized the “desperate economic
outlook” in France, declared that although military occupation of a coun-
try was probably seen at its best in the Rhineland, at its best “it is
brutal; it is provocative; it is continuing war.” France, he asserted, was
instigating separatist movements in the Rhine area, and with the aid of
other poor or deluded states, endeavoring to build up a military domina-
tion of Europe, with the obvious danger of hostile repercussions in Ger-
many and Russia. America, he thought, was the only power that could
prevent disaster. We should ratify the Treaty and the Covenant, and bring

289

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American leadership to the task of building a vital League of Nations.
We should relieve the fears of France and assist in keeping down the in-
fluences working for militarism and for revenge. We should assume finan-
cial leadership and assist in working out a plan for the financial salvation
of Europe. Finally,—

“If we must in the interest of world restoration join Great Britain in advising
France to accept a smaller indemnity from Germany, we will be hypocrites indeed
if we permit the full burden of this self-abnegation to fall upon the most sorely-
wounded of our allies. We cannot do less than accept cancellation of the Franco-
American loans as our share of the Allied war burden. . . . France spent it for us,
and in addition sent to their death during that year a full half million of her young
men in place of an equal number of American boys who would now be buried in
foreign soil. | have yet to meet an American in close touch with the details of the
French and European financial situation who has not agreed” with this judgment.79

This position is interpretive of the feeling of large numbers of Americans
who felt that criticism of European conditions should be tempered by an
admission that the United States had failed in its full duty, and that both
gratitude and wisdom should counsel us to moderation. Opposition, where
it was voiced, was based chiefly upon feeling that failure to collect only
financed militarism.*°

The question of reparations approached a critical stage. Little, apparently,
could be collected in proportion to the amounts needed for reconstruction.
The provisions of the Treaty were not being fulfilled. Prominent Germans
were quoted as saying that Germany would never pay, but that if they
had been victors, they would have known how to collect from the Allies.
Frequent Allied conferences brought no solution. American sympathy
swung in the direction of France and Britain.

“The opinion that Germany can pay all that is required of her is growing in Amer-
ica. The belief that she should pay all she can is, in the light of her unchastened at-
titude, already firmly established.” (Washington Star)

“If Germany doesn’t pay for the devastation she methodically wrought, her victims
must.” (Philadelphia North American)

“We will know that Germany is as broke as she says she is when we read that any
of the Hohenzollern boys have gone to work.” (New York World)

“France keeps her army on the theory that although Germany lost the war she still
knows where to find it.” (Pueblo Star-Journal)

“Germany appears to have thought of everything except a plea of general insanity.”
(New London Day)

“With all notion of enslaving or perpetually impoverishing Germany ruled out, it
is preposterous to pretend that she cannot pay in indemnity at least half as much
as the war has cost France.” (New York Times)

290FRANCE IN ARMS

And then, on March 8, 1921, the Allies carried out the threat first made at
the Spa Conference in July, 1920, and renewed at London in December,
and after formally declaring Germany wilfully in default, employed the
sanctions provided in the Treaty, and occupied Duisberg, Dusseldorf, and
Ruhrort, setting up in these towns a customs barrier against the rest of
Germany.*! Naturally this action brought criticism, and the brunt of it fell
on France, since it was evident that the occupation, even if undertaken by
the Allies acting in concert, was brought about by French demands and
French insistence. Moreover, when no immediate result followed, the
French openly threatened to advance further into Germany and to seize
the whole Ruhr district, an event which the British, quite as openly, did
not wish to occur. The main charges do not differ from the earlier ones,
except perhaps in bitterness and definiteness. France is accused of de-
liberately provoking German default, by preventing the fixing of a definite
and possible amount for the reparations claim, in order to have an excuse
for annexations, and is declared to be wilfully and dangerously militaris-
tic.8* Public opinion, however, continued on the whole to reject these theo-
ries, and to maintain that even though the occupation might not prove in
the end wise or productive, German attempts at repudiation and blackmail
justified France in using any necessary means to put an end to duplicity
and evasion and compel an honest attempt to fulfil the Treaty terms and
bring about the much-needed payments. Secretary Hughes’ reply to the
German appeal for American pressure upon the Allies to moderate their
demands was widely approved. Mr. Hughes said, it will be recalled :—

“This Government stands with the governments of the Allies in holding Germany
responsible for the war, and therefore bound to make reparations, so far as possible,”

concluding with advice to the Germans to offer promptly terms for settle-
ment which were likely to be approved. ‘““We have not forgotten,” said
the New York Evening Mail, “which side we fought on.” °°

Representative of the sincere and thoughtful interest which many Amer-
icans were taking in the situation was America and the Balance Sheet of
Europe, by John Foster Bass and Harold G. Moulton, with its careful
analysis of the economic situation in Europe, and its comprehensive pro-
posals for improvement, which involved not only economy, balanced
budgets, cessation of trade wars, the reduction of reparation demands and
the cancellation of inter-allied debts on the part of European countries, but
full codperation in financial and tariff readjustments on the part of the
United States, together with a cancellation of the debt owed us by the
Allies. The program called definitely for a general reduction of armament,
and for the League of Nations or some other system of international co-

291

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SHENAMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

operation, to be accepted by all, as essentials of successful rehabilitation.®*
In harmony with this portion of the plan, and as an American contribu-
tion to constructive settlements, was the Conference on the Limitation of
Armament, called by the United States to meet in Washington in the latter
part of the year 1921. Representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and
Japan, together with several of the smaller powers, were present, and
Secretary Hughes’ speech at the opening session, with its drastic and spe-
cific proposals for naval reduction, and its indication of plans for land
disarmament, made a profound impression both in this country and abroad.
The British, though undoubtedly surprised at the scope of the proposals,
rose gallantly to the occasion, and heartily seconded them. But to the dis-
appointment, though not wholly to the surprise, of everyone, M. Briand,
then French Premier, declared flatly that without the removal of the
German menace, which he held as imminent, and without protection other
than she herself could devise—referring to the never-ratified Anglo-
American guarantee—France could not disarm. The French delegates, Foch
especially, had been received with unbounded enthusiasm. Briand’s speech,
; so out of harmony, it appeared, with the pacific impulses generously ex-
pressed by the other powers, was chilling and unwelcome. Yet the response
was on the whole temperate and friendly. The Literary Digest sent out a
widely-distributed questionnaire, asking what the United States would do
if France should again be attacked. Out of a total of 273 replies, 228 were
in favor of financial and military aid in case of unprovoked aggression. 66
were willing to sign a guarantee alliance. 123 would give aid, but were un-
willing to accept such a treaty. 48 thought the League would give adequate
protection. 45 believed that there was no real danger from Germany and
no likelihood of need for protection. Only 36 were definitely against giving
aid, and these alleged French militarism chiefly as their reason. Numerous
unfeignedly warm and generous expressions of gratitude and friendliness
characterized the replies.*®
And then the French representatives threw another bombshell. When the
proposed naval ratios were announced, the French rejected theirs, de-
manded a much larger number of capital ships, and added that light
cruisers and submarines, as chiefly defensive in value, should not be subject
to any limitation at all. Observers, aghast, said the conference was wrecked.
The British took the submarine demand as a threat against themselves.
Militant articles on the use of the submarine, with a provocative thrust
against Britain, published in a semi-official French journal, were quoted.
Mr. Hughes cabled to the French Premier, now returned to Paris, appeal-
ing to him to accept the naval ratio, and declaring that the success or
failure of the Conference depended upon his decision. The French repre-
292

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sentatives promptly and definitely disavowed the criticised articles by
Captain Castex, and disavowed, too, any ulterior motive in asking for an
enlarged naval ratio or for submarines. Their government accepted the
proposed ratio as to capital ships. But their attitude had made a very
unfavorable impression, and it proved impossible to undo it. American
sentiment is sensitive upon the subject of submarines and was horrified
that anyone should dare defend their use. “An execrated weapon,—hated
as no other instrument of sea warfare has ever been hated.” The chorus
of criticism was unanimous in saying that this time France “is wrong,
dead wrong.” Even granting that her occasion for land armament was as
great as French authorities asserted, nothing in the German menace ap-
peared to justify a French demand for a big navy, and in particular one
heavily equipped with a weapon “sneaking, covert, accursed.” This, in
the judgment of many, could mean nothing but unadulterated militarism,
a challenge to Britain, to the Mediterranean powers, perhaps in time to
ourselves, and it had its influence upon opinion in regard to the whole
European situation, creating doubt as to French sincerity, diverting sym-
pathy from her admitted needs, and in general arousing a feeling of
“suspicion and apprehension,” in spite of the declaration in favor of re-
tention of submarines made by our own government.

Friendly sources took care to assert that American leaders had been want-
ing in understanding of French psychology, that tact and wisdom and
practical friendliness on our part might have obviated many phases of the
present perturbed situation, and that the French feeling of isolation and
fear was by no means unjustified, and not unreasonably affected their be-
havior. They called attention to the fact that the French naval program
had been entirely halted by the war, while the British and ourselves had
built more actively than ever before. They recalled French heroism and
French suffering, and declared that “if any nation deserves something
more than fair treatment, it is France. She is getting something less.”
The fact remained that, in the opinion of many, France had “estranged
American sympathy,” “lost in power, in prestige, in reputation, and in
good will,” “suffered a manifest diminution of popularity’; and “an ex-
traordinary reversal of feeling towards France” had swept the country.
Said the Milwaukee Leader,—

“Well, suppose France does lose the sympathy of the world. If her present plans
work out, she won't need it.”

In Congress, a bill was introduced, aimed directly at France, providing

that any European nation that had announced its intention of increasing

its navy should be called upon for immediate repayment of any sums

owed the United States. The World’s Work, in its January issue exceed-
293

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

ingly friendly in its comments upon Briand’s speech, in the February one
thought the French attitude “unfortunate,” and added,—

“American public opinion will not support a plan to reduce French payments of
debt or interest if it seems likely that France will spend the money thus saved for
a new kind of military preparation.” 8°

Throughout the year 1922 the tone of discussion continued to reflect a
certain mistrust and disapproval of French behavior. For example, one of
the important books of the season was Frank A. Vanderlip’s What Next
in Europe? After a critical discussion of “the poison treaties of Paris,” as
he called them, he said that France at peace was different from France
at war.

“On the battle-field she presented a stubborn resistance against what seemed to be
overwhelming forces, a gallant courage in the face of any odds, that won for her
the ringing applause of the whole world. Contrasted with that indomitable courage
in war is a state of chattering terror in peace. She seems so beset with fear of the
future that her mental processes do not register logically.” .. .

France was demanding, he went on to say, an impossible indemnity, and
creating conditions which made payment doubly impossible.

“No matter how much one may admire France . . . one cannot remain blind to the
harm that France is doing herself, all Europe, and the world.” 87

A particularly striking demonstration of this trend in American thinking
was furnished when, in the late fall, Clemenceau visited this country, in
an effort to check the tide of anti-French comment and restore the Amer-
ican confidence in his country. He met “for Clemenceau, a tremendous out-
pouring of admiration and applause, despite certain critical voices in the
Senate. For France, an almost universal expression of sympathy and af-
fection on the part of editorial writers,’ but these encouraging symptoms
were accompanied by frank warning that permanent friendship or close
association must be based on unity of ideals and interests. He was told
that not a dozen Senators would vote for the treaty of alliance with his
country, and as for supporting in full the French continental policy, as he
urged,—“‘That is something America cannot do.” The French may attrib-
ute American coolness “to the indefensibility of their own cause.” French
mismanagement of the Near Eastern situation, and especially the rap-
prochement with the Turk, came in for especial criticism. The Syrian ad-
venture was never popular in this country. An editorial in the Nation,
direct and caustic, summed up the points at issue.

“You say you want more than America’s money. You want our hearts and souls.

But, M. Clemenceau, France had our hearts and souls, and more than that. It is
not easy to give again that which has been offered once and tossed aside with con-

294bres uuu " woe

FRANCE IN ARMS

 

 

tempt. You accepted our money and our men, but our ideals, our hopes, our dreams
and visions, the things of heart and soul, you refused . . . our people believed in
these things, and they are left with a sense of bruised disillusionment.”

The secret treaties, defying the ideals France had seemed to accept, secret
conferences, with the old bargaining, the failure to disarm, even to ratify
the Washington Treaties, militarism in the Rhineland, in Africa, on the
European continent at large, the building up of the hostile cordon of
middle-European states, mishandling of the reparations problem, “‘saber-
rattling, ’—

“these things have cut so deeply into the American heart and soul that a resumption
of the old warm and unquestioning affection is to-day impossible.” 88

‘

Another evidence of shifting sentiment is the accession of further ‘re-
visionist” literature. Judge Bausman, in his Let France Explain, declared
that “the present French government drives Europe to desperation by
claims based upon injured innocence.”

“France is a spoiled child, and a dangerously spoiled child. She must be reminded
of her Delcassés, her Millerands, and her Poincarés. ... The world must be re-
minded of the extent to which France armed Russia, of the immense simultaneous
preparation of both, and of the reckless offensive conduct of French public men
toward Germany during a whole decade preceding the war.” 89

Faith in France had, however, been too deeply ingrained to be easily
shattered, and proof of this appeared within a very short time after the
Clemenceau visit. The allied occupation of German towns which had been
undertaken in March, 1921, had failed to produce definite results. During
all of that year and throughout 1922 the reparations impasse had remained
unbroken. Conferences and notes had left Germany sullen, defiant, ob-
structionist, making the most out of allied dissensions. French public opin-
ion had urged an occupation of the entire Ruhr Valley, administered with
sufficient severity to compel German submission. The British flatly balked
at such an undertaking. On December 26, 1922, the French, Italian, and
Belgian members of the Reparations Commission voted Germany in default
on timber deliveries. On January 23, 1923, they voted similarly on the
coal payments. In the face of British disapproval, the French and Belgians
declared that they held these decisions as legal ground, under the Versailles
Treaty, for further occupation of German territory, and on January 10
they occupied the Ruhr Valley in force. In February they extended and
tightened their hold, thus practically severing this entire industrial district
from the rest of Germany.

As in 1921, Washington disapproved of this action. The majority of econ-
omists and financiers took the same position. But the general public sur-

295

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prisingly and decisively rallied again to the French cause. The occupation
might not be wise, said the man in the street, but it was plucky. It was
straightforward and direct, freed from all diplomatic quibbling and bar-
gaining. It commanded respect. Ex-service men all over the United States,
led by such well-known men as Commander A. M. Owsley of the American
Legion, Major-Generals John F. O’Ryan and Clarence R. Edwards, de-
fended the occupation. College presidents and governors, lawyers and
poets, were quoted to the same effect. Motion picture crowds cheered and
stamped as they watched the poilus marching into Essen, and wished the
French luck. There was little expectation that reparation payments would
be directly increased. It was evident that they would probably be tem-
porarily decreased. But Germany had “‘stalled and whined and dodged
and lied to avoid paying.” Force was the only argument she knew, and it
was fit and just that she should have it. If the invasion could be carried
out successfully, the Germans would realize that they had lost the war,
and the French might win to a sense of security and break away from the
fear complex that had obsessed them. Even if it failed of complete success,
it might do good and aid a permanent settlement, by demonstrating what
was and what was not possible. Moreover, it was well known that the Ger-
man industrialists had been foremost in urging resistance to the repara-
tion demands. This, and this only, many thought, would bring them to
terms.*°

Senator Borah led the opposition.

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“The act of France is, in my judgment, without authority under the Versailles
Treaty. It is a defiance of international order and peace. It is an offense against hu-
manity. What she is doing will not bring compensation, but it will bring supreme
suffering, not only to the Germans, but to the people throughout Europe, and in-
calculable loss to our own people.”

Not a few concurred in this judgment. Some added that France was play-
ing into the hands of her own industrialists, or that she was aiming at the
ruin of Germany rather than at reparations, at annexation rather than
occupation. As to security, said they, it cannot be attained by this method.
Such acts of force will but create bitterness and a spirit of revenge. Many
called upon the United States to find some way of friendly intervention,
some means of solving the vexed question of reparations.

In this connection it is to be observed that there was no disposition at
this time to press France for a settlement of her indebtedness to the United
States. Her financial difficulties at home and abroad were recognized as
sufficient justification for postponement of action. It was suggested that
we should be unreasonable and ungenerous if while we were advising
France to modify her reparation demands we at the same time insisted upon

296

Pea

ai) SST iFRANCE IN ARMS

payment of all that was due ourselves. But cancellation was not widely
favored, though there was willingness to accept a reduction. Many seemed
to feel that it would be advisable to encourage the French government
to recognize the debt officially and formally and state her intention of pay-
ing it, and perhaps begin the payment of the overdue and accumulating
interest. French loans to Poland and to states of the Little Entente were
questioned on the ground that “a debtor who can’t pay and can lend is an
anomaly.” Bernard Baruch argued that loans for permanent improvements
or afterwar expenditures should in no case be subject to cancellation, and
warned against establishing a belief in Europe that the United States
could be expected to subsidize all wars. But “we won't play Shylock,’
said various editors. Reduction of the amount to be paid, a generous
moratorium, funding on favorable terms, all would be favored; but can-
cellation was deemed unwise, as establishing a dangerous precedent. Little
change is to be observed in this attitude during 1923 and 1924, and dis-
cussion of the subject was not active.°?

The success of the French in breaking “passive resistance” in the Ruhr
in the fall of 1923 was hailed with satisfaction, and declared to be proof,
especially in view of the contract with the German industrialists which
followed, that the French procedure had been well chosen, and that the
occupation could bring about both reparations and security. Soon after
this, also, earlier suggestions emanating largely from the United States
bore fruit in the Commission of Economic Experts, with the generally-
accepted Dawes Plan as the result of their deliberations. General Dawes
was quoted as having said that without the presence of the French in the
Ruhr there would have been no possibility of attaining a settlement, and
popular opinion seemed not to dissent definitely from this. The Annals of
the American Association of Political and Social Science in its July issue
contained a Round Table discussion which appears to represent American
opinion at this time. In this, Pierrepont B. Noyes criticised France’s recent
actions, charging her with the purpose of separating the Rhineland and
Ruhr districts permanently from Germany, and of attempting to secure
the hegemony of Europe through militarism. He said that this policy had
resulted in feverish international bargainings among the small states, in
the blocking of needed political and economic settlements, and in creating
a danger of bankruptcy or of war throughout the European world. Bruce
Bliven thought France was beginning to see that she was not wise in
alienating all other powers in her attempt to keep Germany weak. But other
writers in the group, among them Oscar T. Crosby, Frederick H. Allen,
and Congressman John Jacob Rogers, stoutly defended the French.®* Ar-
gument on the subject in 1925 followed the same lines. The apparent neces-

297

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AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

 

sity of the invasion was emphasized, on the ground of French needs and
dangers, and this view was declared to have been vindicated by the adop-
tion of the Dawes Plan. As the Philadelphia Public Ledger put it, the Ruhr
occupation hurt the world, hurt France, but hurt Germany worst of all,
and therefore, though regrettable, was worth the cost.°4

The Syrian venture at no time came so near to receiving popular approval.
The grievances of the Syrian people under French rule roused the sym-
pathy of outsiders, and the bombardment of Damascus, in particular,
caused the sternest condemnation. While evacuation of the district by
the French was recognized as open to serious difficulty, her administration
of the mandate was considered in need of radical reform, and it was
thought that an extended period of just and unselfish administration would
be required to undo the bad impression which had been created.%

From the early stages of the Turkish Nationalist movement there had
been recognition of the evils due to the intrigues of the great powers. Both
France and Spain were condemned for their part in the Moroccan dis-
turbances. On the other side may be set the unqualified approval elicited
by the consummation of the Locarno Treaties, with all that they connote
of patience, wisdom, and conciliation, and also, after the flurry over the
question of permanent seats in the League Council, by the generous wel-
come accorded by France to Germany on the occasion of the admission of
the Reich to membership in the League.°*

Meantime, however, the revisionist controversy took on far greater
proportions than at first seemed probable, and came to engage the at-
tention of many thoughtful students of international affairs. The constant
accretions of new documentary evidence, not available when the war be-
gan, have made the arguments on the subject of war guilt very complex,
and produced sharp differences of opinion. It would be impossible even to
summarize here the various aspects of this inquiry. What is most relevant
to the subject of Franco-American relations is the marked tendency to
depart from the accepted canons of the period of the war, and to lay upon
the shoulders of French leaders, and especially upon Poincaré, much blame
formerly accredited to the Kaiser. Prominent among those who have been
investigating this field are Sidney B. Fay, whose earlier writings on the
subject have been added to from time to time by careful analyses of dif-
ferent phases of the question, and Bernadotte E. Schmitt, who has con-
tributed several discriminating articles. Harry Elmer Barnes, whose recent
book, The Genesis of the World War, represents the fullest and most
thoroughly documented summary yet available, appears as departing
most definitely from the earlier judgment of French motives and be-

havior.
298FRANCE IN ARMS

 

 

“We may thus say that the main, in fact the only, direct and immediate responsi-
bility for the general European War falls upon Russia and France. It is difficult
to say which should be put in the first place... .

“One of the persistent, and yet one of the most insidious phases of the Entente prop-
aganda since the War has been the constant reiteration that the security of Europe
and the world is identical with the security of France. Our present knowledge of the
French part in the War of 1870, the menacing French spirit of revenge following
1871, the French diplomatic intrigues and aggressive aims in the Franco-Russian
Alliance, the relatively unparalleled French militarism and military expenditures
in 1914, the prominent part played by France in precipitating the War, and the
domination of Europe by French aggression and militarism since 1918 should be
sufficient to convince even the most biased Francophile Americans that we cannot
found the slightest expectation of European peace upon any plan which gives France
either security or ascendency in Europe at the expense of other countries.” 97

Early in 1925 the French debt question was brought definitely into the
foreground. There had been a slowly growing desire to see all debts ad-
justed and books balanced. It was felt that a sufficient period had elapsed
since the war to admit of this, and that it would contribute to international
stability. France showed little disposition to codperate with this desire,
though other powers responded favorably. Clementel’s budget plan, issued
in December, 1924, made no provision for the American debt, and the
Herriot ministry seemed on the verge of repudiating it. Stung by this
attitude, American sentiment registered a sharp change, and took on an
acerbity hitherto entirely lacking. In Congress and in the press appeared
warnings that the United States would insist on payment. Said the St. Louts
Star:

“Paris and European statesmen generally have been lying awake nights trying to
figure out some feasible scheme whereby rich Uncle Sam could be bamboozled into
shouldering the lion’s share of the expense of whipping Germany.” 98

Various attempts at negotiating a settlement followed, but the accompany-
ing discussions did not clear the air or ease the tension. The French de-
clared their conviction that the demands of the United States were harsh
and unjust. They recalled the American delay in entering the war, and
cited the words of American leaders, both official and unofficial, and the
phrasing of the acts providing for the Liberty Loans, to the effect that the
loans were but a substitute for men and munitions which we were at that
time unable to furnish. They were antagonized by the American tendency
to instruct the French upon their financial policy, by our insistence upon
the stabilization of their domestic situation and the cutting down of ex-
penditures for military purposes, and by our frequent warnings against
undue severity toward Germany and against militaristic enterprises in
general. They professed to fear American financial domination and tutel-
299

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BiAMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

age which should threaten the independence of their country. This ex-
asperation on the part of the French had its most striking manifestation
in the letter sent to President Coolidge in August, 1926, by the aged ex-
Premier Clemenceau, emerging from a six-year retirement to show a flash
of the vigor, the impulsiveness, and the audacity, which characterized the
“Tiger” in his prime. Wrote Clemenceau :—

Paresh bied ceeted ot ot pe spat bib bet tht ocea
Soestberiaeheaictss 3 his hesz saat sae

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“If nations were but business houses, bankers’ accounts would settle the fate of the
world. ... You know, as we do, that our Treasury is empty. In such a case the
debtor must sign promissory notes, and that is just what you are asking us to do.
... It is an open secret that in this affair there are only imaginary dates of pay-
ment, which will lead up to a loan with solid security in the shape of our territorial
possessions, as was the case for Turkey. Such a thing, Mr. President, | am bound to
tell you, we shall never accept.

“France is not for sale, even to her friends. Independent she came to us; independent
we shall leave her. Ask yourself whether, according to President Monroe, you would
feel otherwise about the American continent... .

“Wherein have we failed to fulfil all the demands of duty? Ought we to have sur-
rendered our fortresses to Germany when she demanded them from us under pen-
alty of a declaration of war? . . . Does Verdun prove we have fought badly?

“Yes, we have thrown everything into the abyss—blood and money—as England and
the United States did on their side, but it was France’s territory that was devastated
scientifically. For three deadly years we waited this declaration from America,
‘France is the frontier of liberty—three years of blood and money oozing from
every pore.

“Come to our villages and read the endless lists of their dead and make comparisons,
if you will. Was this not a ‘bank account,’ the loss of this vital force of youth?

“As Russia did at Brest-Litovsk, America has made a separate peace with Germany
without even the slightest suggestion of an adjustment with her comrades in
arms.

“That was the blood truce with the common enemy. To-day a money peace between
the Allied and Associated Powers is being devised.

“How is it we failed to foresee what is now happening? Why did we not halt under
the shells and convoke a board meeting of profiteers to decide the question whether
it would allow us to continue in defense of the finest conquest in the finest histories?
Must the myth of German reparations lead up to American cash collections?” 99

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The Clemenceau letter was received in the United States with surprise and
regret. President Coolidge preserved his calmness, and did not permit him-
self to be stampeded into any excited utterances. The letter, which had been
sent as an open communication through the press, and not as a personal
one, was Officially ignored, but the “spokesman for the White House” let
it be understood that the Mellon-Berenger agreement, reached in April, and
awaiting ratification, was deemed final, that its terms were considered
generous, and that the Administration felt no need and no disposition to
apologize for them.t°° Much unfriendly press comment was directed toward
Clemenceau, and the incident, together with some unfortunate occurrences
involving American tourists in France, tended to stiffen the resistance of

300

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FRANCE IN ARMS

 

 

those opposed to cancellation of the debt. Senator Borah, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, accepted the challenge, and re-
plied to the “Tiger” :—

“The statement that we are trying to undermine the independence of France, or
that somebody wants to buy France, approaches the absurd. If they want to cancel
their debts let them include all debts and all reparations and show that benefit of
the cancellation will go to humanity and to betterment of the masses of Europe and
not to the benefit of the imperialistic schemes which are now crushing the life out
of people who are in no way responsible for this war. This constant charge of in-
justice and usury on the part of the United States is simply not only unfounded
in fact, but dishonest in purpose... .

“We have been charged with being rapacious and usurious, but when the history of
the world war is written the generosity of the United States will have no parallel in
the history of the world... .

“While no one desires to diminish the heroic efforts of the allies prior to our en-
trance, the fact remains that without the American boy the nations now criticising
us so severely would be the defeated rather than the victor nations.” 1°

Mr. C. W. Barron, editor of the Wall Street Journal, declared :—

“If France can not afford to pay for what she borrowed after the armistice, it is

because her people have refused to support their own government by payment of

taxes, and her statesmen have elected to tax them by depreciation of the franc is-

sued to pay government deficits after the fashion of the Germans in sacrifice of
their mark currency... .

“The United States is not responsible for the European diplomacy or international

treaties that brought on the war. The United States is not responsible for the French

fiscal policy or for the cutting of production and hours of labor in France.” 1°?

With these criticisms many would agree. Yet many also would be willing
to say of Clemenceau,—‘‘He is a very old man, and he loves his coun-
try”; or of France,—“She has suffered much, and may be forgiven much” ;
of the debts,—

“These advances were not regarded at the time as ordinary borrowings. They were
Virtually our only substantial contribution to the carrying on of our war during
nearly three-quarters of the period of our participation. They were the means of sav-
ing for us vastly greater expenditure and of sparing hundreds of thousands of Ameri-
can lives. We can no more consider to-day those advances as mere business dealings
between borrowers and lenders than did those who authorized them nine years
ago.” 103

Others, too, believe that collection of the debts would involve such depres-
sion of the standard of living abroad, and such economic dislocation at
home and abroad as to be inadvisable for purely practical reasons.

301AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

 

For the sake of both France and the United States, and for that of the
world at large, it is to be hoped that a solution may be found for this
question which will demonstrate clearly and conclusively that “France
wishes to meet every honorable obligation, and the United States wishes
to uphold a well-earned reputation for generosity as well as for fair
play.” 104

And so for a dozen years the United States and France have been inti-
mately associated. We have fought together against a common foe. We
have rejoiced and we have sorrowed together. We have criticised one an-
other’s shortcomings and praised one another’s virtues. We find ourselves
still far from the millennium of perfect harmony. Yet this period of close
contact, which we cannot forget if we would, has stirred within us a mu-
tual interest, has taught us much in regard to each other’s characteristics,
and has created bonds which cannot lightly be disregarded. Considered in
sincerity and in open-mindedness the experiences which we have shared may
prove most useful in the development of an understanding amity.

SESE tite pasa bination

SEE RELSS

NOTES AND SOURCES

1 The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. Charles Seymour, ed., 1: 260-273.
2 North American, July 29, 1914, citing New York Sun; New York Tribune, July 25;
Chicago Daily Tribune, July 29.
8 Literary Digest, poll of the press, Aug. 8, 1914; Outlook, poll of the press, Aug.
15: A. B. Hart, Why the Nations Fight, Rollo Ogden, “Alliances that Made the
War,” in World’s Work War Manual, Sept., 1914; New York Times, July 27; Boston
Herald, Aug. 3; Chicago Daily Tribune, Aug. 9; Nicholas Murray Butler, “The On-
rush of War,” in A World in Ferment; Philadelphia North American, Aug. 3; San
Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 3.
+ Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations, 25; Outlook, Aug. 15.
5 Philadelphia North American, Aug. 7, 1914.
8 New York Tribune, July 206.
7 Nation, Aug. 6; Outlook, Aug. 15; Herbert Adams Gibbons, The New Map of
Europe, 342-369.
8 Philadelphia North American, Aug. 7; New York Tribune, Aug. 3; New York
Times, Aug. 5, Oct. 25; Review of Reviews, L: 525. Nov., 1914.
9 New York Times Current History, 1: 502-3.
10 Nation, XCIX: 181. Aug. 13, 1914.
11 Robert Underwood Johnson, Collected Poems. “Rheims” was written Sept., 1914.
For typical reactions to the Belgian conditions, see Review of Reviews, L: 398, 406,
484.
12 New Republic, 1: 8-9. Dec. 5, 1914; James M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case
(1914), 198-199; W. Morgan Shuster, Century, Nov., 1914, p. 58; Arthur Sherburne
Hardy, Independent, Sept. 14, 1914.
13 Theodore Roosevelt, America and the World War (1915), 17, 19. Courtesy of
Charles Scribner’s Sons, Publishers, New York.

302

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FSR saeauit i

FRANCE IN ARMS

14Qutlook, Aug. 8, 1914; Philadelphia North American, Sept. 7; W. A. Sloane,
Independent, Aug. 10; Leon Dominian, New York Evening Post, Sept. 8; Review of
Reviews, Sept., 1914.
15 A. B. Hart, The War in Europe (1914), 138-9; Louis E. Van Norman, Review of
Reviews, L: 306; E. F. Henderson, Germany's Fighting Machine (1914), 97.
16 E. S. Martin, The Diary of a Nation (1914), 7-16.
17 Frank H. Simonds, cited in Review of Reviews, L: 734.
18 Nation, XCIX: 705. Dec. 17, 1914; Independent, LXXIX: 292-3, Aug. 31, 1914;
“France” by Percy MacKaye, Nation, XCIX: 547.
19 House, Intimate Papers, 1: 293; Franklin K. Lane, Letters (1922), 164; Paul
Bartlett, cited in The World War, by Members of the American Academy of Arts and
Letters (1919), 9; William Morton Fullerton, Hesitations (1916), VII; C.D.M.,
World’s Work, XXVIII: 134.
20 House, Intimate Papers, 1: 287, 290-291. For Eliot’s vigorous anti-German argu-
ments, see his letters to the New York Times, some of which were reprinted in Cur-
rent History, 1: 473-501; and his Road Toward Peace.
21 Washington Times, May 18, 1915.
22 Edward R. Turner, “The Causes of the Great War,” American Political Science Re-
view, 1X: 16-35, Feb., 1915.
23 Ellery C. Stowell, The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, 14-15, 163 ff, 490 ff., (1915).
24 Agnes Repplier, Atlantic Monthly, CXV: 426-8, Mar., 1915.
25 Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Burton J. Hendrick, ed., 1: 395-6; Review of
Reviews, LI: 278, Sept., 1915.
28 New York Tribune, July 14, 1915, Dec. 27, 1915; Life, May 27, 1915, special French
number; New Republic, VII1: 29, Jan. 9, 1915; Nation, series of articles by Stoddard
Dewey, begun Feb. 1915, and running through the war; Owen Johnson, “The Truth
About France,” Collier’s, LVI: 5-6, 30-35, Oct. 30, 1915; J. Salwyn Schapiro, “The
War of European Cultures.” Forum, LII1: 423-433, Apr. 1915; Edith Wharton.
Fighting France (1915); Owen Wister, The Pentecost of Calamity (1915); F. L. Hum-
phreys, What we Owe to France (1915).
27 Philadelphia North American, July 7, 1915.
28C. H.C. Wright, The Third French Republic (1916), 181-5.
29S. P. Orth, The Imperial Impulse (1916), 80 ff.
30 F. C. Howe, Why War? (1916), 162, Ch. XIV. Courtesy of Chas. Scribner’s Sons,
Publishers, New York.
81 Roland Hugins, Germany Misjudged (1916), 27, 66. Courtesy of the Open Court
Publishing Co., Chicago.
82 North American Review, CCIII: 673-4, April, 1916; Theodore Roosevelt, Fear
God and Take Your Own Part (1916), 42-3, 50-51; Allen Tucker, “The Flame of
France,” Atlantic, CXVIII: 711-715, Nov., 1916.
83 Arthur Bullard, “Our Relations with France,” Atlantic, CXVIII: 640.
s¢ Henry Van Dyke, “The Flame of France,’ World War, American Academy of
Arts and Letters, poem dated Sept. 28, 1916. Typical of this period also are: John
Palmer, “France, 1916,” Century, May, 1916; Robert Herrick, The World Decision,
(1916), 210; Robert Underwood Johnson, “Embattled France,” and other poems,
Collected Poems.
35Poems by Alan Seeger 1916, Introduction and “To America”; James R.
McConnell, Flying for France (1916); Outlook, CXIII: 502.
86 A. Piatt Andrew, “For Love of France,” Outlook, CXIV: 923.

303

{Es Ra lt RS aR SOE Surg caati

iisikhnehtt thin etAMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

87 James Mark Baldwin, American Neutrality. [ts Cause and Cure, (1916), 57-68,
79-81, 137.

38 Outlook, Sept. 20, 1916. See also, Robert Bacon, Life and Letters, James Brown
Scott, ed.; Leslie Buswell, Ambulance No. 10 (1915); Friends of France, The Field
Service of the American Ambulance described by its members (1916); Dallas D. L.
McGrew, “French Character under Test,” Review of Reviews, LII: 468-472, Oct.,
1915; Robert Grant, Their Spirit, (1916); Arthur Gleason, Our Part in the Great
War, (1917) and Golden Lads, (1916); Herbert Adams Gibbons, Paris Reborn, (1916);
War Letters from France, Frederic R. Coudert, ed., (1916); Gertrude Atherton,
Life in the War Zone (1916); Frances Wilson Huard, My Home in the Field of
Honour (1916).

89 Elihu Root, The United States and the War. Russian and Political Addresses.
Address to Mass Meeting in New York, Mar. 22, 1917.

40 New York Times Current History, V1: 389-405, June 17, 1917; Review of Reviews,
LV: 566-7, 490-492; Independent, XC: 313-14, May 19, 1917; Nation, CIV: 520, May
3, 1917; New Republic, X1: 6-7, May 5, 1917; Literary Digest, LIV: 1314-1315, May
5, 1917; Philadelphia North American, Apr. 13, 1917; Nicholas Murray Butler, A
World in Ferment. Address to French envoys, April 21, 1917.

41 Robert Underwood Johnson, Collected Poems. “The Sword of Lafayette,” 24.
Other poems of the same period, 444, 451.

42 Franklin K. Lane, The American Spirit (1918), 49. Courtesy of Frederick A.
Stokes Co., Publishers, New York.

43 Brand Whitlock, “Address at the Tomb of Lafayette,” July 4, 1917, cited in The
World War, by Members of the American Academy of Arts and Letters, 70-73.
44New York Herald, cited in Literary Digest, LIV: 1314-1315, May 5, 1917.

45 Studies of the war and its causes, at this time, are practically unanimous in plac-
ing responsibility largely upon Germany, and considering France as peaceful in
desire. Familiar examples are: Oliver P. Chitwood, Jmmediate Causes of the Great
War (1917); Harry H. Powers, The Things Men Fight For (1917); Willis Fletcher
Johnson, America and the Great War for Humanity and Freedom (1917); A. E.
McKinley, Collected Materials for the Study of the World War (1917); A. B.
Hart and A. O. Lovejoy, Handbook of the War (1917), with later editions revised by
C. C. Pearson and A. L. Frothingham. An address by Elihu Root, Sept. 14, 1917,
before the National Security League at Chicago may also be noted in this
group. Cited in World War, American Academy of Arts and Letters.

48 New Republic, 11: 92-94, May 26, 1917; Review of Reviews, LVI: 227.

47 Lothrop Stoddard, Present Day Europe (1917).

48 Senator Borah, Speech in the Senate, July 26, 1917; Current History, V1: 402-3.
49H. A. Gibbons, Century, XCIV: 527-32, Aug., 1917; E. S. Sergeant, New Republic,
XIII: 240-243, Dec. 29, 1917.

50 Charles Downer Hazen, “Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule” (1917); Review of
Reviews, LVI: 7, 233, 346; in agreement with this position, Norman Angell, New Re-
public, X11; 150-151, 153; New Republic, VIII: 132, Sept., 1916; Outlook, CXVIII:
ll, Jan. 2, 1918; Independent, XCVII: 45-6, July 14, 1917; Theodore Roosevelt,
Metropolitan Magazine, cited in Review of Reviews, LVI: 89; Ruth Putnam, Alsace-
Lorraine (1915); David S. Jordan, Alsace-Lorraine (1916); House, 1: 363.

61 Henry Cabot Lodge, Scribner’s, LXIV: 620-624. For return of the Provinces, Theo-
dore Roosevelt, “All stand unalterably and unequivocally with the President in this

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pledge,” Current History, VII1: 246; H. H. Powers, The Great Peace (1918), 175-90;
H. A. Gibbons, Century, XCV: 732-42; W. S. Davis and others, Roots of the War
(1918), 19-23; New Republic, XVI: 347; A. O. Lovejoy, New Republic, XVI: 257-8;
Outlook, CXVIII: 526; C. D. Hazen, World’s Work, XXXVII: 188-202; for plebi-
scite, New Republic, XVII: 47.
52 William Howard Taft, Win the War for Permanent Peace (1918), 206; Secre-
tary Lansing, June 5, 1918, Address at Columbia University, in Prussia’s War and
America’s Peace; Brander Matthews, Munsey’s Magazine, cited in World War,
American Academy of Arts and Letters, 36; Outlook, CXIX: 403, 477-8; Current
History, VII: 244-6; Nation, CVI: 585-6; Independent, XCVI: 309.
53 Typical books on the causes and responsibility of the war, of this period, are:—
Christian Gauss, Why We Went to War (1918), emphasis on German Schrecklichkeit;
W. S. Davis and others, Roots of the War, Chapter VII, by Wm. Anderson, espe-
cially pro-French; Wm. Herbert Hobbs, The World War and its Consequences
(1918), with Preface by Theodore Roosevelt, praising it as the best book issued on
the subject, bringing out “exactly what the conditions are that have made Germany
a menace and a horror to the whole world.”; the Columbia University Course on the
Issues of the War, by Prof. Howard Lee McBain; a similar outline prepared for the
Michigan Department of Education by G. N. Fuller; J. B. McMaster, The United
States in the World War (1918).
54 Nation, CVI1: 792-3.
55 John Spencer Bassett, The Lost Fruits of Waterloo (1918), 188-189, 200-203; Re-
view of Reviews, LVIII: 3-4, July, 1918; New Republic, XVII: 211-12, Dec. 21, 1918;
Will Durant, The Dial, Apr. 11, 1918.
58 Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, 11: 218; Powers, The Great Peace, 325-6.
51 Nation, CVII: 543. Nov. 9, 1918.
58 New Republic, XVII: 87-89, Nov. 23, 1918.
59 Seattle Times, cited in Literary Digest discussion of the American point of view,
Jan. 11, 1919.
60 Cincinnati Enquirer, Jan. 1, 1919; New Republic, XVII: 262, 297, 354; XVIII: 14
17, Jan. 4, 11, 25, Feb. 1, 1919; Nation, CVII1: 269, Feb. 22, 1919.
61 Baltimore Sun, Jan. 4, 1919.
62 Simonds, in Review of Reviews, LIX: 258-64. Apr., 1919; Henry Cabot Lodge, The
Senate and the League of Nations, 258-9; Strunsky, cited in Literary Digest, LXI:
62-4, Apr. 5, 1919. See also H. A. Gibbons, France and Ourselves (1920), Ch. VI.
63 Outlook, CX XII: 464-6, July 23, 1919; New Republic, XIX: 106-10, May 24, 1919;
Ib., XIX: 198-9, June 14, 1919; Nation CVIII: 778-780, May 17, 1919; /b., 972, June
21, 1919; Literary Digest, LXI: 15-16, May 31; Jb., 9-17, May 24, 1919; World’s
Work, XXXVIII: 235-6, July, 1919. Ambassador Hugh C,. Wallace’s speeches are all
very warmly and openly pro-French, and quite as undiplomatic sometimes as any of
Page’s. (Speeches of Ambassador Wallace, 1919-1921.)
64] odge, The Senate and the League of Nations, 156, 367.
85 Independent, XCIX: 83-4, July 19, 1919; C. D. Hazen, Burton J. Hendrick, World’s
Work, XXXVIII: sup. I-9, June, 1919; Outlook, CXXII: 424-5, July 16; Jb., 525,
Aug. 6, 1919; The Review, 1: 179-80, July 12, 1919; New York World, New York
Tribune, New York Evening Post, Philadelphia Record, Chicago Daily News, New
York Herald, Philadelphia North American, etc., cited in Literary Digest, LX1: 20,
May 3; LXII: 12, July 19; LXII: 10, Aug. 9, 1919.

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66 Baltimore Sun, July 15, 1919; Wm. S. Culbertson, Yale Review, 1X: 298-313, Oct.,
1919; Lodge, Senate and League of Nations, 154, 366-7, 368, 372-3; Harry Hansen,
The Adventures of the Fourteen Points (1919), 376-378; Review of Reviews, LXE
241, Sept., 1919; Current History, X: 274, Aug., 1919; New York Sun, Boston Tran-
script, Springfield Republican, Philadelphia Public Ledger, St. Louis Globe-Democrat,
Seattle Times, etc., cited in Literary Digest, LXI: 20, May 3; LXII: 12, July 19;
LXII: 10, Aug. 9, 1919; New Republic, XIX: 106-10, May 24; XIX: 13940; May 31;
XIX: I, 339-41, July 16; XX: 43-44, Aug. 13, 1919.
67 David Carb, Century, XCVIII: 455-463, Aug., 1919: Alex. Woolcott, North Amer-
ican Review, CCX: 490-498, Oct., 1919; W. T. Larned, Review, I: 102, June, 1919;
Stoddard Dewey, /b., 383-4, Sept., 1919; Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, Leaves from
a War Diary (1925), 214, 299-302; Robt. Lee Bullard, Personalities and Remintis-
cences of the War (1925), 52-57, 244, 329-335; Elbert J. Baldwin, Outlook, CXXII:
635-6; New Republic, XVIII: 104-5, Feb. 22, [b., XIX: 78-81, May 17; 217, June 14,
(Roger B. Hull); Baltimore Sun, Jan. 3, 1919; Literary Digest, LX1: 47-51, June
28, 1919.
68 Simonds, Review of Reviews, LX1: 492-500, May, 1920; Review of Reviews, LXI:
355, Apr., 1920; Independent, Cll: 136-7; Literary Digest, LXV: 44, Apr. 17; LXV:
9-10, Apr. 24, 1920.
69 Review of Reviews, LX1: 349-50, Apr., 1920.
70 \VW. MacDonald, Nation, CX: 650-651, May 15, 1920; James Westfall Thompson,
Nation, CX1: 513-16, Nov. 3, 1920; Literary Digest, LXV: 9-10, Apr. 24, 1920; Cur-
rent History, X11: 231-4, May, 1920; New Republic, XXII: 193, Apr. 14, 1920;
Nation, CX: 448, Apr. 10; 502-3, Apr. 17, 1920.
11 Bernard M. Baruch, Tbe Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of
the Treaty (1920), 2-5; and passim; Charles Homer Haskins and Robert Howard
Lord, Some Problems of the Peace Conference (1920), 31-3, 150, 288; John Foster
Bass, The Peace Tangle (1920), Ch. II, Ch. VII.
72 Ray Stannard Baker, What Wilson did at Paris (1920), 32, 54-55, 70-71, 73.
73 Cited by Myron M. Johnson, New Republic, XXII: 349-50, May 12, 1920.
74 Nation, CX1: 342, Sept. 25, 1920. Cf. also New Republic, XXIV: 53-54, 1-12
Sept. 15; Felix Frankfurter, New Republic, XXIV: 138-40, Oct. 6, 1920; Nation, CX:
572-3, May 1; Jb., 609, May 8; CXI: 464, Oct. 27, 578, Nov. 24, 1920; Reply to Prof.
Frankfurter, Henry W. Bunn, Weekly Review, III: 468-9: Paxton Hibben, Nation,
287-289, Feb. 23, 1921.
75Arthur P. Scott, An Introduction to the Peace Treaties (Chicago, 1920), 9,
Courtesy of the University of Chicago Press; Graham H. Stuart, French Foreign
Policy 1898-1914, (1921), 358, 367, 373-4; Raymond Leslie Buell, Contemporary
French Politics, (1920). Typical publications of this period are:—Norman M.
Trenholme, Syllabus of the Background and Issues of the World War (1919);
Bulletin of the State University of Iowa (1919); Francis A. March, History of the
World War (1919); Frank H. Simonds, History of the World War (1919); John
Spencer Bassett, Our War with Germany (1919); W. L. McPherson, A Short History
of the Great War (1920); F. W. Halsey, ed., Literary Digest History of the World
War (1919); Geo. H. Allen, ed., The Great War (1915-1921); C. D. Hazen, Fifty
Years of Europe (1919); E. R. Turner, Europe 1789-1920 (1920).
76 Sidney B. Fay, “New Light on the Origins of the World War,” American Historical
Review, July, Oct., 1920, Jan., 1921.
77 Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations (1921); Ib., The Big Four and Others
306Trac

FRANCE IN ARMS

of the Peace Conference (1921); What Really Happened at Paris, by American
Delegates, E. M. House and C. Seymour, eds. (1921); Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow
Wilson as | Knew Him (1921). Contributary also, Frederick L. Paxson, Recent His-
tory of the United States (1921); Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Brief History of the Great
War (1921); C. Seymour, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War (1921).
78 Literary Digest, LXIV: 22, Mar. 27, 1920.
79 Pierrepont B. Noyes, While Europe Waits for Peace (1921), 89-90; Chs. IV, VII,
VIII, XIII]; Outlook, CXXVI: 634-5, Dec. 8, 1920; Simonds, Nation, CXII: 214,
Feb. 9, 1921; Washington Herald, cited in Literary Digest, LXVIEIs 7-9; Feb. -19;
1921; C. E. McGuire, Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science,
XCV: 290-305, May, 1921.
80 Literary Digest, LXVIII: 16, Feb. 19, 1921; Nation, CXII: 282, Feb. 9, 1921.
81 Literary Digest, LX VIII: 7-9, Feb. 19: 9, Feb. 26; 20, Mar. 19, 1921.
82 Glenn Frank, Century, Cl: 536-7, Feb., 1921; New Republic, XXVI: 133-5, Mar.
30, 1921; Nation, CXII: 680, May 11, 1921.
83H. A. Gibbons, Century, Cll: 622-29, Aug., 1921; Paul Lambert White, Weekly
Review, 1V: 241-2, Mar. 16, 1921; Paul Scott Mowrer, Balkanized Europe (1921),
310-316; Literary Digest, LXVIII: 9-11, Mar. 19; 14, Mar. 12; LXIX: 5-8, Apr. 16,
1921: Outlook, CXXVII: 363, Mar. 9; 407, Mar. 16; CXXVIII: 50-51, May II, 1921;
Simonds, Review of Reviews, LXIII: 371-387, Apr., 1921; Ib., 597-606, June, 1921;
John Foster Dulles, New Republic, XXVI: 133-5, Mar. 30, 1921.
84 John Foster Bass and Harold G. Moulton, America and the Balance Sheet of
Europe (1921).
85 Literary Digest, LXXI: 5-9, Dec. 31, 1921; Outlook, CXXIX: 247-250; Independ-
ent, CVII: 227-8, Dec. 3, 1921; Ib.. Walter E. Maynard, CVII: 289, Dec. 17, 1921;
World’s Work, XLIII: 239, Jan., 1922; O. G. Villard, Nation, CXITI: 641-2, Dec. 7,
1921.
86 Milwaukee Leader, cited in Literary Digest, LXXII: 15, Feb. II, 1922; World’s
Work, XLII1: 346, Feb., 1922; Ida M. Tarbell, Peace-Makers, Blessed and Otherwise
(1922), 213,—“France has held up the peace of Europe, delayed its reconstruction,
lessened her own chances of reparation, alienated her best friends by her persistent
militarism”; Raymond L. Buell, The Washington Conference (1922); Mark Sullivan,
The Great Adventure at Washington (1922); Current Opinion, LX XII: 157-161, Feb.,
1922: C. Seymour, Yale Review, X1: 479-495, Apr., 1922; Outlook, CX XX: 6-7, Jan.
7; E. H. Abbott, /b., 51-53, Jan. 11; Sidney Ballou, /b., 136-7, 245-6, Feb. 15, 1922;
New Republic, XX1X: 58-60, Dec. 14, 1921; Edward G. Lowry, Ib., 147-49, Jan. 4;
Ib., XXX: 240-241, Apr. 26, 1922; Simonds, Review of Reviews, LXV: 490, May,
1922; Literary Digest, LXXII: 7-9, Jan. 7; 23, Feb. 11; LXXIII: 31-32, May 13;
Of course occasional articles in the old tone are found, as C. D. Hazen, North Amer-
ican Review, CCXV: 464-472, Apr., 1922, or Owen Wister’s Neighbors Henceforth
(1922).
87 Frank A. Vanderlip, What Next in Europe? (1922) Ch. V, Ch. VIII; Similar
criticisms: C. A. Beard, Cross Currents in Europe To-day (1922); H. A. Gibbons,
Introduction to World Politics (1922); R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World
Settlement (1922); Pamphlets,—Europe in March, 1922, Mortimer L. Schiff; The
Vacant Place at the Council Table of the World, \vy L. Lee; What of Germany,
France and England? Hubert Bayard Swope; New Republic, XX XIII: 3-5, Nov. 29,
1922; New York Times, cited in Literary Digest, LXXV: 7, Oct. 7, 1922.
88 Literary Digest, LXXV: 7-9, Dec. 2, 1922; 13-14, Dec. 9, New Republic,
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XXXIII: 31-33, Dec. 6, 1922; Nation, CXV: 596, Dec. 6, 1922; Outlook, CXXX: 5,
Jan. 4, 1922.
89 Frederick Bausman, Let France Explain (1922), 5-6; John Kenneth Turner, Shall
It Be Again? (1922) is also concerned with a fresh evaluation of the war responsi-
bility and the war settlements. J. H. Latané, From Isolation to Leadership (1922)
is an example of the unchanged point of view on war guilt.
90 World’s Work, XLV: 457-8, Mar., 1923; 574-576, Apr., 1923; Literary Digest,
LXXVI: 7-11, Jan. 27; 7-10, Feb. 24; LXXVIII: 7, July 28, 1923; Outlook,
CXXXIII: 160-161, Jan. 24; 205-6, 210-12, Jan. 31; 478-480, Mar. 14; 670-3; Apr. I],
1923; Independent, CX: 40-41, Jan. 20; 80-81, 93-4, Feb. 3; 109-10, Feb. 17; 412, July
7, 1923.
81 Some of these criticisms brought out in preceding references. Especially unfavor-
able, Nation, CXVI: 30, Jan. 10; 111, Jan. 31; 288-290, Mar. 14, debate between
Major-General O’Ryan, in favor of, Pierrepont B. Noyes, against, the occupation;
406, Apr. 11, 1923; New Republic, XX XIII: 308-10, Feb. 14; XXXIV: 4-5, Feb. 28;
99, Mar. 21, 1923; Pamphlet, Letter (Feb. 26), to President Harding, from Willard
Straight Post, American Legion, New York County Chapter.
92 Bernard Baruch, in These Eventful Years, 1: 406-410; Ralph Barton Perry, New
Republic, XXXIV: 97, Mar. 21, 1923; Literary Digest, LXXIX: 14-15, 1923; Pam-
phlet, Address by Benjamin M. Anderson, Apr. 26, 1923.
93 Annals, CX1V: 25-48, July, 1924.
4 Nicholas Roosevelt, Foreign Affairs, 1V: 112-122, Oct., 1925; Buell, International
Relations, 510-511; Literary Digest, LXXXVI: 11, Aug. 8, 1925.
95 Outlook, CXLI: 374-5, Nov. 11, 1925; Nation, CXXI: 501, Nov. 4, 1925; Literary
Digest, LXXXVII: 7-9, Nov. 14, 1925; W. H. Scheifley, Current History, XXIII:
484-490, Jan., 1926; /b., 490-491; Quincy Wright, [b., 687-693, Feb., 1926; [b., XXIV:
223-228, May, 1926.
6 Outlook, CXLI: 547: Dec. 9, 1925; Frank H. Simonds, Review of Reviews, LXXII:
593-605, Dec., 1925; George Wharton Pepper, Norman H. Davis, William MacDon-
ald, Current History, XXII]: 312-323, Dec., 1925; Manley O. Hudson, Independent,
CXV: 517, Nov. 7, 1925.
97 Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World War (1926), 434, 699-700. The
revisionist discussions are illustrated by the following examples: Bernadotte E.
Schmitt, American Historical Review, XX1X: 449-473, Apr., 1924; Harry Elmer
Barnes, Albert Bushnell Hart, Current History, XX: 171-196, May, 1924; Symposium
on War Blame, Current History, XX: 452-463, June, 1924; Sidney B. Fay, New Re-
public, XLIV: 197-200, Oct. 14, 1925; S. B. Fay, Current History, XXIII: 41-48, Oct.,
1925; Ib., 196-207, Nov., 1925; H. E. Barnes, Christian Century, Nov. 5-26, 1925, A.
H. Putney, R. C. Binkley, Current History, XXIII: 525-533, Jan., 1926; Jas. W.
Gerard, B. E. Schmitt, /b., XXIII: 793-803, Mar., 1926; Charles Altschul, Jb., XXIV:
391-398, June, 1926; Charles E. Beard, /b., 730-35, Aug., 1926; E. F. Henderson, /b.,
8-10; B. E. Schmitt, Foreign Affairs, V: 132-147, Oct., 1926.
28 St. Louis Star, New York Herald and Tribune, Los Angeles Express, Wall Street
News, cited in Literary Digest, LXXXIV: 5-7, Jan. 17, 1925.
99 J iterary Digest, Aug. 21, 1926, 12.
100 Boston Post, Aug. 10, 1926.
101 Boston Herald, Aug. 12, 1926; New Republic, Aug. 25, 1926.
102 Cited in Business Conditions Weekly, New York, Dec. 25, 1926.

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103 Congressman A. Piatt Andrew, Congressional Record, 69th Congress, First Ses-
sion, Jan. 13, 1926.

104 Very much has been written in recent months upon the question of the French
debt. The varying points of view, and the most important arguments, are illustrated
in the following references. Moulton and Lewis, The French Debt Problem; J. H.
Latané, Carrie Chapman Catt, in Annals of the American Academy of Political Sci-
ence, July, 1926, 46-50; Denys P. Myers, Current History, May, 1925, 188-198; Frank
Simonds, Review of Reviews, 154-163, Feb., 1925; 383, Oct., 1925; 521-2, Nov., 1925;
417-418, Apr., 1926; 269-273, Sept., 1926; 408-412, Oct., 1926; World’s Work, 237-239,
Jan., 1926; Outlook, 14, Jan. 14, 1925; 218-19, Oct. 14, 1925; Independent, 57-58, Jan.
17, 1925; 145, Feb. 7, 1925; 434, Oct. 17, 1925; 723, Dec. 26, 1925; Review of Reviews,
349-50, Oct., 1925; 350-352, Apr., 1926; 467, May, 1926; New Republic, 296-7, Feb.
11, 1925; 29-31, Mar. 4, 1925; 264, July 28, 1926; 288-290, Apr. 28, 1926; 344-5, May
12, 1926; 4-6, Aug. 12, 1926; Nation, 369, Oct. 7, 1925; 723-4, Dec. 23, 1925; 77-78,
July 26, 1926; Literary Digest, 10-11, Sept. 12; 5-6, Oct. 10; 10, Nov. 28, 1925; 5-7,
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CONCLUSION

NG we consider the whole story of American opinion of France through-
out this century and a half of varied contacts, it is clear that the
influence of those intangible currents which are governed by community
of thought and ideals has been exceedingly great. When French thought
marched with ours, we have been inclined to be friendly. When France
seemed, in character and action, to challenge our ideals, we have become
suspicious of her. In the period just after the Revolutionary War, and at
the time of the War of 1812, we were injured, and we properly resented
the fact, by encroachments upon our sovereignty and our material pros-
perity. But much of our prejudice at the time was based upon our dis-
approval of the excesses of the Revolution and the First Republic, and of
the dictatorship of Napoleon. We disliked and distrusted Bourbon and
Orleanist, and the second Napoleon, not so much because of any actual
harm that they might do us, but because they interfered with liberty of
thought and action, and with the free development of the democratic form
of government which we idealized. We loved Lafayette, not only because
he gave generous aid to us in our time of need, but because he stood for
the liberty which we loved, first serving its cause with us, then defending
it against a reactionary government.

Paris,—and to us Paris has frequently typified France—we held to be
immoral, frivolous, and irreligious, and therefore decadent. French rule
was characterized by violent overturnings at home and militarism abroad,
and this antagonized us. We asserted the Monroe Doctrine in South Amer-
ica, in the case of Maximilian in Mexico, and in the Caribbean, as well
to protect the liberties of others as for our own safety. Anything savoring
of persecution alienates us whether it be directed against political or re-
ligious opponents or against the people of a colonial mandate. The Dreyfus
case, with its revelations of intolerance, of corruption, of militarism, did
France more harm in American eyes than the French spoliations which
touched our rights and our pockets, or the French scheme to build the
Panama Canal, which might have done incalculable damage to our com-
mercial interests. Yet the Dreyfus case could never have affected us di-
rectly. If France seems atheistic, we are cold to her; if she is radical, we
distrust her; if she changes her government overnight, we smile at her; butFe haere ee BREA :

CONCLUSION

 

 

if the new government shows itself generous, sane, democratic, we praise it.
The violence of the June Days and of the Commune repelled us. We scorned
the plebiscite which endorsed the arbitrary rule of the second Napoleon.
The sins of Napoleon III and his counselors led us to condemn France at
the opening of the Franco-Prussian War, but after the Republic was pro-
claimed, and when the French were heroic in the defence of their capital,
courageous and wise in reconstruction, self-sacrificing and scrupulous in
the payment of the indemnity exacted by their conquerors, we swung over
to faith, respect, and friendliness toward the young Republic which seemed
to be struggling to maintain the ideals which we ourselves valued.

Henry Van Dyke, in his Spirit of America, published in 1910, said that
true friendship between France and the United States could not exist so
long as the French looked upon America as the “country of the Sky-scraper
and the Almighty Dollar’ and America considered France merely the
“home of the Yellow Novel and the Everlasting Dance.” Archibald Cary
Coolidge, who knows well both his France and his America, said, speaking
of the impression in America that France is morally and politically de-
cadent,—

“This impression is based upon doubts as to the stability of the government, on the
fact that the population is stationary, and still more on the impression of moral
corruption which French literature has spread abroad. It is hard for a foreigner,
especially at a distance, to appreciate the extraordinary vitality and power of
achievement which, though not always evident on the surface, are inherent in the
French nation.”

Both Americans and French, said Coolidge, think they lead in civilization,
and are inclined to condescend to one another. But to the Frenchman, civ-
ilization suggests art and literature, to the everyday American “efficient
telephone service and improved plumbing.”’ *

Theodore Roosevelt, lecturing in France, and preaching to the French
justice, moderation, and tolerance wrote in his diary :—

“It shows my own complacent Anglo-Saxon ignorance that I had hitherto rather
looked down upon French public men, and have thought of them as people of marked
levity. When I met them | found that they had just as solid characters as English
and American public men, although with the attractiveness which to my mind
makes the able and cultivated Frenchman really unique. . . . In talking with these
French republicans, who are absorbed in the questions that affect all of us under
popular government, I had a sense of kinship that it was impossible to feel with
men, however highminded and well-meaning, whose whole attitude toward these
problems was different from mine.” 2

There must be a mutual tolerance, a willingness to understand one an-
other. We on our part have perhaps too much desired France to be a
311

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mirror, in which is reflected our own likeness, forgetting that centuries of
other history, other customs, other law, have made her what she is, and
that we cannot change this individuality if we should attempt it, any
more than foreign criticism can change the foundations of American char-
acter. But we are within our rights, and we do not overstep the bounds of
courtesy, when we say to France that the faith and confidence she asks
of us can be given only as we recognize in her the simple virtues which
in our moments of heart-searching we ask of ourselves,—honesty, sin-
cerity, unselfishness, a sense of spiritual values, and an earnest will for
peace. We would not be pharisaical. We have done the things that we
ought not to have done, and we have left undone the things that we should
have done,—but we hold to the faith, and we honor most those who join
us in the search for the Grail.

In the events of the last few years, the people in this country have found
their sense of right challenged. We are a peaceful people, the more so
as we come to realize the waste and horror and futility of war. Popular
American support of the Allied cause was based on popular belief that
responsibility for the war rested upon the Central Powers, and that the
Allies were defending the great principles of right, justice, and liberty. In
this faith the sons of America went out to give their lives. In this faith
mothers and fathers reconciled themselves to the sacrifice, and the whole
people joined in the prosecution of the war. Revelations of guilt where
we believed there was none, of ugly misuse of the splendid power of youth,
of unnecessary suffering and of unjust bargaining have shocked and dis-
illusioned us, but they have also clarified and made more intense the
demand that mankind shall be served and not betrayed, that wisdom and
truth, not chicanery, shall govern the relations of nation with nation, of
man with man.

To France Americans would say, with Robert Underwood Johnson, in his
Wish for New France, written before the Great War:—

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“For her no backward look

Into the bloody book

Of kings. Thrice-rescued land,

Her haunted graves bespeak

A nobler fate: to seek

In service of the world again the world’s command.

Paasese ap ey

a

ertepetee

She, in whose skies of peace

Arise new auguries

To strengthen, cheer, and guide...

When nations in a horde

Draw the unhallowed sword,

O Memory, walk a warning specter at her side!” 3

312

os

o

SSHEE OS

FR,
i Hah Why _CONCLUSION

And for America there is sane counsel in the words of Dr. George H.
Blakeslee, in his lately published study The Recent Foreign Policy of
the United States.—

“The American Government, in its efforts to carry out wisely and effectively the
increasingly close codperation which will take place with other nations for the ad-
vancement of world peace, will need the support of a public, not intent upon selfish
national gain, timorous for fear of making a false step, willing to follow at a dis-
tance the advance of other nations less qualified for leadership; but, rather, a pub-
lic insistent that war as an institution shall be destroyed, afraid not so much of mak-
ing a false move as of making inadequate effort, conscious of the difficulty of the
task but with faith that it can be done, seeking less national advantage than the ac-
complishment of a great service to the world as a whole.” #

NOTES AND SOURCES

1 Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, 194-5.

2 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, 11: 232-233.

8 Robert Underwood Johnson, Poems. St. Gaudens, an Ode, and other Verse, 77.
George H. Blakeslee, The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States, 361.

313

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

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INDEX

ApaMs, Henry, 136.

ApaMs, JOHN, xiii; opposes allied control in France, 27.

ApaMS, JoHN Quincy, United States Minister in Russia, 5; fears result of Napoleon’s
fall, 25; praises De Neuville, 37; critical of the Bourbons, 40; confers with De
Neuville on the Florida Purchase, 54-57; requests him to postpone his departure
in order to continue informal mediation, 58; messages on French spoliations, 69;
condemns French intervention in Spain, 73; welcomes Lafayette, 82; instructs
the commander of the Brandywine, 84; advises Lafayette to be cautious in his
revolutionary activities, 85; Message, 87; opinion of French Revolution of 1830,
88; on French spoliations, 103-106; opinion of the French, 124.

Atcotr, Louisa May, on the Franco-Prussian War, 179.

ALEXANDER | oF Russia, 18, 22, 23, 36.

ALLEN, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, 116; sympathetic with French
Revolution of 1848, 122.

ALLIED CONTROL OF FRANCE, after the fall of Napoleon, criticised, 27-31.

ALLIGATOR, 66.

ALSACE-LORRAINE, 184; seizure condemned, 190, 191, 200; a cause of friction, 270-271,
274; restoration to France, 279-282.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY FOR FRANCE, 275-278, 284-285, 293.

AMERICAN TOURISTS IN FRANCE, 243-246.

ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE, in the Crimean War, 143-144.

 

ANNAPOLIS, Memorial to French Soldiers, 231.

ANTI-CLERICAL LEGISLATION IN FRANCE, 257; American sentiment on the subject, 257-
260.

APOLLON , 66, 68.

Arms, sold to France, 212.

ARTHUR, PRESIDENT, address at centenary of Battle of Yorktown, 226; interest in the
Statue of Liberty, 228.

Bacon, Ropert, and American Ambulance Service, 276.

Bacor, Sir CHaRLES, to Sneyd, on French exiles in America, 44-45.

BAKER, Ray STANNARD, on the Peace Conference, 287.

BALKAN CRISIS, 268.

Bancroft, GrorcE, United States Minister at Berlin, pro-Prussian, 174-175, 185.
Barpour, GOVERNOR, of Virginia, on the War of 1812, 6.

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Barnes, Harry EvLMer, on war guilt, 298-299.
BARRON, CLARENCE W., on French debts, 301.
BARTHOLDI, sculptor of Statue of Liberty, 301.

Barton, United States chargé in Paris, instructed to leave if indemnity not paid,
107; returns to the United States, 108.

BaRucH, BERNARD, 286, 297.

Bass, JoHN Foster, on the “Peace Tangle,’ 287; and Moutton, H. G., on the eco-
nomic situation in Europe, 29].

BayarbD, SENATOR, to Clay, 25; quoted, 220.

BAUSMAN, JUDGE, on French war guilt, 295.

Beck, JAMES M.., 274.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY, 270, 272-273.

BENJAMIN, JUDAH P., letter to Slidell, on Louis Napoleon, 150; on French activities
in Texas, 156.

BerRTHEMY, French Minister in the United States, 174, 182, 184.

Bismarck, 180, 188, 190, 202, 210, 271.

Biaine, JAMES G., Secretary of State, on the French quarrel with Venezuela, 217;

on the Panama Canal, 219.

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BLAKESLEE, Georce H., on the foreign policy of the United States, 313.

BLair, FRANCIS, suggests armistice, 165.

BoNAPARTE, JOSEPH, refugee in the United States, 45, 46; supposed plots in his be-
half, 46-48.

BoNAPARTIST EXILES IN THE UNITED States, 44-48; press criticism of, 48-49.

BoNAPARTIST PARTY, interested in Canal schemes, 218.

BoraH, SENATOR, ON war aims of the United States, 279; on the guaranty treaty for
France, 284; on the occupation of the Ruhr, 296; on the French war debts, 300.

BoULANGER EPISODE, 249

Boursons, restored, 24, 26; lack of enthusiasm for, 28, 29; prejudice against, 37-40;
at the time of Lafayette’s visit to the United States, 81-84; satisfaction over
downfall, 85, 86; disapproval of character, 87, 88.

Boutwe Lt, Secretary of the Treasury, 179.

~~ Brianp, 292, 294.

Bryan, Secretary of State, 268.

BRYANT, WILLIAM CULLEN, 191.

BUCHANAN, JAMES, on French spoliations, 102, 108; to King, on French intrigues
in Texas, 112; favors Revolution of 1848, 122.

BugeLt, RayMonp L., on international relations, 288.

BuLiarb, ArtHuR, 273; on France as an ally, 275.

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CaLHoun, JoHN C., Speech on Embargo, 4; favors war with Britain, 7; debate on
New Army Bill, 15; and Milan and Berlin Decrees, 17; on “French influence,”

332

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25: on French intervention in Spain, 74; on French spoliations, 102, 103; called
pro-French, 110; to King, on Texas, 112; on French Revolution of 1848, 122;
interpretation of Monroe Doctrine, 116.

— + CamBon, French Ambassador at Washington, 225, 229.

CAMBRELENG, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, 103; on French spoliations,
104-106.

CARIBBEAN INTERESTS OF THE Unitep States, 135, 142.

CARNEGIE, ANDREW, on Franco-American relations, 261.

CARNOT, PRESIDENT, assassinated, 250-251.

CarROLL, Cuar.es, of Carrollton, 20.

Cary, SAMUEL, 20.

Cass, Lewis, United States Minister to France, 110; upholds Monroe Doctrine, 117;
expansionist, 140; resents European interference, 143.

CASTLEREAGH, Lorp, 31.

CATHOLIC SENTIMENT, 182; on anti-clerical legislation in France, 257-259.

Cuamp p’ASILE, French refugee enterprise in the Gulf of Mexico, 47-48.

CHAMPLAIN, SAMUEL, tercentenary celebration, 231; memorials at Crown Point and

Plattsburg, 231.

CHANNING, WILLIAM ELLERy, sermon, 21.

CHAPMAN, Victor, 276.

Cuarces X, 69, 83, 84, 85, 86.

Cueves, LANGDON, “war hawk,” favors war with Great Britain, 7; debate on New
Army Bill, 15.

Cuitp, LypiaA Maria, 113.

Cuoate, JosepH H., sympathy with French, 187.

CLARENDON, Lorp, 143.

Cray, Henry, Speech on the Embargo, 4; Speaker of the House, 7; member of
Peace Commission, 15; criticism of France, 16; will make a democrat of Na-
poleon, 31; critical of Bourbons, 38; on French intervention in Spain, 74; on
spoliations, 101-102; Report of Foreign Relations Committee, 106; called pro-
French, 110, 111; on French blockade in the Gulf of Mexico, 111.

Cayton, on French spoliations, 102, 103, 104.

CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY, 218.

—. CLEMENCEAU, at the Peace Conference, on the balance of power, 282; obstructionist
at Peace Conference, 288; visit to America, 294; on French war debts, 300-301.
CLEVELAND, PRESIDENT, Message, on Liberian affairs, 215; case of J. L. Waller, 217;

at unveiling of Statue of Liberty, 219; Message, 229; on death of President

Carnot, 250.

Cotomsia, in relation to Cuban independence, 77, 220.

Comes, French Premier, and anti-clerical legislation, 258.

CoM MERCIAL TREATY WITH FRANCE, 67.

333

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CoMMUNE, 208-209.

ConFEDERACY, European sympathy with, 146.

CoNFEDERATE OPINION, On French intervention in the Civil War, 148-150; on French
activities in Mexico, 155-156, 163, 164, 165.

CoNFERENCE ON LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT, 292-293; French attitude, 292-293.

Concress, debate on French spoliations, 102-104; debate on Revolution of 1848,
122-3; sentiment on French in Mexico, 157-158; on the Franco-Prussian War,
198-199.

ConNEcTICUT LEGISLATURE, on War of 1812, 8.

CoNVENTION OF 1803, with France, 60, 65.

Coo.ipceE, ARCHIBALD Cary, on Franco-American relations, 226; on French charac-
ter, 311.

CooLiDGE, PRESIDENT, 300.

CrawForp, to Clay, 25; to Gallatin, 56; criticat of Administration, 68.

CRITTENDEN, acting Secretary of State, on Lopez incident, 136.

Cusa, rumored cession to England or France, 75, French designs questioned, 76, 77,
78; Daniel Webster on, 76; interest of Mexico and Columbia in, 77; British or
French occupation rumored, 114; United States interest in, 135; filibustering ex-

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peditions, 136; plan for tripartite treaty concerning, 137; Mason favors annexa-
tion, 140; European interest in, 143; and Spanish-American War, 224.
Curtis, GEORGE WILLIAM, on French militarism, 247.

irish ss

CusHING, CALEB, resolution on French blockade of Mexico, 111; objects to French
intervention in Uruguay, 116.

DACIA, 273

Dana, Cuares A., on Louis Napoleon, 123, 133.

Dana, DANIEL, Fourth of July Address, 20.

Davis, H. W., Resolutions in regard to French in Mexico, 158-161.

Davis, J. C. B., Assistant Secretary of State, 174; on Franco-Prussian War, 184; to
Bancroft, on American policy, 185.

Davis, JEFFERSON, 149; bitter over European neutrality, 150; on Mexican affairs,
165; refuses to meet Napoleon III, 173.

Davis, RicHarD HarpinG, on Louvain, 270.

Dawes Pian, 297.

Dayton, United States Minister in Paris, 158; to Seward, 159, 165.

De Bacourt, French Minister in Washington, 110.

De BEAUMARCHAIS, Caron, claims, 66.

De Bou.son, RaoussetT, French adventurer, 138.

De HEGERMANN-LINDENCRONE, MMeE., 225.

De Lesseps, FERDINAND, and the Panama Canal, 218-223; on Committee for the
Statue of Liberty, 228-229.

334INDEX

 

 

De cassé, 261.

De Onis, SeNor, Spanish Minister to the United States, friction with John Quincy
Adams, 53; signs treaty for sale of Florida, 54.

Democrats, expansionist, 139-140, 142.

Democrats, pro-French at time of Franco-Prussian War, 181, 183.

De Menou, Count, 110.

De NevuviLte, Hype, appointed French Minister to the United States, 36; qualifica-
tions, 37; and the “affair of the Postmaster,” 42; strives for friendly relations, 44;
anxious over Napoleonic exiles, 44-48; to Richelieu, 51, 52; gaining in popularity
in the United States, 52; informal mediation in negotiations for purchase of
Florida, 52-56; plans return to France, 56; requested by State Department to
remain to assist in discussions with Spain, 58; conclusion of services, 60; im-
portance of personality, 61; return to America, 67; unable to arrange commercial
treaty, 67.

Dickerson, Manion, Governor of New Jersey, 38.

Dix, Masor-GeNneraL, American Minister to France, 175.

Doucias, STEPHEN A., on French Revolution of 1848, 122.

DreyFus Case, 251-256, 260.

Drounyn DE L’Huys, 154, 159.

Duty oN FRENCH VESSELS IN AMERICAN PorTS, 60.

Ecuapor, warned by French against United States, 143.

Eiot, CHarLes W., proposes American intervention, 272.

Emerson, RatpH WALDo, on Louis Philippe, 119, 121; opinion of the French, 124;
criticism of Napoleon III, 144; letter to Grimm, pro-Prussian sentiment, 193.

Ervine, United States Minister to Spain, 51.

EuROPEAN ALLIANCES, 269.

Evarts, W. M., Secretary of State, defends Liberian interests, 215; warns French
in Venezuela case, 217; speech on “The French Alliance,” 226; and Bartholdi
statue, 227-228.

Everett, Epwarp, Gallatin to, 96; and chairmanship of Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, 103; on French spoliations, 104, 105; on tripartite treaty for Cuba, 137;
refuses treaty, 141.

EXCHANGE PROFESSORSHIPS, 238-239.

Favre, 184; Circular, 190, 196.
Fay, Siwney A., on Origins of the War, 288-289; 298.
FEDERALISTS, Oppose war with England, 10; celebrate downfall of Napoleon, 23;
criticise Jefferson’s French proclivities, 27; abuse of Napoleon, 29.
FILLMore, PresipENT, 130.
Fish, Hamiton, Secretary of State, 174, 185.
335

“Liriebel ais,

 

Pa RRR TL a et CES RH
Sess asia iL be) peal ahal | reINDEX

 

Fioripa, disorders in, 49; unsettled boundaries, 49-51; treaty for purchase from
Spain, 54; delay in ratification, 57; danger of war with Spain, 58, 59,

ForsytH, Chairman of House Committee on Foreign Relations, 68.

ForTIFICATIONS BILL, 106.

“FouRTEEN Points,” 280.

FRANCE, gratitude toward, 177, 194, 198.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE, 249.

FRANKLIN MEDAL, 230.

FRANZ FERDINAND, 268.

FRELINGHUYSEN, Secretary of State, on Liberia, 215; on Venezuela, 217.

FRENCH AFTER-WAR PSYCHOLOGY, 294.

FRENCH ART, 242.

FRENCH CHARACTER, American opinion of, 133-135, 209-211, 213, 245-246, 272, 273,
282-283, 285.

FRENCH DEBT TO THE UNITED States, 281, 289, 290, 296, 299-301.

“FRENCH INFLUENCE,” 6, 11, 25.

FRENCH INSTITUTIONS, 246-247.

FRENCH LITERATURE, 239-242.

FRENCH MILITARISM, 247, 289, 293, 295, 296, 297, 298.

FRENCH Music, 242.

FRENCH POLITICS, 247-249.

FRENCH REVOLUTION, XIV.

FRENCH SCIENTISTS, 239.

FRENCH SPOLIATIONS, indemnity desired for, 60, 65; difficulties in obtaining in-
demnity, 65, 66; French counter-claims, 60, 66, 67; treaty negotiated by Rives, 67,

eat

ease

SEEMS

aH

aes

SHAME Ieee

i
5
i

68; appropriations not made, 69; friction due to this, 69; press comment, 70, 71;

wyet preety eet

belief that Louis Philippe would bring about payment, 71; disappointment, 71;
serious difficulties over, 94-109; Chamber refuses appropriations, 94; subject of
party dissensions in the United States, 96, 107; press comments, 96, 100, 105-109;
France demands apology from Jackson, 107; British mediation accepted, 109;
settlement delayed, 214.

FRENCH UNIVERSITIES, restrictions upon foreign students, 235.

FRICTION WITH FRANCE, colonial period, xii.

lege

GALLATIN, ALBERT, attack upon, 13; letter to Clay, 25; appointed United States
Minister in Paris, 35; reluctant to accept, 35; letter to Jefferson, 35; reports
French coolness toward Americans in France, 41; letter to Monroe, 44; to John
Quincy Adams, 52; attempts to obtain indemnity for French spoliations, 60;
unable to arrange for it, 66-67; critical of Administration policy, 68; to Everett,
on spoliations, 96.

GARFIELD, PRESIDENT, On Panama Canal, 219.

336

Siar Heese

itso

aay

: Pa, :
SPUN RN ae Me,INDEX

 

 

GERMAN-AMERICANS, in Civil War, 179-180, 198.

GERMAN REPARATIONS, 286, 290, 291, 294, 295, 296.

GERMAN UNIVERSITIES, welcome American students, 235.

GERMANY, distrusted in the United States, 260-261.

Gero_t, Baron, German Minister to the United States, 174, 182, 184, 185.

Gippons, HERBERT ADAMS, 279.

GILMAN, Governor, of New Hampshire, 11.

Gore, SENATOR, of Massachusetts, 22.

Grant, Utysses S., 166; pro-Russian, 174; and pro-French sympathy in the South,
180; Message, 198; interest in trans-oceanic waterway, 218, 220; and Bartholdi
statue, 227.

Great BRITAIN, infractions of neutrality, War of 1812, 1-2; mediation refused in
matter of Florida boundary, 51; mediation accepted in dispute over French
spoliations, 109; intrigues in Texas, 112-113; activities in Liberia, 215-216; and
responsibility in 1914, 273.

GREEK REVOLUTION, French intervention criticised, 78, 79.

GREELEY, Horace, 147.

Groucuy, Marsnat, French refugee in the United States, 45, 46.

Grunpy, FEeLix, speech on the Embargo, 4; favors war with Britain, 7; and Milan
and Berlin Decrees, 17.

GUARANTY TREATIES FOR FRANCE, 283, 284, 294.

Guizot, advocates balance of power in America, 113, 114, 117.

Gwin, SENATOR, of California, 141; on Hawaii, 145; plan to colonize Sonora, 166.

HacuE CONFERENCES, 225.

Haiti, independent of France, 78; French sincerity doubted, 78; European inter-
vention favored by French, 114; United States in tripartite intervention, 137;
civil war in, 137-138; French intrigues, 141-142; European influence in, 143-144.

HaANoTAUX, GABRIEL, 231.

Harper, RoBert Goop.oe, 18.

HarRISON, PRESIDENT, 110.

HASKINS, CHARLES Homer, on education in France, 237; on the Peace Treaties, 287.

Hawau, French activities in, resented, 118, 119; European aggression in, 144, 145;
accepted by the United States, 225.

Hawkins, Governor, of North Carolina, on “French influence,” 6, 7.

Hay, JoHn, on Louis Napoleon, 172, 173; Treaties of 1904, 225.

Hay-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY, 218.

Hayes, PresipENT, on the Panama Canal, 219; political weakness, 222.

Hazen, CHarLeES Downer, on Alsace-Lorraine, 279.

HENDERSON, Ernest F., defends Germany, 271.

Hottanp, J. G., quoted, 195.

337

Reuse cera a ETC ee eT TT RETR HECINDEX

 

Hott, HAMILTON, on United States debt to France, 284.

Houpin STATUE OF WASHINGTON, replica presented to France, 231.

House, CoLoneL, European mission, 268.

House CoMMITTEE ON ForEIGN RELATIONS, Report, October, 1812, 4; Report on
French spoliations, 68-69; Report on same subject, written by Clay, 101.

Howe, Freperic C., on war causes, 274.

Howe, JuLIA Warp, on the Franco-Prussian War, 191; on the Commune, 208.

HucHEs, THoMas Evans, Secretary of State, on German reparations, 291; on dis-
armament, 292.

Huains, RoLanp, pro-German, 276.

Hype, JAMEs Hazen, and exchange professorships, 238; on French literature, 241.

INTELLECTUAL CONTACTS WITH FRANCE, 238, 239.
INTER-OCEANIC WATERWAY, Plans for, 138.

JacKSoN, ANDREW, PRESIDENT, policy on French spoliations, 67; Messages, 69, 70;
draws on French treasury for indemnities, 94; resents delay in payment, 95;
Message on spoliations, 95; press comment on Message, 97-101; advises reprisals,
105; more pacific message, 107; breaks diplomatic relations, 108; proposes cessa-
tion of commercial intercourse, 108; accepts British mediation, 109.

James, Henry, 173.

Jay, JoHN, xiii, 23; opinion of the French, 124.

JEFFERSON, THOMAS, letter to Kosciusko, 2; favors war with Britain, 2; condemns
Napoleonic aggressions, 2; critical of Napoleon, 27; called pro-French, 27; letter
to Leiper, on the Coalition and Napoleon, 29; to John Adams, on the same
subject, 30; to Gallatin, on his appointment as Minister to France, 36; critical
of the Bourbons, 40; to Leiper, on the Spanish Revolution of 1820, 73, 74; to
Richard Rush, on Lafayette’s visit to the United States, 81; favors gift to
Lafayette, 8).

J EUNE EUGENIE, 6.

— JorFre, in the United States, 277.

JouNson, Ropert Unperwoop, “The Keeper of the Sword,” 254; “To Dreyfus Vindi-
cated,” 256; “Rheims,” 270; “The Sword of Lafayette,” 278; “Wish for New
France,” 312.

Jones, JoHN Paux, body returned to the United States, 230.

Jorpan, Davin Starr, on Belgian neutrality, 260-261.

Juarez, ruler of Mexico, 151, 156.

— JusseRAND, J. J., Ambassador from France to the United States, receives Franklin
medal, 230; at memorial service for John Paul Jones, 230.

KENDALL, Amos, 8.

3384

ee ee ee Cee eee end a

INDEX

 

 

Kine, Rurus, favors war with France, 9; hopes for fall of Napoleon, 20; rejoices
over Napoleon’s defeat, 23; critical of Bourbons, 29.
Knox, PHILANDER, Secretary of State, 216.

LAFAYETTE, visit to America, 79-85; welcome, 79; representative of the idea of democ-
racy, 79; occasion for demonstrations against reactionary policies of the Bourbons,
80, 81; attitude of French government toward the visit, 82, 84; American anxiety
over future safety, 84; statue presented to France, 229; memory of, 275; memorials
in America, 277.

LAFAYETTE FLYING Corps, 276.

LaFITTE, pirate, codperating with Bonapartist exiles, 47.

LAKANAL, JosEePH, refugee in United States, 45, 46.

LALLEMAND BROTHERS, French refugees, 45; concerned in Bonapartist activities, 46-48.

LANE, FRANKLIN K., pro-French sentiments, 278.

LEAGUE oF Nations, Covenant, 283; and guaranty treaty for France, 284; needed
for European relief, 290, 291.

LEFEBVRE-DESNOUETTES, GENERAL, French refugee, 42; in refugee enterprises, 45, 46.

LiperiaA, French and British activities in, 214-216.

LiBeRTY, STATUE OF, 226-229.

LINCOLN, elected, 145; unwilling to coerce French in Mexican affair, 157; re-
nominated, 161; delays action on Mexican question, 162; discusses it with Con-
federate commissioners, 165.

LiverPoot, Lorp, 31.

Livincston, American Minister in France, instructed to withdraw if indemnity not
paid, 105; returns to the United States, 107-108.

LocaRNo TREATIES, 298.

Lopce, Henry Casot, on the Morocco question, 261; on guaranty treaty for
France, 284; on the World War, 269; on Alsace-Lorraine, 280; on peace terms,
282.

LoncFELLow, HENRY WapswortH, to C. E. Norton, 187.

Lopez INCIDENT, 136.

Lorp, Ropert E., on Peace Treaties, 287.

Louis XVIII, appoints De Neuville as Minister to the United States, 36; official re-
lations with the United States friendly, 61; end of reign, 72, 73; death, 85.

LouisiANA Purcnase, 49, 50, 60.

Louis NapoLeon, candidate for the French Presidency, 123, 124; coup d’état, 130;
American criticism, 130-132; “Napoleonic ideas,” 133; inter-oceanic waterway
plans, 138.

Louis Puivipre, accession favored in the United States, 88; early diplomatic rela-
tions friendly, 94; factional disturbances in legislature, 94; unable to obtain
appropriation for spoliations indemnity, 94; promises fulfilment of treaty, 95;

339

PRET en ae EC eR EEN raters

!

RSPR CSET EN [LtLES tee POM peak thee Hs Re HeINDEX

 

 

praised by Clay, 111; and Oregon boundary, 118; American opinion on downfall,
119-121; and inter-oceanic waterway, 138.

Lowett, JAMEs Russet, “Ode to France,” 120; “Villa Franca,” 132; “Biglow Pa-
pers,” 133; Letter to Norton, 178; to Thomas Hughes, 197; opinion of the
French, 211.

McCork te, REPRESENTATIVE, of California, on Hawaii, 144.

McDouaat, Senator, of California, on the French in Mexico, 157, 162.

McKiIn ey, PRresiDenrT, 225.

McLane, Secretary of the Treasury, 94.

Macon, NATHANIEL, 1; debate on New Army Bill, 15.

MacVEIcH, WAYNE, on France, 273.

MaApISsON, PRESIDENT, Message, 1; letter to Jefferson, 2; Message, 4-5; sermon
against, 9; accused of pro-French bias, 9, 19; unable to obtain redress from
France, 11; cool toward the Bourbons, 41; resents “affair of the postmaster,” 42;
on Clay’s Report, 106.

Marguesas IsLanps, taken by French, 119.

Mason, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, 140; objects to European inter-
ference, 143; Confederate commissioner, 145.

Martin, E. S., on France, 271.

MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATURE, and War of 1812, 8.

MAXIMILIAN IN Mexico, 152-166.

MESSER ASE arf ig Madrasy cent tear ee

Seiriathesas Miah

Mairibes:

eRe

a5

1

bu
Fi

MELLON-BERANGER AGREEMENT, 300.

MenocaL, Lieut., report on Panama Canal route, 219.

Mexico, and Cuban affairs, 77; blockaded by the French, 111; and Raousset de
Boulbon’s enterprise, 138; French intrigues in, 141-142; disorders in, 150-151;
European intervention, 151; attitude of the United States, 151-152; withdrawal of
British and Spanish, 152; Maximilian’s enterprise, 152-157; French occupation, 174.

Mitan Decree, debate on, 16-17.

Monroe, JAMES, letter to Joel Barlow, 5; letter to John Quincy Adams, 5; denies
“French influence,” 14; letter to Gallatin, 35; displeased by “affair of the post-
master,” 42; refuses British mediation on Florida question, 51; refuses French
mediation, 52; Message on Florida question, 58; requests De Neuville to continue
informal mediation, 58; praises De Neuville, 60; on French spoliations, 68; Mes-
sage, 69; issues Monroe Doctrine, 75.

Monroe Doctrine, announced, 75; immediate effect, 76; incidents connected with,
111-118, 135-140; and European intervention in Mexico, 151, 153, 157-159; en-
dorsed by political parties, 161-162; France not inimical to, 213; ignored in the
Caribbean, 217; applied in Venezuela, 217; in relation to Panama Canal, 219-221.

Mou ton, H. G., on European economic conditions, 291.

“Mr. Doo.ey,” on the Dreyfus case, 254.

340Pere ee Re ae ree eg ee ee ee oa aH SR
Lae phe! ghee) J disids Gi i sual

INDEX

 

 

Morocco QuEsTION, 260-262, 298.

Morris, GouvERNEUR, letter to H. G. Otis, 18; oration on the Bourbon restoration,
23-24; critical of Bourbons, 29.

Morton, Levi P., United States Minister to France, 228.

Mottey, JoHN LorHrop, to Oliver Wendell Holmes, 147; on Louis Napoleon, 173;
to Bismarck, 187, 188; to O. W. Holmes, 210.

Mott, Lucretia, 191.

NapoLeon I, attacks on neutral commerce, 1, 2; considered a despot, 6; evades pay-
ment of reparations, 10; detestation for, in the United States, 7, 13, 16; retreat
from Moscow, 18; celebration of downfall, 19, 21-24; banishment to Elba, 25;
condemned by American leaders, 27; return from Elba, 28; character considered
altered, 29; called legitimate ruler of France, 30, 31; restoration favored in the
United States, 60.

NApo.eon III, criticised, 139, 140-141; allied with England, 143; anxious to check
United States expansion, 144; favors the Confederacy, 146; likely to intervene,
147; proposes mediation, 149; Northern and Confederate reception of plan, 148;
no active intervention, 149; policy in Mexico, 152-166; insecure position, 172;
responsible for Franco-Prussian War, 175-178, 182, 184, 188-190; American senti-
ment, 191-193; interest in trans-oceanic waterway, 217.

NAPOLEONIC CONSPIRACIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 45.

 

 

 

 

 

Nast, THomas, cartoons, 176, 193.

NELson, United States Minister to Spain, 74.

New Army BILL, debate on, 14.

New ENGLAND, prejudice against France, 7.

New Jersey LecisLature, and the War of 1812, 8.

Nicaracua, canal route, 218, 219, 220.

Norton, CHarves Exiot, on the French Republic, 211.

Notes AND SOURCES, 32-34, 61-64, 88-93, 125-129, 166-171, 202-207, 231-234, 262-267,
302-309, 313.

Noyes, E. F., American Minister in France, 215.

Noyes, Pierrepont B., on post-war Europe, 289; on Ruhr occupation, 297.

Occ, Freperick A., on government in France, 247.
Onto LEcIsLATURE, and War of 1812, 6.

OREGON BOUNDARY, and French intrigue, 118.
OrTH, SAMUEL P., as author, 274.

Oris, Harrison Grey, 18, 121.

Pace, AMBASSADOR, 273, 281.

Paceor, 110.

341

Be apeerEeeary gars ETT aT TT RTPULSES

i

FETE:

 

INDEX

 

 

Shears Pee

PANAMA CANAL, undertaken by the French, 218-223; Monroe Doctrine in relation to,
219-221; deemed impracticable by Americans, 222; discussed in Congress, 223;
built by the United States, 225.

PANAMA SCANDAL, 250.

Paris, Peace of, xii; Declaration of, 146; siege of, 199-200; occupied by Germans,
209; deemed immoral, 134, 210; American colony in, 229; new appreciation for,
244, 246.

Paris Exposition, 173, 225.

PEACE CONFERENCE, 281, 282; French desires, 287.

PHILLIPS, WENDELL, 208.

PICKERING, TIMOTHY, critical of Administration, 12; celebrates fall of Napoleon, 18.

Pierce, PRESIDENT, 130, 140.

PLuMER, Governor, of New Hampshire, 2.

Poincare, 236, 298.

PoLk, PRESIDENT, Message, 113; Revolution of 1848, 120, 122.

Pontois, 110.

PorTeR, GENERAL Horace, American Ambassador to France, 225; address at presen-
tation of Statue of Liberty, 228; instrumental in restoring the body of John
Paul Jones to the United States, 230.

Porto Rico, reported cession to England or France, 75; interest of Mexico and
Colombia in, 77; French designs in, 77, 78.

PoSTMASTER, affair of, 42-44.

Powers, H. H., on Alsace-Lorraine, 280; on French war debt, 281.

Prince, NorMANn, 276.

PrussiA, praised, 178-179; criticised, 181-182; militarism, 188-201.

Quincy, JOSIAH, 4.

RANDOLPH, JOHN, speech on the Embargo, 4; opposed to war with Britain, 13.

Reip, WuiTeLaw, American Ambassador to France, and tariff difficulties, 222; and
Lafayette statue, 229.

REPARATIONS CoMMISSION, 295.

ReppPLieR, AGNES, On war guilt, 272.

REPUBLICANS, pro-Prussian, 183.

REVISIONIST CONTROVERSY, 288, 289, 298, 299.

REVOLUTION oF 1830, France, 67; favored in the United States, 85; success cele-
brated, 86, 87; fails to unify France, 94.

REVOLUTION OF 1848, France, American opinion on, 120, 121, 123.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR, Xiii.

RHINE FRONTIER, 283, 288.

342iy SU Rn a ERE mee ston ra: A hitch: Heenan ere Ae ae a Le eRe Hed ce Hi

INDEX

 

 

Ripot, 223.

RicHELiEu, duke de, French foreign Minister, 36; resents “affair of the postmaster,”
43: De Neuville to, on Spanish-American relations, 45; declines to indicate
boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase, 50; to De Neuville, 51; suggests mediation
on Florida question, 52.

Rives, WILLIAM C., United States Minister to France, negotiates treaty on French
spoliations, 67, 68; unwise remarks upon treaty, 94; delays recognition of Louis
Napoleon, 130.

RocHAMBEAU, statue of, 229.

RockKwELL, KiFFIn, 276.

Ropin, “La France,” 231.

RoosEVELT, PRESIDENT, interest in Liberia, 216; and memorial service for John Paul
Jones, 230; favors French in Morocco, 261; on responsibility for the World War,
270; on the heroism of France, 275; on the French, 311.

Root, Euinu, Secretary of State, on Liberia, 216; address in honor of M. Cambon,
229: address at presentation of Franklin medal, 230; on the death of President
Carnot, 250; pro-French utterances, 277.

Ruur VALuey, French occupation, 285-286; allied occupation, 291, 295-296, 297, 298.

Rusu, Ricuarp, United States Minister to France, recognizes Second Republic, 121.

Russia, 143, 144, 146.

St. BARTHELEMI, bought by France, 217.

SAAR VALLEY, 282, 288.

SAMANA Bay, French interest in, 138, 139, 142.

SAMOAN ISLANDS, United States interest in, 225.

SANDWICH IsLaNps, 143, 144, 145.

SAN FRANCISCO MEDAL, presented by the French, 230.

SARAJEVO INCIDENT, 268.

ScHIEBER, CLARA E., on American sentiment toward Germany, 260, 261.
SCHOFIELD, 166.

 

ScHMItTTr, BERNADOTTE E., on war guilt, 298.

ScHurz, Car, criticised, 180, 181.

SciENTIFIC ConcrEss, to discuss canal routes, 218, 219.

SECRET TREATIES, 295.

SEDAN, 184.

SEEGER, ALAN, 276.

SEMINOLE War, 51.

SERRURIER, French Minister to the United States, 36, 105, 110.

SEwarD, WILLIAM H., on Caribbean questions, 141; Secretary of State, 145; to Day-
ton, on French mediation, 147; reported friction with French Minister, 149; on

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INDEX

 

 

European intervention in Mexico, 152, 153, 157, 158, 159; press opinion on his
“apology,” 159-161; rebuked in party platforms, 161; dislodges French from
Mexico, 166; visits Paris, 211.

SeYMour, CHARLES E., as author, 273.

SHERIDAN, GENERAL, 166; observer with Prussian army, 175.

SHERMAN, JOHN, financier, 173.

SHERMAN, W. T., General, on French intervention in Mexico, 153.

SIMONDS, FRANK, on France, 271; on peace terms, 282.

SLIDELL, Confederate commissioner, 145, 150; seeks French alliance, 155, 156, 165.

SLOANE, W. A., on Alsace-Lorraine, 271.

SNELL, THOMAS, oration by, 18.

SNYDER, SIMON, Governor of Pennsylvania, 38.

SoclETY FOR THE CULTIVATION OF THE VINE AND THE OLIVE, 46.

Sonora, French intrigues in, 138-142, 151.

SouLE, would take Cuba, 140.

SouTH, sympathetic with France, in Franco-Prussian War, 180-18].

SPANISH-AMERICAN COLONIES, United States interest in, 49; revolutions in, 74; United
States attitude toward independence, 74; criticism of French policy toward, 74-75;
and Monroe Doctrine, 75.

SPANISH-AMERICAN War, and French hostility, 224-225.

SPANISH REVOLUTION oF 1820, sympathy in the United States, 72; French interven-
tion condemned, 72-74.

STILLMAN, W., 175.

STODDARD, LoTHrop, 279.

STOWELL, ELLery C., on French war guilt, 272.

STRONG, CALEB, Governor of Massachusetts, 9; anti-French, 20.

STUART, GRAHAM H., 288.

SUMNER, CHARLES, 110; on Louis Napoleon, 155; on French in Mexico, 157; on
Franco-Prussian War, 191-193, 198; resolution on the sale of arms, 212.

Suez CANAL, 219, 220.

SyriA, French occupation, 298.

TAFT, PRESIDENT, on Liberia, 216.

TAHITI, seized by France, 118, 119.

TALLEYRAND, on boundaries of Louisiana Purchase, 50.

TARIFF DIFFICULTIES, With France and Germany, 223-224.

Texas, benefited by French blockade of Mexico, 111; French intrigues in, 112; Polk
on annexation, 113; French intrigues, 156.

Tuiers, 208, 211.

Tuirp RepuBLic, recognized by the United States, 184; welcomed by Americans,

344cl

mn m Mr Risrcera er seente eee SO TCR iter it atti
rf Ponta BRAG tt fog arate hatin Maceo RR

INDEX

 

ie
i}

 

186, 187; sympathy with, 188-190; stability doubted, 196; confidence in, 199-200;
diplomacy, 213.

TicKNor, FRANCcIs, 193.

Ticknor, GeorceE, on French Revolution of 1848, 121.

Toasts, Fourth of July, 2, 6, 38, 42.

TRANS-OCEANIG WATERWAY, discussed, 217; interest of Napoleon III, 218; to be built
by De Lesseps Company, 220; and the Monroe Doctrine, 219, 220.

TRENT AFFAIR, 152.

TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 268.

TRIPLE ENTENTE, 268.

Tucker, ALLEN, 275.

TuTTLe, HErsert, 247.

TuRKEY, intrigues of the Powers, 298.

Turner, E. R., on war causes, 272.

TuRREAU, French Minister in the United States, 11.

TYLER, PresIDENT, 110.

Urucuay, Revolution in, 114-118; European countries involved, 114; American
opinion, 115; protest by United States chargé at Buenos Ayres, 116; discussed in
Congress, 116; press comment, 117-118.

Van Buren, Presipent, 110; favors French Revolution of 1848, 120.

VANDERLIP, FRANK, on anti-clerical legislation in France, 261; on French after-war
psychology, 294.

VAN Dyke, Henry, “The Name of France,” 275; and Franco-American friendship,
311.

Van NorMaNn, Louis E., on war responsibility of France, 271.

VENEZUELA, quarrel with France, 217.

VERSAILLES TREATY, 283, 295.

Vives, GENERAL, Spanish commissioner to the United States, and the Florida Pur-
chase, 58-60.

Vivian, 277.

WALLER, JoHN L., imprisoned in Madagascar, 217.

War GUILT OF EuROPEAN Powers, 270-275, 288-289, 298-299.

War oF 1812, 1-28; British and French infractions of neutrality, 1; bitterness toward
both, 2-6; reasons for declaration of war against England and not France, 2-4;
popular demonstrations against France, 5, 6; sermons on the war, 9, 10; Peace
Commissioners, 28.

WaASHBURNE, ELiHu B., United States Minister in France, 174, 175; and the Third
Republic, 184, 185; in Paris during the Commune, 208.

345

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Wayne, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, 103.

WessTeER, DANIEL, resolution concerning the Milan and Berlin Decrees, 16; debate
on Ways and Means Committee, 17; stresses importance of Cuba to the United
States, 76; condemns French intervention in Spain, 79; on French spoliations, 102;
called pro-French, 110; on Revolution of 1848 in France, 121; cool toward Louis
Napoleon as Emperor, 130; on Lopez incident, 136; on Hawaii, 144.

WEED, THURLOW, to Seward, on the Mexican question, 152; to Albany Journal, 162.

WELLES, GiDEON, 154.

WELLINGTON, Duke of, 36.

WENDELL, BARRETT, on education in France, 237; on religion in France, 259.

Wuarton, Epitu, and American Hostels for French Refugees and Children, 276.

Wuics, anti-expansionist, 139; Seward wing, 139.

Wuite, Anprew D., 237.

WHITTIER, JoHN GREENLEAF, “Ihe Peace of Europe,” 132.

WuitLock, BRAND, on Belgium, 270; pro-ally sentiment, 278.

Wi aM I, 182, 187, 188, 189, 190, 195.

WILSON, PRESIDENT, 272, 280; and Versailles Treaty, 283; and League of Nations,
283; and guaranty treaty for France, 283-284; and Ruhr occupation, 286; idealism,
287; at Peace Conference, 287, 288.

Wirt, WILLIAM, 24.

YoRKTOWN, BATTLE oF, centenary celebrated, 226.

346A NOTE ION THE TYPE IN
WHIGH THIS BOOK IS SEd

This book is set (on the Linotype) in Elzevir No. 3,
a French Old Style. For the modern revival of this
excellent face we are indebted to Gustave Mayeur of
Paris, who reproduced it in 1878, basing his designs,
he says, on types used in a book which was printed
by the Elzevirs at Leyden in 1634. The Elzevir fam-
ily held a distinguished position as printers and pub-
lishers for more than a century, their best work ap-
pearing between about 1590 and 1680. Although the
Elzevirs were not themselves type founders, they uti-
lized the services of the best type designers of their
time, notably Van Dijk, Garamond, and Sanlecque.
Many of their books were small, or, as we should say
now, “pocket” editions, of the classics, and for these
volumes they developed a type face which is open
and readable but relatively narrow in body, al-
though in no sense condensed, thus permitting a
large amount of copy to be set in limited space with-
out impairing legibility.

 

SET UP AND PRINTED BY THE VAIL-
BALLOU PRESS, INC., BINGHAMTON,
N. Y.* PAPER FURNISHED BY W.
F. ETHERINGTON & CO., NEW
YORK.* BOUND BY H. WOLFF
ESTATE, NEW YORK.

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