i_ sy of Vigra ia Library i mi il iii,TSE SO SAINT RATING TIS Res~ ae eee ee LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA GIFT OF VIRGINIA EDUCATION ASSOCIATIONTHE LIFE AND LETTERS OF WALTER H. PAGE (School Edition)From a painting by P. A. LASZLOThe Life and Letters ot Walter H. Page By Burton J’ Hendrick Adapted for school use by Rollo [2 Lyman Professor in the Teaching of English University of Chicago Garden City New York Doubleday, Page & Company [925COPYRIGHT, 1921-1922 Duy bi , DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY; N: ¥.CHAPTER I. is ITI. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. », Ae XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. CONTENTS A Reconstruction Boyhood Journalism Services to the South The Wilsonian Era Begins England Before the War America [ries to Prevent the European War England Under the Stress of War ‘Waging Neutrality” Germany’s First Peace Drives The “Lusitania’”—and After . Dark Days for the Allies A Perplexed Ambassador Peace Without Victory The United States at War Page—The Man A Crisis on the Western Front Last Days 5. tee (ade pe 9! 116 134 161 WwW i) © CO WwW ~] WwW Nm waTHE LIFE AND LETTERS OF WALTER H. PAGE (School Edition)DAE LIE: -ANDe baat ERs OF WAL PER? he Ge (School Edition) CHARGER i A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD HE earliest recollections of any man have great biographical interest, and this is especially the case with Walter Page, for not the least dramatic as- pect of his life was that it spanned the two greatest wars in history. His last weeks in England Page spent at Sandwich, on the coast of Kent; every day and every night he could hear the pounding of the great guns in France, as the Germans were making their last desperate attempt to reach Paris or the Channel ports. His memories of his childhood days in America were similarly the sights and sounds of war. Page was a North Carolina boy; he has him- self recorded the impression that the Civil War left upon his mind. “One day,” he writes, “when the cotton fields were white and the elm leaves were falling, in the soft au- tumn of the Southern climate wherein the sky is fath- omlessly clear, the locomotive’s whistle blew a much longer time than usual as the train approached Mill- worth. It did not stop at so small a station except when there was somebody to get off or to get on, and so long a blast meant that someone was coming. Sam and I ran down the avenue of elms to see who it was. Ia 2 A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD Sam was my Negro companion, philosopher, and friend. I was ten years old and Sam said that he was fourteen. There was constant talk about the war. Many men of the neighborhood had gone away some- where—that was certain; but Sam and I had a theory that the war was only a story. We had been fooled about old granny Thomas’s bringing the baby and long ago we had been fooled also about Santa Claus. The war might be another such invention, and we some- times suspected that it was. But we found out the truth that day, and for this reason it is among my clearest early recollections. “For, when the train stopped, they put off a big box and gently laid it in the shade of the fence. ‘The only man at the station was the man who had come to change the mail bags; and he said that this was Billy Morris’s coffin and that he had been killed in a battle. He asked us to stay with it till he could send word to Mr. Morris, who lived two miles away. The man came back presently and leaned against the fence till old Mr. Morris arrived, an hour or more later. ‘The lint of cotton was on his wagon, for he was hauling his crop to the gin when the sad news reached him; and he came in his shirt sleeves, his wife on the wagon seat with him. ‘All the neighborhood gathered at the church, a funeral was preached and there was a long prayer for our success against the invaders, and Billy Morris was buried. I remember that I wept the more because it now seemed to me that my doubt about the war had somehow done Billy Morris an injustice. Old Mrs. Gregory wept more loudly than anybody else; and she kept saying, while the service was going on, ‘It'll be my John next.’ Ina little while, sure enough, John Gregory’s coffin was put off the train, as Billy Morris’sA RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD 3 had been, and I regarded her as a woman gifted with prophecy. Other coftins, too, were put off from time to time. About the war there could no longer be a doubt. And, a little later, its realities and horrors came nearer home to us, with swift, deep experiences. “One day my father took me to the camp and pa- rade ground ten miles away, near the capital. The General and the Governor sat on horses and the sol- diers marched by them and the band played. They were going to the front. There surely must be a war at the front, I told Sam that night. Still more cof- fins were brought home, too, as the months and the years passed; and the women of the neighborhood used to come and spend whole days with my mother, sew- ing for the soldiers. So precious became woolen cloth that every rag was saved and the threads were unraveled to be spun and woven into new fabrics. And they baked bread and roasted chickens and sheep and pigs and made cakes, all to go to the soldiers at the front.” ? The quality that is uppermost in the Page stock, both in the past and in the present generation, is that of the builder and the pioneer. The ancestor of the North Carolina Pages was a Lewis Page, who, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, left the original American home in Virginia, and started life anew in what was then regarded as the less civilized country to the south. It may safely be assumed that the im- pelling motive was that love of seeking out new things, of constructing a new home in the wilderness, which has never forsaken his descendants. His son, An- derson Page, manifesting this same love of change, 1From “The Southerner,” Chapter I. The first chapter in this novel is practically autobiographical, though fictitious names have been used.—————— 4 A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD went farther south into Wake County, and acquired a plantation of a thousand acres about twelve miles north of Raleigh. He cultivated this estate with slaves, sending his abundant crops of cotton and to- bacco to Petersburg, Virginia, a trafic that made him sufficiently prosperous to give several of his sons a college education. The son who is chiefly interesting at the present time, Allison Francis Page, the father of the future Ambassador, did not enjoy this opportunity. ‘This fact in itself gives an insight into his character. While his brothers were grappling with Latin and Greek and theology, we catch glimpses of the older brother bat- tling with the logs in the Cape Fear River, or pene- trating the virgin pine forest, felling trees and con- verting its raw material to the uses of a growing cly- ilization. Like many of the Page breed, this Page was a giant in size and in strength, as sound morally and physically as the mighty forests in which a con- siderable part of his life was spent, brave, determined, aggressive, domineering almost to the point of intol- erance, deeply religious and abstemious—a mixture of the frontiersman and the Old Testament prophet. Though he was not especially versed in the learning of the schools, Walter Page’s father had a mind that was keen and far-reaching. He was a pioneer in pol- itics as he was in the practical concerns of life. Though he was the son of slave-holding progenitors and even owned slaves himself, he was not a believer in slavery. The country that he primarily loved was not Moore County or North Carolina, but the United States of America. In politics he was a Whig, which meant that, in the years preceding the Civil War, he was opposed to the extension of slavery and did not regard the election of Abraham Lincoln as a sufficientA RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD 5 provocation for the secession of the Southern States. If we are seeking an ancestral explanation for that moral ruggedness, that quick perception of the differ- ence between right and wrong, that unobscured vision into men and events, and that deep devotion to Amer- ica and to democracy which formed the fiber of Wal- ter Page’s being, we evidently need look no further than his father. But the son had qualities which the older man did not possess—an enthusiasm for litera- ture and learning, a love of the beautiful in Nature and in art, above all a gentleness of temperament and of manner. ‘These qualities he held in common with his mother. On his father’s side Page was undiluted English; on his mother’s he was French and English. Her father was John Samuel Raboteau, the descend- ant of Huguenot refugees who had fled from France on the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes; her mother was Esther Barclay, a member of a family which gave the name of Barclaysville to a small town halfway between Raleigh and Fayetteville, North Carolina. It is a member of this tribe to whom Page once re- ferred as the ‘‘vigorous Barclay who held her recep- tions to notable men in her bedroom during the years of her bedridden condition.’”’ She was the proprietor of the “Half Way House,” a tavern located between Fayetteville and Raleigh; and in her old age she kept royal state, in the fashion which Page describes, for such as were socially entitled to this consideration. The most vivid impression which her present-day de- scendants retain is that of her fervent devotion to the Southern cause. She carried the spirit of secession to such an extreme that she had the gate to her yard painted to give a complete presentment of the Confed- erate Flag. The granddaughter of this determined and rebellious6 A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD lady, Walter Page’s mother, had also her positive quality, but in a somewhat more subdued form. She did not die until 1897, and so the recollection of her is fresh and vivid. As a mature woman she was un- demonstrative and soft spoken; a Methodist of old- fashioned Wesleyan type, she dressed with a Quaker- like simplicity, her brown hair brushed flatly down upon a finely shaped head and her garments destitute of ruffles or ornamentation. The home which she directed was a home without playing cards or dancing or smoking or wine-bibbing or other worldly frivoli- ties, yet the memories of her presence which Catherine Page has left are not at all austere. Duty was with her the prime consideration of life, and fundamental morals the first conceptions which she instilled in her children’s growing minds, yet she had a quiet sense of humor and a real love of fun. She had also strong likes and dislikes, and was not especially hospitable to men and women who fell un- der her disapproval. A small North Carolina town, in the years preceding and following the Civil War, was not a fruitful soil for cultivating an interest in things intellectual, yet those who remember Walter Page’s mother remember her always with a book in her hand. She would read at her knitting and at her miscellaneous household duties, which were rather arduous in the straitened days that followed the war, and the books she read were always substantial ones. Perhaps because her son Walter was in delicate health, perhaps because his early tastes and temperament were not unlike her own, perhaps because he was her oldest surviving child, the fact remains that, of a family of eight, he was generally regarded as the child with whom she was especially sympathetic. The picture of mother and son in those early daysA RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD a is an altogether charming one. Page’s mother was only twenty-four when he was born; she retained her youth for many years after that event, and during his early childhood, in appearance and manner, she was little more than a girl. When Walter was a small boy, he and his mother used to take long walks in the woods, sometimes spending the entire day, fishing along the ‘brooks, hunting wild flowers, now and then pausing while the mother read pages of Dickens or of Scott. These experiences Page never forgot. Nearly all his letters to his mother—to whom, even in his busiest days in New York, he wrote constantly —have been accidentally destroyed, but a few scraps indicate the close spiritual bond that existed between the two. Always he seemed to think of his mother as young. Through his entire life, in whatever part of the world he might be, and however important was the work in which he might be engaged, Page never failed to write her a long and affectionate letter at Christmas. “Well, I’ve gossiped a night or two’’—such is the conclusion of his Christmas letter of 1893, when Page was thirty-eight, with a growing family of his own— “till Pve filled the paper—all such little news and less nonsense as most gossip and most letters are made of. But it is for you to read between the lines. That’s where the love lies, dear Mother. I wish you were here Christmas; we should welcome you as no- body else in the world can be welcomed. But wher- ever you are and though all the rest have the joy of seeing you, which is denied to me, never a Christmas comes but I feel as near you as I did years and years ago when we were young. (In those years big fish bit in old Wiley Bancom’s pond by the railroad: they must have been two inches long!)—I would give a8 A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD year's growth to have the pleasure of having you heres,ere ‘‘God bless you. ‘““WALTER.” Such were the father and mother of Walter Hines Page; they were married at Fayetteville, North Caro- lina, July 5, 1849; two children who preceded Walter died in infancy. The latter was born at Cary, Au- gust 15, 1855. Page’s home was almost the last stopping place of Sherman’s army on its march through Georgia and the Carolinas, and the Confederacy came to an end, with Johnston’s surrender of the last Confederate Army, at Durham, only fifteen miles from his native village. Walter, a boy of ten, his brother Robert, aged six, and the Negro ‘“‘companion” Tance, stood at the second-story window and watched Sherman’s sol- diers pass their house, in hot pursuit of General ‘oak Wheeler’s cavalry. The thing that most astonished the children was the vast size of the army, which took all day to file by their home. They had never real- ized that either of the fighting forces could embrace such great numbers of men. One day a kindly Northern soldier, sympathizing with the boy because of the small rations left for the local population, invited him to join the officers’ mess at dinner. Walter drew proudly back. “I'll starve before I'll eat with the Yankees,” he said. “IT slept that night on a trundle bed by my mother’s,” Page wrote years afterward, describing these early scenes, “for her room was the only room left for the family, and we had all lived there since the day before. The dining room and the kitchen were now superflu-A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD 9 ous, because there was nothing more to cook or to eat. .. . A week or more after the army corps had gone, I drove with my father to the capital one day, and almost every mile of the journey we saw a blue coat or a gray coat lying by the road, with bones or hair protruding—the unburied and the forgotten of either army. Thus I had come to know what war was, and death by violence was among the first deep impressions made on my mind. My emotions must have been violently dealt with and my sensibili- ties blunted—or sharpened? Who shall say? The wounded and the starved straggled home from hos- pitals and from prisons. There was old Mr. Sanford, the shoemaker, come back again, with a body so thin and a step so uncertain that I expected to see him fall to pieces. Mr. Larkin and Joe Tatum went on crutches; and I saw a man at the post office one day whose cheek and ear had been torn away by a shell. . ‘But there was the cheerful gentleness of my mother to draw my thoughts to different things. I can even now recall many special little plans that she made to keep my mind from battles. She hid the military cap that I had worn. She bought from me my military buttons and put them away. She would call me in and tell me pleasant stories of her own childhood. She would put down her work to make puzzles with me, and she read gentle books to me and kept away from me all the stories of the war and of death that she could. Whatever hardships befell her (and they must have been many) she kept a tender manner of resignation and of cheerful patience. ‘After a while the neighborhood came to life again. There were more widows, more sonless mothers, more empty sleeves and wooden legs than anybody there10 A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD had ever seen before. But the mimosa bloomed, the cotton was planted again, and the peach trees blos- somed: and the barnyard and the stable again became full of life. For, when the army marched away, they, too, were as silent as an old battlefield. The last hen had been caught under the corn crib by a ‘Yankee’ sol- dier, who had torn his coat in this brave raid... . “Every year the cotton bloomed and ripened and opened white to the sun; for the ripening of the cot- ton and the running of the river and the turning of the mills make the thread not of my story only but of the story of our Southern land—of its institutions, of its misfortunes and of its place in the economy of the world; and they will make the main threads of its story, I am sure, so long as the sun shines on our white fields and the rivers run—a story that is now rushing swiftly into a happier narrative of a broader day. The same women who had guided the spindles ‘n war-time were again at their tasks—they at least were left; but the machinery was now old and worked ill. Negro men, who had wandered a while looking for an invisible ‘freedom,’ came back and went to work on the farm from force of habit. They now received wages and bought their own food. That was the only apparent difference that freedom had brought them.” It was a tragic world into which this boy Page had been born. He was ten years old when the Civil War came to an end, and his early life was therefore cast in a desolate country. Like all of his neighbors, Frank Page had been ruined by the war. Both the Southern and Northern armies had passed over the Page territory; compared with the military depreda- tions with which Page became familiar in the last years of his life, the Federal troops did not particu-A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD II larly misbehave, the attacks on hen roosts and the destruction of feather beds representing the extreme of their ‘‘atrocities’’; but no country can entertain two great fighting forces without feeling the effects for a prolonged period. Life in this part of North Carolina again became reduced to its fundamentals. The old homesteads and the Negro huts were still left standing, their interiors for the most part unharmed, but nearly everything else had disappeared. Horses, cattle, hogs, livestock of all kinds had vanished before the advancing hosts of hungry soldiers; and there was one thing which was even more a rarity than these. That was money. Confederate veterans went around in their faded gray uniforms, not only because they loved them, but because they did not have the where- withal to buy new wardrobes. Judges, planters, and other dignified members of the community became hack drivers from the necessity of picking up a few small coins. Page’s father was more fortunate than the rest, for he had one asset with which to accumulate a little liquid capital: he possessed a fine peach orchard, which was particularly productive in the summer of 186s, and the Northern soldiers, who drew their pay in money that had real value, developed a weakness for the fruit. Walter Page, a boy of ten, used to take his peaches to Raleigh and sell them to the “invader”: although he still disdained having companionable re- lations with the enemy, he was not above meeting them on a business footing; and the greenbacks and silver coin obtained in this way laid a new basis for the family fortunes. “Wat” Page—he is still known by this name in his old home—was a tall, rangy, curly-headed boy, with brown hair and brown eyes, fond of fishing and hunt-12 A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD ing, not especially robust, but conspicuously alert and vital. Such of his old playmates as survive recall chiefly his keenness of observation, his contagious laughter, his devotion to reading and to talk. He was also given to taking long walks in the woods, frequently with the solitary companionship of a book. Indeed, his extremely efficient family regarded him as a dreamer and were not entirely clear as to what purpose he was destined to serve in a community which, above all, demanded practical men. Such elementary schools as North Carolina possessed had vanished in the war; the prevailing custom was for the better-conditioned families to join forces and en- gage a teacher for their assembled children. In such a primary school in Cary Page learned the elementary branches, though his mother herself taught him to read and write. The boy showed such aptitude in his studies that his mother began to hope, though in no aggressive fashion, that he might some day become a Methodist clergyman; she had given him his middle name,‘‘Hines,” in honor of her favorite preacher—a kinsman. At the age of twelve Page was transferred to the Bingham School, then located at Mebane. This was the Eton of North Carolina, from a social and an educational standpoint. It was a military school; the boys all dressed in gray uniforms built on the plan of the Confederate army; the hero constantly paraded before their imaginations was Robert E. Lee; discipline was rigidly military; more important, a high standard of honor was insisted upon. There was one thing a boy could not do at Bingham and remain in the school; that was to cheat in class- rooms or at examinations. For this offense no second chance was given. ‘“‘I cannot argue the subject,” Page quotes Colonel Bingham saying to the distracted parentA RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD 13 whose son had been dismissed on this charge, and who was begging for his reinstatement. ‘In fact, I have no power to reinstate your boy. I could not keep the honor of the school—I could not even keep the boys if he were to return. hey would appeal to their parents and most of them would be called home. They are the flower of the South, sir!” And the social standards that controlled the thinking of the South for so many years after the war were strongly entrenched. “The son of a Confederate general,’ Page writes, ‘if he were at all a decent fellow, had, of course, a higher social rank at the Bingham School than the son of a colonel. There was some difficulty in deciding the exact rank of a judge or a governor, as a father; but the son of a preacher had a fair chance of a good social rating, especially of an Episcopalian clergyman. A Presbyterian preacher came next in rank. I at first was at a social disadvantage. My father had been a Methodist—that was bad enough; but he had had no military title at all. If it had become known among the boys that he had been a ‘Union man’—I used to shudder at the suspicion in which I should be held. And the fact that my father had held no military title did at last become known!” At Bingham Page gained his first knowledge of Greek, Latin, and mathematics, and he was an out- standing student in all three subjects. He had no particular liking for mathematics, but he could never understand why anyone should find this branch of learning difficult; he mastered it with the utmost ease and always stood high. In two or three years he had absorbed everything that Bingham could offer and was ready for the next step. Page spent something more than a year at Trinity14 A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD College, entering in the autumn of 1871, and leaving in December, 1872. A few letters, written from this place, are scarcely complimentary. They show that the young man was very unhappy. One long letter to his mother is nothing but a boyish diatribe against the place. “I do not care a horse apple for Trinity’s dis- tinction,” he writes, and then he gives the reason for this juvenile contempt. His first report, he says, will soon reach home; he warns his mother that it will be unfavorable, and he explains that this bad showing is the result of a deliberate plot. The boys who obtain high marks, Page declares, secure them usually by cheating or through the partisanship of the professors; a high grade therefore really means that the recipient is either a humbug or a bootlicker. Page had there- fore attempted to keep his reputation unsullied by aiming at a low academical record! ‘The report on that three months’ work, which still survives, discloses that Page’s conspiracy against himself did not succeed, for his marks are all high. ‘‘Be sure to send him back” is the annotation on this document, indicating that Page had made a better impression on Trinity than Trinity had made on Page. But the rebellious young man did not return. After Christmas, 1872, his schoolboy letters reveal him at Randolph-Macon College in Ashland, Va. Here the atmosphere was of a somewhat more genial type. ‘It was at Ashland that I first began to unfold,” said Page afterward. ‘‘Dear old Ashland!” Dr. Duncan, the President, was a clergyman whose pulpit oratory is still a tradition in the South, but, in addition to his religious exaltation, he was an exceedingly lovable, companionable, and stimulating human being. In many ways young Page was the life of the under-A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD Is graduate body. A passing desire for an immediate theological campaign was merely that passion for doing things and for self-expression which were always con- spicuous traits. His intense ambition as a boy is still remembered in this sleepy little village. He read every book in the sparse college library; he talked to his college mates and his professors on every im- aginable subject; he led his associates in the miniature parliament —the Franklin Debating Society—to which he belonged; he wrote prose and verse at an astonishing rate; he explored the country for miles around, making frequent pilgrimages to the birthplace of Henry Clay, which is the chief historical glory of Ashland, and to that Hanover Court House which was the scene of the oratorical triumph of Patrick Henry; he flirted with the pretty girls in the village, and even had two half-serious love affairs in rapid succession; he slept upon a hard mattress at night and imbibed more than the usual allotment of Greek, Latin, and mathematics in the daytime. One year he captured the Greek prize and the next the Sutherlin medal for oratory. With a fellow class- icist he entered into a solemn compact to hold all their conversation, even on the most trivial tropics, in Latin, with heavy penalties for careless lapses into English. ‘The experiment at least had a certain in- fluence in improving the young man’s Latinity. An- other favorite dissipation was that of translating English masterpieces into the ancient tongue; there still survives among Page’s early papers a copy of Bryant’s ‘Waterfowl’ done into Latin iambics. As to Page’s personal appearance, a designation coined by a fellow student who afterward became a famous editor gives the suggestion of a portrait. He called him one of16 A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD the “seven slabs” of the college. And, as always, the adjectives which his contemporaries chiefly use in de. scribing Page are “alert’’ and “‘positive.” But Randolph-Macon did one great thing for Page. Like many small struggling Southern colleges it man- aged to assemble several instructors of real mental dis- tinction. And at the time of Page’s undergraduate life it possessed at least one great teacher. This was Thomas R. Price, afterward Professor of Greek at the University of Virginia and Professor of English at Columbia University in New York. Professor Price took one forward step that has given him a permanent fame in the history of Southern education. He found that the greatest stumbling block to teaching Greek was the fact that his hopeful charges were not sufficiently familiar with their mother tongue. The prayer that was always on Price’s lips, and the one with which he made his boys most familiar, was that of a wise old Greek: ‘“(O Great Apollo, send down the re- viving rain upon our fields; preserve our flocks; ward off our enemies; and—build up our speech!” “It 1s irrational,” he said, ‘‘absurd, almost criminal, to ex- pect a young man, whose knowledge of English words and construction is scant and inexact, to put into Eng- lish a difficult thought of Plato or an involved period of Cicero.” To-day every great American educational institution has vast resources for teaching English literature; even in 1876, most American universities had their professors of English; but Price insisted on placing English on exactly the. same footing as Greek and Latin. He himself became head of the new English school at Randolph-Macon; and Page himself at once became the favorite pupil. This distinguished scholar—a fine figure with an imperial beard thatA RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD 17 suggested the Confederate officer—used to have Page to tea at least twice a week and at these meetings the young man was first introduced in an understanding way to Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth, Tennyson, and the other writers who became the literary passions of his maturer life. And Price did even more for Page; he passed him on to another place and to another teacher who ex- tended his horizon. Up to the autumn of 1876 Page had never gone farther North than Ashland; he was still a Southern boy, speaking with the Southern drawl, living exclusively the thoughts and even the prejudices of the South. His family’s broad-minded attitude had prevented him from acquiring a too restricted view of certain problems that were then vexing both sections of the country; however, his outlook was still a limited one, as his youthful correspondence shows. But in October of the centennial year a great prospect opened before him. Two or three years previously an eccentric merchant named Johns Hopkins had died, leaving the larger part of his fortune to found a college or university in Baltimore to which only those American boys who had displayed exceptional promise should be admitted. Part of the university funds should be used to pay the expenses of twenty young men who, in undergraduate work at other colleges, stood head and shoulders above their contemporaries. The bringing together of selected teachers and selected students, two sets of brains for graduate study, would constitute the new university. A few rooms in the nearest dwelling house would suffice for headquarters. Dr. Gilman's scheme was approved; he became President on these terms; he gathered his faculty not only in the United18 A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD States but in England, and he collected his first body of students, especially his first twenty fellows, with the same minute care. It seems almost a miracle that an inexperienced youth in a little Methodist college in Virginia should have been chosen as one of these first twenty fellows, and it is a sufficient tribute to the impression that Page must have made upon all who met him that he should have won this great academic distinction. He was only twenty-one at the time—the youngest of a group nearly every member of which became distinguished in after life. He won a Fellowship in Greek. This in itself was a great good fortune; even greater was the fact that his new life brought him into immediate contact with Professor Gildersleeve, a scholar of great genius and lovableness. The atmosphere of Johns Hopkins was quite dif- ferent from anything which the young man had previ- ously known. ‘Gentlemen, you must light your own torch,’ was the admonition of President Gilman, in his welcoming address to his twenty fellows; intel- lectual independence, freedom from the trammels of tradition, were thus to be the directing ideas. One of Page’s associates was Josiah Royce, who afterward had a distinguished career in philosophy at Harvard. “The beginnings of Johns Hopkins,” he afterward wrote, “‘was a dawn wherein it was bliss to be alive. The air was full of noteworthy work done by the older men of the place and of hopes that one might find a way to get a little working power one’s self. One longed to be a doer of the word, not a hearer only, a -creator of his own infinitesimal fraction of the prod- uct, bound in God’s name to produce when the time came.” A choice group of five aspiring Grecians, of whomA RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD 19 Page was one, periodically gathered around a long pine table in a second-story room of an old dwelling house on Howard Street, with Professor Gildersleeve at the head. The process of teaching was thus the in- timate contact of mind with mind. Here in the course of nearly two years’ residence, Page was led by Pro- fessor Gildersleeve into the closest communion with the great minds of the ancient world and gained that intimate knowledge of their written word which was the basis of his mental equipment. But the truth is that the world was tugging at Page more insistently than the cloister. ‘Speaking gram- matically,” writes E. G. Sihler, one of Page’s fellow students of that time, “Page was interested in that one of the main tenses which we call the Present.”’ In his after life, amid all the excitements of journal- ism, Page could take a brief vacation and spend it with Ulysses by the sea; but actuality and human activ- ity charmed him even more than did the heroes of the ancient world. He went somewhat into Baltimore society, but not extensively; he joined a club whose membership comprised the leading intellectual men of the town; probably his most congenial associations, however, came of the Saturday night meetings of the fellows in Hopkins Hall, where they passed in review all the questions of the day. Page was still the Southern boy, with the strange notions about the North and Northern people which were the inheritance of many years’ misunderstand- ings. He writes of one fellow student to whom he had taken a liking. ‘He is that rare thing,” he says, “fa Yankee Christian gentleman.” He particularly dislikes one of his instructors, but, as he explains, “‘he is a native of Connecticut, and Connecticut, I suppose, is capable of producing any unholy human phenom-20 A RECONSTRUCTION BOYHOOD enon.” Speaking of a beautiful and well-mannered Greek girl whom he had met, he writes: “The little creature might be taken for a Southern girl, but never for a Yankee. She has an easy manner and even an air of gentility about her that doesn’t appear north of Mason and Dixon’s Line. Indeed, however much the Southern race (I say race intentionally) however much the Southern race owes its strength to Anglo-Saxon blood, it owes its beauty and gracefulness to the South- ern climate and culture.’ This sort of thing 1s especially entertaining in the youthful Page, for it is precisely against this kind of complacency that, as a mature man, he directed his choicest ridicule. As an editor and writer his energies were devoted to recon- ciling North and South, and Johns Hopkins itself had much to do with opening his eyes. Its young men and its professors were gathered from all parts of the coun- try; a student, if his mind was awake, learned more than Greek and mathematics; he learned much about that far-flung nation known as the United States.CHAE TER. jl JOURNALISM HE five years from 1878 to 1883 Page spent in ak various places, engaged, for the larger part of the time, in several kinds of journalistic work. It was his period of struggle and of preparation. In the au- tumn of 1878 he went to Louisville, Kentucky, and presently found an occupation in this progressive city which proved absorbing. A few months before his arrival certain energetic spirits had founded a weekly paper, the 4ge, a journal which, they hoped, would fil the place in the Southern States which the very suc- cessful New York Nation, under the editorship of Godkin, was then occupying in the North. Page at once began contributing leading articles on literary and political topics to this publication; the work proved so congenial that he purchased—on notes—a controlling interest in the new venture and became its directing spirit. The Age was in every way a worthy enterprise; in the dignity of its makeup and the high literary standards at which it aimed it imitated the London Spectator. Perhaps Page obtained a thousand dol- lars’ worth of fun out of his investment; if so, that represented his entire profit. He now learned a lesson which was emphasized in his after career as editor and publisher, and that was that the Southern States provided a poor market for books or periodicals. The net result of the proceeding was that, at the age 2I22 JOURNALISM of twenty-three, he found himself out of a job and considerably in debt. He has himself rapidly sketched his varied activities of the next five years: ‘After trying in vain,”’ he writes, “to get work to do on any newspaper in North Carolina, I advertised for a job in journalism—any sort of a job. By a queer accident—a fortunate one for me—the owner of the St. Joseph, Missouri, Gazette, answered the advertise- ment. Why he did it, I never found out. He was in the same sort of desperate need of a newspaper man as I was in desperate need of a job. I knew nothing about him: he knew nothing about me. I knew noth- ing about newspaper work. I borrowed $50 and set out to St. Joe, Missouri, where I didn’t know a human being. I became a reporter. ‘At first I reported the price of cattle—went to the stockyards, etc. My salary came near to paying my board and lodging, but it didn’t quite do it. But I had a good time in St. Joe for somewhat more than ayear. There were interesting people there. I came to know something about Western life. Kansas was across the river. I often went there. I came to know Kansas City, St. Louis—a good deal of the West. After a while I was made editor of the paper. What a rousing political campaign or two we had! Then—lI had done that kind of a job as long as I cared | it fs ‘ok 106 AMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WAR From Edward M. House Paris, June 3, 1914. DEAR PAGE: I had a satisfactory talk with the Kaiser on Mon- day. I have now seen everyone worthwhile in Ger- many except the Chancellor. I am ready now for London. Perhaps you had better prepare the way. The Kaiser knows I am to see them, and I have ar- ranged to keep him in touch with results—if there are any. We must work quickly after I arrive, for it may be advisable for me to return to Germany, and I am counting on sailing for home July 15th or 28th. . . . I am eager to see you and tell you what I know. Yours, E. M. H. The political situation in Great Britain was greatly confused. ‘The country was in a state approaching civil war on the question of Home Rule for Ireland; the suffragettes were threatening to dynamite the Houses of Parliament; and the eternal struggle be- tween the Liberal and the Conservative elements was raging with unprecedented virulence. A European war was far from everybody’s mind. It was this utter inability to grasp the realities of the European situation which proved the main impediment to Colo- nel House’s work in England. He met all the impor- tant people—Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Edward Grey, and others. With them he discussed his ‘‘pact”’ proposal in great detail. Though the Brit- ish statesmen did not say so definitely, the impression was conveyed that the mission on which ColonelAMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WAR _ 107 House was engaged was an unnecessary one—a prep- aration against a danger that did not exist. The fact that the British statesmen entertained so little apprehension of a German attack may possibly be a reflection on their judgment; yet Colonel House’s visit has great historical value, for the experience afterward convinced him that Great Britain had had no part in bringing on the European war, and that Germany was solely responsible. It certainly should have put the Wilson Administration right on this all- important point, when the great storm broke. The most vivid recollection which the British states- men whom Colonel House met retain of his visit, was his consternation at the spirit that had confronted him everywhere in Germany. The four men most in- terested—Sir Edward Grey, Sir William Tyrrell, Mr. Page, and Colonel House—met at luncheon in the American Embassy a few days after President Wil- son’s emissary had returned from Berlin. Colonel House could talk of little except the preparations for war which were manifest on every hand. “T feel as though I had been living near a mighty electric dynamo,” Colonel House told his friends. “The whole of Germany is charged with electricity. Everybody’s nerves are tense. It needs only a spark to set the whole thing off.” The “spark”? came two weeks afterward with the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand. “Tt is all a bad business,’’ Colonel House wrote to Page when war broke out, “and just think how near we came to making such a catastrophe impossible! If England had moved a little faster and had let me go back to Germany, the thing, perhaps, could have been done.”108 AMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WAR To which Page at once replied: “No, no, no—no power on earth could have pre- vented it. The German militarism, which is the crime of the last fifty years, has been working for this for twenty-five years. It is the logical result of their spirit and enterprise and doctrine. It had to come. But, of course, they chose the wrong time and the wrong issue. Militarism has no judgment. Don’t let your conscience be worried. You did all that any mortal man could do. But nobody could have done anything effective. “We've got to see to it that this system doesn't grow up again. ‘That’s all.” In the latter part of July the Pages took a small house at Ockham, in Surrey, and here they spent the fateful week that preceded the outbreak of war. ‘The Ambassador’s emotions on this event are reflected in a memorandum written on Sunday, August 2nd—a day that was full of negotiations, ultimatums, and other precursors of the approaching struggle. Bachelor’s Farm, Ockham, Surrey. Sunday, August 2, 1914. The Grand Smash is come. Last night the Ger- man Ambassador at St. Petersburg handed the Rus- sian Government a declaration of war. ‘To-day the German Government asked the United States to take its diplomatic and consular business in Russia in hand. Herrick, our Ambassador in Paris, has already taken the German interests there. It is reported in London to-day that the Germans have invaded Luxemburg and France. Troops were marching through London at oneAMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WAR 10g o’clock this morning. Colonel Squier + came out to luncheon. He sees no way for England to keep out of it. There is no way. If she keep out, Germany will take Belgium and Holland, France would be be- trayed, and England would be accused of forsaking her friends. People came to the Embassy all day to-day (Sun- day), to learn how they can get to the United States— a rather hard question to answer. I thought several times of going in, but Greene and Squier said there was no need of it. People merely hoped we might tell them what we can’t tell them. Returned travelers from Paris report indescribable confusion—people unable to obtain beds and fighting for seats in railway carriages. It’s been a hard day here. I have a lot (not a big lot either) of routine work on my desk which I meant to do. But it has been impossible to get my mind off this Great Smash. It holds one in spite of oneself. I revolve it and revolve it—of course getting nowhere. The United States is the only great Power wholly out of it. The United States, most likely, therefore, will be able to play a helpful and historic part at its end. It will give President Wilson, no doubt, a great opportunity. It will probably help us politically and it will surely help us economically. The possible consequences stagger the imagination. Germany has staked everything on her ability to win primacy. England and France (to say nothing of Russia) really ought to give her a drubbing. If they 1 At this time American military attaché.ctrl Il10 AMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WAR do not, this side of the world will henceforth be Ger- man. If they do flog Germany, Germany will for a long time be in discredit. I walked out in the night a while ago. The stars are bright, the night is silent, the country quiet—as quiet as peace itself. Millions of men are in camp and on warships. Will they have to fight and many of them die—to untangle this network of treaties and alliances and to blow off huge debts with gunpowder so that the world may start again? A hurried picture of the events of the next seven days is given in the following letter to the President: To the President London, Sunday, August 9, 1914. DEAR Mr. PRESIDENT: God save us! What a week it has been! Last Sunday I was down here at the cottage I have taken for the summer—an hour out of London—uneasy because of the apparent danger and of what Sir Ed- ward Grey had told me. During the day people be- gan to go to the Embassy, but not in great numbers— merely to ask what they should do in case of war. The Secretary whom I had left in charge on Sunday telephoned me every few hours and laughingly told funny experiences with nervous women who came in and asked absurd questions. Of course, we all knew the grave danger that war might come but nobody could by the wildest imagination guess at what awaited us. On Monday I was at the Embassy earlier than | think I have ever been there before and every mem- ber of the staff was already on duty. Before break-AMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WAR III fast time the place was filled—packed like sardines. This was two days before war was declared. ‘There was no chance to talk to individuals, such was the jam. I got on a chair and explained that I had already telegraphed to Washington—on Saturday—suggest- ing the sending of money and ships, and asking them to be patient. I made a speech to them several times during the day, and kept the Secretaries doing so at intervals. More than 2,000 Americans crowded into those offices (which are not large) that day. We were kept there till two o’clock in the morning. The Embassy has not been closed since. Tuesday the crowd at the Embassy was still great but smaller. The big space at the Savoy Hotel gave them room to talk to one another and to get relief for ‘mmediate needs. By that time I had accepted the volunteer services of five or six men to help us explain to the people—and they have all worked manfully day and night. We now have an orderly organization at four places: The Embassy, the Consul-General’s Office, the Savoy, and the American Society in London, and everything is going well. Those two first days, there was, of course, great confusion. Crazy men and weeping women were imploring and cursing and demanding—God knows it was bedlam turned loose. I have been called a man of the greatest genius for an emergency by some, by others a damned fool, by others every epithet between these extremes. Men shook English banknotes in my face and demanded United States money and swore our Government and its agents ought all to be shot. Women expected me to hand them steamship tickets home. When some found out that they could not get tickets on the trans-II2 AMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WAR ports (which they assumed would sail the next day) they accused me of favoritism. These absurd ex- periences will give you a hint of the panic. But now it has worked out all right, thanks to the Savoy Com- mittee and other helpers. Then came the declaration of war, most dramat- ically. Tuesday night, five minutes after the ultima- tum had expired, the Admiralty telegraphed to the fleet “Go.” In a few minutes the answer came back “Off.” Soldiers began to march through the city going to the railway stations. An _ indescribable crowd so blocked the streets about the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Foreign Office, that at one o’clock in the morning I had to drive in my car by other streets to get home. The next day the German Embassy was turned over to me. I went to see the German Ambassador at three o’clock in the afternoon. He came down in his pyjamas, a crazy man. I feared he might literally go mad. He is of the anti-war party and he had done his best and utterly failed. This interview was one of the most pathetic experiences of my life. The poor man had not slept for several nights. Then came the crowds of frightened Germans, afraid that they would be arrested. ‘They besieged the German Embassy and our Embassy. I put one of our naval officers in the German Embassy, put the United States seal on the door to protect it, and we began business there, too. Our naval officer has moved in—sleeps there. He has an assistant, a ste- nographer, a messenger; and I gave him the German automobile and chautteur and two English servants thatAMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WAR DE were left there. He has the job well in hand now, under my and Laughlin’s supervision. But this has brought still another new lot of diplomatic and govern- mental problems—a lot of them. Three enormous German banks in London have, of course, been closed. Their managers pray for my aid. Howling women come and say their innocent German husbands have been arrested as spies. English, Germans, Americans —everybody has daughters and wives and invalid grandmothers alone in Germany. In God’s name, they ask, what can I do for them? Here come stacks of letters sent under the impression that I can send them to Germany. But the German business is already well in hand and I think that will take little of my own time and will give little trouble. I shall send a report about it in detail to the Department the very first day I can find time to write it. In spite of the effort of the English Government to remain at peace with Austria, I fear I shall yet have the Austrian Embassy too. But I can attend to it. Now, however, comes the financial job of wisely using the $300,000 which I shall have to-morrow. I am using Mr. Chandler Anderson “as counsel, of course. I have appointed a Committee—Skinner, the Consul-General, Lieut.-Commander McCrary of our Navy, Kent of the Bankers Trust Company, New York, and one other man yet to be chosen—to advise, after investigation, about every proposed expenditure. Anderson has been at work all day to-day drawing up proper forms, etc., to fit the Department’s very excel- lent instructions. I have the feeling that more of that money may be wisely spent in helping to get people off the Continent (except in France, where they seem ad- mirably to be managing it, under Herrick) than is114 AMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WAR immediately needed in England. All this merely to show you the diversity and multiplicity of the job. _ All London has been awake for a week. Soldiers are marching day and night; immense throngs block the streets about the government offices. But they are all very orderly. Every day Germans are arrested on suspicion; and several of them have committed suicide. Yesterday one poor American woman yielded to the excitement and cut her throat. I find it hard to get about much. People stop me on the street, follow me to luncheon, grab me as I come out of any committee meeting—to know my opinion of this or that—how can they get home? Will such- and-such a boat fly the American flag? Why did I take the German Embassy? I have to fight my way about and rush to an automobile. I have had to buy me a second one to keep up the racket. Buy ?—no— only bargain for it, for | have not any money. But everybody is considerate, and that makes no matter for the moment. This little cottage in an out-of-the- way place, twenty-five miles from London, where I am trying to write and sleep, has been found by people to-day, who come in automobiles to know how they may reach their sick kinspeople in Germany. I have not had a bath for three days: as soon as I got in the tub, the telephone rang an “urgent” call! Upon my word, if one could forget the awful trag- edy, all this experience would be worth a lifetime of commonplace. One surprise follows another so rapidly that one loses all sense of time: it seems an age since last Sunday. I shall never forget Sir Edward Grey’s telling me of the ultimatum—while he wept; nor the poor Ger-AMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WAR I1$ man Ambassador who has lost in his high game— almost a demented man; nor the King as he declaimed at me for half-an-hour and threw up his hands and said, ‘““My God, Mr. Page, what else could we do?” Nor the Austrian Ambassador’s wringing his hands and weeping and crying out, ‘‘My dear Colleague, my dear Colleague.” And this awful tragedy moves on to—what? We do not know what is really happening, so strict is the censorship. But it seems inevitable to me that Ger- many will be beaten, that the horrid period of alliances and armaments will not come again, that England will gain even more of the earth’s surface, that Russia may next play the menace; that all Europe (as much as survives) will be bankrupt; that relatively we shall be immensely stronger financially and politically—there must surely come many great changes—very many, yet undreamed of. Be ready; for you will be called on to compose this huge quarrel. I thank Heaven for many things—first, the Atlantic Ocean; second, that you refrained from war in Mexico; third, that we kept our treaty—the canal tolls victory, I mean. Now, when all this half of the world will suffer the unspeakable brutalization of war, we shall preserve our moral strength, our political powers, and our ideals. God save us! We P:CHAPTER Vit ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR HE months following the outbreak of the war were busy ones for the American Embassy in London. The Embassies of all the great Powers with which Great Britain was contending were handed over to Page, and the citizens of these countries— Germany, Austria, Turkey—who found themselves stranded in England, were practically made his wards. It is a constant astonishment to his biographer that, during all the labor and distractions of this period, Page should have found time to write long letters de- scribing the disturbing scene. [here are scores of them, all penned in the beautiful copper-plate hand- writing that shows no signs of excitement or weariness, but is in itself an evidence of mental poise and of the sure grip which Page had upon the evolving drama. From the many sent in these autumn and early winter months the following selections are made: To Edward M. House September 22nd, 1914. My DEAR House: When the day of settlement comes, the settlement must make sure that the day of militarism is done and can come no more. If sheer-brute force is to rule the world, it will not be worth living in. If German bureaucratic brute force could conquer Europe, pres- 116ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR 107 ently it would try to conquer the United States: and we should all go back to the era of war as man’s chief industry and back to the domination of kings by divine right. It seems to me, therefore, that the Hohen- zollern idea must perish—be utterly strangled in the making of peace. Just how to do this, it is not yet easy to say. If the German defeat be emphatic enough and dramatic enough, the question may answer itself—how’s the best way to be rid of the danger of the recurrence of a military bureaucracy? But in any event, this thing must be killed forever—somehow. I think that a firm insistence on this is the main task that mediation will bring. The rest will be corollaries of this. The danger, of course, as all the world is beginning to fear, is that the Kaiser, after a local victory—es- pecially if he should yet take Paris—will propose peace, saying that he dreads the very sight of blood— propose peace in time, as he will hope, to save his throne, his dynasty, his system. That will be a dan- gerous day. The horror of war will have a tendency to make many persons in the countries of the Allies accept it. All the peace folk in the world will say “Accept it!” But if he and his throne and his dynasty and his system be saved, in twenty-five years the whole job must be done over again. .. . The diplomatic work proper brings fewer difficulties than you would guess. New subjects and new duties come with great rapidity, but they soon fall into for- mulas—at least into classes. We shall have no sharp crises nor grave difficulties so long as our government and this government keep their more than friendly relations. I see Sir Edward Grey almost every day. We talk of many things—all phases of one vast wreck; and all the clear-cut points that come up I re-118 ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR port by telegraph. To-day the talk was of American cargoes in British ships and the machinery they have set up here for fair settlement. Then of Americans applying for enlistment in Canadian regiments. “‘If sheer brute force conquer Europe,” said he, “the United States will be the only country where life will be worth living; and in time you will have to fight against it, too, if it conquer Europe. . . .” I hear nothing but satisfaction with our neutrality tight-rope walk. I think we are keeping it here, by close attention to our work and by silence. Our volunteer and temporary aids are doing well —especially the army and navy oficers. We now occupy three work places: (1) the over-crowded embassy; (2) a suite of offices around the corner where the ever-lengthening list of inquiries for per- sons is handled and where an army officer pays money to persons whose friends have deposited it for them with the Government in Washington—just now at the rate of about $15,000 a day; and (3) two great rooms at the Savoy Hotel, where the admirable relief com- mittee (which meets all trains that bring people from the Continent) gives aid to the needy and helps people to get tickets home. They have this week helped about 400 with more or less money—after full inves- tigation. At the Embassy a secretary remains till bed-time, which generally means till midnight; and I go back there for an hour or two every night. The financial help we give to German and Austrian subjects (poor devils) is given, of course, at their em- bassies, where we have men—our men—in charge. Each of these governments accepted my offer to give our Ambassadors (Gerard and Penfield) a sum of money to help Americans if I would set aside an equalENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR 119 sum to help their people here. The German fund that I thus began with was $50,000; the Austrian, $25,000. All this and more will be needed before the war ends. —All this activity is kept up with scrupulous atten- tion to British rules and regulations. In fact, we are helping this government much in the management of these ‘alien enemies,” as they call them. The soldiers here complained for weeks in private about the lethargy of the people—the slowness of men to enlist. But they seemed to me to complain with insufficient reason. For now they come by thou- sands. They do need more men in the field, and they may conscript them, but I doubt the necessity. But I run across such incidents as these: I met the Dowa- ger Countess of D yesterday—a woman of sixty-five, as tall as I and erect herself as a soldier, who might be taken for a woman of forty, prematurely gray. “I had five sons in the Boer War. I have three in this war. I do not know where any one of them is.”” Mrs. Page’s maid is talking of leaving her. ‘My two brothers have gone to the war and perhaps I ought to help their wives and children.” The Coun- tess and the maid are of the same blood, each alike unconquerable. My chauffeur has talked all day about the naval battle in which five German ships were lately sunk.1_ He reminded me of the night two months ago when he drove Mrs. Page and me to dine with Sir John and Lady Jellicoe—Jellicoe now, you know, being in command of the British fleet. This Kingdom has settled down to war as its one great piece of business now in hand, and it is impos- sible, as the busy, burdensome days pass, to pick out events or impressions that one can be sure are worth 1 Evidently the battle of Heligoland Bight of August 28, 1914.120 ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR writing. For instance a soldier—a man in the War Office—told me to-day that Lord Kitchener had just told him that the war may last for several years. That, I confess, seems to me very improbable, and (what is of more importance) it is not the notion held by most men whose judgment I respect. But all the military men say it will be fong. . _. Food here is practically as cheap as it was three months ago and the sea routes are all open to England and practically all closed to Germany. The ultimate result, of course, will be Germany’s defeat. But the British are now going about the business of war as if they knew they would continue it indefinitely. The grim efficiency of their work even in small de- tails was illustrated to-day by the Government’s in- forming us that a German handy man, whom the German Ambassador left at his Embassy, with the English Government’s consent, is a spy—that he sends verbal messages to Germany by women who are per- mitted to go home, and that they have found letters written by him sewed in some of these women’s under- garments! This man has been at work there every day under the two very good men whom I have put in charge there and who have never suspected him. How on earth they found this out simply passes my understanding. Fortunately it doesn’t bring any em- barrassment to us; he was not in our pay and he was left by the German Ambassador with the British Gov- ernment’s consent, to take care of the house. The Germans have far more than their match in resources and in shrewdness and—in character. As the bloody drama unfolds itself, the hollow pretense and essential barbarity of Prussian militarism become plainer and plainer: there is no doubt of that. AndENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR I21 so does the invincibility of this race. A well-known Englishman told me to-day that his three sons, his son-in-law, and half his office men are in the military service, ‘where they belong in a time like this.” The lady who once so sharply criticized this gentleman to Mrs. Page has a son and a brother in the army in France. It makes you take a fresh grip on your eye- lids to hear either of these talk. In fact, the strain On one’s emotions, day in and day out, makes one wonder if the world is real—or is this a vast dream? .. . No experience seems normal. A vast organization is working day and night down town re- ceiving Belgian refugees. ‘They become the guests of the English. They are assigned to people’s homes, to boarding houses, to institutions. They are taking care of them—this government and this people are. I do not recall when one nation ever did another whole nation just such a hospitable service as this. You can’t see that work going on and remain unmoved. An old woman who has an income of $15 a week de- cided that she could live on $7.50. She buys milk with the other $7.50 and goes to meet every train at one of the big stations with a basket filled with baby bottles, and she gives milk to every hungry- looking baby she sees. Our American committeeman, Hoover, saw her in trouble the other day and asked her what was the matter. She explained that the police would no longer admit her to the platform be- cause she didn’t belong to any relief committee. He took her to headquarters and said: ‘Do you see this good old lady? She puts you and me and everybody else to shame—do you understand?” The old lady now gets to the platform. Hoover himself gave $5,000 for helping stranded Americans and he goes— i ear " 122 ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR to the trains to meet them, while the war has stopped his big business and his big income. This is a sample of the noble American end of the story. These are the saving class of people to whom life becomes a bore unless they can help somebody. There’s just such a fellow in Brussels—you may have heard of him, for his name is Whitlock. Stories of his showing himself a man come out of that closed-up city every week. To a really big man, it doesn’t mat- ter whether his post is a little post or a big post but, ‘{ I were President, I’d give Whitlock a big post. There’s another fellow somewhere in Germany—a consul—of whom I never heard till the other day. But people have taken to coming in my ofice—English ladies—who wish to thank “‘you and your great gov- ernment” for the courage and courtesy of this consul.’ Stories about him will follow. Herrick, too, in Paris, somehow causes Americans and English and even Guatemalans who come along to go out of their way to say what he has done for them. Now there is a quality in the old woman with the baby bottles, and “1 the consul and in Whitlock and Hoover and Her- rick and this English nation which adopts the Bel- gians—a quality that is invincible. When folk like these come down the road, I respectfully do obeisance to them. And—it’s this kind of folk that the Ger- mans have run up against. I thank Heaven I’m of their race and blood. The whole world is bound to be changed as a result of this war. If Germany should win, our Monroe Doctrine would at once be shot in two, and we should have to get “out of the sun.” The military party is a party of conquest—absolutely. If England wins, 1The reference in all probability is to Mr. Charles L. Hoover, at that time American Consul at Carlsbad.ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR 123 as of course she will, itll be a bigger and a stronger England, with no strong enemy in the world, with her Empire knit closer than ever—lIndia, Canada, Aus- tralia, New Zealand, South Africa, Egypt; under obligations to and in alliance with Russia! England will not need our friendship as much as she now needs it; and there may come governments here that will show they do not. In any event, you see, the world willtbevchangeds ==". All of which means that it is high time we were con- structing a foreign service. First of all, Congress ought to make it possible to have half a dozen under- secretaries—men who, after service in the Depart- ment, could go out as Ministers and Ambassadors; it ought generously to reorganize the whole thing. It ought to have a competent study made of the foreign ofices of other governments. Of course it ought to get room to work in. ‘Then it ought at once to give its Ambassadors and Ministers homes and digni- fied treatment. We've got to play a part in the world whether we wish to or not. ‘Think of these things. The blindest great force in this world to-day is the Prussian War Party—blind and stupid.—Well, and the most weary man in London just at this hour is Your humble servant, Wa Eee but he’ll be all right in the morning. To Arthur W. Page [ Undated ] DEAR ARTHUR: ... I recall one night when we were dining at Sir John Jellicoe’s, he told me that the Admiralty124 ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR never slept—that he had a telephone by his bed every night. .°.% “Did it ever ring?” I asked. “No; but it will.” You begin to see pretty clearly how English history has been made and makes itself. This afternoon Lady S told your mother of her three sons, one on a warship in the North Sea, another with the army in France, and a third in training to go. “How brave you all are!” said your mother, and her answer was: “They belong to their country; we can’t do anything else.’ One of the daughters-in-law of the late Lord Salisbury came to see me to find out if I could make an inquiry about her son who was reported “missing”’ after the battle of Mons. She was dry-eyed, calm, self-restrained—very grateful for the effort I prom- ised to make; but a Spartan woman would have envied her self-possession. It turned out that her son was dead. You hear experiences like these almost every day. These are the kinds of women and the kinds of men that have made the British Empire and the English race. You needn’t talk of decadence. All their great qualities are in them here and now. I believe that half the young men who came to Katharine’s* dances last winter and who used to drop in at the house once in a while are dead in France already. [hey went as a matter of course. ‘This is the reason they are going to win. Now these things impress you, as they come to you day by day. This government doesn’t now let anybody carry any food away. But to-day they consented on condition 1Miss Katherine A. Page, the Ambassador’s daughter.ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR 125 I’d receive the food (for the Belgians) and consign it to Whitlock. This is their way of keeping it out of German hands—have the Stars and Stripes, so to speak, to cover every bag of flour and of salt. ‘That’s only one of 1,000 queer activities that I engage in. I have a German princess’s! jewels in our safe— $100,000 worth of them in my keeping; I have an old English nobleman’s check for $40,000 to be sent to men who have been building a house for his daughter in Dresden—to be sent as soon as the German Gov- ernment agrees not to arrest the lady for debt. I have sent Miss Latimer ? over to France to bring an Austrian baby eight months old whose mother will take it to the United States and bring it up an Ameri- can citizen! The mother can’t go and get it for fear the French might detain her; I’ve got the English Government’s permission for the family to go to the United States. Harold? is in Belgium, trying to get a group of English ladies home who went there to nurse wounded English and Belgians and whom the Germans threaten to kidnap and transport to German hospitals—every day a dozen new kinds of jobs. To the President [ Undated. ] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: When England, France, and Russia agreed the other day not to make peace separately, that cooked the Kaiser’s goose. They'll wear him out. Since 1 Princess Lichnowsky, wife of the German Ambassador to Great Britain. 2 Private Secretary to Mrs. Page. 3. Mr. Harold Fowler, the Ambassador’s Secretary." - a ae 126 ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR England thus has Frenchmen and Russians bound, the Allies are strengthened at their only weak place. That done, England is now going deliberately, method- ically, patiently to do the task. Even a fortnight ago, the people of this Kingdom didn’t realize all that the war means to them. But the fever is rising now. The wounded are coming back, the dead are mourned, and the agony of hearing only that such-and-such a man is missing—these are having a prodigious effect. The men I meet now say in a matter-of-fact way: “Oh, yes! we’ll get ’em, of course; the only question is, how long it will take us and how many of us it will cost. But no matter, we'll get ’em.”’ a . e . . . . ? . e To Edward M. House October II, 1914. Dear House: There is absolutely nothing to write. It’s war, war, war all the time; no change of subject; and, if you changed with your tongue, you couldn’t change in your thought; war, war, war—‘‘for God’s sake find out if my son is dead or a prisoner’; rumors—they say that two French generals were shot for not supporting French, and then they say only one; and people come who have helped take the wounded French from the field and they won’t even talk, it is so horrible; and a lady says that her own son (wounded) told her that when a man raised up in the trench to fire, the stench was so awful that it made him sick for an hour; and the poor Belgians come here by the tens of thousands, and special trains bring the English wounded; and the newspapers tell little or nothing—every day’s reportsENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR 127 like the preceding days’; and yet nobody talks about anything else. Meantime this invincible race is doing this revolu- tionary task marvelously—volunteering; trying to buy arms in the United States (a Pittsburgh manufacturer is now here trying to close a bargain with the War Office) ;1 knitting socks and mufflers; taking in all the poor Belgians; stopping all possible expenditure; darkening London at night; doing every conceivable thing to win as if they had been waging this war always and meant to do nothing else for the rest of their lives—and not the slightest doubt about the re- sult and apparently indifferent how long it lasts or how much it costs. We here don’t know what you think or what you know at home; we haven't yet any time to read United States newspapers, which come very, very late; nobody writes us real letters (or the censor gets ’em, per- haps!) ; and so the war, the war, the war is the one thing that holds our minds. We have taken a house for the Chancery ?—almost the size of my house in Grosvenor Square—for the same sum as rent that the landlord proposed hereafter to charge us for the old hole where we've been for twenty-nine years. For the first time Uncle Sam has a decent place in London. We've five times as much 1 Probably a reference to Mr. Charles M. Schwab, President of the Bethlehem Steel Company, who was in London at this time on this errand. 2No. 4 Grosvenor Gardens.128 ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR room and ten times as much work. Now—yjust this last week or two—I get off Sundays: that’s doing well. And I don’t now often go back at night. So, you see, we've much to be thankful for—Shall we insure against Zeppelins? That’s what everybody’s asking. I told the Spanish Ambassador yesterday that I am going to ask the German Government for instructions about insuring their Embassy here! Write and send some news. I saw an American to- day who says he’s going home to-morrow. “Cable me,’’ said I, “if you find the continent where it used to be.” Faithfully yours, WALTER H. Pace. To Arthur W. Page London, November 6, 1914. DEAR ARTHUR: Those excellent photographs, those excellent apples, those excellent cigars—thanks. I’m thinking of send- ing Kitty! over again. They all spell and smell and taste of home—of the U. S. A. Even the messenger herself seems Unitedstatesy, and that’s a good qual- ity, I assure you. She’s told us less news than you'd think she might for so long a journey and so long a visit; but that’s the way with us all. And, I dare say, if it were all put together it would make a pretty big news-budget. And luckily for us (I often think we are among the luckiest families in the world) all she says is quite cheerful. It’s a wonderful report she makes of County Line 7—the country, the place, 1Miss Katherine A. Page had just returned from a visit to the United States. 2Mr. Arthur W. Page’s country home on Long Island.ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR 129 the house, and its inhabitants. Maybe, praise God, I’ll see it myself some day—it and them. But—but—I don’t know when and can’t guess out of this vast fog of war and doom. The worst of it is nobody knows just what is happening. I have, for an example, known for a week of the blowing up of a British dreadnaught '—thousands of people know it privately—and yet it isn’t published! Such secrecy makes you fear there may be other and even worse secrets. But I don’t really believe there are. What I am trying to say is, so far as news (and many other things) go, we are under a military rule. It’s beginning to wear on us badly. It presses down, presses down, presses down in an indescribable way. All the people you see have lost sons or brothers; mourning becomes visible over a wider area all the time; people talk of nothing else; all the books are about the war; ordinary social life is suspended— people are visibly growing older. And there are some aspects of it that are incomprehensible. . There must already be a total of 2,000,000 killed. Nothing like that has ever happened before in the his- tory of the world. A flood or a fire or a wreck which has killed 500 has often shocked all mankind. Yet we know of this enormous slaughter and (in a way) are not greatly moved. I don’t know of a better measure of the brutalizing effect of war—it’s bringing us to take a new and more inhuman standard to meas- ure events by. As for any political or economic reckoning—that’s beyond any man’s ability yet. I see strings of incom- prehensible figures that some economist or other now and then puts in the papers, summing up the loss in 1. Evidently the Audacious, sunk by mine off the North of Ireland, October 27, 1914.130 ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR pounds sterling. But that means nothing because we have no proper measure of it. If aman lose $10 or $10,000 we can grasp that. But when nations shoot away so many million pounds sterling every day— that means nothing to me. I do know that there’s going to be no money on this side the world for a long time to buy American securities. The whole world is going to be hard up in consequence of the bank- ruptcy of these nations, the inestimable destruction of property, and the loss of productive men. I fancy that such a change will come in the economic and financial readjustment of the world as nobody can yet guess at. It is not only South-American trade; it is all sorts of manu- facturers; it is financial influence—if we can quit spending and wasting, and husband our earnings. There’s no telling the enormous advantages we shall gain if we are wise.. When’s it going to end? Everybody who ought to know says at the earliest next year—next summer. Many say in two years. As for me, I don’t know. I don’t see how it can end soon. Neither can lick the other to a frazzle and neither can afford to give up till it is completely licked. This way of living in trenches and fighting a month at a time in one place is a new thing in warfare. Many a man shoots a cannon all day for a month without seeing a single enemy. There are many wounded men back here who say they haven’t seen a single German. When the trenches become so full of dead men that the living can’t stay there longer, they move back to other trenches. So it goes on. Each side has several more million men to lose. What the end will be—I meanENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR I31 when it will come, I don’t see how to guess. The Allies are obliged to win; they have more food and more money, and in the long run, more men. But the German fighting machine is by far the best organiza- tion ever made—not the best men, but the best organi- zation; and the whole German people believe what the woman writes whose letter I send you. It'll take a long time to beat it. Affectionately, We Eiek: To Ralph W. Page* London, Sunday, November 15, 1914. DEAR RALPH: You were very good to sit down in Greensboro’, or anywhere else, and to write me a fine letter. Do that often. You say there’s nothing to do now in the Sandhills. Write us letters: that’s a fair job! God save us, we need’em. We need anything from the sane part of the world to enable us to keep our balance. One of the commonest things you hear about now is the insanity of a good number of the poor fellows who come back from the trenches as well as of a good many Belgians. The sights and sounds they’ve experienced unhinge their reason. If this war keep up long enough—and it isn’t going to end soon— people who have had no sight of it will go crazy, too —the continuous thought of it, the inability to get away from it by any device whatever—all this tells on us all. Letters, then, plenty of them—let ‘em come. You are ina peaceful land. The war is a long, long way off. You suffer nothing worse than a little idle- 1Qf Pinehurst, North Carolina, the Ambassador's oldest son.= ae i }| a} | it i” a / u | ese 132 ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR ness and a little poverty. They are nothing. I hope (and believe) that you get enough to eat. Be con- tent, then. Read the poets, improve a piece of land, play with the baby, learn golf. That's the happy and philosophic and fortunate life in these times of world madness. As for the continent of Europe—forget it. We have paid far too much attention to it. It has ceased to be worth it. And now it’s of far less value to us— and will be for the rest of your life—than it has ever been before. An ancient home of man, the home, too, of beautiful things—buildings, pictures, old places, old traditions, dead civilizations—the place where man rose from barbarism to civilization—it is now bank- rupt, its best young men dead, its system of politics and of government a failure, its social structure en- slaving and tyrannical—it has little help for us. The American spirit, which is the spirit that concerns itself with making life better for the whole mass of men— that’s at home at its best with us. The whole future of the race is in the new countries—our country chiefly. This grows on one more and more and more. ‘The things that are best worth while are on our side of the ocean. And we've got all the bigger job to do be- cause of this violent demonstration of the failure of continental Europe. It’s gone on living on a false basis till its elements got so mixed that it has simply blown itself to pieces. It is a great convulsion of nature, as an earthquake or a volcano is. Human life there isn’t worth what a yellow dog’s life is worth in Moore County. Don’t bother yourself with the continent of Europe any more—except to learn the value of a real democracy and the benefits it can con- fer precisely in proportion to the extent to which men trust to it.ENGLAND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR 33 Did you ever read my Address delivered before the Royal Institution of Great Britain?! I enclose a copy. Now that’s my idea of the very milk of the word. ‘To come down to daily, deadly things—this upheaval is simply infernal. Parliament opened the other day and half the old lords that sat in their robes had lost their heirs and a larger part of the members of the House wore khaki. To-morrow they will vote $1,125,000,000 for war purposes. ‘They had already voted $500,000,000. They’ll vote more, and more, and more, if necessary. They are raising a new army of 2,000,000 men. Every man and every dollar they have will go if necessary. That’s what I call an in- vincible people. The Kaiser woke up the wrong pas- senger. But for fifty years the continent won't be worth living on. My heavens! what bankruptcy will follow death! Affectionately, We Eel 1On June 12, 1914. The title of the address was “Some Aspects of the American Democracy.”i. ' 2 bi ee } ; Cyleilyglel ee Piet) oe WAI ETE WAGENG NEU DRALITEY 7 HE foregoing letters sufficiently portray Page’s attitude toward the war; they also show the ex- tent to which he suffered from the daily tragedy. The great burdens placed upon the Embassy in them- selves would have exhausted a physical frame that had never been particularly robust; but more disintegrat- ing than these was the mental distress—the constant spectacle of a civilization apparently bent upon its own destruction. Indeed, there were probably few men in Europe upon whom the war had a more depressing effect. In the first few weeks the Ambassador per- ceptibly grew older; his face became more deeply lined, his hair became grayer, his body thinner, his step lost something of its quickness, his shoulders be- gan to stoop, and his manner became more and more abstracted. ‘In those first few weeks,” says Mr. Irwin Laugh- lin, Page’s most important assistant, “he acted like a man who was carrying on his shoulders all the sins and burdens of the world. I know no man who seemed to realize so poignantly the misery and sorrow of it all. The sight of an England which he loved bleeding to death in defense of the things in which he most believed was a grief that seemed to be sap- ing his very life.” Page’s associates, however, noted a change for the better after the Battle of the Marne. Except to his 134“WAGING NEUTRALITY” 135 most intimate companions he said little, for he repre- sented a nation that was ‘‘neutral’’; but the defeat of the Germans added liveliness to his step, gave a keener sparkle to his eye, and even brought back some of his old familiar gayety of spirit. One day the Ambassa- dor was lunching with Mr. Laughlin and one or two other friends. ‘We did pretty well in that Battle of the Marne, didn’t we?” he said. ‘‘Isn’t that remark slightly unneutral, Mr. Ambas- sador?”’ asked Mr. Laughlin. At this a roar of laughter went up from the table that could be heard for a considerable distance. Yet greatly as his sympathies from the first day of the war were enlisted on the side of the Allies, there was no diplomat in the American service who was more “neutral” in the technical sense. ‘‘Neutral!” Page once exclaimed. ‘‘There’s nothing in the world so neutral as this embassy. Neutrality takes up all our time.’’ When he made this remark he was, as he himself used to say, “the German Ambassador to Great Britain.” And he was performing the duties of this post with the most conscientious fidelity. Page was prepared to observe all the traditional rules of neutrality, to insist on American rights with the British Government, and to do full legal justice to the Germans, but he declined to abrogate his con- science where his personal judgment of the rights and wrongs of the conflict were concerned. ‘‘Neutrality,”’ he said in a letter to his brother, Mr. Henry A. Page, of Aberdeen, N. C., “is a quality of government—an artificial unit. When a war comes a government must go in it or stay out of it. It must make a declaration to the world of its attitude. That’s all that neutrality is. A government can be neutral, but no man can be.”’136 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” “The President and the Government,” Page after- ward wrote, “‘in their insistence upon the moral quality of neutrality, missed the larger meaning of the war. It is at bottom nothing but the effort of the Berlin absolute monarch and his group to impose their will on as large a part of the world as they can overrun. The President started out with the idea that it was a war brought on by many obscure causes—economic and the like; and he thus missed its whole meaning. We have ever since been dealing with the chips which fly from the war machine and have missed the larger meaning of the conflict. Thus we have failed to ren- der help to the side of Liberalism and Democracy, which are at stake in the world.” Evidently Page did not regard his frank descrip- tions of England under war as expressing unneutral feeling; at any rate, as the war went on, his letters, even those which he wrote to President Wilson, be- came more and more outspoken. Page’s resignation was always at the President’s disposal; the time came, as will appear, when it was offered; so long as he oc- cupied his post, however, nothing could turn him from his determination to make what he regarded as an accurate record of events. This policy of maintain- ing an outward impartiality, and, at the same time, of bringing pressure to bear on Washington in behalf of the Allies, he called “waging neutrality.” Such was the mood in which Page now prepared to play his part in what was probably the greatest diplo- matic drama in history. The materials with which this drama concerned itself were such apparently life- less subjects as ships and cargoes, learned discourses on such abstract matters as the doctrine of continuous voyage, effective blockade, and conditional contra- band; yet the struggle, which lasted for three years,“WAGING NEUTRALITY” 137 involved the greatest issue of modern times—nothing less than the survival of those conceptions of liberty, government, and society which make the basis of English-speaking civilization. To the newspaper reader of war days, shipping difficulties signified little more than a newspaper headline which he hastily read, or a long and involved lawyer’s note which he seldom read at all—or, if he did, practically never understood. Yet these minute and neglected controversies pre- sented to the American Nation the greatest decision in its history. Once before, a century ago, a Euro- pean struggle had laid before the United States prac- tically the same problem. Great Britain fought Napoleon, just as it had now been compelled to fight the Hohenzollern, by blockade; such warfare, in the early nineteenth century, led to retaliations, just as did the maritime warfare in the recent conflict, and the United States suffered, in 1812, as in 1914, from what were regarded as the depredations of both sides. In Napoleon’s days France and Great Britain, according to the international lawyers, attacked American com- merce in illegal ways; on strictly technical grounds this infant nation had an adequate cause of war against both belligerents; but the ultimate consequence of a very confused situation was a declaration of war against Great Britain. Though an England which was ruled by a George III or a Prince Regent—an England of rotten bor- oughs, of an ignorant and oppressed peasantry, and of a social organization in which caste was almost as def- initely drawn as in an Oriental despotism—could hardly appeal to the enthusiastic democrat as embody- ing all the ideals of his system, yet the England of 1800 did represent modern progress when compared with the medieval autocracy of Napoleon. If we138 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” take this broad view, therefore, we must admit that, in 1812, we fought on the side of darkness and injus- tice against the forces that were making for enlight- enment. The war of 1914 had not gone far when the thinking American foresaw that it would present to the American people precisely this same problem. What would the decision be? Would America repeat the experience of 1812, or had the teachings of a century so dissipated hatreds that it would be able to exert its influence in a way more worthy of itself and more helpful to the progress of mankind? There was one great difference, however, between the position of the United States in 1812 and its posi- tion in 1914. A century ago we were a small and feeble nation, of undeveloped industries and resources and of immature character; our entrance into the Eu- ropean conflict, on one side or the other, could have little influence upon its results, and, in fact, it influ- enced it scarcely at all; the side we fought against emerged triumphant. In 1914, we had the greatest industrial organization and the greatest wealth of any nation and the largest white population of any country except Russia; the energy of our people and our na- tional talent for success had long been the marvel of foreign observers. It mattered little in 1812 on which side the United States took its stand; in 1914 such a decision would inevitably determine the issue. Of all European statesmen there was one man who saw this point with a definiteness which, in itself, gives him a clear title to fame. That was Sir Edward Grey. The time came when a section of the British public was prepared almost to stone the Foreign Secretary in the streets of London, because they believed that his ‘subservience’? to American trade interests was losing the war for Great Britain; his tenure of office“WAGING NEUTRALITY” 139 was a constant struggle with British naval and mili- tary chiefs who asserted that the Foreign Office, in its efforts to maintain harmonious relations with Amer- Ica, was hamstringing the British fleet, was rendering Riese impotent its control of the sea, and was thus throwing away the greatest mdvantane which Great Britain possessed in its life-and-death struggle. These criticisms unquestionably caused Sir Edward great unhappiness, but this did not for a moment move him from his course. His vision was fixed upon a much greater purpose. Parliamentary orators might rage because the British fleet was not permitted to make indiscriminate warfare on commerce, but the patient and far-seeing British Foreign Secretary was the man who was really trying to win the war. He was one of the few Englishmen who, in August, 1914, perceived the tremendous extent of the struggle in which Great Britain had engaged. He saw that the English people were facing the greatest crisis since William of Normandy, in 1066, subjected their island to foreign rule. Was England to become the ‘‘Reichs- land” of a European monarch, and was the British Empire to pass under the sway of Germany? Proud as Sir Edward Grey was of his country, he was modest in the presence of facts; and one fact of which he early became convinced was that Great Brit- ain could not win unless the United States was ranged upon its side. Here was the country—so Sir Edward reasoned—that contained the largest effective white population in the world; that could train armies larger than those of any other nation; that could make the most munitions, build the largest number of battle- ships and merchant vessels, and raise food in quanti- ties great enough to feed itself and Europe besides. This power, the Foreign Secretary believed, could de-140 ‘“WAGING NEUTRALITY termine the issue of the war. If Great Britain se- cured American sympathy and support, she would win; ‘f Great Britain lost this sympathy and support, she would lose. A foreign policy that would estrange the United States and perhaps even throw its support to Germany would not only lose the war to Great Brit- ain, but it would be perhaps the blackest crime in history, for it would mean the collapse of that British-American cooperation, and the destruction of those British-American ideals and institutions which are the greatest facts in the modern world. ‘This con- viction was the basis of Sir Edward’s policy from the day that Great Britain declared war. Whatever ene- mies he might make in England, the Foreign Secretary was determined to shape his course so that the support of the United States would be assured to his country. A single illustration shows the skill and wisdom with which he pursued this great purpose. Perhaps nothing in the early days of the war en- raged the British military chiefs more than the fact that cotton was permitted to go from the United States to Germany. That Germany was using this cotton in the manufacture of torpedoes to sink British ships and of projectiles to kill British soldiers in trenches was well known; nor did many people deny that Great Britain had the right to put cotton on the contraband list. Yet Grey, in the pursuit of his larger end, refused to take this step. He knew that the prosperity of the Southern States depended exclusively upon the cotton crop. He also knew that the South had raised the 1914 crop with no knowledge that war was impending and that to deny the Southern planters their usual access to the German markets would all but ruin them. He believed that such a ruling would im- mediately alienate the sympathy of a large section of‘“‘WAGING NEUTRALITY” I4I the United States and make our Southern Senators and Congressmen enemies of Great Britain. Two other dangers constantly haunted Sir Edward’s mind at this time. One was that the enemies of Great Britain would assemble enough votes in Congress to place an embargo upon the shipment of munitions from this country. Such an embargo might well be fatal to Great Britain, for at this time she was im- porting munitions, especially shells, in enormous quantities from the United States. The other was that such pressure might force the Government to convoy American cargoes with American warships. Great Britain then could stop the cargoes only by at- tacking our cruisers, and to attack a cruiser is an act of war. Had Congress taken either one of these steps the Allies would have lost the war in the spring of 1915. At a cabinet meeting held to consider this question, Sir Edward Grey set forth this view and strongly advised that cotton should not be made con- traband at that time.t’ The Cabinet supported him and events justified the decision. Afterward, in Washington, several of the most influential Senators informed Sir Edward that this action had averted a great Crisis. This was the motive, which, as will appear as the story of our relations with Great Britain progresses, inspired the Foreign Secretary in all his dealings with the United States. His purpose was to use the sea power of Great Britain to keep war materials and foodstuffs out of Germany, but never to go to the length of making an unbridgeable gulf between the United States and Great Britain. The American Am- bassador to Great Britain completely sympathized 1This was in October, 1914. In August, 1915, when conditions had changed, cotton was declared contrabrand.oupuprore ea =_—r 142 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” with this program. It was Page’s business to protect the rights of the United States, just as it was Grey's to protect the rights of Great Britain. Both were vigilant in protecting such rights, and animated dif- ferences between the two men on this point were not infrequent. Great Britain did many absurd and high- handed things in intercepting American cargoes, and Page was always active in “‘protesting” when the basis for the protest actually existed. But on the great overhanging issue the two men were at one. Like Grey, Page believed that there were more 1m- portant things involved than an occasional cargo of copper or of oil cake. The American Ambassador thought that the United States should protect its ship- ping interests, but that it should realize that maritime law was not an exact science, that its principles had been modified by every great conflict in which the blockade had been an effective agency, and that the United States itself, in the Civil War, had not hesi- tated to make such changes as the changed methods of modern transportation had required. In other words he believed that we could safeguard our rights in a way that would not prevent Great Britain from keeping war materials and foodstuffs out of Ger- many. That Page took this larger view of the supreme im- portance of British and American coéperation 1s evi- dent from the communications which he now began sending to the President. One that he wrote on Oc- tober 15, 1914, is especially to the point. The date is extremely important; so early had Page formu- lated the standards that should guide the United States and so early had he begun his work of attempt- ing to make President Wilson understand the real““WAGING NEUTRALITY” 143 nature of the conflict. The position which Page now assumed was one from which he never departed. To the President In this great argument about shipping I cannot help being alarmed because we are getting into deep water uselessly. The Foreign Office has yielded unques- tioningly to all our requests and has shown the sin- cerest wish to meet all our suggestions, so long as it is not called upon to admit war materials into Germany. It will not give way to usin that. We would not yield it if we were in their place. Neither would the Ger- mans. England will risk a serious quarrel or even hostilities with us rather than yield. You may look upon this as the final word. Since the last lists of contraband and conditional contraband were published, such materials as rubber and copper and petroleum have developed entirely new uses in war. ‘he British simply will not let Ger- many import them. Nothing that can be used for war purposes in Germany now will be used for anything else. Representatives of Spain, Holland, and all the Scandinavian states agree that they can do nothing but acquiesce and file protests and claims, and they admit that Great Britain has the right to revise the list of contraband. This is not a war in the sense in which we have hitherto used that word. It is a world clash of sys- tems of government, a struggle to the extermination of English civilization or of Prussian military autoc- racy. Precedents have gone to the scrap heap. We have a new measure for military and diplomatic ac- tion. Let us suppose that we press for a few rights144 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” to which the shippers have a theoretical claim. The American people gain nothing and the result is fric- tion with this country; and that is what a very small minority of the agitators in the United States would likeseen: Let us take a little farther view into the future. If Germany win, will it make any difference what posi- tion Great Britain took on the Declaration of Lon- don? The Monroe Doctrine will be shot through. We shall have to have a great army and a great navy. But suppose that England win. We shall then have an ugly academic dispute with her because of this con- troversy. Moreover, we shall not hold a good posi- tion for helping to compose the quarrel or for any other service. The present controversy seems here, where we are close to the struggle . . . a petty matter when it is compared with the grave danger we incur of shutting ourselves off from a position to be of some service to civilization and to the peace of mankind. As we see the issue here, it is a matter of life and death for English- speaking civilization. It is not a happy time to raise controversies that can be avoided or postponed. We gain nothing, we lose every chance for useful codperation for peace. In jeopardy also are our friendly relations with Great Britain in the sorest need and the greatest crisis in her history. I know that this is the correct view. I recommend most earnestly that we shall substantially accept the new Order in Council or acquiesce in it and reserve what- ever rights we may have. I recommend prompt in- formation be sent to the British Government of such action. I should like to inform Grey that this is our decision. So far as our neutrality obligations are concerned,“WAGING NEUTRALITY” 145 I do not believe that they require us to demand that Great Britain should adopt for our benefit the Dec- laration of London. Great Britain has never ratified it, nor have any other nations except the United States. In its application to the situation presented by this war it is altogether to the advantage of Germany. WALTER H. PAGE. The immediate cause of this communication was, as its context shows, the fact that the State Department was insisting that Great Britain should adopt the Dec- laration of London as a code of law for regulating its warfare on German shipping. Hostilities had hardly started when Mr. Bryan made this proposal; his tele- gram on this subject is dated August 7, 1914. “You will further state,” said Mr. Bryan, “that this Goy- ernment believes that the acceptance of these laws by the belligerents would prevent grave misunderstand- ings which may arise as to the relations between bel- ligerents and neutrals. It therefore hopes that this inquiry may receive favorable consideration.” At the same time Germany and the other belligerents were asked to adopt this Declaration. In Great Britain the Declaration had an especially interesting course. In that country it became a foot- ball of party politics. The Liberal Government was at first inclined to look upon it favorably; the Liberal House of Commons actually ratified it. It soon be- came apparent, however, that this vote did not repre- sent the opinion of the British public. In fact, few measures have ever aroused such hostility as this Dec- laration, once its details became known. For more146 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” than a year the hubbub against it filled the daily press, the magazines, the two Houses of Parliament and the hustings; Rudyard Kipling even wrote a poem de- nouncing it. The adoption of the Declaration, these critics asserted, would destroy the usefulness of the British fleet. In many quarters it was described as a German plot—as merely a part of the preparations which Germany was making for world conquest. The fact is that the Declaration could not successfully stand the analysis to which it was now mercilessly submitted; the House of Lords rejected it, and this action met with more approbation than had for years been ac- corded the legislative pronouncements of that cham- ber. The Liberal House of Commons was not in the least dissatisfied with this conclusion, for it realized that it had made a mistake and it was only too happy to be permitted to forget it. When the war broke out there was therefore no single aspect of maritime law which was quite so odi- ous as the Declaration of London. Great Britain realized that she could never win unless her fleet were permitted to keep contraband out of Germany and, if necessary, completely to blockade that country. What enraged the British public against any sugges- tion of the Declaration was that it practically deprived Great Britain of this indispensable means of weaken- ing the enemy. In this Declaration were drawn up lists of contraband, non-contraband, and conditional contraband, and all of these, in English eyes, worked to the advantage of Germany and against the advan- tage of Great Britain. How absurd this classification was is evident from the fact that airplanes were not listed as absolute contraband of war. Germany’s dif- ficulty in getting copper was one of the causes of her collapse; yet the Declaration put copper forever on“WAGING NEUTRALITY” 147 the non-contraband list; had this new code been adopted, Germany could have imported enormous quantities from this country, instead of being com- pelled to reinforce her scanty supply by robbing housewives of their kitchen utensils, buildings of their hardware, and church steeples of their bells. Ger- many’s most constant scramble for rubber formed a diverting episode in the struggle; there are indeed few things so indispensable in modern warfare; yet the Declaration included rubber among the innocent articles and thus opened up to Germany the world’s supply. But the most serious matter was that the Declaration would have prevented Great Britain from keeping foodstuffs out of the Fatherland. Germany, of course, promptly accepted the Dec- laration, for the suggestion fitted in perfectly with her program; but Great Britain was not so acquies- cent. Four times was Page instructed to ask the British Government to accede unconditionally, and four times did the Foreign Office refuse. Page was in despair. In the following letter he notified Colonel House that if he were instructed again to move in this matter he would resign his ambassadorship. To Edward M. House American Embassy, London, October 22, 1914. DEAR HOUSE: This is about the United States and England. Let’s get that settled before we try our hands at mak- ing peace in Europe. One of our greatest assets is the friendship of Great Britain, and our friendship is a still bigger asset for her, and she knows it and values it. Now, if148 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” either country should be damfool enough to throw this away because old Stone! roars in the Senate about something that hasn’t happened, then this crazy world would be completely mad all round, and there would be no good will left on earth at all. The case is plain enough to me. England is going to keep war materials out of Germany as far as she can. We'd do it in her place. Germany would do it. Any nation would do it. That’s all she has de- clared her intention of doing. And, if she be let alone, she'll do it in a way to give us the very least an- noyance possible; for she'll go any length to keep our friendship and good will. And she has not confis- cated a single one of our cargoes even of unconditional contraband. She has stopped some of them and bought them herself, but confiscated not one. All right; what do we do? We set out on a comprehen- sive plan to regulate the naval warfare of the world and we up and ask ’em all, ‘“‘Now, boys, all be good, and agree to the Declaration of London.” “Yah,” says Germany, “if England will.” Now Germany isn’t engaged in naval warfare to count, and she never even paid the slightest attention to the Declaration all these years. But she saw that it would hinder England and help her now, by forbid- ding England to stop certain very important war materials from reaching Germany. ‘Yah,’ said Germany. But England said that her parliament had rejected the Declaration in times of peace and that she could now hardly be expected to adopt it in the face of this Parliamentary rejection. But to please us, she agreed to adopt it with only two changes. 1Senator William J. Stone, perhaps the leading spokesman of the pro-German cause in the United States Senate. Senator Stone rep- resented Missouri.“WAGING NEUTRALITY” 149 Then Lansing to the bat: “No, no,” says Lansing, “you’ve got to adopt ital: Four times he’s made me ask for its adoption, the last time coupled with a proposition that if England would adopt it, she might issue a subsequent proclama- tion saying that, since the Declaration 1s contradictory, she will construe it in her own way, and the United States will raise no objection! In a word, England has acted in a friendly way to us and will so act, if we allow her. But Lansing, in- stead of trusting to her good faith and reserving all our rights under international law and usage, imagines that he can force her to agree to a code that the Ger- mans now agree to because, in Germany’s present predicament, it will be especially advantageous to Germany. Instead of trusting her, he assumes that she means to do wrong and proceeds to try to bind her in advance. He hauls her up and tries her in court— that’s his tone. Now the relations that I have established with Sir Edward Grey have been built up on frankness, fair- ness and friendship. I can’t have relations of any other sort nor can England and the United States have relations of any other sort. This is the place we've got to now. Lansing seems to assume that the way to an amicable agreement is through an angry controversy. Lansing’s method is the trouble. He treats Great Britain, to start with, as if she were a criminal and an opponent. That’s the best way I know to cause trouble to American shipping and to bring back the good old days of mutual hatred and distrust for a150 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” generation or two. If that isn’t playing into the hands of the Germans, what would be? And where's the “neutrality” of this kind of action? See here: If we let England go on, we can throw the whole responsibility on her and reserve all our rights under international law and usage and claim damages (and get ’em) for every act of injury, if acts of injury occur; and we can keep her friendship and good will. Every other neutral nation is doing that. Or we can insist on regulating all naval warfare and have a quarrel and refer it to a Treaty Commission and claim at most the selfsame damages with a less chance to get ’em. We can get damages without a quarrel; or we can have a quarrel and probably get damages. Now, why, in God’s name, should we pro- voke a quarrel? Now about the peace of Europe. Nothing can yet be done, perhaps nothing now can ever be done by us. The Foreign Office doubts our wisdom and prudence since Lansing came into action. The whole atmos- phere is changing. One more such move and they will conclude that Dernburg and Bernstorff have se- duced us—without our knowing it, to be sure; but their confidence in our judgment will be gone. God knows I have tried to keep this confidence intact and our good friendship secure. But I have begun to get despondent over the outlook since the President tele- graphed me that Lansing’s proposal would settle the matter. I still believe he did not understand it—he couldn’t have done so. Else he could not have ap- proved it. But that tied my hands. If Lansing again brings up the Declaration of London—after four flat and reasonable rejections—I shall resign.“WAGING NEUTRALITY” 151 I will not be the instrument of a perfectly gratuitous and ineffective insult to this patient and fair and friendly government and people who in my time have done us so many kindnesses and never an injury but Carden, and who sincerely try now to meet our wishes. It would be too asinine an act ever to merit forgiveness or ever to be forgotten. I should blame myself the rest of my life. It would grieve Sir Ed- ward more than anything except this war. It would knock the management of foreign affairs by this ad- ministration into the region of sheer idiocy. I’m afraid any peace talk from us, as it 1s, would merely be whistling down the wind. If we break with Eng- land—not on any case or act of violence to our ship- ping—but on a_ useless discussion, in advance, of general principles of conduct during the war—yJust for a discussion—we've needlessly thrown away our great chance to be of some service to this world gone mad. If Lansing isn’t stopped, that’s what he will do. Why doesn’t the President see Spring Rice? Why don't you take him to see him? Good night, my good friend. I still have hope that the President himself will take this in hand. Yours always, Ws ELBE: The letters and the cablegrams which Page was sending to Colonel House and the State Department at this time evidently ended the matter. By the middle of October the two nations were fairly dead- locked. Sir Edward Grey’s reply to the American proposal had been an acceptance of the Declaration of London with certain modifications. For the list of contraband in the Declaration he had submitted the list already adopted by Great Britain in its Order in152 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” Council, and he had also rejected that article which made it impossible for Great Britain to apply the doctrine of “continuous voyage’’ to conditional con- traband. The modified acceptance, declared Mr. Lansing, was a practical rejection—as of course it was, and as it was intended to be. So the situation re- mained for several exciting weeks, the State Depart- ment insisting on the Declaration in full, precisely as the legal luminaries had published it five years before, the Foreign Office courteously but infiexibly refusing to accede. Only the cordial personal relations which prevailed between Grey and Page prevented the crisis from producing the most disastrous results. Finally, on October 17th, Page proposed by cable an arrange- ment which he hoped would settle the matter. This was that the King should issue a proclamation accept- ing the Declaration with practically the modifications suggested above, and that a new Order in Council should be issued containing a new list of contraband. Sir Edward Grey was not to ask the American Govern- ment to accept this proclamation; all that he asked was that Washington should offer no objections to it. It was proposed that the United States at the same time should publish a note withdrawing its suggestion for the adoption of the Declaration, and explaining that it proposed to rest the rights of its citizens upon the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States. This solution was accepted. ‘Now we can goon, . . . inan independent position vigorously stand up for every right and privilege under law and usage and treaties; and we have here a govern- ment that we can deal with frankly and not (I hope) in a mood to suspect us of wishing to put it at a disad- vantage for the sake of a general code or doctrine. A“WAGING NEUTRALITY” G3 land and naval and air and submarine battle (the greatest battle in the history of the belligerent race of man) within seventy-five miles of the coast of Eng- land, which hasn’t been invaded since 1066 and is now in its greatest danger since that time; and this is no time I fear, to force a great body of doctrine on Great Britain. God knows I’m afraid some American boat will run on a mine somewhere in the Channel or the North Sea. There’s war there as there is on land in Germany. Nobody tries to get goods through on land on the continent, and they make no complaints that commerce is stopped. Everybody tries to ply the Channel and the North Sea as usual, both of which have German and English mines and torpedo craft and submarines almost as thick as batteries along the hostile camps on land. The British Government (which now issues marine insurance) will not insure a British boat to carry food to Holland en route to the starving Belgians; and I hear that no government and no insurance company will write insurance for anything going across the North Sea. I wonder if the extent and ferocity and danger of this war are fully realized in the United States?” And so this crisis was passed; it was the first great service that Page had rendered the cause of the Allies and his own country. Yet shipping dificulties had their more agreeable aspects. Had it not been for the fact that both Page and Grey had an understand- ing sense of humor, neutrality would have proved a more difficult path than it actually was. Even amid the tragic problems with which these two men were dealing there was not lacking an occasional moment’s relaxation into the lighter aspect of things. One of the curious memorials preserved in the154 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” British Foreign Office is the canceled $15,000,000 check with which Great Britain paid the Alabama claims. ‘That the British should frame this memento of their great diplomatic feat and hang it in the Foreign Office is an evidence of the fact that in states- manship, as in less exalted matters, the English are excellent sportsmen. ‘The real justification of the honor paid to this piece of paper, of course, is that the settlement of the Alabama claims by arbitration sig- nalized a great forward step in international relations and did much to heal a century’s troubles between the United States and Great Britain. Sir Edward Grey used frequently to call Page’s attention to this docu- ment. It represented the amount of money, then considered large, which Great Britain had paid the United States for the depredations on American ship- ping for which she was responsible during the Civil War. One day the two men were discussing certain de- tentions of American cargoes—high-handed acts which, in Page’s opinion, were unwarranted. Not in- frequently, in the heat of discussion, Page would get up and pace the floor. And on this occasion his body, as well as his mind, was in a state of activity. Sud- denly his eye was attracted by the framed Alabama check. He leaned over, peered at it intensely, and then quickly turned to the Foreign Secretary: ‘If you don’t stop these seizures, Sir Edward, some day you’ll have your entire room papered with things like that!” Not long afterward Sir Edward in his turn scored on Page. The Ambassador called to present one of the many State Department notes. ‘The occasion was an embarrassing one, for the communication was writ- ten in the Department’s worst literary style. It not“WAGING NEUTRALITY” 155 infrequently happened that these notes, in the form in which Page received them, could not be presented to the British Government; they were so rasping and undiplomatic that Page feared that he would suffer the humiliation of having them returned, for there are certain things which no self-respecting Foreign Office will accept. On such occasions it was the practice of the London Embassy to smooth down the language be- fore handing the paper to the Foreign Secretary. The present note was one of this kind; but Page, be- cause of his friendly relations with Grey, decided to transmit the communication in its original shape. Sir Edward glanced over the document, looked up, and remarked, with a twinkle in his eye: “This reads as though they think that they are still talking to George the Third.” The roar of laughter that followed was something quite unprecedented amid the thick and dignified walls of the Foreign Office. It has been said that the tact and good sense of Page and Grey, working sympathetically for the same end, avoided many an impending crisis. The trouble caused early in 1915 by the ship Dacia and the way in which the difficulty was solved, perhaps illustrate the value of this codperation at its best. In the early days of the War Congress passed a bill admitting foreign ships to American registry. The wisdom and even the “neutrality” of such an act were questioned at the time. Colonel House, in one of his early telegrams to the President, declared that this bill “is full of lurk- ing dangers.” Colonel House was right. ‘The trouble was that many German merchant ships were ‘interned in American harbors, fearing to put to sea, where the watchful British warships lay waiting for them. Any attempt to place these vessels under the156 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” American flag, and to use them for trade between American and German ports, would at once cause a crisis with the Allies, for such a paper change in owner- ship would be altogether too transparent. Great Britain viewed this legislation with disfavor, but did not think it politic to protest such transfers generally; Spring Rice contented himself with informing the State Department that his government would not ob- ject so long as this changed status did not benefit Ger- many. If such German ships, after being transferred to the American flag, engaged in commerce between American ports and South American ports, or other places remotely removed from the Fatherland, Great Britain would make no difficulty. The Dacia, a merchantman of the Hamburg- America line, had been lying at her wharf in Port Arthur, Texas, since the outbreak of the war. In early January, 1915, she was purchased by Mr. E. N. Breitung, of Marquette, Michigan. Mr. Breitung caused great excitement in the newspapers when he announced that he had placed the Dacia under Ameri- can registry, according to the terms of this new law, had put upon her an American crew, and that he pro- posed to load her with cotton and sail for Germany. The crisis had now arisen which the well-wishers of Great Britain and the United States had so dreaded. Great Britain’s position was a difficult one. If it ac- quiesced, the way would be opened for placing under American registry all the German and Austrian ships that were then lying unoccupied in American ports and using them in trade between the United States and the Central Powers. If Great Britain seized the Dacia, then there was the likelihood that this would embroil her with the American Government—and this would serve German purposes quite as well.“WAGING NEUTRALITY” 157 Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the British Ambassador at Washington, at once notified Washington that the Dacia would be seized if she sailed for a German port. The cotton which she intended to carry was at that time not contraband, but the vessel itself was German and was thus subject to apprehension as enemy prop- erty. The seriousness of this position was that technically the Dacia was now an American ship, for an American citizen owned her, she carried an Ameri- can crew, she bore on her flagstaff the American flag, and she had been admitted to American registry under a law recently passed by Congress. How could the United States sit by quietly and permit this seizure to take place? When the Dacia sailed on January 23rd the excitement was keen; the voyage had obtained a vast amount of newspaper advertising, and the eyes of the world were fixed upon her. German sympa- thizers attributed the attitude of the American Gov- ernment in permitting the vessel to sail as a “dare” to Great Britain, and the fact that Great Britain had announced her intention of taking up this ‘“dare’’ made the situation still more tense. When matters had reached this pass Page one day dropped into the Foreign Office. “Have you ever heard of the British fleet, Sir Ed- ward?” he asked. Grey admitted that he had, though the question ob- viously puzzled him. “Yes,” Page went on, musingly. ‘“We’ve all heard of the British fleet. Perhaps we have heard too much about it. Don’t you think it’s had too much adver- tising ?”’ The Foreign Secretary looked at Page with an ex- pression that implied a lack of confidence in his sanity. “But have you ever heard of the French fleet ?”’ the158 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” American went on. ‘“‘France has a fleet too, I be- lieve.” Sir Edward granted that. “Don’t you think that the French fleet ought to have a little advertising °”’ ‘“What on earth are you talking about?” “Well,” said Page, “there’s the Dacia. Why not let the French fleet seize it and get some advertising ?”’ A gleam of understanding immediately shot across Grey’s face. The old familiar twinkle came into his eye. “Yes,” he said, ‘‘why not let the Belgian royal yacht seize it?” This suggestion from Page was one of the great in- spirations of the war. It amounted to little less than genius. By this time Washington was pretty wearied of the Dacia, for mature consideration had convinced the Department that Great Britain had the right on its side. Washington would have been only too glad to find a way out of the difficult position into which it had been forced, and this Page well understood. But this government always finds itself in an awkward plight in any controversy with Great Britain, because the hyphenates raise such a noise that it has difficulty in deciding such disputes upon their merits. To ig- nore the capture of this ship by the British would have brought all this hullabaloo again about the ears of the Administration. But the position of France is entirely different; the memories of Lafayette and Rochambeau still exercise a profound spell on the American mind; France does not suffer from the persecution of hyphenate popula- tions, and Americans will stand even outrages from France without getting excited. Page knew that if the British seized the Dacia, the cry would go up in“WAGING NEUTRALITY” 159 certain quarters for immediate war, but that, if France committed the same crime, the guns of the adversary would be spiked. It was purely a case of sentiment and “psychology.” And so the event proved. His suggestion was at once acted on; a French cruiser went out into the Channel, seized the offending ship, took it into a port, where a French prize court promptly condemned it. The proceeding did not cause even a ripple of hostility. The Dacia was sold to Frenchmen, rechristened the Yser and put to work in the Mediterranean trade. The episode was closed in the latter part of 1915 when a German submarine torpedoed the vessel and sent it to the bottom. Such was the spirit which Page and Sir Edward Grey brought to the solution of the shipping problems of 1914-1917. There is much more to tell of this great task of “waging neutrality,” and it will be told in its proper place. But already it is apparent to what ex- tent these two men served the cause of English- speaking civilization. Neither would quibble or up- hold an argument which he thought unjust, even though his nation might gain in a material sense, and neither would pitch the discussion in any other key than forbearance and mutual accommodation and courtliness. For both men had the same end in view. They were both thinking, not of the present, but of the coming centuries. The cooperation of the two nations in meeting the dangers of autocracy and Prus- sian barbarism, in laying the foundations of a future in which peace, democracy, and international justice should be the directing ideas of human society—such was the ultimate purpose at which these two states- men aimed. And no men have ever been more splendidly justi- fied by events. The Anglo-American situation of160 “WAGING NEUTRALITY” 1914 contained dangers before which all believers in real progress now shudder. Had Anglo-American diplomacy been managed with less skill and considera- tion, the United States and Great Britain would have become involved in a quarrel beside which all their previous differences would have appeared insignifi- cant. Mutual hatreds and hostilities would have risen that would have prevented the entrance of the United States into the war on the side of the Allies. It is not inconceivable that the history of 1812 would have been repeated, and that the men and resources of this country might have been used to support purposes which have always been hateful to the American con- science. That the world was saved from this calamity is ow- ing largely to the fact that Great Britain had in its Foreign Office a man who was always solving tem- porary irritations with his eyes constantly fixed upon a great goal, and that the United States had as am- bassador in London a man who had the most exalted view of the mission of his country, who had dedicated his life to the world-wide spread of the American ideal, and who believed that an indispensable part of this work was the maintenance of a sympathetic and helpful codperation with the English-speaking peoples.CHAPTER IX GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES HE Declaration of London was not the only (4 li problem that distracted Page in these early months of the war. Washington’s apparent deter- mination to make peace also added to his daily anx- ieties. That any attempt to end hostilities should have distressed so peace-loving and humanitarian a statesman as Page may seem surprising; it was, how- ever, for the very reason that he was a man of peace that these Washington endeavors caused him endless worry. The inspiring force back of the proposals, as the Ambassador well understood, was a panic-stricken Germany. The real purpose was not a peare, but a truce; and the cause which was to be advanced was not democracy but Prussian absolutism. Between the Battle of the Marne and the sinking of the Lusitania four attempts were made to end the war; all four were set afoot by Germany. President Wilson was the man to whom the Germans appealed to rescue them from their dilemma. It is no longer a secret that the Germans at this time regarded their situation as a tragic one; the suc- cess that they had anticipated for forty years had proved to be a disaster. The attempt to repeat the great episodes of 1864, 1866, and 1870, when Prussia had overwhelmed Denmark, Austria, and France in three brief campaigns, had ignominiously failed. In- stead of beholding a conquered Europe at her feet, 161162 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES Germany awoke from her illusion to find herself en- compassed by a ring of resolute and powerful foes. The fact that the British Empire, with its immense resources, naval, military, and economic, was now leading the alliance against them, convinced the most intelligent Germans that the Fatherland was face to face with the greatest crisis in its history. Peace now became the underground Germanic pro- gram. Yet the Germans did not have that inexorable respect for facts which would have persuaded them to accept terms to which the Allies could consent. The military oligarchy were thinking not so much of saving the Fatherland as of saving themselves; a settlement which would have been satisfactory to their enemies would have demanded concessions which the German people, trained for forty years to expect an unparal- leled victory, would have regarded as a defeat. The collapse of the militarists and of Hohenzollernism would have ensued. What the German oligarchy de- sired was a peace which they could picture to their deluded people as a triumph, one that would enable them to extricate themselves at the smallest possible cost from what seemed a desperate position, to escape the penalties of their crimes, to emerge from their failure with a Germany still powerful, both in eco- nomic resources and in arms, and to set to work again industriously preparing for a renewal of the struggle at a more favorable time. If negotiations resulted in such a truce, the German purpose would be splendidly served; even if they failed, however, the gain for Germany would still be great. Germany could, appear as the belligerent which desired peace and the Entente could perhaps be maneuvered into the position of the side responsible for continuing the war. The consideration which was chiefly at stake inGERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 163 these tortuous proceedings was public opinion in the United States. Americans do not yet understand the extent to which their country was regarded as the de- termining power. Both the German and the British Foreign Offices clearly understood, in August, 1914, that the United States, by throwing its support, es- pecially its economic support, to one side or the other, could settle the result. Probably Germany grasped this point even more clearly than did Great Britain, for, from the beginning, she constantly nourished the hope that she could embroil the United States and Great Britain—a calamity which would have given victory to the German arms. In every German move there were thus several mo- tives, and one of the chief purposes of the subter- ranean campaigns which she now started for peace was the desire of putting Britain in the false light of prolonging the war for aggressive purposes, and thus turning to herself that public opinion in this country which was so outspoken on the side of the Allies. Such public opinion, if it could be brought to regard Germany in a tolerant spirit; could easily be fanned into a flame by the disputes over blockades and ship- ping, and the power of the United States might thus be used for the advancement of the Fatherland. On the other hand, if Germany could obtain a peace which would show a profit for her tremendous effort, then the negotiations would have accomplished their pur- pose. The Ambassador was especially apprehensive of these peace moves in the early days of September, when the victorious German armies were marching on Paris. In London, as in most parts of the world, the capture of the French capital was then regarded as inevitable. September 3, 1924, was One of the dark-164 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES est days in modern times. The population of Paris was fleeing southward; the Government had moved its headquarters to Bordeaux; and the moment seemed to be at hand when the German Emperor would make his long anticipated entry into the capital of France. It was under these circumstances that the American Ambassador to Great Britain sent the following mes- sage directly to the President: To the President American Embassy, London, Sep. 3, 4. A. M. Everybody in this city confidently believes that the Germans, if they capture Paris will make a proposal for peace, and that the German Emperor will send you a message declaring that he is unwilling to shed another drop of blood. Any proposal that the Kaiser makes will be simply the proposal of a conqueror. His real purpose will be to preserve the Hohenzollern dynasty and the imperial bureaucracy. The prevail- ing English judgment is that, if Germany be permitted to stop hostilities, the war will have accomplished nothing. ‘There is a determination here to destroy utterly the German bureaucracy, and Englishmen are prepared to sacrifice themselves to any extent in men and money. The preparations that are being made here are for a long war; as I read the disposi- tion and the character of Englishmen they will not stop until they have accomplished their purpose. There is a general expression of hope in this country that neither the American Government nor the public opinion of our country will look upon any suggestion for peace as a serious one which does not aim, first ofGERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 165 all, at the absolute destruction of the German bureau- cracy. PAGE. This message had hardly reached Washington when the peace effort of which it warned the President be- gan to take practical form. In properly estimating these maneuvers it must be borne in mind that Ger- man diplomacy always worked underground and that it approached its negotiations in a way that would make the other side appear as taking the initiative. This was a phase of German diplomatic technique with which every European Foreign Office had long been familiar. Count Bernstorff arrived in the United States from Germany in the latter part of August, evidently with instructions from his government to se- cure the intercession of the United States. There were two unofficial men in New York who were ideally qualified to serve the part of intermedia- ries: Mr. James Speyer and Mr. Oscar S. Straus. Mr. Straus had been born in Germany; his father had been a German revolutionist of ’Forty-eight; like Carl Schurz, Abraham Jacobi, and Franz Sigel, he had come to America to escape Prussian militarism and the Prussian autocracy, and his children had been educated ‘na detestation of the things for which the German Empire stood. Three times Mr. Straus had served the United States as Ambassador to Turkey; he had filled the post of Secretary of Commerce and Labor ‘n President Roosevelt’s Cabinet and had held other important public commissions. Among his other activ- ities, Mr. Straus had played an important part in the166 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES peace movement of the preceding quarter of a century and he had been a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. On September 4th, Mr. Straus arrived at New York on the Mauretania. He had hardly reached this country when he was called upon the telephone by Mr. James Speyer, a friend of many years’ standing. Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, Mr. Speyer said, was a guest at his country home, Wald- heim, at Scarboro, on the Hudson; Mr. Speyer was giving a small, informal dinner the next evening, Satur- day, September 5th, and he asked Mr. and Mrs. Straus to come. Mr. Straus accepted the invitation, men- tally resolving that he would not discuss the war him- self, but merely listen. It would certainly have been a difficult task for any man to avoid this subject on this particular evening; the date was September Sth, the day when the German Army suddenly stopped in its progress toward Paris, and began retreating, the French and the British forces in pursuit. A few min- utes before Count Bernstorff sat down at Mr. Speyer’s table, with Mr. Straus opposite, he had learned that the magnificent enterprise which Germany had planned for forty years had failed and that his country was facing a monstrous disaster. The Battle of the Marne was raging in all its fury while this pacific conversation at Mr. Speyer’s house was taking place. Of course the war became the immediate topic of discussion. Count Bernstorff at once plunged into the usual German point of view—that Germany did not want war in the first place, that the Entente had forced the issue, and the like. ‘The Emperor and the German Government stood for peace,” he said. Naturally, a man who had spent a considerableGERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 167 part of his life promoting the peace cause pricked up his ears at this statement. “Does that sentiment still prevail in Germany?” asked Mr. Straus. “Yes,” replied the German Ambassador. “Would your government entertain a proposal for mediation now ?”’ asked Mr. Straus. “Certainly,” Bernstorff promptly replied. He has- tened to add, however, that he was speaking unofh- cially. “Do you object to my laying this matter before our government ?”” = Novledo! not.” Mr. Straus glanced at his watch; it was 10:15 o'clock. “T think I shall go to Washington at once—this very night. I can get the midnight train.” In a few minutes, Mr. Straus was speeding in his automobile through Westchester County in the direc- tion of the Pennsylvania Station. He caught the ex- press, and, the next morning, which was Sunday the sixth, he was laying the whole matter before Secretary Bryan at the latter’s house. Naturally, Mr. Bryan was overjoyed at the news; he at once summoned Bernstorff from New York to Washington, and went over the suggestion personally. The German Am- bassador repeated the statements which he had made to Mr. Straus—always guardedly qualifying his re- marks by saying that the proposal had not come orig- inally from him but from his American friend. Mean- while Mr. Bryan asked Mr. Straus to discuss the mat- ter with the British and French ambassadors. Both thought that the proposal should be seriously considered. “Tf it holds out one chance in a hundred of lessen-168 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES ing the length of the war, we should entertain it,” said Ambassador Jusserand. These facts were at once cabled to Page, who took the matter up with Sir Edward Grey. A despatch from the latter to the British Ambassador in Washing- ton gives a splendid summary of the British attitude on such approaches at this time. Sir Edward Grey to Sir Cecil Spring Rice Foreign Office, September 9, 1914. SIR: The American Ambassador showed me to-day a communication that he had from Mr. Bryan. It was to the effect that Mr. Straus and Mr. Speyer had been talking with the German Ambassador, who had said that, though he was without instructions, he thought that Germany might be disposed to end the war by mediation. .. . The American Ambassador said to me that this in- formation gave him a little concern. He feared that, coming after the declaration that we had signed last week with France and Russia about carrying on the war in common, the peace parties in the United States might be given the impression that Germany was in favor of peace, and that the responsibility for con- tinuing war was on others. I said that the agreement that we had made with France and Russia was an obvious one; when three countries were at war on the same side, one of them could not honorably make special terms for itself and 1On September 5, 1914, Great Britain, France, and Russia signed the Pact of London, an agreement which bound the three Powers of the Entente to make war and peace as a unit. Each Power specifi- cally pledged itself not to make a separate peace.GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 169 leave the others in the lurch. As to mediation, I was favorable to it in principle, but the real question was: On what terms could the war be ended? If the United States could devise anything that would bring this war to an end and prevent another such war being forced on Europe I should welcome the proposal. The Ambassador said that before the war began I had made suggestions for avoiding it, and that these suggestions had been refused. I said that this was so, but since the war began there were two further considerations to be borne in mind: We were fighting to save the west of Europe from being dominated by Prussian militarism; Germany had prepared to the day for this war, and we could not again have a great military power in the middle of Europe preparing war in this way and forcing it upon us; and the second thing was that cruel wrong had been done to Belgium, for which there should be some compensation. I had no indication whatever that Germany was prepared to make any reparation to Belgium, and, while repeating that in principle I was favorable to mediation, I could see nothing to do but to wait for the reply of the German Emperor to the question that Mr. Bryan had put to him and for the United States to ascertain on what terms Germany would make peace if the Emperor's reply was favor- able to mediation. The Ambassador made it quite clear that he re- garded what the German Ambassador had said as a move in the game. He agreed with what I had said respecting terms of peace, and that there seemed no prospect at present of Germany being prepared to accept them. I am, &c., E. GREY.170 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES A letter from Page to Colonel House gives Page’s interpretation of this negotiation: To Edward M. House London, September 10, 1914. My DEAR House: A rather serious situation has arisen: The Ger- mans of course thought that they would take Paris. They were then going to propose a conqueror’s terms of peace, which they knew would not be accepted. But they would use their so-called offer of peace purely for publicity purposes. They would say, ‘See, men of the world, we want peace; we offer peace; the con- tinuance of this awful war is not our doing.” Every nation was willing to accept Sir Edward Grey’s proposals? but Germany. She was bent on a war of conquest. Now she’s likely to get licked— lock, stock, and barrel. She is carrying on a propa- ganda and a publicity campaign all over the world. The Allies can’t and won’t accept any peace except on the condition that German militarism be uprooted. They are not going to live again under that awful shadow and fear. They say truly that life on such terms is not worth living. Moreover, if Germany should win the military control of Europe, she would soon—that same war party—attack the United States. The war will not end until this condition can be im- posed—that there shall be no more militarism. But in the meantime, such men as Straus (a good fellow) may be able to let (by helping) the Germans appear to the Peace people as really desiring peace. Of course, what they want is to save their mutton. 1 This refers, of course, to proposals made before the war started,GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 171 And if we begin mediation talk now on that basis, we shall not be wanted when a real chance for media- tion comes; our chance for real usefulness will be thrown away. Put the President on his guard. Wee: In the latter part of the month came Germany's reply. One would never suspect, when reading it, that Germany had played any part in instigating the negotiation. The Kaiser repeated the old charges that the Entente had forced the war on the Father- land, that it was now determined to annihilate the Central Powers and that consequently there was no hope that the warring countries could agree upon ac- ceptable terms for ending the struggle. So ended Germany’s first peace drive, and in the only possible way that it could end. But the Wash- ington administration continued to be most friendly to mediation. A letter of Colonel House’s, dated Oc- tober 4, 1914, possesses great historical importance. It was written after a detailed discussion with Presi- dent Wilson, and it indicates not only the President’s desire to bring the struggle to a close, but it describes in some detail the principles which the President then regarded as essential to a permanent peace. It fur- rishes the central idea of the presidential policy for the next four years; indeed, it contains the first state- ment of that famous “Article X’’ of the Covenant of the League of Nations which was Mr. Wilson’s most important contribution to that contentious document. This was the article which pledges the League “to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independ- ence” of all its members; it was the article which,V72 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES more than any other, made the League obnoxious to Americans, who interpreted it as an attempt to in- volve them perpetually in the quarrels of Europe; and it was the one section of the Treaty of Versailles which was most responsible for the rejection of that document by the United States Senate. There are other suggestions in Colonel House’s letter which ap- parently bore fruit in the League Covenant. It is somewhat astonishing that a letter of Colonel House’s, written as far back as October 3, 1914, two months after the outbreak of the war, should contain “‘Article X’’ as one of the essential terms of peace, as well as other ideas afterward incorporated in that document, accompanied by an injunction that Page should present the suggestion to Sir Edward Grey: From Edward M. House October 3rd, 1914. DEAR PAGE: Frank [the Ambassador’s son] has just come in and has given me your letter of September 22nd which is of absorbing interest. You have never done any- thing better than this letter, and some day, when you give the word, it must be published. But in the mean- time, it will repose in the safe-deposit box along with your others and with those of our great President. I have just returned from Washington where I was with the President for nearly four days. He is look- ing well and is well. Sometimes his spirits droop, but, then again, he is his normal self. Before I came from Prides! I was fearful lest 1 Colonel House’s summer home in Massachusetts.GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 173 Straus, Bernstorff, and others would drive the Presi- dent into doing something unwise. I have always counseled him to remain quiet for the moment and let matters unfold themselves further. In the mean- time, I have been conferring with Bernstorff, with Dumba,! and of course, Spring Rice. The President now wants me to keep in touch with the situation, and I do not think there is any danger of anyone on the outside injecting himself into it unless Mr. Bryan does something on his own initiative. Both Bernstorff and Dumba say that their countries are ready for peace talks, but the difficulty is with Eng- land. Sir Cecil says their statements are made merely to place England in a false position. The attitude, I think, for England to maintain is the one which she so ably put forth to the world. That is, peace must come only upon condition of disarma- ment and must be permanent. I have a feeling that Germany will soon be willing to discuss terms. I do not agree that Germany has to be completely crushed and that terms must be made either in Berlin or Lon- don. It is manifestly against England’s interest and the iriterest of Europe generally for Russia to become the dominating military force in Europe, just as Ger- many was. ‘The dislike which England has for Ger- many should not blind her to actual conditions. If Germany is crushed, England cannot solely write the terms of peace, but Russia’s wishes must also largely prevail. When peace conversations begin, at best, they will probably continue many months before anything tan- gible comes from them. England and the Allies could 2 Ambassador from Austria-Hungary to the United States.174 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES readily stand on the general proposition that only en- during peace will satisfy them, and I can see no in- superable obstacle in the way. The Kaiser did not want war and was not respon- sible for it further than his lack of foresight which led him to build up a formidable engine of war which later dominated him. Peace cannot be made until the war party in Germany find that their ambitions cannot be realized, and this, I think, they are begin- ning to know. When the war is ended and the necessary territorial alignments made, it seems to me, the best guaranty of peace could be brought by every nation in Europe guaranteeing the territorial integrity of every other nation,’ by confining the manufacture of arms to the governments themselves, and by permitting represen- tatives of all nations to inspect, at any time, the works.” Then, too, all sources of national irritation should be removed so what at first may be a sore spot cannot grow into a malignant disease. It will not be too dif- feult, I think, to bring about an agreement that will insure permanent peace, provided all the nations of Europe are honest in their desire for it. I am writing this to you with the President’s knowl- edge and consent and with the thought that it will be conveyed to Sir Edward. There is a growing impa- tience in this country because of this war and there is constant pressure upon the President to use his influ- ence to bring about normal conditions. He does not wish to do anything to irritate or offend any one of ‘This, with certain modifications is Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. *There is a suggestion of these provisions ir Article 8 of the League Covenant.GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 175 the belligerent nations, but he has an abiding faith in the efficacy of open and frank discussion between those that are now at war. As far as I can see, no harm can be done by a dis- passionate discussion at this stage, even though nothing comes of it. In a way, it is perhaps better that in- formal and unofficial conversations are begun and later the principals can take it up themselves. I am sure that Sir Edward is too great a man to let any prejudices deter him from ending, as soon as pos- sible, the infinite suffering that each day of war entails. Faithfully yours, E. M. House. By December 4th Washington had evidently made up its mind to move again. From Edward M. House December 4th, 1914. DEAR PAGE: The President desires to start peace parleys at the very earliest moment, but he does not wish to offend the sensibilities of either side by making a proposal before the time is opportune. He is counting upon being given a hint, possibly through me, in an unofh- cial way, as to when a proffer from him will be ac- ceptable. Pressure is being brought upon him to offer his serv- ices again, for this country is suffering, like the rest of the neutral world, from the effects of the war, and our people are becoming restless. Would you mind conveying this thought delicately to Sir Edward Grey and letting me know what he thinks?176 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES I stand ready to go to Germany at any moment in order to sound the temper of that government, and I would then go to England as I did last June. This nation would not look with favor upon a policy that held nothing but the complete annihilation of the enemy. Something must be done sometime, by somebody, to Initiate a peace movement, and I can think of no way, at the moment, but the one suggested. I will greatly appreciate your writing me fully and freely in regard to this phase of the situation, Faithfully yours, E. M. House. To this Page immediately replied: To Edward M. House December 12th, 1914. My DEAR House: The English rulers have no feeling of vengeance. I have never seen the slightest traces of that. But they are determined to secure future safety. They will not have this experience repeated if they can help it. They realize now that they have been living un- der a sort of fear—or dread—for ten years: they sometimes felt that it was bound to come some time and then at other times they could hardly believe it. And they will spend all the men and all the money they have rather than suffer that fear again or have that danger. Now, if anybody could fix a basis for the complete restoration of Belgium, so far as restora- tion is possible, and for the elimination of militarism, I am sure the English would talk on that basis. ButGERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 177 there are two difficulties—Russia wouldn’t talk till she has Constantinople, and I haven’t found anybody who can say exactly what you mean by the ‘“elimina- tion of militarism.” Disarmament? England will have her navy to protect her incoming bread and meat. How, then, can she say to Germany, “You can’t have anarmy’? You say the Americans are becoming “restless.” The plain fact is that the English people, and espe- cially the English military and naval people, don’t care a fig what the Americans think and feel.. They say, “We're fighting their battle, too—the battle of democ- racy and freedom from bureaucracy—why don’t they come and help us in our life-and-death struggle?” I have a drawer full of letters saying this, not one of which I have ever answered. The official people never say that, of course—nor the really responsible people, but a vast multitude of the pub- lichdot: Now, the question which nobody seems to be able to answer is this: How can the military party and the military spirit of Germany be prevented from con- tinuing to prepare for the conquest of Great Britain and from going to work to try it again? That im- plies a change in the form, spirit, and control of the German Empire. If they keep up a great army, they will keep it up with that end more or less in view. If the military party keeps in power, they will try it again in twenty-five or forty years. This is all that the English care about or think about. They don’t see how it is to be done themselves. All they see yet is that they must show the Germans that they can’t whip Great Britain. If England wins decisively the English hope that somehow the military178 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES party will be overthrown in Germany and that the Ger- mans, under peaceful leadership, will go about their business—industrial, political, educational, etc.—and quit dreaming of and planning for universal empire and quit maintaining a great war machine, which at some time, for some reason, must attack somebody to justify its existence. This makes it dificult for the English to make overtures to or to receive overtures from this military war-party which now is Germany. But, if it be possible so completely to whip the war party that it will somehow be thrown out of power at home—that’s the only way they now see out of it. To patch up a peace, leaving the German war party in power, they think, would be only to invite another war. There you are. I’ve blinked myself blind and talked myself hoarse to men in authority—from Grey down—to see a way out—without keeping this intol- erable slaughter up to the end. But they stand just where [ tell you. At present, I can’t for the life of me see a way to peace, for the one reason I have told you. The Ger- mans wish to whip England, to invade England. They started with their army toward England. Till that happened England didn’t have an army. But I see no human power that can give the English now what they are determined to have—safety for the fu- ture—till some radical change is made in the Ger- man system so that they will no longer have a war party any more than England has a war party. Eng- land surely has no wish to make conquest of Germany. If Germany will show that she has no wish to makeGERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 179 conquest of England, the war would end to-morrow. _. . All this for you and me only—nobody else. Heartily yours, WALTER H. PAGE. Probably Page thought that this statement of the case—-and it was certainly a masterly statement— would end any attempt to get what he regarded as an unsatisfactory and dangerous peace. But President Wilson could not be deterred from pressing the issue. His conviction was firm that this winter of 1914-1915 represented the most opportune time to bring the war- ring nations to terms, and it was a conviction from which he never departed. After the sinking of the Lusitania the Administration gazed back regretfully at its frustrated attempts of the preceding winter, and it was inclined to place the responsibility for this fail- ure upon Great Britain and France. The efforts which the Administration was making represented a most serious determination to bring hostilities to an end. This letter and the correspondence which now took place with Page also indicate the general terms upon which the Wilson Administration believed that which Colonel House now set forth were probably the mighty differences could be composed. ‘The ideas more the President’s than his own; he was merely the intermediary in their transmission. They emphasized Mr. Wilson’s conviction that a decisive victory on either side would be a misfortune for mankind. As early as August, 1914, this was clearly the conviction that underlay all others in the President’s interpreta- tion of events. His other basic idea was that mili- tarism should come to an end “‘on land and sea’’; this could mean nothing except that Germany was expected180 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES to abandon its army and that Great Britain was to abandon its navy. From Edward M. House January 4th, 1915. DEAR PAGE: I believe the Dual Alliance is thoroughly ready for peace and I believe they would be willing to agree upon terms that England would accept provided Rus- sia and France could be satisfied. They would, in my opinion, evacuate both Belgium and France and indemnify the former, and they would, I think, be willing to begin negotiations upon a basis looking to permanent peace. It would surprise me if the Germans did not come out in the open soon and declare that they have always been for peace, that they are for peace now, and that they are willing to enter into a compact which would insure peace for all time; that they have been misrep- resented and maligned and that they leave the entire responsibility for the continuation of the war with the Allies. If they should do this, it would create a profound impression, and if it was not met with sympathy by the Allies, the neutral sentiment, which is now almost wholly against the Germans, would veer toward them. Will you not convey this thought to Sir Edward and let me know what he says? The President is willing and anxious for me to go to England and Germany as soon as there is anything tangible to go on, and whenever my presence will be welcome. The Germans have already indicated this feeling but I have not been able to get from Spring Rice any expression from his government.GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 181 As I told you before, the President does not wish to offend the sensibilities of anyone by premature ac- tion, but he is, of course, enormously interested in initiating at least tentative conversations. Will you not advise me in regard to this? Faithfully yours, E. M. House. Why was Colonel House so confident that the Dual Alliance was prepared at this time to discuss terms of peace? Colonel House, as his letter shows, was in communication with Zimmermann, the German Under Foreign Secretary. But a more important ap- proach had just been made, though information bear- ing on this-had not been sent to Page. The Kaiser had asked President Wilson to transmit to Great Brit- ain a suggestion for making peace on the basis of sur- rendering Belgium and of paying for its restoration. It seems incredible that the Ambassador should not have been told of this, but Page learned of the pro- posal from Field Marshal French, then commanding the British armies in the field. Page has left a memo- randum which explains the whole strange proceeding —a paper which is interesting not only for its contents, but as an illustration of the unofficial way in which diplomacy was conducted in Washington at this time: Field Marshal Sir John French, secretly at home from his command of the English Forces in France, invited me to luncheon. . . . The military situation is this: a trench stalemate in France. Neither army has made appreciable progress in three months. Neither can advance without a great loss of men. Neither is whipped. Neither can conquer. It would require a million more men than the Allies can com-182 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES mand and a very long time to drive the Germans back across Belgium. What then? The Allies are still stronger—so long as they hold together as one man. But is it reason- able to assume that they can? And, even if they can, is it worth while to win a complete victory at such a cost as the lives of practically all the able-bodied men in Europe? But can the Allies hold together as one man for two or three or four years? Well, what are we going to do? And here came the news of the lunch. General French informed me that the Presi- dent had sent to England, at the request of the Kaiser, a proposal looking toward peace, Germany offering to give up Belgium and to pay for its restoration. “This,” said Sir John, “is their fourth proposal.” “And,” he went on, “if they will restore Belgium and give Alsace-Lorraine to France and Constanti- nople will go to Russia, I can’t see how we can refuse tan Now—did General French send for me and tell me this just for fun and just because he likes me? He was very eager to know my opinion whether this peace offer were genuine or whether it was a trick of the Germans to—publish it later and thereby to throw the blame for continuing the war on England? It occurs to me as possible that he was directed to tell me what he told, trusting to me, in spite of his protestations of personal confidence, etc., to get it to the President. Assuming that the President sent the Kaiser’s message to the King, this may be a suggested informal answer—that if the offer be extended to give France and Russia what they want, it will be con- sidered, etc. “This may or may not be true. Alas!GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 183 the fact that I know nothing about the offer has no meaning; for the State Department never informs me of anything it takes up with the British Ambassador in Washington. Well, I'll see. These were therefore the reasons why Colonel House had decided to go to Europe and enter into peace negotiations with the warring powers. . . . His letter intimates that the German Government was eager to have him cross the ocean on this particular mission; it discloses, on the other hand, that the Brit- ish Government regarded the proposed negotiations with no enthusiasm. Sir Edward Grey and Mr. As- quith would have been glad to end hostilities on terms that would permanently establish peace and abolish the vices which were responsible for the war, and they were ready to welcome courteously the President's representative and discuss the situation with him in a fair-minded spirit. But they did not believe that such an enterprise could serve a useful purpose. Pos- sibly the military authorities did not believe that either side could win a decisive victory, but this was not the belief of the British public itself. Ihe atmosphere in England at that time was one of confidence in the suc- cess of British arms and of suspicion and distrust of the British Government. A strong expectation pre- vailed in the popular mind, that the three great Powers of the Entente would at an early date destroy the menace which had enshrouded Europe for forty years, and there was no intention of giving Germany a breath- ing spell during which she could regenerate her forces to resume the onslaught. Colonel House reached London early in February and was soon in close consultation with the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey. He made a great184 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES personal success; the British statesmen gained a high regard for his disinterestedness and his general de- sire to serve the cause of decency among nations; but he made little progress in his peace plans, simply be- cause the facts were so discouraging and so impreg- nable. Sir Edward repeated to him what he had already said to Page many times: that Great Britain was prepared to discuss a peace that would really safe- guard the future of Europe, but was not prepared to discuss one that would merely reinstate the régime that had existed before 1914. The fact that the Ger- mans were not ready to accept such a peace made dis- cussion useless. Disappointed at this failure, Colonel House left for Berlin. His letters to Page show that the British judgment of Germany was not unjust and that the warnings which Page had sent to Washington were based on facts: From Edward M. House Embassy of the United States of America, Berlin, Germany, March 20, 1915. DEAR PAGE: I arrived yesterday morning and I saw Zimmer- mann almost immediately. He was very cordial and talked to me frankly and sensibly. I tried to bring about a better feeling toward Eng- land, and told him how closely their interests touched at certain points. I also told him of the broad way in which Sir Edward was looking at the difficult prob- lems that confronted Europe, and I expressed the hope that this view would be reciprocated elsewhere, so that, when the final settlement came, it could beGERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES 185 made in a way that would be to the advantage of mankind. Zimmermann said that it was impossible for them to make any peace overtures, and he gave me to under- stand that, for the moment, even what England would perhaps consent to now, could not be accepted by Germany, to say nothing of what France had in mings 0-0 Faithfully yours, E. M. House. From Edward M. House Embassy of the United States of America, Berlin, Germany. March 26, 1915. DEAR PAGE: While I have accomplished here much that is of value, yet I leave sadly disappointed that no direct move can be made toward peace. The Civil Government are ready, and upon terms that would at least make an opening. ‘There is also a large number in military and naval circles that I believe would be glad to begin parleys, but the trouble is mainly with the people. It is a very dangerous thing to permit a people to be misled and their minds inflamed either by the press, by speeches, or other- wise. In my opinion, no government could live here at this time if peace was proposed upon terms that would have any chance of acceptance. Those in civil author- ity that I have met are as reasonable and fairminded186 GERMANY’S FIRST PEACE DRIVES as their counterparts in England or America, but, for the moment, they are impotent. I hear on every side the old story that all Germany wants is a permanent guaranty of peace, so that she may proceed upon her industrial career undisturbed. Faithfully yours, E. M. Hovuse. The ink on those words was scarcely dry when a message from Queenstown was handed to the Ameri- can Ambassador. A German submarine had tor- pedoed and sunk the Lusitania off the Old Head of Kinsale, and one hundred and twenty-four American men, women, and children had been drowned.(GlalerteIUir D6 THE ‘“‘LUSITANIA’—AND AFTER HE news of the Lusitania was received at the American Embassy at four o’clock on the after- noon of May 7, 1915. At that time preparations were under way for a dinner in honor of Colonel and Mrs. House: the first Lusitania announcement de- clared that only the ship itself had been destroyed and that all the passengers and members of the crew had been saved; there was, therefore, no good reason for abandoning this dinner. At about seven o’clock, the Ambassador came home: his manner showed that something extraordi- nary had taken place; there were no outward signs of emotion, but he was very serious. The first news, he now informed Mrs. Page, had been a mistake; more than one thousand men, women, and children had lost their lives, and more than one hundred of these were American citizens. It was too late to post- pone the dinner but that affair was one of the most tragic in the social history of London. The Ambassa- dor was constantly receiving bulletins from his Chan- cery, and these, as quickly as they were received, he read to his guests. His voice was quiet and sub- dued: there were no indications of excitement in his manner or in that of his friends, and hardly of sup- pressed emotion. The atmosphere was rather that of dumb stupefaction. The news seemed to have dulled everyone’s capacity for thought and even for 187188 THE “SLUSITANIA’—AND AFTER feeling. If anyone spoke, it was in whispers. A fter- ward, in the drawing room, this same mental state was the prevailing one; there was little denunciation of Germany and practically no discussion as to the consequences of the crime; everyone’s thought was en- grossed by the harrowing and unbelievable facts which the Ambassador was reading from the little yellow slips that were periodically brought in. An irresist- ible fascination evidently kept everybody in the room; the guests stayed late, eager for every new item. When they finally left, one after another, their man- ner was still abstracted and they said their good-nights in low voices. There were two reasons for this be- havior. The first was that the Ambassador and his guests had received the details of the greatest infamy which any supposedly civilized state had perpetrated since the massacre of Saint Bartholomew. ‘The sec- ond was the conviction that the United States would at once declare war on Germany. On this latter point several of the guests expressed their ideas and one of the most shocked and outspoken was Colonel House. For a month the President's per- sonal representative had been discussing with British statesmen possible openings for mediation, but all his hopes in this direction now vanished. That President Wilson would act with the utmost energy Colonel House took for granted. This act, he evidently be- lieved, left the United States no option. “We shall be at war with Germany within a month,” he declared. The sensations of most Americans in London dur- ing this crisis are almost indescribable. Washington's failure promptly to meet the situation affected them with astonishment and humiliation. Colonel House, confident that war was impending, hurried his prepara- tions to leave England; he wished to be in the UnitedTHE ‘‘LUSITANIA’—AND AFTER 189 States, at the President’s side, when the declaration was made. With this feeling about Mr. Wilson, Colonel House received a fearful shock a day or two after the Lusitania had gone down: while walking in Piccadilly, he caught a glimpse of one of the famous sandwich men, bearing a poster of an afternoon news- paper. This glaring broadside bore the following legend: ‘We are too proud to fight—Woodrow Wilson.” The sight of that placard was Colonel House’s first intimation that the President might not act vigorously. He made no attempt to conceal from Page the shock which it had given him. Soon the whole of England was ringing with these six words; the newspapers were filled with stinging editorials and cartoons, and the music halls found in the Wilsonian phrase materials for their choicest gibes. Even in more serious quar- ters America was the subject of the most severe denun- ciation. No one felt these strictures more poignantly than President Wilson’s closest confidant. A day or two before sailing home he came into the Embassy greatly depressed at the prevailing revulsion against the United States. “I feel,”’ Colonel House said to Page, ‘“‘as though I had been given a kick at every lamp post coming down Constitution Hill.” And now came the period of distress and of dis- ‘Ilusionment. Three Lusitania notes were sent and were evasively answered by Germany, and Washing- ton still seemed to be marking time. The one signifi- cant event in this exciting period, Mr. Bryan's resignation as Secretary of State, seemed likely to have important consequences for Page. Colonel House and others strongly urged the President to call the Ambassador home from London and make him Secretary of State. This was the third position in190 THE “‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER President Wilson’s cabinet for which Page had been considered. Of all cabinet posts, however, the one that would have especially attracted him would have been the Department of State. But President Wilson believed that the appointment of an Ambassador at one of the belligerent capitals, especially of an Am- bassador whose sympathies for the Allies were so pronounced as were Page’s, would have been an “unneutral”’ act, and, therefore, Colonel House’s rec- ommendation was not approved. Page, pinning his faith in President Wilson, still had confidence in the President’s determination to up- hold the national honor. Page was not one of those who thought that the United States should declare war immediately after the Lusitania. The Presi- dent’s course, in giving Germany a chance to make amends and to disavow the act, met with his approval, and he found, also, much to admire in Mr. Wilson’s first Lusitania note. His judgment in this matter was based first of all upon the merits of the case; besides this, his admiration for Mr. Wilson as a public man was strong. To think otherwise of the President would have been a great grief to the Ambassador and to differ with his chief on the tremendous issue of the war would have meant for Page the severance of one of the most cherished associations of his life. But in the summer and autumn of 1915 one agony followed another. The “too proud to fight” speech was in Page’s mind nothing less than a tragedy. The President’s first Lusitania note for a time restored the Ambassador’s confidence; it seemed to show that the President intended to hold Germany to that “strict accountability’ which he had threatened. But Mr. Wilson’s course now presented new difficulties to his Ambassador. Still Page believed that the President,THE “‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER IgI in his own way and in his own time, would find a path out of his dilemma that would protect the honor and the safety of the United States. If any of the Em- bassy subordinates became impatient over the proced- ure of Washington, he did not find a sympathetic listener in the Ambassador. The whole of London and of Europe might be resounding with denunciations of the White House, but Page would tolerate no man- ‘festations of hostility in his presence. ‘The problem appears different to Washington than it does to us,” he would say to his confidants. “We see only one side of it; the President sees all sides. If we give him all the facts, he will decide the thing wisely.” Events, however, eventually proved too strong for the most devoted supporter of President Wilson. After the Arabic and the Hesperian, Page’s official intimates saw signs that the Ambassador was losing confidence in his old friend. He would discuss Mr. Wilson occasionally, with those in whom his con- fidence was strongest; his expressions, however, were never flippant or violent. That Page could be biting as well as brilliant in his comments on public per- sonages his letters abundantly reveal, yet he never exercised his talent for sarcasm or invective at the ex- pense of the White House. He never forgot that Mr. Wilson was President and that he was Ambassa- dor; he would still defend the Administration; and he even now continued to find consolation in the reflection that Mr. Wilson was living in a different atmosphere and that he had difficulties to confront of which a man in London could know nothing. The Ambassador’s emotion was rather one of dis- appointment and sorrow, mingled with anxiety as to the plight into which his country was being led. As to his duty in this situation, however, Page never hesi-192 THE “‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER tated. In his relations with his Embassy and with the British world he maintained this non-critical attitude; but in his letters to President Wilson and Colonel House, he was describing the situation, and expressing his convictions, with the utmost freedom and frank- ness. In both these attitudes Page was consistent and absolutely loyal. It was his duty to carry out the Wilson instructions and he had too high a conception of the ambassadorial office to show to the world any unfavorable opinions he may have held about his country’s course. His duty to his post made it just as imperative that he set forth to the President the facts exactly as they were. And this the Ambassador now proceeded to do. For the mere ornamental dignities of an Ambassador- ship Page cared nothing; he was wasting his health in his duties and exhausting his private resources; much as he loved the English and congenial as were his sur- roundings, the fear of being recalled for ‘‘disloyalty”’ or insubordination never influenced him. The letters which he now wrote to Colonel House and to Presi- dent Wilson himself are probably without parallel in the diplomatic annals of this or of any other country. In them he told the President precisely what English- men thought of him and of the extent to which the United States was suffering in European estimation from the Wilson policy. His boldness sometimes as- tounded his associates. One day a friend and adviser of President Wilson came into the Ambassador’s office just as Page had finished one of his communications to Washington. ‘Read that!’’ the Ambassador said, handing over the manuscript to his visitor. As the caller read, his countenance displayed the progressive stages of his amazement. When he hadTHE ““LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER 193 finished, his hands dropped helplessly upon his knees. “Is that the way you write to the President?” he gasped. “Of course,’ Page replied, quietly. “Why not? Why shouldn’t I tell him the truth? ‘That is what I am: here for.’ “There is no other person in the world who dare talk to him like that!’ was the reply. This is unquestionably the fact. When Mr. Wil- son found that one of his former confidants had turned out to be a critic, that man instantaneously passed out of his life. And this was now Page’s fate; the friend- ship and associations of forty years were as though they had never been. Just why Mr. Wilson did not recall his Ambassador is a question that has puzzled Page’s friends. He would sometimes refer to him as a man who was “more British than the British,” as one who had been taken completely captive by British blandishments, but he never came to the point of dis- missing him. Perhaps he did not care to face the public scandal that such an act would have caused; but a more plausible reason is that Page, despite the causes which he had given for irritation, was indis- pensable to him. Page’s early letters had furnished the President ideas which had taken shape in Wilson’s policies, and, disagreeable as the communications now became, there are evidences that they influenced the solitary statesman in the White House, and that they had much to do in finally forcing Mr. Wilson into the war. The alternative question, as to why Page did not retire when he found himself so out of sympathy with the President, will be suficiently answered in sub- sequent chapters; at present it may be said that he did resign and only consented to remain at the urgent re- quest of Washington. In fact, all during 1915 and194 THE “LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER 1916, there seemed to be a fear in Washington that Page would definitely abandon the London post. On one occasion, when the newspapers published rumors to this effect, Page received an urgent despatch from Mr. Lansing. The message came at a time— the date was October 26, 1915—-when Page was es- pecially discouraged over the Washington policy. “Representatives of the press,” said Mr. Lansing, “have repeated rumors that you are planning to re- sign. These have been brought to the President's at- tention, and both he and I have denied them. Still these rumors persist, and they cause both the President and me great anxiety. We cannot believe that they are well founded. ‘In view of the fact that they are so persistent, we have thought it well to inform you of them and to tell you how earnestly we hope that they are base- less. We trust that you will set both our minds at rest... If Page had ever had any compunction about ad- dressing the President in blunt phrases these expres- sions certainly convinced him that he was a free agent. To Edward M. House July 21, 1915. DEAR HOUSE: I enclose a pamphlet in ridicule of the President. I don’t know who wrote it, for my inquiries so far have brought no real information. I don’t feel like sending it to him. I send it to you—to do with as you think best. This thing alone is, of course, of no consequence. But it is symptomatic. There is much feeling about the slowness with which he acts. One hundred and twenty people (Americans) wereTHE ‘‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER 195 drowned on the Lusitania and we are still writing notes about it. . . . Anybody who knows the Ger- mans knows, of course, that they are simply playing for time, that they are not going to ‘“‘come down,” that Von Tirpitz is on deck, that they’d just as lief have war with us as not—perhaps had rather—be- cause they don’t want any large nation left fresh when the war ends. They’d like to have the whole world bankrupt. There is a fast growing feeling here, therefore, that the American Government is pusillan- imous—dallies with ’em, is affected by the German propaganda, etc., etc. Of course, such a judgment is not fair. It is formed without knowing the conditions in the United States. But I think you ought to real- ize the strength of this sentiment. No doubt before you receive this, the President will send something to Germany that will amount to an ultimatum and there will be at least a momentary change of sentiment here. But looking at the thing in a long-range way, we're bound to get into the war. For the Germans will blow up more American travelers without notice. And by dallying with them we do not change the ulti- mate result, but we take away from ourselves the spunk and credit of getting in instead of being kicked and cursed in. We've got to get in: they won't play the game in any other way. I have news direct from a high German source in Berlin which strongly con- firms thiss ane It’s a curious thing to say. But the only solution that I see is another Lusitania outrage, which would force war. Wielae ke The prophecy contained in this letter was quickly fulfilled. A week or two after Colonel House had196 THE ‘“‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER received it, the Arabic was sunk with loss of American life. “That settles it,’ said Page to his son. “They have sunk the Arabic. That means that we shall break with Germany and I’ve got to go back to London.” To Edward M. House London, September 2nd, 1915S. DEAR House: You write me about pleasing the Allies, the big Ally in particular. That doesn’t particularly appeal to me. We don’t owe them anything. There’s no obligation. I’d never confess for a moment that we are under any obligation to any of them nor to anybody. I’m not out to ‘please’ anybody, as a primary purpose: that’s not my game nor my idea—nor yours either. As for England in particular, the account was squared when she twice sent an army against us—in her folly—es- pecially the last time, when she burnt our Capitol. There’s been no obligation since. The obligation 1s on the other foot. We've set her an example of what democracy will do for men, an example of efficiency, an example of freedom of opportunity. The future is ours, and she may follow us and profit by it. Al- ready we have three white English-speaking men to every two in the British Empire: we are sixty per cent. of the Anglo-Saxons in the world. If there be any obligation to please, the obligation is on her to please us. And she feels and sees it now. My point is not that, nor is it what we or any other neutral nation has done or may do—Hiolland or any other. ‘This war is the direct result of the over- -polite, diplomatic, standing-aloof, bowing-to-one-another inTHE ‘‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER 197 gold lace, which all European nations are guilty of in times of peace—castes and classes and uniforms and orders and such folderol, instead of the proper busi- ness of the day. Every nation in Europe knew that Germany was preparing for war. If they had really got together—not mere Hague Sunday-school talk and resolutions—but had really got together for business and had said to Germany, ‘“The moment you fire a shot, we'll all fight against you; we have so many millions of men, so many men-of-war, so many billions of money; and we'll increase all these if you do not change your system and your building-up of armies’ — then there would have been no war. My point is not sentimental. It is: (1) We must maintain our own self-respect and safety. If we submit to too many insults, that will in time bring Germany against us. We've got to show at some time that we don’t believe, either, in the ef- ficacy of Sunday-School resolves for peace—that we are neither Daughters of the Dove of Peace nor Sons of the Olive Branch, and (2) About nagging and forever presenting tech- nical legal points as lawyers do to confuse juries—the point is the point of efficiency. If we do that, we can’t carry our main points. I find it harder and harder to get answers now to important questions be- cause we ask so many unimportant and nagging ones. I’ve no sentiment—perhaps not enough. My gush- ing days are gone, if I ever had em. The cutting-out of the ‘‘100 years of peace” oratory, etc., etc., was one of the blessings of the war. But we must be just and firm and preserve our own self-respect and keep alive the fear that other nations have of us; and we ought to have the courage to make the Department of State more than a bureau of complaints. We must198 THE “‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER learn to say “‘No” even to a Gawdamighty independent American citizen when he asks an improper or 1m- practicable question. Public opinion in the United States consists of something more than the threats of Congressmen and the bleating of newspapers; it con- sists of the judgment of honorable men on courageous and frank actions—a judgment that cannot be made up till action is taken. Heartily yours, W:, Hise: To Edward M. House London, Tuesday night, Sept. 8, 1915. Dear House: ... They are laughing at Uncle Sam here—it comes near to being ridicule, in fact, for seeming to jump at Bernstorff’s unfrank assurances. And, as | have telegraphed the President, English opinion is— well, it is very nearly disrespectful. Men say here (I mean our old friends) that with no disavowal of the Lusitania, the Falaba, the Gulflight, or the Arabic or of the Hesperian, the Germans are “stuffing’’ Uncle Sam, that Uncle Sam is in the clutches of the peace-at-any-price public opinion, that the United States will suffer any insult and do nothing. I hardly pick up a paper that does not have a sarcastic par- agraph or cartoon. We are on the brink of con- vincing the English that we'll not act, whatever the provocation. By the English, I do not mean the lighter, transitory public opinion, but I mean the thoughtful men who do not wish us or expect us to fire a gun. They say that the American democracy, since Cleveland’s day, has become a mere agglomerationTHE ““LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER 199 of different races, without national unity, national aims, and without courage or moral qualities. And (I deeply regret to say) the President is losing here the high esteem he won by his Panama tolls repeal. They ask, why on earth did he raise the issue if un- der repeated provocation he is unable to recall Ge- rard or to send Bernstorff home? ‘The Hesperian follows the Arabic; other “liners” will follow the Hesperian, if the Germans have submarines. And, when Sackville-West 1 was promptly sent home for answering a private citizen’s inquiry about the two political parties, Dumba is (yet awhile) retained in spite of a far graver piece of business. There is a tone of sad disappointment here—not because the most thoughtful men want us in the war (they don’t), but because for some reason, which nobody here un- derstands, the President, having taken a stand, seems unable to do anything. (Here comes a parenthesis. Word came to me a little while ago that a Zeppelin was on its way to London. Such a remark doesn’t arouse much atten- tion. But just as I had finished the fifth line above this, Frank and Mrs. Page came in and challenged me to play a game of cards before we should go to bed. We sat down, the cards were dealt, and bang! bang !—-with the deep note of an explosion. A third, a fourth shot. We went into the street. [here the Zeppelin was revealed by a searchlight—sailing along. I think it had probably dropped its bombs; but the 1Sir Lionel Sackville-West was British Minister to the United States from 1881 to 1883. In the latter year a letter was published which he had written to an American citizen of British origin, the gist of which was that the reélection of President Cleveland would be of advantage to British interests. For this gross interference in American domestic affairs, President Cleveland immediately handed Sir Lionel his passports. The incident ended his diplomatic career.200 THE “‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER aircraft guns were cracking away at it. Some of them shot explosive projectiles to find the range. Now and then one such explosive would almost reach the Zeppelin, but it was too high for them and it sailed away, the air guns doing their ineffectual best. I couldn’t see whether airplanes were trying to shoot it or not. The searchlight revealed the Zeppelin but nothing else-—While we were watching this battle in the air, the maids came down from the top of the house and went into the cellar. I think they’ve al- ready gone back. You can’t imagine how little ex- citement it caused. It produces less fright than any other conceivable engine of war. We came back as soon as the Zeppelin was out of sight and the firing had ceased; we played our game of cards; and here I am writing you the story—all within about half an hour.—There was a raid over London last night, too, wherein a dozen or two women and children and a few men were killed. I haven’t the slightest idea what harm this raid to- night has done. For all I know it may not be all done. But of all imaginable war experiences this seems the most futile. It interrupted a game of cards for twenty minutes!) When I am asked every day “Why the United States doesn’t do something—send Dumba and Bern- storft home ?”’—Well, it is not the easiest question in the world to answer. Yours heartily, Wieskiee: Friday, September 10, 1915. P. S. The news is just come that Dumba is dis- missed. That will clear the atmosphere—a little, but only a little. Dumba committed a diplomatic of-THE “LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER 201 fense. The German Government has caused the death of United States citizens, has defied us, has de- clared it had changed its policy and yet has gone on with the same old policy. Besides, Bernstorff has done everything that Dumba did except employ Arch- ibald, which was a mere incident of the game. The President took a strong stand: they have disregarded it—no apology nor reparation for a single boat that has been sunk. Now the English opinion of the Germans is hardly a calm, judicial opinion—of course not. There may be facts that have not been made known. There must be good reasons that nobody here can guess, why the President doesn’t act in the long succession of German acts against us. But I tell you with all solemnity that British opinion and the British Government have absolutely lost their re- spect for us and their former high estimate of the President. And that former respect is gone for good unless he acts now very quickly. ‘They will pay noth- ing more than formal and polite attention to any- thing we may hereafter say. This is not resentful. They don’t particularly care for us to get into the war. Their feeling (I mean among our best old friends) is not resentful. It is simply sorrowful. They had the highest respect for our people and our President. [The Germans defy us; we sit in silence. They conclude here that we'll submit to anything from anybody. We'll write strong notes—nothing more. I needn’t and can’t write more. Of course there are more important things than English respect. But the English think that every Power has lost respect for us—the Germans most of all. And (unless the President acts very rigorously and very quickly) we'll202 THE “‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER have to get along a long time without British respect. Wi. EPs P. S. The last Zeppelin raid—which interrupted the game of cards—killed more than twenty persons and destroyed more than seven million dollars’ worth of private business property—all non-combatants’! Woe The letters which Page sent directly to the President were just as frank. ‘Incidents occur nearly every day,” he wrote to President Wilson in the autumn of 1915, ‘which reveal the feeling that the Germans have taken us in. Last week one of our naval men, Lieu- tenant McBride, who has just been ordered home, asked the Admiralty if he might see the piece of metal found on the deck of the Hesperian. Contrary to their habit, the British officer refused. ‘Take my word for it,’ he said. ‘She was torpedoed. Why do you wish to investigate? Your country will do nothing—will accept any excuse, any insult and—do nothings 7... A sort of pro-German American newspaper corre- spondent came along the other day from the German headquarters; and he told me that one of the German generals remarked to him: ‘War with America? Ach no! Not war. If trouble should come, we’d send over a platoon of our policemen to whip your little army.’ (He didn’t say just how he’d send -Giy)) To the President American Embassy, London, Oct. ce LOG DEAR Mr. PRESIDENT: I have two letters that I have lately written to you but which I have not sent because they utterly lackTHE ‘‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER 203 good cheer. After reading them over, I have not liked to send them. Yet I should fail of my duty if I did not tell you bad news as well as good. The high esteem in which our government was held when the first Lusitania note to Germany was sent seems all changed to indifference or pity—not hatred or hostility, but a sort of hopeless and sad pity. That ship was sunk just five months ago; the German Government (or its Ambassador) is yet hold- ing conversations about the principle involved, making “concessions” and promises for the future, and so far we have done nothing to hold the Germans to account- ability. In the meantime their submarine fleet has been so reduced that probably the future will take care of itself and we shall be used as a sort of excuse for their failure. This is what the English think and say; and they explain our failure to act by concluding that the peace-at-any-price sentiment dominates the Government and paralyzes it. They have now, I think, given up hope that we will ever take any ac- tion. So deeply rooted (and, I fear, permanent) is this feeling that every occurrence is made to fit into and to strengthen this supposition. When Dumba was dismissed, they said: ‘‘Dumba, merely the abject tool of German intrigue. Why not Bernstorff?” When the Anglo-French loan? was oversubscribed, they said: ‘The people’s sympathy is most welcome, but their government is paralyzed.” ‘Their respect is gone—at least for the time being. 1JIn a communication sent February 10, 1915, President Wilson warned the German Government that he would hold it to a “strict accountability” for the loss of American lives by illegal submarine attack. 2A reference to the Anglo-French loan for $500,000,000, placed in the United States in the autumn of 1915.‘ 204 THE “LUSITANIA”’—AND AFTER It is not that they expect us to go to war: many, in fact, do not wish us to. They expected that we would be as good as our word and hold the Germans to accountability. Now I fear they think little of our word. I shudder to think what our relations might be if Sir Edward Grey were to yield to another as Foreign Minister, as, of course, he must yield at some time. It comes down and comes back to this—that for five months after the sinking of the Lusitania the Germans are yet playing with us, that we have not sent Bernstorff home, and hence that we will submit to any rebuff or any indignity. It is under these con- ditions—under this judgment of us—that we now work—the English respect for our Government in- definitely lessened and instead of the old-time respect a sad pity. I cannot write more. Heartily yours, WaLTER H. Pace. On January 3, 1916, Page sent the President a mass of clippings from the British press, all criticizing the Wilson Administration in unrestrained terms. In his comment on these, he writes the President: ‘Public opinion, both official and unofficial, is ex- pressed by these newspaper comments, with far greater restraint than it is expressed in private con- versation. Ridicule of the Administration runs through the programs of the theaters; it inspires hundreds of cartoons; it is a staple of conversation — at private dinners and in the clubs. The most serious class of Englishmen, including the best friends of the United States, feel that the Administration’s reliance On notes has reduced our government to a third- or fourth-rate power. There is even talk of spheres ofTHE ‘“‘LUSITANIA’’—AND AFTER 205 German influence in the United States as in China. No government could fall lower in English opinion than we shall fall if more notes are sent to Austria or to Germany. The only way to keep any shred of English respect is the immediate dismissal without more parleying of every German and Austrian official at Washington. Nobody here believes that such an act would provoke war. “T can do no real service by mincing matters. My previous telegrams and letters have been purposely re- strained as this one is. We have now come to the parting of the ways. If English respect be worth preserving at all, it can be preserved only by imme- diate action. Any other course than immediate sever- ing of diplomatic relations with both Germany and Austria will deepen the English opinion into a con- viction that the Administration was insincere when it sent the Lusitania notes and that its notes and pro- tests need not be taken seriously on any subject. And English opinion is allied opinion. The Italian Am- bassador said to me, ‘What has happened? ‘The United States of to-day is not the United States I knew fifteen years ago, when I lived in Washington.’ French officers and members of the Government who come here express themselves even more strongly than do the British. The British newspapers to-day pub- lish translations of ridicule of the United States from German papers.’ One of the reasons why Page felt so intensely about American policy at this time was his conviction that the severance of diplomatic relations, in the latter part of 1915, or the early part of 1916, in itself would have brought the European War to an end. ‘This was a conviction from which he never departed. Count Bernstorff was industriously creating the impres-206 THE “LUSITANIA” —AND AFTER sion in the United States that his dismissal would im- mediately cause war between Germany and the United States, and there is little doubt that the Administra- tion accepted this point of view. But Page believed that this was nothing but Prussian bluff. The sever- ance of diplomatic relations at that time, in Page’s opinion, would have convinced the Germans of the hopelessness of their cause. In spite of the British blockade, Germany was draw- ing enormous quantities of food supplies from the United States, and without these supplies she could not maintain indefinitely her resistance. The sever- ance of diplomatic relations would naturally have been accompanied by an embargo suspending trade between the United States and the Fatherland. Moreover, the consideration that was mainly leading Germany to hope for success was the belief that she could embroil the United States and Great Britain over the block- ade.