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Every well-in- formed person will read the classics either in the original or in a translation: Caesar's Gallic War—Seven Books............ $.75 Cicero's Orations.... .........................75 Virgil's Aeneid—First Six Books.............. .75 Horace—Complete........................... ,75 Xenophon's Anabasis..........................75 Storm's Immensee.............................75 Gerstacker's Germelshausen....................75 Hillern's Higher Than The Church............75 Freytag's Die Journalisten....................75 Heyse's L'Arrabbiata..........................75 Merimee Colomba ........................... 1.25 Alarcon, El Capitan Veneno................. 1.50 If you do not find on this list the particular Trans- lation you desire, write us and we shall secure it for you—if it exists. STUDENTS' SERIES OF DICTIONARIES Compiled from the best authorities on modern languages. Accurate in their definitions, precise in the arrangement of their text, sufficient in their detail to provide the student with a complete working knowledge of the foreign language. These books represent the utmost possible in a handy dictionary at a moderate price. -Spanish-English—English-Spanish Dict'y.. .$1.25 -French-English—English-French Dict'y..... 1.25 -German-English—English-German Dict*y... 1.25 --Italian-English—English-Italian Dict'y...... 1*25gEfte &tu'oentg' ^Literal Cranglationg CESAR's Commentaries ON THE GALLIC WAR literally translated The Translation Publishing Company 31 West 15th Street ' New York CitySample page of the New Students' Interlinear Translation ^ of Caesar THE COMMENTARIES OF CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR ON THE GALLIC WAR FIRST BOOK Ccnr, in recounting the events of the war which he waged in Gaul, first describes Gaul itself, then tells of two battles against the Helvetians and then of one against the Germans. 1. Omnis1 Gallia est divisa in tres partes: unam All Gaul is divided into three parts: one quarum Belgae incdlunt; aliam Aquitani; tertiam, of which the Belgae inhabit; another the Aquitani; the third, qui lingu& ipsorum appellantur (those) who in (the) language of themselves are called Celt®, nostra, Galli. Omnes hi diffSrunt inter Celts, in ours, Gauls. All these differ between se lingua, institutis, leglbus. Flumen themselves in language, in institutions, (and) inlaws. The river Garumna divldit Gallos ab Aquitanis, Garonne divides the Gauls from the Aquitani, Matrona et Sequ&na a Belgis. Belgae sunt the Marne and Seine from the Belgae. The Belgae are fortisslmi omnium horum, propterga quod absunt the bravest of all these, because (that) they are distant longisslmfe a cultu atque humanitate farthest from the cultivation and humanity [refinement] Provinclae; que mercatores minlmfe saepe of the Province (Provence]; and merchants least often Copyright 1921, by Translation Publishing Company, Inc. ^THE COMMENTARIES OF C. JULIUS CJ3SA11 OK HIS ¥AE IN GAUL. BOOK I. the argument. I. Description of Gaul and its divisions. — II.-IV. The ambi- tious designs of the Helvetii under Orgetorix, and the suspi- cious death of the latter. — V.,VI. The Helvetii still proceed to carry out their designs. — VIII.-XI. Caesar's opposition and measures.—XII. The battle at the river Arar. — XIII. The Helvetii send ambassadors to sue for peace.—XIV. Caesar's politic answer.—XV. Another engagement with the Helvetii. — XVI. Caesar's reproof of the ./Edu\ for not sending him the promised supplies.— XVII.-XIX. The disclosures of Liscus respecting Dum- norix. — XX. Diviti&cus, his brother, pleads for Dumn6rix. — XXI.-XXVI. Various events in the war between Caesar and the Helvetii. — XXVII. The Helvetii, being worsted, offer a surrender, but some clandestinely return home. — XXVIII., XXIX. The numbers of the several Helvetian forces before and after the war. — XXX. Certain parts of Gaul congratulate Caesar and request a council. — XXXI. Complaints are there made against Ariovistus. — XXXII.- XXXVI. Caesar's message to Ariovistus and the bold answer of the latter.—XXXVII.-XXXIX. A panic in the Roman camp. — XL. Caesar's speech on that occasion.— XLI. Its effects. —XLII.-XLVI. Conference between Caesar and Ariovistus.—XLVII.-LII. Which terminates in war. — LIII. The overthrow of the Germans and their flight from Gaul. — LIV. Caesar, having sent his army into ^ winter quarters amongst the Sequ&ni, proceeds to perform the civil duties of his proconsular office. Chap. I. — All Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae inhabit, the Aquitani another, those who in their own lan- guage are called Celts, in ours Gauls, the third.CJE&AR'S COMMENTABIES. All these differ from each other in language, customs, and laws. The river Garonne sepa- rates the Gauls from the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine separate them from the Belgse. Of all these, the Belgse are the bravest, be- cause they are farthest from the civilization and refinement of [our] Province, and mer- chants least frequently resort to them, and im- port those things which tend to effeminate the mind; and they are the nearest to the Ger- mans, who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war; for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gauls in valor, as they contend with the Ger- mans in almost daily battles, when they either repel them from their own territories, or them- selves wage war on their frontiers. One part of these, which it has been said that the Gauls occupy, takes its beginning at the river Rhone : it is bounded by the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgse: it borders, too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helve- tii, upon the river Rhine, and stretches towards the north. The Belgse rise from the extreme frontier of Gaul, extend to the lower part of the river Rhine; and look towards the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from the river Garonne to the Pyrenean mountains and to that part of the ocean which is near Spain : it looks between the setting of the sun and the north star. Chap. II.—Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the most distinguished and wealthy. He, when Marcus Messala and Marcus PisoCJEJSAR'S COMMENTARIES. ft were consuls, incited by lust of sovereignty, formed a conspiracy among the nobility, and persuaded the people to go forth from their territories with all their possessions, [saying] that it would be very easy, since they excelled all in valor, to acquire the supremacy of the whole of Gaul. To this he the more easily persuaded them, because the Helvetii are con- fined on every side by the nature of their sit- uation : on one side by the Rhine, a very broad and deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory from the Germans ; on a second side by the Jura, a very high mountain, which is [situated] between the Sequani and the Helve- tii ; on a third by the Lake of Geneva, and by the river Rhone, which separates our Province from the Helvetii. From these circumstances it resulted, that they could range less widely, and could less easily make war upon their neighbors ; for which reason men fond of war [as they were] were affected with great regret. They thought, that considering the extent of their population, and their renown for warfare and bravery, they had but narrow limits, although they extended in length 240, and in breadth 180 [Roman] miles. Chap. III.—Induced by these considera- tions, and influenced by the authority of Orge- torix, they determined to provide such things as were necessary for their expedition ; to buy up as great a number as possible of beasts of burden and wagons; to make their sowings as large as possible, so that on their march plenty of corn might be in store ; and to estab-6 CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. lish peace and friendship with the ^neighbor- ing states. Thej reckoned that a term of two years would be sufficient for them to exe- cute their designs; they fix by decree their departure, for the third year. Orgetorix is chosen to complete these arrangements. He took upon himself the office of ambassador to the states : on this journey he persuades Castl- cus, the son of Catamantaledes, (one of the Sequani, whose father had possessed the sov- ereignty among the people for many years, and had been styled friend " by the senate of the Roman people,) to seize upon the sov- ereignty in his own state, which his father had held before him, and he likewise persuades Dumnorix, an JEduan, the brother of Diviti- acus, who at that time possessed the chief authority in the state, and was exceedingly beloved by the people, to attempt the same, and gives him his daughter in marriage. He proves to fl^m that to accomplish their at- tempts was a thing very easy ' to be done, because he himself would obtain the govern- ment of his own state ; that there was no doubt that the Helvetii were the most powerful of the whole of Gaul; he assures them that he will, with his own forces and his own army, acquire the sovereignty for them. Incited by this speech, they give a pledge and oath to one another, and hope that, when they have seized the sovereignty , they will, by means of the three most powerful and valiant nations, be enabled to obtain possession of the whole of Gaul.CAESAR'S COMMENTABIES. IN Chap. IV.—When this scheme was disu closed to the Helvetii by informers, the>, according to their custom, compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause in chains; it was the law that the penalty of being burned by fire should await him if condemned. On the day appointed for the pleading of his cause, Orgotorix drew together from all quarters to the court, all his vassals to the number of ten thousand persons ; and led together to the same place all his dependants and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he had a great number ; by means of these he res- cued himself from [the necessity of] pleading his cause. While the state, incensed at this act, was endeavoring to assert its right by arms, and the magistrates were mustering g large body of men from the country, Orgetorix died ; and there is not wanting a suspicion, as the Helvetii think, of his having committed suicide. t 0-» Chap. V. — After his death, the- Helvetii nevertheless attempt to do that which they had resolved on, namely, to go forth from their terri- tories. When they thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking, they set fire to all their towns, in number about twelve, to their villages about four hundred, and to the private dwellings that remained; they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to carry with them; that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be the more ready for undergoing all dangers. They order every one to carry forth from home for himself provisions for three months, ready ground.8 CJESAE \S COMMENT ABIES. They persuade the Rauraci, and the Tulingi4 and the Latobrigi, their neighbors, to adopt the same plan, and after burning down their towns and villages, to set out with them : and they admit to their party and unite to them- selves as confederates the Boii, who had dwelt on the other side of the Rhine, and had crossed over into the Norican territory, and assaulted Noreia. Chap. VI. — There were in all two routes, by which they could go forth from their coun- try— one through the Sequani, narrow and difficult, between Mount Jura and the river Rhone, (by which scarcely one wagon at a time could be led ; there was, moreover, a very high mountain overhanging, so that a very few might easily intercept them;) the other, through our Province, much easier and freer from obstacles, because the Rhone flows be- tween the boundaries of the Helvetii and those of the Allobroges, who had lately been sub- dued ^ and is in some places crossed by a ford. The farthest town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to the territories of the Helvetii, is Geneva. From this town a bridge extends to the Helvetii. They thought that they should either persuade the Allobroges, because they did not seem as yet well-affected towards the Roman people, or compel them by force to allow them to pass through their territories. Having provided everything for the expedition, they appoint a day- on which they should all meet on the bank of the Rhone. This day was the fifth before the kalends of April, fi. e.,CAESAR '8 COMMENTARIES. 9 the 28tliof March,] in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius [B. C. 58]. Chap. VII. — When it was reported to Cae- sar, that they were attempting to make their route through our Province, he hastens to set out from the city, and, by as great marches as he can, proceeds to Further Gaul, and arrives at Geneva. He orders the whole Province [to furnish] as great a number of soldiers as pos- sible, as there was in all only one legion in Further Gaul: he orders the bridge at Geneva to be broken down. When the Helvetii are apprised of his arrival, they send to him, as ambassadors, the most illustrious men of their state, (in which embassy Numeius and Veru- doctius held the chief place,) to say u that it was their intention to march through the Prov- ince without doing any harm, because they had" [according to their own representa- tions] 4'no other route; that they requested they might be allowed to do so with his consent." Caesar, inasmuch as he kept in remembrance that Lucius Cassius, the consul, had been slain, and his army routed and made to pass under the yoke by the Helvetii, did not think that [their request] ought to be granted ; nor was he of opinion that men of hostile disposition, if an opportunity of marching through the Province were given them, would abstain from outrage and mischief. Yet, in order that a period might intervene, until the soldiers whom he had ordered [to be fur- nished] should assemble, he replied to the ambassadors, that he would take time to delib-10 C^ESAB yS COMMENTARIES. erate; if they wanted anything, they might return on the day before the ides of April [on April 12th]. Chap. YIII. — Meanwhile, with the legion which he had with him and the soldiers who had assembled from the Province, he carries along for nineteen [Roman, not quite eighteen English] miles a wall, to the height of six- teen feet, and a tr nch, from the Lake of Gene- va, which flows into the river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the territories of the Sequani from those of the Helvetii. When that work was finished, he distributes garrisons, and closely fortifies redoubts, in order that he may the more easily intercept them, if they should attempt to cross over against his will. When the day which he had appointed with the ambassadors came, and they returned to him, he says, that .lie cannot, consistently with the custom and precedent of the Roman people, grant any one. a passage through the Province; and he gives them to understand, that, if they should attempt to use violence, he would oppose them. The Helvetii, disap- pointed in this hope, tried if they could force a passage, (some by means of a bridge of boats and numerous rafts constructed for the purpose; others, by the fords of the Rhone, where the depth x>f the river was least, some- times by da}', but more frequently by .night,) but being kept at bay by the strength of our works, arid by the concourse of the soldiers, and by the missiles, they desisted from this attempt.CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 11 Chap. IX.—There was left one way, [namely] through the Sequani, by which, on account of its narrowness, they could not pass without the consent of the Sequani. As they could not of themselves prevail on them, they 3end ambassadors * to Dumnorix the ^Ednan, that through his intercession they might ob- tain their request from the Sequani. Dumno- rix, by his popularity and liberality, had great influence among the Sequani, and was friendly to the Helvetii, because out of that state he had married the daughter of Orgetorix ; and, incited by lust of sovereignty, was anxious for a revolution, and wished to have as many states as possible attached to him by his kindness towards them. He, therefore, undertakes the affair, and prevails upon the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to march through their territories, and arranges that they should give hostages to each other, — the Sequani not to obstruct the Helvetii in their march; the Helvetii, to pass without mischief and outrage. Chap. X. — It is again told Caesar, that the Helvetii intend to march through the country of the Sequani and the JEdui into the terri- tories of the San tones, which are not far dis- tant from those boundaries of the Tolosates, which [viz., Tolosa, Toulouse] is a state in the Province. If this took place, he saw that it would be attended with great danger to the Province to have warlike men, enemies of the Roman people, bordering upon an open and very fertile tract of country. For these rea- sons he appointed Titus Labienus, his lieuten-12 CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. ant, to the command of the fortification which he had made. He himself proceeds to Italy by forced marches, and there levies two L gions, and leads out from winter quarters three which were wintering around Aquileia, and with these five legions marches r. pidly by the near- est route across the Alps into Further Gaul. Here the Centrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges, having taken possession of the higher parts, attempt to obstruct the army in their march. After having routed these in several battles, he arrives in the territories of the Vo- contii in the Further Province on the seventh day from Ocelum, which is the most remote town of the Hither Province ; thence he leads his army into the country of the Allobroges, and from the Allobroges to the Segusiani. These people are the first beyond the Province on the opposite side of the Rhone. Chap. XI. —The Helvetii had by this time led their forces over through the narrow defile and the territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at the territories of the iEdui, and were ravaging their lands. The iEdui, as they could not defend themselves and their posses- sions against them send ambassadors to Cae- sar to ask assistance, [pleading] that they had at all times so well deserved of the Roman people, that their fields ought not to have been laid waste, their children carried off into sla- very, their towns stormed, almost within sight of our army. At the same time the Am- barri, the friends and kinsmen of the iEdui, apprise Caesar, that it was not easy for them,CJESAli 'S COMMENTABIES. 13 now that their fields had been devastated, to ward off the violence of the enemy from their towns: the Allobroges likewise, who had vil- lages and possessions on the other side of the Rhone, betake themselves in flight to Caesar, and assure him, that they had nothing remain- ing, except the soil of their land. Caesar, in- duced by these circumstances, decides, that he ought not to wait until the Helvetii, after destroying all the property of his allies, should arrive among the Santones. Chap. XII. — There is a river [called] the Saone, which flows through the territories of the JEdui and Sequani into the Rhone with such incredible slowness, that it cannot be de- termined by the eye in which direction it flows. This the Helvetii were crossing by rafts and boats joined together. When Caesar was in- formed by spies that the Helvetii had already conveyed three parts of their forces across that river, but that the fourth part was left behind on this side of the Saone, he set out from the camp with three legions during the third watch, and came up with that division which had not yet crossed the river. Attack- ing them, encumbered with baggage, and not expecting him, he cut to pieces a great part of them ; the rest betook themselves to flight, and concealed themselves in the nearest woods. That canton [which was cut down] was called the Tigurine ; for the whole Helvetian state is divided into four cantons. This single canton having left their country, within the recollec- tion of our fathers, had slain Lucius CassiusIt CJE SAB'S COMMENTARIES. the consul, and had made his army pass under the yoke £B. C. 107]. Thus, whether by chance, or by the design of the immortal gods, that part of the Helvetian state which had brought a signal calamity upon the Roman peo- ple, was the first to pay the penalty. In this Caesar avenged not only the public, but also his own personal wrongs, because the Tigurlni had slain Lucius Piso the lieutenant [of Cas- sius], the grandfather of Lucius Calpurnius Piso, his [Caesar's] father-in-law, in the same battle as Cassius himself. Chap. XIII. — This battle ended, that he might be able to come up with the remaining forces of the Helvetii, he procures a bridge to be made across the Saone, and thus leads his army over. The Helvetii, confused by his sudden arrival, when they found that he had ef- fected in one day what they themselves had witlj the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty, namely, the crossing of the river, send ambas- sadors to him ; at the head of which embassy was Divico, who had been commander of the, Helvetii, in the war against Cassius. He thus treats with Caesar that, u if the Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii they would go to that part and there remain, where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be ; but if he should persist in persecuting them with war, that he ought to remember both the ancient disg ace of the Roman people and the characteristic valor of the Helvetii. As to his having attacked one canton by surprise, [at a time] when those who had crossedCJBSAB'JS COMMENTARIES. i5 the river could not bring assistance to their friends, that he ought not on that account to ascribe very much to his own valor, or despise them ; that they had so learned from their sires and ancestors, as to rely more on valor than on artifice or stratagem. Wherefore let him not bring it to pass that the place, where they were standing, should acquire a name, from the disaster of the Roman people and the de- struction of their army or transmit the remem- brance [of such an event to posterity]." Chap. XIY. — To these words Caesar thus replied : — that 4' on that very account he felt less hesitation, because he kept in remem- brance those circumstances which the Helve- tian ambassadors had mentioned, and that he felt the more indignant at them, in proportion as they had happened undeservedly to the Roman people : for if they had been conscious of having don6 any wtong, it would not have been difficult to be on their guard, but for that very reason had they been deceived, because neither were they aware that any offence had been given by them, on account of which they should be afraid, nor did they think that they ought to be afraid without cause. But even if he were willing to forget their former outrage, could he also lay aside the remembrance of the late, wrongs, in that they had against his will attempted a route through the Province by force, in that they had molested the JEdui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges? That as to their so insolently boasting of their victory, and as to their being astonished that they had16 CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. so long committed their outrages with impu- nity, [both these things] tended to the same point; for the immortal gods are wont taallow those persons whom they wish to punish for tlieir guilt sometimes a greater prosperity and longer impunity, in order that they may suffer the more severely from a reverse of circum- stances. Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were to be given hi&i by them in order that he may be assured they will do what they promise, and provided they will give satisfac- tion to the iEdui for the outrages which they had committed against them and their allies, and likewise to the Allobroges, he [Caesar] will4nake peace with them." Divlco replied, that " the Helvetii had been so trained by their ancestors, that they were accustomed to re- ceive, not to give, hostages; of that fact the Roman people were witness." Having given this reply, he withdrew. Chap. XV. — On the following day they move their camp from that place ; Caesar does the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the number of four thousand, (which he had drawn together from all parts of the Province and from theiEdui and their allies,) to observe towards what parts the enemy are directing their march. These, having too eagerly pursued the enemy's rear, come to a battle with the cav- alry of the Helvetii in a disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated with this battle, because they had with five hundred horse repulsed so large a body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes tooCAESAR'S COMMENT ABIES. 17 from their rear to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar [however] restrained his men from battle, deeming it sufficient for the pres- ent to prevent the enemy from rapine, forage, and depredation. They marched for about fifteen days in such a manner that there was not more than five or six miles between the enemy's rear and our van. Chap. XVI. — Meanwhile, Caesar kept daily importuning the -ZEdui for the corn which they had promised in the name of their state ; for, in consequence of the cold, (Gaul being, as before said, situated towards the north,) not only was the corn in the fields not ripe, but there was not in store a sufficiently large quantity even of fodder : besides he was unable to use the corn, which he had conveyed in ships up the river Saone, because the Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to retire, had diverted their march from the Saone. The iEdui kept deferring from day to day, and saying that it was being " collected—brought in—on the road." When he saw that he was put off too long, and that the day was close at hand on which he ought to serve out the corn to his soldiers, having called together their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his camp, among them Divitiacus, and Liscus who was invested with the chief magistracy,(whom the iEdui style the Vergobretus, and who is elected annually, and has power of life and death over his countrymen.) he severely reprimands them, because he is not assisti d by them on so urgent an occasion, when the enemy were so close at13 CJSSAB'S COMMENT ABIES, hand, and when [corn] could neither be bought, nor taken from the fields, particularly as, in a great measure urged by their prayers, he had undertaken the war ; much more bitterly, there- fore, does he complain of his being forsaken. Chap. XVII.—Then at length Liscus, moved by Caesar's speech, discloses what he had hitherto kept secret: — that-"there are some whose influence with the people is very great, who, though private men, have more power than the magistrates themselves : that these by seditious and violent language are deterring the populace from contributing the corn which they ought to supply ; [by telling them] that if they cannot any longer retain the supremacy of Gaul, it were better to submit to the gov- ernment of Gauls than of Romans, nor ought they to doubt that, if the Romans should over- power the Helvetii, they wou'd wrest their freedom from the JEdui together with the remainder of Gaul. By these very men, [said he,] are our plans, and whatever is done in the camp, disclosed to the enemy; that they could not be restrained by him: nay more, he was well aware, that though compelled by necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Caesar, at how great a risk he had done it; and for that reason, he had been silent as long as he could." Chap. XVIII. — Caesar perceived that, by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, was indicated; but, as he was unwilling that these matters should be dis- cussed while so many were present, he speed-CuESAB'S COMMENTARIES. 19 ily dismisses the council, but detains Liscus: he inquires from him when alone, about those things which he had said in the meeting. He [Liscus] speaks more unreservedly and boldly. He [Caesar] makes inquiries on the same points "privately of others, and discovers that it is all true ; that "Dumnorix is the person, a man of the highest daring, in great favor with the people on account of his liberality, a man eager for a revolution: that for a great many years he has been in the habit of con- tracting for the customs and all the other taxes of the -ZEdui at a small cost, because when he bids, no one dares to bid against him. By these means he has both increased his own private property, and amassed great means for giving largesses; that he maintains con- stantly at his own expense and keeps about his own person a great number of cavalry, and that not oiily at home, but even among the neighboring states, he has great influence, and for the sake of strengthening this influence has given his mother in marriage among the Bitunges to a man the most noble and most influential there ; that he has himself taken a wife from among the Hel^tii, and has given his sister by the mother's side and his female relations in marriage into other states ; that he favors and wishes well to the Helvetii on ac- count of this connection; and that he hates Caesar and the Romans, on his own account, because by their arrival his power was weak- ened, and his brother, Divitiacus, restored to bis former position of mfiueaoe and dignity:20 CuE SAB'S COMMENTARIES. that, if anything should happen to the Romans, he entertains the highest hope of gaining the sovereignty by means of the Helvetii, but that under the government of the Roman people he despairs not only of royalty, but even of that influence which he already lias." Caesar discovered too, on inquiring into the unsuc- cessful cavalry engagement which had taken place a few days before, that the commence- ment of that flight had been made by Dumnorix and his cavalry (for Dumnorix was in com- mand of the cavalry which the JEdui had sent for aid to Caesar) ; that by their flight the rest of the cavalry was dismayed. Chap. XIX. — After learning these circum- stances, since to these suspicions the most un- equivocal facts were added, viz., that lie had led the Helvetii through the territories of the Sequani; that he had provided that hostages should be mutually given; that lie had done all these things, not only without any orders of his [Caesar's] and of his own state's, but even without their [the JEdui] knowing anything of it themselves; that he [Dumnorix] was reprimanded by the [chief] magistrate of the JEdui; he [Csesai\j considered that there was sufficient reason, why he should either punish him himself, or order the state to do so. One thing [however] stood in the way of all this—that he bad learned by experience his brother Divitiacus's very high regard for the Roman people, his great affection towards him, his distinguished faithfulness, justice, and moderation; for he was afraid lest by theC^E SAB'S COMMENT ABIES. 2l punishment of this man, he should hurt the feelings of Divitiacus. Therefore, before he attempted anything, he orders Divitiacus to be summoned to him, and. when the ordinary interpreters had been wit!idrawn, converses with him through Caius Valerius Procillus, chief of the province of Gaul, an intimate friend of his, in whom he reposed the highest confidence in everything ; at the same time he reminds him of what was said about Dumnorix in the council of the Gauls, when he himself was present, and shows what each had said of him privately in his [Caesar's] own presence ; he begs and exhorts him, that, without offence to his feelings, he may either himself pass judgment on him [Dumnorix] after trying the case, or else order the [iEduan] state to do so. Chap. XX. — Divitiacus, embracing Caesar, begins to implore him, with many tears, that " he would not pass any very severe sentence upon his brother; saying, that he knows that those [charges] are true, and that nobody suffered more pain on that account than he himself did ; for when he himself could effect a very great deal by his influence at home and in the rest of Gaul, and he [Dumnorix] very little on account of his youth, the latter had become powerful through his means, which power and strength he used not only to the lessening of his [Divitacus'] popularity, but almost to his ruin; that he, however, was influenced both by fraternal affection and by public opinion. But if anything very severe from Caesar should befall him [Dumnorix], uo22 CJE SAB'S C0MMENTAB1ES. one would think that it had been done without his consent, since he himself held such a place in Caesar's friendship; from which circum- stance it would arise, that the affections of the whole of Gaul would be estranged from him." As he was with tears begging these things of Caesar in many words, Caesar takes his right hand, and, comforting him, begs him to make an end of entreating, and assures him that his regard for him is so great, that he for- gives both the injuries of the republic and his private wrongs, at his desire and prayers. He summons Dumnorix to him ; he brings in his brother ; he points out what he censures in him ; he lays before him what he of himself perceives, and what the state complains of; he* warns him for the future to avoid all grounds of suspicion ; he says that he pardons the past, for the sake of his brother, Divitia- cus. He sets spies over Dumnorix that he may be able to know what he does, and with whom he communicates. Chap. XXI. — Being on the same day in- formed by his scouts, that the enemy had en- camped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp, he sent persons to ascer- tain what the nature of the mountain was, and of what kind the ascent on every side. Word was brought back, that it was easy. During the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his lieutenant with pretorian powers, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountain with two legions, and with those as guides who had ex- amined the road ; he explains what his plan is.CJESAM'S COMMENTARIES. 23 He himself during the fourth watch hastens to them by the same route by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all the cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to be very experienced in military affairs, and had been in the army of Lucius Sulla, and afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with the scouts. Chap XXII. — At daybreak, when the summit of the mountain was in the possession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not farther off than a mile and a half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterwards ascer- tained from the captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus been discovered; Consi- dius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him ; says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by Labienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discov- ered this by the Gallic arms and ensigns. Caesar leads off his forces to the next hill, [and] draws them up in battle order. Labie- nus, as he had been ordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] own forces were seen near the enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemy might be made on every side at the same time, was, after having taken possession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and refraining from battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced, Caesar learned through spies, t'mt the mountain was in possession of his own men, and that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Con- sidius, struck with fear, had reported to him,24 CJBSAB'S COMMENTABIES. as seen, that which he had not seen. On that day be follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his camp three miles from theirs. Chap. XXIII. — The next day, (as there remained in all only two days' space [to the time] when he must serve out the corn to his army, and as he was not more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and best-stored town of the iEdui,) he thought that he ought to provide for a supply of corn ; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and advanced rapidly to Bibracte. This circum- stance is reported to the enemy by some de- serters from LucifTk iEmilius, a captain, of the Gallic horse. The Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans, struck with ter- ror, were retreating from them, the more so, as the day before, though they had seized on the higher grounds, they had not joined battle, or because they flattered themselves that they might be cut off from the provisions, altering their plan and changing their route, began to pursue, and to annoy our men in the rear. Chap. XXIY.—Caesar, when he observes this, draws off his forces to the next hill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy. He himself, meanwhile, drew lip on the middle of the hill a triple line of his four veteran legions in such a manner, that he placed above him on the very summit the two legions, which he had lately levied in Hither Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountain should be covered with men, and that meanwhile the baggageCJESAB >■$ COMMENTARIES. 25 should be brought together into one place, and the position be protected by those who were posted in the upper line. The Helvetii, hav- ing followed with all their wagons, collected their baggage into one place : they themselves, after having repulsed our cavalry and formed a phalanx, advanced up to our front line in very close order. Ciiap. XXV. — Caesar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, then those of all, that he might make the danger of all equal, and do away with the hope of flight, after en- couraging his men, joined battle. His soldiers, hurling their javelins from the higher ground, eisily broke the enemy's phalanx. That being dispersed, they made a charge on them with drawn swords. It was a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting, that, when several of their bucklers had been by one stroke of the (Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned fast together, as the point of the iron had bent itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, with their left hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that many, after having long tossed their arm about, chose rather to cast away the buckler from their hand, and to fight with their person unprotected. At length, worn out with wounds, they be: an to give way, and, as there was in the neighborhood a mountain about a mile off, to betake themselves thither. When the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancing up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men closed the enemy's line of march and served as a guard to their26 CAESAR'S COMMENTAMEk rear, having assailed our men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround them; upon seeing which, the Helvetii, who had betaken themselves to the mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle. The Romans having faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions : the first and second line, to withstand those who had been defeated and driven off the field; the third t > receive those who were just arriving. Chap. XXVI. — Thus was the contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtful suc- cess. When th;>y could no longer withstand the attacks of our men, the one division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to the mountain ; the other repaired to their bag- gage and wagons. For during the whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventh hour [>. e., 12 (noon) — 1 p. m ] to eventide, no one could see an emeny with his back turned. The figlit was carried on also at the baggage till late in the night, for they had set wagons in the wny as a rampart, and from the' higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they came on, and some from between the wagons and the wheels kept darting their lances and javelins from beneath, and wounding our men After the fight had lasted some time, our men gained possession of their baggage and camp. There the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix were taken. After that battle about 130,000 men [of the enemy] remained alive, who marched incessantly during the whole of thatCESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 27 night; and after a march discontinued for no part of the night, arrived in the territories of the Lingones on the fourth day, whilst our men, having stopped for three days, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burial of the slain, had not been able to follow them. Caesar sent letters and messengers to the Lingones [with orders] that they should not assist them with corn or with anything else; for that if they should assist them, he would regard them in the same light as the HclvetiL After the thi\ e days' interval lie began to follow them himself with all his forces. Chap. XXVII.—The Helvetii, compelled by the want of everything, sent ambassadors to him about a surrender. When these had met him on the way and had thrown them- selves at his feet, and speaking in suppliant tone had with tears sued for peace, and [when] he had ordered them to await his arrival in the place where they then were, they obeyed his commands. When Caesar arrived at that place, he demanded hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to them. Whilst those things are being sought for and got together, after a night's interval, about 6,000 men of that canton which is called the Verbigene, whether terrified by fear, lest, after delivering up their arms, they should suffer punishment, or else induced by the hope of safety, because they supposed that, amid so vast a multitude of those who had surrendered themselves, their flight might either be don-28 CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. cealed or entirely overlooked, having at night- fall departed out of the camp of the Helvetii, hastened to the Rhine and the territories of the Germans. Chap. XXVIII. — But when Caesar discov- ered this, he commanded those through whose territories they had gone, to seek them out and to bring them back again, if they meant to be acquitted before him; and consider them, when brought back, in the light of enemies ; he admitted all the rest to a surrender, upon their delivering up the hostages, arms, andvdesert- ers. He ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi to return to their territories from, which they had come, and as there was at home nothing whereby they might support their hunger, all the productions of the earth having been destroyed, he commanded the Allobroges to let them have a plentiful supply of corn; and ordered them to rebuild the towns and villages which they had burnt. This he did, chiefly, on this account, becausa he was unwilling that the country, from which the Helvetii had departed, should be unten- anted, lest the Germans, who dwell on the other side of the Khine, should, on account of the excellence of the lands, cross over from their own territories into those of the Helvetii, and become borderers upon the province of Gaul and the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the iEdui, that they m'ght settle the Boii, in their own ( i. e , in theiEduan) territo- ries, as these were known to be of distinguished valor, to whom they gave lands, and whomCjESAB \S COMMENTARIES. 29 the}* afterwards admitted to the same state of i ights and freedom as themselves. Chvf. XXIX. — In the camp of the Hel- vetii, lists were found, drawn up, in Greek characters, and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had been drawn up, name by name, of the number which had gone forth from their country of those who were able to bear arms; and likewise the boys, the old men, and the women, separately. Of all which items the total was : — Of the Helvetii [lit. of the heads of the Helvetii] . ......... 263,000 The sum of all amounted to . . 368,000 Out of these, such as could bear arms [amounted] to about 92,000. W hen the census of those who returned home was taken, as Caesar had commanded, the number was found to be 110.000. Chap. XXX. — When the war with the Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors from almost all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled to congratulate Caesar, [saying] that they were well aware, that, although he had taken vengeance on the Helvetii in war, for the old wrongs done by them to the Roman people, yet that circumstance had happened no less to the benefit of the land of Gaul than of the Roman people, because the Helvetia Of the Tulingi Of the Latobrigi Of the Hauraci Of the Boii. . 36,000 14,000 23,000 32,00030 CCESAR'S COMMENTARIES. while their affairs were most flourishing, had quitted their country with the design of making war upon the whole of Gaul, and seizing the government of it, and selecting, out of a great abundance, that spot for an abode which they should judge to be the most convenient and most productive of all Gaul, and ho'd the rest of the states as tributaries. They requested that they might be allowed to proclaim an assembly of the whole of Gaul for a particular day, and to do that with Caesar's permission, [stating] that they had some things which, with the general consent, they wished to ask of him. This request having been granted, they appointed a day for the assembly, and ordained by an oath with each other, that no one should disclose [their deliberations] except those to whom this [office] should be assigned by the general assembly. Chap. XXXI. — When that assembly was* dismissed, the same chiefs of slates, who had before been to Csesar, returned, and asked that they might be allowed to treat with him pri- vately (in secret) concerning the safety of themselves and of all. That request having been obtained, they all threw themselves in tears at Caesar's feet, [saying] that they no less begged and earnestly desired that what they might say should not be disclosed, than that they might obtain those things which they wished for; inasmuch as they saw, that, if a disclosure were made, they should be put to the greatest tortures For these Divitiacus the JEduan spoke and told him; — "That thereCjESAR'S COMMENTARIES. v 31 were two parties i,n the whole ot Gaul: that the JEdui stood at the head of one of these, the Arverni of the other. After these had been violently struggling with one another for the superiority for many years, ifr came to pass that the Germans were called in for hire by the Arverni and the Sequani. That about 15,000 of them [i. e., of the Germans] had at first crossed the Rhine: but after these wild and savage men had become enamoured of the lands and the refinement*and the abun- dance of the Gauls, more were brought over, that there were now as mnny as 120,000 of them in Gaul: that with these the JEdui and their dependants had repeatedly struggled in arms ; that they had been routed, and had sustained a great calamity, — had lost all their nobility, all their senate, all their cavalry. And that broken by such engagements and calamities, although they had formerly been very powerr ful in Gaul, both from their own valor and from the Roman people's hospitality and friend- ship, they were now compelled to give the chief nobles of their state as hostages to the Sequani, and to bind their state by an oath, that they would neither demand hostages in return, nor supplicate aid from the Roman people, nor refuse to be forever under their sway and em- pire. That he was the only one out of all the state of the iEdui, who could not be prevailed upon to take the oath or to give his children as hostages. On that account he had fled from his state and had gone to the senate at Rome to beseech aid, as he alone was bound neither32 * CAESAR '$ COMMENTARIES. by oath nor hostages. But a worse tiling had befallen the victorious Sequani than the van- quished iEdui, for Ariovistus, th§ king of the Germans, had settled in their territories, and had seized upon a third of their lnnd, which was the best in the whole of Gaul, and was now ordering them to depart from another third part, because a few months previously 24,000 men of the Harudes had come to him, for whom room and settlements must be pro- vided. The consequence would be, that in a few years they would all be driven from the territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would cross the Rhine; for neither must the land of Gaul be compared with the land of the Ger- mans, nor must the habit of living of the latter be put on a level with that of the former. Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no sooner did he defeat the forces of the Gauls in a battle, which took place at Magetobria, than [he began] to lord it haughtily and cruelly, to de- mand as hostages the children of all the prin^ cipal nobles, and wreak on them every kind of cruelty, if everything was not done at his nod or pleasure ; that he was a savage, passionate, and reckless man, and that his commands could no longer be borne. Unless there was some aid in Caesar and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do the same thing that the Helvetii have done, [viz.] emigrate from their country, and seek another dwelling place, other settle- ments remote from the Germans, and try whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If these things were to be disclosed to Ariovis*CJESABrS COMMENTARIES. 33 tus, [Divitiacus adds] that ho doubts not that he would inflict the most severe punishment on all the hostages who are in his possession, [and says] that Caesar could, either by his own influence and by that of his army, or by his late victory, or by name of the Roman people, intimidate him, so as to prevent a greater number of Germans being brought over the Rhine, and could protect all Gaul from the outrages of Ariovistus.,, Chap. XXXII.—When this speech had been delivered b}7 Divitiacus, all who were present began with loud lamentation to entreat assistance of Caesar. Caesar noticed that the Sequani were the only people of all who did none of those things which the others did, but, with their heads bowed down, gazed on the earth in sadness. Wondering what was the reason of this conduct, he inquired of them- selves. No reply did the Sequani make, but silently continued in the same sadness. When he had repeatedly inquired of them and could not elicit any answer at all, the same Divitia- cus the ^Eduan answered, that — " the lot of the Sequani was more wretched and grievous than that of the rest, on this account, because they alone durst not even in secret complain or supplicate aid ; and shuddered at the cruelty of Ariovistus [even when] absent, just as if he were present ; for, to-the rest, despite of everything, there was an opportunity of flight given; but all tortures must be endured by the Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within their terri- tories, and whose towns were all in his power "34 CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. Chap. XXXIII. — Caesar, on being in- formed of these things, cheered the minds of the Gauls with his words, and promised that this affair should be an object of his concern, [saying] that he had great hopes that Ario- vistus, induced both by his kindness and his power, would put "an end to his oppression. After delivering this speech, lie dismissed the assembly ; and, besides those statements, many circumstances induced him to think that this affair ought to 1 e consklered and taken up by him; especially as lie saw that the JEdui, styled [as they had been] repeatedly by the sen- ate u brethren " and ^kinsmen," were held in the thraldom and dominion of the Germans, and understood that their hostages were with Ariovistus and the Sequani, which in so mighty an empire [as that] of the Roman people he' considered very disgraceful to himself and the republic. That, moreover, the Germans should by degrees become accustomed to cross the Rhine, and that a great body of them should come into Gaul, he saw [would be] dangerous to the Roman people, and judged, that wild and savage men would not be likely to restrain themselves, after they had possessed them- selves of all Gaul, from going forth into the province and thence marching into Italy, (as the Cimbri and Teutones had done before them,) particularly as the Rhone [was the sole barrier that] separated the Sequani from our province. Against which events he thought he ought to provide as speedily as possible. Moreover, Ariovistus for his part, had assumed to him-CJESAB 9S COMMENTARIES. 35 self such pride and arrogance, that he was felt to be quite insufferable. Chap. XXXIV. — He therefore determined to send ambassadors to Ariovistus to demand of him to name some intermediate spot for a conference between the two, [saying] that he wished to treat with him on state business and matters of the highest importance to both of them. To this embassy Ariovistus replied, that if he himself had had need of anything from Caesar, he would have gone to him ; and that if Caesar wanted anything from him he ought to come to him. That, besides, neither dare he go without an army into those parts of Gaul which Caesar had possession of, nor could he, without great expense and trouble, draw his army together to one place ; that to him, moreover, it appeared strange, what bus- iness either Caesar or the Roman people at all had in his own Gaul, which he had conquered in war. Chap. XXXV. — When these answers were reported to Caesar, he sends ambassadors to him a second time with this message : " Since, after having been treated with so much kind- ness by himself and the Roman people, (as he had in his consulship [B. C. 59] been styled 'king and friend' by the senate,) he makes this recompense to [Caesar] himself and the, Roman people, [viz.] that when invited to a conference he demurs, and does not think that it concerns him to advise and inform himself about an object of mutual interest, these are the things which he requires of him ; first, that36 C^JSAB'S COMMEN fABIE8. he do not any more bring over any body of men across the Rhine into Gaul; in the next place, that he restore the hostages, which he has from the iEdui, and grant the Sequani permission to restore to them with his consent those hostages which they have, and that he neither provoke the iEdui by outrage nor make war upon them or their allies; if he would accordingly do this," [Caesar says] that 44 he himself and the Roman people will entertain a perpetual feeling of favor and friendship to- wards him; but that if he [Caesar] does not obtain [his desires] that he (forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso [B. C. 61] the senate had decreed that, whoever should have the administration of the province of Gaul should, as far as he could do so consistently with the interests of the repub- lic, protect the iEdui and the other friends of the Roman people) will not overlook the wrongs of the iEdui." Chap. XXXVI.—To this Ariovistus re- plied, that "the right of war was, that tli y who had conquered should govei n those whoiii they had conquered, in what manner they pleased ; that in that way the Roman people were wont to govern the nations which they had conquered, not according to the dictation of any other, but according to their own discre- tion. If he for his part did not dictate to the Roman people as to the manner in which they were to exercise their right, he ought not to be obstructed by the Roman people in his right; that the iEdui, inasmuch as they had tried theCuESAB'S COMMENTABIES. 37 fortune of war and had engaged in arms and been conquered, had become tributaries to him; that Caesar was doing a great injustice, in that by his arrival he was making his rev- enues less valuable to him ; that he should not restore their hostages to the iEdui, but should not make war wrongfully either upon them or their allies, if they abode by that which had been agreed on, and paid their tribute an- nually : if they did not continue to do that, the Roman people's name of 'brothers** would avail them naught. As to Caesar's threatening him that he would not overlook the wrongs of the iEdui, [he said] that no one had ever entered into a contest with Mm [Ariovistus] without utter ruin to himself. That Caesar might enter the lists when he chose ; he would feel what the invincible Germans, well trained [as they were] beyond all others to arms, who for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof, could achieve bv their valor." Chap. XXXVIL —At the same time that this message was delivered to Caesar, ambassa- dors came from the JEdui and the Treviri; from the JEdui to complain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought oyer into Gaul, were ravaging their territories ; that they had not been able to purchase peace from Ariovis- tus, even by giving hostages: and from the Treviri, [to state] that a hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the banks of the Rhine, and were attempting to cross it; ,that the brothers, Nasuas and Cimberius, headed them. Being greatly alarmed at these things,38 GJESAB'S COMMENTARIES. Caesar thought that he ought to use all de- spatch, lest, if this new band of Suevi should unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he [Ariovistus] might be less easily withstood. Having, therefore, as quickly as he could, pro- vided a supply of corn, he hastened to Ario- vistus by forced marches. Chap. XXXVIII. —When he had proceeded three days' journey, word was brought to him that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize on Vesontio, which is the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced three days' journey from his territories. Caesar thought that he ought to take the greatest pre- cautions lest this should happen, for there was in that town a most ample supply of every- thing which was serviceable for war; and so fortified was it by the nature of the ground, as to afford a great facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the river Doubs almost sur- rounds the whole town, as though it were traced round it with a pair of compasses. A moun- tain of great height shuts in the remaining space, which is not more than 600 feet, where the river leaves a gap, in such a manner that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank on either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this [mountain], and connects it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens by forced marches by night and day, and, after having seized the town, stations a garrison there. Chap. XXXIX. -—Whilst he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn andCJESAB '$ COMMENTABIES. 39 provisions, from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the Gauls and traders, (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge stature, of incredible valor and practice in arms; that ofttimes they, on encountering them, could hot bear even their countenance, and the fierceness of their eyes,) so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree. This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the rest, who, having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives of friendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And al- leging, some of them one reason, some another, which they said made it necessary for them to depart, they requested that by his consent they might be allowed to withdraw ; some, influ- enced by shame, stayed behind in order that they might; avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither compose their counte- nance, nor even sometimes check their tears; but hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with their comrades the gen- eral danger. Wills were sealed universally throughout the whole camp. By the expres- sions and cowardice of these men, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in command of the cav- alry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to be considered less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but feared the narrowness of the roads and the40 CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. vastness of the forests which lay between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be brought up readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar, that when he gave orders for the camp to be moved and the troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient to the command, nor advance in consequence of their fear. Chap. XL. — When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, and sum- moned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely reprimanded them, u particularly, for supposing that it belonged to them to in- quire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching, or with what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar'sJ consul- ship, had mo4 anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people ; why should any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He for his part was per- suaded, that, when his demands were known and the fairness of the terms considered, he would reject neither his nor the Roman people's favor. But even if, driven on by rage and madness, he should make war upon them, what after all were they afraid of? ov why should they despair either of their own valor or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial had been made within our fathers' recollection, when, on the defeat of the Cimbri and Teu- tones by Caius Marius, the army was regarded as having deserved no less praise than their commander himself. It had been made latety, too, in Italy,during the rebellion of the slaves^CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 41 whom, however, the experience and training which they had received from us assisted in some respect. From which a judgment might be formed of the advantages which res- olution carries with it; inasmuch as those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed, they had afterwards vanquished, when well armed and flushed with success. In short, that these were the same men whom the He-lvetii, in frequent encoun- ters, not only in their own territories, but also in theirs [the German], have generally van- quished, and yet cannot have been a match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when the Gauls had been tired out by the long dura- tion of the war, Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this tim3 despairing of a battle, and scat- tered in all directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than valor. But though there had been room for such stratagem against savage and unskilled men, not even [Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby our armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear to a pretence about the [deficiency of] supplies and the nar- rowness of the roads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust their general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That these things were his concern; that the42 CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to furnish the corn ; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as to the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its being reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew, that in the case of all those whose army had not been obedient to command, either upon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune had de- serted them, or, that upon some crime be- ing discovered, covetousness had been clearly proved [against them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would therefore instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a more distant day, and would break up his camp the next night, in the fourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a sense of honor and duty, or whether fear had more influence with them. But that, if no one else should follow, yet he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it should be his pretorian cohort." —This legion Caesar had both greatly favored, and in it, on account of its valor, placed the greatest confi- dence. Chap. XLI. — Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in a surprising manner, and the highest ardor and eagerness for prosecuting the war were engen- dered ; and the tenth legion was the first to return thanks to him, through their militaryCJESAIi'S COMMENTARIES. 13 tribunes, for his having expressed this most favorable opinion of them; and assured liira that they were quite ready to prosecute the war. Then, the other legions endeavored, through their military tribunes and the centu- rions of the principal companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, [raying] that they had never either doubted or feared, or supposed that the determination of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's. Hav- ing accepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitred by Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith, [he found] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as he had said [he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his march, he was informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only four-and-twenty miles distant from ours. Ch\p. XL1I. —Upon being apprised of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to him, [saying] that what he had before requested as to a conference, might now, as far as his permission went, take place, since he [Caesar] had approached nearer, and he considered that he might now do it without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal, and began to think that he was now returning to a rational state of miud, as he spontane- ously proffered that which he had previously refused to him when requesting it; and was in great hopes that, in consideration of his own44 CJESAtt \S' COMMENTARIES. and the Roman people's great favors towards him, the issue would be tli it he would desist from his obstinacy upon his demands being made known. The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of conference. Mean- while, as ambassadors were being often sent to and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier with him to the conference, [saying] that uhe was afraid of being ensnared by him through treachery; that both should come accompa- nied by cavalry ; that he would not come on any other condition." Csesar, as he neither wished that the conference should, by an excuse thrown in the way, be set aside, nor durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls, decided that it would be most expedient to take away from the Gallic cavalry all their horses, and thereon to mount the legionary soldiers of the tenth legion, in which he placed the greatest confidence ; in order that he might have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible, should there be any need for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the tenth legion said, not without a touch of humor, "that Caesar did more for them than he had promised ; he had promised to have the tenth legion in place of his pretorian cohort; but he now converted them into horse." Chap. XLIII.—There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of considerable size. This spot was at nearly an equal dis- tance from both camps. Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the conference.C^E SAB'S COMMENTARIES. 45 Caesar stationed the legion, which he had brought [with him] on horseback, 200 paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus also took their stand at an equal distance. Ariovistus then demanded, that they should confer on horseback, and that, besides them- selves, they should bring with them ten men each to the conference. When they were come to the place, Caesar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his own and the senate's favors towards him [Ariovistus], "in that he had been styled king, in that [he had been styled] friend, by the senate, in that very considerable presents had been sent him; which circumstance he informed him had both fallen to the lot of few, and had usually been bestowed in consideration of important per- sonal services; that. he, although he had neither an introduction, nor a just ground for the request, had obtained these honors through the kindness and munificence of him- self [Caesar] and the senate. He informed him too, how old and how just were the grounds of connection that existed between themselves [the Romans] and the JEdui, what decrees of the senate had been passed in their favor, and how frequent and how honorable ; how from time immemorial the iEdui had held the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even [said Caesar] before they had sought our friendship; that it was the custom of the Ro- man people to desire not only that its allies and friends should lose i one of their property, but be advanced in influence, dignity, andU CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. honor; who then could endure that what they had brought with them to the friendship of the Roman people, should be torn from them?-" He then made the same demands which he had commissioned the ambassadors to make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war either upon the iEdui or their allies, that he should restore tho hostages; that, if lie could not send back to their country any part of the Germans, lie should at all events suffer none of them any more to cross the Rhine. Chap. XLIY.—Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Caesar; but expatiated largely on his own virtues, " that he h id crossed the Rhine not of his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the Gauls; that he had not left home and kindred without great expectations and great rewards ; that lie had settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gauls themselves ; that the hostages had been given by their own good-will; that he took by right of war the tribute which conquerors are accus- tomed to impose on the c mquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls upon him; that all the states of Gaul came to attack him, and had encamped against him ; that all their forces had been routed and beaten by liim in a single battle; that if they chose to make a second trial, he was ready to encounter them again ; but If they chose to enjoy peace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute, which of their own free will they had paid up to that time. That the friendship of the Ro- man people ought to prove to him an orna-a^JSAB >S COMMENTARIES. .47 ment and a safeguard, not a detriment; and that he sought it with that expectation. But if through the Roman people the tribute was to be discontinued, and those who surrendered to be seduced" from him, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman people no less heartily than lis had sought it. As to his leading over a host of Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this with a view of securing himself, not of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of this, in that he did not come with- out being invited, and in that he did not make war, but merely warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before the Roman people. That never before this time did a Roman army go beyond the frontiers of the province of Gaul. What [said he] does [Caesar] desire? — why come into his [Ariovistus's] domains ? •—that this was his province of Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not to be pardoned in him, if he were to make an attack upon our territories; so, likewise, that we were unjust , to obstruct him in his preroga- tive. As for Caesar's saying that the JEdui had been styled 'brethren' by the senate, he was not so uncivilized nor so ignorant of affairs, as not to know that the iEdui in the very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance tc the Romans, nor re- ceived any from the Roman people in the struggles which theiEdui had been maintaining with him and with the Sequani. He must feel suspicious, that Caesar, though feigning friend- ship as the reason for his keeping an army in48 CJESAR'S COMMENTABIE& Gaul, was keeping it with a view of crushing him. And that unless he depart and withdraw his army from these parts, he shall regard him not as a friend, but as a foe ; and that, even if he should put him to death, he should do what would please many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he had assurance of that from themselves through their messen- gers, and could purchase the favor and the friendship of them all by his [Caesar's] death. But if he would depart and resign to him the free possession of Gaul, he would recompense him with a great reward, and would bring to a close whatever wars he wished to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him." Chap. XLV. — Many things were stated by Caesar to the effect [to show] : " why he could not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Roman people's practice would suf- fer him to abandon most meritorious allies, nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people; that the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them and had not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon them. And if the most ancient period was to be regarded, then was the sov- ereignty of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the senate was to be observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] had conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws." Chap. XLVI. — While these things areCJESA E 9 S COMMENTABIES. 49 being transacted in the conference, it was announced to Caesar that the cavalry of Ario- vistus were approaching nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men, and casting stones and weapons at them. Caesar made an end of his speech and betook himself to his men; and commanded them that they should by no means return a weapon upon the enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry would be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not think proper to en- gage, lest, after the enemy were routed, it might be said that they had been ensnared by him under the sanction of a conference. When it was spread abroad among the common soldiery with what haughtin ss Ariovistus had behaved at the conference, and how he had ordered the Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack upon our men, and how this had broken off the conference, a much greater alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into our army. Chap. XLVIL — Two days after, Ariovis- tus sends ambassadors to Caesar, to stnte 4 4 that he wished to treat with him about those things which had been begun to be treated of between them, but had not been concluded"; [and to beg] that u he would either again appoint a day for a conference ; or, if he were not willing to do that, that he would send one of his [officers] as an ambassador to him." There did not appear to Caesar any good rea- son for holding a conference; and the more so as the day before the Germans could not60 CJESAirS COMMENTARIES. be restrained from casting weapons at our men. He thought he should not without great danger send to him as ambassador one of liis [Roman] officers, and should expose him to savage men. It seemed [therefore] most proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest courage and accomplishments (whose father had been presented with the freedom of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and on account of his knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by long practice, now spoke fluently ; and because in his case the Germans would have no motive for committing violence ; and [as his colleague] M. Mettius, who had shared the hospitality of Ariovistus. He commissioned them to learn what Ariovistus had to say, and to report to him. But when Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp, he cried out in the presence of his army, " Why were they come to him? was it for the purpose of acting as spies?" He stopped them when attempting to speak, and cast them into chains. Chap. XLVIII. — The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under a hi;l six miles from Caesar's camp. The day following he led his forces past Caesar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him; with this design, — that he might cutoff Caesar from the corn and provisions, which might be con- veyed to him from the Sequani and the iEdui. For five successive days from that day, CaesarCESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 51 drew out his forces before the campk, and put them in battle order, that, if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in battle, an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all this time kept his army in camp : but engaged daily in cavalry skirmishes. The method of battle in which the Germans had practised themselves was this. There were 6,003 horse, and as many very active and courageous foot, one of whom each of the horse selected out of the whole army for his own protection. By these [foot] they were constantly accompanied in their engagements; to these the horse retired; these on an}7 emergency rushed for- ward ; if any one, upon receiving a very severe wound, had fallen from his horse, they stood around him: if it was necessary to advance farther than usual, or to retreat more rapidly, so great,'from practice, was their swiftness, that, supported by the manes of the horses, they could keep pace with their speed. Chap. XLIX. — Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Caesar, that he might not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a convenient position for a camp beyond that place in which the Germans had encamped, at about 600 paces from them, and having drawn up his army in three lines, marched to that place. He ordered the first and second lines to be under arms ; the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant from the enemy about 600 paces, as has been stated. Thither Ariovistus sent light troops, about 16,000 men in number, with all his cavalry; which forces52 CJESAB 'S COMMENTARIES were to intimidate our men, and hinder them in their fortification. Caesar nevertheless, as he had before arranged, ordered two lines to drive off the enemy: the third to execute the work. The camp being fortified, he left there two legions and a ponion of the auxiliaries ; and led back the other four legions into the larger camp. Chap. L — The next day, according to his custom, Caesar led out his forces from both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one, drew up his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting. When he found that they did not even then come out [from their intrenchments], he led back his army into camp about noon. Then at last Ariovistus sent part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. The battle was vigorously main- tained on both sides till the evening. At sun- set, after many wounds had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus led back his forces into camp. When Caesar inquired of his prisoners, wherefore Ariovistus did not come to an en- gagement, he discovered this to be the reason: that among the Germans it was the custom for their matrons to pronounce from lots and divination, whether it were expedient that the battle should be engaged in or not; that they had said, " that it was not the will of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in battle before the new moon." Chap. LI. —The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard for both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliariesCMS A li 'S COMMENTARIES. 53 in sight of the enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the num- ber of legionary soldiers, considering the num- ber of the enemy; that [thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He himself, having drawn np his army in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. Then at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces out of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Yangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and surrounded their whole army with their chariots and wagons, that no hope might be left in flight. On these they placed their women, who, with dishevelled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went forward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans. Chap. LII. — Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that every one might have them as witnesses of his valor. He himself began the battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that part of the enemy to be the least strong. Accord- ingly our men, upon the signal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins, they fought with swords hand to hand. But the German *, according to their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our swords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the5i (jjes^r's commentaries. phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the enemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left wing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus, a young man, who commanded the cavalry, — as he was more disengaged than those who were employed in the fight, — sent the third line as a relief to our men who were in distress. Chap. LIU. — Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turned their ba^ks, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the river Rhine, about fifty miles from that place. There some few, either rely- ing on their strength, endeavored to swim over, or, finding boats, procured their safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who, meeting with a small vessel tied to the bank, escaped in it: our horse pursued and slew all the rest of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whom he had brought with him from home ; the other a Norican, the sister of King Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent [thither for that purpose] by her brother. Both perished in that flight. Of their two daughters, one was slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus, as he was being dragged by his guards in the flight, bound with a triple chain, fell into the hands of Caesar himself, as he was pursuing the enemy with his cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded Caesar no less pleasure than the victoryCESAR'S COMMENTARIES. M itself; because he saw a man of the first rank in the province of Gaul, his intimate acquaint- ance and friend, rescued from the hand of the enemy, and restored to him, and that fortune had not diminished aught of the joy and exul- tation [of that day] by his destruction. He [Procillus] said that, in his own presence, the lots had been thrice consulted respecting him, whether he should immediately be put to death by fire, or be reserved for another time : that by the favor of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius, also, was found and brought back to him [Caesar]. Chap. LIV. — This battle having been re- ported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had come to the banks of that river, began to return home, when the Ubii, who dwelt near- est to the Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed, slew a great number of them. Caesar having concluded two very important wars in one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters among the Sequani, a little earlier than the season of the year required. He appointed Labienus over the winter quarters, and set out in person for Hither Gaul to hold the assizes..56 CuESAB'S C OMMENTARIES. BOOK II. the argument. I. The Belgae, from various motives, enter into a confederacy against the Roman people. — II. Caesar, having received in- telligence of it, proceeds against them. — III., IV. The Remi submit to Caesar, and give him information respecting the other Belgae.— V; He crosses the liver Aisne and encamps beyond it.—VI., VII. The attack on Bibrax by the Belgae, and its relief by the Romans. — VIII.-X. State of affairs be- tween the Romans and the Belgae. — XI. The Bellovftci, withdrawing from the warfare to return home, are pursued by the Romans and suffer severely. — XII. Caesar proceeds against the SuessiSnes.— XIII. Then against the Bellov&ci, and receivas the surrender of both. — XIV. Diviti&cus pleads in behalf of the Bellov&ci. — XV. Caesar's reply; the charac- ter of the Nervii. — XVI.-XXIII. Engagements with them; a peculiarity in their mode of warfare; their extraordinary courage; they are finally subdued. — XXIX. The Aduatfici. — XXX. Their ridicule of the Roman engineering. — XXXI. Their pretended submission to the Romans. — XXXII. Cae- sar's reply to their embassy.— XXXIII. Their treachery and overthrow. — XXXIV. P. Crassus announces that several nations had submitted to the Roman power. — XXXV. Cae- sar returns to Italy; a solemn thanksgiving is decreed by the senate. Chap. I. — While Caesar was in winter quarters in Hither Gaul, as we have shown above, frequent reports were brought to hira, and he was also informed by letters from La- bienus, that all the Belgae, who we have said are a third part of Gaul, were entering into a confederacy against the Roman people, and giving hostages to one another ; that the rea- sons of the confederacy were these — first, because they feared that, after all [Celtic] Gaul was subdued, our army would be led against them; secondly, because they were in-CjESAB>S comment A HIES. 57 stigated by several of the Gauls, some of whom as [on the one hand] they had been unwilling that the Germans should remain any longer in Gaul, so [on the other] they were dissatisfied that the army of the Roman people should pass the winter in it, and settle there; and others of them, from a natural instability and fickle- ness of disposition, were anxious for a revolu- tion ; [the Belgoe were instigated] by several, also, because the government in Gaul was gen- erally seized upon by the more powerful per- sons and by those who had the means of hir- ing troops, and they could less easily effect this object under our dominion. Chap. II. — Alarmed by these tidings and letters, Caesar levied two new legions in Hither Gaul, and, at the beginning of summer, sent Q. Pedius, his lieutenant, to conduct them farther into Gau'. He himself, as soon as there began to be plenty of forage, came to the army. lie gives a commission to the Sen- ones and the other Gauls who were neighbors of the Belgse, to learn what is going on amongst them [i. e , the Belgae], and inform him of these matters. These all uniformly reported that troops were being raised, and that an army was being collected in one place. Then, indeed, he thought that he ought not to hesitate about proceeding towards them, and having provided supplies, moves his camp, and in about fifteen days arrives at the territories of the Helgae. Chap. III. — As lie arrived there unexpect- edly and sooner than any one anticipated, the88 SAB'S OOMMENTABIES. Remi, who are the nearest of the Belgae to [Celtic] Gaul, sent to him Icfeius aad Ante- brogius, [two of] the principal persons of - the state, as their nmbassiiorsv to tell him that they surrenderecPthemselves and all their pos- sessions to the protection and disposal of the Roman people ; and that they had neither com- bined with the rest of the Belgae, nor entered into any confederacy against the Roman peo- ple ; and were prepared to give hostages, to obey his commands, to receive him into their towns, and to aid him with corn and other things ; that all the rest of the Belgae were in arms; and that the Germans, who dwell on this side the Rhine, had joined themselves to them ; and that so great was the infatuation of them all, that they could not restrain even the Suessiones, their own brethren and kinsmen, who enjoy the same rights, and the same laws, and who have one government and one ma- gistracy [in common] with themselves, from uniting with them. Chap. IV. —When Caesar inquired of them what states were in arms, how powerful they were, and what they could do in war, he received the following information: that the greater part of the Belgae were sprung from the Germans, and that having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they had settled there, on account of the fertility of the coun- try, and had driven out the Gauls who inhab- ited those regions; and that they were the only people who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was overrun, had preventedCJESAU >S COMMENTARIES the Teutones and the Cirabri from entering their territories; the effect of which was, that, from the recollection of those events, they assume to themselves great authority and haughtiness in military matters. The Rem! said, that they had known accurately everything respecting their number, because, being united to them by neighborhood and by alliances, they l ad learnt what number each state had in the general council of the Belgse promised for that war. That the Bellovaci were the most powerful amongst them in valor, influence, and number of men; that these could muster 100,000 armed men [and had] promised 60,000 picked men out of that num- ber, and demanded for themselves the com- mand of the whole war. That the Suessiones were their nearest neighbors and possessed a very extensive and fertile country; that among them, even in our own memory, Divi- tiacus, the most powerful man of all Gaul, had been king ; who had held the government of a great part of these regions, as well as of Britain ; that their king at present was Galba; that the direction of the whole war was con* ferred, by the consent of all, upon him, on. account of his integrity and prudence ; that they had twelve towns ; that they had prom- ised 50,000 armed men ; and that the Nervii, who are reckoned the most warlike among them, and are situated at a very great distance, [had promised] as many; the Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapii, 9,000; the Caleti,60 CMS AH'8 COMMENTABIES. 10,000; the Yelocasses and the Veromandu as many ; the Aduatuci, 19,000 ; that the Con- drusi, the Eburones, the Csersesi, the Psemani, who are call d by the common name of Ger- mans, [had promised], they thought, to the number of 40,000. Chap V. — Caesar, haying encouraged the Remi, and addressed them courteously, ordered the whole senate to assemble before him, and the children of their chief men to be brought to him as hostages ; all which commands they punctually performed by the day [appointed], tie, addressing himself to Divitiacus, the iEduan, with great earnestness, points out how much it concerns the republic and their common security, that the forces of the enemy should be divided, so that it might not be necessary to engage with so large a number, at one time. [He asserts] that this might be effected if the iEdui would lead their forces into the territories of t'ie Bellovaci, and begin to lay waste their country. With these instructions he dismissed him from his pres- ence. After he perceived that all the forces of the Belgse, which had been collected in one place, were approaching towards him, and learnt from the scouts whom he had sent ©ut, and [also] learnt from the Remi, that they were not then far distant, he ha-tened to lead his army over the Aisne which is on the bor- ders of the Remi, and there pitched his camp. This pos tion fortified one side of his camp by the banks of the river, render d the country which lay in his rear secur • from the enemy,CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 61 and furthermore insured that provisions might without danger be brought to him by the Remi and the rest of the states. Over that river was a bridge: there he places a guard; and on the other • side of the river he leaver Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, with six cohorts. He orders him to fortify a camp with a rampart twelve feet in height, and a trench eighteen feet in breadth. Chap. VI. — There was a town of the Remi, by name Bibrax, eight miles distant from this camp. This the Belgae on their march began to attack with great vigor. [The assault] was with difficulty sustained for that day. The Gauls* mode of besieging is the same as that of the Belgae : when after having drawn a large number of men around the whole of the fortifications, stones have begun to be cast against the wall on all sides, and the wall has been stript of its defenders, [then], forming a testudo, they advance to the gates and undermine the wall: which was easily effected on this occasion; for while so large a number were casting stones and darts, no one was able to maintain his position upon e wall. When night had put an end to the assault, Iccius, who was then in command of the town, one of the Remi, a man of the high- est rank and influence amongst his people, and one of those who had come to Caesar as ambas- sador [to sue] for a peace, sends messengers to him, [to report] "That, unless assistance were sent to him, he could not hold out any longer."62 caesar's commentaries. Chap. VII.—Thither, immediately after midnight, Caesar, using as guides the same persons who had come to him as messengers from lecius, sends some Numidian and Cre- tan archers and some Balearian slingers as a relief to the towns-people, by whose arrival both a desire to resist, together with the hope of [making good their] defence, was infused into the Remi, and, for the same reason, the hope of gaining the town abandoned the enemy. Therefore, after staying a short time before the town, and laying waste the country of th<' Remi, when all the villages and builds ings which they could approach had been burnt, they hastens d with all their forces to the camp of Caesar, and encamped within less than two miles [of it] ; and their camp, as was indicated by the smoke and fires, extended more than eight miles in breadth. Chap. VIII. — Caesar at first determined to decl ne a battle, as well on account of the great number of the enemy as their distin- guished reputation for valor: daily, however, in cavalry actions, he strove to ascertain, by frequent trials, what the enemy could effect by their prowess and what our men would dare. When he perceived that our men were not inferior, as the place before the camp was nat- urally c< nvenient and suitable for marshalling an army, (since the hill where the camp was pitched, rising gradually from the plain, extended forward in breadth as far as the space which the marshalled army could occupy, and had steep declines of its side to eitherCESAR'S COMMENT ABIES. 63 direction, and gently sloping in front gradu- ally sank to the plain;) on either side of that hill he drew a cross trench of about four hun- dred paces, and at the extremities of that trench built forts, and placed there his mili- tary engines, lest, after he had marshalled his army, the enemy, since they were so powerful in point of number, should be able to surround his men in the flank, while fighting. After doing this, and leaving in the camp the two legions which he had last raised, that, if there should be any occasion, they might be brought as a reserve, he formed the other six legions in order of battle before the camp. The enemy, likewise, had drawn up their forces which they had brought out of the camp. Chap. IX.—There was a marsh of no great extent between our army and that of the enemy. The latter were waiting to see if our men would pass this; our men, also, were ready in arms to attack them while disordered, if the first attempt to pass should be made by them. In the mean time battle was com- menced between the two armies by a cavalry action. When neither army began to pass the marsh, Caesar, upon the skirmishes of the horse [proving] favorable to our men, led back his forces into the camp. The enemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Aisne, which it has been stated was behind our camp. Finding a ford there, they endeavored to lead a part of their forces over it; with the design, that, if they could, they might carry by storm the fort which Q. Titu-64 CjESAB % 8 COMMENTARIES. rius, Caesar's lieutenant, commanded, and might cut off the bridge; but, if they could not do that, they should lay waste the lands of the Remi, which were of great use to us in carrying on the war, and might hiijder our men from foraging. Chap. X. — Caesar, being apprised of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalry and light- armed Nuinidians, slingers and archers, over the bridge, and hastens towards them. There was a severe struggle in that place , Our men, attacking in the river the disordered enemy, slew a great part of them. By the immense number of their missiles they drove back the rest, who, in a most courageous manner, were attempting to pass over their bodies, and surrounded with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those who had first crossed the river. The enemy, when they perceived that their hopes had deceived them both with regard to their taking the town by storm and also their passing the river, and did not see our men advance to a more disadvantageous place for the purpose of fighting, and when provisions began to fail them, having called a council, determined that it was best for each to return to his country, and resolved to as- semble from all quarters to defend those into whose territories the Romans should first march an army; that they might contend in their own rather than in a foreign country, and might enjoy the stores of provision which they possessed at home. Together with other causes, this consideration also led them toQjESAB'S COMMENTARIES. 65 that resolution, viz., that they ha 1 learnt that Divitiacus and the iEclui were approaching the territories of the Bellovaci. And it was impossible to persuade the latter to stay any longer, or to deter them from conveying sue* cor to their own people. Chap. XI. — That matter being determined on marching out "of their camp at the second watch, with great noise and confusion, in no fixed order, nor under any command, since each sought for himself the foremost place in the journey, and hastened to reach home, they made their departure appear very like a flight. Caesar, immediately learning this through his scouts, [but] fearing an ambus* cade, because he had not yet discovered for what reason they were departing, kept his army and cavalry within the camp. At day- break, the intelligence having been confirmed by the scouts, he sent forward his cavalry to harass their r«-ar; and gave the command of it to two of his lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta. He ordered T. Labienus, another of his lieutenants, to follow them closely with three legions. These, attacking their rear, and pursuing them for many miles, slew a great number of them as they were fleeing ; while those in the rear with whom they had come up, halted, and bravely sustained the attack of our soldiers ; the van, because they appeared to be removed from danger, and were not restrained by any necessity or command, as soon as the noise was heard, broke their ranks, and, to a man, rested their66 CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. safety in flight. Thus without any risk [to themselves] our men killed as great a number of them as the length of the day allowed; and at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and betook themselves into the camp, as they had been commanded. Chap. XII. — On the day,following, before the enemy could recover from their terror and flight, Caesar led his army into the territories of the Suessiones, which are next to the Remi, and having accomplished a long march, hast- ens to the town named Noviodunum. Having attempted to take it by storm on his march, because he heard that it was destitute of [sufficient] defenders, he was not able to carry it by assault, on account of the breadth of the ditch and the height of the wall, though few were defending it. Therefore, having fortified the camp, he began to bring up the vineae, and to provide whatever things were necessary for the storm. In the mean time, the whole body of the Suessiones, after their flight, came the next night into the town. The vinese having been quickly brought up against the town, a mound thrown up, and towers built, the Gauls, amazed by the great- ness of the works, such as they had neither seen nor heard of before, and struck, also, by the despatch of the Romans, send ambassadors to Caesar respecting a surrender, and succeed in consequence of the Remi requesting that they [the Suessiones] might be spared. Chap. XIII. — Caesar, having received as hostages the first men of the state, and evenCJB BAR'S COMMENTARIES. 67 the two sons of King Galba himself, and all the arms in the town having been delivered up, admitted the Suessiones to a surrender, and led his army against the Bellovaci. Who, when they had conveyed themselves and all their possessions into the town called Bratus- pantium, and Caesar with his army was about five miles distant from that town, all the old men, going out of the town, began to stretch out their hands to Caesar, and to intimate by their voice that they would throw themselves on his protection and power, nor would contend in arms against the Roman people. In like manner, when he had come up to the town, and there pitched his camp, the boys and the women from the wall, with outstretched hands, after their custom, begged peace from the Romans. Chap. XIV. — For these Divitiacus pleads (for after the departure of the Belgae, having dismissed the troops of the ^Edui, he had returned to Caesar) : u The Bellovaci had at all times been in the alliance and friendship of the -iEduan state; that they had revolted from the iEdui and made war upon the Roman people, being urged thereto by their nobles, who said that the JEdui, reduced to slavery by Caesar, were suffering every indig- nity and insult. That they who had been the leaders of that plot, because they perceived how great a calamity they had brought upon the state, had fled into Britain. That not only the Bellovaci, but also the iEdui, en- treated him to use his [accustomed] clemency68 CAESAR'S COMMENT ABIES. and lenity towards them [the Bellovaci]: which if he did, he would increase the influ- ence of the iEdui among all the Belgae, by whose succor and resources they had been accus- tomed to support themselves whenever any wars occurred." Chap. XV.— Caesar said that on account of his respect for Divitiacus and the iEduans, he would receive them into his protection, and would spare them; but, because the state was of great influence among the Belgse, and pre- eminent in the number of its population, he demanded 6 0 ho-tages. When these were delivered, and all the arms in the town col- lected, he went from that place into the territorii s of the Ambiani, who, without delay, surrendered themselves and all their posses- sions. Upon their territories bordered the Nervii, concerning whose character and cus- toms when Caesar inquired he received the following information: That "there was no access for merchants to them ; that they suf- fered no wine and other things tending to luxury to be imported, because they thought that by their use the mind is enervated and the courage impaired ; that they were a savage people and of great bravery; that they up- braided and condemned the rest of the Belgae who had surrendered themselves to the Roman people and thrown aside their national cour- age ; that they openly declared they would neither send ambassadors, nor accept any con- dition of peace." Chap. XVI. — After he had made threeCAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 69 days' march through their territQries, he dis- covered from some prisoners that the river Sambre was not more than ten miles from his camp ; that all the Nervii had stationed them- selves on the other side of that river, and together with the Atrebates and the Vero- mandui, their neighbors, were there awaiting the arrival of the Romans ; for they had per- suaded both these nations to try the same fortune of war [as themselves}: that the forces of the Aduatuci were also expected by them, and were on their march ; that they had put their women, and those who through age appeared useless for war, in a place to which there was no approach for an army, on account of the marshes. Chap. XVII. — Having learnt these things, he sends forward scouts and centurions to choose a convenient place for the camp. And as a great many of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar, marched with him, some of these, as was afterwards learnt from the prisoners, having accurately observed, during those days, the army's method of marching, went by night to the Nervii, and informed them that a great number of baggage-trains passed between the several legions, and that there would be no difficulty, when the first legion had come into the camp, and the other legions were at a great distance, to attack that legion while under baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-train seized, it would come to pass that the other legions would not dare to stand70 CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. their ground. It added weight also to the advice of those who reported that circum- stance, that the Kervii, from early times, because they were weak in cavalry, (for not even at this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can,) in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbors if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut young trees, and bent them, by meajis of their numerous branches [extending] on to the sides, and the quick- briers and thorns springing up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye. Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed by these things, the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to be neglected by them. Chap. XVIII. — The nature of the ground which our men had chosen for the camp was this : A hill, declining evenly from the top, extended to the river Sambre, which we have mentioned above : from this river there arose a [second] hill of like ascent, on the other side and oppo- site to the former, and open for about 200 paces at the lower part; but in the upper part, woody, (so much so) that it was not easy to see through it into the interior. Within those woods the enemy kept themselves in conceal- ment ; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground, along the river. The $epth of the river was about tbw fe§t-C^E SAB'S COMMENTARIES. 71 Chap. XIX. — Caesar, having sent his cav- alry on before, followed close after them with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march was different from that which the Belgse had reported to the Nervii. For as he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, according to his custom, led on [as the van] six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placed the baggage-trains of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train. Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced action with the cavalry of the enemy. While they from time to time betook themselves into the woods to their companions, and again made an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare to follow them in their retreat farther than the limit to which the plain and open parts extended, in the mean time the six legions which had arrived first, having measured out the work, began to fortify the camp. When the first part of the baggage-train of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the time for com- mencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routedund thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed12 CjESAR '8 COMMENTARIES. to be in the woods, the .river, and close upon us almost at the same time And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to our camp and to those who were employed in the works. Chap. XX.—Caesar had everything to do at one time: the standard to be displayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms ; the signal to be given by the trumpet; the sol iiers to be called off from the works ; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of seeking materials for the rampart* to be summoned; the order of battle to be formed ; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be given. A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy. Under these difficulties two things proved of advantage: [first] the skill and experience of the soldiers, because, having been trained by former engagements, they could suggest to themselves what ought to be done, as conveniently as receive infor- mation from others ; and [secondly] that Caesar had forbidden his several lieutenants to depart from the works and their respective legions, before the camp was fortified. These, on ac- count of the near approach and the speed of the enemy, did not then wait for any command from Caesar, but of themselves executed what- ever appeared proper. Chap. XXI. — Caesar, having given the ne- cessary orders, hastened to and fro into what* ever quarter fortune carried him, to animateCAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 73 the troops, and came to the tenth legion. Haying encouraged the soldiers with no further speech than that 41 they should keep up the remembrance of their wonted valor, and not be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain the assault of the enemy" ; as the latter were not farther from them than the distance to which a dart could be cast, he gave the signal for commencing batlle. And having gone to another quarter for the purpose of encour- aging [the soldiers], he finds them fighting. Such was the shortness of the time, and so determi ed was the mind of the enemy on fight- ing, that time was wanting not only for affix- ing the military insignia, but even for putting on the helmets and drawing off the covers from the shields. To whatever part any one by chance came from the works (in which he had been employed), and whatever standards he saw first, at these he stood, lest in seeking his own company he should lose the time for fighting. Chap. XXII. — The army having been mar- shalled, rather as the nature of the ground and the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the time, than as the method and order of military matters required ; whilst the legions in the dif- ferent places were withstanding the enemy, some in one quarter, some in another, and the view was obstructed by the very thick hedges intervening, as we have before remarked, neither could proper reserves be posted, nor could the necessary measures be taken in each part, nor could all the commands be issued by74 CJESAft' S COMMENTARIES. one person. Therefore, in such an unfavor- able state of affairs, various events of fortune followed. Chap. XXIII. — The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been stationed on the left part of the army, casting their weap- ons, speedily drove the Atrebates, (for that division had been opposed to them,) who were breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from the higher ground into the river; and following them as they were endeavoring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of them while impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the river; and having advanced to a disadvanta- geous place, when the battle was renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had returned and were opposing them. In like manner, in another quarter two different legions, the eleventh and the eighth, having routed the Yeromandui, with whom they had engaged, were fighting from the higher ground upon the very banks of the river. But, almost the whole camp on the front and on the left side being then exposed, since the twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no great distance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body, with Bod- uognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastened towards that place ; and part of them began to surround the legions on their unprotected flank, part to make for the highest point of the encampment. Chap. XXIV. —At the same time ourCJSSAIl'S COMMENTARIES. 75 horsemen, and light-armed infantry, who had been with those, who, as I have related, were routed by the first assault of the enemy, as they were betaking themselves into the camp, met the enemy face to face, and again sought flight into another quarter ; and the camp-followers, who from the Decuman Gate and from the highest ridge of the hill had seen our men pass the river as victors, when, after going out for the purposes of plundering, they looked back and saw the enemy parading in our camp, com- mitted themselves precipitately to flight; at the same time there arose the cry and shout of those who came with the baggage-train; and they (affrighted) were carried some one way, some another. By all these circumstances the cavalry of the Treviri were much alarmed, (whose reputation for courage is extraordinary among the Gauls, and who had come to Caesar, being sent by their state as auxiliaries,) and, when they saw our camp filled with a large number of the enemy, the legions hard pressed and almost held surrounded, the camp-retain- ers, horsemen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing on all sides divided and scattered, they, despairing of our affairs, hastened home, and related to their state that the Romans were routed and conquered, [and] that the enemy were in possession of their camp and baggage- train. Chap. XXV.—Caesar proceeded, after en- couraging the tenth legion, to the right wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in consequence of the stand-76 C^ESAB'S COMMENTARIES. ards of the twelfth legion being collected to- gether in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance to themselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the othef cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion, P. Sex- tius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable to support himself; he likewise perceived that the rest were slack- ening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy [on the other hand], though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were [at the same time] pressing hard on both flanks ; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis, and that there was not any reserve which could be brought up ; having therefore snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear (for he himself had come without a shield), he advanced to the front of the line, and addressing the cenfurions by name, and encouraging the rest of the soldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and ex- tend the companies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On his arrival, as hope was brought tc the soldiers and their courage restored, whilst every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desired to exert his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a little checked.CJBSAS'S COMMENTARIES. 77 Chap. XXVI. — Caesar, when he perceived that the seventh legion, which stood close by him, was also hard pressed by the enemy, directed the tribunes of the soldiers to effect a junction of the legions gradually, and make their charge upon the enemy with a double front; which having been done since they brought assistance the one to the other, nor feared lest their rear should be surrounded by the enemy, they began to stand their ground more boldly, and to fight more courageously. In the mean time, the soldiers of the two legions which had been in the rear of the army, as a guard for the baggage-train, upon the bat- tle being reported to them, quickened their pace, and were seen by the enemy on the top of the hill; and Titus Labienus, having gained possession of the camp of the enemy, and ob- served from the higher ground what was going on in our camp, sent the tenth legion as a relief to our men, who, when they had learnt from the flight of the horse and the sutlers in what position the affair was, and in how great danger the camp and the legion and the com- mander were involved, left undone nothing [which tended] to despatch. Chap. XXVII. -—By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leant on their shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, though un- armed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked [them though] armed; the horsemen too, that they might by their valor blot out78 CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionary soldiers in all parts of the battle. But the enemy, even in the last hope of safety, displayed such great courage, that when the foremost of them had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought from their bodies ; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who survived cast their weapons against our men [thence,] as from a mound, and returned our darts vhich had fallen short between [the armies] ; so that it ought not to be concluded, that men of such great courage had injudi- ciously dared to pass a very broad river, ascend very high banks, and come up to a very dis- advantageous place; since their greatness of spirit had rendered these actions easy, although in themselves very difficult. Chap. XXVIII. — This battle being ended, and the nation and name of the Nervii be- ing almost reduced to annihilation, their old men, whom together with the boys and women we have stated to have been collected togethei in the fenny places and marshes, on this battle having been reported to them, since they were convinced that nothing was an obstacle to the conquerors, and nothing safe to the conquered, sent ambassadors to Caesar by the consent of all who remained, and surrendered themselves to him ; and in recounting the calamity of their state, said that their senators were reduced from 600 to three ; that from 60,000 men, they [were reduced] to scarcely 500 who could bear arms; whom Caesar, that he might appear toCJESAM'jS COMMENTARIES. 79 use compassion towards the wretched and the suppliant, most carefully spared ; and ordered them to enjoy their own territories and towns, and commanded their neighbors that they should restrain themselves and their depend- ants from offering injury or outrage [to them]. Chap. XXIX. — When the Aduatuci, of whom we have written above, were coming with all their forces to the assistance of the Nervii, upon this battle being reported to them, they returned home after they were on the march ; deserting all their towns and forts, they con- veyed together all their possessions into one t »wn, eminently fortified by nature. While this town had on all sides around it very high rocks and precipices, there was left on one side a gently ascending approach, of not more than 200 feet in width ; which place they have forti- fied with a very lofty double wall: besides, they had placed stones of great weight and sharp- ened stakes upon the walls. They were de- scended from the Cimbri and Teutones, who, when they were marching into our province and Italy, having deposited on this side the river Rhine such of their baggage-trains as they could not drive or convey with them, left 6,000 of their men as a guard and defence for them. These having, after the destruction of their countrymen, been harassed for many years by their neighbors, while one time they waged war offensively, and at another resisted it when waged against them, concluded a peace with the consent of all, and chose this place as their settlement.80 CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. Chap. XXX.—And on the first arrival of our army they made frequent sallies from the town, and contended with our men in trifling skirmishes ; afterwards, when hemmed in by a rampart of twelve feet [in height], and fifteen miles in circuit, they kept themselves within the town. When, vineae having been brought up and a mound raised, they observed that a tower also was being built at a distance, they at first began to mock the Romans from their wall, and to taunt them with the following speeches, " For what purpose was so vast a machine constructed at so great a distance ?" u With what hands," or u with what strength did they, especially [as they were] men of such very small stature " (for our shortness of stat- ure, in comparison with the great size of their bodies, is generally a subject of much contempt to the men of Gaul), u trust to place against their walls a tower of such great weight ? " Chap. XXXI. — But when they saw that it was being moved, and was approaching their walls, startled- by the new and unaccustomed sight, they sent ambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about peace ; who spoke in the follow- ing manner: uThat they did not believe the Romans waged war without divine aid, since they were able to move forward machines of such a height with so great speed, and thus fight from close quarters: that they resigned themselves and all their possessions to [Caesar's] disposal: that they begged and earnestly entreated one thing, viz., that if per- ch unce, agreeably to his clemency and human-CAESAR *JS COMMENTARIES. 81 ity, which they had heard of from others, he should resolve that the Aduatuci were to be spared, he would not deprive them of their arms ; that all their neighbors were enemies to them and envied their courage, from whom they could not defend themselves if their arms were delivered up ; that it was better for them, if they should be reduced to that state, to suf- fer any fate from the Roman people, than to be tortured to death by those among whom they had been accustomed to rule." Chap. XXXII. — To these things C^sar replied, "That he, in accordance with his cus- tom, rather than owing to their desert, should spare the state, if they should surrender them- selves before the battering-ram should touch the wall; but that there was no condition of surrender, except upon their arms being deliv- ered up ; that he should do to them that which he had done in the case of the Nervii, and would command their neighbors not to offer any injury to those who had surrendered to the Roman people." The matter being reported to their countrymen, they said that they would execute his commands. Having cast a very large quantity of their arms from the wa 1 into the trench which was before the town, so that the heaps of arms almost equalled the top of the wall and the rampart, and nevertheless having retained and concealed, as we after- wards discovered, about a third part in the town, the gates were opened, and they enjoyed peace for that day. Chap, XXXIII. — Towards evening Caesar82 CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. ordered the gates to be shut, and the soldiers to go out of the town, lest the towns-people should receive any injury from them by night. They [the Aduatuci], by a design before en- tered into, as we afterwards understood, be- cause they believed that, as a surrender had been made, our men would dismiss their guards, or at least would keep watch less carefully, partly with those arms which they had retained and concealed, partly with shields made of bark or interwoven wickers, which they had hastily covered over with skins, (as the short- ness of time required,) in the third watch, suddenly made a sally from the town with all their forces [in that direction] in which the ascent to our fortifications seemed the least difficult. The signal having been immediately given by fires, as Caesar had previously com- manded, a rush was made thither [i. e., by the Roman soldiers] from the nearest fort; and the battle was fought by the enemy as vigor* ously as it ought to be fought by brave men, in the last hope of safety, in a disadvanta- geous place, and against those who were throw- ing their weapons from a rampart and from towers; since all hope of safety depended on their courage alone. About 4,000 of the men having been slain, the rest were forced back into the town. The day after, Caesar, after breaking open the gates, which there was no one then to defend, and sending in our soldiers, sold the whole spoil of that town. The num- ber of 53,000 persons was reported to him by those who had bought them.CJESAB >S COMMENT ABIES, 88 Chap. XXXIV. — At the same time he whs informed by P. Crassus, whom he had seat with one legion against the Vengti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolitae, the Sesuvii, the Aulerci, and the Rhedones, which are maritime states, and touch upon the [Atlantic] ocean, that all these nations were brought under the dominion and power of the Roman people. Chap. XXXV. — These things being achieved, [and] all Gaul being subdued, so high an opinion of this war was spread among the barbarians, that ambassadors were sent to Caesar by those nations who dwelt beyond the Rhine, to promise that they would give host- ages and execute his commands. Which em- bassies Caesar, because he was hastening into Italy and Illyricum, ordered to return to him at the beginning of the following summer. He himself, haying led his legions into winter quarters among the Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, which states were close to those regions in which he had waged war, set out for Italy ; and a thanksgiving of fifteen days was decreed for those achievements, upon receiving Caesar's letter; [an honor] which before that time had been conferred on none.84 CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. BOOK III. the argument. £> Caesar, at the close of the late campaign, sent Servius Galba into the territories of the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, with permission to winter there, if expedient; his reason for this. Gralba resolved to winter at Octodurus.— II. The Seduni and Veragri combine against him. — III. And attack his camp. — IV.-VI. A fierce battle ensues; in which, as well as in several other engagements, Galba is successful.— VII., VIII. An unexpected war in Gaul; the occasion of it. The Vengti are the principal instigators. — IX. Caesar gives orders for the equipment of a fleet. The VenSti and other states augment their navy, and extend their alliances.— X.-XII. Caesar's difficulties; arising chiefly from the posi- tion of the Venetic towns. — XIII. The structure of the Venetic ships accommodated to that position. — XIV., XV. Caesar surmounts these disadvantages; and in a naval engagement obtains a victory. — XVI. Which terminated the war with the Veneti.— XVH.-XIX. Titurius Sabinus is sent into the territories of the Unelli. Conduct of their king, Viridovix. Sabinus is compelled to resort to stratagems; he defeats the Unelli.—XX., XXI. P. Crassus enters Aqui- tania, and is attacked by the Sotiates, who are signally worsted. —XXII. The " Soldurii." — XXIII. Crassus proceeds into the territories of the Vocates and Tarusates; who engage in measures of opposition. — XXIV. He draws up his forces for a battle; which the enemy decline.— XXV., XXVI. He then attacks their encampment, and is victorious. — XXVIII. Caesar advances against the Morini and Menapii; his motives for this: the enemy make a sud- den assault on the Roman forces, and are repelled vith great loss.—XXIX. Caesar's provision against such at- tacks : his operations interrupted by the inclemency of the season: the army is led into winter quarters. Chap. I. — Whea Caesar was setting out for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the twelfth legion and part of the cavalry, against the Nantuates, the Veragri, and Seduni, who extend from the territories of the Allobrdges, and the lake of Geneva, and the river RhoneCESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 85 to the top of the Alps. The reason for send- ing him was, that he desired that the pass along the Alps, through which [the Roman] merchants had been accustomed to travel with great danger, and under great imposts, should be opened. He permitted him, if he thought it necessary, to station the legion in these places, for the purpose of wintering. Galba, having fought some successful battles, and stormed several of their forts, upon ambassa- dors being sent to him from all parts and host- ages ^iven and a peace concluded, determined to station two cohorts among the Nantuates, and to winter in person with the other cohorts of that legion in a village of the Yeragri, which is called Octodurus; and this village being situated in a valley, with a small plain annexed to it, is bounded on all sides by very high mountains. As this village was divided into two parts by a river, he granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned the other, which had been left by them unoccupied, to the cohorts to winter in. He fortified this [latter] part with a rampart and a ditch. Chap. II. — When several days had elapsed in winter quarters, and he had ordered corn to be brought in, he was suddenly informed by his scouts that all the people had gone off in the night from that part of the town which be had given up to the Gauls, and that the moun- tains which hung over it were occupied by a very large force of the Seduni and Yeragri. It had happened for several reasons that the Gauls suddenly formed the design of renew-86 CJESAB' S COMMENT ABIES. ing the war and cutting off that legion. First, because they despised a single legion, on account of its small number, and that not quite full (two cohorts haying been detached, and several individuals being absent, who had been despatched for the purpose of seeking pro- vision) ; then, likewise, because they thought that 011 account of the disadvantageous char- acter of the situation, even their first attack could not be sustained [by us] when they would rush from the mountains into the valley, and discharge their weapons upon us. To this was added, that they were indignant that, their children were torn from them under the title of hostages, and they were persuaded that the Romans designed to seize upon the summits of the Alps, and unite those parts to the neighboring province [of Gaul], not only to secure the passes, but also as a constant possession. Chap. III. —Having received these tidings, Galba, since the works of the winter quarters and the fortifications were not fully completed, nor was sufficient preparation made with regard to corn and other provisions (since, as a sur- render had been made, and hostages received, he had thought he need entertain no apprehen- sion of a war), speedily summoning a council, began to anxiously inquire their opinions. In which council, since so much sudden danger had happened contrary to the general expecta- tion, and almost all the higher places were seen already covered with a multitude of armed men, nor could [eitherJ troops come toCJESAB 'S COMMENT ABIES. 87 their relief, or provisions be brought in, as the passes were blocked up [by the enemy ;] safety being now nearly despaired of, some opinions of this sort were delivered, that, "leaving their baggage, and making a sally, they should hasten away for safety by the same routes by which they had come thither." To the greater part, however, it seemed best, reserving that measure to the last, to await the issue of the matter, and to defend the camp. Chap. IV. — A short time only having elapsed, so that time was scarcely given for arranging and executing those things which they had determined on, the enemy, upon the signal being given, rushed down [upon our men] from all parts, and discharged stones and darts upon our rampart. Our men at first, while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely, nor did they cast any weapon ineffectually from their higher station. As soon as any part of the camp, being destitute of defenders, seemed to be hard pressed, thither they ran, and brought assistance. But they were over- matched in this, that the enemy when wearied by the long continuance of the battle, went •out of the action, and others with fresh strength came in their place; none of which things could be done by our men, owing to the small- ness of their number; and not only was per- mission not given to the wearied [Roman] to retire from the fight, but not even to the wounded [was liberty granted] to quit the post where he had been stationed, and recover. Chap. V. — When they had now been fight-88 CJESAXl'S COMMENTARIES. ing for more than six hours, without cessation, and not only strength, but even weapons were failing our men, and the enemy were pressing on more rigorously, and had begun to demolish the rampart and to fill up the trench, while our men were becoming exhausted, and the matter was now brought to the last extremity, P. Sextius Baeulus, a centurion of the first rank, whom we have related to have been dis- abled by severe wounds in the engagement Vith the Nervii, and also C. Yolusenus, a trib- une of the soldiers, a man of great skill and yalor, hasten to Galba, and assure him that the only hope of safety lay in making a sally, and trying the last resource. Whereupon, assembling the centurions, he quickly gives orders to the soldiers to discontinue the fight a short time, and only collect the weapons flung [at them], and recruit themselves after their fatigue, and afterwards, upon the signal being given, sally forth from the camp, and place in their valor all their hope of safety. Chap. VI. — They do what they were or- dered; and, making a sudden sally from all the gates [of the camp], leave the enemy the means neither of knowing what was taking place, nor of collecting themselves. Fortune thus taking a turn, [our men] surround on every side, and slay those who had entertained the hope of gaining the camp, and having killed more than the third part of an army of more than 30,000 men (which number of the barbarians it appeared certain had come up to our camp), put to flight the rest when panic-CAESAR 9 8 COMMENTARIES, 89 itricken, and do not suffer them to halt even upon the higher grounds. All the forces of the enemy being thus routed, and stripped of their arms, [our men] betake themselves to their camp and fortifications. Which battle being finished, inasmuch as Galba was unwill- ing to tempt fortune again, and remembered that he had come into winter quarters with one design, and saw that he had met with a different state of affairs ; chiefly, however, urged by the want of corn and provision, having the next day burned all the buildings of that vil- lage, he hastens to return into the province; and as no enemy opposed or hindered his march, he brought the legiori safe into the [country of the] Nantuates, thence into [that of] the Allobroges, and there wintered. Chap. VII. — These things being achieved, while Caesar had every reason to suppose that Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity, the Belgse being overcome, the Germans ex- pelled, the Seduni among the Alps defeated, and when he had, therefore, in the beginning of winter, set out for Illyricum, as he wished to visit those nations, and acquire a knowl- edge of their countries, a sudden war sprang up in Gaul. The occasion of that war was this: P. Crassus, a young man, had taken up his winter quarters with the seventh legion among the Andes, who border upon the [At- lantic] ocean. He, as there was a scarcity of corn in those parts, sent out some officers of cavalry, and several military tribunes amongst the neighboring states, for the purpose of pro-90 CuESAB'S COMMENTARIES. curing corn and provision; in which number T. Terrasidius was sent amongst the Esubii; M. Trebius G-allus amongst the Curiosolitse; Q. Yelanius, with T. Silius, amongst the YengtL Chap. YIII. — The influence of this state is by far the most considerable of any of the countries on the whole sea-coast, because the Yeneti both have a very great number of ships, with which they have been accustomed to sail to Britain, and [thus] excel the rest in their knowledge and experience of nautical affairs ; and as only a few ports lie scattered along that stormy and open sea, of which they are in pos- session, they hold as tributaries almost all those who are accustomed to traffic in that sea. With them arose the beginning [of the revolt] by their detaining Silius and Yelanius ; for they thought that they should recover by their means the hostages which they had given to Crassus. The neighboring people, led on by their influ- ence (as the measures of the Gauls are sudden and hasty), detain Trebius and Terrasidius for the same motive; and quickly sending ambas- sadors, by means of their leading men, they enter into a mutual compact to do nothing except by general consent, and abide the same issue of fortune; and they solicit the other states to choose rather to continue in that liberty which they had received from their ancestors, than endure slavery under the Romans. All the sea-coast being quickly brought over to their sentiments, they send a common embassy to P. Crassus [to say], " If he wished to re-QJESAB*8 COMMENTARIES. 91 eeire back bis officers, let him send back to them their hostages." Chap. IX. — Caesar, being informed of these things by Crassus, since he was so far distant himself, orders ships of war to be built in the mean time on the river Loire, which flows into the ocean; rowers to be raised from the province; sailors and pilots to be provided. These matters being quickly executed, he him- self, as soon as the season of the year permits, hastens to the army. The Vengti, and the other Btates also, being informed of Caesar's arrival, when they reflected how great a crime they had committed, in that the ambassadors (a char- acter which had amongst all nations ever been sacred and inviolable) had by them been de- tained and thrown into prison, resolve to pre- pare for a war in proportion to the greatness of their danger, and especially to provide those things which appertain to the service of a ttavy, with the greater confidence, inasmuch as they greatly relied on the nature of their situ- ation. They knew that the passes by land were cut off by estuaries, that the approach by sea was most difficult, by reason of our ignorance of the localities, [and] the small number of the harbors, and they trusted that our army would not be able to stay very long among them, on account of the insufficiency of corn ; and again, even if all these things should turn out contrary to their expectation, yet they were very powerful in their navy. They well understood that the Romans neither had any number of ships, nor were acquainted with the92 CJESAB'S COMMENTARIES. shallows, the harbors, or the islands of those parts where they would have to carry on the war ; and that navigation was very different in a narrow sea from what it is in the vast and open ocean. Having come to this resolution, they fortify their towns, convey corn i$to them from the country parts, bring together as many ships as possible to Yenetia, where it appeared Caesar would at first carry on the war. They unite to themselves as allies for that war, the Osismii, the Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambi^ liati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and the Me- napii; and senclAtff auxiliaries from Britain, which is situated over against those regions. Chap. Xf—There were these difficulties which we have mentioned above, in carrying on the War, but many things, nevertheless, urged Caesar to that war; — the open insult offered to the state in the detention of the Ro- man knights, the rebellion raised after surren- dering, the revolt after hostages were given, the confederacy of so many states, but princi- pally, lest if [the conduct of] this part was overlooked, the other nations should think that the same thing was permitted them. Where- fore, since he reflected that almost all the Gauls were fond of revolution, and easily and quickly excited to war; that all men likewise, by nature, love liberty and hate the condition of slavery, he thought he ought to divide and more widely distribute his army, before more states should join the confederation. Chap. XI. — He therefore sends T. Labie- nus, his lieutenant, with the cavalry to theCJSSAWS COMMENTARIES. 08 Treviri, who are nearest to the river Rhine. He charges him to visit the Remi and the other Belgians, and to keep them in their allegiance mid repel the Germans, (who were said to have been summoned by the Belgse to their aid,) if they attempted to cross the river by force in their ships. He orders P. Crassus to proceed Into Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts ftnd a great number of the cavalry, lest auxili- aries should be sent into Gaul by these states, and such great nations be united. He sends Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, with three legions, among the Unelli, the Curiosolltae, and the Lexovii, to take care that their forces should be kept separate from the rest. He appoints D. Brutus, a young man, bver the fleet anfl those Gallic vessels which he had ordered to be furnished by the Pictones and the Santoni, and the other provinces which remained at peace ; and commands him to pro- ceed towards the Veneti, as soon as he could. He himself hastens hither with the land forces. Chap. XII.—The sites of their towns were generally such that, being placed on ex- treme points [of land] and on promontories, they neither had an approach by land when the tide had rushed in from the main ocean, which always happens twice in the space of twelve hours; nor by ships, because, upon the tide ebbing again, the ships were likely to be dashed upon the shoals. Thus, by either cir- cumstance, was the storming of their towns rendered difficult; and if at an}- time perchance the Veneti, overpowered by the greatness of our94 CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. works, (the sea having been excluded by a mound and large dams, and the latter being made almost equal in height to the walls of the town,) had begun to despair of their fortunes ; bringing up a large number of ships, of which they had a very great quantity, they carried off all their property and betook themselves to the nearest towns; there they again defended themselves by the same advantages of situa- tion. They did this the more easily during a great part of the summer, because our ships were kept back by storms, and the difficulty of sailing was very great in that vast and open sea, with its strong tides and its harbors far apart and exceedingly few in number. Chap. XIII. — For their ships were built and equipped after this manner. The keels were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby they could more easily encounter the shallows and the ebbing of the tide : the prows were raised very high, and, in like manner, the sterns were adapted to the force of the waves and storms [which they were formed to sus- tain]. The ships were built wholly of oak, and designed to endure any force and violence whatever; the benches, which were made of planks a foot in breadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the thickness of a man's thumb ; the anchors were secured fast by iron chains in- stead of cables, and for sails they used skins and thin dressed leather. These [were used] either through their want of canvas and their ignorance of its application, or for this reason, which is more probable, that they thought thatC^ESAB'S COMMENT ABIES, 96 such storms of the ocean and such violent gales of wind could not be resisted by sail, nor ships of such great burden be conveniently enough managed by them. The encounter of our fleet tpith these ships was of such a nature that our fleet excelled in speed alone, and the plying of the oars; other things, considering the nature of the place [and] the violence of the storms, were more suitable and better adapted 011 their side; for neither co ild our ihips injure theirs with their beaks (so gi\ at was their strength), nor on account of their height was a weapon easily cast up to them; and for the same reason they were less readily locked in by rocks. To this was added, that Whenever a storm began to rage and they ran before the wind, they both could weather the Storm more easily and heave to securely in the shallows, and when left by the tide feared nothing from rocks and shelves: the risk of all which things was much to be dreaded by our ships. Chap. XIV.—Caesar, after taking many of their towns, perceiving that so much labor was spent in vain and that the flight of the enemy could not be prevented on the capture of their towns, and that injury could not be clone them, determined to wait for his fleet. As soon as it came up and was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fully equipped and appointed with every kind of [naval] implement, sailed forth from the har- bor, and drew up opposite to ours ; nor did it appear clear to Brutus, who commanded the96 CJESSAR 'S COMMENTARIES. fleet, or to the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions, to whom the several ships were assigned, what to do, or what system of tac- tics to adopt; for they knew that damage could not be done by their beaks; and that, although turrets were built [on their decks], yet the height of the stems of the barbarian ships exceeded these; so that weapons could not be cast up from [our] lower position with sufficient effect, and those cast by the Gauls fell the more forcibly upon us. One thing provided by our men was of great service, [viz.] sharp hooks inserted into and fastened upon poles, of a form not unlike the hooks used in attacking town walls. When the ropes which fastened the sail-yards to the masts were caught by them and pulled, and our vessel vigorously impelled with the oars, they [the ropes] were severed; and when they were cut away, the yards necessarily fell down; so that as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended on their sails and rigging, upon these being cut away, the entire manage- ment of the ships was taken from them at the same time. The rest of the contest depended on courage, in which our men decidedly had the advantage; and the more so, because the whole action was carried on in the sight of Caesar and the entire army; so that no act, a little more valiant than ordinary, could pass unobserved, for all the hills and higher grounds, from which there was a near prospect of the sea, were occupied by our army. Chap. XV. — The sail-yards [of the enemy],CJSSAB'S COMMENT ABIES. 97 as we have said, being brought down, although two and [in some cases] three ships [of theirs] surrounded each one [of ours], the soldiers strove with the greatest energy to board the ships of the enemy; and, after the barbarians observed this taking place, as a great many of their ships were beaten, and as no relief for that evil could be discovered, they hastened to seek safety in flight. And, having now turned their vessels to that quarter in which the wind blew, so great a calm and lull suddenly arose, that they could not move out of their place, which circumstance, truly, was exceedingly opportune for finishing the business; for our men gave chase and took them one by one, so that very few out of all the number, [and those] by the intervention of night, arrived at the land, after the battle had lasted almost from the fourth hour till sunset. Chap, XVI. — By this battle the war with the Veneti and the whole of the sea-coast was finished; for both all the youth, and all, too, of more advanced age, in whom there was any discretion or rank, had assembled in that bat- tle ; and they had collected in that one place whatever naval forces they had anywhere ; and when these were lost, the survivors had no place to retreat to, nor means of defending their towns. They accordingly surrendered themselves and all their possessions to Caesar, on whom Caesar thought that punishment should be inflicted the more severely, in order that for the future the rights of ambassadors might be more carefully respected by barba-98 CJE SAB'S COMMENTABI&S. rians: haying, therefore, put to death all their senate, he sold the rest for slaves. Chap. XVII.—While these things are go- ing on amongst the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabi- nus, with those troops which he had received from Caesar, arrives in the territories of the Unelli. Over these people Viridovix ruled, and held the chief command of all those states which had revolted : from which he had col- lected a large and powerful army. And in those few days, the Aulerci and the Lexovii, having slain their senate because they would not consent to be promoters of the war, shut their gates [against us] and united themselves to Viridovix; a great multitude besides of desperate men and robbers assembled out of Gaul from all quarters, whom the hope of plundering and the love of fighting had called away from husbandry and their daily labor. Sabinus kept himself within his camp, which was in a position convenient for everything; while Viridovix encamped over against him at a distance of two miles, and daily bringing out his forces, gave him an opportunity of fights ing; so that Sabinus had now not only come into contempt with the enemy, but also was somewhat taunted by the speeches of our soldiers; and furnished so great a suspicion of his cowardice that the enemy presumed tb approach even to the very rampart of our camp. He adopted this conduct for the fol- lowing reason: because he did not think that a lieutenant ought to engage in battle with so great a force, especially while he who held theCJESAR >S COMMENTARIES. 99 chief command was absent, except on advan- tageous ground or unless some favorable cir- cumstance presented itself. Chap. XVIII. — After having established this suspicion of his cowardice, he selected a certain suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one of those whom he.-had with him as auxiliaries. He induces him by great gifts and promises to go over to the enemy ; and informs [him] of what he wished to be done. Who, when he arrives amongst them as a deserter, lays before them the fears of the Romans; and informs them by what difficulties Caesar himself was harassed, and that the matter was not far removed from this: that Sabinus would the next night privately draw off his army out of the camp and set forth to Caesar, for the pur- pose of carrying [him] assistance, which, when they heard, they all cry out together that an opportunity of successfully conducting their enterprise ought not be thrown away; that they ought to go to the [Roman] camp. Many things persuaded the Gauls to this meas- ure : the delay of Sabinus during the previous days ; the positive assertion of the [pretended] deserter; want pf provisions, for a supply of which they h id not taken the requisite precau- tions ; the hope springing from the Venetic war; and [also] beciuse in most cases men willingly believe whit they wish. Influenced by these things, they do not discharge Virido- vix and the other leaders from the council, before they gained permission from them to take up arms and hasten to [our] camp ; which100 CJESAB'S COMMENTARIES. being granted, rejoicing as if victory were fully certain, they collected fagots and brush- wood, with which to fill up the Roman trenches, and hastened to the camp. Chap. XIX. — The situation of the camp was a rising ground, gently sloping from the bottom for about a mile. Thither they pro- ceeded with great speed (in order that as little time as possible might be given to the Romans to collect and arm themselves), and arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus having encour- aged his men, gives them the signal, which they earnestly desired. While the enemy were encumbered by reason of the burdens which they were carrying, he orders a sally to be suddenly made from two gates [of the camp]. It happened, by the advantage of sit- uation, by the unskilfulness and the fatigue of the enemy, by the valor of our soldiers, and their experience in former battles/that they could not stand one attack of our men, and immediately turned their backs: and our men with full vigor followed them while dis- ordered, and slew a great number of them; the horse pursuing the rest, left but few, who escaped by flight. Thus, at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar of victory gained by Sabinus; and all the states immediately surrendered themselves to Titurius : for as the temper of the Gauls is impetuous and ready to undertake wars, so their mind is weak, and by no means resolute in enduring calamities. Chap. XX.—About the same time, P.CuESAB'S COMMENTARIES. 101 Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania (which, as has been before said, both from its extent of territory and the great number of its people, is to be reckoned a third part of Gaul), understanding that he was to wage war in these parts,.where a few years before, L. Va- lerius Prseconinus, the lieutenant, bad been killed, and his army routed, and from which L. Manilius, the proconsul, had fled with the loss of his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary care must be used by him. Wherefore, hav- ing provided cornt procured auxiliaries and cavalry, [and] having summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, which are the states of the province of Gaul that border on these regions [Aqui- tania] , he led his army into the territories of the Sotiates. On his arrival being known, the Sotiates having brought together great forces and [much] cavalry, in which their strength principally lay, and assailing our army on the march, engaged first in a cavalry action, then when their cavalry was routed, and our men pursuing, they suddenly display their infan- try forces, which they had placed in ambuscade in a valley. These attacked our men [while] disordered, and renewed the fight. Chap. XXI. The battle was long and vig- orously contested, since the Sotiates, relying on their former victories, imagined that the safety of the whole of Aquitania rested on their valor ; [and] our men, on the other hand, desired it might be seen what they could ac- complish without their general and without102 CJSSAB'8 COMMENTARIES. the other' legions, under a very young com- mander; at length the enemy, worn out with wounds, began to turn their backs, and a great number of them being slain, Crassus began to besiege the [principal] town of the Sotiates on his march. Upon their valiantly resisting, he raised vineae and turrets. They at one time attempting a sally, at another forming mines to our rampart and vineae (at which the Aqui- tani are eminently skilled, because in many places amongst them there are copper mines), when they perceived that nothing could be gained by these operations through the perse- verance of our men, they send ambassadors to Crassus, and entreat him to admit them to a surrender. Having obtained it, they, being ordered to deliver up their arms, comply. Chap. XXII. — And while the attention of our men is engaged in that matter, in another part Adcantuannus, who held the chief com- mand, with 600 devoted followers whom they call soldurii (the conditions of whose associa- tion are these, that they enjoy all the con- veniences of life with those to whose friendship they have devoted themselves: if anything calamitous* happen to them, either they endure the same destiny together with them, or com- mit suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of men, has there been fou^d any one who, upon his being slain to whose friendship he had de- voted himself, refused to die), Adcantuanrius, [I say] endeavoring to make a sally with these, when our soldiers had rushed together to arms, upon a shout being raised at that part of theG^ESAB'S COMMENTARIES. 108 fortification, and a fierce battle having been fought there, was driven back into the town; yet he obtained from Crassus [the indulgence] that he should enjoy the same terms of sur- render [as the other inhabitants]. Chap. XXIII. — Crassus, having received their arms and hostages, marched into the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. But then, the barbarians being alarmed, be- cause they had heard that a town fortified by the nature of the place and by art had been taken by us in a few days after our arrival there, began to send ambassadors into all quarters, to combine, to give hostages one to another, to raise troops. Ambassadors also are sent to those states of Hither Spain which are nearest to Aquitania, and auxiliaries and leaders are summoned from them ; on whose arrival they proceed to carry on the war with great confidence, and with a great host of men. They who had been with Q. Sertorius the whole period [of his war in Spain], and were sup- posed to have very great skill in military mat- ters, are chosen leaders. These, adopting the practice of the Roman people, began to select [advantageous] places, to fortify their camp, to cut off our men from provisions, which, when Crassus observes, [and likewise] that his forces, on account of their small number, could not safely be separated ; that the enemy both made excursions and beset the passes, and [yet] left sufficient guard for their camp ; that on,that account, corn and provision could not very'conveniently be brought up to him.104 CuEBAR 'S COMMENT A HIES. and that the number of the enemy was daily increased, he thought that he ought not to delay in giving battle. This matter being brought to a council, when he discovered that all thought the same thing, he appointed the next day for the fight. Chap. XXIV. — Having drawn out all his forces at the break of day, and marshalled them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries in the centre, and waited to sea what measures the enemy would take. They, although on account of their great number and their ancient renown in war, and the small number of our men thoy supposed they might safely fight, nevertheless considered it safer to gain the victory without any wound, by besetting the passes [and] cutting off the provisions: and if the Romans, on account of the want of corn, should begin to retreat, they intended to attack them while encumbered in their march and depressed in spirit [as being assailed while] under baggage. This measure being approved of by the leaders and the forces of the Romans drawn out, the enemy [still] kept themselves in their camp. Crassus having remarked this circumstance, since the enemy, intimidated by their own delay, and by the reputation [*'. e., for cowardice arising thence] had rendered our soldiers more eager for fighting, and the remarks of all were heard [declaring] that no longer ought delay to be made in going to the camp, after encouraging his men, he marches to the camp of ..the enemy, to the great grat- ification of his wn troops.CuE SAB'S COMMENTARIES. 105 Chap. XXV. — There, while some were fill- ing up the ditch, and others, by throwing a large number of darts, were driving the defend- ers from the rampart and fortifications, and the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not much rely in the battle, by supplying stones and weapons [to the soldiers], and by conveying turf to the mound, presented the appearance and character of men engaged in fighting; while also the enemy were fighting resolutely and boldly, and their weapons, discharged from their higher position, fell with great effect; the horse, having gone round the camp of the enemy, reported to Crassus that the camp was not fortified with equal care on the side of the Decuman gate, and had an easy approach. Chap. XXVI. — Crassus, having exhorted the commanders of the horse to animate their men by great rewards and promises, points out to them what he wished to have done. They, as they had been commanded, having brought out the four cohorts, which, as they had been left as a guard for the camp, were not fatigued by exertion, and having led them round by a somewhat longer way, lest they could be seen from the camp of the enemy, when the eyes and minds of all were intent upon the battle, quickly arrived at those fortifications which we have spoken of, and, having demol- ished these, stood in the camp of the enemy before they were seen by them, or it was known what was going on. And then, a shout being heard in that quarter, our men, their strength having been recruited (which usually106 CuESAB'S COMMENTABIES. occurs on the hope of victory), began to fight more vigorously. The enemy surrounded on all sides, [and] all their affairs being despaired of, made great attempts to cast themselves down over the ramparts and to seek safety in flight. These the cavalry pursued over the Very open plains, and after leaving scarcely a fourth part out of the number of 50,000, which it was certain had assembled out of Aquitania and from the Cantabri, returned late at night to the camp. Chap. XXVII. — Having heard of this bat- tle, the greatest part of Aquitania surrendered itself to Crassus, and of its own accord sent hostages, in which number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones, the Preciani, the Vocasates, the Tarusates, the Elurates, the Garites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibuzates, the Coco- sates. A few [and those] most remote nations, relying on the time of the year, because winter was at hand, neglected to do this. Chap. XXVIII.—About the same time Caesar, although the summer was nearly past, yet, since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the Menapii alone remained in arms, and had never sent ambassadors to him [to make a treaty] of peace, speedily led his army thither, thinking that that war might soon be termi- nated. They resolved to conduct the war on a very different method from the rest of the Gauls, for as they perceived that the greatest nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been routed and overcome, and as they possessed continuous ranges of forests andCESAR'S COMMENTARIES, 107 morasses, they removed themselves and all their property thither. When Caesar had arrived at the opening of these forests, and had begur to fortify his camp, and no enem}r was in the mean time seen, while our men were dispersed on their respective duties, they sud- denly rushed out from all parts of the forest, and made an attack on our men. The latter quickly took up arms ^ind drove tfiem back again to their forests ; and having killed a great many, lost a few of their own men while pursu- ing them too far through those intricate places. Chap. XXIX. — During the remaining days after this, Caesar began to cut down the forests ; and that no attack might be made on the flank of the soldiers, while unarmed and not fore- seeing it, he placed together (opposite to the enemy) all that timber which was cut down, and piled it up as a rampart on either flank. When a great space had been, with incredible speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle [of the enemy] and the rear of their baggage- train were already seized by our men, and they themselves were seeking for the thickest parts of the forests, storms of such a kind came on that the work was necessarily suspended, and, through the continuance of the rains, the sol- diers could not any longer remain in their tents. Therefore, having laid waste all their country, [and] having burnt their villages and houses, Caesar led back his army and stationed them in winter quarters among the Aulerci and Lex- ovii, and the other states which had made war upon him last.108 CJESAIL'S 00MMENTAME8. BOOK IV. the argument. I.-III. TheUsipetes and Tenchtheri, oppressed by the Stievi. migrate JFrom Germany into Gaul; the national character or the Sue\i. — IV. The Usipetes and Tenchtheri possess them- selves of the estates of the Menapii.— V.,VI. Caesar resolves to make war upon the Germans. — VII.-IX. Receives an overture of peace from them; their treacherous designs.— X. Description of the Meuse and the Rhine. — XI.-XV. The perfidy of the Germans; their overthrow and retreat.— XVI.,-XVII. Caesar's bridge over the Rhine.—XVIII., XIX. Caesar leads his army into Germany; punishes the Sigambri; frees the Ubii from the tyranny of the Suevi, and returns into Gaul. — XX.-XXII. His design upon Britain ; preparations for the expedition. —XXIII.-XXVII. Carries it into effect; the defeat and surrender of the Britons.— XXVIII., XXIX. The Roman vessels overtaken by a storm. XXX. The Britons think to take advantage of this. —XXXI. Caesar defeats their designs.—2£XXII. A stratagem of the Britons for attacking a Roman legion.—XXXIII. Their mode of fighting with chariots. — XXXIV. They advance to the Roman camp.—XXXV. Are defeated. — XXXVI. Sue for peace. —XXXVII., XXXVIII. The Morini attack two legions which had just returned from Britain and suffer a severe loss; Caesar goes into winter quarters among the Belgae; a thanksgiving of twenty days decreed by the senate for the successes of this campaign. Chap. I. — The following winter (this was the year in which Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus were consuls) those Germans [called] the Usipfctes, and likewise.the Tenchtheri, with a great number of men, crossed the Shine, not far from the place at which that river dis- charges itself into the sea. The motive for crossing [that river] was, that having been for several years harassed by the Suevi, they were constantly engaged in war, and hindered from the pursuits of agriculture. The ontfon of theCAESAR'S COMMtih l ATUES. 121 and formed an alliance and given hostages^ earnestly entreated " that he would bring them assistance, because they were grievously op- pressed by the Suevi; or, if he was prevented from doing so by the business of the common- wealth, he would at least transport his army over the Rhine; that that would be sufficient for their present assistance and their hope for the future ; that so great was the name and the reputation of his army, even among the most remote nations of the Germans, arising from the defeat of Ariovistus and this last battle which was fought, that they might be safe under the fame and friendship of the Roman people." They promised a large number of ships for transporting the army. Citap. XVII,—-Caesar, for those reasons which I have mentioned, had resolved to cross the Rhine; but to cross by ships he neither deemed to be sufficiently safe, nor considered consistent with his own dignity or that of the Roman people. Therefore, although the great- est difficulty in forming a bridge was presented to him, on account of the breadth, rapidity, and depth of the river, he nevertheless considered that it ought to be attempted by him, or that his army ought not otherwise to be led over. He devised this plan of a bridge. He joined together at the distance of two feet, two piles, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened a little at the lower end, and proportioned in length to the depth of the river. After he had, by means of engines, sunk these into the river, and fixed them at the bottom, and then driven them in122 CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. with rammers, not quite perpendicularly, like a stake, but bending forward and sloping, so as to incline in the direction of the current of the river he also placed two [other piles] oppo- site to these, at the distance of forty feet lower down, fastened together in the same manner, but directed against the fort e and current of the river. Both these, moreover, were kept firmly apart by beams two feet thi( k (the space which the binding of the piles occupied), laid in at their extremities between two braces on each side ; and in consequence of these being in different directions and fastened on sides the on6 opposite to the other, so great was the strength of the work, and such the arrangement of the materials, that in proportion as the greater body of water dashed against the bridge, so much the closer were its parts held fastened together. These beams were bound together by timber laid over them in the direction of the length of the bridge, and were [then] covered over with laths and hurdles ; and in addition to this, piles were driven into the water obliquely, at the lower side of the bridge, and these serv- ing as buttresses, and being connected with every portion of the work, sustained the force of the stream ; and there were others also above the bridge at a moderate distance ; that if trunks of trees or vessels were floated down the river by the barbarians for the purposo of destroy- ing the work, the violence of such things might be diminished by these defences, and might not injure the bridge. Chap. XVIII.—Within ten days after theCJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 123 timber began to be collected, the whole work was completed, and the wbole army led over. Caesar, leaving a strong guard at each end of the bridge, hastens into the territories of the Sigambri. In the mean time, ambassadors from several nations come to him, whom, on their suing for peace and alliance, he answers in a courteous manner, and orders hostages to he brought to him. But the Sigambri, at the very time the bridge was begun to be built, made preparations for a flight (by the advice of such of the Tenchtheri and Usipetes as they had amongst them), and quitted their terri- tories and conveyed away all their possessions, and conceale 1 themselves in deserts and woods. Chap. XIX. — Caesar, having remained in their territories a few days, and burnt all their villages and houses, and cut down their corn, proceeded into the territories of the Ubii; and having promised them his assistance, if they were ever harassed by the Suevi, he learned from them these particulars: that the Suevi, after they had by means of their scouts found that the bridge was being built, had called a council, according to their custom, and sent or- ders to all parts of their state to remove from the towns and convey their children, wives, and all their possessions into the woods, and that all who could bear arms should assemble in one place; that the place thus chosen was nearly the centre of those regions which the Suevi possessed ; that in this spot they had resolved to await the arrival of the Romans, and give them battle there. When Caesar dis-124 cesar's commentaries: covered this, having already accomplished all these things on account of which he had re- solved to lead his army over, namely, to strike fear into the Germans, to take vengeance on the Sigambri, and free the Ubii from the invasion of the Suevi, having spent altogether eighteen days beyond the Rhine, and thinking he had advanced far enough to serve both honor and interest, he returned into Gaul, and cut down the bridge. Chap. XX.—During the short part of sum- mer which remained, Caesar, although in these countries, as all Gaul lies toward the north, the winters are early, nevertheless resolved to proceed into Britain, because he discovered that in almost all the wars with the Gauls suc- cors had been furnished to our enemy from that country; and even if the time of year should be insufficient for carrying on the war, yet he thought it would be of great service to him if he only entered the island, and saw into the character of the people, and got knowledge of their localities, harbors, and landing places, all which were for the most part unknown to the Gauls. For neither does any one except merchants generally go thither, nor even to them was any portion of it known, except the sea-coast and those parts which are opposite to Gaul. Therefore, after having called up to him the merchants from all parts, he could learn neither what was the size of the island, nor what or how numerous were the nations which inhabited it, nor what system of war they followed, nor what customs they used,CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 125 nor what harbors were convenient for a great number of large ships. Chap. XXI. — He sends before him Cains Yolusenus with a ship of war, to acquire a knowledge of these particulars before he in person should make a descent into the island, as he was convinced that this was a judicious measure. He commissioned him to thoroughly examine into all matters, and then return to him as soon as possible. He himself proceeds td the Morini with all his forces. He orders ships from all parts of the neighboring coun- tries, and the fleet which the preceding sum- mer he had built for the war with the Yeneti, to assemble in this place. In the mean time, his purpose having been discovered, and re- ported to the Britons by merchants, ambassa- dors come to him from several states of the island, to promise that they will give hostages, and submit to the government of the Roman people. Having given them an audience, he, after promising liberally, and exhorting them to continue in that purpose, sends them back to their own country, and [despatches] with them Commius, whom, upon subduing the Atrebates, he had created king there, a man whose courage and conduct he esteemed, and who he thought would be faithful to him, and Whose influence ranked highly in those coun- tries. He orders him to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them to embrace the protection of the Roman people, and apprise them that he would shortly come thither. Volusenus, having viewed the localities as far126 CjESAB • 8 COMMENTARIES. as means could be afforded one who dared not !eave his ship and trust himself to barbarians, returns to Caesar on the fifth day, and reports what he had there obsei*ved. Chap. XXII. — While Caesar remains, in these parts for the purpose of procuring ships, ambassadors come to him from a great por- tion of the Morini, to plead their excuse respecting their conduct on the late occasion ; alleging that it was as men uncivilized, and as those who were unacquainted with our cus- tom, that they had made war upon the Roman people, and promising to perform what he should command. Caesar, thinking that this had happened fortunately enough for him, because he neither wished to leave an enemy behind him, nor had an opportunity for carrying on a war, by reason of the time of year, nor considered that employment in such trifling matters was to be preferred to his enterprise on Britain, imposes a large number of hostages; and when these were brought, he received them to his protection. Having collected together, and provided about eighty transport ships, as many as he thought neces- sary for conveying over two legions, he as- signed such [ships] of war as he had besides to the questor, his lieutenants, and officers of cavalry. There were in addition to these eighteen ships of burden which were pre- vented, eight miles from that place, by winds, from being able to reach the same port. These he distributed amongst the horse; the Test of the army he delivered to Q. TituriusC^ESAS'S COMMENTARIES, 127 Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieu- tenants, to lead into the territories of the Me- napii and those cantons of the Morini from which ambassadors had not come to him. He ordered P. Sulpicius Rufus, his lieutenant, to hold possession of the harbor, with such a gar- rison as he thought sufficient. Chap. XXIII.—These matters being ar- ranged, finding the weather favorable for his voyage, he set sail about the third watch, and ordered the horse to march forward to the far- ther port, and there embark and follow him. As this was performed rather tardily by them, he himself reached Britain with the first squad- ron of ships, about the fourth hour of the day, and there saw the forces of the enemy drawn up in arms on all the hills. The nature of the place was this: the sea was confined by ; mountains so close to it that a dart could be thrown from their summit upon the shore. Con- sidering this by no means a fit place for disem- barking, he remained at anchor till the ninth hour, for the other ships to arrive there. Hav- ing in the mean time assembled the lieutenants and military tribunes, he told them both what he had learnt from Volusenus, and what he wished to be done; and enjoined them (a^ the prin- ciple of military matters, and especially as maritime affairs, which have a precipitate and uncertain action, required) that all things should be performed by them at a nod and at the instant. Having dismissed them, meeting both with wind and tide favorable at the same time, the signal being given and the anchor128 CJESAB'S COMMENTARIES. weighed, he advanced about seven miles from that place, and stationed his fleet over against an open and level shore. Chap. XXIV. — But the barbarians, upon perceiving the design of the Romans, sent for- ward their cavalry and charioteers, a class of warriors of whom it is their practice to make great use in their battles, and following with the rest of their forces, endeavored tQ prevent our men landing. In this was the greatest difficultyi for the following reasons, namely, because our ships, on account of their great size, could be stationed only in deep water; and our soldiers, in places unknown to them, with their hands embarrassed, oppressed with a large and heavy weight of armor, had at the same time to leap from the ships, stand amidst the waves, and encounter the enemy; whereas they, either on dry ground, or advan- cing a little way into the water, free in all their limbs, in places thoroughly known to them, could confidently throw their weapons and spur on their horses, which were accustomed to this kind of service. Dismayed by these circum- stances and altogether untrained in this mode of battle, our men did not all exert the same vigor and eagerness which they had been wont to exert in engagements on dry ground. ( Chap. XXV.—When Caesar observed this, he ordered the ships of war, the appearance of 'which was somewhat strange to the barbarians and the motion more ready for service, to be withdrawn a little from the transport vessels, and to be propelled by their oars, and be sta-CJESAB'S COMMENTARIES. ,129 tioned towards the open flank of the enemy , and the enemy to be beaten off and driven away, with slings, arrows, and engines: which plan was of great service to our men ; for the bar- barians being startled by the form of our ships and the motions of our oars and the nature of our engines, which was strange to them, stopped, and shortly after retreated a little. And while ourmen were hesitating [whether they should advance to the shore], chiefly on account of the depth of the sea, he who carried the eagle of thle tenth legion, after supplicating the gods that the matter might turn out favorably to the legion, exclaimed, " Leap, fellow-sol- diers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, for my part, will perform my duty to the commonwealth and my general." WJien he had said this with a loud voi e, he leaped from the ship and proceeded to bear the eagle toward the enemy. Then our men, exhorting one another that so great a disgrace should not be incurred, all leaped from the ship. When those in the nearest vessels saw them, they speedily followed and approached the enemy. Chap. XXVI. — The battle was maintained vigorously on both sides. Our men, however* a§ they could neither keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their standards, and as one from one ship and another from another assembled around whatever standards they met, were thrown into great confusion. But the enemy, who were acquainted with all the shal- lows, when from the shore they saw any com-130 CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. ing from a ship one by one, spurred on their horses, and attacked them while embarrassed, many surrounded a few, others threw their weapons upon our collected forces on their exposed flank. When Caesar observed this, he ordered the boats of the ships of war and the spy sloops to be filled with soldiers, and sent them up to the succor of those whom lie had observed in distress. Our men, as soon as they made good their footing on dry ground, and all their comrades had joined them, made an attack upon the enemy, and put them to flight, but could not pursue them very far, because the horse had not been able to main- tain their course at sea and reach the island. This alone was wanting to Caesar's accustomed success. Chap. XXVII. — The enemy being thus vanquished in battle, as soon as they recovered after their flight, instantly sent ambassadors to Caesar to negotiate about peace. They prom- ised to give hostages and perform what he should command. Together with these ambas- sadors came Commius the Atrebatian, who, as I have above said, had been sent by Caesar into Britain. Him they had seized upon when leav- ing his ship, although in the character of ambassador he bore the general's commission to them, and thrown into chains: then after the battle was fought, they sent him back, and in suing for peace cast the blame of that act upon the common people, and entreated that it might be pardoned on account of their indiscretion. Caesar, complaining, that after they had suedCESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 181 for peace, and had voluntarily sent ambassa- bors into the continent for that purpose, they had made war without a reason, said that- he would pardon their indiscretion, and imposed hostages, a part of whom they gave immedi- ately ; the rest they said they would give in a few days, since they were sent for from remote places. In the mean time they ordered their people to return to the country parts, and the chiefs assembled from all quarters, and pro- ceeded to surrender themselves and their states to Caesar. Chap. XXVIII. — A peace being estab- lished by these proceedings four days after we had come into Britain, the eighteen ships, to which reference has been made above, and Which convej-ed the cavalry, set sail from the Upper port with a gentle gale ; when, how- ever, they were approaching Britain and were *een from the camp, so great a storm sud- denly arose that none of them could maintain their course at sea; and some were taken back to the same port from which they had started; others, to their great danger, were driven to the lower part of the island, nearer to the west; which, however, after having cast anchor, as they were getting filled with water, put out to sea through necessity in a stormy night, and made for the continent. cftap. XXIX. — It happened that night to be full moon, which usually occasions very high tides in that ocean; and that circum- stance was unknown to our men. Thus, at the same time, the tide began to fill the ships132 G^J SAB'S COMMENTARIES* of war which Caesar had provided to convey over his army, and which he had drawn up on the strand; and the storm began to dash the ships of burden which were riding at anchor against each other; nor was any means af- forded our men of either managing them or of rendering any service. A great many -ships having been wrecked, inasmuch as the rest, having lost their cables, anchors, and other tackling, were unfit for sailing, a great confu- sion, as would necessarily happen, arose throughout the army; for there were no other ships in which they could be conveyed back, and all things which are of service in repair- ing vessels were wanting, and corn for the winter had not been provided in those places, for it was understood by all that they would certainly winter in Gaul. Chap. XXX. — On discovering these things the chiefs of Britain, who had come up after the battle was fought to perform those condi- tions which Caesar had imposed, held a con- ference, when they perceived that cavalry, and ships, and corn were wanting to the Romans, and discovered the small number of our sol- diers from the small extent of the camp (which, too, was on this account more limited than ordinary, because Caesar had conveyed over his legions without baggage), and thought that the best plan was to renew the war, and cut off our men from corn and provisions and pro- tract the affair till winter; because they felt confident, that, if they were vanquished or cut off from a return, no one would afterwardsCESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 133 pass over into Britain for the purpose of mak- ing war. Therefore, again entering into a conspiracy, they began to depart from the camp by degrees and secretly bring up their people from the country parts. Chap. XXXI. — But Caesar, although he had-not as yet discovered their measures, yet, both from what had occurred to his ships, and from the circumstance that they had neglected to give the promised hostages, suspected that the thing would come to pass which really did happen. He therefore provided remedies against all contingencies; for he daily con- veyed corn from the country parts into the camp, used the timber and brass of such ships as were most seriously damaged for repairing the rest, and 01 dered whatever things besides were necessary for this object to be brought to him from the continent. And thus, since that business was executed by the soldiers with the greatest energy, he effected that, after the loss of twelve ships, a voyage could be made well enough in the rest. Chap. XXXII. — While these things are being transacted, one legion had been sent to forage, according to custom, and no suspicion of war had arisen as yet, and some of the peo- ple remained in the country parts, others went backwards and forwards to the camp, they who were on duty at the gates of the camp reported to Caesar that a greater dust than was usual was seen in that direction in which the legion had marched. Caesar, suspecting that which was [really the case], —that some new134 GJESAR 9S COMMENTARIES. enterprise was undertaken by the barbarians, — ordered the two cohorts which were on duty to march into that quarter with him, and two other cohorts to relieve them on duty; the rest to be armed and follow him immediately. When he had advanced some little way from the camp, he saw that his men were overpow- ered by the enemy and scarcely able to stai d their ground, and that, the legion being crowded together, weapons were being cast on them from all sides. For as all the corn was reaped in every part with the exception of one, the enemy, suspecting that our men would repair to that, had concealed them- selves in the woods during the night. Then attacking them suddenly, scattered as they were, and when they had laid aside their arms, and were engaged in reaping, they killed a small number, threw the rest into confusion, and surrounded them with their cavalry and chariots. Chap. XXXIII.—Their mode of fighting with their chariots is this: first, they drive about in all directions and throw their weapons and generally break the ranks of the enemy with the very dread of their horses and the noise of their wheels; and when they have worked themselves in between the troops of horse, leap from their chariots and engage on foot. • The charioteers in the mean time with- draw some little distance from the battle, and so place themselves with the chariots that, if their masters are overpowered by the num- ber of the enemy, they may have a readyGuESAB'S COMMENT ABIES. 135 retreat to their ojpn troops. Thus they dis- play in battle the speed of horse, [together with] the firmness of infantry; and by daily practice and exercise attain to such expert- ness that they are accustomed, even on a de- clining and steep place, to check their horses at full speed, and manage and turn them in an instant and run along the pole, and stand on the yoke, and thence betake themselves with the greatest celerity to their chariots again. Chap. XXXIV.—Under these circum- stances, our men being dismayed by the nov- elty of this mode of battle, Caesar most season- ably brought assistance; for upon his arrival the enemy paused, and our men recovered from their fear; upon which, thinking the time un- favorable for provoking the enemy and coming to an action, he kept himself in his own quar- ter, and a short time having intervened, drew back the legions into the camp. While these things are going on, and all our men engaged, the rest of the Britons, who were in the fields, departed. Storms then set in for several suc- cessive days, which both confined our men to camp and hindered the enemy from attacking us. In the mean time the barbarians de- spatched messengers to all parts, and reported to their people the small number of our sol- diers, and how good an opportunity was given for obtaining spoil and for liberating them- selves forever, if they should only drive the Romans from their camp. Having by these means speedily got together a large force ofm CESAR'S COMMENTABIES. infantry and of cavalry, they came up to the camp. Chap. XXXV. —Although Caesar antici- pated that the same thing which had happened on former occasions would then occur; that, if the enemy were routed, they would escape from danger by their speed; still, having got about thirty horse, which Commius the Atre- batian, of whom mention has been made, had brought over with him [from Gaul], he drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp. When the action commenced, the enemy were unable to sustain the attack of our men long, and turned their backs ; our men pursued them as far as their speed and strength permitted, and slew a great number of them; then, having destroyed and burnt everything far and wide, they retreated to their camp. Chap. XXXYI. —The same day, ambassa- dors kent by the enemy came to Caesar to ne- gotiate a peace. Caesar doubled the number of hostages which he had before demanded ; and ordered that they should be brought over to the continent, because, since the time of the equinox was near, he did not consider that, with his ships out of repair, the voyage ought to be deferred till winter. Having met with favorable .weather, he set sail a little after mid- night, and all his fleet arrived safe at the con- tinent, except two of the ships of burden which could not make the same port which the other ships did, and were carried a little lower down/CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 137 Chap. XXXVII. — When our soldiers, about 300 in number, had been drawn out of these two ships, and were marching to the -?amp, the Morini, whom Caesar, when setting forth for Britain, had left in a state of peace, excited by the hope of spoil, at first sur- rounded them with a small number of men, and brdered them to lay down their arms, if they did not wish to be slain ; afterwards, however, when they, forming a circle, stood on their de- fence, a shout was raised and about 6,000 of the enemy soon assembled; which being re- ported, Caesar sent all the cavalry in the camp as a relief to his men. In the mean time our soldiers sustained the attack of the enemy, and fought most valiantly for more than four hours, and, receiving but few wounds them- selves, slew several of them. But after our cavalry came in sight, the t nemy, throwing away their arms, turned their backs, and a great number of them were killed. , Chap. XXXVIII. — The day following Cae- sar sent Labienus, his lieutenant, with those legions which he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini, who had revolted ; who, as they had no place to which they might retreat, on account of the drying up of their marshes (which they had availed themselves of as a place of refuge the preceding year), almost all fell into the power of Labienus. In the mean time Caesar's lieutenants, Q. Titurius and L. Cotta, who had led the legions into the territo- ries of the Menapii, having laid waste all their lands, cut down their corn and burnt their138 CJSSAB'S COMMENT ABIE8. houses returned to Caesar because the Menapii had all concealed themselves in their thickest woods. Caesar fixed the winter quarters of all the legions amongst the Belgae. Thither only two British states sent hostages; the rest omitted to do so. For these successes, a thanks- giving of twenty days, was decreed by the sen- ate upon receiving Caesar's letter.CJESAM' S COMMENTARIES. X69 BOOK V. THE ARGUMENT. i. Caesar orders a large fleet of peculiarly constructed ships to be built; proceeds against thePirustae; they submit. — II. Returns into Hither Gaul; marches against the Treviri. — III. Indutiom&rus and Cingetorix. — V. Caesar goes to port Itius; his policy in taking certain Gallic chieftains with hira to Britain. — VI. DumnoriXj who was to have been in that number, by craft and violence, escapes attending Caesar, but is slain. — VII. Caesar proceeds on his second expedition against Britain. —IX. The bold resistance of the Britons; they are defeated. — X. The Roman fleet suffers severely in a storm. — XI. Caesar gives orders to Labienus to build more ships; Cassivellaunu . — XII.-XIV. — Description of Bri- tain audits inhabitants.—XVII. The Britains again pre- pare for war, and receive a signal defeat.—• XVIII. Caesar advances into the territories of Cassivellaunus as far as the Thames; an engagement with that prince. — XIX. The strat- agem of Cassivellaunus. — XX. The Trinobantes send ambassadors to Caesar respecting the conduct of Cassivel- launus towards Mandubratius.— XXII. The latter induces four princes of Cantiumto attack the Romans, by whom they are defeated. — XXIII. Caesar receives hostages, and leads back his army into Gaul. — XXIV. He quarters his forces contrary to his custom, in several divisions. — XXV. Tasgetius. — XXVI. The revolt of Ambiorix and Cativol- cus.—XXVII. Ambiorix defends himself in reference to hia share in the Gallic combination. — XXVIII.-XXXI. Dis- pute between Titurius and Cotta. — XXXII. The valor and conduct of Cotta.—XXXVIII.-XLII. The quarters of Cicero attacked by the Eburones; he sends intelligence to Caesar.—XLIV. The noble conduct of Pulfio and Varenus. —XLVIII.-LII. Caesar marches to the relief of Cicero; defeats the Eburones. — LIII. Indutiom&rus is thereby deterred from attacking the camp of Labienus.—LV1.- LVIII. Re-enforced, Indutiom&rus attacks Labienus; his forces are routed, and he is slain; Gaul becomes more tran quil. Chap. I. — Lutius Domitius and Appius Claudius being consuls, Caesar, when departing from his winter quarters into Italy, as he had been accustomed to do yearly, commands the140' SAB'S COMMENTAttlES. lieutenants whom lie appointed over the legions to take c .re that during the winter as many ships as possible should be built, and the old repaired. He plans the size and shape of them. For despatch of'dading, and for draw- ing them on shore, lie makes them a little lower than those which we have been accustomed td use in our sea; and that so much the more, because he knew that, on account of the fre- quent changes of the tide, less swells occurred) there ; for the purpose of transporting burdens and a great number of horses, [lie makes them] a little broader than those which we use in other seas. All these he orders to be con- structed for lightness and expedition, to which object their lowness contributes greatly. He orders those things which are necessary for equipping ships to be brought thither from Spain. He himse'f, on the assizes of Hither Gaul being concluded, proceeds into Illyricum, because he heard that the part of the province nearest them was being laid waste by the incur- sions of the Pirustae. When he had arrived there, he levies soldiers upon the states, and orders them to assemble at an appointed place. Which circumstance having been reported [to them], the Pirustae sent ambassadors to him to inform him that no part of those proceedings was done by public deliberation, and assert that they were ready to make compensation by all means for the injuries [inflicted]. Caesar, accepting their defence, demands hostages, and orders them to be brought to him on a speci- fied day, and assures them that unless they didCJE8AR >S COMMENTARIES. HI so lie would visit their state with war. These being brought to him on the day which he had ordered, he appoints arbitrators between the states, who should estimate the damages and determine the reparation. Chap. IT. — These things being finished, and the assizes being concluded, he returns into Hither Gaul, and proceeds thence to the army. When he had arrived there, haying made a survey of the winter quarters, he finds that, by the extraordinary ardor of the sol- diers, amidst the utmost scarcity of all mate- rials, about six hundred ships of that kind which we have described above, and' twenty- eight ships of war, had been built, and were not far from that state, that they might be launched in a few days. Having commended the soldiers and those who had presided over the work, he informs them what he wishes to be done, and orders all the ships to assemble at port Itius, from which port he had learned that the passage into Britain was shortest,, [being only] about thirty miles from the con- tinent. He left what seemed a sufficient num- ber of soldiers for that design; he himself pro- ceeds into the territories of the Treviri with four legions without baggage, and 800 horse, because they neither came to the general diets [of Gaul], nor obeyed his commands, and were, moreover, said to be tampering with the Germans beyond the Rhine. >: ; : Chap. III. —This state is by far the most powerful of all Gaul in cavalry, and has great forces of infantry, and as we have remarked142 CuE SAB'S COMMENTARIES. above, borders on the Rhine* In that state, two persons, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were then contending with each other for the supreme power; one of whom, as soon as the arrival of Caesar and his legions was known, capae to him; assures him that he and all his party would continue in their allegiance, and not revolt from the alliance of the Roman people, and informs him of the things which were going on amongst the Treviri. But Indu- tiomarus began to collect cavalry and infantry, and make preparations for war, having con- cealed those who by reason of their age could not be under arms, in the forest Arduenna, which is of immense size, [and] extends from the Rhine across the country of the Treviri to the frontiers of the Remi. But after that, some of the chief persons of the state, both influ- enced by their friendship for Cingetorix, and alarmed at the arrival of our army, came to Cgesar and began to solicit him privately about their own interests, since they could not pro- vide for the safety of the state ; Indutiomarus, dreading lest he should be abandoned by all, sends ambassadors to Caesar, to declare that he absented himself from his countrymen, and refrained from coming to him on this account, that he might the more easily keep the state in its allegiance, lest on the departure of all the nobility the commonalty should, in their indiscretion, revolt. And thus the whole state was at his control; and that he, if Caesar would permit, would come to the camp to him, and would commit his own fortunes and those of the state to his good faith.SAB'S COMMENTARIES. 143 Chap. IY.— Caesar, though he discerned from what motive these things were said, and what circumstance deterred him from his med- itated plan, still, in order that he might not be compelled to waste the summer among the Treviri, while all things were prepared for tho war with Britain, ordered Indutiomarus to come to him with 200 hostages. When these were brought, [and] among them his son and near relations whom he had demanded by name, he consoled Indutiomarus, and enjoined him to continue in his allegiance ; yet, neverth less, summoning to him the chief men of the Treviri, he reconciled them individually to Cingetorix : this he both thought should be done by him in justice to the merits of the latter, and also judged that it was of great importance that the influence of one whose singular attachment towards him he had fully seen, should prevail as much as possible among his people., In- dutiomarus was very much offended at this act, [seeing that] his influence was diminished among his countrymen; and he, who already before had borne a hostile mind towards us, was much more violently inflamed against us through resentment at this. Chap. Y. — These matters being settled, Caesar went to port Itius with the legions. There lie discovers that forty ships which had been built in the country of the Meldi, having been driven back by a storm, had been unable to maintain the course, and had returned to the same port from which they had set out; he finds the rest ready for sailing, and fur-*IU 0^1 SAB'S COMMEKTABmS. nished with everything. In the same place^ the cavalry of the whole of Gaul, in number 4,000, assembles, and [also] the chief persons of all the states; he had determined to leave in Gaul a very few of them, whose fidelity towards him he hid clearly discerned, and take the rest with him as hostages; because he feared a commotion in Gaul when he should be absent. Chap. VI.—There was together with the others, Dumnorix, the -ZEduan, of whom \ve have made previous mention. Him in partic- ular he had resolved to have with him, because he had discovered him to be fond of change, fond of power, possessing great resolution, and great influence among the Gauls. To this was added, that Dumnorix had before said in an assembly of JEduans, that the sov- ereignty of the state had been made ove. to him by Caesar; which speech the JEdui bore with impatience and yet dared not send am- bassadors to Caesar for the purpose of either rejecting or deprecating [that appointment]. That fact Caesar had learned from his own personal friends. He at first strove to obtain by every entreaty that he should be left in Gaul ; partly, because, being unaccustomed to sailing, he feared the sea ; partly, because he said he was prevented by divine admoni- tions. After he saw that this request was firmly refused him, all hope of success being lost, he began to tamper with the chie persons of the Gauls, to call them apart singly and exhort them to remain on the continent; to agitateCjESAR 'S COMMENTARIES. 145 them with the fear that it was not without rea- son that Gaul should be stript of all her no- bility ; that it was Caesar's design, to bring over to Britain and put to death all those whom he feared ' j slay in the sight of Gaul, to pledge his honor to the rest, to ask for their oath that they would by common deliberation execute what they should perceive to be necessary for Gaul. These things were reported to Caesar by several persons. Chap. VII. — Having learned this fact, Cae- sar, because he had conferred so much honor upon the .ZEduan state, determined that Dum- norix should be restrained and deterred by whatever means he could; and that, because lie perceived hi insane design- to be pro- ceeding farther and farther, care should be taken lest he might be abl to injure him and the commonwealth. Therefore, having stayed about twenty-five days in that place, because the north wind, which usually blows a great part of every season, prevented the'voyage, he exerted himself to keep Dumnorix in his allegiance [and] nevertheless learn all his measures : having at length met with favorable weather, he orders the foot soldii s and the horse to embark in the ships. But, while the minds of all were occupied, Dumnorix began to take his departure from the camp homewards with the cavalry of the iEdui, Caesar being ignorant of it. Caesar, on this matter being reported to him, ceasing from his expedition and deferring all other affairs, sends a great part of the cavalry to pursue him, and com-146 CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. mands that he be brought back; he orders that if he use violence and do not submit, he be slain: considering that Dumnorix would do nothing as a rational man while he himself was absent, since he had disregarded his com- mand even when present. He, however, when recalled, began to resist and defend himself with his hand, and implore the support of his people, often exclaiming that " he was free and the subject of a free state," They surround and kill the man as they had been commanded; but the iEduan horsemen all return to Caesar. Chap. VIII. — When these things were done [and] Labienus left on the continent with three legions and 2,000 horse, to defend the harbors and provide corn, and discover what was going on in Gaul, and take meas- ures according to the occasion and according to the circumstance, he himself, with five legions and a number of horse, equal to that which he was leaving on the continent, set sail at sunset, and [though for a time] borne for- ward by a gentle southwest wind, he did not maintain his course, in consequence of the wind dying away about midnight, and being carried on too far by the tide, when the sun rose, espied Britain passed on his left. Then, again, following the change of tide, he urged on with the oars that he might make that part of the island in which he had discovered the preceding summer, that there was the best landing-place, and in this affair the spirit of our soldiers was very much to be extolled; for they with the transports and heavy ships, theCJBSAB98 COMMENTARIES. 147 labor of rowing not being [for a moment] dis- continued, equalled the speed of the ships of war. All the ships reached Britain nearly at mid-day; nor was there seen a [single] enemy in that place, but, as Caesar afterwards found from some prisoners, though large bodies of troops had assembled there, yet being alarmed by the great number of our ships, more than eight hundred of which, including the ships ot the preceding year, and those private vessels which each had built for his own convenience, had appeared at one time, they had quitted the coast and concealed themselves among the higher points. Ghap.. IX. — Caesar, having disembarked his army and chosen a convenient place for the camp, when he discovered from the pris- oners in what part the forces of the enemy had lodged themselves, having left ten cohorts and 300 horse at the sea, to be a guard to the ships, hastens to the enemy, at the third watch, fearing the less for the ships for the reason that he was leaving them fastened at anchor upon an even and open shore; and he placed Q. Atrius over the guard of the ships. He himself, having advanced by night about twelve miles, espied the forces of the enemy. They, advancing to the river with their cavalry and chariots from the higher ground, began to annoy our men and give bat' tie. Being repulsed by our cavalry, they con' cealed themselves in woods, as they had se- cured a place admirably fortified by nature and by art, which, as it seemed, they had be148 GuESAB'S COMMENTARIES. fore prepared on account of a civil war; foi all entrances to it were shut up by a great number of felled trees. They themselves rushed out of the woods to fight here and there, and prevented our men from enter- ing their fortifications. But the soldiers of the seventh legion, having formed a testudo and thrown up a rampart against the fortifica- tion, took the place and drove them out of the woods, receiving only a few wounds. But Caesar forbade his men to pursue them in their flight any great distance ; both because he was ignorant of the nature of the ground, and be- cause, as a great part of the day was spent, he wished time to be left for the fortification of the camp. Chap. X. — The next day, early in the morning, he sent both foot-soldiers and horse in three divisions on an expedition to pursue those who had fled. These having advanced a little way, when already the reai [of the enemy] was in sight, some horse came to Caesar from Quintus Atrius, to report that the preceding night, a very great storm having arisen, almost all the ships were dashed to pieces and cast upon the shore, because neither the anchors and cable could resist, nor could the sailors and pilots sustain the violence of the storm; and thus great damage was re- ceived by that collision of the ships. Chap. XI.—These things being known [to him], Caesar orders the legions and cavalry to be recalled and to cease from their march; he himself returns to the ships: he sees clearlyCuESAB'S COMMENT ABIES. 149 before him almost the same tilings which he had heard of from the messengers and by let- ter, so that, about forty ships being lost, the remainder seemed capable of being repaired with much labor. Therefore he selects work- men from the legions, and orders others to be sent for from the continent; he writes to Labi- enus to build as many ships as he could with those legions which were with him. He him- self, though the matter was one of great diffi- culty and labor, yet thought it to be most ex- pedient for all the ships to be brought up on shore and joined with the camp by one fortifi- cation. In these matters he employed about ten da}-s, the labor of the soldiers being unre- mitting even during the hours of night. The ships having been brought up on Shore and the camp strongly fortified, he left the same forces which he did before as a guard for the ships ; he sets out in person for the same place that lie had returned from. When he had come thither, greater forces of the Britons had already assembled at that place, the chief command and management of the war haying been intrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose terri- tories a river, which is called the Thames, sep- arates from the maritime states at about eighty miles from the sea. At an earlier period perpetual wars had taken place between him and the other states ; but, greatly alarmed by our arrival, the Britons had placed him over the whole war and the conduct of it. Chap. XII. — The interior portion of Brit- ain is inhabited by those of whom they say150 CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. that it is handed down by tradition that they were born in the island itself: the maritime portion by those who had passed over from the country of the Belgae for the purpose of plunder and making war; almost all of whom are called by the names of those states from which being sprung they went thither, and having waged war, continued there and began to cultivate the lands. The number of the people is countless, and their buildings exceed- ingly numerous, for the most part very like those of the Gauls: the number of cattle is great. They use either brass or iron rings, determined at a certain weight, as their money. Tin is produced in the midland regions ; in the maritime, iron ; but the quantity of it is small: they empio}7 brass, which is imported, There, as in Gaul, is timber of every description, ex- cept beech and fir. They do not regard it lawful to eat the hare, and the cock, and the goose ;; they, however, breed them for amuse- ment and pleasure. The climate is more tem- perate than in Gaul, the colds being less severe. Chap. XIII. — The island is triangular in its form, and one of its sides is opposite to Gaul. One angle of this side, which is in Kent, whither almost all ships from Gaul are directed, [looks] to the east; the lower looks to the south. This side extends about 500 miles. Another side lies towards Spain and the west, on which part is Ireland, less, as is reckoned, than Britain, by one half; but the passage [from it] into Britain is of equal dis-CuESAB'S COMMENTARIES. 151 tance with that from Gaul. In the middle of this voyage is an island, which is called Mona; many smaller islands besides are sup- posed to lie [there], of which islands some have written that at the time of the winter solstice it is night there for thirty consecutive days. We, in our inquiries about that matter, ascer- tained nothing, except that, by accurate meas- urements with water, we perceived the nights to be shorter there than on the continent. The length of this side, as their account states, is 700 miles. The third side is towards the north, to which portion of the island no land is opposite ; but an angle of that side looks prin- cipally towards Germany. This side is con- sidered to be 800 miles in length. Thus the whole island is [about] 2,000 miles in circum- ference. Chap. XIV. — The most civilized of all these nations are they who inhabit Kent, which is entirely a maritime district, nor do they differ much from the Gallic customs. Most of the inland inhabitants do not sow corn, but live on milk and flesh, and are clad with skins. All the Britains, indeed, dye themselves with woad, which occasions a bluish color, and thereby have a more terrible appearance in fight. They wear their hair long, and have every part of their body shaved except their head and upper lip. Ten and even twelve have wives common to them, and particularly brothers among brothers, and parents among their children; but if there be any issue by these wives, they are reputed tQ be the children152 CuE SAB'S COMMENTABIES. of those by whom respectively each was first espoused when a virgin. Chap. XV. —■ The horse ana charioteers of the enemy contended vigorously in a skirmish with our cavalry on the march ; yet so that our men were conquerors in all parts, and drove them to their woods and hills; but, having slain a great many, they pursued too eagerly, and lost some of their men. But the enemy, after some time had elapsed, when our men Vvere off their guard, and occupied in the forti- fication of the camp, rushed out of the woodrf, and making an attack upon those who were placed on duty before the camp, fought in a determined manner; and two cohorts being sent by Caesar to their relief, and these sever- ally the first of two legions, when these had taken up their position at a very small distance from each other, as our men were disconcerted by the unusual mode of battle, the. enemy broke through the middle of them most courageously, and retreated thence in safety. That day, Q. Laberius Durus, a tribune of the soldiers, was slain. The enemy, since more cohorts were sent against them, were repulsed. Chap. XVI.— In the whole of this method of fighting, since the engagement took place under the ej^es of all and before the camp, it was perceived that our men, on account of the. weight of their arms, inasmuch as they could neither pursue [the enemy when] retreating, nor dare quit their standards, were little suited to this kind of enemy; that the horse also fought with great danger, because they [theCJfiSATt *g COMMENT AMES. 153 Britons] generally retreated even designedly, and, when they had drawn off our men a short distance from the legions, leaped from their chariots and fought on foot in unequal [and to them advantageous] battle. But the system of cavalry - engagement is wont to produce equal danger, and indeed the same, both to those who retreat and those who pursue. To this was added, that they never fought in close order, but in small parties and at great dis- tances, and had detachments placed [in differ- ent parts], and then the one relieved the other, and the vigorous and fresh succeeded the wea- ried. Chap. XVII. — The following day the en- emy halted on the hills, at a distance from our camp, and presented themselves in small par ties, and began to challenge our horse to bat- tle with less spirit than the day before. But at noon, when Caesar had sent three legions, and all the cavalry withC. Trebonius, the lieu- tenant, for the purpose of foraging, they flew upon the foragers suddenly from all quarters, so that they did not keep off [even] from the standards and the legions. Our men making an attack on them vigorously, repulsed them; nor did they cease to pursue them until the horse, relying on relief, as they saw the legions behind them, drove the enemy .precipitately before them, and, slaying a great number of them, did not give them the opportunity either of rallying, or'halting, or leaping from their chariots. Immediately after this retreat, the auxiliaries, who had assembled from all sides;.154 OJESAR'S XtQMMENTABIES. departed; nor after that time did the enemy ever engage with us in very large numbers. Chap. XVIII. — Caesar, discovering their design, leads his army into the territories of Cassivellaunus to the river Thames; which river can be forded in one place only, and that with difficulty. When he had arrived there, he perceives that numerous forces of the enemy were marshalled on the other bank of the river ; the bank also was defended by sharp stakes fixed in front, and stakes of the same kind fixed under the water were covered by the river. These things being discovered from [some] prisoners and deserters, Caesar, sending for- ward the cavalry, ordered the legions to follow them immediately. But the soldiers advanced with such speed and such ardor, though they stood above the water by their heads only, that the enemy could not sustain the attack of the legions and of the horse, and quitted the banks, and committed themselves to flight. Chap. XIX. — Cassivellaunus, as we have stated above, all hope [rising out] of battle being laid aside, the greater part of his forces being dismissed, and about 4,000 charioteers only being left, used to observe our marches and retire a little from the road, and conceal himself in intricate and woody places, and in those neighborhoods in which he had discov- ered we were about to march-, he used to drive the cattle and the inhabitants from the fields into the woods; and, when our cavalry, for the sake of plundering and ravaging the more freely, scattered themselves among the fields,CuESAB'S COMMENTARIES, ICS be used to send out charioteers from the woods by all the well-known roads and paths* and, to the great danger of our horse, engage with them; and this source of fear hindered them from straggling very extensively. The result was that Caesar did not allow excursions to be made to a great distance from the main body of the legions, and ordered that damage should be done to the enemy in ravaging their lands and kindling fires only so far as the legion- ary soldiers could, by their own exertion and marching, accomplish it. Ciiap. XX. —In the mean time, the Trino- bantes, almost the most powerful state of those parts, from which the young man Man- dubratius, embracing the protection of Caesar, had come to the continent of Gaul to [meet] him: (whose father, Imanuentius, had pos- sessed the sovereignty in that state, and had been killed by Cassivellanus; he himself had escaped death by flight), send ambassadors to Caesar, and promise that they will surrender themselves to him and perform his commands ; they entreat him to protect Mandubratius from the violence of Cassivellaunus, and send to their state some one to preside over it, and possess the government. Caesar demands forty hostages from them, and corn for his army* and sends Mandubratius to them. They speed- ily performed the things demanded, and sent hostages to the number appointed, and the corn. Chap. XXI. — The Trinobantes being pro- tected and secured from any violence of the soldiers, the Cenimagni, the Segontiaei, the156 CESAR'S COMMENTABIE& Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi; sending embassies, surrender themselves to Caesar. From them he learns that the capital town of Cassivellaunus was not far from that place, and was defended by woods and morasses, and a very large number of men and of cattle had been collected in it. (Now the Britons, when they have fortified the intricate woods, in which they are wont to assemble for the purpose of avoiding the incursion of an en- emy, with an intrenchment and a rampart, call them a town.) Thither he proceeds with his legions: he finds the place admirably for- tified by nature and art; he, however, un- dertakes to attack it in two directions. The enemy, having remained only a short time, did not sustain the attack of our soldiers, and hurried away on the other side of the town. A great amount of cattle was found there, and many of the enemy were taken and slain in their flight. Chap. XXII.— While these tilings are go- ing forward in those places ^ Cassivellaunus sends messengers into Kent, which, we have observed above, is on the sea, over which dis- tricts four several kings reigned, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus and Segonax, and commands them to collect all their forces, and unexpectedly assail and storm the naval camp. When they had come to the camp, our men, after making a sally, slaying many of their men, and also capturing a distinguished leader named Lugotorix, brought back their own men in safety. Cassivellaunus, when this battleCMS AH'S COMMENTARIES. 157 was reported to liim, as so many losses had been su tained, and his territories laid waste, being alarmed most of all by the desertion of the states, sends ambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about a surrender through the media- tion of Commius the Atrebatian. Caesar, since he had determined to pass the winter on the continent, on account of the sudden re- volts of Gaul, and as much of the summer did not remain, and he perceived that even that could be easily protracted, demands hostages, and prescribes what tribute Britain should pay each year to the Roman people; he forbids and commands Cassivellaunus that he wage not war against Mandubratius or the Trino- bantes. Chap. XXIII. — When he had received the hostages, he leads back the array to the sea, and finds the ships repaired. After launch- ing these, because he had a large number of prisoners, and some of the ships had been lost in the storm, he determines to convey back his army at two embarcations. And it so hap- pened, that out of so large a number of ships, in so many voyages, neither in this nor in the previous year was any ship missing which con- veyed soldiers; but very few out of those which were sent back to him from the conti- nent empty, as the soldiers of the former con- voy had been disembarked, and out of those (sixty in number) which Labienus had taken cai*e to have built, reached their destination; almost all the rest were driven back, and when Caesar had waited for them for some158 cj3sajr *s commentabies. time in vain, lest lie should be debarred from a voyage by the season of the year, inasmuch as the equinox was at hand, he of necessity stowed his soldiers the more closely, and, a very great calm coming on, after he had weighed anchor at the beginning of the second watch, he reached land at break of day and brought in all the ships in safety. Chap. XXIV.—The ships having been drawn up and a general assembly of the Gauls held at Samarobriva, because the corn that year had not prospered in Gaul by reason of the droughts, he was compelled to station his army in its winter quarters, differently from the former years, and to distribute the legions among several states : one of them he gave to C. Fabius, his lieutenant, to be marched into the territories of the Morini; a second to Q. Cicero, into those of the Nervii; a third to L. feoscius, into those of the Essui,- a fourth he ordered to winter with T. Labienus, among the Remi in the confines of the Treviri; he stationed three in Belgium; over these he ap- points d M. Crassus, his questor, and L. Muna- tius Plancus and C. Trebonius, his lieuten- ants. One legion which he had raised last on the other side of the Po, and five cohorts, lie sent amongst the Eburones, the greatest por- tion of whom lie between the Meuse and the Rhine, [and] who were under the government of Ambiorix and Cativolcus. He ordered Q. THurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to take the command of these soldiers. The legions being distributed in thisCuESAB'S COMMENTARIES. 159 manner, he thought he could most easily rem- edy the scarcity of corn; and yet the winter quarters of all these legions (except that which he had given to L. Roscius to be led into the most peaceful and tranquil neighborhood) were comprehended within [about] 100 miles. He himself in the meanwhile, until he had sta- tioned the legions and knew that the several winter quarters were fortified, determined to stay in Gaul. Chap. XXY. — There Was among the Car- nutes a man named Tasgetius, born of very high rank, whose ancestors had held the sov- ereignty in his state. To him Caesar had restored the position of his ancestors, in con- sideration of his prowess and attachment towards him, because in all his wars he had availed himself of his valuable services. His personal enemies had killed him when in the third year of his reign, many even of his own state being openly promoters [of that act]. This event is related to Caesar. He, fearing, because several were involved in the act, that the state might revolt at their instigation, orders Lucius Plancus, with a legion, to pro- ceed quickly from Belgium to the Carnutes, and winter there, and arrest and send to him the persons by whose instrumentality he should discover that Tasgetius was slain. In the mean time, he was apprised by all the lieuten- ants and questors to whom he had assigned the legions, that the}7 had arrived in winter quarters, and that the place for the quarters was fortified.1G0 CJS SAB'S COMMENT ABIES. Chap. XXVI.—About fifteen days after they had come into winter quarters, the begin- ning of a sudden insurrection and revolt arose from Ambiorix and Cativolcus, who, though they had met with Sabinus and Cotta at the borders of their kingdom, and had conveyed corn into our winter quarters, induced by the messages of Indutiomarus, one of the Treviri, excited their people, and after having sud- denly assailed the soldiers, engaged in procur- ing wood, came with a large body to attack the camp. When our men had speedily taken up ar us and had ascended the rampart, and sending out some Spanish horse on one side, had proved conquerors in a cavalry action, the enemy, despairing of success, drew off their troops from the assault. Then they shouted, according to their custom, that some of our men should go forward to a conference, [al- leging] that they had some things which they desired to say respecting the common interest, by which they trusted their disputes could be removed. Chap, XXVII. — C. Arpineius, a Roman knight, the intimate friend of Q. Titurius, and with him, Q. Junius, a certain person from Spain, who already on previous occasions had been accustomed to go to Ambiorix, at Caesar's mission, is sent to them for the purpose of a conference: before them Ambiorix spoke to this effect: "That he confessed, that for Caesar's kindness towards him, he was very much indebted to him, inasmuch as by his aid he had been freed from a tribute which he hadCJESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 101 been accustomed to pay to the Aduatuci, bis neighbors; and because his own son and the son of his brother had been sent back to him, whom, when sent in the number of hostages, the Aduatuci had detained among them in slavery and in chains; and that he had not done that which he had done in regard to the attacking of the camp, either by his own judg- ment or desire, but by the compulsion of his state; and that his government was of that nature, that the people had as much of au- thority over him as he over the people. To the state moreover the occasion of the war was this —that it could not withstand the sudden combination of the Gauls ; that he could easily prove this from his own weakness, since he was not so little versed in affairs as to presume that with his forces he could conquer the Roman people; but that it was the common resolution of Gaul; that that day was ap- pointed for the storming of all Caesar's winter quarters, in order that no legion should be able to come to the relief of another legion, that Gauls could not easily deny Gauls, espe- cially when a measure seemed entered into for recovering their common freedom. Since he had performed his duty to them on the score of patriotism [he said], he has now regard to gratitude for the kindness of Caesar; that he warned, that he prayed Titurius by the claims of hospitality, to consult for his and his sol- diers' safety; that a large force of the Ger- mans had been hired and had passed the Rhine ; that it would arrive in two days ; that it was for162 CuESAirS COMMENT ABIES. them to con3ider, whether they thought fit, be- fore the nearest people perceived it, to lead off their soldiers when drawn out of winter quar- ters, either to Cicero or to Labienus; one of whom was about fifty miles distant from them, the other rather more ; that this he promised and confirmed by oath, that he would give them a safe passage through his territories; and when he did that, he was both consulting for his own state, because it would be relieved from the winter quarters, and also making a requital to Caesar for his obligations." Chap. XXVIII. — Arpineius and Junius relate to the lieutenants what they had heard. They, greatly alarmed by the unexpected affair, though those things were spoken by an enemy , still thought they were not to be d sregarded ; and they were especially influenced by this con- sideration, that it was scarcely credible that the obscure and humble state of the Eburones had dared to make war upon the Roman people of their own accord. Accordingly, they refer the matter to a council, and a great controversy arises among them. L. Auruncu- leius, and several tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions of the first rank, were of opinion " that nothing should be done hastily, and that they should not depart from the camp without Caesar's orders" ; they declared, u that any forces of the Germans, however great, might be encountered by fortified winter quarters; that this fact was a proof [of it]; that they had sustained the first assault of the Germans most valiantly, inflicting manyCAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 163 wounds upon them; that they were not dis- tressed for corn ; that in the mean time relief would come both from the nearest winter quarters and from Caesar" ; lastly, they put the query, u what could be more undetermined, more undignified, than to adopt measures re- specting the most important affairs on the au- thority of an enemy ? " Chap. XXIX.—In opposition to those things Titurius exclaimed, " That they would do this too late, when greater forces of the enemy, after a junction with the Germans, should have assembled ; or when some disaster had been received in the neighboring winter quarters; that the opportunity for deliberat- ing was short; that he believed that Csesur had set forth into Italy, as the Carnutes would n6t otherwise have taken the measure of slay- ing Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones, if he had been present, have come to the camp with so great defiance of us ; that he did not regard the enemy, but the fact, as the authority ; that the Rhine was near ; that the death of Ario- vistus and our previous victories were subjects of great indignation to the Germans; that Gaul was inflamed that after having received so many defeats she was reduced under the sway of the Roman people, her pristine glory in military matters being extinguished." Lastly, " who would persuade himself of this, that Ambiorix had resorted to a design of that nature without sure grounds? That his own opinion was safe on either side ; if there be nothing very formidable, they would go with-1C4 C^E SAB'S COMMENTABIES. out danger to the nearest legion; if all Gaul conspired with the Germans, their only safety lay in despatch. What issue would the advice of Cotta and of those who differed from him, have? from which, if immediate danger was not to be dreaded, yet certainly famine, by a protracted siege, was." Chap. XXX. — This discussion having been held on the two sides, when opposition was offered strenuously by Cotta and the principal officers, tfc Prevail," said Sabinus, 44 if so you wish it" ; and he said it with a louder voice, that a great portion of the soldiers might hear him ; nor am I the person among you," he said, u who is most powerfully alarmed by the danger of death; these will be aware of it, and then, if anything disastrous shall have occurred, they will demand a reckoning at your hands; these, who, if it were permitted by you, united three days hence with the near- est winter quarters, may encounter the com- mon condition of war with the rest, and not, as if forced away and separated far from the rest, perish either by the sword or by famine." Chap. XXXI. — They rise from the council, detain both, and entreat, that " they do not bring the matter into the greatest jeopardy by their dissension and obstinacy ; the affair was an easy one, if only they all thought and approved of the same thing, whether they remain or depart; on the other hand, they saw- no security in dissension." The matter is prolonged by debate until midnight. At lastCJfiSAB'S COMMENTARIES. 165 Gotta, being overruled, yields his assent; the opinion of Sabinus prevails. It is proclaimed that they will march at daj'break; the re- mainder of the night is spent without sleep, since every soldier was inspecting his property, [to see] what he could carry with him, and what, out of the appurtenances of the winter quarters, he would be compelled to leave; every reason is suggested to show why they could not stay without danger, and how that danger would be increased by the fatigue of the soldiers and their want of sleep. At break of day they quit the camp, in a very extended line and with a very large amount of baggage, in such a manner as men who were convinced that the advice was given by Ambiorix, not as an lenemy, but as most friendty [towards them]. Chap. XXXII. —But the enemy, after they had made the discovery of their intended departure by the noise during the night and their not retiring to rest, having placed an ambuscade in two divisions in the woods, in a suitable and concealed place, two miles from the camp, waited for the arrival of the Romans ; and when the greater part of the lino of march had descended into a considerable valley, they suddenly presented themselves on either side of that valley, and began both to harass the rear and hinder the van from ascending, and to give battle in a place exceedingly disadvanta- geous to our men. Chap. XXXIII. — Then at length Titurius, as one who had provided nothing beforehand,166 CuESAB >S COMMENTARIES. was confused, ran to and fro, and set about arranging his troops; these very things, how- ever, he did timidly and in such a. manner that all resources seemed to fail him: which gen- erally happens to those who are compelled to take council in the action itself. But Cotta, who had reflected that these things might occur on the march, and on that account had not been an adviser of the departure, was wanting to the common safety in no respect; both in address- ing and encouraging the soldiers, he performed the duties of a general, and in the battle those of a soldier. And since they [Titurius and Cotta] could less easily perform everything by themselves, and provide what was to be done in each place, by reason of the length of the line of march, they ordered [the officers] to give the command that they should leave the baggage and form themselves into an orb, which measure, though in a contingency of that na- ture it was not to be condemned, still turned out unfortunately; for it both diminished the hope of our soldiers and rendered the enemy more eager for the fight, because it appeared that this was not done without the greatest fear and despair. Besides that happened, which would necessarily be the case, that the soldiers for the most part quitted their ensigns and hurried to seek and carry off from the bag- gage whatever each thought valuable, and all parts were filled with uproar and lamentation. Chap. XXXIV. — But judgment was not wanting to the barbarians; for their leaders Qrdered [the officers] to proclaim through theCjESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 167 ranks " that no man should quit his place ; that the booty was theirs, and for them was reserved whatever the Romans should leave ; therefore let them consider that all things depended on their victory." Our men were equal to them in fighting, both in courage and in number, and though they were deserted by their leader and by fortune, yet they still placed all hope of safety in their valor, and as often as any cohort sallied forth on that side, a great num- ber of the enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when he observed this, orders the command to be issued that they throw their weapons from a distance and do not approach too near, and in whatever direction the Romans should make an attack, there give way (from the lightness of their appointments and from their daily practice no damage could be done them) ; [but] pursue them when betaking themselves to their standards again. Chap. XXXV. — Which command having been most carefully obeyed, when any cohort had quitted the circle and made a charge, the enemy fled very precipitately. In the mean time, that part of the Roman army, of neces- sity, was left unprotected, and the weapons received on their open flank. Again, when they had begun to return to that place from which they had advanced, they were surrounded both by those who had recreated and by those who stood next them ; but if, on the other hand, they wished lo keep their place, neither was an opportunity left for valor, nor could they, being crowded together* escape the weapons cast b,y168 CvESAfi'S COMMENTARIES. so large a body of men. Yet, though assailed by so many disadvantages, [and] having received many wounds, they withstood the enemy, and, a great portion of the day being spent, though they fought from daybreak till the eighth hour, they did nothing which was unworthy of them. At length, each thigh of T. Balventius, who the year before had been chief centurion, a brave man and one of great authorit}', is pierced with a javelin; Q. Luca- nius, of the same rank, fighting most valiantly, is slain while he assists his son when sur- rounded by the enemy; L. Cotta, the lieuten- ant, when encouraging all the cohorts and companies, is wounded full in the mouth by a sling. Chap. XXXVI.— Much troubled by these events, Q. Titurius, when he had perceived Ambiorix in the distance encouraging his men, sends to him his interpreter, Cn. Pompey, to beg that he would spare him and his soldiers. He, when addressed, replied, 44 If he wished to confer with him, it was permitted ; that ho hoped what pertained to the safety of the sol- diers could be obtained from the people ; that to him, however, certainly no injury would be done, and that he pledged his faith to that effect." He consults with Cotta, who had been wounded, whether it would appear right to retire from battle, and confer with Ambiorix; [saying] that he hoped to be able to succeed respecting his own and the soldiers' safety. Cotta says he will not go to an armed enemy, and in that perseveres.CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. . 169 Chap. XXXYII. — Sabinus orders those tribunes of the soldiers whom he had at the time around him, and the centurions of the first ranks, to follow him, and when he had approached near to Ambiorix, being ordered to throw down his arms, he obeys the order and commands his men to do the same. In the mean time, while they treat upon the terms and a longer debate than necessary is design- edly entered into by Ambiorix, being sur- rounded by degrees, he is slain. Then they according to their custom shout out" Victory," and raise their war-cry, and, making an attack on our men, break their ranks. There L. Cotta, while fighting, is slain, together with the greater part of ilie soldiers; the rest be- take themselves to the camp, from which they had marched forth, and one of them, L. Petro- sidius, the standard bearer, when he was over- powered by the great number of the enemy, threw the eagle within the intrenchments and is himself slain while fighting with the great- est courage before the camp. They with diffi- culty sustain the attack till night; despairing of safety, they all to a man destroy themselves in the night. A few escaping from the battle, make their way to Labienus at winter quarters, after wandering at random through the woods, and inform him of these events. Chap. XXXYIII. —Elated by this victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with his cav- alry to the Aduatuci, who bordered on his kingdom ; he halts neither day nor night, and orders the infantry to follow him closely.170 . SAB'S COMMENTARIES. Haying related the exploit and roused the Aduatuci, the next day he arrived among the Nervii, and entreats "that they should not throw away the opportunity of liberating them- selves forever and of punishing the Romans for those wrongs which they had received from them; [he tells them] u that two lieutenants have been slain, and that a large portion of the army has perished ; that it was not a mat- ter of difficulty for the legion which was win- tering with Cicero to be cut off, when suddenly assaulted ; he declares himself ready to co- operate in that design " lie easily gains over the Nervii by this speech. Ciiap XXXIX. — Accordingly, messen- gers having been forthwith despatched to the Centrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, all of whom are under their government, they assemble as large bodies as they can, and rush unexpectedly to the winter quarters of Cicero, the report of the death of Titurius not having as yet been conveyed to him. That also occurred to him, which was the consequence of a necessary work, — that some soldiers who had gone off into the woods for the purpose of procuring timber and therewith constructing fortifica- tions, were interc epted by the sudden arrival of [the enemy's] horse. These having been entrapped, the Eburones, the Nervii, and the Aduatuci and all their allies and dependants, begin to attack the legion : our men quickly run together to arms and mount the ramp "it: they sustained the attack that dav with greatC^ESAIl \Sy COMMENTARIES. 171 difficulty, since the enemy placed all their hope in despatch, and felt assured that, if they obtained this victory, they would be conquerors forever. Chap. XL. — Letters are immediately sent to Caesar by Cicero, great rewards being offered [to the messengers] if they carried them through. All the passes having been beset, those who were sent are intercepted. During the night as many as 120 towers are raised with incredible despatch out of the timber which they had collected for the purpose of fortification: the things which seemed neces- sary to the work are completed. The follow- ing day the enemy, having collected far greater forces, attack the camp [and] fill up the ditch. Resistance is made by our men in the same manner as the day before: this same thing is done afterwards during the remaining days. The work is carried on incessantly in the night: not even to the sick, or wounded, is oppoiv tunity given for rest: whatever things are required for resisting the assault of the next day are provided during the night: many- stakes burnt at the end, and a large number of mural pikes are procured: towers are built-up, battlements and parapets are formed of inter- woven hurdles. Cicero himself, though he was in very weak health, did not leave him- self the night-time for repose, so that he was forced to spare himself by the spontaneous movement and entreaties of the soldiers. Chap. XL I. — Then these leaders and chiefs of the Nervii, who had any intimacy172 CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. and grounds of friendship with Cicero, say they desire to confer with him. When per- mission was granted, they recount the same things which Ambiorix had related to Titurius, namely, "that all Gaul was in arms, that the Germans had passed the Rhine, that the win- ter quarters of Caesar and of the others were attacked." They report in addition also, about the death of Sabinus. They point to Ambiorix for the purpose of obtaining cre- dence; "they are mistaken," say the}T, 46if they hoped for any relief from those who dis- trust their own affairs; that they bear such feelings towards Cicero and the Roman peo- ple that they deny them nothing but winter quarters and are unwilling that this practice should become constant; that through their [the Nervii's] means it is possible for them {the Romans] to depart from their winter quarters safely and to proceed without fear into whatever parts they desire." To these Cicero made one reply: " that it is not the custom of the Roman people to accept any •condition from an armed enemy: if they are willing to lay down their arms, they may em- ploy him as their advocate and send ambassa- dors to Caesar: that he believed, from his [Cae- sar's] justice, they would obtain the things which they might request." Chap. XLII.—Disappointed in this hope, the N'ervii surround the winter quarters with a rampart eleven feet high, and a ditch thirteen feet in depth. These military works they had learnt from our men in the intercourse of for-CJESAIi' S COMMENTARIES. 173 mer years, and, having taken some of our army prisoners, were instructed by them: but, as they bad no supply of iron tools which are requisite for this service, they were forced to cut the turf with their swords, and to empty out the earth with their hands and cloaks, from which circumstance, the vast number of the men could be inferred; for in less than three hours they completed a fortification of ten miles in circumference ; and during the rest of the days they began to prepare and construct towers of the height of the ramparts, and grap- pling irons, and mantlets, which the same pris- oners had taught them. Chap. XL11I.—On the seventh day of the attack, a very high wind having sprung up, they began to discharge by their slings hot balls made of burnt or hardened clay, and heated javelins, upon the huts, which, after the Gallic custom, were thatched with straw. These quickly took lire, and by the violence of the wind, scattered their flames in every part of the camp. The enemy following up their success with a very loud shout, as if victory were already obtained and secured, began to advance their towers and mantlets, and climb the rampart with ladders. But so great was the courage of our soldiers, and such their presence of mind, that though they were scorched on all sides, and harassed by a vast number of weapons, and were aware that their baggage and their possessions were burning * not only did no one quit the rampart for the purpose of withdrawing from the scene, but174 GjESAR'8 COMMENTARIES. scarcely did any one even then look behind ; and they all fought most vigorously and most valiantly. This day was by far the most calami- tous to our meu ; it had this result, however, that on that day the largest number of the enemy was wrounded and slain, since they had crowded beneath the very rampart, and the hindmost did not afford the foremost a retreat. The flame having abated a little, and a tower having been brought up in a particular place and touching the rampart, the centurions of the third cohort retired from the place in which they were standing, and drew off all their men : they began to call on the enemy by gestures and by words, to enter if they wished; but none of them dared to advance. Then stones having been cast from every quarter, the enemy were dislodged, and their tower set on fire. Chap. XLIY. — In that legion there were two very brave men, centurions, who were now approaching the first ranks, T. Pulfio, and L. Varenus. These used to have continual dis- putes between them which of them should be preferred, and every year used to contend for promotion with the utmost animosity. When the fight was going on most vigorously before the fortifications, Pulfio, one of them, says, " Why do you hesitate, Varenus ? or what [better] opportunity of signalizing your valor do you seek ? This very day shall decide our disputes." When he had uttered these words, he proceeds beyond the fortifications, and rushes on that part of the enemy which ap-CjESAB'S COMMENTARIES. 175 petered the thickest. Nor does Varenus re- main within the rampart, but respecting the high opinion of all, follows close after. Then, when an inconsiderable space intervened, Pulfio throws his javelin at the enemy, and pierces one of the multitude who was running up, and while the latter was wounded and slain, the enemy cover him with their shields, and all throw their weapons at the other and afford him no opportunity of retreating. The shield of Pulfio is pierced and a javelin is fastened in his belt. This circumstance turns aside his scabbard and obstructs his right hand when attempting to draw his sword: the enemy crowd around him when [thus] embarrassed. His rival runs up to him and succors him in this emergency. Immediately the whole host turn from Pulfio to him, supposing the other to be pierced through by the javelin. Varenus rushes on briskly with his sword and carries on the combat hand to hand, and having slain one man, for a short time drove back the rest: while he urges on too eagerly, slipping into a hollow, he fell. To him, in his turn, when surrounded, Pulfio brings relief; and both having slain a great number, retreat into the fortifications amidst the highest applause. Fortune so dealt with both in this rivalry and conflict, that the one competitor was a succor and a safeguard to the other, nor could it be determined which of the two appeared worthy of being preferred to the other. Chap. XLV. —In proportion as the attack became daily more formidable and violent, and176 CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. particularly, because, as a great number of the soldiers were exhausted with wounds, the matter had come to a small number of defend- ers, more frequent letters and messages were sent to Caesar; a part of which messengers were taken and tortured to death in the sight of our soldiers. There was within our camp a certain Nervian, by name Vertico, born in a distinguished position, who in the beginning of the blockade had deserted to Cicero, and had exhibited his fidelity to him. He persuades his slave, by the hope of freedom, and by great rewards, to convey a letter to Caesar. This he carries out bound about his javelin, and mixing among the Gauls without any suspicion by being a Gaul,- he reaches Caesar. From him they received information of the im- minent danger of Cicero and the legion. Chap. XLYI.—Caesar having received the letter about the eleventh hour of the day, im- mediately sends a messenger to the Bellovaci, to M. Crassus, questor there, whose winter quarters were twenty-five miles distant from him. He orders the legion to set forward in the middle of the night and come to him with despatch. Crassus set out with the mes- senger. He sends another to C. Fabius, the lieutenant, ordering him to lead forth his legion into the territories of the Atrebates, to which he knew his march must be made. He writes to Labienus to come with his legion to the frontiers of the Nervii, if he could do so to the advantage of the commonwealth: he does not consider that the remaining portion of theCjESAB'S COMMENTARIES. 177 army, because it was somewhat farther dis- tant, should be waited for ; but assembles about 400 horse from the nearest winter quar- ters. Chap. XLYII. — Haying been apprised of the arrival of Crassus by the scouts at about the third hour, he advances twenty miles that day. He appoints Crassus over Samarobriva and assigns him a legion, because he was leaving there the baggage, of the army, the hostages of the states, the public documents, and all the corn, which he had conveyed thither for passing the winter. Fabius, with- out delaying a moment, meets him on the march with his legion, as he had been com- manded. Labienus, having learnt the death of Sabinus and the destruction of the cohorts, as all the forces of the Treviri had come against him, beginning to fear lest, if he made a departure from his winter quarters, resem- bling a flight, he should not be able to support the attack of th« enemy, particularly since he knew them to be elated by their recent victory, sends back a letter to Caesar, informing him with what great hazard he would lead out his legion from winter quarters; he relates at large the affair which had taken place among the Eburones ; he informs him that all the in- fantry and cavalry of the Treviri had encamped at a distance of only three miles from his own camp. Chap. XLVIII.—Caesar, approving of his motives, although he was disappointed in his expectation of three legions, and reduced to178 CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. two, yet placed his only hopes of the common safety in despatch. He goes into the terri- tories of the Nervii by long marches. There he learns from some prisoners what things are going on in the camp of Cicero, and in how great jeopardy the affair is. Then with great rewards he induces a certain man of the Gallic horse to convey a letter to Cicero. This he sends written in Greek characters, lest the let- ter being intercepted, our measures should be discovered by the enemy. He directs him, if he should be unable to enter, to throw his spear with the letter fastened to the thong, inside the fortifications of the camp. He writes in the letter, that he having set out with his legions, will quickly be there : he entreats him to maintain his ancient valor. The Gaul, apprehending danger, throws his spear as he had been directed. It by chance stuck in a tower, and, not being observed by our men for two days, was seen by a certain soldier on the third day: when taken down, it was car- ried to Cicero. He, after perusing it, reads it out in an assembly of the soldiers and fills all with the greatest joy. Then the smoke of the fires was seen in the distance, a circumstance which banished all doubt of the arrival of the legions. Chap. XLIX. — The Gauls, having dis- covered the matter through their scouts, aban- don the blockade, and march towards Caesar with all their forces : these were about GO,000 armed men. Cicero, an opportunity being now afforded, again begs of that Vertico, theC^ESAB 'S COMMENT ABIES. 179 Gaul, whom we mentioned above, to convey back a letter to Caesar; he advises him to per- form his journey warily ; he writes in the letter that the enemy had departed and had turned their entire force against him. When this let- ter was brought to him about the middle of the night, Caesar apprises his soldiers of its contents, and inspires them with courage for fighting : the following day, at the dawn, he moves his camp, and, having proceeded four miles, he espies the forces of the enemy on the other side of a considerable valley and rivulet. It was an affair of great danger to fight with such large forces in a disadvantageous situa- tion. For the present, therefore, inasmuch as he knew that Cicero was released from the blockade, and thought that he might, on that account, relax his speed, he halted there and fortifies a camp in the most favorable position he can. And this, though it was small in itself, [there being] scarcely 7,000 men, and these too without baggage, still by the narrow- ness of the passages, he contracts as much as he can, with this object, that he may come into the greatest contempt with the enemy. In the mean while, scouts having been sent in all di- rections, he examines by what most convenient path lie might cross the valley. Chap. L.—That day, slight skirmishes of cavalry having taken place near the river, both armies kept in their own positions; the Gauls, because they were awaiting larger forces which had not then arrived; Caesar, [to see] if perchance by pretence of f§&r he could allure180 CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. the enemy towards his position, so that he might engage in battle, in front of his camp, on this side of the valley; if he could not ac. complish this, that, having inquired about the passes, he might cross the valley and the rivei with the less hazard. At daybreak the cav« airy of the enemy approaches to the camp and joins battle with our horse. Caesar orders the horse to give way purposely, and retreat to the camp: at the same time he orders the camp to be fortified with a higher rampart in all directions, the gates to be barricaded, and in executing these things as much confusion to be shown as possible, and to perform them under the pretence of fear. Chap. LI.—Induced by these things, the enemy lead over their forces and draw up their lines in a disadvantageous position ; and as our men also had been led down from the ramparts, they approach nearer, and throw their weapons into the fortification from all sides, and sending heralds round, order it to be proclaimed that, if " any, either Gaul or Ro- man, was willing to go over to them before the third hour, it was permitted; after that time ihere would not be permission ; and so much did they disregard our men, that the gates having been blocked up with single rows of turf as a mere appearance, because they did not seem able to burst in that way, some began to pull down the raippart with their hands, others to fill up the trenches. Then Caesar, making a sally from all the gates, and sending out the cavalry, soon puts the enemy to flight, so thatCAESAR' S COMMENTARIES. 181 no one at all stood his ground with the inten- tion of fighting; and he slew a great number of them, and deprived all of their arms. Chap. LII. — Caesar, fearing to pursue them very far, because woods and morasses inter- vened, and also [because] lie saw that they suffered no small loss in abandoning their position, reaches Cicero the same day with all his forces safe. He witnesses with surprise the towers, mantlets, and [other] fortifications belonging to the enemy: the legion having been drawn out, he finds that even every tenth soldier had not escaped without wounds. From all these things he judges with what danger and with what great courage matters had been conducted; he commends Cicero according to his desert and likewise the legion ; he addresses individually the centurions and the tribunes of the soldiers, whose valor he had discovered to have been signal. He re- ceives information of the death of Sabinus and Cotta from the prisoners. An assembly being held the following day, he states the occurrence; he consoles and encourages the soldiers ; he suggests, that the disaster, which had been occasioned by the misconduct and rashness of his lieutenant, should be borne with a patient mind, because by the favor of the immortal gods and their own valor, neither was lasting joy left ta the enemy, nor very lasting grief to them. Chap. LIII.—In the mean while the report respecting the victory of Caesar is conveyed to Labienus through the country of the Remi182 CuE SAB'S COMMENTARIES. with incredible speed, so that, though he was about sixty miles distant from the winter quarters of Cicero, and Caesar had arrived there after the ninth hour, before midnight a shout arose at the gates of the camp, by which shout an indication of the victory and a con- gratulation on the part of the Remi were given to Labienus. This report having been carried to the Treviri, Indutiomarus, who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus the following day, flies by night and k ads back all his forces into the country of the Treviri. Caesar sends back Fabius with his legion to his winter quarters ; he himself determines to winter with three legions near Samarobriva in three dif- ferent quarters, and, because such great com- motions had arisen in Gaul, he resolved to remain during the whole winter with the army himself. For the disaster respecting the death of Sabinus having been circulated among them, almost all the states of Gaul were deliberating about war, sending messengers and embassies into all quarters, inquiring what further meas- ure they should take, and holding councils by night in secluded places. Nor did any period of the whole winter pass over without fresh anxiety to Caesar, or, without his receiving some intelligence respecting the meetings and commotions of the Gauls. Among these, he is informed by L. Roscius, the lieutenant whom he had placed over the thirteenth le- gion, that large forces of those states of the Gauls, which are called the Armoricse, had assembled for the purpose of attacking himCAESAR'S COMMENTARIES* 183 and were not more than eight miles distant; but intelligence respecting the victory of Cae- sar being carried [to them], had retreated in such a manner that their departure appeared like a flight. Chap. LIY. — But Caesar, having sum- moned to him the principal persons of each state, in one case by alarming them, since he declared that he knew what was going on, and in another case by encouraging them, retained a great part of Gaul in its allegiance. The Senones, however, which is a state eminently powerful and one of great influence among the Gauls, attempting by general design to slay Cavarinus whom Caesar had created king among them (whose brother, Moritasgus, had held the sovereignty at the period of the arrival of Cae- sar in Gaul, and whose ancestors had also pre- viously held it), when he discovered their plot and fled, pursued him even to the frontiers [of the state], and drove him from his kingdom and his home ; and, after having sent ambassa- dors to Caesar for the purpose of concluding a peace, when he ordered all their senate to come to him, did not obey that command. So far did it operate among those barbarian people, that there were found some to be the first to wage war ; and so great a change of inclinations did it produce in all, that except the iEdui and the Kemi, whom Caesar had always held; in especial honor, the one people for their long standing and uniform fidelity towards the Roman people, the other for their late service in the Gallic war, there was scarcely a state which184 xJ^E SAB'S COMMENT ABIES. was not suspected by us. And I do not know whether that ought much to be wondered at, as well for several other reasons, as particularly because they who ranked above all nations for prowess in war, most keenly regretted that they had lost so much of that reputation as to sub- mit to commands from the Roman people. Chap. LV.— But the Treviri and Indu- tiomarus let no part of the entire winter pass without sending ambassadors across the Rhine, importuning the states, promising money, and asserting that, as a large portion of our army had' been cut off, a much smaller portion remained. However, none of the German states could be induced to cross the Rhine, since " they had twice essayed it," they said, "in the war with Ariovistus and in the passage of the Tenchtheri there ; that fortune was not to be tempted any more." Jndutiomarus, dis- appointed in this expectation, nevertheless began to raise troops, and discipline them, and procure horses from the neighboring people and allure to him by great rewards the out- laws and convicts throughout Gaul. And such great influence had he already acquired for him- self in Gaul by these means, that embassies were flocking to him in all directions, and seeking, publicly and privately, his favor and friend- ship. Chap. LYI. — When he perceived that they were coming to him voluntarily; that on the one side the Senones and the Carnutes were stimulated by their consciousness of guilt, on the other side the Nervii and the Aduatuci wereCAESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 185 preparing war against the Romans, and that forces of volunteers would not be wanting to him if he began to advance from his own ter- ritories, he proclaims an armed council (this according to the custom of the Gauls is the commencement of war), at which, by a common law, all the youth were wont to assemble in arms ; whoever of them comes last is killed in the sight of the whole assembly after being racked with every torture. In that council he declares Cingetorix, the leader of the other faction, his own son-in-law (whom we have above mentioned, as having embraced the pro- tection of Caesar, and never having deserted him) an enemy, and confiscates his property. When these things were finished, lie asserts in the council that he, invited by the Senones and the Carnutes, and several other states of Gaul, was about to march thither through the terri- tories of the Remi, devastate their lands, and attack the camp of Labienus: before he does that, he informs them of what he desires to bq done. Chap. LYII. —Labienus, since he was con- fining himself within a camp strongly fortified by the nature of the ground and by art, had no apprehensions as to his own and the legion's danger, but was devising that he might throw away no opportunity of conducting the war successfully. Accordingly, the speech of Indu- tiomarus, which he had delivered in the council, having been made known [to him] by Cingeto? rix and his allies, he sends messengers to the neighboring states and summons horse from all186 CjESAB'S COMMENTABIES. quarters : he appoints to them a fixed day for assembling. In the mean time, Indutiomarus, with all his cavalry, nearly every day used to parade close to his [Labienus's] camp ; at one time, that he might inform himself of the situa- tion of the camp ; at another time, for the pur- pose of conferring with or of intimidating him. Labienus confined his men within the fortifica- tions and promoted the enemy's belief of his fear by whatever methods he could. Chap. LVIII.—Since Indutiomarus was daily advancing up to the camp with greater defiance, all the cavalry of the neighboring states which he [Labienus] had taken care to have sent for, having been admitted in one night, he confined all his men within the camp by guards with such great strictness, that the fact could by no means be reported or carried to the Treviri. In the mean while Indutiomarus, according to his daily practice, advances up to the camp and spends a great part of the day there: his horse cast their weapons, and with very insulting language call out our men to battle. No reply being given by our men, the enemy, when they thought proper, depart towards evening in a disorderly and scattered manner. Labienus unexpectedly sends out all the cavalry by two gates; he gives this com- mand and prohibition, that, when the enemy shguld be terrified and put to flight (which he foi^saw would happen, as it did), they should all make for Indutiomarus, and no one wound any man before he should have seen him slain, because he was unwilling that he should escape,CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 187 in consequence of gaining time by the delay [occasioned by the pursuit] of the rest. He offers great rewards for those who should kill him: he sends up the cohorts as a relief to the horse. The issue justifies the policy of the man, and, since all aimed atone, Indutiom- arus is slain, haying been overtaken at the very ford of the river, and his head is carried to the camp : the horse, when returning, pur- sue and slay all whom they can. This affair having been known, all the forces of the Eburones and the Nervii which had assembled, depart ; and for a short time after this action, Caesar was less harassed in the government of Gaul.m CjEsar's commentaries. BOOK VI. THE ARGUMENT. I. Caesar, apprehending commotions in Gaul, levies additional forces —II.-VI. Defeats the Nervii, Benones, Carnutes, and Menapii. — VII., VIII. Labienus defeats the Treviri. — IX. Caesar again crosses the Rhine; the Ubii send ambas- sadors to plead the defence of their state. — XI.-XXV. The political factions of the Gallic states. The Druids, the sec- ond order or knights, the third order or commonalty, and the mythology of the Gauls. — XXI.-XX VII. The Ger- mans; their customs; account of some remarkable animals found in the Hercinian forest. — XXIX.-XXXI. Caesar re- turns to Gaul; Ambiorix is worsted; death of Cativolcus.— XXXII.-XXXIV. The territories of the Eburones are Slundered. — XXXV.-XLII. The Sigambri attack the ,oman camp; some extraordinary incidents connected there- with. Caesar arrives and restores confidence. — XLIII., XL1V. Caesar holds an investigation respecting the conspi- racy of the Senones; Acco suffers capital punishment; the appointment of winter quarters; Caesar departs for Italy. Chap. I. — Caesar, expecting for many rea- sons a greater commotion in Gaul, resolves to hold a levy by the means of M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, his lieu- tenants : at the same time he requested of Cn. Pompey, the proconsul, that since he was remaining near the city invested with military command for the interests of the common- wealth, he would command those men whom wken consul he had levied by the military oath in Cisalpine Gaul, to join their respective corps, and to proceed to him ; thinking it of great importance, as far as regarded the opinionCuESA U 'S COMMENTARIES. 189 which the Gauls would entertain for the future, that the resources of Italy should appear so great, that if any loss should be sustained in war, not only could it be repaired in a short time, but likewise be further supplied by still larger forces. And when Pompev had granted this to the interests of the commonwealth and the claims of friendship, Caesar having quickly completed the levy by means of his lieuten- ants, after three legions had been both formed and brought to him before the winter [had] expired, and the number of those cohorts which he had lost under Q. Titurius had been doubled, taught the Gauls, both by his de- spatch and by his forces, what the discipline and the power of the Roman people could accomplish. Chap. II. — Indutiomarus having been slain, as we have stated, the government was con- ferred upon his relatives by the Treviri. They cease not to importune the neighboring Ger- mans and to promise them money: when they could not obtain [their object] from those near- est them, they try those more remote. Hav- ing found some states willing to §£cede to their wishes, they enter into a compact with them by a mutual oath, and give hostages as a security for the money : they attach Ambiorix to them by an alliance and confederacy. Caesar, on being informed of their acts, since he saw that war was being prepared on all sides, that the Nervii, Aduatuci, and Menapii, with the addi- tion of all the Germans on this side of the Rhine, were under arms, that the Senones did not100 C^ESAE'8 COMMENTARIES. assemble according to his command, and wore concerting measures with the Carnutes and the neighboring states, that the Germans were im- portuned by theTreviri in frequent embassies, thought that he ought to take measures for the war earlier [than usual] . Chap. III. — Accordingly, while the winter was not yet ended, having concentrated the four nearest legions, he marched unexpectedly into the territories of the Nervii, and before they could either assemble, or retreat, after captur- ing a large number of cattle and of men, and wasting their lands and giving up that booty to the soldiers, compelled them to enter into a sur- render and give him hostages. That business having been speedily executed, he again led his legions back into winter quarters. Having proclaimed a council of Gaul in the beginning of the spring, as he had been accustomed [to do], when the deputies from the rest, except tlieSenones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri, had come, judging this to be the commencement of war and revolt, that he might appear to con- sider all things of less consequence [than that war], he transfers the council to Lutetia of the Parisii. These were adjacent to the Senones, and "had united their state to them during the memory of their fathers, but were thought to have no part in the present plot. Having pro- claimed this from the tribunal, he advances the same day toward the Senones with his legions and arrives among them by long marches. Chap. IV.—Acco, who had been the author of that enterprise, on being informed of hisCESAR'S COMMENT ABIES. 191 arrival, orders the people to assemble in thq towns ; to them, while attempting this and be- fore it could be accomplished, news is brought that the Romans are close at hand: through necessity they give over their design and send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of im- ploring pardon; they make advances to him through the iEdui, whose state was from ancient times under the [protection of Rome. Caesar readily grants them pardon and receives their excuse, at the request of the iEdui; because he thought thnt the summer season was one for an impending war, not for an investigation. Having imposed one hundred hostages, he delivers these to the JEdui to be held in charge by them. To the same place the Carnutes send ambassadors and hostages, employing as their mediators the Remi, under whose protection they were : they receive thu same answers. Caesar concludes the council and imposes a levy of cavalry on the states. Chap. Y.—This part of Gaul having been tranquillized, he applies himself entirely both in mind and soul to the war with the Treviri and Ambiorix. He orders Cavarinus to march with him with the cavalry of the Senones, lest any commotion should arise either out of his hot temper, or out of the hatred of the state which he had incurred. After arranging these things, as he considered it certain that Ambio- rix would not contend in battle, he watched his other plans attentively. The Menapii bor- dered on the territories of the Eburones, and were protected by one continued extent of192 CuESAR 'S COMMENT All IES. morasses and woods ; and they alone out of Gaul had never sent ambassadors to Caesar oil the subject of peace. Caesar knew that a tie <5f hospitality subsisted between them and Ambiorix: he also discovered that the latter had entered into an alliance with the Germans by means of the Treviri. He thought that these auxiliaries ought ta be detached from him before he provoked him to war; lest he, despairing of safety, should either proceed to conceal himself in the territories of the Mena- pii, or should be driven to coalesce with the Germans beyond the Rhine. Having entered upon this resolution, he sends the baggage of the whole army to Labienus, in the territories of the Treviri, and orders two legions to pro- ceed to him : he himself proceeds against the Menapii with five lightly equipped legions. They, having assembled no troops, as they relied on the defence of their position, retreat into the woods and morasses, and convey thither all their property. Chap. VI. — Caesar, having divided his forces with C. Fabius, his lieutenant, and M. Crassus, his questor, and having hastily con- structed some bridges, enters their country in three divisions, burns their houses and vil- lages, and gets possession of a large number of cattle and men. Constrained by these cir- cumstances, the Menapii send ambassadors to him for the purpose of suing for peace. He, after receiving hostages, assures them that he Will consider them in the number of his ene- mies if they shall receive within their territoriesCJESAR'S COMMENT ABIES. 193 either Ambiorix or his ambassadors. Having determinately settled these things, he left among the Menapii, Commius the Atrebatian with some cavalry as a guard ; he himself pro- ceeds towards the Treviri. Chap. VII. — While these things are being performed by Caesar, the Treviri, having drawn together large forces of infantry and ©f .