ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN PRODUCTION NOTE University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Library Brittle Books Project, 2015.COPYRIGHT NOTIFICATION In Public Domain. Published prior to 1923. This digital copy was made from the printed version held by the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. It was made in compliance with copyright law. Prepared for the Brittle Books Project, Main Library, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign by Northern Micrographics Brookhaven Bindery La Crosse, Wisconsin 2015I £^"w «*■ fs4s \ SOUTH AMERICA AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 1824-1828 EDMUND J. JAMES UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY mv - a 1916 by WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON REPRINTED FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Vol. XXX, No. i, March, 1915 ( NEW YORK PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY 1915SOUTH AMERICA AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE, 1824-1828 IT is the purpose of this article to "describe briefly the recep- tion of President Monroe's message to Congress of Decem- ber 2, 1823, by the republic of Colombia, the empire of Brazil, and the provinces of the Rio de la Plata. Colombia had been placed upon the map of South America by virtue of the victories won over the Spanish royalists by the revolutionary soldiers who were led by the military genius, Simon Bolivar. According to the Colombian constitution of 1821, this republic was to include the territories which under Spanish rule had been organized into the captain-generalship of Venezuela and the viceroyalty of New Granada.1 In 1823 the titular president of " Great Colombia " was Bolivar the Lib- erator; but as he had led his conquering soldiers against the royalists in Peru, the able vice president, General Francisco de Paula Santander, acted as the chief civil executive of Colombia.2 Richard C. Anderson of Colombia, the first minister plenipoten- tiary of the United States to Colombia, reached the capital city of Bogota on December 10, 1823.3 He soon became aware from conversations with the Colombian secretary of foreign affairs, Pedro Gual, that the Colombians were apprehensive of the designs upon America of that mysterious association of European monarchs known as the Holy Alliance. When re- ports of the capture of Cadiz by French soldiers acting as in- formal agents of the Holy Alliance reached Bogota, the govern- ment of Colombia was startled : some Colombian officials feared that, having restored Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain, the Allies might attempt to subjugate the independent states of Spanish America. 1The Colombian Constitution of 1821, which was framed at Cficuta, is found in Blanco, J. F., Documentos para la historia de la vida p6blica del Libertador de Colombia, Peru, y Bolivia, viii, 24-40. 2 Gil Fortoul, J., Historia Constitucional de Venezuela, i, 327, 328. 3 Anderson announced his arrival at Bogota in a letter to Adams, December 22, 1823, State Dept. MSS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Letters from Colombia, iii. 82THE BEGINNINGS OF SPANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY The decadence of Spain as a colonial power with the corresponding rise of new nations in the Spanish Indies constitutes a spectacular drama in modern history. At the opening of the nineteenth century the king of Spain and the Indies claimed title to the territory in the New World which stretched from the sources of the Mississippi River to Cape Horn. This domain, which covered about seven million square miles, included almost one-half of the area of the Americas—a patrimony from which could be carved thirty-five states as large as Spain. It had been gradually divided for administrative purposes into vice- royalties and captain-generalships, both of which were composed of provinces. Legally this glorious heritage **wks not the property of the Spanish people, but of the Spanish monarch. The relation between Spanish America and the mother country was not an organic union but a £ personal union. His Catholic Majesty was the connecting 0 link. e n • — ^ • • • u' The diplomacy of Spanish America, in a sense, orig- in inated in the era of discovery and colonization. In a ii more vital sense, it began during the revolution which S* ultimately rent the patrimony of Spain in America into ® fragments. This revolution was accompanied by at- r"_ tempts of the revolting provinces to enter into political fP and commercial relations with neighboring provinces and JT with foreign governments. This study will consider, so «o far as the opportunity permits, the most significant efforts 3? of the Spanish-American insurgents to initiate diplomatic ■ '& relations with foreign nations from 1810 to 1816 with 431232 W. S. Robertson special attention to Venezuela which was for a time the storm-center of the early revolution. Attempts had indeed been made before the second dec- ade of the nineteenth century to arouse sympathy for the cause of Spanish-American emancipation in the United States, France, and England. Alexander Hamilton be- came interested in the liberation of Spanish America about I7^3 by listening to the glowing representations of Fran- cisco de Miranda, a native of Venezuela who had fled from the Spanish military service in disgrace. The awak- ening interest in the Spanish Indies was illustrated later by the attitude of filibusters and of statesmen who wished the United States to grow at the expense of the crumbling empire of Spain in America. France took an interest in the Spanish estate in America as early as the middle of the eighteenth century. After the treaty of Paris in 1763, which transferred Louisiana to Spain, the re-establishment of the colonial glory of France became a perennial ambition of French statesmen. Napoleon planned in vain to make the magnificent domain of Louisiana the base of a new Franco-American colonial empire. Schemes for the separation of part or all of the Spanish dominions in America from the parent country were urged upon the governments of France and England at propitious moments by private memorialists, by gov- ernmental officials, and by elusive adventurers who claimed to represent the oppressed colonists of Mexico or South America. The enthusiastic patriot-filibuster, Miranda, urged his elaborate schemes for the revolutionizing of Spanish America upon various ministers from 1790 to 1808 and sought particularly the aid of England. Mi- randa's plans were eagerly listened to when that nation was at war with Spain and when the belief grew in official circles that France, the implacable enemy of England, entertained designs upon the Spanish dominions. EnglishSpanish-American Diplomacy 233 officials in the West Indies were instructed to keep a watch- ful eye upon the dissensions in Spanish America and to foster trade with the neighboring Spanish colonies. In 1806 and 1807, when England and Spain were at war, English soldiers made unsuccessful attacks on the vice- royalty of Buenos Aires. In the summer of 1808, when Napoleon dominated Spanish politics and when many Englishmen despaired of checking the victorious French arms on the European continent, an English expedition was preparing to sail for America to prevent the Spanish Indies from becoming the prey of Napoleon.1 At this juncture Napoleon's continental ambitions lured him into that continental policy which was greatly to change the political geography of Europe and America. The irruption of French troops into Portugal in 1807 forced the royal family of Braganza to flee to Rio Janeiro under the escort of a British squadron—a measure which anticipated the independence of Brazil. The odious in- trigues of Napoleon in Spanish affairs were perhaps partly due to a desire to force the Spanish royal family likewise to seek a refuge in their transatlantic empire. If this idea was entertained by the Spanish Bourbons, it was rudely banished by a passionate tumult of the populace.2 The seizure of fortresses in northern Spain by French troops, the abdication of King Charles IV, and the enforced re- nunciation of the Spanish crown by his son, the idolized Ferdinand VII, provoked a national uprising, the begin- ning of the war of the peoples. Juntas, or local councils of 1 For the projects of European governments in regard to Spanish America and for the attitude of statesmen in the United States on various occa- sions see Robertson, W. S., "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolution- izing of Spanish America," American Historical Association Report, 1907, I., pp. 189-414. 3 Cevallos, P., Exposicion de los hechos y maquinaciones que han pre parado la usurpacidn de la corona de Espana y los medios que el Em- perador de los Franceses ha puesto en obra para realizarla, pp. n, 31, 4°> 65, 66.234 W. S. Robertson government, sprang up, as if by magic, from Oviedo to Granada. On June 6, 1808, Napoleon arrogantly pro- claimed his brother Joseph king of Spain and the Indies *; while the patriots soon formed a central junta to exercise the national authority. From the mediaeval fortress of freedom in the Asturias, a patriotic junta stealthily hurried two deputies across the water to solicit aid from Napoleon's inveterate foe. After conferences with the great minister, George Canning, they were promised speedy succor.4 On July 4, 1808, England accordingly published a formal proclamation of peace with Spain.5 In the king's speech to Parliament on that day it was declared that because of the resistance of Spain to the usurpations of France, the Spanish nation could " no longer be considered as the enemy of Great Britain," but was recognized by his Majesty as " a natural friend and ally." It was expressly declared that the king had " no other object than that of preserving unimpaired the integrity and independence of the Spanish monarchy." 9 Hence, English officials in the West Indies soon trans- mitted to the Spanish colonies the news of the national uprising in Spain and of the pivotal change in English policy.7 The British redcoats that had been bivouacking * Lafuente, M., y Valcra, J., Historia general de Espana, XVII., pp. 456, 457- 4 The declaration of the king of England to the envoys of the Asturias, June 12, 1808, is found in the Annual Register for 1808, pp. 321, 322. In the speeches of Sheridan and Canning in the house of commons on June 15 are found hints of the negotiations, Hansard, T. C., Parliamentary De- bates, XI., pp. 886-892. See also Hume, M., Modern Spain, pp. 131, 132. * London Gazette, July 2-July 5, 1808; London Times, July 7, 1808. * Hansard, T. C., Parliamentary Debates, XI., pp. 1140, 1141; Journals of the House of Commons, LXIII., pp. 481. 7 Draft of dispatches to the governor of the Windward and Leeward Islands, June 22 and July 7, 1808, Public Record Office, Colonial Office Correspondence, Windward and Leeward Islands, 25; Cockburn to Castlereagh, August x, 1808, describes the mission sent from Curagoa to Caracas to transmit the news, ibid., Colonial Office Transmissions,Spanish-American Diplomacy 235 on the shores of Ireland in readiness for a South American expedition were now sent, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, to fight France in the Iberian peninsula.8 This movement was crowned by the convention of January 14, 1809, by which the central junta of Seville, in the name of Ferdinand VII, and the English government agreed to confirm these new relations by a " formal Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance." 8 The identical circumstances which transformed England into the firm ally of Spain started a protracted drama in a spacious theater beyond the Atlantic. After Napoleon had usurped the government of Spain, he hurried confi- dential emissaries to the Spanish Indies to announce the dynastic change and to secure the allegiance of the colo- nists to his brother Joseph. The emissaries sent to the province of Venezuela were spurned by many inhabitants of the city of Caracas. The news of the startling changts in the Peninsula caused great excitement and much display of fidelity to Ferdinand VII.1® In July, 1808, the cabildo, or municipal council, of Caracas, influenced by Spanish example, framed a project for the establishment of a local junta.11 In December, 1808, a few of the nobility vainly petitioned the captain-general, Vicente Emparan, to estab- lish a governmental assembly.12 Rumors of reverses to the Spanish cause in the Peninsula helped to set Venezuela into a state of fermentation. Hence, when agents arrived Curaqoa, 668; Vane, C., Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, VI., pp. 374"376- •Robertson, W. S., "Francisco de Miranda," Am. Hist. Assn. Reft., 1907, I., pp. 404-414. • British and Foreign State Tapers, I., part 1, pp. 667-673. 10 Smyth, W. H., Life and Services of Captain Beaver, pp. 334-339; Blanco, J. F.> Documentos para la historia de la vida ptiblica del liber- tador de Colombia, Perti y Bolivia, II., pp. 160-166. 11 Blanco, J. F., Documentos, II., pp. 171-174. " Memorial of the Count of Tovar to the captain-general of Caracas, December 1, 1808, JP. R. OColonial Office Transmissions, Cura$oa, 670.236 W. S. Robertson in Caracas from Spain with orders to recognize the su- premacy of the regency, to which the central junta had transferred its authority, an extraordinary cabildo peace- fully deposed the captain-general and, on April 19, 1810, established a provisional junta, which publicly professed to be acting on behalf of the exiled Ferdinand VII.18 This provisional government soon deported the chief colonial officials, organized rudimentary administrative depart- ments, and decreed various social and political reforms.14 It soon directed a manifesto to the regency boldly dis- avowing its authority.15 The creation of this new govern- ment in Venezuela was in reality a revolution in disguise. A revolutionary spirit soon swept over other provinces of Spanish America. In May, 1810, in the city of Buenos Aires Viceroy Cisneros was quietly succeeded by a junta which was formed ostensibly to conserve the author- ity of Ferdinand VII.16 A similar junta was set up about two months later at Santa Fe de Bogota, the capital of the viceroyalty of New Granada.17 In September, 1810, in the city of Santiago de Chile, Captain-General Carrasco was replaced by a governmental junta which loudly pro- claimed allegiance to the beloved king.18 In the insur- rection which broke out in the viceroyalty of Mexico in the same month under the leadership of the sagacious curate, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, the name of Ferdinand was a favorite battle-cry.19 About a year later a council 18 Blanco, J. F., Documentos, II., pp. 391, 407, 408. On the revolution see also Rojas, A., Los hombres de la revolution, 1810-1826. 14 Caraccas Gazette in London Times, July 2, 1810; the regulations on the liberty of the press are found in Niles, Weekly Register, I., pp. 21, 22. 15 Blanco, J. F., Documentos, II., p. 410. 19 Registro oficial de la republica argentina (Buenos Aires, 1879 ff.), I., pp. 22-24. 17 Blanco, J. F., Documentos, II., pp. 555-559- Ibid., pp. 639, 640; Barros Arana, D., Historia jeneral de Chile (Santiago, 1884-1902), VIII., pp. 215-237. "Alam&n, L., Historia de Mexico (Mexico, 1883-1885), I., pp. 33I_335-Spanish-American Diplomacy 237 which styled itself " the supreme governmental junta of America " was created in the picturesque Mexican village of Zitacuaro.20 In this essay there is opportunity only to suggest the animus of some of the leading actors in the kaleidoscopic scenes in which viceroys and captain-generals were often succeeded by provisional juntas. It must not be forgotten that there were many devoted loyalists who followed the Spanish standard on many widely-separated battlefields. Opportunists there were not a few. The historian of the future may indeed seek a partial explanation of this uprising in the psychology of a group or a " race." Some Spanish Americans were loyal to Ferdinand VII, but agitated because of the chaotic conditions in Spain and loath to yield allegiance to the changing authorities in the Peninsula. In certain regions the people were apparently affected by the contagion of example. Some argued that the dethronement of the Spanish king had broken the connecting link between Spain and the colonies,21 a plea resembling one made at times by the men of 1776. Many Spanish Americans were discontented because of inherent evils in the colonial regime. A few were animated by the doctrines of the revolution in France; some were influenced by the militant policy of England with re- spect to Spanish America; while many conceived the United States to be their grand exemplar. To these nations the chiefs who entertained thoughts of independ- ence naturally turned with great expectations. What was the policy of distracted Spain towards this movement in her transatlantic dominions? On January 22, 1809, the central junta declared the American pos- 20 Hern&ndez y D&valos, J. E., Coleccidn de documentos para la historia de la guerra de independencia de Mexico de 1808 a 1821, III., p. 340. 21 As a specific illustration of this constitutional plea, see the letter of J. G. Roscio to Andres Belo, June 29, 1810, in Amun&tegui, M. L., Vida de Don Andris Bello, p. 83.238 W. S. Robertson sessions of Spain to be not colonies, but an integral part of the Spanish nation with the right to representation in the junta.22 But the regency decreed in August, 1810, that because of the establishment of the provisional gov- ernment by Venezuela, its ports were to be rigorously blockaded.23 On January 21, 1811, after fruitless nego- tiations with the Venezuelans,24 an agent of the regency from a coign of vantage in the West Indies, rashly ordered the enforcement of the blockade.25 On the other hand, the Spanish Cortes, which met in September, 1810, soon decreed that the Spanish dominions in both hemispheres comprised one nation, that the inhabitants of the ultra- marine provinces had equal rights with the peninsular Spaniards, and that the American insurgents would be pardoned as soon as they recognized the legitimate sov- ereign authority in Spain.26 Decrees were passed osten- sibly to encourage industry, commerce, and equality of classes in the Spanish Indies.27 These measures, however, did not conciliate the American deputies in the Cortes, who presented a strong remonstrance on American affairs.28 The proceedings of the national peninsular authorities hence did not heal the widening breach between Spain and her colonies. The quixotic junta of Caracas was meanwhile trying to 22 Blanco, J. F., Documentos, II., p. 230. 2* Walton, W., An Expose on the Dissentions of Spanish America, ap- pendix, document D. 24 Blanco, J. F., Documentos, II., pp. 693-696, 699-703. 28 A copy of the order is found in P, R. O., Foreign Office Corre- spondence, Spain, 120. 2® Coleccion de los decretos y or denes que han expedido las cortes generates y extraordinarios desde su instalacion en 24 de setiembre de 1810 hasta igual fecha de 1811, p. 10. 27 Ibid., pp. 72, 73, 87, 90, 61-63. 28 Al&man, L., Historia de Mexico, III., pp. 451-471, for comment on the proposals see Walton, W., An Expose, p. 291. The eleven propositions on American affairs can be found in Guerra, J., Historia de la revolution de Nueva Espana, II., pp. 647-655.Spanish-American Diplomacy 239 establish friendly relations with foreign governments. It soon communicated with English officials in the West Indies. Early in May, 1810, the junta sent an account of the separatist movement in Venezuela to Governor Layard of Curagoa, who at once dispatched his aide-de- camp, Captain Kelly, to London with the news that the junta was preparing to send envoys to England.29 An agent# of this junta, Juan Ewardo, soon arrived in the island with messages of friendship for Great Britain. He was graciously received by Layard, who declared that he cordially approved of every step which had been taken, and that the manner in which the junta had been estab- lished would be u the admiration of all future ages." Governor Layard also expressed his intention of sending his secretary, John Robertson, to congratulate the junta and to promote friendly relations between Curagoa and Caracas. The sympathies of the governor were so strongly enlisted that he even offered to furnish the Ven- ezuelans with muskets from the governmental ordnance in the island.30 The junta of Caracas also sent a message to Governor Manchester of Jamaica " expressing a desire to enter into the strictest alliance and freest commercial intercourse with the British Nation." 31 The actions of Governor Layard were not in perfect harmony with the wishes of the English cabinet. The mission of Captain Kelly to England with the news of the changes in Venezuela was approved32; but the virtual recognition of the governmental junta was disapproved.33 2• Layard to Liverpool, May 8, 1810, P. R. O., Colonial Office Trans- missions, Curaqoa, 671. *° Layard to Jose de Llamosas and Martin Tovar Ponte, May 14, 1810, ibid. 81 The Duke of Manchester to Lord Liverpool, June 10, 1810, P. R. 0., Colonial Office Correspondence, Jamaica, 7/. *3 Layard to Liverpool, June 29, 1810, P. R. OColonial Office Corre- spondence, Curaqoa, I. •• Layard to Liverpool, July 23, 1810, ibid.240 W. S. Robertson On June 29, 1810, Lord Liverpool, the English minister for war and the colonies, thus described the conduct which England wished its representatives in the West Indies to observe: The great object which His Majesty has had in view from the first moment when intelligence was received in this Country of the glorious resistance of the Spanish Nation against the Tyranny and Usurpation of France, was to assist by every means in His Power this great effort of a brave, loyal, and high spirited People, and to secure if possible the Independence of the Spanish Monarchy in all Parts of the World. As long as the Spanish Nation persevere in their resistance to their Invaders, and as any reasonable Hope can be entertained of ultimate Success to their Cause in Spain, His Majesty feels it to be his Duty according to every obligation of Justice and good Faith, to discourage any pro- ceeding which may have the effect of separating the Spanish Provinces in America from the Parent State in Europe;—the In- tegrity of the Spanish Monarchy upon principles of Justice and true Policy, being not less the object of His Majesty than of all loyal and patriotic Spaniards." 34 Before this dispatch was written, the junta of Venezuela had sent Simon Bolivar, Luis Lopez Mendez, and Andres Bello on the important mission over-seas. Bello, a scholarly and talented Venezuelan, acted as the secretary of the commission;35 Mendez was a member of a leading insurgent family; and Bolivar, the chief of the trio, was the scion of an illustrious family of Caracas, who had been educated in Venezuela and in Europe.86 Like other chiefs *4 Layard to Liverpool, June 29, 1810, P. R. O., Colonial Office Corre- spondence, Curagoa, I. An indorsement on Manchester's dispatch to Liv- erpool, June 21, 1810, states that a copy of these instructions was sent to Manchester, ibid., Jamaica, 7/. 85 Velasco y Rojas, marques de, Simon Bolivar, p. 15. ** Larraz&bal, F., La vida y correspondencia general del libertador Simdn Bolivar (New York, 1901), I., pp. 4-41, sketches the early career of Bolivar. In Rojas, A., Historia Patria, Estudios, Historicos, Origenes Venezolanos, I., appendix, p. 106, is material on Bolivar's ancestry.Spanish-American Diplomacy 241 of the Spanish-American rebellion, Bolivar had served under the Spanish banner of blood and gold, for in Jan- uary, 1797, he had enlisted in a militia company of the valley of Aragua.37 His revolutionary ardor, which was to make him a " liberator " of South America, had ap- parently just been aroused.38 These envoys from the New World to the Old were brought to England in July, 1810, in the corvette Wellington, which seems to have been sent for that purpose from the English squadron in the West Indies.39 They took advantage of the ambiguous clause in their instructions regarding their compatriot Miranda,40 soon consorted with that apostle of South American eman- cipation,41 and thus probably received hints regarding the policy of England towards Spanish America. Bolivar and Mendez brought with them an address from the Vene- zuelan junta to King George III, in which it was sug- gested that England was destined " to complete the grand work of confederating the scattered sections of America, and to cause order, concord, and rational liberty to reign therein." 42 The circumstantial instructions to the commissioners, which are preserved in the archives of the English gov- 91 Ibid., appendix, pp. 119-122, are printed the official records of Bolivar's military services. 88 In regard to the selection of Bolivar as the leader of this deputation see Ducoudray Holstein, H. L. V., Memoirs of Simon Bolivar, p. 28; Velasco y Rojas, marques de, Simon Bolivar, p. 13; Petre, F. L., Simon Bolivar, p. 45. 99 Velasco y Rojas, marques de, Simon Bolivar, p. 13; on the attitude of Admiral Cochrane see also his correspondence with the junta in the Alex- andria Gazette, July 23, 1810. 40 Robertson, W. S., "Francisco de Miranda," Am. Hist. Assn. Rept., 1907,1., p. 432, note a. 41 Dispatch of Apodaca (number 155), July 17, 1810, Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, 8173; J. Tovar to M. Tovar (copy), November 6, 1810, Archivo Historico Nacional, Estado, 3549; Wilberforce, R. I. and F., Life of Wilberforce, III., p. 4. 42 Walton, W., An Expose, appendix, xxv.242 W. S. Robertson ernment, suggest more fully the Venezuelan state of mind The agents were told how to answer certain queries ol the English ministers regarding Venezuela. The change* in that province were to be justified because of the ille- gitimacy of the Spanish junta and the arbitrary adminis- tration of the colonies. The establishment of juntas by the peninsular Spaniards was to be cited as a justification for the proceedings of the Venezuelans. It was asserted that there was a universal sentiment in Venezuela for adhesion to Spain if the patriot cause in the Peninsula was triumphant, and for the establishment of independence if the French arms were victorious. Venezuela was de- clared to be still an integral part of the Spanish empire. Bolivar and Mendez were also instructed to ask England to aid them to procure arms, to protect their commerce, to enjoin the English officials in the West Indies to respect their government, and to favor whatever might promote their peace and happiness. The envoys were directed to conduct themselves with decorum towards the Spanish embassy in London. They were also to solicit the beneficent influence of the English government in paci- fying any disagreements which might arise among them- selves. or with the neighboring provinces in America.43 The English secretary for foreign affairs at this time was the brother of Sir Arthur Wellesley, Marquis Welles- ley, a builder of the English empire in India.44 The Venezuelan commissioners soon sought the marquis. At the first interview, which was perhaps at the minister's house,45 the agents were informed that the English gov- ernment could enter into no " formal or official communi- 48 June 2, 1810 (copy), P. R. O., Colonial Office Transmissions, Curaqoa, 672. 44 Brodrick, G. C., and Fotheringham, J. K., The Political History of England, 1801-1837, pp. 68, 397-400. 45 Amun&tegui, M. L., Andres Bello, p. 88; Larraz&bal, F., Simon Bolivar, I., p. 77, note.Spanish-American Diplomacy 243 cation " with them because of the alliance with Spain.4® A tradition exists that on this occasion Bolivar forgot his instructions and made an eloquent plea for Venezuelan independence.47 The English minister evidently soon jdivined that these emissaries wished to negotiate an alli- ance with England even against the mother-country.48 The jassertion of the Venezuelans, however, that they still ad- hered to Ferdinand and that they were willing to aid ppain during the struggle with France furnished the marquis a convenient excuse for holding conferences with jBolivar and Mendez, in which Wellesley sounded them In regard to Spain, and enunciated the policy of England. |To quote a felicitous passage from the official memoran- jdum of the English government: " In affording to the Deputies from Venezuela the reception to | which they were entitled, Lord Wellesley considered it however, ,to be his Primary Duty to represent to them, without reserve, the danger to which the general Interests of the Spanish Monarchy, 'and of the Allies, were exposed, by the Separation of Venezuela !from the Central Authority acknowledged in Spain; and he therefore endeavored, in the first instance, to inculcate the urgent Expediency of pursuing such conciliatory Measures, as might tend to re-unite the Province to the authority actually exercising the Government of the Parent State, in the name of their Common Sovereign. Lord Wellesley stated this union to be highly important to all the objects, which the Province had avowed; to the immediate Preservation of the Rights of Ferdinand VII, and of the Mon- archy, in complete integrity, harmony and order; to the vigorous 46" Memorandum of the Communication between Marquess Welles- ley and the Commissioners from Venezuela," P, R. O., Foreign Office Correspondence, Spain, 106. 47 Amun&tegui, M. L., AndrSs Bello, II., p. 89; Larrazdbal, F., Simdn Bolivar> I., p. 77. 48 "Notes on the Caraccas, July, 1810," P. R. O., Foreign Office Corre- spondence, Spain, 106. These notes, made while the conferences were being held with Bolivar and Mendez, embody the impressions of the English officials.244 W. S. Robertson j Prosecution of the contest against France by an effectual & sys- tematic Combination of the whole Power and Resources of tble Empire, and especially to the main purpose, professed by thje Province of Venezuela, of contributing the most efficacious aid to the Parent State in the Crisis of her Fate; Towards the attain- ment of this End, no means could be deemed more useful, tha£i the Strength which the Central Government would derive, in the administration of the general Resources of the Monarchy, by th\c continued connection and uninterrupted Support of Every Prov- ince and Colony:—With respect to any local or temporary Grievances, of which the province complained under the Provinj- cial Government established in Spain; Lord Wellesley stated, thaft these considerations were rather Grounds of urgent Representa- tion to that Government of amicable adjustment, or of the inter- position of the good offices of the Allies, than any Justification of & positive and abrupt Separation from the General Government of the Empire." 49 While Bolivar and Mendez admitted the " Principle of these Representations,'' they " resisted the practical Conclusion." They maintained that Venezuela could more effectually promote the cause of Ferdinand VII and of Spain under its existing government than by a closer) union with the Spanish authorities. They expressed their " utter despair " of obtaining the needful redress of griev- ances, except through the provisional government which they had constituted as the " only Organ by which they could hope to preserve the Rights of Ferdinand VII in the province of Venezuela against the Usurpation of France. . . . They further declared, that they pos- sessed no authority to negotiate for any reunion of the Province to the Central authority in Spain; that they were merely the Agents of the Government which had been formed at the Caraccas; and were not authorized further 49 " Memorandum of the Communication between the Marquess Welles- ley and the Commissioners from Venezuela," P. R. O., Foreign Office Cor- respondence, Spain, 106.Spanish-American Diplomacy 245 than to state the sentiments and views of that Government to His Majesty and to receive His Majesty's reply." 69 Two courses were now open to Wellesley, either to allow Venezuela to take her own measures without any interpo- sition by England, or to offer his good offices " for the purpose of preventing common danger to Spain, to South America, and to the Alliance." The marquis chose the latter course. He accordingly requested the envoys to state, " in an unofficial form, the views and objects of that Province, in the Mission, with which they were charged." 51 Bolivar and Mendez then made four pro- posals. First, as Venezuela, " as an integral part of the Spanish Empire," was threatened by France, they asked J:or the maritime protection of England in defending the rights of Ferdinand VII and in completing the " measures of security against the Common Enemy." Second, as the decision of Venezuela might become the cause of " un- pleasant dissentions " with the provinces which had recog- nized the regency, and perhaps with the parent country, l:hey asked " the high Mediation of H. B. Majesty, in order to preserve their relations of peace and friendship with their brethren of both hemispheres." Third, as the maintenance of commercial relations between Venezuela and Spain required some stipulations between the two jjovernments, they wished to make " such stipulations under the Guarantee of H. B. Majesty." Fourth, they wished to have instructions sent to the English naval com- manders in the Antilles so that they might promote the desired ends." " ibid. " " Memorandum of the Communication between the Marquess Welles- ley and the Commissioners from Venezuela," P. R. O., Foreign Office Cor- rtspondence, Spain, 106, A Spanish translation of this memorandum in Velasco y Rojas, marques de, Simdn Bolivar, pp. 26-28, states that the commissioners were asked to state their views " de un modo ©fidos©," which is undoubtedly incorrect. ""Propositions from the Commissioners of Venezuela," July 21, 1810,246 W. S. Robertson i In reply to these requests, Marquis Wellesley assured! the envoys that the naval protection of England would be given to Venezuela to enable her to defend the rights of her " legitimate Sovereign," and to secure herself " against the common Enemy," France. That province, however^ was " earnestly recommended" to seek a reconciliation^ with the government existing in Spain and the good offices of England were offered for that purpose. That nations promised to employ " every effort of friendly interposi- tion " to prevent war between Spain and Venezuela, and to vhen Bolivar embarked for America. One important result of the mission of Bolivar and Mendez was the immediate return of Miranda to his native land. The objects of England in these negotiations, as suggested in drontemporary official notes, were: " that by making a ^killful use of the bond of allegiance to Ferdinand," Eng- land might " prevent a total or sudden separation from Old Spain," might " compel the latter to alter her Colonial system,'' and might " preserve the Colonies from the in- fluence of France." 56 Between the lines of the official memorandum one may indeed read the desire of the Eng- lish to foster their commerce in Spanish America.57 In the opinion of the writer, the English ministers in 1810 were consciously framing a policy which would enable them to develop profitable commercial relations with the Spanish Americans if France should triumph on the Euro- pean continent or if some of the Spanish-American prov- inces should ultimately secede from the mother-country. The English memorandum of these unofficial negotia- tions emphasizes that interpretation of the negotiations which England wished her ally, Spain, to accept. The Spanish minister in London, Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, was 56 The Baltimore American, January 12, 1811, prints, evidently from Caracas papers, a dispatch of Bolivar and Mendez to the government of Venezuela. 66 " Notes on the Caraccas, July, 1810," P. R. 0., Foreign Office Corre- spondence, Spain, 106. *7 See Liverpool to Layard, June 29, 1810, " secret and confidential/' P. R. O., Colonial Office Correspondence, Curaqoa, /; Henry Wellesley to Bardaxi y Azara, December 30, 1811, ibid., Foreign Office Correspond- ence, Spain, 115.248 W. S. Robertson at once furnished by Wellesley with a copy of this memo- randum which was to serve Spain as a guide to the conduct that England proposed to pursue in regard to the revolting colonists.58 It was soon made clear to Spain that, in the case of Venezuela, the English ministers had reached a decision which they would follow in regard to the other Spanish-American colonies. In 18x1 the English am- bassador, Sir Henry Wellesley, was instructed to inform the Spanish government that: " Particular care was taken1 to avoid any direct or formal recognition of the govern-j ments or official authorities constituted in Spanish America 3 nor was any such official communication sanctioned with them, as could be construed into an indirect acknowledg- ment of their legitimacy. . . . The Principles stated with regard to Venezuela were expressly stated to you and to the British authorities in South America to constitute the general rule of conduct which It was intended by Great Britain to observe with respect to every other Province of Spanish America." 69 While England was formulating her policy towards Spanish America, emissaries from the insurgent provinces were trying to elude the royalists who beset them on the way to the goal of their highest hopes in North America. The first commissioners formally appointed to the United States from Venezuela were Juan Vicente Bolivar, an obscure relative of Simon Bolivar, and Telesforo de Orea, whose biography has yet to be written. Like the agents 88 " Memorandum of the Communications between the Marquess Welles- ley and the Commissioners from Venezuela," bears the indorsement: " Memorandum presented to the Commissioners from Caraccas and to the Spanish minister, August 9th, 1810," ibid106. *• Marquis Wellesley to Henry Wellesley, May 4, 1811, P. R. O., Original Correspondence, War Office, 45, For other accounts of the mission of Bolivar and Mendez cf. Becerra, R., Ensayo historic0 docu- mentado de la