THE TREATY with TURKEY
Why It Should Be Ratified
Council on Turkish-American Relations 111 Broadway, New YorkCouncil on Turkish'American Relations
(Incorporated)
“To promote better understanding between the people of Turkey and the people of the United States”
RAYFORD W. ALLEY, President
PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN, Vice-President
MARY MILLS PATRICK, Vice-President
I. SEFA BEY, Secretary
JAMES W. DeGRAFF, Treasurer
ASA K. JENNINGS, Representative in Turkey
ADVISORY BOARD
GEORGE A. PLIMPTON, Chairman
RAYFORD W. ALLEY HORACE D. ASHTON NEAL DOW BECKER FLORENCE BILLINGS PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN JOHN KINGSLEY BIRGE JOHN CARTER STUART CHEVALIER JAMES W. DeGRAFF STEPHEN P. DUGGAN RICHARD EATON E. B. FILSINGER CHARLES P. FAGNANI LOUIS W. FROELICK IRVING C. GARY
GILSON GARDNER ENOS THROOP GEER MARGUERITE E. HARRISON JOHN HAYNES HOLMES ELOISE P. HUGUENIN ELLEN N. LaMOTTE WILLIAM McFEE ARTHUR NASH ROSE STANDISH NICHOLS MARY MILLS PATRICK THOMAS C. PERKINS ALMA M. S. REED FRANCIS SNOW OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD BARTON WILSON
“The Council on Turkish-American Relations, composed of friends of both America and Turkey, earnestly hopes for the speedy ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, in order that the relations of the two countries may be placed on a sound footing of mutual respect and confidence, and deplores the attempt to embitter these relations and to impede the work of consolidation and civilization in The Turkish Republic”
(Resolution adopted by the Council on Turkish-American Relations, May 6, 1926.)The Treaty With Turkey
Why It Should Be Ratified
Council on Turkish-American Relations 111 Broadway, New YorkANGORA
By John H. Finley
“A giant crag upon a gleaming plain,
A gem once coveted by Tamerlane,
Now comes into a world of renown;
Set in a mountain rim of amethysts When seen through summer sunset mists— Earth’s newest democratic crown.”
Copyright, 1926, by Council on Turkish-American RelationsFOREWORD
7 9 U
Ci j s'
So much has been said and written about Turkey and the Treaty of Lausanne that it would be superfluous to say anything more if so much had not been said and written in error, nor would the error have serious consequences if it had not occurred in high places and been uttered by persons of great moral influence.
To correct this error, we have collected in this book the statements of the educational, philanthropic and commercial bodies which, by reason of their interests in Turkey and their intimate and long standing acquanitance with conditions there, are qualified to speak with authority, and also the statements of well known individuals who have carefully studied the question and are familiar with conditions in the Turkey of today.
Dr. Mary Mills Patrick, President Emeritus of Constantinople Woman's College, in a letter which I received on June 5, sums up the changes that have taken place in Turkey:
“In no country in the world have so many sudden changes taken place as in Turkey, during the last few years. These changes are all such as tend to bring the nation into line with modern civilization and to introduce Western customs.
“The greatest change of all was the first one—separation of Church and State—for to the Moslem of olden days, his religion and his nationality were synonomous. Then followed the dismissal of the Caliph and the abolishing of a state religion and its outward machinery, which included the treasury of holy funds, the religious court, and the schools for training an immense body of officials. All these things are now under control of the civil law, as in other lands, and priests are educated for the mosques in the Theological Department of the Turkish University.
“Co-education has been adopted, and general educational methods have been vastly improved. Men and women now study together in the different departments of the university, and women doctors and lawyers are recognized by the government. The first woman doctor thus honored was Dr. Safie Ali, a graduate of Constantinople Woman’s College, an institution which has been a pioneer in teaching equality of rights.
“The New Turkish Republic, having abolished the religious courts, was not satisfied with the existing condition of the civil law. What did it do ? It sought for the most up-to-date social code in the world, and quite recently the Swiss Civil Code was adopted by the Grand National Assembly, without a dissenting vote. Polygamy is abolished, seclusion in the harem is a thing of long ago, divorce is a matter for the courts to settle, laws of inheritance are equal for both sexes. Among the peasants, old men and women are learning to read.
“The drastic changes, by constitutional means, in customs which have so long existed in Turkey demonstrate one of the most peaceful revolutions in history and one which justifies confidence in the New Turkish Republic. Thus a new spirit is abroad in the land and Turkey will be made a country in which a homogeneous population may dwell together in loyalty and peace.”
The Council On Turkish-American Relations believes that the ratification of the Treaty with Turkey will have a favorable and lasting effect upon our relations not only with Turkey but with all Near Eastern peoples. The world is watching our foreign policy. If we fail to
3Fogeword
ratify this Treaty because of misinformation or race or religious prejudice, our leadership in world affairs will be jeopardized.
We hope that the statements brought together here, setting forth the reasons why the Treaty should be ratified, will help the Senate and the public by throwing more light on a difficult situation, in which one Senator has declared that he is “between the Devil and the deep seaT
Rayford W. Alley, President, Council On Turkish-American Relations. Beechmere, Malverne, Long Island.
June 7, 1926.
4CONTENTS
Foreword...............................................Rayford W. Alley
President, Council on Turkish-American Relations
The New Turkey.........................................George A. Plimpton
Trustee, Constantinople Women’s College
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE TREATY
Recent Questions and Negotiations......................Charles E. Hughes
Former Secretary of State
The Lausanne Conference..........................Richard Washburn Child
Representative) of the United States at Lausanne
Americans in Turkey Want the Treaty Ratified
Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol
United States High Commissioner to Turkey
THE CHURCH AND THE TREATY
Action of Council on International Relations
Congregational National Council
Action of the Prudential Committee of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.......................................
Should the United States Ratify the Lausanne Treaty/*
James L. Barton
Secretary, Foreign Department, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions
The Young Men’s Christian Association in Turkey..............D. A. Davis
Administrative Secretary, European Area, Young Men’s Christian Association
Asa K. Jennings
Former Foreign Secretary, International Committee, Young Men’s Christian Association
• Elbert Crandall Stevens
Executive Secretary, Stamboul Branch in Turkey, Young Men’s Christian Association
The Christian Attitude Toward Turkey. ...Hester Donaldson Jenkins
American College for Girls, Constantinople
Reply to Bishop Manning................................William E. Borah
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs
Philip Marshall Brown
Professor of International Law, Princeton University
Guy Emery Shipler
Editor, The Churchman
Charles C. Cozvell
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE TREATY
Rejection Would Cause III Will and Menace Our Interests
Caleb F. Gates
Président, Robert College, Constantinople
Should the United States Ratify the Lausanne Treaty/*
Albert Staub
American Director, Near Eastern Colleges
Turkey Keen to Aid American Scfiools.............Mrs. George Huntington
Robert College, Constantinople
3
7
9
16
19
20
22
23
28
29
30
32
35
38
39
42
45
48
51
5Contents—Continued
BUSINESS AND THE TREATY
Resolutions and Letters to the Senate
Chamber of Commerce of the United States 52
Report of Committee on Foreign Affairs
Chamber of Commerce of the United States 54
Commerce and Industry in Turkey
Research Department, Foreign Policy Association 63
The Turkish Republic—1925. A Survey of Industrial Resources
Elbert Crandall Stevens 66
Memorial to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
American Mens and Womens Clubs of Constantinople 70
SOCIAL REFORMS IN TURKEY
New Turkey Looks to American Aid............John H. Finley 75
*	Of The Neiv York Times
New Judicial Era Dawns in Turkey
{From c‘The New York Times A Jan. 17, 1926)	78
Report of Committee on the Lausanne Treaty to the
Foreign Policy Association
Reply to David Hunter Miller................Rayford W. Alley
Reply to David Hunter Miller.....................John Carter
Armenia—A Lost Cause.....................E. Alexander Powell
Some Truths About the Turks..............E. Alexander Powell
Ratification the Truest Friendship We Can Show the Armenians
Nathaniel Peffer
Reply to the Committee Opposed to Ratification..William T. Ellis
Mustapha Kemal: Incarnation of New Turkey. .. .Lothrop Stoddard The Capitulations...............'...............Ibrahim Sefa Bey
The Lausanne Treaty—Should the United States Ratify It?
Edward Mead Earle
Friendship for Turkey.....................Nicholas Murray Butler
APPENDIX
Summary of Arguments for Ratification........................
Official Summary of the Treaty...............................
How the Treaty Was Negotiated................................
Compulsory Exchange of Populations Between Greece and Turkey
The New Constitution of Turkey...............................
Bibliography ................................................
81
102
105
107
115
120
126
129
135
139
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149
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153
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6THE NEW TURKEY
By GEORGE A. PLIMPTON
(iFront an Address before the Institute of Politics, at Williamstoivn, August, 1925)
At the Treaty of Sèvres, following the World War, it looked as though the end of Turkey as a power had come. Her European territory had been almost entirely taken away from her, and Anatolia had been divided up into mandates. The City of Constantinople itself, with further land extending all the way to Gallipoli, on both the European and Asiatic shores, had been made a neutral zone. Turkey had been thrust back into Asia. But one thing the Allies had failed to conquer, and that was the national spirit of the Turks. In January, 1921, Turkey became a republic, with a National Assembly, and established its Government at Angora, far away from the seacoast. Mustapha Kemal Pasha, who had been commander at Gallipoli, was made President of the Assembly.
The capture of Smyrna by the Greeks and their entrance into Anatolia caused this national spirit to be rekindled into life and made it so powerful that the Turks drove the Greeks back, captured not only Smyrna but Constantinople, and were then able to dictate terms to the Allies at Lausanne. To the rest of the world this appeared positively miraculous. Only a few years before the Turks had seemed hopelessly defeated, yet they secured their independence of the Allies and their right to self-government, free of foreign control.
What is the present condition of affairs in Turkey?
First—She is now a homogeneous nation, but to achieve this homogeneity it was necessary for her to drive out the Armenians and the Greeks. These alien people were largely merchants, business men and heavy taxpayers, but their presence in Turkey meant constant wars. Their expulsion cost great suffering to them f and involved financial sacrifice to Turkey herself. Whether it was right or wrong for Turkey to drive out the Armenians and Greeks is not for us to decide, but it is a fact that it has been done and that peace now reigns within her borders.
Second—On March 2, 1924, Turkey separated Church and State. The Sultan had always been the head not only of the State, but of the Mohammedan Church. One familiar with Mohammedan countries is amazed that this separation could have been effected, but it certainly meant modernizing Turkey and bringing her into accordance with the customs of Western Europe.
Third—She has introduced a universal system of education. With unusual enterprise she has established an Agricultural School at Angora, with European instructors, and every part of Turkey is represented by students. One law exists for all educational insti-
7The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
tutions, whether Turkish or American, and all are subject to the same treatment.
Fourth—Every nation must stand for itself; We believe in America for the Americans, why not Turkey for the Turks? For the last hundred years Turkey has been the football, so to speak, of Russia, Great Britain and the other European powers. Those who are now in control are inexperienced in administration, and they naturally make some mistakes, but they are full of patriotic zeal and are correcting their mistakes as rapidly as possible. If, as Americans, we believe that every nation should work out its own salvation, who is there among us who will not rejoice in the achievement of this vigorous people and hold out a helping hand?
Fifth—A treaty between the United States and Turkey—the Treaty of Lausanne—is now awaiting ratification by the Senate. Every other important country has ratified a similar treaty. Why should we longer delay ? If our people knew what she had already accomplished in the face of tremendous odds, would they not insist that we join with the rest of the civilized world in establishing fraternal relations with Turkey and in thus wishing godspeed to the youthful republic ?RECENT QUESTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS
An Address Before the Council on Foreign Relations, January 23, 1924
By HONORABLE CHARLES E. HUGHES
(From “Foreign AffairsSupplement to Vol. II, No. 2.)
(Copyright, 1924, by Foreign Affairs.)
Let me now direct your attention to affairs in the Near East. The events of the past few years have created a new situation, and the difficulty in clarifying present problems is largely due to the fact that so many of our people discuss them in terms which belong to the past. While there was some consideration of Turkish questions in 1919, and certain inquiries were prosecuted, it was not until 1920, after the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties had been disposed of, that the Allies definitely took up the Turkish treaty. This treaty, called the treaty of Sèvres, was signed in August of that year. Its terms were severer than those of the European peace treaties, not only depriving the Turks of vast territories but imposing upon them an even greater measure of foreign control than had been the case before the war. In spite, however, of the Allied occupation of Constantinople, the Greek occupation of Smyrna and its hinterland, and the French occupation of Cilicia, the Turks refused to ratify the treaty. The Allies were not in a position to compel them to do so.
As one of the results of the Great War, a new spirit of nationalism and a desire for freedom from outside control had made itself felt in the Near East. Nowhere had the evangel of self-determination found a more eager response. The nationalistic movment was particularly significant in Turkey. That this movement had often been accompanied by violence is not to be wondered at, although it is none the less to be regretted. The outcome of the movement in Turkey was the establishment of a government which claimed the right to be dealt with as sovereign and which by its military achievements made good that claim.
As early as January, 1920, the so-called Turkish National Pact had been voted by the Ottoman Parliament which was then assembled at Constantinople. This pact set forth the aspirations of the Turks and later was adopted by the National Assembly at Angora as summarizing the object of the Turkish Nationalist movement. Among its provisions was the following :
Article VI. “It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration.
9The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
“For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial, and other matters.”
In March, 1921, the Allied Powers clearly appreciated that it would be impossible, short of armed allied military intervention in Turkey, to impose the treaty of Sèvres. It would seem that at no time was such armed allied intervention seriously considered, although from time to time certain of the Allied Powers gave a measure of support to the Greek forces in the hope that the latter would be able, through their victory over the Turks, to make possible the realization of the Sèvres treaty at least in part. There were unsuccessful attempts to revise the treaty. At last the total defeat of the Greek forces and the withdrawal of the Greek army from Anatolia completely changed the situation to the advantage of Turkey and effected the elimination of the treaty of Sèvres as a basis for negotiation. A victorious Turkish army being in complete control of Anatolia and threatening Constantinople, the Allied Powers intervened to bring about an armistice between Greece and Turkey which was signed at Mudania in October, 1922. The Lausanne conferences of 1922 and 1923 followed.
The Allies frankly recognized that the situation of 1918 no longer existed and that after the stubborn resistance of the Turks, culminating in their recapture of Smyrna, it was impossible to dictate the terms of peace. A treaty was therefore negotiated in which the Turks ceded very considerable territories and for the first time in their history agreed to open the Straits not only to merchant ships but to foreign warships, but in which the Allies, on the other hand, agreed to renounce their historic capitulatory rights in Turkey.
In 1919 and 1920 the question was directly presented to the Government of the United States as to the nature and extent of its participation in the political and territorial readjustments of the Near East. At that time the spokesmen for the Allied Powers at Paris suggested that the United States assume a mandate for Constantinople and Armenia. The former proposal was never presented for the consideration of the Congress, as it was clear as early as 1919 that the American people would not favor the assumption of a mandate over Constantinpole, which would immediately and directly involve this Government in one of the most vexing political and territorial problems of the world—the storm center of historic rivalries and bitter contests.
When the question of an Armenian mandate was formally presented in 1920 as a result of the action of the Allied representatives meeting at San Remo, the Congress declined to sanction it. It thus again became apparent that the United States Government was not prepared- to intervene in Near Eastern affairs to the extent of assuming any obligations of a territorial character. This course was in accord with our traditional policy. The United States had taken no part in the Turkish settlements which were embodied in the
10Charles E. Hughes
treaties of Paris in 1856, of Berlin in 1878, or in those which followed the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Even during the World War we did not declare war on Turkey or take the initiative in breaking relations with that country, notwithstanding the serious provocation, from a humanitarian standpoint, of the extensive Armenian deportations. Presumably it was felt that the policy then adopted was better calculated to enable the United States to exert its influence and to protect its interests so long as this country was not to join the military operations on the Near Eastern front.
If there ever was a time when we could have successfully intervened and have backed up our intervention by armed forces, it was early in 1919 when we had a large army abroad and were in a position to prosecute such a policy if deemed advisable. But this opportunity passed. It should be added that, contrary to an impression which is somewhat widespread in this country, this government, while it has always exerted its influence in a humanitarian way, has not assumed political obligations with respect to the Armenians or other Christian minorities in the Near East. Treaties concluded by other powers undertook, however, to deal with such questions. This Government took no part in the negotiation of the treaty of Sèvres.
Such, then, was the situation prior to the year 1921. In developing our relations with the Near East subsequently, it was necessary to take into account the established policy of the Government and at the same time to serve American interests and humanitarian ends. It should also be remembered that a large part of the distress in the Near East has been caused by encouraging action which failed of adequate support. At various times the Armenians and Greeks have been encouraged to take up arms, later to be left to their own devices. This Government, however, would not be justified in promoting such a policy on the part of others which it was not prepared itself adequately to sustain. It has no mandate from the people to intervene by arms and thus to impose by force a solution of the problems of the Near East. And, for this very reason, it could not essay the rôle of a dictator in order to determine how others should solve these problems.
This, however, did not prevent this country from cooperating in a spirit of helpfulness and from bringing, as it has brought, its moral influence to aid in dealing with a situation of the utmost difficulty. This influence was brought to bear at the Lausanne Conference, where the efforts of the American representatives undoubtedly contributed in no small degree to the final agreement upon provisions regarding the protection of minorities, the recognition of charitable, educational, and philanthropic institutions, the appointment of judicial advisers and the maintenance of equality of opportunity. As I have said, a state of war had not existed between the United States and Turkey, and the course of events following the German War had reaffirmed the historic policy of refraining from
11The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
intervention in political and territorial readjustments. Turkey had severed diplomatic relations with us in 1917, however, and these had not been resumed. But the formal conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey, entailing as it would the resumption of full diplomatic and consular relations, would leave the United States, unless appropriate action were taken, in a relatively disadvantageous position. Accordingly, negotiations were undertaken between American and Turkish representatives which resulted in the treaty of amity and commerce and the extradition treaty signed on August 6 last.
The treaty of amity and commerce followed very closely the Allied treaty without its territorial, political, and financial features. The United States gained the same general rights and privileges as the Allies, including the freedom of the Straits, and like the Allies consented to the abrogation of the capitulations, that is, of the exercise of the ex-territorial rights in Turkey which the Turks regarded as in derogation of their sovereignty.
In making this important decision the American representatives were obliged to take account of the following considerations. It was quite apparent that the only basis upon which negotiations could be conducted was that of most-favored-nation treatment and reciprocity. Either the Turks were to be dealt with on this footing or not at all. In these circumstances three courses were open to us: (1) To compel the Turks by force to give us better terms than the Allies; (2) not to negotiate at all; or (3) to negotiate with the Turks on equal terms as with a State enjoying an unqualified sovereignty.
The first course was out of the question. However desirable the maintenance of ex-territorial rights hitherto enjoyed might be, it was obvious that the public opinion of this country would not countenance a war for the purpose of maintaining them. Neither did it appear to be practicable to forego negotiations, in an attempt to maintain the status quo. After the armistice of 1918, we sent to Constantinople a high commissioner, with a naval detachment under his command, and in spite of his unofficial status in relation to the Turkish authorities he has succeeded in affording American interests appropriate protection. But this anomalous situation could not continue indefinitely. When the treaty of peace between the Allies and Turkey comes into effect, the diplomatic and consular officials of the Allied Powers return to Turkey, we should find ourselves in an extremely difficult position if action meanwhile had not been taken to regularize our own position, and in the absence of a treaty American interests in Turkey would be without adequate safeguards. In this event, the humanitarian interests which are closest to the American heart would suffer. It was also perfectly clear that no period of waiting would avail to secure for us ex-territorial rights which on their part the Allies surrendered.
In these circumstances, the only practicable course was to ne-
12Charles E. Hughes
gotiate a treaty as with a fully sovereign state. If such a treaty falls short of expectations, especially in that it acquiesces in the abrogation of the capitulations, it should not be forgotten that the only way to maintain the capitulations was to fight for them. It should also be borne in mind (1) that the Lausanne treaty is such a treaty as would be negotiated with any other sovereign state, (2) that it gives us the same rights as other countries will enjoy under the new régime, and (3) that by regularizing our relations with Turkey, now interrupted for nearly seven years, • it will provide safeguards for American educational, philanthropic, and commercial interests in Turkey.
Let me emphasize a further point. At no stage in the negotiations was the American position determined by the so-called Chester concession. This had been granted before negotiations of our treaty with Turkey had been begun. This Government took no part in securing it ; this Government made no barter of any of its rights for this or any other concession. Our position is a simple one. We maintain the policy of the open door or equality of commercial opportunity ; we demand a square deal for our nationals. We objected to the alleged concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company owned by foreign interests because it had never been validly granted, and in so doing we stood for American rights generally and not for any particular interest. Opening the door for American nationals, we give them impartial and appropriate diplomatic support in the assertion of what appear to be their legal rights, but without otherwise involving this Government.
During the course of our recent negotiations, the Department of State was in frequent consultation with those whose interests in Turkey it is its privilege and duty properly to protect, particularly those whose humanitarian enterprises have long been established. They have clearly indicated their accord with the position that the present situation in Turkey should be frankly faced and that the Turkish authorities should have an opportunity to show that their expressed desire for American friendship and help and their willingness to protect American interests are sincere. It is on, this basis that our policy towards Turkey is being developed. Let it be understood that Turkey, while insistent upon unqualified sovereign rights, does not reject the international obligations which are correlative to such rights. Let it also be appreciated that Turkey is not endeavoring to undermine our institutions, to penetrate our labor organizations by pernicious propaganda, and to foment disorder and conspiracies against our domestic peace in the interest of a, zoo rid revolution.
No one is more competent to speak on the subject of the treaty than Dr. James L. Barton, secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Permit me to quote from his recent letter (November 24, 1923) :
“To say that I have followed with keen interest the making of this treaty and its fate up to the present time is to express but
13The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
mildly my own feeling as well as the feeling of the American board and its friends. While the treaty does not contain all that we would like, yet I am sure I express the judgment of the officers of the American board and, so far as I know, the missionaries both on the field and here at home when I say that it is our earnest hope that the treaty will be ratified by the Senate and that without acrimonious debate. We are convinced that this is the best treaty that could be secured under the circumstances, but that it will furnish a basis for negotiations and for securing privileges not covered in the treaty.
“If the treaty should be rejected, I am convinced that the continuance of American institutions in Turkey, with their large invested interests, would be jeopardized. Under the treaty there are grounds for believing that they will be permitted to continue. I refer to educational, religious, medical, industrial, and philanthropic enterprises hitherto carried on by Americans, representing large American investments in Turkey. There are indications that the government will look with increasing favor upon the continuation of these institutions and grant them enlarging privileges. This has already taken place in Smyrna, Tarsus, and at some other points/'
Let me add to this the statement of the distinguished educator, Dr. Caleb F. Gates, president of Robert College of Constantinople. After referring to the views of objectors, he says:
“Let us ask for a moment why it is that we have not made a treaty more in conformity with the wishes of so many of the American people. Is it because the American representatives were not skillful and allowed themselves to be outwitted by the Turks? The American representatives acquitted themselves exceedingly well; they gained the respect of their opponents as well as of the representatives of the Allied Powers. They came out of the conference with a reputation enhanced by the ability and fairness they had shown, and they gained for their country fully as much as the representatives of the Allied Powers gained for theirs. *	*	* The
Turks were determined to become sovereign in their own domain, and they were willing and prepared to fight in order to obtain this sovereignty while the Allies were not. Even those Americans who now denounce this treaty as unsatisfactory were determined that their country should not go to war over these questions. * * * It is the only kind of a treaty which could have been made under the circumstances, when one party knew exactly what they wanted and were ready to fight to obtain it, and the other party was not willing to fight, but still wished to retain the former conditions. * * * As to the treaty itself, what does it give to us? It gives the good will of the Turks instead of their ill will. That is certainly worth something to all who live and work in Turkey* To them the treaty affords an opportunity to work out the problems which their life in Turkey presents and to exercise what influence they may possess in favor of the right. It still leaves an opportunity for missionaries
14Charles E. Hughes
and educators to try to make the principles of righteousness known and practiced in Turkey and it gives to business men a field for their legitimate activities. * * * The schools and colleges established by Americans are carrying on their work and many of those that had been closed are reopening.”
In conclusion, I may say that the new spirit of the Near East must be met sympathetically, not by arms, not by attempts at dictatorship or by meddlesome interventions, but by candor, directness, and just appreciation of nationalistic aims and by a firm but friendly insistence upon the discharge of those international obligations, the recognition of which affords the only satisfactory basis for the intercourse of nations. In this way the Orient and Occident may find ground for cooperation and for the maintenance of peace sustained by the reciprocal advantages of cultural relations.
15THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE
By RICHARD WASHBURN CHILD
United States Ambassador to Italy and Special Representative at the First Session of the Lausanne Conference
(From an Address before The Council on Turkish American-Relations,	*
at New York, May 12, 1925)
During those thirteen weeks in which the foundation of the treaty was laid, I had a great deal to do with the Turkish delegation. Let me say right here that no member of the Turkish delegation ever stated to me an intention which they did not carry out. That is more than I can say of some others. I think Ismet Pasha is unequalled by anybody that I ever came in contact with as a battler. Toward the end of the first session, when the principal delegates were present and Lord Curzon was present, fortunately, because the United States had somewhat of a detached position, my room was the only means by which the two could come together. That came about from our isolation.
One evening, when things were looking pretty black and it looked as if the conference was going to blow up, Ismet Pasha came down to hear Lord Curzon, of whom I was very fond, give him a lecture on the subject of capitulations. Lord Curzon was a master of oral English, but on this occasion he outdid himself. I have never heard a better advocate, or one who was provided with a better prepared forensic statement. He talked in my study for an hour. He went into the capitulations historically and ended up with the last outrage upon a British lieutenant or somebody in Constantinople. It was a gorgeous performance, and he had evidently put a great deal of preparation into it, and all the time he wa§ speaking Ismet Pasha looked at him with great earnestness, apparently absorbing all the things that he was saying. There was an interpreter present who was interpreting what Lord Curzon was saying. When Curzon was through, Ismet Pasha said, “Your Lord-ship, I am a Turkish general, and I have not been outside of my own country to any great extent and, naturally, I am not skilled in diplomatic affairs as you are. I wonder if you will not repeat what you said.”
Now let us.be businesslike about this: The Allies came together and made a treaty with Turkey—a peace treaty. Since we have never declared war on Turkey it was difficult for us to make a peace treaty and, although I was an observer, I was a full delegate in every sense of the word, except that I was not able to make a treaty of peace with a country with which we were not at war. The Allies could not be interrupted in their business of making a peace treaty. I could not rise in the conference and say, "I object to this treaty of peace and its terms/' unless there was something in it
16Richard Washburn Child
which I found offended the rights of the United States or the rights of humanity, and I did that sometimes. When the treaty of peace was made it was perfectly impossible/and it is now impossible for us to expect better terms than the Allies procured. If the Allies were not in unity in dealing with the Turks, that may be our misfortune, but the result on the whole, I think, was a pretty good result.
From the very beginning it seemed to me that, although the Turks may have been unreasonable, on the whole their purposes, their inspiration, the things they were striving for, were admirable.
Here was a nation which during that conference turned toward the United States time and time again, and some of the attaches of the delegation said to me, “Oh, yes, we have a muddy capital, but we understand that Washington was very muddy when it became the capital of the United States; yes, we have a desire for independence and we understand that the United States had it; yes, we know that there is a great deal of clamor in the United States for a National Armenian Home, and when you are ready to set aside the State of Pennsylvania-for the North American Indians we will meet you with that.”
As to the capitulations, I felt from almost the very beginning that, although we could not do anything about it, and it was a very embarrassing situation, nevertheless, capitulations would have to go, and behind that judgment there was the whole picture of years and years of a judicial ingress in the life óf the Turkish nation and of an old worn-out system which came from the days when Venice and Genoa were loaning money to Turkey, and as a consequence of which, up to the present, a territory in a very delicate part of the world found itself, because of the capitulations, open to all kinds of intrigue.
The capitulations were the basis of foreign interference in Turkey. I thought, and I think now, that the world is better because they got rid of them. There were days when I could not say so very strongly, but I felt it. It is a bad thing to have a dangerous corner of the world a place for international log-rolling and, of course, in the next few months, between this time and the time that Congress may take up this question, if you talk to anybody about the subject, let all of us say in our own way what I have just said, that it is a good thing for the world in general that the doorway of intrigue has been closed.
Of course, there will be those who say, “What is the advantage to us of making this treaty?” I speak of this because Senators have asked me what would be the advantage to us. Well, I think it is true that all the business, the religious, educational and social interests that are in Constantinople—and I was in Constantinople only three or four months ago—I think they are all solidly back of the ratification of the treaty, and I think that is something that ought to be told to everyone who wants to talk with you about the treaty.
17The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
Finally, let me point out to you that we had two pretty large and important by-products in dealing with the Turks. One of them was the freedom of the Black Sea, as I choose to call it, and in that fight between Russia and the Allies as to whether the Black Sea should be a Russian lake or should be free to the commerce of the world, it was the United States that settled the matter. It was a real game, and I assume when Turkey made answer and responded to our urgings, that Turkey expected that we were going to make a treaty with her of some kind later on.
The second thing of great importance as a by-product was the extension of the open-door policy in the Near East. We, at least, got in that first conference a record—the British and French are on record in favor of an open-door policy—and that amounts to an agreement for the open-door in the Near East.
After all, the negotiations at Lausanne, so far as the United States is concerned, if they are approved by the ratification of the treaty, express a rather simple foreign policy. It is so simple that when I hear people say that the United States has no foreign policy, I like to tell them about it: We should steal nothing from others and others should' steal nothing from us; we do not like others who steal from others.
18AMERICANS IN TURKEY WANT TREATY RATIFIED
By REAR ADMIRAL MARK L. BRISTOL United States High Commissioner to Turkey
(From a Statement to the Press on Admiral Bristol's Return in 1925 After Seven Years' Absence as United States High Commissioner at Constantinople)
Every country in Europe and Asia has made treaties with Turkey except China, Siam, Serbia and Bulgaria. Bulgaria is now negotiating a treaty. Nearly all these countries have resumed regular diplomatic relations and the remainder are doing so as rapidly as it is practicable for the respective diplomatic representatives to present their credentials. The United States signed a treaty with Turkey Aug. 6, 1923, but it has not been ratified by the United States Senate or by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.
The Americans in Turkey, who are engaged in business, in operating schools, in rendering relief to suffering humanity and in philanthropic and missionary work, are desirous of having the treaty between America and Turkey ratified and regular diplomatic relations re-established. Our Americans, as well as all other nationals, are having sotne difficulties in adjusting affairs to the new régime in Turkey. However, they believe regular relations, with definite treaty provisions, will render all adjustments easier.
The new régime in Turkey is a most remarkable evidence of a revolution in form and administration of a Government. Briefly, an absolute monarchy has been replaced by a republic. Church has been separated from State and religions eliminated from all law codes. Religion of any kind may be taught in the churches and mosques, but ncft in the schools. All persons born in Turkey, without regard to race, religion or nationality, have all rights of Turkish citizenship. The Turkish leaders, without previous experience, must evolve the new administration. There are bound to be mistakes and the evolution will be slow, but there are many evidences of progress.
19The CONGREGATIONAL NATIONAL COUNCIL
Action of the Commission on International Relations
[Editor’s Note.—Of the 127 missionaries in Turkey in Asia 119 are American. Of 'these 114 are Congregational, 1 Presbyterian, 3 Presbyterian Reformed and 1 Apostolic Institute. The other 8 are from religious bodies in The Netherlands.
Of the 138 missionaries in Turkey in Europe 134 are American and 4 are British. Of the 134 American missionaries, 29 are Congregational, 38 are connected with the American College for Girls in Constantinople, 54 with Robert College, 8 are Y. W. C. A. representatives, 2 from the American Bible Society and 3 Seventh Day Adventists.
There are no Episcopal missionaries in Turkey in Europe or Turkey in Asia. The great majority of all missions are those of the Congregational Church, which is therefore in a position to be well informed as to the conditions in Turkey.]
The Commission on International Relations of the Congregational National Council of the United States at a meeting held in New York on the afternoon of April 12, voted unanimously in favor of the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey now before the United States Senate. It was also voted that this action be issued over the names of the chairman of the Commission on International Relations, Rev. J. Percival Huget, D.D., of Brooklyn; the moderator of the National Council, Mr. Frank J. Harwood of Appleton, Wisconsin; and the executive secretary of the National Council of the Congregational Churches of the United States of America, Rev. Charles Emerson Burton, D.D., all of whom were present at the meeting.
This action was taken under the conviction and with the knowledge that the missionary, educational, and philanthropic interests of the Congregational Churches of the United States covering more than a century of sacrificial interests in Turkey and including millions of dollars of investments will be best safeguarded by ratification and that those interests will be endangered, if not sacrificed, if the treaty is rejected. All of the Congregational missionaries, educators, doctors and philanthropic workers' in Turkey without exception strongly urge ratification.
The Commission is convinced that the opponents of ratification should propose something in place of this treaty which will afford protection to American interests, a favor which they consistently decline to do.
The Commission is convinced that the speedy ratification of this treaty will put all American interests in the country upon a par with the interests of the nationals of the European states which have all ratified similar treaties; will afford the Armenians now in the country the fullest protection that is is possible for America to give ; will permit the United States at once to place an ambassador in Constantinople to represent American interests in commercial, educational, religious and humanitarian matters, and will at once put the United
20The Congregational National Council
States in a position to begin the negotiations of other treaties supplementing what may be lacking in this one.
The Commission is convinced that as Turkey has already become a sovereign state, has adopted as its civil code the civil code of Switzerland, has demonstrated to the world its purpose to conform its national procedure to harmonize with the nations of the West, it is not only the duty but also the privilege of the United States to help make Turkey a worthy member of the family of nations.
The Commission realizes that Turkey is not a Christian nation, but that fact did not prevent the United States from negotiating and ratifying treaties with Japan, China, Siam, and other non-Christian countries with the full approval of the Christian people of America. It believes that wrongs that may still exist in Turkey can be best righted not by wholesale condemnation and abuse but by revealing the Christian willingness to help correct the wrongs of the past and to aid in rightly shaping the future. This, in the judgment of the Commission, can best be done by the speedy ratification of the treaty wilh Turkey now before the Senate.
21AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS
The Prudential Committee of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions at its meeting in Boston on June 8, 1926. took definite and unequivocal action in favor of the ratification by the United States Senate of the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey. The American Board is the one American church organization having definite and tangible interests in Turkey. Its missionaries have been working there for over one hundred years and have proven their devotion to the best interests of Turkey and its people, of all races and faiths, by the most unremitting and self-sacrificing labor.
The action taken by the Prudential Committee in regard to the treaty is in accordance with the unanimous sentiment of all those now representing the Board in Turkey. They are strongly convinced that their work, both for the Turks themselves and for the minority populations, will be seriously endangered if the Lausanne Treaty is not ratified. Even the Armenians in Turkey and many of those in Europe agree that the ratification of the treaty, by making possible the exercise of the friendly interest of American diplomats, would afford them the maximum of assistance in the case of any emergency.
The resolution as adopted read as follows:
•RESOLVED, That the Prudential Committee of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions earnestly urges upon the members of the United States Senate immediate and favorable action upon the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey, now pending before that body.
This action of the Committee is based upon the following convictions :
1.	That the ratification of the treaty will open the door to the most effective service by American institutions and missionaries in behalf not only of the Turks but also of the minority populations.
2.	That there is no reason to believe that for an indefinite period if this treaty fails of ratification, another equally satisfactory can be negotiated.
3.	That the ratification of the treaty in no way implies the sanction of regrettable past actions by the Turkish government.
22THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CONGREGATIONAL CHURCHES
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Rev. J. Percival Huget, Chairman
To the Members of the Senate:
In the interest of the ratification of the Lausanne treaty with Turkey, may I be permitted to call your attention again to the definite and formal action taken by our Congregational Commission on International Relations, a copy of which action is enclosed. The Commission speaks for the great Congregational body in the United States which through its foreign missionary agency, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, has carried on missionary, educational, medical and literary work in Turkey since 1820. The Board has been the chief missionary organization operating in Turkey for more than a century. Its missionaries have established churches across the country, built notable modern educational institutions, and erected great hospitals through which modern medicine and surgery were introduced into the country. These institutions and this self-sacrificing work have cost Americans many millions of dollars and many devoted lives.
When the great war broke out and the American missionaries were advised to leave, they refused to do so on the ground that the people would need them more in the stress, strain and trials of war than in times of peace. They remained and cared for the suffering and ministered to the needs of the children throughout the entire period of the war. Many of them followed the refugees into Russia. Syria and Greece and today are there ministering to their needs. Others remained in Turkey and are there continuing their work of education and mercy. They are permitted to remain because of the confidence imposed in them by the officials and the people, that their only purpose is to help the people to a better way of living. Their institutions are in operation. Their relations to the Turkish government and to the people are friendly.
The continuance of this state of affairs depends upon the ratification of the treaty with Turkey which was signed at Lausanne. The Turkish government, we are informed by our missionaries, desires to be friendly and to co-operate with all American interests in the country, but there is no knowing how long this attitude will persist if the United States Senate long defers or rejects the ratification of the treaty.
Many of the American missionary educators and doctors in Turkey have lived for decades in the country. They know the history of the past, the conditions of the present and the needs of the future. They are agreed that the treaty should be speedily ratified for the
22aNational Congregational Council
highest benefit of all the interests involved, and this includes not only the educational and philanthropic interests but also the interests of the minority populations still in the country. These missionaries are not fanatics. They are the product of the best educational institutions of the world. They speak with knowledge. In the face of these facts fanatical prejudice and impractical idealism should give way.
Ratification and the placing of an ambassador in Constantinople will materially aid the success of all American interests in the country ; its rejection may result in irreparable loss. Restored diplomatic relations with Turkey will open the door for entering upon a new era of understanding and constructive co-operation with Turkey, and all in the interest of a n'ew order which Turkey is endeavoring to inaugurate.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed by) J. Percival Huget.
22bTHE MISSIONARIES AND THE TREATY
(From a statement issued by The National Council of Congregational Churches, June 5, 1926.)
An appeal to all friends of American missionary work in Turkey to support the ratification of the Lausanne treaty is contained in an editorial which appears in this week's issue of '‘The Congregational^ ist.” “The Congregationalism” published in Boston, is the national weekly of the Congregational churches in the United States.
The American missionaries, it is stated in the editorial, are practically unanimously in favor of the treaty.
“The missionaries have a closer, more direct and first hand understanding about the new status in Turkey than any other group of Americans,” Rev. Chester B. Emerson, D.D., pastor of North Congregational Church, Detroit, emphasized here in an interview recently at the headquarters of the National Council of Congregational Churches. Dr. Emerson is chairman of the business committee of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions; last summer he made an extensive tour visiting mission work in the Near East.
The records of the American Board, according to Dr. Emerson, show that the missionaries are nearly all college graduates, ninety of the 127 American members of the Turkey Mission of the Board being college trained. Institutions represented include Columbia, New York University, Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Cornell, Dartmouth, Williams, Oberlin, University of Chicago, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, University of California, Radcliife, Vassar, Wellesley, Ml. Holyoke, Elmire, Bryn Mawr.
“The missionaries,” Dr. Emerson said, “are convinced that only good will come from the re-establishment of diplomatic relations by the United States with Turkey. The treaty will give a basis for negotiations regarding further rights, claims and privileges for native born and naturalized American citizens. The missionaries believe more can be accomplshed for the Armenians with the treaty ratified, than without; the treaty leaves the United States free to take any action which she may deem advisable now or in the future with reference to Armenia and the Armenians.”
The Moslems are being reached under the new conditions for the first time by the missionaries, according to Dr. Emerson; hitherto, he said, missionary work has been confined to the ancient Christian races in the Turkish empire.
“A new idea, that of altruism, unknown in the Koran,” Dr. Emerson said, “is being projected into Mohammedan Turkey. The Moslems are beginning to realize that schools, hospitals and other missionary institutions are not being maintained for any hidden, ulterior, selfish motive but in a purely altruistic spirit. The social, educational afid religious reformation now in progress among the
22cThe Missionaries and the Treaty
Turks, with the resultant eagerness for western leadership, is one of the most significant movements in history ; it has opened innumerable doors long closed by custom, bigotry and superstition to the heart and mind of the Turk. The missionaries in the spirit of loving service are entering in, and the American nation should make their task easier, not harder. The American Board’s educational institutions, which formerly had few Moslems, now report many, such as the Bithynia High School, Constantinople, which is now crowded to capacity with seventy percent Moslems, or International College, Smyrna, ninety percent of whose enrollment is Turkish.”
The American Board, which is the foreign missionary agency of the Congregational churches, has been at work in Turkey since 1820 and conducts practically all the American missionary work in that country. The missionaries of all other denominations at work in Turkey total, seven.
Individual missionaries serve for life. Eighty-eight of the American Board’s present active staff of 127 were appointed before the war or previous to 1914; thirty-seven of these eighty-eight have served for more than twenty-five years, some for over thirty, others for more than forty, and two over fifty years. In addition to the missionaries in active service, there are thirty-one on the retired list, three of whom served for more than fifty years, ten others more than forty, and five others more than thirty years.
22dTHE LAUSANNE TREATY—SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RATIFY IT?
By DR. JAMES L. BARTON
Secretary of the Foreign Department of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions
(From a Debate at the Meeting of the Foreign Policy Association, April 5, 1924)
We are not here today to discuss what might have been in Turkey had things gone differently during the last ten years. Neither are we here to prophesy what will take place in Turkey in the near future. I have tried that several times and it has almost always gone wrong. To me it is a significant fact that the people whom I met who are most opposed to the ratification of this treaty with Turkey are those who have never been in Turkey or who were there a long time ago, and who have no knowledge of the present psychology of the Turk, nor of the organization or the purposes of the present Turkish Government.
Let me enumerate four established facts as a starting point, not dealing with prejudices nor with politics, nor with anything of the kind. The first I would name is: The Capitulations are gone. That is a finished thing, and unless the United States and the other nations are ready to go to war with Turkey, there will never be a return to the Capitulations in the Turkish Empire. Turkey has gained her sovereignty, and now to claim that the Treaty should not be ratified because it recognizes the abolition of the Capitulations is like holding a dugout in a battlefield where the battle was fought and lost fifteen months ago. There is nothing whatever to hold. The quicker we accept he fact that the Capitulations with Turkey under which Americans have lived in Turkey for the last hundred years are no more, will not be restored, cannot be restored, the quicker we will be able to consider reasonably and constructively the question of the Treaty with Turkey.
The second established fact, is that an Armenian national home within the boundary of the Turkish Empire is a closed incident, and however much we may regret it, (and certainly many of us have labored day and night, month in and month out, and year in and year out, in order that the Armenians might have a national home within the boundary of the Turkish Empire), nevertheless that battle was fought at Lausanne and it was lost. Unless America and the European nations are ready to go to war with Turkey in order to re-establish the Armenians somewhere in a national home within the bounds of the Turkish Empire and provide an army to protect them there, no home will be provided. The nations will not go to war with Turkey for that purpose.
We also need to stop pleading old treaties with Turkey—the
23The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
1830 treaty and others. I do not propose to discuss the question here, nevertheless the fact remains that the treaty of 1830 has gone. America through its representatives in Constantinople may plead that treaty and insist that the Capitulations referred to in it are now the rights of America in Turkey, they can plead it but only make themselves ridiculous before the Turk and before the world.
The fourth fact is that we have a treaty signed with this Turkish Government. I want to say here, ladies and gentlemen, that the men who negotiated that Treaty in Lausanne were as faithful and loyal American citizens as ever took part in the negotiation of any treaty anywhere, that the work at Lausanne was a work requiring tremendous effort. Night and day those men labored and struggled, and out of that struggle, beginning with November, 1922, and ending in August (with one break) of 1923, they worked for many things that are omitted frm the Treaty. They worked for the continuation of the Capitulations for at least five years. They worked for giving the Armenians a national home within the bounds of Turkey. They labored as heartily and untiringly as any man or any woman in this audience would have worked, and as thousands and hundreds of thousands of the people in America would have dohe. They did finally negotiate a treaty and it is a treaty that does not entirely favor one side.
Do you recognize the fact that Turkey has lost her capital, the most splendidly located of any capital on the face of the earth because of the terms of that Treaty? Do you know that they have been compelled to go into the interior and establish their capital at an interior town upon a branch railway because by the Treaty the Straits were left unprotected? If Turkey had retained her capital at Constantinople, it would be at the mercy of any gunboat of any nation that steamed into the harbor. So, Turkey gave up her historic capital and established herself in the interior of the country.
Let us remember these four facts.
And now we come to the subject of the Treaty: Shall it be ratified or shall it not? I think Ambassador Gerard has quoted me somehow as being on the other side. I never knew it. I have said that it is not impossible that the prejudice of the people of America and the prejudice of the Senate against the history and record of the Turk in dealing with the minority populations may be so great that it will defeat the Treaty, but I never for a moment felt that it was not the duty and privilege of the United States to ratify this Treaty and set it into operation.
It is the best possible treaty that could be negotiated; there is no question in my mind about that. The United States could not have sent to Lausanne men who could have secured from the Turks under the circumstances a better treaty, a treaty that would allow anything of the Capitulations to remain (that seems to be the one thing that causes more trouble than almost anything else), that could have got any protection for the Armenians into the treaty.
24James L. Barton
The men did the best they could. We have the best obtainable treaty.
This is the beginning of treaties with Turkey. All the old treaties are done away with, and we start with a new treaty. This is the first of a series of treaties yet to be negotiated. Why, we are not finished yet negotiating treaties with Great Britain. We didn’t do it all in the first instance. We are not finished yet negotiating and signing treaties with France. When we entered into our first diplomatic relations with France under treaty, we did not have everything in, but we have been adding ever since. This Treaty once ratified will be the basis for the negotiations of further treaties, and in those negotiations, matters left out from this Treaty can be included. Already they have taken steps in that direction.
This is a limited Treaty. No reference has been made to that fact here this afternoon. There are only two items in the Treaty that are perpetual, the first two items. The first item restores diplomatic relations between Turkey and the United States and provides for the interchange of diplomatic representatives. The second item of the Treaty abrogates the Capitulations and all previous treaties. Those two items stand. Items three to eight, inclusive, are for only seven years. From nine to twenty-eight, inclusive, are for only five years. It is in some respects a trial treaty apart from the first two items. It is a treaty that can be revised before the end of the five or of the seven years. It is not expected that it is a perpetual treaty.
Much has been said about the heads of the American institutions in Turkey. Really, it is interesting to see how much solicitude so many people of the United States today, in their opposition to the Treaty, feel for these American institutions within the bounds of the Turkish Empire.
The heads of the institutions and the teachers in them, so far as I am informed—are in favor of the ratification of the Treaty. They on the ground are the ones who will have to put in practice the terms of the Treaty; they are the ones who will suffer if the terms are not carried out in their application to these institutions. These institutions in many places are filled with students today. They are not all open that were open before the war. They were closed not by the Turkish Government but by the force of circumstances. But they are open (other than those mentioned by Dr. Staub), filled with pupils today, and the work is going on. The Americans who have charge of that work say that it is quite possible to carry on the work of these institutions under the terms of the Treaty. Thé missionaries are of the same opinion regarding their work.
The missionaries and these educators are the men and women who must live under the Treaty, and you have already heard that the business men are taking the same position. Is not the evidence of the Americans there on the ground, who have the business in-
25The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
terest and the educational interest and the philanthropic interest of the United States within the bounds of the Turkish Empire in charge, who understand the situation as none outside of Turkey who have never been in the country in the last year can understand it—isn't it reasonable to suppose that those people ought to know whether this is a workable treaty, whether American institutions and American business interests can be carried on under the terms of the Treaty? They say the Treaty ought to be ratified, and they say they will get on with their work under the new conditions. They also urge the importance of early ratification.
Doing away with Capitulations is not a new thing. Siam has done away with Capitulations or “with exterritoriality. I remember very well when the question was up as to a treaty with Japan some years ago, under which the exterritorial terms were to be abolished, many foretold the dire disaster that would take place in Japan if exterritoriality were abolished. I was in correspondence with about a hundred Americans during that time, and I never heard one word of complaint of the unjust actions of the Japanese courts, or the cruelty of their laws.
Americans in Turkey are ready to stay under the Turkish Government, to take their chances with the Turkish Government and Turkish law, believing that they can carry on.
Turkey is striving to win her position among the nations of the world. At Lausanne she did win the diplomatic battle. She won her sovereignity. It was the one thing that she was ready to go to war for if it were not granted. It was granted. Turkey is a sovereign state, and Turkey feels and knows that she is on trial before the world. There is no question that if she fails now as a sovereign state, she loses her last chance to gain and hold a position in the international world.
As to the abrogation of the Caliphate—it has been my privilege to read some of the debate that took place in Angora over the question as to whether the Caliph shall be expelled and whether the Caliphate shall be abolished. The Turks in Lausanne told the Allies and the representatives of the United States that Turkey has separated Church and State, that the State centers in Angora, and the Church, in the person of the Caliph, centers in Constantinople. They said, “The separation has actually taken place. The State no longer dictates to religion within its area, and religion no longer dictates to the State."
They went back to Angora. They endeavored to make laws that would harmonize with the laws and the civilization of the Western world. On every turn they were met by the representative of the Caliph who declared such laws to be contrary to the teachings of Mohammed and of the Koran and the traditions of Islam. There was no way that the Turks could keep faith with the pledges given at Lausanne, there was no way in which they could set their house in order, revise their laws, court regulations
26James L. Barton
and procedure except by removing from Turkey that obstacle in the name of Mohammedanism that prevented them from keeping their promises. So they voluntarily abandoned their traditional and religious hold on the Mohammedan world, on two hundred millions of Mohammedans scattered across the world. In driving out the Caliph, they abrogated their religious power over the Mohammedan world, and virtually said, “We will be a State without the dictation of the Church." And so by abolishing the Caliphate and by sending the Caliph adrift, they put themselves in a position to legislate without being hampered by the objection of the Mohammedan official censor.
For these and many other reasons that might be given, it seems to me that it would be wise for the United States to ratify this Treaty and do it at once. England France have not yet ratified the Treaty, I understand, but I have been informed on what seems to me good authority that they will ratify it. The attitude of the Turk toward the United States is more friendly than that toward any European nation. America never took any territory from Turkey. America has no territorial ambitions for the Turkish Empire, and the Turk knows it. If America will ratify the Treaty and perhaps be the first to do it, it will put America in a position for further favorable negotiations with the Government for other privileges than those which are granted by the present Treaty, and will put us into relations with Turkey that will be of benefit to the American institutions in Turkey and to American trade.
I would be the last in the world to plead for special favors for American missionary work in Turkey or for American institutions; but I plead for American interests, some of which are in these institutions and some of which are in American trade, and I believe they can be protected best by the early ratification of this Treaty.
Mrs. Alma Gluck Zimbalist:	Since our extraterritorial rights
have been abrogated, has there been any effect either to our advantage or disadvantage?
Dr. Barton :	I have heard no complaint whatever in corre-
sponding with seventy-five or a hundred Americans in different parts of Turkey, no complaint whatever of their treatment by the Turkish Government since the Capitulations ceased to be applied following the signing of the treaty at Lausanne in August of last year.
27THE YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
IN TURKEY
By DR. D. A. DAVIS
Administrative Secretary, European Area, Young Men’s Christian Association
(From a Letter to Senator Borah, May, 1926)
I have followed carefully the arguments that are being used by those who favor and those who oppose the Treaty. The chief objection seems to be on moral grounds. To one who is familiar with Turkey and who has studied Turkish history it is evident that the methods used by so-called Christian nations in dealing with Turkey have not been such as to impress the Turks with the desirability of Christian morality. I am convinced that the Turks are now making a sincere and thorough effort to reform their government and social life. The most effective possible means of bringing moral influence to bear on Turkey at the present time seems to me to be to trust the Turks and to find means of co-operating with them. This can only be done effectively when we have established Treaty relations. To try to insert into the Treaty a clause regarding present minorities in Turkey would be very similar to foreign powers having insisted after our revolution on inserting a clause to the effect that we protect the American Indians living in the thirteen colonies.
{From a Letter to Sefa Bey, May 21, 1926)
You may be interested in my personal convictions in regard to the ratification of the Treaty with Turkey. As a person who lived for four years in Constantinople and who has kept in constant touch with the situation in Turkey since that time, having visited Turkey once or twice every year since 1919, I may have some background for my statement. I am heartily in «favor of ratification. I am convinced that the present leaders of Turkey are sincere in their efforts for modernizing the Turkish state and for building a republic which will reflect the genius and the distinctive qualities of the Turkish people. This is the same struggle that other nations in Europe are now going through. I have followed the arguments that have been used for and against the Treaty. .It seems to me there is no valid reason against ratification.
28THE YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
IN TURKEY
By ASA K. JENNINGS
Former Foreign Secretary, International Committee, Young Men’s Christian Association, and Member International Committee for Exchange of Prisoners, Graeco-Turkish War,
(To zvhorn the Greek and Turkish Governments allowed the use of some fifty vessels, following the Smyrna fire in the fall of 1922, and who. in six days following the burning of the city, was enabled to take more than 250,000 Christians to places of refuge on the Aegean Islands and whose efforts were largely responsible for their being fed and cared for in their new environment.)
(From an Interview in the Los Angeles Daily Times, March 7, 1925)
To understand the situation, one must first realize the fact that there is a new Turkey. A Turkish republic exists for the first time in history. The present government has revolutionized conditions in the Mohammedan world. It has adopted a new constitution, granting equal rights and privileges—political, civil and religious—to all citizens; decreed separation of the church and state; eliminated the ministries of Religion and Pious Foundations; expelled the Caliph and all members of the royal family; completely secularized existing schools, private and governmental; in a word, established a new social and political order. In addition to this there is a drifting away from Moslem practices and religion, the rapid rise of the feminist movement, and the growing consciousness of latent power in the Turkish youth.
In their sincere efforts to set up a new and better form of government, based on the models of democracy, the Turkish leaders realized the importance of emphasizing moral restraint and physical training in the education of youth. The Minister of Education, Vasif Bey, and various Americans, of whom I was one, have formulated a basis of agreement for the organization of Turkish-American clubs, formed after the fashion of the American associations, to promote the physical, esthetic, intellectual and social development of the youth of Turkey.
For their organization and control the plan provides for a central administrative committee composed of three Turks and three Americans, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Education; the program to include physical education, organized recreation, language classes, commercial and vocational courses, music, lectures, forums and social activities.
The Turkish leaders believe it highly important to open clubs at once in six centers, with the understanding that Turks and Americans together meet the expense of maintenance; the initial expense to be secured by the Americans. This proposal opens the door for service such as has not been possible before.
The Turkey of today appreciates her needs and is endeavoring to meet them. She would welcome the help America can give toward overcoming her handicaps. They are seeking those who will interpret into the language and spirit of the new Turkey the secrets of America’s real greatness.
29THE TURKISH REPUBLIC—1925
By ELBERT CRANDALL STEVENS
Executive Secretary, Stamboul Branch in Turkey of the Young Men’s
Christian Association
From “Current History/’ March, 1925
[Mr. Stevens spent five years in Turkey, beginning with the early Fall of 1919, and witnessed the momentous events of those years upon the spot. Though most of his official work was done in Constantinople, he visited Smyrna three times—twice before and once after the conflagration that followed the Greek defeat—made a tour of the soivthern shore of the Black Sea as far as Trebizond and a more extensive trip around the western and southern coasts of Asia Minor, and thence to Beirut, Damascus, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. He also went through Thrace during the retreat of ihe Greeks in September, 1922. Mr. Stevens is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin. He has been connected with the Y. M. C. A. for the past twelve years, both in the United States and the Near East.]
After more than seven centuries of absolute despotism, at times fairly strong and progressive, but latterly degenerating into weakness and extreme repression, which brought in extensive foreign intervention, with mixed benefit to the people, Turkey has at last thrown off the shackles both of the House of Osman and of European interference, and through powerful military and popular leaders has declared herself to be a free and sovereign republic. Although the first elections of Deputies of the people to the Grand National Assembly in 1923 were reported to be controlled by the leaders who brought the nation victorious from the late war with Greece, successfully formed a Government in defiance of the Allies and have maintained themselves as the only important political party ever since, the general impression is that the Assembly, however dominated today, represents the aspirations of the strong progressive element of the Turkish people.
In spite of imperfections of administration and certain serious injustices (for which counterparts might be found in the critical periods of other governments now respectably stable, and which it is expected will pass with the natural subsiding of chauvinistic tendencies arising from an intense nationalism), new Turkey’s presiding genius, Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha, and his closest associates, Isrnet Pasha, Rauf Bey, Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, Fethi Bey, Dr. Adnan Bey and others, have shown consistent energy, astuteness and determination to preserve the national sovereignty for the good of the people and to secure for the country a recognized place among the progressive nations of the world today. It is evident that the movement is a continuance of the revolution of 1908, which dethroned the tyrant Abdul Hamid and restored the Bill of Rights of 1876. The beginning of the democratic reform movement precedes that date by fully fifty years. Almost continuous warfare for centuries, which has cursed no nation more than Turkey, and unfortunate leadership even after 1908, retarded the realization of the great hopes which
30Young Men's Christian Association
came to the surface in that year, and these same hopes are slowly and cautiously re-emergingnow.
In spirit, the new republic is apparently “an emphatic adoption of the Western national idea/' as Professor Toynbee says of the National Pact, which was drawn up in 1920 to guide the nationalist effort. In form, the Government follows a basic constitution, which was adopted in the Assembly session adjourned in the Spring of 1924 and which has certain unusual features. Both legislative and executive powers are vested in the Assembly, which has but one house, composed at present of 290 Deputies (theoretically one for each 20,000 of the male population), and which elects the President of the republic as its executive officer, to serve for seven years, with right of re-election. The judiciary is independently constituted according to special laws prepared by the Assembly, but is not allowed to contravene the basic constitution, which grants civic rights comparable with those of Western nations. Moslem religious courts have been declared incompetent for all secular matters and subject to civil intervention, even in matters of religion. The civil code is being built up according to advanced European models and is to be applied in equity to all citizens and sojourners in the land “without fear or favor.”
31The CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD TURKEY
By HESTER DONALDSON JENKINS,
Formerly Teacher in Girls College, Constantinople
(From The Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 1926)
Of all the non-Christian nations, Turkey is the nearest to Christendom, both geographically and politically; therefore, the relations between Turkey and Europe have always had a tendency to be strained. Again, of all the non-Christian religions, perhaps Islam is the nearest in ideals and ethics (excepting Judaism, of course) ; therefore, the friction that so often appears in families has been found markedly between Christianity and Islam. An impersonal judgment might be that of the three great monotheistic religions, Judaism is the mother and Christianity and Islam the two sisters.
But in the intolerant Middle Ages, the Christians abhorred the Moslems unreasonably, and the Crusades, those freebooting expeditions in which all license was permitted in the names of both religions, served to produce a feeling again Muhammadanism that time has never obliterated. The Turk, also a Muhammadan, inherits a dislike on the part of the Christians, caused quite as much by the ill-doing of our ancestors as by the crimes of his. Hence it has come about that the West finds it very hard to be fair to the Turk.
All this ancient prejudice, heightened, to be sure, by wars and massacres within our own times, enters into our consideration of the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by the United States. It seems to me it should not. In our treaty relations with other nations we are not in the habit of considering religious differences, nor, very often, the moral standards of the other nations. If we did, we should refuse all relations with China, Japan, India, the African states, and also with Germany, Belgium at the time of the so-called Belgian atrocities, Russia of the Tsars, indeed every nation in the world whose actions we happened to disapprove at the moment. And some of them might be unkind enough to refuse relations with us. In fact, we should be taking the definitely un-Christian attitude of judging and condemning.
I have no personal or economic interests in Turkey or her oil. I am a student and professor of European history who has lived nine years in Constantinople and learned to love not only the Turks but also the Near East Christians. All of these people seem to me to be lovable and capable of great growth and progress. During the war I was able to retain my fairness toward the Turks and the Bulgarians as if they had joined our allies instead of our enemies.
The Turks are the youngest and least developed nation in Europe, who may not need a century or more to catch up with the West, but who are eminently hopeful. Although I love some of the American institutions in Turkey, I would honestly be willing to see them abandoned if such action meant growth to the Near East; but,
32Hester Donaldson Jenkins
on the contrary, it would seem to me to be the quenching of a great light and hope in the Orient.
I am writing now purely in the interest of fair play. Perhaps I can judge more fairly than Consul-General Horton, who has been quoted so much in these pages, because I am not so close to an emotional event as he, and because I am trained to be an impartial historian. Possibly my book, “An Educational Ambassador to the Near East,” might be quoted as giving an impartial and sympathetic view of all the Near East peoples, based on my personal knowledge of them.
In my doctrinal dissertation, “Ibrahim Pasha, Grand Vizir of Suleiman the Magnificent,” I wrote as follows and it was never refuted:
The Turks are an exceedingly loyal people, accepting the religion imposed on them (Islam) with whole-heartedness. They are not tempermentally fanatical; on the contrary, they are by nature tolerant; fanaticism, where it has existed, being an outgrowth of political conditions, or a foreign trait taken over with Islam.
When they conquered the Byzantine Empire, they allowed the conquered people to remain in their homes, permitted the free worship of their religions, and even gave them separate courts and laws in order that they might follow their religious customs in a Moslem state. The famous “capitulations” under which Christians up to the war were tried and protected by their own tribunals, were a marked instance of toleration. This compares most favorably with the treatment of Jews and Moslems in Europe, as, for instance, in Christian Spain in the fifteenth century. The modern ill-treatment of the Armenians grew out of political conditions, the most effective impulse being Russia’s assumption of authority over the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire.
For generations, the selfish policies of the European states kept Turkey in a broil. Once a pasha sighed heavily on hearing of a war in Europe. An American gentleman to whom he was talking asked why he was disturbed by a European war. He replied: “I have noticed that whenever the pot boils over in Europe, the lid falls on us.” And so it was. Whenever there was fighting in Europe, the treaty of peace somehow managed to take a slice of Turkey, if for no other reason than that Turkey was not a Christian nation.
Turkey was used and abused until she could not expect any kind of fairness from Europe. After the Young Turk revolution in 1908, when Turkey announced her intention of modernizing and civilizing her Government, before the press had got through admiring her moderation and progress, the people of all nations had begun to take advantage of her weakness, our share being the insisting on franchises and the negotiations toward the Chester concessions. No wonder the Turks came to despise Christians.
Some of them read history and would know that Mr. Horton’s
33The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
assertion could be easily refuted that “no government has made great progress in civilization and prosperity since the appearance of the Master on earth that has not accepted his teachings/’ They would know of the great Muhammadan civilization that grew up with the coming of Muhammad to the little primitive Arabia, and, transforming it to a great state with a high culture, spread the so-called Moorish culture from Bagdad to Cordova, one of the finest civilizations in the world, later driven out of Europe by intolerant Christians.
They also know that Turkey herself grew from a rude military camp to a large empire that in the sixteenth century stood higher in organization and security than any contemporary European state. One of my Moslem students once wrote that we seemed to ascribe all of our economic and industrial progress to Christianity. She denied that, and then added: “We grant the economical and intellectual supremacy to Europeans, but we reserve the moral supremacy for ourselves.” Well, there you are. Which of us is to judge the other morally ?
When it comes to dark deeds in war, Christian Europe can throw no stones at Moslem Turkey. But if we grant that the Turks have some particularly dark stains on their record, we could not say they are a hopless people without ideals and without potentialities. Those of us who have lived among them under normal circumstances all tell the same tale of their many virtues and graces. Most Americans know little about the Turks except their usually bad government and the deeds of their soldiers when inflamed. We would not wish ourselves to be judged from so little data. As far as I have observed, there has been very little propaganda for the Turks, but, on the contrary, an unwillingness to hear their side, and a feeling that they are outside of even our compassion.
The Treaty of Lausanne is a two-sided question, and I am not writing to advocate or disaprove it. But I do think definitely that it should not be rejected on the ground that we never liked the Turks, and judging by what their enemies say of them, they are not the kind of people with whom we wish dealings. Would it not be beautiful for one Christian nation to give Turkey an instance of fairness and disinterestedness—in short, a Christian treatment? That is just what our American missionaries and teachers have done, and we have been immensely proud of it.
But were it not a pity for our Government to give the lie to this friendly treatment by declaring itself too prejudiced to have further kindly and helpful relations? It is not a Christian ideal to return evil for evil, nor is it according to the Sermon on the Mount. There are various ways of holding up the Christ, and it may be that in the schools, where avowedly Christian dogma may not now be taught, Christ nevertheless is being manifested. The colleges in Constantinople are not exclusively for the Turks, but are doing a splendid work for the men and women of all the Near East people. Surely, they are fostering homes for love, justice, light and peace.
34REPLIES TO BISHOP MANNING
By HON. WILLIAM E. BORAH
Washington, April 5, 1926. Bishop William T. Manning, New York City.
Dear Bishop Manning: I beg to acknowledge with thanks the protest signed by yourself and 109 other bishops against the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.
The treaty, I presume, will soon be brought forward for consideration and I feel I must do what I can to secure its ratification.
There are good and wholly sufficient reasons, it seems to me, why ratification should be had. But if I were seeking the views of others as a guide, I should feel compelled to give great consideration to the views of Americans living and having interests in Turkey. They are, so far as I know, all in favor of ratification and urge speedy action. Our religious, educational, and business interests combine in asking that the treaty be ratified. They feel it is necessary for their protection, and their arguments in support of their contention seem to me conclusive. It does not seem to be either wise or in any sense justice upon the part of the Government to leave these interests and the people without treaty protection or without the advantage of the friendly intercourse which will result from the relationship the treaty would establish and help to maintain.
It will be remembered also that the leading powers have all concluded treaties with Turkey. The pending treaty with the United States protects our interests, religious, educational and business as fully as the interests of other nations are protected. It cannot be said that the interests of the United States are not as fully taken care of as the interests of other nations. It would be nothing less than folly to stand out and refuse to make a treaty because we cannot get a better treaty than other powers were willing to accept. By such a course we would imperil our interests throughout Turkey.
If it be said we should have a more desirable treaty, that is the best treaty we can secure at this time, and we shall sooner secure a better treaty by making this one and thereafter seeking to improve it than by refusing ratification and breaking off all treaty relations. Whatever there is in this treaty is wholly to our advantage and in no respect to our disadvantage, as against no treaty. In my opinion, by making this treaty we neither condone the past nor compromise the future.
In your protest you say that we should not *''resume friendly relations with an avowedly unrepentant and anti-Christian Government.” For myself, Bishop Manning, I favor this nation establishing friendly relations with all nations and all peoples. To refuse friendly relations
35The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
with all peoples who reject Christianity is not only unthinkable as a practical course for the Government to pursue, but I had always supposed that the great object of Christianity in international affairs was to establish friendly relations, not only with other Christian nations, but with the anti-Christian nations, that they might be brought in touch with the teachings of Christianity and thereby induced to accept its benign precepts.
Can we be of any possible service to our own people in Turkey or can we hope to any any influence in shaping policies along humanitarian or religious lines in that particular region of the world if we break off all relationship and sustain no method or manner of ordinary communication?
You also call to my attention the Turkish massacres. We all know these things only too well and all deplore them and all would like to be helpful, I presume, in ameliorating or preventing them in the future. But how are we to exert our influence in humanizing* that fearful condition of affairs, how are we to accentuate that “righteousness and justice” for which you plead? I know but two ways—either by force and arms, which I wholly reject, or by approaching the subject through the avenue of friendly relations and moral influence.
Do I understand that you and the 109 bishops are in favor of establishing an Armenian home within the territory of Turkey and protecting the Armenians by force of arms? Are you in favor of employing an army and a navy to effectuate “righteousness and justice”? I must presume that you are not. The only alternative to that is to establish the best possible treaty relations and friendly intercourse and thus exert such moral influence and such moral leadership as we may.
But to cut off all treaty relations and sever all friendly connections would not be only to put in jeapardy our own people, but to draw our phylacteries about us and find solace in such spasmodic commiserations as we might see fit to bestow upon the unfortunate from time to time.
I do not presume for a moment that the Turk has completely changed, undergone a transformation overnight. People do not do that. But it is in the face of all the facts, to contend that no progress has been made and that fine assurance of great progress are not everywhere evident. Nations and peoples put off their habits and beliefs slowly, as is fearfully indicated by the fact that the great Christian nations ever since the lesson of the World War seem still to rely wholly upon force and are still expending millions and millions to find some more deadily and destructive weapon with which to slay and kill other Christian peoples. The World War was not the best of lessons to the un-Christian world.
I repeat, I think it the part of wisdom to establish friendly and commercial relations with all governments and peoples. By doing so I would not assume that I was endorsing their form of government or
36William E. Borah
their theory of civilization or their conception of social obligations and relations or approving of their past history. I would assume that by such a course I was establishing the only real foundation for peace— laying the basis upon which the whole superstructure of peace must rest—and further because I know of no other way except by sheer force with which to maintain our prestige and assert our power among the nations.
Let us, therefore, follow after the things which make for peace and things wherewith one may edify another. Very respectfully,
William E. Borah.
37REPLIES TO BISHOP MANNING
By PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN
Professor of International Law, Princeton University
(From a Letter to The New York Times, April 19, 1926)
No people have ever been more unfortunate in their friends than the Armenians. Ever since Great Britain by the Cyprus Convention assumed a great moral obligation in their behalf they have had reason to pray to be saved from their friends. No one can claim that the lot of the Armenians has been improved by the promises, the protestations and recriminations of their friends. The policy of calling the Turks names certainly has been far from felicitous. The failure of the European friends of Armenia to back up their promises by force would hardly seem a good precedent for their American friends to follow. To be content with denunciations and vain shakings of the fist is as senseless as it is supine. And yet that is as far as Bishop Manning seems to get in his statement published in The Times of today. It is an appeal to the old crusading spirit without any practical suggestion to support his appeal.
As one who has lived in Turkey for a number of years and who has tried to keep in close touch with the situation there, I can only express my deep resentment of the slur cast by Bishop Manning on the missionaries “more interested in the preservation of the mortar and bricks of the mission buildings than in the purposes for which they were sent into Turkey.” These splendid idealists are trying to face with common sense and courage the actual situation that confronts them in Turkey. They are honestly trying to play the game like Christian gentlemen. They are eager to rise to the opportunities of this unprecedented situation. They hope to play a helpful, constructive role in the regeneration of the Near East. They earnestly ask that we over here do nothing to> embarrass them in this great task. They urge practically unanimously that we hasten to ratify the Lausanne Treaty, which places our relations with Turkey on as sound and favorable a basis as any of the European nations. They know that no other treaty is obtainable. They ask that we stop nagging the Turks by futile recriminations and by this irritating and preposterous delay in ratifying this treaty.
38THE CHURCHMAN 2 West 47th St., New York City
May 26, 1926.
The Hon. William E. Borah,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.
My dear Senator Borah :
I am enclosing copies of two editorials from recent issues of The Churchman, in which it occurred to me you might be interested. As you will see, The Churchman's position in reference to the Lausanne Treaty runs diametric to that taken by the 110 bishops.
You understand, of course, that the bishops have no right to speak for the Episcopal Church officially. It is what I conceive to be a significant fact that when the matter came before a session of the House of Bishops at our last General Convention in October, the House acting as a unit turned down by unanimous action requests for such an endorsement as that given in their recent statement. My own opinion is that the document originated with Bishop Manning and that the other signatures of bishops were secured in the somewhat happy-go-lucky fashion not entirely uncommon in the practice of bishops.
The Churchman, as perhaps you know, is the oldest religious journal in America and the only liberal national weekly religious journal of the Episcopal Church. There are a good many of us who hope that when the matter comes up for discussion in the Senate it may be made clear that the document signed by the 110 bishops does not by any means express the opinion of the Episcopal Church.
Very sincerely yours,
Guy Emery Shipler, Editor
AMERICA SHOULD SIGN
{From an Editorial in The Churchman, May 15, 1926.)
The protest against the Lausanne Treaty signed by one hundred and ten bishops of the Episcopal Church has accomplished one excellent result: it has brought forth widespread discussion. Americans, being notoriously negligent of interest in foreign affairs, even since the war, need whatever stimulus can be given toward arousing such discussion.
It is all to the good that Christians in America should give attention to all phases of international relations; it is natural for them to become stirred when a treaty has to do with the Turks. For many years American Christians have given generously toward succoring the victims of Turkish brutality. But we find little validity in the arguments put forward by the bishops who signed the protest or by
39The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
those who support them in their position. From a practical point of view it represents precisely the attitude of those Americans who, following the war, insisted that we must have no relations with Germany until she repented.
It would doubtless be an excellent thing if Turkey repented of her evil deeds. But if America awaits the coming of that event we suspect that the signing of any treaty whatever will be long delayed. Few would attempt to sustain any argument in behalf of those Turks who have been responsible for atrocities that have turned the blood of decent people cold. Perhaps the younger Turks are equally vicious. But, after all, they are a new generation, and there is the chance that they may represent an improvement over those who are passing from power. If America fails to sign the treaty she cuts herself off from giving added impetus to whatever potential goodwill may be resident in this new generation of Turks.
The most significant argument in behalf of signing the Lausanne Treaty, as it seems to us, lies in the fact that all American missionaries who live in Turkey are in favor of signing. The potency of this argument, however, has been largely overlooked. It lies in the fact that in asking to have the treaty ratified these missionaries are for the first time departing from their well-known and long-established custom of neutrality in reference to political affairs. It establishes a precedent which will place them in a quite different relationship to future political events. Such a marked departure from established custom, by people who know full well the record of Turkish atrocities, could not have been made lightly and without conviction that the securing of ratification by America was a matter of supreme importance.
(From a letter to The Nezv York Times, June 5, 1926.)
May I protest that I do not deserve the compliment paid me in your columns this morning by Bishop Garland of Pennsylvania? In a communication referring to my letter to Senator Borah on the subject of the Lausanne Treaty he refers to me as “setting his opinion against that of 110 Bishops of the Church”; and again: “Against the individual opinion of Mr. Shipler I place the deliberate conviction of 110 Bishops of the Church.”
I totally lack the courage to oppose my “individual opinion” to that of even a solitary Bishop; to oppose it to the “deliberate conviction” of 110 members of the episcopate would constitute a heroism quite beyond the reach of my imagination. Had I the temerity to do this audacious thing I should be entitled to feel like Joan of Arc in the inquisition scene of Shaw’s “St. Joan.”
I need hardly say that my opinion in favor of signing the Lausanne Treaty is rather far from being the opinion of one individual. The Bishop admits that there are “a few who would sacrifice American honor” and “a few interested people living in Turkey” who wish the treaty ratified. This is hardly an adequate statement. Has the
40Guy Emery Shipler
Bishop overlooked the fact that the Foreign Policy Association of New York, the National Chamber of Commerce, our State Department and the President, as well as our diplomatic and consular representatives in the Near East, all favor ratification?
Does he not know that the missionaries in Turkey are unanimous for ratification, and that their activity toward that end gains significance from the fact that it runs counter to their long-established practice of neutrality in reference to political issues? Does he not know that the Armenians in America, in whose behalf the 110 Bishops stated that they made their plea against ratification, favor signing the treaty, and, moreover, are deeply distressed because of the hatred of Turkey inspired by. the Bishops’ document, fearing that the lives of 100,000 or more Armenians still resident in Turkey will be placed in jeopardy by anti-Turkish propaganda and by a failure of the treaty?
As a matter of fact, in my letter to Senator Borah I expressed no opinion in behalf of ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. I wrote to make clear two points: first, that when the matter came before a session of the House of Bishops at the General Convention of the Episcopal Church in New Orleans last October, the House, acting as a unit, turned down by unanimous action requests for such an endorsement as that given in the recent statement signed by 110 Bishops, acting as individuals; second, that the 110 Bishops had no right, as I fear the public assumes, to speak officially for the Episcopal Church, since official statements can be issued only as the result of concurrent action taken by the House of Bishops and the House of Deputies assembled in general convention. To neither of these points does Bishop Garland make reference.
Guy Emery Shipler,
Editor, The Churchman.
41REPLY TO BISHOP MANNING
By CHARLES C. COWELL
(From a Letter to The New York Times, April 11, 1926)
The appeal of the Bishops of the Episcopalian Church concerning the Lausanne Treaty does not appear to be in accord with a keen desire to consider the problem with clear vision or with recourse to those tendencies which make for clear and rational thinking. Obviously the appeal against the treaty is based upon prejudice, sentimentality and the “spirit of the herd.” Turkey is far from America. There are few Turks here. On the contrary we have numerous Armenians and Greeks who naturally feel it a duty artfully to employ those methods which most easily fall into line with our usual traditional prejudices. To most of the people of America the Turk is always “terrible,” every Greek a bootblack, every Chinese a laundryman, every Italian a laborer. How can we shake off the shackles of the past and project ourselves into the future ?
With reference to the republic of Turkey, or any other nation, we must keep in mind the genetic point of view. Facts of today may not be the facts of tomorrow. Neither the world nor civilization is standing still. Turkey of today is not the Turkey of Abdul Hamid, Italy of today is not the Italy of five years ago. Why not drop our “nest habits” and consider things as they are today? It takes a “big” man with the scientific attitude of “the intelligent ignorant learner” to admit facts of today even though they contradict everything he said yesterday.
If we consider “industrialization” as civilzation, Turkey is slowly becoming civilized. On the other hand, if we consider civilization with Arnold as the “humanizing of society” or with President Eliot as civilization as consisting in a “state of mind,” we must admit that Turkey is becoming rapidly civilized.
We must revise our thinking with respect to Turkey and bring it up to date. Most of us still think of the Turkey under Abdul Hamid, when the “official” stage of national development and thinking was expressed in polygamy, superstition, fanatical religious teachings and the like. This resulted in the judgment which we still insist upon making.
Kemahs keen patriotism for his country bid him shake off the shackles of tradition in his desire for progress. It takes a brave man to rise up and dare to point out the clear road to progress when this involves breaking traditions and habits of thinking centuries old. What happened we well know. The caliphate, the harem, the veil, the fez, were abolished. Fanatical religious orders were suppressed and their licentious and scheming leaders executed when found guilty of political treason. Church and State were separated
42Charles C. Cowell
once for all. Education was revolutionized and woman given her rightful position in society. The capitulations Were abolished. The aim was at solidarity and unity and progress. Keen psychological insight was shown in the abolition of the fez. The first law of solidarity is the “consciousness of kind,” described by Giddings as “the state of consciousness which, in any being, either high or low in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind wTith itself.” The fez had always distinguished the Moslem from the Christian. We know that our conduct toward those we feel to be like ourselves is reflexly and rationally different from our conduct toward those we feel to be less like ourselves. With the passing of the fez the “outward sign of faith” goes also, and Giddings’s theory becomes a law. This latter fact is mentioned because the enemies of Turkey laughingly remark that the change of headgear is a minor matter and fail to grasp its true significance.
The Turkish Republic, in a manner without precedent in history, is breaking the schackles of the past and projecting itself into the future. True, it has a long, hard road ahead, but the changes already put into execution are of tremendous significance psychologically, politically, economically and educationally. The people of Turkey are not responsible for the acts of their forefathers any more than we are responsible for the acts of ours. Neither can the people be expected to throw off all ancient customs and traditions overnight. This must come alone through the synthetic process of education. No nation in the world has faced the problems that Turkey has, having inherited a tremendous debt and the loss of many valuable concessions from the “old régime,” foreign intrigue, your government of the past, which demanded that ignorance and fanaticism be maintained at a high level in order that it could be used in the guidance of control.
All these facts are worth considering. Would that we but had all the facts concerning the history of Turkey. Russia’s dream of Constantinople and her use of the Armenians as “pawns” in constantly urging them to revolt in order that she might fly to their rescue as Christian brothers; France posing as “the protector of the Christians” for political purposes ; England “playing up” to Turkey to offset the aims of the Russians, etc., these and hundreds of other incidents of a country of many tongues and many conceptions of God are vital factors ordinarily left out by those enjoying an “emotional debacle” of thought concerning America’s relation to Turkey.
Many of us who have lived in Turkey have felt certain inconvenience, sometimes very greatly, due to the method of administration in the developmental stage. No one with any common sense expects perfection when obviously the adjustment is so tremendous. The spirit of sportsmanship of America and her cosmopolitan ideals will not let the differences in the interpretation of God, the sentimental outpourings of the “dear ego,” the fallacies
43The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
grown venerable with age, nor the schemings of the “concession hunter” affect her attitude toward an understanding and appreciation of a heroic attempt at freedom and a struggle against great odds toward new ideals and against old traditions.
44REJECTION WOULD CAUSE ILL WILL AND MENACE OUR INTERESTS By DR. CALEB F. GATES
President of Robert College, who has lived in Constantinople for forty-five years
(From a Statement to The New York Times, April 20, 1926)
[Editor’s Note.—Thre are no Episcopal missionaries in Turkey in Europe or Turkey in Asia. The great majority of all missions are those of the Congregational Church, which is therefore well informed as to conditions in Turkey. Of the 127 missionaries in Turkey in Asia 119 are American and of these 119, 114 are Congregational, 1 Presbyterian, 3 Presbyterian Reformed and 1 Apostolic Institute. The other 8 are from religious bodies in The Netherlands.
Of the 138 missions in Turkey in Europe 134 are American and 4 are British. Of the 134 American missionaries, 29 are Congregational, 38 are connected with the American College for Girls in Constantinople, 54 with Robert College, 8 are Y. W. C. A. representatives, 2 from the American Bible Society and 3 Seventh Day Adventists.]
I understand that there is considerable opposition to the ratification of the treaty with Turkey. It is said that this treaty gives up the capitulations without obtaining any substantial guarantees in their place; but the capitulations have already been abolished; they are dead. All the nations of Europe and Japan have already agreed to the abolition of the capitulations, and it would be impossible for the ETnited States to restore them. For the United States to insist that the capitulations are still in force for us would put us in an impossible situation.
Many object to this treaty on the ground that it does not afford any guarantees for the protection of the Christian minorities. This objection does honor to the humanitarian sentiments of the objectors. At the same time we ought to consider what would be the practical value of a clause in this treaty for the protection of the Christian minorities. If the United States should secure the insertion of such a clause in a treaty with Turkey, would she be ready to go to war in case that provision of the treaty were violated? If not, would we not be placed in the unenviable situation of those European nations who have had such a clause in their treaties with Turkey but have never enforced it? Again and again they have abandoned the Christians in the last extremity and have made their fate worse rather than better. The Turks are firmly convinced that 'the European nations use the protection of the Christians only as‘ a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of Turkey for the furtherance of their own selfish aims. This exasperates the Turks to the last degree and makes them all the more determined to get rid of the Christians in order that Europe may have no pretext for interference. The treaty under consideration is a treaty to secure the rights of American citizens and not a treaty for regulating the affairs of other peoples. Every right-minded person must sympathize with the Armenians in their suffer-
45The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
ings. The United States Government and people ought to use all their influence to help them in their most distressing situation, but it will not increase our influence to insist upon the insertion of a clause for the protecton of the Christians or for the granting of a national home to the Armenians, and it might place us in a position of contracting obligations which we would not be willing to carry out.
Another objection urged against this treaty is that it does not provide adequate guarantees for the protection of educational and religious institutions in Turkey. The Americans engaged in such work ask no other protection than is accorded to all American citizens. We realize that the continuance of our educational work depends upon our convincing the Turks that this work is valuable to them. No clause in a treaty could protect us if the Turk were determined to get rid of us, for it would be easy for them to hamper our work with restrictions which would make it impossible for us to continue. The highest Turkish officials have repeatedly testified that they value highly the work which our institutions are doing, and they have given us most favorable treatment. Just before I left Constantinople I attended a gathering of men representing all the American interests in Turkey, business, educational and missionary. It was unanimously voted to send a petition to the Secretary of State and a statement to every Senator, asking for the ratification of the treaty. These men, living and working in Turkey, would seem to be qualified to judge whether the ratification of the treaty is desirable from the standpoint of American interests.
It is well to consider what would be the effect of the refusal of the Senate to ratify this treaty. Some people seem to think that it would only mean that we should continue on the same basis as we are now, but they are ignorant of the real conditions. The European powers have ratified this same treaty and have established friendly relations with Turkey by appointing diplomatic representatives. The The American representative was appointed as American High Commissioner, but a High Commissioner implies an irregular and abnormal state of things in the country to which the Commissioner is appointed. The Turks resent the implication that Turkey is in such a condition. They assert that they have a strong Government regularly established, they no longer recognize the American representative as “High Commissioner.” His position is a very delicate one and would be much more so were it not for the friendly relations which he has established and the influence which he has acquired. If we reject this treaty we must fall back upon the Treaty of 1834, which recognizes the capitulations. The effect of this would be to transform the goodwill of the Turks for Americans into illwill and to provoke retaliations; they might refuse to appoint any representative to the United States rather than to sanction the implication that the capitulations are in force with regard to Americans. Not only missionary and educational interests would then be imperiled, but business interests as well. It is difficult to see how we should extricate ourselves from
46Caleb F. Gates
the ensuing dilemma. We must look ahead and think these problems through to their ultimate consequences. The opponents of ratification are acting under sentimental impulses which are creditable to them, but we must consider how we can attain the ends which they have in view. Is it by cutting off all relations with the Turkish Government and making it impossible for us to influence them? Or is it by establishing such normal relations as prevail among nations and endeavoring to point out the path of progress to the Turks so that they may do better in the future than in the past?
There are, I think, two groups of those who would reject this treaty—the first group would refuse to make any treaty with Turkey even if the refusal should necessitate the withdrawal of all Americans from that country and the cessation of American business in it. They are not concerned with American interests in Turkey; they only desire to give full vent to their indignation against the Turks and their condemnation of them. Consequently, they do not look beyond the rejection of the treaty, which to their minds is an end in itself to be attained at all costs. It is impossible to reason with this group. The second group think that if this treaty were rejected it would be possible to make a better treaty which would contain the provisions which they desire to insert. They would reject this treaty in order to make a better one. This idea is based on ignorance of actual conditions. It would not be possible to make a better treaty if this one were rejected by the Senate, for two reasons: First, the Turks would be exasperated by our rejection of the treaty and would not be disposed to grant us better conditions; we should have incurred their resentment and would be hampered at every step of our negotiations with them. Second, the Turks could not grant us better terms even if they were disposed to do so, for the reason that all the other nations who have concluded treaties with them on these terms would immediately claim the same treatment. This would result in new negotiations with all those powers.
The treaty under consideration is not an ideal one; no treaty ever is ideal, because it is the result of balancing conflicting interests, but it is a good treaty. It gives to Americans all that is conceded to other nations. We can hardly claim more than this; and it makes it possible for Americans to do business and to carry on educational and missionary work in Turkey, the purpose of which is to train men with a better intellectual outlook and a purer moral purpose, who will labor for the uplift of the new Turkey.
47THE LAUSANNE TREATY—SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RATIFY IT?
By DR. ALBERT STAUB,
American Director, Near East Colleges
(From a Debate at the Meeting of the Foreign Policy Association, April 5, 1924)
It is not altogether surprising that there should be so many different points of view in public opinion on this question, even among those who have made a specialty of devoting themselves to the interests of foreign policy, because conditions in the Near East are very complicated. It is, however, a regrettable fact that the ratification of all our post war treaties has divided the country into debating societies, with the unfortunate result that we fail to contribute in a constructive manner to the peace and the stabilization of the world.
We only seem to add to the greater confusion that exists in the minds of the people. In considering this case, we should not have in mind the Ottoman Empire that existed before and during the war, but the Republic of Turkey as it is today. I am not prepared to state that the Turks have perfected democracy, but I am tremendously impressed by the fact that such radical changes have taken place in the Near East in so short a time. The Turkey that I have just seen is fundamentally different from the country I visited four years ago. Very important history has been made, and no thoughtful person can deny that it has resulted in social and political progress. The historians of the future will look back to this period of sudden development with astonishment. Turkish nationalists have accomplished in a short time what it has required other nations hundreds of years to achieve. Every one who studies the situation carefully must realize that a great struggle for national unity is taking place. There have been many mistakes, no one will doubt that. This must necessarily follow in such tremendous social and political changes. But, we must not lose sight of the fact that these very mistakes are symptoms of growing pains. We used to criticize the Near East very freely for being stagnant and unprogressive, and now important changes are taking place so rapidly that we can not fully comprehend them. It is my conviction that, as a result of the World War, all of the countries of the Near East are going forward by leaps and bounds in their desire to give expression to the principles of self-determination which they received from us, and that what is taking place in Turkey is simply a part of the general development.
I wish to illustrate this point by considering for the moment the question of transportation. Instead of going through all of the various stages of the development of transportation, including the trolley car, narrow-gauged railroads and so forth, the people of the
48Albert Staub
Near East have adapted themselves to the use of the automobile. I was surprised to find in the City of Beirut over two thousand registered automobiles, mostly American-made. The people are not contented any longer to go to Damascus by train or to travel about in Palestine by train; they prefer the automobile. The automobile has competed successfully with the. railroad. The Palestine Railroad reduced its fares one-half and the Government placed an increased import duty on benzine in order to break up the business of the automobile traffic but was unsuccessful. People still prefer to ride in the automobile. You can go from Beirut to Bagdad in a Buick car in two days, comfortably. The trip has been made in seventeen hours. There is not much talk of a railroad over the desert, but there is talk of convoys of automobiles with specially built equipment for comfort, and that is one of the things that the people are most interested in at the moment. These people whose lives have been steeped in theory for centuries are now becoming practical in their determination to imitate the West, and this is just the time for us to extend our sympathy in a helpful way rather than adopt an obstructionist policy.
The Turkish leaders in Angora have a very difficult task on their hands. If they succeed in bringing the mass of people up to their conception of the Republican Government, they will perform a modern miracle. Their chances for success will be enhanced if we, who have always had such a high regard for sovereign rights, will have faith in their purpose to improve themselves. A vote of confidence and an expression of hope for success on the part of the American people right now might prove to be just the inspiration that is needed. Certainly nothing constructive can be accomplished by calling them names, and by referring to them as murderers. A better Turkey would be a blessing to the whole world, certainly everybody will admit that. To encourage the Turks in their present reform movement may be the best possible way for us to help the people whose fortunes have been intermingled with theirs for so many years.
I am not so much concerned with the mere proposition of ratifying the Treaty. My plea goes far beyond that. America still has an opportunity to establish the great principles in the Near East for which we stood in participating in the War. Conditions are pretty much the same in Turkey, in Syria, in Palestine, in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, and even in Persia. A new nationalism is in the air. It is a patriotic movement. Old traditions are being brushed aside. The World War has broken down barriers that have stood firm for centuries. These people are looking to the West for help. What is to be our attitude?
All of the other countries are watching with profound interest the experiment that is being made by the Turks in separating Church and State. Moslems, Christians, and Jews are growing closer together in a program for national unity. Turkey is setting
49The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
the pace for her Moslem neighbors, and I was not surprised to observe that these very neighbors wish her success in her undertaking. Even the Secretary of the Ex-Caliph replied to me the other day in Switzerland when I asked him how His Majesty felt over the deportation: “We believe the leaders in Angora acted upon patriotic motives. The reforms they are bringing about are greatly needed but might have been accomplished more gradually. If they succeed in carrying out their program, the world will give them credit for the great achievement.”
In the face of these problems, in the face of these social changes in which the fortunes of a large number of people are at stake, no amount of back-biting is going to do a particle of good. Refusing to recognize the Turks as a civilized nation and urging the non-ratification of the Peace Treaty on these grounds will not help the situation. A constructive plan of co-operation is required, if we are to be of any service to the peoples of the Near East who are groping around in bewilderment, and who are depending upon freedom-loving America for sympathy and for guidance.
Would it be too much to ask those who have assumed the responsibility for molding public opinion in America on the question of the Lausanne Treaty, to study the record carefully of the three American Colleges in the Near East which have done much toward introducing democratic ideals into that part of the world?
We have been guests of the Turks for sixty years. Our Constantinople Colleges have never closed their doors to students of any nationality. They have stood as perpetual Peace Conferences representing at least twenty different nations. It is equally significant that we have never been obliged by the Turks to close our doors for a single day on account of wars or political disturbances. Even during the period of conflict between the various nations, we have maintained ourselves as international institutions. There we stand today, doing business as usual, with almost nine hundred students in the two institutions at Constantinople, among them, I am happy to announce, the brother of Ismet Pasha himself. We are not interested in politics. Our work is that of education. As in days past, we are conforming to the regulations of the established Government. The Turks have faith in us and we have faith in them, because we have faith in humanity, and our sole interest in being in the Near East is to help all of these races to help themselves.
50TURKEY KEEN TO AID AMERICAN SCHOOLS
By MRS. (GEORGE HUNTINGTON,
Wife of the Vice-President of Robert College and Daughter of Cleveland H. Dodge
(From an Interview in The New York Times')
Within the last few years Turkish students who received their education at Robert College have become influential. Before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 Abdul Hamid refused to allow Turks to study at the American colleges, but since then we have had Turkish students and the oldest of them are now in a position to advance our educational ideals in Turkey.
There is now a Turkish university which is training both men and women, while Robert College and the Constantinople College for Women have a far larger proportion of Turks in their student bodies than ever before.
We are not trying to Americanize the Turks but to bring out their native culture by adapting our curriculum to their needs. We do not compel the Mohammedan students to attend chapel exercises or Bible classes, and it is interesting to see that they show far more interest in the religious side of our work now than they every did before.
Although we have twenty-three different nationalities represented at Robert College we have very little trouble in the student body. They quickly absorb our ideals of religious toleration and Greek, Armenian, and Turkish students live together amicably.
I have just received word that at the commencement of the two American colleges in Constantinople many prominent Turks were present and gave every indication of their hearty support of the work of the colleges.CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U. S.
Washington, D. C.
April 15, 1926.
To Members of the Senate:
Ratification of the Turkish-American Treaty was urged by the Executive Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States at a meeting last week at which the following resolution was adopted :
“The lack of treaty relations between the United States Government and Turkey is a menace to American interests in Turkey. To protect adequately these interests it is essential that the Turk-ish-American Treaty negotiated at Lausanne in 1923 shall be ratified by the Senate in this session of Congress.
“Under this treaty our interests are not discriminated against. We are given the same rights and privileges as other nations. At the present time the United States is working under an informal agreement with the Turkish Government which cannot be continued beyond midsummer.
“The strongest argument in favor of its ratification is the fact that the leading representatives of our commercial, religious and educational interests in Turkey unite in urging speedy and favorable action.
“The Chamber of Commerce of the United States has advocated the ratification of this treaty and the Executive Committee urges upon the Senate the necessity of acting upon it during the present session, in order that orderly and friendly relations may be established with Turkey and our commercial, religious and educational interests safeguarded.”
Very truly yours,
Elliot H. Goodwin,
Resident Vice-President.
February 5, 1926.
To Members of the Senate:
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States is on record in favor of the Turkish-American Treaty negotiated at Lausanne nearly three years ago, which is still awaiting ratification by the Senate.
There is a real business interest in this country in Turkey as a present and promising export market for American products, and further interest in many of the materials of industry available in Turkey. The lack of treaty relations between the United States Government and Turkey is a handicap to American trade with Turkey and the Near East. When difficulties are encountered and
52Chamber of Commerce of the United States
formal or informal representations are required before a foreign government, an ambassador duly qualified, speaking on the basis of treaty rights definitely set forth, is much more effective than a “Commissioner” or “Representative,” proceeding without the benefits of a treaty basis. It would be unfortunate if the opportunity for cultivation of mutually profitable trade relations between this country and Turkey should be sacrified because of minor disagreements on certain provisions of the pending treaty.
European governments have entered into treaties with Turkey on Terms no more favorable than those offered our own Government. This fact gives to the nationals of our leading competitors in trade an advantage which is making American trade difficult. Continued delay in ratifying the Turkish-American Treaty will give to our European rivals further advantages which will become increasingly hard to overcome.
This question was considered by the Chamber of Commerce at its Annual Meeting in 1924, at which time the following resolution was adopted:
“To safeguard American commercial, industrial, regilious and philanthropic interests in Turkey it is essential that our relations with that country be regularized without delay. The Lausanne Treaty has been endorsed by leading representatives of these interests. It secures to us the same rights as all other countries and is such a treaty as would be negotiated with any other sovereign state. While it is not as satisfactory a treaty as might have been secured under other conditions, it is wholly consistent with American principles of the 'open-door’ and territorial and political integrity of sovereign states. This Chamber therefore urges the prompt ratification of this treaty.”
The Chamber of Commerce feels that this treaty secures the essential rights of this country and ought to be ratified. I hope that you will lend your support in securing for the treaty prompt consideration and ratification by the Senate.
Very truly yours,
John W. O’Leary,
President.
53CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U. S.
Washington, D. C.
Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Submitted by the Board of Directors for Consideration at the Twelfth Annual Meeting, Cleveland, Ohio, May 6-8,1924
John H. Fahey, Publisher, New York Evening Post, New York, N. Y., Chairman.
Henry T. Allen, Major General, United States Army {Retired), Washington, D. C.
Joseph H. Defrees, Defrees, Buckingham. and Eaton, Attorneys, Chicago, III.
Walker D. Hines, Attorney, New York, N. Y.
Fred I. Kent, Vice-President, Bankers Trust Company, New York, N. Y.
Harold G. Moulton, Director of Institute of Economics, Washington, D. C.
Leo S. Rowe, Director General, Pan American Union, Washington, D.C,
Silas H. Strawn, Chairman of Board, Montgomery, Ward & Co., Chicago, III.
Frank A. Vanderlip, Chairman of Board, American International Corporation, New York, N Y. ,
F, O. Watts, President, First National Bank, St. Louis, Mo. Clarence M. Woolley, President, American Radiator Co., New York, N. Y.
Diplomatic relations between the United Statess and Turkey were severed on April 20, 1917. No declaration of war followed, but there have been no official relations between the two countries since that date, although the interests of the United States have been protected by an American High Commissioner at Constantinople since 1919.
The United States was not a party to the Treaty of Sevres between the Allied Powers and Turkey, nor was it a party to the Lausanne Treaty of July 24, 1923, between the Allied Powers and Turkey which revised the previous treaty. However, at the invitation of Great Britain, France, and Italy, American representatives were present at the Lausanne Conference. They expressed the position of our government in matters of direct American interest and of general humanitarian concern.
The Treaty of Lausanne vitally changed the status of Turkey, particularly by the abrogation of the capitulations. This directly affected American interests in Turkey. To regularize the relations of the United States with Turkey and to better protect the interests
54Chamber oe Commerce of the United States
of our nationals under the new conditions, the Department of State authorized the United States Minister at Berne to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce and a treaty of extradition with the delegates of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. These treaties were signed at Lausanne on August 6, 1923.
Considerable opposition to ratification of the Treaty of amity and commerce has developed. The opponents of the treaty and the sponsors of the protest lodged with the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs claim that American interests are not adequately protected, that American rights have been sacrificed to obtain the Chester concessions and that America has abandoned its Christian sympathizers to Moslem rule. Many of the attacks breathe the fire of racial and religious feeling. A fair examination of the treaty and of the arguments against and in favor Of its ratification is essential if principle and not prejudice is to decide the question.
In the first place, is it essential to differentiate between the two treaties of Lausanne-—the one :signed on July 24, 1923, by the Allied Powers, to which the United States was not a party, and the Ameri-can-Turkish treaty of August 6, 1923 ? Editorial .comment with many implications of American association with the Allied Treaty indicates a widespread misunderstanding of the situation. The two treaties are separate and distinct, but the Allied Treaty so vitally affected the American negotiations that it is essential to mention, if briefly, the salient points:
(1)	It is signed by Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and Turkey.
(2)	The Straits Convention provides that the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles shall be open to the merchant ships of all nations and to warships under certain conditions.. (Russia and Bulgaria signed this convention, a fact most important to note.)
(3)	The capitulations are abolished.
(4)	Constantinople remains definitely Turkish, and all foreign troops are withdrawn.
(5)	Eastern Thrace is restored to Turkey.
(6)	Turkey is reduced territorially by a formal detaching of the mandated States of Syria, Mesopotamia (Irak) and Palestine.
(7)	Greeks in Turkey and Turks in Greece are to be exchanged to render each country homogeneous as rapidly as possible. The League of Nations is given supervision of this wholesale compulsory exchange of populations.
(8)	Turkey provides certain guarantees for the protection of minorities.
It is important to note that America, not having been at war with Turkey and having no part in the Allied Treaty, had no direct concern in the new territorial status of Turkey.	In ne-
55The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
gotiating the treaty America could only accept the territorial integrity of the new Turkish state as determined by the Allied Treaty. The American treaty followed closely the lines of the Allied Treaty but without its territorial, political and financial features.
The charge that American rights have been sacrificed to obtain the so-called Chester concessions can be dismissed with a word. Before the negotiations for the treaty began, it was common knowledge that these “concessions” were not American but were controlled by other interests. And the concessions were ratified in the Turkish assembly some four months before the treaty was signed.
As the charge of the surrender of American rights is largely based on the abrogation of the capitulations, it is necessary to clear the fog of misconception which engulfs this much misunderstood word. What were the capitulations and how does this abrogation affect the rights of foreigners, particularly Americans, in Turkey?
Under the regime of the capitulations, foreigners resident in Turkey were practically exempt from Turkish jurisdiction. The Turkish courts had only a restricted jurisdiction in suits between foreigners and Turkish nationals. Foreign schools and institutions were exempt from taxation and from regulation by the Turkish Government so that students and proteges of these institutions sometimes enjoyed privileges and immunities denied Turkish nationals. The capitulations gave foreign nations the right to limit the customs duties of the Turkish State and, under a broad interpretation of one of the clauses, foreign governments even established their own post-offices in Turkish territory. These were the capitulations which Turkey revoked. Only conquering force, the Turks declared, could re-impose these intolerable restrictions on their sovereignty which force alone was able to maintain. And, as Turkey had made itself master in its own house, the Allied Powers at Lausanne bowed to the inevitable and consented to the abrogation of the capitulations. As the United States obviously cannot employ force to re-impose them, it then becomes a question of whether or not the present treaty provides adequate safeguards to replace them.
A study of the text of the treaty shows that it secures for American nationals all the rights accorded to nationals of the most favored foreign government. They are, however, subject to Turkish laws, with certain exceptions. American nationals are exempt from military service and both individuals and companies are exempt form forced loans or special levies on property even in time of war. They are also guaranteed against confiscation of their property without due process of law or indemnity. The most important exception is that in matters of personal status and family law, marriage, divorce, etc., and the law of succession as regards movable property, Christian American nationals are subject to American jurisdiction, not to Turkish (Mohammedan) law.
56Chamber of Commerce of the United States
The treaty, therefore, gives to American nationals equality of treatment with foreigners and nationals, under the provisions of Turkish law. As the efficiency and the integrity of the Turkish administration of justice has been open to serious question, it is essential to note that in a formal declaration of July 24, 1923, Turkey agrees to take into the service of her government a number of European legal counselors to improve the administration of justice. They have, however, no power of action and this declaration means little. It does contain, however, one clause of great importance, particularly to American commercial interests. Clause four states, “In civil and commercial matters, all reference to arbitration and clauses and agreements providing therefor are allowed and the arbitral decisions rendered in pursuance thereof shall be executed, on being signed by the president of the court in the first instance, who shall not refuse his signature unless the decision be contrary to public order.” If faithfully fulfilled, this clause offers a prompt and satisfactory method of settling trade and other disputes, in accord with the principle of abritration which America has widely and wisely championed.*
The treaty gives the freedom of the Straits to the war and merchant vessels of the United States and in all matters of commerce and trade, the United States is guaranteed all the privileges accorded the most favored nations. There are holes in the most favored nation theory. Turkey, for instance, has put an almost prohibitive duty on vegetable oil products of which we are practically the sole exporter and our objections are countered by the statement that we are given absolute equality of treatment with other nations. The question pf modification of the most favored nation theory to fit cases of practical monopoly of exportable products is, however, beside the point. The essential consideration is that America has secured all that other nations have secured and American trade and commerce has been guaranteed a strict equality of opportunity. In view of our continued and insistent advocacy of this distinctly American policy of the open door, we cannot consistently ask for more.
The Federated American Chambers of Commerce of the Near East, representative of the American commercial interests most vitally concerned in a.commercial treaty with Turkey are convinced “that the treaty ought to be ratified by our government and at as early a date as possible.”
The extent of the trade of the United States with Turkey is indicated by the following table, which also makes plain the demoralizing effect on trade of the war in 1922 and the disturbed conditions of 1923*.
*New Civil, Criminal and Commercial Codes, embodying the best modern practice and custom, have been enacted in 1926 since the above report was written. See “New Judicial Era Dawns in Turkey,” page 78.)
57The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
Year	Exports to Turkey Imports from Turkey
1913...............    $3,313,821	$22,159,285
1914:.............,..	3,328,519	20,843,077
1920 ..,............. 42,247,798	39,766,936
1921	................. 25,785,480	20,143,037
1922 ..,............. 15,980,548	21,682,492
1923	................   3,464,034	13,008,076
The principal articles exported to Turkey by the United States are foodstuffs, petroleum and cotton piece goods, while Turkish exports to the United States comprise principally tobacco, fruits, hides and skins, mohair and carpets. In spite: of the great decrease in exports to Turkey in 1923, statistics now available for the first six months of that year show that in that period the United States lead the world in value of imports into Turkey.
Turkey has been primarily an agricultural country. Her mineral deposits are practically untouched and her transportation system needs extensive development. So in addition to the above record of trade with the United States attention ought to be directed to the possibility of American participation in the eventual constructive development of Turkey.
The status of American philanthropic and religious institutions in Turkey under the new treaty is the subject of heated controversy and the target of bitter attack. It is true that these institutions will no longer occupy the position they enjoyed during the regime of the capitulations. The Turks have formally agreed that American institutions, “As regards fiscal charges of every kind would be on a footing with similar Turkish institutions and would be subject to administrative arrangements of a public character as well as to the laws and regulations governing the latter. It is, however, understood that the Turkish Government will take into account the conditions under which these establishments carry on their work and, insofar as schools are concerned, the practical organization of the teaching arrangements.” This means so little and is so vaguely committing that it is desirable to explain the Turkish point of view regarding foreign religious, educational and philanthropic institutions which dictates their stand in the matter. They regard some of these institutions as having in the past been outposts of the sponsoring governments in encroaching on Turkish sovereignty and territory, furnishing, because of the element of religious friction involved, an excellent excuse for continued intervention in Turkish affairs. They say they are willing to give religious freedom to all non-Mussulman minorities, but in the past they have been compelled to accede privileges to the Christian proteges of some institutions which have been denied to other Turkish subjects. They have had practically no control over these institutions, many of which they accuse of flagrant anti-Turkish propaganda. The assistance given almost solely to Christian minorities and the frequent ignoring of
58Chamber of Commerce of toe United States : .
suffering among the Turks has led them to doubt the really philanthropic spirit actuating these institutions. Now that they have achieved their independence, the Turks do not propose to permit foreign institutions in Turkey except on their terms of equality with Turkish institutions. The fact that most of the American institutions have been able to function even during the period of war and unregularized relations since 1917 is an indication that they are largely exempt from the above accusations.
In this connection it is interesting and important to quote from a letter of Dr., James L. Barton, Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners fot* Foreign Missions, dated November 24, 1923, and referred to by Secretary Hughes in his speech before the Council of Foreign Relations on January 24, 1924:
“To say that I have followed with keen interest the making of this treaty and its fate up to the present time is to express but mildly my own feeling as, well as the feeling of the American board and its friends. While the treaty does not contain all that we would like, yet I am sure I express the judgment of the officers of the American board and, so far as I know, the missionaries both in the field and here at home when I say that it is our earnest hope that the treaty will be ratified by the Senate, and that without acrimonious debate. We are convinced that this is the best treaty that could be secured under the circumstances, and that it will furnish a basis for negotiations and for securing privileges not covered by the treaty.
“If the treaty should be rejected, I am convinced that the continuance of American institutions in Turkey, with their large invested interests, would be jeopardized. Under the treaty there are grounds for believing that they will be permitted to continue. 1 refer to educational, religious* medical, industrial and philanthropic enterprises hitherto carried on by Americans, representing large American investments in, Turkey. There are indications tha,t the Government will look with increasing favor upon the continuation of these institutions and grant them enlarging privileges. This has already taken place in Smyrna, Tarsus and at some other points.”
In the same speech Secretary Hughes also quoted from a statement of Dr. Caleb F. Gates, President of Robert College of Constantinople, the most famous American educational institution in the Near East.
“Let us ask for à moment why it is that we have not made a treaty more in conformity with the wishes of so many of the American people. Is it because the American representatives were hot skillful and allowed themselves to be outwitted by the Turks? The American representatives acquitted themselves exceedingly well ; they gained the respect of their opponents as well as of the representatives of the allied powers. They câhie out of the conference with a reputation enhanced by the ability and fairness they had
59The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
shown, and they gained for their country fully as much as the representatives of the allied powers gained for theirs. * * *
“The Turks were determined to become sovereign in their own domain, and they were willing and prepared to fight in order to obtain this sovereignty, while the Allies were not. Even those Americans who now denounce this treaty as unsatisfactory were determined that their country should not go to war over these questions. * * * It is the only kind of a treaty which could have been made under the circumstances, when one party knew exactly what it wanted and was ready to fight to obtain it, and the other party was not willing to fight, but still wished to retain the former conditions. * * * As to the treaty itself, what does it give to us ? It gives the good-will of the Turks instead of their ill-will. That is certainly worth something to all who live and work in Turkey. To them the treaty affords an opportunity to work out the problems which their life in Turkey presents and to exercise what influence they may possess in favor of the right. It still leaves an opportunity for missionaries and educators to try to make the principles of righteousness known and practiced in Turkey and it gives to business men a field for their legitimate activities. * * * The schools and colleges established by Americans are carrying on their work and many of those that had been closed are reopening.”
Apparently those in closest touch with American educational and religious institutions in Turkey do not share the views of the opponents of the Treaty.
Closely linked with the question of foreign educational, religious and philanthropic institutions is the question of the status of Christian minorities in Turkey. Most of the criticism of the treaty has centered on these two points. A determined effort was made to include in the American treaty certain guarantees for these Christian minorities. The Turks refused on the ground that in the treaty of 1830, which the present treaty replaces, no mention was made of this question. It was alluded to in the Treaty of Lausanne with the Allied Powers but America was not a party to that treaty nor is she a member of the League of Nations which has jurisdiction in questions affecting minorities under that treaty. They claim, therefore, that there is no precedent whatever for any reference to minorities in the present treaty. Logically, their position is hard to assail.
It is essential, however, to point out that in the Treaty of Lausanne with the Allied Powers the Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language or religion. It further guarantees full freedom of conscience and worship and protection to all religious and charitable establishments. To non-Moslem minorities it guarantees the same political and civil rights as Moslems, with freedom of language, and provision that the customs of these minorities shall govern in questions
60Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of family law and personal status. The Turkish Government further agrees that these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.
If the fundamental fact of the independence of Turkey is recognized, it must be admitted that the present treaty is entirely in accord with the declared foreign policy of America in relations with independent and sovereign governments. We have repeatedly stated that we do not desire to interfere in their internal affairs. All we ask is that our nationals receive just and fair treatment according to the laws of the country in which they reside, that they not be unfairly discriminated against in favor of nationals of that country or other foreigners and that American trade and commerce be given as equality of opportunity with that of other nations. In the treaty with Turkey, the United States has been guaranteed these essential conditions. Any valid objection to the ratification of the treaty must, therefore, rest on the ground that Turkey does not merit recognition on the basis of the present treaty, with the trust in the integrity and honor of her new government that such recognition implies.
If the present treaty is not ratified, there are two other courses of action open to the United States ; to endeavor to negotiate a new treaty more favorable in its terms, or to refuse to have anything to do with the present government of Turkey. Certainly the present abnormal situation cannot continue, especially now that normal relations have been or are being re-established with the Allied Powers and other governments.
As far as the negotiation of a new and more favorable treaty is concerned, it is more than doubtful if better terms could be obtained. The United States has secured all that the Allied Powers were able to secure. Turkey could scarcely give us more, even if she so desired, because of the obvious difficulties such action would precipitate with other powers. And if she were unwilling, only, force could obtain a favorable revision. Armed force is out of the question and economic pressure would only bring joy and profit to competing nations.
On the question of the second alternative, of refusing to establish any intercourse or relationship with Turkey, there is a legitimate basis for difference of opinion. The opponents of recognition insist that the Turkish record of inefficiency and corruption, of injustice and oppression, renders impossible any recognition on the basis of reciprocal equality. Their argument has been given wide publicity and it is therefore only fair that the viewpoint of the proponents of recognition on the basis of the present treaty should be made clear. Those who advocate the ratification of the treaty argue that the interests of America will be more harmed than helped by the rejection of the treaty. They feel that we ought to begin to do business with Turkey on the basis of reciprocal trust
61The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
implied in the treaty and, if experience proves that Turkey is not worthy of this treatment, we can then refuse to have anything to do with her with our position immeasurably strengthened through having tried fairly and failed. They argue that if we do not ratify the treaty, American commerce and trade will suffer and the other nations who have resumed relations with Turkey will profit by our loss. They point out the urgent necessity of regulating our present anomalous position in Turkey. American representatives, American nationals and American institutions have no real status. This is not only a continued handicap to us in commercial and other relations but there is always present the danger of further complication and trouble. These are sound considerations but there is one other that they think ought weight heavily in the balance of opinion. ^Turkey has fought for her independence from the corrupt rule of an absolute monarchy and from the domination of her economic life by foreign governments. In her struggles, she has invoked the American doctrine of the right of self-determination for her people. She has established a representative government based largely on an American model. She looks to America for guidance in her political experiment and hopes for commercial relations with America to help restore her economic life. She looks to America in preference to other foreign countries because she feels that America, geographically'remote and free from territorial and political entanglements in the Near East, will be fair and reasonable. The record of our institutions in Turkey and the attitude of the present High Commissioner have stimulated this confidence. America has inspired and now has an opportunity to help make successful the most interesting experiment in representative government in recent years, one which is destined to have a marked effect on the East. Can America, they ask, in justice to her doctrines and her ideals hold aloof and refuse to assist?
Conclusion
To safeguard American commercial, educational and philanthropic interests in Turkey it is essential that our relations with that country be regularized without delay. The Lausanne Treaty, had been endorsed by representatives of these interests. It secures to us the same rights’as all pther countries, and is such a treaty as would be negotiated with any other sovereign state. It is wholly consistent with the American principles of the “open door,” reciprocal most-favored-ñation treatment and the territorial and political integrity of sovereign states.
We urge, therefore, a prompt ratification of this treaty.
62COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY IN TURKEY
(From “The Near East—A Survey of Political Trends in 1925/' by the Research Department of the Foreign Policy Association)
Signs of an approaching economic recovery became evident in Turkey in 1925. The exchange of population between Greece and Turkey, preceded and accompanied by the flight from the country of several thousand Armenians, had seriously depleted the population of the country, affecting agriculture, industry and business alike. Energetic measures were adopted by the Angora Government to counteract the effects of these wholesale migrations. Commerce, transportation and industry were given encouragement by various means. But greatest emphasis was placed by the Government on its measures for the rehabilitation of agriculture, on which the prosperity of the country was felt ultimately to depend.
* Agriculture a Basic National Activity
A Ministry of Agriculture had been created, under the auspices of which agricultural schools were opened in various parts of the country, to serve as training centres for prospective farmers. Advice to persons already engaged in farming was provided by agricultural directors and local agents travelling from place to place encouraging farmers to extend the acreage put under crop and improve the quality of their produce by the adoption of scientific farming methods. A model farm was established near Angora. Schools' were opened for the training of agricultural engineers and mechanics to meet the growing demands for scientific advice and repair and service stations. An Agricultural Bank was established to extend rural credits for the purchase of seed and machinery. Agricultural machinery, farm implements and gasoline for the operation of trucks were admitted to the country free of duty. The burdensome agricultural tithe which had heretofore absorbed approximately twelve per cent of the farmer's total produce, was changed to a ten per cent tax on produce brought to market, leaving untaxed that portion of the crop which was consumed by the farmer or retained by him for the next seeding.
The Government provided a seed selection service which already in 1925 had helped to improve the quality of crops. A cereal exchange was organized on February 21 for the marketing of cereals and vegetables. The formation of agricultural societies and co-operative unions was encouraged as a means of disseminating information on up-to-date methods of farming.
The practical effect of these measures had already begun in 1925 to be evident in those localities where the activities of the Department of Agriculture were most pronounced. Partly on account of these measures, partly on account of favorable weather conditions, and partly on account of the reoccupation of the Smyrna district by husbandmen and fruit-growers, the raisin crop of the region for the first
63The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
time approximately reached pre-war proportions, while fig-production for 1925 exceeded that of pre-war years. The growing of sugar-beets was begun in the Ushak district, a private company having been formed for promoting the enterprise. The Turkish Government subscribed 50 per cent of the authorized capital of this company in the hope of ensuring its success. In the Adana plain shortage of labor necessitated the use of agricultural machinery on an unprecedented scale. The cotton crop of the district far exceeded that of any previous year and the yield of grain was above the average. In Turkey as a whole the total output of tobacco represented a substantial increase over that of previous years.
The general effect of improved agricultural conditions upon the Turkish balance of trade for 1925 has not yet been ascertained; but the latest available statistics—those for the first six months of 1924 —indicated that exports had increased 78 per cent, or more than twice as rapidly as imports, which had increased only 35 per cent. It was anticipated that this tendency toward establishing a favorable balance of trade would be accelerated by reason of improved agricultural conditions in 1925, and that trade with European countries would continue to increase rapidly.
Industry, Trade and Finance
Special measures were also adopted for the encouragement of industry, by far the most important of these being the amendments to the law of December, 1913, granting certain privileges and immunities to industrial enterprises planping to utilize plant worth a minimum of LT1,000 and to employ workmen whose aggregate annual salaries would reach a minimum of LT750. Privileges and immunities extended to such enterprises included a grant of uninhabited state land tax-free for building purposes and other land grants for purposes of transportation and communication; exemption from payment of customs duties on materials needed to construct or enlarge factories, on raw materials not obtainable within Turkey, and on machinery for the construction of railroads and canals for the transportation of manufactured products. Factories, land and buildings were to be exempted from the land tax, income tax and other taxes, whether national, provincial or municipal.
By founding a Bank of Industry authorized to take over factories the value of whose plants was estimated at LT15,000,000, it was hoped still further to stimulate the economic activity of Turkey. Corporations were to be created to exploit these factories, 51 per cent of the stock in such corporations to be Turkish owned and the remainder to be offered for foreign subscription. Notable among the factories recently founded were the cotton-ginning plant and cotton-mill at Adana, the latter operating 8,000 spindles and having a capacity for producing 1,500 meters of cloth per day. Arrangements were also made for opening at Constantinople and Karagach factories for the manufacture of agricultural implements, locomotives, railway rolling stock,
64Foreign Policy Association
etc. Iron resources of the country were investigated during the latter part of the year by an Austrian expert engaged by the Ministry of Commerce. These activities represented, however, only a small beginning in the work of building up indigenous industries.
More tangible progress was evident in Turkey, in the improvement of means of transportation, as part of the general project for the advancement of agriculture. A special effort was made to improve roads in the Constantinople district, where road taxes were doubled, in order that the city might be more closely connected with its legitimate hinterland and come to depend less on imported foodstuffs and more on Turkish farm produce made accessible by the government road-building program. In other districts road-building proceeded more slowly. Notable progress was made in several districts in the construction and improvement of Turkish railway lines and service during the year. One hundred and twenty-five miles of new road was constructed on the Angora-Sivas-Samsun line, work proceeded on the Kara Dereh-Eregli line designed to tap large timber reserves, and on the Arghana-Diarbekr-Aradeh line for transporting ore from the copper mines of Arghana; an appropriation was made in March for constructing a railway line to Ak Serai and a project was adopted for linking Konia in the interior with Adalia on the Mediterranean coast.
65THE TURKISH REPUBLIC—1925
By ELBERT CRANDALL STEVENS,
Executive Secretary, Stamboul Branch in Turkey of The Young Men’s Christian Association
(From the Current History Magazine, March, 1925)
Probably nowhere else in the world has business been more bound up with affairs of Government than in Turkey. For 2,581 years the site of Constantinople has been continuously coveted by many of the nations of the world, both for its strategic position and for its commercial importance as an emporium and distributing centre. The hidden riches of Anatolia and its trade routes to the East have been the goal of many a deal in which big Governments have taken a hand and the source of credit by which the local Government has financed itself. In spite of a high percentage of loss on the commercial balance sheet, of devastating wars, of momentous changes of control, of dead seasons, of occasional oppressive restrictions and of lax guarantees, trade has vigorously survived and has kept alive populations and perpetuated a wholesome competition of races, nations, business organizations and men.
Unexploited Resources
Internal resources have remained relatively unexploited. Imports, therefore, considerably exceeded exports in 1924, reaching a value of $75,000,000, as compared with $35,000,000 in 1923. The margin of profit comes mainly from the handling of goods from Eastern and Black Sea ports in transit to the West, North and South, and vice versa. Chief imports are textiles, flour, sugar, canned milk, fruits, animal and vegetable oils, petroleum products, metals, machinery, live stock, paper and small luxuries. Exports are tobacco, figs, olives, raisins, nuts, gums, licorice, opium, mohair, wool, sheep casings, silk, chrome ore, emery stone and the single manufactured article of carpets, except for some small bazaar goods made up in the country. Growing of wheat, fruits, vegetables and some cotton and hemp in the fertile coast plains and in valleys which cut inland through the fringe of rocky hills' surrounding the barren, dish-shaped plateau of Anatolia, and over perhaps a fifth of the area of Thrace and Rumelia; the raising of sheep, goats, water buffalo and silkworms, and coastal fishing, provide the people of the country with practically all their simple requirements. Crude salt is taken in quantity from several lakes in the central plateau. A fair quality of coal is mined in sections near the Black Sea coast. Building stone is plentiful, and a few forest tracts supply firewood and common, but not much hard or finer wood, for building purposes. Scientific forestry is but little practiced, but seriously needed. Although much expert handwork and some small-scale manufacturing is to be seen, large factories and
66Elbert Crandall Stevens
major industrial factilities are, as intimated above, still practically non-existent in Turkey.
Surveys have indicated, however, that many of the materials for industrial development could be produced in abundance. Coal, iron, copper, lead, silver and oil are the principal minerals available. At present only 2,300 miles of railroad are in operation, roads are generally bad, and though camels, donkeys and buffalo carts carry unbelievable loads, they are quite incapable of transporting ores in quantity. Shipping to and from more than a dozen excellent ports on the 3,500 miles of sea-coast remains one of the dominent industries. Extensive irrigation projects have been outlined, and these, together with the more rapid introduction of modern machinery, would greatly increase the agricultural output, which is the goal of the other and major industry of the country—farming. The climate shows nearly all varieties, but is generally more temperate than is commonly supposed.
In view of the opportunities in Turkey for exploitation not only of trade but also of production, of the fact that the Turkish people themselves had had insufficient«technical experience and capital to make much of either, and of the further fact that a weak Government can be coaxed with cash or diplomatically induced to give concessions, foreign companies long found Turkey a profitable field for their ventures. The capitulations, given first in 1535 to disembarrass the Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent of the troubles of foreign residents who could not reasonably be compelled to submit to Moslem law, had grown into a great system setting up within Turkey colonies of foreigners which were virtually separate small States. With such privilege in their hands, energetic and able foreigners organized, directed and drew profit from the greater part of the industrial and commercial enterprises, excepting farming and fishing, in the country, including principally mining, silk culture, tobacco curing, fig packing, public utilities, railroading, shipping, import and export, insurance and banking. Secondary positions in their companies were by right or favor given mostly to non-Moslem natives, and much of the remaining business was more or less effectively handled by these elements. Moreover, owing to the reckless borrowing of extravagant sovereigns and the strategy of European diplomats, .the finances of Turkey were brought under the control of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, composed almost entirely of representatives of foreign creditors, and which thereby virtually held the country in economic vassalage.
Measures to Regain Control
With the establishment of the new republic a revolutionary change occurred in this traditional situation. ' Economic and financial control by foreigners was naturally considered as subversive of the dignity and sovereignty of the nation. The capitulations, which had been abrogated at the entry of Turkey into the World War, then revived under the allied occupation, were again swept away and in no uncertain fashion. Having obtained a reduction in the national debt
67The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
from ¿120,000,000 to 80,000,000 (Turkish pounds)—a reduction in proportion to the territories lost from the old empire of 1912—the Government is carrying on a so far successful struggle to control the distribution of revenues and payment to her creditors, which she insists on making in paper instead of gold. In contravention of the constitutional provision that all sons of Turkey should be considered Turks without distinction, effective measures have been taken to persuade foreign companies, particularly those holding concessions of public utilities, to employ Moslems as far as possible in preference to others. All concerns have been obligated to register and to pay substantial taxes. Foreigners and natives alike must also pay high income taxes, also school and road assessments, collection of which, however, has not yet been thoroughly or fairly handled. Import duties were raised in general from 11 per cent, to 55 per cent., a prohibitive figure for many articles on which the rate will thus doubtless eventually be forced down. Embargo is in force on foreign coal. By every sign and in every way the new Government is set on securing moth nominal and actual economic mastery within the country's borders.
Whether or not she will succeed is not yet evident. Many have prophesied failure, owing to lack of experience and capacity on the part of those whose enterprises are being encouraged by the Government. Certainly business has declined with alarming rapidity during the past two years, particularly that carried on by foreign firms. Scores, if not hundreds, of these have been discouraged or lost faith and hence wound up their business and gone home. Yet substantial older firms and a few vigorous new ones are adapting themselves to the new conditions. The magnificent harbors of Constantinople and Smyrna, but recently so crowded with ships, merchant and naval, are now, it is true, relatively bare. Life has been far quieter and even more orderly since the big battle fleets of the Allies sailed away, but the absence of cargo fleets as well gives cause for concern. Competent Moslems are but slowly forthcoming to replace discharged or departed employes of other faiths.
Reconstruction
Yet there seems to be no valid fundamental reason why the racial Turk cannot learn to work in businesslike fashion. Soldiering, shepherding, farming and Government functioneering have been his chief occupations in the past. He must now work to live, for the Government can and will no longer keep up a large civil list and relatively few private fortunes are available for the support of a leisure class. Training and capital are recognized to be the two great requisites, which are at present considerably lacking. The preparation of Turkish experts is an educational matter which can be developed within a few years. Native capital will come slowly, with only a small amount of Government subsidy available. Foreign capital will
«8Elbert Crandall Stevens
come back cautiousy with a gradual growth of confidence, and the eventual application of the Citizenship law will encourage the able non-Moslem nationals still remaining in the country and help to keep up standards of efficiency. With the wreckage of war in men and materials, the recent devastation of a great section of Anatolia, the not yet ended threat of foreign intervention from, predatory motives, the problems arising from the now more than half completed exchange of scores of thousands of Greeks from the interior with Moslems from Greece, and a large program of political and educational reform, too much cannot be expected in a short time. The currency situation, however, is favorable and preparations are being actively pushed for the economic reconstruction. The Turkish people have an opportunity and an incentive for work, however, which they have never had before, and they may well surprise the skeptics and gratify the friends who have faith in them. It is believed by sober men of afifairs in Turkey that, given sustained peace, recovery will come slowly but surely.American Men’s ând Women’s Clubs of Constantinople
Memorial to the Secretary of State and the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations
Constantinople, January 21, 1926.
The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Sir—Under the date of January 14th the following cable was despatched to Your Excellency:
“Meeting today of American residents representing all phases of American educational, missionary, philanthropic, financial and commercial interests in Turkey voted unanimously to express to you their earnest desire for prompt ratification Lausanne Treaty. They feél that their intimate personal knowledge of conditions in Turkey entitles their recommendations to more than ordinary consideration.”
At a meeting of the American Men's Club of Constantinople held on January 7th the ratification or the non-ratification by the Senate of the United States of the treaty between the United States and Turkey, signed at Lausanne on August 6th, 1923, was discussed with relation to its effect upon the interests of American citizens and companies located in Turkey. At that meeting it was unanimously decided that the best interests of Americans resident in Turkey demanded the early ratification of the Lauzanne Treaty, because:
1.	This treaty is not only a satisfactory one, but its terms are in some respects more favorable than those included in the treaties already concluded between Turkey and several of the European Powers.
2.	If the Lausanne Treaty is not ratified by the United States, the Americans resident in Turkey firmly believe that equally favorable terms could not be secured by subsequent negotiation of another treaty.
3.	The ratification of this treaty will be of material aid in stabilizing conditions throughout the Near East.
4.	Failure by the United States to ratify this treaty will result in injury to American interests in Turkey. The Turkish Government cannot be expected to continue indefinitely to extend to American citizens and American educational, philanthropic, financial and commercial interests the “most favored nation” treatment which it has thus far accorded to them, without there being a permanent basis for such treatment. Without a treaty these American interests will have no official standing in Turkey and will be in no position to defend themselves against any discrimination which the Government of Turkey can naturally be expected to enforce against them.
5.	The ratification of the Lausanne Treaty by the United States will most certainly prove of material aid to the Turkish Government in its present attempt to establish democratic principles in Turkey.
At the meeting of January 7th a committee representing American educational, commercial and philanthropic interests in Turkey was
70American Men's and Women's Clups of Constantinople
appointed to study the best means of bringing to the attention of the United States Government the opinion of American residents in Turkey respecting the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. It was felt that this opinion should be entitled to more than ordinary consideration, since the intimate personal knowledge of Americans resident in Turkey has caused them to become wholeheartedly in favor of early ratification.
This Committee conferred with representatives of every phase of American activity in Turkey, and decided to recommend to the next meeting of the American Men's Club of Constantinople, held on January 14th, that the above telegram be sent to you, as well as to Senator W. E. Borah, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
At the meeting held on January 14th the recommendations of this committee were unanimously approved, and the meeting furthermore voted unanimously to direct the committee to address this communication to Your Excellency as well as* to Senator Borah in the above sense, and to accompany this communication with the signatures and occupations of as many Americans as could be promptly reached, in support of the representations contained in their telegram of January 14th.
It is the sincere hope of the undersigned American residents of Constantinople that the Senate of the United States will ratify the Lausanne Treaty at a very early date.
American Men's and Women's Clubs of Constantinople.
Copy of Original Signatures to Letter of January 21, 1926 To the Secretary of State, U. S. A., from The American Men’s and Women’s Clubs of Constantinople
Name	Occupation in Constantinople American Address
Howard P. Emerson...........Teacher in Robert College.....290 Prospect St.,
Manchester, N. H.
Charles Stuart MacNeal......Teacher in Robert College.....224 W. Green St.,
Hazleton, Pa.
L. S. Moore.................Teacher in Robert College.....Galena, Illinois,
Robert P. Melton............Teacher in Robert College.....Birmingham, Ala.
J. P. Ninas.................Teacher in Robert College.....714 W. 17th St.,
Univ. PL, Nebr.
Harold Ogden White..........Professor in Robert College.........911 W. 18th St.,
Okla. City, Okla.
Frank L. Hewitt.............Professor in Robert College...93 High St.,
Winsted, Conn.
Howard I. Cole..............Professor in Robert College...24 Ellenton Ave.,
New Rochelle, N. Y.
E. A. Fertig................Professor in Robert College...2335 Flora Ave.,
Cincinnati, Ohio.
Harlan D. Conn...............Bursar in Robert College.....407 W. Columbus Av.,
Champaign, 111.
Raymond A. Hare.............Teacher in Robert College.....Goodman, Wise.
71The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
Name
Occupation in Constantinople American Address
E. Walker, Jr................Teacher	in	Robert	College...1238 Hill Rd.,
Reading, Pa.
Granfa Merrill ............Teacher in Robert College......4527 18th Ave. N. E.,
Seattle, Wash.
Ray E. Riffle..............Teacher in Robert College......R. F. D. No. 5, Box 43,
Walla Walla, Wash.
Harold L. Scott..............Teacher	in	Robert	College...Gronville, Ohio.
Cliffard B. Culver...........Teacher	in	Robert	College...419 Montgomery St.,
Syracuse, N. Y.
M. F. Emerson................Teacher	in	Robert	College...Milford, N. H.
Chas. F. Virtue..............Teacher	in	Robert	College...Cincinnati, Ohio.
Stephen E. Balch...........Supt. B. G. in Robert College...Plymouth, N. H.
Josephine R. Balch.........Secretary in Robert College Plymouth, N. H.
Elsie Van Zandt.................Secretary ................5 Ocean Ave.,
Ocean Grove, N. J.
Mary R. S. Riggs..........................................478 Manheim St. ,
Germantown, Pa.
Anne A. Barnum............................................10 Robinson Ave.,
Danbury, Conn.
Harry H. Barnum............Professor in Robert College....10 Robinson Ave.,
Danbury, Conn.
Alice Morgan ...........:..Teacher in Robert College......Bristol, R. I.
Edgar J. Fisher............Teacher in Robert College......823 Commerce Bldg.,
Rochester, N. Y.
Elizabeth Fehi Fisher........Housewife....................Rochester, N. Y.
Charles E. Estes...........Teacher in Robert College......18 East 41st St.,
New York City.
Caroline L. Estes..........Housewife......................1734 Ridge Ave.,
Evanston, 111.
George H. Huntington.......Vice-Pres., Robert College.....Riverdale, N. Y. C.
Elizab’h Dodge Huntington.................................Riverdale, N. Y. C.
C. F. Gates................President, Robert College......14 E. 41st St., N. Y. C.
Kathryn Newell Adams.......Pres., Constantinople College...105 Plumpton St.,
Walpole, Mass.
Katharine S. Pearce.........Chairman, Constantinople Coll.Blanvelt, N. Y.
Isabel F. Dodd.............Prof, of Art, Constantinople
College....................145 Chestnut St.,
Montclair, N. J.
Eleanor I. Burns............Dean, Constantinople College...18 E. 41st St., N. Y. C.
Janet E. Spooner............Teacher,	Constantinople	Coll.-Grand Marais, Minn.
Julia B. Hall............... Teacher,	Constantinople	Coll....Plainfield, N. J.
E. Marie Plapp.............. Teacher,	Constantinople	Coll....4140 N. Keeler Ave.,
Chicago, 111.
Editha Stone ..............—Teacher, Constantinople Coll....14 Parkway Road,
Stoneham, Mass.
Mary Lee Wallace............Teacher, Constantinople Coll....349 Henry Ave.,
Sewickley, Pa.
Stella Randolph .........—Teacher, Constantinople Coll....834 Madison St. N.W.,
Washington. D. C.
Clare W. Spooner............Teacher,	Constantinople	Coll.-Grand Marais, Minn.
C. Francis Johnson__________Teacher,	Constantinople	Coll....Red Wing, Minn.
Beatrice H. Johnson.........Teacher,	Constantinople	Coll.... Red Wing, Minn.
Mary A. Hall................Teacher,	Constantinople	Coll....l02 Gordon St.,
Perth Amboy, N. J.
Caroline Gurney ...........-Teacher, Constantinople Coll....Sparta, Wise.
Helen P. App...............„Acting Business Manager,
Constantinople College ......130 W. 16th St.,
Ida W. Prime..............Supt. of Dormitories in
Constantinople College
Apt. 44, N. Y. C. .Huntington, L. I.
Dir. Pro. Department,
William S. Murray.........- Constantinople College
122 McLean Ave.,
Yonkers, N. Y. c/o Dr. Holden.
72American Men's and Women's Clubs of Constantinople
Name
Minetta Hargraves
Lewis Heck .....
Clara E. DuBrau.
Geneva Leach ...........
Ruth Frances Woodsmall.
Clara L. Bissell........
Elizabeth B. Mayston....
Dorothy Rutherford .....
Dorothy T. Heck.........
C. D. Campbell....,.....
W. H. Correa............
W. B. Miller............
V. Roman Way....._....„.
Kendall H. Field........
C .R. Wylie, Jr.........
John G. Ardori..........
Edward T. Perry.........
Ellen Elgie Scott.......
Ellen W. Catlin.........
Cecelia J. Berg.........
Anna B. Jones...........
Walter B. Wiley.........
Gwendolyn F. Perry......
Mary E. Kinney
Helen W. Wells.
Fred Field Goodsell...
Luther R. Fowle........
R. Finney Markham......
Evangeline M. Markham. Frank C. Ferguson......
John Bayne Ascham......
Charles T. Riggs.......
Theron J. Damon........
Sarah Randle Riggs.....
E. T. Leslie...........
Occupation in Constantinople American Address
..Secretary to President,
Constantinople College ......Denver, Colo.
...Engr., Constantinople Branch,
Edgar B. Howard, Rgt.........Harrisburg, Pa.
..American Hospital,
Asst. Supt. of Nurses........-.Narrangansett Pier,
R. I.
...Instr. of Nurses, Am. Hospital Union Hill, Maine.
...Exec. Secy. Y. W. C. A. in
.Near East ...................Indianapolis,	Ind.
,.Y .W. C. A. Secretary..................Claremont,	Calif.
..Bus. Secy. Y. W. C. A. in
Near East  -.................Brooklyn, N. Y.
.’.Health Education Secy.,
Y. W. C. A......................-Washington, Pa.
................................    Harrisburg,	Pa.
...Gen. Mgr., Standard Oil Co....26 Broadway, N. Y. C.
..Asst. Gen. Mgr., Standard Oil
Co.....................-.....26 Broadway, N. Y. C.
..Chief Acct., Standard Oil Co....26 Broadway, N. Y. C.
..Station Acct., Standard Oil Co.26 Broadway, N. Y. C.
..Asst., Standard Oil Co........ .441 Barker Ave.,
Peoria, 111.
..Asst., Standard Oil Co........639 King St.,
Pottstown, Pa.
..General Motors Export Co.......224 W. 57th St.,
New York City.
..American Board Mission........16 Atwood St.,
Hartford, Conn.
..Gedik Pasha School............Ann Arbor, Mich.
..Gedik Pasha School............292 Pearl St.,
Burlington, Vt.
..American Board ...............354 E. 53d St.,
Chicago, 111.
..American School, Stamboul.....25 Penwick St.,
..American Mission, Merzifoun... Somerville 45, Mass.
Granville, Ohio.
„American Mission	Board.....16 Atwood St.,
Hartford, Conn.
..Principal, American School for
Girls, Scutari ..............12 Monument St.,
West Medford, Mass.
..American Schools for Girls,
Marash.......................802 Wheaton Ave.,
Kalamazoo, Mich.
..American Board Mission........2014 Dana St.,
Berkeley, Calif.
..Treas., Amer. Board Mission....Thetford, Vt.
..Amer. Boys School, Const......2916 Grove St.,
Rosedale, Kansas.
..Amer. Boys School, Const......Rosedale, Kansas.
..Amer. Boys School, Const......1530 31st St.,
Birmingham, Ala.
..Repr., “A Nash Clothing Co.”.„420 Plum St.,
Cincinnatti, Ohio.
..Secy., Amer. Board Mission...._14 Beacon St.,
Boston, Mass.
..Secy., Amer. Chamber of Com.27 W. 44th St.,
New York City..
.Teacher, Robert College Community School ....................Northampton, Mass.
..Acct., Amer. Board Mission....52 So. Lincoln St.,
Hinsdale, 111.
73The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
Name -
C .B. Flagg.........
A. H. Leavitt.......
J. R. Gordon........
J. P. Wagman........
Asa K. Jennings.....
Elbert G. Stevens.:.
Harry T. Baker......
Ernest M. Hedden....
D. W. Ross..........
Chester M. Tobin,;..
Celma A. Ruggles....
Anna H. Mitchell....
Jean Moodie Stevens
I. C. Gary..;...:...
F. B. Stem...:......
F. W. Bell..........
W. P. Johnston......
P. E. King....•.....
Occupation in Constantinople American Address
.„..With Near East Relief...........160 Potter Ave.,
Providence, R. I.
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.....American Express Company......Pleasantville, N. Y.
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...With Turkish Odjak (Foyer)...347 Madison Ave., *
New York City.
...Secretary, Y. M. C. A..........347 Madison Ave.,
New York City.
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Newark, N. J.
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Peoria, 111.
...Russian Relief ................Washington, D. C.
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...Pres., Gary Tobacco Company...New York City.
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.Asst. Secy.-Treas.,
Gary Tobacco Company........Mebane, N. C.
.Alat'on Tobacco Co...........Davidson, N. C.
.Alton Tobacco Co.............Concord, N. C.
74NEW TURKEY LOOKS TO AMERICAN AID
Approval of Lausanne Treaty Urgently Needed in Efforts Toward Modern Ideas By JOHN H. FINLEY
(Copyright, 1926, by The New York Times Company)
CONSTANTINOPLE, May 22, 1926.—It is; now three, years lacking only a few weeks since I saw Ismet Pgsha come into Angora on a flower-bedecked train bearing the draft of the treaty which had been signed by the representatives of the Western powers at Lausanne. In that great crowd which gathered at the railroad station of that primitive capital on that proud day for the new republic I was the only person who wore a hat. I have now been in two large Turkish cities for twenty-fours each and have seen but one fez. It was worn by a hodjah .who had presumably an official license.
The enforcement of prohibition in the matter of headdress is completely effective—as effective as the seasonal tyranny of the fashion of straw hats in America. Even the muezzin in the mosque that once contained a special place of worship calls to prayer with a derby pulled down upon his ears.
I spoke a few nights ago to a hundred or more Turkish boys gathered around a great bonfire who from all outward appearances might be a group of New York boys at the Palisades Interstate Park. Moreover, they conducted themselves much as American boys.
All Turks no longer look alike since the removal of the fez or kalpak. I have not been able to distinguish the Turkish type, there being seemingly as great an admixture of racial strains as in any American city. Mustapha Kemal might pass for a Scandinavian in his Occidental garb.
It was perhaps only in mock seriousness that Carlyle in “Sartor Restartus” gave the science of clothes a,rank beside political economy and the theor}^ of the British Constitution, but the proclamation of basic constitutional law in Turkey and the adoption of a wise code by the Grand Assembly have probably not had as great an influence upon public, Turkish men or upon the attitude of the stranger who finds the Oriental transformed, outwardly at least, into a nondescript European as the decree concerning headwear.
In the interior the peasant has made a covering of pattinn that antedates the fez or bowler, but the color has disappeared from urban places. They have taken on the dull gray uniformity of Western civilization. If this had come about as a result of universal or widespread individual desire it would indicate more than outward transformation. But the outward change has been brought about by law from above, and one can but conjecture as to whether the form or s}^mbol will affect the spirit, whether clothes, as the
75The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
proverbs in many languages insist, will really make the man. What can be safely said is that the assimilation in clothing, since “society was founded upon clothes/' will make a special political and economic assimilation more ideally possible—at any rate less difficult.
This imitation may well be called the sinqerest praise of the West on the part of those who are directing public affairs in Turkey, because it is a visible symbol made manifest to the world at the great cost of an irreparable break with the past. It may not be an outward sign of an inward grace, but it is a badge of political courage and a pledge of faith in a social order that exists this side of the Bosporus.
Attested as this pledge is by the liberation of women, restrictions of the harem, the attempt to establish a sound judicial system, separation of Church and State and experimental adaptation of the economic policies of modern States to Turkey's medieval conditions, however grotesque and unhappy the consequence in some cases, one wonders why America has, of all nations, shown no official sympathy for this people struggling toward self-government out of a broody past which it did not officially denounce at the time by a severance of relations, but from which they are now trying to sever themselves.
We who refused to join the Allies in making war on unregenerate Turkey are slowest to make peace with those who are giving some evidence of desire to do better, even if the fruits they bring are not wholly meet for repentance. I find Americans who before the war devoted themselves, as missionaries, teachers and philanthropic workers, chiefly to the Christian minorities in Turkey, who remained in the Near East to minister to them in the dire sufferings of these minorities during the war and who are now turning their schools and their services largely to education of Turkish youths, are most eager for ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, both because they see in it the only practical way of regularizing the relations which are now carried on by sufferance and because they believe it will do more than any other way possible to protect the minority remnant still in Turkey.
These conscientious persons, some of whom imperiled their lives for the Armenians and their orphan children, who witnessed monstrous wrongs done by the Turks, and who would be the very last to condone what they have seen or known intimately about, are now unanimously, I am assured, asking that we accept what the other great powers among the Allies have approved, and thus give the weight of our friendly influence and support in an effort to pursue ideals which we have set for ourselves.
That American commercial interests in Turkey are unitedly in favor of ratification indicates that on economic grounds there is no question as to what course we should take touching the treaty. It is on moral grounds alone that there could be any conscientious opposition. But if one explores the facts in the atmosphere in
76John H. Finley
which events have occurred and through the eyes and with the humanistic sensitiveness of the Christians who have suffered here in Turkey with the minorities at the hands of the Old Turks, and who are now trying to apply their teachings directly to the assistance of these of the new regime, who are turning toward Western institutions for the economic, physical and moral salvation of their people from their impoverished and miserable state, one can have no hesitation in urging the immediate ending of the present anomalous state by ratification of the treaty through which alone official protection can be assured American interests here and encouragement given an earnest national effort toward modern social order.
No other country is doing more for Turkey through private agencies than America. Their service should be continued and may be even without “capitulations” (which there is no possiblity of restoring) if only the treaty is ratified. If it is defeated neither American business nor education can proceed in Turkey with a firm step or a permanent prospect.
77NEW JUDICIAL ERA DAWNS IN TURKEY
(From an Article in The New York Times, January 17, 1926)
The announcement published yestèrday in a special Geneva wireless dispatch to The New York Times that the Turkish Government had adopted the complete Swiss Civil Code revealed only a part of the project which contemplates an abrogation of the entire legal system hitherto in vogue in Turkey and its substitution by Occidental laws with their modern methods of procedure.
Besides the Swiss Civil Code, whose entire 1,800 articles have been adopted, there havë been taken 700 articles from the Italian Penal Code and 700 from the German Commercial Code.
After the translations, how proceeding in Rome and Berlin as well as in Berne, are completed, the texts of the three codes will be reviewed by the Faculty of Law at Angora, which was created a few weeks ago by President Mustapha Kemal Pasha, when, before the Grand National Assembly, he presented his project for borrowing the three codes in question.
Although Switzerland herself, in 1848, incorporated parts of the Constitution of the United States within her own, only to be qualified as to “State Rights” twenty-six years later, and certain South American states have borrowed freely from the “Code Napoleon,” this is said to be the first time that a nation has completely revolutionized its legal system by adopting foreign codes to such a great extent.
Of the effects of the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, the Geneva dispatch mentioned some of the important results on the Turkish people—the suppression of polygamy, an increase of obstacles to divorce and the disappearance of the special rights of minorities, so emphasized in the Lausanne Treaty—but the actual social-economic effect can hardly be estimated until the new laws shall have been promulgated and their procedure tested in the new1 ambient.
The way had already been paved for the new codes by the abolition of those religious courts where the statute of the Sheriat was administered according to the whim of the judge, and although the “medjelle” survived with certain Western forms, their application was at the mercy of the judge.
First an attempt was made to codify, just after the proclamation of the republic in October, 1923, all important decisions of the Sheriat courts, which had formed the backbone of all Ottoman jurisprudence for centuries, and give to them modern form. But after some months of investigation the commission which had the matter in charge resigned. A statistician among them had estimated that to perform the work properly would take a century of constant toil for fifty experts working ten hours every day of the 36,525 days of the century. So the Grand Assembly repealed them all in a bunch.
In the months that followed several forms of law which prevailed in other Moslem countries, including that of Iraq with its
78New Judicial Era Dawns in Turkey
Roman amendments, were suggested, but all were rejected. Meanwhile, separate laws were periodically legislated to take the place of the old—notably those on the relations between landlord and tenant, between debtor and creditor, and between partners or the members of the same corporation—while the old magistrates who had formerly adjusted' these matters were legislated out of office, and temporary ones appointed from the body of lawyers of Western education, who applied the new laws or decrees as fast as they were promulgated.
; At the present moment there are in Turkey only 600 lower tribunals, about one-third of which belong to the villages. These deal with all sorts of cases in their incipient form, and their magistrates combine the functions of the American police court magistrate with that of the justice of the peace. There are about half as many tribunals, principally situated in the larger towns, which deal with the more serious cases, civil, criminal and commercial, and to which cases may be transferred, but not appealed from the lower courts. All the old courts of appeal, which consumed years of litigation, have been abolished. Today the appeal is made directly to the Supreme Court, whether the question disputed be one of fact or legal application or interpretation of law.
The Supreme Court, created by Kemal Pasha, is composed of thirty-two members, who are subdivided into as many divisions as there are types of cases. This court now sits at Eskishehr, but will be transferred to Angora as soon as the new buildings being erected for it there are completed.
Among the 15,000 officials who now carry out by special appointment the temporary laws enacted while waiting for the new codes are about 600 “procurateurs” whose functions are to make an investigation in both civil and criminal cases before allowing the complainant to lay the matter before a tribunal. In this way many errors of arrest are avoided and much futile litigation is prevented. Moreover, the country is divided into six general and fifty subordinate inspectorships. It is the duty of the Inspector General to report directly to the Ministry of Justice any petitions of complaint signed by ten or more persons, and to see to the distribution of Government circulars containing the text of laws and decrees, and other information which the Government is anxious to lay before the people.
The Faculty of Law created by the President of the Republic will not only prepare the Swiss, Italian and German codes for presentation to the Grand National Assembly, but is also expected to provide the required magistrates and judges for the execution of the codes, although it is said to be likely that a large number of the present officials, who have proved their ability to execute the temporary laws and decrees, will be retained. At some future time a diploma from the Faculty will be an essential for every magistrate and judge.
The present legal situation as well as the adoption of the foreign codes is due to the initiative of the Minister of Justice, Mamud Essad Bey, who, in a communication recently addressed to a colleague in
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Rome, says he does not expect much difficulty in revoking the present laws and procedure and adopting the new. The worst, and most harrowing stage of progress, he says, has been passed—the abrogation of the old laws and customs—and in this, as for the future, he highly praises the intellectual class of Turkey, which he says in conversation and writing has done much missionary work among those who were fast bound to the old ideas which had developed through centuries of varied interpretations of the Koran.
The reforms contemplated by the Minister of Justice were first revealed by President Kemal Pasha, when he installed the Faculty of Law at the beginning of the last session of the Grand National Assembly. He added that the formation of a body of law officials was not his only aim. There would be work for them to do, serious work, such as had never been done by Turkish jurists before. He went on:
“The new Turkish régime rejects in their entirety the old superannuated methods of government. The common bond which unites the national elements and insures their permanence has abandoned its religious character and has taken on a national form. We are now admitting as à principle of life and strength in the domain of international struggles both science and civilization.
“As a result of the revolution and the modifications which have taken place in its political life the country has been inspired with the needs of the present age, and it regards as the single factor of existence a laic mentality capable of perfecting itself in proportion to the advance of our social evolution.”
After criticizing the old laws and their application and condemning those who believed that anything modern and effective could be evolved from them, the President said:
“When I caused to be laid before the National Assembly the bill consecrating without any restrictions the sovereignty of the people, it was the juris-consults who had been recently duping the country with their pretended knowledge, and who led the opposition under the pretext of safeguarding the Ottoman constitution. Moreover, it was the so-called élite of our lawyers, the men who formed the bar and the majority of whom have pursued their studies in Europe, who chose as the leader of their order, even after the proclamation of the republic, a man who openly declared himself a partisan of the Caliphate. This nomination, this election constitutes in itself a fact lamentably characteristic of the obscurantism of the old jurisprudence. The facts I have just cited bring out in strong relief the position of our old law in the face of the republican mentality.”
The man designated by the President is said to be Lutfi Fikri, the leader of the Constantinople bar. Kemal Pasha then declared that as from such a body of jurists with such a leader it was impossible to evolve a legal system commensurate with the requirements of the new Turkey, it became necessary for the republic to look abroad and to take there what had stood the test of time and had been altered to meet varying exigencies.
80REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LAUSANNE TREATY TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
(MAY, 1924)
Edward Mead Earle, Chairman. Professor of History at Columbia University. Author of “Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway. (New York, 1923.)
Philip Marshall Brown. Professor of International Law at Princeton University. Former Chargé d’Affaires of American Embassy, Constantinople. Author of “Foreigners in TurkeyT (.Princeton, 1914.)
Samuel McCrea Cavert. General Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, who has recently returned from the Near East.
Jackson Fleming. A much-traveled student of world politics, with a special interest in the Near East.
Barnette Miller. Associate Professor of History at Wellesley College. Formerly Professor of History at Constantinople Woman s College, 1909-1913; 1916-1919.
Laurence Moore. Acting Secretary of American Colleges in Turkey. E. E. Pratt. Formerly Chief of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, U. S. Dept, of Commerce.
W. L. Westermann. Professor of History at Columbia University. Formerly Chief of the Near Eastern Division of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Paris, 1919.
To the Executive Committee of the Foreign Policy Association:
The special Committee appointed by the Foreign Policy Association to report upon the Turco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce, signed at Lausanne, August 6, 1923, herewith submits the results of its investigations:
In spite of differences of opinion upon matters of detail, the members of the Committee are unanimously iof the opinion that the prompt ratification by the Senate of the Turco-American Treaty would be in the best interests of the United States and of the peoples of the Near East. Our discussions have demonstrated clearly that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate a peace with Turkey which would satisfy all varities of American opinion. The Turco-American Treaty must be considered an integral part of the Peace of Lausanne which permits the resumption of the affairs of normal life in the Near East.
The Great Need in the Near East is Peace
Even an imperfect settlement in the Near East is preferable to none. This unhappy region of the world has been cursed with an almost uninterrupted series of civil and international wars for the past
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fifteen years—wars which have been fought not only with the usual weapons of “civilized warfare/' but with the other deadly weapons of expropriation, vandalism, deportation, massacre, religious persecution, and almost every other form of outrage against life, liberty, and property. To indulge in recriminations, to vent one's spleen with bitter diatribes against one Near Eastern people or another, is to confuse the issues. What is worse, it is to heighten racial and religious animosities and to create a vitiating atmosphere in which peace— however technically admirable from the diplomatic point of view— can not survive. Vindictiveness will contribute nothing to a solution of the Near Eastern problem. No one people has been responsible for, and no one people has been exempt from the sufferings which have accompanied the Young Turk Revolutions of 1908-1909, the Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the Great War of 1914-1918, and the Graeco-Turkish War of 1919-1922. No right minded American will condone the massacre, literally by the hundreds of thousands, of Christian minorities by the Turks. No intellectually honest American, however, will close his mind to the fact that the Turks themselves have suffered cruel hardships as a result of war, famine, and disease. These sufferings have been none the less severe because the less well known in the United States. It has been estimated by competent authorities that at least
400.000	Turks were driven from their homes in Macedonia and Thrace during the Balkan Wars, and that the Russian invasions of Turkish Armenia from 1915 to 1917 led to the expulsion of about
800.000	Moslem refugees.1 2 According to the Harbord Report, not more than twenty per cent of all Turkish peasants who went to the Great War have returned to their homes, at least 600,000 having succumbed to typhus alone. “In the region which witnessed the ebb and flow of the Russian and Turkish armies the physical condition of the country is deplorable * * * and where Armenians advanced and retired- with the Russians their retaliatory cruelties unquestionably rivaled the Turks in their inhumanity.”2. The devastation wrought by the Greek armies in their advance from Smyrna and Brusa is too well-known to require further comment.
None of these facts is cited for the puropse of denying the charges brought against the Turkish Government for mistreatment of its subject peoples. It may truthfully be asserted, however, that the excesses of the Turks have been exaggerated, and that similar excesses of Christian peoples of the Near East and of Christian Powers of the West have been underestimated or passed over in silence. “If our aim is not simply to condemn, but to cure, we can only modify the
1	Cf. A. J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (1922), especially pp. 138, 191, 342. Also Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (1914).
2	Major General James G. Harboard, Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia (October, 1919). Senate Document No. 266, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session.
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conduct of the Turks by altering their frame of mind, and our only means of doing that is to change our own attitude towards them. So long as we mete out one measure to them, another to the Greeks (and Armenians), and yet a third to ourselves, we shall have no moral influence over them.”3 Atrocities are the most extreme form of a bitter racial, religious and nationalistic struggle between the Near Eastern peoples. The most effective way to terminate this struggle is to eliminate foreign intrigue, to effect normal peace-time relationships, and to take up the heroic task of economic reconstruction. To treat the Turks as pariahs is to invite them to conduct themselves as such. To reject the settlement which has been proposed is to perpetuate the psychology of war, if not an actual state of war. The way to terminate war is to make peace.
A Dictated Peace Neither Possible Nor Desirable
A few elementary facts must be understood if one is to pass judgment upon the Peace of Lausanne as a whole or upon the Turco-American Treaty as one of its parts:
1.	The Allies and the United States were not in a position to dictate to Turkey the terms of settlement. The Turkish delegation at Lausanne had to be listened to, if for no other reason than that it represented a nation victorious in arms whose major claims had been recognized by the Mudania Armistice of October, 1922. Whether the Western nations could have defeated the Turks is not the question. To retrieve lost military fortunes in the Near East would have required expenditures of money and of lives which no government was in a position to undertake. Certainly the Government of the United States, which had never been at war with Turkey and which was in the control of a political party pledged to an isolationist policy, could not have undertaken to reverse the military situation. Failure on the part of the American representatives at Lausanne to recognize the facts as they were, rather than as some Americans thought they ought to> be, would have made any negotiations with the Turks out of the question.
2.	There is no reason for believing that a peace dictated to the Turks by the Western Powers would have been a good- peace. On the contrary, there are excellent reasons for believing that such a peace would have been neither just nor lasting. A great power's terms imposed upon the small are almost certain to be arbitrary and ungenerous. Such a peace, if accepted at all, is accepted “in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and leaves a sting, a resentment, and a bitter memory” which are the very negation of peace.* 1 Such a settlement was the Treaty of Sèvres, signed under compulsion by a puppet Turkish Government in August, 1920. By the terms of this treaty and of the secret interallied agreement which formed part
3 A. J. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 354.
1 See President Wilson’s address to the Senate, January 22, 1917.
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of the settlement, the former territories of the Ottoman Empire were divided with primary consideration for the imperialistic interests of the Great Powers and with only secondary concern for the wishes and the welfare of the Near Eastern peoples. In spite of the promise of “a secure sovereignty” to the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire,2 the Turkey that remained to the Turks was partitioned into spheres of interest and was tied hand and foot by interallied control in military, financial, commercial, judicial, and administrative matters. Allied administration of Constantinople and Greek occupation of Smyrna deprived the peasantry of Anatolia of their only satisfactory ports of export and import. It is not recorded that the persons now denouncing the Peace of Lausanne raised a voice of protest against the injustices of the Treaty of Sèvres. It is essential, if we are to have peace in the world, that “impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just.”* 1
3.	The Turks no more dictated the terms of the Peace of Lausanne, than did the Allies. The Turkish delegation were obdurate regarding concessions, capitulations, and financial control of the Allies, but were surprisingly conciliatory regarding other matters. They accepted without objection a régime for the Straits which is the most liberal in modern times and which, incidentally, places the city of Constantinople practically at the mercy of any first-class naval power. They recognized all of their debts and agreed to examine in most friendly spirit the .pecuniary claims of American and Allied nationals. The property rights of foreigners in Turkey—with the exception of certain concessions of doubtful validity—have been scrupulously observed. No compensation, it is true, was provided for Greek refugees from Smyrna and Thrace whose property was expropriated, but, on the other hand, all claims were renounced for reparation of damage wrought by the Greek Expeditionary Forces in Anatolia from May, 1919, to October, 1922. In territorial questions, full agreement was reached early in the conference; the question of Mosul was to be settled by independent negotiations between Turkey and Great Britain or by the arbitration of the League of Nations; in other respects Turkey renounced all territory which was not predominantly Turkish in nationality. Minorities were placed under the definite protection of the League of Nations. Although there is no denying the fact that the Turks won national sovereignty from the Western Powers at Lausanne, that fact, however distateful to some Americans, should not stand in the way of an honest examination of the treaties. The settlement should stand or fall upon its merits.
4.	Although it is not maintained that the Peace of Lausanne is a perfect peace, it is in many respects the best Near Eastern settlement
2 The Fourteen points of President Wilson, Point XII.
1 President Wilson’s speech at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York
City, September 27, 1918.
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which has been reached for a century and a half. Since the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, in 1774, every treaty between Turkey and the European Powers has been based upon the principle of the right of arbitrary interference by any of the Powers, upon one pretext or another, in the affairs of the Near East. This right of intervention, made possible by the weakness of the former Ottoman Empire, has been utilized by Western Powers to play off one Near Eastern people against another, with results disastrous to all. It is an indisputable historical fact that previous to the nineteenth century the Turks practiced a degree of religious toleration large compared with that practiced contemporaneously in Western Europe. As in Western Europe unorthodox religious beliefs cost the Protestant or the Dissenter or the Catholic his civil and political privileges, so in Turkey Christians were at a disadvantage compared with Moslems. It was not until the nineteenth century, however, that persecution by the Turks occurred in more than isolated and sporadic instances. Massacres and deportations became endemic only when the doctrine of nationalism spread to the Near East, and they increased in geometric ratio of foreign interferences and foreign intrigue. The intervention of the Great Powers in the Balkans and in Turkey has frequently been a curse to the Near Eastern peoples and to the European peoples alike. The Lausanne treaties have established a Turkish national state, free from the Damoclean sword of Western imperialism.
Holding a key position in the political geography of the world, the new Turkish state will have rendered a real service to peace if it can maintain a stable government and successfully resist traditional Western diplomacy. To this purpiose it would be wise for Americans to support the Angora Government. As long as the governments in the Balkan and Anatolian peninsulas are weak and ineffective and constantly flying at each other’s throats with the support of the Great Powers, no satisfactory relations—diplomatic, missionary, educational, archaeological, philanthropic, or commercial,—can be maintained between America and the Near East. Political stabilization in Greece and Turkey will be one of the most effective ways of preventing conflicts between the Near Eastern peoples, as well as conflicts between the European Powers which have been engaged in keen competition for economic, political, and strategic advantages in the Levant. In this connection it is of significance to point put that whereas France and Great Britain were at swords’ points on Near Eastern questions almost continuously from October, 1914, to July, 1923, their relationships have been materially improved since the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne.
The Scope and Purpose of the Turco-American Treaty
It was not and could not have been the purpose of the American representatives at Lausanne to unmake the sordid history of the Near East from 1914 to 1923—the deportations and massacres of Armenians, wholesale extermination of populations by war and disease, preda-
85The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
tory imperialism violating legitimate national aspirations, the ill-advised Greek invasion of Anatolia followed by another cruel war of devastation, the totally unacceptable peace at Sèvres, the charred ruins of Smyrna and Afiun Karahissar and Eskishehr. These damages were irreparable. Our inability or unwillingness to participate fully in the discussion of peace terms for Turkey because we had never been technically at war with the Ottoman Empire; our consent to the Greek occupation of Smyrna ; our refusal—right or wrong—to accept a mandate for Armenia ; all these reasons made it impossible for us to retrace the various steps in American policy in the Near East since 1917. Even the advocates of cooperation in Europe, it may safely be said, would hesitate to embroil the United States in the present Near Eastern situation.
The only course the American delegation at Lausanne could pursue was the course it chose. Faced with a treaty between Turkey and the Allies which abandoned the Capitulations and other exterritorial rights and which recognized the National Government of Angora, it would have been futile to do otherwise than to secure most-favored-nation treatment for American interests. Aware of the temper of American public opinion, it would have been out of the question for the American delegation, apart from the European Powers, to assume responsibility for the purely political questions of boundaries, the status of Constantinople and the Straits, or the establishment of an Armenian Republic. What Mr. Grew1 signed at Lausanne was a Treaty of Amity and Commerce designed to secure to Americans the same rights as were secured by the Allied Treaty to Britons, Frenchmen, Italians, and the others. It is difficult to ascertain upon what basis we could justly claim more or by what methods we could enforce any such additional claim.
In general, the attacks upon the Treaty are launched with two alleged justifications: first, that we have abandoned our rights; second, that we have ignored our responsibilities. It is sometimes intimated, also, that no diplomatic relationships with Turkey—except, presumably, such as are based upon force or the threat of force—are desirable.
As regards American rights in Turkey, they may be classified under the following heads : regime of the Capitulations ; economic ; missionary, educational, and philanthropic; archaeological. American responsibilities, we take it, are concerned with the protection of minorities and with the status of Armenia.
Abolition of the Capitulations
The Turco-American Treaty of August 6, 1923, surrenders the exterritorial rights which American citizens, in common with other foreigners, possessed in Turkey before October 1, 1914, on the basis of most-favored-nation treatment. Under the Capitulations, Ameri-
1 Mr. Joseph Grew, Minister to Switzerland, was the American observer at the second Lausanne Conference.
86Foreign Policy Association
cans formerly enjoyed immunities from the jurisdiction of Turkish financial officials, the Turkish police, and the Turkish courts. Under the proposed treaty, Americans in Turkey will enjoy no such immunities. This is admittedly the surrender of an important American privilege, but it is not the first instance in which such privileges have been surrendered.1 *
It is not certain, however, that the former regime of the Capitulations was justified on the grounds of either expediency or right. The exemption of foreigners from taxation and the veto of foreign governments over increases in the Ottoman customs duties assisted in the perpetual pauperization of the Turkish Treasury and placed the Sublime Porte at the mercy of European diplomatists and European financiers. As a result of the privileged juridical status of foreigners the grossest abuses arose. Foreign consuls were exalted officials who usurped the place, in large measure, of the Turkish authorities. Foreigners were so completely exempt from the jurisdication of the Turkish police that they came, in effect, to be regarded as subject to no law. Consciously or unconsciously, they not infrequently indicated an utter disregard and contempt for many of the police regulations. The Turkish authorities often found themselves quite helpless under the most trying and exasperating circumstances. The most notorious instance of this helplessness was the impotence of the police in dealing with the hotels, cafés, gambling houses, saloons, dance-halls, and other pleasure resorts which flourished in defiance of Moslem sensibilities.
Even before the Great War, the European Powers recognized that a system which permitted of such abuses must come to an end. They bargained with the Turks in Oriental fashion for valuable concessions and other special privileges as the price of their abrogation.
The discredited regime was doomed, and it was no surprise to anyone when, upon entering the Great War, the Ottoman Government declared the Capitulations at an end. The Treaty of Sèvres of August 20, 1920, sought to reimpose the system of the Capitulations, but by Article VI of the National Pact the Nationalist Government of Turkey had previously made it plain that this was one point upon which Mustapha Kemal and his followers would not compromise. The first Lausanne Conference broke up largely because of the determination of the Turks to fight rather than to surrender upon what they considered a vital issue. The Allies were not disposed to resume hostilities, with the result that the second Conference terminated in the abrogation of the Capitulations in every respect.
The United States could not contend single-handed for what the European Powers had renounced. We can not now properly claim privileges greater than those enjoyed by nationals of the Allied Powers. The Turks, with the best of good will toward us, can not be
1 Exterritorial rights in Japan have long since been surrendered by the United States. A treaty was signed on December 16, 1920, between the United States and Siam providing for the abolition (as regards the United States) of exterritorial privileges in Siam. See 42—U S. Statutes at Large.
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expected to concede to Americans a special status which they have refused to grant Europeans. Such being the situation, inexorable logic demanded that the United States should define its relations with Turkey in treaty form in order not to be placed at a serious disadvantage. The Treaty of August 6, 1923, together with the accompanying unilateral declarations of the Turkish delegates at Lausanne, grants to nationals of the United States most-favored-nation treatment with nationals of the Great Powers as defined by the Treaty of July 24, 1923. The judicial status of Americans, therefore, is as follows:
1.	Although Consular Courts are abolished, Article VIII of the Turco-American Treaty provides that Consuls retain their special rights “in matters of civil status according to international law or special agreements/' This provision is general enough to permit of liberal interpretation and elaboration under tactful diplomacy and cautious experiment.
2.	All questions of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, dowry, paternity, adoption, guardianship, inheritance, etc., are left to the jurisdiction of American tribunals or other competent American authorities outside of Turkey.
3.	According to a special declaration of July 24, 1923, issued
by the Turkish delegation at Lausanne in connection with the new system of judicial administration:	“In civil or commercial
matters, all references to arbitration and clauses in agreements providing therefor are allowed, and the arbitral decisions rendered in pursuance thereof shall be executed on being signed by the President of the Court of First Instance, who shall not refuse his signature unless the decision shall be contrary to public order." Experience alone will demonstrate the value of this provision, but it would seem to offer great possibilities for the settlement of litigation by foreigners outside the Turkish courts.
4.	Paragraph three of the same declaration provides that: “In cases of minor offenses, release on bail shall always be ordered, unless this entails danger to public safety or unless such provisional release is likely to impede the investigation of the case."
5.	The Turkish Government obligates itself to employ a number of legal advisers selected from a list prepared by the Permanent Court of International Justice. These advisers shall observe the administration of justice, receive complaints, make suggestions to the Ministry of Justice, and assist in the drafting of legislation. Domiciliary visits on foreigners by the police are to be reported to these advisers.
6.	Foreigners are guaranteed equality of treatment with Turkish nationals—that is, they shall not be discriminated against in the administration of justice.
It is clear that these judicial guarantees are not comparable to those enjoyed by Americans before the Great War. Moreover, they are to continue for only seven years unless permitted to remain in force by the Turkish authorities subject to abrogation after six months' notice. It is also apparent that after the long period of wars and administrative demoralization in Turkey, it will require a long
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time to train competent executive and judicial officials. The administrative inexperience of most of the Nationalists and the scarcity of trained functionaries of intelligence and probity will place a heavy responsibility upon Turkey. It is the opinion of the majority of this Committee that it would have been highly desirable in every way, for the Turks no less than foreigners, if some transitional system had been established during which the Angora Government might have prepared itself for the full assumption of police ahd judicial powers. Turkish suspicion of European intentions is so deep-rooted, however, that no such compromise at Lausanne was possible.
Whatever one may think of the régime of the Capitulations per se, one must admit that it can be re-established in Turkey only by force. No other nations are prepared to go to war with Turkey for the purpose and it is unthinkable that the United States should assume this Quixotic rôle unassisted. To insist that Americans still enjoy exterritorial privileges under the/Treaty of 1830 is to close our eyes to the facts. Such a stand would be ignored by Turkey and would be resented by the European Powers. There remains only the alternative of a graceful acceptance and the securing, by wise diplomacy, of a maximum of legitimate advantages for American interests in Turkey.
American Economic Rights Under the Treaty
Sweeping assertions have been made that the Treaty with Turkey is “humiliating and purposeless” and “surrenders every American right in Turkey.” Nothing could be further from the truth. The abolition of the Capitulations, to be sure, will remove the exemptions from taxation which American business formerly enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire. Inasmuch, however, as no foreigners are hereafter to enjoy such exemptions, American interests are placed at no disadvantage as regards other interests. Americans are to enjoy most-favored-nation treatment as regards import and export duties, patents and trade marks, the transportation of goods and the free entry of merchant vessels, etc., in accordance with the traditional policy of the open door. A convention has been negotiated which satisfies, it is understood, all legitimate pecuniary claims of American citizens for damages resulting from operations of war and other causes for which the Turkish Government may be considered responsible. Furthermore the Treaty confers upon American commercial corporations the right to hold property in their own names, a departure from Ottoman custom which will materially expedite the transaction of business. It is the general opinion of American business men in Turkey that the Nationalist Government should be given an opportunity to establish a stable administration without the interference of foreign powers. Commercial interests desire nothing more than an end of war in the Near East and the re-establishment of normal economic relationships.
The Committee has received an illuminating letter from a prominent American merchant in Constantinople, a quotation from which will indicate the point of view of those who are now doing business
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with the Turks: “Naturally, there are many whose interests would be served by the non-ratification of the Treaty, chiefly our European competitors for trade here. Of late, we have equalled or exceeded British imports; and if the new British Parliament1 ratifies and we do not—and all of the Allies will ratify sooner or later—we shall be placed at a great disadvantage nationally, and individually we shall have a hard time to get along.” It has been stated by opponents of the Treaty that American trade with Turkey is insignificant in volume, that it holds out no hope for the future and that, consequently, it may be ignored as a factor in the situation. This opinion does not conform with the facts. In 1900, American exports to Turkey amounted to only $50,000; in 1913, they had risen to $3,500,000, and in 1920 to $42,200,000. Imports into the United States from Turkey, including certain important raw materials, increased from $22,100,000 in 1913 to $39,600,000 in 1920. From 1919 to 1922 American trade with Constantinople alone averaged over $30,000,000 annually.2 While one cannot definitely predict that there will be a continued increase in Turco-American trade, one can predict with certainty that the denunciation of the Treaty will do nothing to promote such an increase.
According to Article X of the Treaty “merchant and war vessels and aircraft of the United States enjoy complete liberty of navigation and passage in the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus on a basis of equality with similar craft of the most-favored-nation, subject to the rules relating to such navigation and passage in the Straits Convention of Lausanne of July 24, 1923.” An examination of the Straits Convention discloses that American merchant vessels, yachts, fishing vessels and non-military aircraft enjoy unrestricted freedom of navigation of the Straits, without any formalities except international sanitary regulations and without any tax or other charge except such as may be freely paid for towage, pilotage, and other similar services. These privileges are guaranteed American vessels in time of war, as in time of peace, with the single exception of a war between the United States and Turkey, in which case, of course, American vessels would be subject to seizure if not adequately protected. In spite of these indisputable facts, a recent memorandum advocating rejection of the Treaty unblushingly states that the Dardanelles “may be closed at the will of the Turks, as was done in 1914 and on many other occasions.” The most charitable thing which may be said of this statement is that it is ambiguous. If the implication is that the Turks may legally close the Straits, it is inaccurate. If the implication is that they may arbitrarily close the Straits by military
1	Great Britain, France and Italy have already ratified the Treaty of Lau-
sanne and with the formal approval of Japan which is expected in a few days, the Treaty will come into force. New York Times, May 15, 1924. [Editor’s Note:	All of the nations which were parties to the Treaties of Lausanne have
since ratified.]
2	There has been a falling off in Turco-American trade during 1923, because of the interallied military evacuation and post-war economic depression throughout the Near East.
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force, it overlooks completely the elaborate regulations of the Straits Convention for the complete demilitarization of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, and of the islands which control those waterways. It ignores, also, the fact that the administration of these regulations is to be in the hands of an international Commission of the Straits upon which the United States, if it so chooses, may be represented.
At the instance of Mr. Richard Washburn Child, the American observer at the first Lausanne Conference, the Straits Convention likewise permitted free passage through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus of American war vessels to a tonnage equal to that of the most powerful single fleet of the Black Sea countries. It was the contention of Mr. Child that this privilege was desired by the United States in order “to police the free seas, to protect its citizens and ships wherever they might be, to suppress piracy and other menaces, and to act at times for the public good and to give relief to suffering, just as ships of war have recently acted in the Near East/'1 Insofar as American commercial interests and philanthropic enterprises are centered in Samsun and other Black Sea ports of Turkey, they will be under the protection of American destroyers should the Government elect to despatch them. It may safely be said that the Straits Convention of Lausanne is the most liberal international agreement which has yet regulated navigation in those waters.
It is desirable to make clear at this point that there are several members of this Committee who are fearful of the existing tendency of Governments to promote actively by diplomatic and military means the so-called “economic interests” of the nation in foreign territory. Were there any evidence in this Treaty that the Department of State had permitted its Near Eastern policy to be determined by an economic quid pro quo, several members of this Committee would be inclined to advocate the reopening of negotiations with Turkey on a different basis. There is no such evidence, however, and the Secretary of State has recently denied that the negotiation of the Turco-American Treaty was conducted in a spirit of economic imperialism. In his speech before the Council of Foreign Relations, at New York, January 23, 1924, Mr. Hughes said: “At no stage in the negotiations was the American position determined by the so-called Chester concession. This had been granted before negotiations of our treaty with Turkey had been begun. This Government took no part in securing it; this Government made no barter of any of its rights for this or any other concession. Our position is a simple one. We maintain the policy of the open door, or equality of commercial opportunity; we demand a square deal for our nationals. We objected to the alleged concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company, owned by foreign interests, because it had never been validly granted, and in so doing we
1 Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923. Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace (London, 1923), p. 146.
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stood for American rights generally and not for any particular interest/'
The Treaty and Archaeological Research
With respect to American rights in archaeological research in Turkey, the Treaty provides that American archaeologists, in common with other Americans, shall enjoy most-favored-nation treatment. Under the terms of Article III,1 they would be permitted, subject to Turkish regulations, to conduct researches unless such researches should be forbidden to all foreigners. This means that the Turkish law upon antiquities shall apply to discoveries made by Americans who have obtained permission from the Turkish Government to excavate—namely, that the antiquities discovered shall be the property of the Turkish Government, subject to such arrangements for division of the discoveries as may be made by mutual agreement of the excavators and the Turkish authorities.2
It is true, of course, that as with all undeveloped peoples, vandalism and lack of appreciation of materials of scientific value are more prevalent in Turkey than in more developed countries. There is also constant danger that valuable historical materials may be lost. But it is not true that "there are no Turkish archaeologists." The splendid museum built up at Constantinople in the past generation by the well-known archaeologist, Osman Hamdi Bey, who died a few years ago, is sufficient refutation of this misrepresentation. The work of Hamdi Bey, an archaeologist of high international repute, is now being carried on by his brother, Halil Edheim Bey.
At present, two large and important enterprises of American archaeological research in Turkey are being refused permission to work in Anatolia. This is due to the fact that materials excavated at Sardis under a firman of the old Turkish Government were taken away during the Greek occupation of 1919-1922. The bulk of these materials is Lydian-Anatolian and not Greek, and its removal by the Greek authorities is hardly to be commended. About a month before the Greek evacuation of Smyrna the materials in question were shipped to the United States, the prompt action of American archaeologists interested in the enterprise, having thus saved it from destruction in the Smyrna fire.
It is the contention of the Angora Government that these materials should now be returned to the museum at Constantinople. If the Sardis materials are not returned Americans may be seriously handicapped in conducting excavations in Anatolia.
1	Although Article III does not specifically refer to archaeological research, it provides that: “They (nationals of the High Contracting Parties) may, under the local laws and regulations in force, engage in every kind of profession, commerce, etc., not forbiddden by law to all foreigners*” The American delegation at Lausanne understood that this provision included the right of Americans to engage in archaeological research under the exiting Turkish law governing excavations.
2	Under the Italian and Greek laws concerning excavations, the same conditions obtain.
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Religious, Philanthropic and Educational Institutions
No American interest in Turkey, it may safely be said, makes a wider appeal than our schools, colleges and orphanages and religious or philanthropic institutions. The rôle which they have played in healing the wounds of feuds and wars, on the one hand, and in laying the foundations of racial and international conciliation, on the other, is one of which every American may be justly proud. Sir William Ramsay, a distinguished British Orientalist, has stated that American institutions have done more to bring about a just settlement of the troublesome Eastern question than all the statesmen of Europe combined. Professor George Young, former secretary of the British Embassy at Constantinople, and Professor Arnold J. Toynbee, a reputable British historian of the Near East, have testified, as have many other students of the Near Eastern question, regarding the great work which the American schools and colleges have done in breaking down racial and religious prejudices among the younger generations. American schools in Turkey have been appropriately called “oases of peace in a desert of discord.” It is the unanimous opinion of this Committee that the cessation of these educational and philanthropic activities would be the betrayal of a great trust and the abandonment of America’s greatest opportunity for humanitarian work in the Near East. There never was a period, in fact, when their presence was more needed than during the coming critical years of economic reconstruction and political readjustment.
The officials of American schools, missions, and hospitals in Turkey are aware that no detailed regulations, national or international in character, will be as effective in the prosecution of their work as the good will of the Turks. Personal relationships, much more than judicial capitulations, or treaty provisions, are of importance in maintaining harmony with the Turkish Government. As has been stated by the Turks themeselves, “American missionaries and teachers should not object to the abolition of the Capitulations because they have not needed recourse to the courts.” No amount of diplomatic or military force would be of avail if the Turks lost confidence in the good intentions of the American institutions themselves.
* The Turks have indicated their desire that the American schools and colleges should continue their work. As Ismet Pasha, now Prime Minister of the Angora Government, said at Lausanne, they “want these institutions to stay and have no intention of adopting laws that will embarrass the continuation of the admirable American philanthropic work among their people.” (One of Ismet Pasha’s brothers is at present a student in Robert College in Constantinople.) More recently at Angora, in an interview with an official representative of the American colleges, Ismet Pasha reiterated his Lausanne declaration, and other cabinet ministers confirmed this profession of good faith. Americans in Turkey know, and the Turks themselves must confess, that the resources of the peoples, both Moslem and Christian, are too meagre to provide institutions adequate for the educational
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training and the moral advancement of the people in whose hands will lie the future of the Near East. The Turks know, also, that our schools, missions, and hospitals in the Near East—unlike those of some other foreign countries—are without government subsidies and have never been used as agencies of political and economic pénétrer tion. They have held our teachers, physicians and missionaries in high esteem as men and women of generous sympathies, good sense and tact. Left to themselves, these Americans have been able in the past, through personal negotiations, to compose official or private differences With the Turkish Government. It is on the basis of their good record, and on the basis of their great promise for future service, that the American institutions in Turkey rely for favorable treatment by the new Turkish Administration.
The United States Government has maintained its defense of American schools and philanthropic institutions in Turkey upon the general ground of most-favored-nation treatment, but there has never been any specific treaty between these two countries that provided for the establishment of such institutions. This has always been by act of courtesy of the Ottoman Government on behalf of a friendly people. The Sultans, of their own free will, usually granted the institutions certain immunities from jurisdiction as well as authority to carry on their work and the United States Government has always permitted the application of Ottoman municipal law in the regulation of the status and work of these institutions insofar as this has not interfered with the personal rights of Americans claimed under most-favored-nation agreement. Iradês, or decrees of the Sultan, conferring specific rights of immunity to certain American schools in Turkey have also been the freewill grants of the Ottoman Government without treaty coercion. It was in accordance with precedent, therefore, that the Turkish delegation at Lausanne refused to incorporate in the treaties with the Allies and Ihe United States specific provisions designed to establish in international, rather than merely Turkish law, the special position of foreign institutions. Their refusal in this respect was based also upon fear—justified by many a bitter experience in the past—that like guarantees, under international agreement, to certain European Powers would be »utilized as a pretext for intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey. What they were unwilling to grant to the Allies, the Turks hardly could grant to us.
Nevertheless, on August 4, 1923, Ismet Pasha addressed to Mr. Grew a letter promising to American institutions in Turkey liberal treatment under Turkish law. The letter in question, which is identical with a letter addressed to each of the Allied Powers at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, is as follows:
Excellency :
With reference to the Convention regarding the conditions of residence and business signed at Lausanne today, and following on the decision taken by the First Committee at its meeting of the 19th May, 1923, regarding« the substitution of the declaration,
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which was to have been annexed to the said Convention, by an exchange of letters, I have the honor to declare, in the name of my Government, that the latter will recognize the existence of American religious, scholastic and medical establishments, as well as of charitable institutions recognized as existing in Turkey before the 30th October, 1914, and that it will favorably examine the case of other similar American institutions actually existing in Turkey at the date of the Treaty of Peace signed today, with a view to regularize their position.
The establishments and institutions mentioned above will, as regards fiscal charges of every kind, be treated on a footing of equality with similar Turkish establishments and institutions, and will be subject to the administrative arrangements of a public character, as well as to the laws and regulations governing the latter. It is, however, understood that the Turkish Government will take into account the conditions under which these establishments carry on their work, and, insofar as schools are concerned, the practical organization of their teaching arrangements.
I avail, etc.,
(Signed) M. ISMET.
There is one respect in which the Committee would desire to see this declaration, or a clause in the Treaty itself, made more exact. Commercial corporations are guaranteed certain specific rights under the Treaty, including the right to hold property in their corporate capacity. Similar rights are not guaranteed corporations organized for religious and charitable purposes. The property owned by Robert College at Constantinople, for example, must continue to be held in the name of an individual rather than in the name of its Trustees. We believe, however, that this distinction may be removed by supplementary negotiations between Washington and Angora, without requiring an actual amendment to the pending Treaty. As Mr. Gates has stated in a recent communication, the American institutions have received assurances from the Turkish Government that American property rights will be satisfactorily regularized immediately after the resumption of normal diplomatic relations.
The officials of the American educational institutions are ready to accept the conditions and carry on their work in Turkey. Dr. Mary Mills Patrick, who has been engaged for more than half a century in missionary work in Turkey, and who for almost thirty-five years has been President of Constantinople Woman's College, joins with Dr. Caleb Gates, President of Robert College, in declaring in favor of ratification of thfc Turco-American Treaty. Dr. Gates, for example, has said, “As to the Treaty itself, what does it give üs? It gives us the good will of the Turks instead of their ill will. That is certainly worth something to all who live and work in Turkey. To them the Treaty affords an opportunity to work out the problems which their life in Turkey presents and to exercise what influence they possess in favor of the right. It still leaves an opportunity for missionaries and educators to try to make the principles of righteousness known and practiced in Turkey." Furthermore, the American schools and col-
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leges actually are carrying on their work under the new régime. Mr. Albert W. Staub, American Director of the Near East Colleges, wrote last autumn from Constantinople:	“On account of the changes that
have taken place here, it was generally predicted that the enrollment of our colleges would fall off considerably. But with the return of peace has come a new confidence in the future, as the increased enrollment above that of last year would indicate.” Robert College began its sixty-first year last September with four hundred and fifty students of nineteen different nationalities—Greeks, Turks, Armenians and Bulgarians leading in numbers. Constantinople Woman’s College has a registration of three hundred and fifty, comprising Moslem and Christian students of fifteen different races or nationalities. The Turks declare that they are done with the Sultanate and the Caliphate. They have ahead of them tremendous tasks of economic reconstruction, political reorganization, and social readjustment. To insure their success, they need the sympathy and co-operation of those Western States who boost of greater enlightenment. The Turks want our schools; our schools want to stay in Turkey. * * *
The Problem of Minorities
No pledges of the American people regarding the Armenians or other subjects of the former Ottoman Empire have ever been incorporated in treaties between the United States and Turkey. The United States was not a signatory of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 or the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which contained elaborate provisions for the protection of minorities in Turkey. On the other hand, at various times the Government of the United States has definitely taken the position that it could not assume responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace in the Ottoman Empire beyond safeguarding the property and lives of American citizens. Our policy of political isolation was departed from under President Wilson, although even under his administration there was no declaration of war against Turkey—in spite of keen sympathy for the Armenians—and no American participation in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Sèvres.
Those who advocate rejection of this Treaty on the ground that it does not provide for an Armenian Republic or for the adequate protection of minorities in Turkey, overlook the obvious fact that a treaty which obligated the United States to any such policy wo%dd meet still greater opposition from the advocates of political isolation. The Allied Treaty with Turkey contains adequate provisions for the preservation of the liberties of minorities, under the supervision of the League of Nations. If the isolationist sentiment can be overcome, the best manner of American intervention on behalf of the Christian subjects of Turkey is through participation in the League. If isolationist sentiment cannot be overcome, it is futile to talk of defending the rights of minorities. It is incumbent upon opponents of the Treaty to indicate in what respect its rejection would provide for the establishment of an Armenian Republic or would safeguard the lives,
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liberties and property of the minorities in Thrace and Anatolia. It would be nothing short of criminal to incite the Armenians to resist, directly or indirectly, the settlement reached at Lausanne unless we are prepared, with military force if necessary, to support such resistance.
It is the opinion of this Committee that there is no immediate prospect of an American offensive, military or political, to settle the minorities problem. In 1920, we flatly refused an Armenian mandate, at a time when we were asked only to assume guardianship for territory under the military subjection of the Allies. Short of a successful armed invasion of the Anatolian peninsula, there is now no way we can achieve what we then refused to consider. Ratification of the Treaty with Turkey, however, would enable our accredited representatives at Angora to exercise their influence on behalf of moderation and justice. Furthermore, we should remember that ratification of the Turco-American Treaty would assist in making the Peace of Lausanne part af the public law of the Near East, and the Peace of Lausanne is more specific on the question of minorities than any other previous settlement in modern history. It provides for co-operative action on behalf of subject peoples without permitting the arbitrary intervention of any single power. The United States retains its moral right, however, to interest itself in behalf of oppressed peoples.
By the terms of the Allied Treaty with the Turks of July 24, 1923, the new Turkish Republic extends certain guarantees to all nationals of Turkey “without distinction of birth, nationatity, language, race or religion”; equality before the law and full protection of life, liberty and property; equal civil and political rights; permission to establish, maintain and control religious, philanthropic, and social institutions; freedom of religion and unrestricted use of the vernacular; freedom of social customs, including family law and personal status. It will be freely charged, of course, that these promises are not worth the paper they are written on—other such promises, albeit not so far-reaching, have been made before. In this connection it is well to quote Article XLIV of the Allied-Turkish Treaty:
ARTICLE XLIV
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding articles of this section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League \of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.
Turkey agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council
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any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character ‘under Article XIV of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International lustice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as cm award under Article XIII of the Covenant.
As between Greece and Turkey, a solution of the minorities problem was attempted by a compulsory interchange of populations. This plan was the intellectual child of M. Venizelos, born in 1913, and adopted by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen at Lausanne in 1923. The first proposal for an interchange of populations between Greece and Turkey came in a letter of June 24, 1914, from M. Venizelos to the Sublime Porte, which subsequently led to an agreement of July 8, 1914. This agreement became inoperative because of the outbreak of the Great War less than a month later. At the Paris Conference of 1919, M. Venizelos again evidenced his enthusiasm for the idea of inter-migration of dissatisfied peoples across national frontiers by negotiating a treaty providing for an interchange of populations as between Greece and Bulgaria. This latter interchange was carried out by a mixed commission on which Dr. Nansen represented the League of Nations. Even as late as 1921, the Turks did not contemplate such a move and only on the strenuous advocacy of Dr. Nansen was this consummated.1 He became so convinced of the wisdom of the plan under certain conditions that he requested permission to appear before the Territorial and Military Commission of the Lausanne Conference. At the meeting of this Commission on December 1, 1922, Dr. Nansen made an impassioned appeal for a compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey under the auspices of a mixed commission, similar to that which had supervised the Graeco-Bulgarian exchange. His proposals were well received and subsequently incorporated in a convention of January 30, 1924, between Ismet Pasha and M. Venizelos.
It will be objected by American opponents of the Treaty that paper guarantees and interchanges of population, however satisfactory in themselves, do not solve the minorities problem. In their opinion no settlement should be ratified which does not provide a national home for the Armenian people. Upon the wisdom of establishing an Armenian Republic on territory ceded by Turkey, there is some dif-
1 See Appendix.
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ference of opinion in this Committee. Upon the practicability of establishing such a Republic at the present time there is unanimity of opinion. We believe that we can not render a service to the Armenian people by agitating for their national independence at this time. “If we wish an independent Armenia, we must go in and fight for it; the Armenians are too few to win it for themselves. If we do not wish to fight for it, we must be willing to see the Turk remain master in his own house (subject to such reasonable restrictions as are laid down for him in the afore-mentioned Article XLIV of the Treaty of Lausanne). It is the most criminal and cowardly form of betrayal to lead the Armenians to believe that we stand ready to support them in their claim for independence when we know, as we do know, that we shall not send troops to fight for it. For if we lead the Armenians so to believe, they will attempt to rise again encouraged by the belief. If they do and are massacred again, the guilt will be not theirs, not Turkey's, but ours. The sincerest friendship we can show the Armenians now is to encourage the movement for rapprochement (with the Turks). And the worst betrayal of them of which we can be guilty is to refuse, on their account, to ratify the Lausanne TreatyT1
The establishment of an independent Armenia being, for the present at least, out of the question, the best course we can pursue is the lending of our support to the minorities provisions of the Allied treaty with the Turks. For the moment, all we can do is to give moral force to the Peace of Lausanne by the ratification of our own Treaty. Later, American opinion may sanction our becoming coguarantor with the other powers of the rights of those Armenians who remain under Turkish rule. This may be accomplished by American signature of the Treaty of Lausanne or by American membership in the League of Nations. It can not be achieved by mere rejection of the pending treaty.
Shall We Have Any Treaty With the Turks?
Opponents of the Turco-American Treaty must justify one of the following courses of action in lieu of non-ratification of the treaty:
1.	War with Turkey, which is unthinkable.
2.	The continuance of our present informal diplomatic relationships, by which the United States is represented at Constantinople by a High Commissioner and Turkey is represented at Washington by the Spanish Minister. This course is impracticable for a long-continued period.
3.	The severance of all diplomatic relationships with Turkey. Such a course of action would be suicidal. If the objections to the present Treaty are based upon alleged failure to protect American rights in Turkey, it is difficult to see how opponents of the Treaty could consistently advocate severance of diplomatic relations, which would certainly and immediately place all of those rights in jeopardy.
1 New Republic, Feb. 20, 1924.
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4. Insistence upon observance by Turkey of previous treaties between the Ottoman Empire and the United States. There are certain technical arguments which might be advanced to prove that these treaties are even now inoperative. Aside from such considerations,, however, it is obvious that Turkey will refuse to recognize many of the stipulations of our treaties, especially such as are concerned with exterritorial privileges. In the last analysis we can not safely take our stand upon the treaties of 1830 and 1874. If, for example, the Turks should arrest an American citizen and try him in a Turkish court in violation of our alleged treaty rights, we should then be faced with the following dilemma:	To despatch an ultimatum to Turkey
and fight in the event of its rejection, or to accept the humiliating position of standing by while our alleged treaty rights were being ignored.
It should be emphasized, furthermore, that the pursuance of any of these courses of action, even if practicable, would serve only to prolong a state of war in the Near East and thereby to visit continued suffering on all the inhabitants—Christian as well as Moslem—of the Near East. It has been said that the Government of Mustapha Kemal is facing serious domestic difficulties and that its fall is imminent as a result of growing conservative opposition and impending economic disaster. Insofar as this may be true it renders the more, rather than the less, urgent the ratification of the pending Treaty. If the Govern* ment of Mustapha Kemal fails, it may be superseded by one based upon unfortunate traditions of, political opportunism and dependent upon reactionary Moslem support. Or it may be followed by no government at all. But it is self-deception to contend that any new Turkish administration will deal with the United States in a more friendly spirit or upon more favorable terms to us. In this connection it is well to consider our experiences with Mexico and to remember that American recognition of Obregon came almost too late to secure the fruits of recognition. What good purpose would be served by the development of a similar situation in Turkey? * * *
• The record of the present government of Turkey from 1919 to 1922 must be judged with some consideration of the fact that Turkey was a besieged and desperate nation fighting for the right to live. Since the Mudania Armistice the Turks have settled down to the tremendous task of reconstruction and have, on the whole, behaved with dignity and restraint. The attention which they have paid to> economic problems is one of the most hopeful signs that have ever come out of Turkey. Encouragement has been given to the movement for the emancipation of women from the veil and the harem. There has been no repudiation of debts and no fantastic inflation of the currency. Foreign property has been respected; American schools, missions, and hospitals temporarily closed by local authorities were re-opened under orders from the central Government. Turkish authorities in Thrace and Constantinople have recently been showing
100Foreign Policy Association
a more friendly spirit toward Greece in the solution of many delicate problems connected with execution of the Treaty of Lausanne. The recent abolition of the Caliphate, carried out in accord with thè Western tenet of separation of Church and State, was a drastic move against conservative Moslems who objected to legislation designed to abandon the privileged political position heretofore enjoyed by Mohammedan Turks as compared with their Christian and Jewish fellow-nationals.
Whatever may be their record as regards other nations,* the Turks a re friendly to the United States and desire American friendship. They have made sacrifices to retain it under conditions mn^ trying than the present. From the time of our entry into the/	War
until the Armistice, American lives and property in ìb.à if East were wholly at the mercy of the Turks. But American ’TiVeS were protected, American property was kept inviolate, and American schools and colleges outside the war zone continued their work unmolested. This fact is of great significance in the present discussion, when the Turks are so freely charged with ill will and bad faith.
Ratification of the Turco-American Treaty would no more condone past acts of violence on the part of the Turks than assistance to Greek refugees condoned atrocities committed by the Greek armies in Anatolia. It merely gives Americans the opportunity to play a partili the economic and social reconstruction of a war-ridden country. What it asked for the Turks should be demanded for every other Near Eastern people. The tragedy of the Armenians is one which Americans can and should do much to mitigate. The Greek people, worn out as a result of an ill-advised military venture, taxed to the breaking-point, victimized by a series of political revolutions, likewise need American support and generous financial assistance.
It is the judgment of this Committee that the greatest service which Americans can render in the Near East is to heal an old wound, to cure not to condemn, to conciliate not to accentuate racial and religious animosities.
101REPLY TO DAVID HUNTER MILLER
By RAYFORD W. ALLEY,
President, Council on Turkish-American Relations
(From a Letter to The New York Times, December 4, 1925)
To those of us who have followed with more than casual interest the developments in Turkey during the past few years, the letter of Mr. David Hunter Miller advocating that we' reject the pending treaty with Turkey, arouses mixed feelings. While I am not autt	ed to speak for the Council on Turkish-American Relations, 11	tw that all of those associated with me in the Council
believe^v^at the treaty should be ratified. This treaty with Turkey, known as the Treaty of Lausanne, was negotiated between the representatives of the great European powers with Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, who, for the past seven years, has been the United States High Commissioner to Turkey, and Mr. Richard Washburn Child, former Ambassador to Italy, as our “unofficial observers.”
Mr. Miller in his letter says in substance: first, “that the United States owes no obligation to Turkey, but does to Armenia;” second, “that we can and should say on what terms we will have international relations with Turkey;” third, “that the United States surrenders American rights in that it acquiesces in the Turkifica-tion of American missionary institutions and in the repudiation of the Wilson award to Aremenia.” So, in Mr. Miller’s mind at least, the treaty should be rejected by the Senate on these grounds. It is well that we examine them and see if there is any real principle in any of his three ponts which should be determinative of American foreign policy in the Near East.
We certainly are under no legal obligation to Turkey but we are under a heavy moral obligation such as one nation, which has established its liberty and independence and material prosperity, owes to another which has only recently won its independence, thrown off the yoke of absolutism, fetishism, and fifteenth century superstition and has followed our example in the formation of its government and has often officially declared that it looks to us for political inspiration. The United States was under no obligation to Serbia, Bulgaria or Greece, all at one time integral parts of the Ottoman Empire, but we recognized and helped them when they gained their independence and undertook the task of assisting them to realize their ambition to establish a nation. Mr. Miller asks, “are we to forget our obligations to the Armenian people?” It would be extremely interesting and instructive if Mr. Miller would explain what obligations he thinks we are under to Armenia. In referring to Armenia, we assume, of course, that he means the Armenian race because he knows that Armenia is not now and never has been, except for a few isolated periods in the twelfth and
102Rayford W. Alley
thirteenth centuries, more than a geographical expression. The Turks believe that we have incurred a very serious obligation to the Armenians when, for many years, our missionaries and relief workers permitted the Armenians to grow up in the belief that America approved of their political ambitions, created and encouraged their hatred of the Turks and led them to believe that the American government itself would support them in their political independence. The so-called Wilson Award was not approved by the United States as a whole or by the Senate. The offer of the mandate for these peoples to us was rejected by the same people who rejected the Versailles Treaty, yet some misguided philanthropists in the name of the United States did actually lend a few Armenian leaders in Azerbaijan in Russia $12,000,000. It seems to me that the talk about our obligations to Armenia should be reversed. Dr. Wilfred M. Post, who Mr. Miller quotes as saying that the Angora government refused to license American doctors to practice in missionary hospitals, is held responsible for as much of this feeling on the part of the Turks as any other one person.
The writer resents Mr. Miller's belittling of our trade with Turkey because it appears insignificant. While the figures covering our exports and imports are not so impressive as compared with some other countries in the world, I take it that, in this matter, we are discussing principles and not profits.
Every other civilized country in the world has negotiated and ratified a new treaty with Turkey since the war. Many of them are building substantial Embassies in Angora. It is a very significant thing that every American who has been in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic is in favor of the ratification of this Treaty. The Foreign Policy Association under the Chairmanship of Mr. James McDonald, more than one year ago, appointed a special committee to study this treaty, and the committee, after a very exhaustive research and discussion, reported as follows : “* * * jn Spite of the many differences of opinion upon matters of detail and upon some matters of principle, the Committee is unanimously of the opinion that the prompt ratification by the Senate of the Turko-American Treaty would be in the best interests of the United States and the peoples of the Near East." Every representative of American business, which includes great corporations operating in petroleum, dried fruits, tobacco, agricultural machinery, etc., is in favor of the ratification of this Treaty. The Near East Relief through its authorized spokesman, is asking for the early ratification. Every American educational institution in Turkey is actively urging its ratification. All of the religious and church organizations which maintain missionaries or other workers in Turkey are urging the ratification of the Treaty and it would appear to me that when everyone who has first-hand information about the present conditions there is unanimous in urging our Senate to ratify the Treaty, we should be fully advised of the reasons why others object. I can
103The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
understand why Mr. James W. Gerard used his influence to prevent the ratification of the Treaty because he has always been, perhaps, the most prominent friend of Armenia in this country. But in dealing with Turkey we are dealing with a state of facts and not a theory and our refusal to recognize Turkey is not going to aid the aspirations of Armenia in the slightest; we are only inculcating a spirit of hostility in the minds and hearts of the Turks.
Mr. Miller’s statement that “other powers make a treaty at a conference to which we are not a party and then we must accept the result which we have had no influence in establishing * * * I have heard pretty often the contention that we ought not to go to a conference because we might be bound by something that happened there; but in the case of the Turkish treaty the argument of its advocates is that we are practically bound by what happened at a conference in which we took no part.” This is an astounding statement coming from one of Mr. Miller’s experience in diplomatic negotiations. Those of us who followed the newspaper accounts of the conference at Lausanne day by day, recall so clearly that there never was a question raised at that conference that, in one form or another, was not referred to the American observers who were in constant communication with and receiving instructions from our State Department during the whole of these negotiations before it was settled. American counsel, American advice was asked and given freely on practically every clause and paragraph in this Treaty between the Allies and Turkey. Upon what grounds can we, in honesty and fairness, ask for a treaty that would give us more advantage than England, France and Italy got?
It is useless to discuss and argue about the capitulations for the simple reason there are no capitulations. The Turks, exercising the rights that they undoubtedly possess, declared the capitulations abolished and on that day they ceased to be a matter for negotiation or argument. There would be just as much reason in discussing the old Stamp Act or some of the other methods of taxing the American colonies as imposed by George III.
It is not the time to discuss atrocities that may have been committed during the past fifty years because the present government of Turkey is not responsible for them and it certainly is not our responsibility to interfere with their self-government. They have domestic problems which they must handle in their own way.
I wonder how long we in America would tolerate the condition if Japan, for instance, would undertake to send missionaries over- here to work among our Negroes and Indians teaching them a religion totally different from our own and making it doubly attractive by enormous sums of money, food, etc., and building up in their minds the idea that they should have a goodly part of our country in which to establish their own independent government, and the comparison is not so far overdrawn as it may appear.
In discussing this question we should bear in mind that the
104John Carter
present Republic of Turkey is not in any sense the heir of the old Ottoman Empire. If we accept that premise, we will have gone a long way toward clearing up our misunderstandings with the Turkish people.
REPLIES TO DAVID HUNTER MILLER
By JOHN CARTER
(From a Letter io The New York Times, November 3, 1925)
David Hunter Miller urges the rejection or modification by the Senate of the commercial treaty negotiated at Lausanne in 1923 between Turkey and the United States, on the ground that it “surrenders essential American rights, acquiesces in the Turkification' of American missionary institutions, and in the repudiation of the Wilson award to Armenia.”
The “essential rights” referred to are doubtless the capitulations—the principle of extraterritoriality which this country surrendered in Japan, is not averse to modifying in China, and was prepared to abandon in Turkey in 1908. So far as they pertain to American trade Mr. Miller blandly says :
“What little trade we have with Turkey is a benefit to her and of slight concern to us.”
He ignores the fact that the capitulations no longer exist, having been abrogated by the Turkish Government.
His observations regarding Turkification of missionary enterprises may as well be left to Miss Patrick, former President of Constantinople Woman's College, who has urged the ratification of the treaty. Every Government exercises a measure of control over education within its borders.
Regarding “the right of the Armenian people to live their own lives,” we have exactly as much right to tell the Turkish Government what to do as the latter has to prescribe measures for our treatment of the American negro. The Wilson award, like the proposed American mandate for Armenia, was an attempt on thé part of certain European powers to set the United States squarely across the possible junction of Russian and Turkish power. Short of a mandate, our own experience in providing “national homes” for the American Indian may well cause the friends of Armenia to hesitate before accepting similar guarantees from the Turks.
Will you permit me to put a few questions:
1.	Have not we read our own spiritual conceptions of Christianity into the political quality of Eastern Christianity?
2.	Do not the Turkish massacres of the Armenians date from the Russian right of protection over the Eastern Christians in the eighteenth century and from the interest of England and America in the Armenian nation, which has led the Armenians to indulge in intrigues against the Turkish Government?
105The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
3.	Has any Christian Church protested as vigorously against the horrors of the Greek occupation of Anatolia, 1919-22, as against the Turkish atrocities?
4.	Has any Christian Church taken cognizance of the Armenian atrocities against the Turks and Kurds in Russian Armenia, 1916-17?
I put these questions because I believe that an answer to them will clarify public opinion regarding our always dubious right to intervene in Turkey on behalf of a race over which we can exercise no effective control, and to which we have no intention of extending effective military protection.
106ARMENIA: A LOST CAUSE
By E. ALEXANDER E. POWELL
(Copyright, 1923, by The Century Co.)
(From (<The Struggle for Power imMoslem Asia”)
In its more generally accepted sense, Armenia comprises, in part or whole, the Turkish vilayets of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, and Mamuret-el-Aziz—a highly mountainous, heavily forested region bounded on the north by the Black Sea, on the northeast by the Republic of Armenia, on the east by Persia, on the south by Kurdistan, and on the west by Anatolia.
Were the Armenians in a clear majority in any one of these five vilayets the scheme for creating an independent Armenia might possibly have succeeded. But that is nowhere the case. Even by adding to the five Turkish vilayets which have the most Armenians the Russian Republic of Armenia, the Armenians do not total more than a third of the entire population; while in Greater Armenia not more than one-fifth of the inhabitants are Armenians. * * *
After the capture of Constantinople by Mohammed II in 1453, that monarch proceeded to organize his non-Moslem subjects into communities or millets, under their own ecclesiastical chiefs, usually known as patriarchs, who were recognized officials of the Imperial Government with the rank of vizier. To them was delegated absolute authority in civil and religious matters, as well as jurisdiction in criminal cases which did not come under the Moslem religious laws. Thus, the Armenian bishop of Brusa was oppointed by the sultan as the first of that long line of Armenian patriarchs, who have been the spiritual and political heads of the Armenians in Turkey down to the present day. This imperium in imperio secured to the Armenians a recognized position before the law, the free enjoyment of their religion, the possession and administration of their churches, monasteries, and schools, the right to educate their children as they saw fit, in short, the right to, manage their own affairs. It was a remarkable concession for an all-powerful Moslem ruler to make to a non-Moslem minority, the more so as throughout Europe religious intolerance was the order of the day. The millet system also encouraged a community life, which eventually gave birth to an intense longing for a national life. On the other hand, as Sir Charles William Wilson has pointed out, it demoralized and degraded the Armenian priesthood. The priests, as might have been expected, quickly became political leaders rather than spiritual guides, and sought advancement by bribery and intrigue. Education was neglected and discouraged, servility and treachery were developed, and in less than a century after the Conquest the Armenians had become depraved and degraded to an incredible extent. The Armenians, of course, always suffered to a certain extent from their social and political disabilities
107The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
under Moslem rule, yet the undeniable fact remains that they lived for centuries in comparative security, and certainly with a very large measure of prosperity, as Ottoman subjects, many of them attaining to positions of great power under the sultans.
There are two points on which, because they have been so generally misunderstood, I wish to place particular emphasis: first, that the persecution of the Armenians is of comparatively recent origin; secondly, that it was not the result of Moslem religious intolerance and fanaticism. The refutation of the first of these two prevalent misconceptions is that the great Armenian massacres occurred during the last sixty years, while Armenians and Turks have been living together in Asia Minor for upward of six centuries. So little friction was there between the two races up to the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War that histories of Turkey written prior to that time do not even mention such a thing as an Armenian question. The second is refuted by the fact that the Turks are not, like their coreligionists, the Arabs, by nature a fanatical people. As a matter of fact, the history of the Ottoman Empire is less marred by religious intolerance and by massacres due to religious hatreds than the history of European states from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. It is well to remember that when the Crusaders were butchering their Moslem prisoners in Palestine, when the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition were in full swing, when Cromwell's troopers were massacring the Catholics of Ireland, when Protestants in France were being exterminated by orders of the French king, when Jews were being subjected to countless persecutions and barbarities in every European country, Moslems, Christians, and Jews were dwelling side by side, in perfect amity, in Asia Minor. Severe persecution and massacre of the Christian elements began only when Russia conquered part of Armenia and coveted the rest, when the Balkan states became free and started irredentist propaganda, when French intervention in Syria and British intervention in Egypt threatened the disintegration of the empire. The animosity against Christian subject races was born of the suspicion that they were plotting with outsiders to detach from the empire the regions in which they lived.
For upward of two hundred years the enemy of which Turkey stood in mortal fear was Russia—an aggressive, predaceous, unscrupulous, land-hungry Russia with her greedy eyes fixed for ever on the straits and the city that crowned the hills beside them. (I have myself seen Russian maps of Turkey on which Constantinople was labeled Tsarigrad—the City of the Czar.) During all those years Turkey's every energy was bent on averting a Muscovite descent on the Bosphorus, on fending off the paws of the Bear. Russian war-ships hovered in the Black Sea. Russian armies constantly threatened the empire's eastern frontiers. Turkey was infested with Russian spies and political agents, eager to seize on any pretext that offered to stir up trouble between the two nations. And in eastern Turkey, occupying a strategic position of immense importance, dzvelt
108E. Alexander Powell
some two million Armenian Christians, discontented, disloyal, and longing for independence. As Russia seemed1 the power most likely to help them to obtain it, the Armenians began intriguing with St. Petersburg, these intrigues being actively encouraged by the czar's Government, whose policy it was to foster the seditious and disintegrating elements in the sultan's eastern provinces in order to provide a pretext for the conquest of Turkish territory. As a result, the Turks came to regard the Armenians as a treasonable and troublemaking element. There you have the beginnings of what came to be known in time as the Armenian Question. * * *
It was, I repeat, never religious fanaticism, nor racial hatred, but the policy of Russia in the Caucasus and the policy of all the great powers in the Balkans which first awakened and' has since been the exciting cause of the animosity of the Turkish Moslems for the Armenians. In other words, the Armenians have been the unwitting victims of European imperialism. Who ever heard of Armenian massacres before the powers began to appropriate Turkish territory?
The ink on the Treaty of Berlin was scarcely dry before the St. Petersburg Government secretely instructed its consuls in Turkey to encourage the formation of Armenian revolutionary committees, the idea being to provoke an Armenian uprising, which, as Russia knew full well, would be repressed by the Turks with their customary ruthlessness. The excesses which would inevitably ensue would provide Russia with all the pretext she needed to occupy Armenia on the plea of protecting the Armenians, whereas her real motive was to form a vassal state composed of Russian, Turkish, and Persian Armenia. * * *
The project, which was favored by Loris-Melikov, then all-powerful in Russia, would probably have been put into execution had it not been for the assassination, in 1881, of Czar Alexander II. But shortly after his death a strong anti-Armenian policy was adopted by Russia. The schools in Russian Armenia were closed, the use of the Armenian language was discouraged, and attempts were made to Russify the Armenians and bring them within the pale of the Russian Church. * * *
After the abrupt change in Russian policy and the failure of the powers to secure reforms, the Armenian revolutionary leaders in the Caucasus, some of whom had been educated in Europe and the United States and had been deeply affected by the Nihilistic tendencies of the day, having seen the success of the Slav committees in producing disturbances in the Balkans, determined to employ the same methods in Turkey. Organizations were formed in Tiflis and several European capitals for the dissemination of revolutionary literature, secret societies were formed, and an active propaganda was carried on in Turkish Armenia by agents who attempted to smuggle arms and explosives into the country and who represented the ordinary incidents of Turkish misrule as serious atrocities. But this crudely executed scheme to secure foreign intervention did not succeed, though
109The Treaty With Turkey-—Why It Should Be Ratified
the lurid stories related by the agitators aroused a great wave of sympathy in the United States and collections totaling many thousands of dollars were taken up for the cause in churches throughout the land.
Exasperated by their failure, the revolutionaries then proceeded to inaugurate a reign of terror in Turkey, in the course of which several attempts were made on the life of the sultan. On one of these occasions a bomb, placed by the conspirators beneath the seat of a carriage standing before the mosque in which the sultan was at prayer, blew a score or more innocent bystanders to bits but left the padishah unharmed. The agitators also succeeded in precipitating a series of futile outbursts—the most spectacular of which was the seizude by Armenians of the Imperial Ottoman Bank in Constantinople—but they were all easily suppressed.
Retaliation promptly followed in the form of a long series of massacres of Armenians in the capital and in the provinces, instigated by Abdul Hamid, who by this time had developed an inordinate fear and hatred of the Armenians, and carried out by the dregs of the local Moslem populations, aided by Lazis, Circassians, and Kurds. A large majority of the Moslems disapproved of the massacres and many Armenians were saved by Moslem friends, but the lower orders were excited by reports that the Armenians, supported by the European powers, were plotting the overthrow of the sultan, and their cupidity was aroused by the prospect of wiping out their heavy debts to Armenian merchants and money-lenders and of enriching themselves with Armenian goods.
Upon the fall of Abdul Hamid as a result of the Turkish Revolution of 1909, it was believed that a new day had dawned for the Armenians. They quickly discovered, however, that their lot had changed for the worse, for Enver and his colleagues of the Committee of Union and Progress proved to be reactionaries of the worst type, who, though they had overthrown Abdul Hamid, perpetuated the Hamidian régime under another name. Enver, shrewd, callous, utterly unscrupulous, was from the very beginning determined on the complete Turkiftcation of Turkey as the first step in his ambitious scheme for founding a great Pan-Turanian Empire which should include all the Moslem lands lying between the Mediterranean and the western frontiers of China. * * *
The honest, sincere Young Turks, including such men as Mustapha Kemal, Raouf Bey, later to become vice-president of the Grand National Assembly, and others, who had joined the movement because it promised to bring peace to their distracted country, were so few in number that they could not prevail against the reactionary element as personified by such men as Enver, Talaat, Djavid, Djemal, and the rest, and so they broke with the Committee of Union and Progress, which was then free to pursue its policy of repression and persecution without opposition from within. * * *
The declaration of war by the Allies was the signal for Enver and his associates on the Committee of Union and Progress, who
110E. Alexander Powell
were now in undisputed power in Turkey, to launch their cherished scheme for the complete Turkification of Asia Minor. * * *
Only in the Turkish provinces bordering on Transcaucasia did massacre and deportation fail. In these districts the Armenian inhabitants either succeeded in escaping into Russian territory or were saved by the advance of the Russian armies, which many of them joined. Though the majority of the Armenians in the Russian armies were employed on the various battle-fronts in Europe—Mr. Childs estimates the total number at one hundred and sixty thousand, of whom only thirty thousand survived—a considerable contingent of Armenians was attached to the Russian forces engaged in the campaign against Turkey, and it was largely owing to their ardor, courage, and determination to obtain revenge that the Russians owed what success they had against the Turks. There is sound evidence to prove, however, that the methods employed by these Armenian volunteers were no less savage than those of their Turkish enemies. General Mayvesky, the Russian commander on the Caucasus front, in his book, “Armenian Massacres,” which contains his reports to Russian G. H. Q., asserts that the Armenians massacred hundreds of thousands of the Turkish inhabitants of the eastern provinces. In 1916 a Russian column, largely composed of Armenians and other Chris-tion volunteers, calling themselves the Army of Revenge, invaded Central Kurdistan, the atrocities committed by them during the destruction of Rawanduz upon Kurds who until then had known nothing of them being in every respect equal to anything attributed to Kurds in former massacres of Armenians. One can perfectly understand, and in a measure condone, these savage retaliations of a tormented people on their oppressors; but to assert, as some do, that the Armenians themselves have never been guilty of cruelties or massacres is to betray either a complete disregard of the truth or a profound ignorance of the facts. Though reliable figures are not obtainable and probably never will be, unbiased judges are of the opinion that, during the period 1914-22, as many Moslems were massacred in Asia Minor by Armenians mid Greeks as there were Christians massacred during the same interval by Moslems.
After many vicissitudes, the Russian campaign against Turkey was crowned with success in 1916 by the capture of Trebizond, Erze-rum, and Van, the Muscovites thus completing the conquest of Armenia, which they had begun many years before. But the Russian occupation was short-lived, for the following year, by the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Russian armies withdrew not only from Turkish Armenia but from Russian Armenia as well. The million or so Armenians of Transcaucasia, thus abandoned, saved themselves from the Turks by organizing a state of their own, which has been augmented by several hundred thousand refugees from Turkey until the Armenians nqw form about two-thirds of the total population. This state—the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia—which is in area about double the size of New Jersey with half New Jersey's
111The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Shojjld Be Ratified
population, comprises the southeastern frontier districts of Transcaucasia; its capital is Erivan. Though Moscow has permitted it to remain under a quasi-independent Soviet* régime, its future is bound up with that of Russia, its inhabitants having become as Bolshevistic in their tendencies as any of the other Soviet groups in that broad land.
When the Great War ended in complete victory for the Allies, nothing was more confidently expected than that the Armenians of Turkey would be given their independence. The statesmen assembled at Versailles agreed in principle to an independent Armenia, it was definitely provided for in the Treaty of Sèvres, and President Wilson actually delimited the frontiers of the proposed state, which was to include the greater parts of the vilayets of Trebizond and Erzerum and the whole of the vilayets of Van and Bitlis, with a broad outlet on the Black Sea.
But however admirable the decisions of the treaty-makers, they took Armenia little farther toward the actual possession of the territory awarded to her. The Allies might assign the territory by treaty; the feeble and unrepresentative Ottoman Government at Constantinople might, under Allied pressure, sign the treaty ; and President Wilson might define the boundaries of the new state, but for the Armenians to gain possession was another matter. For the real government of Turkey, the Nationalist Government at Angora, had declared in the most unequivocal terms that it would* surrender no territory in which the Moslems were in the majority, and that was undeniably the case in Armenia. The Allies were faced, therefore, with the alternative of accepting that decision with the best grace possible or of going to war. * * *
The truth of the matter was that, though the Armenians possessed the sympathy of the world, their case was not an altogether sound one. America and the Allies had accepted President Wilson's principle of self-determination, but they frankly violated that principle when they decided that the Turkish Armenians should be permitted to organize an independent state. For, despite all the juggling that was done with ethnologic figures, the plain fact remained that in no vilayet of Asia Minor, even before the massacres and deportations, were the Armenians in a majority over the Moslems. The strongest argument for self-determination that the King-Crane Commission on Mandate could advance was that if the million Armenians estimated to have lost their lives in the massacres of 1894-96, 1908-09, and 1915-16 could be restored and brought into the land, the Armenians would form about one half the population. But, adopting this same naive reasoning, if the Moslems who were killed by the Russians, Armenians, and Greeks could be restored, the Armenians would again be in a minority. * * *
I believe that the American Senate showed great wisdom in declining to accept a mandate for Armenia, but that does not alter the fact that the Armenians have been shamefully betrayed by those nations in which they had put their trust and which had solemnly
112E. Alexander Powell
pledged them their independence. The United States had the excuse that it was not a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles, in which Armenia's independence was agreed upon, or to the Treaty of Sèvres, which reiterated it. But Britain, France, and Italy have no such extenuation to offer. As for Russia, there can be little doubt that, had she not been eliminated from the struggle by revolution, she would, sooner or later, have annexed Armenia to her own dominions, for the Muscovite attitude toward the Armenians was never anything save an insincere and predatory one. The treatment accorded to Armenia by the Allies is a sorry commentary on international good faith.
As the Government of Angora has flatly refused to set aside any territory as a “national home” for the Armenians, and as no considerable number of them can hope to find refuge with their Sovietized. brethren in Russian Armenia, whose land is poor and could not support a materially larger population, the Turkish Armenians must, therefore, take their choice between becoming homeless wanderers on the face of the earth, like the Jews of past generations, or remaining in Asia Minor under the guarantees which the Nationalists have agreed to give them.
By the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne the Turks have bound themselves to grant the non-Turkish minorities in their country (on condition of reciprocity for Turkish minorities elsewhere) the whole status, and nothing but the status, secured the minorities in defeated, or newly created, or enlarged states in Europe by the other treaties of peace. This means, if interpreted literally, that those Christians who continue to reside in Turkey will enjoy the same privileges, and be subject to the same restrictions and disabilities, as the Magyars who have come under Rumanian and Jugoslav rule, the Tyrolians who have become Italian subjects, and the Germans and Russians who have come under the sway of Poland.
If the present Nationalist leaders, humane, progressive, far-seeing men of the stamp of Mustapha Kemal and Ismet and Raouf and Adnan, remain in power at Angora, I am convinced that the Armenians henceforward will be secure in Turkey, provided of course, they will consent to abandon their irredentist agitations and give faithful allegiance to the new democracy. For the men who are at present in control of Turkish affairs stand for an entirely new order of things in Turkey, they strongly disapproved of the Armenian massacres (as was shown when they broke with the all-powerful Committee of Union and Progress), and they are keenly alive to the economic value to the young state of a body of industrious, intelligent, cmd talented Armenians. * * *
I, for one, refuse to accept the prophecies of the professional anti-Turks and the political propagandists, the cynics and the calamity-howlers, who assert that the Turk can no more change his attitude toward the Armenians than the leopard can change its spots and that the two races can never live together in amity. On the contrary, I am convinced that if the Armenians will drop their demands for complete
113The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
independence, which it is obviously impossible for Turkey to accede to ; if their priests will cease meddling in political affairs; if the propagandists abroad will abandon their attempts to stir up further trouble, which are of no avail to a cause already lost and only serve to make more trying the position of the Armenians in Turkey, if they will set to work, as loyal Turkish citizens, to support and strengthen the new régime, and if the Turks, on their part, will adopt a conciliar tory and unselfish attitude toward the Armenians, with a view to granting them a very large measure of self-government as soon as they are ready for it and conditions warrant it, it will set forward the hands of progress in the Near East by many years and there will no longer be an Armenian Question.
114SOME TRUTHS ABOUT THE TURKS
(From “The Struggle for Moslem Power in Asia”)
By E. ALEXANDER POWELL
(Copyright, 1923, by the Century Company)
We have witnessed one of the most astonishing and dramatic episodes in the history of the world. In that brief period—less than half a decade—which began with the signing of the Mudania Armistice on October 31, 1918, and ended on July 24, 1923, with the signing of the Peace of Lausanne, we have seen a New Turkey rise like a modern Phoenix from the ruins of the decrepit, detested, and defeated Ottoman Empire. We have seen this young nation, in government more democratic than any existing democracy, successfully defy the victorious Allies, who confidently believed that they had weakened her until she was helpless; tear up the treaty which they sought to impose upon her; annihilate the Greek army which was sent against her; force Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece to write “Finis” to their schemes for territorial aggrandizement in Asia Minor; bring about the overthrow of two European cabinets and the deposition of a European king; outgeneral the ablest diplomatists of Europe at the council-table; achieve a degree of military power which is relatively greater than any that Turkey has known in two and a half-centuries; divorce state and church, and at the same time regain the undisputed leadership of the world of Islam. We have seen the deposition of the last of that long line of sultans who misruled in Turkey for upward of six hundred years. We have seen the Turkish capital transferred from the Bosphorus, where it had been since the fall of Byzantium, to an obscure town of Inner Asia. We have seen the supposedly beaten and demoralized Turks, who, it was confidently asserted, were to be kicked out of Europe for good and all, turn the tables by kicking the Europeans out of Turkey, and, not content with that, just their European frontiers farther to the northward than they were at the outbreak of the Great War. We have seen the complete reversal of every prophecy made in regard to Turkey. * * *
The fact is that the American people have been misinformed and blinded by a propaganda against the Turk, a manipulation of press and pulpit, which has seldom been equaled in audacity of untruth and dexterity of misrepresentation. So subtle, insidious, and systematic has this propaganda been, so shrewdly have the propagandists utilized our racial and religious prejudices, that we have come to accept it at its face-value, convinced that the Turk is all that his enemies have painted him. Knowing nothing of Turkish character save by hearsay—for there are virtually no Turks in the United States to speak for themselves—our attitude, when the word “Turk” is mentioned, has bepome characterized by a hostility, intolerance, and suspicion
115The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
reminiscent of the Whitechapel ruffian who called to his companion: “ ’Ere comes a stranger, ’Arry. ’Eave arf a brick at ’im l”
It seems to me, therefore, that the time has come for Americans to hear the truth about Turkey and the Turks. It is time that they should be awakened to the true significance of the events that have been taking place in the mysterious interior of that great peninsula which separates the Black Sea from the Mediterranean. It is time that they should view the Turkish situation through glasses uncolored by ignorance, prejudice, or misconception. And it is high time that they should examine, understand, and appraise the policies of the Allied statesmen who, ever since the close of the Great War, have been tinkering ineffectually with the Near Eastern Question, thereby imperiling the peace of the world. * * *
Austria-Hungary flooded Europe with anti-Turkish propaganda when, in 1908, she annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece used it during their war against Turkey— the First Balkan War—and prior to that war, to distract the attention of the world from the barbarities perpetrated by their own comitadji bands on the Turkish inhabitants of Macedonia. Italy employed it when she initiated one of the most unjustifiable wars in modern history for the acquisition of Tripolitania. Throughout the four years of the Great War the Allies used propaganda against the Turks as a recognized weapon, just as they used it against the Germans. And England and Greece have used it ever since. To this protracted long-range borAbardment, the ammunition for which has consisted in about equal parts of truths, half-truths, and untruths, the Turk has had no opportunity to reply; first, because he has had few, if any, spokesmen in Western Europe and the United States, and secondly, because the cables and the columns of the West European and the American press have been, to all intents and purposes, closed to him. So far as being able to place his side of the case before the outside world went, the Turk has been, and in a large measure still is, incomunicado. * * *
I wonder if Americans are aware that fully nine-tenths of the despatches regarding Near Eastern affairs which appeared in American newspapers during the four years immediately succeeding the Armistice came from anti-Turkish sources. During this period Constantinople was under the control of the British, Smyrna was occupied by the Greeks, and Angora was almost as effectually cut off from the outside world as though it had been on Mars. Is the American public so credulous as to suppose that despatches favorable to the Turks would have been passed by the British censors in Constantinople or by the Greek censors in Smyrna and Athens? Hardly. It should be realized, furthermore, that about 90 per cent of all cable despatches sent to American newspapers by their European correspondents are relayed through London—and think not that the British cable censorship ended with the war. As a result, the British and their Greek allies, being in control of all telegraphic means of communication between Turkey and America, were enabled promptly to
116E. Alexander Powell
place their own version before American readers and to delay or suppress any despatches attempting to give the Turkish side of the question.
A characteristic example of the determination of the Allies to keep from the world anything which might arouse sympathy for the Turks was the suppression of the report of the international commission (which included the American General Summerall) sent to Smyrna to investigate the atrocities committed by the Greek army when it occupied that city in May, 1919. Though the Allies had published broadcast accounts of the excesses committed by the Turks, they refused to let the world know what had been done to Turks by Christians. * * *
Another cause of American misconceptions regarding Turkey is traceable to the missionaries, and I say this in no disparagement of them. The extent of American missionary effort in the old Ottoman Empire is quite generally known, but its effect on American public opinion is not, perhaps, so widely recognized. Very early in their work the American missionaries discovered that Moslems do not change their faith, so, debarred from proselytism among the Turks, they devoted their energies to religious, educational, and medical work among the Christian minorities, particularly the Armenians. For half a century or more these missionaries provided our chief sources of information on conditions in the Near and Middle East, and by them public opinion in the United States on these subjects was largely molded. Having been rebuffed by the Moslem Turks and welcomed with open arms by the Christian Armenians, it is scarcely surprising that they espoused the cause of the latter and that the reports which they sent home and the addresses which they delivered when in America on leave of absence were filled with pleas for the oppressed Christians and with denunciations of their Turkish oppressors. The congregations which supported the missionaries accepted this point of view without question, and there was thus gradually developed, under the aegis of our churches, a powerful anti-Turkish opinion.
In attempting to gain the ear of the American public, Turkey has been enormously handicapped b ythe insignificant number of Turks living in this country. The Greeks and Armenians in the United States outnumber the Turks by at least thirty to one. Consequently, though Americans rarely, if ever, meet a Turk, they are constantly coming in contact with Greeks and Armenians. * * *
The bright-eyed young Greek who runs the shoe-shining parlor down the street has probably told you, with many gestures and much circumstantial detail, what the Turks did to his relatives when the armies of Mustapha Kemal entered Smyrna in September, 1922. But there isn’t any Turk to tell you what the Greeks did to his relatives when the armies of Constantine retreated across Anatolia during the months preceding. So, you see, you are looking at only one side of the medal.
117The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
Still another reason why we know so little of the Turk is due to the Turk himself—to his failure to place his own case before the world. This is not because his leaders have been blind to the enormous value of skilfully directed propaganda, or because they disapprove of it, but, first because they cannot afford to undertake an extensive publicity campaign—Turkish finances do not permit of establishing news bureaus in foreign capitals, or subsidizing writers and lecturers, of circulating photographs and motion-pictures.
Now I can readily understand and make allowance for the public’s errors and misconceptions, for it has had, after all, no means of knowing that it has been systematically deceived, but I can find no excuse for those newspapers which, clinging to a policy of vilifying the Turk, failed to rectify the anti-Turkish charges printed in their columns even when it had been proved to the satisfaction of most fair-minded persons that they were unjustified. A case in point was the burning of Smyrna in September, 1922. There was scarcely a newspaper of importance in the United States that did not editorially lay that outrage at the door of the Turks, without waiting to hear the Turkish version, yet, after it had been attested by American, English, and French eye-witnesses, and by a French commission of inquiry, that the city had been deliberately fired by the Greeks and Armenians in order to prevent it falling into Turkish hands, how many newspapers had the courage to admit that they had done the Turks a grave injustice? Again, there was the outcry raised by the exchange of populations. Instead of denouncing this measure as a crowning example of Turkish barbarity, why did not our newspapers inform their readers that the scheme was not initiated by Turkey but by the League of Nationsf * * *
We profess to be scandalized by the Turk’s practice of polygamy (it was, in fact, practised by less than 4 per cent of the population) while at the same time reading with perfect equanimity of Abraham, Jacob, Solomon, and other patriarchs of the Old Testament who were likewise polygamists, or of certain American bankers and railway magnates who also maintain establishments which differ in little, save their illegality and secrecy, from Turkish harems. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that, though polygamy in Turkey was abolished by law in 1922, two years after the establishment of the Nationalist Government, it was not prohibited in the United States until nearly a century after the Revolution and in Utah was openly practised until very recently. When one of the most respected Mormons in Utah died not long ago his four wives sat beside the casket during the funeral services! We deplore the position of Turkish women, overlooking the fact that Turkey is the only country in the world that has elevated a woman to the position of a cabinet minister and forgetting that Turkish prostitutes are unknown. The compulsory wearing of the veil by Turkish women was abolished about the same time that steps were being taken to abolish the flogging of women in the State of Georgia. We think of the Turk as intolerant
118E. Alexander Powell
and a hater of Christians, conveniently forgetting that he has not only always left nomMohammedans free to follow their own religions but that, in one chapter of the Koran, Mohammed explicitly directs his followers to help the Christians if they are building a church and need assistance. Does any one assert that Moslem missionaries would receive the same tolerant treatment in this country, or that they would be accorded the same privileges and immunities, that our missionaries have received since the beginning of their work in Turkey? We hold the Turk up to execration as a barbarian, disregarding the testimony of the British and French soldiers who served against him that he was always a clean fighter, and ignoring the fact that throughout the war he steadfastly refused to avail himself of that most inhuman of all civilized inventions, poison gas, on the ground that it was not a gentleman's weapon. We denounce him, and quite rightly, for his massacres of the Armenians and Greeks, forgetting, however, the countless thousands of Turks who have been massacred by Armenians and Greeks in Asia Minor, by Armenians and Russians in the Caucasus, by Greeks in Albania and Crete, and by Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgars in Macedonia and Thrace. We regard the Turk as a tyrant —and he was—yet he gave to the people of Mesopotamia and Syria a considerably greater measure of autonomy than they enjoy to-day under the British and French mandates, which explains, perhaps, why a majority of the inhabitants of those regions want him back again. We are fond of saying that grass dies wherever a Turkish hoof has trod—an old Greek proverb, by the way—yet, as I can attest from personal knowledge, Thrace and Anatolia were productive and comparatively prosperous until the Greek bayonet drove out the Turkish plow. We claim that the Turk cannot be trusted, which is hard to reconcile with the fact that from one end of Western Asia to the other the unsupported word of a Turk is invariably taken in preference to the oaths of any of the brands of native Christians. And how, pray, if he is as black as he has been painted, can we explain the fact that every foreigner who really knows the Turk—diplomats, consuls, army and naval officers, traders, even missionaries—are outspoken in their liking for him as an individual ? It pleases us to think of him as negligible from a political or military point of view, yet in less than three years he annihilated a Greek army far superior in equipment and resources to his own, recovered the whole of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, compelled the Italians to abandon their pretensions to Adalia, forced the French to evacuate Cilicia and alter in his favor their Syrian frontier, constrained the British to withdraw from Constantinople and the Dardanelles, cost Lloyd George his premiership, Gounaris and his colleagues their lives, and Constantine his throne, won a whole series of diplomatic victories over Curzon and Venizelos, tore up the obnoxius Treaty of Sevres and substituted for it the Treaty of Lausanne * * *
European and American apologists have attempted in vain to minimize these remarkable achievements. The facts speak for themselves.
119RATIFICATION OF THE LAUSANNE TREATY THE TRUEST FRIENDSHIP WE CAN SHOW THE ARMENIANS
By NATHANIEL PEFFER
(From “Asia” April, 1924)
(Copyright 1924, by Asia Magazine, Inc.)
In the last talk I had with the Editor of Asia before I left for the Near East, he said to me: "We are interested especially in two questions. First, is there really such a thing as Islamic bigotry ? Second, is it really religious difference that causes the Armenian-Turkish feud and the recurrent disturbance of the peace in the Near East? * * *
To the second question put by the Editor of Asia, an Armenian chanced to give me an illuminating answer in the midst of a conversation I was having with an American doctor who has been long in Turkey. The American was telling me the usual stories of Turkish ill treatment of Armenians, all of them doubtless true. The Armenian, also a doctor, put in a word to confirm them, citing as an example conditions in his native city in the interior.
"In a town like that,” I asked, "do the Turks and Armenians live together without reference to race or in separate communities, each among his own ?”
"In separate communities, even if it is a small town,” he said. "Is there any intermingling of the two socially? Do they have any personal contacts outside business?”
"Hardly any.”
"How about the Greeks?”
"They do the same.”
"They have their own colonies, too, or intermingled with the Armenians ?”
"In their own colnies.”
"Separated from the Armenians as much as from the Turks?” "Yes.”
"How do the Armenians get along with the Greeks?”
"Not very well. Badly, in fact.”
"How much better than with the Turks?”
"Hardly any, if at all. There are no open fights, and no atrocities, of course, but, except for the times when Turkish passions are aroused, the Armenians can get along better with the Turks than with the Greeks. There isn't so much business rivalry, for one thing.”
"But isn't there more community of interest between the Greeks and the Armenians? Don't they mix more, personally and socially?”
"No, hardly any more.”
120Nathaniel Peffer
“Doesn’t their common religion act as a bond at all?”
“No, not at all.”
Then, as if by way of illustration, he told me that the Armenian refugees who had fled from Asia Minor to various places in Greece before the victorious advance of Mustapha Kemal, late in 1922, were having trouble now. The Greek authorities refused to let them study their own language in their schools, a privilege they have always had in Turkey.
Inasmuch as I had no need to put further queries, the conversation reverted to the subject of Turkish iniquities. But in that interlude was answered, I think, the question whether it is religion that digs the abyss between Turks and Armenians. If it is, they why are the relations between the Christian Greeks and the Christian Armenians no closer than those between either of them and the Moslem Turks? Why do Armenians and Greeks live as completely isolated from each other as from the Turks?
Nationalism, race, economic rivalries, international politics— these and other enkindling elements of antagonism have fired the perpetual feud in Turkey. Religion enters only coincidentally. The line of religious difference happens to run parallel with the other lines of difference. Were there no religious differences, the feud would still exist; it would only be less inflamed because not so easily fired from outside. The sudden acceptance of Islam by all the Christians in the Near East would not be followed by tranquillity. It would not even mean that they would be much better treated. As a matter of fact, the conversion of either the Moslems or the Christians to the faith of the other would not be half so great an influence for peace as the conversion of Great Britain and France to decency in international politics. I omit America here only because America is still relatively unsophisticated in that part of the world. Nor am I unaware of the symptoms of sophistication developed at the Lausanne conferences, chiefly on the subject of oil. A generation from now one may have to say Great Britain and France and America. The truth is that we cannot hope to come to an understanding of the Near East and the influences that make for war there until we cease thinking of the Near East in terms of Christian and Moslem. This may entail the unthinking of centuries of human thinking and the stopping of the most efficient propaganda engines in the world; it is necessary, nevertheless. Basically false, the appeal of religion has been used for centuries to inflame the passions of the western world and to obscure the genuine issues at play and the real objects for which passions are inflamed and wars fought. It will always be so as long as the religious appeal can be used.
I talked once to an American woman educator who has lived in Constantinople some thirty or forty years and is one of the most distinguished foreigners in Turkey. The conversation fell to atrocities and racial enmities, of which she has seen much since their
121The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
intensification in Abdul Hamid's time. “It's of no use to talk of atrocities," she said. “When it comes to atrocities, all these people out here are the same." Then she added: “You must not exaggerate the importance of religion, either. The religion of people out here is a form of political allegiance, not spiritual faith." She has herself a Christian religious worker.
An American official told me an incident pointedly illustrative of her statement.
In 1922, when Kemal was marching toward the coast, with the British threatening and a general war likely, an American highly placed was making a call on a Turkish official. “What do you think—will there be massacres?" he asked.
“I am afraid so," the Turk answered slowly. “I hope not, but I am afraid. Feelings have been raised pretty high, and you know what happens then." At that point, seeing on the face of the American the effect his words had had, he hastened to give assurance. “But you Americans need have no fear," he added. “You will be safe. Only the Christians will be attacked."
Christians, not Americans! To the Turk there was nothing unreal or illogical in the distinction. He would have been shocked to be told that Americans considered themselves Christians in the sense he implied. To him the word means not those whose faith was in a certain gospel, but Armenians and Greeks. It was a political designation.
It is as a political category that the Turk fights the Armenians and Greeks, as he has fought other peoples for turbulent centuries. That is, he has fought them, not as Christians, but as foreigners and national enemies, representatives of corintries hostile to Turkey and seeking to bring about its downfall. Sometimes they have opposed Turkey for their own countries and sometimes as instruments of western European countries, but they have been good enemies. What more likely than that the Turk should fight them ruthlessly, especially when some of them happen to be on his own soil, his subjects and at his mercy as a minority people? * * *
Racial enmity poisons all life in Turkey. There is not a fiber of the national body into which it has not worked. And so long as this internal hostility exists, there will always be those outside ready to incite more of it for purposes of international politics. True, external incitation is more frequently a cause than an effect. It is difficult to-know where the circle begins and ends. In any case, Turkey cannot have normal relations with other countries while its internal conditions are entangled externally. Either the various peoples there must come together at least to the point of mutual tolerance, or all but one must be eliminated, by extermination, deportation or voluntary mass emigration. One of those alternatives, or there is no future for Turkey and the peoples that inhabit it.
The first cause of racial ill-will in Turkey is just what it is everywhere ; namely, race. And of race antipathies, the mutual repulsions.
122Nathaniel Peffer
produced by mere difference—difference of color, customs, habits— nobody can speak with more than conjecture. It is enough to say that such antipathies exist in Turkey as elsewhere. And there, of course, dislike is sharpened by other factors peculiar to the country. These are, as I have said, principally economic rivalry, nationalistic political ambitions and memory, and the greatest of these is memory.
On each side, suspicion, fear and hatred spring from an accumulation of wrongs throughout thé past. On each side a sense of grievance well founded breeds a desire for revenge; revenge intensifies the sense of grienvance, which in turn excites more revenge, and thus, for both, hostility is self-feeding and self-perpetuating. There is no occasion for surprise that sometimes in Constantinople you are not sure whether you are talking to a Turk or an Armenian. They sây exactly' the same thing. When I asked a Turkish editor in Constantinople what he thought of the reconciliation plans now projected, he answered me: “We can’t tell. It all depends on the Armenians. They will have to behave themselves better than they have done in the past. ' First they will have to give evidence of a change of heart. All we can do is wait and see.” And when I put the same question to one of the leaders of the Armenian community, an educator, he said : “We hope for reconciliation. We want it. But how can we trust them after what we have suffered? How can we accept their promises and come half-way till we see some proof of a change in their intentions? What can we do, but wait ?” I quote them verbatim ; for I wrote their words down then. And what is essential to remember is that both have reason on their side.
It is impossible to deny that the Armenians have been oppressed. I single them out because, however much the Greeks have suffered, the Armenians typify the problem best. In the first place the Greeks have been less defenseless, and in the second place Greece has been in recent years the avowed enemy of Turkey. If, in the past five years, Greeks have been driven out of Turkey and worse, after all, they would hardly have fared better in America in like circumstances. The Armenians put the case more clearly.
It is asserted with platitudinous- frequency that the Armenians did not fare ill until they began playing politics as allies of Turkey’s enemies. This is a half-truth, however. It is too simple and too charitable to the Turks to say that the Armenians were well treated until they became rebellious. They were not. The fact that they rose, so indicates. People well treated, especially commercial, property-holding people, do not revolt. But if through the centuries the Armenians have been oppressed, it is necessary to remember ■ that they have been a minority people and the Turks the ruling race. Then it is necessary to ask whether the Turks have been very different from any other ruling race. Next to dynastic and religious quarrels, the oppression of one people by another under whom’ it happened to live, has most often determined the history of Europe. There was nothing tender about the way any of the empires in Europe or Asia treated their alien subjects
123The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
between the time of the Holy Roman Emipire and the relative humani-tarianism of the past half-century. Judged by the standards of that period the Turks suffer little by comparison. They suffer even less, judged by the standards of their part of the world. In the Balkans and the Near East there has never been any choice among the races. What betweeen the time of the Holy Roman Empire and the relative humani-th Turk has done to the Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks and Serbs, they have done to him and to one another when they have had the chance.
It is nevertheless a fact that there were no wholesale atrocities against the Armenians until they lent themselves to Russia's schemes. I believe few balanced Armenians in Turkey (I do not refer to Armenians outside Turkey; their safety lends them a specious detachment) will deny that in first adopting that policy the Armenians committed a fatal blunder. I spent an afternoon with an old Armenian leader who still occupies a high position in the Armenian community in Constantinople. He was one of the group of Armenian students in Paris more than thirty years ago when the Armenians first began burning with nationalist aspirations, following the example of the other subject races in the Turkish Empire. The Armenians in Paris were making grandiose plans for revolt with the aid of Russia, like the Slavs in the Balkans. I now quote the Armenian with whom I talked:
“I argued with them/' he said. “I warned them to be calm. I gave two reasons. First, geography. The Armenians were not a separate geographical unit detached from Turkey proper like the Bulgarians, Rumanians and others. They were scattered about in Turkey itself, directly under Turkish military power. Second, history. I was then learning something in my university lectures about the ways of European powers. What I learned convinced me that they were not acting in good faith but were only using Near Eastern peoples as pawns in their own larger game. I told my fellow-countrymen so. I told them that, if we had to rely on Russia, we should be sacrificed. They jeered at me and asked me what kind of Armenian I was. I have lived to see my prophecy fulfilled, and more than once. We have had our hopes raised repeatedly, have taken risks founded on those hopes, have been let down, by now one power and now another, and then have suffered terribly. But now, I believe, my people have learned the lesson. I think they will not sacrifice themselves any more for the big powers.” The last statement I believe to be accurate, at least concerning the Armenians in Turkey. Though most of the extremists are in European capitals or America, there are still some of them, even in Turkey. But nearly all the Armenians have learned that, evil as the choice is, they must recognize the laws of matter. They live in Turkey and they are fewer than the Turks. They must either leave the country or seek some basis of peaceful settlement with the Turks. Most of the suffering of the Armenians in the past generation—though their suffering has been exaggerated, it has been terrible enough—would have been avoided had the Armenians been able sooner to purceive this truth. Since they did not perceive it, even after numerous demonstrations, they must
124Nathaniel Peffer
share with the Turks the blame for what has befallen them. But still more must the blame be borne by the European Powers that cynically, for their own ulterior purposes, incited the Armenians to revolt and then left them) defenseless against Turkish 'punishment. French, British, Russians—all have been guilty at different times. They and not the Turks have been the worst enemies of the Armenians. In a sense, it is they who have committed the atrocities. * * *
125Reply to the “Committee Opposed to the Ratification of the Lausanne Treaty”
By WILLIAM T. ELLIS
(From a Letter to The New York Times, March 20, 1924)
There has just come to my attention an elaborate booklet, “The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey/' which contains such a misleading preversion of an article I wrote recently for The New York Times that I am constrained to call upon you for help in overtaking the misrepresentation.
This expensive booklet, issued in the name of a committee of which James W. Gerard is the head, but prepared by Mr. Cardash-ian, an Armenian, is designed to create public sentiment against the ratification by the Senate of the American treaty with Turkey. It bears the signatures of 107 persons, only 90 of whom, so far as I can learn, have ever been in the Near East or have any first-hand knowledge of conditions in that unhappy part of the earth.
I am not, at the moment, interested in reviewing the document or exposing its misrepresentations—as, for example, its continued use of ex-Ambassador Straus's name, although, according to newspaper dispatches, Mr. Straus cabled from Constantinople, prior to the publication of this booklet, that an examniation of the present situation in Turkey and interviews with Constantinople Americans had led him to favor the ratification of the treaty.
Discriminating readers of the Gerard-Cardashian outgiving will note the omission of the names of American missionary officials, educators, relief works and business men who have the fullest firsthand knowledge of present conditions in Turkey. They are mostly on record, if at all, as favoring the ratification of the treaty.
My concern has to do with a lengthy quotation from an article which I wrote for The Times on Jan. 27, 1924. In the table of contents of this propaganda publication I am listed as one of its contributors ! So far as the compilers are able to do so, I am aligned with those who protest against the treaty. Whereas, the simple truth is that Mr. Cardashian has lifted out of my article upon the exchange of populations in the Near East only those paragraphs which deal with the elimination of the Christians, thus implying that I am writing in support of his claim. He omits all of my explicit statements concerning the reason for this tragic state of affairs. That he does violence to the facts of the case is but consistent with his entire presentation; that he totally misrepresents me is a personal grievance which I ask your help in partially redressing.
Since the Turco-American Treaty is shortly to come before the Senate for ratification, there is additional public reason why I ask you to reprint the following paragraphs which have been omitted from the quotation of my article in this Armenian propaganda pub-
126William T. Ellis
Iication. They may shed real light on the present situation in the Near East:
“No attempt is made here to traverse the whole course qf events in the Near East, from the signing of the World War armistice until today, for that would include the record of the disunion of the Allies at Constantinople; their failure to punish Turkey fqr the Armenian atrocities ; the military adventure of Greek imperialism into Anatolia; the support of the Turks by France and Italy; the overthrow of the old Turkish rulers at Constantinople and the rise of a new Turkish nationalism, with its capital at Angora; the excesses of the Armenians in Cilica, and of the Greeks in Western Anatolia ; the collapse of the Greek Army ; the abandonment of the Greek civilian refugees at Smyrna; the armistice of Mudania and the two Lausanne conferences; and now the inauguration of a new régime by a victorious Nationalist Turkey wherein foreigners have no special privileges. * * *
“The blame will generally be attached to ‘the unspeakable Turk,’ yet I believe the imediate responsibility rests upon the Christians, and the ultimate culprit is European diplomacy. Decades of diplomacy fomented religious and racial passions. Moslems were incited against Christians. Christians were incited against Moslems. Certain powers made themselves ‘protectors' of certain creeds. Two points in the modern history of the Near East illustrate this. One was the Armenian atrocities by the Turks, the other was the Greek expedition into Turkey, under the protection and provision of Great Britain.
“It was the collapse of the Greek adventure in September, 1922, that brought about the present condition. As they retreated from interior Anatolia the Greeks burned cities, towns and villages, aiming to leave the land they were forsaking as near a desert as possible, quite as was the fashion with the Oriental hordes of a millennium earlier. Following the fleeing army, the civilian Greek population, to the number of 1,000,000, also left Anatolia.
“Then came the resolution of the victorious Mustapha Kemal Pasha to have a Turkey for Turks alone. It was decided that the only way to solve this problem of rebellious minorities was to eliminate them. Dr. Nansen, representing the League of Nations, proposed an ‘exchange of populations' between Turkey and Greece, whereby all Greeks should leave Asia Minor and all Moslems should leave Western Thrace. This plan was adopted by the Lau.sanne Conference. * * *
“There is another side to this situation. New Turkey is by treaty to be open to acceptable missionaries. A new force of workers doubtless will be sent into Turkey to preach the Gospel to the Turks. A new chance at a more open-minded Turkey, in a state of religious flux, will be given the missionaries ; and some of the American leaders see in this a possible compensation for the tragic ousting of the old workers."
127The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
As one of the first Americans to protest widely in print against the Armenian atrocities by the Turks during the war, and as one who is abundantly on record against Turkish misdeeds, I cannot be accused of pro-Turkism. But I am pro-American; and I am unable to remain silent while alien propagandists vilify our country by a misstatement of facts concerning which I have personal knowledge.
128Mustapha Kemal: Incarnation of New Turkey
By LOTHROP STODDARD
(From “The New Orient ” April, 1925)
Mustapha Kemal is one of the most extraordinary personalities of our time. He is the living embodiment of that New Turkey which, like the fabled phoenix, has risen suddenly and dramatically from the ashes of what seemed to be hopeless ruin. It was my privilege to meet him on my recent visit to Turkey, and to watch him at his task of nation-building in his remote capital of Angora, situated as it is in the heart of Asia Minor, the Turkish homeland. I left Angora convinced that here was a really great man, who has already set his stamp indelibly upon his country, and who, if he lives, may well play a major rôle in the unfolding drama of the Near East. And that Near Eastern drama is one which commands attention everywhere. There mighty forces are at work that must inevitably affect every corner of the earth. To know and to understand the Near East’s most outstanding figure is therefore not merely a matter of human interest but also a matter of practical necessity. * * *
Mustapha Kemal was born forty-four years ago in the city of Salonika, then part of European Turkey but lost to Greece since the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. His father was a minor Government official who does not seem to have ever displayed particular talents. His mother, however, appears to have been a woman of distinct ability, judging by the way she brought up her son amid hard financial difficulties after her husband’s death at a comparatively early age. It is from his mother, who was of Albanian origin, that Mustapha Kemal probably gets his unusual blondness. It was from her, likewise, that he probably inherits his masterful energy, the Albanian stock being noted.for those qualities and having furnished many noted leaders to the .Turkish Empire in its long history. From childhood Mustapha Kemal was destined for that most honored of Turkish professions, a military career, and he accordingly entered a military school, where he showed distinct promise and was duly graduated as an officer. His professional rise, however, was slow—not because of his military ability, which from the first struck his superior officers, but because of his political opinions. Mustapha Kemal grew up under the corrupt tyrrany of Sultan Abdul Hamid. Like most intelligent, far-seeing Turks, he realized that such a régime was ruinous and he began casting about for ways of rescuing his unhappy country from its evil plight. Cautious and reserved though he was by nature, inklings of his attitude came to the ears of the Sultan’s spies who swarmed everywhere, and he was promptly marked “dangerous.” Accordingly, he was stationed in remote parts of the Empire, and only after years of effort did he succeed in getting a desirable billet in his native Macedonia. By this time Salonika had become the centre of the mil-
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itary conspiracy which, in the year 1908, was to depose Abdul Hamid and effect the so-called “Young Turk” Revolution. Mustapha Kemal was in the thick of this conspiracy and was closely affiliated with its leaders. However, he seems even at this time to have had doubts about their ability to reconstruct Turkey, and once the Revolution was made and Abdul Hamid deposed, he refused to follow the Young Turk chiefs whole-heartedly. Sticking to his profession, he rose steadily in rank, having attained the grade of colonel at the beginning of the Great War in 1914.
This event brought him once more into serious governmental disfavor. Mustapha Kemal strongly opposed Turkey’s entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers. That naturally infuriated his former Young Turk associates, particularly their leader, Enver Pasha, who was now virtually dictator of Turkey and arch-champion of the Germans. Mustapha Kemal was too good a soldier to be disgraced, but Enver took care to get him away from the capital, Constantinople, Kemal’s first billet being at the Dardanelles. Here he showed clearly his great military talents. It was owing to his skill and judgment more than anything else that the great British attack on the Dardanelles was repulsed. At the time this was not generally known, the Government hushing up his exploits and sending him to even more distant commands on the Mesopotamian and Syrian fronts, where Kemal likewise did yeoman service, his last exploit being at the very close of the war, when, after the crushing of the Syrian front, he saved the Turkish rearguard.
The war was over, and, as Kemal foresaw from the first, had ended in disaster. The situation was frightful—apparently hopeless. Turkey lay crushed, literally bled white of men and resources. The victorious Allied Powers occupied Constantinople and all Turkey’s outlying provinces. Only the interior of Asia Minor, the region known to the Turks as “Anatolia,” escaped Allied military occupation.
It was Kemal’s brilliant war-services, combined with his known aversion to the Young Turk Government, which gave him the chance that marked the beginning of his meteoric rise to greatness. Enver Pasha and the other Young Turk leaders had of course fled the country to avoid the vengeance of the victors, and a new Government friendly to the Allies had been set up. This new Government selected Kemal as a good man to go to Asia Minor with the mission of demobilizing and disarming the remnants of the Turkish armies there, which, ragged, starving, and out of discipline as they were, threatened to' break up into brigand bands and plunge the country into complete anarchy.
Had the Allies granted Turkey a tolerable peace, it is probable that Kemal’s mission would have been merely another episode in his military career and that he would have demobilized the shattered Turkish armies with his usual efficiency. At that moment, however, an event occurred which turned his thoughts in a very different direction. Having beaten Turkey, the Allies now disclosed what they were
130Lothrop Stoddard
going to do with her. And it was plain that what the Allies were planning was to wipe Turkey off the map as an independent state. All the outlying provinces were to be cut away, Constantinople was to be internationalized, while Anatolia, the Turkish homeland, was to be divided up into “spheres of influence” for Allied political domination and economic exploitation. And even this was not the worst. From the Turkish point of view the crowning infamy was the Allies' evident intention to assign large sections of Anatolia to the local Christian elements—to the Armenians in eastern Asia Minor and to the Greeks in the west. This was the last straw! That the Turks, warriors and conquerors for a thousand years, and heirs of a great empire, should not merely lose their independence but should in great part be put under the domination of their former slaves was a fate far worse than death. As the knowledge of what was contemplated spread, a low growl of suppressed fury arose portending trouble. Then, scenting trouble in the wind, the Allies made their final blunder. Unable to spare sufficient troops of their own to occupy Anatolia, the Allies sent the Greeks to occupy Smyrna, the chief city of Asia Minor and the best base from which to deal with Turkish resistance to their orders. A strong Greek army occupied Smyrna in the spring of 1919, committed wholesale atrocities upon the Turkish inhabitants, and showed plainly what the Turks might expect under Greek rule.
This event acted like a lighted match in a powder-magazine. The mutinous growl swelled to a roar of wrath, and Anatolia rose as one man, resolved on freedom or death. Rarely has there been witnessed so sudden and dramatic a change in a people's attitude. At the close of the war the Turks were beaten, tired, and apathetic. They were resigned to the loss of their outlying provinces, and they might even have resigned themselves to the internationalizing of their capital, Constantinople. But they did expect that their homeland, Anatolia, would be left to them, and that there they would be allowed to build up an independent national life. It was this nationalist idea upon which the Turks had come more and more to pin their hopes, and the Allied leaders, notably Mr. Lloyd George, had given the Turks to understand that this much would be allowed them in the peace settlement. When the Turks discovered that those Allied pronouncements had been merely war-propaganda and that the victorious Allies were planning what amounted to Turkey's destruction, they resolved on a last desperate stand, no matter what the odds against them or how slim the chances of success.
No man better incarnated this mood of iron desperation than Mustapha Kemal. Long convinced as he had been that his people's best hope of regeneration lay in the upbuilding of a genuine Turkish national state, his keen military eye told him that the moment for action had come:	It was literally now or never. The Greeks were
landing a large, well-equipped army at Smyrna and were preparing to overrun Anatolia. There was not a moment to lose. Accordingly he came forward as the champion of the national cause, and his official
131The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
position, combined with his professional record, insured his being instantly accepted by Turkish patriots as the proper leader. Issuing a ringing call for volunteers, he began feverishly to organize resistance against the invader. The wrecks of the Turkish regular forces were whipped into some sort of shape, while large bodies of irregulars prepared to wage guerilla warfare.
So slender were Kemaks resources that his venture seemed almost hopeless. The Greeks easily disposed of his poorly-armed outposts and soon occupied most of western Anatolia. Two things saved the Turkish Nationalists: The nature of their country and the dissensions among their opponents. Asia Minor is a vast, thinly populated land, largely mountain and desert, and very difficult for campaigning. .Even the large Greek armies spread out thin and were unable to overrun the entire country. Furthermore, the Greeks were not backed up by all the Allies. The Allied Powers were, in fact, quarreling bitterly over the division of the Turkish spoils. First Italy, angered because she had not got what she considered a fair deal from England and France, dropped out and refused to have anything to do with the Turkish settlement. Next, England and France fell out over the whole Near Eastern settlement, and since England was favoring the Greeks and seemed to have obtained the lion's share of the Turkish spoils, France promptly went into reverse and began coquetting with the Turkish nationalists, slipping them arms and aiding them in other unofficial ways. There followed nearly three years of mingled fighting and negotiating, too complicated to relate here, during which Kemal and the Turkish nationalists gradually tightened their grip while the tide went correspondingly against the Greeks. Finally, in August, 1922, Kemal made a lightning stroke, smashed the Greek armies, and drove them headlong from Anatolia. This left England standing alone against the victorious tide of Turkish nationalism. For a moment it looked like war. The Lloyd George Government sent the British fleet and, a picked British army to hold Constantinople and appealed to the Empire to stand behind him. But public opinion, both in Britain and the Dominions, was in no mood , for a Near Eastern war, and Lloyd George soon fell from power. Diplomatic negotiations ensued between the Turks and the Allied Powers. The Turks held the trumps. Flushed with victory, they were ready to fight, while the Allies were not and were also at odds among themselves. The upshot was a sweeping Turkish diplomatic victory. Not only did the Turks get the whole of Asia Minor and Constantinople, but they also succeeded in abolishing numerous political and economic “servitudes” that had weighed upon the old Ottoman Empire for generations, such as the extra-territorial rights of resident foreigners and the European administration of the Ottoman debt. In fine, the Turks emerged from their war of independence more masters of their own house than they had been for at least two hundred years.
Having obtained a free hand, it now remained to be seen what the Turks were planning to do with their opportunity. The Turks,
132Lothrop Stoddard
however, had already made this perfectly plain. The Nationalist program is the creation of a truly Turkish Turkey—a genuine nationstate on Western lines. Fanatically devoted to this ideal, they allowed nothing to stand in their way. No more sweeping change can be imagined, because the old Ottoman Empire was a typical Oriental despotism, ruled by an absolute Sultan and inspired by Islamic tradition, which takes no account of the national idea. Against all this the Nationalists have set their faces like flint. Not merely has European tutelage been thrown off and the unassimilable native Christian minorities, Greek and Armenian, been expelled, but their own traditional institutions and ideals have been ruthlessly scrapped. The Sultan has been deposed, the Ottoman Caliphate ended, and Turkey is today practically a republic, the source of political authority being the Grand National Assembly, which (in constitutional theory, at least) delegates executive power to a President—who is, of course, Mus-tapha Kemal Pasha. The victorious Nationalists are grimly, fanatically determined to realize their ideal. They recognize the difficulties that confront them; they know how herculean is the task of restoring their war-wasted land and transforming it into a prosperous nation-state. Nevertheless, they are resolved to go through with their program, no matter what the risks and difficulties, and they are inspired by an ardent faith in the natural capacity of the Turkish people.
Such is the spirit that dominates Angora, and which, as I have already remarked, is incarnated in Mustapha Kemal. It was in this rather exalted psychological atmosphere that I met the Turkish leader. On a certain afternoon KemaFs own automobile (one of the very few in Angora) motored me out of the city to his residence, situated some miles from town. KemaFs home is a medium-sized stone house, of the villa type, built in a cleft of a range of hills. Passing the sentries, I was ushered into the drawing-room, furnished in European style, where Kemal awaited me. My outstanding impression of the man was one of tremendous (though restrained) energy. The sheer power of KemaFs personality fairly radiated from him. Of all the persons I have met, only one can compare with him in this respect— Mussolini. Kemal is anything but Oriental appearance. His coloring is sish-blond—light hair brushed back from a medium forehead, pale complexion, and gray eyes. Those eyes are extraordinary; they have steely lights in them and fairly pierce you through in their penetrating scrutiny. The longer you study Kemal, the more you are convinced that here is literally a “man of iron.” His tall figure suggests lean, sinewy strength, while his clean-cut features are cast in grave, determined lines that retain their almost grim poise and never relax in a smile. His voice is resonant yet calm, while his speech, though often forceful, never becomes hurried or excited. For nearly two hours I sat with Kemal, discussing New Turkey and its problems. The exact transcript of that conversation I do not feel at liberty to reproduce, since I was there, not as a professional interviewer, but
133The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
informally and as his guest. Suffice it to say that Mustapha Kemal affirms the Nationalist doctrines as I have already described them, and I left his presence convinced that New Turkey had as its leader a man sure of himself, almost fanatically devoted to his ideals, and ruthlessly determined to carry them out. * * *
134THE CAPITULATIONS
By IBRAHIM SEFA BEY
Most of the evils of which Turkey has suffered and which constitute the cause of complaints against Turkey, can directly be retraced to the Capitulations. They had not only a direct bearing in preventing the economic development of Turkey but also in fomenting dissatisfaction, discontent and then unrest and open rebellion among the different races. It stands to reason, therefore* that the new Turkish Republic could never acquiesce to the continuance of the regime of the Capitulations, a collection of antiquated documents absolutely inapplicable to a democratic country standing for the sacredness of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
It might be well to note here that the first Capitulations were granted by Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent to King Francis I of France in the sixteenth century.
When Francis I found himself engaged in his great conflict with the German Emperor Charles the Fifth, he realized his helplessness, and after his defeat at Pavia, he threw aside scruples which Christian sovereigns had generally entertained against an alliance with the Moslems, and sought the aid and friendship of the great Sultan of Turkey. The result of this was that Charles the Fifth gave up his arrogant attitude against Francis First, as the armies of the Sultan were pressing hard against Vienna and St. Gautard.
However, this incident made it possible for Francis I to realize how great an advantage it would be for France to have a closer relationship with Turkey and Frangipani was sent to Constantinople on a secret mission in an unofficial manner. He was successful in his mission in inducing the Sultan to receive an ambassador from France and De La Forest was the first representative of any western nation in the Turkish Capital. Once De La Forest established himself as an ambassador from a very friendly nation in Europe, he asked for a favor from Sultan Suleiman. What he was granted was afterward known as the Capitulations. The granting of this favor was not in the form of a treaty, but a unilateral document, a favor from the Sultan to his friend, the King of France. It permitted French subjects to reside and trade in Turkey. The Capitulations which are generally cited as the basis of the rights claimed by the foreigners are those of 1740, when the French citizens were granted the following privileges:
1.	Liberty to travel in all parts of the Ottoman Empire.
2.	Carrying on trade according to their own laws and customs.
3.	Liberty of worship.
4.	Freedom of taxation and custom duties.
5.	Inviolability of their domicile.
135The Treaty With Turkey"—Why It Should Be Ratified
6.	Right of making wills.
7.	In case of death intestate, their own consul must take possession of their property, and remit it to their heirs.
8.	The ambassadors and consuls were given power to have extraterritorial jurisdiction over their national and even if they committed a crime, they were to be arrested by an Ottoman official only in the presence of a consular or diplomatic official of their own country.
In 1579 Queen Elizabeth tried to secure the same favor of the Sultan by telling him that she and her subjects, being Protestants, did not believe in worshipping images like the Orthodox and Catholic churches; but she was not successful, as the Sultan did not care for this remarkable attempt to show a resemblance between Protestantism and Mohamedanism.
However, the Queen succeeded in establishing relations with the Sultan in 1583 and William Harborne was the first English Ambassador to the Sublime Porte.
The abuses to which such privileges led are self-evident; but let us here cite the opinion of a French expert, who can surely not be taxed of being prejudiced in favor of Turkey, Mr. Francis Rey, in “La Protection Diplomatique et Consulaire dans les Echelles du Levant” says:
The French, English, Russians and the Austrians have been specially guilty of violating the privileges of taking foreigners under their protection. They sold the native Greeks and Armenians (surely they made good customers for this kind of business) the privilege of protection by a document which exempted them from paying duties on goods imported; many of these became wealthy by this advantage and were allowed to make a transfer of their privileges for a consideration. Ambassadors were permitted to have large numbers of dragomans, to each of whom they gave a Berat, which secured for them valuable exemptions. The Ambassadors came to dispose of these appointments for sums ranging from 2,500 to 4,000 piastres. One of the French ambassadors, it is stated in ah official report, received more than 400,000 francs from this illegal source. An English ambassador received from 2,000 to 3,000 pounds from the same source. The ambassadors ventured to bestow the Berats for life. They used to bribe officials, even in the Sultan’s household. They went so far as to issue patents of extraterritorial rights and protection to whole families of, Greeks and Armenians, subjects of the Sultan. For the sake of political intrigue, Russia and Austria shamefully violated this right of protection. Being rivals in seeking influence in the Balkans in 1780 and 1782, their consuls raced with each other in freely granting patents of protection to the natives. At the close of the last century, Austria had, by this process, 200,000 subjects in the Balkans; Russia had 60,000.
In order to hinder Russia, Napoleon put an end to the abuse by French ambassadors of the right of issuing the Berat
136Ibrahim Sefa Bey
to any person but the dragomans, and then Turkey forced most of the foreign powers to follow the example of Napoleon. But this did not entirely prevent Russia, Austria and Great Britain from taking through their consuls large numbers of Turkish subjects under protection for one pretense or another.
In 1808 Russia had 12,000 subjects of the Sultan, Austria a similar number of Serbs and Roumanians, Great Britain many Indians and Maltese registered as their proteges. Of course they formed lawless crowds, claiming exemption from police supervision. Some of the proteges were wealthy and influential merchants whose lawless acts caused great damage to the Turkish Government and brought ceaseless diplomatic conflict.
A vivid illustration of the practice of the Capitulations is to be found in the events which took place in 1905. A group of Armenian anarchists conspired against the life of the Sultan and, with the active participation of Joris, a Belgian anarchist, an infernal machine was constructed and placed in a carriage which stood in the crowd at a ceremony of the Selamlik. The machine exploded and although it missed the Sultan, killed more than 180 civilians and soldiers. The conspiracy was duly traced to the Armenian anarchists and established the direct implication of Joris. But the criminal being a Belgian and the Armenians being of the Russian orthodox faith—therefore protected by Russia—the Belgian and Russian Ambassadors in Constantinople claimed immunity of arrest under the Capitulations and successfully prevented the Turkish Government from rendering justice.
Ever since their grant, the Capitulations have been used by foreign Governments to prevent the economic development of Turkey and the establishment of its finances upon a sound basis, so as to perpetuate the exploitation of its markets by their own subjects. For instance, although the fixing of custom duties is one of the basic sovereign rights of every nation, Turkey was systematically prevented from regulating its custom duties; that is, to adopt a protective tariff. The highest duty in force under the Capitulations was one of 11% ad valorem, which applied to all imports and, consequently, national industries could never be developed. No foreigner ever paid any tax to Turkey under the Capitulations regime.
After reading the statement of the French authority above cited and after taking cognizance of the other facts hereabove described, one cannot help but wonder how it could possibly be expected of Turkey to have peace, order and tranquility and to develop her national resources or her international trade. And, if it is admitted that she failed in accomplishing these things, the responsibility for it certainly is not with her but lies at the door of the unscrupulous foreigners who conducted freely under the Capitu-
137The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
lations their political, social and economic intrigues within the country.
With the birth of democracy and the establishment of a Republic in their country, the Turks naturally insisted upon the abrogation of the antiquated, nefarious and unjust regime of the Capitulations. All foreign nations acceded to this abrogation at Lausanne.
138THE LAUSANNE TREATY—SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RATIFY IT?
By EDWARD M. EARLE,
Professor of History, Columbia University
(From a Debate at the Meeting of the Foreign Policy Association, April 5, 1924)
If we had within our power the weapons with which to compel Turkey to sign any treaty which we chose, it is quite obvious that we could not obtain unanimity of opinion or anything approaching unanimity of opinion in the United States regarding the character of such a treaty. If this audience were to determine, itself, exactly what the treaty should be, I dare say you would have almost as many differences of opinion as there are persons in the audience. Therefore, to expect to find a perfect treaty from the ]3oint of view of the great mass of American public opinion is asking entirely too much.
We must consider, in connection with this Treaty, the circumstances under which it was negotiated. What were the determining factor# in the negotiation of the Treaty? In the first place, the American delegation at Lausanne was faced with actual conditions, conditions which they had to take into consideration in the determination of the terms of the Peace. Those conditions essentially were these : that regrettable as many features of the history of the Near East from 1908 to 1923 were, no action of the American delegation at Lausanne could have unmade that history. In the second place, they had to take into consideration that nothing that they did could retrace the steps which the United States Government officially had taken between 1917 and 1923 regarding Turkey. They could not amend the fact that we had never been at war with Turkey. They could not amend the fact that the decision to land Greek troops at Smyrna was taken with the approval of President Wilson. They could not amend the fact that our delegation did not participate in the making of the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. Finally, they could not amend the fact that we refused to accept a mandate for Armenia in 1920.
In the next place, they were faced with the actual fact that the Allied Powers had previously made a treaty with Turkey which renounced the régime of the Capitulations and the various other exterritorial rights which foreigners had enjoyed in Turkey before the Conference of Lausanne. They had to take into consideration also the fact that if they made a treaty which did not bolster up the claims of the Armenians to special recognition, that they would receive criticism in the United States from the friends of Armenia, and if they made a treaty which did guarantee American participation in the establishment of an Armenian Republic, that they likewise would have received serious criticism from persons in the United States who believed that under no circumstances the United States should become entangled in European affairs, much less
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Asiatic affairs. In other words, the difficulty of the American delegation was a very serious one from that point of view.
It is not claimed, I take it, by many persons that this Treaty is a perfect treaty. There have been few perfect treaties in the history of international relations. But even an imperfect treaty, and I am no prepared to admit that this Treaty possesses serious imperfections, would have been better than no peace at all in this particular region,of thé world.
It is necessary to remember that for fifteen years now, from 1908 until 1923, there has been almost uninterrupted war in the Near East. As Mr. Gerard rightly said, war has brought terrible sufferings upon the Christian populations of the East, and no right-minded American will condone in the least the action of the Turkish officials in thus persecuting Christian populations. At the same time, however, no intellectually honest American can overlook the fact that the sufferings of war were visited upon all the peoples of the Near East, Moslem as well as Christian.
In the Balkan Wars of 1912 to 1913, more than 400,000 Turks were driven out of Thrace and Macedonia by the invading Balkan armies. In the Russian invasion of Anatolia in 1915 and 1916, more than 800,000 Turks were driven out of their homes in northern and eastern Anatolia, and Ismet Pasha said at Lausanne that there were actually in Turkey a million Moslem refugees without homes. These facts are not cited by way of exonerating the Turkish Government from any of the charges which have been leveled against it, but rather by way of making clear that Americans and Europeans who are very much detached from this situation as far as their personal safety is concerned, should not take any action which would tend to perpetuate that state of war in the Near East—war which is fought not only with the so-called civilized weapons of warfare, but with every weapon of expropriation, vandalism, massacre, disease and all the rest of it. In other words, a peace is needed in the Near East, even an imperfect peace being preferable to none.
However, this Treaty is not seriously imperfect in detail. I believe that the settlement of Lausanne, the Allied Treaty and the American Treaty, taken together—and, as Mr. Gerard has said, they must be taken as part and parcel of the same settlement—constitute the best settlement which has been made in Near Eastern history for a period of more than 150 years. That statement obviously requires explantion, and it is with a view to explaining the statement that I wish to point out some of the particular provisions of the Treaty.
In general, the opposition to the ratification of the Treaty is based upon one of two grounds : either that our rights have been ignored or that our responsibilities have been evaded. Now, what is the position as regards both of these points of view? In the first place, regarding American rights in Turkey, it is true that the
140Edward Mead Earle
Capitulations under the terms of the Turco-American Treaty of Lausanne are abandoned. That is unquestionably a surrender of rights which Americans formerly enjoyed, in Turkey. At the same time, however, refusal of the American delegation at Lausanne to recognize the situation as it was would not have preserved those rights. The rights were gone in fact. When the Allies abandoned the Capitulations under the terms of their treaty of July 24, 1923, there is good reason for believing that American rights under the terms of the treaty of 1830 also went, inasmuch as in part those rights were assured to Americans only in so far as they were assured to foreigners. That is a technical, legal point which I am not prepared to press further. But in any case, the choice of the American delegation was either to recognize the de facto abandonment of the Capitulations under the terms of the Allied treaty, or to insist upon their legal maintenance and in the last analysis to fight for their maintenance.
At the same time, it ought to be pointed out that the abandonment of Capitulations is becoming a fairly-well established procedure in the relationships between great powers and small powers. For example, in 1921, the United States abandoned its privileges under exterritorial rights in Siam, and it is my understanding that the American Missionaries in China, at the present time, are circulating a petition asking the American Government to abandon its rights under Capitulations in China as well. In other words, this surrender of the exterritorial rights of Americans in Turkey is not as serious as at first seems to be the case.
On that one point of the Capitulations, the Turks were obdurate, and they would not have accepted any treaty which insisted upon the continuance of the Capitulations. You will recall that the first Lausanne Conference broke up on that very point. The Turks were willing to fight rather than to accept the continuance of the régime of the Capitulations. Whether the European Powers and the United States or any of them could have defeated the Turks on that issue, is not the question. There was not one of those Powers which was willing to fight about the issue, and there is none now which is willing to fight about the issue.
Now, as regards American economic rights under the Treaty. This Treaty, as far as American economic rights are concerned, is in many respects better than the preceding treaties. The Capitulations for business men, of course, are abandoned; but inasmuch as the Capitulations for all foreign business men are abandoned, American business is at no relative disadvantage as regards other business. In other words, American business men are allowed to continue in Turkey upon the same terms as any other foreigners. Furthermore, the Treaty provides that American corporations shall have the right to hold property in their own name, which was not provided by any previous treaty between the United States and Turkey.
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All of the provisions of the economic sections are based upon the most-favored-nation principle. In other words, the United States and its citizens are guaranteed the same rights within Turkey as any of the nationals of the Allied powers, and it is difficult to see, first, upon what basis we could demand more than other foreigners within Turkey, and second, upon what basis the Turks would be willing to give up more than they are willing to grant other foreigners. If the Turks did so grant us more than they granted other foreigners, what would be the attitude, in turn, of the other foreign countries regarding the general diplomatic policy of the United States?
Under the terms of the Straits' Convention which forms part and parcel of this Treaty, American merchant ships are allowed to pass through the Straits in time of war as in time of peace, with the single exception of a war between the United States and Turkey, in which case, of course, American ships would be subject to seizure. Before the adoption of the Lausanne Treaty, the Turks had the right to close the Straits at will. That is not a feature, however, of the present settlement, and the Turks are compelled to keep the Straits open in time of war. That they can not arbitrarily close them legaly is obvious under the terms of the Treaty. That they can not close them arbitrarily by force is obvious when one considers the fact that the zone of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosporous, is to be completely demilitarized with the exception of a small garrison for Constantinople.
It is a significant thing to note that American business men generally are in favor of the ratification of the Treaty, that is, those American business men in Turkey. I have here a letter from an American business man in Constantinople who says “naturally there are many interests which would be served by the non-ratification of the Treaty, among them our European competitors for trade here. Of late we have equalled or exceeded British imports; and if the new British Parliament ratifies and we do nbt—and all of the Allies will ratify sooner or later—we shall be placed at a great disadvantage nationally, and individually shall have a hard time to get along.”
It has been frequently stated by opponents of the Treaty that American trade with Turkey in any case is next to valueless. This does not conform with the facts. In 1900, American exports to Turkey amounted to only $50,0d0. In 1913, they had risen to $3,500,000, and 1920, to $42,200,000. Imports into the United States from Turkey, including certain important raw materials, increased from $22,100,000 in 1913 to $39,600,000 in 1920, and from 1919 to 1922, American trade with Constantinople alone exceeded $30,-000,000 a year. While one can not say, of course, that the ratification of this Treaty will lead to an increase of American trade with Turkey, on can say with assurance that the rejection of the Treaty will not promote an increase of American trade with Turkey. * * *
142FRIENDSHIP FOR TURKEY
By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER
(From a Letter to George A. Plimpton, May, 1925)
It is more than thirty years since I had the pleasure of visiting Constantinople and the more accessible parts of Asia Minor, and in the interval, immense changes have taken place. The American institutions established there years ago under missionary auspices have done what is literally yeoman's work, and they have made the name of America honored and respected in that part of the world because of the character, quality and extent of their service, both to the minds and bodies of the surrounding populations.
I rejoice to learn that under new conditions there is growing up a strong liberal spirit in what was once the Turkish Empire, and that political and social institutions are building there which reflect the best traditions and the largest experience of those peoples in Europe and America who have, by common consent, led the van of civilization for hundreds of years. It is becoming that the people of the United States should hold out the hand of friendship to this new and progressive element and assist it in developing and establishing those policies that will enable the new Turkey to live in peace and amity with its neighbors, to show tolerance for those of different race and religion, and to share, so largely as may be, in the advancing social and political movements of our time.
From the days of Homer to our own, Asia Minor and the surrounding waters have been a center of dominating human interest. Let us hope that that interest may now shift from scenes of struggle, of persecution, and often of carnage, to the spectacle of friendly co-operation and rivalry in the pursuit of those human satisfactions which make life really worth living, and offer the widest opportunity to men to make the most of themselves.
143The Turco-American Treaty of Lausanne SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS FOR RATIFICATION
(From Foreign Policy Association Information Service, April 24, 1926)
1.	Although it is within the rights of the United States to regard the treaties of 1830 and 1874 as being still valid, it is nevertheless true that the revision of those treaties has been made imperative by the revolution and the subsequent wars which have transformed Turkey from a weak empire, almost completely under the domination of European powers, to a nationalist republic determined to occupy an independent position.
2.	A suspicion that the United States is endeavoring to retain in Turkey special rights accorded to no one else and in derogation of Turkish sovereignty would have an unfortunate effect upon Turco-American relations. A result of non-ratification would be to make impossible the continuance of American institutional work in Turkey.
Although the treaty is unsatisfactory in certain respects, it represents the best terms that could be obtained from Turkey in 1923 without resort to war. Fresh negotiations initiated at the present time would in all probability fail to achieve as great a degree of satisfaction for American claims as the present treaty has done.
3.	The United States is bound to relinquish extra-territorial
rights in Turkey:	(a) Because these cannot be enforced against
the will of Turkey except at the point of the sword, and the United States has no intention of resorting to force for their reimposition, (b) Because the United States cannot demand the retention in its own case of extra-territorial rights that have been relinquished by the other leading powers.
4.	Guarantees of special privileges for American institutions in Turkey cannot be granted by the Turkish Government unless similar privileges are conferred upon other foreign institutions, not all of which have been as disinterested as the American establishments. That American educators and missionaries now resident in Turkey anticipate a liberal interpretation of the undertakings of the Turkish Government toward their institutions is indicated by the fact that the majority of them are actively advocating ratification of the treaty.
6. American business men in Turkey strongly advocate ratification of the treaty. Non-ratification would result in the subjection of American trade to discriminatory dues levied on the goods of nations which have no treaty with Turkey.
7a. The United States has never officially adopted a policy of intervention for the protection of Armenians, although European Governments long ago committed themselves to responsibility on behalf of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. The inclusion of articles in the present treaty for the protection of Armenians in Turkey or the establishment of an independent Armenia would be a reversal of
144Summary of Arguments- for Ratification
our traditional policy. Quite aside from this consideration, however, the omission of clauses for the establishment of an Armenian national home is justified by the fact that such a national home already exists, albeit in a form not originally contemplated by its American advocates. The Republic of Armenia, although it is too poor at the present moment to attempt to assimilate all Armenian refugees awaiting repatriation, is at least guaranteed immunity from Turkish invasion by the Russo-Turkish treaty of March, 1921. It would have been impossible to demand enlargement of Armenia's boundaries at the expense of Turkey so as to cause them to coincide with the proposed boundary award of President Wilson, since such a policy would have involved not only a preliminary war against Turkey, in which the United States was not in the least disposed to engage, but would have subjected Armenia once more to the constant menace of Turkish invasion and massacre, now effectively obviated by virtue of Russian protection.
7b. Although the depredations committed upon Turkish communities by Armenians within recent years have received less publicity in this country than cases of similar disorder in which Armenians have been the victims, it is true that the double problem exists. According to the report of Major-General James G. Harbord, in the regions “where Armenians advanced and retired with the Russians their retaliatory cruelties unquestionably rivalled the Twrks in their inhumanityThe Russian invasions of Eastern Turkey (1915-1917) led to the expulsion from their homes of about 800,000 Moslem refugees. Atrocities have not been one-sided. This country cannot undertake to preserve order within Turkey except on the basis of military intervention, which is entirely out of the question. To retain the confidence of Turkey by honoring the signature of the American plenipotentiary is the only practical method whereby the United States can hope to influence Turkey to observe strictly the undertakings it has already made to the Allies for the protection of minorities under guarantee of the League of Nations.
145OFFICIAL SUMMARY OF THE TREATY
(From a Statement by Secretary Hughes, August 7, 1923)
Preamble.—The purpose of the treaty is to regulate the conditions of intercourse between the United States and Turkey and to define the rights of their respective nationals in the territory of the other in accordance with the principles of international law and on the basis of resiprocity.
Article 1. Most-favored-nation treatment is accorded to the diplomatic officers of the two countries.
Article 2. Provides for the abrogation of the capitulations relating to the régime of foreigners in Turkey, both as regards conditions of entry and residence and as regards fiscal and judicial questions.
Article 3. Nationals of the high contracting parties have full liberty of entry, travel and residence upon conforming to the laws of the country, and shall enjoy protection in conformity with international law. Their property shall not be taken without due process of law or without indemnity.
They may, under the local laws and regulations in force, engage in every kind of profession, commerce, etc., not forbidden by law to all foreigners. They shall have the right to possess and dispose of all lands of movable property on a footing of equality with the nationals of the country. As regards immovable property, the nationals of each country shall, in the territory of the other, enjoy the treatment generally accorded to foreigners by the laws of the place where the property is situated, subject to reciprocity.
They may own, lease and construct buildings for residential purposes or other purposes permitted by the present treaty.
Upon conforming to the laws they shall enjoy liberty of conscience and worship and shall, equally with the nationals of the country, have free access to the tribunals.
Article 4. Commercial, industrial and financial companies and associations, organized under the laws of the United States and Turkey and maintaining head offices in the country in which they are organized, shall be recognized by the other country, provided they pursue no aims contrary to its laws.
They shall be entitled to the same protection as that accorded to nationals in Article 3. Subject to the applicable laws, they shall have free access to the courts. vSuch companies and associations shall, subject to the laws in force in the country, have the right to acquire, possess and dispose of every kind of movable property. As regards immovable property and the right to engage in commerce and industry, such companies shall enjoy, on condition of reciprocity, the treatment generally accorded by the laws in the locality where such companies are constituted.
146Official Summary of the Treaty
They shall be able freely to carry on their activities, subject to the requirements of public order.
Article 5. Domiciliary visits and searches of dwellings, warehouses, factories, etc., of nationals or companies, as well as the inspection of books, accounts, etc., shall take place only under the conditions and in the form prescribed by the laws with respect to the nationals of the country.
Article 6. The nationals of one country in the territory of another shall not be subject to military service, and both individuals and companies shall be exempt from forced loans or other exceptional levies on property.
Article 7. The nationals of each country shall be accorded, in the territory of the other, the same treatment as natives in all matters concerning the collection of taxes, imposts and other charges. The companies mentioned in Article 4 shall, on condition of reciprocity, enjoy the same treatment as any similar foreign company. But this article does not apply to exemption from taxes, etc., accorded to state institutes or concessionaires of a public utility.
Matters of Personal Status
Article 8. In matters of personal status and family law (e.g., marriage, divorce, dowry, adoption, etc.) and, as regards movable property, the law of succession, liquidation, etc., citizens of the United States in Turkey shall be subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the tribunals or other national authorities of the United States sitting outside of Turkey.
This does not affect the special rights of consuls in matters of civil status under international law, Or special agreements, nor does it preclude the Turkish tribunals from requiring proof regarding matters coming within the competence of the national tribunals of the interested parties. Turkish tribunals may also have jurisdiction in the above mentioned cases provided all interested parties submit thereto in writing.
Article 9. Provides for freedom of commerce and navigation between the two countries upon most-favored-nation treatment, subject to sanitary, police and customs regulations. The merchant ships of the two countries shall not be subjected to higher tonnage dues or port charges than national vessels. However, this article and other provisions in the treaty do not apply to the coastwise trade.
Article 10. Merchant and war vessels and air craft of the United States shall enjoy complete liberty of navigation and passage in the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosporus on a basis of equality with similar craft of the most-favored nation, subject to the rules relating to such navigation and passage of the Straits Convention of Lausanne of July 24, 1923.
Import and Export Duties
Article 11. Most-favored-nation treatment as regards import duties is accorded to articles exported from one country to the other,
147The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
and no export duty is to be levied higher than that imposed upon similar articles exported to any other foreign country. No prohibition or restriction shall be imposed upon the importation or exportation of an article which is not equally applied to those of the most favored nation.
Vessels and goods of the two countries shall be accorded the same facilities accorded to a third country, irrespective of any favors granted by the third state in return for special treatment.
This article does not apply to the commerce between the United States and Cuba and the Panama Canal Zone, nor to special arrangements between Turkey and the countries detached from the Ottoman Empire since 1914.
Article 12. Most-favored-nation treatment is provided as regards the collection of consumption, excise, ectrol and other local taxes on merchandise.	»
Article 13. Most-favored-nation treatment is accorded all merchandise as regards transit warehousing.
Article 14* No dues for tonnage, harbor, pilotage, etc., shall be levied on any vessels which are not equally levied on national vessels.
Article 15. Any vessel carrying papers required by its laws shall be deemed to be a vessel of the country whose flag it flies.
Article 16. Most-favored-nation treatment is accorded regarding patents, trade-marks, etc.
Articles 17 to 26 define in detail the rights and duties of consular officers.
Article 27. Provides for the protection of shipwrecked vessels and for the operations of salvage.
Article 28. For the purpose of the present treaty the territories of the two countries are considered to comprise all land, water and air over which sovereignty is exercised, except the Panama Canal Zone.
Article 29. No taxes are to be collected from American citizens for any taxable periods prior to the fiscal year 1922-1923 which, under the laws in force on August 1, 1914, were not applicable to them. Any taxes collected after May 15, 1923, on periods prior to the fiscal year 1922 will be returned, but no taxes collected before May 15, 1923, for periods prior to May 15, 1923, will be returned.
Article 30. All previous treaties between the United States and Turkey are abrogated. A new extradition treaty is to replace the one of 1874.
Article 31. The treaty shall come into force two months after the exchange of ratifications. Articles 1 and 2 shall be permanent. Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall be for the duration of seven years, while Articles 9 to 28 shall remain in force for five years. If neither country notifies the other six months before the expiration of these
148How the Treaty Was Negotiated
periods of its intention to denounce any of the articles in question, they shall remain in force until the expiration of a period of six months from the date on which they shall have been denounced.
Article 32. The French, English and Turkish text of this treaty shall be ratified. In case of differences, the French text shall prevail. Ratifications are to be exchanged at Constantinople as soon as possible.
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HOW THE TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED
(From a Statement by Secretary Hughes, August 7, 1923)
Diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey were severed on April 20, 1917. Although no declaration of war followed, there have been no official relations between the two countries from that date. Since 1919 the interests of the United States have been protected by an American High Commissioner at Constantinople.
Peace negotiations between the allied powers and Turkey were instituted early in 1920 and resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920. This treaty was not ratified by Turkey The United States was not a party to the treaty.
The allied powers subsequently invited Turkey to a conference which assembled at Lausanne on November 20, 1922, for the purpose of establishing peace in the Near East and to revise the Treaty of Sèvres. The Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy having informed this Government that they would welcome American representation at the conference, this Government sent to Lausanne Richard Washburn Child, the American Ambassador at Rome ; Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, the American High Commissioner at Constantinople, and Joseph C. Grew, the American Minister at Berne.
The American representatives followed the proceedings of the conference and expressed this Government’s position in matters of direct American interest and of general humanitarian concern. As thè United States had not been at war with Turkey and was not negotiating a treaty of peace with that country, this Government did not become a party to the allied treaty.
On February 4, 1923, the conference was suspended owing to the rejection by the Turkish delegates to certain clauses in the proposed allied treaty. A second session of the Lausanne conference began on April 23, 1923, and continued until July 24, when a treaty of peace between the allied powers and Turkey was signed. During this second part of the conference Minister Grew was the American representative.
The prospective conclusion of peace between the principal Allied Powers and Turkey made it appear advisable, in order ap-
149How the Treaty Was Negotiated
propriately to protect American interests, that the relations between the United States and Turkey be regularized at an early date. This appeared all the more necessary in view of the fact that in the course of the Allied negotiations with Turkey the abrogation of the Capitulations had been agreed to.
On May 5, 1923, Ismet Pasha, the principal Turkish delegate at the Lausanne conference, wrote to Minister Grew proposing the negotiation of a treaty of amity and commerce. The Department of State thereupon authorized Mr. Grew to begin informal conversations with the Turkish delegates to ascertain whether a proper basis for negotiations could be found. These conversations were followed by formal negotiations, and full powers were sent to Mr. Grew. A treaty of extradition was also negotiated.
After almost three months of negotiation, the department on the afternoon of August 2 authorized Mr. Grew to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the Treaty of Extradition. The department is now informed that these treaties were signed at Lausanne today.
The Extradition Treaty contains the usual provisions of such treaties and calls for no special comment.
Ismet Pasha has also communicated to Mr. Grew copies of the Turkish declaration with regard to the designation by the Turkish Government of Foreign Judicial advisers and a communication with regard to foreign schools and institutions in Turkey, assuring to such American institutions the same treatment as enjoyed by the like institutions of any foreign power and defining in some detail the rights and privileges to be accorded these institutions.
150COMPULSORY EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY
(From the Report of the Foreign Policy Association Committee on the Lausanne Treaty, May, 1924)
In accordance with their Convention of January 30, 1923, signed at Lausanne and subsequently attached to the Treaty as part of the Peace of Lausanne, July 24, 1923:
1. The proposal for a compulsory exchange of populations originates with Dr. Nansen, in a statement to the Territorial and Military Commission of the Lausanne Conference, meeting December 1, 1922. Introduced under the heading of repatriation of prisoners. Not on agenda.
(a)	Based upon the precedent of an exchange of Greek and Bulgarian populations under the supervision of a mixed commission, two of the four members of which were designated by the Council of the League of Nations.
(b)	Based, also, upon the previous approval of all the Governments represented at the Lausanne Conference.
(c)	“I do not pretend/' said Dr. Nansen, “that the question is not full of grave difficulties. Anyone who has reflected upon what is involved in the displacement of populations of many more than a million people, in uprooting these people from their homes, transferring them to a strange new country, in registering, valuing and liquidating their individual property which they abandon, and in securing to them the payment of their just claims to the value of this property, will understand that the difficulties are immense. * * * Any exchange of populations, however well it were carried out, must impose very considerable hardships, perhaps very considerable impoverishment, upon great numbers of the citizens of the two countries who are exchanged."
(d)	“But these hardships, great though they may be, will be less than the hardships which will result for these same populations if nothing is done. * * * I know that the Governments of the Great Powers are in favor of this proposal because they believe that to unmix the populations of the Near East will tend to secure the true pacification of the Near East and because they believe an exchange of populations is the quickest and most efficacious way of dealing with the grave economic results which must result from the great movement of populations which has already occurred. * * * My experience of the past two months with the Graeco-Bulgarian Commission and the very careful enquiries which I have made and the consideration which I have given to the whole subject have also brought
151Foreign Policy Association
me to believe that on its own merits the proposal for an exchange is one which is highly desirable in the interests of the countries principally concerned and in the interests of the peace of Europe.”
2.	The economic grounds for the exchange of populations:
(a)	“There have been already very great displacements of populations; almost one million people have left their homes in one country and flocked into the territories of the other. They have left their productive employment in Turkey and are without possibility of securing other productive employment in Greece.” This condition may be remedied by an exchange of populations. “Such an exchange will provide Turkey immediately and in the best possible conditions with the population necessary to continue the exploitation of the cultivated lands which the departed Greek populations have abandoned. The departure from Greece of its Moslem citizens would create the possibility of rendering self-supporting a great proportion of the refugees now concentrated in the towns and in different parts of Greece.”
3.	Summary of the Graeco-Turkish Convention for the interchange of populations:
(a)	Interchange of nationals and liquidation of their property to be supervised by a mixed commission, “consisting of four members representing each of the High Contracting Parties and of three members chosen by the Council of the League of Nations from among nationals of Powers which did not take part in the war of 1914-1918.”
(b)	Provides for “a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory,” with the exception of the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople and Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.
(c)	Property of these involuntary emigrants (except such property as they may choose to take with them) shall be liquidated by the Mixed Commission. Sums due as the result of such liquidation “shall constitute a Government debt from the country where the liquidation takes place to the Government of the country to which the emigrant belongs. The emigrant shall in principle be entitled to receive in the country to which he emigrates as representing the sums due to him, property of a value equal to and of the same nature as that which he has left behind.”
152CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
(From Political Science Quarterly, March, 1925)
Section I
Fundamental Provisions
Article 1. The Turkish State is a Republic.
Article 2. The religion of the Turkish State is Islam; the official language is Turkish; the seat of government is Angora.
Article 3. Sovereignty belongs without restriction to the nation.
Article 4. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is the sole lawful representative of the nation, and exercises sovereignty in the name of the nation.
Article 5. The legislative and executive powers are vested and centered in the Grand National Assembly, which concentrates these two powers in itself.
Article 6. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey exercises the legislative power directly.
Article 7. The Assembly exercises the executive power through the intermediary of the President of the Republic, whom it elects, and through a Cabinet chosen by him. The Assembly controls the acts of the government and may at any time withdraw power from it.
Article 8. The judicial power is exercised in the name of the Assembly by independent tribunals constituted in accordance with the law.
Section II
The Legislative Power
Article 9. The Grand National Assembly is composed of members elected by the nation in conformity with the electoral law.
Article 10. Every Turkish citizen over the age of eighteen possesses the right to vote at legislative elections.
Article 11. Every citizen over the age of thirty is eligible to election to the Grand National Assembly.
Article 12. The following are ineligible to be deputies: those in the service of a foreign power, persons condemned to penal servitude, persons acknowledging foreign nationality, persons condemned for fraudulent bankruptcy, persons who have been deprived of their civil rights, and citizens who cannot read and write the Turkish language.
Article 13. »Legislative elections take place every four years. Members whose terms have expired are eligible for re-election. The Assembly which has reached the end of its term continues to sit until the meeting of the new Assembly.
In case it is impossible to proceed to legislative elections, the session of the legislature may be prolonged one year.
153The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
Each deputy represents not only the constituency which has elected him, but the whole nation.
Article 14. The Grand National Assembly shall meet every year on the first day of November, without the necessity of convocation. The Assembly may not be in recess more than six months a year; such recesses are considered necessary for the purpose of permitting the deputies to visit and inspect their constituencies, of reuniting the elements of control (of the executive power), and of rest and recreation.
Article 15. Initiation of legislation rests with the members of the Assembly and the Cabinet.
Article 16. On the day of their admission to the Assembly, the deputies take the following oath:
“I swear before God that I will have no other aim but the happiness and safety of the fatherland and the absolutely unrestricted sovereignty of the nation and that I will never forsake republican principles.”
Article 17. The immunities of a member of the Grand National Assembly in the Chamber or elsewhere may not be challenged. A deputy who is accused of an infraction of the law, whether committed before or after his election to the Assembly, and whose interrogation or arrest is demanded by the responsible authorities, may be surrendered only by vote of the Assembly in case of flagrant crime. The execution of any judgment pronounced against a deputy before or after his election shall be suspended until the expiration of his legislative term. The statute of limitations, however, shall not be considered to operate during this term.
Article 18. The annual salaries of deputies shall be fixed by special law.
Article 19. If the Assembly is in recess, the President of the Republic or the President of the Council may convoke the Assembly in special session.
Likewise, if one-fifth of the number of deputies should demand the convocation of the Chamber in special session, the Chamber must reconvene.
Article 20. The debates of the Grand National Assembly are held publicly and the reports of its debates are published without any modification of the text.
However, in conformity with its own rules of procedure, the Assembly may also meet in secret session. In such cases, it is for the Chamber to decide whether it is proper to publish the text of the discussions.
Article 21. The debates of the Chamber are governed by its own rules of procedure, adopted in the same manner as ordinary legislation.
Article 22. The Grand National Assembly includes among its powers the right of interpellation and of conducting investigations and parliamentary inquiries.
154Constitution of the Republic oe Turkey
The method of transaction of such proceedings is governed by the regulations of the Assembly.
Article 23. No person may hold simultaneously the office of deputy and any other public office;.
Article 24. The Grand National Assembly at the beginning of November in each year shall elect its president and three vice-presidents for the duration of one year.
Article 25. When the Assembly by absolute majority votes to dissolve before the expiration of its term, the session of the new Assembly must begin the first of November following. A session held before that date is considered as an extraordinary session.
Article 26. The Grand National Assembly itself executes the holy law; makes, amends, interprets and abrogates laws; concludes conventions and treaties of peace with other states; declares war; examines and ratifies laws drafted by the Commission on the Budget; coins money; accepts or rejects all contracts or concessions involving financial responsibility; decrees partial or general amnesty; mitigates sentences and grants pardons; expedites judicial investigations and penalties ; executes definitive sentences of capital punishment handed down by the courts.
Article 27. Only by a vote of two-thirds of the deputies may the Assembly impeach one of its members for high treason or for other crimes committed in the course of his legislative term.
If a deputy is liable to one of the penalties mentioned in Article 12 and if he is condemned by a court, he loses his seat as deputy.
Article 28. Every deputy loses his office if he resigns, if as a result of unavoidable circumstances he is unable to attend the sessions, or if for two months he absents himself from thé sessions without valid excuse or without permission, or if he accepts public office.
Article 29. A deputy shall be elected to replace one who has lost his seat for the reasons enumerated in the preceding Articles or who is deceased.
Article 30. The Assembly assures discipline and regulates its administration by its own rules of procedure, which are enforced by the President of the Assembly.
Section III The Executive Power
Article 31. The President of the Republic is elected by the Assembly from among its members for a period equivalent to that of the parliamentary term. The President exercises his functions until the election of a new President of the Republic. He is eligible for re-election.
Article 32. The President of the Republic is the head of the State; in this capacity he presides over the Assembly on ceremonial occasions and in case of necessity over the Council of Commissioners.
During his entire term of office the President of the Republic
155The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
may not take part in the discussions or in the deliberations of the Assembly and may not vote.
Article 33. If the President of the Republic, by reason of illness, or travel outside the country, or for any other cause, cannot perform his duties, or if as a' result of his death, his resignation, or any other cause, the presidency of the republic is vacant, the President of the Assembly takes up his duties in the interim.
Article 34. If, while the Assembly is in session the presidency of the Republic becomes vacant, a new President is elected immediately.
If the Assembly is not in session, it must be convoked at once by its President to elect the new President of the Republic.
If the vacancy occurs at the end of the legislative term of if a new election has been ordered, the new Assembly shall elect the new President of the Republic.
Article 35. The President of the Republic shall promulgate in ten days of its enactment any law voted by the Assembly.
The President of the Republic must return within ten days any law which he does not consider worthy of promulgation, together with a statement of his reasons, for consideration by the Assembly; amendments to the constitution and legislation concerning the Budget are not subject to the President’s suspensive veto.
The President is obliged to promulgate any law which is enacted by majority vote of the Assembly after reconsideration.
Article 36. In November of each year, the President of the Republic delivers, or causes to be read by the President of the Council, an address concerning the activities of the government during the past year and the recommendations of the government for the year to come.
Article 37. The President of the Republic designates the diplomatic representatives of the Republic of Turkey in foreign countries and receives those from foreign states.
Article 38. After his election and in presence of the Assembly^ the President of the Republic shall take the following oath:
“As President of the Republic, I swear to dedicate myself exclusively to the respect, defense and execution of the laws of the Republic and of the principles of national sovereignty, to devote all my efforts loyally to assure the happiness of the Turkish nation, to contend with all my strength against every danger which may menace the Turkish state, to cherish and defend the glory and honor of Turkey, and in general to conduct myself so that I may never fail in the performance of the duties with which I am entrusted.”
Article 39. All decrees promulgated by the President of the Republic shall be signed by the President of the Council and by the Commissioner within whose jurisdiction the measure lies.
Article 40. Supreme command of the army is vested in the Grand National Assembly, which is represented by the President of the Republic.
The command of the military forces in time of peace shall be
156Constitution of the Republic oe Turkey
entrusted, according to special law, to the Chief of Staff, and in time of war to the person designated by the President of the Republic, with the advice of the Cabinet and the approval of the Grand National Assembly.
Article 41. The President of the Republic is responsible to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey only in case of high treason. The responsibility for all decrees promulgated by the President of the Republic, according to Article 39, devolves upon the head of the Cabinet and the responsible ministers whose signatures are affixed to the decrees. In case charges other than high treason are preferred against the President of the Republic, Article 17 of the Constitution, concerning legislative immunities, shall be applied.
Article 42. The President of the Republic, on the recommendation of the Government, may annul or commute the sentences of persons on account of long-continued illness or of old age. Nevertheless, the President is not authorized to use this right in the case of members of the Council of Commissioners who may have been convicted by the Grand National Assembly.
Article 43. The salary of the President of the Republic shall be fixed by special law.
Article 44. The President of the Council (of Commissioners) is designated by the President of the Republic from among the deputies. The other commissioners (members of the Cabinet) are likewise chosen from among the deputies by the President of the Council, who, after obtaining the approval of the President of the Republic, presents the list of the members of the Council to the Grand National Assembly. The Government must within a week present its program to the Assembly and request a vote of confidence. If the Assembly is not in session, this is postponed until the new session.
Article 45. The commissioners, headed by their president, constitute the “Council of Executive Commissioners.”
Article 46. The members of the Council of Executive Commissioners are collectively responsible for the general policies of the government. Each member, individually, is likewise responsible within the scope of his authority for the general character of his policy and for the actions of his subordinates.
Article 47. The functions and responsibilities of the commissioners shall be defined by special law.
Article 48. The number of the commissioners shall be fixed by law.
Article 49. In case of leave of absence or for any other valid reason necessitating the absence of a commissioner, another member of the Council may be named to replace him temporarily, but no commissioner may be charged with the duties of more than two departments at any one time.
Article 50. A motion of the Grand National Assembly summoning a commissioner before the High Court entails the commissioner’s removal from office.
157The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
Article 51. There shall be established a Council of State which shall be called upon to decide administrative controversies and to give its advice on contracts, concessions and proposed laws drafted and presented by the Government, and to perform specific duties which may be determined by law.
The Council of State shall be composed of persons chosen by the Grand National Assembly, from among those who have held important posts, who possess great experience, who are specialists, or who are otherwise qualified.
Article 52. With the advice of the Council of State, the Council of Commissioners shall promulgate regulations for the administration and execution of the law, provided that such regulations shall not contain new clauses. When the regulations are alleged to be contradictory to the law, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is empowered to adjudicate the matter.
Section IV The Judicial Power
Article 53. The organization, the jurisdiction, and the functions of the courts shall be determined by law.
Article 54. Judges are independent in the conduct of trials and in the rendering of their judgments. They shall be protected from any sort of intervention and are subject only to the law. Neither the legislative nor executive power may modify, alter, or delay execution of decisions of the courts.
Article 55. Judges may be recalled only in conformity with the procedure determined by law.
Article 56. The qualifications of magistrates, their rights and duties, as well as their salaries and the manner of their nomination and of their dismissal, shall be determined by special law.
Article 57. Judges may not assume any public or private office outside of that entrusted to them by law.
Article 58. Court trials are public. Nevertheless, a court may order a secret trial, in cases specified by the code of procedure.
Article 59. Every person is free to use all the legal means which he deems necessary to the defense of his rights before the courts of justice.
Article 60. No court may refuse to examine and pass judgment upon cases which are submitted to it and which fall within its jurisdiction. Cases which are outside its competency may be rejected only by a decision of the court itself.
Article 61. A High Court shall be constituted, the jurisdiction of which shall include the trial of members of the Cabinet, members of the Council of State, the Attorney General, and members of the Court of Appeals in all questions pertaining to the performance of their duties.
Article 62. The High Court shall be composed of twenty-one
158Constitution of the Republic oe Turkey
members, eleven of whom are chosen from among the members of the Court of Appeals and ten from among the members of the Council of State. The said members are elected by secret ballot by the plenary assemblies of each of these bodies. The members of the High Court elect by the same procedure a president and a vice-president.
Article 63. Trials shall be conducted by fourteen members and the president of the High Court, which shall reach its decision by majority vote. The remaining six members shall be considered as alternates, to be chosen by ballot, three from the Court of Appeals and three from the Council of State. The president and vice-president may not be chosen as alternates.
Article 64. The office of prosecutor-general of the High Court is filled by the Attorney General of the Republic.
Article 65. The decisions of the High Court are subject neither to appeal nor to annulment.
Article 66. The High Court shall apply only the provisions of existing laws in the examination of cases which are pleaded before it and in the judgments which it pronounces.
Article 67. The High Court is constituted when necessary by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.
Section V
Public Law of the Turks
Article 38. All citizens of Turkey are endowed at birth with liberty and full right to the enjoyment thereof. Liberty consists in the right to live and enjoy life without offense or injury to others. The only limitations on liberty—which is one of the natural rights of all— are those imposed in the interest of the rights and liberties of others. Such limitations on personal liberty shall be defined only in strict accordance with the law.
Article 69. All Turks are equal before the law and are obliged to respect the law. All privileges of whatever description claimed by groups, classes, families and individuals are abolished and forbidden.
Article 70. Inviolability of person; freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of press; freedom of travel and of contract; freedom of labor; freedom of private property, of assembly, of association; freedom of incorporation, are among the natural rights of Turks.
Article 71. The life, the property, the honor, and the home of each and all are inviolable.
Article 72. Personal liberty shall not be restricted or interfered with except as provided by law.
Article 73. Torture, corporal punishment, confiscation and extortion are prohibited.
Article 74. No one may be dispossessed of his property or deprived of the possession of his property except in the public interest. In such cases the actual value of the expropriated property must previously have been paid. No one shall be constrained to make any sort
159The Treaty With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
of sacrifice, other than such as may be imposed in extraordinary circumstances and in conformity with the law.
Article 75. No one may be molested on account of his religion, his sect, his ritual, or his philosophic convictions. All religious observances shall be free on condition that they do not disturb the public peace, or shock public decency or exist in violation of social conventions or the law.
Article 76. Except in specified cases and according to the form of procedure prescribed by law, the persons and the property of citizens shall be immune from search and molestation.
Article 77. The press is free within the limits of the law and shall not be submitted to any censorship previous to publication.
Article 78. The government shall not restrain the freedom of travel except during general mobilization or a state of siege, or following the declaration of an epidemic in the country.
Article 79. Limitations upon freedom of contract, labor, property, assembly, association and incorporation shall be determined by law.
Article 80. Subject to the supervision and control of the State, education in all its forms is free on condition that it conforms to the law.
Article 81. Letters, documents and packages transmitted through the mails may not be opened without an order from the Attorney General of the Republic and a decision of the competent court.
The secrecy of telephone and telegraphic communications likewise is inviolable.
Article 82. Any Turk, acting on his own behalf or on behalf of others, may address petitions and make complaints either to the competent authority or to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey concerning acts and circumstances which he considers contradictory to the law. Complaints or petitions may be offered by separate individuals or by several persons at the same time. The reply to an individual complaint must be given in writing to the person concerned.
Article 83. No one may be forced to appear before a court other than that to which he is subject by law.
Article 84. Taxes are the contribution of the people toward the general expenses of the State. Any levy which does not contribute to the general expenses of the State, or any tax, tithe or contribution of any other nature imposed by individuals or by corporations other than the government or in the name of the government, is illegal.
Article 85. Taxes are levied in conformity with the law. Taxes and contributions received in conformity with usage, either by the State or by the local administration of the vilayets or municipalities, may continue to be collected until they have been regulated by law.
Article 86. When the Council of Commissioners takes cognizance of the danger or imminence of war, or of internal sedition or conspiracy or intrigues directed against the nation or against the Republic, it may decree martial law, which shall not exceed the duration
160Constitution of the Republic oe Turkey
of one month, in all or part of the Turkish territory. This measure shall then be submitted to the Assembly for its approval as soon as possible. The Assembly may prolong or diminish the duration of martial law. In case the Assembly be not in session, it shall be convened immediately in special session. Martial law consists of the suspension or temporary restriction of the inviolability of the person, the home, freedom of the press, correspondence, association and incorporation. The zone placed under martial law, as well as the provisions to be applied and the procedure to be followed in this zone, shall be determined by special law. The suspension or restriction of personal liberty and personal inviolability in time of war likewise shall be regulated by law.
Article 87. Primary education is obligatory for all Turks and shall be gratuitous in the government schools.
Article 88. The name Turk, as a political term, shall be understood to include all citizens of the Turkish Republic, without distinction of, or reference to, race or religion. Every child born in Turkey, or in a foreign land of a Turkish father; any person whose father is a foreigner established in Turkey, who resides in Turkey, and who chooses upon attaining the age of twenty to become a Turkish subject; and any individual who acquires Turkish nationality by naturalization in conformity with the law, is a Turk. Turkish citizenship may be forfeited or lost in certain circumstances specified by law.
Section VI
Miscellaneous Provisions
Article 89. Turkey is divided into vilayets, based upon geographic situation and economic relationship. The vilayets (provinces or administrative districts) are subdivided into kazas (counties), the kazas into nahiyes (townships), the nahiyes into kassabas and villages.
Article 90. Each vilayet, together with its subdivisions, enjoys a separate entity.
Article 91. The affairs of the vilayets are administered and governed by law, in accordance with the principles of local autonomy and the separation of functions.
Government Officials and Employees
Article 92. Any duly qualified citizen of Turkey, in full possession of his rights of citizenship, is eligible to appointment as an official or employee of the government.
Article 93. The duties and privileges of government officials, including the procedure in their nomination and dismissal, shall be determined by special law.
Article 94. In cases of violation of the law, the obedience of a subordinate to the orders of his superiors does not diminish the responsibility of the subordinate.
161The Treatÿ, With Turkey—Why It Should Be Ratified
Finance
Article 95. The proposed Budget (budgetary balance law) shall be placed before the Assembly at the opening of the session ; that is, no later than the first of November.
Article 96. No expenditure of public funds may be made except as provided for in the Budget or authorized by special law.
Article 97. The Budget shall be adopted for one year only.
Article 98. The statement of final accounting shall give in detail the amounts of the receipts and expenditures during the fiscal year.
Article 99. The statement of final accounting must be placed before the Assembly without fail not later than the first of November of the second year following the end of the fiscal year which the report covers.
Article 100. A Special Court of Accounts shall be established to control the revenues and expenditures of the State on behalf of the National Assembly and in accordance with the law.
Article 101. The Court of Accounts shall present a statement of audit and verification within six months after the Commissioner of Finance shall have submitted to the Assembly his statement of final accounting.
Amendments to the Constitution
Article 102. Amendments to or modifications of this Constitution may be made only upon the following conditions :	The proposal
to amend must be signed by at least one-third of the total number of deputies. The proposed amendment must be thereafter discussed by the Assembly and adopted by vote of two-thirds of the total number of deputies.
No proposal to alter or amend Article 1 of this Constitution, specifying that the form of government is a Republic, shall be entertained.
Article 103. None of the provisions of this Constitution may be arbitrarily modified on any pretext ; neither may the enforcement of any provision be suspended.
No law shall be in contradiction to the Constitution.
Article 104. The Constitutional Law of 1878 (1293) together with its amendments and the Organic Law of January 30, 1921 (1337), and the amendments thereto are hereby annulled.
Article 105. The present Constitution shall be considered in force immediately upon publication.
Provisional Article
The sections of the law of December 19, 1923, regulating the status of military officials who have been elected or are eligible to election to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall remain temporarily in force.
Voted and published April 20, 1924 (1340).
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