The American Army * William Harding Carter* UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE AMERICAN ARMY WII.IJAM HARDING CARTER Major (icncral I'nitcd Slates Army THE AMERICAN ARMY BY WILLIAM HARDING CARTER Major General, United States Army Author of OLD-ARMY SKETCHES, HORSES, SADDLES AND BRIDLES FROM YORKTOWN TO SANTIAGO WITH SIXTH CAVALRY. ETC. INDIANAPOLIS THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY PUBLISHERS COPYRIGHT 1915 THE BOBBS-MBRRILL COMPANY MAUNWOMTM A CO. OOKSINDfim AND PKIMTU* ROOKLVH, N. y. UA2.5" C* a. i With profound respect this volume is inscribed to GEORGE WASHINGTON the first Commander-in-Chief, whose customs of war have come down through the generations to mark all that is noblest in the ethics of the American army. 207902 AUTHOR'S NOTE The manuscript of this volume was begun before the outbreak of the present war in Europe, with a view to setting forth the conditions and methods of administration of the American army, and the urgent need of nationalizing and organizing our military resources while there is no war-cloud on our horizon. During all the earlier years of the Republic, the limitless faith in the ocean barriers guarding our coasts prevented a hearing of those who urged a definite military policy for the nation. Leviathan passenger ships, each capable of trans- porting a brigade such as fought the battles of the Civil War, have changed all that. We are now at peace with the world and the prayers of every American household are for a continuation of that desirable status for all time, but our interests are too great for us to occupy forever the safe side of every (Question. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS .....>. 1 II LESSONS OF HISTORY 14 III MILITARY POLICY 27 IV ECONOMY OF PREVISION 60 V OBGANIZATION AND CHARACTER OF THE ARMY . . '34 VI COLONIAL TROOPS 90 VII RESERVES 101 VIII REGIMENTAL DEPOTS 117 IX FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS 133 X EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 151 XI ABMY ADMINISTRATION . 163 XII COMMAND OF THE ARMY 184 XIII THE GENERAL STAFF CORPS 205 XIV THE CORPS OF OFFICERS 219 XV ARMY SCHOOLS 244 XVI THE TRIUMPH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE .... 252 XVII THE ORGANIZED MILITIA 267 THE AMERICAN ARMY PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS "A solicitude for your welfare, which cannot end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger, natural to that solicitude, urge me to offer to your solemn contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent review, some sentiments which are the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me all important to the permanency of your felicity as a people." WASHINGTON. THE problems of advancing civilization, instead of growing simpler, are becoming more varied and complex, through territorial expansion, race an- tagonism and unequal distribution of economic power. Nations unable or unwilling to defend their rights are accorded scant respect. Helpless peoples, rankling with injustice, may hold rebellious hearts, but the price of liberty still remains in strong bat- talions. Elihu Boot, jurist, diplomat and statesman, has thus epitomized the necessity for armies: "No sense of justice, no desire for peace, no kind- ness of heart can turn aside the inexorable decree of the overwhelming powers that bring war and will bring war in the future, as they have brought it in the past. It lies not in the generous impulses of the 1 THE AMERICAN ARMY human heart, but it lies in the working out of the destiny of mankind that no people can avoid." A well-balanced distribution of the influence of nations will, in the future as in the past, depend upon the ability of each to guard its own interests. It is folly for one nation to expect favors from an- other. Nations play unceasingly at diplomacy, but grim-visaged war lurks ever in the background. The wise men of a day and generation, drawing general conclusions from isolated examples, evolve schools of philosophy which are soon shattered by the proofs of rude experience. The most altruistic con- ceptions are confounded by the actual events of his- tory. Since the foundations of the peace palace at The Hague were laid there has followed a proces- sion of wars, and no amount of hopefulness or liter- ature concerning the prevention of international disputes may be expected to alter materially the course of history, which evinces quite indubitably that interruptions of peace will continue to arise from commercial rivalry or a desire to throw off the yoke of a government become insupportable to the burden bearers. The greediness of man is responsible for much of the miscarriage of justice amongst his fellow men. So the greediness of nations, arising not from mere selfishness, but from the necessity for providing for the increase of population incident to prolonged pe- riods of well-fed peace, operates to interrupt the course of other peoples, sometimes to their higher civilization, sometimes to their all but annihilation, 2 PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS as in the case of the American Indians of the tide- water region, whose country was desired by our own colonizing ancestors. Some- of the smaller countries owe their separate existence to that indefinable something called balance of power, but which some- how suggests inability of the more powerful nations to agree upon terms of partition or absorption, with the same ease as in the cases of Poland, Egypt, Ko- rea, Africa, and as seems in a fair way to be done with Manchuria, Mongolia, Persia and Thibet. The expenditures of nations for war purposes have assumed such vast proportions as to stagger students of history, unless they constantly bear in mind the changes due to steadily increasing civiliza- tion and its wealth producing attributes. Without the restraints of modern civilization there would be no encouragement to accumulation, for all would be at the mercy of those who seize and hold. No great nation has yet been able to establish and maintain a permanent form of government without an armed power to sustain it. Between the societies for the prevention of international disputes and the practical fact of ever increasing armament, there is ample evidence that upon no other subject are men so widely apart to-day as that of war. If there be a middle ground between the extremes of opinion, America should point the way and mark the course. Regardless of arguments, war will continue to be respectable so long as human liberty and the oppor- tunity for progress depend upon the arbitrament of arms. Inspired by the enthusiasm of a just cause, 3 THE AMERICAN ARMY men will continue to enlist under their country's banners without regard to the hardships, dangers and paltry pay, to the end that the door of hope may not be closed to them and to their descendants. When the veil is lifted from the tangles of diplo- macy, peace-loving nations often find themselves en- meshed in the vagaries of contrary policies due primarily to the efforts of each nation to gain advan- tage to the end that the prosperity of its own people may be favorably affected. Civilization has progressed fitfully along rough and often bloody roads but, considered by decades and centuries, progress has been steadfast, and each generation has managed to solve the difficult prob- lems of its own period. It is only a question of concentration of energy upon a given subject, at a particular time, with the best means available. Of all the questions of the hour none is more important than that of preserving peace through comprehen- sive and well-defined policies and ability to enforce them. The complications arising from an immigra- tion policy with a closed door and a commercial pol- icy of the open door furnish our public officials with practice in mental gymnastics that would be much simplified if our political and military policies were more carefully harmonized. Our country leads the world in the number of its arbitration treaties, in which are incorporated the principle of preliminary deliberation in interna- tional disputes before resorting to war. More than thirty of the forty nations maintaining embassies at 4 PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS our seat of government have signified their accept- ance of the principle and it is confidently expected that ultimately all the nations will agree to a period of time for reflection, conciliation and adjustment of questions in dispute and thus reduce occasions for appeal to the arbitrament of arms. In the mean- time, treaties are useless without sufficient power, separately, or jointly with allies, immediately avail- able to enforce them. Notwithstanding all the safeguards that a higher civilization may provide, there will continue to come into the life of nations, at uncertain intervals, ques- tions which will arouse so deeply the spirit of pa- triotism and the resentment of a whole people that those who continue the appeal for peace will be cast out as traitors, and those who lead armies and fleets to victory will be heralded as heroes and their deeds commemorated in bronze and marble. When deep- seated patriotism is aroused, men no longer con- sider the commercial elements of questions at issue, but, knowing full well the dangers of camp and bat- tle, march forth to do or die, for the honor of the nation's flag, merely a bit of silk or bunting, but a sacred emblem around which are clustered memo- ries of ancestors who have rallied to its defense. This reverent feeling of patriotism, immeasurable in a commercial way, is confined to no age or gen- eration, but lingers in the atmosphere of homes from the frozen fiords of the Arctic North to those opposite regions of eternal ice under the Southern Cross and continues one of the foundation stones 5 THE AMERICAN ARMY of stable government. In the face of all theory and academic argument, this has been the history of progress, and out of gigantic struggles upon land and sea civilization has come triumphant and in- dividual liberty has been guaranteed to a greater degree than at any former period of the world's existence. The affairs of nations call for the best efforts of statesmen and the legitimate development of high and patriotic politics, yet we seem ever to stand and wait at the door of opportunity until each crisis is at the threshold. Our isolation and the rivalries of European nations have served in the past to guard us from the usual results of neglect of an established military policy. All our energies have been directed to the development of a vast agricultural domain and the upbuilding of infant industries, too much devotion to which may in the end subject the nation to a humiliation, which diplomacy may assuage but not remove, with the questionable balm of palaver an anaesthetic without an operation. World questions have come to inject themselves into our national life and though we attempt to drug the public conscience by calling interference in the affairs of autonomous nations pacification, restora- tion of order or merely the protection of the rights of American citizens residing abroad, nevertheless we are becoming gradually accustomed to such em- ployment of our military and naval forces. Whether it be the taking over of the customs houses of neigh- boring islands, or defending legations in the far- 6 PBOGRESS AND PROBLEMS distant Orient, or restoring order in disrupted Cen- tral American republics, we are gradually assuming the role of arbiter of helpless nations and the human mind can not foresee the trail of consequences which will inevitably follow from precedents trivial in themselves. We are not executing comprehensive policies, but drifting from one international obliga- tion to another, basing our action in each case upon the expediency of the moment. Vast numbers of high-minded Christian men and women, pondering upon the horrors and waste of the existing war in Europe, honestly believe that the dawn of a new civilization is at hand, and that in the not distant future armies and navies will be maintained only to enforce the decisions of courts of arbitration. Principles sometimes yield to ex- pediency, as laws yield to force, while the cupidity of nations goes relentlessly on undermining the re- sourcefully planned schemes of men, the destruction and overturning of which may be and ofttimes are rehabilitated only through the carnage of war. In the face of accumulated and presumptuous wrong, affecting the commercial or political rights of a nation, all fine-spun and academic arguments against war are swept away in the rising tide of public opinion, against which parties and govern- ments are as chaff before the wind. It was this state of the public mind that Washington portrayed in his farewell address: "Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay 7 THE AMEEICAN ARMY hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions occur. Hence frequent collisions, obstinate, enven- omed and bloody contests. The nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of pol- icy. So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sym- pathy for the favorite nation, . . . leads to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges de- nied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concession, by unnecessarily part- ing with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill-will and a disposition to retal- iate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld. " It is the acceptance of these unalterable facts that brings to the front, in each generation, those who contend for a military policy adapted to the genius of our political institutions. The ever changing elements controlling a republican form of gov- ernment seem absolutely athwart the path of a consistent policy, sufficiently enduring to insure a guarantee of military efficiency. Nevertheless, there is a steadily increasing sentiment that a reasonable preparation for probable contingencies is the surest guarantee of peace. It is this sentiment which has brought about the reconstruction of the fleets, which in twenty years have passed from a state of absolute and shameful mediocrity to a high plane of efficiency, 8 PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS creditable alike to American shipyards and to a superb naval personnel. In every crisis of human affairs the pessimist is ever present, and governments can not count upon unanimous support in the adjustment of grave ques- tions. In all our wars we have encountered these conditions. The Tory of the Eevolution had his coun- terpart in the Copperhead of the Civil War and, in both struggles, it was the faith of the few which car- ried along sufficient mass to deliver the final blows necessary to secure success. Nevertheless, we have regarded ourselves with much complacency as being something different and apart from the rest of the world and our awakening has been long overdue. It may not come until the ruthless development of nature 's wealth shall have proceeded to a point when fortune no longer flows, as by a touch of the magi- cian's wand, and we find ourselves in a world's com- petition which the tariff wall may not forefend. There can be no individual accounting, for the re- sponsibility rests upon the nation, struggling with the manifold problems and seeking for light with as much intelligence and righteousness as ever charac- terized the efforts of the human race. The brief war which tore from the crown of Spain the last and finest of her galaxy of colonial posses- sions, thrust upon America responsibilities of world- wide gravity, demanding more than altruism, if the nation is to enter the tangled fields of diplomacy upon terms of equality with others of like claims to 9 THE AMERICAN ARMY greatness. When the diplomats with their courteous formalities have withdrawn; when The Hague and its arbitral opportunities have been scorned and the tocsin of war resounds in the land, history will repeat itself unless we are prepared. War is one of the recognized instruments of civil- ization for enforcing the decrees of diplomacy, yet our practice has ever been to drift complacently, con- fident that the greatness of our unorganized re- sources will deter militant nations from attacking us. It is profitless to indulge in academic discussion as to the wisdom of expending national wealth upon fleets and armies, so long as the countries possessing those military essentials continue to be the centers of the world 's wealth in treasure, science and the arts. Capital seeks investment at reasonable rates of in- terest only under governments whose stability is assured. The American army is, and of a right should be, maintained for the preservation of law and order within our own borders and to prevent aggression wherever floats the flag which in a world- wide journey has not lost its benediction. A nation which has not the force at call to guarantee the neu- trality of its borders and to give protection to its citizens at home and abroad lacks the very essentials of a sovereign power. In the closing hours of his mortal career, General Ulysses Grant wrote these warning words : * ' To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. There can scarcely be a possi- ble chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occur- 10 PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS ring among our own people again; but growing as we are in population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago ; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a com- bined movement being some day made to crush us out." In the presence of grave emergencies, no other na- tion has been more prodigal than America of its wealth for military and naval purposes. Our plain duty, based solely on self-interest, now lies in fore- casting probable international disputes and their re- lation to our policies and to make such preparation as will enable us to insist upon proper solutions of questions which might otherwise provoke war. Well considered laws and regulations, administered through a proper military hierarchy, make a national force the safest, the best and by far the most econom- ical having regard to our widely dispersed obliga- tions and the needs for keeping alive military knowl- edge, traditions and customs which are of great mo- ment to the security of the nation, and which will enable it always to stand with bold front, while the great body of patriotic but untrained citizens are organizing for war. Sophistry and concealment find no place in our treatment of other nations and the country will con- tinue its endeavor to fulfill its destiny and its duties as one of the great world powers without becoming a nation-in-arms. On the other hand, it is an impera- tive duty that our military resources shall be organ- 11 THE AMERICAN ARMY ized and nationalized and that the doctrine of peace at any price shall not be permitted to confuse or retard the execution of that policy. Accepting without hesitation the doctrine that no amount of desire on our part and no degree of intel- lectual heights to which we may attain will prevent the recurrence of wars, it behooves us to analyze the problems of the hour and being forewarned to fore- arm for contingencies by common and general con- sent and not fritter away our strength by separating in hostile camps under the banners of those who be- lieve in military preparedness and those who pray for peace at any price. The period following the war with Spain has been filled with accomplishment. Never before has the army found such generous encouragement of profes- sional preparation and such willingness to experi- ment with every proposed improvement giving gen- uine promise of success. But reforms move slowly, especially when congressional action is required, for experienced legislators realize that enthusiasm is not always followed by achievement and that policies sometimes change with chameleon-like rapidity. The responsibility of Congress is absolute, under our government, and the only way to ultimate success is to present the needs of the army, under whatever policy may be adopted by the military authorities, leaving to the legislative bodies the determination as to the order in which public funds shall be appropri- ated for the execution of the manifold projects aris- ing in a great country still in its swaddling-clothes 12 PROGRESS AND PEOBLEMS stage of development. If the majority of a commit- tee of Congress is convinced of the righteousness of any measure there is encouragement for the future, but without conviction there is no hope. Success by appeal over a committee to Congress is practi- cally impossible. An honest public opinion may and does, often, induce consideration of measures, but the mere padding of newspapers and magazines with in- spired articles results not infrequently in more harm than good. The dignity of the service, preserved and transmitted by a long line of educated, gallant and distinguished soldiers, dictates that the problems of the army should be clearly set forth, relying upon the merits of the case to secure consideration and leaving untrammeled the responsibility for action where the nation has placed it. That the great and small problems of the army have been studied by as intelligent and devoted offi- cers as are possessed by any nation, there is no doubt. Whether the solutions produced from time to time accord with our civil policies is for those in authority to determine. In any event, the late Gen- eral Upton very clearly pointed the path of duty when he wrote, that : "Unless we frame and bequeath to the succeeding generations a military system suggested by our past experience and commended by the example of other enlightened nations, our rulers and legislators in the next war will fall into the same errors and involve the country in the same sacrifices as in the past. ' ' LESSONS OF HISTORY "In proportion as the structure of government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be en- lightened." WASHINGTON. fTlHE difficulty encountered in the past in securing JL consideration of any comprehensive policy con- cerning preparation for national defense has been greatly due to the absence of any serious public opinion on the subject. It requires much of study and reflection to arrive at a comprehensive knowl- edge of any policy of national dimensions, and an ed- ucated public opinion is the only guarantee of wise, continuing and certain action. Many worthy causes have been sacrificed as hostages to political expedi- ency even when great principles were at stake. There is a fellowship and a freemasonry in politics difficult for the layman to understand but directly traceable to pressure of constituencies in behalf of local in- terests. Men in public life well understand that he who hews to the line in any policy for the general welfare which may conflict with local interests stands confronted with the danger of incurring political an- imosity which will not only avail itself of any oppor- tunity to hamper him, but will gloat over his discom- fiture in event of failure. One of England's most accomplished military 14 LESSONS OF HISTORY students has expressed the opinion that : "Republic- anism and military efficiency are two hopelessly irreconcilable terms." When we consider the small degree of success which has come from the writings of Washington and a long line of statesmen and mil- itary students through the intervening years, in their pleadings for a better state of preparedness for passing from a peace to a war establishment, we are forced to the conclusion that our critic had some foundation for his remark. It should not be as- sumed, however, that the nation is indifferent con- cerning the existing army and navy, for the annual appropriation of upward of $200,000,000 for their maintenance and for reserve supplies, is a refutation of such an assumption. Provision for the establishment of a proper na- tional defense must take into consideration the character of our obligations, which have materially increased since we abandoned the slogan " 54-40 or fight," and retain only the highly charged and in- flammable Monroe Doctrine, which seems to carry in its wake a series of responsibilities requiring some- thing more material than diplomatic notes for their adjustment. The terrorism and misrule which so often prevail in the smaller American republics pre- sent grave problems to the nation that stands solidly behind the pronouncement which resents and rejects political colonization or interference in their affairs on the part of other nations. With the widespread and vast ramifications of modern commerce and con- sequent interchange of ideas have come awakenings 1 15 THE AMERICAN ARMY of human aspirations, feebly characterized as un- rest, which will not down at command, but are destined to grow in ever enlarging circles in the hopeless effort to insure an equitable distribution of wealth and power as between the strong and the weak, the capable and the incapable. The most far-seeing student of the military weak- ness inherent in our government was Alexander Hamilton who wrote much of value on the subject during all the earlier years of our national life. At the close of the Civil War, the late General Emory Upton addressed himself to the task of interpreting its lessons for the benefit of his countrymen and pro- duced a work which remained unpublished during his lifetime but which has become a classic since the true value of his investigations and recommenda- tions has penetrated the minds of military students. Washington's writings, and those of all our military students down to the present time, exhibit a con- sensus of opinion that the correct principle on which our nation should predicate its defense has as its basis a federal army of regulars and volunteers, un- der the direct command and control of the President, and that the militia of the states should be comprised of men whose enlistments should be made with the distinct agreement that their services should not be demanded otherwise than as provided in the Consti- tution. The costly errors of organization and lack of mili- tary policy during the Civil War and the consequent financial burden, have been the most potent causes 16 LESSONS OF HISTORY of objection to every plan for putting our peace es- tablishment upon a proper basis for expansion auto- matically in war. The opinions of those of wide and varied experience, in command of troops during the Civil War, substantiate completely the view that we should abandon all further efforts at preparing to make war as an aggregation of forty-eight states and take the necessary steps to nationalize our war forces during peace. Fifteen years of loyal and ear- nest effort have been given to the scheme to provide for the national defense through the instrumentality of the organized militia, and the results are wholly unsatisfactory, when the requirements of a war with any nation maintaining a modern army are consid- ered. It should require no argument to prove that in the emergency of war we would need for our first line not less than 500,000 men at once. The present force of regulars at many isolated stations within the United States, together with the estimated available organized militia, scattered through forty-eight states, would not aggregate in excess of one-fourth the requirement of the first call mobilization is hardly the term to use regarding forces which have none of the larger tactical organizations complete in peace. There would result an immediate neces- sity for a call for untrained volunteers. It seems very certain that we may count always upon less than 100,000 men of the forty-eight states being available as organized militia, with a limited field of action. If this force, which, to be available 17 THE AMERICAN ARMY for war, must volunteer as individuals after war has been declared, is to constitute our main reliance, then some steps must be taken to increase it many fold. It would seem that as practical people Americans would no longer trifle with so grave a situation, but seek a remedy without delay. The recent decision of the Attorney General con- cerning the use of the state forces by the federal power, is based upon the constitutional limitations as to calling forth the militia. The effect upon our military policy is so far reaching, having in mind the continuous efforts to develop the organized mili- tia as part of the first line for service with the reg- ular army in event of war, that a reconsideration of the subject from its foundations is essential to mili- tary efficiency. It is certain that the several states are reaching the maximum limit of appropriations which may be reasonably expected for the support of their organized militia, and there can be no doubt that organizations of the special arms if maintained at all must be at the expense of the general govern- ment as part of the regular army in excess of the proportions necessary for that force considered as a well balanced army. It is clearly a national duty to provide for the contingencies of war before the occasion for the use of armies shall arise. The most serious questions of military policy now before the country for solu- tion have arisen as the results of legislation having for its object the precedence of the organized militia over national or federal volunteers. None of the 18 LESSONS OF HISTORY schemes proposed by the representatives of the na- tional guard has admitted of allowing the Presi- dent to exercise control over the state organizations during peace, and so much of the militia legislation of 1903 as did authorize the President to give orders in emergencies direct to commanding officers of the organized militia instead of calling upon the gover- nors of states, was quickly withdrawn by a repeal of the statute. The failure of execution of the conscription or ] draft act, during the Civil War, makes it most un- likely that the principle of compulsory service will ever be acceptable to our people, unless the very ex- 1 istence of republican institutions shall be at stake. ' It is useless for military enthusiasts to suggest such schemes for our army, although it requires but a brief study to bring the conviction that state laws, requiring a year's instruction in the theory and or- ganization of our government and in military train- ing as members of the organized militia before being accorded the right of suffrage, would in a few years strengthen and enlighten the whole fabric of popular government, and be lasting monuments to the com- monwealths courageous enough to submit themselves to such preparation for the duties of citizenship. In self-governing countries it has long been rec- ognized that there is no political danger from an army recruited by voluntary enlistments, and sug- gestions of inimical possibilities arise only in the minds of demagogues in search of a slogan for self- ish purposes. Armies do not declare war nor are 19 they responsible for declarations of war. Those who proclaim that the existence of armies induces war would hesitate to assert that the existence of insur- ance policies is a general incentive to arson, yet the active campaign of present day peace advocates is tinged with equally fallacious arguments. As the results of the war with Spain unfolded and the causes of many unsatisfactory conditions were analyzed, it became evident that our state of preparation for modern war with a strong and re- sourceful nation was decidedly in need of improve- ment. Because of the character of equipment and stores required by armies in the field and which can not be purchased in the ordinary markets of the world, nations are compelled to hold in reserve war funds and to establish great depots of supplies to arm and equip troops and enable them to make the initial movements in campaign without the delay necessary to manufacture arms, equipments and other articles required by soldiers. Prior to the establishment of the General Staff Corps in our army, the Secretary of War took up the subject and caused this communication, which contains the essence of material preparation for war, to be addressed to a body of officers then re- cently organized under the title of "The War Col- lege Board' ': "I wish to reach a definite statement of the quan- tities of arms, ammunition, equipments and supplies of all kinds which it should be the aim of the War Department to provide and keep on hand for use in 20 LESSONS OF HISTORY case of sudden and unexpected hostilities, and also to reach a definite understanding as to the domestic sources from which may be obtained in any emer- gency a further supply of material for arms, ammu- nition, equipments and military supplies in excess of the reserve stock kept on hand by the War De- partment. "Assuming first, an army of 150,000; second, an army of 250,000, the question being answered in each case both with reference to a campaign in a cold, northerly climate, and with reference to a campaign in a hot climate : "What is our present supply of each article or class of articles reported as necessary for such an emergency! "What is our present capacity for the production of such articles? "What are the domestic sources of supply to which we could look, in an emergency, for the mate- rial with which to increase either by purchase or manufacture our war materials of all kinds, and what is the productive capacity of the establish- ments from which such material could be produced? "What are the present storage facilities of each of the supply departments and what relation do they bear to the requirements for the storage of the full stock of supplies in that department which you shall report to be requisite under the foregoing direc- tions ? "Are the present places for storage properly lo- cated with reference to strategical requirements of 21 THE AMERICAN ARMY possible hostilities? What, if any, of the present places of 'storage should be enlarged! What, if any, should be abandoned? What new places, if any, should be established? "At present, subject only to the approval of a civilian Secretary of War, the Chief of Ordnance determines where powder, projectiles and equip- ments shall be kept ; the Quartermaster General de- termines where clothing and equipage shall be kept ; the Commissary General, where food shall be kept ; but it is not the business of those officers to plan campaigns or determine where these things are most likely to be needed, and there is therefore, no proper relations between the place where supplies are kept and the place where they will probably be needed. " Nothing of militarism in this, but a situation ur- gent enough to appeal to any statesman. Considera- tion of the subject was begun by the War College Board and later assumed by the newly created Gen- eral Staff, but it was nearly ten years before the first general depot was established. Now that the scheme is launched, we are in a fair way to multiply the number of such depots until the probable needs of the army in an emergency will be met, if war will but await our further convenience. Military men are usually subjected to more or less harsh criticism for every proposal for increase of the army and its appurtenances. Many of those who have been indifferent during peace or in active opposition to the adoption of essential measures of preparedness, become the severe critics of the short- 22 LESSONS OF HISTORY comings usually developed by active campaigns without previous and mature preparation. When the resolution reaffirming the Monroe Doctrine, con- cerning the colonization of this continent was under discussion in the Senate, January 15, 1853, General Cass noted then this same disposition, so often mani- fested, and spoke as follows: "I have seen a great deal of this political per- versity, this unpatriotic predisposition, which prompts many men always to take part against their country, whatever be the position in which she is placed. I do not recollect a single controversy in which we have been involved with a foreign power, since I have been on the stage of action, when the whole sentiment of the country was united in the cause of the country. I doubt if there is another people on the face of the globe whose history pre- sents so many instances of this want of true national pride patriotism rather as our own." The grave problems involved in the establishment of a comprehensive and continuing policy are well worthy the study of statesmen, to the end that the lives of America's sons may not be needlessly sacri- ficed and the wealth of the nation wasted. A correct solution of these problems will demand some sacri- fice of preconceived opinions and of personal and lo- cal interests. There will be some convictions as to states' rights hard to overcome, but our past experi- ences and the interests which have been acquired be- yond our territorial limits demand that the military resources of the United States shall be nationalized, 23 THE AMERICAN ARMY and that the impropriety and extravagance of wag- ing war as an aggregation of forty-eight states, should be recognized by appropriate legislation. Fortunes may continue to be dedicated to the end that sincere and able men shall carry out the cam- paign for the abolition of war, yet there will remain the vital drop of red blood coursing in the veins of those who fear not conflict when principles are at stake, and who cherish the memory of bloody sacri- fices whose fruits have endured in the life of the na- tion. It will be difficult to convince the great body of young Americans that it is more patriotic to fight out questions involving the nation's prestige and honor in the arena of intellectual discussion rather than upon the battlefield. We may rewrite history and eliminate the stories of campaign and battle, of daring and suffering, but there will still remain the spirit expressed in the immortal words of Nathan Hale: "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country." Our people have never been enthusiastic over some of our recent acquisitions of territory and are in nowise anxious to increase our holdings, but the nation is overwhelmingly behind the opening of the trade routes through the Panama Canal and will make any expenditure or sacrifice in the determina- tion and maintenance of policies involved therein. International duties, whether treaty obligations or merely assumed in the interests of humanity, carry grave responsibilities and demand above all things the means to enforce them. The nation un- 24 LESSONS OF HISTORY able to defend itself invites aggression whenever its accumulations tempt the cupidity of other nations. The limit of elasticity of our comparatively small mobile army has been long since reached. To pro- vide for future contingencies Americans should not hesitate to study the questions at issue and having once made up their minds as to the desirable and cor- rect action to insist upon it. It is morally certain that, not only our altruistic ideas of fair play, but the official construction and delimitations of our recently confirmed treaties of arbitration will absolutely put a ban upon all prep- arations for war during the period provided for pre- liminary discussions of matters in dispute. The marked advantage of this to other nations whose armies and reserves are always organized and equipped is apparent, for it would attract no com- ment for each and every individual of such a force to put himself and his equipments in a state of fit- ness for immediate service, because it is his duty -to do so. In the meantime, we could not fill a single vacancy in our skeleton army. The most pacific policy on the part of the nation will not preserve it from being engaged in war, more or less frequently. The circumstances and past his- tory of our country suggest the improbability of our ever having a large military establishment in peace, so that it becomes extremely important that as much perfection as possible should pertain to that which does exist. Parkman, the historian, has wisely said that : 25 THE AMERICAN ARMY "In every well-balanced development of nations, as of individuals, the warlike instinct and the mili- tary point of honor are not repressed and extin- guished, but only refined and civilized. It belongs to the pedagogue, not to the philosopher, to declaim against them as relics of barbarism. ' * Americans when aroused concerning matters of principle have always evinced warrior character- istics, but they are not a military people, the mod- ern craze for buttons and badges notwithstanding. They are, however, to be credited with marked abil- ity, morality and energy in business, and they have never hesitated to tear down and build anew when greater success was reasonably to be anticipated. Shall we continue to sacrifice principles to ex- pediency and evade a national duty, leaving to pos- terity, as our ancestors have done, the cost of our neglect to read aright and to profit by the lessons of history? Ill MILITAKY POLICY "In proportion as the circumstances and policy of a country for- bid a large military establishment, it is important that as much perfection as possible should be given to that which may at any time exist." WASHINGTON. THE military policy of a nation is fundamentally dependent upon its political policy. The la- mented John Hay, late Secretary of State, has thus tersely stated this relation : 1 'War and politics, campaign and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and interdependent; to talk of military operations without the direction and interference of an administration is as absurd as to plan a campaign without recruits, pay or rations. Historical judgment of war is subject to an inflexi- ble law, either very imperfectly understood or very constantly lost sight of. Every war is begun, dom- inated and ended by political considerations; with- out a nation, without a government, without money or credit, without popular enthusiasm which fur- nishes volunteers, or public support which endures conscription, there could be no army and no war no beginning nor end of methodical hostilities." Where the sentiment of a people forbids the main- tenance of a regular military establishment sufficient for war purposes, carefully devised laws for putting 27 THE AMERICAN ARMY such part of the nation as it may be necessary to em- ploy under arms, should be placed upon the statute books before an emergency arises. Such statutes should be founded upon right principles and have as their basis a simple and practicable scheme for mo- bilizing armies before or immediately upon a dec- laration of war, because it is readiness to strike which makes for arbitration and peace. The pres- tige of a proud nation may be sadly lowered by lack of foresight and preparedness, and patriotism and material interest alike suggest the propriety of giv- ing the highest moral support to those who under- take to prepare the nation in time of peace for the shocking realities of war. For more than a hundred years Presidents have periodically invited the at- tention of Congress to the fact that unless a system, or policy, for organizing and equipping our military forces shall be adopted in time of peace, the legiti- mate consequences may and probably will be initial defeat, humiliation, and greater cost of preparation during the existence of a state of war. At a time when practically every member of Con- gress was a veteran of the Civil War, and during the progress of our greatest Indian war, the subject of a military policy was under consideration by the House of Representatives and a conclusion was reached that: 1 1 Our army is viewed as a nucleus wherein is to be acquired and preserved military knowledge, and from which should radiate the elements of instruc- tion and discipline, thus to form in time of war a 28 MILITARY POLICY competent force endowed with talent to direct it as a whole, and provided with agencies capable of grasping the responsibility, organization, and dis- tribution of numerous supplies necessary to the con- duct of successful military operations." The world has moved rapidly during the forty years which have elapsed since Congress com- placently accepted the announcement of our army policy but failed to provide the agencies for radiat- ing instruction and discipline to form in time of war a competent force with talent to direct it as a whole. A well ordered military establishment requires time and experience for its creation and perfection. Every provision for its being or its improvement must usually follow lines of great resistance arising from the necessity of convincing Congress through its overworked committees. The play for partisan ad- vantage is the rule always in evidence, and nearly all progressive laws for the betterment of govern- ment are but compromises, in which wise and patri- otic legislators are compelled often to make terms, to the end that great public good may not be wholly sacrificed. No class of legislation should be so free from party clamor as that which has for its object the perfection of the organization and administration of the army, but broad-minded and practical men realize that dreams of perfection in government are Utopian. All of our wars have been fought, so far as mili- tary organizations are concerned, on the principle that our states constitute a confederacy of independ- 29 THE AMERICAN ARMY ent governments and not one nation for war pur- poses. Our history contains only one remarkable variation from this course and this experience is not apt to be repeated, for it is beyond belief that an- other George Washington will arise in our national existence. The one notable exception to our usual method of raising troops and appointing officers was authorized by this resolution of the Continental Con- gress : "Having perfect reliance in the wisdom, vigor and uprightness of George Washington do hereby: "Resolve, That General Washington shall be and he is hereby vested with full, ample and complete powers to raise and collect together in the most speedy and effectual manner from any or all of these United States sixteen battalions of infantry in addi- tion to those already voted by Congress ; to appoint officers for the said battalions of infantry ; to raise, officer and equip three thousand light horse, three regiments of artillery and a corps of engineers and to establish their pay ; to apply to any of the States for such aid of the militia as he shall judge neces- sary; to form such magazines of provisions and in such places as he shall think proper ; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier gen- eral and to fill all vacancies in every other depart- ment in the American army; to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the army." Nearly forty years have elapsed since General Emory Upton analyzed the military system which 30 MILITARY POLICY had prevailed in America since the Revolution and cited the causes of our weakness to be : First. The employment of militia and undis- ciplined troops commanded by generals and officers utterly ignorant of the military art. Second. Short enlistments from three months to three years, instead of for or during the war. Third. Reliance upon voluntary enlistments, in- stead of voluntary enlistments coupled with con- scription. Fourth. The intrusion of the states in military affairs and the consequent waging of all our wars on the theory that we are a confederacy instead of a nation. Fifth. Confusing volunteers with militia and sur- rendering to the states the right to commission offi- cers of volunteers the same as officers of militia. Sixth. The bounty a natural consequence of voluntary enlistments. Seventh. The failure to appreciate military edu- cation, and to distribute trained officers as battalion, regimental, and higher commanders in our volunteer armies. Eighth. The want of territorial recruitment and regimental depots. As a result of his painstaking study of the Civil War, reinforced with valuable statistics of all our previous military experiences, General Upton rec- ommended that the military system of this nation should embrace, in order, the following forces: the regular army, federal volunteers, militia. The f ecl- 31 THE AMERICAN AEMY eral volunteers, to be officered and supported by the government, and organized in each congressional district; the militia to be supported by the states and to be used only as intended by the Constitution, to execute the laws, suppress insurrection and repel invasions. In commenting upon this subject just prior to his retirement from the office of Secretary of War, Hon. Elihu Root, after a remarkably successful series of appeals to Congress for authority for certain changes of army organization, said: "One other field of great importance remains to be covered by legislation ; that is, the establishment of an adequate system for raising, training, and offi- cering the volunteer forces of the future. It is of first importance that the distinction between volun- teers and militia shall be observed, and that, while the selection of officers of the militia shall continue, as it must under the Constitution, to rest with the States, following such mode of selection as they pre- fer, the officers of the volunteer forces of the United States shall hold their commissions from the Presi- dent, who is to command them during the war for which they are called out, and shall look to their Commander-in-Chief for the promotion which should reward their good conduct, as well as for such dis- cipline as they may merit ; and that an adequate sys- tem shall be provided for the selection of such offi- cers and the direct recruitment of the enlisted volun- teer force under the authority of the national gov- ernment." 32 MILITARY POLICY In February, 1906, Hon. William H. Taft, Secre- tary of War, wrote for publication his views that : ' * It is our duty, therefore, if we would be wise in our generation, to make provision for a compara- tively small regular army and efficient reserve of volunteers, and an adequate and co-operating force of State militia." This was in exact accord with the recommenda- tions of his predecessor in office, than whom none has delved deeper into the conditions, needs and tradi- tions of the army, for he did not fail to perceive how all-important are these traditions, recognized in the oath of honor administered to all members of courts- martial, as * * customs of war. ' ' This, then, was the recognized policy of the War Department from the period immediately following the war with Spain, yet so strong was the influence brought to bear in the interest of the national guard or organized militia of the states, that every effort to profit by our pre- vious experience and plain military lessons, through provision for a reserve of volunteers, was defeated, and conditions, far more drastic than ever before im- posed, were enacted into laws which actually forbid the government from employing any volunteers even in war, until after all the organized militia, which includes numerous generals and staff officers ap- pointed by governors of states, and whose military qualifications the governors have no possible way of ascertaining, have been received into the service. The national guard or organized militia of the states has really thus brought about a military policy for 33 THE AMERICAN ARMY the nation regarded as antagonistic to military effi- ciency. The organized militia as yet is the only available military force, other than the regulars, with any training whatever, but the error of the whole situa- tion, and one needing immediate remedy, lies in the attempt to nationalise the militia of the states, and yet retain it under control of the governors until ac- tually in the service of the United States during war, and then to continue the appointment and promotion of the officers in the hands of the governors. When it was first proposed after the Civil War to establish a war policy involving a small body of reg- ulars and a force of federal volunteers in each con- gressional district, the arguments fell upon deaf ears for the deeds of the great volunteer armies of 1861- 65 were still fresh in memory, and the veterans of that conflict believed that no nation would be guilty of the unthinkable folly of assaulting another nation comprising upward of 2,000,000 men who had experi- enced recent service in a great war. An agreement was reached in 1902 between the War Department and representatives of the national guard that a joint act should be urged to provide for improving the condition of the state militia and to authorize the organization of a force of 100,000 fed- eral volunteers during peace, with officers appointed by the President, subject to immediate call for war, and legislation necessary to accomplish this was passed by the House of Representatives. The provi- sion for the officers of volunteers was enacted into 34 MILITARY POLICY law in the Senate, but that for the men encountered the opposition of a small group of senators who op- posed on principle any system which would take from the governors in time of peace control of vol- unteer troops raised in the several states and was stricken out, making the first part ineffective. The provision for a body of f ederel volunteers embodied the result of painstaking study and involves so essen- tial a principle that it should not be abandoned until Congress has further opportunity to determine as to the merits of the system as a whole without neces- sity for sacrificing part as a compromise, for the proportions and character of special arms to be maintained as regulars in peace are involved in the correct determination of this question. The able opponent of the proposed legislation cre- ating a volunteer reserve stated in the Senate his ob- jections as follows : "My purpose in presenting these views is to put myself on the record and register my protest against this legislation, for I am satisfied that as time passes the evil will be seen and realized. . . . "It takes out a part of the citizen soldiery of a State, provides for their being officered by the United States, and takes them away from the authority and training of the State in which they live and puts them, as far as military duty is concerned, under the exclusive authority of the President and of Congress. The President of the United States can call on these citizens for military duty, but the governor of the State can not, although riot and insurrection may be 35 THE AMEKICAN ARMY at their doors. These men, thus enrolled and set apart, are to be still citizens and civilians in a State, but the governor can not call on them for any mili- tary duty whatever, nor can the State by any law im- pose any military duty upon them. They are to be subject to the orders of the President in military matters, but not to the orders of the governor. ' ' The governor of a State is the military head of the State in the same way that the President is the military head of the United States. The duty to preserve order, put down insurrection, to maintain law, devolves upon the governor of a State in the same manner and even in greater degree than it de- volves upon the President of the United States. Every citizen of the State capable of bearing arms and not in the active military service of the United States is, by every principle of our government, sub- ject to the order of the governor when required to enforce law and maintain authority. It is a violation of this fundamental principle to enact a law by the federal government which shall set apart a certain class of citizens of the State and say that they shall be subject only to the call of the President and to the military duty prescribed by Congress ; that they shall not be subject to the call of the governor or to any military duty which may be laid upon them by the legislature of their State." More than ten years had elapsed since this oppo- sition was developed when, during the closing hours of the session of Congress in 1912, the same views were repeated and applied in opposition to any sys- 36 MILITARY POLICY tern which carries men in civil life, furloughed as reservists from the regular army until their serv- ices shall be needed in war. The Secretary of War, who had recommended ten years previously the creation of a body of federal volunteers, was present as a member of the Senate, and made answer: "I have the highest respect for the opinions of the Senator from Georgia. Whatever he says upon a question arising out of the Constitution of the United States I regard as entitled to most serious and re- spectful consideration. But I think, and have thought for many years, during all the long history the Senator from Georgia has referred to the his- tory of the attempt to secure something which may be called a reserve force for the Army of the United States that the Senator from Georgia builds up his opinion, regarding a reserve force, upon an essen- tially false basis. "The Senator has said that the spirit of the Con- stitution forbids the creation of a reserve force other than the militia. I am not endeavoring to give his words accurately, but that is the substance, and the Senator now indicates his assent. . . . The Sen- ator has referred to the two provisions in the Con- stitution contained in the first article, which sets out the powers of the legislative branch as the basis for the assertion that the creation of any reserve force for the Army of the United States, is in viola- tion of the spirit of the Constitution. He does not say that it is in violation of the letter of the Con- 37 207902 THE AMERICAN ARMY stitution, but of the spirit. Those two provisions are, first, that Congress shall have power to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be em- ployed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia ac- cording to the discipline prescribed by Congress. And then there is the further provision for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. "There are here two independent and different fields of action indicated. The one is to raise and sup- port armies, with no limitation upon the scope of action of the armies raised and supported. The other is to provide for organizing the army and for disciplining the militia, with a limitation upon the use to which the militia can be put. For the power of Congress over the militia is to call it forth to ex- ecute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, and that I take it to be unques- tioned, is the enumeration of the things to be done within the territory of the United States whatever has to be done within our territory the execution of the laws of the union that are to be executed within our jurisdiction; the repelling of invasions, which must be invasions in our own jurisdiction. For these things the militia must be used. But for all that field of warlike operations which go beyond the frontier of the United States the militia may not be used, and for all offensive defense the Army of the United 38 MILITARY POLICY States is the sole military power under the control of the nation. " . . . We have during our entire military his- tory experienced upon each recurring occasion of war the necessity of immediately and greatly, and under stress of imminent need for action, increasing the Army of the United States. That is to say, whenever war comes we are obliged to increase the army, which is not subject to the restrictions rest- ing upon the use of the militia. . . . 1 ' In the Civil War, immediately upon the breaking out of hostilities we had recourse to the raising of a volunteer force, and that great conflict was fought by volunteers and not by militia. 1 1 In the war with Spain the first thing we did was to call for volunteers ; that is to say, an increase of the military establishment of the United States as distinguished from militia, and that war was fought by such a force and not by militia. . . . "... I mean the militia of the States ; and I am drawing a distinction between those forces which are a part of the military establishment of the United States and the militia of the States. "When we came to suppress the insurrection in the Philippines, Congress provided for the raising of a force of 35,000 volunteers, the officers to be ap- pointed and commissioned by the President of the United States, and that war was fought by those vol- unteers in addition to the regular army. ' ' The militia, including all the organizations which the Senator from Georgia describes, is insufficient 39 THE AMERICAN ARMY in number to answer to the demands of the country in any considerable war. The purposes for which its members are enlisted are not the purposes that have to be attained in any considerable war. The constitutional authority of the commander-in-chief of the Army of the United States over them, the con- stitutional authority of Congress over them, are in- evitable to the carrying on of any considerable war by the use of them. "The only way in which we can prepare for war which would really exhibit danger to our country is to make adequate preparation in time for the in- crease of the military establishment of the United States. I say that all our history shows that immedi- ately when the stress comes we turn to the increase of that military establishment. " . . . Statesmanship consists in foreseeing the necessities of the future. When war comes action must be swift, decisive and effective. There is no time to consider and discuss the details of organiza- tion and the machinery necessary to progress. In time of peace, when men can consider deliberately the methods by which the military establishment may be quickly and effectively increased, is the time to discuss and adopt provisions for the machinery, in- stead of waiting until everybody is in excitement and judgments are swayed by feeling and impulse and then hurriedly adopting a jury-writ system which is sure to be defective and inefficient. . . ." It is probable that such discussions will in the end crystallize public sentiment and induce Congress 40 MILITARY POLICY to enact such legislation as will adjust this very se- rious question of broad policy on which all else de- pends. The national guard has long objected to the creation of federal volunteers during peace as a re- serve for the regular army unless it be provided that such volunteers shall not be called into any service until after the organized militia shall have been called forth. The federal volunteers are intended to be a force to be called upon only when a war exists which re- quires a reinforcement for the regular army, and to be composed of men not restricted as are the militia in their sphere of action. Such a force of federal volunteers should be liable to serve for three years or the war and be comprised entirely of men whose home ties would permit of that length of absence without embarrassment. One primary and important reason for having the question of a federal volunteer system settled with- out delay lies in its intimate connection with the proper organization of the regular army. It needs no argument to carry the conviction that the organ- ized militia of the states will never comprise a proper proportion of the special arms but will in future as in the past consist mainly of infantry. The expense of maintenance of proper proportions of cavalry and field artillery is too great to be assumed by any state unless all the states shall agree to pro- vide for their proportionate share. The work de- manded of cavalry and field artillery in the regular army, to reach and maintain a recognized and 41 THE AMERICAN ARMY proper standard of efficiency, makes it certain that militia organizations of those special arms can not be made efficient for immediate war purposes in the limited time available for instruction. For these reasons, the organization of the regular army can never be based upon its use as a complete field army, for it must always comprise an undue proportion of cavalry, field artillery and special branches to bal- ance the infantry of the citizen soldiery whether fed- eral volunteers, organized militia, or volunteers en- listed during war. The legitimate conclusions are that the military policy of this nation should embrace as cardinal features of organization, first, the regular army; second, federal volunteers ; third, the organized mili- tia or national guard. So long as the term national guard is used for state militia, it will avoid confu- sion to use the designation federal instead of na- tional for the volunteers. Under the policy herein suggested the military es- tablishment of the national government would com- prise in peace the regular army and the federal vol- unteers. The active state forces would comprise the organized militia or national guard. The fed- eral volunteers are intended to be organized in each congressional district and to be proportioned among the several branches of the service as may be re- quired by the war establishment, in connection with the regulars. Under this policy, the strength and character of the federal volunteer organizations may be modified from time to time, without disturbance 42 MILITARY POLICY of the principles involved. The proportions of the several branches of the regular army being fixed by statutes, the character of federal volunteer or- ganizations may then be determined by the probable needs of the combined forces and their distribution made with due regard to local conditions. Cavalry, for instance, may be more readily recruited and maintained in horse-raising districts than in more thickly populated agricultural sections or cities. The fact that young men may ride their own horses to places of assembly, for drill and instruction, will in- sure maintenance of organizations in districts too sparsely settled to justify the efforts necessary to create and maintain effective infantry organizations. Similarly, with field artillery organizations, some lo- calities will be more favorable than others. Under this scheme the general government will be entirely responsible for the support of the regular army and the federal volunteers and the several states responsible for the maintenance of their mili- tia, the national government continuing to furnish necessary arms and equipments. The character of the organized militia, however, should be wholly changed so that there may be no cause for misunder- standing. The officers and men physically fit for and desirous of being a part of the war army, should enter the federal volunteers; the militia should be recruited and maintained primarily for state pur- poses and subject to call by the national government solely as provided by the Constitution. In any war of magnitude our coasts would be threatened, and in 43 THE AMERICAN ARMY order that the regular army and federal volunteers may be available at all times for service as a mobile force beyond our borders, the organized militia may well constitute the main reliance for land defense of the seacoast fortifications. Under such an arrangement of our military estab- lishment the organized militia would gradually be recruited with men to whom the changed conditions of probable service would be acceptable and those who have heretofore attached themselves to the state organizations with expectation of unrestricted active field service would be induced to enter the federal volunteers where there would he no doubt as to their status in event of war. The inauguration of this policy would be in line with the best military judgment of the past century. It conforms to the Constitution without evasion or subterfuge. It contemplates a minimum peace es- tablishment of regulars with a dependable support of trained federal volunteers, and a constitutional employment of the organized militia, and should commend itself to patriotic Americans who desire a military establishment proportioned to possible contingencies, maintained without necessity for either amending or evading the Constitution. There has been no student of military affairs in this generation the equal of Emory Upton. As the result of long and patient study of the armies of the world he wrote : "The true object to be kept in view in studying European military organization is to present those 44 MILITARY POLICY features which are common to all armies, and to in- dicate those which we should adopt as indispensable to the vigorous, successful, and humane prosecution of our future wars. "The impossibility of forming a trained reserve as in Europe and the certainty that the States can not be relied upon to support a numerous and well- organized militia, even with the aid . . . appro- priated annually by the Government, should impress us with the importance of devising some method whereby in peace and in war we may have a national force ready to increase, and support, our troops in the field. " "The organization of National Volunteers would give us in time of peace a Regular Army, a re- serve (National Volunteers), and the Militia, and would enable us in time of war to prosecute our cam- paigns with vigor and economy, and with that re- gard for human life which becomes a free people. " General Upton's views have received the contin- ued approval of Presidents, Secretaries of War and experienced officers of the army, and his conclusions as to the value of a reserve of federal volunteers to be maintained in peace, accords exactly with the re- sult of a similar study of the records made without reference to his previous investigations along that line. It is too grave a situation to be met with mere theories. The burden of evidence is all in favor of complying with the spirit and letter of the Constitu- tion, which contemplates a maintenance by the gen- eral government of a national military and naval 45 THE AMERICAN ARMY force in peace and war, and that the militia shall not be called forth except to suppress insurrection, re- pel invasion, or to execute the laws of the Union. Our course for some years has been misleading and improper and a reconsideration and revision of practice as well as of law is demanded by the high- est considerations of wisdom, public policy and statesmanship. The time for accomplishment of na- tional military purposes has arrived, but there may be differing opinions as to the fundamental objects and means of attaining them. Those problems re- garded as in greatest need of immediate and definite determination involve the employment of the na- tional and state forces in their appropriate spheres. Unquestionably the best interests of the nation de- mand that the army of the United States shall con- sist of the regular army and the federal volunteers, maintained both in peace and war. The batteries, troops, companies, battalions, and regiments of fed- eral volunteers should be organized in congressional districts and in such numbers as may be propor- tionally and equitably allotted by the President, the total force not to exceed the strength authorized by Congress, and the officers of such organizations to be appointed by the President. The organization and discipline of the federal volunteers should be provided for in regulations approved by the Secre- tary of War, under an enabling act of Congress. All laws providing for the use of the militia in conflict with the Constitution, as interpreted by the Attor- ney General of the United States should be formally 46 MILITARY POLICY repealed and no further attempts made to provide for the use of the national guard and organized mi- litia for general war purposes. It should be clearly understood that those who desire to serve in war without regard to state or national borders must at- tach themselves to the federal volunteers. The effect of this system, besides providing a fed- eral force of potential war power, would be to relieve the states of the unequal taxation now involved through maintenance of miniature armies by some states while others go to the opposite extreme. Much of the militia duty in states could very properly be performed by constabulary, as is now done in Penn- sylvania, and leave the national guard to its proper employment that of preparation to suppress in- surrection and grave disorder and to resist invasion. The establishment of a body of federal volunteers is a practicable military scheme and its full develop- ment will create a war asset of recognized and per- manent value. The ultimate saving in pensions alone would, in a great war, meet all the expenses incurred for its maintenance in peace. As trained men pass out of the federal volunteers they would remain in their own communities available to aid in organiz- ing and drilling subsequent increments of volun- teers, when called forth to war. The dictates of ex- pediency, common sense and economy all combine to suggest the desirability of such a plan to meet the crisis brought on through the inability of the Presi- dent to call upon the governors for their militia for service beyond our borders. It is morally certain 47 THE AMERICAN ARMY that the states will never consent to any plan by which the governors will surrender control over any part of their organized militia or national guard in peace, and particularly so where large state appro- priations have been made for their support. A force of federal volunteers or similar force under any other designation, is a military necessity, if we are to avoid considerable increase of the regular army, and we should proceed with its organization with- out further delay. It is fully appreciated that such a reorganization of our military establishment will suggest and make advisable many minor changes. It is also recognized that many earnest, worthy and energetic officers of the national guard will feel resentful at the recent course of events and think their efforts have not been appreciated. It is not a question of the effi- ciency of this or that state organization, but whether or not the whole system is wrong; if so, the public welfare demands an early and comprehensive read- justment. It is certain that if this be not undertaken during peace, another war will find us unprepared and leave us again with an unnecessary burden of debt and possible unhappy termination. All this contemplates no special preparation for a great war but only a reasonable arrangement of our resources that we may mobilize them for the military con- tingencies likely to come to us as a nation. It has never been our practice to add any strength to our army except in the presence of actual hostilities. It remains to be seen whether the demands of economy, 48 MILITARY POLICY the needs of foreign garrisons in our over-sea posses- sions and our willingness to continually threaten en- forcement of the Monroe Doctrine are together suffi- cient to appeal to our statesmen and to secure ap- proval of the necessary action to create a reinforce- ment for the regular army in time of peace which will be immediately available for war and thus se- cure conjointly a thoroughly efficient and modern fighting machine ready for any ultimatum when diplomacy fails. IV THE ECONOMY OF PREVISION "There is a rank due to the United States among nations, which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weak- ness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." WASHINGTON. SUCCESS in war depends upon preparedness, which in turn is based upon the proper organ- ization of military resources, comprising men, money and materials. Loyal men, physically fit and trained, properly provided with war materials and sustained by the moral support of the nation and a continually replenished treasury, constitute the most econom- ical guarantee of avoidance of national humiliation. During the progress of war it is not uncommon to draw general conclusions from isolated experiences and to ascribe success or failure to unimportant de- tails. It is only by patient investigation and expert analysis that sources of error and weakness are dis- closed. In the history of the world no other nation has made such lavish expenditures as America for mili- tary purposes after wars. A mere tithe of the ap- palling total, devoted to preparation before war, would have lifted a great and increasing burden from the taxpayers. The vast volume of such expendi- 50 THE ECONOMY OF PREVISION tures has been incurred mainly for pensions and in this regard no charge may ever be justly made that the Republic is ungrateful. The pension system was adopted early in the career of the nation and has be- come so influential a factor in political life that no material change may be expected in this generation. Disregarding the earlier wars before pension agents became scientific promoters of legislation, it may be entertaining if not informing to review some of the facts developed under the existing system. Since the close of the Civil War, a constant stream of laws, making less and less exacting the require- ments for pensions, has been enacted until it has come to pass that those who were merely on the rolls for a few days, and the malingerers and de- serters all march as veterans of the great conflict upon a parity with the noble men who volunteered and fought to the finish in that fratricidal contest. In the year 1866, immediately following the close of the Civil War, the appropriation by Congress for the payment of pensions amounted to a little in ex- cess of $15,000,000. In 1911, forty-five years later, the amount paid out on that account was $157,325,- 160.35, the average annual disbursement for the three preceding years exceeding $160,000,000. An- nual pension payments on account of the Civil War have increased tenfold fifty years after the close of the war, and continue on the ascending scale. Since the close of the war in 1865 pension payments on ac- count of service in that war aggregate upward of four billions of dollars. 51 THE AMERICAN ARMY At the beginning there was a general public opin- ion favoring proper provision for the real veterans who through wounds or disease had been placed at a disadvantage with their comrades in the struggle of life. As years went by the resourcefulness of the pension agents increased and finally an act was se- cured which opened wide the doors, even to the de- serter, except one "who left his command whilst in the presence of the enemy, unless he was sick or wounded, and that when the charge of desertion should be removed against the soldier its effect should be to restore him to the status of honorable service and an honorable discharge should be is- sued in those cases where the soldier received none, and that he should be restored to all his rights as to pension, pay or allowances as if the charge of de- sertion had never been made." Even that restric- tion has now been done away with. The younger generations had become familiar with the pension system and its large appropria- tions, so that the pension agents found an open field in the camps of the volunteers in the war with Spain, where their operations were shocking. Thou- sands of well-meaning young men who had patriot- ically enlisted, after rigid physical examinations, made their arrangements for pension applications before taking the field or performing any duty what- ever. In the brief campaign in Cuba there were five volunteer regiments selected for the Santiago cam- paign by reason of presumed superiority and readi- ness for service. Immediately following their re- 52 THE ECONOMY OF PREVISION turn home a stream of applications for pensions be- gan and in a brief time a tabulation of the applica- tions was made by the Commissioner of Pensions, and comparisons made with those of five regiments of regulars : Claims filed Volunteers: Killed. Wounded. Missing, for pensions. 1st District of Columbia.. 472 9th Massachusetts 685 33rd Michigan 573 34th Michigan 615 8th Ohio.. 652 Total 2,997 Regulars: 6th U. S. Infantry 17 106 17 162 7th U. S. Infantry 33 93 249 13th U. S. Infantry 18 90 87 16th U. S. Infantry 13 107 17 143 24th U. S. Infantry 12 75 6 125 Total 93 471 40 766 The reports of the Commissioner of Pensions show that between July, 1861, and June 30, 1900, invalid pensions had been allowed, under the general law, to 556,255 volunteers, and under the Act of June 27, 1890, to 451,531, a total of 1,007,786. During the period from July 1, 1861, to January 1, 1901, pen- sions were allowed to 30,266 regulars, including the wounded and invalided men of more than thirty years of almost constant Indian wars. To make the comparison intelligible, the total number of volun- teers who enlisted in the Civil War, reduced to a basis of three years' service is 2,324,516 men. The 53 THE AMERICAN ARMY total number of men on the rolls of the regular army during the whole period from 1861 to 1901 is 577,- 000, including re-enlistments, for which a liberal de- duction should be made, to avoid counting the same soldier more than once. On this basis of computa- tion, up to June 30, 1900, 1,007,786 volunteers out of 2,324,516 were in receipt of pensions, while only 30,- 266 regulars out of 577,000 were recipients of such bounty. This shows that the regulars have been sin- gularly free from any accusation of pension seeking. These figures contain much food for thought besides affording a sound argument in behalf of a well-or- ganized, trained and cared-for body of regulars, to the end that the country may not be subjected to the great expense of calling out volunteers or militia for short service periods with the resulting hospital and pension records. The increase of expense for short term volunteers arises not only from pensions but from the waste and injury of public property which results from their lack of experience. Washington observed such conditions at the very beginning of the Revolution and makes this refer- ence to the subject in a letter to Congress : "HEIGHTS OF HARLEM, , t g . "24 September, 1776. "From the hours allotted to sleep I will borrow a few moments to convey my thoughts on sundry im- portant matters to Congress. . . . "It becomes evident to me then that, as this con- 54 THE ECONOMY OF PREVISION test is not likely to be the work of a day, as the war must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have good officers, there are no other possible means to obtain them but by establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen and men of character to engage ; and, till the bulk of your officers is composed of such persons as are actuated by prin- ciples of honor and a spirit of enterprise, you have little to expect from them. . . . There is nothing that gives a man consequence and renders him fit for command like a support that renders him independ- ent of everybody but the state he serves. . . . ' ' When the army was first raised at Cambridge, I am persuaded the men might have been got without a bounty for the war. After this, they began to see that the contest was not likely to end so speedily as was imagined, and to feel their consequence by re- marking that, to get in their militia in the course of the last year, many towns were induced to give them a bounty. Foreseeing the evils resulting from this and the destructive consequences which unavoidably would follow short enlistments, I took the liberty in a long letter to recommend the enlistments for and during the war, assigning such reasons for it as experience has since convinced me were well founded. . . , "Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep fifty or a hundred thousand in constant pay than to depend upon half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia. The time the latter are 55 THE AMERICAN ARMY in pay, before and after they are in camp, assem- bling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores, which, in spite of every reso- lution or requisition of Congress, they must be fur- nished with, or sent home, added to other incidental expenses consequent upon coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of reg- ularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and settled troops, and will, in my opin- ion, prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause. . . . " The volunteer system has met with much favor in our national life and is so surrounded with sentiment due to past services of a glorious character that it is certain to continue as the main reliance in any great war, and yet the most careful students of the Civil War are quite unanimous in the opinion that the volunteer system with limited conscription, adopted by the southern Confed- eracy, was more businesslike and a fairer dis- tribution of the burden of war than the purely volunteer system of the North. In the South the services of all able-bodied men were deemed due the government. When the flower of the courageous northern youth had been swallowed up by the armies in the field, the calls for volunteers fell upon ears not so easily attuned to the din of war. Then began a pernicious system of bounties, state and national. New York alone expended upward of $75,000,000 on this account in the effort to fill its quota of troops. 56 THE ECONOMY OF PREVISION No system of raising armies produces a better or more intelligent class of soldiers for a patriotic war than American volunteers. No system, however, could be more unjust from an academic viewpoint. A just and equitable distribution of the duties of citi- zenship in a republic dictate the righteousness of arranging for the defense of the nation upon a plan which recognizes that each and every citizen owes the debt of personal service in war. There will always be many who, under any rule of right reason, should not enter the service. Campaigning demands the best type of physical manhood, and requires that the mind shall not be harassed by brooding over de- pendents left without provision for support and lia- ble to become a public charge. Then there are im- portant civil duties which must go on in war. All these details, however, demand action at the hands of those in authority and may not be properly left to personal decision of interested parties. After two years ' experience in the great Civil War it was fully realized that, in some contingencies, nothing short of a nation in arms would suffice, and draft legislation was enacted providing for enrolling, calling out and organizing the national forces under the direction of provost-marshals appointed by the President. The orderly procession of events of a nation at war, as contemplated by the Constitution, were thus wholly reversed. History constantly repeats itself in the formation of our armies : popular excitement, a glowing of local pride, stimulation of patriotism, boys pleading for 57 THE AMERICAN ARMY opportunity and the final departure of regiments of untrained men, many of whom are foredoomed to the hospital instead of the battlefield. It cost much in blood and treasure to train the great volunteer armies of the Civil War, but in the end they became regulars in all but name and the equals in battle of any troops in the world. The records contain many instances of regiments fighting courageously after sustaining losses of from fifty to eighty per cent. But war is an expensive school of training and mod- ern wars do not allow much time for preparation before the first blow is struck, and it is the first bat- tle which counts for much in morale and national prestige when the appeal to arms has been made. The great body of citizens to-day is far less well equipped for military duty in war as militia than their forebears who were accustomed to the use of firearms. Existing law provides for calling out this force in addition to the organized militia, when it is morally certain that they will not become fit in time to join in the first battles of modern war. Given time, under trained officers, good results will follow. It is to provide this time or period for training that the regular army and a body of federal volunteers should be maintained in an effective condition. In these organizations the unfit will be excluded from the beginning, thus reducing the probable list of claimants for hospital accommodations and subse- quent pensions. The man who qualifies for his coun- try 's defense in the regular army or the proposed 58 THE ECONOMY OF PREVISION federal volunteers, is just the same patriot as his brother who offers his untrained self in the new regi- ments of volunteers ; in the former case, however, the country's draft for service is immediately honored, while in the latter instance considerable time must elapse before there is an available asset. The nation, through its lack of military policy, is historically committed to its present burden for pen- sions, but with all the warnings of the past half cen- tury it would seem the part of wisdom to provide for trained and physically fit men in the composition of our future armies and make possible less exhaustive demands upon the treasury. Those who are rendered incapable of self support by reason of military serv- ice, whether by wounds or disease, will never be per- mitted to go uncared for by the nation. The economy which the nation may wisely introduce, is through provision for a sufficient peace force of regulars and federal volunteers enlisted for three years, or the war, to stand in the breach while the second line of citizen soldiers to be enlisted for three years or the war, is being taught to shoot, march and take care of itself in campaign. The enormous roll of men enlisted for the Civil War appears incredible when the small size of the armies -engaged in the various campaigns is consid- ered. The abnormal condition arose from the enlist- ment of large numbers of men for three, six, nine and twelve months. The mainstay of the fighting force was composed of those who enlisted for three years 59 THE AMERICAN ARMY or the war, and nothing short of that requirement should again be embraced or allowed to continue in our army schemes. Existing law for calling forth the organized militia or national guard of the several states for federal duty provides that every officer and man comprising the organizations shall be mustered for service with- out further enlistment. In other words, under this system there will be no enlistment for the war and men with one or two months or less to serve may be transported to the points of mobilization without prospect of rendering any real service to the coun- try, but with sufficient time upon the rolls to justify claims for pensions after the mellow period of memo- ries of the war has arrived in the nation. This may be splendidly sentimental, but it does not treat war as the grave business it has heretofore turned out to be in our history. The plan adopted in the Civil War after a large experience provided for enlistments for three years or the war and furnished men employed for a suffi- cient period to justify their systematic training for campaign and battle. By doing away with the ex- pensive, unsatisfactory and all but useless short term men, the number of pensioners of the future would be materially decreased. One man enlisted for three years furnishes but one probable pensioner and his services will be far more valuable than those of six men called in for six months, each of whom may become a pensioner. The three-months men might, and probably would, in the same period fur- 60 nish twelve pensioners. There can be no more effect- ive way of reducing the number of pensions in future than by adhering to the t( three years or the war" enlistment which was so constantly urged by General Sherman and other commanders and students of the Civil War. Such a simple and practicable method of curtailing the enormous expense of the pension rolls of our future wars requires adoption in peace, for if nothing is done until another war may be declared, under the enthusiasm and excitement incident to such events, all precautions will be thrown to the winds and our descendants will be left to count the cost of their forebears' neglect. The enrolment in our various wars was as fol- lows : War of the Revolution: Continentals 231,771 Militia 164,087 Total 395,858 War of 1812: Regulars 38,186 Militia 458,463 Volunteers 10,110 Rangers 3,049 Total 509,808 War with Mexico: Regulars 26,922 Volunteers 73,532 Total 100,454 61 THE AMERICAN ARMY War of the Rebellion: Regulars 46,679 Volunteers and Militia 2,637,080 Total 2,683,769 War with Spain: Regulars (June 30, 1898) 45,669 Volunteers 232,235 Total 277,904 The amounts paid to June 30, 1911, for pensions, including payments to widows, minor children and dependent relatives in the several wars are as fol- lows : War of the Revolution (estimated) $70,000,000.00 War of 1812 (service pension) 45,853,024.19 War with Mexico (service pension) 11,192,205.52 Civil War 3,985,719,836.93 Unclassified 16,488,147.99 Regular establishment since foundation, Including Indian wars 21,705,852.33 A glance at the history of any of our wars will show how impossible it has ever been to get together a respectable proportion of the number enrolled for the army to prosecute a campaign. This arises from the character of our armies which have in all wars been to a great extent composed of short service men, disqualified by the terms of their enlistment for distant campaigning. There are few instances where any militia or volunteers have remained, willingly, beyond the period for which called forth. All had the same ideals and interest in the maintenance of 62 THE ECONOMY OF PREVISION the government, but they were simply victims of a wrong military system. Later on, however, the gov- ernment, representing the entire people, in its taxa- tion became the victim, for pensions flowed alike to those who marched to battle and those who de- manded their release after a few months' service in the midst of a campaign. Prevision demands a dif- ferent and a better system of raising armies, and in its adoption we should be guided rather by our own experiences than by those of European nations-in- arms. ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER OP THE ARMY "I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded if not entirely lost, if their defense is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean one to exist during war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every exigency far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new enlist- ments, which when effected are not attended with any good con- sequences." WASHINGTON. ANALYSIS of past and existing systems bring military men continually to the question of a determination as to the foundation character of the military establishment which America should main- tain, bearing in mind always the actual demands, of peace as well as the probable fields of action in war. To the very large majority of Americans the regular army and its activities in peace are as a sealed book. To many it is known only through the tales of flood and field drifting homeward from time to time from loved ones who have followed the flag in its globe circling journey. In America military matters have been treated usually as questions of expediency, rather than of broad policy, because the abnormal growth of the nation has directed its attention to the 64 ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER solution of the manifold and intricate problems of social and economical development arising under a modern civilization for which there are few prece- dents in the experience of other and older nations for our guidance. In the not distant past the main functions of the regular army, which dictated its organization, were embraced in guarding the movement of our advanc- ing frontiers, westward, into and over the country claimed as hunting grounds of the Indians, and in keeping alive a knowledge of the art of war in a na- tion given over body and soul to business. During the long period between the Civil War and the war with Spain, while the country was supposed to be in a state of profound peace, the little frontier garri- sons, which made the settlement of half a continent possible, went about their work of carving the path of an empire without expectation of other reward than a consciousness of duty right nobly performed. It was the self-reliance which the frontier training brought about that enabled the generals at Santiago to feel confident that each subordinate would lead his little band of followers through the chaparral straight for the enemy on San Juan Hill. With no policy other than that dictated by expe- diency of the moment, the declaration of war in 1898 found the government incapable of putting a single complete army corps in the field until volunteers could be brought into the service. While new regi- ments were being mustered in and crowded into un- 65 THE AMERICAN ARMY sanitary camps, the little army of regulars was rushed aboard improvised transports, landed in the surf of a tropical shore, marched against a fortified city and, in face of all academic teaching, wrested victory from an astonished and superior adversary. Scarce had the smoke of battle in the war with Spain vanished when the regulars were hurried away upon the distant voyage to the Philippines, to suppress an insurrection notable alike for its wide dispersal, resourceful cunning and viciousness. With infinite patience, prodigious labor and rare courage the army of regulars, and the new regiments of na- tional volunteers, accomplished the difficult task of restoring order in a thousand islands just in time to enable a detachment in force to respond to the cry from the beleaguered legations in Pekin and to win new honors in the high character of its services dur- ing the continuance of the Boxer Rebellion. When the military obligations of this country, in- volving outlying garrisons in the Philippines, China, Hawaii, Porto Rico, Panama and Alaska, are consid- ered, the natural conclusion results that America already possesses a large army. Not so, however, for it is only by undue attenuation that the small force may present a bold front at the most important points. It was not until after the war with Spain, in 1901 when a reorganization of the army took place, that legislation was sought and obtained, which au- thorizes the President in emergencies to fill the peace organizations to war strength, provided the total 66 ORGANIZATION AND CHABACTEB strength of the army, including Philippine scouts and exclusive of the hospital corps, does not exceed 100,000 men. This legislation is of great importance, in that regiments destined for particular service may be filled with recruits to war strength without de- pleting others below the minimum or peace strength. The reorganization of the army then adopted involved other material changes. Through the aboli- tion of regiments of artillery and the formation of a corps of coast artillery, with companies of flexible strength for the service of harbor defense, the ad- ministration and training of that arm was much simplified and improved. The subsequent separa- tion of the field artillery and its organization into battalions and regiments was in harmony with mod- ern practice and calculated to insure the proper use of fire in battle. Our previous practice had been quite uniformly to treat the field battery, instead of the regiment, as the unit of organization. Under the reorganization act of 1901, there was no intention of considering the regular army as a properly balanced field army of divisions, with only sufficient cavalry, field artillery and special arms to make them complete units. On the contrary the strength of the several arms was arranged with a view to having the regular army furnish as far as practicable within its limited strength, the special or auxiliary arms not comprised in the militia, which had volunteered for the war with Spain almost wholly as infantry. It is not now and probably never 67 THE AMEEICAN AEMY will be possible to insure a sufficient force of trained cavalry, field artillery and other special arms for the first line in war, except by maintaining them in active existence as regulars. It therefore follows, from the point of view of those who advocate the or- ganization and maintenance of the regular army in divisional and field army units that our force is ill assorted. In considering the organization of the army it should be remembered that many of the laws on the statute books are the result of historic development, while others have come about through special plead- ing and not as the result of any comprehensive pol- icy. The existing organization of the army has resulted from efforts to improve upon conditions developed at the outbreak of the war with Spain. Eeforms of recognized value have come in the inter- vening period but out of proposed policies there have developed some grave differences as to organization which must be finally determined by Congress to whom the Constitution has committed the power and thereby the duty of raising and supporting armies. These differences relate not only to the general war policy but also to the actual purpose and utilization of the regular army which is the basic element of national defense. The present organization and authorized strength of the regular army is : ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER *!** MM 1 i! s p|f si | ; S S1S!? 10 eo co eo S 8J90UJO CaNrtT-IOOOMCCO CDili-HTCCO OCO eo N So S3 ^ : : : : : ' SUIBjdBqQ CO S S CO g -n9]rj puooag -netq is-iij nn^^i 8SS " H CD a snTB^dBO | | ; aBB mi ; 88gi3 . r- M 55 ! SJOfBTff a-apa-ww B i IORIZED STRENGTH ( ^UBU3^tl9l r T SJ9UOIO3 t- ^1 CO 00 -* TH O5 CO >1CO-*O CCO5TH mcoc -(>nco-*o '("ooo ' I I s CD s -i i CO -U9Q jotBjq : : :g ::::::::::::::: :"E : : lip Jilii lii Total Regular Army Additional force : Philippine Scouts Grand total ' THE AMERICAN AEMY In the number of first lieutenants of the Medical Department are included ninety-nine Medical Re- serve Corps officers and sixty dental surgeons. Un- der authority of Congress the enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, now 4,012, and the 6,000 men au- thorized for the Quartermaster Corps are not counted as part of the strength of the army. It should be observed that the total force of mo- bile American troops comprises 34,128 infantry, 14,- 148 cavalry and 5,513 field artillery, a total of 53,- 789 when all vacancies are filled. From this force are drawn the regiments for Alaska, Panama, Ha- waii, the Philippines and China, amounting in the aggregate to more than 20,000 men. The authorized enlisted strength of the line of the army in previous decades subsequent to the Civil War, was as follows : 1810. I battalion of engineers 762 10 regiments of cavalry 9,300 5 regiments of artillery 5,065 25 regiments of infantry 16,375 Total 31,502 1880. 1 battalion of engineers 200 10 regiments of cavalry 8,450 5 regiments of artillery 2,600 25 regiments of infantry 12,085 Total 23,335 1890. 1 battalion of engineers 500 10 regiments of cavalry 7,970 5 regiments of artillery 2,650 25 regiments of infantry 12,625 Total 23,745 70 ORGANIZATION A ND CHARACTER 1901. 3 battalions of engineers 2,002 15 regiments of cavalry 18,540 30 batteries of field artillery \ 18 922 126 companies of coast artillery J 30 regiments of infantry 55,080 Total 94,544 The act of February 2, 1901, authorizes the Presi- dent to enlist natives of the Philippine Islands as scouts, not exceeding 12,000 in number, but requires that the total enlisted strength of the regular army, including such native force, shall not exceed at any one time 100,000. The actual strength during the past decade has at no time approached the author- ized maximum strength. Upon the reorganization of the army, under the act cited, the President under date of October 24, 1902, fixed the authorized strength of the army, including all detachments, and exclusive of native troops, at 59,866 men. The au- thorized strength has been frequently modified, but maintained always well within the maximum limit of 100,000. Some distinguished officers in the past have sought to eliminate the question of the strength of the army in time of peace from further consideration at the hands of Congress, by establishing a fixed ratio as to population, the most favored proposition being that of one soldier to 1,000 of population. The pop- ulation of the United States, and the percentage re- lation of the strength of the army in each decade from the year 1790 to and including the year 1890, were as follows: 71 THE AMERICAN ARMY Year Strength of the Army Population of U. S. Per cent. Officers Men Total 1790 67 1,216 1,273 3,929,214 .03 of 1% 1800 318 4,118 4,436 5,308,483 .08 of 1% 1810 774 9,147 9,921 7,239,881 .14 of 1% 1820 712 8,230 8,942 9,633,822 .09 of 1% 1830 627 5,324 5,951 12,866,020 .05 of 1% 1840 733 9,837 10,570 17,069,453 .06 of 1% 1850 948 9,815 10,763 23,191,876 .05 of 1% 1860 1,108 15,259 16,367 31,443,321 .05 of 1% 1870 2,541 34,534 37,075 38,558,371 .10 of 1% 1880 2,152 24,357 26,509 50,155,783 .05 of 1% 1890 2,168 24,921 27,089 62,622,250 .04 of 1% The desirability of removing the army from the necessity of constant legislation is clearly, apparent, but however much the fixed ratio plan may have com- mended itself in the past, it would not now meet the conditions of our varied requirements. This nation has assumed grave responsibilities in widely sep- arated parts of the world, which may not with honor and safety be trifled with. Their consideration is of the first importance from the view-point of national prestige. The nation relies upon that broad instru- mentality the War Department to accomplish all things needful to meet the demands of the hour in military matters. Any policy as to the present strength of the army must, as matters of first im- portance, take into consideration the actual demands* of garrisons maintained beyond the continental lim- its of the United States and the necessity for an ex- peditionary corps to reinforce them when threat- ened. A considerable part of the regular army will, for 72 ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER an indefinite period, be required to maintain the Alaska, Panama and over-sea garrisons. It is pos- sible that some or all of these garrisons may require reinforcements from the home forces, but it is not probable that any of them could be reduced in time of war for the purpose of strengthening any other part of the army. It would be inexpedient and po- litically unwise to allow conditions ever to reach a point where it might be deemed desirable to deplete the necessary over-sea garrisons to meet any home emergency. The minimum force required to main- tain the Alaska and over-sea garrisons exclusive of signal companies and medical department organiza- tions has been determined by the War Department to be as follows : Philippines A a O Panama Alaska Porto Rico Total for foreign service Regiments of infantry 4 6 3 1 14 Regiments of cavalry 2 1 1-3 3 1-3 Battalions of field artillery 3 1 6 Companies of coast artillery 24 13 49 Companies of Philippine scouts. . . Porto Rico regiment of infantry. . Companies of engineers 52 3 i i 52 1 6 With this serious detachment from our small army it may be seen at a glance that the remaining force is not sufficient for any extended service in war nor for peace instruction in large tactical units. An ear- nest effort has been made to improve the administra- 73 THE AMERICAN ARMY tion of the army by segregation of the coast artillery and the arrangement of the mobile army infantry, cavalry, and field artillery in such manner as to admit of its organization in brigades and divisions in time of peace. Heretofore tactical organizations above that of the regiment were created only for maneuvers or war. The nature of its duties and the vast field over which our small army operates ren- ders it difficult if not impracticable to maintain the integrity of any system embracing the higher tac- tical organizations. Expediency in emergencies ever plays havoc with policy. The following table gives the total numbers of or- ganizations now existing in the army of the United States, the total numbers required to meet the min- imum requirements of the foreign garrisons, and those which will be available within the United States after providing for requirements of the for- eign garrisons: 3 l ttf "> 1 S '? o 2 3 ) h S .2 " S }* %'a 13 c e qft'S cr3 d ..2 'S a ti2 3 a> s ,; 3*c^ .-.=! o *"^ Regiments of infantry 30 14 16 Regiments of cavalry 15 31-3 112-3 Regiments of field artillery 6 3 3 Companies of Philippine scouts. . . . 52 52 Porto Rico regiments of infantry. . 1 1 Companies of engineers 12 6 6 74 ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER It should be apparent to any novice that our newly acquired liabilities leave us in a far worse plight, as regards our army within the continental limits of the United States, than before the war with Spain. Without any opening for criticism of advocating 11 militarism," it may be stated in the plainest man- ner, that we are allowing our insurance to dwindle below a reasonable guarantee of home protection. There should be an immediate increase of the reg- ular army and the character of this increment should be determined in connection with the organization of the volunteer force which is to become a part of the army immediately upon a declaration of war, leaving the proper distribution of the several arms of the greater volunteer army for determination later in accordance with the number of men sum- moned under each call. The problem is one of pro- viding a proper scheme of expansion of a progress- ive character from a peace footing to a war basis. On the assumption that the existing organized mili- tia will be always available for the land defense of our seacoast fortifications, to repel invasions and suppress disorder when required, the mobile force of regulars constitutes the only immediately availa- ble force for any military expedition beyond our ter- ritorial borders. Coming from a nation generally accustomed to the use of firearms, the volunteers of 1861 required quite two years before they became the trained armies that eventually settled the war. Of course it is not possible to train all the volunteers in peace who may 75 THE AMERICAN ARMY be needed in a great war, but it is essential that all the forces subject to immediate call of the President for active service shall be organized and given as much training in peace as possible. For the next and possibly greater call for volunteers the serious prob- lem will be the absence of a sufficient number of trained officers and men as a nucleus for each or- ganization. That this is not a new problem may be seen from this petition to the Virginia House of Delegates from the officers of the Minute Battalion which had obeyed the first call of the Revolution : "To the Honorable the Speaker of the House of Delegates : ''PORTSMOUTH, December 1, 1776. " SIR In expectation of there being a number of additional troops raised, who are to be on Colonial Establishment the officers of the Minute Battalion now in service beg leave to address your Honorable House, on a matter of infinite importance to them- selves. "The disadvantages, under which they came into their present service hath occasioned them to suf- fer exceedingly in their private fortunes especially as they have been continued much longer than they at first expected disadvantages which nothing but the calls of an injured country would have induced their subjecting themselves to. ' ' You will not conceive them trivial when you con- sider that it was in midsummer, when every prepara- tion they had been making for crops, were in their 76 ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER progress to perfection and lost by leaving them. Even, under these circumstances, it is still their fer- vent wish to continue in the service of their country ; in posts of equal rank, with those they have the honor to fill. ' ' Confined to their duty at this place, they were to- tally prevented from offering themselves as candi- dates in their respective counties, by personal ap- plication (the only successful mode) at the choice of officers for the six regiments now raising on Con- tinental Establishment. "You will conceive it a hardship for the officers of the Battalion ; now to be obliged to return to their counties, fall into the militia as common soldiers and at a future day be called into service, among the common mass under the command of those who remained at home enjoying every conveniency of life whilst they were sacrificing both happiness and fortunes. "These sentiments they take the liberty of com- municating through you to your Honorable House and have the honor to be, Sir, "YouR VERY HUMBLE SERVANTS." No nation has a more intelligent personnel from which to draw its armies. The extent to which the nation may go in the organization of its military re- sources in time of peace is dictated by its political policies. The peace administration of our army through a War Department heavily burdened with non-military duties has ever made the pro rata cost 77 THE AMERICAN ARMY of the soldier so high that Congress avoids as far as possible any discussion having for its object a mate- rial increase of the regular army. The fact that the cost of administration goes on without much regard to the size of the regiments is always ignored. The same number of administrative officers could easily handle the business affairs of a much larger army. The regular army is confronted with serious du- ties in so many parts of the world that its usefulness as a school of instruction, except for its own person- nel, is quite limited. Indeed attempts thus to utilize it so expose its paucity of strength as, not infre- quently, to bring it into disrepute in the" minds of those who have no comprehensive information as to existing conditions. A practice has grown up of continually attempting to expand the modest force by simulating organizations of the next higher de- gree thus skeleton battalions are made to masquer- ade as regiments and regiments as brigades, when their small numbers should naturally suggest their consolidation into the unit of the next lower order for practice at real war strength. So far as the army is concerned it needs only added strength to fill any demand which in reason may be made upon it. Its officers are educated and well trained ; the men in the ranks are as intelligent, brave and resourceful as any in the world. The army is the best armed, equipped, clothed and fed of any troops ever in our service. The alternating employ- ment in line and staff duties the detail system to- gether with rotation of service in over-sea garrisons 78 ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER and much consequent travel has enlarged the hori- zon of all officers and qualified them for administra- tion and command in the higher grades to a degree impossible under old conditions. The army of to- day could supply a larger number of officers quali- fied for high command than at any previous period of its history, and the number is being constantly increased through the instrumentality of post-grad- uate schools and practical application in most varied fields of activity. The regulars have maintained the honor of the nation upon innumerable fields of combat and their achievements and sacrifices will live in song and story to bring the glow of pride to coming genera- tions. Through their dignity and manhood in the hour of victory and their tenderness and sympathy in public disaster, they have ever earned honorable recognition. Imbued with the principles and cus- toms instilled by Washington in the * * Continentals ' ' our first body of regulars to whom the nation owed so much in the struggle for liberty they have cherished ideals of duty ever incompatible with hire- lings and soldiers of fortune. Coming down the cen- tury, the regulars are found guarding our frontiers, the friend of the Indian in his hopeless struggle to stem the rising tide of Anglo-Saxon land-hunger, for the course of the pioneer had ever been to enter the wilderness with both rifle and axe and what he con- quered he held. The nation was ostensibly at peace, but during the long period of development of our land-empire 79 THE AMERICAN ARMY the little columns of regulars were incessantly bat- tling with Indians that the pioneer might build his cabin and plant his corn in peace. Sometimes a genius would arise amongst the red men and, arous- ing them to united action, halt the westward move- ment momentarily, but the inevitable course of des- tiny swept relentlessly on, and Dade, Canby, and Ouster and a host of other gallant souls of the reg- ulars passed to eternity, their honored memory serv- ing but as landmarks of frontier history. Their sac- rifice upon the inglorious fields of the Indian wars enshrined them in the hearts of their comrades and with the later generations the stories" of their achievements have lived through repetition in the isolated and widely dispersed garrisons of a con- tinent. Not alone in the protection of the emigrant wagon- trains, ceaselessly winding their way across plain and mountain, did the regulars make their presence felt, but upon the distant battlefields of Mexico, their valor, discipline and steadfastness assured vic- tory from a courageous adversary, superior in num- bers and battling among his native deserts and mountains. Coming down to the Civil War period and possessing practically all the knowledge of the art of war in the country, the regular officers were widely dispersed amongst the great army of volun- teers and the regular troops almost lost their iden- tity in the meagerness of their strength, yet the in- fluence of such organizations as Sykes's Division of regulars in the Army of the Potomac was of inesti- 80 ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER mable value, and there is nothing finer than the stoic courage of Baird's Division at Chickamauga, where, with a loss of fifty-five per cent., they re- mained firmly in line of battle while heroic Thomas gathered the broken fragments of the army about him for the last stand. There is nothing so demo- cratic, in all military history, as the conduct of the regulars who, as generals, having led armies to vic- tory, surrendered their high commissions in the vol- unteers, resumed the modest shoulder straps of regi- mental officers and returned to the frontier to take up again the trail of the Indian marauder, grown overbold through the prolonged absence of his erst- while guardians. As the hand of fate pointed more and more defi- nitely to the end the warrior instinct guided the In- dian race to its last and greatest wars, but the re- sistless wave swept over and about them and closed near three centuries of effort to stem the tide of a civilization, altruistic in heart and theory but prac- tical in its execution of the inexorable decree of des- tiny. With the closing scenes of the Indian wars, the history of the ancient regime was laid away in the lavender of memory. A new era was initiated by the war with Spain, and followed by a train of consequences that has led the army and nation far afield. The old days of the frontier will live in tra- dition and history, but under the mellowing in- fluence of time the hardships of campaigning against the most cunning and resourceful of foes will fade from memory. This in brief is the story of the past. 81 THE AMERICAN ARMY No one can read the biographies and diaries of the generations of soldiers whose services made possible the opening up of this continent, without a feeling of deep and reverent regard for American manhood, as typified by those gallant men during the crude period of our national development. Raw troops have been known to perform deeds of wondrous courage and of lasting importance, but there is a something called discipline which binds together an army and gives it a dependable morale not akin to the spasmodic action of new levies. The well-disciplined officers and men of the regular army who went to Santiago and whose brief campaign in connection with the naval victories promptly set- tled the war with Spain, rendered the country a great service not only in Cuba but in the jungle cam- paigns of the Philippine insurrection, which fol- lowed close upon the termination of the war with Spain. In the battle near Santiago, Cuba, usually referred to as "San Juan," the Cavalry Division, serving dismounted, with a strength of 127 officer ; and 2,522 men, suffered a loss of 36 officers and 339 men killed and wounded. Nearly one-third of the regular officers were killed or wounded, the loss in one regiment being exactly fifty per cent. In Kent's Infantry Division, with a strength of 235 officers and 4,869 men, the loss in killed and wounded was 51 officers and 650 men. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in a volume entitled The War With Spain, paid a tribute to the reg- 82 ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER ular army in connection with the operations against Santiago, Cuba, in this language: "The battle of San Juan was preeminently the battle of the American regulars, of the flower of the American standing army. With scarcely any artil- lery support, armed only with rifles, they were set to take heights and a village strongly held by reg- ular soldiers and defended by forts, intrenchments, batteries, and a tangle of barbed wire fences. This is something which the best military critics would declare well nigh impossible and not to be attempted. The American army did it."* Major-General Sir E. T. Hutton, K. C. M. G., C. B., in an address before the United Service Institu- tion in London, said: * ' I think all British soldiers owe Sir Howard Vin- cent much gratitude for a very instructive paper, and for so much useful information in connection with the army of that other great branch of the Anglo-Saxon race which we are so proud to claim as kinsmen. Having during the course of my service commanded in Canada, I have had especial oppor- tunities of being conversant with the feelings and "That part of the 5th Corps which participated in the expedi- tion to Santiago comprised parts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 6th, 9th and 10th Cavalry; the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 20th, 21st, 22d, 24th and 25th Infantry; and two light batteries from each of the 1st, 2d and 4th Artillery. The strength of these organizations, as shown by the rolls, comprised a total of 14,604 men. Of these 4,963 were in their first year of service; 8,699 had less than three years of service, and 10,773 had less than seven years of service. 83 THE AMERICAN AEMY ideas of the United States Army, and I also think to a certain extent with the trend of the military de- velopments of which Sir Howard Vincent has been speaking. I should like, first of all, to refer to one or two points as regards the regular army. The United States Regular Army is one of unquestioned excellence in physique, discipline, and general mili- tary efficiency. It especially proved its value during the recent Cuban War; and I think if Sir Howard Vincent will allow me to say so, in a great measure its present popularity is due to the extremely gal- lant and excellent service which it rendered during that campaign in Cuba. It is a well-known fact to those who were present, that the success of the United States arms was almost entirely due to the steadiness and gallantry of the regular troops which took part in that campaign " The army has always responded to every demand made upon it to the limit of its strength. That it fades away under the influence of battle casualties is the common fate of courageous Anglo-Saxon armies in all history, but that they have risen and will rise again, even from the ashes of defeat, and move forward at their country's call is equally true. That the American army failed not to repeat its history, we have the words of Hon. Elihu Root, who, as Sec- retary of War, had every possible means of ascer- taining the true state of affairs and who wrote : "No organization could have produced the re- sults exhibited by the army during the past two years which was not in the main sound and efficient. With 84 ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER its handful of regular officers and its small body of trained troops, merged with nearly double their num- ber of raw recruits, and combined with large forces of new, untrained, volunteers, it has in surprisingly short periods of time produced a great body of men, uniformly well disciplined, of good conduct and morale, patient in endurance of hardships, steady, indomitable, and heroic in action, and who, against the debilitating influences of tropical climates, against physical obstacles which seemed insur- mountable, and against enemies of superior num- bers and approved courage, and armed with weap- ons of modern warfare, have won a long series of victories unbroken by a single defeat. ' ' Practically all the cavalry and infantry regiments which had participated in the campaign against San- tiago were engaged subsequently in the Philippine Insurrection. When peace had been sufficiently re- stored in the Philippine Islands to justify the in- auguration of civil government, the President di- rected the transfer of authority on July 4, 1902, and that the following order containing encomiums fairly won and deserving a page in the history of that eventful epoch, be read at parade to every American garrison : 4 'To the Army of the United States : "The President upon this anniversary of National independence wishes to express to the officers and enlisted men of the United States Army his deep appreciation of the service they have rendered to the country in the great and difficult undertakings 85 THE AMERICAN ARMY which they have brought to a successful conclusion during the past year. 1 ' The President thanks the officers and enlisted men of the Army in the Philippines, both regulars and volunteers, for the courage and fortitude, the indom- itable spirit and loyal devotion with which they have put down and ended the great insurrection which has raged throughout the archipelago against the lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United States. The task was peculiarly difficult and trying. They were required at first to overcome organized resist- ance of superior numbers, well equipped with mod- ern arms of precision, intrenched in an unknown country of mountain defiles, jungles, and swamps, apparently capable of interminable defense. When this resistance had been overcome they were re- quired to crush out a general system of guerrilla warfare conducted among a people speaking un- known tongues, from whom it was almost impos- sible to obtain the information necessary for suc- cessful pursuit or to guard against surprise and ambush. "The enemies by whom they were surrounded were regardless of all obligations of good faith and of all limitations which humanity has imposed upon civilized warfare. Bound themselves by the laws of war, soldiers were called upon to meet every de- vice of unscrupulous treachery and to contemplate without reprisal the infliction of barbarous cruelties upon their comrades and friendly natives. They were instructed, while punishing armed resistance, 86 ORGANIZATION AND CHABACTER to conciliate the friendship of the peaceful, yet had to do with a population among whom it was impos- sible to distinguish friend from foe, and who in countless instances used a false appearance of friendship for ambush and assassination. They were obliged to deal with problems of communication and transportation in a country without roads and frequently made impassable by torrential rains. They were weakened by tropical heat and tropical disease. Widely scattered over a great archipelago, extending a thousand miles from north to south, the gravest re- sponsibilities, involving the life or death of their commands, frequently devolved upon young and in- experienced officers beyond the reach of specific orders or advice. ' * Under all these adverse circumstances the Army of the Philippines has accomplished its task rapidly and completely. In more than two thousand combats, great and small, within three years, it has exhibited unvarying courage and resolution. Utilizing the les- sons of the Indian wars it has relentlessly followed the guerrilla bands to their fastnesses in mountain and jungle and crushed them. It has put an end to the vast system of intimidation and secret assassina- tion by which the peaceful natives were prevented from taking a genuine part in government under American authority. It has captured or forced to surrender substantially all the leaders of the insur- rection. It has submitted to no discouragement and halted at no obstacle. Its officers have shown high qualities of command, and its men have shown devo- " 87 THE AMERICAN ARMY tion and discipline. Its splendid virile energy has been accompanied by self-control, patience, and mag- nanimity. With surprisingly few individual excep- tions its course has been characterized by humanity and kindness to the prisoner and the noncombatant. With admirable good temper, sympathy, and loyalty to American ideals its commanding generals have joined with the civilian agents of the Government in healing the wounds of war and assuring to the peo- ple of the Philippines the blessings of peace and prosperity. Individual liberty, protection of per- sonal rights, civil order, public instruction, and re- ligious freedom have followed its footsteps. It has added honor to the flag which it defended, and has justified increased confidence in the future of the American people, whose soldiers do not shrink from labor or death, yet love liberty and peace. "The President feels that he expresses the senti- ments of all the loyal people of the United States in doing honor to the whole Army which has joined in the performance and shares in the credit of these honorable services.'* The efficiency of a republican army, based on vol- untary enlistments, depends upon its contentment with conditions, which in turn depends wholly upon the integrity of its administration. Absence of fa- voritism and cliques is essential to contented and loyal service. The foundation stones of regular army discipline comprise a frank adherence to the principle of supremacy of the civil law, a thor- ough knowledge of theory and the highest grade of 88 ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER proficiency in the practical performance of every military duty. It is not enough that each regular shall do his best but that he shall know and do what is right. With these ingrained principles it is only necessary that the regular army shall be governed by well considered laws and. regulations, adminis- tered through a proper military hierarchy, to enable it to keep alive the knowledge, traditions and cus- toms of war, so essential to safeguarding the vast material interests of the nation. It has come to pass that out of our altruistic senti- ment for the people of the neighboring isle of Cuba a line of increasing responsibilities for the nation has unfolded and led the army far afield. The office of the army of to-day in China, the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, Panama, Porto Rico and within our continental limits calls for a degree of ability and training hardly comprehended by the public. The character, efficiency and courage of the officers and men of the army have ever been beyond question, due not only to a long and brilliant history of arms, but also to the humanity with which they have han- dled the problems arising from earthquakes, floods, forest-fires and pestilence, of so grave a nature as to demand immediate, organized and disciplined re- lief. Through a century of experience the title of " regular" has come to signify safe, conservative and dependable action and the verdict of history during the recent period of world power expansion, will be clear-cut, decisive and unimpeachable as to the character and value of the services rendered by the army. 89 VI COLONIAL, TKOOPS "Remember, especially, that, for the efficient management of your common interest in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable." WASHINGTON. DTJEING the past fifteen years the nation has wandered far from the traditional paths of pioneer development and, in consequence, our little army of regulars has found employment in many strange lands. With the thought and hope that each demand would be the last, expediency rather than a comprehensive and previously considered policy has dictated in each instance the employment of our forces. To meet the modest demands of almost any conceivable call for pacification or intervention in- cident to treaties or the Monroe Doctrine, would drain our country of all the available mobile army re- maining at home, and interfere with the timely re- lief of those employed on foreign service. Whatever may be the policy of the future as to our political relations with the Philippines, the existing form of government makes them autonomous so far as the collection of customs and internal taxes are concerned and the actual administration of the is- lands may be likened to that of a limited republic. In the reform of our military system, which seems essential, it would be a serious mistake not to include 90 COLONIAL TROOPS a complete modification of the defense and utiliza- tion of the military forces in the Philippine Islands. Some of our most experienced officers have long agreed that the solution of the problem would be best met by appointing the military commander in the Philippines to office, under the Civil Governor, with duties akin to those of a Secretary of War and Ad- ministrator of Police. This would not involve much additional administrative force to that now em- ployed for the army and would materially decrease the expenditure in connection with constabulary ad- ministration. The military forces maintained in the islands com- prise three classes : American regulars of all arms ; Philippine scouts, natives, organized in companies and battalions under American officers and sup- ported out of army appropriations ; Philippine con- stabulary, natives, under American officers with but few exceptions, and supported by the Philippine gov- ernment. A reformation of the system has been re- peatedly urged by those in authority and the time has arrived when the situation should be considered in connection with legislation having for its object the modernization of our entire military system, in- cluding regulars, volunteers and militia. The Philippine scout organizations were brought into existence under an act of Congrss providing for a reorganization of the army, without any view other than provision for a temporary force of na- tives to assist in restoring and maintaining order in the islands. The constabulary, supported by the 91 THE AMERICAN ARMY Philippine government, comprises a military organ- ization of natives with a brigadier general at the head and numerous field officers from the regular army as assistants, and has to its credit innumerable gallant actions occurring in the suppression of dis- orders arising from various causes in a thousand islands. When civil government was substituted for military control in the islands, it seemed obvious that the native troops dispersed for maintenance of order throughout the archipelago would ultimately be placed under the same directing authority that controls the native constabulary. The proposition to transfer the Philippine scout companies from the army to the constabulary was much advocated but the condition of the Philippine treasury did not seem to warrant the immediate assumption of the obliga- tion involved in the support of the additional force. A compromise was effected by an act of Congress which continues the burden of expense for mainte- nance of the scouts upon the army appropriations, but authorizes their temporary transfer in emer- gencies to the control of the chief and assistant chiefs of constabulary. The scouts so detached are not subject to orders from any other constabulary officers which places a limitation upon their employ- ment. The scheme was based wholly upon expedi- ency during a critical and unsettled condition in the Philippines, both as to income and public order and should not be continued indefinitely. The opinion was held by numerous army officers 92 COLONIAL TROOPS that the scouts should remain under military con- trol and be thoroughly drilled and disciplined as a counterpoise to the constabulary in event of any considerable portion of the latter body being se- duced into disloyalty by designing native politi- cians. This argument falls to the ground in face of the innumerable and courageous actions of the con- stabulary forces in the maintenance of law and or- der among their own people in all parts of the ar- chipelago. When our army was first sent to garrison stations beyond the seas, expediency, apparent exigencies of the service, and perhaps some favor, combined to prevent the full quota of officers from accompanying their organizations. In the course of time some offi- cers who continued on duty with their regiments ac- quired records of tropical service covering many years, while others had little or none. It appeared difficult, if not impossible, to correct the inequality by returning the absentees to their organizations. In the end, the initiation of a corrective was undertaken by the transfer of certain regiments to constitute permanent garrisons in the Philippines, the system being applied later to the organizations serving in the Hawaiian Islands and Panama. Under this scheme, it is contemplated gradually to correct in- equalities in length of tropical service at over-sea stations by transferring officers, the non-commis- sioned officers and privates being privileged by the terms of their enlistments to return home upon ex- 93 THE AMERICAN ARMY piration of service, where they may reenlist as pri- vates in home organizations. To meet existing and increasing responsibilities it seems inevitable that a material increase of our military establishment shall take place in the not distant future. When that occurs it should include a drastic change of method of providing the over- seas garrisons now demanded in widely separated parts of the world. To provide for the garrisons in the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama, there should be created an en- tirely new military force of Colonial Troops, or- ganized especially for that service and^not given designations as part of the home army of regulars. The lists of officers of the regular army should be in- creased by the addition of extra officers of the sev- eral grades necessary for duty with the Colonial Troops, and the additional number of men to consti- tute the enlisted force should be authorized. In the execution of this scheme the Philippine scout com- panies would be amalgamated with the constabulary and the entire expenses of the native forces for the preservation of order should be borne by the Philip- pine treasury. The old organizations of the regular army now permanently assigned to stations in the Philippine Islands, Hawaii and Panama, may then be returned to home stations and thereafter previous foreign service should be considered in assigning of- ficers to the new colonial troops. In this way provi- sion would be made for the immediate obligations 94 COLONIAL TROOPS confronting the nation and if, in the future, the po- litical status of the Philippines becomes so changed as no longer to require the American army, the co- lonial troops there may be returned and the enlisted force transferred to the permanent army units, or discharged, and the officers continued on duty until disposed of by Congress. As our nation grows, the need of trained officers increases and we will never have even a modest proportion of those required to supply our requirements in the preparation of our forces for the exigencies of war. The minimum garrisons for the Philippine Is- lands, the Hawaiian Islands and Panama having been determined, it is important that there be cre- ated and maintained at home a sufficient force of reg- ulars to constitute at least three reliefs for foreign service, for it is neither economical nor desirable to have our officers and men spend more than one- third of their time at tropical stations. If merely a sufficient army is maintained to alternate tours of foreign and home service, it would make impossible any reasonable arrangement of other necessary serv- ice, such as instructors of schools and colleges, the militia, recruiting and numerous other kinds of de- tached duties of recognized importance. The garrison of about eight hundred and fifty men maintained in China may be disregarded in the cal- culations of colonial troops inasmuch as it is de- tached from the Philippine Islands during the exist- ing temporary emergency. The organizations re- 95 THE AMERICAN ARMY quired ultimately for service as Colonial Troops under the existing War Department policy as to gar- risons comprise the following : Philippine Islands: 4 regiments of infantry. 2 regiments of cavalry. 1 regiment of field artillery. 24 companies of coast artillery. 2 companies of engineers. Hawaiian Islands: 6 regiments of infantry. 1 regiment of cavalry. 1 regiment and 1 battalion of field artillery. 3 companies of engineers. 13 companies of coast artillery. Panama: 3 regiments of infantry. 1 squadron (4 troops) of cavalry. 1 battalion of field artillery. 12 companies of coast artillery. 1 company of engineers. To these should be added the proper proportion of staff and supply corps, quartermaster, sanitary, signal, ordnance and others essential to military effi- ciency. The troops required to garrison Alaska should be drawn from the home army. To accomplish this reorganization of the forces it will be necessary to add to the regular army the of- ficers and men to comprise thirteen regiments of in- fantry, three and one-third regiments of cavalry, three regiments of field artillery, forty-nine com- panies of coast artillery, six companies of engineers, and the proportional strength of staff personnel in accordance with legal and tables of organization au- thorizations. 96 COLONIAL TROOPS Based on existing organizations this will provide for additions to the regular army as follows: 13 regiments of infantry, total enlisted 23,868 3 1-3 regiments of cavalry, total enlisted 4,120 3 regiments of field artillery, total enlisted 3,384 49 companies of coast artillery, total enlisted 6,096 6 companies of engineers, total enlisted 988 Total 37,456 The additional officers required for these organiza- tions will comprise : Colonels a |J 1 ef 3 Captains a I i o Second Lieutenants Chaplains to II Infantry 13 13 39 195 195 195 13 Cavalry 3 3 10 49 50 50 3 7 Field artillery 3 3 6 33 39 39 3 fi Coast artillery 4 4 12 49 49 49 4 Total 23 23 67 326 333 333 23 13 Based on the organization suggested in another chapter as most suitable for volunteers of the mo- bile army the units-of-threes system the require- ments would be as follows : 13 regiments of infantry, 9 companies and 1 depot com- pany each, total enlisted 18,317 3 1-3 regiments, cavalry, 9 troops and 1 depot troop each, total enlisted 3,203 3 regiments field artillery, 6 batteries and 1 depot battery, total enlisted 3,522 49 companies coast artillery, total enlisted 5,096 6 companies engineers, total enlisted 988 Total 31,126 97 THE AMERICAN ARMY The additional officers required for these organiza- tions will comprise: Colonels Lieutenant Colonels E a Captains First Lieutenants Sncond Lieutenants Chaplains Veteri- narian! Infantry 13 13 39 169 169 169 13 Cavalry 3 3 10 42 43 43 3 7 Field artillery 3 3 7 36 45 45 3 6 Coast artillery 4 4 12 49 49 49 4 Total 23 23 68 296 306 306 23 13 There are enough extra colonels of the line, with- out commands, promoted to present grade to rectify inequalities of rank arising from former legislation, to provide colonels for all the regiments of colonial troops. The officers for the additional companies of engineers can be provided, at least temporarily, from the authorized personnel of the engineer corps as soon as the vacancies authorized by recent legis- lation are filled. Should it develop later that there is need for more engineer officers to fulfill these conditions they can be provided by special legisla- tion. To add at once a large number of untrained civil- ians to the regular service as commissioned officers would lower the standards of the army materially and require a long period for recovery. It would be wiser to plan for a preliminary training and profes- sional sifting of those not supplied from the mili- tary academy and the army, and add approved can- 98 COLONIAL TROOPS didates at the rate of not exceeding one-fifth the to- tal increment each year. Together with the vacancies arising annually from casualties among the commis- sioned personnel, this would require about three hundred each year for five years to complete the quota for the Colonial Troops, and provide for current vacancies occurring normally in existing army organizations. Upon the completion of this reorganization the en- tire regular army as now organized and comprising thirty regiments of infantry, fifteen regiments of cavalry and six regiments of field artillery with a total strength of 47,077 officers and men with peace strength organizations would be stationed within the continental limits of the United States and Alaska. Should the unit-of-three system of organization be adopted, coincident with the creation of the pro- posed body of Colonial Troops, the number of regiments in the mobile army would be increased by the organization into regiments of the surplus companies arising from the change from four to three of these units to each battalion. The coast ar- tillery comprises 170 companies and would not be modified through the adoption of the unit-of-three system for the mobile army. With the infantry and cavalry, including Colo- nial Troops of those branches, organized with nine companies and a depot company to each and a depot battery added to each of the present regi- ments of field artillery, the strength of the army ex- 99 THE AMERICAN ABMY elusive of communication, sanitary, and supply corps units, all organizations at the maximum or war strength, would be as follows : Colonial troops 31,123 36 regiments of infantry 50,724 18 regiments of cavalry 17,298 6 regiments of field artillery 7,044 170 companies of coast artillery 18,931 Total 125,120 Such increase of this force as may be determined upon should take into consideration the serious ob- stacles in the creation and maintenance of. expensive special arms of volunteers and militia and also the necessity for having a sufficient number of officers of all arms to insure three reliefs in each grade to meet the requirements of service with Colonial Troops. VII BESEKVES "The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting la only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service." WASHINGTON. A FEW years ago the ranks of the army were depleted, recruits were scarce and there were not so many reenlistments as seemed desirable. It then became the policy of the administration to re- gard the service in the light of a career for the men in the ranks as well as for the officers, with a view to having the small regular army not only a model for volunteers and militia but also a highly-trained and efficient body of dependable troops for immedi- ate military purposes. In presenting this matter in his annual message to Congress, December 3, 1907, President Roosevelt said : "Inducements should be offered sufficient to en- courage really good men who make the army a life occupation. . . . Increase over the present pay need not be great in the lower grades for the first one or two enlistments, but the increase should be marked for the noncommissioned officers of the upper grades who serve long enough to make it evident that they intend to stay in the army, while additional pay should be given for higher qualifica- tions in target practice. . . . "... the man who serves steadily in the army 101 THE AMERICAN AEMY should be treated as what he is, that is, as preemi- nently one of the best citizens of this Republic. After twelve years' service in the army my own be- lief is that the man should be given a preference ac- cording to his ability for certain types of office over all civilian applicants without examination . . ." The efforts of the War Department to show Con- gress that the army should be regarded in the light of a professional body of soldiers were successful, for the pay was increased, special inducements were provided for reenlistments and numerous other things done to make the life of the soldier more at- tractive to the class of men desired for the army. The result was a great improvement ; the organiza- tions began to fill up and enough men reenlisted to insure a broad field of selection for the important grades of noncommissioned officers. Considerable permanency of personnel is the basic element of the policy which regards the regular army as a striking force of dependable soldiers. Such a force maintained at war strength and not as skeleton organizations in peace, constitutes a school for offi- cers where they may practise the art of war and standardize organizations and methods of training so that they will constitute acceptable models for vol- unteers and state troops. Under this policy it is ex- pected that experienced and dependable soldiers, when discharged from the service, will be available in their communities to assist in raising and training volunteers and filling many of the important offices for which they will be better qualified than the great 102 RESERVES body of patriotic but uninstructed young volunteers. Honorably discharged soldiers who prefer to return to service in war with the regulars are not only not to be deprived of the privilege, but by statute author- ized to receive a bonus for so doing. With the advent of a new administration in the War Department, a wholly different policy as to the enlisted personnel of the army was brought forward, which contemplates the utilization of the regular army as a training school where young men will be taught the duties of the soldier and then be trans- ferred to the reserve for the remaining period of their enlistments, which were recommended to Con- gress to be fixed at eight or ten years' duration. Legislation was finally enacted which fixed the pe- riod of enlistment at seven years, of which four are to be spent with the colors, and three in the reserve. Here are found not mere differences of opinion concerning a policy, but two diametrically opposed policies presented to the same Committees of Con- gress, within a brief period, and each carrying the burden of considerable appropriations. All human institutions are subject to the laws of progress, but care is necessary to the end that mere change be not mistaken for reform. Those military men whose views President Eoosevelt so ably championed in 1907 must be credited with proper motives, some ability and much experience. They were confronted with conditions, not theories. The army was ill prepared at the time to perform all the duties which actually crowded upon it, the nature of which de- 103 THE AMERICAN ARMY manded a more perfect military machine than can be produced by turning our inadequate army into a training school for reservists. Regimental officers, on duty with their organizations and who are ex- pected to maintain them in a state of discipline and efficiency equal to the difficult and delicate duties upon the Mexican border, in Alaska, Panama, Ha- waii, the Philippines and China, and those involving service such as the occupation of Cuba upon two occasions, should not be denounced as non-progress- ive if they view with some concern a change of pol- icy which may make their organizations less depend- able, less a fulfillment of the nation 's -idea of the 1 ' regulars. " It is wholly unfair to question the mo- tives of military men because they do not change their views with every new suggestion, but await proof as to the soundness of proposed doctrines. Al- together, the new proposal for short service with the colors and a long period in reserve was a violent overturning of the policy so recently and so force- fully presented to and adopted by Congress, and the opinion that the new policy was quite incapable of meeting the expectations of its supporters, except when applied to semi-permanent or specially as- signed organizations and not to the army as a whole, was not without some justification. Under the new system of long enlistments, seven years, with part of the service in the reserve, it will be many years before any material effect will be visible in the existence of a body of dependable re- servists, whose addresses are listed with the War 104 EESERVES Department. If we assume the army to consist of 100,000 men, enlisted for four years' service with the colors and three in reserve, and there were no inci- dents to occur to interfere with the orderly pro- cedure of events, in theory we might then count upon one-fourth of the whole or 25,000 men annually pass- ing back into civil life and becoming available for a call to arms during the ensuing three years. Those who have not given the available War Department records careful study may well be surprised at the vast difference between the theoretical and actual results. To avoid any possible selection of excep- tional examples from the vast accumulation of army records, the following, within the author's personal experience, are believed to show conclusively that the number of enlisted men who will become availa- ble as reservists upon discharge from the average organization of regulars, will bear a very modest relation to the total number whose connection with the organization is severed during any given period. The regimental records of the 8th U. S. Infantry for the year ending December 31, 1874, show the changes in personnel as follows : Discharge by expiration of service 42 Discharge for disability 21 Discharge sentence general court martial 16 Discharge by order 21 Dropped 11 Transferred 56 Died 7 Deserted 74 Total 248 105 The regiment had exceptionally hard service dur- ing 1872, 1873 and 1874, and during the last-named year, there were only eight reenlistnients. Deduct- ing those from the number discharged by expiration of service there would have remained but thirty-four possible reservists out of a total of 238 lost to the regiment, had the present reserve law been in effect. During the six months ending August 31, 1913, the losses from the Second Division, which comprised an average strength of 12,000 men during that pe- riod, were as follows : Discharge by expiration of service ^. 761 Discharge by sentence court martial 202 Discharge without honor 19 Discharge by purchase 56 Discharge, all other causes 71 Deserted 430 Reenlisted 269 Of those who deserted 127 were apprehended or surrendered. An analysis of the figures shows that for the six months' period the losses of the Division aggregated 1,412. Of the 761 discharged by expira- tion of service, 269 reenlisted, leaving 492 or about one-third of all those whose connection with or- ganizations was severed during the same period, available as possible reservists had the present law been applicable to them. The average monthly enlisted strength of the army, exclusive of Philippine scouts, between July 1, 1912, and June 30, 1913, was 86,140. During the 106 EESEEVES same period the losses from all causes totaled 25,349 men distributed as follows : Expiration of period of enlistment 12,095 Discharge for disability 1,056 Discharged by sentence general court martial. 2,729 Discharged by order 4,278 Died of wounds, disease, accidents, drowned, suicide and homicide 398 Deserted 4,451 Retired 342 Reenlisted during same period 7,033 Had the reserve law been applicable to all men dis- charged during the year the number of possible re- servists would have been 5,349 out of 25,349, whose connection with the service was severed from all causes. In this connection it is of interest to note the de- creasing rate of reenlistments which for all branches was in 1911, 14,172 ; in 1912, 11,601 ; and during 1913, 7,033; only about one-half the number of reenlist- ments as in 1911. The cause of this falling off in re- enlistments may be fairly traced to the marked change of policy already alluded to and to widely published accounts of testimony given before Con- gressional Committees and numerous public inter- views antagonistic to men who under previous en- couragement had decided to make their careers in the army. Assuming that the new system, a wholly different scheme from any in the great armies of Europe, where the local authorities have control of the re- 107 THE AMERICAN ARMY serves, does not break down before a war there will probably arise an infinite trouble of execution ex- cept in the cases of those who really wish to return to the service when summoned. Those who have married, established homes for their families and perhaps invested their all in some business, will surely appeal for release, and in all probability they will be sustained by the sentiment of the community, because the summons will have the appearance of unfairness and it will be viewed as a hardship to take such men, when others perhaps without family ties of a character to prevent service are not required to share in the national defense. Herein lies the dif- ference between a country with a small regular army and a European nation-in-arms, where conscription places the same duty upon all. It may be properly claimed that the individual, who as a lad signed a reserve agreement for seven or ten years, has no just cause of complaint, but there can be but little doubt that in a nation where there is no general resentment at being taxed for pensions to deserters of the Civil War, there will be abundant and successful sym- pathy for individual reservists, in civil life, who no longer feel the spirit calling to arms. In such a sit- uation, Congress may in one vote destroy the re- sults of years of efforts and call for volunteers as of old, in order to release the reservists from an obligation under which they have become restive be- cause of their paucity in numbers in so large a na- tion, and for the further reason that other men with good discharges from the army who are not reserv- 108 EESERVES ists may reenlist in war and receive a 'material bounty for so doing. In this connection it may be well to cite a compila- tion widely published showing the ages attributed to those who enlisted in the Union Army during the Civil War: Those 10 years and under 25 Those 11 years and under 38 Those 12 years and under 225 Those 13 years and under 300 Those 14 years and under 1,523 Those 15 years and under 104,987 Those 16 years and under 231,051 Those 17 years and under 844,891 Those 18 years and under 1,151,438 Those 21 years and under 2,159,798 Those 22 years and over 618,511 Those 25 years and over 46,462 Those 44 years and over 16,071 Of the total men enlisted, 2,778,304, less than one- fourth were over 21 years of age. The statistics relating to very young boys mere children have often been questioned, but it should be remembered that the enlistment of young boys as drummers and fifers was formerly authorized. The author entered the government service at twelve years and six months of age and was em- ployed in the Department of the Cumberland as a mounted dispatch messenger during 1864. The just conclusions to be drawn from the tabulation are that in past wars the young unmarried men and boys con- stituted the main fighting force. 109 THE AMERICAN ARMY The present law provides for a seven years* en- listment, four years with the colors and three in re- serve, or should the soldier elect, he may be trans- ferred to the reserve after three years ' service with an organization. The reserve may be further in- creased by enlistment or reenlistment of men with honorable discharges from the army, but during the year following the passage of the law only eight men had enlisted in the reserve, one of whom enlisted in Porto Rico, and at the expiration of two and a half years, only seventeen men had become reservists. Existing statutes provide that in time of war or when war is imminent, and after the President shall, by proclamation, have called upon honorably dis- charged soldiers of the regular army to present themselves for reenlistment, physically qualified, honorably discharged soldiers under forty-five years of age not furloughed to the reserve, may be re- enlisted and receive a bounty based upon the time elapsed since their discharge from the army not ex- ceeding three hundred dollars in any case. Men of this class are intended to be utilized to fill up the army in the same manner as men furloughed to the reserve. The President may summon the latter class, however, only in the event of actual or theoretical hostilities, when so authorized by Congress, and in event of reservists being called back to the colors all distinctions of rank vanish and noncommissioned staff officers, sergeants and corporals, report as pri- vates, while their inferiors in military qualifications 110 EESEBVES may aspire to the higher offices in the volunteers raised in every war. Under the old militia laws which prevailed for quite a century, it was the duty of the captain or the mustering officer of each district to keep a record of all men subject to military duty. This embraced those males born in the district and who continued to reside there until of militia age, as well as those who moved in from other districts. It is no longer the duty of any official to watch over these matters and only the total of militia age available may be surmised by analysis of the census records. There is no uniform military hierarchy in state or nation at this time which may be depended upon to main- tain that intimate knowledge of the reservists which will be essential in procuring their prompt return to the army in event of war. The result of many years of study of the military history of our country has brought the conviction that it is only by maintaining the small regular army always at war strength, and establishing regimental depots, that we may count upon readiness to strike and upon the necessary flow of men to fill the vacan- cies incurred in campaign, and that for the greater war force we must provide for the maintenance of federal volunteers in peace, with depots in each dis- trict, which will insure a flow of trained men to keep those organizations at full strength in war. It is prob- able that men in each district who have served the prescribed period of training in local volunteer or- 111 THE AMERICAN ARMY ganizations will either rejoin them for war or join new volunteer organizations, as officers or noncom- missioned officers, without being carried as members of a reserve. A force of federal volunteers will attract the patri- otic young men who feel the obligation to qualify for the service of the nation in war, but who may not be counted upon ever to attach themselves to militia organizations which are more and more frequently employed for the preservation of order during labor troubles. Strike and riot duty have been well per- formed by many state organizations, but it is not the type of service which appeals to young men gen- erally. It is not contemplated that the potential re- serve of federal volunteers shall ever be called into active service except for training and actual war. It is more than probable that the seeming unpop- ularity of service in militia organizations, under state control, and which prevents those forces from ever becoming the dependable national reserve re- quired for war, will continue as long as their use as constabulary prevails. With a century of experi- ence in the effort to avoid the maintenance of a con- siderable regular army by giving encouragement to militia, we are compelled to admit that the evidence is all against the theory that the state organizations will ever constitute a dependable reserve available for service with federal troops. We may continue the hope that a body of men worthy the name of re- serve may materialize under the existing militia stat- utes, but it is vain when we consider the probable 112 RESERVES field of action of any army we may need in the years to come. Much has been written recently concerning the practicability and value of the short enlistment as a means of increasing the reserves of partially trained soldiers. There can be no question that under ex- perienced officers and noncommissioned officers, the average group of recruits may be taught the drill regulations and trained in field firing sufficiently in six months to prepare them to render valuable serv- ice in war, provided the whole period is devoted solely to instruction. There is a vast difference, however, between such an organization and a body of soldiers prepared for active service and any attempt to turn the whole regular army into such a training school will disqualify the organizations as to readi- ness to meet immediate demands for distant service. The experiment has been tried in a few organiza- tions, and it is entirely practicable to give the mat- ter a more generous trial, but the organizations des- ignated as training schools should be removed from the roster for active service. The recent establishment of two or three summer camps for college students is justified from the stand- point of arousing interest and creating a public opin- ion, but if relied upon to produce trained men for the ranks, or qualified aspirants for command, they will bring disappointment, because from the very nature of our needs the results of the camps must be insig- nificant. A few of the larger colleges and universi- ties have for years been turning out well-drilled 113 THE AMERICAN ARMY young men from their cadet corps, who constitute splendid material for officers and noncommissioned officers of the proposed reserve of federal volun- teers. When we consider the ages attributed to upwards of two million of the young men who fought in the Civil War, it would seem that without turning our- selves into a nation-in-arins we could safely give en- couragement to the extension of the military depart- ments already existing in schools and universities, and the establishment of a government school in every state for the education and military training of young men as officers of volunteers. It should be borne in mind at all times that training our boys and young men in sanitation, military exercises and marksmanship does not in the least subject the na- tion to a just charge of so-called militarism, for such instruction is for the purpose of fitting them phys- ically and technically for the arduous duties of a sol- dier's life. Without such training, they more readily fall victims of preventable diseases. If never called to serve in war, their training is not lost, for through it, they have become more valuable citizens in their several communities. The statutes relieving certain religious sects from military service should all be re- pealed in order that the available members of such bodies may be employed in the hospitals, supply de- pots and in other ways to relieve able-bodied men whose religious principles do not deny them the right to use force in defense of their liberty or to resist encroachments upon their native soil. 114 RESERVES The value of a body of trained soldiers, in reserve, carried on furlough from their organizations, is theoretically of highest potentiality. The essence of failure of the system in our country lies in the fact that our army has never been territorialized. When that is accomplished, we may then develop a genuine asset in local reserves, trained in regiments devoted to the instruction of short term men while the current demands upon the army for over-sea and other service are met by war strength organizations with regimental depots for training their own re- cruits. Many of our experienced officers in the past have deemed the utilization of men with former serv- ice as most appropriate with the new volunteers, and particularly that men discharged as regimental noncommissioned staff officers, and as sergeants of companies, would be more valuable as officers or non- commissioned officers of high grade in the volun- teers than if brought back to serve under the re- serve system as privates in the regulars. Any sys- tem which induces men of former service to reenter in war meets with general approval, the difference of opinion being solely as to where they may be best utilized. The young men who enlist and follow the flag to distant shores should be given every encouragement while in the service to qualify themselves for ad- vancement. The number of commissions available in the regular army is sufficient to reward only a very small proportion of the good men. Every civil serv- ice position under the War Department and many in 115 THE AMERICAN ARMY the postoffice and possibly other departments should be given to discharged soldiers qualified for the va- rious duties. Once adopted, the men would strive to reach a high degree of fitness and an honorable dis- charge with a certificate from the commanding offi- cer should take the place of the civil service exam- ination. In time of war it is of immense advantage to have railway employees familiar with army conditions and movements. It is not too much to expect that a cam- paign of education among railroad presidents would develop a spirit in harmony with a scheme that would send a small but constant stream of young men of certified character and fine physique to their roads for employment. Men who have served two or three enlistments in the army are usually manly, straightforward soldiers, whose characters are well established. They have ever been the backbone of the discipline and esprit which has always carried the regular organizations to victory. Similar experience, even if briefer, in the federal volunteers, should gradually make available in every district an ever increasing number of trained, relia- ble men of great value. Their communities will gradually come to recognize them and also the value of the system which produces such men. vin BEGIMENTAL DEPOTS "It is much easier at all times to prevent an evil than to rectify mistakes; it is infinitely better to have a few good men than many indifferent ones." WASHINGTON. A DEPOT system for passing trained men into the ranks of organizations employed in active campaign is absolutely essential to an economical and efficient conduct of war. Our wars have all been excessively expensive due to the neglect of this most important feature of military organization. Dur- ing the Civil War the killed represented only a small fraction of the losses in the average regiment. Sickness, with long periods of convalescence, de- sertions, and reported missing, constituted together an appalling total. The large regiments that went to the front shrunk rapidly in numbers and although the reduced organizations represented the survival of the fittest, and grew daily more valuable with ex- perience of camp, march and battle, it was only a question of time when by mere attrition many of them ceased to be regiments except in name. Regi- ments which had entered the service with a thousand or more strong soon fell to half that number. In the meantime, the number of officers and noncommis- sioned officers remained constant so that the real loss fell upon the bone and sinew of the fighting force the privates. Some relief was demanded 117 THE AMERICAN ARMY from a system which was rapidly sapping the strength of the various armies. New regiments of volunteers with full quotas of officers were con- stantly coming into service. The remedy applied by Congress was drastic, extravagant and calculated to discourage the whole army in the field through the loss of its trained officers and noncommissioned of- ficers. The sections of the law enacted which gave the most severe blow to efficiency directed that when- ever a regiment of volunteers should become reduced to one-half the maximum number prescribed by law, the President was authorized to direct the consolida- tion of the companies of such a regiment, and the War Department order issued in conformity with the law, directed that each regiment "of the volun- teer army now reduced, or that may be reduced here- after, as set forth in said sections," should be con- solidated into six, or a less number of companies and the colonel, major, one assistant surgeon and such company officers and noncommissioned officers as might be rendered supernumerary by the consolida- tion should be mustered out of service. General Sherman emerged from the Civil War with a reputation for soldierly ability second only to that of General Grant. As a military student and a forceful writer his reputation is unexcelled. That he was quick to discern the evil effects of the con- solidation order and prompt in his efforts to bring the military mistake to public attention may be best shown by quoting a letter written to his distin- guished brother, then a senator : 118 EEGIMENTAL DEPOTS ' CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG, April 23, 1863. BROTHER I have noticed in the Conscript Act the clauses which empowered the President to consolidate the ten companies of a regiment into five, when the aggregate was below one-half the max- imum standard, and to reduce the officers accord- ingly. Had I dreamed that this was going to be made universal, I should have written you and begged you for the love of our ruined country to im- plore Lincoln to spare us this last fatal blow. Two years of costly war have enabled the North to realize the fact that by organized and disciplined armies alone can she hope to restore the old and found a new empire. We had succeeded in making the skel- etons of armies, eliminating out of the crude mate- rials that first came forth the worthless material, and had just begun to have some good young colo- nels, captains, sergeants and corporals. And Con- gress had passed the Conscript Bill, which would have enabled the President to fill up these skeleton regiments full of privates who soon, from their fel- lows, and with experienced officers, would make an army capable of marching and being handled and di- rected. But to my amazement comes this order. This is a far worse defeat than Manassas. Mr. Wade, in his report to condemn McClellan, gave a positive assurance to the army that henceforth, in- stead of fighting with diminishing ranks, we should feel assured that the gaps made by the bullet, by dis- ease, desertion, etc., would be promptly filled, where- as only such parts of the Conscript Law as tend 119 THE AMERICAN ARMY to weaken us are enforced, viz. : five per cent, for fur- lough and fifty per cent, of officers and noncommis- sioned officers discharged to consolidate regiments. Even Blair is amazed at this. He protests the order can not be executed, and we should appeal to Mr. Lincoln, whom he still insists has no desire to destroy the army. But the order is positive and I don't see how we can hesitate. Grant started to-day down to Carthage, and I have written to him, which may stave it off for a few days, but I tremble at the loss of so many young and good officers, who have been hard at work for two years, and now that they be- gin to see how to take care of soldiers, must be turned out. . . . "If not too late, do, for mercy '& sake, exhaust your influence to stop this consolidation of regi- ments. Fill all the regiments with conscripts, and if the army is then too large disband the regiments that prefer to serve north of the Potomac and the Ohio. Keep the war south at all hazards. If this Consolidation Law is literally enforced, and no new draft is made, this campaign is over. And the out- side world will have a perfect right to say our Gov- ernment is afraid of its own people. . . . "Affectionately yours, "W. T. SHERMAN." Having applied the thoroughly democratic and righteous rule of conscription to carry on the war in which the life of the nation was at stake, Congress had full power to demand that the law be executed 120 BEGIMENTAL DEPOTS in such manner as to fill the ranks of all existing regiments and that the raising of new regiments be stopped. The very provisions for mustering out re- * duced regiments constituted an acknowledgment that the other part of the law providing conscription to fill the ranks was doomed to failure. Much of the writing in which prominent officers of the Civil War indulged subsequent to the close of that conflict bore generally upon discussions of va- rious campaigns and battles. A very few urged the nation to profit by the lessons of that war and al- most without exception their words were unheeded. The clearest proof of this exists in the fact that prac- tically nothing had been done to perfect a depot sys- tem of meeting losses at the front at the time war with Spain was declared. Everything done from April, 1898, until the close of the Philippine Insur- rection was pushed with characteristic American vigor, but an historical examination of the sequence of events and the remedies applied leaves the con- viction that nearly all legislative, administrative and executive action was based on emergency considera- tion and the expediency of the moment. The coun- try gloried in the easy victory ovar Spain, but re- mained anchored to an obsolete and defective sys- tem of maintaining the fighting efficiency of its field armies so far as filling the losses in campaign. His- tory will repeat itself, and unless a remedy is found in peace which will function in war, similar condi- tions will prevail again. When the war with Spain was declared, instead of having a plan which had 121 THE AMERICAN ARMY received the sanction of Congress, the hands of the clock were turned back to 1861. Volunteer regi- ments were brought into service and hurried to large camps before proper provision could be made for them. Thousands of recruits were enlisted for the regular army, but as nearly all the regiments had gone to Cuba before the recruits could join and be equipped and there were no established regimental depots, the men were assembled in large numbers, under a few strange officers rebelling at heart at be- ing compelled to remain behind when their comrades were joining battle with the enemy. It was nobody 's business to look after the men of any particular or- ganization. If another war is allowed to find the na- tion with no better system for expanding the army and maintaining its efficiency in the field, so far as replenishment of its ranks is concerned, public con- demnation will follow as surely as it did in 1898, even though that same public may continue quite in- different to the whole subject of army efficiency un- til war is declared. To accomplish proper results, some form of de- pot organization is absolutely necessary. There may be several feasible plans for accomplishing the pur- pose, but the essential thing to be borne in mind is that in preparing each regiment for war there must be a prearranged plan under which the regiment will know that its sick and wounded will not only be cared for but returned to duty through its own de- pot, without undue delay, and that permanent va- cancies in the ranks will be filled with acceptable re- 122 EEGIMENTAL DEPOTS emits, trained by those interested in the welfare of the regiment. These questions satisfactorily solved make for economy, contentment and efficiency. The depot system here mentioned should not be con- founded with the experiment with "home battalions" during the Philippine Insurrection and the last oc- cupation of Cuba. As a military proposition strong regiments make for good morale, increased confidence and battle effi- ciency. Weakness in the real battle element, the fighting privates, on the other hand, stands for dis- couragement, excessive guard and fatigue duty and a lowered capacity for efficient military employment of all kinds. A regiment, in the mind of the average general officer, stands for a specific organization possessing certain vital characteristics, and when- ever the number of men in the ranks has become re- duced to one-half or one-third the proper number, that particular organization suffers in consequence. Very early in the Civil War this question of fill- ing up organizations at the front became acute, and on December 3, 1861, an order was issued forbidding any more regiments of volunteers to be raised ex- cept upon the special requisition of the War Depart- ment, and at the same time established a recruiting service under general superintendents for each state, with general depots for the collection and in- struction of recruits. The futility of this plan was soon recognized and early in 1862 officers detailed for the volunteer recruiting service were directed to recruit for their own regiments. Later in the year 123 THE AMERICAN ARMY it was ordered that all men who desired, singly or by squads, to join any particular regiment or company in the field, should be enrolled and forwarded at once and that "recruits for regiments now in the field will be permitted to select any company of the regiment they may prefer." That the absence of a prearranged depot system was a constant source of embarrassment is evidenced by repeated orders and instructions on the subject such as : "A large number of volunteers are absent from their regiments who are now fit for duty. To enable them to return, the Governors of States, are author- ized to give them certificates or passes which will entitle them to transportation to the station of the nearest United States Mustering Officer or Quarter- master, who will pay the cost of transportation for the soldier to his regiment or station. ' ' "At large camps, depots, or posts, where ab- sentees arrive en route to their companies, the com- manding officers will immediately set apart a par- ticular place where the men may be quartered, in buildings, tents, or huts, as soon as they arrive, and may, without delay, receive food and clothing. Par- ties will be detailed to await at landing places the arrival of such soldiers, and to direct them to their quarters. They will be assigned immediately to temporary companies, composed as far as possible of men from the same regiments or brigades. . . . " There was much vacillation of policy. On April 3, 1862, orders were issued that recruiting parties 124 REGIMENTAL DEPOTS for the volunteer service should be disbanded, the public property used in connection therewith sold to the best advantage and the offices closed. On the first of the following month it was announced that authority would be given to governors of the re- spective states to recruit for regiments in service when requested by commanders of armies in the field, and on July 25, 1862, orders were issued estab- lishing the recruiting service for each volunteer regi- ment in the field. All of which goes to show the economic desirabil- ity of fixing upon a plan in peace when there are not so many conflicting interests to be subserved. Of course it is well understood that the policy of to- day may be destroyed to-morrow, even if established in conformity to law, but it is certain that carefully devised plans written in the statutes in peace are not so apt to be overturned in war as those brought forward as hasty and ill-digested schemes based on the expediency of the moment. In order to obtain the views of general officers of experience in the war with Spain, a study of a de- pot system was prepared by the author and sub- mitted some years ago to a number of them and the following excerpts exhibit their views on this very important question : Lieutenant-General J. C. Bates : 1 'You so well state the necessity for a depot sys- tem and the advantage of a home station for the regiment in the field that I fully agree with you except on one point, that is, the organization of in- 125 THE AMERICAN ARMY fantry. I am fully convinced that the enlisted strength of a company of infantry should not be greater than 104. ... I believe this is as large a body as a captain, not mounted, can control, and I think the commander of a company of infantry should not be mounted. . . ." Major-General F. D. Grant : "Permit me to say that your proposition in gen- eral for recruiting regiments at the front and feed- ing the firing line in time of war is not only interest- ing and of great value, but must be regarded by all serious-minded men as of vital importance ; your ar- ticle strikes me as being more interesting than any- thing ever suggested before on that line in this country. . . . The fact that Congress must be ap- pealed to in the matter should not deter those who are charged with the task of preserving the best wel- fare of the army, to go to any extent necessary in order to prevent a recurrence of the deplorable ex- perience of the great Civil War as well as those which would have happened in the recent Spanish- American war had it continued." Major-General J. M. Lee: "I fully agree with you as to the necessity for de- pots; but I believe the depot 'home company' taken from each battalion will prove an expensive and unsatisfactory experiment. I am not, however, wedded to any special plan. The desideratum is, to find some method which will fill up the old regiments in time of war instead of letting them run down to skeletons by organizing new regiments. . . ." 126 REGIMENTAL DEPOTS Major-General J. F. Bell : " . . . There is no question but that the system of furnishing recruits to organizations in the field during time of war is badly in need of reform. I know of no better suggestion that has ever been made, than the one you suggest, and I should be greatly pleased to see a systematic plan, based upon your suggestions, given a fair trial. I believe it would work far more satisfactorily than the present system. During the time I commanded a volunteer regiment in the Philippine Islands, I frequently found it necessary to send an officer to collect the men who were in hospitals and who had worked their way back to the headquarters of the regiment in the city of Manila. This led to the detailing of an of- ficer to remain at those headquarters all the time, and thereafter I had no trouble having men re- turned to the regiment as soon as fit for duty, in- stead of attaching them to the headquarters in Manila. ' ' Brigadier-General F. Funston : "Your arguments in favor of a depot company for each battalion are very convincing, but would it not be better in case of volunteer regiments to send each regiment to the front as a whole, and as the cam- paign progressed and the inevitable number of sick and wounded convalescents became available, to send those for each regiment to some previously desig- nated place in the State or general locality whence the regiment came, to constitute the nucleus of a depot detachment for the regiment? . . . Two 127 THE AMERICAN ARMY months of any kind of service would furnish enough men, unequal to duty at the front, who would be glad enough to come home and drill recruits. ' ' Brigadier-General C. C. C. Carr : "I have been so strongly impressed by the array of facts and the effective manner in which they have been employed as a foundation for your argument and appeal for a better method of keeping up to their maximum efficiency the different arms of the service in time of war, that nothing has been left for me to suggest except the adoption of the scheme you have proposed and an early trial of it with such means as may be available. In my opinion, the^only possi- bility of securing it is in time of peace, when there are few persons interested in opposing it, and bring- ing the whole power of the government to bear to prevent its repeal on the occurrence of war. ' ' The officers whose views are quoted represent in their service every phase of army experience ; three served through the Civil War, one of whom was in the volunteer infantry, one in the regular infantry and one in the cavalry. Of the remaining three one has served thirty-five years in the regulars, one re- signed from the regular army and reentered the service in the war with Spain, and one served in the volunteers of that war and was appointed therefrom in the regulars. It is of sufficiently recent date to be remembered, that in 1898 large numbers of soldiers drifted about the country to hospitals or their homes, without de- scriptive lists or means of identification, and created 128 EEGIMENTAL DEPOTS just such a condition, on a smaller scale, as that which existed in 1863 when Congress felt called upon to take cognizance of the situation. It should be rec- ognized that similar conditions will arise again, in any serious or prolonged war, unless some means be devised to correct or reduce the evil. It can never be wholly eradicated when armies are actively en- gaged, but as training in the use of the first aid package has reduced materially the percentage of losses from wounds, so the adoption of a home sta- tion or regimental depot will conserve the strength of the army by inducing the absent from any cause, except desertion, to find their way to comrades, and recognition which carries a personal interest, food, clothing and pay. It would be in the interest of econ- omy, if there is a probability that war will continue for a prolonged period, to construct temporary bar- rack and hospital accommodations for each depot establishment. This would insure good sanitary ar- rangements and more continuous and effective in- struction than if the men were kept in rented quar- ters or under canvas. The regimental depot affords a means of decen- tralizing the recruiting of the army. The centraliza- tion of too much of the detail of army administration in the War Department has caused most serious diffi- culties in the past and similar experiences may be expected in future, if the root of the evil is not laid bare and corrective measures applied. The mass of letters and telegrams coming from recruiting sta- tions, rendezvous, state camps, mustering officers 129 THE AMERICAN AEMY and innumerable other sources during periods of war excitement will break down any system which has ever existed or which may be adopted, unless control over many details heretofore receiving attention at the War Department is distributed to local authori- ties. Any system, which will insure full strength to tried and trained regiments in contact with the enemy, reduces expenses of maintaining the army and lessens subsequent pension claims. That the depot system will accomplish this and more, there can be little reasonable doubt. This subject has been under consideration for half a century in this coun- try, just the same period of delay as occurred be- tween the appearance in General Lee's army at Pe- tersburg of an inventor with his "Artis Avis," or bird machine, from which he proposed to drop explo- sives within the lines of the besieging army of Gen- eral Grant, and the utilization of the modern aeroplane for a similar purpose ; between the use of the submarine boat with fixed torpedo of the Civil War and the development of the present cruising submarine of tonnage equal to the old line of battle ships ; and in the general adoption of smokeless pow- der in our army, after its properties and adaptability for military purposes had been demonstrated by our own officers.* *It Is a remarkable fact that our army, which gave the encour- agement necessary to Professor Langley and the Wright Brothers to lead onward in the development of aeroplanes, has In its official archives a record which establishes our failure to forecast the utilization of smokeless powder and permitted our troops to engage In battle half a century later, handicapped with black powder, with all its target exposing qualities, in the hands of our 130 EEGIMENTAL DEPOTS "In consequence of the quickness and intensity of action of the guncotton when ignited, it can not be used with safety in our present firearms. Without a modification of this agent, or a great change in our firearms the use of guncotton for military purposes, is not to be recommended," was the conclusion reached and the use of smokeless powder in our military firearms awaited its development and appli- cation for non-military uses. European nations rely upon their regular armies and trained reserves to prosecute war. In the past we have relied upon organizing armies after war is declared, expecting them to get their training in the artillery and volunteers. This is the record, in part, of experi- mentation made at the Washington Arsenal: "The discovery of explosive guncotton, announced last year by Professor Schonbein, naturally attracted at once the attention of the military world, and when a patent for the invention was taken out in this country, the new compound was subjected to trial at this arsenal, in order to compare its effects with those of gunpowder, and to ascertaining the practicability of using it in firearms. Under date of December 3, 1846, I had the honor to make the following report of these experiments: "Wishing to try the explosive cotton in a large cannon, as well as in the musket, I prepared, according to Schonbein's formula which had been made known to me, as much of it as my other pressing engagements left me time for. "The mean velocity of the ball in 17 rounds, with 60 grains of guncotton is 1,670 feet a second, and the mean of 48 rounds with 120 grains of musket powder is 1,600 feet. The mean velocity of the ball in 23 rounds good cannon powder is 1,427 feet, almost exactly the same as that, 1,422 feet given by guncotton. "Having determined, by my experiments, that 60 grains would be the proper charge of guncotton, to give the requisite force to the musket ball, I made the following trials:" Here follows a description of results obtained by loading mus- kets with abnormal charges to represent the errors of soldiers under the excitement of battle, resulting, with smokeless powder, in bursting of the gun barrels. The musket barrel of that period of muzzle-loading arms was calculated to withstand the explosion of two, three or four cartridges at one time. 131 THE AMERICAN ARMY expensive school of actual war and making only spasmodic and ineffective provision for replacing the losses of campaign. The establishment of a regi- mental depot system for the existing mobile army and its application to volunteers and militia, when called into active service by the President, ought to go far toward eliminating the evils from which we have suffered in the past. IX FEDEEAL VOLUNTEERS "To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace." WASHINGTON. THE Constitution specifically places upon Con- gress the power and duty of declaring war and providing armies to carry it to a conclusion. It is essential that the force necessary for initiating war should possess a national character and be under the direct control of the President. The militia, which, in the nature of things, embraces all state troops, can not be invested with this national character until it has been called into the service and then only for a limited use within our borders. Since the war with Spain, efforts have been con- tinuous to provide for the automatic transition of the national guard or organized militia of the states from a peace to a war basis, as part of the federal force, but notwithstanding the ingenious devices ar- ranged to nationalize the state organizations, they still remain "militia," available only for service as authorized by the Constitution which not only enu- merates the specific occasions when the state forces may be called into service, but forbids their employ- ment for any other purpose. It should be borne in mind that the liberality of the general government toward the militia during recent years has failed to 133 THE AMERICAN AEMY develop any increase in strength and the opinion of those best informed on the subject is quite unani- mous that no improvement is to be expected unless Congress shall appropriate pay for the state organ- izations, while leaving them still under the control of the governors, in nowise a national force until they have individually volunteered in war. It has been shown how very meager a force of reg- ulars remains available within the United States, after detaching the garrisons necessary for the out- lying possessions. A statement of the legal status of the militia, the only other existing military force, may well be repeated. The Act of May 27, 1908, contains a limitation upon military efficiency, peculiarly embarrassing when the extent and distribution of the forty-eight states are considered: "When the military needs of the Federal Government arising from the necessity to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrec- tion, or repel invasion, can not be met by the regular force, the organized militia shall be called into the service of the United States in advance of any volun- teer forces which it may be determined to raise." The most recent statute relating to the war estab- lishment, the Act of April 25, 1914, provides for rais- ing the volunteer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened hostilities, and definitely pre- scribes that the land forces of the United States shall consist of the regular army, the organized land mili- tia while in the service of the United States, and such volunteer forces as Congress may authorize. The 134 FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS new statute modifies the Act of May 27, 1908, to the extent that after the organized land militia of any arm or class shall have been called into the military service of the United States, volunteers of that par- ticular arm or class may be raised and accepted into service, in accordance with the terms of the act, re- gardless of the extent to which other arms or classes of militia shall have been called into service. It should be borne in mind that for any military opera- tions beyond our borders the militia can not be called into service but must volunteer, so that until the members of each organization decide whether or not three-fourths of the minimum number prescribed as the strength of the particular unit will volunteer, the President is debarred from calling for volunteers of similar arms or classes. All this, be it observed, is to take place after war is upon the nation. Some of our problems may become international in character at a moment unforeseen and unpropitious. In an age when ruptures of diplomatic relations come so suddenly as to preclude the possibility of remedying grave defects, there should be no reliance upon any system concerning which there is a shadow of doubt. To avoid the waste inseparable from going to war without proper preparation there must be devised and ready a complete system for passing from a peace to a war establishment. There should be no necessity for congressional action at such a time be- yond the exercise of its functions of declaring war. The responsibility for proper preparation for war is, 135 THE AMEEICAN ARMY in the final analysis, placed by the people on the War Department and it should be known there at all times just what force and supplies are available. Our people are somewhat misled by the very vast- ness of our military resources which, to be of any potential value, must be organized and directed by a central authority. It is only through coordination of available men and material in peace, that organ- ization and administration may be so perfected that the nation can pass to a war establishment without undue friction. While the millions now being spent upon the state militia are not a total loss, the return in the shape of an immediately available a-rmy bears no relation to the asset we would have in a force of federal volunteers at whatever cost. Once the organization of the federal volunteers is completed, the need for so large a force of organized militia would no longer exist and that force may then be reduced to such numbers as the states may be willing to provide for by commonwealth appro- priations. Young officers, noncommissioned officers and well instructed privates of the organized militia should find a field of broader usefulness in the new federal volunteers, their places in the state forces being taken by men whose family or other ties might serve to limit their field of military employment. The territorial distribution of federal volunteers should embrace every congressional district wherein should be established the local depots for receiving and training the recruits required in war to maintain 136 FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS the organizations in the field at maximum strength. No danger to the liberties of the people lies in this scheme on the contrary it contains the only fair dis- tribution of the debt of personal service in the hour of the country's need. Being a federal force, the ex- pense incident to the organization and maintenance of proper arms, equipments and supplies to be in readiness for active service, will of necessity be borne by the general government. At the present time there are 435 members of Con- gress, apportioned on a basis of 212,407 of popula- tion, and while the population in each district is not exactly the same, for the practical purposes of ap- portioning federal volunteers, they may be so re- garded. Infantry constitutes the basic foundation of all armies, and we should begin by establishing one regiment of federal volunteer infantry in each con- gressional district. With this force as a foundation, authority should be granted to the President to add other organizations, line and staff, of the types and character of those maintained in the regular army, the whole to constitute a force so proportioned as to be capable of mobilization as brigades, divisions and corps or field armies. All enlistment contracts in the federal volunteers should be for two years, with privilege of reenlist- ment, and an express provision that in event of mo- bilization for active service, all enlistments shall be automatically extended for three years or the period of the war, if terminated in less than three years. 137 THE AMERICAN ARMY The appointment of officers to continue under a scheme of age and grade apportionment and satis- factory accomplishment. In order that the federal volunteers shall be pre- pared in a thorough manner for the duties of active service and maintained in a state of readiness for immediate mobilization for war, each regiment should be commanded by a regular officer and there should be in addition an adjutant, a quartermaster, a sergeant-major, a quartermaster sergeant, a com- missary sergeant and an ordnance sergeant selected from the regular army for permanent duty with each organization. The colonels should be selected from the field of officers or captains of not less than five years ' service in command of companies. The increments of special branches required to make a properly balanced force should be assigned to localities in the vicinity of stations of the regular army garrisoned by similar organizations. It will then be practicable to train cavalry, field artillery, engineers, signal and hospital corps organizations by periodically assigning them to actual duty as part of the regular organizations, utilizing the public ani- mals and equipment for the purpose. That will in- sure practical instruction in the least expensive manner. It is recognized by all military men that the crea- tion of any force worthy the name of army demands trained officers of established character. Our mili- tary and naval academies are maintained in a man- ner unequalled the world over to supply officers of 138 FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS the regular forces. For the greatly increased num- bers required by the war establishment other meas- ures are necessary and they should be perfected in peace. Occasionally, in war, a leader of marked ability to command, but without previous technical training, may reverse the usual order and master the details of the military profession from the top down- ward. Dependence upon these rare exceptions should not lead the nation astray as to the necessity for training for the business of war in the most com- prehensive manner. The officers of federal volunteers should all be ap- pointed on the recommendation of the colonel and in the initial stage should be taken preferably from such of the experienced young officers of the existing organized militia as may desire to enter the new or- ganizations ; from honorably discharged soldiers of the regular service and graduates of schools and col- leges having courses of military training of the standards fixed by the War Department. In this connection, attention may well be directed to the anomalous condition brought about by the statutory requirements for military instruction in agricultural colleges receiving government aid. It would serve a national purpose in a much more practical way to establish outright government schools in the several states where military instruction shall be considered as of first importance. Legislation along these lines has recently been proposed in Congress and is most worthy of consideration. When the communities once take upon themselves 139 THE AMERICAN ARMY the public duty of encouraging their own local troops to give a good account of themselves, we shall see the nation backed by all the patriotic power which right- eously comes from those for whom the government is maintained all the people and not some of the peo- ple. In their awakening, they will demand trained officers to prepare and lead their sons in battle and it will be the duty of the federal government to meet this demand. It was this urgency of the Civil War which was contemplated by General Grant when he said : "It would have been a great deal better if the regular army, except the staff and the staff corps, had been disbanded at the outbreak of the rebellion and the officers sent home to their respective states for the purpose of entering and helping organize the volunteer army." The passing of the Indian warrior and his vast hunting grounds and the increased density of popu- lation have had the effect of diminishing the military characteristics of Americans. As they recede far- ther and farther from aptitude in the use of firearms and familiarity with the dangers and hardships of campaigning, it is necessary to evolve some system which will serve to inculcate the characteristics no longer derived in the school of experience. The training of the individual as a federal volunteer at his own home will tend to ameliorate, if not correct this condition. "With any given organization, drill regulations can be evolved so as to make a workable machine for the service of regulars, but having in mind the greater 140 FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS war army of untrained or partly trained volunteers, it is the dictate of wisdom to provide the simplest possible organization and make the drills of the com- pany, the battalion and the regiment as nearly iden- tical as consistent with the battle functions of each. Congress has, from time to time, fixed by statute the details of organization of the several branches of the service. Modifications of ancient formations for drill and battle action have come usually as the re- sult of improvement in arms and material. Sim- plicity in drill and tactical evolutions for volunteers becomes of paramount importance not only for ac- tual battle action, but to bring about ease and rapid- ity of training new troops. Our present organization of infantry comprises three battalions to the regiment, three regiments to the brigade and three brigades to the division. Each battalion has four companies. The cavalry is simi- larly organized, except that the company is called 11 troop" and the battalion is called " squadron" and comprises four troops. It is quite generally accepted by military students that many millions would have been saved in the Civil War had each regiment been localized and pro- vided with its own depots for receiving and training recruits. It is certain unless the depot companies are designated in peace, that when the critical moment for action comes there will be much scheming and straining to avoid being left behind. Of course, as incidents of campaign send homeward the wounded, the weak and the sick, those at the depots will find 141 THE AMERICAN ARMY their opportunity for service at the front. It follows that the tactical organization should lend itself to that form of administration which includes a depot for each regiment. The two elements, therefore, to be considered in devising the organization of federal volunteers are simplicity of drill throughout and a sufficient number of companies to admit of permanent depot organiza- tions. In order that the war army may be organized and administered as a harmonious whole, the regular army should be given the same organization as that which may be provided for volunteers. This would automatically place upon the organized militia the same organization. The matter of simplicity is not difficult of adjust- ment, for it is only necessary to cut off one company from each infantry battalion and one troop from each cavalry squadron. Then by arranging the regula- tions for habitual division of the company into three platoons we have the very simple arrangement of drill which enables the training of the three platoons in the company, the three companies in the battalion, the three battalions in the regiment, and the three regiments in the brigade, to proceed upon similar lines and by practically identical commands, thereby greatly reducing the amount to be committed to memory, in taking over the duties of the higher units. The division of the units into threes lends itself per- fectly to formation of line to the front from column, by both flanks, and also to echelons in three lines. The necessity of a simple and rapid system of pass- 142 FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS ing from column to line and for taking up formations in echelon has become very apparent in view of the effectiveness of modern field artillery, especially of shrapnel fire. Formation of line from column and of column from line, comprise the major portion of tac- tical evolutions in war. Some objection has been offered in the past to cut- ting off a company from the battalion because of the reduction of strength of the regiment. It is quite certain that three companies in which the vacancies arising in campaign are kept filled by their regi- mental depot will be habitually in better condition to meet the enemy than a battalion of four companies without a depot organization. To meet this argu- ment it has been suggested that another battalion be added to each regiment. This not only sacrifices the very great advantage of the tactical possibilities of the units of threes, but retards promotion to the grade of captain too much for effective service. Our army in the past has experienced the deplorable re- sults of delayed promotion to the grade of captain. It must be borne in mind that the men in the ranks are usually very young and their energies should not be sacrificed through the control of captains too old for their grade. The addition of another battalion would make the climb up the ladder to the grade of colonel at an age appropriate to the command, hope- less except to those who enter the service at the minimum age. To provide properly for the new army of federal volunteers, it is necessary first to reorganize those 143 THE AMERICAN AEMY branches of the regular army which are to be copied in the new organizations. In this reorganization we should give careful consideration to the question of localizing, territorially, the regular regiments, in such manner as to best serve the purpose of utilizing them in connection with the federal volunteers. This applies with special force to the cavalry, field artil- lery, engineers and signal corps organizations. The immediate result of the reorganization of our thirty regiments of regular infantry, with three com- panies to each battalion and one for the regimental depot, would be to release two companies from each regiment, sixty in all, available for the creation of six new and very much needed regiments, requiring only the addition of the necessary field and staff offi- cers six colonels, six lieutenant colonels, eighteen majors, eighteen captains, six chaplains, eighteen first and eighteen second lieutenants and the author- ized regimental and battalion noncommissioned staff officers, band and detachments. There is no other possible way of gaining so much efficiency at so little additional cost as by this reorganization. Similarly, the reorganization of the cavalry would release two troops from each of the fifteen regi- ments, a total of thirty troops, available for the crea- tion of three more regiments of cavalry, by the addi- tion of the necessary field, staff and noncommis- sioned staff officers, bands and detachments. The existence of a depot troop for the training of recruits and horses is even more essential for cavalry than is a depot for infantry and is dictated by every princi- ple of economic administration. 144 FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS The present field artillery regiment does not admit of any detachment of an organization as a depot. To create a depot requires the addition of a battery. This branch of the army is so deficient in numbers that a considerable increase is necessary and the re- organization should embrace not only the additional depot organizations, but a sufficient number in all to take over the siege artillery added to the army from time to time and avoid the necessity of withdrawal of coast artillery from the permanent fortifications to man material with the mobile army. The assertion is sometimes made that our sea- coasts are unduly fortified, and that few, if any, of the batteries will ever fire a hostile shot is sometimes made an excuse for detaching coast artillery to other duties as part of the mobile army. This latter is possibly true, but it arises from the very presence of the guns with trained gunners to man them. Our system of harbor fortification, adopted when the nation was deep in humiliation over the sacking and burning of the capital, is not likely to be materially modified, for without it our fleets would be anchored to our coasts and deprived of the great advantage arising from carrying the war into the enemy's waters.* *General Simon Bernard, a graduate of the ^cole Polytech- nique, a distinguished engineer of the French Army and aide- de-camp of Napoleon, was granted an indefinite leave after the battle of Waterloo and came to America at the invitation of the government, still rankling over the destruction of the capital at Washington, in the then recently closed War of 1812. General Bernard was commissioned as Brevet Brigadier General and As- sistant Chief of Engineers, United States Army. During his serv- ice, 1816-1831, and under his technical advice, fortifications were begun at almost every harbor of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, 145 THE AMERICAN ARMY With the reorganization of the regular regiments provided for, we may then consider the greater army of federal volunteers. There are 435 congressional districts, to each of which it is proposed to assign one ten-company infantry regiment of federal volun- teers, comprising nine companies of 150 mean each, which, with the machine gun platoon, regimental de- tachment and depot company, will aggregate about 1,500 men. This would give theoretically a body of 652,500 volunteer infantry enlisted in peace, with an enlistment contract providing for two years ' service in peace and, in event of war, its automatic extension for three years or during the war, if less^than three years. And be it understood, this is not a standing army, for it is not contemplated to withdraw the fed- eral volunteers from their customary vocations any more than the organized militia is now withdrawn, but to systematize their training and provide officers of approved merit to lead them in active service. It is -contemplated that the course of instruction in each regiment of federal volunteers shall embrace not only the training in rifle practice, drill and camp sanitation, so essential to successful campaigning, but also instruction covering the organization and character of our government and the duties of citi- zenship. In this manner it is expected to win the approval and cooperation of the residents of each district by proving the merit and value of the system among these the great Fortress Monroe. Subsequent to his re- turn to his natire land, he was created a baron and field marshal of France. At the time of his decease he was Minister of War of France. 146 FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS which provides for a war army at a fraction of the cost of a similar force maintained as regulars. It is entirely probable that the existing war in Europe will cause a modification in the proportions and employment of cavalry and field artillery, and the number of federal volunteers allotted to these branches may well be determined after the history of the operations becomes available. In the mean- time the minimum number necessary under our ex- isting tables of organization should be authorized and assigned to favorable localities, not restricted to congressional districts, but distributed with refer- ence to horse supply and probable opportunity for training. Incidentally, this will afford opportunity for a census of horses and mules available for war purposes. It should be borne in mind that during the Civil War the number of cavalry regiments be- came too great for the supply of horses. Much more satisfactory results may be expected from restrict- ing the organization of cavalry regiments to the number which can be sustained in campaign by a regular flow of trained men and horses from the reg- imental depots. In fixing upon the proportions of cavalry to infantry it should be remembered that in any war of magnitude, involving invasion, a consid- erable part of the infantry would not be embraced in the mobile army, but assigned to the land defense of seacoast fortifications. The increments necessary to provide the reliefs required to man the seacoast defenses in war should be provided by companies of federal volunteers per- 147 THE AMEEICAN ARMY manently assigned to the particular batteries rather than by organization of regiments similar to those of the organized militia. This would insure competent direction and control of fire by trained officers and gunners assisted by volunteers. Organization of fed- eral volunteers of the coast artillery branch should not be limited to the districts immediately adjoining the coast defenses. The type of men best fitted for the duty is found in the industrial centers. If their recruitment and organization are committed to the officers of the coast artillery the necessary gun crews for war purposes will soon materialize, whereas, un- der the existing militia system, ten years of effort has failed to develop any comprehensive relief of a serious situation. In all this there should be every encouragement given to local pride, not only of the state and dis- trict, but of the county, for this would tend to eliminate the prodigious stream of desertions such as occurred from the volunteers of the Civil War and which has been a continuous source of deep con- cern and regret to those responsible for the recruit- ment of the regular army. A young man would hesi- tate to quit his command in the field if he knew he would have to account for his absence at the home depot of his regiment. It has been quite plainly established that we can not count upon all the men of any organized militia regiment volunteering for war. Then there are some old militia organizations of established reputation, that may be much better utilized than by volunteer- 148 FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS ing in a body, for their records of past services es- tablish that they furnished a large number of officers of volunteer regiments in the Civil War and in the war with Spain and they should be expected, in any future emergency, to act in accord with their past traditions. The latest statute on the subject prescribes an en- listment period of four years for volunteers, the same as for the regular army, omitting the period in reserve. The enlistment period for federal volun- teers is recommended to be fixed at two years, with the automatic extension for three years or the war, in the event of hostilities, notwithstanding the fact that after experimentation in Europe with the two- year term it was abandoned in favor of three years. Two years is the shortest time which will permit of a fair degree of instruction, and proper ideas of the discipline essential for fire control, while still en- gaged in civil affairs. Our system of training should be adapted to the purely volunteer soldier. To se- cure the best results and enable a progressive course of instruction to be followed, arrangements should be made for receiving recruits, at specified dates, in sufficient numbers to constitute workable units. Under the proposed reorganization of the in- fantry, the cavalry and field artillery of the regular army we secure, at a minimum expense, a model of organization peculiarly adapted to volunteer troops and with the marked advantage of having the depot machinery always available for filling vacancies in the firing line. As the federal volunteer regiments 149 THE AMERICAN ARMY are organized the number of field officers and cap- tains and noncommissioned staff officers of the corre- sponding branches of the regular service should be increased in order to supply the skeleton personnel of regulars necessary with each volunteer regiment. When the federal volunteers have been organized the support of the organized militia, except as to arms and equipments of government model, should be taken over by the states. The proposed army of regulars and federal volun- teers will cost more than the existing force of regu- lars and organized militia, but the one will be an asset of highest potential value and probably equal to any emergency likely to arrive without warning, while the other is unequal to the smallest military contingency within the forecast of statesmen and students. The system of federal volunteers has encountered active opposition from the higher officers of the na- tional guard, and this may always be expected. Until public opinion on the subject of national defense be- comes more masterful than this narrow but concen- trated opposition, no change may be expected. In so grave a matter, Congress is entitled to the generous approval of a non-partisan public opinion, because the policy will call for continuing appropriations to be balanced, however, later on by that preparedness for war which makes for lessened obligations for pensions and claims in the years to come. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE "A corrective is, indeed, highly necessary. The practice of fur- loughing officers, and then renewing the furloughs from time to time, is extremely injurious to the service, and ought to be dis- continued on ordinary occasions. And that of frittering away the army into small garrisons is, if possible, worse. It will never be respectable while these evils exist; and until it can be more con- centrated, and the garrisons frequently relieved by detachments from the main body, discipline will always be lax. . . ." WASHINGTON. THE urgency of establishing and maintaining an expeditionary force to serve as a model tactical unit and school of practice for our generals and staff officers, has long been apparent. The accomplish- ment of this most needed feature of our military establishment has not been practicable for various reasons, the primary one being an insufficient num- ber of regiments to meet the recurring needs of actual service. If we are to have, as military men are agreed we should, an expeditionary force in readiness to pro- ceed to threatened points, where initial success should make for simplicity and economy of subse- quent operations, we must organize, equip and main- tain it at all times with its complete military hier- archy of commanders and staff officers, ready to move at a mere signal without necessity of detailed orders from the War Department. The practice of 151 THE AMERICAN ARMY giving orders in great detail concerning every con- ceivable subject has long been the bane of our army and has served greatly to intimidate and curtail the initiative of a most reliable and well-educated body of officers. The establishment of the higher tactical organizations should accomplish much in decentral- izing the giving of orders and gradually foster con- fidence in our generals, who by all tests, except those of exercising large commands, in war, have justified such confidence. The expeditionary force should be comprised of complete organizations at war strength and main- tained in a modest cantonment requiring only care- takers during their absence on active service or in field instruction. In event of a serious war, the can- tonment would fill a most important need as a ren- dezvous for the concentration and instruction of vol- unteers, and when no longer required for that purpose, the buildings would be available for use as hospital accommodations during continuance of hos- tilities. Nations can not engage in war merely to test their military systems, but wisely provide opportunities for the development of weak links in the chain of theory. The most useful method of accomplishing this is by trying out men and material on a suffi- ciently large scale to furnish employment for the generals and the administrative staff upon whom rests the responsibility once war is declared. The British have solved the problem at home by the es- tablishment at Aldershot of an expeditionary force, 152 EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ready to proceed to distant points of the empire whose garrisons encircle the globe. Here are ac- quired by all grades the habitude of service in war organizations. No other nation has had such varied experience in the problems of transportation and supply as the British and their methods and expedi- ents in campaign appeal naturally and strongly to men of Anglo-Saxon mental processes. While we carefully observe all nations with a view to noting the development of military material, the problems of the British are more nearly akin to those confronting us than any to be found amongst other nations. In fact, the train of liabilities which has followed in the wake of the war with Spain, together with the absence of conscription and dependence wholly upon voluntary enlistments for recruiting our army make the military problems of the two coun- tries practically identical. There is not a new dis- covery but has been thoroughly understood and com- mented upon by conservative officers who appre- ciated full well the obstacles to be encountered in any attempt to graft European systems upon the American army. The government already possesses a handsome property, comprising about 2,500 acres of blue-grass land, with an artesian water supply, apparently in- exhaustible, near the important trunk railroad cen- ter at Indianapolis, Indiana. The value of this site for a division cantonment has been tested by actual occupancy on several occasions during combined in- struction of the regular army and national guard. f 153 THE AMERICAN ARMY The military reservation is an asset of great value as a site for mobilization of volunteers in any serious war. It occupies a central location as regards dis- tribution of population and with its exceptional rail- road facilities would enable an expeditionary force to be promptly put in motion, in an emergency, to the north, south, east or west with nearly equal facility. It is in the very midst of the great granary of the nation and but a few hours distant from several of the world's greatest meat packing industries. Here is found neither the extreme cold of our more northern stations nor the debilitating heat of those nearer the gulf. In a material way the -plan com- mends itself for the great economy of maintenance of such a command at a central point of food and clothing supply. Its influence upon the training of volunteers and militia should be marked, for here would be solved in practice all theories relating to improvements in methods and materials. The estab- lishment of such a command does not conflict with any policy of the government and harmonizes per- fectly with the views of a great body of our officers who have recognized the need for such action ever since our nation assumed duties in so many widely separated parts of the world. Especially will such a force be needed in view of our relations arising un- der the Monroe Doctrine, for American interests may demand a show of force at any moment and without time for proper mobilization of units not maintained by the army in peace. We have the site, we know the urgency of the need 154 EXPEDITIONARY FORCE and we have but to make a beginning based upon the ultimate strength of the expeditionary force to be as- sembled in order that the upbuilding shall be pro- gressive and require no destruction or reconstruc- tion. The future force to be provided for at first should embrace a complete tactical division at war strength, with the commanders and staff necessary in war, who should execute all the functions of their office without dependence upon territorial command- ers or supply officers other than for the possible uti- lization of the most economical markets. The reservation at Indianapolis already contains Fort Benjamin Harrison, comprising recently con- structed permanent barracks and quarters for a regi- ment of infantry. Inasmuch as the existing scheme of organization for a division provides for twelve regiments, the twelve company barracks and corre- sponding officers' quarters afford an ideal opportu- nity and ample means to try out a depot system by assigning one of the barracks to each of the regi- ments of the division which will comprise the expe- ditionary force assembled in cantonment in the vicinity. The policy adopted some years ago in relation to the distribution of the army in permanent posts has been recently the cause of serious misunderstanding between the War Department and Congress. Gen- eral Sheridan has always been credited with the responsibility for the policy of locating, at some dis- tance from large cities, the permanent posts for the mobile army, construction of which was begun about 155 THE AMERICAN ARMY the time it became apparent that the Indian question was approaching final settlement. The upbuilding of various so-called permanent posts progressed steadily for some years. In a few cases, entirely new sites were obtained in the vicinity of large cities as at Atlanta and Chicago but the usual plan fol- lowed was to construct anew at or near the sites of old posts. The reorganization of the army under the Act of February 2, 1901, necessitated provision for additional organizations, but as the regular regiments were nearly all on foreign service, the matter was not urged. In March, 1903, the Secre- tary of War decided to have further construction carried on under some definite system, and directed the War College Board the General Staff Corps had not then been organized to recommend a gen- eral allotment of the available appropriations in such manner as to constitute a continuing policy. The board recommended that a comprehensive and progressive study of the subject of stations of troops and projects for quartering them should be continued from year to year, with a view to utilizing the appropriations to the best advantage and to prevent the useless expenditure of public funds at posts which, in the near future, might be abandoned or completely modified. The board then proceeded to recommend, in detail, a distribution of available appropriations, all to be expended at existing posts, and further recommended withdrawal of troops from certain other posts with a view to gradually assem- bling them in regimental garrisons, except that a few 156 EXPEDITIONABY FORCE of the larger posts should have mixed garrisons of cavalry, field artillery and infantry. This policy, recommended by the War College Board, was ap- proved by the then Secretary of War. In his annual report for 1906, the Secretary of War, Hon. William H. Taft, referred to the sub- ject in this language : "It seems to me the general policy should be to do away with the small posts as rapidly as possible and to concentrate the army as far as practicable in regimental and brigade posts, care being taken to utilize in every possible way those posts of re- cent construction, and especially those which by their location are capable of being expanded into regimental or brigade posts without too great cost. . . . "The change to brigade posts ought to be made gradually, and we should avail ourselves of those posts which are nearest now in point of capacity to brigade posts, and which have reservations suffi- ciently large to permit the maneuvers of brigade or larger bodies of troops. The posts which I recom- mend for enlargement to brigade posts are shown in the following list : "Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo. ' ' Fort Leavenworth, Kans. "Fort Riley, Kans. "Fort Sam Houston, Texas. "Each of these posts may well be made a com- mand of a brigadier general, and if the present pur- pose of the Department is carried out will be made 157 THE AMERICAN ARMY so even before the completion of the structure nec- essary to garrison a full brigade. ... At Fort Sill, in Oklahoma, there is a very fine military res- ervation of 50,000 acres, with an adjoining forest reservation which can be properly used for military maneuvers, which will make a total reservation of 100,000 acres. This ought to be ultimately made into a brigade post. "Fort Oglethorpc, which is now situated on part of the reservation of the Chickamauga Military Park, can be enlarged by the purchase of 15,000 acres of land at a very reasonable price, probably not to exceed an average of $15 an acre, and this could be made the brigade post of the southeast. A brigade post upon the western coast ought to be constructed at American Lake, Washington, which is com- mended most highly as a proper place on Puget Sound, though the cost of the reservation will be high. With seven or eight brigade posts and the full regimental posts which we now have, I think the army would be properly distributed and housed with a view to its efficiency and proper training." In his annual report for 1909, the Secretary of War, Hon. J. M. Dickinson, under the head of "Mili- tary Policy," said on the subject of army posts: 1 ' In order to ... permit of practice under war conditions in time of peace by the Regular Army and Militia in combination, the United States should be divided into a number of territorial and tactical districts, so that the organized militia of the States comprising such districts may be conveniently com- 158 EXPEDITIONARY FOECE bined with the Regular Army stationed therein into permanent brigades, divisions and corps for instruc- tion and tactical organization. It will probably be found desirable to have in each State in such a dis- trict at least one military post. . . . No post smaller than a regimental one is of real value from a military standpoint, so far as education, discipline and drill are concerned. ' ' The original idea of having some large posts with garrisons of the three arms of the service was to utilize them in each case as a basis of a larger force of regulars and national guard ; they were never in- tended as brigade posts in the sense of tactical brigades of the mobile army which comprise regi- ments of the same arm of the service. It should be remembered that during all the years which have elapsed since the construction of per- manent posts to replace the frontier cantonments was begun, the units of the army were provided for on a peace basis, and the barracks were calculated for minimum strength organizations. The expan- sion of a peace strength company to a war strength organization introduces a physical factor of serious proportions for not only must barrack accommoda- tions be doubled, but entire plans of posts already completed must be changed for the reason that building sites, sewers, roads and water supply were all based upon the smaller units and no spaces were left for additions. In fact, many of the posts were completed before 1901 when authority of Congress was obtained for expansion of regiments during 159 THE AMERICAN ARMY emergencies from a peace to a war strength basis. Similar difficulties arise whenever cavalry or field artillery units are substituted for dismounted or- ganizations in posts constructed for infantry, for stables, gun sheds and forage storehouses, black- smith shops and corrals have to be provided. The organization of the field artillery into regiments and its redistribution several years ago involved the abandonment of many new and expensive barracks constructed without warning as to the change of field artillery organizations. A new policy recently under consideration at the War Department had for its object an abandonment of the former system of maintaining garrisons in posts established at some distance from cities, and contemplated the construction of barracks within city limits for the men only, requiring the officers to find accommodations wherever available. It will be observed that the questions concerning the distribution of the army, its tactical organization and the construction of posts have grown to be far more complex than would be the case if we had a new army and the disposition of it to consider as an original and single proposition. A redistribution of the army to meet new demands for foreign gar- risons has become a necessity, and unless the army is increased, or foreign garrisons reduced below what are now regarded as essential, some of the garrisons must be withdrawn from posts within the United States in the near future, this regardless of 160 EXPEDITIONARY FOECE the policy of bringing the mobile army together in large tactical units. Successful achievements under legislative control are mainly the results of compromises. In the end it will probably be found that the best interests of the nation will be served by a combination of the several plans for caring for the army and that regi- mental posts will continue to fill a highly useful pur- pose, especially when grouped in territorial areas permitting of concentration for practice in brigade and division training. When the army is increased, as now seems absolutely necessary, if it is to meet fairly the duties pressing heavily upon the present force, it would not be advisable to abandon any of the existing regimental posts unless they are badly placed with reference to fulfilling the important part to be performed in future in connection with the in- struction of volunteers, reservists and militia. Improvements in material and implements of war are based upon experiments which would be greatly facilitated and expedited if there existed a permanently mobilized expeditionary force where exchanges of views could be obtained concerning matters of interest to the mobile army. The more scattered the army, the more difficult to reach def- inite conclusions concerning important matters. Whatever may be the policy finally to prevail con- cerning widely dispersed regimental posts, nothing should be allowed to prevent the concentration of at least one complete division at war strength. Its 161 THE AMERICAN ARMY value as a training school for generals and supply and sanitary officers will alone be worth the cost. The habitude of service with war strength organiza- tions will be of inestimable value and make for econ- omy and dispatch in the practical operations of war. XI AKMY ADMINISTRATION "No sound mind can doubt (the essentiality of military science in time of war, any more than' the moral certainty that the most pacific policy on the part of a government will not preserve it from being engaged in war more or less frequently." WASH- INGTON. THE great administrative branch of the govern- ment known as the War Department,, and pre- sided over by the Secretary of War, ranks second to none in real importance. The vast business car- ried on under the direction of the Secretary is of the most varied kind, involving expenditures in the aggregate probably exceeding those of any depart- ment of the government during the century just passed. Much of this business has little or no con- nection with the military arm of the government, but by a process of accumulation of statutes and au- thorities, resulting often from the expediency of the moment, the present dimensions have been reached dimensions so vast in extent that it is beyond the physical power of any Secretary of War to exercise more than a general supervision of the great ad- ministrative machine under his control. When the Colonies, through the Declaration of Independence, found themselves confronted with a contest, upon the result of which their liberties de- 163 THE AMERICAN ARMY pended, they were without any form of administra- tive government calculated for war, which in all ages requires certain fixed elements men, muni- tions, arms, clothing, food, a military hierarchy, and last, but not least, a substantial money chest. There was much groping in the dark, for, while the min- ute men were also riflemen of the highest type then known, there was wanting that cohesion and system which can be supplied in no other way than by a properly organized military department. When one considers the Declaration of Independ- ence and the wonderful document embodying the Constitution of the Republic, it becomes .difficult of belief that the same talented men who so wisely framed these incomparable state papers could have had any part as members of Congress in the con- duct of military affairs during the Revolution. The student of military history stands aghast at the rev- elation of stupidity and jealousy which character- ized the conduct of Congress in dealing with the practical business of establishing and perpetuating independence after having proclaimed it. During the Revolution Congress issued the com- missions to generals and staff officers, and, by reso- lution, frequently dictated the control of military affairs in minutest detail. At the earnest solicita- tion of General Washington, a committee, consist- ing of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, was ap- pointed to hear Colonel Tudor on the subject of the insufficiency of the disciplinary articles for the gov- ernment of the army, and this resulted in the adop- 164 AEMY ADMINISTRATION tion by the Continental Congress, September 20, 1776, of the British Articles of War, which, in turn, had been bodily drawn from those in use by the Romans. The adoption of the Articles of War laid the foundation of that discipline not inaptly defined as "the orderly sequence of events," which in time brought the Continentals to a capacity to contend successfully with British veterans and as allies to rival the best troops of France. The expediency of establishing a War Office was constantly urged upon Congress, and on June 12, 1776, the method of conducting military affairs by resolutions of that body was discontinued, and the "Board of War and Ordnance," consisting of a committee of five members, was established. Among other duties this board was charged with "superin- tending the raising, fitting out and despatching all land forces ordered for the service of the United Colonies ; immediate care of all artillery, arms, am- munition and warlike stores not employed in actual service; to keep a register of the names of all offi- cers of the land service, with rank and date of com- mission; accounts of the State and disposition of the troops in the respective Colonies." This board continued to act until Congress created, by resolu- tion of October 17, 1777, a Board of War to consist of three persons not members of Congress. That seeming necessity for jealously guarding against any possible encroachment of military power in- duced the legislators to provide specifically that the proceedings of this board should be subject to in- 165 THE AMERICAN ARMY spection of Congress once a month, or oftener, and that every member of Congress should have free ac- cess to the records of the board, with the right to make copies of all documents except returns of ar- mies, provisions or military stores, which could be obtained only on the order of Congress itself. The personnel of the board changed frequently, and the question of a quorum gave considerable trouble. Finally, on October 29, 1778, Congress provided that the Board of War should consist of two members of Congress and three persons .not members, and that three should constitute a legal quorum in order that important matters should not be unduly -delayed. The Board of War continued to exercise its func- tions until Major General Lincoln accepted, on No- vember 26, 1781, the office of Secretary of War, which, with those of Superintendent of Finance and Secretary of Marine, had been authorized February 7, 1781, under the act creating certain executive de- partments. By resolution, Congress, from time to time, assigned various duties to the Secretary of War, and required and enjoined upon all military and other officers connected with the army to ob- serve his directions. July 3, 1782, he was specifically ''authorized to order all persons to be arrested and tried for disobedience of any orders which he is em- powered to issue." The various duties outlined for the Board of War during the Revolution, and subsequently for the Secretary of War, resulted from resolutions based upon the necessity for meeting emergencies arising 166 AEMY ADMINISTRATION from day to day. It was not until January 27, 1785, that "An Ordinance for ascertaining the powers and duties of the Secretary of War" was passed. The War Department as now known may be said to have had its foundation laid in this ordinance which pre- scribes in great detail the powers and duties of the Secretary of War. Matters drifted along under makeshift devices, which, however, were furnishing that experience in administration which culminated in the conviction that the confederation was too frail a vessel to sup- ply this great continent with a stable government. During this period the functions of the office of Sec- retary of War embraced, to a great extent, both those of a commander-in-chief and those of an ad- ministrative and executive officer. In the organiza- tion of the government under the Constitution, the President having been made Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, Congress enacted, on Au- gust 7, 1789, that there should be a principal officer in the Department of War "called the Secretary for the Department of War, who shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be en- joined on or entrusted to him by the President of the United States agreeable to the Constitution, rela- tive to military commissions, or to the land or naval forces, ships or warlike stores, or to such other mat- ters respecting military or naval affairs as the Presi- dent shall assign to the said department, or relative to the granting of lands to persons entitled thereto for military services rendered to the United States, 167 or relative to Indian affairs ; and furthermore, that the said principal officer shall conduct the business of the said department in such manner as the Presi- dent of the United States shall from time to time or- der or instruct." The Navy Department was cre- ated by the Act of April 30, 1798, and thereafter ceased to be an adjunct of the War Department. Up to this date it will be observed that the War De- partment included in the scope of its administration the work of three executive departments War, Navy and Interior, as now constituted. At the time of the establishment of the present War Department General Henry Knox, who had been Secretary un- der the former regime was reappointed to the office by President Washington. General Knox's famil- iarity with the requirements of the office enabled him to establish administrative methods upon a proper basis at the outset. The entire business method of the department was based upon the idea, which has since been confirmed by the Supreme Court, that the Secretary of War is the representa- tive of the President with full legal powers with re- spect to all administration and control of the army and its affairs. The only change in this has been when Congress, from time to time, has provided that specific things be clone by or under the direction of the Secretary of War, and which without specific statute would not be an attribute of any particular executive department. Prior to the Act of July 16, 1798, the War Depart- ment suffered much embarrassment in the matter of 168 ARMY ADMINISTRATION supplies, because all purchases of and contracts for supplies for the military service were made under and by the Treasury Department. The change made in the methods of purchase were not sufficiently drastic to meet the conditions then confronting the Republic, which appeared to be unwillingly ap- proaching a rupture with France, the able and effi- cient ally of the Colonies in their struggle for inde- pendence. The resulting legislation enacted March 3, 1799, established the system which has since pre- vailed by authorizing and requiring the Secretary of War to make purchases and enter, or cause to be entered into, all contracts for providing annually all clothing, camp utensils and equipage, medicines and hospital stores necessary for the troops and armies of the United States. The political dissension of the times, together with the paucity of national re- sources and lack of adequate means of defense caused serious embarrassment in the hour of dan- ger. Fortunately, the country was saved from hostile collision with France, but the war scare had given much food for thought to public officials. It had be- come evident thus early that the militia act of 1792 was lacking in the elements essential for producing a reliable combatant army. In 1803 the President invited Congress to cause a review of the militia laws, and the result was the adoption of a resolu- tion requesting the President to write to the execu- tive of each state, " urging the importance and in- dispensable necessity of vigorous exertions on the 169 THE AMERICAN AEMY part of the State Governments to carry into effect the militia system adopted by the National legisla- ture agreeably to the powers reserved to the States respectively by the Constitution of the United States, and in a manner the best calculated to in- sure such a degree of military discipline and knowl- edge of tactics as will, under the auspices of a be- nign Providence, render the militia a sure and per- manent bulwark of National defence." The nation has for a century continued to play battledore and shuttlecock with a militia system. Under the Confederation the Secretary of War possessed much authority subsequently specifically designated as prerogatives of the President. While the relations between the President and Secretary were left untrammelled with any restrictions in the Act of 1789 creating the War Department, it grad- ually came to be understood that when Congress spe- cifically names the Secretary of War in connection with legislation regarding matters falling within his department, there is no disturbance of system or of the harmonious relations between the President and his cabinet officer. This adjustment has received recognition through decisions of the Supreme Court wherein the Secretary of War is regarded exclus- ively as the active agent of the President in all mat- ters falling within the jurisdiction of the War De- partment, and, in short, for military purposes the order of the Secretary of War is the order of the President the Commander-in-Chief. As early as 1809 the Secretary of War declared 170 ARMY ADMINISTRATION "that the business of the Department had increased beyond what the capacity of any one man could per- form." It was not, however, until 1812 that Con- gress made an effort, coincident with the increase of the army, to give some relief to the Secretary of War from the vast burden of details that pressed upon him. The President proposed that the relief be afforded by the addition of two assistant secre- taries, but Congress established the present system of bureau chiefs who control the various staff and supply departments. The Act of March 3, 1813, au- thorized the Secretary of War to prepare general regulations denning and prescribing the respective duties and powers of the officers composing the va- rious bureaus. Thus it will be seen that in groping for some method which would make it possible for the Secretary of War to perform the higher func- tions of his office, without being crushed with the burden of details, a bureau system was introduced, with a number of semi-independent chiefs, each working along his own lines without of necessity having any knowledge of the character and extent of equally important work going on in other bureaus. The army is absolutely dependent upon these admin- istrative and supply bureaus, and success depends upon the coherent total of all their efforts. The methods remain practically the same to-day as in the War of 1812, except that through a long course of years there has grown up a system of laws and regulations fixing in great detail the duties of the various bureaus. There is a most complex and 171 THE AMERICAN ARMY expensive branch of another executive department to audit and control all the accounts. The severe hardships of war and military life in general result in wastefulness and loss of public property, and some well-devised system is essential to protect the treasury from undue strain. Through a long course of years, the principles early enunci- ated by Secretary of War Calhoun, that some one must be held accountable for each and every article of public property ; that each chief of bureau must be responsible that all accounts are promptly and properly rendered, and that all disbursements are made from funds advanced on proper -estimates, have prevailed. During the earlier years many of these functions were performed by civil agents, but military rank was gradually conferred upon all the principal officials of the War Department who were called upon from time to time to exercise their func- tions in contact with troops. From modest begin- nings, both as to duties and rank, the staff bureaus of the War Department have gradually reached their present proportions. Several of these bureaus are of comparatively recent origin, but to trace the growth of others would be to follow the army through the vicissitudes of a century of able and ear- nest military effort. When the Civil War Secretary, Edwin M. Stanton, took up the work of the Department, which for four years laid such a mental and physical strain upon him as few men could bear, he found a condition cal- 172 ARMY ADMINISTRATION culated to bring discouragement to the stoutest heart. The relations between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army had long been of such a character that the latter officer had removed his headquarters to New York City. It became necessary to reorganize the business meth- ods of the various bureaus to meet the exceptional tasks confronting them in the organization, equip- ping and supplying of an army suddenly increased from about ten thousand to ultimately more than one million men in actual service. The general system of administration was similar to that pursued during the Mexican War, and much reliance was placed on the veterans of that conflict. The history of the great struggle is still fresh in the minds of the American people, but it may be safely stated that only a very limited number have a proper appreciation of the great administrative work performed by the War Department during the days and nights of the whole four years of war. There were periods of marching, of battle, and of monotonous camp life for the average regiment; but for the Secretary of War and his coadjutors there was one unending round of high tension work. Armies are useless without food, clothes, ammuni- tion and transportation, and to obtain and distribute these essential requisites in the quantities demanded during the Civil War required administrative and executive ability of a high order. The absence of a directing and coordinating professional authority 173 THE AMERICAN ARMY in the scheme of army organization threw an im- mense strain upon the Secretary of War and Presi- dent. Nothing in all previous military history equals the business administration of the War Depart- ment as exemplified in the muster-out and transpor- tation of the great volunteer armies to their homes at the close of the Civil War. The great burden of current expense was quickly reduced, a matter of vital importance at the time. Following close upon the muster-out of the volun- teers a reorganization and increase of the regular army took place. A portion of the new army was destined for service in the Southern States during the reconstruction period. The duties required of the army during the long and disastrous efforts at sustaining "carpet-bag" governments were in- tensely distasteful to both officers and men, as well as to the better element amongst the southern peo- ple. To be sure the Civil War had just closed, and it was necessary to reestablish law and or- der throughout a vast territory inhabited by a negro population, which regarded the army as the em- bodiment of that power which had struck off the shackles of slavery. The use of the army at the polls and in civil matters generally has ever been re- pugnant to American ideas, and at this period it only succeeded in embittering the southern people to such an extent that one of their first and most in- sistent policies, after the reconstruction, was to de- mand a reduction of the regular army. Under this 174 ARMY ADMINISTRATION pressure the maximum strength of the army was fixed at 25,000 men, and so remained until the out- break of the war with Spain. The War Department had continued in charge of the Indians until the close of the Mexican War, after which period their affairs were managed by Indian agents, with minimum salaries and maximum temp- tations. Many times the army was compelled to stand idly by and witness the perpetration of wrongs, and when the Indians, in desperation, " broke out," the War Department was called upon to bring about another era of peace. Year after year regiments were summoned to the field, some- times under tropical suns, and again in the land of blizzards, where the icy winds made campaigning miserable alike to pursuer and pursued. With each recurring surrender the Indians were restored to the tender mercies of the agent and his harpies, only to find their grievances multiplied. As years wore on the settlers, with their wire fences, closed in slowly but surely around the res- ervations, and the fact dawned upon the Indians that the wild, free life of the West had gone. The march of civilization had swept away the old life and left but mere remnants of once proud tribes stranded as driftwood along the shores of progress. Encountering only the worst elements amongst the whites, too often the mere outcasts of society, the poor warriors, shorn of the power wielded by their ancestors, turned restlessly for some light to those with whom they had battled and at whose hands 175 THE AMERICAN AEMY they had often suffered defeat. The War Depart- ment resumed charge, when army officers were again installed as Indian agents and gradually laid the foundations of lasting peace by showing the In- dians the utter futility of contending against inevi- table fate. The Indian question having been finally settled, a plan was adopted by the War Department of bring- ing together the scattered fragments of the regular army, which in its entirety did not equal in number a single army corps. The necessity for guarding isolated and exposed points had for years prevented proper instruction of officers and men in the admin- istration of maneuvers of battalions, regiments and brigades, but in minor warfare they were not out- classed by any soldiers the world over. To accom- plish the best results numerous small posts were abandoned and regimental posts established. The unwillingness of Congress to recognize the ur- gent need of men to garrison the growing coast defenses, while continuing to spend millions upon fortifications and guns, caused the War Department grave concern. After years of pleading for proper legislation, a piteous appeal was finally made for two additional regiments of artillery, and action was slowly maturing in this regard when other events occurred which rapidly roused the country to action. For more than half a century Cuba had been a source of incessant anxiety and trouble to every ad- ministration. Forty years previously December, 1858 President James Buchanan, in complaining 176 ARMY ADMINISTRATION in a message to Congress of past conditions, said: " Spanish officials under the direct control of the Captain General of Cuba have insulted our national flag, and in repeated instances have from time to time inflicted injuries on the persons and property of our citizens. . . . All our attempts to obtain redress have been baffled and defeated. . . . The truth is that Cuba, in its existing Colonial condition, is a constant source of injury and annoyance to the American people. ... It has been made known to the world by my predecessors that the United States have on several occasions endeavored to ac- quire Cuba from Spain by honorable negotiation. . . . We would not, if we could, acquire Cuba in any other manner. This is due to our national char- acter. . . . Our relations with Spain, which ought to be of the most friendly character, must always be placed in jeopardy whilst the existing Colonial gov- ernment over the island shall remain in its present condition. ' ' There was a widespread sentiment throughout the United States in behalf of the Cubans in their in- surrection against Spanish domination, but the Sec- retary of War and his co-workers were advised of the unprepared state of the army and of the defenses for immediate war. Everything which could be le- gitimately done at the time was hastened forward to make up for past neglect, but guns, ammunition and armies do not appear by magic. The country had not engaged in war since the close of the gigantic struggle of 1861 to 1865 ; no progress 177 THE AMERICAN ARMY in legislation had been made in a hundred years so far as utilization of organized militia was concerned, and there was no law extant under which the War Department could take any of those preliminary steps so essential to success in war. During April all of the little regular army which could be spared was assembled in southern camps and organized in brigades and divisions. This was a measure of ex- treme precaution; the results at Santiago prove it to have been one of those fortunate strokes upon which the fate of nations often hang. Notwithstanding the many years of threatening clouds, there was no well-defined plan for or- ganizing the army when called into active service. Brigades, divisions and corps gradually came into being through the expediency of the moment. A heterogeneous mass of staff officers was distributed to the general officers, and in many instances, instead of being useful, they proved to be encumbrances. In numerous cases the generals in command detailed subordinate regular officers to perform the duties while the volunteer officers held the higher staff rank and drew the pay of offices requiring technical knowledge, which is not immediately supplied through patriotism and willingness to serve. The humiliating experience of some of the great volun- teer camps should be enough to prevent a repetition of such mistakes. The need for ships was urgent, and the navy was seeking them at the same time as the army. The War Department had had no previous personal ex- 178 ARMY ADMINISTRATION perience with transports, and the history of the Vera Cruz expedition of the Mexican War appeared to have been forgotten. General Shafter's magnifi- cent corps was sent to Santiago, inadequately equipped, and had the navy not come to the rescue, the success of the campaign must of necessity have been endangered through the impossibility of, or long delay in, effecting a landing. Once in contact with the enemy, the American army, as usual, added laurels to its already long list of successful cam- paigns, but in doing so prevented the country from seeing clearly the results of neglect of sound policy. The expedition to Porto Rico, and that across the wide Pacific to Manila, were sent with less haste, and were somewhat better equipped. But experience was being obtained, and now, after having become possessed of a fleet of transports, the War Depart- ment is enabled to point with just pride to many years of such successful endeavor that its record is not exceeded by that of any of the great steamship lines. This service ultimately reached such a de- gree of efficiency that thousands of troops have been transported seven thousand miles across the Pacific, without material accident, in sufficient comfort to have them ready for immediate field service on ar- rival. With the signing of the protocol, it became neces- sary to reduce the forces, but as the Spanish army in Cuba was still intact, it was decided to proceed at once with the muster-out of only 100,000 volunteers. The occupation of posts in Cuba to be evacuated by 179 THE AMERICAN ARMY Spanish garrisons employed 50,000 troops. The question of withdrawing the volunteers from the Philippine Archipelago caused the War Department much concern. Peace once an accomplished official act, all volunteers would become entitled to dis- charge. The department concluded, therefore, to ask outright for a regular army of 100,000 men, and the House of Representatives passed a bill to that effect, but it failed in the Senate. A compromise of a temporary regular army and another force of vol- unteers was agreed upon. The muster-out of the volunteers for the war with Spain was completed as rapidly as possible, having in mind the economy of the moment as well as protection from fraudulent claims for pensions in the future. In the Philippines the army was confronted with many serious problems, the solution of which de- manded a showing of well-organized force. The en- listment and transportation of the new volunteers to a scene of action ten thousand miles from their homes for a comparatively short service, involved such an appalling expenditure of public funds that the President withheld his consent to the organiza- tion of the new regiments until conditions became so critical that the reinforcement could no longer be delayed. The excess of cost of this force of volun- teers over what the cost would have been had reg- ulars been employed, with the usual three years ' en- listments, has been estimated by the various bureaus of the War Department to be $16,374,009.04, quite an item even in these days of abounding wealth. The 180 new volunteer regiments were raised and com- manded by regular officers, and were splendid or- ganizations, but they were of necessity brought home and mustered out with an average of fifteen to eighteen months ' service over-sea, altogether a very expensive proceeding. The exchange of troops in the Philippines to en- able the volunteers who went out in the first expedi- tion to come home, was effected during active insur- rection which continued until a force of nearly 70,- 000 men was assembled in the Islands. It became evident that makeshift devices would no longer serve the purpose, and the Secretary of War presented the needs of the service in carefully pre- pared legislation, which, while not accomplishing everything desired, gave the Department a suffi- cient force to meet the urgent demands upon the army in Cuba, Porto Eico, the Philippines, Alaska and at home. Ever since the spring of 1898 the officials of the War Department have discussed the confusion which arose, and have constantly sought the best means of preventing a repetition of conditions which might lead to humiliation and temporary defeat in a war with an enterprising and audacious enemy. After mature consideration, the Secretary of War settled upon the plan for the establishment of a General Staff Corps, with a chief at its head who is the Chief of Staff for the whole army. Under this plan the misnamed office of Commanding General has disap- peared. It had ever been a delusion and a disap- 18X THE AMERICAN ARMY pointment for the distinguished soldiers who had oc- cupied it, with constant but fruitless efforts to invest the office with something more than a name. The reliability and excellence of the river and harbor works, under the War Department, caused the nation to turn to it when all those previously se- lected to dig the Panama Canal had acknowledged failure. Under the system developed by the Corps of Engineers, its officers, headed by the incompara- ble Goethals, have brought that great public work to a completion well within the time limit of the es- timates. It is, and will remain, a fitting monument to the War Department in general, and to the Corps of Engineers and their alma mater in particular. The administration of civil affairs of great im- portance to the nation have been entrusted to the War Department until the burden of even slight supervision on the part of the Secretary of War leaves little time for proper attention to the orig- inal functions of his office in connection with the army. War has become a complicated and absorb- ing science demanding a knowledge of a vast array of principles and details on the part of those re- sponsible for the administration of armies. The time has arrived when the burden should be rearranged and the parts not correlated with preparation for and the conduct of war should be severed from the War Department so as to bring the labors of the of- fice within the mental and physical capacity of su- pervision of one man. If this can not be accom- plished then there should be a new office created, 182 ARMY ADMINISTRATION that of Secretary of the Army, to correspond with that of Secretary of the Navy. The necessity for some drastic action may be readily appreciated by a slight consideration of the variety and importance of subjects requiring the personal attention of the Secretary of War, and to which are added other bur- dens at almost every session of Congress. It is not an easy matter radically to recast a sys- tem, such as that involved in the organization of the War Department, because of the personal interests within and without the department to be conserved, but it is certain that unless some of the burden is lifted from the Secretary of War and dispersed by authority of law amongst designated assistants, or transferred to other branches of the government, the centralization which has grown up will break down or militate against full success, for the duties have long since outgrown the capacity of any indi- vidual. It is a compliment to the War Department system that Congress should commit to it so many matters requiring discretion, integrity and quick action, as in the case of floods, earthquakes, fires and other great public calamities. It shows that at heart pub- lic men, as well as the people, have confidence in the honesty, capacity and integrity of the army. XII COMMAND OF THE AKMY "If an army was in existence, and an officer were invited to take command of it, his course would be plain, for he would have nothing more to do than to examine the constitution of it, and to inquire into the composition, to enable him to decide . . . The difficulty in which you expect to be involved, in the choice of general officers, when you come to form the army, is certainly a serious one; and in a government like ours, where there are so many considerations to be attended to and to combine, it will be found not a little perplexing." WASHINGTON. THE present status as to the command of the army is the result of more than half a century of discussion, involving, from time to time, some of the most celebrated men of their day. The army regulations in force prior to 1855, those of 1836, 1841 and 1847, defined the duties of the officer as- signed to command the army, as follows : "The military establishment is placed under the orders of the Major General Commanding-in-Chief, in all that regards its discipline and military con- trol. Its fiscal arrangements properly belong to the administrative departments of the staff, and to the Treasury Department, under the direction of the Secretary of War. ' ' The authority of the Commanding General was further specifically extended to cover supervision of everything which entered into the expenses of the 184 COMMAND OF THE ARMY military establishment, and to "see that the esti- mates for the military service are based upon proper data and made for the objects contemplated by law and necessary to the due support and useful employment of the army." In 1855 the regulations were changed and the Commanding General practically ceased to exercise command of the army, until 1864, when under pres- sure of the necessities of a great war, General Grant was assigned to command with unlimited authority over all its parts. As soon as the war closed the office reverted to the conditions existing between 1855 and 1861. Generals Scott, Sherman, Sheridan and other dis- tinguished soldiers found themselves harassed with the impossibilities of the situation, and the War De- partment is filled with records of efforts to find a so- lution satisfactory alike to the Commanding Gen- eral and to the Chiefs of Staff Bureaus. It remained for the war with Spain to disclose, in the most glar- ing manner, the need for some reform of so impos- sible a military situation. Long and bitter experi- ence had shown the impossibility of defining any line of separation between the duties of the Command- ing General of the Army and those of the Secretary of War. All attempts to accomplish this had brought nothing but controversies and misunderstandings. Immediately after the inauguration of General Grant as President, having in mind his own troubles as Commanding General, he authorized the Secre- tary of War to assign General Sherman to command 185 THE AMERICAN ARMY the army, and to order that all official business which required the action of the President or Sec- retary of War should be submitted through the Com- manding General. General Sherman, in assuming command, on March 8, 1869, announced the Chiefs of Bureaus as his "general staff." When a new Secretary of War assumed duty, a few days later, he caused to be rescinded all the instructions except those directing General Sherman to assume com- mand of the army, which removed the Chiefs of Bureaus from his control. Gradually the practice took form and became fixed whereby the office of the Commanding General of the Army was reduced to an empty title and, at the last, the Adjutant General exercised the author- ity of the Secretary of War and became, in effect, the real commander. Although all orders were is- sued in the name of the Commanding General, he was not always consulted, and frequently knew noth- ing of important orders until they had gone into ef- fect. The situation had reached a crisis intolerable to the soldiers of high rank selected from time to time, and assigned to command the army, and none could fill the office without becoming restive under the conditions. It should be remembered that for more than forty years the office had been filled by general officers who had won such distinction in cam- paign and battle as would, in any other country, have led to the highest honors being conferred upon them. This situation at the War Department, bad enough in peace, became obnoxious and impossible in the 186 COMMAND OF THE AEMY face of a foreign war, and the efforts to fix the re- sponsibility for blame made it clearly apparent that a complete reorganization of the whole system was a vital necessity. The controversies arising at the time were of such a character that much of the good work accomplished, in spite of the system, was quite ignored. As a matter of fact, with a very small available regular army less than the strength of a modern division the nation forced a declaration of war. The President called for 125,000 volunteers, and the corridors of the White House and the War Department became blocked immediately with ap- plicants for commissions in the army. The actual operations essential to raising and organizing the army were interfered with to such an extent as to relegate that important work to the hours of dark- ness when the Department was closed to visitors. Another call for volunteers was made and the process of moulding brigades, divisions and corps progressed with celerity and great success, when it is considered that there had been no real prepara- tion for war of any kind beyond operations against the Indians and the reconstruction of harbor de- fenses during the preceding thirty years. Under the prevailing system, or lack of system, it had been impossible even to formulate plans, let alone execute general policies. The situation was understood by military students and, having in mind the rapidly changing world conditions, continuous efforts were made to procure and arrange for pos- sible contingencies all the information concerning 187 THE AMERICAN ARMY foreign armies which, could be properly obtained, for our army has never taken kindly to the shifty methods and unreliable data of a secret service. But through all the years there had been a continuous ef- fort to side-track the Commanding General of the Army, and it was so successful that when the crisis came the blame for defects and mistakes could not be justly laid at his door and in the end was charged against the War Department and its bureaus. The controversy concerning the relations of the bureau chiefs to the Secretary of War and their in- dependence as to the Commanding General became acute as far back as the reorganization-of the army in 1821. Being dissatisfied at what was claimed to be interference on the part of the Commanding Gen- eral, the Adjutant General, Roger Jones, on January 24, 1829, submitted to Secretary of War Porter an " Analysis of the theory of the Staff which sur- rounds the Secretary of War," which contains all the elements of the tempest which raged for three- quarters of a century. After enumerating the sev- eral bureaus General Jones wrote that : " These several departments constitute so many avenues through which the various acts and meas- ures of the Executive which refer to commissions and appointments in the Army ; to permanent forti- fications; the construction of Ordnance; Quarter- master's supplies; Subsistence of the Troops, etc., are communicated and executed and such is the sym- metry in this organization, that whilst each member of the Military Staff of the War Department is con- 188 fined to the sphere of his own peculiar functions, all regard the Secretary as the common superior, the head of the harmonious whole "It will be plainly perceived then, that the Ad- jutant General's Office is now (as kindred offices for more than twenty years have been) an important division of that branch of the Executive Govern- ment, denominated by law 'The Department of War;' and that it is the place where everything 'relative to military commissions,' under the Secre- tary of War, is conducted and registered. . . . "These practical duties of the Adjutant General, under the Secretary of War, may be properly termed administrative in contradistinction to his Military Staff duties under the General in Chief and the for- mer are essentially the same, which, at various epochs of legislation since 1797, have been per- formed by some such Staff Officer, denominated, ' The Inspector ; ' ' The Adjutant and Inspector ; ' * The Adjutant and Inspector General' and finally, since 1821, 'The Adjutant General.' "Have these, or similar Executive functions ever been assigned to any general officer of the line of the Army? Are they compatible with the high duties of a Commander of the Army? Ought a General in Chief to crave these subordinate responsibilities and is it to the interest of the Army, thus to relinquish the glories of the field ? . . . ' * In this new state of things therefore, consequent upon the Reduction of '21, the 'ci-devant' Adjutant and Inspector General's Office which pertained to 189 the War Department but now denominated * The Ad- jutant General's Office,* was also made accessible to the Commanding General, for whatever referred to the Troops the Posts and Military Commands; whilst all the Eecords and documents 'relative to Military Commissions' were, in the nature of things, retained and reserved for the sole and paramount jurisdiction of the Secretary of War. Like his predecessor (the late Adjutant and Inspector Gen- eral), the Adjutant General, but not the General in Chief, continued to be the keeper of the Eecords al- ready enumerated, under the Secretary of War, and to whom, he, only is responsible for all duties, which, are connected in any manner whatever, with 'Mili- tary Commissions.' On the other hand, the Adju- tant General, is responsible to the General in Chief, as Chief of the Staff according to the definition of duties found in the General Regulations for the Army. * ' ... It has remained however for the present General in Chief, aided, it is thought, by the Chief Clerk of the War Department, to claim jurisdiction in some of the enumerated duties exhibited in the above analysis, which, during the command of the lamented General Brown, were practically acknowl- edged at the War Office to pertain to the Adjutant General. Thus for example until recently all papers and documents referring to Commissions and Ap- pointments, were sent direct, from the War Office to the Adjutant General, but now, it seems as if it were attempted and that without the knowledge of the 190 COMMAND OF THE ARMY Secretary of War, to throw into or pass through the hands of the General who commands the officers, the appointments and commissions of the same officers. ... If the Hon. Secretary requires information respecting the fortifications or of the cannon neces- sary to garnish them, where is the resort for such in- formation? Is it to the General in Chief No: re- course is had to the Colonels of Engineers, and of Ordnance. Does he demand a report on the State of the provisions, or of Medical Stores for the Army 1 ? Is reference had to the General in Chief No : The Commissary General of Subsistence and the Surgeon General are the Officers who would naturally be called upon to submit such Reports. Then where is the advantage, or the propriety or expediency of dis- turbing the harmony and rationality of this beauti- ful system which encircles the War Department? Wherefore, let it be respectfully enquired, attribute to the General in Chief functions, which would con- nect him with 'Military Commissions' and which of all others, are the very last he should or can ad- vantageously, have to do with? He is denied juris- diction over the fortifications while in progress or construction; and Ordnance and clothing, until the one is placed in the Bastion, and the other in the Soldier's knapsack yet, he strangely may have something to do with 'Military Commissions'! 61 ... It surely never could have been within the contemplation of the President to regard the General in Chief, as having a right to act in any other character, than commander of the Army; but, 191 THE AMERICAN ARMY if he be more than this (correctly speaking, one should say less), why then * General Headquarters' are metamorphosed into a second rate bevican, fixed at the seat of Government ; and the highest Military officer known to the Army thus forsaking a higher destiny becomes in fact no other than one of the 'Chiefs of Staff' attached to the War Office." Presidents and Secretaries of War had not been left in ignorance of the situation and the ancient con- troversies attending it. After General Sheridan had been rebuked and humiliated over matters trifling in themselves but which assumed a character of vital importance when considered in connection with the independence of the Chiefs of War Department bu- reaus in their relations with the Secretary of War, he, the leader of armies in war, was forced to sulk in his tent, while the petty affairs of our little army were administered through staff bureaus and their representatives at the several headquarters. General Sheridan's successor General Schofield was one of the ablest students and most experi- enced administrators in the army. He had com- manded a large field army in the greatest war of modern times and had filled the office of Secretary of War at a critical stage of our history. President Cleveland was desirous of ending an impossible military situation and, at his desire, General Scho- field submitted his views relative to military admin- istration and command, and it was a national mis- fortune that the President's term of office expired before he was able to accomplish a needful reform. 192 COMMAND OF THE AEMY General Schofield defined the issues and based his discussions under two clear-cut propositions: "What are the duties, and what the authority, of the Commanding General of the Army, and of the General officers commanding Divisions or Depart- ments, or armies in the field? "What are their relations to the War Depart- ment and to the several bureaus thereof, or Staff departments of the army?" Those are the questions, definitely stated, which had given rise to so much controversy and had never been satisfactorily answered. The practice had va- ried extremely and the desirability of the establish- ment of well defined principles as a guide to all con- cerned in the complex duties and responsibilities of military administration and command had become apparent. Not only was the authority of the Com- manding General of the Army denied by bureau chiefs, but complaints were constantly made con- cerning their interference with the several parts of the line of the army by giving orders direct to staff officers serving under the general officers command- ing the troops. It was fully set forth to the Presi- dent that to permit the staff officers of the War De- partment to exercise authority over the army, inde- pendently of, and without even the knowledge of the Commanding General, would be destructive to that unity of authority which is indispensable to the effi- ciency of the service, creating a military system un- der which anything worthy the name of an army could not possibly exist for any considerable time. 193 THE AMERICAN ARMY It should be observed that the duties and responsi- bilities of command are not in general denned by statute, but are rather derived from military usage. A general officer, especially assigned by the Presi- dent to the command of an army in the field, or of a territorial department or division, is necessarily clothed with great military authority, to be exercised in his discretion, subject to approval or disapproval only of his military superiors. The exercise of com- mand necessarily involves the expenditure of money, governed by the general regulations of the War De- partment, but in respect to which a commanding gen- eral must in many cases exercise his discretion. In this his relation to the Secretary of War is that of an administrative subordinate, no less so than the chief of a staff bureau. While independent of each other they are responsible to a common superior the Sec- retary of War. The state of the appropriations or the fiscal regu- lations may not permit of doing all which the mili- tary interests seem to demand. The Commanding General, under his responsibility to the Secretary of War, must act promptly upon his own judgment as to the military necessity. On the other hand, a chief of bureau, not responsible for action or failure to act, may decide calmly to review the case and disap- prove an expenditure already made. Every officer is entitled to the judgment, in approval or disapproval of his acts, of his superior officers in regular line of succession up to the head of the department to which he belongs. We now reach the crux of all controver- 194 COMMAND OF THE ARMY sies for chiefs of bureaus generally considered that here they came under the broad and protecting wings of civil administration in connection with appropria- tions as to the expenditure of which the treasury offi- cials outranked all military authority. As a matter of fact, the authority of the Comptroller, exercised through his decisions, had long since become a seri- ous factor in military administration, for it always had an appearance of unfairness to order a subordi- nate to make expenditures which would fall under the ban of that official. This subject was frequently injected into the controversy by appeals arising be- tween commanders of troops and staff bureaus. Through a long series of ingeniously contrived items of legislation, embodied generally in appropri- ation bills, the estimates for which are prepared in the War Department bureaus, the authority of the Commanding General of the Army and the general officers commanding the troops became limited mainly to the approval of detailed expenditures, def- initely authorized through chiefs of bureaus. This situation was the cause of numerous briefs and pam- phlets upon the general subject by those who con- tended that the Secretary of War could not legally delegate authority to chiefs of bureaus, thus practi- cally placing them over the Commanding General of the Army and the general officers commanding troops who were their seniors in rank. The statute requires the Secretary to perform his functions, but does not authorize him to delegate them to chiefs of bureaus. 195 THE AMERICAN ARMY Experience in numerous efforts had shown the im- possibility of defining any line of separation between the duties of the Secretary of War and those of the Commanding General of the Army, and the offensive sore was allowed to fester until the existence of war established the clear cut necessity for remedial ac- tion. The history of the War Department and all the controversies arising therein were laid bare. Grad- ually certain principles seemed to formulate them- selves, for throughout it was considered that all par- ties were honest of conviction in the matters in con- troversy, and were simply victims of an irreconcila- ble situation. There were two evils clearly to be avoided, the arbitrary exercise of authority by the Commanding General, acting without the knowledge of the Secre- tary of War, and the equally arbitrary course where chiefs of bureaus exercise authority without the knowledge or consent of the Commanding General. An army, however large and complex in organiza- tion, must act under one head. The orders of the supreme power must come to and be transmitted by that head to the several subordinate bodies, accord- ing to the function of each and with regard to its re- lation to the others. The functions of bureau chiefs should be, as far as practicable, delimited and prescribed in law and reg- ulations in such manner as to admit of their being given much discretion in respect to all matters en- trusted to or which concerns their departments. In this way the chiefs are trained to assume responsi- 196 COMMAND OF THE AEMY bility and are relieved of the embarrassment of pre- senting continually to a superior matters which re- quire more time for proper consideration than the superior can give, when the number of staff chiefs is considered. After casting of many nets in vain, it became grad- ually apparent that the Secretary of War, as the rep- resentative of the President, could not surrender the authority to command to any other official in occu- pancy of office at the War Department, whatever his title. The office of a Commanding General had therefore ceased to be anything but a name, a mere mockery of command. It was useless to begin a new century of discontent and conflict in the administra- tion of army affairs, and the decision was finally reached that the office of the Commanding General of the Army should be abolished and that the com- mand should thereafter be exercised by or in the name of the Secretary of War, through a Chief of Staff. The Commission appointed to investigate condi- tions arising out of the war with Spain stated in its report: "For many years the divided authority and re- sponsibility in the War Department had produced friction, for which, in the interest of the service, a remedy, if possible, should be applied. The Consti- tution makes the President the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he can not transfer that authority to any other person. The President selects a Secre- tary of War, who is his confidential adviser. The 197 THE AMERICAN ARMY President must have the power of selection of his General-in-Chief as he has of his Secretary of War ; without this there can be no guarantee that he will give, or that the Secretary of War will place in the General-in-Chief, that confidence which is necessary to perfect harmony. Neither the President nor the Secretary of War should have in command of the Army an officer who is not working in harmony with him." In his testimony before the Commission, General Schofield said : "Recent experience has served to confirm all the results of my lifelong study and large experience, that the proper position for the senior officer of the army on duty at Washington is not that of Com- manding General, a position which is practically im- possible, but that of General-in-Chief, which means in fact Chief of Staff to the President." It was apparent that the conditions desired to be brought about could not be effected by creating the office of Chief of Staff for the senior general officer of the Army, who might be a gallant leader of armies yet not possess the particular qualities demanded as the adviser of the Secretary of War and super- visor of the technical work of the staff bureaus. It would have been impossible to have inaugurated this change by merely assigning an army general as Chief of Staff to exercise functions similar to those performed by General Halleck during the Civil War, for a multitude of minor statutes had been passed during the intervening years, some of which might 198 COMMAND OF THE ARMY have served to give color to resistance to such authority. It was fully recognized that other changes were desirable coincident with the abolition of the office of Commanding General of the Army, and legisla- tion was asked for to abolish permanent chiefs of bu- reaus and to fill the offices by details for periods of four years. The legislation changing the permanent staff departments into corps comprised of officers detailed from the line was effected at the same time as the change of tenure of chiefs of bureaus ; it was not until two years later, 1903, that legislation was obtained authorizing the substitution of a Chief of Staff for a Commanding General in the War Depart- ment. The legislation authorizing a Chief of Staff also created a General Staff Corps to assist with War Department administration and to perform very im- portant functions in connection with preparation for war. The organic act charges the Chief of Staff with supervision over the staff bureaus, but the legal technicalities which were found an insuperable ob- stacle to giving the Commanding General of the Army such supervision of staff bureaus were over- come by requiring all authority to be exercised by the Chief of Staff in the name of the Secretary of War, and not in his own right of command. The change of form has satisfied the legal objec- tions, and while contention and friction may never be entirely eliminated, eventually, when practically all the staff except the engineer and medical officers 199 will be detailed line officers, all friction due to bu- reaucratic pride should be eliminated. The command of armies, as well as of territorial departments will continue, as in the past, to be exer- cised by general officers of the army specifically as- signed to such duty by authority of the President. The Chief of Staff of the Army, while theoretically exercising no command in his own right, as a matter of fact determines the line of action and gives, in the name of the Secretary of War, orders concerning a very large part of the business coming before him, consulting with and harmonizing the recommenda- tions of the bureau staff officers when necessary. This admits of coordinating the action of all the bu- reaus and affords an opportunity for safeguarding the army in its varied duties. The system of com- mand through a Chief of Staff, removable at pleas- ure, differs materially from command by the senior general officer of the army when assigned as Com- manding General. The Chief of Staff may or may not be the senior officer of the army. His detail as such chief is limited to a tour of duty not exceeding four years, and it is especially provided that if, at any time, he finds himself not in personal accord and sympathy with the President and the Secretary of War in the execution of his office it becomes his duty to apply to be relieved. The office of the Chief of Staff constitutes a supervising military bureau of the War Department, and the supervisory power covers duties pertaining to the command, discipline, training and recruitment of the army; military op- 200 COMMAND OF THE ARMY erations, inspections, fortifications, military educa- tion and instruction and kindred matters and, in an advisory capacity, includes such duties connected with fiscal administration and supply as are com- mitted to him by the Secretary of War. The super- visory power of the Chief of Staff extends to matters of organization, armament, equipment, discipline and training the militia. All orders and instructions affecting the army are issued through the Chief of Staff and communicated to the troops and individ- uals by the Adjutant General. In the performance of his enumerated duties and as the adviser and in representation of the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff calls for information, makes investigations, issues instructions, and exer- cises all other functions necessary to secure proper harmony and efficiency of action of all those subject to his supervision. It will be observed that while the Chief of Staff is entrusted with practically all the power denied in former years to the Commanding General of the Army, it is required that he shall not set up any claim of authority except in representa- tion of the Secretary of War, who, as a civilian Cabi- net minister, overburdened with civil duties, may never be expected to have that familiar knowledge of the service which can be acquired only after years of actual experience. In the final analysis, the Chief of Staff has far greater power than was ever sought for or expected by the distinguished Commanding Generals of the Army, who urged in vain that the rights and duties 201 THE AMERICAN ARMY of the great office should be defined and its dignity protected from constant humiliation. The authority of the Chief of Staff , being exercised in the name of another a civil superior with only a general knowl- edge of military matters presupposes that those things needful and necessary for the proper service of the army will be undertaken only after consulta- tion with and approval of the Secretary of War. The office of Chief of Staff, therefore, carries with it a great responsibility, for the very reason that all ac- tion is under cover of authority of the Secretary of War. It remains for the future to determine whether lust for power may create dissension to the great detriment of the public interest, in which case the solution of the grave question undertaken through the substitution of a Chief of Staff for a Commanding General of the Army would prove un- satisfactory. It is within the power of the President to relieve a Chief of Staff, but this authority does not extend to the chiefs of bureaus, who are appointed and con- firmed by the Senate for periods of four years. Re- peated efforts were made to secure legislation to re- serve places in the several staff corps and depart- ments for officers selected to serve as chiefs of bu- reaus, so that in event the interest of the service should dictate relief instead of reappointment at the expiration of a tour, the officer relieved could return to his proper grade and rank in the permanent estab- lishment. For the past ten years sufficient antag- 202 COMMAND OF THE ARMY onism to the proposed legislation existed to prevent its enactment, but it has been recently provided that places shall be retained on the army lists of their appropriate grades for chiefs of bureaus who may hereafter be appointed, making the present chiefs practically permanent. Such questions are not so simple and easy of adjustment as mere questions of discipline. There is a grave danger, under our form of government, in having too frail a tenure of office of those responsible for public business involving large disbursements, for dissatisfied contractors, with powerful political friends, would find it more desirable to urge removal than to combat a consci- entious official. One of the most disagreeable bur- dens of official life arises from efforts of contractors to secure relief from specification requirements rather than performance with probable loss or re- duction of profits. All these conditions must be care- fully considered in making changes in methods of doing public business. There is nothing in the theory of army adminis- tration and command, through a Chief of Staff, that should render full success improbable, and especially after the date when the principal bureau officers will all be detailed officers of the line. There is an adage as old as war which recites that armies may be led but never driven, and which suggests that mutual re- spect for differing opinions and a tactful fulfilment of official duties is a sacred obligation of those re- sponsible for the administration and command of the 203 THE AMERICAN ARMY army. When this view fully obtains, controversies should cease and the Chief of Staff and all heads of bureaus should move forward in harmonious action as the united staff of the Secretary of War, acting as the representative of the Constitutional Com- mander-in-Chief the President. XIII THE GENEKAJL STAFF COEPS "To remark to a military man, how all-important the General Staff of an army is to its well-being, and how essential conse- quently to the Commander-in-Chief seems to be unnecessary." WASHINGTON. THE crying need of the army during the past half a century had been that of a General Staff or body of officers whose business it is to do the pre- liminary planning for the army in order to prepare it for war and to make of its various elements a har- monious working machine. The only practicable way to secure the needed reform seemed to lie in a frank statement to Congress that a continuance of existing conditions in the command and administration of the army was inimical to the welfare of the nation. The proposed abolition of the office of Commanding Gen- eral of the Army, and the establishment of a General Staff Corps whose head should be the Chief of Staff of the Army was not the result of caprice, experi- ment or desire for change, but was suggested by the recorded experience of three-quarters of a century, including the great Civil War, where more than 3,000,000 men struggled for the mastery, and the war with Spain and its train of new and strange experiences. No trained mind could examine the records of that long and eventful period without reaching the conclusion that a drastic modification of 205 THE AMERICAN ARMY our system was justified by every military and busi- ness consideration. Many of the functions devolving upon the General Staff in other countries had been performed in our army by officers of various staff departments and of the line, because such business did not properly pertain to any particular corps and the performance of it seemed needful for the well- being of the service. There was no central authority, other than the Secretary of War, empowered to co- ordinate and direct the manifold interests of the various branches of the service staff and line. The proposed establishment of a General Staff Corps was received without enthusiasm by Congress as well as the army, and even at the present day it fails of much support which should have been given in gen- erous measure. To military men preparedness to strike is the watchword to success. If reasons be longer needed in justification of the creation of the General Staff Corps, let those who are still in doubt ponder on the experience of this warlike but unmili- tary nation in 1898. When it had become certain that a declaration of war with Spain was a question of but a few days, the following order was signed by the Adjutant General : "WAR DEPARTMENT, "ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, "WASHINGTON, April 13, 1898. "Lt.Col.T. Schwan,Lt. Col. A. L. Wagner, Major W. H. Carter are appointed a Board to formulate plans for the call of a volunteer force to the number 206 THE GENERAL STAFF CORPS of 40,000 for active field service ; and 20,000 for re- serve sea-coast service. The Board will make any recommendation that, in its judgment, the possibili- ties of the day seem to call for. ' ' The report of this board was desired immediately and was made as follows : 1 ' WAR DEPARTMENT, "ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, " WASHINGTON, April 14, 1898. 1 ( MEMORANDUM ' ' Two kinds of duty will devolve upon the Army. "First. The defense of our sea-coasts. "Second. Offensive operations against the ene- my's territory. 1 1 The duty of the first kind will require sea-coast artillery and a force of infantry to protect the bat- teries from land attack. The second will require in- fantry, cavalry, and field artillery. "It is a well-known fact that raw troops can not be depended upon to conduct offensive operations successfully, but they can be depended upon when acting upon a pure defensive, especially behind in- trenchments. The infantry for the sea-coast de- fenses should, therefore, be taken from the volun- teers or militia. The offensive operations would re- quire our best and most proficient troops, and the forces for this purpose should, therefore, be com- posed of the regular infantry, cavalry and light artil- lery, supplemented by the best regiments and bat- teries of the volunteers. 207 THE AMERICAN ARMY 4 ( The prompt concentration of the forces destined for offensive operations is desirable for two reasons. First, to give the troops a period, however brief, of instruction in the movements of large bodies, such as brigades and divisions. Second, their concentration for the purpose of embarkation. "For the first of these purposes concentration at any points offering facilities for drill and instruc- tion would be sufficient. Bearing the second object in mind it would seem best to concentrate the troops for organization and instruction at points where they could embark for the operations which they are to undertake, as it would not be advisable' to compel them to entrain and detrain at an intermediate point when their concentration could be effected with a single entraining and detraining. * ' The embarkation of the troops for Cuba could be made from Tampa, Mobile or New Orleans, or better, from these three bases at once, as the embarkation could be more rapidly effected in three fleets of transports one from each of these ports which could concentrate off Key West. "It is believed that it would be best to have the regular troops brigade with the volunteers, one regi- ment of regular infantry and two of volunteer in- fantry, constituting a brigade. The regiments of regular infantry should at once be each designated as the nucleus for a brigade bearing its number ; thus the First Infantry would be the base regiment of the first brigade; the Twelfth Infantry, of the twelfth brigade and so on. The seventy-two regiments of 208 THE GENEBAL STAFF CORPS infantry thus brought together could be formed into three army corps. From two to four batteries of artillery should be attached to each division as divi- sional artillery, and, as a reserve, at least six bat- teries to each corps as corps artillery. One regiment of cavalry should be assigned to each corps as corps cavalry, and the remaining seven regiments should be grouped into a cavalry corps. Every available man in the infantry, cavalry and light artillery of the regular army should be taken for the army of invasion. This would embrace all the cavalry of the Regular Army and all the infantry except the Four- teenth. "The following concentration of the regular army is, accordingly, recommended: The 1st, 7th, 10th, 15th, 18th, 20th, 23d, and 24th Infantry and 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Cavalry at New Orleans. The 2d, 3d, 4th, 8th, llth, 12th, and 16th Infantry and 6th Cavalry at Mobile. The 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 13th, 17th, 19th, 21st Infantry and 3d Cav- alry at Tampa. "The volunteer infantry sufficient to complete brigades to be sent to each of the designated bases and a sufficient number of batteries of volunteer artillery to be sent to raise the number of batteries with each corps to a minimum of at least twelve and a maximum of twenty. "These points of concentration should be desig- nated without delay to the Chiefs of the supply divi- sions, who should receive instructions to regulate their movements accordingly, and an officer should 209 THE AMERICAN ARMY be sent to each of these points at once to select suit- able ground for camps and maneuvers. "It is evident that the measures here proposed would leave our interior military posts without gar- risons. It is recommended that a detail consisting of one officer from each garrison and two men from each company be left at each garrisoned post; and it is suggested that the Quartermaster General be authorized to hire watchmen in such numbers as may be necessary to assist in the proper care of the posts, and that in hiring such watchmen preference be given to retired enlisted men. "The measures proposed in the preceding para- graph manifestly relate only to those posts which could, without detriment to the public service, be left ungarrisoned for some time. Other posts, especially those in the Indian country, need garrisons and such garrisons should be obtained at once from the volun- teer forces, for even comparatively raw and inexpe- rienced troops might be utilized for the purpose of keeping Indians in check when such troops would be of very little account in Cuba. Such posts as Forts Sheridan, Leavenworth, Crook, Snelling, Thomas, and Columbus Barracks, should be utilized as re- cruiting rendezvous. "Assuming that the Department Commanders are to take the field it is recommended that an officer be designated to act as Adjutant General at each De- partment Headquarters to represent the Department Commander in his absence. "The above recommendations are based upon the 210 THE GENERAL STAFF CORPS understanding that it is not deemed expedient to con- centrate the Army at Chickamauga Park. If it be deemed practicable to concentrate the entire forces at that point the advantages to be gained by organiz- ing and instructing the Army at a single point might outweigh the disadvantages of a double entraining and detraining. As soon as a concentration of the troops has been decided upon it is recommended that a general officer be sent to each point of concentra- tion without delay, to assume command of the troops as they arrive." The Commanding General of the Army had as his military family at that time only his personal staff officers and an Assistant Adjutant General. The Adjutant General of the army had established an Information Division in his own office, but there was no General Staff to plan for and guide the orderly procedure of a nation from a state of peace to that of war. It was a humiliating lesson to those in author- ity in a nation about to engage in a foreign war of its own choosing. In the bustle and confusion incident to creating an army, there was no time to give to questions of great moment the study and research they deserved. The result was hasty, ill-digested action with its train of consequences. It is not prac- ticable to discuss the economic features in detail be- cause there is no basis for calculation, but enough is known to justify the assertion that a General Staff, possessing the authority of law for its existence, could have arranged in advance of war the mass of details with reference to distribution, transportation 211 THE AMERICAN ARMY and mobilization of armies, and the establishment of supply depots, in such manner as to have effected a vast saving of men and material. It has never been claimed that a General Staff will prove a panacea for all the misfortunes which may overtake a nation engaged in war, but history con- tains innumerable instances showing that previous preparation for war tends to abbreviate the period of active hostilities and thereby to effect immense saving in life and treasure. Under the old system, before the creation of the General Staff Corps, it was quite possible for a bureau chief to work along his own lines in ignorance of, and on a different basis from, what other bureaus were doing a course con- trary to every economic and business principle. Through the agency of a General Staff, military and political policies may be harmonized as becomes our form of government and the chiefs of War Depart- ment bureaus and others whose functions have to do with waging war may be brought into line and work more coherently and to a common purpose. During peace the duties of a General Staff Corps consist, to a great extent, of bureau work including the preparation of maps, the drawing up of schemes for organization and concentration of troops, the formation of plans for the national defense, and a study of the higher military science to keep pace with modern progress. The soldierly spirit, in- formed by experience of actual service with troops, must ever be the actuating impulse of such an organ- ization, and for this reason all officers of such a corps 212 THE GENERAL STAFF CORPS must return periodically to service with, the line. Any system which allows officers of the General Staff to degenerate solely into bureau officers, will cause them to forfeit the respect of the line of the army. It is on this account that a sufficient number should be maintained in such a corps to furnish ample de- tails both for office employment and for duty with various branches of the army, interchanging from one kind to another at frequent intervals. Above all else, the personnel of a General Staff Corps should be selected with reference to ability, and without any suspicion of favoritism. There is a widespread opinion that influence is more potent than trained talent and fitness. Republics do not differ much from monarchies in some ways, and it is Utopian to expect, under any form of government, a system which will always put the best man in the place, with or without influence. Favoritism will oc- casionally help an individual but the service at large is quite sure to observe it and to exaggerate it to such a degree that it will react unfavorably, some- time, upon the source of it as well as upon the recip- ient. It is possible, however, that the common idea as to the success of influence in forcing men to the top is exaggerated. It would be a grave misfortune to the army if this opinion were to fasten upon it even though the finger of scorn may point unerringly to glaring instances. It is certain in the long run, that the officer who accepts his commission with a determination to fit himself thoroughly for each grade as he progresses in the army, and for as much 213 THE AMERICAN AKMY more as lies within his power, and who performs his duties in a conscientious, intelligent and forceful manner, is more apt to rise in the estimation of his brother officers and his superiors than he who per- forms only the duty required of him and that in a perfunctory manner. Fortunately for the country, it is considered discreditable among the great body of army officers for one not to be thoroughly posted in his professional duties. It should of right be ex- pected that no details to the General Staff Corps, except from officers who have displayed character and talent sufficient to justify their being placed amongst a professionally trained body of ambitious and competent men, shall ever be made. In the comparatively brief existence of the Gen- eral Staff Corps there has developed, as was antici- pated, the question as to the proper manner in which effect should be given to the determinations reached by such a body of officers on the various matters af- fecting the army. It had been expected that the de- tailed studies of all questions by members or sec- tions of the General Staff would be considered by a council of senior officers responsible for maintaining consistent courses of action, which would ultimately constitute fixed policies. That the recent course of events in this regard has varied from the original conception is no cause for alarm. The foundation stones have been carefully laid even though the char- acter of the superstructure may, from time to time, be modified to meet the views of an ever changing personnel. 214 THE GENERAL STAFF CORPS It ought not to be necessary to state that the offi- cers of the General Staff serving with the command- ers of troops are there for the purpose of furnish- ing professional information; to assist in the prep- aration of detailed plans and orders and to relieve their commanders from as much as possible in or- der that they may devote themselves to the con- sideration of the higher questions of command and make success more probable. A Commanding Gen- eral can act more intelligently in a theatre of cam- paign which has received the careful study of the General Staff, if he has an officer of that corps at hand who can elucidate and explain the situation upon which orders for the movement of supplies and troops may be based, than the same general can do if dependent upon his own efforts and those of a group of staff officers suddenly assembled about him at the outbreak of war, and of whose qualifications he is, to a certain extent, ignorant. The General Staff should always justify its exist- ence by making certain that important matters which require investigation shall be given grave considera- tion by a body of selected and highly trained officers, whose time should not be frittered away with rou- tine affairs, and whose opinions should be based upon systematic examination and mature thought. It is only in this manner that the evils of hasty and imperfectly considered opinions may be escaped and the necessity for continual reversal of action and revocation of orders may be avoided. In the earlier efforts, an attempt was made to de- 215 THE AMERICAN ARMY vise legislation which would create a General Staff Corps, by consolidation of the Adjutant General's and the Inspector GeneraPs Departments; but a careful study of the matter determined against dis- turbing the Adjutant General's Department, which, besides being the bureau of correspondence, is the office where are deposited and arranged for current reference all the records pertaining to the armies of the United States and which have been the basis of settlement of pensions and other service and war claims amounting to many thousands of millions of dollars. Those for pensions alone have exceeded $4,000,000,000 since the Civil War. This-decision not to compromise this vast business by consolidation was not arrived at without careful study and con- sideration. It was demonstrated to the satisfaction of those in authority at the time, that it would im- pede and impair the proper development of a Gen- eral Staff Corps, along the lines of its most prom- ising usefulness, if it was created out of another de- partment, or through a consolidation of two depart- ments. The necessary legislation was therefore asked for and secured to create an entirely new Gen- eral Staff Corps and to assign to it the duties which, while most important, had long been neglected be- cause they had never, by statute or custom, per- tained to any particular department or part of the army. A careful examination of the duties pre- scribed for the General Staff Corps is sufficient to convince those familiar with the duties and records of the Adjutant General's Department that there is 216 THE GENERAL STAFF CORPS ample employment of a legitimate kind for both corps. We do not consolidate the fire department with the public health or street cleaning departments be- cause of a period of no fires or a smaller number than were expected, and likewise there should be no modification of the General Staff Corps organic act until a fair test has been made covering a sufficient period to eliminate all personal equations, and to obtain a resultant composite picture of the real merits and defects, if any, of the system. The Gen- eral Staff Corps was created mainly as a selected and highly trained body of military experts to plan for war rather than to perform the duties of routine administration, other than that necessary in co- ordinating the work of the line and the several War Department bureaus. There have always been some who advocate amendments to the Constitution whenever its re- strictions prove embarrassing, but as the decades go by it is seen more clearly how very few changes have been really needed. So excellent and long needed a law as that which provided for the estab- lishment of the General Staff Corps should be studied and executed in the good faith advised by Washington in his Farewell Address : "It is important likewise, that the habits of think- ing in a free country would inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration, to confine them- selves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one depart- 217 THE AMEEICAN ARMY ment to encroach upon another. The spirit of en- croachment tends to consolidate the powers of all other departments in one, and thus to create, what- ever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it which predominate in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against invasions of others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern ; some of them in our own country and under our own eyes. . . . But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one in- stance, may be the instrument of good, it is the cus- tomary weapon by which free governments are de- stroyed. The precedent must always greatly over- balance in permanent evil, any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield. ' * xrv THE CORPS OF OFFICERS "It is not my intention to dispute the powers of the President to make this or any other promotion, which his inclination or the solicitation of others may prompt him to; but I will add, without fear of contradiction by any one acquainted with the usage and prescriptive right of armies that if he wishes to preserve the peace and harmony of ours, rules must be observed, and the feel- ings of the officers attended to in promotions. ... As respects myself, I have no object separated from the general welfare to promote. I have no predilections, no prejudices to gratify, no friends, whose interests or views I wish to advance at the expense of propriety." WASHINGTON. SUBSEQUENT to the war with Spain, and after full opportunity for personal observation, Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of War, testified before a committee of Congress, that : ' ' There is not an abler body of men to be found anywhere in the world than the officers of the American Army. ' ' Whether or not this opinion is too exalted, the history of the past fifteen years discloses no call of duty which our officers have failed to meet with courage, intelligence and professional equipment of a high order. Happy augury for the future that, in a country abounding in business opportunities, so many men of established high character, education and honorable ambition continue willing to sacrifice the chances of wealth and ease and submit without 219 THE AMERICAN ARMY murmur to the discomforts and dangers of the mili- tary service. The army in its methods of selection and train- ing of officers and verification of results is on an en- tirely different plane from any other profession. Candidates enter the army as officers through West Point, by service in the ranks, or by direct appoint- ment from civil life and in every case examinations are held to determine their entrance qualifications. Once in the service, the officer is continually tested in the duties of his profession, theoretical as well as practical, in the garrison schools and at the various other army schools. From his entrance into the army as an officer until he has reached the grade of field officer, usually a period of twenty-five years or more for the line, constant instruction and exam- ination are the order of the day, and no officer can be promoted who has not been certified as qualified for the higher office by a board of his superiors in rank. Time and again since the nation assumed the role of a World Power there have been thrust upon ju- nior subalterns the determination of grave ques- tions involving diplomacy, commerce and the law, international, civil and criminal. A correct decision, with prompt and forceful action, may tide over a grave emergency, whilst an honest error may live to mar a record through a lifetime of loyal service. These are the chances that every candidate for a military career must needs take. In taking these professional risks, the young officer, if he anticipates 220 THE CORPS OF OFFICERS a contented life, must accept the general rule and be satisfied with a consciousness of duty honestly per- formed as the highest reward that will come in the majority of cases. If perchance, others of not greater merit be called for important service, he must needs nerve himself against the sting of envy, else it may poison his mind and inspire him with discontent. Despite the small number of chances of obtaining high rank, and with assured prospects of frequent hardships and deprivations, there has never been a time when candidates of approved character and merit were not in waiting for commis- sions in the army. In the army, as in the navy, there are representa- tives of many families which have sent sons of every generation into one or the other, and sometimes both services. Almost without exception these sons may be counted upon for loyal and gallant services because of personal characteristics, as well as pride in the records of their families. Respect for the uniform is usually bred in the bone of these men and they value the privilege of following in their fath- ers' footsteps beyond the opportunities of material success in business. In a nation so much given to genealogical research, in the effort to locate ancestors who have rendered the nation some service, it is remarkable that many men are entirely content with the service of their forebears, and oblivious to the fact that they too might render some public service to which their de- scendants could, in time, point with pride. The cov- 221 THE AMERICAN ARMY eted privilege of membership in one of the numerous patriotic societies seems to satisfy the ambition of altogether too many able-bodied descendants of virile ancestors. The British nobility and landed gentry have ever given not only of their best blood to the army, but have habitually supplied the greater part of the fortunes necessary for the sup- port of the large body of officers. This burden has always been regarded as a patriotic duty to the Crown and, through several centuries, these tradi- tional gentlemen have freely risked and often sac- rificed their lives in protecting the rights of some distant and obscure trader over whom" floated the British flag. Strange to say, that in America those /who by reason of accumulations of property have assumed the role of the leisure class, seldom con- sider the propriety of devoting themselves or their sons to the public service, except as ambassadors or ministers at foreign courts. While it is true that the number of desirable ap- pointive offices has become extremely small because of the constant extension of the civil service sys- tem, there still remain many opportunities of which the sons of the wealthy could avail themselves for rendering public service to the nation. In a country under whose flag enormous fortunes have become the rule, and under whose laws protection is guaranteed to vast aggregations of capital in single families, public opinion should encourage the members of these families to some participation in the govern- ment beyond the mere payment of taxes. The army 222 THE CORPS OF OFFICERS and the navy, through the medium of the national academies, are always open to a considerable num- ber, and many do take advantage of the educational facilities furnished by these institutions; but, with few exceptions, they resign before opportunities for distinction have arrived. Many of the young men of wealth, who have thus quitted an honorable serv- ice which abounds in fine traditions, have taken up active business or professional careers. Others have sacrificed their trained talents to the idle life of the leisure set, which, in America, has few resources worthy of men of their education and character. If more of such men should seek and remain in the service, they would not only honor their families by so doing, but, here and there, opportunities for dis- tinction would come to some, whose names would be inscribed with credit upon the pages of the nation's history. The satisfaction derived from social suc- cesses of an otherwise idle life is as naught com- pared to the pride which comes of having rendered the state some gallant or useful service. Every man physically fit and of proper age, whose titles to property are confirmed and protected by the laws, should not only be ready to take part in the defense of his country, but should regard it as a sol- emn obligation to qualify himself for it by some service in peace in the army, the navy or the active militia. The Constitution rests upon the basic theory that every able-bodied citizen is part of the nation's bulwark, and it should be made impossible that any of those described shall, in future, be al- 223 THE AMERICAN ARMY lowed to avoid service in war. This once adopted as a national policy, those upon whom the call for service would fall would endeavor to qualify for it. There is always an infinite need of educated officers with practical training when war comes. With all the advantages and all the drawbacks weighed in the balance, there remains a goodly mar- gin in favor of the army as a career for a man adapted to the profession of arms. It is entirely possible for a young man to live with decency and credit upon his pay, but a small private income re- moves the anxiety incident to extraordinary and un- foreseen contingencies. There are frequent occa- sions when, as public officials, both army and navy officers become involved in heavy expense which in justice should be met from the public purse. It is to their credit that they generally measure up to such occasions like gentlemen, even though their do- ing so may subsequently involve them in unpalata- ble economy. Altogether, whether in the govern- ment of Indian or Oriental tribes, in the fair and patient handling of angry mobs, in the tender nurs- ing of earthquake sufferers or in the supreme test of battle, the army has ever -conducted itself in a way to deserve well of the country and to encourage those who regard the army as a career. The officers of our army come from the nation at large and should be truly representative. Those who are graduates of the military academy at West Point are accredited mainly to the congressional dis- tricts of all the states and those appointed from the 224 THE COEPS OF OFFICERS ranks and direct from civil life are nearly as widely dispersed as to birth and citizenship. With so use- ful an institution for establishing and moulding the character of young men, it is a national misfortune that all aspirants for army commissions should not have the benefits of the education and training as- sured by the course at West Point. The value of the West Point preparation, in establishing sub- ordination and character, is shown comprehensively by army statistics. Since and including 1890, appointments have been made to the Corps of Engineers and to the line of the army as follows : Graduates from the U. S. Military Academy. . . 1,771 From the ranks of the army 649 From civil life 1,769 Total 4,189 Of these there have been dropped from the rolls by dismissals of courts-martial, for desertion and forced resignations : Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy 17 or about .95 of 1% Appointments from the ranks of the army.. 38 or about 5.5% Appointments from civil life 64 or about 3.6% The records seem to establish that the process of elimination at West Point, before appointment to the responsible position of commissioned officer of the army, is very thorough. As to the initial quali- fications for the military profession upon gradua- tion, there should be no question. As to the results of competition in actual service, the records of the 225 THE AMERICAN ARMY Civil War show that before the four years' struggle had ended the Army Commanders in that great con- flict were Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Meade, Thomas, Schofield, Burnside, Hooker, Rosecrans, McClellan, Halleck, Buell, Ord, Howard, Pope, Slo- cum, Canby, Wright, McDowell and Curtis. Among the Corps Commanders were Reynolds, Newton, Hancock, Couch, Humphreys, Heintzelman, French, Keys, Gordon, Granger, Stanley, Sykes, Warren, Griffin, Smith, Wright, Steele, Reynolds, Parks, Gillmore, Williams, Davis, Smith, Foster, Franklin, Emory, Grover, McCook, Augur, Hartsuff, Gibbon, Weitzell, Stoneman, Pleasanton, Merritt, Wilson and Fits-John Porter. Among the Division Commanders were Double- day, Stevens, Ricketts, Rufus King, Richardson, Webb, Sully, Hays, W., Hays, A., Berry, Prince, Hamilton, Whipple, Elliott, Ward, Casey, Ayres, Morell, McCall, Robinson, Barnes, Getty, Russell, Neill, Seymour, Davidson, Carr, Wilcox, Brannan, Saxton, Ames, Turner, Gordon, Greene, Smith, Baird, Carlin, Morgan, Hazen, Ransom, Martindale, Palmer, Wessels, Sherman, T., Abercrombie, Ruger, Kautz, Jackson, Buford, Gregg, Custer, Kilpatrick, Upton and Mackenzie. All of these were graduates of the military acad- emy. Of their nongraduate brothers-in-arms of the old regular army none were in command of armies, only Sumner commanded a corps, and Kearney and Mower commanded divisions. Given also with equal emphasis in the armies of 226 THE CORPS OF OFFICERS the South and justified by the results of a score of campaigns and of a hundred battles, this is the ver- dict of the greatest of our wars. No lesson in war was ever more clear-cut and decisive. After a des- perate struggle of four years, involving over three millions of combatants, the officers of a little body of ten thousand regulars, almost wholly graduates of the Military Academy at West Point, commanded as Lieutenant or Major Generals every army in the field, nearly all of the army corps, and a large pro- portion of the divisions. In every great battle of that war both sides were commanded by graduates of West Point. It was not only in the Civil War that the West Point training proved its value, for following the Mexican War, General Winfield Scott wrote : "I give as my fixed opinion that, but for our grad- uated cadets, the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more de- feats than victories falling to our share; whereas, in less than two campaigns, we conquered a great country and a peace, without the loss of a single bat- tle or skirmish." On the occasion of the Centennial celebration at West Point in 1902, Hon. Elihu Root said : "All honor to the volunteers who have been and who must always be the main support of our coun- try in war. All honor to the genius, the courage, the self-sacrifice of the men, many of whom I see before me now, who have won immortal renown as 227 THE AMERICAN ARMY generals of the volunteer army. They will be the first to say aye when I declare that the formative power, the high standard of conduct, the informing spirit of every American army is to be found in the regular army of the United States. All honor to the officers of the regular army, who in true republican fashion have worked their way up from the ranks as did Chaffee, Commanding in the Philippines. And all honor to the officers who, turning aside from the allurements of wealth and honor in civil life, have been appointed to the army as civilians, accepting the slender income and the hard life that is known to accompany the duties of a soldier. They will be the first to say aye when I say that the informing spirit, the high standard of the regular army are derived from the graduates, the teachings and the traditions of the Military Academy. Happy augury for the future that here where for a hundred years honor has ever ruled honor made up of courage, truth, compassion, loyalty is to be found the form- ative and controlling power of the American army of the future regular, militia and volunteer. No army inspired by the spirit of the Military Academy can ever endanger a country's liberty or can ever desert its country's flag." Promotion in the army under normal conditions is usually extremely slow. With all the losses inci- dent to the war with Spain, the Philippine cam- paigns and the employment of troops in China, pro- motion has not been accelerated to a point which en- ables an officer to get his eagles and the command of 228 THE CORPS OF OFFICERS a regiment with less than from thirty to thirty-five years of service. For the young lieutenants recently commissioned the climb upward looks interminable, but the element of chance usually plays a prominent part in keeping up an average movement towards the top. The methods of filling vacancies in the low- est grade of commissioned officers is in accord with the American theory that no door of public employ- ment should be closed to any citizen. For nearly a hundred years promotions from the ranks followed the British custom of restriction to meritorious non- commissioned officers who had proved their courage and their ability to command men. Not satisfied with this open door, legislation was enacted so that any private of two years ' service and within certain age limits may compete for a commission in an ex- amination which requires no greater ability than is called for by the entrance examination at the West Point Military Academy. The law was intended to open the door for commissions to all men without possibility of their aspirations being barred by prejudice. Many misfits have resulted and alto- gether the real object of the law to elevate the character of the whole personnel of the ranks has not been realized in the slightest degree. On the contrary, the presence in the ranks of young men, not infrequently the kinsmen of officers, whose sole object is to obtain commissions and who generally elect to serve in particular organizations with ex- pectation of rapid advancement to the noncommis- sioned grades, has a disheartening effect upon 229 THE AMERICAN AEMY other men, particularly the "back-bone" of the army the sterling old noncommissioned officers who, through defective education or over-age, are not qualified to compete in the examinations. Many of these young aspirants for commissions through the ranks adopt that course after failure to obtain appointments as cadets. It would be a real advan- tage to the service if commissions direct from the ranks were reserved for meritorious noncommis- sioned officers of approved courage and exceptional qualifications in control of men, and all young candi- dates, between the ages of 18 and 22, who pass the preliminary examination for enlisted men, should be sent as additional cadets to West Point, where suffi- cient accommodations exist for them, instead of be- ing promoted as commissioned officers. The indi- vidual and the nation would be the gainer by full utilization of the military academy whose product in trained and disciplined men has justified its ex- istence as a business proposition aside from the pub- lic need of a special institution devoted to military instruction in a country whose policy demands a min- imum army. The lesson of all this is clear-cut and decisive. The public welfare demands that the corps of cadets at West Point should comprise the maximum number possible to educate there without changing the stand- ard. A probationary period of appointment should be created for candidates for commissions from other sources in order that every reasonable precaution may be taken to insure the exclusion of demonstrated 230 THE CORPS OF OFFICERS unfitness. It should be borne in mind that waiving defects and deficiencies of candidates results in placing them in line for promotion to the most re- sponsible military office in the army that of colonel of a regiment which in due course will be reached through seniority promotion. While pride in the past glories of the regiment has not departed, the abolition of regimental promotion and the establishment of lineal lists for all grades in each branch of the service artillery, cavalry, in- fantry has tended to create a broader esprit-de- corps of the arm and in fact of the whole army. The old system had its merits but resulted in so much inequality of promotion and in so many cases of ap- parent injustice that few, if any, would discard the new system which has done so much to enlarge the horizon of personal experience, through contact with an ever increasing number of brother officers, as well as in a greatly extended knowledge of the world, geographically and socially. The adoption of lineal promotion has made it possible not only to promote officers in the order of entry into their arm of the service but, through a system of examinations before promotion, to inflict a definite penalty upon those who fail to measure up to the professional require- ments. Under a system of regimental promotion this would be impossible because of the influence of accident of employment and lack of uniformity in the flow of promotion in the several regiments. Following the adoption of lineal promotion came the detail system of staff employment, which has 231 THE AMERICAN ARMY far more merit than has usually been conceded to it. Under this system all the staff corps and de- partments, except the Corps of Engineers, the Med- ical Corps and possibly the Judge Advocate Gen- eral's Department, will be comprised eventually of detailed line officers. As admission to the line of the army is confined to the lowest grade, that of sec- ond lieutenant, and under carefully devised regula- tions for examination before appointment and be- fore each subsequent promotion, eventually all the corps of staff officers will have had previous instruc- tion and experience in the line, and the opportunity for further appointments to important positions in the staff, direct from civil life and based solely upon political influence, will have disappeared. The bringing about of this condition was long and suc- cessfully opposed, the influence thrown against it being strong enough to delay the necessary legisla- tion for half a century. It was primarily a deter- mination to improve the staff corps and depart- ments, in their relation to the needs of the line, that at last brought about the reform. Owing to various increases of the army and fre- quent disturbance of the list of officers available for staff assignments, the full value of the detail sys- tem has been temporarily impaired, but that the principle is correct and its ultimate importance to the army as a fighting machine very great, there can be no reasonable doubt. It is certain that our system of military education and training, up to the point of practical application in the larger organizations 232 THE COEPS OF OFFICERS of divisions and armies, is unexcelled and that American officers generally are splendidly equipped for all duties, line and staff. This has been well exemplified in the very satisfactory performance during the past fifteen years of a wide range of ex- ceptionally difficult and delicate duties arising in the various foreign possessions which have come under our flag and in the Belief Expedition to Pekin, the Pacification of Cuba, services in China, and the long- continued border patrol on the frontiers of Mexico. In making details under the new system to the several staff corps and departments, they were by an administrative order, allotted to the different branches of the line in accordance with their strength of commissioned officers. The law does not require this, it having been intended to leave it within the discretion of the President or his representative, the Secretary of War, to make details in such manner as to prevent radical inequalities of promotion i n the several branches of the line. Questions involving rank and promotion have been prolific sources of appeals, decisions and acts of Congress since the days of the Revolution. More heart-burnings have been caused by actual or imag- ined wrongs in that regard than from probably any other cause, and some of the deepest grievances have come from injuries arising from efforts to repair presumed wrongs in other cases. Prior to the establishment of the detail system in 1901, scarcely any administration passed into his- tory without influence being brought to bear to ad- 233 THE AMERICAN ARMY vance some officer over others without reference to or involving the question of merit. For many years appointments and promotions to the staff de- partments were regarded in the same light as other patronage, but from time to time the field of selec- tion was limited by statutes until finally in 1894 it was enacted that: "Hereafter all appointments to fill vacancies in the lowest grade of the Adjutant General 's, the Inspector General's, the Quarter- master's and Subsistence Departments, respectively, shall be made from the next lowest grade in the line of the army." When the usual reorganization of the army fol- lowing a war took place in 1901, tremendous pres- sure was brought to bear to have officers with brief service in the volunteers appointed in the regulars with rank above those of long, faithful and excel- lent service. It was successful to a degree in the staff departments, with the result that some com- paratively young men soon reached the highest grades of field officer without having served at all in the line of the army. The light in which army pat- ronage is viewed at such times may be illustrated by citing some of the appointments made. Among the faithful White House employees during the war with Spain were an executive clerk, a telegraph operator and a doorkeeper; the clerk was commissioned a captain in the Pay Department, the telegraph op- erator a captain in the Signal Corps, with tem- porary rank of lieutenant colonel, and the door- keeper was appointed a military storekeeper with 234 THE CORPS OF OFFICERS rank of captain and subsequently through the op- eration of an act of Congress reached the rank of major in the regular army. When the war with Spain began there were many officers in the army who had served as lieutenants more than twenty years before reaching the grade of captain. In urging the interchangeable or detail system of staff employment, the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, said: "I have found many cases of officers who have been doing their duty silently and uncomplainingly, asking no favors and having no friends at court, out on the frontier, enduring the hardships of army life, and who have the feeling that men get appointments here at Washington, and they are at the center of things and know the President and the Secretary of War and the Senators and Members of Congress, and that they can get about what they want. The feeling is that the staff officers constitute a close cor- poration here, with all the luxuries, and the privi- leges and all the power. I think it will be beneficial to every branch of the service to have the men who have been in the staff offices in Washington going back into the line, and that the instruction and the kindly feeling and the better understanding which will be produced by that will be a great benefit." In advocating in the Senate the adoption of the detail system and abolition of permanent staff com- missions, Senator Proctor, formerly Secretary of War, said: "When a vacancy occurs in the staff the promo- 235 THE AMERICAN AEMY tions are made regularly and an appointment is made at the foot of the list. Less care is used than would be in an appointment to a higher place. The scramble for the place commences months before the vacancy actually occurs. It is a mere statement of fact to say that the man who has the strongest pull usually gets the place. Senator A or Senator B has a relative or a constituent with powerful in- fluence behind him, and he demands the appoint- ment and gets it. The appointee has received a pro- motion of a grade, not upon merit, but by influence, and in doing it has jumped many of his fellow-offi- cers. No system could be better calculated to kill ambition. Under a detail system a good officer would doubtless be selected early and serve on dif- ferent staff corps and have the all around training so important for high command. ' * If the introduction of the detail system in the staff corps and departments accomplishes nothing more than the elimination of the heart-burnings arising from such conditions, it will have justified itself. Promotion by selection is now confined solely to the grade of major general and brigadier general, except in the Judge Advocate General 's department. This method has resulted in some junior officers be- ing appointed to the rank of general because, as given out at the time, they could not be appointed or advanced to any intervening grade as a reward for gallant and distinguished service. This is a serious matter and one easily remedied without the aboli- 236 THE CORPS OF OFFICERS tion of seniority promotion for the army generally. Should Congress be asked to enact a law granting the power to the President to reward gallantry and achievements of recognized excellence in active service in the field during war by promotion to the next higher grade, and provide that officers so ad- vanced shall be carried as extra numbers in the higher grade and not retard the regular flow of seniority promotion, there would be every probabil- ity of securing action, for there could be no legiti- mate objection on the part of the army. To understand that the fears of the line officers absent from the circle of personal acquaintance and influence are not without some justification, it is only necessary to review the selection promotions since the war with Spain. Since the reorganization of the army in 1901, there have been one lieutenant general and nine major generals appointed by se- lection from chiefs of bureaus, including chiefs of artillery, serving at the War Department. Of these five were retired immediately following their advancement and five were assigned to line duty as general officers. As this left several chiefs of bu- reaus without promotion to the highest grade, in- fluence was brought to bear upon Congress and a special act was passed which, by a peculiar arrange- ment of language, provided for advancing four other chiefs of bureaus with rank of brigadier general to the rank of major general, upon retirement. During the same period forty-four officers of the permanent staff were promoted to be brigadier gen- 237 THE AMEEICAN ARMY erals, five of whom were assigned to duty in the line under their new commissions. Colonels of the line very naturally complain that their chances of ever reaching the grade of general officer are materially lessened by such appointments and have been prac- tically a unit in desiring legislation to restrict pro- motions to the position of general officer to officers of the line, as promotions to chiefs of bureaus have been restricted by law to officers holding permanent commissions in the staff corps. There are only six major generals and fifteen brigadiers for duty with the line, and it may readily be seen how colonels of regiments should feel aggrieved at each" diminution of already slender opportunities for advancement. Such conditions in the army, particularly that of a Republic with a regulated civil service, are sources of constant discontent, and it was to get rid of the possibility of such things in the future, and to re- lieve the President of some of the solicitation for preferment, that laws were recommended to and en- acted by Congress to limit future appointments in the army to the lowest grades of the line and to sup- ply the officers for the several staff departments by details from appropriate grades of the line. There is still another reform necessary, in order that all candidates for commissions as lieutenants of the line may receive like treatment. If a cadet at the military academy is pronounced deficient upon his final examination, which determines whether he shall be recommended for appointment 238 THE CORPS OF OFFICERS to the grade of second lieutenant, there is no possi- bility of the deficiency being waived by the Secre- tary of War. The practice of waiving defects, both mental and physical, of those examined for appoint- ment from civil life became so common diiring the Spanish War period as to be fraught with serious consequences, because the second lieutenant of to- day becomes in future the commander of a regiment by the process of seniority promotion. Various laws have since been passed in the effort to regulate ap- pointments to the army but no regulations hold in the face of influence, and consequently nearly every competitive examination for appointments to the grade of second lieutenant has met with the same fate overruling of boards, changing of marks and waiving of mental and physical disqualifications. Until Congress specifically enacts that the results of competitive examinations shall have the sanctity of law, and not be subject to review or waiver by higher authority, there need be no expectation of a change of the evil practice. The War Department authorities are possessed of full power to prescribe the character of the examinations and having exer- cised that power no subsequent interference is de- manded by any public interests. The integrity of the corps of officers constitutes the foundation stone of efficiency. The removal of their first commis- sions from even a suspicion of influence will be of marked value in the course of time. In 1857, when one of the periodic efforts to im- 239 THE AMERICAN ARMY prove the service was being made, the Secretary of War invited attention to what he considered defects of organization and said : "One of the greatest errors of detail is the sep- arate, independent character of our staff corps. This removes them from their proper position as aids or assistants to the commander, and consti- tutes them his equals. It contracts the sphere of ob- servation, and experience, and thus unfits the officer for change or advancement, and begets an accumu- lation of precedent and prerogative at war with the vital principle of military organization -the inviola- ble and undivided authority of the head. "A general provision dispensing with the staff bureaus and giving the President authority to reg- ulate the duties on the principles above stated, and to transfer, when necessary, officers to and from the line and staff, would restore the institution to its proper effectiveness. "We have retained another fault, abandoned, at least practically, in almost every service among civ- ilized nations, even the most aristocratic and mon- archical. This is promotion by seniority. Age and experience should bring excellence ; but the test lies in the actual possession of the latter, and not merely in the circumstances which, it is assumed, should produce it. Seniority, with the requirements essen- tial for position, ought certainly to give precedence ; but, without these, that dignity and respect which belong to rank and command can never be secured. "All that has been urged in favor of retaining it 240 THE CORPS OP OFFICERS with us is the danger of political or personal favor governing a selection. There may be danger from this source ; but, by the rule of seniority, the worst officer of the army must, if he lives, come to be one of the most important and responsible officers under the government the colonel of a regiment. By se- lection, it is possible that the very best may not al- ways be chosen, though the chances are in favor of this hypothesis ; but certainly, the very worst never will be, and this is surely a gain on the present rule." Congress has given the army the full power to eliminate the quite inconsiderable number of officers who fail to measure up to the established standards of examinations for promotion and boards have only to remember that each time an officer of doubtful aptitude and efficiency secures an advanced grade, he is one step nearer the command of a regiment and has acquired an additional appeal to sentiment and sympathy of the next board, by reason of longer service. The desirability of having none but the most com- petent in the higher grades of the army needs no ar- gument. The defectiveness of a system which ad- mits of a single incompetent officer arriving, through the process of seniority, at the head of a regiment is equally obvious. The power of influence, personal, social and political, has been in evidence too long to have escaped the attention of even the trusting and generous natures which so much abound among the officers, and at no period have they been willing to hazard their careers by selection promotion under 241 THE AMERICAN ARMY any system of efficiency ratings or boards yet de- vised. It sometimes happens that at about forty-five or fifty years of age a lethargic condition takes posses- sion of an individual and progress seems arrested. No further examinations, perhaps, being required, it is possible for an officer so afflicted to drift along without committing himself in any way, until, through seniority, he reaches the grade of colonel. Such cases are rare, but the government is justified in protecting itself against such an occurrence be- cause the colonel absolutely controls the welfare and training of from 1,200 to 2,000 officers and men. It is entirely probable that a limited system of se- lection, applicable to the grade of lieutenant colonel only, would commend itself to the army. If upon the occurrence of a vacancy in the grade of colonel in any branch of the army, a board of three colonels of that arm of the service be constituted to examine into the records, personality, temperament and pro- fessional equipment of the senior lieutenant colo- nels and to recommend whether the senior should be promoted, it would tend to assure that none but physically and mentally alert officers would com- mand. It should be provided that in event the senior lieutenant colonel is not deemed qualified to com- mand, he shall be promoted and retired. The num- ber who may be passed over should be limited to three, or at most, five, so as to keep in mind that the system is to insure active colonels and not to create promotions for deserving officers lower down on the 242 THE CORPS OF OFFICERS lists. By starting this system with an examination of all colonels and retirement of any not deemed qualified to command a war strength regiment, it would then be entirely safe to establish promotions to the grade of brigadier general by seniority in the lists of colonels. This would confine selection pro- motions to the two most important grades, those of major general and colonel, carrying normally the command of a division and a regiment, respectively, the two important administrative and tactical or- ganizations in our service. In our navy, seniority prevails throughout and from the splendid character of service always rendered by that branch of the service, we may justly conclude that mediocrity would never prevail in the army under the seniority rule, with limited selection in the two most impor- tant grades. XV ARMY SCHOOLS "The establishment of an institution of this kind (military academy) upon a respectable and extensive basis, has ever been considered by me as an object of primary importance to this country." WASHINGTON. IT IS a common observation, that practical quali- ties in a soldier are more important than a knowledge of theory. The very trutn" of this has sometimes been made the excuse for indolence, which, except in rare and gifted individuals, may destroy efficiency. Other things being equal, the of- ficer who keeps his mind alert by intellectual enter- prise, and who systematically studies the reasons of action and the conditions and difficulties with which he may have to deal, will develop into the stronger practical man and better soldier. The necessity for the soldier, above all others, being familiar with the history and imbued with the spirit of our institu- tions, lends encouragement to and indicates the im- portance of thorough and broad education for mili- tary officers. Theoretical study is of moment in any profession, but in the army, which makes immediate application of every scientific device, a knowledge of theory is indispensable. To be an ordinary line officer one need not be a distinguished scientist but to be a good 244 ARMY SCHOOLS line officer one can not have too much knowledge of science, the law, business and the various trades, for all have more or less application to military purposes. The primary and essential qualifications for a good officer are an ability and aptitude to com- mand men and to get the utmost limit of endurance from them, willingly, when the service demands it. This can come only to those to whom the men in the ranks attribute the possession of professional abil- ity, coupled with common sense and judgment. A small knowledge of the duties of a general is not of so much consequence to a lieutenant, as a large and varied knowledge of small things useful in the in- struction and care of his men. Arising from the practice and traditions of the British service, it was long the custom in our army to depend largely upon drill sergeants, but with the passing of the rough and ready period the necessity for a different school of training became obvious. It is recognized that mere knowledge of theory is of little value to the army of- ficer unless he has the power of practical applica- tion. It has been found that the applicatory system of education is best adapted to post graduate work of the army and wherever possible that method is employed. The large influx of young men appointed from civil life, from the ranks of the army, and from volun- teers with brief service in the war with Spain, made it necessary to rearrange and extend the system of instruction of officers, not only to develop their ca- pacity for higher grades but to prepare them for 245 THE AMERICAN ARMY the duties of the grades to which they had been ap- pointed. Prior to the war with Spain a system of lyceum instruction was established at all army sta- tions with a view to affording opportunities for pro- fessional improvement. After a considerable trial it became evident that no uniformity of results could be expected from a system which was greatly de- pendent upon the personality of the various com- manding officers. After careful consideration it was decided to abandon the lyceum system and to establish a more comprehensive scheme, under which every officer entering the service is required to establish his qualifications to perform the duties of his office and his fitness is made a matter of rec- ord. There has long been established in the regular army a system of examinations for promotion which has no connection with the scheme of instruction. The legal machinery in connection with these exam- inations, however, is expected to play an important part in ridding the service of any individual officer, should inefficiency be developed during the progress of the general plan of education and training, estab- lished in the garrison and service schools. While certain principles remain fixed the rapid progress in the development of materials causes rad- ical changes in methods of making war. In our army it has been found necessary to have post grad- uate instruction in many forms to keep pace with modern improvements. The military educational system now comprises : 246 ARMY SCHOOLS The Military Academy for cadets at West Point. The Army War College. The Army Staff College. The Army School of the Line. The Coast Artillery School. The Engineer School. The Mounted Service School. The Army Medical School. The Army Signal School. The Army Field Engineer School. The Army Field Service School for Medical Of- ficers. The School of Musketry. The Field Artillery School of Fire. There are also schools for training bakers and cooks for the army. At each military post a gar- rison school for instruction of officers and a school for the instruction of enlisted men are maintained. The educational scheme contemplates that begin- ning his career in the garrison school every officer shall be required to fit himself thoroughly for the responsible duties of his grade, including familiar- ity with company and post administration and that of the staff and supply service. Those officers who exhibit the most aptitude in the garrison schools are regarded as having a right to precedence when se- lections from their grade are made for attendance at the Army School of the Line. Similarly selections are here made for the advanced course in the Army Staff College. Eventually the distinguished gradu- ates of the Staff College, after a tour of service with 247 THE AMERICAN ARMY their regiments, are destined for participation in the course of study at the Army War College where they will have an opportunity not only to observe the work of the General Staff in connection with war plans but also to participate in similar studies. In this way it is expected that the nation will eventually have at its disposal a highly trained body of officers whose qualifications are a matter of official record based upon progressive work. The rapid development of modern science, as ap- plied to the art of war, caused the establishment some years ago of various special service schools which now form an important part of the general system. The intricate machinery of modern, high- power, coast defense guns and the problems of sub- marine defense necessitate a scientific training for the economical and proper management of this ex- pensive arm of the service and this is supplied at the coast artillery school in the most approved man- ner. The Mounted Service School is utilized for cav- alry and horse artillery and not only serves as a school of application but embraces a school of equitation which is gradually establishing a high standard of horsemanship and developing some offi- cers to a degree entitling them to rank amongst the very small number in the world in the class of horse- masters, which includes far more than mere ability to ride and train a remount. Here also are main- tained schools for farriers and horseshoers which have given the army standards of work equal to any 248 ARMY SCHOOLS in the world and far superior to that found in the average civil community. The Army Signal School is a valuable adjunct to that branch of the service and has been of great as- sistance in training experts, as well as in perfecting material, and has resulted, on the whole, in the line of the army having a most perfect and satisfactory system of field communication, the equal of any in the world. Other nations have expended funds more lavishly for aeroplane work since our army initiated it, but the full measure of usefulness of aeroplanes has not yet been determined. No large force can be moved in modern war without discovery. Most important and satisfactory results have been de- rived from ground lines and the portable wireless system of communication within the limits of our own forces. The Staff Corps have their special arrangements for instruction of their own officers in the Engineer, the Field Engineer, the Medical and the Army Field Service School for Medical Officers, all of which maintain standards well abreast of anything in mod- ern armies. Officers of the organized militia are admitted to the various schools provided they are qualified to undertake the course with profit. The history of our country points clearly to the fact that at the outbreak of every war there is a demand for trained officers far beyond the supply. Upon the reorganization of the army following the war with Spain a large number of young volun- teer officers who had seen service in the field were 249 THE AMERICAN ARMY appointed in the regular army. It was very essen- tial that these officers should be grounded in the the- ories of the profession in order to qualify them for their duties and for the examinations required for the higher grades. The whole scheme of army post graduate and other schools results from a fixed policy, the object of which is to make our small army as perfect as pos- sible not only in the performance of its own duties but in its capacity as instructor for the greater army of citizen soldiers necessary in every war of magni- tude. In striving to meet the demands of drnew era, dif- fering widely from conditions during the period of the Indian Wars, the War College Board was created soon after the termination of the war with Spain. The duties imposed upon this board were almost wholly of the character of general staff employment. The senior officers of our army had long been occu- pied quite exclusively in the details of administra- tion, with inadequate opportunity for the study of the broader military problems/ the consideration of plans for future campaigns and the coordination of the many military agencies involved in the harmo- nious employment of an army. Out of these efforts to meet properly a genuine need have come the sys- tem of post graduate schools, the War College and the General Staff Corps. Appreciation of the opportunities afforded our offi- cers for perfecting their military education is con- stantly shown by the results of their work. In the 250 ARMY SCHOOLS war with Spain and the subsequent insurrection the value of the education and training previously given was manifested by the splendid manner in which they performed every military duty and the success with which they assumed the new and grave respon- sibilities involved in civil functions in recently occu- pied territory of an unfamiliar and resourceful enemy. The delicate situations constantly arising under a military government of an alien civil com- munity, just emerging from insurrection, can only be appreciated by those who have carried the weight of responsibility. It is to the credit of the army and the nation that the American officers not only meas- ured up to all the scientific requirements of their profession, but that during the long period between the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of civil government the affairs of 8,000,000 Orientals were administered by them with the integrity and fidelity only found in those who serve without mer- cenary ends and for the reward of a consciousness of duty well done. A nation which can continue to com- mand such service is to be congratulated. XVI THE TRIUMPH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE "It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence." WASHINGTON. WHEN war with Spain was declared, those in authority did not contemplate an immediate movement in force upon Cuba, for the climate of that island in midsummer was regarded with particular aversion. But the destiny of nations conforms not always to the schemes of men and so when Cevera's fleet appeared in the harbor of Santiago the depar- ture of the army was hastened and the downfall of Spanish power followed almost immediately. The army, with a marvelous burst of energy, had driven home the attack at Santiago and by its lavish ex- penditure of strength, under conditions of peculiar hardship, laid itself bare to the insidious fevers of that tropical island. The occupation of Cuba without undue delay be- came a necessity. The problems of sanitation and disease prevention became at once far more formid- able than ever before in the history of our army. 252 THE TRIUMPH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE Disease has always been the scourge of armies and to such a degree that those who have marched and engaged in battle have, at times, suffered less than those subjected to the monotonous routine of crowded camps. Yellow fever, the most dreaded scourge of the West Indies, was not slow in making its appearance and its victims numbered some of the bravest and most honored of the invading army. And yet fur- ther sacrifice was demanded in order that the history of the scourge might be traced beyond doubt. Courage far greater than that called for in battle was now demanded and it is to the honor and glory of American arms that volunteers were found to sub- mit themselves to the anxiety, pain and horrors of the experiments which in the end have placed civil- ization under a debt of gratitude to the army in gen- eral, and especially to Walter Eeed, Carroll, Lazear and their confreres, whose names and fame will go down the centuries with the veneration due to men who have accomplished things worth while. It had become essential, before any real con- structive w r ork could be done, that the mysteries of propagation of yellow fever should be determined. After a series of experiments remarkable alike in their inception and successful culmination, the cul- prit mosquito was run to cover. Not only was the military occupation of Cuba made possible but also the fulfillment of the dream of the centuries that of the construction of the Panama Canal. In the past so helpless were we in the face of yellow fever that 253 THE AMERICAN ARMY the arrival of a single case at one of our Gulf ports was sufficient to cause immediate establishment of a physical line of quarantine backed by fear and fire- arms. While the army was struggling with the problems of sanitation in the islands over which our flag floated in the wake of war, the nation at home was aroused over the hysterical reports of death and sickness in the great volunteer camps. Typhoid fever had run its rampant course and the only imme- diate remedy seemed to lie in dispersing the troops as rapidly as possible. Out of this experience was born the determination to prevent such Conditions in future, but the requirements of successful sanitation have ever demanded labor beyond the voluntary ef- forts of those whom it was designed to protect. The story of unhealthy camps has ever been the same. It is only in the very recent past that medical science has made known the possibility of preserving health through careful attention to well known laws of sanitation. The cost in death and broken health of its younger men in each war has been a serious draft upon the vitality of the nation. An officer in the mobilization camp of General Zachary Taylor's army on the Rio Grande, in 1846, recorded conditions in his diary which states : "The mortality in our camp at Camargo was ap- palling. The dead march was ever wailing in our ears, and even at this distant period I can scarcely look back to our brief stay there without a shudder. 254 THE TRIUMPH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE At almost every hour of the day funeral escorts of various regiments might be seen following the bod- ies of departed comrades to that vast and common cemetery, the chaparral, where officers and men, 'in dust, without distinction, lie.' The large hospital tents were constantly full the dead being removed at sunrise and sunset, but to make room for the dying. " The hospital and pension records of the Civil War disclose a story of disease only exceeded in pathos by the silent bivouac of unknown dead in the national cemeteries. Had the armies of that period been con- centrated in the proportions now common in great wars, the conditions would have been correspond- ingly worse. And amongst all diseases of camp and hospital none was more to be deplored than typhoid fever. But the science of investigation has once more gained the victory and by means of anti- typhoid inoculation a remarkable degree of immu- nity has been established. The immense advance in camp sanitation and the great value of typhoid inoculation as a protective measure may be illustrated by comparing the expe- rience of the Maneuver Division of Regulars in Texas, during its concentration from March until August 1911, with that of the Second Division, Sev- enth Army Corps, which was organized at Jackson- ville, Florida, about June 1, 1898, and remained there in camp until October. This division was not con- spicuous in its typhoid record for that time, and is 255 THE AMERICAN ARMY selected because of the close similarity of its condi- tions of service to those of the Maneuver Division in Texas. The two divisions were encamped in nearly the same latitude and for about the same length of time. Each had a good camp site and an artesian water supply of unimpeachable purity. While the period in camp of the Second Division, Seventh Army Corps, was later in the year, the number of men in the Maneuver Division was larger. Table showing for the regiments of the Second Division of the Seventh Army Corps, assembled at Jacksonville, Fla., the mortality and morbidity from typhoid fever : Regiments Mean Strength Cases of Typhoid Fever Deaths from Typhoid Fever Deaths from all Diseases a I E O fl S '3-ao * a n <- 8* Second Illinois 1,095 1,164 1,153 1,232 1,097 1,288 1,220 1,274 1,236 253 147 185 209 164 153 105 135 378 341 227 318 311 253 248 152 231 612 18 16 29 46 33 18 17 21 60 22 20 32 48 33 28 20 28 50 First North Carolina Second New Jersey First Wisconsin Fiftieth Iowa Ninth Illinois Second Virginia Fourth Virginia Forty-ninth Iowa Total 10,759 1,729 2,693 248 281 Table showing for the organizations composing the Maneuver Division at San Antonio, Texas, the 256 THE TRIUMPH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE morbidity and mortality from typhoid fever, March 10 to July 10, 1911: Organization Mean Strength June Cases of Typhoid Fever Cer. and Prob. Deaths from Typhoid Fever Deaths from all Diseases Eleventh infantry 924 Fifteenth infantry 969 2 Eighteenth infantry 1,022 Thirteenth infantry 929 Twenty-second infantry 1 033 Tenth infantry 1 016 1 Seventeenth infantry 954 Twenty-eighth infantry 951 Third field artillery 847 2 Fourth field artillery. . . . 741 1 Engineer battalion 536 1 Signal corps 197 Ninth cavalry 744 Eleventh cavalry 1 143 3 Sanitary troops 795 1* 1 Total 12,801 1 11 *This patient, a private of the hospital corps, had not completed his immunization, having taken only two doses. The case was very mild and would perhaps have been overlooked but for the rule that blood cultures were made in all cases of fever of over forty-eight hours' duration. The Widal reaction has no diag- nostic value in immunized persons, as all respond to it. Forty- nine cases of typhoid fever, with nineteen deaths, were reported as occurring in the city of San Antonio during this period. The health of military commands is usually meas- ured by the constantly non-effective rate which rep- resents the average number constantly sick in each thousand men. This was for the Maneuver Division twenty-two per thousand, which can be better ap- 257 THE AMERICAN AEMY predated when it is stated that the rate was thirty- four for all troops in the United States for the year 1910. This epoch-making achievement was not ac- complished by merely waving a magician's wand but through the generous cooperation of line officers and men and employees of every grade, with the medical officers and sanitary squads, for the proper sanita- tion of crowded camps involves far more of practice than theory. As to the spirit which pervaded the command, the sanitary inspector has reported: "The sanitary inspector usually dealt directly with the regimental sanitary officer and was accom- panied by him on his inspections. The- latter was held responsible for the sanitary conditions of his camp, and if sanitary defects were found, he was considered to be at fault unless he could show that he had made proper efforts to have them corrected. "If the regimental surgeon was unable to bring about a correction of the defects, the matter was taken up by the sanitary inspector with regimental authorities. It is interesting to note that it was never necessary for the sanitary inspector formally to use the authority granted him by the com- manding general. It seemed to be well understood that the sanitary inspector was only insisting that the commanding general 's orders be carried out, and it was always possible to arrive at a satisfactory un- derstanding without friction or controversy. "With few exceptions, organization commanders were more than willing to carry out any directions or suggestions concerning ways and means of pre- 258 THE TRIUMPH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE serving the health of the commands. Considerable difficulty was encountered at first in putting the scheme of sanitation into effect, largely on account of a lack of appreciation of the necessity and pur- pose of the measures prescribed." Immediately upon mobilization of the division, or- ders were given making typhoid inoculation compul- sory and the results have not only justified the ac- tion, but fixed a model for future camps. The area available for the encampment was very restricted. With the infantry division were two regiments of cavalry, about the equal of a European cavalry divi- sion; two regiments of field artillery, a battalion of engineers with a ponton train, ambulance and field hospital companies, all of which were accompanied with wagon and pack train transportation. To pro- vide immediately for the proper sanitation of the camp, the following instructions were promulgated : " General Orders, ''No. 2. 1 l HEADQUAKTERS MANEUVER DIVISION, * ' SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS. "March 11, 1911. "The following regulations for camp sanitation are published for the information and guidance of all concerned : * ' 1. The chief surgeon is charged with the general conduct and supervision of the medical department in the performance of its duties, and will make such assignment of personnel as may be required. 259 THE AMERICAN ARMY "2. The sanitary inspector is charged especially with the supervision of the sanitation of the camp. It is the duty of commanders to remedy defects re- ported to them by the inspector. "3. The camp water supply is pure and whole- some and no sterilization of drinking water is neces- sary. Precaution must be taken, however, to pre- vent subsequent contamination by keeping all con- tainers scrupulously clean and protected from dust and other sources of infection. "4. The senior medical officer of each command will make at least one inspection daily of the com- mand to which attached, and report any-sanitary de- fects, with proper recommendations to remedy the same, to his commanding officer, who will immedi- ately take the necessary steps for their correction, if within his authority. If beyond his facilities, or if considered impracticable, he will immediately for- ward the report, with full remarks, for action of higher authority. "5. Organization commanders will be held re- sponsible for the police of their respective camps. Each company or similar organization will construct incinerators as prescribed in Section 216, Field Service Regulations, for the disposal of all solid and liquid garbage of the organization, and no other dis- position will be made of such wastes. Human waste will be disposed of in pits provided with latrine boxes unless other provision has been made. Two urinal cans will be placed in each company street at night. Latrine pits will be burned out, and seats 260 THE TRIUMPH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE scrubbed daily ; crude oil and straw or other material will be used. Urinal cans will be burned out daily and bottoms covered with milk of lime before put in use. Defilement of the ground in or about the camp is absolutely prohibited. Manure will be hauled to a designated dumping ground, and there burned with the aid of crude oil. Rock pit crematories will be used for disposal of general wastes of camp areas not under the jurisdiction of commanding officers. "6. No food, drinks, or like commodities will be sold in camp except in the authorized exchanges. ' * 7. Sanitary squads composed of medical officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates of the hos- pital corps will be organized by the chief surgeon. The sanitary squad will supervise and assist in the disposal of camp wastes. Civilians employed as san- itary laborers will be employed by the quartermas- ter's department and turned over to the medical de- partment. The sanitary police officer will make requisition on the chief quartermaster for such transportation, labor, or material as may be needed. When assigned to this service they will not be di- verted to other uses except by order from these headquarters. "By Command of Major General Carter: "STEPHEN C. MILLS, ' ' Colonel, General Staff, "Chief of Staff." It was clearly comprehended that conditions on the Mexican border might eventuate in the troops 261 THE AMERICAN ARMY comprising the Maneuver Division being called upon for active field service, and it was inadvisable to in- augurate the system involving the expensive and cumbersome incinerators and other patent devices experimented with at camps of instruction in recent years. There was no transportation available to carry along the heavy and bulky apparatus and it was not desired, for many reasons, to increase ma- terially the transportation accompanying the com- mand. It was, therefore, decided that no methods should be employed which would require material change when the troops should proceed upon the march, else time would be wasted and -disaster in- vited. All apparatus connected with the sanitary system was of the simplest kind and within the labor and capacity of troops to install quickly. Storage of garbage and kitchen slops in receptacles was forbid- den. The old camp custom of burying garbage was dispensed with, for such pits become breeding places for myriads of flies. Open pits lined with small boulders, with a continuous fire, were found entirely efficacious for destruction of kitchen garbage, but on account of the incessant rains, simple forms of cov- ered incinerators were constructed and used by some organizations while in the permanent camp. The handling and storing of refuse near the kitch- ens pollutes the ground, attracts flies and furnishes them breeding places. If the garbage is hauled away in cans or carts it is practically impossible to prevent it being slopped over, with consequent ground pollution and attraction of flies. Fire alone 262 THE TRIUMPH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE seems to solve the question of its immediate and proper disposal in the vicinity of kitchens. The past ten years have given a very extended ex- perience to army veterinarians, not only in our own country but in tropical islands, and they have be- come familiar with all known diseases of animals, many of the most serious of which have never been introduced in this country. There were more than 6,000 horses and mules distributed through the camp of the Maneuver Division, tied at picket lines. Very few regimental veterinarians were present and an improvised corps was created through temporary employment of additional civilian veterinarians. The experience of the division was similar to that of the Civil War where, in the final analysis of records, it was found that in our country armies require one horse or mule to every two men in campaign. The animals of the Maneuver Division were exposed from the very first to most inclement weather, con- sisting of a series of northers, accompanied by cold rains, making the surrounding soil a sea of mud. It required incessant labor to ditch and partially drain the ground around the picket lines without conducting the contents amongst the adjoining tents of the troops and, often, for days at a time, the ani- mals were forced to stand in mud above their fet- locks. Such conditions not only subjected the ani- mals to the grave danger of being rendered unserv- iceable by "thrush" and a disease of the heels known as "scratches," but made it more difficult to maintain a good sanitary condition of the camp. 263 THE AMERICAN AEMY Owing to the receipt of frequent shipments of ani- mals from large sales depots, some diseases were introduced in the camp, but although glanders pre- vailed constantly in the vicinity, it was excluded by a rigid system of inspection of all animals entering the camp limits. Of the more than 6,000 horses and mules with the division, 562 were treated at the im- provised canvas hospital of which 201 were suffer- ing from shipping fever, strangles and kindred dis- eases, and 361 were invalided because of injuries and lameness. The loss of animals treated at the hospital during the existence of the division was twenty-nine, being five and one-sixteenth per cent, of those admitted and less than one-half of one per cent, for the whole number of horses and mules pres- ent in the camp during its existence of five months. The picket lines were stretched between com- pactly camped regiments and their cleanliness was an essential part of the sanitary system. The ref- use from the picket lines was disposed of by haul- ing to a dump several miles from camp where it was destroyed by burning with crude oil. The ground about the picket lines was carefully swept and once a week hay was spread over the surface and burned to destroy any larvae of flies which had found lodgment there. No new sanitary principles were attempted but only a scientific application of well-known methods used at various times. There was some perturba- tion because some recently patented, expensive and cumbersome appliances, adapted for permanent camps, were not put in use, but the results proved 264 THE TRIUMPH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE that our army tactical unit the division may camp and march in comparative immunity from disease with little, if any, more impedimenta than was car- ried during the Civil War. The simplicity and prac- ticability of the methods used appealed strongly to experienced soldiers and enlisted their zeal in car- rying them out. Efficient sanitary schemes can best be formulated and carried out under the direction of specially trained medical officers, having a knowl- edge of the origin, nature and diffusion of infectious diseases, and the proper methods of combating each. The early detection and prompt isolation of infec- tious diseases is absolutely necessary to prevent epi- demics. The results of the scientific system em- ployed speak for themselves in a record previously unequalled as regards healthfulness and simplicity of methods, and at a cost a mere fraction of that in- volved at some maneuver camps. In 1913, the Second Division was concentrated about Galveston Bay with a view to service over-sea, but was kept in that vicinity throughout the year. The main camp site at Texas City was to all appear- ances far less favorable than that occupied by the Maneuver Division in 1911, but with the immediate adoption of the same sanitary rules and the use of the anti-typhoid inoculation, the 12,000 men were enabled to continue their field training through the varied weather, winter and summer, with a remarka- ble health record. The results obtained in these two divisions may be achieved by other commands with the same care and labor. And in other lines the battle for prevention of dis- 265 THE AMERICAN ARMY ease has been waged and nowhere with more re- markable results than by the army in Porto Rico and the Philippines where parasitic infection is giving way to the regeneration of the afflicted people. One of the most remarkable incidents in medical history is that involved in the regeneration of the old Span- ish prison called Bilibid, in Manila. The mortality here had reached the abnormal proportions of 238 per 1,000. Through relief from overcrowding, im- proved diet and proper sanitation, the rate was re- duced to 70 per 1,000, where it remained until an examination of the 3,500 remaining prisoners dis- closed that eighty-four per cent, were^ afflicted with intestinal parasites ; fifty per cent, with two varieties and twenty per cent, with three or more. Of the whole number fifty-two per cent, were afflicted with hookworm disease. Proceeding then with proper treatment the death rate in this prison, with a pre- vious record rivaling that reported of the Black Hole of Calcutta, the death rate fell to thirteen per 1,000. This disclosed not only the previous foul- ness of a prison and the victory of science, but sug- gested the broadening field of usefulness of prevent- ive medicine to restore vigor to thousands of weak- lings ignorant of the sapping of life 's blood and en- ergy. War loses some of its terrors when the ex- perience flowing from it discloses so signal a triumph of medical science in prevention of diseases whose toll of death in the past has rivaled that of bullets. XVII THE ORGANIZED MILITIA "To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year." WASHINGTON. THE terms "Organized Militia'* and "National Guard" have been adopted officially to desig- nate those state military organizations which par- ticipate in the appropriations by Congress and to differentiate them from the untrained body of citi- zens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five available as militia or levies in mass. There is a wide variation in the strength, discipline and effect- iveness of the state forces. Some states have prac- tically no troops at all, while others have regularly organized brigades and divisions. These latter are the organizations which have shared in the appro- priations provided by Congress, and which have been declared by the attorney-general in an opinion rendered February 17, 1912, as not being available for national service beyond our borders. The na- tional guard of many states has long since reached a degree of instruction which has caused them justly to resent being classed as militia in the old accepta- tion of the word, and the decision of the attorney- general that: * ' The constitutional provision here considered not only affords no warrant for the use of the militia by 267 THE AMERICAN ARMY the general government, except to suppress insur- rection, repel invasion, or to execute the laws of the Union, but, by its careful enumeration of the three occasions or purposes for which the militia may be used, it forbids such use for any other purpose" came to them as a distinct shock. A large number of the officers and men of the na- tional guard have devoted their time and fortune to its improvement, under the belief that in event of war the organizations to which they belong would be immediately called into service with the regular army. Several schemes have been proposed to over- come the situation brought about by the decision of the attorney-general, which was not rendered as an abstract opinion but at a time when the probability of calling out the state organization for active duty beyond our borders was deemed imminent. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power : "To provide for organizing, arming, and disci- plining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline pre- scribed by Congress.'* The Constitution further provides : ' ' That no state shall, without the consent of Con- gress, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." 268 THE ORGANIZED MILITIA Some of the states now maintain military organ- izations quite equal in extent to the entire regular army as it existed prior to the Civil War. Appro- priations by Congress for the militia have doubled under recent legislation, and their improved condi- tion has been held to justify recognition through a further annual appropriation of, possibly, $10,000,- 000 to pay the officers and men of the existing organizations, notwithstanding they remain state troops. Since Washington expressed his convictions so fully upon the subject, much has been written about the failure of militiamen to make good, and there is no gainsaying that the record is decidedly against the employment of levies of short service men by whatever name they may be designated. The or- ganized militia of the present day, however, should not be compared with any body of troops ever pre- viously employed in this country under the designa- tion of militia. Organized, armed, equipped, and subject to training under the laws and regulations governing the regular army, they constitute a mili- tary force far better prepared for immediate active service than the best of new volunteer organizations. So long, however, as the national guard or organized militia remains in its present legal status, it is not an immediately available asset, and it will constitute a serious blunder on the part of the nation if the ex- isting system is not thoroughly revised in the near future. When the war with Spain was declared, it was 269 THE AMERICAN ARMY found necessary to prepare legislation, which would enable the military organizations existing in the sev- eral states to participate in the war with their origi- nal organizations intact. Congress provided for this by authorizing the President to accept the service of any company, troop, battery, battalion or regiment of the organized militia which would enlist in the volunteer army in a body. No provision was made for receiving into the service the many generals and staff officers of state troops. The generals and staff officers needed for the whole army of regulars and volunteers were appointed by the President as "United States Volunteers," not accredited to or having any obligation to any state. There was a natural feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the generals commanding brigades and divisions and their staff officers of the state organizations at be- ing left out and all subsequent legislation proposed by them has had in mind the recurrence of such a condition in event of another war. There was also a general opinion that better results would have fol- lowed if some method could have been found of or- dering the various state contingents into active serv- ice without waiting for each individual militiaman to volunteer. Some organizations declined to volun- teer and of those which did purport to volunteer as a body, so large a number of individuals failed to do so that the war efficiency of many organizations was materially reduced for the moment because of the small number of old men mustered into the serv- ice, and through the sudden influx of large numbers 270 THE ORGANIZED MILITIA of recruits. Strong influence was brought to bear to reduce the number of privates required in or- ganizations which volunteered, and it was successful to such a degree that it became necessary for the President to make another call immediately for men to fill up the companies which, like all militia or- ganizations, had full complements of officers. Out of the dissatisfaction at that time have come the con- tinuous efforts to modify the laws under which ex- isting state organizations shall be received into the army for war before any volunteers may be ac- cepted. As between the trained or partially trained active organizations of militia and new regiments of volun- teers, there should be no question of relative initial efficiency. The whole matter revolves about the probable value of any body of troops, for national purposes, which is maintained by and solely under control of a state, during peace, even though ap- propriations for their support are made by the gen- eral government. The history of our country since colonial days, a period of a century and a half, ren- ders a steady series of verdicts against the probabil- ity of success of any combination of national and state forces where the latter remain during peace under the actual command and control of the several governors, who appoint the officers and direct, as provided by the Constitution, the training according to the discipline provided by Congress. As a matter of actual practice there is embarrass- ment in joint maneuvers and operations between 271 the regular army and organized militia for the rea- son that officers and men of the organized militia conform to the instructions prepared and issued by the regular army commanders only as a matter of courtesy. Even where the government has gone to great expense in preparing camp sites for them at maneuvers, organizations of state troops have at times felt entirely authorized to come or stay away in their discretion. The fact is the officers of the regular army and organized militia have gone on making the best possible out of a really impossible military situation. During the War of 1812 three members of the Su- preme Court of Massachusetts rendered an opin- ion that while the militia may, under the language of the Constitution, be employed to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection and to repel in- vasions, the governors of the several states have a right to determine whether any of the exigencies ex- ist so as to require them to place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of the United States and if, in the opinion of the governors, the conditions do not require obedience to the call, they are not required to obey it. It is a matter of regrettable history that the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut ex- ercised their discretion at that time, and refused to furnish militia on the call of the President. This was a hundred years ago, but the memory of it caused the insertion in the statutes of 1903, which provided for reorganizing the militia, of a provision which authorized the President to call out any por- 272 THE ORGANIZED MILITIA tion of the militia by direct orders to the several commanding officers. No sooner was this law en- acted, however, than attempts were begun for its re- peal, and at the first favorable opportunity the law was changed and provision made that the call for the militia by the President must be made to the gov- ernors. The inherent defects of any military system which depends upon state executive action in forty- eight sovereign states, some of them an empire in extent, should be apparent to the merest novice in military administration. A great part of the existing organizations of state forces had settled these questions in their own minds and had no doubt that they had already volunteered by entering the organized militia with a declaration of intent to serve without regard to state or national boundaries. The individual may not be the arbiter of his own fate in this matter, and it is now certain that the most ingeniously contrived statute to over- come the obstacle may be declared unconstitutional at a moment inconvenient to the individual and per- ilous to the nation. If, therefore, the methods of transition from state forces into the national army, when war is imminent or declared, are to be always matters of argument and doubt, the country is lean- ing upon a broken reed and a more stable form of support to the regulars should be devised. Any sys- tem which fails to utilize the enthusiastic and patri- otic young men who have been preparing themselves in existing state organizations for the duties of act- ive service will be seriously defective. 273 THE AMERICAN ARMY It is not necessary to hark back to Washington and Hamilton for their views on the utilization of colo- nial and state troops called out for federal service, but they wrote much on the subject and were insist- ent in their efforts to evolve a more stable military system out of the widely scattered communities of their day. The question then was and now is, whether or not the efforts to nationalize the state militia should be abandoned and a more stable and unobjec- tionable system of providing for the military needs of the nation be adopted. The amounts appropriated by the local legisla- tures for maintenance of their militia organizations vary greatly in the several states. The amount ap- propriated by Congress for distribution to the states of arms, equipments, supplies and funds, for their organized militia remained for three-quarters of a century at a fixed annual sum of $200,000. This amount which was originally fixed in the Act of April 23, 1808, usually referred to as section 1661, Revised Statutes, was increased February 12, 1887, to $400,000, on June 6, 1900, to $1,000,000, and on June 22, 1906, was further increased to $2,000,000 annually. In addition to this continuing annual ap- propriation, there is another of equal amount, $2,- 000,000, annually, under a different act of Congress usually referred to as section 13 of the militia law. Since the passage of the Act of January 21, 1903, for reorganizing the militia, appropriations have steadily increased and cover a much wider range of subjects than in prior years, as shown in the follow- ing analysis of the several acts of Congress : 274 THE ORGANIZED MILITIA a d a^ 1j r 3,^1 a" ^S 2 ^a "ort" > ill Q) O> O f So S ! oj O -i W i OS j d *"' d*i o^ oa < <1> d ,-r 2 1 H 2 *-> o ftd-^ kg,^1p.d cp,Q EH Mi (Jj Oj fcfo Hi o> o o ."SO o> 0?^ uniforms the organ- g a ss a o js a,* ^5 o o ^ 4J '~' co "*"" 3 f-i Is "If S^Jgi 1 ft-.ag^ uniforms the organ- 80 -3 ^sa-'S'aBS a * * a S ,-d a, .2-5 * * - 1 2 3 3 <*a QJ B OJ.g-.ti ^ g-d o>.S'S a, cS '2*S I g 1 a | s ^ * 1 1 g 1 a g 3 1 3 ^ H > g 1 a jHfQ-d JH^H +J CQd ^ >rt "d IH rt'd * hn *-" 13 "d n d^ a ^-,.23 p 'dSft'25da 1 ftdS o3.2 ^0^^ o3.S 3bO(U30 o3.2 EH EH EH EH EH S5 O 1 Tl 03 et b H S S3 ca oj HJ bo 5j to d "S S"s CO e8-d u d to a) . d -d 5 li CQ fl ^H -" 5 o a en . d 5 S o o us 02 W CQd .1-9 g ON n CO cp THE AMERICAN ARMY 4 * H I-H J i I a Q N HI i o a H fc O H OS O &H PM P 03 H s P ti O fa O H I I *-|aj m o s 5 o, " PiH oi fa fa Titl Approp ^ 2 o ft Ig W bO u a CD Q> 3 d a . fl 2i g Pi 0> *J bO <5 fa a tf Cv ^ O 5,5 a s s ~ Cj rt H H .a^ c ^ THE ORGANIZED MILITIA For subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending serv ice and garrison schools. For paying the expenses of the organized militia, which may be authorized by the Secretary of War, etc. To procure by purchase or man ufacture and issue to the or ganized militia, such arms etc. Equipment of coast artillery ar mories, organized militia, to provide fire-control equipment dummy guns and mortars mounts for dummy guns dummy ammunition, and other appliances and devices for in structional purposes in armory buildings of the coast artillery companies of the organized militia. For subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending serv- ice and garrison schools. a . o> .2 jjlSSj I 8 III*! 2 T3 2n rO *O O 52 c3 M CD n 02 Ood Ood o CO a> THE AMERICAN AEMY Purpose o provide arms, and uniforms and equipments for the organ- ized militia. o procure by purchase or man- ufacture and issue to the or- ganized militia, such arms, etc., as are necessary to arm, uniform, and equip all of the organized militia. tfOTE Not to exceed this amount in any fiscal year. o provide arms, and uniforms and equipments for the organ- ized militia. o procure by purchase or man- ufacture and issue to the or- ganized militia, such arms, etc. or subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending serv- ice and garrison schools. EH EH * EH EH fa * o o 1 > o o o o o pj o o o 3 o" o_ ^ 0* ^c O o o o o IP^ a of o CNf *; "ff a * W 03 8-^5 bo 0,0 to w d o d oo o CD ^H fr* H CD ^tn ^ * rs .2 ^ ^_i H "S ^ 2 a ^5 o g d 3 g g H (-, Q CO rQ 2 * . 13 S *< . 3 *> cc (H flj*E 73 Pi H O ^S, Pi ^5 a bo dg^ 33-2 la - ~* Co d CS CD "Zl d i3 d CD o> 3 S. 2 ftg . *- CQ a "S o ffl o S cd S S . bO _ w 5-.S d CO ^, *H t^ g E g CD gft (0 3 u g o- ^ g a, o *g fl -a A d >k o E o t- 2 O bo M CO 1 9 CD d rH "2 CO S V " S "S O tO ^ OS CM CO ,-i OS t -> ^ Ood o -.' o os 5 *S . a CN? o .Bet o os o CQ O oj c^ +-> T _^ CtS C-q -^J T _^ CD o 4) CJ '""' o CQ *J 03 ** ^ 05 OS 03 en o ? O o o CD bO en OS r-l OS r-l CB T-l s si o" CO es" eo CO O co o CO 00 CD CD (O d 1 1 3 a THE ORGANIZED MILITIA For paying the expenses of the organized militia, which may be authorized by the Secretary of War, to participate in joint encampments with troops of the regular army. Equipment of coast artillery ar- mories, organized militia, to provide fire-control equipment, etc. To provide arms, uniforms, and equipments for the organized militia. To provide for the purchase or manufacture and issue to the 1 organized militia, such arms, etc. For subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending serv- ice and garrison schools. For paying the expenses of the organized militia, which may be authorized by the Secretary of War, to participate in joint encampments with troops of the regular army. Equipment of coast artillery ar- mories, organized militia, etc. To provide arms, uniforms, and equipments for the organized militia. us 0_ US' o o^ o* o o eT o o o o" o cT o 10 o o o" ^ PJ fl rt , .<-< cc n +* + B ^ 3 ^ o "g 'a ^ +J - sa a .2 I S 15 2 S3 H H THE AMERICAN ARMY th ms purch issue such provide for the manufacture and - < 1 Hi'lrHMrftiil g cjcu3c3"-fl5?!3t*,?? 3 O'cQ'-'-'-'cariJS'ife: ' B 13 fl J3 S.^^" D y ?? o 0^0" H fe fo "Jce ggago3|co a-s HH*B5a Titl Approp "S g"S 9S^ r fl 02 3 bo a w H o a, o H da H o bo a> a So s o I - Oo6 Pi a> to ll CQ 0) THE ORGANIZED MILITIA The District of Columbia has a separate annual appropriation which averages about $80,000. It is also authorized by the Act of March 1, 1899, to draw any amount of supplies from the regular army ap- propriations on requisitions approved by the Sec- retary of War. There are other expenses of a minor character, connected with rifle competitions, paid by the gov- ernment, which is also called upon to furnish reg- ular troops for guards, markers, range officers and other duties in connection with rifle competitions, Whose transportation and other expenses are charged to the appropriations for the regular army. The ap- propriations made by Congress are allotted to the several states in proportion to the strength of the organized militia in each. The states are expected to devote the funds to the purchase of the necessary articles properly to equip the organizations and maintain them in readiness for active field service. The articles procured from the appropriations by Congress include batteries of field artillery, small arms, equipments, tentage, wagon trains, clothing and everything required or presumed to be required by an army. The total strength of the organized militia accord- ing to the returns of 1913, was 9,130 officers and 111,672 men. When the number of men enlisted in the organized militia of the states is considered, it may be concluded that service in the active militia is neither popular nor deemed an exhibition of pa- triotism by American men as a body. Many men join the organized militia in good faith, who under 281 THE AMERICAN ARMY any law of averages will not be available for active field service in an emergency. The actual number now reported in service seems to represent the max- imum possible to put in the field and for whom arms, clothing and equipage must be maintained in readiness. It may be safely inferred that no ma- terial increase in numbers is to be expected under ex- isting conditions. The general government has been dealing with the organized militia with increasing liberality, in recent years, but the strength as a whole has not materially changed since the adoption of the new legislation which purported to make of the state forces a stable and dependable part of the first line for war. The tabulated returns for December 31, 1911, show the reported strength of the organized militia to be : Officers Enlisted men Caralry 262 3,919 Field Artillery 276 4,797 Coast Artillery Corps 476 7240 Infantry 6,315 91,789 Corps of Engineers 131 1 112 Signal Corps 96 1,368 Medical Department 823 2,515 Ordnance Department 167 66 Quartermaster's Department 127 92 Subsistence Department 78 42 Adjutant General's Department 131 Inspector General's Department 90 Inspectors of Small Arms Practice 122 Judge Advocate General's Department 85 Pay Department 68 General officers of the line 42 Aides (extra officers) 16 Chaplains 132 Totals 9,437 112,940 282 THE ORGANIZED MILITIA In 1912 there were 9,142 officers and 112,710 men, and in 1913, 9,130 officers and 111,672 men, a de- crease of twelve officers and 1,038 men. The re- ported strength of the organized militia of the sev- eral states, Territory of Hawaii and the District of Columbia for 1913, with the number of males, as reported by the Adjutants General of States, availa- ble for military duty, and the number of militia age, eighteen to forty-four years, inclusive, according to the census of 1910, are as follows : State, Territory or District Strength of Organized Militia, 1913 Number of males available for mili- tary duty as report- ed by the Adjutants General Number of males of militia age, per Federal census 1910 2 1 O a o> a TJ 1 "3 m Alabama 178 45 111 252 137 184 41 139 93 223 39 50 506 179 213 130 170 60 109 173 452 199 2,391 477 1,248 3,360 1,309 2,457 441 1,507 1,127 2,675 426 790 5,408 2,297 2,768 1,694 1,843 1,082 1,339 1,799 5,341 2,551 352,678 40,538 351,492 357,434 133,450 149,552 32,469 80,199 187,945 572,946 13,475 33,760 1,037,455 647,449 306,669 376,735 342,162 486,070 104,841 204,024 576,303 521,667 401,145 58,962 311,792 665,522 203,982 257,996 44,634 78,349 171,688 497,095 64,663 86,384 1,330,556 580,557 475,829 370,227 457,493 338,343 151,325 271,373 760,324 616,729 Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan . 283 THE AMERICAN ARMY State, Territory or District Strength of Organized Militia, 1913 Number of males available for mili- tary duty as report- ed by the Adjutants General Number of malea of militia age, per Federal census, 1910 Officers Enlisted Men Minnesota 218 116 256 53 134 none 94 330 49 1,056 251 52 529 56 109 768 106 154 71 127 174 31 72 207 91 100 195 48 2,724 1,327 3,320 557 1,038 none 1,164 4,052 599 14,901 2,317 577 5,611 896 1,358 9,766 1,252 1,755 608 1,707 2,387 323 773 2,492 1,147 1,283 2,768 640 227,824 401,460 663,503 45,848 131,100 12,012 41,248 609,610 55,623 1,616,528 352,658 x 60,696 929,646 226,043 136,472 1,134,153 101,361 217,393 90,702 341,883 502,777 45,464 50,858 277,650 236,212 186,451 497,922 27,947 491,113 345,745 721,166 123,232 267,497 29,383 90,357 597,513 73,097 2,156,361 392,192 145,628 1,076,928 357,933 190,553 1,788,619 125,213 276,788 140,635 423,088 804,980 84,449 73,685 398,728 340,872 275,048 497,922 54,654 Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota, Tennessee Texas Utah Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming Total 9,142 112,710 16,127,357 20,538,347 Numerous estimates have been made as to the probable number of men who would turn out with their state organizations on the call of the Presi- dent, and expert opinions agree that between sixty and seventy-five per cent, of the total strength on 284 THE ORGANIZED MILITIA the rolls could be relied upon for immediate com- pliance. In the national guard all sorts of arguments and schemes seem necessary to secure even the minimum numbers in many organizations required to partici- pate in camps of instruction and maneuvers. To il- lustrate this phase of the matter, at a recent en- campment of the national guard, sixteen and one- third per cent, of a regiment numbering 422 men had not been in service a sufficient time to qualify for attendance at a camp of instruction and they could only become entitled to pay by crediting them with alleged military instruction at a school. The actual conditions are disclosed by an analysis of the pay rolls of the regiment, from which it appears that the largest number of men in any company was forty- five ; the smallest twenty-six. The company having forty-five present reported fourteen, recently joined, as having had " school instruction. " In a company of thirty-seven men, fifteen were reported as having "school instruction," which entitled them to pay while in camp. The rolls of another regiment num- bering 377 men showed similar conditions with six- teen and one-half per cent, qualified for pay by "school instruction." These facts are not stated in unkindly criticism but such conditions must be con- sidered in all schemes for national defense, based upon the organized militia. The conditions are not surprising; on the contrary, with the little encour- agement given in any American community to those struggling to maintain efficient militia organizations 285 THE AMERICAN ARMY the wonder is that they manage to accomplish what they do from year to year. It is not to be expected that a movement, such as that undertaken when the change of form of the mi- litia enlistment to one containing an agreement to serve upon call of the President without regard to border lines, could be fully developed in a brief pe- riod. That the recent laws have failed to meet the expectations of the national guard, and of the War Department which gave earnest support to the leg- islation containing the modifications of the old mi- litia laws, is made evident by the proposition to have Congress appropriate for the payment of the state forces for attendance at all drills, camps of in- struction and maneuvers. It seems to be generally accepted now that no further improvement in exist- ing conditions in the organized militia may be ex- pected until the necessary legislation for pay is ob- tained from Congress. On the other hand, there is a disposition not to increase expenditures for any forces which are not available for duty beyond our borders, which is the character of service most fre- quent in the army since the outbreak of the war with Spain, and this view is undoubtedly the most sound by reason of the accumulated evidence in its favor. When it is considered that the population of the country is nearing the hundred million mark, the total strength of the organized militia is not suffi- cient to justify the continuance of existing statutes which prevents any organization of volunteers being considered until after war has been declared and 286 THE ORGANIZED MILITIA the organized militia has been called into service. This status of legislation has resulted from the act- ive efforts of the association of officers representing the interests of the national guard, who have held the opinion that the organization of volunteer regi- ments, for national purposes, would, in time of peace, react unfavorably upon the organized militia. The serious trouble with the whole situation is that all our efforts since the war with Spain have been directed along wrong lines, doubtless influenced by the high degree of efficiency which obtains in a few regiments of the national guard. It will require great moral courage to admit this error but the sooner it is done the better off the nation will be so far as real preparation for war is concerned. Let it be recognized then that the state forces, whether des- ignated national guard or organized militia, are def- initely restricted to the duties for which, and for which only, they are available under the terms of the Constitution and as set forth in the recent deci- sion of the Attorney General of the United States. Various methods have been devised for overcom- ing the obstacle raised by the decision of the attor- ney general, that the Constitution forbids the use of militia for any purpose not stated therein because of its careful definition of the occasions upon which the state forces may be called forth. One method which seems to have found most favor is embraced in a proposition to draft the militia organizations into the army whenever war is imminent or declared. Congress has wide discretion in its constitutional au- 287 THE AMERICAN ARMY thority to raise and support armies and may prop- erly declare that all men between twenty-one and forty-five years of age, or all men between five feet and six feet in height, or with any other defined qual- ifications, may be drafted into the service, except that plenary powers may cease when they conflict with the Constitution wherein the use of the militia is for- mally limited as set forth ~by the attorney general. There has been some disposition to claim that the national guard is not the militia contemplated in the Constitution, but if it is not, then it must be declared to fall under the ban of the provision which forbids any state to keep troops or ships of war without the consent of Congress. It is humiliating to think of so much effort having resulted in such complications. There are occasions when it is wiser and, in the end, more profitable, to admit defeat and begin anew upon a more stable foundation. Makeshifts in law will be unsatisfac- tory because of their liability to be overturned upon the first appeal. The nation needs a dependable war army and the time seems propitious to begin its upbuilding by adopting a system against which there can be no legal assault. The strength required to meet any probable emergency having been agreed upon, the force should then be apportioned in the several arms, be- tween the regular army, and federal volunteers, the officers of volunteers being appointed by the Presi- dent, in whom authority should be vested to provide for their training in peace and calling forth for war. 288 THE ORGANIZED MILITIA Such a body of federal volunteers would not be sub- ject to call from a governor of a state directly, but will be available under the orders of the President, in conjunction with the regular army, when disorder in any state has become too great for suppression by the local authorities. The effect of this move- ment upon the states would be to encourage the em- ployment of constabulary and to restore the organ- ized militia to its true functions and to avoid the apparent necessity for adopting resourceful expedi- ents for evading the language and spirit of the Con- stitution. This method of procedure may shock the pride of some of the old national guard organiza- tions, but it is a safe and reasonable prediction that within a few years the federal volunteers would be- come a body of dependable soldiers whose numbers would bear a more definite relation to the nation's needs for war purposes than will ever be possible with state militia. It may as well be recognized that the doubts which have adhered in the minds of many public men, as to the course we have been following at considerable cost, have now been justified by the opinion of the cabinet officer whose sworn duty it is to advise correctly the administration as to interpre- tation of the statutes. The suggestion of wisdom is to rebuild from a new foundation in accordance with law. In his Farewell Address, Washington wrote : "The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and alter their constitutions of government. But the constitution which at any time 289 THE AMERICAN ARMY exists, until changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. . . . Toward the preservation of your gov- ernment and the permanence of your present happy state, it is requisite, not only that you steadily dis- countenance irregular opposition to its acknowl- edged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretext. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the constitution, altera- tions which will impair the energy of the system ; and thus to undermine what can not be directly over- thrown. In all the changes to which you may be in- vited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other institutions that experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change from the end- less variety of hypothesis and opinion ; and remem- ber, especially, that for the efficient management of your common interests in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consist- ent with the perfect security of liberty is indis- pensable.'* With the official decision and the views of Wash- ington before us it would seem that the only course which should receive consideration for a moment, is that which conforms absolutely to the highest law of our land. Not so, however, for the first step sug- 290 THE ORGANIZED MILITIA gested contemplates an evasion of the Constitution so as not to disturb the organized militia in a status brought about by much careful planning and nurs- ing. That status involves two features, one relating to appropriations by the general government for support of state organizations, and the other to ques- tions of rank and command. As to the first, it is merely a question for Congress to determine as to how far it is desirable to go in maintaining state forces for national purposes, bearing in mind the limitations upon their employment. The second is a far more serious question. In all but two states of the Union militia officers below the rank of major are elected by the men, and the field officers by the company officers. It is need- less to point out that the appointment and promo- tion of officers in such manner is wrong in principle and tends to pernicious results so far as the disci- pline and efficiency of the troops are concerned. Vol- unteer troops with experienced officers in command have proved their greater efficiency by the prompt- ness with which they have acquired instruction and a high state of discipline. While all American sol- diers enter the ranks voluntarily the word volunteers is used to designate a body of troops neither regulars nor militia, and enlisted ordinarily for a specified period or for the war, and the statute law recog- nizes the distinction between the three classes. The statutes provide that : "The organized and active land forces of the United States shall consist of the Army of the 291 THE AMERICAN ARMY United States and of the Militia of the several states when called into the service of the United States: Provided, That in time of war the Army shall con- sist of two branches which shall be designated, re- spectively, as the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army of the United States. "That the Regular Army is the permanent mili- tary establishment, which is maintained both in peace and war according to law. That the Volun- teer Army shall be maintained only during the ex- istence of war, or while war is imminent. . . ." Through a series of acts of legislatures many states have adopted tactical divisions as their unit of organization for the appointment of officers, but not a single state has succeeded in fulfilling the ob- ligation of supporting all the parts necessary to com- plete a division for war purposes, although the ma- jor generals, the brigadier generals and all the staff officers are quite invariably appointed. If this merely related to parades and reviews, the matter would be of no consequence to the nation at large, but this is far from being the case. As long as the tactical divisions are organized under state laws, and are solely under the control of the governors, it is not practicable to assign experienced regular officers to command them. It is impossible to ac- quire, by experience in the organized militia, the knowledge of active service and of the real business of war which should be possessed by officers en- trusted with the direction of large commands in cam- paign and no person should be entrusted with the 292 THE ORGANIZED MILITIA leadership of American armies who has not pre- pared himself and been recognized as having the necessary professional equipment. Any other course is unfair to the men in the ranks and a source of Weakness in the execution of great plans where pro- fessional knowledge is of more importance than en- thusiasm and patriotic desire to accomplish some- thing. From the point of view of the nation at large a very undesirable condition has been brought about, mainly through the instrumentality of an active body of national guard officers in their earnest ef- forts to place the state forces upon a satisfactory basis. As recently enacted laws now stand, no vol- unteers are presumed to be called out until all the organized militia has been accepted in the service, and this carries along all the high ranking officers, who therefore become senior to all regular officers of corresponding grades who may be subsequently authorized by Congress to command volunteers. In other words, the trained and proved officers, edu- cated through a long period of years of active mili- tary service under the general government, must needs be employed under generals appointed by gov- ernors of states in time of peace and for reasons which perhaps would not have been effective had the governors recognized that the peace appointments would carry actual command in war. Such a system is devoid of right reason and common sense and this was so recognized when war with Spain was de- clared and Congress refused to authorize the accept- 293 THE AMERICAN ARMY ance of any organizations of the national guard above that of a regiment which might volunteer for the war. No one would ever think of suggesting the appointment of a naval militia officer to be an ad- miral of the fleet, but a great many Americans feel certain that they can fill the position of general officer with distinction, although the military profes- sion demands more technical preparation than ever before. An infinite variety of reasons could be elaborated to show the need of correction of the system under which we are now drifting to certain disappoint- ment. THE END This book University of California SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed. NOV 2 1 1989 - cwo 000 690975 8