•^ , \ A a 2L. BSSA YS ON THE RECTIFICATION OF PARLIAMENT ESSAYS RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL BY It 1 THE'CANADIAN INSTITUTE ON THE leictiHc^tion of Pstrlmtnent TOGETHER WITH THE CONDITIONS ON WHICH THE COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OFFERS TO AWARD ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR PRIZE ESSAYS. TORONTO : THE COPP, CLARK COMPANY, Limited. 1893. ^ J F/0 76- pirnwnPO |9«C^S MEMORANDUM BY THE COUNCIL. Early in the present year a letter was received from a member of the Society, Dr. Sandford Fleming, bringing to the attention of the Institute the importance of an enquiry into the possibility of rectifying our electoral and parliamentary system, with the view of averting many evils now attending it. He appealed to the Institute as a body which, while non-political in its corporate character, is representative through its members of all shades of opinion. The object expressed was to awaken an interest in a difficult problem, which vitally concerns the whole community, in the hope that some practical and beneficial solution may be obtained. The Council has had the matter under serious consideration for some time ; meanwhile an old. friend of the Institute, deeply impressed with its importance, and the great public need of a satisfactory solution, has placed at the disposal of the Council the sum of one thousand dollars to assist, as far as possible, in the attainment of the desired end. The matter was formally brought before the Institute, at a largely attended meeting, on the 20th February last, when after the reading of Dr. Fleming's communication and the discussion on the "Note" attached, the following resolution passed with substantial unanimity : — " That the generous offer of a friend (who does not wish his name to be known) to contribute the sum of $i,ooo to aid in obtaining a satisfactory solution of the problem referred to in Dr. Sandford Fleming's paper, be accepted with the best thanks of the Institute, and that the Council be empowered to take the necessary steps to obtain essays or treatises, and award the premium to the best workable measure, which, if made law, would give the whole Canadian people equal representation in Parliament, and each elector due weight in the government through Parliament." The Council thereupon appointed a special committee to carefully weigh the whole subject, and consider how best to deal with the matter and carry into effect the wishes of the meeting and the authority and trust conferred on it by the Institute. 90261i7 Vi MEMORANDUM, After many meetings and conferences, the Council has adopted the recommendations of the special committee, and now appeals to every membei of the Institute and to all thoughtful persons within the Dominion, for theii assistance in obtaining a complete solution of the problem. While the Institute addresses Canadians as being specially interestec in the good government of their own land, the prize competition is extendec to all persons of whatever country, on equal terms, as set forth in the condition; issued herewith. Arthur Harvey, President. Canadian Institute, Toronto, April 4th, 1892. Alan Macdougall, Secretary. CONDITIONS On which The Canadian Institute oifers to award prizes for essays on " electokal represbnta- TION AND THE RECTIFICATION OF PARLIAMENT." The sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000) has been placed at the disposal of the Council of the Canadian Institute to be awarded in whole or in part by the Institute for the best work- able measure (Bill or Act of Parliament^ which, if made law, would give the whole Canadian people equal representation in Parliament and each elector due weight in the Government, through Parliament. The Council of the Institute accordingly invites essays on Electoral Representation and the Rectification of Parliament, accompanied by a draft bill applicable to countries with a Parliamen- tary System similar in general features to that of Canada. The essays will be received by the Council before the first day of July, 1893. As the Transactions of the Institute are printed in English, it is desirable the essays should be in that language. They are to be signed with a motto, and the name and address of the writer are to be enclosed in a sealed envelope, endorsed with that motto ; the whole under one cover, to- be addressed ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. To The Secretary, Canadian Institute, Toronto, Canada. The sealed envelopes to remain unopened until final adjudication by the Council of the^ Institute. The Council will, immediately after the Jst July, 1893, examine all the Essays received.. All treatises of merit, to which an apparently " workable measure " is appended (in which, considerable latitude must necessarily be allowed), will then be referred to an independent tribunal for a report. It will be the aim of the Council to have this tribunal composed of riien Df the highest standing in their several spheres, comprising persons learned in political science^ law and practical politics. The Council proposes that one award be given of not less than fine hundred dollars ($500), ind others, proportionate to the merits of the works submitted. If the essays and draft bills shall not be thought by the above tribunal of sufficient merit tO' entitle them to receive the principal or any premium, or if the Council on receiving the report shall be of that opinion, the Council reserves to itself the right not to award any premium. The Canadian Insrtitute reserves to itself the right to publish the successful essays and draft iills to which premiums may ba awarded. Canadian Institute, ALAN MACDOUGALL. Toronto, April 4th, 1892. Secretary. / ,f "*T \.. ' :<«■/ THE REAL M'AJbRITY. f ^ - AN ACT Providing for the Election of the Members o^ the House of Commons by means Of Proportional Representation. Whereas, the present method of electing members to the House of Commons fails in its purpose of securing the representation of the real majority, Therefore Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows : 1. That for purposes of representation in the House of Commons the Province of Ontario shall be divided into four distiicts, as nearly equal in population as may be, each of whicli districts shall elect twenty-two members, as hereinafter provided : The Province of Quebec shall in like manner be divided into three districts, each of which shall elect twenty-one members ; the Pi-ovince of Nova Scotia shall constitute one district, and shall have nineteen members ; the Province of New Brunswick shall constitute one disti'ict, and shall have thirteen members ; the Province of Manitoba shall constitute one district, and shall have six members; the Province of Prince Edward Island shall constitute one district, and shall have five members ; the Province of British Columbia shall- constitute one district, and shall have four members ; the Province of Alberta shall constitute one district, and shall have three members. 2. That the membei-s of the* House of Commons shall be voted for at lai-ge in their respective districts. * .> * 3. That any body of electors in any district which polled at the ifist pregpiihg *^ parliamentary election votes to the number of Vine h^Jf a. quota, as hereinlMfer^leteflniiied, or which shall be endorsed by a petition of^oters amounting to one hali^sAli quota, may nominate any number of candidates not to exceed the number of seats to wliich such dis- trict is entitled in the House of Commons, .and cause their nanjes^Jto^^be printed on the official ballot. ■ . . • •• ■■.♦''•'% 4? That evety voter sh 11 vote as a whole such ballot as he ufay choose, designating thereon the names of th^ . lidates whom he most prefers. 5. The sum of «J1 / ^.Uots east in any district shall be divided by the number of seats to which such <|wirict is entitled, and the quotient "^o the nearest unit shall be known as the quota of r6presre^a^^ 6. That the sums of all the ballots cast by each party or political body nominating candidates shall be severally divided by the quota of representation, and the units of the qiiotients thus obtained will show the number of representatives to which each bodv of voters is entitled ; and if the sum of such quotients be less than the number of seats to be filled, the body of electors having the largest remainder after division of the sum of the votes cast by the quota of representation, as herein specified, shall be entitled to the first vacancy, and so on^Aintil all the vacancies are filled. ■ 7. Tliat the candidates of each body of electors nominating candidates and found en- titled to representatioii under the foregoing rules shall receive certificates of election in the oixler of the- votes received, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes the first certificaxe, and so on ; ,but in case of a tie with but one vacancy to be filled, the matter lliall be determined by lot between the candidates so tied. , ^4 That if a meu^r of the House of Commons shall die or resign, or his seat become vacant for any reason, the remainder of his term shall be served by the candidate of the paA'ty or poliiacal body to which lie belongs who received the highest number of votes of those not receiving certificates and belonging to such party or political body. « i V Conservative. John Smith. J. L. Robei'ts, F. C. Jones. R. L. George. B. C. Blanks. Joseph Budd. Horatio Todd. Simon Black. J. Hopkins. Geo. Sterne. G. C. Albright. H. L. Wills. Geo. L. Green. BALLOT X Liberal. J. L. Peters. X Judah P. Dicky. X A. C. Markin. P. H. House. H. C. Jenney. X Hugh Josephs, John Jacobs. X Pari in Quit. X Moses Soloman. X Wm. Dixon Thos. Brown. Geo. Smith. X Hamilton Judd, Keform. Joseph E. Upright. Hamilton Steed. Richard Black. John Wilson. H. D. Hernderson. The accompanying ballot shows a convenient form for carrying into effect the quota system. The voter marks a cross in the square opposite the name of the party he wishes, and if he has any preference among tlie candidates which are named on that ticket he puts a cross in the square opposite those names. Different voters will of course have different preferences, and hence the votes will vary. Take as an illustration the vote of New Brunswick which may be supposed to amount all told to 76,420 votes. Dividing this by the number of seats, thirteen, to which that province is entitled, it is found that the quota is 5,878. That is to say, if 76,420 votes are to have thirteen representatives 5,878 votes, or one thirteenth part of the whole vote, should have one representative. Dividing the 34,202 votes of the conservatives by the quota, 5,878, gives five full quotas and a remainder of 4,812. By the same process the 30,043 liberal votes make five quotas and a remainder of 653 votes. The 12,175 reform votes make two quotas and leave a remainder of 419. As there is still one seat to be tilled it is given to the party having the lai'gest unfilled quota, which is the conservative party. This makes the dele- gation from the province six conservatives, five liberals, and two reformers. The six conservatives are taken from their list in the order of their votes as has already been ex- plained. It is well for parties to nominate a full list of candidates, as it does not alter the effect of the party vote, and offers the voter greater choice. ^ THE RULE OF THE REAL MAJORITY. In presenting to your learned body the accompanying draft of an act of parliament, it is unnecessary to supplement it with additional words other than the briefest explanation. Nor will it be necessary to review the present system and enumerate its deplorable results, further than to say that the very principle upon which it is based is wrong. Not only do evil results flow from the system, but it must from the very nature of things be so. By dividing the voters into separate districts from each of which a member is elected by a plurality or majority vote as the case may be, all the votes cast for unsuccessful candi- dates are unrepresented ; for a voter cannot be said to be represented by a candidate ao'aiust whom he voted. But this is not the end. Legislation is accomplished by the will of the majority of the members of the legislature; and as all the members together re- pi-esent but a bare majority of the votes and sometimes less, it follows that the action of a majority of these i-epresentatives is really the will of a very small minority of the voters who participated in the election. Taking a majority of the members of any legislative body who received the smallest votes and it will be found that they seldom represent more than one-third of the total vote of the election, often only one-fourth, and sometimes not more than one-fifth. Examples of such results are so common, and have been presented by so many writers that it is superfluous to enumerate them here ; suffice it to say that the mere mention of the false principle upon which the present system is based will bring to mind many examples. It needs no elaboration of reasons and facts to prove that the principle of electing representatives from single districts by majority votes is wanting in all the elements which are conducive to good government. The sole reason for the existence of representative government rests upon the assumption that all men are equally entitled to life ; which involves the right to their own persons and to the results of their own labor. As the individual is the unit of the social and political order, and as governments are instituted among men for the purpose of performing those things which from their very nature can- not be pei'formed by the individual, involving as it does the taking of the wealth of the individual for the use of the community, it naturally follows that the right to vote follows the postulate that all men are entitled to life. Not only are they entitled to vote but to vote in svich a manner as will give effect to that vote. Hence, not only should every act of the government be that of the representatives of the people but of the representatives of a majority of the people. As in a natural state of society where all the members of the community can meet in counnon the majority will determine the action of the body, so should the action of the representatives of the larger body, which is the result of a sort of political boiling down process, be the will of the majority of the whole people of the community. The system which is destined to prove a solution of this problem seems to be some form of elections by quotas. Whether it shall . be by the single transferable vote, as advocated by Thomas Hare, by the multi-vote list of Switzerland, the cumulative vote list, or some other form, it seems that all new systems must be based upon the quota principle. Th6 form which is herewith j^resented for your consideration is a moditication of the list quota system, having as merits the two points that it is certain and detiuite, whereas the Hare system is not, and that it is simple and easily understood by those who ai'e unaccustomed to the study of these matters, while the Swiss system is complicated and apt to confuse the average voter. In presenting a plan of action which must meet the approval of the mass of the people and which must be operated by the mass of the people, it is necessary that it shall be of such a nature as will first meet their approval, and, having been adopted, will be within their capabilities and understanding. Not only must a just principle be set forth, but it must be in such form as will be within the comprehensioit of those to whom it is addressed. And not only must it be within the comprehension of the ordinary voters but it must be of such a nature that designing politicians who profit by the present system cannot torture from it objections which will prejudice the minds of the people. Take as an example the objection which has so long been urged against the Hare system, that it is uncertain. That if a quota of 1000 be necessary to a choice and 1000 electors mai'k A first choice and B second choice, while another 1000 electors mark A first choice and C second choice it will be a matter of chance whether B or C or either of them is elected. For, if in counting the ballots the 1000 necessary for the election of A should contain B as second choice, then the surplus votes of A, which under the rules of the system go to the second choice would be counted for C, though B had just as many votes as C Now, while it may be said that this accident may not happen more than once in a hundred elections, it may happen in all of a hundred elections ; the mere fact that it may happen at all is of sufiicient importance to make its friends pause in their advocacy. That it might cause grave complications at some time is possible if not probable ; that every political beneficiary of the present system would greedily seize upon and exploit it for all it was worth cannot be doubted. It is really axi objection ; it can easily be magni- fied into the greatest of objections. On the other hand the Swiss, and other multi-vote systems are complex enough to cause the uninitiated voter to hesitate, and to enable the designing politician to confound him in the mazes of complicated detail which are bewildering to any but students. The Swiss system is preferable to the Hare system because there can never be any uncertainty as to the result of the counting. It is a question for the statesmen of each country to decide for themselves whether it is so complicated as to confuse the electorate. It has been the experience of the writer that this is an objection urged by the voters to whom it is presented, and with that objection in mind the Swiss system has been modified to the form presented herewith. The province has been made the unit of representation where possible, for the reason that it is a natural political division with which the people are familiar. It is desirable that the unit of representation under any form of proportional representation shall be large enough to admit of representation to all reasonable minorities, and at the same time not so large that citizens cannot acquaint themselves with the affairs of the whole district. A district of from ten to twenty-five members is preferable, and for that reason the pro- vinces of Ontario and Quebec have been divided. The third provision of the act provides for the nomination of all the candidates whose supporters have any reason to hope for success. The money forfeiture which has heretofore been required is unjust because it handicaps the poor people. The circulation of a petition for signatures is a work so light that any body of citizens can easily do it. Intlee I in some of the states of the United States where any body is allowed to present names no confusion has resulted. Tlie fonrth section Is apt to meet with most opposition in that it requires the voting of party tickets. This Is an objection, but it Is one which upon second thought is brushed aside. It is urged mostly by those wlio deprecate party government in any form. Now, there is nothing objectionable in i>arty government of Itself It is as natural for men and women to associate together in parties as In churches or clubs, or any other organizations which they may see lit to effect. There has always been a progressive party and a con- servative ))arty. Men are so constituted that they fall naturally into one or the other of these ^Dartles. The parties do not always bear the same names but their principles are the same. It is just as im.posslble for a man to be a liberal and conservative at the same time as to be an optimist and pessimist, or a protestant and catholic at the same time. And besides this the principle of proportional representation applies only to the election of legislators, or to bodies in which a number of members of the same grade are elected at once. The choice of an executive officer must be based upon his personality. He Is to carry into effect the laws which others have made. It matters not whether he be a conservative or liberal so far as his executive duties are concerned ; If he be an honest man he will perform his duties the same whatever may be his political creed. But when it conies to the law maker's or the creators, all depends upon their opinions regarding public policies. Conservatives will enact conservative measures, and liberal members will enact liberal measures whether they ai-e wise or foolish, honest or dishonest. Hence it is that the voter may with perfect consistency vote for a conservative executive officer and the llbei-al legislative ticket. But he cannot consistently vote for a conservative and liberal legislator at the same time, because they propose opposing policies. He may vote for the conservative executive because that candidate is honest and upright while his opponent is not; and he may vote for the liberal ticket because he believes in liberal laws, and knows the members of the party will enact them regardless of their personal character. In a word executive officers should be chosen on account of their personality, legislative officers on account of their belief in the principles of government. Besides choosing among the several tickets In the field the voter can also choose among the names of the ballot which he does vote. And when the case of presenting tickets is taken into account it must be seen that the probability is that a party representing the belief of every considerable number of citizens will be in the field. It is necessary that the voter shall designate his preference among the names on the ticket ; for if the success- ful candidates were taken in the order in which they ajjpear, the nominating parties would be tempted to place the corrupt and self-seeking at the top and the virtuous at the bottom. This designation of the names by the voter is a safeguard against corrupt primaries, and enables him to exercise a double choice in the selection of his representatives. Sections five, six and seven designate the method of applying the rules. This is practically the same in all systems based upon the quota principle, but it is much simpler in the method here presented than in either the Hai'fe system or the Swiss. The quota having been obtained the votes of the several parties ai'e divided by it, which shows the number of representatives to which each Is entitled. This having been determined the successful men are taken from the ticket in the order of precedence as expressed by their respective votes. If the i)arty polls enough votes to fill but one quota and Is therefore entitled to one representatative the candidate who has received the most votes on that ticket is declared elected. If the party has two seats the next highest candidate goes in. Section eight contains a very simple method of filling vacancies. The new man will be one who was voted for at the same time as the men among whom he must serve, and he always stands ready to respond when the proper officials call upon him, without the delay and expense of holding a new election. For this method of applying the quota principle of electing representatives these advantage" are claimed : It is lUuch simpler than the Swiss, and more definite than the Hare methods. It secures to each party representation in proportion to the votes polled, and at the same time it is as easy of application as the method now In vogue. It secui'es to the new or minority parties their just proportion of political power without in any way deti'acting from the rights of the old parties. By Its means Independent political parties can put candidates In the field with the full assurance that they Vv'IU receive representation if they constitute an Integi-al part of the body politic. It secures a representative body in which a majority of the members will always represent a majority of the voters, thus making representative government what it has long claimed to be, a government of the people for the people and by the people. And yet it is all done with so slight a change in the present. electoral system as to scarcely be perceptible to the average voter. It involves the overturning of no long established customs, or the wrenching of political ties. It Is a simple and logical step in advance of the position now occupied by representative govern- ments : and will pave the way, when the people have grown accustomed to this system, for a still more nearlv jjerfect system when it is developed. In considerinof what is the best form of government for ;iny people fall account must be taken of the general factors which ai-e to enter into tlie calculation. A form of govern- ment which is ideal for one people may be the woi'st possible for another. So patent has this become that the great Spanish re]mblican Castelar admits that the Spaniards of this generation do not appi-eciate a republican form of government, and hence such a form of government would to-day be worse for that country than a monarchy. When the people have accustomed themselves to a limited monarchy they will the better appreciate the ad- vantages of pure democracy ; in a woi'd the Spanish people must evolve into a republic. The same is true of Russia, of Turkey, or of any of the oriental countries, Tiie beat form of govei'nment for them is not that which the philosopher may evolve by a process of in- disputable reasoning, but that which while attaining the ends of government most nearly conforms to the peo])le's habits of thought. Thus with a system for choosing representa- tives for the Canadian Parliament. It is not a question of what is the ideal system for the ideal country ; but of what is practicable to-day, for an existing country. The method which is to be submitted to the Canadian People you have well termed a workable measure. It must embrace the elements of justice and equity and at the same time it must be so simple and comprehensible that the ordinary citizen can understand and operate it. It is submitted that the bill herewith meets these requirements. It is of no use to talk to-day of government without parties. Any reform which has for its purpose the destruction of political parties will be foredoomed to defeat. Parties are a natural and logical result of human activities, and any reform which is to be effective must operate through them, not in spite of them. The evils of party government are not from the party feature any more than are the bursting of boilers from the depravity of steam. Party government as heretofore known, has been a blind, unreasoning force which people have been unable to control. Like the steam in boilers before the invention of the safety valve they have often gotten beyond control and worked mischief But the diificulties of party government may be overcome as were those of steam pressui'e by supplying a vent or safety valve. If the people have it always within their power to nominate independent candidates and elect them, their will be such a resti*aint put upon the old parties and political organizations that they will always be subject to the will of the people, instead of above it as they too often are to-day. With ballots furnished by the state and candidates nominated freely by all parties and political organizations entitled to a place on the ballot, and representatives chosen from them in proportion to the votes polled, it is patent that the voice of the people can be heard at any and all times. Whether or not it shall be deemed desirable at some future time to elaborate the quota system by introducing the features of the cumulative vote, or of the single transferable vote of Hare we cannot tell ; but it does appear that the quota system herein set forth is all the innovation which we are warranted to-day in submitting for popular approval and exercise. It embraces the maximum of benefit from proportional representation with the minimum of change from the present methods and customs. It brings the representative into direct contact with the voter, compelling the candidates to submit to the scrutiny of the whole electoral unit, thus making it the advantage of parties to nominate men who are deserving and worthy of the honor conferred upon them. By enlarging the electoral unit the possibilities of bribery, intimidation, and all the evils which now afflict us are minimized ; and at the same time the power of secret organizations which vote as a unit, thereby deciding the election, will be destroyed ; their votes will simply count as part of the total, and will be effective only as they swell the number which is divided by the quota. There will be no hopeless minorities and wasted majorities penned up in single districts ; every vote will bear directly upon the final result. Gerrymandering, that dragon which threatens representative government, will be utterly destroyed, and men instead of territory will be repx*esented. NULLA VESTIGIA RETRORSUM. No essay or treatise accompanies this draft of a bill, which is thought to be a " work- able measm^e," The main ideas of the plan are : 1st — Plural voting, in which property and intelligence both receive due weight. At the same time no franchise is taken away, and, if desired, both sexes may have the ])rivilege and duty of voting. 2nd — The rectification of parliament by providing under the name of " candidates at large " a safe constituency for men of eminence, instructed in politics, who have acquired a wide reputation, but whom local interests might defeat in territorial constituencies. Existing legislation with respect to registration of voters, bribery, nomination, the ballot, &c., is not materially interfered with by this proposed act, for it is not desired to introduce any violent change. The principles of the measure might be extended by degrees, if found as beneficial as expected. Compulsory voting is not alluded to. If desired, it might be introduced with respect to the " votes at large," and perhaps with advantage. Nulla Vestigia Rbtrorsum. Toronto, June 30th, 1893. DRAFT BILL TO AMEND ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows : I. — Every Biitish subject of the full age of 21 years, excepting inmates of prisons or of insane or inebriate asylums, shall have the right to vote at elections for member of the House of Commons, if he be 1. Owner of real estate or mortgages thereon, government or municipal bonds, shares or obligations of solvent chartered banks or joint stock companies, or cash on dej)osit in any bank or savings institution to the value of five hundred dollars. 2. Or occupant of a house or lodgings of which the rental is not less than five dollars per month. (Provision for enrollment or registration of voters.) (Provision for the right to vote of sons of farmers or others, living with parents and jointly interested in their pursuits.) II. — Any such voter shall have one additional vote in respect of each of the follow- ing qualifications. 1. If he be thiity years of age and over, married or a widower, with legitimate issue. 2. If he have property of the descriptions mentioned in the next preceding section to the value of two thousand dollars. 3. If he holds a lawfully recognised degree from a university or school of practical science, or be a member of the professions of law, engineering or medicine, or have held within five years the rank of sergeant or commissioned officer in the militia or volunteers. HI. — The additional votes which may be claimed (and duly proved and registered or enrolled, vide provision following section I.) shall be called "votes at large." IV. — Of the members each Province of the Dominion elects to represent it in Par- liament, nine-tenths shall be elected by constituencies with limited boundaries, and similar population, and one-tenth by the province at large. (Provision for redistribution of the constituencies in each Province.) y. — The mode of electing members for the territorial constituencies shall not be Rffected by this act. YI. — The members at large shall be nominated at general elections, in any con- stituency, under the same rules which apply to other candidates, except that 1. The returning officer shall publish, within three days of the nomination, a list of any candidates who are nominated and accept the nomination in his constituency, and shall forward the same to who shall forthwith publish in the names of all candidates so nominated and intending to go to the poll. 2. At the election, the returning officer shall give separate ballot papers to each voter who has votes at large, one for each such vote, not exceeding three in all, and the said votes shall only be cast for candidates at large. They shall be deposited in a separate ballot box, and counted the day after the election. 3. Returns of the number of votes given for each candidate at large shall be sent to and these candidates, to the number required by section IV. of this act, who have received the greatest number of votes shall be declared elected. YII. — Members at large shall have the same duties and privileges as those elected from territorial constituencies, but no such member on accepting office shall thereby vacate his seat. In case of the death or resignation of any member at lai'ge or of his vacating his seat for any cause, the next of the candidates at large, according to the number of votes received at the last general election, shall become a member in his place. (Provision for keeping the list of votes cast for each candidate at large.) TJie qualification of a candidate at large shall be He must, within the five years preceding his nomination, have been 1. A member of the Parliament of the Dominion, or of a Provincial Legislature. 2. A Warden of a County, or a Mayor of a City. 3. A Professor in some University, or a Colonel in command of a Regiment of Militia or Volunteei-s. (Provision for proving the same.) Nulla Vestigia Retroesum. "DIGNUS VINDICE NODUS." Although England is acknowledged to be the Mother of Parliaments, the word itself is of Fi ench not of English origin, and its primary meaning may be said to be the same as that of our word "colloquy". There is some obscurity as to the date when the term Parliament was first applied to a deliberative assembly, it was however used in 1146 when Louis YII of France called a council to organize the second Crusade. During the follow- ing century the term came more into use and henceforth it has been retained, bearing generally the meaning which it now possesses. We do not find in English history any mention of a Parliament earlier than 1215 when the Magna Charta was granted by John the tei'm Parliamentuni Runnemede was used incidentally a few years later in the documents which narrate that event. In 1246 a national assembly was held in London, some historians speak of this meeting as the first Parliament, but the assembly generally accepted as the origin of the House of Commons met in 1265 when Henry IIL was a captive in the hands of Simon de "Montford, after the battle of Lewes. On that occasion two Burgesses from each city and Borough in the kingdom and two Knights from each County were summoned to take their seats in the national Council. This was not how- ever the first occasion on which Knights took part in the assemblies summoned by the King. There is a record which goes to show that in 1254 Royal writs were issued direct ing the election and attendance in parliament of two Knights from each shire (Stubbs, Vol. IL p. 232). All previous State councils since the conquest by William (1066) were composed of Noblemen and Ecclesiastics of Rank. The parliaments mentioned (1215 and 1265) and others in the 13th Century mark the first successful eflPorts to shake off the fetters of despotism and restore the liberties and rights enjoyed at an earlier period by the English people. The Great Charter forcibly obtained from King John, and fifty years later the assembly of the memorable Parliament of Eai-1 Simon, the reputed father of the House of Commons, were two cai'dinal turning points in English history. From the 13th century to the 19th century, the constitution has been moulded by circumstances; it has step by step been adapted to the varying necessities which have arisen ; and the many struggles during the six hundred intervening years, have given the British con- stitution the character it to-day possesses. While the constitution of the Dominion of Canada so far as circumstances admit, is a reflex of that of the United Kingdom, it differs from its prototype in some important respects. The most conspicuous of these distinctions is in the second Chamber. In the British Parliament the House of Lords has a character of its own and cannot be i-epro- duced in any part of the outer Empire ; it is the product of innumerable influences traceable to the past which in no way have existed on this side of the Atlantic ; it may indeed be held to be the lineal descendant of the General Councils of the Barons which assembled duiing the centuries of feudalism. Whatever the desire to transplant to Canada the institutions of the Mother Country the House of Lords is the one which defies successful imitation. We have however created a substitute in the Canadian Senate and as such, this second house has functions to perform of the first importance. If the Senate is not directly elected by the people it may indirectly be affiliated with the popular suff"rage for its members are nominated by the executive Government kiiown as the "Ministry" in whose hands the power and authority of the people is placed by their representatives in Parliament. The following in brief form, presents the legal constitution of Canada, established by statutory enactments :— 1. The Executive Government is vested in the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, represented in Canada by the Governor General. 2. The Executive Government is exercised by and with the advice of the " Queen's Privy Council." 3. The " Queen's Privy Council " is nominated by the Governor General. 4. The Parliament consists of the Queen, the Senate and the House of Commons. 5. The Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament shall never exceed those of the House of Commons of the British Parliament, at the passing of the British North America Act 1867. In Canada as in the United Kingdom are recognised certain political theories and priiaciples which do not appear on the Statute Book. There has grown up a conventional 8 form of Government which is not always in accord with the written law on which it is nominally based. This unwritten constitution has during a long series of years been pass- ing through the phase of its development and one of the remarkable results which have followed, is, that the Commons, the lower House in name, has become the upper House in fact. The popular assembly is the actual ruling power in the State, and as the historian Freeman puts it in "The growth of the English Constitution," "we have cast aside the legal subtleties which grew up from the thirteenth century to the seventeenth, and have gone back to the plain common sense of the eleventh or tenth, and of times earlier still." As relates to Canada the chief featnres of our imwritten or conventional constitution may be briefly set forth. 1. The Crown, the visible symbol of power and authority is represented by the Queen, her heirs and successors. 2. The Queen's representative in the Dominion is the Governor General. 3. All Legislative power and executive authority is derived from the people. 4. The power and authority of the people is vested in Parliament, consisting of the Senate and House of Commons. 5. The power vested in Parliament, is transmitted to an executive committee or council of Crown Ministers, known as the " Ministry " to be exercised for the common w^fare. 6. All executive functions of Government are reposed in the Ministry. 7. The Ministry consisting of members of the Senate and House of Commons is appointed by the Governor General, subject to tlie approval of Parliament. As a body it is responsible to Parliament and the members composing it can remain in office so long only as they possess the confidence of the House of Commons. 8. The Members of the Senate are nominated by the Governor General on the recom- mendation of the Ministry. 9. The Members of the House of Commons are chosen by the people. 10. There are at present 78 members of the Senate and 215 members of the House of Commons, The above presents in outline the theory of our constitution as it is generally under- stood. The essential fundamental principle is that the people is the origin of power and authority and that all power and authority proceeds through representatives of the people, to Parliament, constituting that body supreme. That is the theoiy, and in it we have a vital feature of the political constitution which we are privileged to possess ; unhappily however we have never been able to carry the theory into practice with any measure of success. It is assumed that the people is represented in Parliament and that the power and authority proceeding from the people is vested in the assembled representatives. Our electoral usages fail to attain this end; in effect they disfranchise a large majority of the electors and the true principle upon which Parliament should be constituted is not acted upon. This depai'ture from the spirit of the constitution by which so large a number entitled to be represented in the councils of the Dominion, are left without any voice in state affairs, exercises an undesirable influence and constitutes a grave political injustice to the great bulk of the community. If we enquire into the primary cause of this extraordinary irregularity, in the writer's view it may be traced to an early date. Parliamentary Government came into being in feudal times and has been developed to a large extent out of feudal materials. If we bear in view that the principles of feudalism were diametrically opposed to every theory of popular government we obtain a clue to the recurrences of grave difficulties which have continually arisen. To this circumstance, that is to say to the interpenetration of con- flicting and directly antagonistic elements, viz. freedom and feudalism, may be attributed many of the struggles recorded in the history of the past six eventful centuries. We may trace to the same seemingly far i^emote origin, some of the obstacles which are met at the present day in the working out of the Parliamentary system. Feudalism prevailed in Europe from the 10th to the 17tli centuries. This remark- able organization with its various ramifications, extended in all directions throughout the whole social and political fabric. It was first established we are told as a means of common protection and defence, but whatever its necessity or supposed advantage, it had * Page 121. to the effect of permanently separating tlie community into distinct classes,, the feudal Lords and their vassals ; it crashed out every principle of popular freedom and ended in be- coming: an engine of oppression to the great mass of the people. Feudalism attained its highest development in France and at the time of the conquest in 1066, the French Feudalism was superimposed upon that of England which had its own characteristics. This sui)erimposition of continental Feudalism completely changed the social and political condition of the English people and destroyed what rights they had possessed under the early Saxon Kings. Thus imposed on the nation it became an exceedingly difficult task for the people to free themselves from its grasp. " England owes her escape," says Macaulay, " to an event which historians have generally represented as disastrous. Her interest was so directly opposed to the interest of her rulers that she had no hope but in their errors and misfortunes. The talents and even the virtues of her six first French Kings were a curse to her. The follies and vices of the seventh were her salvation." But the great Charter won by the united efforts of the Barons was but the beginning of her release from tyrannical rule, the struggle was continued in after years with the Tudor and Stewart despotism. The strength of Feudalism roughly assailed in the 13th century did not finally yield its power until the middle of the 17th. In Scotland, it was not abolished by Statute until 1747.* Feudalism as a national organization has long ceased to exist but having held sway for seven hundi-ed years it is not surprising that the influences it created have never been wholly removed. The British Constitution has been cast in a feudal mould to impress upon it indelibly the form of its origin, and it is not difficult to trace remnants of this once powerftd factor in our Parliamentary usages. As an illustration of the influence of traditional usages, reference may be made to the practice which without sufficient cause has come to be regarded as almost an essential part of our unwritten constitution. The writer alludes to the organization known as the " parliamentary opposition." A standing opposition appears to have been inherited by transmission from the period when King and people were in continual conflict, when ruler and ruled were in a condition of chronic antagonism. The " Ministry " in its executive functions takes the place of the King or ruler, but in this relationship there is no ground of quarrel between the Ministry and the j^eople. Indeed the Ministry is the constitutional servant of the people, being recognised as the executive committee of Parliament to carry out the people's will expressed by the assembled representatives. It is difficult in this stage of our history to find good reason for the existence of a permanent organization whose main object is to oppose every Ministerial effort and impugn every Ministerial act. Can wise legislation best be secured by continually impeding the constitutional means taken to effect that end 1 Is the business of Parliament best promoted by systematically interposing obstacles? Is it not a wasteful expenditure of time, energy and talent to appoint one set of men to carry out the wishes of Parliament and to organize an antagon- istic set of men to thwart them in every possible manner, on every possible occasion 1 Long anterior to feudalism we can discern a system of Government based on the true principles of popular institutions. Before the age when Frank and Engle migrated from their German forests to give in after years their distinctive names to the French and English peoples, the historian describes a state of political life of deep interest at the present moment to the Canadian observer. In the tribal gatherings of those Teutonic races with which so many of us can claim remote ancestry, we may ti^ace the primordial germs of the true parliament of the people. Centuries before the term Parliament was given to national assemblies, before even Christianity had penetrated the forests of Schleswick the free tribal communities met regularly to consult on State affairs. Accord- ing to their custom these people assembled to enact laws and impose taxes or their equivalent. Every freeman had the right to be pi'esent and take part in the proceedings.! On such occasions they elected their chiefs and rulers, and precisely as modern Par- liaments will displace a Ministry in which confidence is lost, they exercised the right of *"The Norman and English races, each unfit to endure oppression, forgetting their animosities in a common interest, enforced by arms the concession of a great charter of liberties. Privileges wrested from one faithless monarch, are preserved with continual vigilance against the machinations of another ; the rights of the people become moi^ precise, and their spirit more magnanimous, during the long reign of Henry III. With greater ambition and greater abilities than his father, Edward I. attempts in vain to govern in an arbitrary inanner, and has the mortification of seeing his pi-erogative fettered by still more important limitations. The great council of the nation is opened to the representatives of the commons. They proceed by slow and cautious steps to remonstrate against public grievances, to check the abuses of administration, and sometimes to chastise )iublic delinquency in the officers of the crown. A number of remedial pro- visions are added to the statutes ; every Englishman learns to "remember that he is the citizen of a free state, and to claim the common law as his birthright, even though the violence of power should interrupt its enjoyment. It were a strange misrepresentation of history to assert that the constitution had attained anything like a perfect state in the fifteenth century &c." Hallam's Middle Ayes, CJiap. VIII. p. UoO. t "They had Kings elected out of particular families ; and other chiefs, both for war and administration of justice, whom merit alone recommended to the public choice. But the power of each was greatly limited ; and the decision of all leading questions though subject to the previous deliberation of the Chieftains, sprung from the free voice of a popular assembly." Uallam's Middle Ages, Chap. II. p. GU. n ■ deposing their King or other ruler whenever it was held hy th^m to he expedient. These gatherings were Parliaments of a rudimentary character; by means of them they governed themselves and carried out a political constitution whicli suited the simple condition of untutored Teutonic life. *■' It is not a little remarkable that fifteen or eighteen centui-ies later, after all the struggles and changes of iiitervening years, civilized communities should return to the first principles of Government ]>ut in ptactice by our ancient forefathers. This fact itself shows that tlie principles themselves are natural and rational, and that the races who adopted them were in their imperfect civilization imbued with sound common sense and possessed sti'ong moral force. At an earlier period in European history, in the last days of the Greeek civilization, the Government was conducted according to the popular will. The citizens of Athens came together in formal assembly at regular intei'vals, to consider those matters which concerned the State. On such occasions all had the right to be present, and were required to be present to take part in the proceedings. It was the same principles which at a later day prevailed when Angle and Saxons settled in Britain. Beginning with the 5th century, the German races chiefly Angles, Saxons and Jutes crossed the sea to take possession of the land now known as England, rhey carried with them the simple organization to which reference has been made. For five centuries of its existence Anglo-Saxon society adapted its political system to the expansion and growth which resulted from fresh migration from the continent and from Danish and Norseman invasions, and indeed to all the circumstances of its changing situation ; in the end to be overwhelmed by the Feudalism of the 11 th century. At this period the constitution of the Anglo-Saxon recognised the freeman as the fully qualified political unit, as such he had a voice in the " folkmoot" or popular meeting of the shire ; lie had the right of expression at the " Witan " or national assembly ; he was con- sulted in the making of the laws by which he was ruled and he took part in the selection >f those who administered them.f Thus we learn that the ancient Greeks, the ancient Germans and the ancient English — Chi"istian and Pagan alike — recognised the fundamental ))rinciple that the people should oe assenting parties to their laws and participants in their own government ; principles udely set aside in the Mother land, when the popular assemblies of the early English ff-ere transformed into feudal courts. J The fact cannot be disputed that feudalism supplanted a system of Government 'ounded on rational principles, which had prevailed during a ])eriod extending over great Dart of the first half of the Christian era. In the constitution of Canada we possess in ;heory popular Government, based on the same or analogous princi])les as those which lave been described ; the wi*iter has however remarked that the essential principles of popular government are not carried into practice in the Dominion, and thus Government 3y the people exists only in theory. If we refer to the published official returns of the ast census (1891) and the last general election (1891) we shall find as follows : — (a) Population of the Dominion 4,833,239 (6) Number of fomilies 914,504 (c) Voters on the Electoral lists . . ., 1,132,201 (d) Total votes polled ' 720,459 §(e) Votes polled for all Government candidates 368,357 §(/) Votes polled for all Opposition candidates 352,102 (g) Members elected 215 (h) Government supporters elected 123 (i) Opposition members elected 92 (k) Members elected with majorities under 100 . . 50 * "Montesquieu said very truly, that the able and worthy of the improvement it has r.iceived, because actuated y a sound and xital spirit, the love of freedom and of justice. We have seen a forci>jn conqueror and his descendants trample •most alike upon the prostrate nation, and upon those who had been comi>anions of their victory, introduce the servitudes feudal law with more than their usu.al ri;,^our." Hallam's Middle Ages, Chap. I'lIJ. p. /t;'iO. § There were five Government and two ( )i)i>osition members elected by .acclamation ; in these cases the statistician atcs that he took the figure of the previous general election in order to admit of a complete comparison. 12 (I) Of which there were Government supporters 28 M " " Opposition members 22 (n) Average maiorities of Government members elected 476 (o) Average majoi-ities of Opposition members elected ... . 230 These are the actual returns. The number of votes polled for the members elected, is not furnished, but the figures given (e), (/), (n) and (o) admit of this being calculated approximately as follows : — (p) Votes polled for 123 Government candidates elected. . . . 231,238 (q) Votes polled for 92 Government candidates defeated. ... 137,119 Total as above (e) 368,357 (r) Votes polled for 92 Opposition candidates elected 168,350 (s) Votes polled for 123 Opposition candidates defeated 183,752 Total as above (/) 352,102 Several striking deductions may be drawn from these statements. I shall refer to two only. ^ First. If we examine (k), (I) and (m) the exceeding instability of the political equilibrium will at once be ap])arent. Fifty members on both sides, nearly one fourth of the whole House were elected by majorities under 100. Of the.se fifty, twenty-eight were elected Government supporters, by less than 2800 votes. Obviously the reversal, by any means whatever, of so small a number as 2800 votes, distributed over twenty-eight con- stituencies would give the following result : — Members elected to support the Government ., 95 Members elected to oppose the Government 120 A result which would defeat the Government by an adverse majority of 25 and produce an administrative revolution. It is a possible result, and the illustration brings out one of the glaring defects of our electoral system ; establishing that a possible change of 2800 votes out of 720,459 the total votes polled, might revolutionize the Government. What better proof could we have that our electoral system fails to give us a fair i-epi-e- sentation in Parliament of the solid sense of the people, when the oscillation of a few votes, perhaps of the least intelligent voters, might reverse the whole public policy of the Dominion 1 Second. The returns point to an extraordinary dualism in the House of Commons. We have in all 215 members artificially separated into two antagonistic classes or divisions. Class A. the most numerous consists of 123 members. Class B. of 92 member ; two per- fectly distinct organizations continually at war in all public matters. Power and authoi'ity is thrown into the hands of one class A while the other B is excluded from all participation in the direction of public affairs. The 123 members composing class A were elected by the votes of 231,238 electors, and it is these voters alone who have any effective representation in Parliament. There was a total of 720,459 votes cast, if we take into account those given to the 123 Govern- ment suppoi'ters, there remains 489.221 votes describable as wasted, for they were given to defeated candidates and to opposition members neither of whom have any participation or voice in the Government. Tliu.s the representatives of less than one third of those electors who went to the polls and recorded their votes, assume all power, and I'etain the right to exercise it in the name of the whole people. Again, if we consider the whole electoral body, an anomaly still more striking presents itself There are in the electoral lists 1,132,201 voters, but the comparatively small number of 231,238 of this number absolutely control Parliament. That is to say the Dominion of Canada is governed, today, not by the whole people or by representatives of the whole people, according to the theory of our constitution, but by the representatives of only one-fifth of the electors. There remains therefore four-fifths of the whole electoral body without any share whatever direct or indirect in the administration of public affairs. From these indisputable facts established by the latest statistical returns, we may ask if we have made any advance in the development of popular government since introduced in the e^rly centuries of the Cliristian era by our Anglo-Saxon forefathers. Every sphere IS 6t pl'actical economy is characterized by advancement and development, can no explana- tion be given for the anomalous condition in which we tind ourselves in respect to electoral representation ] The po[)ular national assemblies in ancient times, to which reference has been made whether the elected head was chief or king may be described as •' direct democracies." Institutions which partake of this character are only possible in small states, such as were found among the ancient Greeks, Teutons and Anglo-Saxons, or in modern times, remain in the mountain Cantons of Switzerland. In extensive territories and populous com- munities a government, on the simple type of "direct democracy," cannot be brought into uccessful ojDeration. The assembly of the whole electors in one body in a countiy like Canada is impracticable ; and if practicable, the confusion and clamour which are the nevitable consequence of assembling great multitudes, would in no sense conduce to calm leliberation or further the ends of legislation and good government. To meet the iifliculty the representative system has been devised, with the design of having the mass )f the population represented by a limited number of carefully chosen deputies ; and the lumber necessarily must be sutticiently limited to admit of full and fair debate on the jart of the representatives when gathered together in a deliberative assembly. It is by lo means an easy task to carry out this design as it should in practice be realized. We equire new electoral machinery, to attain, unimbittered by strife and contest, the choice f representatives who may command general respect ; men worthy to be entrusted with he confidence of the nation and authorized on behalf and in the names of the whole leople to act and speak in their stead in Parliament. It has been shewn by the returns of the last general election (and it njay be affirmed hat the results of all general elections present the same features) how far short we are f obtaining in Parliament even an approximately true representation of the whole people, lowever unsatisfactory these results, it by no means . proves the representative system to a failure. It establishes, however, beyond all doubt that the means taken to obtain n accurate and faithful representation of the people is much in fauJt. To find some etter means is the primary purpose, as the writer understands it, of the Appeal which the Canadian Institute has submitted to the public. This Appeal therefore presents a problem f profound interest to the political student, and its solution even affects the political well- eing of future generations. The object of its solution is not to destroy, or reform or ven amend our constitution, it is simply to carry out the fundamental principles on which has been established. One of the first consequences of the proposition is to revivify le conceptions of our remote ancestors who recognised the importance of ruling wisely id being wisely I'uled. Self Government was an essential principle with the ancient Teutonic commonwealths I their tribal gatherings, the type and precursor oT that which we desire our own itional assembly to be. They sought in a rude fashion to carry out the assurance of berty and justice held by them to be the primary principles of their constitution. Had :>t the system conceived and begun by them, been set aside by the intrusion of the feudal stem, the ideal Parliament we are to-day seeking would have been long since evolved, n a cursory view we may feel astonished that the intellectual activity observable in the st two or three centuries has not succeeded in putting the plain rational principles of ee Government into practice. On examination the reason becomes apparent ; the tardy generation of English freedom has been owing to causes deeply imbedded in the ditical groundwork of the English nation. The popular Government introduced by the Lxons was not only completely suspended for centuries, but it was crushed out, leaving it the memory that it had existed. The feudal system rose and fell, but it remained a eat political force for nearly seven hundred years and it did not pass away without wing its lasting impression on every phase of society.* The innovations introduced in ese evil times have one by one been removed, but it exacted a long period for even the eory of free institutions to tind general recognition. From the first day of their partial ■introduction they have been forced so to speak into a foreign matrix by which they ve been cramped and confined so that natural growth and expansion became impossible, this lact we tind an explanation why the process of the evolution of popular Govern- mt has been prevented. It is Freeman who points out that from the i3th century ward the development of popular Government has been chronologically inverted, that 3 English constitution has from that period of history made })rogress by a retrograde Jvement, by a falling back "from the cumbrous and opjjressive devices of feudalism, to 3 sounder, freer, and simpler principles of the days of our earliest freedom." * " Transported to England in the eleventh century by the Normans, and firmly rooted there till the middle of the snteenth century, the influence of feudalism on the habits and customs of tliis country, and on its social order was oubtfcdly e.\tensive." Feudalism by Abdy, pmje llii. 14 Every age has to provide against its own difficulties and the dangers which beset it. Possibly there wei'e special reasons for the extensicn of feudal institutions at one period of history which are unappreciated in another. We are not called upon to enquire whether feudalism was a necessity or a supposed necessity in the ages when war and conquest were the chief pursuits of mankind. We have only to recognise that these institutions at one time universally j^revailed, in Older to account for the niaxvellous influence they have had in determining much of our present ])olitical condition. The habit of thought of earlier generations is still to some extent rooted in our national life, and hence it is that we have long tried with but partial success to engraft our modern requirements on the traditions of the past. It has been remarked that it was owing to the superimposition at the conquest of continental feudalism without any formal change in the English laws and Kingship, which determined much of the later features of English history. The despotism imposed by William under legal forms crushed Saxon national life but it did not obliterate Saxon laws; so likewise in the 13th century, and in succeeding centuries, when the old national S])irit was evoked, to regain some concessions of the early freedom, the super-imj^osed feudalism remained, at least in form. The political fabric was never wholly demolished and rebuilt ; the old walls were conserved and in some parts reconstructed and improved. Hence arises much of the divergence between the legal and the actual, between Action and fact, in our modern constitution. Hence the peculiar features of the traditional forms which cling to and characterise our parliamentary system. There is indeed a long chain of causes extending over centuries which has operated! in producing tlie parliamentary system and the electoral form and practices, as we find them established. Not a few of them spring from the feudal age rather than from the age of freedom which preceded the reign of feudalism. If therefore we attempt to solve the problem set before us, we must reject all that is baneful inherited from feudal times, and seek to rectify our national assembly on the early Teutonic model, so that every member of the community, by right entitled as were Saxon freemen of old, may have a voice in his own government. If it be an understood principle of our constitution that, power and authority proceed from the people, it should be our aim to see that that funda-' mental principle is something more than a delusive fiction. At present our representation system is so imperfectly developed that we have but a figment of popular government, and no true responsible govei-nment. The Ministry is practically responsible to only one section of the House of Commons, the representatives of a comparatively small portion of the whole electorate. The Ministry is not and cannot be responsible to the peojile or the representatives of the people in Parliament seeing that the people as a whole is without representation. With these brief remarks beai-ing on the origin of Parliament, its slow and imperfect development, and its need of rectification the writer i-espectfully submits a draft of a measure embracing the principles by which as he believes, the Canadian electorate may be fairly represented in the popular assembly, and each individual voter may through Parlia- ment have due weight in the government of the country. The first section of the Bill is a humble and respectful recognition of the symbol of Power and authority, represented by the Sovereign who stands at the head of our con- stitution. We cannot ignore the force of association and the prevailing attachment to the Crown. The Canadian people cling with confidence to the Monarchical character of government which had its origin not so much in the feudal days as in the age anterior to feudalism. In theory and practice it has happily become blended with our representative democi-acy. Beyond this recognition of the Crown, the measure submitted is limited in its range to the election of Members of the House of Commons. There is no reference to the Second Chamber, the Senate, with respect to which it may be remarked that we have not, as in England a powerful aristocracy, as a rule carefully trained and educated with a view to the station they have in after life to fill and the tluties to perform, not the least important of which is that attendant on a seat in the House of Lords. Nevertheless the Canadian Senate by judicious appointments may become, as at one time that of Rome, an assembly of statesmen who have previously held high office, or in some measure have proved themselves, by their experience, capacity and patriotism, worthy occupants of the exalted position. The first section of the Bill provides for the appointment of electoral officers. The highest officer proposed is an Electoral Commissione}-, who as a Minister or Deputj Minister ot the Crown would be held responsible for the proper regulation of all matters in his department. The other officers acting under him, would assist in carrying intc effect the provisions of the Bill, the Commissioner and his deputies being governed by th( Orders in Council from time to time issued for their guidance. \b Section II provides for the holding of elections at stated times. It is proposed to have one-fifth of the members elected regularly each year. The annual elections to be evenly distributed throughout the several Provinces so as to bring to Parliament yearly from all sections of the countiy new members fresh from the people. By this means the House of Commons would be regularly renewed and the entire Assembly re-elected every five years. This system of renewal would practically result in maintaining a continuous or permanent Parliament annually brought into direct touch with the people, avoiding those general elections which are so familiar to us, and which every few years strain the State to its centre. These periodical convulsions are struggles for political supremacy, their tendency is to inflame the passions and ai'ouse feelings which render it impossible to obtain a calm judgment. In these times of great popular excitement, even individuals of intelligence and character proceed to lengths which in their sober moments they would utterly condemn. As a consequence to the proposed system of annually renewing the House of Commons thei'e woiild be a corresponding change in the Ministry, a proportion of which would be understood to retire each year, to be replaced by others or to be re- appointed, as might be found expedient. In other words there would be an annual reconstruction of the administration, to bring every branch of the Government into harmony with Parliament, to which the regular restorations at yearly intervals would give a character of flexibility combined with continuity. Sections III. and IV. The provisions of these sections are designed with the view of constituting the House of Commons an express image of the general spirit of the nation and giving to each electoral unit in the community its due share of political power, and no more. Admitting the generally recognised truth that every member of the community is individually concerned in the good government of the country, it follows that if we can adequately reproduce in Pai'liament the true spirit and will of the people, we shall obtain the essential elements necessary to the wise and harmonious administration of affairs. The community is composed of many members differing in age, education, religion, Jii| sex, occupation, position and intelligence. The existing statutes relating to the franchise define the qualification of persons entitled to be placed on the list of voters. Those ex- cluded are, women of all ages, Mongolians or Chinese, male persons under 21 years of age, criminals, certain Judges and certain Government Officers. In England and elsewhere there has for some time been a movement for the en- franchisement of women and it must be confessed that it is difficult to give a reason, apart from special disqualification, why women should be debarred from taking part in a matter which concerns them equally with men. All will admit that there are many women in every community far better qualified by experience and intelligence to exercise the fed franchise than young men as they generally present themselves at 2I years of age. As the voter is the political unit, and the right of being well governed is the common heritage of both sexes, it is clear that no good reason can be found why women should be excluded wholly from representation. It is undeniable that woman's true sphere is in her house- hold — she is associated generally with family life ; the Avife lives with her husband, the daughter with her father or elder brother, the widowed mother with her son. Moreover the family is the true unit of the state and the family life is or ought to be, an important tto factor in the development of a high moral public life. Why then should we not recognise 0: the family as the political unit and bestow the voting power on the family, to be exercised M throtigh its head? In this way the just right of woman would be recognised and her influence felt, she would thus share with her husband, or senior male relative, the political dignity whicli full citizenship confers. A reasonable exception to the rule that families only should be allowed to vote, would be in the cases of unmarried or widowed house- holders of mature years. It does not appear to the writer that youths of twenty-one would consider their disqualification a great deprivation, if they regarded the matter in its true light. The j^rivilege wotdd in their case only be deferred and they would look forward to the day when they too would become heads of families, when their interest in the State and its affliirs would be increased and when they would be better fitted by the wisdom which experience brings to exercise one of the privileges of the highest condition of man- hood. On whatever basis the franchise may be established, it would in no way affect the principles of the Bill. In any case the names of the qualified electors would be regularly enrolled on the voters' list for each Electoral District, and each elector would be entitled ;;eii to a certificate setting forth the facts as in form E. The Bill provides that the certificate It shall be required for the purposes of identification whenever the elector is called upon ii to vote. It has been pointed out that a large percentage of the electors of Canada, are at this n( ill! 16 • inotaent deprived of their rightful share iii the Govermnent of tile countiy. 1 do nos hesitate to say that this is a political condition deeply to be deplored. The men in power may be wise and capable, their public policy may be beneficial, the country may be advancing and commerce may be flourishing, but there can be no political peace so long at any considerable number of the people are without jiarticipation in public affairs. When no less than four-iifths of the whole electoral body are practically shut out from any direct or indirect share in their own Government, is it to be wondered at, that, leading men from all parts of the Dominion should have recently assembled in a great political conven- tion at Ottawa, (June, 1893) planning, devising»and urging means to overthrow those in power '? To secure confidence and a general sympathetic interest throughout the community there must be a change in the Government, not merely a transference of power from one portion of the community to another. It cannot be in the public interest to pei'petuate the system, and in order that thei-e may be an entire change, the goodwill the support and the co-operation of the whole people must be sought and obtained. The people generally should be made to feel that each elector by the part he takes under the electoral law is fairly made an assenting party in all matters which concern the common weal. It is unwise and inexpedient to narrow down the governing power to a portion of the people. The Legislative Assembly, the supreme governing body, should not be permitted to stand on the narrow basis of one tifth of the population, it should be supported by the whole five-hfths. It is therefore expedient to widen representation and enlarge the base of responsibility by seeking the co-operation of all, and by acceding to as manv individuals as possible, a share in the administration of public affairs. The mean- ing of this proposition is by no means that each individual elector should become a ruler, or attempt to rule. Government by the people does not mean government by each voter, manifestly an impossibility ; it means government by the collective will and spirit of the 'people expressed by the people's deputies in a national assembly. The very least that should be done, perhaps the most which can be done, is to extend to each individual elector a voice through his deputy and give him the fi-eest possible choice in the selection pi that deputy. Bearing on this' point I will quote from a well known democratic writer (Stickney) with whose view to a'large extent I agree. " If it were a possible thing to give to every individual a direct voice on measures other than in local affairs, it would not be desirable. I believe in the expediency of giving to the individual citizen the fullest part that he can possibly take, under any political system that can be devised, in the administration of public affairs. But the function of the individual citizen must be limited to his voice in the selection of men. As to measures other than local, the individual citizen never is and never can be, able to act wisely, I do not here draw any distinction between rich men and poor men, between learned and unlearned, I say that all individual citizens, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, alike, are incapable of forming a wise judgment on the great questions of State and national policy. The large public questions, if they are to be decided wisely, must be decided by men carefully selected, who can take time to learn the special facts of special cases, who can take part in the common delibei-ations of men who represent diverse interests, and who can, after such conference and deliberation take part in the forming and uttering of a calm common judgment. The judgment of single individuals however learned or skilled, on great public questions, has comparatively little value. That the individual citizen however intelligent he may be, however able he may be, shall be allowed to pass his individual judgment on great public questions to which he cannot give special study, on which he cannot deliberate with other men, is not in accord- ance with any sound theory of democratic government. Democratic government means, not that every citizen shall have a sej)arate individual voice on every public measui-e in his own person, but that every citizen shall, in the person of his representative, have one voice in the people's meeting, by which all questions of general public policy are decided. On mere local questions he can have this voice in his own person. On questions other than local he must have this voice always in the person of his representative, in whose selection he has had, with all other citizens, his equal part. The actual decision of actual questions is, and necessarily must be, in the hands of representatives." Representation is a comparatively modern device ; it was unknown to the Saxon free- man of old, who claimed a direct voice in his tribal legislative assembly ; it introduces a new ])riuciple and the only principle adaptable to the circumstances of populous states. In the Bill, it is proposed to carry the representative principle a little further than has been customary in electoral matters in order effectively to accomplish that which has hitherto been impracticable, viz. government by the great mass of the electors. In an ordinary Electoral District there are let us say 5000 electors. The number is too large to allow each elector to meet for consultation in order to arrive at a commou 17 opinion as to the choice of a Member of Parliament. The Bill provides a means by which they can i-each this end by a orradual pi'ocess. The proposal is for groups of electors of similar views to nominate one of their number as a representative elector and in this each voter will have a perfectly free choice and he will only have to associate himself with a few others entertaining similar views. The number in each group in no way affects the jn-inciple, provided all groups have an equal number. Twenty-hve is considered a convenient number for each group and this number would reduce the 5000 political units in the district to 200. Pi-ecisely as the design of Parliament itself is to bring the whole nation within a compass small enough to admit of orderly debate so likewise by means of the representative princi])le we propose to bring the whole electoral district for the purpose of consultation and concentration of action within the compass of a court con- sisting of 200 persons. The selection of 200 representative electors would involve time and attention mostly of a routine character. Electoral Agents would be appointed to assist, and supervise, the expense being borne by the public exchequer. The task no doubt would be atteude I with difficulty but the ultimate object, the formation of the people's national assembly, in accordance with the theory of our constitution, is a matter of paramount importance and no trouble, no reasonable expense should be held too great to secure its accomplishment. On a day to be determined all the representative electors appointed would assemble in a general court, presided over by the Electoral Warden, for the express purpose of electing a Member for the House of Commons. Section IV. prescribes how the election is to be proceeded with. As any ten elector's present may nominate a candidate, there would be perfect freedom of choice and any number of candidates from one to twenty may be nominated. If there be but one candidate nominated, after a sufficient lapse of time he would be declared elected. If there be several candidates the election would be decided by Ballot; dependent on cii-cumstances there may be a sei-ies of ballots the number of candidates being reduced by the process of elimination unlil one candidate receives the requisite number of votes — viz., more than half the number of Representative electoi-s. If no candidate receives the required number of votes, then as a last p«j^-t the choice to be determined by Lot in a fair and equitable manner as set forth in tlTe Bill. ;^^\ This extension of tlie repi-esentative principle has incidental advajitag;^. * As a rule the j^fi:,^^^ best men in the community, certainly not inferior men, would be cfiosen as representative ^[^''^^ electors and the latter would elect the members of the House of Cctnmons. Thus our 'i^ modern representative democracy would become exalted above a democracy which admits * the ignorant and the corruitt equally with the better class of citizens. By the selection of the best men the representative electors might indeed be likened unto an aristocracy ; not that of the accident of birth, but an aristocracy of toorth. The remaining sections of the Bill deal with election returns, general provisions, and election expenses. With regard to the latter it is felt that in as much as the election of members to sit in Parliament is purely a public matter and it is in the highest degree im- portant that Parliament should be formed constitutionally without being de[)endent on the private means of candidates or individuals ; it should be a tixed principle that all just and reasonable expenses in connection with elections should be [laid out of the public ex- chequer. To carry out this principle not only should the electoral officers in each distinct be paid for their services, but the re|)resentatives electors should he paid an indemnity for their attendance at the Electoral Court. Stringent regulations and a strict audit would be enforced as in other departments of the Government. I read on page fl7 of the Appeal issued by the Canadian Institute: "The central idea of Parliament at the present day, is an assembly of individu;ils representing the whole nation. The functions of Parliament are to act on behalf of the nation as the supreme authority, and — representing the nation — it possesses every power and every right and every attribute which the nation possesses. The fundamental idea and guiding principle of Parliament is, that it embraces all the separate parts which compose the realm, that in f ict it is the nation in essence." Agreeably to this public ajjpeal I h ive set myself to the task of devising " the means of forming an elective assembly which practically as well as theoretically will be the nation in essence." I have endeavoured with all the earnestness I can command to discover a method by which the whole peoi)le of Canada " may be brought to a central point, to a focus so to speak, in a delibei'ative assembly or Parliament." The train of research I have been led into has revealed to me many curious recorded facts. For long centuries England our political mother land was held in the grasp of a con- federation of feudal despots, and Englishmen were then in a very different social condition to what they, or we, now are. For a long period the mass of the English people were thrown into a state of vassalage. Now the subjects of Queen Victoria on both sides of 2 18 the Atlantic enjoy tlie rights and privileges of free citizens. In Canada we are farther advanced as a representative democracy than our fellow subjects in England, for the reason that we are farther removed in some respects from the associations and still sur- viving influences of feudalism, the signs and marks of which are borne in the political constitution of the mother country. In Canada we find ourselves in a different condition. The voice of history teaches us that we have more in common with the early ages of the English race than with the less ancient period of English feudalism and that the germs of our Canadian constitution must be sought for in the ]irimeval institutions of the Teutons. Satisfied on this point the Teutonic germ is the one which it has been my endeavour to unfold and develope, with what success I must leave others to determine. It is not to be expected that a solution of the problem propounded by the Canadian Institute could fail to interfere with old electoral methods and as in every sphere of life there are some persons whose attachment to old usages is so gi-eat that submission to the most indefensible abuses would be preferable to any vital change whatever. Happily all men are not so constituted, if they were, all improvement all advance in human affairs would be at an end. Thei-e is moreover a growing disposition, especially among men of a scientific habit of mind, to penetrate beneath the surface of things, to discern first causes, to recognize the actual facts, in order that rational conclusions may be reached. The cardinal idea in our constitution is that the people rule and it must be understood to mean that the rule is of the whole not of a part. It is well that it should be so — the broader the base of any structure the greater its stability. The people of Canada can rule in one way only, and that is through a national assembly where every Canadian shall be present in person or by proxy — where the consent of the assembled body shall be taken to be the consent of the whole people. Our constitution is essentially that of a re- presentative democracy and our future must mainly rest on the fair and full representation of all Canadians in their own Parliament. This noble purpose cannot be acliieved without change ; it will exact a deviation from old-fashioned ways ; it will invite opposition ; it will involve much trouble and difficnlty to overcome obstacles ; but its achievement is an object of the most vital importance to us as a people and it would ill become the offspring of the great historic races, the heirs of a vitality born of a thousand struggles, to hesitate to enter on the final stage in the development of free institutions. "DIGNUS YIN DICE NODUS." (Draft.) AN ACT RESPECTING THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA. Her Majesty by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Com- mons of Canada enacts as follows : — I. — (Electoral Officers). 1. The Govei-nor General in Council shall aj^point an Electoral Commissioner whose duty it shall be, under the authority conferi'ed on him from time to time by Order in Council, to carry into effect the provisions of this Act. 2. The Governor General in Council sliall, on the recommendation of the Electoral Commissioner appoint an Electoral Warden for each electoral District in the Dominion and shall authorize the appointment of a suflicient number of Electoral Ofiicers and such assistants as may be necessary to carry out efiiciently the provisions of this Act. II. — (Periodical Elections.) 3. The election of Members of the House of Commons shall take place in each Electoral District of the Dominion every fifth year and it shall be arranged as nearly as practicable so that one-fifth of the whole number of Members shall be elected annually. To effect this object the several electoral districts shall be arranged (as in the schedule hereto) under the five headings or Classes A, B, C, D, E, so that one-fifth (approximately) of all the electoral Districts in each Province shall be in each class and elections shall be held in the following order, viz : — 19 In Class A in the year 1900, 1905, 1910, 1915, &c. B " " 1901. 1906, 1911, 1916, &c. C " " 1902, 1907, 1912, 1917, &c. " . D " " 1903, 1908, 1913, 1918, &c. E " " 1904, 1909, 1914, 1919, &c. 4. Two months before the date of an election the Electoral Commissioner shall issue a proclamation directing the Electoral Warden in respect thereto and reciting such portions of the Act bearing on the choice of representative electors as may be deemed necessaiy. 5. Immediately after the issue of the Proclamation the Electoral Warden shall take the oath of Office (in the form A.) and shall appoint a sufficient number of Electoral Agents as may be necessary to assist him in carrying out the provision of this x4-ct and who before acting as Electoral Agents shall be duly couunissioned and shall take the oath of Office (in the form B). III. — (Representative Eleciors). 6. The election of members of the House of Commons shall be made by repre- sentative electors chosen by the electors as herein provided. 7. Any twenty-five electors whose names are on the voters list may nominate and appoint a representative elector in the manner following : — («). Each elector shall sign an elector's nomination paper (according to form C; deputing one other elector, a discreet and competent person, to act as pi^oxy. The several signatures shall be made in the presence of an Electoral Agent who shall receive from each signatory his voter's certificate and the Electoral Agent shall require each elector to make oath or affirmation according to form D. (b). For the purpose set forth in the preceding clause the clerk of the Municipality when called upon shall furnish any elector whose name is on the voter's list, a voter's certificate according to form E. (c) When an elector's nomination paper shall be duly signed as aforesaid and wit- nessed by an Electoral Agent, the latter shall present it along with the twenty-five voter's certificates to the Electoral Warden for the purpose of filing the same. ((/) Before filing an elector's nomination paper the Electoral Warden shall require the Electoral Officer to make oath in the form F. and shall satisfy himself by comparing the names of the signatories with voters' certificates a.nd the voters list that they had not previously voted and are duly qualified to vote. (e) On satisfying himself as to the validity of the elector's nomination paper, the Electoral Warden shall place the same on file and shall issue a certificate according to form G. declaring the representative elector duly chosen. 8. It shall be the duty of the Electoral Warden to provide the fullest opportunity to every voter in the Electoral District to take part in the choice of electoral representatives. He shall emi)loy all right and proper means to promote a free choice on the part of those entitled to vote. He shall at all convenient times furnish needed information and he shall exhibit and publish a list of voters distinguishing from time to time those who have, from those who have not, chosen a representative. 9. The choice of representative electors in any Electoral District shall commence not less than six weeks before the date fixed for the election of a Member and shall be con- tinued until one week before the same date, when the list of representative electors shall be closed. 10. As soon as the list of I'epresentative electoi-s shall be closed the Electoral Warden shall publish the names of all who have been chosen in the order in which they have been placed on tile and he shall notify by letter sent to the post office address of each repre- sentative elector chosen, at what time and place he shall be required to meet in general court to elect a Member for the House of Commons. IV. — General Court of Representative Electors. V 11. On the day named in the proclamation of the Electoral Commissioner the representative electors shall assemble in a genei-al court to elect a member to represent the electoral District in Parliament. Before regularly assembling they shall each present to 20 the Electoral Warden his certificate of appointment to be " vised," and who before taking his seat in the general Court sliall make the oath of qualification according to form H. 12. The representative electors being duly sworn the Electoral Warden shall call the Court to order and shall make such announcements as may be necessary, the nomination of candidates shall then be proceeded with. (A.) — Nomination of Candidates. 13. Any ten representative electors may nominate a candidate by signing a nom- ination paper in the form I. stating therein the name, residence and description of the candidate sufiiciently to identify him. No representative elector shall nominate more than one candidate. 14. The Electoral Warden shall file nomination papers complying with the preceding section in the order in which he may receive them. The I'eceipt of nominations shall be in order np to five o'clock on the first day of the general Court after which the Electoral Warden shall cause to be published a certified list of the candidates nominated. (^.)— Election of a Member. 15. The election of a Member shall be proceeded with at ten o'clock on the morning of the second day of the general Court. 16. Should there be one nomination only, the candidate nominated shall be held to be the choice of the genei-al Court and he shall be declared by the Electoral Warden, elected by acclamation. 17. In the event of there being several candidates, the election shall be accomplished by ballot or by a series of ballots as each case may require, reducing step by step the number of candidates by elimination in accordance with the degree of preference indicated by the votes. Should there be no marked pi-eference for any one candidate made manifest by the weight of the votes given, the selection shall be made from the candidates receiving the largest number of votes and shall as hereinafter provided be determined by Lot. 18. Two of the Electoral Agents shall be appointed tellers to receive the votes and who shall be duly sworn according to form K. 19. The voting shall take place in the immediate presence of the Electoral Warden who shall mark off" the name of the elector voting, on the list of qualified representative electors, as each vote is received. 20. The ballot of each voter shall be a small white card with the name of the candi- date printed or written thereon, it shall be placed in a blank envelope by the voter before handing it at the proper time to the receiving teller. Cards and envelo])es uniform in size for this and other similar purposes shall be supplied to those voting, during the general Court. 21. Should there be two candidates nominated, a ballot shall be taken as follows : — (a). Each rejjresentative elector shall in turn present himself at the voting table and shall show his qualification certificate to the first teller who shall report to the Electoral Warden. (b). All being found in order the elector shall pass the envelope containing his ballot to the 2nd teller to be stamped. The elector shall immediately thereafter place the same in the ballot urn. (c). When all the representative electors present have voted, the Electoral Warden shall open the ballot urn, and with the assistance of the Tellers count the votes and announce the number given for each candidate. (d). In the event of one of the candidates receiving votes numbering more than half the whole number of representative electors in the electoral district, he shall be declared by the Electoral Warden duly elected. Should neither of the candidates receive votes equal to half the total number of representative electors the selection shall be determined as hereinafter provided, by Lot. 22. Should three candidates be nominated a ballot shall be taken as in Section 21, and if one of the candidates receive votes numbering more than half the whole number of repre.sentative electors in the district he shall be held to be the successful candidate and shall be declared elected. In the event of no one candidate receiving more than half, the selection shall be determined by Lot as hereinafter provided. 21 23. Should foul- candidates be nominated, a ballot shall be taken as in section 21, and one of the candidates receives votes numbering more than half the number of represent- ative electors in the district he shall be declared elected. If no one candidate receives more than half the total number, then the three candidates who have received the highest number of votes shall be eligible for a second ballot. The second ballot shall be effected as in section 22 and the election determined in the manner therein laid down. 24. Should five candidates be nominated or a larger number than five, a fii'st ballot shall be taken as in section 21 and if one of the candidates receives votes numbeiing more than half the total number of re])resentative electors in the electoral district he shall be declared elected, but if no one candidate receives more than half, the four candidates who have received the largest number of votes shall be eligible for a second ballot. In this case the second ballot shall be conducted as if there were four candidates (see section 23) and the election of a member determined accordingly as therein provided. (C.) — Determination by Lot. 2/5. "When in any case it becomes expedient to determine the election by Lot as in that alluded to in Section 22, the names of the candidates from whom a selection is to be made shall be inscribed on small white cards. The number of cards for each candidate shall correspond with the numl^er of votes received by each, that is to say should the votes cast have been for Candidate A 78 B 67 C 55 Total votes 200, then the name of A shall l)e inscribed on 78 cards B " " 07 " C " " 55 " making in all 200 cai'ds. Each card shall be put in a blank envelope sealed and placed in a ballot urn. In another ballot urn there shall be placed an equal number of blank envelopes containing in every instance except one, a l)lank card. In one envelope only shall be placed a card similar to the otlier cards but having inscribed thereon the words " This is the Member." 26. The two ballot urns shall each have been shaken so as sufficiently to mix the cards after which the drawing shall be* proceeded with, the teller at each urn shall simultaneously and indiscriminately draw an envelope from each and after stam])ing and numliering both alike the two shall be placed together in a third envelope and handed to the Electoral Warden. 27. After all the envelopes are drawn and disposed of, the Electoral Warden shall proceed to 0[)en them one by one in their order. He shall make known the contents of each as he proceeds, replacing the whole in the original envelopes. 28. The candidate whose name shall be found associated with the card bearing the inscription " This is the Member " shall be declared by the Electoral Warden duly elected. 29. So soon as the member shall be declared elected, the Electoral Warden shall close the General Court and proceed to pay the representative electors their attendance fees and mileage allowances as provided in Section VI. V. — Election Returns. 30. The Electoral Wai-den shall on the day after the closing of the General Court of )-epresentative electors, transmit to the Electoral Commissioner a i-eturn of the election in the form L, certifying who has been elected Member. He shall likewise forward to the Member elect a cojjy thereof. 31. The Electoral Warden shall accom})any his return to the Electoral Commissioner with a report of the proceedings mentioning the several stages thereof and he shall make any observations he may think projjer. 32. The Electoral Warden shall transmit to the Electoral Commission, the nom- ination pa])ers of the representative electors, the nomination pai)ers of the several candidate.s, copies of the voters list and I'oll of representative electors and all other lists and documents used or required at the election. The Electoral Commissioner shall ^'etain in his possession all papers transmitted to him by the Electoral Warden for at least two years after the date of the election. 33. The Electoral Commissioner shall on receiving the return of any Member elected 22 to the House of Commons, enter such return in a book to be kei)t by him for such purpose, in tlie order in which the same is received by him, and thereupon give notice in the ordinary issue of the Canada Gazette of the name of the Member so elected. VI. — Election Expenses. 34. The Governor General in Council shall determine the salary of the Electoral Commissioner and his assistants, the fees and expenses to be paid the Electoral Waiden, Electoral Oificei's, tlie mileage and other allowances to be paid Representative Electors attending tlie Electoi-al Courts and all other legitimate and proper expenses necessary to carry into eflect this statute. And shall esta1)lish a regular tariff in resjiect thereto, which tariff may be amended from time to time as circumstances may require. All such salaries, fees, allowances and disbursements shall be paid as the Governor General may determine, by warrant directed . to the Minister of Finance, out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada and shall be distributed as may be directed by the Electoi-al Commissioner, to the several officers and pei'sons entitled to the same under the i)rovisions of this Act, which distribution he. the Electoral Commissioner, shall report to the Governor General through the Secretaiy of State ; and the Electoral Wardens shall cei-tify the correctness of all accounts within their respective Electoral Districts. VII. — Genekal Provisions. (The general provisions with respect to issuing of proclamations, giving notices, administration of oaths, transmission of information, &c., may be similar to those in the present statute 49 Victoria Chap. 8). (^.)— Oath of Office of Electoral Warden. I, the undei-signed A.V>. Electoral Warden for the Electoral District of , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am legally qualified according to law to act as Electoral Warden for the said Electoral District and that I will act faithfully in that capacity, without partiality, fear, favour or affection. So help me God. Signature (A.B.) Electoral Warden. Certificate of Electoial Warden having taken Oath of Office. I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the day of the month of , 18 (A.B.) the Electoral Warden for the Electoral District of , took and subscribed before me, the oath (or affirmation) of Office in such case required of an Electoral Warden. In testimony wliereof, I have delivered to liim this certificate. Signature (CD.) Justice of the Peace. (B.) The Commission of an electoral officer the oath of Office and certificate of his having taken the oath of Office may be similar to those provided in the Dominion Election Act, in the case of an election clerk (see page 45.) (C.) — Nomination of a Representative Elector. We the undersigned twenty-five electors of the Electoral District of hereby nominate and appoint as our representative elector and deputy to appear and act for us at any Electoral Court held in the Electoral District of and in our behalf to elect a fit and proper person to represent the people of the said Electoral District in the Commons House of Parliament. Witness our hands in the said Electoral District this day 1 8 Signatures with the miinherfi of electors on the voters list. Names. Numl)ers on voters list. ). 2. 3. 4. &c. &c. Y 23 (Z>.) — Oath of qualification of rlector. 1. I solemnly swear (or affirm) that lam the person named on the voters list for the Electoral District of that I am numbered on said list and that I deliver to the Electoi-al Officer my voter's certificate entitling me to the privilege of a voter. 2. That I am a British subject and have not before appointed any person to represent me as an electoi'. 3. That I have not received anything nor has anything been promised me directly or indirectly nor have I paid or i)romised anything to any person, unlawfully, in connection with this election. So help me God. [E.) — Voter's Certificate I hereby certify that is a duly qualified elector in the Electoral District of and that his number on thf^ voters list is and that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges of an Elector for the said District. (Sd) Clerk of the Municipality of Electoral District of (F.) — Oath of Electoral Officer on filing Nomination paper. I the undersigned Electoral Officer duly appointed for the Electoral District of do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the accompanying nomination paper appointing a representative elector for the said District was duly executed by all the twenty-five electors in my pi'esenee in the manner provided by law. So help me God. Signature A.B. Date. Electoral Officer. {G.) — Certificate of appointmrnt of Representative Elector. I horel)y certify that has been duly nominated by twenty-five electors of the Electoral District of , a representative elector in their liehalf and in their stead to elect a Member for the Common House of Commons and that J have placed the nomination on file and I hei-eby d(>clai'e the said nominee duly appointed rei>resentative elector for this Electoral District. Signature Electoral Warden, Electoral District of (//.)— Oath of Qualification of Representative Elector. 1. I solemnly swear ('or affirm) that I am the person named in the nomination paper duly filed by the Electoral Warden of the Electoral District of and now shown to me. 2. That 1 am a British subject and am duly qualified to act as a representative elector for this district. 3. That I have not received anything nor has anything been promised me directly oi' indirectly, nor have I paid or promised anything to any person in connection with this election, unlawfully, and J. will act faithfully as representative elector to the best of my ability. So help me God. (/. ) — Nomination of Candidate. We the undersigned ten repn'sentatative electors hereby nominate a fit and pro| er person to rej^resent the Electoral District of as a Member of the House of Commons of Canada. We have not nominated any other candidate at this election. Witness our hands this day of Si' mil tares. Signatures. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. U. 10. 24 (/r.)— Oath of Tellers. I, the undersigned appointed Teller in this election of a Member to represent the Electoral District of in the House of Commons, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will act faithfully in my capacity of Teller and do my duty according to law without partiality, fear, favour, or affection. So help me God. (Z.) — Return after an Election. I hereby certify that the Member elected for the Electoral District of by the General Court of Representative Electors on the day of 18 is (name &c. as in the nominiition papei). (Sd.) E.W. Date. Electoral Warden. I ''NEW OCCASIONS TEACH NEW DUTIES." It has been pointed out by one of the foremost Canadian investigators of parliament- ary abuses and shortcomings that it is a "necessary result of our human nature that the end of government is primarily and essentially the welfare of the ruling class." The defects in our laws, the corruption in legislative circles and the turmoil of party politics are a necessary consequence of entrusting the government of the country to an absolute parliament, the members of which being human are more or less self seeking, and being selected with reference to their position upon a confused jumble of various public questions manipulated by scheming individuals and inseparably bound together, are not fitted to represent the people upon any one question taken by itself. Is not this pooling of issues a legitimate outcome of the system of the entire abdication by the voter of the law making power in relation to many subjects in favor of one nominal representative 1 By far the better part of the community is practically almost defranchised through the platform system of polictics. For men of thought and sincere jiatriotism will naturally arrive at independent conclusions upon public topics. But if they support measures of which they approve they are forced by the system to support those also to which they are opposed ; thus, to them, the value of the franchise is lessened or destroyed. But the thoughtless, the narrow minded, the corrupt elements and those who place party before country, who think more of triumph than of truth are not hampered, but have an undue influence in public affairs. It may be contended that the party platform system while it may in individual cases bring to the suj)port of certain principles those who otherwise would strongly oppose them, yet will, by a law of averages — ^by counteracting one error by another — by bringing one to sup2)ort a certain proposal to which he is opi)osed in the stead of another who would really wish to su])port it, were he free to do so, and not led by the necessities of the system to oppose it because he considered it in bad company and the system obliged him to endorse the whole list or none— all conflicting elements being eliminated by cancellation — may in its results in the corannmity as a whole truly voice the wishes of the whole people. Is there any certainty that thus trusting to chance will straighten out interminable tangles 1 As well might a seaman endeavour to disentangle his lines by running his free end haphazard through the interstices of the snarl. It is the reasoning of the gambler who stakes his fortune trusting to a change of luck. In theory, a portion of the community unites upon a set of principles which it unanimously wishes to advance, and the triumph of the platform denotes the will of the people with respect to these principles. But, in practice, such is far from being the case. Few men would approve of all the propositions of their party were the judgement untrammeled ; but being part of the machine they must go with the other gearing. The majority of a party decide what the platform shall be. That majority in its turn may be a faction whose votes in caucus or convention are previously decided by the majority of that faction meeting among themselves. Similarly, the ])olicy of this last faction may have been decided uj)on by the majority rule. This system of i)arty within i)arty is capable of expansion in theoi-y until a minority of a very few individuals could impose a policy upon the public at large, having the political power rightfully belonging to a majority of the people. As a matter of fact, it is sufficiently developed to greatly impair the usefulness of parliament, to have an unwholesome influence upon the course of legislation and materially interfere with the welfare of the community. Party government has been compared by its defenders to the balance- wheel system of a chronometer, the opposing tendencies counterbalancing each other in thoir excesses — ^in their variations fiom the* proper mean. But if we consider a moment, the .seeming analogy disappears. It is not the balance-wheel, going first to the one side, then to the other, which marks the time, but it is the steady advancement of tlie liands. With partyism it is the fanatical element, the opposing tendencies, first going one way, then another, which record the workings of the machine, leaving tlie sober judgement, the steady advancing sentiment of the i)eople helpless and unused. Moieover, the waste of power in timepiece escapements is a defect such as is always sought to be avoided where economy of force is an important consideration. In horological science, the waste of power being so small in comparison with man's physical force, we tolerate the defect for the sake of its convenience, having arranged for a perfect resultant action. In politics we exhaust our strength in pulling in opposite directions and the resultant action is 25 26 hecessarily erroneous, being seemed by corruption or through incapacity, or a haphazard many-sided conflict of multitudinous interests. Dr. Fleming has compared political parties to the crew of a row-boat determined to pull in opposite directions. " There would be much agitation of the water, but little or no satisfactory progress." Might I venture to add that this metaphorical row-boat is in dangerous waters, and the force of the crew's efforts being spent against itself the current is bearing the craft steadily towards the rapids. In the strife between the evil and the good, let the good that is in men have but fair play, and we need not fear for the ultimate triumph of Truth and Justice and the progress of the race. But if we continue to render our best propensities powerless, our noblest efforts inoperative, the forces of evil, engineered with better tact will continue to maintain their ascendency in politics and their interference with the welfare of the community. Where the electorate is divided into two hostile parties and a summing up of the aggregate vote determines which shall govern the country, the best intentioned and most intelligent voters but nullify each other's votes. The majority of voters are fully resolved that they will never change their political faith. With many it is a boast that they vote as their father and grandfather voted. In all probability they will continue voting in the same way be it on the reform or conservative side, to the end. If we were to despair of doing away with party politics, it would be a vast saving to the state and the individuals concerned if the votes of these self-proclaimed slaves of their ])resent opinion or their grandfather's opinion, could be eliminated by cancellation, by a •kind of clearing house operation without the useless requirement of going to the voting booth. Majorities only are counted in the end. The shifting vote governs. The " dyed in the wool " voters, reformers and conservatives would as much afiect the result if they would arrange for their mutual disfranchisement. Those who hold the "balance of power " are not slow to make the best of their opportunities. Some will sell their support openly to the highest bidder, others for promise of office or political advancement. Or, it may be a particular church or a society or those of a particular profession or trade whidi desires government favor. But great as are the evils of the party system, they are not the only cause of the (l(?cadence of popular government. The avoi-age legislator in his public conduct is influenced by self interest. Personal favors, direct or indirect, from those seeking to influence parliament, frequently a money bribe, have much to do with shaping legislation, having no connection with party politics. A. lawyer or a doctor or a money lender is selected as a candidate, not owing to any special fitness for the position, but on account of his ability to secure votes. They have bills and other financial claims against a large number of voters who by concession or pressure are brought to jjolitical servitude. The ballot has perhaps lessened this evil, but has failed to effect a cure. When the candidate has become the representative he usually recoups himself in some way for the trouble and expense of the election struggle. Not that legislators necessarily accumulate riches, for politics is a costly game. When the corrupt representative does not fatten upon his ill- gotten gains, he is often losing his substance to the parasites which he carries. As an instance of corrupt influence in a country of similar institutions and political morals to our own, the New York Central Railway runs a weekly dead-head train from New York to Albany and return during the legislative session, and gives passes generously for other trains. The fares, if collected, have been computed at four thousand dollars per week for the twenty-one weeks, a total of eighty-four thousand dollars per annum. The New York Central Railway is not a philanthropic entei-prise. It expects value for its service. That is but one act of a single corporation. Other interests adopt the same policy in this and other countries whex-e parliament has the power of abusing its position. The P-inama Canal Co. controlled by bribeiy so far as suited its purpose, both the French Assembly and the Congress of the United States. The lobby is in every legislative hall. Money or its equivalent can secure almost any legislation, or prevent it, until some particular abuse becomes so glaring that the [)eople are aroused and candidates are pledged to oppose it. It has been advanced that the "representatives of the people in jiarliament should be left free to act according to the dictates of their own judgement, after full examination and full consideration of every subject." But is it not " a necessary result of our human nature," that the removal of what restriction we now have upon the i-epresentative would open still wider the flood-gates of corruption by giving the dishonest legislator a greatly extended field of operations'? Though it is not true that all men have their price, it is exemplified continually in the commercial and legislative world that a very large number of men have their price either 27 in money or personal advancement. And since majorities rule and under tlie present system of delegating the legislative power to individuals, corruptionists can easily afford the price necessary to attain their ends. Capital and knavery combined will continue to unduly influence legislation until men are vastly more moral or until the power o( betraying the public is taken from the hands of the politicians. So long as such glittering jjremiums upon dishonesty are displayed before the politician — so long as a man may attain riches without inciu-ring legal penaUies or forfeiting the respect of the community and has his sense of honor perverted by an unwholesome environment, he will not grow in moral character. Those who have observed the diffei'ent aspect in which the dishonest politician is viewed from the petty thief can attest to the demoralizing influence of political corruption. In ti-ying to remedy political abuses, we must deprive not only partisanship of its power, but corruption of its opportunity. The recognition of the people's right of sovereignty has come slowly but steadily as that rigiit has become more and more manifest. First parliament had to struggle for its existence. Then the franchise was gradually extended as peo[)le became enlightened until now we have so nearly approached manhood suflTrage that practically speaking the terra "the people" is synonymous with "the electorate." In the early part of the century Guizot in his college lectures defended a limited franchise, the confining of the voting power to " a fragment of society," " the most capable." Thiity years later he wrote, "If I should apply, at the present day, to these historical studies of liS20 all the lessons which political life has given me since that period, I should perhaps modify some of the ideas which I have expressed in reference to some of the conditions and forms of i-epi-esentative government. This system of government has no unique and solely good type, in conformity to which it must necessarily and universally be instituted. Pi-ovidence, which allots to nations different origins and destinies, also opens to justice and liberty more than one way of entering into governments ; and it would be foolishly to reduce their chances of success if we condemned them to appeal' always with the same lineaments, and to develop themselves by the same means. One thing only is important, and that is, that the essential principles of order and liberty should subsist beneath the different forms which the interference of the country in its own affairs may assume amongst different peojiles and at different epochs." A growing public intelligence assisted bv the press has fitted progressive countries for self government. We have now accepted the principle of the sovei-eignty of the people. But the electoral machinery is not in harmony with the design, and the sovereignty is largely exercised by the mighty dollar, political cunning and blind chance. In confining our efforts to voting for i-epresentatives we are nearly powerless as to measui'es. As this paper proposes a measure of practical direction of parliament, let us consider the exceptions to the rule when voters have been allowed to indicate their wishes inde[)endent of party politics. Perhaps we may learn something from the histoiy of direct voting by the people. It is no experiment. It is an old institution. The germ of it, the right of petition, dates from the fourteenth century. That was the initiative without the referendum. In Canada we have been voting upon matters of municij:)al legislation for yeais ; rail- way by-laws, waterworks, the control of the liquor traffic and various jjropositions involving the expenditure of coiporate funds, and there are few who will say that the result has not been much more satisfactory than if those questions had been decided by the local parlia- ment without this systematic consultation with the electorate. These questions were referred to the people for the same reason that the directing of parliament in all matters is here urged, to enable the people to separate measures from men, and from other measures, and to avoid corruption. In the New England states direct legislation has been practised by the town meeting system ever since their settlement. In other parts of the Union laws concerning the liquor traffic, lotteries, tax ratt's, railroad regulations, public works of various kinds, the contraction of debts and many other matters must be submitted to a direct vote of the people. The practice has given unbounded satisfaction, and is now greatly on the increase. It is in Switzerland, that most progressive country, that we And the principle receiving consistent treatment. In federal affairs and in nearly all the cantons the popular vote is either made obligatory or dependent upon the will of the peo[)le made known by petitions. After an experience of the system for over fifty years it is to-day more po))ular than ever. It has given them governmental control more or less absolute of all public monopolies, lowered tiixes, withheld legislation sought by the privileged classes and re- moved the worst evils of party politics. The successful working of the governing making power in municipal corporations, 2ft banks, insurance, railways and other commercial enterprises and the comparative absende of jjartisanship therein is due to their being more closely under the control of their constituents through annual elections and reviews of their legislative work — through being pledged to a certain policy and the views of the individuals being obtained by vote or conference upon all important questions. In politics however, the legitimate directing power is silenced by an overwhelming mass platform planks. All the issues before the people are so crowded together in their sub- mission for their approval or condemnation tliat all is confusion. The result is left to chance or is decided upon personal grounds or considerations foreign to the vital question to be decided. As well might a judge try all the prisoners in court in one trial and acquit all or punish all, as the weight of evidence against the various defendants is little or great in the aggregate — if the greater part are guilty, punishing all — if many are innocent, acquitting all. Or, if even a few are guilty of some atrocious crime, condemning the majority though admittedly innocent. Under any uncontrolled system of legislation we do with public questions as such a judge would do with those brought before him. It has been assumed that the possession of a sound general judgement would result in the exercise of the best judgement of the people upon all questions. It is scarcely con- ceivable that a Jegislator could be found whose judgement upon a vai'iefcy of questions would coincide with that of the majority of the people, or a legislature constituted which, even if the conflicting personal interest of the legislator did not intervene, would form a correct estimate of the popular will upon all questions. The voters are forced by the incongruous mixing of measures and men to vote for a representative who, they know, will misrepresent them in many respects in oixler that they may be I'epresented in the consideration of other questions. It has been claimed in the past that a legislator's judgement would be superior to that of the people, but that ])Osition has been abandoned in progressive countries. To confound measures and men and seek for a plan of representation which will be even a2)proximately representative of the nation without some provision for the nation making known its wishes upon each question at issue independently is to appi'oach a [)roblem im})ossible of solution upon the face of it. It would be the production of law and order by the methods of chaos. As well try to travel to a dozen destinations in as many ditferent directions at the same time. With one representative upon several distinct issues the platform and party ism become a necessity. The only practical plan of a truly representative parliament independent for a time of all control would be to have an entii-ely different set of representatives for every question to be decided. That would be a perfect scheme of representation were it not for the fallibility of the representative. To secure that true representation in parliament in a sinq)ler and safer manner the scheme of a parliament at all times under the virtual direction of the people, the pi-inciple of which we have repeatedly tried and approved of, is herewith submitted for examination. To give " each elector due weight in the govern- ment through parliament and thereby to remove the gross political evils of this and other nominally democratic countries," I propose an ada[)tation of the optional form of the Initiative and Referendum, which has given such satisfaction in Switzerland, where it has long since passed the experimental stage. (Appendix). It is a reform rapidly gaining ground wherever brought prominently before the people, notably in the United States where it is fast coming into popular favor and most urgently needed. It may be objected that giving the power of direct voting under certain circumstances would be giving the elector due weight in the government independent of rather than through parliament. It would do both. Parliament would be anxious to ascertain and give cifect to the wishes of the electorate knowing that those wishes could be m;ule elTectivo without its concurrence. It is not proposed that the people shall vote direct, but that they may so vote in certain contingencies. The control would be mainly operative in its effect ui)on parliament. That body could not often oppose the apparent will of the people. Consequently, direct appeals to the electorate in opposition to parliamentary legislation would as the system made its influence felt U2)on politics, be few and generally unsuccessful. Parliament would anticipate the vote of the electorate. It has been represented as lowering to the character of parliament to lessen its nule[)enilence. Do we lose dignity in the faithful performance of a t)-ust 1 Among the last public utterances of the late Phillips Brooks are these words : " Be master and servant. Obey and be obeyed ; and one afternoon's experience, if you can make it, will make you so ni love with the life of service that you can never again during life give yourself up to the life that you led when you tried to be lord and master." Parliament should obey as well as command. It will not thereby forfeit our respect. I.ord Lytton has said : " In proportion us the fiecdom of the representative is cramped and his responsibility im- 29 Doverislied by the exaction of exorbitant and vexatious pledges, the general character of .he representative class will be low and subservient, and the ccniidence it can command ivill be consequently small." Tlmt is the old aristocratic idea of government. Is there lot a better gospel coming to the front proclaiming the duty of those who are intrusted ivith ])ower by the people to sink selfish inclinations in the service of those who send them ;o represent them? Are the judges of our land "low and fc:ubservient," and do they fail ;o command confidence because, repi^esenting the public in its dej^artment of Justice, they ii'c pledged to a certain line of conduct by their oath of office, and are not free to deal yith criminals or litigants as they will, but must be guided by the law of the land l Does the head of a municipal corporation lower his position who endeavors to ascertain [he wishes of the electorate and is guided thereby, though as a private citizen, he might avor a different line of action] Is the presiilent of a railway or other business objection- bly low and subservient because he is guided in his conduct of the business by the wishes f the shareholders 1 When one performs a service voluntarily and receives recompense nr that service, where is the slavery? But if we admit the applicability of the term to he one which is subordinate to the other, is it not better that the representative should le the slave of the people than that the people should be as they now are, the slaves of he representative 1 Is it not a virtue in a politician to make all possible effort to acquaint himself with he wishes of his constituents and to be guided by their wishes'? The object of the nnexed bill is to make that custom practically obligatory. But we are told that voters are incompetent to legislate. If that were true we had etter go back to a more select voter's list. One who is capable of analyzing character, weighing motives and nicely balancing the interests which he entrusts to an independent iw maker is surely capable of forming as cori-ect a judgement ui)on a simple proposition ivested of all personality. " Law cannot rise higher than its source." Nor can parlia- lent be depended upon to rise higher than the electorate. It has been assumed that public discussions on a lai'ge scale are necessary in order to ach proper decisions, separating the wheat from the chafi' by the agency of — wind. But jo not the i)eople meet repeatedly in sections at every elections ? However, there is a etter agency than wind in the winnowing of ideas. The press gives information and lucation gives capacity of judgement. The average elector can gain more wisdom eliberating all alone for five minutes than in talking politics for five years. For in nitroversy we strive to triumph, and gi-ow more prejudiced, while in meditation we seek 16 truth. Every question is discussed by the public at large as thoroughly as in parliament, id usually in advance of parliamentary treatment. Discussions in pirliament are Idressed more to the country than to the legislators. It is not designed to supplant parliament l)y Direct Legislation. That body would ill retain its proper function of interpreting the people's will, arranging details, coni- I -onuses and modifications and moulding legislative schemes into the most accei)tal)le rm. If they did not pei'form that duty then the peo]ile could assist. As an American riter says, we would have " a fire extinguisher which will cost nothing if we do not use but which in some emergency may be worth millions." The actual work of legislation ould remain with parliament. There would be no necessary delay in the legislative ork. The people would only act in case of widespread dissatisfaction with any particular irt of its work. Being subject to this ultimate control political sagacity would enable irliamentary representatives to be the nation in essence as legislators no matter what ey might be as individuals. And is not this the only important point? They would ; in touch with the people and they must respect the touch. Why should we make a distinction in favor of those questions hitherto submitted to e people? Would not the same advantages arise from putting beyond the complicating d corru]jting influence of party politics the consideration of custom's tariff, of railroad licies, of Civil Service Keform, and of the currency laws and of any and every question general interest ? The jieople emancipated from party serfdom would be at liberty to change their . ews, and reasonable discusssion would largely take the place of bitter controversy. The ews of the people would be immediately reflected in the law-making chamber. If we acaept the modern idea of the sovereignty of the peo[)le, of parliament being 8 peo])le in essence, and not merely a condensation of a certain portion of the people esumably more fitted to govei-n, it is difficult to inuigine upon what grounds the princi^)le direct control by the nation over the law-making machinery can be logically assailed. There are but two systems of government ; by a majority of the people, acjomplislied )her directly or by I'spresentatives giving effect to the will of the majority upon all 30 questions, which can only be attained by being under constant control of the people ; and by a part of the community, be it one or many, a king or a parliament, independent of the wishes and beyond the control of the people. That a refei'endary control of legislation is feasible our own experience in submitting propositions to a popular vote, as well as similar instances in the United States and other countries, ^oes far to prove. That it is a satisfactory remedy for political evils nearly all Switzerland attests. "If there be a political prophecy," says W. D. McCrackan in the Arena {or Msiy, "which it is safe to make at this time, it is that our representative system cannot remain in its present form for another decade, if the republic is to endure The institutions of the initiative and referendum, as practised in Switzerland, are the noblest i)olitical achievements of this waning century. They are capable of supplying our decaying democi-acy with the powers necessary for its redemption Making laws by means of all-powerful representatives will some day be looked upon as a method fully as crude and [/riraitive as that of letter-writing by means of scribes on the street corners." This proposition is designed to separate the issues before the people and to prevent the representative's betrayal of his trust. If it will do that, will it not solve the problem of our political decadence and rectify parliament '? A railroad company would not issue passes and grant other exceptional privileges to a sufficient numl)er of voters to enable it to obtain coveted legislation, nor could it bribe the whole countiy. It is incomparably more feasible to buy re[)resentatives every four or tive years than the whole electorate annually. ISTo individual or combinations of individuals could bribe the whole community. Therein consists the only hope of the salvation of popular govern- ment, assailed as it is by a more oi- less corrupt i)rivileged class whose power over parliament is continually on the increase. Under a controlled parliamentary system governments would not bargain for the supi)ort of purchasable members : they would not bribe constituencies to return their supporters by promised public works : nor would candidates bribe the voter, for the motive would be lacking. There would be no money or other personal gain in politics, as there would be n© arbiti'ary power to barter for money or favor. And it is because there would be no money in politics and the [nivileged classes would be prevented from sapping the streno-th of the nation, that every proi)ositioa to remedy affairs is so bitterly opposed by those whose selfish interests would suffer. Let such self-seeking individuals remember that their descendants may not be politicians, and that they may be — tramps. Even they themselves may fall. The ups and downs of life are so frequent that the efforts of those who are up to make more hopeless the condition of those who are down may sometime be viewed from a different though still selfish standpoint. Most schemes of minority representation are founded upon the assumption of the necessity of party government. Grive to the people their rightful sovereignty which would enable every one to pass judgement upon all questions separately instead of in bulk, and the forces of partisanship will be scattered, and there will be no minorities, as we now understand the term, to represent, and no majorities to combat. Though it might be desirable that some scheme should be adopted providing for fivinw due weight to the Aotes of every interest so far as practicable, representation of every interest would be secured by the knowledge that parliament was not supreme. It would be the tendency of the system to make every member of parliament the representa- tive of every interest. The savagery in the forest where man was free so far as governmental control was concerned, but living in discomfort and fear of his fellow man and of wild beasts : — the primitive monarchical systems which secured'the welfare of the people or oppressed them as tlie ruler was wise and beneficent or ignorant and evil disposed — the feudal system with the masses in servitude — the uncontrolled representative government system with political power delegated absolutely for a stated pei-iod to a selected number of professional legis iators — the complete sovereignty of the citizenship of the state through its practical retention of the law-making power — these mark the epochs of the political life of nations advancing from savagery to a complete civilization. That is government by reguhu evolution. The old hajihazard system of parliamentaiy representation, the best available perhaps in primitive times, is a monumental failure in our day. Our greater fitness lor sel government and our growing needs inxjuire that we seek something better. " New occasions teach new duties : Time makes ancient good uncouth, They must upward still and onward who would keep abreast of Truth." 31 To make tlie system complete, a like measure miglit be enacted by the Provincial Assemblies in harmony with this jn-oposed Act, and providing for tlie optional submission of provincial and municipal measures to a j^opular vote. "New occasions teach new duties." (Appendix). BILL. AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR REFERENDARY VOTING. (A^jplied to Canada, but ap])licable in prinGi2}le to any country with a similar Parlia- mentary system.) Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows : — 1. It shall be lawful for fifteen per cent, of the whole number of electors of the Dominion of Canada, or twenty -five per cent, of the membership of Parliament, by petition, to obtain the submission to a popular vote of any measure for the repeal of an existing law or for the passage of a proposed law. 2. The text of proposed legislation may be deposited with the {Head of government department) together with its title. Copies shall be printed and sent to the clerks of municipalities and the titles only shall be used in petitioning and votinof. 3. Such petitions shall be in similar wording to Form A., hereto appended, with a distinguishing heading as there designated. 4. Blank forms of petition shall be furnished by the government under regulations of the Governor Genei*al in Council at the computed cost of production. 5. It shall be the duty of the Government when the aggregate number of public petitioners for the submission of any measure shall exceed fifteeen per cent, of the duly qualified voters of the Dominion ; or when the number of signatures on any petition of members of parliament shall exceed twenty-five per cent, of the whole number of repre- sentatives, to make jirovisiou for the submission of such measure to a popular vote at the next annual election provided for by this Act, providing there shall intervene a ]>eriod of at least thirty days. 6. In the Provinces which shall concur by legislative enactment in the provisions of this Act the voter's list used for all Dominion purposes shall be prepared by a joint commission composed of an officer appointed by the Dominion government, an officer appointed by the Provincial government and a third apjjointed by the council of the municipality aflfected. (1.) In case of dissatisfaction with the rulings of the Commission an appeal may be taken to the regular courts. (2.) Such voter's list shall be used for Municipal, Provincial and Dominion purposes. (3.) The voting uj>on any and every m^easure that may be submitted as well as 'the voting for members of Parliament so often as those elections shall occur, shall be at the same time and place as for municipal offices. (4.) Voting shall be by ballot and one ballot shall serve for Municipal, Provincial and Dominion voting of every descri{)tion. 7. In Provinces that shall not concur by legislative enactment in the provisions of this Act the voting shall be annually and at the same time as the municipal elections when there may be measures to be submitted. 8. Only titles of measures voted upon shall appear upon the ballot. 9. The majority of the aggregate vote shall decide all questions and upon the passao-e of a submitted measure and upon its aj)i)roval by the Governor General shall be declared in force, and the government shall make proj)er provision for its enforcement. 10. All Acts or portions of Acts conflicting with this Act are hereby repealed. Form A. i[ Public Petition for Referendary Vote. (Or Petition of Member of Parliatnent for Referendary Vote.) "•♦ I hereby petition for the submission of {Title of Measure) the text of which has been deposited with the (Head of Government Department.) (Signatures.) SPERO MELIORA. There is little doubt that the system of electing the members of Parliament, by the majority of the votes in each Constituency, is objectionable in the extreme. Though it is the general practice in countries with a repi'esentative form of government, the plan is attended with features totally incommensurate with a well ordered system of po[)ular representation. The evils resulting from it have been repeatedly pointed out by political economists foi- many years past, of late, by Dr. Sandford Fleming, after whose able treat- ment of the subject it would be superfluous to repeat the objections against the system. All those men who have given the subject attention from an independent standpoint are practically unanimous in the opinion, that the injustice possible, and the abuses continually occurring are largely attributable to the fiict that the system of election followed does not give the peojjle equal re})resentation in Parliament which aggravates and intensifies if not causes the strong party feeling which is so much deplored. The desideratum is a plan which would '^ give the whole people equal repre- sentation in Parliament." How is this to be accomplished] It appears easier to denounce the evil than formulate a practicable remedy. Several plans have been proposed by which it was thought the problem could be surmounted, bub all seem to contain provisions which largely counterbalance the advantages that would otherwise accrue from them. The plan known as the Hare system has met with the greatest favor containing more advantages than any other proposed, indeed with some modifications it has been the system of election in Denmark for many years, but it must be admitted tliat there are disadvantages which diminish its merits ; though it is greatly ])referable to the present system. As it is only by friendly criticism of the measui'es ])roposed, their weak points may be eliminated and a more perfect scheme evolved, 1 purpose to show in what respect they are faulty. The greatest oljection to Mr. Hare's scheme and others founded u[)ou it is the large proportion of votes counted for candidates who are only the second, third, fourth and even lower choice of the voters who in other words are i-epresented eventually by persons inferior, in their estimation, to the candidates of their first choice. An elector should be represented in Parliament by a candidate whom he considers the best for the position and in whom he has implicit confidence ; but as will be seen any vote cast for a candidate who does not secure the quota necessary for his return is applied to secure the return of another inferior in the opinion of the votei*. In practice com- paratively few of the candidates would poll sufficient first votes to equal the total voting jjower of a constituency. This is without the difficulty mentioned by Mrs. Fawcett, when a candidate A receives 2000 votes, the second name on half of them being B, the second on the other half of another candidate C, if all the ballots with B's name second were used for A's return as the ballot could only be used to elect one member, B would be left without a single vote, while A and C receiving the full quota of lOOO wotes would be returned. Though B received the same number of second votes as C through the accident of the ballots with his name second l)eing drawn out first and counted to A whose name was at the top of the ballot they were useless to B. How to prevent this occurrence is a yet unsolved problem. Any scheme where the result would largely depend upon chance, as in those where the selection by lot is the ruling principle, however meritorious it might be would be likely to prove unsatisfactory. Many of the electors being uncertain as to whether they would really be repre.sented at all would lose interest in the wh le subject. Another plan of ])roportional reju'esentation is to add up and divide by the unit of representation the total number of votes cast for the candidates of the different political parties allowing each party its proportionate number of members. The objection to this plan is that it would draw the line between the parties even more inten.sely than at present and recognize party distinctions which is one of the worst features of our ])olitical system. It is now in order to formulate the writer's plan for the " Rectification of Parlia- ment." Absolute perfection is i)erhai)s unattainable but his endeavor will be to give a little assistance to the task of solving this difficult problem. A plan which in the writer's opinion would meet the requirements of the case is as follows :— beginning with the Registration of voters I would make personal application to the Registration Clerk necessary to the placing of an elector's name on the voters' list. This provision is rendered needful by the practice of EleCjion Agents making applications wholesale without being particular, in many cases, whether the names are eligible or not. A nd in many cases the Registration Clerk is not over scrupulous if they ai-e on his side of politics. Sometimes 32 33 it is dirticult for those legally qualified to get tlieir names on the list if their views are known to be opposed to those of the Clerks, perhaps appointed by the government on account of their extreme partizanship. This is done by the Clerk omitting to enter their names on the Register, so when election day comes the voter finds he is not on the voters list, or, if he discovers it beforehand he has to attend the C-ourt of Revision which he may be unable to do. Personal registration would prevent any dishonesty on the part of the Clerk. At the Office the a])plicant would be compelled to make an affidavit as to his qualificiitions when the Clerk would give him a certificate of registration similar to the following : — No Electoral Division of Date This is to certify that A. B. of having complied with the statute governing the same, was this day placed on the list of Electors for the Electoral Division of Signed. Registration Clerk. As it might be impossible or difficult for some to apply personally at the office, they could make their affidavit before a magistrate or J. R who would send it by registered mail to the Registration Clerk together with stamps to i)ay postage. The Clerk would send the certificate by return mail to the appplicant. This would meet exceptional cases, but as the applicant would be at the expense of postage both ways and magistrates fee it would not become the practice. At the polling booth the voter before he received his ballot would have to produce his certificate which would prevent the personation often practised. The certificate would then be stamped on the back by the Deputy Returning Officer, stamp to bear date and class of election (this to prevent the certificate fi-om being used again at the same election by another person) and then it would be returned to the voter. The ballot before being handed to the voter would be stamped in the same manner so as to prevent the collusion sometimes practised ; for when the voter has been bribed, to ensure that he " stays bought," a counterfeit ballot, already marked, is given to the voter before he enters the booth ; this one is returned to the Returning Officer instead of the genuine ballot which is given to the briber as a proof of their mutual perfidy^ The appointing of the Returning Officers and Registration Clerks by a party govern- ment when strong partizans are always chosen has l)een the cause of much dishonesty and corruption, for these officials have o])portunity to take an undue advantage of their position with little danger of detection. This consideration has led me to propose the formation of a " High Court of Election," such as appears in the second section of the accompanjdng act, the composition of which would command the respect of the whole Electoi-ate. No matter how Parliament might be divided the minority would have the same power in the Court as the majority while the three neutral members would ensui-e that no party could control it. This is no doubt an innovation and perhaps in the annexed " Act " in its crude state, but I am sure that the principle will commend itself to fair-minded people. If it does that, improvement can follow, it would at least remove the stigma of partizanism, whether merited or unmerited, from the Exeutive Government. Another point where injustice is perpetrated is in cities, or manufacturing centres, where it is in the power of the emi)loyers to prevent their workmen from going to the polls or at least those whom the}'- know to be of diflerent politics. There are many ways this can be done without a positive command ; stress of work is the usual excuse and the employee dare not disobey as it would be met by instant dismissal. To obviate this in many Euro]:)ean countries the elections are held on Sunday, but as this is liable to leail to desecration of the Sabbath I would have the day on which the General Election was to be held proclaimed a Public Holiday, or at least half the day on which all work in factories &c. would be suspended. A plan for Electoral Representation to work satisfactorily must harmonize with the following propositions : — That the majority of Parliament represent the majority of the Electors. That the minority of the electors have a proportionate voice in Parliament. That every vote should have its due weight in securing this result. That the ordinary elector can easily comprehend and practise the system of voting. With these objects in view. the writer proposes the plan of measuring the voting power of each member by the actual number of votes received thus securing the principle of a member representing the actual number of electors who vote for him. Of course the nuuibcr of members woultl be increased by this plan, but an excessive number would be prevented by the provision that limits a seat in the House to those receiving a number etpud to 20 per cent, or more, of the vote cast in their Electoral Division. If the nuinl)er of members is an objection it could be met by reducing the number of Electoral Divisions, which in any event might 3 34 prove beneficial, but I apprehoad uo difficulty ou that account. Meritorious broad-minded candidates would offer themselves for the suffrages of the people and be elected where under the present system they would be snowed under by narrow-minded partizans with nothing to recommend them but slavish adherence to party. With reference to the relation of Parliament to the executive government it should be an understood {)rinciple for the Representative of the Sovereign to appoint as Prime Minister a member whom the House of Commons would by resolution designate as worthy of the position. Further that the fact of a measure introduced or supported by the Government being defeated should not have to be followed by their resignation. Rather than face the prospect of defeat, the Government will often withhold beneficial legislation. On the other hand measures of very doubtful utility become law through their supporters not desiring to defeat them by voting against the Government and causing a new election or possibly a dead-lock which would render all practical legislation difficult if not impossible. To remedy this I would have a direct vote of want of confidence necessary to the resig- nation of a Government, a general election would not then be necessary, but the member in whom the House voted confidence would be intrusted with the administration. It might be advisable, eventually, to extend the choice of the electors so as to allow them to give original votes for candidates in any part of the country, but perhaps for the present the act goes far enough in that direction. The Act will at least do away with Gerrymandering and the distrust often felt in the public mind, whenever a change is made by the administration in the boundaries, kc, and it would ensure each elector having his actual weight through his i-epi*esontative in the councils of the nation. In conclusion the writer ventures to hope that the general features of his plan will meet with the approval of those who wish for some improvement in the realm of politics. Imperfections there no doubt are, and to his ignorance of the legal form of legislative enactments must be attributed any errors in the accompanying draft, but in his humble opinion any diffi- culties that might be encountered in the working of his plan, could be easily surmounted. Speed Meliora. ELECTION ACT. An Act for the better conduct op Elections and the choosing of Members OF Parliament. Preamble. Whereas it is expedient that provision should be made for the equitable re[)resentation of the people in Parliament and as such is not done under the Act at present in force : — Therefore Her Majesty by "and with the consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada enacts as follows : — Interpretation. 1. This Act shall apply to all Elections held in the Dominion of Canada for the purpose of electing members to represent the people in the Dominion House of Commons; and this Act may be cited as the " Dominion Elections Act " and the following terms therein shall be held to have the meaning hereinafter assigned them unless such meaning be repugnant to the subject, or inconsistent with the context that is to say : — (1). The term Electoral District means a district within certain defined bounds, the Electors of which return one or more members to Parliament. (2). The term Elector means a citizen entitled to vote. (3). The term High Court of Election means the Court where the i-esult of the Election in each division is ascertained and the votes apportioned to the candidates entitled to them. (4). The term Parliament means the aggregation of members forming the Dominion House of Commons. (5). The term Returning Officer means the official appointed in each division to receive the nominations of Candidates, and the results of the polls from the Deputy Returning Officers. (C). The term Deputy Returning Officer means the official who presides over the poll at each polling place in the Division. (7). The term Candidate means a person who oflxjers himself for election to Parliament. (8). The term Member means a person duly elected to Parliament. (9). The term Section means a section of this Act with a sepai-ate number, sub-section means a clause with a separate number or letter in smaller type. The High Court of Election. 2. The High Court of Election shall be charged with the supreme control and management of Elections to Parliament. (1.) The High Court of election shall be com \ 35 posed of seven members, as follows : — Four members of the House of Commons of Canada, one member of the Senate, and two judges of the Supreme Court of Canada. (2.) These shall be chosen in the following manner : — Two members of Parliament will be elected by a majority vote of the whole House of Commons, then two more will be elected by those who were in the minority at the previous division, alone. (3.) The four members so electd shall then choose a member of the Senate of Canada upon whom they can unani- mously agree. (4.) The five members shall then choose two Judges of the Supreme Court who must also meet with the unanimous approval of the five members. (5.) The seven members so chosen shall constitute the High Court of Election of Canada. 3. Should any person chosen a member of the High Court of Election under the provisions of the preceding section after receiving a legal notification refuse to act in that capacity without giving a satisfactory reason for doing so, he shall be liable to a fine not exceeding dollars and a substitute shall be elected in the manner provided under Sec. 2. 4. The members shall act for one year and be eligible to be again chosen. 5. After taking a prescribed oath the members when sitting in their ofiicial capacity shall have the full power of Judges on the bench as to the subpoenaing of witnesses, &c., on all matters within their jurisdiction. Duties of High Court of Election. 6. It shall be the duty of the High Court of Election to appoint the Returning Oflicer for each Electoral Division. (1). To keep records of all the candidates nominated previous to an election. (2). To finally apjjortion the ballots cast for the candidates and declare those elected together with the voting power of each member. (3). Finally adjudicate all appeals ami disjjuted returns. 7. At least sixty days before the date fixed for an election the High Court of Election shall notify the Returning Oflicer in every electoral division of the date of the Election, which in a General Election shall be the same day in every Electoral Division, the said day to 1)6 a Public Holiday, by Proclamation of the Governor General. (1). On the receipt of the writ and notification, the Returning Oflicer shall appoint deputies to take the vote of the people, a Deputy for every polling place in the division. (2). It shall slso be the duty of the Returning Oflicer to post up in a conspicuous place in the town or village where he will make his head-quarters during the Election (which shall be as centrally located in the Division as possible) a Public Notice giving the date of Election, and places where polls will be opened, also the dates and where nominations will bo received, together with the Proclamation of Public Holiday. (3). The Returning Officer shall also send a copy of the Notice and Proclamation to each Deputy Returning Officer who shall post them up in a conspicuous part of the polling booth. Nomination of Candidates. 8. Any citizen qualified to vote at an Election for members of Parliament, may be nominated as candidate for the said office in any Electoral Division in the Dominion. (1). The nomination must be in writing in the following form : — Address and date I hereby nominate (here put name address and occupation or profession of proposed candidate) as candidate for member of Parliament for the Electoral Division of and I consider the said (name) a fit and proper person for the position. (2). The nomination must 6e signed by, at least, five of the electors residing in the Electoral Division for which the candidate is nominated. (3). An acceptance of the nomination, signed by the candidate, must be endorsed thereon. (4). The nomination shall be deposited with the Returning Officer for the said Electoral Division not more than forty or less than thirty days before the date fixed for the Election. (5). There shall also be deposited with the nomination whatever sum in legal money of Canada, Parliament may by law direct, for which the Returning Officer shall give a legal receipt. (G). No candidate can offer himself for election in more than one division. 9. The Returning Officer shall immediately on receiving all the nominations for his division, send a certified copy of them, together with the deposits, to the secretary of the 36 Hiwli Court of Election and lie, within ten days after the receipt thereof shall send a printed list with the names and addresses of all the candidates nominated in all the Electoral Divisions of Canada to every candidate, also Returning Officer, and Dei:)uty Returning Officer in the Dominion, whose duty it shall be to post it up in a conspicuous position at each polling place. (1). Every candidate shall then make a sworn declaration before a Magistrate or Justice of the Peace, setting forth the candidate which may be any nominated in the Dominion of Canada to whom he wishes the votes cast for himself to be counted in the event of his failing to secure the number of votes necessary to his return, except the elector directs differently as provided by Sec. 10. (2). The candidate shall then send the declai-ation to the Returning Officer, who shall cause copies of it to be printed and sent to every Deputy Returning Officer in the division whose duty it shall be to post it up in a conspicuous place at every polling booth in the electoral division, at least six days before the election. The Election of Candidates. 10. The ballots to be used at an election shall have the names of all the candidates legally nominated for the electoral division printed thereon, and opposite to each that of the alternative candidate mentioned in sec. 9, sub-sec. 1, as in the following form : — Electoral Division of Names of Candidates. Instructions to Voters. Mark an X in this column, opposite the name of the can- didate for whom you desire to vote. The persons, named below will receive the votes cast for the candidate opposite their respective names, should the said candidata not receive the number necessary to his re- turn unless the voter other- wise directs, as hereinafter provided. If the alternative candidate opposite the name of the can- didate voted for does not meet with the approval of the elect- or he can write the name and address of any candidate nom- inated in the Dominion, in the space below to whom his vote will be transferred. Name Address of candidate, (1). At the polling booth each candidate can be represented by an agent or scrutineer appointed at least three days before the election under written authority of the candidate. (2). Such Agent or Scrutineer must be an elector in the Electoral Division. (3). The duties of the Agent or Scrutineer are, to exercise a general supervision over the election in the interest of his candidate so as to prevent any unfaii-ness being practised. (4). Each Elector must present the certificate of Registration as provided in the Act for the Regis- tration of voters, on the certificate being found satisfactory the Deputy Returning Officer shall stamp it on the back with a stamp bearing date and class of election, it shall then be returned to the elector. (5). The Deputy Returning Officer shall then, in the presence of the scrutineers, hand a blank ballot paper to the elector, after stamping it on the back as directed for the certificate in the preceding sub-section. (6). The elector shall then take the ballot to a part of the booth entirely seelud. d fi-om observation, and after mark- ing it shall fold it in such a manner as to leave the stamj) exposed but prevent any person from seeing how it was marked without unfolding it. The Elector shall then hand the ballot to the Doputy Returning Officer who in the presence of the Elector and Scrutineers, shall without oi>ening it, drop the ballot into the ballot-box which must be made of some incombustible material. 37 11. When tlie poll is closed the Deputy Returning Officer shall unlock the ballot-box and count the number of votes cast for each candidate. (1). After the ballots are counted they shall l)e placed in the l)aliot-l)ox together with a declaration signed by the Deputy Heturning Officer, and the Scrutineer of each candires'>nt the borough, were selected for their ability to watch over and guard the interests of their special locality. The representatives of the people in pai'liament at the present day have a wider range of duties to ])erform, and national and foreign questions to decide ; Ijut it mast not be forgotten that the obligation to jvatch over and guard the interests of their special localities binds them as strongly to- day as it did when first the burgesses of England gathered in the halls at Westminster, although local interests ought to give way to class interests, and class interests to national. To enable the representatives of the p.eople to faithfully fulfil their obligations, and to deal with the interests of their respective localities, and the national, the foreign and the financial questions that affect the prosperity of the country, they must be placed in a posi- tion of absolute independence, free from any influence, interference or coercion that might tend to control their actions ; and protected from all criticism and animadversion upon the course they might think proper to pursue. By so protecting the members of the House of Commons and rendering parliament no longer the arena of party strife, and the path to individual aggiandizement, a class of representatives would be attracted to the public service, patriots anv<^'>^or General, and a Vice President of the Council to be appointed by the House of Commons by Ballot, and who shall hold office during the pleasure of Parliament. 82,' The Governor General shall be ex-officlo President of the Council. ^ ' 83. 'The Sevfetaries of State shall not be members of the House of 'Commons, or of tfce Senate of ^Canada. / > * . ''*. 84.' The Executive Council shall perform the same duties, and have the s^i'^^fewers, as' are now vested in the Ministers of the Crown, Cabinet and Privy Council, »ii||k far as ysilch duties shall not be otherwise assigned and sliall be in all matters and things' directly . ^'esponsible to Parliament. 85. One Councillor of State for each Department, two Secretaries of State, and the -.^resident, or Vice President of the Executive Council, shall form a quorum thereof. Si 86. Air members of the Senate of Canada, holding such appointment at the time of ' the passing of this Act, shall continue to hold such appointment during life, subject to the same conditions that have heretofore governed such appointments, but all future appointments to the said Senate shall be made by the House of Commons by Ballot, and shall be subject to the like qualifications and conditions. 87. After the passing of this Act, no Bill or Act of the House of Commons shall be sent to the Senate after the same shall have been passed by the House of Commons, and the Senate shall have no power to alter, amend, or annul any Act, passed by the House of Commons. 88. The House of Commons may refer any Act, Bill, or Measure, to the Senate for consideration before such Act, Bill, or Measure, shall have been passed, and the Senate shall report thereon to the House of Commons. 89. The Senate of Canada shall have the power and authority to inquire into, and adjudicate, upon all matters and things now referable under Royal Commission, and shall rej)ort thereW to the House of Commons. 90. The Senate of Canada shall have the same powers and authority as are now vested in the Official Arbitrators, and all other powers and functions as are now vested in the Senate, except such as are otlierwise assigned, and shall perform all such other duties and services not inconsistent with this Act, that Parliament may, from time to time require. 91. All Acts, Sections, and ])arts of Acts, inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed. "Canadian Home Rule and Amendments Thereto." "PER ASPERAM AD ASTRA." A consideration of the remedy for any disorder involves a consideration of the nature of the disorder. The character of the remedy is of necessity conditioned on and deter- mined by the character of the disease. Any system therefore which may be submitted for the reform of the method of electoral representation must be determined in its form and nature by the nature of the necessity of which it is born. It is obvious therefore that this essay which forms a preface and exposition of a system for the rectification of repre- sentation and parliament must concern itself with an inquiry into the nature of the disorder it professes to rectify. The questions which this essay^professes to answer therefore may briefly be stated as follows — (1). What are the functions of a complete representative system ? (2). In what particulars and to what degree does the existing system fall short of the purposes for which it was instituted 1 (3). To what causes are the deficiencies of the present system due? (4). By what means can these deficiencies be rectified 1 As the system of electing representatives has its origin in the nature and necessities of representative government, it is evident that a clear understanding of the purpose and functions of such a system involves an understanding of the nature and theory of repre- sentative government itself. So soon as the people of a country acquire the right to govern themselves the question at once arises: — in what way should they do sol The first method that suggests itself and the one most consistent with the principle of popular government is that the people of the nation should meet together, deliberate on all measures affecting their common interest, and after a discussion in which each man has a voice arrive at a conclusion in which each man has a vote. Accordingly, to realize completely the theory of popular self-government, the electors would require to meet in national con- vocation, and debate and determine as a people all matters of public import. It is evident that in a nation of any large proportions it would be impossible for the people to adopt this ideal system of self-government. It would be practically impossible for all the citizens to meet together in a mass, and even if such a possibility were admitted it would be equally im[)OSsible for them after having met to deliberate, debate, and arive at a peaceful and harmonious conclusion on the innumerable matters of public interest. If the people cannot meet in a mass to transact their common affairs they must evidently adopt some other means of self-government and this method must be that which is most closely consistent with the ideal but impossible system of self-government en masse. They cannot act in a body, therefore they must act through representatives. Representative government therefoi'e has its origin in the theoretical impossibility of popular or democratic government. It is a compromise between the theory and practice of popular government. It is a concession of the ideal form to the real. It is not the best imaginable but it is the best possible system of popular self-government. The first; essential representative government therefore is that it should be popular government — that it should realize as far as possible that ideal form in which the people manage the affairs of the people. It must be consistent with the logic of the democratic })rinciple. If it cannot bring about an assembly of the people in person, it must bring them together in spirit. It must be the nation in miniature, a small typical representative nation. The Legislature, (which is the name by which the representatives are known collectively) must be the microcosm of the people. It should be the type of which the nation is the prototype. It should be the essence, the concentrated spirit, the miniature personality, the perfect mirror of the nation. There should be no party of any strengtli, no sentiment of any power, no principle of any vitality in the country which was not also present in parliament in a strength proportioned to its sti-ength in the nation. It is obvious that in order for parliament to attain this ideal character — to be perfectly representative of the people — it is necessary for every member to be perfectly representative of his constituency, to embody in his parliamentary personality the salient characteristics of all his constituents, to be a type of the collective character of those he represents. It would be necessary that in him his constituents should be seen, through him they should speak, and that his political personality should consist of ingredients contributed by the units of which he is theoretically the aggregate, and these ingredients should be grouped in his nature in the same precise and perfect proportion that they exist in his constituency. He would be as it were the parliamentary 50 51 Inolecule, the elements and atoms of whose being are contributed by the political atmosphere that surrounds him ; a composite whose content consists in due pi'oportion of miniature constituents. This is the ideal representative and theoretically he bears the same relation to his constituency as the parliament bears to the nation. He is the microcosm of his constituency. The parliament is the microcosm of the nation. A legislatui-e consisting of such representatives as this is the closest aj)proximation to the idea of absolute popular government. Unfoi'tunately for the existence of such a system of representative govei'nment, human nature conflicts with the conditions essential to its existence and stability. Man is not a mechanism, and representatives must be men. There is mixed with the web and woof of human natui-e an element of individuality. The man is okler than the repre- sentative and earlier in the field. His parhamentary character must be built upon the basis of his individuality, and must be subject to the re-actions of his thought. The electors may impress their character upon the mind of their representative, but the mind precedes the impression, and colors it with its own character, holds it subject to its varying moods. The factors of his own personality must enter into the counsels of the representative, and exercise if not a predominant at least a determinate influence on his actions. He can never be an absolute repre.sentation of the people who elect him, at the best he caii approximate towards the ideal standard. As a matter of fact representative government in the truest sense of the word does not and cannot exist. The representatives cannot exactly and in every particular resemble the electors whom they represent. They cannot exactly combine in their persons the innumerable, diverse, and often conflicting opinions, desires and characteristics of a large numbej- of citizens. On several large issues there may perhaps be an unanimity of opinion among the constituents, and between them and their representative, but it will be very evident that this unanimity cannot continue on the many other minor questions which may arise in parliamentary debate, or enter the arena of public discussion after the elections are over. The existing system of government in Canada might be more properly described as responsible than re|)resentative. Responsible govei'nment has its origin in the impracticability of representative government, as representative government has its origin in the impractical dlity of popular government. Theoretically parliament should exactly and in every particular I'epresent the {)eople. Prictically it cannot do this because it is composed of diverse individualities each possessed of a judgment, volition, con- science and character of his own. But the riglit of the people to govern themselves is still valid, and is not altered by the fact that it is impossible for them to do so as a people. If the parliament cannot be made representative it can be made responsitjle. If the representatives cannot be impressed with the collective personality of the electors so as to do precisely as the electors would have done on every occasion, they can at least be made responsible to the people for their acts and at certain tixearched in that Golgotha of thought the drawing room will yet r(jll over the world in fructifying waves causing upheavals and destructions." The American woman movement seems to be holding Carlyle's floiid idea in the front. Our sturdy ancestors always battled for their rights, and whether opposing the encroachments of royalty, or baronial tyranny, the same brave spirit was always there, and the outspoken word, to condemn what was un-English and therefore unfair ; so it came about that even the haughty Tudors when wrong doing, were compelled to use some crutch of legality, in wandering into bye-ways, which conscience said, were the abodes of lawlessness. What was wrongly done, it was attempted to be shown was done in colour of right, and any plausible pretext was cleverly made use of in quoting or forging precedents. The law always was respected, if the worship of it was not heart-felt — it was assumed to be an impelling factor — especially as to kings. What was earnestly desired by Englishmen, was embodied in ])etitions to the crown, and the monarch was allowed the grace of consenting to it, which often occurred to be more formal than sincere, but the ancient houses of parliament, always had the faculty of persistence in just demands ; terrorised for a while they soon recovered themselves and haughty kings with their notions of divine rights had in the end to yield. The king's most gracious majesty feared the chimes of liberty that rang in on England with the Magna Charta of the tyrant John ; they had a warning note for the ears of rapacious autocrats. There was always in England, both anterior to and after the Norman conquest, a continuation of national assemblies, from the remote year, when all England met in the open field, down to when, from change of the conditions of our insular life, the many were represented by the few — the gathering of the whole community had ceased, simply because all could not come; and as is said, "the democratic aspect^ took on the oligarchical hue." Zeal perhaps was less ardent, and the distances had increased ; and remember it was no slight work in those days to travel over poor roads and into dangerous positions to be patiiotic ; it was a task of many days to leave the extreme north, south, or west of Eng- land and be present at the annual gathering ; there were a great many " lions " in the way. It was evolved as a necessity that chiefs only should represent the community at large — as a rule, occasionally, some of these celebrities would get hike-warm. Summoned by royalty they ceased to come, and in time their names were omitted from the list. After, it was come about that they were conceived as having no right to attend at all, but V)e that as it may, one of the best historians makes out that, paradoxical in sound, yet true is it in fact that the House of Lords, not the House of Commons, is the true modern unbroken identity with the primitive democratic meeting of old England. The Lords 59 were the oldest, and the Commons grew up side by side, till tlie youthful giant absorbed nearly all the vigour and outstripped in combative energy its older brother. Barons in the Lords, Knights of the Shires in the Commons, mere commoners though knights, yet assuming and keeping its leadership, the old and modei'n phrase of " the Commons of England in parliament assembled " was about to become a mighty ])ower and watchword. The eai-ly legislator of England got to the Parliament in s\nte of lonely forests, wolves, Robin Hoods, and other dangers, and in the absence of railroad passes the amor patriae was a sturdy factor to him. And he really did represent those who sent him ; he was known as a familiar object to all, he knew all their desires and wants, and entered the hall withhis lesson well learned, and when all was over, he knew i-ight well an account of a steward- shij) would have to be given ; so that, if disposed to be unveracious or unmanly, he was aware that his omissions were unconcealable ; it was the time of residential representation in purity. A time was coming on when the Crown would wrest from the sturdy knights and yeomanry of England the nomination of Parliament-representatives ; seats in its halls were to be exposed in the jjolitical shambles ; sessions were to be prolonged year in and year out ; a big chasm was opening out between the constituents and the elected one, and the primitive and honest idea of delegated agency was fading into mist. Crown officials wishing acts passed which should be grateful to their master were in time to manipulate a new political weapon, in the shape of members of the House who were not ashamed of the designation of " managers ; " even as late as James II. Middleton and Sir Dudley North wore this sycophantic livery. In social matters of policy it was to be seen that the great pendulum swing was to go back far in one direction, then to rebound in another till what physicists know as the " mean-force " should come in ; the efFacement of the sturdy unit from Kent was to be, and the " dauntless Hampden " was to be crushed in the cogs of political and kingly machines — -or if not meeting so dire a fate he was to be in future crushed into the great mass, a thing without shape, vigour, or conscience. Guizot truly says, "Representation is a natural process, by which public reason which alone has a right to govern society, may be extracted from the bosom of its membei's. All institutions, all conditions of the representative system flow from and return to this point. Election publicity and responsibility are so many tests applied to individual reasons which assume themselves to be the interpreters of the community at large." And Mirabeau, " A representative body is to the nation what a chart is for the physical configuration of the soil, in all its parts and as a whole the representative body should at all times give out a reduced picture of the people, their opinions — their wishes — their aspirations." So it did in the early times, like all else that is good and pure, it continues good and pure for a while, longer or shorter, as the elements of life act on it, then it shows a gray spot here and there, then a black one or more sporadically, ferment and putrescence come on apace, and di-astic remedies are applied heroically with good or bad results, as time goes along, till Guizot's fundamental electoral axiom finds a haven where it can be said that, " Les electeurs fassent qu'ils veulent et sachent ce qu'ils font." This is the goal we are striving for. It was not till the 23rd year of the first Edward that the lower House in England can be said as rightly constituted, and the name of " Parliament " was first applied to the assembly early in that year, and till the middle of the 17th century no law existed as to the life of a Parliament, except that the monarch dying. Parliament died also. The writ by which Henry III. summoned Knights of the Shire and Burgesses of the Town is dated January, A.D., 1265, and this is the earliest record of a gathering both of knights and burgesses; but there always had been in the Saxon churls seeds of a national organization, a craving for a niche in the national order ; municipal life never died out, and the revered names of fi-eeholders and freemen were cherished with a whole nation's pride. If the Charter of John and its announcements are looked on with a proud backward glance by Englishmen, they are equally bound to remember when shouting, " St. George for merrie England," that the 49th year of Henry Ill's reign looked on the first Parlia- ment where knights, citizens, and burgesses, together with the Lords, were welded ^into a legislative body, and it was not till the reign of Henry VI. that sutirage became tightened.^ An act passed in his reign limiting the right to vote to electors and that to freeholdei-s ot forty shillings, and at the same time the idea of " polling " the electors took rise, but there is evidence that the right to a " poll " was not firmly established till the days of James I. Speaking generally, parliamentary government was inaugurated in the reign of Ed- ward I., but that we now and of old had only the two chambers is the result of the gravi- tation of accidents. Edward sometimes conceived of more than three estates of the realm of England; dim signs were there of a coming "house of merchants," and a "house of lawyers," but it narrowed ck)wn to the three houses, lords, clergy and commonei-s ; ot the 60 centi-al one we have only historical recollections in our day, and the clergy faded away as a legislative faculty, simply through their obstinate refusal to act as a parliamentary con- stituent, and in the 41st year of the reign of George III. they were debarred from even a seat in the commons, though for one hundred years before any such cleric could be a can- didate, and if elected, could represent any constituency in England ; and the sarcastic Home Tooke accused George's ministry of passing this act simply because one clergyman had dared to oppose the ministry of that day. Having glanced at the skeleton of our ancient parliament, let us endeavour to get correct views of what representation should be, remembering the quotations from Guizot and Mirabeau given before, not omitting to see the spots time has cast on its ancient purity and referring to the evils gigantic that have come of "government by party." The idea at tiie base of representation being that all classes have a voice in what con- cerns all, that which is injurious to the state be removed by parliament, and what is of benefit should be constructed, that the wants of a society running in advance of law should be supplied by legislation potential with a sanction; law then becomes what it should be, " the embodied conscience of a nation o( persons." The state, as was well said, is " not to be regarded as a kind of God," as some would have it, with the hackneyed cry of " vox populi vox Dei." Such never stay to ask them- selves, What is the state 1 Destroy the units of individuals composing it, and where is your state? The government should exist for the state, but too often strangles it, e. g., the Bourbons with their "I'etat c'est moi." As the monarchs thought, so did the French nobles, and the nation in its frenzy of wrath dyed crimson-red the execution-place of Paris with the wet gore of fair aristocrats, the French tiger bathed his jaws deep in the blood of his former oppressors. We in England took things more steadily and quietly ; where wrong was we generally righted it legally, and while tyrants oppressed us we firmly stood to our charters — our " Bills of Rights " and our " Remonstrances." Still the public is a large animal with many wants, it is many-sided, sometimes hard to please, complaining, often growling. It is of the nature of freedom to get free expression of feeling, even if some of this is hysterical, or as is prettily said that under despotism : — On souffi'e beaucoup, Et I'on crie peu." while in a free land, " On souffre peu et I'on crie beaucoup." Feeling what is called the " people's pulse," is much oftener done than we think. Arnold satirized this where he says, " The middle class is strong enough to atti-act atten- tion, but it is like the enormous creatui-e of Plato, surrounded by obsequious people, trying to find out what its noises meant, and to make in their turn the noises which might please it." Statesmen's sails too often are stretched out for the popular wind, the successful one must be as the Romans said, "populi studiosus." Some one had so little worshipful respect for this kind of thing that he was daring enough to reduce the theory of premiership to a very fine shade when saying, " The whole duty of a political chief is to look sharp for the way in which the political coach is going, and then run on in front and bark aloud." There is a class in England, and particularly in the back parts of that land, in whom IS and has come down a terse epigrammatic mode of expression and comparison, which, while smile-jH'ovoking, is also truth-containing. A Sussex farmer of this kind teased about his idea of politics replied : "To me politics are this : — I has a sow in my yard with 12 little uns, and they little uus can't all feed to once, bekase there ain't room enough, so I shuts six on em out of the yard whiles t'other six be sucking, and they six as be shut out they just do make a hem of a noise till they be let in, and then they be just as quiet as the rest." The beginnings of all institutions, as Freeman says, are commonly honest, and it is only later on that men find out with ingenuity that they can be worked corruptly for their own ends. What, as he says, is known to but few, is that of old, all constituencies, great as well as small, sent two members to Parliament, that each might act as a check on his fellow and debar him from voting contrary to the wishes and interests of constituents common to both of them. These were the halcyon days ; ignorant of the rotting influences of bribery and influence, of rottenness ulcei-ating electors, free to use the voting power and Esau-like gelling their consciences for guineas, and of that other rottenness where monied magnates et had so manipulated politics, as that the corruptible voter had no vote to sell, simply because as the fact was, the vote was not his individual property. The ))olitical aspirant " i-epro luces in rain what he had gathered in mis< from his audience." The hustings everywhere convinces us of this. Liberty, says Hobbs, " is power divided np into fragments," therefore, every one should be allowed to vote in order that he may get his individual fragment, that is his birthright. Political opposition too often produces what oculists call " myopsis," only (in this) it unfortunately is moral and not simply physical merely ; sometimes only one eye is in use, and that so placed at the back of the moral head that it can only look back at what is gone, and sigh like the Chinese politician for a faded away golden age. The people to be represented often rise in disgust and pitch the antiquated theories and their expositors into the wide sea, and the new political doctrines having passed through the successive ages of ridicule and of argumentation, finally and quietly glide into the calm haven of adoption. Rousseau bade all France look only backwards to a state of nature, and the leaves of the revolution came down in rains of blood. A slender atom of truth was with impudent men- daciousness forced on Frenchmen as the whole gospel of ethics, politics and religion, and it took the cannons of a rough Napoleon to blow off from Paris the misty cobwebs of a philos- ophy having one grain of truth to ten thousand of falsity. No one can say that the people here, or in England, or in our neighbours the Repub- licans of America, have or enjoy the full benefits of a political representation in the places where laws are made by the element of force to be imposed on them. The vis-major may be an obedience-compelling factor, but the nativity of morals is in no mundane s]>here. The "ought" is born celestially and is immutably truth, whether applied to politics or religion, and can no where on this earth be less or more than " ought " in its potentiality any more than can there be found a spot in the universes whei'e two^ two equals five. No political refinements, nor political torrents of eloquence, nor political brute-force can make any man say that men or women, now, here, there, or anywhere, are pi'operly rep- resented. The royal or republican mint yearly turns out a great deal of debased coin, stamped as it may be with all the majesty of imperialism or simplicity of republicanism. It is the object of these theses (asked for) to point out defects and, what is a harder task, to suggest remedies ; and we say it in no way of fulsome admiration, that the origin- ator of the idea which brings out these theses, deserves a pei'petual niche in the memory of our countrymen. True it is, the whole vast army of otficialism will be gathered against it, political di-uras and war-cries will fill the air, ridicule will add its mite, but the attention of the day may be caught, and if no more good is done than the presentation of a bare fact, that in this great colony we have men who have been induced to turn aside from the day's din to the examination of what concerns their country, native or adopted, a real good has come to us. One of the greatest evils that eats into the inner heart's core of modern politics, is what we know as " govei'nment by party," or if you will "government by majorities" so called. Originally good in idea, and necessary in the promotion of some great and important principle of.state, it is like a heavy two-edged sword rusty with age, and pi'operly to be hung up till wanted again for some great and new emergency, but unfortunately it is siill yearly brandished, to cut and hack at the vitality of the state, on each and all and every occasion that the party holding it with a death grasp, chooses to cleave the air of politics. At the now we in Canada have little or nothing before us in the sha]:)e of cardinal points of state- craft, the foundations of a great Dominion were well and faithfully laid years v.go ; what we need most is to get rid of the chains of party lines and party strife. These wise wortls of Hegel apply to our case : "The will of the many expels the now government and their opponents take office, but these in turn have to depart; and thus this uni-est and agitation like the sea, never ceases." There are no great principles to be fought for, calling up the necessity of a union of men to fight for the assertion of any truth, dear to man. Formerly party as party was excusable in the Government of England, and in some pages of our colonial history there were wrongs to be righted, there were principles to be adjusted, and frequently these had to be; battled tor by a small but brave band, uniform in honesty of purpose, and superior to the blandishments of office ; but their work was ))arallel to the cutting down of primeval forests by our pioneers, and the weapons of war by " party " should long ago have been quietly laid in the museum of political curiosities. - The evils of competition, replacing, co-operation, have left the desk of 'he merchant, to find a haven in the bosom of jiarl laments, and it required no prophet, to see that the ferocious and tiger maxim of " spolia opima ad debeUatoi'es et vce victis" would follow on apace from the wild jungle of human passions. 62 The elections, held on the lines of government by party, exhibit nature in curious phases. A philosophic wi-iter long ago, called attention to this one naked fact, that men, who all along had been good fiiends the moment tlie fiery cross of politics was carried through the land, suddenly became hostile, so as to allow no obstacle in the way of scruple, to be a lion in the path, in fact it has solidified in the common phrase that '' all and everything is fair in politics and war and in love." Arraying themselves in party ribbons and decorations, they proceed to demolish the enemy politically and sometimes ])hysically, distinctively party terms are used — even flowers ai-e made to yield their beauties to the strife — roses, lilies and prinn-oses all have to go in the procession, and the victor's war crv, is heard by the sulking ear of the vanquished. Is not all this a remnant of savagery, when each stranger was accounted as a foe, and all not of the tribe had to be beaten into insensibility or death 1 Is the league of any political party, with its party emblems, in any way superior to the savage's totem? Distinction with this diffei-ence that the Indian and New Zealander, is a savage and a savage only, while the man of the eighteenth, and part of the nineteenth century, is supposed and arrogated to be civilised, and a civiliser of his savage brother. Hark back to the old electioii days, when the " blues and the yellows " were at it con amove for days, nay for weeks — when beer and blood flowed into the same gutter, when as once occurred, even ladies forgot their reserve and mingled in the din, when the rosy lips of a duchess were pouted to receive the embrace of a drunken butcher, merely to gain the low vote, and ask not where party strife begins and ends. Dickens has well satirised the " Eatanswill" elections and the fights of the rival editors of the political papers of the ''blues" and the "buffs" in his Pickwick papers and well he might. Look at the vast sums spent in bribing electors, ruining their views of moral rights, and corrupting whole communities. The Reform Bill like a neat-handed Phyllis swept away many of these cob-webs, from the scene of politics, but the spiders have been spinning new ones in quiet darkness. We have strangled open bribery, by the tawny fingers of law, and have removed much of the evils of intimidation, and force, by the ballot but the monster of partyism, is as much a living factor as ever he was in the days of Pitt or Walpole, his power is little impaired yet lingers to be felt — "ex ungue leonevi " is still true. Cleisthenes, 509 yeais before Christ divided Greece into townshi})s of one hundred each, and by bounds, and every one had to register his name and property, doing so he was a free man, and eveiy one voted and was taxed at his own home. What a picture of Arcadian simplicity in antithesis to our gigantic system of wheels within wheels ! As was well said, we are when getting pure copper, obliged to rid it of dross, so with political institutions, the whole series of civilisations is one effort prolonged through ages to get pure copper. It is so easy when figures count up, to make them suit our preconceived theories, and notions on political matters, and a leader has only to marshal them in a meretricious arrav, to make good the proposition, which falls like gentle dew on the ears of his adherents, and which they were quite willing to hug complacently even if no figures existed. " Great is Diana of the Ephesians ! " is no new cry. To go roaming about the political world without a " label " pinned on one, is more ati'ocious than a dog without a muzzle, and any member of a party, original enough to think and act for himself, is doomed to political ostracism —a wounded beast stands a better chance for mercy at the horns of his fellows than an independent thinker or asserter of his thoughts in the arena of politics — traitor, renegade, Judas are colloquial terms in the air of politics. The truth is that in politics a sentimental bigotry has become indurated generation after generation, so as to assume the features of heredity. It is no uncommon thing to be certain as to what ground a son of an aristocratic Imuse will occupy on the political field, as the ancestors always were Whig or Tory, as the case may be, and a desertion from the beaten path would be regarded as a monstrosity. There is no honest looking at a subject with eyes blurred by the steam of the cauldron of politics. If it oi'iginates with friends, it is bolted, however unpalatable ; if with opponents, every effort is put out for its strangulation; if every conscience whispers that it is "good for food and calculated to make one wise," the only possibility of its existence lies in the fact that an outside world n)ay insist on the measure becoming law. Political foes are pelted with mud in the hopes that some of it will not wash off. Monarchs in England did very long ago help to keep up the fires of political strife, but fancy it being done in 1780; when Keppel ran for the borough of Windsor against the candidate of royalty, poor old George III. canvassed in person against Kejipel, and actually was seen going into a sick mercer's shop muttering in his jumbled up style of iterated dictalion, " The Queen wants a gown — wants a gown. No Kei)[)el ! no Keppel !" The purchase of a lady's silk gown was a very mild and innocent bribery in those days of corruption. We have put a stop to isolated bribing, but wholesale bribery is still 63 in the ah'. It assumes now the expenditure of large monies where no pressing need is for public woi'ks, gigantic monopolies granted to favoured corporations (willing hands to sus- tain the party in power), the immoral poison of corruption percolates through these strata of public life. Political creeds, as they affect both head and heart, are hugged with solemn gravity, and there is a species of eloquence redundant with catch-phra.ses lying like a fringe around the creeds — "the working man's friend," the "coming economist of public money," the " asser- ter of the equal rights of all," the champion of this or the other ism, etc., the "patriot," etc., and the more noise that ensues the better, while the best classes, the thinking, edu- cated and pure minded keep aloof from the dirty sawdust of the political arena. Go back a little in our own House of Commons, and as was pointed out, look at the enormous waste of money and time over the Pacific Eailroad inquiry, and contrast the expense with the net result. Guizot tersely says " that the aim of representation is to oppose a barrier at once to tyranny and to confusion." How widely is the aim separated in real life from the results ! " Plurality (said Pascal) which does not reduce itself to unity is confusion ; unity which is not the result of plurality is tyranny." Fabre (another French thinker) reminds us that " all political sti'uggles have a root in the variance of two principles, a new, which seeks to shape itself beside an old one already there. . . There always has been a party which laid the greater sti-ess on the old, and rejected the new with emphasis. When this tendency is dominant, conservatism is the watcli-word, and a condition of seeming stagnation begins, but after I'eaching its culmina- tion it has to give way to the steadily increasing pressure of the new, which now, fre- quently with violent commotions, declares a war on the old, in a more or less ludical fashion, and every revolution is based on a violently repressed or badly directed evolution. So strong has "party" gone in France, that any party would welcome a foreign invasion which would overthrow their adversaries." Speaking of the tyranny of politics, a late American writer characterises it very justly, as a survival of the savage or neo-savage community, e.g., as is shown in the Russian 3Iir and in the Hindoo village community and also the Indian tribe, whoever submits not to what the rest dictate in custom, religion and ideas of morality becomes an outcast, is tabooed — while the Hindoo who changes his theological theories, (his brethren remaining firm in Brahmanism or the profession of Mahomet) must go, if not, they will cut ofi" both " his pipe and his water." Communism in land, coin, and property is an anachronism, but the imposition of communal shackles on thought, religious or political, is an outrage and more so if backed up by the terrorising influences of majorities. As Sir H. Maine truly said, the vast majority of mankind have stereotyped their institutions — a political party is tolerant of just so much and no more of truth than falls within its own political lines — any truth straggling into or within the lines of the opposing party is to be treated both with suspicion, scorn, and decapitation unless it is evident that the great creature, the public at large wills it, it is easy then to become proprietor and sole owner of it — the patent medicine. There is no trace of "party government" in England till after the Revolution, before that the King's ministers were his personal fi'iends. William III. first formed a ministry based on political bases ; he had essayed to rule by a ministry culled from the best men of all parties, but so deeply rooted was tlie i)oison of political hostility that his ministry was no exemplification of the "happy family ;" growling and scratching assailed his royal ears and he was forced to form a cabinet of a one-party materiel, who were ready to rely and ho])e for a majority of their own creed, on the floor of the houses. This inaugurated policy was completed by 169,' — fond delusion — as we shall .see that government by party by no means is in the correct sense a government by majority, but is really, when examined, per- ceived to be merely government by the m .'l.-c- torate, and are often rejected by large majorities. The Scrutin de Liste. In this, each constituency returns several members, each elector has a number of votes equal to the number of representatives, but can't give more than one vote toany one candidate. 66 Proportional Representation. The Limited Vote. — Here each elector has a number of votes somewhat less than the number of representatives. The Free i>?s<. —Where the elector votes for a list. The Cumulative Vote. — Where each elector has a number of votes, equal to the num- ber of representatives, but can divide them up as he chooses. The Single Transferable Vote. — Here the elector has only one opei'ative vote, but is allowed to indicate to which candidate he desires it to be transferred if not required, by the one to whom he first devotes it. The Single System works badly, as is the fact when an election is to be had the Con- servatives put one name up and the Reform party another, and the elector is presented with a sort of " Hobson's choice," as the bringing in of a third candidate would in the col- loquial phraseology of politicians " split up the party." The clique system flows in the bed of single representation, i. e., any number, few or large, of electors may have some one favourite "fad" which they hoist up into conspicuity, and the glare and noise they sur- round it with too often darkens and hushes the interest of a public, on whom far more pressing matters should be imposed for consideration. The candidate is generally too cun- nin"' not to catch the breeze with sails spread and is wafted into the parliamentary haven — often a person known to fame only for his noisy insistence of a new doctrine, probably an attenuated part merely of a half-truth. A majority of electors in each constituency is by no means the same as a majoiity of all the electors. Suppose, says Lubbock, a community of 60,000 electors is divided in three divisions each containing 20,000, and tliat there are as a fact 32,000 Liberals and 28,000 Conservatives, the division might be and likely would be as follows — 1st Division. 2nd Division. 3rd Division. Liberals, 15,000 9,000 8,000 Conservatives, 5,000 11,000 12,000 I 20,000 20,000 20,000 And thus though in a minority, the Conservatives actually return two members out of three, and this is no hypothetical case. The Scrutin de Liste. Assume a constituency returning 7 members. The two great parties may be very evenly balanced, but whichever had the majority, however small, would return the whole of the 7 representatives, e.g., Liverpool we will say has 31,000 Con- servative electors and 30,000 Liberals, under this system the 31,000 electors would have 7 members while the 30,000 would have none at all. Lubbock concludes and juatly that the " Scrutin de Liste " gives unfair preponderance to a majority, while where parties are at all evenly balanced, the transfer of a few votes from one side to the other, may entirely alter the balance of power. The Single Transferable Vote we have spoken of was adopted in Denmark in 1855, and still is there now in active operation. In the system of Proportional Representation, it is suggested that each elector shall have one vote, but he may vote in the alternative for as many candidates as he chooses, by writing simply the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., opposite to their respective names. Therefore, if A's vote be not required for his candidate 1, he should be allowed to have its weight trans- ferred to candidate 2, or in other words his A's action at the polls is not a mere cipher in the political field. All votes for candidate No. 1 above what is required to put him in, are transferred to candidate No. 2, etc. The ballot papers are then all mixed up and drawn out successively and stamped with numbers, so as no two shall bear the same number. The quotient obtained by dividing the whole number of good ballots papers tendered by the number of members to be elected -f-1 and increasing the quotient by 1, is the quota, aiid so denominated. Each candidate who has a number oi first votes equal to or greater than the quota, shall be declared elected, and so many of the ballot papers containing these votes as equal the quota shall be set aside as of no further use. On all other ballot i)apers the name of the elected candidate shall be cancelled, with the effect of raising by so much in the order of precedence all votes given to other candidates after him. Rule Jf.. This pro- cess is to be i-epeatcd till no candidate has more than a quota of first votes or votes deemed first. Rule 5. Then the candidate or candidates with the fewest yiVsi votes or votes deemed 67 first, shall be declared to be not elected, with the efiect of raising by so much in the order of preference all votes given to candidates after him or them. Rule 4 shall again be applied if possible. Rule 6. When by successive applications of Rules 4 and 5 the number of candidates is reduced to the number of members remaining to be elected, the remaining candidates shall be declared elected. * The Cumulative Vote. Here each elector has as many votes as there are candidates, and he may cumulate them all on one candidate or divide them up among the candidates as he chooses. The Free List or Ticket System. By this the elector would vote for a list. The Limited Vote. In this the constituency returns three or four members, but the elector has a number of votes somewhat less than the number of members to be elected, the most common arrangement being for the constituency to return three members, each elector having two votes of which, however, he may only give one to any one candidate. There is a work of an American called Sterne which lauds the work of the English Mr. Hai-e, at the same time suggesting some improvements on Hare's great work on Rep- resentative Govern ment. In this system of Sterne the ideas are nearly on a line with Mr. Hare's, Each voter may cast votes equal to the nund)er of candidates for election, the voter may concentrate on one or divide them up as he pleases, e. g., there being three candidates, each voter may concentrate on one or divide his vote among the three. A minority having one-third of the voters or more can therefore always, by concentriiting all their votes on one candidate, secure his election. In the limited voting, e. g., where three members can be by law returned the voter may only vote for two, therefore the minority can return one member. Canton after Canton of the Swiss, and State upon State in America adopted this mode. Mr. Hare's Scheme Is to substitute for the dominance of local majorities, a true representation of the people. He proposes to divide at eacli general election the number who vote by the number of members to be elected. The balloting paper to be printed thus : — Name of voter. Address. Vote No. Town or city of The above elector hereby records his vote for the candidate named 1, in the list below or in the event provided for by this act for the other candidates successively ifl their numerical order. L A. B. 2. C. D. 3. E. F. 4. G. H., «fec. That is if A.B. gets too many votes, CD. gets the unrequired balance, or if A.B. has too few, all of A.B.'s go to CD. Each voting p;ii)er after the candidate is declared elected, shall be endorsed with the candidate's name to whom it is appropriated so that election agents may consult them. To sum up. 1. No vote to be counted for more than one candidate. 2. No candidate to have more votes recorded or counted in his favour than is the "Quota" in numbers. 3. Each votei- to have tlie right of naming several candidates in his order of preference so that if his vote be not counted for the Jivtit, then it may be counted for the second or the third, &c. It has also been suggested that in a constituency, e.g., say Glasgow— any elector may vote for say Mr. Glandstone or Lord S., or Sir J. B. who never represented Glasgow and are not candidates for representing Glasgow at the now election. In other words any elector may vote for any name that impresses him whether the owner is a candidate at the said elector's voting-place or not. The design of course is a good one to In-ing on the floor of the House all available talent, but it is respectfully submitted that Canada is not yet a field for such an exijeriment. "Ln Deo Spero." June 26, 1893. 68 THE REPRESENTATION ACT. Whereas, minorities in elections have not heretofore had proper representation in Parliaments, and it is desirable to remedy this evil. Be it enacted, &c. : — 1. This Act shall be known as the "Representation Act." and in the interpretation thereof shall be construed by all courts as having for its object the representation of minorities in Parliaments. 2. All Acts lieretofore passed inconsistent with this Act, shall with regard to all incon- sistent provisions be repealed, but all previous acts not so inconsistent shall remain in force. This Act shall come into force within one year from the passing thereof. 3. No pi'operty cpialification shall be required from any candidate, but each candidate for election in the Dominion or any Provincial Parliament, must be either a Biltish-born or naturalized subject of the Crown. 4. No person shall in future be a candidate for a seat in the Dominion or any Provincial Parliament who is in the employment of the Crown, or receives pay therefrom, but the members composing the Dominion and sevei'al Provincial Governments, now holding offices are exem]:)t from the provisions of this clause, but they must on a change of ministry seek re-election as is now the practice. 5. Immediately upon the coming into force of this Act and within three calendar months from such date, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the House of Commons in Ottawa and of the clei-k of each one of the respective Provincial Parliaments, to ascertain the numbers of voters recording votes at the last general elections for the Dominion and of the last general election in each of the Provinces, and the clei'ks of said Provinces shall officially certify within the time aforesaid such number to the clerk of 'the House of Com- mons in Ottawa. 6. On receipt of such information the said clerk of the House of Commons at Ottawa shall thereupon having previously added to such number the number of thousand or as the case may nquire from the statistics of pojjulation, which addition is to be considered as a fair allowance for an increase in population, proceed to divide the number of electors for the Dominion Parliament by the number of members allowed by the now laws to sit therefor dispensing with fractions and the result so obtained shall hereafter be known as the " Quota" for Dominion elections and he shall at the same time proceed to divide the number of voters who voled at the last election in each Province by the number of membeis entitled to sit by law in such and each Provincial Legislature or Parliament, adding and allowing as above for increase in each Province of population or if diminution is shown by Provincial statistics, then allowing for such diminution as the case may be, and it shall be tlie duty of the said clerk of the House of Commons and of the clok of each Provincial Legislature to similarly obtain the said " Quota " at all times hereafter within one month before any Dominion or Provincial election shall be had. 7. Within two weeks from obtaining such " Quota " the clerk of the House of Com- mons at Ottawa shall publish officially in the Domhdou Gazette, the "Quota" for Dominion elections and the " Quota " for each respective Provincial election, of which all officials are to take notice and govern themselves thereby, and such "Quota" shall be the number each candidate for election must obtain to obtain a seat in the said House of Commons or of any Provincial Legislature. 8. All persons who acted as returning officers, or shall hereafter act as such, are to give all the information in their power to enable the clerk of the House of Commons and the clerks of the respective Provincial Legislatures to carry out this Act, and any one so refusing shall be compellable by a writ of mandamus from any competent court to do so, which shall be issued on prima facie |)roof of such refusal, and the penalty of disobedience shall be enforced by fine and imprisonment of not less than six months in a jail. 9. When an election for either the Dominion Parliament or any Provincial Parlia- ment is ordered to be had, the sheriff of each county in the province in which a provincial election is to be had, shall, 21 days before, cause the same to be duly proclaimed officially in the official paper of the province, and the clerk of the House of Commons, at Ottawa, shall likewise 21 days before such election, if the same is a Dominion election, cause the same to be advertised in the Dominion Gazette, and all candidates shall be called on there- by to put themselves in nomination, and the time for such elections shall be so proclaimed. 10. Within 14 days from the insertion of such notices in the Dominion Gazette, or any Provincial Official Gazette or paper, all returning officers are to be nominated by the respective governments of the Dominion or Provinces, and such returning officers shall pro- claim the fact of such their appointment and shall appoint the proper number of deputy returning officers as by law now provided. 09 n. Sucli proclamations by retuniiug officers shall sjiecify the names and other infor- mation requisite for the guidance of electors, as to the deputy returning officers who shall issue officiiil notices as to the time, day and hour and place of election, and the respective polling places in districts where such deputy returning officers reside. 12. All candidates for any Dominion election or Provincial election eligible as such under this Act, shall within seven days from such advertisement by the aforesaid returning officers, lodge with sucli returning officers a statutory declaratioji showing their beino' so eligible, and also deposit in current money of the Dominion the sum of two hundred dol- lars, which shall be returned to the' person so depositing the same, provided he is not elected, but if elected, the same shall be paid in at once after such member takes his seat to the Treasurer of the Dominion or Province as tlie case may be, and by him applied to the payment of Dominion or Provincial elections, and the names of candidates so proposing themselves shall be duly advertised by all deputy returning officers, and shall by them be signified to the electors in their divisions, and shall be printed on all the ballot papers and numbered numerically in order with the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., as the case may be, as follows : — Name of voter. Address. Vote No. County or —r-. 1. Name of candidate prefeiTed, John Smith. x 2. '' " next " W. Jones. x 3. " . " next " C. Thomas. x 4. ^' " next " Pt. Williams. x 5. " " next " B. Thomas. x The ballot pajiers shall be marked by a cross put by the elector as now required by law opposite to the name of the party he votes for, and no elector shall have more than one vote at any Dominion or Provincial election, but shall vote where his name appears on the legal list of voters, and the capacity of any elector to vote where he has a property qualification therefor, is by this Act abolished, but it is the intention of this Act that each elector voting may vote for all the candidates whose names appear on the ballot paper, by putting a cross opposite to all or any of their names in the order of preference he shall choose to make, but no elector's vote so recorded shall count for more than one, but if the candidate numbered one in his preference of choice shall obtain more than the "Quota" required for election by law, then such excess shall be ti-ansferred to the candidate numbered two in the voter's order of preference, expressed by such voter as aforesaid, and the same shall continue to be done till all candidates eligible through obtaining the required " Quota" are disposed of. 13. All provisions of the election laws not inconsistent with this Act are to be con- sidered as in full force. 14. All ballot pajiers and other papers now required by law to be printed for use at elections, shall be prepared by the proper- officials as heretofore has been the custon'i, but shall be altered to suit the changes made under the provisions of clause 12 or any suc- ceeding clauses of this Act. 15. All voting shall be begun and ended as heretofore, in one day. IG. When any election is completed the ballot boxes shall be returned by tlio deputy returning officers to the returning officers from whom their aj)[)ointments were received, and such returning officers shall within seven days after receipt thereof, and due adver- tisement in the official paper of the province where such election is had, either for Domin- ion or Provincial elections, })i'ocee i in accordance with the provisions of clause 12 of this Act, in the presence of agents who may attend (or candidates) to make count of such votes, and such counting sliall be made in the order of preference and strictly in accord with the above section 12, and he' sliall declare what candidate or candidates are elected, and if the election is a Provincial election he shall forthwith officially declare the same, and tiansmit the said declaration with the ballot i)apers to the clerk of the Legislature ot the Province where the election is had, with his statutory declaration as to the .same, and if the same be an election for the Dominion each returning officer in each province shall similarlv transmit the like papei's to the clerk of the House of Commons in Ottawa, where the same may be inspected by parties interested, and the lesult shall be dwly ])roclaiined by each clerk of the several Legislatures of the Provinces and of the House of Commons, if the same is a Dominion election, in the proper ofiicial pa[)ers, and any otiicial wilfully contravening the provisions of this Act, shall be liable to a fine of five hundred dollars, or in defanlt of payment thereof to imprisonment for six mouths, and any official guilty 70 of bribery or corruption shall be sentenced to imprisonment for three years, and to be in- capacitated from ever voting thereafter, or holding any office or emolument from the Crown. 17. The official declai-ations of the clerks of the Houses, Dominion or Provincial respectively, shall be made within ten days from the receipt of the aforesaid papers from the returning officers, and all election returns and ballot papers shall be retained in proper custody till after one month shall have expired from the meeting of the Dominion Parlia- ment or Provincial Parliament for which they were used, when they shall be destroyed, unless required for judicial purposes. 18. The constituencies in the Dominion elections and Provincial elections shall be en- titled for the present to send the same number and no more representatives to Parliament, as is now their right. 19. To prevent the evils of what is commonly known as the "Gerrymandering sys- tem " it is declared hereby that no alteration of territorial election fields shall take ])lace oftener than once in ten yeai's, and all constituencies now retui'ning members for Dominion or Provincial Parliaments shall return the same number and from the same places, and such number shall represent the same territories for the space of ten years fiom the passing of this Act. 20. Residence in any constituency shall not be required of any candidate, and any one pi'operly qualified may be a candidate for any Dominion or Provincial election, whether lie resides within the territory where such election is to be had or not, and any one may as aforesaid be a candidate at any number of election places, but in such case he shall be obliged to make only one deposit of two hundred dollars as aforesaid provided, and no more, and in case of his return for inore than one constituency, DoiAinion or Provincial, he shall at once elect where he chooses to sit, and when he signifies his election in the way hereinafter provided for, then the jDerson or persons next after him of candidates in the constituency who are ])referentia]ly entitled to the number of votes immediately less in order than his, shall be declared elected, and the returning officers shall before any other candidates are disposed of, proceed to dispose of those who are candidates for more than one constituency, and finding any one by reason of preferential votes entitled to sit for more than one constituency, such person shall be notified by the returning officer of the fact, and it shall be his duty within 24 hours of the transmission of such message to cfioose which constituency he shall represent, and in default of his doing so his name shall be dro])ped as if he never had been a candidate at such election, and he shall signify his election to such returning officer by telegram, and in case by reason of such his neglect or i-efusal so to signify his election, his name is so dropped, the officials aforesaid shall proceed with the names of the other candidates in order of ^^reference designated by the electors, and the votes recorded in constituencies other than the one he chooses to sit for, shall be distributed in the order of designated preference among the other candidates at each such constituenc}' so that siich votes shall not be nugatory, and the acceptance aforesaid by telegram and notification from the said officials to the candidate shall be legal and final though trans- mitted by telegram. 21. The elections to be held next after the passing of this Act, whether Dominion or Provincial, shall not be held sooner than three months after the date of the proclamation directing the same to be held so as to allow full time for the proper carrying out of the provisions thereof, and the working out of the same by the officials for the purpose appointed, but this clause is not to be imperative as to subsequent elections after said first election. MEMORANDUM. I have ventured to put my ideas into the above form. The bill can l)e altered mutatis mutandis to suit any country where the style &c. of officials in parliament are different from ours. , I have spent a great deal of time in considering what is to be done with the surplus or unused votes in any constitueney after the return of a candidate is arrived at, there will likely be many such which as a fact are left in the "air" and utterly wasted. After considering it anxiously in every light I can arrive at no solution satisfactoi-y to my mind, so that they shall be saved as atoms of representation, one cannot rightly take them from^ say constituency A and give them to constituency B because in doing so you are robbing the voter in A of what the law has given him as a right. "In Deo Spero." PACIFICO. Wliea the French Academicians were getting up their dictionary, they submitted to Cuvier their definition of a crab as "a red lish that walks backward," whereupon he remarked that their definition was correct, excepting that the crab was not red, was not a fisli, and did not walk backward. King Charles II. asked the members of the Royal Society how it was that when a fish was placed in a bucket of water, the weight of the bucket and its contents was not thereby increased. Several presented ingenious explanations, after which one of the members rose up and denied the fact, when the king rejoined: "Odds; fish! but you're right." Tliose who write so fluently and frequently abovit " the peoi)le's rule," " the government is what the people make it," " the power of the ballot," which " drops as snow u[)on tlie sod," etc., are as wide of the mark as the savans above mentioned, in that they have not themselves ascertained the facts, but merely accept and reiterate current dogmas. They ex()atiate at length on "Democracy" which has no existence outside of Switzerland, and tliere only partially. W. D. Stead, in the Review of Reviews says that " Demos will regard millionaires as the cottager regards his bees." But his and others' " Demos " is as much a myth as the i)agau Bacchus or Venus. De Tocqueville about half a century ago wrote a large volume entitled " Democracy in America " — thing that never existed on this continent; neither does "Representative government" really exist, excepting very partially in the elections of members of British school boards and, lately, in three Cantons of Switzerland. It is primarily important to the consideration of any of the fundamental i)olitical questions now taken up by thinking persons to ascertain what is and what is not represent- ation ; how much influence -voters, as such, really exert in the making of laws, or in any legislative act ; and how tar they might do in practice, through a better mechanism, they are now said to do in theory, the answers to these questions lie at the very foundation of all intelligent effort to in'iprove industrial and moral conditions by legislative or politica processes. CHAPTER I. A PRIORI NEGATIVE DEMONSTRATION. It can be demonstrated, irrespective of any experience, that under representation (so-called) by districts, minorities, from one-third down (the iiroportion growing less as the number of parties increases), can return a majority of the members in elective bodies. Suppose three constituencies of 3,000 voters each elect for each constituency a member of a so-called " representative" body. Let each " representative " be designed by capitals and each thousand voters by " lower case " lett(jrs ; then Constituencies. Representatives, a a b A a a b -A. b b b B Here two constituencies with 2,000 "a" voters each, and 1,000 "b'' voters each, return an " A " member each. The third constituency, consisting entirely ot b votei-s, returns one " B " member. But the " b " voters in the three constituencies number o,00U, and get but one member, while the " a" voters, with 1,000 less voters, get two membei-s. Now let us try with seven constituencies, each having <,000 voters : , a a a a b b b A. a a a a b b b A. a a a a b h b A a a a a b b b A b b b b b b b B b b b b 1. 1> b B b b b 1) b b b B - Here we have 16,000 "a" voters electing 4 member.s, and 33,000 "b" voters electing but 3 members, so th.U less than a third of the voters elect a majority of the so-called "representatives." I Constituencies. b b c c a a a b b c c a a a b b c c a a a b b c c a a a c c c }) b b b c c c b b b b c c c b b b 1) But to attempt to represent all grades of opinion by means of two parties is as absurd as it would be to undertake to fit every one by two sizes and makes of coats, hats or shoes. In proportion as people think for themselves — differentiate — the need is felt for a third, a fourth or even a fifth party ; and still the current varieties of opinion on subjects pertaining to legislative action would be inadequately voiced, especially as tliese diffei-ences would extend to the exponents as well as to the principles or platform of a party. But let us try a third party "c." Kepresen tati ves. A A A A B B B Here we have 49,000 voters in 7 constituencies. The "a's" with but 12,000 — less than a fourth of the whole — still return 4 of the 7 " representatives," while the " c's " with nearly 50 per cent, more votes (17,000) than the " a's," do not obtain one member, and the "b's," with 8,000 more votes than the "a's" get one representative less. "Were there four, five, or six parties, the minority of voters that might thus secure a majority of the elected body wovdd necessaiily become less and less. That is, the more intelligent voters become, the less representation — if they vote according to their convictions — do they obtain, while the least intelligent are the most represented. It may be claimed that the cases presented are extreme, not occurring in actual life. But there are other factors, not yet considered, that would increase these disparities. One is that it is practically imj^ossible for voters, in a mass, to control party m;inagement ; and a very small minority of the party not only can, but do — not only do, buc imist control the nominations, so that the alternation — not choice — of the voter is, in most cases, to vote for one man that he does not like in preference to another that lie dislikes. If his party wins, he is j?i/s-represented ; if the other i>arty wins, he is un represented. CHAPTEE II. A POSTERIORI DEMONSTRATION ; THE " MAJORITY RULE '* MYTH. I might fill volumes with most conclusive proof from the figures of electoral votes, that a minority of voters, or a small majority, elect all the legislators in nearly every case, waiving for the time the fact that even those voters who do elect only have a choice of evils as a rule. But a few recent examples may sufiice to establish that which no one well informed on such subjects would undertake to controvert. In Oakland, Cal., seven councilmen and seven school trustees are elected fi'om as many wards, into which the city is divided, and four more of each are elected " at large " ; that is, all the voters in that city vote for four candidates " at large " and one from their respective wards. At the election of March, 1893, 28,488 votes were cast for the four councilmen elected "at large" (scrutin de Uste) but only 10,195, or nearly 36 percent., were cast for the candidates elect ; thus over 64 per cent. — nearly two-thirds— of the votes cast were ineffective. For the members of the board of education so chosen 26,588 votes were cast, of which but 10,739, or a little over 40 per cent., were cast for the candidates elected. The votes cast in the seven several wards for school trustees aggregated 7,127, of which 3,265 were effective for the elected members or nearly 46 ])er cent. The 7 candidates elected to the council by wards received 3,079 out of 8,141 votes cast, so that only 37.8 per cent, of these votes were, in the most latitudinarian sense, effective. The successful candidate for the school board irom the 6th ward received 297 out of the 8()3 votes cast, or nearly 36 per cent. The candidate elected from the 7tli ward to that body recived 724 out of the 1,114 voters, which is nearly two and a half times as many votes as the candidate elected from the 6th received, yet each has the same voting power on the board ; that is, in our present system of political arithmetic 297 is equal to 724. The elected candidate from the 6th ward received only four votes more than one who was defeated, so that a change in three votes out of 803 would have elected another man ; that is, three voters in that ward had power to determine who should "represent" 800 besides themselves! In three wards (1st, 2nd and 4th) as many defeated candidates received more votes (329, 372, 292) than the candidate elected from the 6th. t3 Of tiie councilmen elected by wards, two received less than a third of the votes cast in each ward (SOO and 3315 per cent.); two more received hut little over a thinl (31-4 and 36), and none of them received half. Taking the average, six out of the 11 councilmen voting for a measure against five opposed would repi-esent but 20 per cent, of the voters, and from the inequality of the votes in the sevei'al wards, might represent less. Yet this minority can enact ordinances binding upon the whole people of Oakland ! And this is called " government of the people, by the people, for the i)eople " ! At the election of six assemblymen from as many districts in Alameda County, Cal., on Nov. 8th, 1892, 17,307 votes were cast, of which 8,078 — 46 per cent. — were effective in electing candidates. A change of from one to less than three per cent, of the voters in three of those districts, of less than a third of one ])er cent, in another, and of 5^- and 7| per cent. in the other two would have elected an entirely different delegation to the assembly from that county. And it is much the same in most of the districts in California. That is, a few of the most worthless, the most vicious or the most weak-kneed voters can turn tlie scale, so that men of character, honesty and determination can, as a rule, neither he representatives or i-epresented. In the San Francisco municipal election of Nov. 8th, 1892, the average vote for 12 Supervisors, (who are elected "at" large, or Scrutin de liste) was 51,131, and that for successful candidates was 19,085, — slightly over 37 per cent. The Democratic party, on a vote of 39 per cent, of the whole, secured 83^ per cent. — 10 o>it of 12 — of the Board. A vote of seven-twelfths of that Board would not, then, average a i-ejiresentation of more than about 211 per cent, of the voters. The 12 members of the Board of Education, also elected at lai-ge, received nearly the same percentage of the total vote as the Supervisors. By comparing these per-centages with those of Oakland for similar bodies, and witli those of Alameda county for the Assembly, it will be seen that election either at large or by districts is equally unrepresentative. In 1890 the Congressmen elected from the State of California received 128,451 votes out of 252,012 cast, or 50-1 per cent. In 1892 they received 119,171 out of 240,210, or 49 '6 per cent. The political elements at work in" 1892 differed widely from those of 1890, by reason of the increase of votes for "outside" parties, yet the percentage of voters represented (in a degree) varied but little one from the other ; and until we have complete proportional representation, independent of parties, mere changes in p>rty names, or the organization of new parties, will accom]ilish little. It is similar in voluntary organizations. On March 29th, 1893, the Typographical Union of San Francisco elected three delegates to the International Convention of that body, each meuiber voting for three of the 11 candidates. The votes nvnnbered 1,758, which, divided by three, gives 653 voters. The successful candidates received 280, 224 and 228 votes respectively, being an average of 247. This shows an average of 38 per cent, of the voters represented. A change of one vote would have elected another candi- date, who received 227, in place of that one who received 228. In the whole State, on November 8th, 1892, 249,363 votes were cast for assembly- men from 80 single districts, of which 1L6,90S votes were cast for members elected, and 132,455 against them, so that only a small fraction over 47 per cent, of the voters elected every member of the Assembly, and nearly 53 per cent, were totally unrepresented even in form, while most of the 47 per cent, were not probably fully re[iresented in fact. The vote of 41 out of the 80 members could not, therefore, be fairly considered as representing, on the average, over 24 per cent, of the voters ; yet that proportion has the power to enact laws, so far as that house is concerned. Where there are two houses, the other is elected in a similar manner, or it is ajijiointed. Fortunately, this House, at its ensuing session, by their votes on certain measures, positively proved the preceding position. On February 23rd, 1893, an amendment to the State constitution, r«"'quiring that on request of ten per cent, of the voters of the State, any bill passed liy the Legislature must be submitted to the voters at the polls for latiHcation or lejection, aiul that any bill pro- posed by that percentage should be similarly submitted, was rejected by :i2 n<>gative vot.-s out of the 80 assemblymen, the constitution re(iuiring a two-thirds maj.irity for any amen.i- ment thereto. These 32 members received a total of 44,281 votes in their several con- stituencies or districts, being less than 18 p^r cent, of the 219,603 votes of the State received by all candidates for the Assembly. Thus kss than a fifth of the voters of the State are empowered under this sham of repr(>seutation— this "majority rule" myth -to determine that the other four-tifths shall have nothing to do witli the laws except to vote tor the class of men usually nominated by the macliinery of new as well as of ohl parties. But the positive, special and conclusive proof that a bare majority would rej)i-eseiit 74 on an average about 24 jier cent, of the voters, is sliown in regard to a proposed amend- ment to tlie constitution, giving the Legislature power to so amend tlie tax laws as to permit the voters of each county or incorporated city or town to decide by direct vote what classes of property should and what should not be taxed. There were 42 negative votes on this proposition, which 42 members received an aggregate of 60,803 votes, which is less than -4^ per cent, of the total vote for assemblymen in the State. In the Assembly elected in November, 1890, 133,265 votes were cast for the success- ful candidates out of a total vote of 248,423 for assemblymen, which is 53 per cent. The Vagrant Bill was passed by 44 ayes to 26 noes; the ayes had received 70,277 votes at the polls — a little ovei- 28 per cent, of the total vote ; the 26 noes had received 47,294 votes ; and 130,702 voters, being over half the voters in the State, had not even a negative voice as to that law. The bill for an appropriation of $300,000 to the World's Fair received 44 ayes, those members representing or receiving the votes of 80,886 — less than a third of the whole. The 24 members who wanted a less amount appropriated received 36,651 votes; and 130,- 886 voters — 52.7 per cent, of the whole — had no opportunity to be heard from. When U. S. Senator Stanford was re-elected by that Legislature, he received in the Assembly 59 votes, these representing 97,939 voters at the polls, or less than two-fifths of the whole, though his majority only lacked one of being three-fourths of that " representative" body. The whole coui-se of legislation might thus be followed up iii any session of almost any legislature in the world with similar results. And if these figures do not prove my position that legislatures do not represent the opinions of voters in the enactment of laws, &c., then no figures can pi'ove anything, arithmetic is a delusion and all reasoning im- possible. It is fully as reasonable to claim that the earth is flat, with the heavenly bodies revolving around it as to assert that by our electoral system even an a;iproximation to true representation can be obtained. And the demonstration to the contrary is much more easily understood in the latter than in the former case. Were it not that the false view is so persistently taught in educational institutions of all grades and types, in periodicals of all sorts and sizes — in short, iterated and re-iterated on every ])ossible occasion, the proposition that any country, outside of three Cantons in Switzerland, has a really repre- sentative government or that " the people make the government what it is," would be laughed to scorn as the gibberings of an idiot or the croaking of a parrot. Political science to-day is where physical science was in the fifteenth century ; it hardly exists. CHAPTER III. DIRECT LEGISLATION. This is accomplished negatively by the Referendum, positively by the Initiative. At first sight, these, with the power of recalling a member on demand of a majority of his Iccal constituency might seem to be sufficient, and the workings of the Referendum and the Initiative in Switzeidand, and of the former of these occasionally in the United States and British North America, have been such as to create a favorable impression. But direct legislation, compared with propoi-tional representation is as pack mules to a railroad. By simplifying and improving our system of enacting and executing laws, their number and com[)lexity could doubtless be much reduced. Yet with all that could be done in this line (and which never will he done under our present electoral system) the necessary collective business of any municipality, state, province or nation, to be proidded for by general enactment, would be too great and diversified to be handled advantageously, or even possibly, by the whole mass of voters ; nor could even any considerable fraction of these act intelligently, whatever their mental ability and moral endowments, on the hundreds and even thousands of propositions coming before them. It is not a question of the intelli- gence or morality of the voters, as compared with those acting as their agents in legislatures, etc. The point is that in any but a very small and sparse community, the business of society must be transacted through agencies and by division of labor ; and the tendency of social and industrial advancement lies actually and necessarily in this direction. No longer does the farmer shear his sheep and his family turn the wool laboriously into cloth ; but he sends the wool to market, and buys the materials for his clothing, if not the clothing itself And so of every occupation. Whether the change is a benefit or otherwise, it had to come, and the old cannot be restored. Public business needs to keep pace with indus- trial changes. Progress in any direction necessitates differentiation. In the very lowest animals, the stomach is substantially the whole animal, and the functions of the various oi-gans as they begin to develop are interchangeable. It is only as the species rises in the scale of being, that the several organs become more and more distinct. So as tlie body ))olitic grows, its functions become more difterentiated, so that the direct transaction of tlie business of the whole by the whole, becomes either impossible, or as costly as it would be for the pastoralist to weave the wool of his sheep into his garments, or the wheat grower of Manitoba to haul his grain to a sea or lake port by ox-teams. If it would be an advantage for men to lose the pi-esent differentiation of tlieir organisms and become clams, it would be also of advantage for the people to legislate directly, iMther tlian through freely chosen and really representative bodies. "Direct legislation" may be designated "clam reform." Even in small voluntaiy organizations committees are elected or a[)pointed to conduct the details of their business, as a matter of convenience, if not of necessity. In many such only a minority of members can be induced to attend meetings where a majority of those present have full power to act. For instance : previous to a recent change, the attendance at the monthly meetings of the Typographical Union of San Francisco, numbering nearly 700 members, rarely exceeded 150 and often fell below 100; yet in voting for elective officers nearly the entire strength was called out. In the Mechanics' Institute of San Francisco, the vote in February, 1892, was some 1,40"), and on Feln-uary 28th, 1893, 905 ; but it is only of late, owing to the agitation connected with the proportioned plan that the attendance at its quarterly meetings reached as high as 117 to 150, out of a membership of nearly 4,000. It is evident that nearly every one would rather vote for competent persons to conduct any sort of collective business than attend to the details themselves. Many loc;il ti-ades unions and other organizations send delegations of their members to act for them in National, Dominion, State, or Provincial assemblages. On March 29 Lli, 1893, the Typographical Union of San Francisco elected three delegates to the luterna tional Convention (as detailed in Chapter II.) by 38 per cent, of the vote. They had to be elected in some way from all the local unions, as it was impossible for every compositor in the United States and British America to visit Chicago, and if they had all gone there, such a large number could not deliberate or transact any business. It is true that the i.cts of the convention have to be ratified by the members of the Union at large; but if that was all to be done, there need have been no convention at all, as any proposed measure could have been merely ratified or rejected without bringing several hundred i)ersons hundreds or thousands of miles to a common centre. The purpose, however, of this con- vention, as of any similar body, legislature, or parliament, was to consult, deliberate and decide with a view to jiractical action ; hence the members of such bodies should, as nearly as possible, lepreserd the general views of those who sent them, concentrating their efforts on devising such measures as would carry out these views, subserving the interests and securing the approval of their constituents. "Direct legislation" cannot meet these requirements ; proportional representation can. I mention this because the Typographical Union has been cited to prove the sufficiency of "direct legislation" to solve the political problem, while the experience of that Union proves the contrary. And I may add that, as a member of that Union, I was not long since called upon to vote, at about twenty-four hours' notice, on some thirty difl'erent propositions, having no means of forming an intelligent opinion as to much over half of them. Every one at all posted as to the exigencies of legislation, or other collective action, knows that where there is any opportunity (as there always would be under proportional representation) to select a few competent and reliable men, it is much easier to do so than to decide upon the merits of many vieasures. Even with our present ?«tVrepresentative and ^^^^-representative processes this is shown by the jjopular vote. A striking instance of this occurred in the California election of Nov. 8th, 1892, when both men and measures were voted upon at the polls. Five " proi)ositions " and four constitutional amendinents were submitted for direct vote. While 249,363 voters in the whole State voted tor assemblymen and over 208,000 for presidential electors, the vote pro and con on election of U. S. Senators by the people was 201,300, being but a little over 80 i)er cent, of the vote for assemblvmen. The vole for and against a new ferry di^pot in San Francisco ^was 181,726, or nearlv 73 per cent.; educational qualiHcation for voters, 192,729, being u7 percent.; on refunding the debt, 168,504, 67^ per cent.; constitutional amendment >)o. 10, 190,273—76-3 per cent.; constitutional amendment No. 7, 168,490— 67i per cent.; constitutional amendment No. 11, 132,199— a little over 53 i)er cent. of. the vote tor assemblymen and 7iot half that for Presidential electors; constitutional _ amendment D, 156,994—63 per cent.; constitutional amendment 14, 156,693-less than 63 per cent. These figures are the sums of the vote, pro and con. It has been claimed that the working of Direct Legislation in Switzerland has been t6 so satisfactory as to prove that no representative body is needed excepting to formulate measures for the approval of or rejection by the voters, and hence that with the " Obligatory " Keferendum, (one providing that all measures tnust be refen^ed to the body of votei-s) and the Initiative, the legislatui'e would simply be "a body of powerless committeemen." Committeemen, whether in voluntary organizations or in legislatures, are, however, well known to be far from " powerless." Every one at all acquainted with legislative operations knows that a bill can very rarely be passed in a legislature when it has been handicapped by an adverse report of a committee. It is equally well known that very few legislators have the requisite knowledge to vote intelligently, upon half or quarter of the bills coming befoi-e them, and are virtually compelled as to all the others, to vote accoi'ding to the committees' reports. It is, then, a fundamental necessity for effective work not only that public and collective business should be transacted by agents, but that these agents should be chosen in such a manner as to secure the most capable persons, fairly and fully representing not merely a party, fraction of a party, clique or " ring," but the whole body of the constituents. That is, they should be actually, and not merely nominally, rejyresentatives. No merchant or manufacturer would be satisfied with an agent or clerk, especially at a place distant from his centre of business, when not allowed to use his best judgment in the selection of a person, merely because he could instruct such agent or clerk what to do, or over-rule his action. Another serious objection to the efficiency of the Initiative is that to formulate any measure by that means, so77ie person or persons must be selected or empowered to draft it by some iri-egular process, subject to no efficient checks. These persons would be no more " repi-esentative " of the community generally, or of any portion of it than the average legislator, but would pi'obably be less so, being liable to be composed of the scum that usually rises to the top in times of excitement. What security would there be that the persons so selected would not be the worst enemies of the jiroposed measiires, secretly paid by powerful classes 0[)posed to it to introduce some provision fatal to its efficacy or con- stitutionality, which the mass of voters would fail to detect? Even if they did detect it, when too late, they could only vote it down, and that would be claimed as proof of their hostility to the priniciple of the measure. Even in our present legislatures, all measures are liable to be exposed to close criticism, while in a truly representative legislature, no bill could escape a close analysis both as to its principles and details. But a bill presented for direct vote of the people can only be voted on by ayes and noes, amendments and substitutes being out of the question. And would it not be much easier by proportional representation, to secure a body of men that would be competent to act on all legislative business, rather than to spasmodi- c illy and specially, by some uncertain and irregular process, to organize a special committee for each and every measure, for which there seemed to be a popular demand 1 Legislation under the Initiative, would be even more a work of Sisyphus, than it is at j)resent. As to the experience of Switzerland, direct legislatiou would naturally work better nr a small and nearly stationary population, where eveiy man's record is known from childhood, and public opinion thei-efore a greater power, than in large cities, or in states or countries where the population is migratory and the people given to frequent changes of residence, or that the antecedents of individuals are, for ordinary purposes, untraceable. But even in Switzerland the Cantons of Ticino, Neuchatel and Geneva have found it altogether inadequate and have in succession adopted a form of proportional representation which admits of jmrties being represented measurably in proportion to the number of voters in each party. In the Canton of St. Gall, a similar plan was rejected at the ])olls on January 30th, 1893, by 21,982 against 19,826 : in Soleure, on January 15th, by 6.620 to 4,950; and in Bale, on Nov. 23rd, 1890, by 4,217 to 2,755. In the Cantons of Zug, Lucerne, and Vaud, it will probably soon be adopted. These figures indicate a progressive and ra{)id increase of f^ublic sentiment in its favor, even in the three Cantons wherein it has been, for the time, defeated. In all these Cantons the Referendum and Initiative are in operation, and the action in each proves that they are inadequate. Tlie Imperative Mandate may be regarded as a species of direct legislation, consisting in the power of a majority of the voters in any elective body to recall a member with whose course tliey are dissatisfied. Whatever benefit coidd be accomplished thereby has been reached in Switzerland by the Referendum and Initiative, so that in that country it is no longer mentioned. As it can only be used by a majority in a district, it is incom- patible with a representation of the whole body of voters, and would make political agitation incessant and intrigues without end. I am not aware that it has ever been put in practice, and may be regarded as a political fossil. 77 Little, if anything can be accomplished on this continent by picking up Switerland's old clothes that are worn nearly threadbare or cast off altogether, when we can get some- thing better than even its new apparel. Finally, "Direct Legislation" in America (particularly on the Pacific Coast) would work on the plan of a Prohibitory li(i[Uor law passed by the Rhode Island Legislature some thirty years ago, in which the proliibitory clauses were clear and strong, but the penal clauses someliow " got left." One man remarked that everybody should be happy, in that the temperance men had secui-ed the law, which was what they wanted, and the liquor sellers could continue their business unmolested, which was all tliey wanted. Even so, the people would get the shell by the i)ermissioir to propo.se a law, but the financially strongest and the machine politicians would get the oyster by injecting what they pleased into the law before its submission, much the same as manufacturers of glass lamp chimneys are said to put materials in the glass to make the chimneys break quickly. CHAPTER IV. THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. This process, as ai)plied to the election of dii'ectors in corporations and trustees for Reclamation Districts, is thus defined in Art. XII., vSect. 12, of the Constitution of Cali- fornia : — " In all elections for directors or managers of corporations, every stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person or by proxy, the number of shares of stock owned by him for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall equal, or disti'ibute them on the same })rinciple, among as many candidates as he shall think tit," etc. It is a movement towards the proportional representation of parties rather than of 2)eople, which can only be worked to advantage in small organizations where all can be present, or in districts return*5ng three to five members, and then only imperfectly, whereas full proportional I'epresentation by the preferential process works with the greater accuracy as consituencies are enlarged. Sir Rowland Hill, th^ father of cheap postage, in 1840 drafted a form of oi'ganization for the municipality of Adelaide, South Australia (which colony was then new), and included therein a provision for cunnilating the vote in the election of 2^) town councillors, so that one-twentietli of the voters, by concentrating their twenty" votes apiece on one man, could elect him. This was before the secret ballot was introduced, and hence it could be known when any candidate had been elected in time to avoid any waste of votes on him. It was used for three yeai-s, when the municipal organi- zation was discontinued because of the expense to a scanty population. The process was suggested in England in 18f)7, by James Garth Marshall. In 1868 it was advocated in the United States by U. S. Senator Buckalew. In 1870 it was used to elect members of school boards in Great Britain, and has been so used ever since. About that time it was introduced for the election of members of the House of Assembly in Illinois, in districts returning three members each, and is still so used, with the effect that the absolute waste of votes is much lessened ; but it perpetuates the evils of party rule ir. that nearly all votes are wasted that are not cast for one or the other of two lead- ing parties, and hence the Illinois Assembly is but little if any more a reflex of public opinion than are other legislative bodies. As applied to the election 'of moie numerous bodies, it is liable to great inaccuracy and a lai-ge absolute waste of votes. In the INIarylebone (London) election of November, 1870, for seven members of the school board, Miss Garrett received ^7,858 votes out of 165,165 cast (each voter casting seven votes), of which total the successful candidates receiving in all 111,649 votes. The lowest of them received 8,355 votes, and the highest of the 1-5 unsuccessful ones 7,927, so that it api)ears Miss Garrett could have been elected on a much less number than she received, and had her supporters known their strength they could have elected several other candidates sharing her views. Besides this drawback, 53,516 votes — nearly a thii'd of the whole — were entirely wasted for unsuccess- ful candidates. In the Board itself, Miss Garrett, representing ovei- three times the vote of the highest elected candidato except hersi^lf, and nearly six times the lowest,^lnul only the same voting power. This is, however, an extreme case. But at the best, it must require very much canvassing beforehand to enable this system to work out even an approach towards justice. 78 CHAPTER V. THE FKEE LIST OR TICKET. This is said to have been first proposed by Mr. Gilpin oi" Philadelphia, in 1844, and has been advocated at different times in England. It is, however, princii)ally interesting through its energetic advocacy in Belgium for many years, and in Switzerland since 1864, resulting in its adoption there in 1890-92 by three Cantons of Ticino, Neuchatel and Geneva, as previously stated in the chapter on direct legislation. Under it the number of votes cast is divided by the numbei- of candidates to be elected, and the quotient is 'the quota. Or the number of votes is divided by the number of candidates p/ws one, and one added to the quotient to form the quota, as is done in Ticino. Or it can be conibiiied with the cumulative vote by a fractionizing process advocated by Messrs Seebohm and Parker Smith in England, and M. D'Hondt in Belgium, whereby a vote for one candidate counts as one, a vote for four as one-fourtli, a vote for three as one-third, and so on. In the former processes, the voter, as in the cumulative vote, has as many votes as there are candidates to be elected from the district. Stated generally, the principle is that the number of candidates elected from each list or ticket is proportioned to the aggregate vote cast for that ticket, and the fractions of quotas result in additional members either for the list in which thei-e is the largest frac- tion, as in Neuchatel and Geneva, or for the list casting the largest vote in the district, as in Ticino. Three elections have now been held under it in that Canton, and one each in Neuchatel (May 1st, 1892) and Geneva (November 13th, 1892). The first in Ticino, was on March 10, 1892, in which the Conservative vote in its ten districts (each returning from five to 15 members) was 11,348, and the Liberal vote, 11,480; but the Conserva- tives returned 50 members, and the Liberals on a vote of 11,480 returned 45 membeis. (These figures represent the number of voters). In the election for five members of the "Council of State," on Feb. 19th, 1893, the Conservatives received 58,245 voies (each voter voting for five candidates) and the Liberals or Radicals 61,488, the former returning two and the latter three candidates. In each case the candidates taken on each list are those receiving the highest numbers, the voter signifying his preference for candidates at the same time as he votes for the list. In the election for the Grand Council (the cantonal legislative body), on March 5, 1895, the districts were reduced to eight instead of ten ; 172,390 Radical votes elected 53 membei'S, and 143,089 Conservative votes elected 43 membei's. The following is a statement of the result in each district as tabulated by the Brussels La Representation Froportionelle : Districts. Suffrages. Deputies. Radical. Conservative. Radical. Conservative. I. Mendrisio II Lucano 40,345 19,706 10,685 11,349 36,153 2,029 20,134 31,989 23,570 11,597 ■ 18,818 9.532 34,449 2,986 11,392 30,745 10 7 4 5 9 2 7 9 5 4 Ill Vezia-Tesserete 7 IV Malcantone 4 V. Locarno 8 VI Vallemacia * 3 VII Bellinzona 4 VIIL Tre Valli 8 172,390 143,089 53 43 Under the usual system the Radicals would have secured 80 and the Conservatives 16 only. In September, 1890, tliere were armed conflicts in this Canton resulting in the death of one prominent politician, caused by a similar inequality the other way, under which the Radicals, with nearly half the vote, secured less than a third of the representa- tives. Nothing V)ut the intervention of the Federal troops prevented a civil war. This led to the adoption of the improved system, with the result of removing that bitterness of 79 feeling natuvally resulting from the grossest injustice. Proportional Eep'ese^dation is peace. In the Geneva election above mentioned, 13,349 persons voted in three districts for 100 members of the cantonal legislature. The wasted votes amounted to 3*9, 3-4 and 1-7 per cent, in the several districts, which were not equally apportioned, however, as 5,412 voters elected 40 deputies from Rive Gauche, 26 de[)uties were elected by the 2,972 voters of Rive Droite, and 34 by 4,96.t voters of the City of Geneva. There were five parties represented sulistantially in proportion to the number of votes cast by each party. One week earlier 53 per cent, of the votes of California were wasted. In the Neuchatel election, three parties were represented, viz. : Radicals, Liberals, and Workingmen, besides local parties. The total of voters was 20,059, including 9,961 Radicals, who elected 57 members ; 5,786 Liberals, 29 members ; 2,906 Workingmen, 18 members; and 1,106 "mixed" (local), 9 members. The strict proportion would have been 57, 33, 17 and 7. Under the old svstem, aside from coalitions, it would have been 65, 10, 30 and 9. Professor Adrien ISTaville, of Neuchatel, in his Report as Secretary to the members of the Swiss P. R. Asssociation, remai-ks that before the election it was noticeable that, " notwithstanding the very active work of the electoral committees, the struggle was less bitter and less personal than at any preceding election, each party knowing that it would have its part ; " that is, secure its pro rata of representatives. He further states that more votes were cast than ever previously because all knew their votes would count ; that the counting of the ballots, etc., was rapid and easy. I repeat. Proportional Representation is peace. Hon. Tom L. Johnson, in 1892, proposed a bill in Congress to enable members of the National House of Representatives to be elected in a similar manner, but rather more simply. The imperfections in the List system are that without great complication, a voter cannot cast his ballot for candidates on two or more party tickets, and it requires as much elaborate party machinery to work it as the present system. It admits of much less absolute waste of votes than the present system, but still leaves the voter within party trammels, more or less, instead of leaving free play to his individuality in his selection of candidates without impairing the effectiveness of his vote. M. D'Hondt, of Belgium, has devised an elaborate modification of this system, referred to at the beginning of this chaptei", which would require three or four times the space of this pamphlet to explain, and much space is occupied in La Representation Proportionelle in elaboi'ate discussions on the details of tiie List plans, the complications of which would seriously obstruct its acceptance on this continent. Nor are the reasons which obtain for its acceptance in Belgium or Switzerland (where the people are in the practice of voting for a large number of candidates from one district, 32 from Brussels, for instance) operative in the XJ. S. or British North America, where single districts ha,ve always been largely predominant. M. D'Hondt defines proportional I'epresentation as " the repartition of several seats between divers parties proportionally to tJieir relative importance." But what is really required, and can be obtained by a much more simple process than the List system, is a repartition of seats not between parties, but between the whole body of voters, indepen- dently of party machinery or party leaders. This ideal accords with the spirit of a decision by the California Supreme Court, in Octobei-, 1892, that the clause in the so-called Australian liallot law permitting party heatlings on the ballot, so that a voter could vote for the entire party ticket bj^ making one mark, was unconstitutional, because it was " an attempt to discriminate against classes of voters," and "its efiects would be to subject such classes to partial disfranchisement, or the casting of such votes upon more burdensome conditions than others no better entitled, under the fundamental law, to the free and untrammeled exercise of the right of suflfrage." But this is done under our present system of so-called i'epresentation by the mode of apportionment, irrespective of and before the act of depositing the ballot. For it gives to voters acting with party organizations an advantage in securing an alleged representation over independent voters. And to the extent that the List systems do this, tliey retain the old leaven. CHAPTER VL The Preferenti.\l Plax. This has been designated bv Rev. Ernest Naville, of Geneva, to whom the success of the movement in Switzerland has been so largely due, as the ideal of pi-oportional 80 representation. It was introduced, in a very limited and imperfect way, into the election, by indirect vote, of the Denmark "Folketliing" in 1855, by Prof. Andrse ; and is still continued similarly in the election of a few members of the " Landsthing," or upper house, of that country ; that is, a number of persons, designated " electors of the second degree," are elected by the ordinary mode, and these electors of the second degree elect the legislators by this })referential process. It was independently discovered by the late Thomas Hare, barrister-at-law, London, and published in 1857. John Stuart Mill was among its earliest and most enthusiastic advocates, claiming that "it lifts the cloud that hangs over our civilization." It has since then been much simplified by Sir John Lubbock and others, and can now be claimed as at once the simplest (aside from the Gove system) and the most effective of any plan yet pro- posed, in that it upholds and expresses the individuality of the voter to the largest possible extent. The quota is ascertained, as in one form of the " Free List," by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of candidates to be elected ; but its paramount feature is that the wasted votes are reduced to a minimum. Each voter numbers the candidates on the ballot (all the candidates should be on one ballot) in the order of his choice, placing the fio'ure " 1 " opposite the name of the candidate whom he most desires to see elected, " 2 " opposite the name of the candidate next "preferred" (hence "preferential") by him, " 3" against his next choice, and so on. The ballots are then arranged according to the first choice (figure 1) and counted, so many for each candidate, after which the surplus ballots, over the quota, that any candidate may have received, are transferred to the second choice on each liallot, if that candidate has received no quota ; but if, or when, such candidate of the second choice has received a quota, the ballot is transferred to the third choice candidate, and so on, until all the surplus ballots have thus been disposed of. Tliese transferred ballots count the same as if they had been originally cast as first-choice for that candidate, and as soon as any candidate's quota is thus made up by transferred votes, that candidate's ballots forming the quota are withdrawn and packed up in any convenient manner, and the candidate declared elected. After the surplus votes ai'e thus disposed of, if there are still candidates remaining to be elected, the ballots of the candidate having the least number of first-choice votes, are transfeired in the same manner as surplus ballots, to the second, thii'd, fourth, or fifth choice, etc., as the case may be ; and whenever l)y these transferred ballots any candidate reaches his quota, his ballots are withdrawn in the same manner as in the case of surplus ballots. This process — termed "elimination" — is continued until the number of candidates remaining is no greater than the number to be elected. The process is thus specified in the amendment to Section 2 of Article IX. of the Constitution of the Mechanics' Institute of this city, passed in September, 1892, and under which seven trustees of that institution were elected on February 28, 1893 : The voting shall be by the process known as the preferential method of proportional representation, as follows : 1. Each voter .shall have one vote, but may vote in the alternative for as many can- didates as he jileases, by writing the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., opposite the names of those can- didates in the order of his preference. 2. The ballot papers having been all mixed, shall be drawn out in succession and stamped with numbers, so that no two shall bear the same number. 3. The number obtained by dividing the whole number of good ballot papers tendered at the election by the number of trustees to be elected shall be called the quota. If such number has a fraction, such fi'actional part shall be deducted. 4. Every candidate who has a number of first votes equal to, or greater than, the quota, shall be declared to be elected, and so many of the ballot papers containing those votes as shall be equal in number to the quota shall be set aside as the quota of that can- didate, in a sealed envelope, and sealed and signed by the judges of election. On all other ballot papers, the name of such 'elected candidate shall be cancelled, with the effect of rais- \\\olitically to all, and the tendency will be upwards and onwards — a real, and not merely material advancement. As evil now permeates, so would good "leaven the whole lump." Let one Province, one State, even one municipality lead the way, by introducing full proportional representation, and the whole civilized world must eventually follow. Inspiration and aspiration will impart that superiority to evil it always secures in a fair field, and proportional x'epresent a tion will make the field a fair one. Then, " Ever the right comes uppermost Aud ever is justice done," will become more than a poet's ideal. New occasions teach new duties ; Time makes ancient good uncouth ; They must upward still, and onward, who would keep abreast of truth ; Lo, before us gleam our camp-fires, we ourselves must Pilgrims be, Launch our Mayflower, and steer boldly through the desjierate winter sea. Nor attempt the Future's portal with the Past's blood-rusted key. — J. R. Lowell. The false belief that the peojyle rule, " the people make the laws," and that " to make governments better we need only to make the people better," are the most efficient pavalyzers that could be devised to arrest any form of advancement through political action. The removal of that false bellief would invigorate a public opinion, now paralyzed, so that it would become a force so powerful that its insistance on being embodied in the processes of election would have to be heeded. But if men of thought and conscience fail to realize how deep this political cancer reaches, their slumbei-s may be rudely bi'oken. Better is chaos than systematized corruption; better is the insane than the satanic; better that tlie corpse of a rotten civilization should, preparatory to interment, taint the air, so that out of its putrefaction shall, in after ages, come new life, than that it should remain a walking {pestilence — a living death. Must our civilization thus perish 1 By no means. A few in earnest can arouse a demand for the riglit to complete representation of all voters. Already their voices echo and re-echo, each helping the other, from Canada in the far north to the lands of the Southern Cross, from the mountains of Switzerland to the plains of Illinois ; from the metropolis of the British empire to the marvellously beautiful and varied Pacific slope of America — from all these and more men and women will gather in the poiJulous city on the shores of Lake Michigan, to inaugui-ate a vaster enterprise than was ever dreamed of by the founders of the World's Fair — a world's convention of workers for political equity. The evolution of science by investigation, the evolution of industry by invention, the evolution of the social order by co-operation — all these demand as a concomitant, with- out which they may — yes, must — become cui'ses, that political evolution which is in harmony with science, with industry, with social progress, and above all, with justice. The old Roman said '^ Fiat justitia, mat caelum" — let justice be done, though the heavens fall. Rather I would say. Let justice be done lest the heavens fall. This political justice would bring not fallen heavens, but a risen, redeemed earth, seen by the prophet — " a new heavens and a new earth wher-ein dwelleth righteousness." Pacifico. APPENDIX. "Draft Bills" for "The Best Workable Measures." An Act to amend the Dominion Elections Act, 37 V, c. 9, s. 135. Section 1. — Hereafter the House of Commons shall be elected by the process known as the preferential method of proportional re^^resentation, also known as the transferable - vote, as follows : — Sec. 2. — Excepting as hereinafter provided for districting the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, members of the House of Commons shall be elected by each Province without regard to districts for the number of members to which they shall be entitled by law, But each voter's vote shall count for one candidate only in the manner following : — ■ 85 Sec. 3. — The voter shall i>lace opposite the name of snch candidate as he may prefer above all others the figure " 1 ; " and opposite the name of the candidate next preferred by him, as being his second choice the figure "2;" for his third choice the figure "3" in like manner ; for his fourth choice, the figure " 4 ; " for his fifth clioice the figure " 5 " and for his sixth choice, the figure " 6." But he can mark any number of candidates not exceeding six with figures from one to six. Sec. 4. — The ballot boxes, after being duly sealed, as provided for in Sec. 58 of the aforesaid Dominion Elections Act, shall be forwarded to an official to be known as the Central Returning Officer, at the seat of government for each Province (exceptinf^ as here- inafter provided for the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec), where they shall be counted in the ])resence of the candidates or their agents, by said Central Returning Officer and his deputies, in the manner following : Sec. 5 — The ballot papers, having been fully shuffied and mixed, shall be drawn out in succession and stamped with numbers in the order of their being so drawn out, so that no two shall bear the same number, and the whole number as stamped shall correspond with the actual number of such ballot papers. Sec. 6. — The whole number obtained by dividing the whole number of ballot papers by the number of members of the House of Commons to be elected from that Province, or from any district in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, shall be called the quota. But when such quotient has a fraction, that fraction shall be dropped to form such quota. Sec. 7. — The ballot papers shall then be placed on files, or otherwise be conveniently segregrated, according to the first choice votes on each ballot paper ; and, after that is done and the votes on such first choice for each candidate are duly recorded by the Central Returning Officer, if any candidate is found to have a surplus of first choice votes above the aforesaid quota, a number of ballot papers equal to that quota shall be taken from the tile or pile of ballots of such candidate and set aside as his quota, placed in an envelope, or other suitable package and sealed and signed by the Central Returning Officer and liis deputies or clerks. If more than one candieate has a surplus over the quota, the first candidate's ballots taken shall be that having the highest surplus, and so on in succession to the candidate having the least surplus, which shall be taken last. Sec. 8. — All other ballot papers having the name of such candidate or candidates as first choice, shall be disti'ibuted in the same order, by cancelling with pencil the name of the first choice candidate and counting such ballots for the candidate numbered " 2 " for second choice ; and if that candidate shall have previously received a quota, the ballot shall be counted for the third choice ; and so on to the number of six, if so many are marked by figures as provided by Section 3 of this Act, the effect contemplated being to raise by so much in the order of prefei-ence all votes given to other candidates after the first choice. If all of the candidates marked on such ballot shall have been elected before such ballot has been reached, it shall be set aside, in an envelope or other suitable method, as an ineffective vote, with all similar ineffective ballots. Sec. 9 — Whenever by the distribution of such ballot papers as are specified in the preceding Section, added to the ballots cast for any candidate as first choice, a quota shall be reached, such quota of ballots shall be, sealed, certified to and set aside as provided in Sec. 7, the same as if such candidate had received a quota by first-choice votes. The pro- cess described in this and the preceding Section shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a quota of first-choice votes, oi- votes deemed first. Sec. 10. — In case the requisite number of candidtes be not elected by the distribu- tion of surplus votes as hereinbefore set forth, then the candidate having the fewest number of first votes, or votes deemed first, shall be declared not capable of being elected, with the effect of raising so much in the order of preference, all votes given to the candidate, or candidates after him, which ballots shall be counted for such caiuliilates in the same order and manner as specified in Section 8 ; that is to say, the same as if they were sui-plus votes. Then the ballots of the candidate having next fewest votes as first choice shall lie dispo.sed of in like manner, and so on until there are no more candidates' ballots remaining than the number of candidates remaining to be elected. And whenever, by the dLstribution and transfer of such insufficient votes, any candidate shall receive a quota, the package of such ballot papers thus apportioned to him shall be sealed and set aside in the same manner, and with the same effect as provided in Section 9. Sec. 11. — When, by the distribution of surplus votes as provided in Section 9 and of insufficient votes ("elimination") as provided in Section 10, the nunil)er of candidates remaining is reduced to the number of members of the House of Commons remaining to be elected, the remaining candidates shall be declared elected. Sec. 12. — In disposing of ballot papers not filled up according to rule, the primary purpose shall be to carry into effect, in counting the vote, the intention of the voter. 86 When it can be ascertained for what candidate the voter desired to vote, the ballot shall be counted accordingly, even if irregular in form. Sec. 13.-^For the purpose of avoiding the insertion of an inconvenient number of names on the ballot papei's in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, the same shall be divided into electoral districts not exceeding six in each of said Provinces by a Commission of three members for each Province, to be appointed by the Governor General of Uie Dominion. Pi'ovided that no city, present electoral district or county shall be so divided into more than one district ; provided also that the districts or counties contained in the Island of Montreal and such other islands adjacent, as may be comprised in the districts or counties of that island, shall not be divided, but shall constitute one entire disti'ict, or a part of one district. The commissioners shall also designate suitable places in each district in which all the ballots for such district shall be counted with a view to declare the retui'n of candidates in substantially the same manner as at present, with such differ- ences only as the ^proportional preferential system may necessitate. The number of can- didates to be returned by each of said districts shall be made to conform, as nearly as possible, to the population of each district as determined by the last preceding census, and it shall be the duty of the said commissioners to make a re-apportionment as soon as possible after the result of each succeeding census shall be officially declared. Sec. 14.~ All the provisions of the sections 1 to 12 inclusive shall apply to the Pro- vinces of Ontario and Quebec, excepting as to their division in districts, and the same shall apply to those districts, after they are formed, in the same manner as if they were separate provinces, excepting as to such general superintendence and revision as the pai'- liament of each province may provide for at the capital of each province for the verifica- tion of returns. Sec. 15. — Whenever one or more vacancies occur between elections, the ballots which have been counted for the vacant membei's shall be re- distributed among such of the pre- viously unsuccessful candidates may be still eligible and willing to accept, as provided in sections 8, 9 and 10, and the candidate (or candidates, if there shall be more than one vacancy) highest on the list after such distribution shall be declared elected. In view of the great extent, sjiarse population and other features of the Province of Quebec, or a lai-ge portion thereof, the Gove system may be more available, though less theoretically exact. Its workings are clearly defined in a bill prepared for the Massachu- setts Legislature and given at length in pages 147-9 of " An Appeal to the Canadian Institute." For the words " Secretary of the Commonwealth " might be substituted the words "Secretary and Eegistrar," the word "Assemblymen" for " Senator " and " Pro- vince " for " Commonwealth." The reduction of the number of Legislators would be very desii'able, and forty would be sufficient for any Province or State. I subjoin a copy (slightly modified) of the essential portions of this bill with some modifications. Section 1. — In order to provide for a representation of the citizens of this Province founded upon the principle of equality ; any resident of this Province, eligible by law to the office of Assemblyman, may be nominated as a candidate to said office by any person. No such nomination shall be valid unless the following conditions are compled with: — (1). The nomination shall be in writing, signed by the person making it, and shall contain the name and jDlace of i-esidence of the candidate. (2). An acceptance of the nomination, signed by the candidate, shall be endorsed thereon. (3) It shall be deposited in the office of the Secretary and Registrar of the Province not more than three months nor less than five weeks before the day of election. (4) There shall be deposited with such nomination the sum of ten dollai-s, or such other sum not exceeding fifty dollars, as the Legislature may hei-eafter direct. Sec. 2. — Not less than four weeks before the day of election, the Secretaiy and Re- gistrar shall furnish to each candidate and to every voter who shall request it, a j^rinted list containing the names of all the candidates in alphabetical order, with the place of residence of each, and the name of the person by whom each was nominated. Sec. 3. — At any time after his nomination and not less than three weeks before the day of election, any of said candidates may furnish to the Secretary and Registrar a state- ment in writing, signed by himself and acknowledged before any authorized notary, or other official authorized to take acknowledgement of deeds, which statement shall contain the names of one or more others of said candidates with whom he believes himself to be in accoi'd on the most important public questions, and to one or more of which he wishes to oransfer any ineffective votes cast for himself 8? Sec. 4. — The Secrefcaiy and Registrar shall prepai-e a new list of candidates similar to that named in Section two of this article, bnt containing also against the name of each candidate the names in alphabetical order of all candidates named in the list, if any, fur- nished by that candidate, as provided in Section three ; and he shall, not less than two weeks before the day of election, fui'nish to the a sufhcient number of copies of said nev/ list. Every such shall, immediately upon the receipt thereof, post conspicuously, and open to the inspection of the public, one copy of said list at each and every place in his where votes are to be re- ceived at said election, and shall also furnish one copy to every legal voter i-esident in said who shall demand the same, to the extent of his supply over and above two copies reserved for file in his office. Sec. 5. — Every legal voter, wherever resident, shall be entitled to cast his vote for Assemblyman in favor of any candidate whose name appears in the aforesaid list of candi- dates ; bnt no person shall vote for more than one candidate, nor for any person whose name does not appear upon the aforesaid list of candidates. But wherever a candidate duly nominated is omitted from the list published by the Secretaiy and Registrar, votes may be cast for him with the same effect as if his name appeared on said list. If the Secretary and Registrar shall knowingly omit such name from the list when the same is entitled legally to be there, he shall .... Sec. 6. — The returns of votes having been transmitted to the Secretary and Registrar, as provided by law, he shall make a list of all candidates voted for, with the vote received by each candidate in each precinct or voting place, and his total vote, and said list shall be transmitted, published and distributed in the same manner provided in Section 4 concern- ing the list therein named ; and after the Secretary and Registrar shall have ascertained he shall make a list of the successful candidates, with the computation by which, as hereafter [)rovided, their election has been ascertained, and shall forthwith furnish a copy of the same to each candidate and to every voter, especially publishers of newspapers or other periodicals, who shall request it. Sec. 7. — Ineflfective votes shall be transferred according to the request of the candi- date for whom they were originally cast, to a person named in the list furnished by said candidate, as provided by Section 3. The . . candidates then having the highest num- ber of votes shall then be declared elected, and the Secretary and Registrar shall issue cer- tificates of election to them. In case two or more candidates have the same number of votes, the candidates residing at tlie greatest distance from the legislative capital of the Province shall be preferred. Sec. 8.— The following shall be deemed ineffective votes, and shall be transferred in the order named : — (1). Any vote cast for a candidate in excess of one-fortieth of the entire vote cast, beginning with the candidate receiving the largest vote, and proceeding to the one next highest, and so on. In the case of two or more receiving the same vote, the ti-ansfer shall be from each alternately in alphabetical oi'der. (2). Votes cast for candidates who have died or become ineligible in the same order. (3). Original votes cast for candidates who fail of election, beginning with the candi- date receiving the smallest total vote, and proceeding to the next lowest, and so on ; in case of two or more receiving the same vote, the transfer to be made from each alternately in alphabetical order. No voters shall be transferred from any candidate who has not furnished the statement named in Section 3. Sec. y. Every ineffective vote of a candidate shall be transferred to the candidate named in his said list living and eligible at the time of counting the vote for whom the largest number of votes were originally cast and whose vote, by transfer or otherwise, does not equal one-fortieth of the vote cast, until all are transferred as far as possible. Section 10 provides for return of money to candidates for whom a thousand or more votes were cast. . „ Sec. 11.— Incase a vacancy shall occur in the Assembly after the declaration ot election provided in Section 7, the votes cast for the member whose seat shall have beconie vacant, together with any ineffective votes assigned to him, shall be re-distributed in the same manner as if he had died or become ineligible before the canvassing of the votes ; and the candidate not before elected, who, after returning to him any votes originally cast for him, shall then appear to have the largest number of votes shall be declared elected. [I prefer the phraseology of Section 15, Dominion Elections Act, to t4us]. Section 12.— Provides for the correction of errors by the Supreme Judicial Court, etc . Section 13.— Provides for the election of representatives of the lower House by means of districts. 88 1 have retained that part of the bill providing for the diA'ision of votes hy forty, believing that the best interests of the community would be consulted by limiting the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec to that number, so as to enable their Legislatures to be really deliberative bodies. As I presume the number could be reduced by the Acts of the respective Legislatures, the proposition may not be out of place. Its bearing on the subject of proportional representation is that by the reduction in number there need be no division of those Provinces into electoral districts, such division invariably necessitating more or less inequality in legislative power of voters, and leading to endless and useless controversy. If, however, the present or similar numbers of representatives were to be retained concurrently with the enactment of proportional preferential representation, they could be divided into districts substantially as provided in the proposed Act to amend the Dominion Elections Act, Section 14, in this Appendix. For the application of the Gove system to the Province of Ontario, the same bill would be adapted with the following changes : — For " Secretary and Registrar " substitute "Secretary." Fill up the first blank in Section four with the words " to the clerk of every city, town, village and township;" the second blank with the word "clei'k;" the third blank with the words " city, town, village or township ; " the fourth blank the same. PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND. An Act to provide for the election of members of the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly. Section 1. — Hereafter, the members of the Legislative Council and of the Legisla- tive Assembly shall be elected by the process known as the preferential method of propor- tional representation, and also known as the transferable vote, in the manner following : Sec. 2. — There shall be no division into districts, but the representation shall be quotas, each quota consisting of the quotient obtained by dividing the whole number of votes received at any election for each House by the number of candidates to be elected from the whole Province for each House, and dropping the fraction, if any, in such quotient, and any candidate receiving that number of votes shall be declared elected. Sec. 3. — The voter shall place opposite the name of such candidate as he may pi'efer above all others the figure " 1," and opposite the name of the candidate next preferred by him, as being his second choice, the figure " 2," and opposite the name of his third choice, the figure " 3," and so on ; but any mark beyond " 6 " will not be noticed. Sec. 4. — The boxes or other packages containing the ballots, having been duly sealed, as provided by law, shall be sent to the office of the Provincial Secretary and Treasurer, to be there counted by him in the presence of the candidates, or their agents, in the manner following : — Sec. 5. — The ballot papers, having been fully shuffled and mixed, shall be drawn out in succession and stamped with numbers in the order of their being so drawn out, so that no two shall bear the same number, and the whole number so stamped shall correspond with the number of such ballot papers. Sec. 6. — The ballot papers shall then be placed on files, or otherwise conveniently assorted, according to the first-choice votes on each ballot paper ; and after that is done, and the votes on such first choice duly recorded by the Provincial Secretary and Treasurer (the ballot jmpers being thus gone through for each House separately, if both ai-e voted for on the same ballot by each voter), if any candidate is found to have a surplus of first-choice votes above the aforesaid quota, a number of ballot papers equal to that quota shall be set aside as his quota, placed in an envelope or other suitable package, and sealed and signed by the Provincial Secretary. If more than one candidate has a surplus over the quota, the ballots of that candidate shall first be taken having the highest surplus, and so on in succession to the candidate having the least surplus, which shall be taken last. Sec. 7. — All other ballot papers having the name of such candidate or candidates, as first choice shall be distributed in a similar order, by cancelling with pencil the name of such candidate of first choice and counting the ballot for the candidate numbei-ed " 2 " for second choice ; and if that candidate shall have previously received a quota, the ballot shall be counted for the candidate marked " 3," and so on to the number of six, if so many are marked by figures as provided for in section tla*ee of this Act, the effect con- templated being to raise by so much in the order of preference all votes given to other candidates after the first choice. If all the candidates marked on such ballot shall have been elected before such ballot has been reached in the order of counting, then it shall be set aside as an ineffective vote. 89 Sec. 8. — Whenever, by the distribution of such ballot papers as are specified in the preceding section, added to the ballots cast for any candidate as first choice, a quota shall be reached, the ballots constituting that quota shall be set aside as provided in section six for a like number of fii-st-choice votes. The process specified in this and the preceding section shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a quota of first-choice votes, or votes counted for him as hereinbefore [)rovided. Sec. 9. — In case the required number of candidates be not elected by the distribution of surplus votes as hereinbefore provided, then the candidate having the fewest number of first votes, or votes deemed first, shall be declared not capable of being elected, with the eflPect of raising so much in the order of preference all votes given to the candidate or candidates after him, which ballots shall be counted for such candidates in the order and manner specified in ISection 7 of this Act ; that is to say, the same as if they were surj)lus votes. Then the ballot of the candidate having the next fewest votes as first choice shall be disposed of like manner, and so until there are no more candidates' ballots remaining than the number of candidates i-emaining to be elected. And whenever, by the distribution and transfer of such insufficient ballots or votes, any candidate shall receive a quota, the package of such ballot papers shall be set aside in the same manner as provided in Section eight. And the process as defined in this Section shall be known as " elimination." Sec. 10. when by the distribution of surplus votes, as provided in Sec. 8, and of insufl&cient votes, as provided in Sec. 9, the number of candidates remaining is reduced to the number of members r-emaining to be elected, the remaining candidates shall be declared elected. Sec. 11. In the disposal of ballot papers not filled up according to rule, the primary purpose in counting and assigning such votes to the sevei'al candidates, shall be to carry into effect the intention of the voter, so far as that can be ascertained. Sec. 12. — (Same as Section 15, Dominion Elections Act). These provisions can be readily adapted to the several Provinoes of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, British Columbia, Manitoba and the North- West Territory. It would facili- tate operations if the membei-ship was reduced to from ten to twenty members for each Province. Municipal Elections. Aside from the cities, as to which I am not informed in detail, the municipal organi- zation of the Province of Ontario would need but slight modification to adapt it to the proportional and preferential system as hereinbefore defined for Prince Edward Island. The affairs of the townships and villages being administered by a reeve and four council- lors and the election taking place entirely (as I presume) in one room, no transportation of ballots, etc., would be required and the votes could be counted then and there. The towns are governed by a mayor and three councillors for each ward, if less than five, or two for each ward, if more than five wards. These would present but little more difficulty. It might be a good measure to provide for the election of reeves and mayors in common with councillors, assigning the office of reeve or of mayor to the candidate for councillor receiving the highest number of first choice votes. It appears to me that " the best workable measure " could be introduced more easily and woi-k more smoothly in the municipalities than in the Legislatures, and that the prac- tical experience to be reached through the municipalities (where the working would be as simple and clear as in the Mechanics' Institute of San Francisco) would be an excellent preparative for its introduction into legislatures. It would work very smoothly from the outset in the smaller Provinces, especially in British Columbia, where the Victoria Single Tax has already commenced its advocacy. Pacifico. SOUTHERN CROSS. CHAPTER I. IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT. After centuries of parliamentary government, carried on with, on tlie wliole, fair suc- cess in the United Kingdom, and imitated in its main features in its offshoots all over the world, whether these have been separated like the United States of America, or remain still an integral part of the Empire, it is noteworthy that in the oldest and most populous of the British colonies, a demand should ai'ise for the rectification of Parliament. This premises that in the opinion of thinking people, under present conditions, Parliament is not rightly organized or equitably worked ; that it does not give efficient representation to the people, or provide an efficient spur or check to the executive. Many writers and thinkers have pointed out the injustice and the dangers of the system of majority repre- sentation under which parliaments are chosen ; grave physicians and pretentious quacks have diagnosed the disease and prescribed remedies, and the latter generally with the larger following. Party politics, local ])olitics, and personal politics obscure the great national issues. and account for most of the blunders, administrative and financial, into which the self- governing colonies have fallen, and indeed these have been hurtful to the mother-country also, and it is only by resohitely casting these aside and considering what is best for the community as a whole, and by calling on men to co-operate rather than to fight for mastery and spoils, that we can hope to rectify parliament and to purify politics. It has been well said, that under party politics when thoroughly organized, there is a conspiracy of half the cleverest men in the country to keep the other half out of public affairs ; and that whei-eas the right function of the opposition is to see that the ministry does the nation's work properly, the usual practice of the opposition is to try to prev«^nt the ministry from doing it at all. Local politics lead to the varying policy of submission and of obstruction, in oi* 104 the people disliked being merged in a lai-ge group, but it was never brought forward except once by a member of |)arliament, who was in the chair, and he did not give as his own opinion, but as an objection natural to the electors. I sup})ose I had so thoroughly con- vinced ray hearers that however large the electorate might be, no vote would miss its aim, that they did not object. I suppose that in South Australia as elsewhere, a voter thinks his member ought to do something for him or for the district, but still he may be able to see that if every member did the same for other voters and other districts, more taxes must be paid by all. Evei-y one can see that log-rolling practised for the advantage of other districts is done at his cost, and it needs little acumen to perceive that ministries would be more stable and more honest, as well as more happy, if their hand was not so often forced by the need of votes which demand local concessions. Party spirit might decline, local and parochial matters might sud'er, but real public s])irit would be strengthened and purified. There are three kinds of interests which an honest man should watch, lest they lead him astray. The first is his personal interest. He may have a piece of land to sell to the government or to the municipality, for which he may ask a higher price than he would gladly take from a private individual. The next is his class interest. This leads him to desire laws passed for the benefit of his trade or his business, at the cost of other trades and businesses. The third is his local interest, which seeks an advantage to his town or his county, at the cost of other towns and counties. Our personal interests are, however, watched by people who have interests in other direction^, while our class and local interests are flattered, exaggerated, intensified, by the public opinion which is nearest to us — that of our own class and our own locality, who would also be benefited, and who have the same bias as ourselves. " Tax the squatters (the pastoral lessees) to make our roads," said a South Australian farmer some years ago in my hearing. The sqimtters did not need the roads. This was both a local and a class bias, but we hear a good many such cries. " Give us some advantage for ourselves, foi' our class or our district, at the expense of other ])eople, other districts, and other classes." If it needs the chance of local a])propriations to induce interest in public matters, the elec- toral stuff" must be poor indeed. It is time public S[)irit was fed on better food and roused to better pui'pose. With regard to the delocalising of politics, people are a))t to speak as if because the elector may vote for another man than stands for the segmerit he lives in, he will always do so. This is contrary to human nature. The great majority of the votes will be given to the local man who best represents the elector's views. There will be local centres in every large district which will compete, but not for local votes only, and tlierefore they will be anxious to bring forward good men, who might win first and contingent votes to aid his return. Even Mr. Hare expected most of the votes to be j)olled for the local man candidates, although he allowed free range over the whole United Kingdom. The nomin- ation was to be for the district, though power was given to escape from it. In the smaller district which I propose, locality will tell more strongly than in Mr. Hare's scheme. It will retain much that is good in local representation, its direct interest in the district doing itself credit, which will be stimulated by healthy emulation with other districts, but it will lose much of its narrowness and selfishness. An elector chosen by a quota of the ninth part of the votes of all Liverpool, would occupy a higher position in public estimation and in his own, than one elected by a bare majority in a ninth part of that great city. VTII. While some seem to fear that a strong government cannot be maintained under proportional representation, others say that without the strong organised opposition of the "outs" the "ins" cannot be sufficiently checked. Is there really true strength and pro- gress under the perpetual reign of see-saw, with unfair handycapping on alternate sides, than there would be on a stable government built on a true representation of the people '] Methods might indeed be varied. Capable men adjust themselves to changes, however great and far-reaching. There would be opposition to what apjieared bad, criticism of what was doubtful, support to what appeared to be good, more certain than when the leader of the ministry and the opposition count noses, and the debates which fill the news- papers make no change in the following of either. 105 At the time of the Reform Bill of 1832, the party of order predicted a cataclysm of destruction, and the party of progress looked for a niillenniuin of liberty and prosperity. Neither expectation was realized. Siiccessive extensions of the sufiVage and successive inroads upon privilege have been likewise feared and hailed as if the issues were of life and death. Still in the year of grace 1^93 the party of order tinds institutions that are woi"th preserving, and the part of progress demands further and further advance. The standing ground is shifted, that is all. A noted politician in South Australia, Mr. Thomas Playford, ytroposed i-eeently in his election address, that ministries should be elected for the session by the parliament, and that during that term the proceedings of government might be watched and criticised, but no attempt should be made to oust them. A great part of each parliamentary session in the Australian colonies is often .spent in trying to unseat the cabinet, and when the opposition succeeds, the mover of the " No confidence" vote has the difficult and invidious task of choosing a new team, and offends more men by leaving them out, than he can please by including them. A ministry elected thus, according to Mr. Playford's idea, would be all pretty much of one party, and would all possess the cnntidence of the majority in parliament to start with, at any rate. If any oue forfeited it, he would not be elected for next session. This suggestion shows how burdensome a practical politican Hnds the present conditions of office. He would i*ather have the choice of colleagues taken out of his hands than have to make compromises and concessions in order to strengthen his position. If the parliament were elected on proportional lines, a ministry tlius formed would be strong for work, and legislation and administration would go on more cpiickly and more thoroughly when the ministry were relieved from factious opposition during the session. Next session they might be displaced if the parliament was dissatisfied. There would not be so many slaushtered innocents, there would not be so many bills passed or rejected by the Upper House without due discussion, if more time was given to work and less to wrangling for place. It may be said that this method would force on the premier a team he does not like, but experience shows that people as unsympathetic are forced on him by the exigencies of party government. IX. — Another objection made is that the districts would be too large to allow of personal canvassing, but as most honest politicians find it hard to go through this oi-deal with a clear conscience, and would be glad to be i-eiieved from it, it is of no moment from their side. The elector might complain perhaps, for it is the per-sonal canvass which flatters him most. At that moment, if at no other, he feels that he is the master of the situation, that he can make and unmake parliaments and governments. But the candi- date's public addre.sses and speeches would be far more candid and courageous, far more enlightening to the constituency, if he appealed to every elector in a large tlistrict who thought with him, or who might be imluced to think with him, than if he had to deprecate the antagonism of people who might vote against him in a small district. He nuist niake his appearance at one or more centres in the electorate, and submit to searching (piestioning from all points of view. His speeches and replies as well as his address, would be widely circulated, so that first votes and contingent votes may be won. These would come from unexi)ected quarters without personal canvassing. I have already said that I do not think it wise to require a deposit to be paid by every candidate, to be forfeited in case he does not poll a certain percentage of the vote.s. Open candidature is the right thing for a free and progressive country. The caucus and convention cannot dictate who shall enter the lists unilei- proportional rei>resentation, and by means of the contingent votes no man need lose his vote even if his lii-st choice falls on a most unpopular candidate. X. An objection originally nuide to Mr. Hare's vast scheme, that it w.)ul.l HU the House of Commons with faddists, is still brought against such a modest modiHcation of it as is advocated here. Crotchettv people are of course completely extinguishi^d by majority election, but it would be only to" the extent of its following that it would be represente. in Parliament according to proportional representation. And the most valuable and vital of all reforms are at first looked on as mere Utopian crotchets. Mr. Grote's Ballot. Mr Villiers' Free Trade were crotchets for many years. Woman's Suffrage and Proi.ortional 106 Representation were crotchets brought forward in Parliament by John Stuart Mill, which prevented his return to the House for a second term. The electors of Westminster tried him once, but he was too unpractical for thom. Under proportional voting, England would have retained his seivices. In the modification here proposed no extreme crotchet could be resented absolutely. Any reform which did not secure the sixth part of the votes given for a six-member, or an eighth part of those for an eight-member constitu- ency, would not be able to return an independent member of its own. But should such minorities lose their power altogether, as is the case with considerable minorities now, when like the Prohibitionists, they conscientiously cast their ballots for the man who truly represents their convictions 1 No, they should not be extinguished, but should be allowed by means of the contingent votes, to support the most favourable or the least objectionable of the other men standing for the lai-ge district. Even if, like George Eliot's old woman, there is but a choice of mislikings in this world, there are some mislikings which by comparison are desirable. The waste of votes given by conscientious third parties is so much political capital to the main contendei-s, as it narrows the field, and when we add to these the votes that are angled for by promises of concession, we see that everything plays into their hands. Sinking all minor differences, all third parties ought to unite in the demand for equitable representation, and they would get it, because they would be reinforced by the honest and thoughtful of tlie main parties themselves. I have thus endeavoured to answer seriatim, the various objections which have been made, or which may be made, against this radical measui-e of electoral reform, and I hope T have shown that those as to complexity for voter and returning officer are groundless ; that the uncertainty as to surplusage in no way affects the result in such districts as are proposed; and that party leaders will accommodate themselves to the change of methods. 1 hope I have also proved that governments are likely to be more stable and the opposition more intelligent under the new system, and that the filling up of vacancies and the adjustment of electorates would be easily provided for on equitable principles, and that the best local interests would be ])reserved, while their mischievous operation would be greatly checked. The })rocess and the results would also be interesting to the electors themselves, as well as to the candidates who offer themselves to the enlarged and truly enfranchised constituencies. CHAPTER IV. EFFECTIVE VOTING. The exclusively majority repi*esentation which is organized in most civilized countries, gives rise to party government. It creates the impression that there ai'e only two parties in the state whose views are entitled to consideration. To the ineffective third parties, to the original, to the idealist, these parties say scornfully, " Become a majority and then you will be attended to," but at the same time, they carefully close up the avenues through which converts are made in sufficient numbers for such results. " The truth is great and it will prevail," may be true in the long run, but it has to run the gauntlet of indolence and apathy, of prejudice and opposition, of vested interests and rooted traditions. Mean- time all changes in law and administration are made in the real or supposed interests of one of the two parties which happens to be in ]50wer at the time, and sufficiently predom- inant to bear down the organised opposition of the other. Not only does this party dualism reign supreme in the legislature ; — it dominates the chief instructor of the people, the newspaper press. In proof of this we may instance that although proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote has been brought forward by comiietent advocates for over thirty yeai'S, and treated in books and magazine articles as a real issue of the first importance, for the rectification of parlia- ment and the purification of politics, no ordinary newspaper has taken hold of it, and it still remains with a sort of academic halo about it, quite apart from the bosom and business of ordinary men. Editors of papers will not admit articles or even letters on the subject because they "consider it unwise to open the question of improved electoral 107 methods, which might divert public attention from more important and practical matters." I must except the newsjiaper press of South Australia, which has taken up the subject as a practical matter recently, but this was greatly due to the interest excited in the public mind by the lecturing and the trial ballots used all over the Province. I have been asked Iiow many members of parliament in my Province aie in favour of proportional re})resentation, and have been tempted to reply in the words of Hcri|)ture, " Have any of the Pharisees or of the Scribes believed in Him 1 " Until a radical reform like this is brought home to the people so strongly that they demand it, membei'S of par- liament do not care to touch it. When I advocated proportional representation under the title of Etiective Voting, I caught hold of an experience that was familiar to all. Every one knew of how many votes were wasted at every election, and many knew instances where more votes were lost than wei-e utilised ? The reform goes under many names, preferential voting, equal representation, distiibutive voting, the single transferable vote, representation of minorities, and it deserves all these titles. It is equal because it is proportional ; it is proportional because it is transferable ; it represents minorities as I'airly as majorities, it is worked by distributing surplus and minus votes preferentially, and because it is all these things it is effective. It is no party weapon. It is equally just to all. It has thus the advantage of appealing to all parties alike. But it has the defect of its qualities. Because it does not promise any exclusive advantage to either of the great parties who have in the past exchanged ]>lace and power, neither of them are at ail eager to take it up. The members of the legislatures who are now there, owe their position to majority or plurality represent- ation. Their success depended on making all votes ineffective except wiiat were polled for themselves. They know the old ropes, and how to pull theui. They cannot tell how they would fare under a system of absolute righteousness. This is the uncertainty which makes .so-called practical politicians warn theorists against flying from some .smail evils which we know of, lest we may encounter other evils probably greater. If the people do not demand it with a very loud voice indeed, the ordinary political candidate will not touch it with the longest pair of tongs, and even men who believe in the principle hold it back, lest they should be stigmatised as theoretical and Utopian. Thus the one thing needful is to arouse public opinion, and that not merely by essays read by the few, but by public lecture, familiar speech and practical illustration. It is a long time since Thomas Hare and John Stuart Mill delivered this Gospel to me, but all the yeai-s since have only emphasised the world's need of it. The coui-s^ of politics in England, France, America, Canada and Australia, has been a running comment on the original text. When people tell me "You have waited thirty years and more; the mills of God grind slowly, but they grind exceeding small. In the course of another generation or two, truth may prevail. All will come right in time ;" I can only reply that nothing will come right unless those who feel that they have the truth, speak, and work and strain, as if on them only depended the destinies of the world. In the substitution of the co-operative spirit for the competitive in politics, I believe we may tind deliverance from many evils that are eating into the heart of humanity. Therefore I call upon all who see this truth to aid in the spread of it, and not to keep it as a private opinion. Unless our disciples become apostles, our progress will continue to be slow. It is easier for a good man to gain a quota in a large district than a plurality in a small one, and he is most likely to get it by the best means ; by courage and sincerity, by character and abilities. It is easier for a bad man to get a plurality in a small district than a quota in a large one; and he may gain it by the worst means; by trimming anil truckling to what he fancies is the popular feeling; by misrepresenting the views and the motives of his opponents ; by pandering to local and class interests ; by encouraging too many candidates to start, so that votes may be lost, if not by bribery outright. I was asked at one of my meetings if I really believed that Effective Voting would put a stop to bribery, and I replied that as each vote must count, and no vote extinguished any other, every vote must be bought, and that would be too exi)ensive. My questioner said that supposing the quota for the district was one thousand, a rich man who wanted very much to get into parliament would be willing to give a thousand pounds for them. To this I replied that he might indeed be willing, but where in any district of South Australia, could he tind a thousand men willing to sell their birth-right ior sui'h a poor mesa 108 of pottage? There are a few weaklings who may be cajoletl, and a few crawlers who may be bought, by means of whom the scale may be turned in a uninorainal constituency, but they are an insigirihcant portion of any quota. The use of this doubtful fringe has been long known to electioneeiing agents, and so long as we have plurality x-epresentation, the temptation to gain through their means is very great. How to secure a win for our side is the main object, and while it is merely satisfactory to win when we have an undoubted majority, the crowning glory of tactics is to make a victorious plurality with an undoubted minority of the votes. How often the president of the United States is brought in by a minority of the popular vote ; in the case of Harrison amounting to a hundred thousand (100,000) ! The Liberal-Unionists congratulated themselves on their tactics in Birmingham and the Midland counties, which were so successful that while it took somewhat over four thousand votes to return one candidate for them, it needed eighteen thousand to return a Gladstonian. Elsewhere the process was reversed, and the Gladstonians had the advantage. The respected deacon of the church who confessed that when election time came round and he acted as an agent, he had always to shut up his conscience in a box, and not take it out till it was over, did not take out the same article he put in. No, you cannot ignoi-e justice and take every advantage, and trample upon every consideration for others, during the weeks or months of canvassing and polling, without grave moral deterioration. " Everything is fair in politics " they say, but unfairness is met by unfairness, and what is gained here is lost there, even by the party itself. The only certain result is that the tone of morality is lowered, and tliat the best men keep out of politics altogether. When you hear this phrase so glibly spoken by travelling Americans and Australians, you scarcely appreciate the importance of the fact. It cannot but injure in its most vital pjints any nation when the best men leave the large issues of national life, and the pro- gress or decline of the land to which they owe a citizen's duty and devotion, to professional wire-pullers and their backers. Meanwhile they immerse themselves in business, or waste themselves in idle j^leasure, or at the best, indulge in litei'ary leisure, or cultivate an ajsthetic fad, or even a cloistered and academic virtue for their private benefit, and allow a. great nation to decline, perhajjs to perisli for lack of wisdom and courage. Mr. Bryce, in "The American Commonwealth," looks on this lightly talked of defection of the best men from political life as the most dangerous feature in the United States. He says so much about the party machine and the work it does, that one expected him to suggest some radical cui-e. But he only diagnoses the disease, and trusts to nature and to time for the remedy. As the intrinsically honest chai-acter of the people and their practical common sense has pi-evented the worst of machinery from doing more than half the mischief that it was likely to work, he believes things will right themselves. The Australian ballot and the diminution of the " Spoils " system are the most hopeful signs in his eyes, but so long as the caucus limits the choice of candidates, the free ballot is of little value. With the spoils system he considers that the evils of American political and muni- cipal organisations are bound up. Independent of the spoils of office, by which party can directly reward adherents, there are many indirect and secret ways by which weidtli in the hands of individuals and corporations can vitiate elections and misrepresent the ])eople. Mr. Bryce lays his finger on the greatest hindrance to radical reform. This is the essential conservatism of the American people. Probably no statement in the book sur- prised European readers more, but it is quite true. The parchment constitution under which such gigantic evils have grown up is reverenced — almost worshipped — by the people. Children at school are taught its provisions. It is the citizen's Bible. The British Constitution has been the slow growth of centuries and therefore vener- able, but there is not a single point in it that is not open to criticism ; it has been pro- foundly modified by men now living, and it is threatened with greater changes still. The American constitution was the work of the great men wlio made the nation. It was the outcome of the best thought of the time, and provided for dangers which the fathers of the state could see, but it could not jn-ovide for what they did not dream of The unification ot the States as a single power against a foreign foe, and the free intei'change of commodi- ties with each other were indispensable, and to secure these a compromise was made with slavery, which afterwards bore such bitter fruits. The unification of the Bepublic could 109 only be effected by granting to tlie sovereign states the largest measure of independence outside those necessary lines, and giving the federal government the greatest strength pos- sible within tlie limits prescribed. It was a grand idea, but it did not cover°all the ground, nor could the framers of the constitution foresee that the checks which seemed to them wise to restrain popular impatience and make presidential and senatorial elections peaceful and dignified, would be over-ridden and undermined by the strength and craft of party. The election of United States Senators by the State Legislatures makes these bodies which ought to deal with domestic matters in a business-like way, chosen by the party on party lines, and has helped tovvards the invasion of ])arties into mimici[)al elections also. The electoral college chosen by the citizens for the presidential election are simply mandate- bearers, called out for one purpose. The voting in each state is at large, or by scriUin fh I'Ste, and a slight wave of ])ublic opinion in New York may change 36 Republicans for 36 Democrats, and virtually elect the President. While the power of the Sovereign of England and of the House of Lords has dwindled during the centurv, that of the President and the Senate has increased. It is the strongest Sovereignty and the strongest Upper House in the civilised world. The Senate being not only stronger collectivel}^ than the Piepresentatives, but fewer in number, lobbying goes on there to a far greater extent than in what is supposed to be the People's House. Presi-dent Harrison, during the last two years of his term, had three to one against him in the Representatives, but got along with a narrow majority in the Senate. Imagine Mr. Gladstone or Lord Salisbury ruling with three to one against him in the House of Commons ! It is indeed singular how the American seems to enjoy the exercise of the veto by the President, and even by the Governor of a State against the Representatives. He has voted for liis Governor and for the presidential electors, and these have been returned by the plurality to whom he is bound to submit, and he admires the pluck of one man against many. In this as in many other respects, America is less democratic than England. The Electoral College dreamed of by the founders of the Republic was a wise deliberative body, and not a lot of message boys. But the thing is so favourable to professional politicians and their employers, and so intrenched by the consei-vatism of the people, that it stands strong. Great is Diana of the Ephesians ! Great is our glorious American Constitution I Touch it, and our craft is endangered. Perliaps there is a third part, or at least a fourth part of the American people who think reform is necessary. They can do no good so long as they only cast hoi)eless votes to outsiders, or make terms with insiders. If Prohibitionists, Poi)uIists, Socialists, Single- ta.xers, and the great inarticulate Labour party would make common cause, and go ou together till they secui'ed honest i-epresentation, no party force or fraud could withstand them. So long as each of these voices of discontent is single, the wirepullers, the monopo- lists, and " the corporations smile." United, they are masters of the situation. The idea is new to the general public, but the time has come when that which h{\s been whispered in the ear must be proclaimed from the house tops. Let the principle only be grasped by the plain people of Canada, Australia and America, and we shall see a peaceful revolution, founded on peace and good will. The twenty-three chapters which Mr. Bryce devotes to the Party System and the Party machine were a i^evelatiou to the English peo|»le, and yet he rather understates the case. He is just to the people, while condensing the system which tyrannises over them. We hear it said that governments are what the people make them, l)ut I do not blame the people. It is the machinery through which they work that is responsible for the faults in American administration. They are not represented in any true sense of the word. It is not even the majority who rule ! It is calculated that 47 per cent, of the votes cast return all the representatives to Congress, and these are only what the caucus brought forward. What would we think of a mirror that only i-eproduced what was ugly and common- place, and not the fine exjiression or the delicate lines of the features ? The electoral net is so coarse that the best elements in the nation escape it, and those who haul in that net desire that it should be so. There are good men everywhere who.se colours are not those of the party, and whose weapons are not those of the duel, whom a better system of representation would secure for the country, to work independently or in conjunction with others likeminded, without fear or favour. no EflFective Voting does not feav the most searching criticism. It is not a mere theory, not the fad of the pi-ofessorial chair, or of the mathematical mind, but when shown to average men and women, it commends itself as equitable and practicable. No pai-ty can return more representatives that its numbers entitle it to, and need not return fewer under Effective Voting. Lord Beaconsfield complained that parliaments were in their decadence and that county and parish politics prevailed over lai-ge national questions. If this was said of England, what may be said of Canada and of Australia ? Government grants and appro- priations are the main demands of local constituencies. In Canada the members sent to the Dominion Parliament were all Conservatives, while the Local Parliaments elected by the same votes wei-e of the other side, because under a Conservative Ministry, there was more chance of grants if the locality supported them. It is in Sovith Australia and in New Zealand that I hope to see the first steps taken towards equitable representation. Both these are more democratic than the other Australian colonies. They have "one man one vote." Both colonies have taken steps towards the taxation of land on the best basis. South Australia, eight years ago, imposed a tax of a halfpenny in the pound on assessed value of every acre of freehold land in the Province, whether it is a rood or a hundred thousand acres, and it is the most cheaply collected and certain of all our sources of revenue. New Zealand has tried several modes of direct taxation, but the last, of exempting from the land tax all improvements up to three thousand pounds, is the best, and other j^lans to encourage settlement and to stop the selling of Crown lands altogether, are in advance of anything done on the island- continent of Australia. In New Zealand, in 1888, the Atkinson Ministry brought forward an electoral bill embodying Sir John Lubbock's modification of Hare's system, for districts returning from four to eight members, and taking his mathematical quota. There were some other new points about the bill open to criticism, and any how the Ministry failed to carry it. As allowing of the transferable vote for quota i-epresentation, it would have been most valuable, and not misleading to the public like the contingent vote in the new electoral law in Queensland, voted under for the first time this year. This is meant to secure that there shall be an absolute majority for one man in every uninominal district. It is intended to exclude everywhere and always all minorities, and it was a conservative measure passed by a parliament where the capitalist party had the majority, and designed to prevent earnest and compact minorities from obtaining a member which their numbers did not entitle them to. The Trades and Labour unions including the Shearers' union had scored somt: triumphs through the divisions of votes among other candidates, so by the use of the contingent vote in case the first choice does not poll sufl&cient for return, the lost votes are heaped on another, so that he is returned by a majority and not by a mere plurality. The labour party have also difficulties placed in the way of registration, which in the case of a large nomad population of shearers and knock-about hands is of great importance, by requiring identification by a J. P., not always friendly to the labour vote. Thus the contingent A-ote which under Hare's quota would be the means of their complete enfranchisement, is associated with this obnoxious bill. No doubt the contingent vote used thus is much better than the second election to secure an absolute majority which is required by French and German law, whereby the two highest at the poll are put up again. The election agents try all they can to secure a first or second place for their candidate, and in the second trial they go to work anew, not only to secure the lost votes, but to change the destination of those previously given to the only remaining competitor. Grevillc Murray's brilliant novel " The Member for Paris " shows how strangely the result may come out. But why did this bill pass the Queensland Parliament so easily, while the far more valuable bill was lost in New Zealand ? Because the Conservative party saw that it would work in their interests. The great Maritime strike, the Shearers' strike, and the Broken Hill Miners' strike had ahirmed capitalists and merchants,- pastoralists, sugar-growei's and shippers. All the moneyed interests of Queensland wei'e threatened by the claims of labour. And by this apparently just system, they could extinguish the voice of labour in all but two or three electoi'ates in Queensland. There was no such motive for passing the New Zealand bill. Ill M. Smet de Borman, in the debate in the Belgian Chamber from which I quoted M. Beernaert's remarks, speaks thus on the wisdom and justice of combining a i)rovision for proportional representation, with the extension of the suffrage from its former limit of the payment of direct taxes to the amount of 45 francs : "For Avhom then do we ask the right to votel Is it for the bourgeoisie, greater or smaller 1 .No, it is for the toilers. It is their situation which we are told has not been sufficiently studied; it is their grievances which have found no echo in Parliament. These are the malcontents whom we desire in the spirit of patriotic justice to disarm and what do we propose to give them 1 " I do not hesitate to say that without proportional representation, we give them nothing, while with it we give them all to which they can legitimately aspire. Let us admit even manhood suffrage; I assert that in almost every district in Belgium the workers would be Excluded from the )'epresentation. " Out of 600 deputies how many working men are in the Parliament of France 1 We scarcely count two or three! And France lias a paid parliament and manhood auffra^e ! So we hear the same complaints and the same attacks on parliament by the Labour party in Fi-ance as we read in the Belgian proleteriat press. Neither in Brussels, nor in lAe^e nor in Ghent could the Labour party succeed in sending a dejtuty to parliament even with manhood suffrage, unless it allies itself with the bourgeoise advanced i>artv. By means of such alliance a representative may be returned who only knows the working man because he ap]jlauds him at the meetings, and makes use of him as a stepping-stone, or the labour party flourishing theii- own standard may be crushed in detail in every electorate in the kingdom." Thus this reform is truly a working man's measure. If South Australia takes the lead with Effective Voting, I trust she will take a better grasp than was attempted in new Zealand, and not cumber the reform by other doubtful provisions. It can be adapted to the present electoral law, and only requires the change of a few clauses. If Canada takes the lead for the Dominion Parliament, which most needs the reform, it will be a more prominent example than can be furnished by a distant Australian province. But whether an Australian or a Canadian province sets the example, it will be followed. The fact that simultaneous interest is aroused as to electoral reform in Canada, in Australia, and in America, as well as in Switzerland and Belgium, and that the minds of thoughtful men are turning from tinkering to radical changes, is a presage for good. Some blunders may be made, many reformers are shortsighted and onesided, but the greatest hindrances to progress are the inertia of indiffeience, and the apathy of despair. Citizens who talk constantly about the evils of the political machine without doing anything to amend them, and as if they were incidental to a free government, intensify these evils, for they create a despair of good. CHAPTER V. PALLIATIVES: THE INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM: THE IMPERATIVE MANDATE: DIRECT LEGISLATION. It is often said that party and party spirit are excellent things, necessary and helpful to right government. Party spirit and a [uirty organisation bring indifferent and reluctant voters to the poll without lining them as the Danish law does. The lynx eye of the opposition checks the hand of the other; a strong opposition is as useful as a strong government. Is it then a mistake to suppose that a hou.se divided against itself cannot stand, and is constant see-saw the true condition of progress with stability, which is the ostensible aim of all parties? All the excesses- of party spirit, its malice and uneiiaritabloness, its injustices and deceptions are set down to the occasional abuse of what in itself is a good thing. These evils are however, inherent in party spirit, and not accidental to it. Gerry- mandering is a party weapon, only to be checked or extirpated by the collective con- science. Thanks to that conscience, political morality makes progre.-;s in the world in spite of defective methods and machinery. Bribery has always been a party weapon, and in the 112 days of Fox and Pitt it was no disgrace to bribe, though it was discreditable to be bribed. Going back to Walpole, we see there was no discredit in either paying or receiving money for votes in or out of parliament. Nowadays, both law and public opinion make either giving or accejjting bribes disgraceful in England. In America every one knows that bribery goes on, and that in spite of the recently introduced secret ballot, money exercises enormous power at all elections, political and municipal. The actual agent who pays over the money, and the man who receives it are no doubt looked on as contemptible characters, but who finds the money ? Who provides the election funds for the campaigns conducted for victory or defeat "? Wlio does not know how a large portion of the money is expended 1 We cannot wash our hands publicly of the matter if our hands privately have furn- ished the means of corruption. Closing our eyes to the ugly machineiy we have set to work does not exonerate us from responsiljility. If the evils inhereftt in party govern- ment depend on majority representation, we can only get rid of them by truly democratic representation — that is by the re-presentment of tlie whole people in the legislature. Among the palliatives proposed for the acknowledged abuses from which America suffers, the most noteworthy are the Initiative and the Referendum, used in the oldest of federal republics, Switzerland. Those who groan under the tyranny of the caucus and the ticket, hope that by means of the Initiative new and valuable legislation might be forced on a reluctant or apathetic congress, and that by the Referendum, mischievous or inter- ested legislation or administration might be reversed. Whatever may be the need of such things now in America, it seems paradoxical and absurd first to elect a body of men to do the national business, and then to make a requisi- tion to drive them to attend to it, and to put all their work to the test of a plebiscite as to whether it was done ]jroi)erly. The Initiative might work fairly well in a country like Switzerland, but in America it would be taken up by a caucus, and as for the Referendum, just fancy the whole people of the United States voting en masse on every measui-e. If the parliament is justly elected by proportional representation there would be no need of any Initiative to drive the people's representatives to undertake important reforms. The representatives of earnest minorities would be there in the House ; sent there for that very purpose, and they could be trusted to introduce and to advocate those measures which are neglected and ignored under our existing system. Nor would there be any need to refer to any plebiscite any measure which had passed both Houses of Legislature, when the really important House (the people's) really represented the whole people. The decision in doors will correspond with the convictions of the real majority out of doors, and will be argued better in a deliberative assembly than in the harangues and the rhetoric presented to a plebiscite. It is noteworthy, too, that it is in Switzerland, where the Initiative is in operation, that there has risen an effective demand for proportional representation. When three- fourths of the measures passed by both Houses were reversed by the Referendum, the fact that majority representation did not really represent was made patent. The Canton of Ticino (Italian speaking) and the Canton of Neufchatel (French-speaking) were followed by the more important Canton of Geneva, and the proportional voting by lists, as is explained in my second chapter, has been successfully worked in all three. Two other cantons are agitating for the change, so that the brave little European republic, which was a model for the Transatlantic republic in its inception, goes on still ahead. Those cantons which have adopted proportional representation will soon drop the useless appeals to the people, and it will be amusing if it were not so mischievous if the great United States caught hold of the machineiy that Switzerland has outgrown, fancying it to be a real safeguard to liberty. There is also a demand made in the United States for recourse to the Imperative Mandate, requiring a member of the Legislature to resign his seat on the demand of two- thirds of his constituency. With such a short term of office as the House of Representa- tives has, one long and one short session, it seems unnecessary to recall a representative during that term. The Imperative would be impossible under proportional representation, for under the secret ballot it is impossible to discover who are any man's constituents. Two-thirds or three-fourths of the qualified voters in the electorate may have voted for others and may desire his recall, but yet he may be the chosen of an earnest minority, and as such I think it is in human nature for him to be true to his principles. It is note- 113 worthy that in Switzerland, whioli originated the imperative Mandate, it has fallen into disuse and is never heard of. Switzerland has found out hotter means. This at 1 ast has been outgrown. One feels glad to hear a demand, even for these Swiss methods, from the Ameiican people, as it sl/ows they are willing to change the old had methods or to supply some- thing in the shape of an antidote. But it is as if when the hounds are in full cry after the fox, a red herring is trailed across the scent, and they are drawn off to something of no value. Tinkering at defective machinery and bolstering up abuses which should be destroyed, only delays radical reform. Another demand that is made is for direct election of President by the whole people, so that the choice should be made by the populai- vote and not by the state vote for electors to elect. This seems reasonable enough. The United States Senate too would be more righteously elected by the people of the States than by the legislatures, and the domestic assembly would be elected on better lines for state business, if there was no arriere pensee of choice of United States senators in the mind of the citizens. Pi-obably this restriction to domestic legislation and regulation would lessen greatly party spirit in them, and tend to keep it out of municipal affaiis. The reduction of the number of elective officers would purify municipal matters greatly, and save money and heai-tburnings all round. An American munici[)al ticket is a fearful and wonderful thing, and it is hard to vote, on the Australian ballot system. Where every office from mayor to coroner, from rate-collector and surveyors to judges and police magistrates is competed for by many candidates, all bracketed according to their jtolitics, it presents a fai" moi"e bewildering array of names than any modification of Hare's .system of voting I have ever seen. There are far too many elections in America, and the Initiative and especially the Referendum would indehnitely multiply them. The indirect or di.stilled election adopted in the American constitution to secure calm- ness and wise deliberation is pointed out by Mr. Bryce as perhaps the most striking instance in which a written and rigid constitution bends and warps under the actual force of politics, for the caucus — the majority, for the time being, in the local legislatures settle the matter without deliberation, generally before the houses meet. To imitate Pope's lines: " Blest paper credit ! last and best su|)))ly. That lends corruption quicker wings to fly ! " the machine politician and his backers may sing : " Elect electors ! Glorious double means For wealth and craft to oil the state machines ! " CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION. The reform of Mr. Hare was originally known under the name of the Repiesentation of Minoiities, and that was somewhat misleading. An idea arose that it was meant to make minorities rule. Under party government, people fancy that majorities always rule, while in point it is only a majority of a j>lurality elected parliament, a fraction of the people who appoint and dismiss the cabinet, and administer the affairs of the country. Mr. J. M. Berry, of Worcester, Massachusetts, has calculated that less than twenty ]>ev cent, of the vote elected the working majority in the Canadian Parliament, and this is not due so much to gerrymanders as to the inherent vices of the systtMU itself. Proportional representation would secure that it is the real majoi-ity in the country who have ascenditnoy in parliament. I cannot say whether the adoption of this (;quitable system would l)e of greater advantage to minorities or to the majority itself. It is a good thing when there is no dissatisfied, unrepresented chuss m the community, and it is a v^ery bad thing when political life has no charms for our wealthy citizens, or for 8 114 our best educated young men. But gieat as are the advantages to uiinoriLies of liaving their votes freed, and their individual powers of action made available, tlie advantage to majori- ties is no less. In the first place, they can make sure of having honest representatives. Those who differ from them can ai)peal to other voters in the larger constituency, and go in free ; they are not exposed to the temptation of concealing their convictions as the only means of enterin<^ parliament at all. We are told that there is no need for the reform, because there ai'e men in our present parliaments of every sliade of opinion. But every man whose convictions were diflfereiit from thos^e of the real or supposed majority in the district for which he sou"-ht election, had to submit to a lowering style of canvass and to a cross- questioninf, legitimate enough if minorities can be represented, but xuider the exclusive power of plurality, weakening to the moral sense of the candidate. The second advantage to the majority would be that they would hear all sides of public questions, and that oVjjections to their ]iarty measures would have to be met fully and fairlv. Questions would be discussed in parliament, in news})apers, at election meetings and pul)lic meetings gent riiUy, in a very different way from what takes place now. A minority unrepresented is apt to be a sulky and a useless thing, going about continually with a o-rievance for which it has no redress, and unable to make its voice heard in parliament, or through the populai- press. A minority represented is the sharpener of the wits of the ruling )>owers, the educator of the people, the animator of the press. It is the only strong and moralising oi)position : without it there may be struggles as to who shall be in office or out of it ; for as long as there are such things as place and power, those who have them will want to keep them, and those who have them not, will desire to ol)tain them, but such opposition is too often factious and dangerous — not constitutional and progressive. It is not only when they are in the right that repiesented minorities could give such life and vigour to the body politic. Right or wrong, the sincei'e expression of opinion is always the fiiend of truth and progress. We never believe anything so firmly, as when an adversary whom we cannot silence, or ignore, or ridicule, has marshalled all the aj-f^uments on tl)e other side, and we have jiroved them fallacioiis. And if the minority should perchance be in the right, will it be wise to silence them, and lose the truth that is in them 1 There are many ways of losing truth. One is by pei-secuting it ; another is by not listeniu"- to it ; a thinl is by being too stupid to understand it. Persecution has gone out of fashion, except perhaps in Russia, but inattention and stupidity are not yet obsolete. I hear it said that you cannot make men moral by any electoi'al system whatever, and France is instanced to show that all sorts of methods liave been tried without any real betterment in legislatures oi- people. France has never tried ])roportional representation. I should be as unwilling to charge the people of France with the corruption in the legislature recently exposed, as to say that the American ]Mrty abuses are what the Ameiican people choose to make them. It is what the machinery has made it. Improve the machinery in France and in the United States, and then we shall see things mightily changed for the better. As Mr. Simeon Stetson, of San Francisco, in his trenchant jjamphlet "The People's Power : How to wield the Ballot," points out, the difficulty is not i-eally a moral one. When people ask how it is possible that a simple readjustment — an ai-ithmctical devici-, can purify ])olitics, educate the voter, and raise the chai-acter of the legislature, he replies that there is enough of virtue and honour among the people of France and of America, only they are shut out by the party machinery. Change the machinery so as to give equality of opportunity to the higher elements of society, and you will transfoi-m the whole political world. There is no doubt that some methods of representation make men immoral. We have bieen so long in the habit of excluding reason and fair play from electioneering, that we have almost grown into the belief that such drawbacks as we cannot but see, are insepar- able from re]tresentative institutions themselves, and a part of the price we must pay for liberty. It would be absurd if we blinded ourselves to the relations between cause and effect in ordinary life. It is not the ascertaining of peo})le's opinions and preferences, but the means we take to ascertain them, whereby one's loss is another man's gain, that creates the injustice and the bitterness. 115 Just fancy a mothei", who wanted a peck of peas shelled, setting all hei- children old and young to do it, promising to give the one wiio shelUid the most the reward of an ajiple. Suppose her disregarding all the cries for fair jday, when Tom the eldest Ijoy pulls the basket towards him, and does all in his power to prevent his lnothers and sisteis from obtaining the pods from which to extract the peas. Fancy her thinking that by .'ivin.r each child a measure stamped by authority, she has done all in her power to equalise theiT- chances of success; and then bestowing the reward on the virtuous Tom, whose stion^er nails had more easily opened the pods, and whose vigorous arm had kept possession of the basket. Fancy her saying when the younger children made faces at Tom as he munched his apple, and called him a bully and a cheat, that she did not understand how it was, but they always quarreled about the peas. She did her best to excite a little whole.some emu- lation, and nevei- gave the apple but to the cliild who shelled the most. She supposed it must be something in the peas ! ! ! Politically speaking, I agree with the popular orator, " One man is as good as another." I only object to the commentary or addition of his Irish admirei-, " Yes, that he is, and better too." By majority representation, we give the Irish interpretation to the equality. Yet though political equality is desiiuble, mental and social equality is not desir- able, even if it were possible. In Democratic communities, it is of supreme importance that everything individual, original, and even eccentric, .should be called out and utilised. The average man and the average woman have things too much ordered according to their liking for their own advance beyond mediocrity. What John Stuart Mill feared was that originality would dwindle and die under the reign of the common-place. The comfort and convenience, mental as well as material, of the mass of humanity would be too exclusively studied, in their eating and in their drinking, in their education and their amusements, in their politics and their leligion. But puie Democracy such as is advocated in these pages, would give scope to individuality. What can a man of genius give to the world of moie value than just a bit of himself? All th;it is wanted is ecpuility of opportunity for expre.ssion ; — the best will come to the front and keep there. For the benefit of all, for the service of all should the varied gifts of all earnest men and women be used and strengthened by use. Jjife would be enriched, would be elevated, would be moralised by the Iree play of the higher elements in society. Our competitive system has had its day and done its work. It has spui'red many individuals to laborious and continuous efforts, and in many directions man has essentially served the community, when he was primarily seeking his own profit or his own fame. But even in the past, the race has not been always to the swift, or the battle to the strong. Nowadays King Capital appropriates, not only a very huge amount of the earnings of labour, but also almost monopolises the rewards of invention. Too often only the crumbs from the rich man's table are flung to the creator of wedth who by some happy di.scovery has cheapened production or transportation V)y some nuichinery or appliance which the rich man was incapable of inventing himself King Capital too, often tempts the artist out of the straight narrow way to which his genius prom[)ts him, into the ])rimrose path which leads to money making and ephemeral applause. No common-placeness of the vulgar taste is more fatal to true art than the conventionalism which the wealthy art- patron loves. "Art for the people," has in it the true elements of progress. The power of admiration grows when it is fed with worthy objects. Democratic art can scarcely be said to exist, even in democratic countries. Mr. J. Addington Symonds. in his penetrative essay on 'Democratic Art,' says that with the single exception of Walt Whitman, neither poet nor novelist, neither painter nor sculptor, has yet adequately recognised the peo'ple. If it is said in an essay on electoral lepresentation and the rectification of parliament, suggestions as to the rewards of invention and on democratic art are out of ])lace, I Iwg to submit that they are in place. We hear much about the correlation of forces, and the interchangeableness of much that we used to believe were distinctly separate in the physi- cal world. In the intellectual and moral world, all thinking men and women .see the sjime correlation and interdependence, and they cannot look on anything as i.solated and detached. Religion is of no value if kept only for Sunday services and stated sea.sons. and does not penetrate the whole daily life. Honour and honesty should not be confiiu'.l to one's personal affairs, and be kept out of corporate matters and political action. Intel- ligence should not be restricted to the acquisition of knowledge, but should be allied to 116 our religion and to our bread-earning avocation, and to all the duties of a citizen. And the democratic spirit which sees in every man a brother and in every woman a sister, should not be kept for platform orations, but should be felt in the church and in the state, in the factory and in the shop, in the author's study, in the newsj)aper editor's den, and in the artist's studio. It is on account of this interdependence, this inextricable complexity of human mo- tives and actions that the exclusively dual character of political representation is so mis- representative of modern society. In olden times, when the people had to struggle against monarchs and piivileged classes, there was a definite dualism in politics, and party organi- zation on one side or the other was a useful, perhaps a necessary, thing. But in that very country which has woi-ked the p^irty system longest, in the United Kingdom, we see every year more and more important questions withdrawn from the limitations of party, and "This is not a ])arty question" is publicly given out; members on both sides of the House are free to speak and vote for or against it ; and if it is brought forward by the ministry, the loss of a majoiity does not compel them to resign. Under proportional representation there will be more and more liberty given to individual thought in parliament, and this will react on the people outside. The pocket boroughs of England once represented localities, opinions and people. But when a demand was made for their reform in 1832, they represented nothing but the prestige of rank, the bribes of wealth and the venality of a handful of voters. Great cities like Biimingliani and Manchester had no lepresentative at all, while a dozen depopu- lated hamlets in Cornwall sent two members each to parliament. After they were disfranchised, was there a single voice heard all over the United Kingdom for their re-instatement 1 No, not one, although before the passing of the Reform Bill, the whole Conservative forces of Great Britain protested against laying unhallowed hands on the sacred aik of the constitution. Thus it was, and thus it will ever be. The advocates of the radical reform of enfran- chising minorities, arc confronted with the whole conservative and traditionary forces of the world. Local separation of small districts fiom their fellows has been the invaluable rule in the past; distiicts whether large or small, have always been carried by the plurality of votes, however small the pieponderance may be, and under this hap-hazard system England and her daughter states have managed to jog on. Practical politicians would be put out of their reckoning and embarrassed in their tactics under proportional i-epresenta- tion. How often is it necessary to remind the world that national organisations do not exist lor the ae expected. 11? With confidence that men and women may rise to the height of their res|M)iisihiHties, and of their opportunities and take up this, the greatest political reform of this great political centur}', and not lay it dcwn till they have embodied it in law. I submit these pages for thoughtful consideration to the Institute of Canada. Southern Cross. CHAPTER VII. DRAFT BILL FOR THK PROVINCK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA. The condition that along with the essay on electoral repiesentation, there must also be forwarded for consideration a draft bill, applicable to countries with a parliamentary system similar to that of Canada, is somewhat hard on writei'S who are not legal or parlia- mentary experts. The essay may indeed indicate the principles on which an Act of Parliament should be framed, and may describe practical methods, and yet the essayist may lack the legal technicality requisite for details. In any case, it is unnecessary to construct a complete electoral Act. The qualifications of voters, the methods of registi-ation, the fixing of polling places and the definition of the duties of returning officers, the penalties for bribery, treating, and corrupt influence must be the same under proportional representation as they are under the present majoril^ system. The points necessarily to be provided for are the enlaigement of constituencies, the conditions of candidature, the method of voting, the method of counting votes, so as to return each representative by quota, the filling up of vacancies, and the readjustment of the number of candidates to electoral districts according to relative increase or decrease of population. In some of these points I avail myself of certain clauses in Mr. Hislop's Bill pre- sented to the New Zealand Parliament in 1888, in the time of the Atkinson Ministry, and lost. As however he uses Sir John Lubbock's mathematical quota instead of Hare's simpler one, and as he takes the contingent vote as used in Queensland for uninominal elections to fill up a vacancy, while I fall back on the votes of the retiring candiilate to asceitain which of the unsuccessful candidates ^at the last election makes a plurality over the others, and allot the seat to him without a new election at all, there are several features in these suggested clauses quite distinct from Mr. Hislop's. Proposed clauses to be introduced into a new Electoral Act for Election of Membera of the House of Assembly for the Province of South Australia, in onler that the jirinciple of proportional rej>resentation by means of the single transferable vote may be carried into practice in the said Province. Preamble.— Whei-eas it is expedient that the system of voting iu the Province of South Australia shall be altered so as to give ecjual representation to tlie whole people : Be it enacted : — I. That the Province of South Australia shall be divided into nine electoral districts, or divisions, following the natural geographical divisions of the country, and as nearly as possible of equal population ; the 27 present electorates being amalgamated into nine groups to return each six members to the House of Assembly. II. Any duly registered elector, with his consent, may be nominated as a candidate for any district by not less than ten electors thereof, by a nomination paper in the form and to the effect set forth by regulation, and given to the returning oHicer. or transmitted to him so as to reach him Ijefore the last hour appointed for leceiving nomination papers. III. Any duly registered elector may vote for any candidate who presents himself for the larger electoral district, but he shall record his vote in that division for which he is registered, and at the polling jdace appointed for such division. Il8 IV. Every duly regisierea])er as it is diawn out being marked with a number in arithmetical series beginning with the number " 1," so that no two jtapers shall have the same number, #nd the resident magistrate or the two justices of the peace shall sign a document stating the entiie number as a whole, of the ballot papers received from the various returning offi- cers, which shall be carefully preserved by the said election officer for production when required by lawful authority. 3. The election officer shall first reject all ballot papeis which have not the official mark on the back, and all on which no numbers have been placed by the voter, and all those in which the same number has been placed against more names than one, but he shall not reject any ballot paper whereon the numbers of designation are fewer or in excess of the numl-er of members to be elected. 4. The election officer shall then proceed to ascertain the quota by dividing the aggre- gate number of all the ballot papers tendered at the election by six, and the quotient, ex- clusive of fractions, shall be the number required for the return of any candidate. 5. Every candidate who has a number of first votes equal to or in excess of the quota shall be declared elected, and so many of the votes as make up the quota shall be set aside as his votes — his constituency — to be of no further use. 6. On each ballot paper beyond the necessary quota, the name of the elected candi- date shall be cancelled, and the candidate maiked " 2 " on each paper, shall take the first place and the election officer shall transfer the vote to him. After the surplus votes, if any, have been transferi-ed according to the contingent choice of the voters, the election officer shall declaie the candidate having the fewest first aiul transferred votes not elected, and his votes shall be given to the second choice in each ballot ]»aper, if he is not already elected, when the third is made use of. After this distri- bution, the ballot papers of the ruan who now has fewest votes are dealt with in a similar' way and given to the first name down tlie series who has not been declai-ed elected, or who has not been declared not elected. This {)rocess shall be apj)lied successively to the lowest on the ])oll until there are no more candidates left standing than are required for the electoral district, when these shall be declai-ed to be elected, whether they have attained the full quota or have fallen short of it. For example of an actual scrutiny for the return of six repi-esentatives out of twelve candidates, see Appendix I. For Filling up a Vacancy. VII. All the ballot papers given at each election for each electoral district shall be [)r-eserved by the election officer, and the ballots appropriated for the return of each candi- h 11!) (late shall he ke|)fc to<,r-ther and lahelle 1 with his uamr>, and a correct reorl shall also i>e kept of the nuialjer of first votes given to each of the unsuccessful can(li(hit«;s which were afterwai-ds transferred. VIII. When by death, resignation, or other cause, any seat sliall lie declared vacant, the election officer, in the presence of the resident magistrate of the district, or of two justices of the peace, shall take the votes which made \ip the quota for the dead or retiiing member, and shall distribute such of these as are not limited to the six successful candi- dates among the unsuccessful candidates, and add these contingent ballot-papers to the number of hrst votes originally polled by each man, and the candidate having the greatest number, shall be declared elected for the remainder of the term for which the retiring member was ajjpointed to act as representative. For an example of how this would work, see Appendix II. Foil Rkadjustmknt of Elkctoral Districts. IX. After every decennial census, a revision of electoral districts shall be undertaken by a parliamentary committee, and whenever an electorate shall have increased projjortionately to the aggregate population of the said Provinc(! of South Australia by one 54th part, (be the same a little more or less) that district shall return seven members at the ne.xt and siicceeding elections, and whenever an electorate shall have decreased in ])opulation by a f)4th p:irt, (be the same a little more or less) that diminished electorate shall return five members at the next and at succeeding elections, Ijut the number of representatives shall remain the same, 54 representatives for the whole Province, and shall not be altered with- out a vote of a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament. Legislative Council op South Australia. For the Upper House, or Legislative Council of South Australia elections, all the change that would be necessary to secure pro])ortional representation would be that in the four electoiates returning six members each, all six should retire at once and not two in rotation, and to require the qualified electors to recoril preference by the single transfer- able vote as provided for in the preceding clauses for Assemblymen. It would indeed be better if the Upper House could be elected by the votes of the whole Piovince, as was originally done, but unfortunately by scrutin de liste, or voting at large — the very worst system of majority voting. If it were done by means of the quota ascertained by the single transfeiable vote, it would be Hare's gjand ideal realized in one English-sjieaking coninnmity, at least. V20 APPENDIX I. Results of /Scrutiny of Voting Papers filled in at various iiieetinys held for Efiective Voting, 10th March, 1893. Total Votes, 3,824— Quota, 637. ^-^^ CI yA-¥^ ^^ ^ .-^ 1 1 as i—t o " „ C 6 'S- X s* |Zi tH. i;o (>^ oi M ^ fll . ■* -^ GO lO F*-4 ID ^^ £-go TT 1 (M T 1 1 1 -C ngle Ten X ^ ^ oi CD 1 1 ^+1 d 1 «;^Ha2 ■u Oi oJ 6 52i a: d . 6 Q ^ Ed d 55 O 6 H ,,, .Si ""c > < 2 92 ^1 w X PS "A OS O 03 X OS < CO 3 OS ^ -S =« O cc W ^ 1 H w < oj ^ Jx a: H 02 as o a: s OS ->! ^- 2 = H a = <1 1- p, -^ * S O J =i t3 ^ ' — ' <: S o ^ (1h S^ o olitical atoms have coalesced into a body, and learned to feel themselves one people, except through ]»revious subjection to a central authority common to all." The consolida- tion of tribes and principalities into kingdoms and nations has been the result of con- quest. And representative government has arisen, not as a device for promoting this consolidation, but as a lesult of it, in order to protect the people against the oppression of a military conqueror and his successors. It was the sufferings they endured from a common oppressor which drew them together in common opposition. The gi'owth of representative government, then, is the growth of freedom and democ- racy. It is the institution of the masses. It fulfils its highest functions when it unites distant tribes and peoples into mighty nations, and at the same time assures them freedom and local independence. It is thus the link that unites a powerful, far-reaching central government to patriotic and indej)endent millions of citizens. The question of representa- tive government is therefoie a fundamental question of democracy. It is not to be supposed that the ancients were without any institutions which took the nature of repi-esentation. We read of councils of elders among the very earliest records of the Jews, the Greeks and the Romans. But these elders were not elected elders, i-epresenting the free choice of the people, but were hereditary chiefs and patriarchs of clans. They represented their followeis by divine and inherited right instead of by popular choice. The histcny of all i-aces that have achieved distinction has been a histoiy of federation. Back in the dawn of history there are traces of small independent village connnunities living isolated lives and united by the ties of blood. Each village had its patriarch who was at the same time king, priest and chief. _ But soon these village clans were drawn together by alliances, at first temj)orary and afterwards permanent, for purposes of defense and conquest. Now, the chief of one clan became permanent over the others. But his supremacy was not absolute. He could act only with the consent of the other chiefs. In council he was the presiding officer. Thus the king and his council of hei-editary elders were the ruling representatives of tlie people in the time of the judges in Israel, of Homer, and of the kings of Rome. Every reader of the history of politics is familar with the universal growth of the power of the people in making laws. From the very first, the king and his eldei-s found it necessary to submit the re. ult of their deliberations to the popular assembly of men in ai-ms for rejection or ratification. But there was no public debate. The warriois sinq.ly expressed by their shouts and clashing of arms their assent or dissent. But not until the principle of election was substituted for that of heredity, did the people themselves gain control of the laws. This principle, however, was of slow growth. The history of Athens in this respect is characteristic of all ancient democracies. Fu-st, the king and his council of elders promulgated the laws and sought the as.sent of the people. ° The iirst conflict in this arrangement was not between this council and |)eople, but between the king and the elders. Po])ular sovereignty has never s|)read out and down- ward among the masses of the people l)y leaps, but has always becm i)receded by an aristocrat y and an oligarchy. The elders in Athens were the first to denumd and se.ure the principle of election. They made the king a limiteil monarch ;ind aapnred the right to choose him, first for life, then for a term of ten years, and finally they elected nine 124 arclions or kings foi- a term of only one year. The elders thus deveh)|)ed into a nobility and an oligarchy, making the kingly office wholly dependent on their own will. But meanwhile, the ))eople were growing restless and revolutionary. The oligarchy. in usurping the powers of the king had trampled upon the rights of the ])eoi>le and had oppressed them through harsh debtor laws and the monopolization of the land. The next step was to make the aristocracy itself elective. This was the work of Solon. The nine archons were to be chosen for one year by a popular assembly, not from the people at large, but only from the ranks of the nobility and the wealthy. Their duties wei*e executive and judicial. The popular assembly included all classes except slaves. It elected the magistrates and enacted some of the laws. But it did not originate the laws. This was done by a new body of representatives, the Senate of Four Hundred, chosen for one year by the popular assembly from among the three propertied classes, and presided over by the archons. It was therefore a kind of aristocratic House of Commons. It could enact most laws without reference to the popular assembly. Finally, there was the senate of the Areopagus, the Athenian House of Lords, the remnant of the old council of elders. Membership here was for life. It had no legislative power, but only a kind of general supervisory authority. Thus Solon endeavored to establish a representative democracy with a conservative balance wheel, and a limited j)opular referendum. But the people were not yet able to maintain this sort of government. After a short period of anarchy it ended just as the republics of Mexico and Central America and Hayti have ended, in a tyranny under the forms of representation. Peisistratus held autocratic sway for fifty years, supi>orted by the voles of the popular assembly and practically appointing his henchmen to all the elective offices, just as a city " boss " to day in America nominates his candidates, and the voters excite themselves wtih the show of electing them. Still, the popular assembly was educating the people. When the sons of Peisistratu s abused their power, the people deposed them and chose Clisthenes to draw up a new con- stitution. This constitution introduced the ripest fruits of Athenian democracy, and under it Athens reached her pinnacle of power. The suffrage was extended and equalised. Every citizen was made eligible to the senate of iive hundred, and the senate of the Areopagus was limited in its powers. All magistrates were elected for terms of only one year. The popular assembly engrossed the law-making powers into its hands. An extreme democracy was reached when minor magistrates were chosen by lots. Thus it will be seen that Athens never successfully adopted representative government. She could not trust her repi-esentatives. Her citizens took from them the powers of legislation, both in its initiative and final determination. But so large a mass meeting could not enact laws, and therefore they followed their popular leaders, like Peisistratus and Pericles. They simply expressed the decrees, but the laws proper could only be made and altered and harmonised by a smaller body of representatives. Without a proi)er control over this revising legislature, the Athenian system could never succeed. But compared with modern states and cities, we can see wherein are to be found the elements of success which it actually achieved. Athens, with the whole of Attica, was a small community, covering no larger area than an American township. Its population at no time exceeded 500,000, and four-fifths of these were slaves and had no part in government. Its citizen population numbered only 90,000, of whom 18,000 were eligible voters. They were supported by slaves, and could therefore give their whole time to public affairs. How different from the citizens of the modern city ! There are no slaves — all are voters. Not only do the manual workers have a share in controlling the local politics, but the wealthy classes do not look upon business as dishonorable, as did the Athenians, but business is the main vocation of their lives, and politics has a very subordinate place. The Athenians being limited in numbers, with abundant leisure and small distances to travel, could easily assemble in mass meeting. Hence political parties on a national basis with local machinery and strict discipline could not arise. Instead of the party caucus, with its intolei'ance and ambition for party advantage, opposing orators addressed the assembled nation on the broad issues of the day, and the Athenians were educated in wide views of policy. There were no partisan newspapers, which the party voter read in private, but the |>ublic meeting was his press and the street discussion his newspaper. There were no private 125 corporations of gieat we.iltli requiring legislation, and therefore no orgaiiised and paid lobby. Yet, notwithstantiing all these advantages, the Atheuiaii sysr,-in bicke down. The suffrage was extended, new and ignorant voters came into political prominence and through the privileges of the mass meeting and majority rule thev overrod(! all the better elements of the city. The voters became cori-upt and indolent,' the ea.sy |)rey of the demagogue and the briber. And tinally, when Athens came under the power of Macedonia, and later of Rouie, she lost her right to elect her own magistrates. Had the hundred independent cities of Greece ever been brought into a united nation they might have developed a system of federal or state repz'e.sentation. Some progress was made in this direction in the Amphictyonic Council. But it is the famous Achfean league to which we look for the nearest approach to a federal representation. "This league acted through ;in assembly, which met twice every year, and to which was entrusted, not only the election of all confederate officials but also the supreme direction of every affair which affected the foreign relations of any city in the league, even thou<»h it were an affair not of general but only of local interest. The business of the assembly was prepared by a council which was prol)ably i)ermanent. There certainly was here abettei- frame work than the Greeks had ever known before for concerted national action. Its chief defects lay in the composition and procedure of the assembly. That body was com- posed in theory, of every free man of the cities of the league who had reached the af»e of thirty years. In fact, of course it consisted of the whole body of the free men of the town where it met, (u.sually Aegium, or in later days Corinth) and of such citizens of other towns as had the leisui-e or the means to attend. The votes of the a.ssembly were taken by towns, not decided by the majority voice of the free men present. Tin; few chance attendants from some di.stant city within the league spoke authoritativelv for their fellow townsmen, the smallest delegation had an equal vote with the largest, and vet there was no fixed [)lan which would make the vote of one delegation as representative as that of another."* When we turn to the Roman republic we find far more apparent than in little Greece the need of representation. The progress of democracy was parallel to that of Athens. First the king was displaced by two councils elected by the senate of nobles. A popular assembly did not ai-ise until the plebs, having revolted against the hai'sh judgments of the patrician magistrates, acquii-ed the right of electing tribunes. The tribune had power to suspend the judgment of any magistrate upon a plebian. They weie the representatives of the peoj)le. They soon became the leaders of the people. Had the tribunes been elected into a legislative body co-ordinate with the senate, they would have furnished the natural prototype of the popular branches of modern legislatures. But such a device did not occur to the Romans. The trilnines became simply the leaders and orators before; the popular assembly — the comitia tributa—o{ the people. This assembly gradually engros.seil the greater share in electing magistrates and deciding laws. But the hereditary and wealthy senate was never completely subdued. As the citizenship became more numerous and more degraded, anarchy followed for a long period, and finally the empire restored ^leace and prosperity. Especially was the lack of representation oppressive to the wide extejuled provinces which the Romans had conquered. Provincial governors sent out from the city were wholly iriesi)onsible to the people they governed. The provincials had no redress or appeal except to a corriipt popular assemblage at Rome, and had no voting power that could have comi>elled attention to their demands. We may (piote in conclusion the words of May, who savs : f ' With the lights of modern experience, we are naturally led to con- sider how far a system of representation would have brought these conflicting forces into harmony. By such a remedial measure the forces of the people would have become less dangero"u-s, while the senate would have been strengthened l\y its moral support. The responsibilities of the senate woidd have been increased, and the |)olitical alienation of clas.ses replaced by mutual confidence. The varied forces and interests of society would have been con.solidated. The wealthy aristocracy would still have nded the state, but they would have shared their power with other classes of citizens ; and the policy of the state * Wilson, The State, page 91-2. t May, Democracy in Europe, Vol. I, page 223. would have been determined, not by irregular conflicts but by timely concessions to |X)pnlar demands. Ive])resentation is the only safeguard against anai-chy in democratic consti- tutions. In Rome representation was peculiarly needed, as it offered the only means whereby large bodies of citizens, enjoying the Roman franchise, but living at a distance from the capital could have exercised their political rights. Without it, the citizens of RoDie itself, usurped all their powers ; and Roman citizenship outside the walls of the ca))ital was but a barren honor," It is to England that the world looks for the origin of true representative govern- ment. The peculiar circumstances and history of the country suggest as naturally the form of repiesentation which we enjoy to-day, as did the circamstances of the Romans suggest the tribune of the plebs. These cirumatances were the ]>rimitive local government of the Anglo-Saxons, and the centralized impei'ial government of their Noruian conquerors. The combination of these two elements on English insular soil, separated from the conflicts and conquest of the continent, worked out through internal forces the institutions of repre- sentation. The germ of representation is found among the Teutonic conquerors of Britain long before the time of the Norman conquest. These Teutonic conquerors came over in small companies during a period of one Ijundied and fifty years, and scattered in groups through- out the country. Each group was independent of the others, having its own system of popular government. A process of federation and internal conquest at once began, small kingdoms were built up, and finally the vk^hole of England was united under one king. But the original townships and minor kingdoms retained much of their powers of local legislation. The township is the " unit of the constitutional machinery." The alodial owners, or the tenants of the manorial lord, met in popular assembly, elected their own officers and jiassed their bylaw.s. Their chief officer, the constable or gerefa, was ex officio, the repi'esentative of the township in the courts of the hundred and the shire, and with him went the four best men, or selectmen, of the township. They represented the town- ship as a unit in the higher assemblies of the peojJe. The hundred was a union of townships. With the ))iogress of federation it tended to disappear and to be mej-ged into tJie shire or county. The shire court was com{)osed of all the freeholders resident in the district, together with the representatives from the town- ships. Thus it was both a popuJar assembly and a representative body. " The primitive Teutonic conception of an assenjbly," saj's Hannis Taylor,* " whether local or national, rested upon one simj)le id a, and that was that every freeman resident within a state or district had a right to appear and represent himself in the assembly of such court or district." With such a conception as this there could be no true representation, as we understand it. Our representatives have the exclu.sive right to stand for their constituencies in the assembly. If individuals couJd appear in their own light there would be not repre- sentation of all, but only of the wealthy and the politicians. This was exactly what occurred in the national assembly of all England after its final consolidation. This assembly was not a folk moot but a witenagemot, i. e., an assembly of the " wisemen " or the " best men." It was not a great tunmltuous assembly composed of the whole body of the people, but a small assembly composed of the great and wise men of the land, who met as councillors of the king. " The only consistent theory upon which this changed condition of things can be explained, is that as the progress of aggregation advanced, the limits of the greater kingdoms so widened as to render a general attendance both ii'ksome and difficult, and for this the mass of the people simply ceased to attend. In this way assemblies purely democratic in theory, without the foruial exclusion of any class, shrank up into assemblies purely aristocratic"! In the hundreds and the counties, however, the idea of representation existed along with the idea of a popular assembly. It is probable that the selectmen from the township were not at first just four in number nor elected formally by the votes of all the tun- moot, but they held simply the individual proxies of the various voteis. They were the wealthier members of the township, who happened to be going to the county court on their own account, and their neighbors in an informal way transferred to them their own * Origin of the English Constitution, page 247. t Taylor, p. 247. 127 right to go. Griulually tiiis proceeiliiig liecaiiK! more ami more foiiii.il until the four men were elected by general consent. The mixed character of this ronnty cmrt, l>eing thus partly rei)resented and i)aitly primary, must have given undue iiiHuence to the freeman of the township where it happened to meet. It remained for a later day and a new set of political circumstances to develop this [)rimitive unsatisfactory germ of representation into a formal and exclusive jjrinciple. After the Norman Conquest the old idea was continued, which gave to every freeman the right to appear in the national assembly. But for the same reasons as in earlier times only the wealthier land-owneis attended. This assembly became known a.s the Great Oouncil. It was not a representative body, but every member attended in his own prim- ary right. It possessed, with tho king, all the law-making authority ot England. The king and his council of magnates was the government of England. But there was little legislation to be done.* The customs of th'3 p3ople were adequate for laws. The kin" was ex[)ected to administer these customary laws as they had been handed down to him. He was not dependent upon the legislature for revenues, because, according to the feudal theory, he was ex{)ected to meet the public expenditures for peace or for war out of the customary revenues from his own immense private domains. These were the ancient feudal dues, aids and reliefs, j)aid by his tenants, the amounts of which were determined not by competition, but by immemorial and well-known custom. In the course of time the alienation of portions of his domains, and the growing expenditures of war and ad- ministration, compelled the king to seek out sources for other and "extraordinary" revenues. The experience of a couple of centuries showed that this could not be success- fully done by arbitraiy exactions from his subjects. He must obtain their consent. It was found, too, that their hearty consent and co-operation could not be obtained when tliey were approached privately and individually. Hence the practice grew up of summoning them collectively in order that the king might lay before them the state of his exchequer and the urgency of his needs for additional funds. These assemblies became in time not merely financial but also political assemblies. The king laid befoi-e them the general affaii's with reference to which he desii'ed their advice and approval and which he con- sidered them competent to decide. In still later times they claimed the ri<;ht to present petitions for redress of grievances, and even to withhold grants of supplies until their peti- tions wei-e allowed. It is not the ultimate powers of those assemblies, .so well known, but the manner of their constitution with which we are concerned. They were far from being assemblies for the whole people or of representatives of the people, as we understand such as.semblies in our day. They were merely conventions of different interests ai\d classes of men. The earliest financial assemblies were naturally those of the military tenants of the king. The gieater tenants, those holding u|»wards of six manors, and who had hitheito paid their feudal dues directly to tin; king, were summoned by name. The lesser tenants, who had hitherto paid their customary dues to the king's lieutenant, the sheriff, were snmmoneil indirect! v, through writs issued to the sheriffs directing them to attend the assembly. But they all met together, voted the aid' desij'ed, and returned homo. The clergy were summoned in like manner, and met. in assembly at different times and places from the military tenants. Finally, when incor|)orated cities began to acquire wealth, they were summoned to send representatives for their own peculiai- assembly. It was Edward I. who first consulted these asi5eml)lies regarding interests other than financial. Says Hearn, regarding this important phase of the evolution of parlia- ment,! "It was no part of his design to carry his changes, iiowever beneficial, with a high hand. In words that well became the noble king of a free people, he acknowledged that " what touched all should be approved by all." But these words conveyed a different meaning in the fourteenth century from what they imply in the nineteenth. In tho.se earlier days the cohesion of our national elements was still imperfect. It is only in an advanced state of political development that the social organism exhibits that inilependence of its various parts which Itinds them, whether for good or evil, into one national life. Five centuries ago the divisions of society, now so minute and intertwined, were few and *Hearn, Government of England, page 417. + Government of England, page 423-5. 128 distinct. There was little in common between the bui-gher and the knight. There was still less sympathy between these two classes and the cleric. The general interest, thei-e- fore, and the general approbation, which were assumed to be inseparable, wei-e the intei-est and approbation of each great class of the community. Each class was concerned in its own affairs and was neither competent nor desirous to interfere with the affairs of others. Edward accordingly seems to have designed to establish councils of advice for each of the great interests that then existed in the kingdom. While he retained his own authoi-ity and the services of the Great Council for legislation, he invited the assistance of all the tenants of the crown, either ])ei-sonally or through their representatives, on all questions relating to estates or tenures ; of the clergy in like manner on all questions relating to ecclesiastical affairs ; and of the citizens and burgesses, through their representatives, on all matters relating to trade and commerce. It had at all times been the duty of these several classes to meet for the ptir])ose of considering the wants of the king and the propriety of affording him ])ecuiiiary assistance. They were now asked under a more complete organisation to perform the additional function of giving to their sovereign information and advice as to their own respective wants and the means of their satisfaction. Thus out of the financial assemblies Edward formed special consultative bodies, each dealing exclusively with its special class of subjects. In legislating upon these several classes of subjects he sought the advice of the ai)i)ropriate assembly, although the legislation still proceeded from the king and his council. But in matters not directly affecting any of these classes, or when no charge was directly imposed upon any of them, the king in his council was free to legislate as he saw tit." It will be noticed that these assemblies were both primary and representative. The assembly of military tenants was originally altogether primary. In 1254 we find the first recorded instance of the introduction of re[)resentatives. The lesser tenants, who had been hitherto summoned by the sheriffs, were seiiously burdened by the expenses incurred on account of their long journeys and the poor roads. In the above year, " Heniy III., in contemplation of a campaign in Gascony, and in addition to other preparation.s, commands each of the sheriffs to send his council two good and discreet knights of his county, whom the men of the county shall have chosen for this |)urpose, in the str-atl of each and all of them, to consider along with the knights of other counties, what aid they shall grant the king in such an emergency."* One year later the lower clergy were tirst asked to send representatives. Ten years later occurs the first representation of cities and boroixghs. These had heretofore been looked upon as little more than despised labor organizations. But their wealth and influ- ence had now greatly increased, and they were destined to i)lay an important part in all financial matters. This innovation was not the work of the king but of Simon de Mont- fort, the libei-al patriot, who summoned both the knights of the counties and the burge.sses, because in his revolt against the king he found his natui-al adherents among the lower oi-ders of the people. He directed the towns to send to his parliament two of their more discreet and wo)"thy citizens or burgesses. There were, then, at the end of the thirteenth century, four distinct legislative assem- blies with recognized functiors. The Great Council of Nobles, which with the king was the ultimate law-making body ; the assembly of military tenants, including members of the Great Council, and the representative knights fi-om the counties ; the clergy, including all the highei" clergy and representatives of the lower ; the bui'gesses, including the repre- sentatives of the towns. How these assemblies coalesced into the modern bicameral sys tern is an interesting evidence of the growing community of feeling and interests among the middle classes of the English people. The clergy were gradually deprived of their power to legislate even on ecclesiastical affairs. The higher clergy, then, merely retained the place which they had always held in the Great Council, and this became the modern House of Lords. The lower clergy, so far as they had political influence, were merged in the electorate of the counties and the towns. In the year 1333 occurs the first recorded instance of the joint deliberation of the knights and the burgesses, though they had pi-evi- ously submitted to the king and council their joint petitions. And in the latter part of the fourteenth century they appointed a ]iermanent speaker to represent them before the higher authorities. This coalescence of town and county was the origin of the House of *Hearn, page 477. 129 Commons. It was based on newly discovered common interests and the need of combina- tion against the exactions of the Great Council and the aristocracy. It was tlie primitive- consolidation of the Knights of Labor and the Farmer's Alliance. When we turn to the colonial history of the United States, we tind in each of tlu? colonies a curious repetition in miniature of the evolution of re[)resentative assemblies which took place centuries before in the mother country. As truly as the physical child, according to the biologists, repeats in a few months its ancestral history of geological a»es, so did these children of English liberty pass in a few years through that development which in medieval England was the slow and painful growth of centuries. In all cases we find the same problems and the devices of representation to meet them. There were no studied theories nor contemplation of general principles, but the development took place in almost that unconscious way which we observe in the natural world. There were im- mediate pressing exigencies, and the colonists, with determination to maintain their liber- ties, took the shortest way of meeting them. In some of the colonies the full record of the development has not been preserved. What it was can only be surmised from the history of thosi concerning which we have information. It was in Maryland that we see old England most quaintly depicted. The following account is abridged from the scholarly work of Doyle.* " The constitution, as originally conceived by the proprietor, was to consist of a gov- ernor, a council and an assembly. . . An ordinance sent out by Baltimore in 16.'37 vested all judicial power in the governor and council. . . The original deliberative and legislative body, in the case of Maryland, was a primary assembly at which any free- man of the province might present himself and vote. . . At the outset, while tlie col- ony was but a single encampment of log huts, all the freemen might easily meet together for the trifling business of the colony. But as the settlement gradually expanded over a wider ai-ea, how could the planter leave his corn to be eaten by deer, his cattle to stray in the woods, his pig to be stolen by the Indians 1 Every year the assembly would have become more and more a little oligarchy of those living at or near the centre of govern- ment. " One would suppose that the remedy of representation would at once have suggested itself. But before that was adopted a more cumbrous and far less efficient device was tried. In 16-38 the assembly met for the second time. Their proceedings, unlike those of the previous session, are recorded. On this occasion, those who could not appear in person were allowed to send proxies. If such a system avoids the evils incident to a primaiy body, it brings with it other evils of a directly contrary kind. It may be bad that an eneigetic and ever-present minority should have everything its own way. It is worse that energy and constant attendance should count for nothing, and that the voter who dele- gates his power to another should have as full a share in legislation as the \oter who exerts himself to attend. "The evils of this system were amply illustrated in the events of the yeai-. The assembly, undeterred by its failure, [)roceeded to enact a set of laws. . . While the proposals of the as.sembly, or rather a part of it wei-e under discussion, a rival set of laws was sent out by Baltimore. Apart from the intrinsic merits or demerits of the propo.sed laws, it was clearly a most serious question whether the initiative in legislation was to belong to the proprietor or the colonists. . . The division which followed illustrati'd forcibly the evils of the proxy system. The acts sent out by the proprietor were rejecteower of the New Enghinders is manifest throughout the process. At Plymouth the change was effected easily, indeed almost spontaneously and completely, with none of those couipmmises which accompanied it in Maryland. . . "The growth of new townships gave an impulse to the political life of the colony. So long as Plymouth was the only settlement, constitutional machinery of a simple kind -sufficed. Tlie power of making laws was vested in the whole as.sembly of the freemen. The judicial and executive body, called the Court, consisted of the governor and seven Assistants elected by the assembly. . . The addition of Scituate and Duxbury made some .system of delegation neces.sary. Complete representative government did not, however, come at once. In 1636 eight deputies met, four from Plymouth, and two from each of the other colonies, and in conjunction with the court revised and codified the laws. . The selection of deputies was only intended as a temporary measure for a special pui-pose. But in November 1636, another step was taken in tlve direction of a representa- tive system. The functions of the General Assembly were divided. The meetings for legislation were to be kept distinct from those for electing the governor and assistants. At the former the whole body of freemen were to attend as before ; at the latter, proxies were to be allowed. The need for this change was illustrated by the fact that two yeai-s later sixteen freemen were fined for absenting themselves from the a.ssembly. ^' In 1638 the system of representation was definitely introduced, and the functions of the legislative assembly of freemen were definitely transferred to deputies. Plymouth returned four, each of the other towns two. . . Ai)parently the ne»v system did not formally supersede the old. The primary assembly still seems to have remained in theory the supreme legislative body. In practice, the advantages of representation asserted themselves, and the more cumbrous system fell into disuse." In the colony of Massachusetts Bay we find again similar conditions and a similar outcome. " Tlie growth of fresh settlements brought with it an expansion of the constitu- tional machinery of the colony. Of all the colonies that have yet come l)efore us, Vii-ginia is the only one where a system of local representation came into existence at once in full working ordei". In every other case it was reached after a variety of contrivances and com))romises. The reason is plain. Every other colony enjoyed a certain amount of inde- pendence before it had grown large enough to make a local representation either needful or possible. Only in Vii-ginia had the colony the needful materials for a repre.sentative Hssembly at the time when it first acquired the right of self government. It might be thought that the rapid formation of separate plantations would have made ^lassachusetts a second exception. But if it be not a paradox to say so, the constitution of Ma.ssachusetts was older than the existence of the colony. The legislature of the colony was simply the general court of the company transferred across the Atlantic. At tlie same time the dis- persal of the settlers at once unfitted that body for the work of legislation. The remedy first applied to this difficulty was, not to fiubstitute a representative assembly for a in-imary one, but to limit the functions of the court. It is clear that there was an oligarchic^il temper at work among the leading men in Mfissachu.setts. The action of this was plainly shown by the transfer of all legislative rights from the court of freemen to the goveinor, een personal, but always organic. . . Our electors have always voted, not because they were men or even because they were Englishmen, but because they were freehoidei's of a particular county, or because they were citizens or burgesses of a particular city or town. Their right is circumscribed by locality. . . Thus our system of repre.sentation is the representation not of inteiests or opinions or of population, but of population organised. It regards men not merely as men, but as neighbors. In one sense it is obviou.sly true that a district cannot have other rights than those of the people who inhaltit it. But the rights of a district are those of its organized population. Its inhabitants by virtue of theii- residence have, as compared with the inhabitants of other places, separate habits and interests and associations, jjcculiar views on public aflairs, and pCL-uliai- .sym|)athies and modes of thouglit. These distinctive habits and feelings produce a distinctive ciiaraoter. The individunlity, the indept-ndent life of each political body is established, and it actpiires .and desires to e.x])ress its sjiecial shade of feeling and thought." t This is the original and primitive idea of representation. But today the ii\stitution is quite difterent. The change has come so gradually that it is haidly appreciated. The problem of naiionalisation has been fully settled. Not only the kingdom of England but the kingdom of Great Britain has liecome a single oiganism. Localities have lost their significance and their adoration. Railways, telegraph, the newspaper press, internal traffic and communication and political rei)resentation have brought the people together. Foreign relations, a world-wide system of colonies and dependencies, national armies and navies liave exalted a national flag and inspired a national patriotism. The repr.'.sentative to- dav is therefore not a mere agent of a clo.se cor|)oration, having geiu-ral powei-s, it is true. but speaking and acting only for his constituents. Besides this, .says Hearn, " he is a member of the supreme council of the Crown. He is to give tlie king true and faithful *Cited by Bourinot, Local Government in Canada, page '24. ■f- Hearu, Government of England, p. 501-2. 134 advice to the best of his judgment. . . Thus, although lie has been selected by the electoi'S or a portion of the electors of a particular district, he repi-esents not merely those who voted for him, or even the inhabitants of his district, but the whole kingdom."* Mr. Hearn in continuing, holds that this was the ancient conception and usage. However that may be, its significance was not a])preciated so long as the great council i-etained the chief legislative powers. When the representative body became supreme tlien it could be said in the words of Burke,t " Parliament is not a congress of ambassadoi'S from different and hostile interests, which interest each must maintain as an agent and advocate against the other agents and advocates. But parliament is a deliberative assembly of our nation with one interest, that of the whole, where not local j>urposes, not local prejudices, oiight to guide, but the general good resulting from the general reason of the whole. You may choose a member, indeed, but when he is chosen he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of pai'liament." In the United States, too, tiie problem of representative government from the earliest times until the reconstruction jieriod, which followed the war of 1861-65, was that of con- solidation and union. It passed through three stages. The first was the union of counties and towns into independent colonies. The second was the confederation of states for mili- tary revolt. The third was that of nationality. By the first our state legislatures have arisen. By the third our national Congress. A division of powers between state and national legislatures has recognized a diflference between state and national questions. But each in its own sphere stands for a unified people. The representative in the state legisla- tui-e, no matter from how remote a county, does not represent alone that county. He i epre- sents the people of the state. He legislates upon the common interests of all. And so it is with the national Congress. The senators represent in a peculiar sense semi-sovereign states, and partake of the nature of ambassadors, and the re])resentatives come more directly from the people of the states, but both are national and not local ofl^icials. They draw their salaries from the national government. They vote upon the connnon interests of all the states and all the people. The members from California make laws for the peo- ple of Florida. In Canada, the original problem of I'epresentative government closed with the British North America Act of 1867. At that time an independent nation was practically consum- mated. 2, On account of the long-developing organic nature of the whole English nation, many of the questions and policies which were considered in ancient times as local and class questions, and were ti-eated by separate assemblies, are now national questions in which evei-y citizen and every individual has a pressing interest. In the 13th century, export and import duties were the especial interest of the merchants and buyer.s. It was upon their petition that customs tariffs were imposed, and the other assemblies were not consulted. So too, with mercantile law. Questions relating to the tenure of land were referred only to the assembly of militaiy tenants, and the greatest statutes of English real property were determined without consulting the burgesses or the clergy. The clergy managed their enormous estates without reference to other assemblies. And the great council enacted laws of a political nature, like the government of Ireland and Wales or foreign relations which were supposed to have no concern for clergy, knights and burgesses, without consulting these popular bodies. But all of these questions now affect every Englishman. They are national questions, and the representatives who deliberate and legislate ujjon them, must do so from the standpoint of the nation, and not from that of their locality or class. More important as a national question than any that have been mentioned, is that of taxation and expenditure. It would be unthinkable to-day to leave these mattei'S to the determination of those sections and classes which were immediately interested. The same is true of the United States and Canada. The intercommunication of all kinds has so bound together the states and provinces into an organic whole, that national laws are vital to the interests of each. Foreign relations, currency, customs duties, are national questions, and we have seen citizenship and rights of property come under federal * Hearn, p. 506. + Quo ted by Hearn, p. 507. 135 protection, and federal control has reached out for the two most influential business interests, banking and railways. Federal interference has grown into marvellous nimitica- nons, and with the consolidation of enormous trusts and syndicates, we may expect to see it still further extended. 3. Growing out of these histoi-ical conditions we can perceive the impressive si<'niti- cance of the modern growth of national political parties. Before there were national ipiestions there were no national parties. But even the early development of party divisions was on territorial lines. The Whigs were almost unknovvn in the counties, and the Tories unknown in the cities. Consequently, there was no important minority in either division which was unrepresented. Cities were unanimous on national questions, and .so were the counties, because the only im[)ortant question they had to meet was the demand of tlie king for additional subsidies. More or less the distinction between city and county continues to the present day, but district lines have been changed from their oi-iginal boundaries, villages and counties are thrown together, national jjarties are often evenly divided in the territorial disti-icts, and a representative of the majority, therefore, does not represent the opinions and wishes of the mass of his constituency. The minoi-itv is simply crushed for the time being. In Canada the character and political influence of political parties are about the same as in England. But in the United States this power has reached a height unattained by those of any other country. This power is the growth of not more than fifty years, and especially has it made its greatest advances since the period of tiie civil war. The jieculiar feature of the development has been the supremacy of tliat new force in political parties, the "machine." Party organisation is an essential element of part5^ governnient, l>ut the extent, perfection and detail of this organisation in the United States is something bewildering. It conti'ols both candidates and voters with an iron-like grip, and thev glory in their subjection. These parties are not divided on territorial lines. They are divided on national questions. In colonial times parties were unknown. Or, rather, we might say there was a court party represented by the governor and his council. But the legislatures, the representative bodies, practically stood for a united people. The upper house being appointed by the governor, the lower house was drawn together as a single unit, representing all the i)eople. No matter from what county a representative was returned, he was the ablest man in the couty, for the j^eople were unanimous in their wishes to withstand the i)arty of prerogative. Furthermore, the districts were all alike, being exclusively agricultural, and a representa- tive from one was in harmony with the people of the others. There was no minority in any district to be unrepresented by a delegate chosen by the majorit}'. But to-day, the legislature, instead of being the organised representMtives of tiiose who protested against the government, is itself the govei-nment. Within its halls occur the conflicts for the control of the fortunes and destinies of the people. There is no ojit- side enemy whose constant presence enforces hai'inony and mutual help. But two great parties stand face to face in conflict, and whichever masters the legislature masters the people. 4. Furthermore, from the earliest times suflVage both in England and the United States was narrowly limited. In England this continued until the latter half of the present century. The masses of the {)eople were not considered as citizens or entitled to political consideration. In the counties, serfs, copyholders, and the lesser freemen were e.xcludcd from the suff'rage. Only the freehold knights were voters. The cities were close corjiora- tions, made up of the mayor and aldermen and a few of the leading men of the guil.ls.^ Altogether, perhaps not one-fifth of the adult male poi)ulation were entitlecl to vote for representatives to parliament. As a result, these classes in their respective ilistricts were practically unanimous on the few questions of national interest foi which they wore required to select representatives. But in modern times the great political (piestions are those which grow out of the citizenship of the manual laborers, the former serfs. They have to do directly or remotely with the profound problem of the distribution of wealth and the betterment of the social conditions of the lowest classes. These classes are distributed throughout all districts. They form the great foundation structure of every community, upon which the other classes are built. They form the majority of the voters. They feel that they have not heretofore been represented in the councils of the nation. t 186 They are unaccustomed to political power, and therefore they are the fertile soil for dema- gogues and partisans. They hold the balance of power. They must be placated and jiacitied. The party or candidate who )>resents to them the most specious appeals wins tlie day. They themselves are not allowed to combine according to their natural divisions and elect their acknowledged le.iders to parliament. Could they combine throughout the king- dom, the labor unions scattered as they now are through a hundred districts would unite, and the more intelligent of the laborer^ would select those who represent them as a body, just as they select their union presidents and secretaries. As it is, they are forced into artificial territorial divisions and are compelled, along N\itli the whole of the electorate, to submit to the dictation of the candidates who appeal to the more ignorant, thouglitless, prejudiced and easily influenced minority. The trial of representative government in England did not really begin until 1867 and 1884 when the laborers were enfranchised. We have seen how the local governments of the American colonies were close corporations. In the South, it was the aristocratic families, united by ties of blood and marriage. In New England it was the church members, who alone held the suffrage. But in the United States of to-day not oidy the native Anglo-Saxon is admitted to the suffrage, but also millions from antagonistic races. Especially is this true of the cities. If England is threatened by the widening of the suffrage far more so is the republic of America. 5. Again, legislation in the olden times was very limited both in the number of subjects discussed and the details of the reguiations. The })eople were satisfied to live according to the customs of their ancestors. Governmi?nt was simply a mattei" of administration. The king, his council, his officers, and his judges were not called upon to make new laws but to learn what were the customs of the land and 'hen to act accordingly. But to-day, legislation is the most intricate of arts depending uj)on the profoundest of sciences, and dominating the most vital of human interests. There are hundreds of pressing problems requiring legislative direction, which the assemblies of Edward I, or even the Parliaments of George III never dreamed of as having a social importance. " Time was, " says Wodrow Wilson,* " in the infancy of national I'epresentative bodies, when the representatives of the peoi)le were called upon simply to give or refuse their assent to laws prepared by a king or hy a jjrivileged class in the state, but that time is far passed. The modern representative has to judge every weighty plan, ))reside over every important reform, provide for every passing need of the state. All the motive ])Ower of govei'nment rests with him. His task, therefore, is as complex as the task of governing, and the task f governing is as complex as is the play of economic and social forces over which it has to 2)reside. Law-making now moves with a freedom, now sweeps through a field unknown to any ancient legislator ; it no longer provides for the simple needs of small city states, but for the necessities of vast nations, numbering their tens of millions." The modern legislator must therefore, be a well equi])j)ed man. He must give the greater part of his time to parliamentary duties, and above all must have a long experience in his particular art. These qualifications, it is true, England secures in her parliamentry leaders better than other countries. But new conditions are fast making shoi't-term men of the majority of the members of parliament. This tendency is checked only by that wise custom which permits the election of non-residents to i-epresent a district. To the American, bound by the three spirits of local i)ride, local spoils and democratic equality, this custom is incomprehensible. Indeed, it rests on tradition. So important is this principle as a relief from the restrictions of the district system that the following account given by Hearn f of its origin and purpose is in place. " There is no room for doubt that originally members of parliament were required to V)e residents in their respective electorates. The early writs invariably commanled the election of two knights de comitatu tuo, and in like manner of citizens and burges.ses of each city or town in the bailiwick. In the first year of Henry V an act was passed expressly providing that the knights should be resident, at the time of their election, in the counties for which they shall be elected, and that the election for cities and boroughs •shall be of citizens resident and enfranchised in the same cities and boroughs, and none * The State, p. 583. t Government of England, 524-5 137 others. This statute, which was merely declaratory of the common hiw, was comfinne.l more than once in the following reign. Tlie disposition to infringe upon tlie oM custom which thus called for legislative interference, was i)erliaps due to the desire of employing the services of i)rofessional men. We have seen at least that practising lawyers were excluded. But to whatever circumstance it may have been due, the tendency against the •old restriction was too strong to be resisted. Non-residents were constantly elected. . . At least in 1681 Lord Chief Ju.stice Pemberton ruled that " little regard was to be bad to that ancient statute (1 Henry V.) forasmuch as the common practice of the kingdom had been ever since to the contraiy. ..." " This limitation was originally designed to secure a trustworthy statement of the wants and opinions of each electorate. But for its continuance another and different reason prevailed. The old restriction was sometimes useful as a [)rotection agaijxst the nomination of the Crown or the neighboring nobles. . . . But even tliose who on the.se grounds defended the old law were not insensible to its inconveniences. A com- promise was suggested (in the reign of Elizabeth) that one of the members for each borough should be a gentleman resident, if not actually in the town, at least in the neighborhood, and the other should be a man of learning " who could si)eak; ". The principle of residency was indeed inconsistent in two respects with our political developement. While this law was in force and the motives upon which it w,is founded were influential, no tiue conception •could be formed of our national representation. Further, if it had been enforced, the great popular movement of the 17th century would have wanted its most prominent intellectual leaders. In the time of the Tudors and for some time afterwai'ds, none of the country gentlemen had or could acquire any political skill. Statesmanship was then exclusively -confined to the servants of the Crown. The country party was thjM'efore obliged to seek its leaders from the Bar ; and for the most jtart the leaders thus chosen could not and did not reside in the towns which they represented. Nor was the influence of the lawyers <;onlined to the services, great though they were, which tlipy lendered in their capacity of leaders. It was their p)rofessional habits and modes of thought which brought to the contest that strong legal character which it never afterwards lost." The American people have never suffered by the principle of residency as would the English because political ability has always been moie widely diffused. But it is well- Ivnown that our ablest and most experienced leaders are often found in districts where their own party is in a minority, or e^se a hostile legislature es{)ecially creates such a district lor them. The English system enables a party to keep its great leaders in parliament for a life time. There can always be found a number of districts which have sure majorities foi- the given ])arty, and in the.se districts the national leaders of the party can be \>ut in nomination. Thus the English House of Commons is an assemljlage of giants, re))re.sent- ing not localities but the nation. In the course of decade after decade of honoral)lt' service they acquire knowledge, experience, wisdom and national views, so nece.ssary to manage the affairs of a modern emj)ire. This makes possible too, an institution whicii cannot exist in America, the executive administration of the country by a cabinet chosen from the members of the legislature. 6. There is one feature of modern legislation so extremely important in its intiuence upon legislative bodies themselves, as to demand si)ecial notice. This is the private corporation with its professional lobby. Corporations are as i-ecent as party machines, and both have grown up together like Siamese twins. The professional lobbyists are nearly always the managers of the political machine. Tlu^y carry in their pockets tin- political fortunes of the legislator.s. The "Third House" is really the modt-rn legislature. at least in the United States. Corporations from their very inceptiim, and in then- m their sayings, nothing is more popular than denunciation of aldermen, state representatives and congressmen. These diatribes do not extend to other officei-s of government, but are hea|ed u|jon the legislators. Every winter when Congress is in session, the business interests are reported to be in a gasp of agony until it adjourns. And the cry that goes up towards the latter days of a state legislature's session, is sickening." A Sacramento daily has just earned the petty spite of the California legislature by printing across its title page in glaring type tlie words "Thank God the legislature adjourns today". And tii.- San Francisco Bulletin is quoted as recently saying " It is not i>ossible to speak in measure.l terms of the thing that goes by the name of legislature in this state (California). It has of late years been the vilest deliberative body in the world. The assemblage has become *Stubbs, I., 424 tSee Bigbee, The City Government of Boston, in Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science, 5th series, page 22, + Bigbee, page 23. 140 one of baudits inst'ad of law-makers. Everything within its prasp for years has been for sale. The connnissions to lii^h office which it confers are the outward and visible signs of felony rather than of careful and wise selection." Every state in the Union can furnish examples more or less approaching to this. These outcries are not made alone in a spirit of partisanship, but respectable ])arty jiapers denounce unsparingly legislatures whose majorities are of their own political com- plexion. The people at lai-ge join in the attack. They have come thoi'oughly to distrust their law-makers, chai-ges of corruption and bribery are so abundant as to be taken as a matter of course. The honored histoiical name of alderman has become a stigma of suspicion and disgrace. As might be ex{)ected this distrust has shown itself in many far-reaching constitutional changes. The |>owers of state and city legislatures have been clipped and trimmed and shorn until they offer no inducements for ambition. The ])Owers of governors, mayors and administrative boards have been correspondingly increased. The growing popularity of the executive veto is one of the startliing facts of the times. Cities have been known to turn out in mass-meetings to illuminate the heavens with bonfires in honor of a mayor's veto which has rescued theui from outrages jind robberies perpetrated by theii- own law- fully elected "city fathers." The latest reform in municipal constitutions has been the transfer of many legislative functions and a great deal of the legislative discretion from the city councils to the mayors. This lias been done on the plea of concentrating responsi- bility, and there are many people who would be glad to see municipal legislatures abolished altogether and their duties handed over to the mayor and his cabinet. The recent constitutions of the new states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Mont ma and Washington, may be taken as a consensus of the American peoi)le at the present time regarding the chai-acter and functions of State legislatures. Says an observing writer,* " The work of the four conventions brings into sharp relief the essential difference between the tendency and the character of political changes in England and in the United State.s. In England every reform in government for a thousand years has had for its immediate purj)Ose the limitation of the powers of the executive ; in the United States since 1776 the opinion has steadily grown that it is safer to limit the ])owei-s of the legislature and to increase tlie powers of the executive. Englishmen distrust the Crown and grant almost unlimited powers to Parliament ; Americans distrust the legislattire, esi)ecially the state legislatures, and give great powers to their president and their governors. . . The' articles in the new state constitutions on the "legislative Department" are long and detailed. They seem to be composed by the framers in order to declare what the respective legisl itures cannot be permitted to do. . . The perusal of these new constitutions suggests that the people have lost confidence in their state legislatures, and that the conventions, responsive to this feeling, have sought to anticipate great evils by limiting the powers of the legislature, or by substantially limiting them in declaring by what procedure the legislature shall act, on what it shall not act, and to what extent it may act. The chief limitations on the legislature are with respect to special or private legislation, corporations, political corruption amomg members, taxation, and powei- to use the credit of the state. . . "Among administrative officers (all of them filled by popular election) are several of economic significance, as those of insurance, railroad, agriculture, and labotir, prison and ])ublic land commissions. The first state constitutions knew nothing of such offices When are considered the demands upon the modern legislature, and the character of that, legislature, according to the confessions of the American people in their state constitutions, the tendency to short legislative sessions once iu two years is expressive of a ho])e of escape from both " over-legislation," which is merely the activity of zealous, but as is sometimes the case, incompetent men, antl inadequate legislation which is the ciinfession of moe politicians. It may be that the creation of bureaus in the modern state government is practically the soltition of the ))roblem how to esca})e the danger of a session of the legislation." The judiciary, too, has gained materially at the expense of the legislatures, both in the ex|)ress provisions of constitutions and in the popular apj)roval. Conscious of the feelings - of the people, judges have steadily encroached upon the very fields of legislative discretion, and, reluctantly it may be, have more and more assumed the right to set aside legislative * F. N. Thorpe in Annals- of American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1S91. 141 enactments. This has become boldly apparent in numerous recent decisions overthro\vin«- such peculiarly political statutes as those which redi.stiict a state for the election of le.'is"^ lative representatives. This interference of the judiciary, however justitialjle the reasons can only be frauglit with danger to itself. It is thereby forced into the political aien.i.' where are the heated questions of political expediency, at the expense of its integrity in tht- field where administration and justice alone are its sphere. Nevertheless, the pidiciary i.s forced by the people to take this step, as a further limitation \ipon their discredited legislatures. This whole movement is portrayed by Mr. Horace Davis, in the followin,' words:* "The executive, all powerful at the beginning (of colonial history) was reduced to a mere shadow of its former glory, and in these later days is regainino^ some of its lost power. The legislature, at first weak, afterwards absorbed the powers of the other departments, but is now much reduced again. Throughout all these changes the dignitv ami power of the judges have steadily increased. . . Their greatest power, most amnzin"' to Europeans, is the authority to set aside a statute which they hold to be in conflict with the written constitution. No other courts in the world possess this unitpie power. The scope of this power to declare a law unconstitutional, is much broadened by the modern tendency to limit legislation. The early constitutions were very brief, containin;,' little more than a bill of rights and a skeleton of the government, leaving all details to the descretion of the legislature. Now all this is changed, the bounds of the diffeient departments^are carefully defined, and the power of the legislature is jealously curbed, particularly in the domain of special legislation. It will be seen at a glance that this enlarges the relative power of the courts. It limits the legislature, and widens the field of the judiciary at one stroke." These tendencies to restrict the legislature which are showing themselves so unmis- takably, and this demoralization of legislative bodies, must be viewed as the most alarming features of American politics. Just as the duties of legislation are inci-easing as never before, in order to meet the growing vital wants of a bewilderingly com[)lex civilization, the essential organs for performing those duties are felt to be in a state of collapse. The legislature controls the purse, the very life-blood of the city, the state, the nation. It can block every other department. It ought to stand neare.st to the lives, the wislus, the wisdom of the people. It is their necessary organ for constituting, guiding, watching and supporting all the de|)artments of government. Above them all, then, it ought to )><> eminently representative. But it is the least representative of all. Surely, then, for the Amei'ican people above all others, and in a high degree, too, for all nations who depend upon representative institutions, it is pertinent to inquire carefully into the fundamental nature of these institutions, the causes of their fiiilures and the means if any can be found, which will adapt them to'the exigencies of modern times. It will likely be found that there is no simple refoim that will revive them. Many different reforms must cooperate in so complex and momentous a jjroblem. But there is at least one feature that reaches the fundamental nature of these institutions, with which all the others are intimately related and out of which they grow. This feature is the system of electing each represent- ative by a single district established on territorial lines. As has been shown, this is an inheritance from the past, when representation was in its infancy and when its problems were very different from those of the present. It was adopted without any political philosophising, and has been inherited, like complexion and hair and real estate, without any questioning. To-day is the time to test it and see whether it suits new conditions, and if it is found wanting to devise a system which shall be based on solid foundations adapted to modern needs. CHAPTER III. THE SINGLE ME.MBKRED DISTRICT. The position of the modern voter who essays to independence of choice is well known to be an unenviable one. When he comes to tlie polls to cast his vote he rinds that then- •American Constitutions-^ohns Hopkins University studies in History ami Political Science. 3rd series, pages 55, 59. 142 is just one candidate to be chosen for any given office. He finds that through the machinery of the ]jolitical party with wliich he has been accustomed to vote, there is one candidate offered to him. There are practically but two candidates in the field — those of the two great parties. It is known to every one that one of these two will be elected. If the voter is dissatisfied for any reason with the nominee of his own party there are three courses open to him; to vote for the opposing candidate, to vote for a third candidate, or to stay at home. It is likely that his dissatisfaction with the opposing candidate is far more e.\treme than for his own party's. Only in periods of oxcejjtional unrest or as a protest af^ainst an exceptionally corrupt candidate do large numbers of voters make so radical a revolt as to go entirely over to the enemy. The great majority of the dissatisfied simply stay at home. This is their only comfortable way of condemning their party's nominee. But should they be intensely exaspei-ated, or should they be of an uncompromising turn of mind, they may go to the extreme of nominating and voting for a third candidate. In this case their offence is even worse than if they vote for the principal opposing candidate. They indeed give him a half vote, just as they do when they stay at home, but they gain the opprobrium of a "crank" and the scorn of having "thrown their votes away." More bitter than the hatred towards rivals, says Bryce,* is the hatred of Boss and Ring towards those members of the party who do not desire and are not to be appeased by a share of the spoils, but who agitate for what they call reform. They are natural and permanent enemies ; nothing but the extinction of the Boss himself and of bossdom altogether will satisfy them. They are, moreover, the common enemies of both jiarties. Hence in ring-governed cities professionals of both parties will sometimes unite against the reformers, or will rather let their opponents secure a place than win it for themselves by the help of the " independent voce." Devotion to " party government," as they under- stand it, can hardly go further." In this way the party machine is the master of the situation. It alone can name the candidate, the only check upon it is the fear of the bolt on the part of the voters. This fear is reduced to a minimum. Though there may be loud protests and a vigorous show of independence it is well known that most of the protesters will fall into line on election day rather than see the other party win. Add to the foregoing the fact that disti-icts are bounded more or less arbitrai-ily, so as to include heterogeneous elements of ])opulation, and that boundaries are frequently changed, and we have an additional reason for the supremacy of the party organization. The voters have very few inte)'ests in common. They see little of each other ; they have few o those general and social relations that would accustom them to join and work togetherf They do not meet in mass meetings as in the old New England town meeting, where individuals of all parties come together and discuss in public the affairs of their district, and the qualifications of candidates before the candidates are nominated. They must therefore look to their party organization for the dictation of a policy and the designation of a candidate. It is in the party that they find their common meeting place. The party organization is a more or less close corporation composed of a series of practically self-perpetuating committees, the committees coriesponding to the different elec- tion areas. The l)arty primai'y of the smallest division the township or the ward — -is the foundation of the system. But the primary is in the hands of its standing committee. A very small percentage of the party voters, for some leason or another, attend the primaries. The majoi'ity of the party voters are too bvxsily employed in private callings, or they find the work of primaries and conventions distasteful, or they are systematically barred out. In cities the percentage ranges from two to ten. In the townships from ten to forty. A majority of the voters in these primaries, then, elect delegates to the iiominating conventions or nominate local candidates. This is the case with botii the ruling parties. These candidates are the only ones between whom the voters can choose at the elections. The nominating convention is therefoi-e practically the electing con- vention. If this be so, we are faced by the fact that our public officials instead of being elected by a majority of the voters, as is fondly supposed, are elected by a minority of a minority of a majority. And in case the election is determined by a i)lui'ality vote or a sufficiently lai'ge number of voters have absented themselves from the j)olls, the candidate is elected by a minority of a minority of a minority. * Amer. Com. vol. II, page 3. 143 I do not mean that the minority who have this power can use it autocratically. Tliey must keep before themselves constantly, the qualities of their candidate which would promote or^ mar his popularity. They must nominate a man who, as they say, is " available." But within this limit, unless the popular interest has been aroused by some unusual emergency, they have a wide field of autocracy. Such a system results inevitably in the selection of weak and inefficient officei-s and representatives. They are not necessarily corrupt, and taking the country as a whole, they are very rarely corrupt. But they are tools and figure-heads. Confining ourselves to tiie case of representatives and councilmen, let us notice more fully the reasons whv inefiioient men are chosen. In the first place, the area of choice is arbitrai-ily limited. Ti is a universal principle in elective constituencies, that the larger the area over which an election district extends the more distinguished and capable are the candidates of all parties. In all districts representatives must be chosen from the ranks of the i)arty which happens to be in the n)ajority in the given district. It is wholly improbable that the able men of a party will be distributed about one by one in the .small districts where the partv has its majorities. But even were they so benev-olently disposed, the chances are alace them at its mercy. It is a mistake to suppose that there is a large amount of corruption. Legislators fall into the nets of lobbyists mainly because of inexperience and incapacity. The lobbyists them- selves ai-e the shrewdest, brightest and most influential men of the state or nation. They often control the party spoils, and an ambitious legislator cannot afifoi'd to antagonise them. The lobby is organised far better than the legislature itself. It has its great chiefs who band together. All of the corporations interested in legislation practically combine as a unit. Then these able and honorable chiefs employ their I'esources of argument and suggestion with individual legislators and before comniittees. They fully size up every individual who is in their way. But if their honorable methods are inade- quate they turn the legislator in question over to the petty lobbyist who carries the ])Ocket-book. Their own hands are clean. The power of the lobby is found mainly in the fact of the party machine. The lob- byists are usually the managers of the machine. They control state and national party 145 spoils and offices. They have the political future of individuals in their hands. They are the actual leaders in party politics. There must be leadershii) somewhere. The only question is, shall the leaders be elected to the legislature by the people or shall they con- trol the legislature from outside as mere irresponsible private citizens ? As lon<^ as the people are [prevented from electing the leaders they wish to positions of responsibility, there will surely arise these self-constituted leaders whose shrewdness gives them control over the weaklings and hirelings who are actually elected. The lack of leadership on the floor of the legislative bodies is shown also in the fruit- less bickerings and factious combinations which so often prevent a legislature from accom- plishing any results. A party in the majority needs to be held together through conhdence in some leader or leaders. But their forces are often scattered and legislation is blocked. It is needless to say that this is the prime opportunity for the lobby. The district system too, exalts local interests above the general interests of the state or nation. Legislation is too often a mere exchange of favours between localities. Perhaps the most glaring weakness and injustice of the district system is the opportunity it gives a majority party to wholly crush out and disfranchise the minority. This is seen flagrantly in the " Gerrymander." But even where the system is employed with the fairest of intentions, it is almost wholly a matter of chance whether the opinions of the people shall be justly expressed or not. This danger was not imminent under the earlier conditions of representation, as has already been shown, when electoral districts were natural units and the problem of representation was the federation of local communities. But now that party lines are drawn through the midst of every coinuuinity, it nearly always happens that one party gains in the elections an unjust pro[)ortiou of representatives at the expense of others. From the theory of the matter it may be shown to be possible to exclude minority parties altogether and to give the entire legislature bodies to the minority. Suppose a legislative body to be composed of forty members elected from forty districts, and that the popular vote at large of the two political parties stands respectively 120,00U and 100,000. If the districts are so arranged as to have 5,500 voters each and the parties happen to be divided in the districts in the same projjortion as they are divided at large, we should have in each district a vote respectively of 3,000 and 2,500. All of the foi'ty candidates of the majority would be elected, and the minority wholly excluded. An extreme result of this kiml though it seldom occui*s, is not unknown. Again it may happen, and often does, that a minority of the popular vote obtains a majority of the representatives. In the case assumed, parties may have been divided in the several districts as follows : — - Party A. Narrow majority in twenty-tive districts, 2,800 x 25 = 70,400 votes. Minority in fifteen districts, average 1,973J x 15 = 29,000 " Total 100,(00 votes. Party B. Minority in twenty-tive districts 2,7*10 x 25 = 67,500 votes. Large majority in fifteen districts 3,500 x 15= 52,500 " Total 120,000 votes. Where a system offers in theory such fruitful oi)portunities it is too much to rxpect party managers from using it. As a result, the district system, in conjunction with party politics, has resulted in the universal sf.reail of the geiiyman.ler. It is .litHcult to 10 146 express the opprobi-ium which ought to be heaped upon so iniquitous a practice as the gerrymander, but its enormity is not appreciated, much for the same reason that a brutal prize fight is not reprobated, provided it be fought according to the rules. Both political parties practise it, and neither can condemn the othe)-. They simply do what is natural^ make the most of their opportunities as far as permitted by the constitution and the sys- tem under which both are working. The gerrymander is not the iniquity of parties, it is- the outcome of the district system. If representatives are elected by districts, there must be some public authority for outlining the districts. And who shall be the judge tO' say where the line shall be drawn 1 Exact equality is impossible, and who shall set the limits; beyond which inequality shall not be pressed "? Every distribution act that has been passed in this or any other country has involved inequality, and it would be absurd to ask a political jtarty to pass such an act and give the advantage of the inequality to the- opposite party. Consequently every distiibution act involves more or less of the featui-e* of the gerrymander. The gerrymander consists simply in constructing districts in such a manner as to economise the votes of one's own party by giving them small majorities in a large number of districts, and cooping up the opposition party with overwhelming majorities in a small number of districts. Tliis may involve a very distortionate and uncomely sha})ing of districts, and the joining together of distant and unrelated localities into a single district. Such was the case in the famous original distribution act of Governor Gerry of Massachu- setts, whence the practice obtained its amphibian name. But it is not always necessary that districts be cut uj) into distortionate shapes in order to accomplish the unjust results of the Gerryinander. A maj) of all the congressional and legislative districts of the United States would by no means indicate the location of all the outrageous gerrymanders. In fact many of the worst ones have been so well designed that they come close within all constitutional requirements. They are made of compact and contigiious territory and have each a population as nearly eqjUally divided as. could be expected. The truth is, that the district system itself is so vicious that constitu- tional restrictions cannot keej) it witiiin just bounds. The national congress has attempted to do so by requiriug that districts for congressional re[>resentatives must be compact and of contiguous territory and of neax'ly equal population. But the law is everywhere disregarded. Parties are compelled to disregard it, for a gerrymander in a democratic state can be- nullified only by a geirymander in a rej)ublican state. As a result of the district system the House of Representatives in congress can scarcely be entitled to the honor of a representative body. It has never had a representation in proportion to the pojjular vote of political ])arties throughout the country,, and at some elections a minority of the people have returned a majority of the representatives.. This- was most strikingly true of the noted Fifty-fii'st congress in which a republican majority of three enacted the famous prohibitoi-y tariff. That this tariff was opposed by a majority of the peo|)le is evidenced by the popular revulsion which at the next election re- turned a majority of 119 over all and a majority of 128 over the republicans. Such a political avalanche must have had deep causes, and these causes are well shown by the following table taken from an article by Mr. Stoughton Cooley in Belford's Magazine for December, 1891, wherein it aj)peai-s that the acts of that congress, were the work of a, minority of the people. 147 Fifty-First Congress, 1889-1891. Actual. Proportional. E. D. R. I). P. U.L. Alabama 8 5 2 ...... 1 2 10 7 10 3 2 3 1 2 i 3 10 7 6 4 5 2 2 3 7 5 3 2 6 2 1 1 3 17 4 10 1 15 1 1 5 3 1 5 2 5 5 3 3 ■ 2 1 1 7 9 6 5 2 6 4 2 3 5 5 2 5 7 Arkansas California 4 1 3 Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Illinois 13 3 Indiana Iowa 10 i 1 7 2 9 1 5 4 2 4 10 2 9 2 5 Kansas 1 Kentucky Louisiana Maine Mai-yland Massachusetts Michisan .... 1 Minnesota Mississippi 7 in Missouri 4 1 Nebraska 3 ; 1 i 2 4 ""3' 19 i 15 3 6 16 5 1 21 i 7 2 i 1 ' Nevada N. Hampshire 1 ' 4 16 1 5 10 1 N. York North Carolina Ohio Pennsylvania 12 1 Rhode Island 1 S. Carol ina 7 7 11 6 3 5 Texas 7 1 '. 1 1 2 Virginia West Virginia Wisconsin 2 8 4 7 2 5 2 4 164 161 154 163 5 3 This estimate is made upon the basis of the })residential vote for 1888 which stood Democrats 5,536,242, Republicans 5,440,708, giving, wlien allowance i.s made for minor parties, the Democrats 48-63% and the Republicans 4783% of the toUil vot*?. In.stoml, therefore, of a Republican majority of three, and no represeiitiitives of the Peopl»»'s party or the Union Labor party, there should have been seven representatives of the latter two- parties and a Democratic majoi-ity of two over all. The unparalleled revolution which took place in the compo.sition of the next congress, giving the Democrats a majority of 128 over the Republicans, likewise displays the fortuitous consequences of the district system. The Democnitic minority of 49 6% of the membership of the House was changed to a Democratic raajoritj^ of 698%, but in the- 148 popular vote the democratic proportion of 4863% of the total was changed only to a proportion of 55 '3% of the total. In this fifty-second congress there were ninety -nine Republicans, 227 Democrats and nine Independent and Farmer's Alliance men, giving the Democrats a majority of 11 9 over all. If the popular strength had been truly represented the Republicans would have had 141 members, and the Democratic majority would have been only thirty-nine. As it was, 1 68 Democratic votes, giving a majority, were elected by fifteen southern states and the gerrymandered states of New York, New Jei-sey, Ohio and Indiana, where representation was a follows : — In New York, 500,395 Democrats sent twenty-three representatives, and 421,403 Republicans sent eleven representatives. In New Jei-sey, 128,417 Democrats sent five representatives and 114,808 Republicans only two. In Ohio a minority of 350,528 Democrats sent fourteen representatives, and a majority of 360,624 Republicans sent only half as many, while Indiana with a con- greesional vote of 239,858 Democrats and 216,766 Republicans sent eleven Democrats and only two Republicans. Consequently in this state one Democratic vote at the polls was equal to five Republicans. If represeiatation had been proportional. New York would have sent eighteen Democrats and sixteen Republicans, New Jersey four Democrats and ;hree Republicans, Ohio ten Democrats and eleven Republicans, and Indiana seven Demo- crats and six Republicans. Mr. Jolin M. Berry has pointed out in an interesting way that in the I'ifty-second Congress "less than half who voted at the North secured 202 of the 211 representatives from that portion of the country," and that "3,172,999 citizens elected 167 representa- tives, a majority of the 332 in Congress from all the states, both North and South, while 3,304,692 who voted in 167 northern districts failed to elect any. . . Oiie half the northen representatives were elected by less than a quarter of the northern voters, and more than twice as many who voted in the same states did not elect even one. . . In the northern states 2,703,976 votes elected 167 representatives, a majority of Congress from the North and South, while 3,420,246 in the north voting at the same time could not elect even one." In the Fifty-third Congress, 1893-95, if we take the presidential vote as a basis of comparison, we get the following results : — Ticket. Pres. Vote. Representatives. ACTUAL. proport'nal. Democrat , Republican 5,556,562 5,162,874 1,055,424 264,066 11,348 216 129 8 164t 1521 People's Party 31 Prohibition 8 Scattering 12,150,274 353* 355 The Democrats, with 457 % of the votes, secured 61 % of the rej)resentatives, and a majority of 79 over all, whereas they should have lacked 28 of a majority. The Republi- cans, with 42-5 % of the votes, get only 33 % of the representatives; the People's Party, with 8"3 % of the votes, have only 2*2 % of the lepresentatives, and the Prohibitionists, with 2 % of the votes, get no representatives, though entitled to eight. The injustice of the district system is seen sti-ikingly when we observe its eS"ects on new parties or minority parties. Such parties sufier for two reasons. In the case of the dominant parties there is a I'ough equality, because a Democratic gerrymander in one state is likely to be balanced in another by a Republican gerrymander. But a new party can- not establish a gerrymander to suit itself, until it gets control of a state government. Also * Two vacancies, t The share of the ■ scattering " vote is assigned to the Democrats and Republicans. 149 a new party is usually scattered throughout a large number of districts and states, and the district system prevents them from combining to elect their fair share of representatives For example, in the Fifty-first Congress the Prohibitionists should have had five represent- atives and the Union Labor party should have had three, whereas they received none, and in the Fifty- third Congress the People's party should have received thirty-one instead of only eight, and the Prohibitionists should have received eight instead of none. Endless examples might be given from individual states to show the unrepresentative chai-acter of Congressional Representatives. Those states which are close in their political majorities, and whose legislatures alternate frequently, show an endless see-saw of f^eriy- manders. Ohio has perhaps had more of these partisan displays than any other state. It was during the war that the first Republican legislature overthrew a long standing Democratic districting act, the results of which were brought out forcibly by Mr. Garfield in a si»eech in Congress in 1870. He said :- " When I was first elected to Congress in the fall of 1862, the state of Ohio had a clear Republican majority of about 25,000, but by the adjustment and distribution of political power in the state there were fourteen Democratic representatives upon this floor and only five Republicans. The Stnte that cast a majority of nearly 25,000 Republican votes was represented in the proportion of five representatives and lourteen Democrats. In the next Congress there was no great political change in the popular vote of Ohio — a change of only 20,000 — but the result was that seventeen Republican members were sent here from Ohio and only two Democrats. We find that only so small a change as 20,000, changed their representatives in Congress from fourteen Democrats and five Republcians to seventeen Republicans and two Democrats. " Now, no man, whatever his politics, can justly defend a system that may in theory, and frequently does in practice, produce such results as these." The Republicans retained power in the Ohio legislature until 1876 with a consequent unfair advantage in the distribution of Congressional seats. In the latter year u Demo- cratic legislature jmssed a new re-districting act. Since that time there have been eight re-districting acts, the results of which upon the fortunes of the two parties are depicted by the following statistical analysis : — Representation of the State of Ohio in Congress. Congressional Representati^ 'es. Ace. to Actual Repre- Vote. Actua'. Proportional. sentation. Rep. Dem. R. D. 1 R. D. 46th Cong. 1879-81.. 277,875 264,737 9 11 10 10 1 D. vote=l j R. vote. 47th Cong. 1881-83.. 405.042 340,572 15 5 9 1 R. " " 2§ D. " 48th Cong. 1883-85.. 306,674 268,785 8 13 10 1 D. " " 2 R. " 49th Cong. 1885 87.. 395,596 380,934 10 11 10 1 D. " " li R. " 50th Cong. 1887-89.. 336,063 325,629 15 6 10 1 R. " " 2A D. " 51st Cong. 1889-91.. 412,520 395,639 16 5 10 1 R. " - 3 D. " 52nd Cong. 1891-93.. 362,624 350,528 7 U 10 1 D. " " 2\ R. " 53rd Cong. 1 893-95 . . 397,320 407,1-0 9 12 10 10* 1 D. " " li R. •• * Prohibitionists get 1. Representatives to the Fifty-third Congress were elected under a Republican act. and had it not been for a wholly unexpected increase of Democratic votes in soveraK-lose dis- tricts there would have been a Republican advantage similar to those in the 47th. 50th, and 51st Congresses. It will be seen that the Democrats have been in a minority at every Congressional election except the last, yet in four out of the eight elections they have been able to return a majority of the representatives. 150 The following from a writer in the Atlantic Monthly, April 1892, brings out pointedly some of the inequalities of the present system. The apportionment of 1880 gave to " Kansas seven i-epresentatives, which is at the •rate of one for 14 '3 voters in each hundred. In 1882, the Democrats of that State polled 32-2 votes of every hundred cast for Congressmen, but failed to elect one ; in 1884, they mustered 37-2 votes of every hundred cast, but it availed them nothing; in 1886, they rolled up 40 "3 votes of every hundi-ed ])olled witliout breaking the solid Republican dele- gation ; and in 1888, they polled 31 '9 out of every hundred votes cast, v/ith the same result. Not since Kansas was admitted to the Union have the Democrats of that State had a representative in Congress, though they have polled at the different elections from thirty to forty of every hundred votes cast. Minnesota tells the same stoiy. There being ^ve representatives from that State, twenty votes in each hundred should have one ; but the Deznocrats, in 1882, cast 31*9 in every hundred, and in 1884, 40-9 in every hundred, without effect; in 1886, owing to the curious make-up of these same districts, they elected two repre.sentatives, with a vote of 38 8 in the hundred ; in 1888, a vote of 41*2 in the liundred availed them nothing. " That this result is not due to climate, altitude, or the innate depravity of the Re publicans, Kentucky or any other Democratic State can testify. In 1876, the Re])ublicans of Kentucky polled 34 '9 votes of every hundred cast for Congressmen, but failed to «lect one of the ten Congressmen, though ten votes in the hundred should have been sufficient to elect one. The same party, in 1878, cast 28-7 votes of every hundred, without effect. Since that time the Republican vote has ranged from thirty-two to forty in the bundled, securing them sometimes two, but more often one representative. In 1890, the Rei)ublican3 of Missouri polled 39*8 per cent, of the total vote, but failed to elect one of the fourteen representatives from that State ; almost forty out of every hundred men voting cast their ballots for Republican candidates, iind the whole was thrown away, though a trifle over seven in the hundred should liave been sufficient to elect one. The Republicans of Indiana, in 1890, cast 45"8 votes in every hundred and elected two of the thirteen Congressmen ; 45'8 per cent, of the vote secured them 7 "6 per cent, of the represfiutation. In 188S, the same party in Michigan, with fifty per cent, of the vote, had eighty-two per cent, of the Congressmen ; in 1890, it cast forty- iive per cent, of the votes, and got but twenty -seven per cent, of the representation ; with a loss of five per cent, of the vote, the party lost fifty-five per cent, of the representation." In Missouri the Democi-ats elected the entire contingent of fourteen representatives, though the popular vote stood : Dem., 253,736 ; Rep., 184,337 ; Union Labour, 23,4 92. In Indiana, in 1892, the Democrats cast for Congressmen 259,190 votes and elected eleven Congressmen ; the Republicans cast only 5,522 less votes, namely, 253,668, Imt elected only two Congressmen. It required 126,834 Republican votes to elect one Con- gressman against only 23,565 Democi-at votes, in other words, one Dem. vote was worth 5-4 Rep. votes. The Democrats casting 473^ of the total vote secured, 81/3% of the re- presentatives, and the Republicans, with 463-% of the vote, secured only 15^'\ of the representatives. The smallest majority received by any Dem. candidate was forty-two, the largest was 3,081, whereas the smallest majority received by a Rep. candidate was 4,125, and the largest was 8,724. The inequalities of the district .system are not at all confined to the United States. though it is doubtful whether in any other country there have been such wide opportuni- ties for the manipulation of the system. The following table, kindly furnished by the ^Statistician of the Dominion of Canada, through the request of Mr. Sandford Fleming, will ;show that the relative popular weight of parties is not represented in the Dominion House of Commons : — 151 CANADIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1891 AND 1887. 05 — D eg > HI > S +3 on. u . 3 = 1891. o ent. ise 7. >1 J i *l .^•| :SK -S O aj CO , « > ^ t- > i: ^ ^j CO 0) ^ o o^ O -H S S- -«3h O s5 o ^ -^o ■s-o r^ > > s S Canada .... 1,132,201 138,287 13 9 730,457 378,355 352,102 27,692 +27,153 539 1887. Canada .... 993,914 * 190, 327 23-62 725,056 370,342 354,714 J 15, 028 No. of Members Elected. Average Majorities. No. of Members Elected with Majorities under 1(X). No. of Elections by Acclamation. Total. Gov't. Oppos. Gov't. Oppos. Gov't. Oppos. Gov't. Oppos. 215 123 92 476 230 28 22 5 2 215 125 90 307 351 34 25 4 4 Increase over 1882. + Net 1891. t Net 1887. It will be seen that in 1887 517% of the voters elected oT'J;; of the repi-esentatives, 3ind that the government majority of 31 shoulil have been reduced to u maj.iiity of 9, the propoitionate representation being 112 to 103. In the election of 1891, the government majority of 35 should have been only five, since the true proportion with reference to the popular vote was 110 to 104. In this election 51% of the voters elected 580% of tli.- representatives. Says Dr. Sandford Fleming regarding these two elections;* " Tiie government had on this occasion (after the election of 1887) the largest support given to any administration since Canada became a Dominion ; and yet, including every vote polled for government candidates who were defeated at the elections the supporters of the administration represented only 39% of the whole body of electois. The opposition membei-s repre.sented 37% of the whole, counting also the votes |)olled for the defeate.l caiulidates on then- side. Thvis it becomes perfectly obvious that a large majority of the people, whatever party ni.iy rule, has no part whatever through representatives, in the admini.stiation of public affairs. •In the case referred to 61% of the whole body of electors had no share in the government of the country. The adininisti-ation was supported bv the representatives of 39% and it Address at Queen's University, 1891. 152 was opposed by those of 37% in every measure carried in the house by a party vote : leaving as a net balance the representatives of only 2% of the electors to determine legislation, to settle the policy of the govei'nment, and to speak and act for the nation, with the whole weight and supreme authority of parliament. I have presented no extreme case. If we take the lesults of the recent general elections (1891) it will be found that the number of votes cast for government candidates was only .33% of the electors, and the government net majority in the House represents but l|%of the total number of voters on the list." Some interesting results for England are given by Sir John Lubbock in his excellent little book, Rrepresentation.* In the parliamentary elections of 1886, there were con- tested 460 seats. "The total number of votes given were 2,756,900 of which 423,500 were for Unionist, 1,333,400 for Home Rule candidates, or a majority of 90,000 voters for maintaining the Union. According to the votes polled the number of members returned without a contest, viz: 111 Unionists and ninety-nine Home Rulers, would have given 349 Unionists, and 320 Home Rulers, or a majority of twenty-nine. The actual numbers, however, were 394 Unionists and 275 Home Rulers. The Unionists, therefore obtained forty-five seats more and the Home Rulers forty-five fewer seats than they were entitled to from the votes jiolled, making, of course, ninety on a division. Thus, then, in 1874 the Conservatives obtained thirty-eight seats more than their votes entitled them to, count- ing seventy-six on a division; in 18S0, on the contrary, the Liberals had forty-four too many, counting eighty-eight on a division. . . Thus whatever side has the majority, we are confronted with a violent contrast between the voting strength in the constituencies and the voting strength in the House of Commons.t " In my own County of Kent," continues Sir John Lubbock, " the Liberals polled in the three divisions, at the last election, over 13,000 votes, against 16,000 given to their opponents, and yet the latter had all the six seats. Taking all the contested seats in the county, the Liberals polled 32,000 votes against 36,000, and yet the Conservatives carried sixteen members and the liberals only two. | "At the general election in Ireland in 1880, eighty-six seats were contested. Of these the Home Rulers secured fifty-two, the Liberals and conservatives together only thirty-four. Yet the Home Rule electors were only 48,000, while the Liberals and Con- servatives together were no less than 105,000. . . If the uncontested seats were estimated for the results would remain the same." || In the Italian elections of 1884, the popular vote stood in the proportion of 1-85 for the government to I for the opposition, but the representatives in the Chamber of Deputies was 5" 19 for the government to one for the oppo.sition. These election results are enough to show that in all countries the people are not actually repi'esented in their legislative assemblies. This is true whether the gerrymander is employed or not. Perhaps, taking a nation as a whole, the gerrymanders of the United States do not affect the average result, since, as already shown, both parties practise it, and the work of one is offset by that of another. The inequality lies in the very nature of the district system of election. State legislatures show even greater inequalities in the constitution of their legislative bodies tlian do national legislatures. Mr. Berry summarizes the vote in Massachusetts as follows : At the state election of 1892, 162,028 votes elected thirty-five out of forty senators, while 166,776 votes were cast for defeated candidates and 89,391 votes (less than one-fourth of those cast) elected twenty- one senators, a majority of the forty. 116,708 Republican voters elected twenty-five Republican senators while 119,045 Democratic votes failed to elect the Democratic candi- dates for whom they were cast. The Democratic vote was 165,606, and ten Democratic senators were elected. Thus- an average of 16,560 votes wei'e required to elect a Democratic senator. The Republican vote was 185,479, and thirty Republican senators were elected. Thus an average of only 6,182 votes was required to elect a Republican senator. A Republican vote was therefore * The Imperial Parliament Series, London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1890. + Preface. :!:Page 17. - II Page 19. ected. Proportional 21 15 11 14 ^*" 1 1 1 3 153 worth more than 2f times as mxich as a Democratic vote. "A change of less than U% of the vote in twenty-one districts from the candidate elected to the next higher candidate would have elected the latter, and a majority of the senate would then be made up from the opponents of the candidates actually elected. A similar change of G|% in all the districts would have defeated every senator elected, and made his opponent a senator." Municipal elections give results equally disproportionate with state and national. The Chicago elections for aldermen in 1891 were as follows : ' - Total Vote. Democratic 67,024 Republican 63,721 Socialist 3, 1 14 Independent 4,495 U. C 1,308 CD 14,022 In the actual results of the election, it required 3,191 Democrats to elect one alder- man, 5,793 Republicans, and 7,011 CD., while Socialists and Independents were wholly dej)rived of their rightful share of representation. All these statistics go to prove conclusively the excessive inequality and minority domination of the present system wherever applied. But we have not yet reached the end of the story of minority rule under this system. We must enter the legislative hulls in order to see the final chapter. To say nothing further of the rule by the speaker of the house and by the legislative committees by which power is taken out of the hands of the assembly itself, there is on all party questions the imperium in imperio of the party caucus. If one party in a legislature has sixty re|)resentatives out of 100, the policy of the legis- lature is not dictated by an open conference of the sixty with the foi-ty, but, the majority party withdi'aws, and in secret conclave determines by a majority vote what shall be its united action. Thus thirty-five members-— a majoi-ity of the sixty — may determiue the policy of the legislature and enact the laws of the people. This is no fanciful sketch. The power of the party caucus is well known. A man who " bolts " the caucus can have no influence whatever in legislation. He is sure to have several measures of his own which he is anxious to have enacted into laws. There may be appropriations of money for improvements or for state or national institutions m his own district. They may be good measures or they may be bad. But he know.s that in order to carry them he cannot afford to stand out against the wislies of his fellow partisans on other measures. Thus every representative is in the complete power of his^ party caucus. He cannot stay out of the caucus, and when he enters he must agree to abide by its decisions. To say that legislatures are deliberative assemblies under such circumstances is the keenest of irony. They are rather war-camps. Deliberation involves consultation between opposing interests a«d o[)inions and the development of a compromise policy which will be modified more or less by all who have a voice. But the aiucus rule, dominated in the interests of the party rather than of the people, begets intolerance and the overriding of minorities. The party emerges from its caucus like an army fi'om its fortress, runs upon the enemy, listens to no cry for quarter or compromise, beheiuls its own deserters, and then carouses over its own victory. CHAPTER IV. THE GENERAL TICKET. Enough has been said to show the army of evils which spring from the single ilistrict system.' These evils have not escaped observation, and various attempts have been made- to modify them. Especially in France have very interesting experiments been made by the substitution of " ScriUin de Liste" or the " general ticket." Under this method each c-onstituency elects several members, each elector hsis as many votes as there are membere 154 to be elected, and those candidates are declared elected whose votes stand at the head of the list. In this way the majority party gets the entire list and the minority is wholly unrepresented. There are two apjjlications in this system which lead to important differences in the final results. The first is that adopted in several instances in the United States in the election of Boards of county commissioners and Boards of Education, where the entire legislative assembly is elected on a single ticket. With such a system the question of ecjual repiesentation plays no part whatever. The minoi-ity parties are without a single representative. But the system u.sually results in the election of abler men than the district system. This would naturally be expected from what has already bi^en said on this point. A party in making nominations for a large area cannot afford to nominate obscure men. For example, the city of Cleveland, Ohio, recently introduced, by the sanction of the state legislature, a far reaching I'eform in the system of public schools, one feature of which was the abandonment of the district system of electing the school board and the ado]jtion of the general ticket. In the elections which have followed, it is acknowledged on all sides that far abler men were nominated by all parties, and the new boards have been remarkably superior in quality to the old. But the results have been as follows : tigures being given for the election of the year 1892 : — Republican. Democratic. Buss I5,7U Dodge 13,661 Boutelle 15,595 Goulder 13,551 Backus 15,385 Pollner 13,3i)6 House 15,860 Ryan 12,851 Daykin 16,198 Burke 12,8U McMillan 15,690 Hoffman 12,777 Ford 16,036 Plent 12,804 Total 110,518 Total 91,764 It will be seen that the Republicans obtained the entire board, but had there been a change of only i,000 to 2,000 votes from Republicans to Democrats the Democrats would have cariied their entire list. The Cook County (111.) Commissionei"s are elected on a general ticket with the result that in 1892. the Democrats with a vote of 133,000 elected their entire list, and the Republicans with 100,000 voters were unrepresented. The second application of the general ticket is a combination of the district and the general ticket. Districts are made larger and a solid delegation of from five to twenty representatives is sent to the legislature, representing of course only the majority or plurality partj^ of their district. For example, the County of Cuyahoga (including the city of Cleveland) sends repeatedly a solid delegation of six Repul)licans to the Ohio state legislature, and not one Democi-at. The county of Hamilton (including the city of Cin- cinnati t sends a solid delegation of nine Democrats. Re])resentatives to Congress in the first half century of our constitutional history were elected l)y this system. Each state sent to Congress a solid delegation of one party or anothei', elected either by the state legislatures or by populor vote. So unjust did it prove to be that gradually the single district system was substituted by individual state action, and finally in 1842 Congress made the latter obligatory on all the states. Presidential electoi-s are still elected by this .system, though the state of Michigan made in the election of 1892 a notable depai-ture by substituting the single district system. The legislature of 1893, however, controlled by the 0|)posing party, has i"e[»ealed the law and returned to the general ticket. It will, of course, be observed, that a legislative body elected upon this basis will not wholly exclude a minority party. Indeed, the expei-ience of France seems to show that as far as equality of repi-esentation is concerned, the general ticket — scrutin de liste — is as good as the single district ticket — scrutin tVarrondissemenl. In the election of members to the Chamber of Deputies in 1885, conducted on scrutin de liste the Republicans with 4,300,000 votes obtained 366 seats, whereas their numbers entitled them to only 311. 155 while the conservative-monarchists with 3,550,000 votes obtained 202 seats against their rightful proportion of 257. The genei-al ticket was abandoned in 1889, after the trial of only this one election, and the French method at present is the same as that of other countries. But the general ticket is wholly erratic and vicious. Sir John Lubbock gives the following account of the Belgian election in 1884 based on this method. He says ; * "The Chamber is elected in sections, and in June, 1884, tifty-two seats were contested with the following result : — Rksults of the Belgian Elections of June, 1884. anti-ministerialists. ministerialists. Bruxelles. . . . Voters. 9,311 2,340 1,655 1,658 572 1,182 240 282 331 2i>3 818 1,825 605 6,818 Elected. . . 16 Voters. 7,92 1 Elected Louvain. . . 5 1,211 . Nivelles . . . ... 4 1,568 .. Brusfes .. 3 1,024 .. Ostende . 1 556 .. Ypres Arlon . . 3 690 . . .. 334 1 Uarche . ... .. I 229 .. Neufchateau . . . 1 2S6 .. Virtors .. 30" .. 1 Dinant .. 2 502 .. Namur Pliillippeville. Anvers . . 4 .... 2 1,522 536 .. .. .. 8 5,405 .. 50 Tote Total 27,930 il 22,117 2 According to their just proportion, the Anti-Ministerialists ought to have carried 30 seats out of the 52, but they actually secured all but two. This election took place in June. In the following month the same constituencies had to elect representatives in the Senate. Warned by their recent defeat, the Minis- terialists exerted themselves to the utmost, and polled 6,000 more votes. This increase, small as it was, turned the scale, and this time they secured 19 seats out of 31. Results of the Belgian Elections of July, 1884. anti-ministerialists. ministerialists. Voters. Members. Voters. Elected. Bruxelles. . . . 8,969 . . y,51 7 . . 8 Kivelles.... 1,552 .. 1,650 .. 2 Gaud 3,926 .. 4 3,547 .. Ostende 569 . . 1 548 . . Soignies .... 1,365 .. 2 1,246 .. Charleroi .... 2.728 . . 2,>55 . . 3 Ath 895 . . 1 875 . . Liege 2,477 .. 3,800 .. 4 Huv 596 . . 658 . . 1 Verviers .... 1,803 . . 2 1 ,6-'0 . . Namur 1,746 .. 2 1,''58 .. Arlon 560 . . 593 . . I Total 27,186 12 Total 28,46] Representation, pp. 29-31. 156 Thus the city of Brussels in June sent all its 16 members to oppose the Government in the Chamber ; while in July it sent its eight senators to support them ; so that it is now represented by 16 Conservatives in the Chamber and eight Liberals in the Senate. Nor ai*e x-esults of this character at all unprecedented ; for instance, in the elections of June, 1882, 29,142 Liberals secured 39 seats, while 28,052 Conservatives only car- ried 11. CHAPTER V. Proportional Representation. The general ticket thus shows itself to be crude and barbarous. But it oflTers an opportunity to introduce with the very slightest of amendments what is destined to prove the most important reform in government since the invention of repi'esentation itself. It is an amendment which naturally suggests itself to any one who examines the results of an election on the general ticket. This reform is simply the apportionment of representa- tives among the different parties on a general ticket in exact proportion to their popular vote. Take, for example, the election already cited, for members of the Cleveland school board.* There are seven members to be elected. Each party nominates seven candidates. Why should it not naturally occur to distribute the successful candidates between the two parties in such a way that the Republicans with 110,518 votes would obtain four members, and the Democrats with 91,764 votes would obtain three members'? This would give each party its fair shai-e of representatives. The total number of votes is 202,286. This divided by seven gives 28,898 as the number required to elect a single candidate. The shares of each party would be determined by dividing in turn their total votes by this quotient, with the following results : Republican Vote 110,518--28,898 3 remainder of 23,824 Democratic " 91,764--28,898 3 " '' 5,070 Total 6 There being seven to elect and the Republicans having the largest i-emainder above the three full quotas are entitled to the i-emaining candidate, giving them four members and the democrats three. The individual candidates elected would be discovered by taking those on each ticket whose vote stands the highest, namely. Republicans, Day kin, Ford, House, and Buss, Democrats, Dodge, Goulder and Pollner. Could anything be ftirer or more natural than this 1 Nothing whatever is left to chance. Equality is assured as exact as mathematics can make it. Each party elected its own most popular candidates. The transition from the form of the present system is scarcely noticeable, but the transition from its essence is profound and far-reaching. But it must be confessed that a scheme so simple and just as proportional representa- tion requires a multitude of minds and a depth of thought for its perfection. The simplest things in politics as in mechanics are the last to be thought of. Besides there are many details in the election machinery which must be carefully worked out in order to give the greatest freedom to the voters and obviate every possible blunder. In the proposed bill which follows is incorporated the points which seem best and simplest for attaining the desired object, borx'owing them from whatever source they may be found. The bill is given here in full, and comment upon its several features is i-eserved until the reader has surveyed it as a whole. But it may be well fir.•^t to designate the sources from which its distinctive features have been derived. The machinery of iiomination and election and the common official ballot are drawn from the secret ballot law of the state of Indiana, probably the best law of its kind in the United States. Many of the proportional features correspond with the admirable law for the election of deputies to the Grand Council which went into effect on the 3rd of September, 1892 in the canton of Geneva. The *Page 154. 157 provision for cumulation of votes is borrowed from a bill drawn up by Dr. L B Tucker- man and Mr. Webster, of Cleveland, Ohio, and introduced by Hon. Tom Johnson in the House of Repre.sentatives in June, 1892. A similar device has also been proposed by Mr Westlake, of the English Proportional Representation Socieiy. The details for the application of the cumulative vote, the plan for the exclusion of a minority party havinc/ less than 85% of a full quota of votes and many other details are the work of the present writer. The bill is made applicable to the election of representatives for the lower branch of the American Congress. In this respect it will correspond exactly (with the proper modilications as to officials, etc.) to the election of the representatives to the House of •Commons of the Dominion of Canada. Both these governments being federal governments it is believed that there should be retained a proper recognition of state and provincial boundaries. Hence a general ticket is not provided for the nation at large, but as many tickets as there are states and i)rovinces. The application of the princii)le to state and municipal legislatures will require minor modifications, which will be noticed later. A BILL For the Election of Congressional Representatives by Proportional Representation. Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rrepreseutatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That iDenibers of the House of Represent- atives shall be voted for at large on general lists of candidates for their respective states, and that rej^resentatives shall be apportioned to different lists in proportion to the votes cast for each list. Sec. 2. There shall be created in each State a State loard of Election Commissioners, to be compoised of the Governor of the State and tvvo qualified electors by him appointed, one from each of the two political parties that cast the largest number of votes in the State at the last j)receding general election. Such appointments shall be made at least thirty days pi'ior to the general election for Congressional Re[)resentatives, and if prior to that time the chairman of the State Central Committee of either of such parties shall nominate in writing a member of his own party for such appointment the governor of the State shall appoint such nominee. In ca.se of death or inability of any such appointee, the Governor of the State shall notify the chairman of the said Central Committee of such appointee's jjolitical party, and such chairman may, within thi-ee days thereafter, reconj- mend a successor who shall thereupon be api)ointed. Provided that if such chairman shall fail to make recommendations of appointment within the time specified, the Governor of the State shall make such appointment of his own selection from such political party. It shall be the duty of said Board to j^repare and distribute ballots and statnps for the election of all Congressmen for whom all the electors of the State are entitled to vote, in compliance with the [)rovi3ions of this election law. The members of such board shall serve without compensation. Sec. 3. That lists of candidates to be known in this bill as " tickets, " may be nomi- nated by State conventions or by petitions as heieinafier provitled, and any numl)er of candidates, not to exceed the number of seats to which such State is entitled in the House of Representatives, may be included in a single ticket. Sec. 4. The said Board of Election Commissioners for each State shall cause to bo printed on a single sheet of j)aper of appropriate size, to be known in thi.s Act us the "ballot," tickets nominated by the State conventions of any party that cast one per cent, of the total vote of the State at the last preceding general election, the .said ticket to be certified as heinatter specified to the said Board by the presiiling utHoer and .secretary of such convention ; and also the list of names of candidates when petitioned so to do by electors qualified to vote for such candidates, providing the nnmlier of said electors signing such petition amounts to fifty petitioners for each representative to which the State is entitled. The signatures to such petition need not be appended to one paper, buc no 158 petitioner shall be counted, except his residence and post office address be designated. No petitioner can subscribe his name to more than one list of candidates. Each petition must designate one of the petitioneis who shall act as attorney for the others. Such petition shall state the name and residence of each of such candidates, that he is legally qualified to hold such office ; that the subscribers desire and are legally qualified to vote for such candidates, and may designate a brief name or title of the party or principle wliich said candidates represent, together with any simple figure or device by which they shall be designated on the ballots. The certificate of nomination by a convention shall be in writing, and shall contain the name of each person nominated and his residence, and shall designate a title for the party or printiple which convention represents, together with any simple figure or device by which its ticket may be designated on the ballots ; said certificates sliall be signed by the presiding officer and secretary of such convention, who shall add to their signatures their respective places of residence, and acknowledge the same before an officer duly author- ized to take acknowledgment of deeds. A certificate of such acknowledgment shall be appended to such instrument. In case of the death, resignation, or removal of any candidate subsequent to nomination, unless a svipplemental certificate or petition of nomination be filed, the chairman of the State committee or the attorney of the groiip of petitioners shall fill such vacancy. In case of a division in any party, and claim by two or more factions to the same pai'ty name, or title, or figure, or device, the Board of Election Commissioners shall give the preference of name to the convention held at the time and place designated in the call of the regularly constituted party authorities, and if the othei- faction shall present no other party name, title or device, the Board of Election Commissioners shall select a name or title and place the same at the head of the ticket of said faction on the ballot and select some suitable device to designate its candidates. If two or moi'e conventions be called by authorities claimed to be the rightful authorities of the party, the Board ot Election Commissioners shall select some suitable devices to distinguis'i one faction from the other, and print the ballots accordingly — Provided, however, that if any ])olitical party entitled to nominate by convention shall in any case fail to do so, the names of all nominees by petition who shall be designated in their petitions as members of and candidates of such party, shall be printed under the device and title of such {tarty on the ballots, as if nominated by convention. Certificates and petitions of nomination of candidates shall be filed with the governor of the State at least thirty days before the election. The tickets which shall be presented as above provided for, shall be printed by the Board of Election Commissioners on a single ballot, each ticket being assigned a separate column, and the names of candidates on each ticket shall be printed in the oi'der in which they are assigned by the respective conventions or groups of petitioners. In all respects otherwise than as provided for in this Act the elections of representatives in the several States shall be conducted in accordance with the State laws enacted and provided for the election of representatives to Congre s. But no election shall be valid in which the provision of this Act shall not be fully complied with."*" Sec. 5. If the name of any candidate appears on more than one ticket, he shall select the ticket to which he wishes his votes to be accredited. In case he makes no selection, the governor shall notify the chairman of the committees or the attorneys of the ])etitioners on whose tickets his name appears, and they shall make a choice. In default of such a choice, the governor shall select by lot one of the tickets in which his name ap[)ears, and the said name shall be struck off from the other tickets. Sec. 6. Not less than eighteen days before the election for rej)resentatives, the Governor of the State shall certify to the County Clerk of each County the name and place of residence of each person nominated for representative, as specified in the petitions and certificates of nominations filed with the Governor of the State, and sliall designate therein the device under which the ticket or list of candidates of each party will be printed, and the order in which they will be arranged. Not less than ten days before the election, the * In case of Canada, the elections shall be conducted in accordance with "The Dominion Elections Act," except as amended in harmony with the present Act. 159 county clerks shall make public notice in all election precincts, by bulletin, givin« in full the lists of candidates, their residence, and the titles and devices prefixed to eacli ticket as certified to them by the governor. Sec. 7. The State Board of Election Commissioners shall furnish, at least ten days before the election, to each County Clerk to be distributed by him to the inspectors of the several election precincts, ten ballots for every five voters or fraction thereof in vach precinct of his County at the last presidential election. And no ballots shall be received l)y the judges and inspectors of elections from electors e.xcept official ballots as herein provided. Sec. 7. Every legal elector shall be entitled to cast one ballot, but he shall be entitled to as many votes ui)on his ballot as there are repi-esentatives to be elected from the State w^hereof he is a resident. This number shall be known in this Act as his " lawful number of votes." All votes in excess of this number shall be disciirded. E-v(>ry elector shall be entitled to two kinds of votes, namely: votes for tickets, known in this Act as "ticket votes" and vctes for individual candidates, known iii this Act as "candidate votes." The elector shall be entitled to a number of ticket votes equal to his lawful number of votes and also to a number of candidate votes equal to his lawful number of votes, and he may divide his votes between tickets and individual candidates as herein- after specified. Sec. 8. In order to give his total lawful number of votes to a single ticket the elector shall affix a mark or stamp immediately to the left of the title and device belounfin'^- to the ticket for which he wishes to vote. This shall be known as a "general ticket vote." In the case of a general ticket vote the total lawful number of votes shall be accredited to the ticket, unless the elector shall have voted also for individual candidates on the said ticket or on other tickets as hereinafter provided, in which case, there shall be deducted from the total lawful number of his general ticket votes all such votes for individual candidates. Sec. 9. Each elector is entitled to vote for individual candidates, either on the same ticket as that for which he has given his general ticket vote or for candidates on other tickets, and he may distribute his votes or cumulate his votes among the candidates of all the tickets in such manner as he chooses. To vote for individual candidates he shall affix a mark or stamp immediately to the left of the name of the candidate for whom he wishes to vote. To cumulate on oue oi- more candidates he shall write inmiediately to the left of the name of each candidate for whom he cumulates, a numerical figin-e expressing the number of votes which he wishes to have accredited to the particular candidate. Sec. 10. All votes for individual candidates up to the lawful number of votes shall be counted also as ticket votes, and each ticket shall be accredited, in addition to the general ticket votes herein provided for, also with a number of votes eendix* the substance of M. V. D'Hondt's plan, and shall pause here a moment to justify the device which I have proposed. * See page 183. ' 163 In the first place, exact justice is impossible, A. representative is non-fungible. He cannot be devided up like a bushel of wheat and distributed in exact proportions anion"- all his rightful claimants. We must be satisfied with a combination of justice and expediency. The claims of justice are absolutely secured by that portion of the scheme which gives representatives to all groups of electors in proportion to the full quotas which they can muster. That portion of votes which does not come up to a full quota must b«; satisfied by a division based mainly on expediency. And it seems that the highest efiiciency of government would be secured by preventing too excessive infiuence to petty minorities. Moreover, it is not clear that the rule given works any injustice. The comparison is not properly to be made between a party, on the one hand, whose total vote is less than the full quota and those remainders of other parties, on the other hand, which are less than a full quota.* The just comparison is between the said minority party and the averaye number of votes required to elect a candidate in the other parties. If a party havin" less than a full quota is able to elect a candidate by means of a number of votes less than the average number required in other parties there would be injustice. It is believed that on the whole a minimum of 85^ would prevent such inequalities. The present district system works serious injustice to all new and diminutive parties, but that is not a good reason for going to the other extreme and giving these parties an influence excessive beyond their numbers. If once they reach the dimensions of a full quota their claim is indefeasible. Before they reach that figure they should live by sufferance. But the question is one of degree. The line should be drawn somewhere. 85/ may seem too high, and it might be placed even lower, say 7o%. In the example given this would still exclude the Prohibition list, since 75% of the fii-st quota is 338,836, whereas if the limit were not imposed at all, they would gain one representative. In the samj le election given herewith, the apportionment would have been different if the first quota had been employed as in the Swiss laws instead of the second, as shown by the following, the divisor being 451,782 : — Democratic list obtains 6-f remainder 178,558 Republican list obtains 5-|- " 143,810 Prohibitionist list obtains 0+ " 334,700 People's list obtains , 1 + " 348,649 Ind. Republican list obtains 0+ " 449,636 Total 12 The additional three representatives would be apportioned so that the result would stand : Democrat 6 representatives Republican 5 " Prohibitionist 1 " People's 3 Ind. Republican 1 " Total 15 If, now, we weigh the influence of the voters of the different parties on the final result according to the Swiss method, we get the following : — To elect one Democrat requires 481,540 votes " Republican requires 480,544 " " Prohibitionist requires 334,700 " People's requires 400.215^ " " Ind. Republican lequires 449,636 " See page 164 below. » 164 Is this result more just than the one obtained by the method herein proposed, where To elect one T)emoci-at requires 412,748y votes " Republican requires 480,544 " " People's requires 400,2151 " " Ind. Republican requires 419,636 " The matter may be stated in another way. Since each elector casts fifteen votes, the actual number of electors who voted for each ticket was as follows : — Democrats 192,616 Republicans 160,181 Prohibitionists 22,313 People's 53,362 Ind. Republicans 29,975 According to the Swiss method 22,313 Prohibitionists would have been entitled to one repi-esentative. If so, then 133,878 Democrats ought to be entitled to six representa- tives. But there were 192,616 Democrats. Consequently, 58,738 Democrats would be without their proportionate share of representatives, compared with the Prohibitionists. But it may be said that in depriving the Prohibitionists of a representative and giving the Democrats an additional one the equality between Democrats and Republicans is disturbed to the disadvantage of the Republicans. This is true, but not to so great an extent as would have been the inequality of Republicans compared with Prohibitionists, had the latter received a representative. It requires 32,036 Republicans to elect a single i-epresentative and the Prohibitionists could have elected one with 22,313 electors, whereas under the plan here proposed it requires 26,849 Democrats to equal 32,036 Republicans, a difference ia favor of this plan on the score of justice of 21%. The ground for the whole distinction consists in the fact that a remainder in the case of a large party, is averaged with several full quotas, so that the average constituency of a representative is but little short of the full quota itself, whereas in the case of a party whose total vote is less than a full quota the total vote itself becomes the " average " constituency, and this, not being averaged with any full quotas, may fall considerably below the averages for other parties. To obviate such inequality the 85% exclusion is eminently fair. Another feature of the bill as distinguished from the Swiss system is the provisi.m made to prevent an elector from losing on any account any one of his full number of law- ful votes. So long as his ballot is declared lawful and he is entitled to vote at all, he should be entitled to his full number of votes, and any oversight or misunderstanding on his part should not opei-ate to deprive him of them. It is believed that the rules laid down are sufficiently reasonable to interpret what would have been the wishes of the average elector should he happen to make actual use of only a part of his lawful votes. It is this feature of the bill, as will be readily seen, which results in the ideutity between the total number of ballots cast and the first quota of representation. The bill as herein given has been adapted to the National Congress, but it is easy to translate it into terms of State legislatures and city councils For American State legis- latures it would i)rove desirable to adapt the plan to the bicameral system and to make as marked a distinction as possible between the upper and the lower house. State senates could be elected on a general ticket for the State at large, in exactly the same way that the Congressional delegation would be elected. This could very easily be done, as the membership in the senates now varies in number in the different States, from thirty-two in New York to fifty in Pennsylvania, Indiana and Iowa. Perhaps a senate of thirty-five would prove the most convenient. This would give the voters of the two great parties fifteen to twenty senators to choose. The lower house should be elected by a combination of the district system and the general ticket, like the national house. The State could be divided into such a number of districts that each district would return from seven to eleven representatives. The larger the number returned from each district, the smaller, of cour.se, would bo any unrepresented remainder. The lower houses in the State legislatures vary widely in 165 membership, ranging from thiity-five in Wyoming, to 359 in New Hampshire. The latter State might properly be divided into twenty districts. With this two-fold application of the plan of proportional representation the senate would stand distinctively for State questions at large, while the house would retain a fair share of local flavor. For municipal councils and boards of aldermen the election should be general, like that for the State senates. CHAPTER VI. ADVANTAGES OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. In Stating the advantages of proportional representation there are two lines of discus- sion which are necessarily involved, a general and a special. The general principle of proportional representation involves merely the goal towards which electoral reform should be directed, and the results to be obtained thereby. To reach this goal innumerable plans have been proposed, all having more or less merit. The special questions involved are those connected with the formulation and choice of a specific plan. This is a question of method, a mechanical problem. But methods are as important in representative democracy as measures. The two lines of discussion need not be separated. If a practicable and effective method cannot be devised the general principle is a mere dream. I have proposed a method which seems to me to embody the best in all other methods that have been put forwai'd, and in presenting its advantages I shall necessarily both compare it with otlior plans and shall expound the general princi[)les to be attained. 1 . In the first place, proportional representation recognises the nature of modein [)oliti- cal problems. Government is made up ofintei'ests and political parties rather than federated localities. Representation is national and not local. This may appear as one of the i»rincipal objections to the plan. But a slight thought will show that it has no force. In anotlier place I have called attention to the tact that the gerrymander has taken nearly all the vii'tue out of a district that it may ever have jjossessed. There are few Congressional districts that have a unity of any kind, either economical, political, topographical, geographical or historical. The county of Huron, in Ohio, has been in five different combinations during the past twelve years, and now it is in the western part of a district one hundred and twenty miles long and twenty wide ; its Congressional representative lives sixty miles away, ami had, previous to the gerrymander of 1890, very little knowledge of or interest in the county. In this, and hundreds of other cases, the candidates in some districts at the other end of the State are better known to the voters of the district than are the candidates in their own district. On the other hand, the State is a historical and political unit. Its great men belong to no one district. At present only two of them can go to the United States Senate, and others are shelved as governors, or are compelled to seek some Presidential a))pointment. Under proportional representation tho.se who are unavailable for Senators would lead their ])arty delegations in the House. The same is true regarding State legislatures and provincial parliaments. The State or the Province is a unit in itself. But here it may be ))lausibly urged that the county should be the unit of representation, that the county retains a political unity which in no way belongs to a Congi-essional district composed of several counties. However, this cannot be realized without serious inequalities. Some counties have a population ten and twenty times larger than others in the same State. Small counties must be grouped and large ones must be divided. Here is all the opportunity needed for the gerrymander, as is well shown by the constitution of any legislative apportionment in the union. Yet as far as the Lower House is concerned, it seems desirable to compromi.se between the State and the County System and to provide for a number of districts each electing some odd number of representatives. For State senates there seems to be no question that a general State ticket Ls the best. At present no one can tell just what our State senates do represent. Only nine out of the fifty-two Indiana senators represent counties, and two of these ai-e from one county. The others represent the most arbitrary combinations of two, three, anlace a mark against the party name of their ticket, or they may place the mark against the name of any candidate on their ticket. This is as simple as any existing plan of election. Equally simple are the provisions for cumulating and distributing votes among candidates. If there is any complexity in tlie scheme it is to be found in the duties of leturning officers. But it is the duty of these officers to make tliemselves thoroughly acquainted with any election law, and their duties here are scarcely more than those connected with the deservedly i)opular " Austi'aiian " secret ballot. They are to keep just two sets of accounts, one for tickets and the other for candidates. The instructions on these points are full and explicit. There is no room for discretion. The only burden imposed upon them will be found in those cases where voters have scattered their votes and have voted either more or less than their lawful number of votes. In other words, the only com- plexity for returning officers is that involved in the effi^rt to mend the negligence of electors, and to secure to them their full number of votes. This is reduced to a minimum. J\ nd the directions cover all possible contingencies, so that there seems to be no occasion for any mistake on the part of electors or officers. 3. Proportional representation it will be quickly observed is eminently elastic in its adaptation to changes in population. There are no district lines which must be chaugep after every census, but representation adapts itself inuiiediately to every change in ])opulation. 4. It is needless to call attention further to the justice and equality of the measure. Frst, every political party is accurately represented in proj)ortion to its popular strength, as exactly as a mathematical calculation can figure it out. Instead of the flagrantly distorted assemblies which by way of rhetoric and rose-water we call re})resentative, we should have true mirrors of the people. We should accomplish what has never been accomplished, and in the eloquent and oft-repeated words of Mirabeau it could for the first time be said " that a representative body is to the nation what a chart is for the physical configuration of its soil ; in all its parts and as a whole, the representative body should at all times present a reduced picture of the people, their oj)inions, aspirations, and wishes — and that presentation should bear the relative proportion to the original precisely as a maj) brings before us mountains and dales, rivers and lakes, forests and plains, cities and towns. The finer should not be crushed o>it by the more massive substance, and the latter not be excluded ; the value of each element is dependent upon its importance to the whole and for the whole. The proportions are organic, the scale is national." Secondly, every individual elector is represented, providing lie votes for a ticket which polls 85% of a full quota. There are two ways of looking upon this matter of individual or personal representa- tion. It is held by most advocates of proportional, i'epresentation that a voter is not represented unless the candidate is elected for whom lie actually cast his vote. For 167 example, says Sir John Lubbock,* " To tell the Liberals of Kent and Surrey that they are represented by the Liberal members for Scotland and Wales is just the old and explo led argument which used to maintain that the people of Birmingham were virtually repre- sented by the members for some other borough. The fiiberals of Kent are glad, no doubt, that Scotland and Wales send such admiral)le repi-esentatives. It is some consolation^ but it is not the same thing to them as if they were directly rei)resented. Perhaps the one thing about which Kentish farmers care most is the suljject of extraordinary tithes. . . . But the farmers of Kent cannot expect the Liberal members from Scotland to help them as regards extraordinary tithes. It is possible that they do not even know what extraordinary tithes are." Are the Negroes and Republicans of the Southern States represented by the RHpul)li- cans from the North] Stated in this way the answer must be that they are not. Their votes were thrown away. So it is with all who have voted for defeated candidates. And this may include more than one-half the population. But they are not wholly uiu-epre- sented as they are in the case of a presidrtiitial election. More than one-half the electors voted against Mr. Cleveland for president. They are not represented in the policy of the ndministration. But in Congress they are partially represented. Congressmen do not represent sim]>ly their localities. They represent the nation. Mr. McKinley stood for more than tiie 20,000 Republicans in Ohio who voted for him. He stood for every advocate of protection in the nation. Could they all have done so, they would have voted for him, or at least, for a ticket containing his name. At the same time voters for defeated candidates have no voice in the selection of the standard-bearers of their own party. In this important sense they are unre[tres'»uted. And this is the sense, too, which gives the party machine its control over nominations and elections, as will be shown later. Candidates are not chosen on one issue alone, l)ut on several. It is this tempering and modulation of the representative 1)0-1 v so as to correspond to all the phases of opinion and policy throughout the country which proportional repre- sentation guarantees. It is to be observed that there are certain constitutional restrictions on ecpiality of representation which do not propei'ly come within the view of this essay. In the bicameral system the uppei" house is usually constituted for a very different purpose from that of equal representation. In the Unitetl States senate the State of Nevada with a population of 45,000 has as much numerical weight as the State of New York with a population of 6,000,1 too. We are not now quarreling with this jn-actice. There is much to be said for it in virtue of the wide area and divergent sectional interests of the United States. Yet it does not seem that the senate should have the .same weight in legislation as the house. It ought to sink to the level of a revisory board like the House of Lirds and the Upper Cnamber of Canada and the Provinces. This would tend more and more to become its status if the house really repre.sented the people and possessed the ability which would be attracted to such a branch. As it is, the senate shines not by virtue, but by comparison. For the present, proportional representation has practical significance only in its applica- tion to that branch of the legislature vdiich assumes to be truly representative. Another matter with which we are not directly concerned is the basis of suffrage- We are not enquiring whether it shall be wide or narrow, male or female, old or young, white or black, intimidated or fearless. We take the suffrage for granted, ami inquire only whether, .such as it is, it is effective ; whether with the show of representation there is essential disfranchisement. ^. Proportional representation promises above all, the independence of the voters and freedom from the' rule of the party machine. It will not do away with parties. Indeed, parties are inevitable and essential to a free government. At least, it is doubtful^ whether anv one can show how a free government can be possible without them. In the 6 est place there is a fundamental difference existing in the nature of a progressive .society which must divide individuals into two groups or sets of groups, the one bused on order or con- servatism, the other on progress or liberalism. Human interests ami tenq)erament deter- mine to which group individuals shall ally themselves. There nnist be a large cla.ss whose interests are in the maintenance of the existing order. Their fortunes, their position. Representation, page 18. 168 their influence has come about as a result of the social arrangements which the past has^ evolved. Another class, equall)' large, are dissatisfied with their lot. They see inconsist- ency or injustice in social arrangements. They desire change, reform. Society make& progress through the ebb and flow of these two fundamental groups. But this natural grouping of free individuals is far different from the iron-bound classification imposed by the modern highly-developed party machine. Individuals, if left to themselves, will be continually forming new groupings as new political questions arise. But the machine having control of nominations, as has already been shown, maintains itself in power against the natural regroupings of the voters. Freedom for the machine, then, means, first, power on the part of the voters to control the nominations of theii' party ; and, second, power to defeat obnoxious candidates of their own party without endangering the success of the party. Both of these advantages are provided for in the proposed bill — first, by the provision for cumulation of votes, and, second, by the pro- visions for independent tickets. In the first place, let us suppose the nominations have all been made and voters have come to the polls ready to cast their ballots. Suppose there are fifteen candidates to be elected, and that tickets have been nominated as in the sample ballot given on page 161. It is known beforehand very nearly how many candidates each party will elect. The Demo- crats, for example, are certain to elect not less than six, and perhaps not more than eight. They have accordingly nominated ten candidates. The provision for cumulation now enables any voter to cast his entix-e fifteen votes for the party of his choice, but at the same time to select among the ten candidates that one who best represents him and to- " plump " his fifteen votes for him. The party convention is powerless in the matter. Ft is compelled to put up nine or ten candidates instead of one. The voter may be so dis- gusted with some of the nominations that he would willingly stay at home or vote the opposing ticket if there were no further choice for him. This is what he is forced to do in the single-membered district. But with ten candidates there will likely be one or two at least with whom he is satisfied. For them he can .^ive his entire strength. And if there are a sufficient number of voters like-minded with himself, they can elect those candidates who- are least subjected to the machine lule. I believe that herein will be found a very decided advantage over the Swiss method of proportional election. The Swiss ticket is prepared in exactly the same way as the one here proposed, and. voting is conducted in exactly the same way, with the exception of thia one feature of cumulation. The Swiss voter is not allowed to cumulate. If he votes a party ticket, it must be a straight ticket. He can give but one vote to each caiididate. He is therefore constrained by the party machine, not as much as under the district system, but more than seems necessary. According to the true theory of proportional representation one representative should be elected by every group of voters whose number is equal to the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of votes by the number of representatives to be elected. If 20O voters elect ten representatives, any group of twenty voters should be able to elect one, i. e... each elector should have ij^(j part of the total influence. But the Swiss method by giving electors as many votes as there are representatives, reduce the influence of the elector in his vote for any individual candidate in exactly the invei-se ratio. That is to say if 20O electors have ten votes each the total votes will be 2,000 and it will require 200 instead of 20 to elect. If the elector can give only one of his ten votes to any one candidate he ha& jTHTTj P^i"t of the total ifluence, i.e., only tV the influence he rightly should have. The simplest plan of cumulative voting is now employed in England in the election of members of the school boards. It is also in operation in Illinois in the election of members of the Lower House of the State Legislature. There have been more or less- valid objections raised to those schemes for cumulative voting which have been heretofore proposed, namely (1) that they lead to a loss of voting power, (2) that they increase the power of political machines, and (3) that they give too much power to the minority. The present plan differs fi-om all others in such a way that I believe these objections will not hold. Sir John Lubbock presents conclusively the first objection to this system in the example he gives of the Marylebone election for members of the school board. (November, 1870.)* * Kepresentation, page 52. 169 There were seven members to elect and the votes were as follows : — Successful Candidates. Unsuccessful Candidates, Garrett 47,858 Mills 7, 1)27 Huxley 13,494 Powell 7,852 ThOrold 12,186 Whelpton 5,759 Angus 1 1,472 Waterlow 4,994 Hutchins 9,253 Garvey 4,933 Dixon 9,031 Marshall 4,668 Watson 8,355 Guedella 4,635 Cremer 4,402 Edmunds 3,973 Verey 2,130 Stanford 1,486 Wyld 334 Dunn 258 Brewer 103 Beare 62 Total 165,165 "■It will be seen that Miss Garrett received no less than 47,858 votes, while under the circumstances 8,000 would have elected her. Nearly 40,000 votes out of the 48,000 were therefore wasted, and it is obvious that if Miss Garrett's supporters ha 1 known their strength, they would have desirefi to vote so as to secure the return of other candidates sharing their opinions. The Marylebone election was certainly an extreme case, but there have been many others in which the same phenomenon has been repeated." Out of this fact grows the second objection. If there is danger of wasting votes the only way in which votes can be properly economised is for the voters to know their strength before election. This they can do only through the party organisation. The machine therefore will designate the candidates to be voted for and those of the party voters who do not follow the instructions of the machine will throw their votes away. These objections .seem valid against the simple plan of cunnilation. But it will be readily seen that the bill proposed in this es.say does away with these objections by reason of its double provision for ticket votes and candidate votes. The elector cannot possiVily throw his votes away, because if too many votes have been cumulated on one candidate, as in the case of Miss Garrett in the Marylebone election, the sur[)lus votes as well as the necessaiy votes for the candidate go to swell the aggregate of votes for the ticket, and thus lielp to elect other candidates on the same ticket. In this way, too, as is already shown, the power of the machine is greatly minimised instead of increased. , But suppose the elector finds that his party ticket has been ])ut forward wholly in the interests of the machine, that there is no candidate offered to him whom he deems worthy of election. Under the district .system, as has been shown, he must vote for the pai'ty nominee or else stay at home or cast his vote in such a way as to benefit the opposite party. Proportional representation enables him to " bolt " the party ticket and not bolt the party. Of course, in order to do this, he must join with other protestants against the machine and nominate a new candidate, and a new ticket. The bill provides readily for a movement of this kind by a petition signed by fifty names for every candidate to be elected from the given State. This would be about fifty signatures for every 30,000 voters in the State. In the case of the simple ballot on page 161 the petition would require 750 signatures. The bill now provides that all tickets shall be printed on a .single i)alIot. This Is the well lecognised principle of the official ballot, introduced into this country from Australia, and now*adopted by States representing ^ of the population of the country. The bill provides that this ballot shall be extended into all States in so far as congressional elections are concei-ned. Indeed, the highest success of proportional representation could not be obtained were it not for the admirable features of the Australian ballot. It gives the voter complete independence of choice, enables him to scatter his votes among ditlVrent 170 tickets, and to easily pick out from a large number of candidates an individual for whom he may wish to cumulate. The system could readily be applied to the voting machine which has just been introduced into elections in New York State and which possesses many features superior even to those of the Australian ballot. The independent voter has therefore before him the ticket nominated by his party organization and another ticket of the same party nominated hy petitioners outside the machine. Suppose he votes for the independent ticket. Ho does not endanger the success of his party ticket as a whole, but only of one candidate out of the entire ticket. And he is not running the risk of throwing his vote away, providing only a single quota of the voters of the State cast their ballot for the independent. Under the district system his vote would l)e wasted unless the votei-s for the independent were a mojority or a plurality of all the voters in the district Returning to the sample ballot on page 161, the Re[)ublicans h:tve nominated nine candidates, expecting to elect six oi* seven. The Independent Republicans have nomi- nated two, ex[)ecting to elect one. From the final i-esult it will be S'^en that the Republi- cans could under no circumstances have elected more than six candidates, because the Democrats have elected seven and the People's two, out of the fifteen. But t\\e straight Re]mblicans and the Independent Republicans togetlier have elected the six can didates to which the Republicans were entitled. The Independents have in no way endangered the success of their party, but they have succeeded in putting in a Republican who, st mding for the party, nevertheless opjiose 1 the machine. The party as a whole gains its share of representatives, but the inde|)endent wing of the party has also securod its just share. Had the election been conducted under the district system, the Independent Republicans in order to be elected would have required a majority or i)lurality of the votes in his dis- trict. And in the effort to reach this I'esult, the Democrats would [)robably have elected their candidate. But in proportional representation the independent is elected if he polls an average of one-fifteenth of the votes in all the districts, and the Democrats do not gain an iota tlirough the disaffection of the Republicans. The present .system, in other words, ])ens up a minority of inde[)endent voters in narrow districts under the whip of their ])arty machine, but ])ro()ortional representation teai-s duwn the fences and enal)les them to combine throughout the State, without i-isking the success of the o|)posing party's machine. That this feature of proportional representation strikes at the radical evil of ))resent jiolitics, is evidenced by the current literature on all hands The evil of absenteeism on the part of the intelligent and business classes is everywhere alarming. It can not be too loudly deplored. In an article favoring com|)ulsory voting Mr. F. W. Holls says : * "Tiie extent to which this duty is shii'ked is easily ascertained, at least approximately. The interest which centers in a jn-esidential contest is generally sufficient to bring out the fullest vote obtainable without compulsion, and a comparison of the total vote in a presi- dential year with that in an "off" year, shows almost the entire number of shirks. In the state of New Yoi'k 300,375 per.sons who voted in 1880 remained away from, the polls in 1889, and 286,278 did so in 1890 In the last mayor.dty election in New York city over 35,000 men who had even registered abstained from voting, with the result that the city was once more turned over to an organised gang of ])tunderers. A more delibei-ate and extensive betrayal of trust would be difficult to find. In Massachusetts the total vote of 328,588 in 1.S88 fell to 260,798 in 18)0, a difference of 67,790. In Chicago the figures are even moi'e startling. In the spring election of 1887 less than 72,000 votes out of a po.ssible 138,000 wei-e cast — 66,000 citizens failing in their duty — while in June o f the same year, at the judiciary election for the choice of judges for a city of almost ^ million of souls, the total vote was 44,074, less than one-third of the number of qualifie voters." Prof. A. B. Hart + asserts in a careful review of election statistics that the voting ))0})ulation is one-fourth of the total population, and that in presidential elections five sixths of this voting strength is cast. In New York, in 1880, the vote was 1,104,605,' being 23 per cent, of the total population and 95 jier cent, of the voters, but in 1891 it was only 259,425. In New York city, in 1888, the vote was eighteen percent, of the population ; in 1890 it was 1V6 per cent, and in 1891 it was 13"2 per cent. * Annals of Amer. Acad. Pol and Soc. Sci., April, 1891. t Political Science Quarterly, vol. vii., page 307. 4 171 The New York Nation of Aj)ril 13, 1893, says, ijertinently : — " The Government of Russia has been described as ' despotism tempered by assassina- tion.' In like manner the government of hirge cities in America may be termed 'bummer government tempered by uprisings.' Nevertlieless, we believe that' both in Chicago and New York the better element is really in a majority, and could, if it chose, retain the government of the municipality perin.inently in its hands. This is certainly true of New York, for the bummer element here has never yet polled a majority of the registered vote. Take, by way of illustration, the important election of 18S8, at which Tammany got possession of the city. Tammany polled in that year 114,000 out of a total registered vote of 286,000. In 1890 it polled 116,000, or only 2,000 more, which may be called the natural increase of the Bummer Element. We tliink it is quite fair to set down as Better Eieuient all voters of every description who do not vote the Tammany ticket. Tliis Better Element, then, in 18S8, registered 172,000 votes; in 1890, after two yeai-s' experience of Bummer rule, 1 29,000 votes. If the fidl registei-ed vote in either of tlie.se two years had l)een cast against Tammany, Tammany would have been defeated and the Better Element would now be in possession of the city. But, in 1890, after a full trial of the kind of government the new Bummer regime was prepared to furnish, 30,000 of the Better Element stayed away from the polls and allowed Taiimany to retain the city. Why did they stay away? Any one who could answer this question would explain the failure of po])ular government in American cities. Now, if it were ])Ossibie to go around among these 30,000 and ask them severally why, having registered, they failed to vote, we should in all jirobability get a perfectly . intelligent answer from nine out of every ten of them. Not one would say that he did not vote because he was not ''organized;" that if anybody wanted him to vote, he must '■' organize " him. Nor probably would any of them say that they preferred Bumuier Oovernment to Citizens' Government. Some woidd have said, doubtless, that they did not think the election of Scott would be enough of an improvement on Grant to make it worth their while to go to the polls to bring it about; other.s, that Scott was "Grace's man," and they hated Grace ; others, that they would never, under any circu instances, vote for a Democrat ; others, that they hated Mugwumps, and that Scott was a Mugwump inventiou ; others, that Scott's nomination was a contrivance for breaking up the Repub- lican ))arty in this city ; others, that they wanted to keep Tammany in power as an example" of Deuiocratic rule." But appeals to the voters to go to tiie polls are of little consequence. What can they acconiiiiish by going? Says a recent writei- : * "It is only the fear of wasting their votes •on good men wiio have no chance of winning, which detei-s the people from voting agauist bad candidates who are forced upon them by the regular macliine." Neitiier would com- jtulsory voting meet the real difficulty. To quote the words of Prof. Hart, in the article iilrt^ady referred to, "To compel men to vote against their will is to tighten the conti-ol of party mmagers. . . Honest voters are indifferent or refuse to vote because they feel tiieir impotence to affect their own party management. Yet they sup))ort, their party management because experience shows th.at the men who fight it must make great exer- tions and sacrifices or be set out of politics ; and further because permanent political results can be brought about only through strong and persistiug parties. Compulsory voting sup- plies no new motives, and would not alter those political habits of the American people which are the real evil. Compulsory voting cannot create interest in local afl"iii-s. or break up the practice of adhesion to unfit leaders." Compulsory voting would not stimulate independence. It is l)nt natural that a well known machine Governor of New York should have recommended it to the legislature m one of his annual messages. Profes.sor Giddings has shown t tiiat the fringe of mol)iie voters who change from one party to another, is seldom more than 5% of tiie maximum total vote in a presidential year, and "the number of voters liable to be decisively influenced bv mere opinion, apa- 1 from personal, class or sectional interests, is not more than 2h or 3% of the whole." Compulsorv voting might |>ossil>ly change this proi>ortion slightly, but there is little reason to hope for the good results which its advocates claim for it. ♦ Charles Richardson in American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1892, page 86 t Political Science Quarterly, Vol. VII., page 116, 124. ! 172 That i)ropoitional representation would bring out a full vote at every election is not to be asserted. There is no experience from which to draw conclusions. The system has been in practice in Switzerland for only one year. But it certainly removes one of the most potent reasons for staying at home. In this respect the election of representatives offers advantages over the election of executives, judges, and other single officei-s, where, of course, there is no question of proportion. These advantages consist, as already shown, in the fact that there are several candidates to be elected on one ballot, and a small number of voters does not hold the balance of power. If the party vote is reduced even so much as a h\\\ quota, — i. e. lb to 20% — the party loses only one candidate out of a possible five, ten, or fifteen, and this one candidate is not gained by the opposing party hnt by the independents of their own party. A similar defection in the district system would usually throw the majority to the other party, since, as is well known, the two great parties are closely divided in the majority of districts. A change of 1^% in twenty -one districts is estimatt^d by Mr. Barry as sufiicient to give the control of the Massachusetts senate to the opposite party. As a result of the freedom which would be given by proportional representation to the rank and file of the party voters, the machine would usually be compelled to consult their wishes in nominating its candidates. At present it knows that, whatever tlieir threats, they will not bolt and thus elect the common enemy. But if they can bolt with- out committing such direful treason, they will be inclined to do so, and the machine must listen. Candidates will be of larger caliber and better reputation and more in harmony with the opinions of the voters. Numerous writers have called attention to the importance of the primaries, and have emphasised the duty of citizens to attend their paity primaries and conventions. In the view here presented of the probable workings of proportional representation, the primary loses much of its significance. A paity nominates candidates to win. Though voters do not attend the caucus, yet the machine has the probable action of these voters in mind when it nominates its candidates. The significance of the primary to-day is due to the impossibility of acting independently of machine dictation. Besides, politics is a business. It requires time and strength. The politician does the very least part of his work in the primary. The real work is done beforehand. America has no leisure class who can afford to give themselves to this work. They must leave it to the professionals. The latter are tacit attorneys. They sound their clients, learn their wishes, and act accordingly. If proportional representation should bring for- ward an abler aiid pni-er class of [joliticians, more in harmony with the best wishes of the people, the latter could leave the primaries to them. At the same time, primaries and conventions are the sources of power. They must be recognized as such. They must be brought under legal regulation. Perhaps the most serious evil of primaries and conventions and the one which gives the machine entire con- trol is the practice of exclusive majority rule. It is the almost universal rule to elect committees and delegates by a majority vote on the principle of the general ticket, or else to authorize the chairman to appoint tliem. The true puipose of a primary, as represent- ing all sections of a party is thereby defeated. It is proper that the majority should elect the chairman or nominate single candidates for ofiices, but why should the majority be alone represented on committees and delegations 1 Plainly here is the need for a further application of the proportional rule. A plan is required which will be simple and quickly wor ed. Such a plan has been pioposed by Di-. L. B Tuckerman, and is described in the Revleio of Reviews for November, 1891, as follows: — The Tuckerman plan provides for iveighing the choices of each elector. If there are five ofiices to be filled the elector writes on his ballot the names of five candidates in the order of his preference. Then the tellers, in counting the ballots, allot to each name on the ballot a weight of choice corresponding to the position held by that name on the ballot. Thus if the candidates A, B, C, D, E, aie written on a single ballot in the order given, candidate A will have five units credited to him, candidate B will have four units, C three units, D two units, and E one unit. After all the l)allots are counted the units oj)posite the names of the candidates are added up, and the five having the highest number of units are declared elected. Thus only one ballot is required to elect the five ofiicers. Continuing the example given, suppose the candidates A, B, C, D, E, are voted for in the order named by each of the fifty-five delegates. The weight of choice would be as follows : — \ 173 Choice. Units. Electors. Total Units A. 5 X 55 275 B. 4 X 55 220 C. 3 X 55 165 D. 2 X 55 110 E. 1 X 55 55 '^But candidates F, G, H, I, K, receive the support of the minority of fortyfi\ electors. The preponderance of choice will run : " — Candidates. Units. El ECTORS. Total Units. F. 5 X 45 225 G. 4 X 45 180 H. 3 X 45 135 I. 2 X 45 90 K. 1 X 45 45 " Consequently the successful candidates are A, B, C, F, and G. The majority faction has three representatives, and the minority has two — their first and second choice. According to the current method they would have been unrepresented ; but with this plan they can in no possible way be excluded so long as they number one fifth of the total electoi-s. In such cases their fiist choice would receive one hundred units, bringing him in ahead of the fifth choice of the majority." This j)lan is remai-kably simple and effective, and can be ajiplied readily to mass- meetings and conventions. It could be introduced into the bill proposeil in tliese paf^es by providing that conventions making nominations of Congressional candidates should be required to adopt the plan, and that the presideiits and secretaries of such conventions in presenting their tickets to the Board of Election ( iommissioners should certify that the nominations had been made in accordance with the law. They should certify, too, that primaries and other conventions sending delegates to the nominating convention had also complied with the law. With a rule of this kind governing primaries and conventions we should accomplish the ■same results within party lines as would be accomplished by the ])roposed bill between parties. All classes within a party would be represented, " packed " conventions would he unknown, the party machine would be shorn of much of it.-; undeserved power, tickets would be nominated containing candidates acceptable to all ranks of the party, the necessity for indeiiendent tickets would be lai-gely obviated, and citizens would be more inclined to attend their i)arty primaries, knowing that their wishes would be res|>ected. G. Proportional representation would bring into legislative iisseniblies able and experienced men, the true leaders and representatives of their ])arties, and the i)eople. The district system excludes such men. Social and legal institutions j^ossess a certain capacity of natural selection. They furnish the environment in which individuals grow up and develop. As in the physical universe, those individuals survive and prosper who are best fitted to their enviionnicnt. This does not mean that the fittest are the best morally. They are the best physically. In society, those individuals come forward and acquire power whose natural (pialities adapt them best to utilize the passions, customs and legal regulations of their fellow men. But society, unlike the physical universe, can change its customs and laws within certain bounds and thereby can change the environment of individuals. New and diftei-cnt qualities now are necessary for survival and i)ower. And this is the essence of Innuan activity controlled by human wisdom, to modify the environment and so to develop those quilities and powers' which it deems desirable. This is the rule all the way from raising chickens to organizing governments. If the peo])le desire certain qualities in their law- makers they can modify their institutions in such a way as will secure thf>in. The pivsent breed will then wither and sink away. If they wish to bi-ing forward in their legisl.itur.vs intelligence, experience, ability, probity and sympathy with |)opular wishe.s, they should first develop those forms of government and tho.se technical ilevices which will ensure adequate support, dignity and security to such qualities. 174 It is claimed that propoi'tional representation would be an improvement of this kind In the first place, it wonld secure all the advantages of the English and Canadian practice of non-residency. Ilepi'esentatives could be selected from an entire State witliout I'eference to district lines. The area of choice is widened. A party leader need no longer be excluded from Congress because he happens to live in a district where his party is in the minority. Gerrymanders could not be constructed to exclude him as soon as he has become known. All the 'money and influence of a wealthy opposing party would eff'ect iiotliing when thrown into his district. If his party wei*e in a minority in the State, they certainly would be able to command a quota and he wonld be their choice. Nothing could exclude him except the dissatisfaction of his own followers. This is true of all parties and groups, which can command a quota of the votes. Oi'ganized party minorities and factions could not defeat the nomination and election of such men, because they no longer hold the balance of power. In the district system a change of 1 to 5 per cent, of the votes to the opposite party will nearly always defeat a. candidate. But 50 per cent, might bolt under proportional representation and the remain- ing 50 per cent. — if they equalled a quota — could still elect the party leader. Mr. Albert Stickney, has found in frequent elections and short terms the root of con-upt politics and machine rule.* Indeed he is right. A representative must give his time to carrying elections. He must })lacate and harmonise factions. He must properly distribute the s])oils. He cannot afford to break with the machine and the spoilsmen. But with proportional representation frequent elections would be combined with life-loni; service, provided the representative retained the confidence of a single quota of the voters. He would not be called upon for a day's thought on the mere matter of carrying the elections. He would succeed himself as naturally as the season retui-n. His only thought would be to know that in his legislative duties he truly represented his supporters. If the machine repudiated him he would but have earned added strensth with his people. No faction could defeat him. Only a wide-spread revolt against his leadership could threaten his service. As long as the mass of the voters had confidence in him they would return him. Frequent elections, on the other hand, would give the people power quietly to drop the I'epresentative who was weak or who had cea.sed to represent them. They would simply cumulate their votes on their true leaders. Frequent elections under the district system are dangerous to both the good and the bad. Under proportional representation they would endanger only the bad. The State of Ohio presents a national example of the suicidal crudity of the district system — a State where republicans and democrats have world-famous leaders but cannot send them continuously to Congress where their services are needed. McKinley, Foster^ Foraker, are the first choice of the republicans of that State. But they have been gerry- mandered into democratic ilistricts, or else local republican factions have made them unavailable in their limited districts. With pro})ortional representation these men would lead their delegation in the House. Republicanism in Ohio, and the nation would be immeasurably the gaineis. Every other State has like examples. Many able men, too, now unknown to politics, -would be encouraged to look to such a career wei'e the tenure certain and the .service free from machine dictation. The importance of this feature of proportional representation cannot be ovei-estimated. Every interest or class in the State would not only be fairly represented in numbers, but would be represented by its ablest advocates. Every repre.sentative of ability would be continued in the legislature until he had acquired experience adequate to his duties. In this way many of the reforms advocated for leg slatures would mend themselves. The representatives would be leaders in reforms of this kind, knowing well by experience the evils to be met and being most interested in curing them. The Si)eaker of the House would no more be called upon to appoint committees, because the delegates, having a long acquaintance with each other and a national reputation, and knowing their mutual qualifi- cations, could easily elect their own committees. They would naturally do this on some proportional plan, somewhat as the committeas of the United States Senate are now appointed, or else by adopting a plan like that ali-eady suggested for the u.se of ))arty * See " A True Republic " and other writings. 175 primaries and conventions. The power of the lobby would be immeasurably reduced. The sinister influence of the party machine would be banished, since the leaders of the parties hold seats in the legislative branches and would be responsible to theii- constituen- cies instead of to the spoilsmen and lobbyists. Hasty and ill-considered legislation would be cleared from the statute books. Legislation would be simplified and harmonized. It may be well to emphasise again the way in which this bill would secure the responsibility of legislators directly to the people. The olijections will doubtless arise that it would do away with " party resi)Onsibility ; " that it will reduce the votes of both the leading parties so close that no party will have a majoiity and therefore no party can go beiore the people with a party record to be approved or rejected. But this is an intangible and indisci-iminate responsibility. It i.s like all kinds of nuikiple or corporate responsibility. There is no particular individual whom the j)eo|de can select and fasten resi>onsibility upon. And a jjarty, like a corporation, can be held responsible oidy as its agents are responsible. The growing popularity in the United States of city government by mayoi'S, and the recent transfer of legislative and aduiinistrative functions to mayors, ai"e based upon the well-grounded oi)inion that the responsibility of one man is .safer for the purity of city government than the responsibility of boards and councils. When ;i party is defeated at the j^oUs, both the good and the bad are defeated together. Why should a representative rise above party expediency and create a good reputation for him- self individually when he knows that the evil deeds of the other membei'S of his party will drag him down with them ? But there are two features of ju-oportional representation which permit the voters to discriminate directly between individuals, and to hold them instead of parties, responsible. The first is the fact tliat parties would not be defeated as a whole but would lo.se only a very small proportion of their representatives. So close are the votes of parties in most States, that a State returning say fifteen representatives, would return only eight of the majority party and seven of the minority. If the majority party should be een made for a more liu.ited suttVage. Representative institutions, it is sai.l. aiv not on trial but they have been condemned. ,„ , , . .• But has true representation. been given even a trial? We have a shau. representation. It crives a show of fairness. But it is crude ami essentialiy-untair. It is still m itH 176 primitive stages. It is like the steam engine in the time of Fulton. It needs mechanical adjustaients and technical improvements. It does not rej^resent the people. It represents the politicians. With ti'ue representation democratic institutions will begin a new era. Able, disinterested and patriotic men will come to the front. The people will be free to grant them their confidence and continued support. And they can be trusted to do it. 7. It may seem startling, and yet it is indisputable, to affirm that proportional repre- sentation would purify elections by removing the most potent of inducements for bribery and corruption. It is to the district system that must be chai-ged the alarming growth of corruption in elections. The system is a powerful temptation to bribery. The secret ballot has no doubt made the crime more difficult and dangerous but it has not at all ^l^iohed the inducements to commit the crime. These inducements consist in the ex- a^erated influence of the purchasable vote in turning the scale. The great majority of ^e districts are close. Elections turn on very narrow mai-gins. Mr. Berr}' says that a change of lJ°/<, of the vote in twenty -one districts of Massachusetts would have turned the State senate over to the opposite party.' Th^ results of elections in general may be said to turn on the balance of power held by 2 or 3°/^ of the voters. Any cause that can influence so small a percentage may be adequate to control elections. I have mentioned already the power held by small and compact factions, like the saloons, and the office seekers. The purchasable vote makes up another similarly factional group. The venal voters are amply sufficient in numbei-s to turn the scale. Prof. J. J. McCook has cave fully investigated the proportion of these votes in twenty-one towns of Connecticut, and he very justly entitles his article, "The Alarming Proportion of Venal Voters."* He linds tha^the nun.ber x-anges fx-om 3 to 50°/^ of the total voters of the towns in question, and the average for the twenty-one towns is 15'2°j^. The average f^r city and county is about 1217^. ._•*;. ' ■,. ',. With such a large percentage, it is plaiu that uii^er the district system elections offer the greatest inducements for bribery. The entim result can be changed by changing a few votes, and considerably more than these few;.' '.>tes ai'e bribable. But with proportional representatijJJiFi therd is~no faction nor group which holds the balance of power. A change of 12 per fiBut. of tlje votes affects only 12 percent, of the results. And as the changes of this kiril v^Quld uSlially be no more than 1 to 3°/^, it can be seen how diminutive is the iirfluence of ilj^ b'"^^®^'- Successful bribery wpuld endanger only one candidate out of a party's entire del^g^ion. The unbribable voters would not have their just influence in the least reduced by the disaffection of the floaters. No-body would care therefore to bribe the latter. Their occupation would be gone. While the secret ballot makes bribery difficult, proportional representation makes it fruitless. 8. With all parties faii-ly represented, with able men, with bribery ineffective, legis- latures would become deliberative assemblies instead of arenas for party strife. The objection against proportional representation has already been notra that it would do away with party responsibility. Closely connected with this is the other objection that it would give a small minority the balance of power and enable them to dictate legislation. These objections are of apparently great weight We have frequently noticed the very close popular vote between the parties. Third parties, if given their due weight in legislatures, would often hold the balance. These objections overlook, in the fii-st place, the questions of fairness and individual res))onsibility. It may ))rove here, as elsewhere, that justice is the wisest expediency. But waiving for the moment this reply let us look a little more deeply into the nature of, government itself and see whether we should expect a gain from the more equal division of power in legislative assemblies. Professor Ernest Naville, the earliest advocate and ablest defender of proportional representation in Switzerland, very wisely observes that outside the ranks of party are -always to be found groups of independents who care little for the personelle of candidates and party success, but more for principles and measures In society at large they naturally hold the largest place. They hold the balance of power. If people could meet together in mass-meeting their influence would be felt. But they are not organized. They are not practical politicians. Hence they put forward no candidates of their own, and by force of * See Forum, September, 1892. I 177 necessity are compelled to vote for party candidates or to stay away from the polls Thev consequently make up the large stay-at-home vote. But if they had their own peculiar representatives they would necessarily bring {lartisans to terms, would force them to put measures above spoils and would be a balance-wheel of legislation, preventing one party from crushing the minority, and thereby making legislation an ideal compromise conserving the interests of all. As a matter of fact it will be found that very few of the questions of legislation are l)arty questions. A great many are settled on lines of combination running across parties. The only strictly ]>arty questions are those concerned with the spoils ami with suffra'^e legislation, such as •' force bills" and gerrymanders, which threaten to deprive one partv of its votes. If the capture of spoils were ruled out, and United States senators weie elected outside of legislatures there would seldom be deadlocks, no matter how narrow the majorities or how obstinate those holding the balance. The i)oints of agreement amon<' parties on other questioiis jire faV more numerous than those of disaf'reement. Parties differ only on th^fringe of policies. Their battles are mock battles. When the outg get in they do n^ radically reverse the polic/y of their predecessors, not even to such an ex- tent as a president "ftf ■ ene part^ often reverses that of his predecessor of the same party. At any given time the massed of tlie people will not permit radical far-reacliing chanf/es. A new party in power must in the main accept what its predecessor has done, and may modify it only in minor points. Take all the important questions of national politics and it will be seen that they are not settled on party lines. The two great pai-ties do not tlifler more than 20 per cent, on tho. tai-iff question. It is simply a question of a very hi^h tariff or one not quite so high. The counti-y would not endure a return to no-tariff, and the Democratic party will not allow itself tp- be called a free-trade party. So witli the J silver question. Both {parties are split in t\TO on this question. The bill against dealing in futures and options was fought entirely indej^pdent of party lines. The voting of pen- sions brings emulous rnajorities from .'both partie^ River and harbour bills are settled by individual log-rolling, and exohjuige of favours. i'On so many of the vital questions do the representatives, in Congress ^iisregard [larty lineal that one is forced to suspect that the tight over the tariff-^the only question where fartjSines are drawn — is only for show to keep the voters in line. Behind the scenes Cfee votey imagines his lately antagonistic Congress- men chuckling together, rubbing theip'hands and laughing up theii- sleeves over the success of their " war scare." ^~ ' W i< The fundamental nature of politics is. hot party strife or parti.sian victory, but com. promise. There is a blindly accepted aphorism of Bentham's to the effect that the criterion of legislation is the greatest good to the greatest number. Strictly defined this is false. The true goal is the greatest good to all. Bentham's dictum is the war-cry of party. The just criterion harmonises and |»romotes every interest. It is simply and solely compromise. This was the essential idea in Calhoun's distinction V)etween the constitutional and the numerical majority. But with him compromise was to be enfoi'ced in a way that was anarchical — nullitication. The true solution is to have it solved within the councils of the sovereign body itself — and then the unity of the sovereign can be maintained along with the promotion of all individual and private interests. The fear of Calhoun would be groundless if legislative bodies were accurately representative. The people theujselves differ so little that there is no danger of an intolerant and oppressive majority, providing all are equally rejiresented. Calhoun and all who dread the power of majority are influenced by the exaggerated and distorted constitution of existing legislative assemblies, and the unjust power which the majority thereby usually obtains. Compromise is expediency. Expediency is nothing more nor less than general princi- ples in process of evolution. The doctiine of compromise rests on the fact of irrowth. Society is developing out of a piimitive l)arbaric state where l)uman rights were unknown, towards an era where the happiness, honor and dignity of man as sucii shall be nvogni.sed and obtained for every individual. Abstract principles are the .goal towards whioli we are aimino'. One by one the impedimenta of the past are being thrown off in the steady march towards the goal. And this is expediency— compromise. Kan.ttics and enthusiast-s ap|>ertl to the "hi^'herlaw" and demand that all obstructions be overthrown at once. liut thi.s is impossible. The impedimenta of social progress are not like coats of mail and trunks and baggage, carried on the shoulder or in a waggoit. They aiv human beliefs, feelings, .178 passions, necessities. They exist in the very souls of men, and are conditioned by their material resources and opportunities. They can be overthrown only as one generation dies and is succeeded by another with new beliefs and feelings, and with larger resources and a greater command over nature. Compromise is that vital pi-inciple of organic unity which ounects the past and the future. It is simply life itself — the very essence of growth. No more can the human body separate itself from its past development through childhood, and suddenly leap over the period of youth into that of mature and ripened manhood, than can the social body break from its past. But the social body makes its growth through modifications of social institutions. It does this both consciously and unconsciously. It lops off here an vmdesirable growth or an obsolete appendage, and there it starts a new line of movement and growth. The institution of private propert)', for example, has passed through manifold changes, no one of them ajjpearing to contemporary men as radical or far-reaching, yet in thi'ee generations the old institution is radically changed. The family, too, the State, the church, all change and grow. But they are growing towards some higher abstract ideal. They are being gradual!}' modified so as to give wider opportunities for individual upbuilding and to bring out more and more the best and happiest that is in man. But it must be admitted that compromise involves compounding with evil. This is only because evil is deeply rooted in the past of society and in human nature. Yet there are two kinds of compromise. There is another kind which contemplates the perpetuation of evil. This is base. It gives the evil a deeper root in society and makes its future dislodgement harder. It is the doctrine of quiescence. It is not true expediency, but dalliance, i»usillaniniity. True expediency contemplates the ultimate extinction of hoary evil. It sets the forces to work which in time gather strength and gradually but surely imdermine and sap the evil that now is compounded. True expediency is true statesman- ship. It is courage, wisdom and a firm grasp upon ennobling truths. But does it follow, even, that compromise in its better sense will yield the greatest good to all "? First, it should be remembered that not all jirogress is good or wise. Legislation is experiment. Each new project must be tried. Only experience will establish it if good, and experience is needed to revise it if bad. Hence to adopt a new thing in its entirety would be as bad as to cling obstinately to all that is old. Again, in society at large, as has already been said, there ai"e nearly always to be found two general groupings of individuals partaking more or less of the nature of parties, namely the party of oi'der and the party of pi'Ogress. The one rejoices in and is satisfied with the honoi-able achievements of the past, the other is anxious for change. The one is composed of those whose prosperity depends upon maintaining things as they are, whose interests are " vested interests," whose minds and temperament are conservative. The other is composed of unprivileged classes, restless, exjierimenting, pioneering, minds. But the lines are not fast drawn. On particular questions there will be slight shiftings and regroupings. These diffei-ent classes and interests come together in legislative halls. The circum- stances of the times compel change of some kind. The Radicals demand extreme measures. The Conservatives are for doing nothing. Neither has a majority. There is a number who hold a medium view. The measures proposed must be examined, debated, amended, until they reach a shape which will commend a majority of the votes. And thei-e is no measure in politics which cannot be thus modified. Even the question of slavery could have been compounded. There are a hundred intermediate measures between immediate emancipation and permanent slavery. Had a law been enacted in the fifties providing for gradual emanciimtion, even upon the basis proposed by Abraham Lincoln of a hundred years, the civil war might have been avoided. But the district system of representation had excluded the moderate men from a share in the councils of Congress. Especially is it affirmed by the senate committee which investigated this matter in 1867, and it is welt known to students of history, that the South was not fairly represented in Congress. A very large minority of the people were in favor of the Union, and doubtless they could have been brought to gradual emancipation without rebellion. Bat this minority was excluded from its State legislatures and from the halls of Congress. The machiiie politician precipitated the South into rebellion. When once the die was cast the whole people were I 179 forced to follow. Would not compromise have been better than so deadly a war? Would not the slave himself have been as well off or better to-day with gradual emancipation ] Would not the Union have rested on as secure foundation] If a question presenting such clear moral issues could have compromised with benefit to all classes and individuals, surely the thousand minor questions of politics could find a similarly happy solution. When representatives abandon jjarty lines this is the direction they take. We have seen in America two very ingenious compromises on the silver question — a question which certainly has aroused bitter conflicts and which seemed clear- cut and incapable of compromise. Party divisions were disregarded, and representatives set about to find a common ground of agreement. With able financiers in Congress and a spirit of compromise no doubt a permanent settlement of this question would be found which would bring the greatest good to every one. If the proper conditions were provided and the people were equally represented in legislatures and Congress, doubtless every other question could be settled in the same way. Party lines would continue but not those artificial party lines perpetuated by party machines. The legislature of Nebraska has just adjourned with the record of having done the best work of any State legislature for many a year. Yet in that legislature there were three parties about equally divided. The legislature spent six weeks out of twelve in a deadlock over a question of spoils — the election of a United States senator. That is a matter which cannot well be compromised, except by electing an unknown man. This the legislature did, and then set about its legitimate business. It passed faiily able laws on important matters, among them a railroad law which was neither confiscatory nor reactionary, but just to all concerned. This was the character of the other laws. There were no deadlocks on legislation, but every measure was a fair compromise. With pro- portional representation legislation would take on more of this character, since it would be under the guidance of far abler and more experienced legislators. If compromise seems tame and devoid of the picturesqueness of party struggles, it should be borne in mind that radical reforms are not permanent. There nnist follow a reaction. Those noble anti-slavery agitators who saw in the proclamation of emancipation the gloi'ious fruition of their work, and were ready then to pass to other questions, and those extremists who gave the new-fledged freeman the liberty of the ballot, nuiy well to- day look back with chagrin on those exultant measures. The slave is not ye( free. He was not ready for the ballot. And the south is a land of smothered anarchy. Surely gradual emancipation and deliberate enf ranch isemet would not have been slower in final results than have been these spectacular reforms. " [f the process seems intolerably slow," says John Morley,* " we may correct our impatience by looking back ujjon the past. People seldom realise the enormous | eriod of time which each change in men's ideas requires for its full accomplishment. We speak of these changes with a peremptory kind ■of definiteness, as if they hail covered no moi-e than a space of a few years. Thus we talk •of the time of the Pveformation, as we might talk of the Reform Bill or the Repeal of thf Corn Duties. Yet the Reformation is the name for a movement of tlni mind of northern Europe which went on for three centuries. Then if we turn to that still more njomentous set of events, the rise and estallishment of Christianity, one might suppose from current speech that we could fix that within a s|)ace of half a century or so. Yei it was at least four hundred years before all the foundations of that great superstructure of doctrine and ■organisation were completely laid. . . The conditions of speech make it indispensalile for us to use definite and compendious names for movements that were both tardy and complex. We are forced to name a long series of events as if they wei-e a single event. But we lose the reality of history, we fail to recognise one of the most striking aspects of human affairs, and above all we miss that most invaluable practical lesson, the les.son of patience, unless we remember that the great changes of history took up long periods of time which, when measured by the little life of a man, are almost colossal, likt? the va.st changes of geoloo-y. We know how long it takes before a species of plant or animal disappeai-s in face of a better adapted species. Ideas and customs, beliefs and institutions, have always lingered just as long in the face of their successoi-s, and the competition is not less keen or less prolonged, because it is for one or otlier inevitably destinetl to be hoj)ele88." * On Compromise page 233-5. 180 But it must not be supposed, since proportional representation would compel recourse to compi'omises, that it would stand in the way of reform. Indeed, it would bring forward the time of genuine reform. And this, not by erratic jumps, but like the steady processes of nature. Reform movements would get a hearing while yet in their beginnings. Legislation would then anticipate and prepare the way for them. The minds of men would get ready for them. They would not come with that suddenness which districts counsel and demoralizes business and all other interests. Under the present system there is a false ignorance of these movements. They are choked and blanketed. They have no spokesman in places of authuiity until they have become the majority party in various districts. By this time their pent-up fire is raging. A sense of injustice is urging them on. They accumulate wrath, and all the conservative interests of the country are trembling. With a change of party on the taiiff question business is almost at a stand- still for a year or more. There is a dread of extreme change. Legislation ought to proceed so quietly and advance so naturally that the community would scarcely notice it. It would do so were these new and progressive interests early represented. Beforms would shew themselves inside the party lines. At present parties tend to build about themselves a crust ot tradition. New parties spring suddenly forth and take the place of the old. This is because our party machinery is not elastic. It does not respond to the gi'owing body within. There is a false feeling of securitj'^ on the ]xu't of the managers. In France this is the cause of armed revolution. The party in power sees its large majority in the Chamber of Deputies and goes its way. But the ])eople are ready to burst the shell. There follow catastrophe, disaster, partisanship, reaction. Pi'oportional rei)resentatiun was defended twenty years ago in the interests of the minority. It was thought to be a pi'omising corrective of j)oj)ular suffrage. It would protect the rich against confiscation by the mob. This was the idea of John Stuart Mill in his classical work on Representation. But to-day it is plain that proportional repre- sentation is in the interests of the masses. John Stuart Mill knew nothing of the lobby. One man of wealth has the influence of ten thousand day laborers. But the lobby is a dangerous machine for legislation. It protects the rich for a while, but stirs those vindictive passions that demand finally indiscriminate spoliation. Much better for one and all would be fair and open compromise, looking far into the future and working in harmony with social forces. If legislatures were delibei-ative assemblies they would bring together year by year all these forces and promote continually the greatest good of all. Among the many projects for legislative reform which have been brought out by the recognised failure of representative assemblies perhaps none is more extreme than the demand for so-called direct legislation. This is nothing more noi" less than an attenpt to return to the primitive town meeting on a large scale and to reduce the legislatures to a perfunctory board. The above discussion of the nature of a deliber.itive assembly will enable us to pass a fair judgment upon the possibilities of direct legislation. To quote the words of an American advocate of this i)lan of legislation : " The great trouble with our legislative bodies is that they have ceased to be the representatives of the body of the people and their acts are not exponents of the will of the majority of the people. The remedy, if there is any practical remedy, is in taking from our legislative assemblies the absolute power of making laws. The people should be the only makers of the laws that are to control them, and they should only delegate to their representatives the duty of consideration and advice. No important principle in government should become active in specific law until it has been referred to the people, and has been approved by a majority vote. This is the position taken by the advocates of the reform called the "Initiative and Referendum." In a political sense "Initiative" has a special meaning and a double function. It signifies the proposal of law by those who have the legal right to do so to the body which may accept or reject the law. In the first exercise of tliis function the individual or collective citizen may pi-opose a law, and this proposal will start it on the regular course of enactment. This method would have many and obvious advantages. The sovereign rights and duties of the people would be in exercise. 'J'he people would originate the laws, would know them and expressly sanction them. Ignorance of the law could no longei* be pleaded as an excuse. Inability to secure relief and redress would not be a justification for bloody revolution. The right of t 181 initiative with the people would not prevent the same to be exercised by the representative body originatnig such propositions as their judgment might suggest. Tlie broad proposition covered by the "initiative" is that proposed law shall originate in the aroused and concentrated desires of the body of people. The function of the legislature would consist in digesting and assimilating the crude movements of the popular will for deliberation and tinal action. This final action is the purpose of the " Referendum." It is to refer all important laws passed by the legislature to a vote of all the people. In effect it holds in suspense before the scrutiny of the public all measures of public welfare long enough to discover and discuss their purpose and adaptation." Direct legislation is not without a long trial. It has been adopted by all the Cantons of Switzerland, and by the Swiss Federal Republic. Its results in that country under the most favorable conditions would hardly furnish a criterion for America or other o-reat nations where legislation is infinitely complex and jniblic interests both delicate and massive. It is therefore significant that after a long trial the Swiss Cantons are making a rapid espousal of proportional representation. Two Cantons have already done so, and the question is a live one in others and in the Federal Government. The people in their ]jrimary capacity are incapable of giving the necessary deliberation to public measures. They decide questions not on their merits but on entirely different considerations, the principal one being the question of confidence in the Congress which submitted the bill. A vote against a given bill is not to be taken as a disapproval of the bill, but as a general lack of confidence in the legislature. The Swiss people have rejected through the Referen- dum more bills than they have ratified, and then in a few years later have turned about and ratified bills which they had previously rejected. The Referendum has undoubtedly prevented bad legislation, but it has also prevented the good. But the people cannot judge upon such matters. They lack the information and the opportunities of counsel and com- promise. They can only express contitlence or distrust in individuals. What they need is wise and experienced legislators in whom they can confide, and then to leave the decision to them. Says Albert Teckney* " Do we really wish that our legislators shouM give us only such legislation as we ourselves think best? Do men wish their shoemakers to make such shoes as they themselves would make, or their lawyer to try their cases as they themselves would try them, or their physician to give them such drugs as they themselves- may fancy I What we wish from our public servants is, not such work as we ourselves should do, or as we may think the best, but better work than we know anything al)out. On any proper theory of government we select our very best men, to use their own brains, and not ours, in our service. We choose them, or should choose them, bee -use they will be leagues in advance of anything we dream of." However much the powers of legislators may be reduced by the referendum, it never- theless is necessary to leave great discretion to them. An act of legislation is a growth. It takes days and months, conferences and committees, reports and debates, arguments and amendments, to complete it ready for enactment. Here is where skilled workmanship tells. Here is the opportunity for the lobby. The people are helple.ss'. They must treat the statute as a whole. They can only answer the categorical yes or no. But legislation is far more than this. Its essence is in the details, the working, the harmonising with other statutes. The same reasons which substituted i-epresentation for the primary assembly must hold good, though in less degree, against direct legislation. " Representation," .says Hearn,t "is not a makeshift, it is a substantive institution. It is essentially distinct from the government of the Agora or the Forum ; and as a ))olitical instrument is far superior to that polity. . . The primary principle on which its value rests is the sjime priuciplo which regulates the exerci.se of the royal will. The people require checks and limitations and enlightment no less than the king. An aggregate ii,sseml)lage of individuals must be restrained and informed no less than each individual unit of that aggregate. If a monarchic absolutism be liable to infirmities, democratic absolutism is liable to other and no lesa dan^'erous infirmities. Hor the sovereign jNIany, therefore, as well as for the sovereign One, the law a.ssigns a specific and exclusive form of expression. The object of this form is- the same in both cases. It is designed to secure the well-weiglied and deliberate * A True Republic, page 240. + Governaient of England, page 496. 182 opinion of the utterer. . . For popular utterances a suitable organ is found by the aid -of the principle of trusteeship. The application of this principle produces several im- portant results. By its means the size of the deliberative body is reduced to reasonable limits. An orderly and comparatively unexcited assembly is substituted for the tumultuous crowds of the market. The selection, too of a few pei-sons to act on behalf of many others never fails even in circumstances of great excitement to produce a sobering effect. The responsibility is in such cases less divided and is consequently more acutely felt. The repi'esentative feels too, that a reason will be requii-ed for whatever course he adopts, and that he must give his reason subject to criticism. Both in their acts and in their forbearance, thereforce, a representative assembly is more careful than a larger and less responsible body would be. Nor is it the least meiit of i-epresentation that the repre- sentative is generally above the average of his constituents. From the very nature of the case, he is selected on account of some superior aptitude, real or supposed. Thus, although the represent-itative reflects and ought to reflect the character of the electors, he reflects that character in its most favorable and not in its less favorable aspects." I do not hold that there is no place for the referendum. Some kinds of bills can well be put to popular vote. American States and cities practise this method of legislation successfully in matters of constitutional law, taxation and indebtedness. Here the i)rinciple has undoubted merits. It might perhaps be extended to other measures. But however far it is extended, legislation must also be carried out by a delegate body of some sort. The referendum gains its sti-ongest claim in the fi-ailties of legislatures. .If proportional representation should impi-ove these bodies and make them able, representative, and popular, the people would be glad to entrust to them their dearest interests. CHAPTER VII. Conclusion. Professor Emil de Laveleye has said that the remedies for parti.san abtises in represen- tative government are : Eepresentation of minorities, secret ballots, civil service reform. These three reforms are to-day well under headway. The secret ballot is now well- nigh universal in parliamentary countries. Intelligent people are wide awake to the evils of the spoils system. Proportional representation has been adoptedi n two cantons of Switzerland. In America it has as yet not been fully comprehended. But it fills out the measure of these other great reforms. The three are co-ordinate and complementary. The secret ballot prepares the way for a simple application of proportional representation. It enables the voter to have before him when he comes to the polls several lists of candidates, re)_)resenting all parties and interests, it i)rotects him from outside influences, it gives him the widest possible freedom of choice. The secret official ballot therefore, gives the movement an advantage which it by no meiins possessed in the period of reconstruction •of the Southern States, when it was widely but unsuccessfully advocated. Again, proportional rej^resentation is impossible in the presence of a spoils system. It would result in constant deadlocks. Legislation would be at a standstill. No measure would so powerfully impress vipon the people the need of civil service reform. Legislatures in theii- own defence would take the initiative in this reform instead of waiting to be driven by public opinion. With these three reforms co-operating, there need be no fear of popular government. They are not makeshifts or palliatives. They reach the sources of power. A reformed legislature would be the mightiest of engines for handling every other reform. It rightly holds the purse, the very life of government. It controls all other departments. It is nearest the people. It should include the best wisdom, integrity, enterprise of the people. It should represent the opinions and wishes of tiie people in the same proportions in which they exist at large. It should be the people themselves in conference. It should be a deliberative body in the highest sense, and not a side-show of puppets worked by the party machine and the lobby. It should harmonise all social interests. ' It should give power to the majority, a hearing to the minority, each in the persons of their ablest advocates. I F c % 183 APPENDIX.— Page 162. The Distribution of Seats. M. Victor de Hondt, of Brussels, Belgium, has devised an ingenious and accurate l)lan for the assignment of representatives to parties. The plan has been officially adooted by the Belgian Proportional Representation Society, and has received wide approval among continental reformers. The rule adopted is simple enough in its operation, but the reasons for it are so difficult of explanation that it is questionable whether it can be successfully advocated at this stage of the movement. Having adopted the free ticket as advocated in these pages, M. D'Hondt determines the number of seats to be assigned to each party Vjy dividing the respective electoral votes by such a common divisor as will give quotients whose number is equal to the numbers of seats to be filled. This common divisor is obtained by dividing the electoral vote of the parties by 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., and taking that quotient which holds in the order of importance the rank corresponding to the number of seats to be tilled.* M. D'Hondt gives the following example : — * Example. There are seven deputies to be elected. Total vote of the Liberal ticket 8,1-45 " " Catholic ticket 5,680 " " Independent ticket 3,725 The common divisor is 2,038. This is contained 4 times in 8,145 2 " 5,680 " " 1 " 3,725 Giving the liberals four members, the Catholics two, and the Independents one. The divisor is discovered by dividing the votes of the parties successively by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, as follows :— Divided by 1 8,145 2 4,027 3 2,715 4 2,038 5 1,629 Ranking now these quotients in the order of their importance — 1st 8,145 2nd 5,680 3rd -^,072 4th 3, < 2o 5th -3,848 6th 2,715 7th 2,038 8th 1,893 There beincr .seven seats to fill, the number 2,058 is the seventh in the order of impor- tance, and is taken for the common divisor. If there were eight seats the number would be 1,893 and so on for any number of seats. * The complete statement of M. D'Hon.lf s plan is found in La Representation Proportionelle. Vol. IV, page 360-374 Brussels, 1885. 5,680 3,725 2,840 1,862 1,893 1,862 184 The plan of M. D'Hondt is mathematically accumte, am' is superior in some, respects to the simple nxle of three which has been adopted in the Swiss legislation, and 's advocated in the foregoing pages of this essay. There are contingencies also where the results would Be different from those of the simpler operation, especially that it is more likely to exclude small parties from representation. This is certainly an advantage, in the opinion of the present writer, and one that ought to be incorporated in legislation of this kind. Eventually we may hope that it may be done. But at the present stage of the movement it is above all things necessary to ensure simplicity in any proposed legisla- tion. The Hare system foundered on the rock of complexity, and reformers must take warning from its fate. Absolute equality is impossible, under any system. The simpler rule is only slightly less accurate than the rule of D'Hondt. Both are infinitely better than single membered districts. Tiie present problem is t ) substitute in the mind of the public the principle of proportional for that of majority representation. When once the principle has been accepted and adopted in legislation, its evident fairness will prevent a return to the old system, but will prepare the way for minor amendments to secure the highest possible accuracy and justice. Equality. V THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS *A/.i I BE ASSESSED FOR FAIUURE TO RETURN ^^S'bOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY w.LITn?rease to so cents on the fourth DAY AND TO $t.OO ON THE SEVENTH DAY overdue. Photomount Pamphlet Binder Gaylord Bros., Inc. Makers Stockton, Calif. PAT. IAN. 21, 1908 90261) I THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY