'■^x>ii:itm^u REESE LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. [ -I((L'ss/()/is Mo. / /t?v^5 (Jjss No. > m "War should not be included in the domain of the arts and sciences, but rather in the sphere of social life. It is a conflict of vast interests, which is solved in blood, and only in this respect does it differ from other contests. A better comparison could Ix^ made with commerce than with any art whatever, for trade is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and much nearer to it still is ])olitics, which, for its part, can be reojardcHl as a sjxM-ies of trade on a larger scale. Besides, it is the lap in which war is developed; in it the features of war are already obscurely outlined, like the attributes of living creatures in their germs." Clausewitz, "On War," Book 2, Chapter III. THE CONDUCT OF WAR A BRIEF STUDY OF ITS MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES AND FORMS, Colmar, Baron von der Goltz, Royal Prussian Lieutenant-General, T^nattached; Imperial Ottoman Field Marshal and Adjutant-General; Author of "The Nation in Arms," etc. TRANSIvATED FROM THE GERMAN BY JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, First Lieutenant, 3d Cavalry, U. vS. Army; Assistant Instructor in the Art of War, I'. S. Infantry and Cavalry School. OF THl ' i UNIVERSITY KANSAS CITY, MO.: THE HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING CO. 1896. IvONDON: W. H. ALLEN & CO., (Limited), 13 Waterloo Place, S. W. Publishers to the India Office. u 7/.?^3 Copyrighted by HUDSON-KlMBERI.Y PUB. CO. 1890. TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. Amonj^ the many German writers on military sub- jects who have come into prominence since the Franco- German war, Lieutenant-General von der Goltz cer- ERRATA. Page 15, 12th line, for nationatiiites read nationalities. Page 158, 21st line, for reteating read retreating. Page 217, 2d line, for sruch read crush. ing the character of the military operations, the ability of the generals, and the qualities of the troops of the armies of the United States during that eventful peri- od; neither will they be willing to admit that his prem- ises, as stated, are always strictly accurate. How- ever, it was deemed best to reproduce the author's statements relating to our Civil War without comment; for, although it is well to know the opinions of author- ities occupying a different point of view, a discussion TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. Among the many German writers on military sub- jects who have come Into prominence since the Franco- German war, Lieutenant-General von der Goltz cer- tainly ranks with the very best, and his style of ex- pression and method of treatin«»' technical matters have made him a favorite with military readers. It is the peculiar merit of this author that his writings are at the same time instructive and entertaining, his thoughts being expressed in language so simple as to be readily intelligible to the ordinary understanding. This was a noticeable feature in former works of the author, such as '^Operations of the II. Army," "Gam- betta and His Armies," "The Nation in Arms," ^'Ross- bach and Jena"; but in this, his latest production (1895), these attractive qualities are sufficiently developed to make the book interesting even to non-professional readers. Tlie technical discussion of the subject is enlivened by a wealth of illustration drawn from mili- tjuy history, in which our war of 18(>l-()5 is not neglected. American officers will not be able to agree with the distinguished author in some of his opinions concern- ing the character of the military operations, the ability of the generals, and the qualities of the troops of the armies of the United States during that eventful peri- od; neither will they be willing to admit that his i)rem- ises, as stated, are always strictly accurate. How- ever, it was deemed best to reproduce the author's statements relating to our Civil War without comment; for, although it is well to know the opinions of author- ities occupying a different point of view, a discussion vi The Conduct of War. on matters of opinion is not likely to prove beneficial unless the participants are eciually cai)able and disinterested. The endeavor of the translator has been not only to render the author's ideas into En<;lisli with rea- sonable accuracy, but also to catch something of his style of expression, realizing that mere ''dictionary work" is as far icuiovcd from a satisfactory transla- tion as a jumble of rhyming sentences is from poetry. If he has been moderately succc^ssful in excluding the dreariness pervading the "confused and ct)nfusing translations'' of works on the .Vrt of AN'ar complained of by a recent English writer on military subjects, his labors will not have been in vain. The translator is under obligation to ('ai)tain A. 1 . ^^'agner, (Jth lufanii-y, luslrnclor, and 1st Lieulcnaut A. L. Mills, 1st Cavab-y, Assislaut Instructor, Depart- ment of Military Ai-l, for suggestions and assistance in the revision of this ti-anshdion. V . S. Infantry and Cavalry School, Fori Leavenworth, Kansas, Sei)tember 1, 1800. TABLE OF CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION 9 I. THE POSITION OF WAR IN SOCIAL LIFE 15 War u continuation of politics, p. 15. Courts of arbitration witliout practical results, p. 15. Best means of preserving peace: tliorouj;li military orpmi- zation, p. IG. II. THE SPECIAL NATURE OF MODERN WARS 17 War nowadays aims at the complete overthrow or destruction of the enemy, p. 17. How this should be construed, p. 11). III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN STRAT- • EGY 20 First object: the hostile main army, p. '20. All the forces to be C(mibined aj;ainst tliat army, p. 21. Destruction of the hostile main army not always synonymous witli tlie eomph-te attainment of tlie object of tlie war, p. 25. Compulsion of peace often an additional problem, p. 2(». Moans to this end, p. 27. D;stinjaiishinj4- characteristics of modern methods of conducting war, p. 2S. IV. THE PRINCIPAL METHODS OF WA(;iX(; WAR.. 2!) Offensive and defensive, p. 29. Strategy .-uul tactics, p. ol. Combinations of strategical ;ni(l tactical (►tfcn- sive and defensive and AMlhsen's vi(>ws as to their consLHiuences, p. 33. V. THE OFFENSIVE 37 1. The Strat(^gical Off(>nsive 37 It results from tlie political otfensive, p. 37. Rapid- it3', activity, and surprise form its vital element, p. 37. The strategical offensive facilitates the con- centration of masses of troops, p. 38. Victory gen- erally results from success at a single point, p. 39. Causes for the decline in power of the offensive, p. 40. The point of culminaticm, p. 44. It requires arduous exertion on the part of the troops, p. 44. 2. The Tactical Offensive 45 Facilitates cooperation of the troops to An even greater extent than the strategical offensive and brings the objective into view, p. 40. It possesses the advantage of selecting the decisive point, p. 47. Weakening factors, p. 48. Is made difficult by very high demands on the troops, p. 49. viii The Conduct of War. VI. THE DEFENSIVE 50 1. The Strate^'ical Defensive 50 Various ways of makiu^' dispositions tor stralc.uieai defensive, p. 51. Fundamental idea— to equalize orij;inal disparity of strenjctli by a slower expendi- ture of force, p. 52. Favorable circumstances, pp. 53- 50. Disadvantages counterbalanciu;L,^ tliem, p. 50. Essential defect: is able only to avoid defeat, never to gain a victory, p. 01. 2. The Tactical D(^fensive 01 Avoids thednn.u'er of shattering:- the troops in a fulile charj^e, p. 01. Advantaj;e»4 of lire and terrain, p. (VJ. AVealvUess of tlie tianlvs, p. O^J. Less exertion recpiiri'd of tlie troops, p. 04. VII. ALTERNATION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFEN- SIVE 04 rro])cr time for the change indicated by the deterio- rating clToct of the offensive on its own troops, p. '05. Conil)ination of the two methods by using botli at tile same time on different portions of the held, p. OS. VIII. THE OPERATIONS 00 1. General Statements 00 Detinition of an operation, p. 70. A nund^er of oper- ations constitute a campaign, p. TO. A war may be composed of several campaigns, j). 71. The progress of the operaticms not to be inteiTupted. \). 71. 2. The Base of ( )perations 7:> What is meant by '"base of operations." ]). 7.'5. The importance wliicli great commanders have attaclied to a good l)ase. p. 74. A whole district as a base, p. 70. .M<>val)le l>ases. p. 70. Simpl(> and double bases, p. 77. Change of base and pushing forward of the base, p. 78. Temporary abandonment of the base, p. 70. o. Lines of Oi)erations. Lines of ('ommunieation, Ob- j(-ct of Operations and Lines of Retreat 82 Difference between lines of opt'rations and lines of communication, p. 82. Tlie various kinds of lines of communication and their imiM>rtance. p. Si\. The necessity of rendering lines of communication secure, p. 87. Difficulty of changing them, p. 90. Definition of object of operations, p. 01. Ijines of retreat, p. 92. Important considerations in their selection, p. 93. A movable base affords great freedom in such selec- tion, p. 94. 4. Preparation of the Army (Equipment, Mobilization, Strategic Concentration) 94 Contents. . ix Necessity, in case of iiiodern armies, of first placing them on a war footing, pp. 94, 95. DiffcrLUcc between equipment and mobilization, p. 95. Strategic cou- concentitition and its importance, p. 9(J. 5. The Plan of Operations 97 Object of the plan, p. 97. Limitation of the scope of the plan by tirst serious encounter witli the enemy, p. 99. Conditions controlling the formation of a good plan, p. 102. How its details are arranged, pp. 103- 100. IX. STRATEGICAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 100 1. Object, Conditions, Expedients 10<; Object, to bring on tlie tactical decision under tlie most favorable conditions, p. 106. How this may be accomplislicHl, p. lOi;. Tlie main thing is to recognize the most important object, p. 108. 2. Selection of tlie I'oiiit of Concentration 108 Impossible to keep the troops assembled — necessity of separation, p. 109. The two opposite principles goA'erning the selection of the point of concenti'ation, p. 109. The Napoleonic principle of concentrating before the battk', p. 110. Moltke's principle of con- centrating on the tield of battle, pp. 110-111. 8. Parallel, Convergent, and Divergent Advance, Night :Ma relies and Flank Marches 115 I'ar.Mllel advance suitable after a decisive engage- ment, to adv.-inee r:iiildly, p. 115. Approach to the enemy (IciiiniKls coiiviTging advance, p. 110. The divergent advance is the after-piece of ;i Imttle, p. 117. Flank marches are unavoidable and not danger- ous, p. 118. Fear of night marches also unjustitiable, p. 119. 4. Special P^ornis of the Strati^gical Offensive 120 The strategical frontal attack 120 Sti'ategical penetration 122 Strategical attack of a wing 127 Strategical envelopment 128 Strategical turning movemeuts 182 Strategical attacks in rear and on the flanks 188 X. TACTICAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 140 1. Object, Conditions, and Aids 140 All strategical offensive operations primarily derive their importance from the battles to which they give rise, p. 140. Objw't: attack on the fi(4d of battle, p. 140. Tactical sui)(>rioi-ity a condition for success, p. 141. Superiority of lire the most important auxiliary, p. 142. X The Conduct of War. 2. Prepanitiaii of the I'orces, DispositioiLS for Attack. .142 Judicious (lisi)<)siti(>iis for the decisive attacks bej^et success, p. 14o. Uelatively easy in a premeditated battle, p. 143. More ditticult in rencounters, p. 143. 3. I*arallel. Oonverg(>nt, and Diverj^ent Advance 144 Tjs(> of masses in a cliar.ii'e precluded by mctdern fire- arms, p. 144. Convergent advance from a lon^' base line a natural constniuence, p. 145. Eccentric direc- tions in tlie tactical attack applicable in very excep- tional cases only, p. 145. 4. Special Forms of the Tactical Offensive 140 The tiictical frontal attaclv and bri^akinjj: of the enemy's line 146 Tactical envelopment 150 Tactical tui-nin,u- movements 153 Tactical attacks in rear and on the Hanks 154 XI. STRATEGICAL DEFENSIVE Ul'EUATlOXS 155 1. Objei'ts, Conditions, Aids , 155 Object: to avoid decisive action, p. 155. Condition for success: j^i'adual increase of strength so that a decisive battle may be accepted Liter, under more favorable conditions, p. 155. Aids: time, space, and obstacles for the enemy, ]). 15(5. 2. Selection of the I'oint for a Decisive Stand 15S Must be located far in the interior, wlien exlianslion of tlie (►])i)onent is counted on, p. 158. Wluni depi'Ud- ent on arrival at a good point, it nmst be made so that tlie forces will not be l)adly shaken before occupying the position, p. 1(11. AVhen based on union witli reinforcements, it will dep(>nd on their state of readiness, p. 1(52. 3. The Final Defensive I*osition; Direct Withdrawal: Convergent and I)iv(>rgent Retreat K;;; - The place may correspond to the conclusion of \\ic whole strategical defensive operation. ]>. Kl.). DiiiHi retreat generally indicates previous eiroi-, p. 1<;5. Object of a convergent retreat is to assemble tlu' forces in a favorable position, p. 1(>5. A divergent retreat to a. Hank position seldom possible, [). lOCt. A double divergent retreat divides the army; cases when it is necessary, p. 107. 4. Special Forms of the Strategical Defensive ir/.> The system of flank positions ir>!) Operations on interior lines 1 74 Combined operations 17S Contents. xi XII. TACTICAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 179 1. Objti-t and Aids 179 Object: repulse of the assaihiiit on the battletield, or j^aiuiiij? of time, p. 179. Means: lire, use of terrain, Held fortification, exhaustion of the opponent, p. 180, 2. Application of the Different Methods of the Tactical Defensive 18:^ Decisive enpijjenients and battles to .uain time, p. 18;^. Battles to tire out tlie enemy, p. 183. 3. Disposition of the Troops 185 Suitable dispositions for evei*y combat, p. 18."). Dis- positions for decisive en,ua.u'ements, p. 185. Protec- tion of the flanlvS. p. 187. I'osition of the reserves, p. 187. When the object is to j;ain time, p. 189. Wlien we endeavor to exliaust tlie enemy, p. 189. 4. Spe^cial Forms of tlie Tactical Defensive 190 The aml>usli defensive 190 Tactical flank positiims 19H XIII. OPERATIONS UNDER SPI](MAL (OXDITIOXS. .190 In mountain country, p. l'.>7. In defense^ of rivers, p. 199. Under the inlluence of artilici.il defensive arran«rements. p. 199. Fortitied positions, p. 200. IntrencluMl camps, p. I'oo. l'\)rtifications, p. 201. XIV. THE IXFIJ EXCE OF XA\ AL OPERATIOXS OX THE (U)NI)UCT Ol'^ WAR 210 The assistance of Ihe lU-et in the strale.uical concen- tration of anniet-^, p. 210. Method of iisini;- it when pushing' forward the base, p. 211. C(»ntr(»l of the sea make« fortress<>*4 supertluims, p. 211. It enables a nati(m to make use of international industry in arm- intr and e(piippinjj: its forces, p. 211. Rlo'ckad(> of tile coast contributes materiidly to the defe.il of Secession in America, p. 212. Direct support of the operations of a land force by tlie licet, p. 212. De- scents, p. 213. CONCLUSION 216 INDEX. Adrianople, The Russians at, 42., Alexander, establislies a new base on the Mediterranc^an Sea after defeating the Persians, 74; causes a fleet to accom- pany his land forces, 79. Allied Army, The, action of at Ltitzen, 57. Allies, The, in 1813, 68; mistake of at Austerlitz, 141. Alternation of offensive arjd dc^fensive, 64; difficulty of layinjj: down rules for, 64; selection of time and placd*for, 65; commander must make the selection, 65; dangers involved in delay, 65; change must be voluntary, 66; calculation in advanee difficult, (}C); how the change may become impera- tive, 67; use of both forms at the same time, 68. American War of Secession— Confederatt^ unable to force a peace, 26; effective use of blockades, 27; difference in resom'ces, 5.'>; compai'ison of troops, 51); use of railroads, 103; .furnishes examples, of fortifitni positions, 200; use of water-courses for naval operations, 212. Anatolia, character of campaigns in, 84. Arbitration, com'ts of, lack of practical results, 15. Argenteau, General, at Montenotte, 124. Atliuita., march from, example of temporarily abandoning a base, 80. Augereau, Marshal, action at jMillesimo, 124. Austerlitz, battle of, example of tactical counter-attack, 63; example of tm'uing movcMuent, 137; example of the am- bush defensive, 191. Austria, conduct of. In Crimean War, 41; intervention in favor of, in 1866. 58. Balance of power. The, effects of, 58. Barboshi, desti'uction of bridge at, 100. Base of operations. The, 73; former idea of, 73; vai'ious kinds of, 73; high value attached thereto by great commanders, 74; a province as a base, 76; movable bases, 76; advantages of movable bases, 76; to bo sufficiently extensive, 77; forti- fications as bases, 77; network of railroads as a base, 77; straight line not a desirable form for a base, 77; double bases, 77; change of base, 78; pushing forward the base, 78; fleet and land force supporting each other in transferring the base, as in Korea, 78; temporary abandonment of base, 81, 82; lateral bases, 93. xiv The Conduct of War, Bazaine, Marshal, at Gravelotte, 49; chances of escape from Metz, 71; at Vionville and Gravelotte, example of reversetl fronts, 136; divergent retreat to the French Nied, 1G7, Beaulieu, Austrian commander, action against Cervoni, in 1796, 124. Bigelow, Captain, quoted, 80. Bliicher, General von, draws Naix>leon after him into Silesia, 68; action at Ligny, 93; in 1813. 112; dofontod at Etogo.s, 176; operations in Silesia favored 1»y ici-i-.-iiii. 17'.>: :»cti(ni at Waterloo, 192. Blume, Cxerman military writer, quoted, 52. Bonin, General, at Trautenau, 114. Bourbaki, General, action at Villersexel, 57. Brialmont, General, fortified districts of, 208. Carolina.s, The, Gen. Sherman's march through, 80. Cervoni, General, attacked by Beaulieu, ^124. Charleroi, concentration of the French at. in 1815, 110. Clianzy, Gen(n-al, at T>e Mans, 130. (Mmrh'S. rrinc(' Fred(Mick. :it Orlcniis, 4(;: :it Le :SI;nis. 130; S(4(H'ts (icillheim as place of coiiccntralion, lOr). China, war with Japan, 78. Chouans. The, resistance of, 190. Clans(vwitz. (Jciieral von, worlvs referred to, 10; defines tactics and stratcuy. .".1; on reinforcement, 43; qnoted, 60; observa ti(m.s with reference to Russian campaign of 1S12. 157, 171: discusses defense of France in 1814, 172. Combined oporations, 178; require theater of war of ample size, 179. Concentration, reasons for, 21; hardshiiis resnltiiig from. 22; strategical, details to be worked out in advance. '.>(',. Conclusion, 216. Conlie, camp of, an example of intrenclied cam])s, 200. Constantinople, Russians at, in 1878, 43. Converging advance, when ncx^essary, 116. Cortes, Hernando, burns his ships. 83. Cremer, General, action at Frahier, 188. Curten, General de, pasition of troops, .l.inu.iiy C. 1S71. 174. Czataldcza, the ])osi1ion of. 160; as an example of fin'tilied positions. 20(); ])r(>i>osed nse of. 214. Danew(Tk. position of, an example of fortified positions, 200, Defensive, The, as a method of war, 29; not a complete method, 29; how rendered imperative, 30. Defensive. Tlie strategical, 50; not absolute passivity, 5(i: methods of defensive operations, 51; fundamental idea ol such defensive, 52; advantages of, 53-59; disadvantages, 60, 61; fundamental weakness of, 61. Index. XV Defensive, The tactical, 61; advantages of, Gl, 62; surprises in, 62; wealiness of flanivs, 63; counter-attaclis in, 63; use of inferior troops, 64. Dennewitz, battle of, reason for the victory, 68. Descents, 213; their peculiarities, 213; hoAv used, 213; their weakness, 214; no prospect of success in a densely popu- lated civilized country, 214; exception when the objective lies on the coast, 215; use in colonial wars and against nations of inferior military development, 215. Detachments, disadvantages of, 21; why unavoidable, 22. Diobitscli, Field Marshal, at Adrianople, 42; passes to the defensive, 44. Divergent advance, example of by the Allies, in 1814, 117; when of advantage, 117. Elbe, The, as a base in 1813, 74, 82; northern course of, 75; middle Elbe as a ])ase, 75. Endurance in war, an advantage, 24; importance of, 28. England, C(mduct of in Kusso-Tiukish W.n-. 41. Eugen(\ Viceroy, recommendations to by Napoleon, 75. Flank marches, defined, 117; when dangerous, 118; precautions necessary, 118; why unavoidable. 111). France, resistance of in 1870-71, 2(5; intervention in favor of in 1871, 58; fundamental eri-or committed in 1870, 100. Franco-CJennan War. The. two i)hases of, 28t Fredericlv the (Jreat, mareli lo Kolin, 34; furnishes examples of strategical dt^fensive in Seven Years' AVnr. 56; action at beginning of 1757, 110, 123; operates on intei-ioi- lines, 178. Frederick William, Crown Prince, at Iv("»iiiggr:itz, 192, I'rench troops, bivouacs of, 1870-71, 55. (Jeofgia, nature of country, 80. (hu'isenau, G<'neral von, at Ligny, 93. (xourko. General, at Hain Boghaz Pass, 153. Granicus, battle on the, referrefl to, 74, Gravelotte, battle of, partial success of the Germans, 47. Gro«s-Be<^ren, battle of, reasons for victory, 68; effect of Roynier's defeat, 114, Hamburg, fortified by Napoleon, 75, Hamley, General, quoted, 124. Hannibal, means of not sutfici(mt, 43, 55. Highways, as lini^s of comnumication, 84; means of increasing their usefulness, 84. Hohenlohe, "Letters on Strategy" quoted, 40, * ** xvi The Conduct of Wm\ Ingolstadt, concentration of French at, in 1805, 110. Intervention, in 1866 and 1871. 58. Issus, battle at, referred to, 74. Japanese war with China, description of operations, 78. Tomini, Baron, study of works of recommended, 10; quoted on "lateral bases," 94; guesses Napoleon's objective in 180(1 99; on campaign of 1796, 124; on tm*ning movements, 184. Kapczewitsch, General, defeated by Napoleon in 1814, 176. Kai-s, frontier fortification, strategic use of in 1877, 203, 204. Katzbach, The, battle of, reason for the victory at, 68. Keller, General von, action of detachment on the Lisaine, 188. Kleist, Gon(M"al von, defeated by Napoleon in 1814, 176. Koniggriitz. battle of, effect of, 26; position of troops at, 116. Korea, as Japanese objective, 78. Ktistrin, fortress, importance of because situated on a river, 206. Kutuzoff, General, at Kaluga, 184. I^a Harpe, General, at Montenotte, 124. La Rochejacquelin, Vendean chief, comes to grief at Le Mans, 131. Liebert, militai*y writer, quoted, 146. Ligny, battle of. 93. Lines of communication, 82; defined, 82; number and im portance of increase with the size of the army, 83; highway:^ the safest, 83; water-routes, 84; effect of ice on water-routes. 85; the sea as a means of communication, 85; railroads pre- ferred, 85; inferior to ships in carrying power, 85; should be made secure, 87; length of, 87, 88; affected by shortness of base, 88; affected by extent of territory occupied, 89; changes of lines of communication, how made, 90; advan tage in large number of lines, 91. Lines of operations, 82; defincHl, 82; not identical with lines of communication, 86, 87; danger in having such lines separated by imi>assable obstacles, 92. Lines of retreat, defined, 92; separation from lines of communi- cation, 93; eccentric lines of retreat defined, 94: m()val)le base in connection therewith, 94. Lisaine, battle on the. 45. Lisbon, the objective of Mai*shal Massena, in 1810, 42. Ix)cation of troops, beneficial effect of changes in, 38. Loire, advance of the German II. Army against the, 87. Lorn, difficulties of the main Turkish army on the, 92. Liitzen, success of Allied Army at, 57. Index. xvii Macedonia, Alexander's starting-point, 74. Magdebui'g, forti'ess, importance of, 75. Maneuvers, futility of, without battle, 17. Marches, losses on, 40; march of the Prussian Guard Corps, 40. Marmont, Marshal, left to watch Bliicher in campaign of 1814. 177. Massena, Marshal, advances to Torres Vedras, 42, 87; at Montenotte, 124. Metz, fortress, German troops relieved at, 40; operations around, 70; as a support for the flanli of the French Army, 205. Militia, not suitable for offensive campaigns, 45. Missions, diplomatic, work of, 15. Mobilization, defined, 95; advantages of, 95. Moltke, Field Marshal von, quoted on "separation and con- centration," 23; calculates with what force Marshal Diebitsch Avould liave aiTived at Constantinople, 42; his principle of concentration. 111; intentions with reference to Danish position at Danewerk, 131; plan proposed for defense of Berlin in 18e attended t» beforehand, 71; distances which can be passed over, 72; effect of checks, 72. Operations on interior lines, defined, 174; example: Napoleon's campaign of 1814, 175; situation not always favorable, 176; conditions necessary for success, 177; future operations on interior lines, 178. Operations under special conditions, 196; defense of mountiiin ranges, 197; probable action of the assailant, 198; proixn* measures for the defender of a mountain range, 198; attack and defense of rivers, 199; fortified positions, their objects, 199; intrenched camps, 200; fortresses more indept^ndent than intrenched camps, 201; fortresses, when appropriate, 201; example in the Turkish Empire of fortresses needed, 202; addition of smaller strong points, 202; important places near frontiers, 203; fortifications provided with a Index. XIX camp, 208; necessary conditions, 205; as a support for the flauK of an army, 205; importance of fortifications situated on streams, 20(i; danger connected with fortifications, 200; escape of an army shut up in a fortress, 206; use of fortified camps, 207; fortified districts, 208; fortifications to protect capitals, 208; injurious influence of fortifications on a field army, 208; fortifications will probably be wanting at the places where most needed, 209; movable fortified camps, 209. Opinion, public, effect of, 18. Organization, military, which is best, IG; usual form, IG; militia and recruiting systems, IG; plays an essential part in the strategical offensive, 36. Orient, The, character of the campaigns in, 84, Orleans, confusion of the French after the battle of, 167. Osman Pasha, advance of in 1877, 57; night marches of, 119; criticism of, 173. Oudinot, Marshal, at Gross-Beeren, 114. Parallel advance, advantages of the, 115. Parigne I'Eveque, battle at, action of a French brigade, 155. Paris, Germans at, 43. Peace, best means of preserving, 16; coercion of a special task, 26. Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, its influence in the Japanese war, 79. Penhoat, General, at Frahier, 188. Plan of operations, The, 97; complete plan impracticable, 97; it is supposed to fix the place of assemblage of the army, 96; the essential point in devising a plan, 98; effect of arbitrary assumptions, 98; effect of offensive plan with inferior trooi>s, 101; defensive plan with excellent troops against an inferior enemy, 101; probable action of the enemy to be considered, 102; offensive plan must favor cooperation, 103; difficulty of destroying the enemy in- creased by movable base, 103; additional information to be embodied in defensive plan, 104; moderation desirable, 105; influence of fortifications on the plan, 105; details of the plan, 106. Plevna, interruption of operations at, 24. Point of concentration, selection of, 108; Napoleon's principle with reference to, 109, 110; Moltke's principle. 111; advan- tages of the two methods, 112-115. Political offensive. The, founded in history, 34. Port Arthur, in the Japanese war, 79. Prague, siege of, 34, 123. ^ Precis of strategy, need for, 10. ^i^^' '^ Preparation of the army, 94; important features of the, 9r^^ ^^ '^^'^ ^TTNIVER; Of CAIIFOf XX The Conduct of War. rrincipal methods of waging war, The, 29; convenience of the division, 30. Prussian Army, movements suggested for, 57. Prussian Guard, The, losses on the march, 40. Psychological factors, effect of, 88. Pyrrhic victories, in the offensive, 02. Railroads, development of, 11; effect of, 11; value of to the defensive, 54; repair and demolition of, 77; as a base, 77; as lines of communication, 85, 80; their use in concentration of troops, 96; strategical railroads, 97. Ranipon, Colonel, at Montenotte, 124. Reynier, General, at Gross-Beeren, 114. Russo-l'^irkish War, 24, 27; sti^ategical defensive succumbs in, 59. Sacken, General, action in Febniary, 1814, 175. Sadowa, concentration of Prussians at, 110. Sainte Marie aux Chenes, capture of, 49. Saxon ti'oops, in 1806, 55. Scharnhorst, General von, suggestions of, 57. Schwarzkoppen's brigade, in action, 48. Secession in America, why a failure, 26. Sedan, battle of, 153. Serbelloni, General, absent from battle of Prague, 129. Sevastopol, reasons for the importance of, 215. Sherman, General, march from Atlanta to Savannah, 80; through the Carolinas, 80; provisions cairied, 80; his total strength, 80. Silesia, campaign of 1813 in, 68; Bliicher pm'sued in, 79. Smolensk, battle of, 66. Spain, condition of in campaign of 1810, 159. Special forms of strategical defensive, KM); system of flajik positions, 169; under what circumstances advisable, 109; special conditions arising, 170; the system requires elbow- room, 171; tlank positions taken by retreating armies, 173. Special forms of tactieiil defensive, 190; ambush defensive, 191 ; not easy to cany out, 191; method to be employed when troops are insufficient in number, 192. Special nature of modern wars, 17; usual form, 17; distinguish- ing cliaracteristics, 28. St. Cyr, Marshal, Napoleon's letter to, 82. Steinmetz, General von, action at Nachod, 114. St. Privat, battle of, communicjitions temporarily abandoned at, 80. Strategy, definitions of, 31; characteristics of modern, 20, Sti'ategical attack of a wing, 127; intentions of the Germans in 1870, 128; conditions to be observed, 128. Index. xxi Strategical attacks in rear, 138. Strategical defensive operations, 155; object of, 155; gaining of time, 155; conditions for success, 15G; selection of the poiijt for the decisive stand, 158; not to be ti'ansf erred too far to tlie rear, 158; the retreating defensive, 159; principal danger in the defensive, 161; favorable change from rein- forcements, 1(52; endurance in the victor, 162; example, French winter campaign of 1807, 163; Germans in 1870, 163: Final defensive position, 163; case of an army in a forti- fied frontier position, 164; direct withdrawal, 165; object of convergent retreat, 165; divergent retreat, 166; double di- vergent retreat, 167. Strategical envelopment, 128; Frederick in 1Z57, 129; Prussians in 1866, 129; conditions for success, 130; Prince Frederick Charles at Le Mans, 130. Strategical flank attacks, 1.39. Strategical offensive operations, 106; object of, 106; method of attaining the object, 106; firet condition of success, 107; difficulties attending fulfillment of the object, 107; value of correct coup d'oeil, 108. Strategical penetration, 122; proper moment for, 122; influence of lines of couimunication, 123. Strategical turning movements, 132; difficult after a position has been taken up, 133 ; Austrians in 1800, 133 ; Napoleon, in 1805 and 180(>, 134; lead to reverse fronts, 134; effect of rapid means of communication, 135; campaign of 1870 as an illustration of reversed fronts, 136. Tactical defensive operations, 179; double object of, 179; gain ing of time. 180; effect of judicious dispositions, 181; skillful leaders and good troops necessaiT, 182; difficulty of recog uizing proper moment for considering object accomplished, 182; application of different methods of the tactical defen- sive, 183; exhaustion of the enemy a powerful resource, 183; difficulty of estimating prospective losses, 184; disposition of the troops, 185; efficiency of fire to be favored, 185; strong positions advantageous, 185; terrain should be practicable, 186; obstacles for the enemy, 186; field fortifi- cation, 186; prolongation of line to meet envelopment, 187; crotchet formations, 187; reserves in echelon, 188; both wings in the terrain, 188; considerations when gaining of time is advisable, 189; considerations when exhaustion of the enemy is our object, 189. Tactical flank positions, 193; strong points of support necessary, 193; under what circumstances particularly effective, 194; illustration by tactical problem, 194; results when defense in a flank position is successful, 195; when most effective, 196. xxii The Conduct of War, Tn.'tical offensive operations, 140; object of, 140; condition for success, 141; sui>eriority of fire, 142; shock action, 142; melee, 142: prepai-ation of the forces, 142; dispositions for attack, 143; effect of modern lire, 143; rencounters, 143; plan of attack, 144; parallel, converg:ent, and diverj?ent advance, 144; special forms, 146; tactical frontal attack, 146: basis for hope of victory, 147; tactical frontal attack still necessary, 148; breaking of the enemy's line, 149; difficulties of peneti'ation, 149; likely in rencounters only, 149; battle of Orleans, 150; tactical envelopment, 150; difficulty in preliminary dispositions, 151; lack of concert. \~A; proper time for development of frontal attack, 152; prceaiitioiis to be observed, 152; double envelopment, 152; tactical attacks in flank and rear, 154. Tactical turning movements, 153; effect of wide turning move- ments, 153; moimta,in warfai-e as a field for, 154. Tactics, definitions of, 31. Thuringian Forest, advance of the Prussians through, 182. Torgau, fortress on the Elbe, 75. Torres Vedras, Massena at, 42; as an example of fortified positions, 200. Turks, The, their situation in the Crimean War, 53. Turkish Army, The, movements of in 1877, 53; confines itself to the defensive in 1878, 100; mistake of after loss of the Balkans, 158. Vendeans, The, resistance of. 190. Vendee, The, great army of, 81 ; repeated failures of the Repub- licans in 1793, 132. Villersi'xel, General Bourbaki at, 57. War, position of in social life, 15: a conliiination of politics, 15; war unavoidable, 15; eft'ect of state of war, 24. Waterloo, arrival of PnLssians at, 93. Wavre, march of the Prussians on, 93. Wei-hai-wei, capture of, 79. W^eimar, Duke of, action in October, 1806, 82. Werder, General von, dispositions on the Lisaine, 45; at Villers- exel, 57. Widdin, night march from, 119. Willisen, military author, quoted, 34; scheme of results to be expected, 33. Worth, battle of, an example of double envelopment, 152. York, General, defeatcni by Napoleon in 1814, 175. INTRODUCTION. The circumstances under which military operations are executed are so manifold that two situations ex- actly alike will hardly ever be discovered. But should this happen, then the persons called upon to act in the two cases would still be different, and subsequent events would never coincide, like two congruent tri- angles. Hence it follows, that although there may be in the conduct of war certain laws whose truth?is incontesta- ble, their application, by no means, always produces the same result, as might be the case in the use of two mathematical formulas. We say, it is true, that it is only necessary to apply them with good judgment to the special circumstances existing at the time to be sure of success. It is, however, exceedingly difficult in this matter to hit upon exactly the right thing. The bare knowledge of the laws of strategy may therefore be of doubtful value. In their practical ap- plication success depends upon numerous anterior conditions; and if due attention be not paid to them, knowledge may even be the cause of fatal delusions. It easily betra^'s people into placing too high a value on the power of the rules and precepts of the art of war to produce victory, and, none the less, into an over- estimate of their own talents. It is a remarkable yet explicable phenomenon, that precisely in those armies where the commander is afforded the fewest opportuni- ties to acquire practical experience, the number of those is great who imagine that they were intended for 10 The Conduct of War, generals, and who consider the practice of this voca- tion quite easy. But in the school of golden practice such impres- sions are, of course, quickly rectified through experi- ence of failure, difficulties, and misfortune. The ba- rometer of self -consciousness then sinks, as with the approaching storm, to a low level. At some great military schools the idea of making the theory of the guidance of armies the subject of a special course of instruction has already been entirely abandoned, and each individual is left to himself to ascertain its principles from a study of military his- tory, careful observation of extensive exercises of troops, and personal reflection. However, the need of a precis of strategy continues to exist. The young soldier who desires to fit him- self for the position of a commander will not every- where be offered the means to attain the coveted ob- ject through his own efforts, in the manner indicated. Not everywhere will active social intercourse with ex- perienced companions in arms give opportunities for an exchange of ideas, which, extending gradually to all the occurrences of war, affords instruction without constraint or formality. The need of ascertaining what the leading rules of strategy requiring consideration are, is then involun- tarily forced upon the novice, who, without a safe guide, desires to learn the laws of his art out of books. These may be determined through comparative study of the older works, such as those of Billow, Jomini, Clause- witz, Willisen, etc. But work of this kind requires time, pains, and a certain maturity. The more recent treatises on the conduct of war on a large scale deal extensively with those developments, which, in con- Introduction. 1 1 trast with former times, have only in our days begun to play an important part — namely, the mobilization and concentration of armies. This is the result, prin- cipally, of the formation of a dense network of rail- roads in the Occident, whereby the means for surpris- ingly rapid preparation of the forces is furnished. Each power tries to surpass the others in this respect. As on such occasions the transportation of very large masses of troops has to be planned, the whole takes the form of a sort of military w ork of art, which affords the technologist a good opportunity to display his brilliant qualities; and thus it has come about that many think to find the whole subject of the guidance of armies in this one section. They forget that wars are also waged in countries where railroads do not yet play as prominent a part as in western Europe, so that the concentration of armies will be accomplished in a slower and simpler manner. They also overlook the fact that even in the Occident the importance of railways for the use of the forces, during a battle, is not considerable. But we shall here give preference to just this field — that is, the activity of the masses of troops already de- ployed, because it is rather neglected nowadays. It is, and always will be, the most important part of the art of w^ar. Preparation and maintenance of troops are the proper subjects of special treatises, for which they offer a wide field. We shall here touch upon them in so far only as may be necessary for a proper under- standing of the whole. If w^e forego the systematic development of the principles to be imparted, in order not to add a new one to the many portly volumes on the subject, but little more will remain than a table of contents of the 12 The Conduct of War. study of the conduct of war; but this serves our pur- pose — naniely, to lead the beginner, in an easy way, up to a more thorough study of the art. And only under a restriction of this kind can the present volume be con- sidered suitable for its intended purpose, — that of a guide for instruction, — in which, during the quite lim- ited number of hours of a year's course, a survey of the whole domain is to be given in the most complete man- ner possible. It is taken for granted that the reader will prima- rily accept in good faith many assertions the absolute accuracy of which may appear doubtful to him. We need fear no disadvantage on this account, as it is only a question, in the meantime, of leading him, in the right way, to a personal examination of the subject. This examination will later on bring out the details Avhich, wholly or conditionally, confirm the worth of the assertion. For the experienced this book may serve as an aid to the memory. The whole difficulty, as Clausewitz justly says, consists in remaining true to one's self- devised principles under the more difficult circum- stances of war. The very first requisite is to remember them at the proper moment, and this again requires that we should occasionally refresh our memories. For such work, however, "s. brief study of the conduct of great wars" is a better aid than military philosoph- ical treatises in several volumes. Some subjects ordinarily treated in writings like the present, such as the system of reports and infor- mation, orders, and command, have been excluded. We desired simply tomake a compilation of those meth- ods of. using troops which may find application in war. The manner in which the application should be made Introduction. 13 is reserved for a future work, which is to comprise everything referring to the relations of the commander to his army. This segregation is of advantage in avoid- ing apparent contradiction between rules and their application. For example, we might very readily, in a general theory of strategy, distinctly favor the offen- sive, and yet, with reference to a particular army and special 'circumstances^ choose the defensive as the only correct course. Were we to attempt a union of both sections of the general theory, we should be obliged to add at once to each sentence all the excep- tions, and this would produce an impression of confus- ing vagueness and uncertainty. It is better, therefore, to give in a separate treatise on the ''command of armies" the necessary hints for the application of what is contained in this work on the conduct of war. Individual exceptions were of course unavoidable. Thus the plan of operations, although it belongs rather in the domain of the command of armies, is treated here because it is intimately connected with the concentra- tion of armies, as this in turn is associated with the base and the lines of operation and communication. In this case the separation could not very well be car- ried out. I. THE POSITION OF WAR IN SOCIAL LIFE. The governments of all civilized nations now maintain special ministries and permanent diplomatic missions for the current regulation of their mutual political relations. A large part of their work consists in settling, in a peaceful way, points of controversy that may arise. Never, however, will it be practicable to avoid en- tirely those questions in which each of the contesting parties believes that it is impossible to give way with- out dealing himself a fatal blow. Such cases have arisen in our times especially from the endeavor of nationalitites to form homogeneous and independent states, which could not be created without violating previous possession. But also questions of power and influence, even of mere national jealousy and rivalry, may acquire such importance that political wisdom and diplomatic skill seek a peaceful adjustment in vain. A violent solution through war then becomes una- voidable. War, therefore, is the continuation of politics; only the means for the attainment of the object have changed. The idea of making war impossible through courts of arbitration has led to no practical result, because the power which could enforce unconditional and uni- versal respect for the decisions of such courts is lacking. 15 16 The Conduct of War. The best means, therefore, to preserve peace, is to be found in a thorough military organization; for the strong are not as readily attacked as the weak. With the size and power of armies the damage resulting from the encounter increases, the responsibility for deciding on war becomes more serious, and, conse- quently, this decision is not so lightly made. Weak states, in the military sense, suiy:*ounded by more powerful neighbors, constitute on this account a danger of war. States which on erroneous considera- tions neglect their military organization, conjure up this danger through their own fault. The same is true of states with a weak government which is not able to restrain the passions of the people ; for the excited ma'sses will more easily raise the cry for war than cabinets. The best military organization is that which makes all the intellectual and material resources of the nation available for the purpose of carrying a war to a success- ful issue. It would not be justifiable to attempt a de- fense with a portion of the force, when the existence of the whole is endangered. The forms of organization, as well as the details thereof, depend largely upon the internal condition of the country, as well as upon international rivalry. They are transformed witli the gradual change in the social life of nations. The form under which most of the military organi- zations of the present day appear is that of skeleton armies. A portion of the men able to .bear arms ai*e retained in permanently organized bodies of troops which serve as a school of military training for the entire male population fit for service, and, at the same time, furnish the framework for the reception of the stream of educated soldiers in case of war. But few The Special Nature of Modern Wars. IT states have proceeded further to a militia organiza- tion, in which permanent cadres, with the exception of a few troops of instruction, are entirely lacking. Such an organization may appear justifiable in case the natural situation renders an attack by an army ready for battle impossible, or when the small extent and limited population of the state cause the adoption of this method, in order to raise a force which shall be respectable, at least in point of numbers. The recruiting feystem by voluntary enlistment is now employed in a few cases only, and is obsolescent. II. THE SPECIAL NATURE OF MODERN WARS. In this age war appears generally under its natural form — that is, as a bloody conflict between nations, in which each side strives for the complete overthrow, or, if possible, the annihilation of the opponent. The attempt to frighten the enemy suflSciently to cause him to submit to our will, by simply moving masses of troops, or, — as a well-known writer of the present century has expressed it, — "to gain victory without battle, through the mere power of maneuver," will no longer accomplish its purpose. The experi- ence of the Napoleonic wars has taught us that ac- tions of the above nature immediately lose all their effect as soon as the opponent resolves to make war in earnest and to strike with a sharp sword. The idea that in modern times two disputing states may enter into conflict without putting forth their full strength, and without contemplating the over- 18 The Conduct of War. throw of the opponent, but, on the contrary, may em- ploy only a portion of their forces, in order to advance to a certain point, the possession of which is the only matter of interest to them, — is as improbable as armed conflicts without a decisive battle.* This can be considered a rational proceeding only in case the object is quite insignificant. But, as a rule, nations will not at the present day go to war for such trifling causes. Should this, however, happen in some excep- tional case, because of the perverted measures of the disputing governments, the excited national feeling of the people will at once become active and will not per- mit the authorities to make the fate of the whole war depend on the reverse of a very small portion of the fighting strength of the nation. Public opinion will insist upon reinforcement, the opponent will follow suit, and, therefore, contrary to the original intention, the whole force will gradually be put into action after all. Since state and nationality have become prac- tically synonymous terms, nations resemble persons who would forfeit life rather than lose their honor. This also shows that certain notions which are often advanced about systematic methods of conducting war ♦Herein we must disregard exceptional cases; for example, when a weak state has violated the rights of a more powerful neighbor, and through blind passion, or for other reasons, declines to give ear to the complaints of the latter, who is then finally constrained to take up arms to compel an adjust- ment of the affair. Such wars partake more of the nature of military executions, and are not the object of our consideration. The same is true of colonial wars, which, according to the nature of the country and of the enemy, will in each case bring about quite peculiar circumstances. We can exclude both these cases without hesitation, because it is generally a matter of indifference whether, in their prosecution, the prin ciples of war on a large scale are correctly followed or not. The Special Mature of Modern Wars. 19 rest upon a misconception of the nature of modern wars. Although all the forces in these cases are con- sidered as armed and equipped, no unreserved use is intended to be made of them for decisive action ; in lieu thereof a system of maneuvers and isolated battles is contemplated, with engagement of ,Qnly a portion of the entire force. Only a very awkward and inactive enemy would allow himself to be delayed in this way. Since wars for conquest, spoliation, or mere love of fighting have been rendered impossible by the advanc- ing civilization of nations, and since their culture has been developed to the extent that every war would injure it, the combatants must endeavor to compel the opponent, as quickly as they can, to recognize the de- sired conditions of peace. As this only becomes possi- ble after one of the parties has lost all prospect of suc- cessful resistance, the necessity of overthrow or de- struction again obtrudes itself. As long as the principle of nationality remains the dominant feature in political structures, these condi- tions will not change, and war will retain its absolute character. But this overthrow and destruction are not to be considered as actual killing or disabling of all the hos- tile combatants. The loss of a part will generally have such an effect on the whole that they will give up all hope of victory and cease fighting. The moral effect, therefore, adds its weight as a destructive agent to the work of the weapons; in fact, human nature is such that the moral effect becomes the greater. When, therefore, we speak of the overthrow of the opponent, we mean that, through defeat of a portion of his forces, we induce him to give up all chances of a later favorable turn in the campaign; — and by destruc- 20 The Conduct of War. tion we mean the act of producing such a physical and moral condition that he for the present feels himself unable to continue the struggle. III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN STRATEGY. The enemy, whose motives we must assume to be similar to our own, will assemble his troops into one army in order to deliver, with united forces, blows which shall be as decisive as possible. In case the great size of the entire land force of a state necessitates the formation of several groups, be- cause in one mass the whole might be too unwieldy, several of these bodies would still receive instructions looking towards mutual action. We shall, therefore, in every case be able to recognize a portion of the enemy's force as intended for decisive action, and this may be designated the hostile "main army." We may also say that it embodies the resistance which will be offered by the enemy. It is obvious that after the main army is defeated, the other groups can still less count upon victory. Perhaps they will even abandon further resistance and we may happily be able to terminate the whole work with one great success. Consequently the immediate objective, against which all our efforts must be directed, is the Jiostile main army. In this first principle of modern warfare no change is wrought by the fact that a number of smaller under- takings occasionally precede the great encounter. Frontier fortifications which obstruct the highways The Characteristics of Modern Strategy. '-21 perhaps prevent the simultaneous movement of great bodies of troops. They must, therefore, be attacked and reduced before the principal action begins. Both fighting forces may endeavor to interrupt the concen- tration of the opponent by rapidly pushing forward bodies of troops, especially cavalry, and thus prelimi- nary combats will ensue. But in these isolated actions no independent pur- pose is pursued; both through the object on which they are based, and the consequences attending them, are they intimately connected with the main action and belong to it, as heat lightning belongs to the ap- proaching thunderstorm. The surest means of vanquishing the hostile main army lies in the concentration .of a superior force; for nobody can with certainty claim in advance that he will have the better general at the head of his army, or that his troops will be braver than the enemy. Such elements of strength inducing confidence in victory may, of course, come under consideration in the prac- tical solution of difficult questions in campaign. Often, in reaching decisions, they may have a more positive value than all other influences. But scientific investi- gation must always assume that the troops on both sides are of the same quality, unless an exception is specially indicated. In such cases, next to judicious dispositions, numbers are decisive. From this we deduce a second general principle of modern war — namely, to have, if possible, all the forces assembled at the hour of decisive action. A single battalion may turn the scale in battle. According to this, every separation, and every de- tachment from the main force, would appear faulty. As great successes carry smaller ones with them, all 22 The Conduct of War, minor dangers might be disregarded, and even some losses accepted, in order not to weaken the fignting body. This, however, cannot be carried out to its limit. We shall seldom be able to determine the exact point of time when the great decision may be expected, and we cannot neglect all secondary objectives for an in- definite period. In addition, there will always be points, which, though lying off the straight road to the object, would, if abandoned to the enemy, not be with- out influence on our main army, and might hamper its action at the most important moment. We must, therefore, secure them by special details. Detach- ments are unavoidable, and it is only a question of making them in such a way that we can either draw them in for the battle, or that they wilf have an imme- diate influence on its successful issue. The most prof- itable way of accomplishing the latter is by detaining stronger forces of the enemy at a distance from the field of battle. Detachments, however, which cannot be made to exert any influence on the outcome of the decisive action are always faulty. The concentration of very large masses of troops at one point naturally is the occasion of many hard- ships, which, with the advent of unfortunate contin- gencies, such as epidemic diseases, may rise to a serious danger. The housing of all the troops in shel- tered places becomes impossible, their subsistence deficient. Furthermore, it becomes difficult to set such masses in motion when they are collected in one place instead of being stationed in separate groups; for from two or more points of departure we can naturally use more roads than from a single one. During the march these difficulties repeat themselves at every halt for the night The Characteristics of Modern Strategy. 23 and every time the command leaves camp. We must also consider that only from 30,000 to 40,000 men can be permitted to advance on the same road if the whole force is to be brought into action the same day; other- wise the rear detachments will not be able to arrive on the field of battle before night. This circumstance, therefore, also demands a division of the great masses of troops, and the maxim about united forces is not to be so understood as to require them to continually march and camp in an assembled state, but only in such a way that it may be possible to unite them at the deci- sive moment, or at least to bring them into active coo[)eration. The conduct of modern war, therefore, appears un- der the form of continual separating and assembling of masses of troops. It is the business of the commander to maintain this state of separation as a rule, because it facilitates the subsistence of an army; but at the same time he must always be able to effect an oppor- tune concentration. "For this no general rules can be given, the problem will in each case be different."* To have all the available forces concentrated on the day of decisive battle, without causing them to suffer beforehand through continuous overcrowding, would represent the triumph of the art of separation and concentration. The mere continuation of a state of war has, of *Field Marshal v. Moltke in "Militllr-Wochenblatt" of No vember 18th, 1867, Napoleon has given us a valuable hint for the solution of this question: "The commander should several times a day imagine that the enemy has appeared in front, or on a flank of the army, and then ask himself what action ought to be taken. Should this cause embarrassment, it would indicate an error in the dispositions, which would have to be remedied at once." 24 The Conduct of War. itself, become an independent destructive and annihi- lating power on account of the sensitiveness of the highly developed commercial life of our times; under certain circumstances it may exercise a positively de- cisive influence. The consequence of these conditions is that modern warfare brings with it an uninterrupted flow of events. A cessation of hostilities may occur in exceptional cases; for example, when one of the combatants has repulsed the attack of the other, but is not strong- enough to proceed to a counter-attack. This orcurred in the last Russo-Turkish war, after the second battle of Plevna, the interruption, up to the fall of that place, lasting more than four months. However, in this case the ratio of strength of the two contending parties was an unnatural one from the start. Turkey was too weak to pass over to the counter-stroke after fortunate repulse of the attack, and ought not to have proceeded to the arbitrament of the sword without absolute cer- tainty of assistance from allies. An original error, therefore, in deciding uj^on war, brought about the exception in this case; and this only prov^es the rule. Those long pauses, without evident and urgent reasons, which were a feature of the older wars, are not even to be thought of any more. They were the result of dis- inclination for action, lack of clear ideas on the enter- prise in hand, or even of a custom — for instance, that of resting for the winter. The expenses of maintenance of the armies placed in field at the present day arc so great that, merely to be rid of this oppressive burden, governments must insist upon uninterrupted employ- ment of the forces by their commanders. The party with the greater endurance in war en- joys a large advantage. Theoretically the case is very The Characteristics of Modern Strategy. 26 readily conceivable of a state which has overthrown the organized military power of another and overflowed a great portion of its territory, but cannot support the sacrifices which this occupation entails in the long run, and is finally obliged to grant a comparatively favor- able peace to the defeated enemy. This point is often overlooked, and the annihilation of the enemy's principal army erroneously considered synonymous with the complete attainment of the ob- ject of the war. Countries of great extent, like the Russian empire, with a closely related national population which is not overcrowded, and whose conditions of life are still simple and but slightly dependent on the undisturbed continuation of international intercourse, naturally suffer much less under a protracted state of war than liighly civilized s\ates with contracted boundaries, densef population, and imperfect unity or concord of the whole. This weakness is often further increased through the fact that such states are not able to feed their population on the products of their own soil, but must have recourse to importation from abroad, which may be interrupted by war or cut off altogether. Social and political conditions also play an import- ant part. If it is only a peasantry, living scattered over a flat country, which is struck by a war, the govern- ment generally retains a free hand in making its decis- ions; for the former, as a rule, have not the means to give suitable expression to their desire for peace. Quite different is the case if there be, residing in great cities, a rich commercial middle class, which, through inten'n])tion of the ordinai'v course of affairs, may lose evei'vthing. They will be the first, after preliminary defeats, to be iuclined towards peace; at the same time 26 The Conduct of War. they possess the means, through command of the press and influences of all kinds, to make their wishes heard. It is only when two states are of approximately the same nature that the defeat of the hostile main army carries with it the attainment of the further purpose, the immediate exaction of the desired peace. The most remarkable case of this kind w^as the campaign of Prussia against Austria, in 1866, when, with the battle of Koniggratz, peace was also decided. But even in cases of this kind matters may turn out differently, as was shown in the Franco-German war of 1870-71. After an almost complete annihilation of the organized armies of France during the first three months of the war, three months more were necessary to bend the will of the French people to the necessity of concluding peace. When the inner nature of the warring states is quite different, the defeat of the enemy's forces amd the compulsion of a treaty of peace will seldom be coincident. Napoleon failed in 1812, by no means on account of inability to defeat the Russian armies, but rather be cause the defeat of those armies, and even the loss of the capital, Moscow, did not force a peace from Russia, which was widely extended, stubborn, and difficult to touch to the quick. In the great American war the armies of the Secession remained victorious almost to the end, and yet they had to succumb at last, because they had at no time been able to bring such a pressure to bear on the land and people of the Union as to com- pel the latter to accept a peace. After shattering the hostile main army, we, there fore, still have the coercion of a peace as a special, and, under certain circumstances, more difficult, task to con- The Characteristics of Modern Strategy. 27 sider, the solution of which should, however, have been carefully weighed before deciding upon war. That is to say, we should ascertain whether the organization of our own forces would suffice, after vic- tory on the field of battle, to make the enemy's country feel the burdens of war with such weight that the de- sire for the return of peace would overcome the inclina- tion to continue the conflict. This is the point in which Napoleon I. failed. The organization of his forces was not complete enough to furnish to the grand army, which had marched out in advance to vanquish and de- stroy the Russian armies, a continuous stream of new troops which could occupy the hostile territory over which the army had passed in sufficient force to make a reconquest, within a definite period, impossible. Had the Emperor been able to do this, he would have arrived at the desired peace. It will depend upon the nature of the country and the people what means to employ to exercise the pres- sure necessary to create a sufiiciently powerful demand for peace. The occupation, or, perhaps, the mere threat- ening of the capital, as was the case in the last Russo- Turkish war, and also in that of 1828-29, may suffice for this purpose. But it may also be necessary to seize the harbors, commercial centers, important lines of traflfic, fortifications, and arsenals, in other words, all important property necessary to the existence of the people and the army, and even to occupy a considerable portion, or the whole, of the enemy's territory. Occa- sionally, when the question of subsisting the popula- tion meets with difficulties, it may be sufficient to estab- lish a blockade against the outside world, — a method which the Union employed with great effect against the Southern States in the American war. 28 The Conduct of War. The determination to be satisfied, after victory, with nothing less than the attainment of peace, im- parts an altered character to the conduct of war. Ee- gardfor the maintenance of one's strength will be much more prominent than formerly. Henceforth, more will depend upon endurance than upon intensity of effort. The characteristics of these two phases are plainly shown by the Franco-German war. It began with an energetic advance of the assailant from one de- cisive battle to another, until the enemy was com- pletely subdued, and cJosed with a defense of the occu- pied territory against the efforts towards recapture made by the hitherto overborne enemy. Not from further victories in the field, but from capture of the beleaguered capital, was peace expected. If we now assemble the distinguishing characteris- tics of the modern method of conducting war, the fol- lowing will be recognized as such: 1. Calling forth of the military resources of a country to such an extent that, after victory, an advan- tageoois peace may also be forced from the enemy, and that as quickly as possible. 2. Preparation of all the forces immediately at the beginning of the war. 3. Unceasing progress, without delay, until the or- ganized resistance of the opponent is broken in decisive battles; and only after that, until the conclusion of peace, a calmer course, with less injury to the instrument of war. . It lies in the nature of things that in this last phase politics, which gave birth to the war, should again come to the front, to be finally, at the conclusion of the treaty of peace, paramount. The Principal Methods of Waging War. 29 IV. THE TKINCIPAL METHODS OF WAGING WAK. The principal ways of waging war are generall^^ divided into the offensive and the defensive; and we designate as the assailant that one of the two combat- ants who forms the resolution to advance, to seek the enemy and defeat him, and thirs compel him to yield. The defender, on the other hand, is intent upon ward- ing off these enterprises directed against him. But he who thinks only of parrying can at best merely avert his own defeat. The result, for him, is a negative one; he simply frustrates the purpose of his adversary. The defensive, therefore, is not, properly speaking, a complete method with which it is possible to attain the object sought, the overthrow of the enemy. Hence all adherents of the defensive recommend an ultimate counter-attack. The last decree of their wisdom is that, after all, the defensive must be aban- doned in the end, in order to accomplish something. Consequently, the defensive generally appears as an episode in the conduct of the combatants, and only in very exceptional cases will it be maintained from the beginning to the end of the conflict. Only he can make up his mind to this who is dominated by the convic- tion of his own weakness and is satisfied to have es- caped the downfall prepared for him. For this reason it is by no means necessary to con- ceive of a defender, as opposed to an assailant, in every case in war. On the contrary, the combatants, if approx- imately of the same strength, and both swayed by the 30 The Conduct of War. feeling of power, will simultaneously advance to the attack. There will, consequently, be two assailants only, until one of them, as a result of the first encoun- ters, is so shaken in his power, and his hopes are so much lowered, that he begins to be satisfied with de- fense. Greater rapidity and skill in the preparation of the means for war, and the unexpected develop- ment of superior numbers, will often make the adop- tion of the defensive imperative, as was the case with the Frencli in 1870. In view of the care with which the military resources of prospective opponents, as well as the time in which they can be mobilized, are generally calculated at this day, such surprises will in future be among the rarities. We ^hall probably see the assailant making tern- porary use of the defensive as an expedient when he is preparing for increased exertion, or when he hus- bands his strength at one point in order to be so much the stronger at another. All this indicates that of the two methods of waging war the defensive is subordinate in rank and at bot- tom cannot be regarded as independent. However, it is convenient to allow the accepted division to stand and to let the offensive and the de- fensive pass as principal forms entitled to equal con- sideration. By the use of these words we indicate at the same time the role and the general situation of the respective parties at war, so that we can immediately form a clearer idea of their prospects and the condi- tions under which they are operating, than if we simply designated them both, in a ad to crreat (M-rors to disregard them. Knowledi:(^ of hninnn nnture is cert.-iiiily tlie most ditficult. but at the same time tho most im]>ort:nit. i)art of the jreneral scioTH'o of war, witli which the commander must be familiar in oi-dcr to be equal to tlie duties of his hiffh office. The Strategical Offensive. 39 until the enemy makes his appearance in front of the position. This natural support given to cooperation by the whole character of the offensive is the more important, as all strategical wisdom unites in the final advice, to be as strong as possible at the point of attack. Moreover, the offensive has generally won its game when it is successful at a single point; for, as a rule, the positions of the defender will form an organic whole which loses its stability and coherence as soon as a part is destroyed. In this connection an additional fact comes in for consideration — namely, that the assailant is able to make his own selection of the point of attack, and is, to that extent, favored by the element of surprise. Al- though the defender, by carefully weighing all the cir- cumstances, may often detect this point, yet the affair will seldom pass off without errors as to detail. The attack, therefore, has a certain right, based on the nature of things, to expect that he will find the de- fender not fully prepared at the decisive point. Although the duration of the greater strategical opera- tions permits the defender to repair, to a certain ex- tent, the errors he has committed, yet he will have to deal with rather long distances and the correction will not be complete. It will be difficult for the defender to remedy errors committed in the original concentra- tion of his forces, for masses of troops cannot be moved like chessmen. The fact that the offensive, as a rule, continually leads the army into new regions, is not to be under- rated. In uncomfortable situations change is of it- self a benefit. The change of location resulting from the offensive usually has a morally and materially re- 40 The Conduct of War. freshing effect on the troops. This apparently insig- nificant circumstance may become a very important element in the reanimation of exhausted armies. To appreciate this we have only to think of an army which, after lying for a long time in front of one of the enemy's fortifications, again marches into the country for a c/impaign, as was the case with the Germans when they were relieved at Metz. Thus it would seem of the offensive that it has only advantages for us to praise. It must, however, not be forgotten that the offensive makes great demands on the troops. Its nature requires the employment of troops regardless of consequences, and marches draw on their strength as much as the attacks to which they lead. Losses on the march are in war generally even greater than the losses in battle. As the design is to develop the attack in constantly progressing action up to the attainment of the object, and, if possible, without interruption, it permits of no resting pauses for recovery of strength, to bring up the stragglers, or to collect fresh forces. The Corps of the Prussian Guard lost, in spite of its excellent disci- pline, between 5,000 and 6,000 men on the marches between the battles of St. Privat and Sedan.* The country through which the aggressor passes must, as a rule, be considered hostile; provision must therefore be made for security.** The advancing *Eohenlohe, "Letters on Stratejry," I., p. 55. **Of coursft the case is very readily conc(Mvnbl(> of an invader supported hy the inhabitants of a country, when the latter are of an allied race. Such a condition, however, is an exceptional and piu'oly accidental one, not conrlccjed with th(» nature of the offensive. The Strategical Offensive. 41 army must leave portions of its force behind, and these cannot take part in the subsequent decisive actions. Moreover, the lines of communication upon which the necessaries of life are conveyed to the army gen- erally require special protection. The army at the same time increases the distance from its home depots. Although this circumstance loses much of its importance in highly civilized nations on account of modern means of communication, such as railroads, it still retains a not inconsiderable vv^eight as a weakening force for the offensive; for, in the first place, even after a railroad in the enemy's country has been placed in condition for use, we cannot rely upon it like upon one of our own, and it will be unable to bring up all of the detachments following in rear of the attacking army. A retreating army, however, effects a junction with them in the most natural way. Sieges and blockades of fortifications which cannot be disregarded also require troops. When matters are progressing favorably, the ur gency of exertion is not so plainly recognized as in the distress of an unfavorable situation, and the efforts of the troops gradually relax; this is founded in human nature. Finally, the advancing offensive easily excites the envy, jealousy, or apprehension of other powers, and these motives give rise to an unfavorable political sit- uation, which also becomes an element of weakness, and may even rise to the extent of armed intervention.* ♦Anstria's condnet in tho- Crimean war, and that of Ensrland in thf' last Rnsso-Tnrkisli war. fnrnish f^xnmnlos of how irrita- ting: tho intorferoneo of third powers may become, even without armed intervention. 42 The Conduct of War, The assailant also incurs the danger of losing allies who are willing to support him up to a certain point, but do not wish to see him grow strong at their expense. It is characteristic of the strategical oifensive, that the force at the head of the army, which is in contact with the enemy, and which fights the battles, forms a relatively quite small paii;, often only one-fourth, or even one-eighth, of the whole force employed; and yet the fortune of the whole depends upon the success or failure of this fraction. Attacking armies melt away like fresh snow in springtime. Napoleon, in 1812, crossed the Niemen with 442,000 men; but, after not quite three months of campaign, he arrived at Moscow with only 95,000. The destruction of this one-fifth of his force during the retreat deter- mined the loss of the whole campaign and became the turning-point in his historical career. Still more re- markable is the example of the Spanish campaign of 1810. In the spring of that year 400,000 Frenchmen crossed the Pyrenees; they continued an uninterrupted advance and gained many successes, and yet Marshal Mass^na finally brought only 45,000 men in front of the lines of Torres Vedras, at Lisbon, which was the decisive point. This force was too w^eak to deliver the last decisive blow and thus completely attain its object. This final weakness necessarily resulted in a calami- tous retreat, which marked the end of French military success on the Iberian peninsula. Of the 100,000 men which Russia placed in the field in the spring of 1820 to decide the campaign on the Balkan peninsula. Field Marshal Diebitsch had only 20,000 left when he arrived at Adrianople. Moltke calculated that if he had been obliged to con- The Strategical Offensive, 43 tinue his march he would have arrived in front of Oon- stantinopU^ with 10,000 men at the most. A skillfully concluded treaty of peace saved him from exposure of his weakness and a reversal of the situation. A similar state of affairs existed in 1878 when the Russians, out of a great army of 460,000 men which they carried across the Danube, could scarcely muster 100,000 men in front of the gates of Constantinople, and in this number the sick, said to have formed one- half of the whole, are included. Even the Germans, who had unusually favorable conditions, out of an army of 372,000 with which they crossed the frontier in 1870, brought only 171,000 men as far as Paris, after a campaign of six weeks ; yet a defeat of this portion of their forces would undoubtedly have given a different turn to the whole campaign. Very properly, therefore, do we speak of the waning power of the offensive as an unavoidable fact which must be taken into account, and which becomes the more pronounced the longer the line is upon which the attack advances. This circumstance requires that the necessarv' provisions be made, both in organization and plans of campaign, to be able to continually strengthen the fighting front of the army by means of reserves, of which, as Clausewitz says, the military roads in rear of the army must never be clear. In the correct appreciation of these circumstances the most important foundation for the completion of every offensive campaign is to be sought. The boldest and best planned strategical offensive leads to final ruin when the available means are not sufficient for the successful attainment of the last objective, the posses- sion of which insures peace. This is most clearly seen in the fate of great commanders, from Hannibal to 44 The Conduct of War. Charles XII. and Napoleon I., who failed in this point, and were wrecked in consequence. They resemble those talented enterprisers whose means do not quite suffice for the entire completion of their speculations, so that occasionally a last, often a very insignificant, mishap may cause the loss of all their brilliant achieve- ments at one blow. If we follow the course of the offensive, we shall find that, in contrast with the defensive, there is in each case a point of culmination, at which the original su- periority has, through Aveakening influences, arrived at a condition which was still just sufficient for a victory, but which does not guarantee future success. It is the business of the commander to recognize the arrival of this culminating point at once, in order to utilize it, as Diebitsch did, for the conclusion of a treaty of peace, or to pass over to the defensive and hold on to what he has acquired until the enemy agrees to a peace. Should the point of culmination arrive too soon, — that is, before the desired peace is secured, — a disastrous reverse follows, and this is generally much more severe in its consequences than the effect of a defeat on the defensive. The offensive, moreover, requires not only ample numbers of active forces and abundant sources of sup- ply, but also special qualities in the arm3^ As marching activity is the element of the offensive, the masses of troops must themselves be mobile, and this we can only count upon when they are well trained. Frequent and independent action is required of the separate parts; consequently, a sufficient number of skillful and experienced leaders must be available. Only well-organized and well-disciplined troops, who, during an adequate period of peace service, have be- The Tactical Offensive. 45 come accustomed to acting together, will be able to withstand the destructive elements which make them- selves felt during the course of the offensive. With young land indifferently instructed armies the strategical offensive can be successfully carried out only when the adversary is of still more inferior quality. Militia troops are not at all suitable for this purpose, and a forward movement alone will often disintegrate them. The strategical offensive therefore makes the pos- session of numerous and efficient armies an indispens- able condition. 2. The Tactical Offensive. In the tactical offensive the relative importance of numbers and character of troops, as compared with the strategical offensive, undergoes a change. The value of the good quality of troops becomes still more striking, for in the tactical offensive there may be questions, such as the capture of intrenchments, de- files, bridges, fortified positions, etc.^ which ordinarily cannot be solved with troops of mediocre or inferior quality. A single good battalion, which does not fear the effect of fire, may suffice to storm a narrow bridge de- fended by the enemy, whereas ten poor ones would stand helpless in front of it, or would, one after the other, undertake ten feeble attacks, which fail to ac- complish their object. Pictures of this kind are shown by the battle on the Lisaine. General von Werder's extended line of battle would probably have been pene- 46 The Conduct of War. trated by 40,000 efficient troops, whereas 120,000 medi- ocre soldiers were unequal to the task.* Here also, as in the case of the strategical offensive, we remark that the nature of the changes in the posi- tions of troops facilitates concentration on the point selected for decisive action. It heightens in a no less degree the mental activity and independent action of the leaders. It awakens their inventive faculties by offering a variety of oppor- tunities, and stimulates ambition and eagerness for action. It helps the troops to overcome the impression of danger and strengthens them through the feeling of superiority; for everybody knows that the commander would not have decided upon attack without being sure of the existence of such superiority. , The tactical offensive points out the common ob- jective even more plainly than the strategical offen- sive. In the latter case the objective is guessed at from the enemy's dispositions ; in the former it is seen. This circumstance diminishes the danger, to which separate portions of the force are exposed, of going astray in the fight. ♦We do not herewith desire to reflect on General von Werder's dispositions. They were perfectly adapted to the circumstances, although they did not conform to the rules for ordinary cases, for the extension of 19 milt^ for 43,000 men is excessive. General von AVerder, however, imderstood his enemies very well, and knew that if he deprived them of opportunities to make turning movements, they would not be able to derive advantage from their great numerical superiority. As a comparatively weak resistance at each point was sufficient to check the clumsy opponent, thi,s method of procedure was entirely justified. Prince Frederick Charles managed in a similar way before tlie battle of Orleans when opposed to the French Army of the T^oire. Both these examples teach us how lai'gely, in the practical application of the rules for the con- duct of wai', the character of the opponent must be taken into account. TJie Tactical Offensive. 47 The influence of surprise assists the tactical offen- sive more powerfully than the strategical, because it gives the enemy less time to recall the errors he may have made through lack of foresight. The special means of attacking in various directions at the same time, turning movements on one or both flanks, and sim- ultaneous advance against the flank and line of retreat of the enemy, are in this case also Available. As the attacking forces move forward the objective comes into view, and this admits of a combination of fire, the value of which also must not be underrated. The great ranges, especially of modern artillery, make it possible for troops not belonging to those actually making the attack, and who took no part in their ad- vance, still to assist materially in the decisive action by means of their projectiles. Finally, the tactical offensive, from its very nature, also possesses the advantage of selecting the point of attack; and, with even greater certainty than in the strategical offensive, is victory assured when a decisive advantage is gained at this one point. What has been stated about the way in which the strategical meas- ures of the defender constitute a whole is true with increased force of his tactical dispositions, and the solidity of the entire arrangement is shaken when a part is destroyed or put out of joint. The defeat of a wing, or a successful attack in flank, usually decides the fate of the battle. We even see the defender give way when he has been placed at a disadvantage in only one-fourth of his position, whereas the assailant, who was repulsed on three-fourths of his front, still trium])hs, because of victory on the last fourth. Such was the case on August 18th, 1870, at Gravelotte and St. Privat. The natural road to the place where the 48 The Conduct of War. break is made through the enemy's line of battle is apparent to all the forces of the assailant, and the course of events, of itself, brings about concentration and cooperation. The moral impulse of success in- creases the inherent force of the shock. Now, the tactical offensive, from its very nature, also contains elements which diminish its power. The marching of the troops, of itself, gives rise to the very first one of these disadvantages. It deprives the ag- gressor, before he reaches the enemy's line, of a por- tion of his strength, through fatigue. This may have the most serious consequences; for instance, when, after a long march to the field of battle, considerable obstacles in the terrain have still to be overcome, as was the case in the attack made by Schwarzkoppen's Prussian brigade, on the 16th of August, 1870. Num- bers of men sank down from exhaustion and fell into the hands of the enemy, incapable of making a defense. Another item of the greatest importance is the fact that tactical movements almost completely inter- rupt the fire, so that the assailant must temporarily submit to the enemy's fire without being able to reply. This fact, and the circumstance that during the ad- vance he must forego the protection afforded by the terrain, cause the losses of the assailant, up to the moment of breaking the enemy's line, to be by far the greater, as a rule. Generally it is not until after this success that he can obtain compensation; for then the defender is also put in motion, and is made to feel the disadvantage thereof with double force, because his movement is to the rear. Limitation as to time is another condition which The Tactical Offensive. 49 must be considered as tending to increase the diffi- culties of the tactical offensive. The work must gen- erally be accomplished in one day. With the setting of the sun an undecided battle often becomes a victory for the defense and a defeat for the attack. Had the battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat been fought on a winter day, the French would, in all probability, have remained victorious. Night would have called a halt in the attack after the capture of Sainte Marie aux Chenes, and would have given Marshal Bazaine time to reinforce his menaced right wing in a suitable manner with the whole Guard Corps. It is frequently pointed out as a weakness of the at- tack, that, being under compulsion to act, errors com- mitted therein will precede any that may be made by the stationary defense, and that the latter can take advantage ef them. This weakness, however, is bal- anced by the fact that the assailant can take advantage of defects existing in the original dispositions of the defense — in fact, can base his plans upon them. It is one of the most difficult tasks for the comman- der not only to recognize errors committed by the oppo- nent at once, but also to take advantage of them; the latter requires very favorable previous arrangements, especially a suitable distribution of the troops. The great demands made upon the troops in action, although not constituting a source of weakness, still impose conditions which considerably increase the diffi- culties of the attack, as has already been indicated. The troops should be mobile and at the same time pos- sess great power of withstanding the moral effect of danger. They require numerous leaders, of high and low grades, who have had a great deal of practice. All this makes a thorough and sufficiently long course of 50 The Conduct of War. preparation in time of peace a matter of necessity. With untrained armies, even if tliey be superior in num- bers, the tactical is still less practicable than the stra- tegical offensive. These conditions must be carefully weighed before the offensive is decided upon. Unless we have at least the greater part of them on our side, success will hardly be attained. It is also to be considered that to carry through an attack successfully demands of the commander much greater severity towards his troops than is required in the defense. The latter appears as the least, the indis- pensable measure of military service demanded by the duty of self-preservation. The attack, as it were, re- quires an increment, which only a powerful mind is able to exact. The decision to make the attack increases the weight of responsibility for the generally very heavy losses incurred in its execution; and from such responsibility the majority of mankind shrink. VI. THE DEFENSIVE. 1. The Strategical Defensive. We must not imagine the strategical defensive to be a state of absolute passivity, in which an army quietly waits in the positions it has occupied until the enemy approaches and makes an attack. Proceed- ings of this kind are imqX with only in the most excep- tional cases, and almost never accomplish their object. The strategical defensive should not exclude move- ments entirely, and by no means confine itself to an ab- solute standstill. The Strategical Defensive. 51 One way of carrying out the latter idea is as fol- lows: The defender takes up a position which permits him to oppose the aggressor at once, with a portion of his forces, no matter from what direction he may come, and to delay his progress until the masses of the army have been concentrated in that direction and are able to cooperate. This method of arranging the strategical defensive is found in military history to be the one most fre- quently adopted by the weaker side. Although it con tains no special advantages, it still permits postpone- ment of the decision which is so difficult in such cases, and affords freer play to the hope for favorable occurrences. Another course of action that may be adopted in the strategical defensive is for the defender to retire before the assailant into the interior of his country, so as to permit the natural circumstances which have a weakening effect on the attack to operate for a certain time, before matters arrive at the decisive stage. In cases of this kind the defender often acquires an in- crease of strength while thus retreating; for he in the meantime approaches his sources of supply and estab- lishes connection with bodies of troops which were not available for the first line, nor at the very beginning of the war. Of course, such a plan is only advisable when there is sufficient space to give ample time for the operation of the influences which have a deteriorating effect on the offensive. The importance, also, of those portions of the whole territory involved, which are sacrificed by a preliminary retreat, must not be such that their loss alone would have a decisive influence. Tlie tliird nietliod of bringing the element of move- 52 The Conduct of War. ment into play in the defensive is to await deliberately only the preliminary enterprises of the assailant, in order to detect his errors or weak points, and then, taking advantage of these, to pounce upon him with our forces, which have in the meantime been con- centrated.* This method of carrying out the strate-, gical defensive is considered the most effective — prop- erly speaking, the ideal one. In this case, however, it is overlooked, as has already been stated, that the de- fensive surrenders itself, so to speak, and does not ap- pear as the true principle of action, but rather subor- dinates itself to the offensive and becomes an auxiliary thereof. It is here more a question of an attack wait- ing for the auspicious moment, than of defense, and we have no unqualified right to count an operation of this kind as defensive. It is the fundamental idea of every strategical de- fensive to equalize an originally unfavorable ratio of strength by a relatively slow consumption of our own forces, as against the more rapid expenditure of the enemy's troops in the offensive. This endeavor is favored, in the first place, by the fact that in the defensive the question of marching, which, as we have already emphasized, has in itself an injurious effect, plays a less important part than in the offensive. It is much safer, therefore, with infe- rior troops, to venture upon the strategical defensive than upon the strategical offensive. There are also other circumstances which make the situation easier or afford strength to the defensive. As the most important of these we must count the *Blume ("Strategy," first, edition, p. 199) has classified these three methods of defensive action as position, retreating, and sortie defensive. The Strategical Defensive. 53 fact that the defensive pursues only negative purposes, and that these are much less difficult of attainment than positive ones. The latter require action, and this is much more likely to give rise to unfavorable inci- dents than waiting. In case the assailant commits errors in his measures and his undertaking is wrecked thereby, then the defender can consider himself vic- torious, without much effort on his part. The oppo- nent has accelerated the destruction of his own force, which was the main object of the defensive. Clause- witz says of the defender that "he reaps what he did not sow." Even omissions and unnecessary delays of the ag- gressor inure to the benefit of the defender. The ad- vantage may, under certain circumstances, already be on his side, simply because up to a certain time he has not yet been decisively defeated. This, for instance, would be the case when through the intervention of powerful allies a turn in affairs may be expected; such was the situation on the side of the Turks at the out- break of the Crimean war. Time, as a rule, is the de- fender's friend ; for the offensive, even when not of it- self too weak, is often paralyzed because final success is too long delayed. It is of vital importance for the defender to hold on, and for the assailant to acquire; in war the former is generally the less difficult.* The strategical defender, moreover, selects his own theater of war — which is known and perhaps specially prepared — and is not forced, like the aggressor, to ♦Only in casos when thero Is n very consirler:iT)le difference in material resonrcs, as in tlie American War of P5ec(»ssion, will the reverse be true. To he able to endnre the war lon;^ enough is one of the fnndamentnl conditions of a snccessfnl stratesrical defensive. Great confidence may be placed in the existence of this element of strength. 64 The Conduct of War. break away and enter upon unknown territory. He is better protected than the latter against disasters which may be caused by- the unexpected appearance of obsta- cles. As it must be assumed that the defender has a better knowledge of the region in which the war is being waged than the assailant, and is already in po- sition, whereas the latter is only arriving, his enter- prises will be attended with less friction than those of his opponent. The defense can obtain more effective service from the railroads of the theater of war than the attack, for the latter generally has at its disposal only such lines as are held by force, and which have been deprived of their personnel, are destroyed to a considerable extent, and have been thrown into dis- order. Finally, the defender is able to make use of the natural and artificial sources of strength offered by the terrain, such as streams, forests, swamps, or deserts, which the enemy, in order to make headway, must over- come, as well as of fortifications and intrenchments, which detain the enemy, or compel a division of his force. Moreover, we also, very naturally, suppose the de- fender to be in his own, and the aggressor in a foreign country. The former can thus count upon the assist- ance of the inhabitants, which, in obtaining informa- tion and subsisting the troops, will be of importance. He also, in most cases, controls the usual administra- tive departments of the theater of war, which may be of great service in the maintenance and shelter of the army, in repairing its losses, and in making arrange- ments for the transportation of large bodies of troops. In a wider sense the defender receives the assistance of the entire people, whereas for the aggressor ihv probability of such support becnmcs moie and inore The Strategical Defensive. 55 remote. In this we need not immediately con- sider an armed uprising, but rather the support which a patriotic people can furnish to w^hatever system of defense may be adopted, at the same time obstructing the movement, shelter, and subsistence of the enemy.* The danger to home and fatherland, which becomes visible to the defender, spurs him on to increased exer- tion, and may develop passions which will heighten his powers of resistance to a degree not anticipated, as was the case in 1808-12 in Spain, and in 1813 in Ger- many; in France also, in 1870. The assailant, whose own people imagine him as advancing through the enemy's country in a career of victory, without seeing at close quarters the difficulties and dangers with which he is struggling, will be far from having these forces at his disposal to the same extent. It will es- pecially be difficult to bring to public knowledge the indications of the imminence of a reaction, which, though almost imperceptible, do not escape the prac- ticed eye; thus the support which is imperatively nec- essary to a successful conclusion of the campaign may be denied when the object is all but accomplished, as was experienced by Hannibal in Italy. *We of course assume that in the defender's country the public spirit is active, that it takes part in all public affairs, is ready to make sacrifices, and, also, that the people are ac- customed to contribvitions for the army. Should this be not the case, then it may happen that, on the contrary, the hostile army, which is not hampered by restrictions, will live better than the defender in his own territory. In the campaiijn of ISOG the Prussian and Saxon troops nearly starved to death in a rich country, because they did not dare to touch its sup- plies, Avhereas the enemy made unrestrained use of them In the winter campai.jxn of 1870-71 some French troops bivouacked in the streets of cities in bitter cold weather, as it was not considered desirable to quarter them in the houses of rich citizens, while, on the contrary, the Germans following them made themselves comfortable at such hearths and tables. 56 The Conduct of War. The greater freedom which the defender enjoys on account of all these circumstances occasionally allows him to prepare surprises for his opponent. As he can generally live in the country wherever he may choose, he is able to make abrui)t changes of direction in his lines of defense, in order to take up flank positions. This forces the assailant also to make an unexepected departure from the direction in which he had been ad- vancing, and in which he had made arrangements for the subsistence of his army. This is, of itself, a not inconsiderable difficulty. As he lacks knowledge of this new country, — with which the defender should be familiar, — this sudden change may be the cause of errors and misfortunes which increase his troubles. The invader will, on account of the forward move- ment of his army, have greater difficulty in providing for the subsistence of his troops; he will, therefore, oftener be constrained to divide his forces in order to occupy more space and be able to draw more supplies from the country. This presents the defender with an opportunity to fall upon one of the parts with his united force, before the others can arrive to support it. If this succeeds, then there arises the further possibility of proceeding with the same troops which have just victoriously fought one of the enemy's columns, against a second, or even a third, with similar success. Na- poleon furnished a brilliant example of this in his sally against the Silesian Army, on the days of February 10th to 14th, 1814. Frederick also carried out a de- fense of this kind on a large scale in the Seven Years' War. As long as the defender's army is not thoroughly defeated, it exerts an entirely natural power of attrac- tion on the assailant, as the magnet does on iron. The The Strategical Defensive. 57 reason, to be sure, why he endeavors to find that army, is to defeat it, and thus obtain relief from the pressure which its proximit}' exerts on all his enterprises. We may therefore assume, in general, that the assailant will arrive at whatever place the defender may have chosen for his position. This makes the situation of the latter much less difficult. Should the invader attempt to pass by a position commanding the theater of war and held by the de- fender, the latter will generally only have to make a show^ of movement to cause the attractive power of his army to be felt. Even the not very pronounced movements of the Turkish Army of the Danube on the left flank, and the advance of Osman Pasha on the right flank, of the Russian Army in the summer of 1877, suf- ficed to recall the latter from its hasty fiist enterprise across the Balkans. Any attempt of the assailant to pass by and disregard the defender can always be ef- fectually answered by an advance against his flank. In October, 180G, Scharnhorst in vain suggested a movement of this kind for the Prussian Army; but in May, 1813, his recommendation for the Allied Army at Liitzen w^as crowned with success. General von Wer- der, on the 0th of January, 1871, successfully executed this movement against General Bourbaki at Viller- sexel. The strategical defender can make use of this greater freedom of movement without anxious concern, especially in his own country. We have already recognized the necessity of com- pleting the preparation of the forces earlier than the adversary as one of the most important conditions for the strategical offensive. The possibility of fulfilling this requirement, however, depends on the legal organi- zation of the army, as well as on systematic prepara- 58 The Conduct of War. tion for mobilization and the possession of abundant equipment and great means of transportation; and, furthermore, on the geographical configuration and condition of the realm. It also demands considerable sums of money. It is difficult to unite all these condi- tions. Rivalry in these matters with neighbors who are more fortunately situated may, even in time of peace, bring a country to the verge of ruin. But the combatant who confines himself to the strategical defensive escapes this danger. He can probably, without much damage, leave to the opponent the advantage of a somewhat earlier start, provided, of course, that it is not so considerable that the lines of defense and the positions selected for use are reached by the enemy before occupation by the defenders. While considering the offensive the statement was made that the defender, in the general case, has a better prospect of the support of the other powers than the aggressor. At the present time a condition of equilib- rium has been formed in Europe, in the maintenance of which all the powers have a certain interest. They will, therefore, look with disfavor upon the disturbance of this balance by the destruction of one power or another, will oppose it, and will forcibly check any vic- tor who goes too far in the exploitation of his advan- tages. In 1866 the intervention of the powers not di- rectly concerned in the war was limited to a very feeble diplomatic action by Napoleon III. in favor of defeated Austria; and for prostrate France, in 1S71, it did not make itself felt at all. The reason for this lay in the wise restraint which the victor ])laced upon himself in making use of acquired superiority. The general tendency towards conservatism which is prominent in political circles at the present time has The Strategical Defensive. 59 its origin in the advanced age of all the European states ; and this naturally suits the purpose of the stra- tegical defensive, whose principle also aims at the preservation of the status quo. In the Seven Years' War young Prussia found out how dangerous it may be to disturb a condition w^hich has become established and has been generally accepted as satisfactory. Only the uncommon genius of a great sovereign saved her from destruction at that time. Opposed to these advantages connected with the choice of the strategical defensive, there are, however, certain material disadvantages. This method of con- ducting a war will, as a rule, not be able to rid itself of a certain general consciousness of weakness. This very feeling, in fact, was what gave birth to the de- cision to limit action to the defensive. We must remember the fact that with parrying alone nothing can be decided. The utmost that can be obtained in the strategical defensive is a peace, which the opponent grants on account of exhaustion. Such was the peace achieved by Frederick the Great; how- ever, a change in the political situation came to his aid. He was also extraordinarily favored by the methods of fighting in use in his time. The attempt of the Southern States, in the Ameri- can War of Secession, to tire out their more powerful opponent, failed, in spite of the most patriotic exer- tions, in spite of better armies and more competent commanders. In the Russo-Turkish war, ^also, the strategical defensive succumbed after preliminary suc- cesses. He who is not able, at the conclusion, to pass over from the defense to the attack, may generally be 60 The Conduct of War. considered as lost. His collapse is only a question of time. The strategical defensive will in most cases be obliged to abandon a certain amount of territory and its resources from the very beginning; for a defense conducted exactly on the frontier will hardly ever be possible. The defender does not escape without loss, unless he can, after a successful defense, recover what he at first abandoned to his opponent. Thus, with ref- erence to its final objective, the defense has only itself to blame for an increase in the difficulties of the task. The moral consequences resulting from conscious- ness of weakness, which is always present in the defen- sive, and from enforced inactivity while waiting to see what the enemy will do, exercise an important influ- ence. If movement develops new intellectual and moral forces in the aggressor, continual uncertainty puts the existing ones of the strategical defensive to a severe test. We have stated, it is true, that the de- fender may prepare surprises for the attack by ob- serving his movements and falling upon him as soon as mistakes are discovered; but this is not easy, for the situation will never be perfectly clear. The attack will touch the defender, not' only at one, but at several points simultaneously. Generally, those in immediate contact with the enemy imagine that their position is the one of the greatest danger. "As a rule, everybody is clamoring for assistance," says Clausewitz. This un- certainty results in false alarms and exertions, which, when they are recognized as useless by the troops, have a doubly depressing effect. Only a very sure and ex- perienced eye will be able to perceive at once whither to turn. Moreover, the utilization of the errors of the attack is only possible in case of very rapid successes, The Tactical Offensive. 61 and these demand great tactical superiority. Thus, here also, the advantage of the strategical defensive is conditional and limited. Nor can the defensive ever be freed from the dis- advantages that lie in the fact that an active enemy can menace its lines of communication with the rear, even when there are several of them. In order to protect the latter the defender will often be forced to abandon advantageous positions. Finally, it remains to be mentioned that in the stra- tegical defensive the troops are often deprived of beneficial changes of location for long periods of time, whereby the danger of devastating diseases is increased and, as a rule, a depressing effect is produced on the minds of the soldiers. Yet all these circumstances will not have as much weight as the one fundamental weakness, that with the strategical defensive — as witli the defensive in general — we can only avoid defeat, never gain a victory. 2. The Tactical Defensive. Most of the peculiarities and conditions which in- fluence the strategical will also come into play in the tactical defensive. Some, however, produce their ef- fect in a different way. The principal advantage of the tactical defensive, and the one which generally causes its adoption when the commander is at liberty to take this course, lies in the fact that it avoids the danger of shattering the tr()Oj>s in an unsuccessful assault on the enemy's posi tion. Headstrong assailants easily yield, especially in local combats, to the t(nn])tation of expending great ef- forts on objeclivrs wliicli are not worth the sacrifice. In this way theal tack iiraycauseawasteof troops. Even 62 The Conduct of War. success, considering the fearful effect of modern fire- arms, may be so dearly bought that the general situa- tion is made worse, rather than better. Pyrrhic vic- tories are a special fatality of the tactical otiensive of our times. The desire to make effectual use of fire action invites the adoption of the defensive in most cases, especially after bitter experience of loss in of- fensive battles. As a matter of fact, the defender has the continuous use of fire on his side, whereas the fire of the attack must be broken off during the forward movement. This advantage is limited in the defense only by the unavoidable divergency of the tire, while that of the attack, from the nature of things, is con- verging. The assistance of the terrain is still more efficient in the tactical than in the strategical defensive. The defender selects the obstacles which the assailant must cross under his fire, and, moreover, can often strengthen ^hem artificially. Furthermore, the de- fender enjoys the special advantage of being able to station his troops under cover and of keeping his dis- positions concealed, while the assailant has to advance in plain view, nearly always on the established roads. This would give the defender still more frequent opportunities for surprise than are recorded in history, were it not so difficult to move troops out of assigned positions with the promptness requisite to take full advantage of the enemy's errors. The picture which shows us the defender lying in wait, so to speak, in his position, ready to pounce upon the enemy as soon as he makes a mistake, looks quite well, but is seldom realized. An army simply is not able to dash at its prey with the quickness of thought, like a tiger. The eye requires time to discover the opportunity; time must also be allowed for the decision to ripen, for The Tactical Defensive. 63 orders to reach the troops, and for the latter to prepare for the advance and begin the movement. All this makes an aggregate of time which will generally per- mit the assailant, who is in continual motion, to pass the critical point. After troops have once been assigned to places in the terrain it is difficult to set them in motion again, especially in directions other than perpendicular to the front; this is the cause of the weakness of the flanks of every position. Otherwise the defender, w^ho has the shorter lines, would always complete a change of front sooner than the assailant with his turning movement. To be attacked from several directions at the same time, to be occupied in front and have one or both flanks turned, or even to be deprived of the line of retreat,— these are the principal dangers to which the tactical defensive succumbs. It is more difficult in this case to reply with counter-attacks than in. the strategical de- fensive, because space is generally too limited and time too short to begin them and develop them to their full power. Such a procedure as advancing with the same troops, first against one and then against another portion of the enemy's army — that is to say, operating tactically on interior lines — will hardly ever be possi- ble, because the distance between the separated groups of the enemy will be too small, and we should thus find ourselves, not only between two opponents, birt also between two fires. Tactical counter-attacks on the field of battle other than in the simplest form, by a direct advance after re- pulse of the enemy, require a high mastery of the art of handling troops, such as was possessed bv Napoleon. At Austerlitz he gave an example thereof worth imi- tating; but such examples are rare. 64 The Conduct of War. The defender will have a better chance of preparing a surprise for the assailant by appearing unexpectedly in a different direction, after the assailant has already made his dispositions with reference to the supposed direction of his enemy. The attack must then often be combined with a change of front, and this is the most fertile source of confusion and misunderstanding. If the stability of the troops in the defense consti- tutes a certain weakness, it is coupled on the other hand with the peculiar advantage that it will not be necessary to make equally high demands on their dex- terity and cohesion, nor on the skill of their leaders, as in the attack. With troops with whom, on account of their general character, it would be impossible to carry out anything like an energetic attack, a very passable and even suc- cessful defense may be organized. Between these twa tasks there is a great difference; and in case of free choice, with deficient troops, the defensive frequently offers a harbor of refuge. VII. ALTERNATION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE. It is difficult to lay down definite lules for the alternation of offensive and defensive. 'Hie nature of both forms must be carefully considered and that one chosen which, at the time, is more suitable for one's own army and the more conducive to the attainment of the object. The selection of the prG]>er moment for the change is a matter of iacA. The commander must, Alternation of Offensive and Defensive. 65 so to speak, feel the pulse of his aiuiy, to ascertain what he cau demand of it. In the element of strategy we shall make a change from the otfensive to the defensive, as soon as the de- structive action of the former on the army, which, as we have seen,* results from the most natural causes, has become so great that superiority over the oppo- nent, on which the assumption of the offensive w^as based, is in danger of being lost. In the endeavor to take full advantage of that original superiority, it would be an error to continue the advance until the force of circumstances makes it imperative to adopt a defensive course. The latter becomes all the more ruinous, because of the losses in moral and physical force connected with a violent change; these losses will no longer permit the assailant to remain stationary at the pinnacle of his progress, but will push him down below it. The commander must himself select the proper moment for the change to the defensive, and possess sufficient force of character to relinquish a continua- tion of the offensive voluntarily, if he desires to re- tain what he has already won. But in deliberating on the situation, he should bear in mind that the losses which he perceives in his own army unwittingly pro- duce a greater effect on him than those which his imagi- nation assigns to the enemy. Otherwise he will give up the attack too soon and not pursue his advantages to their utmost limit. .To delay passing over to the defensive until th(^ last monuMit, and tlien to make the change of one's own accord, is the highest achievement of the art. *See page 40. 66 The Conduct of War. Tactically, the same go veruing conditions hold good. An attack pushed too far generally leads to a fatal repulse; for here events move much more rapidly than in the domain of strategy, and the stemming of the tide, when once backsliding has commenced, becomes doubly difficult. The impressions of the moment here have greater power. However, it is less difficult in the tactical than in the strategical domain, to hit upon the right moment for the change. The diminution of forces becomes more plainly visible. The commander not only has the army under his eye, but can also over- look the stage on which the whole action must take place. The limit to which he sliould advance, and which can be attained without incurring the risk of sacrificing what has been won, becomes more clearly recognizable. In general terms this limit is formed by the enemy's line of defense; in detail it is marked by localities in that line, such as villages, strong enclosures, woods, and ridges. The rules of tactics teach us not to ad- vance beyond localities immediately after capturing them, but to occupy them, restore order, secure pos- session — in a word, to cbange to the defensive temporarily. The change, in this case, also, must not be an in- voluntary one, but must originate in the discernment and the well-considered purpose of the leader. A change to the defensive because' the distances, and the exertions they will demand from the troops, ar(^ too great, would indicate neglect in the details of the preparation. Calculation in advance is difficult and demands a strict control of the imagination, which otherwise is easily swayed by personal desires and pro- duces illusions. Napoleon I. has been criticised be- Alternation of Offensive and Defensive. 67 cause in 1812, after the battle of Smolensk, he did not stop to change to the defensive, as the preparations for the maintenance of his army, vast as they had been, were still seen to be inadequate for a farther advance. If this great genius made such an error, how much more likely is it to befall others? A change to the defensive merely on account of a desire to take advantage of the terrain and make strate- gical or tactical use of a strong position, will seldom accomplish its purpose. The circumstances which, theretofore placed the aggressor in condition to make the attack, but forced the defender to limit himself to the defensive, will continue to be operative at the time when an exchange of parts might seem desirable. It is not to be supposed that the defender, who but just now felt himself too weak to stand his ground, will suddenly gratify our wish and change to the attack — especially when he has a strong and advantageous po- sition opposed to his front. Heavy losses in the attacks brought on by the stra- tegical offensive may make a change imperative. De- fensive action procures the time necessary to draw in reinforcements, or it may afford the opportunity to exact relatively greater sacrifices from the enemy for some time, in the offensive battles, which, under cer- tain circumstances, he is compelled to fight. Thus an equalization of losses takes place which restores the original proportion. Such a ca^e will ar'se when we suc- ceed in hemming in and enclosing the hostile army to such an extent that the enemy is bound to make room for himself at any cost, or in cutting him off from a com munication without which he cannot live. However, such fortunate situations are rare. Though they can- 68 The Conduct of War. not be excluded from tlieoietical cousideratiou, in prac- tice we generally cannot count upon them. The alternation may also be of such a kind that both forms come into use at the same time. Those portions of the army which are not intended for decisive action are made relatively weak. They are instructed to act only so as to occupy the enemy, to give way when he pushes on with overwhelming forces, and to advance again as soon as he weakens himself, — whereas the troops selected for the engagement proper are made relatively strong at the expense of the former. The Allies made very successful use of this combination of offensive and defensive in the autumn campaign of 1813. They decided to retire before Napoleon, until the pursuit should be abandoned, whenever he might make his appearance at the head of his main army, but, on the other hand, to fall upon his marshals, in com- mand of detachments, with all their forces, whenever said marshals endeavored to operate against them. The only violation of this principle of action commit- ted by the Army of Bohemia was punished by the loss of the battle of Dresden; its observance, on the con- trary, brought to the Northern and the Silesian Army the vicitories of Gross-Beeren, Dennewitz, and the Katzbach. Still such proceedings require a very ex- perienced eye and quick resolution. Blticher showed himself a master of the art, for he twice succeeded in drawing the Emperor after him into Silesia, without offering him the ardently longed-for opportunity for battle. In both cases he was obliged to abandon the pursuit because the advance of the Army of Bohemia against Dresden recalled him. In the end he had at- tained nothing; he had only exhausted the forces of his troops to no purpose. The Operations. 69 The difficulty of seizing the right moment for pas- sing from the defense to the attack is due to the fact that it must generally be ascertained from the condi- tion of the enemy; and for the formation of this opin- ion we have only uncertain indications. The case will very seldom be so simple that a great increase of strength on our side, or a plainly visible decline on the enemy's side, practically forces the offensive upon us. The essence of the defensive lies in retention, that of the offensive in acquirement, and, consequently, in expenditure of force. Like a good business man, the commander ought not to part with his means uselessly, where success is not profitable; but neither should he stint when promising gains are in prospect. Judicious distribution of the forces, with reference to time and space, — and with it success, — depends upon a happy combination of these principles. To be equally strong and make the same efforts everywhere is the sign of clumsy leadership. Only he who knows how to husband his forces and present only a temporary front to the enemy at points where a disaster could not have deci- sive consequences, will be in position to make a vigor- ous attack at another place and to gain the superiority at that one point, which should be the constant object of our endeavors. vni. THE OPERATIONS. 1. Generalities. In the course of military events there will always be separate groups of affairs springing into ])rominence, the parts of which are more intimately connected with TO The Conduct of War. each other than with preceding or subsequent occur- rences. Military activity then tends with livelier inter- est towards a special object and leaves all others to one side, or subordinates them, until the former is attained. After that, a certain abatement, or perhaps a brief pause for recuperation, may be observed, until a more rapid course is again adopted, and, in a manner, a new idea, a second objective, becomes visible. Every such group of actions will be composed of marches, the assumption of positions, and combats, and is called an ^'operation." Thus in the narrative of the Franco-German war we speak of an operation against the Saar, against the Mos?lle, of the operations around Metz, etc. That the different groups of occur- rences or operations must be connected by the bond of a common leading thought, and not arbitrarily or acci dentally strung together, is a matter of course, and does not remove the distinction. Again, among certain operations a more intimate relationship will generally be brouglit about by the fact that they are conducted under similar circumstances, at the same time of year, against the same hostile army, and are separated from the rest of the operations through conditions of time or space, change of oppo- nents, or alteration in the method of conducting the war. Such an association of operations is properly called a ^^campaign," which forms a definite portion of the war. Originally this designation referred only to the time of tlic rear, and people spoke of "winter" and "summer campaigns." With the increase in the size of armies and extension of the theaters of war the dif- ferentiation with reference to location was added. Thus, for example, we distinjjuish in 1870-71, a Loire ^ campaign, a campaign in the North and one in the East The Operations. 71 of France, etc. This classification of course "has no practical significance for the conduct of war; still it facilitates a general survey when considering events of the past, as well as when forming plans for the fu- ture. That a war may, in exceptional cases, be con- cluded in a single campaign, and the two terms thus coincide, was shown in the year 1866, in Bohemia. If we have stated that the nature of modern war- fare demands an uninterrupted flow of events, this is not to be taken in a literal sense with reference to a whole war or campaign. No troops can march and fight, day and night, continuously. Periods of rest are inserted. With reference to a single operation, how- ever, we must hold to the requirement more rigidly; for the enemy will soon divine the purpose associated therewith and make use of every delay to frustrate our plans. Even a single inopportune day of rest may cause great harm, especially to the attack. Bazaine would probably have escaped from Metz if the German I. and 11. armies had insisted on resting on the 15th of August, 1870. He, for his part, was carried into ruin because he did not sufliciently utilize the same day to effect his departure. In the defensive such interrup tions of movement often occur of themselves, because delay is necessary to ascertain what the enemv is doing. This, however, does not imply a standstill with refer enoe to the general plan, for that very often merely aims at delay and gaininc: of time. Tf the projrress of action during the whole course of the operation is to be an uninterrupted one, if possi- ble, then all the reouirements of the troops must be well attended to beforehand. Their subsistence and the reserve supply of ammunition must be most care- fully regulated for the whole course of the operation. 72 The Conduct of War. The distances to be passed over must not be greater than can be covered, as it were, in one dash. In mili- tary history we seldom meet with operations which contain more than five or six successive marches in the same direction, without any change of design or ob- jective. To stop in the middle of an operation for no other reason than that the exhausted state of the troops requires it, does not augur well for success. The oppo- nent quickly observes that we have undertaken more than we are able to carry out, and this increases his confidence and strength. If the distances are too great, it will be better to divide the operation, or to make an attempt to move the troops slightly nearer to the enemy before the actual beginning, so as to arrive in a tract of country from which we can reach our object at one stretch. In that district provisions and ammunition are then, collected, and the means for crossing the nat- ural obstacles that may be found on the way are ])re- pared;* and the completion of the last indispensable preparations should be immediately followed by the setting out of the troops. During tlie movement, com- munication with the region in wh^'ch thf se preparatory measures have been taken must not be severed, for the necessary supplies have to be forwarded there- from. That district forms the foundation upon which the operation is built up. This leads us to the concep- tion of a base usually adopted in the Art of War. ♦In his campaign to Portugal, in 1809, Marshal Sonlt was forced to mal^e a detour of 140 miles, merely to find a crossinj; over the lower Minho; this was a punishment for thonj^htless- ness in the preparation of his nndertakinff. The bridge train had been left behind in the delusive hope that the inhabitants would be quite friendly, and that the bridges would be found intact The Base of Operations. 73 . 2. The Base of Operations. Formerly the designation **base of operations" was understood to apply to a definitely fixed geographical line, the possession of which was secured through special provisions, such as the construction of fortifi- cations, bridgeheads, intrenched camps, etc. Often the operations of a whole campaign aimed only at gaining a base for the next one. Nations contented themselves with the capture of a few fortifications from which, perhaps not until the following year, the enemy's territory was to be invaded. The existence of a good line of communication between the important points of the base was, of course, necessary, as also the availability of a serviceable network of roads towards front and rear. A navigable river, with a row of forti- fications commandling both Ibanks at the principal points of crossing, consequently, appeared to be the best base of operations, in the older sense of the word. Lines of fortifications connected by a great military road rendered similar service. Along the base, protected by the fortifications, com- missary storehouses were e^tab'ish d, supplies of cloth- ing and foot gear accumulated, and the ammunition for a whole campaign brought together. Workshops were erected for the repair of damaged, and the re- placing of lost, w^ar material; artillery, bridge, and baggage trains were assembled; and often even depots of recruits were established in order to make good the losses in human life also. The army, in a word, was regularly installed, so that it could always, after exertions and losses, be restored to a good condition. When the army advanced, care was taken to follow it with the base, and a new line, a temporary, or inter- 74 The Conduct of War. mediate base, nearer to the theater of operations, was established. Although the arrangements in the latter ease were not as complete as on the main base, it, never- theless, was required to contain a supply to last sev- eral days, of everything that might be needed by the troops. All great commanders, although their campaigns may bear the stamp of boldness, have attached the highest value to the possession of a good base. How- ever much Alexander may have been tempted, after his first victories over the Persians, to follow at the heels of their defeated armies in order to make the most of the advantages he had gained, we nevertheless see him, as well after the battle on the Granicus as after the one at Issus, turn first to the maritime countries on the Mediterranean Sea ; there he even undertook w^eari- some sieges in order to capture the harbors and thus establish a line of communication with his native coun- try, besides securing places in which to create depots for his army. He even considered the conquest of Eg3^pt necessary before marching into the interior, in order to provide himself with the naval forces needed for the extension of his conquests. Having started out from the small and far-distant territory of Macedonia, he changed his base after penetrating Asia and utilized the whole eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea for that purpose. Napoleon I. was not less thoughtful always to pro- vide himself with a secure footing for his operations. Especially instructive in this regard are his measures for the campaign of 1813 in Germany. After the lines of the Vistula and the Oder had been lost the winter before, he chose the Elbe as a base of operations. At first lie thought of undertaking a gigantic offensive The Base of Operations. 75 from the lower course of this stream in order to regain connection with the strong garrisons which he had left in the fortresses of the Polish-Prussian theater of war. He attached the greatest weight to the retention of the northern course of the Elbe, with Magdeburg and Ham- burg, in order to use it as a base, and recommended to the viceroy Eugene, with this sole purpose in view, the plan of taking up a menacing position, with the re- mains of the army returning from Russia, in advance of the former place, on the road to Berlin. In the second portion of the same campaign the Emperor chose the middle Elbe as a base for the de- fensive. He arrived at this conclusion in view of the general situation, although it was quite contrary to his inclinations. It is instructive to examine in detail his careful measures for the security of the position. He already possessed three fortresses on the banks of the stream, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, and Torgau, but that, did not satisfy him. Hamburg and Dresden were also fortified: the former strongly, so as to be able to offer independent resistance to the enemy for a long time; the latter so that it could be left in the sole charge of its garrison for a week. The Emperor did not anticipate remaining away from the latter city for a longer period, under any circumstances. During the campaign he also thought of adding two other places of arms, one at the opening of the Plauen Canal into the Elbe, and the other at the confluence of the Havel and the Elbe; in the course of events the project was, how- ever, abandoned. In this way Napoleon endeavored to relieve himself of all care for the security of his base while delivering rapid and powerful offensive strokes against the Allies, 76 The Conduct of War. who surrounded him on a wide arc, extending from Mecklenburg, through Silesia, into Bohemia. All the material of war that his army might need, and rich stores of provisions, were accumulated in the Elbe fortresses, so that he could look forward with confidence to a long and decisive campaign. Yet it must not be forgotten that an antecedent armistice had given him ample time to equip his base properly. The events of war will not always grant a sufficient delay for this purpose; and a rich territory with good communications, from which all necessary supplies can be collected during the operations, is of extraordinary assistance. In a wider sense, this whole region is also called a base, and we therefore speak of an army as based on such or such a province. In the Occident dense networks of railroads permit us to bring reinforcements and supplies from the most distant sections of the realm in a few days. Even the limitation of a base to a certain district is abolished by this fact. The whole domain of the state takes up this role. And as the railroads of the enemy's country can also be used, in case his demolitions have not been too systematic and thorough, the frontier itself no longer forms an obstacle. The conduct of war of our times therefore reckons with a movable base, and this is one of those ad- vantages which permit the exercise of the utmost energy. It is evident, without further proof, how favorably an army which controls such a movable base is situ- ated. The assailant must, therefore, carefully prepare himself for the restoration of the railway lines of the theater of war beyond the termini originally controlled The Base of Operations. 77 by him, and for the resumption of the operation of the roads interrupted by the enemy; otherwise the de- fense will soon have an advantage. The latter, in turn, must take the necessary steps to deprive the enemy of the use of the stretches of road he is compelled to abandon, either by barring them with fortresses or forts, or by thorough demolition. A further requirement of a base is that it be suffi- ciently extensive. If it consists of only a short line, or even of a single point, it will naturally be easy to force off an army resting on it. In any case the base must bear a proper relation to the size of the army. An arm^^ numbered by hundreds of thousands cannot be suitably based on one or two small fortifications. For so many men, the hospitals alone require more room. In order to be able to live, such masses require a greater space. All movements are hampered when the dis- trict to which the army, in case of necessity, must return is too contracted. The fundamental difficulty with all transmarine expeditions lies in the fact that they are usually limited to a single point, that of debarkation. When a network of railroads forms the base, a large army would receive but poor support from a single line. There must be several of them in the direction of the line of operations, if some degree of freedom of move- ment is desired. The straight line is not an advantageous form for a base. But if a base surrounds the theater of war on two sides, the situation becomes more favorable, es- pecially if the two legs form an angle approximating a right angle. The party operating within this angle can find support and security in two entirely different directions. Hence it is called a double base. Na- 78 The Conduct of War, poleon I. endeavored to secure such a base in 180G, when the line of the Khine, to the left of and touching the line of the Main, from which he advanced, was also prepared as a base. To have one or more lines of railroad in rear, and to be certain that in the advance others will soon be found which arrive upon the theater of war from a lateral direction, constitutes the most favorable case. For this, however, the theater of war must have a very fortunate configuration. A change of base in the midst of the operations of war is a quite difficult matter, even when we are able to make use of the domestic system of railroads by a circuitous route. The transfer of accumulated sup- plies to another line, in any 'case, requires more time than the impatience of the commander is willing to grant, or the necessities of the troops can concede. The delay is caused by the confusion which generally arises in rear of the great armies of modern times, as well as by the extent and variety of the demands made on the officials in such situations. A simple pushing forward of the base, so as to fol- low up an advancing army, is of course much less diffi- cult; we have only to prolong the existing lines of com- munication and put into operation the railroads held by the advancing troops. It thus becomes merely a question of forwarding the means of subsistence of the army to the new termini. In pushing forward a base, a fleet and a land force can support each other very well, whenever one side of the theater of war borders on the sea. Of this the Japanese are at the present time giving us a very pretty example in their advance against China. At first they occupied the disputed objective, Korea. The Base of Operations. 79 Then, after a victorious combat, they crossed the bor- der stream, Yalu. By this time the distance between their army and the harbors of Korea where they had disembarked had become immoderately extended. The fleet then appeared, with a second contingent of the army, in front of the fortified harbor, Port Arthur, situated at one side of the theater of war, and took it. Afterwards it captured Wei-hai-wei. In the further advance these points offered support to the land forces. From their position, both these points command the great basin of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. Provisions, ammu- nition, and reinforcements can be dispatched to every port on the coast. An earlier appearance of the assail- ants before these fortified places would have ex- posed them to the action of relieving armies; a later one would have missed its purpose. In the ages of antiquity we see the same thing carried out on a large scale by Alexander, who caused his land forces to be accompanied by the fleet of Near- chus, on the march to and from India. The uninterrupted maintenance of proper connec- tion between the operations and a well-supplied and secure base has always been carefully considered by all great commanders. Twice in the year 1813 do we see Napoleon I. abandon his pursuit of Bliicher in Silesia and return to Saxony, because the Elbe, and the principal point of support thereon, Dresden, were menaced by the main army of the Allies advancing from Bohemia. Yet circumstances may require us to abandon, temporarily, all considerations of the base, and, as it were, look only forward, not backward. We then pursue an object which, when it is attained, will fur- nish us a new support for future undertakings, in place 80 . The Conduct of War. of the one we have abandoned. General Sherman's march from Atlanta to Savannah, and thence onward through South and North Carolina to Goldsboro and Raleigh, gave an example of such an operation which was attended' with the greatest success. Yet it is to be remarked that the march was made through a terri- tory almost denuded of hostile troops, and that the supplies taken along could be replaced in the country. The general also had the certain prospect of gaining another base on the sea coast. Careful preparation, very determined leadership which will not stop for anything, and decided superior- ity over the enemy are indispensable in such cases.* Nevertheless, the total abandonment of a base is always a leap in the dark. The strength of the army pla^^s an important part in this matter. It must not be out of proportion to the means of the country. Sherman ,on his march commanded 65,000 men. This is a considerable force for a thinly populated district like Georgia and South Carolina. With the armies of our times, running into the millions^ it will seldom be permissible for the com- mander to separate himself from all connection with his base; unless it be just before a great decisive en- gagement, in order to gain a favorable direction of at- tack, as was ventured by the Germans on the 18th of August, 1870, at St. Privat la Montague. Victory in battle restores complete freedom and opens all communications which before haid been aban doned. It is a matter for correct judgment to deter- mine, in individual cases, when and to what extent *At doparture from Atlanta, Shorman caiTied alons in his was der certain circumstances winter closes mountain roads completely. Although special means are now sometimes employed to increase the usefulness of such simple lines of communication, — such as high freight wagons, harnessed with heavy horses, which are cus- tomary in the east of Europe; horse railroads, with hastily laid wooden rails; trains of freight wagons drawn by road engines, etc., — yet expedients of this nature are applicable only to the great artificial high- ways, and not to byways and mountain trails, and can never entirely displace the more rapid means of trans- portation which regulate commercial intercourse. An army of respectable strength which relies entirely upon the roads of the country will be hampered in its move- ments, and, according to modern ideas, be considered clumsy. All campaigns in the Orient, on the Balkan peninsula, and in Anatolia, to our eyes seem to bear that character. They can be correctly judged only by taking into account the circumstance that in most cases provisions and ammunition are transported on the backs of horses, mules, and camels. It is only in the level regions of these countries that ox-carts, such as are to be found there, can be utilized. Routes by water, such as navigable canals and streams, furnish excellent lines of communication. Transportation in vessels is cheapest, and the largest single loads are carried in that way. Now that freight boats running along chains are drawn by steam power, as is done on the Elbe, such lines of transport are many times as efficient as in the days when they were de- pendent on favorable winds, oars, and sails. And yet the possession of the middle course of the Elbe, which intersected his whole theater of war, became for Fred- Lines of Communication. 85, erick the Great one of the elements of his superiority in all his campaigns in Saxony and Bohemia. However, the value of these lines is limited by the facts that in a severe winter they may be closed by ice, and that their direction cannot be changed. With a sudden change in the operations they may therefore lose their importance. The sea, as a means of communication between an army and its sources of power, is free from both these restrictions; it does not freeze over except in the far North, and vessels are not confined to a fixed line. But w^e must not be limited to a single harbor nor to a small number of them, especiall}^ while the enemy still possesses the means to become dangerous to us at sea. He would lie in wait for our transport ships when on their way to harbor, and destroy them. It must also be remembered that harbors on the coast of our latit\ide may be closed in winter by ice-floes, and that storms and bad weather may temporarily interrupt communi- cation by sea. We therefore give the preference to railroads as the most rapid means of intercourse, depending neither on wind and weather nor on heat and cold. They are, of course, inferior to ships in the power of carrying large single loads, and, in common with canals and streams, they have the defect that it is impossible to change their location to suit the convenience of the commander. Still, in western Europe railroads are more numerous than navigable water-courses, and, when an army suddenly executes a change of direc- tion, it will generally be able to find lateral and cross lines available for its use. However, demolition by the enemy is not as difficult with railroads as with other lines; and with an extensive system the most 86 The Conduct of War. careful guarding will scarcely be able to entirely pre- vent interruption. Railroads are weak lines of com- munication; but this fact affords us the advantage of being able to operate the line ourselves and of destroy- ing its usefulness for the enemy.* Streams cannot be damaged at all, and the great roads of a country only with difficulty; but railroads are easily rendered un- serviceable. When one of the termini is on the sea- shore, it is only necessary to withdraw the rolling stock to the interior to make the line worthless to the enemy for some time. It is not easy to convey locomotives and cars on ships, at a time when all the means of transportation are in use for the troops, their equip- ment, and their subsistence. In any case the amount of rolling stock so transported w^ould hardly suffice to render considerable service. On other lines the dem'olition of a few structures will prevent their use for months. The mention of railroads brings us to the fact that lines of communication and operations are not iden- tical, as is often silently admitted. As it is impossi- ble to advance into an enemy's country by rail, lines of railway will hardly become lines of operations;** in rare cases navigable rivers may be used in that way in countries where there are no roads, the army being transported in vessels. The two kinds of lines of com- *One of the most untenable of the objections which have been urjjed in various quarters against establishment and en- larjjement of railroad systems— for example, in the Ottoman empire, and this on the part of the military authorities, too —was that thereby a road into the country would be opened to the enemy. ** Exceptions, such as the turninj? movement of the French against the Austrians by way of Vercelli, May 23-31, 1859, are disregarded. Lines of Communication. 87 inunication most capable of rendering service can, con- sequently, not be used at all, or only in exceptional cases, as lines of operations. Under certain circumstances ±he latter deviate materially from the former in their directions. When the German 11. Army advanced against the Loire, late in the autumn of 1870, it choise its principal line of oper- ations by Joinville, Troyes, Sens, Nemours, and Pithi- viers. It would have been impracticable to use this road continually, because of the great distances to be traversed by wagons. Therefore the railroad by Join- ville, Chaumont, Chatillon sur Seine, Tonnerre, Joigny, Moret, Montargis, and Juvissy, to Orleans, was chosen. At times the railroad to Lagny near Paris was also used for this purpose. Thus, in this case, lines of com- munication and operation were widely separated. It may sometimes be a matter of no consequence if the enemy does cut the line of operations in the rear of the army. As soon as the troops advance, these lines lose their importance, unless they are at the same time intended to serve as lines of communication. In the general case the two of course coincide, or they are parallel, so that they share the same fate when the enemy makes his appearance. Lines of communication must be made secure, above all things. The longer they are, the more difficult does this become, the more liable are they to injury, the easier is it for the enemy to break them, and, naturally, the more difficult does the supply of the army become. Advances upon long lines of operations, which require similar lines of communication, are of the most diffi- cult kind. The whole undertaking has often failed on account of their inordinate length; for instance, the march of Mass^na against Lisbon, and of Napoleon 88 The Conduct of War. against Moscow, or the advance of Frederick into Bo- hemia in 1744. A line of communication of more than five or six long marches may already be considered an extended one, and we shall do well to establish a new- base, at least for means of subsistence and ammuni- tion ; this the German II. Army tried to do in December, 1870, when it reached the Loire. The danger of losing the communications increases with the shortness of the base. The angle of meeting of the lines of operation becomes correspondingly acute. It naturally contains less space than an ob- tuse angle and is more easily turned. The lines, coming closer together, are more readily .eut, and the theory of the Art of War formerly demanded, in the interest of safety, angles of a certain size between lines of operation. This purely geometrical concep tion is, however, very superficial. The only matter of impprtance is that intercourse in rear of the army shall remain open. A wide, navigable stream, com manded by our men-of-war, might form a very long, and yet a very good, line of communication. A great deal depends upon the density of the population, their feel- ings towards the advancing army, and the degree of their warlike character. Finally, the number of troops plays an important part. Everything depends upon the proper proportion of the troops to the amount of space occupied. Count Yorck,* in his excellent work on Napoleon I., makes an interesting comparison in this regard. Three months and a half after the begin- ning of the war with Russia, the Emperor was in Mos- cow, with a line of communication, 5»^8 miles in length, extending t(\ the Niemen in his rear. The terri- ♦"Napoleon as Commander," II., p. IGO ct scq. Lines of Communication. 89 tory through which the army had marched, and which was occupied by him, contained in all 94,170 square miles; the strength of the army was 213,000 men. The Germans, three and one-half months after the begin- ning of the Franco-Prussian war, were camped before Paris with their main body, and were only 211 miles from the Prussian frontier. Their troops covered in all a space of 28,470 square miles and numbered 425,000 men. It is clear from this with how much great- er security they controlled their theater of war than Napoleon' I. did his. Operations against their lines of communication with their native country would have been much more difficult, and disaster could never have caused such a calamitous retreat as the French Army experienced in 1812. The safety of the communica- tions in rear of the army, consequently, depends upon thorough control of the theater of war ; and the former, for its part, has a direct bearing on the condition of the troops for battle. Favorable length and situa- tion of individual lines, and definite measurement of the angle they form, do not matter so much as favora- ble relation of the strength of the forces to the space occupied, and the control they exercise therein. He who pictures to himself how many wagon trains, each one belonging to a distinct body of troops, come and go in rear of an army, will easily understand what important consequences every transfer of base, or change in the front of operations, must have for the lines of communication. A mere change of the rela- tive positions of bodies of troops in the front produces difficulties. The trains of wagons crogs each other, and confusion is unavoidable. As it is usually impossible to keep up incessant telegraphic or written communi- cation between them and the fighting portions of the — 7 90 The Conduct of War, army, they will have trouble in finding their way as soon as the customary line of communication no longer conducts them straight to their destination. The w^andering about of trains in rear of an army, look- ^ing for their organizations, is a common occurrence. In case^of change of front and shifting of position of the army corps we therefore content ourselves, as long as possible, with a bending of the lines of communi- cation, even when unnecessary detours are caused thereby. The first long pause in the operations is utilized to make the necessary exchanges. The best way of making these changes is to give up the old lines little by little, and to establish the new ones gradually, so that for a time both will be in operation side by side. This, however, assumes that a new base is found by the side of the old one; its equip- ment alone requires a good deal of time. It is only when we possess a double base from the very begin- ning, or when the district serving as a base encloses the army in a semicircle, that the transfer is easy. The advantages of a base of this kind are most clearly shown by the possibility of forming new connections in various directions. The advantages of a movable base- are, however, still more pronounced in such cases. If we are skillful in the restoration of destroyed rail- road lines,* we can begin the establishment of the new base at the same time that the decision to change the line of operations is being formed, and thus transfer ♦Military forces— railroad troops— will never be able to ac- complish this as well as great railroad conti'actors, who, in time of war, should be drawn into the service of the govern- ment for this purpose. In this way the bridge of Montereau could have been restored in 1870, and an excellent line of communication for the II. Army would have been opened by Troyes-Nogent sur Seine, The Object of Operations. 91 the wJiole apparatus for the maintenance of the army to another district. Nothing can endow the inventive faculty of the commander with a bolder flight than the freedom of movement thus acquired, and the Art of War of the future cannot help showing us still greater things than have so far been seen in history. The greater the number of lines of communication an army possesses, the better, of course, it is off. The most favorable condition is for each one of the units which are independent with reference to administra- tion, supply departments, and recruitment, to have its separate line of communication. At present, in most of the great armies, these units are the Army Corps. In 1870 and 1871 the Germans succeeded in almost every case in assigning a separate road to each one of these units for its exclusive use. The object to which a movement especially relates is designated the object of operations. As all im- portant undertakings in war require cooperation of the forces, the lines of march leading to the object will, in the nature of things, be convergent. However, we must not conceive the object as stationary, but as in motion. The possibility of union must therefore not be confined to the single point upon which we originally fixed our view. The lines of operation must rather be flexible, to the extent that they can be brought together earlier, as soon as the presence of the enemy demands it; or, so that they may be separated still more, and only brought together beyond the object originally in- tended. It is a serious matter to have several lines of operation, separated by impassable obstacles, in use at the same time. They expose the army to the danger that its separate parts may be defeated, in case the enemy should advance more rapidly than was antici- 92 The Conduct of War: pated, and bring superior forces to bear on one of the lines of operation. Lines of operation directed to the rear, which are used by an army retiring before a superior foe, are called lines of retreat. In their selection certain points may come up for consideration which are quite different from those referring to lines of advance. The defeated army, which can no longer think of immediate resistance and only endeavors to withdraw from the enemy, will convert its line of communication into a line of retreat in order to secure subsistence and cover its base.* However, we did not have in mind such an army as that, but rather one which is not yet checkmated, and which continues to play a vigorous game in spite of its retreat. For the moment, therefore, it suffers only from a relative inferiority, as compared with the strength of the enemy. Instead of escape and self-jrpes- ervation, the most important thing for such an army is restoration of the equilibrium through reinforcement. Hence it follows that on a retreat we must use the lines which will unite the army with its reinforcements; and it is quite immaterial whether the latter are approach- ing on the same lines of operation or on different ones. ♦The more awkward an army is, and the more defective the arrangements of its supply departments are, the more closely will it be bound to its base. Large, newly levied armies, such as those of the third French Republic in the winter of 1870-71, can scarcely get away from the railroads. The subsistence of the Tiu'kish Army in the last Balkan war was only made pos- sible by the extraordinary frugality of the soldiers, of whicli people in Europe can hardly form an idea. And yet the diffi- culty which the commanders experienced in just this point tied their hands to an unusual extent, and prevented all frei^ and rapid movement. This was especially the case with the main army on the Ix>m. Lines of Retreat. 98 In the bold determination to make light of all anxiety about the communications and the base, a retreating army has often found the means to bring abodt'an un- expected turn in affairs. We have only to think of Blti- cher and Gneisenau after the lost battle of Ligny, when, instead of a retreat by Sombreffe, on Li6ge and Maes- tricht, where their natural communications were situ- ated, they chose the line on Wavre and Tilly, where the possibility of union with the English lay, for whom they had waited in vain at Ligny. Thus they succeeded in arriving at Waterloo at the decisive hour, in winning the battle, giving a surprising turn to the campaign, and preparing a precipitate termination for the sway of Napoleon. Of course, the period during which the lines of retreat are separated from the communications must not be such a long one that the army is ruined there- by, or weakened very much through want. A union with the reinforcements would then no longer be able to effect the desired restoration of the equilibrium. This restoration is sometimes to be sought in strong positions, which are reached by the retreating army. The deviation of the line of retreat from the line of communications, however, becomes more dangerous in this case. When retreating upon auxiliary forces, means of subsistence can generally be found with them; but not so with a position, unless this has been rapidly brought into communication with a newly cre- ated base. Such a base, instead of being situated in rear of the army, may be located to one side; and if the increase in strength resulting from the advantages of the position, or the arrival of reinforcements, is great enough to influence the enemy, such a situation may be an advantage rather than a disadvantage. The ene- 94: The Conduct of War. my must then not only renew his attack, but also unex- pectedly change his line of operations. '^Lateral bases are often decisive in preventing penetration of the enemy to the heart of the country," declares Jomini. Lines of retreat which lead to such a base and leave the direct road to the object open to the enemy are, as a rule, called eccentric. A movable base, such as a network of railroads, in case we control a sufficient extent thereof, facili- tates connections with eccentric lines of retreat to a greater degree than simple lateral bases; for, after separation of the lines of retreat from the original lines of communication, railroads not only restore to us the power to feed and supply the army, but also allow the rapid transportation of reinforcements. This advan- tage is especially useful to the defender in his own country. If the increase of strength sought by the re- treating army is to be derived either from positions or from reinforcements, good judgment should be dis- played in choosing lines of retreat in the direction affording the greatest chances of success. On this subject definite rules cannot be given; however, we shall endeavor further on, when treating of defensive operations, to advance a few ideas bearing on their selection. ^. Preparation of the Army; Equipment, MoUlization, Concentration. No army can take the field from a peace footing, without additional preparation. This lies in the nature of the modern organization of armies, which in time of peace keeps together only a nucleus of the troops to be formed in time of war. In fact, in a great many Preparation of the Army. 95 cases even this does not exist, and entirely new bodies of troops have to be formed. Officers and men of the furlough class have to be called out, the number of horses, wagons, and means of transportation must be increased on a great scale, and a vast quantity of war material procured. A certain amount of time is there- fore necessary to arm the troops. This can never re- main a complete secret. The opponent will receive news about it, and will know what to expect. Rivalry between great powers has led to preparation for arm- ing in time of peace, even when no war is in prospect. The maxim for such cases is to keep in store all those necessary supplies which, when the army must be transferred to a war footing, could no longer be pro-, cured, or the acquisition of which would require so much time that the completion of the preparation of the whole force would be delayed thereby. In the same way all, even the most minute, administrative details that may be necessary are worked out on paper. The ideal of perfection set up in this regard is that the army should be ready to march as soon as the last soldier called out has taken his place under the colors. This transition from a peace to a war footing, pre- pared beforehand to include the smallest details, is called the moUlization of the army. The great relative advantages of mobilization are apparent. It makes a surprise of the enemy possible and does not betray the purpose we are pursuing until it is too late for the enemy to overcome the advantage we have gained. It does not become certain that we have decided upon war, until just before its outbreak. When the mobilization is completed, the troops are ready for war, but the army is not yet in position for action. The time we have gained might be lost again 96 The Conduct of War. if the assemblage of the troops proceeded too slowly. This must therefore also be prepared in all its details. Some persons may remark that it is impossible to fore- see where this concentration would have to take place. In the succeeding section of this work, however, we propotse to show that this is an error. The plans of operations are supposed to fix the most suitable place for the assemblage of our forces, against each one of the neighboring powers. By careful work a combina- tion of marches and conveyance by rail^and water may be found, in consequence of which all the troops will be able to arrive at their destination without loss of time. The limit of the attainable is generally to be found in the capacity of the railroads. Not until all the railroad lines that reach the zone of assemblage are put to use, and each line is daily supplied with as many troops as it can transport, can the concentration be considered well arranged. Among the most important features of the prepa- ration are the permanent quartering of the troops — peace stations — in such a way as to favor to the utmost their embarkation and transportation to the frontier; the ample eq^uipment of all the lines with rolling stock, so that the greatest number of trains that the nature of the road permits of miay be run ; and finally, a com- pletion of the network of railroads in accordance with military considerations. The latter would not toler- ate impaired efficiency of two or more roads on ac- count of the fact that for certain distances they use the same track, or have crossings of streams in common. Rivalry between neighboring states has caused the construction of entirely new lines, for no other" reasons The Plan of Operations. 97 than those given above. Strategical railroads form a characteristic feature of our times.* The time required for the concentration of armies is now reckoned almost in hours. It is a fact worth pondering that if France were able to complete the concentration of her army three days sooner than Ger- many, she might, before the latter could get ready, invest Metz and Diedenhofen, cut Strasburg off from its communications, and cross the Saar with her masses of cavalry. The German forces, on the con- trary, might be compelled to transfer their point of concentration, perhaps back to where it took place in 1870. Much more important than the material gain of such a start would be the moral effect, the increasfi of confidence on the part of the troops. Even one day may mean a great deal, and, as a matter of course, no power which understands its own interests, will allow itself to be surpassed in this respect, without the most stringent necessity. 5. The Plan of Operations. Although it is now generally admitted that a com- plete plan for enterprises in the field is impossible, because we have to reckon with the independent will of the opponent, we still shall be loath to give up en- tirely our purpose of determining in advance what the course of action shall be. On the contrary, it is in the highest degree important that quite definite ideas be formed; for vagueness of purpose produces vacilla- *Their number is relatively greatest in Russia, because the private intercourse of the thinly scattered population does not require as many railroads as the military consideration of the concentration of the army makes desirable. 98 The Conduct of War. tion and uncertainty in the commands, which in turn are followed by incomplete or feeble execution on the part of the troops. Lack of clear conception of pur- pose gives rise to weak methods of conducting war and is the germ of future defeat. The only essential point, when devising operations, is to apprehend with good judgment how far we can go and to what extent we are permitted to enter into details. We must also guard against letting arbitrary assumptions slip in which might become the basis for erroneous inferences. It is dangerous to take for granted that our prelimi- nary steps will be successful simply because they are worked out on correct lines; for, as we have already shown, in war the most judicious measures may fail through accident.* Our material superiority will sel- dom be so great that we can be certain of crushing the enemy, in spite of misfortune and error. Should such be the case, then the contriving of a plan is also very easy and does not require ingenious devices. While making a study of the probable course of a prospective campaign, we shall meet with certain possi- bilities which are within our reach; but the art of se- lecting with certainty the one promising the greatest success cannot be definitely taught. In such cases a certain divinatory talent comes into play, which is generally called coup d'oeil, and is difficult to explain. Through study and experience this powe^ may be heightened, but it cannot be created where Nature has failed to make an endowment. Napoleon I., as is known, made the assertion that ho never had a plan. Yet we see that all his undertak- ings are, from the beginning, directed at some large *See pp. 9 and 10. The Plan of Operations. 99 and definite object which may be easily recognized, such as the separation of the hostile army from its com- munications, as in 1805, or the threatening of the ene- my's capital, for the protection of which his army is compelled to interpose and accept battle, as in 1806, or the like. It is said that Jomini, before the beginning of the latter campaign, to the great surprise of the Emperor, guessed not only the object he had selected, but also the road on which his campaign would begin. We may therefore assume that for the intelligence of an atten- tive observer it was possible to foresee both. The surprising changes, which the great master of war had himself not anticipated, occurred only in the course of events, in accordance with the measures, and especially the mistakes, of the enemy. It thus becomes clear what Napoleon meant. The plan is supposed to state what we desire to do, and, with the means available, hope to accomplish. It can- not prescribe the separate movements and enterprises through which we attain our object. The first serious encounter with the enemy has a quite decisive influ- ence on our plans. We have only to think of Worth and Spicheren, in 1870, as examples. The material and moral consequences of each battle determine sub- sequent action. As in the wars of our times operations begin with the completion of the strategic concentra- tion, and the first battles ensue immediately there- after, it follows that the farthest range of the plan can generally not be permitted to extend beyond the con- centration. After that, the great general purpose alone remains as the guiding star for the commander in his undertakings. In order to obtain a -good conception of this general 100 The Conduct of War. purpose, it is, above all things, necessary for the com- mander to have a correct understanding of the general military and political situation, and a keen apprecia- tion of the capabilities of his own army. In 1870 the jF'rench committed a fundamental i error. They be- lieved it was possible to surprise the enemy by assum- ing a rapid strategical offensive. But the large units of their army were to be formed, for the first time, at the general assemblage; the reserves could not join un- til after arrival on the terrain of strategical concen- tration; and the administration of the army had been subjected to the most stringent centralization, so that the whole machinery was bound to be slow in its operation. The enemy, on the contrary, had prepared the mobilization and concentration of his forces in the most careful way; well-contrived decentralization per- mitted the quickest possible execution; and the great units, in the form in which they took the field, already existed in time of peace. It was quite correct for the Turkish Army, which had just been conducting an offensive campaign in Ser- via and Montenegro, to confine itself to the defensive in the subsequent Russian war, as its entire organiza- tion made a forward movement to a great distance im- practicable, and the enemy had the advantage in num- bers and mobility. However, self-restraint ought not to have gone so far as to abandon wholly an active de- fense and individual offensive enterprises which could have impeded the march of the enemy, such as the oc- cupation and destruction of the bridge of Barboshi, and the like. Whoever plans a strategical offensive requiring energy and celerity, to be executed by awkward levies, the commanders of which have never had an opportu- The Plan of Operations. 101 nity to acquire, at great peace maneuvers, the neces- sary practice in handling considerable bodies of troops, is building a house without a foundation. It is bound to fall unless specially fortunate circumstances fa- vor it. On the contrary, the commander who, with a well- disciplined and suitably equipped army with experi- enced leaders, confines his action to the defensive, wheii dealing with a foe of inferior quality, and without being forced thereto by overwhelming odds, buries a treasure. Of course, nobody will be likely to commit such an error deliberately. Even in armies that are quite neg- lected, we have only to listen to the spokesmen; we shall generally find that they consider it capable of, and destined for, the greatest things. Either through lack of experience, or perhaps through pride, they ascribe to it the necessary qualities, and replace the solid foundation for their plans by artificial reasoning. For deficiencies that may exist, they would compensate by natural talent or special ideal powers, such as heroic bravery, enthusiasm, religious fanaticism, or the like.* Consequently, a thorough general knowledge of our own capabilities and resources is the very first requi- site for a proper grasp of the military object of the plan of operations. Often an enterprise that is good enough of itself will have to be dropped be- cause the man who, from the nature of the situation, will be in command is not equal to it. In case it is the commander who forms the plan, let him ask him- *The importance of such incentives should, of course, not be completely denied; but it would be still more erroneous to endeavor to cover up in this way all the weaknesses of an army, recognized by ripe and deliberate judgment. 102 The Conduct of War. self candidly and without self-deception, whether he believes himself capable of the great things he proposes. In this way the first important point of the plan of operations will be decided — namely, the general meth- od of conducting the war; whether it is advisable to proceed to the attack of the enem^^, or to await an im- provement of our own situation, on the defensive. If we have to deal with several opponents at the same time, we must also determine against which one the main force is to be directed, and which others can be treated more as a collateral issue. Then let us ask ourselves what the probable action of the enemy will be. Although the theory of war does not entirely preclude assumption of errors on the part of the enemy, when for special reasons we believe that they may with certainty be expected, it will, neverthe- less, be circumspect to suppose, as a rule, that his measures will be correct — that is, such as will be most effective against us. After we have arrived at a definite supposition in regard to the intentions of the enemy, it will be possi- ble to draw up an image of the concentration of his forces, which is governed by the same fundamental conditions that control our own. The purpose which we ascribe to him permits us to recognize the district in which the assembly of his army must take place, and which, consequently, will form the base of his opera- tions. The peace stations of his troops, — of which we should not be ignorant, — as well as the location and limits of his districts of military administration, will give us the points of departure from which his troops will start. The railroads, and routes by land and water, which lead from the^e points to the base, will The Plan of Operations. 103 indicate to us their lines of approach thereto. At the place where the latter terminate we can sum up, and thus form an outline of the state of assemblage of the hostile forces. If this work be carefully done, it can- not turn out to be entirely incorrect. We can at the same time perceive the natural grouping of the enemy's forces into separate armies. Our own strategic concentration should be planned accordingly. This, in case we intend to pursue the offensive must, above all things, favor cooperation towards the front. But if we have a defensive plan in view, then the concentration of our forces on the probable line of advance of his principal body becomes the main point. In such cases it is of advantage to push the point of assemblage as near to the enemy as the security of the concentration will permit, as every step backward sacrifices territory, resources, and time. After this, a plan for offensive action can furnish a more detailed statement concerning the directions to be taken by the different columns, and may, moreover, designate the more limited space for the concentration preceding battle, and the special point of attack, such as a wing, a flank, or the center of the enemy's army. Beyond this we can only set up very general ideas as to probable action. They will, ordinarily, indicate the separation of the enemy from his most important communicafions, without which the continued exist- ence of his forces is no longer secure. This is the eas- iest way of destroyinj? the enemy, in the military sense of the word. That this problem is much more difficult of solution now than in the past is evident from our conception of a movable base, which affords a special means of slipport for the defender. As late as in the great American war, thirty years ago, the fate of an 104 The Conduct of War, army could be decided by forcing it away from a single line of railroad. But at present this is no longer possi- ble on a theater of war in western Europe. Here it would be a question of pushing an army away from entire regions, upon the resources of whiph it mainly depends for its subsistence. Unless we can surround the enemy, a complete decision is not attainable until we succeed in throwing him back against a neutral frontier, or against the shore of a sea not controlled by him. Finally, a hint as to the way in which the enemy is to be forced to accept a peace forms the necessary' con- clusion of the plan. A plan for the defensive will, in addition, state with some certainty in what strategical position the first resistance is to be made, or, in case this is to be only temporary, the probable location of the decisive stand. If the plan has been correctly developed, this place will generally coincide in point of time with the expected favorable change in the general situation. We must then also point out the sources of reinforcement which are to bring about this favorable change. It is manifest how important it is for the defender to so conduct his retreat as to approach these sources, at the same time leading the enemy away from his objective as far as possible. The more difficult his communica tions become, and the more ours improve in the course of the operations, the sooner will this change appear. The plan of defense concludes with an exposition as to when and where this change is to be expected. It consequently does not, like the plan for the offen- sive, lead to a final tenniiuilion, but can only open a prospect for the second period of the war, which will demand a plan for attack. ' The Plan of Operations. 105 Sensible moderation is the quality which is more likely than any other to give value to a plan of opera- tions. If it considers too much time and space, and goes too far into details, which depend upon chance anyhow, it will soon be contradicted by the course of events. However, some additional instructions are indis- pensable. The plan must prescribe general rules of conduct for armies on adjacent theaters of war. The object of these rules will be to prevent the events tak- ing place on adjoining theaters of war from having any etfect on the behavior of the main arni}^, before the de- cisive battle. When fortifications influence the operations, the mode of procedure with reference to them must be de- termined beforehand, because it reacts on the concen- tration. A siege train of modern times can only with difficulty be transferred from one adopted line of march to another. It must, therefore, be decided in advance which of the enemy's strong places is to be taken by siege. We must likewise decide, when making the plan of operations, upon the place where the enemy's line of frontier fortifications, barring the way to his main army, is to be penetrated; for the troops advanc- ing in that part of the theater will require a special equipment. Finally, we must also consider the mutual relation of the operations of the land and naval forces, when a fleet is supporting the army. A plan of operations thus forms a memorial, which begins with a general consideration of the political and military situation, especially with a comparison of the opposing forces, and deduces therefrom a rule of con- 106 ' The Conduct of War. duct for the course to be pursued in the general case. Then it should make a statement of what the enemy may do, and where he will effectuate the concentration of his forces, in order to determine, furthermore, where our own must be assembled and how they must be grouped. This is followed by selection of the directions for the first movements, the purpose of which is to deliver decisive battle against the hostile main body under the most favorable conditions. Then a division into offensive and defensive plans takes place. The former indicates the further objects to be pursued in a way which, though general, still includes events up to the exaction of peaQp; the latter carries us only to the moment of the change and merely opens the prospect of a subsequent offensive campaign. Finally, both discuss lateral issues which may in- fluence the result. IX. STRATEGICAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. 1. Object, Conditions, Expedients. We already know that the object of all strategical offensive operations is to bring on the tactical decision under conditions in the highest degree favorable to us. We attain this when with superior forces we fall on the enemy's weakest spot. If, before the de- cisive battle, we succeed in bringing together all the troops that are at all within reach, and in leading them against the enemy's most sensitive point, then we have, strategically speaking, done everything that ordinarily can be done in the offensive. To be the stronger at strategical iiit^mmiim Operations. 10 7 the decisive point is the object in which the whole science of war finally terminates. The prime condition for success, aside from the fact that the means must be ample throughout, is conceal- ment of our design, so that the enemy will not be able to perceive the direction of our thrust until it is too late for him to answer it by a concentration of all his forces before the battle. Consequently, at the moment when the movement has advanced so far that the enemy can no longer be deceived as to its purpose, the most distant fractions of our army must be nearer to the point where the encounter must take place than the corresponding portions of the enemy's force. If we have had good reports before the beginning of the operations, calculations in regard to these distances can be made with some degree of certainty. The ra- pidity of the advance must, of course, be such that the enemy cannot surpass it. Energetic action must ex- clude every species of delay. These conditions seem so very simple that one would believe a failure in their fulfillment impossible. What makes them rather difficult is the fact that the clearness of the situation, as we imagined it when re- solving upon action, soon disappears in the execution. The contact of the two fighting armies does not take place at a single, but at a great number of points. However, whatever their number may be, just that many forces are there to lead us off from the course we had chosen. With offensive enterprises matters are not in as bad a state as in the defense, where a cry of distress soon goes up in all directions; yet there is this similarity, that the forces everywhere seem to be too small, and that reinforcements apear to be neces- sary. Nevertheless, the general is supposed to be able 108 The Conduct of War, to withdraw troops here and there, in an unconcerned way, and put them in march in the decisive direction. Doubts then come up as to whether this has been for- tunately selected. The operations of the enemy also have their effect and make the situation appear differ- ent from what he thought it was. For the further progress of the action real dangers arise which had not been foreseen. Instead of the one object of operations which he had in view while forming the plan, many of them appear before him in its execution. In this crisis everything depends on whether, with correct coup (Tmil^ he is able to detect quickly the most important, or at least an important, object, and has sufficient self-control to disregard the others for the moment. It will be of decisive value to bear clear- ly in mind, at all times, that the offensive generally wins the whole game as soon as it is victorious at a sin- gle point, no matter how its efforts at other points may turn out. In the skillful utilization of this peculiar- ity of the offensive lies the secret of successful execution. 2. Selection of the Point of Concentration. After we have chosen our object, and have given the troops the proper direction towards the sanue, a great deal still depends on the selection of the point of concentration. If the troops, at the moment when they reach the object they are seeking, cannot cooperate, the operation is a failure, for the necessary superiority will not exist. Now, it would be a good idea, in order to avoid this evil, to keep the forces united from the very begin- ning, and advance in a state of assemblage. This, Selection of the Point of Concentration. 109 however, is possible only in the rarest eases. We may, in the first place, have to reckon with a preliminary sit- uation which was beyond our control, and which, for geographical reasons alone, prevents a concentration before the beginning of offensive undertakings, as, for example, was the case with the Prussians in 1866. Should we attempt in every case to follow the rule of first assembling all the troops on a base line, before putting them in motion, so much time would be lost that the whole military situation might in the meantime be changed, and the assumptions on which our plans were based become useless. We know that all such assemblages of great masses bring hardships to the army.* It may still be possi- ble to feed the troops if we have a dense network of railroads behind us. The water supply is often a mat- ter of greater difficulty. For an advance, subdivision and separation are requisite in every case. The ne- cessity of finding a sufficient ifumber of practicable roads makes such action imperative.** But this again makes previous designation of a point of assemblage indispensable. In the selection of that point two great principles confront each other. Napoleon I., as is known, is the principal exponent of assemblage before arriving on the field of battle. He formed his army into a single closed mass before delivering his irresistible thrust against the enemy. In order to have the assistance of surprise in such cases, he always took pains to conceal his concentration be- hind some covering obstacle in the terrain, such as a *See p. 22. **See p. 23. 110 The Conduct of War. mountain range, a stream, etc. He called his system "breaking forth in mass." Thus he united his army in 1805, between Donau- worth and Ingolstadt, behind the right wing of the Austrians, before crossing the Danube and attacking them in their rear at Ulm. In the same way he assem- bled his army, in the beginning of October, 1806, on the upper Main, at Baireuth, Bamberg, and Schwein- furth, ready to lead it forward in a concentrated mass. Similarly in April, 1813, with the masses approaching from France, he marched first to the lower Saale, at Merseburg and Weissenfels, where the viceroy Eugene was posted with the army remaining in Germany. True to his principle, he wished first to form a mass of his forces, and then advance against Leipsic and turn the right flank of the Allies, whose main force was in po- sition south of that city. The spectacle is repeated in the same campaign toward the end of August, when the Emperor returned from Silesia, to the battle of Dresden on the Elbe. He did not fail to appoint a general rendezvous for his troops at Stolpen, in ad- vance of the Elbe and of Dresden, in order to continue his movement therefrom in a united body. His very last campaign, that of 1815, began with a rapid concen tration of all the troops stationed on the northern fron- tier, in the direction of Charleroi, in order to invade, in a compact body, the cantonments of the Prussian Army confronting them. Quite contrary to this was the action of Frederick the Great at the beginning of the campaign of 1757, and also that of the Prussian Army of 186(5, before Sadowa. Separated columns in these cases marched into the enemy's territory and chose their point of assemblage within the space occupied by the latter. Selection of the Point of Concentration, 111 The same procedure was repeated in 1870 and 1871 at Worth, Orleans, and Le Mans, by the Prussian armies. Field Marshal Moltke appears as the exponent of the principle of concentration of separate columns on the field of battle, which is contrary to the Napoleonic principle. The principles of both Napoleon and Moltke have led to great results. Both follow a similar purpose, to bring superior forces into cooperation in battle. In spite of the opinion of one of our most important mili- tary writers,* who, even after 1870, declared the prin- ciple of Moltke to be the less valuable, we must accept both on equal terms. Each corresponds to a definite preliminary situation, and cannot be arbitrarily applied. With reference to preparation for war, Austria had gained the start upon Prussia in 1866. It was impor- tant to overcome this by rapid preparation and concen- tration of the Prussian forces, which were advancing from the eastern and western portions of the monarchy. Had General von Moltke attempted to assemble them at a single point before leaving Prussian territory, an additional loss of time would have been occasioned thereby. The natural point of concentration, which could be most quickly reached by all the fractions of the army, lay in the direction of the enemy, in Bohemia, in the region of the upper Elbe. It is true that the enemy was able to arrive there first, though not with his whole army; for several corps were still at Lunden- burg, in Moravia, while the most distant Prussian de- *Gount Yorck, "Pr6cis militaire de la campagne de 1813 en Allemagne," Leipsic, 1881, p. 34. 112 The Conduct of War. tachments were approaching from Dresden and Neisse, and could consequently arrive in less time, in any event. The general advance in the direction of Git- schin had, therefore, not been resolved upon as a hazard which could only succeed in case of good fortune, but rather as a carefully considered and suit- able expedient to counteract the unfavorable geograi)h- ical conformation of the Prussian domain. It is therefore quite possible that the point of con- centration may sometimes be looked for in territory already controlled by the enemy; his control, however, must not be so complete as it is in the case when, with superior forces, he awaits our arrival in the occupied territory. The Napoleonic principle of massing^ troops before the inroad, has the advantage that, in case of surprise, when the circumstances are found to be different from what was expected, all of the troops will, nevertheless, be at hand, and that consequently there is not much to be feared. This is what happened to Napoleon I. in October, 1806, when, instead of encountering the Prussians on the great road to Berlin by way of Leip- sic, he unexpectedly found them on his left flank, be- hind the Saale. A crowded advance, however, causes an increase of hardships and losses. Napoleon's army in 1813 was ruined by constant marching back and forth in this close formation. The Austrians in 1859, and also in 1866, suffered in the same way. And when the enemy is able to avoid the thrust, as Bliicher twice was successful in doing in August and the beginning of September, 1813, the united mass will soon be con- strained to give up the game or to separate in the pres- ence of the enemy, and either is dangerous. Finally, a concentration of this kind requires a Selection of the Point of Concentration. 1 J 3 certain amount of space for its execution. If the ene- my is in position near our front, it can only be done by drawing the troops together on the base line. This necessitates flank marches, which, although not by any means as dangerous as works on the Art of War have often made us believe, yet, when executed in too close proximity to the enemy, easily lead to surprises, con- fusion, and unpremeditated combats. If we conceive of two great armies, counted by hundreds of thous- ands, as collected near the frontier at the outbreak of the war and facing each other in close proximity, — which would be the case in western Europe, — it is easy to see that sufficient space for a closer concentration, before invasion of the enemy's positions, would be lacking, and that it would have to be accomplished while engaged in combats with the enemy. The plan of concentrating in the enemy's territory naturally permits us to retain separate columns up to the last moment. In case the enemy retreats, we can likewise push the point of concentration forward. This facilitates subsistence and movement of the masses of troops. The principal danger is that the enemy may suddenly appear among the separated col- umns, and defeat them before they can assist each other. Often an accident, or the unskillful and timid conduct of a single one of the columns, causes the re- treat of all, and the advantage of the offensive, in that it is generally victorious when it gains the upper hand at a single point, has been converted into the disad- vantage of a general failure because a mishap occurred at a single place. As the space occupied by an army expands, the in- fluence of the commander-in-chief naturally becomes less, and the independence of subordinate commanders J 14 The Conduct of War. increases. The conduct of the latter becomes of great importance with reference to the general result. The concentration will not succeed unless at least the great majority of the generals are energetic, circum- spect, and quite in harmony with the ideas of the com- mander-in-chief. The latter may easily be ruined by the errors of his subordinates. In its invasion of Bo- hemia the Prussian II. Army did not allow itself to be detained by the failure of one of its corps commanders. Yet this might have occurred if a second corps had re- mained away — if, for example. General Steinmetz had acted at Nacliod in the way that Benin did at Traute- nau. Therefore, we must know our men and be able to place implicit reliance upon them in every respect. The troops, also, must not be of poor quality, for accidents may easily cause the dissolution of separate detach- ments, as was the case in Oudinot's army on the 23d of August, 1813.* The concentrated advance furnishes great security against harm, and he who lacks confi- dence had better adopt it. On the other hand, the advance in separate bodies ordinarily gives promise of greater success, it being easier to surprise the enemy. For the latter, being attacked in several places at the same time, will have greater difficulty in recognizing the objective likely to prove most serious to him; he cannot arrive at a clear decision and definite action quickly; and the fact that danger menaces him at sev- eral points is likely to cnnsc^ confusion and errors in his dispositions. Lastly, tliis method of concentra- tion, when well carried out, will, from its nature, term! ♦The battle of Gross-Beoi'on, where the rout of Reynier's troops caused the retreat of the whole armj" advancing? in three columns. Parallel, Convergent ^ and Divergent Advance. 115 nate in turning the enemy on the field of battle, and this, with the effectiveness of modern firearms, is the best form for the tactical offensive. It is for good judgment to determine, from the situa- tion, — different in each case, — which principle is to be our guide in selecting the point of concentration for the masses of our army. However, let us continually bear in mind that the object is not to look for the point of concentration in accordance with the one or the other of these methods, adopted as a fixed system, but to bring all the forces into cooperation on the field of battle. 3. Parallel, Convergent, and Divergent Advance; Night Marches and Flank Marches. A direct advance on parallel roads has the advan- tage of always leaving the same space between col- umns during the forward movement; this can be util- ized by them for the purposes of quartering and sub- sistence. Each column possesses its own line of oper- ations, and, generally, also its own line of communi- cation. Entanglement of the troops, and of the wagon trains following them, is prevented. An arrangement of this kind is undoubtedly the most convenient one for the movement of large masses of troops. But it would not lead to concentration on the field of battle except in places where the lines of march run quite closely to- gether, and in that case the advantages above named would cease to exist. We shall therefore not be able, in general, to use this method of advancing, just before a battle. But, after a decisive engagement, we may have to march through the country separating the section just captured from the one where the enemy lie The Conduct of War. is preparing to make his next stand. In this case the above arrangement would be suitable, provided there is no prospect of encountering the enemy. This was the case, for example, with the German armies between the Saar and the Moselle, in August, 1870. Changes in the order of march, however, became necessary, when the French unexpectedly made a stand behind the Nied. As we approach the enemy, a converging advance becomes necessary. But we must not incline from the parallel directions too soon, in order not to betray the objective before the proper time, and not to assume too early the hardships resulting from limited space. As the point of concentration is not fixed, but moves about in a certain space, depending upon the action of the hostile army, which is also in motion, the converg- ing directions of the separate columns are not actually aimed at a point, but, in a more general way, at a certain district, until it becomes clear where the tac- tical decision may be expected. The word ^^assem- blage" also must not be taken literally, as requiring all the troops to stand in touch, on the same field. An army is concentrated when its most distant corps can arrive on the field of battle on the same day, at a suit- able hour. When the positions of the corps take the form of a semicircle enclosing the field of battle, as was the cage at Koniggratz, the situation is most favor- able, and it is more probable that we shall be able to dispense with actual completion of the assemblage, — which was the course adopted there. This state of separation into fractions facilitates the march of troops and their deployment. When the concentration which was necessary for battle is to be dissolved for the benefit of the troops, or Flank Marches, 117 to occupy the captured territory, the divergent advance becomes the afterpiece of a successful offensive battle. To subdivide the forces, preparatory to a divergent advance in the presence of the enemy, is dangerous. It should only be done when another considerable en- gagement is neither expected nor even considered possible. The campaign of 1814, on two occasions, show^s us the peculiar spectacle, on the part of the Allies, of separation into parts for no other purpose than to be able to envelop the enemy again and drive him into a contracted space. However, in this case personal mo- tives also were influential, especially the ambition of Blticher to secure greater independence and freedom of action than were attainable in close connection with the main army. The war between Servia and Turkey in 1876, strange to say, began with a divergent offen- sive on the part of the Servians, their four army groups being directed to the three cardinal points in the direc- tion of which the hostile territory lay. Political con- siderations had been the more influential ones by far, and a miserable failure of the undertaking was the the speedy result. Still, these are exceptional cases, which probably will seldom be repeated. The direction of the march will not always be per- pendicular to the enemy's front, but will frequently be oblique, and at times even parallel thereto, so that the marching troops will present a flank to the enemy, and, consequently, execute a flank march. We therefore add here a few remarks concerning flank marches, although they may just as well occur in the defensive; for example, when it becomes a question of forestalling the enemy at a point situated to one side. Flank marches are only dangerous when we our- 118 The Conduct of War. selves have no clear idea that our march is of that nature, and, consequently, are surprised bj a flank attack of the enemy. A marching column can be de- ployed more quickly towards the flank than towards the head, for the distances are shorter. Of course, we must not be too near to the enemy, but must retain the space necessary for deployment. The service of se- curity of a flank march, by means of a special detach- ment which is placed in position facing the enemy, is attended with a certain amount of risk. If the de- tachment be weak, it invites the attacks of the enemy at the least desirable moment ; and if it be strong, then the lateral shifting of the main body will be delayed by the necessity of waiting for the detachment to fol- lows The requisite precautions are careful explora- tion, a change in the order of march so that some cav- alry will be available in the middle of very long col- umns, and transmission of information to subordinate commanders, so as to keep them alert and ready for deployment towards the flank. An attack during a flank movement will, of course, always be trouble- some; for the march will be directed at a perfectly defi- nite object, which we desire to reach as quickly as possible. Every combat, even if it terminates success- fully, causes delay. If the enemy is at a standstill, the flank movement derives a certain amount of pro- tection from the fact that loss of time is involved in setting in motion troops which have been deployed and assigned to places in a position. The situation becomes more difficult when the enemy is already in motion and we are endeavoring to slip past the heads of his columns. Often there is no remedy left but to attack them with separate detachments and bring them to a sudden halt, while all the rest of the forces Night Ma rcJies. 119 continue their march. The danger is, however, immi- nent that through a number of such combats we shall be drawn into a general engagement at a place where we do not desire it. Flank marches are unavoidable. Every concentra- tion in the presence of the enemy of previously separa- ted bodies of troops will make flank marches, or quasi flank marches, necessary. They must be executed cautiously and with full appreciation of the situation and of the object of the march, but, nevertheless, with- out timidity. Not less deserving of banishment is the fear of night marches, which in recent times has become preva- lent on account of anxiety to spare the troops. We can no more exclude them from strategical calcula- tions than flank marches. Many examples from the campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon go to prove that w^ell-organiized night ,;marches are possible without injurious effect on the condition of the troops. In southern latitudes they are the rule during the hot sea- son. Osman Pasha, in July, 1877, made three night marches between Widdin and Plevna. The combats following them proved, however, that the efficiency of his troops for battle had not been impaired. Just before a battle, night marches can render great service by enabling us to place densely crowded masses of troops in position close to the enemy, before the attack. With the growth of armies they will, in future, be indispensable; for otherwise two army corps cannot very well be directed to use the same road to the field of battle. But the habitual disturbance of night rest is to be avoided ; this can easily be done by issuing the orders for the following day in proper season. 120 The Conduct of War, 4. Special Forms of the Strategical Offensive. It is clear that from the location of the base of operations, the selection of the objective, the direc- tion of the line of operations or of retreat, the nature of the advance, and the determination of the points of concentration and attack, a great number of different forms may be put together, which cannot all be treated in detail. It suffices to bri»g forward the simplest ones, which, in a modified shape, are continually recur- ring in the conduct of war. The Strategical Frmital Attaclc. This is the simplest expression of superior force, and as such is entirely justifiable. He who knows that he is able to throw down his adversary under any and all circumstances makes straight for him, in order to attack him wherever he may be found. In this method all artificial aids to increase the suc- cess obtained by superior force are, of course, neg- lected. The full benefit thereof must be sought in energy of action, especially in the pursuit, after pre- liminary victories. Neither the flanks nor the lines of communication and retreat are menaced. It is im- possible to cause a surprise by the direction of the at- tack; it can only be attained by the celerity of the ad- vance. However, the invention of any addition w^hat- ever to the simple frontal attack is, of itself, neither a subject for approbation nor a special source of strength. As it would require a detachment of troops, its first effect would be a weakening of the force as a whole. It is not until later, when the enemy is deceived, sur- prised, or led into error thereb}^ that artifices have their value. Consequently, when there are no special The Strategical Frontal Attack. 121 reasons, which on account of the nature of the terrain, the networli of roads, the position of the enemy or of our own forces, naturally invite a combination of the strategical frontal attack with other undertakings, we should not hesitate to forego such association. This simple form of attack should by no means be consid- ered as of inferior value. The object is to bring on a battle, and the shortest and quickest way of doing it is by a direct advance. It is also a fact that there is, in strategy, less scope for envelopment and turning movements that in tac- tics. Considering the great size of modern armed forces, it is easy to conceive of an army which, in its strategical concentration, is able to find secure sup- ports, such as sea-coasts, neutral frontiers, systems of fortifications, etc., for both flanks. Tactically this would seldom occur. Simple forms facilitate leader- ship and diminish the danger of confusion, misunder- standing, and error. The strategical situation does not by any means indicate in advance the way in which the tactical de- cision is to be fought out. From a strategical frontal attack we can still very readily pass over to a tactic- ally outflanking and enveloping attack. The simplest method of advance — namely, on paral- lel lines of march, preserving uniform contact with the enemy all along the front — naturally only promises the least decisive results. It may find an application in case the enemy is so weak that it is only a question of running over him and occupying the territory he defends, without delay; or when, being supported by well-nigh inexhaustible resources, we endeavor to ruin the enemy through losses which he is unable to replace 122 - The Conduct of War. — as was done by Grant at the close of the War of Secession. The distribution of the forces on the parallel lines of march is usually not uniform; that wing is strength- ened which is expected to crush the enemy opposite to it by the weight of numbers. Finally, the strategical frontal attack generally makes use of converging lines of march, which are directed at a certain point in the enemy's position and thus give rise to a special form. Strategical Penetration. This form of strategical offensive, which breaks the hostile line and separates the individual portions of the army attacked, in order to defeat them in succes- sion, must, if it succeeds, be highly effective and lead to great results. Moreover, the groups which have thus been driven apart nearly always lose their nat- ural lines of communication, because they are forced to retire in a lateral direction. But, if the propelling force is not great enough, the wedge may stick, and herein lies the great danger of attempted penetra- tion. From the nature of the case, it leads to numerous* tactical frontal attacks, and these now meet with the greatest difficulties in the effects of highly developed fire. This will especially be true if the enemy's forces are already united, or if he is able to assemble them coincident with the attempt at penetration, so that all parts of his army come into cooperation. Then there will be enemies in front and on both flanks, just as in a sortie from a fortification. The proper moment for strategical penetration con- sequently lies before the assemblage of the hostile armies. In this way Frederick the Great entered Bohemia strategical Penetration. 123 in 1757/ when he knew that the Austrians were still scattered in their cantonments, between Koniggratz and Eger, and occupied with preparations for the coming campaign. He had reason to believe that he would be able to divide their army into several parts, and to defeat the groups separately. His success, nevertheless, was only a partial one. It is true that the Austrians were unable to assemble their whole army for the principal battle at Prague; but Frederick's tri- umph could only have been considered complete had he been fortunate enough, later on, to frustrate Daun's attempt to raise the siege of Prague, and to force the army of Prince Charles of Lorraine, which was shut up in Prague after losing the battle, to lay down its arms. But Frederick himself had his forces scattered over too great an area before the invasion, and they were separated by the Elbe. This occasioned loss of time and diminished the weight of the blow. Individual portions of the army we are about to attack may have different interests with regard to their lines of communication; this favors penetration and facilitates separation. This is what Napoleon counted upon in 1796, when, in his first campaign with independent command, he gave us one of the most bril- liant examples of strategical penetration. At the beginning of April of that year he occupied a position on the Riveria, about Savona, with 36,000 men; opposite his right there were 30,000 Austrians between Sassello and Voltri, with their line of commu- nication running towards the northeast, along the Bormida and through Alessandria and Milan; on his left were 22,000 Piedmontese, about Ceva, with all their *In the general direction of Leitmeritz. 124 The Conduct of War. connections to the northwest, at Turin. He imme- diately decided to advance from Savona with his uni- ted forces, against the point where the two armies op- posing him touched hands. The game was made easy for him, for the Austrian right wing came to meet him, and he was able to defeat them on the 11th and 12th of April at Millesimo* and throw them back on Dego. He captured the latter place also on the 14th,** and the Austrians concentrated at Acqui, while the Pied- montese remained at Oeva, so that Bonaparte with his army was then between the other two. -The Allies therefore were separated and on divergent lines of re- treat, which they had chosen, each one following his own inclinations. Their reunion had been made impos- sible.*** Bonaparte now turned his victorious troops first against the Piedmontese, to defeat them and oo- *Por Millesimo read Montenotte. The more important movements about that time were as follows: Ai>ril 10th.— Arj^enteixu with 10,000 men from Sassello, by Montenotte, towards Savona; Beaulieu with 11 battal- ions on Voltri, April 11th.— Argenteau is stopped in the pass of Monte- notte by Col. Rampon. Beaulieu attacks Cervoni. April 12th.— La Harpe in front, and Massena in rear, attack Argenteau; the Austrian remnants rally at Dego. April 13th.— Augereau and Massena envelop the Sardinians at Millesimo. — (Translator.) **The date given in the original is the 11th, which is evi- dently a typographic;)! error. Massena and La Harpe drove tlie Austro-Sardinians fioiii Dego on the 14th.— (Translator.) ***On this point \vv i\\u>\r fioiu .7(miini's "Life of Napoleon," Ilalleck's translation, page 00: "Nevertheless, the situation of the enemy was fai* from desperate. * * The Allies might have repaired their fortunes by two days of vigor, activity, and resolution." And from Hamley's "Operations of War," page 144: "There was no doubt ample time after Beaiilieu reached Acqui, on the 15th, for him to move behind strategical Penetration. 125 erce them to conclude a peace, and later against the Austrians, to follow up his advantages. As accident would have it, his last campaign had a very similar beginning, whereas the outcome was quite different. On the 15th of June, 1815, he pushed for- ward from Charleroi, against the cross-roads of Som- breffe, in order to separate the Prussians from the English at this point, where their interests came in contact. The former had their communications to- wards the northeast, with the Rhine; the latter towards the northwest, with the sea. On the 16th of June, jN'a- poleon defeated the Prussian Army at Ligny; but, as we have shown in our previous consideration of lines of retreat, they quickly detected the design to separate them from their Allies, and frustrated it by a bold countermove.* They forcibly accomplished a reunion with their Allies on the 18th of June, to the destruction of Napoleon. The presence of mind and force of char- acter of his opponent caused an originally well-planned operation to fail completely. It must be admitted that on the morning of June 17th, Napoleon, after win- ning the battle of Ligny the day before^^ was guilty of the Tanaro to the aid of his ally, who was not driven from Mondovi till the 22d." On the 15th Beaulieu was at Acqui with about 20,000 Austrians, and Colli at Ceva with 15,000 Piedmontese. Dis- tances from Acqui: To Alba, by Nizza, 23 miles; to Cherasco, 33 miles; to Fossano, 45 miles. From Ceva to Mondovi, 10 miles; to Fossano, 22 miles. From Acqui to Ceva, by Alba, Fossano, and Mondovi, is only 67 miles, an easy day's ride for a courier. Beaulieu moved towards Alba with the desigrn of joining Colli, on the 24th. The occupation of a position behind the Stura, between Coni and Cherasco, seems to have been feasible under the circumstances. According to Jomini, Napo- leon feared that a movement of this kind was contemplated by the enemy.— (Translator.) *See p. 98. 126 The Conduct of War. dilatoriness, which favored the success of his ene- mies.* It is clear that the assailant, immediately after piercing the enemy's front, must act with the ut- most celerity in order to utilize the consternation of his opponent; for the latter, if time is given him to gather his wits, will generally find ways and means to restore the coherence of his masses. Future wars in the Occident will very likely furnish new examples of strategical penetration. This simple and effective form, as a matter of course, attracts our attention when the armies counted by hundreds of thousands are crowded together in a narrow space, face the enemy in close proximity, and, for purely me- chanical reasons, can scarcely be moved in any other direction than straight to the front. As the mobiliza- tion and preparation of an army on a frontier has. among the great military nations of our times, been re- duced to a question of hours,** it will scarcely be possi- ble any longer to pierce the enemy's line at the most favorable moment — that is, before the concentration of his forces. We shall find them already assembled, and a rapid decision, such as that of 179G, is out of the question. It will be more a question of a forcible working through than of penetration. As frontier fortifications are coming more and more into use, a combination of field and siege operations will arise. A lunge against the point of concentration of dif- ferent armies with divergent interests, as in 1796 and 1815, is now only seldom to be expected. When allies ♦In April, HOC). Napoloon was swift, and Boaulion vory slow. But in Jnno. ISIH, Nni/oloon was eoniparativoly slow, and Bliichor, profiting at last by tho nnniorous lossons ho had received, was botli swift and disintert^sted onon.irh to kc^^p his enjja.jjement with Wollin^ton.— ( TninsJator.) **See p. 97. The strategical Attack of a Wing. 127 work together nowadays, they take pains to establish perfect unity of action. But the place where two par- ticular groups of the enemy's forces will come in con- tact may be approximately conjectured from an exami- nation of their strategical concentration, and later on, in the field, may, with sufficient acumen, be more defi- nitely recognized. There the assailant will enjoy the advantage of a single head as against double leader- ship, in which the two commanders must come to an understanding with reference to concerted action by means of telegraphic or written communications. This will be the more difficult, the more sudden and dangerous the development of the situation — in other words, the more rapid and energetic the action of the assailant is. Those points, therefore, where the con- tact of two independent armies takes place at the time of the strategical concentration, will in future be the aim of strategical penetration. The Strategical Attack of a Wing. The dangers attending the attempt at strategical penetration diminish as the width of the gap we are able to make in the enemy's position increases. They disappear entirely when we are able to crush a hostile wing; for then that flank is kept free and there is no danger of being cramped for room. After a first success, other advantages develop quite naturally; for, by executing a wheel against the rest of the enemy's army, he is forced to form front to a flank, thus nearly alwa^^s placing himself in an unfavorable situation with reference to his communications. At the begin- ning of the war of 1870 the Germans had something 128 The Conduct of War. of this kind in view. They intended first to destroy the French right wing in Lower Alsace, and then turn his main body in Lorraine, from the south, in order to force it towards the north, away from its communica- tions with Paris. The battle of Spicheren, which caused the French to retreat on Metz, interfered with this plan. Later, on the western bank of the Moselle, the plan was realized in a different form. The strate- gical attack of a wing will perhaps be the customary form in the wars of the future; it is simple, and the width of front is suitable for the masses of troops en- gaged. The conditions to be observed are, that the deciding wing must be strong enough, after crushing the opposing enemy, to proceed at once to the rolling- up process; that its communications must not be lost; and, finally, that the refused wing must either be able to hold the enemy in check, or that the general situa- tion will permit of the retreat of that wing without incurring losses of altogether too serious a nature. Strategical Envelopment. This term implies a simultaneous attack in front and on one or both flanks of the theater of war occu- pied by the enemy. The point of concentration for the different columns naturally lies within the space held by the enemy; and all the considerations mentioned by us when discussing the selection of the point of con- centration will apply here also. And all the dangers of an advance on separated lines of operations between which the enemy is placed, become active. If the enemy has completed his preparations, he will answer with a counter-stroke, and in that case we would have to be strong enough to enable each fraction to resist the strategical Envelopment. 129 blow for some time. This supposes a considerable superiority in aggregate strength. When the enemy is not quite ready for action, the simultaneous advance from various directions which leads to envelopment will confuse him and cause changes in his dispositions and subdivision of the forces available for the defense, and thus make success easier. Frederick the Great achieved an advantage of this kind'^when, in 1757, he entered the theater of war in four columns, the directions of which enveloped the enemy. One whole Austrian corps, that of Ser- belloni, was absent from the field on the decisive day at Prague.* The campaign of 1866, fought out on the same ground, exhibits the greatest success of the enveloping strategical offensive on the part of the Prussians. It led to the enclosure and defeat of the hostile main army on the battlefield of Koniggratz. The most far- reaching consequences had in this case been relent- lessly exacted. It is a characteristic of operations of this kind that, in case of success, all the results to be expected are realized at one blow. The strategical penetration is, so to speak, only the prelude to victory, the full meas- ure of which is only obtained by rapid passing back and forth between the separated hostile groups, and unremitting pursuit. The battle of partial or com- plete enclosure, resulting from strategical envelop- ment, cannot very well turn out to be otherwise than destructive. It bears its fruit on the field of battle *In 1757 Frederick combined envelopment and penetration. His columns entered the theater of war from different direc- tions, but later on they were ^iven the general direction to- wai'ds the center of the space occupied by the enemy. 130 TJic Conduct of War, itself. A pursuit will usually be wanting, because at the moment of triumph the troops, which have become united by advancing on converging lines, are thrown into such confusion that they must first be disentan- gled. They are not immediately available for new enterprises, This circumstance partially explains the lack of pursuit after the battle of Koniggratz. In order to make sure of success, the envelopment must reach well to the enemy's rear, although the danger of disaster increases with the length of the de- tour. For otherwise the defense, conducted by a cir- cumspect commander, will withdraw its forces from the envelopment by a short retrograde movement at the last moment, and the assailant will arrive before the front in an awkward formation. Every envelop- ment, therefore, must be ushered in with a certain amount of boldness of action. One of the most daring attacks of this kind in recent times was undoubtedly that of Prince Frederick Charles against General Chanzy at Le Mans, in Janu- ary, 1871. The numerically weaker army enveloped both flanks of its stronger foe and carried the enter- prise to a successful conclusion, although its columns, separated by wide intervals, maintained only very loose connection with each other, and could secure imme- diate support only by advancing. The result was the dissolution of the French Army, which left a number of guns and many prisoners in the hands of the victors. But the danger which it incurred may be easily perceived. If General Chanzy, on the 11th of January, instead of accepting battle on a large semi- circle in front of Le ^Fniis, had promptly retired over the Sarthe in his rear, he could have taken up a good position behind that stream. The Prussian troops strategical Envelopment. 131 following him would have poured into the extensive city of Le Mans and would thus have arrived in front of his center. They were suffering from -cold and hun- ger, and this large and rich city, which in former times had become fatal to the army of La Rochejacquelein, would have exerted a powerful influence on the men under such circumstances. It would, therefore, have been difficult to lead them on to a further frontal attack. With far-reaching and energetic attacks, strate- gical envelopment becomes the most suitable means of holding an enemy who appears to have the intention of avoiding decisive action. If sudden attacks on the outer portions of the wings, or on the flanks, are suc- cessful, the middle of the line will also be unable to withdraw. Thus it was General von Moltke's intention to cause a powerful envelopment of both flanks of the Danish Army in Its well-known position at Danewerk, near Schleswig, in order to prevent, at once, a retreat which would have prolonged the war. His plan, which was written in December, 1862, was never executed, but it nevertheless forms a very instructive example. The employment of strategical envelopment is the logical consequence of the possession of a double base, enclosing the theater of war on two sides. In such cases strategical concentration at a single place is usually either impossible, or else connected with great loss of time; this was true of the Prussian armies in 1866. The streams of troops naturally flow together on both sides of such a base; consequently there is nothing to be done but to unite them while advancing. From this action envelopment results spontaneously. Ordinarily in cases of this kind the attacking party is assumed to be numerically superior; and there is in 132 The Conduct of War. fact no means which would make the enemy feel this superiority more quickly than strategical envelopment. Perhaps for this very reason it will also in future play an oft-repeated and important part. The successful execution of this operation, how- ever, requires the fulfillment of two more conditions; namely, tactical superiority of the troops, and uniform- ly good leadership. Both are of even greater impor- tance than advantage of numbers. During such an attack nothing could interfere more seriously with the current of action than sudden and unexpected defeat of individual portions of the army. As a rule, rumor carries the news of these reverses to other portions of the army in an exaggerated form, and the depressing effect on the morale of the army is increased by the fact that everybody easily comprehends the danger of the situation. The repeated miserable failures of the Kepublicans in their attacks on Vendue in 1793 furnish the proof that in such a convergent and enveloping advance the advantage of numbers alone does not always guarantee victory. The troops must be sufficiently trustworthy to be able, if necessary, to bid defiance to odds, in case the defender throws all his available force against a single column; and the character of the leaders must supply the certainty that not a single part of the whole will break down completely. Strategical Turning Movements. When the attack not only envelops the enemy^s flank, but reaches so far to his rear that his communica- tions are threatened, and he is forced into such a posi- tion that defeat would cut him off, then the envelop- ment has become a turning movement. strategical Turning Movements. 133 However, after we have once taken up a position parallel to his front, such an undertaking will be ex- ceedingly difficult. It may still be possible to shift the forces laterally and crush one of the enemy's wings by envelopment; but he will not look idly on while we disappear from his front and swing around on a large arc to attack his flank or even his rear. He will follow us and bar the road, or attack, so that, at best, we can turn him only after a series of combats. The turning movement must, therefore, be com- bined with the strategical concentration, and the lat- ter must be consummated on or behind one of the enemy's flanks, at the inception of the campaign. This is what took place in the most brilliant turn- ing movements executed by Napoleon I. In April, 1800, the victorious Austrians occupied positions on the Var and before Genoa, to which points they had pushed back the French Army in Italy. They occupied the territory behind them with a weak force. Apparently no danger menaced them there, and the Alps were considered a sufficient protection for the roads passing through Upper Italy to Austria. But long before this, Bonaparte, then First Consul, had pushed forward the so-called Reserve Army, supposed to be stationed at Dijon, according to public report, into Switzerland, and had assembled it at the foot of the northern slope of the mountains. From this point he crossed Mount St. Bernard in May, and emerged from the mountains directly in rear of the enemy's army. He was on their line of communications at the very beginning of the operation. In 1805 the course of events was the same. Mack was w^aiting for Napoleon with an Austrian army posted on the Iller, facing west and guarding the 134 The Conduct of War. eastern exits of the passes of the Black Forest. In the meantime the Emperor had, with the utmost rapidity, assembled his army from the north of France and from Hanover, between Mannheim and Lauterburg on the Rhine, and at Wtirzburg, respectively, and was hasten- ing forward by Ludwigsburg, Hall, Ingelfingen, and Anspach. He appeared on the Danube between Donau worth and Ingolstadt, with the concentrated mass of his army behind the right wing of the Austrians. A single French corps had made demonstrations against them from Strasburg, in a direction perpendicular to their front. Napoleon operated in a similar way in 1806. From the upper Main at Baireuth, Bamberg, and Schwein- furth, he advanced with his united army, and passing between the Austrian frontier and the Prussian army, which was concentrating behind the Saale, he marched straight on Leipsic, and, consequently, before a decisive battle, was nearer to Berlin than the Prussians. Strategical turning movements, from their nature, generally lead to a battle with reversed fronts. And the side which turns the enemy and deprives him of his communications has at the same time abandoned its own.* The decisive battle must therefore neces- sarily terminate in the total defeat of one side or the other. This is what Napoleon always was driving at. There ar^ various circumstances which will make strategical turning movements, of the Napoleonic ♦We are aware that Jomini requires seizure of the enemy's communications without relinquishini? our own, but it will be possible only under very favorable circumstances to conll)l.^ strictly with this demand. strategical Turning Movements. 135 kind, extremely rare in the future, if not altogether impossible.* The strategical concentration is restricted to a definite district on the frontier, the location of which is guessed by both sides.** The unwieldiness of the great masses of troops imperatively requires simplicity in the wa^s and means of movement; and the greatly extended service of exploration of the cavalry renders it much more difficult than formerly to conceal the turn- ing movement from the enemy — and yet, the movement is intended to be a surprise. We must remember that the electric telegraph, newspaper reporters, and the soil in which they flour- ish — public curiosity, no longer permit of prolonged concealment of uncommon facts. The whole civilized world is now informed, even of unimportant events, within 24 hourfe. We shall certainly receive informa- tion of the enemy's entrance upon our theater of war in a great deal shorter time. In the campaign of 1800, mentioned above, Bonaparte did not know what had become of Mass^na in Italy, and Melas was not aware of the fact that Bonaparte was already in Switzerland. It will hardly be possible for such conditions to be repeated. The strategical turning movement, consequently, like the penetration, will be accomplished after a series of preliminary combats, in which the retreating defender will lose his communicaticms gradually, and the victorious assailant obtain possession of them at the same rate. An example of such an operation is *Tlie example of the French, who between the 2Sth and 31st of May, 1859, turned the right wing of the Aiistrians by transferring troops from Alessandria to Vercelli by rail (see note, page 86) is too isolated a case to have convincing force. **See p. 102. 136 The Conduct of War. furnislied by the days before Metz, in 1870. On the 14th of August the French Army was still east of this place, confronting the German I. Army, while the 11. Army, farther south, had advanced to the Moselle and was about to cross that stream. In order to evade this movement Marshal Bazaine resolved on retreat. But through the unexpected attack of the German advance guard in his front he was detained, and the battle of Colombey-Nouilly was brought about on the 15th of August. In this battle the fronts and lines of commu- nication were still quite normal, corresponding to geographical conditions. In the meantime the IT. Army had commenced crossing the Moselle, and the French commander-in-chief found himself forced to resume the retreat. But the Germans had already gained a start towards the west. After passing through Metz, Bazaine found himself attacked from the south and held fast. From this arose the battle of Vionville, in which the general front of the combat- ants was an east-and-west line, approximately at right angles to their position of August 14th. In spite of his numerical superiority, the marshal did not succeed in shaking off his antagonist. Neither did he venture to ci^ntinue his march towards the west by circuitous routes. He wheeled his army to the rear towards Metz and occupied a position on the plateau between Roncourt and Le Point du Jour, his front facing west, towards France. In the battle of Gravelotte and St. ]*rivat la Montague, on the 18th of August, the two fronts were already completely reversed. Both armies had passed through three-fourths of a circle, and, with reference to their communieat'oiis, occupied a position d'ametrically opposite to that of August l4th. The French had lost their communications with strategical Turning Movements. 137 France, and the Germans had voluntainly abandoned theirs with the Khine. The destruction of the defeated force was not completed until the capitulation of Oc- tober 27th; this was due to the fact that they found temporary protection under the guns of Metz. The catastrophe had, however, been made unavoidable by the action of August 18th. The strategical turning movements of the future will present similar spectacles. They retain their value, and may continue to have the same conse- quences; but, as a rule, they will no longer have a place at the beginning of a. war, their first application being deferred until some time during the course of the de- cisive operations. Turning movements made in a slow and hesitating manner never had any prospect of success. If the com- batant who is turned gains sufficient time to rest to recover his presence of mind, and to answer with a counter-stroke, then the one making the turning move- ment will himself soon be forced away from his commu- nications, although he set out to cut off the enemy. At Austerlitz the Allies learned that the mere idea of a turning movement does not insure victory. Tneir movement was introduced boldly. They conceived the plan of turning the refused wing of the enemy con- fronting them at Briinn, by a movement towards the south. If defeated in the attack which was to follow, the enemy would be thrown back on the Prussian frontier, where a strong army was just then being collected to oppose him. As early as three days before the battle, Napoleon recognized the purpose of his op- ponents; for, while first advancing towards the west, they suddenly changed direction, in an open country, 10 138 The Conduct of War. towards the south. And then, on the day of battle, they neglected to protect the movement sufficiently against the Emperor. The latter, in order to entice them into the trap, intentionally refused his right wing, which they expected to strike; and, when their prin- cipal forces were passing his front, he suddenly fell upon them and converted the movement into a crushing defeat. History records few examples of attacks be- gun with such joyous confidence of victory, and ending in such miserable failure. They had forgotten that even the best strategical conception owes its importance entirely to the fact that it leads to successful tactical decision on the field of battle. Strategical turning movements form no ex- ception to this rule, their only object being to lead the troops up to the enemy in a specially favorable direc- tion, in which he does not anticipate an attack, or in which it must prove more dangerous to him than else- where. It is not the end itself, but only a means to the end. Strategical Attacks in Rear and on the Flanks. Attacks on the enemy's rear, which shall be perfect in their execution and appear as the final result of a successful strategical turning movement, can no longer be reckoned among the possibilities. But, in the al- tered form of a final decisive advance against an oppo- nent deprived of his communications through previous defeats, they may still take place. Their nature re- quires very clear decision and an energy of execution which will not stop for any consideration. The com- mander, moreover, must take it for granted that he will find the enemy in motion, and not at a standstill. We shall not, by any means, always find a Mack opposed to us. strategical Flank Attacks. 139 The case is different with flank attacks. They are easily evolved from an advance against very strong positions, especially in battles near fortified frontier lines. To break through the front of such a line, when the hostile army is in position between the works, can only be thought of in case of great moral and material superiority. The assailant will generally endeavor to deceive the defender as to the true point of penetra- tion, in order to induce him to collect his troops for the defense at a false place. The assailant then at- tempts to capture one or more of the strongholds, situ- ated apart and not supported by field troops, by means of surprise. In case of success, he will naturally strike the troops on the farther side of the broken line in flank. However, as the electric telegraph, the telephone, cy- clists, and riders at racing speed now report all un- usual events with the greatest celerity, he must be prepared for an early encounter with the heads of rap- idly approaching columns of the enemy's troops. In the most favorable case the first battle will, therefore, be delivered against a hurriedly formed crotchet. Skill in rapidly bringing up troops from the rear and de- ploying them — a test problem for the general staff — will decide the victory. It must, of course, be assumed that the enemy, either on account of the nature of his front, or because of our numerical superiority, was in the meantime prevented from replying to our undertaking by a coun- ter-stroke delivered directly from his position. This would necessarily have interrupted our action and pre- vented the general movement against his flank. 140 " The Conduct of War. X. TACTICAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. 1, Object, Conditions, amd Aids. As all strategical offensive operations primarily derive their importance from the results of battles to which they give rise, it will now be appropriate for us to add suitable remarks about the latter. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, we shall discuss only those points in which a radical difference from the statements referring to strategical offensive operations is observed. They can, moreover, be properly included under the heading of tactical offensive operations. The object of all tactical offensive operations is attack on the field of battle. As this will be easier if we can find the enemy in motion than when he has already taken up a defensive position,* it follows that the assailant must continually make efforts to force the enemy to decisive battle while he is still on the march.** *How important the diJBference is may be seen from a com- parison of the battles of Vionville and St. Privat, on the IGth and 18th of August, 1870, respectively. In the former, 214 Prussian army corps sufficed to defeat and hold fast the whole of Bazaine's army. In the latter, 8 corps had trouble to force the same army out of its position. **We can not refrain from making the remark at this stage, although it more properly belongs to the province of army command, that the great degree of self-relying independ- ence of the subordinate commanders, which was manifestut there is an exception to this rule. If the reinforcement is still so distant,* or so far from being prepared, that prolonged operations by the forces deployed against the enemy become absolutely necessary, a stout resistance may be preferable to a simple retreat. To reach strong positions, the capture of which will cost the enemy a great deal of time and strength, then becomes more important than the rapid approach of anticipated assistance. In such cases the unfavorable fact for the assailant — namely, that the power of an army to endure the har(]shi])s of war is not an unlinnlcd one, but is exhaus- ted (n^en in a successful course of events — coriK^s u]) for consideration. After a certain period, the vicior also b('( (niics tired of war. The more highly civilized a peo- ])le is, the more quickly will this weakness be developed. ♦In which case it is also assnmod that it is impracticable to bring them on by rail. strategical Defensive Operations. 163 It is very difficult to overcome th^ apathy which takes possession of troops and their officers when, as the first campaign is about to close, they encounter a new enemy, so that, with the longing for home already in their hearts, they have to begin work anew. Napo- leon's winter campaign of 1807 proves this clearly. When, after a campaign of victory without parallel, against the Prussian Army, he came upon the weaker but fresh Russian Army in Poland, his operations in- voluntarily came to a standstill. The Germans had a similar experience in 1870 when, after victory over the armies of the Empire, they unexpectedly had to take up a serious struggle against the armies of the Republic. The leading idea of a strategical defensive can, con- sequently, very properly be based on this concex^tion. The original plan of the Prussian commanders, to be- gin by delaying Napoleon I. in an exhausting campaigu until late in the autumn of 1806, and to conduct deci- sive operations against him in the spring of 1807, with fresh Russian troops to assist them, was, of itself, not such a bad one. However, to make it a success, it would have been necessary for the execution of the plan to have been a less pitiful one. S. The Final Defensive Position; Direct Withdraival; Convergent and Divergent Retreat. The place for the decisive stand may correspond very closely to the conclusion of the whole strategical defensive operation. It is, in fact, quite conceivable that it was originally selected for the former purpose, and that the defender's idea is simply to wait for the I arrival of the assailant. This is the method which will always be adopted when we desire a battle, but do \^ ^ ^ p 164 The Conduct of War. not feel quite strong (Enough to make an attack, which, in fact, requires a numerical superiority. This was Napoleon's situation before the battle of Austerlitz. Accordingly, he intentionally spread rumors about the poor condition of his army, and succeeded in his de- sign. The Allies advanced and imprudently attacked him.* An army in a fortified frontier position — for in- stance, the French Army as against Germany — may proceed in a similar manner. We can readily imagine that such an army would like to see itself assailed be- tween and behind the frontier fortresses; for an attack, undoubtedly, is far more difificult under such conditions than in the open field. The fact also that years of labor and millions of money have been invested to prepare a defense, invites the adoption of a waiting policy. There seems to be a certain moral obligation to make use of the artificially created battlefield. But the assump- tion of such a position is generally justified only in case the enemy is compelled to attack. We must not count upon always having so complaisant an antagonist as Napoleon found at Austerlitz. The solution of the problem of defense, in a strate- gical position of this nature, amounts to nothing more than rapid shifting of troops by the flank, to the place which the enemy has selected for the penetration of our lines. Good cross-communications behind the front and a suitable distribution of the troops, skill- fully adapted to the capacity of the roads, are the points of principal importance. For the infantry of the de- fender, railroads may also play a part during the operation. ♦See page 137, and note, page 141. Direct Withdrawal, 165 A direct withdrawal, from the first front of concen- tration to a position in rear, ordinarily indicates a pre- vious error,* unless important political reasons have influenced strategy; for we do not retire in this way unless we find, upon approach of the enemy, that the position we have taken up is not sufficiently strong to enable us to make a successful resistance. But this conclusion might have been reached beforehand. It ought not to have required the battles of Worth and Spicheren to convince the French of the weakness of their preliminary concentration on the German fron- tier. They might have derived precisely the same in- formation from a careful objective comparison of the forces on both sides, and could then have taken up the retreat to the stronger line of the Moselle without a fight. If they had halted their main bodies on the Mo- selle in the first place, to prepare a defensive position while the advance guards hastened to the frontier, they would have fared much better. The object of a convergent retreat is to assemble the armies in a favorable position, previously selected, which lies on the prolongation of the enemy's line of operation. The remark might, with seeming justice, be made, that it would ha.ve been more judicious to assemble the forces in that position in the first place. But there may be important reasons preventing this. We may not be willing to abandon our territory, up to the frontier, without further ceremony; consequently, we occupy it with our troops, not beginning withdrawal until the enemy makes his appearance. We may also apprehend that advance guards pushed out in front ♦Unless we are endeavoriiijEf to inaugurate a system of re- peated procedures of this nature, a so-called defense by sec- tions, which is calculated to tire out the enemy. 106 The Conduct of War, would, alone, not exercise sufficient attraction to draw the enemy on. When we entertain a doubt about com- pleting ouf deployment before the enemy, and fear that the latter may begin operations before w^e are ready, the selection of a place of assemblage farther to the rear becomes an imperative precautionary measure. Prince Frederick Charles, at the time of the strategic concentration of the II. Army, had selected such a po- sition at Gollheim in the Palatinate. A convergent retreat to a position in rear is also the natural expedient in case of surprise. A central location makes assemblage easier. Thus, when Fred- erick the Great suddenly fell upon the Austrians in 1757, Prague, simply on account of its situation, became their general rallying jtoiiit. Finally, ]>reUmiiiary combats may demonstrate the impracticability of pre- viously planned offensive operations. Falling back on a central position, such as that of the Austrians in 1806, behind the Bistritz, then forms the transition to the defensive. The convergent retreat is the first and most essen- tial operation for him who realizes his own weakness. '^Concentration to the rear," therefore, has a dubious sound in the conduct of war. It is closely related to those central positions, which are praised because we can advance from them equally well in all directions, but wiiich are generally assumed because we don't ex- actly know where else to go. A divergent retreat to a flank position will, in case of surprise, probably be no longer possible, except perhaps, when this position is especially conspicuous on account of some peculiarity of form, and had thus become generally known. In such moments we do the things that are simplest and most natural ; but retreats Dwergent Retreats. 167 to a flank certainly ^re not of that kind. The latter require that the army be nearly all assembled before- hand and well under control of the commander. Mar- shal Bazaine's retreat to the position on the French Med, after the 6th of August, might be called a di- vergent one; for he transferred his army to the right flank of the German armies, which were then advancing towards the Moselle. The benefit of a divergent re- treat, in that it causes a surprise to the enemy, forces him TO change his dispositions and order of march, and causes a loss of time in any event, would not have failed in this case either, if the marshal had waited for the effects to be developed. A 'double divergent retreat, which intentionally divides the army, deprives it temporarily of ability to fight the enemy, and for this reason retreats of this kind have been condemned on principle. However, there are sufficient opportunities in war when we tem- porarily have the greatest interest in avoiding all con- tact with the enemy. After a lost battle, a divergent retreat often is the best way of withdrawing from pursuit. In the first place, the use of a greater num- ber of roads facilitates escape. Moreover, a divergent retreat deceives the enemy as to the direction taken by the main body of the retreating army. The example of the French, after the battle of Orleans on the 4th of December, is instructive in this respect. The victo- rious army of Prince Frederick Charles, after cap turing the city, which occupied the center of the enemy's line, had retreating bodies of the enemy on its right flank, towards the west, on its left flank, towards the east, and in its front, towards the south. As a re- sult of the unavoidable confusion caused by the battle, troops of different French corps, mingled together, 168 The Conduct of War. were found in all three directions, and a doubt tempo- rarily arose as to what had become of their main body. The double divergent retreat, therefore, has its ad- vantages, under certain circumstances, and may well be a subject for consideration. A considerable obstacle in our rear, which has to be crossed in view of the enem^^, may likewise force us to adopt a divergent retreat. For example, in the case of a large stream, it may be necessary for us to reach certain fixed points of crossing, separated by consid- erable distances. A similar state of affairs may arise from the cir- cumstance that we are expecting the assistance of an army approaching from our rear, and desire to remove the immediate consequences of a lost battle. The separation must, of course, be considered as onl^ tem- porary, and a definite idea as to the place of reunion should be formed in advance. A i)oint of support is necessary for this latter pur- pose. It may consist in a naturally strong position, fortifications, or reinforcements. For precisely the reason that a divergent retreat deprives the enemy of a definite objective, his pursuit will have an earlier termination, and it will thus be- come possible to draw the forces together again. In this respect railroads may render good service. After the battle of Orleans the Fre^nch succeeded in trans- ferring several corps to jniollicr IIkmiIim' of war by rail, without prompt discovery of the fact in the Ger- man camp. A convergent assemblage on serviceable railroads, if planned and prepared in time, would cer- tainlv not be more difficult. Flank Positions. 169 Jf. Special Forms of the Strateyieal Defensive. We lay stress upon three special forms, as being the most interesting? ones: (a) The System of Flank Positions. The general subject of flank positions has already been discussed.* Only their premeditated application requires further elucidation. Whoevet feels himself strong enough to oppose the enemy in front and bar his advance will choose this, the simplest of all the forms of the strategical defen- sive. It is the safest, diminishes the danger of error, and does not permit the adversary to pa^s us by. We re tain our lines of communication and of retreat behind us, and, if our resistance is not successful in the first line, it can be resumed at another, farther to the rear. It has the disadvantage, of course, of drawing the oppo nenf on behind us in the direction he himself desires to take, and we must, therefore, be sure of our ability to stop him at some point before he reaches his objective. AYlien this certainty is wanting, advantage will be takc^n of strategical flank positions, as an artificially strengthening expedient. Their chief advantage is that the antagonist is drawn away from the direction of his obj(*ctiv(\ which we thus prot( ct indirect'y, after doubt ing our ability to make a direct defense. The change of direction, moreover, considerably increases the dif- ficulties of the enemy.** However, in most cases we thus increase the troub- les of our own situation also. We establish our lines ♦See paj?es uO, 93, 167. **See page 56. — 12 170 The Conduct of War. of communicatiou and retreat on one tlank where it is easier to lose tlieni, and turn the other think towards the enemy, thus exposing it to envelopment. If we are defeated, the opportunity of interposing a second po- sition between the enemy and his objective is also gone. The complicated arrangements which always form a part of the system of flank positions, more easily lead to disaster; and they make higher demands on the skill of the leaders. In any event, special conditions will arise whicli render the situaticm more difficult. The army on the defensive, in the first place, must be strong enough to be able to exercise a suflficient attraction on the bulk of the antagonist. If the assailant's excess in numbers is very great, he will detach a portion of his force to confront the defender in his flank ])osition, and with the mass of his army resume the advance on the unob- structed direct road. Every strategical flank posi- tion must, therefore, at the same time be a good loca- tion from which to inaugurate offensive o]HM'ations. A combatant who retires behind a broad and deep stream and then destroys all the bridges may, indeed, be in a flank position, but he throws away all his ad- vantages. He sim])ly locks the door to the theater of o])eratioiis against himself. The flank position, moreover, must not be perceived too soon by tlie enemy, otherwise he will change direc- tion towards il in lime and we sliall at most cause him a little d(iay. Retreat from a flank position must not be impos- sible, but S'hould be favored by the natui'e of the re- gion, at least on circuitous rout(^s; othcM'wise wn^ shall be confinc^d there ami rendei'ed innocuous by the assailant. If retreat is practicable in various direc- Flank Positions. 171 tions, we have the valuable chance of letting the enemv approach close to the flank position, and then of draw- ing him on hj slow retreat, still further away from his original direction. From this we see that the" whole system requires a great deal of elbow-room in the country and a good net- work of roads. Freedom of movement is necessary. A strategical flank position must have country behind it. The best of such positions is one which covers a theater of war situated on a flank and still untouched, upon which an army can base itself, and from which it can draw reinforcements. Jomini's high opinion of such a base is well known.* It is evident that gener- ally it will only be found by a defender in his own country. A few examples will make the nature of this opera- tion still clearer. Clausewitz, in his discussion of the campaign of 1812, says: ''If we consider that at Uorodino there were only in(),()00 FrcMiclnneii against 12(),()()() Kussians, no man can doubt that another direction of the campaign — for instance, on Kaluga — would have })ut Moscow en- tirely out of the game." At Kaluga the Russian Army would still have had ample territory behind it to live, and, after a while, even to have augmented its num- bers. The French would have been compelled to fol- low them for the sake of their own safety; but they would have lacked the necessary surplus to occupy Moscow at the same time.** That such a course was not pursued, Clausewitz thinks is readily explained by the fact that nobody could foresee the rapid dwin- dling of the French forces, and that no arrangements *See p. 94. **Claus€U'itz, Posthumous Works, 2d edition, Vol. 7, p. 119. 172 TJir Conduct of War. had been made for a retreat of the army towards a tlank. Ill such a comparatively uninhabited country preparations would have been necessary. In discussing the defense of France against the Allies in 1814, he suggests a poisition for Napoleon, southeast of Paris. However, it would have been es- sential to protect the capital against a sudden attack; for mere occupation might, for political reasons, have decided the fate of the Empire. We have, then, a final condition for the success- ful application of a defensive of this nature — namely, that the object to be protected, if it be of overwhelm- ing importance, must always have a sufficient garrison to render it secure. Moltke, as has recently become known,* proposed, in 1860, to defend Berlin, in case of an Austro-Prussian war, by a flank position. Taking into account the rela- tive strength of the armies at that time, he considered a direct defense against the hostile army supposed to be advancing from Bohemia as disadvantageous. An unsuccessful battle had to be considered as among the possibilities. In that event we should also have lost Berlin, and, with an energetic pursuit by the enemy, been forced back on Stettin. But — he proceeds to explain — if the Prussian Army were to lak(* up a position on the Elbe, between Torgau jind Wittenlverg, excelh'iit results might be expected from every offen- sive o])ei'atioii inaugurated fi'om this flank ])Osition. It would force the enemy to \',\v(' in that direction and to giv^e up his communications with Bohi^mia. In case of successful issue for us, the enemy would be thrown *F'uhl yfnrshnl Count ran Molll'c'fi "Viows on Flniik Posi- tions, " fust sni)])l('ni('nt of "Militar-Wochcnblatt," 1895, p. ^. Flank Positions. 173 back on Silesia; but in case of defeat, we could find protection behind the stream, and the possession of the fortifications would soon enable us to advance again. It would, of course, have been necessary to place Berlin in condition to be able, independent!}^, to resist a direct attack for a few da} s. In a memorial dated 18()8, in which the possibility of a war with both France and Austria is considered, a similar proceeding was again recommended against the second power. In addition, we had the further ad- vantage that an army in a flank position on the Elbe would still have remained in good communication with the other Prussian army on the French frontier, and, in case of emergency, could have drawn reinforcements therefrom. This would have made the position of the Austrians marching past the flank position, and on Berlin, still more precarious. The ott'ensive element in the system of strategical flank positions has been still more strongly empha- sized by Moltke than by Clausewitz. As a matter of fact, they form the best foundation for a defensive making use of counter-attacks, and the effectiveness of the latter is further increased by their favorable direction and the element of surprise. Flank positions taken up by retreating armies are, however, not the only ones we have to deal with. They may equally well be evolved from offensive operations against the flank of the assailant, as Osman Pasha's example at Plevna shows. Its effect upon the Russian operations against the Balkans was increased by the fact that his appearance was not anticipated.* ♦Critics have taken two exceptions to liis conduct of jifTairs, unjustly so in both cases; namely, that he did not coiitinu-.' 174 The Conduct of War. Although flank positions offer undoubted advan- tages to the strategical defensive, it would, neverthe- less, be a mistake to attempt their application under all circumstances. Our brief preceding discussion has enabled us to form an idea of how many conditions must be combined in ordcM- to make tliem u eful. More over, the i)ersonal inliuence of the commandcr-iii chief, the reputation which his army enjoys with the enemy, and many other points must be taken into considera- tion. General de Curten, with his division, found him- self, on the ()th of January, 1871, in what api)eared to be geogra]»hically a very effective position, on the left flank of Trinci' Frederick Charles, who attacked the line of the Loir at Vendome; but nobody had any idea of stopping on iliai account. Nothing of a serious nature was api)rehended from the general, who was not known, nor from his troops. (b) Operations on IiiIci-'kh- Lines. Operations on interior lines foiiii a well-worn theme of the theory of war, because they have repeat- edly produced brilliant successes which astonished the world. When the defender supports himself at a fixed ])lace, and his antagonist attacks him on sepa- i-ale lines of oiteiation starting from various points of an arc surrounding him, we say that the defender is the off<^nsive, ospocially after his first suecoiscs piiiKMl wliilo (•(HKliictinjr file dcfenso, and that Ik^ ivniaiiKHl in his position s(> loim Hint h(' tinall.v was unabh' to havo it. Hnt number of troops for tlie former procixxlinff, iMid liis army, moreover, lacked th(>' necessary tactical mobility. As far as the second point is eoncx^irned, he acteortion. Tlie concieption has been generalized and made to include the situation of an army which finds itself amqng various hostile groups and is able to combine its forces, in the space enclosed, before the enemy can attack them with superior numbers. The nature of these operations is best elucidated by the measures of Napoleon I. on the days of February lOth to 14th, 1814. Retiring on Paris before the Allied Armies, the Emperor, on the 9th of February, was at Sezanne with the main body of his forces. Towards the north, separated from him by the Petit-Morin and its swampy valley, the Army of Silesia was marching paist and advancing on P^iris. Ht w%*i,s not concen- trated, but was marching on two roads^ — namely, along tlic Mniiie, and the shorter road by Cham])aubert. On both roads the army corps followed each other at considerable distances. These certainly were favora- ble conditions for a sudden attack, es])ecially when of- fered to a Napoleon. The latter at once took possession of the crossing of the Petit-Morin. Then, making use of the crossing, he moved rapidly to the southern road used by Blucher's army, and, on the 10th of February, destroyed the nearest force, the Russian corps of Olsuvietf, at Champa ubert. On the 11th he hastened to Montmirail and defeated the corps of Sacken, which had already taken up a position at that point. The troops of the Prussian corps of York, hastily drawn from the northern road alone: the Marne to the support of Sacken, were hurled back across that stream on the 12th, at Chateau -Thierry. Napoleon then turned back 176 The Conduct of War. to the southern road, where Bliicher was now coming ui) with the Prussian corps of Kleist and the Russian corps of Kapczewitsch. On the 14th of February Blii- cher was totally defeated at Etoges, and was forced to rally his army in rear, at Chalons, before engaging in further enterprises. A situation on interior lines is, of itself, not always favorable, by a good deal. It is generally brought about by the numerical superiority of the opponent. The defender may find salvation in the fact that he oc- cupies a position between the enemy's lines of opera- tions. The possibility of using the same force repeat- edly, against different groups of the enemy, gives the defender this chance. At the head of 30,000 men it is not difficult to defeat three detachments of 20,000 men each in succession, wliei-eas a conflict with the united G0,000 would be hopeless. The conditions making such action possible are, in the first place, great firmness at the headquarters of the army, not permitting a single hour to be wasted; for the enemy is in motion for the purpose of concentra- tion, which, if accomplished, would convert the situa- ti(m into an unfavorable one. The next in importance is great efficiency of the troops; for, repeated eini>loy- ment must, of course, wear them out more rai)idly than the ordinary amount of work. Continual march- ing and counter-marching is fatiguing; and it beconn^s more difficult to subsist the army.* The distances must also b(» fa\ orable. I| they become too small the defender exposes himsc^lf to the (lander, while engaged with one of the enemy's columns, of being envelo])ed oi* ♦For this ronson successful <>ii< r.ilioiis on interior linos nro, as a rule, only nvailable for the (lefenr who is fij;htinj? in his own country. Operations on Interior Lines. 177 surrounded by the other approaching forces. If they are too great, he will be obliged, while engaged with one antagonist, to disregard tlie others for a consider- able length of time; the latter can then pursue their ad- vantages without hindrance. Average distances, there fore, are necessary; in case of a convergent advance by the assailant they would exist only for a short time. On account of the uncertainty that prevails in war, it is difficult to seize the moment wlien the conditions are favorable. Finally, we must also take for granted that the understanding between the commanders of the dif- ferent columns of the enemy's army is imperfect; tliis is a necessary condition for success. If they act as the Allies did in 1813, when Napoleon's grand scheme of interior lines of operation, based on Dresden,* ended in failure, success will be frustrated.** Moreover, at the beginning of the wars of modern times, the great numbers of the armies stand in the way of success. Such masses as are raised in our times cannot be moved back and forth on interior lines, after the manner in which Napoleon handled his corps on those glorious days of February. Surprise also, which at that time contributed so much to suc- cess, ceases wherever the electric telegraph transmits *See page 68. **In order to deceive :he enemy's coiniii;iii(U'is aiid^ iiiter- fei'e with their concert of action, it will usually be necessary for the general operating on interior lines to leave a. detach ment, even if it be only a small one. io observe those columns of the enemy against which he is not operating with his main body. Thus Napoleon, when he turned towards Montmirail and Chat^^au-TliieiTy, had left Marmoot behind to Avatch Blucher. 178 The Conduct of War. numerous reports as to the actual location of the defen- der moving about in the interior space. In future wars we shall i^robably see successful operations on interior lines only after prolonged con- test s have materially reduced the individual bodies of troops, and exhaustion besides has diminished tlie energy and vigilance of one of the combatant forces. On a very large scale, when the strategical situa- tion becomes a political one, such operations may be conceivable. In case of war in the east and the west of her territory at the same time, Germany would con- trol interior lines and might find in this fact a means to increase her powers of resistance. Should she suc- ceed in bringing the enemy's operations on one of the frontiers to a standstill, the almost perfect system of railways would permit tbe rapid transfer of considera- ble bodies of troops, thus giving lier a numerical supe- riority on the other frontier. Uut promptest decision and most rapid execution wH)uld be necessary; for the beginning of the operation would not remain a secret very long. The operations of Frederick the Great against Austria, France, and Russia during the Seven Years' War were of this nature. Movements at that time w^ere slow, but the news thereof also traveled slowly; and the arrangements between the Allied Oourts for concert of action were a good deal slower still. * (c) Comhiiicd Opci-dtious. The term "conibincd o])erations'' is a])plied to pro- ceedings of the (letVuder when he makes use of both offensive and defensive operations — that is, causes his forces to retire when it can be done temporarily with- out permanent disadvantage, but advances again when Tactical Defensive Operations. 179 there is good prospect of profitable results, the object being gradual accumulation of a number of small successes into an overwhelming preponderance. The system of the Allies in the campaign of 1813, after the armistice, was of the nature just indicated. Nearly everything worthy of note on this subject has already been stated in the chapter on the alternation of offen- sive and defensive. Operations of this kind require a theater of war of ample size, and, in some poi*tions at least, the nature of the terrain should be such as would furnish support for the defenders. Blucher's success- ful action against the French was greatly favored, in the campaign just mentioned, by the physical nature of Silesia, with its water-courses in deep-cut valleys. Fortresses and foi'tified positions may furnish similar assistance. With tlieir aid one stiategical wing may be very much reduced, femi)orarily, so as to gain for the other the forces necessary for an energetic counter- stroke. "^ I ' 1 ' I- xn. TA( TKML DEFENSIVE OrEKATIONS. 1. Object and Aids. The details of this subject should be found in tac- tical text-books. We shall here discuss only the gen- eral relations of tactical defensive operations. They may, in contrast Avith tactical offensive opera- tions, have a double object — namely, to repulse the assailant on the battlefield, and to gain time. It does not always follow that we are bent on determined re- sistance whenever we take up a position. We have 1 80 The Conduct of War. seen from the nature of the defensive that time is its ally, and that the defender can often consider himself successful, when, up to a certain moment, he has not yet been defeated. When an army, after losing a bat- tle, is hard-pressed by the eneni}', and leaves its rear guard in position in order to gain the start which is necessary to enable it to occup}' a strong position, the cDUimander of the rear guard will generally have com- pletely accomplished his task if he can hold the enemy in check for several hours. If the main body halted towards evening, it will usually be sufficient to pro- long resistance until nightfall. We shall thus have gained the night for the accomplishment of our object. Gaining of time may, consequently, be a complete substitute for advantage in battle; whereas in the of- fensive the advantage must be obtained at any price. The object of the tactical defensive must, of course, not be purchased with too heavy losses; for other- 'wise we might, by fighting, secure the desired delay in the operations, or maintain a jxvsition to wliich we attach special value, and still be ruined by losses and forced to abandon the war. The sum of the means available for the defensive — namely, effect of fire, ter- rain, ^artificial defensive positions, and exhaustion of the enemy, must in (nich case be great enough to make it probable that the change in our favor will counter- balance his previous superiority. It remains to be ex])lained how the exhaustion of the antagonist is to be considered as a means of which the defender may make use, Th<^ eff(^ct of fir(\ the in- fluence of ilie teiM-aiii and of field fortifications, will be understood without furtlKM' ex])lanation. We know Ihaf the successful ]>rogi'ess of an attack d<^pends very mateiially on skillful dis])ositions and I) Tactical Defensive Operations. 181 ^ judicious deployment of the troops. Wlieu the retir- ing defender halls on his line of retreat, the assailant cannot at once rush upon him, but must fiist bring up troops from his columns in rear. Ii the defender's po- sition is of some extent, and he has taken advantage of favorable features of the terrain, it will be necessary to reconnoiter the position before proceeding further. Then the roads approacliing the position must be found, and the troops brougbt forward on them and deployed in suitable battle formation. All this must be done beyond etlectivM^ artillery fire, the range for which is now assumed at about 2700 yards. The line of deploy- ment will, therefore, be considerably longer than the enemy's ])osition, and the necessary movements will be made across country. This usc's up the energy of the ti'oo])s. The larger the unit of troops, the more time will be required for deployment, and the more powerful will the effect of fatigue be. If the ground is soaked, or the fields are covered with deep snow, the laboriousness of progrc^ss may amount to a downright calamity. The method of fighting must also change; for the activity of the cavalry almost ceases, that of the arlilleiy is very much restricted, and practically the whole burden falls on the infantry. If we add to this the shortness of the days in winter, a factor which is usually coexistent with the othci' unfavorable cir cum stances, it becomes explicable why battles, not fought to a finish, but interrupted by darkness, before a complete decision is arrived at, become a common occurrence. For examples we have only to think of the Le Mans campaign. When, after a battle, the troops file into the roads again, the picture of the deployment is repeated in inverse order. A consideration of the depths of the 182 The Conduct of War. coluiims aloue, shows that an entire c()rj)s can be de- ph)yed for combat only once in a day. A division, with the ntmost exertion, might be able to deploy, resnme column of route, and deploy for battle aj^ain. lUit the second exertion would be useless, for no time would be left for a combat before evening. These circumstances are all of advantage to the tac- tical defensive. If the defender can dcM-eive a large unit of the enemy's troops, and induce it to deploy for battle, and can then withdraw without serious loss, he will have gained a day. This is often overlooked, and a i)recious means, that of accomplishing our object by simply threatening to tight, is not utilized. Naturally, for the successful emjdoyment of these means, skill of the leaders and good figliting disci- ])line of the troops are requisite. In the att(Mnj)t to gain time it is easy to be held fast against our will, and to be forced to decisive action when we did not contem- ])late it. To avoid this, a liberal use of artillery fire at tire gi-eatest distances is necessai'y to begin witli. This diminishes the effect, to be sure; but effect is not what we arc after-, so much as decejjtion. Separation of the batteries, in order to make the cik my believe in the ]>resence of a greatcM' number, is an entirely jus- tilia])le strategeni and one that has fulfilled its object even at peace maneuvers, where observation is so much easier. Fronts which are much more extended than the number of troo]»s would ordinarily ])ei'mit, and de])loyment of a very strong first line, with reserves which would be insufficient for serious resistance, may also be employed with profit on many occasions. The most dilficult part is to recognize the ])roper moment when we would be justified in considering our object as accomplished. If we have allowed it to pass, Tactical Defensive Operations. 183 the piiiiislmieut t't)llo\vs at once. The appeiii-auce be- comes a reality, for which we are not prepared, lu fi^eneral, we iiui}' say that when the infantry once be conies serionsly engOiged, the battle will have to be fouj>,iit thronj»h to a decision, because it is no longer possible to recall it, without incurring the heaviest losses. We must, therefore, break off the engagement before this moment. This is not (^asy; for the enemy will notice it and soon begin to push with vigor. 2. Application of the Different Methods of the Tactical Defensive. When is gaining of time, exhaustion of the enemy, or dc^cisive battle, tinn^ly? The last of these three should indicate the final stage of the entire defensive operation and serve as the introduction to the reversal of the general situation. The decisive battle should, therefore, be accepted as soon as we believe that our ])owers of resistance are at a maximum. The number, of troops, their condition, the strength of the position in the terrain, and moral powers are the factoi's Avhich compose the maximum. It is not absolute, but must be determined by comparison with the enemy. If we still expect an increase which will probably exceed the losses arising up to the time of its arrivals then delay, without decisive action up to that moment, is important, and the (jainimj of time becomes the main point. Exhaustion of the enemy, which under certain cir- cumstances is the most powerful resource of the defen- der, and whicli may lead to the complete debilitation of the assailant, will become the sole object of defen- sive operations whenever the limit of the latter is not yet well defined. 184 The Conduct of War. This disci'imiuatioii sounds, simple aud clear, li is, how ever, uot easy to carry it into practice; for the image which we have before our eyes in the held lack^ the necessary distinctness. Aithougii we are able to assume with some degree of certainty when and where we shall receive reinforcements, there will, generally, be no way of determining whether the enemy is not also being reinforc-ed in the meantime, thus neutralizing our advantage. Still less will it be possible to estimate the prospective losses. In judging of the conditions ex- isting in the enemy's army, considerable errors may be (•(nmnitted. We know how seriously the Allies were mistaken in this respect before the battle of Auster- litz.* Tlie decline w^hich the French Army underwent in Kiissia in 1812 did not become perce])tible lo tlie o])- })onent until quite late. Even in his position at Kaluga, Kutuzoff was not yet fully aw.are of it. The assailant is better off in this respect than the defender. His road leads over the battlefield and camping-places of the enemy — in fact, lie generally marches by the same roads that the enemy made use of before him. Evidences of disintegration will hardly escape him; and lu* 1ms better opportunities to take prisoners. The retrc^iitiiig defender has no such means at his disposal, and, if lie is on foi-eign soil, will not even receive suffi- cient information from the inhabitants. Tlie activity which the assailant displays in his combats would ]M'ol)aldy furnish a guide to estimate his physical and moral power, but we must not overlook the fact that this may depend on the greater or less energy of his ]dans. Consequently, although it may theoretically be possible to d(5termine the points on which to base our *See p. 164. Tactical Defensive Operations. 185 estimate of the enemy, our judgment will, nevertlieless, often grope in uncertainty. The diagnosis must be governed by the circumstances as a whole. Experi- ence in war and knowledge of human nature are most likely to find the proper course. 3. Disposition of the Troops. For every kind of combat, the defender must de- cide upon suitable dispositions, which should form an organic whole. If he allows himself to be caught while in motion, and defends himself only in such a way as the circumstances may permit, at the places where the troops happen to be, he relinquishes control of affairs. Such occurrences are usually without benefit to scientific investigation and the determination of rules. When it is a question of serious and decisive resist- ance at the final stage of the operation, it is of the high(^st importance, in selecting the position to be oc- cupied, to favor the efficiency of fire, for the latter, not the difficulties of the terrain, forms the greatest ob- stacle for the enemy. If the defender desires the battle to take place at the position he occupies, it will not even be advantageous to have too considerable an ob- stacle in front; for this may induce the enemy to mak(^ movements to deprive the position of its importance, so that it will have to be abandoned. A seeming weak- ness, as in Napoleon's right wing at Austerlitz, may be advaiiiageous; for it induces the enemy to advance in a direction easily recognized. It is, of course, con- venient, if a portion of the front is strong by nature; for, on the whole, we must consider the defender as the weaker of the two combatants. And, if he desires to keep the upper hand on at least a portion of the 186 The Conduct of War. field, he must be able to exercise rigid economy in the employment of his forces on the other portions. Another condition is the possession of a covered interior space which tiie enemy cannot readily observe. Formerly undulations of the ground in advance were sufficient; now, when by means of captive balloons the enemy can look over the tops of considerable eleva- tions, a terrain screened by cultivated fields, groves, enclosures, and gardens is more desirable, as it ena- bles us to conceal the distribution of our forces. In addition to the above, the terrain should be easily practicable. It is difficult to find a combina- tion of these conditions complied with. Ground with cover is especially likely to be found in highly culti- vated districts, which, on the other hand, abound in obstacles to movement. Although impassable water- courses, deep ravines, swampy stretches, and the like may be lacking, garden walls, drainage ditches, deeply plowed fields, wire fences, and similar evidc^n- ces of improved cultivation take their placets. Nu- merous roads, or, at least, passable ground to the line of battle and towards the flanks, are requisite. We should continually bear in mind that a chjingc of front may become necessary. If it is possible to select a position so that the enemy, in approaching it, must cross an obstacle which is passable only at a few ])()ints — for instance, a river restricting him to the bridges, the defender enjoys IIh^ advantage of knowing beforehand in what dii'ections to concentrate his fire. The movennrnts, also, of th<^ assailant are then limited to a eeilain extent, and the defender can form an idea of what he has to expect . In order to obtain the benefit of artificial strength- ening of a position, it will be of advantage if, on a Tactical Defensive Operations. 187 portion of the line of battle, the nature of the terrain facilitates such work. We all know how small the prospect for the sue cess of a frontal attack is.* The defender's attention must, therefore, be principally devoted to the flanks. It is more difficult to find secure supports for them tactically than in strategical defensive positions.** We should endeavor to rest one of the winj^s, at least, on a secure point — if possible, the one which is by na- ture the stronj>er and, consequently, the weaker in troops. On the other wing the troops are accumulated, and the surplus necessary for an active protection of the flank thus becomes available. The ])roper dispositions for this purpose will be indicated by the form of the battlefield. One very simple means is found in the prolongation of the position, after the assailant has commenced his envelopment; his flanking forces will tlius airive before our front. For this purpose reserves in the rear of the wing are necessary. But a wing stretched out too far becomes w(\ak, and may be easily shattered or driven off by the opponent, as the French were at Ron- court on the iSth of August, 1870. A defeat of this kind will have almost as disastrous an effect on the army as an envelo])ment. A crotchet foimation will usually b(^ stronger, especially if the assailant is unable to disco v<'r if until lie lias arrived at the flank of the position. The distance he has to go will then be greater than that to be traversed by our reserves, and the only advantage remaining to him will be the con- vergency of his attack. *See p. 147. **See pages 121, 122. 188 The Cwcr of tire; those of the defensive cannot gainsay nshed forward somewhat, from the parallel to the enemy's line of operations. If we wish to deceive tlu^ enemy about the trap thus laid for him, w^e cannot leav(^ the direct road to his objective entirely open. A re^ir guard must retire in that direction in order to draw the enemy along after it. The position must also not be farther than artil- lery range to one side, for otherwise the assailant re- tains too much freedom to change direction, deploy, and begin battle. It must also be easy to leave the flank position and take up the offensive, in order to be able to fall upon the enemy and punish him, in case *W(' (luotc luTe tlu' iiinstorly cxplaiiMtioii of positions of tliis Iviiid wliicli Field Marslial v. Moltkc pivo in tlie solntion of Tactical Problcni No. 08: "A flanlv position is a position vvliicli is talv(>n np near to, and parallel with, the enemy's line of operations,— a ])osition Avliich the enemy can not pass with- out sacrificing- his communications, — a position in which vie torious combat and pursuit would lead the enemy away from his orisrinal objective. We must remember in such cases, that we also liive up our lines of retreat. A flank position can therefore, as a rule, only be taken in the interior of a country, 194 The Conduct of War, he disrej^ards our position and attempts to pass us hy while pursuin<^ his own jilans. Finally, in case we leave the main road and take up a tlank position, we must not entirely deprive ourselves of the means of retreat, but always keep a goud line open. Consequently, in this case also, quite a number of prior conditions would have to be satisfied to make our plan feasible. A large part of them would cease to be operative if we took up a position so as to inter- pose directly between the enemy and his object. Flank i>ositions become particularly effective when they raise a doubt in the enemy's niiiid whether the troops he is likely to encounter therein are the same that have been retreating- before him, or are the ad- vance guard of reinforcements. If, behind the flank position, there is an im]K)rtant defile, from which troops belonging to the army of the defender nuiy be expected, or a railroad station, whei-e they may arrive, the uncertainty of tlie general situation for the assail- ant is still furllicr inci'eased. This is especially true when the country between the latter ])oint and the flank position is full of comm- and cannot be fully ob- served. In so favorable a case tlie defender caiL willi (piite inferior forces, derive the greatest advantages from the situation. The best illustration of ()])ei'atioiis of this kind has been furnished by Field Marshal von ^lolike, although it is not drawn from actual war, but from a tactical problem. A weak detachment is supposed to occupy whore frioiidly territory, on which wo can subsist, is avaihiMe in roar. In an enemy's country this will be nmcli more cliitirult. Tn these cases we turn one wins: towards tlie enemy; it is, consequently, a. necessary condition that this wins" find stromr support in the terrain, — otherwise the eneiiiy will advance on a diagonal and roll up our posilion i'nnn that liiu\" Tactical Flartk Positions. 195 a positiou west of Metz, at Gravelotte, with orders to delay a hostile army which is advancing to invest this fortress, and the heads of whose cohinins are supposed to have arrived at Vionville. It is necessary to gain at least a day, in order that the full strength of the gar- rison may have time to arrive. In any position directly barring the enemy's road, this would be quite impossible, the enemy's superiority being much too great. The detachment, therefore, should take a flank position, south of the high road from Vionville to Metz, at the edge of the Rois des (Ignons. Its strength could not be reconnoitered in tliat jtosition; a dense forest lies in its rear, and behind it the market-town of Ars. with two bridges across the Moselle, and a large depot, where reinforcements could be expected at any moment. The assailant would be in doubt whethei- he had to deal with a detach- ment })ushed out from tlie siarrison, or with the ad- vance guard of an a])proacliing column. He w^ould not be able to undertake anything further until this doubt had been set at rest by a combat. Even the capture of the border of the forest, which alone re(i aires considerable time, would not solve the doubt, for nobody could know how much of a force might still be in the woods. Not until he succeeds in pushing the def(Miders back to Ars, without noticing an increase in their strength, would matters become clear. By that time the detachment would have gained the nec- essary delay, and have solved its problem. When the defense in a flank position turns out to be successful, the defender reaps the further advantage that the assailant must begin his retreat under diffi- cult circumstances, because it is only by a change of front that he can resume the natural direction suitable 196 The Conduct of War. for his purposes. A counter-stroke from the flank position may, therefore, drive him entirely off his line of retreat. Flank positions are most effective when they are opi)osed to an antagonist immediately after he has issued from a defile — for example, when he has just ci-ossed a bridge over a large stream. In case of fail- ure, retreat will then also become most difficult for the assailant, because it must be ellected through a de- file with which he is connected by a flank. XIII. OPERATIONS UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS. All oi^erations may undergo a certain amount of restriction or alteration on account of the form and nature of the theater of war. Formerly a (juite deci- sive importance was attached to tlicse two influences. Different kinds of warfare were uanuMl after them. Thus mountain warfare was regarded as something quite independent. Special principles were laid down for use in such cases. There likewise was a special theniy for the at tad; and defense of rivers, etc. No real necessity exists for this diflerentiation, at least not with refer(mcc to the ])i'inciples of the art of war. On such Tlu^aters also, the conduct of wai" is govciiKMl l>y the gciici-al laws, and all that is necessary is to modify its methods to suit the ground on Avhich they are applied. Iiiij>assable districts, mountain ranges, streams, etc., should, primarily, be considered as obstacles to movemcMit; they are, therefore, of advantage to the defensive. Operations under ^peeial Conditions. 197 If we consider the defensive as in possession of a mountain chain, it enjoys the advantage of a front which, in general, is vulnerable only at fixed points — namely, at the places where roads lead through the mountains. These points can be defended by compara- tively small forces; and the intc rvals between them are, according to our conception, impassable obstacles, so that the whole chain has the appearance of a closed front. The question, therefore, is one of simple frontal defense, which all the circumstances seem to suggesi: as the proper course. We are inclined to consider such positions very strong. It is to be observed, how- ever, that in the Occident nearly all the mountains have been made quite accessible by the pursuits of civilization, and that good roads pass among them.* They hardly form an obstacle now. We must not assume, because the roads are impracticable, that the country is impassable, as the Turkish headquarters did in 1829, 1877, and 1878, with reference to the Bal- kans.** Finally, short mountain ranges, with their extremities resting on secure obstacles, such as sea- coasts, are extremely rare. Positions in mountains are either very much extended, and on that account cioiupaialivcly weak at all points, or else their flanks are exposed. This danger is doubly serious because the separate detachments occupying the front have *Onr cliaTissCM'S in the mountains are mostly of the bost charMctd'. bccanso they n^t on jjood foundations, and suitable matc^i'ial lor their construction and repair is everywhere within easy reach. **Tnfantry now overcomes the j^reat.est obstacles, of which tlici Itali-tu and French Aliniic troops occasionally furnish '^\aiiii)h's in time of i)eace. 'IMk^ mule follows foot soldiers on r(Mnarlval)ly difficult trails. Mountain artillery also goes almost anywhere. 198 .The Conduct of War. little counection with each other, and are incapable of rendering mutual assistance. Reinforcement of the threatened point bj the defender is generally only possible from the rear, and the troops advancing from that direction encounter the same difficulties as the assailant when he enters the mountain region. Well aware of these circumstanceSj the assailant who finds an occupied mountain range before him will merely keep the defender in his front engaged, and will at the same time endeavor to turn him on one or both flanks. If the defender, in order to oppose him, takes up a more and more extended formation by oc- cupying a constantly increasing number of passes towards the flanks, he furnishes the assailant an oppor- tunity to break the line with his reserves. His method of operation in sucli cases will be to overwhelm one post, while holding the garrisons of adjacent posts in their places by means of weaker attacks. A precipi tate retreat of the defenders, when they receive the news that the enemy has broken their line, is the final result.* The defender, for his part, naturally will foresee such a course of events and will prefer to occupy the passes of the mountain cluiin with only relatively small detachments, unless special circumstances force him to make Ihe (Iccisivc stand in llie mountain country itself. Tn this way the defender is able to ascertain the assail- ant's direction and the strength of his forces, and at the same time to kccj* the bulk of liis invu forces in conceal- ment behind the mountains, with orders to fall upon th(^ *Tlio nbortivo dofons-o of the hno of tlio Balkans by the Turks in tho wint(T of 1S77-7S is the most rocont warning example of an ovorf'stimation of the value of ^nountain ranges as defensive positions. Operations under Special Conditions. 199 enemy whenever his columns of route Endeavor to wind their laborious way out of the mountain passes. Here we simply have another ease of the ambush defensive.* It is not a question, therefore, of setting up new maxims for the conduct of war, but rather of suitable application of those already known, to the circumstan- ces of the case. We find similar difficulties in the attack and de- fense of rivers ; they nearly always suffer from the evil of too great extension, and cannot even be watched suf- ficiently throughout their entire length. In this case also the defender will generally prefer to defend the course of the river only in so far as may be necessary to dev(^lop the intentions of the enemy. He will assem- ble his main body farther to the rear, in order to attack the enemy when he crosses the river and when, with an obstacle in his rear, he is compelled to accept battle without fully deployed forces. Artificial defensive arrangements, also, do not cause a fundamental change in the rules for the con- duct of war, but only call forth special measures in their ex(^cution. We distinguish the following: Fortified positions, intrenched cninjjs, and foiti-csscs. The first are intcmded either t*o crcaic a strong po- sition with flank protection, in which a weak army can offer decisive resistance to a numerically superior enemy, or their object is to strengthen only a portion of the front so as to save troops at that place and accu mulate them at another. In the former case they require substantial support in the terrain, and they play a part that is principally * Seep? 191. 200 The Conduct of War. strategical. The lines of Torres Vedras, as well as the position near Danewerk, for the protection of North Schleswig and Jutland, which extended from sea to sea, belong to this class. At present, the position of Czataldcza, and the fortified French frontier line against Germany, extending from one neutral terri- tory to another, furnish specimens of such defensive systems.* Fortified positions of the second kind are prepon derantly of a tactical nature, ^cure support for both flanks is nearly always lacking, and the intrenched line forms only a portion of the front, at places where we may desire to station a comparatively weak force of troops. Turning movements are anticipated and a battlefield neai- a Hank is selected at the very begin- ning. On this field we expect to make profitable use of the troops saved in the' occupation of the position. An intrenched camp protects the rear of a position also; it forms a closed figure, and its front may be in any direction. Yet it resembles a fortified position in this, that it requires the presence of troops to give it a value. Deserted by trooy^s, it becomes w^orthless, like the cam]) of roiilie at Lc Mans in 1871. An in- trenclied camp is intended to serve as a support, or place of refuge, for an army which decides to abandon, temporarily, its communications and line of retreat. However, armies do not withdraw to such camps unless tliey feci that they no longer have the power to resist llie enemy in I lie ojumi field. And we may logically conclnde that they will not be any more likely to pos- sess llu' necessary strength to leave the ])lace of refuge again — that is, to effect their escape, after being sur- *Tho AiiKH'ican Civil W:ir mIso prcxlucod scvcrnl (^KMiuples of this nature. Operations under Special Conditions. 201 rounded. Wa sliould, therefore, never retire to an in- trenched eamp unless we can count upon approachinj» reinforcements with certainty. The army in such a case enjoys the advantage of not being weakened by further retreat and also of being able, in most cases, to bring the operations to a temporary standstill. An intrenched camp mhiyed by foitilicatious of this form, in combimitioii witli armies, are indicated below. The army, retiring before a stronj^cr foe, may leave the fortification in its front, to act as a buttress which is placed before a bridge and is designed to break the first thrust of accumulating ice floes. The enemy will be forced either to invest the place, or else to detach a stronger force in its front, in observation. Consequently, in case of further advance, he will ar- rive with diminished forces in front of those positions which the defender takes uj) latei-, to olTer resistance. The prospects of success for the latt(M' ini])rove. Thus Achmed Muckthar Pasha succeeded in repulsing the first attack of the Russians, at Zewin, on the 25th of June, 1877, afU^r they had weakened their force by the investnn^nt of Kars. Wlicn the Held army, as in that case, was in contact with the fortification only a short time before, success will be rendered more certain ; for the assailant cannot know how many tr<,o])s may liave been left behind in the fortress. The reasons why he cannot afford, under such circumstances, to disregard the defender's field nnny are, consequently, all the stronger. It is, of course, a necessarv condition that the for- tho lonj?-raiij?o jrnns of tho nssnilniit. As thoiso k(^pt on im- proving;, tlio worlds wore' i^isIkmI out I'.-m'IIkm-. niid tlnis bocnino nioro isolMtod and exposed. I'or this i-cason iniprovonionts havo rocontly bocn (•<)niniencurpo«(\ The j::aiTisons, of courso, .i,M'o\v coi-resixnidinuly and finally become so larjro that, as armies, tliey would have sufficofl for tho attainment of tho object without fortifications. Tn this wo havo undoubtedly t^nkon the wT-ontr tra(^k. and de]iarturo therefrom is d<^mandod by tho interests of national W(>lfar(^ and economy of strenjxth. Operations under Speeial Conditions. 205 tress be large enough, and the garrison strong enough, to have a perceptible influence on the operations of the attacking army. Besides, the po.^ition of the defender, in which he desires to accept battle, must not be too near the fortress; otherwise the assailant will draw off the corps of investment for use in battle, and send it back later. A fortress may also be used as a support for the flank of an army, in which case we should consider that with exterior works and long-range cannon it may command a space several days' march in width. It would, consequently, form a considerable part of the general front. It is not even necessary for the army to be in immediate contact with the fortress. A gap may with impunity be left between the position of the army and the fortress; this space may be increased with the size of the army. In 1870 the projectiles of the fort on Mont St. Quentin reached as far as Ars sur :M()S(']h', a (lennan mile from Metz. If the retreating French Army of the Rhine had taken u]) a position be- hind the Moselle, between ront-i\-M(msson and Nove- ant, the fortress would still have secured their left wing. The narrow strip between Ars and Nov^ant, not swept by the guns of the fortress, would not have sufficed for the advance of the German armies, nor even for the deploynuMit of a strong enveloping move- ment. The position of Metz wonld have been a doubly favorable one; for it was in advance of the line of de- fense, and threatened the right flank of the assailant. Portions of the field army, not emi)loyed in the front, miglit have advanced throuQ-h ^ he fortress and assumed a powerful offensive against that flank. This also makes it a])parent that a fortified place 2U6 The Conduct of War. gains in importance when it is situated on a stream, and covers a transfer from one bank to tlu* otiier. If it commands the point of confluence of several considerable streams, its inipor lance rises. Kiistrin is a fori less of this kind, and Napoleon I. blamed the N'iceroy Eugene severely because he had not taken ad- vantage of its possessio'n when making his retreat in February, 1813. Twenty days might have been gained there to secure lierlin — so Napoleon wrote to him. As a liiatter of fact, Eugene might at first have taken up a position in front of Kiistrin, say at Drossen, and thus have restrained the enemy from crossing the Oder. Then, in the event of the advance of the enemy in over- whelming numbers, it would have been possible for him to retire from one of the sections between streams, to another. If we conceive, still furthc r, of a third, or even a fourth, river or brook in a swampy valley, llowing towards the conmion point, the play may be success- fully repeated still oftener, and the army, using the fortress as a pivot, may swing around in all the direc- tions of the compass. The only danger is that of being ])ushed into the fortified place and surrounded there. The outer wing must, therefore, be the stronger one. This is a simple rule, the importance of whicli cvcrybDdy easily under- stands, but which, nevertheless, was overlooked by so ex])erienced a commander as Marshal T»azaine,'on the 16th and 18th of August, 1870. His unnecessary fear of being forced away from the fortress made him place his reserves behind the inner wing. An army, when once it is shut up in a fortress, will, in its attempts to escape, be limited to tactical pene- tration of a position specially ])repared for defense. Operations under Special Conditions. 'J 07 with the diflficiilties of which we are already acquain- ted.* These difficulties are still further increased by the fact that the enemy's reinforceuK^nts, from the line of countervallation, will naturally approach the threat- ened point from the ri«^ht and left; consequently, in the most effective direction with reference to the flanks. Hence, military history records very few examples of troops effecting their escape after they were once shut up in a fortress. From the nature of the case, the proximity of a protecting;- fortress must exercise a great power of at- traction upon the army when it is in difficult situa- tions, and must make it much easier to withdraw the troops to the cover of its walls and guns than to march them out again from this safe asylum.** The employ- ment of a fortress as a point of support and pivot of ojK'rations, therefore, conceals many rocks on which the command of an army may go to pieces. This has induced one of the more recent writers to nuike the veiy appropriate remark that a fortress is a sphinx which destroys him who does not solve its riddle. This indicates w^hat ought to be said about the last method of employment, for which our great fortified camps are considered suitable by some people — name- ly, to serve as a place of refuge for defeated or hard- *See pages 148, 149. **EY(M'y iiidividnnl soldier will receive the impreission that the army can no lon,ii('r cope with the enemy hi the open, and needis artificial protei-tion. This feeling, however, is by no means a suitable one to raise the morale of the troops and restore their confidence in success. B(^sides, it is no longer possible to replace th(^ losses cansed l)y combat and diseavSe. and shelter for the troops usually is deficie^nt. Therefore, the material advantages of the situation also disappear upon closer inspection. i 208 The Conduct of Wwr. pressed armies in the field, where they can rest, recu- perate, and be provided with all the necessaries, so as to be able to resume operations in the open field. The whole conception is too theoretical to stand the test of the actual practice of war. Metz is the great warning- example in this respect. Fortified districts. General J»rialmont's reglojis Jortiftees, are to be preferred, because they cannot be enclosed, and jet sufficient!}^ protect tlie space in whicli the army is to find accommodation. We still Imve to consider the function of fortifica- tions for the protection of the capitals of countries. With reference thereto the remark may be made that the assailant who is able to drive the army back into the capital will also i)0ssess the necessary power tt) reduce the city, and that, at juost, it is only a (piestion of gaining time. However, it must not be forgotten that such gain, with reference to the aid of allies, mav be of value. Furthermore, there are exceptions. Capitals which for inherent reasons play a controlling ](art in their country, but on account of their situation are very much exposed to attack, must be fortified. ( Constanti- nople, Copenhagen, and Lisbon belong to this class. An enemy controlling the sea could take possession of them by a sudden stroke and thus paralyze tlie (level opment of the whole ])o\vei' of the nation. Political reasons here become parainoniit. It may jilso be that the fortified cai)ital is the nucleus of an elabo- rately ])re])ared systi'm'of defensi' for the whoh^ coun- 'try. It is, howev(M', im])ossible to overcome entirely the injurious infliienee of so large a fortification on the troops destined for the field. Tt exercises a strong attraction and not only supports the troops, but also Operations under Special Conditions. 209 holds them back, a considerable portion being retained for immediate use as a garrison. The danger of pre- mature investment and surrender of the army also is imminent in this case. The larger tlie fortification becomes in compari- son with the field army, the greater will be the danger. Bucharest may more easily become fatal to Ron- mania than Paris to France. If we should attempt to proAide all jjlaces of im- portance for the defense of a country with modern fortified camps, their number would become a very large one. In spite of this, it would probably turn out, in case the operations of a campaign took an unex- pected direction, that they are lacking precisely at the place where they are most needed. France was not by any means deficient i^i strong places in 1870; yet they were wanting at the two places where they would have been of the greatest value in the second stage of the war — namely, at Orleans and Amiens. If the fortified camp is intended for the use of a rather large army, it must be extensive. But with extension its passive strength diminishes, and an in- crease of the garrison becomes necessary. The sac- rifices in treasure and troops necessary for the forti- fication of the country are, therefore, doubly increa?ec'. It would be desirable if we could find the means of making a fortified camp movable, and of such construc- tion that a small garrison would suffice for protec- tion against capture by force. The use of iron and steel as a means of protection, and their direct connec- tion with the gun so as to form a movable whole 210 The Conduct of War, of the piece and its cover,* indicate the way to such a system. We would be able to secure important points by the use of a few such contrivances, served by a handful of men, and to create a skeleton of future fortified positions or camps. These would be laid out as soon as their probable utility was indicated by the course of the operations. In this way it may be- come possible for a state to avoid the necessity of pernuinently maintaining; ten or twelve lar<;e fort- resses, with whole armies for «;arrisons. Of such large works one or two mij^ht prove useful in case of war; but at those places where they are most needed, pos- sibly none would be available at all. XIV. THE INFLUENCE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF AVAR. The assistance of a lieet in the strale«;ical con- centration of armies, by taking charge of the trans- portation of large bodies of troops, may become veiy important. Tlie Turkish Empire, in ISTT, would have been quite unable to collect its armies without such aid. During the course of the war it owed the resto- ration of the summer campaign on the Balkan x)enin- sula to the fleet, which transferred the army of Sulei- man Pasha from the Albanian to the Thracian coast. *I)esijriiat('. 7C>. of 1S94. the term "l''ahri>:inzei-" is :ii)pli(Kl to such (Mi.uiiies of \y:\v. (Tnins- Idlnr.) Influence of Naval Operations. 211 How useful the cooperation of the naval forces may prove in moving*- forward the base and estab- lishing^ new connections, when the operations on land occasionally touch the coast, was shown in the war between China and Japan. The command of the sea, which permits the land- force to obtain support at every point on the coast possessing;' a good harbor, is not less useful to the de- fender than to the assailant. A glance at the map will suffice to show the great importance for Germany, in case of war on both its eastern and western fron- tiers, of having secure control of the Baltic Sea. With reference to a Polish theater of war, the German armies would liave quite a different degree of freedom of oper- ation if they were at liberty, in case of emergency, to retire on Konigsberg or Dantzic, than if they were limited to a retreat in a westerly direction towards the Oder. The command of the sea often makes costly and ex- tensive systems of fortitication unnecessary. As long as the Ottoman navy hehl th(^ Black Sea and was at tlie same time strong enough to close the Dardanelles against all comers, the fortification of Constantinople could be regarded as a luxury. London could not be ]HM'mitted to lie open if England d'd not have the oceans under her control. Of two combatant powers, the one which is stronger at sea will, at all events, keep its rear free and re- taiu connection with the rest of the world, from which it can draw means of resistance. Tt is enabled to make use of international industrv in the arminf»- and equip- ment of its forces. France, in 1870, after the downfall of the empire, would never hnve been able to accom- plish such immense results in the formation of armies. 212 The Conduct of War. which, though newly organized, were well equipped, if a hostile fleet had blockaded her coasts. The exam- ple of the American Wav of KSecession shows that the blockade of a great country, which does not produce enough food for the subsistence of its own population, may literally starve it out, and finally render all its successes on land useless. Between two opponents of approximately equal strength, victory will finally fall to the one Avho re- mains master of the sea. The latter will exhaust the financial resources of the other by destroying his com- merce and interrupting all transmarine intercourse, thus undermining his military power also. Aside from this indirect assistance, lying in the do- main of grand strategy, a direct support of military operations, by the activity of the fleet, is also possible, when the form of the theater of war is favorable. An army following a coast can place one of its flanks in absolute security by means of the accom- panying ships of war, and need only take care of the otlier. V*y ])roceeding in advance a'ud talcing posses- sion of coast towns, the naval force may facilitate the march. An attack on fortifii^d i>ositions or ])laees on the sea-coast has little prospect of success without the participation of a fleet. Tf tln^ defender retains his connecticm with the sea, it will be inntoss'ble to deprive him of reinforcements and additional su])plies of food, guns. ;nid ammunition, and he can prolong the defense indefinitely. It will seldom ha])i)en that large water courses en able a fleet to assist directly in penetrating a theater of war. How(n'er. the Lii-enl American Civil War furnishes an example of this also. One of the most important causes of the overthrow of the Southern Infiiien cc of Naval Operations. 213 States was tlie fact that the fleets of the Union, ad- vancinj»' at the same time from the sea and the upper course of the stream, gradually gained complete pos- session of the Mississippi, cut the South in two, and kept the parts permanently separated. The naval forces may furnish direct support to the defender, as follows: Bj protecting fortified places on the coast; by sorties against blockading squadrons; by maintaining communications by sea between sepa- rated portions of the national domain or between sepa- rated armies; and also by protecting the flank and rear of the land forces. Under speciallj' favorable circumstances this as- sistance may become decisive. It enables the defender to I'cinovc tlie culminating point of his strategical defensive far to the rear, to a remote point of land, up to whicli Ills own force then increases to a maximum, while tlie ciieiny is weakened by a long line of opera- tions. His ultimate repulse then becomes doubl}^ dis- astrous. Without the protection of the rear secured by the fleet, the attempt would never have been made to hold the lines of Torres Vedras, and the defense of the lines of Czataldcza would have been impracticable. In conclusion, we have briefly to consider the nature and importance of descents. The peculiarity of these enterprises is that the point selected as their first ob- jective also becomes their base, and that they are, therefore, indejiendent of connection with the rest of the ai'my. Tliey may pass beyond territory occupied by the enemy, and may app:'ar unexpectedly in portions of the country quite untouched by the w\ar up to that time. They are especially suitable for the purpose of demonstrations against an enemy's rear and his flanks. 214 The Conduct of War. Oonsequeiitly, in sketching a plan for the defense of the lines of Czataldcza, at the close of the Rnsso- Turkish war, we had a movement of that kind in view\ On account of the possession of the Bulgarian quad- rangle of fortresses, and the presence of not inconsid- erable Turkish forces therein, it could have been made peculiarly effective. If descents, on the whole, inure more frequently to the benefit of the assailant than of the defender, the reason therefor lies in the fact that the latter will less often have the necessary surplus of troops at- his disposal. Otherwise, such enterprises would afford the defender, who is the weaker one on land, an oppor- tunity to attack the assailant, whose communicalions and rear he would threaten by descents. Tlie weak- ness of all landing enterprises consists in the fact that, on account of the difficulty of transporting troops by sea, the strength 'of the forces will always be lim- ited, and, especially, that the supply of cavalry, artil- lery, and wagon transportation will be defective. This makes the troops that have landed unsuitable for a rapid and distant advance from the coast, which, how- ever, is exactly what is necessary to gain room and en large the base. In highly cultivated and dc^nsely j^opulated coun- tries, descents, consecpiciilly. nevci- liavc any ])rospect of great success. Tlic military organization of such states, and the nK^ms of communication, are so well devel()]M'd that no (pieslion could arise as to the po-si- bility of bringing crushing odds to bear against the landed party, whose strength at the beginning could hardly exceed 40,000 to 50,000 men. This condition is changed only in case the landed troops receive im- mediate support through a popular uprising, or from Influence of Naval operations. i "^^lo _ the forces of an allied power, wliicli was only waiting for an excuse to begin hostilities. A French landing in riei'many could acquire a ccM^tain importance only by a combination with Denmark. The proper time for such enterprises is at the very beginning of hostilities, when all the field troops are on their way to the frontier and the interruption would, therefore, be most effective; or, quite at the end of the operations, against a de- fender already exhausted and weary of the war. Exceptions occur when an important object of oper- ations lies on the coast itself, or near it, so that a tem j)orary capture alone would necessarily exercise con siderable influence on the course of the w^ar. Polit- ical considerations may materially heighten the im portance of landing exjKMlilions, especially in cases where the ca])ital is situated on the sea-shore. I>y the rapid occu])ation there'of, a hesitating government may be forced into pai-ticipation, or the desired declara- tion of neutrality. Such an object justifies the risk wliicli is always connected with enterx)rises across the water. During the Crimean War the Allies desired to de- stroy the cradle of the Russian navy in tlie TUack Sea, Sevastopol, and this s]>ecial reason gave the otherwise not very inliuentia] place the necessary importance corresponding to the magnitude of that landing enterprise. Colonial wars, and conflicts with nations of inferior military development in distant parts of the world, are the ordinary field for landing expeditions. In such places a numerically small but well-equipped and well-disciplined body of European troops has a deci- sive weight in tlie settlement of political quarrels. As ' the opening of these lands to the trade of the world 210 The Coiiducf of War. and to Eiii'opeaii civilization advaiu; s, tlu' (^'ffccTive sphere for such entiM-pi ises b comes (Mniti acted. Thus, we may say that the times wlu^n a few thousand of French or En^lisli tr<)o])s, acc()m])anie(l by a lleet, could compel the <^'()v<'niments of <2reat and populous nations in eastern Asia to bend to their wishes, as they for- merly did, haye disappeared forever with the close of the war between China and Japan. OONCLTTSION. We are unable to conclude this series of sketches illustratin*]^ the theory of war without oncc^ more inyit- injij attention to the fact that they do not exhaust the subject by any means. All the princi])les here elucidated and the forms portrayed are simple and easily comprehended. To be familiar with them is not a great scientific attain- ment, which, in the active affairs of war, could insure success. Every educated soldier knows them, but this does not make every one a capable oenc^ral sim- ply on that account. Only an exceedinj>ly small num- ber ever develop imto really eminent leaders of armies. Now, when it comes to ])nttinfij the principles we have d(Hluced theorelically into ])iactice, so many se- crets of human nature have to be considered that only a keen mind, which is able to read these secrets with the ra]ndity of thou<»ht and to estimate their effect without laborious delibei'ation, ciui be successful. Political, social, and matei'ial circumst;mces and conditi(ms of all kinds must be carefully ])en(lered. The (execution will, however, still invariably re- quire a sironj; mind and firm cliai'acler; for only such Conclusion. 217 an one wil remain true to himself and to his convic- tions in the stormy sruch of warlike events. Powder over men — which is denied to many an excellent man — is a further requisite; consciousness of purpose, and that difficultly definable talent of instinctively seizing all favorable circumstances, which in every-day life is called luck, are indispensable. These conditions make the art of leading armies as difficult as the theoretical knowledge of the conduct of war appears easy. Military Letters and Essays International Military Series No. I By CAPTAIN F. N. MAUDE, R.E., Author of "Letters on Tactics and Organization," OF Modern Drill-Books," Ktc. 'The Evolution I. cont: Stati.stics of the Franco-German ENTS: XIV. War. XV. II. Smokeless Powder. XVI. III. Conditions of Modern Warfare. IV. Cost of Modern War. XVII. V. German Cavalry Maneuvers. VI. Independent Patrols. XVIII. VII. A Modern Battle. XIX. VIII. A vStudy of a Modern Battle. XX. IX. Attack or Defence. XXI. X. The Origin of Extended-Order XXII. Fighting. XXIII. XI. The Legend of St. Privat. XXIV. XII. Von Wedell's Brigade at Mars-la- Tour. XXV. XIII. Present Tactical Tendencies in the German Army. XXVI. The Physique of European Armies. The Weapon or the Man. The Minor Tactical Day at Alder- shot. The Volunteer Field Day at Alder- Shot. Field Day at Aldershot. Notes on the French Maneuvers. The German Army. Marching Through Thuringia. The Panics at Gravelotte. Moltke's Work. The Spirit of the New German Infantry Regulations. Notes in Germany, 18S9. Blank vs. Ball Cartridge Tactics. One volume, 8vo, handsomely bound in blue cloth. Sent post- paid on receipt of $1.50 Cavalry Studies from Two Great Wars International Military Series No. 2 COMPRISING THE FRENCH CAVAIvRY IN 1870, By LIEUTENANT-COLvONEL BONIE, (French Army.) THE GERMAN CAVAIvRY IN THE BATTLE OF VIONVILIvE— MARS- LA-TOUR, By MAJOR KAEHLER, (German General Staff.) THE OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN, By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GEORGE B. DAVIS, U. S. A. Illustrated ; full blue cloth. Sent postpaid on receipt of $1.50 Tactical Studies on the muITsS Battles Around Plevna no j By THir.O VON TROTHA, Captain of the Grenadier Regiment Frederic William IV. (Attached). Translated by Carl Reichmann, 1st Ivieut. 9th Inftj-., U. S. A. One volume, 8vo, handsomely bound in blue cloth. Sent post- (h paid on receipt of Cp I . 5 O HuDSON-KlMBERLY PUBLISHING Co. 1014-1016 Wyandotte St. Kansas City, Mo. e^ e^ JUST COMPLETED— A REVISED EDITION (THE THIRD), ENLARGED AND WITH NEW ILLUSTRATIONS* ^ The Service of Security and Information (third edition) By ARTHUR L. WAGNER, Captain, Sixth Infantry, U. 3. Army ; Instructor in Art of War at the U. vS. Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort L,eavenworth, Kansas. ¥ ¥ ^ CONTENTS : Chapter I.— Introduction. Chapter VII.— Spies. Chapter II.— Advance Guards. Chapter VIII.— Orientation and Map-Read- Chapter III.— Outposts. ing. Chapter IV.— Reconnaissance. Chapter IX.— Indian Scouting. Chapter V.— The Cavalrv Screen. Appendix I.— Advance Guard Drill. Chapter VI.— Rear Guards. Appendix II.— Questions for General Re- view., Illustrated with Fifteen Plates. ¥ ^ If This book has been officially adopted by the War Department as a stand- ard in the examination of officers of the Regular Army for promotion. It has also been officially adopted as a text-book in the U. S. Artillery School, Fort Monroe; the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth; the U. S. Cavalry and Light Artillery School, Fort Riley. ¥ ¥ ¥ 8vo, 265 pages. Sent postpaid on receipt of 4^ I O HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING CO., KANSAS CITY. A Catechism of Outpost Duty INCLUDING ADVANCE GUARD, REAR GUARD, AND RECONNAISSANCE. By ARTHUR I.. WAGNER, Captain, Sixth Infantry, U. S. Army ; Instructor in Art of War at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort I,eavenworth, Kansas. ¥¥¥ This book is a careful abridgment, in the form of questions and answers, of Captain Wagner's **Servick of Security and Information," which has been officially sanctioned by the War Department as a standard in the exam- ination of officers of the Regular Army for promotion. * The 'Catechism of Outpost Duty" will be found admirably adapted to the needs of the National Guard, well suited to the instruc- tion of non-commissioned officers, and of value to officers in review- ing the larger book preparatory to examination. One volume, 16mo, cloth, ten illustrative diagrams. Sent post- ^ r^f c paid on receipt of j^ CLS. HuDSON-KlMBERLY PUBLISHING Co. 1014-1016 Wyandotte St. Kansas City, Mo. MANUAL OF MILITARY FIELD ENGINEERING FOR THE rSE OFl OFFICERS AND TROOPS OF THE LINE. Prepared at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School by the Depart- ment of Engineering. Captain WM. D. BEACH' Third Cavalry, Instructor. This book hus been in use at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School as tlie official text-book on the subject since September, 1894. It is a profusely Illustrated volume of 284 pages, and treats In a most comprehensive and non- technical manner of Hasty Intrenchments, Obstacles, Field Works, Working Parties, Revetments, Field Casements and Magazines, Defense of Hoxises and Villages, Use of Cordase and Spars, Spar Bridges, Floating Bridges, Roads, Camping Expedients, etc, etc. The work has been officially recognized by the War Department as a standard in the examination of Line Officers for promotion. Price, $t .75. HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUB. CO., Kansas City, Mo. TO BE ISSUED IN NOVEMBER: A Revised Edition of Military Topograpliy and Sketching Prepared for Use of the Department of Engineering United States Infantry and Cavalry School of Fort Leavenworth, by LIEUT. EDWIN A. ROOT. »80 pages, full cloth. !^3.50. HI DSON-KIMBERLY PUB. CO., Kansas City, Mo. Organization and Tactics .. . BY . .. ARTHUR L. WAGNER, Captain 6th Infantry, U. S. Army; Instructor in the Art of War at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School. CONTENTS. Introduction. — Organization and Discipline.— Characteristics of the Three Arms. — Historical Sketch of Modern Infantry.— Infantry in Attack and Defense. — Historical Sketch of Modern Cavalry. — Cavalry in Attack and Defense. — Historical Sketch of Field Artillery. — Ar- tillery in Attack and Defense.- The Three Arms Combined. — Convoys. — The Transportation of an Army Corps. — Space and Time Required in Formations and Marches. — Recent Changes in European Infantry Tactics. This book has been officially adopted as a text-book in the U. S. Artillery School, the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, and the U. S. Cavalry and Light Artillery School, at Ft. Riley. It has also been officially recommended by the War Department for the use of officers in preparing for exam ination for promotion . 8vo, 514Pag:es, Price, ^3.00 Handsomely Bound in Sheep, 75 Cents Additional. SENT POSTPAID ON RECEIPT OF PRICE BY HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING CO. lOl 4-101 6 Wyandotte St., - KANSAS CITY, MO. t^t &otm A MONTHLY MAGAZINE .^.THE HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING COMPANY ^ I0I4-J0J6 WYANDOTTE ST KANSAS CITY, MO. ^ SUBSCRIPTION ONE DOLLAR A YEAR ^ EDITED BY WALTER BLACKBURN HARTE IF, ' r UNIVERSITY THIS Boo7lTrl% 'oate'du.' '^ ^° ''^^''^ WILL INCREASE TO 50 CrMTo "^"^ ^^ENALTY .DAV AMP, 1-^ *l° f ^Jr^'^Z® ON THE FOURTH LU LU O 0) O