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 SAFE AND 
 UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 A COMMENTARY ON 
 
 POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE 
 
 AMERICAN COMMONWEALTHS 
 
 BY 
 
 HENRY WARE JONES 
 
 31)^^3 
 
 NEW YORK 
 THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY 
 
 PUBLISHERS 
 
 J » •• • '
 
 Copyright, 1918 
 By henry ware JONES 
 
 Norfaonli ^rtes 
 
 J. S. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. 
 
 Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 
 
 • • . •• .'. 
 
 • « • 
 
 * • 9 9 § t • 
 
 • • . "•• 
 
 # * * « • • • < 

 
 T7f 
 
 TO THE 
 
 AMERICAN STATE ELECTORATES 
 
 IN WHOM IS REPOSED THE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL PRE- 
 ROGATIVE, AND UPON WHOM IS IMPOSED THE OBLIGATION 
 OF MAINTAINING AND OF TRANSMITTING UNIMPAIRED TO 
 FUTURE GENERATIONS THE INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, LIBERTY, 
 EQUALITY, AND JUSTICE THAT WAS ORIGINALLY ORDAINED, 
 THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
 
 ,# 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 What does " Safe " and " Unsafe " Democracy mean? In the 
 first place, Democracy is that system of PubHc PoHty under which 
 The Will of The People decides all questions connected with es- 
 tablishing and administrating Government; under which The 
 People exercise the Power to Govern, and continue in the control 
 of its exercise. 
 
 ')' The system consists, or should consist : first, of an explicit 
 "agreement concerning principles of association and of action ; 
 second, of an explicit statement of The Spirit and Intent of The 
 People and of the Objects and Purposes for which Government 
 is established ; and third, of an adequate Body of Law contain- 
 ing logical rules for putting The Will of The People into full effect 
 during the continuous process of Political Administration. 
 
 Generally speaking. Democracies are based upon convictions 
 concerning individual freedom, liberty, equality, and justice as 
 these conditions of human existence are defined by the people ; 
 and any Democracy which is as free as human intelligence can 
 make it from opportunities to misuse the Power to Govern, is 
 reasonably safe for the people to use. 
 
 On the other hand, any system of public polity wherein gen- 
 eralities take the place of clear and precise definitions, and whereby, 
 because of defects in the body of administrative law, the people 
 are either hampered or prevented from maintaining continuously 
 their ordained conditions of individual existence, is unsafe for 
 any Commonwealth to use. 
 
 Neither Government nor Political Administration is automatic. 
 The one results from, and the other proceeds through, political 
 action by The Individual. The force contained in mere procla- 
 mation is insufficient. 
 
 Speaking prefatorily. The Commonwealth is a Collective- 
 Sovereign and its individuals are Sovereign-units. The Sovereign- 
 units exercise Political Power, and at the same time some of them 
 exercise Political Authority. Here are two kinds of political 
 action, and no Democracy is " Safe " anywhere in the world 
 unless its system includes at some time or another a body of 
 Administrative Law which regulates clearly and logically every
 
 vi PREFACE 
 
 exercise of Political Power by the Sovereign-units, and every 
 exercise of Political Authority by those who are chosen to exer- 
 cise it. 
 
 To be more explicit, an unsafe democracy may be one in which 
 the administrative law does not enable the people to apply their 
 ordained Principles of Association freely in their management of 
 public and of private affairs ; or it may be one in which the con- 
 tinuous exercise of Political Power by the Sovereign-units, and 
 their continuous and collective control over the exercise of Politi- 
 cal Authority is not safeguarded adequately by the administrative 
 law. 
 
 This book deals more particularly with the process of Political 
 Administration. 
 
 I*reniises. The author's premises concerning Political Ad- 
 ministration in the American Commonwealths are stated broadly 
 as follows : 
 
 That before the people of each State entered upon the work of 
 political administration they constituted The Electorate as their 
 Collective Sovereign. 
 
 They vested The Electorate with the exercise of Political 
 Prerogative, and solemnly declared their intention to be : 
 
 That for some purposes The Electorate should exercise the 
 Political Power of the people directly. 
 
 That for certain other purposes The Electorate should exercise 
 political power indirectly, and by means of an administrative 
 agency called The Government. 
 
 That through a direct exercise of Political Prerogative the 
 electorate should fill the elective offices in The Government and 
 continuously impart a definite direction to the action of The 
 Government. 
 
 That the electorate should continuously and directly control 
 the exercise of Political Authority by The Government, and by 
 all public officials in the civil service. 
 
 That each individual elector was to be and remain absolutely 
 free in the exercise of Political Prerogative and Political Power. 
 
 That notwithstanding this solemn declaration of intent each 
 State Electorate now uses a permanently organized Intermediary 
 03 an agency by which to exercise its Prerogative and enforce its 
 Control, and has been led by this intermediary into the adoption 
 and use of a system of administrative action which produces an 
 indirect exercise of Political Prerogative and an indirect control 
 over the exercise of Political Authority.
 
 PREFACE vii 
 
 That the present manner of using PoHtical Prerogative and 
 Power constitutes a misuse of such prerogative and power by 
 The Electorate, 
 
 That this present misuse is attributable directly to the lack of 
 an Administrative System that will compel a logical use of Political 
 Prerogative and of Political Power by The Electorate. 
 
 That the Obligations of Sovereignty — not to mention the 
 dictates of prudence — require any CollectiveSov ereign to pro- 
 vide its Sovereign-units with a clear, definite, and logical rule 
 of administrative action, and in advance of such action if possible, 
 and if not possible then, as soon as possible afterwards. 
 
 That because the people were lacking in suflScient Adminis- 
 trative Knowledge they failed in each Commonwealth at the 
 outset of administrative action to construct and ordain the use 
 of a System of Action that would enable them to put their Prin- 
 ciples and Intent into effective operation. 
 
 Objects, The author's objects in writing this book are : 
 
 To set forth the fundamental and detail falsity of the Partizan 
 Party System of Administration now in use. 
 
 To show the impossibility of producing the intended results of 
 American Self Government by the use of that system. 
 
 To outline a logical system of political administration. 
 
 To urge the American Commonwealths to abolish the Partizan 
 Party System, to abandon the use of the Partizan Party as an 
 intermediary in the exercise of Political Prerogative, Political 
 Power, and Political Authority, and to construct and ordain the 
 use of a system of administration under which The People can 
 return to a logical exercise of the Powers of Administration, 
 (See Chap, 23.) 
 
 In explaining why men sometimes adhere to errors of which 
 they themselves are the victims, Mr. Richard Hildreth (" Theory 
 of Morals," p. 235) says in substance, " All men profess to admire 
 and desire truth ; but most men mean by it, the opinions they 
 have already adopted." 
 
 Now action which is based upon opinion is necessarily illogical 
 because an opinion is a mental estimate or conclusion that falls 
 short of the truth. Regarded as a phenomenon such action 
 presents the paradox of illogical — or what is the same thing — 
 of untruthful action by those who profess the truth ; and when- 
 ever opinion which is honestly held as truth is made the basis 
 of action, the further paradox is presented of seemingly honest 
 action working injury to all concerned. The injury is caused by
 
 viii PREFACE 
 
 A," 
 
 the mistaken action, itself consequent upon the adoption of 
 opinion as the motive for action. 
 
 As to Opinion. The following propositions concerning the 
 part played by opinion in the administrative action of the State 
 Electorates will be presented for consideration. 
 
 That the Principles of each State Polity clearly indicate the 
 specific kind of administrative action that was originally in- 
 tended. 
 
 That the failure at the outset to ordain the use of a logical 
 Administrative System left the opportunity open for an expres- 
 sion of opinion regarding proper administrative action. 
 
 That from the very beginning The Electorates have been 
 dominated by opinion in their work of political administration. 
 
 That The Electorates, being dominated by opinion, have been 
 forced to use Expedients in their administrative action. 
 
 That through the use of expedients the administrative action 
 of the electorates has necessarily been perverted from its intended 
 objects, purposes, and results; for an expedient always permits 
 more or less to be done than was originally intended should be 
 
 one. 
 ■J That The People of the American Commonwealths will never 
 be able to obtain the full " Blessings " that were promised in the 
 name of American representative government until they abandon 
 expediential action and return to the intended exercise of their 
 political power and political authority. 
 
 That by reason of the added administrative knowledge, which 
 has been acquired during a century and a quarter, it is now pos- 
 sible for, and is therefore incumbent upon, the Collective Sovereign 
 of each American State to provide its Sovereign-units with a 
 logical system of administration that precludes the existence 
 of opinion regarding the proper discharge of the obligations of 
 sovereignty and of the duties of citizenship. 
 
 Napoleon said that a blunder was worse than an intentional 
 wrong-doing, because, while it was sometimes possible to frus- 
 trate evil intentions beforehand, it was never possible to correct 
 a blunder until afterwards. We have reached a point where if 
 we wish to make a success of our governmental experiment we 
 must correct our past and present blunders. Our wrong-doing is 
 not attributable to intent. We blundered at the outset through 
 adopting the opinion that in the absence of an ordained rule of 
 administrative action the Sovereign could, with safety to The 
 State, delegate the exercise of its prerogative and control. Most
 
 PREFACE ix 
 
 of our subsequent blunders are mainly due to the prevalent 
 opinion that The Partizan Party, as now constituted, is a proper 
 leader, organizer and manager of individual and of official ad- 
 ministrative action. To expose the fallacies upon which these 
 opinions rest is a moral duty incumbent upon any one who per- 
 ceives them, and the discharge of this duty must be the author's 
 apology, if any be needed, for placing before an overtaxed and 
 justly skeptical reading public another book on politics. 
 
 The author contends that the intermediaries now used by the 
 State Electorates are not political parties in any true sense of 
 that term. Because their objects and actions distinguish them 
 from true political parties he has named them Partizan Parties; 
 and the administrative system which has been built up mainly 
 through their instrumentality he has named The Partizan Party 
 System. 
 
 He confidently asserts that the component methods of the 
 partizan party system, as measured by our theory and principles 
 of political action, are radically wrong; and that because of this 
 fact the administrative action which is taken now under this 
 system is necessarily wrong. He does not attack the action of any 
 particular partizan party. He has striven to keep his work 
 above the level of partizanship. Critically and impartially he 
 has tried to investigate the causes of the present pathological 
 condition of the American state democracies and to suggest 
 a remedy. His effort is an attempt to further substantiate the 
 truth that the political agencies, means, and methods of every 
 body politic must give full effectiveness to its established political 
 principles and ideals before the full benefits of its chosen Form of 
 Government can be secured by the people thereof. 
 \/This is no new theme. But in the succeeding pages the reader 
 may discover some old truth clothed in new thought, which, in 
 turn, may lead to the discovery of new truth in the old belief that 
 our form of Representative Government can be made permanent 
 and effectual only through the consistent, continuous, and direct 
 exercise by individuals of those administrative powers which the 
 theory of our government requires them, and them alone to exercise. 
 
 In this book Political Administration will be considered as a 
 systematic series of contributive processes, each of such processes 
 having but one specific contributive object in view. It will be 
 contended that proper Individual Action consists in properly using 
 certain administrative powers, at certain times, for certain proper 
 administrative purposes, by means of certain proper administra-
 
 PREFACE 
 
 tive agencies, means, and methods, in each period of administra- 
 tion. 
 
 The work of political administration will be considered as 
 moral in nature, technical in kind, and as being directed primarily 
 to the proper regulation of individual effort. Individuals will 
 be considered as morally bound to the proper discharge of cer- 
 tain political obligations and duties. 
 
 The various principles, doctrines, processes, agencies, means, 
 and methods of administrative action are set forth in separate 
 chapters. This plan involves more or less repetition ; but repeti- 
 tion is unavoidable because each contributive process ties into 
 its neighboring processes and is at one and the same time a result 
 of what has gone before and a partial cause of what is to follow 
 in an unending cycle of administrative action. 
 
 The use of anecdote is shunned as having no proper place in 
 the treatment of a moral and technical subject. Politics is not 
 the joke that anecdotes so often make it appear. It is not the 
 intention of the author to amuse. He presents a serious treat- 
 ment of a most serious subject for the consideration of seriously 
 minded readers; and those who pick up the book for enter- 
 tainment — Critics excepted — are warned to close it here and 
 shelve it. 
 
 The author's plan of writing is as follows : First, to set forth 
 in general terms the spirit, intent, and objects of the original 
 governmental agreements of the American Commonwealths. 
 Second, to show how and why the Commonwealths failed to put 
 the detail of their agreement into full and effective operation. 
 Third, to show how and why The Partizan Party has taken ad- 
 vantage of the mistakes of the Commonwealths ; and finally, to 
 show that which is necessary to enable the Commonwealths to 
 put their original spirit and intent into effective operation in the 
 future. The past action of the people and its detail consequences 
 is revealed. Their present action and its detail results is disclosed. 
 The way to logical action in the future is indicated. 
 
 The concept of this book regarding Political Reform places it 
 in opposition to the great bulk of contemporary political writing. 
 Also the author believes that absolute accuracy in the use of words 
 and terms is essential. Because of this opposition and because 
 of the requirement of accuracy the author has found it impossible 
 to derive satisfactory support from the well-meant but loosely 
 drawn literary generalities that have for their purpose the im- 
 provement and the continuance in use of the partizan party
 
 PREFACE xi 
 
 system and not its abolishment. Consequently he has been 
 obliged to forego the pleasure and advantage of an impressive 
 list of cited authorities, and has chosen to make the worth of this 
 book depend entirely upon the correctness of its premises, argu- 
 ments, and conclusions, and not to appear to depend in part upon 
 the thoughts of others that are written from a different stand- 
 point and for a different purpose. 
 
 Upper Montclair, New Jersey, 
 August 14, 1918.
 
 LIST OF CHAPTER SUBJECTS 
 
 CHAPTER SUBJECT PAGE 
 
 Preface v 
 
 I. Introductory Survey 1 
 
 II. Political Principles 28 
 
 III. Political Rights 40 
 
 IV. Political Power 56 
 
 V. The Will of the People, Public Opinion ... 70 
 
 VI. The Doctrine of Majority Rule 84 
 
 VII. The Obligations of Sovereignty ant) the Duties of 
 
 Citizenship 96 
 
 VTII. Political Agencies, the Electorate . . . .110 
 
 IX. Political Agencies, the Government .... 120 
 
 X. Political Means anb Political Methods . . . 130 
 
 XI. Political Organization 149 
 
 XII. Political Leadership 175 
 
 XIII. Political Parties 189 
 
 XIV. Political Majorities 203 
 
 XV. The Process of Naturalization and Registration . 214 
 
 XVI. The Process of Nomination 236 
 
 XVII. The Process op Election 264 
 
 XVIII. Political Representation 297 
 
 XIX. The District System of Representation . . . 327 
 
 XX. Political Responsibility 350 
 
 XXI. Political Control 370 
 
 XXII. Political Education 380 
 
 XXIII. The System of Political Administration . . . 394 
 
 XXIV. Political Reform 419 
 
 XXV. Independent Non-Partizan Associations. Commission 
 
 Form of Government 450 
 
 XXVI. Retrospective Survey 459 
 
 XXVII. Conclusions 465 
 
 xiii
 
 CHAPTER I 
 mXRODUCTORY SURVEY 
 
 Let us establish our point of perspective by differentiating 
 the meanings contained in the terms " Government " and " Ad- 
 ministration." 
 
 Both result from an exercise of " The Power to Govern " ; 
 which is Political Power. 
 
 Political Power is used for two main objects. 
 
 In the beginning it is used to establish Government. 
 
 Afterwards it is used to administer Government as established. 
 
 The Establishment and the Administration of Government are 
 two distinct processes in point of time. 
 
 Each process is consummated through the performance by 
 individuals of certain specific acts, one after another, in a regular 
 order of sequence, and for definite purposes. 
 
 The Process of Establishment. Such acts as deciding the Form 
 of Government ; the State Polity ; and the manner of applying 
 the state polity, are parts of the Process of Establishment. 
 
 Theoretically, they are performed but once in a governmental 
 regime, and at its beginning. 
 
 The Process of Administration. Other acts such as deciding 
 the temporary administrative Policy ; naturalizing aliens ; nomi- 
 nating candidates ; filling governmental offices ; enforcing political 
 responsibility ; and controlling the exercise of political authority, 
 are parts of the Process of Administration which must be performed 
 repeatedly, and at stated intervals while the govermental regime 
 lasts. 
 
 If we regard the performance of each of these acts as a distinct 
 exercise of political power for a specific purpose, then the Power 
 to Govern will appear to be composed of two main groups of 
 powers, namely : 
 
 The Powers of Establishment; and The Powers of Adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 The Powers of Establishment are used to bring a new Regime 
 of Life, Law, and Order into existence. 
 
 1
 
 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 The Powers of Administration are used to maintain, perpetuate, 
 and make operative the ordained Regime. 
 
 The names of the several powers will be given in the order of 
 their exercise in Chapter IV. For the purposes of this chapter 
 " Government " will be defined as the Ordained Regime of A State ; 
 and '' Administration " will be defined as the process by which 
 the ordained regime is maintained, perpetuated, and made opera- 
 tive within The State. 
 
 The energizing force in Government and In Administration 
 proceeds immediately from Individual Action. Let us briefly 
 consider the general status of The Individual ; the one who exer- 
 cises The Power to Govern. 
 
 In the American Democracies each adult individual (exceptions 
 excluded) possesses a dual capacity. He is at one and the same 
 time a Political Unit and a Social Unit. 
 
 As a social unit each individual is endowed with the exercise of 
 Individual Power along social and economic lines of effort, accord- 
 ing to a fixed and definite scheme of rights. All are held to have 
 agreed to use these rights so as not to impair the rights of others. 
 Generally these rights are set forth distinctly in a written " Govern- 
 mental Agreement " called a Constitution. The definitions serve 
 to illustrate the meanings of the State Polity in detail. 
 
 As a political unit each adult is endowed with the exercise of 
 Political Power. Some at various times are also endowed with 
 the exercise of Political Authority; and all have assumed the 
 discharge of the Obligations of Sovereignty and of the Duties of 
 Citizenship. The meanings of these terms, in all their details, 
 will appear in subsequent chapters; but in passing there is one 
 important point to be emphasized; viz. the political capacity of 
 The Individual is his supreme capacity; for in Commonwealths 
 like ours, where the collective people act as The Sovereign, every 
 rule of action that finally regulates either the social or the economic 
 effort of the individual, is first proposed, discussed, formed, and 
 adopted as a Law by individuals while acting in a political capacity. 
 In other words, the social and economic status of The Individual 
 is either fixed or changed by legislation, which is a political process. 
 
 A brief review of a few historical facts will serve to set forth the 
 kind of regime intended and the manner of its maintenance. 
 
 The Desired Conditions of Existence : When our Forefathers 
 achieved independence from British Rule, they declared that there 
 were four distinct conditions of human existence which were most
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 
 
 conducive to individual welfare and happiness, and to human 
 progress. 
 
 They said that these conditions were Freedom, Liberty, Equality, 
 and Justice. 
 
 Certain broad and somewhat vague meanings had become at- 
 tached to these terms in colonial times, and, without attempting 
 to define the conditions in set terms, The Fathers in each State 
 accepted the current meanings as sufficiently indicative of the 
 desired social, economic, and political status of The Individual, 
 and ordained the maintenance of these conditions as commonly 
 understood. 
 
 The Political Agencies: Next they constituted two special 
 political agencies by means of which the people were to act at stated 
 intervals in their work of Political Administration. 
 
 The Electorate. The first of these is the Voting Class. It is 
 called The Electorate. In it is vested the Political Prerogative 
 of the people. It has the privilege of exercising the Discretionary 
 Powers and the Volition of the people. All of these powers were 
 to be exercised directly by The Electorate while acting in the ca- 
 pacity of the Collective Sovereign. 
 
 The Government. The second of these is a composite, three- 
 branched agency, consisting of an Executive, a Legislative, and 
 a Judiciary Department. It is an assisting agency of The Elec- 
 torate which is the " Common Superior " of the three administra- 
 tive departments. 
 
 Theoretically, The Government always remains under the direc- 
 tion and control of The Electorate acting as the Collective 
 Sovereign. 
 
 The direction and control of this agency by the Collective 
 Sovereign is necessary because a limited exercise of a few of the 
 sovereign powers of administration has been delegated to it. 
 
 The Fathers then prescribed the qualifications of The Electors 
 and declared that the more important offices in The Government 
 were to be filled through direct nomination and election by The 
 Electorate, and that the less important positions were to be filled 
 by proper action on the part of the elected officials. 
 
 In a very cursory way they then separated and divided the 
 exercise of Political Authority between the three departments in 
 The Government; and, evidently relying upon the force of Civic 
 Virtue to produce logical electoral and official administrative 
 action, they obtained the " Consent of The People " to their action 
 in establishing government; caused all administrative offices
 
 4 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 and positions to be filled from The Electorate, and started The 
 Government in operation. 
 
 But they failed to provide the people beforehand with any 
 adequate guarantee against improper action by The Electorate 
 or by The Government. 
 
 Administrative Problems : From this time on the people faced 
 the new problems of political administration, so called to distin- 
 guish them from the problems involved in the exercise of the 
 Powers of Establishment. 
 
 These administrative problems comprehend the continuous 
 preservation unimpaired of the above-named conditions of indi- 
 vidual existence, and the continuous transmission of them to the 
 succeeding generations of men who constitute The State. As they 
 were in the beginning, these are now our problems, and ever will 
 be the problems of succeeding generations so long as our present 
 form of government continues to exist. 
 
 How Solved. Theoretically, we finally reach a solution of these 
 problems through action that is taken by The Individual while 
 engaged in a political capacity; for every political act that is 
 properly performed, whether we realize it at the time or not, is but 
 an attempt by the individual to apply some one or another of his 
 basic Principles of Action to the correct decision of some one ques- 
 tion or another that affects the true welfare of The Individual and 
 of The State. 
 
 Now as to the manner in which The Individual acts in deciding 
 these constantly arising questions. 
 
 Theoretically, each individual elector is restricted to the use of 
 his intelligence and reason in forming his judgment and will. 
 
 Theoretically, only those who are capable of forming a clear 
 and decisive will are supposed to be vested with the exercise of 
 sovereignty. 
 
 As to the manner of deciding these questions, and sketching it 
 in very general manner : 
 
 Each question must be placed separately before the people in a 
 clear and readily understandable form. Individual will is first 
 formed. The Will of The Electorate is next formed. The various 
 acts connected with the transaction of the several and successive 
 administrative processes which lead up to the decision of the 
 temporary Administrative Policy ; the impartation of a clear and 
 definite " Impulse " to action by The Government ; and the filling 
 of the elective offices must be performed ; and finally the people 
 must control the official action of their representatives and see to
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 
 
 it that they pass and enforce Laws that are responsive to the 
 Administrative Will as ascertained at The Election. 
 
 Requisites for Proper Electoral Action : Few of us realize the 
 number or the variety of the moves that are theoretically required 
 of an individual Elector in the transaction of the various steps, 
 stages, and processes in the work of Political Administration ; 
 but rough as the above outline of such work is, it may nevertheless 
 serve to make these two facts apparent ; namely, that before the 
 average elector can hope to transact his part of the general ad- 
 ministrative work of the commonwealth properly, he must in the 
 first place have a definite conception of what is meant by his basic 
 Principles of Action ; and in the second place he must possess the 
 assistance of a definite and logical System of Electoral Action 
 that will show him how he can perform every administrative act 
 that is required of him properly, and that will also show him how 
 he can, if necessary, enforce the proper performance of such work 
 from others. Such a Body of Law is the accredited standard of 
 Electoral Morality. 
 
 Requisites for Proper Official Action : But Electoral Action is 
 only one part of Administrative Action. The other part is Official 
 Action. Before the people can reasonably hope to obtain the in- 
 tended kind of Official Action they must provide their Public 
 Officials with plain, suitable, and unmistakable rules for the dis- 
 charge of the definite function and special duties of each separate 
 office ; to the end in the first place, that the exercise of Political 
 Authority cannot be safely surrendered by any official in any de- 
 partment of The Government, or safely usurped by another ; and 
 to the end in the second place, that The Commonwealth shall 
 always possess in such a body of rules a reasonable and just basis 
 for action in enforcing political responsibility and punishing mal- 
 feasance in office ; and to the end in the third place, that the great 
 body of individuals who possess certain rights shall also possess 
 an adequate guarantee that their rights will not be permanently 
 impaired by the action of those few individuals to whom they 
 delegate an exercise of some of their Political Power. 
 
 Without such a Body of Rules there is no definite and ade- 
 quately enforcible standard of Official Morality. 
 
 The Fathers failed to provide the original Commonwealths with 
 adequate standards of Electoral Morality and Official Morality. 
 The succeeding Commonwealths have failed in the same respect. 
 
 Inherited Conditions. Turning now from a contemplation of 
 intent and of failures in past action, let us glance at the conditions
 
 6 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 of existence that have been transmitted to us by our predecessors. 
 One hundred and twenty-fi\^e years of self-government has brought 
 us to the pass where absolute individual freedom in administrative 
 action does not exist ; where liberty in economic action is grievously 
 restricted ; where equal opportunities between individuals to 
 promote the Common Welfare through administrative action are 
 destroyed ; where political and also economic injustices are rife in 
 every American Commonwealth ; and where the woof of American 
 Politics is shot through and through with a web of trickery, deceit, 
 hypocrisy, chicanery, dishonesty, fraud, intimidation, oppression, 
 moral crime, political crime, and statutory crime. 
 
 To some this statement may come as a surprise. But to many 
 others it is a bitter conviction. Already on the streets of the Cities 
 and Towns of the United States one may hear the question dis- 
 cussed whether, after all, the firm rule of an Autocrat or of a 
 Dictator is not to be preferred to the loose political administration 
 of our heedless Societies. Nor are the warnings of republican 
 statesmen throughout the world lacking to the effect that if the 
 political action of the " American People " is allowed to proceed 
 unchecked along the lines it has followed and is following, then 
 American Representative Government must ultimately fail to 
 accomplish the objects for which it was ordained, and, failing, 
 must give way to some other form of government that is better 
 adapted to conserve human morality, welfare, and happiness. 
 
 What, O my Countrymen, have we done in the past that could 
 so alter our ordained conditions of existence ? What are we doing 
 now to contribute to these administrative results or that lends 
 color to this belief ? With Freedom, Liberty, Equality, and Justice 
 at present clearly defined and still solemnly ordained as the proper 
 conditions of life ; with Political Power in our hands and placed 
 there to enable us through its exercise to continuously maintain 
 these conditions withm the Body Politic ; why is it, that through 
 administrating Government to ourselves, we impair these condi- 
 tions, imperil the stability of our Form of Government, and vitiate 
 both the public morals and private morals? 
 
 The Original Administrative Error : For twenty years the author 
 has sought a conclusive answer to these questions. He has worked 
 in the belief that if investigation will succeed in accurately locating 
 the origin and cause of an administrative evil, it will at the same 
 time disclose the course of action which will eliminate that evil. 
 To him the present deplorable condition presented the appearance 
 of a gradual and cumulative growth. He saw in the present mode
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 
 
 of administrative action a result of what the American Common- 
 wealths had done or left undone in their past administrative action. 
 In common with others he found himself deprived of the free and 
 untrammeled exercise of political rights that he knew^ were his and 
 theirs. He set himself the task of finding out why he and they 
 were so deprived. Starting with no preconceived theory, relying 
 on observation, patience, and perseverance, he has traced all of 
 the prominent evils of our present administrative action back to 
 one and the same origin ; namely, the absence of a definite and 
 comprehensive Body of Administrative Law in the State Con- 
 stitutions and the consequent use of Opinion — uncertain, illogical, 
 and devious Public Opinion — as the impulse to Electoral and to 
 Official Action. 
 
 The Peril of Opinion : Opinion, concerning right individual 
 exercise of democratic political power and authority, should not 
 be allowed to exist. An opinion, whether it is formed by an in- 
 dividual or by a commonwealth, is a mental estimate or conclusion 
 that falls short of the truth. It exposes its holder to loss or im- 
 pairment of ordained status. Being a faulty conclusion, it must, 
 perforce, be put into operation by an expedient; that is, by a 
 means or method of operation that permits either more or less to 
 be done than was originally intended should be done. Good 
 Government, or a proper administration of the Will and Intent 
 of The People, can never be produced through devising expedients 
 for putting opinion into effect. If faulty conclusions concerning 
 administrative action are put into operation by administrative 
 expedients, then either more or less will be done than was intended 
 to be done originally, and individual hardships and injustices will 
 follow as a matter of course. They have followed, in abundance ; 
 and mainly because the American Commonwealths, never having 
 set forth their Administrative Truth fully in the administrative 
 law, have left the opportunity open for the free play of and the 
 free manipulation of " Opinion " concerning w^hat is right electoral 
 and official action. 
 
 The fact that the exploitation of the opportunity is due in part 
 to human nature has not been overlooked. In every common- 
 wealth there is a large body of individuals who, because of their 
 nature, will seek their owm private advantage ahead of the ordained 
 General Welfare through their manipulation of public opinion 
 and of political administration ; and the only way in which such 
 action can be prevented in part is through the enactment and the 
 enforcement by the people of an adequate and comprehensive
 
 8 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Body of Administrative Law which regulates administrative action 
 logically and in detail, thereby putting a premium upon right 
 action and a penalty upon wrong action. 
 
 "A Government of Laws." Nothing but such a body of Law 
 will ever enable a Commonwealth to obtain what John Adams 
 called " A Government of Laws and not of Men." John Adams 
 knew human nature in the mass. He insisted that without logical 
 Laws there could not be a " Government of Laws " such as The 
 Commonwealth intended to have. Massachusetts followed his 
 lead far enough to insert a distinct statement of its purposes and 
 intent in its Fundamental Law. It enacted what is known as its 
 Body of Liberties, but it did not provide its Sovereign-units with 
 a clear, distinct, and unquestionable law of individual action in 
 support of those liberties, and before long the nature of its 
 " Administration " changed to one of Men and not of Laws. 
 
 Administrative Success, Requisites : One of the requisites for 
 successful Political Administration is that the System of State 
 Polity be able of itself to exert a beneficial and protecting influence 
 on the individuals of The State. The System is but the expression 
 of the Public Will ; and this Will should be set forth clearly in the 
 Administrative System; thereby not only enabling individuals 
 but compelling individuals to act in accordance with the Public 
 Will. Such a Body of Law constitutes the real " Political iEgis 
 of the State,"and it alone can discharge the function properly of 
 declaring what shall be considered right, and what is wrong and 
 hurtful individual administrative action. 
 
 A Standard of Public Morals. The Body of Administrative Law 
 should stand as the expression of the Public Conscience and Morals ; 
 but this it cannot do unless every administrative act is set forth 
 in clear and definite terms. American administrative morals 
 differ from the political morals of every other nation ; and we 
 should keep them different. But the only way to do so effectively 
 is to define our ideas of political morality clearly and definitely in 
 the Fundamental Law ; thereby establishing a distinctive standard 
 of administrative morals and morality to which all must conform. 
 
 Moral Force. Also, The People must have Force with which to 
 effect their Will. But Moral Force they cannot have unless they 
 have logical and minute administrative Law for its basis. Other- 
 wise their Moral Force is dissipated in the conflict and struggle of 
 Opinion concerning what is right, or moral, action. 
 
 Logical Means and Methods. The individual rights that are 
 indicated by the terms "Freedom," "Liberty," "Equality," and
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 9 
 
 " Justice " spring into operation through political action by the 
 people of The State. Their maintenance is to be accomplished 
 through administrative action by the individuals of The State. 
 Viewing self-government as an attempt by the people to maintain 
 these individual Rights, the prime factor in success is an adequate 
 and logical System of Administrative Action, meaning by this 
 term, a system composed of means and methods of a character 
 that will enable individual electors and officials to act in strict 
 conformity to The Commonwealth's intended Plan of Action. 
 
 "Eternal Vigilance.'^ For the moment confining our thought 
 to what The Electorate has to do in maintaining individual rights : 
 
 Proper individual action is an indispensable requisite for success- 
 ful Political Administration ; and this, in turn, calls for the 
 exercise of eternal vigilance by the electors and a continuous and 
 direct use by them of their specific Administrative Powers. 
 
 In support of this truth let us hark back to an utterance of 
 John Philpot Curran, made in a speech at Dublin in 1790; and 
 which paraphrased to fit political conditions existing here may be 
 fairly rendered as follows : " It is the common fate of the indolent 
 to see their rights become the prey of the active. Eternal vigilance 
 on the part of individuals who possess these rights is the price 
 which they must pay for their continued maintenance ; and vigi- 
 lance, in this connection, means not only watchfulness, but con- 
 tinuous individual exercise of the political power that was given 
 them to be used in maintaining their rights. Unless this price is 
 fully paid, servitude in one form or another is at once the conse- 
 quence of their neglect and the punishment of their indolence." 
 
 If this utterance enunciates a political truth, — and who that is 
 conversant with the history of past experiments in self-government 
 can doubt it, — then surely it is the voice of Opinion which claims 
 that it is possible for the electors of the American Commonwealths 
 to effectively maintain their own rights and the rights of The 
 Commonwealth by passively allowing a few active men at the head 
 of this or that association of voters to exercise their political pre- 
 rogative for them in the first place, and to dominate their entire 
 administrative action afterwards ; and this, too, notwithstanding 
 the well-known character of the motives, means, practises, and 
 actions of these few active men and their sponsors. 
 
 But this is exactly the fundamental opinion that is held by the 
 great majority of the misled and administratively uninformed 
 American Electorates. They have proceeded to put this opinion 
 into operation ; and this action on their part explains exactly why
 
 _JiO 
 
 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 we of the present generation have not received from our prede- 
 cessors, and cannot transmit to our successors, the full benefits 
 that were promised to us, yes, and to humanity at large, in the 
 name of American Representative Government. 
 
 The adoption of the opinion that a direct exercise of individual 
 political prerogative and powers could be delegated, led naturally 
 to the formation and adoption of further opinions regarding the 
 agencies through which, and the means and methods by which, 
 this delegated exercise could be made to serve the purpose of a 
 direct exercise ; and the results which immediately followed the 
 application of these opinions to the technical work of political 
 administration gave rise to a host of conflicting opinions regarding 
 nearly everything connected with that work. 
 
 The Original Lack of Administrative Knowledge. Now an 
 Opinion cannot exist in the bright light of Truth. It flourishes 
 best in the murk of Ignorance. How did these opinions gain a 
 foothold and vigor if not because of a widespread lack of ad- 
 ministrative knowledge? 
 
 Behind every opinion lies a cause for its existence ; and behind 
 the use of expedient lies the reason for its use. If we can locate 
 the cause for the existence of administrative opinions, we shall have 
 reached a sure starting-point from which to trace the underlying 
 reasons for the use of administrative expedients. 
 
 Admitting the existence of beliefs to the contrary, nevertheless 
 the author anticipates that those who are familiar with American 
 political history will agree with him that the underlying cause for 
 the existence of administrative opinion in the first American 
 Commonwealths was the lack of adequate administrative knowl- 
 edge. Lacking in such knowledge The Fathers necessarily trans- 
 mitted this lack to their successors and left them without the 
 information that was necessary to produce logical administration. 
 
 The Lack of a Distinctive Political Science. One of the handicaps 
 which the American Commonwealths have always struggled 
 against is the lack of a distinctive political science. Stress is laid 
 upon this point for the reason that each separate Body Politic 
 must from the nature of things be capable of having its own distinct 
 science of Government. It must also possess such a science before 
 it can hope to avoid perturbed administrative action. The political 
 sciences of the different bodies politic of the world must differ. 
 They are distinctive because they are in each instance founded 
 upon certain definite but different conceptions of the nature of 
 Political Power; of the specific objects to be attained by its
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 11 
 
 exercise ; and of the agencies, means, and methods by which it is 
 to be used. 
 
 These various and varying concepts serve in part to distinguish 
 poHtical communities from each other; and in no two bodies 
 poHtic are they ahke. If PoHtical Administration were merely 
 the orderly regulation of the affairs of a community according to 
 one general process or system, then a general political science could 
 apply to all communities alike ; but the divergencies existing in 
 the above-mentioned conceptions preclude this idea ; and each 
 body politic must perforce be capable of possessing its own dis- 
 tinctive political science. 
 
 Take an illustration of this truth from the liberal arts. Tanning 
 is the process of converting raw hides into leather. The basic idea 
 is to extrude all fat from the hides and to make the skin tough and 
 durable. There are several distmct processes by which this result 
 is obtained. Each process or system has its own distinctive agen- 
 cies, appliances, and methods. Each has its own distinct science ; 
 that is, a precise knowledge beforehand of the separate details of the 
 process. Each process will convert raw hides into leather. But 
 the knowledge of what is done and happens, and of the appliances 
 used and of the methods pursued in the process of bark tanning, 
 is of little practical use to one who tans by the chrome process ; 
 and electric-tanned leather cannot be produced by following the 
 processes and using the appliances employed either in chrome 
 tanning or in bark tanning. The basic idea is the same in each 
 process ; but the agencies, the means, and the methods are dif- 
 ferent ; and the results, that is, the leathers, are different in ap- 
 pearance, in toughness, and in durability. 
 
 As in each process of tanning the basic idea is the same, so in 
 most of the free political communities of our western civilization 
 the basic idea is the same. But as in tanning the processes, the 
 means, the agencies, the appliances, and the results are different, 
 so in political administration within these different bodies politic 
 the administrative action, the agencies, the means, the methods, 
 and the results are different. 
 
 In a very broad and loose way The Fathers indicated the general 
 manner in which Political Power and Political Authority were to 
 be used ; but lacking in sufficient administrative knowledge, they 
 were perforce unable to construct an authoritative statement of 
 the relations existing between cause and effect in administrative 
 action. They could not produce an affirmative thesis setting forth 
 the peculiar relations existing between political Responsibility
 
 12 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 and political Freedom. They could not in advance of adminis- 
 tration issue an authoritative explanation of the dependence of 
 individual Freedom and Liberty upon the use of logical means and 
 methods for the exercise of Political Power and Authority. The 
 people of the succeeding Commonwealths knew little if anything 
 more of these matters. They did little more than to copy the 
 political action and the administrative procedure of their pred- 
 ecessors. No American Commonwealth has at any time pos- 
 sessed a body of law which imperatively directs the attention of 
 its sovereign-units to the specific requirements of its distinctive 
 administrative action. In no Commonwealth have the people 
 ever taken the time to institute a systematic and scientific inquiry 
 concerning what, for them, is a logical exercise of Political Power 
 and Political Authority ; and this in a sketchy way explains why 
 no American Commonwealth at present possesses its own dis- 
 tinctive and inclusive political science. 
 
 But a knowledge of what must happen in the process of adminis- 
 tration, and of how it can be made to happen, is as necessary to 
 proper action by a sovereign-unit as the knowledge of the knack of 
 his tools is to good work by a craftsman ; and common prudence 
 suggests that this necessity be met without further delay. 
 
 It will be assumed that the capacity of the individual to govern 
 can never equal his power to govern so long as he uses incorrect 
 methods of administrative action ; and that if he uses such methods 
 be his intentions never so honest, the result of his attempt to 
 govern will be misgovernment. Past experience warrants this 
 assumption. It also forces the conviction that one of the first 
 requisites to successful administration is a widespread appreciation 
 of correct methods of action. And this The Commonwealth 
 should bring about because it depends for its continued existence 
 upon the proper action of its Sovereign-units. 
 
 Not only does the individual possess no political science as a 
 guide, but at every turn he encounters the discouraging " Opinion " 
 that an exact political science is impossible. On the street, from 
 the rostrum, and by the press he is informed that our failures in 
 political administration are excusable if not inevitable because of 
 " the impossibility " of devising a system for putting the conflicting 
 desires of large bodies of individuals under a uniform and just 
 restraint. The " necessity for better methods " is admitted, but 
 " better Partizan Party Methods " is what is meant. The in- 
 dividual's attention is not directed to a consideration of our 
 Principles of Action, which clearly indicate the definite kind of
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 13 
 
 restraint on individual action that is required, but is diverted to 
 a consideration of arguments intended to show how The Partizan 
 Party System can be patched up and made to serve. Fmally, 
 this " Opinion " is driven home and cHnched by the statement that 
 were such a science possible, it would have been constructed and 
 we should have had it long ago. 
 
 To such as hold this opinion the mere fact that we of the superior 
 intelligence have not as yet been able to devise a logical adminis- 
 trative system seems to warrant the conclusion that an exact 
 political science is impossible, notwithstanding the existence of 
 exact Principles of Action. The author contends, however, that 
 such mental processes, such jumping at conclusions, such begging 
 of the whole question discloses a lack of superior intelligence. 
 Successful business men never proceed upon the assumption that 
 a thing can never happen because it never has happened. In fact 
 they proceed upon the very opposite assumption. Competition 
 bears so heavily upon economic results that economic success 
 depends more and more upon making things happen that never 
 happened before ; and it is the realization of this fact that has in 
 part led to the recent great development of economic detail. 
 From this development of economic detail we can learn something 
 about developing the detail of political administration. One 
 general rule holds equally good in each of these departments of 
 human effort. This rule is, that results are always logical. The 
 meaning contained in this rule is, that correct action will always 
 'produce correct results ; that incorrect action will always produce 
 incorrect results ; and that mistaken action will always produce 
 puzzling and paradoxical results to those who honestly take it. 
 
 Now there is nothing mysterious in Administrative Action by 
 which intellection is paralyzed. The administrative actions of 
 individuals in a body politic must necessarily produce just as 
 certain and definite results as the action of force on matter ; and 
 this is especially true in bodies politic like ours wherein the nature 
 of political power and the objects for which it is to be used are clearly 
 stated, and wherein the manner of its exercise is clearly indicated. 
 Effect follows action in politics as surely as in physics. Every 
 science, no matter what, is nothing but a correct statement of the 
 sequence between cause and effect. An exact knowledge of causes 
 will fully explain resultant effects whether these effects are pro- 
 duced in and upon matter or in and upon the individuals who 
 compose a body politic. 
 
 The author will contend that the evils which exist in our present
 
 14 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 administrative action are due to honest but unprescient action 
 by the people ; that one of the causes for such action is the lack 
 of a distinctive Political Science ; and that the time has now come 
 when that lack must be supplied. 
 
 The Lack of an Authoritative Political Literature. Lack begets 
 lack. Nowhere is this fact better illustrated than in the present 
 chaotic political literature of the American People. Lacking in a 
 political science the commonwealths are lacking in a foundation 
 for an authoritative political literature. No American Common- 
 wealth possesses a body of authoritative political literature, or 
 even any disquisitions that attempt a comprehensive explanation 
 of its distinctive effort at self-government in the same way that 
 Blackstone's Commentaries reveal the structure, purpose, and 
 detail application of the English Common Law. As a consequence, 
 the individual is necessarily left to find out for himself how he is 
 to act properly in any given administrative emergency, or what 
 agencies, means, and methods are proper for him to use while 
 endeavoring to put the Principles of The State Polity into effective 
 operation. 
 
 Now if in this predicament the individual turns for assistance 
 to his political literature he will not find in it the authoritative 
 help he seeks. He will not find a single American book in which 
 the subject of political administration is comprehensively con- 
 sidered from its original meanings or standpoint ; or in which the 
 functions of administrative methods are made the subject of careful 
 examination. He will find in this literature the same words and 
 terms used by different writers to express diametrically opposed 
 ideas. He will find that what is claimed by one writer as the truth 
 is denied by another. He will find no general agreement either 
 as to fundamentals or as to detail. He will find that ideas which 
 are correctly expressed by the word " Government " are much 
 more often than otherwise confounded with ideas that can only 
 be properly expressed by the term " Political Administration." 
 In this literature he will find that groups of individuals who are 
 actuated by and who are working for the satisfaction of private 
 and selfish desires are indiscriminatingly spoken of as " Political 
 Parties." He will find that such groups are described as being 
 animated and kept together by " Political Principles " ; while, 
 as a matter of fact, it is the utter lack of such principles which 
 keeps them together. He will find the subject of political adminis- 
 tration approached from such widely differing premises as to bring 
 about widely differing conclusions as to requisite methods of
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 15 
 
 action. From end to end he will find it abounding in argument 
 supporting the use of expedients which necessarily permit the 
 satisfaction of politically immoral desires. And finally, he will 
 find this literature teeming with an idiom in which vernacular 
 meanings are attached to technical terms, thus producing inex- 
 tricable confusion of thought and frustrating his every attempt 
 to reduce order out of chaos. 
 
 Such a condition of affairs makes it almost impossible for the 
 average individual to find out for himself what is the truth about 
 our administrative action both past and present. It is, however, 
 ideal for the spread of Opinion. But a political literature is one 
 of the educational factors in political administration, and if the 
 literature is chaotic, that fact may be accepted as a partial ex- 
 planation of a chaotic administrative action. 
 
 The Lack of a Logical System of Political Administration. The 
 lack of a Political Science and of an Authoritative Literature 
 and of an adequate Educational System (which will be considered 
 in Chapter XXII) are somewhat remote causes for illogical ad- 
 ministrative action. We pass now to the consideration of some 
 more immediate causes for such action. 
 
 Because the people of the original thirteen Commonwealths 
 were lacking in sufficient information, and also in time for prepara- 
 tion, they were perforce unable to construct a logical and compre- 
 hensive system of administrative action and to embody it within 
 the Fundamental Law. In other words, the Collective Sovereigns 
 failed to discharge one of the Obligations of Sovereignty before 
 they entered upon the exercise of Sovereignty. They left the 
 opportunity open for an improper exercise of Political Prerogative 
 and Political Power by failing to properly regulate its exercise 
 beforehand. The people entered upon the work of political ad- 
 ministration without a compulsory Rule of Administrative Action. 
 
 As will more fully appear in Chapter XXIII, the widespread 
 inappreciation of true administrative requirements, and the physi- 
 cal conditions then existing in the States combined to interpose 
 serious obstacles to easy and logical administrative action. The 
 development of the land and its opportunities demanded the 
 unremitting attention of individuals. Political Administration 
 bade fair to become an onerous work because of the time and 
 effort required. There was no body of law which compelled in- 
 dividual electors to take logical administrative action ; and, as a 
 means for avoiding the onerous hardships of Politics, the Collec- 
 tive Sovereigns of each commonwealth permitted their Sovereign-
 
 16 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 units to delegate their own exercise of Political Prerogative to a few 
 of their number who volunteered to act as Political Leaders in 
 administrative action. 
 
 In subsequent chapters we shall see how, for the sake of mere 
 individual convenience, these two or more groups of State leaders 
 were allowed to build up in each State a personal following of 
 electors into two or more organized associations of partizan voters, 
 who, at the direction of their leaders, would vote as a unit ; and in 
 passing it may be well to say here that it is these separate and 
 ostensibly opposed associations, similar in nature, undemocratic 
 in organization, in no true sense political parties, often having 
 non-political ends in view, and often working together in accord 
 for self-preservation and in self-interest, that are hereafter referred 
 to inclusively as " The Partizan Party." 
 
 We shall also see that the people permitted The Partizan Party 
 to be established as a quasi-permanent, unconstitutional, and 
 uncontemplated Political Agency ; that they permitted it to lead 
 and to organize the administrative action of individual electors ; 
 to gradually absorb the exercise of the political prerogative of the 
 electors in the periodic determination of administrative policies, 
 measures, and candidacies; to exercise a dominant control over 
 the periodic performance of all of the several administrative 
 processes; to obtain and exercise a dominant control over the 
 action of the representatives of The Electorate in public office ; 
 and to exercise its illogically acquired power and control for objects 
 that were never contemplated in the original Government Agree- 
 ments of the people. 
 
 We shall see how all this came about as a natural consequence 
 of the lack of an ordained and logical system of administrative 
 action. Furthermore we shall see that instead of then devising 
 and ordaining the use of an administrative system which would 
 meet the altered requirements of their altered scheme of action 
 the people imprudently and improperly allowed The Partizan 
 Party to prescribe the rules and practises under which this new, 
 illogical, and originally uncontemplated kind of administrative 
 action was to be taken ; and that by so doing the people also im- 
 prudently surrendered the exercise of their proper right and avoided 
 their obligation to regulate the internal action of, and control the 
 administrative work of, The Partizan Party considered as an 
 Administrative Agency. 
 
 The Transmutation of Political Power into Partizan Party Pmver. 
 The folly, not to call it the political immorality, of such action by
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 17 
 
 the people does not stand forth clearly upon a mere statement of 
 such action. That element will become more clearly apparent 
 when we consider what The Partizan Party has done. In sub- 
 sequent chapters we shall see that it has never discharged its 
 illogically acquired functions properly ; that through an improper 
 exercise of an unrestricted authority which in the beginning was 
 hastily and imprudently conferred it has proceeded step by step 
 to the establishment of a body of partizan customs, usages, and 
 practises which, when put into active use, almost completely 
 nullifies the original meanings and operative force of our ordained 
 Principles of Political Action ; which always restricts and often 
 completely destroys the opportunity for free administrative action 
 on the part of individual electors and of public officials ; which in 
 effect transmutes the political power of individuals and the political 
 authority of public officials into Partizan Party Power ; and which 
 enables The Partizan Party to use its partizan power partly for 
 its own perpetual maintenance and partly for the private and 
 politically immoral advantage of its active members, its adherents, 
 and its outside sponsors and backers. 
 
 Effects of this Transmutation. We, the American Electorates, 
 have permitted this to be done. Because of this we, as individual 
 Sovereign-units, can no longer either freely exercise or enjoy the 
 intended fulness of our Political Rights. Nor can we transmit 
 the full enjoyment or exercise of them to our successors. Where 
 Justice was to reign, giving to each his rightful dues, " restraining 
 men from injuring one another and leaving each otherwise eco- 
 nomically free," grasping Injustice sits enthroned, taking and ever 
 taking from the political power and economic substance of the 
 many weak, and bestowing unequal advantage upon the powerful 
 few. In the place of Democratic Political Equality as the instru- 
 ment of Justice stands The Power of The Boss as the instrument 
 of Privilege. 
 
 The Transmutation of Political Action into Partizan Party Action. 
 All this has come about " legally " ; in the name of American 
 Democracy ; and as the result of an alleged exercise of The Will 
 of The People. This is all our own doing. To these consequences 
 we are obliged at present to submit, not because submission is 
 right, but mainly because we, in our political shortsightedness, 
 have been gradually led into the adoption of, the development 
 of, and the use of the illogical partizan party system of political 
 administration which to a preponderating extent transmutes 
 Individual Political Action into Partizan Party Action.
 
 18 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Effects of This Transmutation. Even the action of individual 
 electors who are not members of the partizan party associations 
 is twisted into a support of a partizan party because in many 
 administrative acts such an one is obliged — if he acts at all — 
 to use the means, methods, and instrumentalities that are furnished 
 by The Partizan Party ; and if he does not act then his inaction 
 makes Partizan Party Action easier. 
 
 As for The Electorates, they are forced to take a kind of action 
 that in addition to minimizing the operative force of their ordained 
 prmciples of action also alters, impairs, and in many instances 
 actually destroys the very conditions of individual existence which 
 self-government was invoked to maintain and to perpetuate. 
 
 The Ordained Kind of Action. In free democratic communities 
 the true moving forces in administrative action are the Political 
 Principles of the community. They are made operative or not 
 through individual action. The use by individuals of expediential 
 agencies and methods must necessarily diminish the operative 
 force of the principles through affording opportunities for avoiding 
 the mandate contained in the principles regarding the manner of 
 individual action. 
 
 But even if the people use expediential agencies and methods, 
 the principles themselves do not change. In our case they still 
 continue to embody our Political Truth. They were ordained 
 by Common Consent. They still prescribe the ethics of our ad- 
 ministrative conduct. They still declare with unabated force the 
 results sought to be attained through our administrative effort. 
 They are still as binding upon our individual administrative action 
 as they were in the beginning. And when taken in connection with 
 the commonly accepted rules of Democratic Action they leave no 
 question open but that the results desired shall be obtained in the 
 first place through free, equal, just, direct, and united adminis- 
 trative action by the individuals who compose The Electorates ; 
 and in the second place, through action on the part of individual 
 officials that is thoroughly responsible and responsive to The Will 
 of The Electorate, and not to the Will of a Partizan Party. 
 
 This is the kind of administrative action which we profess to 
 desire. But desire alone can never produce it. The mere existence 
 of Principles will never produce it. No amount of mere intent 
 and desire will ever produce it. Nothing will ever produce it but 
 logical action on the part of individual electors and of individual 
 officials ; and this — with human nature in its present stage of 
 development — will never be even reasonably approximated until
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 19 
 
 individual electors and officials possess an adequate system of ac- 
 tion under which it is possible for a majority of them to take logical 
 action if they desire to, and under which it is possible for The 
 Commonwealth to reasonably and justly compel such action from 
 a majority of all who represent it in an administrative capacity. 
 Without such methods our political capacity can never equal our 
 political power, and our incapacity will necessarily result in 
 maladministration. 
 
 Now our expressions of intent and our professions have drawn 
 encomiums from all lovers of Democracy ; but our action towards 
 making that intent operative has been so lacking in requisites as 
 to deprive that intent of its necessary force. When for the sake 
 of individual ease we adopted the use of the partizan party system 
 of administration we departed from a logical exercise of adminis- 
 trative power and a logical exercise of control over the exercise 
 of administrative authority. We left the opportunity open for 
 an improper exercise of that power and authority in every step, 
 stage, and process of administrative action. In the succeeding 
 chapters the author will attempt to prove that this opportunity 
 has been improperly exploited by The Partizan Party. This he 
 will do through showing the impropriety of the objects for which, 
 and the immorality of the manner in which, The Partizan Party 
 leads, organizes, dominates, and controls both electoral and official 
 administrative action. 
 
 The Unceasing Effort of The Partizan Party. There is another 
 partial explanation of our persistence in illogical administrative 
 action. The American Electorates are subject to an unceasing 
 advocacy by The Partizan Party of the continued use of its make- 
 shift system of action. It argues that political administration is 
 a mj-sterious and an occult process ; that it requires the expenditure 
 of a vast amount of time and energy by the individual ; that the 
 great body of the electorate does not possess a requisite amount 
 of administrative knowledge ; that it is unsafe to entrust adminis- 
 tration to a people who do not know what is required of them ; 
 that The Partizan Party possesses this information ; that the re- 
 sults of political administration can be attained just as well, and 
 much better, and with much more individual ease and convenience 
 providing The Electorate will entrust the transaction of its onerous 
 formative and constructive work to The Partizan Party, leaving 
 nothing for The Electorate to do but vote at the elections ; and 
 that even this work can be made more easy provided the electors 
 will vote as The Partizan Party directs.
 
 20 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 So far in our governmental experiment these arguments have 
 prevailed with the majority in the American Electorates ; and in 
 each State the electorate has accepted the kindly proffered offices 
 of The Partizan Party to act as an administrative agency. 
 
 But let us look a little more closely into the character of our 
 action in this respect, and also into the nature, objects, and internal 
 workings of the benevolently importunate partizan party. 
 
 A paragraph will suffice to describe the character of our action. 
 Whenever, as is the case in the American Commonwealths, the 
 administrative agencies are distinctly set forth and the means by 
 which administrative electoral action must be taken is generally 
 understood, then any other or substituted agency or means must 
 of necessity be a makeshift or an expedient. The use of an ex- 
 pediential agency or means under such circumstances is, to say 
 the least, illogical ; and if such an agency or means is taken into 
 use for the purpose of satisfying any desires other than those which 
 were originally sanctioned by the people as moral, or if its use is 
 adopted in order to enable individuals to avoid obligations, re- 
 sponsibilities, and duties that were originally assumed by them in 
 return for political freedom and economic liberty, then the use of 
 the expedient becomes immoral. 
 
 The Collusive Action of Partizan Parties. In each State there 
 are two or more partizan party associations working under prac- 
 tically the same system of internal management and for the same 
 selfish and non-political objects. Each is actively exploiting the 
 opportunity left open by an insufficiently regulated restraint upon 
 human action. Whenever the sure accomplishment of their secret, 
 selfish, and ulterior purposes is seriously threatened by an attempt 
 of The Electorate to provide better methods of action, then these 
 ostensibly opposed associations combine collusively for mutual 
 protection, to defeat the attempt, and to maintain the precedent 
 of Partizan Party Control over administrative action. 
 
 Underlying Cause For. Considered as an Organization the parti- 
 zan party owes its existence partly to the deeply rooted natural 
 human propensity to escape labor whenever it is possible to do so. 
 
 Its Internal Management. Its method of internal management 
 reflects the effect of this propensity. Each partizan association 
 is composed of two classes of members, namely a numerically small 
 but active class and a numerically large but passive or indolent 
 class. The desire to escape labor, combined with ignorance and 
 greed, has led the large indolent class to allow its rightful action 
 to be so completely dominated and controlled by the small active
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 21 
 
 class that now the great body of the membership merely serves as 
 a medium by which The Managements of the partizan organiza- 
 tions are enabled to substitute partizan party action in the place 
 of true political action on the part of the passive members. 
 
 Not Based on Political Principles. From this it is apparent that 
 the partizan Associations of " voters " are not based on any of our 
 ordained principles of democratic action. As a matter of fact they 
 do not give effect to any such principle. The Memberships in 
 these associations do not freely elect their Managements ; nor do 
 they directly decide how the associations shall act. Because they 
 submissively do as they are told to do these passive voters are in 
 truth nothing but the private means by which the individuals who 
 compose the Party Managements are enabled (under the false 
 pretense of political leadership and with the use of purely partizan 
 practises) to satisfy the selfish and private desires of these leaders 
 and those upon whom they are dishonestly dependent, at the cash 
 expense of The Commonwealth, the degradation of public and of 
 private morals, and the impairment of the general welfare. 
 
 Composition of The Managements. As matters stand to-day 
 The Managements of these partizan associations exercise an al- 
 most complete degree of control over the administrative action of 
 individual electors whether they are members of the associations 
 or not. These Managements are almost wholly composed of men 
 who in one way or another, directly or indirectly, either make a 
 living, or gain political " honor " and preferment by keeping and 
 exercising this control. These Party Managements have not been 
 selected by The People. Considered as administrative agencies 
 they have never received the positive sanction of The People that 
 is necessary to logically create an administrative agency. They 
 are self-constituted bodies which maintain their position by the 
 use of means and methods that are opposed in nature to every 
 Principle of Democratic Action. Specifically, they are composed 
 of National, State, Local, and Lesser partizan party Bosses, Com- 
 mitteemen, Office Holders, Office Seekers, and party patronage 
 seekers. They work secretly, collusively, and for their own private 
 interests through self-appointed administrative boards and local 
 partizan party Leaders, Captains, Workers, Heelers, Repeaters, 
 and Ballot-Box Stuffers. Under their regime " Practical Politics " 
 and " Commercialized Politics " flourish and bear the baneful 
 fruits of Bossism ; Deals ; Trades in votes, offices and oppor- 
 tunities for dispensing privileges to private interests ; Combines 
 against the Public Interest; The Gerrymander; Log-Rolling;
 
 22 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Jobbery ; " Favorable Legislation " ; " Strike Legislation " ; Non- 
 representation ; Misrepresentation ; Disfranchisement ; Extrava- 
 gance ; Graft ; Apathy and a score of other administrative evils. 
 Measured by the standards of political morality the men who 
 compose the Party Managements stand forth as opportunists 
 who, disregardful of the rights of others, are seeking in the public 
 exigency their own private welfare ahead of the General Welfare. 
 They are past masters in the use of legal, moral, and adminis- 
 trative expedients. They perceive that so long as the majority of 
 individual electors can be kept in doubt or ignorance regarding 
 the requirements of proper electoral action, just so long will their 
 opportunities be left open ; and, in the absence of any authorita- 
 tive rule or statement, it has not been difficult for them in the 
 past to persuade the opinion-bewildered and expedient-habituated 
 electorates to use the partizan party system of administrative 
 action. — 
 
 At last, however, partly because of the extent of the evils men- 
 tioned and partly because of intolerable injustices that have been 
 perpetrated by party-dominated action, attention is being more 
 and more widely focused upon the partizan party and its system. 
 Condemnations of some of the partizan party practises have for 
 years issued from all departments of The Press ; but its utterances 
 never reach the limit of demanding the abolishment of The Partizan 
 Party and its system or the construction and use of a logical system 
 of political administration. Unfortunately its force is expended 
 in advocating the substitution of one expedient for another. The 
 people, however, have gradually growTi restive under the successive 
 failures of these expedients ; and signs are not wanting of a growing 
 resolution on their part to shake off their " Invisible Government " 
 and resume the exercise of their rightful powers if possible. But 
 this growing dissatisfaction within the body politic naturally in- 
 cites The Partizan Party to renewed exertions. By every possible 
 instrumentality at its command it holds itself forth as the only 
 possible means for producing administrative action, and proclaims 
 its system to be the only system possible under the circumstances. 
 
 The Coming Public Debate. The author takes direct issue with 
 these partizan party claims. In the first place he contends that 
 The Electorate as the acting Sovereign is under the obligation to 
 exercise all of its administrative powers freely, directly, and without 
 the interposition of, or dominance of, any intermediary whatso- 
 ever ; and in the second place he contends that notwithstanding 
 past action it is now not only possible but that it is incumbent upon
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 23 
 
 The Electorate as the Collective Sovereign to construct and ordain 
 the use of a logical system of administrative action by its sovereign 
 units ; that is, a system which will compel its units while engaged 
 in the exercise of Political Power or Political Authority to act 
 solely m a political capacity and not in the capacity of a member 
 of any permanently organized association of voters. 
 
 The time has arrived when the American Electorates must 
 choose between the alternatives of retaining the partizan party 
 system with its attendant train of corroding and disrupting evils, 
 or of constructing a logical system of political administration with 
 its opportunities for proper exercise of Political Power and of Po- 
 litical Authority. Progress has made the United States a " World 
 Power." If it is to exist in its present territory as a Nation, it must 
 from now on accept its altered status and act as and like a world 
 power in the maintenance of that status. The success of its action 
 depends upon its ability to exert its full moral strength. Unless 
 its individuals act freely, unitedly, and with a common purpose, 
 it cannot exert its full moral strength ; for the strength of demo- 
 cratic action is united moral action. At present the moral strength 
 of The State is weakened by the presence of two codes of individual 
 administrative action ; the one moral but unsupported by a logical 
 system of operation, the other immoral and supported by an im- 
 moral exercise of Partizan Party Power. Under the latter The 
 State attempts to make political progress by supplanting an un- 
 bearable conduct of its affairs by one partizan party with a manage- 
 ment of its affairs by another partizan party that soon becomes 
 intolerable. Depending for initiative in action upon the outcome 
 of an immoral struggle between two partizan parties for " party " 
 advantage, it can neither defend itself quickly or effectively if 
 attacked nor even reasonably prepare itself against possible attack 
 by any nation that may become actuated by the greed of territory 
 or dominion. Reasonably rapid administrative action is impos- 
 sible where the management of affairs is entrusted to a partizan 
 party. At all times such a party is unavoidably an obstacle to 
 normal political progress. Striving for " Party " advantage, it is 
 necessarily timid and slow to act ; but if we consider it as a State 
 Agency, then, in times of emergencies, its slow action for private 
 reason becomes nothing short of criminal dilatoriness ; and at all 
 times its action produces unrest and bitterness. The happiness 
 and patriotism that in early days accompanied the reasonably 
 free and direct exercise of political power have vanished with the 
 vanished opportunity for freely participating in political adminis-
 
 24 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 tration. The Electorate is no longer united. Nor does the Col- 
 lective Sovereign act unitedly. Numbers of its units are by the 
 exercise of fear, fraud, and favor kept permanently segregated 
 within two or more permanent camps that are utilized as head- 
 quarters by as many groups of political brigands who prey upon 
 each other and the public. Society is rent by dissension and 
 divided into classes. Class feeling is engendered and ripened into 
 class hatred. The doctrine of force is supplanting the doctrine of 
 harmonious cooperation. Already millions of citizens reasonably 
 deem themselves discriminated against by a partizan party-filled 
 Judiciary. A greater number of millions reasonably consider them- 
 selves aggrieved by the privileges that are granted to the influential 
 wealthy by the partizan party-filled Legislatures. The standard 
 of public political morals has been lowered through the debase- 
 ment of the political morals of individual electors. This debase- 
 ment is to a large degree directly attributable to the enforcement 
 by The Partizan Party of political immoralities that are possible 
 under its system of administrative action. Morally, The State 
 is lamentably weak. This phase of its condition, however, is not 
 yet desperate, for it can regain the full measure of its moral 
 strength; but not unless it returns to a moral exercise of its 
 Political Power by which alone it can compel a moral exercise of 
 Individual Power. 
 
 Effect of Ambiguity. The choice between these alternatives will 
 naturally follow a discussion that will assume the character of a 
 public debate. Every debate should be an exercise of reason, and 
 should result in a conviction one way or another. But this is im- 
 possible if the terms used by the contestants are vague, uncertain, 
 and ambiguous. The use of such terms invariably produces con- 
 fusion in thought, inconclusive conclusions, and irritating personal 
 disagreements that do more harm than good. If, however, the 
 exact meanings underlying our political Principles and Doctrines 
 can be ascertained and determined beforehand, then we shall pos- 
 sess an authoritative standard by which to measure the worth of 
 the arguments advanced, to determine the propriety or impro- 
 priety of the instrumentalities we now use in administrative action, 
 and the fitness of such means and methods as may be proposed 
 for future use. The task of attaching precise meanings to our polit- 
 ical generalizations is neither easy nor short. It must be done, 
 however, before we can either locate the faults in our administrative 
 procedure, or approach the work of rectification with a reason- 
 able hope of success ; and that is why so much space will be
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 25 
 
 given in this book to the unpalatable but wholesome work of 
 definition. 
 
 Remoteness of " Government." Everywhere the feeling exists 
 that " Government " — as it is loosely called — is a thing apart 
 from the individual, mysterious, remote, unapproachable. Even 
 with Representatives in The Legislature the average man does not 
 feel a bond between himself and " the government." With many 
 there is no such bond ; for the bond they feel ties them to a Partizan 
 Party which works secretly and often mysteriously and stands 
 between them and " the government." Reason enough for the 
 appearance of remoteness from " Government." 
 
 But the author's experience with all sorts and conditions of 
 men is, that the haze of mystery and uncertainty concerning their 
 connection with " Government " is dispelled the moment they 
 realize two facts ; namely, first, that they are Sovereign-units 
 bound by obligation to use Political Power continuously ; and sec- 
 ond, that the component parts of political power are to be used 
 by them in a regular order of use, at certain times, for specific pur- 
 poses, and in each period of administration. WTien these facts 
 are realized, then " government " appears as a process that derives 
 its energy and force from Individual Action. 
 
 Now " Government " — using the term loosely — is merely 
 the performance by individuals of the various Processes of Ad- 
 ministration ; and in order to make this fact appear more clearly 
 the author has in Chapter IV executed the idea of separating 
 political power into its component parts, and in Chapter XXIII 
 has roughly outlined a logical system of administration showing 
 how each part should be used by The Individual for the accomplish- 
 ment of one specific purpose. 
 
 There can be no mystery connected with the orderly exercise 
 by Sovereign-units of one " governmental " power after another 
 and each for a specific purpose ; nor will " Government " appear 
 remote when individuals realize that it is they who continuously 
 exercise Administrative Power. 
 
 " Government " can only appear remote to Sovereign-units who 
 have delegated the exercise of Prerogative and Power to an agency 
 over which they have and exercise no efficient control ; and under 
 Democracy, the very sense of remoteness should be a warning of 
 something radically wrong in The State. 
 
 The absence of an originally ordained and logical system of 
 administrative action does, however, present the opportunity for 
 uncertainty to exist regarding the means and methods by which
 
 26 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 a " Government by Public Opinion " is to be administered. Public 
 Opinion must be formed, ascertained, expressed, put into operation 
 by The People, and enforced by The Government. But any un- 
 certainty as to the way in which this should be accomplished is 
 largely dispelled if we but remember that our Democratic Prin- 
 ciples of Action indicate that the only permissible administrative 
 means and methods are those which continuously afford each 
 Sovereign-unit an absolutely free and equally effective exercise 
 of his reason, conscience, and will while he in common with others 
 is attempting to put the Principles of The State Polity into effective 
 operation. Any means or methods which impair or destroy his 
 ordained status while so engaged are certainly illogical in character ; 
 and in view of our original professions their use is, to say the very 
 least, foolish and ridiculous. 
 
 Space here forbids a recapitulation of what we have done in de- 
 tail. That will appear in the following chapters ; but the substance 
 of what we have done is this. In our misplaced confidence and 
 trust we have practically delivered The Electorate and The Gov- 
 ernment over into the hands of The Partizan Party for management 
 and control ; and, in so far as sins of omission can bestow a status, 
 we have in effect created a partizan party as an administrative 
 agency in the place of The Electorate, which we have made its tool. 
 
 In view of the Obligations of Sovereignty which we originally 
 assumed ; and of the Duties of Citizenship which we have promised 
 to perform, can what we have done be considered as right, as 
 sapient, as prudent, or even as honest action on our part? Has 
 our confidence in The Partizan Party as an administrative agency 
 been justified ? Is Patriotism its ruling motive ? Do its customs 
 and practises secure to each elector a free and equal and effective 
 participation in political administration ? Do they tend to main- 
 tain the exercise of Political Power in the hands of The People? 
 Taken together are they based upon Democratic ideas concerning 
 the exercise of political sovereignty? Does The Partizan Party 
 work solely for the promotion of the General Welfare? 
 
 All of these questions must be answered in the negative. By 
 the use of the partizan party system the exercise of a large part of 
 the political power has been removed from the hands of individual 
 electors — who together are The Sovereign — into the grasp of the 
 immoral few who at present manipulate electoral and governmental 
 action for private and personal gain. This indefinite, self-consti- 
 tuted, and self-perpetuating body existing within the body politic 
 but not a constituent part of the plan or frame of Government;
 
 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 27 
 
 independent of The Commonwealth because it is allowed to make 
 and apply its own private rules of conduct and action ; in no true 
 sense a Political Party; destroying the opportunity for the free 
 formation, ascertainment, and expression of Public Opinion and at 
 the same time hypocritically posing as the " Official IMouthpiece " 
 of Public Opinion, is actively engaged not in providing individuals 
 with proper methods of administrative action, but in exploiting 
 every selfish personal desbe of the individual, every human weak- 
 ness, every ignoble ambition, and in perpetrating every conceivable 
 fraud on individual rights and true administration. All this it 
 does in order to reach the position, not where it can promote the 
 General Welfare, but where it can manipulate The Government, 
 its revenues, its offices, and also the greed of the individuals who 
 compose the unconscientious and powerful material " Interests." 
 This is the character of the body which, while serving as a " politi- 
 cal " agency for the proper discharge of the Obligations of Sover- 
 eignty and the proper performance of the Duties of Citizenship, 
 in reality imposes upon electors and officials alike its partizan rules 
 and usages that are diametrically opposed to the Spirit of De- 
 mocracy, and the use of which undermines the political power, the 
 political capacity, and the morals of the body politic. 
 
 Now as for ourselves. We have allowed The Partizan Party to 
 become the dominating factor in our administrative work. We 
 continue to use this non-political and unconstitutional intermediary 
 for the discharge of those political obligations and duties which 
 our theory of government proclaims must be discharged directly 
 and by individuals alone ; and we continue to use its undemocratic 
 scheme of procedure which destroys individual freedom in adminis- 
 trative action. This is the parent inconsistency of all the lesser 
 inconsistencies th^ permeate our administrative effort. 
 
 The Remedy. Is there any Remedy? Yes I The remedy of 
 the knife ; for the reader must remember that a Partizan Party is 
 not a constituent part of our political organism and as such ac- 
 tually necessary to our political health and welfare. On the 
 contrary ! It is a parasitic growth which saps the vigor of our 
 political body and threatens a premature political death. Neither 
 with safety nor with honor can The Reserved or The Delegated 
 Powers of Administration be placed under the control of any parti- 
 zan agency whatsoever, and both The Partizan Party and its Sys- 
 tem must be dropped from our scheme of administrative action 
 before we can hope to obtain and to transmit the " Blessings " 
 promised in the name of American Democracy.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 Principles of Association : Individuals in free bodies politic 
 associate together for two main objects : 
 
 First, To establish the desired conditions of individual 
 existence. 
 
 Second, To maintain and perpetuate them. 
 
 Principles of Association, therefore, fall into two classes. One 
 class sets forth the desired conditions of existence. The basic 
 concepts of these conditions are called First Principles. 
 
 First Principles are those distinctive fundamental beliefs con- 
 cerning social existence which are accepted as true by the majority 
 of the individuals who compose the body politic. 
 
 The other class indicates the manner in which the desired con- 
 ditions are to be maintained and perpetuated, and are called 
 Political Principles. In theory these last-named principles pre- 
 scribe the right administrative action of individuals when the body 
 politic is called upon to decide the social, economic, and political 
 questions that constantly arise during the progress of Society. 
 
 The Need of Definitions. For the sake of consistent action by 
 The State each of these concepts should be framed in the form of 
 a distinct proposition. The detail meanings attached to the terms 
 Freedom, Liberty, Equality, and Justice are nq|i the same in any 
 two States in the Union ; the political power possessed and exer- 
 cised by the average citizen of Virginia, for instance, differing 
 greatly from that had and used by the average citizen of Massa- 
 chusetts. But the abstract ideas expressed by these terms mean 
 pretty much the same in Virginia as in Massachusetts, the dif- 
 ference lying mainly in the systems by which these ideas are to be 
 made effectual. 
 
 American Meanings. Our first attempt must be to attach pre- 
 cise American meanings to these general terms. This is not so 
 difficult as it appears ; for although each of these terms has from 
 time to time in the past possessed very different meanings, never- 
 theless the American Colonists succeeded in attaching to each of 
 
 28
 
 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 29 
 
 these terms a broad general American meaning. Also, and because 
 they differed between themselves concerning the objects of exist- 
 ence, they succeeded in attaching several Commonwealth Meanings 
 regarding social, economic, and political action. 
 
 First Principles : Space forbids an attempt to define separately 
 the first principles of the forty-eight States. But a knowledge 
 of the fundamental meaning of each is necessary. Before The 
 Individual can determine with certainty whether present condi- 
 tions of existence are those originally intended, and before he can 
 determine with certainty how he is required to act in settling the 
 questions of the day, he must know what was originally intended 
 regarding Government and Political Administration. 
 
 Freedom, Early Meanings : In the early stages of individual 
 enfranchisement the terms freedom and liberty were used synony- 
 mously to mean the absence of all restraint ; the condition in which 
 a man could do as he willed whether or not it brought injury to 
 others. Such freedom is, however, destructive of society ; and 
 organized Government was in part instituted over society as a 
 means by which to put a restraint upon it. 
 
 Middle Ages : As society progressed the term freedom acquired a 
 distinctively political meaning. In the middle ages it meant more 
 particularly the possession and exercise (as they were gradually 
 extended) of those specific powers and authorities that were then 
 had and exercised by the nobles, the church, and the cities, as 
 distinguished from the sweeping power exercised by the monarch. 
 The claims made by these three classes of society were often dia- 
 metrically opposed to each other, but all agreed on one point; 
 namely, that Freedom meant immunity in some degree from an 
 oppressive exercise of monarchical power. 
 
 Modern Meanings : Under a popular form of Government, that 
 is, where the people are the sovereign, Freedom means individual 
 immunity from oppressive political administration by any and all 
 
 officials. ~ *^ '^ •^"•^' cC^;, ..v»u>Y-.' 
 
 Under a representative form of Government it more particularly 
 means individual immunity from oppressive legislation. 
 
 Social Freedom : In a narrower sense. Freedom means that an 
 individual, while engaged in transacting his part of the social af- 
 fairs of the community, shall be immune from all restraint except 
 that established by the State. It also means the exemption of 
 the individual from the restraints of slavery, of involuntary servi- 
 tude, or of confinement except as the result of due process of law. 
 Enough has been said by way of illustration. Regarded as a con-
 
 30 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 dition of social existence, Social Freedom is not an inalienable 
 possession. It is bestowed by the State. It can be destroyed 
 by the action of the individual himself ; and it can be taken away 
 by the State. 
 
 Economic Freedom: The particular immunity from restraint 
 which an individual enjoys while engaged in " making a living " 
 is now most frequently called Liberty ; and we will consider this 
 aspect of freedom under that head. It is not an inalienable pos- 
 session and can be destroyed and lost in the same way as social 
 freedom. 
 
 Political Freedom : Because our system of Government provides 
 an opportunity for each individual to act politically (as well as 
 socially and economically) the freedom of an American citizen 
 means that particular state of immunity from control which is 
 prescribed for him by the terms and intent of the original govern- 
 mental agreement, and which he is to enjoy while he is engaged in 
 exercising either political power or authority. 
 
 It means that while he is engaged in the various stages of politi- 
 cal action he shall be, and shall at all times remain, exempt from the 
 exercise of any improper restraint by any other individual, or by 
 any association of individuals. A consideration of the propriety 
 of the restraints upon such action which exist at present will be 
 found in subsequent chapters ; at present we are merely defining 
 an ordained status. 
 
 One of the objects of Political Action is the establishment of a 
 proper restraint on individual action. Another is the proper ad- 
 ministering of the established restraint. After Government is 
 established, questions of Administration come to the fore ; and 
 the function of political freedom is to enable each individual to 
 freely and effectively participate in the administration of restraint 
 according to his principles of association, and so long as his par- 
 ticular governmental regime shall last. 
 
 Finally it means an ideal condition of society in which no re- 
 straint whatsoever shall be put upon the individual exercise of 
 reason, the play of conscience, and the formation and expression 
 of volition regarding any question that may be up for decision 
 before the body politic. 
 
 Moral Freedom : Because of the manner in which our political 
 power is used, freedom has a much more significant meaning. 
 Because the individual, considered as one of the Collective Sov- 
 ereign, is in part responsible for right political action, he is given 
 the moral freedom that is essential to moral responsibility. He
 
 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 31 
 
 is at all times to remain immune from the exercise of restraint upon 
 his volition because without such immunity the will cannot be 
 freely formed. 
 
 Such freedom is moral freedom. It presupposes action taken 
 in accordance with the declared principles of association and of 
 action, and it means the freedom to act and speak politically — 
 that is, for the general welfare — as reason and conscience dictate. 
 
 Liberty : By modern usage the meanings attached to the term 
 Liberty differ from those which distinguish the term Freedom. 
 
 Liberty expresses a social condition which pertains more es- 
 pecially to the exercise of inherent individual power than to the 
 exercise of acquired political power. 
 
 It also has an individual rather than a communal meaning. In 
 the abstract, it can be defined as freedom to choose from the par- 
 ticular range of economic effort that is permitted by the community 
 whatever line of activity the individual prefers, and to enforce his 
 individual will in the management of his own affairs. 
 
 Civil Liberty : But free Communities generally impose some 
 conditions upon their individual members in this respect. The 
 People usually declare beforehand that while in the exercise of his 
 liberty the individual must not interfere with, or impair the extent 
 of the liberty and rights of others, and by so doing either produce 
 discord in the community, or harmfully affect the general welfare. 
 
 The Community prohibits license, or unrestrained action ; but 
 on the other hand it agrees to protect the rightful liberty of the 
 individual so long as he continues to observe the restraints imposed. 
 
 The imposition of conditional limitations by the community 
 produces a social condition that is now commonly called Civil 
 Liberty ; which means the freedom of the individual to conduct 
 his own affairs as he pleases, subject, however, to only such re- 
 straint as the community declares the public good or private welfare 
 may require. 
 
 The limitations put upon the exercise of inherent individual 
 power by the community before government is established are 
 generally considered to be universally beneficial ; and the mainte- 
 nance of the social condition created by this action is commonly 
 regarded as a right due the individual from the community. 
 
 Civil liberty so defined is not inherent in the individual. Neither 
 is its possession inalienable. The State creates it, and The State 
 can deprive an individual of his possession of it if he intentionally 
 and grossly misuses it. 
 
 Defined : From the above it appears that individual liberty,
 
 32 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 according to American ideas, means primarily the ordained scope 
 of the exercise of individual power in economic action. 
 
 " Political Liberty " : Of course inherent individual power can be 
 exerted in social, moral, and political matters as well as in economic 
 matters. Without going deeply into this phase of the subject, 
 and while deferring for a moment to popular usage, it may be 
 permissible to consider the right of an individual to use properly 
 whatever elements of individual power he may possess in the deci- 
 sion of administrative questions as " political liberty." Actions 
 so taken necessarily determine or modify the extent or the char- 
 acter of the individual's private activities in society. But as such 
 actions are only taken when the individual is acting in the capacity 
 of a Sovereign, and not in the capacity of a subject or citizen, it 
 will help to a clearer understanding if we habitually think of the 
 right to participate in political action as springing from Political 
 Freedom. 
 
 The Body of Liberties : There are many specific privileges and 
 rights enjoyed by Americans which, when enumerated together, 
 are commonly called " The Body of Liberties." Each State has its 
 own body of liberties, expressed in one form or another. The con- 
 ditions of existence ordained by The People were considered 
 " privileges " because they flowed from the adoption of self-govern- 
 ment and were then not to be enjoyed under monarchical forms of 
 government. 
 
 As they are in themselves but special modifications of this, that, 
 or another general social condition as ordained, we will defer their 
 consideration until we reach the chapter on Rights. 
 
 Equality : The diverse combinations of the elements of in- 
 dividual power in men precludes the idea of an absolute equality 
 between individuals either in a physical, mental, or moral sense. 
 Some men are always superior to others in whatever situation they 
 may be placed; and the only equality which can possibly exist 
 between the individuals of any community must necessarily be 
 that particular degree of equality which The Community bestows. 
 
 Political Equality: This is Political Equality. It implies an 
 equality in Freedom, in Liberty, and in Rights ; but it more par- 
 ticularly means an equal opportunity for each individual to effi- 
 ciently participate in shaping and administering public and private 
 affairs. 
 
 What the majority of the individuals of any given free com- 
 munity desire is supposedly embodied in The Law ; and the general 
 meaning of political equality is, that each individual falling within
 
 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 33 
 
 certain provisions of the law has exactly the same standing as all 
 other individuals falling within the same provisions. But no mat- 
 ter within what provisions of the law a man may stand, each in- 
 dividual has an equal right and an equal opportunity with every 
 other individual of the community to invoke the poM^er of the 
 community to protect his civil and political rights, to protect 
 the rights of others, and to prevent the misuse of political power 
 either by individuals or by associations of individuals. 
 
 WTiile the community can bestow political equality upon men, 
 the retention of this condition, however, rests entirely with the 
 individual. He may by his own acts entirely change the relations 
 normally existing between himself and his fellow-citizens and be- 
 come deprived through judicial action of that which the community 
 bestowed. 
 
 He may do infinitely worse ; for through joining with others in 
 the misuse of political power he and they can succeed in destroying 
 equality of political power in the remainder ; but (and the point 
 cannot be overemphasized) whether the opportunity for the misuse 
 of political power exists or not will depend entirely upon the es- 
 tablished system for the use of such power. If the system is not 
 correct in every particular, then the tenure of the individual upon 
 political equality must necessarily be feeble and precarious. 
 
 Justice : In the abstract, justice may be defined as an impartial 
 adherence to truth as apprehended. We have to say " truth as 
 apprehended " because the truth about truth is that it has no uni- 
 versally recognized concept. From this fact, however, we may 
 extract one very important truth for our guidance, viz. that the 
 terms freedom, liberty, equality, and justice possess only such 
 meanings as are attached to them by various communities. 
 
 Political Justice : Consequently, justice, in a political sense, is 
 conformity to that which the community has declared to be its 
 polity and finidamental law. The conformity must be reciprocal 
 both on the part of the community and on the part of the individual ; 
 and it must also be conformity to the spirit of the law and not 
 merely to its letter. Hence the necessity for knowing the exact 
 meanings of the principles of the state polity. 
 
 Benjamin Franklin defined justice as the rendering to every one 
 of his due ; but of course this must be understood as the rendering 
 to every one of his due according to the established polity and law 
 of any given community. 
 
 With us the rendering is done by the community which is a 
 freely acting collective unit. Justice then must mean for us a
 
 34 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 given state or condition of human existence in which each individual 
 not only receives that which is agreed to be his due, but is made 
 secure in its continuous possession. Continued possession de- 
 pends most largely upon the administrative action of individuals. 
 Hence the bestowal upon individuals of an equal opportunity to 
 invoke the assistance of other individuals in maintaining the status 
 originally ordained. But no political right exists that does not 
 carry with it its corresponding obligation, and because the indi- 
 vidual acts as one of the collective sovereign he is at all times under 
 the moral obligation to maintain the original status in every respect. 
 
 Justice being defined as an impartial adherence to truth, it be- 
 comes necessary to attach some definite meaning to the term truth. 
 As in the abstract truth may be considered that which is in con- 
 formity to natural law, so in a political sense truth may be con- 
 sidered that which is in conformity to the polity and fundamental 
 law of any community. In a narrower sense, and considered as a 
 guide to proper political action, truth must be considered as a 
 correct statement of the relations which exist between cause and 
 effect in the political phenomena of any given community. In 
 other words, political truth must be pure logic ; and hereafter the 
 word logical will be used to express the truth concerning political 
 action. 
 
 Civil Justice : Civil Justice is any form of Justice that is ordained 
 by any State. It is at best but a human conception. Its meaning, 
 however, is capable of being applied in the regulation of every in- 
 dividual action. Free communities attempt to attach practical 
 definiteness to its meanings through constructing a system of rules 
 which are to govern the administrative action of individuals. 
 
 Here, in the construction of an administrative system. Democ- 
 racy, considered as a regime of reason, balances between success 
 or failure. 
 
 Here, in this work, a democracy, considered as a self-governing 
 community exercising political power and authority, can either 
 make its Principles of Association fully operative, partially so, or 
 inoperative ; that is, it can provide agencies, means, and methods 
 which will produce these effects. But, unless it succeeds in con- 
 structing a system of administrative procedure that is both com- 
 prehensive and logical, the Justice which has been ordained by 
 The State will inevitably become perverted through attempts to 
 maintain it by means of an illogical system. Individuals can never 
 produce intended political results unless they work with logical 
 agencies, means, and methods of political administration.
 
 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 35 
 
 Political Principles : Let us now consider the second set of Prin- 
 ciples mentioned on the first page of this chapter. These, taken 
 together, relate to the continuous maintenance of the composite 
 status set forth in the Principles of Associations ; and which main- 
 tenance is to be accomplished through the consistent use of political 
 power and authority during political administration. 
 
 Principles of Association determine the desired nature, char- 
 acter, and object of Government. 
 
 Political Principles indicate the nature, character, and kind of 
 administrative action to be taken. They possess and should 
 continually exert a binding force and obligation upon the indi- 
 viduals who compose a State. 
 
 Defined. Political Principles are the basic concepts of any com- 
 munity regarding the continuous exercise of political power and 
 authority. As such, they are the principles of Political Adminis- 
 tration, 
 
 They, in connection with the First Principles, form the basis of 
 the community's Plan of Administration. 
 
 They necessarily restrict The Community while engaged in the 
 endeavor to make its principles of association fully operative, to 
 the use of certain definite administrative agencies and means. 
 
 They are Supposed to fully reflect the nature and character of 
 the First Principles, and thus to fix in advance of administrative 
 action the character of each agency, means, and method used 
 therein. 
 
 Taken together they embody the fundamental rules of adminis- 
 trative action in its various stages of progression. 
 
 Combined with stated rules of detail application, they will natu- 
 rally constitute a System of Political Administration, showing its 
 salient divisions. 
 
 We must now briefly review some of the more important prin- 
 ciples of our administrative procedure, at the same time remem- 
 bering that we, through the action of The Fathers, are solemnly 
 bound to give them full force and effect in our individual adminis- 
 trative action. 
 
 Freedom and Liberty : Enough has already been said regarding 
 the freedom and liberty of the individual while engaged in ad- 
 ministrative work to render any further remarks unnecessary at 
 this point. 
 
 Common Consent : The Supreme Power is the Power to Govern. 
 The Power to Govern includes the power to command, and to en- 
 force obedience from The Individual. The Fathers held that all
 
 36 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Political Power proceeds from The People, and that the Right to 
 Govern rests on the common consent of the governed ; and they 
 placed the exercise of the Supreme Power over themselves on the 
 basis of Common Consent. 
 
 Happiness, an Object of Administration : Among other beliefs 
 the Colonists also held that the jree opportunity to exercise Politi- 
 cal Power was in itself one of the chief sources of individual hap- 
 piness ; but they went no further in maintaining and perpetuating 
 such an opportunity than to merely declare that while the individ- 
 ual was engaged in the exercise of Political Power or of Authority 
 he should be immune from all restraints except those exercised by 
 his reason and conscience. 
 
 Equality, an Object of Administration : The free formation, 
 expression, and application of The Will of The People is one of the 
 chief objects of administrative action. Public Opinion is being 
 formed all of the time. As Sovereign-units we have agreed that 
 this Will cannot be formed and applied properly unless each indi- 
 vidual unit shall have an equal opportunity with every other like 
 unit to freely express his ideas during its formation, and to freely 
 express his individual will concerning its expression and its appli- 
 cation. 
 
 This consensus of belief establishes Equality as a basic principle 
 of our political administration. 
 
 The restrictions which we have put upon individuals in the 
 exercise of Administrative Power, and which necessarily divide 
 individuals into classes, will be considered later. At present we 
 are merely considering general principles. 
 
 Justice, an Object of Administration : We have seen that every 
 exercise of our political power is in theory sanctioned by our original 
 governmental agreement ; the prime object of which is to establish 
 and place such a just restraint upon the natural freedom and lib- 
 erty in individual action as will promote the general welfare of 
 society, and the private welfare and happiness of the individual. 
 With us this agreement declares that the exercise of the Supreme 
 Power shall be had for the express purpose of securing to each 
 individual all of the benefits which are rightfully his under the 
 agreement. 
 
 This in effect makes ordained Justice not only an ultimate object 
 of administrative action; but an indispensable requisite to its 
 orderly continuance. If men do not receive the justice which is 
 their due under their State Polity, they will naturally strive to 
 change the administrative system which aids in producing injustice
 
 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 37 
 
 to some of them. Either that, or they will strive to change their 
 Form of Government entirely. 
 
 Representation: In administering restraint The People have 
 agreed to use a subsidiary body called The Government as a helpful 
 agency in ascertaining : first, what is necessary to be done from 
 time to time by the community ; and second, in providing the 
 necessary rules of action, or laws. The effect of the agreement 
 in this respect is to establish Representation, or an indirect use of 
 a part of their supreme power, as a principle governing their ad- 
 ministrative procedure. 
 
 Responsibility : In a political sense the term Responsibility is 
 nearly the equivalent of the two terms liability and accountability. 
 
 It is the state or condition which the individuals of free com- 
 munities voluntarily assume when they enter into the govern- 
 mental agreement, — the condition in which one is bound to act in 
 accordance with the intent of the agreement or suffer the conse- 
 quences. 
 
 Direct Responsibility. In free communities the exercise of au- 
 thority is supposed to be continuously under the control of the 
 people. In order to enable the people to enforce a proper exercise 
 of authority from all who are in the public service, the people agree 
 that all such individuals shall be personally accountable to The 
 Communitv for malfeasance in office or dereliction in official dutv. 
 The eflPect of this agreement is to establish the principle that 
 Responsibilit}' on the part of public officials shall be direct to the 
 people ; and not to any political party, much less to any partizan 
 party, or any other intermediary whatsoever. 
 
 Individual Responsibility. When entering upon the exercise of 
 political power, the individual assumes the responsibilities of a 
 sovereign. He binds himself to use his political power solely for 
 the promotion of the general welfare. This is his individual re- 
 sponsibility. The community can enforce it provided it has the 
 methods for doing so. These methods are usually contained in 
 the administrative system. In effect they define the duties of 
 citizenship. The community is under the obligation to state and 
 to define these duties beforehand, for otherwise it cannot properly 
 enforce their discharge. This subject will be taken up again. For 
 the present it is sufficient to say that the principle of individual 
 responsibility for proper political action exists whether the com- 
 munity has succeeded in making it fully operative or not. 
 
 Allegiance : In return for the protection he receives each indi- 
 vidual is placed under the obligation to support his governmental
 
 38 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 institutions and to obey the laws made by his regularly constituted 
 authorities. The part of the obligation which relates to obedience 
 establishes the principle that the individual shall not oppose the 
 operation of a law which works a private injury to him with an 
 exercise of physical force, and that he shall not incite others to join 
 him in the exercise of the power of Revolution as the means to 
 redress private grievances or public wrongs until all other peace- 
 able means have been exhausted. 
 
 Allegiance, however, does not mean that the individual is to 
 forever remain passively inert either under a law which he may 
 believe is not in accord with some first principle of his community, 
 or under a system of action which does not give full effect to the 
 political principles of the community. Such inertia might easily 
 result in despotism. In this respect allegiance merely means that 
 until such time as he can through the force of reason and the spread 
 of ideas bring about a reversal of the obnoxious law or a change in 
 the inoperative system he shall peaceably submit to them. He is 
 free at all times to peaceably oppose them. Indeed, he is under a 
 moral obligation to oppose them because the allegiance to principle 
 is supreme. 
 
 The spirit of the people manifests itself primarily in and through 
 its declared Principles of Association. No American citizen owes 
 allegiance to any political principle beyond those included within 
 the State Polity. No man owes support to any agency or system 
 that in any way weakens the original force of the governmental 
 agreement. 
 
 In theory, no man is permitted to give support to outside prin- 
 ciples or unordained instrumentalities, because, if given, such sup- 
 port tends to produce administrative action that is not in accord 
 with the spirit of the people as originally declared. 
 
 The Principle of Union : For a long time prior to the Declaration 
 of Independence the British government sought to obtain the de- 
 pendence of the American colonies upon England ; claiming that 
 this was for the best interests of the colonists. Parliament legis- 
 lated to this end, and sought to enforce this legislation in the colo- 
 nies by means of the colonial governmental agencies, the character 
 of which it molded as far as possible to suit its purposes. Parlia- 
 ment, as then constituted and swayed, was but an agency of the 
 King. Immediately before The Declaration it resorted to an 
 exercise of military force to maintain a fictitious " unity of interest" 
 between the colonists and their governmental agencies as then 
 constituted. The colonists considered this course most grievous.
 
 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 39 
 
 By it their " liberties " were practically destroyed. They claimed 
 the right to decide for themselves what was for their best interests 
 — or welfare as they termed it. When they threw off " The Brit- 
 ish Yoke," they had to reorganize political society ; create a new 
 governmental agency; and supply a new uniting bond between 
 themselves and it. 
 
 Familiar with democratic principles of action (which exclude 
 the idea of applying physical force to political action) they decided 
 to supplant the monarchical principle of unity — harmony through 
 compulsion — with the democratic principle of union — harmony 
 tlirough agreement — and to secure the united action necessary 
 to a satisfactory exercise of political power by reaching a free agree- 
 ment of wills beforehand concerning all matters of government 
 and political administration. This agreement expressed The Will 
 of The People. So long as it remained unaltered by concerted 
 action on the part of the people it was to be equally binding upon 
 all of the individuals who compose the body politic; all being 
 equally bound to carry out its intent. 
 
 The Bond of Union : The common purpose of the people was to 
 secure the greatest possible happiness and welfare of all by means 
 of Representative Government ; and the desire to promote the 
 " General Welfare " according to their ideas of right political action 
 supplied the bond uniting the community with its administrative 
 agencies. 
 
 Besides the Principles mentioned above there are other generally 
 accepted ideas regarding the proper exercise of political power and 
 authority which are binding upon individual Americans while 
 acting in the dual capacity of Sovereign and citizen. 
 
 Some of these exist in the character and form of Rights ; some 
 in the shape of Obligations and Duties ; and some have taken the 
 form of a Doctrine ; that is, an inclusive body of beliefs which are 
 held to be true. 
 
 Each of these separate rights, obligations, duties, and doctrines 
 has a peculiar and distinctive American meaning. 
 
 Each of them has an important bearing upon the manner in 
 which our political power and authority is to be used. 
 
 Each of their meanings is the result of gradual perception, 
 growth, and acceptance. 
 
 The establishment of their true meanings is necessary to the 
 clear perception of our true political action ; and inasmuch as this 
 will require some research we will consider them separately in the 
 following chapters.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 POLITICAL RIGHTS 
 
 Principles of Duty : In the early stages of human progress and 
 of civilization the moral strength of The Community depended 
 upon two sets of principles ; namely, those relating to Duty and 
 those relating to Rights. 
 
 Principles of Duty were generally divided into two classes by 
 their objects. 
 
 Principles of Religion. The first class contained principles of 
 religion. They prescribed the duty which man — considered as a 
 being dependent for his existence, welfare, and happiness upon 
 some higher intelligence supposed to control the forces of good 
 and evil — owed to that superior being. 
 
 Principles of Ethics. The second class contained the principles 
 which prescribed man's duty to his fellow associates. These have 
 been called the principles of ethics. Later on in progress these 
 principles were extended to include ideas concerning man's duty to 
 those outside of his immediate association ; briefly, to Humanity 
 at Large. The character of these principles has everywhere been 
 affected more or less by the religious concepts held by society. 
 Some of them are a direct outgrowth from man's religious belief. 
 In some instances, however, they have been brought into existence 
 by the tyranny exercised in the name of Religion. But be this as 
 it may, both sets of principles were originally devised with but one 
 object ; namely, to promote the true welfare and happiness of The 
 Individual as the same was understood when the principles were 
 devised. 
 
 F*rinciples of Right : Leaving religion out of consideration, we 
 shall find the original conception of Duty and of Right to be simple, 
 clear, and direct. Man, in common with all living organisms, is 
 impelled to perpetuate his species. In common with all animals 
 he is impelled to preserve his life, and that of his young. In that 
 
 40
 
 POLITICAL RIGHTS 41 
 
 way the species is perpetuated. Considered as a species, primi- 
 tive man had to contend for existence against many other groups 
 of animals, the individuals of which far exceeded individual man 
 in size, strength, and the means of offense and defense. The real- 
 ization of his comparative defenselessness originally impelled 
 primitive man to associate with his fellows. 
 
 Welfare and Happiness. Primitive Meanings. Association 
 meant United Action in times of individual peril. By means of 
 united action the adults of The Association secured a longer lease 
 of life, and the young an increased chance to live. Association 
 accomplished three results. First, it brought the strength of 
 numbers. Second, it increased personal security from physical 
 injury which in the main then constituted welfare. Third, it 
 decreased the dread of physical injury which in the main was 
 then the chief source of unhappiness. 
 
 Cooperation. Association was originally prompted by the de- 
 sire for mutual support. The desire sprang from the realization 
 of mutual dependence. Here, then, we get at the original essence 
 of Association ; for by mutual support and through cooperation 
 the peril of individual weakness is in part averted. 
 
 Social Instinct. During the long periods in which man found 
 comparative safety in association, the appreciation of the benefits 
 to be secured through mutual support became more and more 
 acute, and created a fixed desire in man for association with his 
 kind. Out of the long-continued and habitual satisfaction of this 
 desire the so-called " Social Instinct" arose ; instinct being in- 
 herited habit. 
 
 Primitive Progress. By the time man had reached the savage 
 state, he — considered as a destroying force — had acquired 
 ascendency over the other animals and the force of the original 
 reason for Association was somewhat weakened by the sense of 
 this independence. The form of The Association had also changed. 
 Permanency had produced related families ; and the natural 
 attraction of relationship had brought about the grouping of 
 related families into tribes. The same attraction working in a 
 wider range had tended to cement the tribes into the larger associa- 
 tion called The Community, or The Nation. 
 
 Primitive Society. But while fear was being eliminated as one 
 of the reasons for association other considerations developed and 
 took its place. The appreciation of the benefits flowing from the 
 exercise of authority on the part of parents and the practise of 
 obedience on the part of the young grew stronger and finally
 
 42 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 acquired the force of a controlling idea. Gradually the meanings 
 of authority and obedience were extended to apply to individuals 
 when acting in the capacity of members of the tribe or nation. 
 Moreover, crude notions concerning the property and rights of 
 individuals, of families, of tribes, and of nations were forming. 
 These in turn produced new ideas concerning the objects for which 
 united action was to be had. In short, new meanings were at- 
 tached to the original principle of cooperation. But from now on 
 these meanings were to receive the sanction of approval from the 
 community ; were to be enforced by the community ; and the 
 community, in its new aspect, must be considered hereafter as 
 Society. 
 
 Society and Progress. Society has existed during all stages of 
 human progress about which any positive knowledge exists. It 
 has at one and the same time been the prime means for the satis- 
 faction of the social instinct and the prime cause of individual 
 development ; upon which human progress depends. 
 
 Individual development has been promoted by Society first, 
 because through orderly association individuals are afforded 
 additional opportunities to develop their special powers of body 
 and brain, which development, of itself, increases desire on the 
 part of all who make it, and on the part of many who witness it ; 
 and second, because through the attempted satisfaction of in- 
 creasing desire the mental powers of individuals are continually 
 raised to a better appreciation of the true relation of things in 
 general. 
 
 Factors in the Strength of. Whether a free community accom- 
 plishes its desired purposes or not will depend upon its adminis- 
 trative action and its strength. Its strength confers endurance, 
 thus prolonging the opportunity for action. Its strength is a 
 compound of material strength, moral strength, and intellectual 
 strength. 
 
 Its material strength is founded upon its numbers and re- 
 sources. 
 
 Its moral strength is founded upon its Principles of Action. 
 
 Its intellectual strength is founded upon the Knowledge and 
 Wisdom of the individuals who compose it. 
 
 Since all of its purposes are declared Right by reason and 
 morality, it is apparent that the ultimate success of society will 
 depend in the first place upon its intellectual strength, but ulti- 
 mately it must depend upon its moral strength, which alone will 
 determine the moral character of its administrative action.
 
 POLITICAL RIGHTS 43 
 
 Individual Rights, Bands of : ]\Ian originally resorted to 
 Association as a means of reenforcing Individual Power. Later 
 on Association was used as a means for developing individual 
 power. Association is impossible, however, without agreement; 
 and agreement implies mutuality. The Individual agrees to act 
 in unison with his fellows in determining what shall be done by 
 Society, how it shall be done, and finally in doing it. He relin- 
 quishes somewhat of natural independence in action in return for 
 added safety and opportunity. He substitutes one kind of 
 happiness for another. 
 
 What he is bound to do under the new circumstances are for the 
 future his Duties. 
 
 What he is to receive in return are his Rights. 
 
 Without going further into the philosophy of the subject let us 
 broadly define an American Individual Right as a just claim of 
 an individual to anything which his Governmental Agreement 
 declares is his either because of his nature or because of the 
 agreement. 
 
 Natural Rights. Acquired Rights. LTnder this definition in- 
 dividual rights must be divided into two kinds ; namely, Natural 
 Rights and Acquired Rights. 
 
 Natural rights are those which belong to an individual con- 
 sidered as a separate and independent being. 
 
 Acquired rights are those which belong to an individual con- 
 sidered as one of the Collective Unit, or Community. 
 
 Natural rights differ in origin from acquired rights in that the 
 former spring from the impulse of self-preservation and pro- 
 tection, while the latter spring from the desire for the benefits 
 accruing from mutual protection and preservation. 
 
 A natural right may be considered as a just claim to satisfy 
 human necessities without molestation by other individuals; 
 while an acquired right may be considered as a just claim to 
 assistance from other individuals in maintaining mutual rights. 
 The Agreement of Association fixes the justness of the claims and 
 determines the specific individuals upon whom these respective 
 claims must be made. 
 
 Natural rights are claims against the other Individuals of the 
 Association. 
 
 Acquired rights are claims upon such individuals. 
 
 The one are rights of non-interference ; the others, of cooperation. 
 The one are liberties and immunities ; the others, privileges and 
 advantages. The one are ungranted ; the others, granted. The
 
 44 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 one exist because man exists ; the others, because man has created 
 them. The one are equally' applicable to all mankind; the others, 
 only specially applicable to the individuals of any given com- 
 munity. 
 
 The Community. Regarding a right as a claim, there must be a 
 something upon which the claim can be made. In free societies 
 the only recognized body or thing superior in power to the indi- 
 vidual and upon whom the individual can rest for justice is the 
 community which the individuals have created through joint 
 action. A right without its benefit is valueless. The community, 
 however, is powerful enough to secure the benefit to its claimant, 
 and it was formed voluntarily by its individuals and invested with 
 the power to secure certain benefits to them. 
 
 The first claims that individuals made on primitive society were 
 that when extraordinary peril of lif^ threatened the individual, 
 society should act to avert it; and that when the individual was 
 restricted in his ordinary and proper action, society should act to 
 restore the original conditions of existence. Later on, and because 
 of individual development and human progress, the individual 
 claimed the benefit of action by society concerning personal, 
 property, moral, and political rights ; and before a man can know 
 now how he is to act properly as one of the collective sovereign 
 in the maintenance of these declared rights he must know exactly 
 what each of them are. 
 
 Inherent Human Rights : Concerning natural rights, develop- 
 ment and progress having gradually changed the status of primi- 
 tive man into that of a social and civil being, have also at the same 
 time, gradually increased his powers of understanding his own 
 nature, its needs, and the claims of non-interference which he can 
 rightfully make upon his fellow associates. Such rights, however, 
 must not be considered as acquired rights merely because they 
 have not always been perceived and enforced. They are in fact the 
 natural rights that development and progress have enabled man to 
 perceive were inherently his because of his nature. They pass from 
 dormancy into dominancy during the awakening consciousness of 
 human needs and while man advances through the stages of prog- 
 ress commonly called " Society" and " Civilization." Their estab- 
 lishment depends, of course, upon their general perception and 
 the general acquiescence in their existence. Because their in- 
 cipiency and recognition is contemporaneous with the advanced 
 stages of human progress they are usually distinguished from the 
 natural rights that are perceived in the primitive stage by the term
 
 POLITICAL RIGHTS 45 
 
 " Inherent Human Rights." Furthermore, and because they 
 cannot with safety, either to the community or to the individual, 
 be ignored, violated, or set aside, they are generally considered as 
 " Inalienable and Indefeasible Rights." 
 
 Progress, however, has not altered the original meanings of 
 natural individual rights when once established. It has merely 
 modified ideas concerning how, and when, under the chosen con- 
 ditions of existence, and within any given community, a human 
 being may exercise individual power to secure self-preservation, 
 self-protection, and self -development. 
 
 Two Classes of Individual Rights : Now if we consider a Right 
 to be a just claim to any and every benefit which either belongs to 
 an individual inherently, or which may accrue to him through 
 association, then individual rights fall naturally into two classes; 
 namely. Civil Rights, and Political Rights ; the one determining 
 in advance the status of his bodily and material welfare, the other 
 determining in advance his political status and the peculiar 
 political advantages he may enjoy under his established form of 
 Government. 
 
 Civil Rights : Civil Rights are those natural, inherent, inalien- 
 able, and indefeasible rights which are set apart and distinguished 
 from other rights by the First Principles of the community, and 
 which are deemed to belong to each individual thereof as of no 
 question, and which exist irrespective of Government. 
 
 In order to escape a possible confusion of ideas which such a 
 general statement might create, the reader must bear the following 
 points in mind. A distinction exists between the people of the 
 United States and the people of the various States. Rights, 
 considered as just claims, are only enforceable within the com- 
 munity which establishes them. Before The Constitution was 
 adopted the people of the original thirteen States had adopted 
 their own distinctive Governments under which dissimilar indi- 
 vidual rights were established by the different commonwealths. 
 After The Constitution was adopted it was amended to include a 
 distinct expression of the will of the people of the United States 
 regarding the future action of the United States Government 
 concerning certain individual rights then deemed to be established. 
 
 The Bill of Rights: An American bill of rights is a concise 
 declaration of the people in any State of the separate individual 
 rights which The Commonwealth is to maintain. It is usually 
 made at the same time that Government is established and is 
 included in the State Constitution mainly for the purpose of
 
 46 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 indicating the restrictions which are to be placed upon the exercise 
 of political authority by the governmental agencies. In the case 
 of the original thirteen American States the bill of rights was 
 intended not so much to set forth new ideas of political action as 
 to secure against future violation the rights for which the American 
 colonists had fought because the possession of which had been 
 denied them by the Government previously exercising jurisdiction 
 over them. 
 
 In one way such declarations are regarded as restrictions put 
 upon the use of the Supreme Power in connection with matters 
 which the people declare belong to individuals as of right; and 
 which the governmental agency in the exercise of authority is 
 prohibited from interfering with except as the people may from 
 time to time expressly permit and direct. 
 
 As against the governmental agency they are a reservation of 
 sovereignty contained in a grant of authority. 
 
 Considered as incorporations in the fundamental law they are 
 self-executory. Their purpose cannot be altered or affected 
 permanently by legislative enactment. They nullify all Statutes 
 thereafter passed which are inconsistent with them. 
 
 Considered as parts of the governmental agreement they serve 
 other purposes. First : by attaching definitive meanings to such 
 terms as civil liberty ; religious liberty ; personal liberty, security, 
 and safety ; indictment, trial by jury, twice put in jeopardy, the 
 impairment of contracts ; retroactive laws, ex post facto laws ; bills 
 of attainder ; due process of law ; freedom of speech ; freedom of the 
 press ; the right of assembly ; the right to petition ; the right to 
 bear arms ; the right to the writ of habeas corpus etc., they serve 
 in part to strictly define the four general conditions of individual 
 existence described in Chapter II ; and second : they serve to 
 indicate the general obligations of sovereignty, the general duties 
 of citizenship, and the kinds of means and methods to be employed 
 in political action by individuals acting either in a private or in a 
 public capacity. 
 
 Equality in Rights : Now as we pass to a consideration of the 
 political rights which our forefathers established, a word concern- 
 ing the development of the idea of political freedom becomes 
 advisable. And, as the desire for self-government has in the past 
 been largely stimulated by the injustices produced through the 
 exercise of the supreme power by the monarchs or by ruling 
 classes, our attention is unavoidably attracted to the reasons 
 bringing about changes in the form of Government.
 
 POLITICAL RIGHTS 47 
 
 Briefly then, and as far as the people of modern communities 
 are concerned, it is the desire on the part of individuals to be 
 secure in the continued maintenance and possession of their 
 admitted rights that chiefly leads to the establishment of Govern- 
 ment as a means to that end. Indeed, it has been the desire on the 
 part of men to be secure in the possession and benefits of newly 
 perceived rights that has often led to the establishment of new 
 societies and new forms of Government. Community government, 
 which was originally intended to be the continuous exercise of a 
 necessary but beneficial restraint over individuals, was originally 
 patriarchal in form. The father of the family, who ruled by 
 paternal right (by reason of his relationship, his superior knowl- 
 edge, or his reputed wisdom), naturally succeeded to the added 
 responsibilities and obligations of the Patriarch when the related 
 families grouped themselves into tribes. When acting in the 
 capacity of a general chieftain or war lord, or as the leader or 
 counselor in times of peace, the patriarch may either have assumed, 
 or have been permitted, to exercise the civil power over the con- 
 federated tribes or nation. He may also have claimed the right 
 to name his successor in office ; and unless this claim were success- 
 fully opposed it might easily transpire in the course of time that a 
 certain family in all the nation was held to possess the right to 
 supply a ruler to the nation ; thus establishing a dynasty, the 
 members of which were neither under the same obligations to the 
 people which the patriarch was, or wholly dependent upon the 
 people for the office. 
 
 In such a state of affairs inequality, considered as a condition of 
 existence, was admitted, recognized, maintained, and perpetuated. 
 Under such a condition Government frequently degenerated from 
 an exercise of wisdom, reason, and justice into an exercise of 
 physical force for the satisfaction of private desires. The trans- 
 ition as it took place was usually a natural one. The rulers were 
 peculiarly exposed to the temptations of the love of power, which 
 is the root of all political evil. They were in a position for the time 
 being at least where adequate restraint could not be put upon them. 
 Possessing a power superior to that of the many, they frequently 
 used it to gratify their personal desires and often through the wilful 
 destruction of the life or liberty of an individual or through the 
 absorption of his property. The masses were placed under a hard 
 disadvantage. They were rendered unhappy either through the 
 actual destruction, or the dread of the destruction, of that happiness 
 which consists in the satisfaction of the desire to freely exercise
 
 48 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 individual power according to the received principles of association. 
 In short, cooperation between individuals as a means for maintain- 
 ing individual rights was destroyed, and the right of the individual 
 to the assistance of the acquired power of united action was denied 
 for many purposes. 
 
 But throughout the slow course of the centuries the great body 
 of men, as compared with the few who claimed the possession and 
 exercise of superior rights, have slowly enlarged the field of action 
 in which they claim to possess rights in common with all men, until, 
 at last, and in some communities, they have succeeded in establish- 
 ing the justice of the claim of an equal right in all men to participate 
 in the government of men. 
 
 Equality. In free communities " Equality" takes on new mean- 
 ings. It means that there are no inherently superior political class 
 in the community, and no individuals with superior political rights. 
 It means that the claim of such to the exercise of the supreme power 
 is invalid. It means that such exercise can only be had properly 
 by all of the individuals of the community when acting together. 
 It means that the collective people are the sovereign. It means, 
 when all are endeavoring together to apply their fundamental 
 principles in the conduct of social, economic, and community 
 affairs, that the voice of one individual shall be as effective as the 
 voice of another in the decision of all administrative questions. It 
 means that this new individual status shall be determined at the 
 outset by an agreement of individual wills ; that the agreement 
 when reached shall be sanctioned by an expression of the general 
 will ; and that the new status of the individual shall be maintained, 
 altered, or destroyed in the future only by a free exercise of the 
 will of the associated individuals. It means that the people shall 
 determine for themselves that which in the future shall be con- 
 sidered justice in the community ; and that in reaching this deter- 
 mination each shall be equally free to express his ideas effectively 
 and compel a similar expression from others. 
 
 Political Freedom. Under the concept of equal rights as above 
 defined the power to govern becomes seated in the people and they 
 succeed to the exercise of the supreme power. At the same time 
 the individuals who compose the community adopt a new set of 
 principles and a new set of rights that are connected with the 
 future exercise of the supreme power. The effect of this action is 
 to create for themselves and for succeeding generations the new 
 condition of individual existence called political freedom. The 
 fundamental idea of political freedom is that each individual shall
 
 POLITICAL RIGHTS 49 
 
 freely and effectually participate in establishing and administering 
 restraint. The condition is to last so long as the governmental 
 agreement holds good in its entirety as the basis of political action. 
 
 The new situation, however, is not without the practical difficul- 
 ties connected with the administration of restraint, or the individ- 
 ual perplexities concerning proper political action. In a free 
 community the individual acts in a dual capacity. While in some 
 respects he acts as a free and independent citizen, in others he must 
 act as one of the collective sovereign. At one and the same time 
 he has to faithfully perform the duties of citizenship and to help 
 discharge the obligations of sovereignty. As a citizen he must 
 observe all of the established rights of others, and as one of the 
 collective sovereign he must act to preserve this body of rights in 
 their entirety. As a citizen claims are made against him. As 
 one of the collective sovereign claims are made upon him. LTnder 
 these circumstances the individual faces this problem : How are 
 the double capacities of sovereign and citizen to be determined 
 and kept separate ? How is the individual to discharge the duties 
 of non-interference and of cooperation ? 
 
 Political Rights : At best the situation is a difficult one ; but 
 by delegating the exercise of some of their political power to a 
 governmental agency the people make the administration of 
 restraint much more complicated. The Government requires 
 constant replenishing with individuals who are to be selected by the 
 people. It requires constant energizing, direction, and control by 
 the people. New duties, new obligations, and new rights spring 
 into existence with the adoption of a representative form of 
 Government. To be as brief as possible, these new rights, which 
 are the accompaniment of the possession and exercise of our 
 political power and authority under our chosen form of Govern- 
 ment, are our political rights. They are that particular body of 
 rights which are determined by our principles ; they are those just 
 claims to benefits which spring from our chosen form of mutual 
 association in the exercise of restraint. But this point is to be 
 noted, viz. they are bestowed upon individuals by community 
 action, and are therefore acquired. Accompanying the possession 
 of political power acquired under a governmental agreement, they 
 languish if the agreement is not maintained in its entirety ; and 
 they die when administration ceases under the governmental 
 agreement in the same way that the right of occupancy ceases at 
 the end of a lease. In this respect they differ from civil rights, the 
 existence of which is not affected by the cessation of Government,
 
 50 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 and the continued possession of which often requires the death 
 of one regime and the birth of another based upon new concepts 
 concerning the exercise of poUtical power. Consequently, if these 
 rights are to be maintained, and if they are to confer their dis- 
 tinctive benefits upon individuals, the governmental agreement 
 must be maintained in its entirety. 
 
 Defined. The political rights which we have created are the 
 just claims of individuals to the free, equal, and effectual participa- 
 tion in the exercise of political power for the accomplishment 
 of the ordained objects of society; the accomplishment to be 
 had in accordance with the ordained principles of action. These 
 rights bear the same relation to the exercise of political power that 
 civil rights do to the exercise of individual power. They are all 
 created by an agreement of individual will ; but they cannot possess 
 an operative force until Government is established and ordained. 
 
 The Right of Cooperative Control. Considered as individual 
 privileges, political rights are the distinctive advantages which the 
 individuals of one free community may possess over those had in 
 other communities. They serve to attract outside individuals to 
 citizenship and so to increase the material strength of society. 
 Looked at from another standpoint they are the specified pre- 
 rogatives of sovereignty which the community has established. 
 As such they are inseparably connected with the proper discharge 
 of the obligations and responsibilities of sovereignty. They are 
 based upon considerations determining the right manner of ex- 
 ercising political power in the promotion of the general welfare of 
 the individual and of society. Pertaining more especially to the 
 domain of moral political action they are intended to increase 
 the moral strength of society. Their observance by individuals 
 is supposed to be prompted by that civic virtue which seeks the 
 welfare of all. 
 
 Then again, and approaching the subject from the standpoint of 
 Individual material welfare, and because, in theory, all of the 
 individuals are supposed to be interested in promoting the general 
 welfare as the surest foundation for individual welfare and happi- 
 ness, the exercise of the Supreme Power is placed in their hands. 
 With us this exercise carries with it the right on the part of each 
 individual to freely participate in the exercise of Political Control. 
 The exercise of this right is considered necessary because of the 
 frailties in human nature. It is considered beneficial to the 
 individual and to the community. It enables any individual to 
 obtain the assistance of the community in preventing a palpable
 
 POLITICAL RIGHTS 51 
 
 misuse of political power or of political authority by any other 
 individual, or by associations of individuals, or by political agencies. 
 Since there is no political right without its corresponding obliga- 
 tion, it enables the community to obtain the assistance of all of its 
 individuals who are similarly minded in maintaining the ordained 
 body of rights. This ability to obtain assistance from and to 
 render assistance to the community tends to make the political 
 capacity of all individuals equal. It tends to place the naturally 
 weakest on a parity with the naturally strongest in the defense 
 of individual rights through political action. Finally, political 
 rights are conferred upon the individuals of a communit}^ to enable 
 them to act properly and to secure proper individual action when 
 they, acting together as a collective sovereign, are engaged in 
 forming, ascertaining, expressing, and applying the Will of the 
 People. 
 
 Are not Private Rights. From this it appears that political 
 rights are not private rights ; but that on the contrary they are in 
 the nature of an express public trust created for the purpose of 
 enabling the collective sovereign to do justice between individuals 
 while it is exercising the supreme power of the community. 
 
 It was the original intention that the community, while adminis- 
 tering justice, was to have the benefit of free, direct, and eflFectual 
 action by all individuals upon whom the exercise of political 
 power was conferred. Following out the idea governing all trust 
 procedure, it was never intended that individuals, while acting in 
 the capacities of the sovereign, should delegate the discharge of 
 sovereign obligations and responsibilities to other individuals, or 
 to associations of individuals ; because, if an individual delegates 
 the discharge of his moral obligations to another, then his power to 
 control the action of the other is lost ; he is no longer the equal of 
 others in influence ; he has deprived the community of the moral 
 support which it has a right to expect from him ; he has improperly 
 increased the influence of others ; and he has destroyed the political 
 equality between individuals that was originally ordained. More- 
 over, the free exercise of political power was originally assumed by 
 the original Collective Sovereign as a solemn trust to be executed 
 for the benefit of the succeeding generations which compose the 
 commonwealth. Because of this trust nature it was intended that 
 the exercise of any political power or authority specially conferred 
 upon an individual should not be delegated by him. Experience, 
 reason, wisdom, prudence, and safety declare against the practice. 
 If discretionary exercise can be delegated by one elector, it can be
 
 52 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 by others ; and should it be delegated by a large number of in- 
 dividuals, then the ability of the community to maintain justice 
 between individuals may become either seriously diminished in 
 force or lost altogether; all of which will be made more fully 
 apparent when the separate functions of The Electorate are con- 
 sidered. 
 
 The Right to Govern. Individuals were given political rights in 
 order that they might assist each other in the maintenance of the 
 ordained conditions of existence. These conditions are estab- 
 lished, ordained, and maintained by a progressive series of actions 
 by individuals taken at different times. The rights are conferred 
 to enable individuals to act properly and to secure proper indi- 
 vidual action at all times. They are mutually supportive and 
 complementary. Each has a separate administrative purpose, 
 and, taken separately, they present our conceptions of the com- 
 ponent parts of the right to govern as we have construed it. With 
 us the right to govern is the right of the people to command and to 
 enforce obedience to the will of the people. In a Democracy the 
 will of the people is enforced by direct action on the part of the 
 people. In a Representative Democracy, however, the right to 
 govern takes on an added meaning because the exercise of political 
 power has become specialized. The people no longer establish 
 and administer restraint directly. They have a public servant 
 to assist them in administration and have assumed the added 
 duties, obligations, and responsibilities of master and servant. 
 The community must now enforce its will upon The Government as 
 well as upon private individuals. But whatever the polity of the 
 community, the right to govern bestows upon the individual the 
 right to freely and effectually exercise every political power which 
 is necessary to establish and administer restraint according to the 
 principles of association and the accepted administrative polity. 
 
 The Right to Choose. The principle underlying the right to 
 govern is moral freedom. Man is considered as a " free agent " ; 
 that is, as a being who can determine his own actions, who is 
 morally and personally responsible for them, and who is capable 
 of deciding for himself what will best promote the general welfare. 
 Free association affords him the opportunity to exercise his will 
 to this end within the limits of the community, and the right by 
 which the principle is made operative is commonly called the right 
 to choose. 
 
 Moral freedom is bestowed upon individuals so that they, while 
 engaged in forming individual opinion, may be absolutely free
 
 POLITICAL RIGHTS 53 
 
 from any restraint but that of conscience and reason. The right 
 to choose bestows absokite freedom in the exercise of voHtion after 
 the reasoning process has culminated in a predominating senti- 
 ment or opinion. 
 
 A free expression of opinion is required from each individual 
 concerning all matters connected with the establishment and 
 administration of Government. The intention is that the expres- 
 sion shall be direct and effectual. The right to choose is intended 
 to confer the free exercise of individual judgment and volition 
 concerning every matter connected with the political action of the 
 individual, the governmental agencies, and the community. The 
 establishment and administration of Government is accomplished 
 through political action by the people. A statement of the various 
 matters which the people have to transact as a sovereign will dis- 
 closes most of the stated individual political rights which the com- 
 munity has created. 
 
 Political Rights Enumerated. Lender our governmental polity, 
 and concerning the establishment of government, individuals 
 possess the right to participate in the determination : 
 
 Of the objects for which Government shall be established. 
 
 Of the form of Government to be adopted. 
 
 Of the political agencies by which political power and authority 
 shall be exercised. 
 
 Of the character, composition, nature, and administrative 
 objects of these political agencies. 
 
 Of the plan of administrative action ; and finally they have the 
 right to freely participate in the action by which Government as 
 proposed is ordained. 
 
 Concerning administration, the individual possesses the right to 
 freely participate : 
 
 In determining the temporary administrative policy. 
 
 In filling all elective governmental or administrative offices. 
 
 In controlling the action of the representative governmental 
 agency in reference to the administrative policy. 
 
 In providing the necessary impulse to action by The Government. 
 
 In obtaining organized political action from individuals. 
 
 In obtaining political leadership. 
 
 In securing the full benefits of statesmanship in The Government. 
 
 In determining the kind of representation individuals shall 
 possess. 
 
 In enforcing the obligations of responsibility upon all public 
 officers and agents; and
 
 54" SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 In prescribing the qualifications of citizenship and candidacy. 
 
 The individual also possesses the right to hold office if properly 
 qualified and chosen and to freely discharge the functions of office ; 
 to freely express his choice between administrative policies and 
 candidates for elective office by means of the ballot ; to freely ex- 
 press his opinion as to proposed amendments of the fundamental 
 law by means of the ballot ; to have that ballot made fully effectual 
 for the intended purposes ; to be freely represented in the admin- 
 istrative body where laws are proposed, discussed, advocated, 
 enacted, altered, amended, or repealed ; to be freely represented in 
 the executive and in the judiciary branches of The Government ; 
 to be properly represented in the public offices that are filled 
 through an exercise of the appointive authority ; to have the 
 action of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary fully 
 responsive to the will of the people ; and tc have every improper 
 influence excluded from the processes by which that will is formed, 
 ascertained, expressed, and applied. Finally, and as a sweeping 
 clause, let it be added, that each individual possesses the right to 
 enjoy in its fulness every benefit logically flowing from the prin- 
 ciples upon which the exercise of political power is established. 
 
 As a corollary it follows that individuals cannot rightfull}^ act so 
 as to either weaken the control of the Community over its govern- 
 mental agencies ; or alter, diminish, or destroy direct responsibility 
 to the people on the part of public officials and servants ; or avoid 
 the true meanings of the principle of representation ; or alter the 
 true meanings of the doctrine of majority rule ; or make majorities 
 unnaturally permanent and so affect the free succession of majori- 
 ties ; or create obstacles to the free formation, ascertainment, and 
 expression of the will of the people concerning policies, candidates, 
 acts, or measures ; or substitute partizan methods for the trans- 
 action of the political work of the electorate or of The Government 
 in the place of the methods originally intended ; to create or allow 
 to be created any agency for the discharge of the obligations of 
 sovereignty originally resting upon the people. 
 
 In brief, individuals cannot rightfully do anything by which the 
 political power, freedom, and equality of any individual is dimin- 
 ished, or by which either indirect or undemocratic action is pro- 
 duced from private individuals while in the exercise of political 
 power, or by which partizan action is produced by members of The 
 Government while in the exercise of political authority. 
 
 Each commonwealth, however, now permits its individuals to 
 do all of these things which should not be done. As a result, each
 
 POLITICAL RIGHTS 55 
 
 has, for the time being, lost a part of its ability to control the 
 political action of its governmental agencies and of itself. Al- 
 though the present situation is fraught with moral and p>olitical 
 mischief it has nevertheless come about in a perfectly natural 
 manner and because of an originally insufficient regulation of 
 administrative action. None of the Commonwealths succeeded 
 at the outset in devising an administrative system composed of 
 methods that completely governed the exercise of political power 
 and authority in all its detail and which left no questions open as 
 to proper conduct. There were, as we shall see, many opportu- 
 nities left open for an illogical use, and, therefore, a misuse of such 
 power and authority. Having a defective system to begin with, 
 and failing to realize that the continuance of individual freedom, 
 liberty, equality, and justice as ordained depends very largely 
 upon the use by individuals of only those means and methods of 
 political action that give full operative force to the ordained 
 principles of action, the great mass of the people while endeavoring 
 to properly discharge their obligations and duties have been 
 unpresciently led into the adoption of expedient after expedient as 
 a mode of action in one or another respect until they have finally 
 produced a body of rules under which the political power of the 
 individual can be and is now most often used to either impair or 
 to destroy those very conditions of existence which the people 
 originally declared and still declare are absolutely essential to 
 individual welfare and happiness. 
 
 This body of rules is The Partizan Party System of Administra- 
 tion. It is most largely composed of customs which regulate 
 political action, but of customs that are in many instances and 
 respects opposed to the principles of political action. Under it 
 newly devised custom possesses an operative force on individuals 
 superior to that of their original political principles. Under it we 
 are taking customary, but unprincipled action ; and that is why 
 we fail to obtain the full blessings of political liberty. This 
 is a broad statement ; but its truth can be fully demonstrated 
 to any one possessing the patience to look into the character, 
 purposes, and effects of the political means, methods, and agencies 
 originally intended for our use, and then compare them with the 
 character, purposes, and eft'ects of the partizan means, methods, 
 and agencies now in use.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 POLITICAL POWER 
 
 Human Nature. The primary force that alters, impairs, or 
 destroys ordained conditions in a free community is Human 
 Nature, or the general characteristics of mankind. 
 
 Individual Action. It becomes manifest through individual 
 action ; which, for the time being, we will define as the exertion of 
 individual power for the satisfaction of individual desire. 
 
 Individual Power: A brief analysis of individual power, 
 coupled with a statement of the general manner and common 
 objects of its exercise, may help to explain some of the difficulties 
 besetting a logical and successful exercise of administrative 
 power. 
 
 Defined. Individual power is the ability of The Individual to 
 enforce individual will in the management of affairs. This ability 
 proceeds from the presence and combination in an individual of 
 some or of all those certain human forces which impel him to 
 action. 
 
 The degree of personal power depends upon the extent to which 
 these separate forces or moving energies are combined in a single 
 individual. His influence for good or bad will depend upon his 
 preponderating desire. 
 
 Elements of. Two Classes. Some of these incentives to action 
 are inborn, inherent, and natural. Others, originating after birth, 
 are acquired. 
 
 Natural Elements. Among the natural elements of Individual 
 Power are : 
 
 Physical Strength ; conferring endurance. 
 
 Intelligence ; or the capacity for assimilating the higher forms 
 of knowledge. 
 
 Sagacity ; or the ability to comprehend affairs. 
 
 56
 
 POLITICAL POWER 57 
 
 Virtue ; or the disposition to act in conformity to the generally 
 accepted ideas of Right; and which, when exercised politically, 
 is called Public Spirit. 
 
 Acquired Elements. Prominent among the acquired elements 
 may be mentioned : 
 
 Knowledge ; the result of training, education, and experience ; 
 and sometimes amounting to Wisdom, which is a superior knowl- 
 edge of relations in general. 
 
 Skill, Art; by which physical strength is reenforced, or its 
 deficiency is made good. 
 
 Eloquence ; the greatest aid to sagacity and knowledge in pro- 
 ducing conviction, and a moving force over the emotions. 
 
 Organization ; or the systematic union of individuals in a body 
 whose members, officers, and agents work together for a common 
 end, and whereby united strength is secured to effect the purposes 
 of the dominating will. 
 
 Wealth in all its various forms ; which enables its possessor to 
 buy or turn to his own use the assistance of all the elements of 
 human power except virtue, and if not that, then the appearance 
 of virtue, which often answers the same purposes. (Hildreth, 
 Theory of Politics.) 
 
 Objects for Which Used. All individuals will use their power to 
 satisfy their desires. The predominating human desire is for 
 wealth ; and it is seldom satisfied in full. 
 
 The expressed desire of The Community is for the maintenance 
 of a certain fixed standard of cooperation between its individuals ; 
 but after the first flush of patriotic feeling is past most individuals 
 will seek the satisfaction of their desire for wealth even at the 
 expense of others. 
 
 The full satisfaction of the desires of some will result, if un- 
 checked, in the gradual acquirement of special privileges by some 
 at the expense of the remainder. Such a condition is contrary to 
 the expressed desire of The Commonwealth ; and in order to fore- 
 stall it, if possible, the economic action that is taken in the satis- 
 faction of individual desire is regulated by administrative action 
 taken by the community to satisfy its desire. 
 
 There is also another and most serious danger. The experience 
 of past republics has shown that the opportunity to exercise either 
 political power or political authority is sought after either secretly 
 or openly, if not by all, then by nearly all of those who are entitled 
 to the exercise of either. 
 
 It has also shown that the exercise of this power and authority,
 
 58 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 like every other object of human desire, will, if unchecked, be 
 acquired ultimately by those who are the stronger; that is, by 
 those who in a superior degree combine w^ithin themselves the 
 various elements of individual power. 
 
 It has further shown that moral fitness has nothing to do with 
 the ability of an individual to merely exercise political power or 
 political authority ; and that immoral but able men will seek this 
 exercise as the means for promoting their private aims at the 
 expense of the other individuals in the community, and of the 
 community itself. 
 
 Restraint upon Exercise of. Now if the satisfaction of individ- 
 ual desire for wealth remains unchecked, what can prevent some 
 individuals from obtaining control over administrative action 
 and from establishing a statutory inequality in the place of the 
 ordained Equality? 
 
 But the immediate effects of such action in free communities is 
 to seriously impair the ordained Freedom, Liberty, and Equality 
 of individuals ; to make it impossible for The Commonwealth to 
 render Justice as ordained, and to produce contention, discord, 
 and possibly open strife in Society. Consequently, if the indi- 
 viduals of a free body politic are to live in harmony as ordained, 
 the necessity immediately arises for The Commonwealth to place 
 some uniform, just, and beneficial restraint upon the exercise of 
 individual power for selfish individual desire, and to enforce that 
 restraint afterwards ; for righteous administrative action can never 
 be brought about through the mere adoption of a good form of 
 Government. The adoption of a good form of government pre- 
 sents the opportunity for righteous administrative action by The 
 Commonwealth, but the character of its action depends entirely 
 upon the kind of action which its individuals take, and this, in turn, 
 depends very largely upon the kind of administrative system in use. 
 
 Administrative Impulse. Finally, our own experience has 
 shown that a representative administrative agency will respond to 
 an improper impulse as well as to a proper impulse, and will put 
 the one into operation as surely as it will the other. 
 
 Theoretically, The Will of The People is to supply the impulse 
 to action by The Government. 
 
 Under our present procedure, however, The Will of The Partlzan 
 Party has for j^ears supplied the impulse. 
 
 Why ? Because it had the opportunity to do so ; for without a 
 logical, a comprehensive, and an ordained system of administrative 
 action that will enable The Commonwealth to compel its individ-
 
 POLITICAL POWER 59 
 
 uals to take proper electoral and official action the opportunity is 
 presented to the selfish and powerful few to dominate the adminis- 
 trative action of The Commonwealth in their favor. 
 
 Free Opportunity : But our theory of Administration was not 
 based on the idea of passing the exercise of administrative power 
 into the hands of the stronger few. That idea is monarchic at 
 core. It was detested by the original commonwealths because it 
 conferred the pleasures of governing and of superiority upon a few, 
 and imposed the pains of obedience and of inferiority upon the 
 many. It was detested because it was an ideal scheme for the 
 possible misuse of political power and authority, and the pro- 
 duction of individual unhappiness in The State. The Fathers in- 
 tended to produce a system of administrative action under which 
 all who were entitled could freely participate in the pleasures of 
 governing; and these pleasures were to neutralize the pains of 
 obedience. This was possible because of the dual capacity of the 
 individual as Sovereign and subject. 
 
 The free opportunity of the individual to exercise whatever 
 power he possessed towards promoting individual development 
 and human progress along the lines laid down by common consent 
 was held to foster the sense of political equality ; to lessen the 
 sense of individual inferiority ; to strengthen the sense of responsi- 
 bility ; to raise human desire above the dead level of selfishness ; 
 and so to increase the sum of human happiness. 
 
 The phrase " Free opportunity of all " did not mean that every 
 individual of discretionary years within the body politic should 
 directly exercise political power or political authority. It meant 
 just this : that all should be free to help decide who out of the 
 whole should exercise political power, and who out of the whole 
 should temporarily exercise political authority during the rapidly 
 succeeding periods of administration. All were free to seek the 
 exercise of political authority ; but the choice was limited to those 
 who possess moral force as well as ability because The Common- 
 wealth has the right to command the services of such individuals 
 only. 
 
 Constituted Authority, and Authorities : The adoption of 
 representative government of itself constitutes the exercise of 
 Political Authority as one of its elements. 
 
 The administrative sj'stem serves in part to set forth in detail 
 how authority shall be used, and for what purposes. 
 
 Now whether the system is consistent, practical, or otherwise, 
 it nevertheless is the common practise to refer to it as the " Con-
 
 60 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 stituted Authority," and to refer to the collective agencies and to 
 the single individuals who are entrusted with the exercise of 
 political authority as the " Constituted Authorities." 
 
 Two points are to be noted in connection with the use of these 
 terms. First, that the phrases are intended to convey the im- 
 pression that the authority has been created, and the " Authori- 
 ties " have been obtained, by action on the part of The People, 
 which has been taken in accordance with the spirit, meaning, and 
 intent of the original governmental agreement ; and second, that 
 unless such action is taken, then the people will produce a " Con- 
 stituted Authority" that is at variance with their Principles of 
 Action, and also will obtain constituted authorities which must 
 necessarily put other principles into operation. 
 
 Revolution: Before proceeding to separate Political Power 
 into its component parts it may be well to consider a power that 
 is used for political purposes, and also its alternative, the Power 
 of Amendment. 
 
 The exercise of the Powers of Establishment, and the continuous, 
 orderly, and effective exercise of the Powers of Administration 
 results in " Government" ; — using the term in the sense of a 
 working political regime. 
 
 But when the exercise of the administrative powers is seriously 
 interrupted, as by an effort of The People to change the existing 
 order of affairs, then Revolution is the result. 
 
 The main points to be noted regarding Revolution are as 
 follows : 
 
 The People alone possess the right to its use. 
 
 Its exercise is never directed against The Community, or against 
 its Sovereignty. 
 
 It is seldom directed against the continuance of an ordained 
 political regime. 
 
 It is usually directed against the personnel of administrative 
 agencies. 
 
 Or to effect a change in that which up to the time of its exercise 
 has served as the Constituted Authority of the People. 
 
 In free communities it can not with propriety be used to force 
 the performance of detail administrative work. 
 
 Its exercise usually precedes the exercise of the Powers of 
 Establishment and of Administration, and is had for the purpose 
 of clearing a tumultuous situation of armed opponents so that an 
 embryonic society can peaceably establish and administer govern- 
 ment unto itself.
 
 POLITICAL POWER 61 
 
 It is not a constitutional power, but an extra-constitutional 
 one ; " For Revolution is nothing but The People acting above and 
 beyond the constituted order of things, in defiance of what has 
 been considered law, but still in pursuance of inherent powers 
 which they hold superior to law." (See Pomeroy's " Constitu- 
 tional Law, 10th ed., p. 74.) 
 
 The Right of Revolution. The Right of Revolution is not 
 constitutional, but extra-constitutional. The right to its exercise 
 by the people is based upon the principle that The Community 
 has the right to a self-continued existence as a body politic ; has 
 the right to institute over itself whatever form of government it 
 desires ; and has the right to provide itself with an acceptable 
 system of administration. Consequently, if the administrative 
 agencies persistently misuse authority, then, through the exercise 
 of this power, the people can abolish them ; and also, if, in the 
 course of time, the administrative system becomes instrumental 
 in the misuse of political power, then The Community through 
 the exercise of this power is enabled to destroy that which has in 
 the past been considered law, and to substitute that in its place 
 which shall in the future be considered law even if it has to resort 
 to armed force to do it. 
 
 The Power of Amendment : The Commonwealths of the 
 United States have, however, a constitutional and peaceable way 
 to effect changes which in the past have often been accomplished 
 through the exercise of armed revolutionary force. 
 
 The Agreement of Wills. In these States political changes are 
 accomplished through peaceably reaching an agreement of wills 
 as to the desired change and then tlirough peaceably expressing 
 the majority will at elections ; when, and at frequent mtervals, 
 the people have the opportunity, and without resort to force, to 
 pass upon the proposed change, and also upon the proposed 
 personnel of the representative agency. 
 
 Exercise of. In the United States the exercise of the Power of 
 Amendment has never been restricted for the accomplishment 
 of any one specific purpose, or set of purposes. 
 
 Only the manner of its use for some purposes has been fixed. 
 
 When rightly used its scope is absolutely unlimited. 
 
 It can be used by The Commonwealth, The Government and 
 its branches, and by the individuals of each political division of a 
 State who work together as a unit for political purposes. It is the 
 power by which the tyranny that a Democracy is capable of can 
 be stopped without a resort to armed force.
 
 62 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 The Commonwealth can use it directly to change their Funda- 
 mental Law, of which the System of PoHtical Administration is a 
 rightful part. 
 
 The Commonwealth can use it indirectly to change their 
 Statutory Law, and by means of The Legislature. 
 
 Finally, it can be used to revise and correct past political action 
 that has been taken for any specific purpose whatsoever; to 
 change or alter any prescribed law, system, method, rule, and 
 usage ; and through its use The Commonwealth can still persist 
 in making its intent operative even though its use of political 
 power has proved ineffective in the past. The Community may 
 have incorporated within its Fundamental Law a defective ad- 
 ministrative system under which it eventually finds itself power- 
 less to accomplish fully its desired ends of administration ; but 
 nevertheless the right to exercise the supreme power for any polit- 
 ical object still remains with it, and it is at all times free to rectify 
 past mistakes in this respect through a wise exercise of the power 
 of amendment that is directed towards securing a consistent and 
 a practical administrative system. One under which the political 
 freedom of the individual is either hampered or destroyed can not 
 reasonably be regarded as a consistent or as a practical system for 
 the exercise of democratic political power. 
 
 " The People" : Much that The Electorate does is commonly 
 spoken of as action by The People : " The people's vote," " The 
 people's choice," " The Will of The People" are illustrative ; and 
 a word concerning this habit of speech may dispel possible mis- 
 conceptions. 
 
 " The People" and " The Electorate" are distinct entities, each 
 having its own functions to discharge ; but to the extent in which 
 the exercise of political prerogative has been bestowed upon The 
 Electorate, that body, and to that extent, may be considered to 
 act as The People until the latter resume the exercise of their right 
 to choose. 
 
 The acts of The Electorate in choosing between administrative 
 policies, in the selection of and the choice of candidates for elective 
 office and so forth, bind The People temporarily ; but the reader 
 will experience no serious confusion in thought through regarding 
 The Electorate as The People, providing he remembers that 
 merely the exercise of political power has been bestowed by The 
 Commonwealth, and that its individuals can at any time, and at 
 their will, restrict The Electorate to a smaller number or extend 
 it to a larger number, even to the total of community individuals
 
 POLITICAL POWER 63 
 
 who have reached the age of discretion, and this irrespective of 
 sex. The main function of The Electorate is the formation, 
 ascertainment, expression, and application of " The Will of The 
 People " concerning administration. Actually, it is The Will of 
 The Electorate that is formed and applied ; but so long as The 
 Commonwealth sanctions this substitution, we are warranted, 
 while considering the exercise of our political power, in regarding 
 The Electorate as "The People." 
 
 Political Power : In free communities there is but one power 
 that is superior to Individual Power; and that is, the collective 
 power of the individuals of the community when used to enforce 
 The Will of The Community in the management of its affairs 
 (which comprise both those of a public and of a private nature) 
 and which affairs are regulated by the community for the purpose 
 of promoting the welfare of The State, and of the individual. 
 
 Ethical Aspect. This power, when used for this purpose, is 
 called Political Power. In its ethical aspect it is used to establish 
 a moral standard of human existence within the community. 
 Free Commonwealths have to use their political power for this 
 purpose because wherever The Church is not a constituent part 
 of its governmental agencies the duty of developing the moral 
 status of the individual devolves upon The Commonwealth ; it 
 having assumed the exercise of the right to declare what shall be 
 considered just relations between individuals, and what shall be 
 considered right individual action. 
 
 Practical Aspect. In its practical aspect it is used primarily 
 to maintain the status of the community so that it shall at all 
 times be able to maintain its ordained individual relationships, 
 which, if seriously disarranged, tend to destroy the harmony upon 
 which the stability of The Commonwealth mainly depends. 
 
 Used for Two Main Objects. The two main objects for which the 
 political power of a Commonwealth is used are, The Maintenance 
 of the Ordained Status of The State, and The Maintenance of the 
 Ordained Status of the Individual. 
 
 Hoiv Used. Because it is generally admitted that the work of 
 maintaining individual status can not with safety to all be en- 
 trusted to any one individual, or to any small group of individuals, 
 the community itself assumes the exercise of its power. 
 
 In the accomplishment of its main objects the community acts 
 like an individual. The process resembles that followed by an 
 individual in building a home. Many minor objects are accom- 
 plished before the main object is attained. Territory is secured.
 
 64 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 A plan is adopted. The cellar is excavated. The foundation is 
 laid. The frame is erected and enclosed. The plumbing, heating, 
 lighting, and cooking apparatus is installed. The exterior and 
 interior finish is applied, and the whole is kept in repair afterwards. 
 The special knowledge, skill, and ability of the architect, the mason, 
 the carpenter, and others is requisitioned for the best possible 
 construction of the several distinct but complementing parts. The 
 owner uses his natural and acquired power in building. Some of 
 it he uses directly. But some of it he uses indirectly and through 
 those whom he employs ; and over the action of whom he exercises 
 control. 
 
 In the exercise of political power for the purpose of constructing 
 and maintaining a body politic the Collective Sovereign acts both 
 directly and indirectly. It commands the use of whatever special 
 ability its units may possess. It may group its specially capable 
 units into separate bodies acting for it as political and as adminis- 
 trative agencies, and it may use individuals acting alone. It is 
 the Common Superior of all its respective agencies and agents, and 
 
 V /possesses the right to control their action. 
 
 V The Supreme Power: While those who excel in Individual 
 Power will always be able to command the acts of others to a 
 greater or less degree, in free commonwealths they are not per- 
 mitted to control them ; that is, such individuals are not permitted 
 to enforce unqualified obedience to their Individual Will. In free 
 communities the power to command and to enforce obedience 
 from individuals within certain defined limits belongs to The 
 Commonwealth. This power is generally conceded to be the 
 highest form of power exercised by man; and when used to pro- 
 mote the welfare of The State and of The Individual by means of 
 Government is called The Supreme Power. 
 
 Origin, Seat of. It is the organic, and the absolute power of 
 The Community, by which all public and private action of a 
 political and economic nature is controlled ; and by which all 
 methods of public action, and the manner of private action is — 
 in theory — prescribed and enforced. It originates in the volun- 
 tary act of association. It is seated in all of the individuals who 
 are associated together. It is made operative through an exercise 
 of their collective will ; and it is made effective through the 
 ability of The Community to back up its will if necessary by the 
 exercise of its coercive or physical force. 
 
 Delegated Exercise of. Since political power is seated in the 
 people, it would naturally follow that they should exercise it
 
 POLITICAL POWER 65 
 
 directly. But the individuals of the American Commonwealths 
 being too numerous and too widely separated to act conveniently 
 together in one large political assemblage have adopted the custom 
 of using parts of their supreme power either by means of repre- 
 sentatives, or by means of representative agencies acting in 
 different capacities. 
 
 Sovereignty. The mere fact, however, that the people delegate 
 the exercise of some parts of their supreme power does not affect 
 their Sovereignty in the least; for sovereignty is an attribute 
 arising out of the continued possession of Political Power. It is 
 universally conceded that a commonwealth can exercise a part of 
 its supreme power indirectly, and the fact that it has delegated 
 the exercise of a part of it may be taken as additional testimony 
 of its Sovereignty; the distinguishing feature of which state or 
 condition is, immunity from accountability to a superior. Of 
 course if the people make mistakes, they — being under the moral 
 obligation to their posterity to manage affairs according to the 
 meaning and intent of their original governmental agreement — 
 are accountable and responsible for them ; but only to them- 
 selves. No outside Power or Government is allowed to force 
 them to rectify mistakes which affect only their welfare either as 
 a body politic or as individuals. 
 
 Political Authority : The reader must constantly bear in mind 
 the distinctions which exist between political power and political 
 authority. While political authority is an indispensable requisite 
 to representative government it nevertheless differs in two essen- 
 tial respects from political power. In the first place, political 
 authority is not inherent in individuals as political power is, but 
 is always conferred by The Community ; and in the second place, 
 unlike political power, it is — in theory — always exercised under 
 the control of a superior. The right to exercise political authority 
 always pertains either to some administrative office or to some 
 collective administrative agency ; and in theory, the exercise of 
 political authority is a trust that is reposed either in the official 
 or in the agency because of his or of its superior virtue and 
 ability. 
 
 Exercise of an Acquired Right. The exercise of political authority 
 is an acquired right which proceeds not from the nature of the 
 individuals who compose The Community, but from the assumed 
 political necessities of the associated individuals. 
 
 The exercise of authority is bestowed upon The Government to 
 enable it to assist The Electorate to maintain the desired political
 
 66 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 status of The State and the desired relations between its individu- 
 als ; but The Commonwealth reserves and retains the exercise of 
 its poiver to compel the proper exercise of authority. Hence it is 
 that The Government exercises authority only, while The Com- 
 monwealth exercises power, — even the power to make and un- 
 make governmental agencies and systems of administration. 
 
 Coercive Force of. In order to make the action of its representa- 
 tive agencies and agents effective the people bestow upon them the 
 right to use a coercive force which will compel obedience to their 
 lawful mandates. The mandates are held to be uttered in the 
 name of the people ; and the force is the whole moral and physical 
 force of The Commonwealth. 
 
 Supreme Authority. The right which governmental agents 
 have to use this force to compel obedience to their lawful man- 
 dates while in the performance of their lawful duties is called The 
 Supreme Authority. Thus we speak of the authority of a Sheriff 
 as the right and the ability which he has in the execution of a 
 public function to compel obedience to his commands. 
 
 Component Parts of Political Power: Government and 
 Administration are final results; each of which, like the final 
 result in the mathematical process of long division, is accomplished 
 by obtaining beforehand a number of partial results correctly, 
 and in a regular order of progression. 
 
 In political parlance these results are called " Objects," or the 
 major or minor ends which The Commonwealth desires to accom- 
 plish. 
 
 By regarding political power from the standpoint of objects to be 
 accomplished it appears to be composed of several powers that are 
 distinct in themselves; each one of which, when properly used, 
 accomplishing some one distinct minor object. 
 
 The inclusive administrative power is never used by The Indi- 
 vidual at one and the same time in any one period of administra- 
 tion ; but parts of the power are so used, and in a regular order of 
 use, and at separate times, and for the accomplishment of some 
 one specific minor object ; the accomplishment of one such object 
 paving the way to or clearing the situation for the accomplishment 
 of the other minor objects ; the final result clearing the situation 
 as it were for the reexercise of the administrative powers in the 
 next period of administration. 
 
 We speak of " Legislative Power" as a part of The Supreme 
 Power. We do this because the exercise of this power is a separated 
 exercise of political power that is directed to the accomplishment
 
 POLITICAL POWER 67 
 
 of a series of results which we call Legislation. If this use of 
 speech is proper, why then is it not proper to speak of the exercise 
 of political power for the accomplishment of any of the remaining 
 specific purposes as the exercise of this, that, or the other power ? 
 We object to such a treatment of the subject mainly because in the 
 past we have not differentiated all these parts by names ; and 
 consequently to do so now seems to transgress the established 
 order of things. Nevertheless, we commonly call some of these 
 parts by names and experience no unpleasant sensations. For 
 Instance : We speak of the Power to Choose ; the Power to 
 Naturalize Citizens ; the Power to Elect ; and the Power to 
 Control ; and the use of these names enables us to understand 
 just what specific exercise of political power is meant. Instead 
 of hesitating we should hasten to separate the supreme power into 
 its component parts and to name them ; firstly, because names, 
 when rightly used, are in themselves of incalculable assistance to 
 perspicacity ; secondly, because each separate power — the Legis- 
 lative Power as an example — is capable of separate consideration 
 and analysis ; thirdly, because the exercise of each separate power 
 is a separate factor in the problem of proper Political Administra- 
 tion ; and finally, because the exercise of each separate power — 
 depending upon whether the exercise is proper or improper — will 
 produce important results either for good or evil to our political 
 existence, to society, and to the individual. 
 
 Such treatment of this subject may be open to criticism of an 
 academic nature. But when we pause to consider the many 
 administrative matters which the Commonwealth and the indi- 
 vidual must transact ; and when, by whom, at what time, and in 
 what manner they must be transacted ; then it is submitted that 
 the practical assistance which such treatment of the subject will 
 afford an individual in apprehending his obligations, rights, and 
 duties, must far outweigh any objection as to form alone. 
 
 The separation will not be carried beyond principal parts. It 
 is not intended to reveal the minutiae of Administration, such for 
 example as the way in which political power is used to care for the 
 poor. It is made in the hope that when the reader passes to the 
 consideration of political agencies, means, and methods, he may 
 more easily determine what are and what are not logical agencies, 
 means, and methods. 
 
 Divided, classified, and enumerated according to objects to be 
 accomplished the component parts of our political power will 
 appear generally as follows :
 
 68 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 THE POLITICAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 
 
 Class I 
 THE POWER OF REVOLUTION 
 
 Class II 
 THE POWERS OF ESTABLISHMENT 
 
 To declare the Polity of The Commonwealth. 
 
 To choose the Form of Government. 
 
 To create and to Frame The Electorate and The Government. 
 
 To distribute the exercise of Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Authority 
 between the three branches of The Government. 
 
 To frame and to declare the Fundamental Law. 
 
 To ordain the permanent existence of the Political Regime and start its 
 operation. 
 
 Class III 
 THE POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION 
 
 Division One 
 THE RESERVED POWERS 
 
 To determine the qualifications for Citizenship. 
 
 To confer Citizenship upon qualified ahens by the Process of Naturalization. 
 
 To determine the Voting Electorate ahead of the General Election by the 
 Process of Registration. 
 
 To pro\'ide The Government, during each period of administration, with an 
 Impulse to Action, tlirough the free formation, ascertainment, and expression 
 of The Will of The People as to Administrative PoUcy. 
 
 To select and to choose proper Candidates for all elective oflBces and 
 positions in The Government by the Process of Nomination. 
 
 To fill all elective offices and positions by the Process of Election. 
 
 To fill all local offices, and all positions on Electorate Boards having charge 
 of the Processes of Natiu-alization, Registration, Election, and so forth. 
 
 To control the political action of The Government, The Electorate, Electo- 
 rate Boards, Electorate Conventions, and also the political acts of all Indi- 
 viduals whether taken in or out of office or position or as members of associa- 
 tions which act politically, and in every step and stage of political procediu-e 
 or of Individual Action. 
 
 To enforce Responsibility for improper political action from all individuals 
 who exercise PoUtical Power or Political Authority for any major or minor 
 political object or piu-pose. 
 
 To enforce action that is wholly Responsive to The Will of The People 
 concerning temporary political administration from all public officials and 
 servants. 
 
 To educate the youth and the naturalized citizens in the Obligations of 
 Sovereignty and the Duties of Citizenship. 
 
 To decree the Amendment or alteration of the Statutory Law. 
 
 To amend the Fundamental Law.
 
 POLITICAL POWER 69 
 
 Division Two 
 THE DELEGATED POWERS 
 
 Those Executive Powers, the partial exercise of which is vested in the Chief 
 Executive to enable The Commonwealth to act properly, speedily, and 
 effectively in an executive, contractual, and belligerent capacity; including 
 also the exercise of whatever other authority The People deem necessary to 
 the effective operation of the executive department of The Government. 
 
 Those Legislative Powers, the partial exercise of which is vested in The 
 Legislature for the prime purpose of providing The Commonwealth with a 
 body of efficient, consistent, reasonable, and just Statutory Law ; including 
 also whatever other authority the people may deem necessary to the effective 
 operation of the legislative department of The Government. 
 
 Those Judicial Powers, the partial exercise of which is vested in The Judi- 
 ciary to enable The Commonwealth to justly interpret the Fundamental Law ; 
 to ascertain the exact meaning and effect of past Legislation ; to justly decide 
 all controversies in which The Commonwealth is a party; to settle justly all 
 serious disputes between Individuals ; including also whatever other authority 
 the people deem necessary to the quick and eflBcient operation of the judicial 
 department of The Government. 
 
 Continuous Political Action. The established government of 
 each of the United States is maintained and perpetuated by the 
 exercise of the Reserved Powers of Administration and through 
 the Control of the exercise of the Delegated Powers. Such effort 
 demands the constant attention of the people and constitutes 
 the Continuous Political Action of the people. 
 
 The Distinctive Administrative Problem : Each Common- 
 wealth of the L^nited States has undertaken to maintain its or- 
 dained conditions of individual existence within its owti territorial 
 limits. The problem of each is, how to do this properly ; that is, 
 in accordance with its ordained Principles and scheme of action. 
 The foregoing table assists in the perception of what is proper 
 action and what is improper action. It shows at a glance the 
 kinds of action that are permissible, and the specific purposes to 
 be effected through direct and through indirect action. Proper 
 direct action is the clue to the solution ; and if the true meanings 
 contained in the contents of the table are apprehended, it will be 
 perceived that the distinctive problem of each American Common- 
 wealth is, How to continuously secure a direct and free exercise 
 of all the Reserved Powers from The Electorate ; and, How to 
 enable The Electorate — and no other body — to continuously 
 secure from The Government a direct and otherwise proper 
 exercise of the Delegated Powers.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 The Will of the People : At the outset of this subject let us 
 recall that each adult member of an American Commonwealth 
 has a dual capacity. 
 
 He is at one and the same time a political unit and a social unit. 
 Politically he acts as a Sovereign. Socially and economically he 
 acts as a Citizen. But here is the point to remember. The 
 character of his social and economic status is determined before- 
 hand by action which he and others of the community have taken 
 together in one way or another when acting in a political capacity ; 
 and there is hardly any question of right individual action which 
 does not in the end resolve itself into a question of what The 
 Community shall do to secure and enforce such action. 
 
 The Community, as we have seen, acts directly in some matters 
 and through its members. In other matters it acts indirectly and 
 through the personnel of its administrative agencies. Either way, 
 it is impelled to action by the desire to do some one thing or 
 another. It ascertains what the community-desire is by ascertain- 
 ing what the greater number of its members agree upon as desirable 
 to do. 
 
 Defined. The Will of The People is therefore a consensus of 
 individual wills. It is an agreement of belief on such matters held 
 by the greatest number in the community. 
 
 Theoretically, it is this will of the people which, when properly 
 ascertained, directs all political action, and controls the adminis- 
 trative agencies. 
 
 Objects. It acts for the accomplishment of two main ends ; 
 namely : 
 
 (1) To Establish Government; and 
 
 (2) To Administer Government as established ; and the reader 
 must also bear in mind that the main ends are finally accomplished 
 
 70
 
 PUBLIC OPINION 71 
 
 only through the proper performance of several successive and 
 subordinate stages of action, over which The Will of The People 
 is or should be fully operative. 
 
 Character of. It acts in two ways ; namely : 
 
 (1) Permanently; by placing restrictions and limitations upon 
 the exercise of the supreme power and authority of the community 
 at the beginning of Government ; and 
 
 (2) Intermittently ; by declaring what the community shall do 
 from time to time in readjusting the relations of individuals which 
 have become changed in the course of time through social and 
 economic effort. 
 
 Concerning the Establishment of Government and of the State 
 Polity, the Fathers considered that the Polity should be immutably 
 established by an exercise of The Will of The People at the begin- 
 ning ; and that this expression of the will was to remain practically 
 immutable and unchanged for such time as Society remained or 
 continued under its chosen form of government. 
 
 FHiblic Opinion: But when acting in its second capacity, it 
 becomes the will of the people as to Political Administration, 
 which, for short, has been called Public Opinion, to distinguish it 
 from the general will acting to establish general principles. 
 
 The term " public opinion" is an unfortunate misnomer, not- 
 withstanding that at present it most aptly describes the moving 
 force in our administrative action; but the name is too firmly 
 established to admit of displacement, and so long as we under- 
 stand it to mean " Will" and not " opinion " no real confusion of 
 ideas need arise. 
 
 Concerning political administration. The Fathers apparently 
 appreciated the fact that the successive generations who were to 
 compose The State in the future, and who were to possess political, 
 economic, and moral freedom, should not be bound by an expres- 
 sion of immutable will by them. They considered that the Policy 
 of Administration should be left open for determination from time 
 to time as occasion required by an exercise of the will of the people 
 had for this sole purpose. Public Opinion was considered as an 
 expression of public belief which was to be held in check until an 
 occasion called for it; and then was to be made solely for the 
 purpose of settling administrative questions which then pressed 
 for decision. These occasions arose whenever such questions 
 came before the people in advance of action by their admin- 
 istrative agencies. Interests (and by this term meaning those 
 individuals who are engaged in promoting their private welfare
 
 72 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 along given lines of economic effort) were to meet other " interests " 
 on a footing of equal opportunity and freedom ; and the people, 
 after considering the situation, were to reach an agreement of wills 
 as to how the general welfare could best be secured under social 
 and economic conditions, which, if left unaltered, would tend to 
 impair or to destroy the conditions of individual existence origi- 
 nally ordained. 
 
 In their discussions concerning administrative policies indi- 
 viduals were supposed to be animated solely by Public Spirit; 
 that is, by a desire to promote the general welfare. The agree- 
 ment as to Policy was to be determined by a vote at the general 
 elections. Should this expression of will prove ineffectual after 
 a trial it was still open to alteration or repeal in the future. 
 
 From this conception of The Will of The People working first 
 for the establishment of Government, last for its proper adminis- 
 tration, and all of the time for the promotion of the general 
 welfare, we reach Abraham Lincoln's meaning in the phrase 
 " Government of the people, by the people, and for the people." 
 
 In a Democracy. Considered as an outside, directing, and 
 controlling force, exerted over political action, public opinion does 
 not exist in a pure democracy. Under that form of administering 
 public affairs it is The Will of The People which is constantly 
 active in all matters. 
 
 When the people of a pure democracy are assembled for 
 purposes of government, they themselves are the Governmental 
 Agency ; and they ascertain, express, and apply their will at one 
 and the same time. 
 
 Moreover, their Will is ascertained, expressed, and applied in 
 accord with those provisions of their Supreme Law which regulate 
 the orderly and systematic transaction of legislative as well as 
 executive work. This body of regulations is called Parliamentary 
 Law ; and it is binding upon all of the people of a democracy when 
 assembled for Legislative work. 
 
 In a Republic. But in a republic the people must reach their 
 consensus of Will a comparatively long time in advance of their 
 Official Administrative Action. Furthermore, this consensus 
 must be reached by and in the body of the people. With us it is 
 reached by and in the body called The Electorate. 
 
 This work is legislative in its nature ; and unless The Electorate 
 is made into a kind of legislature by the adoption beforehand of 
 appropriate and enforceable means and methods for transacting 
 this work, what guarantee has a commonwealth that the formation.
 
 PUBLIC OPINION 73 
 
 ascertainment, expression, and enforcement of Public Opinion will 
 proceed in a proper manner? None whatever. Our own ex- 
 perience is proof of this ; for through the absence in the beginning 
 of appropriate means and methods for transacting the work of 
 political administration we have been led gradually into the 
 adoption of other means and methods, by the use of which The 
 Will of The People as to administrative action is constantly 
 perverted, is mechanically manufactured, and is changed from a 
 political nature into a partizan nature. 
 
 Let us briefly review the origin and development of Public 
 Opinion. 
 
 Development of: Early Stages. Before the adoption of The 
 Constitution, and for some time afterward, public opinion was 
 most largely formed by and through the workings of the Colonial 
 Assemblies, the Colonial Congresses, the Federal Congress, the 
 State Legislatures, and the present Congress ; all of which bodies 
 were, in theory, considered as assemblies convened for the open 
 discussion of, and deliberation upon, the political matters affect- 
 ing the welfare of the people. 
 
 These assemblies were composed of members sent from all parts 
 of the Colonies, or the State, or the Country, as the case might be. 
 
 In these assemblies the members were supposed first, by an 
 exchange of views and through debate, to ascertain the needs of 
 the Colonies or of the Country, and then later on were to explain 
 to their respective constituencies the intent and effect of their 
 administrative action. 
 
 Force of. At this stage of development the force of Public 
 Opinion was passive rather than active among the constituencies. 
 Constituencies were more led into action than otherwise. Of 
 course they exerted an influence, but they had not then arrived at 
 the point where they initiated definite action beforehand through 
 reaching a consensus of individual wills. Public Opinion was 
 used to support rather than to determine administrative action ; 
 and the representative, using the term in its broadest sense, 
 played a most important part in its formation ; for at that time 
 the necessary opportunities for its easy formation by the people 
 did not exist. 
 
 Later on the newspaper, the extended postal service, the railroad, 
 and the telegraph supplied the needed facilities for the people to 
 form their Will as to administrative action in advance of legislation. 
 
 At the same time the legislative bodies adopted the system 
 of transacting a large portion of their work through " Standing
 
 74 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Committees " ; and in just so much as they ceased to be openly 
 deUberative assembhes they also ceased to be active factors in the 
 formation of Public Opinion. Events began to play a far larger 
 part in its formation than mere personal acts or personal force. 
 The Partizan Party had organized itself permanently in society 
 and was sending its representatives into the Government instead 
 of representatives freely chosen by The Electorate. Naturally, 
 such representatives, working in the interest of a partizan party, 
 lost most all of their power to influence public-spirited citizens, 
 and ceased to discharge the functions of true political leadership 
 in the formation of Public Opinion. But at the same time, and 
 because of the greatly extended opportunities for communication 
 between the individuals of a community, the force of Public 
 Opinion gradually increased ; and, instead of remaining a passive 
 factor in political administration, public opinion rapidly developed 
 into what Mr. Bryce calls " The ultimate force in the conduct of 
 affairs." ("The American Commonwealth," 2d ed. revised. 
 Chap. I, p. 6.) 
 
 When we reach a consideration of the doctrine of Majority 
 Rule, and perceive how majorities are " manufactured," we shall 
 be better able to judge whether this conclusion is borne out fully 
 by facts. In theory, public opinion should be the ultimate force 
 in political administration. It should be the energizing force in 
 The Government. It should be capable of controlling the action 
 of individuals in the separate branches of The Government and 
 of enforcing logical action from them. It should be capable of 
 preventing the existence of injustices within the body politic. 
 When properly formed and acting freely, it is capable, it is suffi- 
 ciently permanent to accomplish its end in view, it is continuous 
 in the sense of lasting over from one period of administration to 
 another, it is flexible in that it easily turns to a fresh question when 
 another has been settled definitely, and (with proper means and 
 methods) it can rigidly enforce its mandate. 
 
 " Why then," the reader will ask, " if Public Opinion is capable 
 of such action — why does it not produce its intended results in 
 our governmental experiment? " The answer is. Public Opinion 
 is not allowed at present to freely form or freely act. The People 
 do not employ it, except spasmodically and in attempts to correct 
 evils of a local nature when they become intolerable. The atten- 
 tion of individuals is seldom if ever directed to the absolute need 
 of logical means and methods for the exercise of the Reserved 
 Powers of Administration ; but invariably to some injustice or
 
 PUBLIC OPINION 75 
 
 abuse in society. For all general purposes of administration the 
 people substitute The Will of The Partizan Party for The Public 
 Will ; and that party, while pretending to listen to the voice of 
 Public Opinion, hampers in every possible way its free formation 
 in The Electorate, and its free operation in The Government. 
 How this is done will appear in subsequent chapters as we review 
 the different stages of administrative action ; but as a result, The 
 People do not govern, they let The Partizan Party govern. In- 
 dividuals are too busy looking after their private welfare to 
 attend to the General Welfare. They leave the discharge of this 
 obligation of sovereignty to The Partizan Party ; and the party, 
 through the inexorable enforcement upon its adherents in public 
 office of its freedom-killing rules, succeeds in producing " Party 
 Welfare" and widely distributed forms of " Private Welfare" 
 from a governmental agency that was designed to produce only 
 the General Welfare. 
 
 Electoral Action: In the study of Government and Political 
 Administration it is impossible to satisfactorily examine any 
 particular one of its separate but related divisions without taking 
 the intimately related parts into consideration together. The 
 different stages of political action tie naturally into each other 
 from first to last ; and the knowledge of one stage becomes as it 
 were the prefatory introduction to the next stage, explaining in 
 part its cause, and indicating somewhat its nature and character. 
 To treat the subject this way causes unavoidable repetition which 
 is tiresome ; but it also helps to reach a correct conclusion which 
 is most to be desired, and this must excuse a slight excursion into 
 the topic of Electoral Action for information concerning the 
 separate functions of Public Opinion. 
 
 Broadly speaking, the work of Political Administration is 
 divided between The Electorate and The Government. 
 
 That part which is to be done by the individuals who compose 
 the electorate we shall call Electoral Action. 
 
 General Object of. It is a periodic routine which has for its 
 object the formation, ascertainment, final expression, and effectual 
 enforcement of The Public Will. 
 
 Four Stages of. As we transact this work at present it is sepa- 
 rated into four progressive stages ; the work of each stage accom- 
 plishing a part of the general object. These stages in their 
 natural sequence are (1) The formation of the Will of the Indi- 
 vidual as to Administrative Policy and Political Procedure. (2) 
 The bringing of individual wills into agreement as to the Policy of
 
 76 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Administration and the Candidates for office. (3) The work of 
 Elections ; and (4) The Control of the action of Public Officials. 
 
 The Formation of Individual Will : The public will is a con- 
 sensus of individual wills. Individuals must first decide what 
 they desire before the community can decide what it desires. 
 
 Passive Formation. There are two external agencies at work 
 in the formation of individual will : men and events. By men, 
 I mean the actions and beliefs of others. By events, I mean 
 the results which conclude a sustained course of administrative 
 action. 
 
 The judgment of an individual is influenced by acts and by events 
 in which he is a spectator and not a participator ; and the two 
 above-named external agencies working together in Society pro- 
 duce a sort of passive formation of individual will. 
 
 Active Formation. But each individual is supposed to actively 
 exert himself in the formation of his will as to political administra- 
 tion. He has to properly discharge his Obligations of Sovereignty 
 and his Duties of Citizenship. He is supposed to inform himself 
 as thoroughly as possible concerning the intent, purpose, and 
 probable result of any proposed Policy, and to likewise post him- 
 self concerning the fitness and character of individuals proposed 
 for public office and position. He should also critically examine 
 the character and fitness of the means and methods by which The 
 Public Will is formed ; and finally, in reaching a decision in these 
 matters, he is supposed to be influenced only by the free play of 
 reason, conscience, and public spirit. 
 
 Legislative Work : Much of the work that the individual is 
 called upon to do in this connection is legislative in its nature. 
 One great question is always before The Community; namely, 
 " What administrative course will best promote the General 
 Welfare ? " and a secondary question is, " What candidate is best 
 fitted to make the administrative policy fully operative ? " 
 
 Theoretically, individuals must answer these questions them- 
 selves. They are not supposed to leave these decisions to other 
 individuals, or to associations of individuals. Each individual 
 must carefully form his judgment himself, and not accept the 
 conclusions of others ; otherwise the community runs the risk of 
 adopting illy digested "opinion " as a guide in place of a properly 
 formed and reasonable Will. 
 
 Theoretically, The Commonwealth has reserved the exercise 
 of "The Right to Choose" to itself; that is, the individuals of the 
 body politic shall themselves decide their administrative policy.
 
 PUBLIC OPINION 77 
 
 select and elect their own candidates for public ofRce, and also 
 instruct The Government somewhat as to the detail application 
 of the policy. 
 
 In the formation of individual will regarding these matters each 
 individual is entitled to avail himself of the superior experience, 
 intelligence, wisdom, and sagacity of other individuals, and to 
 obtain and use the aid and assistance of true Leadership and 
 appropriate Organization ; but most of all he is entitled to the use 
 of logical means and methods which will as far as is humanly 
 possible free him from influences and considerations concerning 
 selfish private welfare while he is engaged in forming his judgment 
 regarding ways in which to promote the General Welfare. 
 
 The Final Expression at Elections : In theory, the people are 
 to finally decide all Administrative Policies and to fill all elective 
 administrative offices at stated periods called " Elections." 
 
 Frequent Elections. In order that questions of State Polit}'', of 
 Administrative Policy, and of Candidacy may not be held too 
 long in abeyance and so become a source of discontent or of 
 revolution ; and partly to enable the people to keep the sense of 
 responsibility alive in public officials through the fear of quick 
 retirement to private life; and partly as a means by which to 
 secure responsiveness to Public Opinion in The Government ; and 
 partly as a means to afford a more equal opportunity for individual 
 political preferment, the people have agreed to express their will 
 frequently. 
 
 The Ballot. For the purpose of imparting definiteness to the 
 final expression of individual will the people employ the secret 
 ballot. An added force is given to such expression by confining 
 the use of the ballot to a picked class of individuals called The 
 Electorate. The vote is intended to accomplish two purposes. 
 It is supposed to declare a definite temporary Administrative 
 Policy, and also to fill the elective administrative offices for one 
 period of administration. The casting of the ballot is the final 
 act in the long series of electoral actions which lead up to the 
 consummation of this political process. 
 
 Individual Political Freedom. Everything that has been said 
 regarding the absolute freedom of the elector while engaged in 
 administrative action applies with unabated force to the perfor- 
 mance of this last act in the process of election. If voting can be 
 perverted or prevented, then all of the prior electoral work of the 
 individual goes for little or nothing. If the freedom of the indi- 
 vidual can be hampered here with the trammels of partizan party
 
 78 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 customs, usages, or practices, then Public Opinion can be robbed 
 of its definiteness. 
 
 Means and Methods. Everything that has been said also 
 regarding the imperative need for proper and logical means and 
 methods in the transaction of electoral work also applies in the 
 casting, in the counting, and in the return of the vote ; for it is 
 here in this final electoral act that the opportunity has long 
 been presented for the successful manipulation of the Public Will 
 through personal wrong doing and chicanery. 
 
 How this particular class of election frauds has been met in the 
 past, and how we are attempting to prevent their perpetration at 
 present, are matters which will receive consideration in subsequent 
 chapters. Here we are concerned solely in ascertaining what an 
 elector should do in this stage of administrative action, and how 
 he should be protected in doing it. 
 
 Agreement as to Policy and Candidates : While questions of 
 administrative policy may include a wide range of ideas, neverthe- 
 less the State Polity points to one general direction and the 
 Constitutional provisions set a limit to the discussion. 
 
 Theoretically, in each State, the direct exercise of the Reserved 
 Powers of Administration is had for the express purpose of making 
 its own distinctive Polity wholly operative within its geographical 
 boundaries. Differences of opinion as to how this can best be 
 accomplished will always exist ; and while individual wills are 
 being formed simultaneously, these differences of opinion will 
 inevitably bring about a natural division of the citizens into 
 separate aggregations holding dissimilar views. 
 
 This process of segregation goes on unconsciously in the minds 
 of individuals all of the time ; and if unhampered by Machia- 
 vellian considerations or objects, plays a most important part in 
 the true political action of the people ; and the reverse is equally 
 true of wrong political action. Left to themselves, the free play 
 of ideas produces a spontaneous segregation which should be 
 fostered. It never was originally intended or contemplated in our 
 administrative theory that any unpolitical restraint should be put 
 upon the free association together of individuals who wished to 
 avail themselves of the added strength of union while promoting 
 their idea of how the General Welfare could best be secured. If 
 such aggregations organized themselves properly, they became 
 Political Parties ; but that is another subject. The aggregations 
 being formed spontaneously, the individual was free at any time 
 to join this, that, or the other body which he judged was best
 
 PUBLIC OPINION 79 
 
 intentioned and would give the most effect to his Will. Finally 
 the body having the greatest number of individuals united in a 
 common- will supplied the temporary Will of The People. 
 
 Political Issues : These different associations, like the parties 
 to a civil action in the Courts of Justice, were to put before the 
 people their definite statements of what they deemed best to do. 
 In this way a distinct " Political Issue" between opposing ideas 
 regarding Political Administration was formed and raised in the 
 community ; and every available means was originally employed 
 to bring about a full presentation of the existing situation so that 
 the people might form an adequate and comprehensive judgment 
 thereon. 
 
 The Decision of Policy. In one particular the Administrative 
 System originally adopted was defective in principle, and has 
 always remained so. The use of the ballot was given to the 
 individual elector primarily to enable him to freely and decisively 
 express his will concerning the course of administration that he 
 wished to have put into operation ; and secondarily, to enable 
 The Electorate to definitely and decisively ascertain the Political 
 Majority. The individual elector was regarded as a Sovereign- 
 unit ; and was required to act as such. The Governmental 
 Agreement imposed the duty upon each individual elector to 
 exercise his Right to Choose between opposing policies and between 
 selected candidates directly, by himself, not by or through another 
 or others, but free from all influences except those proceeding 
 from his reason, judgment, and conscience. 
 
 We have seen that direct action is the principle underlying the 
 exercise of each and all of the Reserved Powers of Administration 
 and that the prime object of the ballot is to enable individuals to 
 express their wills as to any proposed course of action. Notwith- 
 standing these facts individuals always have been allowed to 
 express their wills as to policies by a vote cast in favor of some 
 candidate for office ; and the reason for this illogical procedure will 
 be found in the further fact that our incomplete Administrative 
 Systems have never contained the necessary mandatory provisions 
 for the separation of the process of expressing Public Opinion from 
 the process of Nomination. The system now in use does not 
 enable The People to keep nothing but political questions before 
 the people, and to exclude all others. It does not provide a stated 
 way in which The Electorate shall directly and unitedly frame a 
 political question ; or bring it to an issue with other political 
 questions ; or move the political issue before the people for de-
 
 80 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 cision ; or compel The Electorate to settle one issue at a time ; or 
 compel a direct vote of The Electorate upon the one point in issue. 
 
 Questions relating to Administrative Policy have never been 
 submitted to the people upon their merits alone. The people 
 have adopted the expedient of voting for a candidate as a means 
 for reaching a decision as to administrative policy ; and the em- 
 ployment of this expedient results in an indirect ascertainment 
 of the Public Will as to Administrative Policy. 
 
 Unfortunately and unpresciently the decision of questions re- 
 lating solely to administrative policy has always been subjected 
 to considerations which influence a man in his choice of another 
 mail for office ; and this in face of the fact that the various reasons 
 which affect the individual while determining his will as to admin- 
 istrative policy are necessarily quite different from those which 
 naturally influence his selection and choice of a candidate for 
 office. 
 
 This should not be. The vote for or against an administrative 
 policy can never mean the same thing or produce the same effects 
 as a vote for a candidate. Probably every one of my readers 
 knows how it works out in practise when a corrupt candidate is 
 put forward as the " Standard Bearer" of a desirable policy. The 
 individual who will not vote for the corrupt candidate must lose 
 his vote for the policy he desires to have put in operation ; and the 
 individual who votes for the policy he wishes to have put in 
 operation must assist in putting a corrupt man in office to make 
 it operative. 
 
 Some Results. This mixing together of questions of " Policy" 
 with questions of " Candidacy" has, in practice, almost totally 
 destroyed the individual freedom of action that was originally 
 declared necessary while individuals were deciding between differ- 
 ent administrative policies. With the loss of individual freedom 
 comes a loss in individual power and effectiveness. Through the 
 use of a wrong means the individual is forced into a dilemma. He 
 can do neither one thing nor the other properly and his right to 
 freely choose evaporates. If The Individual — the Sovereign-unit 
 — can not freely choose, then the Collective Sovereign can not 
 make a free choice; and what becomes of the force of Public 
 Opinion ? 
 
 Flowing from this mixture of questions is another perfectly 
 natural result which works insidiously against true political 
 action. If the decision of policy is made to depend upon the 
 election of candidates, then it must naturally appear to the un-
 
 PUBLIC OPINION 81 
 
 trained perception of the great masses of the voters that the work 
 of nominating and electing candidates is of superior importance 
 to the work of deciding administrative policies ; thus reversing 
 the theory in this respect. All sorts of selfish, ulterior, and 
 illogical considerations are thrust upon the immediate attention 
 of the voter ; and this, in the case of the average voter, effectually 
 befogs his perception of that which is primarily required of him 
 in this stage of administrative action. 
 
 Political Issues vs. Partizan Issues. Our present manner of 
 action is WTong in another vitally important respect. Electoral 
 Groups are supposed to frame and raise Political Issues ; but in 
 forty-eight general elections it would be difficult to find one such 
 issue. In the place of true political issues which are raised by free 
 individual political action in The Electorate we now undertake to 
 promote the General Welfare by voting on " Issues" that are 
 raised between Partizan Party Promises. 
 
 Political Questions vs. " Party " Platforms. In the place of 
 political questions, as an incentive to political action, individual 
 electors are now required to support partizan party " Platforms " 
 that are " framed up" on them and for them by The Managements 
 of this, that, or the other partizan party ; each having its own 
 welfare most at heart ; the exact meaning of the " Platform " 
 being seldom understood outside of the partizan party committee 
 that put it together ; each platform containing not one but several 
 disconnected questions or party policies which the elector is 
 required to " settle" by the deposit of a blanket vote for a set of 
 party candidates. 
 
 In short, " We, the people " do not frame Political Questions 
 directly. W^e do not raise Political Issues directly. W^e permit 
 the ideas connected with these processes to be jumbled together 
 with the ideas connected with the process of nomination ; and 
 finally we give the control of the management of this improperly 
 mixed inclusive process to The Partizan Party. We have passed 
 the exercise of initiative over into the hands of The Partizan 
 Party. What more is there for us to do in this stage of adminis- 
 tration ? Nothing ; because we have done all that we can do to 
 transmute The Public Will into The Will of The Partizan Party. 
 
 The Failure of Public Opinion : Now while as a matter of fact 
 Public Opinion should be and rightfully is " The ultimate force 
 in the conduct of affairs" it is also a matter of fact that Public 
 Opinion is not at present the immediate force in the conduct of 
 affairs because it has been supplanted by The Will of The Partizan
 
 82 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Party. The people, considered as the Sovereign, never has the 
 opportunity now to form and express its will freely except at the 
 cost of great political unrest, disquiet, and totally unnecessary 
 political travail. And even then what follows ordinarily is this. 
 The Sovereign is obliged to entrust the detail application of its 
 will to what are in fact representatives of The Partizan Party; 
 and these representatives produce a miscarriage of Public Opinion 
 through applying this will so as to produce Party Welfare instead 
 of the ordained General Welfare. 
 
 Results. In ordinarj^ times the production of Party Welfare 
 brings into existence many hardships and injustices to a large 
 proportion of the individual units of The Sovereign, leaving them 
 in a state of unhappiness over the miscarriage of public opinion 
 which appears to spring either from their own political impotence 
 or from inherent defects in their system of state polity. 
 
 Happiness. Happiness is a component part of the General 
 Welfare. One of the distinguishing features of the early days 
 when self-government actually existed was the general felicity that 
 permeated society. This felicity arose mainly from the fact that 
 individuals had established and put into operation their own 
 system of state polity. No general appreciation of the defects in 
 the system existed. Ambitions were moderate and happiness 
 then proceeded largely from a benign exercise of the supreme 
 power that was intended to produce the greatest possible number 
 of opportunities for all alike to become independent and self- 
 supporting through sobriety and industry, and not intended to 
 produce opportunities for the satisfaction of selfish desires for 
 great wealth on the part of a few individuals. 
 
 Where is that general felicity over political action now? It 
 does not exist. It has been overridden and extinguished by the 
 want, worries, and disappointments arising out of our inefficient, 
 ineffectual, and illogical administrative action. In its place we 
 have the " Prosperity" and private felicity of our " Captains of 
 Industry" accompanied by a widespread suspicion if not hatred 
 of our legislative assemblies under whose laws privileges become 
 rampant in society. Privileges ! The very form of injustice 
 which Democracy was established to abolish forever in society. 
 We say "Thank God" when a legislative session is ended. We 
 realize our impotency to control the action of our own legislators 
 and we are thankful that they have done no worse. Is that a 
 dignified condition for free men to live in ? Is it even respectable ? 
 Is it not foolish and contemptible ? And when our obligations to
 
 PUBLIC OPINION 83 
 
 the successive generations who compose The State are taken into 
 consideration is it not criminal to continue on in that condition? 
 Think of the contradictions involved ! Free men, possessing the 
 exercise of the Supreme Power, and impotent to control the action 
 of our public servants ! A Sovereign, and unable to form and 
 express our Will freely ! How has this condition come about ? 
 Partly, I contend, because The Sovereign failed to clothe itself 
 with that ability which proceeds from the possession and use of 
 appropriate means and methods for the transaction of the various 
 processes of administrative action, and partly because The Sover- 
 eign, finding the work too onerous, imprudently delegated its 
 exercise of the Power to Choose, thereby almost completely 
 destroying its Power to Control. 
 
 Apathy. There are some writers who contend that apathy is 
 the prime cause of our present political impotence. I contend 
 that apathy in political matters is not a cause of our present 
 impotence but is a result which springs first from observing our 
 apparent impotency, and second, from an utter inappreciation of 
 the effectiveness which the use of logical means and methods can 
 give to political action. Political apathy is a symptom of a broken 
 political spirit. It not only tends to remove its victims from the 
 field of political effort, but what is worse, it discourages individual 
 thought and investigation. It is a mental disease, a morbid 
 obsession bv an idea which can be removed by the instillation of 
 correct ideas concerning Electoral Action. Supposing its removal 
 is arduous. The effort is worth making if for no other reason than 
 its removal means a long step towards bringing back to many the 
 happiness which comes with the conscious attempt at a right 
 exercise of the administrative powers. 
 
 Such an exercise is impossible without a system of action that 
 makes it possible ; and until an administrative system has been 
 constructed under which every elector can take the ordained kind 
 of administrative action freely, public opinion can neither be the 
 pure expression of the community's desire concerning the adminis- 
 tration of justice, nor can it exist as the real moving force in 
 political administration. Public opinion is rightfully the expres- 
 sion of public spirit. But when public spirit wrongfully degener- 
 ates into partizan party spirit, then partizan party opinion 
 supplants public opinion as the wrongful energizing force in 
 administrative action.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY RULE 
 
 The term "Majority Rule " is an epitomized description of the 
 general character of American political action. 
 
 As applicable to our administrative action it expresses our gen- 
 eral intent to rightfully apply the principles of the State Polity 
 in the management of public and of private affairs, using a majority 
 of a definite character as a means by which to ascertain and deter- 
 mine what is right to do. 
 
 The doctrine is a rule of political action. We must therefore 
 begin its consideration by attaching a political meaning to the 
 general term " majority." Unless we do this we shall soon be 
 lost in a maze of conflicting and confusing generalities which will 
 spring from attaching general meanings to a technical term. 
 
 Every general idea which we employ in our scheme of political 
 action must, by reason of its use in this way, receive a distinctively 
 political aspect and meaning. This political meaning serves to 
 distinguish it ever afterward from other distinctive meanings of 
 the general idea that are used in other connections. We must 
 know what the term " majority " means in a political sense before 
 we can definitely ascertain the kind and character of the " Rule " 
 which is to be obtained by means of the majority. 
 
 In its prime meaning the term " majority " expresses the idea 
 of the greater number of two like numbers, which, taken together, 
 compose the whole number. 
 
 Another meaning is, "more than one-half." 
 
 Used in connection with administrative action the term would 
 naturally appear to mean more than one-half of any political group 
 of individuals, or a "majority of individuals." 
 
 And since we commonly ascertain a majority by the use of a 
 ballot, it might appear to mean a " majority of ballots," or " of 
 votes." 
 
 And also because the use of the ballot is confined to the Electors 
 in a State, it might be construed as a " majority of Electors." 
 
 84
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY RULE 85 
 
 As a matter of fact the term " majority," when a majority is used 
 as a means for the decision of questions of State PoHcy, has a 
 different meaning from that given to it when a majority is used as 
 a means for determining questions of Candidacy. At present we 
 are concerned only with its meaning when used in connection 
 with questions of State Policy ; and we will consider its other mean- 
 ings in the Chapter on PoHtical Majorities. 
 
 The above definitions do not throw much light on the political 
 meaning of the term "majority." They describe "majorities of 
 individuals " and " majorities of votes," both of which can be 
 obtained by practising deception and fraud, but neither of which 
 can for a moment be considered as a proper means of free and 
 righteous political action. At most the above definitions show 
 what a political majority should not be, but they do not indicate 
 the true nature or character of the means by which the people 
 are to be guided in their action. 
 
 Our question here is, " the greater number of " or " more than 
 one-half of " — what ? 
 
 A vote that is bought and paid for in cash can not express an 
 individual will to do. 
 
 A vote that is given in exchange for a nomination or a public 
 office carries no expression of individual political will. 
 
 Majorities that are gerrymandered into existence do not and 
 can not express a collective political will. 
 
 The majorities which we have in mind at present are supposed 
 to express the community's sense of Justice ; and are supposed to 
 definitely indicate that which in the end will best promote the 
 welfare of all. But the sense of Justice cannot be bartered or 
 gerrymandered into existence. No ! The majorities meant in 
 this connection are not such as can properly be compacted to- 
 gether by mechanical means, or by money, or by favor ; for under 
 our theory of political action, that peculiar and distinctive political 
 means, that " more than one-half " which is meant by the term 
 " majority " as here used, can only be called into existence prop- 
 erly by the free play of Reason on the intellects of individuals. 
 
 It is through the exercise of Reason that man traces the connec- 
 tions between cause and effect in political phenomena, and learns 
 the relative values of different modes of action. 
 
 The Community, claiming to be guided by Reason and the 
 desire for Justice, seeks through reasonable action to apply its 
 Principles of Association to the management of its own affairs, 
 and to the private affairs of its individuals.
 
 86 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 The reasoning process, when used in the attempted solution of 
 the constantly arising administrative problems, produces individual 
 convictions concerning the administrative course which will best 
 promote the general welfare. Such convictions relate to the 
 " interests " of the individual and to the " interest " of the body 
 politic, and are supported by the desires for Progress and the 
 Spirit of Patriotism. These convictions stimulate further desire 
 in the individual to have them made operative in political ad- 
 ministration ; and strong enough desire begets an individual will 
 to this end. 
 
 Differences in individual opinion as to the propriety or the advis- 
 ability of putting any given course of administrative action into 
 operation will naturally exist in bodies politic like ours which have 
 heterogeneous populations ; and the free play of ideas mentioned 
 in the preceding chapter naturally produces a division of the 
 citizens into separate aggregations holding to different beliefs 
 and desires. Some aggregations become numerically larger than 
 others, but that is simply because there are more men adhering 
 to one common desire or will than there are other men supporting 
 other wills or desires, and the " majority " which is produced by 
 such action is a majority of wills that is based upon political con- 
 victions. 
 
 Such a majority, so formed and prompted, is a Political Majority. 
 Of course it is individuals who vote ; and it is their ballots which 
 are counted ; but the ballot is considered merely as an expression 
 of individual will ; and the majority so ascertained is rightfully 
 considered as a majority of wills and not as a majority of in- 
 dividuals. No one thinks for a moment of obeying a majority 
 of individuals ; but the majority of wills, when properly formed 
 and ascertamed, is bowed to and acknowledged by all as the right- 
 ful moving force in political administration. 
 
 Character and Kind of Rule : Acting on the principle that 
 two heads are better than one, the people have agreed, in advance 
 of political administration, that the ideas concerning administrative 
 policy, which, at the elections, are freely supported by the greater 
 number of adherents, shall be used to animate and prompt The 
 Government during periods of administration ; the minor aggrega- 
 tion in society being left meanwhile perfectly free to convert new 
 adherents to its ideas through the force of reason and argument, 
 and to become a major aggregation if possible. 
 
 The doctrine also carries with it this corollary, viz. that the 
 individuals who compose the minor aggregation shall peaceably
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY RULE 87 
 
 permit the ideas held by the larger number of individuals to be 
 applied in the management of public and private affairs for the 
 time being. 
 
 The doctrine was intended to embody all of the commonly 
 accepted ideas regarding the proper, the logical, and the prudent 
 exercise of political power and authority by the individual; 
 and the " Rule " described by it is a rule of Reason, prompted by 
 Public Spirit. 
 
 Considered as a rule of action, this is the doctrine under which 
 the Commonwealths seek to produce the general welfare, that is, 
 the greatest good to all ; and not, as some writers express it, 
 " the greatest good to the greatest number." This latter con- 
 ception implies the existence of two aggregate bodies of individuals, 
 one of which is smaller than the other, but both of which are nec- 
 essary to compose the commonw^ealth, the body which is acting 
 politically in its own interests, and in the interests of all of its 
 individuals whether all of its individuals perceive for themselves 
 what is really for the common welfare of State and individual or 
 not. It IS not at all likely that all of the individuals of a 
 State will be fitted by nature and education to perceive accurately 
 what is going on in society and in the world ; and the best that a 
 Democracy can do in self-preservation and in helping individuals 
 is to ascertain what the greater number of its citizens believe is 
 best to be done under the given circumstances and occasions as they 
 arise, and let the expression of that judgment serve for the time 
 being as the Will of the Collective Sovereign, 
 
 Successive Statements. Under our theory of political administra- 
 tion the Collective Sovereign is to state, and from time to time is 
 required to restate, its Will as to the exercise of the Reserved 
 Powers of Administration. Its Will to administer Government as 
 established is continuous. Its Will as to what is best to be done at 
 various times is necessarily subject to modification or change. Our 
 method of ascertaining the will of The Commonwealth concerning 
 administrative matters from time to time is to refer all such 
 matters that are pressing for decision to a vote of all the individual 
 members of The Electorate who are legally entitled to vote, and 
 to determine the Majority of Wills in favor at a time called the 
 Election by a count of the individual ballots cast for or against ; 
 the idea being that each elector shall be left to freely use his judg- 
 ment and conscience independently of others in the exercise of g, 
 franchise that has been bestowed on him by The Commonwealth. 
 
 Theoretically, we ascertain such majorities for the purpose of
 
 88 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 deciding rightly some one administrative question. This does 
 not necessarily mean that only one question can be decided at an 
 election ; for of course it is possible to definitely decide several 
 questions, provided they are separated from each other and the 
 individual has an opportunity to vote on each separately. But 
 the administrative periods were made short partly to prevent 
 the accumulation of many political questions at one time. 
 
 Now the processes of division and segregation mentioned before 
 continue to produce aggregations of differently minded individuals 
 during the successive periods of administration. But when one 
 political question is finally settled, then the political majority 
 (Majority of Wills) which decides it becomes a thing of the past. 
 Its individual units are no longer united together by the common 
 purpose which animated them, viz. to have their sentiments put 
 into the form of Law. This being done, each individual is again 
 left free to join himself with others in the formation of other 
 political majorities for the decision of other political questions. 
 
 Has No Permanency. From this it appears that a Political 
 Majority can have no continued permanency. It is called into 
 existence for the accomplishment of one political purpose and its 
 influence ceases when that purpose is accomplished. Its function 
 is entirely different from that of a Political Party; the latter 
 being merely a group of individuals who primarily work together 
 unitedly for the creation of a political majority, and sometimes 
 secondarily to secure the proper application of the Majority Will 
 in Administrative Action. 
 
 Now if a political majority has no permanency, and if a 
 Majority of The People is not allowed to organize itself per- 
 manently either for the exercise of or for the control of the exer- 
 cise of political power because such permanent organization might 
 entail the possibility of an improper or oppressive exercise of such 
 power, does a small association of " voters," who are united to- 
 gether for the purpose of securing a number of other " votes " 
 that is sufficient to enable it to put some of its active members 
 into public office where they can more effectually protect and help 
 "The Organization," possess any such right? And if it is not 
 right for such associations to create through permanent organiza- 
 tion a Power of their owti and exercise it in political administration, 
 is it right for the people to let them do so or let them continue 
 to do so? 
 
 A Political Majority Is a Political Means. — A Political Major- 
 ity cannot exercise political power or political authority. It is
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY RULE 89 
 
 merely an expression of Administrative Will. It is not an estab- 
 lished governmental agency having the permanence in existence 
 and organization which is necessary to that exercise. It is called 
 into being and operation repeatedly, and generally during each 
 period of administration, and for the sole purpose of indicating 
 what general action the collective sovereign shall take from time 
 to time. In other words, it is the accredited means for ascertain- 
 ing the temporary administrative will of the people, and not the 
 will of any party, or majority of individuals, within the body 
 politic. It is " The People " who govern and not majorities of 
 any kind. " The People " decide through an exercise of political 
 power what shall be done and The Government decides through 
 an exercise of authority how it shall be done. According to our 
 theory of government all of the political power of the people is 
 exercised by the people, and all of the authority they have created 
 is exercised by their representative administrative agency ; 
 consequently there is nothing of political power or authority left 
 to be exercised by majorities or parties of any kind. 
 
 Successive Majorities. It is the people who protect the rights 
 of individuals and not a majority of the people. These rights 
 are being constantly affected by the economic progress of society 
 and require to be constantly protected and readjusted. Political 
 majorities are the means enabling the people from time to time 
 to determine how individual rights shall be justly protected. 
 They are merely expressions of the public will in which everj^ one 
 participates, some by voice and some by vote. They are mainly 
 directed towards the passage of statutory law. Taken together 
 they comprise one continuous " social contract " by means of 
 which each individual can not only invoke the whole power of the 
 community in the continuous protection of his own person and 
 his own property, but can assist in protecting the rights and prop- 
 erty of others. Considered as separate expressions of the social 
 contract they are to occur frequently. The periods of administra- 
 tion were purposely made short, partly to enable the people to 
 speedily decide the constantly recurring questions raised by the 
 rapidly changing relationships between individuals during economic 
 development, and thus to avoid the possible necessity for revolu- 
 tionary action ; and there can be no question that The Fathers in- 
 tended that administration should proceed according to the people's 
 will as expressed by a constant succession of political majorities, 
 and not according to the will of any majority of individuals, or 
 the will of any permanently organized association of individuals.
 
 90 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 The Original Doctrine : Majority Rule, defined as it applies 
 to political administration, means that as questions of State 
 Policy arise from time to time, they shall in each instance, and 
 from time to time, be decided in accordance with the strongest 
 collective will in the community. There will always be opposite 
 wills in the community, and, as opposite wills can not prevail at 
 the same time, in the same society, and on the same subject, 
 the people agree beforehand that the particular will which is 
 supported by the greater number of adherents at the stated times 
 of expression shall be the administrative policy of the Common- 
 wealth until changed in the ordained manner. 
 
 But the doctrine also means more than this. Freedom, 
 Equality, and Justice are principles governing individual politi- 
 cal action. The doctrine recognizes the political freedom and 
 equality of each elector. It also presupposes that each elector 
 has the absolute right, and the opportunity as well, to cast a vote 
 that is fully expressive and decisive of his own political will. 
 The doctrine is also intended to be fully supportive of the Principles 
 of Association and of the governmental agreement ; and from this 
 it follows that the community is morally bound to avoid the use 
 of any agency, means, or method, political or otherwise, that 
 hampers the perfectly free formation of political majorities. 
 
 Mayflower Compact. Our form of the doctrine first found 
 expression in the " Compact " signed by the Pilgrim Fathers on 
 board the Mayflower, wherein each individual, considering himself 
 as an integral unit of a Body Politic, bound himself by implication 
 to be governed in his future political action by a majority of wills 
 directed to the regulation of public and of private affairs. It first 
 found practical application in the New England Colonies, not 
 only to the decision of questions of Policy, but to the decision of 
 questions of Candidacy ; for there a majority of more than one- 
 half of the whole vote was required to elect the executive and 
 legislative members in The Government. 
 
 Questions of Candidacy : The doctrine as applied to the 
 decision of questions of State Policy has never been universally 
 applied in the decision of questions of Candidacy. Here, for 
 various reasons, the term " majority " has been given an entirely 
 new meaning, with many variants. Here, the meaning *' greater 
 of two similar numbers " or " more than one-half of the whole 
 number " gives place to the idea of " the greatest number among 
 several similar numbers." 
 
 This last-mentioned meaning has been called into existence
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY RULE 91 
 
 through the use and employment of many different customs, 
 usages, and expedients which pervade the several systems for 
 obtaining representation in The Government. Original political 
 deficiencies begat political necessities ; these in turn begat political 
 expedients; and the use of expedients (always producing results 
 that are different from the results that were originally intended) 
 has worked insidiously to rob the doctrine of much of its intended 
 force and effect as a rule of moral action. If but one candidate 
 for one office was voted for on one ballot, then the doctrine could 
 apply to questions of candidacy with the same effect as it is 
 intended to apply to questions of policy. But assumed practical 
 necessities have caused us to adopt the practice of voting for 
 several candidates for several offices on one ballot. This changes 
 a ballot into a " Ticket," and the vote into a vote for a collective 
 set of candidates. As the set of candidates is usually named by a 
 " Party," this changes the vote into a vote for a " Party Ticket " 
 instead of a vote for a candidate to one office. Our present ques- 
 tions of candidacy do not resemble such questions as originally 
 conceived ; and the attempt to apply to the decision of such ques- 
 tions a doctrine that was intended to apply only to the decision of 
 one single question at a time has served to obscure the true 
 meanings of the doctrine ; has served to weaken the force of the 
 doctrine when properly used ; and, when results are considered, 
 it gives it the appearance of possessmg other meanings than the 
 ones it was intended to have. 
 
 The Modem Doctrine : The original doctrine related to a 
 specific character of political Rule ; but the modern doctrine 
 appears to relate much more to " majorities of individuals " or 
 majorities of " votes " than to the character of administrative 
 rule. 
 
 The expedient of making the decision of a question of policy 
 rest upon the success in electing candidates naturally makes an 
 individual most immediately anxious to get votes for the candidate 
 who in so)ne way or another is made to stand for the application 
 of the individual's will. 
 
 The danger which lies in this method of action is the likelihood 
 that Political Principles will be lost sight of in the discussion 
 of the personal qualities or the relative merits of the candidates ; 
 and that personal feelings will override the sense of political 
 obligations while working to get a majority of votes. There is 
 also danger that the majority, rather than a right application of a 
 just principle, will become the immediate object worked for, and
 
 92 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 that the getting of majorities, no matter how, but getting them, 
 will seem to be the only way by which an individual can partici- 
 pate in political administration. But if in acting the individual 
 violates the doctrine of his action, then what he actually does is 
 to put a violated doctrine into operation instead of the true one. 
 
 Plurality Rule : This plan of mixing questions of Candidacy 
 with questions of Policy also works badly in other respects. Given 
 a close state election in which the voters are about evenly divided 
 in opinion between the support of four sets of administrative beliefs, 
 each of which is advocated by a separate set of candidates, then, 
 in that event, it becomes a practical impossibility to secure a 
 " majority of more than one-half of the voters " or a " majority of 
 more than one-half of the vote cast." Also, and because no limit 
 is set to the number of candidates for one office, it might frequently 
 happen, were an actual majority required to elect, that the work of 
 administration might be seriously hampered through a failure to 
 fill the offices. Where the Township System of local self-govern- 
 ment obtains, a majority of more than one-half is usually required 
 to elect the superior officers ; but where the County System and the 
 Compromise System obtain, a candidate, when more than two are 
 in the field, is deemed to be elected if he has received a larger 
 number of votes than either of the others ; thus, making it possible, 
 where there are four candidates for the same office, to elect one 
 who has one vote more than one-fourth of all the votes cast ; and 
 the same possibility of election holds good whether the total vote 
 is divided between four " Party Tickets " or four separate candi- 
 dates. 
 
 The result under such a method is called an election by plurality ; 
 and the consequent management of public and private affairs 
 under this scheme of action is sometimes called Plurality Rule. 
 
 Where the scheme of Plurality Rule is put in operation great 
 changes take place immediately in the individual's capacity to 
 participate in political administration freely, and to be represented 
 effectively in The Government. Elections are frequent under 
 Plurality Rule where considerably less than one-half of the voters 
 voting elect the majority of representatives in the administrative 
 bodies. At such times even the will of the greater number of the 
 voters becomes inoperative, and the Doctrine of Majority Rule 
 considered as a political maxim also becomes inoperative in prac- 
 tise. How these changes in meaning and status are brought about 
 in detail will be considered further in the chapters on Political 
 Representation.
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY RULE 93 
 
 Partizan Party Rule : Probably those who established our 
 system of State Folity believed that the term " Majority " would 
 always mean a " IVIajority of Wills " whether that meaning was 
 given the force of a legal definition or not. They probably 
 believed that the term " Majority Rule " would continue to mean 
 " Political administration according to the consensus of political 
 wills in the community " whether individuals were compelled by 
 law to put this construction on the term or not. Apparently they 
 did not appreciate the necessity for regulating definitely every step 
 of individual administrative action. But be this as it may. They 
 failed to ordain an adequate and comprehensive administrative 
 system, and in this omission they left the extensive field of 
 administrative action msufficiently protected by law and open 
 to exploitation. 
 
 Of course the mere ordainment of such a system will not of 
 itself change human nature or prevent the perpetration of all 
 possible political offenses. But the existence of such a system 
 would serve to remove in advance of political effort many of the 
 mental bewilderments and difficulties with which the path of 
 democratic administrative action is beset. Since it is natural in 
 men, irrespective of their moral fitness, to seize upon the exercise 
 of political power and political authority whenever the opportunity 
 presents, the necessity exists at the beginning of democratic action 
 for The Commonwealth to establish and ordain the use of logical 
 and legal methods for the right transaction of every individual 
 act in the whole process of administration. 
 
 In the first place, without logical methods, there is danger that 
 political action by the individual may gradually cease to be demo- 
 cratic in kind because of the introduction of undemocratic methods 
 of action. 
 
 In the second place, without legal methods, there is danger that 
 the exercise of The Reserved Powers of Administration may be 
 taken easily (by those who are greedy for the exercise of Power) 
 out of the hands of The Collective Sovereign where it was placed 
 originally. 
 
 In the third place, the mere existence of such a system serves 
 to lessen the opportunities for the misuse (intentional or otherwise) 
 of such power and authority by individuals or by groups of in- 
 dividuals. 
 
 In the fourth place, and in the absence of such a system, opportu- 
 nities for illogical (and therefore improper) action are presented 
 all along the line of effort and The Sovereign is forced to turn to
 
 94 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 its servant The Legislature for speedy relief. But statutory regu- 
 lations of political action are generally powerless to produce 
 " Pure " political action. Statutory regulations are usually mere 
 prohibitions against the exercise of wrong influences at some one 
 specific stage of political action, and do not prevent the exercise 
 of such influences at other times and at other stages of action. 
 Political action cannot be rendered pure by regulating the trans- 
 action of individual work in any one of its stages alone. If The 
 Law is to help in purifying political action, it must be Law which 
 covers individual action in each step of each stage ; and such Law 
 should possess the sanction and approval of The Commonwealth 
 in order to give it the necessary obligatory force. 
 
 Since also it is natural in men to avoid onerous labor whenever 
 possible, the necessity immediately arises at the beginning of the 
 truly burdensome work of political administration for The Sover- 
 eign to provide a system for the proper transaction of that work and 
 not leave its individual units in doubt or perplexity concerning 
 the proper discharge of their political obligations and duties. 
 
 In the first place, such a system (showing how political power 
 and authority are to be rightfully used by individuals both in and 
 out of office) would serve to make political work easier to the in- 
 dividual. 
 
 In the second place, it would serve to gradually instruct the 
 individual in political morality. 
 
 In the third place, it would gradually instruct the individual 
 how to keep the exercise of political power in his own hands, and 
 how to secure a proper exercise of political authority from his 
 neighbor. Under such a system doubts would be removed to a 
 large extent. Settled habits of right political action could be 
 formed, and the transaction of political work would be made 
 attractive as the individual realized that he was exercising The 
 Supreme Power for rightful ends. 
 
 But when, in the absence of such a system, The Partizan Party 
 succeeded at last in establishing itself as the leader, organizer, and 
 controller of administrative action, it had succeeded also in attach- 
 ing new and partizan meanings to every idea connected with 
 political administration. The old names were retained unaltered, 
 but used henceforth solely for " Party " slogan purposes. The 
 names served to deceive the people into the belief that they were 
 still a united Collective Sovereign, and acting as such. But 
 Public Opinion — Manufactured by " The Party." Nominations 
 — For Sale by "The Party." Representatives — Of "The
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY RULE 95 
 
 Party." Responsibility — Enforced by "The Party." In- 
 dividual Freedom in political action — Yes ! Join any Partizan 
 Party you please. The Ballot — No ! Party Ticket now. Politics 
 — A Business pure and simple. Public Office — The reward of 
 " Party Regularity." Political Preferment — Easily obtained 
 through Partizan Action. Statesmanship — The province of 
 " The Boss." Statesmen — High " Party Officials." Individual 
 Morality — A negligible quantity. Public Morals — A mere 
 catchphrase ! Every man has his price ! 
 
 The " Majorities " which henceforth were to determine the 
 character of the " Rule " were to be majorities of " Party votes," 
 obtained (whenever " Party Success " required it) by cajolery, 
 intimidation, corruption, bribery, deceit, fraud, assault, repeating, 
 ballot-box stuffing, tissue ballots, gerrymandering, false returns, 
 manipulation, and the breaking do^^Ti of private morals generally. 
 
 The " Rule " which the commonwealth was to enjoy and trans- 
 mit to future generations was henceforth to be a Partizan Party 
 Rule as put in operation by the representatives elected to office 
 by the majorities obtained in the manner outlined above. 
 
 Now, in passing from this subject, it is but fair to say that The 
 Partizan Party is not wholly to blame for setting aside the Doctrine 
 of INIajority Rule. We, the people, have been and still are wo- 
 fully shortsighted in our political vision. But The Partizan Party 
 (considered as the professed and trusted Savior of American 
 Democracy) is, however, largely responsible for this action, be- 
 cause, instead of trying honestly to correct the faults in our 
 administrative system (as a true political leader should do) it has 
 uniformly, systematically, dishonestly, and hypocritically striven 
 to turn these faults to its own peculiar advantage, notwithstanding 
 that this action on its part has always had the effect of destroying 
 the force and influence of the principles and doctrines of political 
 action which The Sovereign laid down originally as the basis of 
 righteous administrative action by The People.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE OBLIGATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE DUTIES 
 
 OF CITIZENSHIP 
 
 In the political sense of the term, The State is an independent 
 body of individuals united together under a Form of Government. 
 
 The word " independent " means, that the united body of in- 
 dividuals acknowledges no superior body to which it owes alle- 
 giance. 
 
 The State and " The Individuals of The State " are equivalent 
 political expressions. For short, we term the individuals of the 
 state " The People." 
 
 Government implies the exercise of Power. 
 
 Self-Government implies the exercise of Power by The People. 
 
 The power exercised is the united powers of the individuals who 
 compose The State. If large numbers of individuals withdraw 
 from a body politic, the power of The State is immediately lessened. 
 
 The power exercised in government is called The Supreme Power. 
 
 The Supreme Power is created when individuals unite them- 
 selves together as a Political State for the independent management 
 of the affairs of The State, and of the affairs of the individual. 
 
 The word " Sovereign " expresses the idea of the absence of 
 outside restraint upon volition. It is synonymous with the word 
 "dominant." 
 
 Political Sovereignty expresses the idea of the possession and 
 the exercise of The Supreme Power. 
 
 Political Sovereignty, like the Supreme Power, springs into exis- 
 tence with the birth of the independent State ; and it is impossible 
 to think of political sovereignty, or of the supreme power, except 
 in connection with The State. It is an attribute of, or a character- 
 istic attaching itself to, either the individual, or the body of 
 individuals, who exercise The Supreme Power. 
 
 In the American commonwealths, " The People " are The 
 
 96
 
 THE OBLIGATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 97 
 
 Sovereign, and exercise their attribute, Sovereignty. By this 
 statement I do not wish to be understood as intimating that the 
 American commonwealths -are Sovereign States. They are not, 
 and never were, although some of them claimed to be ; but the 
 claim was made after they had already relinquished the exercise 
 of supreme power for national objects to The Nation. But in 
 the regulation of their own affairs, both public and private, The 
 People of the States are The Sovereign. 
 
 Before beginning political administration, the individuals of a 
 State agree that the object of government shall be the promotion 
 of the General Welfare according to certain broadly conceived 
 but epigramatically expressed ideas of right action. 
 
 The General Welfare means the welfare of The State and the 
 welfare of The Individual. 
 
 The effect of this governmental agreement is to put the Collec- 
 tive Sovereign under the obligation : 
 
 First : To promote the Welfare of The State. 
 
 Second : To promote the Welfare of The Individual. 
 
 Third : To act as a Sovereign strictly in accord with the Prin- 
 ciples of the State Polity ; and 
 
 Fourth : To compel all of its individual units to act in a similar 
 manner. 
 
 For some purposes the Collective Sovereign itself acts. 
 
 For other purposes the Collective Sovereign acts through the 
 existing body of Electors. 
 
 For still other purposes the Collective Sovereign acts through 
 the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of its political 
 agency, The Government. 
 
 As for the manner of its acting, the Collective Sovereign is 
 bound by the Principles of Democratic Action. These principles 
 require a united and direct exercise of political power by the 
 Sovereign ; a united and direct exercise of political authority by 
 its administrative agencies ; and a direct, personal exercise of 
 authority by its executive officials. 
 
 But the individual is not always acting in a political capacity. 
 Part of the time he is at liberty to exercise his Individual Power 
 in his own private affairs. 
 
 From this it appears that each individual in a free commonwealth 
 acts in a dual capacity. In the exercise of political power he acts 
 as a Sovereign. In the exercise of individual power along social 
 or economic lines he acts as a citizen owing allegiance to The State. 
 
 While acting in the capacity of a Sovereign, and either to estab-
 
 98 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 lish Government or to administer it, he is under a broad, general 
 obligation to maintain the integrity of The State, and the ordained 
 status of The Individual. 
 
 When acting in a private capacity, he is specifically bound to 
 observe the rights of others. 
 
 He is also morally bound to maintain the rights of others, as 
 otherwise he stands in danger of losing his own rights. 
 
 While engaged with others in exercising the Powers of Establish- 
 ment, or the Reserved Powers of Administration, he is bound by 
 all the various obligations that always rest upon The Sovereign. 
 These various obligations of the sovereign, when grouped together, 
 make up the inclusive Obligations of Sovereignty as set forth on 
 page 102. 
 
 When acting independently of others, he is held to be governed 
 by certain concepts, which, when taken together, declare the Duties 
 of Citizenship. 
 
 In the main these duties consist in using individual power in 
 the various stages of political administration solely for the objects 
 which the community has ordained, and solely in accordance with 
 the spirit and the intent of the original governmental agreement. 
 
 The Individual may, in one period of administration, be called 
 upon to act as a Sovereign-unit, as an Electoral unit, as a Legislative 
 or as a Judicial unit, or as an Executive official ; but no matter 
 in what capacity he acts, he still retains his other capacities for 
 action, and he is under the obligation to act in each and any of 
 these capacities so that he does not impair his other capacities 
 for right action. He has an intricate and difficult task to accom- 
 plish. His duties are imposed by the Collective Sovereign. How 
 is he to know what they are in each separate instance. How is he 
 to act so that in the end The Sovereign shall take right action ? 
 
 Theoretically, it is The Sovereign only that exercises political 
 power. The acts of a collective sovereign, however, must be the 
 result of the acts of the individuals who compose it ; for it is only 
 through the acts of its individuals that a decision is reached 
 concerning what shall be the act of The Sovereign. 
 
 Practically, then, right action on the part of The Sovereign can 
 only be obtained through right action on the part of its individual 
 units. Right individual political action may be broadly defined 
 in passing as action which makes the true intent and spirit of the 
 State Polity fully operative. But this is too broad a definition to 
 be of practical assistance. It points to Principles of Actions; 
 but does not show how they can be applied in daily practise.
 
 THE OBLIGATIONS OF SO\^REIGNTY 99 
 
 Also it is the duty of the individual to act rightly both in pur- 
 pose and in the manner of his action. 
 
 His status as a citizen, and the general purpose of his action, 
 is actually determined for him by the exercise of the Powers of 
 Establishment, and when they are exercised. 
 
 The manner of his action, that is, the specific way of accom- 
 plishing all of his several minor political acts, should also be 
 prescribed by the exercise, and at the time of the exercise of these 
 same powers ; for it is one of the Obligations of Sovereignty to 
 prescribe the Duties of Citizenship. 
 
 The Sovereign must rule, the citizen must obey ; but the citizen 
 cannot obey intelligently unless The Sovereign has ordained a 
 rule of action beforehand. 
 
 The obedience of the citizen consists in a rightful participation 
 in the management of public affairs, and in the rightful manage- 
 ment of his own affairs. His interests clash. Left to himself he 
 falls into doubt and perplexity. 
 
 The principles of the State Polity serve only to indicate the kind 
 of action desired. 
 
 Standing by themselves, that is, unsupported by a " Rule of 
 Action," they can not insure right action. Their force is 
 phylacterial in nature ; that is, they serve to remind the individual 
 of his duty to put them in operation ; but, because there is no 
 stated rule for making them operative, their force lacks the com- 
 pelling power of Law. 
 
 The individual may be animated with a right motive ; but the 
 way in which he transacts each specific detail of his work will, in 
 the end, determine the actual character of his work ; and, before 
 he can be sure that he has acted rightly throughout, he must 
 possess an understandable rule governing the performance of 
 each specific act. 
 
 There is just as much necessity for a graven set of command- 
 ments regulating Administrative Action as ever existed for a set 
 of commandments regulating social or religious action. 
 
 With us, the exercise of Political Power is only bestowed upon 
 the individual in order that he, through its proper exercise with 
 others, shall secure himself, his fellows, and his and their successors, 
 in the possession of Freedom, Liberty, Equality, and Justice as 
 ordained. Through the rightful enjoyment and maintenance of 
 these conditions of existence the individual is supposed to secure 
 his personal welfare and happiness, and that of others. 
 
 Also, being politically free, the individual is supposedly capable
 
 100 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 (or if each single one is not, then at least a majority of them are 
 supposedly capable) of devising a logical system for maintaining, 
 enjoying, and transmitting the Blessings flowing from fi^e/f-Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Political Freedom is moral freedom. Considered as a personal 
 status, it is immunity from all restraint upon the political action 
 of the individual except that exerted by reason and conscience. 
 But moral freedom, as ordained, can not contmue to exist in the 
 absence of a Law regulating its maintenance; and in order that 
 each Sovereign-unit shall be able to quickly determine before it is 
 too late whether, in each specific instance, he is, or others are, 
 acting in accord with the spirit and intent of the State Polity, 
 he must be provided with a code of instructions or a system of 
 action which, when put into operation by The Sovereign, will 
 assist in making that spirit and intent operative in individual 
 action. 
 
 If the system he uses does not do that, then it must do something 
 else ; and if it does do something else, then the political freedom 
 of the individual is impaired, and the continued possession of his 
 status is imperiled. 
 
 Furthermore, the safety of The Commonwealth requires that 
 no question whatever regarding the meaning and intent of its 
 Polity shall be left open to construction by those who exercise 
 political power or authority ; otherwise, society will be kept in a 
 ferment of political uncertainty by a constant discussion of 
 political meanings. If while society is divided in political belief 
 those in authority persist either honestly or dishonestly in apply- 
 ing their own belief to the exclusion of the other, then society 
 stands in danger of disruption either through secession or revolu- 
 tion. 
 
 The continuous possession by the individual of the ordained 
 conditions of existence also requires that no question as to the 
 duties of citizenship shall be left open to construction by those who 
 participate in the exercise of the Supreme Power. If the individual 
 is to remain possessed of an ordained status, then he and all of 
 his fellows must at all times know exactly how he and they must 
 act politically in order to maintain that status. 
 
 The individual must receive this instruction from the Collective 
 Sovereign. Where Church is separated from State, the people 
 determine the morality of political action. The Majority of Wills, 
 when freely formed, is the Public Conscience as to what is right, 
 as well as the Public Judgment concerning policy.
 
 THE OBLIGATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 101 
 
 The Collective Sovereign is the only superior of the individual ; 
 and it is under the obligation to tell the individual what is right, 
 and how to act. It is unsafe for the Collective Sovereign not to 
 tell him ; for unless individuals know exactly what is required of 
 them, then there can be no such thing as an established Public 
 INIorals or a definite Public Conscience as a guide to right political 
 action. 
 
 In the absence of any rule of action the citizen is unbound, and 
 The Commonwealth is in so much rendered impotent. 
 
 In the absence of a logical rule of action, the citizen can honestly 
 take improper action, and The Commonwealth cannot reasonably 
 punish him. 
 
 Under an illogical, or an indefinite, or an incomprehensive 
 administrative system, serious, harmful,?irritating, and exhausting 
 friction is produced in the work of administration. 
 
 If the Collective Sovereign neglects to provide its members 
 beforehand with a stated method for the exercise of every power 
 and every authority, then, through this omission, it practically 
 brings about the following undesirable political situations : 
 
 It leaves its individuals without a standard of duty in reference 
 to the exercise of The Reserved Powers of Administration. 
 
 It leaves its individuals without any adequate and reasonable 
 means and rules by which to enforce a proper exercise of such 
 powers from other individuals. 
 
 It leaves its public officials without instruction as to what the 
 specific duties of their offices really are. 
 
 It leaves them also without the means to prevent either en- 
 croachments upon the exercise of their specific authority or to 
 prevent the injection of duties upon the office that are foreign to 
 the purpose of the office. 
 
 Finally, The Commonwealth itself is left without a rule, or the 
 means, or the ability, to speedily and reasonably enforce proper 
 action from either individuals or officials. 
 
 Unless the rule of action is logical, definite, and comprehensive, 
 an enormous waste in energy, efficiency, and time results. The 
 Commonwealth necessarily remains continually in doubt con- 
 cerning alleged infractions of the rule, and must listen to endless 
 controversies concerning infractions between those who selfishly 
 benefit by them and those who unjustly suffer by them. In each 
 American Commonwealth to-day, doubt and impotency concern- 
 ing political administration prevail in the place of certainty and 
 ability. There is no question of capacity to rule, but because in
 
 102 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 the past each Commonwealth has failed to properly regulate the 
 modus operandi of each separate stage of political action, ques- 
 tions concerning the propriety of past, present, and proposed 
 action multiply indefinitely and the efficiency of the adminis- 
 trative action of The Commonwealth is seriously impaired by 
 having to spend so much time over questions of " Reform." 
 
 The Separate Obfigations of Sovereignty : Now it makes no 
 difference whether the Supreme Power is exercised by a single 
 Sovereign or a Collective Sovereign ; the broad obligation to 
 promote the general welfare according to the principles of the 
 state polity remains the same. 
 
 But the way in which an Autocrat discharges the obligation 
 differs widely from the way of a Collective Sovereign. 
 
 The American Commonwealths seek to discharge their obliga- 
 tions through a separation of powers ; through the use of two 
 agencies — The Electorate, and The Government ; and through 
 the use of several means — Leadership, Organization, Public 
 Opinion, Majorities, Representation, Responsibility, and so on. 
 
 The Collective Sovereign has to exercise the Supreme Power for 
 many separate and totally distinct purposes, all of which, when 
 properly accomplished, contribute to the promotion of the general 
 welfare as ordained. 
 
 It proceeds step by step to the final discharge of its obligation. 
 
 Consequently, there is a separate and distinct obligation 
 to have each step taken properly. 
 
 Classified in the order of the exercise of Political Power for its 
 various prescribed purposes, these separate obligations will appear 
 as follows : 
 
 As to the Powers of Establishment : 
 
 (1) State Polity, Object of Government, Individual Status. 
 
 To reach an agreement of wills concerning, first, the Polity of 
 The State; second, The Object for which Government is estab- 
 lished ; and third, the distinctive political, social, and economic 
 status of the individual that is to be maintained within the body 
 politic. 
 
 (2) The Supreme Power, Agencies. 
 
 To reach an agreement of wills concerning the nature and seat 
 of the Supreme Power, and who individually, and what bodies 
 collectively, shall exercise it directly, and indirectly. 
 
 (3) Separation of Powers, Limits of Authority. 
 
 To reach an agreement of wills concerning the distribution of 
 the exercise of the Delegated Powers of Administration between
 
 THE OBLIGATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 103 
 
 the three branches of The Government, and to similarly agree 
 as to the limitations to be set upon the exercise of Political 
 Authority in The Government. 
 
 (4) Administrative System. 
 
 To reach an agreement of wills concerning the Means and the 
 Methods by which each of the Reserved Powers of Administration, 
 and each of the Delegated Powers of Administration shall be 
 exercised for its specific purpose, and to group these mutually 
 complementary methods into a comprehensive System of Political 
 Administration. 
 
 (5) Constitution. 
 
 To embody these several agreements in a formal written state- 
 ment, or Constitution, which, as to these matters, shall constitute 
 the Fundamental Law of the body politic, that is, The Supreme 
 Law. 
 
 Written, so that all who can read shall have the opportunity to 
 question and to understand. 
 
 Fundamental, because it can only be altered by action of The 
 Sovereign People. 
 
 (6) Public Sanction. 
 
 To obtain a formal sanction of the proposed governmental 
 regime from the people by means and methods acceptable to them ; 
 to fill the administrative offices, and to set Political Administration 
 in operation. 
 
 As to the Reserved Power of Amendment : 
 
 (7) Amendment. 
 
 To reach an agreement of wills concerning what individual acts, 
 or agency actions, shall be considered an intolerable perversion of 
 the original Spirit and Intent of The People ; and to similarly agree 
 concerning the reasons for which and the manner by which the 
 fundamental law shall be altered in any particular. 
 
 The foregoing statement is intended merely to indicate the com- 
 posite nature of the broad Obligation of Sovereignty. 
 
 In some respects the obligation has been properly discharged. 
 The State Polity, The Object of Government, and the Individual 
 Status have been fixed and determined. The nature and seat of 
 the Supreme Powers has been declared. Governmental Agencies 
 have been ordained. The Separation of Powers has been made; 
 and in a way, limitations have been put upon the exercise of Polit- 
 ical Authority. 
 
 But in respect to the exercise of the Reserved Powers of Adminis^ 
 tration, and the exercise of the Delegated Powers of Adminis-
 
 104 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 tration, the obligation has not been properly discharged. The 
 Sovereign has never devised and ordained the use of logical means 
 and methods for their exercise. The character of these means 
 and methods has never been so determined that the use of means 
 and methods of another character entailed a penalty. 
 
 Regarding the means and methods themselves, their character 
 must in reason be such as fully reflect the Theory of Administration 
 and the Principles of the State Polity. They should be only 
 those which will give the fullest operative force to these Principles 
 and this Theory. 
 
 As to the Reserved Powers of Administration : Briefly, then, 
 the obligation lies upon The Sovereign to provide and maintain 
 an Administrative System composed in part of means and methods 
 as follows : 
 
 I. Formation of Individual Will, Majorities of Wills, Policy. 
 That enable individual electors to freely form, ascertain, and 
 
 express their Wills on all questions of Administrative Policy ; to 
 frame such questions ; and to freely decide them uyon their merits 
 alone. 
 
 II. Nominations, Elections, Representation. 
 
 That secure to each individual elector the free exercise of The 
 Right To Choose in all matters relating to the selection, election, 
 and the appointment of the individuals who are to fill the adminis- 
 trative offices during the periods of administration ; to the end that 
 the kind of representation originally ordained, viz. Representation 
 of Ideas, shall be forever maintained. 
 
 III. Control, Responsiveness. 
 
 That enable The Sovereign to speedily and efficiently enforce 
 its will as to administration upon its administrative agency, and 
 upon individuals generally ; to the end that Government shall 
 in fact be administered by the people ; that the work of the 
 administrative agencies shall be controlled by the people, and be 
 made responsive to Public Opinion. 
 
 IV. Responsibility. 
 
 That will enable The Sovereign People to freely, speedily, 
 continuously, effectually, and reasonably enforce due responsibility 
 upon every individual exercising any degree of political power or 
 political authority ; and which rule of action, in case of serious 
 differences of opinion, controversies, or disputes, will pave the way 
 towards easily invoking the exercise of the coercive power of the 
 people through The Judiciary.
 
 THE DUTIES OF CITIZENSHIP 105 
 
 V. Leadership, Organization, Legislative Impulse. 
 
 That shall secure the continued existence of a true Political 
 Leadership both in and out of The Government ; that shall secure a 
 true political Organization of individual electoral effort; to the 
 end that The Legislature and The Executive shall receive the kind 
 of Impulse that is necessary to make action on their part truly 
 representative of the ordained State Polity. 
 
 The separate obligations so far considered are those more 
 especially connected with the ordained direct exercise of political 
 power by individuals, whether acting independently of others or 
 with others. 
 
 From here on we must consider what distinct obligations The 
 Sovereign is under in reference to the ordained exercise of delegated 
 political power, or political Authority. 
 
 Two Main Classes of Citizenship Duties : Our theory of 
 administration places the duty upon all citizens who participate 
 in political administration to exercise political power for several 
 specific purposes ; and, at the same time, it places an additional 
 duty upon some of the citizens to exercise political authority for 
 other distinct purposes. 
 
 The duties of citizenship, therefore, fall naturally into two 
 classes, viz. those relating to an exercise of political power, and 
 those relating to an exercise of political authority. 
 
 In this connection we must remember two facts. 
 
 The first is that the final and completed exercise of the specific 
 authority of the government is consummated in the same way that 
 the people consummate the exercise of political power, viz. through 
 the accomplishment of several separate and distinct series of acts 
 in a regular order of succession. 
 
 The second is that the indirect or delegated exercise of political 
 power was originally intended to be a direct exercise of political 
 authority. 
 
 The obligations of sovereignty now to be considered have more 
 especial reference to the statement of, and the enforcement of, 
 the duties which are due from citizens while acting in the capacity 
 of officials. 
 
 Theoretically, the official is chosen to act for the people, and 
 not for any majority of individuals, or any organized party. 
 
 Theoretically, the individual is selected to act as an official 
 partly because of Ws probity, partly because of his superior sagac- 
 ity and ability, or because he combines all of these qualities and 
 elements of individual power to a superior degree.
 
 106 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 The people, as The Sovereign working for the General Welfare, 
 has the right to command the services of such citizens during a 
 period of administration. 
 
 Theoretically, the exercise of political authority is bestowed 
 upon such an individual because he of all others is considered best 
 fitted to serve The Sovereign for the time being. 
 
 The Sovereign commands a personal exercise of his virtue, sagac- 
 ity, and wisdom. 
 
 How can The Sovereign effectively enforce its command for 
 personal service ? 
 
 Manifestly, The Sovereign cannot enforce its command if it 
 permits a redelegation of the exercise of authority through the 
 surrender by the official of the discharge of the functions of his 
 office into the hands of another, or if it permits an official to 
 become subject to any other Will than its own. 
 
 If The Sovereign permits the practise of redelegating the exer- 
 cise of political authority to exist, then there is nothing to prevent 
 an individual to whom the exercise of such authority has been 
 redelegated from passing the exercise on to another, and so on 
 until the Fundamental Law is rendered meaningless and the 
 original intent of The Sovereign regarding the kind of exercise 
 required can be set aside as of no account. 
 
 If, in addition to this. The Sovereign permits its representative 
 to become subject to any other WUl than its own (like the Will of a 
 Partizan Party, for instance), then the ability of The Sovereign to 
 speedily and effectually control the exercise of its owti authority 
 can be worn dowTi to the vanishing point. 
 
 If The Sovereign does not control the exercise of its own author- 
 ity, then whoever or whatever does control it becomes the Ruler 
 in fact. But, in the theory of government, there is no such idea as 
 a right in the sovereign to relinquish its control in any respect. 
 On the contrary. The Sovereign is bound to keep the exercise of 
 political power in its owti hands, and to keep the exercise of political 
 authority entirely within the hands of its representatives. If it 
 does not do this, then, necessarily. Government becomes perverted. 
 
 But there is nothing in our original plan of political action 
 which makes it absolutely necessary for The Sovereign to relin- 
 quish the exercise of control. All .that it has to do in order to rule 
 righteously is to act itself in accordance with its ordained principles 
 of action, and to provide such means and methods as will enable 
 its sovereign units to act in a similar manner. 
 
 Our principles of administrative action, as they relate to the con-
 
 THE DUTIES OF CITIZENSHIP 107 
 
 trol of The Sovereign over the exercise of poHtical authority, are 
 nowhere more clearly indicated than in the following section (501) 
 of Meechem's " Public Officer." 
 
 " All political power is inherent in the people, and all officers 
 exercising governmental powers must derive their authority either 
 directly from the people, or from duly constituted representatives 
 of the people, who have either directly, or through their represen- 
 tatives in Convention assembled, created such offices as they deem 
 requisite for the proper management of public affairs, prescribed 
 their functions and declared the manner in which, and the persons 
 by which, such functions shall be exercised." 
 
 In order to speedily obtain a logical exercise of political authority 
 in an orderly and effective manner, the people, after they have 
 created the offices, must : 
 
 First, prescribe the function of each office. 
 
 Second, declare the manner in which the function of each 
 office shall be discharged ; and 
 
 Third, themselves elect some of their individual members to 
 fill the offices. 
 
 Now it makes no difference whether the authority is to be 
 exercised by a single individual or by a body of individuals created 
 to exercise it ; the principle remains the same. The exercise is 
 to be direct in every sense of the word. 
 
 No other Will but that of the people is to impart direction to 
 the exercise of political authority, and no other Will but that of 
 the people shall control this exercise. The ordained relations be- 
 tween the " Common Superior " and its collective administrative 
 agencies are to be scrupulously maintained and observed on both 
 sides. 
 
 But this cannot be unless The Sovereign has definitely prescribed 
 beforehand the manner of agency action. For instance: if the 
 agency is permitted to prescribe its own methods of action, what 
 guarantee has the community against the prescription of expedients 
 which will ultimately enable the agency to control its own action 
 and take its own direction ? If by good chance it does neither of 
 these things, nevertheless the agency, without an ordained rule of 
 action, is in a position that affords the opportunity for the exercise 
 over it of a Will that may be anything but truly political in nature. 
 
 Such a permission on the part of The Sovereign is suicidal. If 
 The Sovereign, using an agency, is to rule rightly, that is, to effect 
 its ordained purposes and redeem its promises, it must be in 
 a position at all times to direct and control every specific act of
 
 108 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 its agency. This, however, it cannot do, unless through the force 
 of estabhshed Law it can direct and control every act of every 
 individual in the agency; for it is by individual acts within the 
 agency that the character and effect of agency action is determined. 
 
 The nature of Electoral Action and of Governmental Action is 
 that of trust action. The Electorate is a picked class entrusted 
 with the use of the ballot. The offices in The Government are 
 filled with selected individuals who are entrusted with a temporary 
 exercise of political authority. 
 
 Trust action of any kind is always presupposed to be regulated 
 beforehand by those who create the trust; and the regulation 
 beforehand of action by a collective political trustee is rendered 
 peculiarly necessary by the well-known fact that a body of men 
 will often do that which an individual would not dare to do alone. 
 
 As to the Delegated Powers of Administration : Finally, and 
 because The Sovereign is under the broad obligation to rule 
 rightly and logically, it is under the following specific obligations ; 
 namely : 
 
 I. To prescribe the function of all the higher elective and 
 appointive offices in either branch of The Government, and to 
 declare the manner in which such functions shall be discharged. 
 
 II. As to the Executive Branch. 
 
 To provide methods of action definitel}^ and properly regulating 
 the delegated exercise of the executive powers of Appointment and 
 Removal ; the Veto (especially in connection with the work of 
 raising and disbursing the revenues of Government), and which 
 regulations definitely declare the manner of organizing the execu- 
 tive departments and the systematizing of their action. 
 
 III. As to the Legislative Branch. 
 
 To provide methods w'hich safeguard the proper exercise of the 
 Delegated Powers of Legislation by regulating the organizing of all 
 bodies exercising legislative authority, and also by regulating the 
 manner in which and the system by which the work of such bodies 
 shall be transacted. 
 
 IV. As to the Judicative Branch. 
 
 To provide methods of action which shall safeguard the proper 
 exercise of the delegated Judicial Authority through regulating the 
 organizing of all judicial bodies, by systematizing their action, 
 and by clearly specifying the manner in which Judicial Authority 
 shall be applied in the settlement of all public controversies or 
 private contentions concerning either the exercise of political power, 
 political authority, or individual power.
 
 THE DUTIES OF CITIZENSHIP 109 
 
 The above statement is not intended to show each and every 
 act that calls for regulation. It is intended merely to show the 
 composite nature of the broad Obligation of Sovereignty, and the 
 connection it has with the duties of citizenship. 
 
 A Direct Discharge Indispensable. The nature of the above- 
 named obligation is such that its discharge cannot with safety, 
 or in reason, be delegated by The Sovereign. 
 
 Nor can the proper discharge of its obligations by The Sovereign 
 be safely dispensed with by the individuals who compose the body 
 politic ; because, if the proper discharge of obligations that relate 
 to the exercise of the Reserved Powers of Administration and of the 
 Delegated Powers of Administration be not had, then the oppor- 
 tunity is presented for the substitution of an improper System of 
 Administration, or of one not contemplated in our Theory of 
 Government. 
 
 Lastly, if these sovereign obligations have never been wholly 
 or properly discharged in the past, nevertheless they continue to 
 exist as obligations ; and, unless they are properly discharged by 
 some generation. The Commonwealth will never know whether it 
 is possible for it to make good its professions by the use of its 
 chosen Form of Government. 
 
 If The Commonwealth does not properly discharge its sovereign 
 obligations, then it cannot definitely prescribe the Duties of Citi- 
 zenship ; and if these are left indefinite, how can The Common- 
 wealth ever hope to maintain a moral exercise of political power and 
 political authority, not to mention a moral exercise of individual 
 power ?
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE ELECTORATE 
 
 The Right to Choose : The American Commonwealths proceed 
 upon the theory that a certain degree of capacity is required in all 
 individuals who are to participate directly in the exercise of 
 Political Power. 
 
 They have limited the exercise of the Right to Choose to a 
 certain portion of the individuals of the State. 
 
 These individuals are supposed to possess the mental and moral 
 qualifications which will enable them to exercise the Political 
 Power in accordance with the mandate contained in the Principles 
 of the State Polity, and for the objects ordained by The Sovereign 
 People. 
 
 Whether the qualifications imposed are in conformity with 
 Reason and Justice is an open question which need not be dis- 
 cussed here. The qualifications are purely arbitrary restrictions. 
 They are not uniform throughout the States. They are in the 
 nature of discriminations ; and they proceed from the general 
 assumption that individuals who do not possess all of the qualifi- 
 cations imposed are either incompetent or are unfit to participate 
 directly in Government and in Political Administration. 
 
 The Ballot. In order that the individual may express his 
 choice in a clear and determinate manner, he is given the use of a 
 ballot. 
 
 Theoretically, and by this means, the people are enabled to 
 easily get a definite and conclusive expression of Public Opinion 
 on political questions. 
 
 The casting of the ballot is called voting. 
 
 The Right of Suffrage : Those who are thus generally permitted 
 to directly participate in the exercise of political power are said 
 to possess the Right of Suffrage. 
 
 110 
 
 i
 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE ELECTORATE 111 
 
 The Sovereign creates, grants, secures, or denies this right solely 
 on the ground of Public Policy. It is a pure political right. 
 
 Defined. Each State prescribes its own qualifications and 
 restrictions and embodies them in the general law of the state. 
 For the present the Right of Suffrage will be defined as the Right 
 to Vote in political matters in the manner prescribed by the state 
 law. 
 
 Not a Personal Right, or Privilege. The people bestow the 
 exercise of this right upon certain of its individuals as a means for 
 obtaining greater efficiency and excellence in the work of main- 
 taining the General Welfare. 
 
 The exercise of this right is always connected with an exercise 
 of political power. 
 
 Individuals possessing this right are under peculiar obligations 
 to the people. 
 
 It is not a private right, and cannot be considered as a personal 
 privilege to be used by individuals for private ends. 
 
 In political action a man is given the use of a ballot to enable 
 him to definitely state kis own belief as to Justice. 
 
 Certain picked individuals of The State are given the use of the 
 ballot to enable The State to ascertain its will as to Justice. 
 
 Theoretically, the maintenance of Justice as ordained is the 
 way in which the General Welfare is produced. 
 
 The use of the ballot is given to the individual for the express 
 purpose of obtaining kis assistance in promoting the General 
 Welfare. 
 
 When the individual votes at elections, he does not vote in the 
 capacity of a private person, but as one of the Collective Sovereign 
 and for the purpose of obtaining an expression of its Will as to 
 Justice. 
 
 Hence it is considered criminal to buy or to sell a vote, because 
 such action tends to vitiate the will of the people as to Justice. 
 
 Theoretically, the moving force in The Government is the will 
 of the people as to political administration. 
 
 Theoretically, the majority of the votes when freely cast ex- 
 presses that Will. But if the majority of votes is obtained by 
 buying votes, or by the manipulation of the voters within The 
 Electorate, then The Will of The People is not expressed by a 
 majority of votes freely cast, and in its place stands the will of the 
 few who have successfully " manufactured" an artificial and false 
 majority of votes by either destroying or by seriously impairing 
 the political freedom of the individual.
 
 112 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 The Elective Franchise : Those who possess the right of suffrage 
 are picked individuals, selected for their superior qualifications. 
 
 They not only possess the privilege of directly participating in 
 the exercise of political power, which the other individuals of the 
 community do not possess; but, inasmuch as they alone of all 
 community individuals have the right to determine political 
 questions by an expression of will, they have a prerogative which 
 the other individuals of the community do not have. 
 
 This combined prerogative and privilege is called the Elective 
 Franchise. 
 
 The Electorate : Those of the individuals of The State who are 
 privileged to directly exercise the Right to Choose between pro- 
 posed political polities, policies, candidates, means, and methods 
 of political action, are called " Electors." 
 
 The inclusive body of electors is called The Electorate. 
 
 The Electorate is the body of individuals in which is vested the 
 high and solemn Political Prerogative of the people. In this sense 
 the term " political prerogative" means the discretionary power 
 of the people. 
 
 As the medium for the exercise of the discretionary power of the 
 people. The Electorate is a Political Agency. 
 
 It is this body which, through the possession of the Right of 
 Suffrage, finally exercises the Reserved Powers of the people. 
 
 This is the body which is commonly spoken of as " The People." 
 
 Numerically, the electorate comprises about one-fifth of the 
 population of the nation. In states where women exercise the 
 right of suffrage the proportion of the electorate to the population 
 is much larger. The population of the nation is about 100,000,000. 
 The membership in the electorate is about 20,000,000. Theoret- 
 ically, it is the utterance of a majority of more than one-half of 
 the electorate, or about one-tenth of the population, that is called 
 " The Voice of The People" ; and it is a majority of wills in the 
 electorate which, in theory, energizes and controls its agent, The 
 Government. 
 
 Electoral Functions : The electorate is the body which exercises 
 the discretionary power of the community in the endeavor to 
 maintain Justice between individuals. 
 
 Upon the acts of the electorate depend the welfare, happiness, 
 and development of all of the individuals of the community, and 
 the progress of American civilization as well. 
 
 The political rights of individuals also depend upon the proper 
 discharge of its ordained functions by the electorate.
 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE ELECTORATE 113 
 
 For all practical and working purposes the electorate is the 
 acting Sovereign ; and from this it is apparent that it must neces- 
 sarily work only as a collective unit. 
 
 Considered as a governmental means, the functions of the 
 electorate are somewhat similar to those of a jury. Both of these 
 bodies are organized to pass on questions or propositions sub- 
 mitted for decision ; but the functions of the electorate have a 
 much wider scope and effect than those of a jury. The Electorate 
 as a political agency has higher powers than those of merely 
 deciding. It can command the action of The Government, and, 
 through the medium of The Judiciary, can enforce The Will of 
 The People upon it and upon individuals. 
 
 In Connecticut, the electorate, like the jury, is sworn to the 
 performance of a duty. In that State each elector is sworn to be 
 true and faithful to the State, the Constitution and Government 
 thereof, and to the Constitution of the United States ; and when- 
 ever called to give his suffrage touching any matter concerning 
 the State or the L^nited States, to give it as he judges will conduce 
 to the best good of the same without respect of persons or favor 
 of any man. 
 
 This in a general way expresses the duty of an elector; fixes 
 his status as a public agent possessed of the exercise of political 
 power ; and states his moral obligation to Society to use his 
 position and powers only for the public good. The ballot is not 
 his own private perquisite. He cannot morally, lawfully, or with- 
 out perjury and delinquency use it otherwise than to promote 
 the general welfare. It belongs to the Community and to the 
 Country ; and its proper use is the return demanded for the high 
 honor of being allowed to directly participate in Political Adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 Viewed in the light of the above statements, the electorate is in 
 fact a numerically small collective trustee of the political powers 
 of the people. 
 
 \^^len we consider that it is a part of its duty to devise and 
 provide the means and methods of right political action, we find 
 that it has the character of a collective guardian of the Public 
 Conscience. 
 
 And inasmuch as it finally decides what the people shall do in 
 government and in political administration, we find it acting as 
 the Collective Sovereign. 
 
 In seeking the cause of the failure of the American Common- 
 wealths to produce the kind of political administration desired,
 
 114 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 it is necessary to keep the above facts constantly in mind. We 
 are apt, when we speak of " The Will of The People," to let our 
 brains be flooded with such ideas as the glory, the physical strength, 
 and material might of The Commonwealth. The splendor of these 
 ideas causes us for the time being to forget that the phrase " The 
 Will of The People" means at best nothing more than a possible 
 majority of wills in one-fifth of the population, and that it often- 
 times means a majority of wills which in number falls far short of 
 one-tenth of the population. 
 
 Let us ask ourselves this question. Upon what particular part 
 of our political action does the glory, the power, and the might of 
 The Commonwealth and the welfare and happiness of the indi- 
 vidual mainly depend ? Is not the answer apparent ? It does not 
 so much upon the social and economic activities of the populace ; 
 not so much upon the doings of The Government, as it does 
 depend upon the logical and proper discharge by The Electorate 
 of its trust functions and high responsibilities. If these were 
 properly discharged, neither The Government, nor the individual 
 could easily or safely avoid the moral obligations each is under ; 
 and if there were in the commonwealth a widespread and ever 
 present conviction that it is The Electorate, and not The Govern- 
 ment, and not The People who really govern, would not that 
 conviction gradually prick the general intelligence into an appre- 
 ciation of the necessity for binding that small body by appropriate 
 legal provisions that would compel its individual members to act 
 in accordance with the Principles of Action originally ordained by 
 The Commonwealth ? How else can public spirit and civic virtue 
 be kept alive and stimulated? How else can the community be 
 kept from taking illogical actions that will get it into administrative 
 difficulties ? 
 
 Nature of Electoral Action : The questions of administration 
 which the community has to decide for itself are, in the main, 
 either of a political nature or of an economic nature. 
 
 Those of a political nature relate more specially to the mainte- 
 nance unimpaired of the conditions of existence which are defined 
 by the Principles of the State Polity. 
 
 Those of an economic nature relate more specially to the main- 
 tenance of or the readjustment of the relations existing between 
 the individuals of the body politic. 
 
 Political questions are generally those affecting the general or 
 moral welfare of The Commonwealth, while economic questions 
 relate more specially to the material welfare of separate individuals.
 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE ELECTORATE 115 
 
 In theory, the final decision of poHtical questions is obtained 
 through a direct vote of the individuals who compose The Electo- 
 rate; while the final decision of economic questions is obtained 
 through a direct vote of the individuals who compose the legisla- 
 tive branch of The Government. 
 
 By the words '* final decision" I do not mean one that is unalter- 
 able ; but only such a decision as stands as the law until altered 
 or changed by some competent action on the part of the com- 
 munity. No question can be considered as finally settled until 
 it is settled rightly ; and the main point of the above statement is, 
 that the community adopted an indirect way of settling eco- 
 nomic questions, but a direct way of settling political questions. 
 
 Kind of Action. The original intention of the community was 
 to delegate the exercise of some of its political powers to The 
 Government, but to have The Electorate directly exercise all 
 powers reserved in the original grant of Authority. The com- 
 munitv recognized the fact that the nature of the Reserved Powers 
 of Administration called for a direct exercise by the collective 
 sovereign ; and the community, being under the obligation to 
 maintain individual Justice, and being also under the obligation 
 to control the action of its administrative assistant The Govern- 
 ment, reserved unto The Electorate the exercise of the powers 
 necessary to enable it to discharge its obligations in full to the 
 community. 
 
 Now the sole object of exercising these powers is to declare and 
 to enforce " The Will of The People" ; and if we are to consider 
 this will as a moral will, then it necessarily follows that it can only 
 be rightly produced through the free play of conscience and 
 reason. 
 
 But our acting sovereign, The Electorate, is a collective sover- 
 eign, composed of individuals having " free wills." Consequently, 
 if the will of The Electorate is to be considered as a moral will, 
 then it can only be rightly produced through the free play of reason 
 and conscience in each of its component individuals. Moreover, 
 and because the maintenance of Justice is made to depend upon 
 an equally effective exercise by individuals of their political 
 powers, the exercise of reason and of conscience cannot rightfully 
 be avoided, or delegated by one individual to another ; because if 
 it is, then the equality in the ability of individuals to help the 
 community is immediately destroyed, and the discretionary power 
 of the community is that much weakened. 
 
 Hence it is that Electorate Action was originally intended to be
 
 116 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 that kind of action which is the result of direct, free, and equal 
 political action on the part of each elector. 
 
 As to the manner in which The Will of The People is to be 
 declared, that, of necessity, depends entirely upon whatever 
 means and methods the community adopts. Its intention may 
 be the best in the world ; but without proper means and methods 
 its intention will be practically inoperative. 
 
 As to its intention concerning the settlement of political ques- 
 tions there can be no manner of doubt. Such questions it intended 
 to settle through a direct exercise of political powers by individual 
 electors. But when we pause to consider that The Electorate, 
 instead of deciding questions of administrative policy by voting 
 directly for or against them on their own merits, have adopted the 
 method of deciding such questions by voting for candidates who 
 merely avoiv an adherence to this or to that side of the question, 
 then it becomes apparent that the community, through permitting 
 the elector to express his " opinion of right " through an expression 
 of preference for a man or for a " Party," and irrespective of what 
 has caused that individual preference, has been gradually led into 
 the abandonment of the direct way of deciding political questions. 
 But this is only the initial step ; for the community, through 
 giving The Partizan Party the control over electoral action, has 
 been forced into the position where it is powerless to prevent vital 
 political questions from being unduly postponed, or distorted, or 
 shelved, or set aside entirely by the intermediary which now is 
 the organizer and leader in electoral action. 
 
 Furthermore, the practice of permitting individual electors to 
 decide questions of administrative policy by voting for candidates 
 has the effect of forcing personal considerations affecting candi- 
 dates or of " Parties " upon the immediate attention of the voter 
 and to give them undue prominence. It serves to arouse personal 
 feelings and to divert the attention of the average voter away from 
 the true character of the action that is required of him. 
 
 Personal feelings and considerations being kept uppermost by a 
 Partizan Party in its neighborhood work, the great mass of the 
 less informed voters unconsciously get to regard the ballot as the 
 means by which such feelings are to be expressed and such con- 
 siderations satisfied. In many other cases personal feelings sub- 
 merge the political consciousness for the time being, and voting 
 at the elections gets to be regarded as the act of an individual 
 rather than the act of a Sovereign-unit. The trust character of 
 the Right of Suffrage is lost sight of. There is no WTitten law
 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE ELECTORATE 117 
 
 compelling an elector to take truly political action. The power 
 of example outweighs the power of precept. He sees individuals 
 all around him taking personal action for personal reasons and 
 considerations. Considering himself merely as an individual and 
 not as one of a collective sovereign, he becomes conscious of his 
 individual weakness and impotence. In this condition, and seek- 
 ing the aid of united effort in the support of whatever opinions he 
 holds, he is naturally drawn into the membership of some associa- 
 tion of voters which is 'permanently organized to give added force 
 to similar opinions. When he joins such an organization, he has 
 to promise to submit himself to its rules. 
 
 If the great mass of individual electors take this course, then 
 several results immediately follow. 
 
 The Electorate is no longer a united body. 
 
 Electoral Action is no longer united and direct. 
 
 Individual electors are split up between the memberships of 
 this or that Partizan Party ; and individual electorate action is 
 no longer free. 
 
 Majority Rule as ordained becomes impossible because it is no 
 longer possible to obtain a Political Majority, or a succession of 
 such majorities. 
 
 The Will of The People as the moving force in Political Adminis- 
 tration cannot be formed, ascertained, expressed, and enforced in 
 the manner originally ordained ; and the will of a Partizan Party 
 is substituted to act in its place. 
 
 " Party Success" is declared to be the first great object to be 
 worked for by the individual voter, because the general welfare is 
 made to appear dependent upon party success. 
 
 A consideration of political questions is relegated to the back- 
 ground by a consideration of partizan questions, which, however, 
 are called political questions to hoodwink the unintelligent and 
 careless. 
 
 Summed up in a sentence, The Electorate has, in effect, delegated 
 the exercise of the Reserved Powers of administration to The 
 Partizan Party ; and the elector has sunk to the level of a partizan 
 party voter. 
 
 That we have allowed this to come to pass is one of the glaring 
 inconsistencies in our political action. The majorities of votes at 
 every one of our general elections are partizan party majorities. 
 Whenever " The Boss " calls for party success these partizan party 
 majorities of votes are gotten together by the use of every fraud on 
 true individual political action that the ingenuity of man can devise.
 
 118 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 These partizan majorities actually express the will of the partizan 
 party which is necessarily partizan in nature and in purpose. But 
 we, incredible as it might seem, not only employ this partizan 
 will in the place of the ordained Political Majorities described 
 in Chapter VI, but we actually call it " The Will of The People." 
 
 With the will of The Partizan Party operative upon and in The 
 Government, what is to prevent partizan legislation, or what is 
 the same thing, illogical political action ? 
 
 So long as the votes, or the voters, can be continually manipu- 
 lated, there is absolutely nothing to prevent the reign of injustice. 
 The manipulation of votes, or of the voters, is an atrocious political 
 offense, whether it stands on the statutes as a crime or not. To 
 permit the manipulation of votes, or of the voters, is the acme of 
 political stupidity; because The Government, responding easily 
 to a vicious impulse, particularly if it is proclaimed as the will of 
 the people, will surely, and perfectly consistently, produce legis- 
 lation that is subversive of the General Welfare. 
 
 Now what is the prime underlying cause for this surrender of 
 sovereignty by The Electorate ? What has weakened the binding 
 influence of the Principles of Political Action ordained by the 
 community? What has destroyed true cooperative action be- 
 tween its individuals ? What has deprived its individuals of their 
 rightful claim to united and direct action on the part of The 
 Electorate ? What has allowed self-interest to become a powerful 
 influence in the administration of restraint ? What has weakened 
 the force of the political and of the individual power of men ? If 
 it is not an illogical system of political administration that is the 
 prime cause of our present MTong political action, then are the 
 days of mourning near at hand ; for it is either through the inno- 
 cent use of a wrong system, or the wrongful disregard of political 
 morality, that we, as individuals, are led into a constant disregard 
 of honor, and into a continuous violation of the intent of our 
 Political Principles. 
 
 Of the two causes I arraign the system. It came into existence 
 primarily because the people in the beginning failed to appreciate 
 the fact that illogical results must necessarily flow from the use of 
 illogical means and methods of exercising Political Power and 
 because they failed to appreciate the further fact that a prescribed 
 means or a prescribed method for making a principle practically 
 operative is an indispensable prerequisite in keeping the spirit 
 of the principle before the attention of the individual and as a 
 guide to daily action. The Fathers, and the succeeding genera-
 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE ELECTORATE 119 
 
 tions, have never fully appreciated the impossibility of main- 
 taining the general Freedom as ordained without means and 
 methods which compel the individual to take absolutely free 
 political action. 
 
 Does not freedom as originally ordained mean, among other 
 things, that the individual, when acting in a political capacity, 
 shall be immune from any outside restraint whatsoever upon his 
 volition ; that he shall be and remain free to act as his conscience 
 and his reason tell him will best promote the General Welfare? 
 
 And if the people have mistakenly allowed a statute to be passed 
 which in effect compels individual electors to submit themselves 
 to " Party" guidance, is not the general freedom as ordained im- 
 mediately impaired, diminished, and depleted by such action? 
 
 In Political Administration, as in every other human undertak- 
 ing, this much is true ; the use of wrong means and methods of 
 individual action will inevitably and necessarily produce wrong 
 results, while the use of right means and methods will at least 
 make it possible to produce right results ; that is, the political 
 results which at the outset of political administration were declared 
 to be the objects of administrative action. 
 
 What these means and methods should be, and how they should 
 be provided by The Commonwealth, will be further considered 
 in Chapter XXIII.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE GOVERNMENT 
 
 Frame of. The structure or frame of The Government is 
 determined by the manner in which the Delegated Powers are 
 used. 
 
 To illustrate : the English entrust the exercise of such powers 
 to an administrative agency of two branches ; namely, The Legis- 
 lative and The Executive; or Parliament and The King, We, 
 however, for reasons of our own, have added another branch called 
 The Judiciary. 
 
 Distribution of " Powers " : The Roman idea was to distribute 
 the exercise of the supreme power between the different classes in 
 the body politic. The struggles for the possession and exercise 
 of the supreme power which took place during the feudal period 
 between the four classes of society, namely, The Monarchs, the 
 Nobility, the Church, and the People, together with the various 
 compromises and settlements between them, gradually expanded 
 the Roman idea. 
 
 Threefold Nature of the Supreme Power. Gradually, and with 
 the growth of the influence which the people exerted, the idea 
 obtained ascendency that in order to preserve effectively the 
 liberties of individuals and the permanence of society, classes 
 should not be set against classes in the exercise of the supreme 
 power, but that all should unite in the promotion of a Common 
 Welfare. The supreme power was held to have a threefold 
 nature. Some communities agreed that the objects for which its 
 exercise was instituted should be accomplished through making 
 laws, through enforcing laws, and through applying laws. The 
 power to make laws was called the Legislative Power. The 
 power to enforce laws was called the Executive Power; and the 
 power to apply laws was called the Judicial Power. 
 
 Three Branches of. Finally, in Democratic Communities, 
 the idea was conceived that the exercise of the delegated portions 
 
 120
 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE GOVERNMENT 121 
 
 of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be vested 
 in three separate bodies of individuals in the administrative 
 agency, which bodies should be dependent upon " The Will of a 
 Common Superior" capable of controlling them, and that these 
 bodies should be selected from the people at large at stated inter- 
 vals for the express purpose of exercising these " Powers," and 
 that these bodies should also be responsible to those who elected 
 them for the proper exercise of authority, and that the people 
 should from time to time during the progress of society decide for 
 themselves what Administrative Policy would be most likely to 
 promote the Common welfare. 
 
 The objects sought were : to unify democratic society ; to make 
 the people the Common Superior of their three-branched adminis- 
 trative agency ; to make The Will of The People the moving force 
 in that agency ; and to supply an easily perceived connection 
 between individual action and agency action. 
 
 All of this must be understood as a most general statement of 
 results attained through long periods of political development ; 
 and the reader is necessarily referred to history for a full explana- 
 tion of the causes and events preceding this ultimate conception. 
 
 Colonial Action. The American colonists were imbued with 
 the idea of the threefold nature of the supreme power. They 
 framed their administrative agency accordingly. They gave to 
 the legislative branch the authority to propose, discuss, pass, 
 amend, and repeal " Statutory Laws" or those laws which regulate 
 the detail of individual, social, economic, and political action. 
 They gave to the executive branch the authority to enforce the 
 laws. They gave to the judicial branch the authority to determine 
 the validity of the laws as passed and their special applicability 
 to matters in controversy and dispute. But they reserved to 
 The Electorate as "The Common Superior" the right to decide 
 the policy to be pursued, and also the right to control the action 
 of The Government. 
 
 Efficiency. Theoretically, the officers in each branch of The 
 Government were to be filled with the most able statesmen and 
 public-spirited citizens ; and the idea which prompted the colonists 
 to use such an administrative agency was, that the action of a 
 body so composed would necessarily be superior in effectiveness 
 to action that otherwise must be taken by The Electorate at 
 Large. 
 
 Authority of Branches. Many of the State Constitutions 
 contain provisions to the effect that neither branch of the govern-
 
 122 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 ment may exercise "authority or powers " belonging to the others ; 
 but nevertheless the general plan of separation permits each of 
 the branches in some cases to exercise " powers " which are not 
 strictly within the departmental province of a branch. 
 
 Thus, the Executive, in using the veto, exercises a legislative 
 power ; and, in passing on claims, a judicial power. 
 
 The Legislature may exercise the power of appointment, which 
 is executive in its nature; and, in adjudicating claims, or, as in 
 some States granting divorces, it acts judicially. 
 
 The Judiciary legislates not alone by decisions which modify 
 the existing law, but also by making rules of procedure which have 
 nearly the effect of Statutes ; and it is also clothed with the 
 executive power of appointment. 
 
 Equality of Branches. Since all the branches of The Govern- 
 ment derive their special authority from the same source, they 
 possess the attribute of authority in equal degree. In respect to 
 the duties assigned to each, and in the exercise of its special 
 authority, each is of equal dignity, and is supreme. 
 
 Independence of Branches. Likewise also the exercise of author- 
 ity is intended to be exclusive in respect to the duties assigned to 
 each branch of The Government ; and in so far, it is intended that 
 each branch shall act independently of the others. 
 
 The scheme as originally devised accomplished some of the 
 objects intended. It secured the separation of the above-named 
 political " Powers." It bestowed the exercise of a special authority 
 on each of the three branches. It made each branch such a check 
 upon the others as to preclude the possibility of any one branch 
 obtaining the exercise of a degree of authority sufficient to enable 
 it to assume control of the entire Administrative Authority. But 
 it was insufficient in two respects. It was lacking in the pro- 
 visions necessary to keep the branches dependent upon the will 
 of the Common Superior for guidance ; and it was lacking in 
 provisions necessary to enable The Electorate to maintain its 
 integrity as a controlling agency over The Government. 
 
 Usurpation of Official Function. The Constituted Authority 
 of a Commonwealth is that body of administrative law which 
 among other things is intended to properly regulate the action of 
 public officials. But if in that body of law the Constituted Au- 
 thorities are not mentioned by their official names, and if the 
 official function of each office and the methods of procedure of 
 each official are not distinctly set forth, what is to prevent any 
 public official who is so minded from usurping functions belonging
 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE GOVERNMENT 123 
 
 to another office ; and how can The Commonwealth mtervene 
 immediately to prevent such action ? Without a system of action 
 enabling it to intervene quickly it is powerless to do so and it must 
 illogically defer the correction of administrative abuse. 
 
 But delay in the correction of abuse is dangerous ; for mean- 
 while some of the usurpations may continue, and may gradually 
 ripen into pernicious customs possessing a specious sanction. If, 
 tlirough the failure of The Commonwealth to intervene, an official 
 is 'permitted to misuse his office, not only is the intent of the creator 
 of that office frustrated but the proper function of its creator is 
 also usurped. Also, the power of the creator to control is weak- 
 ened because so long as The Common Superior permits the misuse 
 of an office it is bound by the permission and remains powerless 
 to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice which may proceed 
 from the misuse of authority. In such a case the permission 
 originates a custom ; and the custom, through making omissions 
 in the system operative, can change the intended operation of the 
 law. The custom may be illegal; but because it is permissible, 
 it overrides the intent of the law. 
 
 Let us take the present maladministration of the office of The 
 Speaker of The House as an example of the truth of the proposition 
 that prescribed methods are indispensable to the fruition of intent. 
 
 This office is purely ministerial in nature. Its possession was 
 intended to confer an honor ; but it was not intended to confer 
 the exercise of any other authority, or to carry with it the exercise 
 of any other power than that accorded to every presiding officer. 
 In theory, its occupant merely presides over the meetings of The 
 House. But because the people failed at the outset to clearly 
 define the duties of The Speaker and the manner in which they 
 should be performed, the entire character of the office has been 
 changed ; and, from being one of the inconspicuous and non- 
 executive offices in The Government it has come to be the seat of 
 and the means for the exercise of a dominant formative " Power" 
 that is foreign to the theory of our scheme of Government ; which 
 is not of the people ; which is not that of a true political leader or 
 of a statesman ; but which, on the other hand, is that of a puissant 
 partizan ; which is conferred by The Partizan Party ; and which 
 is often exerted by the individual who occupies the office for the 
 express purpose of furthering the interests of The Partizan Party, 
 using Congress as the means. 
 
 In Chapter XXI we shall see how this " Power " has been 
 developed and how the character of the office of The Speaker has
 
 124 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 been changed. At present attention is merely directed to the 
 possible misuse of political authority that may follow the failure 
 of The Sovereign to provide its Sovereign-units with definite and 
 compulsory methods for the use of authority conferred, and to 
 the further fact that the permitted abuse of political authority, 
 or office, has the effect of weakening the ability of The Sovereign 
 to control the action of its agent. This leads us naturally to the 
 consideration of another characteristic phenomenon of American 
 administrative action. 
 
 " Friction between Governmental Branches" : In most of our 
 political writings we are told that there is constant " friction" be- 
 tween the " branches " in The Government ; that the " branches " 
 are continually encroaching upon the province of the others ; 
 that this encroachment is watched with jealousy ; that it is con- 
 stantly resisted by each " branch" because " an observance of the 
 division of authority is considered essential to the maintenance 
 of our form of government " ; that the encroachment by one 
 "branch" and the resistance by another "branch" produces a 
 " friction between the branches " that not only hampers and 
 impedes satisfactory action by The Government, but sometimes 
 brings action to a standstill. What is the nature of this friction, 
 how has it become possible, and what is its immediate cause ? 
 
 Mr. Gold win Smith attributed its existence to an " unnatural 
 separation of the executive from the legislative power." But it 
 is difficult to perceive how friction can exist between " powers " 
 whether they are separated or not; and friction can not exist 
 between " separated " powers, no matter how unnaturally they 
 were separated. He goes on to say in substance — for the quota- 
 tion is from memory — that " the separation of the executive 
 from the legislative power is a dream, although Montesquieu has 
 established a belief that it is one of the securities of liberty." But 
 it is patent that there can not be friction between political •powers; 
 that political friction can only exist between individuah or bodies 
 of individuals; and that it can not exist between them unless they 
 use these powers either illogically or immorally, or both ways. 
 Here then is an important distinction to be noted. The friction 
 does not exist between the branches, but between the individuals 
 who fill the branch offices ; and we are forced to conclude that 
 Mr. Smith meant that the successful separate exercise of these 
 powers by separate bodies of individuals was a dream, and there- 
 fore impracticable, and therefore to be abandoned. But is it 
 impracticable? Is this conclusion conclusive? Why is not such
 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE GOVERNMENT 125 
 
 exercise perfectly practicable provided governmental officials and 
 bodies of officials while engaged in the exercise of separate au- 
 thorities are bound by clear and distinct statements of official 
 functions and methods of action? Does not the practicability 
 of a system depend entirely upon its perfection? On the other 
 hand, an imperfect or an insufficient system can do nothing else 
 but afford opportunities for impractical results. 
 
 Mr. Smith says the original separation was " unnatural." As 
 a matter of fact it was only impracticable because it was performed 
 so indefinitely and so incompletely. For instance : the phraseology 
 of the original broad grants of authority (which every succeeding 
 State has followed) shows that each branch in The Government 
 was considered as if it were merely one single office. This was an 
 error in judgment as far as the legislative branch is concerned 
 because the legislature is composed of two distinct sets of officials 
 who have different, distinct, and often conflicting functions to 
 perform. It was also more of a mistake in those States where 
 several higher elective officials besides the governor are elected by 
 ballot. The Senate was devised to act as a check upon possible 
 hasty action by the lower chamber. The other higher executive 
 officials were elected partly to prevent a too great or unwise 
 concentration of authority in the hands of one individual. Here 
 were distinct ideas to be made smoothly operative. How was 
 that possible unless the special action of each office was distinctly 
 regulated and the action of all correlated together into a working 
 system? But no such general system was constructed, and the 
 only way by which the commonwealths sought to secure proper 
 individual action from the higher officials in either branch was to 
 require from each an oath to faithfully discharge the special 
 authorities of an office the duties of which had not been fuUy 
 prescribed. This in eft'ect was an attempt by the commonwealths 
 to secure individual responsibility under a broad grant of col- 
 lective authority that was silent as to the manner in which separate 
 individuals were to exercise the separate authorities of their offices. 
 
 The commonwealths were thus left without either a rule by 
 which to gauge official action or a means by which to control it. 
 Not having expressed their wills fully, and at the same time having 
 bestowed the exercise of some discretion upon their public servants, 
 they were unable to keep their servants in the necessary degree of 
 subjection, and ultimately they found themselves in the position 
 of a man who has imprudently given another a general power of 
 attorney when a special power should have been conferred.
 
 126 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Opportunity for Misuse of Authority. If, when the separation 
 of the exercise of authority is made, no definite provisions for its 
 exercise exist, then the opportunity is presented for the intro- 
 duction and use, let us say, of Partizan Party objects and customs. 
 The effect upon public officials of introducing " Party " objects 
 and customs is to leave them in uncertainty, doubt, and confusion 
 regarding their proper ofiicial action ; and this is so especially if 
 they owe their position in part to the efforts of a Partizan Party. 
 If while in office the " power " of a " Party " bears stronger upon 
 an individual than the Power of The Electorate does, then in- 
 dividual officials will give way before the former, especially if its 
 exercise is a permitted factor in administrative action. 
 
 It is a matter of fact that " Party " power and customs have 
 been introduced into the scheme of Official Action. It is a matter 
 of history that immediately upon this introduction officials began 
 encroaching upon rights belonging to offices not their own ; not 
 so much for the purpose of merely exercising a political authority 
 not their own, but for the express purpose of building up and 
 increasing " Party Power." Departmental authority and " Party 
 Power " conflicted ; and quite naturally " friction " at once ensued 
 between officials who on the one hand attempted to exercise 
 departmental authority as ordained and those who on the other 
 hand attempted to exercise " Party Power." 
 
 Separation of The Electorate from the Direct Exercise of Power. 
 The " Friction" that ensued was not " Friction between the 
 Branches " nor was it originally caused by any " unnatural " 
 degree of " Independence between the Branches." It was, how- 
 ever, caused by another and most dangerous " separation " which 
 The Partizan Party was mstrumental in bringing about ; namely, 
 the separation of a part of the exercise of The Reserved Powers 
 of Administration from the hands of The Electorate. 
 
 After this unnatural separation was accomplished The Partizan 
 Party assumed the exercise of the " powers " thus separated ; and 
 it is this permitted exercise which creates in branch-officials an 
 unnatural degree of " independence " from control by their rightful 
 Common Superior ; and which has changed The Government into 
 an agency for the exercise of Party Power. The Government was 
 designed as an agency for putting some of the Political Power of 
 The People into operation for some Political Purposes ; and it 
 can not work smoothly so long as its individual members are 
 subjected to the application of " Party power " for the accomplish- 
 ment of " Party purposes."
 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE GO\TRNMENT 127 
 
 Control of. The Government was designed as a subordinate as- 
 sisting administrative agency of The Electorate. As such it was 
 supposed to be at all times under the control of the electorate. 
 At present it is not wholly under such control. Briefly, the loss 
 of control by the electorate has come about through permitting 
 The Partizan Party to control the performance of some of the 
 Processes of Administration. 
 
 As a result of permission given in this direction the electorate 
 has failed to maintain its integrity as The Sovereign. It no longer 
 directly exercises all of those powers which it was created to 
 exercise and which it alone can rightfully exercise. It is no 
 longer the sole " Superior " of The Government because The 
 Partizan Party is permitted to share that position with it and to 
 discharge some of the functions of that position. 
 
 What has made this unnatural separation possible? In what 
 does the beginning of this unnatural and actually immoral abdi- 
 cation of Sovereignty lie ? Given an acceptable policy, acceptable 
 principles of action ; acknowledged powers and rights, and an 
 honest desire to produce through right action the " Blessings of 
 Liberty," where else is the original cause for the present loss of 
 the political power of The Electorate to be found if it be not in 
 the original absence of appropriate and compulsory methods by 
 which the direct exercise of all of The Reserved Powers of Adminis- 
 tration could be maintained inviolate in the hands of the electorate ? 
 With a fundamental and obligatory system of methods which se- 
 cured absolute freedom and equality of power to each individual 
 elector while engaged in the transaction of every act by which 
 sovereignty is expressed, what but a faulty administrative system 
 — unless it be an unthinkable absence of public spirit in the great 
 majority of the electorate — could prevent united action on the 
 part of the electorate in defense of its powers and rights? With 
 a logical and comprehensive system of methods how could the 
 exercise of a part of its rightful powers be dislodged from its hands ? 
 
 But on the other hand, and supposing The Commonwealth to 
 have constructed a system which leaves private individuals free 
 to devise administrative expedients and unbound to use only 
 logical methods, then does it not become possible for the more 
 selfish, shrewd, and individually powerful to devise counterfeit 
 "methods" and to succeed in having them adopted? And if 
 they are adopted, will not their use in the end produce a counterfeit 
 Electoral Action amounting to a separation of the electorate from 
 the proper exercise of some or of many of its powers, and also
 
 128 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 amounting in the end to the destruction of its power to wholly 
 control The Government ? 
 
 The adoption and use of illogical and partizan methods of 
 Electoral Action is exactly what has transpired in the American 
 Commonwealths. And it has transpired solely because there was 
 nothing in the original political action of The Commonwealths 
 to prevent it. If, however, we look back at the times when the 
 American colonists instituted their State Governments and 
 realize the paucity of precedents then existing regarding electoral 
 action, we cannot be surprised that The Fathers failed to antici- 
 pate the possibility that an extra-constitutional and permanent 
 partizan association of voters would develop within the electorate ; 
 would ultimately absorb the exercise of the political power of some 
 of its members ; would usurp the discharge of some of the func- 
 tions of the electorate ; would become the moving force in The 
 Government and would exploit administration in its own interests 
 through introducing partizan objects and partizan methods as the 
 Rule of Action both in and out of The Government. But all this 
 has happened ; and it is this exercise by the Partizan Party of 
 unconstitutional and undemocratic " Power " over individual 
 Electors which produces the so-called " friction between the 
 branches " of The Government as this, that, or the other " Party " 
 drives its members in the branches to encroachments upon sepa- 
 rated authorities in order to supply it with further " Power " in 
 the form of opportunity. This is the true cause of the observable 
 friction, and not the supposed fact that under the ordained control 
 of their rightful Common Superior these branches are, either from 
 the nature of political power or of the requirements of its exer- 
 cise under a Representative Form of Government, incapable of 
 harmonious action. 
 
 Under the Partizan Party System the whole administrative 
 agency, being dependent upon the will of an unnatural Common 
 Superior for motive force, and being wrongfully energized, 
 directed, and controlled, must of necessity work unnaturally, 
 illogically, and inharmoniously together ; and must also of neces- 
 sity, but in perfect consistency to the illogical system of action, 
 produce administration that is in part destructive of individual 
 justice and liberty. From this ignoble and contemptible electoral 
 situation there is but one avenue of escape. The Electorate must 
 either provide itself with, or must have provided for it, such a 
 system of methods of electoral action as will enable its members 
 through the absolutely free exercise of their public powers to
 
 POLITICAL AGENCIES, THE GOVERNMENT 129 
 
 resume the full discharge of their public trust. In this work all 
 of the individuals of the community, whether members of The 
 Electorate or not, are entitled to a voice and to active participa- 
 tion. The Community is the superior of The Electorate in the 
 same way that The Electorate is the superior of The Government ; 
 but The Community can not make its governmental regime fully 
 operative and stable unless it first makes The Electorate act 
 according to the principles of action that were originally ordained 
 by community action.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 POLITICAL MEANS AND POLITICAL METHODS 
 
 We have now reached a part of this subject-matter where it 
 becomes necessary to define exactly what is meant in this book by 
 the terms " PoHtical Means " and " PoHtical Methods." 
 
 We have seen that theoretically the people employ two distinct 
 groups of individuals in the transaction of their political work; 
 namely, The Electorate and The Government. 
 
 Each of these collective bodies has its ovrn distinct sphere of 
 action and each has its own distinct political function to discharge. 
 Individual action within each of these bodies produces certain 
 distinct political results, and the final collective action of each 
 goes far towards determining the character of the political admin- 
 istration of any given period. 
 
 Each of these bodies might, in one sense, be considered as a 
 means to an end. But these groups are more than a mere means. 
 The term if applied to them does not sufiiciently describe them; 
 and inasmuch as a means is generally understood to be a some- 
 thing which is employed in the doing of things, while these groups 
 are themselves the active doers of the things required of them by 
 the people, I have given them the distinctive name of Political 
 Agencies. 
 
 The function of an agency is to act. The function of a means 
 used by an agency is to assist the agency either to accomplish its 
 full purpose or to accomplish some specific object necessary for 
 that purpose. 
 
 Considered as an administrative agent, the function of the 
 electorate is, briefly, to provide an administrative policy; to fill 
 governmental offices ; and to control the action of public officials 
 during a period of administration. Each of these specific objects 
 may, for the purpose of illustration, be called secondary objects 
 inasmuch as they each contribute to but do not separately 
 constitute the sole object of political action by the people. 
 
 130
 
 POLITICAL MEANS AND POLITICAL METHODS 131 
 
 The attainment of each of these separate results constitutes in 
 itself a separate stage of political action ; and the completion of 
 each stage is reached through the transaction of several prelimi- 
 nary matters or steps of action which lead up, one after another, 
 to the final accomplishment of each definite result. 
 
 Theoretically, each of these preliminary steps is supposed to 
 be taken by the individual either independently by himself or 
 when acting in conjunction with others. In transacting this 
 work the individual is expected to avail himself of certain helpful 
 instrumentalities, the object of which is to bestow force, efficiency, 
 definiteness, and propriety to such individual political action. 
 
 Theoretically, the work of the agency is the result of the work 
 of the individuals who compose it ; and the appliances and in- 
 strumentalities serve to produce the proper, true, and efficient 
 agency-action through producing in the first place proper con- 
 certed individual action in the various steps and stages of agency- 
 action. 
 
 A collective political agent must necessarily act as a collective 
 political unit ; and in this book the term " Means" will be defined 
 as any instrumentality by the help of which the properly concerted 
 action of an agency is obtained. ]Means differ from methods in 
 that the latter relate more especially to the way in which independ- 
 ent individual action should be properly performed. 
 
 In transacting the distinctive work connected with the accom- 
 plishment of each of the secondary objects above mentioned the 
 individual does not use the same identical instrumentalities and 
 appliances. Each stage of political action requires the use of 
 distinctive instrumentalities. All of the appliances and instrumen- 
 talities taken together constitute the system of means to be used. 
 Some one means may be used for the accomplishment of some one 
 step in political action, and others, or combination of others, will 
 be used in other steps. So regarded, it is quite possible to con- 
 sider the aid used in any one stage of political action as a second- 
 ary means for the accomplishment of a secondary object. 
 
 A Means : The term "means," used in the sense of a "means to 
 an end," may be defined as the appliance, or instrumentality, or 
 combination, by the orderly use of which a definite result is brought 
 about. 
 
 But the instrumentalities which we are at present considering 
 are those which are connected with the exercise of political power 
 or of political authority ; and any means by which a political 
 result is attained must necessarily possess a distinctive political
 
 132 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 applicability, characteristic, and peculiar fitness ; and it is this 
 which distinguishes it from all other means as a political means 
 for a political end. 
 
 Under our theory of political administration each Common- 
 wealth is supposed to possess a comprehensive system of political 
 administration composed of means and methods which completely 
 and properly regulate the exercise of administrative power for 
 every specific object for which that power is to be used, and which 
 has received the sanction of approval from The People. Such is 
 not the fact ; but such is the theory. 
 
 A Political Means : Taking the theory and the ultimate object 
 of our political administration into consideration, our political 
 means — using the term in the plural — are the several ordained 
 instrumentalities by the aid of which the Principles of the State 
 Polity are continually made operative by our political agencies in 
 the conduct of public and of private affairs. 
 
 But, as we have said, there are many specific, secondary, and 
 mutually supportive objects to be attained before final action in 
 any administrative period is reached, and theoretically we employ 
 several distinct and servient means for their accomplishment 
 which will be readily recognized under the titles of The Ballot, 
 The Ballot Box, Organization, Leadership, Political Majorities, 
 Political Parties, Representation, and so on. 
 
 Viewed from the standpoint of theory, each of the above-named 
 instrumentalities or modes of specific action play their distinctive 
 part in the attainment of the several successive and secondary 
 results above mentioned ; and I have chosen to distinguish these 
 several modes of action by the names of a " Political Means," so 
 that my readers may experience no difficulty or confusion in 
 determining just what is meant in this book by this term. 
 
 Defined. For our purposes, therefore, a political means is de- 
 fined as a subsidiary or auxiliary instrumentality which assists 
 in the transaction of any specific part of the whole political work 
 of an ordained Political Agency. 
 
 Character of. But because The Commonwealth is professedly 
 taking right political action, a political means must necessarily 
 be one by which political action can be taken properly. The 
 means must be one that accords in spirit with the fundamental 
 principles of democratic association. It must also be one that 
 makes democratic rules of action fully operative ; and that pro- 
 duces the ordained exercise of political power and of political 
 authority.
 
 POLITICAL MEANS AND POLITICAL METHODS 133 
 
 Any means which does not possess this character and pecuHar 
 effectiveness is, under our theory of government, an illogical one. 
 The use of an illogical means may serve to make the transaction 
 of political work easier to the individual because it does not keep 
 him strictly up to the line of moral civic conduct ; but the mere 
 use of an illogical means cannot in itself bestow upon it the char- 
 acter of a political means, for the latter ranks as an element in the 
 moral strength of The Commonwealth through promoting moral 
 political action. 
 
 Conversely, an illogical political means is an element in the 
 moral weakness of The Commonwealth because its use will pro- 
 duce illogical, and therefore ineffectual and improper political 
 action. 
 
 At present much of our political, action is startlingly ineffectual 
 in many respects. This, in a measure, is due to the character of 
 the means we employ in our political work. For instance : the 
 illogical means that we are using at present do not assist in main- 
 taining the free exercise of political power in the hands of the 
 elector. They do not assist The Electorate in controlling the 
 exercise by public officials of political authority. Quite the con- 
 trary. Those of my readers who through experience have become 
 initiated in the " practical " politics of the day, know that the 
 means in present use which are called Organization, Leadership, 
 Political Parties, etc., are gross travesties of their true originals. 
 By the " Party " partizans they are hypocritically proclaimed as 
 " Political Means." By the uninformed they are heedlessly 
 accepted as such. The only trace which they possess of a political 
 nature springs from the fact that they are used in our political 
 action ; but when they are put into operation, they produce 
 partizan action and injustice in the place of political action and 
 justice ; and to the use of these perverted means we can reasona- 
 bly attribute much of the discordance which exists between our 
 political theory and our political practise. 
 
 These means, in their present shape, are the finished and de- 
 veloped products of The Partizan Party. They have been fur- 
 nished to us for use by The Partizan Party, since it, as George 
 Bernard Shaw would say, was made the Savior of American 
 Democracy by universal hallucination. 
 
 If I have succeeded in making my meaning clear, a Political 
 Means will appear as any instrumentality or mode of orderly 
 action which properly assists a Political Agency to the right 
 exercise of its collective political power or political authority for
 
 134 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 the accomplishment of its specific part of the work of poHtical 
 administration. It is more especially an aid to proper action that 
 is to be taken by a group of individuals acting together as a unit. 
 This characteristic distinguishes a means from other modes of 
 action which in effect regulate the way in which separate individual 
 action is to be taken. We shall have to consider several of such 
 means as are now in use, in the chapters immediately succeeding 
 this one. 
 
 Method : Turning now to a consideration of the way in which 
 right political action is to be obtained from the individual when 
 acting in the capacity of an independent Sovereign-unit. 
 
 Ordinarily a method is defined as a regular manner of doing 
 anything. Manner means literally the handling of a thing ; and 
 regularity in handling anything implies a generally accepted order 
 in the process by which a desired result is obtained. 
 
 Concerned as we are in the investigation of the proper exercise 
 either of individual power or of political power for political pur- 
 poses, it is necessary to limit the general meaning of the term 
 somewhat ; and methods will be defined as the regular manner 
 in which either individual power is used to accomplish individual 
 results, or political power and authority is used to accomplish 
 political results. 
 
 Where individual power is exercised for the satisfaction of purely 
 individual desires, the methods are individual in character. Such 
 methods are usually the outcome of experience. They have been 
 devised and adopted, and are used by the individual — when 
 acting as a social or economic unit — because they add the greatest 
 possible efficiency to his effort. 
 
 Where, however, political power or political authority is 
 exercised for the satisfaction of political desires, the methods are 
 necessarily political in character; and the point to be noted here 
 is, that theoretically, and with us, the methods are supposed to 
 be devised by the Collective Sovereign for the use of the individual 
 when he is acting in a political capacity. 
 
 In either case, the desire for the happiness which accompanies 
 a self-produced welfare requires that the method shall be such as 
 puts the power into operation with the greatest possible effect and 
 with the least possible hindrance or friction. 
 
 System : Comparatively few human results are accomplished 
 nowadays by the use of one single method standing alone by 
 itself. Social and economic operations are more or less complex. 
 Usually methods are combined with one or more mechanical
 
 POLITICAL MEANS AND POLITICAL METHODS 135 
 
 appliances or means which aid the process ; and the inchisive 
 means, methods, and order of action constitutes the system of 
 operation. 
 
 This fact is exemphfied by the common use of such terms as 
 " agricultural systems," " business systems," " educational sys- 
 tems," " political systems," etc. Each system has its own dis- 
 tinctive methods; thus we speak of "agricultural methods," 
 "business methods," " educational methods," "political methods," 
 etc. 
 
 The powers utilized or used may be either natural power, 
 individual power, or political power; but the point to be kept in 
 mind is, that in either case the character of the methods to be 
 used is determined beforehand by the specific result sought for. 
 
 Generally speaking, the methods that will produce one distinct 
 result will not produce another. For instance : pure business 
 methods — being those used in competition — will not produce 
 pure political results ; which results, in free communities, proceed 
 from harmonious cooperation. 
 
 Political Methods : From this we perceive that political 
 methods must of necessity differ from all other methods in function, 
 character, purpose, and effect. 
 
 To function properly a political method must assist in making 
 the exercise of some one or another of the component parts of our 
 political power fully operative for its specific purpose. 
 
 In character, a political method must reflect the spirit of the 
 original Principles of Association, and also the intent of The 
 Commonwealth. 
 
 During any period of administration the individual has several 
 distinct political objects to accomplish. Each object is accom- 
 plished by the aid of its distinctive means and methods. Depend- 
 ing upon the specific work to be done, and summed up briefly, let 
 us say that the purpose of any given political method may be 
 either to produce equality in the political action of individuals; 
 or regularity, order, and similarity in the performance by individu- 
 als of a political duty that is common to all ; or certainty and 
 definiteness in the desired result; and lastly, the method must be 
 such as will produce freedom in individual political action through 
 the exclusion of influences which, under our governmental agree- 
 ment, are considered improper. 
 
 Finally, in effect, every political method should contribute 
 towards the maintenance within the territorial limits of The 
 Commonwealth of its chosen conditions of individual existence.
 
 136 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Function of Method. The function of any individual method in 
 a mechanical operation is to make some power fully operative. 
 But ahead of the operative process there exists an intent to reach 
 a definite result. In all mechanical operations there is a most 
 intimate relation existing between intent, method, and result ; 
 and unless the mechanical method be right, the mechanical result 
 will not be that intended. 
 
 What is true in this respect concerning a mechanical operation 
 is equally true regarding a political operation. If anything, 
 there is a more intimate relation between political intent, political 
 methods, and political results, because the element of morality 
 is included in the operation. 
 
 Expanding the general definition of function as given above to 
 fit political action, let us say that the function 6f any given political 
 method is to make some part of the political power fully operative 
 for its specific purpose. In order to make a political power fully 
 operative we have to take its intent into consideration ; and this 
 element of intent naturally predetermines the character of the 
 method. Of course political power can be used even in the 
 absence of right methods of action. It is easily possible to make 
 a political power partially operative by substituting an expedient 
 in the place of a logical means or a logical method ; but if an 
 expedient is used, then the result can never be that which was 
 originally intended. 
 
 The intent of each American Commonwealth is to maintain 
 within its territorial limits those certain conditions of individual 
 existence which it calls Freedom, Liberty, Equality, and Justice. 
 Each Commonwealth has ordained their existence and main- 
 tenance. Each has adopted its own peculiar way of maintaining 
 these conditions, which w^ay differs in details from that of the 
 others ; but in all of the States the general intent of the people 
 was to maintain what each Commonwealth conceived was indi- 
 vidual Freedom, Liberty, Equality, and Justice. Each Common- 
 wealth has defined these terms in the same general way and has 
 given to these definitions the name and force of Political Prin- 
 ciples ; and it is to these general principles as ordained that we 
 must look for the intent of the people. These principles, when 
 adopted, were expressed in broad terms. No attempt was made 
 to distinguish sharply between freedom, and economic freedom, 
 and political freedom, or to show in detail how either of these 
 varieties of freedom should be exercised or be preserved through 
 individual action. The general idea of the principle was supposed
 
 POLITICAL MEANS AND POLITICAL METHODS 137 
 
 to be accepted by the people as a whole and individuals were 
 supposed to be governed by the general idea when acting in any 
 capacity; but the detail manner by which individuals were to 
 exercise and to maintain these several forms of freedom was, 
 with few exceptions, left to be worked out by the people in the 
 future. 
 
 Looked at from this standpoint, Political Principles, expressing 
 as they do the general intent of the people of any State, are the 
 underlying moving forces in political action. 
 
 Couched as they are in the form of broad generalizations, they 
 can do no more than indicate the kind or character of action 
 which the individual is to take when transacting the work con- 
 nected with any given step or stage of political action. 
 
 Political Principles the Touchstone of Political Methods. But 
 inasmuch as political principles do indicate the kind of action 
 which is expected of individuals, they become the sole touchstone 
 of political methods ; for we can always judge correctly of the 
 propriety or of the impropriety of any given political method by 
 first ascertaining whether the method in use gives full and logical 
 efFect to some one or another of our political principles. 
 
 Theoretically, the individual power which we use in political 
 action, or the political power which we are entitled to use, is 
 always used solely for the purpose of putting our political prin- 
 ciples into effective operation. The function of a political princi- 
 ple is to declare the general intent of political action. The function 
 of a political method is to make that intent fully operative. If 
 the general intent of political action is clearly stated, then the 
 general character of individual political action, whether taken 
 with others, or by oneself, is indicated beforehand. But what 
 is it that in the end absolutely determines the character of such 
 action when taken beyond any possibility of a doubt? Not the 
 principles, not the declaration of intent, but the means and the 
 methods of individual action which are used, and through the use 
 of which alone the full intent of the principles can either be evaded 
 or made operative. 
 
 The relations which exist between intent and method, or to 
 put it more specifically the relations which exist between any 
 political principle and any political method, is one of the most 
 interesting as well as important subjects for investigation. So 
 far as I know, this subject, as it relates to proper political action 
 on our part, has never received any consideration worthy of the 
 name ; but a master hand might pen a book on this theme that
 
 138 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 would be of inestimable service to the American People, not to 
 mention humanity at large. 
 
 Take one example of this relation by way of illustration : drop- 
 ping the word " intent" and substituting for it the term " political 
 freedom " as generally expressive of intent concerning political 
 action. If individuals are to remain free as ordained through 
 their own free political action ; if they are to transmit this or- 
 dained freedom and accompanying felicity to their posterity, 
 then is it not indispensably necessary that they have and use only 
 such methods as enable them at all times and for all purposes to 
 act freely in a political capacity ? Freedom, or immunity from 
 oppressive government, has been ordained as a condition of 
 existence ; and political freedom, or freedom of will and judgment, 
 has been ordained as a condition of individual political action. 
 The individual has been made politically free, so that he, at all 
 times, may use his reason, conscience, and will -in the endeavor to 
 maintain and to perpetuate the condition of freedom as ordained. 
 Theoretically, he assists in perpetuating freedom by transmitting 
 to succeeding generations in the State the opportunity for all 
 citizens to act freely in a political capacity. 
 
 But if the individual uses, or has thrust upon him the use of, 
 any one single method of action by which his moral freedom is 
 impaired, or destroyed, then not only is his usefulness to the 
 State lessened but his action is changed in character and kind from 
 that originally ordained from him ; and if the use of such a 
 method is widespread or general, then the opportunity is presented 
 for an administrative action by the people that may be oppressive 
 to a greater or lesser extent. 
 
 Finally, if the individual acquiesces in the use of an illogical 
 method, and dies while it is in general use, then he has not helped 
 in the perpetuation of freedom ; but, on the contrary, he has 
 helped in perpetuating a condition of affairs under which in the 
 course of time the political rule may become either undemo- 
 cratically oppressive to some members of The Commonwealth 
 or productive of unjust privilege to others. 
 
 What is true of one political principle is true of all the others. 
 If individuals use methods of political action by which the force 
 of any political principle is lessened, or by which its intent is not 
 fully carried out, then the political action of such individuals 
 becomes different in kind from that originally intended ; and if 
 the use of illogical methods be general among the individuals, and 
 is persisted in by the people of a State, then The Commonwealth
 
 POLITICAL MEANS AND POLITICAL METHODS 139 
 
 will never be able to ascertain whether it is possible through 
 political administration to reap the benefits to humanity that were 
 promised through an adherence to its original Principles of Action. 
 
 But, as said before, political principles, standing by themselves 
 and unsupported by a rule of application, possess only a moral 
 force. Moral force resembles physical force in that both require 
 the aid of appropriate means and methods before either can be 
 made fully operative. The mere moral force of our governmental 
 agreement, however, is not in itself, and all of the time, strong 
 enough to cause all of the individuals in the community to make 
 the intent of our political principles fully operative through their 
 political action. Even the moral force of the principles of a 
 religious association requires a system of organized action. The 
 generality of individuals require the immediate compelling force 
 of a stated rule as an ever present stimulus to right action. The 
 same is true of political action ; and the function of a political 
 method is to make the intent of a political principle fully operative 
 through individual action ; and, in passing, because only the 
 Collective Sovereign can make its individual sovereign-units act 
 rightly in the exercise of political power, the political methods, 
 or the system of political methods, should be devised, accepted, 
 and ordained as a Law by The People. 
 
 Now we exercise our political power in a distinctive way. We 
 attempt to make the intent of our political principles fully opera- 
 tive through a serial exercise of the component parts of our Powers 
 of Administration at different times in a period of administration, 
 and for certain definite and distinct objects. Our purpose in 
 exercising some of the parts of our political power ahead of the 
 others is to continually prepare the situation for the proper 
 exercise of the remaining parts. The various subservient or 
 secondary objects worked for are attained in a regular order of 
 succession ; and each of these specific objects is, in turn, accom- 
 plished through the performance by individuals of several separate 
 and distinct series of political actions. 
 
 Defined. If the above brief statement of the peculiar function 
 of a political method is correct, then we may define a political 
 method as the ordained manner in which the intent of any part 
 of the inclusive political power is made fully operative for its 
 specific purpose through individual action. 
 
 Under this definition there can be but one right or logical 
 method ; namely, that which makes the intent of the action fully 
 operative, and neither more, and neither less.
 
 140 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Non-political Methods. Any method which does not produce 
 this result must necessarily produce a result other than the one 
 intended. Such methods, no matter how they get into use, must 
 be excluded from the category of political methods, because their 
 use makes the individual do either more or less than it was orig- 
 inally intended he should do. 
 
 Such methods can only be properly considered as makeshifts, 
 expedients, customs, usages, practices, and so on. We should 
 habitually think of them as such and call them so as an aid to 
 right thinking. We discriminate constantly between non- 
 political and true political methods by the daily use of the term 
 " Party methods " ; thus betraying consciousness of the fact that 
 " Party methods " are those which have received the sanction of 
 " Party " approval, and not the sanction flowing from a free 
 exercise of The Legislative Power by the people. 
 
 The character of a " Party method " is not changed by calling 
 it a political method, or by the mere fact that it is used in adminis- 
 trative action. Xor does the fact that the Collective Sovereign 
 has given its units permission to use " Party methods " change 
 them into true political methods, for the latter are such as tend 
 to produce the intended use of political power and political author- 
 ity, while " Party methods " are such as tend to pervert the intent. 
 
 Importance of Correct Methods. The effectiveness of the political 
 principles of a free Commonwealth depends not so much upon the 
 intent of the people, or upon their desire for good administration, 
 as upon the way in which its individuals act ; and this in turn 
 depends very largely upon the appropriateness of the methods by 
 which their principles are applied. 
 
 Political principles merely declare the intent of administrative 
 work; methods, however, make that intent operative or not as 
 the case may be. The People at Large may continue to be infused 
 with and animated by the Spirit of their First Principles, but 
 unless they possess the assistance of logical methods their admin- 
 istrative action must as of course prove more or less ineffective ; 
 the degree of ineffectiveness bearing a close ratio to the pre- 
 ponderance of improper methods. 
 
 Political Administration. The rightful application, by The 
 Commonwealth, of its principles of action while managing pub- 
 lic and private affairs, is Political Administration. Economic 
 progress, however, constantly changes the face of affairs and the 
 relative power of individuals. As a consequence. The Common- 
 wealth is continually forced into a consideration of questions
 
 POLITICAL MEANS AND POLITICAL METHODS 141 
 
 relative to just actions by individuals. It has to do one of two 
 things. It must either reestablish the original relations between 
 individuals that have become disturbed, or it must establish, 
 under the new social and economic conditions, such new individual 
 relations as shall be in accord with the original principles of 
 association. 
 
 The Electorate exercises the initiative of The Commonwealth 
 in this work ; and because it is given the exercise of discretion it 
 is under the obligation to enforce right action from all of its own 
 members, for otherwise immoral and conspiratous action between 
 private citizens and public officials becomes possible. 
 
 A Rule of Right Action Indispensable. The success of Govern- 
 ment, like that of any venture, mainly depends upon right methods, 
 rightfully used. We, the people, are The Sovereign. It is we, 
 the people, who create the added opportunities for individual 
 development and happiness. We, the people, must preserve 
 them ; and we declare ourselves morally free in order to do so. 
 We are bound to act morall}'. 
 
 But right action cannot be definitely ascertained either in 
 the absence of a definite rule of action, or in the presence of an 
 indefinite rule of action. Hence the necessity for a logical and 
 comprehensive administrative system. 
 
 Kind of Methods Intended. At the first glance the connection 
 between successful administration and correct electorate methods 
 may not appear. But it becomes more apparent when we realize 
 two facts ; namely, first, that the forces which The Commonwealth 
 has to contend against are human ignorance, selfishness, and a 
 lack of public spirit in many of its individuals ; and second, that 
 methods which tend to minimize these forces, or which prevent 
 their organization by individuals into active factors in political 
 administration, are the ones calculated to produce the best admin- 
 istration. (See Mill, on " Effect of Methods," Chapter II, Rep- 
 resentative Government.) 
 
 At present our efforts do not produce either the required or 
 the desired kind of administrative action. Failing in this, we also 
 fail to produce all of the results to individuals which our form of 
 Government was instituted to secure. Admitting that our failure 
 may be due in part to inherent human weakness ; nevertheless, 
 if we are agreed concerning the kind of action to be taken by The 
 Commonwealth ; if we admit that the motive for taking such 
 action be pure ; that the objects to be obtained are beneficent ; 
 and that the power to enforce the required action is legitimate and
 
 142 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 sufficient, then where else should we naturally look next for an 
 explanation of the presence of a different kind of action from that 
 required if not into the character and kind of methods which we 
 use. 
 
 Our reasons for requiring free, direct, and independent action 
 from electors, whether in or out of office, are based on our knowledge 
 of human nature and of past political experiences. Succinctly 
 they are as follows. Government is instituted by us to impart 
 permanence to The Commonwealth, and to secure permanence in 
 individual welfare and happiness. True happiness consists in 
 the satisfaction of moral desires. True welfare is best safe- 
 guarded by the welfare of others. But the force of these truths 
 is not sufficiently strong to dominate all individual action. The 
 desire in the average individual to promote the General Welfare 
 does not compare in strength to the desire to promote personal 
 advancement or material welfare. The satisfaction of this latter 
 desire, if unchecked, will before long so unsettle the relations of 
 individuals to each other as to render it impossible for them to 
 live together in happiness. Unhappiness produces discord and 
 division ; and this, if long continued, finally results in the dis- 
 memberment of society. This means social death, which society 
 strives against as the individual strives against his own death ; and 
 as the individual resorts to correct food and proper exercise to 
 prolong his life, so does society resort to correct means and proper 
 methods of action to prolong its existence. 
 
 Now as to the kind of methods originally intended. It is rec- 
 ognized and admitted that no mere method of action is of itself 
 capable of producing moral action. Nor is the mere ordination 
 of the use of any system of methods, however correct, capable of 
 this. But there is value in methods, for it is admitted that the 
 method which prescribes a free, independent, and direct exercise 
 of the Powers of Administration is the kind of method under 
 which the acts of the individual are most easily observed; and 
 therefore is the one under which his responsibility to act morally 
 — that is, in accord with the true intent of his governmental 
 agreement — can be most speedily enforced by The Common- 
 wealth. It is also recognized that any other kind of method than 
 the one just described will, if used, enable an individual to more 
 easily evade his moral responsibility in part or in whole, and will 
 also afford him greater opportunity, if he is that way inclined, to 
 satisfy his selfish desires at the expense of his fellows ; but also at 
 the risk of creating destructive discord in society.
 
 POLITICAL MEANS AND POLITICAL METHODS 143 
 
 Consequently, and to enable The Commonwealth to more easily 
 detect, effectually prevent, and speedily punish such infractions 
 of the general moral obligation, it must have the means for securing 
 a direct and easily observable exercise of the Powers of Adminis- 
 tration from each elector whether he is in or out of office. 
 
 Danger in Two Sets of Methods. The Commonwealth is con- 
 tinually striving to secure exact Justice to its individuals during 
 a rapid progress of society and development of the individual. 
 In doing this it employs methods that are intended to produce 
 proper Leadership, Organization, Legislation, Representation, 
 Control, and so on. All of its methods when taken together are 
 intended to assist it to produce a free formation, ascertainment, 
 expression, application, and enforcement of a rightfully animated 
 Will of The People. 
 
 If its intent is to be realized, then all of its various methods must 
 harmonize, correlate, mutually support, and complement each 
 other. The Commonwealth should not have in its administrative 
 system some methods, or a set of methods like " Party methods," 
 which, when put into use, offset the effects produced by the use of 
 whatever true political methods there may be ; for if it does, 
 then its administrative action must partake necessarily of the 
 uncertainty, the indefiniteness, the inefficiency, the delay, and the 
 contradictions that always flow from the use of two sets of incon- 
 gruous methods in one operation. In the readjustment of social 
 equilibrium we, the people, are constantly called on to support old 
 methods or to adopt new ones. The welfare of our society, the 
 true welfare of its individuals, and possibly the welfare of humanity 
 at large may hinge on our right action at such times. It is not 
 enough that we possess the Power and the Right to administer 
 restraint coupled with an acceptable State Polity and theoretically 
 correct political agencies. These, of themselves, will not produce 
 the results aimed at. It is we, the individuals of The Common- 
 wealth acting together, who produce results. Consequently, we 
 must have a proper and a homogeneous working system or our 
 agencies cannot be made to perform their theoretical duties. For 
 instance : The Government does not work automatically. As an 
 agency it requires constant energizing and direction from the Will 
 of The People. And because the exercise of political authority, if 
 left improperly guarded, will be grasped by individuals who 
 (entirely irrespective of their morality) are most capable or most 
 anxious to wield it, and because The Government will respond as 
 easily to an improper impulse as to a proper one (provided the
 
 144 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 improper impulse is called The Will of The People) , it is indispen- 
 sably incumbent upon us, if we wish to reap our ordained benefits, 
 to provide ourselves with methods that will tend to produce an 
 absolutely free formation of Public Opinion, and its direct appli- 
 cation by individuals to all questions and matters involved in 
 political administration. 
 
 Danger in Two Codes of Action. If, in political administration, 
 there are two sets of methods in use, then there exists, in effect, a 
 dual code of action. Our present administrative system contains 
 provisions under which the individual, while engaged in the various 
 processes of administration, is required to act solely in the capacity 
 of an elector; but it also contains provisions which permit him 
 and even compel him while so engaged to act in the capacity of a 
 mere Partizan Party Member. 
 
 Results. Through making Administrative Success depend upon 
 " Party Success" we have in effect offered an opportunity to 
 Sovereign-units to subordinate political obligations to partizan 
 party obligations. We have produced indirect action where 
 direct action was ordained. We have put a premium on dependent 
 action instead of on independent action. We have seriously 
 impaired the binding force of the ordained political obligations 
 of citizens and of officials. We have weakened the power of The 
 Commonwealth to enforce responsible action from electors and 
 from officials. Instead of The Will of The People we allow The 
 Will of A Partizan Party to act as The Impulse to The Government. 
 We fill the offices and positions in The Government with " Party 
 Workers," instead of filling them with true Political Leaders, 
 Statesmen, and Public-Spirited Men. We have passed the con- 
 trol over Governmental Work into the hands of A Partizan Party ; 
 and through failing in logical administrative action all along the 
 line we have failed to maintain in society those conditions of 
 individual existence which we as a people originally promised 
 humanity at large to maintain. 
 
 The Necessary Political Guarantee. The American Common- 
 wealths bestowed political freedom upon their Sovereign-units so 
 that they should be able to maintain these conditions continuously 
 through free individual administrative action. But the Common- 
 wealths have never taken adequate action to guarantee the 
 continued existence of individual political freedom or the oppor- 
 tunity for its exercise. 
 
 Apparently, We, the people, have forgotten that individual 
 Freedom, Liberty, and Equality as ordained can be maintained
 
 POLITICAL MEANS AND POLITICAL METHODS 145 
 
 in a Democracy only by free action on the part of those who 
 exercise political power and authority. Apparently we do not 
 realize that free action as ordained requires the support of a body 
 of compulsory law. Apparently we do not perceive as yet that 
 the exercise of political power and of political authority by the 
 individuals who compose a Collective Sovereign can never be 
 regulated properly except by The Collective Sovereign itself. 
 
 Requisites of. An adequate political guarantee of free individ- 
 ual administrative action, and of the opportunity for such action, 
 must possess the force that flows from direct action by The Col- 
 lective Sovereign. It must be composed of ways and methods 
 that are devised and ordained into use by The Collective Sovereign ; 
 and the ways and methods must be of a kind that enables each 
 Sovereign-unit to promote the general ivelfare freely in every step, 
 stage, and process of political administration. 
 
 Such action only is logical political action. Such methods only 
 are logical administrative methods. Such a Body of Adminis- 
 trative Law constitutes a guarantee beforehand to each Sovereign- 
 unit of the opportunity, at least, to take free administrative action 
 in the promotion of the general welfare as ordained ; but a Body 
 of Administrative Law that is devised for the people, or by any 
 agencv or association of individuals whatsoever which has in 
 immediate view other objects than the promotion of the general 
 welfare, is a sure guarantee of perverted administrative action. 
 
 The Specific Political Guarantee. Now the IMassachusetts 
 colonists ordained the existence of what they called their Body of 
 Liberties. But they failed to accompany such action with an 
 explicit statement as to how such liberties should be kept in 
 existence during their future political administration ; and, 
 ultimately, these liberties dwindled to distorts of their original 
 meanings because of the lack of support, and were supplanted 
 with antagonistic ideas, ^^^lat happened in Massachusetts is a 
 substantiation of the truth that the guarantee which is contained 
 alone in and by the mere act of adopting political principles as a 
 guide is too general to be of immediate or of effective assistance in 
 the attempt to prevent — or even to punish — a violation of 
 principle. But a logical method, as above defined, is a specific 
 guarantee that is immediately available and efi'ective because it is 
 comparatively easy to prove a violation of a specific legal pro- 
 vision if the attempt is made seriously. The Commonwealths, 
 lacking in sagacity, have failed to make their intent fully operative 
 mainly through failing to make their Sovereign-units act con-
 
 146 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 sistently. The Partizan Party, with sagacity to spare, has 
 succeeded in making its intent fully operative through making its 
 members act consistentl}". The Commonwealths can learn a 
 lesson in efficient and logical administrative action from The 
 Partizan Party. That body started out to control the exercise 
 of political power in The Electorate and to control the exercise of 
 political authority in The Government. Necessarily its members 
 were Sovereign-units. It had to teach its members to forget the 
 fact that they should act as Sovereign-units. It addressed itself 
 first to the construction of its own System of ]\Ianagement ; one 
 of its parts being the dogma of " Party Regularity." It defined 
 this dogma specifically as " Implicit Obedience to the Constituted 
 Authorities of the Partizan Party Organizations." Then, by an 
 inexorable application of this rule of action to its members while 
 they were engaged in matters of political administration, a partizan 
 party was enabled to preclude most of its members from a proper 
 exercise of The Reserved Powers of Administration in The Electo- 
 rate, and was always able to permit, and often able to compel, an 
 improper exercise of political authority in The Government. 
 
 The truth suggested by " Party Action" is this : if a partizan 
 party can secure improper action from the Sovereign-units of The 
 State by the construction, and the enforcement upon them, of 
 improper rules of administrative action, then surely The State 
 can secure proper action from its owti Sovereign-units by the 
 construction, and the enforcement on them of proper rules of 
 administrative action. 
 
 The Political .^gis : The idea of an actively-working and 
 protective power, influence, or instrumentality working from the 
 outside in favor of, or in the protection of the people, is as old as 
 The Nations. Its latest expression " Gott mit uns" is merely an 
 adaptation of the Israelitish idea of a Favorite Nation. It is a 
 dangerous idea in that it contains the germs of Special Privileges 
 and National Self-Conceit. 
 
 But under a Popular Form of Government, or where the people 
 decide for themselves what shall be considered just action, the 
 idea of the Political iEgis changes somewhat. It is no longer 
 considered as a protective instrumentality^ that exists and acts 
 from somewhere outside of the people. On the contrary! It 
 exists because it has been created by the people through an ex- 
 ercise of Volition : and its influence proceeds not from somewhere 
 outside of The State, but from the Moral Conscience and \Yill of 
 The Commonwealth.
 
 POLITICAL MEANS AND POLITICAL METHODS 147 
 
 Defined. The Political iEgis of a Free Commonwealth is, 
 therefore, the universally acclaimed and formally ordained state- 
 ment of the people as to the Objects for which Government is 
 established, and as to the way in which the " Benefits" of Govern- 
 ment shall be preserved, maintained, and perpetuated to the 
 successive generations that compose The State. But of the two 
 parts of the statement, the real Protective Law is contained in 
 the Body of Administrative Law. 
 
 Method of Action. In the olden days when a mythological God 
 was supposed to exert his favoring influence over a Nation, he 
 did so through protecting the action of its individuals. The 
 Political iEgis of to-day works in exactly the same way as of old ; 
 and where it is established by a people who understand the mean- 
 ings of their rights, powers, and conditions of existence, it pos- 
 sesses all the attributes of a mandate issuing from the Collective 
 Sovereign. 
 
 It aids The State to protect itself through affording protection 
 and aid to its individual Sovereign-units, while they are striving 
 to prevent the existence of Special Privileges and their accompany- 
 ing Injustices. 
 
 The Non-Political ^gis. But without the protection afforded 
 by such an ever easily invoked, clearly understood, and promptly 
 interposing political segis, or even with a political aegis that is 
 lacking in some of its necessary parts, the opportunity is always 
 presented to those who make Self-interest their rule of action for 
 the insidious commission of the gravest possible frauds on The 
 Individual and frauds on The Commonwealth. 
 
 We have seen how through insufficient initiatory action the 
 American Commonwealths left the opportunity open. We know 
 through daily reading and observation that many such frauds are 
 perpetrated at present. 
 
 Apparently, however, there are but few who realize the fact that 
 the several American Commonwealths, through permitting the 
 adoption and use of The Partisan Party System of Administration, 
 have, in effect, erected for themselves a Non-Political iEgis. 
 
 Apparently but few realize that it is the aid and protection 
 afforded by this Partizan ^Egis which makes the perpetration of 
 all forms of political fraud comparatively easy, and the prevention 
 thereof comparatively hard. 
 
 Apparently but few realize that political frauds are the progeni- 
 tors of industrial frauds, or that, under this partizan segis, any 
 Sovereign-unit who wishes to call the attention of The Common-
 
 148 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 wealth to the perpetration of well-known and easily observable 
 frauds on individual political sovereignty, and who wishes to have 
 The Commonwealth eliminate the opportunity for their per- 
 petration, is placed in a position where he can not help his Country 
 quickly, his State, or even himself and those with whom he is 
 immediately associated. 
 
 At every attempt he is hampered and delayed by The Partizan 
 Party acting as the defender of established illogical action. Say 
 he appeals for support to the meanings of the Principles of The 
 State Polity ! He can pursue two courses, neither of which is 
 certain and expeditious, and each of which is roundabout, ex- 
 pensive, and long drawn out. If he applies to The Courts for an 
 interpretation of meanings, then his appeal is to be decided by a 
 Judiciary that in most States is at present very largely composed 
 of party partizans, who, because of their promised partizanship, 
 or because of their indebtedness to the partizan parties, are more 
 or less unfitted to be impartial construers of political principles. 
 If, as the other course, he appeals directly to the people, then his 
 cause can be decided by the people only after a majority thereof 
 have been educated politically to a point enabling it to perceive the 
 frauds, the manner of their perpetration, and their consequences. 
 
 To conclude : the performance of every step, stage, and 
 process in Political Administration should be regulated by logical, 
 adequate, and minute Fundamental Law. And the reason is, 
 that without such law it is quite impossible to preserve even a 
 remote resemblance of political freedom to the individual elector 
 at any time, notwithstanding the fact that our Political Principles 
 call for the continuous existence of absolute political freedom for 
 the elector. 
 
 Our Duty to Posterity. Our duty to Posterity, to The State, 
 and to Humanity at Large, is to maintain, to perpetuate, and to 
 transmit the conditions of individual existence that were origi- 
 nally ordained to exist in The State. We cannot discharge this 
 duty now. Undemocratic conditions exist. Our Administrative 
 Methods prevent us. Working under them, we are forced to 
 transmit undemocratic conditions. 
 
 But if " Methods " can prevent the discharge of our duty, 
 " Methods " can aid us in its discharge ; all that is necessary 
 being the construction by The Commonwealth of methods of 
 procedure under which logical administrative action in all of its 
 phases can be taken easily, effectively, and as a matter of common 
 agreement.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
 
 The action of a monarch does not need to be organized. It needs 
 only to be systematized. 
 
 The political action of a Collective Sovereign, however, is the 
 result of action which is taken by its individual units ; and if the 
 action of the Collective Sovereign is to be as effective as possible, 
 the political action of its individual units must be both systema- 
 tized, and organized to a certain extent. 
 
 Necessity for. The necessity for organizing the political action 
 of individuals within our Commonwealths proceeds from the fol- 
 lowing named causes, 
 
 First, the size of the population. 
 
 Second, the size of the political domain. 
 
 Third, the dissimilarity in the sagacity, character, temperament, 
 knowledge, ideas, pursuits, and wealth of the various individuals 
 composing society ; which dissimilarity, through creating varied 
 and often conflicting desires, greatly increases the difficulty of 
 obtaining an agreement of wills concerning the administrative 
 policy to be pursued. 
 
 Fourth, the immense amount of physical and mental work re- 
 quired of the individual : first, in ascertaining and expressing Public 
 Opinion ; second, in selecting and electing the numerous candi- 
 dates for National, State, County, and local offices ; third, in con- 
 trolling the action of public officials ; and fourth, in considering 
 questions relative to the proper political procedure. 
 
 Regarding The Electorate as the acting Sovereign, in no State 
 is it composed of less than thirty thousand individuals, while in 
 the State of New York there are about nineteen hundred thousand 
 electors. 
 
 In every State electorate the individual is the unit in political 
 action. In theory, his will as to political administration is to be 
 freely formed, ascertained and expressed, and his political power is 
 
 149
 
 150 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 to be used for the benefit of the body politic and of the individual. 
 In such tremendous bodies of individuals, scattered as they are 
 throughout the length and breadth of large political domains, the 
 separate and independent action of single individuals counts for 
 but little ; and it is generally accepted as true that for the effective 
 transaction of political work by such large bodies of men, systemat- 
 ically organized political effort is an indispensable political means. 
 The word " political " is emphasized because political organization 
 has distinctive political ends in view which distinguish it from any 
 other kind of organization. It is one of the means which assist 
 The State in taking right, moral, and just administrative action ; 
 and as such it becomes an element in the moral strength of The 
 State. 
 
 In analyzing the acquired elements of individual power we de- 
 fined Organization as " The systematic union of individuals in a 
 body, whose members, agents, and officers work together for a 
 common end, and whereby united strength is secured to effect 
 the purpose of the dominating will." Let us try to make this 
 definition applicable to Electoral Action, which, we remember, 
 consists in the formation of individual will as to administrative 
 policy ; the ascertainment of the majority of such wills as to such 
 policy ; the definite statement of Public Opinion as to such policy ; 
 the selection and the election of candidates for public ofiice ; 
 and the enforcement of the Public Will upon public oflBcials, and 
 also upon individuals while acting in a political capacity. 
 
 In this connection the word " union " must be understood as 
 meaning the voluntary getting together of those electors who hold 
 a common desire to have the pressing questions of political ad- 
 ministration decided in a particular way. Differences of individual 
 beliefs and convictions will always exist; and those who think 
 alike will naturally seek the aid of association to give force to their 
 beliefs. In other words : during a period of administration cer- 
 tain of the electors are actuated by a common will as to the proper 
 decision of the administrative questions up for settlement ; and 
 this agreement in individual wills naturally draws them together 
 into united action for the purpose of more effectually advocating 
 the adoption of their idea of a proper administrative policy. Such 
 " union " is democratic in character, for it proceeds from an " agree- 
 ment of individual wills " regarding right administrative action. 
 
 Inasmuch as the impulse to The Government proceeds theoret- 
 ically from the " Majority of Wills " in the electorate, the term 
 " body " must be held here to mean whatever spontaneously
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 151 
 
 formed aggregations of electors there are at any time, and which 
 are united together temporarily by a common conviction as to ad- 
 ministrative policy. The common conviction held by the largest 
 of these aggregations stands for the time being as Public Opinion, 
 or, the dominant will. 
 
 As to the " common end " to be attained, the ultimate object 
 of electoral action is the promotion of the general welfare. But 
 The Electorate acts repeatedly to this end, and during the ever 
 recurring periods of administration. Theoretically it accomplishes 
 its objects through commanding the application of some one, or 
 another, or more, of the ordained principles of political action, 
 either to the settlement of controversies regarding general policy, 
 or to the readjustment of the relations between individuals which 
 have become changed during past periods of administration, or 
 which at any time are considered unsatisfactory by the body politic. 
 
 Taking the purpose and the procedure of electoral action into 
 consideration, the immediate " common end " of such action must 
 be considered as the rightful decision of some political question, 
 or issue. 
 
 Objects of. The Commonwealth takes all of its formative and 
 constructive political action through and by means of The Elec- 
 torate. It is bound by moral obligations to compel the electorate, 
 as the acting sovereign, to take right political action. Right 
 electorate action proceeds from right individual political action ; 
 and such action is action that is morally free. 
 
 Free individual political action is indispensable to the continued 
 existence of individual freedom as ordained. Individual freedom 
 is always engaged in a struggle with " interests " that are economic 
 at core ; and only the strong arm of The Commonwealth can regu- 
 late the selfish action of such interests within its territorial limits. 
 The regulation of these interests must be moral in order to be just ; 
 and the only way The Commonwealth can take moral action is 
 to secure moral action from the electors. Unless it does this it 
 necessarily assists in the impairment of its moral strength ; for 
 the moral strength of a body politic is immediately affected one 
 way or another by the moral or immoral action of its politically 
 acting individuals. Leaving natural opportunities out of the 
 question at present, the chief source of the physical strength of a 
 Democracy is its professed morality. Individuals are attracted 
 to it by the hope of sharing the ordained conditions of individual 
 existence. These conditions are either maintained or not by the 
 exercise of political power by individuals. Consequently, one of
 
 152 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 the chief ends of The Commonwealth should be to secure from its 
 individuals a continuously moral exercise of political power because 
 such action is an ever flowing spring of physical strength. Finally, 
 the reputation of The Commonwealth for political honesty and 
 political capacity calls for such action because, after all, it is upon 
 the exercise of political power by The Electorate that the character 
 of the political action of The Commonwealth most largely depends. 
 
 Political Leadership. Approaching the subject from another 
 standpoint we shall see that among the individuals who compose 
 The Commonwealth there will always be some, who, by reason 
 of their superior wisdom, experience, and sagacity, are better fitted 
 than their fellows to determine in any given emergency what is 
 right political action. These are the statesmen and the natural 
 leaders in political action. When acting freely within The Com- 
 monwealth these men discharge the very important educational 
 and practical function of political leadership. The logical dis- 
 charge of the function of such leadership in the electorate results 
 in the free formation of true political parties — not the boss- . 
 bidden and immorally motived associations of mere voters which 
 are at present permanently maintained within the electorate for 
 partizan purposes, and which heedlessly by some and hypocriti- 
 cally by others are called political parties — but freely formed 
 associations of electors who work collectively for the accomplish- 
 ment of some one or another political object, and which associa- 
 tions, having accomplished their object, dissolve as entities, 
 leaving their former members free to reassociate with others for 
 the accomplishment of some other political object ; in this way pro- 
 ducing the required direct exercise of political power by the in- 
 dividual, the united exercise of political power by The Electorate, 
 and the free formation of successive political majorities. 
 
 Viewed in this way there seem to be several specific objects to 
 be attained through political organization. 
 
 One is to assist in conserving the moral strength of The Com- 
 munity. 
 
 Another is to help in keeping the exercise of the Reserved Powers 
 of Administration within the hands of the electors. 
 
 Another is to assist in keeping the exercise of these powers per- 
 fectly free. 
 
 Another is to give added strength and effectiveness to the polit- 
 ical convictions of individual electors. 
 
 Another is to afford an opportunity to " Political Leadership " 
 for continued existence, and to give it an added facility in operation.
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 153 
 
 And another is to provide the opportunity for the free formation 
 of true political parties, through the action of which the required 
 political majority can be obtained properly in each period of ad- 
 ministration. 
 
 Defined. Summed up generally, political organization is one of 
 the political means enabling The Commonwealth to take political 
 action in accordance with its ordained political principles and those 
 of democratic action. 
 
 But let us try to make the definition more applicable to the 
 specific objects to be accomplished. 
 
 Defined as a noun, Political Organization, as described in this 
 book, will mean the systematic and free union — as above out- 
 lined — of electors in a political party, whose members, managing 
 boards, and officers work together for the proper formation of a 
 majority of wills in the electorate concerning the right exercise of 
 the Reserved Powers of Administration for certain political 
 objects. 
 
 Defined as an administrative means it will be considered as the 
 collective processes by which an added effectiveness is given to 
 true individual political action ; to true political leadership in The 
 Electorate and in The Government ; and whereby the united 
 strength of a political party is secured to effect the proper forma- 
 tion and expression of Public Opinion regarding any political 
 matter. 
 
 Three Stages of Electoral Action : Theoretically, The Electorate 
 is engaged in the work of political administration all of the time. 
 If we classify this work according to the specific objects to be ac- 
 complished, we find that it is divided naturally into three separate 
 divisions, viz. the work before elections ; the work of and at elec- 
 tions ; and the work after elections. 
 
 The pre-election work properly consists of the processes of 
 Naturalization and Registration ; the free formation of individual 
 will ; the free formation of Public Opinion as to administrative 
 policy ; and the free nomination of candidates for public office ; 
 nomination including selection. 
 
 The election work properly consists of the casting of the ballot ; 
 the counting of the ballots ; the return of the vote ; and the cer- 
 tification of the result of the election. 
 
 The post-election work properly consists of the control by Tlie 
 Electorate of the action of all public officials and of all individuals 
 acting politically ; the enforcement of Responsibility from all 
 such officials and individuals ; and the securing of action from all
 
 154 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 officials that is truly responsive to The Will of The People con- 
 cerning political administration during the current administrative 
 period. 
 
 Theoretically, all of this work is supposed to be done first in the 
 manner indicated by the Principles of the State Polity ; and second, 
 in accord with the commonly accepted rules of democratic pro- 
 cedure. 
 
 But neither the election work nor the post-election work needs 
 to be organized. The mere acts of casting the ballot, or of count- 
 ing the ballots and so on, need no organization. All such acts re- 
 quire is proper systematizing under proper laws. While voting, 
 the individual should at all times be and remain absolutely free. 
 It is largely through the practise of " organizing " the election 
 work that the marked-ballot frauds, the tissue-ballot frauds, the 
 ballot box stuffing frauds, the colonization frauds, and the repeating 
 frauds are made possible. Theoretically, the individual acts in- 
 dependently in the election work, and the electorate acts inde- 
 pendently in the post-election work; and in either case nothing 
 more is required to premise right action than appropriate laws 
 properly enforced. The consideration and enactment of such 
 laws is, however, a matter that is always before The Electorate 
 at Large for action. 
 
 Pre-election Work. The pre-election work by The Electorate 
 in determining the Administrative Policy partakes of the nature of 
 " caucus action." In political parlance the term " caucus action " 
 is the name applied to that part of the action which is taken ahead 
 of the final action, w^hatever it may be, and which caucus action 
 is had for the express purpose of determining the objects to be ac- 
 complished by the final action, or of forecasting the results of the 
 final action. It is this action which constitutes the foundation of 
 the entire structure of electoral action ; and, theoretically, all of 
 the electors are supposed to participate freely in it. The impor- 
 tance of the formative and constructive pre-election work of the 
 people can not be overestimated. Individuals who are not electors 
 are just as vitally interested in the proper transaction of this work, 
 and frequently join in its discussion ; for it is recognized that in- 
 dividual freedom, liberty, equality, and justice do not in the end 
 depend so much upon the mere act of voting as they do depend 
 upon the reaching of a free agreement of wills beforehand concerning 
 what and whom shall be voted for. 
 
 Human progress, whether attempted through political action 
 or otherwise, always hinges upon the object sought for. In politi-
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 155 
 
 cal action, as in action taken by a public meeting, the real value 
 of the action depends upon the object for which it is taken. Now 
 the particular object to be accomplished by the action of a public 
 meeting is always decided upon beforehand by those who call and 
 manage the meeting. Given a proper object, then moral force is 
 added to the action of the meeting by the use of recognized and 
 commonly accepted methods of orderly procedure. 
 
 The same holds true of political action. The deciding before- 
 hand of the objects and purposes to be voted for is caucus action ; 
 but the question that will always recur to the student of Demo- 
 cratic political action is, How can moral force be added to the 
 caucus action of the electorate except by establishing beforehand 
 an ordained and logical system of pre-election work? 
 
 With such a system, then every elector could call upon The Com- 
 munity to compel any other elector, or body of electors, to trans- 
 act their political work properly; but in the absence of such a 
 system, then every elector is left free to transact his particular 
 share of the political work according as he may be influenced by 
 fear, force, favor, inclination, or desire. 
 
 Of course there will be many who, conversant with Democratic 
 ideals and action, will discharge their political duties properly; 
 but in our heterogeneous and populous societies there will be more 
 who, through the lack of an informing rule, cannot decide rightly 
 what those duties are. These will be easily led astray through 
 sophisms concerning the " established order of things," the force 
 of appearances, and the natural desire to go with the crowd ; and 
 when we shall have finished the review of our present-day electoral 
 action, we shall find that most of the electors transact their pre- 
 election work in the very opposite way from that in which they are 
 required to act by their principles of association. 
 
 Problems of : When the original American Commonwealths 
 began the work of political administration, none of them possessed 
 a body of law which comprehensively regulated organized indi- 
 vidual electoral action. Certain means and customs were em- 
 ployed which will be considered in detail later on ; but no logical 
 system was devised for reaching an agreement of wills before the 
 decisive action at the elections. Remembering that the " Majority 
 of Wills " when properly ascertained was to stand as The Will of 
 The People as to political administration, the questions relative 
 to the proper transaction of the pre-election work which then 
 awaited a decisive answer — and for that matter, which have ever 
 since awaited a logical settlement — were these :
 
 156 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 (1) How shall individual wills logically obtain the added force 
 or support of united action in advocating the application of a given 
 policy of administration? 
 
 (2) How shall The Electorate logically shape and advocate politi- 
 cal questions as they arise, and frame the political issues ? 
 
 (3) How shall The Electorate logically select candidates for public 
 office and place them before the people for election ? 
 
 The problem contained in these three questions is merely one of 
 operation. The power to logically transact this pre-election work 
 exists. The manner in which it is to be done logically is indicated 
 by the principles of the State Polity. Wliat more then is needed 
 to provide the opportunity for a logical transaction of this work 
 but an ordained system of logical means and methods by which it 
 shall be done ? The sole function of a political system is to afford 
 an opportunity for right final political action. The system stand- 
 ing by itself is a part of the legislation of the people. Legislation, 
 however, will not necessarily produce right individual action ; but 
 a system which, because of its logical parts, affords an opportunity 
 to any elector to invoke the aid of The Commonwealth to compel 
 any other elector to transact his political work properly, is the 
 system that is best adapted to produce right political action from 
 the electorate as a whole. 
 
 Character of Pre-election Methods. Now the fact which I have 
 mentioned before, namely, that the particular administrative 
 object for which The Commonwealth strives is of the utmost im- 
 portance to its individuals, makes the means and methods by which 
 the individuals are to agree beforehand upon the object of almost 
 equal importance to them also. Briefly, the methods for the trans- 
 action of the political work in this stage of political action must 
 be of a character which tend : 
 
 First, to preserve the political freedom of the elector; keep 
 the direct exercise of political power within his hands ; and main- 
 tain the political equality of each elector. 
 
 Second, which produce direct, independent, logical — and 
 therefore moral — political action by individual electors. 
 
 Third, which give free play to political leadership and permit 
 of the free formation and dissolution of political parties ; and 
 
 Fourth, which produce the required political majority in each 
 successive period of political administration. 
 
 Freedom, of the Elector. It is self-evident that the ordained polit- 
 ical freedom of the elector can only be maintained through a free 
 exercise of political power by the individual. Theoretically, each
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 157 
 
 elector is bound to give a free expression of individual will as to 
 administrative policy whenever required. No one has the temerity 
 to openly deny that in forming and expressing his political will the 
 individual must be absolutely free. 
 
 It is obvious that if individual political freedom is hampered in 
 any way, then the individual will be unable to apply all of his 
 rightful political power. If the hands are bound, a man cannot 
 apply all of his strength or skill to his physical task, and it will 
 suffer. Similarly, if the exercise of volition concerning adminis- 
 trative matters is restricted by any other influence than the 
 promptings of reason and conscience, then the moral force of in- 
 dividual political action is diminished and the elector is caused to 
 apply his political power or influence only to a limited extent, or 
 possibly, in a direction not freely chosen by himself but by another. 
 If this happens — and it may happen because of the character of 
 the means and methods in use — then the action of the individual 
 in political matters helps to change the impulse to The Govern- 
 ment from a logical to an illogical impulse. If The Government 
 receives an illogical impulse, then an illogical application of the 
 principles of the State Polity will be had, and this illogical applica- 
 tion will in turn produce changes in the relations between the in- 
 dividuals within the body politic which of necessity are illogical 
 and therefore immoral, and which also tend to create unrest, dis- 
 satisfaction, and sometimes disorder. Hence the supreme need, if 
 political administration is to freely reflect The Will of The People, for 
 absolute freedom on the part of each elector while engaged in forming 
 his will as to administrative policy ; for under no other condition can 
 a logical agreement of individual wills on this point be obtained. 
 
 Necessity for Logical Pre-election Methods. The necessity' for 
 having and using only logical pre-election means and methods is 
 most urgent because the results produced by the use of the means 
 and methods that are employed in this stage of political action 
 affect the results produced by all subsequent action. For in- 
 stance : the character of the means and methods by which the 
 impulse to The Government is obtained vitally influences the char- 
 acter of that impulse. The character of the governmental impulse 
 will seriously affect both the moral status of the agency and the 
 character of its administrative action. Finally, the very capacity 
 of The Commonwealth to govern according to the Principles of 
 the State Polity must necessarily be affected by the means and 
 methods which it employs ; and the stability of the chosen condi- 
 tions of existence within the body politic will eitiier be maintained
 
 158 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 or shaken according to the means and methods by which individuals 
 exercise political power in their caucus action. 
 
 Direct Electorate Action : \ Theoretically, The Electorate is a 
 
 United Electoral Action : / governing body specially designed 
 for the continuous administration of Government as ordained. It 
 is, however, obliged to entrust the exercise of the Delegated Powers 
 of administration to an administrative agency the members of 
 which are selected and are elected to office by itself. But we will 
 search our theory of government and our plan of administration 
 in vain for any intimations even that The Electorate has the right 
 to delegate the exercise of any of the Reserved Powers of Admin- 
 istration. The Electorate is a body designed to exercise certain 
 political powers, and not authority which is exercised by The Gov- 
 ernment ; and every provision in our plan of administrative action 
 points to the fact that these powers are to be exercised continuously, 
 unitedly, and directly by The Electorate. If The Electorate un- 
 warrantedly delegates the exercise of its Reserved Powers, then 
 such action on its part must necessarily result in the unauthorized 
 creation of a third, uncontemplated, and unconstitutional political 
 agency for the exercise of these powers ; and furthermore. The 
 Electorate can not with safety permit any of its individuals to dele- 
 gate the exercise of their discretion to others because, such action, 
 if persisted in by many, will ultimately destroy the character of 
 the electorate as the specially designed agency for the exercise of 
 the political prerogative of the people. 
 
 Nor is there anything in the true requirements of the political 
 situation that makes it necessary for The Electorate to delegate 
 the exercise of its peculiar powers. If The Electorate is provided 
 with a body of proper political means and methods, both the elec- 
 tors and The Electorate can properly discharge their respective 
 functions and duties. Organized individual electoral action being 
 resorted to merely as a means to obtain the effectiveness of united 
 strength through orderly procedure does not of itself change the 
 nature of our administrative action ; it merely affects results ; it 
 neither warrants the creation and use of a political agency not 
 mentioned in the plan of political administration, nor permits the 
 use of any but purely political means and methods in electoral 
 work, nor confers the right upon The Electorate to adopt and use 
 any but logical means and methods for the exercise of any of its 
 administrative powers. 
 
 Effects of Allowing a Partizan Party to Provide Methods of. But 
 the resort to organization as a political means — which in itself
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 159 
 
 was perfectly proper — did, when it took place, impose an added 
 political obligation upon the people; namely, to distinctly pre- 
 scribe in advance of such action the means and methods of political 
 organization, and of organized political action. This obligation 
 the people did not fully discharge ; and, in order to relieve indi- 
 viduals of what then appeared to be an impossible political bur- 
 den, they have allowed The Partizan Party to gradually provide 
 methods for such action, and also to establish itself as an expedien- 
 tial political agency. By this action the people destroyed all pos- 
 sibility of securing the united and direct performance of their 
 necessary political caucus work by the electorate. Through the 
 use of partizan party methods the electorate has become split up 
 into two or more permanent associations of mere " party " voters, 
 the members of which voluntarily relinquish their right to initiate 
 political action mto the hands of those who assemble and manage 
 these associations. 
 
 The individual electors who joined the partizan party associa- 
 tions, in the main did so honestly ; and in order to add effectiveness 
 to their individual political work. The managements of the 
 partizan party associations outwardly professed to secure to such 
 members the full exercise of all of their political powers and rights. 
 But at the same time they themselves made the so-called " Con- 
 stitutions and By-Laws " of the associations, under the provisions 
 of which the logical exercise of these powers and rights was rendered 
 impossible. The joining of such partizan associations by unin- 
 formed electors was a leap in the dark ; and it has since transpired 
 that the individual members, having when they joined no ordained 
 body of legal political methods absolutely securing to individuals 
 the free exercise of the Right to Choose, have not only lost the right 
 to initiate political action within the partizan associations, but they 
 also have — through the undemocratic action of the association 
 managements above mentioned — been gradually deprived of all 
 direct control over the action of the associations and over the 
 managements of the associations ; for in every important political 
 district partizan organization the managements of the association 
 have so prescribed the qualifications for membership, and have so 
 arranged the code of action within the partizan association, as to 
 completely prevent the membership from getting control of the 
 partizan organization so long as the membership continues to be 
 governed by the " Party Rules " which are imposed upon the par- 
 tizan associations by their managements. 
 
 The managements of the partizan party organizations are very
 
 160 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 peculiarly constituted bodies ; that is, they are peculiarly consti- 
 tuted when we take the ordained exercise of political power into 
 consideration. They are usually self-constituted bodies. The 
 character of the managements is not alike in all of the partizan as- 
 sociations. Dependmg upon the chcumstances, exigencies, local- 
 ities, and conditions in which they develop, we find them assuming 
 the forms described as Rings, Combines, The Boss, and so forth. 
 As for the general plan of organizing the partizan party associa- 
 tions, and the plan of partizan association action, these strongly 
 resemble the plans by which some " big business " corporations 
 are organized and act. Corporations are quasi-permanent organi- 
 zations. Certain individuals contribute cash capital to the busi- 
 ness venture, receive certificates of capital stock in return, and 
 become associated permanently together. The stockholders del- 
 egate the exercise of initiative in economic action into the hands 
 of the board of directors. This board, in turn, generally passes 
 this exercise along into the hands of an executive committee of the 
 board, and this executive committee not infrequently passes this 
 exercise still further on into the hands of some one executive officer. 
 
 The partizan party associations of voters are permanently organ- 
 ized ; that is, the organizations are kept alive and active over many 
 periods of administration. The individual members of these as- 
 sociations are obliged by the " Party Rules " to delegate the man- 
 agement and the control of the organization into the hands of a 
 self-constituted managing body called " The Committee," which, 
 in turn, generally passes the management and control of the associ- 
 ation on into the hands of an executive committee of " The Com- 
 mittee," which executive committee may be and often is either a 
 Ring, or a Combine ; and finally the Ring, or the Combine may, 
 and usually does, pass this exercise along to the " Chairman of The 
 Executive Committee," which is the euphonious appellation of the 
 partizan party Boss. 
 
 The self-constituted Party Committee discharges the self-im- 
 posed function of devising the " Party Rules." These, with a 
 due regard to sound and appearances if not to substance and effect, 
 are pleasingly entitled " The Constitution and By-Laws " of such 
 and such a body. The Committee — as the ostensible executive 
 of the partizan party organization — causes The Party Convention 
 — as the ostensible legislating body of the partizan party organiza- 
 tion — to adopt the Party Rules so devised as the organic law of 
 the organization ; and then The Committee assumes the power to 
 construe the meaning of these rules.
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 161 
 
 For the present it is sufficient to say that this parasitic 
 custom of organizing sovereign-units into permanent par- 
 tizan party associations of voters, combined with the practise 
 of allowing the entire management and control of such asso- 
 ciations to be vested in and exercised by " The Committee," 
 the Combine, the Ring, or the Party Boss, has produced some 
 very startling results in American political action. Of course it 
 will be interjected at this point that there are laws which permit 
 of the doing of all this. That is admitted. But on the other hand 
 it will be well contended that these laws were not passed by the 
 free action of the people in the direct exercise of their legislative 
 power and of their political prerogative. They were passed in 
 the State Legislatures that were packed with partizan party mem- 
 bers, and, all protestations to the contrary nevertheless, they were 
 passed with the secret intention of permitting The Partizan Party 
 to do things which are in direct contravention of the principles of 
 our political action. 
 
 Some of the results of permitting The Partizan Party to act as 
 it does are as follows : 
 
 Fear of " discipline " — the partizan party name for punish- 
 ment — or hope of material reward, or of political preferments 
 which carry substantial emoluments, or of opportunities for private 
 gain, have been established as a binding force between individuals 
 in a professedly political association. 
 
 " Partizan Party Success " has been substituted as the object 
 of organized electoral action. 
 
 Freedom in political action on the part of mere partizan party 
 organization members can not exist under the party rules, and has 
 ceased to exist. Having, when they joined the partizan associa- 
 tions, agreed to do as they were told to do, those electors who are 
 merely association members have sunk to the level of a body of 
 voting puppets whose ballots do not have to be worked for by The 
 Committee or The Boss at elections. Such electors may be re- 
 warded if they act " regularly," that is, strictly in accordance with 
 the party rules ; but they will surely be " disciplined " if they take 
 free, independent political action. But the point to be noted here 
 is, that if they do act regularly, their reward comes out of the public 
 revenues and is always ])aid them for actioii that weakens the moral 
 strength and the political capacity of The Commonwealth. In 
 other words, the great body of the people is taxed to pay for im- 
 moral political action. 
 
 Then again, the partizan party organizations are not kept alive
 
 162 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 by a desire on the part of the association membership to acquire the 
 added strength of united action in properly promoting the general 
 welfare. They are improperly kept together by their manage- 
 ments, so that they can be utilized by The Committee, the Ring, 
 the Combine, or The Boss, as the case may be, as a private means 
 whereby the managements, in whatever form they exist, may as- 
 sume and discharge the functions of political leadership ; or may 
 create, frame, and advocate administrative issues which are not 
 wholly political in nature ; and whereby the managements may be 
 enabled to determine the qualifications of candidates and the 
 detail manner of their nomination. ^Mlile vigorously protesting 
 that it has been solely animated by the desire to promote the gen- 
 eral welfare, nevertheless its acts at all times have shown that The 
 Partizan Party has also been animated by the selfish desire to 
 obtain and wield political power for private advantage of one kind 
 or another. The Partizan Party has been allowed to organize 
 the pre-election work of the electors, and it has done so in a manner 
 which enables the managements of the partizan associations to 
 obtain control of the offices and positions in The Government, and 
 to distribute them as they please in return for " regular party sup- 
 port " both in and out of The Government. The partizan party 
 managements also desu*e the exercise of political power (which 
 carries with it the control of the exercise of political authority) for 
 still other immoral purposes, such as the production of party rev- 
 enue from individuals not connected with the partizan organiza- 
 tions, and which is paid into the party treasury in return for " fa- 
 vorable legislation " and like services. 
 
 Now let every reader ask himself these questions concerning the 
 methods which The Partizan Party has been allowed to devise and 
 employ in the transaction of pre-election work. 
 
 Do the methods which have been introduced into general use in 
 this work by The Partizan Party tend to preserve the political 
 freedom of the elector, or tend to keep the direct exercise of politi- 
 cal power within his grasp, or tend to maintain the political equal- 
 ity of each elector, or tend to shield the moral character of the true 
 political agency that was designed to exercise the political pre- 
 rogative of the people ; or the contrary ? 
 
 Do they tend to produce direct, independent, and moral politi- 
 cal action from individual electors ; or the contrary ? 
 
 Do they tend to give full play to true political leadership and to 
 the free formation at all times of true Political Parties ; or the con- 
 trary ?
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 163 
 
 Do they tend to produce the required political majority in each 
 successive period of administration ; or the contrary ? 
 
 Do they tend to produce a perfectly definite and unmistakable 
 expression of public opinion in any period of admmistration ; or 
 the contrary? 
 
 If they do not tend to produce these results, and if they tend to 
 produce other and contrary results, then has not the time come for 
 every patriotic citizen, every statesman, and every educational 
 agency to institute an exhaustive research into the character and 
 functions of political methods, which, if wrong, are capable of under- 
 mining and corroding the political ability and morals of the in- 
 dividual, and which if wrong are also capable of impairing the polit- 
 ical capacity and moral strength of The Commonwealth ? 
 
 Taking the condition of the average individual into considera- 
 tion, the immediately pressing necessity is that of a daily income 
 with which to meet the daily expenses of living. The great major- 
 ity of men are under agreement to render their services to others 
 in return for wages. When their daily service is rendered most of 
 them are too tired, even supposing they desired to do so, to take 
 up the difficult, exacting, and exliausting consideration of right 
 administrative action and its requirements. The result is that 
 the consideration of political work is habitually deferred by the 
 great mass of the people, and individually, they are unprepared 
 for its proper transaction when the time comes for final action. 
 The danger in this condition lies in the possibility of a right- 
 minded electorate taking unwitting action ; and, unless their 
 political means and methods are logical, the taking of unwitting 
 action is fully insured. The difficulty in individual administra- 
 tive action mainly consists in determining what is right action. 
 But even if right action is determined upon, without right means 
 and methods peaceable right action is impossible. 
 
 The great majority of the right-minded, however, do not fully 
 appreciate this fact. As it is at present under our partizan party 
 system of political administration, individuals are required to 
 solve the problem of right political action with wrong political 
 means and methods. Of course, that problem, with such factors, 
 is unsolvable. The right-minded, but uninformed, attempt its 
 solution with the means and methods provided ; and the result 
 is their utter confusion, bewilderment, irritation, failure, and 
 sometimes despair. Oftentimes, instead of finding difficulty in 
 doing right, the real difficulty consists in escaping from doing wrong ; 
 a ridiculous situation for a right-minded and a free man ; but
 
 164 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 brought about in part by his own unwitting action concerning 
 poHtical means and methods. Something is wrong somewhere. 
 Organization has worked wonders in economic efficiency. Why 
 does it not do the same for poUtical efficiency ? Of course it will 
 if it is the right kind, is used properly, and for proper objects; 
 and the reason it works badly in our instance is, that we employ 
 the wrong kind, improperly, and for some objects that are not 
 strictly political in nature, such, for instance, as the maintaining of 
 a permanent association of voters within the body politic, the in- 
 dividuals of which are prevented from taking considerations of 
 right into account when they are attempting to act in the capacity 
 of the political sovereign. 
 
 In a passage that is evidently intended to be eulogistic of the 
 effectiveness of the partizan party way of organizing electoral ac- 
 tion, Mr. Bryce in Chapter LIX of the American Commonwealth 
 says, " The Americans made the discovery . . . that the victories 
 of the ballot box . . . must be won by the cohesion and disciplined 
 docility of the troops ; and that these merits can only be secured 
 by skilful organization and long continued training." The omis- 
 sions indicated above show that Mr. Bryce used the word " troops " 
 as a simile by which to convey the idea of electors ; because these 
 are the only individuals by whom " the victories of the ballot box " 
 can be won. 
 
 But to the broad statement that " disciplined docility " in an 
 elector is a merit, assent must be withheld for several reasons. 
 
 In the first place, any cohesive force that binds electors together 
 in political work other than that of an agreement of wills freely 
 obtained, is an illogical (and necessarily immoral) force to use in 
 political action. 
 
 In the second place, any " docility " on the part of an elector to 
 any influence other than that exerted by reason and conscience, is 
 a stigma upon the individual. 
 
 And finally, such " cohesion " as results from " Party discipline " 
 and " Party training," instead of being meritorious either in the 
 individual or as a political means in a free commonwealth, deserves 
 the condemnation of every citizen. 
 
 Later on in the chapter and while writing about the " Party 
 System " of nominating, Mr. Bryce says : " The essential feature 
 of the system is that it is from bottom to top strictly representative. 
 This is because it has power, and power can only flow from the 
 people. . . . But when an organization which the party is in the 
 habit of obeying, chooses a party candidate, it exerts power, power
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 165 
 
 often of the highest import. . . . Such power would not be yielded 
 to any but a representative body, and it is yielded to the bodies I 
 shall describe because they are, at least in theory, representative." 
 
 The above quotation is a fair sample of the kind of misinforma- 
 tion concerning our political action that is given to the American 
 public and to the reading world. Let us analyze the statement a 
 moment. 
 
 First it is a system that has power, and finally it is a body that 
 has power. First it is a system that is representative, and finally 
 it is a body that is representative. But representative of what ? 
 Of the people? Of their moral character? Of their democratic 
 principles of action? Mr. Bryce does not say. What does the 
 reader make out of his statement ? 
 
 If he is a Republican by affiliation he will die protesting that 
 the " system " used by the Democratic Party (one of the bodies 
 Mr. Bryce had in mind) never did and never can be representative 
 of the whole people ; if for no other reason, then for the perfectly 
 good reason that the Republican Party is at least as numerous as 
 the Democratic Party. 
 
 If he is a Democrat he will reject Mr. Bryce's statement that the 
 " system " used by the Republican Party is representative of the 
 people, as a libel pure and simple. 
 
 We shall have to reject as wholly untenable the supposition that 
 Mr. Bryce really meant that the " Party System " in use actually 
 represents the moral character of the people, because the whole tenor 
 of his work shows that he intended to be fair, if not complimentary. 
 
 And from what we already know of the lack of political principles 
 underlying any partizan party system of operation, we cannot 
 accept as true the supposition that such systems are representative 
 of the Democratic Principles of Action which were ordained by the 
 people as their moral and political creed. 
 
 Mr. Bryce, in common with many other writers on this subject, 
 fails to note the fact that there exists no comprehensive system of 
 administrative action in any of our American Commonwealths, 
 and that each of them always uses two, and sometimes three or 
 four distinct partizan party systems, which systems are repre- 
 sentative of nothing else under the sun but the ideas and desires 
 which are held by the managements of the partizan associations 
 of voters. 
 
 Returning to the consideration of the quotation, how can a mere 
 system be representative, either from bottom to top, or vice versa f 
 How can a system have and exert power ? Which is the top and
 
 166 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 which the bottom ; and what parts do its intermediary portions 
 — if any — play ? A system is a collection of provisions intended 
 to regulate individual action ; and when Mr. Bryce spoke of " the 
 system " he probably meant some body of individuals who, acting 
 in accordance with the provisions of the system, put it in operation. 
 He speaks of "an organization " which " chooses a party candi- 
 date " and " is in the habit of obeying the party." This utterance 
 describes a form of systematic action, but not a system. When 
 Mr. Bryce speaks of "an organization which chooses a party 
 candidate " we must understand him as describing the " Party 
 Management " ; and by the term " the party " we must under- 
 stand that either the inclusive membership of a partizan associa- 
 tion, or all those who vote a party ticket, is meant. 
 
 Mr. Bryce recognizes the fact that it is the party managements 
 which make the party nominations ; but from this mere fact — 
 and using his terms for the time being — he has jumped to the con- 
 clusion that " the organization " has been obtained by action on 
 the part of the membership of " the party," and that such action 
 has been taken in accord with Democratic principles of representa- 
 tion and of representative management. 
 
 Such a conclusion is unwarranted by the facts in the matter, and 
 such a statement as the one we are considering is entirely mis- 
 leading as information because the facts in this connection are that 
 in any State partizan associations " the organizations " are self- 
 created and self-maintaining bodies, over the composition of which 
 the mere " party " members are deprived of any adequate action 
 or volition by the " Party Rules " which " the organizations " 
 make or cause to be made in the manner above set forth. Word 
 comes down from the top — The Boss, or The Committee — to 
 the bottom — the membership of any lesser territorial division 
 of the partizan association — to send such and such representa- 
 tives up into " the organization " ; and the members, with the fear 
 of discipline in their minds, do as they are told. 
 
 But how about the power that is " exerted " by Mr. Bryce's 
 " organizations "? Does it reaWy fiow from the people? Or is it 
 a power that has really been created by " the organizations " ? 
 And how about the nature of this power? Is it democratic, or is 
 it autocratic in nature? And if it is really autocratic in nature 
 how can it flow from the people ? 
 
 We must conclude that the idea Mr. Bryce intended to convey 
 was that " the party " nominating agency was representative in 
 composition, character, and action.
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 167 
 
 Resuming the use of the terms employed in this book let us see 
 if such is the fact. The ostensible nominating agency of the State 
 partizan party associations is called " The Party Convention." 
 It is composed of " Delegates " from the various territorial divi- 
 sions of the association ; which so called delegates, however, are 
 selected in the manner above described by the executive managers 
 at the top of the association. The membership of the territorial 
 divisions of the association merely go through the form of selecting 
 and electing such " delegates." This farcical action on their part 
 gives the Party Convention the appearance of a representative 
 assembly but not the character of one ; and in this matter of rep- 
 resentative character it looks as if the author of the above quota- 
 tion had been deceived by outward appearances. 
 
 Lender the scheme in present use by which the internal affairs 
 of the partizan associations are managed, the party nominations 
 and the party platforms are supposedly made by the Party Con- 
 vention. As a matter of fact these nominations and platforms 
 are made by those members of the Party Committee who control 
 its action, into whose hands the Party Committee has passed the 
 discharge of its functions as above described. 
 
 The Party Committee shrew^dly employs the Party Convention 
 (outwardly representative in composition and character) as the 
 means for putting the despotic action of the Party Committee 
 before the people in a democratic guise. By causing the " Dele- 
 gates " when assembled in the form of a Party Convention to 
 strictly observe the democratic formalities of orderly procedure 
 in proposing and in choosing candidates and in adopting an admin- 
 istrative policy, the Party Committee contrives to impart the ap- 
 pearance of democratic and of representative action to the party 
 convention w'ork ; but that the great majority of the " Delegates " 
 who compose the party convention exercise free will, or actually 
 by their free action ever frame any political issue or decide any 
 nominations, is a proposition impossible of serious consideration 
 by those who know ; for the " Delegates " as a body are driven 
 through the convention ritual, and they w^ould not be there if they 
 could not be driven. 
 
 Concerning the composite character of the party convention. 
 Are the delegates " docile " — fairly so. " Disciplined " — many of 
 them. " Trained " — every man of them. " Cohesive " — as a 
 general rule ; and also unanimously adhesive to all public offices 
 and positions. So composed and constituted the party convention, 
 as the partizan party nominating agency, certainly presents a type
 
 168 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 of representation ; but not that which proceeds from " bottom to 
 top." As a matter of fact, the kind of representation that prevails 
 throughout every partizan party organization is an upside-down 
 representation, in that the act of every association member and 
 subordinate managing body or official, must represent the will of 
 his or its party superiors. 
 
 These party superiors are called " Constituted Authorities," 
 thus spreading the impression that they are properly constituted 
 by proper democratic action on the part of the organization mem- 
 bership, and leaving the impression to obscure the perception of 
 the truth that these so-called constituted authorities are in reality 
 self-constituted bodies and officers. This knowingly false and 
 consciously misleading use of this unwarranted term is one of the 
 many petty deceptions that are practised by The Partizan Party 
 to draw support from unthinking or easy-going electors ; and we 
 shall as we proceed have occasion to disclose others of the same 
 nature. 
 
 Finally, the kind of representation that is in use in every partizan 
 party organization is in fact strictly from top to bottom ; and, in 
 kind, is wholly irreconcilable with the democratic ideas that the 
 right to govern belongs to the individuals who compose a political 
 association, and that the right to freely participate in matters of 
 association management belongs to them also. It is this peculiar 
 kind of autocratic regulation of the internal affairs of the partizan 
 party associations which makes it impossible to accurately describe 
 either the association or its action by the use of terms which cor- 
 rectly express ideas of democratic political action ; and whenever 
 such an attempt is made, it invariably results in the confusion of 
 thought on the part of all concerned. 
 
 The various usages, practises, and customs of The Partizan 
 Party do not constitute a system of political action ; but only a 
 system of partizan party action. That which the partizan party 
 managements succeed in having done within its associations, and 
 also by means of these associations, does very materially affect the 
 political action of the people. A contribution of $250,000 to a 
 partizan party by some big " Business interest," to be used in in- 
 fluencing individual votes at an election, also affects the political 
 action of the people very materially ; but in neither case would we 
 be warranted by these facts alone in concluding that the systems 
 of either of these associations were political systems. It is true 
 that the partizan party associations are organized with the express 
 purpose of affecting the political action of the people; but even
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 169 
 
 that fact can not convert its system into a system of political action 
 which must be applicable to all electors alike. Each partizan 
 party, irrespective of its purposes, and of the final results of its 
 association work, has its own peculia,r system which lacks many 
 characteristics, objects, and provisions that are indispensable in 
 a system of political action ; and a partizan party system can never 
 become a political system until such time as the partizan party 
 has become the Collective Sovereign and has ordained the use of 
 its system upon every individual elector in The Commonwealth. 
 
 Other Evils. The partizan party system of internal management 
 produces one or two effects which we may as well notice here as 
 elsewhere. The individual members of the partizan party associa- 
 tions, considered as the membership, do not initiate "party action." 
 Word comes down from the top to the members to do so and so ; 
 and they do it. In other words, the association members do not 
 act, in the sense of deciding what the association shall do ; and, 
 in the same sense, neither does the partizan association act. If 
 we speak of the action of any big business corporation (outside 
 that taken at a meeting of the stockliolders) we do not mean, nor 
 are we commonly understood to mean, the acts of the stockholders. 
 WTiat we mean, and what our hearers understand us to mean, is 
 either the action of the board of directors of the corporation, or 
 the action of some officer or executive committee of the board which 
 is sanctioned by the board. So in any partizan party association, 
 it is " The Management " of the association which really acts ; 
 and, in one sense, the managements, so far as association action 
 is concerned, are in fact the Partizan Party itself. The mere 
 partizan association members really discharge but one important 
 partizan function ; namely, that of constituting a passive nucleus 
 of " regular party votes " which the partizan party managements 
 can be reasonably sure of ahead of The Campaign. 
 
 But the uninitiated reader must not imagine that those who 
 occupy positions in the partizan party managements recline on 
 beds of roses. Professional Politics — the management of a 
 Partizan Party Association — as contrasted with Political Ad- 
 ministration — the administration by the people of Government 
 as ordained — is a " business." Business is Business. Compe- 
 tition for the positions is fierce. Those who can not " make good " 
 to the managements must give place to those who have shown that 
 they can. There is no true politics in professional politics ; and 
 this is but one of the many evils of the partizan party system of 
 organizing the pre-election work of individual electors.
 
 170 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Then again. A partizan party considered as an agency, and its 
 system considered as a means, lack everj^ element of moral strength 
 that a political means of a Democracy should possess. No warrant 
 for either can be found in our plan of administrative action. 
 Neither give full operative force to any one single principle of the 
 State Polity while each acts to destroy the force of every principle 
 of democratic action. Each operates directly for the creation of 
 " opportunities " for the misuse of political power to private ad- 
 vantage. The secret intent of the partizan party is wrong. The 
 practises of its system are wrong, for they hamper the free formation 
 of Political Majorities as far as is possible and they promote the 
 production of illogically obtained " majorities of votes " through 
 affording opportunity to the partizan party managements to in- 
 fluence the political action of individual electors by favor, fear, 
 force, fraud, and falsity. Of course the truth of this statement 
 will be vigorously denied in certain quarters. But " by their 
 fruits ye shall know them." Their acts speak louder than their 
 words ; and the acts of the partizan party managements through-, 
 out the length and breadth of our land amply prove the truth of 
 the statement, and warrant the conclusion that the partizan party, 
 by reason of its inherent political immorality, is totally unfit to 
 discharge the functions of political organization. 
 
 The partizan party association — which individual electors are 
 invited to join for the purpose of helping the partizan party man- 
 agements to " form a majority " — is just what the above name 
 implies. It is an association of " voters " which belongs to the 
 partizan party management ; which is kept together by it ; which 
 is utilized as a catspaw by it ; and without which, as compacted, 
 " The Management " as constructed could not exist. These 
 associations are composed only of those " voters " who " regu- 
 larly " comply with the requirements of membership and action 
 that are prescribed by the " Party Committee." There is nothing 
 of a political nature in these requirements, for they merely impose 
 " obedience " to the dictates of the " Party Committee." It is 
 true that the partizan associations are made to appear to act freely ; 
 but in making them to appear so the " Party Committee " has to 
 use a mixture of favor, fear, deception, and despotic force that 
 would destroy any free association, or any other that was not held 
 together by human greed. 
 
 Now the partizan party association is only the theoretical foun- 
 dation and not the actual foundation of the partizan party manage- 
 ment. Because the association is practically devoid of the moral
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 171 
 
 desire and force which alone can properly unite individuals to- 
 gether in a political association ; because the ever pressing need of 
 " The Management " is to secure public offices, public positions, 
 and " Party " positions for distribution between its members and 
 the members of the association for the purpose of producing the 
 desired " cohesion " ; because there are never at any one election 
 as many vacant offices and positions as there are " office seekers " ; 
 and because these numerous claimants are persistently seeking 
 from " The Management " a fitting recognition of their individual 
 claims, that body is necessarily subject to many disturbing and 
 disrupting influences that are not political in nature. 
 
 The association is also rendered unstable because so many of the 
 active, " regular " and enrolled members are seeking to satisfy 
 personal and not political desires. These members expect some 
 political office or position, or a cash return for their services ; and, 
 there being no moral consideration involved in their action, if they 
 can not get from one partizan association what they want, have no 
 hesitancy in trying another at times. The very existence of these 
 associations itself is rendered precarious for the very reason that 
 the majority of the enrolled members are always seeking their 
 personal advantage out of the political necessities of The Com- 
 monwealth. That is one of the reasons why the partizan party 
 management constantly resorts to deceptions in the effort to create 
 in the minds of uninformed electors the impression of proper 
 action by the partizan party association ; for if the majority of the 
 people should once fully appreciate the true nature of the action 
 of the partizan party association and perceive its effects upon 
 the morals of individuals and on the political capacity of The 
 Commonwealth, this association and its " Constituted Authori- 
 ties " would forever be abolished as a political instrumentality, as 
 it should be. 
 
 Its theoretical foundation, being unstable, " The Management " 
 is unstable, and is constantly struggling to maintain its position. 
 That in itself is not surprising ; but the way it is allowed to work 
 is. It constantly uses undemocratic, immoral, and often crimi- 
 nal means, and not infrequently resorts to the organization of the 
 criminal classes in the cities as the pivotal means by which to man- 
 ufacture a majority of votes for its ticket. If it gets its " victory 
 at the ballot box," then it retains its position as " The Manage- 
 ment " of the partizan party association. But is an instrumentality 
 which is capable of such action a proper one to use in the organi- 
 zation of individual electoral effort?
 
 172 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Factions. But this is not all. The partizan party manage- 
 ment contains other sources of instability within itself which poison 
 the springs of political action. Sometimes a divergence of opinion 
 between its own members concerning what a partizan party should 
 do before the people ; or as to their own relative positions or in- 
 fluence within " The Management " ; or as to individual claims 
 to the " Spoils of Victory " ; or as to individual chances for nom- 
 inations — nominations being the gateway to political preferment 
 — is sufficient to cause a separation between the members of the 
 partizan party managements. 
 
 When the management of a partizan party association becomes 
 separated into opposing groups, the aggrieved group, persistently 
 seeking the control of the association for the satisfaction of 
 its own ends, is commonly called a Faction. If a faction 
 succeeds in getting control of the managemental positions in 
 the association, then it becomes the partizan party manage- 
 ment itself. 
 
 Measured by the standard of democratic ideals the immorality 
 of such action lies first, in the object for which it is taken ; and 
 second, in the fact that the faction becomes the management of 
 the association independently of the action by the association as 
 such ; for the mere partizan association members are, as a general 
 rule, totally powerless to prevent such quarrels between their 
 " Constituted Authorities," and are equally powerless to depose 
 their quarreling superiors. It is true that members can always 
 leave a partizan association if they are sufficiently dissatisfied. If 
 they remain, their attention is systematically diverted away from 
 a consideration of the political needs of The Commonwealth, and 
 is directed mainly to a consideration of " partizan party " needs, 
 and often to the settlement of factional disputes within the par- 
 tizan party managements. If the members leave, and do not 
 join any other partizan association, then they are reduced to the 
 necessity of fighting these partizan party associations as a means 
 by which to truly promote the general welfare. In such a situa- 
 tion the difficulties of political action are greatly increased, and 
 elements of discord and unhappiness exist which should not ac- 
 company the transaction of political work. But the situation is 
 general, and, as a result, there is hardly a large community in any 
 State in which there are not one or more groups of independents 
 actively engaged in fighting the immoralities that are practised 
 by this, or that, or the other partizan party in the name of political 
 organization.
 
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 173 
 
 Wings. Also in times of great political unrest the solidarity of 
 the partizan party associations themselves becomes disrupted by 
 differences in opinion between association members concerning 
 desired administrative action, ^^^lere the partizan association 
 becomes separated into groups holding different convictions on 
 questions of public or of administrative policy, the group actively 
 opposing the course advocated by the partizan party management 
 is commonly called a Wing. 
 
 This separation of a partizan association membership into the 
 groups called " wings " is not so much to be deplored by an out- 
 sider, for the reason that the cause of the separation is sometimes 
 political in nature ; but the period in which " wings " are forming 
 is always one of great " Party " strife, bitterness, and machina- 
 tions. The members of a partizan party who associate together 
 as a " wing " are taunted with " party " irregularity and personal 
 disloyalty. They are reminded of their promises to maintain the 
 solidarity of the partizan party, the maintenance of which condi- 
 tion is placed before every other political consideration and duty. 
 The managements of the partizan associations, being self-consti- 
 tuted bodies and leaders in electoral organization, naturally strive 
 to maintain the solidarity of their associations and the permanent 
 existence of the partizan party organization undepleted in num- 
 bers ; and at such times the managements place every possible 
 obstacle, and use every " party " force and means in their power, to 
 prevent the enrolled members in the partizan associations from 
 freely exercising their individual reason and conscience in the dis- 
 charge of w^hat they then conceive to be their political duty. The 
 maintenance of the improper "permanence of the partizan party 
 lies at the bottom of tliis improper action by the partizan party 
 managements ; and the discord, bitterness, and personal strife in 
 the body politic during periods of unusual political unrest would 
 be largely done away with were individual electors left free under 
 the law to form themselves into true political parties as the means 
 for advocating the adoption of their political convictions as an 
 administrative policy for the time being. 
 
 " Personal Politics." — On the other hand, in times of " politi- 
 cal quiet," when The Electorate is not agitated by questions of 
 administrative policy, or is practically agreed upon an advisable 
 course of political administration, then the partizan party, con- 
 sidered as the organizer of political action, loses much of its con- 
 trolling power over the political action of individuals ; thus re- 
 vealing a weakness that is hidden in times of political unrest.
 
 174 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 A true political leader is never at any time without his immediate 
 influence and control over the political acts of individuals; but 
 the partizan party managements, in times of political quiet, and 
 when the people are satisfied with the way in which public affairs 
 are being administered, do not have sufficient " Spoils " in the 
 way of public offices and positions for distribution among the 
 workers. This lack of immediate personal reward for party serv- 
 ices dissolves the " cohesion " w^hich primarily keeps the members 
 of the partizan associations compacted together, and the naturally 
 dissatisfied members seek other fields for their activities. 
 
 Such a period of political quiet was the so-called " Era of Good 
 Feeling " following Monroe's election in 1817. The partizan party 
 managements were unable in this era to hold their partizan associa- 
 tions together, and the members of their associations grouped 
 themselves together in other associations under such names as 
 "Adams Men," "Clay Men," " Cahiounites," " Clintonians," 
 and the like. As some one has pithily observed, these various 
 groups soon succeeded in working up an " Era of Personal Feeling," 
 the influence of which lasted long after they were dissolved or had 
 become amalgamated within new associations formed to advocate 
 or oppose the creation of a national bank; the spending of the 
 national revenues for " internal improvements " ; the adoption 
 of a " protective tariff," and other measures. These were matters 
 upon which the widest divergence of individual opinion existed 
 at that time. The National Government was new. Its juris- 
 diction was a matter of controversy; and the majority of The 
 Nation was fearful lest its administrative agency should exceed 
 its proper functions. This fear is not dead yet by any means and 
 it still continues to be one of the causes which tend to separate the 
 people of The Nation into opposing groups on National Issues. 
 But these groups, unfortunately for logical political administra- 
 tion, are not, and never can be true political parties so long as we 
 retain in use the present illogical partizan party methods of organiz- 
 ing electoral action, whereunder, the partizan party associations 
 are made as permanent as possible by the exercise of fraud and 
 force, and whereunder the formation of true Political Majorities 
 is rendered as remote as possible in every period of administration.
 
 ^<-' 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
 
 Let us say that Public Opinion is the controlling force in admin 
 istrative action ; and that its moral force springs from the free ^*' > 
 agreement of electoral wills concerning that action. How can The 
 Commonwealth strengthen the moral force of public opinion ? 
 
 In the heterogeneous societies of the American Commonwealths 
 a large proportion of the electorates consists of individuals who are 
 incapable of forming even an approximately correct estimate of 
 the probable effect of their individual action on administrative 
 action — the immigrants ; the illiterates ; the fh-st voters ; the 
 unintelligent, and others. The administration of Government as 
 established is to them more or less of a mystery. About the only 
 details in electoral action with which they are familiar are con- 
 nected with the casting of the ballot ; almost the last act in the long 
 series of acts which they are required to perform. 
 
 Concerning the proper transaction of the formative and con- 
 structive administrative work of The Commonwealth and con- 
 cerning the effects produced by a proper or improper trans- 
 action of that work, the masses stand in constant need of instruc- 
 tion and guidance ; and in the absence of any duly constituted 
 educational agency, and to supply that lack, The Commonwealth 
 is obliged to make use of the special ability, knowledge, sagacity, 
 and virtue possessed by a few of its hidividuals as a means for 
 obtaining such instruction and guidance. 
 
 True Political Leaders. Because men differ in ability there will 
 always be some men in every community who are better able than 
 their fellows to comprehend the trend of events and the exigencies 
 of The Commonwealth ; and because men differ in temperament 
 there will always be some among the more competent who, actuated 
 by civic virtue to a superior degree, will be able to explain the affairs 
 and the needs of The Commonwealth unbiased by personal con- 
 siderations. 
 
 175
 
 176 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Statesmen. Such men are called " Statesmen " by Pericles. 
 They are the natural and logical leaders in social and in political 
 action ; and when they are afforded an opportunity to freely in- 
 fluence the political actions of the individuals of The Common- 
 wealth, then true Political Leadership is secured, and becomes a 
 natural and proper means for the formation of Public Opinion. 
 
 Considered as a Position. Normal ability to lead in the political 
 action of the free community depends mainly upon the combination 
 in one individual of mental power and moral force ; and Political 
 Leadership, considered as a position, is normally obtained, or 
 conferred, through the more or less general recognition and free 
 support that is given to the ideas that are advocated by some one 
 or more individuals. 
 
 " Noblesse oblige." The institution of self-government does not 
 release " The Nobility " from their obligations to lead society 
 in the promotion of the General Welfare ; but the " Nobility " 
 of a democracy is composed solely of those individuals in whom 
 virtue and wisdom are combined. The obligation of such to lead 
 society always exists ; but considering leadership in administrative 
 action as a position to which a man has been raised by the sponta- 
 neous agreement of his fellow^s, then it follows that there is no 
 obligation on the part of his fellows to support a leader in any- 
 thing that does not meet with the approval of their conscience 
 and judgment; for the obligation to support springs from the 
 agreement of wills and desires that exists between the leader 
 and those who are led. 
 
 Character of Action. Theoretically, a political leader does not 
 act like a delegate; that is, like one under instructions. He is 
 supposed to instruct and lead the people in the proper exercise of 
 their political power, and to instruct and lead the representatives 
 of the people in the proper and desired exercise of their political 
 authority ; and in each instance he must lead through the force 
 of arguments addressed to their understanding. 
 
 Specific Work of. The specific work of Political Leadership is 
 to crystallize public opinion upon all administrative questions. 
 These questions are discussed before the people first in order to 
 get from the electorate a definite expression of will concerning 
 them. They are again discussed in the legislature for the purpose 
 of determining how the expressed will of the electorate shall be 
 made applicable in detail. 
 
 As an Individual Obligation. Theoretically, the desire to enjoy 
 what is commonly called " The Blessings of Liberty " furnishes
 
 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 177 
 
 the motive for political action in free communities. Desire in 
 itself, however, will never produce good political administration, 
 for that follows only from the exercise of perseverance, sagacity, 
 wisdom, and morality by the Collective Sovereign. But good 
 political administration — by far the most intricate work 
 attempted by man — has at present to be produced from and 
 by a society the larger part of which is composed of individuals who 
 but vaguely comprehend the detail problems involved. All are 
 supposed to know what is generally required from individuals; 
 but few really know how to act wisely in each administrative 
 move. Each is given the right to participate ; but the bestowal 
 of political equality does not in the least alter inherent inequalities. 
 AVhile the bestowal of political equality increases the political 
 capacity of The Individual it does not increase his natural ability ; 
 and good democratic political administration depends very largely 
 upon correct initiative in detail and a widespread knowledge of 
 probable resvlts. All are supposed to be animated by the desire 
 to promote the general welfare ; but because the masses must be 
 instructed concerning the special objects and effects to be produced 
 by proposed action, it is possible to consider Political Leadership 
 as a special individual obligation resting upon the more capable 
 to help the less capable to take proper administrative action. 
 
 As an Individual Right. In the exercise of its power to initiate 
 action The Electorate works theoretically as a composite unit. Its 
 ignorant element is one of its inherent weaknesses. L^nless the 
 mentally blind are helped to proper political action The Common- 
 wealth is more than likely to fail of its ultimate objects. One of 
 these objects was to protect its individually weak members from 
 encroachments by its individually powerful members. The exer- 
 cise of political power was given to all as a means for preventing 
 such encroachments and oppression ; consequently it is possible 
 to consider Political Leadership as a special individual right of the 
 ignorant to be led into proper administrative action by the en- 
 lightened. 
 
 As a Political Necessity. But since the ignorant can participate 
 directly and effectually in political administration by means of the 
 ballot — the vote of the politically ignorant counting for just as 
 much in the final expression of the Will of The People as the vote 
 of the statesman ; and the proportion of the politically uninformed 
 to statesmen being as thousands to units — political leadership, 
 considered as a means for imparting the right direction to the 
 political action of a heterogeneous society, becomes a political
 
 178 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 necessity as well ; and one that will continue to exist so long 
 as individuals differ in the natural and acquired elements of 
 individual power. 
 
 Individual freedom, liberty, equality, and justice as ordained 
 are not the fruits of any mere form of Government. They are the 
 fair blossoms or promises of fruits that are held possible of obtain- 
 ment under a given form of Government. Government is not a 
 vegetative process deriving its nourishment from the forces of 
 nature and fructifying by itself. Considered as a human institu- 
 tion Government always acts by and through individuals. It is 
 individuals who promise these fruits. The promises themselves 
 are conditional. In the American Commonwealths the final 
 possession and enjoyment of the promised fruits is made to depend 
 upon the logical exercise of the Powers of Administration; and 
 whatever " Fruits of Government " we garner, we gather as the 
 result of individual administrative action. 
 
 In the Formation of Political Majorities. The economic and 
 moral freedom of an individual can be affected by the final ad- 
 ministrative action of a democracy as well as by that of a monarch. 
 Unless the required majority of wills is properly formed, and 
 unless the sovereign units are correctly informed concerning the 
 true objects of proposed administrative action, then individual 
 freedom stands in danger ; if not of being destroyed, then of 
 being seriously impaired. Consequently, one of the prime req- 
 uisites to proper administrative action by The Commonwealth is 
 the proper formation of political majorities ; and one of the prime 
 necessities of the commonwealth is a proper means for forming in- 
 dividuals into political majorities. This is especially true of 
 commonwealths which, like ours, attempt to administer 
 Government according to the Will of a constant succession of 
 political majorities ; and Political Leadership meets this necessity. 
 
 Necessity for Morality in. As stated before, the moral strength 
 of a democracy is founded upon the fundamental principles govern- 
 ing its collective political action. Political principles require 
 some means through which their force can be brought to bear 
 on the individuals who exercise political power and authority ; and 
 The Commonwealth is under the moral obligation to keep its 
 political means strictly in unison with its moral principles of 
 action. 
 
 The ultimate success of society will depend most largely upon 
 
 First. Its Principles of Action — which supply individuals 
 with proper motives of action ;
 
 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 179 
 
 Second. The general intelligence of at least a majority of 
 society — which enables its members to know what they want and 
 to forecast the probable results of their proposed administrative 
 action ; and 
 
 Third. The absolute fitness of their political means and 
 methods, which, if they are fit and are combined with right motives 
 and a fair amount of individual sagacity, will at least guarantee 
 the continued opportunity for taking right political action. 
 
 But unless the channel through which the moral force of the 
 principles is led to the people is kept unobstructed and pure, then 
 the impulse which proceeds from the people is likely to become 
 impure and of insufficient vitality to produce the promised 
 "Fruits of Government." 
 
 A Political Means : In all of its aspects, however, Political 
 Leadership is one of the political means which The Commonwealth 
 employs first, for the purpose of enabling the Collective Sovereign 
 to discharge its obligations of sovereignty properly ; and next, for 
 the purpose of enabling the legislature to provide The Common- 
 wealth with the best Statutory Law obtainable. 
 
 Functions : As originally conceived Political Leadership is the 
 natural means for obtaining general support to administrative 
 policies ; for presenting these policies to the people at large in a 
 clear, definite, and understandable manner; for elevating the 
 moral conscience and public spirit of the individual; and for 
 "Heveloping the political capacity of The Commonwealth. It is 
 also one of the means for inculcating a general desire for democratic 
 methods of political action, and for stimulating the love of the 
 Principles of the State Polity. It is one of the logical means in 
 a Republic for obtaining a truly representative administrative 
 agency; for assisting the people at large to understand what is 
 being done in and by that agency ; and for enabling The Electorate 
 to obtain responsive action from it and to enforce responsible 
 action from its members. 
 
 In the Formation of Political Parties. Of course there will always 
 be differences of opinion between individual electors concerning 
 either the necessity for or the propriety of a proposed course of 
 action ; and it is these differences in opinion that raise the political 
 issues which The Electorate has to decide. The issues are con- 
 stantly arising as society progresses and the differences in indi- 
 vidual opinion work constantly to separate individuals into 
 two or more groups, the individuals of which work together 
 for the purpose of securing the adoption and application of
 
 180 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 some administrative policy which they all agree will promote 
 the general welfare most. 
 
 Such groups, so separated, so animated, and so working, fill all 
 the requirements of true political parties ; and it is a special prov- 
 ince of true Political Leadership to enlighten the less informed 
 among the electorate concerning the meaning and the proposed 
 effects of any given administrative policy so that individuals 
 may freely form and reform themselves into true political parties 
 working for the production of true political majorities as often 
 as the constantly changing administrative questions arise. 
 Leadership is thus made to serve as a factor in logical action, the 
 integrity of which both the community and the individual are 
 interested vitally in preserving. 
 
 Requisites of. Unless, however, each individual is absolutely 
 free to choose between the ideas that are advocated by the natural 
 leaders, and unless these leaders are also afforded full opportunities 
 to freely and directly reach the people at all times, then political 
 leadership in electorate action loses most of its operative force. 
 
 Also, unless The Commonwealth possesses a system of electorate 
 action under which it is both possible and easy for the people 
 to send their natural leaders into The Government, then it becomes 
 impossible for the community to secure the full benefits of Political 
 Leadership, to say nothing of its having to put up with whatever 
 kind of leadership the defective system makes possible and 
 probable. 
 
 Defined. Political Leadership is natural leadership used in 
 administrative action. The main difference between the two 
 lies in the fact that while natural leadership may be and is used 
 by all sorts of individuals in all kinds of social and economic effort, 
 political leadership is or should be exercised by those natural 
 leaders only who, animated by public spirit, will place the obliga- 
 tions of sovereignty above personal or party considerations. 
 When such leaders are given a free opportunity to act. Political 
 Leadership becomes the free play of Statesmanship upon the 
 intelligence of the Sovereign-units. 
 
 Distinctive Problem of. There is no step or stage of adminis- 
 trative work in which political leadership, if permitted, does not 
 impart the deciding character of that work. Theoretically, it is 
 only when public opinion is freely and deliberately formed under the 
 guidance of political leadership that it becomes the energizing 
 force in, and the controlling influence over, the action of The 
 Government. If the individual while forming his opinion upon
 
 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 181 
 
 administrative policies and candidacies is subjected to influences 
 and considerations which, not being prompted by reason and con- 
 science, do not bear directly upon the right or wrong of his action 
 and the probable consequences thereof, then his vote on the ques- 
 tion of the adoption contributes nothing but uncertainty and in- 
 definiteness to the result considered as an expression of public 
 opinion. And taking nominations into consideration, unless the 
 individual is unhampered in his efforts to entrust the exercise of 
 political authority to the leaders in whom he has confidence, then 
 his ability to assist in keeping the character of his representative 
 agency up to the required level, or in filling it w^ith members who 
 are representative of the true Will of The People, will be impaired 
 or possibly destroyed. 
 
 It often happens that many periods of administration elapse 
 before the people decide finally what administrative policy shall 
 be adopted. During these periods of suspense the true political 
 parties — those spontaneous and voluntary associations of 
 Sovereign-units that are formed to advocate or to oppose the 
 adoption of any given policy — continue to exist. Even in 
 States with the least population the membership in such parties 
 will reach into the thousands ; and since the action of any body 
 of men which reaches even into the hundreds will always be the 
 action in fact of the smaller body of men who — in order to make 
 the action of the larger body more effective — are encouraged 
 to assemble, organize, and lead the larger body, the people 
 are brought face to face with this political problem ; namely, 
 How to keep their Political Leadership always political in 
 composition and character, and how to prevent it from dete- 
 riorating into a means for the promotion of private and 
 selfish interests and so to the production of discord and dis- 
 content in society. 
 
 Must Be Safeguarded by Law. The Commonwealth can solve 
 the problem in just one way ; namely, through affording public- 
 spirited leaders a continuous opportunity to reach the Sovereign- 
 units directly; not through educational institutions merely, be- 
 cause the people do not fully control them ; not through the various 
 departments of the press for the same reason ; but face to face 
 in the forum and through the power of the spoken word and the 
 force of personality. 
 
 This was one of the problems facing the people of the original 
 Commonwealths which they never met. The situation called 
 for the passage of Laws that sharply defined and prescribed the
 
 182 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 proper exercise of political power by the electors in each step and 
 stage of their action. It does not matter what the means may- 
 be, whether it be leadership or the ballot. Neither can be kept 
 pure or used properly in the absence of appropriate and compre- 
 hensive laws ; for Laws are the only rules in political action that 
 stand a fair chance of observance. 
 
 Our experience with the ballot is illustrative. We have been 
 trying for a century and a quarter to keep the ballot pure ; and 
 the reason we have not succeeded yet is to be found in the fact 
 that up to the present we have not regulated properly many of the 
 processes of administration which center on the use of the ballot, 
 and, as a consequence, we have not as yet been able to prevent its 
 use for illogical purposes. 
 
 How Kept Pure through Utilizing Natural Forces, If laws 
 existed under which individuals could remain free to act in ad- 
 ministrative matters according to the best of their understanding 
 and belief; and if there were nothing to prevent but everything 
 to encourage political activity in the natural leaders of society; 
 then, the fundamental desire which lies deep in the hearts of the 
 great masses of the people for individual freedom, liberty, justice, 
 and political equality, combined with the public spirit and acumen 
 of their true leaders, could be relied upon to keep the political 
 leadership of the people political in nature, for both individuals 
 and leaders would have the means for keeping it so. 
 
 Would Guarantee Existence of Political Parties Only. And with 
 nothing to prevent, but ever;yi:hing to encourage the free formation 
 of individual belief and the free expression of individual will in 
 matters administrative, then the separate bodies of electors 
 hereinbefore mentioned could never attain a permanent basis 
 naturally ; because the free groupings and regroupings of in- 
 dividuals according to their political beliefs would render that 
 impossible. True political parties would spring naturally into 
 existence for the express purpose of giving an added efficiency to 
 the work of true political leadership ; and the group would cease 
 to exist as an association when the political issues upon which its 
 individuals were united were finally decided. Political parties 
 as an institution would not cease to exist. On the contrary; 
 their existence and their use as a political means would be guaran- 
 teed to The Commonwealth ; but partizan party associations of 
 mere voters in which despotic and undemocratic power is applied 
 to Sovereign-units would cease to have a place among the ad- 
 ministrative means of a democracy, for moral freedom in adminis-
 
 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 183 
 
 trative action would tend towards keeping leadership non-partizaii 
 in nature through causing it to receive support on political grounds 
 alone. 
 
 Makes Political Action Attractive. Then again, and looking 
 at the matter from another standpoint. If individuals while 
 engaged in administrative matters were wholly free to act in a 
 democratic manner, then the power of the separate electoral 
 groups would be in the group membership ; and could be used 
 for drawing into political action those men who by nature and 
 education are best equipped for the work of Political Leadership. 
 The work of such men would tend inevitably towards making 
 politics and administrative work not only interesting but attractive 
 to the peDple at large through showing the less informed individual 
 electors how to use their political powers towards the correct 
 solutions of the political problems of The State. 
 
 Effect on Force of Public Opinion. Also, were true political 
 leadership assured, then public opinion could become in fact the 
 virile source of administrative activity. Instead of possessing the 
 uncertain and indefinite force of a mere opinion that is produced 
 in and from an uninformed or a misinformed, or in an unguided 
 or a misguided, or in a bewildered, deluded, and disunited populace, 
 public opinion could become free, definite, spontaneous, powerful, 
 and possessed of a force fully entitled to and fully able to command 
 respect and observance from individuals, officials, and adminis- 
 trative agencies. 
 
 Ttoo Fields of Action. Political Leadership has two distinct 
 fields of action ; namely, in The Electorate, and in The Govern- 
 ment. In each it produces separate and distinct effects. Working 
 freely in The Electorate, it is capable of producing logical initiatory 
 action. Working freely in The Government it is capable of 
 producing logical detail administrative action. 
 
 Dual Functions of. Political Leadership has a dual function to 
 discharge ; namely : 
 
 First: To guide The Electorate in the exercise of political 
 power; and 
 
 Second: To guide The Government in the exercise of political 
 authority. 
 
 Electorate Leadership. Of the two functions the guidance of the 
 electorate is the most important. Under our plan of action the 
 final character of our administrative action is made to depend 
 largely upon the character of the individuals sent into The 
 Government; and the character of that agency depends very
 
 184 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 largely upon the manner in which the work of political leadership 
 is performed in The Electorate. 
 
 United Electoral Action. For all administrative purposes The 
 Electorate is the Collective Sovereign. As such it must necessarily 
 impart impulse and direction to the action of The Government. 
 The Commonwealth has declared that the Right to Govern, the 
 Power to Govern, and the Obligation to Govern belongs to and 
 rests with the entire male (and in some States female) population 
 of the age of twenty-one years and over who have complied with 
 certain other provisions of eligibility. The power, the right, and 
 the obligation is the power, right, and obligation of a Sovereign ; 
 and cannot be considered properly as an individual attribute, or 
 be exercised properly by any single individual or small group of 
 individuals. Consequently there can be no logical transfer or 
 delegation of the exercise of any electoral power by an individual 
 to another ; there can be no logical individual relinquishment of a 
 political right, or its exchange for a private and material advan- 
 tage ; there can be no logical transfer by one individual to another 
 of the discharge of the obligation ; and the only logical course left 
 open to Sovereign-units while they are engaged in initiating ad- 
 ministrative action is through united electoral action under 
 political leadership ; unquestionably not through " Party Leader- 
 ship " because that has the effect of disuniting electoral action 
 and also works for the promotion of objects other than the general 
 welfare. 
 
 Leadership in The Government. Political Leadership to be 
 effectual must act continuously; and in order to secure the full 
 benefits flowing from continuous political leadership the common- 
 wealths originally adopted the plan of sending their true political 
 leaders into The Government; in this way securing the benefit 
 of their action w^hile the changed relations of individuals were 
 being temporarily adjusted by that body. With true political 
 leaders in The Government, where they could deal authoritatively 
 with these problems of adjustment, that body would be relieved 
 to a great extent of difficulties caused by the rapidly shiftmg 
 partizan majorities that are sent into it. The present inability of 
 the electorate to freely select or to elect its representatives and 
 to directly control their official action is not innate or inherent in 
 the electorate. It is one of the manifestations of an illogical 
 leadership. It arises partly out of the unprincipled restraints that 
 are put upon the free and natural action of individual electors 
 by The Partizan Party while it is assuming to act as the leader
 
 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 185 
 
 in electoral action. By means of these wrongful restraints The 
 Partizan Party succeeds in destroying Political Leadership, and 
 so at the same time succeeds in destroying the natural relation- 
 ship or connecting bond that would otherwise exist between 
 The Electorate and The Government. Acting as the " Leader " 
 in electoral action The Partizan Party succeeds in filling the govern- 
 mental offices with the party partizans it sends there for partizan 
 reasons and purposes ; and the interminable attempts of these 
 partizans to make a political office serve " Party " and personal 
 ends creates that friction in the governmental part of adminis- 
 tration which is commonly ascribed to defects in our " Form " 
 of Government. The defects are not in our form of Government. 
 They do exist, however, in our present administrative system 
 which affords the opportunity to The Partizan Party as the ad- 
 ministrative leader to engraft " party " functions upon political 
 offices and enforce these functions afterwards for " Party " and 
 personal reasons. 
 
 Partizan Party Leadership. No American Commonwealth 
 has ever safeguarded the opportunity for the continued existence 
 of political leadership by Law. As a consequence none of them 
 now possesses political leadership in the true sense of the term. 
 Each has a spurious leadership that manipulates individual action 
 and official action. But this leadership is a partizan party leader- 
 ship and not a political leadership. It is directed towards obtain- 
 ing " Party " advantage which is desired mainly for private 
 reasons. It is not used for the purpose of maintaining individual 
 freedom in political action. On the contrary, it is directed towards 
 the destruction of such freedom as far as is possible. Under it 
 The Commonwealth can not take free action because many of 
 its Sovereign-units are bound in their action by " Party " custom 
 and consequently are restricted in their political freedom. Those 
 who acknowledge the binding force of " Party " custom and regu- 
 lations are not absolutely free to group and regroup themselves 
 into true political parties. Such parties do not exist. In their 
 place we have the permanent partizan party associations composed 
 of two classes : the drivers and the driven, the active and the 
 passive. The small active class has assumed the exercise of 
 leadership in administrative action. It is composed exclusively 
 of men who place " Party Success " ahead of everything else in 
 political administration. It is largely composed of men who seek 
 either positions of individual power, or of " party power," or 
 special opportunities for the acquisition of wealth, or salaried
 
 186 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 positions in the public service or in the partizan party organiza- 
 tions ; none of which are true political objects. 
 
 A leadership so composed, and which is dominated by personal 
 considerations, must necessarily produce maladministration. It is 
 useless to claim that because " Party leadership is the free choice 
 of the people " it amounts in the end to Political Leadership. The 
 very nature, composition, character, and objects of The Partizan 
 Party preclude every other idea but that of partizan party leader- 
 ship. As well claim that because paper money is the free choice 
 of the people it is the same thing in effect as gold money. One 
 means is never the same thing as another means. Each has its 
 own applicability and produces its own results. 
 
 The Purity of The Leader. Unquestionably if the people are 
 to have partizan party leadership then it becomes necessary for 
 them to keep the partizan parties purely political in character, 
 composition, and action. But the people have never taken any 
 adequate steps towards securing proper action within and by the 
 partizan parties. Upon the pretext of " mutual service " the 
 people have permitted partizan parties to contend with each 
 other for the control of the exercise of the administrative powers 
 and have allowed the active class in the partizan parties to obtain 
 an ascendancy over the consciences of the passive members of a 
 partizan party through specious " appeals " for " Regularity in 
 party action." The people have allowed the active class either 
 to make these appeals effectual through an illogical bestowal of 
 personal advantage, or to turn the " appeals " into threats by 
 hinting at the exercise of " party discipline." 
 
 The people have failed utterly to maintain the requisite character, 
 composition, and action of their accredited leadership agency. As 
 partial results partizan parties have been allowed to destroy the 
 idea of the responsibility of The Sovereign in the minds of many 
 Sovereign-units ; partizan parties have succeeded in separating 
 many such units from their rightful exercise of administrative 
 powers; and have actually prevented the remainder from dis- 
 charging their political duties and obligations effectively. 
 
 "The Choice between Two Evib." Such leadership action 
 produces very serious effects. There are two or more partizan 
 party organizations in every State. To them is given the right 
 to frame the political issue up for decision. The " Issues " raised 
 by these organizations are never strictly political issues. The 
 memberships do not frame the issues. Partizan party necessities 
 are merely " framed up " by the managements into the appearance
 
 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 187 
 
 of political issues, and the people are obliged to choose between 
 them. Thus, through giving the exercise of the power to frame 
 political issues to partizan parties the Commonwealth, in effect, 
 reduces its Sovereign-units to a choice between two non-political 
 courses of action as the means for obtaining good political adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 Proper Administrative Action Impossible. Under partizan 
 party leadership any so called " Party " is allowed to coop some 
 of the Sovereign-units within " Party " organizations where, by 
 forcing them to vote as the management dictates, a partizan party 
 succeeds in producing subordinate action from sovereign-units; 
 in disuniting electoral action ; in securing from a disunited and 
 partizan party-hampered electorate a partizan party impulse 
 which perverts political administration from its intended objects 
 and purposes ; and finally succeeds in producing Government by 
 The Partizan Party instead of Government by The People. 
 
 The Abdication of Sovereignty. If we consider The Electorate 
 to be the guardian of The Reserved Powers of the people ; if we 
 consider the object of electorate action to be the promotion of the 
 General Welfare ; if we consider that one of the special functions 
 of the electorate is the control of the exercise of The Delegated 
 Powers ; then it follows that if for any reason or pretext what- 
 soever The Electorate passes the immediate control over in- 
 dividual electoral action and official action into the hands 
 of any mere group of electors whatsoever, then it has com- 
 mitted the act of abdicating sovereignty whether it has done 
 so wittingly or unwittingly. 
 
 Finally, no ultimate result in administrative action proceeds 
 solely from the use of any one single means ; but each of the above 
 named results is attributable very largely to the use of a wrong 
 kind of leadership in administrative action. The work of main- 
 taining the ordained conditions of individual existence is the 
 hardest work faced by the electorates of free communities. It 
 can not be done so long as communities are led by the organized 
 force of self-interest and by a leading agency that manipulates 
 the electors in the interests of " The Party." Of all forms of 
 government Democracy is most dependent for its success upon 
 its administrative system. If the people are to succeed in solving 
 their political problems correctly they must have a system under 
 which true political leadership is afforded the fullest opportunity to 
 stimulate Public Opinion and increase administrative knowledge. 
 True political leadership, however, can not exist in a Democratic
 
 188 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 commonwealth unless the sovereign-units keep themselves politi- 
 cally free, and free also to follow the lead of those, who, combining 
 within themselves a sense of public duty and political sagacity, are 
 capable of showing the uninformed how the general welfare as or- 
 dained can be produced through logical political administration.
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
 A Necessity in a Republic. In every populous and territorially 
 large Republic wherein the exercise of The Powers of Administra- 
 tion is entrusted to a given class of its citizens a true Political 
 Party is a proper and logical political means. It is capable of 
 contributing so much of propriety and of effectiveness to political 
 administration that its use as a means becomes not only advisable 
 but practically indispensable. 
 
 Each body politic has its own distinctive problems to solve; 
 and each is confined necessarily to the use of certain definite and 
 characteristic instrumentalities of action. The political parties 
 in a Representative Democracy will differ in many respects from 
 those in pure Democracy and also from those in a Monarchy. 
 Consequently, and in order to determine with certainty just 
 what constitutes a true political party in our Commonwealths 
 we shall have to take into consideration the various ideas which 
 govern the manner of its formation, determine its composition, 
 fix its character, prescribe its objects and functions, and limit 
 the sphere of its action and its duration. 
 
 Principles. Whenever large bodies of individuals are at one 
 and the same time engaged in promoting the political welfare 
 of The State and the private welfare of the individual, differences 
 in belief concerning the course of administrative action best cal- 
 culated to produce these results will naturally arise and divide 
 individuals into groups holding opposite beliefs ; but no matter 
 what the cause may be that separates individuals into groups 
 advocating different courses of administrative action, each in- 
 dividual, while engaged in the settlement of the controversy, 
 whether he acts alone or in combination with others is theoretically 
 bound to act so that he violates neither the spirit and intent of his 
 ordained principles of association, nor transgresses the commonly 
 accepted rules of free Democratic action. The necessary free 
 
 189
 
 190 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 agreement of wills between individuals is to be produced by the 
 force of arguments addressed to their intellects and consciences, 
 and by the use of no other means whatsoever. 
 
 Administrative Routine. Theoretically, The Electorate imparts 
 the necessary impulse to action in The Government b}^ deciding 
 the temporary administrative policy in each period of administra- 
 tion. Theoretically, the impulse, in order to be authoritative 
 and binding upon the Government, must proceed from a logically 
 formed and ascertained majority of individual wills. If a definite 
 or satisfactory agreement of wills can not be reached in one period 
 of administration, then the attempt to reach an agreement con- 
 tinues through two or more periods until the attempt is successful 
 or is abandoned by common consent and for suflBcient reason. 
 When the agreement is finally reached then The Government 
 is supposed to work out the detail connected with putting the 
 settled course of action into effective operation. 
 
 The Question. The question is. Whether a given course of ad- 
 ministration shall be had, or not ? This is a political question. 
 
 The Problem. The problem is, How can a definite decision of 
 the question be reached in a logical manner ? 
 
 The Practise. Under Democratic procedure the practise is, 
 To bring the question before the people, to give it a full hearing ; 
 and to obtain a free vote on it. 
 
 An added force can be imparted to individual effort by con- 
 certed and common advocacy of ideas that are held by many ; 
 and theoretically, the similarly minded individuals in the body 
 politic are permitted to organize themselves into groups under 
 political leaders of their choice for the express purpose of securing 
 this added force ; and for no other purpose whatsoever. 
 
 The Management of. Those members of an organized group 
 who do not take an active part in the direction of its affairs, 
 voluntarily defer to their leaders in thought. This secures a 
 unity of management with which to advocate the unity of purpose. 
 The unity of management is an element of strength in the or- 
 ganization. It promotes efficiency. It generally inspires con- 
 fidence and tends to draw from separated and isolated individuals 
 a concerted and harmonious support of the common object. 
 
 Is a Voluntary Organization. The act of associating himself 
 with others in constructive administrative work is purely voluntary 
 on the part of the individual. The desire for added force prompts 
 the act. The individual is under no legal obligation to join. 
 A political party is not a political agency. It is never entrusted
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES 191 
 
 with the exercise of pohtical power or political authority. Its 
 province is to produce a right exercise of that power and authority 
 from the duly constituted agencies ; and the mere fact that since 
 the beginnings of American State Government the partizan party 
 has succeeded through partizan party legislation in obtaining 
 a specious "legal " standing before the people as an agency can not 
 be advanced properly or successfully in opposition to the claims 
 made here concerning a Political Party. 
 
 Is a Freely Fanned Organization. The individual is free to join 
 a political party. He is also at all times free to leave it. He is 
 under no compulsion one way or the other except that exercised 
 by his conscience and reason, which are free. If he joins, he 
 relinquishes no right whatsoever. Nor does he escape respon- 
 sibility for the proper discharge of any obligation of sovereignty ; 
 nor avoid responsibility for the proper performance of any duty 
 of citizenship ; nor alter the nature of his moral obligations. 
 If he joins he merely agrees to be governed in his immediate ad- 
 ministrative action by the superior sagacity, wisdom and experi- 
 ence of his voluntarily accepted leaders in political thought so 
 long as their actions receive the approbation of his conscience 
 and reason, and no longer. 
 
 Is a Temyorary Organization. A Political Party can never 
 remain permanently organized. Government is permanent ; 
 Political Agencies are permanent; Political Administration is 
 continuous ; but political parties like political majorities form 
 and disappear as the changing social conditions produce con- 
 stantly changing political problems, which in turn produce con- 
 stantly changing associations of individuals that are organized 
 on the spur of the moment to advocate the adoption of new rules 
 of administrative action, or the reformation of old rules, methods, 
 and procedure. 
 
 All administrative questions are distinct. All call for distinctive 
 action ; and each calls separately for its proper and final settle- 
 ment. When an association of electors has accomplished the 
 distinctive object that unites its members together, what more 
 is there for it to do? If it does more, if it attempts to exercise 
 political power instead of influencing its exercise, then it ceases 
 to be a political party in object and character because it grasps 
 at the exercise of power, which exercise belongs to The Electorate. 
 
 Contrasted with Political Majorities. Especially are the younger 
 readers of this book cautioned to keep the distinction between 
 political parties and political majorities clear in their minds.
 
 192 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Both have some features in common but both differ in the following 
 respects. A political party is never so large numerically as a 
 political majority. The political party is the logical means for 
 the creation of a political majority. If its work is successful 
 it draws support to its ideas from individuals who have contrib- 
 uted neither money nor effort in support of its organization. 
 Considered as an organization a political party is a group of electors 
 actively working ; while a political majority is merely a defi- 
 nitely ascertained number of concurring political wills. The 
 party is an entity : the majority is an expression. 
 
 Functions, Work of. The work of a political party is intended 
 to produce convictions in the minds of the people at large. The 
 convictions in turn produce support throughout the State. The 
 similarly minded work together as temporary aggregations of 
 individuals having a common political will. One of these aggre- 
 gations will contain more individuals than the other or others. 
 Their votes express the temporary majority of political wills or 
 the political majority, which for the time being determines the 
 Administrative Policy. 
 
 The prime function of a political party is the formation of a 
 political majority. Leaving questions of candidacy out of con- 
 sideration for the moment, the function of a political party is to 
 secure from widely separated Sovereign-units a speedy, logical, 
 and decisive expression of Public Opinion on questions of ad- 
 ministrative import that are pressing for immediate settlement. 
 Individual action that is so obtained is proper individual action 
 because : first, no illogical compulsion is exerted and individual 
 electors are enabled to participate freely in Administrative Action ; 
 second, because by the use of such a means individual electors 
 can exercise the Reserved Powers of Administration directly, and 
 perform their Duties of Citizenship as it was originally intended 
 they should be performed ; and thirdly, because by the aid of 
 such a means the impulse to The Government is made to proceed 
 directly from the people. 
 
 A Means for Promoting the General Welfare. A political party 
 is a logical means for assisting individual electors to promote the 
 general welfare in accordance with the spirit and intent of their 
 Governmental Agreement. The people permit aggregations of 
 electors to avail themselves of the added force of organization 
 solely upon the theory that a political party will assist individuals 
 in and to a logical exercise of The Reserved Powers of Administra- 
 tion as questions arise concerning its proper exercise. Acting in
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES 193 
 
 this way a political party becomes a logical means for assisting 
 Political Leadership to crystallize public opinion upon some one 
 question or another of political administration that has arisen 
 or that is pressing for settlement in some one or another period 
 of administration. 
 
 A Means for Obtaining a Hearing. When a political party has 
 secured a political majority in favor of applying a course of po- 
 litical administration which it advocates and the question is 
 settled, and supposing that another question is pressing for settle- 
 ment, then all the members who composed the political party 
 of the affirmative on the settled question, and the members of the 
 party or parties opposed being no longer held together by a common 
 object or desire, are automatically left free to regroup themselves 
 and to reorganize themselves into new political parties which work 
 for the settlement of the new question through securing other 
 political majorities. This process, repeated so long as there are 
 political issues to decide, produces the " Succession of Political 
 Majorities " that is necessary in the continuous Political Ad- 
 ministration of a Republic ; and a political party motived, acting, 
 and formed as above set forth, is a political means which the 
 American Commonwealths can use logically for the purpose of 
 bringing a political question before the people for a comprehensive 
 and deliberative hearing in any period of administration. 
 
 Is a Means of Appeal. But possibly The Government may not 
 proceed immediately to put the settled course of administrative 
 action into active operation, or may make only a part of it opera- 
 tive; thus in effect leaving individuals in uncertainty and the 
 question in suspense. If The Government continues inactive 
 during one or more periods of administration and its inaction 
 produces a more or less widely felt discontent, then relief may be 
 sought through electing new representatives of the people who will 
 apply and enforce public opinion. At such times a political party 
 becomes the logical means by which those who feel aggrieved 
 may appeal to the people for relief from delay on the part of 
 The Government. 
 
 Or possibly The Government, ignoring public opinion, may pass 
 laws which neither carry out nor apply the true intent of the ex- 
 pressed opinion. In such a case a political party is the logical 
 means by which those who are aggrieved or injured may appeal 
 to the people for relief from the wrongful action of The Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Then again, The Government, being composed of individuals,
 
 194 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 may err unintentionally either under the spur of sudden emotion 
 and passion, or because of insufficient time for necessary de- 
 liberation. Laws may be passed which are shown ultimately 
 to be bad in principle; creating as it were specially privileged 
 classes, or favoring one economic " Interest " over another or 
 others. In short, whenever The Government so acts that many 
 of the people feel aggrieved by its action, then a political party 
 becomes the logical means for reviewing past representative 
 action before the people with the view of correcting improper 
 legislation. 
 
 Procedure, One Question at a Time. Considering a political 
 party as a means employed to obtain a speedy, logical, and de- 
 cisive settlement of political issues and questions, the members 
 composing the organization should never attempt to settle more 
 than one question at a time. If two questions are brought up for 
 decision at one time then it is more than likely that the membership 
 of the party will cease to be a unit on both questions ; that the 
 solidarity of the party will be shaken ; and if this happens, then 
 the usefulness of the party will be impaired. We have no com- 
 monly accepted political science which, if it existed, would bear 
 the same relation to the political action of individual electors 
 that Parliamentary Law does to the action of individuals in public 
 meetings. If we had such a science, it would from the very nature 
 of things require the settlement of one question at a time. Legis- 
 lative bodies and public meetings never divide — that is, advo- 
 cate, deliberate, and vote — upon two questions at once. Demo- 
 cratic procedure requires that the attention of the elector shall 
 be concentrated on one political issue ; that the issue shall be 
 decided by a vote for or against, so that the political situation 
 shall be cleared for future political action on future political 
 questions. The underlying purpose in this procedure is to obtain 
 certainty in the settlement of the question and the removal of 
 doubt as to sentiment ; but these effects can not be produced if 
 the attention of the elector is directed to more than one issue 
 at a time, or if there be uncertainty, ambiguity, or diversity in the 
 issues as stated. 
 
 Bond of Union. Considering a political party as an actively 
 working organization of Sovereign-units, one of its prime requisites 
 is that all of the individuals composing the organization be united 
 upon a fundamental principle of political action, upon the ad- 
 visability of applying it in political administration, and upon 
 the general manner in which it shall be applied.
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES 195 
 
 If all be not agreed, then the association is devoid of a binding 
 force sufficient to make it a unit as to object; and if all be not 
 agreed as to the meaning of some political principle and as to the 
 advisability of applying it, then the association fails of being a 
 political party. I do not mean by this that the organization as 
 such is necessarily disrupted to the point of being destroyed; 
 but I do mean to say that if an organization is kept alive after the 
 members have become divided on principle, or after the members 
 hold no common uniting belief, the nature of the association 
 will surely reflect the nature of the binding force which is employed 
 to keep the members together; and, that if the binding force 
 is non-political in nature, the association will be non-political 
 in kind. Whenever it is the fear of " party discipline," or the hope 
 of " party reward," or appeals to " party regularity " that keeps 
 individuals associated together ; and whenever it is " Orders 
 from the Boss " which produce action within and from organiza- 
 tions of electors, then the actual bond of union is non-political 
 in character, and the organization becomes a means for transmuting 
 electoral action into " party action " for " party ends " that are 
 never wholly political in nature and may be the very reverse. 
 Membership in such organizations by Sovereign-units is a virtual 
 disclaimer of individual political duty, obligation, and responsi- 
 bility. 
 
 Principles of Organization. The principles of association and 
 work of a true political party must be identical w ith the principles 
 under which individuals associate together as a body politic, as 
 otherwise there will be two divergent and antagonistic sets of 
 principles at work in society for the accomplishment of the same 
 end. Members of a true political party are Sovereign-units 
 above everything else. They are bound by the obligations of 
 sovereignty. They are held to a proper performance of the duties 
 of citizenship ; and they profess to be governed in their individual 
 action by the commonly accepted provisions — not merely the 
 forms — of Democratic procedure. A true political party is 
 merely a temporary political means which enables electors to 
 exercise their political power more effectively ; to participate 
 in political administration more effectually, and to participate 
 in a manner that is consistent with, and supportive of, the true 
 intent of the chosen principles of political action. An elector has 
 a trust function to discharge. He avails himself of the force 
 of organization in order to make his trusteeship more beneficial 
 to all concerned than it otherwise would be. Consequently, the
 
 196 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 principles of the organization must be such as will make the intent 
 of the original creators of the trust fully operative. 
 
 Must Be a Logical Means. Political duty is paramount to 
 party duty. In order that a political party (considered as an 
 organization of electors) shall assist all electors whatsoever to a 
 proper discharge of political duty, it must at all times and for all 
 purposes act strictly in accord with the fundamental principles 
 of administrative action which have been ordained by common 
 consent. If in the beginning, The Sovereign has neglected to 
 provide its units with a logical means of administrative action, 
 nevertheless the electors are bound by the obligations of sovereignty 
 to provide The Sovereign with such a means. If the political 
 capacity of an elector becomes diminished through joining an 
 association of electors in which freedom of individual action is 
 undemocratically restricted, then the ability of that elector to 
 assist The Sovereign to solve its political problems properly is 
 made unequal with that of electors who do not join ; the principle 
 of political equality is deprived of some of its proper force and 
 effect; and the political capacity of The Commonwealth is*di- 
 minished just so much. If this happens to many electors, then 
 the political capacity of The Commonwealth may become seri- 
 ously impaired ; and, proceeding to extremes, if a sufficient 
 number of electors identify themselves with — or even support 
 the ticket of — an organization that is not working for strictly 
 political objects and ends so that party success at the polls 
 is assured, then, providing this practise is continued and 
 developed, it is only a matter of time when the capacity 
 of The Commonwealth to take logical action will become de- 
 stroyed altogether. 
 
 If, on the other hand, a political party exists for the purpose 
 of promoting the general welfare, and is formed, motived, and 
 acting in the manner above set forth in detail, then political 
 administration in the American Commonwealths could become 
 as near being " Government according to The Will of The People " 
 as it is possible to get it ; but the reader will notice that in such 
 a summary no provision whatever exists for a permanent or a 
 rigid association of mere " voters." 
 
 Must Use Logical Methods. A political party, like The Elec- 
 torate, is morally confined to the use of logical means and methods. 
 In this connection the word " logical " is of more urgency than 
 the words " legal " and " lawful " as expressing a s;vTionymous 
 meaning. The object of a political party is to assist in producing
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES 197 
 
 right political action as that term is indicated by the State Polity. 
 Right action is moral action ; and final moral political action re- 
 quires the use in all steps and stages of moral instrumentalities, 
 which, in this case, are instrumentalities that reflect and carry out 
 the spirit of Government and produce right action from individuals 
 and political agencies. The people may have unpresciently put 
 upon their statutes some rule of political action that in its real 
 object and operation does not reflect the intent of the principles 
 of such action, or does not enable individual electors to freely, 
 fully, and effectually participate in political administration. 
 Such a rule of action is unquestionably " legal " or " lawful " 
 in a sense ; but no amount of use can make it a logical rule ; and 
 it never can be a right one, that is, one which is appropriate for 
 the use of an association of free electors. 
 
 Defined : Reviewing everything that has been said heretofore 
 regarding Political Action, we shall be obliged to define a Political 
 Party as : 
 
 I 
 
 (1) An Organization of Electors, 
 
 (2) Freely, voluntarily, and temporarily united together, 
 
 (3) Whose Officers, Managing Bodies and Members work in 
 unison, and logically, 
 
 (4) During some Period or Periods of Administration, 
 
 (5) For the purpose of promoting the General Welfare, 
 
 (6) By deciding some one Political Issue, Controversy, or 
 Question, 
 
 (7) According to some Fundamental Principle of Action, 
 
 (8) Concerning the meaning of which principle, 
 
 (9) And the advisability of applying it, 
 (10) They are all agreed. 
 
 As to Candidates. Enough has been said in previous chap- 
 ters of the undesirable and illogical results and effects pro- 
 duced by allowing the decision of the administrative policy 
 to be determined by votes that are cast in favor of candidates 
 for office. 
 
 It has been repeatedly pointed out that theoretically — which 
 is the same thing as rightfully — the candidates for office are 
 to be freely selected by The Electorate. The political leaders 
 of the people, as before described, are the logical candidates for the 
 public offices ; but, confining ourselves to our text, when the stage 
 of administrative action is passed wherein the candidates have
 
 198 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 been sifted and selected, then the political party becomes a proper 
 means for placing their merits and qualifications before the people, 
 and for advocating their election. This matter of candidates 
 will be placed in a clearer light when we reach a consideration 
 of partizan party candidates; and for the present let us try to 
 reach a clearer perception of what a political party really is by 
 enumerating some of the things it is not. 
 
 What a Political Party Is Not : A political party is not a theoretical 
 or constitutional agency. The stated obligations of sovereignty 
 do not include an obligation to join any political association. 
 The duties of citizenship do not require any such action. The 
 citizen owes allegiance to The State only. He rests under the 
 moral duty to vote ; but not for, or with, a party, political or other- 
 wise. His vote is intended to express his own idea of freedom 
 and justice and how they can best be maintained ; and not any 
 party idea of these conditions, or methods of maintenance. The 
 party is merely the means enabling him to more effectually ex- 
 press his idea; and in fact his obligations, allegiance, and duty 
 may at times compel him to remain independent of and un- 
 trammeled by all existing party organizations. 
 
 Not a Political Agency. A poHtical party is not an agency 
 entrusted with the exercise of political power or the control of the 
 exercise of political authority while the people attempt to ad- 
 minister justice to individuals. That is the proper work of 
 The Electorate and The Government working together. Theo- 
 retically, The Electorate decides all of the grand questions that 
 are of vital importance to the General Welfare, leaving many of 
 the problems of application to be solved by its representatives 
 in The Government. 
 
 The average organization which at present is called a political 
 party is everywhere more often than otherwise engaged in op- 
 posing other " parties." The danger in " party membership " 
 is, that the attention of the elector who is a party member will be 
 divided between questions of partj^ policy and questions of political 
 import, and that " party questions " may be made to appear 
 of more importance for the tune being than true political ques- 
 tions relative to the continued maintenance of Freedom, Liberty, 
 Equality, and Justice in The State. It is the destructive danger 
 that many political communities have succumbed to in the past ; 
 namely, that of trying to make Sovereign Electors serve " The 
 Party " instead of trying to make the party — a relatively small 
 body — serve the State.
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES 199 
 
 Not a Permanent Organization. A political party is not a per- 
 manent organization such as must exist for the continuous exer- 
 cise of political power or the continued control over the exercise 
 of political authority ; and it should not possess the general 
 features of or act like such an agency. On page 258, Vol. II, of 
 " Political Ethics," Francis Lieber says, " But nothing is more to be 
 shunned than regular party organizations, with lists of admissions 
 and erasures of expelled members, with regular party assessments 
 and distinct party obligations, with absolutely dependent papers 
 dictated to by a leading paper, which is servilely reechoed by 
 the other party organs." 
 
 Nor can a political party, considered as an organization of 
 individual electors, with honesty or propriety, make any promise 
 of material reward to any of its members, or place any of its 
 membership under any obligation to favor the organization. 
 A political party does not know beforehand the limit of its duration. 
 It can not be sure that it will exist long enough to keep its prom- 
 ises. It can make no party promises of material reward to in- 
 dividual members that do not involve individual dereliction in 
 political duty; and, as Mr. Walter Thomas Mills has said on 
 page 61 of his book entitled " The Science of Politics," revised edi- 
 tion : " The party may properly exist only for the public good 
 of all, not for the private good of any. When a thing is to be done 
 purely ' for the sake of the party,' that is a reason for not doing it. 
 It is evident that this is contrary to current popular notions. 
 But the notions are false and our principle is sound." 
 
 Not the Source of Administrative Impulse. A political party 
 is not the source of the Impulse to The Government. That 
 impulse must proceed from the people, using The Electorate as a 
 freely working political agency; and a political party is merely 
 a means enabling the people to decide more speedily and under- 
 standingly what that impulse shall be. 
 
 Not Possessed of Personal Rights. A political party is not an 
 organization having valid rights of a personal nature, such as a 
 right to a vote for its own sake, or its own purposes, or its pri- 
 vately selected candidates, or because of its past record. It is 
 merely a means to enable the elector to vote as he thinks will 
 best conserve the present and future interests and welfare of 
 The State and of the individual. It is only a means to enable 
 The Electorate to secure the present application of some broad 
 principle of action, using officials selected and elected by itself 
 to develop and enforce the application. What a political party
 
 200 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 has done in the past can have no bearing upon the right or wrong 
 of any present political question. 
 
 Summed Up Generally. A political party is not an organization 
 of electors which strives for the strangulation of third or independ- 
 ent political parties ; for the denial to minorities of fair repre- 
 sentation in The Government; for the control of the whole 
 representation from The State ; for " Party Success " ahead of 
 the General Welfare; for the disfranchisement of large bodies 
 of electors ; for misrepresentation as a rule ; for control over the 
 exercise of political power and political authority; for the accu- 
 mulation of votes by mechanical, fraudulent, and criminal means 
 involving the destruction of the political freedom and political 
 equality of the elector, so that it may acquire offices and positions 
 for distribution among its members as rewards for " party 
 regularitv." 
 
 A political party is not an organization of electors which strives 
 to be the " Invisible Government " ; whose officers, managing 
 bodies, and leaders trade votes with the officers, managing bodies, 
 and leaders of other organizations, for offices, positions, and 
 opportunities for private gain ; or which, in its internal organiza- 
 tional action, avoids as far as possible adhering to the ideals of 
 Democracy or the true meaning of democratic action ; which 
 permits its managements or officers to first usurp the power of the 
 organization and then to exercise despotic and tyrannous power 
 in its place, covering the exercise with the cloak of democratic 
 formalities; which through its corrupt public action transmutes 
 what should be the political action of individuals into factional 
 and partizan action ; which debauches private morals ; which 
 lowers the standard of public morals ; which drives capable public- 
 spirited citizens into retirement instead of drawing them into polit- 
 ical activity and service ; which undermines the reputation 
 of The State; which supplants universal felicity with universal 
 distrust ; which bequeathes a largess of apathy and disgust to 
 The Electorate through rendering an honest participation in 
 political administration as difficult as possible, and making the 
 cooperation with it of right-minded and politically intelligent 
 citizens morally impossible. 
 
 A political party is not an organization of electors which strives 
 to prevent united and direct electoral action ; which strives to 
 prevent direct, independent, and responsible action on the part 
 of public officials ; which denies the doctrine of direct political 
 responsibility and substitutes the dictum of party responsibility ;
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES 201 
 
 which interposes every possible obstruction to the proper dis- 
 charge of the obHgations of sovereignty by the Collective Sov- 
 ereign ; which resorts to the use of multifarious detestable means 
 to prevent the proper performance of the duties of citizenship; 
 which in the place of justice deals out privilege ; which denies 
 to one business interest the privileges it accords to another ; 
 which actively encourages the perpetration of every known 
 political crime and misdemeanor and many statutory crimes and 
 misdemeanors ; which organizes the criminal and lustful elements 
 in society to its support ; which systematically hoodwinks and 
 deludes the public with petty deceptions and false claims ; which 
 vitiates public opinion with doubts, uncertainties, ambiguities, 
 and cunning sophistries; which takes advantage of every defect 
 in our political system ; which never tries to remedy any such 
 defect or omission ; which strives to render free, independent 
 sovereign-units politically weak, servile, and dependent ; and which 
 actually does render the Sovereign State impotent to either freely 
 ascertain its will, or to fully enforce obedience to the Principles 
 of the State Polity upon its citizens. 
 
 Such objects, such purposes, such means and methods of party 
 work and of administrative action are none of them characteristic 
 features of a true political party. On the contrary, each and 
 every object, purpose, means, and method just enumerated bears 
 the impress and sign manual of The Partizan Party; and each 
 helps to destroy free political administration. Such results as 
 we American electors produce yearly through the use of the 
 partizan party as an agency in the place of political parties as a 
 means are difficult to explain with satisfaction to ourselves or 
 others. As a whole we are honest and right minded. We are 
 patriotic. But the conclusion is inevitable that as yet we are 
 lamentably lacking in administrative sagacity. 
 
 We attempt to maintain Freedom by means of an agency 
 which produces legislation that is unwarrantedly oppressive 
 to many. 
 
 We attempt to maintain the ordained individual freedom and 
 equality of all electors by permitting many of the electors to join 
 organizations wherein their political freedom and equality is 
 destroyed. 
 
 We profess to act as a democracy should act, and yet we permit 
 the exercise of autocratic, despotic, and tyrannous power by 
 The Managements of these associations over and upon the units 
 of the collective sovereign.
 
 202 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 From this discreditable and contradictory course of action 
 there is but one avenue of escape. The Collective Sovereign 
 must construct an administrative system under which it can 
 compel every association of its units to serve The State alone, 
 and under which it can prevent its own individual units from 
 serving the interests of any party whatsoever.
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 POLITICAL MAJORITIES 
 
 " If it is the fundamental law of a country that the majority of 
 the lawful votes lawfully polled shall be the last decision, the final 
 supreme authority, which decides and can be appealed to, it 
 amounts to a contamination of the supreme authority, when we 
 corrupt it by the introduction of any foreign element." (Lieber, 
 "Political Ethics," Vol. II, Woolsey Rev. Ed., p. 283.) 
 
 The corrupting elements which Mr. Lieber had in mind when 
 writing the above are offenses connected with the detail applica- 
 tion of the Doctrine of Majority Rule which we more specifically 
 designate as naturalization frauds, registration frauds, election 
 frauds, and others. Of course if voters are illogically manufactured 
 through evasion of the provisions relating to acquired citizenship ; 
 if they are Gerrymandered ; if their political action is illogically 
 controlled before the election ; and if " votes " are both manu- 
 factured and manipulated by means of fraudulent individual acts 
 at the elections, then it becomes impossible to obtain a free ex- 
 pression of a political majority, and Public Opinion, so expressed, 
 is nothing but a political forgery or counterfeit. 
 
 But a political principle, or a political doctrine, considered as 
 an ordained authority to act in a particular manner, can be evaded 
 as to intent, robbed of its results, and become as thoroughly 
 corrupted by an innocently wrong interpretation or use, as by a 
 wilfully dishonest application in final detail. In previous chapters 
 we have considered some of the prejudicial results which flow from 
 the improper attempt to obtain a decisive and authoritative ex- 
 pression of Public Opinion by means of a ballot which carries 
 with it at the same time an expression of preference for a named 
 candidate, or a named partizan party candidate, but which does 
 not afford the elector an opportunity to register his will " for or 
 against " a course of political administration, uninfluenced by 
 other considerations. 
 
 203
 
 204 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 This highly illogical practise has the effect of making the deci- 
 sion of a State Policy to depend upon the vote for a candidate in 
 any event, and in most instances to depend upon the vote for a 
 partizan party candidate; thus at the outset introducing an 
 element of action that at once corrupts the character of the final 
 action through robbing it of much of its intended force and effect. 
 
 If a political issue, controversy, question, or measure is to be 
 decided by ballots that are cast in favor of a candidate, then 
 either personal considerations, or party considerations, or possibly 
 both of these considerations influence the casting of the ballot; 
 and the " majority " as ascertained from such votes so cast 
 acquires a personal or a party significance which changes its char- 
 acter from that of a true political majority. Supposing the vote 
 to have been honestly cast and honestly counted ; nevertheless, 
 the " majorities " so formed are nothing more than majorities of 
 individual preferences of a mixed character and not of a purely 
 political character. But, if in addition to this effect we consider 
 the further effects that are possible whenever "voters" or "votes" 
 are illogically manufactured and manipulated, then it becomes 
 apparent that the resultant "majorities" are stripped of every 
 vestige of a political significance or effect, and become mere 
 mechanical contrivances that have been juggled into existence by 
 action that is non-political in kind. 
 
 It is true that " majorities " so produced can be and are utilized 
 as an administrative expedient; but it is also true that they 
 can not in reason be considered as a political means because they 
 do not tend to subsequently produce true political action either 
 from the individual or The State. They can not be considered as 
 a political means for the further reason that their underlying 
 postulate is destructive in part of administrative action as ordained. 
 In themselves such majorities do not constitute an element of 
 strength in The Commonwealth because they are formed by 
 practises which tend to corrupt individual morals. 
 
 The use of an expedient in political action instead of a political 
 means always produces a change in the originally intended result 
 of political action because the expedient always permits of more 
 or less being accomplished than was intended to be accomplished 
 by the use of the true means. If an expedient be used, then, in 
 order to preserve a semblance of coherency, the original terms 
 in which right political action is correctly described must be 
 changed so as to express the peculiar administrative action pro- 
 duced by the use of the expedient and the peculiar results attained ;
 
 POLITICAL MAJORITIES 205 
 
 and so it has come about that in many of the State Constitutions 
 and Statutes such vaguely descriptive phrases as " majority of 
 voters," " majority of qualified voters," " majority of voters 
 voting," "majority of votes," "majority of electors," "majority 
 of inhabitants," and others occur. 
 
 Each of these terms expresses an idea of a majority that can be 
 utilized in administrative action ; but neither of them expresses 
 the idea of a political majority, which is a majority of individual 
 wills that have been freely formed and expressed for or against a 
 proposed administrative policy. 
 
 Theoretically, the appeal is for Justice to all. It is made in 
 every political question that is put to the Collective Sovereign. 
 It is to be decided by a free expression of will on the part of every 
 Sovereign-unit ; but under the process now everywhere in vogue 
 the decision is reached, not through the practise of obtaining a 
 free expression of political will from all of the electors, but through 
 the practise of obtaining what is heedlessly called " votes " from 
 electors at elections, many of which so called votes are not political 
 votes because they are obtained by means that often touch crime 
 at one extreme and petty deceptions at the other. All such so- 
 called votes are merely expressions of preferences that through 
 wrongful individual action somewhere, are made to serve the 
 purpose of political votes. 
 
 A Vote. A vote is the free expression of the individual voting. 
 
 A Political Vote. A vote that is given on a political question 
 or issue has a peculiar political character, function, object, and 
 effect. It is true, so far as I know, that the Constitutions and 
 Statutes of the American commonwealths do not contain a set 
 definition of the term " A political vote " ; but the Court decisions 
 of the various States contain definitions of the term " vote " 
 when used in connection with political action that distinctly set 
 forth its political character and effect and which carefully dis- 
 tinguish it from the meaning attached to the term when used in 
 connection with social or economic action. Every instrumentality 
 or process that is rightfully used in political administration must 
 possess a political character and effect which will distinguish it 
 from the same instrumentality or process wKen used in other 
 directions or for effects that are not political in nature ; and it 
 would be of incalculable assistance to individuals while engaged 
 in determining the propriety or impropriety'' of proposed adminis- 
 trative action if our political writers and speakers would, when 
 writing and speaking of political instrumentalities, describe them
 
 206 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 in terms that would instantly set forth their peculiar political 
 character, effect, and binding obligations. If this were done in 
 connection with the use of the word " vote " in political matters, 
 then it would appear that a political vote is the free expression 
 of the political will of the individual elector voting at the 
 elections. 
 
 Characteristics of a Political Vote. A political vote must possess 
 at least six indispensable characteristics. 
 
 First. It must be a, free expression ; because individual political 
 freedom has been ordained. 
 
 Second. It must be an expression of the political will of the 
 Elector and of nothing else. The reasons for this have been so 
 fully set forth heretofore as to make recapitulation superfluous at 
 this point. 
 
 Third. It must be the act of an elector, as only such possess 
 the Right of Suffrage. 
 
 Fourth. It must be the act of a duly qualified elector, as only 
 such possess the right to exercise the Right of Suffrage at the 
 stated times of its exercise. 
 
 Fifth. It must have been properly cast by the duly qualified 
 elector himself; and by no other. 
 
 Sixth. It must be cast at the stated time and place for the exercise 
 of the Right of Suffrage, and neither before nor after. 
 
 Individual electoral votes that are given in any matter of political 
 administration and which are obtained in any way except through 
 the free play of reason and conscience, political organization, 
 political leadership, and political parties rightfully employed, must 
 necessarily carry an expression of will or preference that is not 
 wholly political in nature, and which will, when cast, vitiate the 
 expression which is intended to be obtained from the majority of 
 the electoral votes cast. 
 
 The slip of printed paper that is deposited in the ballot box by 
 a " Repeater " or by a " Colonizer " is not a political vote ; it is 
 merely a fraudulent ballot. It carries no expression of individual 
 political will, free or otherwise. The Repeater, when he repeats 
 and the Colonizer, at any time, is not an elector in fact. He is 
 merely a fraudulent elector ; and as such is not entitled to a vote 
 at an election ; and his fraudulent ballot, if counted as a political 
 vote because of subsequent political fraud on the part of those in 
 charge of the election, can only help either to vitiate " The Will of 
 The People " or to override it altogether. 
 
 A " Stuffed " or a " Tissue " ballot carries no expression of will
 
 POLITICAL MAJORITIES 207 
 
 whatsoever ; but if fraudulently counted as a political vote will 
 also tend to vitiate or to override The Will of The People. Such a 
 ballot is not a political vote. An elector is entitled to but one 
 vote, and to vote but once; and such a ballot can be made to 
 serve the purpose of a political vote only through individual fraud 
 or partizan party fraud in making it appear as the vote of a voter, 
 and not through any political action whatsoever. 
 
 A ballot that has been deposited at a political election, and the 
 deposit of which has been obtained through bribery, corruption, 
 intimidation, or fear of " Party Discipline " as these terms are 
 commonly understood, is not a political vote. Such a ballot 
 carries no free expression of individual political will, and it can be 
 subsequently transmuted as to name and effect only through 
 WTongful action by some individual or body of individuals. The 
 ballot may be counted as a political vote ; but the counting it 
 as a vote is merely the final act by which the prior fraud is made 
 effective against the people. 
 
 A ballot that is deposited at a political election in support of 
 a partizan party, or an economic organization, is not a political 
 vote. The individual elector is under the obligation to vote for 
 the General Welfare and to give his opinion on this subject and 
 upon no other ; and if such a ballot, given for support of any 
 organization, is counted as a political vote, then The Will of The 
 People as to political administration becomes vitiated and rendered 
 uncertain and ambiguous. 
 
 Theoretically, a political majority is ascertained by a count of 
 the political votes cast at an election ; but if all sorts of illogical 
 ballots illogically cast are counted as political votes in ascertaining 
 the aggregate of the vote, how is it possible to ascertain a political 
 majority? 
 
 " Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? " No! 
 Neither do men of free communities produce logical political 
 administration by the use of means or practises which in the first 
 instance destroy the political character of action that is taken by 
 individual electors, and, in the second instance, bestow the name 
 of political action on any kind of improper action that can be 
 utilized to affect results in administrative action. If the aggre- 
 gate vote is composed of true political votes and fraudulent or 
 illogical ballots which have been counted as political votes, then 
 the majority of such an aggregation of votes, having a like com- 
 position and character, can not possibly stand for the expression 
 of a true political majority, without which, political administration
 
 208 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 as ordained, becomes either impossible or at best halting and in- 
 efheient. 
 
 But, as I have said before, no one definition of universal political 
 application was attached to the broad term " majority " by the 
 people of the various States when they started State Government. 
 In relation to the decision of questions of administrative policy it 
 has been held to mean one thing. In relation to the decision of 
 questions of candidacy it has been held to mean many others. 
 Disputes as to the actual meaning of the vague terms above referred 
 to have been frequent, and it may be interesting to some and 
 instructive to others to briefly recapitulate some of the meanings 
 which the Courts have attached to these terms. 
 
 Voter. But before doing so let us fix the meaning of the term 
 " voter." A voter is one who has and exercises the Right of 
 Suffrage. A voter is therefore an elector who votes ; and not one 
 who does not vote. 
 
 By way of illustration : A "Repeater " may or may not be an 
 elector ; but after he has deposited a ballot once, he is not a 
 voter in his second successful attempt to deposit a ballot ; he is 
 merely a fraudulent personifier of a voter. 
 
 A " Colonizer " is usually not a lawful local elector ; he is 
 merely a fraudulent personifier of such an elector. He may 
 through connivance succeed in depositing a ballot in the name of an 
 elector who is qualified and has not voted ; but that does not make 
 the colonizer a voter in the sense that is meant by the statute. 
 
 A ballot that is " stuffed " into the ballot box is not a voter's 
 vote ; it may be utilized towards creating a " majority of votes " 
 by fraudulently counting it as the ballot of an elector who is 
 entitled to vote and who does not vote ; but that does not make it 
 the vote of a voter. 
 
 A " Tissue " ballot may be fraudulently utilized in the same 
 manner as a " stuffed " ballot ; but that does not make the 
 individual whose name it is counted under " a voter who has 
 voted." 
 
 Now bearing in mind the various ways in which " votes " 
 and " voters " are customarily manufactured and manipulated, 
 let us look at a few of the decisions and endeavor to perceive their 
 bearing upon true political administration for good or evil. 
 
 Majority Vote. In cases where the decision of a question is 
 made to depend upon " A majority vote," that term has been 
 variously held to mean : 
 
 A majority of those voting on the question ;
 
 POLITICAL MAJORITIES 209 
 
 A majority of those participating in the election, whether 
 voting on the question or not; 
 
 A majority of all those entitled to vote at the election. 
 
 In the ratification of an amendment to a State Constitution the 
 term has been held to mean more than one-half of the electors of 
 the State ; and the whole number of votes cast at the election at 
 which the question on the amendment is submitted has been 
 considered as determining the whole number of the electors of the 
 State. 
 
 As to Policy. It may be accepted as generally true under the 
 decisions, that where a question of administrative policy is made 
 to depend upon a " majority vote " the term means the larger 
 number of those voters who exercise the privilege of voting upon 
 the question ; and those electors who do not exercise the privilege 
 are presumed to give their assent to the expressed will of the larger 
 number, be it either for or against the question, and whether or 
 not the larger number of votes cast equals a majority of more than 
 one-half of those entitled to vote. 
 
 As to Candidacy. If, however, a question as to policy is sub- 
 mitted at the same time that candidacies are decided, then the 
 term means that the number of votes required to pass the question 
 of policy must equal a majority of the total of the votes cast for 
 the candidates. The votes cast in favor of adopting the policy 
 may outnumber the votes cast against by four to one ; but if they 
 do not equal a majority of the total of the votes cast at the election 
 for candidates, the question is lost. 
 
 Majority of Voters Voting. In connection with the decision of 
 administrative policy this term has been held to mean a majority 
 of all voting at the election and not merely of those voting on the 
 question ; and in Kansas the term has been held to mean also a 
 majority of those voting legally. This would seem to be a gleam 
 of political truth were it not for the fact that the term " legally " 
 is by no means synonymous with the term " logically " and is 
 often used to give the appearance of propriety to action that is 
 diametrically opposed in spirit and effect to logical political 
 action. 
 
 Majority of Voters. Where the law contains the phrase " Major- 
 ity of voters " this term has been held to mean : 
 
 A majority of those voting ; and not of those qualified to vote. 
 
 Where, however, the " expressed assent " of a majority of 
 voters in a political group is required by law to carry a question, 
 then the term is held to mean more than one-half of the voters in
 
 210 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 the group, and there is no presumption as to assent from those 
 who do not vote. 
 
 It is unnecessary to further multiply variations in the meaning 
 of the terms in point. It leads to nowhere; for these decisions, 
 delivered with all the solemnity that properly invests a Court of 
 Justice, are rendered to settle disputes that have arisen between 
 individuals or parties that are engaged in trying to make an expe- 
 dient serve in the place of a true political means ; and that, too, a 
 means whereby Justice is to be rendered to all. What possible 
 difference can it make to the administration of Justice whether 
 the expedient be considered as a " majority of votes " or as a 
 " majority of voters " when on the one hand an act of an individual 
 which is not a political vote is counted as a vote, and on the other 
 hand, an act of an individual who is not an elector, or a legal 
 voter, can be counted as the act of a voter. The present political 
 situation partakes of the nature of a chaotic farce in which true 
 meanings are so twisted by illogical action that a reasonable 
 construction becomes impossible ; but such a condition is the 
 inevitable result of an attempt by a political community to make 
 an expedient serve in the place of a true political means, and no 
 amount of Court decisions regarding the composition of the 
 expedient in present use will ever be able to bestow upon it the 
 political character which is inherent in a true political majority. 
 
 Now if a political majority can be considered as a body of any 
 kind or thing, it must be considered as a body of political will. 
 It is not produced by the ballot. It is produced by political 
 convictions. The ballot is merely the means whereby an in- 
 dividual gives expression to his own political conviction. It is 
 political convictions that are counted either for or against when 
 we speak of counting ballots that have become votes; and the 
 count reveals the conviction that is supported by the larger number 
 of electors voting; and this body of political conviction stands 
 for the time being as Public Opinion. Questions of candidacy are 
 theoretically kept subordinate to questions of policy in order that 
 candidates may be selected later who will trulj'^ represent the will 
 as ascertained. 
 
 From this it is apparent that a political majority is not a major- 
 ity of electors ; is not a majority of individuals ; is not a majority 
 of " voters " ; is not a majority of " votes " ; nor a number of 
 voters or of votes that is larger than half of the total vote cast 
 at an election for candidates for public offices ; nor the largest 
 number of electors who think alike concerning either policies or
 
 POLITICAL MAJORITIES 211 
 
 candidates. The mere naming of such bodies discloses char- 
 acteristics and structural features that a political means for 
 the administration of Justice should not possess. Under our 
 present administrative practise and procedure none of these last 
 above named " majorities " can be reasonably considered as 
 freely and fully expressing the prevailing reason, conscience, and 
 political desire of The Commonwealth. It may be urged by some 
 that they are compacted for the purpose of promoting the general 
 welfare ; but the reply to this is, that the individuals who compose 
 the above named " majorities " have not had an opportunity to 
 freely express their wills for or against a course of administrative 
 action ; that other considerations than those of a strictly political 
 nature have brought these " majorities " together ; and that in 
 many cases these " majorities " are determined at the election 
 instead of before, and by individual acts that are of a politically 
 criminal nature because they are performed to serve a party or 
 an individual purpose instead of the ordained purpose of The 
 Commonwealth. 
 
 Object, Purpose. The ultimate object of a political majority, 
 considered as a political means,* is the promotion of the general 
 welfare. Its immediate purpose is to reveal the predominating 
 sentiment of The Commonwealth regarding the way in which 
 the general welfare can best be promoted by present action. 
 It is part of the requirements of Electorate Action to reveal public 
 opinion. Theoretically, public opinion is revealed by obtaining a 
 free expression of will from each elector regarding what shall be 
 done either in the way of new legislation or of re-forming past 
 legislation. The purpose is single in nature, and in order to 
 obtain a free, decisive, and authoritative expression of public 
 opinion, individual electors should have but one political question 
 before them at a time for decision, and should have the opportunity 
 to freely register their wills for or against, and uncontaminated 
 by any other considerations whatsoever. The improbability of 
 a tie vote in any State is very great. The probabilities are largely 
 in favor of there being more electors agreed on one side of the 
 question than on the other; and the majority will, having been 
 reached freely through considerations that are confined solely to 
 logical action in the first place, and having been ascertained by 
 election methods that permit of an accurate ex-pression of in- 
 dividual political will in the second place, would clearly stand 
 forth on the return of the count as public opinion concerning 
 proposed administrative action.
 
 212 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 But, in order to make public opinion fully operative, and 
 practically operative as well, questions of administrative policy 
 and questions of candidacy should be separated, and be acted 
 on at different times. Both theoretically and practically, the 
 predominating sentiment of The Commonwealth regarding pro- 
 posed administrative action should be revealed sufficiently ahead 
 of the elections so as to give The Commonwealth, working through 
 The Electorate, enough time in which to carefully select candidates 
 for legislative and executive offices who are unreservedly in 
 accord with the revealed sentiment, and who will unreservedly 
 pledge themselves to work while in office to apply it, and to 
 enforce its application, to the best of their ability, and to do 
 nothing else. 
 
 Is Not a Political Agency. A political majority was never 
 intended to act. It is an ascertained expression of Administrative 
 Will which merely exists as an accomplished fact exists. It is 
 not a political agency and can not act as one. No exercise of 
 political power or political authority was ever conferred by the 
 people upon a political majority or any kind of a majority. Such 
 exercise requires permanency in organization of the exercising 
 agency; and the people originally ordained two permanently 
 constituted active and acting political agencies for that purpose. 
 
 Has No Permanency. A political majority can possess no Will ; 
 nor do the people ever seek to ascertain " The Will of The Major- 
 ity " ; they merely seek to ascertain what their own Will is through 
 definitely ascertaining what the predominating sentiment is 
 among the electors. The people are required to ascertain this 
 predominating sentiment in each successive period of adminis- 
 tration. They ascertain it repeatedly in order to enable them to 
 act justly in the matters of administration that constantly press 
 for settlement in each successive period of administration. In- 
 dividual Rights are neither secured by nor protected by political 
 majorities. These rights are secured to individuals by the people, 
 and are protected by them. These rights may have become im- 
 paired, and individual injustices may have sprung into existence 
 either because of unforeseen economic progress or because of mis- 
 guided or insufficient administrative action in the past. The 
 people are constantly obliged to take new administrative action 
 because of economic progress, and are often obliged to reverse 
 or revise their past administrative action. Political majorities 
 serve merely as a means which enables the people to act justly 
 at such times, and can never have permanency in effect because
 
 POLITICAL MAJORITIES 213 
 
 when once public opinion is put into the form of Statutory Law 
 such law is always open to addition or amendment. 
 
 Finally, through abandoning the proclaimed use of a majority 
 of individual wills as a political means, and through using in its 
 place either a majority of votes, or of voters, the American 
 Commonwealths have been led gradually into changing a proposed 
 administration of principles into an actual administration of 
 men. This action on the part of the people has merely had the 
 effect of substituting forms of popular tyranny for the monarchical 
 tyranny they opposed in the beginning. This kind of adminis- 
 trative action has been made possible almost entirely because the 
 people have not set forth in their fundamental law the manner in 
 which their ordained political majorities are to be obtained and 
 used in administrative action. Failing in this respect the people 
 also failed to impart to individuals the constant stimulus to right 
 action that is just as necessary as the possession of right ideas 
 concerning fundamental principles of action. Vice is habitual 
 deviation from moral action. If civic virtue is relied upon to 
 produce administrative action as ordained, then, in addition to 
 beliefs concerning principles of administrative action, individuals 
 must also have beliefs concerning the way in which the principles 
 are to be made operative, incorporated in, and kept alive as a part 
 of, their civic virtue. Otherwise civic virtue will never be strong 
 enough to stop the operation of private vice in the community 
 to the extent that is necessary to prevent political administration 
 from being transmuted into private exploitation of the political 
 necessities of the commonwealth.
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE PROCESSES OF NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRA- 
 TION 
 
 American Citizenship : Naturalization is defined in many 
 political treatises and writings as the process by which an alien 
 is made a citizen of The United States of America. 
 
 In another sense it is defined as the adoption of a foreigner by 
 The Nation ; the clothing him with the political privileges of the 
 native born ; and the granting to him of protection by the National 
 Government at home and abroad. 
 
 Article I, Section 8 of The Constitution provides that " Con- 
 gress shall have power ... to establish an uniform rule of 
 naturalization." 
 
 The national power of naturalization has to do solely with 
 foreign immigrants. Among other things its exercise is intended 
 to absolve the alien immigrant from his old allegiance, and to 
 establish allegiance to the National Government in its place. 
 Momentous as this change in allegiance is to the alien immigrant, 
 from the standpoint of The State it is of secondary importance 
 to other considerations. Mr. Justice Johnson, in the decision 
 rendered in the case of Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wlieaton, 277, sets 
 forth the prime object of the process of naturalization in sub- 
 stance as follows. " The management and control of the foreign 
 intercourse of The Nation having been given to the National 
 Government, it becomes the peculiar province of that govern- 
 ment to determine who are entitled to the privilege of American 
 citizens, and to the protection of that government." 
 
 The italics in the above quotation are mine. They serve to 
 show that Citizenship is the prime object aimed at in naturaliza- 
 tion. They reveal an element that is not distinctly set forth 
 in the definitions appearing at the head of this chapter. That 
 element is the mental and moral status which the alien must 
 possess before he is entitled to citizenship. Theoretically, the 
 
 214
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 215 
 
 renunciation of the old allegiance follows only in those cases in 
 which the applicant has been found properly qualified ; and if 
 my younger readers will consult the National Law, and their 
 State Law on this subject, thej'^ will perceive that it is the intent 
 of the Nation and of the State to admit to citizenship only such 
 aliens as shall, upon application and examination, be found by a 
 Court of JiLstice to possess certain qualifications, which,, when 
 taken together, entitle each to citizenship. Without such quali- 
 fications the individual applicant is theoretically deemed either 
 unfit to discharge the obligations of sovereignty or incapable of 
 properly performing the duties of citizenship. 
 
 Defined. Giving the element of qualification its due weight, 
 and recasting the definition to this end, it will then read as follows : 
 Naturalization, in our instance, is the political process by which 
 a duly qualified alien is made a citizen of The United States of 
 America. 
 
 The law, taken as a whole, prescribes several distinct quali- 
 fications which the alien applicant must possess, and several 
 formalities with which he must comply ; but the element of quali- 
 fication is the heart of the matter. Unless the alien be truly quali- 
 fied for citizenship he can not properly or effectively discharge 
 the obligations incumbent upon a free Sovereign-unit ; and it is 
 this consideration which gives its political character to the process 
 of naturalization and makes the process such an important factor 
 in the efficiency as well as in the morality of our political ad- 
 ministration. 
 
 Common prudence requires us to keep the process wholly 
 political in character and in effect. If an unqualified alien be- 
 comes possessed of citizenship through the fraud of some connected 
 with the process, combined with connivance on the part of others 
 in charge of the process, then the Collective Sovereign becomes 
 just that much more unintelligent and politically incapable ; 
 and, depending upon the facts in the fraud, it may become just 
 that much less moral in its composition and in its action in the 
 future. Besides this, if naturalization frauds are permitted to 
 exist by the people, then those who perpetrate the fraud, or those 
 in whose name the fraud is perpetrated, naturally gain an ascend- 
 ency in leadership over the newly created unqualified citizen who 
 benefits by the fraud, and Fraud, as a working instrumentality, be- 
 comes entrenched in the political action of The Commonwealth ; 
 not under the name of " Fraud," to be sure, but under the cog- 
 nomen of Naturalization that is fraudulent in the process and non-
 
 216 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 political in its object; the end aimed at by the perpetrators of 
 naturalization frauds being in the great majority of cases the 
 making of partizan party votes, and not qualified American 
 citizens. 
 
 State Citizenship. WTiile the process of naturalization, properly 
 performed, will transform a qualified alien into an Ajnerican 
 citizen, it does not at the same time make a State Elector out of 
 him. Each State retains the exercise of the power to impose 
 such additional qualifications upon aliens with regard to partici- 
 pation in the political administration of The State as it thinks 
 proper. 
 
 Object. Avoiding an extended discussion of this somewhat 
 involved subject, let us say that the object of political naturaliza- 
 tion is the conversion of qualified foreigners into free citizens. 
 Unless an individual be mentally and morally free he can not act 
 politically as it was originally intended he should act ; and a pro- 
 cess which results in bestowing citizenship papers upon an indi- 
 vidual, qualified or unqualified, while at the same time it leaves 
 him bound to obey the behest of a partizan party boss of low 
 degree, certainly does not accomplish the intended object of 
 political naturalization. 
 
 Effect. Confining our attention at present to the effect pro- 
 duced by naturalization within the limits of a State, we find it 
 to be one of the processes or instrumentalities by which the 
 numerical extent of, the intellectual capacity of, and the moral 
 status of the State Electorate is determined. Naturally the 
 supervision of a process connected with such grave results was 
 given to the Judiciary branch of The Government; and the 
 process itself is of a judicial nature. 
 
 Declaration. Briefly, the salient points in the process are as 
 follows : The alien applicant, who must be at least eighteen years 
 old, is required to file a signed and sworn declaration of intent 
 to become a citizen and to renounce his present allegiance, which 
 declaration must also show his name, age, occupation, and time 
 and place of arrival in the United States. 
 
 Petition. Three years afterwards, and after five years' con- 
 tinuous residence in the United States, the alien applicant may 
 file a sworn petition for citizenship in any Court having juris- 
 diction, showing that he has resided at least one year in the State 
 in which he petitions, his name, residence, occupation, place and 
 date of birth, place from which he emigrated, and the date and 
 place of his arrival in the United States, that he is not opposed
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 217 
 
 to organized government, that he is not a polygamist or a believer 
 in polygamy, or a member of any society opposed to organized 
 government, and that he intends to renounce his former alle- 
 giance. The petition must be supported by affidavits from two 
 credible witnesses, citizens of the United States, showing that the 
 aflSants have known the applicant during his entire residence in 
 the State and during his five years' residence in the United States, 
 that during such time he has acted as a man of good moral char- 
 acter, attached to the principles of The Constitution and disposed 
 to the good order and happiness of The People. No petition may 
 be heard until after ninety days have elapsed since filing, nor within 
 thirty days prior to a State general election. The witnesses must 
 attend the hearing and be examined by the Judge. Filing fees 
 for the declaration and the petition are one Dollar and four 
 Dollars respectively. If the applicant is admitted, he is required 
 to take the oath of allegiance, and his certificate of naturalization 
 is issued to him later. 
 
 There are other provisions in the United States law which it is 
 not necessary to note here ; and besides the matters above men- 
 tioned the petition must contain information concerning all of 
 the qualifications which the State in question imposes upon a 
 would-be State Elector. 
 
 The reader will note that there are many points to be established 
 as facts in the process, and he will also recognize — at least as far 
 as The Court is concerned — the possibility of establishing some 
 of these " facts " by manufactured evidence, so long as the fraud- 
 ulent action is not apparent to The Court. 
 
 Theoretically, the individuals immediately connected in the 
 process are the alien applicant, his witnesses, his attorney, the 
 Clerk of the Court, and the Judge of the Court ; all of whom, with 
 the exception of the applicant, are supposed to be acting wholly 
 in a political capacity and for strictly political ends. 
 
 Theoretically, the parties immediately concerned are the 
 alien applicant and The State. The applicant's witnesses, the 
 attorney, — who is an officer of the Court, — the Clerk of the Court, 
 and the Judge of the Court are supposed to safeguard the interests 
 of the Commonwealth. 
 
 The " Stuffed " Electorate : Actually, however, and under 
 our present practise as often carried out, there are individuals 
 connected with the process who are not acting wholly in a political 
 capacity, but subterraneously as it were, and for the peculiar ad- 
 vantage of another party which is vitally interested in the out-
 
 218 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 come of the process. This thu-d interested party is the partizan 
 party. Speaking now only of aliens who are actually unqualified 
 for citizenship, let us see how it is possible for the partizan party to 
 strengthen itself and at the same time to weaken the political 
 capacity of The Commonwealth by perverting the process of 
 Naturalization. 
 
 Usually, the transaction of the preliminary work of the process 
 is given to some working member of a partizan party city ward 
 organization. This party worker immediately attaches himself 
 to the alien upon arrival, and, if necessary, attends to the housing 
 of the alien. When the alien is definitely located in some ward 
 of the City he is given into the care of another party worker who 
 is a member of the partizan party organization of the ward in 
 which the alien resides. This second party worker is an attorney 
 at law. He is " thoroughly " versed in the law, practise, mal- 
 practise, and customary local procedure in the process. The 
 attorney draws the declaration in regular form, attends to its 
 execution, verification, and filing ; and makes sure that the filing 
 fees are paid. He also attends to every detail connected with 
 the preparation and filing of the petition, the affidavits of the wit- 
 nesses, the hearing, and the issuance of the certificate of naturaliza- 
 tion. Between the filing of the declaration of intention and the 
 hearing on the petition the partizan party causes the alien to be 
 " instructed " in the matters that are necessary to give him the 
 appearance of qualification upon the hearing; and, depending 
 upon the provisions of the State law, either when the alien has 
 declared his intention of becoming a citizen, or upon his taking 
 the oath, some other working member of the partizan party 
 marches his " citizen " off to the proper partizan party District 
 Headquarters and enrolls hun as a partizan party organization 
 member. 
 
 By this action a partizan party has secured another passive 
 member of its organization whose " vote " it can cast in its own 
 peculiar interest. But The Commonwealth has received a set- 
 back in capacity, efficiency, and morals; and when the frauds 
 are extensive the setback is most serious. 
 
 Naturalization frauds are not numerous in the rural counties 
 of a State wherein the voters know each other, the alien appli- 
 cants, and those in charge of the process. It is in the large cities 
 and in the immigration ports that such frauds are perpetrated 
 wholesale. The fraud consists in giving unqualified aliens the 
 outward appearance of aliens who are qualified for citizenship.
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 219 
 
 In character the fraud is precisely the same as many other partizan 
 party frauds on true political action. It is worked by the same 
 means and for the same purpose ; namely, the advantage of The 
 Partizan Party. In the same way that a " colonizer " is in effect 
 converted into a " voter " by fraudulent and collusive action 
 of partizan party members of the registration and election boards, 
 so, in the same way, an alien who is actually unqualified can be 
 converted into a State " citizen " by similar fraudulent and collu- 
 sive action by partizan party workers who are in charge of the 
 process of naturalization ; and whenever or wherever the situation 
 is such that the partizan party Judges — those who possess the 
 office solely because of services which they have rendered to the 
 partizan party — will accept the nod of a partizan party City 
 Ward Leader as making " it appear to the satisfaction of the 
 Court " that everything is right and proper in the applicant, in 
 his declaration, petition, and proof, then the State Electorate 
 becomes " stuffed " with hundreds if not thousands of members 
 W'ho are in point of fact totally unqualified for State Citizenship ; 
 but who, on the other hand, are most admirably adapted to the 
 working out of the non-political purposes of the partizan party. 
 
 Of course the reader will understand that Citizenship is not the 
 end aimed at in this partizan party perversion of Justice. At all 
 stages in its machinations a partizan party has one ultimate 
 object in view. This object is called " Party Success." Party 
 Success is brought about by the deposit at the polls of more ballots 
 in favor of one partizan party ticket than are deposited for any 
 other " party " ticket. Party Success means that the successful 
 partizan party either acquires the control of the exercise of The 
 Reserved, and of The Delegated Powers of Administration, or 
 maintains itself in the control already acquired. 
 
 Through the control of The Reserved Powers of Administration 
 a partizan party is enabled to maintain as many of its working 
 members as possible in salaried public offices and positions, and 
 to keep them united together in its organization through the bond 
 of self-interest. 
 
 Through the control of the exercise of The Delegated Powers 
 of Administration a partizan party is enabled to pass legislation 
 that is favorable to the partizan party considered as a working 
 political instrumentality. 
 
 All things being equal, the partizan party which controls the 
 deposit of a larger number of individual ballots at the election 
 stands a better chance of achieving " success " than its opponent
 
 220 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 does. When these controlled ballots are deposited and counted, 
 they are called " votes," notwithstanding the fact that they convey 
 no expression of individual political will whatsoever. 
 
 The accumulation of a majority of the deposited ballots is the 
 sine qua non of " party success." The controlled " votes " are 
 the nucleus to which can be added the votes which a partizan 
 party is otherwise able to influence in The Electorate at Large. 
 If the nucleus is large, the task of getting a " majority of votes " 
 together is easier; and what the partizan party immediately 
 seeks through the perversion of the process of naturalization is 
 one more passive member of its organization, whose " vote " it 
 can control. Working always in its own interest the partizan 
 party immorally treats citizenship merely as a condition prece- 
 dent to the casting of a " vote." It therefore causes citizenship 
 to be fraudulently bestowed upon unqualified aliens and adds 
 their " votes " to the total of its controlled " votes," which total, 
 if large enough, will determine in advance the " majority of votes " 
 to be cast at the election. 
 
 The passive acquiescence on the part of the people in the per- 
 sistent perversion of the process of naturalization by the partizan 
 party, is one of the paradoxical political phenomena of American 
 administration. Naturalization is one of several political processes 
 which, theoretically. The Electorate is held bound to perform 
 through a proper and direct exercise of the various Powers 
 of Administration. The work of naturalization is purely political 
 in its nature. Its proper performance is of vital importance to 
 The State and to the individual. In the first place, naturalization 
 helps to determine the numerical extent of The Electorate. In 
 the second place, naturalization helps to determine the intellectual 
 composition of The Electorate, which is an element in the political 
 capacity of The State. In the third place, naturalization helps 
 to determine the moral composition of The Electorate, which is 
 an element in the moral strength of The State. The ultimate 
 purpose of naturalization is to strengthen and not to weaken 
 The State. If, however, an unqualified alien is conscious of his 
 incapacity, but nevertheless is made a citizen, does he not acquire 
 a contempt for Political Principles and Ethics that are so easily 
 set at naught and violated? If he is instructed by the partizan 
 party that his first obligation is to " vote " with the partizan 
 party which has assisted him to citizenship, is he likely to become 
 either a competent or a desirable Sovereign-unit ? Where citizen- 
 ship is treated as a mere incidental to partizan party membership
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 221 
 
 is not the unqualified alien encouraged by example to put " Party " 
 considerations ahead of Political considerations in action that 
 affects the political welfare of all ? 
 
 Common sense, if allowed, would decide that the management 
 and control of the process of naturalization should not be left to 
 the oversight of partizan parties because it offers too great tempta- 
 tion and opportunity for the manufacture of " partizan party 
 votes." Theoretically, naturalization is the conversion of qualified 
 aliens into qualified citizens ; but ample experience and thousands 
 upon thousands of instances do not as yet seem sufficient to con- 
 vince the people at large that a partizan party Machine when 
 working smoothly will as surely and certainly convert an un- 
 qualified alien into a " partizan party voter " as it will, when work- 
 ing for another purpose, convert a " stuffed ballot " into the 
 effect of a " voter voting." 
 
 \Miat is the explanation of this paradoxical action on the part 
 of the people? Why do they give any third agency, political 
 or otherwise, the opportunity to pervert political action ? 
 
 At the bottom of the cause for such action lies the absence 
 of an adequate, comprehensive, and ordained system for the direct 
 exercise of The Reserved Powers of Administration. Theoreti- 
 cally, The Electorate are required to perform the several pro- 
 cesses of naturalization, registration, election, and so forth ; but 
 the people have never provided The Electorate with a body 
 of law that compels the logical transaction of each detail in the 
 several processes. Then again, the average American has a 
 happy-go-lucky temperament which predisposes him to the accept- 
 ance and use of any plausible expedient by which political work 
 can be lessened or dispensed with. He seldom, if ever, thinks of 
 Political Administration as the direct exercise by individual 
 sovereign-units of The Reserved Powers of Administration. 
 He does not realize either the purposes for or the extent to which 
 the reserved executive, legislative, and judicial Powers of the 
 people are to be used. He is inclined to regard " Government " 
 as automatic in action and to think that he has sufficiently dis- 
 charged his political duty when he has assisted in filling public 
 offices and positions with individuals who will discharge the 
 duties of office. He is trustful to a faulty degree. He is natu- 
 rally inclined to credit love of country to those who proclaim 
 patriotism as the motive for their action ; and above all he is 
 eager to progress materially as rapidly as possible. 
 
 So constituted, the desire for relief from individual political
 
 222 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 work (which at the beginning of State Government appeared 
 doubly onerous because of the widespread ignorance concerning 
 the imperative requirements of direct poHtical action) influenced 
 the people at large to accept the proffered services of the partizan 
 party as the manager of such action. When the partizan party 
 assumed control, it put its own means and methods into operation. 
 It busied itself most assiduously in " getting out the vote " ; 
 and its success in this direction led the trustful Commonwealth 
 to believe that it had found its political Saviour. 
 
 Sanction. Notwithstanding its many years of perversive 
 and most deleterious work the partizan party still retains great 
 influence in the electorate at large. What are the sources of 
 this influence? While temperament, trustfulness, a widespread 
 lack of political information, and a desire for material progress 
 still combine to foster this influence, nevertheless the chief source 
 of the influence of the partizan party lies in the possession by it 
 of a species of sanction which bestows upon it the appearance 
 of being a real Political Agency, or part of the constituted politi- 
 cal instrumentalities of the State. It obtained this sanction 
 when the people encouraged it to assume the oversight of all 
 detail political action connected with the work of Leadership, 
 Organization, Naturalization, Registration, Nomination, Elec- 
 tion, and the enforcement of Responsibility. 
 
 Two unforeseen results followed the illogical bestowal of this 
 sanction. In the first place, that which had in the past been 
 Political Administration was immediately converted into Partizan 
 Party Administration ; and in the second place, confusion imme- 
 diately beset the average individual through the retention of 
 political terms to describe processes that were not strictly political 
 in effect. For instance : The word " Naturalization " when 
 standing by itself correctly describes a political process properly 
 performed ; but if it is indiscriminately used to describe a 
 process that is mainly partizan in object and effect, then the 
 careless individual will be led unconsciously into the belief 
 that partizan action will suffice to produce effects that in fact 
 can only be produced through true political action properly 
 performed. 
 
 As for the average individual, the native born in the large 
 cities, never having been naturalized, absorbed in business, or 
 in other personal affairs, pays little heed to the process of natu- 
 ralization. If he thinks of it at all, he regards it as under the 
 control of his " Party " ; and the average citizen naturally looks
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 223 
 
 upon an organization possessing and using such control with 
 something of the same feeUng of loyalty with which he regards 
 his Government or his State. His mental attitude towards his 
 " Party " is something like that of a ward to his guardian. The 
 guardian must of course be looking after his interests. He sel- 
 dom analyzes the character of his " Party," and thinks of it as a 
 Political Party working for a Political Majority. 
 
 As for the alien, he meets the partizan party first; instead of 
 the State Officials. He naturally believes the partizan party a » J f ?- 
 to be a political party and one of the constituted political means 
 of The State. He is immediately taught to believe that " The 
 Party " alone will safeguard and preserve his electoral rights 
 and that in return he must give his support to it; and, unfor- 
 tunately for The State, the very ones who know the least about 
 their electoral rights are the very ones who most eagerly entrust 
 the " preservation " of these rights to the partizan party. 
 
 What the alien immigrant seeks in coming to America is citizen- 
 ship, freedom, and liberty. What America asks of the immigrant 
 alien is a certain capacity for citizenship, freedom, and liberty. 
 Many of the immigrants possess this capacity and soon become 
 assimilated as qualified citizens ; but the great mass do not possess 
 this capacity. As a rule the great mass of the incapable aliens re- 
 main in the manufacturing cities or go to swell the " foreign popu- 
 lation " of the mining sections. Few, if any of them, know the 
 American definition of Freedom or of Liberty. Hardly one of 
 them knows a single thing concerning American political adminis- 
 tration ; and they hail with gladness and render fealty to the 
 partizan party worker who will put them through the naturaliza- 
 tion process, pay all of its expenses, and obtain for them the 
 coveted citizenship papers which make them State Citizens and 
 entitled to exercise the elective franchise in matters of National 
 Administration. 
 
 Three things are expected in return from the unqualified citizen ; 
 namely, to enroll as a member of the partizan party which assists 
 him to citizenship ; to vote as he is directed by his partizan party 
 leader wherever he may be ; and to influence all future immigrants 
 he may know to join the same partizan party ; and this return 
 the unqualified citizen is almost always only too happy and willing 
 to make. 
 
 My younger readers may be puzzled to know how it is that an 
 unqualified immigrant gets to be a State " voter " right off when 
 the United States Laws require a residence of five years before
 
 224 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 dmission to citizenship. A perusal of the State Laws will fur- 
 
 ish the solution to the puzzle. 
 
 State Citizenship. The longest term of residence within a state 
 that is required by the laws of any State is two years. Thirty 
 states require a residence of but one year. Nine states require 
 a residence of but sLx months ; and one state of three months only. 
 Also many of the States bestow the exercise of the elective fran- 
 chise on aliens who have merely declared their intention of be- 
 coming citizens and have resided in the State for a period of from 
 three months to a year and a half before election ; and further- 
 more, all of the provisions of the Law that are intended to eji- 
 hance the capacity and moral status of The Electorate are easily 
 avoided by the partizan party in the control of each step in the 
 naturalization process. 
 
 Of course the fraud originating in the process of naturalization 
 and consummated in succeeding processes injects an element into 
 The Electorate that it was originally intended not to contain. 
 No amount of partizan party fraud can make an unqualified 
 alien into a qualified citizen or elector. All that the fraud ac- 
 complishes is to " stuff " The Electorate with unqualified members 
 whose action in political administration can be most easily trans- 
 muted into partizan action or worse. These unqualified electors 
 are at all times an element of danger to The State. Knowing 
 next to nothing about the Duties of Citizenship, and still less 
 of the Obligations of Sovereignty, and nothing at all of the effect 
 of " Party Regularity " upon The State, they receive constant 
 supervision and " instruction " from the partizan party in order 
 to boost them through the formalities of citizenship. Their value 
 to the partizan party, however, lies in the fact that they can, 
 through constant care, custody, coaching, and collusion, be made 
 to go through the motions of voting for a partizan party ticket. 
 Their menace to The State lies in precisely the same fact, for their 
 " votes " — which have been fraudulently obtained in the sup- 
 port of the partizan party — are counted as the votes of electors 
 who are actually qualified to give an expression of the political 
 vnll of The Commonwealth ; and the final effect produced by the 
 votes of the unqualified citizens when added to the votes of the 
 easy-going native born is to make it appear to the world at large 
 that the American Commonwealths intentionally sanction a 
 partizan administration of their political affairs, and hypocriti- 
 cally dispense privilege while professing to render even-handed 
 Justice.
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 225 
 
 Registration : Theoretically, registration is the political process 
 which finally determines who among the electors of a State are 
 truly entitled to vote at an election. If mistakes are alleged to 
 have occm-red in the process, an appeal by any individual who 
 thinks himself aggrieved will lie to the Courts; but the appeal, 
 and its decision and consequent action, if any, are considered 
 a part of the process. 
 
 The registration of electors as a condition precedent to voting 
 is not required in Texas or in Arkansas. In some States it is 
 required in the larger cities or towns; but in thirty-nine States 
 it constitutes one of the compulsory qualifications for the exercise 
 of the elective franchise. 
 
 The laws in the various States are by no means uniform as to 
 method or procedure ; and the reader must consult the Statutes 
 and Court Decisions of his own State for definite information on 
 these points, as space forbids an extended consideration of this 
 highly diversified subject. 
 
 The qualifications for Citizenship vary widely in the different 
 States. The Electorate itself is being constantly changed as to 
 number by death, removal, penal sentences, action by the legis- 
 lature or by the people, accession of " first voters," naturalization, 
 and so forth. The population of the States is being constantly 
 increased or changed in number by foreign or domestic immigra- 
 tion ; and as one way to prevent wholesale fraudulent voting 
 at elections it has been generally deemed necessary to ascertain 
 during each period of administration, and before the election, 
 and as nearly as possible, the exact numerical extent of the quali- 
 fied Voting Electorate, so that administrative policies shall not 
 be decided, or candidates be elected, by majorities of votes that 
 are built up of improperly given ballots. 
 
 But there is no uniformity regarding registration throughout 
 the various States, either in the process or in the composition of 
 the body of officials in charge of the process. Generally speaking, 
 however, and as far as the individual elector is concerned, the 
 process is simple if honestly performed. At a fixed date before 
 the election the elector appears before the officials in charge and 
 makes a sworn statement concerning all of the qualifications for 
 registration which are imposed on him by the Statutes of The 
 State. If the statement is uncontested, the elector is registered 
 as a voter. If contested, the elector can appeal to the Courts 
 for relief and also to have any wrong entry corrected. 
 
 Usually the date of the election is taken as determining
 
 226 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 whatever period-qualifications exist, such as age, residency, 
 and so forth. 
 
 Registration Boards. As said before, there is no uniformity 
 regarding the composition of the officials in charge of the work 
 of registration. In some States the Tax x\ssessors compile and 
 verify the Registry List, as it is there called ; but generally speak- 
 ing, the process of registration is in charge of a number of indi- 
 viduals who are known as the Board of Registration. In many 
 States the registration board also acts as the board having charge 
 of the process of election. In addition to registering applicants 
 the board is usually required to remove from the existing registra- 
 tion list the names of individuals appearing thereon who have 
 either died since the last election, or have moved away from the 
 registering district, or have lost the right to vote for any reason. 
 In some States it is customary for the board to add names of indi- 
 viduals who are known to it to be duly qualified electors ; the 
 fundamental idea being to afford facility to the exercise of the 
 elective franchise and not to make registration a hindrance to its 
 exercise ; and for convenience such boards are created to act in 
 each Representative Unit of a State. 
 
 Concerning the manner in which individuals either get on, 
 or are placed on, these boards, the reader is referred again to the 
 Statutes of his State. He will find, as a rule, that there is one 
 indispensable qualification at present for membership on these 
 political boards ; namely, membership in a partizan party organiza- 
 tion. He will find that there is one indispensable formality to 
 be observed by the applicant for membership ; namely, either 
 a sworn statement of his " Party Regularity " or a certification 
 to that effect by some one of his partizan party superiors. In 
 other words, the people of the various American Commonwealths 
 have solemnly decided that their political work of registration 
 shall be performed only by individuals who have previously 
 agreed to place partizan party considerations ahead of their 
 political obligations ; and moreover, in some States — New 
 Jersey, for instance — the people have sanctioned the rule that 
 only such electors who are " regular " members of the two " parties " 
 which at the last election polled the highest aggregate of " party " 
 votes shall be eligible for membership on registration boards, 
 thus, in efi^ect, precluding from service on these boards every 
 elector, independent or otherwise, whose name does not appear 
 on the enrolment lists of these two largest partizan parties. 
 
 To put it as mildly as possible, this seems strange action on the
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 227 
 
 part of The Commonwealth ; for here, in the work of registration, 
 an opportunity is presented for the " manufacture " of votes that 
 should be met and dealt with by individuals of undoubted political 
 independence and integrity, and not by individuals of certified 
 subserviency and undoubted partizanship. But be that as it may, 
 the situation at present, with the exception of a few States, 
 is such that the political work of Registration is under the control 
 of individuals who viust, while they are transacting it, work for 
 the manufacture of partizan party votes if required ; and who 
 wo2ild not be on the boards if either they did not promise in advance 
 to work while there for the partizan party, or if the managements 
 of the partizan parties had any doubts on this score ; and in this 
 particular way the partizan party has succeeded in laying the 
 foundation for the perpetration of the same kind of political 
 frauds in connection with the process of registration that charac- 
 terize its control of every political process or detail in political 
 work. 
 
 In rural communities, where population is sparse and where 
 the members of the registry boards are the neighbors of all of the 
 district voters, little if any serious evil results from the partizan 
 party regulation of Registration ; but in the cities, where popula- 
 tion is congested and where the voters in a district neither know 
 each other nor the members of the registry boards, the result is 
 different. 
 
 The Party Machine : There is hardly a city of any size, or 
 sizable town for that matter, without one or more partizan party 
 organizations, at the head of which is a partizan party Boss, and 
 having its executive, managerial, and ministerial offices and 
 positions filled by individuals who are completely submissive 
 to the will of The Boss and subservient to his purposes. Such 
 an organization, working smoothly in times of political quiet, 
 attaining its desired results with almost automatic certainty, 
 whether those results are morally right or wrong, and whether 
 the action involved is of a political nature or the opposite, has 
 been nicknamed " The Machine." 
 
 "WTierever the partizan party Machine is in control of the pre- 
 election work of a political division of the electorate, and when- 
 ever partizan party Success requires it, there and then will regis- 
 tration frauds be perpetrated. What is it that instigates these 
 frauds ? Is it the brain or desire of an independent and otherwise 
 duly qualified elector? Obviously not; for to such no fraud is 
 necessary and it would be folly for such an elector to attempt
 
 228 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 to fraudulently register as an independent voter before a registry 
 board composed wholly of accurately posted partizan party 
 workers. Who benefits by these frauds ? Manifestly the partizan 
 party alone. Who perpetrates these frauds ? Always some more 
 or less venal individual who is instigated thereto by the bene- 
 ficiary of the fraud and who works in conjunction with the partizan 
 party while it in turn is working through its working members. 
 
 Besides the numbers of stupid, trustful, or politically ignorant 
 unqualified naturalized citizens who are " put through " the 
 process, other venal individuals will appear and give in false 
 names which they have learned from an outside working member 
 of this or that partizan party and be registered as a voter through 
 collusive action on the part of the members of the registration 
 board; members, mark this, who have been put on these boards 
 to safeguard the interests and welfare of The Commonwealth — 
 theoretically. Individuals of the like kind and of trustworthy 
 memories will " register " in a similar way in several Election 
 Districts — at so much per. Names of dead persons will be con- 
 tinued on the lists ; to be utilized by some " colonist," " repeater," 
 or otherwise unqualified voter. In some instances individuals 
 have been " registered " under the names and addresses of ani- 
 mals — goats, dogs, etc., a goat's vote smelling as sweet to the 
 partizan party as by any other name. W^ell-seasoned gangs of 
 loafers and tramps are " colonized " in boarding houses sufficiently 
 ahead of the date of election to give them a false but seeming 
 domicile in point of time, are " registered " as voters in one, or 
 if the supply meets the demand, in many Election Districts. 
 Repeaters are "registered " in several districts, or, as has happened, 
 several times in one district under several names and addresses. 
 
 Several prerequisites are indispensable to the successful per- 
 petration of a registration fraud. In the first place there must 
 be registration board-members who will knowingly falsify the 
 list and work collusively together. Secondly, there must be col- 
 lusive effort between the outside partizan party heeler in charge 
 of the applicant on the one part, and the inside partizan party 
 board-member on the other part. Thirdly, there must be suffi- 
 cient rehearsing of the farce between the heeler, the member, and 
 the applicant to make it run smoothly when staged ; and fourthly, 
 the partizan party must pay all the expenses incidental to the 
 performance. Sometimes, however, there is a hitch in the per- 
 formance, and the actors plod their weary way to a court of 
 Justice. Ordinarily, after each general election, there are a suffi-
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 229 
 
 cient number of convictions to show these two facts clearly : 
 First, that somewhere the partizan party has attempted or per- 
 petrated a registration fraud ; and second, that the fraud itself 
 is one of the recognized means for increasing its " vote." 
 
 What is the immediate object of this action? It is to enable 
 the partizan party to poll one or more votes in each Election 
 District of a State than otherwise rightfully and properly exist 
 in such districts. For what reason ? To enable one State partizan 
 party to " poll " more " votes " than any other State partizan 
 party. But why is this desirable? Because, in the first place, 
 the people have passively agreed that the biggest partizan party 
 vote (no matter how gotten together) shall stand in the place of. 
 and serve the purposes of, a Political Majority ; and in the second 
 place, because the people have further passively agreed that the 
 partizan party which gets together at one election more " votes " 
 for its ticket than any other partizan party does for its ticket 
 shall have the control and oversight of the agencies, means, 
 processes, and instrumentalities by which The Commonwealth 
 transacts its political work, for at least one period of administra- 
 tion, and for as many more consecutive periods as this particular 
 partizan party is able, by political or non-political action, to get 
 together the biggest partizan party vote. 
 
 How does this action by the people affect the political adminis- 
 tration of public affairs? It abolishes it altogether and substi- 
 tutes in its place Partizan Party Administration of public affairs, 
 with all its attendant evils and illogical results to The Common- 
 wealth and to the individual. 
 
 Collusion between Partizan Parties : Mention has been made 
 of the fraudulent and collusive action that is taken whenever 
 " party success " requires it between the active members of a 
 partizan party who are working in different capacities for the 
 ostensible accomplishment of some step, stage, or process of 
 Political Administration ; and which collusive action is indis- 
 pensable for the successful transmutation of individual political 
 action into partizan party action. To transmute individual 
 political action into partizan party action is fraudulent because 
 the partizan party professes to act as the political Saviour of The 
 Commonwealth and to act solely for the General Welfare of 
 The Commonwealth and of the individual. 
 
 But partizan parties — considered as the exponents of the 
 abstract institution or agency known as The Partizan Party — 
 are guilty of a much deeper fraud than the mere instigation and
 
 230 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 sanction of fraudulent action in political matters between its own 
 working members. The immorality of such action is suflScient 
 in itself to disclose the imfitness of a partizan party to act as a 
 political agency; but it is grades above the iniquity to which 
 the partizan party has descended upon occasion, as, for instance, 
 when to accomplish its purposes it deliberately encompasses the 
 financial or the wholesale moral ruin of individuals who oppose 
 its desires. 
 
 Theoretically, different political parties exist in a State for the 
 express purpose of supporting and advocating opposing political 
 beliefs as to Government and Political Administration. We 
 have permitted partizan parties to act in the place of political 
 parties ; and the partizan parties profess to act as political parties. 
 If they so act, then they must necessarily be uncompromisingly 
 opposed until the Political Issues upon which they are opposed 
 are finally settled one way or another. But do they so act? 
 Continued experience has shown that they do not so act. Every 
 politically informed man must be aware that every State partizan 
 party, through the sanction which its Management bestows upon 
 the acts of its working members, is guilty at times of secretly 
 agreeing with and cooperating with its ostensible opponent- 
 party, to transact the political work over which the partizan 
 party has control so that it and its opponent shall receive some 
 private and peculiar advantage in the control of the exercise of 
 Political Power, or so that its working members and the working 
 members of its opponent may receive political preferment that 
 is dependent upon this advantage and not otherwise surely 
 obtainable without it. 
 
 At least two results follow upon such collusion. Firstly, 
 the private advantage and the political preferment are always 
 secured at the moral cost of The Commonwealth ; and secondly, 
 such collusion helps for the time being to more securely fasten 
 the partizan party system upon the people as their system of 
 Political Administration. 
 
 This collusion between partizan parties, and this collusive action 
 of the working members of the partizan parties, is a distinguishing 
 characteristic of partizan party oversight of the political work 
 that is necessary to the accomplishment of every step in Political 
 Action from the beginning of the formation of individual political 
 will to the passage of the Laws by The Legislature ; and when- 
 ever public sentiment has in the past been aroused to the pitch 
 of demanding an administration of affairs that is consonant with
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 231 
 
 the original political principles of the State Polity, then, in- 
 variably, the " dominant " partizan parties, State or local as the 
 case may be, have joined hands, and through secret agreement 
 and cooperation have eventually frustrated every independent 
 attempt for " good " or for " honest " political administration, 
 and have succeeded in having retained in use the Partizan Party 
 System of Administration under which collusion is practised ; 
 under which the partizan party can continue to deceitfully rob 
 individuals of the proper exercise of their rightful powers of 
 political administration ; under which it becomes impossible for 
 The Commonwealth to enjoy, or individuals to transmit, the bless- 
 ings promised in the name of logical political administration ; and 
 under which the partizan party actually prevents The State from 
 securing to its sovereign-units that freedom and equality in political 
 action which it originally ordained should exist continuously. 
 
 Bi-partizan Boards : In the period immediately preceding the 
 adoption by the States of the grievously modified form of the 
 Australian ballot system of voting, the control of the election 
 processes of a State was practically wholly in the hands of which- 
 ever partizan party had succeeded in " securing " a majority 
 of the votes in the State. The frauds, abuses, and oppressions 
 which the " successful " partizan party perpetrated in the work 
 of the election upon its partizan party opponents, and upon 
 associations of electors who organized themselves independently 
 of existing partizan party organizations, and which frauds upon 
 true political action were perpetrated solely for the immediate 
 purpose of enabling any partizan party to get together a " ma- 
 jority of votes," gradually aroused the people to seek relief from 
 conditions that had become intolerable. The idea which gained 
 prominence at that time was that if the positions on the electorate 
 boards which controlled the pre-election and the election processes 
 were divided equally between the " dominant parties " in The State, 
 then the " opposing elements " in these boards would act as a check 
 upon each other and prevent the future perpetration of such frauds. 
 
 But the people can not work up a sentiment regarding propriety 
 in political action or concerning the manner in which the detail 
 work of The Electorate shall be performed without the partizan 
 party being at the same time fully aware of that sentiment and 
 of the underlying ideas of the people. The partizan party has 
 just as much time to prepare itself for a change in political practise 
 and procedure as the people have ; and besides this. The Manage- 
 ment of a partizan party is much more shrewd and capable of work-
 
 232 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 ing a situation to the advantage of the partizan party than the 
 people at large in a State are of working a situation to the 
 advantage of The Commonwealth. While this sentiment for 
 bi-partizan registration and election boards was gaining favor 
 in the people at large, the partizan party had perceived a fact 
 that the people had failed to grasp ; namely, that boards which 
 were wholly composed of partizan party members could not pos- 
 sibly contain an opposing element of political action, and what 
 the people were really doing was setting a political thief to catch 
 a political thief in a board composed wholly of — party partizans. 
 
 Nothing could have suited the purposes of the partizan party 
 better than the establishment of such boards, for at that time the 
 appointment to the positions was in the control of its own 
 " Executive Committees." The partizan party hypocritically 
 professed dissatisfaction with existing conditions and secured 
 the passage of laws creating such boards. It caused some of the 
 Legislatures which were composed almost entirely of republican, 
 democratic, or some other partizan party partizans to give to these 
 boards the name of " Non-Partizan Boards." 
 
 By the use of this particular petty deception, the partizan 
 party hoped to create and actually did create the impression in 
 the minds of the great mass of the politically careless — and one 
 which persists in some quarters to the present time — that the 
 action of such-named boards is somehow removed from the sphere 
 of partizan party influence and must work automatically to check 
 the complained-of frauds. 
 
 But as a matter of fact the registration boards thus created 
 were, if possible, made more completely partizan in their work than 
 before. From this time on, the only element of political action 
 which any Machine-filled registration board contained was the 
 element of partizanship. The registration frauds did not cease. 
 Neither did the election frauds stop. Indeed it was not sensible 
 to suppose they would cease ; for the perpetration of registration 
 frauds and of election frauds was absolutely indispensable for 
 carrying into effect the object aimed at in the naturalization 
 frauds, and, also, were very often the only means by which a parti- 
 zan party could be sure of getting together more " votes " than 
 its opponents did. 
 
 " Trades " and " Deals " in Votes. There being now but one 
 " element " in the newly constituted boards, the new order of 
 procedure was immediately improved by the partizan party as 
 an opportunity for the secret exchange of " Party Courtesies "
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 233 
 
 between opposing partizan parties whereby one partizan party 
 gains something in local public office, position, or ascendency in 
 the control of the exercise of local political power — " Spoils " 
 is the inclusive term — in exchange for similar concessions ac- 
 corded to the " opposing " partizan party in another sphere of 
 action in the State ; the control in a city administration, for 
 instance, in exchange for the control in the State legislature ; 
 all of which is made easily possible when " opposing " partizan 
 parties secretly agree not to attack the validity of the naturaliza- 
 tion, registration, enrolment, and election work of each other, 
 and thereby clinch the control of the pre-election and election 
 work and processes in the hands of the partizan party as an agency 
 in Electoral Action. In short, " votes " were to be exchanged 
 between " opposing " partizan parties regardless of Political 
 Issues; and the partizan party proceeded to utilize the work of 
 these bi-partizan boards to secure votes by the improper regis- 
 tration of unqualified applicants which could be " traded " in 
 " deals " that form a most important factor in partizan party 
 Success at the polls. 
 
 Sanction. But the one result in this maneuver which at this 
 time the partizan party valued most was the implied acknowledg- 
 ment by the people of the legal status of the partizan party as a 
 political agency. Of course The Commonwealth did not intend 
 to sanction the destruction of the political powers and rights of 
 individuals, or to relieve them from the proper discharge of their 
 political obligations and duties. On the contrary, it merely 
 sought through its action in this respect to conserve the political 
 capacity of The State and of the individual by preventing the 
 future perpetration of certain political frauds upon some individuals 
 or associations by other individuals or associations. But by per- 
 mitting the partizan party at the same time to control the trans- 
 action of all of the political work of electors, electorate boards, 
 and of The Electorate ; and further, through passively permitting 
 the partizan party to use means and methods which are actually 
 destructive of these powers and rights (because they change the 
 political work of individuals, boards, and The Electorate into parti- 
 zan work) The Commonwealth nevertheless did impliedly sanction 
 a misuse of individual political powers and rights that amounts 
 in effect to their destruction as long as the sanction obtains. 
 Under this implied general sanction the partizan party is allowed 
 to manufacture " votes " and to dispose of and " trade " individual 
 " votes " for its own selfish and non-political purposes. The
 
 234 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 result of this action by the people is the weakening of the political 
 capacity of The State through weakening the political capacity 
 of every elector in it ; for whatever the partizan party does fraud- 
 ulently interposes an obstacle to the proper performance of the 
 political work of every elector, whether a member of a partizan 
 party organization or otherwise. 
 
 If an elector acts independently of a partizan party organization, 
 he must, in addition to the political work theoretically required, 
 expend much more effort in combating the pernicious and cor- 
 rupting work of the partizan party. His political work is quad- 
 rupled ; his endurance is illogically strained ; his energy is un- 
 necessarily dissipated and unduly taxed ; his capacity to work 
 properly is diminished through having to use partizan means and 
 methods for the transaction of political work; and before the 
 individual electors of a State can ever again participate freely 
 and equally in matters of political administration, the people 
 must withdraw the sanction which has made the partizan party 
 the manager of electoral and of electorate action, and which also 
 allows the partizan party to provide the System of Political 
 Administration, 
 
 Party partizanship and individual political freedom and equality 
 as ordained can not exist together, because they are antagonistic 
 states or conditions. Party partizanship as an element in or a 
 motive force in true Political Administration as ordained is a 
 contradiction in terms. There is but one right way to administer 
 Representative Government as ordained in the United States 
 of America. The partizan party system of administration must 
 be abolished and the people must devise and ordain the use of a 
 logical system of political administration under which each indi- 
 vidual elector can freely exercise the Reserved Powers of Ad- 
 ministration, and under which any elector can use logically any 
 Delegated Power of Administration that the people may call 
 upon him to use in their behalf. 
 
 Partizan Party Enrolment. Under the partizan party system 
 of organizing electoral action, and by virtue of authority that 
 is conferred either by " Partizan Party Rules " or by the people, 
 the registry boards are sometimes utilized for the performance 
 of work that is strictly of a partizan party nature. The process 
 called " Enrolment " is now merely partizan party Registration, 
 the ostensible object of which is to determine the right of a qualified 
 voter to participate in party action or affairs, and to vote in the 
 " Party Primaries,"
 
 NATURALIZATION AND REGISTRATION 235 
 
 In most States having the partizan party primary and conven- 
 tion system of nominations the appUcant for poHtical registration 
 is obhged to state his " Party AffiHation." In some States he is 
 obhged when registering to declare his intention to support the 
 nominees of the partizan party with which he is " affihated." 
 By this means he becomes entitled to vote in the Primary of his 
 partizan party. But this right does not enable the passive mem- 
 ber of a partizan party Primary to assist The Commonwealtli 
 to obtain competent and qualified candidates for public office 
 because, when the elector joined the partizan party organization, 
 he was obliged to promise to obey the " constituted authorities " 
 of the organization, and they supply the Primary with the list 
 of partizan party candidates. 
 
 This promise to obey is in effect a limitation and a restriction 
 put upon the political action of a voter. If the management of 
 the partizan party organization in his election district is in the 
 form of The Machine, or if the management employs machine 
 methods to frame " party platforms " or to place " party candi- 
 dates " in nomination, the voter is obliged by his promise to sup- 
 port The Machine and countenance its means and methods. 
 If he can not conscientiously support either his " Party " or its 
 actions, he is obliged to break his promise and be deprived of the 
 benefits accruing to organized effort which he sought, and to per- 
 form all of his political work (that is, to discharge his moral obli- 
 gations to The Commonwealth and to Humanity-at-Large) in 
 the face of, and actively opposed by an energetic and powerful 
 partizan organization that is exerting itself to the utmost to 
 suppress and nullify free and independent political action. 
 
 Were the partizan party deprived of the opportunity and the 
 right to " reach " individual electors through the " regulation " 
 of Naturalization and of Registration matters, and if it were 
 deprived of the power to control the action of its organization- 
 membership by Machine-made Rules, it would be shorn of much 
 of its effectiveness as an agency for the selection and the election 
 of partizan candidates for public office. At present it has this 
 right to select candidates and it concentrates its power to select 
 in the hands of its Managements where it can be despotically 
 used to enforce obedience to its Will in the ranks of the organiza- 
 tion and to produce " party votes " for the election of " party 
 candidates." But why continue on at all with the use of an agency 
 that corrupts this political process and every other over which it 
 has acquired control?
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 
 
 The success of political administration depends very largely 
 upon the proper performance during each period of administration 
 of the stated contributive processes of administration. 
 
 Each Political Process, properly performed, contributes its 
 partial result towards the sum total of logical political adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 Political Process Defined. A political process is either a speci- 
 fied action, or a systematic series of specified actions, required 
 of a Sovereign-unit on the one part, and of a public official or a 
 body of public officials on the other part, at some one step or 
 stage of political administration, and for the production of some 
 one contributive result thereto. 
 
 Degrees of Importance. Some contributive processes play a 
 more important part than others. The most important process 
 is the formation and expression of Public Opinion. Next in 
 importance comes the selection of public officials. 
 
 Defined. The Process of Nomination is the free selection by 
 one or more Electoral Groups of some of their number who are 
 willing, able, and competent to carry the Administrative Will of 
 the Political Majority into full operation, and the placing of those 
 selected individuals before the people for choice. 
 
 The choice follows later in the process of election ; but emphasis 
 is put on the word " selection " because where the selection has 
 been made wisely and logically, the choice becomes of minor im- 
 portance to the selection. For instance : Let us suppose the 
 existence of a commonwealth wherein the pre-election processes 
 that culminate in the Process of Nomination have been performed 
 logically. 
 
 The first result of such action is the existence of two or more 
 sets of public-spirited, able, and competent candidates for public 
 office. 
 
 236
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 237 
 
 The second result is that the people are required to make a 
 choice only between two or more irreproachable candidates or 
 sets of candidates. 
 
 The final result is that no matter how the choice between 
 administrative policies is decided, nevertheless the people will 
 have public-spirited and capable men in public office ; the action 
 of such men being the only kind of action upon which either The 
 State or the individual can rely with safety when either the in- 
 tegrity of The State or the rights of individuals are threatened. 
 
 Enough has been said already to show that the American Elec- 
 torates do not perform the process of nomination in a logical 
 manner. As the process is now^ performed, The Electorates do 
 not and can not produce the results originally intended, for their 
 performance is now regulated by a woful system of practise 
 under which individual political obligations, rights, and the General 
 Welfare are subordinated to private personal interests and the 
 " Welfare " of the partizan party. The system now in use neither 
 compels nor permits The Electorate to freely, directly, and unitedly 
 select its candidates for public office or to vote freely and directly 
 for the election of each one separately. It neither compels nor 
 permits an intelligent, free, open, and direct public transaction 
 of the work connected with the process of nomination. It allows 
 each partizan party to select and place only its own members 
 before the people for choice of officials ; and to exclude all others. 
 It acts as an impediment to the formation of Electoral Groups 
 and Political Parties, and unduly increases the difficulties of their 
 work. It forces The Electorate to give an expression as to political 
 administration through a choice between sets of candidates that 
 are not directly selected by electoral action, but which are selected 
 by undemocratic partizan party action, and who are secretly 
 pledged beforehand to the support of a partizan party policy 
 and the maintenance of the partizan party as an institution. 
 
 Publicity in. Finally, the system provides the opportunity for 
 banishing full and open publicity from the work of nomination 
 and allows the more important part of the process to be transacted 
 secretly by the partizan party according to its own reprehensible 
 standard of action. One would naturally suppose that the work 
 of selecting candidates for public office was a part of the adminis- 
 trative work, in which there could not be too much publicity and 
 open investigation. But open publicity has never been the char- 
 acteristic feature of the American way of performing the Process 
 of Nomination ; and this too, notwithstanding the fact that in
 
 238 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 later years the decision of the administrative poHcy has hinged 
 very largely upon the vote-attracting power of the candidates. 
 
 Secrecy vl. Consequently, the partizan party can not in fairness 
 be held wholly responsible for the initiation of the practise of 
 secrecy in political work that should be transacted openly and 
 above board, A glance at the politics of Colonial days and also 
 the early years of political independence will show how the belief 
 in secrecy and the practise of secrecy originated in the Common- 
 wealths before partizan parties as such ever came into being. 
 Let us take the political action of the JVIassachusetts colonists as 
 a fair example. In 1634 the colonists possessed the secret ballot 
 and filled the elective offices in the three branches of The Govern- 
 ment by vote. Nominations W' ere made by Magistrates, who were 
 elected annually by the colonists. In 1639 William III forced a 
 new charter on the colonists, under which he appointed a Royal 
 Governor, the Military Officers, and, with the consent of The Coun- 
 cil, the Judicial Officers. The Governor was given power to veto 
 any law. The King, and his successors, exerted themselves to 
 the utmost to establish and maintain a " Roj^alist Party " and a 
 royalist sentiment in the colony. The colonists still elected 
 their representatives to the Legislature (which body alone could 
 vote appropriations of the public money to meet the expenses of 
 the Colonial Government) and were able to successfully prevent 
 either the establishment of a predominating royalist party, or of 
 a predominating royalist sentiment in the colony. But the Kings, 
 and afterwards the Parliaments, continually attacked the " Civil 
 Rights " and the " Political Liberties " of the colonists, and the 
 struggle for Freedom became more and more intense. 
 
 Now because under these circumstances the preservation of these 
 rights and liberties hinged directly upon the action of the repre- 
 sentatives in the colonial legislature, the prime consideration of 
 the colonists became the selection of candidates for public office 
 whose fidelity to The Commonwealth was assured, and upon 
 whose political integrit}' they could rest safely. It was the force 
 of circumstances w^hich made the selection of candidates seem 
 then to be the one matter of supreme importance, and upon this 
 w^ork all of the political force of the community w^as then brought 
 to bear. But since all the power and prestige of the Royalist 
 governors, officers, and followers were exerted in opposition to 
 such action, it was not deemed advisable to perform it openly and 
 in Town Meeting. The fear of successful opposition and of 
 open rupture between the colonists and the royalist authorities
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 239 
 
 constrained the colonists to resort to secrecy to reach an agreement 
 of wills as to nominations ; and in this predicament they gave to 
 their political leaders the right to choose their candidates and to 
 place them in nomination, trusting to their incorruptible 
 patriotism to provide the people with faithful and sagacious 
 representatives in The Government. 
 
 \Yith the advent of political independence the people of the 
 colony were called on to fill the executive and judicial offices 
 heretofore filled by the British Government. Besides this, they 
 had to fill all the offices in their incipient General Government 
 under the Articles of Confederation ; and, with the adoption of 
 The Constitution, they were obliged to fill a still larger number of 
 offices in the National Government ; thus increasing enormously 
 their political duties as they, through political action, sought to 
 energize their Governments properly. But while independence did 
 away with the necessity for secrecy in their pre-election work, the 
 vastly increased demands for political effort, combined with the 
 lack of means for communication and transportation, predisposed 
 the people in favor of some nominating agency ; as otherwise 
 their political work would occupy too large a share of their time. 
 The purpose of the people remained unchanged, the spirit of 
 Liberty permeated and solidified society. The people expected 
 to be animated continuously by this spirit. They desired the 
 passage of just laws. The selection of desirable candidates was 
 the means at hand ; and since the caucus plan of nomination had 
 been instrumental largeh^ in securing their political independence, 
 libertv, and freedom, thev continued its use when the colonies 
 became States. It was through the force of necessity in the first 
 place that the practise of making nominations secretly was 
 adopted; but it was through the development of this illogical 
 practise under conditions of political freedom that the nominating 
 body finally succeeded in establishing itself as an intermediary body 
 between The Electorate and The Government in the work of 
 nomination. 
 
 In the matter of making nominations secretly the situation of 
 to-day presents a curious resemblance to that of colonial times ; 
 namely, the partizan party now holds pretty much the same 
 attitude towards the people that the colonists held towards their 
 Royal Executives. The interests of " The Party " are no more 
 identical with those of The Commonwealth than were the interests 
 of the colonists with those of their Royalist Governments. Parti- 
 zan party interests are in most respects diametrically opposed
 
 240 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 to the interests of The Commonwealth ; but it would never do to 
 let the appreciation of this fact become widespread in the com- 
 munity. Consequently, in its efforts to maintain and strengthen 
 its illogical position as an administrative agency, the partizan 
 .party works now in pretty much the same way that the colonists 
 worked to circumvent their rulers ; that is, through employing 
 secrecy. But the reasons for secrecy in these two instances are 
 very different. The partizan party intends to utilize adminis- 
 trative action for the accomplishment of many non-political ends ; 
 and in order to carry out its intention, it is obliged to resort to 
 secrecy, hypocritical pretense, and many petty deceptions while 
 endeavoring to hoodwink the people at large into the belief that 
 the ends of both are identical. If that is true, what is the necessity 
 for secret party action in promoting them ? The fact that partizan 
 parties act constantly in an " invisible " way belies the claim. The 
 ends are by no means identical and " The Party " resorts to secrecy. 
 Nominations that appear to be made by "party organizations" 
 are actually made by The Boss working through the managements. 
 The ulterior object for which many partizan party nominations 
 are made compels The Boss to work in secret. Besides posing as 
 the political leader of a section of the electorate and being the head 
 of a " party organization," The Boss is more often than otherwise 
 the panderous agent of " Interests " that are seeking some immoral 
 if not illegal advantage or privilege from The Government. In 
 procuring the desired legislation The Boss must have more or 
 less corrupt men in The Government upon whom he can depend 
 during its passage. These he can get if he can make the nomina- 
 tions ; and these he can elect if he can manufacture and manipulate 
 the required " majority of votes." But to grant a special economic 
 advantage, to sell legislation, to manufacture electoral voters 
 and votes is corrupt political action. It has to be performed 
 under the cloak of secrecy and the mask of deception because 
 it would be fatal to the established order of Bossism should the 
 majority of the people become convinced of the existence of such 
 conspiratous action, or even get an inkling of the effect produced 
 by such action on private morals. Also, and as a means of raising 
 party revenue. The Boss sells nominations for cash to party 
 partizans. The seller and the buyer are fully aware of the im- 
 morality of the action, and the consciousness of wrong doing is 
 another incentive to secrecy. But not to multiply instances un- 
 necessarily. The Boss working alone can not successfully apply 
 the many corrupting, corroding, and Politics-destroying practises,
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 241 
 
 means, methods, and rules of which the partizan party system is 
 composed. He must have accompHces with whom to work at 
 every step and stage of administrative action and in every poHti- 
 cal process. These accomplices aggregate hundreds, even in the 
 smaller States ; and he, and each active member of every partizan 
 party, is desirous of keeping such shady transactions entirely 
 in the dark and concealed as far as possible from public observa- 
 tion, not to mention that of the passive members of the partizan 
 parties. 
 
 Let us trace briefly the history of the ordeal to which the people 
 of the States have been subjected while trying to establish in use 
 a consistent process of nomination. 
 
 The Poioer to Choose. The political power considered in this 
 chapter is the Power to Choose. Its exercise is divided between 
 choosing the temporary administrative policy and choosing can- 
 didates for political office. The selection of an administrative 
 policy is a distinct stage in administrative action as well as a tre- 
 mendously important stage; and its work should be performed 
 as a distinct process. 
 
 Function of Nominating Process. Part of the administrative 
 action of the American Commonwealths is performed by public 
 servants. The people are supposed to fill the public offices with 
 public servants ; that is, with individuals who will serve the public, 
 and no other body. Theoretically, the candidates are to be se- 
 lected by The Electorate and while it is acting as a Collective 
 Sovereign. The selection of candidates and their presentation 
 for choice before the people is a distinct stage in administrative 
 action. 
 
 The function of a nominating process is to regulate logically 
 the exercise by individual electors — Sovereign-units — of their 
 Right to Choose while they are engaged in the work of filling 
 public offices. In a logical and comprehensive system of political 
 administration the process of nomination would consist of a pre- 
 scribed series of actions whereby candidates for public office are 
 selected and presented before the people for choice by absolutely 
 free action on the part of each individual elector ; and of nothing 
 else. 
 
 The General Situation. But when political administration began 
 in each State, the people had already adopted the plan of causing 
 the decision of their administrative policy to depend upon the 
 election of candidates. This complicated matters badly. Be- 
 cause this action improperly jumbled the three logically distinct
 
 242 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 processes of forming Public Opinion, of Nomination, and of Elec- 
 tion into one intricate, unnecessarily involved, and obscure process, 
 it had the effect of placing impediments in the way of easy and 
 orderly administrative action. The work of political administra- 
 tion is, at best, sufficiently exacting. It requires the people to 
 put many separate concepts and ideas into active but harmonious 
 operation. Simple and direct action is the main desideratum in 
 any process; and simplicity and directness should characterize 
 especially the rule of administrative action. But if several dis- 
 tinct ideas are jumbled together, the otherwise distinct meaning 
 of each idea becomes more or less overlaid, obscured, and confused. 
 If ideas concerning administrative action are confused, then indi- 
 viduals become confused by uncertainty and doubt concerning 
 the right way in which the separate ideas should be put into active 
 and harmonious operation ; and finally, the absence of certainty 
 presents the opportunity for " Opinion " to win over converts 
 to " Expediency." The people were divided into the few who 
 were capable of leading administrative action and the many who 
 had to be led and instructed. The leaders were divided by motives 
 of individual action into two groups. On the one side were the 
 true political leaders, who worked for the establishment of a 
 popular nominating agency. The mass of the people wanted it, 
 but the situation alone seemed to present insuperable obstacles 
 to the easy and practical work of such a course. On the other 
 side were the " Practical " politicians, who offered expedients as 
 the means for overcoming the difficulties of the situation. They 
 called their expedients by political names but hid the full con- 
 sequences of their adoption and use from the people. They 
 worked constantly for the development of a process whereby 
 nominations should be made for the people and not by The Elec- 
 torate. They developed and fostered the idea that nominations 
 should be made by systematically organized and permanent 
 associations of electors that were compacted together under their 
 own management. Of course it is apparent that if such associa- 
 tions should have any other object in view than the promotion 
 of the general welfare, then such associations if called " Parties," 
 would necessarily be non-political parties as hereinbefore defined, 
 and the nominations would be party nominations, possibly partizan 
 party nominations, and not nominations by The Electorate. 
 Both groups of leaders, the one actuated by civic virtue and the 
 other very largely by self-interest, were forced to appeal for sup- 
 port to a public that lacked administrative knowledge as well as
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 243 
 
 administrative laws relative to the work of nominations; and, 
 as the event has proved, both were fated to give way to experi- 
 ence as the leader of the people — Experience, whose ancient and 
 salutary mode of political education consists in letting her pupils 
 wilfully butt their heads against successive expedients until (if 
 they survive the attempt) they are driven by the pains of succes- 
 sive failures into the proper use of proper agencies, means, 
 methods, and processes of political action. 
 
 " The Nominating System." By many political writers the 
 nominating process now in operation is called " The Nominating 
 System " ; and so far the written history of its development and 
 use is, in the main, a medley of truth and error that abounds in 
 mixed ideas and confused thought. This is one of the natural 
 results of jumbling several distinct ideas into one inclusive but 
 involved and confused idea. As an illustration : Writers have 
 failed continually to differentiate clearly between the functions 
 of a " Political Caucus " and those of a partizan party Primary 
 Meeting. Terms that describe properly the composition and 
 functions of a political caucus are employed indiscriminately to 
 describe the functions and composition of the other meeting. 
 Such literary work leaves the impression in the mind of the reader 
 that a partizan party primary meeting is a true political means ; and 
 the impression, backed up by the fact that this means is in actual 
 use, creates the belief in the uninformed and heedless that the 
 means and its use are proper. The impression is false and con- 
 fusing. The composition, actual objects, and true functions of 
 each meeting are opposed to each other. The properly performed 
 work of a political caucus leads up solely to further political work 
 by The Electorate. The action of a partizan party primary 
 meeting (while of course it does affect individual administrative 
 work both present and future) nevertheless leads up solely to 
 further action by a partizan party, and generally to action that 
 is not wholly political in its nature and purpose. But while 
 wTiters are vivisecting the nervous centers of The Electorate and 
 of The Partizan Party, careful discrimination becomes imperative. 
 Therefore let us compare the composition, the purposes, and the 
 work of these two meetings a little further. 
 
 Political Caucus Defined. A political caucus is a preliminary 
 meeting of a few of The Electorate, held prior to the election, for 
 the purpose of freely discussing and reaching an agreement ; first, 
 concerning the most advisable administrative course to be pur- 
 sued during the coming administrative period by The Electorate ;
 
 244 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 and second, to agree upon candidates for public office who favor 
 the adoption of this course ; and for no other purpose. 
 
 Such a body is a political body. Its action is political in nature 
 because it relates exclusively to the administrative action of the 
 body politic. True political caucus action initiates, gives form 
 and direction to, and cause for the direct exercise of The Reserved 
 Powers by the electors of The State. Its work is spontaneous 
 and is accomplished in, by, and at the meeting through a direct 
 and free exercise of individual judgment and volition. The 
 meeting is its own master. It receives no " orders " from any 
 source. It is composed solely of individuals acting in the capacity 
 of Sovereign-units. 
 
 The Partisan Party Primary. The original scheme of partizan 
 party organization provides for three working divisions ; namely, 
 The Primary, The Committee, and The Convention. In states 
 where partizan party conventions have been abandoned as nomi- 
 nating agencies, partizan party primaries now act as a nominating 
 means. In the remaining states the ostensible purposes of the 
 partizan party primary are : first, to effect its own organization 
 as a meeting ; second, to nominate candidates for " Party " 
 offices and positions; and third, to choose Delegates from the 
 membership of the partizan party organization to serve as members 
 of the partizan party nominating convention. 
 
 All of this work is of a partizan party nature ; and its transac- 
 tion merely enables a partizan party to make the nominations 
 instead of The Electorate. As for composition, the meeting is 
 held forth as an open meeting in which all of the partizan party 
 organization members are entitled to participate ; but the meet- 
 ings are generally managed and arranged so that the majority 
 at the meeting is composed of those only who are strictly ad- 
 herents of The Boss. As for nominating candidates for " Party " 
 office and position, it may be insisted upon by some that the phrase 
 " To nominate " means the same in partizan party parlance as in 
 parliamentary practise ; that is, to select and nominate ; but 
 no one who is familiar with partizan party machine methods will 
 advance such an opinion, because, while the passive partizan 
 party members are either left or led to believe that such is their 
 right, the actual selection and choice of every official in each divi- 
 sion of the partizan party organization is made by the manage- 
 ment ; for the management of every partizan party machine must 
 have men at every lever of the machine upon whom it can depend. 
 The actual truth is, that acting by virtue of the peculiar species
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 245 
 
 of partizan party " authority " that is conferred upon him by 
 the so-termed " Constitution and By-Laws of the Party Com- 
 mittee," the Boss issues his orders to the members of the partizan 
 party primary meeting to " nominate " so-and-so for such-and- 
 such party offices, and to " choose so-and-so as Delegates " 
 to the partizan party nominating convention. The passive 
 members in the meeting, if any, are bound to obey these orders, 
 because of their previously promised submission to the will of the 
 " Constituted Authorities " of the partizan party organization. 
 The active members become instrumental by seeing that these 
 orders are carried out to the letter. They present the prepared 
 lists of nominees and of delegates at the primary meetings, and, 
 joining with the passive members, if any, hypocritically go through 
 the twisted parliamentary formalities of selecting and choosing. 
 The Boss is able to secure obedience to his orders from the active 
 members through his ability to " discipline " them in case they 
 show any disinclination to obey their " Constituted Authorities." 
 Finally, the executive head of each partizan party organization 
 is the division called " The Committee." Among the partizan 
 party organization powers which it has absorbed unto itself is 
 the power to initiate party action. As a result, the partizan 
 party primary meeting is actually subordinate to the party com- 
 mittee and merely serves to register the will of The Committee. 
 It is put through a farcical ritual of democratic procedure by 
 The Committee, for the sole purpose of creating a belief in the 
 minds of the politically careless that somehow the party primary 
 is exercising the caucus powers of The Electorate. And it must 
 be admitted that The Committee has succeeded in establishing 
 this belief to an astonishing extent. 
 
 In the statutory laws relating to elections this meeting is com- 
 monly called " The Primary," the idea being to create the im- 
 pression that political powers and political rights are exercised in 
 it. But enough has been said to make it clear to the reader that 
 no matter by what misleading name the meeting may be called, 
 it never has and never can serve the purpose of a political caucus. 
 So long as it remains composed and controlled as at present, it will 
 never be an>i:hing but a partizan party travesty of a political 
 meeting. 
 
 The Caucus : The political caucus originated in Boston. For 
 many years before The Revolution it had been the custom of the 
 true political leaders of the Massachusetts colonists to hold a 
 private meeting before any general or public meeting at which
 
 246 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 the colonists would have to act administratively. At these 
 meetings the leaders agreed between themselves upon the policy 
 to be pursued by the colonists, and selected the candidates whom 
 they wished nominated in the meetings at which they were voted 
 upon. This plan was continued in operation when the Colonies 
 became States. The members of the caucus meetings provided 
 themselves with ballots and induced as many as possible to vote 
 for the chosen candidates. Tested by modern requirements, 
 these caucuses lacked equality, publicity, regularity, and authority. 
 As for equality, all could nominate; but those who nominated 
 without organized support generally failed to elect. The force 
 of the plan lay in the agreement of united support. As for pub- 
 licity, it was considered good management at that time to keep 
 the caucus plans concealed as much as possible from those who 
 might oppose ; for " publicity " might weaken the effective force 
 of the agreement to support. This practice was however opposed 
 to the " Democratic Spirit " of the times and before long it be- 
 came the custom for the Town Crier to give notice of the time, 
 place, and object of the Political Caucus. Later on a written or 
 printed notice was given and posted in public places. Still later 
 it was posted, or published, or both, thus securing publicity, 
 some authority, and a degree of organized action. But with 
 the addition of publicity to the work of the caucus, and with the 
 exercise by many of the delicate work of political management, 
 came a lessening of the effectiveness of such work through the 
 multiplicity of counsel and also through the impossibility of al- 
 ways getting a binding agreement to support from the caucus. 
 These features made the successful performance by the caucus 
 of the initiative caucus work of The Electorate well-nigh im- 
 possible ; and before long the attempt in this direction was aban- 
 doned. Finallj^ these meetings gradually became open Primary 
 Meetings in which nominations were made, while the performance 
 of the caucus work proper, the choice of administrative policy, 
 was put into the hands of Committees of citizens specially formed 
 to transact it. 
 
 Political Committees of Correspondence : Between 1776 and 
 1800 nominations were made in various ways. Early in this 
 period either The Caucus, or Mass Meetings of citizens, or the 
 Newspapers placed candidates in nomination. Candidates an- 
 nounced themselves, and " stumped " their Districts, but this 
 latter species of nomination was disliked by the majority, and 
 passed out of general use as early as 1792 when " The Parties "
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 247 
 
 began to take on a semblance of organization. Neither of the 
 above methods satisfied the people, who, accustomed to apply- 
 ing their own initiative and control, desired to decide poli- 
 cies and select candidates by " conventions of Delegates " 
 selected especially for that purpose. But the practical diffi- 
 culties of this method were at that time too great to be 
 overcome. 
 
 With the necessity, however, for filling the quantities of new 
 ofiices consequent upon the adoption of their State Constitutions, 
 The Ai'ticles of Confederation, and The Constitution, came the 
 immediate need for some method by which candidates for general 
 as well as local office could be satisfactorily nominated. The 
 old caucus plan failed to meet the requirements of the new situa- 
 tion. Mass Meetings were impossible as a means, and for obvious 
 reasons Newspapers were inadequate. Railroads were unknown, 
 and the means for efficiently transporting delegates to and from 
 central nominating assemblages were lacking. In this predica- 
 ment Political Committees of Correspondence were used as the 
 means for ascertaining the sentiment of the people at large con- 
 cerning Policies and Candidates. These committees differed in 
 nature from those of the same name in Revolutionary times in 
 that their work was confined strictly to matters of policies and 
 nominations, and later on to party management. They were 
 usually composed of social leaders who " interested themselves 
 in Politics " and who voluntarily associated themselves together. 
 They soon became in effect the old Political Caucus working on 
 broader lines and over extended territory. In some instances 
 they made their nominations directly to the people, but in others 
 they were used as auxiliary adjuncts of nominating bodies presently 
 to be described. They sent out " Circular Letters " to The 
 Electorate at large, and from the replies received made out lists 
 of candidates to the voters. 
 
 But this method of transacting initiative caucus work was 
 most unsatisfactory. The work of The Committees was sporadic. 
 It was necessarily incomplete because of the lack of replies from 
 outlying districts. Neither was the committee a permanent body. 
 It also lacked direct " authority " to nominate, there being no 
 uniform or specific method of calling it into existence. Besides 
 this its work was tentative in that it had to be submitted to the 
 people for confirmation whenever it acted as an auxiliary. The 
 people in their turn were not bound to accept it and often did not. 
 In short, The Committees lacked authority, permanence, proper
 
 248 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 organization, and power to enforce either united or " harmonious " 
 action in The Electorate. 
 
 Representative Caucuses : While the Committee System was 
 demonstrating its incapacity to organize electoral action properly, 
 the voters in various localities in the ,Union were trying to establish 
 the " Convention System " ; but there was no uniformity in the 
 organization methods adopted, or in the names used to denote 
 the bodies. Some were called Representative Caucuses, some 
 Delegate Conventions, and some Nominating Conventions. In 
 1786 candidates for local offices were nominated in Massachusetts 
 by " County Conventions," supposed to be composed of delegates 
 selected at primary meetings held in the various Towns. But 
 these conventions were not in fact representative because the 
 delegates from the near-by districts generally outnumbered those 
 from the outlying districts, which, sometimes were not repre- 
 sented in the convention at all. Their composition was also ir- 
 regular, some of the delegates being sent by Mass Meetings, 
 some by self-constituted Committees, and some by The Primaries. 
 They also were sporadic, being called into existence by various 
 agencies. Because of these defects they lacked Authority, neither 
 the people, nor the leaders, nor the candidate feeling bound by 
 their action. Nor did they nominate candidates for general office, 
 and they soon gave way to another method. 
 
 Legislative Caucuses : The Conference System, which was 
 employed alongside of the Representative Caucus to nominate 
 candidates for and in the State Senatorial and Congressional 
 districts, possessed the same structural defects of the Repre- 
 sentative Caucus and soon shared its fate. So far the efforts of 
 the people to provide themselves with a " Nominating System " 
 had made little progress. They attempted to make " The Caucus 
 System" fit the new conditions, but its failure to work well in the 
 county conventions and in the conferences showed conclusively 
 that it was incapable of transacting the work of nominating 
 candidates for general office in The State or in The Nation. The 
 people still desired to nominate through Delegate Conventions, 
 but the leaders who were then in 1790 first forming and organizing 
 " The Party " were not enthusiastic. To organize the voters 
 in the various districts of a State was a work of great difficulty. 
 Because of the necessary outlay of time and expense, it was almost 
 impossible to get a representative State Nominating Body together ; 
 and if gotten together when feeling was running so high, it was 
 more than likely that the leaders would be unable to enforce
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 249 
 
 " harmony " on the various Factions and Wings. AMiy, they 
 argued, attempt an undertaking fraught with such labor, expense, 
 difficulty, and doubt? Why entrust the Caucus Work to an un- 
 disciplined and unorganized Electorate ? \Miy not let the leading 
 members of " The Organizations," who were assembled together 
 annually at the Capital in the Legislature, and who were the 
 social leaders of the People — why not let the members of the 
 Legislature, acting in the capacity of Political Leaders, meet 
 together annually in the Capital at stated times, and there exer- 
 cise the initiative necessary to produce continuous and coherent 
 action m the local " Party " organizations throughout the State? 
 WTiy not let them canvass the general political sentiment as to 
 Administrative Policy, using the Committees of Correspondence 
 for this purpose ; and why not let them, who were most conver- 
 sant with the political situation, make all but local nominations ? 
 
 The People adopted this scheme as a happy solution of their 
 difficulties ; and by common consent the Legislative Caucus so 
 formed was conceded to be the proper body to make all but local 
 nominations. By 1797 all of the States were using this method, 
 under which "The Party," composed strictly of Office Holders 
 and their supporters, gradually succeeded in imposing nominations 
 upon The People. 
 
 By the adoption of this method The People thought they had 
 at last secured an " Authorized " and a " Regular " Nominating 
 Agency, for the vote which elected the Representatives regu- 
 larly also regularly elected the Caucus Members, and in an 
 authorized way. 
 
 But the real effect of adopting this plan was to take the per- 
 formance of Caucus W'ork away from The Electorate and put it 
 into the hands of "The Partv," and to sanction beforehand an 
 exercise of Political Power by a small portion of The Electorate. 
 
 The adoption of the plan marks the beginning of the present 
 permanent partizan party organizations. It also marks the 
 beginning of " Regular " action on the part of partizan party 
 organization members. The Legislatures were composed largely 
 of Social Leaders. As a rule the Electors were predisposed to 
 recognize their authority, even when acting as a Caucus ; and be- 
 fore long the action of the Legislative Caucus on administrative 
 policies, candidacies, and individual administrative action, ac- 
 quired a weight and binding force on the members of the partizan 
 party organizations which few men cared to oppose openly. 
 
 Working together in secrecy during legislative sessions, and
 
 250 SAFE AKD UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 under their own rules, and working in unison throughout the 
 State during the remainder of the time, the members of this cau- 
 cus succeeded for the time being in securing contmuous and co- 
 herent individual Electoral Action (along " Party " lines) in 
 matters of nomination. The Caucus also succeeded during the 
 next twenty-five years in making obedience by the partizan party 
 members to its dictates regarding their exercise of Political Power 
 seem as obligatory to them in honor as was the obedience of the 
 Legislators to the mandates of " The Party " Caucus which, at 
 the beginning of every legislative session, settled the course they 
 were to pursue while acting as Representatives of The People, 
 Considered as the accredited agency for the nomination of candi- 
 dates for general office, the Legislative Caucus succeeded in 
 enforcing a support to its action from a majority of The Elec- 
 torate that amounted in appearance to a sanction. The members 
 of the partizan party organizations generally regarded its deci- 
 sions as authoritative and as mandatory respecting their individual 
 action in administrative matters. 
 
 "Aristocratic Rule." When the Legislative Caucus was adopted 
 as the nominating agency, its membership was composed entirely 
 of office holders who had been selected for office because of their 
 social position, their wealth, their superior education, and political 
 sagacity. These men naturally believed themselves better fitted 
 to exercise political authority than the average run of the electors. 
 They naturally desired to be returned to office and they suc- 
 cumbed to the temptation of utilizing the " voting strength " 
 of the party organization as a means to this end. In the Southern 
 States the leaders in social and political action had produced a 
 system of State Government that was aristocratic rather than 
 democratic in nature. They openly spoke of " The common 
 people" as a class to be legislated /or ; and while social conditions 
 in the Northern States differed from those in the Southern States, 
 nevertheless, as the socially prominent men in each section were 
 united in the pursuit of public office, the stigma of aristocratic 
 feeling was attached to all of them alike in the minds of those 
 who felt themselves deprived of much of their political birthright 
 by the actions of the united office seekers. Moreover, immigra- 
 tion was rapidly increasing the population of the States and was 
 also invigorating the " Democratic Spirit " of The People. This 
 state of mind demanded a freer participation in political adminis- 
 tration by all legally qualified electors than was possible during 
 the regime of the Legislative Caucus. Under the process of nomi-
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 251 
 
 nation put in operation by the Legislative Caucus, many individual 
 electors found themselves deprived of the right to freely select 
 candidates. Such electors vigorously objected to the action of 
 the Legislative Caucus as a " usurpation of their Right to Choose." 
 They denied that any " political rights " whatsoever were con- 
 ferred upon individuals by the possession of social position, 
 wealth, or education. They decried the efforts of the office holders 
 to maintain the so-called " aristocratic class " in office and they 
 claimed that the nominating body was instrumental in bringing 
 the Executive and the Legislative branches of The Government 
 into dependent relations that were incompatible with public 
 safety. These ideas were gradually assimilated by the " Common 
 People," who became more and more dissatisfied with having 
 their administrative affairs managed for them by " aristocrats 
 from Massachusetts and Virginia." They imagined that they 
 saw behind the work of the Legislative Caucus a scheme to per- 
 petuate the distasteful " Aristocratic rule." They believed that 
 the Legislative Caucus was assisting the " aristocratic class " 
 to retain its hold upon the public offices and they practically 
 put an end to its existence as a nominating agency when they 
 joined with others who were dissatisfied and brought about in 
 1828 the election of Andrew Jackson as " One of the common 
 people." 
 
 Evih of This Process. But although the Legislative Caucus 
 ceased to be the active nominating agency, it bequeathed a legacy 
 of administrative evil under which American Democracy suffers 
 to-day. It practically established the belief that a group of 
 electors organized to attain objects other than the promotion 
 of the General Welfare was a proper agency for the guidance and 
 control of individual and representative administrative action. 
 It succeeded in making a partizan party the accredited leader 
 in administrative action and in making the existence of a Political 
 Party well-nigh impossible in any State. It devised and applied 
 the means and practises by which individual electors were organized 
 into permanent associations of " Party Voters," by which in- 
 dividual political action was successfully transmuted into partizan 
 party action, and by which the control of The Government 
 was taken away from The Electorate and placed in the hands of 
 a partizan party. It did not hesitate to use " Party Patronage " 
 as a means for influencing individual administrative action. It 
 freely bestowed State offices as a reward for faithful " Party 
 Work." Having the power to make nominations, it resorted
 
 252 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 to " Deals " and " Trades " in party votes as a means whereby 
 to secure the election of its own candidates. Practically all of the 
 important work of the Legislative Caucus was contrary to the 
 spirit and intent of American Democracy and a brief word con- 
 cerning the way in which it succeeded in perverting the adminis- 
 trative action of the Commonwealths may not be out of place. 
 
 Partizan Party Permanence. Considered as the management 
 of the then existing partizan party organizations, the Legislative 
 Caucus succeeded in keeping its organizations alive and active 
 in the work of securing a " majority of votes " for the party 
 during successive periods of political administration. This it 
 accomplished through having the exercise of the rightful power 
 which the organization member has (to work continuously in 
 formative and constructive political action) transferred to it as 
 the manager of such action. It succeeded through a perversion 
 of the doctrine of allegiance in making the dictates of the Legis- 
 lative Caucus fully binding upon the action of the organization 
 member, whether acting in the capacity of a sovereign-unit or as 
 a party member. It established the opinion that each organiza- 
 tion member was " bound in honor " to support the action of the 
 Legislative Caucus in return for the benefits, political or material, 
 which resulted from the organized action which the Legislative 
 Caucus produced. It differentiated such support (obtained 
 through the " unhesitating obedience " of each organization 
 member to the " Party Dictates ") from true allegiance (or the 
 support due from an individual to his Government) by the name 
 of " Party Regularity " ; and it intended by this name to convey 
 the idea of political regularity or proper political action by the 
 members of a political party. 
 
 Partizan Party Regularity. But let us consider a moment 
 whether the name is accurately descriptive either of the asso- 
 ciated individuals or of the condition produced by applying the 
 party doctrine. 
 
 If there is such a thing as " Political Regularity," it must be 
 the state or condition in which each individual elector is absolutely 
 free to act politically as his conscience and judgment impels, 
 and in which he remains immune from all other influences or 
 considerations while acting politically. Under our principles 
 of political association no action of an elector can be considered 
 regular that does not tend to maintain the moral freedom of him- 
 self and all other electors ; and this is true whether the elector 
 is a member of a political party or of a partizan party because the
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 253 
 
 Obligations of Sovereignty are binding upon each elector whenever 
 he acts in a political capacity alone, or with others, in any way 
 that affects the results of political administration. 
 
 As for the compacted group of individuals referred to, sufficient 
 has been said heretofore to show that it is a partizan party. Con- 
 sequently, the " regularity " referred to must be a partizan party 
 conception of action that is to be taken by the members of the 
 partizan party organizations. But since a partizan party has 
 other objects in view besides the promotion of the General Welfare, 
 " partizan party regularity " becomes synonymous with political 
 impropriety. Considered as an obligatory and as an ejiforcihle 
 rule of individual administrative action within the partizan party 
 organizations, the doctrine of partizan party regularity acquires 
 an influence sufficient to supplant patriotism with partizanship 
 as an active motive for administrative action. In the absence 
 of an adequate and comprehensive system of political administra- 
 tion, patriotism is left without an enforcible rule of action ; and 
 an unenforcible patriotism is easily supplanted by an enforcible 
 partizanship, and more easily still if individuals can be induced 
 to believe that partizanship is merely one form of patriotism. 
 Partizan parties in a representative democracy are, however, 
 groups of individual electors who work together to secure objects 
 that are not contemplated in the governmental or administrative 
 plan of action — individual or class privileges through legislation, 
 for instance ; or improper opportunities for individual material 
 or political advancement ; " Party Success " ahead of the General 
 Welfare, and so forth. The accomplishment by a partizan party 
 of each one of its non-political objects requires the partizan party 
 to hamper or to destroy free, independent, and proper individual 
 administrative action to a greater or less extent within The Elec- 
 torate, and to substitute in its place a blind dependence upon the 
 selfishly motived " Party " in the minds of the politically unin- 
 formed. But when we pause to consider the ordained Obligations 
 of Sovereignty that rest upon each Sovereign-unit, it will at once 
 become apparent that the enforcement by a partizan party of its 
 doctrine of " Regularity " upon any one of the sovereign-units 
 not only is traitorous in nature because it tends to weaken the 
 political capacity of The State, but that it debases the morals 
 of all parties concerned and so tends to corrupt the public morals. 
 The more non-political objects a partizan party has in view, the 
 more necessary it becomes to increase the number of " voters " 
 it can herd and control within its " organization " ; and the
 
 254 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 doctrine of " Partizan Party Regularity " was devised as one 
 of the partizan party means by which to override or obscure the 
 true poHtical obligations which should govern all electors in their 
 administrative action, whether that action was taken in an in- 
 dividual or in a representative capacity. 
 
 This doctrine of " Party Regularity " and its binding force over 
 individual volition in administrative action is perhaps the chief 
 evil legacy of the Legislative Caucus to the American People; 
 for it was during the period of the Legislative Caucus that the 
 doctrine of " Party Regularity " was given an ascendency in the 
 minds of that class of electors who voluntarily become passive 
 members of " Party Organizations " that is very little diminished 
 at present. 
 
 ^Vhile the Legislative Caucus was posing as the " Political 
 Leader," it was also acting as a partizan party Nominating 
 Agency. Its pose and its action were irreconcilable, but it 
 finally succeeding in creating a false impression in the minds of 
 the politically heedless that its work as a political leader was 
 irreproachable by the following means. 
 
 By making " The Party " appear essential to the Welfare of 
 The State. By stimulating the " Love of Party " in the minds 
 of the organization members and by making " The Party " 
 appear to be the proper agency for satisfying their Love of Country. 
 By making it appear that " Party Success " was the direct method 
 of serving The Community. By making " Party Success " 
 appear to depend entirely upon " Party Regularity " and by en- 
 larging upon the danger to party success of any breach of party 
 regularity. By creating in individual electors a feeling of de- 
 pendence upon " The Party " and of insecurity in independent 
 action. By giving to any breach of " Party Regularity " the ap- 
 pearance of conduct traitorous to both " The Party " and The State 
 that involved ignominy and un worthiness in the perpetrator. 
 By creating in the minds of the organization members an almost 
 universal dread of the consequences flowing from free inde- 
 pendent political action through the infliction of every possible 
 " discipline " and punishment upon any member " guilty " of 
 such a " breach of Party Regularity." 
 
 Using the above named means, and through stifling inde- 
 pendent political action in every possible way, the Legislative 
 Caucus succeeded in developing among its organization members, 
 and even among many unattached electors, the idea and belief 
 that " Party Regularity " was the prune safeguard of Citizenship,
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 255 
 
 und that only such " Issues," Platforms, and Candidates that 
 possessed the stamp of " Party Regularity " were entitled to the 
 s^iff rages of the Electorate at Large. Such was the blight cast 
 by the Legislative Caucus upon true electoral action in this respect. 
 In another matter it acted with equal perniciousness. 
 
 The Single List and the General Ticket. Acting in its capacity 
 as the executive and managing body of the partizan party or- 
 ganization, the Legislative Caucus insisted that "Party Success " 
 required the use of but one single list of party candidates. It 
 imposed its " Imperative mandate " upon all organization members 
 to use at the elections only the " General Ticket " which it, the 
 Legislative Caucus, had prepared for use. The reasons for this 
 action are evident. In the first place, it sought to retain the 
 Caucus members in office, and, in the second place, it sought the 
 election of a " Party " majority in The Government where that 
 majority under the pressure of " discipline " should pass laws 
 that were devised by the Legislative Caucus. Two " Party 
 Tickets " would split the organization vote and lessen the chances 
 for " Party Success " and increase the chances for the " success " 
 of its opponent, as was fully demonstrated in after years when 
 the Democratic Party split, one wing nominating Breckenridge 
 while the other nominated Douglas, and the election went to the 
 Republican Party which elected Lmcoln as its candidate with less 
 votes than a majority. 
 
 So much for the effect of the " General Ticket " on " Party 
 Success." What effect did the use of the general ticket have on 
 organization members, and on electors who were not members 
 of any partizan party organizations ? 
 
 The enforcement of the " Imperative mandate " put a restric- 
 tion upon the exercise of individual volition. It destroyed the 
 organization member's right to vote freely for a candidate. By 
 joining a " Party " organization and by obeying the dictates of 
 the Legislative Caucus, the individual elector lost his right to 
 freely select a candidate of his own choice because a list of candi- 
 dates was prepared /or him and not by him and his fellow members. 
 No matter if the list contained the names of individuals who were 
 obnoxious to him because of their principles, or lack of principles, 
 he must vote the list. His participation in matters of political 
 administration must be such as " The Party " decrees ; and not 
 such as his judgment, his conscience, his will, his desire, or his 
 Country calls for. For good or for evil he is bereft of the exercise 
 of volition. He has no political will of his own. He is no longer
 
 256 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 free to exercise his Political Power, for he has been deprived of 
 the exercise of that political freedom which the Principles of The 
 State Polity originally guaranteed to him. Whether he votes 
 with or against his " Party," the general ticket still destroys or 
 hampers his political freedom and ability; for, unless he can 
 establish some other process of nomination, the voter is, by the 
 use of the general ticket, practically reduced to the choice be- 
 tween two evils in his attempt to discharge his political obligations. 
 Moreover, the use of the general ticket tends to the final sup- 
 pression of political representation and to the substitution in its 
 place of partizan party representation whereunder the public 
 affairs are manipulated in the favor of this or that partizan party. 
 Besides the above consequences, the use of the general ticket 
 produced a most striking effect upon the political freedom and 
 ability of those individual electors who were not, at the time we 
 are speaking of, enrolled as members of any " Party " organiza- 
 tion. So long as the Legislative Caucus alone was entitled to 
 make the "Regular" nominations, the unenrolled in The Elect- 
 orate found themselves in a position where, if they wished to vote 
 effectively, they must also choose between two machine-made 
 lists of candidates, neither of which commanded their entire 
 respect or confidence. To them also was presented the choice 
 between two evils — Misrepresentation or Disfranchisement — 
 as their means to obtain Good Government; and although the 
 nominating process of to-day affords more opportunity for inde- 
 pendent political action than in the days of the Legislative Caucus, 
 nevertheless those electors who are not enrolled members of the 
 " Dominant Parties " find themselves deprived of the oppor- 
 tunity for the natural, full, free, and logical exercise of their po- 
 litical powers and rights by the action of that comparatively 
 small part of The Electorate which is enrolled as partizan party 
 organization members. By enrolling in the partizan party 
 organizations and by submitting to the " Party Dictates," each 
 of these theoretical Sovereign-units becomes politically impotent ; 
 but through surrendering the exercise of their initiative and voli- 
 tion to " The Party " they afford " The Party " that aid and sup- 
 port that is necessary to enable it to burden, hamper, and obstruct 
 the political action of every other member of The Electorate. In 
 other words, by enrolling as a partizan party Member and by 
 submitting to partizan party dictates, each elector aids in estab- 
 lishing working conditions that are destructive of the political 
 freedom of all.
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 257 
 
 But during the thirty-odd years in which the Legislative Caucus 
 acted as the nominating agency, it encountered steady opposition 
 from two sources. On the one hand, were the true poHtical leaders 
 and many of The Electorate. They objected to it because of 
 the above-mentioned evils which it produced in political ad- 
 ministration ; because it was not a " popular " nominating body ; 
 because its control had been removed from The Electorate and 
 had passed into the grasp of " The Party " which actually used 
 this control for partizan party ends ; and because the Legislative 
 Caucus was in fact nothing more or less than what was then con- 
 sidered as the old objectionable " Caucus " but exercising greatly 
 extended and improperly acquired powers. 
 
 On the other hand objections came from within " The Party." 
 There were many active partizan party members who failed to 
 get what they wanted out of the nominating process as controlled 
 by the Legislative Caucus. They complained with truth that it 
 was practically impossible for any " Party " to send a party 
 representative into the Legislature from every Representative Dis- 
 trict in The State ; that as a matter of fact there were many 
 such districts which had no partizan party representative in the 
 Legislature ; and that consequently the " Party voters " in such 
 districts were left without a voice in the selection of " Party " 
 candidates. 
 
 Looked at from a partizan party standpoint, this inability of 
 some of the partizan party members to fight on equal terms with 
 the other members for whatever " Party " rewards there were 
 in the game was finally considered " intolerable " ; and by 1824 
 this form of nominating agency was abandoned even by the 
 partizan party. 
 
 The true political leaders and their increased following per- 
 sisted in their attempts to give the nominating agency a more 
 " representative composition and character " and their eff'orts 
 to this end assumed somewhat of the nature of a struggle be- 
 tween the people and " The Party " ; but " The Party " was too 
 firmly established as a quasi-political agency to be dislodged from 
 its position, and the succeeding forms of the nominating body 
 continued to be partizan rather than political in nature. 
 
 Congressional Caucuses : The Congressional Caucus was the 
 same in principle as the Legislative Caucus. Members of " The 
 Parties " in Congress met separately and nominated candidates 
 for President ; for it was not until the election of 1804 that candi- 
 dates for President and Vice-President were voted for separately.
 
 258 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 " Early in the year 1800 the FederaHst members held a conference 
 in the Senate Chamber for the purpose of settling the candidacy 
 of John Adams for a second term. No account of the proceedings 
 of this conference was ever published. The Democratic-Repub- 
 lican members of Congress held a caucus and secret meeting 
 somewhat later, probably the last of February, 1800, and selected 
 Jefferson and Burr as candidates." ^ 
 
 The first regular, open. Congressional Caucus for the nomination 
 of candidates for President and Vice-President was held on Feb- 
 ruary 25, 1804, by the members of the Democratic-Republican 
 Party. Candidates were nominated in this manner in 1808 and 
 1816. In 1820 there was no opposition to the candidacies of 
 Monroe and Tompkins, and although a Caucus was called, but 
 few members attended, and they resolved to make no nominations. 
 In 1824 this system was abandoned altogether because of popular 
 disfavor. 
 
 Mixed Conventions, i8 17-1832 : The growing desire of The 
 People for a " Popular Nominating Body," acting under authority 
 conferred directly by the " Members of The Organizations," 
 next took form in the Mixed Conventions. The " select," or 
 " aristocratic," character of the body was destroyed and it took 
 on a more " representative " composition. To remedy the evil 
 of unrepresented districts, " Special Delegates " were elected in 
 such districts to act with the party representatives in the Legis- 
 lature when assembled as a Nominating Body. 
 
 The word " Caucus " was dropped from the name, but the 
 reader will see as we proceed that the caucus itself was not dropped 
 as the real nominating body. At the same time that The Con- 
 vention became more " representative " in its composition, it had 
 (in the minds of the organization leaders) become less fitted to 
 transact the delicate caucus work of " The Party." They there- 
 fore induced The Convention (the majority of which was com- 
 posed of " Party " adherents) to pass a " Rule " making The 
 Committee the permanent division of the Partizan Party Or- 
 ganization and endowed with the exercise of its Executive Powers. 
 By this action The Party Committee was made a permanent 
 caucus of the partizan party organization. It possessed the right 
 and the ability to act secretly and continuously as a caucus 
 throughout the year ; and, when acting as The Executive of the 
 organization, to call and assemble the Party Convention for the 
 real purpose of ratifying and confirming its own caucus work. 
 
 1 " National Conventions and Platforms," MeKee, p. 8.
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 259 
 
 Of course this actual action was concealed as far as possible 
 from the ordinary public perception. The great mass of the 
 people believed that the Party Convention actually transacted 
 the caucus work of the party organization because it went 
 through the forms of transacting it. At the same time the 
 work of the Mixed Convention smacked strongly of the 
 " Old Caucus " and The Electorate in New York and in Massa- 
 chusetts did not succeed in forcing their " Special Dele- 
 gates " into the Mixed Convention until 1823 and 1824, 
 respectively. Altogether it was not such a nominating body 
 as the people wanted. It was too much " representative " of the 
 Party Committee (the de facto Partizan Party) and not suffi- 
 ciently representative of the organization members, which body 
 the partizan party leaders continuously and fallaciously referred, 
 to as " The People." 
 
 The reader can not fail to perceive that by this time the nomi- 
 nating body had completely ceased to be a popular body and had 
 become a partizan party agency, which was used among other 
 things to whip party voters into line. This whipping process 
 was hateful to the great majority of the people, and their aggra- 
 vation was further increased by the realization that they had again 
 failed to get what they wanted. In their efforts to properly exercise 
 their true caucus powers they had transformed their Old Secret 
 Caucus (which once exercised true initiative in Political Action) 
 into an open, public meeting which failed to exercise their 
 initiative effectively. They had allowed Partizan Parties to organ- 
 ize themselves upon a permanent basis and had practically placed 
 the exercise of their own initiative in the hands of the partizan 
 party Committee ; and the " Party Committee," having absorbed 
 the exercise of the " Caucus Powers " of the party organization, 
 rose superior to the party organization and to the party convention 
 and continued to act as a secret caucus in matters of nomination. 
 This did not suit the people, and protests against " the machina- 
 tions of the few to dictate to the many " were widespread. The 
 people wanted to play a more effective part " in their own work " 
 of nomination, and by 1832 the farsighted partizan party was 
 ready to supplant the Mixed Convention with another expedient 
 that was no less partizan in effect but was somewhat more " rep- 
 resentative " in outward appearance. 
 
 Partizan Party Nominating Conventions : The next futile plan 
 which the people were led into adopting in order to " impart a 
 more truly popular form and representative character " to their ( ?)
 
 260 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 nominating body, was to allow the partizan party organization 
 members in each District to " choose whomsoever they pleased " 
 as their Delegates to the partizan party nominating convention, 
 and to choose them solely for the purpose of acting as such dele- 
 gates in such a convention and in no other capacity. 
 
 These Conventions were called " State Nominating Conven- 
 tions." Here again the name was misleading and deceptive, for 
 The State had nothing to do with their existence. It is true that 
 The Convention could with propriety be considered as a " Dele- 
 gate Convention " ; but it was not the kind of delegate convention 
 that the people really desired, for the delegates were not chosen 
 from and by The Electorate but were chosen from, and ostensibly 
 by, the membership of the partizan party organizations. Such 
 a convention was not a " Popular Body " in any true sense of 
 the word. It was not a Political Convention convened by a direct 
 exercise of the political power of the people. It was nothing more 
 or less than a partizan party expedient that was contrived by the 
 active members of The Partizan Party to serve in the place of 
 a truly popular delegate convention, instances of which had 
 occurred some thirty-odd years before in Pennsylvania and 
 New Jersey. 
 
 The obstacles which had at that time combined to prevent 
 the general use by The States of the desired " Popular Delegate 
 Conventions " were the insuflBcient means of transportation, 
 communication, and the absence of adequate provisions in the 
 system of administration ; but with the advent of the railroad 
 and greatly increased facility in communication some of these 
 obstacles were being removed and " Delegate Conventions " 
 became possible. 
 
 During the interim, however, The Partizan Party had developed 
 and perfected its own peculiar organization throughout The 
 State ; and when " Delegate " Conventions became possible the 
 " Party Committee " had completely dominated the affairs of 
 the partizan party organization and was ready with a scheme 
 which, when put into operation, would place the so-called State 
 Nominating Convention completely under its power. 
 
 In the light of subsequent transactions it is easy to perceive 
 that the people had again failed to construct a Political Conven- 
 tion and had obtained a Partizan Party Convention in its place. 
 The People also failed in another respect, for the above-described 
 plan was ineffective to even make the partizan party nominating 
 convention more truly representative of the partizan party
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 261 
 
 membership. The power of the Party Committee over the 
 membership of the partizan party organization was too strong 
 to be shaken off; and, by resorting to the simple expedient of 
 naming the Delegates and forcing their election, the partizan party 
 Committee succeeded in making the partizan party Nominating 
 Convention completely representative of its own will, and not 
 representative of the free will of the organization members, or 
 of The Will of The People. 
 
 Looked at from the partizan party standpoint, this style of 
 corruptly assembled nominating convention was held to be 
 " established by the voluntary exercise of The Will of The People 
 as the means for placing all Party Candidates for general office 
 in nomination." The Convention as assembled was therefore 
 held to possess " The sanction of Public Approval." Nothing 
 whatever was said of the perversion of the convention plan through 
 the " capturing of the delegates " by the Party Committee ; but, 
 as one of the means for the transaction of some of the pre-election 
 work of the people, the convention was held to be " invested 
 with the exercise of a limited degree of Political Authority." 
 
 Of course all this is purely fallacious as far as the people are 
 concerned, but with the organization membership the case is 
 different. Having a definite part of the work of nomination to 
 perform ; being " regularly " called and organized under stated 
 " Party Rules " for " Party Objects " ; and in theory being com- 
 posed of delegates who are actually and properly elected to it 
 by the members of the organization assembled at Primary Meet- 
 ings, the authority of the partizan party Nominating Convention 
 over organization members is considered as indisputable. Pro- 
 claimed by The Partizan Party as the body which exercises The 
 Supreme Power of the partizan party organization in the matter 
 of nominations, it is supposed to be capable either of securing 
 or of enforcing " united action " within and from the " Party 
 Organization." Presenting the opportunity for discussing and 
 deliberating " Party Affairs," it is held forth as the best means 
 for securing " harmony " within the organization. Being, in 
 theory, composed of the " best elements " of the party organiza- 
 tion, it is supposed to be the place above all others where the 
 " peculiar fitness of candidates " may become known and ascer- 
 tained, and where only proper candidates will be placed in nomina- 
 tion through the exercise of a " free and public-spirited choice " 
 by the Delegates. 
 
 How far the partizan party Nominating Convention has
 
 262 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 substantiated these preposterous claims, either in favor of the 
 people or of the passive party organization member, will be 
 shown as we proceed. 
 
 When the Legislative Caucus gave way to the Mixed Conven- 
 tions, and when these in turn were superseded by the " State " 
 Nominating Conventions, the change in the process of nomination 
 was merely one of partizan party ritual. The political freedom 
 of the elector was not increased. The opportunity for a direct 
 and effective exercise of political power by the elector was not 
 enlarged. The old corrupting means were continued in use and the 
 old partizan party practises still governed the action of the partizan 
 party voters, and hampered the political action of all others. 
 
 The " Single List " was retained in use as being necessary to 
 " Party Success." The idea of centralizing power in the hands 
 of those who actively managed organization affairs was retained ; 
 but, under the new scheme, instead of being frankly seated in the 
 convention, which was openly proclaimed as exercising the " Caucus 
 Powers " of the organization, these powers were disingenuously 
 lodged in the hands of " The Committee." This body, having 
 other than the political caucus work of the people to attend to ; 
 that is, having partizan party affairs to manage and objects to 
 accomplish, could with propriety be called a " Committee " ; 
 and thus it could escape the odium of a name now grown ex- 
 ceedingly obnoxious, and lull suspicions by a name that once 
 had a political significance. 
 
 The " Imperative Mandate " concerning the use of the general 
 ticket continued to be just as binding upon the partizan party 
 organization members when issuing from a Party Nominating 
 Convention (assembled and controlled directly by " The Com- 
 mittee ") as when coming directly from the old-time Legislative 
 Caucus. 
 
 The disfranchising dogma of " Party Regularity " lost none 
 of its force. On the contrary, being now promulgated by the 
 Party Convention (which in theory and in external appearance 
 was composed of duly elected representatives of the partizan party 
 membership), it actually gained in force. As for partizan party 
 organization members, they shrink to-day from any " breach " 
 of " Regularity " as they do from no other act connected with 
 political administration. 
 
 Many States still retain the use of " State Nominating Con- 
 ventions." Others have resorted to the use of " Primary Nomina- 
 tions." But in either case The Partizan Party still controls the
 
 THE PROCESS OF NOMINATION 263 
 
 performance of the process. By far the larger part of each State 
 Electorate (having become habituated to partizan party leader- 
 ship, knowing no other way, glad of the opportunity to discharge 
 their onerous political work easily and return to their economic 
 pursuits quickly) heedlessly accept the nominations made by the 
 partizan party as regular, without bothering themselves con- 
 cerning the morality of the means, methods, and practises by 
 which such nominations are made. 
 
 But there never has been a time when these means and methods 
 have not worked political hardships and injustices to some indi- 
 viduals. There have always been some individuals who have 
 perceived the corrupting effects produced by partizan party rule 
 in private morals and upon public morals ; and there has hardly 
 been a time when there was not somewhere a group of individuals 
 who were trying to make things better by recasting the partizan 
 party " Nominating System." 
 
 Although the fact may not as yet be generally recognized, 
 what the American Commonwealths have always sought, and 
 what thej'^ are really striving after now, is the invention and 
 possession of correct methods for the proper performance of their 
 administrative processes. For nearly a century the people have 
 looked to The Partizan Party for guidance; but the number 
 of individuals who are now looking to Political Principles for 
 guidance betokens the ultimate adoption of logical methods 
 of administration which, of themselves, will effect a complete 
 separation of the three distinct administrative processes of forming 
 Public Opinion, of making Nominations, and of filling Elective 
 Offices.
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 
 
 Assumptions as to Justice. Popular Government is established 
 for the general purpose of enabling The People of a State to 
 maintain their own peculiar conceptions of individual Freedom, 
 Liberty, Equality, and Justice within the territorial limits of 
 The State. Before the governmental regime is inaugurated, it is 
 assumed that The People will administer Justice as ordained 
 through putting the Spirit and the Intent of the State Polity into 
 free operation and full effect. The people agree beforehand 
 that Political Majorities shall shape the course of administrative 
 action, and they assume that such Majorities will stand as an ex- 
 pression of Justice, which is the ordained law for all, the minority 
 as well as the majority. 
 
 The Elective Principle. The exercise of the political prerogative 
 by The Collective Sovereign involves a free and voluntary choice 
 or election on the part of each Sovereign-unit between alternative 
 courses of political administration and between opposing candi- 
 dates for public office. 
 
 A Political Election. Choices between alternatives or between 
 opposites occur in every department of human effort. Political 
 Administration is a distinct department of human effort and 
 when the choice determines or affects the course of, or the char- 
 acter of political administration, it becomes a political choice, 
 which is also further differentiated from all other choices or elec- 
 tions by the specific requirements as to validity which have been 
 established by The Commonwealth. 
 
 Defined. Therefore, we will define a Political Election as the 
 choice, made in accordance with the Principles of the State Polity 
 and the Statutory Laws of The State, by the free vote of The 
 Electorate, or of a political division thereof, between opposing 
 Administrative Policies, and between opposing candidates for 
 public office. 
 
 264
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 265 
 
 The Process of Election. The numerous requirements as to 
 validity have the effect of converting a political choice or election 
 into a distinctive political process. Theoretically, it is in this 
 process that the American elector reaches a periodic conclusion 
 of his observations on State Action, Social Action, and Individual 
 Action. Theoretically, his observations have produced con- 
 victions regarding what should be done in future Political Ad- 
 ministration. Theoretically, his convictions have aroused a 
 desire and will to have his beliefs tried out by The Commonwealth, 
 and also to have them tried out by individuals who are in sym- 
 pathy with his beliefs. Theoretically, it is in this process that the 
 American elector, splendored with sovereignty, stands forth most 
 publicly to uphold the Power, the Glory, and the Might of The 
 Commonwealth, through a free exercise of his reason, his con- 
 science, his individual will, and by asserting his manhood, his 
 civic virtue, and his political ability. 
 
 A Composite Process. Not including the partizan party work 
 of " Campaigning," " Electioneering," " Getting out The Vote," 
 and so on, the immediate political work of election consists of 
 obtaining election boards and officials ; providing polling places, 
 ballot-boxes, booths, furniture, blank records, and other necessary 
 accessories ; preparing, printing, distributing, casting, and count- 
 ing the ballots ; challenging ; canvassing the ballots ; stating 
 the results ; making the election returns ; issuing certificates 
 of election, and so on. Besides the above there may be other 
 matters to attend to that arise out of the incompetent or the wrong- 
 ful action of a voter or of an election official. 
 
 All of these various contributive acts or actions are really 
 subordinate processes that are performed in point of time some 
 before, some while, and some after the vote is cast ; but all of which 
 are performed in a regular order of sequence that combines and 
 coordinates them all into one general composite process. All 
 of these subordinate processes are carried out either by the joint 
 action of the elector and the election officials, or by single officials 
 or sets of officials ; and the main point to be remembered is that 
 throughout the general process both the individual elector and the 
 public officials and boards are supposed to be acting solely for the 
 promotion of the General Welfare. 
 
 Variations in the Process. No two Commonwealths have 
 agreed exactly concerning the manner in which the ordained 
 protection, security, benefit, and happiness of the individual 
 shall be obtained ; and on no one point do the Commonwealths
 
 266 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 differ more than in the exercise of the Political Prerogative 
 of The People. 
 
 Although each Commonwealth professes adherence to the same 
 general principles ; although each possesses a representative form 
 of Government ; although each has the same kind of Adminis- 
 trative Agencies ; and although the general theory of the elective 
 principle applies to each State alike ; nevertheless, each Common- 
 wealth has its owTi distinctive objects to accomplish ; each has 
 its own distinctive system for accomplishing its objects ; and this 
 difference in objects and in the way of accomplishing them pro- 
 duces distinct variations in the process of election. 
 
 Three Systems of Local Self-government. The term " Local 
 Self-government " expresses the idea that The Commonwealth 
 leaves the management of some of its affairs that are of a public 
 nature, but of limited applicability and effect, to the individuals 
 of the local political divisions of The State. 
 
 The ideas of political administration which underlaid the forms 
 of Government that were adopted by the thirteen original States 
 were not alike. They were the natural outcome of the different 
 religious, social, economic, and political beliefs that were either 
 held by the original settlers of the different Colonies, or which 
 were forced upon them. 
 
 Territorial Divisions in the States. When the original American 
 States began independent political administration, the territory 
 occupied by each of the bodies politic was already divided into 
 Counties, and these in turn were subdivided into smaller divisions. 
 In some of the States the county was subdivided into Towns. In 
 others the county subdivisions had the name of Magisterial Dis- 
 tricts, and in Louisiana they were called Parishes. These 
 Counties, To\\tis, etc., are purely political div^isions of The State. 
 In theory each has its peculiar part of the work of political ad- 
 ministration to perform, and I need but add that the division 
 of the territory of the state was originally devised as a means for 
 adding convenience in the transaction of the general work of 
 administration by the people. 
 
 The Political Unit of Representation. The fixing of territorial 
 boundaries to these political divisions of The State served also 
 to divide the individuals of the body politic into collective political 
 units, each of which was held entitled to collective representation 
 in the lower chamber of the State Legislatures. 
 
 The County System. In some of the states the County was 
 the political unit of representation ; and in such states, the system
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 267 
 
 by which the people managed their political administration was 
 called The County System. 
 
 The Township System. In some of the states the Town was the 
 political unit of representation ; and in such states, the system 
 by which the people managed political administration was called 
 The Township System. 
 
 The Representative District. But the uneven increase of popu- 
 lation which subsequently took place in the Counties, Towns, 
 etc., gave to the more sparsely settled political units what was 
 considered to be an undue influence in The Government ; and this 
 changing condition in affairs gradually brought about in many 
 states the adoption of another and different unit of representation, 
 which was effected by dividing the territory of The State into 
 " Districts " containing as nearly as possible an equal number 
 of inhabitants and giving the inhabitants of each " District " a 
 collective representation in the lower chamber of the State 
 Legislature. 
 
 The Compromise System. The adoption of The District as the 
 political unit of representation necessarily obliterated former polit- 
 ical lines, created new ones, and somewhat changed the political 
 status of individuals in the states making the change. Individuals 
 found themselves grouped together differently, and a new system 
 was devised to meet the requirements of the new situation. It 
 contained some of the appointive features of the County Sys- 
 tem and some of the elective features of the Township System, and 
 it received the descriptive name of The Compromise System. 
 
 Nature of the Original State Governments. It may be laid dowTi 
 as a general proposition that the political power and influence 
 of the individual varies in direct proportion to the active part he 
 takes in the management of the affairs of the body politic. His 
 power and influence is greatest in a Democracy, because he is an 
 integral part of The Sovereign ; and smallest in an Autocracy, 
 because he is only one of the governed and plays no active part 
 in the action of The Sovereign. 
 
 Let us take Virginia as an example of the Colonies which em- 
 ployed the County System. Its theory of State Government was 
 Aristocratic in nature in that it embraced the aristocratic principle 
 of Privilege in the exercise of political power and of political au- 
 thority, leaving the individuals inhabiting the State with unequal 
 political rights. The exercise of political power was centralized 
 as much as possible in The Government and, the exercise of 
 several different kinds of political authority being bestowed upon
 
 268 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 single individuals, was thus compressed most undemocratically 
 into the hands of the few. 
 
 In Virginia the territory of the Colony was divided into a small 
 number of large Counties for the sole convenience of The Govern- 
 ment and " The Common People " were prevented as far as 
 possible from managing local affairs. The underlying principle 
 of The County System as it originally developed in Virginia is 
 that Sovereignty resides only in The Monarch, and those who 
 are familiar with the history of the colony know that the County 
 System was originally imposed upon its settlers by an exercise 
 of Royal Prerogative. After Virginia obtained independence, 
 it continued the use of The County System, modified in some 
 respects, but not modified so as to greatly affect the power and 
 influence of the individual elector who happened to be of " the 
 common people." 
 
 Now take Massachusetts as an example of the Colonies which 
 employed The Township System. The principle underlying the 
 use of this system is that Sovereignty resides in The People. In 
 Massachusetts the theory of State Government is purely 
 Democratic in that it embraces the ideas of equal political rights 
 among the individuals who compose the body politic ; of keeping 
 the exercise of political power in the hands of the people; and 
 of distributing the exercise of political authority among the 
 many as widely as is considered advisable. 
 
 In Massachusetts, originally, the people of The Towns " Con- 
 stituted The State " and, acting independently of each other, 
 managed their own local affairs. In Massachusetts, and in the 
 other States using The Township System, the idea of the exercise 
 of political power in the control and management of local affairs 
 by the inhabitants of the political divisions of The State has never 
 been relinquished by the people. This system of management 
 was their free choice; and it has always been retained in use by 
 them because they have demanded its use, instituted its use, 
 and regarded its use as one of their chief Political Rights. 
 
 Now as to the extent to which these systems are used in The 
 United States : 
 
 The County System is in use throughout the Southern States, 
 New Jersey included. The Township System is in use through- 
 out the New England States. The Compromise System is used 
 in the remainder of the States. 
 
 Under the County System many general State Officers and 
 almost all local OflScers and Boards are obtained by appointment
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 269 
 
 and not through selection and choice by the people. Under the 
 Township System such officers and boards are generally obtained 
 by popular elections. Under the Compromise System they are 
 obtained by a modification of the other systems. 
 
 The political, economic, and moral results produced upon the 
 individual in the American Commonwealths by the application 
 of these three systems of Local Self-government deserve the 
 most careful attention of every American elector because — and 
 speaking theoretically — The County System is designed to pro- 
 duce a small and active class of electors, which directs and controls 
 Electorate Action, and a large but passive class of electors, which 
 is led. The power and influence of a few are heightened, but the 
 power and influence of the many is so lessened and restricted 
 that the individuals of this class play a really insignificant part 
 in political administration because they have little or no voice 
 in deciding matters of far-reaching import or of local application. 
 
 The Township System is designed to give the individual elector 
 the widest and freest range in administrative action and to enable 
 him to play the most important part in it because, under this 
 system, he has a voice in every step and stage of administrative 
 action and has the opportunity to participate actively first, in the 
 formative and constructive work of The Commonwealth, and 
 second, in the selection and choice of all public officials. 
 
 The Compromise System affords the individual elector an oppor- 
 tunity to play a more important part than he could under the 
 County System, but a less important part than he could under 
 the Township System. 
 
 These, in the main, are the distinctive results that would flow 
 naturally from the use of either of these systems were they allowed 
 to operate freely in a Commonwealth as a part of a logical system 
 of administration ; and if the reader wonders why many of these 
 political results do not at present work out in practise as in theory, 
 he will find an explanation in the fact that The Commonwealths 
 do not use a logical system of administration, and that every po- 
 litical act of the individual is now perverted to partizan party 
 purposes by the superimposed, dominating, and subversive parti- 
 zan party system now in use. 
 
 The Impulse to The Government. A Political Election is a stated 
 exercise of The Reserved Powers of Administration by The 
 Electorate. The prime purpose of a political election is to provide 
 a proper impulse to the exercise of The Delegated Powers of 
 Administration by The Government. In order that The Govern-
 
 270 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 merit shall work properly it must be energized properly. This is 
 done through the utterance of what is known as " The People's 
 Mandate," and through the filling of all general public offices 
 properly. 
 
 The People's Mandate. In each period of administration The 
 Electorate is required to express its Will definitely and directly 
 as to all past, present, and future administrative action that has 
 been brought up for consideration before the election. The 
 means used to ascertain this Will is The Ballot, the " Majority 
 Vote " being considered as the official expression of Public Opinion, 
 or the Administrative Will of The People. 
 
 Character of Mandate. Theoretically, The Electorate is re- 
 quired to provide The Commonwealth with a clear and unambigu- 
 ous Administrative Policy. Whether the policy provided is right 
 or wrong is not of so much initial consequence to the people as 
 it is to have it clearly stated and readily understandable ; for 
 if the vote when cast results in a mandate to apply an ambiguous 
 or an uncertainly expressed policy, then the final result will be 
 ambiguous or uncertain administrative action. Either that, or 
 possibly the Legislature will merely " Mark time " and make no 
 political progress for the people. 
 
 The Application of The Policy. The secondary purpose of a 
 Political Election is to secure a sagacious and proper application 
 of the policy. Theoretically, this is accomplished through the 
 filling of all elective offices with sagacious, public-spirited, and 
 competent individuals. When the newly elected Legislature as- 
 sembles, it takes up its particular work of providing the ways and 
 means for applying the policy; and when, in the course of time 
 this is done, then the Executive public officials are supposed to 
 enforce the application of the policy upon all alike and in the 
 manner provided by the Legislature. 
 
 Necessity for Proper Application. True political progress de- 
 pends partly upon the proper application of a definite adminis- 
 trative policy. Whether a logical application of any given policy 
 will work out " Justice to The Individual," time and effort alone 
 will show. If, upon logical application, the policy is shown to be 
 wrong in any respects, then it can be changed quickly at the suc- 
 ceeding elections ; but the people will never be able to ascertain 
 definitely whether a policy is right or wrong until they have 
 applied it logically for a while. 
 
 Necessity for a Logical System. The proper application of a 
 policy requires the use of a proper system of application. The
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 271 
 
 policy may be right because it is in consonance with the State 
 PoHty, and the officials may be all that the spirit and intent 
 of the people call for ; and yet the results of the application may 
 be unsatisfactory and disappointing. When this happens, the 
 fault must be looked for in the methods of application. If a 
 Commonwealth attempts to administer a proper policy to its 
 individuals with an incomplete administrative system wherein 
 official duties are not properly prescribed, or with an illogical 
 system whereunder public officials are subject to a control coming 
 elsewhere than directly from The Electorate, then even public- 
 spirited, honest, and capable officials will find themselves so be- 
 wildered on the one hand, and so hampered in the discharge of 
 their official duties on the other hand, as to be unable to apply 
 the policy with the thoroughness and effectiveness which the people 
 desire. 
 
 But this is not the worst that can happen ; for the people, 
 through an unprescient adoption of an illogical system of ad- 
 ministrative action, may succeed in placing themselves in a posi- 
 tion where it is no longer possible for them to frame a clear and 
 definite policy and get it passed on properly by means of the ballot. 
 Such a condition of political impotence always arises whenever 
 The Collective Sovereign entrusts the management of and the con- 
 trol of its action to an agency, which, having non-political objects to 
 attain and using Sovereign-units to attain them, must perforce 
 resort to non-political or to expediential action to attain them. 
 
 The Ballot : The Process of Election has been built up around 
 the use of The Ballot ; and a word concerning its use, and the 
 purposes intended to be accomplished by its use, finds an apt 
 insertion here. The word " Ballot " originally signified the use 
 of a little ball by which the lot or chance of a question was decided, 
 white balls being deposited in a receptacle in favor, and black 
 balls against, the preponderance of either determining the ques- 
 tion for or against. Hence the term " Ball-lot," shortened to 
 ballot, to signify the method of voting. 
 
 Other methods of taking a vote are by a viva-voce vote (some- 
 times decided by the amount of noise made) ; by the ayes and nays ; 
 by rising ; by a show of hands ; and by a division of the assemblage. 
 But as the written ballot is now the universal instrumentality 
 by which the Right of Suffrage is exercised in the United States, 
 we will not pause to consider the other methods of voting. 
 
 The Written Ballot, History. As far as the writer has been 
 able to ascertain, written ballots were used first in the Roman
 
 272 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Republic for the election of Magistrates by the Comitia in the 
 year 139 B.C., but it is not at all improbable that the idea may 
 have come down to the Republic from Antiquity. Tiberius 
 transferred the election of Magistrates from the Comitia to the 
 Senate which voted viva voce. Under Trajan the Senate used 
 the written ballot, and Pliny states that some of the Senators — 
 protected by the secrecy of the method — wrote " gross imper- 
 tinences " on their ballots. 
 
 Coming down to the time of the Reformation we find record 
 of the use of the written ballot by the Provincial Synod of the 
 Reformed Church for North Holland assembled at Alkmaar 
 in 1573. By 1580 there was a widespread use of the written 
 ballot in the Churches for the election of Ministers. In 1595 
 the practise was used in Emden, in East Friesland, in the nomina- 
 tion of candidates for Public Office ; and when in July, 1620, 
 The Pilgrims left Delft Haven, Holland, on the Speedwell and 
 the Mayflower for America, the practise was widespread in political 
 administration in Holland. 
 
 In America. The written ballot was first used in America at 
 an election of a minister of the Church in Salem, Massachusetts, 
 in July, 1629. In 1634 the Governor of the Province of Massa- 
 chusetts Bay was elected by the use of " written voting papers," 
 as they were then called. In 1635 the Colony of Massachusetts 
 made the use of the written secret ballot in the election of its chief 
 Magistrates one of its Laws. Rhode Island and Connecticut 
 also voted that way in 1639, West Jersey in 1676-77, and Penn- 
 sylvania in 1683. 
 
 From these beginnings the use of the written ballot has spread 
 throughout the States. Virginia abandoned the viva-voce 
 method of voting in 1861, and Kentucky in 1891. 
 
 Objects of: Secrecy. " The principal object of the written ballot 
 is to enable the voter to express his preference and voice his will 
 secretly, without being liable to any ill will or persecution from any 
 person or class ; and to prevent his being overawed in the exercise 
 of the franchise, as many were in times past when the voter had 
 to announce the name of the candidate for whom he voted." 
 (Temple m. Meade, 4 Vermont, 541.) 
 
 Freedom of Voter. Mr. Cooley says that the system of written 
 ballot voting rests upon the idea that every Elector is to be per- 
 fectly free to vote as he pleases, and that for so doing he should 
 never be called to account at any time whatever. In a New York 
 case Judge Denio said that " The right to vote in this manner
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 273 
 
 has usually been considered an important and valuable safeguard 
 of the independence of the humble citizen against the influence 
 which wealth and station might be supposed to exercise." 
 
 Freedom of Elections. The WTitten secret ballot was also 
 provided to hinder and prevent bribery, corruption, violence, 
 and intimidation at Elections. The exercise of the Right of Suf- 
 frage implies the voluntary exercise of the reason and will of the 
 voter on all or any questions submitted at the election ; and any- 
 thing which interferes with, or prevents, the free exercise of the 
 reason and the will of the voter vitiates the election just so much, 
 and also militates against the commonly accepted doctrine that 
 " Elections must be Free." 
 
 Finally, the right to vote with the effectiveness above set forth 
 has always been considered by Americans as one of their " Political 
 Safeguards," and one which they attempt to provide by some such 
 Constitutional provision as the following, which is in the Con- 
 stitution of the State of New York that was adopted in 1894; 
 namely, " All elections by the citizens, . . . shall be by ballot, . . . 
 provided that secrecy in voting shall be preserved." 
 
 Query? Are any of the above-mentioned objects or purposes 
 accomplished at present under the Partizan Party System of 
 Administration ? 
 
 Forms of. The ballot is used in several forms for the accom- 
 plishment of several purposes. 
 
 The Single Ballot is used when the voter is voting either for 
 or against a single proposition, or a single candidate, or for one 
 of two candidates. It may also be used for the election of several 
 candidates for membership on a board or collective body when 
 each candidate is voted for separately. Depending upon custom 
 or previous action, the primitive single ballot usually contains 
 only the words " For " or " Against," or " Yes " or " No," as the 
 case may be, and the name of one candidate. Where the judg- 
 ment or will of any number of persons, considered as an aggregate 
 body, is that which is evidenced by the consent or agreement 
 of the greater number of them, the use of the single ballot will 
 enable the aggregate body to definitely and decisively express 
 its judgment or will. 
 
 The Plural Ballot is used where boards of any kind, or com- 
 mittees, or delegations are voted for as a whole. It contains the 
 names of all the candidates for membership in the bodies voted 
 for, and the whole list is voted for by its deposit. The enforced 
 use of this form of the ballot may sometimes compel some of the
 
 274 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 voters to vote for some candidates in whom they have no confi- 
 dence as the only means for electing others whom they desire 
 to have elected ; and from this fact we can perceive that the mere 
 form of the ballot may in itself exercise a restricting power on the 
 free exercise of individual volition. 
 
 ''The Blanket Ballot " is the name given to a form of the ballot 
 which contains on one sheet a list of all the offices both general 
 and local that are to be filled by the voters at the General Election. 
 It also contains the names of all the candidates who are " run- 
 ning " for each of such oflBces. Later on we will consider its forms, 
 the way in which it is prepared, the manner in which it is used, 
 and some of the effects produced by its use. At present we will 
 briefly look at the prevalent method of voting : 
 
 The Australian Ballot System ; Objects : 
 
 Secrecy. The prime object of this method of voting is to secure 
 absolute secrecy of the ballot. 
 
 Purity and Freedom of Elections. Another object was to secure 
 the purity and freedom of elections by preventing tumultuous 
 and disorderly action ; the exercise of physical violence, intimida- 
 tion, coercion, and corruption on or over a voter ; the bribing of 
 electors and of election officials ; the falsifying of the count and 
 the return ; the practise of Repeating, etc. 
 
 Expense of Election. Another object was to reduce the cost 
 of election to poor or to independent candidates, or to Independent 
 Parties, and so to promote independent candidacies. Under 
 this system The State bears all the expense incurred in preparing, 
 printing, and distributing the ballot, furnishing all the polling 
 places, ballot boxes, blank records, furniture, booths, and so forth. 
 Because The State does some of the work, the ballot is termed 
 the " Official Ballot," and the candidate is called an " Official 
 Candidate." 
 
 Legal Control of. But a most important object was to take 
 The Election out of " Party Control " and place it under the 
 control of Law. Of course with this particular end in view it was 
 absolutely incumbent upon the people to pass laws that would 
 accomplish this result. We will shortly see what they did in this 
 respect. 
 
 The original system provided for the registration of voters ; 
 the nomination of candidates by petition ; the use of but one 
 ballot on which the voter can vote separately by placing a cross 
 mark opposite the name of a candidate ; arranging the candidates' 
 names in alphabetical order on the ballot — thus in a measure
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 275 
 
 putting the candidates before the voters fairly. The voter was 
 allowed to write in the name of a candidate if he preferred his 
 own choice to the " official candidate " ; and he was required to 
 mark the official ballot which he received from the election offi- 
 cials, and to mark it in a secret enclosure called a " booth," 
 thus preventing the " substitution " of previously marked ballots. 
 The ballot as the voter gets it contains no indications of " Party " 
 preferences. The marking of the ballot by the voter is supposed 
 to produce a ballot that expresses the political will and judgment 
 of the voter on the question, or on the candidates submitted. 
 The use of the '* official " ballot does away with the " Vest Pocket " 
 ballot, whether that ballot carries an expression of the voter's will, 
 or has been previously marked for him so as to count in favor of 
 another's will or desire. There is an instance on record where 
 under the former " system " a mine superintendent marked the 
 ballots of three hundred and twenty Italian employees that were 
 voted in one election district in Pennsylvania. 
 
 Origin. The s^'stem was devised by Francis S. Button, who 
 was a member of the South Australian Legislature from 1851 
 to 1865. It was originally designed to meet the requirements 
 of an election of legislative candidates where but few candidates 
 are voted for in a legislative district election, and was ffi'st 
 adopted in Victoria, Australia, in 1856. 
 
 The American Form, or Modified System. But the Australian 
 System in its entirety has never been adopted in any American 
 Commonwealth. And the reason why the system in its original 
 form and effect was not adopted in America is this. The Pro- 
 fessional Politicians and the active members of the partizan party 
 organizations saw plainly that their " opportunities " at elections 
 would be sadly interfered with, restricted in scope, or in some mat- 
 ters done away with, if this system came into use. The Public, 
 however, was strenuously insisting for " Election Reform," for 
 " Ballot Reform," and for freer opportunities for " Independent 
 Parties " and candidacies. The partizan party, ever anxious to 
 pose as the Mouthpiece of Public Opinion, was also anxious to 
 respond, provided it lost little or nothing by so doing. After 
 the partizan party had sufficiently canvassed the possibilities 
 of the proposed innovation, then the public got " The Australian 
 Ballot System," but not until various weakening and nullifying 
 provisions had been inserted in " the system " to meet the various 
 " Party Requirements " ; and, as a partizan party ward Boss is 
 reported to have said regarding the action of the people in adopting
 
 276 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 the Modified System, " If any one had deHberately tried to make 
 things easy for the Machine, he could not have hit on anything 
 better." 
 
 As many of my readers are aware, but few of the objects in- 
 tended hy the people have been accompHshed by the adoption 
 of the modified form of the system, while pretty nearly all of the 
 objects intended by the partizan parties have been accomplished ; 
 and, taking this into consideration, it certainly was shrewd in the 
 Party Boss to give the credit for its construction and adoption 
 to the American People. 
 
 Purity and Freedom of Elections. The one observable effect 
 of the adoption of the modified system on political administration 
 is that it has purified elections somewhat, but it has not purified 
 Politics a particle. It has somewhat limited the " sphere of 
 activities " of professional politicians at Elections, but it has 
 caused them to redouble their " activities " in the pre-election 
 processes of the people. Physical violence, disorderly conduct, 
 obstructing tactics, bribery, intimidation, and corruption are 
 no longer practised at elections on the large scale in use before the 
 change; but bribery, intimidation, corruption, and collusion 
 are now used secretly to influence individual administrative action 
 in the political processes antecedent to election and at the election 
 itself. With the above-mentioned exception there is hardly a 
 partizan party doctrine, practise, custom, or usage that is changed 
 in its ultimate effect by the adoption of the Modified System. 
 Such changes can not be effected by a Law that merely puts the 
 expense of the election on The State and gives The State some 
 clerical work to do. 
 
 Voters are still " induced " to go " fishing " on registration 
 days. If registered, voters are still " induced " to refrain from 
 voting. Enrolment Lists and Registration Lists are still falsified 
 in many places as before described. Colonizing is practised, and 
 regular gangs of " roughnecks " under the pay of a partizan party 
 still vote repeatedly in Cities at the same election, going from 
 election district to election district and voting therein under 
 fictitious names and addresses that are learned by them at the 
 different election districts from " Party Workers." 
 
 Wherever The Machine predominates, the immediate work of 
 balloting is still controlled and " managed " by the Bi-partizan 
 Election Boards before described. Has the reader forgotten the 
 election crimes and oft'enses committed wholesale in Ohio and 
 Indiana since 1911?
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 277 
 
 The election process has not been simplified, except in the 
 matter of enabling a partizan party to get its " Straight Tickets " 
 (the modern synonym for The General Ticket) voted ; and, 
 through the mediumship of legislative " Party Majorities " (the 
 members of which when constructing Statutes act under the 
 orders of the " Party Committee ") provisions regarding various 
 matters connected with balloting are scattered disconnectedly 
 throughout the Election Law, thus making the Law as involved, 
 indirect, and hard of easy comprehension as possible. 
 
 Secrecy of the Ballot. The secrecy of the ballot, whether this 
 phrase means the deposit of a ballot, the contents of which are 
 unknown to another, or secrecy of the whole operation of balloting, 
 has not been maintained. Bi-partizan Election Boards are in 
 part designed to enable the " Party " members on these boards 
 to keep track of the " regular " and of the " venal " party ballot. 
 The " Assistance clause " which is in force in some of the States 
 enables an " ignorant " or a corrupt " Party " voter to obtain 
 the " assistance " of a party superior in " preparing " his vote ; 
 and it also enables a " Party " to know what is put on the ballot. 
 Also, when coupled with the exchange of " Party Courtesies " 
 between the " Bi-partizan " members of the boards, it becomes 
 a means for consummating the naturalization and registration 
 frauds, and also for nullifying the underlying idea of a check by 
 one " Party " on another. 
 
 The Statutory provisions regulating the Inspection of Elections 
 are rendered completely inoperative as far as the venal party vote 
 is concerned through the adoption by The Machine of the simple 
 expedient of selecting beforehand corrupt inspectors who assist 
 The Machine in its manufacture of a " majority of votes " by 
 giving information to the " Party Workers " outside of the voting 
 places as to how the vote-buying, colonizing, personating, and 
 repeating contracts are being carried out by " the voters." Similar 
 information is also " passed out " regarding the progress of the 
 " Regular " party vote, thus affording The Machine a final oppor- 
 tunity to remind the laggard or the apathetic of their duty to obey 
 the " Constituted Authorities " of the partizan party organizations. 
 
 The Formation of Independent Parties and independent can- 
 didacies are hindered as much as possible ; and the partizan party 
 is given the advantage in many ways. There is no end to the 
 inconsistencies in The Law. Notwithstanding the fact that 
 " Party " Nominations are always made by the Party Committee 
 and are often " jammed through " the Party Convention by it.
 
 278 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 nevertheless in many States The Law regards a partizan party 
 as an Electoral Group (Political Party) and allows the Party 
 Committee to place the " Party " lists of candidates on the 
 " Official Ballot " by merely " certifying the correctness " of 
 what really is its own List ; while independent parties and candi- 
 dates are forced to the use of a Petition or a Nomination Paper 
 that must necessarily be signed by other Electors, thus in effect 
 giving organized partizanship the advantage over independent 
 administrative action. In addition to this, the subtly tinctured 
 State Law " safeguards " the use of the Petition and Nominating 
 Paper with numerous technical legalities, and at the same time 
 does not prevent a partizan party from keeping back its statement 
 of its list to a date which often leaves insufficient time for the 
 Independents to comply with the provisions of the law. 
 
 Dominant Parties. Again, the left-hand or first columns on 
 the "Blanket Ballot" are appropriated by the "Dominant 
 Parties." Any kind of an organized group, the management 
 of which has succeeded in polling a fixed minimum of the entire 
 vote cast at a General Election, which minimum ranges from 
 one per centum in some States to ten per centum in others, is 
 entitled to the name of " A Party," according to Law ; but gener- 
 ally only those " Parties " which " poll " the first and second largest 
 number of " votes " are entitled to be considered as " Dominant 
 Parties." The Minimum-per-cent-Parties take the next columns 
 and the Independents are relegated to the last columns, and any 
 one who has used such a blanket ballot can form a pretty accurate 
 estimate of the opportunity which an independent party, or 
 candidate, has of securing effective support at the hands of a pe- 
 culiarly indiscriminating Electorate by the use of such a ballot, 
 except in times of "moral awakenings." During the interims, 
 and while Morality is putting patches on its Administrative 
 System, organized partizanship secures " The victories of the 
 ballot box." 
 
 . illiterates. The original Australian system creates an edu- 
 /dational test in that it presupposes the ability of the voter to read 
 the names of the alphabetically arranged candidates in order 
 CO make his selection. It regards the voter not as a member of 
 jany kind of a " Party," but as a Sovereign-unit who is discharging 
 jsome of his Obligations of Sovereignty and Duties of Citizenship 
 in the interest of the General Welfare. In States where Illiterates 
 have the Right of Suffrage, this excluding provision is circumvented 
 by having the ballot printed in party columns that are sur-
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 279 
 
 mounted by pictures called " Party Emblems " that the illiterate 
 (and the venal) can recognize in the booth after the picture and 
 its meanings have been drilled into him by the " party worker," 
 thus in effect proclaiming to the World at Large that any indi- 
 vidual who is sufBciently literate to remember a primitive picture 
 for a few days and remember also to make a cross mark with a 
 lead pencil in a printed circle under it, is sufficiently equipped 
 mentally to act as a Sovereign-unit of an American Common- 
 wealth and help put its distinctive principles of administrative 
 action into full effect and efficient operation in Society. 
 
 Party Control. The People have assumed the financial burden 
 of preparing for and handling the vote at elections, but the " price " 
 of a partizan party Nomination remains about the same in money, 
 and exactly the same in Party Regularity, as before the adoption 
 of the " Modified " System. The State has eliminated a few of 
 the overhead charges of the partizan party organizations, but 
 it has not removed the control of The Election from The Partizan 
 Party. The process of election is but one process in the System 
 of Administration ; and it is impossible to remove this one process 
 from the control of The Partizan Party when every provision in 
 the Laws which relates to Political Administration actually tends 
 to give The Partizan Party the control of every step and stage 
 of every other process of the whole system ; and it is impossible 
 to effectually oust The Partizan Party from some participation 
 in the management of the steps and stages of the Election Process 
 so long as it retains its position as the manager of the whole system. 
 WTiat can be more ridiculous action on the part of the people than 
 to start out to remove the control of " The Party " over the elec- 
 tions and at the same time allow " The Party " to control and 
 manage the processes of Naturalization, Registration, and Nomi- 
 nation, and also fill the election boards with its partizan adherents 
 only ? 
 
 Legal Sanction of the Partizan Party. The above is by no 
 means a comprehensive statement of the effects connected with 
 the adoption of the " Modified " Australian Ballot system of 
 voting ; but the one result most to be regretted, the far-reaching 
 effects of which do not as yet appear to be widely appreciated or 
 apprehended, is that the partizan party, through the medium 
 of its Boss-filled Legislatures, and while enthusiasm for the adop- 
 tion of the new system ran high, succeeded in incorporating in 
 the State Laws certain new sections relative to its standing and 
 work in the processes of nomination and election which had the
 
 280 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 effect of bestowing a " legal " sanction to its existence and work 
 as a Political Agency of the people. For under the provisions of 
 the Modified System as it is embodied in the law of many States, 
 any group of electors, the membership of which includes a fair 
 proportion of active Professional Politicians, Practical Politicians, 
 Brokers in the Sale of Legislation to the Big Interests, Bribers, 
 Intimidators, Corruptionists, Destroyers of Private and Public 
 Morals, CoUusionists, OflSce Seekers, and Self-seekers, w^ho, 
 under any distinguishing name, can poll a certain per centum of 
 the total votes cast at any General Election, is entitled to be 
 considered as an " Electoral Group," to be called a political Party, 
 and to possess and exercise privileges and advantages in the pre- 
 election, and in the election work of The Commonwealth, which 
 individual Sovereign-units who work independently of such 
 groups in political administration, and in a public spirited, moral, 
 and logical manner, and solely for the promotion of the General 
 Welfare, do not possess. And, moreover, it is still further possible 
 for any such Minimum-per-cent-Party, through the assiduous 
 and persistent and unpunished commission of almost every con- 
 ceivable offense against public, private, and political morality, to 
 rise to the proud eminence of administrative infamy, where it can 
 share and divide with one other similarly composed and working 
 *' Dominant Party " the "Spoils" of Partizanship that have been 
 WTung by perfidious action from the administrative necessities 
 of The Commonwealth. 
 
 Now, the true character of any group of individuals is determined 
 only by its composition, object, and action. The reference by a 
 Legislature to what is actually a Partizan Party as " A Party " 
 does not change a partizan party into a properly composed or 
 organized Electoral Group, w^hich is the only kind of " Party " 
 that is entitled to direct participation in matters of Political 
 Administration. The actual facts in the matter remain entirely 
 unchanged by such a reference ; but, when a State Legislature 
 refers to a partizan party as " A Party " it has this deplorable 
 effect as far as correct future administration is concerned ; namely, 
 it tends to create the impression in the minds of the undiscriminating 
 and credulous masses that the existing partizan party is in com- 
 position, construction, and object a Political Party, and is one 
 that acts solely for the promotion of the welfare of The State 
 and of the individual, which impression is as widely separated 
 from the Truth as the gulf w^hich divides Pretense from Civic 
 Virtue.
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 281 
 
 The provisions of the modified system here referred to are 
 those which relate to the way in which nominations are to be made 
 and the way in which the names of the nominees are to be placed 
 on the ballot. 
 
 Under the modified system the ballot is " prepared " by The 
 State. Broadly speaking, the method of preparation is as follows ; 
 but State methods vary, and each reader must consult his Election 
 Laws. Nominations for general office, when made, are reported 
 by " The Party " to some State Official, who, in turn, sends to 
 each County Clerk a list of the candidates for general office to be 
 voted for in his County, and the County Clerks in turn add to 
 the list received the names of all local candidates to be voted for 
 in the political subdivisions of the County, and so completes the 
 ballot for use everywhere within the County, City, Ward, 
 Town, etc. 
 
 The important point to the partizan party in the modified 
 system lies here. If The State has conceded the Right to Nomi- 
 nate to a partizan party, and then passes legislation which enables 
 the partizan party to have its list of candidates placed upon the 
 Official Ballot upon receipt by the proper State Official of a mere 
 " certificate " as to its correctness made by The Committee of a 
 partizan party, then The State has further established the partizan 
 party in the position it has always sought ; viz., that of a "legally" 
 acting Political Agency, not a duly acting agency, not a properly 
 acting agency, not a logical agency, but An Agency that is " legally " 
 authorized to act in political administration and to apply its own 
 rules of action in a field of action that was unpresciently left un- 
 regulated by Fundamental Law in the beginning, notwithstanding 
 the effects its application of its own rules may produce in the 
 character of the Political Administration of The Commonwealth. 
 The Partizan Party proceeds and acts upon the doctrine that 
 whatever is not prohibited in set terms by the Law is therefore 
 possible to it and proper in nature because not distinctly and 
 definitely prohibited. The most vociferous plaudits of individual 
 Freedom, Liberty, Equality, and Justice have come from the parti- 
 zan party. It admits with us all that these Principles outline 
 in a general way what shall be considered moral political conduct 
 on the part of The Individual. But it urges that the people 
 have not in set terms declared how free, equal, and just individual 
 conduct shall be had in every step and stage of Administrative 
 Action, and that because of this failure of The Sovereign to pass 
 such obviously necessary laws, an individual sovereign-unit may
 
 282 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 properly do, or be made to do, that which would be improper 
 were such Laws in force. This in a fair way sets forth the moral 
 turpitude of the Political Saviour which the people, through the 
 adoption of the modified form of the Australian ballot system, 
 more firmly established in its assumed positions of Guide and 
 Leader. 
 
 The Use of the Ballot The use of the ballot is intended to 
 serve two political purposes : first, to enable each Sovereign- 
 unit to freely register his own individual will and choice between 
 opposing courses of administrative action, and between opposing 
 candidates. Second, to enable The Collective Sovereign to 
 freely ascertain and express its Will as to administrative action 
 definitely and authoritatively. 
 
 "Practical " Disfranchisement. An elector can be disfran- 
 chised properly only by due process of law. In such a case he is 
 not allowed to vote. But there are other ways in which a voter 
 who votes can be disfranchised improperly and effectually. If, 
 for instance, an elector joins a partizan party and obeys its Con- 
 stituted Authorities when voting, then his vote expresses no free 
 individual choice because it merely expresses a choice that has been 
 made for him. Also, the vote of such a man expresses no individual 
 political will. It is not a contribution towards an expression of 
 Public Opinion, but only towards an expression of partizan party 
 Will. Such an elector does not vote freely as a Sovereign-unit, 
 but voluntarily as a partizan party member under duress; and 
 he has disfranchised himself practically, as far as a free expression 
 of Sovereignty is concerned, because he makes the ballot serve 
 partizan party purposes. 
 
 Then again, if because of any ignorant or wrongful perversion 
 of the Process of Election, or of the preceding processes, the ballot 
 comes to him in a form that does not enable him to register his 
 own political will or preference fully and effectually, then such an 
 elector is practically disfranchised and the binding force of public 
 opinion is weakened correspondingly. But furthermore, if it 
 happens that the " Practical Politicians " succeed in enforcing 
 a general use of such ballots, then public opinion ceases to be an 
 expression of Political Will and becomes a manufactured quantity 
 that can be utilized by those in the control of the administrative 
 processes for the perpetration of many subtle forms of injustice. 
 
 Concerning the object for which the ballot is to be used, individ- 
 ual electors can also be " practically disfranchised," and public 
 opinion be rendered nugatory, providing the electors do not possess
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 283 
 
 the opportunity to cast a ballot for or against a political issue or 
 question, but are obliged to cast a ballot only in support of some 
 partizan party promise the wording of which is habitually loose, 
 ambiguous, and deceptive, and the true partizan party-meaning 
 of which is concealed intentionally behind some such attractive 
 but utterly misleading word as " Prosperity." 
 
 Obstruction of Political Progress, Effects. Political Progress 
 consists in settling political questions as they arise. Wherever 
 a Free People attempt to maintain the stability of The State and 
 the happiness, peace, and order of society, political progress is 
 more important than any other kind of progress. But no ade- 
 quate political progress can be made if individual electors, through 
 being disfranchised by such " practical " methods and practises, 
 are rendered impotent to raise and bring true and pressing political 
 questions to the ballot box for settlement, or where, if they vote 
 the " Ticket " provided by a partizan party, they are obliged to 
 subordinate the General Welfare to supposed or to actual partizan 
 party needs. 
 
 Economic and individual action can be regulated properly 
 and forcibly only through political action. Regulative adminis- 
 trative action always follows after individual or economic action 
 has disturbed existing conditions or individual relationships. If 
 regulative action does not keep pace with economic progress then 
 the " Economic Interests " possess the opportunity to obtain an 
 improper or undue private advantage on the old, specious, and 
 morality-dodging plea that their action has not been prohibited 
 specifically by The Law. If Political Progress — sufficiently 
 obstructed by the " Professional Politicians " — lags far behind 
 economic progress, then it is "practically" possible for the self- 
 ish economic interests (groups of individuals), working to their 
 mutual advantage with the partizan party politicians, to establish 
 a regime of Injustice ; so true is it that Political Principles are of 
 little practical use unless they be supported by a logical and an 
 enforcible system of application. 
 
 The Inadequate Administrative System. Changing our stand- 
 point now so as to include a view of some of the pre-election work 
 that was intended originally to give force and effect to the use 
 of the ballot. 
 
 Political Leadership. The inadequate system with which the 
 original Commonwealths started political administration was 
 silent as to the kind of leadership to be employed in the formation 
 of Individual Will and of Public Opinion.
 
 284 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Political Organization. It contained no definite provisions 
 relative to the proper organization of electoral action. 
 
 Political Registration. The Commonwealths failed to appre- 
 ciate the necessity for having The Voting Electorate ascertained 
 definitely and fixed properly before election, and then* systems 
 contained no provisions to this end. 
 
 Political Nominations. Likewise, the important work of 
 selecting candidates and of placing them in nomination was left 
 unregulated. 
 
 In these, as in almost every other matter, the inadequate system 
 neither enabled The Electorate nor compelled the elector to act 
 in the manner ordained. Now, political leadership and political 
 organization are essential elements in political administration. 
 But the people, lacking political sagacity, put the discharge of the 
 functions of leadership and organization into the hands of the 
 partizan party, thereby changing these elements of political 
 administration into partizan party leadership and partizan 
 party organization, which, when applied, necessarily produced 
 partizan party administration in the place of Government by 
 The People. 
 
 The Appointive System. The same lack of sagacity character- 
 ized the action of the people in reference to the proper performance 
 of the Process of Nomination. They started administration with 
 a system that was based on the idea of direct political action by 
 individuals ; but they soon put the performance of the Process 
 of Nomination into the hands of the partizan party. Now the 
 Power to Fill Public Office is a part of The Supreme Power, 
 and, theoretically, is to be exercised directly by the people. But 
 the general Plan of Administration that was originally adopted 
 did not adhere strictly to theory in this respect. It took conditions 
 into consideration and provided that the higher State offices 
 should be filled by direct electorate action at the elections, and 
 that the minor or ministerial ofiices should be filled by indirect 
 electorate action afterwards ; that is, by an exercise of discretion 
 and authority on the part of the elective officials. The choice 
 of a public officer by either method is a discretionary act. The 
 act itself is intended to work benefit to The State and to the 
 individual. 
 
 Public Office is a public charge, trust, or duty that is imposed 
 upon an individual, or body of individuals, for public purposes. 
 
 Public Officials. In theory, only those of known probity and 
 ability are to be "elevated " to public office.
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 285 
 
 Public Service consists in assisting the people to promote the 
 General Welfare. 
 
 Political Appointment. As distinguished from a Political 
 Election — which is a direct exercise of political power by all of 
 the individuals of a Political Agency, or a part thereof — a Political 
 Appointment is a direct exercise of political authority by some 
 one individual, or by a body of individuals holding some one or 
 another important elective office in The State Government. 
 
 When the people originally distributed the exercise of political 
 authority between the three branches of The State Government, 
 they also bestowed and apportioned the Appointive Authority 
 between them. They gave to the highest departmental official 
 or officials the authority to exercise this discretion, but to exercise 
 it for The People, and for the purposes intended by the people ; 
 hence the necessity, if the people are to be served only by public- 
 spirited, honest, and capable officials, for the proper performance 
 of the processes of nomination and of election ; for if the elective 
 oflEices are not properly filled, the appointive ones are not likely 
 to be so filled. 
 
 This necessity is greatest in the States which employ either the 
 County System or the Compromise System of Local Self-govern- 
 ment ; for in these States by far the greater number of public 
 offices are filled by appointment. The use of the County System 
 was originally imposed upon the people ; but the Compromise 
 System was more a matter of choice. Where this system obtains, 
 the people resorted to the appointive method of filling the larger 
 number of their offices, partly as a means for making political ac- 
 tion less onerous to the individual through relieving The Electorate 
 from the necessity of reaching an agreement of wills regarding 
 the filling of a great number of public offices, and partly to center 
 the obligation of Responsibility in as few individuals as possible, 
 leaving it to The Government, considered as a Political Agency, 
 to make these few individuals feel this responsibility and cause 
 them to select honest and capable subordinates ; thus, as it were, 
 somewhat twisting the true Doctrine of Political Responsibility, 
 which is, in this respect, that responsibility for proper official 
 conduct in a Free Commonwealth lies directly to the people. It 
 was also held that the elected officials, because they were so held 
 responsible, should be allowed to choose the non-elective ofiicials 
 under them, and to whom the actual or routine execution of the 
 Laws was in many cases entrusted ; and further because the ca- 
 pable elected officials were deemed better able to judge of the
 
 286 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 character, capacity, and ability of their assistants than the people 
 at large. 
 
 Three requisites were necessary to insure the successful operation 
 of this plan of action. In the first place, the people should select 
 and elect these elective officials. In the second place, Respon- 
 sibility should be continuously placed and binding upon the 
 elective officer and promptly enforced whenever necessary. In 
 the third place, and as a means to make the second requisite 
 effective, the function of each office and the duty of each official 
 should be stated definitely and beforehand by the people. Neither 
 of these requisites existed. Consequently the people experienced 
 difficulties in making their plan work successfully. 
 
 With the development and acceptance of the idea of " Party 
 Government " — which really means the administration of Gov- 
 ernment according to the will of " A Party " — a complete dis- 
 tortion of the plan ensued ; for without in any way first deter- 
 mining the nature, character, composition, objects, functions, and 
 specific work of " A Party," or in any way trying to secure re- 
 sponsible action from it, the people allowed " The Party " (com- 
 posed as hereinbefore described) to assume the responsibility for 
 proper Political Administration. 
 
 The Spoils System. Also the idea was advanced, grew, and was 
 finally accepted, that the right to fill the elective offices belonged 
 to " The Majority Party," as otherwise it could not enforce the 
 responsibility for proper administration, which it had succeeded 
 in obtaining at the election — by the practises above set forth. 
 And finally " The Party " claimed and was accorded the right 
 to fill the appointive offices as well. 
 
 This movement was not accomplished without opposition. 
 The people in some of the States attempted to enforce Respon- 
 sibility on the elective officials ; but these officials stepped behind 
 " The Party " as their political sponsor. A sentiment in favor 
 of Civil Service Reform Laws as a means to raise the level and 
 morale of the appointive officials developed and grew, but was for 
 the time being side-tracked by the agitation for the adoption 
 of the Australian Ballot System of Voting as a panacea for our 
 political ills. This movement went through, and now some of its 
 " practical " results are that a partizan party is the Common 
 Superior of all of its members who are in public office ; that public 
 office is treated as a bit of partizan party patronage to be bestowed 
 for past and future partizan party service ; that public officials 
 are regarded as responsible to a partizan party ; that the immedi-
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 287 
 
 ately obligatory purpose of their official action is to serve a partizan 
 party ; that public service has been changed in nature to partizan 
 party service ; and that this kind of service is obtained by the 
 partizan party through filling public office with men who in many 
 respects are the opposites of those whom The Commonwealth 
 originally intended should serve it in an official capacity; all 
 of which serves to confirm the truth of the statement that a 
 Free Commonwealth can not accomplish its objects in any respect 
 without having beforehand a logical Rule of Action, 
 
 Our Politically Criminal Election. Laws. In the beginning 
 of Political Administration, and before the surrender of the exer- 
 cise of the Political Prerogative to the partizan party, the indi- 
 vidual elector had the opportunity to act freely and effectively 
 in all of the processes of administration whether he acted wisely 
 or not. If he had retained the opportunity to act freely, the wis- 
 dom or unwisdom of his action would have been apparent quickly, 
 and unwise action could have been corrected quickly. But at 
 present, and although the performance of some of the steps in the 
 pre-election work, the election work, and the post-election work 
 is at last " Regulated by Law," nevertheless, a very large propor- 
 tion of the electorate is compelled to act unwisely all of the time 
 in the process of election. 
 
 The passage of the laws which regulate the performance of this 
 process has been brought about mainly by the partizan party. 
 The laws themselves have been devised mainly by the partizan 
 party. They have been so worded as to bestow an undue 
 advantage upon partizan parties in election work ; to bestow 
 a " legal status " upon partizan parties ; and to maintain them 
 in the practical control of the entire administrative work of 
 the elector. 
 
 The final result of all this is that now an independent or free 
 elector finds himself so hampered by The Election Laws that he 
 cannot participate in political administration freely and effectively ; 
 that is, as his conscience, will, and judgment decree. As for a 
 member of a partizan party organization, such a man can not act 
 freely in any event, or at any time, so long as he remains a member. 
 Nor can he act effectively except to assist in transmuting Political 
 Administration into Partizan Party Administration ; for the 
 really formative and constructive action of the people is now 
 under the control of the partizan party, the Managements of 
 which constantly divert all detail electoral administrative action 
 from its true obiects and effects.
 
 288 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Political Crime. Political Crime may be defined broadly as a 
 serious offense against the Political Morality of The State. 
 Crimes against the public morals exist, whether they are defined 
 in set terms and prohibited by the Law of The State, or not. The 
 above-described action by the partizan party is a political crime. 
 In a Republic there is no crime comparable in magnitude to an 
 offense against the Moral Status of The Commonwealth and the 
 Political Freedom of the individual. No Commonwealth will 
 ever be absolutely free from such crimes. But any Commonwealth 
 can be reasonably free from them, provided it wdll specifically 
 guarantee beforehand the proper performance of each step, stage, 
 and process in its administrative action, and afterw^ards, when new 
 forms of political crime appear, will promptly eliminate the oppor- 
 tunity for their perpetration by Direct Legislation. 
 
 Failure to Enforce Laws. Notwithstanding the true character 
 of our Body of Administrative Law, there are still many political 
 writers who would have us believe that the main trouble with 
 the present political situation is, that the Laws are not enforced. 
 They point to the Corrupt Practises Acts, The Civil Service Acts, 
 and other similar laws and say, " Enforce these stringently and 
 all will be well." 
 
 With such opinions this book raises an issue of fact. It is true 
 that the above-mentioned acts and laws contain some few specific 
 guarantees of proper action. But they do not strike at the parent 
 evils of allowing a partizan party to act as an Electoral Group 
 and dominate the entire administrative action of a large part of 
 The Electorate by the exercise of immoral power for non-political 
 objects. These Acts do not prevent the partizan party from apply- 
 ing and enforcing its immoral Code of Action in the administrative 
 work of The Sovereign. Quite the Contrary ! These Acts and 
 Laws countenance the existence of a Partizan Party as a Political 
 Agency. They exist merely for the purpose of making the Parti- 
 zan Party System of action less evil in spots, and for making the 
 results of Partizan Party Action less harmful to private morals 
 and to the public morals. They are merely small portions of a 
 large and bad system of action. They are passed to enable The 
 State to punish the perpetration of what are considered grossly 
 intolerable overt acts at certain stages of administrative action 
 only. They only relieve some few parts of the situation from the 
 fear of violence, bloodshed, and other forms of Statutory Crime. 
 But they leave the rest of the situation open to the undisciplined 
 practise of dishonest}', fraud, and immorality. Consequently,
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 289 
 
 the enforcement of these few Acts and Laws referred to will not 
 and can not clear up the present political situation and make all 
 well ; and furthermore, the stringent enforcement of a Body of 
 Administrative Law that is defective fundamentally can have 
 no other effect than to produce defective administration. 
 
 Political Fraud : It is affirmed in this book that the American 
 Commonwealths have blundered in Political Administration, and 
 that a gigantic political fraud, composed of numerous lesser frauds, 
 is being practised systematically by the active members of the 
 partizan party organizations. Now a complete statement of a 
 general proposition must be built up from statements regarding 
 the details involved. Careful attention to detail is fatiguing. 
 But it is well worth while because it exposes the hidden meanings 
 in generalizations, it prevents a hasty jumping to conclusions, 
 and it reveals the whole truth of the matter. Therefore, m the 
 interest of sure progress let us go into details somewhat. 
 
 A Political Fraud. A Political Fraud may be defined as any 
 deliberate act, omission, concealment, deception, or dishonesty, 
 connected with the Process of Political Administration, that is 
 hurtful or injurious to The State or to the individual, or by which 
 any illogical or inequitable private privilege or advantage is pro- 
 cured. Sovereignty is the attribute most affected by political 
 fraud ; and any act or action that affects the sovereignty of The 
 State or of the individual deleteriously, must be either a political 
 blunder or a political fraud. 
 
 Characteristics of. The above definition comprehends the de- 
 grees of moral obliquity that are described loosely by the terms 
 Deceit and Dishonesty ; each of which terms characterizes the 
 nature of some one or another political fraud. 
 
 Deceit. For instance : Are Deceit and its practise (Decep- 
 tion) constituent elements of Free Administrative Action ? No ! 
 They are the death virus to such action. Are they necessary 
 to the attainment of the ordained ends of The State ? No ! 
 Affecting the acts of individuals, they work to prevent The State 
 from attaining its ordained ends. In free administrative action 
 the practise of deception is never resorted to except as the means 
 for enabling some individual or body of individuals to gain some 
 private end illogically ; and if the accomplished end or object 
 be non-political in nature, then a political fraud has been 
 perpetrated. 
 
 Dishonesty. Political Llonesty may be described as the disposi- 
 tion to act in accordance with the generally received ideas of
 
 290 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 right administrative action. It is much the same thing which 
 we have heretofore described as PubHc Spirit and Civic Virtue; 
 but it is more particularly distinguished as the disposition to carry 
 out the Spirit and Intent of The People while engaged in ad- 
 ministrative work that is not comprehensively regulated by Law, 
 
 Political Dishonesty is the opposite of this, or the disposition 
 to take private advantage of any unregulated or insufficiently 
 regulated matter of Political Administration ; and if we accept 
 the above definition of political honesty as true, then we need no 
 argument to prove that in any free body politic where a Collective 
 Sovereign is attempting to administer Government as Ordained 
 without a comprehensive system of administration, Political Hon- 
 esty is one of the indispensable factors to the successful solution 
 of the administrative problems. 
 
 The Spirit and Intent. We remember that Democracy was 
 favored as a Political Regime because it was possible for the 
 Collective Sovereign, through democratic action, to abolish the 
 existence of Special Privilege in society. We remember that the 
 stated benefits to be derived from a democratic Regime were set 
 forth in terms that showed special privilege to be unjust. We 
 remember that the ultimate purpose of Political Administration 
 is the maintenance of the ordained status of The Commonwealth, 
 and the ordained conditions of individual existence, through 
 individual administrative action. 
 
 The Opportunity for Fraud. Such being the case, it became 
 incumbent upon The Collective Sovereign to regulate definitely 
 and properly every move, step, stage, and process of individual 
 administrative action. But the Collective Sovereign has never 
 done this. Consequently it does not possess an indisputable way 
 of making its o^^^l units act solely as Sovereign-units either in 
 Electoral Action or in Official Action ; and right here in this failure 
 by The Sovereign to provide a logical and comprehensive Body 
 of Administrative Law lies the opportunity for politically dishonest 
 Sovereign-units to perpetrate political fraud easily. 
 
 How Perpetrated. By Whom. We will admit that The Col- 
 lective Sovereign has failed in the discharge of its sovereign 
 obligations. But nevertheless we wull assume that The Collective 
 Sovereign will not deliberately perpetrate a fraud upon itself, or 
 upon its units. And, if frauds are perpetrated upon The Com- 
 monwealth or upon its individuals, we will affirm that they must 
 be perpetrated either by some individual, or by some body of 
 individuals, who hope, through deceitful or dishonest political
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 291 
 
 action, to derive some special, peculiar, and private advantage 
 that is not included among the stated benefits which are intended 
 to be secured and to be transmitted to future generations through 
 logical and honest administrative action. 
 
 Two Main Classes of. Ever since the adaptation of the Process 
 of Election to political uses it has been utilized by some indi- 
 viduals or groups of individuals for the purpose of gaining a private 
 advantage of some kind or another. Depending upon what is 
 accomplished and how it is accomplished, such action amounts 
 to a fraud either upon The Commonwealth or upon the individual. 
 Such frauds are carried through by perverting electoral action 
 and official action that is taken in any or all of the Processes of 
 Administration. Some originate in action that is antecedent to 
 the process of election and either culminate there, or are carried 
 on for culmination in the action of The Government. Others 
 originate in the process of election and are culminated there by 
 the perversion of the process. 
 
 Legal Frauds, Moral Frauds. We might further differentiate 
 these frauds as Legal Frauds and Moral Frauds. But we would 
 gain nothing because we know that many of the current practises 
 and usages which have received the legislative sanction — or, let 
 us say in the deluding words of the partizan party, " The Sanction 
 of Public Approval " — are nevertheless moral frauds upon the 
 Spirit and Litent of The People and upon their ordained regime. 
 We know the basic political immorality of these practises and 
 usages. We know also the political depravity underlying their 
 contrivance and enforcement ; and all that need be said at this 
 point is, that " Legislative Sanction " is a very different matter 
 from " Public Sanction," and that these practises and usages have 
 never received the Sanction of Public Approval. It is true that 
 individuals have been deluded and lioo(lwinked into a passive 
 acceptance of their use ; but The Collective Sovereign has never 
 passed on the question of their use directly, nor in the manner 
 ordained for the expression of a political choice, and which 
 action is absolutely essential for the proper bestowal of " Public 
 Sanction." 
 
 Frauds on The Commonwealth. A fraud on The Commonwealth 
 is any deliberate act or action which alters its ordained status 
 through weakening its moral strength, its material strength, its 
 physical strength, its intellectual capacity, and its ability ; or any 
 such act or action by which its ordained Principles of Political 
 Action are set aside.
 
 292 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Frauds on The Individual. A fraud on The Individual is any- 
 deliberate act or action which alters or impairs the ordained status 
 of the individual considered either as a Sovereign-unit or as a 
 social and economic unit of The Commonwealth. 
 
 Among the grosser frauds on The Commonwealth may be men- 
 tioned the perversion of the Elective Principle. The perversion 
 of the Political Principles of Majority Rule, Representation, and 
 Responsibility. The counterfeiting of Public Opinion. The 
 destruction of Electorate Control over The Government; all of 
 which are more or less attributable to the use of a partizan party 
 as a Political Agency and the application in political administra- 
 tion of such ideas as Party Success, Party Responsibility, Party 
 Control, Party Regularity, and Collusive Action between opposing 
 Partizan Parties, all of which ideas unite to produce the irre- 
 sponsiveness of the public oflBcial to the true Spirit and Intent 
 of The People, and which irresponsiveness is evidenced by the 
 passage of Strike Legislation, Favorable Legislation, Pork-Barrel 
 Legislation, Log-Roiling, Jobbery, and so on. 
 
 Among the frauds that are perpetrated in the Political Processes 
 may be mentioned the naturalization, registration, nomination, 
 and the election frauds, — including the use of The Gerrymander, — 
 all of which tend to produce the final frauds on the individual of 
 political disfranchisement, misrepresentation, and non-representa- 
 tion. 
 
 Election Frauds. Passing by some forms of fraud that are 
 perpetrated in the w^ork of the political Campaign, Canvass, 
 Electioneering, Getting out The Vote, and so on, we will confine 
 our attention at present to frauds that are more immediately 
 connected with the handling of The Ballot. It will be im- 
 possible at this point to do more than indicate some of the 
 many specific acts which have been construed as constituting 
 such frauds. 
 
 Political Bribery consists of offering a voter a valuable con- 
 sideration either for his vote or for his forbearance to vote. We 
 have, in Chapter VIII, considered the fundamental immorality 
 of the practise and some of its effects. 
 
 Political Intimidation is the use of physical violence, or threats, 
 or menaces, against a voter, or any act whereby, through the force 
 of fear or dread, the free exercise of the Elective Franchise is 
 interfered with or prevented. 
 
 Political Corruption consists in the enforcement upon a voter 
 of any dishonest practise, usage, inducement, or doctrine whereby
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 293 
 
 the morals of the individual are contaminated, vitiated, and 
 debased, and whereby his political integrity is either weakened 
 or destroyed. 
 
 Repeating, where Registration is required, consummates the 
 registration repeating frauds ; and is the voting several times at 
 an election by an individual under the fictitious names placed 
 upon the Registration Lists. Repeating may occur where regis- 
 tration is not required ; but this fraud is generally made possible 
 only through collusive action of one kind or another. 
 
 Personating is the voting at elections by an individual who 
 claims to be some one whose name is properly on the voting list 
 but who has not voted. Collusive action is generally its distinctive 
 feature, and especially so when the true voter is precluded from 
 voting because of this act. 
 
 Voting of Colonizers consists in receiving the ballots of " Colo- 
 nizers " — who may not even be residents of The State, see 
 Chapter XV — and counting them as votes of duly qualified voters. 
 Generally this fraud is only possible through collusive action. 
 
 Abstraction of Ballots is the wrongful taking during the polling 
 hours, by some one in charge of the election, or by another under 
 his direction or connivance, of ballots from the ballot box. Ballots 
 so taken are usually all of one kind ; but the number of ballots 
 abstracted is usually supplied in one way or another by ballots 
 of another kind so that the " Majority " is wrongfully built up 
 in an apparently true total. 
 
 Ballot Box Stuffing is the insertion of spurious ballots into the 
 ballot box. The stuffing may be done by a voter, or by a few 
 voters, or by some one in charge of the ballot box, or by some one 
 acting under his direction or through his connivance. A voter 
 assists in stuffing the ballot box whenever he deposits two or more 
 ballots folded together so as to appear as one ballot. The box 
 is also stuffed whenever ballots are put in the box that have not 
 been deposited by actually qualified election district voters. Ballot 
 box stuffing is the easiest possible way of manufacturing an 
 election district " majority of votes " wherever the Registration 
 Laws are lacking and the Election Laws are loose. An instance 
 is on record where previously prepared ballots were put on the 
 bottom of the box before the polls opened and upon them a false 
 bottom was placed. When the box was inverted to empty it, 
 these stuffed ballots became mixed with the rest. 
 
 Tissue Ballots are ballots in proper form that are printed on 
 such thin tissue paper that several of them when carefully folded
 
 294 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 take up no more space than the authorized ballot. The use of 
 the tissue ballot is another form of ballot box stuffing. 
 
 Obstruction. One form of obstruction is accomplished when 
 party partizans of one " Party " form in line outside of the polls 
 under pretense of waiting to vote and so prevent the other 
 " Party's " adherents from voting in time. Another form is, 
 occupying the election booth for a long time. 
 
 Illegal marking. One who has sold his vote to a candidate or a 
 " Party " can prove the discharge of his part of the bargain to the 
 venal candidate or member on the Election Board by some slight 
 mark, tear, or wrinkle that distinguishes his ballot from others. 
 Also, the ballot clerk can easily ascertain how any individual 
 votes by tearing off the stub of the ballot in a peculiar way. 
 
 Assistance. In Election Districts where personal registration 
 is not required, the actually unqualified illiterate electors who have 
 been stuffed into The Electorate by the fraudulent performance 
 of the Process of Naturalization are allowed the " assistance " 
 of their " political " sponsors in preparing their ballots. In some 
 States two Inspectors of Election of opposite (but not necessarily 
 opposing) " Dominant Parties " enter the booth with the illiterate 
 for this purpose. But whenever the Party Machine is in control 
 of the process and Trades or Deals are being consummated, the 
 booth merely becomes another place for the exchange of " Party 
 Courtesies " in the manufacture of " Party Majorities." The 
 assistance clause, however, when properly applied, does enable 
 blind or maimed electors, who are otherwise qualified, to use the 
 written ballot; but a blind elector has to trust to the political 
 honesty of his " assistants." 
 
 False Canvassing, Counting, and Return. The frauds indicated 
 by these names are resorted to for the purpose of " Counting in " 
 or " Counting out " a candidate regardless of the actual number 
 of votes cast for a candidate. When the election was under the 
 control of the Dominant Party, this was the easiest way of " electing 
 a candidate " or getting a " Party Majority " with all that that 
 meant ; but need I point out that where this was done The Election 
 was turned into a farce and that the actual electing body was the 
 Election Board and not The Electorate. 
 
 Ballot Manipulation. Counterfeiting a ballot may be con- 
 summated by the knowing insertion of some slight change in the 
 printed name of a candidate, or the knowing omission of some part 
 of the name such as the abbreviation "Jr.," which change or 
 omission is easily overlooked by the illiterate or heedless voter.
 
 THE PROCESS OF ELECTION 295 
 
 but whereby a vote for that candidate may be lost through being 
 rejected in the canvass, count, or return by the knowing election 
 board. It has been consummated by heading a printed ballot with 
 the name of one " Party " and printing the names of candidates 
 of the other " Party " under it ; but that was when the Dominant 
 Parties were in control of the Election. 
 
 The above list of election frauds is not inclusive. It merely 
 sets forth some of the frauds that have been perpetrated in times 
 past, and includes others that are still practised. In many States, 
 where a serious attempt has been made to " purify elections," 
 the original open opportunity for many of these frauds has been 
 restricted, diminished, or surrounded with more risk by Statutory 
 Law. The real effect of this State Action has been merely to 
 obstruct fraud in connection with the transaction of some of the 
 detail work of the election. It has, in such States, the effect of 
 making the perpetration of certain kinds of election detail fraud 
 inadvisable ; but even there it has by no means completely closed 
 the opportunity for such frauds, as witness the fraudulent action 
 that is still possible to the Bi-Partizan Election Boards, the use of 
 which is proudly proclaimed by the partizan party to have the 
 sanction of Public Approval. 
 
 But what can The Commonwealth reasonably expect? Its 
 present " Purity of Election " Laws have been passed mainly 
 through the guidance and influence of the self-seeking partizan 
 party having its own axes to grind and using The Electorate 
 to grind them with. Does not that fact alone make it quite prob- 
 able that the practises possible under such laws will be largely 
 of a non-political character, and therefore politically fraudulent? 
 Can we reasonably believe that a body of law which permits of 
 non-political action in Political Administration will ever prove 
 an efficient safeguard against political fraud ? 
 
 But on the other hand there are many States which have no 
 efficient Registration and Election Laws that afford a safeguard 
 against the commonly fraudulent use of the ballot; and this 
 must justify me with those of my readers who live in States more 
 favored, in having set forth some frauds that may now be obsolete 
 in their States. I do not claim that these election frauds now 
 exist everywhere. That is not the point. I do claim that 
 they all existed somewhere and at some time, and that this 
 fact, coupled with the other fact that the partizan party 
 was in control of the Political Processes where and when 
 they were perpetrated, tends to throw a strong light on the
 
 296 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 character of the aggregation to whom we have entrusted the 
 management of our administrative affairs. 
 
 But who perpetrates the great frauds upon The Commonwealth 
 that are still possible, notwithstanding the Purity of Election Laws 
 and the Corrupt Practises Acts ? It is not reasonable to suppose 
 that The Commonwealth does, or that individual Sovereign-units 
 designedly divest themselves of their political power, political 
 rights, and political privileges. There are no Political Parties 
 in existence and the partizan parties are still in control of the dis- 
 charge of the Political Processes. Who is it therefore that practises 
 these frauds upon the Sovereignty of The Commonwealth and 
 upon the integrity of its Sovereign-units, or causes such frauds 
 to be so practised, unless it be the partizan party, the active mem- 
 bers of which being the only individuals who chiefly benefit by 
 them ? A fraudulent Election is a sufficiently serious matter in 
 itself ; but it sinks into insignificant proportions beside a fraudu- 
 lent Political Administration.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
 
 Representative Democracy: The American Commonwealths 
 are commonly called " Representative Democracies," Standing 
 by itself, the term " Representative Democracy " expresses a 
 contradiction in ideas. 
 
 Democracy. The word " Democracy " is used primarily to de- 
 scribe the political system under which government is established 
 and administered afterwards by direct action on the part of the 
 people. 
 
 A Democracy. Standing by itself, the term " A Democracy " 
 expresses the idea of a people who have assumed political inde- 
 pendence, who have established government, and who exercise 
 their sovereignty directly in its administration. 
 
 Republic. The word " Republic " is used primarily to describe a 
 Political System under which the State Polity is established and a 
 governmental regime is ordained, through a direct exercise of the 
 supreme power; but under which system the people entrust the 
 performance of some of the work of administrative detail to 
 representatives selected by themselves. 
 
 A Republic. Standing by itself the term " A Republic " 
 expresses the idea of a politically independent people who exercise 
 some of their political powers indirectly in the work of administra- 
 tion. Theoretically, an indirect exercise of political power is held 
 to be a direct exercise of political authority. 
 
 A Representative. A representative is one who stands in the 
 place of and who acts for another. 
 
 A Political Representative. A political representative is one who 
 stands for the time being in the place of the sovereign, who acts 
 for the sovereign in certain matters, and who exercises such 
 authority as is bestowed upon the office he occupies. 
 
 Representative Administration. The transaction of parts of the 
 work of political administration by means of the exercise of politi- 
 
 297
 
 298 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 cal authority produces representative administration in some 
 matters. 
 
 The Spirit and Intent of The People. Broadly speaking, the 
 separate American Commonwealths instituted Government as the 
 means for imparting stability and effective operation to the fol- 
 lowing ideas; namely, that Sovereignty resides in the people, 
 that Political Power proceeds from the people ; that individuals 
 who possess and exercise Sovereignty shall be and remain politi- 
 cally free and equal ; that The Will of The People shall decide the 
 purposes for which and the manner in which The Supreme Power 
 shall be exercised ; and that each Sovereign-unit shall at all times 
 freely participate in the formation, ascertainment, expression, and 
 execution of that Will in all matters connected with the establish- 
 ment of Government and its administration afterwards. 
 
 The Plan of Effective Operation, In each Commonwealth one of 
 the first acts of sovereignty was the ordainment into use of a general 
 plan of administrative action under which the Collective People 
 were to be represented primarily by The Electorate and secondarily 
 by the collective bodies of legislative, executive, and judicative 
 officials, which, when working together, we call The Government. 
 In each case the general management of political administration 
 was put into the hands of The Electorate. This, in effect, decided 
 the composition of the acting Sovereign and the identity of the 
 Sovereign-units. In each case The Electorate was required to 
 exercise some of the supreme powers directly for certain purposes, 
 and for other purposes was required to exercise some of the supreme 
 powers indirectly and by means of the secondary Administrative 
 Agency. This agency was to be put into active operation by The 
 Electorate through the process of filling its offices and positions 
 with some of the members of the electorate. Afterwards, The 
 Government was to be directly guided and controlled in its action 
 by The Electorate acting for the people. 
 
 Through this exercise of political power the American Common- 
 wealths proclaimed themselves Democracies in sovereignty, spirit, 
 and purpose, but acting as Republics in some matters of Political 
 Administration. In this way they ordained the principles of 
 Democracy as a guide to their action as a Republic. 
 
 Representative Administrative Action : The American Common- 
 wealths have ordained Representative Administrative Action as 
 the kind of action by which some of the administrative powers are 
 to be exercised for the production of some of the desired adminis- 
 trative results. Each Sovereign-unit must act as an elector and
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 299 
 
 some will be called upon to act both as electors and as public 
 officers; but as a right exercise of these powers depends upon a 
 right exercise of individual power in administrative matters, and 
 as each individual elector is, in theory, animated by the desire to 
 produce the General Welfare, each is clothed with Political Freedom 
 to act as he deems best for this end. 
 
 Electoral Action. We distinguish the direct action that is 
 required of an individual while acting in the capacity of An Elector 
 by the name Electoral Action. 
 
 Electorate Action. The direct action on the part of the Collective 
 Electorate that is necessary to enable it to discharge its functions 
 as a political agency, we call Electorate Action. 
 
 Official Action. The indirect electoral action that is taken by a 
 public officer in the discharge of the duties of a public office, and 
 the indirect electorate action that is taken by a collective body of 
 public ofiicers, and which is necessary to enable it to discharge the 
 functions of an administrative board, a Legislature, etc., we call 
 Official Action. 
 
 Objects, Reasons for. By resorting to this kind of administrative 
 action the people sought to avoid the inconveniences and the 
 dangers that are necessarily connected with a direct exercise of all 
 of their administrative powers by all of the citizens of The State 
 when acting together as an administrative assemblage. The 
 people also believed that through the use of comparatively small 
 political agencies that were to be composed of men of superior 
 personal civil-virtue, ability, and political knowledge, they could 
 secure a wiser and a speedier readjustment of the constantly dis- 
 turbed relations of individuals than could be had from direct 
 action by the collective people ; and, all things considered, the 
 people regarded Representative Action in some matters as feasible, 
 practicable, and altogether the most advantageous way of exercis- 
 ing some of their Powers of Administration. 
 
 But, of course, administrative action takes place after the ex- 
 ercise of the Powers of Establishment. Part of it is indirect action 
 and not direct action by the people. The question immediately 
 arises, How can future indirect action be made as effective as direct 
 action by The People in the future? How can future indirect 
 action by an agency be given the compelling force that direct 
 action by the people always has? 
 
 Sanction. The way in which the people sought to accomplish 
 these effects was to bestow their Sanction beforehand upon the 
 " lawful " exercise by their Political Agencies of The Delegated
 
 300 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Powers of Administration. This they did; but hastily, and 
 without providing a Rule of Action beforehand that would enable 
 either The State or the public official to easily and speedily deter- 
 mine what action could or should be considered " lawful." 
 
 We remember that the Delegated Powers of Administration are 
 portions only of the legislative, executive, and judicial Powers of 
 the people. 
 
 The Electorate is supposed to exercise executive, legislative, and 
 judicial powers directly for the purpose of providing an Adminis- 
 trative Policy, imparting the Impulse to administrative action by 
 The Government ; selecting and choosing between Candidates and 
 filling elective public offices; and controlling the action of The 
 Government. 
 
 The Government. Confining ourselves now to a consideration of 
 Representative Action as it applies to The Government. When 
 the original States established Government their Fundamental Law 
 was in existence, and there was also a large body of " Colonial 
 Statutory Law " in existence and which was continued on in use 
 as binding rules of action in many respects. 
 
 Legislative Power. Taken in connection with the delegated 
 exercise of Legislative Power, representative action becomes the 
 means by which the people, through their sanction given before- 
 hand, attempt to secure the enactment of proper Statutory Laws 
 without passing them directly. 
 
 Executive Power. In relation to the delegated exercise of 
 Executive Power, representative action becomes the means 
 whereby the people, through their sanction given beforehand, 
 attempt to secure the proper enforcement of their Fundamental 
 and their Statutory law without assembling together for this 
 purpose. 
 
 Judicial Power. In relation to the delegated exercise of Judicial 
 
 Power, representative action becomes the means by which the 
 
 people, through their sanction given beforehand, attempt to secure 
 
 the application of the full meanings of the Principles of The State 
 
 Polity, and of their Statutory Law, to their political, social, and 
 
 economic affairs without assembling together for that purpose ; 
 
 the three branches of The Government, working together, being 
 
 / merely the instrumentality by which this inclusive division of the 
 
 Jjr work of political administration is made practically operative. 
 
 ' Sanction, in representative action, is the solemn approval 
 
 bestowed by The People upon the acts of their representative 
 
 agencies or agents. In a pure Democracy sanction beforehand is
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 301 
 
 unnecessary because the people deliberate and legislate directly. 
 In a Republic, however, the people agree beforehand to let an 
 administrative agency decide some administrative matters by its 
 vote ; and in order to impart the compelling force of Law to the 
 acts of The Agency, they bestow their sanction before the agency 
 begins its exercise of Authority. By so doing, the people also 
 impose an obligation upon each citizen to conform to and support 
 the " lawful " acts of The Government, and to work peaceably for 
 theu* alteration or repeal if the acts produce hardships to the 
 individual or injury to The State. 
 
 Theoretically, the bestowal of sanction beforehand enables 
 individuals to avoid the inconveniences connected with Direct 
 Legislation in some matters, and enables the people to secure a 
 wiser and more beneficial exercise of The Supreme Power in these 
 matters. 
 
 But, if this system of administrative procedure is to be made 
 effectual, the people must possess some way of making it so. 
 Standing by itself the system will not of itself produce proper 
 administrative action. It must be backed up by a " Body of 
 Law " before proper action can be guaranteed, or even premised. 
 Individual and collective Official Action must be distinctly and 
 comprehensively described and prescribed by Law, for how else 
 can anyone determine what is " lawful." The proper performance 
 of such action must be in each instance compelled by Law, for 
 unless it is, no individual or body of individuals will come forward 
 and give up the necessary time to try to make a debatable idea 
 work practically. If what is " lawful " is neither described nor 
 compelled, then the bestowal of sanction amounts to nothing more 
 than a mandate from The Sovereign to its agency to go it blind ; 
 and this is equivalent to ordering its individual units to act as the 
 agency decrees, even if that decree permits of or compels improper 
 individual action, and even if that decree has been obtained by 
 wittingly wrong action by the individuals who compose the repre- 
 sentative agency. 
 
 A Free Commonwealth always stands in danger of two kinds of 
 administrative action ; namely, dishonest action, and well-meant 
 but shortsighted and illogical action ; both of which produce hard- 
 ships and injustice to some of its individuals. The State also can 
 be injured as effectually by witless honest action as by wilfully 
 dishonest action. It attempts to discourage either kind ; first, by 
 impeaching public officials for corrupt action, incompetence, and 
 unfitness and imposing fine and imprisonment, provided the action
 
 302 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 complained of and proved has been made a " legal " crime; and 
 second, by the action of The Judiciary in declaring the official action 
 taken to be a nullity. But, unless the people, at the same time 
 when they bestow their sanction upon future official administrative 
 action, already possess a Body of Law which distinctly defines the 
 functions of office ; which declares the official who shall discharge 
 its functions ; which prescribes the methods by which the duties 
 of the office are to be performed ; which declares the punishment 
 for official malfeasance in every case; which determines the 
 manner and means for inflicting such punishment — in short, 
 unless The State has a Body of Law which definitely regulates its 
 own action in this respect, it can never speedily, effectually, or 
 justly accomplish even so righteous a purpose as this. 
 
 When the American Commonwealths bestowed such sanction, 
 they committed the stupendous blunder of failing to ordain such 
 a body of law. They failed to appreciate the necessity of having 
 beforehand a " Specific Guarantee " for the proper exercise of 
 Political Authority. True ! They had the example before them 
 of the wholesome effects produced by the use of a prescribed rule 
 of procedure which the Judiciary of America and of England 
 presented ; but they failed to perceive the necessity for a similar 
 rule of procedure in the case of the legislative and executive 
 branches of The Government. They trusted to the force of Public 
 Spirit to produce proper rules of action and proper action itself 
 on the part of individual representatives ; but so far this force, 
 unsupported as it is by any definite statements as to proper indi- 
 vidual administrative action, has not proved the equal in strength 
 to the love of individual material advancement which lies at the 
 root of all evil, political evil included. 
 
 The Judiciary. Outside of the faith in individuals that The 
 Judiciary will administer Justice, what is it that imparts definite- 
 ness and compelling force to judicial decisions, and obtains respect- 
 ful compliance with the results proceeding from the exercise of 
 volition, discretion, and reason, by Judges and Courts, if it is not 
 the fact that the Rule of Judicial Procedure is definite, a part of the 
 knowTi Public Law, and that in the exercise of discretion, volition, 
 and reason Judges are governed by a body of exact and widely 
 known definitions which control their administration of Justice as 
 ordained. If accurate definitions and a rule of procedure will 
 produce such effects in judicial administrative action, why will 
 they not produce action of a similar character from the executive 
 and legislative departments? Fortunately for the American
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 303 
 
 People the administrative action of the first State Judiciaries was 
 aheady regulated by a body of accepted rules of procedure and 
 general definitions and concepts concerning Freedom, Liberty, 
 Equality, and Justice, Also the general character of the judiciary 
 was established ; and the really important point to be covered 
 was the future maintenance of the character and grade of the 
 judiciary. But, as we have seen, this point was left uncovered, 
 and the final result is that wherever nominations to the Bench are 
 sold and bought like any other commodity, the character and 
 grade of The Judiciary has necessarily declined in degree and 
 integrity. 
 
 Legislative and Executive Action. The bestowal of sanction 
 beforehand upon undefined action produced several effects. An 
 undue exercise of discretion was bestowed upon the legislative and 
 executive representatives concerning the immediate purposes for 
 which official action should be taken, and concerning the manner 
 in which Political Authority should be used. The whole broad 
 question of what is proper, responsive, and responsible official 
 action was left open to dispute instead of being settled beforehand 
 so that The People could at all times reasonably secure a logical 
 exercise of Political Authority, or speedily rectify or punish its 
 illogical exercise. The Common Superior told its agencies to go 
 ahead until further orders and then failed to issue any further 
 adequate orders. The legislative and executive departments were 
 left to fight it out between themselves and grab the exercise of 
 Authority from each other. A wide field of administrative action 
 was left insufficiently regulated by Law. The opportunity was left 
 open for its selfish exploitation ; and we know what has happened. 
 Administrative Action in both departments that is ministerial in 
 nature — because theoretically taken under the direction and 
 control of the ordained Common Superior, The Electorate — is 
 now supplanted by partizan party action. That means that The 
 Electorate has abdicated the office of Common Superior in favor 
 of The Partizan Party. Each Commonwealth has been confi- 
 dentially hoodwinked into the use of successive administrative 
 expedients until now in the place of a Logical System of Political 
 Administration we have and use a collection of Partizan Party 
 customs, practises, and usages which, in connection with admin- 
 istrative offices, allow the successive occupants of public office to 
 use the office for partizan party purposes while ostensibly filling it 
 for public i)urposes; and for three-quarters of a Century indi- 
 viduals in The Government have so misused executive and legis-
 
 304 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 lative authority for the accomplishment of purposes that are 
 foreign to its ordained use as to seriously impair the ordained 
 conditions of individual existence ; all of which effects would not 
 have been so speedily possible had the Commonwealths started 
 political administration with a comprehensive and logical system 
 of Administration. 
 
 Free Participation in Government : Our general plan of Repre- 
 sentative Administrative Procedure is full of words and terms 
 which properly describe the administrative action of a Democracy. 
 Free participation in Government is one of these democratic terms. 
 What is its meaning under a Republican form of administration ? 
 
 In a democratic sense the term means the direct and free partici- 
 pation by a Sovereign-unit in all matters connected with the 
 exercise of Sovereignty by the Collective Sovereign. But if a 
 Collective Sovereign exercises some of its administrative powers 
 in an indirect manner and by Agencies, then all of the Sovereign- 
 units can not freely participate in all matters of administration. 
 That is our position ; and therefore the term " Free Participation " 
 must have a peculiar meaning with us. Considering The Elector- 
 ate as the Collective Sovereign, its individual members are the 
 Sovereign-units who are entitled to participate in administration. 
 We divide Electorate Action into direct and indirect action. This 
 in turn divides participation — free or otherwise — into direct and 
 indirect participation. In order to get a Democratic form of the 
 direct exercise of all of The Reserved Powers of Administration, 
 the States have ordained that all of the electors who are duly 
 qualified shall in each period of administration freely participate 
 in the exercise of these particular powers. 
 
 Political Representation : This leaves open the matter of par- 
 ticipation in the exercise of The Delegated Powers of Administra- 
 tion. Of course an elector, as such, can not participate directly 
 in the administrative action that is taken by the three-branched 
 Government; but in order to enable The Electorate to exercise 
 the Delegated Powers indirectly and yet effectively Republics 
 employ a means called Representation. 
 
 Defined. Leaving details for future elaboration, the American 
 form of Political Representation may be briefly described as a 
 scheme of administrative action whereby The Electorate, in the 
 official exercise of Executive Power, shall act by and through an 
 individual, or certain sets of individuals ; and in the official exercise 
 of Legislative Power shall act by and through a certain number of 
 individuals ; and in the official exercise of Judicial Power shall act
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 305 
 
 by and through still other individuals ; and, in order to impart a 
 Democratic character to this indirect exercise of political power, 
 the States decree that all of the individual Electors shall freely 
 select and choose the individuals who are to primarily represent 
 The Electorate in such official action, and that such official action 
 shall be directed and controlled by The Electorate. The fact 
 that Official Action is divided into Public Action and Local Action 
 does not affect the general theory of official action. 
 
 Comidered as a Political Right. Since Political Representation 
 is an ordained means for enabling individual electors to freely 
 participate indirectly in the exercise of The Delegated Powders of 
 Administration, it is capable of being considered as a Political 
 Right. In theory, Representative Action for certain purposes is 
 held to possess a distinct advantage over Direct Action. Both the 
 Collective Sovereign and its individual units are therefore entitled 
 to all of the benefits flowing from its use ; and both may rightly 
 claim that the whole process of Representation shall be kept 
 logical, as otherwise it will not produce the kind of administrative 
 action that was originally intended. Besides this, the public officer 
 may claim the same thing; as otherwise he may not be able to 
 secure the benefits of immunities that are granted to public officials. 
 
 The advantage of considering Political Representation as a 
 Political Right is obvious. Our attention is immediately directed 
 first, towards ascertaining the exact meanings and benefits of the 
 right; and second, to the distinctive obligations that rest upon 
 The Electorate, the individual, and the public official to secure all 
 of the peculiar benefits which flow from that right to The Com- 
 munity considered as a Political Power ; to the citizens who 
 compose The Community (and through ourselves to our posterity) ; 
 and to the public official. Furthermore, by regarding it as a 
 Political Right we are enabled to refer all controversies and dis- 
 putes concerning its nature, meaning, intent, and manner of opera- 
 tion, back to our Principles of Action for elucidation and decision. 
 Being a Political Right, all, and each, are interested in its full 
 maintenance; and all, and each, are injured by its violation in 
 any respect ; and finally, each individual is held in duty bound to 
 call the attention of The Community to any violation of the right 
 or diminution of its benefits. 
 
 The American Kind of. Let us say that our theory of represent- 
 ative government, so far as it bears on the matter of Political 
 Representation, is this : Government and its Administration are 
 instituted and maintained through an exercise of The Will of The
 
 306 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 People, and for the purpose of promoting the General Welfare ; 
 Political Representation is ordained as an advantageous means 
 for the transaction of some of the work of administration ; the 
 people are made the basis of representation in The Legislature ; 
 that the exercise of the Delegated Powers of Administration is to 
 be directed and controlled by The Will of The People ; that each 
 Sovereign-unit, however acting, is morally bound to properly dis- 
 charge his allotted part in every step, stage, and process of political 
 administration ; that the privilege and the duty of expressing 
 The Will of The People as to political administration is bestowed 
 upon The Electorate ; that The Will of The People is a consensus 
 of individual Electoral Wills ; that Political Majorities are ma- 
 jorities of Electoral Wills ; that Political Majorities are to be 
 formed solely through the free play of individual reason and con- 
 science ; that majorities of Electors are not to be permanently 
 organized for the continuous exercise of Political Authority ; that 
 Representatives, who are selected for the sole purpose of more 
 advantageously expediting, perfecting, and carrying out some of 
 the detail work of the people in administrative action, must work 
 and act according to the ordained Principles of Democratic Action 
 which apply to all alike ; that such representatives must by their 
 action put nothing but the Spirit and Intent of The People into 
 practise ; that such representatives must by their action put 
 nothing but The Will of The People into operation as to adminis- 
 trative details ; that the predominating administrative sentiments 
 of The Community are to be freely represented in The Legislature 
 as well as in The Government as a whole ; and that in the legis- 
 lature, the representatives are to act 'precisely as the people would 
 act were they gathered together as a Legislative Assemblage and 
 working under their ordained Democratic Principles of Associa- 
 tion ; for otherwise, it will be impossible for the people, through 
 indirect action, to put their Principles of Action either into full or 
 effective operation. 
 
 A Representation of Ideas. From this it appears that the 
 American Commonwealths have ordained the existence of but one 
 kind of political representation ; viz., the representation of Ideas 
 concerning the Geiural Welfare; and in passing it may be said that 
 the representation of any other ideas than these will tend to, if it 
 does not actually, pervert the administrative action of the people 
 from its true objects. 
 
 Form of is Personal Representation. Our ordained form of 
 political representation is most commonly termed Personal Repre-
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 307 
 
 sentation. The name is used to indicate the difference in nature 
 which exists between our form and some other forms of political 
 representation such, for instance, as : 
 
 Arbitrary Representation, or Representation by Status, which 
 form rests upon the basis of traditional ideas concerning individual 
 position and privilege ; and such a form, for instance, as : 
 
 Equal Representation, which name more especially indicates the 
 kind of representation possessed by the several not wholly autono- 
 mous political bodies or subordinate States that may compose a 
 larger confederated Nation. 
 
 The specific objects to be accomplished by the bodies politic 
 using either of these tliree kinds of political representation are 
 perfectly distinct, and the reasons for the use of either kind are 
 different. Space forbids a consideration of any other objects and 
 reasons than our own ; and these, being considered, show that with 
 us Political Representation means that particular kind which will 
 enable the individual units of the Collective Sovereign to partici- 
 pate as freely as possible in the exercise of the Delegated Powers of 
 Administration ; and we neither bestowed nor intended to bestow 
 political representation on any body of individuals who were 
 permanently organized to promote Sectarian, Military, Social, 
 Economic, Sectional, Class, Selfial, and Selfish Interests what- 
 soever. And finally we prohibited such organizations and all 
 individuals from exercising private selfial influence upon individual 
 electors while acting in an administrative capacity. 
 
 Importance of Correct Methods. Whether we shall ever secure 
 the desired extent and kind of participation required, and whether 
 we can ultimately secure the administrative results hoped for, 
 will of course depend very largely upon the Methods by which we 
 act. But in looking into the general plan of American representa- 
 tive action we experience an instant and encouraging gleam of 
 conviction that it can be made to work successfully, that it will 
 naturally become composed of logical methods, Provided Only, that 
 each Individual elector, while acting either in an elective, or in an 
 official capacity, and in each step, stage, and process of adminis- 
 trative action, will be guided and governed by the principles of 
 Freedom, Liberty, Equality, and Justice as they apply to such 
 action. But with human nature in its present state of develop- 
 ment one indispensable prerequisite is necessary for the production 
 in and by any Free Commonwealth of the kind of individual action 
 that has been ordained. The State must possess a logical System 
 of Administration that not only provides the individual elector
 
 308 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 with the opportunity to act in a logical manner, but which also 
 enables The State, if occasion requires, to compel a logical and 
 therefore an effectual action from every Sovereign-unit however 
 acting. The Collective Sovereign must at all times retain effective 
 control over the action of its Sovereign-units or fail in the at- 
 tempted exercise of Sovereignty. 
 
 Now it makes no difference by what form of popular government 
 the people seek to make their will effectual ; in each form the 
 obligation regarding the kind of methods remains the same. 
 Under any form of Popular Government the obligation is upon the 
 Collective Sovereign to provide methods of individual administra- 
 tive action which, whether they are used to produce this, that, or 
 the other specific result, w^ill in each instance harmonize in char- 
 acter with its self-chosen Principles, and will also give full opera- 
 tive force to their meanings. Our form of representative action, 
 being based upon a distinctive concept of individual Equality, 
 can never succeed in maintaining individual Justice, unless our 
 administrative methods are such as will maintain individual 
 Equality in administrative action. Any method of administrative 
 action which tends to impair or to destroy absolute equality in 
 individual administrative action necessarily works mischief to 
 The Community through giving to some more influence in admin- 
 istrative work than they should rightfully possess, and through 
 depriving others of their rightful degree of influence. The use of 
 such methods tends to create a Privileged and an Unprivileged 
 Class ; and this was one of the possibilities that Democracy was 
 instituted to prevent. Let us briefly examine some of the argu- 
 ments which support the use of several methods of representation 
 that directly affect the political equality of individuals, and which 
 methods should therefore be avoided. 
 
 Improper Methods : By " Interests." Some writers liken 
 Society to an " Organic Body " that is composed of different 
 groups of individuals, which groups they term " Collective Organ- 
 isms." These so-called organisms are engaged in various economic 
 pursuits, which are called " Social Interests." The claim is made 
 that the solidarity of Society depends upon the freedom in which 
 these " Social Interests " may be carried on. Such writers argue 
 that these " Interests " are the real animating force in Society — 
 the accumulation of wealth being the strongest desire in Man ; 
 that the " General Interest " will be best secured by the successful 
 development of these " Social Interests " ; that Representative 
 Government is really instituted to afford superior opportunities
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 309 
 
 for the prosecution of these " Interests " ; and that to make it 
 fully effective these " Interests " should be the Units of Repre- 
 sentation in The Government. 
 
 But Representation by " The Interests " will produce a Govern- 
 ment of The People, by " The Interests," and for " The Interests." 
 So in the same way Representation by " The Party " will produce 
 a Government of The People, by " The Party," and for " The 
 Party." Measured by our Objects, Representation by " The 
 Interests " is a totally inapplicable form ; but the arguments in its 
 support are in many respects so like the arguments advanced 
 by some writers in support of Representation by " The Party " 
 that it may be well to analyze them briefly. Besides being fatally 
 defective in basis — because they ignore the stated meanings of the 
 Principles of our State Polity — the arguments are also fallacious 
 because of their ingeniously equivocal terms. 
 
 As to the State. The word " Society " is used to express the idea 
 of a Political State. The State, however, is not composed of 
 " groups of individuals working economically." It is composed of 
 all of its individuals working together politically. The object of 
 Political Action is to produce and maintain Individual Justice. 
 The object of Economic Action is to produce Wealth. The State 
 acts politically to remedy injustices that are committed economi- 
 callv, and to force individuals and " Interests " to work harmoni- 
 ously together for the production of the General Welfare, which 
 onlv exists when Individual Justice is maintained. 
 
 As to Welfare. These arguments ignore our idea of Individual 
 Welfare, which is personal immunity from any form of injustice. 
 They interpret " Welfare " as the welfare of certain groups of 
 individuals. They confine the meaning solely to Economic 
 Welfare, thereby excluding from their calculations the idea of 
 the moral welfare of the individual upon which rests the moral 
 welfare of The State. They say nothing concerning personal 
 immunity from possible oppressive administration, and the Wel- 
 fare of Humanity at Large, which conditions, it must not be for- 
 gotten. Popular Government was in part designed to secure. 
 
 As to Object of Government. The term " Social Interests " 
 conveys an impression of State Interests; and by creating this 
 impression these writers slide over the truth that these so-called 
 " Social " interests are actually private, individual, selfish, eco- 
 nomic interests. Certainly these private interests can be prose- 
 cuted most successfully if they can obtain control in administra- 
 tion, but we did not institute Government for that object.
 
 310 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 As to Political Status. Through the use of an mdiscrimmatmg 
 nomenclature these writers on Popular Government avoid the 
 truth and create false impressions in many respects. By calling 
 these proposed Units of Representation " the Collective organisms 
 of Society," they create the impression of an Electoral Group having 
 political features, work, composition, and character, and being 
 entitled to control the exercise of The Delegated Powers of Admin- 
 istration. But these " Social Interests " considered as groups do 
 not possess political attributes. They are merely many separate 
 groups of economic units — not electors — who are pursuing 
 various mechanical or commercial callings, who can not exist 
 independently of each other; who can not be "harmonized" 
 because they are engaged in a constant economic warfare ; who 
 can not possess the Collective Will that is necessary to supply the 
 animating force to Political Administration and whose members 
 are merely united together by one part only of the "General 
 Interest " which unites the individuals of a State together. Let 
 a real political question like Slavery arise ! Then what happens ? 
 The individuals who compose these " Collective Organisms," these 
 " Social Interests," these proposed " Units of Representation " 
 instantly fly apart, separate, and associate themselves with others 
 for the decision of the Political Question ; and the " Organism," 
 considered as a Political Unit, disappears. 
 
 As to Character. Furthermore, the character of these " Social 
 Interests " is fixed not by the Principles of Democratic Associa- 
 tion, but by the use of the Principles of Competitive Business. 
 Each collective " Social Interest " is more or less dependent upon 
 the activities of the other " Social Interests," and each is always 
 striving to reduce the extent of that dependency by " absorbing " 
 every possible " Allied Interest " ; that is, by reaching out into 
 and by occupying fields of economic effort that are by nature 
 similar or " allied " to their effort. And moreover, each separate 
 business group in each collective " Social Interest " is constantly 
 and most unsocially fighting every other business group with 
 competitive methods of business for the purpose of killing off 
 business groups of its oion kind. Experience has shown that these 
 " Social Interests " stop at nothing either to destroy a competitor 
 or to enlarge their own private fields of operation. The commer- 
 cial practises of the " Social Interests " proclaim them to be pure 
 Selfish Interests. They are in fact a most improper unit of repre- 
 sentation because representation of Self-interest does not accord 
 with that theory of popular government which seeks to secure to
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 311 
 
 each individual an equal opportunity to participate in administra- 
 tion and to pursue happiness. To give such " Interests " repre- 
 sentation in The Government is merely to afford the more powerful 
 " Interests " an added opportunity to absorb the weaker " In- 
 terests" and to destroy in Society the conditions of individual 
 existence that popular govermnent was invoked to secure and 
 maintain. 
 
 By Sections : " Natural opportunities " play an important part 
 in the formation of what are called " Sections " in a State. By 
 natural opportunities are meant those peculiar conditions of the 
 soil, or combinations of land and water, or the special productive- 
 ness in either or both, which enable man to satisfy his desire for 
 Wealth with less exertion than at other places. These oppor- 
 tunities lie in sections of the State widely separated from each 
 other. The pursuits of the inhabitants of these sections are dif- 
 ferent, some being agricultural while some may relate to manu- 
 facture, fisheries, mining, etc. The inliabitants of each section 
 have selfial interests that are somewhat at variance with each other, 
 and the needs of each section are different. This leads naturally 
 to the idea that a Representative from each Section is needed in 
 The Government to see to it that the welfare of the inhabitants 
 of his section does not suffer at its hands. Since the Welfare of 
 The Whole involves the welfare of its units, however economically 
 engaged, there is nothing seriously inconsistent in this supposition, 
 so long as the selfial interests of sections is not allowed to degener- 
 ate into the selfish interest of business groups. But the idea is 
 dangerous because it is a move in the direction of centralizing the 
 control of the exercise of Political Authority in such groups instead 
 of retaining this control in The Electorate. Furthermore, the 
 different sections are not populated evenly, and, under our plan 
 of giving one representative to a given number of inhabitants, 
 some sections would soon obtain a preponderating representation 
 in The Government with the accompanying danger of Sectional 
 Legislation. 
 
 By Classes : In the early days of State Government there were 
 distinct Classes in the Commonwealths which originated in tra- 
 ditional ideas concerning the right to govern that is conferred by 
 family position, acquired wealth, and the possession of education. 
 As a rule, these " Classes " were held in lively suspicion by the 
 greater part of the people, and it was partly as a means for making 
 their disapprobation of the " Spirit of Caste " in society permanent 
 and effectual, partly as a means for establishing but one rule of
 
 312 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 political action for all of the members of society alike, partly in 
 order to improve the social and economic opportunities of the 
 " Unprivileged " class and to minimize the pains of inferiority and 
 of obedience in the masses, partly as a means to counteract sup- 
 posed " Monarchical Tendencies " in some classes and to stop the 
 Power-centralizing forces at work in some directions, that The 
 People at Large sought a free, equal, and personal representation 
 in The Govermnent. In other words, they sought through Per- 
 sonal Representation to harmonize selfial interests for the benefit 
 of The Commonwealth, and through such representation to prevent 
 a combination of selfish interests, whether of sections or of classes, 
 which might otherwise obtain control of political administration 
 and use it to obtain special benefits, advantages, or privileges unto 
 themselves. The election of Jackson to the presidency was the 
 final protest of The People at Large against what up till then had 
 been the practise of electing representatives from certain " Classes " 
 in society and of selecting the Executive officers of the General 
 Government from certain " Sections " of the Country. It was 
 in effect a People's Mandate that from then on the only requisite 
 of a Representative was his ability to intelligently represent the 
 ideas of those who returned him — honesty being taken for 
 granted ; that Administrative Ideas come properly from The 
 People at Large and not from Classes; that Administration, in 
 order to freely reflect The Will of The People, must be managed 
 by an agency that is composed of representatives who are returned 
 by The People and not by Privileged Classes within The Common- 
 wealth ; that Admmistration by Classes invariably produces Class 
 Welfare first, and tends to produce an evil form of Government ; 
 viz.. Government by Classes. Evil, because of the political 
 thraldom to which it reduces the unprivileged classes, or the 
 " Common People," as such classes were called in Jackson's time. 
 This had been fully illustrated in the Southern States, wherein a 
 few rich families in each county had, by a combination of class 
 interests, been able to completely control the administration of 
 local affairs, and where also, through a similar combination within 
 The Government, they had been able to completely control its 
 action and so to perpetuate the exercise of Political Authority in 
 the hands of an openly so-called " Ruling Class." 
 
 By Party : The first impression created by the term " Represen- 
 tation by Party " is that of a Political Party with its representa- 
 tives in The Government. Individual electors, however, do not 
 associate together in a true political party for the purpose of
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 313 
 
 giving Representation to " A Party " ; they do this for the sole 
 purpose of obtaining an added force and efficiency to their effort 
 to create a preponderating administrative sentiment in the Com- 
 monwealth and to obtain a preponderating representation of that 
 sentiment in The Government. It may take a true political party 
 several periods of administration to establish its ideas as the pre- 
 dominating sentiment in the Commonwealth ; but when this is 
 accomplished and The Government is instructed to put the pre- 
 dominant sentiment into practical operation, the function of a 
 political party is discharged. Considered as a " Body of Electoral 
 ^Yill," it ceases to exist when that Will is properly made into 
 Statutory Law. Considered as a definitely ascertained number of 
 electors, a political party ceases to exist when its functions are 
 discharged in any period of administration because its individual 
 members at once unite with other electors in other political parties 
 of possibly greater and possibly lesser numerical magnitude for 
 the settlement of other Political Questions in other periods of 
 administration ; and these, too, disintegrate when their political 
 function is discharged. 
 
 The proper subject of Political Representation is the ideas of 
 individual electors regarding Political Administration and not 
 the ideas that may be held by a temporarily organized association 
 of electors; and all of the arguments against representation by 
 " Interests," by Sections, and by Classes bear with equal force 
 against giving Representation to Parties of any kind. 
 
 By Partizan Parties : And more especially do they bear against 
 giving representation to the permanently organized associations 
 of partizan voters which we inaccurately term Political Parties. 
 Such Associations are not necessary elements of Democratic 
 Administration. They are not an ordained means, agency, or 
 part of our Administrative System. They are not even contem- 
 plated in our' Theory of Administration. They do not put Demo- 
 cratic Principles of Action into operation in the management of 
 their own affairs. They are not organized for the purpose; of 
 maintaining the exercise of Political Power or the control of the 
 exercise of Political Authority in the hands of The Electorate. 
 They are not organized for the sole purpose of promoting the 
 General Welfare. On the contrary, they are organized (professions 
 to the contrary notwithstanding) for the immediate purpose of 
 creating an immoral and undemocratic Power which they can use 
 in obtaining control over the exercise of political power and political 
 authority for the ultimate purpose of promoting the welfare of
 
 314 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 " The Party " and the undue political advantage of some of their 
 active members. 
 
 In its object, character, composition, and structure a Partizan 
 Party resembles an " Interest." To give Representation to a 
 Partizan Party is to present the largest Partizan Party with an 
 increased opportunity to kill off its opponents, to prevent the 
 formation of Political Parties and Political Majorities, to distort 
 and pervert Electoral Action, Electorate Action, Official Action, 
 Administrative Action, and to obstruct the individual and The 
 State from taking Democratic Action as the means for putting 
 Democratic Principles of Action into full operation and effect. 
 Such representation must necessarily result in the administration 
 of a Government of The People, by The Partizan Party, and for 
 the inclusive interests of the existing partizan parties. The State 
 being left to exist upon and maintain and protect itself with the 
 remnants of individual Freedom, Liberty, and Equality that 
 partizan parties have not yet devised means to absorb. Having 
 indicated the kinds of representation to be avoided, let us now 
 consider the form that was intended to be used. 
 
 Proportionate Representation : The ideas which enter into the 
 American conception of political representation in legislation are 
 briefly these. The Power to Legislate is among the Administrative 
 Powers. The Electorate must legislate directly and for the pur- 
 pose, among others, of decidmg the temporary Policy of Admin- 
 istration. It must legislate indirectly, by means of The Legisla- 
 ture, and for the purpose of providing rules of action (Statutory 
 Law) which will enable individuals to properly apply the tem- 
 porary Policy. Individual electors are to participate as freely 
 as possible in official legislation by means of Representatives that 
 are freely selected and chosen through direct judicial and executive 
 action by The Electorate. Theoretically, the sentiment of the 
 body of The Legislature is to be a reflex of the sentiment of 
 the body of The Electorate; and if the direct action of The 
 Electorate is properly performed, then the sentiments that 
 exist in The Electorate will be freely represented in The 
 Legislature, and will also, as far as is mechanically possible, 
 be represented therein in about the same proportion as they 
 exist in The Electorate. 
 
 Speaking of the effect which this kind of Political Representation 
 will have upon the composition of The Legislature, and designating 
 the preponderating administrative sentiments of the community 
 as " A Political Majority " and as " A Political Minority," we
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 315 
 
 find it to be in accord with Mr. Mill's idea of proper Democratic 
 Representation as set forth by him in Chapter VII of his Con- 
 siderations on Representative Government. Expressing Mr. 
 Mill's ideas in terms that are used in this book and without forcing 
 any meanings, they will appear as follows. " A Political Majority 
 would always have a majority of the representatives, but a Political 
 Minority would always have a minority of the representatives. 
 JVIan for man, a Political Minority would be as fully represented 
 as the Political Majority. Unless they are, there is not equal 
 government, but a government of inequality and privilege ; one 
 part of the people rule over the rest : there is a part whose fair 
 and equal share of influence in the representation is withheld from 
 them contrary to all just government, but, above all, contrary to 
 the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very 
 root and foundation." 
 
 This, in a fair way, describes the plan of political representation 
 which the American People intended to put into operation. Let 
 us give it a distinctive name. In the first place, we need a name 
 that will definitely express this one idea of giving Political Repre- 
 sentation solely to Administrative Ideas or Sentiments ; and in the 
 second place, we need assistance in distmctly separating and setting 
 this idea apart from another which, since 1844, has developed 
 regarding a " proportional representation " of Partizan Parties 
 in The Government, but which proportion is based upon the 
 majorities of party votes which are manufactured and gotten together 
 by the illogical, immoral, dishonest, and fraudulent practises that 
 are employed by Partizan Parties in securing Party Success. This 
 sort of Representation is the very antithesis of the American idea 
 whereunder the ideas of Political Majorities and Political Muiorities 
 are to be freely and fully represented in The Legislature ; there- 
 fore, to express this meaning and to exclude all others, let us use 
 the name Proportionate Representation. 
 
 There is nothing in the concept of Proportionate Representation 
 upon which to base a claim that a Majority Sentiment is entitled 
 to a disproportionate part of the whole representation ; or which 
 will justify the people in adopting any scheme, means, or methods 
 that will enable a majority to secure more than its fair proportion 
 of the representation. And it is ridiculous to suppose that any 
 Free People, possessing the power to govern themselves, would 
 knowingly ancl willingly adopt a plan of representation that would 
 permit one part of themselves to deprive the other part of them- 
 selves of the right to freely and fully participate in official admin-
 
 316 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 istration. As pointed out, such action would be destructive of the 
 very poHtical equahty which they created and ordained Govern- 
 ment to preserve, and would produce the very injustice which they 
 ordained Government to prevent ; and that the American Com- 
 monwealths have been led astray in this respect must be primarily 
 attributed to the fact that they started political administration 
 without possessing a Body of Administrative Law that set forth 
 the kind of representation desired. 
 
 Furthermore, there is nothing in the concept of Proportionate 
 Representation which even remotely suggests the idea of giving 
 political representation to any organized association of individuals 
 whatsoever. It is undeniable that the Will of The People, when 
 properly expressed, shall, during administrative periods, decide 
 the Policy of Administration ; but this idea applied to the matter 
 of Representation means that a true majority of wills — not a 
 manufactured majority of individuals or of votes — shall elect a 
 majority of the representatives. The right of the majority to 
 " Rule," that is, to decide and apply the Policy of Administration, 
 is by no means the same idea as the right of " a majority " to the 
 whole or to a disproportionate part of the representation, for that 
 might quickly lead to an unrestrained administrative rule by any 
 kind of a majority. 
 
 Then again, the true idea of Republican administrative action 
 under Democratic principles of action is that the legislature shall 
 be composed of representatives of the people, and that these 
 representatives when assembled together for official action shall 
 act precisely as the people would act were they assembled together 
 in the exercise of the Legislative Power. In such a General Legis- 
 lature the majority representation and the minority representation 
 would engage in deliberation concerning how the expressed Will 
 of The People should be put into operation ; and the true idea of 
 the representative legislature is that the Minority Sentiment, as 
 it exists in the people, shall, at all times and through its represent- 
 atives, be present in The Government, acting there as a check 
 upon unwise, hasty, or dishonest official legislation. And finally, 
 the principle of Political Equality, as it applies to the doctrine of 
 Free Participation by the individual in official legislation, requires 
 the political minority to be represented in the legislating agency 
 by its representatives. 
 
 Apportionment of : Theoretically, the term " Apportionment of 
 Representation " means dividing the legislative representatives 
 proportionally between the groups of individuals who hold oppos-
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 317 
 
 ing sentiments regarding the temporary administrative policy to 
 be pursued bj' the people. 
 
 The importance of a logical sj'stem of apportionment can not be 
 overestimated, for it is right here at the beginning of Political 
 Administration that the people may unwittingly abandon the 
 guidance of Democratic Principles of Action through omitting to 
 supplement their apportioimient of representation with methods 
 of voting that will enable them to always obtain a representation 
 of administrative sentiments and to always preclude a represen- 
 tation of groups of individuals. 
 
 Basis of. The American Commonwealths chose population as 
 the basis of representation. Through an exercise of The Powers 
 of Establishment, they determined the numerical size of the legis- 
 lature, and thus in effect determined the whole number of legis- 
 lative representatives. They divided the population of The State 
 by this fixed number, and the quotient expressed the number of 
 individuals who together were entitled to participate in official 
 legislation by one representative. 
 
 Defined. In this connection Political Apportionment may 
 be defined as the partition of the population of a State, by 
 the people of a State, into a certain number of numerically 
 equal portions for the purpose of political representation in 
 the State Legislature. 
 
 Representative Quotas. Territorial boundaries are set to each 
 portion and each portion is called a Representative Quota. 
 
 Each Representative Quota is entitled to be represented in the 
 State Legislature by one representative, who acts officially for all 
 who compose the quota. There are two chambers in the State 
 Legislature, and there may be fractions in the quotients above 
 mentioned. These matters will be further considered when we 
 describe the District System of Representation. 
 
 Problem of. The important point to remember here is that this 
 division of the population into representative quotas is done for 
 convenience in Political Administration, and is never done with the 
 idea of disuniting Electorate Action, or of hampering the political 
 freedom of electors, or of impairing their political equality. 
 
 The population of The State being divided into Representative 
 Quotas, the problem which faces The State is how to obtain a 
 representation of a General Administrative Sentiment from 
 separate and detached groups of electors. The same sentiments 
 permeate each group. The problem is therefore one of expression 
 or, in other words, is a voting problem, and one which can only
 
 318 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 be solved logically through the use of correct methods of voting 
 in connection with correct methods for the transaction of the pre- 
 election work. The entire population of a State always contains 
 within itself a large number of individuals who favor the application 
 of one certain Administrative Policy as against another ; and the 
 application of the other policy is supported by another large group 
 of individuals. There may be more than two groups, but that 
 does not affect the working-out of the principle. The number of 
 individuals in each group may be the equivalent of one or more 
 representative quotas. Theoretically, each group is held entitled 
 to be represented in the legislature by one or more representatives, 
 as the case may be. In this way a proportionate representation 
 of the Sentiments of the people is to be had in the legislature ; 
 and, according to this idea, all The People are held to possess an 
 opportunity to freely participate in the detail matters of official 
 legislation. The expression of the sentiments existing in the body 
 of the people is given to The Electorate, the idea being first, that 
 the electors will share the sentiments, and second, that the electors 
 shall also have the opportunity for freely obtaining a representation 
 of these sentiments in the legislature. Whether the electors have 
 this opportunity must necessarily depend upon whether the Admin- 
 istrative system under which they transact their pre-election work 
 provides it in all of its various requirements ; but unless these 
 sentiments are freely represented within the legislature by indi- 
 viduals who have been /rce/?/ selected and sent there by the electors, 
 then some of the population must be deprived of their right to 
 freely participate in the making of laws which regulate individual 
 action in whatever capacity taken. 
 
 The Partizan Party Idea of. At present, however, Proportionate 
 Representation is nowhere practised in the American Common- 
 w^ealths. Nor do the legislatures reflect the ideas regarding com- 
 position and method of acting which called them into existence. 
 This has come about because of the mistaken original action of the 
 people combined with subsequent illogical action which they have 
 been induced to take. 
 
 With the rise and acceptance of what is loosely termed " The 
 Party Idea," but what is in fact The Partizan Party Idea of guid- 
 ance and control in administrative action, representation in the 
 legislature was accorded to Partizan Parties. Considered as an 
 institution. The Partizan Party immediately argued that if Gov- 
 ernment was to be administered according to " The Will of The 
 Majority " (then expressed by the largest Party Vote) administra-
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 319 
 
 tion could be made most effectual by giving the whole of the rep- 
 resentation to the " Majority Part}^" 
 
 The Exclusion of Minority Representation. This claim invoh'ed 
 the idea of the exclusion of the minority representation, and the 
 people rejected it. But they were, however, gradually led into the 
 acceptance of another misleading belief; namely, that " A Party " 
 was entitled to the whole of the representation if it could get it ; 
 and if that were impossible, then it had the right to as large a 
 " Party Majority in The Government " as it could get, and this 
 notwithstanding the noxious means used by Partizan Parties in 
 promoting Party Success at elections. When The Partizan Party 
 was allowed to put this doctrine into " practical " operation, it 
 quickly destroyed Proportionate Representation. Further details 
 of the way in which this was done will shortly appear. The 
 reasons for wishing it done are obvious. Of course a selfish 
 " Majority Party," or one wishing the assistance of the legislature 
 to further build itself up into a permanent political agency, does 
 not relish the salutary check upon its partizan legislation that 
 a minority representation in the legislature would afford. Such 
 " Parties " much prefer to see the restraining influence of the 
 Minority Sentiment, or of the " Minority Party," relegated to the 
 slow process of molding Public Opinion within the body of the 
 people rather than to have it bear directly upon the passage of its 
 desired legislation while that legislation is being discussed in the 
 legislature. Those who support the Partizan Party Doctrine of 
 Majority Rule strenuously urge that it is necessary to have " The 
 Party of The Minorit}'^ " outside of The Government, there to 
 watch " The Party in Control " to see that it does not commit 
 mistakes, or worse, and, if it does, then to secure a majority of 
 votes and assume temporary control. Besides, it argues to itself, 
 if the minority can be placed in this position, it can also be put under 
 the additional disadvantage of having to contend with the enor- 
 mous power of the majority party that springs from the control of 
 the administrative processes and of the public offices. An estab- 
 lished system of this sort would be the natural desire of a Partizan 
 Party that is engaged in exploiting the political necessities of the 
 people in its own interest ; and such a " Party " would, if per- 
 mitted, naturally devise means for excluding as many of the repre- 
 sentatives of its opponents as possible from the legislature. 
 
 The casuistries in the above claim are apparent. Theoretically, 
 we do not attempt to make progress in political administration 
 through frustrating the selfish efforts of one Partizan Party after
 
 320 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 another. We attempt progress through constantly putting into 
 operation the collective will of the people as to Justice, and it is 
 undemocratic not to have the will and desire of each individual 
 equally and freely reflected in the legislature. It is unwise to 
 remove from The Government the check imposed by the presence 
 in the legislature of representatives of the minority sentiments. 
 As it is against the state polity of Liberty and Equality to deprive 
 any citizen of his right to representation in the legislature, it is 
 therefore unjust. The " minority party " can watch the official 
 action of the " majority party " representation better inside than 
 outside of The Legislature ; and finally, to prevent this is to deprive 
 both the people and The Government of much counsel and advice 
 at just the time when it is most needed ; namely, during the ses- 
 sions of the legislature. But the claim is also fallacious in that it is 
 founded upon the supposition that the new " Party in Control " 
 will administer public affairs more wisely or more in accordance 
 with the Principles of The State Polity than its predecessor. The 
 supposition is unwarrantable because the character of the incoming 
 " Party in Control " is the same as that of its predecessor and it is 
 obliged to administer Government under exactly the same system 
 as that employed by its predecessor, and further, because experience 
 has shown that sooner or later it is bound to perpetrate the same 
 kind of errors. This is a perfectly natural result, for, by employing 
 the same system and methods, it finds itself in the same situation, 
 governed by the same assumed necessities, animated by the same 
 objects, devoid of a salutary check upon selfish legislation, without 
 a logical rule of action, and drawn on by the same temptations into 
 the commission of the same kind of action that worked the downfall 
 of its predecessor. The claim is also contrary to the experience 
 of other Republics, which is to the effect that wherever the minority 
 sentiment is for a continued period not freely represented in the 
 legislating agency, then administration rapidly deteriorates into 
 one not according to the Will of The People, but according to the 
 desire of " The Majority in The Government," whether that 
 majority has been obtained properly or improperly. But if that 
 majority has been obtained improperly, then Government will be 
 administered according to some class, section, interest, or " Party " 
 that, in the absence of proper methods of Electoral Action, may 
 succeed in getting a majority of votes together by a combination of 
 means and methods that may not be political in nature. As far 
 as the present partizan party means and methods are concerned, 
 this is putting it as mildly as possible, for yearly experience shows
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 321 
 
 us that in every large center of population our Political Saviour 
 does not hesitate to use means and methods for getting his repre- 
 sentation into The Government that are not only immoral and 
 dishonest, but that are often criminal in kind. 
 
 The Partizan Party Idea. The Partizan Party Idea meant that 
 a Partizan Party was to organize Electoral Action, was to furnish 
 an Administrative Policy, was to secure the necessary majority 
 of votes to elect a majority of the representation, was to control 
 the action of the representatives elected through its efforts, and 
 was to act generally as a Political Agency should act. Nothing 
 was said about the morality of its action. That was taken for 
 granted. But with the putting of this idea into operation. Political 
 Representation was actually changed into Partizan Party Repre- 
 sentation, although the people — though habitually regarding a 
 partizan party as a political party — still cherished the delusion 
 that The Will of The People was somehow represented in The 
 Government, and by individuals who continued under the control 
 of the people. 
 
 The difficulties which the people have always experienced in 
 obtaining a Proportionate Representation of their administrative 
 sentiments are not entirely attributable to The Partizan Party. 
 Certainly their origin is not. In the filling of the general elective 
 executive offices all of the electors choose between all of the candi- 
 dates, the candidates for Governor, etc., being the same in every 
 Unit of Representation. In the vitally important matter of official 
 legislation all of the electors should have the opportunity of choos- 
 ing between all of the legislative candidates, as how else can the 
 people obtain a free expression of their general legislative senti- 
 ments ? This seemed impossible at the beginning of Administration, 
 and for convenience the people resorted to political apportionment ; 
 but as said before, the apportionment of legislative representation 
 for the sake of convenience called for the construction of a logical 
 system of electoral action in this respect for the sake of the ordained 
 Principles of Action. Having established collective units of legis- 
 lative representation, the people needed a system of action that 
 would produce in the legislature a proportionate representation of 
 the predominating general sentiments from the separated and 
 detached collective units of representation ; and, since the elector 
 must express his administrative sentiment through voting for a 
 candidate, the first thing needed was a ballot and a balloting sys- 
 tem that would enable each elector, wherever residing and however 
 grouped with others, to freely and definitely express his individual
 
 322 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 sentiment through freely expressing his preference and choice 
 between all of the legislative candidates, or, if lists of candidates 
 were used, then for the opposing lists entire. 
 
 Individual electors are partitioned into territorial groups with 
 the idea of making administrative action less onerous to the individ- 
 ual, and not with the idea of changing the character, force, or 
 effect of electorate action or of individual action. When, however, 
 the Collective Sovereign splits up its individual sovereign-units 
 into collective Units of Representation and compels its individual 
 sovereign-units in each group to elect a legislative representative 
 who is a resident of the territorial unit, it produces several marked 
 effects in both the above-mentioned classes of action. 
 
 Uniting Bond Weakened. By so doing, it weakens the capacity' 
 of the individuals who compose The State by preventing their 
 free action together as a Collective Sovereign in all matters that 
 vitally affect the General Welfare. WTien individual sovereign- 
 units are partitioned into specially working groups, a certain inde- 
 pendence in action is created, and the sensitiveness of The Collective 
 Sovereign to right or wTong action by its individual sovereign- 
 units is somewhat deadened by the realization that the group-unit 
 has group-interests to conserve. The Sovereign itself has become 
 a bundle of group-units, each having some distinctive work to do ; 
 and the bond which originally united all of the sovereign-units 
 together in one general purpose is loosened when the purpose is 
 partitioned. 
 
 Free Association Prevented. By so doing, the Collective Sover- 
 eign interposes an obstacle to the free association together of the 
 individuals who compose the Collective Sovereign. It may still 
 present an outward appearance of union in some respects, but 
 without free association together of its units in the matter of gen- 
 eral legislative representation it can not act in this respect as a 
 Collective Sovereign should act, and it must act as a Collective 
 Sovereign that is composed of group-units must act. 
 
 Political Capacity Weakened. Without free association and free 
 action between Sovereign-units as to official legislation there can 
 be no Free Agreement of Individual Wills upon which rests The 
 Will of The People in this respect. The Power of The State to 
 govern remains intact, but The State has slightly disintegrated and 
 its capacity is weakened. Its capacity depends upon the ability 
 of the elector to act freely in all administrative matters. But an 
 elector who is now compelled to act in the capacity of a member of 
 one collective unit'for certain purposes can not by his vote help to
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 323 
 
 prevent unwise or even dishonest action for these same purposes 
 outside of his collective unit because the final utterance of his Will 
 (his vote) has no direct influence outside of his own unit of repre- 
 sentation. He can argue, but he can not prevent such action by 
 the vote that was originally given him for the express purpose of 
 enabling him to help prevent it. All of the individual electors of 
 The State are no longer free to act together for the accomplishment 
 of all of the purposes of Electorate Action. A new species of " Col- 
 lective Will " has been created in reference to legislative represen- 
 tation, and the individual electors in each representative unit must 
 now work separately from those of the other units in ascertaming 
 the collective will of the Unit of Representation. 
 
 As to Political Majorities. When the Partizan Party Idea of 
 organizing electoral action was put into " practical " op'^ration by 
 the practical politicians, political majorities considered as the 
 largest nmnber of free individual wills ceased to exist. ^Vhile 
 obtaining representation in the legislature the effort of the individ- 
 ual was immediately directed to getting a " Representative Dis- 
 trict " majority. District majorities, like State majorities, were 
 construed to be either " Majorities of Votes " or " Majorities of 
 Voters " ; and the originally intended Political Majority (the will 
 of The State as to Justice) became transmuted into nothing more 
 or less than a Majority of The District Majorities ; and, naturally, 
 the Will that was represented by such a majority was the will of 
 the organizing agency that produced it. 
 
 The Will of The People. The difficulty of obtaining a " Body of 
 Representation " that fully reflects the Legislative Will of The 
 State is mcreased by causing that body to be composed of members 
 who are returned by and from territorial districts in which the 
 individual elector is prevented from acting freely with all other 
 individual electors of The State while ascertaining and ex-pressing 
 the Legislative Will of The State. The representative no longer 
 wholly represents the Legislative Will of The State for he is held 
 to represent also the Will of a District Constituency. A new 
 species of Will has been created which The State must protect 
 itself against. But, as we have seen, under the Partizan Party 
 Idea this Will is often if not always expressed by a manufactured 
 majority of " Party " votes ; and, depending upon the means used 
 in the manufacture, is always more or less a perverted will. In 
 short, in the absence of logical methods of organizing electoral 
 action, The Partizan Party was aftorded the opportunity for 
 centering its energy upon the manufacture of a Majority of the
 
 324 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 District majorities, and so to manufacture the Legislative Will of 
 The People. Also, and whenever the opposing administrative 
 sentiments were about numerically equal in a State, the situation 
 offered the organizing agency an opportunity to expend most of its 
 energy and " resources " upon the creation of majorities of votes 
 in a few of the Units of Representation or in a number of them 
 sufficient to give it the majority of the district majorities, The 
 State, meanwhile, being put in the illogical position of being con- 
 trolled by the action of its subordinate agency. 
 
 As to Majority Rule. It needs no argument to show that the 
 intent of the Doctrine of Majority Rule can be rendered inoperative 
 in proportion to the extent in which District Majorities can be 
 mechanically manufactured or be fraudulently produced. 
 
 As to The Partizan Party Will. Under the Fartizan Party Idea, 
 the " Will " that is to be represented in official legislation is always 
 the W^ill of a Partizan Party. Controlled by the idea of Majority 
 Rule, it is but natural to suppose that the dominant will in the 
 legislature would always be the Will of the Majority Dominant 
 Party ; that is, the " Party " that polled the largest number of 
 votes for one " Party Ticket " at the last election. But this does 
 not always follow, for there have been instances where through a 
 combination of accident and vicious party practises it has been 
 possible to give the majority of the representatives to the Minority 
 Dominant Party, thus, in effect, producing legislative administra- 
 tion according to the Will of the minority of the organizing agency. 
 When this occurs, then the Will of The People is set aside and 
 destroyed as the animating impulse to official legislation, the 
 majority will of the acting political agency is overriden, and the 
 theory of the Partizan Party Idea is completely subverted and 
 rendered of no account. 
 
 The Will behind The Partizan Party. The American Common- 
 wealths made The Partizan Party the organizer of electoral action. 
 This " Organizing Agency " is not, however, a united agency for 
 it is always composed of two (or more) opposing partizan parties, 
 one of which may be the " Majority Party " in some sections of 
 The State, while the other may occupy the same position in other 
 parts of The State ; but on the surface it appears that the legisla- 
 tive will that is immediately represented in the legislature is The 
 Will of the Local Majority Partizan Party. 
 
 To give representation to any Partizan Party is courting admin- 
 istrative disaster. The experience of other States in the past 
 teaches that sooner or later this kind of will becomes subject to the
 
 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 325 
 
 Will of some species of Self-interest Class that in one way or 
 another obtains control over the action of the partizan organizing 
 agency. The natural opportunities in a State or in a Country 
 cause various " Literests " (meaning by this term the individuals 
 who, grouped together in the form of a corporation, are separately 
 engaged for the production of wealth in the occupations broadly 
 indicated by the terms Coal, Cotton, all forms of Common Carriers, 
 Grain, Iron, Leather, Meat, Mines and Mining, Oil, Steel, Sugar, 
 etc., etc.) to be located at different portions of the State or the 
 Country. Splitting the population of a State into legislative 
 districts, and then giving representation to a majority of individuals 
 in a district, unavoidably tends of itself to produce a representation 
 of " Interests " or of Sections ; and if, further, the individuals are 
 compelled either to act in the capacity of Partizan Party Members, 
 or to support partizan party action by their votes, then it will to 
 all intents and purposes give representation to the Will of The 
 Partizan Party. It will also tend to destroy the Power of The 
 State to harmonize the actions of The Interests with the General 
 Welfare. The Interests no longer appear before the people (the 
 primal Legislature) with the idea of seeking Justice for all through 
 presenting there their claims for adjustment. On the contrary, 
 The Interests are given an opportunity to fight each other in The 
 Government and there to obtain laws which specially favor them- 
 selves in their competitive exploitation of each other and of The 
 People at Large. 
 
 But the individuals who compose the Big Business Interests are 
 far too shrewd to indulge in such an open method of action. It 
 is very seldom that our " Captains of Industry " are bold or cynical 
 enough to become active leaders in electoral action or open personal 
 opponents in the legislature. That sort of thing would be too 
 flagrant to succeed because the Political Principles which govern 
 the action of an individual considered as an elector, and the Busi- 
 ness Principles — I had almost said Lack of Principles — which 
 govern an individual considered as a member of a Big Interest, 
 are diametrically opposed to each other and make it either an 
 impossibility, or an absurdity, or a dishonesty for an individual to 
 openly act at one and the same time in these opposing capacities. 
 Besides, it is not necessary. It is possible for The Interests to 
 accomplish their ends secretly and without any foolishness. The 
 people have, in effect, provided The Interests with a specially 
 devised, self-seeking class of individuals, who are ready at hand for 
 use, provided only that the Big Interests can obtain control over
 
 326 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 " The Organization " to which this self-seeking and office-seeking 
 class of individuals belong. To obtain this control is comparatively 
 easy because The Partizan Party must have funds for the main- 
 tenance of the organization and of its non-office-holding but spe- 
 cially active members, and the control can be bought by " Contri- 
 butions." Once in control, The Interests can work indirectly but 
 much more effectively because it will then appear to the uninformed 
 masses that their own cause is championed by the Representatives 
 of The People. The bald fact, however, is that the cause of The 
 Interests is being championed by the paid agents of The Interests, 
 which agents can and do create and compel legislators to carry out 
 their will. The Big Interests do not care which partizan party 
 they use. Depending upon circumstances and what they w^ant. 
 The Interests commonly use one, or the other, or both " Parties " 
 at one and the same time and for one and the same object or for 
 different objects. Having the Power of Wealth and using it 
 underhandedly in matters of political administration, " The 
 Interests " not only can but systematically do make or break the 
 local influence of partizan party organizations to suit themselves, 
 while all of the time using " The Party " to enable themselves to 
 exploit the economic necessities of the individuals who compose 
 The Commonwealth. 
 
 These few hastily sketched points must suffice to illustrate the 
 pressing necessity for logical and supplementary action at the time 
 when a Representative Democracy partitions its population into 
 collective Units of Legislative Representation. Such action was 
 never taken by the American Commonwealths. They created 
 electoral legislative entities which in the course of time passed 
 under the control of The Partizan Party when it became the 
 accredited organizer of electoral action ; and in the next chapter 
 we will review as briefly as possible some of the effects produced 
 in our work of political administration by this course of action.
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 
 
 Some of the States originally started Administration with, and 
 still retain, the County as the Unit of Legislative Representation. 
 Some started with the Town as such unit, and some established the 
 Representative District as the unit of such representation. This 
 chapter treats solely of the so-called District System of Representa- 
 tion, under which the population of a State is divided into two sets 
 of approximately equal numerical groups of individuals, and under 
 which a legislative representative is apportioned to each group in 
 each set. The boundaries that are set to each group divide the 
 territory of the state into Districts. Each group in one of these 
 sets of groups is to be represented by one individual in the lower 
 and larger chamber of the state legislature, and each group in the 
 other set of groups is to be represented by one individual in the 
 upper and smaller chamber. Considered as territorial divisions, 
 the smaller districts are called by the name of the lower cham- 
 ber ; but let us term them Representative Districts, and let us 
 use the name " Representative " to indicate the individual who 
 is returned by the smaller district into the larger chamber. The 
 Representative Districts are considered as the Unit of Representa- 
 tion. The larger districts are called Senatorial Districts. They 
 contain several representative districts within their territorial 
 limits, the idea being to have The Senate composed of representa- 
 tives returned from districts that have a wider range of selfial 
 interests than that of the representative district and therefore 
 likely by its action to impart stability and wisdom to the action 
 of the State Legislature. 
 
 Fractions of Districts. In dividing the population by the fixed 
 number of representatives in order to ascertain the Representative 
 Quota, fractions always occur. There is no rule of universal opera- 
 tion regarding the representation of these fractions, but speaking 
 broadly, the tendency is to give representation to fractions larger 
 
 327
 
 328 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 than one-half of the representative quota, and to give the fractions 
 representation in any event if equality in representation is better 
 guaranteed by so doing. 
 
 Possibilities Considered. It is generally admitted that the 
 " District System " affords facilities to the people in getting Rep- 
 resentatives. I think it will be generally admitted also that if the 
 district system were backed up by a logical and comprehensive 
 Administrative System, it would afford no insuperable obstacles 
 to the getting of Proportionate Representation by the people. 
 
 But on the other hand, if the people permit a partizan party to 
 control the work connected with the getting of representatives, 
 then it must be admitted that the district system will afford a 
 Partizan Party facilities for getting representatives just as well ; 
 and, if the people allow The Partizan Party to put the district 
 system into operation according to its code of action, then it must 
 be admitted that the district system will afford most undesirable 
 facilities for changing the political representation that was ordained 
 into Partizan Party Representation, for impairing or destroying 
 the political Right of Representation, and for perverting official 
 legislation from its true objects. The system itself is merely an 
 administrative contrivance, and it can be made to produce 
 proper or improper results, depending entirely upon the way in 
 which it is constructed and used. 
 
 Equality in " Party " Representation. Let us pause for a 
 moment to consider how the people, working under the Partizan 
 Party Idea, might still preserve some semblance of democratic 
 action in their administrative work. According to the Partizan 
 Party Idea, the partizan party manages, controls, and assumes 
 responsibility for that work. Individual ideas are to be expressed 
 as partizan party ideas. Partizan party ideas are to be repre- 
 sented in the legislature. Consequently, if the legislature, com- 
 posed of representatives elected through the efforts of this, that, or 
 the other partizan party, is to reflect The Will of The People in any 
 degree, or if any semblance of equality in representation is to be 
 retained, then the partizan parties should be represented in the 
 legislature according to their numerical proportion in The Elector- 
 ate. With the adoption of the Partizan Party Idea the situation 
 called for political action by the people in two respects. In the 
 first place, laws should have been passed that would have secured 
 proportional representation by " The Parties " ; and in the second 
 place, laws should have been passed that would have enabled the 
 people to control the action of their hastily created Partizan
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 329 
 
 Agency. Nothing of the sort was done. The people left the par- 
 tizan parties free to organize themselves as they saw fit and handed 
 the control and management of electoral action over to them. 
 
 Equality in Representation. Since Equality is a fundamental 
 principle of American Administrative Action, it should characterize 
 every part of that action. Equality in Political Representation 
 exists when the predominating administrative sentiments of The 
 Electorate are freely and fully represented within its legislative 
 agency in about the same numerical ratio as the number of electors 
 holding one belief bears to the number of electors holding other 
 beliefs. But in order to obtain such representation it is necessary 
 for The Electorate to act while obtaining it as a single, whole, and 
 united body of electors. 
 
 District Representation. If, in obtaining representation in the 
 legislature, The Electorate is split up into Representative Quotas 
 and representation is given to each Quota considered as a District, 
 then The Electorate can no longer act as a single, whole, and 
 united body of individual electors, but must act as a body that is 
 composed of groups of electors having group functions to discharge. 
 When so acting, the freedom of individual electors in the work of 
 getting legislative representation is destroyed, and the possibility 
 of producing Proportionate Representation is rendered remote. 
 
 Measured by our principles of administrative action, representa- 
 tion of the predominating sentiments of The Electorate (Propor- 
 tionate Representation) and representation of the majority senti- 
 ment in representative districts (District Representation) are 
 widely different ideas. If the latter is the rule, the former must 
 stand aside. It was not necessary, however, to give representation 
 to the Representative Districts. The idea of splitting The Elect- 
 orate up into representative groups was merely to obtain facility 
 in producing a Proportionate Representation of the administrative 
 sentiments that existed in The Electorate through making the 
 several processes of ascertaining Public Opinion, of Nomination, 
 and of Election easier to individual electors. Public Opinion is 
 the expressed sentiment of the majority of wills in The Electorate, 
 and both Public Opinion and its opposing sentiments could most 
 freely and equally be given proportionate representation in the 
 legislature by allowing electors to choose their representatives from 
 The Electorate at Large — the body in which the opposing senti- 
 ments exist. 
 
 The Resident Membership Provision. When the people adopted 
 the plan of District Representation, they went a step farther —
 
 330 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 in the wrong direction — and declared that the representative 
 units should be represented in the legislature only by individuals 
 who resided in the district containing the representative unit. 
 
 The effect of this provision upon the influence which the in- 
 dividual elector can bring to bear in The Government is plain; 
 for, unless it happens that some person of more than ordinary polit- 
 ical ability and fitness resides in a representative district, then the 
 electors who reside there are forced by accident or circumstances 
 alone to send into the legislature some person who is not qualified 
 properly to deal with matters that come before a legislature. 
 Whenever this happens, a lowering in the proposed grade of repre- 
 sentatives occurs, the efficiency of legislation is impaired, the 
 force of the required impulse to official administrative action is 
 diminished, and the political influence of a whole representative 
 quota is weakened. 
 
 A Government of Men. Also, the District System, through sub- 
 stituting the opinions, wishes, and desires of local majorities of 
 men for the intent of the fundamental laws of The Commonwealth, 
 tends to make that body subject to men instead of laws, so true 
 is what James Fenimore Cooper said in the early days of our 
 administrative experiment ; namely, that " Freedom is not gained 
 by the mere achievement of a right in the people to govern, unless 
 the manner in which that right is to be both understood and 
 practised is closely incorporated with all the popular notions of 
 what has been obtained." 
 
 The Redistricting Acts. When the people first established the 
 limit of the representative districts, they ordained that a new 
 apportionment should be made after each census, if necessary. 
 At that time Patriotism and the desire to promote the General 
 Welfare were the virile administrative impulses in the people. 
 The idea of Personal Representation was new in 1776 and knowl- 
 edge of its requirements was lacking, but the people trusted to the 
 force of Public Spirit and individual Civic Virtue to keep the 
 legislatures filled with true representatives of the people, and 
 failed to anticipate the possibility that the legislature might in the 
 course of time pass under some other control than that of the 
 people. Trustful and uninformed, the people bestowed the 
 authority to make the new apportionment upon the legislature, 
 and furthermore, to make it during periods between the censuses, 
 if necessary. The Governor was to sign the Redistricting Act as 
 of course, because such an Act, when passed by a truly representa- 
 tive legislature, was considered as an expression of The Will of
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 331 
 
 The People. As to detail, the District System of Representation 
 merely provided that the districts should be compact, of contigu- 
 ous territory, and of as nearly equal population as possible. But 
 it was silent as to the Principles governing the people in their redis- 
 tricting action, as to the precise reasons which should constitute 
 the necessity for a redistricting, and as to the permanency of 
 district boundaries which, when once fixed, justly included an 
 approximately eOj^ual representative quota. In short, much of the 
 important detail connected with district representation was left 
 most insufficiently regulated. The situation was left open to 
 possible manipulation ; and when the partizan parties assumed 
 control of the formative and constructive work of The Electorate, 
 they proceeded to cause this open matter to be so regulated that 
 the districts, even if they as established constituted a proper 
 numerical quota, could be remade at any time and for any reasons 
 that were satisfactory to the dominant Partizan Party. 
 
 The Party Program. Under the operation of the Partizan 
 Party Idea of political administration, The Partizan Partj'^ has 
 become the leader and organizer of administrative action not only 
 within The Electorate but within The Government as well. It 
 lays out " The Plan of Campaign " in both political agencies. 
 This plan of campaign is called " The Party Program." The 
 Partizan Party is allowed to make these political agencies carry 
 out the Party Program in its own way, and the program is Self- 
 perpetuation and Opportunism. 
 
 Now because there is nothing tangible in the Fundamental Law 
 to prevent, any partizan party which through its own peculiar 
 practises has become " The Party in Control " can cause its 
 members in The Government (Governor included) to divide the 
 population of a state by "party" lines and for partizan party 
 reasons instead of for public convenience and for true representation 
 reasons ; and so, by the mere shifting of district boundaries about 
 in the population for partizan party purposes, to enable itself to 
 mechanically make and unmake majorities of " Party " votes in 
 the Districts whenever its " Success " at the election depends upon 
 such action, and irrespective of the fact that the existing districts 
 fulfil all the working requirements of the District System of 
 Representation. 
 
 The Gerrymander. A Redistricting Act that is passed for the 
 purpose of maintaining numerical equality between Representative 
 Quotas, and one that is passed for partizan party purposes differ 
 very widely in character. The one is a part of the requued admin-
 
 332 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 istrative work of the people, the other is a political fraud that is 
 perpetrated by a partizan party on Political Representation. This 
 particular form of partizan party fraud has received the name of 
 " The Gerrymander," The use of this term grew out of the 
 necessity for having some distinctive name which would set forth 
 sharply the difference in purposes between a Gerrymander of The 
 State by the legislature and a true Redistricting of The State by 
 the legislature. 
 
 Object of. In either case the legislative act always bears some 
 such title as " An Act to Apportion Representatives in Certain 
 Districts." There is nothing in this title to suggest a Gerrymander. 
 On the contrary, the use of the word " Apportion " in the title 
 serves to connect the purpose of the Act in the mind of the average 
 man with matters relating to quotas entitled to representation rather 
 than to numerical changes in the membership of the partizan 
 party district organizations, and which is the real purpose of a 
 Gerrymander. 
 
 General Process of. With partizan party " majorities " in the 
 control of the legislatures (but at the same time under the control 
 of the partizan party ]\Iachine), it has become the common custom 
 (whenever this or that " Party in Control " deems it necessary for 
 its continued " Success " at the election) for The Party in Control 
 to cause the legislature to redivide the population of a state into 
 new representative districts along " Party " lines, so that a larger 
 number of districts shall contain small Dominant " Party " 
 majorities, as against a smaller number of districts containing large 
 majorities against the Party in Control. And this is done without 
 consulting the people at all, for whoever heard of a Representative 
 being elected for the purpose of changing the political composition 
 of the district electing him ? 
 
 Detail. The detail of the practise is as follows. A State may 
 contain certain adjoining areas of manufacturing, commercial, 
 mining, and agricultural " Interests " by reason of its natural 
 opportunities. In such a case, and ordinarily, one partizan party 
 will have natural majorities in some Districts and natural minor- 
 ities in others. As each district elects a representative to the 
 legislature, it is plain that a dominant partizan party can increase 
 its number of representatives in the legislature, providing it can 
 by any unprohibited means increase the number of districts in 
 which it can secure a majority of votes. Voters who are controlled 
 by Partizan Parties are the same to such parties as votes. In all 
 districts where a dominant partizan party has large majorities it
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 333 
 
 has votes to spare ; and if it can take portions of such districts 
 and attach them to other districts in which it has either a doubtful 
 majority or a large minority membership, then it will be possible 
 for that partizan party to change its " doubtful districts " or 
 its " large minority districts " mto " Sure Majority Districts," 
 thereby increasing the number of its representatives in the legis- 
 lature. If this operation can be performed in a sufficient number 
 of districts, then that dominant partizan party can manufacture a 
 large enough " Majority in The Legislatiu-e " to insure its control 
 of official legislation and possess itself of legislation to sell. 
 
 As said before, such an " Apportionment " can only be ac- 
 complished by a Statute which the Partizan Party in Control 
 causes to be passed. It has long been a favorite maneuver em- 
 ployed by the partizan party which has " Captured a State " to 
 further " Strengthen itself " within The State, the first work of 
 the legislature being to " Redistrict the State " so that the Majority 
 Dominant Party shall have majorities of voters or votes (same 
 thing) in the greatest number of representative districts. 
 
 A successful Gerr\Tnander means the death of Proportionate 
 Representation. It means the success of Disproportionate 
 Representation. Often it means the exclusion of the minority 
 party from any representation in the legislature. It means that 
 the actual Will of The People is opposed by a non-political and 
 partizan party will in The Government, and it means that The 
 Government itself can be rendered in no sense representative of 
 the will, the spirit, and the actual intent of the people. A Gerry- 
 mander is a partizan party contrivance for making a strong 
 partizan party stronger and a weak partizan party weaker. It is 
 in effect a scheme for manufacturing Partizan Party Power and for 
 centralizing its exercise in the hands of " The Bosses." An ac- 
 curately worked-out Gerrymander will guarantee beforehand a 
 subservient partizan party majority in the larger number of 
 representative districts and a similar majority in The Government. 
 With a guaranteed " party " majority in the district, both " the 
 Party " and the applicant for candidacy can contract beforehand 
 reasonably for the sale and purchase of the nomination ; and with 
 a guaranteed " Party Majority " in the legislature, both " The 
 Party " and " The Interests " can bargain beforehand reasonably 
 for the sale and purchase of Special Privileges. The same " Gen- 
 eral Ticket " which elects the guaranteed legislative majority will 
 carry other " Party Candidates " into the general administrative 
 oflBces of The State, and the Gerr^Tnander thus becomes a partizan
 
 334 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 party means for the " strengthening of The Party hold " on all 
 administrative offices in The State. A guaranteed partizan party 
 majority is also a guaranteed substitution of Bossism as the source 
 of Administrative Impulse ; for by the mere shifting of partizan 
 party lines among individuals, the qualified voters in a district 
 (through the enforcement upon, and the observance by many of the 
 doctrine of " Party Regularity,") can be made to frustrate the 
 natural formation of The Administrative Will of The People. 
 
 It may be a matter of surprise to some of my younger readers to 
 learn that this iniquitous practise was put into operation in the 
 State of Virginia by Patrick Henry at the very first election for 
 United States Senators held after the adoption of The Constitu- 
 tion, the object being to pack the legislature with opponents of 
 James Madison. 
 
 Origin of Name. The practise got its name in the following 
 manner. In 1811 the then Democratic Party obtained a majority 
 in The Government of Massachusetts, with Elbridge Gerry as 
 Governor. I quote the substance of Professor Ware's article in the 
 American Law Review of January, 1872. " In order to secure 
 themselves in the possession of The Government, the party in 
 power passed the famous law of Feb. 11th, 1812, providing for a 
 new division of the State into senatorial districts, so contrived 
 that in as many districts as possible, the Federalists should be 
 outnumbered by their opponents. To effect this, all natural and 
 customary lines were disregarded, and some parts of the State, 
 particularly the Counties of Worcester and Essex, presented 
 singular examples of political geography. It is said that Gilbert 
 Stuart, seeing in the office of the Columbian Centinel an outline of 
 the Essex outer district, nearly encircling the rest of the County, 
 added with his pencil a beak to Salisbury, and claws to Salem 
 and Marblehead, exclaiming, " There ! That will do for a Sala- 
 mander." " Salamander ! " said Mr. Russell, the editor, " I call 
 it a Gerrymander " ; and the practise was named in that remark. 
 
 The state of Michigan was once so Gerrymandered that the 
 " Opposing Party " required a majority vote of fifteen thousand 
 to overcome the effects of the Gerrymander alone, and the reader 
 is probably aware of the notorious Congressional " Shoe-string 
 District " of Mississippi, comprising all of the Counties on the 
 river, and being about three hundred miles long with an average 
 width of twenty miles. 
 
 Were the vote of a State taken as a whole on any administrative 
 sentiment, there would necessarily be a majority — in all cases not
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 335 
 
 a tie — either for or against a sentiment, and a majority of Admin- 
 istrative Wills would decide. But by separating the voters into a 
 number of districts all of which vote separately, and by leaving the 
 redistricting of a state in the hands of a partizan party, district 
 majorities of partizan party votes, and partizan party majorities 
 in The Government, can be manufactured long in advance of the 
 election by simply transferring subservient partizan party voters 
 by process of Law from one or some districts where they can be 
 spared to another or other districts where they are needed by a 
 partizan party for its purposes, the transference being made purely 
 for partizan party reasons and to accomplish partizan party 
 objects. 
 
 Individual Freedom ! Liberty ! Equality ! Justice ! and 
 United Action ! They can not, and they do not, exist where such 
 administrative practises prevail, and The Gerr;vTriander — the 
 partizan party redistricting of a state — is to our shame a term of 
 reproach in the mouths of all who look to the American Common- 
 wealths as leaders in Human Progress and as the guardians of the 
 Rights of Mankind. 
 
 Proportional "Party " Representation. On page 48 of his book 
 on " Proportional Representation," Professor John R. Commons 
 argues in favor of giving Proportional Representation to what he 
 calls political parties. He is, however, speaking of the present 
 partizan parties; is criticizing the immoralities of the present 
 Partizan Party System of political administration and is advocat- 
 ing the application of a remedy for some of the abuses flowing from 
 the partizan party management of political apportionment. 
 Paraphrased to fit the facts and with the salient points emphasized, 
 his argument is as follows. " Let us suppose that the lower house 
 of a State Legislature contains 40 members sent from 40 Districts 
 and that one partizan party controls 120,000 votes in the State 
 and the other 100,000 and that the same relative proportion of 
 partizan party votes exists in the districts as in the State at large. 
 Each district has 5500 voters. In each district Partizan Party A 
 has 3000 votes and Partizan Party B has 2500 votes. Partizan 
 Party A elects all of the Representatives and the individuals 
 belonging to Partizan Party B are unrepresented in the legislature 
 by a representative of their own cAo/ce, although they aggregate over 
 forty-five per cent of those entitled to participate in official 
 legislation. An extreme result like this seems improbable but 
 it sometimes happens." 
 
 Professor Commons docs not state that it usually " happens "
 
 336 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 nowadays because this, that, or the other partizan party makes it 
 happen; but as this is a fact it should appear. Continuing, Pro- 
 fessor Commons says : " Again it may happen, and often does (and 
 for the same reason) that a minority of the popular vote obtains 
 a majority of the representatives. In the case assumed, partizan 
 parties may have been divided in the same Districts as follows : 
 
 Party A 
 
 Majority of 100 in 25 Districts . . 2800 X 25 = 70,000 votes 
 
 Minority of 1500 in 15 Districts . 2000 X 15 = 30,000 votes 
 
 Total 100,000 votes 
 
 Party B 
 
 Minority of 100 in 25 Districts . . 2700 X 25 = 67,500 votes 
 
 Majority of 1500 in 15 Districts . 3500 X 15 = 52,500 votes 
 
 Total 120,000 votes 
 
 In this assumed case Partizan Party A with 100,000 votes obtains 
 25 representatives, while Partizan Party B with 120,000 votes 
 obtains only 15 representatives." 
 
 The reader is asked to note several matters in reference to the 
 above quotation. When Professor Commons wrote the above he 
 did not have in mind either " Political Representation " or " Pro- 
 portionate Representation." He was merely suggesting a way 
 in which a fairer representation by " Partizan Parties " could be 
 had. His words betray no hmt of a suspicion of a belief on his 
 part that the present administrative action of the people is illogical 
 and improper. The instances he cites merely illustrate the pos- 
 sibilities for perverted administration that exist under the opera- 
 tion of the Partizan Party Idea. In one instance, a majority 
 partizan party has obtained all of the representation. In the other 
 instance, a minority partizan party has obtained more than a 
 majority of the representation. In each instance, the Doctrine of 
 Majority Rule — as far as it applies to a free and equal participa- 
 tion by individual electors in official legislation — has been set 
 aside and nullified ; and in the last instance, the ordained Major- 
 ity Rule — as far as it applies to official legislation — has been 
 supplanted by a species of Class Minority Rule. 
 
 Now in view of the admitted fact that such " happenings " are 
 possible under the regime of the Partizan Party Idea, does it not 
 seem strange that a professor in one of our high educational insti-
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 337 
 
 tutions should gravely proceed upon the assumption that the use 
 of a partizan party as the organizer of electoral action was right, 
 and that the use of The Partizan Party System as a System of 
 Political Administration was right, without first settling the ques- 
 tion of whether it was right or wrong b}^ applying the test of our 
 Principles of Political Action? Is not the verj- fact that such 
 thmgs are possible under the application of the Partizan Party 
 Idea sufficient at least to create a presumption that both the 
 partizan party and its system are not a proper agency and means 
 for the production of Democratic action by the people ? And is it 
 not actually wrong that the youth of our Country should — 
 through arguments that are only directed towards remedying a 
 badly working agency and system — be insensibly led mto the 
 assumption that the use of such an agency and its system is in 
 accordance with our professed kind of administrative action ? 
 
 "Solid Delegations." Under the "practical " operation of the 
 Partizan Party Idea, the exclusion of the minority " Party " from 
 any representation in the legislature is not only possible but in 
 many localities it is actually present as the Established Order of 
 Things. In illustration of the truth of the above statement as it 
 applies to representation in the National Legislature the reader 
 may be interested to know that in the 1917 House of Representa- 
 tives, and counting States that have more than one representative, 
 seven States are represented by what is termed a " SoHd " Delega- 
 tion of Republican Partizan Party Representatives, while eight 
 States are there represented by a " Solid " Delegation of Demo- 
 cratic Partizan Party Representatives. Counting all of the States, 
 these " solid delegations " mean that the entire body of individuals 
 who are " affiliated " with one or another of the National Partizan 
 Parties in twenty out of the forty-eight States — some six hundred 
 thousand altogether — are precluded from representation in The 
 House by representatives of their own selection and choice. Re- 
 publicans in Texas must be content to be represented by Republi- 
 can representatives elected in other States (if that may be called 
 " Representation ") and the same is true of Democrats in States 
 sending " Solid Republican Delegations " to The House. This is 
 not Political Representation, or Proportionate Representation. 
 It is nothing more or less than Partizan Party Representation, 
 which can and does completely annul the right of thousands of 
 individual electors to freely and fully participate in all matters 
 of National official legislation. 
 
 I quote again from Professor Commons' book, page 49, and fol-
 
 338 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 lowing, and again ask the reader to note the curious conclusions 
 of the writer. Professor Commons says : " Where a system offers 
 in theory such fruitful opportunities, it is too much to expect 
 party managers to refrain from using them. Consequently, the 
 district system combined with party politics has resulted in the 
 universal spread of the Gerrymander. Both political (sic) 
 parties practice it, and neither can condemn the other. They simply 
 do what is natural — make the most of their opportunities as far as 
 permitted by the Constitution and system under which both are 
 working. The Gerrymander is not produced by the iniquity of 
 parties, it is the outcome of the district system. It is simply 
 such a thoughtful construction of districts as will economize the 
 votes of the party in power by giving it small majorities in a large 
 number of districts, and coop up the opposing party with over- 
 whelming majorities in a small number of districts. But it is 
 not always necessary that districts be cut into distorted shapes 
 in order to accomplish these unjust results. A map of all the 
 congressional and legislative districts of the United States would 
 by no means indicate the location of all the outrageous Gerry- 
 manders. In fact, many of the worst ones have been so well de- 
 signed that they come close within all constitutional require- 
 ments. But the Law is everywhere disregarded. Parties are 
 compelled to disregard it, for a Gerrymander of a Democratic State 
 can be nullified only by a Gerrymander of a Republican State." 
 The italics are mine and are used to bring out the astonishing 
 political mentality of the writer. 
 
 Party disregard of The Law! Everywhere practised, and 
 condoned in our highest " Halls of Learning " ! The Partizan 
 Party — call it by any name you prefer — our semi-legalized 
 Organizer, Leader, and Manager of electoral and electorate action, 
 a Law Breaker, or at best, a Law Evader ! This, then, is the state 
 of Public Morals to which the people have arrived since their 
 departure from the true Democratic principle of Equality in Repre- 
 sentation ! Is it not time to call a halt on this line of political 
 " Progress," before the consciences of individuals are further 
 contaminated by such administrative ineptitude on the part of the 
 people and turpitude on the part of the partizan parties ? 
 
 Our Servile Colleges. But hov/ does it come about that many of 
 our college professors (and in some instances, college presidents) 
 merely direct their efforts to patching up The Partizan Party Sys- 
 tem so that the " Law-breaking Agency " shall have fewer oppor- 
 tunities to break the Law? Why do not the instructors of our
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 339 
 
 youth denounce the use of the law-breaking agency and its admin- 
 istration-perverting system? This is one of the disquieting 
 political phenomena of our times that requires an explanation. 
 Is not tJie use of a law-breaking agency immoral ? And if so, what 
 terms describe the actions of individuals in high educational posi- 
 tions who admit the character of the agency and at the same time 
 countenance its use? 
 
 Coming to the point directly, the fact of the matter is that many 
 of our colleges and universities are obliged to support the use of 
 The Partizan Party and its system, and herein lies the explanation 
 of the action of their Managing Bodies and educational staff. That 
 they are so obliged, however, is another cogent reason for the 
 disuse of the partizan party and the abolishment of its system, for 
 the obliging force is not exercised by the American People, or by 
 The Partizan Party, but is secretly exercised either by " The 
 Interests " as this term is defined in Chapter XVIII, or by the 
 privilege-fattened individuals who compose " The Interests." 
 The use of The Partizan Party and its system is an indispensable 
 requisite for the success of " The Interests " in their exploitation 
 of the necessities of the individual. It is these privileged individ- 
 uals who have it in their power to " kill off " speedily any educa- 
 tional institution that seriously threatens the continued possession 
 by The Interests of the fruits of legalized privileges ; and it is the 
 Partizan Parties who sell special privileges to The Interests. 
 
 Our colleges and universities are not self-supporting. The 
 tuition fees fall far short of meeting expenses. The colleges depend 
 for continued existence upon endowments and gifts. These come 
 mainly from individuals who have made their money in the " Big 
 Business " or " High Finance " that is made possible either 
 through legislation or the obstruction of legislation. If these gifts 
 are withheld, then many of our higher educational institutions 
 face financial ruin. They bow to this form of the inevitable, 
 accept a species of moral ruin, and continue to teach the kind of 
 political economy and political administration that can be best 
 utilized by The Interests and which ultimately results in college 
 gifts. Fortunately there are some American colleges that do not 
 as yet depend for their existence upon gifts from the super wealthy, 
 but those which do can be depended upon to avoid teaching the 
 kind of political administration that The Fathers ordained. 
 
 Returning to the matter in hand, let us as briefly as possible 
 indicate some of the more important effects that either have been, 
 or are capable of being, produced in our admhiistrative action by
 
 340 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 the use of the District System of Representation as managed and 
 appHed by the Partizan Parties. 
 
 Non-representation. The Partizan Party Doctrine of Majority 
 Rule, combined with the District System of Representation and 
 reenforced with the Resident Membership clause and the right 
 of a Partizan Party to make Official Nominations, have together 
 insured the existence of the evil of Non-representation to some of 
 the electors of A State. If all of the individuals in a given district 
 can only be represented in the legislature by one member, then it 
 follows that unless they all vote for him there must be some in the 
 district who are unrepresented by a member of their choice, and the 
 right to equally participate in official legislation is violated. 
 Then again, there are always many individuals whose political and 
 whose administrative ideas differ from those held by the individuals 
 who " affiliate " with the two Dominant Partizan Parties. But 
 these individuals are usually scattered throughout The State, 
 residing here and there in districts that are separated by district 
 lines within which they must vote. There may be in any State 
 more electors of a given independent political belief than would 
 be required to elect a representative were the vote of the State 
 taken at large. But under the District System this total number 
 avails them nothing. It does not exist as an administrative factor, 
 for the comparatively few individuals in each representative dis- 
 trict are compelled to vote in their residence district and only for 
 " District Candidates," and are thus practically prevented from 
 obtaining direct representation of their ideas in The Government. 
 
 And the same is true of an individual who is a member of a 
 minority partizan party if it is small. He can obtain no direct 
 representation from his district or in the legislature, because he is 
 not allowed to join his vote to those of others who are similarly 
 minded but who merely reside outside of his district. 
 
 Free Association expresses two ideas. It means absolute 
 freedom in political association, and it means the association together 
 of the individuals who compose the body politic. As it relates to 
 Political Representation, free association means the association 
 together of the individuals who exercise the Right of Suffrage. 
 The District System of Representation prevents the association 
 together of such individuals for all of the purposes of political 
 administration. It thus in effect curtails, restricts, and impairs 
 individual freedom in administrative action, and what freedom is 
 left to the individual is rendered almost worthless by the chicaner- 
 ous application of the Partizan Party Idea by the partizan parties.
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 341 
 
 United Administrative Action is an individual Political Right. 
 It means individual administrative action that is taken in concert 
 with all other individuals who compose the body politic. It has a 
 broader meaning than voting on the same day or in the same way. 
 The District System, however, destroys united action on the part 
 of The Electorate and splits it up into " District Action," as far 
 as Representation is concerned, thus violating another Political 
 Right. 
 
 But the danger which most threatens the morale of both The 
 Commonwealth and of The Government lies not so much in the 
 evils of non-representation as in the prevalence of a vast amount of 
 Misrepresentation to which individuals are condemned by the 
 combination of The District System of Representation with The 
 Partizan Party System of organizing electoral action. 
 
 Misrepresentation. Were electoral action organized under 
 Political Leadership, and were the processes of Nomination and of 
 Election performed logically, the chances for misrepresentation 
 would be minimized because The Electorate would freely nominate 
 and elect, and the majority and minority will would be propor- 
 tionately represented in the legislature by members representing 
 that will. 
 
 But under the Partizan Party Idea, some of the electors are 
 grouped apart and cooped up within two or more permanently 
 organized Partizan Associations and are compelled mainly by 
 Party Power to act in a Partizan Party capacity. Under the 
 District System, the electorate is also split up into " District Units " 
 and the individual electors are compelled by Law to act and vote 
 in the capacity of District Members. The Electorate ceases to 
 exist as a unitedly acting administrative body, and a species of 
 representation is created that is foreign to our principles of political 
 administration ; namely, the representation of Partizan Parties 
 in the legislature. 
 
 On its face, the representation of Partizan Parties in the legisla- 
 ture is a misrepresentation of The Electorate because the real 
 objects and purposes of a Partizan Party and the true object and 
 purpose of The Electorate are diametrically opposed. But it is 
 the misrepresentation of the individual elector that attention is 
 called to here. This occurs in two ways. The electors are either 
 those who act independently of any partizan party, or those who 
 act as members of such organizations. The misrepresentation of 
 an independent elector occurs whenever such an elector finds 
 himself represented in the legislature by some person who has
 
 342 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 been elected at the Partizan Party Dictate, and with whose 
 principles, or lack of principles, as the case may be, or with whose 
 political ideas, or administrative ideas, the independent elector has 
 neither sympathy nor accord. Such a " Representative " is usually 
 a partizan of the " Regular " stripe. He is one in whom the 
 " Party Management " has confidence ; that is, such confidence 
 as is bestowed by the " Constituted Authorities " on their cat's 
 paw. He is one who while in the legislature will, to an immoral 
 certainty, give the orders of the Partizan Party Boss preference 
 over the call of his district constituency or of his Commonwealth, 
 and he would not be in the legislature if he would not do this. 
 
 The misrepresentation of a Partizan Party Member occurs 
 whenever such a voter finds himself represented in the legislature 
 by some person with whose ideas concerning either internal par- 
 tizan party management, or the general course of a partizan party, 
 or the partizan party management of electoral action or of official 
 administrative action, the voter disagrees or is not in accord. 
 Questions of partizan party management, or of partizan party 
 policy, or of partizan party control of administrative action, are 
 of vital consequence to continuous partizan party representation. 
 But as a rule all of these partizan party questions are made sub- 
 servient to the temporary partizan party success at the election. 
 This subordination of all considerations to " Party Success " at 
 the elections produces very marked effects in the matter of partizan 
 party candidacies. " Party Success " at the election means the 
 insured prospect of a partizan party revenue through the insured 
 possession of a vast number of non-elective offices and positions 
 to be filled, and also the insured " support " of those who seek 
 special privileges through the mediumship of The Party in Control. 
 In striving for " Party Success," the partizan party leaves no 
 means unworked. The kind of man who is a " party man " is 
 always looking indiscriminately in the direction of " The Party " 
 as an administrative institution ; and if he can not get what he 
 wants from one " Party," he will most generally join another. 
 The desire for success induces a Partizan Party in close elections 
 to put forward candidates whose partizan party attitude will oppose 
 as little as possible the opinions of the voters of the competing 
 partizan party. This is done in the hopes of possibly drawing 
 away from that " Party " whatever " dissatisfied vote " may exist 
 therein. 
 
 Again, at such times, the purely partizan party necessity for 
 poling the whole vote of " The Organization " induces a partizan
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 343 
 
 party management to select a candidate who will not be seriously 
 objectionable to any Wing or Faction in the partizan party by 
 reason of his past " Party Action " or his official action. The 
 partizan party's " logical " candidate, or perhaps its most able 
 man, is dropped from the list of candidates because either his 
 personal force or party action in the past may have offended some 
 portion or section of " The Organization " ; and a man who has 
 offended no one by his force or ability, because he has none to speak 
 of, is selected as the " Standard Bearer " of his " Party." In 
 either event such candidates are sure to carry out the desires and 
 behests of the party managers, are sure to " represent " their 
 partizan party as managed at every possible turn in The Govern- 
 ment, because through msuring the prospect of continued " Par- 
 tizan Party Success," they at the same time insure the prospect 
 of their own individual success. 
 
 The great mass of The Electorate, however, and Irrespective of 
 *' Party " affiliation, at heart desire the promotion of the Welfare 
 of The Commonwealth. But under such a scheme of political 
 administration, the individual elector who honestly seeks to promote 
 that welfare through the use of " The Party " often finds himself 
 confronted with the alternative of either voting for his " Party " 
 nominee, in whom he has no confidence or close political agreement, 
 or of voting for the nominee of the competing " Party " with the 
 *' Principles " of which he is in active disagreement, or of refrain- 
 ing from voting at all, which, in effect, helps the " Party " he 
 dislikes. If he votes for his " Party " nominee (as most party 
 men do except in most aggravated instances), he finds himself 
 misrepresented in the legislature by the candidate of his own vote 
 — not choice — and is practically forced into a support of Mal- 
 administration. Then again, how shall we describe the position 
 of the independent elector, and of those who are not enrolled 
 members of any partizan party organization? The Electorate, 
 considered as an administrative bodv, has no Bodv of Law under 
 which the administrative action of its individual electors considered 
 as such is organized. The Electorate, as such, is not an organized 
 body for the transaction of the work of Nomination and of Election. 
 Practically nothing has been done by the State to compel individual 
 electors to act all of the time as electors. Those who wish to do so 
 are allowed to act as members of partizan party organizations that 
 are organized permanently for the transaction of the processes 
 of nomination and of election in the interest of " The Party " ; 
 and those who do not wish to join such associations because they
 
 344 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 believe that such associations are wrong in principle and bad in 
 action are practically compelled either to form themselves into 
 similar organizations or follow the lead of the already organized 
 partizan parties. But the candidates of all partizan parties are 
 selected by Partizan Party Action and not by Electorate Action. 
 They are all selected for the same reasons and purposes ; and if the 
 great body of unenrolled (and therefore usually unorganized) 
 electors follow the lead of the partizan parties, then they are prac- 
 tically forced to choose between the evil of Partizan Party Repre- 
 sentation as the means of keeping political administration going 
 at all, and the evil of abstaining from voting at all as a concession 
 to conscience. 
 
 The adopted systems make ordained Electorate Action impos- 
 sible. They permit Electoral Action to be transacted wrongfully. 
 They give permanently organized partizan parties the right to 
 Nominate, the right to manufacture district " majorities of votes " 
 and " majorities of voters," and the right to keep a solid organiza- 
 tional vote at the command of the Partizan Party Management 
 or of the Partizan Party Boss. The Law compels an individual 
 elector to vote in his residence district and prevents him from 
 joining his vote with others similarly minded but residing outside 
 of his district. How, under these conditions and restrictions, 
 can an independent elector (or any other elector for that matter) 
 assist effectively in obtaining true Political Representation? 
 And finally, look at the situation of a voter who is a member of a 
 Minority Partizan Party and resides in a district that is under the 
 control of a sure Majority Partizan Party. For him there are 
 no factors but accident and the unlikely change in a manufactured 
 Public Opinion that will enable him to obtain any representation 
 whatever — except misrepresentation. 
 
 Apathy in The Electorate. The probability of Misrepresentation 
 and of Non-representation that is guaranteed beforehand to many 
 individual electors by the combination of the District System of 
 Representation, the Partizan Party System of Administration, 
 and " Party Politics," is one of the causes for the discouragement 
 and apathy of many electors who decline to give time to that kind 
 of electorate action which is productive only of results that are 
 foreign to those set forth in the Principles of The State Polity. 
 
 Numbers vs. Ideas. The American Commonwealths started 
 political administration with the idea that Individual Political 
 Will should have free play and that Political Majorities should be 
 Majorities of Administrative Wills. But they afterwards adopted
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 345 
 
 a system of administrative action in which the free association of 
 individual electors was greatly restricted, and in which a " majority 
 of party votes " was to serve in the place of a Political Majority, 
 whether all of those " party " votes carried an expression of indi- 
 vidual administrative will or not. They next permitted the 
 partizan parties to increase their respective numbers of " party " 
 votes by fraudulent manipulation of the processes of Naturaliza- 
 tion, Registration, Nomination, and Election, and to mechanically 
 manufacture district majorities of votes long in advance of the 
 election by the use of The GerrjTnander, all of which action has 
 the effect of giving to the largest number of indimduals the force 
 that it was originally intended should be possessed only by a freely 
 ascertained IVIajority of Administrative Wills. Administrative 
 Will is eliminated as the Administrative Force and partizan parties 
 are allowed to express their Will by fraudulently and mechanically 
 manufactured majorities of voters, thus in effect substituting 
 numbers in the place of ideas as the subject of Representation. 
 Lord Cairns says in a report to the British Parliament : " There is 
 nothing so irksome to those who form the minority in one of the 
 large constituencies as finding that from the mere force of numbers 
 they are virtually excluded from the exercise of any political power ; 
 that it is vain to attempt to take part in public affairs ; that the 
 election must go in one direction ; and that they have no political 
 power whatever. On the one hand, the result is great dissatisfac- 
 tion, and on the other, it is a disinclination on the part of those 
 who form the minority to take any part in affairs in which it is 
 important that they should take a prominent and conspicuous 
 part." 
 
 The right to freely nominate, the right to freely choose, and 
 the right to freely vote as his conscience directs, and to have that 
 vote made effectual, is denied to the average elector under the 
 present Partizan Partj^ System combined with the District System 
 of Representation. But the situation is not without one redeeming 
 feature, for with his political rights set at naught, and with his 
 political influence lessened to the degree set forth, it can not be 
 very laborious mental work for a thinking man to ascertain what 
 his political capacity amounts to at present and how he has come 
 to lose it. 
 
 Disfranchisement. Under our present administrative system, the 
 ballot is given to the elector as the official means whereby he can 
 authoritatively express his preference for a given Administrative 
 Policy by casting it for a Candidate ; but if the situation be as
 
 346 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 above described and the individual, by force of the existing law and 
 practises, can not express a preference by electing a candidate of his 
 own choice, he is just as much disfranchised as though he had no 
 ballot to cast. A system which provides a vote for a candidate as 
 the method of expressing a sentiment, and then precludes a free 
 expression of sentiment by forcing an elector to vote for a candidate 
 who does not express or stand for his sentiment, has either digged 
 its own grave or the grave of Political Freedom. 
 
 The Influence of Small Factions. Another undesirable result 
 of the District System of Representation is the added influence it 
 gives to small factions in the partizan party district organizations. 
 Whenever two partizan party organizations in a district have 
 about the same number of " votes," an opportunity is afforded for 
 any unscrupulous partizan to surround himself with a few followers, 
 the votes of whom are indispensable to the " Success " of one or 
 another partizan party in a district. Such a man, holding and 
 controlling these votes as a unit, and threatening to so cast them, 
 actually holds the " Balance of Power " at the election in such a 
 district. He is able to levy political blackmail on one or both 
 partizan parties and even to dictate some of the nominations. 
 Mr. Mill says in the work previously quoted : " Any section whose 
 support is necessary to success possesses a veto on the candidate. 
 Any section which holds out more obstinately than the rest can 
 compel the rest to adopt its nominee. . . . Speaking generally, the 
 choice of the majority is determined by that portion of the body 
 who are the most timid, the most narrow-minded and prejudiced, 
 or who cling most tenaciously to the exclusive class interest ; and 
 the electoral rights of the minority, while useless for the purpose 
 for which votes are given, serve only for compelling the majority 
 to accept the candidates of the weakest or worst portions of them- 
 selves." 
 
 While this is an argument against giving Representation to 
 " Sections " or to " Classes," it is nevertheless applicable in this 
 connection as illustrating the source of the power of small partizan 
 party factions and the manner in which it can be safely used under 
 the District System of Representation to destroy the intended 
 character of District Representation, and also to weaken the 
 political capacity of the individual and of The Commonwealth. 
 
 The Influence of Large Factions. On the other hand, and in 
 districts where a partizan party has an overwhelming majority, the 
 tendency is for the partizan party to choose men to be elected to 
 public office whose sole claim to public service is an unswerving
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 347 
 
 fidelity to the interests of The Partizan Party, thus not only 
 ignoring utterly the minority of the district constituency in the 
 matter of Representation, but possibly ignoring also the minority 
 of the membership in the partizan party district organization — 
 and possibly the majority as well — in making such nominations, 
 which, in the assumed case, is equivalent to election. Nominations 
 by a partizan party in such districts are usually made by The Boss 
 and for reasons that are known to him but which are not generally 
 known to The IMembership of the organization and which are 
 never known by the electors who merely vote the " Party Ticket " ; 
 but were the vote of The Electorate at Large taken, the overwhelm- 
 ing district majority of the partizan party would only go just so 
 far in swelling " The Party Vote " in The State, and would not go 
 directh^ towards establishing a " Party " Majority in the legislature 
 that is composed of faithful partizans. Were nominations made 
 freely by The Electorate, the opportunity would be afforded to the 
 true political leaders and statesmen to get freely before the people 
 both as advocates and as candidates ; and, looking at the political 
 problem from a material standpoint, what better course could The 
 Commonwealth take than to constantly keep the men who are 
 fitted by nature and knowledge busy in the moral work of The 
 Electorate and of The Government ? Is it not inviting the moral 
 degradation of The Commonwealth and the possible downfall of 
 the governmental regime to keep self-seeking and politically dis- 
 honest men in charge of such work ? 
 
 On Leadership and " Representative Government." The true 
 progress of a Democracy depends to a very large degree upon the 
 force of Political Leadership, but the use of the District System 
 tends either to weaken or to destroy that force altogether. It 
 offers additional opportunities to The Partizan Party to con- 
 centrate its " votes," its work, and its money a,ga,'mst the candidacy 
 of any true Leader in administrative action, whether he belongs 
 to any Partizan Party Organization or not, and to make it ex- 
 tremely difficult, if not actually impossible, for a true political 
 leader or a public-spirited statesman to obtain either nomination 
 or public office. These nominations and offices are needed by a 
 partizan party as a reward for past and future partizan fidelity, 
 but with true leaders and statesmen kept out of public activity 
 and office, the people are " practically " deprived not only of 
 " Representative Government " but of honest administration as well. 
 
 On the General Character of Legislators. The effect of putting the 
 control of electorate action into the hands of the partizan parties
 
 348 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 and of permitting them to manufacture " sure majorities " in 
 Representative Districts is actually to assist into public office men 
 of the character of the " Regular," the " Available," and the 
 " Yellow-Dog " candidates and so to debase the general character 
 of the body which makes the Laws. The prevalence of Jobbery, 
 Log-Roiling, Graft, Extravagance, " Strike Legislation," " Pro- 
 tective Legislation," and " Favorable Legislation " in the legis- 
 latures is for the present sufficient evidence of the general character 
 of the legislators who are elected under the Partizan Party System 
 with the partizan parties working the District System of Repre- 
 sentation in their own interests. 
 
 On the Quality of Legislation. Through affording additional 
 opportunities for excluding true political leaders, statesmen, 
 public-spirited and well-educated citizens from participating in 
 legislative work, the District System tends to lower the level or 
 grade of such work. Aside from the general character of such work, 
 its grade of proficiency is a matter too well appreciated by those 
 who will read this book to need more than a passing mention here. 
 
 On Legislative Methods and Rules. Lending itself as it does to 
 the filling of legislatures with partizans of a divided Responsibility, 
 the use of the District System of Representation is partly account- 
 able for the existence in the legislature of the present undemocratic, 
 hurtful, and partizan methods and rules by which the work of that 
 body is performed and regulated. We shall have occasion to look 
 more closely into the effects these methods and rules produce on 
 political representation when we reach a consideration of The 
 Committee System in The Legislature in Chapter XXL 
 
 On Responsibility and Irresponsible Administration. Again, by 
 affording illogical facilities to a partizan party to manufacture 
 " District majorities," the District System of Representation aids 
 in the election of party partizans to The Government who are 
 bound beforehand by self-interest and promises to serve their 
 " Party " first. The sense of individual responsibility to the 
 people or to The Electorate is necessarily weakened by the realiza- 
 tion that the office comes from a partizan party, and not from The 
 Electorate, or from the people ; and when The Majority in The 
 Legislature or in The Government is composed of such men, it 
 follows as a matter of course that the administrating agency's 
 sense of responsibility is weakened also. The individual legis- 
 lators realize their partial independence from Electorate Control, 
 and their divided allegiance tends inevitably towards bringing 
 about an irresponsible administration of public affairs.
 
 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION 349 
 
 On Impulse and Responsive Administration. By affording addi- 
 tional facilities for fraudulently manufacturing a fictitious and 
 counterfeit " Will of The People," the District System assists in 
 deprivmg The Government of its true and natural " impulse " to 
 action, and assists in imparting to the administrating agency an 
 unnatural, illogical, partizan, and perverting impulse, thus aiding 
 in the establishment over the people of a working administrative 
 agency that is irresponsive to the true Will of The People. 
 
 Finally, the District System of Representation disintegrates 
 the Collective Sovereign and weakens its political capacity. 
 Apparently, the lessons taught by the use of the Continental Con- 
 gress have been forgotten. However that may be, the fact 
 remains that under our ordained democratic system of state polity 
 the Collective Sovereign is under the obligation to maintain its 
 own integrity unimpaired, and to exert its administrative power 
 at all times as a united and integral body, and in just the same way 
 as The Commonwealth exerts its physical power in times of war 
 to preserve its existence as a State ; but the Collective Sovereign 
 can never discharge this obligation properly until it has provided 
 itself with methods that enable it to form and to express its own 
 Will in a purely Democratic manner, and to enforce a logical 
 response to that will afterwards from those of its own units who are 
 chosen to assist it in the promotion of the ordained General Wel- 
 fare. No body of administrative law, however perfect in itself, 
 will, of itself, produce correct representative action, but a body of 
 law that is in consonance with the principles of the state polity 
 which relate to the exercise of Political Authority and its control, 
 will afford the people the widest possible opportunity and the 
 greatest possible chance to accomplish properly through the exer- 
 cise of Political Authority those matters which population and 
 extended domain preclude them from accomplishing conveniently 
 through a direct exercise of Political Power. That which is to be 
 considered as proper action is to be determined by reference to the 
 ordained principles of action, and there is no escape from the 
 conclusion that principles of Democratic action require a Demo- 
 cratic exercise of Political Authority, as otherwise a democracy 
 will not be able to put Democratic Principles into operation while 
 acting as a Republic.
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 Considered as a political fundament the doctrine of Political 
 Responsibility presupposes the power to create the obligation, 
 and the power to punish any infraction thereof. In a Repre- 
 sentative Democracy it is The Collective Sovereign alone who 
 has, and who can exercise these powers properly. 
 
 Problem of. A Collective Sovereign acts through its units. 
 The problem of Political Responsibility is, therefore, How to 
 enable The Collective Sovereign to obtain that which shall be 
 considered responsible action from its units. Obviously, an or- 
 dained definition is the first requisite. The next requisite is an 
 ordained Code of Responsibility. 
 
 Broadly Defined. Recalling what was said in Chapter H let 
 us define the American form of Political Responsibility as, The 
 self-imposed obligatory accountability accompanying the exercise 
 of The Supreme Power. 
 
 Obligation of. The obligation which rests upon The Sovereign 
 is, to act in accordance with the Spirit and Intent of the ordained 
 political regime. It matters not whether The Sovereign is a 
 single unit or a collective unit ; the obligation remains the same. 
 
 In a Limited Monarchy. Political Responsibility in a limited 
 monarchy has been defined as, " The moral obligation The King 
 is under to administer public affairs in the interest of the whole 
 Body Politic." If the monarchy is hereditary, The King is born 
 to the office and the obligation ; and under ordinary circumstances 
 he can neither avoid the office or evade the obligation safely. 
 
 American Idea of. The American Commonwealths drop the 
 phrase " In the interest of " from the definition and declare 
 Political Responsibility to be the obligation which The Collec- 
 tive Sovereign is under to promote, to maintain, and to transmit 
 the General Welfare as ordained to the future generations who 
 compose The State. 
 
 350
 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 351 
 
 How Specialized. All of the Sovereign-units exercise Political 
 Power for certain stated objects. Some of them exercise Political 
 Authority for other certain and stated purposes. 
 
 Electoral Resyonsihility . Consequently there is created a 
 specific responsibility of The Elector for the proper discharge of 
 all The Reserved Powers of Administration. 
 
 Official Responsibility. And there is also created a specific 
 responsibility of The Official for the proper exercise of all The 
 Delegated Powers of Administration. 
 
 Departmental Responsibility. Because the exercise of Political 
 Authority is distributed between the three branches of The 
 Government, official responsibility is separated into executive, 
 legislative, and judicial responsibility. 
 
 Legislative Responsibility. Legislators have a peculiar re- 
 sponsibility of their own. Theoretically, they are under the 
 obligation to assist The Sovereign by providing Laws — stated 
 rules of individual action — which the people desire ; and not 
 laws which " A Party " or " The Interests " desire. Theoretically, 
 they are under the obligation to promote the General Welfare 
 alone ; and not the interests of any association of electors whatso- 
 ever. In some matters they act for The State ; in others they 
 act for their representative units. In some matters their re- 
 sponsibility lies direct to The Sovereign ; in others, to their 
 constituencies. Theoretically, they are selected to serve the 
 people because of their pronounced civic virtue and sagacity; 
 and theoretically, they are held responsible only for a failure to 
 use their individual power generally for the promotion of the 
 General Welfare as ordained. 
 
 Moral Character of. The word " properly " is emphasized 
 because our political regime, being founded on the basis of Moral 
 Right, it follows that the political responsibility which we have 
 created is fundamentally moral in character. Each elector is 
 morally bound to exercise Political Power properly. Each official 
 is morally bound to exercise Political Authority properly. And 
 " properly " means. In strict accordance with the original Gov- 
 ernmental Agreement and the Principles of the State Polity. 
 
 Accountability. Whether in or out of office the moral responsi- 
 bility of the elector to promote the General Welfare and nothing 
 else remains always the same. So also does his liability to be 
 held accountable for any failure in this respect. 
 
 Individual Political Responsibility. The General Welfare as 
 ordained is maintained and perpetuated by the exercise of The
 
 352 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Powers of Administration. These powers are to be exercised 
 in accordance -with certain broadly defined Principles of Political 
 Action. 
 
 Presupposing a comprehensive and adequate administrative 
 system, each Sovereign-unit is under the obligation to use these 
 powers for the ordained objects of Government and in the or- 
 dained manner ; and individual political responsibility is the 
 assumed individual accountability for any failure to use these 
 powers in the ordained way and for the ordained objects, and 
 for any attempt to use these powers for any other purposes. 
 
 Continuity of. Theoretically, political responsibility must be 
 continuous. There must be neither lapses, nor opportunity for 
 lapses in the binding force of the assumed accountability ; for if 
 political responsibility is not continuous, then doubts immediately 
 arise as to when and where the lapses occurred, and to what degree 
 it should be enforced. 
 
 Direct, and Undivided. Finally, the accountability for ques- 
 tionable action, and the liability for improper action on the part 
 of a Sovereign-unit, or on the part of an administrative agency, 
 lies directly to the sovereign who creates the unit and the agency ; 
 for if the sovereign cannot speedi'y and reasonably enforce re- 
 sponsible action from its units and from its assisting agencies, 
 then it faces the likelihood of perverted or of ineflficient adminis- 
 trative action. If political responsibility is not direct, then it 
 becomes divided ; and doubts are raised at once as to who shall 
 enforce it, and how it can and shall be enforced properly. If 
 political responsibility cannot be enforced in a consistent manner, 
 doubts are cast at once upon the propriety of imposing any penalties 
 whatsoever upon individuals, not to mention the practical diffi- 
 culties that arise by the score in the absence of a comprehensive 
 and adequate system of enforcement. 
 
 Insufficiency of Moral Responsibility. But what becomes of 
 the force of the obligation in the absence of an ordained Code of 
 Responsibility? Obviously, all that remains or exists is a mere 
 moral obligation on the part of the Sovereign-unit to honestly 
 attempt to use The Powers of Administration as originally in- 
 tended ; and the past experience of every Republic has shown 
 that the force of a mere moral obligation is utterly insufficient 
 to produce responsible administrative action from more than a. 
 few of the Sovereign-units. 
 
 Legal Responsibility Necessary. Concerning the moral pur- 
 poses and intent of our political regime there is nothing left to
 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 353 
 
 desire. But because we have no ordained Body of Adminis- 
 trative Law which will serve to fix the status of political responsi- 
 bility and will convert moral responsibility into a universally 
 acknowledged Legal Responsibility there is no end to the dispute 
 concerning what is right and what is wrong administrative action, 
 the dispute and the lacking definiteness furnishing abundant 
 cover for the safe evasion of true political responsibility. 
 
 Futile Attempts at Enforcement. Political Responsibility is a 
 concomitant of Political Morality, which, considered as an in- 
 dividual attribute, is the disposition to respond to the ordained 
 Spirit and Intent of the people, and to act in the manner decreed. 
 The obligation to respond is supposed to exist ; but it cannot be 
 enforced consistently in the absence of an ordained and adequate 
 standard of administrative morality, which we of the American 
 Commonwealths have not vet constructed. It is true that we do 
 attempt to secure responsible administrative action by declaring 
 certain actions to be crimes and punishable as such ; but the 
 actions so punishable are but a very few of the immoral adminis- 
 trative actions that are actual political crimes. For instance : 
 The abdication by a Sovereign-unit of the direct exercise of The 
 Reserved Powers of Administration is a political crime of the 
 highest degree ; but if it be not so declared and be rigorously 
 punished, how can the people prevent such abdication by in- 
 dividuals who are predisposed for any reasons to shirk the obliga- 
 tions of sovereignty? 
 
 Political responsibility is the opposite of political absolutism. 
 In Democracies, political absolutism takes on the form of party 
 absolutism. Party absolutism is the form of Tyranny which 
 invariably disrupts and destroys democratic regimes. Should a 
 Sovereign-unit who delegates the exercise of the Reserved Powers 
 of The Sovereign to " A Party " be allowed to remain a member 
 of the Collective Sovereign? If so, what becomes of our re- 
 sponsibility to future generations for the maintenance within 
 The State of the ordained conditions of human existence, and 
 their transmission unimpaired? A Church is responsible to its 
 communicants for the salvation of their souls. Have we not the 
 same reasons and grounds for expelling from The Electorate any 
 individual who by his acts either wilfully or selfishly impairs the 
 force of, or who obstructs the free operation of, our ordained 
 principles of political association, as a sectarian Church has for 
 expelling a communicant who sets at naught the binding obliga- 
 tion of its creed?
 
 354 - SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 A Logical Administrative System Indispensable. But irre- 
 sponsible and irresponsive administrative acts cannot be made 
 criminal acts properly, or be made punishable as such, unless 
 The Collective Sovereign, through a legitimate and direct 
 exercise of its legislative power, makes them such and imposes 
 a penalty. 
 
 Now although such action would constitute the one adequate 
 safeguard to the continued existence of individual freedom, 
 liberty, equality, and justice as ordained, nevertheless we hesi- 
 tate to take it. Consequently our administrative action is full 
 of contradictions. We profess to attempt to eliminate irre- 
 sponsible official action by keeping known irresponsibles out of 
 office ; but nevertheless we use thoroughly irresponsible partizan 
 parties as the principal means for selecting candidates for public 
 office. We say that we select public officials for their known 
 civic virtue and sagacity; but nevertheless we permit a partizan 
 party to select venal candidates from its own membership. We 
 acclaim our Sovereignty but at the same time we allow control 
 over its exercise to pass into the hands of a non-political partizan 
 party nor do we in any effectual way attempt to fix our adminis- 
 trative system so that we may possess even a moderate degree of 
 control over the action of a partizan party. In brief, we continue 
 to use an administrative system that is so faulty in all of its parts 
 that whatever we do to correct administrative action in one re- 
 spect can be offset and nullified easily by action that is permissible 
 under other parts of the system. 
 
 Such administrative action is futile. In effect it condones the 
 evils of the past, and it does not provide security from similar 
 evils in the future. If illogical action has been consummated in 
 the legislature, its evil effects can be ameliorated only by re- 
 pealing the objectionable legislation at some future session of the 
 legislature ; that is, provided the people can get a legislature that 
 will do it; for, being without means for enforcing responsible 
 electoral action, the people will always experience more or less 
 difficulty in getting a legislature that is composed of individuals, 
 the majority of whom unhesitatingly acknowdedge the obliga- 
 tions of true political responsibility. 
 
 We may as well face these unequivocal facts. First, That the 
 force of the doctrine of Political Responsibility has been dissipated. 
 Second, That the results hoped for from its operation have not 
 been realized. Third, That the outcome is due to no inherent 
 fault of the doctrine ; and Fourth, That the outcome is due to
 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 355 
 
 our failure to appreciate the indispensable requisites for responsible 
 administrative action. 
 
 As to " Partizan Party Responsibility.'" In the first place we 
 failed to provide electors and officials with a system of methods 
 of administrative action that would fix the status of Political 
 Responsibility and would enable any individual to speedily invoke 
 an exercise of Community Power in the enforcement of the doc- 
 trine upon any other individual or class of individuals. In the 
 absence of logical methods for enforcing political responsibility 
 from electors and from officials we have not only permitted, we 
 have actually instructed The Partizan Party to assume the re- 
 sponsibility for proper political administration ; and this too in 
 face of the fact that The Partizan Party as organized is an un- 
 constitutional, undemocratic, self created, self animated, and a 
 wholly improper and illogical means for the exercise of Democratic 
 Political Power, or for the control of its exercise. The first effect 
 of this action was to divide the political responsibility of electors 
 and ofiicials between the people and The Partizan Party. The 
 next effect was to take The Partizan Party into partnership for 
 the transaction of political work that can only be properly per- 
 formed by the people. Having taken action that was without 
 the warrant of the governmental agreement, the necessity im- 
 mediately arose, provided the people hoped to prevent a partizan 
 party from usurping the exercise of their vital political functions, 
 for providing themselves with stated methods of action by which 
 to enforce responsible political action from the partizan party. 
 
 But did the people do this, or have we done this since? Quite 
 the contrary. Both they and we have permitted the partizan 
 party to organize the political action of individual electors under 
 its o^^^l rules and " leadership " ; thus substituting in the place 
 of the moral obligations of sovereignty and duties of citizenship 
 the immoral obligations of partizanship. We ha^'e given a prac- 
 tical monopoly of nominating candidates for all public offices both 
 general and local to the partizan party, and we permit it to barter 
 nominations with individuals for past, present, and future " Party " 
 service either in or out of The Government. We have allowed the 
 partizan party to so manipulate the Parliamentary Law regulating 
 the political action of representatives in the legislatures that there 
 is no longer any responsibility that the people can enforce either 
 directly, immediately, or effectually. We have allowed the parti- 
 zan party to use comparatively unimportant and ministerial offices 
 in The Government for the express purpose of building up a
 
 356 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 partizan system and a permanent partizan organization of in- 
 dividuals for the exercise of partizan party " Power " as the 
 controlling force over individuals in The Electorate and in The 
 Government, thus substituting in the place of the ordained political 
 responsibility of public officials the kind of motives which actuate 
 administrative guerrillas. 
 
 The Breakdoicn of The Doctrine. The present irresponsibility in 
 public officials, and the irresponsibility that is everywhere notice- 
 able in individual electors, has its origin in the irresponsible action 
 of the people at the beginning of Political Administration. 
 
 " We, the people," that is, we. The Electorate, are directly 
 responsible for the breakdown of the Doctrine of Political Re- 
 sponsibility. In the first place, instead of properly organizing 
 The Electorate for proper Electoral Action, we the original elec- 
 torate drifted along without a Body of Administrative Law and 
 finally shifted our sovereign responsibilities in most respects on 
 to the shoulders of a private association of electors that was 
 finally organized to vote mechanically as a unit. 
 
 In the second place, and notwithstanding its known composi- 
 tion and make up ; its known despotic methods of internal or- 
 ganization and management ; and its known non-political objects 
 of action ; we, the present electorate, are pleased to confer on 
 such " Organizations " the rights and duties of a Political Party. 
 
 In the third place, we, the present electorate, — theoretically 
 discharging the Obligations of Sovereignty — passively allow 
 some of our Sovereign-units to join partizan party organizations 
 and to virtually promise the " Constituted Authorities " of such 
 organizations that they, our sovereign-units, will, while they are 
 acting either in an electoral or in an official capacity, obey the 
 orders of the " Constituted Authorities " of such organizations. 
 
 In the fourth place, instead of compelling The Membership of 
 the partizan party organizations by law to retain and continuously 
 exercise in a public manner its own rightful Power of Control over 
 the action of " The Organization " (and especially over organiza- 
 tional action that is taken in administrative matters) we, the 
 present electorate, allow The Membership of the partizan party 
 organizations to illogically shift theu* control over " Party Action " 
 into the hands of The Party Committee acting as the executive 
 body of " The Organization " ; and we further permit The Party 
 Committee to shift its responsibility for proper " Party Control " 
 by passing the exercise of that control along into the hands of an 
 Executive Committee of The Party Committee, but which Execu-
 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 357 
 
 tive Committee avoids its responsibility for proper " Party Con- 
 trol " by either passing that control still further along into the 
 hands of a few men actively working all of the time as The Party 
 Management, or directly into the hands of one man who is tech- 
 nically called The Chairman of The Executive Committee but 
 who is most widely known as The Boss. 
 
 By permitting the partizan party " Organizations " to use this 
 most undemocratic form of organization, we, the present elec- 
 torate, have in effect permitted either The Boss alone or the 
 collective " Party Managers " to become possessed not only of 
 the power of control which belongs to " The Organization," but 
 also of the right to control the performance of whatever duties 
 which The Electorate have imposed upon *' The Organization " 
 considered as an administrative agency. 
 
 Possessed of the power of control through the use of this form 
 of organization either The Boss alone or the collective Party 
 Managers (The Ring, The Combine, or The Machine), as the 
 case may be, make the " Party Rules " and constitute themselves 
 as the " Constituted Authorities " whom the members of " The 
 Organization" — individual Sovereign-units — must obey when 
 acting in an administrative capacity. 
 
 The Party Managers control the action of the Party Organiza- 
 tion through controlling the action of the individual members of 
 the organization ; and possessed of the power of control and of 
 the executive power of " The Organization," the Party Managers 
 ruthlessly apply the " Party Rules " to any individual member 
 who shows the least inclination to discharge the responsibility of 
 an individual Sovereign-unit. 
 
 The function of The Electorate considered as The Collective 
 Sovereign is that of an ever actively working Administrative Body ; 
 but the distorted function that is imposed upon the Sovereign- 
 units who compose The Membership of a partizan party is that 
 of passivity and inaction in matters connected with the formative 
 and constructive work of Political Administration, and of passive 
 " Party Obedience " in the transaction of the rest of the electoral 
 and official work of Political Administration, but especially in 
 that of voting. 
 
 Finally, Individual Political Responsibility is an individual 
 accountability that has been created and imposed upon individual 
 electors by the people. But we have supplanted this political 
 fundament with the idea of partizan party responsibility for 
 administrative action, and furthermore, we have allowed The
 
 358 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Partizan Party to destroy the feeling of political responsibility 
 in as many Sovereign-units as possible and to put in its place the 
 idea of " Party Regularity " ; and, as a consequence of this action, 
 The Collective Sovereign can not now either speedily, reasonably, 
 consistently, or justly enforce true political responsibility upon 
 many of its units, and in the remainder of its units the idea itself 
 does not exist as an active force in political administration except 
 in the minds and consciences of a comparatively few individuals 
 scattered here and there in The Commonwealth. 
 
 The Concentration of Partizan Party Power. Theoretically, 
 the power of a partizan party organization is seated in The Mem- 
 bership. We are told that it is exercised by The Party Com- 
 mittee acting as the representative executive of The Membership. 
 As a matter of fact it is exercised by The Machine or The Boss who 
 merely use The Party Committee as a screen behind which to act. 
 
 Why is the exercise of this power so concentrated ? To enable 
 The Machine or The Boss — working through Bi-Partizan Boards 
 and Commissions, Representative District Leaders, Ward Heelers, 
 Election District Captains, and others in and out of ofHce — to 
 perpetuate the political frauds which The Partizan Party finds 
 necessary for the maintenance of its existence and its control over 
 administrative action. To enable The Machine or The Boss — 
 acting through such partizan agencies or agents — to take an 
 immoral advantage of every human frailty, failing, weakness, 
 appetite, and desire while The Partizan Party is struggling for 
 what it calls " Party Success." To enable these secretly working 
 " Constituted Authorities " to employ methods and means of 
 party action which The Party Committee in its professed repre- 
 sentative capacity would not dare to use out in the open for fear 
 of consequences ; and which methods and means are incompatible 
 with, repugnant to, and destructive of administrative action as 
 ordained. 
 
 The concentration of the exercise of Partizan Party Power 
 through the process of delegating and redelegating its exercise 
 affords the opportunity to corruptly minded partizan party 
 members — who are Sovereign-units as well — to escape liability 
 for the misuse of that power in political administration. As a 
 rule, individuals shrink from corrupt actions because they are 
 against the moral nature, but more particularly in this instance 
 because they involve the fear of detection and punishment. 
 The responsibility of individuals working together on committees 
 is divided, let us say, between the parent organization and the
 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 359 
 
 committee. Also, committeemen have a somewhat lessened 
 responsibility because majorities decide the action of committees. 
 But the responsibility of a Sovereign-unit is not lessened enough 
 to afford the degree of protection desired against possible detec- 
 tion and punishment of immoral, improper, and politically dis- 
 honest action. However ! a satisfactory degree of safety in 
 corrupt action can be secured provided the exercise of partizan 
 party power in political matters can be delegated and redelegated 
 a sufficient number of times. 
 
 But under such procedure who is individually responsible if 
 the methods and practises employed turn out to be illegitimate, 
 illegal, corrupt, and opposed to the spirit of Democratic Gov- 
 ernment ? Somebody is, of course ; but, by sufficiently dividing 
 responsibility, it can be shifted around among so many individuals 
 and bodies as to make it next to impossible to fix it upon any one 
 individual ; thus making it possible to put corrupt methods into 
 practise with the utmost security obtainable. Hence the ne- 
 cessity for the concentration of all of the partizan power of The 
 Organization in the hands of the Partizan Party Machine in order 
 to enable it to enforce upon the people the use of whatever methods 
 of " Political Action " it sees fit to employ. 
 
 The destruction of the original meaning and force of Political 
 Responsibility is largely due to the passive use by the people of 
 partizan party methods in political administration. The people 
 placed the responsibility for " Good Administration " upon the 
 partizan party Organization. This body shifted its obligation 
 into the hands of its committees ; which committees, by reason 
 of their own so-called " Constitution and By-Laws," were obliged 
 to relinquish their right to act into the hands of The Party Man- 
 agements ; and so by the practise of this time-worn Hocus-Pocus 
 the Party Managements succeeded in occupying the position of 
 responsibility originally intended to be held by " The Organiza- 
 tion," and with all possibility on the part of the people to effec- 
 tively enforce that responsibility eliminated from the situation. 
 In the absence of legal provisions, and through permitting " The 
 Organization " to delegate and redelegate the exercise of its own 
 Power, the choice of methods by which the people are to act in 
 administrative matters, and which .belongs to them, becomes 
 very largely discretionary on the part of The Partizan Party 
 Managements. Ostensibly, The Partizan Party aims at " Good 
 Administration " ; but actually, it aims at " Party Success " — 
 at the elections. But Party Success that is obtained at the price
 
 360 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 of the destruction of Political Responsibility, or at the price of 
 individual corruption, is not good administrative work, and does 
 not tend to promote the General Welfare. A " Party Organiza- 
 tion " that is maintained for the purpose of enabling the " Party 
 Management " to periodically acquire the control of the exercise 
 of Political Power can not maintain the exercise of that power in 
 the hands of The Electorate, Neither can a Partizan Party 
 Machine impart a moral Impulse to The Government. 
 
 Official Responsibility. Let us call to mind some of the ideas 
 which the people held originally regarding official administrative 
 action. In order to get the best possible administrative action 
 the people delegate the exercise of The Delegated Powers to a 
 few of their number, at the same time reserving sufficient power 
 to control the acts and action of their public servants. Theo- 
 retically, these few are selected because of their superior sagacity, 
 civic-virtue, and known ability. The people are conceded to have 
 The Right and The Power to command the services of the few 
 which they select. These few are supposed to sacrifice their pri- 
 vate interests temporarily to the General Welfare. This sacrifice, 
 which the people command through the processes of nomina- 
 tion and election, entitles those making it to prefix the word 
 " Honorable " to their names. This select body of " Honor- 
 ables," when convened and acting together properly as an ad- 
 ministrative agency, is supposed to be continuously under the 
 direction and control of The Collective Sovereign, and to act 
 solely for the welfare of The State and of the individual and for 
 nothing else. 
 
 " Party-made Public Ojnnion." We endeavor to direct official 
 action through an expression of Public Opinion. Here a difficulty 
 arises. A Monarch can ascertain and express his will at any 
 moment ; but it takes time to obtain a Union of Wills in a Re- 
 public. We profess our intent to keep Public Opinion sufficiently 
 continuous and clear by meeting together freely and frequently 
 as electors at the elections to ascertain and express Our Will as 
 to Official Action during the incoming period of administration. 
 
 Now because Public Opinion can be ascertained properly only 
 through a Union of Wills, nothing but the dictates of Reason and 
 Conscience should govern its ascertainment. The question for 
 the people to decide at elections should be " Shall this or that 
 Policy be pursued ? " All the arguments addressed to the under- 
 standing of individuals should bear directly on that question; 
 and at the election each elector should have the opportunity to
 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 361 
 
 cast a ballot on this question separate, apart from, and irrespec- 
 tive of the vote for candidates, and should be required to do so. 
 
 The necessity for such a requirement was not appreciated at 
 the beginning of our political independence. A majority of the 
 people were united in wills on the question of Independence and 
 were practically unanimous in the selection of their public servants. 
 So long as the people retained the exercise of their power to select 
 their candidates, and selected those only who were public spirited, 
 capable, and truly representative of their Will, they were still able 
 to enforce political responsibility and to direct Official Action. 
 But this condition did not last long. In the absence of an or- 
 dained Code of Responsibility the situation was taken advantage 
 of by their so-called " Political Leaders " who, combining to- 
 gether into " The Party," gradually led the people to adopt the 
 idea that the partizan party was the proper body to formulate 
 and shape Administrative Policy, and that the acceptance or 
 rejection of a Party-made Policy should depend upon the election 
 of Party-made Candidates. 
 
 With the electors deprived of the opportunity to reach an 
 agreement of wills as to Policy freely, directly, and unitedly; 
 with the exercise of their right to choose candidates surrendered 
 to their new Political Agency ; with the partizan party taking 
 precedence in every process of administration ; and under this 
 doubly indirect way of determining Administrative Policy, all 
 semblance of direct and continuous responsibility of public officials 
 to The Collective Sovereign faded from the scheme of adminis- 
 trative action, and The Sovereign lost its ability to enforce direct, 
 continuous, and true responsibility upon its units in and out of 
 office. 
 
 Partizan Party Irresponsibility. Simultaneously with the de- 
 velopment of the idea just described The Partizan Party secured 
 the acceptance of another idea ; namely, that by reason of its 
 " Organized Strength " it was best capable of controllhig Official 
 Action and therefore should be held responsible to the people for 
 proper administration of public affairs. 
 
 The people regarded this as a happy inspiration but events 
 do not seem to have justified their conclusion ; for although the 
 partizan party considered as a political agency assumed the 
 responsibility for proper official administration it has never been 
 able to discharge this obligation continuously. It often happens 
 that The Executive and the majority in the legislative branch of 
 The Government are elected by different partizan parties. When
 
 362 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 this happens in ordinary times it becomes impossible for The 
 Partizan Party to enforce the carrying out of its own promises. 
 There is no " Party of The Majority "; there is merely a dis- 
 reputable dispute as to which is the party of the majority. The 
 political agency of The Sovereign having lost control of The Gov- 
 ernment its responsibility lapses meanwhile; and the reader 
 may remember the helpless attitude of the sovereign people when 
 Jackson, Tyler, Johnson, and Cleveland were either struggling to 
 coerce Congress ; or resisting the coercion of Congress ; or trying 
 to " Unite The Party " in Congress. 
 
 Nor has The Partizan Party at any time attempted to discharge 
 its obligation in a manner consistent with democratic principles 
 of administrative action. At all times it has deliberately em- 
 ployed means that are calculated to weaken the sense of Political 
 Responsibility in public officials, and which actually hinder the 
 application of the doctrine in administrative action. Through 
 its practise of manipulating political issues so as to fuse its own 
 interests with that of a local majority it succeeds in rendering a 
 Union of Administrative Wills between the electors throughout 
 the state next to impossible except in times of great political 
 excitement when the people insist on having some one question 
 settled. If at times it cannot manipulate issues successfully, 
 nevertheless it still can and does manipulate " Majorities of 
 votes " in The Electorate with the effect that The Majority Vote 
 more often than otherwise expresses no truly collective sentiment 
 of the people, and as a consequence becomes an improper, because 
 uncertain, basis upon which to enforce Responsibility. More- 
 over, through its manipulation of candidates The Partizan Party 
 denies access to public office to any but its own adherents while 
 at the same time making the decision of Public Policy dependent 
 upon their election. Having the monopoly of nominations it 
 does not hesitate to sell them for cash to such moral delinquents 
 as will buy them, well knowing that the mere buying of a nomina- 
 tion destroys the sense of Responsibility to the people. Even 
 if the nomination is not bought for cash, the fact that it can not 
 be had except at the price of " faithful " party work produces 
 the same result. One who buys a nomination from a " Party " 
 (which is equivalent to buying an election, for the nomination 
 has no value unless " The Party " can elect) feels only a certain 
 responsibility to " The Party " to so conduct himself as not to 
 bring reproach upon " The Organization " ; but feels no direct 
 responsibility to the people, who, under passive acquiescence, are
 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 363 
 
 powerless to enforce the penalty. On the contrary, a feeling of 
 complete dependence upon " The Party " is created in such a 
 man and he belongs to it body and soul, but responsible to it 
 only according to the terms of his contract of purchase ; and it is 
 through the use of such methods that the American People pro- 
 claim the absurd dogma that The Government of a Representative 
 Democracy is responsible to a portion only of The Electorate known 
 as " The Party," which body because of its character and composi- 
 tion is not a legitimate part of the political structure erected by the 
 people. 
 
 But the complete folly of the situation becomes plainer when 
 we consider that although the individuals composing The Govern- 
 ment may feel a certain responsibility to " The Party," at the 
 same time " The Party " itself feels no responsibility either to 
 The Government or to the people. This is so because " The 
 Party " no longer derives its force from spontaneous action by 
 the people or The Government. On the contrary it is constantly 
 forced to most strenuous efforts both in and out of The Govern- 
 ment to maintain its own position as a Political Agency. Relying 
 entirely upon its own efforts for its existence it can feel no true 
 sense of responsibility to those from whom it has to force support. 
 But, nevertheless, it has to profess a sense of responsibility because 
 it occupies the position of a Political Agency; and so it comes 
 about that while " The Party " occupies the position of the 
 leader in the formation of Public Opinion, on the other hand it 
 continually asserts that it is only the " Official mouthpiece " of 
 Public Opinion ; that it constantly " listens " to its voice and is 
 always " feeling its pulse." All this is true in a sense, not how- 
 ever because there is anything resembling a live and spontaneous 
 Public Opinion existent anywhere, but because " The Party " is 
 constantly watching the effects of the poisonous doses which it 
 has administered to political action. 
 
 In its " Platforms " it makes broad, loose, vague, ambiguous, 
 and glittering statements of what it has " heard " and " felt." 
 Then it fills the majority of The Government with men who must 
 do as it says or make way for others who will. Then it proceeds 
 to attach its own meanings to the generalizations of the platform 
 and to pass out legislation to those who either have in the past 
 or will in the future support " The Party " Ticket with money 
 or influence. Should any of my readers think this an unwarranted 
 statement he has but to read the reports of the Tariff Hearings 
 before The Committee on Ways and Means of The House for
 
 364 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 the last twenty years ; the Archbold letters published during the 
 political Campaign of 1908; and the comments of The Press 
 during this period. Such support to a "Party" Ticket means 
 the return by " The Party " to the legislature in the future of 
 men who can be made to supply more " favorable " legislation 
 to those who are in the market for it ; but the point to be em- 
 phasized here is, that in all this work " The Party " is working 
 for itself. It acts as Jay Gould said he acted when building the 
 Erie Railroad ; namely, for himself. In some of the communities 
 through which the railroad passed the Republicans were " in 
 Power " ; that is, the local administrative offices were mainly 
 filled by Republicans whom " The Party " had caused to be 
 elected, while in others the Democrats were " in Power." But 
 no matter what the political complexion of the communities was, 
 " The Party " was managing its affairs and had to be " seen " 
 before Mr. Gould could get what he wanted from the community ; 
 (another illustration of the fact that " The Party " has no political 
 principles whatever ; that it simply mixes and fuses its " interests " 
 with the interests of those who are in the majority ; that its so- 
 called principles are those of self-interest, and that it works on 
 this principle as easily and as effectually in a Republican Com- 
 munity like the City of Philadelphia as it does in a Democratic 
 Community like the City of New York). But to return to the 
 narrative. In answer to questions put to Mr. Gould at an in- 
 vestigation of transactions connected with the construction of 
 the Erie Railroad he said in substance, " When I am in a Demo- 
 cratic Community I am a Democrat and act as one and contribute 
 to the support of ' The Party.' When I am in a Republican 
 Community I am a Republican and act as one and contribute to 
 the support of ' The Party.' But at all times I am an Erie Rail- 
 road man and always act as one." The quotation marks within 
 the quotation are mine ; but their use is necessary to bring out 
 the true meaning of Mr. Gould's testimony in this respect. 
 
 Now The Partizan Party acts in the legislature through and by 
 means of " The Party in The Legislature " ; and while it pretends 
 to hold its elected adherents in that last-named body responsible 
 in the true sense of the word, as a matter of fact it only exercises 
 a direct supervision over them regarding that part of their public 
 work which affects " Party " interests. In every other matter 
 the legislator can do as he pleases, with nothing to deter him 
 but the fear of detection. If detected, " The Party " claims 
 that the offense is a matter of individual or personal delinquency
 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 365 
 
 and not of " Party " immorality, leaving the people to settle this 
 question as best they may; and while they are trying to settle 
 it The Partizan Party carries another election. 
 
 How much more experience with such agencies, means, and 
 methods of political administration do we need to make it clear 
 that under a system of administrative action where " Parties " 
 are allowed to control electoral and official action there can not 
 be a direct or a continuous individual responsibility to the people 
 on the part of an official elected by a partizan party, and that 
 consequently, there cannot be responsibility as originally decreed 
 on the part of The Government ? 
 
 Of Appointed Officials. There is no need to mention the re- 
 sponsibility of the appointed officials because The Spoils System 
 has settled that matter definitely. 
 
 Of Municipal Executives. Wherever, as is now often the case, 
 the exercise of municipal authority is largely " centralized " in 
 The Mayor, the practise has the actual effect of weakening the 
 sense of political responsibility in that official, because he — being 
 elected by a Party Machine — is bound beforehand by party 
 promises to do what The Machine directs in every respect ; the 
 ultimate effect of which is to promote partizan party interests 
 rather than to produce truly responsible administration. 
 
 Committee Legislation. But w^hile The Partizan Party has 
 been actively engaged in demolishing the Doctrine of Responsi- 
 bility, the reader must not forget that the people are directly 
 accountable also in part for its failure. Without their acquies- 
 cence these things could not be. One of the causes for the break- 
 down of responsibility is " The Committee System of Legislation." 
 The responsibility of the legislature for proper work becomes 
 divided when the work is divided between Standing Committees. 
 The responsibility of the individual legislator is divided between 
 the legislature and the committee. This double and treble 
 division of responsibility under The Partizan Party System re- 
 moves its force almost to the vanishing point. The Collective 
 Legislature can not be held directly responsible because it passes 
 a bill favorably reported to it by a committee which was in theory 
 appointed because of the superior ability and expert capacity of 
 its members in reference to the special subject considered. Nor 
 can " The Committee " be held directly responsible, because it 
 obeyed the orders of a " Party " Caucus, itself composed of 
 alleged " Representatives of The People." On the other hand : 
 supposing The Committee disobeyed The Caucus Order; then
 
 366 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 " The Party " can not be held responsible, because the individual 
 legislators take refuge behind their oath to serve the people. In 
 fact, the Committee System as a part of " The Party " System 
 is much too " complicated " to work advantageously to the 
 people. It is not intended to work advantageously to the people. 
 It is that part of " The Game " in which Responsibility for ad- 
 ministrative action is lost in the shuffle. The people find it im- 
 possible to keep an eye on the various acts of a representative 
 performed in the various committees ; and often his acts are not 
 known at all until the bad effects of a Statute are felt in the com- 
 munity. 
 
 But this is not the worst of all, for if the people wish to fix 
 responsibility upon an offender and to punish him for the offense, 
 they nevertheless are obliged to work through " The Party " 
 for this end. The offender is usually a valued member of " The 
 Party " and it is almost always strong enough to checkmate or 
 to side-track the efforts of the people and to shield the offender 
 from the immediate consequences of their displeasure. For the 
 sake of convenience we have adopted The Committee System of 
 Legislation and we must accept the consequences. 
 
 With the true Doctrine of Responsibility shelved, our plan of 
 administration by " The Party " resolves itself into an organized 
 effort by " The Party " to use The Government in the interests 
 of a few and at the expense of the public. This in turn often 
 results in the complete degradation of the public service, as in 
 the case of the so-called Boodle Aldermen in New York City, 
 who formed a " Combine " among themselves for the disposal of 
 franchises and divided the proceeds of the sale between the mem- 
 bers of The Combine. 
 
 Political Graft. Then again, and relying upon the inability of 
 the people to immediately and efficaciously enforce Political 
 Responsibility, many improperly elected and unfit public officials 
 do not hesitate to " make " private money out of public office. 
 The process by which such money is " made " is now called " Graft- 
 ing." The term is most felicitous inasmuch as it indicates an 
 illogical process which produces unnatural, dishonest, and private 
 financial gain from a stock that was originally intended to produce 
 only lawful emoluments in the way of salary or compensation. 
 The gain so made is called " Graft." Briefly defined, Graft is 
 any illegitimate private profit that is obtained by a public official 
 from a legitimate public transaction. More particularly de- 
 scribed, Graft is any unlawful, illegitimate, or dishonest financial
 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 367 
 
 profit or advantage that is made by a lawful incumbent of a public 
 ofiice or position while in the discharge of the function or duties 
 of such an office or position. 
 
 Almost any public office or position can be turned to some 
 private advantage if its incumbent is so minded ; and the forms 
 of gross and petty grafting are almost as numerous as the ofiices 
 and positions. One single form will sufiice by way of illustration. 
 Notwithstanding the prohibitive Statutes — moral obligations 
 having no force with a " Practical " office holder — public officials 
 of this stamp do not hesitate to enter into a collusive compact with 
 outside individuals, firms, or corporations, out of which compact 
 the officeholder will be able to " make money." Collusive 
 conditions are inserted by public officials in public contracts and 
 specifications that make it physically impossible for others than 
 the one " favored " individual, firm, or corporation to transact 
 the necessary public work, or to get the contract to furnish supplies 
 to the public, like bridge and culvert materials, asphalt and paving 
 materials, fire-hose, fire-engines, street-sweepers, and the like. 
 
 These collusive conditions virtually create illegal monopolies. 
 They also destroy the competition that might otherwise exist 
 between a number of other bidders for public work ; thus depriv- 
 ing the public of the benefits which would otherwise accrue to 
 it by reason of free competition in the ordinary course of business. 
 From the illegitimate profit that accrues to the " favored " party 
 by reason of this collusive action the grafting officeholder receives 
 a return either in a lump sum, or a stipend, or a block of corporate 
 stock, or a Wall Street tip, or in various other forms. If the return 
 is in cash, then it usually becomes liable to a partizan party 
 " Assessment," the amount of which assessment goes to swell the 
 partizan party revenues. If the return is small, it usually stays 
 in the pocket of the official in the form of petty graft. Petty 
 political graft, following the Persian idea, is commonly considered 
 permissible in certain quarters provided it is not found out to the 
 reproach of " The Party in Power." If found out, then " The 
 Party " repudiates the act, sacrifices the " offender," and dis- 
 claims any connection with the transaction in question. 
 
 In passing from this topic there are one or two points to notice. 
 In the first place. The People pay in taxes for every cent of political 
 graft that is " made," not to mention the likelihood of receiving 
 indifferent service or materials. In the second place, grafting 
 necessarily undermines both private and public morals. And in 
 the next place, although grafting is in the main a partizan party
 
 368 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 practise, so far the people have been unable to trace the connec- 
 tion between big grafting and Partizan Party Managements — 
 those indefinite " Higher Ups " — who always remain beyond 
 the reach of a people that are using a broken-down Responsibility, 
 a broken-backed Administrative System, and a Partizan Party 
 Agency as the means of reaching them. 
 
 Tested by reason — if not yet suflBciently by experience — The 
 Partizan Party as at present constructed, organized, and working, 
 is not only an illogical and an inherently weak administrative 
 agency, but a positive menace to any form of Representative 
 Democracy. Not only does it fail of the logical purposes for 
 which true political parties exist, but its continued use places 
 the American Commonwealths in the absurd position of attempt- 
 ing to secure democratic political administration by means of an 
 administrative agency that is constructed upon despotic and 
 autocratic principles of action. Some of its apologists seek com- 
 fort from the fact that the means and methods employed by the 
 way-back rural partizan party organizations are much less ob- 
 jectionable than the means and methods employed by similar 
 urban organizations ; and they urge in mitigation of condemnation 
 that what is true of a part of a State Party Organization may not 
 be true of the whole state organization. 
 
 But on the other hand the whole state organization is built up 
 out of its parts. In every City there is a partizan party " Ma- 
 chine " at the head of every partizan party organization in the 
 city, which machine is using either corrupt or corrupting means 
 and methods to obtain " party votes " and to maintain its local 
 ascendency; and while, as a rule, rural "party politics" shine 
 in comparison wath urban " party politics," nevertheless the 
 " purity " of country party politics is utterly insufficient to main- 
 tain the purity of State party politics whenever the rural delegates 
 meet the city delegates and Bosses in the partizan party State 
 Nominating Conventions ; experience having demonstrated the 
 fact over and over again that a powerful partizan party machine 
 working anyw^here in a State will gradually impart its character 
 to the w^ork of the State partizan party organization. By the 
 grace of the partizan party system of administration it can not do 
 otherwise than break down the sense of individual political re- 
 sponsibility everyw'here throughout The State. 
 
 Finally, political responsibility attaches to four classes of in- 
 dividuals ; namely, electors, elective officials, legislative repre- 
 sentatives, and appointive officials. Each member in each class
 
 POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 369 
 
 is under the moral obligation to transact his part of the adminis- 
 trative work properly. Unsupported by law the inherent force 
 of the obligation proceeds merely from Approbation — of con- 
 science, and of The Community ; but with human nature at its 
 present stage of development this force needs enforcement in 
 order to make the obligation effective. The power to enforce 
 political responsibility is seated rightfully in the Collective Sover- 
 eign ; and, unfortunately for all Democratic ideals, it will remain 
 seated there, and inoperative, until such time as the Collective 
 Sovereign itself perceives the necessity for acting in a responsible 
 manner and provides itself and its units with an ordained code of 
 responsible political action that leaves no question open regarding 
 the meanings of the doctrine of political responsibility as they 
 apply to sovereign action, to electoral action, and to official action.
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 POLITICAL CONTROL 
 
 The Power to Govern is the highest form of human power. It 
 is the power to command and to enforce the obedience of indi- 
 viduals. Theoretically it is exercised for the purpose of promoting 
 the welfare of the individual and of The State. 
 
 The Supreme Power is exercised by men. The chief difficulty 
 connected with a proper exercise of The Supreme Power lies in 
 making men exercise either political power or political authority 
 properly ; that is, in accordance with the spirit and intent of the 
 State Polity. 
 
 The experience of past republics has shown that the opportunity 
 to exercise either power or authority is sought after secretly or 
 openly, if not by all, then by nearly all of those who are entitled 
 to the exercise of either. It has also shown that the exercise of 
 this power and authority — like every other object of human desire 
 — will, if unchecked, be acquired ultimately by those who are 
 the strongest ; that is, by those who in a superior degree combine 
 within themselves the various elements of individual power 
 mentioned in Chapter III. Experience has shown also that moral 
 fitness has nothing to do with the ability of an individual to exercise 
 political power or political authority ; and that immoral but able 
 'men will seek this exercise as the means for promoting their private 
 aims at the expense of the other individuals in the community, 
 and of The Community itself. And finally, every attempt at 
 Self Government has shown that the ordained welfare of the 
 individual requires the exercise of The Supreme Power to be 
 controlled somehow so that it shall not be had for any purposes 
 that are not ordained. 
 
 How Obtained. Control over the action of The Sovereign — 
 whether it be a Monarch or an Electorate — is obtained in the 
 same way as control is obtained over the action of an individual ; 
 namely, through an imposed and enforced restraint. 
 
 370
 
 POLITICAL CONTROL 371 
 
 Who or what is it that can impose and enforce restraint upon 
 the exercise of pohtical power by the Collective Sovereign of 
 a Republic? Obviously no one but the Collective Sovereign 
 itself. The restraint must be a self-imposed restraint. 
 
 Objects of. The principal objects sought by imposing restraint 
 upon the action of a Collective Sovereign are, to help the Sovereign- 
 units to remain their o^^^l political masters ; to keep the Collective 
 Sovereign from wilfully or unwittingly impairing or destroying the 
 political capacity of its units ; and to keep the activities of the 
 Collective Sovereign confined to maintaining and perpetuating the 
 ordained political regime. 
 
 \Miat have we, the people, done towards controlling the exercise 
 of The Supreme Power? Bearing in mind all that has been said 
 on this subject in Chapters III, VII, and IX, we have decentralized 
 the exercise of political power in order to make the control of its 
 exercise easier. We have created two main agencies for its exercise. 
 We have in effect divided The Supreme Power into " Power " 
 and " Authority." We have vested The Electorate with the direct 
 exercise of The Reserved Powers for certain objects ; and we have 
 distributed this exercise between certain administrative processes 
 that are capable of easy control. We have delegated the exercise 
 of Authority for certain other purposes to The Government ; and 
 in the endeavor to put a check upon undue exercise thereof we have 
 distributed its exercise between the three departments of The 
 Government. Finally, and as a means for placing and enforcing 
 control over the exercise of The Supreme Power, we have con- 
 structed written Constitutions containing ordained restrictions 
 and limitations upon the use of Political Power and Authority 
 which both the Sovereign and its units are bound to observe and 
 enforce. The sufficiency of our action in this last-named respect 
 will be considered in Chapter XXIII. 
 
 Direct Exercise of. In a Republic the Right to Govern is the 
 Right of The People to command and to enforce obedience to 
 The Will of The People. The ability of a Collective Sovereign 
 depends upon proper action by its units. Consequently, what 
 happens when if in the absence of a comprehensive and adequate 
 administrative system a Sovereign-unit delegates the discharge of 
 his moral obligations and duties to another individual or to an 
 association of individuals? Just This! The Sovereign-unit 
 weakens the ability of the Collective Sovereign to enforce obedience 
 from all its units. His own power to control the action of other 
 units is impaired or lost, as the case may be. He is no longer the
 
 372 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 equal of other Sovereign-units in influence for he has increased 
 the influence of other Sovereign-units improperly. He has 
 destroyed the ordained political equality between Sovereign-units. 
 He has deprived the Collective Sovereign of the moral support 
 which it has a right to expect from him even in the absence of a 
 specific rule of action ; and he has destroyed the force of the Right 
 of Cooperative Control mentioned in Chapter HI. 
 
 Moreover, the free and direct exercise of political power was 
 assumed originally by The Collective Sovereign as a solemn trust to 
 be executed for the benefit of the succeeding generations which 
 compose The Commonwealth. The exercise of individual discre- 
 tion is involved. Following out the idea governing all trust pro- 
 cedure it was never intended that the exercise of any political 
 power or authority specially conferred upon an individual should 
 be delegated by him. Experience, reason, prudence, and safety 
 declare against the practise; for if discretionary exercise can be 
 delegated by one elector, it can be by others ; and should it be 
 delegated by a large number of electors then the ability of The 
 Commonwealth to maintain Justice between individuals may 
 become seriously diminished in force or lost altogether. 
 
 Problem of. In the exercise of political power and of political 
 authority The Collective Sovereign acts through its units. Under 
 our distinctive plan of political procedure our inclusive problem 
 of political control is. How to obtain such a use of The Reserved 
 Powers as will enable the Collective Sovereign to control the 
 exercise of The Delegated Powers properly. Analyzing the 
 problem we find it to be composed of two distinct problems; 
 namely, The problem of Electoral Control, and the problem of 
 Official Control. In either case it is a matter of enforced 
 obedience. 
 
 Electoral Control : How can The Collective Sovereign confer 
 upon itself the ability to enforce political obedience from its units 
 reasonably and justly ? 
 
 Political obedience is compliance with a political command. 
 Manifestly, that which shall be considered political obedience 
 can be determined in no other way than by defining rights, obliga- 
 tions, duties, and methods of electoral action in clear and distinct 
 terms. The command must be explicit. The Sovereign-unit 
 must know what is commanded of him, and he must have agreed 
 beforehand to obey the command. The moral force of Adminis- 
 trative Law depends almost entirely upon distinctness ; and in a 
 Republic morality in administrative action is very largely a matter
 
 POLITICAL CONTROL 373 
 
 of clear, distinct, and agreed-upon Law. We all know how The 
 Law, of itself alone, fortifies individual impulse to moral action, 
 and acts also as a check upon immoral impulse. But unless the 
 administrative law is clear, distinct, and self-enacted, the Collective 
 Sovereign can not reasonably and justly enforce it, and therefore 
 can not control the actions of its units effectively. In order to 
 maintain the Political Regime as ordained logical, prompt, and 
 decisive action is required of The Collective Sovereign. It must 
 rule, and rule rightly. It must maintain its ability to rule. It 
 must maintain its own sovereignty through maintaining the 
 sovereign capacity of its own units, and it must prevent the absorp- 
 tion of the exercise of their political power by majorities and 
 parties. Consequently, in order to enable the Collective Sovereign 
 to control its own action properly, it must, through an exercise of 
 its own sovereignty, declare what shall be a proper performance 
 by its units of every administrative move, step, stage, and process 
 in which they participate. 
 
 Official Control : In Chapter VII the establishment of Political 
 Control was considered as one of the Obligations of Sovereignty. 
 In Chapter IX the necessity for control over the action of The 
 Government was touched upon. But there is still more to say 
 regarding the necessity for Political Control, and regarding the 
 practical way of getting it. 
 
 " Political Reward." We say that we " Reward " public-spirited 
 action in individuals by " elevating " them to posts of honor and 
 emolument in the public service. But this " rewarding action " 
 on the part of the people is by no means of a purely benevolent or 
 disinterested nature. Theoretically we select public-spirited men 
 for office because they are disposed to take right administrative 
 action as the same is indicated by the Principles of The State 
 Polity. Such men do not require watching and control in this 
 respect. Consequently administrative action is made easier for 
 The Collective Sovereign by their selection, the political effort 
 of its units being reduced somewhat by such action. While the 
 moral character of a public servant is a determining factor in his 
 selection it is not the only one. Superior individual ability to 
 discriminate between advantageous and disadvantageous admin- 
 istrative action is also required. The people want their most 
 capable and public-spirited men in charge of the detail work of 
 administration so that the community and all its individuals shall 
 receive the greatest possible moral and material advantage from 
 administrative action. But capability and civic virtue are seldom
 
 374 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 blended equally in the individual. Consequently the people can 
 not with safety rely ivholly upon the binding force of morality to 
 keep their public servants in the path of duty. 
 
 Official Discretion and Responsibility. Something more definite 
 is necessary ; for when the exercise of political power is delegated, 
 then a certain degree of control over its exercise is lost because the 
 judgment of the representative or official is to some extent sub- 
 stituted for that of his principal. While a sovereign-unit is in 
 office in any department of The Government he is subject to in- 
 fluences that are peculiar to his position ; influences which do not 
 emanate directly from the will of his constituency or from the 
 will of the people ; and naturally his action will be affected more 
 or less thereby. Whatever he does will affect the General Wel- 
 fare and also the ability of The State ; but the people, having 
 given their sanction beforehand to what he does, should in reason 
 also possess some effective means for controlling his action. 
 
 Manifestly, the situation calls for an ordained Rule of Official 
 Action which is specially applicable to every public official, and 
 which is designed for the express purpose of enabling the people to 
 control the substituted exercise of discretion by the public official. 
 In its absence how can the people determine what is or what is not 
 responsible or responsive action? Here, as in every question 
 concerning the propriety of this, that, or the other specific admin- 
 istrative act, the just and the speedy determination of the question 
 hinges upon the sufficiency of the Administrative System. Unless 
 that system contains a declaration of the function of each public 
 office ; a statement of the one official who is to discharge the dis- 
 tinctive function of the office ; and also sets forth the manner in 
 which that function is to be discharged, then it leaves either such a 
 wide opportunity open, or so many specific opportunities open for 
 " discretionary " official action as to render it almost impossible 
 for the people to enforce effectually what they have but vaguely 
 defined as responsible administrative action. 
 
 An ordained official function acts as a desirable limitation upon 
 the exercise of political authority ; desirable from the standpoint 
 of the official in that it protects him in the proper discharge of 
 official function ; and desirable from the standpoint of the people 
 in that it affords The Collective Sovereign an opportunity to force 
 speedily its proper discharge from the official. 
 
 Also, an ordained official method is a Published Rule of Official 
 Action. On the one hand it gives notice to the official beforehand 
 exactly what is expected of him, while on the other hand it informs
 
 POLITICAL CONTROL 375 
 
 the successive generations that compose The State exactly what 
 kind of service they have the right to receive from the public 
 servants. 
 
 Departmental Authority. Through distributing the exercise of 
 authority between the three branches of The Government we have 
 as it were created a Departmental Authority which is, of course, 
 exercised by the individuals who fill the offices in each branch. 
 Hence the necessity for a preordained function and method for each 
 departmental office in order to enable the Common Superior to 
 easily prevent an official from usurping the discharge of the func- 
 tions of another office, and also to prevent the engrafting upon any 
 office of functions that are foreign to its original purpose. 
 
 Proper Official Control. Proper official control must also be a 
 just exercise of force by The Sovereign over the official. Ordained 
 and comprehensive law is an indispensable requisite for the deter- 
 mination of that which is just to the official and just on the part of 
 The Sovereign. We have attempted to instruct individuals 
 explicitly as to what they shall and shall not do in society. A 
 comprehensive body of rules exist in the judiciary department of 
 The Government which regulate the proper discharge of detail 
 judicial work. But we have never furnished individuals who hold 
 office in the executive and legislative branches of The Government 
 with sets of instructions by means of which either they or the 
 community are bound effectively to a proper discharge of mutual 
 obligations. The original electorates acquired the full exercise 
 of political power before they were equipped fully for its exercise. 
 They were forced by the push of events to begin administrative 
 action without the requisite means and methods for adequate 
 control over the exercise of The Delegated Powers by their agencies 
 and servants. 
 
 Punishment as a Means. In this situation they resorted to 
 political punishment as a means for enforcing political control ; 
 that is, they held the fear of the loss of office over any official who 
 was openly guilty of detail maladministration. 
 
 Political Control Defined. Political Control, however, means the 
 prevention (not the punishment) of any administrative offense 
 which alters or impairs the ordained status of individuals whether 
 in or out of office. To punish the officeholder after the offense 
 has been committed by withholding political preferment in the 
 future is not political control in the sense intended. It is merely 
 punishment, which of itself is complete evidence of inefficient 
 control. Punishment does not remove the opportunities for
 
 376 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 similar offenses in the future, and, because of human nature, 
 effective poUtical control can never exist so long as abundant 
 opportunities offer for its avoidance. If, under such circumstances, 
 the Collective Sovereign does resort to punishment, then the law 
 regulating official action must be distinct, known, and unquestion- 
 able ; for these three elements in the law form the only just basis 
 for penalty and punishment. 
 
 But punishment would seldom be required had the people in the 
 beginning, or at any time afterwards, declared the function and 
 duties of all offices and so have provided public officials with 
 concise and explicit rules for the proper discharge of the detail work 
 of each office. Such action would have made it extremely difficult 
 for any official to openly surrender the exercise of his particular 
 authority to another as is done now; or for one public official 
 to openly usurp the exercise of authority properly belonging to 
 another office as is done now ; or for any public official to continue 
 to openly violate the plain intent of the original governmental 
 agreement as is done now, and to the constant impairment of the 
 General Welfare. 
 
 The Breakdown of Political Control. In previous chapters I have 
 endeavored to show that the final loss of political control by the 
 Collective Sovereign was coincident with its improper delegation 
 of the exercise of the power to control to The Partizan Party ; and 
 that this improper delegation was due to an unpremeditated failure 
 on its part to discharge its sovereign obligation to construct a logical 
 and comprehensive system of administrative action. 
 
 In the beginning of administrative action each American Com- 
 monwealth was more or less handicapped in its ability to control 
 official action by the defects of the Fundamental Law in this 
 respect. Admitting their difficulties ! But nevertheless, when 
 The Electorates delegated the exercise of the Power to Control 
 they shirked their political obligations in an undemocratic and in a 
 foolish manner ; undemocratic, because they bestowed the exercise 
 of a political power upon a party ; and foolish, because they took 
 it for granted that what appears to have been a party composed 
 largely of self-seekers would exercise this control properly. The 
 folly of their action has been demonstrated amply. The Partizan 
 Party has never made any honest attempt to exercise political 
 control properly because the unsafeguarded situation was exactly 
 suited to its own politically immoral purposes. Being vested with 
 the control of the Processes of Administration it has been com- 
 paratively easy for The Partizan Party to fill The Government, or
 
 POLITICAL CONTROL 377 
 
 at least the great majority of administrative offices and positions, 
 with individuals who have bound themselves beforehand to do 
 what " The Party " requires of them while they are in public 
 office. 
 
 Mixed Authority. The Partizan Party has been allowed to 
 build up a Power of its owti, and to exercise it effectively within 
 The Government. This it does through bestowing the exercise 
 of Party Authority upon some of the more important public 
 oflBcials who owe the office to " Party " exertions, and through en- 
 joining upon the remainder of its members in office strict obedience 
 to those who exercise its " Authority " within The Government. 
 
 But this bestow^al of the exercise of " Party Authority " upon a 
 public official creates a mixed or double authority which can pro- 
 duce nothing but a mixed or double administrative action ; part 
 of which may be directed to the accomplishment of true adminis- 
 trational results, but part of which may be directed towards the 
 accomplishment of results w'hich are neither administrational or 
 political m nature. 
 
 Fusion of Political and " Party Authority." This fusion of 
 Political and " Party Authority " produces two effects. It 
 destroys not only the character of the ordained authority but the 
 character of the ordained office as well. It is a means for the 
 exercise of " Party Control " over official action ; for when a 
 public office is occupied by an individual who can not be prevented 
 from using the position for the benefit of a partizan party — be- 
 cause The Sovereign has no adequate legal provisions relative to 
 the specific use of the office which it can apply to the official — 
 then, through this fusion of authority it is possible to change the 
 whole character of the office from its original meanings and to use 
 the office for purposes never originally intended. In other words, 
 the office can be used for partizan party purposes as well as for its 
 administrational purposes. 
 
 This permitted fusion of authority is a political blunder amount- 
 ing to a disaster. While in office a Sovereign-unit can not exercise 
 " Power " of any kind logically. All he can do rightfully is to 
 exercise the authority with which the ofice was originally invested. 
 Therefore, if while in office he exercises " Power " of anv kind 
 except his own, it must be some kind of " Power " that docs not 
 proceed directly from The People. Under our present procedure 
 we delegate the exercise of political control to The Partizan Party ; 
 we permit the fusion of Political Authority and Partizan Party 
 Authority ; we allow The Partizan Party to exercise its own power
 
 378 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 in Official Action by means of individuals whom it has selected 
 for that express purpose ; and consequently " Government For 
 The People," that is, administration for the General Welfare, 
 perishes through being transmuted into " Government for The 
 Partizan Party " as well. 
 
 The Speaker's Office. The change in the character and object of 
 the office of The Speaker of The House is a startling illustration 
 of what may happen when a Collective Sovereign forsakes logical 
 action. Space forbids us to trace this change out step by step. 
 Suffice it to say that we have permitted The Partizan Party to 
 make this ofiice the seat of the exercise of the highest degree of 
 partizan party power. We have permitted The Partizan Party 
 to invest whomever it elects to the ofiice with a discretionary 
 exercise of its own Power ; the power to be used for Partizan Party 
 Success both in and out of The Government. We let The Partizan 
 Party make The Speaker its " Constituted Authority " in The 
 House. The Partizan Party holds The Speaker " Responsible " 
 for its success in the legislature. The Speaker insures " Party 
 Success " through enforcing the dogma of " Party Regularity " 
 rigidly upon every other member of his partizan party in The 
 House ; that is, he enforces upon such members their previously 
 given promises to obey the Constituted Authorities of their 
 " Party." 
 
 Now supposing that the lower chamber of the legislature was 
 designated by The Fathers to be a popular body responsive to the 
 Public Will. What does that amount to now? Has not The 
 Partizan Party been given the right to transmute Public Opinion 
 into Partizan Party Will through the manufacture of majorities 
 of voters, or of fraudulently acquired votes? If The Partizan 
 Party has the right to " Manufacture " Public Opinion, why should 
 it not have the right to enforce that manufactured Public Opinion 
 in The Government ? And, if it is necessary for the enforcement 
 of Party Will that the power of the speaker should be felt upon the 
 floor of The House and in its committee rooms, what reasonable 
 objection can there be to the exercise of such " Power " by him 
 unless it comes from one crying in the wilderness that it never was 
 the intention to clothe a purely ministerial office with functions 
 that bestow upon its occupant the exercise of Despotic Power ; and 
 that it never was the intention that public oflBcials should be driven 
 by party power while engaged in producing appropriate statutory 
 law, that is, law for the promotion of the general welfare. 
 
 The intention ! Of what avail is the intention without The Will
 
 POLITICAL CONTROL 379 
 
 to enforce it ? And of what avail is The Will without the means 
 to make it effective ? 
 
 Resumption of. The indispensable prerequisite to the proper 
 exercise of Political Control over Official Action is a logical and 
 comprehensive Administrative System. Now a public officer is 
 merely a Sovereign-unit upon whom has been bestowed a tem- 
 porary exercise of the Political Authority that has been vested in a 
 public office. There is no difference whatever between the way in 
 which a Collective Sovereign obtains control over the action of its 
 units, and the way in which it obtains control over the action 
 of its units in office. There is merely a difference in what it has 
 to do. In the first instance it ordains that which shall be con- 
 sidered proper Electoral Action and the punishment of its infrac- 
 tion ; and in the second instance it must ordain that which shall 
 be considered proper Official Action and the punishment of its 
 infraction ; but this it can do properly only by declaring the func- 
 tion of every public office ; by declaring the official who shall dis- 
 charge such function ; by declaring the manner in which the func- 
 tions and duties of each office or class of offices shall be discharged ; 
 and by obtaining the sanction of Public Approval to its acts. 
 
 We, The Electorate, are The Sovereign. We are under the 
 obligation to rule righteously; that is, to make our originally 
 expressed intention fully operative. But until we discharge this 
 obligation through constructing a logical and comprehensive 
 System of Administration we shall never be able to use our Re- 
 served Powers so as to control properly the exercise of any Dele- 
 gated Power by the most insignificant functionary in office.
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 POLITICAL EDUCATION 
 
 As said in Chapter IV, the broad administrative problem of 
 each American State is, how to continuously maintain unimpaired 
 the ordained conditions of human existence, and how to continu- 
 ously transmit them unimpaired to the succeeding generations 
 who compose The State. 
 
 In a pure Democracy the proper solution of this problem calls 
 for the continuous, free, and direct exercise of political power by 
 the individuals who compose the Collective Sovereign. 
 
 But in a Representative Democracy the exercise of parts of the 
 supreme power for some specific objects is delegated to represen- 
 tatives of The Sovereign, 
 
 This plan of representative action injects a new element into 
 the administrative problem ; namely that of political authority. 
 It becomes incumbent upon the Collective Sovereign not merely 
 to impart direction to the exercise of political authority, but to 
 continuously control the action of each sovereign-unit who has 
 been vested with its exercise ; and the problem now becomes, 
 how to secure from a majority of the electors a continuous, free, 
 and direct exercise of all of The Reserved Powers of Administra- 
 tion, and how to enable The Electorate to secure a logical exercise 
 by some of its members of The Delegated Powers of Administration. 
 
 On its face the stated problem seems capable of easy and correct 
 solution, provided only that The Electorate uses logical means 
 and methods of administrative action. But the correct solution 
 appears less easy when it appears further that the main factor 
 in the problem. The Electorate, is unstable in point of number, 
 character, and capacity ; losing members every year by death, 
 removal from the State, etc., and every year gaining new mem- 
 bers by removal into the State, through naturalization, and by the 
 incorporation of the youth of the people who have reached the 
 voting age. 
 
 380
 
 POLITICAL EDUCATION" 381 
 
 The instability of the acting sovereign injects another problem 
 into the situation, and one that must be correctly solved before 
 it is possible to solve the main problem of the people correctly. 
 This problem is, how to maintain the character and capacity of a 
 constantly changing acting sovereign up to the standard of intelli- 
 gence that is requisite to successful administrative action. 
 
 The transmission of the benefits of self-government does not 
 occur once every thirty-three and one-third years, and so on 
 throughout the future. It occurs from day to day ; for the 
 generation of to-day transmits its living conditions, its means 
 and its methods of action to the generation of to-morrow, and so 
 on throughout the future. Because of the natural forces at work 
 upon the composition, character, and capacity of the acting 
 sovereign The State stands in instant need at all times of some 
 means whereby, for instance, the newly naturalized members 
 of the electorate can be assimilated as quickly as possible, and 
 whereby the youth of the people can be fitted beforehand for the 
 proper discharge of the Obligations of Sovereignty and of the 
 Duties of Citizenship. 
 
 This necessity was appreciated by the New England colonists. 
 They selected Education as the means through which to produce 
 administrative intelligence in the community, and as the means 
 by which to continually secure a widespread appreciation of 
 what was meant by, and involved in, the exercise of Political 
 Prerogative by the individuals of their communities. Schools 
 were established ; and in 1647 Massachusetts put the support of 
 the schools upon the public and made education compulsory and 
 free. By the time independence was achieved the great majority 
 of the people of each New England State held that education was 
 a political necessity ; that is, they held it as " indispensable to 
 the continuance of a republican government." They regarded 
 it as a Community Right because it was " of supreme utility to 
 The State." They held it to be an Individual Right ; that is, a 
 right of every individual who is given the exercise of political 
 power for the purpose of maintaining the welfare of The State 
 and of the individual. They argued for it on the grounds of 
 public economy and of public morality. They considered it as 
 a factor in the ordained Equality; and they contended that the 
 minimum of education under a representative form of govern- 
 ment should never be less than the amount which would 
 qualify each sovereign-unit to properly discharge not only his 
 social duties but the obligations and duties that are transmitted
 
 382 > SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 to every one who participates in the exercise of the Sovereignty 
 of The State. 
 
 An Auxiliary Aid to Administration. From the foregoing 
 statement it is plain that the pioneers in American education 
 reahzed their duties to posterity and appreciated the fact that 
 the supreme capacity of the individual was his political capacity. 
 Education, therefore, was to be Political Education as well as 
 social and economic education. With surprising insight they 
 realized that the full nature of and the full measure of the benefits 
 possible under logical administrative action could not in the 
 natural order of events continue to be widely understood in a 
 Commonwealth that was rapidly becoming heterogeneous in 
 composition. To a limited extent they anticipated the advance 
 that the material prosperity of individuals would make when 
 men were free and at liberty to bend their energies to the develop- 
 ment of the natural opportunities that lay scattered over the 
 state domain. Their brief experience in self-government already 
 enabled them to perceive that this material advance would bring 
 in its train ever widening and more and more complex problems 
 of pure and righteous political administration ; and it is not 
 overstating the case to say that their leaders in thought perceived 
 that unless the instruction given as to political action was as 
 correct and as comprehensive as that given to social and economic 
 action it might result in finally leaving the sovereign-unit without 
 information suflScient to enable him to determine for himself 
 w^hat was or what was not righteous daily administrative action ; 
 and that if this state of affairs came to pass, then the material 
 development of society would far outstrip its moral development. 
 
 During their whole lives the New England settlers had suffered 
 under oppressive administrative action. Resistance to oppression 
 was an ingrained part of their nature. Experience had made 
 them well acquainted with the frailties of human nature and 
 with the subtle temptations to wrongdoing that beset men in 
 their struggle for material advancement. By the mere process 
 of emigrating to a new land they had possessed themselves of 
 local political freedom, economic liberty, individual equality of 
 a sort, and the opportunity to promote Justice as they perceived 
 it; and, as the means for continually raising the intelligence of 
 the constantly succeeding generations up to a comprehensive 
 appreciation of what their form of civil government when rightly 
 filled, directed, and controlled could confer in human happiness, 
 in individual welfare, and in moral advance, they devised the
 
 POLITICAL EDUCATION 383 
 
 Common School System of Education as an auxiliary aid to 
 Political Administration. The State was to educate its future 
 citizens in the Obligations of Sovereignty, the Duties of Citizen- 
 ship, and the preservation of Individual Freedom ; and they, in 
 the course of time, were to do the same for futiire generations. 
 The people were to maintain an educational system, and that 
 system was to help the people to forever maintain its chosen 
 form of Government, and to enjoy and transmit the enjoyment 
 of its benefits to their posterity. Each system was to supple- 
 ment the other in the common endeavor to preserve and to per- 
 petuate the conditions of individual existence originally ordained. 
 The prime function or specific work of the educational system 
 as originally conceived was to maintain the level of intelligence 
 in the Collective Sovereign and to " nourture " the original Spirit 
 and Intent of The Commonwealth. The Church was entirely 
 separated from The State. The people claimed and assumed 
 the exercise of the right to decide for themselves what was right 
 or wrong political and administrative action ; and individuals 
 were to receive active and compulsory moral guidance from The 
 State. Each question of right or wrong exercise of individual 
 power along social or economic lines was to be finally decided 
 through an exercise by sovereign-units of their political power. 
 New sovereign-units were constantly uniting with the existing 
 Collective Sovereign and it was made the special function of the 
 Common Schools of The State to educate the new and the future 
 sovereign units in the knowledge of true American political action 
 so that when their period of sovereignty arrived they could strive 
 steadfastly and intelligently for the general welfare by applying 
 in public and in private life the agreed-upon Principles of the 
 State Polity. This point stands forth clearly. The system was 
 not originally devised solely as a means whereby individuals 
 were to be made materially prosperous. The mental powers of 
 the oncoming sovereign-units were to be developed by the educa- 
 tional system in order to make them better fitted to succeed in 
 the constantly narrowing economic struggle. But the moral 
 perception of the oncoming sovereign-units was to be widened 
 into a true appreciation of the established rights of each with the 
 idea of making them more considerate of and helpful to each 
 other ; and finally their political knowledge was to be developed 
 in order to enable each to perceive how each could act the part 
 of a just sovereign under the ordained plan of administrative 
 action. In a heterogeneous Democracy, the larger part of which
 
 384 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 necessarily possess but a smattering of statecraft, the chief diffi- 
 culty in obtaining a wise choice between alternative courses of 
 State-action springs from a combined lack of administrative 
 sagacity and unsettled convictions concerning the ordained Prin- 
 ciples of Action on the part of many, if not most, of its individual 
 members. Each individual elector, however, has the power to 
 act, and is expected to act in every period of administration. 
 The situation is fraught with perilous potentials and calls for the 
 assistance of some means whereby the administrative sagacity 
 and understanding of the average elector can be developed into a 
 capacity that will reasonably well supplement his power to act. 
 Our Forefathers were alive to the fact that capable as well as 
 politically powerful Sovereign-units were indispensable to the 
 continuance of the political regime which they had established. 
 They selected Public Education as the means whereby The Com- 
 monwealth could constantly provide itself with a body of capable 
 and righteous electors (not merely prosperous and happy in- 
 dividuals, however desirable that might be) but electors, who, 
 when their time came for administrative action, would be actuated 
 by the truths enunciated in the Principles of The State Polity 
 both as to the intent and objects of action and as to the manner 
 in which such action should be taken. 
 
 Space forbids, and it is unnecessary to narrate here in detail 
 the failure of our present educational effort to discharge the func- 
 tion of political education. Any of my readers in any State can 
 get a better idea of the extent of this failure than I could possibly 
 give him within the limits of a chapter, by looking at the text- 
 books that his children use in the schools, colleges, and universities 
 of his State. 
 
 Now the failure on the part of the present educational system 
 to produce capable Sovereign-units springs primarily from our 
 own failure to act properly. No mere system of action will ever 
 discharge its functions automatically. It must be made to work 
 properly through individual impulse and will. But we have 
 failed to keep the cardinal purpose of the educational system 
 in view. We have failed to continually impel our educational 
 agencies to the accomplishment of its prime function ; and through 
 our improper educational inaction we have shorn our educational 
 system of its capacity to turn out capable sovereign-units who are 
 fitted to act the part of independent freemen. Through our 
 supineness in educational action we fail to get any marked political 
 advantage out of our educational system. In fact, it is an open
 
 POLITICAL EDUCATION 385 
 
 question if we do not actually obstruct our political progress; 
 for, relying upon our educational system to turn out capable 
 sovereign-units, we annually contribute to the acting sovereign 
 a crop of fledgling first-voters who have received no comprehen- 
 sive elementary information from the common schools regarding 
 the exercise of sovereignty, and who in thousands upon thou- 
 sands of individual instances among those who have been " com- 
 mitted to the care " of our higher educational institutions, have 
 not only received an unconscious bent, but positive encourage- 
 ment, advice, and exhortation to use a Partizan Party as an inter- 
 mediary in the discharge of those moral sovereign obligations 
 and citizenship duties which the Political Principles of The Com- 
 monwealth obligate each citizen to discharge and perform freely, 
 directly, conscientiously, and — in the absence of a compulsory 
 law — honestly ; that is, according to the professed Spirit and 
 Intent of The Commonwealth. We have not kept our educa- 
 tional system pure in spu-it and intent. We have allowed it to 
 become overwhelmingly permeated with the spirit of materialism 
 and commercialism. We do not compel the executive heads of 
 our higher educational institutions to be selected partly because 
 of their preeminence in civic virtue, political sagacity, and states- 
 manship. We allow them to be selected mainly because of their 
 superior ability to finance the institutions; and thus we have 
 been insensibly drawTi into allowing these institutions to pass 
 under the dominating power of money. Through permitting 
 these institutions to expand tremendously along lines of material 
 development we have allowed them to create a situation for 
 themselves where they are now dependent for cash revenue upon 
 donations and endowments of hundreds of thousands if not 
 millions of dollars from single individuals who in times of peace 
 could not possibly have these sums to give away unless they 
 had been obtained through evasions of the spirit, the intent, 
 and the administrative principles of The Commonwealth. We 
 continue to " commit " the youth of the land to the " care of " 
 boards of trustees of educational institutions who deny to the 
 members of their educational staffs free speech that touches 
 upon improper current administrative procedure, electoral action, 
 and official action. We " commit them to the care " of institu- 
 tions whose professors and presidents labor unavailingly for 
 years to intelligently explain the relationship existing between 
 individual political freedom and individual political responsibility ; 
 and which institutions speaking through theu- presidents in vale-
 
 386 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 dictory addresses, urge their graduates to join a Partizan Party 
 for the purpose of raising the average intelligence of " The Party " ; 
 and this, too, notwithstanding the fact that any raise of intelli- 
 gence in " The Party " serves only to make it a still more power- 
 ful foe to the ideals of American Democracy. We " commit 
 them to the care " of institutions whose professors instruct them 
 that every Partizan Party is a law breaker; that a remedy for 
 the injustices and hardships of the times is to give these law 
 breakers a proportional representation in the legislatures, the 
 administrative boards of The State, and the governing boards 
 of our municipalities ; and then in our beslippered ease at home 
 after a hard day at golf many of us croak despondently of the 
 inherent inefficiency in a Representative Democracy. In fact, 
 our folly appears to be ine^austible. Having failed through 
 our concerted educational action to contribute capable and jfitted 
 sovereign-units to the acting sovereign, what are we doing as 
 individuals towards this end? Why we turn our new and ad- 
 ministratively uninformed sovereign-units into the arena of 
 administrative action to receive administrative information from 
 a Public Press that has become most largely subsidized by The 
 Partizan Party, to receive instructions from " Regular " party 
 partizans, who, " sticking close to the American Eagle and their 
 dear native land," contrive to create the belief in their unsophis- 
 ticated listeners that the American Eagle would die miserably 
 unless it received its nourishment direct from the hand of The 
 Partizan Party ; to be inculcated with the doctrine that " Partizan 
 Party Regularity " is sublimated patriotism ; to receive political 
 preferment at the hands of an organization that rigidly enforces 
 the partizan party price of preferment ; to have their adminis- 
 trative enthusiasm stimulated at public dinners by the inconse- 
 quential japery of a wine-filled Colonel Buncombe ; to have 
 their enthusiasm for " party action " whooped up by outings, 
 clambakes, and picnics that are gotten up by local partizan party 
 "Leaders" for the purpose of strengthening their grasp upon 
 prominent positions in the Party Managements ; to assist in the 
 " Chinese business," involving uniforms and parades that " The 
 Party " organizes for the purpose of " demonstrating its strength " 
 before those who wish to be on the winning side ; to receive a 
 moral impulse from " Campaign lies " and an intellectual stimulus 
 from campaign " literature." But why recapitulate the scores of 
 other immoral and unintelligent ways in which we allow our 
 native-born youth to be initiated in administrative action ? It all
 
 POLITICAL EDUCATION 387 
 
 amounts to this in the end : We thrust these innocents forth to 
 be converted into " regular " members of partizan party organiza- 
 tions; to be despoiled of honor and of the exercise of volition; 
 to be made followers of party patronage-dispensing men instead 
 of political principles and ideals; to become baby-kissing sup- 
 pliants for public office, or buyers of " Blocks-of-Five " ; and we 
 transmit this method of administrative education to our successors. 
 
 Now if upon operation our Representative Democracy turns 
 out to be inefficient, wherein does that inefficiency lie? Is the 
 inefficiency inherent in the form of government as ordained, or 
 in the acting sovereign? It is possible for an efficient sovereign 
 to make the worst possible form of government work benignly 
 for the people ; and there is nothing in the form of our State 
 Government that would actually prevent us from possessing the 
 benefits possible under that form providing we made it work 
 properly. The people possess the power, and the right to use 
 their power according to a system of State management that no 
 one can successfully maintain is unworkable. If under such 
 circumstances inefficiency exists to the degree that premises 
 ultimate administrative disaster, then the cause of the inefficiency 
 must be sought for in The Sovereign. We originally selected 
 Public Education as a means for keeping the active sovereign 
 administratively efficient from generation to generation. We 
 have failed to so regulate Public Education that it would aid in 
 keeping up the required standard of administrative efficiency in 
 our acting sovereigns. That is the whole story of our efforts as 
 far as public education is concerned. 
 
 But besides recei\'ing proper political instruction, the first-voter 
 and the naturalized citizen should always have before them the 
 example of proper individual administrative action. Supposing 
 the existence of proper political instruction, then the force of 
 the theoretical information on this new element in The Electorate 
 should be supplemented by our own daily practise in maintain- 
 ing the character and the intellectual capacity of The Electorate. 
 But here again we fail because we have failed to safeguard the 
 performance of the process of Naturalization so that it will pro- 
 duce either of these effects. We have allowed the performance 
 of the process to pass under the control of The Partizan Party. 
 Naturally a partizan party uses the process for the sole purpose 
 of making partizan party voters. Competency in citizenship is 
 not a qualification for partizan party membership. On the 
 other hand, citizenship and incompetency combined are the ideal
 
 f 
 
 388 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 qualifications. We permit The Partizan Party to turn the part 
 of the process that relates to the competency of the applicant 
 into a farce; and to our o:reat detrim ent. J When the immigrant 
 reaches America he is not met l)y~3rgnified and public-spirited 
 representatives of The State and instructed in the meanings of 
 the Principles of The State Polity, the true obligations of American 
 Sovereignty, and the true duties of American Citizenship. On 
 the contrary we allow the immigrant to pass immediately under 
 the influences of a partizan party and to receive " instructions " 
 from some minor partizan party hack who is either as ignorant 
 of these matters as the immigrant is, or is dangerously contemptu- 
 ous of them. We stand supinely by while every matter that is 
 of vital consequence to the general welfare is slurred over and 
 minimized in a distorted process that has for its main object the 
 securance of the allegiance of one more subservient and dependent 
 member of a partizan party organization. 
 
 Here is no attempt on our part to maintain either the moral 
 or the intellectual capacity of our acting sovereign through secur- 
 ing a logical performance of the administrative process that bears 
 most vitally on these points. What are the results of the avoid- 
 ance of our duty in this respect ? In the first place, through per- 
 mitting The Electorate to be " stuffed " every year with thousands 
 of thoroughly unqualified members, many of which are too stupid 
 to realize the fraud on American democracy that is involved in 
 their citizenship, we passively assist in lowering the intellectual 
 capacity of our Sovereign. In the second place, we passively 
 assist in weakening the moral character of our Sovereign because 
 there are also many among those who are " naturalized " by this 
 distorted process who not only perceive the fraud but at the same 
 tim e acquire a merited contempt for American ideals and honesty. 
 
 [n any experiment in democratic administration, and particu- 
 larly so where comprehensive rules governing the detail discharge 
 of the obligations of sovereignty and the duties of citizenship are 
 lacking, individual political honesty (the disposition on the part 
 of the individual to put the Spirit, the Intent, and the funda- 
 mental Principles of the people into daily application) becomes a 
 most important factor in administrative success. Honest ad- 
 ministrative action by the individual sovereign-units is the only 
 possible course of action that will enable the people to put the 
 several Principles of The State Polity into full operation, and 
 so to determine whether their spirit and intent is possible of 
 realization, and if so, whether the realization will accomplish
 
 POLITICAL EDUCATION 389 
 
 that for individuals which was originally hoped for. Are we 
 transmitting to our successors a legacy of honest individual 
 exercise of political prerogative and power? Are we not at 
 present adopting the expedient of relying upon " Party " honesty, 
 which, as Grover Cleveland said, is " Party expediency "? And 
 has not our resort to expediency in this respect brought about a 
 condition of affairs wherein our sovereign-units are receiving a 
 practical education in expediential administrative action that 
 is gravely dishonest in most of its specific details? Even Ostro- 
 gorski, who would make Fear the moving force in a Democratic 
 regime, and who divides the democracy into two classes — the 
 masses and the rulers — contends that Education is the only 
 means which will raise the power of the masses suflSciently to 
 enable them to intimidate the rulers into giving the masses what 
 they want. 
 
 The truth is plain. Education alone will increase the probability 
 of success in any process, whether good or bad. Logical education 
 will greatly increase the chances for success, and illogical edu- 
 cation will greatly decrease such chances. Unfortunately the 
 success of our governmental experiment depends immediately 
 upon a logical exercise of political prerogative and power by an 
 unstable Electorate. This instability of our acting sovereign 
 renders it necessary for us to constantly maintain the moral 
 grade and intellectual capacity of our sovereign. Its moral grade 
 depends entirely upon the character of its individual units ; and 
 this character must depend most largely upon the kind of political 
 education which the units receive from us. Our political spirit 
 is altruistic. Our political intent is to perpetuate our political 
 regime and sovereignty in order to enable us to make our chosen 
 kind of individual welfare permanent. Individual welfare is 
 immunity from every form of injustice as the same is conceived 
 by us. Such a condition of individual existence will make The 
 State strong and long lived. Consequently our educational 
 effort should reflect the spirit, the intent, and the character of our 
 professions, and should give our sovereign-units correct informa- 
 tion regarding the kind of restraint, the extent of the restraint, 
 and the ordained manner of enforcing the restraint which The 
 Sovereign has declared shall be put upon the exercise of individual 
 power within the limits of The State. 
 
 The questions every American citizen should ask himself are 
 these : Does our present educational effort in precept and in 
 practise constantly invigorate and strengthen the moral nature
 
 390 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 of our sovereign-units by directing their attention to the spirit, the 
 intent, the immediate objects and the ultimate purposes of our 
 governmental regime? Does it constantly work to raise the in- 
 telligence of our sovereign-units into a realization of the absolute 
 dependence of freedom and justice upon the use of logical means 
 and methods for the exercise of political power, and the control 
 of the exercise of political authority? Does it constantly work 
 to impart information concerning our administrative truth as 
 against opinion? Has it not failed in the discharge of its po- 
 litical function, and, worse than this, has it not become the 
 medium for imparting administrative misinformation? Are not 
 our sovereign-units at present instructed by it that it is advis- 
 able, if not proper, to employ a partizan intermediary in the ex- 
 ercise of a political prerogative and power that is bestowed upon 
 them to be exercised directly ? Is the attention of our sovereign- 
 units ever directed to the all-important fact that our State Con- 
 stitutions are lacking in a body of provisions that would, were 
 they so incorporated, make expediential action illegal and not 
 merely dishonest ; and which provisions would, were they con- 
 tained in the Constitutions, at least afford to each sovereign-unit 
 a guarantee of the opportunity to take free, continuous, direct, 
 logical, and effective administrative action that would in intent 
 at least be supportive of our professed ideals and objects ? Does 
 our educational system and effort impart accurate information 
 to the youth of the native born and of the foreign born in the art 
 of American Statecraft; that is, in the intelligent, skilful, and 
 logical exercise of political power and political authority for the 
 attainment of the professed objects of the American Democracies ? 
 Now Education is a means for producing individual develop- 
 ment. In every Democracy, where by reason of the mere flight 
 of time individuals become vested wdth the exercise of Sovereignty, 
 political education is a necessary means for producing fully 
 equipped political units. But at present we make no serious 
 effort to educate our future sovereign-units in American state- 
 craft. We allow our youth to reach the status of an acting sover- 
 eign with practically no conception of American administrative 
 art ; and it is very largely owing to our own action in this respect 
 that our present administrative action is characterized by artifice 
 and expedient. Naturally, if we do not continually keep before 
 our sovereign-units the true objects for v/hich they are to exercise 
 political power ; if we do not instruct them concerning the manner 
 in and by which that power is to be properly exercised ; if we do
 
 POLITICAL EDUCATION 391 
 
 not keep alive in them convictions of the obligations that accom- 
 pany the individual exercise of political power, then we have 
 failed to properly safeguard them against the lure of artifice, 
 besides leaving the opportunity fully open for them to be drawn 
 into an expediential rather than a moral exercise of power. 
 
 The Youth of The State of to-day become The Sovereign of to- 
 morrow. Unless we fit them as capable administrative units, we 
 necessarily transmit the heritage and the fruits of administrative 
 incapacity to our administrative successors, and through them 
 to our own flesh and blood. Freedom as ordained is not a self- 
 maintaining condition. It is only through free administrative 
 action by free men that ordained freedom can be maintained. 
 Liberty as ordained is not a self-maintaining condition. It can 
 only be maintained through a free and logical exercise of political 
 power by free men. Equality as ordained is not a self-maintaining 
 condition. It ceases to exist the instant any sovereign-unit is 
 permitted to employ agencies, means, and methods that produce 
 an illogical exercise of political power or of political authority. 
 Justice as ordained is not a self-maintaining condition. It can 
 only be maintained through maintaining individual political 
 freedom as ordained, individual political equality as ordained, 
 and individual liberty as ordained within the limits of The State. 
 Precept and Example ! Both are lacking in our educational 
 effort. But nevertheless the truth holds good that Political 
 Education by precept and example is an indispensable requisite 
 to the continuance of our form of Republican Government. If 
 The Commonwealth is to contmue to exist long under its present 
 form of Government, then it must secure from a majority of 
 its acting sovereign a logical exercise of political power and a 
 logical control over the exercise of political authority. Unless 
 The State possesses a logical and an ordained System of Political 
 Administration, it can not secure a logical exercise of power or of 
 control. If it does not secure such an exercise of such power and 
 control, then it will have an illogical exercise of power and control 
 in some, many, or possibly all respects. If an illogical exercise 
 of power and control obtains, then individual hardships and in- 
 justices will necessarily result from an improperly regulated 
 exercise of individual power. If, with human nature in its present 
 stage of development, The State does not direct the energies of 
 its individuals in the ordained direction, they will naturally seek 
 satisfaction in unordained and therefore politically wrong direc- 
 tions. If personal injustices become prevalent and rife in The
 
 392 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Commonwealth, then emotional unrest will follow. If the hard- 
 ships and injustices be not speedily rectified, then disorder will 
 follow, and possibly political disruption. 
 
 How else than through Political Education will The State ever 
 be able to make the majority of the people realize that the only 
 possible way in which the Principles of The State Polity can be 
 made fully operative is through ordaining a System of Adminis- 
 trative Action under which it is not only possible for each sovereign- 
 unit to put these principles into full operation in every step, stage, 
 and process of political administration, but that will also actually 
 enable every public-spirited sovereign-unit to speedily and suc- 
 cessfully invoke the whole power of The State to compel from 
 every other sovereign-unit a logical exercise of political power, 
 and a logical exercise of political authority in every oflSce and 
 every official position ? 
 
 The Strength of Deviocracy. Wherever the people attempt to 
 administer government as ordained, the educational system should 
 be made a constituent part of their system of administration. 
 Considered as a working political regime. Democracy is inherently 
 strong in one respect and inherently weak in another. The 
 inherent strength of Democracy proceeds in part from its basic 
 principle of self-preservation, which removes many of the causes 
 of revolutionary action by individuals. The people govern, and 
 all are presumed to have a common desire to retain the exercise 
 of the power to govern. Considered as The Sovereign, the people 
 are not likely to revolt against themselves. 
 
 The Weakness of Democracy. The inherent weakness of De- 
 mocracy lies in The Sovereign, and proceeds from the inherent 
 civic weakness of the Sovereign-units. Every democracy is 
 bound to contain some individually powerful units who will strive 
 constantly to have the sovereign do this, that, and the other 
 thing that is to their owti selfish advantage. Never yet has a 
 democracy existed which for any great length of time possessed 
 a body of sovereign-units amounting in number to more than a 
 majority who perceived and believed that it was for their own 
 welfare, for the welfare of all, and for the permanency of The 
 State to have justice as ordained administered throughout the 
 body politic. Consequently, past democracies have not pos- 
 sessed the great moving power that was necessary to maintain 
 themselves permanently as bodies politic. 
 
 But besides the inherent weakness that is common to all forms 
 of democracy, the American form is conspicuously weak in another
 
 POLITICAL EDUCATION 393 
 
 respect. Its administrative system contains no provisions making 
 it obligatory for The Sovereign to constantly instil the sense of, 
 the love of, and the desire for justice as ordained in every Sovereign- 
 unit of the successive generations that compose The State. If the 
 administration of justice as ordained will produce the individual 
 welfare and happiness promised by the collective sovereign, then 
 the system of administration should be such as will oblige the 
 people — the collective sovereign — to instruct every one of its 
 units and prospective units that it is not only the unit's duty but 
 to his ultimate welfare to have justice administered as ordained. 
 A man will work for that which he conceives is for his own welfare. 
 A body of men who work for what they conceive is for the common 
 welfare constitutes the only source from which democratic political 
 power can issue to compel the production of the common welfare 
 and the welfare of The State. 
 
 The collective sovereigns of the past were weak in civic virtue. 
 Those of the present betray the same weakness. Consequently, 
 this weakness always has been and now is transmitted from one 
 generation of sovereign-units to another. Plainly, the prime 
 requisite to righteous administration by a collective sovereign is 
 an ever increasing amount of civic virtue in the sovereign-units ; 
 and, unless the sovereign secures this increase tlu"ough the aid of 
 Political Education, it is bound to find itself involved unceasingly 
 in administrative difficulties because of the constant succession 
 of deviations from ordained moral action on the part of many 
 of its own units. 
 
 Finally, in a commonwealth where administrative action is not 
 regulated adequately and comprehensively, the main educational 
 effort should be expended in producing public-spirited sovereign- 
 units ; for otherwise general education will serve but to make a 
 large part of the sovereign-units still more skilful and adept in 
 the evasion of the true spirit, intent, desire, and principles of the 
 people.
 
 CHAPTER XXIII 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
 " American Representative Democracy." From what has been 
 said regarding the County System, the Township System, and the 
 Compromise System of Local Self-government, the reader will 
 have grasped the idea that there are at least three distinct kinds of 
 representative democracies in the United States. 
 
 Any one unacquainted with the facts in the matter would 
 naturally suppose that the county system States would all use 
 practically the same system of political administration. It would 
 be natural to suppose the same thing in reference to the compromise 
 system States. 
 
 But such is not the case. Each county system State and each 
 compromise system State has its own distinctive body of provisions 
 under which it attempts to produce satisfactory administrative 
 action ; and when we compare these systems and perceive the 
 existing differences between fundamental ideas, between system 
 details, and in the administrative results that are produced by each, 
 then the significant fact appears that there are at least some forty- 
 odd varieties or modifications of Representative Democracy in the 
 United States, each of which is producing administrative results 
 that are distinctly different in many respects from the results that 
 are produced in the other States. 
 
 All of the States are alike in two respects ; namely, the lack of a 
 logical and comprehensive system of administrative action, and the 
 dominance of The Partizan Party over Electoral Action and 
 Official Action ; but outside of the New England States, and with 
 reference solely to the fundamental ideas of administrative action, 
 wide dissimilarity exists in the provisions which regulate the detail 
 exercise of The Powers of Administration. The Civil Rights, the 
 Political Rights, the Political Freedom, and even the Liberties of 
 the individual are not the same throughout the States. The 
 systems for the administration of justice differ. Justice itself in 
 
 394
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 395 
 
 one State is different from justice in another ; and, considered as a 
 single political phenomenon, each State stands forth as a variant 
 form of American Representative Democracy. 
 
 But nevertheless the people of each State have at the outset of 
 state existence invariably protested their allegiance to abstract 
 Democracy as the only proper system of Government, and each 
 separate Commonwealth is attempting to work out practically 
 the same administrative problems under practically the same 
 broad principles of democratic action. Each Commonwealth 
 employs the same political agencies ; namely. The Electorate and 
 The Government. Each professes adherence to the doctrines of 
 Majority Rule, Political Representation, and Political Responsi- 
 bility. Each Commonwealth has ordained the maintenance 
 within its territorial limits of several conditions of individual 
 existence and each has set about this task in practically the same 
 way ; that is, through the exercise of the Reserved Powers of 
 Administration by its individual electors, and through the exercise 
 of the Delegated Powers of Administration by some of the electors 
 who have been selected and chosen for that purpose. 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that each American Commonwealth 
 may differ somewhat — and in some instances quite materially — 
 from the political structure of the other Commonwealths, never- 
 theless the ultimate object of each is the mamtenance within its 
 limits of what it calls individual Freedom, Liberty, Equality, and 
 Justice. 
 
 In order to more clearly appreciate the extent to which correct 
 administrative action on the part of any State is dependent upon 
 the establishment and use of a correct system of political admin- 
 istration, let us briefly recapitulate the main ideas concerning 
 administrative action which we attempt to put into effectual 
 operation. 
 
 The Status of Individual Liberty. Remembering what has been 
 said concerning individual liberty in Chapters II, III, and X, it is 
 sufficient for the present to say that the particular condition of 
 individual liberty which each Commonwealth has decided to 
 maintain is believed to afford the greatest opportunity for indi- 
 vidual development and human progress. 
 
 Being generally desired, it has been broadly described and 
 ordained into existence as an individual status when Government 
 was established. The individual status may differ in detail in the 
 various States, but if each State works out its particular idea of 
 individual liberty in a logical manner, then it will be possible for
 
 396 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 intelligent individuals to determine which particular idea of liberty- 
 is best adapted to individual development and human progress. 
 
 The Status of Individual Freedom. It is also generally believed 
 that the ordained status of individual liberty can be maintained 
 properly only through an absolutely free and continuous exercise 
 of The Supreme Power of The State by the individuals who com- 
 pose The State. The exercise of this power in this manner is 
 therefore bestowed upon the freemen who compose The State, 
 and the status of individual political freedom is broadly described 
 and ordained into existence when Government is established. 
 The permanence of the status of individual liberty is believed to 
 depend upon the continuous maintenance of the status of individual 
 freedom. 
 
 Free Government. Free Government, considered as the means 
 for preserving ordained status, is the orderly, logical, continuous, 
 and effectual self-maintenance of the ordained status of a commu- 
 nity and of its individuals. But it is obvious that before it will be 
 possible for the people of a state to obtain orderly, logical, con- 
 tinuous, and effectual individual action in this effort, it will be 
 necessary for the people to construct and use a system of action 
 that will enable The State to compel the kind of action it desires 
 from its individuals, and that the work of constructing such a 
 system is properly a part of the work of establishing Government. 
 / Political Action. All action that is taken by the people of a 
 state either in establishing status, or in maintaining it afterwards, 
 is commonly called political action ; but it is also plain that part of 
 this action should be carefully distinguished as administrative action. 
 
 The Electorate. The exercise of the maintaining power and of the 
 compelling power is, in the American Commonwealths, given to a 
 specially selected class called The Electorate ; that is, the voting 
 class. In some States The Electorate is wholly composed of men, 
 and in others it is not ; but be this as it may, the preservation 
 of the ordained status of the individual depends most largely upon 
 the preservation of the integrity of The State and of its acting 
 Sovereign ; and the special knowledge concerning these particular 
 matters is supposedly confined to the wisest and most capable in 
 The Commonwealth who are constituted as The Electorate. 
 After the objects, principles, form, and frame of Government have 
 been ordained, then The Electorate must administer Government 
 as Established. 
 
 Political Administration. Political Administration is the or- 
 derly, logical, continuous, and effectual application of the Prin-
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 397 
 
 ciples of The State Polity in the management of the affairs of 
 The Community and of its individuals. 
 
 The Government. The Electorate is to be assisted in the work of 
 political administration by a smaller body of electors called The 
 Government. The exercise of the maintaining and of the compel- 
 ling power of The Commonwealth is thus divided between The 
 Electorate and The Government. Broadly speaking, this division 
 creates two kinds of administrative action ; namely, electoral 
 administrative action and official administrative action. Theo- 
 retically, all administrative action, whether electorate, official, or 
 individual, is to be taken in strict accord with the ordained Prin- 
 ciples of The State Polity. 
 
 Composition of the Government. The assisting agency of The 
 Electorate is to be composed of individual electors who are to be 
 freely and directly selected by and from The Electorate. 
 
 Administrative Policy. The general course of administrative 
 action is to be freely and directly determined by The Electorate 
 acting for the people. 
 
 Administrative Impulse. Impulse to official action is to be 
 freely and directly imparted by and from Electorate Action that is 
 taken for this purpose. 
 
 Administrative Control. Official administrative action is to be 
 freely and directly controlled by The Electorate acting for the 
 people. 
 
 Electoral Administrative Action. For reasons already set forth, 
 logical action by individual electors can only be had when their 
 action is both free and direct. Electoral Administrative Action 
 consists therefore of a free and direct exercise by individual electors 
 of The Reserved Powers of Administration. 
 
 Function of The Government. The specific work of The Govern- 
 ment, considered as an assisting agency of The Electorate, is to 
 assist The Electorate to maintain the ordained status of The 
 Commonwealth and of its individuals in peace and in war. Con- 
 sidered as a collective body of a distinct composition as to members, 
 The Government only acts during one period of administration. 
 Its detail work is : 
 
 To provide the necessary means for maintaining the organized 
 State and to defray the cost of political administration. 
 
 To act in certain respects as the contractual agency of the 
 people in their dealings with other bodies politic, and, whenever 
 necessary, as their belligerent agency. 
 
 To provide rules of detail administrative action for The Common-
 
 398 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 wealth and for its individual Sovereign-units whereby Public 
 Opinion shall be made practically operative ; and to provide rules 
 for the detail exercise of individual power along lines of social and 
 economic effort. These rules are called Statutory Laws, or 
 Statutes. They are to be consistent with the spirit of the people ; 
 that is, with the intent of the people as originally expressed in their 
 ordained principles of association and of action. 
 
 To apply and to enforce a uniform application of Fundamental 
 and of Statutory Law. 
 
 To settle all controversies concerning the consistency of Statutes ; 
 to settle all disputes that are brought before it for determination 
 concerning individual action that is taken either under the Law of 
 The State or without its sanction ; and to enforce its decrees. 
 
 Official Administrative Action. For reasons already given, official 
 administrative action consists in the free and direct exercise of The 
 Delegated Powers of Administration by the elected public officials 
 and representatives. 
 
 Character of. All public officials and representatives are gov- 
 erned in their action by exactly the same principles of action as 
 those which govern The Electorate in its action. The public 
 official and the representative does not cease to be an elector when 
 he is elected to office. He is merely asked to sacrifice his individual 
 welfare for the time being to the welfare of The State and of its 
 combined individuals. He is not released from the obligation to 
 take official action in accordance with the accredited principles of 
 Democratic Action. 
 
 While the people and The Electorate are two different bodies, 
 nevertheless, for the purpose of putting The Will of The People 
 into practical operation, the people act by and through The 
 Electorate; and The Government is nothing but the authorized 
 administrative agency of The Electorate. Having no free choice 
 as to its line of action, its offices being filled and its members being 
 selected, animated, directed, and controlled by and through 
 electorate action, The Government, considered as a subordinate 
 administrative agency, merely exercises the authority of a special 
 agency ; and, so considered, all of its acts are ministerial in nature. 
 
 The Status of Freedom. Freedom, as originally conceived when 
 Government was established, means immunity of the individual 
 from oppressive administrative action. 
 
 Permanency of Statv-s. Freedom, as ordained, rests upon an 
 agreement of individual wills which at the outset of political 
 administration enunciates the principles of individual existence
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 399 
 
 and of political action within the body politic ; and, calling to mind 
 all that has been said before, two facts must appear ; namely, first, 
 that the permanence of the stated form of freedom depends imme- 
 diately upon absolutely free, direct, continuous, and consistent 
 administrative action by individual electors, whether they are in or 
 out of The Government ; and second, that the possibility of this 
 kind of action will depend upon whether The Commonwealth 
 has and uses a system of administrative action under which it can 
 compel mdividual electors, however acting, to take this kind of 
 action. 
 
 Without such a sj^stem. The Electorate acting for the people 
 can not obtain and retain political leadership in electoral action or 
 statesmanship in official action ; or properly form, ascertain, and 
 express its opinion as to administrative action ; or obtain and 
 retain the chosen form of political representation ; or justly decide 
 what is responsible action either from electors or from officials, 
 whether either are acting individually or collectively with others. 
 But the one supreme reason for the existence of a comprehensive, 
 logical, and mandatory system of political administration remains 
 to be told. Unless a Free People, whose continuance in freedom 
 depends upon their own political action, have a system which 
 compels proper individual action, then the ability of The State 
 to keep individual action forever free is weakened, and an oppor- 
 tunity is presented for the adoption of a kind of administrative 
 action that is not in accordance with its original principles of 
 association. 
 
 The American Commonwealths have never possessed such a 
 system. All they ever had at the outset was an outline of one 
 which merely called for the use of The Electorate and The Govern- 
 ment, and loosely indicated how the ballots of individuals were to 
 be cast. The undesirable opportunity was always present; and, 
 almost from the first attempts at administration, each Common- 
 wealth ceased to confine itself to the use of the two ordained 
 Political Agencies. From the standpoint of political capacity, 
 this action seems incredible, but a glance at the conditions under 
 which our State Governments were formed and forced into action 
 may serve to soothe our wounded pride. 
 
 The administrative situation of the people of the thirteen original 
 States in 177(3 and the administrative situation of the original 
 Puritan settlers of Massachusetts in 1630 were alike in this one 
 respect ; namely, in neither instance did the people have an adequate 
 body of administrative law. Force of circumstances compelled the
 
 400 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Puritans to emigrate before devising such a body of law, and force 
 of circumstances pushed the people of the original States into self- 
 administration before such a body of law had been devised. 
 
 As for the Puritans, they lived along for eleven years without 
 laws which adequately prescribed electoral action, or oflScial 
 action, or which definitely determined individual rights under their 
 new regime. Being without an ordained rule of administrative 
 action, the body of settlers were unable to make their Will effectual 
 in the management of the affairs of the Colony ; and every student 
 of their political history' will remember that during this time there 
 was a constant clash of opinion ; that there were constant dis- 
 putes between individuals and between individuals and officials ; 
 that agreement, harmony, and united action became impossible ; 
 that " individual rights and liberties were considered precarious " ; 
 and that this condition of affairs continued until a statement of 
 the " Body of Liberties " was finally passed by the people in 1641. 
 
 During the succeeding one hundred and thirty-five years the 
 King, and Parliament, succeeded in destroying as much of the 
 political powers of the American Colonists as possible and in 
 putting the Colonies in a dependent position ; consequently, when 
 Independence came on with a rush in 1776, it placed the people of 
 the States in much the same position that hurried emigration had 
 placed the Puritan settlers in ; that is, it widened the field of polit- 
 ical action in the States before a body of law existed which regu- 
 lated such action ; and thus it came about that when the Common- 
 wealths assumed the responsibility of self-government, none of them 
 had a comprehensive and adequate system for forming, ascertain- 
 ing, expressing, applying, and enforcing The Will of The People, 
 or for accomplishing logically all of the various steps, stages, and 
 processes of free political administration. Up to the time when 
 Independence was asserted, the people of the Colonies were organ- 
 ized under a Colonial Form of Government and were forced to act 
 as measurably dependent Colonies. With the assumption of 
 Independence, how^ever, the whole plan of administrative action 
 was changed. The People were to fill all administrative offices, 
 and were to animate, direct, and control the action of their repre- 
 sentatives in public office. Their Will alone was to be the moving 
 and controlling force in political administration ; and the reader can 
 perceive the unfortunate position in which the Commonwealths 
 were placed through acquiring political independence before they 
 were fully prepared for it ; for, notwithstanding the fact that 
 proper political administration depends most largely upon proper
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 401 
 
 Electoral Action, the Commonwealths were forced by the push of 
 events into administering Government without constitutional or 
 even statutory provisions that would enable The State to keep the 
 exercise of The Reserved Powers of Administration in the hands of 
 the electors, or which would enable The Electorate to effectually 
 control the exercise of The Delegated Powers of Administration. 
 
 Requisites of an Administrative System : Theoretically, at the 
 birth of every Representative Democracy the people exercise a 
 choice between fundamental laws, governmental objects, admin- 
 istrative agencies, and administrative systems. 
 
 The alternative choice which is presented to the people when they 
 are considering or constructing their administrative system is solely 
 a choice between logical and expediential means and methods for 
 the exercise of the Powers of Administration. 
 
 Specifically, these means and methods relate to the exercise of 
 political power for its specific objects, and to the exercise of political 
 authority for its specific objects. 
 
 Theoretically, the choice between the different kinds of adminis- 
 trative means and methods is to be determined through a considera- 
 tion of the underlying principles of association, principles of action, 
 and objects of action. In other words, the choice should be deter- 
 mined by a reference to the first principles, the political principles, 
 and the governmental objects which the people have ordained. 
 
 Theoretically, these means and methods should be of a kind that 
 will enable the people to put all of their principles into full operation 
 in the political, economic, and social effort of the individual. 
 
 The people of the American Commonwealths have never 
 exhausted their Powers of Establishment ; that is, they have 
 never at the outset of government constructed a logical and com- 
 prehensive system of administration. But nevertheless what they 
 did do in this respect is sufficient to show that they intended to have 
 their administrative systems composed of means and methods of a 
 kind that when used together would enable The Commonwealth 
 to secure a direct, united, continuous, and effectual exercise of 
 The Reserved Powers of Administration from and by all of the 
 electors, and a direct, continuous, and responsible exercise of The 
 Delegated Powers of Administration from and by individual 
 officials and representatives in The Government. The power to 
 determine the Administrative Policy during a period of admin- 
 istration ; to select and to choose candidates for elective office and 
 for the legislature ; to direct and to control the action of The 
 Government ; to enforce responsible action from electors, officials,
 
 402 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 and representatives, are powers the theoretical exercise of which 
 belongs exclusively to the people. We have, however, entrusted 
 the direct exercise of these powers (and others) to The Electorate. 
 We must therefore conclude that the exercise of these powers 
 belongs exclusively to the individuals who compose The Electorate, 
 and that The Electorate acts as the political trustee of the people. 
 
 Testing these powers of administration by the spirit, the intent, 
 the obligations of the people and their principles of Democratic 
 Action, we have found in the first place that they each and all are 
 powers that must be continuously exercised by the individuals who 
 compose The Electorate — the body that is the Common Superior 
 of its three-branched administrating agency, The Government; 
 secondly, we have found that they must be exercised freely by the 
 individuals who compose The Electorate ; and thirdly, we have 
 found that the exercise of these powers can not be logically or 
 morally transferred or delegated by such individuals, the reason 
 being that if these powers are not so exercised, or if such delegated 
 exercise is allowed to take place, then The Sovereign immediately 
 loses its ability to make its Will operative upon all of its Sovereign- 
 units and upon its administrative servants so long as the misuse or 
 the illogical transfer remains operative. The Sovereign has the 
 right, and has created the power by which, to make its Will 
 operative. At the outset it has the ability to do so. But whether, 
 under its scheme of administrative action, it continues to retain 
 this ability will depend most largely upon the character and kind 
 of means and methods of which its administrative system is 
 composed. 
 
 Electoral Requisites. A certain degree of intelligence is required 
 of electors in order to maintain in society the individual Freedom, 
 Liberty, Equality, and Justice as ordained. They must also 
 possess a certain degree of moral development, sufficient at least 
 to enable them to understand the meanings of their first principles, 
 the spirit and intent of the people, and to recognize and feel their 
 responsibilities as units of the Collective Sovereign. As far as 
 possible, the " Power to Govern " which individual electors have 
 acquired in one way or another must be equaled by their mental 
 and moral capacities. These must be continually sustained, invig- 
 orated, and developed in order to fit the people to deal under- 
 standingly with the ever changing economic conditions in society, 
 for political administration must keep pace with economic develop- 
 ment or individual hardships and injustices will be the result. 
 Possessing liberty, that is, being economically free, individuals
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 403 
 
 must be imbued with civic virtue, or, as we call it, " Public Spirit " ; 
 for unless all individuals while exercising political power or political 
 authority act in a public-spirited manner, then the ordained 
 liberties in the exercise of individual power will stand in danger of 
 impairment or extinction. 
 
 But most important of all, having originally been ordained as 
 'politically free, the individual electors must remain politically free ; 
 for, in order to secure the necessary stability and effectiveness in 
 political administration, this one prime necessity exists ; namely, 
 the continuous, absolute, and unrestrained freedom of the indi- 
 vidual elector while engaged in the formation and expression of 
 his administrative desire and will. Political Administration may 
 become perverted in any of its steps, stages, and processes ; but 
 unless all individual electors possess the opportunity for an 
 absolutely free exercise of volition and political prerogative, it will 
 necessarily be perverted at its source; and, whether after Govern- 
 ment is established, individual electors possess the requisite oppor- 
 tunity or not, will depend upon the character and adequacy of the 
 administrative system m use. 
 
 It may be objected that an electorate composed of thoroughly 
 qualified electors does not exist. The claim is true ; but on the 
 other hand, it does not have to exist in order to produce logical 
 political administration. All that is necessary in a Representative 
 Democracy is the existence of a majority in the electorate, the 
 individuals of which are properly qualified and morally motived ; 
 and I doubt that any of my readers will seriously insist that such a 
 majority, given the opportunity to act logically, would not be 
 found at present in every American Commonwealth. 
 
 Orderly Administrative Action. As said before, the people 
 attempt to make their will operative in political administration 
 through a regular succession of moves that are made over and over 
 again in the succeeding periods of administration, the exercise of 
 political power for one specific purpose clearing the situation, as it 
 were, for the exercise of power for the next succeeding purpose. 
 Broadly speaking, every successive exercise of political power has 
 for its ultimate object, first, the issuance of a command regarding 
 the exercise of The Delegated Powers of Administration; and 
 second, the placing of The Electorate in the position where it can 
 rigidly and justly control the exercise of those powers. 
 
 Amount of Administrative Work. A glance at the chapter titles 
 from Chapter V to Chapter XXII inclusive will serve to indicate 
 some of the specific purposes for which the Powers of x\dministra-
 
 404 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 tion are to be used. The amount of administrative work is tre- 
 mendous ; but, as said in Chapter I, it is the price which the people 
 must pay for the maintenance of their ordained conditions of 
 individual existence. 
 
 Object of. Individual liberties as ordained by Representative 
 Democracies are entirely dependent for continuance upon the 
 administrative action of individuals. This kind of action requires 
 strict regulation. Common prudence requires The Common- 
 wealth to appraise its ever changing and increasing Sovereign- 
 units of their obligations and duties. Theoretically, this notice 
 is served in the form of an established body of administrative laws 
 by which the individual elector is bound while in the exercise of 
 political administrative power, and by which the public official or 
 representative is bound while in the exercise of political authority. 
 These laws, relating as they do to the exercise of political power 
 and of authority, should completely regulate every administrative 
 action, whether taken in an electoral or in an official capacity. 
 The function of these laws is to distinctly prescribe the means and 
 the methods, or both, by which all of The Powers of Administration 
 are to be exercised ; and the rules should have but one end in view ; 
 namely, to make The Will of The People (and nothing else) fully 
 operative in the administrative action of The Commonwealth. 
 
 As to Individual Rights. No matter how glorious the principles 
 which underly our attempt at self-government, no matter how 
 fair our form of government, the benefits and happiness which are 
 supposed to flow to individuals from its administration can never 
 be secured (and consequently can never be transmitted to the 
 succeeding generations that compose The State) unless the system 
 by which it is administered enables individuals to put the full 
 meaning and intent of the principles into active operation in every 
 step, stage, and process of administration, for the use of an 
 illogical system of application must necessarily produce illogical 
 results. The happiness of the individual in the American Com- 
 monwealths proceeds in part from the fact that he has been declared 
 to possess certain political and civil rights. The continuance of 
 this kind of happiness depends entirely upon his continued posses- 
 sion and exercise of these rights. Both classes of rights have been 
 created and bestowed in the same way ; that is, by political action 
 on the part of the people ; and the exercise of political power has 
 been placed in the hands of the individual to enable him, when 
 acting with others as the Collective Sovereign, to protect individual 
 units in the possession of these rights and to provide individual
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 405 
 
 units with the opportunity for constantly using them. Between 
 civil or political rights there is no difference in principle concerning 
 the manner in which they can be made effectual, and the first step 
 towards making them effectual is the construction by the Acting 
 Sovereign of a logical and comprehensive system of administrative 
 action. 
 
 Outline of. When we consider the successive steps in which, and 
 the specific objects for which, The Supreme Power of The People is 
 used, then it will appear that a system of administration must 
 necessarily be composed of several distinct, complementary, and 
 mutually supportive sets of methods, each making it possible to 
 properly accomplish some one step, stage, process, and specific 
 purpose of political administration. 
 
 Each of these several prescribed sets of methods will constitute, 
 as it were, a subsidiary system that regulates the transaction of 
 some specific department or phase of administrative action, such, 
 for instance, as naturalization, the elections, public control, amend- 
 ing State Constitutions, public education, and so on. 
 
 Looked at in this way, and roughly outlined, the system of politi- 
 cal administration will appear to be composed of several sets of 
 " Rules of Action " which regulate the following matters : 
 
 1. The Organization of Formative and Constructive Electoral 
 Action under the guidance of Political Leadership and with the 
 assistance of Political Parties, thus securing a free exercise of Voli- 
 tion and Political Prerogative on the part of the Sovereign-units. 
 
 2. The Organization and Work of All Directly Legislating 
 Electorate Bodies, such as Constitutional Conventions. 
 
 3. The Organization and Work of All Officially Legislating 
 Bodies, such as Legislatures, Commissions, Councils. 
 
 4. The Organization and Work of All Judiciary Bodies : Courts. 
 
 5. The Organization and Work of Ail Electorate Boards having 
 the management and control of the various Administrative Pro- 
 cesses. 
 
 6. The Periodic Determination of the Numerical Extent of the 
 Electorate : Citizenship, Naturalization, Admission of First Voters. 
 
 7. The Periodic Determination of the Voting Extent of the 
 Electorate : Registration. 
 
 S. The Filling of the Appointive Positions in the Civil Service of 
 the Government in such a manner as will make the Parlizan Party 
 Spoils System inoperative as a means to this end. 
 
 9. The Free Formation of Administrative Will in and by the 
 People during each Period of Administration as a prclimhiary
 
 406 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 requisite towards obtaining a Proportionate Representation of the 
 predominating sentiments of The People in The Government. 
 
 10. The Free Periodic Expression of Public Opinion by the 
 Electorate : Public Opinion to be expressed by means of a form 
 of The Ballot that enables individual electors to freely choose 
 between the Predominating Administrative Sentiments upon their 
 merits alone; thus separating Questions of Candidacy from Ques- 
 tions of Administrative Policy ; providing electors with the oppor- 
 tunity to Freely and Directly express their Administrative Will ; 
 securing a Definite Impulse to The Government ; securing a con- 
 stant succession of Political Majorities ; and the opportunity for 
 the Representation of Ideas in The Legislature. 
 
 1 1 . The Nomination of Candidates for Elective Offices by means 
 of a method of selection and choice that compels individual electors 
 to act solely as Sovereign-units ; that is, in a political capacity and 
 not in any other capacity while engaged in this work. 
 
 12. The Filling of Elective Offices by means of a form of The 
 Ballot that expresses nothing but an individual preference for a 
 Candidate. 
 
 13. The Continuous Enforcement of Political Responsibility 
 upon and from The Elector, The Public Official, The Legislature, 
 The Government, and each of its Branches through declaring the 
 Function and the Duty of all who exercise Political Power and 
 Political Authority for any general object or specific purpose. A 
 Department of The Judiciary might be established for the express 
 purpose of enforcing Political Responsibility after it has been 
 defined definitely. 
 
 14. The Continuous Control by the Electorate (the Actmg 
 Sovereign) over Its Individual Units, whether they are acting alone 
 or as members of the Electorate Boards, Political Conventions, 
 The Government and its separate branches, or as Public Officials, 
 through defining electoral malfeasance and official malfeasance, 
 prescribing and enforcing the specific and definite penalties there- 
 for, and prescribing definite procedure and methods for Removal 
 from Office. 
 
 15. Fhiblic Education, by declaring its definite objects and 
 purposes, and prescribing a system for the accomplishment of 
 these objects and purposes. 
 
 16. The Amendment of the System of Political Administration : 
 The Initiative and the Referendum, considered as means for sub- 
 stituting direct legislation for official legislation, or for obtaining 
 direct legislation at times when the ordained indirect legislation has
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 407 
 
 proved unsatisfactory, have not been included in the above out- 
 lined system of administrative action for the reason that it is framed 
 with the idea of putting the principle of Representative Action into 
 logical operation. 
 
 Importance of. Next to the form of government, the system of 
 administration exerts the most powerful influence upon the welfare 
 of the commonwealth and of the individual ; for upon its excellence 
 will depend the character of the impulse which the commonwealth 
 imparts to The Government, the fitness of those who are chosen 
 to public office, the degree of control which the commonwealth 
 has over its Sovereign-units, The Government, and its public 
 servants, the whole character of administrative action, and finally 
 the character of the public morals. 
 
 Must Have the Force of Law. The administrative system of a 
 commonwealth stands in the same relation to the continuous 
 administrative action of individuals as the " Rules of the Game " 
 do to the players of a game. Without a settled, an agreed-upon, 
 and operative body of rules, the contest between the players will 
 more often than otherwise degenerate into an unseemly squabble, 
 to say nothing of the opportunity for dishonest action or play 
 which the absence of rules affords. In the same way, and unless 
 the political contest is regulated by rules which are binding alike 
 upon all who are entitled to participate in administration, it is 
 sure to become the scene of irritating and distracting conflicts of 
 opinion, to say nothing here of the opportunity which is presented 
 for the satisfaction of immoral and selfish desire. 
 
 Supposing the people have framed a logical administrative 
 system, what then is necessary to enable them to retain possession 
 of it and to keep it intact ? A consideration of the following facts 
 with which we are familiar will suggest the answer. 
 
 Systems of political action are composed of means and methods 
 by which political power is exercised. Political power is exercised 
 by individuals possessing human frailties. The desire for wealth 
 actuates more individuals in common than any other desire, and 
 more powerfully. The opportunity to exercise political power 
 increases the ability of individuals who improve it to acquire 
 wealth. This opportunity will be grasped by individuals who 
 possess the elements of individual power in the greatest degree, 
 be those individuals moral or immoral in character. The Govern- 
 ment will respond as readily to an impulse of self-interest as to an 
 impulse of self-sacrifice. The exercise of a certain amount of 
 civic virtue by individuals is hidispensable to the production of the
 
 408 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 General Welfare. Up to the present time, self-interest has proved 
 to be a stronger animating force than civic virtue. Therefore, and 
 in order to insure from all individuals the requisite amount of 
 public-spirited or self-sacrificing action, it has been found necessary 
 for the people to confer upon each means and method for the 
 exercise of political power the compelling force of law; as otherwise 
 The Commonwealth will be unable to speedily or effectually pre- 
 vent the exercise of political power for selfish or non-political 
 objects. 
 
 Necessity for a Constitutional Basis. But since a Statute can be 
 altered or repealed at any time by another legislative enactment, 
 the only way to confer the permanency necessary in an administra- 
 tive system is to embody it within the Fundamental Law ; and this 
 can be easily accomplished by means of a properly organized, 
 directed, and controlled Constitutional Convention. 
 
 A Political Constitution : Theoretically, the Governmental 
 Agreements of the several American Commonwealths embrace the 
 following matters : 
 
 1. The Principles of Association and of Action. 
 
 2. The Objects of Government. 
 
 3. The Form of Government. 
 
 4. The Rights of Individuals and of The State. 
 
 5. The Administrative Objects to be attained through the 
 exercise of The Reserved Powers of Administration. 
 
 6. The Administrative Objects to be attained through the exer- 
 cise of the Delegated Powers of Administration. 
 
 7. The Manner in which these two classes of Administrative 
 Power are to be exercised. 
 
 Theoretically, these Governmental Agreements are supposed to 
 be embodied and set forth at length in the form of a written State 
 Constitution that acts to give formal notice to all of the inhabitants 
 of The State of all the detailed mandates that are contained in the 
 Governmental Agreements. 
 
 The chief difficulty, however, which is encountered by a people 
 who desire to operate together as a Representative Democracy is 
 not connected with the decision regarding their principles of 
 association and action, or the objects of Government, or the 
 specific form of government, or the powers and rights of individ- 
 uals and of The State; for these are all matters which time, 
 experience, desire, and reason have practically settled before the 
 attempt is made to establish Government. The chief difficulty 
 is first encountered when the subject of Administrative Action is
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 409 
 
 taken up. It lies in the construction of a set of rules under which 
 it will be possible for the people to peacefully and continuously 
 maintain unimpaired the ordained political and social regime. 
 These rules fall naturally into two classes ; namely, those regulating 
 the exercise of Reserved Powers of Administration, and those 
 regulating the exercise of the Delegated Powers of Administration, 
 and when we consider the specific objects that are to be attained 
 by the exercise of these two sets of powers, we experience no real 
 difficulty in deciding that the logical exercise of The Reserved 
 Powers is of supreme importance to the individual and to The 
 State. 
 
 Principal Administrative Object of. The logical exercise by in- 
 dividuals of both of these sets of powers enables each individual to 
 assist properly in the maintenance of the ordained regime. But an 
 illogical exercise of The Reserved Powers has the effect of instantly 
 impairing and altering the very powers, rights, and conditions 
 which the exercise of political power was given them to maintain, 
 and administrative action becomes perverted at its very beginning. 
 If, as is generally but loosely stated, the prime object of a State 
 Constitution is to safeguard the powers and rights of individuals, 
 then, in so far as political administration is concerned, the principle 
 administrative object of a Constitution should be to distinctly 
 define iJie sphere of continuous Electoral Action. Stated in other 
 words, its principal object should be to provide logical rules for 
 the exercise of each of The Reserved Powers of Administration for 
 its specific object, such an exercise being absolutely indispensable 
 to the logical exercise of The Delegated Powers for their specific 
 objects. 
 
 But when the people of the original States started self-govern- 
 ment, they were much more concerned with securing a safe exercise 
 of political authority than they were in securing a logical exercise 
 of political power. They relied on the force of Public Spirit to 
 produce a logical exercise of The Reserved Powers, and the part 
 of their Constitutions which related to political administration was 
 chiefly given over to defining the sphere of Official Action through the 
 incorporation therein of a long statement of the restrictions and 
 limitations that were to be placed upon the exercise of The Dele- 
 gated Powers. But when completed, the Constitutions were 
 practically silent concerning the logical exercise of the Reserved 
 Powers ; and this one-sided action by the people produced two 
 important results. In the first place, the Commonwealths were 
 forced into administrative action before they possessed a compre-
 
 410 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 hensive system of action. This in turn imposed upon them the 
 necessity of developing one after administration was started. 
 But starting with no compulsory rule of direct Electoral Action, 
 the choice of the means and methods of such action was unfor- 
 tunately left open to influences that proceeded from human weak- 
 nesses combined with the widespread lack of administrative 
 knowledge ; and, as we are aware, the final result was the growth, 
 development, and dominance of The Partizan Party System of 
 Administration. In the second place, the effort of the people to 
 strictly define the sphere of ofiicial action, unaccompanied as it 
 was by a corresponding effort to secure a logical exercise of The 
 Reserved Powers of Administration, had the effect of creating a 
 widespread impression that the official action of the people was 
 the most important. 
 
 This confusing and erroneous idea of the relative importance of 
 electoral action and official action still receives support from the 
 form and phraseology of many of the present State Constitutions. 
 Taking the Constitution of the State of New Jersey as an example 
 because it lies next to hand : It starts oflF well by declaring that 
 " All political power is inherent in the people " and that they have 
 the right at all times to alter or reform their method of Govern- 
 ment. But in Article IV it declares that " The legislative power 
 (sic) shall be vested in " the legislature. Then, and notwithstand- 
 ing this statement, the Constitution proceeds to demonstrate 
 that all of the legislative power of the people of the State is not 
 vested in the legislature, for there is a further provision in the 
 Constitution which provides that any amendment of the Consti- 
 tution shall be submitted by the legislature to the People of The 
 State for approval, ratification, or rejection. 
 
 What is the approval, ratification, or rejection by the people of 
 a proposed amendment of the State Constitution either more or 
 less than a direct exercise by the people of their legislative and 
 judicial power? And which is the most important action, the 
 mere drafting of the amendment by the legislature, or the approval, 
 ratification, or rejection by the people ? And how can the people 
 properly exercise legislative power if its exercise is really vested 
 in the legislature ? 
 
 This instance is but one of the inaccuracies regarding the proper 
 exercise by the people of their administrative power that are con- 
 tained in the Constitution quoted from ; and exactly the same 
 kind of blunders, but more in quantity, are to be found in the 
 proposed Constitution of the State of New York that was put forth
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 411 
 
 by the New York State Constitutional Convention in September, 
 1915. 
 
 But the point to be emphasized is this : A State Constitution 
 should contain an absolutely logical and comprehensive System of 
 Political Administration that .regulates both kinds of action. 
 L^nless it does contain such a body of law, it is not and it can not 
 be the safeguard of individual rights that it should be. As illus- 
 trative of the general uncertainty that always follows insufficient 
 political action, let me cite the solemn utterance of one Southern 
 Judge, who, in speaking from the Bench of the indefinitely regu- 
 lated or safeguarded political rights of individuals, has referred to 
 them as " The implied rights of the people," thus raising the 
 implication that all individual rights, political or civil, which are 
 not definitely provided with or supported by constitutional means 
 and methods of enforcement, are upon an insecure basis, as indeed 
 they are. 
 
 This fact was illustrated signally by a clash which occurred in 
 the State of New York between individual rights and the rights of 
 the State, or what are commonly called " Community Rights." 
 In this instance it was the community rights that were unsupported 
 by legal provisions, but that does not alter the principle. The 
 legislature declared a transfer tax due upon property within the 
 State of non-resident intestates ; but provided no agency, means, or 
 methods for assessing, for determining the amount of, or for collect- 
 ing the tax. The State found itself unable to collect such taxes ; 
 for when the question of the right of the State to take the tax 
 imposed was brought before the judiciary, that branch of the State 
 Government immediately declared that it was not sufficient for 
 the legislature to merely declare that propert}^ was taxable, that 
 a tax could not be legally imposed unless the law in addition to 
 imposing the tax provided either an Officer or a Tribunal for its 
 assessment and collection, that in the absence of specific provisions 
 relating to the collection of the tax the law as it stood was incapable 
 of execution, and that, without a definite procedure under which 
 the respective rights of The State and of the individuals interested 
 could be determined, individuals stood in danger of being deprived 
 of some of their property rights. As said before, there is no 
 difference in principle as to the way in which Civil Rights and 
 Political Rights are made effectual, and the Courts of the Ameri- 
 can Commonwealths have repeatedly and emphatically declared 
 that the absence of legal and fully supportive provisions leaves 
 these rights " open to invasion."
 
 412 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 The protection of civil rights, once they are clearly defined in 
 the Constitution, is commonly left to oflScial action as affording 
 the speediest means of relief, the established statement and the 
 logical action of the judiciary combining to afford relief if needed. 
 Why then should not the political rights of the individual — the 
 protection of which is of the utmost importance to The State 
 because they are connected with the exercise of the political pre- 
 rogative, the volition, and the control by the people over official 
 action — be as fully, as clearly, and as definitely set forth in the 
 Constitutions ? 
 
 This necessity was partly recognized and in part met by the 
 original Commonwealths when they incorporated in their Con- 
 stitutions the scattered provisions relating to the exercise of the 
 Right of Suffrage and the Right of Amendment ; and in this con- 
 nection one significant fact is to be noted ; namely, that only those 
 political rights that were originally incorporated and supported 
 remain intact to-day, while all of the others have been gradually 
 invaded, impaired, or rendered practically inoperative by improper 
 administrative action which the people have unwittingly allowed 
 to be taken. 
 
 It is an undeniable fact that the American State Constitutions 
 have failed to enable the people to produce either the character or 
 the kind of political administration hoped for. They have failed 
 in part of their objects because of their faulty construction. 
 Lacking in the essential feature of control over individual electoral 
 action, the Constitutions (considered as enactments by the people) 
 have left the opportunity open for individual electors to avoid their 
 political obligations. We have seen how the electors, eagerly 
 pursuing the happiness that flows from material advancement, 
 have generally improved the opportunity to shift their obligations 
 and responsibilities to the shoulders of the irresponsible and 
 illogically working Partizan Party. Lacking in the essential feature 
 of control over oflBcial action, the State Constitutions have left the 
 opportunity, if not the necessity, open to the legislatures to choose 
 the agencies, means, and methods by which the ordained admin- 
 istrative work of the elector. The Electorate, the official, and The 
 Government shall be performed. Because of this lack, the people 
 have been left without any effective guarantee whatsoever that the 
 agencies, means, and methods so chosen will either reflect the 
 ordained democratic ideals, or make operative the democratic 
 principles of action that are but vaguely expressed in the Consti- 
 tutions ; and we have seen how the legislatures, filled by improper
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 413 
 
 action with party partizans, have finally provided the people with 
 agencies, means, and methods which, when put into operation, 
 actually destroy the ordained administrative action. 
 
 Is Not Immutable. But a State Constitution is not immutable ; 
 that is, it is not incapable of change, and herein lies the hope of 
 the people for ultimate administrative success. The provisions 
 relating to amendment provide and ordain a method (in case at 
 any time the other provisions of the Constitution fail to meet the 
 emergencies of administration, or fail to provide means enabling 
 the people to deal justly with the changed conditions of individuals 
 in society) whereby the Constitution can be altered or changed by 
 the people in any period of administration and without recourse 
 to violent revolutionary methods, and without impairment of its 
 dignity, force, and effect. 
 
 The Process of Amendment. The Power to alter or change the 
 political aegis of a Democracy is practically unlimited. It is one 
 of the Reserved Powers of Administration. The people of The 
 State alone possess the right to exercise it. Direct electoral action 
 is the ordained mode for its exercise. Consequently a Political 
 Constitution can not be properly amended in any respect by a mere 
 exercise of authority by The Government, that body being nothing 
 but an agency of The Electorate. 
 
 The reason for direct electoral action is evident. The system of 
 political administration is properly a part of a Political Constitu- 
 tion, It should be as stable as the other parts of the Constitution. 
 Otherwise the people are kept constantly stirred up regarding the 
 mode in which power and authority are to be exercised. The 
 people are subjected to the perplexities of uncertainty, for if The 
 Government is permitted to prescribe the means and the methods 
 by which political power and political authority shall be exercised, 
 then there is nothing to prevent the administrative system from 
 being subject to constant change and alteration, or from having 
 illogical means and methods incorporated within it in case the 
 administrative agency wishes to change the ordained mode of 
 exercising the Powers of Administration. An instable Constitu- 
 tion can not serve as a permanent safeguard to political rights, 
 its instability affording the opportunities for the speedy destruc- 
 tion of these rights. 
 
 Constitutional Conventions. Theoretically, it is The Electorate 
 who produce the state constitution in the first place, and who 
 amend it afterwards. A Constitutional Convention is strictly a 
 political body that works for the General Welfare. Theoretically,
 
 414 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 the Constitutional Convention is to be composed of individual 
 electors who while in convention assembled will work solely in the 
 capacity of electors; and we may as well squarely face the fact that 
 the hope of the people for ultimate administrative success will be 
 deferred just so long as the people continue to pass amendments 
 that are devised by partizan-filled legislatures, and just so long 
 as the people continue to fill their periodic constitutional conven- 
 tions with national, state, and county partizan party Bosses and 
 leaders, with Partizan Party office holders and office seekers, 
 with Captains of Industry, with Big Business and High Finance 
 lawyers, every man of whom is either interested in the mainte- 
 nance of The Partizan Party as the broker in the sale of legislation 
 and as the dispenser of " Privilege " in some form or other, every 
 man of whom is seeking some private advantage or political pre- 
 ferment by means of a Partizan Party, and every man of whom 
 places partizan party considerations first in his action while in 
 convention. 
 
 True statesmen, true political leaders, and sagacious public- 
 spirited citizens alone are entitled to seats in a State Political 
 Convention ; and their presence as a majority in a constitutional 
 convention will alone afford any hope to the people that the con- 
 vention will produce a political and not a partizan Constitution. 
 Constitutional action is merely direct legislation that is most largely 
 aimed at administrative action. Unless the people regulate con- 
 stitutional action beforehand so as to exclude all Partizan Party 
 considerations from that action, the result will be that the funda- 
 mental laws mil more and more receive a Partizan Party bias 
 that will pervert administrative action. 
 
 As to Principles. The spirit and the intent of a people find 
 first expression in the statement of their professed Principles of 
 Associative Action. In order that there may be no misunderstand- 
 ing or dispute concerning the true meaning of that spirit and intent, 
 a State Constitution should contain a formal statement of the 
 precise meaning of each fundamental principle of individual 
 existence and action upon which the experiment in government 
 rests, for one of the proper functions of a constitution of a Repre- 
 sentative Democracy is to distinctly set forth the relations of the 
 citizens to each other, to the Commonwealth, to The Electorate, 
 to The Government, and the relation of each branch of The Gov- 
 ernment to the whole composite agency. The fundamental 
 principles of beneficent Republics are necessarily moral concepts, 
 and political administration in the American Commonwealths is
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 415 
 
 an attempt by the people of a State to put their moral concepts 
 into effective operation. 
 
 As a Moral Law. Regarded from the standpoint of morality, 
 a State Constitution is a written statement by the people of their 
 political ]\Ioral Law. The individual should refer to it alone for 
 guidance in his administrative action whenever questions of 
 propriety arise. It should be couched in terms that imperatively 
 direct his attention to each specific principle that governs the 
 performance of each class of administrative actions, and should 
 neither leave him in mental uncertainty concerning the true 
 meaning of these principles, nor force him to the perusal of general 
 history — in our case largely an expression of private opinion — 
 for information concerning the methods by which the principles 
 can be best put into effective operation. 
 
 The statement of the inclusive political principles of the Ameri- 
 can Commonwealths has won world-wide admiration and com- 
 mendation, but the efforts of the commonwealths to put these 
 principles into effective operation have failed. This failure is in 
 part due to the fact that the Commonwealths have not as yet 
 inserted a logical body of Administrative Law in their Constitu- 
 tions. Lacking in mandatory law, the people have been swayed 
 by " Opinion " as to admmistrative procedure. We have seen 
 how The Electorate has been led into delegating the exercise of 
 political prerogative and volition to The Partizan Party, and I do 
 not hesitate to say that both reason and experience unite to prove 
 the inadequacy of our present State Constitutions in that they fail 
 to distinctly indicate the manner in which the problems that are 
 connected with the exercise of The Reserved Powers of Admin- 
 istration shall be worked out in and by The Electorate. 
 
 Theoretically, the exercise of The Supreme Power is placed in 
 the hands of the individuals who compose The Electorate partly 
 to enable any elector, at any time, to invoke the whole power of 
 The State to maintain his own ordained powers and rights, and 
 the powers and rights of others, against any misuse and encroach- 
 ments whatsoever. 
 
 Theoretically, the Reserved Powers of Administration are to 
 be exercised freely and directly by the individuals who compose 
 The Electorate. Therefore, the Constitution, considered as the 
 Supreme Law which individual electors are to observe while in the 
 exercise of these powers, should, in order to be effectual, dis- 
 tinctly and conspicuously prescribe the way in which these powers 
 are to be used, thus, m effect, prohibiting The Electorate from
 
 416 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 delegating the exercise of any of these powers either to The Govern- 
 ment or to any association of voters whatsoever. Our theory of 
 Government provides for but two legitimate administrative 
 agencies; namely, The Electorate and The Government; conse- 
 quently, any exercise of political power by any other agency is 
 an improper exercise. 
 
 Function of. The function of a body of Administrative Law is to 
 prevent an improper exercise of political power and political 
 authority. It attempts this through specifying how the Reserved 
 Powers of Administration shall and shall not be used. Such a body 
 of law is the only safeguard which a people can possess against the 
 creation and existence of an illegitimate administrative agency 
 and the consequent improper exercise of the Delegated Powers of 
 Administration. Individual electors are in fact political trustees 
 of the people. Public safety and individual welfare require that 
 electoral action be strictly regulated. Were individual electors 
 obliged to exercise political power for specific purposes according to 
 specific methods — just as a Sheriff is bound by legal provisions 
 that govern every move in the exercise of his authority — they 
 could not be deprived of the exercise of political power so long as 
 the desire to exercise it remained ; for the obligation to use, coupled 
 with the methods of use, would secure them in the exercise of the 
 right to use, while the remaining provisions in the law would enable 
 any elector to invoke the whole powder of The State to prevent 
 and to punish any improper exercise of administrative power and 
 authority. Also the mandatory provisions would serve to protect 
 the public official in the exercise of authority, while the prohibi- 
 tory provisions would serve to enable the Common Superior to 
 secure a proper exercise of authority. 
 
 The American Commonwealths have never had and do not now 
 possess such an administrative system, either in kind or in detail. 
 Because of this lack, their efforts at administration have not only 
 been ineffectual, but to a considerable extent have damped the 
 belief that a republican form of government is a practical means 
 for promoting individual and social welfare. Moreover, our 
 mistaken and misguided but misunderstood administrative action 
 has created widespread doubts as to the ability of any free Com- 
 monwealth to manage its affairs properly by this means. But 
 what is still worse, our failure has lessened the feeling of loyalty 
 and attachment to Democratic Principles in many of our owti 
 citizens who do not perceive the true cause of the failure, and 
 attribute it to our " Form of Government." While this is incal-
 
 THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 417 
 
 culable harm, it is by no means irreparable, provided the people 
 be brought in time to realize that by far the larger part of their 
 administrative faults and blunders have their immediate origin in 
 their illegitimate use of The Partizan Party as an administrative 
 agency. 
 
 Benefits Flowing from a Logical System : If such an administra- 
 tive system as that indicated above were incorporated within the 
 Fundamental Law, it would greatly assist The Commonwealth 
 in the following respects. 
 
 As to Policy. It would secure to individual electors absolute 
 freedom in forming their " opinions " on questions of Administra- 
 tive Policy, and in ascertaining, constructing, and expressing the 
 Administrative Will. 
 
 As to Filling Elective Offices. It would enable The Electorate to 
 directly transact the indispensable Caucus Work connected with the 
 selection and the nomination of candidates for elective oflSces. 
 
 As to Leadership. With absolute freedom secured to individual 
 action, then Political Leadership would assert its full force in the 
 administrative action of The Commonwealth and would become the 
 natural stimulus in the formation of Public Opinion. 
 
 As to Political Parties. With absolute freedom secured to 
 individual action, then Political Parties could freely form and dis- 
 solve w^henever required, and play their natural part in the forma- 
 tion of the required successive Political Majorities. 
 
 As to Representation. It would enable the people to more easily 
 maintain their chosen kind of Political Representation, and would 
 also enable them to prevent the easy substitution of other kinds. 
 
 As to Control and Responsibility. It would tend to maintain the 
 Power of Control in the hands of the people, and would restore its 
 pristine meanings to the Doctrine of Responsibility. With a 
 logical system for exercising its coercive power, the body politic 
 could reasonably and justly enforce the obligations of Responsibil- 
 ity, not only upon each public official, but also upon each member 
 of The Electorate as well. 
 
 In the Hamilton edition of the Federalist (1880) on page 302 a 
 Republic is defined as " That form of control in which all executive 
 officers are personally and legally responsible for the manner in 
 which their duties are performed." It is plain, however, that 
 responsibility cannot be legally enforced unless there be legal 
 methods or provisions for its enforcement, and it is equally plain 
 that responsibility can not be jnstly and reasonably enforced unless 
 an adequate rule of official action exists beforehand.
 
 418 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Finally, a logical administrative system would help The Com- 
 monwealth to secure the right kind of administrative action from 
 all who are entitled to participate in such action, and so would 
 tend to keep alive the Spirit of American Democracy. Add to 
 such a system a specific method for exercising the Power to Amend, 
 and the people would have the opportunity at least for maintaining 
 the exercise of The Reserved Powers of Administration in the 
 hands of The Electorate, for controlling the exercise of The 
 Delegated Powers, and for solving their Problems of Political 
 Administration logically. 
 
 " The Machinery of Government.'' Political Administration is 
 not a mechanical operation involving the use of machines or 
 machinery. The power applied is Administrative Will. Suc- 
 cessful political administration does, however, require the aid of 
 a comprehensive system of logical individual action. Such a 
 system occupies the same relation to the moral application of 
 political power as machinery does to the eflScient application 
 of physical power ; but it regulates moral action. Consequently 
 it is dangerous to speak of it in terms of mechanics, for by so 
 doing we insensibly drift away from a contemplation of its moral 
 side. There is no " Machinery of Government." There is, how- 
 ever. The System of Political Administration.
 
 CHAPTER XXIV 
 POLITICAL REFORM 
 
 Era of Reform. The installation of an illogical administrative 
 system is the inauguration of an era of political reform ; for al- 
 though an illogical system can not and will not serve as an instru- 
 mentality for giving full force and effect to the ordained principles 
 of action, nevertheless the true meanings of the principles remain 
 unaltered and continually prompt some individuals to strive for 
 their proper application in The Commonwealth. 
 
 Continuous Reform. Attempts to reform the electoral action of 
 the American Commonwealths have been continuous since the 
 beginning of State Government. Continuous political reform is 
 a symptom of political disease. It points directly at two facts ; 
 namely, the existence of a defective system of action, and the in- 
 adequacy of the attempted reforms. 
 
 Our whole line of reform effort has failed in the past because at 
 core it was but an attempt to make opinion serve in the place of 
 administrative truth. Our repeated attempts at administrative 
 reform have failed in the past because they were merely attempts 
 to make some one expedient or another serve in the place of a 
 logical agency, means, or method. 
 
 Effects produced by our Bad System. The administrative 
 system which we have allowed to be built up is not " Complex " 
 — as so many political writers euphemistically term it. It is just 
 plain bad in nature and in detail. It forces us to take action that 
 belies our professions of intent and gives to these professions the 
 appearance of foolish or h\-pocritical pretensions. The majority 
 of us are not hj-pocrites ; but viewing our action dispassionately 
 does it not appear foolish to try to purify a system that is bad in 
 principle by tinkering at its various parts ? No matter how much 
 we attempt to make The Partizan Party System " work " by in- 
 troducing new methods, the system remains bad because its prin- 
 ciple is bad ; and when put into oi)eration with the new method or 
 
 419
 
 420 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 methods incorporated it can not do otherwise but produce a kind 
 of action that is not in accord with our professed principles of 
 action. 
 
 Furthermore, we suffer in peace of mind and in reputation ; for 
 the faihire of each " Reform method " or " Reform Movement " 
 is heralded as evidence either of inherent weakness in our form of 
 government, or of our inherent inability to govern ; while the 
 plain fact of the matter is that each " Reform " method when ap- 
 plied is but a patch upon an inherently false and alien administra- 
 tive system that, nurtured by The Partizan Party, can grow faster 
 than it can be patched. Once the reform patches are applied they 
 lose their reform character and are made to serve the purposes of 
 The Partizan Party. Is not this one fact alone sufficient to show 
 the futility of trying to produce logical action by means of an il- 
 logical system of action? 
 
 But besides this the Partizan Party System is illogically elastic. 
 It is composed largely of expediential methods. If one fails, 
 another may be incorporated in its place ; and there is no limit to 
 the incorporation of expediential methods, none of which however 
 will serve to produce logical individual action. The trouble with 
 our reform methods is that they are usually given a partizan party 
 applicability before they are incorporated into the system. Con- 
 sequently political reform makes no real progress. It merely 
 consists of repeated attempts to make one expedient after another 
 produce some one detail result. Finally, the system in use is a 
 partizan party system ; and by this time we should have learned by 
 experience that the ultimate effect of each tinkering effort is to seat 
 The Partizan Party more firmly as an incubus upon our shoulders. 
 
 Chief Source of Support. Considered as a change for the better 
 political reform receives its chief support from the young and 
 from the politically uninformed — the mentally young. Such 
 men are usually the most enthusiastic concerning proper detail 
 results in administrative action. On the other hand they are 
 most inclined to regard " the established order of things " as right. 
 Effectual political reform is revolutionary in character in that it 
 seeks to change the established order; and the young and the 
 politically uninformed naturally shrink from such reform because it 
 alters that which in the past has had their affection and allegiance. 
 
 Character of Effort. Such men are most easily led into attempts 
 to " make the existing system work." To them political reform 
 means the devising of another way of using a bad system and 
 not the substitution of a better system. Being short sighted
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 421 
 
 their attention is most easily directed towards an expediential 
 remedying of detail local conditions, and away from a consideration 
 of the real cause for the existence of distasteful conditions every- 
 where in The State. Each succeeding attempt by such " Re- 
 formers " results in a ridiculous failure to " Purify Politics " ; 
 and, what is most regrettable, at times when several " Reform 
 efforts " press together for immediate attention the main cause 
 of our failure becomes more and more beclouded in the mental 
 fog that is raised by the conflict of " Opinion." 
 
 Sporadic and Disconnected Character of. True political reform 
 consists not in trying to make illogical methods work properly, or 
 in trying to make them work properly in given localities in a 
 State. It consists in constructing logical methods under which 
 it is possible to transact administrative work properly everywhere 
 in The State. 
 
 Our past reformatory effort has proved ineffective largely be- 
 cause it has not been turned towards remedying the general evil 
 under which the power and capacity of the elector is weakened 
 and misdirected everyW'here and at all times throughout The 
 State. Efforts which are made to remedy local conditions at 
 different times naturally impart a sporadic and disconnected 
 character to reform effort. Details are attacked one after another ; 
 but the general system under w'hich it is always possible to coun- 
 teract reformatory effort is never attacked sapiently. While 
 every now and then it is possible to eradicate an evil, nevertheless 
 the sum total of political evil is not lessened materially because it 
 is always possible for The Partizan Party to create new evils by 
 the simple process of devising new methods of action. Is Politics 
 more moral after all these years of effort? Have our reform at- 
 tempts bestowed a satisfactory exercise of political power upon 
 the elector? Have they succeeded in banishing from society 
 conditions that are abhorrent to our moral sense, and which are 
 detrimental to the General Welfare, and which are menacing 
 the stability of The Commonwealth ? True ! The Independents 
 sometimes cast the largest vote and sometimes succeed in throwing 
 some local Party Machine out of gear for the time being; but 
 that effort does not affect the system of " party organization " 
 nor does it upset the general system of " Party Control " over 
 Ivlectoral and over Governmental Action. Quite the contrary — 
 and this is the most deplorable feature of the matter — in every 
 election gained by the Independents they have had to use most 
 of the methods of The Partizan Party System, and so, instead of
 
 422 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 even weakening it, their efforts have had the effect of strengthening 
 it and of bestowing a species of sanction upon its use. 
 
 A " Victory " so obtained over a local Party Machine is of little 
 consequence to a commonwealth so long as the illogical adminis- 
 trative system remains unchanged under which the " Party Ma- 
 chine "" remains a political institution. Such a victory may re- 
 sult in better local administration somewhere for a short period ; 
 but it does not affect the general political condition at all, nor does 
 it even unseat Bossism in the locality of the victory. Such an 
 effort finds the reasons for its existence in dissatisfaction with 
 local " Party Practises " rather than in dissatisfaction with the 
 illogical system which makes " Party Politics " general. Having 
 a special instead of a general object the attempt at reform lacks 
 the necessary incentive to continuous exertion. Because all 
 " Reform Movements " in later years have been devoid of a suf- 
 ficient and sustaining principle and object they have been spas- 
 modic, unsystematic, and intrinsically weak. Let us take two 
 illustrations. 
 
 The Committee of Seventy. The first New York City Committee 
 of Seventy, an independent association of citizens formed in 1871, 
 broke up the Tweed Ring, and, through an alliance with the Re- 
 publican Partizan Party Machine in the City, defeated the Tam- 
 many Hall Democracy. But, depending upon the alliance with 
 the local Republican Machine for its success, and failing to satisfy 
 that Machine in the distribution of party patronage, the Repub- 
 lican Machine made a " Deal " with the Tammany Machine con- 
 cerning party patronage in 1874. The Republican Machine then 
 put a third ticket in the field. This enabled strictly " Regular " 
 Republicans to escape the " Party " odium of " irregular " action 
 with The Independents ; and the ticket drew support that would 
 otherwise have gone to The Committee. Two results followed. 
 Tammany won ; and The Committee, discouraged by its lack of 
 continued support, soon afterwards dissolved. 
 
 The Citizens Movement. The second Committee of Seventy, 
 appointed in 1892 to manage the Citizens Movement in New 
 York City, which was also an independent association of citizens 
 working to secure " Honest " government of the City affairs, allied 
 itself with all associations opposed to " Tammany Rule " and won 
 the election on the issue of freeing cit}^ administration from 
 " Party dominance." 
 
 This Movement was really a revolt against the evils of local 
 Bossism. It made no attack against The Partizan Party System.
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 423 
 
 It really helped no citizen to retake that exercise of his political 
 powers which had been absorbed by The Partizan Party. In fact 
 it sanctioned the use of The Partizan Party System in that it 
 used and depended upon the help of the City Republican Machine 
 for its success ; and it was obliged to resort to " Party " methods 
 and practises to retain its separate existence. It was not a " Cit- 
 izens " movement in the true sense. It was merely a Reform 
 " Movement " in a City. 
 
 The Citizens Union. In 1895 the new State Constitution 
 separated State and Municipal elections. In 1897 the first mu- 
 nicipal election under the new charter of the "Greater New York " 
 was to be held. Prior to this time the movement had resolved it- 
 self into The Citizens LTnion formed to elect a " City Govern- 
 ment " on " Citv Issues " alone. The Citizens Union held that 
 the Mayor — who would have the disposal of some twenty-five 
 thousand city offices and positions — should be the choice of " The 
 Citizens " and not of any Party Machine. It secured a written 
 assurance of support from over one hundred thousand electors 
 of all shades of political opinion. It declined an alliance with the 
 Republican City Machine. It nominated its own candidates inde- 
 pendently, thereby striking a blow at The Partizan Party System 
 which placed the monopoly of even local nominations in the hands 
 of the local Party Machines. 
 
 But this action by The Citizens Union threatened if successful 
 to put the Republican City Machine at the head of the third largest 
 partizan party organization in the City; and rather than lose its 
 position as one of the two dominant City Machines it made another 
 " Deal " with Tammany as to party patronage. It agreed to 
 " Deliver " enough Republican " votes " to elect Tammany can- 
 didates in whatever election districts Tammany desired in return 
 for a sufficient number of Tammany " votes " to elect Republican 
 candidates in other districts. The Deal actually divided all of 
 the offices between the Democratic and the Republican City Ma- 
 chines. This deal consummated, the Republican Machine again 
 put a third ticket in the field with a highly " Respectable " and 
 strictly " Regular Republican " as candidate for Mayor ; thus 
 again giving all strictly " Regular " Republicans a " respectable " 
 excuse for taking " Regular " party action. 
 
 This third ticket was put forward in the first place to maintain 
 the position of the Republican City Machine. In the second place 
 it was put forward to perpetuate the control of The Partizan 
 Party over the administrative action of the citizens. By means
 
 424 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 of The Deal and through the enforcement of Party Regularity it 
 accomplished its purposes for it " drew " 100,000 " Regular " 
 Republican votes, leaving 150,000 votes for The Citizens Union 
 as against 230,000 votes " received " by the Tammany Machine. 
 
 But look at the travesty of proper administrative action which 
 an analysis of the vote presents. The " Republican vote " was a 
 mixture of strictly regular Democratic and Republican ballots. 
 The " Tammany vote " was a mixture of strictly regular Repub- 
 lican and Democratic ballots ; for only such ballots as are cast 
 by men who will vote as they are told to vote can be "delivered " 
 by one partizan party to another ; thus beautifully illustrating 
 the ignominy that is involved in " Party Regularity." 
 
 After this strictly partizan defeat, accomplished solely through 
 the use of strictly partizan party practises, worn out in mind 
 and purse. The Citizens Union gradually faded into the back- 
 ground, leaving the impression on the average voter's mind that 
 after all " The Party " is his main reliance. 
 
 Municipal Reform: Arguments for. These two attempts at 
 political reform afford us a chance to measure the value of the 
 oft-repeated claim that such reform can be best worked out at 
 first in the Cities. Several arguments are advanced in support 
 of this idea. Among them are first : That it is easier to bring home 
 a realization of the part played by the Party Machine in exploit- 
 ing the opportunities of a municipality because the proofs can be 
 more easily obtained within the limits of a City than within the 
 limits of a State. Second : That in a limited locality it is com- 
 paratively easy to show wherein the unsatisfactory conditions re- 
 sulting from such exploitation are either political or economic in 
 nature and how they flow in turn either from " Party " misuse of 
 the powers of electors or from " Party " misuse of the authority 
 of ofiicials. Thirdly : That municipal reform, being limited in 
 extent and scope, is therefore easier of accomplishment since it is 
 directed towards obtaining " Good " local results. Therefore, 
 " Good Local Government " is to be accomplished through 
 eliminating " Party Politics " from local administrative action. 
 " Honest Local Administration " is to be accomplished through 
 enforcing the application of the Principles of the State Polity in 
 local administrative work. " Good Government " meant to 
 The Citizens Union the free participation of each elector in local 
 administration. " Honest Government " was intended to secure 
 to each individual an equality in local economic opportunities 
 and from each official a proper discharge of local official duty.
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 425 
 
 Good State Government will be possible only when a majority of 
 its municipalities have got good government. 
 
 But on the other hand the City is the habitat of the " Party 
 Machine " and it is never so easy to accomplish reform in localities 
 where two actively working partizan party Machines are in 
 common control of Electoral Action as in localities where they 
 do not exist in such perfection. 
 
 Sets up Two Moral Codes. Moreover, " Municipal Reform " 
 necessarily sets up one code of political morality for the City and 
 another for The State, thereby opposing one of the principles of 
 Democracy which calls for the existence of One Code of INIorals 
 only, to which all in The State must conform. Then again, The 
 State has never made a definite utterance concerning official 
 function and duty ; and even if the citizens of a City do succeed 
 in filling city offices with men whom they select, they are never- 
 theless left without the means to enforce a proper discharge of 
 official function and duty from their officials. No matter who is 
 " inducted into office," or by whom, the official finds partizan 
 party functions operative. He can not discharge any other with- 
 out " Revolutionary " action to the disturbance of " Regular " 
 and " Orderly " administrative procedure under the established 
 order of things ; and so long as " Reformers " bend their efforts 
 solely to filling offices with " Good " men they may expect to find 
 the " Goodness " of their officials largely nullified by the badness 
 of their accredited system. 
 
 The Game of " Politics." What are the relative chances for 
 success in a struggle for "Municipal Reform"? On the one 
 hand are the " opposing " Party Machines playing unitedly for 
 the common control of Electoral Action. The Game has its rules. 
 The people do not make the rules. The IVIachines make them. 
 "Reformers" can not use machine-made rules with propriety; 
 but the Machines can. One of these rules is, The Secret Trade 
 and Deal. If the Machines play The Game in conformity to this 
 rule, then they will be established in the common control of adminis- 
 trative action, and The State and the individual will be left an 
 easy prey to opportunist adventurers. 
 
 The central idea of The Partizan Party System is " Control over 
 Electoral Action." This control assures the division of the 
 public offices and positions — The Spoils — between the mem- 
 bers of the Dominant Partizan Party Organizations. Obviously 
 the simplest way to repel a voting attack for this control is to 
 combine forces ; that is, controlled " votes." The strongest " Party "
 
 426 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 is to help the weakest with " votes " where they can be used best 
 to defeat the independent attack. The weakest " Party " is to 
 render similar assistance in the common defense of their Common 
 System. The incentive for the strongest to help the weakest 
 lies in the fear that if help is refused, the weakest may combine 
 with the Independents and so oust the strongest from temporary 
 control. But no political progress is made by such action. It 
 merely affords an opportunity for the ousted " Party " to effect a 
 similar combine in the future as the means for getting back some 
 of The Spoils. Also, this hind of struggle is most unsatisfactory to 
 the Dominant " Parties." It forces one of them to divide the 
 spoils with the Independents. What the Dominant " Parties " 
 want is not " Some of The Spoils." They want all of the spoils 
 all of the time for division between themselves ; and in times of 
 " Reform Movements " the most effective way in which all of 
 the offices can be assured to The Partizan Party is for " opposing " 
 partizan parties to collude in a common defense of their com- 
 mon interests. Morality? What has Morality to do with 
 "Politics"? 
 
 Facing these conditions and possibilities ; with insufficient or- 
 ganization ; with an inconclusive and superficial object ; in the 
 absence of logical methods of Electoral Action ; with a numerical 
 force weaker than the combined forces of the Dominant Machines ; 
 what chance have Reform Movements to continue to obtain " A 
 Majority of the District Majorities " ? Almost none ; for in 
 each Voting District the Independents have to contend against 
 either a normal Republican or a normal Democratic majority, or 
 an abnormal and collusively fused majority of Democratic and 
 Republican " votes " that are combined for the sole purpose of 
 defeating the candidates of The Independents. 
 
 Causes for Failure. The Citizens Union failed partly because 
 the influence of organized self-interest was stronger than the 
 influence of public spirit in the City, and partly because it was 
 numerically weaker than the combined vote of the Dominant 
 Party Machines. 
 
 But the decisive factors in its failure were : It was weak in ob- 
 ject in that it aimed merely to put " Good men in office " under a 
 bad system of action. It was lacking in the assurance of an ulti- 
 mate improvement of the political condition of the elector, which 
 if consummated, would attract continuous support to it from in- 
 dividuals. Its plan of campaign provided merely for a continuous 
 fight against an intrenched local " Party " Machine with no
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 427 
 
 reasonable prospect of eliminating partizan party Machines from 
 local administrative work. It was lacking in moral force in that 
 it stooped to the use of partizan party practises for its success. 
 It had no reasonable system of administration to offer as a sub- 
 stitute in the place of the Partizan Party System which would be 
 left in full operation even if it succeeded at the polls, and which 
 system permitted a " combined " vote of theoretically opposing 
 " Parties " ; and a similar fate awaits every such " Movement " 
 until the time arrives when the majority in the State Electorates 
 perceives the necessity for regulating by logical laws every process, 
 stage, step, and move in administrative work. 
 
 Impeded Political Progress. The Committees of Seventy did 
 not attack the Partizan Party System nor alter its (lack of) prin- 
 ciple, nor affect the working energy of The Partizan Party in the 
 least. As a result, each succeeding reform movement has had to 
 begin exactly where these committees began ; but with this dif- 
 ference. Each has a harder problem to solve because of the 
 perfection of the Partizan Party System which has been going on 
 meanwhile. Each Movement has to fight with some of the 
 methods of, and against the perfected criminal practises of this 
 system at every election. Each has constantly encountered the 
 prestige of " The System," the immoral " Power'" of " The Party," 
 and the combined manipulated " votes " of the " Party " Ma- 
 chines in The Electorate, in The Government, and at the polls. 
 Each has seen the associations they sought to keep together 
 constantly disintegrating, and each has seen its efforts to energize 
 the administrative agencies of the community rendered of little 
 or no effect by the engraftment of partizan party function on 
 public office. 
 
 The Honest Man in Office. There have been times when In- 
 dependent effort has voted an isolated " Honest man " into office 
 at the head of a State " Party Ticket." But no real administra- 
 tive progress has resulted from such action, nor has Democracy 
 as a helpful means to Human Progress been benefited by such 
 action materially. Such a man while in office may check success- 
 fully a few attempts of the greedy. But he really owes his position 
 more to the necessities of " The Party " than to any other factor 
 in the situation, and he soon passes out of office having actually 
 benefited The Partizan Party System and his " Party " more 
 than Democracy because he has lent his " Strength " towards 
 carrying into office scores of partizan party office-seekers whose 
 combined official and legislative action under " Party " guidance
 
 428 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 is far too strong for any one man to contend against successfully. 
 The nomination of an honest man by a Partizan Party is tanta- 
 mount to dishonesty by the " Party." His election does not 
 change the nature of The System or of " The Party " and unsup- 
 ported he can do practically nothing for Democracy. If he stands 
 out against the desires of " The Party " whose ticket he headed, and 
 if he attempts to put The Will of The People into operation, he 
 may succeed in splitting that " Party." But of what use is that 
 to Democracy, or to political morality? Nothing to speak of 
 because a " Split Party " means only that ultimately the other 
 " Party " will " Get in " by virtue of The System and will speedily 
 reproduce the system evils in society. 
 
 The Boss is only an Incident. Smarting under successive de- 
 feats administered under the leadership of the " Party Boss " ; 
 impatient under conditions that " The Boss " is able apparently 
 to impose constantly, the opinion is hastily formed by many that 
 " The Boss " is responsible for the situation. Nothing is more 
 common than diatribes against " The Boss " or attempts to dis- 
 lodge him from the headship of some " Party " Organization. 
 The Boss, however, is but one of the means by which the ignoble 
 force of self-interest is organized and strengthened in society. 
 He may be the brains of The Machine ; but if he is dislodged, 
 then another man will take his place, and, profiting by the mistakes 
 of his predecessor, will still more successfully smother, undermine, 
 and overpower the civic virtue upon which the stability of The 
 Commonwealth rests. While " Party " Bosses are intolerable 
 evils, they are not the proper object of attack at present. They 
 are one of the perfectly logical results of an Illogical System ; and 
 they will continue to exist and to put its methods into operation 
 in one dishonest form or another just so long as " The System " 
 which provides opportunities for dishonest action continues in 
 use. 
 
 Neighborhood Reform. If Self-interest is the force to be over- 
 come in society, then it is clear that the attack must be directed 
 not against any one man or " Party Leader " but against The 
 System which permits the organization of Sovereign-units into 
 permanent associations of self-seekers. The struggle for logical 
 political administration is not against the self-interest of any one 
 man, but is against the systematic exercise of self-interest by those 
 of our neighbors who are organized to profit unduly by it. Re- 
 form then, to be effectual, must begin in the neighborhood. Be- 
 fore the majority of Sovereign-units can be induced to take proper
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 429 
 
 action they must be showTi the disaster involved in improper 
 action and the benefits flowing from proper action, which is Demo- 
 cratic action. They must be convinced beyond the shadow of a 
 doubt that undemocratic action is impractical action because 
 through undemocratic action it is impossible to maintain within 
 The Commonwealth those conditions of human existence which 
 were originally declared to be necessary to continued human wel- 
 fare, happiness, and progress. 
 
 Education the First Step. It is an aphorism that honest men are 
 in the majority. If this be true, then all that is necessary to secure 
 true political reform is to make the majority politically intelligent. 
 If the honest majority can be made politically intelligent, and 
 individuals are given the opportunity under proper methods of 
 action to organize and add the force of association to their effort 
 in political action, then it will be only a question of time when 
 public-spirited effort will prevail over selfish effort and The Com- 
 monwealth w^ill rehabilitate its electors with the Sov^eignty that 
 is rightfully theirs. Given honesty and mental capacity, proper 
 collective action hinges largely on The System of Action ; and 
 proper detail action hinges on the propriety of the detail methods. 
 Before we can escape from the pernicious consequences flowing 
 from the adoption and continued use of The Partizan Party 
 System there must be years of steady, continuous, persistent, 
 painstaking, and systematic activity on the part of each and 
 every public-spirited citizen who grasps the full significance of 
 the problem of American Democracy ; and this activity must be 
 directed towards the formation and the adoption of a logical 
 system for the exercise of The Powers of Administration. In- 
 dividuals must be brought to perceive these administrative truths ; 
 namely : That The Electorate is the Collective Sovereign. 
 That each individual elector is a Sovereign-unit. That a 
 Sovereign-unit can act properly only in the capacity of a Sov- 
 ereign-unit and in no other capacity. That action in the 
 capacity of a Sovereign-unit is Electoral Action and not 
 " Party " Action. That ordained Freedom, Liberty, Equality, 
 and Justice can be maintained and transmitted unimpaired 
 only by absolutely free Electoral Action. That free Electoral 
 Action depends mainly upon two things ; namely, the exist- 
 ence of a logical system for the performance of each Electoral 
 Process, and an authoritative declaration of the function and 
 duty of oflBce. That any System of Administrative Action 
 under which it is possible for some individuals to stimulate self-
 
 430 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 interest in other individuals as the immediate motive for the 
 administrative action of the latter ; or any " System " which 
 permits the notoriously self-interested element in society to 
 associate together in a permanent organization with the secret 
 purpose of exploiting the administrative necessities of The Com- 
 monwealth ; or any " System " which diverts the exercise of The 
 Supreme Power away from the accomplishment of its ordained 
 ends, is necessarily destructive of those ends, and thereby tends to 
 minimize the chance for the continued existence of The Common- 
 wealth, 
 
 An Electoral Movement. All this is educative work. It must 
 be carried on in the home, in the neighborhood, and in the edu- 
 cational institutions of the people if possible. It means the 
 gradual formation within the present and coming generations of 
 a righteous, burning, and dominant desire for moral administra- 
 tive action. It means the gradual formation of an Electoral 
 Movement that is stronger numerically than the combined " votes " 
 of Partizan Party Organizations. But that such a movement will 
 have to meet and overcome the combined force and influence of 
 the Partizan Parties there can be no doubt ; for if successful, the 
 movement means their annihilation. 
 
 Classes of Past Efforts : Depending upon the special object 
 aimed at, our reform efforts in the past fall into two main classes ; 
 namely : 
 
 (1) Those which have attempted to change the nature of our 
 Political Saviour either by " Reforming The Party From Within," 
 or by driving it into proper action ; and 
 
 (2) Those which have attempted to bring about a logical per- 
 formance of some special step or move in the various processes of 
 administration. 
 
 Reform Within The Party. Concerning " Reform Within The 
 Party " as a means for maintaining the exercise of political power 
 in the hands of the electors, and as a means for enabling The Elec- 
 torate to control the exercise of The Delegated Powers, there is 
 not much to say. To some, however, it appears as the most likely 
 way to uproot bossism and to secure proper administration. 
 Those who hold this belief are invariably those who, looking at 
 the surface of action, fail to grasp the distinction between a true 
 political party and a partizan party organization. They are also 
 those who have failed to appreciate the full significance of our 
 theory of administration in which there is no mention or hint of 
 an administrative agency like a permanent partizan party absorb-
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 431 
 
 ing the exercise of Political Power, or any hint of any party so 
 acting. They are those who fail to perceive that our theory of 
 action distinctly requires The Electorate to exercise such power 
 directly, and not through an intermediary. 
 
 The class of minds which will overlook the fact that The Par- 
 tizan Party is an abnormal growth in an American Common- 
 wealth is such as will always concern itself with applying mechan- 
 ical expedients in straightening a devious course of action rather 
 than in searching out the primal cause for the deviousness. They 
 are the " God Sakers " of Bennett, The efforts of individuals of 
 this class may be animated by the best of intentions but they 
 necessarily must be ineffectual. Their efforts are not directed 
 towards abolishing causes ; and considering this particular effort 
 in connection with the circumstances surrounding its application, 
 it is, to put it as mildly as possible, fatuously insufficient. The 
 method consists in exerting within a corrupt body organized to 
 promote Self-interest the corrective force of mere entreaty in the 
 hopes of getting the corrupt body to abandon the use of corrupt 
 practises and methods by which alone it lives and flourishes. 
 Those who attempt to reform "The Party " from within fail to 
 appreciate the essential fact that what The Partizan Part}^ is after 
 is " Votes " ; and that no other force but the fear of losing votes 
 will ever cause a partizan party to change its practises and methods. 
 They fail to see that so long as they stay within " The Party " 
 or in its organizations, and vote with it, they are in effect strength- 
 ening it. Rather than not have their votes a partizan party will 
 tolerate their membership, entreaty, and " goodness " and build 
 on it ; but so long as this class of " Reformers " continue to \'ote 
 " Party Tickets " their efforts to reform either the condition of 
 the elector or unsatisfactory administrative conditions will come 
 to naught, and partly because of their own votes. 
 
 Then again, those who attempt " Reform Within The Party," 
 failing to perceive the true obligations of sovereignty, fail also to 
 perceive that a partizan party is illogical in its objects and methods ; 
 and so fail to perceive that it is their duty to abandon it and to work 
 independently for the adoption of a system of methods enabling in- 
 dividual Sovereign-units to discharge the obligations of sovereignty 
 properly. They fail to perceive that the political obligations of 
 the individual lie first, last, and always to The Connnonwealth and 
 not to any other body of individuals. They fail to perceive that 
 a partizan party was theoretically (if unprescieutly) adopted as 
 an agency for enabling the individual to perform his duties of
 
 432 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 citizenship properly; and they fail to perceive that a partizan 
 party does not act as such an agency, but on the contrary, that 
 it substitutes private interest as the immediate object to be worked 
 for and systematically destroys individual capacity in all of its 
 organization members to freely discharge their 'political obligations 
 to The Commonwealth. 
 
 If these facts are admitted then it is plain that The Partizan 
 Party is a peril to Democracy and should not receive the support 
 of anybody. So long, however, as these facts remain obscured 
 there will always be some individuals who, clinging to traditional 
 action, will seek to reform " The Party " from within as the best 
 way to purify such action ; but, failing to appreciate the real cause 
 for illogical action, and never by any possibility working for the 
 removal of that cause, their efforts to reform political action will 
 continue to be barren of helpful results. 
 
 Mugiimmp Associations. Akin to " Party " reformers are other 
 groups of " Party " members who try to drive " The Party " into 
 right action. These groups are composed of "The Better Ele- 
 ment "ma" Party Organization." They have received the nick- 
 name of Mugwoimps. 
 
 Their power to drive springs from their possession of the balance 
 of voting power. This they threaten to use against a " Party " 
 candidate, ticket, or measure. 
 
 Considered as a reformatory effort, INIugwump action is weak 
 because it is usually directed from within a partizan party and 
 against action that is proposed by The Management. Being 
 directed towards the welfare of some one partizan party, its ap- 
 peal for support that lies outside of that party is lacking in con- 
 vincing force. It is also weak because it may lose its reason for 
 existence at any time by the disintegration of " The Party." 
 Mugwump action defeated Blaine in 1884, and Free Silver in 1896 ; 
 but it did not rectify any of the fundamental evils of " Party 
 Leadership " then, and it has not since then. It is a species of 
 partizan party action. It tends to keep the control over the 
 exercise of political power and political authority in the hands of 
 The Partizan Partv. It merelv affords " The Better Element " 
 a chance to have its say sometimes when " Party Leadership " 
 is worse than usual. It never attains to the dignity of true reform 
 action which seeks the betterment of the general political condi- 
 tion of the Collective Sovereign, 
 
 Associated Special Effort. The steady increase in the evils of 
 bossism gradually forced a realization of the need of organized
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 433 
 
 reform effort ; and for a time Municipal reform work was carried 
 on mostly by local associations which had for their objects the 
 elimination of some one special form of administrative evil. 
 
 In Leadership. Some of these associations, like the Good 
 Government Clubs of New York City, sought to discharge the 
 functions of political leadership through creating and providing op- 
 portunities for citizens to meet and discuss public needs, measures, 
 and candidates ; and through disseminating suggestions to electors 
 in their election districts. Some undertook to remedy the evils 
 of Naturalization and Registration. Some took an active part 
 in the campaign through their speakers. Others worked actively 
 at the election by furnishing " Watchers " of the balloting, the 
 canvass, and of the Police where they had charge of the process 
 of election. 
 
 The Library Hall Association of Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
 passed on the character, capacity, and record of every candidate 
 put up by any " Party." It discussed their merits in open meeting 
 and used a secret ballot to decide them. It then sent a printed 
 statement of the result of its deliberation to each voter irrespective 
 of " Party " affiliation. Its membership was open to all who 
 believe in non-partizan municipal government ; and, in order 
 to preserve the character of the association, applicants for 
 membership had to receive a two-thirds vote of its Executive 
 Committee. 
 
 The Municipal Voters League of Chicago does the same work 
 there. The action of these two associations does not bind even 
 their own members. Every voter is left free to form his own 
 opinion after the matter has been presented to him. The fight is 
 not against " The Boss," or against The Partizan Party as an 
 administrative agency. The endeavor is to make a bad system 
 produce good candidates and so to produce good administration. 
 The intent of these associations is good ; but their work does not 
 strike at the existence of The Partizan Party System. It neither 
 emancipates the elector from partizan party restrictions nor pro- 
 vides him with methods under which he can use his political power 
 directly. 
 
 Federated Action. The presence of several associations in a 
 city, all working for special objects of a similar nature, suggested 
 the idea of joining them all together under the nuuiagement of a 
 central body. The adoption of the idea led to the establishment 
 in many cities of a " Civic Federation " having general oversight 
 of all attempts at reform either of a political or of an economic
 
 434 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 nature ; the work being done by separate federation committees, 
 each having charge of some special department. 
 
 Responsibility, Control. As a rule these federated associations 
 seek the enforcement of poHtical responsibihty. They attempt 
 to use the " Power of Control " by watching the action of public 
 oflBcials and by punishing their derelictions through legal pro- 
 ceedings. They usually bear some such name as " Law^ and 
 Order Leagues " or " Law Enforcement Societies." As their 
 names suggest, they work to enforce honest action from public 
 officials who need the spur of fear to keep them in the path of 
 administrative duty. They enforce The Law ; but The Law in- 
 cludes The Partizan Party System. Consequently their efforts do 
 not better the political condition of the elector in the least. Nor 
 does it advance the possibility for logical administration at all ; 
 for it is all done after the official has been selected and chosen in 
 an improper way. Their effort is directed towards making 
 partizan party officials perform a purely public service properly ; 
 but it does not help the people to put into office public-spirited 
 men who are minded to perform their work properly. It does 
 exercise a certain degree of influence over individuals who are 
 in office ; but none at all over the system W'hich is instrumental 
 in putting opportunity seekers into public office. The Partizan 
 Party System permits the putting of individuals who need watch- 
 ing into office ; and the Law and Order Leagues continue to watch 
 them, apparently oblivious of the fact that if their energies were 
 applied towards regulating the electoral action of the people prop- 
 erly, it might result in getting a system under which it would be 
 possible to put, or which might provide increased opportunities for 
 putting, public-spirited men into office who do not need watching. 
 
 The efforts of these associations fail to help much in the solu- 
 tion of the problem of proper administration because the associa- 
 tions begin work at the wrong end. They work merely to make 
 the combination of a bad system and a partizan party official 
 produce honest political administration. But that is ridiculous 
 effort when compared with the effort that is needed. 
 
 The Australian Ballot System. In Chapter XVII we reviewed 
 an attempt to " Reform Politics " through the adoption of a new 
 way of performing the process of election. Now the purpose of 
 the process of election is to make effective all that has gone before 
 in the antecedent processes. Therefore, if administrative evils 
 exist in the pre-election processes, it must be apparent that the 
 mere proper performance of the election process w^ill not cure
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 435 
 
 those evils. If an administrative evil like The Partizan Party Idea 
 exists in The Electorate, the mere performance of the process of 
 election properly does not strike at that evil. On the contrary, 
 through failing to strike at it, the adoption of a " Better Ballot- 
 ing System " has the effect of sanctioning tliis evil ; of giving it 
 the appearance of propriety and of political regularity; and of 
 strengthening its hold upon the minds of the politically uninformed. 
 
 The adoption of the modified form of the Australian Ballot 
 System failed of its promised results because it left The Partizan 
 Party unaffected in its illogical position as an administrative inter- 
 mediary, besides leaving it free and authorized to manipulate 
 the performance of every administrative process including the 
 election process. It failed because it is but a patch upon an 
 illogical administrative system under other parts of which a 
 partizan party is allowed to undermine and diminish the political 
 power of Sovereign-units ; to curtail the exercise of their ordained 
 rights ; and to impose a kind of restraint on individual adminis- 
 trative action that is logically incompatible with the principles of 
 free Democratic Action. 
 
 Through aiming at a specific detail in an inconsistent system, 
 this " Reform effort " succeeded in fastening more securely than 
 before upon The Electorate the use of the whole line of partizan 
 party methods ; which use, if persisted in, must end in stifling 
 Democracy. 
 
 Reform in Practises. Practise, in itself, is the systematic and 
 repeated performance of some thing or things. 
 
 A Practice. A practise is the systematic and repeated doing 
 of some thing or things as a means to an end. 
 
 Corrupt Practises. In political administration a corrupt prac- 
 tise is a customary doing of something which weakens the sense 
 of political obligation and duty in a Sovereign-unit, and which 
 perverts his administrative action. 
 
 Political Corruption. Political Corruption is the systematic 
 perversion of Sovereign-units into a means for some non-political 
 end or ends. With us it takes the form of the creation of a body 
 of political perverts and the utilization of this body as a means to 
 some partizan party end or ends. It is the capital crime in the 
 whole category of political crimes. 
 
 The partizan party code of procedure is a compilation of cor- 
 rupt practises that are put into operation in every administrative 
 process, beginning with the processes of Education and Natural- 
 ization and ending with the process of Control. It is " The
 
 436 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 established order of Things " ; things that are non-poHtical in 
 nature. 
 
 Beginnings of Corruption. With us the corruption of the Sov- 
 ereign-unit begins in childhood. Long before the voting age is 
 reached the great majority of our embryonic Sovereign-units have 
 become perverted insensibly by the force of example that is set 
 them by their parents, pedagogues, pastors, and pillars of society. 
 As for the great masses of the immigrants, any one who has watched 
 the process of naturalization in the great ports of entry knows that 
 the force which is exerted fu-st on them is the corruptmg force of 
 The Partizan Party. 
 
 Corrupt Practises Act^. Under the circumstances, and in the 
 absence of an ordained declaration of administrative obligation 
 and duty acting as a restraint upon morally weak human nature, 
 the existence in The Commonwealth of permanent organizations 
 of the politically young and uninformed that are utilized con- 
 tinuously for the promotion of " Self-interest " by bodies of po- 
 litical perverts called The Committee, The Party, The Machine, 
 and so on, is not surprising. But in view of the scores upon scores 
 of corrupting practises that have been disclosed in the last fifty 
 years of political administration, it is surprising that those who 
 have political reform most at heart can conceive of no better plan 
 to stop political corruption than the enactment of a few Statutes 
 which aim to prevent a flagrant use of money and of individual 
 power at the polls; or which limit the amount of money that a 
 Corporation may contribute to a partizan party fund ; or which 
 prescribe the amount of money which a man who is " running for 
 Office " may spend while he is running to get there. Can the tide 
 of political corruption be stopped by such efforts? As well at- 
 tempt to stop the influx of the ocean tides by building here and 
 there a wire fence at low-water mark. If a Corrupt Practise Act 
 merely tends to stop the flagrant use of money and of individual 
 power as a means for securing the necessary "majority of partizan 
 party votes," how is the political condition of the elector bet- 
 tered ? If it merely tends to prevent the corrupt acquirement of 
 a comparatively few " Party " votes or voters as a means for se- 
 curing the " Success " of one partizan party over that of another, 
 how is political action purified ? 
 
 But, it is insisted, a Corrupt Practises Act will " enable merit 
 instead of money to decide the issue at the polls." That sounds 
 finely. A moment's thought, however, and we perceive that 
 "The Issue" is a partizan party issue, and that the fatuous effect
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 437 
 
 of the Act is to relieve the elector from the pressure of one or two 
 flagrant influences, while he is engaged in a kind of administrative 
 action which, in itself, is ichoUy wrong. Such Corrupt Practises 
 Acts neither contemplate nor affect the political corruption that 
 goes on in society, or that which goes on in every other political 
 process besides the process of choosing. They aim at the elimi- 
 nation of two or three natural products of the Partizan Party Sys- 
 tem ; but they do not aim at the elimination of the root of corrup- 
 tion itself, from which scores of other corrupt political practises 
 derive their nourishment. At present the existence of political 
 corruption in numerous subtle forms continues to receive a sanction 
 from The Commonwealth ; and the conclusion seems irresistible 
 that before political corruption can ever receive much of a check, 
 the people will have to enact a logical system of administration 
 under which all atrocious offenses against the ordained political 
 powers and rights of the elector are made Legal Crimes and be- 
 come punishable as such. If the people can be brought to the 
 point of establishing such a system, they will at the same time 
 have reached the point where they will enforce the law which they 
 have made; but at present, with Courts and Juries filled by 
 individuals who are more or less conscious of political per- 
 version, the natural tendency is against a rigorous enforcement 
 of penalties against the perpetrators of those overt political 
 crimes which have their origin in the subtle political corrup- 
 tion that permeates, and at the same time receives, the passive 
 sanction of society. 
 
 Direct Legislation. True Dhect Legislation is the exercise by 
 the people of the Reserved Legislative Powers. These powers are 
 not the same in every State. For instance ! In some states the 
 location of the State Capital is determined by direct legislation. 
 In others, the people legislate directly upon the question of raising 
 the assessment valuation on taxable property. In still others the 
 people of the political divisions of The State vote directly on the 
 liquor question ; while in many Cities the City Council can not 
 vote a franchise, that exercise of legislative power being reserved 
 to the people of the Municipality. 
 
 But speaking broadly, in each State, after the exercise of the 
 Powers of Establishment, the people legislate directly in each 
 period of administration, and at other stated times, for certain 
 purposes. As for example ! The exercise of the right to propose, 
 to adopt, and to amend the Fundamental Law of The State has 
 never been relinquished by the people. Also, the right to legislate
 
 438 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 directly includes the right to propose a temporary course of ad- 
 ministrative action during each period of administration, to 
 advocate or to oppose its adoption upon its merits, and to vote 
 freely upon the question of its adoption. Furthermore, the right 
 to legislate directly includes the right to propose a Body of Ad- 
 ministrative Law, to advocate or to oppose its adoption upon its 
 merits, and to vote freely upon the question of its adoption. 
 Such action is really an exercise of one of the Powers of Estab- 
 lishment. Many of the administrative hardships of to-day spring 
 from an inadequate exercise of these powers in the beginning. 
 But this important fact must be kept in mind ; namely, even if 
 these powers have not been exercised properly in the beginning, 
 nevertheless the people have the right to exercise them properly 
 at any period in their political existence. 
 
 Official Legislation. Official Legislation is another matter. It 
 is the exercise, by the legislature, of one of the Delegated Legis- 
 lative Powers ; and is directed solely towards making Statutory 
 Law governing detail in social, economic, and administrative 
 action. Official Legislation has never been regulated adequately 
 because the administrative system has always been absurdly in- 
 adequate in content. As one of the consequences. Official Leg- 
 islation has passed under the control of the Partizan Party and 
 the results produced by this phase of partizan party control have 
 at many times, and in many respects, been distasteful to a large 
 body of the people. 
 
 " Direct Legislation." In order to preclude some of these re- 
 sults it is proposed that The Electorates shall exercise directly 
 what is in fact the Delegated Legislative Power, whenever, in their 
 discretion, this course seems necessary as a means for putting 
 their administrative will into effect. 
 
 Resource Legislation. This attempt at political reform has re- 
 ceived the misleading name of " Direct Legislation." The name 
 is indefinite and should be changed. Such an exercise of power 
 is not a direct exercise of Legislative Power to shape administra- 
 tion, but is a direct discretionary exercise by The Electorate of 
 the delegated power, and as a means for controlling official legis- 
 lation, or for correcting a possible misuse of political authority 
 by their elected legislators. It is a resourceful aid but plainly in 
 the nature of an expedient. Let us give it the milder name of 
 " Resource Legislation," and define it as The making of Statutory 
 Law by The Electorate. 
 
 But Resource Legislation is an improper and an ineffective
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 439 
 
 way of securing " Good Administration " as a whole. It is op- 
 posed to the theory of our administrative action which requires 
 that the Delegated Legislative Power shall be exercised by capable 
 representatives selected for that purpose. The manner of select- 
 ing capable representatives was left for decision to the people. 
 They failed to provide a proper way for securing them. They 
 now seek through Resource Legislation to restrict an illogical use 
 of legislative authority, and of Partizan Party Power in the 
 Legislature, by depriving that body at times of a portion of its 
 constitutional field of action. 
 
 Such electorate action is neither proper, logical, nor sagacious. 
 It merely stops some one bad bit of legislation without destroying 
 the opportunities for other bad bits. It is aimed at atrocious in- 
 dividual action and not at general illogical action which makes 
 atrocious individual action possible. At present it results in the 
 existence at one and the same time of two different kinds of action 
 in administrative detail. Pushed to a logical extreme it would 
 result in the substitution of Democratic Action in matters of 
 detail in the place of Republican, or Representative Action. In 
 essence it is merely a sporadic and expediential attempt to escape 
 some of the results of other administrative action. It is not a 
 primal political necessity of the people. It springs from their 
 political mistakes ; and if these mistakes were rectified by the 
 enactment of a logical administrative system, the necessity for re- 
 course to expediential action would be greatly minimized if not 
 dissipated entirely. But Resource Legislation does, however, 
 contain a valuable underlying significance. If, under present 
 conditions, it can at times restore to the elector some of his or- 
 dained ability to shape and to control administrative action, it 
 necessarily indicates the way through which The Electorate can 
 resume the full exercise of its ordained administrative powers 
 and rights; namely, through a direct exercise of its reserved 
 legislative power to amend. All that The Electorate lacks in order 
 to obtain a logical system under which it can secure the ordained 
 exercise of any Delegated Power is The Desire. It is not at all 
 likely that the electorate will ever get back its rightful exercise of 
 Sovereignty so long as it asks it from legislatures that are composed 
 mainly of partizan party members ; but if the time does come when 
 the electorate really desires to resume its rightful position and 
 influence, it can go above the legislature and resume it by means 
 of an amendment of the Fundamental Law in the shape of an ade- 
 quate and logical Body of Administrative Law.
 
 440 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 The Initiative. Considered as a part of Resource Legislation, 
 The Initiative is the right of one or more electors to propose an 
 administrative measure, and, through the use of a Petition com- 
 plymg with statutory requirements and subscribed by a certain 
 proportion of the voters, to secure the submission of the measure 
 to a direct vote of the Electorate. 
 
 The Referendum. Considered also as a part of Resource Legis- 
 lation The Referendum is a right of the people, by means of a 
 Petition complying with statutory requirements, to obtain the 
 submission of an administrative measure that is either initiated 
 by citizens or by a legislative body, to a direct vote of The Elec- 
 torate. The method by which State Constitutions are adopted 
 and amended is based on the principle of the referendum. 
 
 The Recall. If, in addition to the ability to freely retire a de- 
 faulting representative at the end of his term, the people were also 
 to provide themselves beforehand with a stated means for re- 
 tiring a public official immediately upon the discovery of his de- 
 fault at any time during his term, then they would regain the 
 exercise of the power to control the action of the public servants 
 to a much greater degree than at present possessed, and would 
 also put themselves in the position where, when acting in the 
 capacity of the Common Superior, they could freely and speedily 
 enforce the responsibility due from Sovereign-units to the Col- 
 lective Sovereign, and where they could punish offenses against 
 the proper use of the Delegated Powers both effectively and 
 righteously. 
 
 Proportional Representation. Proportional representation of 
 what? Freely ascertained administrative ideas? Opposed ad- 
 ministrative beliefs ? No ; for Public Opinion is now expressed 
 by majorities of ballots that are gotten together through natural- 
 ization frauds, registration frauds, nomination frauds, by coloniz- 
 ing, repeating, ballot-box stuffing, manipulation, bribery, intimida- 
 tion, corruption, deceit, deals, trades, collusion, and so on ; all of 
 which is made apparent by the scores, if not hundreds, of court 
 actions that are brought after everv General Election. 
 
 If grave political frauds have been consummated in all of the 
 administrative processes dowTi to and including the election 
 process up to the actual casting of the ballot, of what real re- 
 formatory value is a method of counting the votes after they have 
 been cast? True proportional representation can only be ob- 
 tained through a proper performance of all the administrative 
 processes includmg the process of election.
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 441 
 
 If all of the processes of a Democratic administrative system do 
 not carry out the underlying Democratic Principles of association 
 and action, then the insertion in almost the last of the processes 
 of a method of better action will he entirely insufficient to cure the 
 fundamental evils of such an administrative system. A patch on 
 a bad system becomes a part of that system, and works to pro- 
 long the existence of that system in the same way that a patch 
 on a garment works. 
 
 Proportional Representation is acclaimed as a positive cure for 
 evil legislation. It is put forward confidently as a means for 
 obtaining in administrative bodies the same proportion of in- 
 dividuals holding opposite political beliefs as exists in The Electo- 
 rate. But if, because of past action, individual political beliefs 
 have become transmuted into desires for partizan party success, 
 then proportional representation in administrative bodies merely 
 assists in perpetuating opportunities for evil legislation. 
 
 Of what possible use is proportional representation as a means 
 for obtaining a representation of jJolitical majorities and minorities 
 when all of the processes of administration are so performed that 
 non-political majorities are fashioned by the aid of all the above- 
 mentioned political crimes and many others besides? Since this 
 proposed reform does not contain the essence of true political re- 
 form, the most we can expect of it is a mathematically propor- 
 tioned representation of Partizan Party IVIajorities in legislative 
 bodies. This in turn calls inevitably for repeated doses of " Di- 
 rect Legislation " ; and here you have revealed the unprogressive 
 central idea of sporadic reform ; namely, one reform on the back 
 of another and so ad infinitum. 
 
 Proportional representation is also powerless to aid political 
 progress either efficiently or materialh'. Political progress is not 
 achieved through a multiplicity of illogical reform efforts. Political 
 progress can only be made by going ahead steadily ui)on the lines 
 laid down originally for the solution of the composite administra- 
 tive problem. Apparently the sponsors of proportional represen- 
 tation overlook this vital fact. They take things as they are, and, 
 in merely trying to make the best of a bad part of the existing sys- 
 tem, they divert the attention of citizens from its inherent faults 
 and so postpone the era of true political reform. 
 
 Nor does proportional representation enable The Electorate to 
 regain the exercise of politi(;al control. It does not strike at the 
 existence within The Electorate of permanent partizan party 
 organizations of controlled electors. It still leaves individual elec-
 
 442 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 tors and The Electorate, its officials, administrative bodies, and 
 boards exposed and subject to the immoral influences exercised 
 by partizan parties. It still leaves individual electors compelled 
 to choose between two evils as the means for filling administrative 
 office and energizing the action of The Government. The Partizan 
 Party is in control of electoral action ; and so long as the Col- 
 lective Sovereign itself does not act freely to conserve the ordained 
 rights of its own units, the application of proportional representa- 
 tion will serve merely to afford proportional opportunities for 
 partizan parties to strengthen and perpetuate their control over 
 the action of Sovereign-units through official legislation. 
 
 Of itself proportional representation affords no support to the 
 fundamental doctrine of Majority Rule. It can not replace the 
 exercise of the Reserved Powers in the hands of The Electorate 
 nor enable that body to secure at present the kind of representa- 
 tion that was originally ordained. Grafted on the stock of the 
 present partizan party system it can at best but produce a modi- 
 fication of the present partizan party fruits of disfranchisement, 
 non-representation, misrepresentation, and political apathy. Its 
 adoption into general use would merely mean the prolongation 
 of the existence of our present most illogical, undesirable, and 
 undemocratic form of minority rule ; namely, that of a partizan 
 party, a body which is much smaller than a majority of The Elec- 
 torate, and which body is now allowed to manipulate the votes of 
 electors to the destruction of our doctrine of Majority Rule. As 
 a political panacea proportional representation is at present 
 practically worthless and is bound to meet the fate accorded to 
 all attempts at piecemeal reform. In economic and in social 
 action it has its uses ; but if incorporated within a bad political 
 system, it is immediately overridden and deprived of its force by 
 the numerous bad provisions of that system, which it does not 
 attempt to counteract. 
 
 Bi-Partizan Political Process Boards. The agitation of the 
 idea of proportional representation produced some astonishing 
 results; one of which was the creation of additional facilities 
 for making a Deal or a Trade between the Dominant Partizan 
 Parties, and another of which was the indirect sanction of The 
 Spoils System. 
 
 The Partizan Party seized upon the idea of proportional repre- 
 sentation and applied it to the composition of the various State 
 election boards and commissions. This application twisted the 
 idea of proportional representation of Partizan Parties in The
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 443 
 
 Government into " Proportional Division of The Spoils between 
 Partizan Parties." ^ The State paid the salaries but " The Party " 
 appointed the officials ; thus, in effect, sanctioning the basic idea 
 of The Spoils System ; namely, that the right to fill the appointive 
 offices belongs to the victorious " Party " and not to the elected 
 officials or representatives of the people. The people were led 
 into the creation of Bi-Partizan Boards by the specious argument 
 that an equal division of the board membership between the 
 dominant " Parties " would remove the incentive for corrupt 
 " Party " struggles after positions; and would also prevent one 
 " Party " from getting an undue advantage, prominence, or con- 
 trol, in the administration processes which it could use to the 
 disadvantage of other and smaller " Parties." All this is very 
 interesting. The people were told in effect that the partizan 
 parties, considered as a political Agency, were corrupt ; and that 
 if left to themselves the stronger would corruptly obtain an undue 
 advantage, thus making it next to impossible for the weaker 
 corrupt party to prevent the utter despoliation of the people's 
 heritages by the stronger corrupt party. The right to fill appointive 
 positions in the process boards having been filched previously 
 from the people they were then told that in order to stop the im- 
 moral struggles between partizan parties for such positions it 
 was now necessary for the people to step forward and do the 
 dividing of that which had been taken from them wrongfully. 
 
 In other words, By adopting this reform method the people 
 should admit openly and stultifyingly that the filling of process 
 boards positions belonged rightfully to the two dominant " Par- 
 ties," and having done this should further divide the positions in 
 question equally between two corrupt parties as a way of making 
 the peculiar evil power of the two " Parties " as nearly equal as 
 possible, and as a means for putting a check upon intolerable evil 
 action by any one " Party." But is it not plain that with bofh 
 " Parties " entrenched in the control of the election process and 
 of the pre-election processes of the people, both would be in a 
 better position to insure the putting through of any " Party Deal " 
 or " Party Trade " by means of which the Will of the People could 
 be nullified in the election process in case the people attacked ani/ 
 part of the Partizan Party System? This, however, the people 
 failed to perceive ; and again not only did the " RefornuTs " fail 
 to appreciate and to eliminate the true cause of the evils attacked, 
 but on the contrary they actually secured a legal sanction to their 
 continued perpetration.
 
 444 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Civil Service Reform. A recapitulation of serious reform efforts 
 would be incomplete without a mention of Civil Service Reform. 
 A perspective of fifty years, however, enables us to perceive clearly 
 that civil service reform, admirable as was its original intent and 
 scope, is but a mere incidental when compared with the reform 
 that is needed. It contained the element of weakness common to 
 all piecemeal reform. It did not strike at the root of our illogical 
 administrative effort. Giving it full credit for accomplishing much 
 good, nevertheless it was but an attempt to make a bad system 
 of action work better in some few minor respects ; an attempt to 
 weaken the power of admittedly bad partizan parties by stopping 
 a few of their many bad practises. It did succeed in having laws 
 passed which prohibited some bad party practises, but it did not 
 succeed in stopping any " party " from evading these laws by 
 other equally bad practises; nor, in the end, did it weaken the 
 position of the partizan party as an illogical administrative agency. 
 It succeeded in forcing into use a more respectable way of trans- 
 acting the clerical work of administration, but it did not at- 
 tempt to alter the disreputable way in which electors were then 
 and are now forced to transact their truly vital political work as 
 Sovereign-units. 
 
 For half a century civil service reform acts have been operative. 
 But still the partizan party remains as the leader, organizer, and 
 vitiator of electoral action, still its system remains in universal 
 use, and still the problem of how to maintain the exercise of The 
 Reserved Powers in the hands of The Electorate and how to use 
 these powers to control the exercise of The Delegated Powers re- 
 mains to be solved. 
 
 State Control of " The Primary." The incorporation of the 
 modified Australian Ballot System into the General Election Law 
 precluded the partizan parties from using some of their corrupting 
 practises at the elections ; but not elsewhere. In effect it drove 
 " the Party " into applying its corrupt practises in " The Primary " 
 and in the Party Convention. The modified General Election 
 Law did not contemplate the elimination of the practises by which 
 permanent partizan party organizations were produced in The 
 Electorate. Nor did it seriously affect the Party Machine prac- 
 tises by which candidates for public office were produced. The 
 Law as passed actually legalized such practises because it com- 
 pelled The Electorate to accept a partizan party's candidate no 
 matter how he was " obtained " ; and the adoption of the law 
 really led to the development of " Party " primary and " Party "
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 445 
 
 convention methods that were and still are an offense to public 
 decency. 
 
 The effect on the public mind of such practises created a growing 
 desire for State Control over the work of " The Primary ", but 
 the attempt made in this direction has been characterized by the 
 same lack of common political sense and common political pru- 
 dence which we as a people have always exhibited. We continue 
 to employ The Partizan Party as our nominating agent without 
 adequately regulating its initiative action. For instance! The 
 laws relative to State Control of The Primary regulate such com- 
 paratively unimportant minutice as the date of the meeting, the 
 place of the meeting, the form of the notice to be sent, and so on. 
 They do not in the slightest degree alter the power of, or restrict 
 the possible opportunities of, the Party Machine to " fix " the 
 primary, or to subjugate the will of primary members, or to sell 
 a nomination for cash. In some States the primary considered as 
 the place for electorate caucus action no longer exists. In its 
 place the people have one more election to attend, but with this 
 difference, that all of the caucus work of this election is done by 
 The Partizan Party, and all of the officials of this election are 
 appointed by The Partizan Party; the prime effect being that 
 The Partizan Party is enabled to jam its lists of candidates through 
 its Primaries and its Nominating Conventions, hut according to 
 Law; and the outcome of this " reformatory " action is that the 
 political condition of the elector is worse than before. 
 
 Legislative Reform. The fact of the matter is that the present 
 situation can not be helped sufficiently through action to be taken 
 by the legislature ; that is, by Official Legislation. The proper 
 transaction of political caucus work depends upon a free exercise 
 by individual electors of reason and conscience ; and this particular 
 exercise of freedom can not be restricted properly by Statutory Law 
 in a Free Commonwealth. 
 
 The Direct Primary. The Direct Primary is another futile 
 reform project. Any " Party " politician will tell you that so 
 long as The Partizan Party is allowed the control over electoral 
 action it will contrive to use it Direct Primary or no Direct Primary. 
 Naturally ! And without any new contrivance ! For so long as 
 The Partizan Party is allowed to pack its organizations with 
 controlled electors who at the elections will vote at the dictates 
 of the Party Machine, of what earthly use is a Direct Primary 
 over any other " Primary " as a means for making The Will of 
 The People operative? The mere enunciation of Tiie Will as to
 
 446 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 policies and candidates at the direct primary does not make it 
 operative. Direct primaries have been in operation long enough to 
 enable us to perceive that the work done at these meetings not 
 only can be, but is, undone continually at the elections by the same 
 Partizan party manipulation of " votes " and of " voters " that 
 has been sufficient in the past to " fix " the election and make The 
 Will of The Partizan Party operative. 
 
 The following quotation taken from "Nominating Systems," 
 E. C. Meyer, 1902, is a fair sample of the reform argument in favor 
 of the use of the Direct Primary. " The Power of Government 
 streams from the political party. Party government is necessary. 
 Party Organization must be maintained. Good party government 
 depends upon good party action and this in turn depends upon 
 strong party organization. Without well-organized parties dem- 
 ocratic government would be a farce. As long as politics is pol- 
 itics and men are men, there will be Professional Politicians, 
 Machines, Bosses, Rings, Heelers, and all the other instrumental- 
 ities employed for concentrating power in politics and for the 
 control of political activity. The question is, under what system 
 of nomination will these forces of evil be least active and their 
 political power most nearly eliminated. Small political com- 
 binations are to be expanded through the admission of all legal 
 voters. Every voter is to have an effective vote. When this 
 happens parties are to be effectively organized, and not as they 
 are at present." 
 
 We are back now in the generalities-jungle of political lit- 
 erature. The umbrageous ambiguities contained in the phrases 
 " Politics," " While politics is politics," " The concentration of 
 power in politics," " Small political combinations," " Their ex- 
 pansion to include all legal voters," " The political party," "An 
 effective vote," and so on, cast such a dense mental shade that 
 we are lost. But from this literary environment alone we become 
 aware that 'permanently organized associations of party voters 
 are to continue. That Government by Party is to continue. 
 That Good Government by Party is to be obtained by changing 
 the partizan party organizations into " Effectively organized bodies 
 of individuals exerting a strong influence upon political activity." 
 That these permanently and effectively organized parties are to 
 decide administrative policies ; to nominate party candidates ; 
 to frame party issues ; to influence Public Opinion ; to be re- 
 sponsible for good government ; to secure representation ; to 
 energize, direct, and control the action of The Government, and
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 447 
 
 so on. The gist of the above quotation is that while men are men 
 the elector, by the adoption of the Direct Primary, is to be led 
 out of his deplorable condition at present into one under which 
 his future political action is to be controlled by Professional Poli- 
 ticians, Machines, Bosses, Rings, Heelers, and all other corrupt- 
 ing evil instrumentalities as they mill then exist in the " Effectively " 
 organized -parties. 
 
 Not a very convincing plea for support from one who believes 
 that The Power to Govern is seated in the people and should 
 never be allowed to stream away from them and become seated 
 in any kind of a party whatsoever. Not very alluring to one 
 w^ho believes that the Right to Govern belongs solely to the people 
 and should always be exercised directly by them. Rather re- 
 pelling to one w^ho believes that the obligation to govern rests upon 
 the people and that its discharge can not be avoided morally by 
 them. Perfectly futile to one who believes that any 'permanent 
 association of voters "effectively" or howsoever organized for the 
 purpose of absorbing the exercise of that power or for discharging 
 that obligation must necessarily be an illogical means, and con- 
 sequently, that any support given by a Sovereign-unit to such 
 an exercise of The Supreme Power must be unavoidably suicidal 
 to his own political capacity, rights, and morals, besides weakening 
 every element of strength of The Commonwealth. A decidedly 
 unattractive proposition to one who believes that such associations 
 however " effectively " or " strongly " organized, but working 
 under party-manipulated Statutory Law, are the very hot-beds 
 for propagating all of the " Evil forces " above mentioned ; and, 
 as such, should be removed entirely from our administrative 
 action. Then again, the prospect offered by the argument for a 
 continuation of " Party Politics " even in an attenuated form is 
 far too gloomy to attract enthusiastic support from one who be- 
 lieves that Democratic Government becomes a farce because the 
 exercise of the Power to Govern is controlled by permanent par- 
 tizan parties, and because such associations of voters are allowed to 
 place individual electors while engaged in political process work 
 under forms of physical, mental, and moral restraint not con- 
 templated in our plan of Government, and to banish the controlHng 
 influence of political equality which was bestowed upon Sovereign- 
 units. 
 
 No ! The political powers, obligations, and rights of Sovereign- 
 units are inalienable. As such they are logically incapable of 
 exercise, discharge, and enforcement except in the manner originally
 
 448 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 ordained. Unfortunately, and as an expedient, the people have 
 seen fit to delegate an inadequately regulated exercise of The Re- 
 served Powers of Administration to " The Party." The effect of 
 this unprescient delegation was to grant " The Party " tenure in 
 authority without definitely binding it in obedience to the Will of 
 The Sovereign. The Partizan Party became tenant of the power 
 to govern through promising to become the vassal of the people ; 
 and, as in the Feudal System the tenant never became the ab- 
 solute owner in fee of the lands used, so in the Partizan Party 
 System " The Party " never became the owner in fee of The Re- 
 served Powers of Administration ; only their user. The powers 
 themselves belonged to the people and the resumption of their 
 exercise in full was to follow the default of " The Party." Like 
 the Feudal System of land tenure, the principle which bound the 
 people and " The Party " together was mutual service ; but as 
 in the Feudal System, so in the " Party System " the feeling of 
 dependence and obligation on the part of the tenant gradually 
 became weakened and lost as "The Party" gradually gained this 
 and that ascendancy over the political action of the people. The 
 strength which " The Party " absorbed gradually diminished the 
 strength of The Sovereign. And here the parallel between the 
 systems ends ; because while the general effects of the Feudal 
 System were towards the emancipation of the individual from un- 
 wise, selfish, and oppressive use of the power to govern, the general 
 effect of the " Party System " is the exact reverse, for it has been 
 built up by partizan parties, and out of partizan party customs, 
 usages, practises, and methods all of which impose illogical, im- 
 moral, and oppressive restraints upon a proper exercise of The 
 Supreme Power by the Sovereign-units. The partizan party 
 system precludes the existence of mutual service in the true sense 
 of the term. The partizan party is in default. Its use as a 
 political agency should be discontinued. The efforts of The 
 Sovereign should not be directed towards securing " Effective " 
 or " Strong organization " that secures 'permanency in associations 
 composed of some of its units ; but should be directed towards 
 destroying permanency in such associations. Electors should be 
 afforded every opportunity to form and freely re-form into tem- 
 porary associations, on questions of administrative policy, and 
 for the purpose of securing the free succession of political ma- 
 jorities originally intended. 
 
 In passing there is one phenomenon to be noticed. Political 
 Reform has become to many an aggravating idea, and with reason.
 
 POLITICAL REFORM 449 
 
 Reform really means the undoing of what has been done in the 
 past. The admission of the necessity for reform is an admission 
 of the perpetration of mistakes in the past. All tliis is unpleasant 
 enough. But the consciousness of the futility of past action that 
 was supposedly efficacious throws doubt upon possession of ad- 
 ministrative ability. The existence of this doubt is, however, 
 largely due to the actions of the " Reformers " in the past. They 
 have gone ahead with the existing system in the endeavor to make 
 political reform appear to be a progression rather than what it 
 truly is, a retrogression — a return to First Principles. Their 
 proposed " Reforms," however, have not been political reforms. 
 They have merely been the re-formations of this, that, or another 
 portion of a non-political system ; and the repeated failures of 
 the re-formed portions to produce the promised political effects 
 have created a w^idespread distrust of the efficacy of any proposed 
 reform effort. Now w^hether the present situation is due wholly 
 to the lack of administrative knowledge on the part of the people 
 as " The Party " claims, or wholly to the venality and improbity 
 of " The Party " as many reformers claim, or in part to both, as 
 is most likely ; in either case the only logical and possible escape 
 from it at present is through the construction of a new, a com- 
 prehensive, and a logical system of individual action and of official 
 action ; and this leads us to the consideration of two reform efforts 
 that in many respects contain the essence of true Political Reform.
 
 CHAPTER XXV 
 
 INDEPENDENT NON-PARTIZAN ASSOCIATIONS. COMMIS- 
 SION FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
 
 " Independent Non-Partizan Associations " : Probably there is 
 no local community big or little in the United States which does 
 not contain some individuals who are disgusted by local adminis- 
 trative conditions which are the direct outcome of the immoral 
 exercise of partizan party power over local official action, and by 
 the degree of political impotence in local administration to which 
 the elector has been reduced by the long-continued enforcement of 
 the use of the Partizan Party System of action in local adminis- 
 tration. The expression of this disgust has taken various forms. 
 In the preceding chapter mention was made of several kinds of 
 local associations, the members of which are joined together for 
 the general purpose of obtaining a better exercise of local political 
 power and authority. 
 
 Are Partially Free Electoral Groups. Some one or another 
 special detail administrative reform has been accomplished in 
 hundreds of municipalities by similar electoral groups spon- 
 taneously formed and composed of municipal electors who, for the 
 time being, and for one specific purpose, have cut loose from 
 partizan party affiliations. Unfortunately, these groups have never 
 been able to cut loose from the destructive influences which any 
 partizan party, considered as the physical exponent of the Partizan 
 Party System, is always able to bring to bear on official and on 
 individual administrative action. The members of these groups 
 are never wholly free from the operation in one way or another 
 of malign influences which, theoretically, are not allowed to play 
 a part in administrative action ; and since the members are not 
 wholly free and independent of these influences, the groups them- 
 selves can not be considered as perfectly free and independent 
 groups. 
 
 450
 
 INDEPENDENT NON-PARTIZAN ASSOCIATIONS 451 
 
 Independence of. In American political literature these associa- 
 tions are described somewhat inaccurately as Independent Non- 
 Partizan Associations. It is true that many of the association 
 members feel themselves freed for the time being from the illogical 
 and general obligations of partizan party " Regularity " ; but it 
 is also true that no amount of individual self-assertion can free 
 the action of the individual or the action of the association wholly 
 from the effects produced by the incorporation and retention in 
 the Statutory Law of partizan party methods of general electoral 
 action. 
 
 The independence achieved is merely a temporary individual 
 emancipation from the application by a local Party Machine of 
 its local machine rules of local electoral action. That, in itself, is 
 a partial political freedom ; but it falls far short of the ordained, 
 free, and independent exercise of the Reserved Powers of Adminis- 
 tration by a Sovereign-unit through which alone logical action 
 by the Collective Sovereign becomes possible. 
 
 The independence achieved is not permanent and general as 
 ordained. It is a local, partial, and temporary independence; 
 and as such it will continue to be the meager portion of those who 
 work solely for local relief and not for the emancipation of the 
 Collective Sovereign from the oppressive restrictions which can 
 be imposed upon its action at present by a partizan party, and 
 which oppressions find their sanction in the permitted use of The 
 Partizan Party System. 
 
 Character of. In composition, and in internal management, 
 these associations resemble free electoral groups and political 
 parties. The power of the association is seated in its member- 
 ship ; and the membership have and exercise the right to choose 
 the officers of the association, and the objects of its action. 
 Broadly speaking, however, these associations are merely local 
 bodies of electors who are voluntarily united for the purpose of 
 performing presently some specific political process or processes 
 according to their ideas of right action, and not according to the 
 dictates of some local partizan party Boss or Machine. The 
 associations are sporadic expressions of political morality. The 
 State having laid down no general and logical rule of moral elec- 
 toral action, the associations form to i)ut their idea of such action 
 into local operation for the time being ; but the illogical and im- 
 moral general control of electoral action which the State sanctions 
 still continues to exist and to impel men here and there to occa- 
 sional resistance.
 
 452 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Work of. Results. While these associations have effected no 
 fundamental change in general administrative action, neverthe- 
 less their work has not been barren in local results, some of which 
 are as follows. They have smashed a few local partizan party 
 Machines ; that is, they have deprived a dominant partizan party 
 temporarily of the unbridled exercise of its ill-gotten " Power." 
 They have lessened the local opportunities for the exercise of 
 partizan party " Power " through forcing the use of better and 
 efficient business methods in the ministerial part of municipal 
 administration, and in filling local offices temporarily with a 
 better class of men. In some few localities they have succeeded 
 in weakening somewhat the hold of the dogma of " Party Regu- 
 larity " upon the minds of a portion of the Municipal Electorate 
 through educating that portion to a perception of the impropriety 
 of letting a partizan party organization restrict the free action 
 of individual reason, conscience, and volition. They have af- 
 forded temporary opportunities to a portion of the local electorates 
 to reach freely a definite agreement of wills as to policies and can- 
 didates, upon which definite administrative action depends. 
 They have to a very limited degree afforded opportunities for 
 free association in administrative work, and have awakened 
 general interest in local political action. They have, in some 
 localities, and through their method of caucus action, been able 
 to weaken somewhat the monopoly of nomination that was held 
 by partizan bodies of voters. And in some instances these asso- 
 ciations have initiated, shaped, and for the time being have con- 
 trolled local administration through substituting themselves as a 
 temporary Political Leader and intermediary in the place of the 
 local partizan party Machine or Boss. 
 
 Work of. Significance of. But the real value to The Common- 
 wealth of the work of these associations lies not so much in results 
 as in example ; not so much in what they have done as in the 
 way they have done it. The lessons taught by their manner of 
 action have not been lost ; and it may be said that the spread- 
 ing appreciation of the results that are possible under this 
 manner of action mark the inauguration of a period of effective 
 reform. 
 
 Whatever success they won is due partly to their independent 
 character, partly to the freedom of action conferred upon their 
 members in association work, partly because their general method 
 of administrative action is more in accord with the ordained prin- 
 ciples of action than are the despotic and wholly undemocratic
 
 COMMISSION FORM OF GOVERNMENT 453 
 
 methods of the partizan parties, and partly because they them- 
 selves afforded an opportunity for municipal electors to use some 
 of their political powers and rights jreely and directly, which 
 opportunity is wholly barred to those electors who retain their 
 membership in a partizan party. They have shown The Com- 
 monwealth that a freely organized part of a municipal electorate 
 can, for the time being, check a municipal party machine and 
 partially reform municipal administration through a return to the 
 use of proper {and therefore practical) methods of political admin- 
 istration. Having done this much they have indicated the prac- 
 tical way in which all of the municipal electors — if the majority 
 be so minded — can reassume and use all of their political powers 
 and rights all the time. 
 
 What can be done in a municipality can be done in a State. 
 The so-called independent non-partizan associations, by their 
 manner of action, have shown The Commonwealth how it can — 
 if it be so minded — eliminate the partizan parties and their sys- 
 tem from the scheme of State political administration ; namely, 
 through a return to the use of perfectly free, temporary. Electoral 
 Groups working to promote the ordained General Welfare in a 
 manner that is in accord with the ordained principles of association 
 and of political action. 
 
 Commission Form of Government : Within the last twenty 
 years such partially free and " non-partizan " groups have forced 
 the adoption in many municipalities of a combined administra- 
 tive system and official agency that is described under the in- 
 clusive name of the Commission Form of Government. Enough 
 has been written concerning the intent of the system, and of the 
 nature of the work that is possible through the use of a commission 
 as an official agency, to render any further description unnecessary 
 in this chapter. But I wish to draw attention to an underlying 
 feature of the general subject that so far has not been sufficiently 
 emphasized in what has been written, that so far still remains 
 obscure in the minds of many who support the use of this plan of 
 action, and in which feature the inherent weakness of the plan 
 lies snugly ensconced. 
 
 To begin with ! The inclusive idea which underlies the com- 
 mission plan of administration is made up of two distinct sets of 
 ideas. One of these sets relates exclusively to this specific system 
 of municipal administration ; and the other set relates to its official 
 agency, the commission. We will concern ourselves at present 
 with the ideas relating to the system, bearing in mind that it
 
 454 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 has a local applicability only and is also tied up with the general 
 administrative system of The State. 
 
 The System. The set of ideas which relate to the system 
 is in turn divided into ideas which relate to local efficiencies 
 which the system is capable of producing if allowed to act 
 freely, and ideas concerning the possible local action of the 
 municipal elector. 
 
 Efficiencies under. Briefly, one of the ideas is. That through 
 the adoption of this system by a municipality the work of mu- 
 nicipal administration will be separated and relieved from partizan 
 party control and influence; that municipal administration will 
 become an efficient civic business and not a mere local opportunity 
 for partizan party activities. Experience, however, has shown 
 two facts. First, that municipal administration does take on more 
 of the essence of efficient civic business; but second, that mu- 
 nicipal administration can not be relieved from partizan party 
 influences so long as partizan party organizations and machines 
 continue to exist in the municipalities for the purpose of satisfying 
 the desires which they work for. 
 
 The Partizan Party will continue to try to make The Commis- 
 sion an instrumentality for its ovra efficiency. To illustrate ! 
 Some of the work of the municipality is of a big nature. Its speedy 
 and successful performance calls for resources in plant and capital 
 that is now mostly in the hands of the Big Business Interests. 
 The Big Interests can get this big business easiest by working 
 through the partizan party organizations. Some of the Big In- 
 terest members are influential members in these organizations 
 and contribute enormously to their support. These influential 
 members are after the profits to be made out of municipal work. 
 In every sizable municipality some of the Big Interests have a 
 paid agent (usually a fellow partizan party member) whose business 
 it is to influence some of the commissioners to throw municipal 
 work to their employers. If a partizan party containing Big 
 Interest members can secure the election of a majority of The 
 Commission, its chances for continuing to exploit the needs of the 
 municipality are greatly increased. But whether it can control 
 the action of one, or some, or none of the commissioners, this 
 much has been made plain by experience that The Commission as 
 a whole is never relieved from the open or subtle influence which 
 The Partizan Party constantly exerts directly or indirectly on 
 its action. All that the adoption of Commission Form of Gov- 
 ernment has accomplished so far in this respect is the partial
 
 COMMISSION FORM OF GO\^RNMENT 455 
 
 limiting and lessening of local opportunities for partizan party 
 activities. 
 
 What I have said must not be taken as disparagement of the 
 commission form of municipal administration. In pointing out 
 its weakness I am indicating the way in which it can be made 
 strong. The intent of the scheme is wholly admirable; but at 
 present its intent is overridden and brushed aside in many respects 
 by the organized force of the intent of a partizan party to exploit 
 political administration all of the time and in whatever possible 
 way or locality. The benefits of the Commission Form are many 
 and indubitable ; but they are at present limited in degree, and 
 they must remain so, and never be realized fully, so long as the 
 pernicious influence of the Partizan Party System and its agency 
 is allowed to exist in The State. 
 
 Electoral Action under. The chief value of this system lies in 
 the fact that it really betters the political condition of the elector, 
 somewhat. It makes possible a degree of political freedom (ef- 
 fectiveness) and it affords an opportunity for municipal electors to 
 participate directly in the exercise of municipal power and hi the 
 control of the exercise of municipal authority such as they never 
 have had since the advent of The Partizan Party as an instru- 
 mentality in administration. 
 
 Weakness and Insufficiency of. All this is admirable, as far as 
 it goes. But it does not go nearly far enough. The possible 
 freedom and the possible opportunity are really contingent — a 
 matter of choice as it were. They may exist for some who are 
 disposed to use them, but they might as well not exist for others 
 who are not so disposed ; for alongside of the possibilities afforded 
 by the commission system lie the opportunities presented by The 
 Partizan Party System for illogical and immoral action, which, 
 if taken (and it surely will be taken by the organized opj)or- 
 tunists), is capable of greatly diminishing the value of the com- 
 mission system. The inherent weakness of the Commission 
 System lies in the fact that municipal electors do not have an 
 absolute opportunity to act uninfluenced by the permanently 
 organized partizan parties. 
 
 Two Codes of Action. Such an opportunity is, of course, im- 
 possible as yet, because the commission system of municipal ad- 
 ministration is made a part of the partizan party system of State 
 Administration. Whenever the Commission System is adopted 
 by a municipality, the first effect of the adoption is to set up a 
 code of municipal administrative action that is inconsistent with
 
 456 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 the established code of State administrative action. This results 
 in making it possible (perhaps certain) that some of the municipal 
 electors will take logical administrative action in municipal mat- 
 ters and illogical administrative action in State matters. To 
 illustrate ! It is not unusual to see a man " Standing for Com- 
 mission Form of Government " and " Running for State Office " 
 at the same time ; independent in the first instance, but in the 
 second instance dependent for the possession of the office upon 
 the support of a partizan party, which he must support vigorously 
 in turn or lose the office. Such a man struggles against the influ- 
 ence of The Partizan Party in local administration, but he coun- 
 tenances the exercise of this influence in the general political pro- 
 cesses of State administration. Really ! there is no end to the in- 
 consistencies involved in the practise of piecemeal political reform. 
 
 Collective Action under. Taken as a whole the commission sys- 
 tem offers an opportunity to the municipal electorate to weaken 
 the hold of a partizan party over local electorate action, somewhat. 
 That seems to be the full measure of its reformatory force in this 
 respect. Compared with the forces at w^ork in general adminis- 
 tration, this particular degree of force is not strength ; it is weak- 
 ness. The system is capable of accomplishing but a part of what 
 is necessary. Consequently, it works well in some cities and in 
 others it does not. But why? Because the system is merely 
 appliqued upon, and so is made a part of, the Partizan Party 
 System. Naturally, it will work well in cities wherein the in- 
 fluence of the partizan parties has already been weakened ; but 
 it will not and can not work well in cities wherein the influence of 
 The Partizan Party is still dominant over electoral action. In 
 many respects the commission sj'stem is incomparably better 
 than the " Mayor and Alderman System " ; but so long as it 
 remains a part of the Partizan Party System, its reformatory force 
 will remain insufficient to produce logical municipal administrative 
 action. The municipality is but a part of the County and of the 
 State ; and the illogical action which the municipal elector is 
 compelled to take in support of partizan party action which re- 
 lates to County and to State matters will always to a greater or 
 less degree nullify the effects of the logical action which the elector 
 can take in local matters ; the reason being that, by his illogical 
 action in general matters, he is keeping the partizan parties alive, 
 and so is affording them a continued opportunity for their immoral 
 exploitation of municipal needs. 
 
 There are some writers who think they perceive the culmination
 
 COMMISSION FORM OF GOVERNMENT 457 
 
 of ejffective political reform in the extension of the commission 
 system to the management of the affairs of all the municipalities, 
 all the Counties of the State, and of the executive department 
 of the State Government. But is it not clear that so long as the 
 commission system remains but a part of the Partizan Party Sys- 
 tem it can never possess the reformatory force necessary to pro- 
 duce wholly effective and logical electoral action in the County 
 any more than it can in the Municipality ? And would not a 
 commission acting as a State Executive be subject to the same 
 influences that are brought to bear on a municipal commission? 
 Such a plan is hopeless, besides being circumlocutory to an exhaust- 
 ing degree ; and it does not compare in efficiency to the simple, 
 direct, and sure way that lies right at hand. The principle under- 
 lying the commission system is, absolute freedom in the exercise 
 of administrative power and in the control of the exercise of 
 administrative authority. The reformatory value of the system 
 lies most in its example. It affords municipal electors partial in- 
 dependence, partial political freedom, and an opportunity for 
 direct administrative action. Were the partizan party and its 
 system eliminated entirely from the local situation, the freedom, 
 the independence, and the opportunity of the municipal elector 
 would become absolute under the inclusive electoral provisions of 
 the system. Whatever the commission system can do for a city 
 it can do for The Commonwealth. But it should do more in each 
 instance, and it can be made to do more in each instance providing 
 The Commonwealth will abolish the permanent partizan party 
 and its system and will extend the provisions of the commission 
 system relative to electoral action to cover the action of all of the 
 Sovereign-units of The State while they, as the Collective Sov- 
 ereign, are engaged in performing all of the processes of political 
 administration. So long as the partizan parties control the per- 
 formance of some of these processes, the commission system of 
 administration will not be allowed to work freely or effectively 
 anywhere. 
 
 Piecemeal Reform. So long as permanent partizan parties are 
 continued as administrative instrumentalities, just so long will the 
 adoption of a " Commission Form " of administration result merely 
 in the substitution of a differently formed administrative agency 
 for the partizan parties to manipulate. Of it.self this substitution 
 is not a fundamental reform, nor has it any far-reaching effects 
 on general administration. Good State administration — which 
 is what we really desire — does not so much depend ui)on good
 
 458 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 men in local or in general offices as it does upon logical administra- 
 tive methods of universal application. 
 
 But, at present, the path to logical administrative action is 
 barred by the illogical partizan system and the permanent partizan 
 parties. They build up the illogical system faster than it can be 
 taken down piecemeal. Under the circumstances which is the 
 speediest and most effective course ? To try to remedy the illogi- 
 cal system provision by provision, leaving the partizan parties to 
 hinder, obstruct, and twist our efforts as in the past, or at one 
 stroke to abolish the illogical system and with it its vivifying source, 
 the permanent partizan parties ? The first course involves untold 
 misdirected energy and unending effort. Surely, under properly 
 directed effort, the creation of a predominating sentiment for a 
 return to a logical exercise of the Reserved Powers of Administra- 
 tion throughout the State must be the shorter operation, and 
 one that will result at least in providing the opportunity for effec- 
 tive administrative action everywhere.
 
 CHAPTER XXVI 
 RETROSPECTIVE SURVEY 
 
 Casting a retrospective glance at the political action of the 
 American Commonwealths, our attention is caught by several 
 prominent features. 
 
 We see the people of the Commonwealths, possessed of the 
 Power and the Right to Govern, establishing themselves as Rep- 
 resentative Democracies, and The Electorates as the Collective 
 Sovereigns. 
 
 We see the exercise of Administrative Power placed in the hands 
 of The Electorate and the exercise of Administrative Authority 
 placed in the hands of their representatives in public office. 
 
 We see that Administrative Action is thus divided into two kinds 
 of action ; namely, Electoral Action and Official Action ; and that 
 each represents a sum total of distinctive Individual Action. 
 
 We see that the Administrative Problem is. How to keep the 
 exercise of The Reserved Powers in the hands of the electors and 
 how to cause The Electorate to use the Reserved Powers so as to 
 produce a logical exercise of the Delegated Powers. 
 
 We see The Electorates entering upon the work of administration 
 without a comprehensive Administrative System enabling The 
 Commonwealth to enforce a proper discharge of electoral obliga- 
 tions or of official obligations. 
 
 We see how The (Commonwealths left the opportunity open for 
 individual electors to be organized into aggregations of voters 
 that are in no true sense Political Parties through failing at the 
 outset to regulate adequately the administrative action of the 
 electors. 
 
 We see how The Commonwealths left the opportunity open for 
 changing the nature and character of public office through failing 
 at the outset to prescribe distinctly the function and duty of office 
 and officers. 
 
 We see how that before long The Electorates, involved in 
 
 459
 
 460 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 apparently insurmountable administrative difficulties, abandon 
 the kind of individual electoral action required by their form of 
 Democracy, and how they allow The Partizan Party to gradually 
 control the discharge of the duties of citizenship through con- 
 structing a system composed of methods of action that are not in 
 consonance with the ordained principles of action, and which 
 control enables The Partizan Party to produce a kind of electoral 
 and of official action that is foreign to the original spirit and intent 
 of the people. 
 
 We perceive how through the use of the Partizan Party System 
 the electors have been forced gradually to relinquish the direct 
 exercise of more and more of the Reserved Powers, and how 
 through submitting to the indirect exercise of these powers The 
 Commonwealths have lost their direct control over the action of 
 their administrative agency. The Government. 
 
 And finally we perceive that whatever of power and influence 
 the electors have lost has been gained by The Partizan Party, and 
 that The Commonwealths do not at present possess the requisite 
 methods enabling them to force their Sovereign-units to act in the 
 manner required by their theory of government. 
 
 Turning now to what The Partizan Party has done and is doing 
 in reference to matters which are of vital importance to the con- 
 tinued existence of the American Form of Democracy : 
 
 Principles of Association. We see The Partizan Party ignoring 
 the Democratic principles of Association, Free Agreement of Wills, 
 and Harmony through Agreement, and keeping its organizations 
 alive and operative by the exercise of Fear, Favor, Fraud, and 
 Force ; thus seriously weakening the Bond of Union between the 
 people and The Government. 
 
 Free Participation. We see it actively engaged in making free 
 participation in political administration impossible for the passive 
 class in its organizations by enforcing the dogmas of Party Regular- 
 ity and Party Success. We see it greatly hampering the political 
 freedom of the remainder of The Electorate and obstructing active 
 participation of public-spirited citizens as much as possible. 
 
 Naturalization. We see it utilizing the Process of Naturalization 
 to swell the passive class in its organizations, and weakening the 
 political ability of The Commonwealth by stuffing The Electorate 
 with a vast number of individuals who are totally unqualified for 
 citizenship. 
 
 Registration. Where Registration Laws are in force we see it 
 perpetrating all sorts of registration frauds for the purpose of
 
 RETROSPECTI\'E SURVEY 461 
 
 manufacturing its characteristic partizan partv majorities of 
 " votes." 
 
 Nominations. We see it impairing the Right to Select candi- 
 dates through bestowing nominations for public office on party 
 partizans for secret partizan party reasons, and through selling 
 nominations for cash. We see it successfully obstructing access 
 to the public service of independent and public-spirited citizens, 
 and even foisting its " Yellow-dog " candidates upon the people 
 at times and in places where its naturalization, registration, and 
 election frauds assure its " Success." 
 
 Elediom. We see it setting aside the Elective Principle and 
 impairing the Right to Choose between administrative policies 
 by multiplying the issues, by making vague, ambiguous, and 
 deceptive professions of intent, by mixing questions of candidacy 
 with questions of policy, and by bringing influences to bear upon 
 the exercise of the elective franchise that range from mere cajolery 
 to open crime. 
 
 Responsibility. We see it destroying Political Responsibility by 
 supplanting it with " partizan party responsibility " ; and we see 
 it enforcing partizan party responsibility upon electors and officials 
 rigorously, but always for the purpose of promoting the immoral 
 interests of The Partizan Party and never for the purpose of 
 securing a logical discharge of the Obligations of Sovereignt}' or of 
 the Duties of Citizenship. 
 
 Leadership and Statesmanship. We see it substituting profes- 
 sional politicians for true political leaders in Electoral Action, and 
 constantly destroying the chance for statesmanship in The Gov- 
 ernment by withholding from public-spirited leaders of public 
 opinion every possible opportunity for deliberation and debate 
 within The Government. 
 
 Organization. We see it organizing Electoral Action under a 
 system of methods, usages, and practises that destroys freedom of 
 political action completely on the part of some of the electors, 
 which hampers that freedom in all of the remainder, and which 
 reduces The Electorate to a choice between two sets of bad partizan 
 party promises and candidates as the means for producing good 
 administration. 
 
 Public Opinion. We see it everv-where and in all stages of its 
 work before the people hampering the free formation of Public 
 Opinion by its manipulation of political questions ; and we see it 
 while in control of the process of election actively engaged in 
 distorting, vitiating and counterfeiting The Will of The Peoi)le
 
 462 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 by fraudulent and criminal manipulation of the ballots cast at the 
 elections. 
 
 Representation. We see it actively engaged in destroying the 
 principle of representative action and substituting Partizan Party 
 Representation in the place of Proportionate Representation 
 through the use of the Gerrymander, Deals in Offices, Trades in 
 controlled " votes " before the elections, and we see it doing the 
 same thing at the elections by means of ballot manipulation, ballot 
 box stuffing, colonization, repeating, fraudulent canvassing, and 
 so on. We see it lowering the grade of representation and of 
 legislation through denying capable but public-spirited citizens 
 the opportunity to hold public office and position ; through the fill- 
 ing of public office for partizan party objects and reasons, and 
 through preventing political minorities from obtaining representa- 
 tion as far as may be. And we see it producing the evils of non- 
 representation, misrepresentation, and disfranchisement in the 
 body politic through developing — instead of correcting — the 
 faults of our system of representation. 
 
 Majority Rule. We see it ignoring the idea of Majority Rule, 
 making it impossible, and substituting in its place a form of 
 Minority Rule ; namely, the control of administrative action by 
 some one partizan party all of the time. 
 
 Political Majorities. We see it making the existence of Political 
 Majorities and the free succession of such majorities absolutely 
 impossible through twisting the term to mean " The largest 
 aggregation of partizan party ' votes ' or ' voters ' " ; and we see 
 the dominant partizan parties getting their votes and voters 
 together through frauds practised in the various administrative 
 processes that range from deception to secret collusive action. 
 
 Electoral Action and Duty. We see it destroying the ordained 
 exercise of The Reserved Powers as far as possible by inducing or 
 deceiving numbers of the electorate to take indirect action by 
 means of a permanent partizan party, thus interposing a partizan 
 party as an intermediary for an indirect discharge of electoral 
 duty ; and we see it transmuting individual political action into 
 partizan party action through enforcing partizan party duty as 
 the first rule of Electoral Action. 
 
 Official Action and Duty. We see it constantly misusing and mis- 
 applying The Delegated Powers for its own partizan ends through 
 the investure of certain important public offices with partizan party 
 functions, through the induction of trusted partizan party leaders 
 into public offices having functions utterly foreign to their original
 
 RETROSPECTIVE SURVEY 463 
 
 purposes, and through twisting the parliamentary law governing 
 the organization and procedure of legislatures to fit the changed 
 situation. We see a partizan party imposing its Will as the 
 stimulus to action by The Government; and we behold The 
 Government, so energized, constantly affording opportunities for 
 the growth in society of conditions that are the very opposite of 
 those which Government was instituted to maintain. We see 
 The Partizan Party transmuting official action into partizan party 
 action through forcing public officials to act in the interests of 
 " The Party " while in office ; and we perceive how the unnatural 
 action of such partizan party officials becomes the cause for the 
 interminable so-called friction between the branches of The 
 Government. 
 
 Electorate Action. We see it preventing United Electoral Action 
 by splitting The Electorate into groups that are not opposed to 
 each other on political grounds alone, but which are opposed to each 
 other largely by the desire to satisfy personal and private interests 
 ahead of the ordained welfare of the individual and of The State. 
 
 Public Morals and Conscience. We see it undermining the public 
 morals and the public conscience by debauching the morals and 
 smothering the conscience of large numbers of the Sovereign-units 
 through inducing partizan party action by the exercise of bribery, 
 intimidation, physical force, party power, and the promise of 
 party favor. 
 
 Obligations of Sovereignty. We see it taking advantage of the 
 faults in the administrative system ; ignoring every obligation 
 of sovereignty ; and impairing every ordained condition of 
 existence. 
 
 Duties of Citizenship. We see it making a widespread realiza- 
 tion of the duties of citizenship as hard as possible by insisting that 
 " Party Success " is the main object to be worked for instead of the 
 General Welfare ; and we see it openly inspiring a contonij)t for 
 such duties by the frauds it practises in the processes of naturaliza- 
 tion, registration, nomination, and election, and in the Bi-Partizan 
 Boards and Commissions of The State. 
 
 Tivo Codes of Action. We see it weakening and dissipating the 
 political energy of The Commonwealth by maintaining and 
 enforcing a code of administrative action that is diametrically 
 opposed to the kind of action originally ordained. 
 
 Education. We see it doing nothing in the way of true i)olitical 
 education ; but on the contrary, by precept and example we see it 
 educating Sovereign-units to act m a maimer productive of social
 
 --/' 
 
 464 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 unrest and destructive of the true welfare of the individual and of 
 The State. 
 
 The Present Situation. Turning now to the present situation : 
 While it is bad enough, yet, as said before, it is not desperate. The 
 " Powers of The People " and the " Rights of The Individual " are 
 the same now as in the beginning. But through continuous 
 illogical administrative action by The Collective Sovereign its 
 units have become deprived of the opportunity for free and direct 
 exercise of their rightful political powers and consequently are 
 unable to control the action of The Government in reference to 
 individual rights. 
 
 The question is, How can a free and full exercise of The Reserved 
 Powers of Administration be regained by The Electorate ? As 
 said in Chapter IV the people have the right to exercise political 
 power for any political object. They have the power to correct a 
 defective administrative system at any time. They can if they 
 wish abolish that which in the past has been considered Law and 
 ordain that which shall be considered Law in the future. They 
 can construct a logical administrative system and incorporate it in 
 their Organic Law through an exercise of the Power of Amendment.
 
 CHAPTER XXVII 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In his final exhortation Mr. Ostrogorski says in substance : ^ 
 " Hitherto the victorious struggle which democracy has carried 
 on in the world has been mainly a struggle for material liberty; 
 moral liberty which consists in thinking and acting as free reason 
 dictates, has yet to be achieved by it. Democracy has brought 
 with it political liberty ; but nowhere else has it appeared more 
 clearly than in the United States that political freedom, which 
 can build up material liberty only, is not complete without the 
 citizen's independence of mind, and without the spontaneous and 
 vigilant energy of his will. In the absence of this independence 
 and this vigilance, demagogism and corruption have entered the 
 house in broad day as a thief enters in the night, and democracy 
 (as a regime of free reason) has received a check, not from an excess 
 of liberty, but from a deficiency of moral liberty. To retrieve 
 this check and to prevent complete ruin, the remedy is obvious ; 
 return to reason and to duty." 
 
 No one can object to the spirit in which this is written ; but may 
 we not be pardoned for asking. How is it possible for an individ- 
 ual to " return to administrative duty " in the absence of an ex- 
 press declaration by The Sovereign of what that duty isf How 
 can an individual possess " independence of mind in administra- 
 tive action " in the absence of an express statement by The Sover- 
 eign of how he is to act administratively f It is all very well for us 
 to say with Mr. Ostrogorski that " We must devote ourselves to 
 the work of life, and at the voice of conscience which calls to duty, 
 each contribute his personal efforts as bricks and mortar for build- 
 ing the walls of the free democratic city, the supreme refuge of 
 human dignity." 
 
 But what conscience is it that calls ? How can the individual 
 
 ' " Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties," Vol. 2, 728. 
 
 465
 
 466 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 or the democracy possess a political conscience in the absence of 
 an express declaration concerning political duty? And is it not 
 because of the absence of such a declaration concerning specific 
 administrative duty, and not because of the lack of innate " inde- 
 pendence of mind " on the part of the Sovereign-units, that the 
 opportunity was presented for demagogues and corruptionists to 
 usurp the exercise of the political powers of the Sovereign-units 
 easily ? How otherwise were it possible for the demagogues and 
 corruptionists to construct openly and apply a body of customs, 
 usages, and practises which, while it stood as an expression of 
 administrative duty, actually worked to prevent its discharge? 
 Blind trust on the part of the people explains its use ; but it never 
 could have come into existence in the face of an ordained Rule of 
 Administrative Duty, 
 
 Now although we as individuals cannot " Return to duty " in 
 the absence of a standard of duty established by the Collective 
 Sovereign and acknowledged by its units to be the expression of 
 our ideas concerning administrative duty, nevertheless there are 
 no valid reasons why we should continue on blindly without a 
 standard of duty, or should not possess one if we wish. On the 
 other hand there is every reason why we should possess one if we 
 wish to reap the full benefits of our chosen form of Self Govern- 
 ment. But in getting it there is only one possible course to take ; 
 expediency, as a rule of administrative action, must be banished. 
 Then, with minds open to conviction, we must return for instruc- 
 tion to our first principles. Those who perceive the central truths 
 embodied therein must strive and ever strive to quicken the in- 
 telligence of the majority to perceive that administrative duty 
 will remain a matter of dispute, and impossible of reasonable and 
 just enforcement, until such time as we. The Collective Sovereign, 
 take up the unfinished work of The Fathers, and, through a proper 
 and full discharge of the obligations of sovereignty prescribe the 
 manner in which every electoral duty and every official duty shall 
 be performed and enforced. Thus, and thus only, can we dis- 
 charge our duty to the succeeding generations that will compose 
 The Commonwealth, transferring — in addition to the material 
 liberty that our fathers fought for and acquired — the opportunity 
 for the free exercise of that degree of moral liberty which The 
 Fathers thought they had secured to posterity, but failed through 
 unprescient action to preserve. Shall we be the generation to 
 confer moral freedom upon the American electors and show 
 Humanity at Large how it can be obtained ?
 
 CONCLUSIONS 467 
 
 As to Administrative Duty : Oiir search for information is at an 
 end. We have prosecuted it through enough of the field of polit- 
 ical action to enable us to draw some definite conclusions and to 
 state them as follows : 
 
 Two Kinds of. The term " Administrative Duty " expresses 
 two kinds of dutv ; namelv, Electoral Dutv, and Official Dutv. 
 
 Electoral Duty, General Character. Every Sovereign-unit, while 
 engaged in the exercise of The Reserved Powers of Administration, 
 is by virtue of the original governmental agreement regarding 
 objects and democratic action, bound to act freely, reasonably, con- 
 scientiously, and directly in every move, step, stage, and process of 
 electoral action. He is also bound morally to secure the same kind 
 of action from, and to secure the opportunity for such action to, 
 every Sovereign-unit with whom he is associated either in local or 
 in general administrative action. 
 
 The Duties of Citizeiiship. This, in a broad way, expresses the 
 general character of what is commonly spoken of as the duties of 
 citizenship. These duties are numerous. They range from the 
 duties of political naturalization to the duties of political control. 
 They are performed at different times during a period of adminis- 
 tration. Unfortunately, this broad name does not serve to in- 
 dividualize these duties. It conveys no distinct impression as to 
 the exact number, time of performance, sequence, specific purpose 
 of each duty, or as to the manner in which each duty is to be per- 
 formed. It is a term to juggle with, for it serves merely to give a 
 vague impression of the general character of these duties, which 
 impression, however, loses most of its force in the face of an estab- 
 lished system of action which, in many respects, compels an 
 elector to support a partizan party as the means for discharging 
 his duties as a Sovereign-unit. 
 
 Under our theory of Government the administrative duty of 
 the electors lies solely and directly to The Commonwealth — the 
 Sovereign which made them Sovereign-units for the specific pur- 
 pose of promoting the General Welfare according to Democratic 
 principles of action. But if The Sovereign delegates the exercise 
 of its sovereignty improperly to a partizan party, of what par- 
 ticular use is an appeal for proper administrative action to an 
 elector who knows that the partizan parties do not work for the 
 General Welfare alone, but on the contrary are constantly working 
 for their own private ends? Under such a scheme of procedure 
 even the general character of administrative duty is lost sight of 
 by some, remains obscure to others, and impossible of performance
 
 468 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 by many ; and under such a scheme of procedure the minds of the 
 citizens at large remain permeated with that pernicious confusion 
 of contradictory ideas concerning proper administrative effort 
 that results in suspicious, inharmonious, weak, inefficient, and 
 even wrongful action by many. 
 
 Necessity for establishing Electoral Functions. What, then, is 
 necessary to impart to each electoral duty the binding force of a 
 specific obligation? 
 
 Definite political powers without stated methods of exercise 
 possess a limited effectiveness only ; there being no definite meth- 
 ods for the exercise of each power for a stated purpose. 
 
 Political powers with illogical methods operate harmfully, and 
 present the opportunity for the misuse of power for the accom- 
 plishment of purposes never intended. 
 
 Definite political powers, to produce definite administrative 
 results, must be used in a definite manner. 
 
 Consequently, in order to attach the binding force of obligation 
 to each specific electoral duty it is necessary for the Collective 
 Sovereign to construct and to enforce the use of definite methods 
 for the exercise of each definite power for each definite purpose. 
 
 Body of Electoral Liberties. Such methods, embodied in the 
 Organic Law, bestowing freedom of reason, conscience, and voli- 
 tion on the elector, and making possible a free exercise of political 
 prerogative are indispensable to action as ordained. All questions 
 relative to the action of the Collective, Sovereign hinge on these two 
 basic facts ; namely, The action of the Collective Sovereign is the 
 sum total of the action of its units ; and the character of its action 
 depends upon the character of the action of its units. The Col- 
 lective Sovereign can not act freely to produce the ordained results 
 of administrative action unless the action of its units is free. It 
 can not produce Justice as ordained unless its units possess equality 
 of political freedom. It can not do what it has to do unless it can 
 control the action of the individuals who do it. Without a man- 
 date prescribing definitely the action which shall be considered a 
 proper discharge of each detail of the processes of administration 
 both The Sovereign and the Sovereign-unit are weak; the sov- 
 ereign because it has no definite rule of action under which it can 
 enforce proper electoral action resolutely and justly, and the 
 sovereign-unit because he cannot confidently invoke just and 
 speedy action by the Collective Sovereign in enforcing proper 
 electoral action from others. For instance : One of the objects 
 of organizing electoral action is, to impart decisiveness to the
 
 CONCLUSIONS 469 
 
 " Electoral Mandate " as to administrative policy. Experience 
 has shown that in very many instances the mere oath of the elector 
 that he will discharge his electoral duty properly is not enough to 
 produce such a discharge. The oath does not compel him to act; 
 and whenever an elector is " induced " to " go fishing " on primary 
 or on election davs such failure or omission to act constitutes in 
 itself a politically criminal breach of electoral duty in that his 
 action tends to detract from the decisiveness of the electoral 
 mandate. Theoretically, there is a specific duty attached to each 
 electoral action. Consequently, the only way by which The 
 Electorate can hope to control its own collective action with a 
 reasonable degree of certainty and effectiveness is through pro- 
 viding each elector with a full opportunity to enforce a proper 
 discharge of electoral duty from each elector with whom he comes 
 in contact in electoral action, and to make a failure to do so a 
 punishable political offense. 
 
 But The Commonwealth cannot use physical force to control 
 the mental and moral action of the elector while he is engaged in 
 formative and constructive administrative action. Individual 
 reason and conscience are operative alone. All that the Com- 
 monwealth can do logically is to incorporate within its organic law 
 certain methods by which individual action in this respect can be 
 taken spontaneously, and by which the electoral will when formed 
 can be made fully effective. Having secured to the elector the use 
 of such methods, and having provided the means for enforcing 
 their use justly, then The Commonwealth has done all that 
 it can do properly to conserve the free exercise of individual 
 reason, conscience, and will upon which the general welfare 
 depends ultimately. 
 
 Now since The Commonwealth must act in this manner, then 
 surely it is illogical action on its part to permit several relatively 
 small associations of individuals to exercise what is generally 
 admitted to be improper influence and control over the minds and 
 consciences of a part of the electorate; and since illogical action in 
 this respect is also immoral action in that it tends to destroy polit- 
 ical freedom in administrative action on the part of some, and to 
 hamper it on the part of the remainder, this of itself is sufficient 
 reason for abandoning the use of the present partizan party 
 methods of electoral action. 
 
 Moreover, political equality is a part of the ordained status of 
 the elector. Then surely it is illogical action on the part of The 
 Commonwealth to bestow special advantages upon any associa-
 
 470 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 tion of voters in the matter of making nominations, or in the per- 
 formance of any process of administration. 
 
 Also it is the duty of The Electorate to maintain the exercise of 
 The Reserved Powers in the hands of the electors. It is the duty 
 of the electors to exercise these powers directly. Both of these 
 duties are rendered impossible of performance by the use of an 
 administrative system that enables a partizan party to take the 
 exercise of these powers out of the hands of a dangerously large 
 proportion of The Electorate, and to convert what should be 
 direct electorate action into what is necessarily indirect partizan 
 party action. 
 
 Furthermore, the promotion of the general welfare is the object 
 sought after in deciding administrative policies. From the fact 
 that the Power, the Right, and the Obligation to Decide, is, as we 
 conceive it, upon The Electorate as a chosen body, it follows that 
 there can be no other logical body or any intermediary body for 
 the exercise of individual political freedom. 
 
 Finally, it is one of the duties of The Electorate to control ofHcial 
 action through enforcing a proper discharge of official duty. The 
 Electorate is the Common Superior of all public oflBcials whether 
 acting alone or with others in an oJEcial body, board, or agency. 
 But how can The Electorate control official action properly so long 
 as it uses an administrative system which enables several partizan 
 parties to select these officials ; to elect these officials by politically 
 fraudulent means ; and to misdirect the exercise of The Delegated 
 Powers through the application of " Party Power " on these public 
 officials ? It cannot be done ; and this leads us to a consideration 
 of ofiicial duty, and of the action which is necessary to enable the 
 Collective Sovereign to obtain, and to enforce if necessary, a proper 
 discharge of official duty from those of its units who for the time 
 being are in public office. 
 
 Official Duty: General Character of. Broadly speaking, every 
 Sovereign-unit, while engaged in the exercise of any of the Dele- 
 gated Powers of Administration, is by virtue of the original gov- 
 ernmental agreement as to objects and democratic action, bound 
 to act in exactly the same manner as an elector would act were all 
 the electors assembled together in a general administrative body ; 
 that is, freely, reasonably, conscientiously, and directly. He is 
 also morally bound to see to it that every other sovereign-unit 
 with whom he comes in contact in official action shall act likewise. 
 An individual does not lose his electoral capacity or avoid his 
 electoral obligations merely because he is entrusted with the tern-
 
 CONCLUSIONS 471 
 
 porary exercise of political authority. The character of electoral 
 duty and of official duty is the same. The general object sought 
 through the proper discharge of each is the same. The sovereign- 
 unit in office is bound to carry out the intent of the Collective 
 Sovereign. 
 
 Electorate action, however, can be rendered of little effect by 
 improper official action. Consequently, an indispensable pre- 
 requisite to proper Administrative Action is some means for pro- 
 ducing a proper discharge of official duty. But here again, specific 
 official duty can neither exist or be enforced reasonably in the 
 absence of a stated rule of official duty. If the people are to 
 govern, then they alone must prescribe official functions; and if 
 they are to govern in an orderly and effective manner, then the 
 functions of each similar class of offices, and that of each separate 
 and distinct office in any class, must be stated beforehand pre- 
 cisely as the functions and duties of the board of directors and of 
 the various officers in a corporation are, by initiatory action on 
 the part of the stockholders, set forth in the By-Laws of the Cor- 
 poration. As between the affairs of a business corporation and 
 that of a body politic there is no difference in principle. Con- 
 sidering each as a going concern, the duties of members and offi- 
 cials ; the relationships between each of a class to the others in a 
 class ; and the relations of each class to the other class or classes 
 must be distinctly stated to begin with in order to enable each 
 member and official to maintain or to assist in the maintenance 
 of the established relations and relationships. In political action 
 there is but one possible proper way in which official duty can be 
 rendered specific as to detail, definite as to character, and readily 
 and justly enforced ; and that is for the Collective Sovereign to 
 prescribe the function and duty of each office and declare the 
 manner in which and the official by which such function and duty 
 shall be discharged ; for without such fixing of function and duty 
 beforehand the greatest possible opportunity is left open for im- 
 proper official action through which The Government can be made 
 the instrument for forcing upon society conditions of existence 
 and action at once destructive of individual rights and productive 
 of social unrest. 
 
 The Body of Official Liberties. Finally, and by no means of 
 least importance, the ordainment of such a rule of official action 
 would establish a " Body of Official Liberties " under which the 
 official would possess the requisite amount of freedom and inde- 
 pendence in official action, and under which he could immediately
 
 472 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 invoke the power of The Commonwealth to resist encroachments 
 by other officials and to punish any attempted exercise of control 
 over his action that does not proceed directly from the Collective 
 Sovereign. It is this fixing beforehand of function, duty, and 
 manner of discharge, that makes the administrative action of The 
 Judiciary so orderly, smooth, and effective. It is the basis of that 
 publicity in judicial action which the people consider an indis- 
 pensable safeguard to their " Liberties " ; and as evidence of the 
 fact that the people are gradually perceiving the advantages to 
 be obtained by doing the same with general public ofiice may be 
 cited their action in prescribing and imposing upon their quasi- 
 public corporations a system of bookkeeping by which public 
 officials can easily ascertain the actual values of their properties 
 and franchises when seeking administrative revenue through 
 taxation. 
 
 As to Political Progress : After Government is Established, 
 political progress is made through administrative progress. State 
 necessities, action outside The State, economic progress, and in- 
 dividual material progress are constantly originating questions 
 of administrative policy within The State. Formative and con- 
 structive electoral action consists in shaping and bringing political 
 questions (not partizan party questions) up for a hearing and settle- 
 ment before the people. The electoral decision is made operative 
 by The Government, Where individual electors can act freely, 
 electoral action proceeds regularly from the settlement of one 
 administrative question to the discussion and settlement of another. 
 In logical electoral action each vote cast is a definite expression of 
 individual convictions regarding administrative policy; thus be- 
 stowing decisiveness of utterance upon the Electoral Mandate. 
 The questions themselves attract support ; the amount of support 
 determining their relative importance. 
 
 Logical administrative progress depends upon reasonably quick 
 and decisive electorate action that is carried out in detail by saga- 
 cious official action. Depending upon the presence of some, all, 
 or none of the elements of speed, decisiveness, and sagacity, ad- 
 ministrative progress will be rapid, slow, or perhaps lacking alto- 
 gether. 
 
 Because The Electorate (as the agency for imparting a definite 
 impulse to official action) should not attempt to decide more than 
 one political question at a time ; and because the elector has but 
 one vote to cast in determining the Administrative Will of The 
 People, the tendency of logical electoral action is to produce true
 
 CONCLUSIONS 473 
 
 political groups or parties advocating some one single issue as the 
 most important issue to be decided. 
 
 Representation. Where one political question at a time is de- 
 cided Representation becomes more direct and characteristic. 
 The representatives (officials) are caused to feel more strongly 
 the force of impulse and of control. Opportunities for unconscion- 
 able delay are curtailed, and the tendency in legislative action is 
 to a more speedy disposition of its particular work. This, in turn, 
 enables the people to take up and consider other political ques- 
 tions quickly, and to decide the order of their importance. 
 
 Apathy. Such electoral action is most healthful. It tends 
 to destroy the permanent alignment of " Parties " and the per- 
 manent combinations in " Leadership " which are dangerous. At 
 the same time it permits full scope to Political Leadership, and, 
 what is of the utmost importance, it tends to keep the individual's 
 interest in political administration awake and active. Apathy 
 cannot exist to a dangerous extent where individuals realize that 
 their votes bear directly upon the settlement of some one political 
 question; and the reader who is conversant with past administra- 
 tive action has not failed to notice the entire lack of apathy in those 
 who were members of the few truly political parties of the past, 
 not to mention its complete absence in the members of the opposing 
 parties whether acting collusively or separately as opponents. 
 
 But on the other hand ! If a partizan party is allowed to " at- 
 tract votes " to its candidates through advocating a multiplicity 
 of issues, then the settlement of the most important question may 
 be, and often is, postponed indefinitely by the decision of " The 
 Party " as to importance. Wlien this happens — and it happens 
 constantly — administrative progress is retarded. Also, by the 
 use of a multiplicity of issues the force of the individual's one vote 
 can be so weakened in decisiveness as to become worthless as a 
 practical means for producing logical administrative progress; 
 and apathy concerning administrative progress will continue to 
 exist on the part of many so long as they continue to believe that 
 there is no logical way of escape from the use of a partizan party 
 intermediary that throws every possible obstacle in the way of 
 administrative progress in order to enable it to perpetuate Special 
 Privilege in the place of Equal Opportunity. 
 
 As to Political Organization : While advocating the adoption 
 of a logical administrative system the author has been met re- 
 peatedly with objections like the following : " What's the use 1 
 The disposition and the lack of mental ability in the average
 
 474 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 elector will soon cause the freely forming political groups or 
 parties to have the same kind of Managements at their heads 
 as the partizan parties have now." " Their Managements will 
 soon dominate the action of the political parties and will soon 
 utilize the parties as the means for controlling electoral and 
 official action in their own interests ; thus, in the end, perpetuating 
 conditions in administrative action similar to those at present." 
 " The average elector must be led in his action ; and he will con- 
 tinue to be led by men who will take advantage of the situation 
 and busv themselves in getting votes to maintain ' The Established 
 Order of Things.' " 
 
 In meeting these objections the author has endeavored to show 
 that they are but partially warranted conclusions, and conclusions 
 that leave the latent public spirit and patriotism of the average 
 elector out of the consideration, and which also fail to take into 
 consideration the fact that under a logical system the elector 
 would have the full opportunity of being led by Statesmen and 
 not by Opportunists. Of course the need for organizing electoral 
 action will always exist, but in meeting conclusions against the 
 adoption of a logical system the author claims in turn that the 
 kind of organization possible under such a system will be most 
 acceptable to the average elector. He has shown the mental de- 
 pression that accompanies the present illogical organization of 
 electoral effort. He has endeavored to show how the existing 
 discontent and unhappiness can be dispersed largely under a 
 logical system because the average elector can turn freely to his 
 natural leaders for instruction as often as the occasion requires; 
 the happiness that is bestowed by a consciencious attempt to dis- 
 charge electoral duty uplifting the elector and prompting him to 
 similar effort in the future. He has shown that under a logical 
 system the political groups or parties are necessarily short-lived, 
 and therefore do not lend themselves readily to a scheme of per- 
 manent private control over electoral and official action ; but on 
 the contrary do afford the means for a permanent and constantly 
 active electorate control over such action. He has shown that 
 The Managements of political groups are composed of public- 
 spirited political leaders who — when the opportunity is pre- 
 sented — work to promote the general welfare through showing 
 the elector how to discharge his electoral duty properly. 
 
 Moreover, the author claims that the kind of organization pos- 
 sible under a logical system will not be an objectionable feature in 
 administrative action. Public Spirit will be given the opportunity
 
 CONCLUSIONS 475 
 
 to act as the force binding the electors into groups. It will be the 
 kind of organization that gives effect to true political leadership 
 which concerns itself with the propriety of administrative action ; 
 with the merits and character of candidates ; with the appro- 
 priateness of statutory law ; with the enforcement of political 
 responsibility upon public oflScials ; and with leading The Elec- 
 torate towards a conscientious solution of its problems rather than 
 in " Feeling " the resistance of Public Opinion against vague and 
 deceptive partizan party proposals. Public Spirit will be given 
 the opportunity to offset the desire for private advantage which is 
 now the chief incentive to produce organized electoral effort, and 
 which desire is made effectual now by such means as, the selling 
 of nominations to politically immoral opportunists for cash ; the 
 distribution of public offices for partizan party reasons ; the sup- 
 pression of Political Leadership and the general misuse of the Re- 
 served Powers of Administration. And finally, Political Organ- 
 ization, as defined in this book, w^ould, if put into operation, have 
 the tendency to produce fairly capable Sovereign-units out of 
 crude material, and would tend to prevent the degradation of 
 electors into " docile " and " trained " partizan party serfs whose 
 " votes " are utilized at present by The Partizan Party to offset 
 the effect of ballots that carry a real political significance. 
 
 As to Delegating the Exercise of the Reserved Powers : The 
 Power to Establish an administrative system, and the Power to 
 Amend it, is seated in The Electorate. Relying upon the public 
 spirit and the civic virtue of the individual we have given to The 
 Partizan Party the right to devise and to legalize the methods by 
 v.'hich The Reserved Powers of Administration are to be exercised. 
 Our action amounts to this ; namely, the creation of a partizan 
 party as an Administrative Agency ; the careless delegation to it 
 of the exercise of Political Prerogative; and the imprudent be- 
 stowal beforehand of our Sanction upon its acts. Improving its 
 opportunity, the Partizan Party has devised a system of methods 
 which enable it to control electoral action. It exercises its con- 
 trol for wrongful purposes. When forced to abandon one way of 
 misusing administrative power, it devises another immediately. 
 This sort of thing has been going on since the beginning. There 
 is no sign of change in partizan party intent or purpose ; and we 
 continue to suffer in happiness, in reputation, in character, and 
 in pocket, because we delegate wrongfully the exercise of Re- 
 served Powers which we should exercise directly. 
 
 However! We learn by experience; and our past experience
 
 476 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 in partizan party leadership and control warrants us in drawing 
 the following conclusions. First ; That so long as we continue 
 to delegate the exercise of any of the Reserved Powers to an agency 
 that is working constantly for politically immoral purposes we 
 cannot prevent that agency from diverting administrative action 
 from its true objects. Second ; That before we can hope to real- 
 ize the benefits flowing from Self Government, we ourselves, The 
 Electors, must resume a free and untrammeled exercise of all 
 The Reserved Powers of Administration. Third ; That just so 
 long as we continue to delegate an unrestricted exercise of dis- 
 cretion to The Partizan Party and it continues to use a partizan- 
 party-filled legislature as the means to legalize its methods of 
 electoral action, just so long will there be a struggle between the 
 people and the partizan party over proper administrative methods. 
 Fourth ; That so long as the people allow a partizan party to in- 
 corporate its methods in the administrative system, just so long 
 will the struggle leave The Electorate-at-Large at a disadvantage 
 because a proper administrative system cannot be composed of 
 partizan party methods. 
 
 The Danger of a Swper-'Elastic System. Experience has sho^Ti 
 us, or should have sho^\^l us, that an effective system must give 
 effect to the ordained Principles of Action, which, of themselves, 
 indicate the kind of methods to be used. Wherever Democracy 
 has been tried experience has demonstrated the fact that a limit 
 must he set to administrative action, and by The People's Mandate 
 concerning the precise object for which each administrative power 
 and authority shall be used, how it shall be used, by whom, and 
 at what time and place. 
 
 Now as a matter of fact we are using an administrative system 
 that is capable of unlimited and illogical extension ; and one that 
 contains no constitutional limitations upon the exercise of each 
 power and authority. But worst of all, we have an administrative 
 system the provisions of which can be easily modified, changed, 
 or be rendered inoperative as a safeguard of electoral freedom, by 
 the mere passage of some " Rule," " Regulation," or " Resolu- 
 tion " by some partizan party organization of voters ; for the 
 people allow a partizan party to dictate rules of electoral action 
 to a portion of the electors and also allow its Management to en- 
 force its dictates with all the power of a Despot. But aside from 
 this ! The danger that lies in an elastic administrative system, or 
 in one like ours which can be modified or changed easily by the 
 systematic adding of expediential method to expediential method
 
 CONCLUSIONS 477 
 
 is, that it provides no definite rule of administrative duty appli- 
 cable to all alike. 
 
 There are, however, several definite facts concerning it. It is 
 a partizan party system, affording a wide opportunity for the in- 
 fluential members of a partizan party, or of two dominant " par- 
 ties " — always more or less in collusion — to manipulate ad- 
 ministrative action for their own private benefit. Because of 
 its indefiniteness the question of proper administrative action is 
 left open to continual discussion and dispute. Unfortunately, 
 we have given The Partizan Party the right to curtail the freedom 
 of the elector ; and, under the circumstances, " The Party " has 
 something to say on the question of duty — not Administrative 
 Duty — but partizan party duty that is destructive of the other. 
 While there is a continual dispute concerning the relative merits 
 of " Partizan Party Duty " and the " Duties of Citizenship," 
 and while The Partizan Party is allowed to keep itself alive and 
 powerful as a disputant by its immoral and often criminal manip- 
 ulation of " the voters " and of " votes," political administration 
 cannot progress in effectiveness as it should progress. And finally, 
 since there is no end to the methods that human ingenuity can 
 devise for the misuse of political power and of political authority, 
 this system can be made to produce any result whatsoev^er that its 
 presiding genius desires, nor can the people prevent action being 
 taken under it that undermines the ordained freedom of the 
 individual upon which the ability and the stability of The Com- 
 monwealth rests. 
 
 As to the Obligations of Sovereignty : What then is necessary 
 to restore the elector to the position he was given originally, and 
 to enable him to discharge his administrative duties properly? 
 Just this, and nothing else ! The Collective Sovereign must dis- 
 charge its Obligations of Sovereignty properly through providing 
 its Sovereign-units with a system of administrative action enabling 
 electors as such to exercise The Reserved Powers of Administration 
 properly, and enabling officials as such to discharge the true func- 
 tions and duties of all offices properly. 
 
 Duties and functions must be defined ; and the system, con- 
 sidered as a Body of P^lectoral and of Official Liberties, must be 
 embodied in the Fundamental Law where it cannot be overridden 
 by individual or by legislative action. 
 
 As to the Power of Amendment : But in view of the fact that 
 individual Political Freedom cannot be regained and retained 
 without the establishment of such a system, the work of its es-
 
 478 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 tablishment entails no real hardship on the elector. There is 
 nothing mysterious to be done; nothing that the average intel- 
 ligence cannot grasp and understand. The people generally are 
 not wholly unfamiliar with the basic idea of proper action. The 
 people generally realize that State electoral action is a matter 
 which they are free to regulate. Are not the people of the various 
 States constantly recasting and amending their Constitutions so 
 as to meet the requirements of conditions that have been changing 
 constantly since their autonomy was achieved ? 
 
 Of course it is admitted that The Commonwealth cannot stop 
 evil intent, evil desire, or even evil action on the part of a perverse 
 individual by merely prescribing a Rule of Duty ; but this natural 
 lack of ability in The Commonwealth furnishes no excuse what- 
 ever for its failure to do all in its power to preserve political free- 
 dom to its Sovereign-units. On the Contrary ! The average 
 lack of sagacity and the average disposition should, of itself, serve 
 as an incentive to most painstaking action to that end. Common 
 prudence, as well as honor and reason, demand that much of The 
 Commonwealth ; and since The Electorate was originally com- 
 manded to exercise several distinct and separate powers for several 
 distinct and separate ends, common honesty and ordinary com- 
 mon sense require two things ; namely. That distinctive methods 
 shall be prescribed for the exercise of each power, and that 
 the methods shall be such as will keep the exercise of each 
 power confined to the accomplishment of its distinctive purpose 
 as far as is possible. 
 
 Reform through Official Legislation. The resumption of a proper 
 exercise of political power and authority is, however, hindered 
 greatly by the failure of the people to perceive the impropriety of 
 trying for it through official legislation. Political reform can- 
 not come that way because it is the way of Political evil. Official 
 reform legislation is indirect action by The Sovereign where direct 
 action is required. 
 
 Acting upon the assumption that indirect action will do in the 
 absence of a rule compelling direct action, the people, through 
 official legislation, conferred upon the Partizan Party the op- 
 portunity to influence, and if possible to control, Electoral Action. 
 The adoption of The Partizan Party System had the effect of 
 conferring upon it the sanction of custom ; and its use has taken 
 a strong hold on the minds of the masses who do not apprehend 
 its working possibilities. Time and again right-minded citizens 
 with the majority of the people behind them have tried to get
 
 CONCLUSIONS 479 
 
 right electoral methods through official legislation — The Aus- 
 tralian Ballot System, The Direct Primary are instances ; but 
 each time it has been found impossible because the people have 
 improvidently allowed The Partizan Party to employ undemo- 
 cratic motives of associative effort by means of which it has been 
 able to change the permitted " Organizations of Voters " (which 
 in nature should be Political Organizations) into compacted bands 
 of self-seekers that are strong enough in their controlled voting 
 power to head off or to side-track the insufficiently organized at- 
 tempts of the people to get what they want from the partizan- 
 party-filled Legislatures. How can the people get what they 
 want and at the same time allow full play to the Will of a political 
 agency over whose actions they have no adequate control ? 
 
 Reform through True Direct Legislation. Briefly, the Col- 
 lective Sovereign has authorized The Partizan Party to make 
 political administration as easy as possible for the Sovereign- 
 units. Li exchange for this mess of pottage the Sovereign-units 
 have relinquished their political birthright of political freedom 
 and are — as individuals — being swindled continually by The 
 Partizan Party out of the blessings which belong to them rightfully 
 and to their successors. This is the situation of the people at 
 present ; and this is the price paid for political ease. Out of this 
 discreditable condition there is but one course of action open. 
 Through a direct exercise of the power of amendment the Col- 
 lective Sovereign must provide its Sovereign-units with a system of 
 methods under which they can freely, directly, and unitedly when 
 necessary, discharge their self-imposed political obligations and 
 duties. In no other way can they safeguard the possession and 
 transmission of their rights. 
 
 Drastic Reform. There are many who shrink from attempting 
 political reform in this drastic manner. They argue that there is 
 a settled indisposition on the part of the people to amend their 
 Constitutions radically. But if the history of amendatory effort 
 be examined closely, the student will perceive that the people have 
 never hesitated to amend when they thought it right to do so. 
 And it will appear also that this supposedly innate indisposition or 
 distrust in the people has been engendered largely by The Partizan 
 Party ; which interesting body, being intrenched in the faults of 
 the administrative system, naturally bends its utmost efforts to- 
 wards preventing their eradication by amendment. 
 
 Heretofore the reformatory attempts have been mainly directed 
 towards eradicating one particular fault after another ; and in
 
 480 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 most instances The Partizan Party has stepped forward as the 
 Defender of The Faith — in the partizan party — and has led 
 the people into a rejection of the proposition. But the reform 
 proposed here strikes at the existence of 'permanent parties of 
 any sort. It is the re-formation of the entire Administrative 
 System ; the creation of a Body of Electoral and of Official Lib- 
 erties ; the ordainment of a Rule of Administrative Duty ; and 
 the vitalization of the Public Conscience. 
 
 As to Organized Educational Effort : Of course reform through 
 true direct legislation can not come until the majority of the 
 electorate is convinced of the necessity and of the propriety of 
 resorting to amendment. Of course the Collective Sovereign can 
 act as it pleases. But it can not administer Government wisely 
 or well until its intellectual ability equals its ability to govern. Its 
 intellectual ability is the sum total of the intellectual ability of 
 its units. Manifestly, the intellectual ability of the Sovereign- 
 units must be raised through intellectual effort intelligently ap- 
 plied. We suffer from political evils which engender the growth 
 of social and economic evils. The escape from this condition lies 
 through raising the intelligence of a majority of the electorate to 
 a clear perception of the true cause for the existence of general 
 political evil ; and then through du-ecting that intelligence to the 
 kind of administrative action that is necessary to render the 
 existence of such evil less possible. The opportunity for the 
 existence of such evil must be restricted as far as possible. 
 
 A systematic study by the mentally strong of the political prob- 
 lem of the American Democracies, and of the processes involved 
 in its logical solution must be the first step in The Reformation. 
 Then, a systematic education of the young, the politically unin- 
 formed, and of our immigrants, in the Obligations of Sovereignty 
 and the Duties of American Citizenship must follow. Such effort 
 will be necessary to supplement the pitifully weak curricular in- 
 struction of our public educational institutions, and will be neces- 
 sary also to offset the misinformation which these classes receive 
 now concerning the ordained exercise of political power and of 
 political authority; for if Democracy considered as a regime of 
 reason is to last and play its beneficent part, then these prospective 
 and actual Sovereign-units must be converted into beings capable 
 of reasoning from political cause to political effect. 
 
 As to Reformatory Agencies and Methods : How can these classes 
 in society be reached properly ? Here the lessons taught by the 
 work of the temporarily free electoral groups described in Chapter
 
 CONCLUSIONS 481 
 
 XXV become of assistance in indicating the practical way for 
 taking up and organizing educational effort. 
 
 Free Electoral Groups. Whenever the desire for electoral free- 
 dom becomes strong in a few, the educational means and methods 
 are available ; for there is nothing structural in our Plan of Ad- 
 ministration to prevent the natural, free, and spontaneous for- 
 mation of similarly' minded electors into District, County, or 
 State associations, all animated by the same purpose, all led by 
 the same Leaders or by local leaders acting under State Leader- 
 ship, and all working together to arouse individuals to a realization 
 of the true exercise of political power and political authority ; to 
 a realization of the actual Obligations and Duties of Sovereign- 
 units ; and to a realization of the fact that without logical ad- 
 ministrative action The Electorate, working collectively, can 
 neither perpetuate Government as ordained nor ascertain whether 
 it is possible to secure the peculiar benefits promised in its name. 
 
 Those associations which have been most successful and effective 
 in the past have been those which have tried most to discharge 
 the function of Political Leadership and to keep their Managements 
 free from outside interference and control ; and the methods they 
 adopted suggest the methods necessary for keeping The Manage- 
 ments of the electoral groups pure in composition, character, and 
 purpose. 
 
 In a Republic the natural function of a political leader is to assist 
 the elector to a clear perception of the probable results of pro- 
 posed electoral action ; and the function of a statesman is to assist 
 the legislators to a clear perception of the probable results of 
 proposed legislation. Electoral Groups, formed and managed 
 as above described, would become the natural " Breeding places " 
 of Leaders and Statesmen because they would afford the oppor- 
 tunity for the free, direct — and therefore most effective — play 
 of individual public spirit, civic virtue, political knowledge, 
 wisdom, and sagacity ; such as does not exist at present, and such 
 as it was hoped the " Party " organizations would afford, but do 
 not. 
 
 Political Leagues. Such free and mutually supportive electoral 
 groups, working together for the adoption of a logical system of 
 administrative action, would possess the characteristics of a 
 League. Having a " Political Object " it would be in fact a 
 Political League and should be named so. Why ? Because there 
 is either deception or instruction in a name, and the word " Po- 
 litical " would serve to distinguish these leagues sharply from the
 
 482 SAFE AND UNSAFE DEMOCRACY 
 
 present permanent associations of voters which are their natural 
 opponents, and the real character of which is not revealed by the 
 use of the single word " Parties." 
 
 Such a body of independent electors working in or through a 
 State for the restoration of and for the permanent preservation of 
 indiiidual political freedom would soon attract an influential mem- 
 bership. It could not fail to attract support from the truly In- 
 dependent Press. It could not fail to become an educational 
 factor in political administration and to secure effective public 
 education therein if it worked for it. It could not fail in the end 
 to become a numerical majority in The Electorate ; and, if it re- 
 mained true to the principles of Free Association, it could not fail 
 to establish that kind of Leadership and Statesmanship ; that 
 system of organized electoral action ; that degree of individual and 
 official responsibility ; and that level of individual character upon 
 which depends the success of American Democratic Government 
 as ordained. 
 
 Because of the lack of a duly ordained and reasonably enforcible 
 Rule of Administrative Duty the original operative force of our 
 principles of duty has become diminished and dissipated. Through 
 our unwitting administrative action unfair, unjust, undemocratic, 
 unpolitical, and uneconomic conditions of individual existence 
 have been allowed to creep into and exist in our body social. A 
 Democratic Regime can be ordained ; but it can not last or be 
 made effective without that continuous and logical action on the 
 part of the people which imparts life, strength, and operative force 
 to the principles that brought it into existence. Illogical political 
 action that is caused by the use of illogical political agencies, means, 
 and methods, weakens the force of these principles, undermines 
 society, and prevents the administration of Justice as ordained. 
 To just the extent in which self-interest is allowed to supplant 
 public spirit in individual political action will privilege supplant 
 equality and justice in political and economic action. To just 
 the extent in which privilege supplants equality in any respect 
 will the social equilibrium be unbalanced. An unbalanced society 
 must produce an unbalanced Electorate. An unbalanced Elec- 
 torate must produce necessarily an unbalanced assisting admin- 
 istrative agency ; and unless the unbalancing process is stopped, 
 society must move forward either to its end or to a governmental 
 revolution which may be either peaceful or the opposite, depending 
 upon the preponderance of either political knowledge and public 
 spirit, or the individual hatred and distrust developed.
 
 CONCLUSIONS 483 
 
 This is not prophecy, but the plain statement of a truth ; for 
 principles such as ours, although their vigor may be sapped by the 
 illogical action of one society, will nevertheless survive, and will 
 be given other means of expression by other societies formed to 
 give them their full effect.
 
 FINIS 
 
 AND THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY SPAKE UNTO THE PEOPLE, SAYING: 
 I AM THE TRUTH WHICH HAVE BROUGHT THEE OUT OF THE HOUSE 
 OF POLITICAL, BONDAGE. THOU SHALT HAVE NO OTHER GODS BE- 
 FORE ME. THOU SHALT NOT MAKE UNTO THEE ANY LIKENESS OF ME; 
 NEITHER SHALL YE MAKE UNTO YOU GODS OF GOLD. THOU SHALT 
 NOT BOW DOWN THYSELF UNTO THEM OR SERVE THEM ; FOR I THY 
 TRUTH AM A JEALOUS MASTER, VISITING THE ERRORS OF THE FA- 
 THERS UPON THE FUTURE GENERATIONS THAT COMPOSE THE STATE. 
 HONOR MY POLITY ACCORDING TO MY PRINCIPLES THAT MY DAYS 
 MAY BE LONG IN THE LAND OF THY OCCUPATION. AN ALTAR OP 
 SELF-SACRIFICE THOU SHALT MAKE UNTO ME ; AND IN ALL PLACES 
 WHERE THOU SHALT RECORD MY NAME I WILL MAKE SAFE THE 
 FREEDOM, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND JUSTICE THOU HAST ORDAINED. 
 
 484
 
 INDEX 
 
 Absolutism, political, 353. 
 
 Adams, John, on Government of Laws, 8. 
 
 Administration, Political, character of, 
 
 . true, 58 ; how turned into partizan 
 party administration, 222, 229 ; de- 
 fined, 140, 396, 414 ; distinguished 
 from Government, 1 ; education a 
 factor in, 381 ; effects of our partial 
 failure in, 416; good, upon what it 
 depends, 457 ; human nature a factor 
 in, 7 ; irresponsible, causes, 349 ; lit- 
 erature on, character of our, 14 ; lack 
 of a logical system of, causes, 15 ; ob- 
 jects of, 404 ; original plan of, insuffi- 
 cient, 4 ; policy of, improper decision 
 of, powers of, two classes, 68 ; prob- 
 lems of, variety of, solutions of, 4 ; 
 the distinctive American problem, 69 ; 
 process of, 1 ; progress in, how is and 
 is not made, 320 ; proposed course of, 
 a political question, 190 ; propositions 
 concerning, submitted, Pref. vi ; repre- 
 sentative, meaning of term, 297 ; spirit 
 and intent of people as to, 298 ; suc- 
 cessful, requisites, 8, 141, 148, 236; 
 the system of, 394-418 ; the partizan 
 party system of, see under System, full 
 problem of, 380 ; is a final result, 60 ; 
 how accomplished properly, Pref. ix ; 
 work of, Pref. x. 
 
 Administrative Action, amount of work 
 in, 5, 403 ; burden of, how increased, 
 148, 234 ; character of our, 6, 20, 398 ; 
 dangerous kinds of, two, 301 ; dis- 
 honest, defined, 289 ; how discouraged 
 and punished, 301 ; can not be deter- 
 mined in absence of prescribed rule of 
 action, 101 ; dual codes of, effects, 
 danger, 23, 143 sq., 233, 237, 425, 455, 
 463 ; each step, stage, and process of, 
 requires legal regulation, 148 ; control 
 over, how obtained, 399 ; effect on, of 
 giving control of, to partizan party, 
 376 ; energizing force, source, true, 2, 
 14, 18 ; fundamental erroneous opinion 
 concerning, 10; the parent incon- 
 sistency concerning, 27 ; intent of 
 The Fathers concerning, 2, 4 ; elec- 
 
 toral, defined, 397; follows process of 
 establishment, 1 , 299 ; how produced, 
 213; individual, requisites, 5, 12, 18; 
 illogical, causes for, 5, 19, 141 sq. ; the 
 kind we profess to desire, 18; logical, 
 what is, 9, 34, 139, 196 ; methods of, 
 danger in two sets of, 143 ; danger in 
 two codes of, 144 ; nothing mysterious 
 ia, 13; object of, 299, 404; official, 
 defined, 299, 378, 397; how official 
 made to seem most important, effects, 
 410; orderly, what is, 403 ; ordained 
 kind of, 18; how destroyed, 253, 413; 
 proper, what is, 349, 351, 370, 397; 
 source of inefficiency in, 387 ; proper, 
 hinges on methods, 429 ; why impos- 
 sible at present, 187 ; reasons for reg- 
 ulating beforehand, 5 ; remedy for 
 our improper, 27 ; routine in, 1, 4, 75, 
 139, 190, 403; progressive stages in, 
 75 ; how transmuted into partizan 
 party action, 17; why transmutation 
 fraudulent, 229; theory of, .396; 
 united, a political right, 341 ; some 
 results of our, 144 ; how path to logical, 
 barred, 458 ; the partizan party an 
 obstacle to speedy, 23, 358, 363. 
 
 Administrative Power, for what used, 4. 
 
 Administrative Problems, 4, 69, 380; 
 clue to solution of, 69. 
 
 Administrative Questions are distinct, 
 191. 
 
 Agencies, functions of, 130; what de- 
 termines character of action of, 108. 
 
 Agencies, the two political, 3, 110-119, 
 120-129 ; why action of, must be reg- 
 ulated by The Sovereign, 107. 
 
 Agreement, implies mutuality, 43, as to 
 policy and candidates, 78. 
 
 Agreement, The Governmental, de- 
 fined, 2 ; effect of, 97 ; weakness, 
 force, needs, 139; content, 140, 408. 
 
 Aliens, Unqualified, how converted into 
 citizens, 219; effects on, 220, 223; 
 why a danger to the state, 224. 
 
 Allegiance, considered, 37 ; party reg- 
 ularity a partizan form of, 252. 
 
 Ami)iguity, effects of, 24. 
 
 485
 
 486 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Amend, The Power to, 61 ; uses, 62, 
 477 ; is practically unlimited, 413. 
 
 American, character of average, 221 ; 
 heedlessness of, 222. 
 
 American Commonwealths, differences, 
 similarities, 394 ; republics in form 
 democracies in intent, 298 ; not 
 strictly sovereign states, 97 ; general 
 intent of, 136 ; duty of, as to methods 
 of individual action, 469 ; ultimate 
 object of each, 395 ; why doubt and 
 impotency prevail in, 101. 
 
 Apathy of Electors, considered, 83, 473 ; 
 a contributing cause, 344 ; Lord Cairns 
 on, 345 ; how possible to dispel, 478. 
 
 Appointive System, The, 268, 284 ; requi- 
 sites, 286. 
 
 Appointment, Political, 285. 
 
 Apportionment of representation, 316. 
 
 Aristocratic Class and Rule, 250. 
 
 Assistance clause, 277 ; fraudulent use 
 of, 294. 
 
 Association, principles of, 28 ; essence, 
 basis of, 41 ; function, 35 ; results, 41 ; 
 free, meanings, 340 ; destroyed by 
 party action, 460 ; prevented by po- 
 litical apportionment, 322. 
 
 Australian Ballot system, history, ob- 
 jects, 274 sq. ; further considered, 434 ; 
 American modified form of, considered, 
 275-279 ; some results of, 286. 
 
 Authority, Political, defined, described, 
 65, 66 ; exercise of, is a trust, an ac- 
 quired right, 65 ; how exercise of 
 originally divided, 3 ; proper kind of 
 exercise, 105-107 ; why exercise gen- 
 erally sought, 370 ; when acquired 
 by strongest, 143 ; redelegation of 
 exercise of, 106 ; must be controlled, 
 104 ; problem of control, 372 ; de- 
 partmental, created, 375 ; mixed, or 
 double, how created, 377 ; fusion of, 
 with party authority, 377 ; misuse of, 
 126 ; broad grants of, effects, 125 ; 
 direct exercise of, indispensable, 69, 
 105-107. 
 
 Authority, The Supreme, 66 ; difficulties, 
 in exercise of, 125, 370. 
 
 Author's objects, vii ; plan of subject, x ; 
 premises, vi. 
 
 Ballot Box Stuffing, 293. 
 
 Ballot, The, means for expressing in- 
 dividual political will, 91 ; frauds on, 
 293 sq. ; history, kinds, 271-277, 293 ; 
 how changed into a ticket, effects, 91 ; 
 objects, use of, 77, 110, 111, 272 ; prep- 
 aration of, 278, 281 ; purposes served 
 
 by use of, 271, 282; a wrongful use 
 of, 116; our experience with, 182. 
 
 Bi-Partizan Process Boards, considered, 
 2 3 1 : partial object, 277 ; further con- 
 sidered, 442, 443. 
 
 Blessings of Democracy, how obtained 
 and transmitted, 27. 
 
 Blunders, our administrative, viii ; im- 
 mediate origin of, 417. 
 
 Body of Liberties, 32; Electoral, 468; 
 Massachusetts, 400; Official, 471. 
 
 Boodle Aldermen, 366. 
 
 Bribery, political, 292. 
 
 Bryce, James, on organization and 
 nomination, 164 ; on public opinion, 74. 
 
 Cairns, Lord, on apathy, 345. 
 
 Candidate, qualifications, 105 ; charac- 
 ter of, proper, 106, 197 ; proper selec- 
 tion of, effects, 197, 236 ; selection and 
 choice of distinguished, 236 ; a logical, 
 197 ; the official, 274 ; how selection 
 of, by partizan party legalized, ^^^^ . 
 
 Caucus, 243 ; American origin, 245. 
 
 Caucus Action, requisites, 154. 
 
 Caucus, A Political, defined, 243 sq. ; con- 
 gressional, 257 ; legislative, 248, 254 ; 
 original, 246, representative, 248-254. 
 
 Caucus Work, when put into hands of 
 "the party," 249. 
 
 Central Idea of the partizan party 
 system^2^^ 
 
 Choose, TnePower to, effect of dele- 
 gating exercise of, 83 ; how exercised 
 in nominating process, 241. 
 
 Choose, The Right to, 52, 110; be- 
 tween policies, 76 ; considered, 107 ; 
 proper exercise of, 79, 110; and im- 
 portance of, 241 ; how impaired, 345. 
 
 Citizenship, essence of, 214 sq. ; State, 
 requisites, frauds etc., 216, 224 ; parti- 
 zan party conception of, effects, 220. 
 
 Citizens Movement, The, 422 sq. 
 
 Citizens Union, The, 423 sq. 
 
 Civic Federations, 433. 
 
 Civic Virtue, object, 50; defined, 57, 
 403 ; how strengthened, 213, 383. 
 
 Civil Service Reform, as a reform, start 
 of sentiment for, 444. 
 
 Classes in Society, origin, etc., 311 ; rep- 
 resentation by improper, 312. 
 
 Cleveland, Grover, party honesty, 389. 
 
 Collective Action, proper, 429. 
 
 Collective Social Organisms, 308. 
 
 Colleges, our servile, reasons, 338. 
 
 Colonizers and Colonizing, 208 ; regis- 
 tration, 219, 228; elections, 293. 
 
 Collusion between partizan parties, ^Q,,
 
 INDEX 
 
 487 
 
 229 sq. ; between members of, and 
 officials of, and outsiders, 367. 
 
 Combine, The Boodle, 3G6. 
 
 Commission Form of Government, 453- 
 457 ; combines two sets of ideas, 453. 
 
 Committee Legislation, 73, 365. 
 
 Committees of Correspondence, 246. 
 
 Committees of Seventy, 422 ; how im- 
 peded political progress, 427. 
 
 Common Consent, 35. 
 
 "Common People," The, 250, 268. 
 
 Common School System, an auxiliary 
 aid to administration, 383. 
 
 Common Superior, The, described, 3, 
 64, 121 ; integrity of, control of, how 
 lost, 122-127 ; the partizan party an 
 unnatural, 125 ; effects of having 
 "The Party" act as, 126, 303. 
 
 Commons, John R., on district system 
 and gerrymander, 338 ; on propor- 
 tional representation, 335. 
 
 Commonwealth, The, effect on, of no 
 ordained administrative system, 101 ; 
 on what its power, glory, and might 
 depends, 114; forces it must contend 
 against, 141 ; acts formatively and 
 constructively through the electorate, 
 151 ; lesson it can learn from party 
 action, 146, 148; how exercise of its 
 compelling power is divided, 397 ; 
 how uniting bond and capacity of is 
 weakened, 322 ; requisites for exist- 
 ence, 391 sq. 
 
 Communities, how formed, 41, 44; how 
 the American make their regime opera- 
 tive, 129 ; the prime questions of, 76 ; 
 how act to attain objects, 63. 
 
 Community Rights, of revolution, 61, 
 411. 
 
 Conditions of Existence, the four prime 
 ordained, 4 sq. ; human nature and, 56. 
 
 Conscience, The Public, defined, 100 ; 
 on what depends, 101 ; the electorate 
 the guardian of, 113. 
 
 Consent of the Governed, 36. 
 
 Constituted Authority and Authorities, 
 of the state, 59, 122 ; of "The Party," 
 160, 168, 357 sq., 378. 
 
 Constitution, A Political, purpose, 2; 
 prime object of, 40^; considered in 
 detail, 408-414 ; as a moral law, 4 L^: 
 faulty construction of American, 412 ; 
 amendment of, 413; and public atti- 
 tude towards, 479. 
 
 Constitutional Conventions, J^l^*^^- 
 
 Continuous Political Action, 69. 
 
 Control, Electoral, 372; official, 373; 
 proper official, 375. 
 
 Control, Political, considered generally, 
 370-379 ; cause for loss of exercise of, 
 83, 101 ; the moral and material sides 
 of, 253 ; reason for existence of, 50 ; 
 of the common superior, 127 ; of its 
 units by the sovereign, 308 ; not suf- 
 ficiently regulated in constitutions, 41^^ 
 
 Control, The Power to, 370. -*'*^ 
 
 Cooley, Judge, on written ballot, 272. 
 
 Cooper, James Fenimore, on a govern- 
 ment of men, 330. 
 
 Cooperation, a principle of free associa- 
 tion, 41 ; problems of, 49. 
 
 Cooperative Control, the right of, 50; 
 how destroyed, 372. 
 
 Conventions, delegate, 260 ; constitu- 
 tional, 413 sq. ; mixed, 258 ; nominat- 
 ing, 166 sq., 259 sq. ; partizan party 
 state, 260. 
 
 Corrupt action, how safety in accom- 
 plished, 359. 
 
 Corruption, defined, 292, 435 ; begin- 
 nings of, 436. 
 
 Corrupt Practise, A, defined, 4^^^ 
 
 Corrupt Practises Acts, futihty of, 2§^ 
 
 Crime, Political, defined, 288. 
 Curran, J. P., on vigilance, 9. 
 Custom, how may override law, 123; 
 
 how may possess force superior to that 
 
 of principles, 55. 
 
 Deal, The, 232, 422 sq. 
 
 Debate, the coming public, 22. 
 
 Deceit, a political fraud, 289. 
 
 Delegated Powers, The, stated, 69; 
 object, sanction, 299. 
 
 Delegation of exercise, of authority never 
 intended, 51, 105 ; of political preroga- 
 tive, danger, 10; of reserved powers, 
 475 ; of sovereignty, effects, 467. 
 
 Democracy, A, defined, 297 ; source of 
 strength, 51, 151 ; source of ineffi- 
 ciency in, 287 ; three kinds of, in U. S., 
 J5^ ; each state a variant of ,J39g, 
 
 Democracy, defined as a system of state 
 polity, V ; as a form of government, 
 297 ; broad problem of American, 69 ; 
 professed ifiorality is the chief source 
 of attractiveness, 151 ; on what success 
 or failure of depends, 34 ; of all forma 
 of government is most dependent 
 upon its administrative system, 187 ; 
 strength, weakness of, 392 ; spirit and 
 intent of, requisites, 100 ; representa- 
 tive, expresses a contradiction in 
 ideas, 297. 
 
 Direct Action, in the exercise of political
 
 488 
 
 INDEX 
 
 power and authority is obligatory and 
 imperative, Pref. ix, 18, 69, 76, 79, 
 105-107, 300, 352-354, 371, 398, 431, 
 460, 462, 467 sq., 470, 478. 
 
 Direct Legislation, True, defined, scope, 
 437 ; an improper conception of, 438. 
 
 Direct Primary, failure of as a reform 
 means, ,4^. 
 
 Discipline/Party, defined, 161. 
 
 Discouragement of voters, 295. 
 
 Disfranchisement, Practical, 282, 345. 
 
 Dishonesty, Political, defined, 289. 
 
 " Distribution of Powers, The, " 120, 124. 
 
 Docility in political action, 164. 
 
 Doctrine, defined, 39. 
 
 Dominant Parties, described, 268; want 
 all of the spoils all the time, 4%. 
 
 Duties of Citizenship, considered briefly, 
 105-109 ; how ascertained and pre- 
 scribed, 98, 109 ; how contempt for 
 inspired, 463 ; why meanings of should 
 not be left open to question, 100 ; how 
 supplanted by the obligations of par- 
 tizanship, 355 ; further considered, 
 465. 
 
 Duty, principles of, 40 ; standard of, 
 101, 466 ; administrative, kinds, 467, 
 469; electoral, 467; official, 470; 
 how rendered specific, 471 ; our duty 
 to posterity, 148, 466 ; path of return 
 to barred, 466. 
 
 Ease, Political, price of, 479. 
 
 Economic Action, progress, 2, 283. 
 
 Education, Political, considered, 380- 
 393 ; minimum required, 381 ; free, an 
 auxiliary aid to administration, 382 ; 
 is first step in political reform, 429 ; 
 non-partizan associations as a means 
 of, 480. 
 
 Educational effort, need for, 480. 
 
 Election, A Political, frequency of, 77 ; 
 purposes, objects, 264, 270 ; methods 
 of, 157 ; work of, 153 sq. ; vital ques- 
 tions^concerning, J56; freedom of, 
 273; frauds in, 292^94; legal con- 
 trol of, ^74 ; party control of, ^4Z^ 
 purity of, a name only, 276, 295 ; in- 
 spectors of, 276. t-_r'v*rv» 
 
 Election, term defined, 264. 
 
 Election Laws, our partially criminal, 
 287 ; how naainly obtained, 295. 
 
 Election, The Process of, gfi4^;29^. 
 
 Elective Franchise, 112, 264, 287. 
 
 Elector, An, 112; duty, status, 113, 
 469 ; freedom and power of, 156, 468 ; 
 oath of, in Conn., 113; insufficiency 
 of oath, 469 ; requisites for freedom of, 
 
 5, 402 ; qualifications imposed on, 110 ; 
 effects on, of joining a "party" or- 
 ganization, 117, 159, 161, 231, 256. 
 287, 357; how "reached" by partizan 
 parties, 235 ; how freedom of re- 
 stricted by law, 345 ; how forced to 
 act in a partizan party capacity, 341, 
 344. 
 
 Electoral Action, defined, 75, 397 ; 
 objects of, 75, 150 sq., 299; nature 
 and kind of, 114, 115; requires regu- 
 lation beforehand, 108 ; requisites, 5 ; 
 common end of individuals in, 151 ; 
 right, 153 ; problems of, 155 ; must 
 be direct, 158; united, 158, 184; 
 organization of, 153 ; Mr. Bryce on, 
 164; relative importance of, 409 sq., 
 472 ; is the sum total of individual 
 action, 459 ; duties of, 467 ; how ren- 
 dered ineffective, 471 ; tendency of 
 logical, 467 ; how organized by par- 
 tizan parties, 358 ; partizan party 
 control of, 23. 
 
 Electoral Functions, 112; necessity for 
 establishing, 468. 
 
 Electorate Action, defined, 299 ; req- 
 uisites, 5 ; proper regulation of, 23 ; 
 kind, and objects, 18, 115; right, 
 source of, 151 ; why must be direct 
 and undelegated, 158 ; must be united, 
 158, 184 ; how changed into district 
 action, 361 ; why ordained, is impos- 
 sible now, 344 ; how united, destroyed, 
 463. 
 
 Electorate, The, considered as a politi- 
 cal agency, 110-119; has exercise of 
 political prerogative, 3, 190 ; con- 
 trasted with the people, 62 ; is the 
 acting sovereign, and the collective 
 political trustee, 113, 402; cause of 
 its surrender of sovereignty, 118 
 its loss of control of The Govern- 
 ment, 127 ; is more than a means, 130 
 exercises the commonwealth initia 
 tive, consequent obligation of, 141 
 exercises the maintaining and compel- 
 ling power of the people, 396 ; func- 
 tions of, 112, 121, 130, 300, 357, 397 
 direct action required of, 158; effect 
 of delegating exercise of its powers 
 117, 159; intellectual composition of 
 175; how "stuffed" through process 
 of naturalization, 217 ; is misrepre- 
 sented and unorganized, 341, 343 
 theoretical character of, 396 ; powers 
 exercised by, 300 ; separation of, 
 from exercise of powers, 126 ; cause 
 for loss of integrity, 126 ; the guardian
 
 INDEX 
 
 489 
 
 of the public conscience, 113; caucus 
 action of, 154 ; apathy in, 344 ; in- 
 stability of, causes, 380 ; the common 
 superior of the branches of the govern- 
 ment, 303 ; and of all public officials, 
 470 ; duties of, 470 ; will of, proper 
 creation of, 115; work of, is the re- 
 sult of the work of its units, 131. 
 
 Eloquence, an element of individual 
 power, 57. 
 
 Enrollment, party ; how performed , 2 3.4^. 
 
 Equality, absolute impossible, 32. 
 
 Equality, Political, an instrument of 
 Justice, 17 ; meaning, how bestowed, 
 how lost, 32 ; extended meaning, 48 ; 
 basic principle of administration, an 
 object of administration, 36 ; how 
 sense of, fostered, 59 ; education a 
 factor in, 381 ; not a self-maintaining 
 condition, 391 ; destroyed if exercise 
 of power is delegated, 51. 
 
 Era of good feeling, 174. 
 
 Era of Reform, when inaugurated, 419. 
 
 Error, political, the root of, 13, 14; the 
 original administrative, 6. 
 
 Established Order of Things, 435. 
 
 Establishment, process of, defined, 1 ; 
 powers of, 2 ; defined, enumerated, 
 68 ; exercise of, not yet exhausted, 
 401 , 438 ; choices presented in process 
 of, 401. 
 
 Ethics, principles of, 40. 
 
 Events, term defined, 74. 
 
 Evil, Political, original source of, 13 ; 
 root of, 47 ; how only eradicated, 
 
 E^olsT The Choice between Two, forced 
 on the electorate, j,ii£kfc„2i&ft/4fiJ» 
 
 Executive Power, defined, 120 ; indirect 
 exercise of, sanction, 300. 
 
 Expedient, An, defined, nature, action 
 of, viii, 7 ; what use of, accomplishes, 
 91 ; effect of use of, in administrative 
 action, 204 ; when use of, in political 
 action becomes immoral, 20. 
 
 Experience, education by, 435. 
 
 Faction, defined, 172. 
 
 Factions, Party, influence of district 
 system on large and small, 346. 
 
 Failure to enforce laws, 288. 
 
 Feudal System, and partizan party 
 system compared, ^j^ 
 
 First Principles, defined, 28. 
 
 Fraud, A Political, defined, the pro- 
 genitor of industrial frauds, 289 ; open 
 opportunitiea for, 290 ; beneficiaries 
 of, 296. 
 
 Frauds on The Commonwealth, classes 
 of, 291 ; perpetrators of, 296. 
 
 Frauds on The Individual, legal and 
 moral considered, 291 ; at election, 
 292 ; by whom practised, 297. 
 
 Freedom, early and modern meanings, 
 changes in, 29; economic, of con- 
 science, 30 ; defined, 138, 398 ; one of 
 the ordained conditions of existence, 3 ; 
 contrasted with liberty, 31 ; of the elec- 
 tor, 119, 156; status of, permanency, 
 requisites, 398; from undue restraint, 
 29 ; not a self-maintaining condition, 
 391 ; J. Fenimore Cooper on, 330. 
 
 Freedom, Individual, how bestowed, 
 30 ; effects of perversion of, 77, 80 ; 
 how maintained, 138; status of, 3, 
 396 ; effect of district system on, 340 ; 
 why continuous, and absolute, neces- 
 sary, 403. 
 
 Freedom, Political, eternal vigilance 
 the price of, 9 ; defined, objects, 30, 
 49 ; is moral freedom, 30, 100 ; mean- 
 ing of, how maintained, 119; why 
 bestowed on individuals, 52 ; how 
 impaired, 100; as ordained, 138; 
 requisite of, 151 ; not a self-main- 
 taining condition, 391 ; our attempts 
 at maintenance, 201. 
 
 Freedom, Social, 29. 
 
 Free Participation, meaning, 304 sq. ; 
 the right to, 50 sq. ; how rendered in- 
 operative, 400. 
 
 Friction between the branches of the 
 government, 124 ; the original cause 
 
 Function, A Declared, how acts, 374. 
 
 Functions, electoral, official, necessity 
 for establishing, 109, 122, 468, 472. 
 
 Fusion of party and corporate interests, 
 362-364 ; of party and political au- 
 thority, 377. 
 
 Game of Politics, The, 425. 
 
 "General Interest," fallacy in term as 
 
 used, 308. 
 General Ticket, The, reasons for, ef- 
 
 fects produced, 
 
 sq. ; retained in 
 
 use, 203. 
 
 Gerrymander, The, term defined, con- 
 sidered generally, 331-335. 
 
 Good Government, defined, 7 ; somo 
 inadequate ideas of, 424 ; requisites, 
 457 ; clubs and associations, 433. 
 
 Good men iu i)olitics, 425. 
 
 Gott mit uns, 146. 
 
 Gould, Jay, testimony of, 364. 
 
 Govern, The Power to, 1, 368; the
 
 490 
 
 INDEX 
 
 right to, 52, 371 ; capacity to, how 
 weakened, 12, 19 ; how produced, 390. 
 
 Government, contrasted with adminis- 
 tration, 1 ; how established, 1 ; source 
 of energizing force, 2 ; beginnings of, 
 29; of the people etc., meaning, 72; 
 for what instituted, 142 ; for the 
 people, 378 ; objects of, 97, 142 ; sense 
 of remoteness of, meanings, 25 ; fruits 
 of, by whom promised, 178 ; promises 
 made in name of, are conditional, 178 ; 
 a, of men, 330; free, defined as a 
 means, 396 ; honest, 424 ; patriarchal, 
 • 47 ; success of, on what depends, 141 ; 
 benefits of, when transmitted, 381 ; 
 moral right the true basis of, 351; 
 chief difficulty encountered when es- 
 tablishing, 408. 
 
 Government, The, considered as a 
 political agency, branches of, 120- 
 129; the moving force in. 111; con- 
 trol of, by the electorate, 3, 127 ; is 
 more than a means, 130 ; composition 
 of, function, exercises authority only, 
 397 ; responsibility of, destroyed, 363 ; 
 how control over, lost, 127 ; does not 
 work automatically, 143 ; is the as- 
 sistant of the electorate, 3, 397 ; 
 functions of its three branches, 121 ; 
 responds as easily to a wrong impulse 
 as to a right one, 58, 143 ; how made 
 an agency for exercise of party power, 
 126 ; how connecting bond between, 
 and the electorate destroyed, 185. 
 
 Graft, and Grafting, 36&-367. 
 
 Greatest Good for All, 87. 
 
 Groups, Electoral, pri\aleges, 278, 280 ; 
 free, the necessary reformatory agency, 
 481 ; character of, how determined, 
 280. 
 
 Guarantee, The Political, requisites, 
 144 sq. ; the specific political, 145 ; 
 the only effective, 412. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, definition of re- 
 public, 417. 
 
 Harmony, American meaning, 39 ; nec- 
 essary to stability of commonwealth, 63. 
 
 Happiness, primitive meaning, 41 ; one 
 source of, 36, 82 ; an object of ad- 
 ministration, 36; a cause for absence 
 of general, 82 ; of what true, consists, 
 142 ; upon what depends, 404. 
 
 Hildreth, Richard, on truth, vii ; on 
 individual power, 57. 
 
 Honest Man in Office, effects, 427. 
 
 Honesty, Political, defined, 289, 388; 
 indispensable to successful adminis- 
 
 tration, 290 ; how only can be deter- 
 mined, 101 ; party, defined, 389. 
 
 Honorable, meaning of term, 360. 
 
 Human Nature, taken into consideration, 
 7 ; a destructive force in administra- 
 tion, 56 ; and exercise of political 
 power, 93. 
 
 5^324, 386 
 
 Idea, The Party, defined, 
 various matters, 94 sq., 318- 
 sq. 
 
 Ideas, proper subject of representation, 
 306 ; results and effects of confusing 
 and jumbling, 242. 
 
 'illiterates, effects of vote of, 278. 
 mmigrants, character of many who seek 
 citizenship, 223 ; why should be in- 
 structed first by the State, 388. 
 .mplied Rights ot citizeB s ; 411. - , 
 
 Impulse to The Government, source, 
 58, 150, 397 ; further considered, 269 ; 
 how character of, affects administra- 
 tion, 157 ; effect of political leadership 
 on grade of, 180, 184 ; when work of 
 imparting is finished, 270 ; how 
 weakened and perverted by the dis- 
 trict system, 349. 
 
 Independent Non-Partizan Associations, 
 
 character, work, results, etc., 4^ 
 
 JiS^ are only partially independent, 
 
 4Csq. ' 
 
 Independent Parties, how formation of,/ 
 is hindered, ,^77^ 
 
 Individual Action, the ordained kind of, 
 Pref. ix., 18 ; defined, 56 ; direct, 69i 
 105-107 ; requisites for proper, 17, 
 100 ; chief difficulty in, 163 ; how 
 transmuted into partizan party power 
 and action, 16, 17, 253. 
 
 Individual, The, dual capacity of, 2, 49, 
 70, 97 ; political capacity his supreme 
 capacity, 2 ; how it is made equal with 
 others, 51 ; how made unequal, effects, 
 196 ; how intellectual capacity raised 
 to level of political capacity, 383 ; 
 how political capacity most easily 
 weakened, 12, 19, 322 ; supposed to be 
 politically capable, 100 ; effects on, 
 of leaving without a law, 101 ; re- 
 quires the spur of law, 139 ; how 
 ability raised to capacity, 381 sq. ; 
 how social and economic status is 
 changed, 2 ; how his conditions of ex- 
 istence become changed, 38 ; account- 
 ability of, 351, 357; bewilderments 
 of, cause, 163 ; desire of, why regu- 
 lated, 57 ; elements of power of, 56 ; 
 
 1 objects for which used, 57 ; use of
 
 INDEX 
 
 491 
 
 power in political action, 137 ; why 
 limitations on use of, beneficial, 31 ; 
 exercise of power, 58 ; rights of, 
 43 sq. ; obligations of, 54, 96 sq., 1S9 ; 
 duties, status, 98, 144; obedience of, 
 99 ; right action of, requisites, 9S- 
 99; should not be allowed to devise 
 administrative expedients, 127 ; con- 
 ditions and necessities of average, 163 ; 
 danger tc.in partizan party member- 
 ship, 198 ; why shrinks from corrupt 
 practises, 358 ; how hampered by the 
 election laws, 287 ; how dependence of, 
 on a partizan party created.^g^^sg.. 
 254 ; why must receive moral guidance 
 from the state, 383 ; present undigni- 
 fied condition of, 82 ; ordained politi- 
 cal action of, IS, 189. 
 
 Inequality, when a principle in govern- 
 ment, 47. 
 
 Information, Political, no authorita- 
 tive body of, 14. 
 
 Initiative, The, 440. 
 
 Injustice, reign of, how made possible, 118. 
 
 Inspection of Election, evasion, 277. 
 
 Inspectors of Election, how secured, 277. 
 
 Instinct, defined, 41 ; Social, origin of, 
 41. 
 
 Intelligence, defined, 56. 
 
 Intent, character of our political, 19, 389, 
 relation of, and method, 137. 
 
 Interests, economic defined, 325 ; how 
 conflicting claims of, regulated prop- 
 erly, 71, 325; representation of, 309, 
 325 ; social, defined, analyzed, 308 sq. ; 
 how may become possessed of undue 
 advantage, 283. 
 
 Interests, The, defined and considered 
 generally, 308, 311 ; just regulation of, 
 must be moral, requisites, 151 ; con- 
 trol of, over partizan parties, 324 ; 
 influence of, in administration, 325 ; 
 hold of, on educational institutions, 
 339 ; principles of, opposed to political 
 principles, 325. 
 
 Intimidation, defined, 292. 
 
 Issues, Party, vs. political issues, ^; 
 character of, J86. 
 
 Issues, PoliticalT' defined, considered, 
 79, 81 ; multiplicity of, effects, 473. 
 
 .Judicial Action, cause of orderliness and 
 
 effectiveness of, 472. 
 Judicial Decisions, source of compelling 
 
 force of, 302. 
 Judicial Power, defined, 120, 300; to 
 
 interpret statutes, 121 ; sanction, 
 
 effects, 300. 
 
 Justice, abstract, political, meanings, 
 how rendered, an object of, adminis- 
 tration, 33-36 ; civil defined, on what 
 depends, 34, 117; not a self-main- 
 taining condition, 391 ; in the dif- 
 ferent states, 394 ; assumptions con- 
 cerning, 264; systems of, not alike 
 in all states, 395 ; how the state as- 
 certains its will as to, 111; sense of 
 can not be gerrymandered into exist- 
 ence, 85. 
 
 Knowledge, defined, an element of in- 
 dividual power, 57 ; original lack of 
 administrative, results, 10. 
 
 Law, Administrative, source, moral 
 force, 372 ; appropriate statutory, de- 
 fined, 378 ; elements in that form just 
 basis of penalty and punishment, 376 ; 
 how acts as spur and check, 373 ; 
 function, 416; when enforcement 
 possible, 437. 
 
 Law and Order leagues, 434. 
 
 Lawful action, 299 ; how determined, 
 301; lawful and "legal" contrasted, 
 196. 
 
 Laws, are the only rules of action likely 
 to be enforced, 182 ; a government of, 
 18, 330 ; failure to enforce, 288 ; effect 
 of enforcing defective, 289. 
 
 Leaders, true political, 152, 175 ; how 
 might be drawn into political action, 
 183 ; need for, use of, 175 ; noblesse 
 oblige of, 176; purity of, 186; func- 
 tions, 152, 176, 481 ; how kept out 
 of office, 347; the true "breeding 
 places" of, 481. 
 
 Leadership, Political, 152 ; the con- 
 necting bond between the electorate 
 and the government, 185 ; considered 
 generally, 175-188 ; originally dis- 
 charged by representatives, 73 ; re- 
 sults of logical, 152 ; why none at pres- 
 ent, 185 ; constant need for, cause of 
 suppression of, 347 ; independent 
 non-partizan associations as a means 
 of, 482 ; by partizan parties, results, 
 185. 
 
 Legislation, some purposes of, 437 ; how 
 quality, character, grade of, lessened 
 by u.se of district system, 348; Com- 
 mittee, 73, 365; frue Direct, 437; 
 so called "direct," and Official, de- 
 fined, 438 ; Resource, term defined, 
 why improper, illogical, and unwise, 
 43S ; sale of, 210 ; how sale of, made 
 safe, 333 ; character of some of our, 
 21 sq.
 
 492 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Legislative Powers, indicated, 68-69 ; 
 exercise of divided between the elec- 
 torate and the government, 69 ; in- 
 direct exercise of, is a trust, 67 ; how 
 authorized by sanction, 303 ; charac- 
 ter of, methods, rules of exercise, 348. 
 
 Legislators, theoretical character of, 
 155, 284; required action of, 316, 
 398 ; how influenced by use of dis- 
 trict system, 348; responsibility of, 
 351,364; how responsibility of de- 
 stroyed, 365 ; are deserted by the 
 party if criticised by the people, 366 ; 
 partizan party power over, 377 ^ q. 
 
 Legislature, The, prime object of, 69, 
 378 ; composition of, true idea of, 316- 
 318 ; how responsibility of divided and 
 destroyed, 365. 
 
 Liberty, general meaning, contrasted 
 with freedom, civil, individual, 31 ; 
 political, 32 ; eternal vigilance the 
 price of, 9 ; not a self-maintaining 
 condition, 391 ; not the same in the 
 various states, 394 ; status of, on what 
 depends, 395 ; how maintained, 396. 
 
 Library Hall Association, 433. 
 
 Lieber, Francis, on parties, 199 ; on 
 contamination of political majorities, 
 203. 
 
 Literature, Political, lack of an author- 
 itative, character of current, eft'ects, 
 14 ; some samples of current, 165, 
 335, 337, 446. 
 
 Local Self-Government, meaning, three 
 systems of described, compared, 266 sq. 
 
 Local State Governments, similarities, 
 differences, 394. 
 
 Logical, term synonymous with truth, 
 34 ; with proper, etc., 139, 196. 
 
 Love of Country, how supplanted by 
 love of party, 2.54. 
 
 Loyalty, how feeling lessened, 416. 
 
 Machine, The Partizan Party, 227; 
 habitat, 425 ; effect of, on state party 
 organizations, 368. 
 
 "Machinery of Government, The," 
 why a dangerous phrase, 418. 
 
 Majorities, political, defined, described, 
 84-88, 203-213; defined, 192; why 
 extinct, changed into a majority of 
 the district majorities, 323; how 
 ascertained properly, 207 ; constant 
 succession of required, 89. 
 
 Majority Rule, The Doctrine of, 84- 
 95 ; meaning of, 316 ; character and 
 kind of, 86 ; assumptions which lie 
 behind the use of, 264 ; intent of. 
 
 made inoperative by manufactured 
 district majorities, 324 ; the modera 
 doctrine of, 91. 
 
 Majority, various meanings of term, 84, 
 85 ; as to policy, 209 ; as to candidates, 
 209 ; of voters, of voters voting, 209 ; 
 character of, 205; of "votes," char- 
 acter of, 210; how gotten together, 
 440 ; of wills is the public conscience 
 and judgment, 100. 
 
 Majority Vote, The, present character 
 of, 206 sq., 362, 424. 
 
 Mandate, The Imperative, of "the 
 party," effects, 255, 262. 
 
 Mandate, The People's, character, 270 ; 
 of Jackson's time, 312. 
 
 Mayflower compact, 90. 
 
 Means, Political, defined, described, 132- 
 134 ; logical defined, 132 ; an element 
 in moral strength of a state, 133 ; 
 character of some means in use, 133. 
 
 Misrepresentation, defined, how pro- 
 duced, .341. 
 
 Means, term defined, function, 131. 
 
 Meechem's Public Officer, quoted, 107. 
 
 Method, A, defined, 134. 
 
 Methods, Political, defined and con- 
 sidered, generally, 134-148 ; char- 
 acter of those in use, 55, 104 ; neces- 
 sity for correct, 26, 78, 93, 99, 140, 
 307 ; must be ordained by the people, 
 101, 408; govern results largely, 136; 
 danger in two sets of, 143 ; requisites 
 of pre-election, 156 ; declared, ef- 
 fects, 374 ; John Stuart Mill on effect 
 of, 141 ; logical, meaning of term, 
 145 ; cause for adoption of illogical, 
 128 ; the kind intended, 142. 
 
 Meyer, E. C., on organization, 446. 
 
 Might of The Commonwealth, upon 
 what most depends, 114. 
 
 Mill, John Stuart, on representation, 
 315; on methods, 141. 
 
 Mills, W. T., on political parties, 199. 
 
 Minimum-per-cent-parties, term ex- 
 plained, composition of, 278 ; how 
 become dominant, 280. 
 
 Moral Action, how only obtained, 151. 
 
 Moral Force, requisites, 8, 139, 157. 
 
 Morality, Political, defined, 353 ; of 
 action, by whom determined, 100. 
 
 Morals, Private, by whom debased, 
 2S0; and how, 463. 
 
 Moral Progress, need for exceeds need 
 for material progress, 382 sq. 
 
 Moral Standard, how established, 5, 63. 
 
 Moral Strength, of the state, how weak- 
 ened, 23, 151.
 
 INDEX 
 
 493 
 
 Morals, The Public, standard, S ; req- 
 uisites, 101 ; how debased by partizan 
 parties, 24, 253, 358, 367, 463; are 
 a matter of agreed-upon law, 372. 
 
 Mugwump Associations, 432. 
 
 Municipal Reform, 424, 433 ; sets up 
 two codes of action, 425. 
 
 Mutual Ser\'ice, the bond between the 
 people and "the party," 448. 
 
 Mystery, none connected with govern- 
 ment, how apparent, can be dispelled, 
 25. 
 
 Names, advantage derived from use of 
 correct, 63, 67 ; either instruction or 
 deception in, 481. 
 
 Napoleon, on effect of a blunder, viii. 
 
 Natural opportunities, defined, effects 
 on society, 311. 
 
 Naturalization, defined, 214 ; objects, 
 effects etc., 216; frauds, 218 sq. 
 
 Naturalization, The Process of, 214-224 ; 
 theoretical definition, 221 ; results of 
 present performance of, 217 ; who are 
 the parties to, 217 ; effects of partizan 
 party control of, 219, 387 ; purpose 
 of, is to strengthen the state, 220 ; the 
 menace of improper performance, 223, 
 224, 387 sq. 
 
 Neighborhood Reform, 428. 
 
 New England Settlers, educational ideas 
 of, 382. 
 
 Nobility, The, in a democracy, 176 ; 
 noblesse oblige of, 176. 
 
 Nominate, The Right to, how impaired, 
 345. 
 
 Nominating Agency, 249 ; the real at 
 present, 242 ; conventions and pri- 
 maries merely the ostensible, 259, 260, 
 262. 
 
 "Nominating System," 243, 248. 
 
 Nomination of Candidates, how made to 
 appear of supreme importance, 238 
 sq. 
 
 Nomination, The Process of, 236-265 ; 
 why publicity not a feature in, 237 
 sq. ; a distinct stage in administra- 
 tion, 241 ; evils of, present process, 
 251 sq. ; ideas of, jumbled with ideas 
 concerning public opinion and election, 
 242 ; secrecy in, origin of, 238 ; pres- 
 ent process, development of, 242 ; 
 natural results of proper performance 
 of, 236. 
 
 Nominations, sale of, effects, 362 ; by 
 partizan parties, 167. 
 
 Non-Political Methods, defined, effects 
 of use of, j^j^HJ^ 
 
 Non-representation, 340. 
 
 No Politics in Professional Politics, 169. 
 
 Numbers vs. Ideas, 344. 
 
 Oath of office, futile in absence of pre- 
 scribed duties of office, 125. 
 
 Obedience, a factor in development of 
 society, and of progress, 41 ; of the 
 citizen, 99; political, defined, 372; 
 pains of, how offset, 59, 312. 
 
 Obey, The Voters promise to, effects, 
 245, 250, 325. 
 
 Objects, Political, defined, 66. 
 
 Obligation of The Individual, 54. 
 
 Obligations of Sovereignty, The, de- 
 fined, enumerated, 96-105; direct 
 discharge of, indispensable, 109 ; no 
 basis for delegating discharge of, evals 
 of delegating, 51 ; effect on common- 
 wealth of not discharging, 109 ; proper 
 discharge of, the first step in political 
 reform, 477 ; how overridden by party 
 regularity, 254 ; how supplanted by 
 the obligations of partizanship, 355 ; 
 when shirked originally, 376 ; as to 
 the reserved powers, 104, 478 ; as to 
 the delegated powers, 108 ; one of, is 
 to construct a logical administrative 
 system, vi, 108, 109. 
 
 Obstruction of Election, 294. 
 
 Official Action, requisites for proper, 5 ; 
 defined, 299 ; of what consists, 398 ; 
 the sphere of, in constitutions, 409 
 sq. ; how made to seem of most im- 
 portance, 410; represents the sum 
 total of individual official action, 459. 
 
 Official Discretion and responsibility, 374. 
 
 Official Function, necessity for ordaining, 
 107, 374, 470; effect of ordaining on 
 judiciary action, 470 ; usurpation of, 
 5, 122, 376. 
 
 Official Legislation, 438. 
 
 One Question at a time, 80, 194, 211, 473. 
 
 Opinion, term defined, vii, 7, 70 ; part 
 played by, in administration, viii ; a 
 source of expediency, peril of, 7 ; ad- 
 herence to, an immediate source of 
 administrative failure, 7 ; our most 
 prevalent, incorrect, and dominating, 
 9-10 ; why the people have become 
 swayed by, 415. 
 
 Opinion, Public, term defined and 
 considered generally, 70-83 ; how 
 properly formed and expressed, 177, 
 210, 282, 284 ; source of moral force 
 of, 175, 183 ; successive statements of, 
 why required, 87 ; how doubts con- 
 cerning are created, 252, 303 ; how
 
 494 
 
 INDEX 
 
 transmuted into party will, 378; 
 further considered, 329 ; party-made, 
 360 ; how counterfeited, 203 ; how 
 rendered uncertain, 207; failure of, 
 81; the "official mouthpiece" of, 
 27, 363 ; how expressed now, 440. 
 
 Opportunity, equal, free, 59; for rep- 
 resentation, how destroyed, 322. 
 
 Organization, term defined, 57. 
 
 Organization, Political, defined, de- 
 scribed, the process of, considered, 
 149-174; objects, 151 sq., 468; ef- 
 fect of partizan party system of, 461 ; 
 need for always exists, proper kind of, 
 473 sq. 
 
 Ostrogorski, duty, 465; education, 389. 
 
 Paradox, of untruthful action by those 
 who profess the truth, vii ; of bad ad- 
 ministration under good form of gov- 
 ernment, 60; of naturalization, 220. 
 
 Parliamentary Law,^^L> effect of par- 
 tizan party manipulation of, 355. 
 
 Parties, Political, defined, J^ ; a 
 necessity in a republic, 189 ; character- 
 istics, functions, objects, work, etc., 
 described, 189-202, 230 ; how politi- 
 cal leadership assists in formation of, 
 152, 179, 182; objects of, 192, 230; 
 polity of should be same as state 
 polity, 195 ; why none at present, 185. 
 
 Party Government, meaning, 286. 
 
 Party Partizanship considered, ^^34. 
 
 "Party Success," effect of allowing an 
 elector to work for, 144 ; meaning of, 
 219, 342 ; the sine qua non of, 220 ; 
 when obtained at too great a price, 
 359. 
 
 Party, The Partizan, described, name 
 used as an inclusive term, 16 ; under- 
 lying cause for, 20; how became an 
 administrative agency, 233, 281 ; char- 
 acter of as such, 26, 170, 185 ; status 
 of as such, described, how conferred, 
 287 ; aims and objects of, 162, 359 ; 
 effects of allowing, to provide methods 
 of administration, 158 sq. ; associa- 
 tions, not based on political principles, 
 21 ; uses of, 162, 169 ; how kept per- 
 manently organized, 160 ; uniting 
 bond in, 101 ; characteristics of, 170 ; 
 cohesion in, how dissolved, 174 ; boss, 
 the real nominating agency in and of, 
 240 sq. ; functions, power, 245 ; is 
 only an incident, 428; diatribes 
 against, 429 ; candidates, effect of 
 using in administration, 80 ; how 
 selected, 245; character of some, 343, 
 
 348 ; caucus, distinguished, functions, 
 244 sq. ; caucus, work of, how per- 
 formed, 241 ; character of, general, 
 20, 27, 200 sq., 295, 355, 368; col- 
 lusions between two, 234 ; collusive 
 action of, 20, 219 ; committee, char- 
 acter of individuals, composing, 21 ; 
 composition and work of, 160 ; when 
 made permanent division of, 252, 258 ; 
 functions, powers, work, 258, 259, 
 358 ; possible composition of, 280 ; 
 contributions to, 168 ; control, im- 
 propriety of, 469 ; how acquired, 223, 
 279 ; over electorate action, 219, 254 ; 
 over governmental action, 219, 255 ; 
 springs from present system of ad- 
 ministration, 279 ; convention, com- 
 position, character, work, 167 sq. ; 
 courtesies, 232, 277 ; feeling of de- 
 pendence upon, how created, 363 ; 
 discipline, 161 ; divisions of, three, 
 244 ; doctrine of its own action, 281 ; 
 effort of, unceasing, 19 ; object of, 22 ; 
 enrollment in, 234 ; force of, not de- 
 rived from action by the people, 363 ; 
 influence of, sources, 222 ; instability 
 of, causes, 171 ; internal management 
 of, 20 ; evils of, 169 ; intent is wrong, 
 170 ; interests of, not identical with 
 those of the people, 239 ; in The Gov- 
 ernment, how acts, 355 ; in the legis- 
 lature, how acts, 364 ; irresponsibility 
 of, cause, 361 ; illustrated, 355-366 ; 
 leaders described, 185 ; leadership, 
 effects, 185-187, 254 ; conclusions as 
 to,j476: management of, lesson for 
 commonwealth in, 146, 148 ; manage- 
 ments of, 21 ; why peculiarly con- 
 stituted bodies, 159 ; instability of, 
 171 ; majorities, character, 204 ; how 
 got together, 95, 117, 205 sq., 331 sq., 
 345, 440 ; are of voters and not of 
 ideas, 333 ; how manufactured, 335 ; 
 functions of, 205 ; means, character 
 of, 133, 170 ; members of, two classes, 
 20 ; have no individual political free- 
 dom, 169 ; active, are the manage- 
 ments, 20 ; passive, are mere voting 
 puppets, 20, 169 ; function of, 169, 
 245 ; membership, rights of, how de- 
 stroyed, 253 ; a menace to any form 
 of democracy, 368 ; methods of, char- 
 acter, 140, 143 ; results of use of, on 
 private morals, 230, 463 ; on pubHc 
 morals, 24, 253, 358, 367, 463; of 
 influencing electoral action, 364 ; 
 organization of, character, 168, 170, 
 356 ; permanency of, impropriety in,
 
 INDEX 
 
 495 
 
 161, 447; beginning of, 249; how 
 attained, 252 ; how maintained, 170 ; 
 peril to democracy of, 432 ; petty de- 
 ceptions of, 16S, 232, 240, 245, 259, 
 260, 283, 363 ; platforms character- 
 ized, 81, 361 ; politics of, rural and 
 urban, 368; power of, character, 123, 
 166, 377 sq. ; why concentration of, 
 for what used, 358 ; principles, lack of, 
 14, 364 ; primary, described and con- 
 sidered, ^ 244 sq. ; program, what is, 
 331 ; promises of, impropriety of, 199 ; 
 purposes of, real, 358 ; representation 
 in, is upside down, 168 ; revenue, 
 sources, 162, 362, 367 ; rule, described, 
 93, 95; rules, what are, 160, 166; 
 how made, 357 ; apparent sanction 
 of, 222, 233, 279; status of, how ob- 
 tained, 279 ; support of," how forced, 
 252 ; timidity of, effects, 23 ; the tool 
 of the interest, 325 ; turpitude of, 
 282, 338 ; use of, is our parent political 
 inconsistency, 27 ; votes of, how ob- 
 tained, 205, 229, 440; will of, 324: 
 will behind, 325 ; work of, 26 ; re- 
 sults of work, 161. 
 
 Paternal Right, 47. 
 
 Patriarchal Power, 47. 
 
 Patriotism, an unenforcible, easily sup- 
 planted with an enforcible partizan- 
 ship, 253. 
 
 Penalty, just basis of, 376. 
 
 Periods of Administration, why made 
 short, 88. 
 
 Personal Politics, 173. 
 
 Personating, in election, 293 ; in regis- 
 tration, 207. 
 
 Plurality Elections and Rule, 92. 
 
 Policy, The Administrative, proper and 
 improper decision of, 78—80 ; why 
 successive statements of, 87 ; why 
 meaning of should not be left open to 
 question, 100; clear and definite 
 statement of the greatest desideratum, 
 270, 271 ; illogical to make decision 
 of depend on vote for a candidate, 
 116, 203, 241 ; application of, neces- 
 sity for proper, 270 ; how and by what 
 agency determined properly, 397. 
 
 Political Act, A, what is, 4. 
 
 Political Action of The People, The, 
 considered broadly, 1-4, 395 sq. ; the 
 kind desired and ordained, Pref. ix, 
 18; past, reviewed, 2-14, 459 sq. ; 
 why illogical, 7 ; nothing mysterious 
 in, 13, 25 ; continuous, what is, 69 ; 
 underlying impelling force of, 137; 
 regular ucquenco in, of steps, stages. 
 
 and processes, Pref. ix, 403 ; a step in, 
 a stage in, defined, 131 ; each requires 
 use of distinctive instrumentalities, 
 131 ; a rule of right action indispen- 
 sable, 141 ; how transmuted into par- 
 tizan party action, 17 ; why trans- 
 mutation of, is fraudulent, 229 ; intent, 
 of, 136 ; customary conception of, 
 396; inefficiencj'^ of, to what largely 
 due, 23, 133, 140; improper organiza- 
 tion of, effects, 355 ; objects ofj_30i_ 
 ^20Sk; main and secondary objects of, 
 132 ; and of The Electorate contrasted, 
 62 ; problems of, how solved, 69, 163 ; 
 moral, what is, 31 ; inorality of, how 
 determined, 100 ; peril in opposing 
 sets of practises, 237 ; retrospective 
 survey of, 459^64 ; final conclusions 
 concerning, Pref. ix, 482. 
 
 Political .iEgis, The, defined, described, 
 146-148 ; what is, 8 ; power to alter 
 is unlimited, 413; the non-political 
 jEgis, 147. 
 
 Political Agency, A, functions, 130; 
 work of, is the result of the work of 
 its units, 131. 
 
 Political Appointment, characteristics, 
 285. 
 
 Political Power, analyzed, described, 5&- 
 69 ; component parts of, 66 ; exer- 
 cise of assumed as a trust, 51 ; is one 
 source of individual happiness, 36; 
 why bestowed on the individual, 1, 
 99, 177 ; on what effective exercise 
 of depends, 144 ; love of exercise of 
 the root of political evil, 47 ; our dis- 
 tinctive exercise, 139 ; by whom 
 sought after, 57, 370 ; and acquired, 
 58, 370; used for two main objects. 
 1, 63, 403; ethical and practical 
 aspects^oT, 63 ; delegated exercise of, 
 danger, 51 ; effects of, 64. 
 
 Political Principles, defined, enumerated, 
 35-39 ; the touchstone of methods, 
 137 ; effect of a broad expression of, 
 99, 137; requisites for effectiveness, 
 99, 137 ; intent and force of, how dis- 
 sipated, 18, 203 ; require a rule of ap- 
 plication, 139. 
 
 Political Questions, nature, decision of, 
 
 116 ; how relegated to the background, 
 
 117 ; contrasted with party platforms, 
 81 ; our defective system as to, 79. 
 
 Politics of rV)lonial days, 238, 346 ; rural 
 
 and urban compared, "3f)S. 
 Polity, State, principles, functions, 
 
 clarity of, 90, 100. 
 Pomeroy, John N., quoted, 01.
 
 496 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Posterity, our duty to, 148, 466. 
 
 Practise, defined, a corrupt political, 
 defined, 435. 
 
 Pre-election methods, requisite character 
 of, 156 sq. 
 
 Prerogative, Political, meaning, exer- 
 cise of, 3, 112; direct exercise of re- 
 quired, vi ; to what misuse of attribut- 
 able, vu; e\Tl effects of delegating 
 exercise of, 9 ; how opportunity for 
 misuse of, left open originally, 15. 
 
 Principles, Basic, should be strictly 
 defined, 28 ; are moral concepts, 414 ; 
 if unsupported by methods have only 
 general effectiveness, 99, 139, 468. 
 
 Privilege, 82 ; The Boss an instrument of, 
 17. 
 
 Process, A Political, defined, 236 ; re- 
 siilts of mixing ideas of several to- 
 gether, 82 ; how processes are made 
 involved and obscure, 241 ; simple 
 action the desideratum in, 242. 
 
 Professional Politics, defined, 169. 
 
 Professions, Our, how made to appear 
 hypocritical pretensions, 26, 201, 224, 
 354, 360-.363, 419. 
 
 Progress, Primitive, 41 ; and societj', 
 42 ; has made the U.S. a world power, 
 23 ; hinges on object, 154. 
 
 Progress, Political, of what consists, 
 the most important kind of, 283 ; 
 effects of obstruction, 283 ; how ob- 
 tained properly, 319, 320; on what 
 depends, 270, 472 ; our foolish at- 
 tempt at, 23 ; should keep pace with 
 economic progress, 283, 441 ; how re- 
 tarded by multiplicity of "issues," 
 473 ; the partizan party an obstacle to, 
 23. 
 
 Proper, and Properly, meaning of, 69, 
 351, 370, 429. 
 
 Proportional Representation, 315 ; con- 
 trasted with proportionate representa- 
 tion, 335 ; real essence of, 440 ; why a 
 faUure as a reform, 440-444 ; what it 
 really is, 335-338. 
 
 Proportionate Representation, defined, 
 314; concept of, 315 sq. ; how pre- 
 vented, 318 sq. 
 
 Protective Law, where contained, 147. 
 
 Public Approval, what necessary for 
 sanction of, 291. 
 
 Public Office, defined, 284 ; how original 
 character of, destroyed, 377 ; functions 
 of, insufficiently stated, 5 ; functions 
 and duties of, must be ordained, 107; 
 how party function engrafted on, 185, 
 355. 
 
 Public Officer, defined, 379; Meechem 
 quoted, 107. 
 
 Public Ofiicials, why the sovereign must 
 control action of, 106, 271 ; theoreti- 
 cal character of, 284 ; why chosen, 
 and for what, 105, 129. 
 
 Public Service, defined, 285 ; how trans- 
 muted into partizan party service, 
 287 ; degradation of, cause, 366. 
 
 Public Spirit, defined, 57, 72, 403 ; what 
 happens when degenerates into par- 
 tizan party spirit, 83. 
 
 Publicity, not a feature in process of 
 nomination, 237 ; why not a feature 
 in colonial politics, 239. 
 
 Punishment, just basis of, 375, 376. 
 
 Purity of Election Laws, limited effect 
 of, reason, 295. 
 
 Questions of Candidacy, how improperly 
 treated, 80, 90, 116; why properly 
 subordinate to questions of policy, 
 210, 212. 
 
 Questions to be answered regarding: 
 Alteration of ordained conditions of 
 existence, 6 ; our Administrative 
 Action, 26 ; The Partizan Party and 
 its system, 26 ; Partizan Party 
 methods, 162 ; the perpetrators of 
 the political frauds, 296 ; Political 
 Education, 389, 392 ; the surrender 
 of sovereignty by the electorate, 118; 
 our reform attempts, 421 ; ourselves, 
 26, 82. 
 
 Reason, function of, 85 ; why exercise 
 of must not be delegated, 115; free 
 exercise of is not a proper subject of 
 statutory law, 445. 
 
 Recall, The, a means of control, 440. 
 
 Redistricting Acts, 330. 
 
 Referendum, The, 440. 
 
 Reform Action, True, object, 432 ; 
 classes of past efforts, 430. 
 
 Reform Association, classes of, 433. 
 
 Reform, Legislative, when improper, 
 444, 478. 
 
 Reform Movements, why past were weak 
 intrinsically, 422 ; slim chance of, 426. 
 
 Reform, piecemeal, 457. 
 
 Reform, Political, considered in detail, 
 419-449 ; why attempt for through 
 officii 1 legislation is impracticable, 
 478 ; through direct legislation neces- 
 sary, 479 ; drastic, 479 ; agencies and 
 methods of true, 480 ; the kind pro- 
 posed, 480; true, requires an electoral 
 movement, 430.
 
 INDEX 
 
 497 
 
 Reform, Sporadic, 421 ; central idea of, 
 441. 
 
 Reform Within The Party, 430. 
 
 Reformers, general capacity of, 420 ; 
 usual mistakes of, 449. 
 
 Registration, The Process of, objects, 
 purposes, performance of, 225-234. 
 
 Registration Boards, character of mem- 
 bers on, 22G sq. ; bi-partizan, 231 sq. 
 Registration Frauds, 228-232. 
 
 Regularity, Party, synonymous with 
 political impropriety, 252-254, 262 ; 
 the ignominy involved in, 424 ; party 
 conception of, 386 ; beginnings of, 
 249 ; why traitorous in nature, 253 ; 
 effect of, on responsibility, 358. 
 
 Regularity, Political, defined, 252. 
 
 Religion, Principles of, 40. 
 
 Repeaters and Repeating, 206 ; in regis- 
 tration, 228 ; in elections, 293. 
 
 Representation, a political means, 37 ; 
 a political right, 305 ; kinds of, 305 
 6q. ; district, 329; apportionment of, 
 316; minority, 316, 319; improper 
 methods of, 308. 
 
 Representation, Political, analyzed, con- 
 sidered in detail, 297-326; by Party, 
 by partizan party, 312-313 ; equality in, 
 329 ; defined, 304 ; .Vmerican kind, 305. 
 
 Representation, The District System 
 of, some salient features of, 327-349 ; 
 effects of, further considered, 322 sq. 
 
 Representative, A, defined, function, 
 how discharge of function can be had, 
 297-300; requisites of, 312. 
 
 Representative Action, objects, reasons 
 for, why sanction bestowed on, 298- 
 301 ; requisites for proper, 301 ; basis, 
 308. 
 
 Representative Administration, a fea- 
 ture of a republic, plan of, 297, 298. 
 
 Representative Districts, how formed, 
 267, 317, 327 ; fractions of, 327. 
 
 Representative Quotas, how created, 
 317; fractions, 317, 327. 
 
 Representatives, how selected properly, 
 314, 329. 
 
 Republic, A, defined, 297; Hamilton's 
 definition, 417. 
 
 Republic, defined, 297. 
 
 Reserved Powers of the People, classi- 
 fied, enumerated, 08 ; logical exercise 
 of, is of supreme importance, 409 ; 
 logical exercise of, defined, 79, 415; 
 effects of delegating exercise of, 475. 
 
 Resident Membership clause, 329. 
 
 Resource Legislation, term defined, 438; 
 valuable significance in, 439. 
 
 Responsibility, defined as a state or 
 condition, 37 ; direct, individual, de- 
 scribed, 37 ; legal, necessary, 352 ; 
 moral, insufficiency of, 352 ; the 
 divided, of individuals composing 
 bodies, committees, etc., 359, 365. 
 
 Responsibility, Political, defined, ana- 
 lyzed, and considered in detail, 37, 
 350-370 ; in oflicial administrative 
 action, 374 ; how transmuted into 
 partizan party responsibility, 357 ; 
 of legislators, how district system tends 
 to weaken, 348. 
 
 Results are always logical, meaning, 13 ; 
 right political, defined, 119 ; by whom 
 produced, 143. 
 
 Restraint, 30, 31 ; how and why imposed 
 on sovereign, 371 ; why on exercise of 
 power, 58. 
 
 Revolution, defined, basis, nature, 60 ; 
 against what always directed, 60; 
 peaceful, 61 ; the right of, 61. 
 
 Reward, political, 373. 
 
 Right, Principles of, 40. 
 
 Right, The, to enjoy governmental 
 benefits, 45, 54 ; to hold office, 54 ; 
 to legislate, 438. 
 
 Right Action, a rule of, indispensable, 
 141 ; from what proceeds, 151 ; what 
 is, 197 ; of the individual, requisites, 
 98, 99; necessary stimulus to, 213. 
 
 Right Political Conduct, 54. 
 
 Righteous Admimstration, 393 ; on what 
 depends, 58 ; how obtained, 106. 
 
 Righteous Rule, 379. 
 
 Rights, contrasted with duties, 40; 
 how protected, 89 ; acquired, enumer- 
 ated, 43; natural, enumerated, not 
 modified by progress, 43 ; inherent, 
 inalienable, indefeasible, 44 ; re- 
 garded as a claim, 43 ; bill of, 45 ; 
 ci\'il, 45 ; not the same in the various 
 states, 394; equality in, 46; equal, 
 doctrine of, 48 ; indiviilual, 43 ; two 
 classes of, 45 ; how progress modifies 
 idea of some, 45 ; moral, two classes of, 
 45 ; value of, how determined, depend- 
 ence of value upon union, 44 ; how 
 rights in general can only be secured, 
 maintained, and transmitted, 404 ; 
 how left "open to invasion," 411. 
 
 Rights, Political, defined, enumerated, 
 considered generally, 40-55 ; on what 
 depend, 112, 411. 
 
 Safe Democracy, what is, v. 
 
 Sagacity, defiiieii, 5(». 
 
 Sanction, defined, 301 ; of public ap-
 
 498 
 
 INDEX 
 
 proval, requisites, 291 ; when a mem- 
 ingless term, 261 ; sanction before- 
 hand, why bestowed, 299-303; ef- 
 fects of bestowal, 301 ; of representa- 
 tive action, objects, requisites, dangers, 
 299-303 ; bestowal of, beforehand on 
 unregulated action a blunder, 302 sq., 
 448 ; how bi-partizan process boards 
 take advantage of bestowal before- 
 hand, 233 ; "legal," of partizan party, 
 279 ; legislative, differs from public 
 sanction, 291. 
 
 Scienc3, A, what is, 13. 
 
 Science, Political, our lack of a dis- 
 tinctive, effects, 10-14 ; is the basis of 
 an authoritative political literature, 
 14 ; an exact, is possible, 13 ; why 
 our, is kept inexact, 22. 
 
 Sections, meaning, origin, cause, rep- 
 resentation by, 311. 
 
 Self-Government, what it implies, 96. 
 
 "Separation of Powers," 122. 
 
 Single List, The, origin, effects, 255. 
 
 Situation, The Present Political, 5 ; 
 one of gradual growth, 6 ; to what 
 mainly due, 7 ; not much improved 
 since the beginning, 95 ; possible 
 causes, 449, 458, 464 ; how can be 
 rectified, 27, 464 ; introductory survey 
 of, 1-27 ; retrospective survey of, 
 459-464. 
 
 Smith, Goldwin, on friction, etc., 124. 
 
 "Social Organisms," 308. 
 
 Society, general aspects, functions, fac- 
 tors in strength of, effects produced by, 
 41, 42; how unified, 121; primitive, 
 41 ; first claims made on, 44 ; ulti- 
 mate success of, 178. 
 
 Solid Delegations, 337. 
 
 Sovereign, meaning of term, 96. 
 
 Sovereign, The, who is, in American 
 states, 96 ; right of, to command serv- 
 ices of citizen, 64, 106. 
 
 Sovereign, The Collective, composi- 
 tion, obligations, requisites, 97-99 ; 
 the only superior of the individual, 
 101 ; right action of, how obtained, 
 98, 151 ; how obligations of, discharged 
 properly, 115; is weak in civic virtue 
 and transmits this weakness, 393 ; 
 instability of, problem, 381, 389; 
 original ability of, on what depends, 
 106, 124, 371, 402; why must in- 
 struct its units in right action, 101 ; 
 source of administrative difficulties, 
 370, 393 ; strength of, how diminished, 
 by whom absorbed, 448 ; must con- 
 trol action of units, 106, 308, 469; 
 
 broad obligation of, 350; how moral 
 sensitiveness deadened, 322. 
 
 Sovereign-units, act in several capaci- 
 ties at once, how bound when acting, 
 96; how uniting bond of weakened, 
 322 ; how weakened in power, 371, 
 463; must not delegate exercise of 
 reason and conscience, 117; how 
 rendered impotent, 256 ; who properly 
 instructs, 100 ; danger in allowing to 
 serve "The Party," 198. 
 
 Sovereignty, abdication of, by electo- 
 rate, 187 ; surrender of, by electorate, 
 118. 
 
 Sovereignty, Political, defined, 65 ; ori- 
 gin, limits, 97; a direct exercise of, 
 imperative, 109; delegating exercise 
 of some powers does not affect, dis- 
 tinguishing features of, 65 ; obliga- 
 tions of, 96 sq. 
 
 Speaker's Office, The, character of, 123 ; 
 how changed, 123, 378. 
 
 Spirit and Intent of The People, how 
 first manifested, 38 ; how first ex- 
 pressed, 414 ; requisites for effective 
 operation, 101 ; as to administrative 
 action, 139 ; as to election process, 
 290 ; as to representation, 298 ; as 
 to public officials, 378 ; as to the edu- 
 cational system, 385. 
 
 Spoils System, The, a result of "Party 
 Leadership," 286; how obtained a 
 species of sanction, 443. 
 
 State, defined, source of power of, 96; 
 how crippled by use of partizan party 
 and its system, 23, 234 ; how moral 
 strength weakened by two codes of 
 action, 23 ; territorial divisions in, 
 266 ; how capacity becomes weakened, 
 322. 
 
 State Control of Primary, futile pro- 
 visions for, 4445;^ 
 
 Statecraft, American, 390. 
 
 State Governments, variations, 267 sq. 
 
 Statesmen, definition, description, 176; 
 the natural breeding places of, 481. 
 
 Statutes, defined, requisites, 398. 
 
 Statutory Regulation of system action, 
 why is weak, 94. 
 
 Stuffed Ballot, characterized, 206, 293. 
 
 Stuffed Electorate, The, 217, 388. 
 
 Success, Administrative, requisites, 8 
 sq. ; where the hop)e of, lies, 314 ; edu- 
 cation a factor in, 389 ; hangs on direct 
 individual action, 69, 105-107. 
 
 Suffrage, The Right of, analyzed. 111. 
 
 Supreme Power, The, origin, seat, 
 delegated exercise of, 64, 105 ; when
 
 INDEX 
 
 499 
 
 springs into existence, 96 ; three-fold 
 nature of, 120 ; chief difficulty in ex- 
 ercise of, 370. 
 
 System, term defined, 134, 166 ; prac- 
 ticability of any, depends upon its 
 perfection, 125 ; nothing automatic 
 in a, 384. 
 
 System of Administration, The Par- 
 tizan Party, effects produced by adop- 
 tion of, 23, 94, 128, 144, 237, 340, 419 ; 
 character of, 17, 23, 55, 168 ; some 
 evils of, 161, 169 ; is not complex, just 
 bad, 419 ; reformation of, insures its 
 continued use, 420 ; central idea of, 
 425 ; reform of, directs attention away 
 from true reform, 421 ; can not be 
 reformed by tinkering at parts, 
 419 ; chief source of support of use, 
 420 ; is illogically elastic, 420 ; is a 
 compilation of corrupt practises, 
 303, 435 ; is the non-political aegis, 
 147. 
 
 System of Political Administration, 
 The, character, component parts of, 
 functions, requisites, outline of, ef- 
 fects, sketched, 394-^18; is properly 
 a part of a state constitution, 413 ; 
 the lack of a logical, causes, 15 ; nec- 
 essary as a just basis for enforcement 
 of responsibility, 5, 353, 376 ; an in- 
 definite, source of administrative 
 evils, 7 ; kind the states started with, 
 55, 83, 155, 283, 399 ; character of, 
 which each state is supposed to pos- 
 sess, 34 ; success or failure of Democ- 
 racy depends upon the constructing 
 of a logical, 34 ; construction of a 
 logical, a sovereign obligation, 103 ; 
 which rests on us, 109 ; advantages of, 
 94 ; the supreme reason for, 399 ; 
 requisites of a logical, 141 ; must be 
 ordained, 145 ; sole function of, 156 ; 
 when necessity for a logical arises, 95 ; 
 necessary as source of moral force, 
 157 ; benefits flowing from a logical, 
 417 ; kind originally intended, 59 ; 
 inauguration of an illogical, the be- 
 ginning of an era of reform, 419 ; 
 danger in use of an illogical, 101, 271 ; 
 a logical, indispensable, 354 sq. ; rea- 
 sons for stability of, 413 ; is the body 
 of protective law, 147 ; is the specific 
 guarantee, 145 ; is the body of elec- 
 toral and official liberties, 477 ; danger 
 of a super-elastic, 476 ; our present, 
 arraigned, 118; an inadequate, some 
 effects of use of, 34, 101, 109, 111, 283 
 
 BQ. 
 
 Temple vs. Meade, 272. 
 
 The People, meaning of term, 62, 96. 
 
 Township System, 267, 269. 
 
 Trade, The, in votes, 233 ; how worked 
 
 Trust Action, how regiilated, 108. 
 
 Truth, what most men mean by, vii ; 
 abstract, political, synonymous with 
 logic, 34 ; the truth about, 33. 
 
 Truths, our administrative, 429. 
 
 Turpitude of the partizan party, 33g^ 
 
 Tyranny in a repubUc, 213, 353. 
 
 Undemocratic action is impracticable 
 
 action, 429. 
 Unhappiness, effects of, 143. 
 Union, principle of, 38 ; bond of, defined, 
 
 39, 159 ; character of, 150. 
 Unit of Representation, 266. 
 Unity, defined, distinguished, 39. 
 Unsafe Democracy, described, v. 
 Usurpation of official functions, 122, 376 ; 
 
 prevention of, 5. 
 
 Vice, defined, 213. 
 
 Victories of the Ballot-box, 164; why 
 
 of little consequence to the common- 
 wealth, 422. 
 Vigilance, meaning, defined, 9. 
 Virtue, defined, 57. 
 Voice of the people, The, 112. 
 Vote, A, defined, a political, 57, 205; 
 
 characteristics of, 206; why criminal 
 
 to buy or sell. 111. 
 Vote, The, frauds on, 297. 
 Vote, The Right to, how impaired, 345. 
 Voter, A, defined, 208 ; freedom of, 272. 
 Voters League of Chicago, 433. 
 Voters' qualifications, 110; induced to 
 
 "go fishing," 276. 
 Votes, how destroyed in character, 205 
 
 sq. ; "delivered " votes descriljed, 424 ; 
 
 manipulation of an atrocious crime, 118. 
 Voting Electorate, meaning, 225. 
 
 Ware, Prof., on the Kcrrymander, 334. 
 
 Wealth, the predominating human do- 
 sire is for, 57 ; an clement in strength 
 of the community, 42. 
 
 Welfare, Party, results, 75, 82. 
 
 Welfare, primitive meaning, 41 ; in- 
 dividual, 309, 389; how l)OHt safe- 
 guarded, 143; on what doponds, 393, 
 407. 
 
 Welfare, The Cicnoral, meaning of 
 term, 87. 97; how produced. 39. 111. 
 393 ; how clortonite works to pro- 
 duce, 151 ; Low uubordiuutud tu yur-
 
 500 
 
 INDEX 
 
 tizan party needs, 283 ; how sub- 
 verted, 118^ 
 
 Will, Individual, formation, factors, 
 76 ; as to policy, elements in, 77 ; 
 legislative in nature, 76, 78 ; political, 
 how created, 86. 
 
 Will of The People, The, aspects, for- 
 mation, functions, considered, 70-83 ; 
 what it really is, 1 14 ; supplies im- 
 pulse to the government, 58 ; theoreti- 
 cal expression of, how turned into a 
 manufactured will, 111, 282, 324, 329, 
 404 ; proper ejcpression depends on 
 methods, 116, 402; requisites for 
 making operative, 404 sq. ; final ex- 
 pression of, at elections, 77 ; successive 
 statements of, 87 ; how ascertained 
 properly, 39, 87 ; how transmuted 
 into will of a partizan party, 81, 117, 
 320; to be moral must proceed from 
 free play of reason and conscience, 
 
 115, 360; difficulties connected with 
 ascertaining, proper way of, 360 ; 
 how counterfeited, 203 ; difficulties 
 in obtaining a body of men repre- 
 sentative of, 323. 
 
 Wills, Agreement of, 39, 61, 75, 102 sq., 
 361 ; Union of, basis of public opinion, 
 360. 
 
 Wings of party organizations, 173. 
 
 Wisdom, defined, 57. 
 
 Wrong, difficulty in escaping from doing, 
 163. 
 
 Young, The, mental attitude of, towards 
 reform, character of effort in, 420. 
 
 Youth of the Land, proper political edu- 
 cation of, 381 sq. ; improper educa- 
 tion of, 385 sq. ; how proper edu- 
 cation should be supplemented, 
 387 ; are The Sovereign of to-morrow, 
 391.
 
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